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PAÑCAPRAKRIYA OF SARVAJNATMAN: A STUDY,

WITH

TRANSLATION, NOTES, AND A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION

by

IVAN KOCMAREK, B.A., M.A.

A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

McMaster University

(November) 1980

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (1980) McMASTER UNIVERSITY (Religious Studies) Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: Pafcaprakriya of Sarvaifatman: A Study with trans- lation, Notes, and a Fhilosophical Introduction

AUTHOR : Ivan Kocmarek, B.A (McMaster University)

M.A (McMaster University)

SUPERVISORS : Dr. J. G. Arapura, Dr. K. Sivaraman, Dr. Phyllis Granoff

NUMBER OF PAGES: ix, 245

ABSTRACT

This thesis is comprised of a translation, for

the first time, of the Sanskrit philosophical work entit-

led Pancaprakriya which belongs to the relatively early

Advaita Vedanta thinker Sarvajmatman (first half of the

tenth century) and a thematic analysis of the contents of

that work. The Pafcaprakriya is a manual of Advaita Ve-

danta philosophy of language which, for Sarvajnatman, can

eventually be reduced to the discernment of the proper

meaning of certain rreat Upanisadic statements or maha-

vakya-s such as "I am Brahman".and ""hat thou art."

It has been demonstrated in the analytic portion

of the thesis that the Sarvajnatman who is the author of

SamksepasarIraka and the Sarvajnatman who is the author

of Pancaprakriya are one and the same. In addition to

this, the thesis has brought to the fore the close philo-

sophical indebtedness of Sarvajñatman to Sankara and Su-

resvara before him, in terms of the Advaita Vedanta philo-

sophy of language and the problem of the locus of ignor-

ance (ajnanasraya), though the traditional connection be-

tween Sarvajnatman and Sureśvara, as direct pupil and tea-

cher respectively, has been denied.

iii

. iv

From our analysis, Sarvajhatman appears tobe the

first of the relatively early Advaita Vedanta thinkers to

make use of two of perhaps the most central notions in the

Advaita Vedanta philosophy of language. The first of these

is the classification of Upanisadic statements about Brah-

man into 'great statements' (mahavakya-s) and into sub-

sidiary statements' (avantaravakya-s) allowing the latter

to contribute to the understanding of the former. The se-

cond is the formulation of the three-fold division of the

secondary usage of language into non-inclusive secondary

usage (jahallaksana), inclusive secondary usage (ajahal-

laksana), and both inclusive and non-inclusive secondary

usage (jahadajahallaksana), along with the determination

that it is only the last of these which is suitable for

obtaining the proper import of a mahavakya.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I must thank all the people of my supervisory

committee who have seen me through this, namely, Dr. J.

G. Arapura, Dr. K. Sivaraman, Dr. Phyllis Granoff and

Dr. W. K. Whillier. I am ecpecially compelled to thank

Dr. Granoff for her remarkable patience and stamina in

correcting my translation, and in working with me regu-

larly even through a period of unfortunate ill-health.

My philosophical indebtedness to Dr. Arapura is immense.

I must also thank K. Venugopalan of Deccan College, Poona

under whose warm and kind guidance I first had the pleas-

ure of reading the text.

The good things in this thesis belong to my teach-

ers. The faults are all mine.

V

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS vi

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

15 I. The Nature and Content of the Text

II. Authorship

III. The Date of Sarvajnatman 14

IV. Hermeneutics and Metaphysics in

Advaita Vedanta 22 .

V. Hermeneutics in Śankara, Suresvara

and Sarvajñātman 28

VI, Metaphysics and the Problem of the

Locus of Ignorance in Sankara, Su-

resvara and Sarvajñātman 65

PART TWO: TRANSLATION, NOTES AND REFERENCE MATTER

I. An Examination of the Uses of Words 82

II. Explanation of the Great Sentences 00

III. Explanation of the Meaning of the

Words "Tat" and "Tvam"

IV. Explanation of the Subsidiary Sentences 104

V. The Examination of Bondage and Release 111

Notes to the Translation 125

APPENDIX 209

BIBLIOGRAPHY 233

vi

ABBREVIATIONS*

AIU Aitareyopanisad in Isadi-Daśopanisadah Sankara- bhasyayutah

AT AnvayarthaprakasikatIka of RamatIrtha in SS

BHG BhagavadgIta in BHGBH

BHGBH Sankarabhasya on BHG in SrImadbhagavadgīta (An- andagirikrtatIkāsamvalitasānkarabhasyasametā)

BS Brahmasutras of Badārayana in BSBH

BSBH Sānkarabhasya on BS/ in Brahmasūtrasānkarabhāsya

BU Brhadaranyakopanisad in Isādi-Dasoparisadah San- karbhāsyayutah

BUBH Śankarabhasya on BU in Isadi-Dasonanisadah ..

BUBHV Värttika of Suresvara on BUBH in Brhadāraryako- panisadbhasyavartikam kašixakhyatīkāsamvalitam). (Anandaririkrtasāstrapra- Edited by S. Agase Anandāsrama Sanskrit Series Poona : andasrama Press, 1892-1804.

CHU Chandogyopanisad in Isadi-Dasopanisadah ...

CHUBH Sankarabhasya on CHU in sadi-Dasopanisadah.

KẸC Kenopanisad in Isadi-Dasopanisadah ....

REUBH Sankarabhasya on KEU in Isadi-Dasopanisadah ....

KU Kathopanisad in Isadi-Dasopanisadah.

• See Bibliography below pp. 225-237 for further information on the titles mentioned in this list.

vii

KUBH Sankarabhasya on KU in Tsadi-Dasopanisadah

MAU Mandukyopanisad in Isadi-Dasopanisadah ....

MAUBH Sankarabhasya on MAU

MS MImamsasutras of Jaimini in SrImajjaiminipra- nītam Mimāmsādaršanam

MU Mundakopanisad in Isadi-Dasopanisadah ...

NUBH Sankarabhasya on MU in Tsadi-Dasopanisadah. ,

NAIS Naiskarmyasiddhi of Suresvara in Naishkarmya- Siddhi of Sri Suresvarācarya

NS Nyāyasutras of Gautama in Nvavadarsanam

P Astadhyavi of Panini in The Astādhyāyi of Panini

PP Pancaprakriya of Sarvajhatman in Pancaprakriya of Sarvajhatman with the Commentaries of Ananda- jana and Purnavidyamuni

PR Pramānalaksana of Sarvajnātman in Pramānalaksa- nam of Sarva hatmamuni

S$ SamksepasārTraka of Sarvajfatman in Samksera- 3arfrakam (Agnicitpurusottamamisrakrtasubodh)- nitIkaya.

ST SubodhinItIka of Agnicitpurusottamamiśra on SŠ in SS

ŚV Slokavārttika of Kumārila Bhatta in Slokavārttika of SrI Kumarila Bhatta ..

SV Sambandhavarttika of Suresvarin Brhadaranyako- panisadbhasyavārtikam (Anandagirikrtasāstrapra- kašikākhyatīkasamvalitam)

TD TarkasamgrahadIpika of Annambhatta in Ts

TS Tarkasamgraha of Annambhatta in Tarka-Samgraha of Annambhatta

TU TaittirTyopanisad in Isadi-Dasopanisadah.

viii

TUBH Sankarabhasya on TU in Isadi-Dasopanisadah ....

TUBHV TaittirIyopanisadbhasyavarttika of Suresvara in TaittirIyopanisadbhāsyavartikam (Anandagiri- krtatīkāsamvalitam)

US Upadeśasāhasrī of Sankara įn Śańkara's Upadeśa- sahasrī

Vedānta- sara (vs) Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda in Vedānta-Sāra

VEDP Vedantaparibhāsa of Dharmaraja in Vedāntapari- bhasa

ix

INTRODUCTION

I. The Nature and Content of the Text

The Pancaprakriya is a small manual (prakarana)

which endeavours to impart knowledge concerning the funda-

mental tenets of Advaita Vedanta philosophy. In accor-

dance with the four traditional preliminary considerations

(anubandha-s) to the composition of a work, we find" that

its thematic concern (visaya) is the unknown atman (ajna-

tatman; its aim (prayojana) is to produce final release

(nihsreyasa); the relation between the text and its object

(sambandha) is that between the means of knowledge and ob-

ject of knowledge (visayavisayibhava); the qualified per-

son for whom the work is written (adhikarin) is one who de-

sires final release (nihsreyasakama). In keeping with the

fact that it is a prakarana or simple manual, the text is

written in, what is for the most part, simple and uncum-

bersome Sanskrit prose.

-According to Anandagiri's Commentary, since Sar- vajnatman himself does not provide them in any explicit manner (also see note 3 to the translation).

1

2

As its title suggests, the work is composed of five

chapters or sections. The first of these examines the ac-

cepted usages or powers of words (sabdavrtti-s) such as the

primary usage (mukhyavrtti), that based on similarity of qualities (gunavrtti), and secondary usage (laksanavrtti),

and concludes that of these only the last two" should be

applied to the great Upanisadic st&tements (mahavakya-s)

in order to reveal their true purport. The second chapter

provides an example of partially non-inclusive and partially

inclusive secondary uasage (jahadajahallaksana) in its ap-

plication to the mahavakya: "I am Brahman " ("Aham brahmas-

, mi. " BU I. iv. 10) ,9 as well as a somewhat detailed descrip-

tion of the person who is qualified to receive the knowledge

conveyed by these statements and which terminates in final

realization (anubhava). Sarvadñatman also here includes a

defense of the doctrine of liberation while living (jIvan-

mukti). The third chapter, in the overall context of ex-

plaining the meanings of the words "That" ("tat") and "Thou"

("tvam") taken from the mahavakya: "That Thou art " ("Tat-

tvamasi, " -- CHU VI. viii. 7), supplies a brief account of

2Sarvajnatman's ultimate position seems to.be that jahadajahallaksana alone can reveal Brahman, but he concedes that given certain suppositions one may, as Suresvara does, state that gunavrtti and jahallaksana can also apply to Brahman (see Below p, 44).

,3

the progressive unfolding of the universe from Brahman as

associated with ignorance (avidyasabalabrahhman) and the

reciprocal or inversely related merging (laya) of this cosmos

back into the pure Brahman (suddhabrahman) by the aspirant

for release (sadhaka). The fourth chapter examines the na-

ture of subsidiary statements (avantaravakya-s) in the Upa-

nisads, such as the statement "Brahman is truth, knowledge,

the infinite." ("Satyam jñanamanantam brahma." -- TU II. i. 1),

which contribute to the determination of the meanings of the

words "tat" and "tvam" in the mahavakya: "Tattvamasi " -- CHU

VI. viii. 7). The fifth and final chapter, which in itself

comprises one third of the work, is the most philosophically

intricate of the five chapters. In this chapter Sarvajñatman

puts forward one of his central theses, namely, that ignor-

ance (ajnana) and knowledge (jmana) both have Brahman in its

inward form (pratyagrupa) as their locus (asraya)3 so that

3"And Brahman in its inward form alone is the locus. of knowledge and ignorance." (see translation below p. 112 and p. 228of the Appendix: . "Brahmanasca pratyagrupenaiva jnana jnanasray at vamucyate. ") . Though Sarvajnatman also ac- cepts the necessity of the fact that Brahman alone is also the object (visaya) of ignorance (see Samksepasariraka I. 20; II. 27, 189, etc.), this does not appear to have much to do with the central theme of this chapter, namely, that it is Brah- man alone which is bound (i.e., serves as the locus of ignor- ance) and freed (i.e., is subsequently the locus of that knowledge which destroys ignorance), and so Sarvajnatman men- tions it only in passing: "Nor should the thought that, 'Ig- norance must have a distinction between its content and locus.'

it is Brahman alone which undergoes bondage (bandha) and

which experiences release (moksa).

be urged, because that [distinction] is indeed absent in the state of deep sleep (trans. p. 114).

II. Authorship

The author called Sarvajnatman has two other extant

works besides the Pañcaprakriya" attributed to him. The

smaller and less important of them is the Pramanalaksana

which examines and defends the various means of valid know-

ledge (pramana-s) that are accepted by the Bhatta MImamsakas.

The remaining work called the SamksepasarIraka° is Sarvajnāt-

4Henceforth abbreviated as PP with PP trans. refer- : ring to my own translation of it which comprises the second part of this thesis.

There are two editions of this work available. The older of the two: "Pramanalaksanam", ed. T. R. V. Dikshitar and T. R. Chintamani, Journal of Oriental Research, 10 (1936), 1-8 continued in vol. 15 (1945-46), 9-16 of the same journal, contains only the sections dealing with perception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumana), while the most recent edition: The Pramanalaksanam of Sarvajnatmamuni, ed. E. Easwaran Nampoo- thiry, Kerala University Sanskrit Department Publication, No. 8 (Trivandrum: Department of Sanskrit University of Kerala, 1973), has brought to light sections on all of the Bhatta pramana-s except for presumption (arthapatti).

T. Vetter on p. 159 of his Sarvajnatman's Samksepa- sarIrakam, I Kapitel; Einführung, Ubersetzung, und Anmerkung- en (Wien: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1972), lists four separate editions of the work. of these I have used the earliest: SamksepasarIrakam (Agnicitpurusottamamis- rakrtasubodhinItIkaya ramatIrthaviracitānvayarthaprakāsikayā tikaya ca sametam), Anandāsramasamskrtagranthavalih 83 (Poona: Anandasrama, 1918); it is with reference to this edition that the abbreviation SS is henceforward employed. In addition to

5

man's magnum opus, which is described by Sarvajnatman him-

self as a work that abounds in the skill of making clear

the purport of Sankara's Brahmasutrabhasya (srImaccharIra-

kārthaprakatanapatutāsāli) and does so concisely (samksepa- tas). It is, as associated with this last treatise that the

name Sarvajnatman finds prominence in the history of Indian

philosophy.

What evidence do we encounter in PP that could be

said to further an identification of its author with that

of SŚ ?

Stylistically, there can be little comparison be-

tween the two works, since PP, as a basic manual of Advaita

Vedanta, has a far more. limited doctrinal horizon than ss.

PP does what it is intended to do fundamentally and briefly,

avoiding elaboration and entirely, with the natural excep-

tion of benedictory verses, colophons, and quotations, em-

ploying prose as its medium.

ss, on the other hand, is a large work comprised

of 1240.verses in varying meters 8 and which has grown to

this, the work has been edited and translated by N. Veezhi- nathan and is entitled, The SamksepasarIraka of Sarvajnat- man (Madras: Centre For Advanced Study In Philosophy, Uni- versity of Madras, 1972).

TSee SS I. 10 and I. 57.

8T. Vetter (1972) pp. 175-6 lists twenty different

7

its great size by virtue of its author's frequent indul-

gence in thoroughagoing polemics9 as well as by means of

the careful and detailed explanations that have earned the

text an important place in Advaita Vedanta literature.

Composed in meter, SS is subject to its contingencies, such

as the frequent variation from verse to verse of synonyms

that refer to the same entity and the exceedingly frequent

use of pronouns. These tend to provide a healthy medium

fon an obscurity which is not encountered, to any real

types of meter that appear in the first chapter of SS.

The main opponents encountered in SS séem to be other Advaitins (Mandana Misra being chiefly identifiable, e.g. , SS II. 138, 174, etc.) and the two main Mimamsakas (e.g., SS I. 343 ff.), thoug we do meet up with arguments against the causal theories of the Bauddhas, Sankhyas, and Vaisesikas (SŚ II. 56-80).

10This does not go unnoticed by T. Vetter (1972, p. 6) when he states the following:

In dem einen Vers stehen z. b. su viele Parti- keln, in dem andern fehlen sie, obwohl sie der Kontext dringend n8tig hatte. In dem einen Vers ist einen Sache durch unnotige Doppel- oder Drei- fachausdrucke umschrieben, in dem andern kommt sie gerade noch durch ein Pronomen zur Sprache.

Synonyme . Das Metrum verlangt ferner den Gebrauch vieler

Vetter (1972, p. 173) also supplies a list of various sy- nonyms that occur in SS I for the following notions: 'ig- 'revelation", 'the concluding portion of revela- "tion', 'the intellect', 'knowledge', and the verb 'to know'. norance',

8

degree, in PP.

Thematically, the two works are quite similar, so

much so that PP may quite readily be said to be a precis of

SS. Both works are predominantly preoccupied with the

interpretation of scriptural passages that bear upon and

include mahavakya-s, with the second chapter in SS and the

last chapter in PP being the only ones that can be said to

emphasize definitely an analytic metaphysics in its own

right -. In order to illustrate this thematic similarity

we can select some key issues which are dealt with identi-

cally in both SS and PP:

1. There is support of Suresvara in his accep-

tance of jahallaksana and gunavrtti as applying to the interpretation of mahavākya-s (SS I. 169-70, 233 and PP trans. pp. 85-87).

2. There is the explanation and interpretation

of the subsidiary statements (avāntaravākya-s) in-

volving the notion of a gathering of unrepeated

Sarvajmatman himself gives twenty synonyms for 'ignorance' at SS I. 318 and II. 127.

11The cosmology and psychology, of the three states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep which dominate the third chapter of PP have their foundation in the Upanisads and are meant only to clarify the meanings of the words "tat" and "tvam".

9

words (apunaruktasabdopasamhāra) (SS III. 312-25

and PP trans. pp. 94-95).

3. The acceptance of laksanavrtti to be of three

kinds with only that secondary usage which is par-

tially non-inclusive and partially inclusive (ja-

hadajahallaksana) being ultimately applicable to

the interpretation of mahavakya-s (SS I. 154-57 and PP trans. pp. 84 and 86).

4. There is a heuristic acceptance of two aspects

of Brahman: the non-dual (advaya) and the inward

(pratyafc), and of the fact that it is the latter

alone which is the locus of ignorance (SS III. 13-

14 and PP trans. p. 113).

5. There is the acceptance of the fact that the

relation of jñana to Brahman is by means of Brah-

man taking on the outer-coat of the internal organ

(kañcukadvāra) (SS III. 132 and PP trans. p. 115).

6. There is the acceptance of the fact that the

relation of ajfana to Brahman is through ajfana

alones i.e., that it is an admissible self-depen-

dence (atmasraya) as in the case of difference

(bheda) (SS I. 51-7 and PP trans. pp. 115-6).

10

7. There exists the re-interpretation of state-

ments made by Sańkara and Suresvara which indicate

that the JIva serves as the locus of ignorance, so

that they are not contrary to Sarvajnatman's po-

sition that Brahman alone is the locus of ignor'-

ance (SS II. 174-5, 188, 192-4 and PP trans. pp.

119-122).

Therefore in terms of these key issues, the case for the

identity of the author of SS with that of the author of PP

appears to be a strong one; at the very least we should say

that if they are not identical, the author of PP certainly

exhibits an unusual familiarity with many of the central

themes of SS.

Supporting. this identification, we find that there

are two colophons, one each at the end of the first and se-

cond chapters of PP, which pay homage to the same guru,

namely Devesvara, who is also given at S$ I. 8 and IV. 62

as the guru of the author of that work. In addition to

this we must take notice of the fact that the author of PP

has, on three occasions, employed verses directly from SS without crediting them to that work or to its author

in the usual manner, e.g., iti samksepasarIrakakaraih. 12

12The verses taken from SS are SS I. 2, I. 169 and

11

On the other hand, the assertion of the identity of

the two authors is not completely free of blemishes, even

though they may be relatively minor ones, and there are two.

The first is that there appears to be some inconsistency in

attaching rather elaborate colophons to the first two chap-

ters of PP, a minimal colophon which simply supplies the

name of the author of PP to the work as a whole, and no co-

lophon whatsoever to the last three chapters of the work.

This fact may give rise to the suspicion that the first two

chapters alone are the true work of Sarvajnatman and that

the remaining chapters were composed by someone else, per-

haps one of Sarvajhatman's pupils who was well-versed in the teachings of ss.13 However, though this possibility

would not be forgotten, the conceptual similarity between

PP and SS renders it less significant.

The second fact which may be taken to work against

our acceptance of the identification of the author of PP

with that of SS is the pejorative dismissal by the author

III. 16, which respectively occur on pages 225, 211-2, and 231 of the Appendik below and on pages 111, 87, and 123-124 of my translation.

13of course there are the possibilities that Sar- vajhatman had some preference for the content of these two chapters and thus concluded them alone with colophons, or that the corresponding colophons for the remaining chapters were simply lost.

12

of PP, at the close close of the second chapter, of the

doctrine of instant liberation (sadyomukti) and death' (de-

hapata) in favour of the assertion of the doctrine of li-

beration while living (jIvanmukti) with the body falling

away on the exhaustion of karma-s already set in motion (1.e., prarabdhakarma-g). 14 This is so because we find

that at SS IV. 37-39 Sarvajñatman clearly propounds the op-

posite and accepts sadyomukti and dehapata, stating that

the notion of jTvanmukti encountered in scripture can only

be properly understood as referring to a person who is ima-

gined to be freed while living and not one who is really so.15 However, this may be resolved by the postulation

that PP might have been one of Sarvajnatman's earlier works

and that by the time of the composition of his magnum opus

he had refined his views on this point. 16 Such an expla-

nation may be looked upon as having further credence by

virtue of the fact that in SS IV. 40-45 Sarvajnatman seems r

pp. 95-96. "See Appendix below pp. 215-16 and my translation

. 15"JIvanmuktipratyayam sastrajatam jIvanmukte kal- pate yojanTyam/" -- SS IV. 39a-b.

16If this was in fact the case with Sarvajmatman, then it is interesting to note that the three verses made mention of in note 14 above would not actually be quotations from Sarvajnatman's major work, but rather the original sour- ces for those verses as they appear in SS -- that is if they are not, to begin with, mere interpolations into PP.

13

to undergo a minor, but abrupt, turnabout in refusing to

do away with the doctrine of jIvanmukti completely and takes

pains to explain how thinkers such as Sankara (BSBH IV. 1. .

15. could propound such a belief.

Therefore, based upon the above evidence, the iden-

tification of the author of PP with that of SS does not

seem at all unreasonable.

:

III. The Date of Sarvajñatman

As is the general case with the relatively early

history of Indian philosophy, the controversy over the as-

signment of a date to Sarvajnatman is one which exhibits

an understandable polarity between the acceptance and de-

fense of traditional views on what that date should be,

and the submission of scholarly approximations of the same

which attempt to avoid any traditional bias. 17 Scholars

such as S. V. Venkiteswara Iyer,- 18 K. Sitaramayya,* 19 M. Hi-

1The most informative discussion of this debate, as it concerns Sarvajnatman, is presented by E. Easwaran Nampoothiry in the "Introduction" to his edition of The Pramanalaksanam of Sarvajnatmamuni (Trivandrum: ment of Sanskrit University of Kerala, 1973). I agree Depart-

with his conclusion that Sarvajmatman must have flourished in the last half of the tenth century and perhaps up to the early decades of the eleventh century, so that the fact of. his being the direct pupil of Suresvara (first half 9f the eigth century in keeping with the accepted date of ankara-see note 31 above) is necessarily precluded. There is nothing from my study of PP that I could bring to Nampoothiry's commendable research on this subject, therefore I merely summarize, for the most part in what fol- lows, the essential reasons for situating Sarvajfatman in the tenth/eleventh century as he has brought them to our attention.

18"The Date of Sankaracarya", Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of England (1916-17) 151-61.

19"A Note on the Date of Sarvajnatman", Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference, 13, No. 2 (1946) 206-11.

14

15

riyanna, 20 and N. Veezinathan, 21 uphold the traditional

view that Sarvajhatman was a direct disciple of Sureśvara

and lived in the later half of the ninth to the earliest

parts of the tenth century. Standing against this we have,

the position of scholars such as T. A. Gopinatha Rao, 22

T. R. Chintamani, 23 and T. Vetter, who hold that Sarva-

jñatman is not the direct pupil of Suresvara.

The former of these two viewpoints appears to be

founded mainly upon the identification of Devesvara, who

is cited in all of Sarvajñatman's known works as his guru, 25

20"The Date of Sankaracarya", Indian Antiquary, 55 (1926) p. 19.

21The SamksepasarTraka of Sarvajnatman (Critically Edited with Introduction, English Translation, Notes and Indexes) (Madras: University of Madras, 1972). Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy,

22Travancore Archaeological Series, Vol. 2, Part III, pp. 144-45.

23"Introduction" to his Pancaprakriva of Sarvajnat- man with the Commentaries of Anandaj nana and Purnavidyamuni, Bulletins of the Sanskrit Department University of Madras No. 4 (Madras; University of Madras, 1946).

24Sarvajnatman's SamksepasarIrakam I Kapitel, Ein- fuhrung, Ubersetzung und Anmerkungen (Wien: 1972).

25Namely: a) in the colophons at the end of the first and second chapters of PP; b) SS I. 8 and IV. 62; c) in the colophon found at the close\of Pramanalaksana.

16

with Suresvara the direct pupil of Sankara, by force of

the fact that the words "sura" and "deva" are synonymous. 26

Traditional accounts of lineage that have been preserved

in the various Advaita Vedanta centres of learning (matha-s)27

are also brought forward to support this identification.

Thus, those who assert this position tend to employ textual

and epigraphic evidence with the aim of bringing the dates

of Sankara, Sureśvara, and Sarvajnatman as close together

as possible.

As a contradiction of this viewpoint, we can briefly

summarize the reasons called to our attention by the sup-

porters of the theory that Sarvajnatman could not have been

We encounter this in Madhusudana SarasvatI's Sa- rasamgraha on SS I. 8 where he states the following concer- ning the occurrence of the name Devesvara in that verse: "Surapadasthane devapadaprayogah saksadgurunamāgrahanāya, gurornāma na grhaniyaditi smrteh. ( The use of the word 'deva' instead of the word 'sura' is in order not to men- tion directly the name of the teacher, because of the smrti- passage: 'One ought not to take the name of the teacher." "). Thus Madhusudana SarasvatI (last half of the seventeenth century) asserts the identification on the basis of a popu- lar citation from what appears to be a Dharmasastra. Rama- tIrtha (mid-sixteenth century) in his Anvayarthaprakasika on SS I. 8 also makes this identification: svagurum suresvarācaryamabhipujayati.". "IdānIm saksat-

7K. Sitaramayya (1946 pp. 207-208) employs the relevant portion of a chronology from the matha at Kanci to

Sureśvara. testify to the direct connection between Sarvajnatman and

17

the direct pupil of Sureśvara;

1)' The lineage of teachers and pupils given in

the colophon to Pramanalaksana supplies the fol-

lowing succession: Devananda is the pupil of

Sresthānanda, Deveśvara is the pupil of Devananda,

and Sarvajnatman is the pupil of Devesvara. This

contradicts the direct lineage from Sankara to Su-

resvara to Sarvajnatman propounded by the matha-

chronologies.

2. The ruler Manukuladitya mentioned atSS IV. 62

seems, in fact, to be Bhaskararavivarman who ruled

in Kerala from 962-1018, so that Sarvajñatman can- not be pushed back into the ninth century In order

to be temporally proximate enough to Suresvara that

he might be regarded as having received tutelage from him. Thus it seems that we cannot place Sar- vajnatman much lower than the middle of the tenth century 28

28 Both points one and two were first brought to the attention of scholarship by T. A. Gopinatha Rao, while he edited the Huzur Qffice Plates (see Travancore Archaeolo- gical Series 2, part III, pp. 131-207 -- the relevant pages being pp. 143-46). He was the first to associate Manuku-

18

3. All of the extant colophons give the name De-

veśvara as Sarvajnatman's guru and never Suresvara.

In all three of Sarvajnatman's works Suresvara is

always called Vartikakara and never Suresvara; in

fact in the Pramanalaksana the Vartikakara is in- deed once called Sureśvara29 and not Devesvara,

which seems to add credence to the fact that they

läditya with the reign of Bhaskararavivarman, whose ascen- sion he concluded took place in 978. Since then, the ascen- sion date of Bhaskararavivarman seems to have been fixed more accurately at 962 (see p. 702 of S. Sanku Ayyar's "King Manukuladitya," Journal of Indian History 44 (Dec. 1966) part III, pp. 699-705; however, in this paper the author, basing his argument on a kavya source called the SItaharana, comes to identify Manukuladitya with Kodaravi- varman Kulasekhara who reigned in Kerala between 917 and 949). More recently, evidence such as the inscription dis- covered in the Pullur Kotavalam Visnu temple, Hosdurg Talik, Cannanore District, Kerala (see Annual Report of Indian Epi- graphy (1963-63) pp. 23-64 No. 125) in which the name Manu- kuladitya is directly related to Bhaskararavivarman, seems to have made the identification of Manukuladitya with Bhas- kararavivarman (ruled: 962-1018) an accepted and settled fact (e.g., see M. G. S. Narayan, "The Ceraman Perumals of Kerala," Historical Studies in Kerala (XXXVII Indian His- tory Congress, 1976, Souvenir Volume), edited by M. G. S. Narayan and K. K. N. Kurup, Department of History Univer- sity of Calicut, pp. 28-34, especially p. 30, and K. Velu- that, Brahman Settlements in Kerala (Calicut University: 1978) pp. 40-41 and 69, where the name Manukuladitya seems to be preferred over that of Bhaskararavivarman.) ..

See E. Easwaran Nampoothiry's The Pramanalaksanam of Sarvajnatmamuni (Trivandrum: 1973) p. 30: Trirupatve lińgasya jyotirbrahmanagatam suresvarasya vartikam gamakam- ahuh.

19

are two separate people, 30

4. One of the central arguments that is taken to'

contribute to collapsing the chronological distance

between Sankara, Suresvara, and Sarvajnatman is the

acceptance of Sankara's date to be 788-820, however

it seems more appropriate that he should be placed a century earlier. 31

3As a whole, this point was first made by T. R. Chintamani in the "Inroduction" to his edition of Pañcapra- kriyā (Chintamani 1946 p. v) where he also calls our atten- tion to the fact that it would be'an anomaly in the Indian philosophical tradition that a pupil should never refer to his teacher in his own name, as well as to the fact that the use of the synonym "deva" for "sura" in the light of Dharma- sastric principle (see note 26 above) is an extremely weak argument for the identification of Deveśvara with Suresvara.

31The problem of the date of Sankara has by no means been settled in any final way. However, we may divide mo- dern scholarship onto two main schools on the issue, namely, those who place Sańkara at teh beginning of the ninth cen- tury (specifically 788-820, e.g., see K. G. Pathak, "The Date of Samkaracarya," Indian Antiquary (June 1882) pp. 174-5; Nilikantha Sastri, "A note on the Date of Samkara," Journal of Oriental Research, 11 (1937) p. 285), and those scholars wanting to place Sankara in the seventh century and no later than the earliest part of the eight century (e.g., see S. Kup- paswami Sastri's "Introduction" to his edition of Brahmasid- dhi, Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Series No. 4, (Madras: 1937) p. lviii; T. R. Chintamani, "Date of SrI Sam- karacarya and Some of his Predecessors," Journal of Oriental Research, 3 (1929) pp. 39-56; S. L. Pandey, Pre-Samkara Ad- vaita Philosophy, (Allahabad: Darshan Peeth, 1974, chapter VII). While the former view seems to be founded upon a ma- nuscript which cites the date of Sankara (Pathak 1882) and a Celonese inscription which seems to bear it out (N. Sastri 1937), the latter one seems to rely mainly upon ideological

43 20

5. There is a direct reference to Vimuktatman

at SS IV. 14 and a direct quotation from Ista-

siddhi in the last chapter of PP (see note 235

to my translation below) so that, given the fact

that Vimuktatman cannot be placed earlier than

$850,32 - we should have to strain the life span of

Suresvara considerably from his being a contem-

porary of Sankara (700 or just prior to this) to

meet even this lowest possible date for Sarvajñāt-

man. 33

and textual crossreferences between the content of the wri- tings of Sankara and the content of the available writings of pre-Sańkara thinkers. The forefront of the most recent scholarship on Advaita Vedanta seems to lean towards the latter view in placing Sankara prior to, or around, 700 (e.g., see Paul Hacker, Orientalistiche Literaturzeitung, 59 (1964) pp. 235-36; S. Mayeda, Sankara's Upadesasahasri (Critically Edi- ted with Introduction and Indices), (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1973) p. xi, where he cites H. Nakamura's Shoki no Vedanta Tetsugata, (Tokyo; 1950) pp. 64-121 as his basis; Allen Wright Thrasher, "The Dates of Mandana Miśra and Samkara," Wiener Zeitschrift Für Die Kunde Sud- Und Ostasien, 23 (1979), pp. 117-139. We go along with this latter view and accept the fact that Sankara must have lived around or before 700.

''As established by M. Hiriyanna in the "Introduc- tion" to his editton of Istasiddhi, Gaekwad's Oriental Se- ries Vol. LXV (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1933), pp.xii- xii1.

33Attention was first drawn to these references to Vimuktatman in the writings of Sarvajhatman by T. R. Chinta- mani in the "Introduction" to his edition of Pancaprakriya (Chintamani 1946 p. vi).

21

.6) According to E. Easwaran Nampoothiry (1973

p. 56) Sarvajnatman seems to be following Bhasar- vajña (860-920), 34 author of the Nyayasara, quite

closely in his discussion of the fallacies concer-

ning the example (udhaharanabhasa-s) of a syllo-

gism in his analysis of inference (anumana) in his

Pramanalaksana (see Nampoothiry 1973 pp. 22-3).

If this is the case then Suresvara cannot be the

direct teacher of Sarvajnatman on the same grounds

as given in the previous point.

It is on the basis of these reasons that we must

assign Sarvajnatman to the later half of the tenth century,

or at the latest, to the first half of the eleventh century,

which makes his traditional association with Suresvara, na-

mely, as his direct pupil, an extreemly improbable one.

3-As accepted by Karl H. Potter in his Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies Vol. II: Nyaya-Vaisesika, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), p. 9

IV. Hermeneutics and Metaphysics in

Advaita Vedānta

At the close of the last chapter of PP Sarvajñatman

states that in it he has discussed the function or workings

of ignorance (avidyavrtti) and implies that in the preceed-

ing four chapters, which deal with the interpretation of

mahavakya-s, he has done the same for knowledge (vidya).35

Knowledge (vidya, jrana) in this sense is knowledge of the

unity of the Self (atmaikatvajñana), which is identical

with Brahman in its pure state (suddhabrahman) and which

is the final soteriological aim of Advaita Vedanta. It is

attainable only through the correct understanding of the mahavakya-s.36 Everything other than this knowledge is ul-

35See p. 124 and note 241 of PP trans ...

36What I mean to say here is that, for the Advaitin, jnana as liberational knowledge of the Absolute can only be derived from the Upanisads, so that all knowledge derived through any other means is necessarily subordinate to it. For example see PP trans. p. 9: "For the person desirous of final release, final release (moksa) comes about only from the knowledge of the great sentences such as 'I am Brahman. ' " Compare this with SS II. 53:

Vedāntavākyajanitām paramatmabuddhivrttim vyapeksya punaratra na kacidast1/

22

23

timately ignorance (avidya, ajñana) or its effect (ajñana-

kārya).

In this way, when the Advaitin pursues jhana (i.e.,

knowledge of the Absolute which is identical with the Abso-

lute) the medium that predominates is the interpretation of

scripture, or in other words, hermeneutics. . When he is di-

rectly concerned with the Absolute, the Advaitin is pre-oc-

cupied with hermeneutics since only the revealed statements

offer a direct access to the Absolute. On the other hand,

when the Advaitin is indirectly concerned with the Absolute,

that is, when his main concern is not a soteriological one

but, for example, a polemical one, then the interpretation

of things predominates. That is to say that he is then

more pre-occupied with the analysis of phenomenal existence

(lokavyavahra) itself in an attempt to expose, in a ra-

tional manner, its ultimately illusory nature and to esta-

Satsamprayogajanita bhuvanatraye 'pi buddhis- tamoviracitam hi jagatsamastam//

(When compared with that mode of knowledge [which has the form] of the Supreme Self and which is produced by Upanisadic statements, there exists no other khowledge whatsoever which is produced through connection with [empirically] existent objects, for the universe in its totality is fashioned out of ignorance.)

Also see S$ III. 294 and 303.

24

blish the possible relationship it might have with ultimate

reality. There he is more directly concerned with the work-

ings of ignorance and its effects, that is, an interpreta- tion of things or what might be called metaphysics. 37

In proposing this division I should not want to im-

ply that there is a strict dichotomy in the philosophic en-

deavour of the Advaitin and that when he deals with Brahman

he is a dogmatist, or that when he deals with phenomenal ex-

istence he is an empiricist. On the contrary, hermeneutics

and metaphysics often overlap, presuppose, and draw support

from one another for the Advaitin. Though he might in one

sense be called an illusionist (mayavadin), the Advaitin

still holds to the principle that the unseen must be deter-

mined from the seen (" ... drstacadrstasiddhih." -- Sankara BSBH

II. i1. 2) and this shows that there existed within his

ideology a margin for the valid extension of thinking in

itself, and that the conjectures which resulted from such

an extension were unacceptable if they were opposed to that

which was simply seen to be the case -- of course what this

implies is the central empiricist axiom that facts essen-

tially cannot be irrational. Thus he should not be thought

3I use this term in its widest sense to mean specu- lation on truth, being and knowledge, but as apart from con- nection with revelation. In the Advaita Vedanta system this would include its epistemology, psychology, cosmology, and ontology as they are products of human speculation.

25

of excluding all valid sources of knowledge other than scrip-

ture from bearing upon the final knowledge (jñana) of Brah-

man, since they also add something towards the correct un-

derstanding of the mahavakya-s. Similarly, scripture will

often be called upon to lend its support to certain points

an Advaitin may make while debating with an opponent. How-

ever, the point that must be remembered if one is to see

the difference between hermeneutics and metaphysics which

exists for the Advaitin, is that metaphysical thinking on

its own is ultimately ineffectual in a soteriological sense,

since it cannot actually tap the visionary force that is

capable of altering the being and becoming of the inquirer

in the way in which that force is made accessible through

revealed scripture.

The main reason for pointing out such a division

between hermeneutics and metaphysics is that PP affords

an obvious perception of it in the ordering of its chapters .

and because positing such a division enables us to call

attention to the two respective points of departure and the

' different end-products involved in them within the context

of Advaita Vedanta philosophy. For example, in hermeneutics (

the starting point is scripture (sastra) which purports to

present a direct access to the experience (anubhava) of ul-

timate reality (Brahman), and it is the realization of one's

26

unity (ekatva) with this ultimate reality which is its fi-

nal product. For metaphysics the starting point is given

phenominal existence along with an accepted number of valid

means of knowledge (pramana-s)30 which are applied to that

given phenomenal existence. The end product here is the

baring, and logical reinforcement, of the fact that this

given phenomenal existence is ultimately illusory.

However, from a higher viewpoint, both the herme-

neutics and metaphysics of Advaita Vedanta must be seen to

begin from within ajñana, which is only to say that given

phenomenal existence and the pramana-s (which include scrip-

ture) are, in their totality, effects or products of igno-

rance (ajnanakarya) 39 * Yet hermeneutics must be seen to

hold a privileged position since its starting point is re-

velation (sruti) itself and therefore it has conceded to it

38 In his Pramanalaksana, Sarvajñatman accepts the usual six pramana-s held by the Bhattas and Advaitins: per- ception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana), scripture (astra), comparison (upamana), non-cognition (anupalabdhi), and pos- tulation (arthapatti) -- see D. M. Datta's The Six Ways of Knowing, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1972).

39This is the reason why, at the close of BSBH I. i. iv (p. 78), Sankara states: "Nahy aheyanupadeyadvai- tātmavagatau nirvisayanyapramatrkani ca pramanani bhavitum- arhantIti. ( Once within the realization of the non-dual atman, which is neither to be discarded nor appropriated, being devoid of objects and knowers, there cannot be any valid means of knowledge.")

27

a certain proximity to Brahman. 40 Without examining and

understanding the meaning of the Vedantic statements one

cannot realize the ultimate unity between the jIva and

Brahman; it is only through these Vedantic statements that

one can gain access to Brahman. 41

Thus, we will employ the above division, which I

do not take to be an artificial one, but on the contrary,

an inherent one in the writings of Sańkara, Sureśvara, and

Sarvajnatman, in our investigation of the philosophical con-

tent of the Pancaprakriya.

40 Compare this with BSBH II. i. 4 p. 344: "Drsta- sāmyena cadrstamartham samarthayantI vuktiranubhavasya sam- nikrsyate, viprakrsyate tu srutiraitihyamatrena svarthabhi- dhanat.(Reasoning, which determines unknown things be- cause of their similarity to known things, is near to mun- dane experience, while śruti is more remote since the ex- pression of its meaning is by mere tradition."); and CHUBH VIII. xii. 1 p. 598: "Tato gurutarasya pramānāntarasyānu- papatteh." ("Another pramana higher than that (i.e., Srutil is not possible.")

41As at US XVIII. 188: "Nityamuktatvavijhanam vāk- yad bhavati nanyatah" ("The knowledge of being eternally · free comes from Vedantic statements, not from anything else"); and BSBH II. i. 6 p. 349: "Agamamatrasamadhigamya eva tva- yamartho dharmavat .... " ." ("However, this [Brahman], just as

alone.") is the case with dharma, is to be known through scripture

V. Hermeneutics in Sankara, Surešvara,

and Sarvajnatman

Sarvajnatman begins his work with an examination

of the different usages of words (sabdavrtti-s) that are

accepted by the Advaita Vedanta school, namely, mukhyavrtti

(primary usage, also variously termed, abhidha, prasiddhi,

vacya, or agauna), gunavrtti (that usage based on a simila-

rity of qualities), and laksanavrtti (the secondary, or implied usage).42 It is the last two of these, and espe-

cially laksana, which are crucial to Sarvajnatman's herme-

neutics, in the sense that it is only through them that one

can interpret or fathom the true extent of certain Upanisa-

dic statements (vedantavakya-s) which purport to refer to

Brahman which is beyond any of the accepted relations that may permit the common or primary use of language. 43

42For an informative explanation of these three usages and the attitudes of the various schools towards them, see Chapters II and VI of K. Kunjunni Raja's Indian Theories of Meaning, (Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1963).

43See note 15 to PP trans. and similar statements by Sankara at BUBH II. 111. 6 p. 755; MAUBH 7; BHGBH XIII. 12 p. 385; US XVIII. 28; and by Sureśvara at NAIS III. 103.

28

29

Śankara and Sureśvara also accept this same gene-

ral distinction, however in Sankara the distinction between

gunavrtti and laksana does not seem to be as developed as

it is in both Suresvara and Sarvajnatman." .44 In all of his

authenticated works, 45 excluding BSBH, Sankara never uses

the noun: laksana, although the related verb is often em-

ployed. He does often use the words mukhyavrtti and guna-

vrtti (e.g., BHGBH VI. 1 p. 211; BSBH I. 1. " p. 76), or

mukhya and gauna (e.g., BSBH I. i. 6, 22 p. 120, II. iii.

5, iv. 2, IV. iii. 12), or gauna and agauna (e.g, BUBH III.

v. 1 p. 810 and p. 812) or even mukhya and upacara (e.g.,

44. A distinction between the two had already been definitely formulated by Kumarila in the Tantravartika p. 313 under MS I. iv. 22:

Abhidheyavinabhute pravrttirlaksanesyate, Laksyamanagunairyogadvrttirista tu gaunata

(That usage which exists when there is a con- nection with the primary usage is admitted to be laksanā, That usage which is due to a similarity with the qualities being implied is admitted to be guna.)

Sarvajñatman is well aware of the distinction and seems to be making a reference-to this exact verse at SS I. 172.

45That is the Upanisadbhasyas, BHGBH, BSBH, US, and. MKBH. The word laksana does occur at MKBH IV. 67 but with a completely different sense and because Gaudapada has made use of it.

30

BSBH I. 1. 5 pp. 88-89, I. 1. 7 p. 93) to point to a broad

distinction between the primary and secondary usages of

words. 46 Even when he comes actually to employ words such

as laksana (e.g., BSBH I. iv. 11 p. 303, III. 1. 22 p.

590, i1. 21 p. 624, ii1. 7 p. 657, ii1. 9 p. 661, IV. i1. 1

p. 824), laksanika (BSBH II. iv. 17 p. 558, III. 1 10),

or läksanikT vrtti (BSBH II. iv. 19 p. 560) they seem no-

thing more than alternative appellations for the general

concept of non-primary designation. However, at two places

in BSBH Sankara does seem to accord laksana a peculiar qua-

lification which perhaps implies that he was to some extent

åware of laksana in the sense used by Suresvara and Sarva-

jñatman, when he states that there are two types of laksana,

namely, a proximate one (samnikrsta laksana) and a remote

or detached one (viprakrsta laksana). 47 What must be no-

°This distinction already appears in Gaudapada at MK III. 14 and seems to appear even in Badarayana at BS I. 1. 6.

4The passages propounding such qualification of laksana are BSBH III. 111. 9 pp. 661-62 and IV. 1. 6 p. 807 1. 3-4. Of these the former is the more informative one and it occurs in the context of a discussion of the possible relationships between the two words "om" and "udgItha" in the phrase: "OmityetadaksaramudgIthamupasIta." ( One should meditate on the syllable om' as the udgItha." -- CHU I. i. 1) Sankara denies that the relationship could be one of super- imposition (adhyasa) since that would require the use of la- ksana for the word referring to the superimposed cognition and that no proper result could be determined for the medi- tation. Sublation (apavada) is denied because no proper re-

31

ticed here is that this observation about two 'strengths'

of laksana may very well be one of the sources 48 that con-

tributed to Sarvajnatman's notion of dividing laksana into

three kinds, with viprakrsta laksana, which is so termed

because it is quite detached from its primary sense, per-

haps contributing to Sarvajñatman's idea of jahallaksana

and samnikrsta laksana, being the less removed from its pri-

sult could be attained and, lastly, unity (ekatva) is de- nied because, if that were so, then there would be no need to use two separate terms. Sankara holds that the relation must be one of qualification (visesana) where the udgItha qualifies 'om' whose primary sense is all the Vedas, making it mean only that syllable 'om' contained in the udgitha. portion of the Veda (i.e., the second part of the Samaveda). Here, the purvapaksin intercedes saying that this would also entail the use of laksana, as was the case with adhyasa since the word udgitha taken as referring to 'om', would be referring only to a portion of what its primary sense means. Sańkara replies that in the case of the adhyasa relation the laksana was detached (viprakrsta) and clearly improper, while here, where the word for the Whole (i.e., udgftha) is used to denote part of itself (i.e., the omkara), the laksana is more proximate (samnikrsta) to the direct mean- ing, as with the phrase, "The cloth is burnt.", is used when perhaps only a portion of the cloth has actuàlly been burnt. This example of the cloth would be considered to be an example of jahadajahallaksana according to Sarvajñatman since it is only a portion of its original sense that is finally meant by the word "cloth". One cannot help but no- tice that the acceptance of laksana in the one case and the rejection of it in the other seems to be somewhat contrived on Sankara's part.

48 'Another possible source being Patanjali's com- ments on Paninisutras II. 1. 1 (see note 29 to my trans- lation of PP).

32

mary sense, could similarly have contributed to the distinc-

tion of,ajahallaksana and jahadajahallaksana from jahallak-

sana.

With Suresvara we find that his ideas of mukhya-

vrtti and gunavrtti do not really differ from those of San-

kara, but he can claim an innovation in his application of

gunavrtti to the Upanisadic statement, "I am Brahman " ("Ah-

am brahmasmi " -- BU I. iv. 10) at NAIS II. 55 and Sarvajñat-

man clearly seems to accept and acknowledge this in Pp.49

Concerning laksana, Suresvara, just as with gunavrtti, again

goes one step further than Sankara in applying it to the

phrase, "I am Brahman " at NAIS II. 54; however, this verse , f has sparked some controversy 50 because of the fact that Su-

49See note 19 to my translation as well as NAIS III. 97-104 and Paul Hacker, Untersuchungen uber Texte des fruhen Advaitavada I, Die Schuler Sankaras, 1950) pp. 55-56 -- especially the remarks by Hacker (p. 55 (Wiesbaden:

note 2) on the termigunalesa which occurs at NAIS III. 97, 98 and 102. Suresvara sometimes employs the words gauna and mukhyärtha in an epistemological sense to refer to ac- tual experiences rather than word usages (sabdavrtti-s) as at NAIS III. 96 (see Hacker, Untersuchungen ... , p. 82).

50That is, as to whether Suresvara does in fact ap- ply laksana to phrases like "I am Brahman" and "That thou J. M. van Boetzelaer, Suresvara's Taittiriyopanisad- bhasyavartikam (Translated into English with an Introduction art."

and Notes) (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), p. 54, seems to be of the opinion that he does not (we must note some confusion on his part because when he does refer to NAIS II. 54: "As a matter of fact it may be noted that the term laksana does not occur in the NaiSi where the proposition tat tvam asi is

: 33

resvara has used the neuter form: laksanām 51 rather than

the expected feminine form: laksana, to mean the secondary

usage of words (laksana vrtti). Yet two things seem to

discussed (NaiSi II, 54).", he does not correctly note that it is the proposition, "Aham. brahmasmi " that is under dis- cussion at NAIS II. 54, nor that the word laksana does in- deed occur in the prose preamble to NAIS II. 54. Van Boet- zelaer also cites M. Biardeau, "La Definition dans la Pen- see Indienne," Journal Asiatigue (1957) p. 383, in support of his position. Standing clearly against this view we have Hacker in his Untersuchungen ... , and A. J. Alston in his translation of NAIS entitled, The Realization of the Abso- lute (London: Shanti Sadan, 1971).

51NAIS II. 54 runs: "Najfasisamiti praha susuptad- utthito 'pi hi/ Ayodahadivattena laksanam paramatmanah//" ("Indeed, even the person risen from deep sleep says 'I knew not. '/ In that statement there is whe secondary indica- tion of the highest atman, just as inthe statement, 'The metal burns. ' //" ) The word laksana is most commonly used in the Advaita Vedanta school to mean definition as, for example, the words in the phrase, "Satyam jhanamanantambrah- ma." ("Brahman which is truth, knowledge, the infinite." -- TU II. 1. 1) are laksana-s (definitions) of Brahman (see TUBH II. 1. 1 and TUBHV II. 50-54, 74-76) and they do not have recourse to laksana (secondary usage) to fulfil their function (see van Boetzelaer, 1971, pp. 53-54 for the views of certain scholars on this point), nor do they ever leave off their primary senses (see TUBHV II. 76-79). Secondly, the word laksana is also used by Suresvara to mean the pro- cess of indirect (secondary) indication as at NAIS III. 27a: "Laksanam sarpavadrajjvah praticah syadaham tatha/" ("Just as the snake indirectly indicates the rope, so does the 'I' indirectly indicate the inward supreme Self/") This same

20. usage is also found at NAIS III. 97, SV 704, and TUBHV I. It is this laksana (secondary indication) which is.of- ten employed to explain the actual relation between. the ma- jor components of a sentence in order to render, what seems otherwise an incongruous sentece, understandable and that relation is referred to as laksyalaksanabhava (or ... sam- bandha) as at NAIS. III. 3, 11, 26 (also see Hacker, Unter- suchungen ... , p. 77 and note 62 to my translation of PP).

34

make it certain that Sureśvara does mean laksana vrtti here:

a) the last sentence of the prose introduction to NAIS II.

54 directly states that the three usages of words are going

to be presented ("Socyate prasiddhalaksanagunavrttibhih.");

b) the phrase "The metal burns.", which is given as an ex-

ample in the verse, clearly illustrates a case of laksana

vrtti (1.e., burning, which in its primary sense is appli-

cable to fire, is made to apply to the metal itself) and in

fact, Sarvajhatman uses this very same examp-le in PP (see

my translation pp: 5-6 which is equivalent to SS I. 169)

and calls it an instance of jahallaksana. In any event,

NAIS II. 54 appears to be another source for Sarvajfatman's

three-fold division of laksana.

It is with Sarvajnatman, from among the relatively

early Advaitins, that we first encounter a clear-cut dis-

tinction between the three usages of words and, more signi-

ficantly, the formulation of the distinction between the

three types of laksana which comes to play such an impor-

tant role in the exegesis of the key Upanisadic statements

(mahavakya-s) in the texts of the Advaita Vedanta thinkers

" that follow Sarvajnatman. After Sarvajnatman, jahadajahal-

laksana (i.e., partially inclusive and partially non-inclu-

sive secondary signification) seems to become the standard

way of properly interpreting statements like "That thou

35

art.# 52

Having elaborated the three usages of words, inclu-

ding the three-fold division of laksana, Sarvajnatman goes

on, in the next three chapters, to deal with Upanisadic

statements which profess to say something about final real-

ity (Brahman). These he divides into two categories; a)

the great Upanisadic statements (mahavakya-s) such as "I

am Brahman " (BU I. iv. 10) and "That thou art " (CHU VI.

viii. 7), the correct understanding of which is the ulti-

mate means of bringing about final release (moksa) ;53 b)

statements which are subsidiary (avantaravakya-s) to the

great Upanisadic statements, but which contribute to the

understanding of the meaning of the components of the great

statements -- these subsidiary statements are of two kinds,

positive or affirmative ones (vidhimukha) such as, "Brah-

man is truth, knowledge, the infinite " ("Satyam janam-

anantam brahma." -- TU II. i. 1), and negative ones (nisedha-

52For example see Vedantasara p. 11, where the term bhagalaksana (this seems to be a later term for jahadajahal- laksana, cf., SS I. 164) is used, but compare this with the untraditional denial of laksana altogether for statements such as "That thou art." at VEDP IV. 27.

53See p. 90of my translation of PP below and also the prose introduction to the initial chapter of Sures- vara's NAIS.

36

mukha) such as "Not this, not this " ("Neti neti. " -- BU II. i11. 6, ix. 26, IV. i1. 4).54 All of the effort of what I

call Advaita Vedanta hermeneutics is directed towards the

proper understanding of these revealed mahavakya-s with a'

purely soteriological motive. Finding out what they mean,

which is equivalent to directly experienceing their mean-

ing, produces liberation.

There seems to be evidence for the separation of

statements such as "That thou art." from other statements

about Brahman even among the pre-Sankara Advaitins,5> but

Sankara himself is not always clear on this point. To be-

gin with, the term mahavakya is not employed by him,56 in-

54s 'See chapter four of my translation of PP and sŚ III. 310-25 which gives the purpose and different extent (parimana) of both the positive and negative avantaravakya-s (also compare Sarvajnatman's distinction between avantara- vākya-s and mahavakya-s with the relation that he feels holds between statements conveying the qualified Brahman (sagunavakya-s) and those conveying the unqualified Brahman (nirgunavākya-s) made at SS I. 463-65).

55s. L. Pandey offers a quotation from Anandagiri on BUBH II. 1. 9 which describes the view of Dravidācarya on this point at note 11 on p. 206 of his Pre-Śamkara Ad- vaita Philosophy (Allahabad: Darshan Peeth, 1974): "Tat- tvamasyadivākyam aikyaparam tacchesah srstyādivākyamityukte 'rthe dravidacaryasammatimaha." ("He gives the concurrence of Dravidacarya for the rule: 'Statements like "That thou art." etc., have unity as their aim; statements concerned with creation etc., are subordinate to them. '"

56 In fact, the word mahavakya does occur at BSBH

37

stead he calls statements such as "That thou art " simply

Upanisadic statements (i.e., vedāntavakya-s, vākya-s, vacas,

etc.). Generally, we can perceive two strata in Sankara

concerning those statements which in the later Advaita tra-

dition are termed mahavakya-s. In the first stratum we find

that the statements "That thou art " and "I am Brahman "

are grouped together with, and regarded as similar to, sta-

tements such as "Not this, not this " which are clearly

avantaravakya-s according to Sarvajnatman.>! In the se-

= cond stratum texts such as "That thou art begin to be

accorded more of an individual status and in places even

merit analysis of their component parts. 58 Though there

I. iii. 33 p. 264 1. 4 in connection with the word avantara- väkya but there they occur in a purvapaksa and mean only greater and lesser portions of a sentence in general.

5 Lists of such Upanisadic statements appear, for example, at BUBH I. iv. 7 pp. 662 and 663, I. iv. 10 pp. 670 and 671; AIUBH preamble to the second adhyaya p. 342; BSBH II. 111. 18, 30, 47; III. i1. 27; IV. 1. 3; iv. 4. The statements "That thou art " and "I am Brahman " are not at all distinguished in these lists.

5oWe encounter more restricted grouping of "That thou art " and "I am Brahman " at BSBH I. 1. 4 p. 62; I. i. 31 p. 145 1. 4; I. ii. 8 p. 158 11. 1-2; and singular presentation of "That thou art " at BSBH I. 11. 6 p. 155 1. 6; I. 11 .. 13 p. 168 1. 3; I. iv: 6 p. 294 1. 2 and p. 295 1. 9; etc .. This does seem to indicate that these two sentences, and especially the sentence "That thou art ", were to some extent beginning to be distinguished, per- haps paradigmatically, from all other Vedäntic statements about ultimate truth or Brahman. Though Sankara does not

38

may appear, in Sankara, some movement towards the recogni-

tion that texts such as "That thou art " and "I am Brahman

are superior to all other Vedantic statements, ultimately,

he cannot be said to have regarded them as being fundamen-

tally different from texts such as "Not this, not this "

in the sense that their function is also the negation of

what is not-Brahman. 59

exegetically analyse the sentence "I am Brahman " in terms of its component parts (he does concern himseif with the meaning of the word "Brahman" in it at BUBH I. iv. 10) in the same way that Suresvara (NAIS II. 54 ff.), he does at- tempt such analysis of the sentence "That thou art " at CHU VI. xvi. 3; BSBH IV. 1. 2; and US XVIII; with the last being perhaps the most significant. It is curious to note that there appears to be no mention of either the state- ments "That thou art " or "I am Brahman" in Sankara's BHGBH.

59That is to contrast it with the clearly positive, but not objectifiable, knowledge that such statements are given to convey in Sarvajñatman's writings (see SS II. 15, 101-2 and 238) and in the writings of later Advaitins. Thus Sankara states the following at US XVIII. 4: "Siddhadevaham- ityasmadyusmaddharmo nisidhyate/ Rajivāmivāhidhīryuktyā tat- tvamityadisasanaih//"( Teachings such as 'That thou art. etc., along with reasoning, negate the not-Self element from the Self which is established as the 'I', just as the notion of snake is negated in relation to the rope."). Si- milar statements occur at MAUBH 7; BUBH I. iv. 7 p. 662 11. 10-11 (" ... abrahmanātmavijnananivartakatvācca tekamevadvi- tiyam', 'tattvamasi; ityevamādivākyānam. ); at the close of CHU VI. xvi. 3 ( "Tasmāt vikāranrtadhikrtajIvātmavijñanavi- vartakamevedam vākyam tattvamasiti siddhamiti. "); BSBH III. ii. 21 p. 625 1. 9-11; III. i1i. 9 p. 660 1. 7-8 ("Yathā * dehendriyasamghate atmabuddhiratmanyevatmabuddhya pascad- bhāvinya tattvamasi' ityanayā yatharthabuddhyā nivartya- te."). Thus Sankara seems, in this sense, to have regarded statements such as "That thou art " as mainly having the purpose of negating what is other than Brahman.

39

If we consider the manner in which Sankara analy-

zes the statement "That thou art " in the three central

places that he does this, we find the following. At CHU

VI. xvi. 3 Sankara determines that the statement "That thou

art " is not: a) a statement of meditative attribution

(upasana, which is obviously what is meant here, although

the word does not actually occur in the passage) as when

the idea of a god is imposed on its image, because there is

only attribution, and not identity, between the two enti-

ties concerned, and also because this would involve the er-

roneous superimposition of qualities on Brahman; b) a me-

taphor (upacara) as in the case of the statement "You are

a lion ,60 because the knowledge produced from a metaphor

is false ("Mrsatvadupacaravijnanasya .. " -- p. 540 1. 6); c)

a statement of praise (stuti) since Śvetaketu, the "thou"

of the statement is not to be praised and because there is

no praise involyed in referring to Brahman as Svetaketu.

What the statement "That thou art " does do is that, after

having shown that the Existent enters the world,°- it points

This is none other than the common example given for gunavrtti; with this statement Sankara seems to deny the application of gunavrtti to the statement "That thou art."

61In Sarvajfatman this is the function of one of

40

. to the unbridled unity between the Existent and the atman 62

and thus it excludes or negates everything which is other than that. 63

At BSBH IV. i. 2, in the context of discussing the

significance of the repetition of the statement "That thou

art." in CHU VI., Sankara states that the sentence expres-

ses an identity between the sense or content of the word

"thou" (tvam) and the sense or content of the word "that" (tat ) . 64 Further, the sense of the word tat is given as

that Brahman which is the cause of the origin of the uni-

verse and Sankara supplies a string of what Sarvajnatman

would call avantaravakya-s for additional clarification of

this sense, while the sense of the word tvam is the inward

the five kinds of arthavada-s (elaborating statements) which are grouped in the avantaravakya-s (see PP trans. pp. 104-5).

62CHU VI. xvi: 3 p. 540 1. 2-3: = ... pravesam dar- sayitvā tattvamasīti nirańkušam sadātmabhāvamupadisati.

63Tbid., 1. 25-6: "Tasmāt vikārānrtādhikrtajIvāt- mavijfanavivartakamevedam vakyam tattvamasīti siddhamiti." ("Therefore it has been established that this Upanisadic statement 'That thou art.' only excludes the knowledge of the living self which is a modification, which is unreal and which is qualified [for religious duty].")

64 BSBH IV. 1. 2 p. 795: "Api ca tatvamasItyetad- vakyam tvampadarthasya tatpadarthabhavamacaste."

41

Self (pratyagatman).65 Śankara goes on to say that, for

those persons for whom the proper meaning of these two

words is somehow obstructed, the repetition of the state-

ment assisted by reasoning (yukti) will lead to a proper

discarding (avadhana or apoha) of the false meanings of

the words tat and tvam. 66

Finally, in the eighteenth chapter of US, Sankara

draws an analogy between the statement "That thou art " and

statements like "The horse is dark " in which there is a

mutual restriction existing between each of the sentence

portions, namely, the word "horse" excluding everything

that is non-horse from the sense of the word "dark", and

the word "dark" excluding everything that is non-black from

65Ibid. : "Tatpadena ca prakrtam sadbrahmeksitr jagato janmādikārąnamabhidhīyate satyam jnanam anantam brah- ma ... ityadisastraprasiddham. ( That witness which is the existent Brahman, which has been mentioned and which is the cause of the origination of the universe, is what is. denoted by the word 'that', 'That Brahman which is truth, knowledge, the infinite.' ... such scriptural passages make this well known.") On p. 796 of the same passage, Sankara explains the sense of the word tvam: " ... tatha tvampadartho 'pi pratyagatmataya sambhavyamanascaitanyaparyantatvenavadhari- tah. ( ... in the same way the sense of the word 'thou' is the inward self, the hearer, which beginning with the body is thought of as the inward self and which is determined as finally ending up in pure consciousness.")

66See BSBH IV. 1. 2 p. 796 11. 2-6 for the passåge which this paraphrases.

42

the sense of the word "horse' (US XVIII. 169).67 Thus the

word tvam by being brought into conjunction with the word

tat, which expresses the sense of being free from suffer-

ing (nirduhkha), has the sense of being the suffere (duh-

khin) excluded from it, and similarly the word tat by co-

ming into conjunction with the expressed sense of the word

tvam, which is the inward self (pratyagätman) in its im-

mediateness, has the sense of what is not the inward self

(apratyagatman) or non-immediacy (paroksatva) excluded from

it; in the end Sankara does not seem to look upon state-

ments such as "That thou art " and "Not this, not this "

as operating on different levels, for both are taken by

him to demonstrate the fact that in order to understand

Brahman one has to negate what is not-Brahman. 68

67For a further explanation of this relation which is called bheda, see K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning (Madras: Adyar Library, 1963) pp. 192-3.

'US XVIII. 194-5:

TattvamostulyanIdarthamasItyetatpadambhavet Tacchabdah pratyagatmarthastacchabdarthastvamas tatha.

Duhkhitvapratyagatmatvam vārayetamubhavapi Evam ca netinetyartham gamayetam parasparam.

(The purpose of the word 'art' is to show that the words 'that' and 'thou' refer to the same thing, The word 'that' comes to have the sense inward

43

However, it is also important for Sańkara that be-

fore one can properly execute such an analysis of the sen-

tence "That thou art " one must first of all, as with the

analysis of any sentence, call to mind the correct meanings

of the individual terms.9. This process of recollection

involves the application of the method of retaining what

is constant and abandoning what is not constant (anvaya-

self and similarly the word 'thou' comes to have the sense of the word 'that'.

Both words exclude being the sufferer and not being the inward self [from oneanother], And thus they mutually express the meaning of the statement "Not this, not this." .)

Similar lines occur at US XVIII. 169b-170a: "Nirduhkha- vācina yogāttvamsabdasya tadarthata// Pratyagatmabhidha- nena tacchabdasya yutestatha/". This bears a structural similarity to what Sarvajhatman came to call partially non- inclusive and partially inclusive secondary usage (jahad- ajahallaksana -- see PP trans. pp. 84-5), but Sankara nowhere mentions the secondary usage of language (laksana) in his analysis of statements like "That thou art. ; compare US XVIII. 171a: "Svarthasya hyaprahanena visistarthasamar- pakau/" ("The two words tat and tvam express a peculiar sense without giving up their own senses/"); but whether we can get jahadajahallaksana out of this certainly deba- table.

69uS XVIII. 188b : "Vakyarthasyapi vijnānampadār- thasmrtipurvakam//" ("The knowledge of the sentence sense is preceded by the recollection of the word senses.") Similar statements are made by Sankara at US XVIII. 176-79 and especially vèrse 178 ..

44

vyatireka) 70 in order to determine the proner sense of the.

word tvam which, once accomplished, automatically makes the

proper sense of the word tat clear and, in turn, leads to

the possibility of understanding the meaning of the sen-

tence "That thou art." in the correct manner. I It is in

For example the atman is always present whenever we encounter the three states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep -- this is the positive concomittance (anvaya) between them. However, the three states are not always present whenever the atman is present, as in the state of libera- tion (moksa); this is the hegative concomittance (vyatireka) between the two. From this, the atman is deduced to be the more essential element (cf., US XVIII. 168).

71Following US XVIII. 179-181:

Tattvamasyādivākyesu tvampadarthavivekatah Vyajyate naiva vakyartho nityamukto hamityatah.

Anvayavyatirekoktistadvivekāya nānyathā Tvampadarthaviveke hi panavarpitavilvavat.

Vakyartho vyajyate caivam kevalo 'hampadarthatah DuhkhItyetadapohena pratyagatmaviniscayat.

(In statements such as "That thou art." etc., one cannot indeed get the sentence sense, whish is eter- nally freed 'I am', without the discrimination of the word "thou".

We have mentioned the process of positive and nega- tive concommittance for the sake of the discrimina- tion of that; for, once the discrimination of the sense of the word "thou" occurs, it ds/as if it were a bilva fruit placed in one's palm,

Then the sentence meaning is clear from the deter- mination of the inward self through the exclusion 'of suffering to the ego twhich is the sense of the word "thou"]. )

45

this way that one moves from an understanding of the indi-

vidual word senses (padartha-s) to an understanding of the

sentence sense (vakyartha) as a whole as it has been descri-

bed in the previous paragraph.

: In summarizing Sankara's ideas on the exegesis of

statements such as "That thou art " we may say that, first

of all, he clearly distinguishes them as being statements

of unity. The fact that their true purport is the unquali-

fied unity be tween their constituent elements is what se-

parates them from all other Upanisadic. statements dealing

with Brahman. Secondly, this umity comes to be realized

through the determination of the correct meanings of the

individual words of the sentences through the process of

anvayavyatireka which seems to lay the groundwork for the

sentence analysis by the discarding of the contradictory

portions (e.g., the duhkhitva in terms of "thou" and the

paroksatva in terms of "that") of the ordinary sense of

the individual words. It.is important to take note of the

fact that Sankara nowhere mentions the term laksana (se-

condary usage of language) in his exegesis of statements

like "That thou art."

Turning to Suresvara, we find that, as with Sankara,

he does not employ the word mahavakya in his writings. In

addition to this, the lists of Upanisadic sentences in which

46

the statements "That, thou art " and "I am Brahman " were

often found in Sankara are absent in Suresvara, but per-

haps this is simply due to the fact that almost all of

his writing is in verse form. Aside from this, the two

statements do seem to possess a more prominent profile in

Suresvara's work than they did in the work of Sańkara (e.g.,

see NAIS II. 54-58 and the whole of the third chapter of

that work as well).

Suresvara is distinguished by Sarvajfatman as ap-

plying gunavrtti and what Sarvajnatman calls jahallaksana

(non-inclusive secondary usage -- see PP trans. p. 86) in the

analysis of the statement "I am Brahman ", and in doing

so Suresvara seems to be the first Advaitin to apply sab-

davrtti-s to mahavakya-s in an outright fashion. This is Suresvara's innovation to the exegesis of mahavakya-s.

Just as with Sankara, Suresvara holds that one can

obtain knowledge of Brahman only through sentences like

"That thou art." (" ... vedantāgamavakyadeva samyagjnanam."

-- NAIS I. 1. prose) and that one can correctly understand

these sentences only by first recalling the proper meanings

of their individual word-components through the process of

-See PP trans. p. 85 where Sarvajnatman quotes .NAIS II. 55 and also the paragraph pp. 86-7 (notes 26-8) which seems to directly presuppose NAIS II. 54.

47

anvayavyatireka. Also just as with Sankara (see above p.

44. it is the subject element (the "I" and the "thou")

rather than the predicate ("Brahman" and the "that") in

these sentences which is the crucial point of entry into

their proper exegesis. Thus we find that the aim of the.

whole second chapter of NAIS is to establish the correct

meaning of the term "thou" and it does so through the pro-

cess of separating the eternal or constant element in the

notion of subject from those elements which are not con-

stant but eventually fall away (e.g .; the body, sense or-

gans, etc. ). Without the employment of such a process

of anvayavyatireka to understand the underlying sense of

tat and tvam one could not properly understand a statement such. as "That thou art." 73 Once one comprehends the true

senses of the words tat-tvam one can begin to deal with

propositions such as "That thou art. " without falling prey

to thèir surface contradictions.

. Dealing with the sentence "That thou art " as a

73Following NAIS II. 9: "Anvayavyatirekābhyam vina vakyarthabodhanam/ Na syat tena vinajhanaprahanam nopapad- yate//" ("There would be no understanding of the meaning of the great Upanisadic sentences without the process of posi- tive and negative concommittance, and without that there is no possibility of ignorance being. destroyed."). The pro- cess is further mentioned at NAIS ITI. 4; 22; 28; 36; 38; 46 prose; 53; TUBHV III. 19.

48

whole, Suresvara posits three relations to occur between

the two components tat and tvam. The first is one of gram-

matical co-ordination or identity of case (samanādhikaranya)

between the words themselves; the second is the relation of

qualification and qualified thing (visesanavisesyata) be-

tween the two word senses (padartha-s); the third is the

relation between indirect indication and the indirectly in-

dicated thing (laksyalaksanasambandha), and obtains between

the individual word senses (padärtha-s) and the sentence

sense (vakyartha) as a whole. 74 This, in fact, seems to.

be the source for Sarvajnatman's similar analysis of maha-

vakya-s at SS I. 169-70 and PP trans. p. 91. Both thinkers

seem to agree that the relation of indirect indication and

indirectly indicated thing is the only manner of interpret-

"Samanadhikaranyam ca visesanavi- śesyatã/ 'NAIS III. 3: Laksyalaksanasambandhah padārthapratyagatmanam//" (There is grammatical co-ordination and the relation be- tween qualification and qualified thing, the relation of indirect indication to indirectly indicated thing is between the word senses and the inward self [which is the sentence sense]."). Our paraphrase of this passage follows Hacker's (Untersuchungen ... , p. 78) translation of Jhanottama's com- mentary on the verse since Suresvara himself is not precise here and because Jhanottama's remarks do seem to correctly describe what Suresvara does when he treats of these rela- tions (NAIS III. 3; 9-11; 25-26). In fact, Hacker's ex- planation of Suresvara's exegesis of statements such as "That thou art " and "I am Brahman " is the most valuable secondary source on this topic (see Untersuchungen ... , .pp. 73-79 and 101-102) if one does take into account the con- sideration that he does depend on Jñanottama excessively.

49

ing the sentence "That thou art " which is actually free

from contradiction (virodha).

The process of perceiving these three relations in

the statement "That thou art " involves two movements.

First of all there is the movement towards laksyalaksana-

sambandha, which involves the perception of a contradic-

tion concerning the identity between the two entities de-

scribed by the words "that" and "thou" present on the level

of grammatical apposition (samanyadhikaranya), that is,

though the case terminations say that the two are one, we

still find two words which must refer to separate entities.

In order to avoid this contradiciton one confronts the

statement on the level of visesanavisesyata so that the

entity referred to by the word "thou" becomes qualified

by the qualification 'being free from suffering' which is

an essential qualification of the entity referred to by the

word "that", and conversely "that" becomes qualified by

'being inward', or in other words 'being immediate', which

is characteristic of the entity referred to by the word "thou". 75 However, this leads to the problem that we would

7>NAIS III, 10: "Nirduhkhitvam tvamarthasya tad- . arthena visesanāt/ Pratyakta ca tadarthasya tvampadenasya samnidheh//" ( The sense of the word "thou" is one who is free from suffering because there is qualification of it by the sense of the word 'that', and the sense of the word

50

have to admit two contradictory qualities existing in the

same locus for each of the entities called "that" and cal-

led "thou". These contradictions, which arise from con-

sidering the purport of these sentences on the level of

the primary meanings of its words, lead us to the abandon-

ment of those primary meanings and the employment of la-

ksyalaksanasambandha, which in itself resolves these con-

tradictions through the exclusion (vyavrtti or hana) of

their mutually contradictory primary senses (i.e., sadvi-

tIya for tvam and paroksya for tat -- see note 75 above) and

the retainment (upadana) of that sense which is the under-

lying substratum (nisthatman -- NAIS III. 76) of those con-

tradictory senses. /7

Once this first movement has been completed there

76As stated at NAIS II. 38: "Dharminasca viruddha- tvanna drsyagunasangatih/ Mārutāndolitajvalam saityam nāg- nim sisrpsati//" (" Just as coolness cannot creep into a ra- ging wind-fanned fire, objectifiable qualities are not asso- ciated [with the Self] because that would mean that the sub- stratum [of those qualities, tradicted."). namely, the Self] would be con- Also see NAIS III. 25 and SV 121; in the lat- ter visesanavisesyatā is said not to exist without ignorance ("Navidyamantarenaisam visesanavisesyata/").

For this see NAIS III. 76-80 and also the prose portion of NAIS III. 26. There is a structural similarity' here with Sarvajnatman's notion of jahadajahallaksana (both non-inclusive and inclusive secondary. usage.of language -- see PP trans. pp. 84 and 86) and is probably a source for it.

51

is, through the admission of laksyalaksanasambandha, a pos-

sibility of rectifying the surface contradictions which

were apparent in terms of samanadhikaranya and visesana-

visesyata in the sentence on the primary level of language

by employing an exclusion (vyavrtti) of those portions of

the primary senses of tat and tvam which are contradictory

from taking part in the grammatical or qualifier-qualified

relation that occurs among the sentence components. :78 This

second or downward movement shows how, once properly un-

derstood, the true purport of the sentence, which is the

unity of tat and tvam, can be apprehended on all levels.

Another feature which distinquishes Suresvara's

7oThus we find NAIS III. 9: "Samanadhikaranyader- ghatetarakhayoriva/ Vyavrtteh syadavākyārthah sāksannas- tattvamarthayoh//" ( That which cannot be the sense of any sentence but which belongs to the senses of 'that' and 'thou' occurs to us directly due to the exclusion from the rela- tion of grammatical co-ordination etc., [of the contradic- tory portions of the sense of those two words], just as in the case of the ether in a pot and the other [all-pervasive] ether."). See Hacker, Untersuchungen ... , p. 78 for an ex- planation of the ether simile; briefly, in the statement "The pot-ether is the great ether.", the surface contradic- tions are resolved by excluding the notion of limitation in the case of the pot-ether and the notion of greatness, which distinguishes the all-pervasive ether from all other limited ethers, from the great ether, thus revealing that one and the same ether is the true sense of the statement. This verse recurs at TUBHV II. 658. Of the different transla- tions of this verse available (A. J. Alston 1971; R. Balasu- bramanian 1974; P. Hacker Untersuchungen ... , p. 79; S. S. raghavachar 1965; J. M. van Boetzelaer 1971) Hacker seems to place it in its most proper context, while van Boetzelaer's seems to be the most mistaken. Compare the similar use of varana (exclusion) in NAIS III. 2.

52

exegesis of statements such as "That thou art " is that he

paradoxically explains their meaning (vakyartha) as that

which cannot be the meaning or sense of any sentence (avak- yartha).79 Among the earlist and most general ways of

explaining the nature of the relation that subsists between

the component parts of a sentence and that work towards

producing the sentence sense (vakyartha) were those of ei-

ther a combinative interrelation (samsarga) or an exclu-

sive interrelation (bheda), 80 but according to Suresvara

the sense of statements such as "I am Brahman " or "That

thou art " can be neither of these, 81 instead it is inca-

79A. J. Alston in his translation of NAIS (Reali- zation of the Absolute, London: Shanti Sadan, 1971) notes, under NAIS I. 67 prose portion, that this idea that know- ledge of Brahman is non-verbal and non-relational may stem from Mandana Miśra.

See K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, 2nd ed. (1977; rpt. Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre) pp. 191-93 for an explanation of these two terms.

-As at SV 902: "Anyatreva na capyatra vakyartho bhedalaksanah/ Samsargalaksano vāpi brahmatmabhedato bha- vet//"( Elsewhere, but not here [i.e., in the sentence 1That thou art.'] the sentence sense is characterized by either exclusive interrelation [of the components] or com- binative interrelation [of the components] for Brahman and atman are not different."). Also see SV 903-7 and NAIS III. 26 prose (in the latter, avakyārtha is described as Being free from both combinative and exclusive interrela- tion, i.e., bhedasamsargarahita). Sarvajñatman too denies samsarga for That thou ar+ at SS I. 145 and 195 which may be compared with Suresvara's rebuke of it at NAIS III. 76-78.

53

pable of being reduced to the sense of any sentence. 82

It is this avakyartha which one finally attains in senten-

ces such as "That thou art." through the application of

anvayavyatireka to the components involved" and the reso-

lution of the contradictions apparent in terms of sāman-

adhikaranya and visesanavisesyata in the sentence by the

For example at TUBHV II 6,42, Brahman's being avakyartha is explained as follows:

Nanapadarthasamsargalaksano tyam yatah smrtah Vākyartho vakyavidbhirhi pramāvakyam ca no matam Tasya cāvisayatvattu brahmavākyartharupabhrt.

(Since this thing which is sentence sense is de- scribed by those who know about sentences as cha- racterized by being a combinative interrelation of various words, and since our opinion is that an Upa- nisadic sentence is a valid means of knowledge [con- cerning Brahman7, then, because it is not an object, Brahman possesses a nature which is not capable of becoming the content of any sentence.)

The term is used tepeatedly in TUBHV, occuring at II. 99; 392; 534; 618; 641-2 ;. 647; 658-9; 664; III. 35; and it also occurs at NAIS III. 2 prose; 3 prose; 9; 39 prose (also com- pare the phrase "Na padārtho na vakyartha atmayam .... " " at SV 462).

83As at NAIS III. 28 prose: "Iyam cavakyarthapra- tipattiranvayavyatirekabhijfasyaiva. 7And this uncerstand- ing of what cannot be the content of any sentence belongs only to him that knows positive and negative concommitance."). Also compare a similar statement at NAIS III. 39 prose: "Anvayavyatirekapurassaram vakyamevavākyartharupamātmanam pratipadayatiti .... .(The Upanisadic sentence alone, as preceded by the process of positive and negative concomit- tance, teaches that atman which cannot become the content of any sentence."); and TUBHV II. 656-7.

54

adoption of laksyalaksanasambandha.

In summarizing Suresvara's approach to the analy-

sis of statements such as "That thou art." we may say that

a) he does accept the application of gunavrtti and laksana (see pp. 32-34 above) to them; b) just as with Sankara,

anvayavyatireka plays a' crucial role in the analysis of

these sentences by serving as the means of determining the

correct senses of the individual terms aham ("I") and tvam

("thou") and that it is this subject-element in the sen-

tences which serves as the important point of entry to their

exegesis; c) once the true sense of the individual terms

has been determined, one can move through the contradic-

tions apparent on the levels of samanadhikaranya and vi- Sesanavisesyata to the adoption of laksyalaksanasambandha . . in order to obtain the proper sentence sense; d) this final

sentence sense is paradoxically that which cannot be the

sense of any sentence (avakyartha).

It is on this foundation, as created by Sańkara

and Suresvara, that Sarvajnatman directly builds his her-

meneutics, and more often than making innovations on their

ideas, Sarvajnatman simply clarifies or elaborates what

seems to have stood as implicit in them. In moving from

Sankara through Suresvara to Sarvajñatman, we can discern

an increasing emphasis on the crucial role that the under-

55

standing of the proper sense of statements such as "That

thou art " and "I am Brahman " plays in the system. With

Sarvajfatman the use of the term mahāvākya becomes a ne-

cessity, since it is made clear in his writings that the

understanding of all else (e.g., inter-scholastic polemics)

in the Advaita Vedänta system is incidental to the proper

understanding of such statements which encapsulate within

them the whole truth of the system itself.

In his hermeneutics Sarvajnatman first of all makes

a clear and central distinction between mahāvakya-s and

avāntaravakya-s (see pp. 35-36 above) and in doing so he

makes a shift from Suresvara's emphasis on entering upon

the examination of the mahavakya-s from the inward or sub-

jective perspective (i.e., through examining the sense of

the words aham and tvam -- see p. 47 above) and the applica-

tion of anvayavyatireka to properly determine the content

of that subjective element which accompanies it, to an em-

phasis on the remaining element (i.e., that denoted by the

terms Brahman and tat) with the role of anvayavyatireka

there being taken care of by the function of the avantara-

vākya-s. Sarvajñatman seems to try to make of the exege-

sis of mahavakya-s a more closed system in the sense that,

by entering into the mahavakya through the Brahman-element

(Brahman being the import of sruti or revelation as estab-

56

lished, at length, by Sankara at BSBH I. 1. 4), the inves-

tigator (mumuksu or brahmajijnasu) need never go outside

of sruti to find the necessary information about it.

Sarvajfatman discusses the extent (parimana) of

both the positive (vidhi) and negative (nisedha or prati-

sedha) avantaravakya-s at SS III. 312-26 and there we find

that in both cases one determines the extent by a gather-

ing together (upasamhara, see PP trans. note 66) of unre-

peated Upanisadic words that refer to the supreme Self

(paratman -- see SS III. 314-15 and 317-18). Thus, in terms

of the positive avantaravakya-s we obtain ten different

predicates (Suddha, buddha, mukta, etc., see PP trans. note

58); however, Sarvajhatman seems less specific about the

number of negative predicates (the example of śruti which

seems most often quoted by Sarvajnatman in this respect is

BU III. viii. 8, as at SS I. 254 and 256). Since the ne-

gative avantaravakya-s merely negate what has sprung up

out of ignorance, 84 while the positive avantaravakya-s also

aim at affirming the essential qualities of Brahman, 85 sar-

84SŚ III. 320a: "Yadiha kimcidabodhasamudbhavam tadakhilam pratisedhati kevalam/" ( Whatever has arisen out of ignorance in this world, that [the negative subsi- diary statements] negate entirely.").

85SŚ III. 319a: bhavati samgrahavarjanarupakam/ "Vidhivacasyubhayam tu pade pade (But each word in. the

57

jnatman takes the purpose of the nerative statements

to be only the clarification of the sense of the words tat d tvam, 86 86 and the confirmation of the possibility (sam-

bhavana) that such an entity as described by the positive

avantaravakya-s could exist. 87 They do not, as the posi-

tive avāntaravakya-s do, give rise to a positive transfor-

mation of knowledge (buddhivrtti or dhI)e that will des-

positive subsidiary statements has both the nature of con- veying and negating [something about Brahman].").

86ss I. 256b: "Evam tattvamasItivakyagatayostat- tvampadoktarthayoh samsuddhyaiva tu neti neti vacanam mo- ksaya saksanna tu// ( Thus, the phrase 'Not this, not this.' is meant only for the clarification of the mentioned senses of the words 'that' and 'thou' as they are found in sentences such as 'That thou art/'; it is not directly for the sake of final release.").

87- I. 263a: "Satyam iñanamanantamityabhihite sambhavana niyate nasthuladivacahsamudbhavadhiya dvaitopa- mardam vina/ ( Without the knowledge which is produced from statements such as 'Not gross .... etc. and which de- stroys duality, when it is stated that [Brahman] is truth, knowledge, the infinite, the possibility [of it] is not realized/"). Also see note 146 to PP trans ..

88 As described at SS II, 125a: "Brahmaj fānasam- udbhavam grahanam satigraham brahmanah svakaragrahanena vedasiraso jâtà matirbadhate/ ("That mental state born out of the Upanisads sublates the senses and their objects which are produced from ignorance, because it apprehends the reflection of Brahman in itself/"). ' Of course the transformation of knowledge that finally liberates can only come from the mahavakya-s, but the point is that the positive avantaravakya-s, as opposed to the negative ones, do make a positive contribution to the attainment of this final knowledge. Also see SS I. 341-2; II. 53; III 306-7.

58

troy ignorance and lead directly to liberation (see SS I.

253-4) and are thus regarded as mere restatements (anuvak-

ya-s) of the destruction of duality made known by the posi-

tive subsidiary statements. 89 It is in this way that the

avantaravakya-s are taken by Sarvajnatman as clarifying

the sense of the term "that" in the mahavakya "That thou

art."

Using the avantaravakya-s in the above manner to

determine the sense of the word tat as the qualified Brah-

man, and putting this together with the given immediacy of

our own subjective perspective as the sense of the word

tvam, one gains entry into the mahavakya on the surface

level, that is, on the level of the primary sense of its

components and a level on which contradictions still abound.

Then one proceeds to discover that the only manner in which one

can resolve these apparent contradictions is by dealing

with the relationship of the components involved on a se- condary level.90 In this respect SarvajHatman differen-

9Sarvajnatman cites 'the opposing view which pla- ces both negative and positive statements about Brahman on an equal footing at SS I. 250ff. and ST on this verse attributes it to Mandanamisra, however, T. Vetter (Sarva- jAatman's SanksepasarIrakam I. Kapitel, 1972) takes this as an injustice to Mandanamisra's position (note to S$ I.250).

9This refers to the samanadhikaranya, visesanavi- sesyata, laksyalaksanasambandha progression which Sarvajhat- man adopts from Suresvara (see above pp. 46-50; SS I. 196-7).

59

tiatès three separate types of secondary usage of words:

non-inclusive (jahallaksana), inclusive (ajahallaksana),

and both inclusive and non-inclusive (jahadajahallaksana)

-- each being thus termed as to whether or not they include,

that is retain, their primary sense (mukhyavrtti).91 of

these, he principally accepts only jahadajahallaksana as

' being able to reveal the true import of the mahavakya-s

although he concedes, perhaps simply out of deference, Su-

resvara's positon that gunavrtti and jahallaksana might. also yield the proper sense of the ma İvakya "I am Brah-

man." 92

In order to accommodate this adoption of jahadaja-

.hallaksana, in which a portion of the primary sense of the

word involved is given up and a portion of it, retained,

"-The use of this three-fold distinction seems to be an innovation on the part of Sarvajnatman, for an ex- planation of them, along with the appropriate examples, see PP trans. pp. 3-4. The three are also treated of at ss I. 154 with the corresponding examples found in every -. day language (laukikavakya-s) given at SS I. 155-6 and those from Veda at SS I. 157.

92Sarvajfatman clearly establishes the fact that jahadajahallaksana is the only way of revealing the pra- tyagatman. which is. the true sense of the mahavakya-s at PP trans. p. 5, but on pp. 4-5 of the same work he also states that gunavrtti is applicable to them, and on pp. 5-6 concedes that in a. certain sense jahallaksana may also be applicable (also see SS I. 233).

60

Sarvajnatman takes the primary senses of the words tat and

tvam to be neither their ultimate connotation, which would

be what is indicated by their secondary sense (1.e., the

supreme Self or paratman), nor their given or daily usa-

ges,being that which is the source of the universe and the

ego respectively, but rather, a blend of both of these por-

tions in each case is meant, so that the primary sense of

tat is a mixed Brahman (sabalabrahman), that is, a trans-

cendent Brahman which is mixed or associated with all the

qualifications ascribed to it by the positive avantaravāk-

ya-s, and the primary sense of the word tvam is the inward .

from as mixed with the qualities of being possessed of du-

ality and all the qualifications we normally associate with the given subject. 93 This same structure, in which the

primary sense of a word is a mixture (sabala or samparka)

of its secondary sense and its given sense, is further em-

ployed by Sarvajnatman to construct primary senses for the

words satya (the true), jñana (knowledge), ananda (bliss),

nitya (eternal), Suddha (pure), mukta (freed), and sat (the

existent), at SS I. 178-184. These are the key components

of the avantaravakya-s, but Sarvajnatman aiso does this

93See PP trans. pp. 90-1, where'this is made clear with respect to the terms. "I"' and "Brahman": for the process as it relates to the words and pp. 108-9. "that". and "thou".

61

for the words "Brahman" and atman at SS I. 158-9: The rea-

son for this seems to be that these words might'easily avail

themselves of jahadajahallaksana and indicate an impartite

sense (akhandartha) without contradiction.94

In this way, since the primary senses of both the

„words tat and tvam already conceal within themselves their

true or secondary sense, this process of jahadajahallaksana

is merely a logical way of liberating that portion of their

primary senses which do not fall short of the true import

of the mahavakya-s. Thus, in respect to the word tat, the

qualified or limited (upahita) portion signified by the

word päroksya (the non-immediate) is given up and the un-

limited portion signified by the word advaya (the non-dual)

is retained; similarly for the word tvam, the limited por-

tion signified by the word sadvitIya (possessing duality)

is abandoned and the unlimited portion signified by the

word pratyak (that which is inward) is retained .? ' 'The re-

94 "These words cannot yield liberational knowledge in themselves and thus must be seen as different from ma- havakya-s. Cf., SS I. 191, where Sarvajnatman makes the concession (praudhivada) that gunavrtti and jahallaksana should be used to interpret the sense of these words.

9>This operation is described in relation to the terms "I" and "Brahman" at. PP trans. pp. 91-92 and also. compare this with pp. 108-9 of that text on tat and tvam. We also find the following statement at S$ I. 160:

62

tained portions are what each word signifies secondarily

and it is the complete and utter identity of these two se -.

condary senses (laksyartha-s) which is the result of this

whole operation and the true import of a sentence like

"That thou art."

While Sankara did not really have a term to denote

this final import or sentence sense (vakyartha) of state-

ments such as "That thou art." and while Suresvara seemed

to favour the paradoxical term avakyartha (that which can-

not be the sense of any sentence -- see above p. 52), Sarva-

jñätman prefers to use the term akhanda (partless) or.akhan- dartha (impartite sense).96 Essentailly there seems to be

Tacchabdavacyagatamadvayabhāgamekam pratyaktvamātramavirodhamapeksamanah; Tvamsabdavacyasabalasthamupadadano vākyādakhandamatha tattvamasTti vidyat.

(Who aspires to non-contradiction [in the sense of the mahavakyal, must make use of that one por- tion of the non-dual contained in the expressed sense of the word tat [and] that bare inwardness found in that mixed entity which is the expressed sense of the word tvam, it is then that from the : great Upanisadic statement "That thou art " one might know that thing which is partless.)

Though we still have the secondary senses of tat and tvam described by two separate words (i.e., the non-daul and in- wardness), their apposition in the sentence "Tattvamasi. allows for the final enlightening leap to a direct awarè- ness of absolute unity (ekatva) which crowns the Advaita Vedanta system.

90See SS I. 145-51; 160; and 195-6.

63

no difference between what Suresvara means by his use of .

avakyartha and Sarvajnatman's use of akhandartha; both of

them use it to show that the sense of a sentence such as

"That thou art." cannot be the result of any relation (sam-

sarga or bheda, see above p. 52),97 rather it is a partless

whole which secondarily conveys the total identity of the

entities signified by the terms tat and tvam.

In summarizing Sarvajnatman's contribution to Ad-

vaita Vedanta hermeneutics, we may say that it is basically

two-fold. First of all, he introduces the notion of ma-

havakya to describe the two statements "That thou art "

and "I am Brahman " whose purport is the complete identity

of the living subject (jIvätman) with the Absolute (Brah-

man) as conveyed through an ipartite sentence sense (akhan-

dartha) as opposed to all other Upanisadic statements about

the Absolute which are subsidiary (avantaravakya-s) and

which are meant to qualify it either positively (vidhivakya)

or negatively (nisedhavakya). In doing this he gives the

dominant role to the positive subsidiary statements over

the negative ones in their ability to contribute to the un-

derstanding of the final sense of the mahāvakya and thus

9For Sarvajfatman's viewpoint on this see SS I. 145-6 and SS I. 195 (cf., SS I. 218-21 where akhanda is termed a principal(mukhya) syntactical relation and sam- sarga a secondary (gauna) one.

64

he falls more closely in line with later. Advaitins rather

than with thinkers such as Sankara, Mandanamisra, and Su-

reśvara, who seem to place the positive and negative state-

ments about Brahman on much the same level when it comes

to contributing to knowledge about Brahman. Secondly, Sar-

vajfätman introduces the three-fold division of laksana

and most importantly the notion of jahadajahallaksana which

was to become the staple explanation of the later Advaitins

in their discussions of the manner in which the mahāvakya-s

convey an impartite sense (akhandartha). Though the ba-

sic structural operation of jahadajahallaksana can already

be found in Sankara and Suresvara (see above pp. 41-42 and

50), Sarvajnatman codifies it and clearly adds to it with

his introduction of the idea that the primary sense of the

words involved in the mahavakya is an associated entity

(sabalavastu) which already contains, as a portion of it-

self, that which eventually becomes its secondary sense

(laksyartha). Broadly speaking, these are Sarvajnatman's

main contributions to the Advaita Vedanta hermeneutics.

VI. Metaphysics and the Problem of the Locus of

Ignorance in Sańkara, Suresvara, and Sarva-

j ñätman

To whom does ignorance belong? Where.does it

claim its foothold in order to gain whatever measure of

ontological reality it may merit in the Advaita Vedanta

system? Basically, there are two possibilities which to-

gether form an apparently irreducible dilemna. Either

ajfana (ignorance) has its locus (asraya) in Brahman, in

which case, Brahman could no longer be held to be the part-

less and pure entity serving as the irreducible base of

Advaitism, or, ajñana has its locus in the jIva ( the li-

ving subject), in which case, one is faced with the contra-

diction that, since the jIva is an effect or product of

ignorance (ajñanakarya), there would be a point, prior to

the arisal of that product, when ignorance would be without

a locus.

This problem gains more and more philosophic atten-

tion in the Advaita Vedanta school as we move ahead from

the time of Sankara.9. 9.9 On the whole, one must say that Śaň-

For a brief but informative survey of this, see E. A. Solomon's Avidya -- A Problem of Truth and Reality, (Ah- medabad: Gujarat University, 1969), pp. 254-299.

65

66

kara and Suresvara are vague on the topic; however, tradi-

tion seems to accept them as being united in holding that

Brahman is both the locus (aśraya) and object (visaya) of

ajnana. The archtypical exponent of the contrary position,

namely, that the jIva is really the locus of ajfana, is

Mandanamisra and it is at him that Sarvajnatman directs his main polemic.100

Sankara himself provides scant detail on this prob-

lem, 101 but there seem to be at least four definite places

where he touches upon the subject. The chief of these oc-

curs at BHGBH XIII. 2 pp. 371-73. There, in response to

the question "Whose is ignorance?" ("Atrāha savidyā kas-

yeti?" -- p. 371) from the opponent, Sankara replies, "It

belongs to the one it is perceived to belong to." ("Yasya

drsyate tasyaiva." -- p. 372). From this we get the imme-

diate impression that Sankara holds that the jIva must be

the locus of ignorance; however, if we go on a bit further

100See PP trans. note 180.

101Two papers are helpful on this point, Paul Hack- er's section on avidya in his "Eigentumlichkeiten der Lehre und Terminologie Sankaras: Avidya, Namarupa, Maya, Isvara", Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft 100, No. 1 (1950), 246-286, and Daniel H. H. Ingalls, " kara on the Question; Whose is avidya?", Philosophy East and West, 3, No. 1' (1953), 69-72.

67

into the passage we can see that Sankara's aim here is more

didactic than one of philosophical exactitude. The oppo-

nent carries on the inquiry with the question: "Of whom

is it perceived?" ("Kasya drsyate?"); but Sańkara quickly

cuts him off: "The question 'Of whom is ignorance perc-

eived?' is pointless. How? If ignorance is perceived,

then that to which.it belongs must also be perceived." ("At-

rocyate 'vidya kasya drśyata iti praśno nirarthakah. Ka-

tham, drsyate cedavidya tadvantamapi pasyasi."). This same

didactic tenor is echoed in a thematically similar passage

at BSBH IV. i. 3 p. 800: "Kasya punarayamaprabodha iti cet

-- yastvam prcchasi tasya ta iti vadāmah. NanvahamIšvara

evoktah śrutya, yadyeva pratibuddho 'si, nasti kasyacid- 7 aprabodhah." ("If it is asked: 'Whose is this ignorance?'

-- we say: 'You who ask are the one to whom it belongs.'.

But [you may object]: 'It has been stated in scripture

that I am the Lord.'; [we say:] 'If you are so knowledge-

able, then ignorance belongs to nobody at all."). The fact that Sankara's aim in these passages is to show that igno-

rance should in no way be ultimately connected with Brah-

man is made clear further on in BHGBH XIII. 2 p. 373 in the

following summary statement: "Yadā caivamavidyāduhkhitvād-

yairna jñatuh ksetrajnasya kimciddusyati." ("And when this

is so, the knower, i.e., the field-knower, cannot be de-

68

filed in any way by ignorance, being the sufferer and si-

milar things.").

. However, in two other places we encounter a slight-

ly. different view on this topic. At BSBH I. iv. 3 pp. 287- 288, in refuting the Sankhya theory of causality, Sankara

makes the following statement about ignorance in its causal

aspect (i.e., as the seed-potency or bIjasakti of the uni-

verse) : "Avidyātmaka hi bIjaaktiravyaktasabdanirdeśya

paramesvarasraya .... " ("For the seed-potency, which con-

sists of ignorance and which is denoted by the word 'un-

manifested', has its locus in the supreme Isvara .... "), San-

kara clearly recognizes that, as the causal principle of

the universe, avidya cannot claim to have its locus in any

one of its products (1.e., in the jiva), and so he takes

Brahman (paramesvara) as being its locus. . The other state-

ment occurs at BUBH I. iv. 10 p. 670 11. 4-6: " ... navidya-

kartr bhrantam ca brahma. Kintu naivābrahma avidyākartā

cetano bhranto 'nya isyate." (" ... Brahman is neither the

author of ignorance nor is it subject to error. Neverthe-

less, it is indeed not admitted that there is another con-

scious entity which is different from Brahman that is the

author of ignorance and is subject to error."). Here,

though there is no specific mention of the locus of ignor-

ance, we can get a clear idea that, although Sańkara wants

69

to avoid any association of ignorance with Brahman at all

costs, ultimately he cannot place it anywhere else. This

is the true dilemna for Sankara concerning the locus of

ignorance, and it is in the light of these last two state

ments that I think one must view passages such as the ones

cited in the previous paragraph which seem to place the

ontological accountability for ignorance (alñana or avidya)

on the shoulders of the jIva.

Suresvara is also aware of the problem of locating

ignorance in its proper place. Without doing so one can-

not fit any ontological status to it, and so at NAIS III. 1

prose p. 226 11. 6-8 he states the following: "Tacca ajfa-

nam svātmamātranimittam na sambhavatIti kasyacit kasmimścid

visaye bhavati -- ityabhupagantavyam." ("And therefore one

has to admit that the fact that ignorance is caused simply

out of itself is impossible; it [must always] belong to a

certain thing [i.e., have its locus in something] and be in.

relation to some sort of object fof which there is ignor-

ance]."). As with Sankara, Suresvara on the one hand wants

no relation to subsist between Brahman and ignorance that

would affect the purity of Brahman. For example, at NAIS

II. 53 prose, Suresvara states: "Na tu paramarthata atmano

'vidyayā tatkāryena vā sambandho 'bhūt, asti, bhavisyati va.

Tasyapariluptadrstisvabhavyat." ("But in reality the atman

70

neither has had, now has, nor will have any relation with

ignorance or its products, because the atman possesses a

nature which is undefiled consciousness."). On the other

hand, in terms of causality, he cannot escape admitting

ignorance to be the source for the relation which the at-

man has with what is ultimately unreal and superimposed

upon it (1.e., adhyasa), as at NAIS III. 20 prose: "Tay oh

kutasthaparinaminoh atmananavabodha eva sambandhahetuh, na

punarvastavah kascidapi sambandha upapadyate .... ". ("Non-

knowledge of the atman alone is the reason for the rela-

tion between the changeless entity and the modified entity,

but in reality, no relation whatsoever is possible .... ").

In terms of his final conclusions on the topic,

Suresvara is far clearer than Sankara. At NAIS III. 1

prose, having admitted that there are two categories (pa-

dartha-s) of things in the world, the atman and what is

not the atman, Suresvara presents a string of reasons as

to why the latter cannot serve as the locus of ignorance:

Tasya hi svarūpamevajnanam; na hi svato 'jnanasya- JHanam ghatate. Sambhavadapyaianasvabhave "jKanam kamatisayam janayet. Na ca tatra jhanaprantirasti yena tatpratisedhatmakamajhanam syat. Anatmanasca- jhanaprasutatvat. Na hi purvasiddham sat tato lab- dhatmabhavasya setsyata āsrayasyasrayi sambhavati. Tadanapeksyasya ca tasya nihsvabhavatvat.

71

(For the very nature of it [i.e., the anatman] is ignorance; indeed it is not possible that ignor- ance belong [1.e., have its locus in] to ignorance itself [which would be the admission of the fault of self-dependence or atmaśraya7. Even if this were possible, what special change would ignorance give rise to in something whose nature was [already] ignorance? And the attainment of knowledge does not exist in it [i.e., the anätman as the locus of ignorance], whereby ignorance could have the nature of negating that [knowledge -- and thus ignorance would exist without a purpose (nisprayojana) in the anatmanl. And there is the further reason that the anatman has been produced form ignorance. For it is impossible that what has been established as existing earlier [namely, ignorance] be the thing that rests on a locus which is yet to be establi- shed and which is obtained from that (ignorance]. And for the reason that it [the anatman/ which is completely dependent on ignorance, has no nature of its own [apart from it].)

It is these reasons, and predominantly the causal one (1.e.,

since the jIva is an effect of ajhana it cannot serve as

its locus), which force Suresvara to the following conclu-

sion later on in the same passage: "Evam tavannanatmano

'iñanitvam, napi tadvisayamajnanam. Parisesyādātmana evas-

tvajnanam." ("Thus the anatman is not the locus of ignorance,

ignorance is not even its content. Let ignorance belong to

the atman alone since that is the remaining alternative.").

Both Sankara and Suresvara exemplify the earliest

phase of dealing with this problem, but in general it does

not seem to have been a preoccupation with them. Sarva-

jnatman, however, does mean to set aside some space stric-

72

tly for resolving this issue and thus he seems to consider

it a relevant problem. In doing this he is more represen-

tative of the analytic concerns of later Advaitins, or at

least, he represents a transition between these two periods.

For Sarvajhatman there are two entities which can be

held accountable for ignorance, namely, Brahman and what is

not-Brahman or ajñana. The former is ultimately real, while

the latter is ultimately illusory and gains whatever claim

to provisional reality it has through its association with

Brahman. Sarvajnatman also clearly recognizes the fact

that the locus of ignorance cannot be ignorance itself (see

S$ II. 218-19) or its effects (i.e., ajñanakārya and speci-

fically the jIva, see SS III. 15) but must be the pure Brah- 102 man. However, the logical difficulty is at exactly this

point, since Sarvajnatman also accepts the fact that pure

Brahman cannot be associated with anything that has to do

with ignorance. 103 Therefore, the whole problem for Sarva-

10zAmong the terms that Sarvajnatman employs to refer to that entity which serves as the locus of ignor- ance are the following: "the bare Self" (atmatvamatra SS I. 20); "consciousness" (citavastu, cit, SS I. 318); part- less consciousness" (nirvibhagaciti Ss f. 319); "the inward entity" (pratyagvastu SS II. 127; pratyaktvamatra SS II. 212).

103As at SS III. 24: "Na hi kalpanaviracitam vi- racitam vitatham paramatmavastvavitatham sprsati/ Param- ātmavastu ca tatha tamasa parikalpitam na kimapi spršati//" ("For a thing which is unreal and which is constructed out

73

jfatman, in his claiming that pure Brahman is the locus of

ignorance, is how can Brahman, the sole reality and com-

pletely free from any association, enter into a relation

with ignorance which is ultimately unreal? What is the

cement that could account for such a paradoxical bond as

that involved in' saying that Brahman is the locus of.ig-

norance?

& Sarvajhatman at least names this 'cement', in what

for him is the correct formula describing' Brahman's rela-

tionship to that state of affairs which is phenomenal ex-

istence, when he states: .. Brahman in its inward form

is the locus of knowledge and ignorance." (PP trans. p. 113 -- "Brahmanasca pratyagrupena jmanainanasrayatvam .... " ).

Now by this term "inward form" or pratyagrupa, Sarvajñat-

man clearly does not intend the fIva (the living subject)

since he explains that there is a non-correspondence (vy-

abhicara) between ignorance (which is present) and the jIva

(which is absent) in the state of deep sleep (susupti). :104

of imagination [1.e., ighorance] does not come into asso- ciation with that real entity which is the supreme atman/ And similarly, that entity which is the supreme atman does not come into association with anything whatsoever that is imagined out of ignorance//"); the example is given at S III. 25.

104 'Sarvajhatman provides this argument at PP trans. 'pp. 113-4 and for further references to susupti as the state.

74

He also does not intend pure Brahman here, since that would

render the key portion of the statement tautologous and lo-

gically uninformative, and it is obvious that Sarvajfatman

means a definite aspect-of Brahman in his choice of the

term pratyagrupa. But if Sarvajñatman intends a specific

aspect of Brahman as the thing which allows absolute Brah-

man to be the locus of ignorance, then one could argue that

a differentiation would have to be admitted in a supposedly

undifferentiated Brahman, and to the Advaitins differen-

tiation is the signal that one is dealing with an entity

other than Brahman, an entity which is a product of ignor-

ance, and an entity which is, in fact, ignorance itself.

One may also ask the question, "Why is this absolute Brah-

man brought in by Sarvajnatman as the locus of ignorance,

when this pratyagrupa could very well serve as the locus

in itself?"'

The logical impasse is obvious and unrelenting. If the pratyagrupa is still pure Brahman, then, in order

for Brahman to become the locus of ignorance, one will have

in which everything is completely merged in ignorance, see SS III. 120-23. In emphasizing the fact that susupti is a state dominated by bare ignorance, Sarvajñatman seems to make a departure from Sankara who, though he also ag- rees that no jiva exists there (CHUBH VI. vii. 1 p. 522), never seems to use ignorance in connection with it (see'. BUBH IV. i11. 30 p. 899; MAUBH 5; CHUBH VI. 11 1 p. 506).

75

to admit the intervention of yet another entity between

the pratyagrupa and ignorance, and so on, due to the fact

that pure Brahman cannot be associated directly with ig-

norance. If the pratyagrupa is no longer pure Brahman,

then one will have to admit the intervention of another

entity between the pratyagrupa and Brahman, and so on,

since the pratyagrupa, being different from Brahman, would

fall on the side of ignorance and need something else to

connect it to Brahman.Thus we can see that Sarvajnatman's

introduction of this inward entity as the means of Brahman

becoming the locus of ignorance logically solves nothing.

In order to see any value in Sarvaj.ñatman's state-

ment on the locus of ignorance, one is forced into an il-

logical leap, or in other words, a leap out of logic. This,

of course, is the final fate of any non-dualistic absolu-

tism which means to assert its position with any integrity,

and I do not try to.disparage it.

7 In this way, we are forced to take Sarvajnatman's

use of the term pratyagrupa as a heuristic one- 105 in which

105The term pratyagrupa, as well .as similar terms such as pratyagatman, pratyagvastu, and pratyagmatra are all used by Sarvajfatman to refer to pure Brahman and there- fore must necessarily be interpreted in a heuristic fashion . from the start (see PP trans. note 177 for further details .' 'on this).

76

the overall force of the introduction of this inward en-

tity into the formula about the locus of ignorance intends

to call our attention to the paradoxical fact that, though

pure Brahman can in no way be associated with anything, let

alone ignorance itself, there is no reasonable alternative

but to assume that pure Brahman is the locus of ignorance.

Though our automatic inclination is not to associate ignor -.

ance with Brahman, but with some subjective or inward as-

pect of consciousness, 106 we have to realize that this op- .. tion comes from within the sphere of ignorance itself.

The final truth of non-dualistic absolutism does not allow

for such an option, and we are heuristically led to the

necessary leap that undercuts given perspectives altoget-

her whether logical, or psychological. It seems that it

is in this way that Sarvajñatman wishes to interpret the

statements of Sankara which appear to state that the jIva

must be the entity which serves as the locus of ignorance

(see PP trans. p. 121).

106 Sarvajñatman seems to account for this in his discussion of the jIva as the manifesting factor (vyanjaka) for ignorance (see PP trans. pp. 119-20). The nature of a vyanjaka is to manifest an object (vyangya) as if it were contained on the vyanjaka. Thus the JIva, being the vyan- jaka for ignorance, manifests it as if it were contained in the JIva, so that even though the jIva is not the locus of ignorance, there is the experience of ignorance as con- tained in the jIva.

77

While Brahman serves as the locus of ignorance, a

condition which one experiences completely in the state

of deep sleep (susupti), in the states of waking (jagarita)

and dreaming (svapna) we clearly experience some varied

types of cognition. Where does Sarvajnatman think that

such knowledge secures its locus? Such knowledge is a

transformation (parinama) of the internal organ (antahka-

rana) which is an effect of ignorance and thus is diffe-

rent from Brahman which is eternal, for such a transfor-

mation is limited and perishable. As such, ordinary know-

ledge may ultimately be seen to be/no different from ig-

norance itself. In this ultimate sense, the explanation

of the locus of ignorance also accounts for the locus of

objectifiable knowledge. However, though this bare 're-

lation' between Brahman and ignorance is evident in the

state of deep sleep, the objectifiable knowledge that makes

up the states of waking and dreaming is once-removed by

comparison and needs a different accountability of its locus.

Sarvajfatman provides this by saying that, in order

to be the locus of such objectifiable knowledge, Brahman

needs an intermediary (dvara), since by itself it could

not be directly associated with such a transformation.

'This presents us with essentially the same logical problem

we have already encountered in Sarvajnatman's assertion

.78

. that Brahman serves as the locus of ignorance through its

inward form. However, here Sarvajñatman attempts to bridge ..

the existing gap through the employment of a metaphorical

phrase, so that the descriptive formula takes the follow-

ing shape (see PP trans. p. 34): "Knowledge is a trans-

formation, and for this reason, pure consciousness, having

taken on the outer coat of the internal organ, is its lo-

cus .... (" ... jnanasya tu parimanitvadantahkaranakancukam-

aparidhayaiva caitanyamasrayo bhavati."). Thus pure Brah-

man (suddhabrahman) serves as the locus of knowledge only ..

in the capacity that it has. already somehow become its as-

scociated aspect (Sabalabrahman or visistabrahman). The

intervening entity appears to be more tangible in this case

as opposed to the case of the locus of ignorance, but again

the logical contradiction is not really overcome by its in-

tervention unless one interprets it heuristically, and, its

tangibility seems to be meant primarily to account for the

manner in which pure Brahman can be both the locus of know-

ledge and ignorance (jfanaiñanasraya) at the same time.

By so demonstrating that pure Brahman is the locus

' of knowledge and ignorance, 107 Sarvajnatman is able to make

107It might be appropriate to mention here that the distinction: concerning the nature of alocus, which Sarvajñatman draws between the base (adhisthana) and the

79

the crucial extrapolation which seems, to be the central

point of the last chapter of PP, namely, that pure Brahman

alone is subject to transmigration and pure Brahman alone

is the entity which is liberated from it. 108 As the locus

of ignorance., pure Brahman is the only entity which can

finally 'be termed directly subject to ignorance, and as

the locus of knowledge pure Brahman is the only entity which

can finally be termed capable of appropriating the varied

.cognitive experiences ayailable in the phenomenal world

support (adhara) of an illusion at SS I. 31-33 is not ex- pressed in PP. That distinction comes about in response to an objection against the Advaita Vedanta theory of mu- tual superimposition (anyonyadhyasa) which states that the 'false relationship between Brahman and the world is one of mutual superimposition. The objection is that since super- imposition always implies that the superimposed object will eventually be sublated, the mutual superimposition between Brahman and the world also implies their eventual mutual sublation and a necessary nihilism. That is to say that if Brahman is superimposed upon the world as its final lo- cus, then when the world is eventually sublated Brahman would have to be sublated as well and nihilism would re- .sult. But Sarvajnatman holds that Brahman is superimposed upon the world not as its final base(adhisthana), but as its apparent support or temporary prop (adhara), and that :it is this temporary prop which is what is sublated once the illusory world is sublated and not Brahman as the fi- nal base or locus (adhisthana) of phenomenal .existence.

'As stated at PP trans. p. 115: "Therefore Brah- man alone undergoes transmigration and Brahman alone is liberated ("Tasmadbrahmaiva samsarati brahmaiva muc- yate. -see Appendix below p.229).

80

in order to escape eventually from it. 109

The distinction between pure Brahman (suddhabrah-

man) and qualified Brahman (visistabrahman), which must

be taken heuristically from the beginning, is what allows

Sarvajfatman to resolve the various contradictions and

paradoxes that are encountered in the association of pure

Brahman with anything else whatsoever. The epistemologi-

cal counterpart of this distinction is the well known Ad-

vaita Vedanta distinction between the ultimate (paramär-

thika) and the given (vyavaharika) levels of truth.110

Ultimately pure Brahman is the ground of everything, but

everything other than pure Brahman is regarded by the Ad-

vaitin as a false reality, and pure Brahman's association

with it as a false problem.

109 The arguments against the jIva being the entity, which undergoes bondage are presented at PP trans. pp. 116-7. Basically, the central argument is that the entity which strives after liberation (sadhaka) and the entity which fi- nally attains it (phalin) must be identical otherwise there would be a general disorder in the arrangement of persons properly reaping the results of the actions (karma-s) that they have performed, and thus, in order.not to disrupt this. arrangement, if we hold that the jIva is the sadhaka, we should also have to admit that the jIva alone is the en- tity which is released and such a final admission would go against all accepted Advaita Vedanta tenets.

110For an informative group of essays on this to- pic see The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedanta, ed. M. Sprung (Dordecht: Reidel, 1973).

81

In summation, Sarvajnatman has, through his intro-

duction of this heuristically interpreted intervening en-

tity (i.e., the pratyagrupa) into the problem of the lo-

cus of ignorance, improved, in terms of clarification, on

the position of Suresvara and especially on the somewhat

unclear position of Sankara on this same topic without

deviating from their original expressed stances. Whereas

the problem was not of consummate concern to the two ear-

lier thinkers, Sarvajñatman accords it a central place in

his writings in the form of a rather exhaustive argument.

However, though this trend is evidence that he should be

grouped along with progressively later Advaitins in the

tradition, his continuity with Sankara and Sureśvara ap-

pears to be quite evident and the traditionally accepted

bond between these three philosophers is a more then jus-

tified one.

TRANSLATION

The Five Chapters

I. [An Examination of the Uses' of Words]

I' praise the Veda which, like a lamp, is the

cause of the origination of the knowledge of

all knowable things,

Which is an illusory evolute3 of pure conscious-

ness, which is eternal, and which is the Bestower".

Now' we will examine the different functions of

words, for the sake of the faultless establishment of the

knowledge of the meaning of the Veda. There are three uses

of words that are well established in the world: the com-

mon (prasiddha) one, the secondary (laksana), and that ba-

sed on similar qualities (guna). What is meant by the word

"common" is the primary (mukhya) use .. Whenever there is a

word which is possessed of a known denotative capacity re-

vealed in the exchanges of those who are experienced in

the manner of expressing its meaning, then its use with re-

spect to its own object through that very cause (prayojaka)

82

83

is its primary use. For example, the use of the word "cow"

which has a known denotative capacity concerning a shape 8

which is possessed of things such as dewlap, only when it

is used in respect to that object, as in such general usa-

ges as "Bring the cow." On the other hand, the secondary

usage is that usage with respect to a different sense on

the basis of a connection with the primary sense, 9 when

the understanding of the primary sense is contradicted by

other valid means of knowledge. 10 For example, in the sta-

tement "The hamlet is situated on the Ganges ", the use of

the word "Ganges" [intends] the banks of the Ganges through

its connection with the Ganges river, which is the primary

sense of the word. And the usage based on similar quali-

ties is that usage which occurs when the accepted primary

sense is contradicted by other means of valid knowledge,

and which [indicates] a sense different [from the primary

sense on account of a connection with qualities found in

the primary sense. For example, in the phrase, "Devadatta

is a lion ", the use of the word "lion" is due to the asso-

ciation with the qualities of a lion such as fierceness

and courage. Even if the basic form 'usages of a particu-

lar word to mean an object different [from its primary sense] '

is the same for both the secondary usage and the usage based

on similar qualities, still there is a difference between .

84

them because their specific definitions are different.

Thus the three usages of words have been explained.

Of these three, mukhyavrtti and gunavrtti have only

one form. On the other hand, laksana is threefold, namely,

non-inclusive secondary usage (jahallaksana), inclusive se-

condary usage (ajahallaksana), and partially non-inclusive

and partially inclusive secondary usage (jahadajahallaksa-

na). In respect to this, the one called jahallaksana is

the usage of a word in a different sense by [completely]

abandoning its primary sense (mukhyartha); just as the word

"Ganges" [in the sentence, "The hamlet is situated on the

Ganges "7, is used to mean only the banks of the river by

abandoning its primary sense 11 entirely. Ajahallaksana,

on the other hand, is the use [of a word] to mean a dif-

ferent sense while not abandoning its primary sense, and

retaining its entire primary sense; just as when thereis

the secondary indication of a horse in the phrase, "The

red stands [there] ", the word "red" is used to mean the

individual object -- horse, while retaining [its original

sense of]"redness". And jahadajahallaksana is the use of

a word, while retaining its primary sense and abandoning

one portion of it, to mean the other portion of its primary

sense, just as in the statement, "This is that Devadatta

the two words "this" and "that", which express different

85

times and places, are used to mean an individaul called De-

vadatta by abandoning that portion consisting of those times

and places. These are the three types of laksana that are

well known in the world.

If the question, "Which among these usages, namely,

mukhyavrtti, gunavrtti, and laksanavrtti, is the one that

applies to the Supreme Self within us all-5?",14 should a-

rise, we reply to it that, if one excludes mukhyavrtti,

there is no prohibition for using gunavrtti or laksanavrtti

in reference to it. Mukhyavrtti is indeed prohibited in re-

spect to the pratyagatman (the Supreme Self within us all)

on account of the fact that [in the case of the pratyagatman]

mundane things such as relation (sastT), quality (guna), ac-

tivity (kriya), universal (jati), or convention (rudh1), f which are the basis for mukhyavrtti, do not exist. 1> In-

deed, there is no possibility of relation and the rest exis-

ting in the pratyagatman, of which all qualifications have

been prohibited, according to the sruti passage, "Not this,

not this ",10 and which is beyond the range of speech and

mind, whereby mukhyavrtti would be applicable. Therefore

gunavrtti and laksana are the usages applicable to the pra-

tyagatman. - 18

Due to the fact that there is a connection with qua-

lities, as demonstrated in the following statement:

86

Because it is inward, because it is exceedingly

subtle, because it is similar in form to the

atman, 19

the usage of words such as "I", based on similar qualities,

is accepted with respect to the pratyagatman.

Also, in reference to laksana, jahallaksana and

ajahallaksana are not accepted [as applicable to the prat-

yagatman], but jahadajahallaksana is, because there is the possibility of using the words "that" (tat) and "thou"'

(tvam) , 20 which, in terms of primary signification, [res-

'pectively mean something associated with'non-immediacy (paroksya) and something associated with possessing duality

(sadvitIya), 21 to mean one portion [of that primary sense]

by abandoning another portion of it,"< just like the words found in statements such as "That is this." 23 Therefore,

the pratyagatman is known through jahadajahallaksana, not

through ajahallaksana which consists of not abandoning the original meaning as in the case of words like "GayatrI",

"Vaisvanara", etc., " nor through jahallaksana which in-

volves abandoning the original meaning, as is the case in

sentences such as "The sacrificer is the clump of darbha-

.grass "The sacrificer is. the unsegmented dish ") -- thus

87

it has been established. If26 the word "Brahman", in its primary sense,"

means ignorance together with the illusory reflection of

consciousness, and likewise the word "I", in its primary

sense, means the I-faculty (ahamkara) [together with the

illusory reflection of consciousness], then, given this

position, the jahallaksana [of those words] is also [suit-

able in the mahavakya, "I am Brahman ""] so that they mean

the Supreme Self (atmavastu). In the same way [jahallak-

sana is used in phrases such as: "The boat roars "; "The

metal burns "; "The snake is a rope "; and there is no

fault in this whatsoever .< 28

Having accepted these three types of [secondary]

usage, those people who are well-versed in the three Vedas

have made the distinction [between the different types] of

laksana through their use of the technical terms: 'aban-

doning the original sense [of the components]' (jahatsvar-

tha); 'retaining the original sense [of the components]'

(ajahatsvartha); and 'abandoning part and retaining part of

the original sense [of the components]' (jahadajahatsvar-

in reference to the sutra: "[Whenever] an operation

concerning a finished word [is prescribed, the word] sam-

arthah: 'semantically connected' [is to be supplied]." 30

Nor should one think thus -- that even if laksana makes the

88

atman known, there is the unwarranted conclusion that the

atman is an object -- because scripture functions to repu-

diate those qualities which do not belong to [the pratyag-

atman but which are superimposed on it by ignorance. For

scripture only removes a quality which does not belong to

the Self but which is superimposed on it out of ignorance,

it does nothing more,32 it does not make that pratyagat-

man7 an object; thus there is indeed no contradiction con-

cerning statements such as, "That from whence words turn back." 33 Also, the qualification of 'being that thing

which is taught in the Upanisads'54 is indeed appropriate

even if [the atman lacks objectivity, because scripture

repudiates that ignorance which refers to the pratyagatman

without making it into an object. Therefore, by discar-

ding mukhyavrtti and [employing] either laksana or guna-

vrtti as it suits one, there will be no contradiction con-

cerning the pratyagatman which is being instructed -- thus a

person striving after release should [examine statements

like "tattvamasi"] by using positive and negative concomi-

tances that resort to laksana and gunavrtti. 35

I praise36 that consciousness which is great,

which is eternally unchanging, and by whose power

[all internal and external things shine forth.

89

Sarvajnatman, 37 w who has been purified through contact with the falling of the pollen-dust38

from the full-blown lotus feet of the glorious

Devesvara, who is expert in the ways of the

Veda in its entirety,

Has explained the different usages of words,

in this way, for the sake of the establishment

of clarity of knowledge in the minds of those

who are holy men. For the knowledge of words

is the prime cause of final release and the

joys of heaven"' for a person in the world.

Thus the Examination of the Uses of Words

[is Concluded.]

II. [Explanation of the Great Sentences]

I praise that Bowman [Visnu] who is pure,

whose essential nature is knowledge,

Due to the ignorance of whom this whole

world appears, and due to the knowledge

of whom it vanishes.

40 Now we shall examine the meaning of the great

sentences found in the Upanisads. For the person desirous

of final release, final release (moksa) comes about only

from the knowledge of the great sentences such as, "I am Brahman. " 41 And the knowledge of the meaning of the great

sentences comes about through a complete knowledge of the

two words "I" and "Brahman". 42 And the meanings of those

two words are two-fold, the expressed (vacya) and the im-

plied (laksya). Of these, the expressed sense is the asso-

ciated entity and the implied sense is the pure entity.

That very inward consciousness associated with the effects

consisting of the vital breath and the body, and which ex-

ists [in all beings] up to the gods," 44 'is the expressed

:90

91

sense of the word "I". That non-dual, blissful conscious-

ness associated with that ignorance which is the cause 45

of the vital breath and the body, is the expressed sense

,of the word "Brahman". This is the idea -- that inward form

which is possessed of duality is the expressed sense of the word "I"; that blissful consciousness accompanied by non-

immediacy is the expressed sense of the word "Brahman";"

now there is the occurrence of a contradiction in these

two expressed senses of the words "Brahman" and "I" [invol-

ving the fact that] the entity associated with the cause

and that associated with the effect share the same gramma-

tical cases and are related to each other as qualifier and thing qualified. 47 Thus one must abandon the adventitious

limitation in both instances [and in this way,] two pure

entities are made known through secondary implication.46

Concerning this, the word "I" secondarily signi-

fies that portion of its meaning which is the inward cons-

ciousness by abandoning that portion [of its meaning which

refers to] that thing possessed of dualtiy in the form of

the effect consisting of vital breath and body. And the

word "Brahman" secondarily indicates that portion which

is the non-dual, blissful, consciousness by abandoning that poriton [of its meaning which refers to that non-immediate

thing in the form of ignorance which is the cause of vital

Q2

breath and body:

Thus, for the qualified person who a) knows the'

inward consciousness through the secondary usage of the

word I", and the non-dual, blissful, consciousness through

the secondary usage of the word "Brahman";" b) who has

destroyed his sins through [the performance of] sacrifices;

c) who has attained the ultimate fruit of the whole of the

ritual portion of the Veda' d) who has renounced all ritual

activity; e) who has approached a teacher who [himself] has

1. directly experienced Brahman,'4 2) become a person who

though living has gained final release, 3) has destroyed

the cause of all sorrows by the fire of correct knowledge,

4. who has perfected all the characteristics [of such a

person who is freed while living], 5) who is, as it were,

a teacher granted the rank [out of the student's own ig-

norance 7, just as in the case of things imagined [to be

real7 in dreams, 6) who is imagined to be surrounded by a

thousand pupils of the same character as the student [him-

self]; f) who has errors, doubts, the knowledge of what is

not the purport, confused ideas and impossibility, destroyed

through repeated hearing, thinking, and meditating which

are all obtained through the grace of the teacher; g) who

has been granted the grace of Isvara --- [for such a quali-

9.3

fied person the knowledge of the unity of the meanings of

the two words "I" and "Brahman" as in such statements as

"I and nothing other am Brahman " [terminates] in final

realization, having arisen from the mahavakya "I am Brah-

man." [All this is] according to the maxim "The Veda pro-

duces correct knowledge in the qualified person." 51

Therefore,52 when there is the cessation of igno-

rance and its effects due to the arisal of knowledge, one

persists for some time because that which has been subla-

ted'3 still continues and because there is nothing contra-

dictory in one simultaneously experiencing the highest

Brahman and liberation while living as a jivanmukta; [for.

such a person,on account of the fact that he has exhaus-

ted, through their enjoyment, the merit and demerit that

might cause the arisal of a body, and because his accumu-

lated karma is completely consumed by the fire of correct

knowledge, and because he does not produce future merit

and demerit, or if producing them he is not sullied by them

due to his knowledge, when his existing body falls away --

since in the absence of its cause no product arises --

no further body is produced.55. And even if, for that rea-

son, you say that when there is an absence of ignorance [in

that state of being a jIvanmukta7, there exists there an

absence of those things constructed out of ignorance such

94

as omnipresence, omniscience, being the lord of all things,

being the atman of all things, having an irresistable will,56

etc., just as there would be the absence of the whole ma-

nifest cosmos including the teacher and the ether,even

so there does indeed occur an absolute release for that

wise person, which is not a negative state butwhich pos-

sesses those characteristics which are found in the essence

of that inward Brahman that is eternal, pure, sentient,

freed, true, supremely blissful, non-dual, consciousness,58

which is left over after the universe, along with its root

case, 59 has been consumed by the fire of the knowledge of

the meaning of the scriptural statements 60 which arise from,

the knowledge of the meanings of the individual words [in

those statements]. The meaning of those statements is made

possible through the maxim of retaining that portion [of

the word meanings which should be retained and giving up

that portion [of the word meanings which should be given

up by means of the process of secondary signification"

which arises when there is a contradiction in terms of the

grammatical apposition and the accompanying relation be-

tween qualifier and thing qualifiede2 [in the statements].

[The possibiltiy of employing such a maxim exists] on ac-

count of the admission that there can be a complete under-

standing of the scope°3 of those subsidiary sentences 64

95

which are ancillary to the mahavakya-s already meantioned,

and which are in the form of positive statements°> [about

Brahman, by collecting together all those words which re-

late to brahman without qualities (nirgunabrahman) and

which are not repeated in the Upanisads of all the Vedic recensions. 66 All of this is according to śruti passages

such as: "He who possesses a teacher knows that so long

will he remain, just until there is final release for him, and then he will attain perfection ":67 and "The gods have

no power to obstruct that person who has attained realiza-

tion of Brahman." 68

There are some people who say, 69 that because there

is no cause for the comings and goings of the worldly cycle, 70

and because there are sruti passages 71 which negate that [cy-

cle7, and because the sruti and smrti passages 2 which deal

with the state of liberation whlle living can be seen to re-

fer to an imagined 3 teacher who has been liberated while

living, there exists only instant liberation [upon acheiv-

ing the realization of Brahman. Moreover, if you admit

that the state of being liberated while living exists for

that perfected person, 75 then, due to the fact that he could

not be a teacher for a pupil who [to him would represent]

nothing more than [the charred remains of an illusion con-

sumed by the fire of7 knowledge, there would be no use

96

for the perfected person who was liberated while living;

and the reason for the existence of the cirasruti (CHU VI.

xiv. 2) is the intention of conveying an absolute release

in which there is a delay for the removal of that covering

which is the sleep of ignorance -- that is its more appro-

priate interpretation.

Ah: 77 Praise be to the sage of the highest or- der 78 he is established in the Infinite, > he

prostrates himself before Vasudeva,° 80 he destroys

attachments, 81

He broods 82 over that which is real, he renoun-

ces actions, he wordhips the Knower, 83 he is

virtuous.

This examination has been made by the sage cal-

led Sarvajnätman who has been purified by coming

into contact with the pollen-dust from the lotus feet84 of Deveśvara,

Thus, this explanation of the Upanisads, whose

supreme concern is the unity of Brahman and the

ätman, has been written for the sake of the fi-

nal beatitude of those people who have renounced

97

ʻ

the world,8 85 it is to be revered by those who

hold the maintenance of their own duty 86 supreme.

Thus [the Chapter] on the Meaning

of the Mahavakya-s is Concluded.

(

III. Explanation of the Meaning of the

Words "Tat" and "Tvam" 7

I praise that from which the universe beginning

with Mahat .87 has originated, just as a snake ap-

pears from a rope, 88

That forever-blissful 89 witness of the dancing

of the inward intellect.90

The expressed sense of the word "tat"91 , is Brahman

as associated with ignorance. From that are born in suc-

cession the five primordial elements: the ether, air, fire,

water, and food. What is meant by the word "food" is

earth. 92 From that comes the ether: from the ether comes

air; from air, fire; from fire, water; from water, food.

The expressed sense of the word "food" is earth. Thus, these are the unquintupled93 primordial elements. From

them arises the subtle body containing the seventeen.94

This subtle body containing the seventeen [can be broken

down as follows: speech, the feet, the hands, the anus,

and the organ of generation are the five motor organs; hear-

98

99

ing, touch, seeing, taste, and smell, are the five cogni-

tive organs; life-air, the downward going air, the dif-

fused air, the upward going air, the circulating air, are

the five vital airs:95 mind and intellect are the two '

[functions of the] internal organ, the one having the na-

ture of doubt is the mind, the one having the nature of

certainty is the intellect -- thus although the internal or-

gan is one, it tan be designated in both ways depending on

its activity, just as one and the same person can be cal-

led a cook when he is cooking and a cutter when he cuts

grass. 96 The five unquintupled primordial elements and

their product, the subtle body containing the seventeen,

are Hiranyagarbha, 97 and this is the subtle body of the

atman. 08

The quintupled primordial elements are established

in sruti passages that refer to a triplication process. 79

From them are produced the divine Cosmic Egg, 100 the human

sphere, and that world of things which serve as objects

of human perception; .101 [the last two worlds] consist of

beings that possess the type of gross body that is commonly

known to us as equipped with things such as hands, head,

and feet. 102 These five quintupled primordial elements

and their product, the Cosmic Egg, and all the various gross

bodies belonging to [different] creatures -- all this is cal-

100

led Viraj. This is the gross body of the atman.

There is only one gross body called Viraj; there

is only one subtle body called Hiranyagarbha; there is

only one jIva which is under the delusion that these two

bodies belong to it, 103 and which is the primary meaning of the word "tvam"; the primary sense of the word ["tat"7, 104

that very Brahman which has entered into those two bodies

just like the reflection of the sun in the water or the

space within a jar, 105 is termed the jIva by reason of its

activity of sustaining the vital airs. 106 And this jfva

is indeed that Supreme Self (paramatman) which is the wit-

ness of [the three states of] waking, dreaming and deep

sleep, which is a qualitiless entity different from [the

three states of ] waking, dreaming and deep sleep, :107 which

is partless, which is free from association [with anything

else7, whose essence is eternal, pure, sentient, freed, true, supremely blissful, and non-dual, 108 who exists even

in the three times. That unmodified one, on account of its

proximity to the internal organ, 109 perceives waking, dream-

ing and deep sleep, which are states of the internal organ,

and the actions, agents and results of actions [in those

states.

The waking state, which is the perception of objects

through the sense organs, is caused by the actions of the

101

gross body; when the sense organs are withdrawn there is

the dreaming state which has for its content objects such

as elephants whose nature are mental impressions. This

state is caused by the actions of the subtle body and is

born from the mental traces fof the waking state. When

there is a cessation of the actions of the gross and subtle

bodiesthere is a cessation of the two states of waking and

dreaming which are fashioned out of them; for this reason

the internal organ resides in its causal form within that

Brahman which is the Wielder of Maya110 and which is the

expressed sense of the word "tat" 111 just as a fig tree exists in its seed,112 and this is the state of deep sleep.

Thus the jIva perceives these states such as waking and

the rest in order and sometimes not in order. 113

First, when he undertakes his meditation, 114 the as-

pirant for final releaseshould understand things in the

above way, and after making his internal organ immobile, 11g.

he should merge all the many types of objective realities ,116

in succession, and the knower of those objective realities- ,117

should be made to remain [since it cannot be merged]. That

which has originated from the five quintupled primordial

elements, such as the Cosmic Egg etc., all that does not

exist apart from those five quintupled primordial elements,

just as a pot which is produced from clay does not exist

101

apart from the clay, due to the fact that the fatter is

an effect of the former. 118 In the same way, the five quin-

tupled primordial elements do not exist apart from the five

quintupled primordial elements. At this point only Hiran-

yagarbha, which is the subtle body [of the atman], re-

mains. 119 Concerning this, the seventeenfold subtle body

does not exist apart from the five unquintupled primordial

elements, just as a pot which is produced from clay does

not exist apart from the clay, due to the fact that the

latter is an effect of the former. At this point, the five

unquintupled primordial elements are what remain. Of these,

earth, which is expressly indicated by the word "food",

does not exist apart from water, water does not exist apart

from fire, fire from wind, wind from the ether, the ether

apart from that Brahman in the form of the Wielder of Maya,

which is the expressed sense of the word "tat"; the Wielder

of Maya, as well, does not exist apart from the pure Brah-

man. At this point, when there is an absence of the three

states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep because of the

absence 120 of the internal organ, then that pratyagatman

whose essence is consciousness and which is free from the

quality of being the jIva, remains, [as well as,] that Brah-

man whose essence is eternal, pure, sentient, freed, true,

supremely blissful, and non-dual -- these two entities, which

103

are the [secondary] senses of the words "tat" and "tvam",

remain. Concerning this, he who has acheived absolute con-

viction up to the point of[that exemplified in]the holding

the burning axe 121 *-- the conviction being in the form:

"Brahman alone is I ", "I alone am Brahman " -- he knows

the meaning of the sentence, "Tattvamasi " ("That thou art ") 122 through a knowledge which is nothing short of di-

rect experience, 123 just as with the perception of the ama- laka fruit in the hand;124 such a one is indeed liberated

as according to the sruti passage, "He who possesses a teacher knows that, so long will he remain .... 125

Thus the Examination of the Meanings of the

Words "Tat" and "Tvam" has been Concluded.

IV. Explanation of the Subsidiary Sentences 1267

I praise the teacher, 127 whose nature is truth

and bliss etc., who is the one witness of all

the worlds,

Who is to be known from the Upanisads 128 and

who destroys [all] differences.

Now we will explain the meaning of the subsidiary

sentences to that supremely qualified person, who is an

ascetic, who is prompted by the injunction for hearing,

thinking, sustained meditation etc., 129 who is a brahmana 130

who has attained, in full, the four means 131 such as the

discrimination between eternal and non-eternal, things etc.,

who approaches fa teacher] as according to the injunction; 13<

[we will teach only such a person] because others-33 are

only secondarily qualified through an absence of prohibhi-

tion without any impelling from the injunction for hearing,

and the rest.

Now, the meaning of the subsidiary statements is 4

only the sense of the two words "tat" and "tvam" as they

104

105

participate in the meaning of the mahavakya whose charac-

teristic feature is [expressing] the unity of Brahman and

the atman. Of them, subsidiary statements such as "Brah-

man is truth knowledge, the infinite # 134 "One knows that

Brahman is bliss " 135 etc., clearly set down the meaning

of the word "Brahman". That real entity which is contra-

dictory to insentience, differentiation, and suffering, is

made known by words such as "truth", "knowledge", "the in-

finite", as the meaning of the word "Brahman" in the state-

ments "Brahman is truth, knowledge, the infinite." and "One knows that Brahman is bliss." 136 For in this way,

because Brahman is truth it is not false; because it is

knowledge it is not insentient; because it is infinite it

is not broken up,by limits; the three differencesand

the three absences -138 do not hinder it -- this is what is

meant. And in the same way it is declared that because

it is bliss it is free from suffering.

The fivefold elaborating statements -139 which have

reasoning as their nature 140 and which convey creation,

continuance, dissolution, entrance, and control, are like

those elaborating statements of praise and disgrace141 which

are subsidiary to the sense of statements which are posi-

tive or negative injunctions; 14 they exist for the sake

of explaining the eternality of that very Brahman which is

106

being taught in this manner. Of these, "That from which

these creatures are born, that by which creatures live,

that which those who die enter, that Brahman is what you

must seek to know ",- ,w 143 are statements of creation, con-

tinuance, and dissolution. "Having created it, it then en- tered into that [creation].",144 is an entrance statement.

"Out of fear of it, the wind blows; out of fear of it the sun shines " 145 is a statement of control. When the eter-

nity etc., of Brahman is taught by these fivefold artha- vada-s, which convey an idea 46 of Brahman and which are

supported by reasoning such as, 'The universe consists only

of that [Brahman] because it is born from that [Brahman],

because it is dissolved into it, because it is maintained

on it,1 147 because it has been entered by it, and because

it is restricted by it.', then the meaning of the word

"Brahman" is determined. The errors of knowledge concern-

ing the meaning of the word "Brahman" are destroyed -- thus

the explanation of the meaning of those subsidiary state-

ments which have as their aim the determination of the

meaning of the word "Brahman".

Now we will also explain the meaning of those sub-

sidiary statements which have as their aim the determina-

tion of the meaning of the word "tvam". The setting forth

of the fivefold sheaths which define the atman possessed

107

of adventitious limitations and which are termed the food

sheath, the vital-air sheath, the mind sheath, the know-

ledge sheath, and the bliss sheath, 148 has for its aim the

determination of the essence of that atman which is free

from adventitious limitations, on account of the fact that

what is illustrated here is that [each] inner atman is si-

milar to the previous atman just as an image made by pour-

ing molten copper into a mould, is similar to the mould; 149

otherwise that teaching of the sheaths would be useless,

while [interpreting it] in this way 150 does render it use-

ful. Indeed, the teaching of the principal object is not

easily done without the mention of the incidental object,

just as the description of ArundhatI -- for one cannot easily

point out the faint star ArundhatI, which is the principal

concern and which is next to [a bright star], without [first]

. saying that the bright star which is the lesser concern is ArundhatI 151 In the same way, one is not able to describe

the principal atman without having [first] dealt with the 1 five sheaths. Thus there is the description of the sheath-

selves, which are possessed of adventitious limitations, on

account of the possibility of drawing out the ätman from the

five sheaths like an arrow from its sheath. And in this

way, there is another sruti passage: 152

108

Being only the size of a thumb, that person

which is the inward self abides within the

hearts of men,

That may be drawn out of one's own body with

care, as an arrow is from its sheath.

Therefore, the purport of the teaching of the five sheaths

in the sruti passage is that pratyagätman which is differ-

ent from those five sheaths, which is one in all bodies,

and which is the meaning of the word "tvam" as it accords

with the sense of the mahāvakya.

In the same way, this one entity which is diffe-

rent from the states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep,

which is free from any relation with the states of waking,

dreaming, and deep sleep,- 153 and which exists in the bodies

of men, animals and gods, is the meaning of the word "tvam"

This is because of the fact that the three states do not

always exist while the atman, which experiences them, does always exist. 154 Things which are found to lack constancy

are unreal; for example, the snake, stick, line, crack in

the ground, or the line made by cow urine on the ground155

which are illusory perceptions of a rope]. The atman [which

never wanders from the three states], is the true thing,

C

10

just like the 'this'-portion which refers to the rope.

This is the purport of the teaching of the three states

as encountered in sruti passages such as, "The three abodes are the three sleeps." 156 because if we take them in their

own right they would lack human purpose, 157 and. because

we perceive human purpose in the knowledge of the unity

of Brahman and the atman in statements iike, "The knower

of Brahman attains to the Supreme n158 ¡and thus we employ

the maxim -- "That which has no result is subordinate in re- lation to that which does." 159

Now, that which is charactarized as the true, know-

ledge, the infinite, and bliss, and which is contrary to

whatyis non-existent, false, insentient, limited, and sor-

rowful, that is Brahman and should be secondarily indica-

ted by the word "tat".in the mahavakya , "Tattvamasi

through the abandonment of that portion of the associeated

Brahman which is non-immediate, the associated Brahman be-

ing the expressed sense of the word "Brahman". 160 The afore-

mentioned pratyagatman ist be secondarily indicated by the

word "tvam" through jahadajahallaksana by means of denoting

its owh expressed sense: "tvam", as a thing which is asso-

ciated and possessed of duality: [and] by means of abandon-

ing that portion which is the 'possession of duality' con-

tained in that associated pratyagatman which is the expres-

110

sed sense of the word "tvam", because otherwise there would

be the unwarranted conclusion that there would be a contra-

diction in the understanding of the sense of the words of

the mahavakya, "Tattvamasi ", for the dual would be the

non-dual, and the perceivable would be the non-immediate, etc.

Thus, having clarified the meanings of the two words,

the teacher causes that very thing which is unchanging to be

understood by saying the words "Tattvamasi." And through a

mahavakya such as "Tattvamasi ", that person who is desirous

of final release is taugh with certainty that Brahman and

atman are one by [employing] the interchange: 'That afore-

mentioned Brahman and nothing more is I '; 'That pratyagat-

man is I and nothing more '; 'And I and nothing more am the

aforementioned pratyagatman '; [I and nothing more ] am that

aforementioned Supreme Brahman.' , 161 And on account of that,

he is immediately released from the cycle of transmigration,

as according to sruti passages such as, " ... so long will he

remain .. # 162

Thus Ends the Examination of the

Meaning of the Subsidiary Statements.

v. The Examination of Bondage and Releasel

That inward consciousness whose plenitude163

is obscured by the differences of universe,

of being Isvara, and of being a jIva- 164 --

differences artificially constructed out of

its own ignorance, 165

Which exists in its own essential greatness 166

which is free from all delusion, 167 stands

supreme, the single source of everything,Ih

the world.'

When ignorance has arisen, the fact is that the

pure Brahman alone is a) the material and instrumental

cause, 168 b) the Lord, c) the Witness, with respect to a)

the whole cosmic expanse of effects, b) the different jI- va-s which are to be lorded over, c) the objective world, 169

by means of ignorance which is accompanied by a reflection

of consciousness; just as the pure pratyagatman alone be-

comes associated with the qualities of being the impelled

one, 170 the agent, the enjoyer, and the knower, "4 by means

of its relation to [that collection of] effects and senses172

111

112

which has a reflection of consciousness in it. However,

this is not so of that thing qualified by entities such

as the collection of effects and senses. 173 This has been said: 174

The ätman is possessed of lordship, and is

the cause, as well as being the Witness,

Because it is always connected with objects

that are to be lorded over, to be effected,

and to be witnessed.

Therefore, Brahman alone undergoes transmigration due to

its own reflection-infused ignorance, 175 and Brahman alone

is liberated by its own knowledge. And transmigration is

the fact that this Brahman is the locus of the differences

such as being a jIva, being Isvara, and the universe; when

these are destroyed, liberation occurs which is [Brahman's]

remaining in its [true] essence, as according to the śruti

passage: "Indeed the plenitude is immortal, that which is meagre dies." 176 And Brahman in its inward form177 alone

is the locus of knowledge and ignorance. 'Until this mo-

ment I knew not the atman, now I know it ' -- due to such an

113

experience of knowledge and ignorance which has the prat-

yagatman as locus, [we]cannot say that] Brahman in its non-

dual blissful nature is(also the locus of knowledge and

ignorance, fand further, this is also true] because we do

not experience such things as, 'That Brahman whose essence

is non-dual and blissful is ignorant.' Nor can Isvara,

who is the reflection of pure consciousness], be the locus

of knowledge and ignorance, since we never experience cog-

nitions such as, 'Isvara is ignorant.', and because this

would contradict the sruti and smrti passages dealing with

the fact that Isvara is omniscient, as well as what is

common knowledge. 178 Nor can the universe serve as the

locus of knowledge and ignorance, because it is a well known

fact that it is insentient. 179 Nor can that reflection cal-

led the jIva be the locus of knowledge and ignorance; 0

the fact that 'When there is the merging of all adventi-

tious limitations at the time of deep sleep, the jIva-con-

dition 181 exists as potential and rests on ignorance .: 182

is inferable through the inferential mark of its rising up

again,1 183 and at the time of deep sleep there is no expe-

.rience of the jIva-condition either directly or indirectly. 184

And if the jIva-condition is not perceivable [i.e., that

it must be inferred], then the jIva cannot be directly.per- ceptible. 185 If you say that this jIva which is inferred]

114

is the locus of ignorance at that time, then ignorance as well would be only inferable186 -- but we do not perceive

this to be the case. Therefore it should be accepted that

the pratyagbrahman alone is that in which ignorance resides,

because at the time of deep sleep we experience ignorance

as having its locus only in the' inward consciousness. Nor

should the thought that, 'Ignorance must have a distinction

between its content and locus ,187 be urged, because that

[distinction] is indeed absent in the state of deep sleep; this has been stated by Suresvara:188

Prior to the rise of the knower of correct

knowledge and the rest, there is no relation

with anything other than pure consciousness,

For this reason, [there is at that time], pure

consciousness alone, which is one, which pos-

sesses ignorance as a qualification, and which

is known only through its self-experience.

In respect to this, pure consciousness is the locus [of

ignorance without indeed taking on the outer coat of the

internal organ, becuase ignorance is beginningless;+ 189 but

119

knowledge is a transformation, 190 and for this reason, púre

.consciousness, having taken on the outer coat of the inter-

nal organ, is its locus, since it is contradictory that the

Unchanging One191 should have a relation with a transforma-

tion without the intervention of something which can be

subject to the transformation." 192

Hence, stating that the associated atman is what is

to receive instruction in the words, 'That which receives

instruction is the associated atman, not the Supreme Brah-

man, nor that which is insentient.', does not help to prove

the position that the jIva is [the locus]. of ignorance, 193

because even if we adopt the position that Brahman is the

locus of ignorance, the fact that Brahman is the locus of

knowledge is possible through an association with the in- 0 ternal organ. 194 Brahman alsohas a relation with begin-

ningless ignorance only through a relation with ignorance; .195

it is not by means of Brahman alone .- 196 Nor is it through

a relation with another ignorance, because just as differ-

ence is independent of another difference, 198 so also is

ignorance independent of a relationship with another igno-

rance. Therefore ignorance has the pratyagatman alone as

its locus, and its being the locus of ignorance is due to

that very ignorance alone. 198 Therefore Brahman alone un-

dergoes transmigration and Brahman alone is liberated, as

116

according to sruti passages such as: "Indeed in the begin-

ning this was Brahman, it knew only itself, saying 'I am Brahman.', then it became all." 199

On the other hand, if that jIva-reflection alone,

which is qualified by what is not atman, 200 is taken as en-

titled to knowledge and action, but not the inward Brahman

by means of taking on the outer coat of the internal organ,

then one should say that it the jiva as that very quali-

fied entity has a relation to heaven and liberation, on

account of the fact that the striver alone is the reaper. 201

Or else, if you admit the fact that one is the striver and

the other is the reaper, 202 then there would be the unwar-

ranted conclusion that there would occur the acceptance of

what has not been done and the destruction of that which

has been done. 203

And because that qualification which is destroyed at times such as that of the Great Dissolution204 cannot rise'

up again, 205 ? it being contrary to common occurrence to have

something which has been totally] destroyed rise up again, ,.206

one cannot say that that very qualification- which exis-

ted previously is the one that exists now, by basing it on

w the recognition of the same names and forms [which existed prior to the Great Dissolution7.208 For, if you say that

it is the essence (svarupa) which is the recognizer on ac-

117

count of the fact that because of the destruction of the

qualification [at these times] the qualified thing cannot

be the recognizer of the [new] qualification, then it turns

out that the essence alone would be the ignorant one, 209

due to the fact that the error of seeing duality has its

locus in ignorance. 210 When the essence alone through

its being qualified by the adventitious limitation [which

is the internal.organ] is taken as the striver, it may

also.be taken as the reaper. For that reason, the above

mentioned fault (cannot be applied to us].211 In that way,

one cannot raise the objection that, 'If the atman, through

its being qualified by bodies such as that of a brahmana,

is the one that is entitled to perform proper religious

actions, then it is the atman in that very form [i.e., as

the qualified thing or jfva which must be the enjoyer '

because the qualified entity is not the striver, only the

essence is the striver. , 212 Therefore, Brahman alone is

subject to transmigration due to its own ignorance, and

is freed due to its own knowledge. 213

And if Brahman is the striver, 214 the fact that

there is no experience having the form, 'The non-dual,

blissful Brahman is ignorant ', is not a fault, because

it is Brahman in its inward form which is admitted to be

ignorant, the striver, and so on -- this is what has been'

118

stated. 215 It has been said by Sankara that, "By intend-

ing to do something favourable for Brahman, one should not

abandon the true sense [of the scriptures] by construing

something that is contrary to the meaning of the scrip- tures." 216 Suresvara has also said the following:

Why are you intolerant about this idea of

agentship [being applied to Brahman]?

Don't you see that the cycle of transmigra-

tion, which is imagined out of ignorance,

exists only in me?

Therefore, Brahman alone is subject to transmigration and

Brahman alone is released; jIva-s do not have a relation 18

with knowledge and ignorance, or with bondage and release.

For, the position that ignorance concerning Brahman, which

occupies the position of being the source of reflection,

belongs either to those entities which are imagined out of

ignorance and possess differences which are imagined out

of ignorance, .219 or to those things which are like reflec-

tions, 220 has been destroyed.

There is [the statement by Suresvara] :221

119

It is by means of perception which tends out-

wards, and not by itself, that the knower which

resides in the intellect assumes ignorance to

exist in itself, just as one imagines blueness

to exist in the sky.

Here it has been stated that ignorance belongs to that

thing which resides in the intellect. [The passage]is meant

to indicate that the jIva, which is subject to the adventi-

tious limitation of the internal organ, is the manifesting factor222 - of the recognftion223 3 of ignorance which is its

own cause, and notthat the jIva is the locus of ignorance.

For the jIva manifests ignorance, which has its sole locus

in the inward consciousness, as contained in itself, due

to the fact that the many manifesting factors that exist ,224 in the world have such a nature. For instance, the

physical forms such as 'the dappled one', etc., manifest

the universal 'cowness', which itself is all-pervasive, only .. as contained within themselves, as shown in the notions:

'The cow is dappled '; 'The cow is muti-coloured '; 'The cow is hornless '; ete .. 225 Likewise, different vocal durations

such as the short, the long, and the prolonged, 226 which ma-

nifest a meaningful sound through the manifestation of the

120

[specific] instrument of articulation" ,227 [used for the vo- calization], manifest that meaningful sound only as con-

tained in themselves, as in such notions as: 'The letter

"a" is a long sound ', etc .. Similarly, the manifesting

factors of the face, such as a jewel, a sword blade, or a

mirror, manifest the fade only as contained in themselves. 228

Therefore, the nature of the many manifesting factors in

the world is that they manifest the thing which is to be

manifested as if it were contained in themselves. There-

fore, even though the internal organ, or the JIva which has

taken it on as an adventitious limitation, is not the locus

of ignorance, due to the fact that they [ -- the internal or-

gan and the jIva -- ] are the manifesting factors of that ig-

norance which [in reality] rests on the pratyagatman, it

is but proper that there be an experience of ognorance as

contained in them of the form: 'I do not know this." And

the fact that is that the internal organ, or the jIva which

has taken it on as an adventitious limitation, is the mani-

festing factor of ignorance, because when they [ -- the in-

ternal organ and the jIva -- ] are absent at the time of deep

sleep, even though there is an indeterminate knowledge of

it at that time, there is no determinate knowledge of that

ignorance which rests on the pratyagatman, and because when

they are present, as in the waking state, there is a deter-

121

minate knowledge of it; 229 and Suresvara has said that

things such as the internal organ are the manifesting fac- tors of ignorance:230

Just as when there is no production of an

outward [mental] modification there is 'no

manifestation of "I",

Just so, without the internal organ there

is no clear manifestation of ignorance.

Even though Sankara has stated that the internal

organ is the locus of ignorance in his commentary on the

chapter concerned with the 'Knower of the Field' in the

BhagavadgIta, 231 even so, he has stated that in order to

negate the notion that the pratyagatman's being the locus

of ignorance is ultimately true, 232 not in order to justify

the notion that the internal organ is the locus of igno-

rance. For, given the suspicion that the notion of the

pratyagatman's being the locus of ignorance is ultimately

true, the statement, 'Ignorance belongs to the [internal]

organ which serves as the manifesting factor ' is indeed

meant to assign that [ignorance] to that [internal organ]233

122

with the intention 'May the pratyagatman not have any con-

nection with ignorance.' The statement does not intend

to say that the internal organ has a connection with igno-

rance because this would be the Sankhya doctrine .234 and

because [Sankara'sother commentorial passages contradict

such a view point. Thus in Sankara's doctrine, the prat-

yagatman alone is the locus of knowledge and ignorance. '

Vimuktatman has stated the following: .235

That self-luminous entity shines, and it is in

reference to it that there exists the notion of

the distinction between knowledge and ignorance,

Thus, that to which ignorance belongs, that is

the object of ignorance.

Therefore, that inward ignorance, which is accompanied by

an illusory reflection of consciousness (sabhasa), alone

is the means for the paramatman's being the cause of the

universe which consists of the field and the field-knower.

In respect to this, when the illusory reflection of con-

sciousness existing in ignorance predominates it is the

cause of the field. knower, and taking that recourse in

123

which ignorance predominates, it is the cause of the field. This has been stated:236

Darkness [i.e., ignorance] is the predominace

belonging to the fields, consciousness is the

predominance belonging to the conscious selves,

Supreme Brahman becomes their cause through

meditations, previous mental impressions,

and actions.

Of these, the field-knower is the illusory reflection of

consciousness which has taken upon it the Citadel of Eight

as an adventitious limitation. The five motor organs, the

five cognitive organs, the four-fold internal organ,23/ the

five vital airs, the five elements, ignorance, desire, and action -- these are the Citadel of Eight.238

The five motor organs, the five others which

are the cognitive organs, and the four-fold

entity beginning with the mind,

The five vital airs, [the elements] consisting

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of ether etc., and desire, and action, and

darkness, are the Citadel of Eight.239

By the word "ignorance" [is meant] mistaken knowledge, be-

cause the topic under discussion here is the effects of ig-

norance. 240 Concerning the verse, one should understand

the word "darkness" as a function of ignorance; this func-

tion of ignorance belongs to the Supreme Self. On the

other hand, the function of knowledge has already been

explained. 241

Thus, the manual called Pancaprakriya writ-

ten by the revered supreme ascetic, mendicant,

and teacher, Sarvajnatman, has been concluded.

Notes to the Translation

1 The word employed here is vrtti, which can al- ternately be rendered into English by the words: "func- tion", "power", "employment", etc .. It is used in this way by Sarvajnatman, along with specific modifiers, namely, mukhya-, guna-, and laksana-, to mean the level upon which a word operates in order to convey its intended sense. Sań- kara too, though rather infrequently, uses the word in the same manner: mukhya vrtti at BSBH I. ii. 13 p. 75 1. 11, IV. i. 5 p. 467 1. 6 (èf., svarthavrtti in the same sen- tence); gunavrtti at BSBH I. i. 6 p: 29 1. 9; the phrase "lāksanikIm vrttim" occurs at BSBH II. iv. 19 p. 321 1. 1. Anandagiri freely uses the word pravrtti in the same sense though this word does not appear in Sarvajnatman's text. Of course the most common use of the word vrtti in Advaita Vedanta is in the sense of manovrtti (mental modification) as in the phrase 'Srotradinimittah Sabdādivisaya manasah

11. 10-11. panca vrttayah prasiddhah .... -- BSBH II. iv. 12 p. 316

This is the mangalacarana or salutory verse/ver- ses taken as mandatory at the commencement of any Sanskrit treatise to insure successful and faultless completion. Its usual form seems to include a praise of an istadevata (attendant deity) in the first verse and a salutation to the author's preceptor in the second, as is exemplified in both commentaries to our text. Here, as in PR, Sarvajñat- man mentions only the istadevata (the Veda here and Visnu in PR) though in the eighth verse of the ten mangala verses to SS he does give the name of his guru, Devesvara: other- wise this teacher is named only at the close of PR and SS IV. 62, as well as at the end of each of the first two chap- ters in the present work. The significance of Sarvajfatman's mentioning his guru only at the close of these two chapters but not at the end of the work as a whole is not clear. his part, Sankara generally refrains from employing manga- On

lacarana-s except in half a dozen specific instances: three times in US, namely, in introducing the metrical portion as well as at the beginning of US XVII and XVIII;, at the be-

125

126

ginning of TUBH; at the beginning of MAUBH; at the begin- ning of BHGBH (actually a quotation of a Puranic verse). See pp. 152-3 of Paul Hacker's "Relations of Early Advai- tins to Vaisnavism ", Weiner 7eitschrift Fur Die Kunde Süd- und Ost-asiens, Q (1965), 147-154 on this point. There Hacker draws our attention to a statement by Sańkara oc- curing at KEUBH p. 97 1. 17-18, which runs: "Na hi sva- rajye 'bhisikto brahmatvam gamitah kamcana namitum icchati. ("He who is resigned to Brahman, who is enthroned in self- effulpence, does not need to make obescience to anything whatsoever."). The mangalacarana, as Anandagiri reveals in his commentary, has for its authority (pramana) the practise of learned men (sistcāra) who precede their works with a verse or verses of praise (e.g., Suresvara). From the conduct of such men and from MS I. 33 ("Asti hyanumanam") which states that when a sruti passage is not expressly evident (as in our case with the mangalacarana), one should infer its existence (see Sabarabhasya on the sutra -- an in- ference is made for a sruti passage that would support such conduct even though it cannot be pinpointed in the Veda). These two proofs can be challenged by a purvapaksin on the grounds that a) people like Sankara have, in many instan- ces, successfully completed works without employing a man- galacarana, and even nastika-s such as certain Buddhists have completed their treatises without the aid of benedic- tory verses: b) many works never reach fruition even thouch they do berin with a mangalacarana (essentially demonstra- ting the breakdown of the positive and negative concomit- tance or anvayavyatireka between mangalacarana and a suc- cessful completion of a work). The reply of the siddhan- tin to the first part of the objection would be that pre- ceptors like Sankara have mentally performed the mangala- carana before commencing their works even though it may not be present in so many words, and that the works of nastika-s who do not perform mangalacarana-s are propor- tionately fraught with errors. The reply to the second portion of the objection would have to suppose that the mangalacarana-s set forth by those people were not equal to the tasks they set out to perform in their writings and therefore could not remove all the obstacles that lay in the way of their completion of the works. See Annambhatta's DIpika on his own margalacarana to his Tarkasamgraha, where such a polemic takes place. A mangalacarana should also indicate all the anu- bandha-s or preliminary considerations for the work in ques- tion, namely: 1) the adhikarin or qualified person for whom

127

the treatise is written; 2) the visaya or thematic con- cern, i.e., the subject matter of the work; 3) the sam- bandha or mutual connection between what is to be made known and the means of making it known (bodhyabodhakabhava or pratipadyapratipādikabhava); 4) prayojana or aim of the work. See VS pp. 1-2 on the anubandha-s. Since it is necessary that an author be well aware of the anubandha-s for his particular work before he begins it, and since Sarvajnatman has not explicitly made mention of them, Anandagiri assumes them to be latent in the mań- galacarana. tion: -He states the following on p. 3 of our edi-

Cidvivartāyeti kāranatvena cidātmano nirdešāt, ajfatasya tasya visayatvam visayavisayibhāvasam- bandhascoktah. Vedhasa iti ca nihsreyasahetutva- nirdesāt tasya prayojanatvam tatkāmasyādhikāri- tvam cavagamitam.

(On account of the fact that there is the mention of that atman which is pure consciousness as the cause [of the illusory evolutel in the words, ' ... which is an illusory evolute of pure conscious- ness .. .', that unknown thing [i.e., which will be realized through study of the Vedanta] is the sub- ject matter, and the mutual relation between what is to be made known and the means of making it known which exists between the cidatman and the Veda is also expressed there: Since the author indicates that it [the Veda] is the cause of final beatitude through the words, ' ... which is Brahma the Bestower.', it is admitted that such final beatitude is the aim of the work and he who desires it is the qualified person for whom the work is written.)

3 Vivarta -- an evolute of cit to which only pragma- tic and not ultimate reality is conceded. It stands in op- position to the notion of parinama or actual transformation that is held by the Sankhyas. See Paul Hacker's Vivarta (Weisbaden: Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literature Geistes und Sozialwissenschaften Klassen, 1953). The cid- ätman is both the karana (cause) and adhisthana (locus or support) of each and every vivarta. On p. 2 of our edition, Anandagiri calls attention to the possible objection that since the Veda is such a vi-

128

varta, consisting of verses and strophes, it is an effect. like the ether (akasa) nad onw should wish.to set it as- ide, as one does with all insentient effects om prder to attain a realization of Brahman and one should not praise it as Sarvajhatman does in the mangalacarana. The siddhan- tin replies that it should indeed be praised because it is a supremely speceial.effect of ignorance on two counts: a) it is not a human product (i.e.,fit is apauruseya -- this concept is taken over by the Advaitins from the MImansa school and their position is summarized by Sankara at BSBH I. iii. 29 and also see MS I. viii. 27); b) its subiect matter fs of such an eminent nature (visistavisaya).

Vedhas -- here we follow Anandagiri who gives the following explanation of this term:

Tasyaiva karmāvabodhamutpādyānusthānadvara abhy- udayahetutvam brahmajnanamutpadya ca brahmanis- thadvarena nihsreyasaprayojakatvamabhyudayam nih- šreyasam ca ubhayamuktavidhaya vidhatIti vyutpat- teriti vaisistyantaramaha -- vedhasa iti.

(Having given rise to the knowledge of karma, the Veda is the cause of prosperity through the per- formance [of those proper actions], and having given rise to the knowledge of Brahman, the Veda ds the cause of final beatitude through a firm conviction in Brahman, thus according to the ety- mology: 'It bestows both kinds of things, namely, prosperity and final beatitude.', he gives another eminent qualification by stating that it is the Bestower.)

5 Athatas -- Vidyāpurna in his Vyākhya on this, ex- plains the word atha (now) as 'immediately following upon the adhikarin's desire to know Brahman (brahmajijñasa)' and the word atas (hence) as referring to the cause (hetu) of the origination of all knowable things, and therefore that which is the cause of the origination of the knowledge that will be imparted by the. text, namely, the Veda. This fol- lows Sankara at BSBH I. i. 1, concerning the same two words. The word athatas (now) carries in its sense the response to both the questions "When?" and "Whence?" the work which en- sues comes about,.

129

6 GrhItasaktika -- Anandagiri glosses this with the word "jñatasamarthya . The idea here is that one comes to know what a word stands for through witnessing the exchan- ges of experienced people.

7 Vrddha -- here meaning the uttamavradha or the most experienced in the sabdarthasambandha (the connection be- tween a word and its sense), that is, the one making the statements such as "Bring the cow. ", and the madhyamavrddha or the one who is not so well. experienced, that is, the one hearing (srotr) and acting on the first's statements. These two are observed by the least experienced one, that is, the child (bala) or learner (vyutpattr) who perceives what is taking place between them and thus gains a knowledge of the relation between a specific word and its sense. Anandagiri supplies more detail of the actual process once the child has finished his observation of the exchange of these ex- perienced people, when he states the following on pp. 5-6. of our edition:

Tamalaksya balasya parisaragatasyaivam manīsā sam- unmisati -- vimatā pravrttih višistavijnānapurvika, visistapravrttitvat, madīyapravrttivad iti. Tac- cedam vijiānam kuto jātam -- iti gavesanāyām anvaya- vyatirekābhyām prakrtavacanajanitametadityavadhā- rayati. Tadevamavisesena višistavijnanavisavatve padasamudāyasyāvadhārite kriyāpadasya pravartaka- visyatvam, itarasya ca padakadambakasya kārakago- caratvamityadhigate satyavapoddharabhyam padavi- sesasya arthavisesavisayatvādhyavasāyāt syapi tattatprayogabhedesugotvavacchinnasasnādi- gosabda-

madarthavyabhicarat tadarthe tasyavipratipattya pravrttih mukhyavrttivyapadesabhaginftyarthah.

(Having beheld that [exchange], an idea occurs to the child who is nearby: "This activity is prece- ded by a specific knowledge because it is a speci- fic activity, just as my own activity." asks himself]: "Whence does this knowledge arise?'; And The

then through positive and negative concomittance he comes to the realization that it is born from those words in question. Thus he has a general knowledge that the collection of words has as its object a specific knowledge, and then The realizes that] the verb has 'acting' as its aim. and the rest of the words fall within the category of declined words

130

relating to the verb; when that fact is learnt one then apprehends, through the process of grouping together and grouping apart, that specific words refer to specific objects; similarly, the word "cow" never fails, in its various occurrences, [to refer tol that object which is possessed of things such as dewlap and which is distinguished [from other things by a connection with] the universal: "cow- ness" .. Thus, the invariable use, of that word [i.e., "cow"] in repsect to that object [i.e., cow] is en- titled to the designation: "primary usage" .)

Anandagiri's elaboration can probably be aligned with Kuma- rila's explanation for the acquiring of sabdarthasambandha- jMana which occurs in the closing verses (i.e. 141) of the sambandhaksepaparihara of SV (p. 482). There verses 140-

the steps of the learning process are brought into line with the following three pramana-s: a) pratyaksa -- where the vy- utpattr perceives the interaction between the uttamavrddha and the srotr; b) anumana -- where having perceived that in- teraction, the vyutpattr infers that thene 'must exist some knowledge of the connection between words and objects in the minds of the two people being 'observed; c) arthapatti -- where following that, there is the postulation that a rela- tion between the word used (e.g., "cow") and the object brought by the srotr actually exists. The process of āva- poddhara (grouping together nad grouping apart the occur- rences of the same words as they appear in different sen- tences -- see SS I. 135; 141; 367; NAIS III. 131) mentioned in the last half of Anandagiri's elaboration, is a form of mutual anvayavyatireka between the two words occuring in the statement, gamanaya", so that one learns the meaninp of. the word "cow" by grouping together the occurences of the word "cow" and its corresponding.object in sentences in which it is constant, but the verb varies (.e.g., "Bring the /cow ", "Bind the cow ", "Milk the cow ") and by grouping apart the varying verbs form the word "cow" (e.g., for the verb "bring" we get the following sentences: horse " "Bring the "Bring the pot ", "Bring the cloth ") -- here the verb is constant and the object varies. The method sepa- rately dtermines the meaning of each of the two portions of the sentence. The word avapodvapa sometimes occurs in an identical context in later texts such as the Kavya text called Sahityadharpana (II. 4a) and Annambhatta's TD on TS LIX (p. 50 of the Bombay edition).

131

8 Akrti -- in the Nyaya sense of shap or collocation of parts (see NS II. ii. 65-68) rather than in the MImamsa sense of jati (see MS I. iii. 30 and Sabara on this, as well as SV XIII. 18).

9 The purpose of this specification is in order to avoid the ativyapti (over extension) of the definition of laksana to the other two usages. TD on TS III p. 4 states the three faults of a defintion:

Laksyaikadesavrttitvamavyāptih yathā goh kapi- latvam. Alaksyavrttitvamativyaptih yatha goh 3rigitvam. Laksyamātrāvartanamasambhavah yatha gorekasaphatvam. Etaddusanatrayarahito dharmo laks anam.

(The exclusion of part of the things which are being defined is non-pervasion (avyapti), just as in saying acow is a tawny animal [and thereby excluding those cows which are white, spotted, etc.]. The application of the definition to what is not being defined is over-extension (ati- vyapti), just as in saying a cow is an animal that has horns, [which would also apply to animals such as goats, buffaloes, etc.]. The non-application Cof the definition] to any of the things being de- fined is impossibility (asambhava) [of the defi- nition] just as in saying that a cow is an animal with uncloven hooves. That thing which is free from these three faults is a [true] definition.)

Anandagiri points out how the specification avoids ati- vyäpti on two counts when he states (p. 6 of our edition):

Yatkincidarthamapeksya vacyarthasyapi bhavatvar- thantaratvamityarthantare vrttisabdasya laksanety- ukte mukhyā laksana syāditi višinasti -- mukhyārtha- ambandhaditi. Atha varthantare vrttirityukte gu- navrttau vyabhicare tannivaranarthamidam visesanam.

(If he had just said "Secondary usage is usage with respect to a different sense. ', then since every word-sense is different compared to other word-sen- ses, even a primary sense would be secondary; thus

132

he specifies that it is " ... on the basis of a con- nection with the primary sense ... .". Or if he had ' said that [laksana is simply] usage with respect to a different sense, then this (definition] would fail because it would also apply to that usage which is based on similar qualities -- this speci- fication is made in order to avoid that.)

The idea of the first point seems to be that though the primary sense of the word "cow" is that thing qualified by the universal: "cowness"; that sense is a different sense from the primary sense of the word "pot" which means that thing which is qualified by the universal: Thus, given the definition: "potness". 'Secondary usage is usage with respect to a different sense.'; the primary sense of the word "cow" which refers to that thing qualified by the uni- versal: "cowness" (which is in itself a sense different from that thing which is qualified by the universal : "potness") would have to be taken as a secondary usage. The specification 'on the basis of a connection with the primary sense' avoids this difficulty by stating that the different sense referred to must be connected with the pri- mary sense of the word in question; that is to say, it is not enough to say that the senses concerned simply be dif- ferent, as in the case of the words "cow" and "pot", in order for secondary signification to take place, but it is important that the different sense (arthantara) indi- cated by the secondary usage be firmly connected with the primary usage of the original word. The second ativyapti mentioned above concerning gunavrtti is clear (see SS I. 172 for the difference between gunavrtti and laksanavrtti).

10 This specification is meant to avoid the pos- sible objection that the given definition of laksana is asambhavin (i.e., can never apply to anything at all). The sense of the objection is that if mukhyavrtti is ad- mitted, then one should stop at, or be content with, that and not resort to laksana. If mukhyavrtti is present, then that in itself accounts for the funtion of the owrd and the question of laksana will never arise, so that your defini- tion will be asambhavin. Sarvajfatman's qualification, " ... mukhyarthaparigrahe pramanataravirodhe sati .. when the understanding of the primary sense is contradic- ..

ted by other pramana-s. ") is stated to account for such an objection.

133

11 Which is the river proper itself, i.e., the current.

12 There is a misprint in the editichere, apara- rityajya should be aparityajya.

13 That is, the pratyagatman. Sankara consistently uses the term to refer to the Absolute Self in his writings and Sarvajnatman follows him on this point (see SS I. 25, 50, 242; II. 8, 12-15; IV. 16). Compare with this, the three different aspects of the term pratyahc as given by Sarva- jfatman at SS I. 159:

Pratyagbhavastavadeko 'sti buddha pratyagbhavah kascidanyah pratIci, Pratyagbhavastatkrtastatra canyo vyutpanno 'yam tatra catmeti sabdah

(Indeed, one aspect of inwardness is in the intellect, A certain other one is in the inward self, And another aspect of inwardness which is made out of them exists in [the mixture], this [last one] is the primary sense of the word "atman".)

This final aspect of inwardness is a result of the mutual superimposition taking place between the intellect and the Absolute Self (pratyanc) and exists in the associated (śabala) entity, namely,, the JIva.

14 With this question, Sarvajnatman has in mind the possible objection that the three usages of words are all innaplicable with respect to the pratyagatman since it is not an object (avisaya).

15 SarvajMatman states the same thing at S$ I. 239:

Sastijātigunakriyādirahite sarvasya vijÃātari pratyakse parivarjitakhilajagaddvaitaprapańce drsau; Samtyaktavyavadhanake paramake visnoh pade sāsvate tvayyajfanavijrmbhita na hi giro mukhyapravrttiksamah.

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(Indeed, language which is arisen out of ignor- ance cannot cope, in its primary usage, with You who are free from things such as relation, univer- sal, quality, activity, etc., who know all things, who are directly perceivable, who are completely devoid of this cosmos of duality which is the uni- verse, who lack all concealments, who are the high- est abode of Visnu, and who are eternal.)

16 BU II. iii. 6.

17 VanmanasagocaratIta -- as in TU II. 4 and 9: "Yato vaco nivartante aprapya manasa saha/ Anandam brah- mano vidvān na bibheti kadacana//( That from which words together with the mind, not being able to reach, turn back/ The one who knows that Brahman's bliss never fears at all//"); and KU VI. 12: "Naiva vāca na manasā prāptum sakyo na ca- ksuna/ AstIti bruvato 'nyatra katham tadupalabhate//" (It can neither be obtained by words, nor by the mind, nor by the eye/ How then can it be apprehended other than by saying, 'It exists. '?//").

18 The idea seems to be this, that even though it is correct to say that the two usages are ultimately inap- plicable to the pratyagätman, since they still belong to the realm of language, even so they can be taken as pro- visionally applicable because teh pratyagatman is not di- recty perceivable and it has to be somehow indicated in order to be taught, as well as in order to account for sruti passages that contain words that stand for the Ab- solute Brahman. Since the primary usage of words is clearly innapplicable to the pratyagätman, due to the absence of the sabdapravrttinimitta-s already mentioned. (note 15 above),. one must resort to the remaining types of word-usages.

19 "PratyaktvadatisuksmatvadatmadrstyanusIlanat/" -- NAIS II. 55a; the second half runs: Ato vrttIrvihāyānyā hyahamvrttyopalaksyate//" ("For these reasons having dis- carded other modes, the I-mode figuratively indicates [the inward Self)//"). Sarvajfatman similarly admits the appli- cability of gunavrtti to the Absolute. at SS I. 170:

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Pratyaktvadigunānvayena yadi va gaunyastu vrttis- tayorbrahmahampadayoh paretaradrsormukhye virodho yatah, Mukhyarthanupapattihetukataya gaunyasti vrttiryato loke manavako vibhāvasurasau simhah pumānityapi

(Or, since there is a contradiction concerning the primary senses of the two words, "Brahman" which are the Supreme [Self] and the other [self and "["

(i.e., the jIva)], those two words are said to have a secondary usage based on similar qualities because of the fact that [the two entities] are linked by qualities such as inwardness, etc., just as in the everyday world secondary usage based on a similarity of qualities is found in statements like, "The young pupil is a fire.", "This person is a lion.", due to the impossibility of their primary senses.)

It is clear therefore that both of the authors ac- cept the applicability of gunavrtti with respect to the pratyagatman. However, due to the recognition of the prob- lem that such an admission presupposes the existence of two entities that can be compared in terms of their qulities, as well as of the problem that Brahman is ultimately qua- litiless (nirupadhika), later Advaitins shy away from it and explain away statements such as the above in earlier writings as an argumentative indulgence (praudhivada), and not ture admissions (see for example, Madhusudana Sarasvati's statement on p. 94 of his Vedantakalpalitika: "Siddhante 'pi prabhvadigunayogena gaunyâh svikārah samksepašārīrakakārānām praudhivadamātram, iti sampradayah. ). Returning to the quotation from Suresvara which ap- pears in our text, we may add that the comparison in terms of inwardness is made because the "I" (ahamkara) is the most inward thing apart from the atman, and the comparison in terms of subtlety is grounded in the fact that both are be- yond the range of the two types of sense organs (i.e., the five sensory organs or buddhIndriya-s and the five motor or- gans or karmendrIya-s, which are listed for example at Manu- smrti II. 90). The last reason, namely, the similarity of form, is based on the notion that both the "I" (ahamkara) and the atman have the form of consciousness (caitanya); the atman being purely and naturally so, and the "I" because it takes on the reflection of that consciousness which is es- sential to the atman. Jñanottama, commenting on NAIS II. 54 gives an additional interpretation for the phrase," .. , atma-

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drstyanusIlanat ... bhyatmadrstyanusTlanat .... " , glossing it as: " ... annamayakosara- ( ... because it is similar in -form to that self which begins with the sheath of food .... "). Such an interpretation alludes to the microcosmic/macro- cosmic comparison between the higher and lower self as it accurs at TU II. 2-5, where both the cosmic and individual selves'are described as comprised of five progessively sub- tle sheaths or bodies, beginning with the gross material body which is designated, the body of food and ending with the most subtle body which is called the body of bliss (anandamayakośa). Thus, keeping in mind that notion of "I", namely the ahamkara, which can be connected with the pratyagatman through the similar qualities mentioned, and not taking into account other mental modes, such as the intellect (buddhi) or the mind (manas), one can employ gunavrtti in statements such as "I am Brahman " ("Aham brahmasmi. BU I. iv. 10) in order to apprehend the unity of the in- dividual self with the Absolute Self (jTvatmaikatva) which is the final truth of Advaita Vedanta. Lastly, Anandagiri points out a possible objection that might arise to Sarvajfatman's use of the quotation from Suresvara when he states: "Nanudahrtavartikasya lak- sanavrttivisayatvena caritārthatvānna gunavrttau paryava- sanamiti .... " ("Due to the fact that the line extracted by you could also be meaningful in terms of laksanavrtti, you should not take it to refer to gunavrtti ... The ob- jection is simply that the line from Suresvara has been taken out of context in terms of what the second half of the verse states. There the word "upalaksyate" clearly occurs, but gunavrtti is not mentioned at all. Perhaps this is the reason for Sarvajfatman's quoting of only the first half of the verse. In any event, the quotation does comply with Sarvajfatman's definition of gunavrtti, and his interpretation of the verse is borne out by Jhanottama's commentary on it as well.

20 The reference here is to the mahavakya: "Tat- tvamasi " ("That thou art." -- CHU VI. viii. 7).

21 quite similar. Compare this with NAIS III. 23-24 which is

22 That is, by abandoning the 'non-immediacy' and the 'possessing duality' portions, and intending the por- tion left over, namely, the eternally existent inward con- sciousness.

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23 Here the word "that" refers, in its primary sense, to a thing associated with a past time and place, and the word "this" refers, in its primary sense, to a thing associated with a present time and place, but by abandoning their references to these various times and places, the two words refer to the entity which persists through them. Anandagiri introduces two possible objec- tions here. First of all, one might say that the entity which is qualified by previous times and places (i.e., the "that", say a person as a young child) simply becomes further qualified (visistaviasistya) by the present times and places (i.e., the this" , say the same person as an adult) so that resorting to laksana becomes unnecessary in order to explain the purport of the statement. The retort to such an objection would be that it is impos- sible to be possessed of two contradictory qualifications simultaneously (i.e., it is contradictory to be simulta- neously a child and an adult); therefore, one must admit laksana in this case in order to get to the purport of the statement. This leads to the second possible objec- tion: Alright then, let one (e.g., the "that") be a qua- lified entity (visista) and one (e.g., the "this") be a secondarily signified entity (laksita), and in that way, the two could exist at one and the same time and place. The answer that Anandagiri gives to this is that the ob- jector completely misunderstands the purport of the sen- tence, and this purport is the underlying entity as an indivisible unity and not the identity of that which is qualified and that which is secondarily signified (e.g., that the adult which one previously encountered as a child is in fact the same person as that child). However, this last response given by Anandagiri does not really seem to bring out the difference between regarding one of the com- ponents to be visista and one to be laksita, and regarding them both to be laksita; instead with his response he ap- pears to side step the issue.

24 'As an illustration, Anandagiri supplies the following sentence: "GayatrI va idam sarvam bhutam." ("In- deed the GayatrT is all this that has arisen. -- CHU III. xii. 1). Here, though the word "GayatrI" means a certain type of meter in its primary sense, it is taken to refer to Brahman in its causal form (see BSBH I. i. 2, which deals with Brahman as the origin of the world, this is cal- led the karanatman and is commonly identified with Isvara). For a schema of the meditational symbolism of the GayatrI

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meter, see BU V. xiv and Sankara on it. As for the word "vaisvānara", Anandagiri supplies the sentence: "Vaišva- naramatmanam sampratyadhyesi' ("Now know that atman, Vais- vanara. -- this is similar to CHU V. x1. 6). Sankara ex- plains the meditation upon Vaisvanara in his commentary to BU V. ix. 1 (compare this with BHGBH XV. 14). In this latter sentence the primary reference of the word "vaiśva- nara" is to the digestive fire (jatharagni), but it is ta- ken as meaning Brahman. The word etc. ("adi") as used by Sarvajnatman intends things such as the vital breath (prana) and ether (akasa). Such ajahallaksana can never account for the qualitiless (nirupadhika) side of Brahman.

25 T The two sentences are, "Yajamanah prastarah from TaittirIya Samhitā II. vi. 5, and Yajamāna ekakapā- lah " from TaittirTya Brahmana I. vi. 3. 4. In the former sentence, the word "sacrificer", whose primary sense is a specific type of man, is used to refer to the specific fist full of darbha-grass which is the place on which the sacrificial ladle rests, by abandoning its primary sense entirely. Similarly in the latter sentence, the word "sac- rificer" refers to the sacrificial cake which is baked in the unsegmented dish.

26 This verse in the text, which becomes the whole of the paragraph that follows in the translation, is iden- tical to SS I. 169, except for the fact that in our text it concludes with the words " ... na khalu tadā kascidapyasti dosah ", while in SS I. 169 it ends with the words, bhavatu jahallaksana ko virodhah." Whether this can be taken as an indication of the chronological sequence be- tween PP and SS is completely open to debate. If SS was written prior to PP, why would an author of Sarvajfatman's emminence misquote a passage from his own magnum opus ? On the other hand, and more likely, the variation can be attributed to the contingencies of oral transmission. In any event, both ST and AT on SS I, 169 start off their com- mentaries with the statement that the verse is a praughi- vada (an argumentative indulgence in a position not uiti- mately acceptable to the author -- see note 19 above) on be- half of Sarvajfatman. It is also termed abhyupagamavāda (cf., NS I. 1'. 31) as in AT on SS I. 169: Atra yadisab- daprayogadabhyupagamavadatasya paksasya dyotita vastutastu vedāntesu brahmādisabdānam pratyagbrahmanyeva pravogadar sanat .... ". What the verse in our text is ultimately try- ing to say may be paraphrased in the following manner:

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If, given a certain context, we admit that jahalaksana can lead to the purport (i.e., ekatva) of a mahavakya, this does no injury to our ultimate position that only jahadajahallaksana can lead to it.

27 BU I. iv. 10.

28 ST on SS I. 169 supplies a helpful paraphrase Vof the verse:

VyavaharātIte brahmani vyutpattyasambhavānna śa- balam brahmahampadayoh sakyam kim tu sabhasajfānam sābhasahamkarasceti pakse rauti naurayo dahati sar. po rajjurityatra krtsnasvārthaparityāgena tatsam- bandhijanasamūhavannisarpādhisthānalaksanāvadihāpi

thah. tadadhisthanabrahmalaksana syadityavirodha ityar-

(On account of the fact that primary usage is im- possible in respect to Brahman which transcends the ordinary world, it is not possible that [Brah- man as] an associated entity [serve as the primary sense7 of the two words, "Brahman" and "I"; more- over, [their primary senses must respectively be] ignorance together with an illusory reflection of consciousness and the I-faculty together with an illusory reflection of consciousness; with regard to this position there may be [through the complete abandonment of the primary sense] the secondary/in- dication of Brahman which is their locus, just as by the abandoning of the primary sense entirely in statements such as "The boat roars "; "It is burn- ing "; "The snake is the rope "; there is the se- condary indication of people [on the boat], the fire, and the locus of the snake, which have a con- nection with the respective primary senses. There is no contradiction in this -- this is the sense in- tended. )

Thus, in the mahavakya: "I am Brahman ", the primary sense of the two words, which is the associated (sabala) entity, is abandoned in each case, leaving pure consciousness which is the locus (adhisthana) of each associated entity. In this way one comes to understand the true purport (tatparya)

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of the mahavakya, which is the unity (ekatva) of the locus which underlies each of the entities indicated by the pri- mary senses of the words "I" and "Brahman".

29 The sutra being referred to is P II. i. 1. How- ever, though Patanjali introduces the notions of jahatsvar- tha and ajahatsvartha in his MBH at Bhasya No. 75 on P II. 1. l as two types of vrtti, the word "vrtti" as employed in MBH always means either: a) the transformation or in- tegration of word components to form finished products of a structurally higher order, for example, gam + suffix -ana = gamana, or compounding rajnah purusah to form raja- purusa: on b) the finished form which results from that process (see S. D. Joshi's Patanjali's Vyakarana-Mahābhasya -- Samarthahnika P. 2. 1. 1., Poona: University of Poona, 1968, p. 9 note 19 and also pp. x-xi), and not sabdavrtti as is intended in SarvajHätman's text. Coupled with this problem is the fact that neither Patañjali, nor the major commentators Kaiyata and Nagesa, who both posdate Sarva- jmatman, mentions the third type of vrtti called jahadaja- hatsvartha, but only jahatsvartha and ajahatsvartha. It is puzzling to see why Sarvajhatman should call our attention to this sutra which really has little affi- nity with the discussion of laksana that is underway ex- cept for a seemingly co-incidental parallel in the termi- nology used. Sarvajnatman does seem to be the first Ad- vaitin to use this three-fold division of laksana, perhaps the original inspiration for his notion of jahadajahalla- ksana lies in Patañjali's Bhasya on P II. 1. 1 (compare Bhasya No. 80 on this same sutra which reads: "Jahadapy- asau svārtham nātyantayā jahāti. Yah pararthavirodhI svār- thastam jahati -- Although it abandons its own sense, i does not do so completely. It abandons that part of its own sense which contradicts the other sense."). In any event, the problem of this sentence is: To whom is Sar- vajnatman specifically referring when he uses the term "traividyavrddhah."? Perhaps Sarvajfätman is seeking some sort of contrived'basis for his three-fold division of la- ksana in the writings of the Grammarians.

30 I supply S. D. Joshi's translation from his Pa- tanjali's Vyakarana-Mahabhasya -- Samarthahnika P. 2. 1. I7. (Poona: Poona University, 1968).

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31 Karmatvaprasanga -- karma here means object both in the physical sense (visaya) and in the sense of the ac- cusative in terms of grammatical relation (karmakaraka -- see P I. iv. 49). Therefore, one should not think that if la- ksana makes the atman known, it means that the atman is then necessarily an object, in both the above senses, of such statements and the knowledge they generate.

32 The phrase that occurs in the text is: kevalam. Restrictive particles are of three kinds: ... eva

a) ayogyavyavrtti, in which that which is excluded is a non-connection with a specific thing, e.g., "Arjuna in- deed (eva) is the wielder of the bow ("Partho dhanur- dhara eva '), where the non-connection with the quality of wielding the bow is denied of Arjuna; b) anyayogyavyavrtti which involves the exclusion of a connection with some other thing, e.g., "Arjuna alone (eva) is the weilder of the bow ("Partha eva dhanurdharah "), where Arjuna alone and no other person is meant; c) atyantayogyavyavrtti, in which ` the particle negates the suspicion that the statement is a fiction, e.g., "Indeed (eva) the lotus is blue " ("NI- lamutpalambhavatyeva "), where the suspicion that the fal- sity of the lotus being blue is excluded. The first is an affirmative exclusion, the second a disjunctive exclusion, and the last is an absolute exclusion. In terms of the phrase from our text, as the commentary points out, the particle eva is of the first type and it points to the ex- clusion of the non-connection of the Veda with the removal of avidya, meaning that the removal of avidya certainly exists in the Veda; while the particle kevalam is of the second kind, meaning that this removal and nothing else, such as presentation of the atman as an object of krow- ledge, is what is asserted of the Veda.

33 "Yato vaco nivartante " -- TU II. iv. 1 and II. ix. 1.

34 This is an allusion to BU III. ix. 26: tam tvaupanisadam purusam prcchami .... " (" " ... I ask you a- ..

bout that person who is taught in the Upanisads .. The issue of the appropriateness of the qualification, "au- canisada", could be called into question in the following way: If the atman is not an object, then how does it come about that there exists this sruti passage that states that. it is taught in the Upanisads?

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35 What is meant here is that the mumuksu deals . with such statements by observing that the essence secon- darily signified by the words "tat" and "tvam", namely pure consciousness (caitanya), is what persists in all cases, and also by observing that what is primarily signified by the words "tat" and "tvam", namely that entity associated with non-immediacy (paroksatvasabala) and that entity as- sociated with possessing duality (sadvitIyasabala) respec- tively, does not concomitantly persist with that pure con- sciousness. The former observation is one of positive con- comitance (anvaya) and the latter observation ohe of nega- tive concomitance (vyatireka)

36 The Vyakhya calls our attention to the fact that while the mangalacarana at the beginning of the chapter has as its object of. praise the Veda, here the praise is being more clearly directed at Brahman in the form of abstract consciousness: "Prakaranarambhe abhi fsic dhanapradhanyena pranamya ante punarabhidheyaprādhanayena pranamam karoti." ("Having offered praise at the beginning of the work with that thing which is speaking about [Brahman] predominating, he praises again at the end of the work with that thing which is spoken about predominating."). It must be noted that the only chapters in the whole of the work to have closing benedictory verses are the first and the second, and that there is no such verse at the close of the work as a whole. This could point to the fact that these two chap- ters alone belong to Sarvajatman, but there does not seem to be any significant evidence in the last three chapters that might indicate their attribution to a separate author. Sarvajfåtman's two other known works both conclude with verses of praise and both mention Devesvara in those verses.

37 Anandagiri explains Sarvajhatman's use of the third person here, instead of the expected first person: "Vyācakhyaviti paroksavacanamacāryasya ahamkārarahityapra- katIkaranartham. "( The Teacher's use of the third person with the words, 'he has explained' is in order to convey his freedom from egotism.").

38 Rajas -- the comparison (upamiti) between Deves- vara's feed and two lotuses allows for a play on the word rajas to mean both pollen from flowers and dust from the feet.

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39 Sreyas and preyas respectively -- the significance of mentioning preyas here. is that even in attaining or de- siring heaven, one must know the meanings of the words cor- rectly in terms of their various usages, so that sacrifices may be performed properly and thus be efficacious. What we might also take note of here is the fact that, for the Ad- vaitins, verbal testimony (comprised of scripture and the statements of trustworthy persons such as one's teacher) alone allows proper access to the realization of Brahman (e.g.,Sankara at BSBH I. i. 2 p. 7: "Vakyārthavicaranad- hyavasananirvrtta hi brahmavagatih, nanumanādi pramānanta- ranirvrtta. -- The realization of Brahman is accomplished by the firm understanding [that results ] from deliberation on the meaning of [Vedic7 sentences, not by other valid means of knowledge such as inference, etc .. "). For the contrasting Buddhist standpoint on this we have Dhamakir- ti's statements at Nyayabindu I. 2-3: "2. Dvividham sam- yagjnanam. 3. Pratyaksamanumanam ca." ("2. Correct know- ledge is two-fold. 3. Perception and inference.").

40 Athatas here means, as Anandagiri points out that after investigating the usages of words one should explain the great sentences ("Sabdavrttivivekanantaram ma- hāvakyavyakhyanam kartavyamityarthah.").

41 Anandagiri illustrates the sense of Sarvajñat- man's emphasis on the fact that moksa arises only from great sentences such as these, when he supplies a probable Mimamska objection at this point, as the Advaitin retort to it:

Nanu "aham brahma" iti vakyarthajfanamapi nopa- yujyate; tyatol moksasya karmasādhyatvāt; tathā

ahamiti. ca mahavakyavyakhyanamakincitkaramiti, tatraha -- Na hi karmana moksah sadhyate, krtaka- tvena anityatvaprasangāt; nakarmana. ityadini- sedhavirodhacca ityarthah.

(But the knowledge of the meaning of sentences such as "I am Brahman." is useless, because free- dom is stablished through proper ritual action, and in this way the explanation of the great sen- tences does not do anything useful. Sarvajnatman says in reply to that the words: ' "I am Brahman." etc .. For moksa is not established by proper ri-

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tual action, because that would lead to the un- warranted conclusion that it would be non-eternal since it would be produced by human effort; and because this is contradicted by such prohibitions as, "Not through proper ritual action. " -- Mahana- rayana Upanisad X. 5).

42 The idea is that a clarification of the mean- ing of these two words (padarthaparisodhana), i.e., the discrimination between what is directly and indirectly ex- pressed by them, will lead to a correct understanding of the mahavakya.

43 The words used here are sabala to mean the as- scociated entity, and suddha to mean the pure entity. Ša bala means something that is mixed with, or qualified by, something else, while suddha here means a thing which is pure in a sense opposite to what is conveyed by the word sabala and it is meant to point to that pure consciousness. which is dissociated from everything.else.

44 Adhidaivaparyanta -- Advaitins accept a three- fold division of the manifest Brahman: the Divine (adhi- daiva), the Human (adhyatma), and the Elemental (adhibhuta). Suresvara, in his Pafcikaranavartika, verses 12-28, gives the following itemization:

Adhyatma Adhibhūta Adhidaiva

The five sensory Their correspond- The corresponding organs: ing objects: divinity:

a)auditory b) tactile a) sound b) object of touch a) Dis (Space)

c) visual b) Vayu (Wind)

d) taste c) colour or form c) Aditya (Sun) d) Varuna e) olfactory d) flavour e) odour e) the Asvins

The five motor Their correspond- organs: ing functions: The corresponding divinity:

a) tongue b) hands a) speech b) taking hold a) Agni b) Indra

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c) feet c) walking c) Vişņu d) anus d) excreting d) Mrtyu (Death) e) sexual organ e) sexual joy e) Prajapati

The three-fold The correspond-' internal organ: ing objects: The corresponding divinity:

a) mind a) mental objects a) Candra (Moon) b) intellect b) knowable objects b) Brhaspati c) I-faculty c) ego-objects c) Rudra

Thought (citta) Objects of thought Ksetrajña

Ignorance Objective modes of Iśvara ignorance (vikāra)

Anandagiri makes the sense of the phrase clear when he states the folowing in the commentary: "Adhyatmikadhi- bhautikopadhidvarakam paricchinnatvam parihartum 'Hiranya- garbhatām nitvā tasmai bruvāt' itinyāyamanusrtya višinasti -- adhidaivaparyantamiti. ("Having resorted to the maxim, Taking him up to the limit of Hiranyagarbha, one should say [the mahavakya] to him.' -- BUBHV I. iv. 1338], in or- der to put aside the restrictions caused by the human and elemental spheres, Sarvajnatman specifies [the qualifica-' tion] 'up to the gods'.") In terms of the above chart, the Hiranyagarbha of the BUBHV quotation would be equated with Isvara who is the cumulative totality (samasti -- see Vedantasāra p. 3 f.) of all pratyakcaitanya-s, as opposed to the distributed in- stances (vyasti-s) of consciousness internal to sentient entities. In this same sense Hiranyagarbha is subject to the cumulative totality of ignorance, so that the sense of the BUBHV passage quoted above by Anandagiri would be: 'ha- ving brought the person who seeks release up to the stage of Hiranyagarbha, who contains all pratyakcaitanya-s and all individual ignorance, that is having made the seeker aware of this macrocosmic perspective, the teacher should

hāvākya'. remove the ignorance that exists there by uttering the ma-

We may note an occurrence of the word adhidaiva and its .counterparts at SS III. 67a, where Sarvajnatman states the following: "Adhyatmamevamadhibhutamathadhidaivam su-

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tram virajamapi pasyasi sāksibhutah/" ("Thus having the na- ture of a witness you see the Human, the Elemental, the Di- vine, Sutra, and Viraj/"). This is interpreted by AT as follows: "Evam ca sati samastivyastisarvasarTrasāksitayā sarvatmekatvam sicdham .... WWhen this is so there is the establishment of the unity of all selves in the form of the witness of all bodies both in cumulitive totality and distributed instances .. ."); and ST glosses the terms in this way: "Tatradhyatmam dehadi. Adhibhutamakasadi. Adhi- daivam karanadhisthatrsuryadi. Sesam spastam. (of these the Human is that which consists of body etc .; the Elemen- tal is the ether etc .; the Divine consists of Surya and the rest who preside over the organs; the remainder is clear."). In summation, it seems that Sarvajnatman's use of the phrase "up to the gods .... " intends the inclusion of all ... pratyakcaitanya-s up to and including those of the gods, na- mely those on the Flemental level (adhibhuta) -- probably meaning those found in plants and animals -- on the human le- vel (adhyatma), and those found in the gods (adhidaiva).

45 Ignorance, in its collective totality,is the

Brahman. causal body of Isvara who is the first differentiation of As at Vedantasara p. 3, 1. 9: "Isvarasyeyam sam- astirakhilakaranatvātkaranasarīram .... " ("This collective totality [of ignorance] belonging to Isvara is the causal body [of Isvara] because it causes everything .... ").

46 The Vyakhya states that Sarvajnatman is trying to connect the primary meanings of the two words given here, with the primary meanings of those same words given in the first chapter;

Nanu pūrvasmin prakarane sadvitIvapāroksyābhyam Sabalam caitanyam mahāvākyaratapadadvayābhidheyam- ityabhihitam; iha tvanyathabhyabhani; atah purvap- aravirodha ityasankya tātparyamāha -- etaduktamiti.

(But in the previous chapter the caitanya as qua- lified by sadvitiya and paroksya was the primary sense of the two words contained in the mahāvakya; here he says otherwise. Thus there seems to be a contradiction between what was said earlier and what is said later. Having this doubt in mind, he gives what is meant through the words, 'This is the idea etc .. ").

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47 Sāmānādhiķaranyaviśesanavisesyabhāva -- sāmanadhi- karanya literally means having the same substratum' and here it refers to the appositional relation that is set off by the agreeing grammatical terminations of words in a sen- tence, and which indicates the fact that the words concer- ned refer to one and the same object. The logical contra- diction that results from placing the words "I" and "Brah- man" in grammatical apposition, and thereby asserting their identity, is obvious (see SŚ I. 166). The problem with rela- tion hetween qualifier and qualified (visesanavisesyabhava) which is implied by the failure of the grammatical relation is given by Sarvajfatman at SS I. 167: "Aviruddhavisesana- dvayaprabhavatve tpi visistayordvayoh/ tada nitaram tadviparItarupayoh// Ghatate na yadaikatā ('Even when two qualified entities which arise due to two non-contradictory qualifica- tions cannot possibly be identical, then it is completely [impossible for two entities whose qualifications] are of an opposite nature."). AT on this gives the example of a person qualified by possessing a stick and wearing ear- rings for the case of two different attributes connected with one qualified entity, and the example of Devadatta as qualffied by different times and places (i.e., in the state- ment "This is that Devadatta ") as an instance of contradic- tory qualifications.

48 .. .suddhau padarthau ca laksyate." -- what is meant is that the pure portion of each of the two word mean- ings is what each of the two words secondarily indicates.

45 These are the seven qualifications mentioned for the adhikarin:

a) laksayitvavatisthamana -- reaching the stage of being able to apply secondary signification to the mahavakya.

b) yajnadiksapitakalmasa -- this and the next qua- lification are evidence of a practical acceptance of the karmakanda.

c) sarvakarmakandaphalabhuta -- compare this with the description of the great-souled person (mahatman) who is described at SS I. 69 as karmakandakrta- buddhisuddhita (who has purified the intellect.by the performance of the karmakanda). Anandagiri

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in his commentary to PP interprets the qualifica- tion in two ways: i) as a purification of the intellect in the form of a cleansing of the per- son ("Buddhisuddhirapi purusasamskararupa .... " which is close to the sense of SS I. 69; 11) at- taining the state of Hiranyagarbha (see note 97 below), which he explains in the following way:

Darvihomamarabhya sahasrasamvatsatraparyan- tasya kramena karmano 'nusthanādašesajagad- ātmatvam hiranyagarbhabhavam praptasya prap- tavyantaramapratipadyamānasya gargyavadavas- thitasyetyarthah

(The sense is this: he has reached the state of Hiranyagarbha, which means that one becomes the whole universe through the performance of ritual actions beginning, with the oblation made with the ladle [which is the simplest] and ending with the thousand-year session [which is the most complex] -- for such a person who has attained this state there is no perceiving of anything else which should be attained, just like the descendant of Garga.)

The reference to a Gargya is probably an ironic allusion to Drptabalaki, who in BU II. 1. 1-14 divulges to Ajatasatru the various things that he is content with considering as the Absolute (Sankara, in fact, calls the last thing that Dr- ptabalaki names, i.e., the purusa in the self which is the limit of his metaphysical penetra- tion, Hiranyagarbha -- see BUBH II. i. 14)

d) sarvakarmasamnyäsitva -- this, and the two prior qualifications demonstrate a clear progression (krama) through karmakanda to jhanakanda

e) guropasanna -- the teacher is.of paramount im- portance in the Vedanta tradition. See MU I. ii. 12; Sankara in his commentary on this passage makes this statement: "Sastrajno 'pi svatantryena brah- majnananvesanam na kuryaditi .... " (Even though one is .versed in the scriptures, he should not pursue . the knowledge of Brahman on his own .... "). Also see note 50 below for the various qualifications of a teacher.

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f) tatraprasadalabdhasravanamanananididhyasana- bhyasananirastāsambhavanāviparītabhavanātātparya- Jhanasamsayaviparya -- Anandagiri glosses the ob- stacles which must be destroyed in the qualified person, as follows:

1. asambhavana (impossibility) is the lack (vaidhurya) of any internal percetions (vasana-s) corresponding to the' cognition: 'I am Brahman and nothing else.'

ii) viparItabhavana (confused idea) is pos- sessing the imagined idea (vasana) that the body and like things are the Self.

ii1) atātparyajñana (knowledge of what is not the purport) is both ignorance of what is the purport (namely, the unity of Brahman and the Self) and knowledge of what is not the purport (namely, duality).

iv) samsaya (doubt) is as to whether I am dif- ferent from Brahman or not different from it.

v) viparyaya (error) is the deep rooted notion (abhimana) that the atman is the body.

g) paramesvaranugrhTta -- Anandagiri cites MU III. 11. 3: "Yamevaisa vrnute tena labhyah. ." 7"He is to be reached only by the one whom he chooses."). Sankara's interpretations of this line at MUBH III. i1. 3 and KUBH I. i1. 23, where it recurs, take the pronouns quite differently and do not take Isvara into account at all.

50 r These are the six qualifications mentioned for the teacher:

1. säksätkrtabrahma -- the opposite to this is paro- ksajhana (theoretical or academic knowledge), and as Anandagiri points out, a person who has this latter kind of knowledge is not necessarily a guru because we see that perceiving final reality (tat- tvadarsitva = saksātkrtabrahmatva) exists apart

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from paroksajhanatva. In other words, Anandagiri is saying that paroksajnanatva is of a lesser ex- tension than saksatkrtabrahmatva.

2. jIvanmukta -- as at SS IV. 45: "TasmanjIvanmuk- tarūpena vidvānārabdhānām karmānām bhogasiddhyai/ Sthitva bhogam dhvantagandhaprasutam bhuktvatyan- tam yati kaivalyamante//" ( Therefore the realised person goes on existing in the form of one who though living has gained final release, in order to fulfil the experiencing of those actions already set in motion; having remained in that state and having experienced it as resulting from a [remain- ing] trace of ignorance, he completely attains fi- nal release."). However, Sarvajnatman seems to accept the state of jTvanmukta only pragmatically in SS IV. 38-40 in order to account for the ability of a realised teacher to teach, since if a teacher were completely liberated at the moment of reali- zation (i.e., a sadyomukti) he could.bear no rela- tion whatsoever to bodily parts, such as the organ of speech, which are necessary for imparting in- struction.

3. samyaginanagnidagdhasamastaduhkhanidana -- as at BHG IV. 37: kurute :rjuna/ "Yathaidhamsi samiddho 'gnirbhasmasat- Jhanagnih sarvakarmāni bhasmaşātku- rute tatha// ( O Arjuna, just as a blazing /fir reduces fule to ashes, just so does the firè of knowledge reduce all actions to ashes."). But in his commentary on this passage, as. well as at BUBH IV. 1. 15, Sankara is quick to state that this fire of knowledge can destroy only those actions that have not yet borne fruit (anarabdhakarma-s) and not prarabdhakarma-s.

4. sarvalaksanasampanna -- Anandagiri gives the fol- lowing qualities as examples: being proficient in the Veda (srotriyatva), being intent on Brahman (brahmanisthatva), being tranquil (santatva) -- these are probably all among the jIvanmukti as well. characteristics of a

5. svajfanakalpitasvapnadrsyakalpitagurumiva -- Be- cause in reality there is no duality, one is gran- ted this rank of teacher only due to the fact that the students still perceive duality. This, however,

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should not hamper his effectiveness as a teacher, and this is the intention of the example of the dream-object, since even a dream-object, though it lacks reality, can instill fear in the dreamer (even to the point of waking him up) as can the rope snake. Also see SS I. 338.

6. kalpitasabrahmacarisahasraparivestita -- popula- rity, probably as a result of vanquishing oppo- nents in philosophical debates.

51 m "Adhikarinah pramitijanako vedah." -- Source un- determined.

52 The Vyakhya on p. 22 of our edition sums up the basic purport of this long sentence in these words: tasmaiiñanādajnānatatkāryanivrttau kincitkālamavasthitasya vidhusah sarīrāntarānutpatteh ātyantikam kaivalyam bhava- tyeveti. (" ... when ignorance and its effects have been destroyed by knowledge, and after one has stayed in the world for a while, there is absolute freedom, because there is no possibility of another body for that pure person."). Due to the length of the sentence in the text, I have di- vided it into several sentences for the purpose of trans- lation. The first half of the sentence in the Sanskrit text deals with the negative side of final release, namely, with the fact that no new body can arise for the jIvanmukti (this runs up to " ... sarirantaranutpatteh .... ", see Appendix p. 217' l1. 1-2) and this is one sentence in my translation. The second half of the Sanskrit sentence emphasizes the positive side of this final release, in an effort to show that it is not completely negative, as might be supposed from the first half of the sentence; it is comprised of three sentences in my translation, ending on p. 95 1. 6 of the translation.

53 Badhita -- meaning the illusion of the external world. The idea seems to be this, that though for all in- tents and purposes the illusory world of duality has been sublated due to the arisal of knowledge, one is still sub- ject to the inertia of one's karma-s that have already been set in motion (prarabdha), and thus though one is no longer effected by it, the illusion of the world continues until the prarabdhakarma-s have run their course.

54 As stated in the same sentence, merit and de- merit (punyapapa), which are simply actions whose nature

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it is to bind (" ... punyapape bandhanabhute karmanI .. MUBH III. 1. 3), cause the production of a body. tions can be of three kinds, namely, those which have been These ac-

set in motion (prarabdha) and are bearing fruit for the present body; those which have been accumulated (sancita) in previous existences but which have not yet fructified; those future (agamin) actions which are yet to be perfor- med by the jIvanmukta while in his final body. The first type cannot be the cause of further bodiesfor the jIvan- mukta since he is exhausting their consequences by means of his present body; the second type cannot be such a cause because it is completely burnt up by his correct knowledge; the remaining type cannot be such a cause because his cor- rect knowledge has destroyed all ignorance which could be the cause of such actions clinging to him (see the closing portion of BSBH IV. 1. 19).

55 Up to this point we are given the negative side of the jIvanmukta's state of release, that is, no actions cling to him (other than the ones that are already set in motion), and no further bodies are produced for him. He is in a state of isolation from transmigratory existence.

56 Satyasamkalpa -- Sankara explains this term at CHUBH III. xiv. ?:

Satyasamkalpah satvā avitathāh samkalpā yasya so yam satyasamkalpah. Na yatha samsarina Iva- naikantikalpah samkalpa Isvarasyetyarthan. sarino nrtena mithyaphalatvahetuna pratyudhatvat- Sam-

samkalpasya mithyaphalatvam ...

(He who has irresistable will [lit., true will] is one whose volitions are true and infallible. Isvara's will is not like the ordinary person's will which is variable [i.e., sometimes it is ful- filled and sometimes it is not]. The will of the ordinary person, because it is under the reins of untrugh which serves as the cause of its bearing false results, bears false results.)

57 That is, since all manifest things such as the teacher, or the ether, have ignorance as the cause for their manifestation.

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58 This varies slightly with a similar list given by Sarvajfatman at SS I. 173: "Nityah suddho buddhamukta- svabhavah satyah suksmah sanvibhuscadvitIyah/ Fnandabdhir- yah parah so 'hamasmi pratyagdhaturnatra samsitirasti//" ("That supreme thing is eternal, pure, its essence is sen- tient and freed, it is true, subtle existent, omnipresent, non-dual, endless bliss/ I am that internal basic element, there can be no doubt about this//"). The additional pre- dicates given in this quotation are: subtle (sūksma), ex- istent (sat), omnipresent (vibhu) -- making ten in all. In SS I. 178-184 SarvajHatman devotes a verse each to the following from among those predicates: (= buddha), ananda, nitya, suddha, mukta, asti (= sat). satya, jnana

The corresponding verse dealing with advitIya seems to ap- pear at SS I. 158, while sūksma and vibhu do not seem to be allotted separate verses by Sarvajfatman. In his notes to his translation of SS I. 173 T. Vetter (Sarvajnatman's SamksepasarIrakam -- I. Kapit 1, Einfuhrung, Wbersetzung und Anmerkungen, Wein, 1972) puts forward the likely obser- vation that, through such a list of predicates, Sarvajnat- man exhibits a combination, perhaps as an intermediate stage, of what was a preference among earlier Advaitins such as Sankara for the phrase 'suddhabuddhamukta' to refer to Brah- man, with what later became a preference of later Advaitins for the phrase 'saccidānanda' to refer to Brahman.

59 The reference here is to ignorance (avidya).

60 Specifically those statements whose purport is the unity of the jIva and Brahman (brahmajIvaikatva), in other words of mahavakya-s, which are traditionally accep- ted to be four: Tattvamasi "Aham brahmasmi ("That thou art." -- CHU VI. viii. 7); "Prajnanam brahma ("I am Brahman " -- BU I. Iv. 10);

'Ayamatma brahma ("Knowledge is Brahman " -- AIU V. 3); ("This atman is Brahman " -- MAU 2). These are listed by Sankara at the close of his minor and not de- finitely authentic work, PancIkarana, but the term mahavakya itself does not occur in Sankara or Suresvara with this spe- cific sense (though the term does crop up with a different sense at BSBH I. 111. 33). What should be noted here is that for Sankara, Suresvara, and Sarvajfatman, those of the above sentences taken from the two oldest Upanisads, namely, "Aham brahmasmi " and "Tattvamasi " are of chief importance; they do not accord the same depth of concern and scrutiny to any other separate vedantavakya-s.

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61 The term employed here is laksyalaksanabhava, which literally means the relation between secondary sig- nification and the thing secondarily signified.

62 See note 47 above

63 Parimana -- literally the word means 'size' or 'measure'; in our context the word refers to the fact that the subsidiary sentences (avantaravakya-s, see following note) circumscribe the essential nature (svarupa) of Brah- man. Sarvajfatman uses the word parimana and the word pa- rimiti in the same context at SS III. 311-313, 317-318, and 326. From SS III. 311 it seems that knowledge of the scope or extent of these subsidiary statements is an invaluable supplement to the understanding of the meanings of the words "tat" and "tvam", and hence the sense of the maha- vakya-s themselves:

Adyapyavantaravacah parimanabodhavaikalyamasti mama tena mahavaco 'pi Vākyārthabuddhimanubhutiphalavasānām notpādayat- yaharah srutamapyasakteh.

(Even now I lack an understanding of the scope of the subsidiary sentences; because of this even though I hear the great statements daily, they are unable to bring about that final result which ends up in the direct experience of the knowledge of the meaning of those statements.)

The word parimana therefore seems to be drawing our atten- tion to the fact that these avantaravakya-s also cover a very valuable amount of ground when it comes to tracing out the extent of that Brahman who is tof be realized through an understanding of the meanings of the mahavakya-s. This pa- rimana is obtained through the process of upasamhara or ga- thering together described in note 66 below and it is com- prised of the predicates nitya, suddha, buddha, mukta, etc., mentioned in note 58 above. It is interesting to note that the essential definition (svarupalaksana) of Brahman, na- mely, "satyam jnanamanantam" (TU II. 1. 1) would, for Sar- vajfatman, probably fall within this parimana of the avan- taravākya-s.

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64 Avāntaravakya -- Sarvajatman gives a brief defi- nition of this at SS III. 312:

Vidhimuķhena parasya nivedakam vacanajātamavān- tarasamifitam, Yadapi bhedanisedhamukhena tatparimitim prati- padaya me 'dya bhoh.

(That group of statements which makes Prahman known in a positive manner is termed subsidiary, as well as that group which negates difference, Revered Sir, teach me today their extent.)

Thus avantaravakya-s are essentially those statements in the Upanisads which deal with the highest Brahman (para) either in a positive (vidhi) or a negative (nisedha) man- ner and, one might add, which are not mahāvakya-s. The basic difference between the two (see SS III. 319-320) is that while the purpose of the negative statements is only to negate what has arisen from ignorance (abodhapratisedha), the purpose of each word in the positive statements about Brahman is both to exclude what is imagined (parikalpita- varjana) about Brahman and to grasp hold of its real na- ture (svakavapuhsamgraha).

65 Vidhimukhena -- it is important to note here that though the definition of avantaravakya-s includes both po- sitive and negative statements about Brahman, Sarvajfatman does not mention the latter here. The reason for this is that the nisedhavakya-s are not meant solely to convey that thing which they intend to negate (nisedhya = anātma- rupa), more importantly they are indirect indicators (or indirect definitions = upalaksana-s) of that thing which is left over (avasista = parabrahman) from the process of ne- gation. On the other hand, the vidhivakya-s do not convey any additional form (abhyadhikardpa) apart from the part- less essence (akhandas varupa) which their words, once ga- thered together (upasamhara), define (see SS III. 322-323 and AT on SS III. 322) Brahman. Thus it is the positive avantaravakya-s which make the more critical contribution to the understanding of the purport of mahavakya-s such as "Tattvamasi.".

66 The reference here is to the process of upasam-

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hara which is also referred to by Sarvajnatman at SS III. 313-321; of these, verses 314-15 explain both the necessity of the)process and the process itself:

Apunaruktapadāni vina yato na paripuskalabuddhi- samudbhavah, Apunaruktapadani tatastatastvamupasamhara tat- 4

tvabubhutsayā.

Kuru parāparavākyavivecanam tadanusabdasamāha- ranam kuru, PriyasirahprabhrtIni ca yatnavānupacitāpacitāni parityaja.

(Since there is no arisal of the knowledge of that fully complete entity [i.e., the highest Brahman] . without the unrepeated words, the fore collect together. those unrepeated words with a desire for [the knowledge]of reality.)

(Distinguish between Upanisadic statements con- cerned with the higher and lower forms of Brahman, then collect together the [unrepeated] words, then carefully discard [from the former type of state- ment] such phrases as 'having joy as its head' C -- TU II. v. 17, which are quantifiable CIit., pos- sess distinctions as to being greater or lesser].)

Such a process of upasamhara is also discussed by . Śańkara 'at BSBH III. ii1. 10-13. There the concern is whether the qualities (guna, dharma) attributed to a given object of an esoteric meditational knowledge (vidya) in one Upanişa- dic recension (sakha) should be inserted or understood where- ever that same object (e.g .; prana in relation to the prana- vidya) appears in any Upanisadic recension. Sańkara's+con- clusion concerning this appears at the close of BSBH III. iii. 10: "Evamabhiyogavisesacchakhantare 'pyupāsya gunah sakhantare Tpyasyeran. Tasmadekapradhanasambaddha dharma ekatrāpyucyamanāh sarvatraivopasamhartavyā iti. ( Thus, the qualities set down in one recension may be, out of. spe- cial application, inserted in another recension. Therefore the qualities connected with the one chief object, although they are being stated in the one place rand not the other places] should be gathered together in all the places [that the chief object is mentioned]."). Thus what we have here

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is a gunopasamharà or a gathering together of qualities. In his bhasya to the next sutra (11) Sankara goes on to say that the same process applies to those texts which aim at teaching the essential nature of Brahman (brahmasva- rupapratipadanapara), so that all the essential qualities, such as bliss and the rest, should be understood and brought together wherever one of them is mentioned. The next sutra (12) and the bhasya thereon are clearly the basis for the second of the two verses quoted above from Sarvajñatman, .since they too point out that quantifiable (upacitapacita -- see also BSBH III. ii. 2 where this term also occurs) qua- lities are to be discarded in reference to the higher (para or nirguna) Brahman. Finally, the last sutra (13) reiter- ates the fact that those qualities which teach the essen- tial nature of Brahman, such as bliss and the rest, are va- lid for all passages dealing with Brahman. One might also consult Sankara's BUBH IV. ii. 18, where the following phrase occurs: "Ekavākyataya tupasam- hriyamanam phalam nityamuktabuddhasuddhasvabhavatasya .... ("The result which is being collected together as a single topic is that it [i.e., Brahman] is 'eternal, freed, awake- ned, pure in essence .... ") What we should notice is that, when Sankara uses this notion of upasamhara, though it is clearly the fore- runner of Sarvajfatman's same idea, it is not as sophisti- cated as Sarvajnatman's usage, since Sankara does not seem to be aware of the concept of avantaravakya , nor does he seem aquainted with the idea that what should be gathered together are words that are unrepeated (apunarukta) in the various recensions of the Upanisads. Lastly, and by way of an aside, there seems to be a small problem with the final list of predicates that ac- cording to SarvajMatman, results from this process of ga- thering together. If these predicates are supposedly a re- sult of the process as applied to the positive statements (vidhivakya-s), then how does Sarvajfatman obtain the pre- dicate non-dual' (advaya or advitIya) which is one of the final ten (see note 58 above). Sarvajñatman does not seem to take notice of this.

67 "Acaryavan puruso veda tasya tavadeva ciram ya- vanna vimoksye atha sampatsye."- -- CHU VI. xiv. 2.

68 "Tasya ha na devascanabhutva Isate. " -- BU I. iv. 10.

69 ₱ .. iti kecit." -- it is strange to find Sarvajfat- man using such a pejorative phrase to name the adherents to

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the view of sadyomukti, since he himself staunchly pro- pounds that view. at SS IV. 38:

Samyagjanavibhāvasuh sakalamevājñānatatsambhāvam sadyo vastubalapravartanamarudvyaparasamdīpitah, Nirlepena hi dandahiti na managapyasya rupanta- ram samsārasya sinasti tena vidusah tirdhruva sadyo vimuk-

(The fire of correct knowledge, which has been set ablaze by the action of the wind which is swirling with the force of Absolute Reality, immediately consumes the whole of ignorance and its products without remainder; no minute por- tion of worldly existence, no other form of it remains whatsoever; because fo this the reali- zed person is liberated immediately.)

What this perhaps signifies is that PP was written earlier than SS, so that Sarvajnatman had not yet developed his fi- nal conviction concerning this point. It would also seem more probable that Sarvajmatman should try his hand at a small manual such as PP prior to embarking on his magnum opus (though I am not aware that this should be the prece- dent for classical Indian philosophical authorship). On the other hand, this may be evidence to the fact that Sar- vajhätman did not compose the text; however, due to the text's wider conceptual affinity with SS I think that this is unlikely. Finally, this small statement concerning sad- yomukti could even be an interpolation.

70 turning. Utkrantigatyagati -- lit., death, living, and re- The cause for all of them, which is being descri- bed as absent, is ignorance.

71 . Anandagiri gives the following as an example: "Na tasya prana utkramanti, atraiva samavantyante." ("His breaths do not depart, they are indeed lead away together." -- this quotation is similar to BU IV .. iv. 6 which reads: "Na tasya pranā utkramanti, brahmaiva sanbrahmapyeti."). The statement refers to the perfected person, and the idea seems. to be that, as such a person, he is devoid of karma-s that would normally, on death, cause a person to proceed to. the next world in preparation for rebirth, and therefore

7

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the usual cycle of death, life, and rebirth ceases for him. His breaths do not depart in this usual way, instead they are lead away together, i.e., merged back into their cuase which is Brahman (cf., Sankara on BU IV. iv. 7: . "Tasmādviduso notkrāmanti prānah yathāvasthita eva svakā- rane puruse samavanIyante.

72 Anandagiri again supplies examples: "Tadyatha- hinirvlayanI valmIke mrta pratyastā śayīta. ("Therefore just as the slough of the snake lies on the anthill, dead, cast off .... ") -- BU IV. iv. 7; "Sacaksuracaksuriva." ("Ha- ving eyes he is as if he were without them. ) -- source un- known; "Sthitaprajnasya ka bhasa?" ("What is the definition of the man whose wisdom is stabilised?") -- BHG II. 54: "Pra- jahati yada kaman .... " ("When he abandons desires .... ") -- BHG II. 55. The first two quotations. refer to the fact that the perfected person is no longer affected by his body, even though it may linger on, due to various. karma-s after his attainment.

73 See note 51 (5) above. We might also allude here to the story of Ekalavya in the "Sambhavaparvan" of the Mahabharata (I. 123 in the Critical Edition, Bhandar- kar Oriental Institute, Poona). He attained proficiency in.archery to rival even Arjuna by erecting a clay statue of Drona, weapons master and teacher of the Pandavas, who would not instruct him on account of Ekalavya's family ori- gins. By worshiping this image of Drona in the forest, Ekalavya was able to perfect his skill in archery to the point that, upon encountering his prowess, the real Drona has, our of fear for someone's surpassing Arjuna's skill, to ask for Ekalavya's right thumb as tribute for the in- struction he had received from the image. Ekalavya, of course, consented and thus Arjuna's unrivalled excellence in archery was preserved. In this way, even a teacher who is only construed to be so may impart instruction to the pupil who exibhits proper reverence for him.

74 Sadyomukti -- se note 69 above.

75 See note 69 above.

.76 Jñanadagdhabhasamatrarupa -- lit., possessing a form that is merely an illusion which has been burnt by knowledge. Anandagiri makes the sense clearer when he says the following: "Kifca na vidusah sisyam pratyupadeso yuj-

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yate, sisyasamghatasya dagdhapatavat jnanadagdhasyabhasa- matrasyopeksanIyatvena upadesayogyatvat .... ("Moreover, the fact that this perfected person should instruct a pu- pil is implausible, due to the fact that that aggregate which comprises the pupil is not fit for instruction since [to such a teacher,] he, being merely an illusion that has been consumed by knowledge, is useless, just like a cloth that has been burnt fis 'useless] .... "). The point of the example of the burnt cloth is that though the charred re- mains of a cloth might still have the shape of a cloth, it can no longer be used as one. In the same way, for a jIvanmukta, a pupil is merely the semblence of a pupil, since the jIvanmukta realizes that there is no second, ex- ternal thing which can be taught by him.

77 Anandagiri explains that the use of the excla- mation here is on account of the fact that: "Because of the greatness of the knowledge, the person who is qualified for it is a rarity ... " ("Vidyamahātmyāt tadadhikārino daur- labhyam .... "). In connection with this, in the sentence preceding the one to which we have just referred, Ananda- giri supplies a reading of BHG VII. 3: "Manusyanam saha- sresu kascideva." ("There is only a certain one in a thou- sand people. ".).

78 Ekadandin -- lit., bearing one staff. It is an epithet signifying the highest order of sage (muni), and in so doing, it is on par with shch terms as parivrājaka and paramahamsa.

79 Bhuman -- as at CHU VII. xxiii. 1: "Yo vai bhuma tatsukham." ( That which is the Infinite is bliss. ); and CHU VII. xxiv. 1: "Yatra nanyat pasyati nanyacchrnoti nan- yadvijanati sa bhuma." ("That in which nothing else is seen, nothing else is heard, nothing else is known, that is the Infinite."). Bhuman is a synonym for Brahman.

80 In his commentary to BHG VII. 19, Sankara equa- tes Vasudeva with the pratyagatman.

81 giri states: Attachment to objects of the senses, as Ananda- "Sabdadisu visayesu asangabhavo 'pi .... also lacks attachment to objects such as sound, etc., .... "). " ("He

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82 Anandagiri explains this as follows: "Tattvam- padarthaparisodhanarthamanvayavyatirekarupamalocanamaci .... ("He also employs thought processes, which take the shape of positive and negative concomitances, in order to clarify the meanings of the words 'tat' and 'tvam'."). Thus he seems to allow for a play in the word "tattvamartham" (the real) in the phrase " ... tapasyati tattvamartham. ("He broods over that which is real. ) to mean tattvampadartham" ("the meanings of the words 'tat' and 'tvam' ).

83 The knower of the unity between the pratyagatman and Brahman.

84 See note 38 above.

85 Samnyasin-s -- the last of the dutiful stages of life (aśramadharma-s), see Manusmrti VI. 33 ff ..

86 Nijadharma -- this is the equivalent of svadharma which is the dutiful mode of life appropriate to each of the four castes.and the four stages of life (varnāsrama- dharma-s): Cf., BHG III. 35: "Sreyansvadharmo vigunah pa- radharmatsvanusthitat/ Svadharme nidhanam Srevah paradhar- mo bhayavahah//" (Better that one's own duty should be without merit than someone else's duty be performed/ Bet- ter that one should die doing one's own duty, another's duty is frought. with danger//"). By nijadharma here,.Sar- vajnatman pnbably means samnyasadharma since it is the sam- nyasin for whom the work is written.

87 This term is integrated into Advaita Vedānta from the Sankhyas and stands for the first primordial evo- lute of Brahman. Suresvara gives the Sankhya position at Mānasollāsa II. 32: "Mayayam brahmacaitanyapratibimbanusan- gatah/ Mahatkalapumamsassyuh mahattattvadahamkrtih// ("Due to the adherence of that reflection of consciousness which is Brahman in mãya/ There is Mahat, Time, and Spi- rit; form. that element which, is Mahat arises the I-faculty//").

88 The implication is that the whole manifest uni- verse is an illusion (abhasa) superimposed upon Brahman as its ground (adhisthana), in the same way that one might su- perimpose the false notion of a snake upon a coil of rope perceived in a dim light.

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89 Anandagiri gives two alternate readings concer- ning thespecific phrase 11 sadanandam. # in the verse: a) sada-anandam, where sada is taken with the verb with the sense being, "That praising is fruitful which is done with an excessive degree of faith and devotion .... " ("Bhak- tisraddhayoratirekena kriyamana namaskriya phalavati .... "), the thing intended being that Sarvajfatman is not praising just one, but is continually praising; b) sat-anandam, this = being taken as a single qualification of ". saksinam .. 'with the meaning, tent and blissful .... " ... that witness which is both the Exis-' ." (here, the word sat would refute the notion that the saksin could be an effect -- "Tatra sattvena kārananirapeksatayā kāryatvam nirākrtya kāranatvam samar- thyate. , i.e., Concerning that [single qualification] he, having refuted the fact that it could be an effect, since it is the Existent and thus does not require a cause, he em- phasizes the fact that it is a cause."). I have chosen to take it as a bahuvrhi with sada as its first member, mean- ing that which is possessed of perpetual blissfulness There does not seem to be any ground for preferring one of these senses over the others.

90 AntardhInrttasaksin -- here the inward intellect (antardhI) refers to the antahkarana (internal organ) as it is composed of buddhi (intellect), ahamkara (I-faculty) and manas (mind), and the witness (saksin) of the activity of these is the atman. The same imagery is used by Sureś- vara at NAIS II. 58a: "Esa sarvadhiyam nrttamaviluptaika- darsanah/" ("This [atman] is the one unimpared entity that views the dance of every intelect/"); it is more fully de- veloped at PancadasI X. 10 ff ..

91 The editor suggests the reading "sat" in place of "tat" in accordance with the readings of Anandagiri's pratika-s. However, in view of the specific concern of the chapter, which is the explanation of the words. "tat" and "tvam", I have taken "tat" to be the more appropriate rea- ding.

92 This account of the production of the five pri- mordial elements is based on TU II. 1. 1., where instead of sat; the atman is named as the prime source; agni ap- pears for tejas, and prthivI for anna. As Anandagiri points out, the equation of earth with food which which is made here by Sarvajnatman, is based on CHU VI. 11. 4 which runs:

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"Ta apa aiksanta -- bhavyah syama prajayemahiti. Ta annam- asrjanta. ( Water wished -- 'May I be many. Let me issue forth.' It created food."). All in all, the account given here blends together the version presented at TU II. i., with that presented at CHU VI. ii ..

93 ApancIkrta -- this serves as a descrption of the five primordial elements because they are pure and unmixed in terms of each other. The gross (sthula) elements are termed pancIkrta (quintupled), and they are a result of a proces (i.e., pancIkarana) which is explained by Sureśvara in his PancIkaranavarttika verses 8-10:

8. PrthivyadIni bhutāni pratyekam vibhajeddvidha, Ekaikam bhagamadaya caturdha vibhajetpunah.

(The elements such as earth and the rest, are each one divided in two, Taking, one by one, a half tfrom each element, that half] is again divided four-fold.)

9. Ekaikam bhagamekasmin bhute samvesayetkramāt, Tatašcakāsābhutasya bhagāh pancā bhavanti hi.

(Each of these parts combines with Cthe untouched halves of those]. elements [different from it], And thus ether, [for example, has five parts.)

10. Vāyvadibhagascatvāro vāyvādisvevanādiset, PancIkaranametatsyadityahustattvavedinah.

(Four of these parts are air and the rest, one should teach the sameconcerning air and the other [elements], The knowers of reality declare that such is the process of quintupling.)

In other words, ether consists of half pure ether, and a half made up of one-eighth of each of the other four ele- ments. Each of the other gross elements is made up in the same manner.

94 Saptadasakalinga -- this is also termed the sutrat- man and Hiranyagarbha (see note 97 below), and is sometimes described under the imagery of the eight-fold citadel (pur- yastaka -- see note 238 below).

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95 The five vital airs are explained according to their functions at BSBH II. iv. 14:

Pranah pragvrttirucchvasadikarmā. Apāno 'rvāg vrttirnisvāsadikarma. tamano vIryavatkarmahetuh Vyanastayoh samdhau var-

utkrantyadihetuh. Udāna urdhvavrttir- Samanah samam sarvesvangesu yo 'nnarasānnayatIti evam pancavrttih prānah.

(Prana is the function which is directed forwards involving actions such as exhaling. Apana is the function directed backwards involving such actions as inhaling. Vyana exists at the juncture of those two and it is the cause of actions involving stren- gth. Udana is the function directed upwards and it is the cause for things such as the departing of the breaths at death. Samana conveys the essen- tial nutrition of food throughout all' the limbs.)

96 Anandagiri takes note of the possible objection that if the internal organ (antahkarara) entails two func- tions, then it must be made up of two different substances since otherwise the idea of a subtle body comprised of se- venteen things would break down -- thus the internal organ cannot be one simple thing (advaya). His reply to this is that the idea of having two separate substances for these two functions is unnecessarily complicated when they can be accounted for as simply two separate functions of the one antahkarana.

97 Hiranyagarbha is also known as sutratman (see BUBH V. v. 1: "Tadetaddhiranyagarbhasya sutratmano janma, yadavyakrtasya jagato vyakaranam.") t is the highest form of Brahman as effect (karyabrahman) and is called the first-born (prathamaja -- see MUBH I. ii. 11). I present a schematic representation of the Advaita cosmology below as it is given by Suresvara in his Pancikaranavarttika (the numbers appearing in parenthesis refer to specific verses in which occur the names beside which they stand):

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turfya = Śuddhabrahman

Microcosm State Letter Macrocosm* Atman-body (vyasti) (avasthiti) (kāra) (samasti) (atmaśarīra)

prajña (43) susupti (deep sleep) Aksara( 44) causal (karana)

taijasa(38) dream (svapna) Hiranya- garbha( 38) subtle (linga)

visva( 30) waking (jagarita) Viraj(11) gross (sthula)

*Akşara is also called 'the Seed" (bIja) at verse 2, and "Cause of the Universe" (jagatkārana) at verse 43; Hiranya- garbha is also called "the Thread" (sutra) at verse 6 and linga at verse 36.

One must notice that movement downward on the chart represents the unfolding of the cosmos, and that upward mo- vement on the chart represents the reverse of that process or the re-integration of existence through eacn level of the various atmasarIra-s. Such a process of re-integration is described at verses 49-50 of PacIkaranavarttika:

Akāram purusam visvamukare pravilapayet, Ükāram taijasam suksmam makare pravilāpayet.

(That person which is visva and which is the letter "A", should be merged into the letter "U" That subtle thing which is taijasa and which is the letter "U" should be merged into the letter "M".)

Makāram kāranam prājnam cidātmani vilāpayet, Cidatmaham nityasuddhabuddhamuktasadadvayah.

(That causal thing which is prajha and which is the letter "M" should be merged into that atman which is pure consciousness, I am that atman which is pure consciousness and which is eternal, pure, sentient, freed, existent, and non-dual.)

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Thus,as our own text states, Hiranyagarbha con- sists of the five unquintupled elements and their effects and in terms of comprehensive knowledge about the highest Brahman (parabrahman or suddhabrahman) it represents a knowledge of the subtle basis which underlies the cosmos. Yet it is a level of understanding which must be surpassed as exemplified by Yama's commendation of Naciketas at KU II. 1l and Sankara's commentary on it which glosses the state reached by Naciketas, and yet abandoned by him, as the " ... abode of Hiranyagarbha." (" ... krtoh upasanāyāh pha- lam hairanyagarbhapadam."). For further information on the Advaita Vedanta conception of Hiranyagarbha consult A. C. Swain's "Concept of Hiranyagarbha in the Philosophy of Sań- kara", Rsikalpanyasah (Felicitation Volume for Shri Dravid Shastri), Bharti Parishad Prayag, 1970, pp. 126-133.

98 A. danda seems necessary after " ... atmanah"

99 Anandagiri clarifies this:

Yatha hi bhutatrayotpattisrutih bhutapahcakotpat- tiparā parigrhītā, tatha trivrtkaranašrutirapi pancIkrtabhutapafcakavisayesyate, anyatha sarIradau bhutavyavaharavadbhutadvayavyavaharavirahaprasangat, atah Tāsām trivrtam trivrtamekaikam karavāni. Ityadi šrutisiddhāni yathoktāni bhutanityarthah.

(Indeed, just as it is accepted that those sruti passages concerning the origination from three ele- ments have as their real concern the origination from five elements, just so is it admitted that those sruti passages which deal with triplication have as their aim the five quintupled elements, and this is so for the reason that otherwise there would be the unwarranted conclusion that the two elements [not mentioned in the triplicated account, namely, akasa and vayu ] would not be applicable to the body in the way that the elements are used in reference to the body [i.e., in the sense, that they are the grounds of the various organs akasa being the ground of srotra (hearing) and vayu the ground of prana (vital breath)], hence those elements just mentioned are established in sruti passages such as "Let me make each one of those three-fold, three fold." -- CHU VI. ili .. 3.)

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The term trivrtkaransruti seems to be applicable to any one of the passages CHU VI. 1i. 1 through to about CHU VI. vi. 5 since they all fall within the topic of the triplication of elements, and this seems to be the only place in the Upanisads where such an analysis occurs. No metion of the quintuplication of elements seems to be made in Vedic literature (i.e., no scriptural authority seems to be present for it -- see S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy II, London: Cambridge University Press, 1928, p. 74 note 1). The main characteristic of this tripli- cation-sruti is that it considers the world to arise from only three elements, namely, fire, water, and earth, and that these three elements triplicate in a manner analogous to the quintuplication process described in note 93 above, where the major element concerned, e.g., fire in the case of fire, predominates in the final triplicated form. In explaining this Sankara (see CHUBH VI. iii. 3) does not seem to be aware of any specific reckoning of the division of the elements (e.g., half of the original element remain- ing as the predominant element, and the remaining half be- ing divided into equal parts of the other elements) as seems to be the case with the later concept of pancIkarara -- per- haps Suresvara is the first to do this in his PancTkarana- värttika, Sankara does not ddescribe this process of pancI- karana even in the small work entitledPafcIkarana) but mere- ly states that there is a predominating element in each of the three cases (e.g., he uses the word pradhanya or predo- minating thing) at CHUBH VI. iii. 3, and he refers to a pre- ponderance or bhuyastva at BSBH II. iv. 22). From the historical perspective, the doctrine of trivrtkarana is the original account of the arisal of the phenomenal elements. However, due to the apparent contra- diction between Upanisadic accounts which, on the one hand, accept the existence of five elements (earth, water, fire, air, and ether) as at TU II. i. 1, and those passages which assume the existence of three elements (fire, water, and food = earth) as at CHU VI. ii1. 2 f., Advaita Vedanta thin- kers have been compelled to favour one over the other, and most of them seem to favour the more comprehensive CHU ac- count. In this way, that is, by accepting the idea of five elements and in addition and modifying the process of rep- lication offered in the TU account so that it would acco- modate the acceptance of this idea of five elements, the doctrine of quintuplication (pañcIkarana) seems to have been evolved. Sankara, for the most part, accepts the existence of five gross elements and he seems to refer to the doctrine of triplication only when the text (e.g., CHU VI) forces him

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7 to discuss it (see section IV of S. Mayeda's "On the Cos- mological View of Samkara", The Adyar Library Bulletin 39 (1975) 186-204). This can be seen at CHUBH VI. iv. T when he encounters the objection that the process of triplica- tion cannot account for air (vayu) and ether (antariksa or akasa) and their qualities (touch and sound respectively) since they do not enter into this' process of triplication at all, and this being the case the premise of this whole portion (adhyaya) of CHU, namely, that knowledge of sat will make all things known, will be a faulty one (since the evolution of the world from sat through the process of tri-" plication will not account for the existence of air and ether, and their qualities, and thus these things, though they exist, will not be known from sat). What Sańkara of- fers in reply is a veiled pancIkarana in which the two mis- sing elements are inferred to exist in'the finally tripli- cated elements from the perception of their qualities there- in:

Tejasi tavadrūņavati śabdasparsayorapyupalam- bhadvayavantariksayostatra sparšašabdagunava- toh sadbhavo numiyate .... Yatha tu trivrtkrte trini rupanītyeva satyam, tatha pancikarane pi samano nyayah ...

(Just as much as sound and touch are perceived in fire which is a thing possessing colour, just so can the existence of air and the ether, which possess sound and touch as qualities, be . inferred in that [fire] .... Just as in the pro- cess of triplication only the three forms are real, so also in the process of quintuplication the same reasoning follows.)

100 Brahmanda -- This seems to be the first of the effects of the five gross (quintupled) elements. In refe- rence to the chart provided in note 97 above, we find that this brahmanda belongs as part of Viraj; since the latter is defined at PancIkaranavarttika 11 as: ' "PancIkrtani bhu- tāni tatkāryanca viradbhavet/( The quintupled elements and their effects are Viraj/"). The brahmanda is the gross creation on the macrocosmic order, which is the reason for its being called "divine" (adhidaiva). In explaining the term, Anandagiri states the following: "Anavacchinasamast- yatmakamagnyādityadyavayavamityarthah." ( The sense is that

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it has parts such as Agni[-loka] and Äditya[-loka] which themselves are undivided cumulative totalities."). Thus it seems that each devaloka is a samasti (see note 44, the brahmanda corresponds to the adhidaiva portion of the chart there) and that all the devaloka-s collectively make up the body of Viraj.

101 These are the other two pancIkrtabhutakarya-s and represent the gross creation on the microcosmic (pin- danda) order. Again the terms used here are adhyatma and adhibhuta respectively (see note 44 above).

102 The structure of the sentence seems to imply that only the latter two loka-s consist of beings who have gross bodies equipped with hands, head, etc .. However, it is not clear where the bodies of the deva-s who comprise the brahmanda, and must also have hands, head, and feet, should go. Perhaps this final qualification can be taken as referring to all the three spheres. /. 103 Anandagiri calls the following possible objec- tion to our attention here: "Nanu virāji eko jīvātmā hi- ranvagarbhe caparah sarTrabhede jIvabhedaprasiddheranyatha vyavasthanupapatteh .... (But, Viraj has one jIva, and Hiranyagarbha another, because it is commonly known that when bodies are different the jIva is different, otherwise, there would be the impossibility of the distinctive arran- gement [of individuals and their deeds] .... '). That is to say, we see in the everyday world that each different body has a separate lIva, so that the karma-s that result from the activity of any specific body accrue to their own jIva and not to the jIva of a different body which has not per- formed those karma-s, and conversely any given jIva recei- ves only those karma-s performed by its own body and not those performed by a body associated with another jIva; otherwise if this distinctive arrangement (vyavastha) of things were not the case, the liberation (mukti) of a given JIva could not be worked out, and this would be so because one could never be sure that a jIva would receive the kar- ma-s worked out by its own specific body. Anandagiri responds to the objection in this way: "Ekasyāpi jIvasya atItanāgatasarTrabhedasambhavāt na tad- bhedo jIvabhedaraksipati; vyavasthapi dehabhedadaviruddhā "On account of the fact that it is quite possible

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to have one jIva for the different past and future bodies, a difference in the body does not indicate a difference in respect to the jIva; the distinctive arrangement is also not contradicted because it is based on the difference con- cerning JIva-s:"). So, though in a life one might have va rious bodies such as that of a child, an adùlt, or an cld man, one experiences the sameness of the iIva throughout because of things such as childhood memory, and thus the idea that a jIva may have more than one body is not unsound".

104 Again (see note 91 above) the word "sat" ac- tually occurs in the text, but in keeping with the aim of the chapter I have chosen to place the.word "tat" here. Since this part of the chapter has evolved out of cosmo- gony presented at CHU VI. ii. 1 where "sat" is given as the original source, that sense should not be totally ex- cluded here.

105 The first of these examples represents the pra- tibimbavada (reflection theory, see SS II. 176-77; III. 277-78) adhered to by the Vivarana school of Advaita Ve- danta (e.g., Padmapāda and Prakasātman) wherein the jiva is seen to be a reflected image of the original Brahman (bimba) and is real with respect to its identity with Brah- man (i.e., its «cidrupatva) but unreal in terms of the form the. reflection takes (i.e., its ajfanarupatva) -- see Panca- padika I. 103 on this. The second example represents the avacchedavada (limitation theory) adhered to by the Bhamati school of Advaita Vedanta (e.g., Vacaspati Miśra) wherein the jIva-s are false delimitations of Brahman produced by the adventitious limitations (upadhi-s) of ignorance (ajMa- na) -- see BhamatT on BSBH II. i. 4.

106 : Pranadhāranakriya -- this is the same as Sanka- ra's definition given 'at BSBH II. 1: 36: nam jIvasabdena pranadharananimittenabhilapan .... " " ... SarIramātma

the embodied atman is expressed by the word jiva which has 7 ...

as its reason [for. applfcability], the fact that it sus -. tains the vital airs .... ")

107 See the chart presented in note 97 above as well as MAU 3-5, and Sankara's Bhasya thereon.

108 See note 58 above. The phrase occurs in San- kara's PancIkarana towards the end of it and. runs as fol-

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lows: ' ... nājnānam nāpi tatkāryam kintu nityasuddhabuddha- muktasatyasvabhavam yam brahmaivahamasmi paramanandadvayam pratyagbhutacaitan- .. neither ignorance nor its effects am I, moreover I am that Brahman alone which is the inward consciousness, which is eternal, pure, sentient, freed, true, wupremely blissful, and non-dual .. ,."). For a list of points that argue against the authenticity of the PancIkarana see S. Mayeda's "On the Cosmological View of Samkara", Th ", The Adyar Library Bulletin 39 (1975) p. 203 note 2. Also see Suresvara's PancIkaranavārttika verses 50-51 on this. point.

.109 Antahkaranasannidhana -- what is being referred to here is that, except for the pratyagatman, the antah- karana is the most inward thing to a person, and thus in this sense the two do hold somewhat of a proximity.

110 Mayavin -- this is Isvara the Cosmic Conjurer or Juggler. See TUBHV II. 374 and 378. .

111 See note 104 above.

112 Thepoint of the example, as Anandagiri makes clear, is to serve as a refutive instance for the following possible objection: "Yadi hi karanātmanā tasyāvasthānam, kimiti tarhi nopalabhyate? ( Indeed, if the state of it [the antahkarana] is the causal form, why then is it that it is not perceived in deep sleep ?"). This objection is based on the idea that; in deep sleep, one does not perceive any object whatsoever (BUBH IV. iii. 23, p. 897). The an- swer to the objection runs as follows: api janmano vatabIje 'vasthanamasthitam, "Vatavrksasya prāg- asato naravisana- syeva janmayogat; tathapi tasya upalambho nasti; tatha pra- krte pi .... "It is accepted that the fig tree exists in the seed of thefig tree even before the production of the fig tree, because [thing's like] the horns of man, which are non-existent entities cannot possibly be produced; similarly, the tree is not perceived in the seed and this is what oc- curs in respect to what is under discussion [i.e., the an- tahkarana ?.... ").The idea of the response involves the inference of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause (satkaryavada), a theory of causality shared by the Advai- tins and Sankhyas (see Sankhya Karika 9) but held in a some- what modified form by the Advaitins. This theory of causa- tion is in direct opposition to the theory which accepts

:

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the fact that the effect is not pre-existent in the cause (asatkāryavada) upheld by the Nyaya-Vaisesikas (see Prasa- stapada's Padarthadharmasamgraha 88 and Sridhara's Nyaya- kandalI on it). The point of the answer is that the an- tahkarana is not perceived when it is in its causal form because it is only present as a subtle potentiality, but it is,.in any case, certainly there. The example of man's horns is meant to refute the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of causality.

113 m That is, one sometimes experiences the three states in the normal order of waking, dreaming, and deep- sleep, and sometimes, such as when one faints (i.e., pro- ceeding from the waking staté directly to the state of deep- sleep) not in the normal.order.

114 Samadhi -- lit., a collecting together, and it ...

is intended to refer to a fixing or concentration of the mental faculties that stands as the culmination of the as- cetic's spiritual discipline: It is the eighth and last limb of yoga (see Yogasutra II. 29). Anandagiri explains its purpose as: ... yathoktaikatvajnanadrdhIkaranārtham (" ... in order to make the already mentioned know- ledge of unity completely fixed .... ").

115 Niscala -- Anandagiri explains the steps to this: ... antahkaranam visayehbyo 'pacchidya pratyakpravanamapadya tannisthatvena tasminniscale jate prasankhyanam kuryat ... (" .:. when the antahkarana is cut.off from worldly objects, when an inward inclination is brought about, then that [an- tahkarana7 is immobile due to its being firmly established in that [inward state7, when that is the case one may per- form meditation ...

1.16 XIII. 5-6: Ksetra-s -- these are briefly enumerated at BHG

Mahabhūtanyahamkāro buddhiravyaktamevaca Indriyani dasaikam ca panca cendriyagocarah.

(The primordial elements, the I-faculty, the in- tellect, and also the Unmanifested, The ten-senses and the one [manas], and the five objects of the senses.)

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Iccha dvesah sukham duhkham samghatascetana dhrtih Etatksetram samasena savikaramudhahrtam.

(Desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, the aggregate [of the body and the senses], sentience, deter-

This is the ksetra described in brief, together mination,

with its modifications.)

117 Ksetrajña -- this is Brahman, the conscious pri- nciple residing in all ksetra-s and which is described at BHG XIII. 12-17. Since it is the end point of the retra- cing process, it cannot be merged as can the ksetra-s.

118 .The idea is that an effect cannot exist as so- mething apart from its cause, since according to the theory of causation accepted by the Advaitins (see note 112 above) an effect is not a new entity separate from the cause but already exists in a potential state within the cause. Thu's the cause (karana) is the more fundamental of the two en- tites, since there is the possibility that it might exist without having to account for its effect (kärya) while the opposite is not the case.

119 Again it must be noted (cf., note 97 above) that this process of merging is the reverse of the actual unfolding of the macrocosmic and microcosmic universe. Ān- andagiri draws our attention to this when he states "Apan- cīkrtānām bhutanam 'Viparyayena tu kramah' pattiviparītakramena pravilāpanakramam .... iti nyayenot- (The sequence of merging is in reverse order to that of the production of the unquintupled primordial elements; as according to the maxim, 14] .... "). 'The sequence is in reverse order.' [ BS II. iif.

120 There is a misprint in the text here, since .... antahkaranabhavat. ... " should clearly read .". karanābhavat .. (see Appendix p. 220. 1ine 16) .. .antah-

121 This is a reference to a trial by ordeal in- , volving the grasping of a burning hot axe in the bare hands -- a person who is committed to untruth (abrtabhisandha) in respect to the alleged offence is burned when having to grasp the axe, while a person committed to truth (satyabhi-

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sandha) remains unscathed through the same procedure -- which is described in CHU VI.xvi. 1-3 (see also pp. 245-6 of Franklin Edgerton's. Studies in the Veda", Journal of the American Oriental Society 35 (Dec. 1915) 240-246, for a discussion of the translation of the word abhisandha in this specific passage). In his commentary on CHU VI xvi. 3 p. 537, Sankara treats the trial by ordeal described above, as a metaphor of the two states, i.e., bondage and release that are possible for man. . The person committed to untruth represents the bound person who is committed to the untruth of the modifications of Brahman (vikaranrtabhisandha), while the person committed. to truth represents the liberated per- son who is committed to the atman (atmabhisandha):

Yadatmabhisandhy anabhisandhikrte moksabandhane, yacca mūlam jagato, yadāyatana yatpratisthasca sarvāh prajā, yadātmakam ca sarvam yaccaj amamrtam- abhayam sivamadvitIyam, tatsatyam sa atma tava atastattvamasi he svetaketo ..

(Liberation and bondage are respectively ioned out of a commitment to the atman and a non- fash-

commitment to the atman, and that which is the root of the universe, that in which all . creatures have their abode and on which they are establi- shed, and that of which all things consist, and that which is not born, does not die, is without fear, which is bliss, which is non-dual, that is the true, that is your atman, hence that thou art O Śvetáketu .. .. )

Thus, the satyabhisandha of CHU VI. xvi, has become the atmabhisandha of Sankara's commentary.

122 " ..: tattvamasivakyarthah .... the accusative in order to agree with the verb should be in

" -- see Appendix p. 220 lines 21-22. ... janati

123 Anubhava -- This is even referred to as a pra- mana (means of valid knowledge) by Sankara at BSBH I. I. 2 p. 8:

Na dharmajijfasayamiva srutyadaya eva pramanam

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brahmajijāsāyām, kimtu śrutyādayo 'nubhavadayasca yathasambhavamiha pramanam; anubhavavasanatvad- bhūtavastuvisayatvācca brahmaj Hanasya.

(Sruti and the rest are not the only valid me'ans of knowledge in the case of the enquiry into Brah- man as they are in the case of the enquiry into dharma, but sruti and the rest and direct experi- ence etc:, are valid means of knowledge as the case may be, because the knowledge of Brahman has as its goal direct experience and because it has as its object an existent thing.)

124 m1' .karatalanyastamalavavat .... " should read . . amalakavat ... , see Appendix page 222 line 21 ..

125 "Acaryavan puruso veda tasya tavadeva ciram ... -- CHU VI, xiv. 2. That is, one is liberated as a jIvanmukta (see PP trans. p. 96 above).

.126 ° See note 64 above.

127 Here the praising of the teacher and the ista- devata overlap so that the equation, istadevata = paramāt- man = guru, can be made and since we may carry over the idea of the guru as jIvanmukta from the previous chapter, the jTvanmukta can also be added to this equation. As An- andagiri takes it, the first three quarters of the verse praise the supreme deity intended, and the fourth quarter, i.e., " ..: guruve bhedabhedine." (" ... to the teacher who de- stroys [all] differences."), mentions the distinction be- tween the actual teacher and the devata ("Tatra padatrayena paradevata namaskriyate; caturthena tu pādena gurorvaisisti- pūrvam namaskriyeti vivektavyam. ), but it must also be re- membered that this is ultimately only an imagined (kalpita) distinction.

128 As at SU VI. 23:

Yasya deve para bhaktiryatha deve tatha gurau, Tasyaite kathitā hyarthah prakāsante mahātmanah prakāsante mahātmana iti.

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(For someone who has the highest devotion to a deity, who has [the same devotion] for his tea- cher as for the deity, do these things which have been related shine forth, for that great soul the shine forth.)

129 That is BU II. iv. 5: "Atmā va are drastavyah srotavyo mantavyo nididhyasitavyo maitreyi .... .( The at- man, my dear MaitreyI, should be directly perceived, heard, thought about, and repeatedly meditated upon .... "). San- kara, in his Bhasya on this, explains the terms as follows:

Tasmādātma vai are drastavyo darsanarho, darsana- visayamapadayitavyah agamatasca. Srotavyah pūrvamācāryata Pascānmantavyastarkatah. Tato nidi- dhyāsitavyo niscayena dhyātavyah evam hyasau drsto

titaih. bhavati sravanamanananididhyāsanasādhanairnirvar-

(Therefore the atman, my dear, should be directly perceived, i.e., it deserves to be perceived di- rectly which means that it should be made to be- come an object of direct perception. It should be heard firstly, from teacher and scripture. Af- ter it should be thought about through reasoning. Then it should be repeatedly meditated upon, i.e., the mind should be fixed on it with resolve, for thus is it directly perceived by going through these methods of hearing, thinking, and sustained. meditation.)

130 The highest of the four castes, see Rg Veda X. xc and Manusmrti I. 87-88.

131 Sadhanacatustaya -- see BSBH I. i. 1 p.5. They are: a) nityānityavastuviveka (discrimination between et- ernal and transient realities); b) ihamutrarthabhogaviraga (renunciation of the enjoyment of objects in this world and the next); c) samadamadisadhanasampat (perfection of the means of tranquility, giving, etc.); d) mumuksutva (desire for release).

132 As, for example, at MU I. 11, 12: "Tatvijña-

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nartham sa gurumevabhigacchetsamitpanih śrotriyam brahma- nistham." ("For the sake of that knowledge may he approacn, carrying sticks for the fire in his hand, a teacher who is versed in the Vedas and who is established in Brahman.").

133 These others are, for example, the three remain- ing castes, the gods, and women, according to Anandagiri.

134 "Satyam jAanamanantam brahma. " -- TU II. i. 1.

135 "Ananda brahmeti vyajanat. " -- TU III. vi. 1.

136 See previous two notes.

137 The three bheda-s are explained at Pahcadaśr II. 20:

Vrksasya svagato bhedah patrapuspaphaladibhih, Vrksāntarātsajātīyo vijātIyassiladitah.

(The self-contained difference in a tree exists with respect to its leaves, flowers, fruit, etc., Because there is a.difference between different kinds of trees, a tree possesses difference within its own class; because it is different from thins such as a stone, etc., a tree possesses a differ- ence from things external to its own class.)

Thus, Brahman cannot possess the first kind of difference (svagatabheda)because it is not subject to internal limits; that is, it is not differentiated. It cannot possess the second kind of difference (sajatIyabheda)because there is no second entity with which it could be subsumed under a universal. It cannot possess the third kind (vijatiyabheda) since there is nothing except it (cf., PancadasI II. 21). Anandagiri however, takes the reference to three differen- ces to apply to those concerning time (kalā), space (desa), and object (vastu), which would also fit the present con- text since Brahman is beyond both the limits of space and time, in addition to not being objectifiable.

138 .The three absences as supplied by Anandagiri are: a) prior absence (pragabhava) which is the absence

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of something prior to its coming into being; b) subsequent absence (pradhvamsabhava), which is the absence of some- thing subsequent to its destruction; c) mutual absence (an- yony abhava), which mutually denies the identity between two given things. All of these are explained, along with a fourth type of abhava called absolute absence (atyanta- bhava) which is the absolute absence of something on a gi- ven locus (adhikarana), at VEDP. VI. 21 ff .. fold division is accepted by the Nyāya-Viasesikas, as at Such a four-

TS 80 and TD on this; however the earliest instance of this four-fold analysis comes from the Kumarila Bhattas, e.g., verses 2-4 of the 'Abhavapramanyavada' section of SV. The fourth type of abhava is not mentioned here by Sarvajnatman is that since something is being predicated. of Brahman in the sentence, the possibility that Brahman is absolutely non-existent simply does not arise. In any event, since Brahman is completely beyond temporal bound- aries, that is, since Brahman is never either created or destroyed, it can never suffer prior or posterior absence. In addition to this, because Brahman is non-dual, no other entity exists through which mutual absence, which in itself is nothing more than difference, can come into play.

139 Arthavada -- an arthavada is taken by the MImam- sākas as a statement that is conjoined with and subsidiary to an. injunction; its purpose is the praising of what is enjoined in the injunction (vidhistuti). This is explained at MS II. i. 7 and in the commentaries upon it. this is the way in which it seems to be used in early Ad- In. general,

vaita writings, such as at BSBH I. iii. 33 for example. Sarvajnatman however, appears to want to put forward a pa- rallel between the relationship that exists between. artha- vada-s and that thing enjoined by injuctions, namely, dhar- ma as propounded by the MImamsakas on the one hand, and the relationship that exists between the five-fold statements dealing with creation etc. (i.e., with qualified Brahman) and that thing which is the meaning of the mahāvakya-s, na- mely, nirgunabrahman ps propounded by the Advaitins, on the other. Thus, these five-fold statements dealing with cre- ation etc., are meant to contribute a type of elaboration. upon the meaning of the mahavakya-s.

140 Yuktyarthavādavakyani -- Anandagiri glosses this as' "Yuktirupanyarthavadavakyani .... ", by which he probably means something to the effect of 'being supported by reason' since Sarvajfatman uses such a phrase, namely, yuktyupabrm- hita, on the next page of the text.

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141 These are arthavada-s in the strict MImamsāka sense and Anandagiri supplies the phrase "Vayurvai ksepl- stha. " ("The Wind is the swiftest." -- TaittirIya Samhita II. 1. 1. 1) as an example of a statement of praise, and the phrase "So 'rodit." ("He wept. " -- TaittirIya Samhita I. v. 1. 1) as an example of a statement of disgrace. These are the arthavada-s that correspond to the two injunctions gi- ven in the following note.

`142 Vidhipratisedha -- as an example of the former (vidhi), Anandagiri supplies the phrase. "Vayavyam śvetamā- labheta bhutikamah." ("A person who desires prosperity sho- uld sacrifice the white animal assigned to the Wind." -- Taittiriya Samhita II. i. 1. 1). The arthavada from the previous note which corresponds to this injunction, namely, "The Wind is the swiftest.", does not indicate any action to be done, but merely shows that the Wind, 'as the swift- est deity, will be the quickest to lead to prosperity (see Sabarabhasya on MS I. ii. 7). Anandagiri's example of the latter (pratisedha) is "Barhisi rajatam na. deyam. ("One should not put silver on the sacrificial grass. -- Taitti- riya Samhita I. v. 1. 2). This is paired with the artha- vada "He wept. ", which, as we learn from the rest of Tait- tiriya Samhita I. v. 1: 1, refers to Rudra and to the fact that ,when he wept, his tears became silver. This conveys the idea that silver should not be given at a sacrifice since it is produced from tears and can only lead to sup- sequent sorrow for the givver (see Sabarabnasya on MS I. ii. 10).

143ry "Yato va imani bhūtāni jāyante; yena jatani jī- vanti; yatprayantyabhisamvisanti; tadvijijnāsasya, tadbrah- meti." -- TU III. 1. 1.

144 "Tatsrstva, tadevanu pravisat. " -- TU II. vi. 1.

145 "BhIsasmadvatah pavate, bhIsodeti suryah. " -- TU II. viii. 1. Sankara, in his commentary on this passage, throws some light on the reason for terming this a restric- tive statement :

Vātādayo hi mahārhāh svayamIśvarah santah pavanadi- kāryesvayāsabahulesu niyatah pravartante. Tady uk- tam prasastari sati, yasmat niyamena tesam pravar-

*...

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tanam, tasmadasti bhayakaranam tesar prasastr bramna. Yataste bhrtva iva rajno 'smāt brahmano

brahma. bhayena pravartante tacca bhayakaranamanandam

(Indeed, the Wind and the rest, who are worthy of great praise and are lords in themselves, go about as restricted to activities such as blowing breezes, and so on, which involve much effort. This would be proper if a master exis- ted over them, Thus ther is something on ac- count of which they go about in their restricted manner, and their master is Brahman. They go about in fear of that Brahman as if it were the fear [of servants] from their king, and so that

fear. ) Brahman which is bliss is the cause of their

Thus the aspect of Brahman that seems to be stressed by the controling type of arthavada is Brahman as the Lord (Isa, Isvara) over the universe.

146 Sambhavana -- the meaning of the word is not al- together clear here. It occurs in a similar fashion at SS I. 263 where the sense is that sambhavana is not attained unless knowledge which arises from statements such as "Not gross, etc.".(" .. asthuladivacah .... ") confirms the know- ledge of the secondary meanings of the avantaravakya-s.

'147 m These first three reasons give, namely, tajjatvat tallatvat tadanatvat .... " are based on Sankara's analysis of the obviously artificail construction "tajja- lan" which occurs at CHU III. xiv. 1:

Tasmadbrahmano jatam tejobannadikramena sarvam. Atastajjam. Tathā tenaiva jananakramena prati- Iomataya tasminneva brahmani lIyate tadātmataya 3lisyate iti talam .. Tathā tasminneva sthitikale niti prānīti cestata iti.

(All the world has been born from that Brahman in a succession of things such as fire, water, food, etc .. Hence it is termed 'born from that' [tajja]. Similarly, as it sprouts out in that very succes-

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sion of generation, so it dissolves into that very Brahman and is united as indentical with it. Thus it is termed 'dissolved into that' [talla]. Similarly, because it breathes and moves on top of that very Brahman during the duration of its existence, it is termed 'living on it' [tasmin. ... an]. )

148 These five sheaths arrarge themselves concen- trically around the atman, with the food sheath being the outermost sheath, and the one consisting of bliss the in- nermost -- see TU II. ii .- v. and Sankara on this.

149 The idea here is that each subsequent atman, meaning each progressively inner ätman in the series of concentric sheath-selves, is similar in form to the one be- fore it. For example, the pranamayatman is similar in form to the annamayatman, and the manomayatman is similar in form to the pranamayatman. The same simile occurs in the same context at BSBH I. 1. 12, i.e., in reference to the concentric symmetry of the various sheath-selves. However, as used at US XIV. 3 and Pañcadasf IV. 2°, this simile can also refer to the manner in which, according to the Advaita Vedanta theory of perception, the mind (manas) extends it- self outwards to assume the form of the object it perceives. In his commentary to TU II. ii. 1 (pp. 289-90) Śankara em- ploys this simile with reference to the five kośa-s as fol- lows:

Sa va esa pranamaya ātmā purusavidha eva purusakāra eva sirahpaksadibhih. Kim svata eva netyaha. Pra- siddham tavadannarasamayasyatmanah purusavidhatvam. Tasyannarasamayasya purusavi dhatām purusākaratām Anvayam prānamayah purusavidho musanisiktapatima- vanna svata eva. Evam pūrvasya pūrvasya puruşavi- dhata, tāmanūttarotarah purusavidho bhavati, pūrvah purvascottarottarena purnah. 4

(Indeed this ätman consisting of vital air is also of a human kind, i.e., it also has a human shape replete with head, flanks, etc. Is this intrinsic to it? The answer is no. Indeed it is well known that the atman which consists of food-essence is of a human kind. To say that that one which consists of food-essence is of a human kind is to say that

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it has a human shape. Following in line with that, this one consisting of vital air is of human kind, just as an image which has been cast in a mold -- it is not intrinsic to it. Thus each prior [self] is of a human kind, following in line with them, each subsequent [self] comes to be of a human kind, and each prior one is completely filled up by each sub- sequent one.)

From this it is clear that the concetric symmetry indicated by the simile given in our text is one of shape, and one in which each progressively inward atman completely fills up the shape of the atman that immediately preceded it.

150 That is, by interpreting the teaching of the five sheaths as having as its principal concern the pratyag- atman and not the sheaths themselves, which are incidental.

151 I. 1. 8 and I. 1. 12. This same illustrative simile accurs at BSBH

152 This is KAU VI. 17:

Angusthamatrah puruso 'ntatatmā sadā janānām hrdaye samnivistah, Tam svāccharTrātoravrhenmunjādivesīkām dhair- yena.

As Anandagiri states, the means for drawing out the atman from the body is discrimination ("Dehaderatmano niskarso- payam vivekam ... atman. between what is atman and what is an-

'153 'The idea is that, though the three states are different from the atman, it could still enter into some sort of relation with them, such as possessing them -- but Sarvajñatman denies this.

154 That is to say that the atman is avyabhicarin in terms of the three states, since they are never found apart from it.

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155 SarpadandadharabhucchidrabalIvardamutrita -- the idea is that whatever,is vyabhicarin (1.e., does not persist as long as some other thing does) in terms of some other thing, is false (mithya) in terms of that other thing. The example supplies five things which may, under certain circumstances be superimposed upon what fs in reality a rope. Thus, since they all disappear when one comes to re- alize the rope for what it is, they are said to be vyabhi- carin in terms of the rope, and therefore they.are also mi- thya in terms of the rope. The author seems to have chosen five examples of possible superimposition on the rope in order to coincide with the five kosa-s which are superimposed on the atman. The five examples are all epistemological, that is, they illustrate errors in cognition, and it will profit us to take a closer look at the most famous of them, namely, the rope-snake. This example refers to the erroneous cognition 'This is a snaket upon, for instance, encountering a coil of rope in a dimly lit room. The 'this'-portion of the cog- nition refers, according to the Advaitin, to the substratum (adhisthana) of the erroneous superimposition, and this sub- stratum is the rope, which therefore is also the true thing since it is that which is eventually unsublated (abadhita) in terms of the cornition. The error in the cognition ari- ses from the mutual superimposition (itaretaradhyasana) be- tween the 'this'-element in the cornition and the snake-el- ement, and it is sublated upon the discrimination of the fact that what has been encountered is indeed a coil of rope and not a snake. See SS I. 34-37, and I. 465, where the same ideas are touched upon in terms of the cognition 'This is silver' in reference to a piece of nacre.

156 "Traya avasthastrayah svapnah." -- AIU I. i1i. 12. Here "svapnah" is meant to stand for all the three states.

157 Purusartha -- the goal towards which man. should strive. For the Advaitin this would be moksa (final release) in the form of brahmajfana (Brahman-realization). In Epic and Puranic literature, as well as in Dharmasastras, four purusartha-s are accepted, namely, dharma (duty), artha

lease). (material well-being), kama (pleasure), and moksa (final re-

158 "Brahmavidāpnoti param. " -- TU II. i. 1.

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159 "Phalavatsannidhavaphalam tadangam." -- This id- entical phrase occurs at BSBH II. 1. 14 p. 200 1. 19. An- andagiri refers to this as a Mimamsa principle (mImamsāsam- mati), and as such, it would probably refer to the diffe- rence between primary (pradhana) and subsidiary (guna) ac- tions, since the former are those acts which produce a spe- cific imperceptible potency (apurva) that eventually leads to the production of results (phala) in the atman, and which receive their impetus from the optative verb in an injunc- tion, while the latter do not produce such a potency and are merely preparatory to the primary act (see MS II. i. 6-8 and Sabara on this). Sarvajnatman uses the principle to show that the avantaravakya-s which mention the three states must point to the pratyagatman.

160 Svavacya -- Anandagiri glosses this as "Tacchao- dasya vacyam .... ", in other words, simply as 'the expres- sed sense of the, word "tat"!

161 Vyatihara -- this is a reciprocal form of medi- tation having the form 'X is I ' 'I am x ', and in our case we have two vyatihara-s involving Brahman and the pra- tyagatman respectively as the variables. This form of me- ditation is referred to by Sankara at BSBH III. 11i. 37.

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with the ciraśruti: As in the previous chapter, Sarvajnatman closes

xiv. 2). ... tasya tavadeva ciram ... ." -- CHU VI

163 Bhumabhava -- Anandagiri glosses this as " ... li- mitless greatness (" ... bhumabhavo mahatt vamanavacchi- natvam yasyah. The verse is identical to SS I. 2, and ST on it glosses the same phrase as ". ated by bliss. .. essence perme- .bhumabhavah purnanandasvarupata ya- sya iti .... "), while AT glosses the phrase simply as Brahman .... " .. (" ... bhumabhavo brahmabhavah purvoktalaksano yasyah .... "). All three of these interpretations seem to coincide with the manner 'in which the word "bhuman" occurs at CHU VII. xxiii. 1 and xxiv. 1, as well as with the man- ner in which Sankara takes it in his BSBH I. ii1. 8 (i.e., taking it to refer to an infinite Brahman identical with bliss. Madhusudana Sarasvati, however, in his Sarasangraha on SS I. 2, goes against this interpretation on the basis of the fact that Brahman itself can never be obscured:

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Citerbhavo na kalusIkrtah, sarvabhāsakat vena sarvadā prakāsamānatvāt, kintu tattadbhedakal-

krtah. panaya tadaparicchinatvarupo bhūmaiva kalusī- Pūrnatvena prakāsamānatvāt.

(The true stateof being consciousness is not obscured, because as shining in all things it is luminous everywhere; moreover it is the in- finiteness alone, whose nature it is not to be bounded by [external things], that is obscured by the artificial construction of those various differences. Because it does not appear in its fullness [and thus its fullness is what is ob- scured].)

So it is clear that Madhusudana does not take Brahman and bhuman to be identical as do the other interpretations; in- stead he takes bhuman to be an attribute or characteristic of Brahman. This is further borne out when he goes on to say: "Bhumo bhava.iti vyakhyanamanupadeyam, bahorbhavasya bhūmasabdavācyatvena bhāvasabdavaiyarthyappateh. (The in- terpretation: 'the state of being infinity' should not be adopted, because there would be the unwarranted conclusion that, since the state of being great is [already] expressed by the word 'infiniteness' [itself], the words the state of being' would serve no purpose."). We would side with the former type of interpreta- tion because of the effort that it makes to base its expla- nation on sruti (cf., Vetter's translation of the verse in his SarvajMatman's SamksepasarIrakam I. Kapitel, Wien, 1972, which sides with Madhusudana).

164 JagatparamesvaratvajIvatva -- Madhusūdana, in his Safasamgraha, breaks this down further into the following five-fold differences: a) between the jiva and the universe; b) between the jIva and Isvara; c) between each separate jI- va ; d) between the different universes (perhaps referring to the adhyatma, adhidaiva, adhibhuta distinction -- see note 44 above); and e) between the universe and Iśvara. Basically Sarvajfatman's statement of these three artificially con- structed (kalpita) differences points to the distinction in the manifested world between the object to.be enjoyed (bho- gya) which is the insentient universe, the enjoyer (bhoktr) which is the jIva, and the controller (niyantr) these things, which is Isvara. A samilar phrase occurs at SS I. 20.

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165 Svajfana -- Anandagiri glosses this as: "Svasya pratyagatmanah svatmanyevajnanam .. ("Ignorance of the inward self, resting on the self. This attempts to take notice of the fact that Sarvajnatman regarded Brahman to be both the object.(visaya)and locus (aśraya) of igno- rance -- see SS I. 20.

166 Svamahiman -- as at CHU VII. xxiv. 1: "Sa bha- gavah kasminpratisthita iti Sve mahimni yadi va na mahim- niti. ("Sir, in what is that [ bhuman] established? In its own greatness, or not on greathess. ").

167 Astamoha -- while Anandagiri and AT take this in the sense of having delusion destroyed (apakrtamoha and nir- astamoha respectively) and ST does not gloss it, Madhusudana in his Sarasamgraha takes it as 'having delusion superimpo- 'sed on it ( Asto dhyasto 'paramarthasanmohah .... "). In any case, one can see that the first half of the verse presents the atman as it exists in its bound state, while the second half presents the atman as it exists in its freed state.

168 Prakrtinimittakārana -- cf., SŠ I. 540.

169 Drsya -- lit., visible thing, thing which is to be seen.

170 Niyojya -- Anandagiri explains this as " ... yāge niyogo mametyevam svakIyatvena kāryaboddhrtvatmakam niyoj- yatvam .... " (" ... the impelled one is the knower of what should be done as belonging to him in the form of the cog- nition 'This is my order to sacrifice' "). This, of course, is predicated of the pratyagatman only after it has acquired a body.

171 Anandagiri notes that the relation of the pra- tyagätman to these four states is due to a relation of the pratyagatman with the body as infused with the reflection of cit (sābhasakaryakaranasambandha).

172 - The body or the sense organs are meant here.

173 What is meant by the thing qualified (viśista) here, is the jIva. This statement is intended to stand a-

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gainst the avacchedavada which holds that the jIva, since it is the pure Brahman in its limited form, is the thing which is impelled etc .. Anandagiri summarizes the reasons, standing agains this avacchedavada when he states: "Viśis- tasya visesanabhede bhedatkartrtvabhoktrtvadisu vaiyadhf- karanyadakrtabhyagamakrtavipranasaprasangat .... T 7"Because there would be the unwarranted conclusion that there would occur the destruction of what was done and the admission of what was not done, due to the fact that the substrata would be different for the agent, the enjoyer, etc .; why? because the thing qualified [visista = jIval is different when the qualifying thing [visesana = antahkarana] is different .... "). The unwarranted conclusion given is that what has been done (krta), namely, those karma-s performed by a jiva, would be destroyed, that is, they would not impart their results (phala) to the jIva that originally performed them. In other words, the kartr and the bhoktr of one and the same action would then be separate jIva-s. Further, that which has not been done (akrta), namely, those actions.not per- formed by one's self but by a different JIva, would be ad- mitted also resulting from the fact that the kartr and the bhoktr of one and the same action would have to be separate jIva-s. This is not an admission that the avacchedavadin wishes to make since it would be impossible for moksa to come about in such a chaotic state of affairs concerning the performance of actions and the reaping of their fruit. Dut the avacchedavadin is forced into such an admission if he accepts the fact that it is the jIva, i.e., the visista, instead of the pure pratyagatman. which is kartr, bhoktr, etc., because there would have to be different visesana-s for each of the four.states, namely, kartr, bhoktr, etc., in order to explain the fact that kartr, bhoktr, etc., are different at all. Now, if we have different visesana-s for each different state, we must also conclude that the visis- ta-s are different in each state, since what makes a vi- sista different from any other is the visesana-s which are peculiar to it. Thus the avacchedavadin is forced to ac- 0. cept the conclusion that the visista (i.e., jIva) that is regarded as the kartr is separate from that visista (i.e., jIva) that is the bhoktr, which in fact admits the above mentioned unwarranted conclusion concerning the performance and consequences of karma-s.

174 This is BUBHV IV. i11. 354: "Aisvaryam karana- tvam ca saksityamapi catmanah/ Sadesitavyakāryarthasāksyar- thenasya samgateh//

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175 Sabhasasvavidya -- see note 165 above for the' sense of svavidya (=svajhana). Sarvajnatman echoes the same view expressed in this sentence at SS III. 7.

176 . tyam. " -- VII. xxiil. 1. "Yo vai bhuma tadamrtam, atha yadalpam tanmar-

177 Pratyagrupena -- that is, as the pratyagatman (see p. 214 1. 1l of the Appendix and PP träns. p. 91 1. 4, for the same use of the word pratyagrupa). Sarvajňatman explains the three ways in which the word pratyanc is used at SS I. 159:

Pratyagbhavastāvadeko 'sti buddho pratyagbhavah kašcidanyah pratIci, Pratyagbhavastatkrtastatra canyo vyutpanno 'yam tatra catmeti sabdah

(Indeed, there is one inwardness in the intellect, there is a certain other one in the inward entity, And there is another inwardness which is a mixture of them and this is the primary sense of the word "atman".)

The first of these is the mundane (aparamarthika) use, the second is the use on thelevel of a absolute truth (tättvika), and the third is the mixed (sabala) use which has a heuristic function when it is used as the primary sense of words that refer to the self in mahavakya-s. The use of the term 'pratyanc' in the context of discussing the locus of ignorance presents one of the most difficult'prob- lems in understanding Sarvajfatman's metaphysics, because of his adamance about the fact that the suddhabrahman alone, as opposed to any product of ignorance (ajhanakarya), must be the locus of ignorance (e.g., SS II. 208: jñāni tasmādiha bhavitumalam nāparam vastu kincittasyājna- Brahmaivā-

nätmakatvät .... -- Therefore Brahman alone is capable of being the locus of ignorance, this is not so of any other entities whatsoever because they themselves consist of ig- norance [i.e., the purpose of ajñana is to obscure jñana

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so that if something were already ajnana there would be no purpose to its having even more ajfana and it would thus be purposeless .. ") Therefore, as the locus of ignorance, the pratyag- ätman cannot be an ajnanakarya, yet in the next few lines of our text Sarvajfatman goes on to state that that Brah- man which is non-dual and blissful (advayanandabrahman) is clearly not the locus of ignorance because we never expe- rience the fact that such a Brahman is ignorant, which in turn leads us to the conclusion that the pratyagatman and and advavanandabrahman are somehow different aspects of the same absolute entity -- the former aspect being the one Sar- vajnatman puts forward as the locus of ignorance. Clearly, there is-a logical lacuna here in repect to Sarvajñatman's staunch non-dualism and the manner in which he proposes that ignorance comes to rest on the suddhabrahman; however, there is evidence in SS as well for both an inward (prat- yagrupa) and an infinite or absolute (anantarupa or adva- yarupa)aspect of the suddhabrahman. I. 269, 561; III. 305. For example, see SS

One cannot fully understand the notion of inward- ness without also appreciating the complementary idea of absolute non-duality, and vice versa, in order to completely apprehend the partless (akhandartha) unity conveyed by the syntactical compatibility of the two words, 'tat" and "tvam". In the end if we are to explain Sarvajfatran's employment of this term 'pratyanc' as it refers to suddhabrahman, we are forced to explain it as a heuristic one, and a heuris- tic one with an effort to convey two specific truths about suddhabrahman: a) the notion of inwardness is used by Sar- vajhatman to distinguish suddhabrahman from everything that is external (paranc) and thereby, objectifiable (see SS I .. 241) -- this heuristic purpose may thus be called 'eptstemo- locigal' since its implication is that there can be no ob- jectifiable knowledge of Suddhabrahman; b) it is also used to point to the fact tha suddhabrahman is the inward or underlying essence (svabhava) of all things -- thus we may call this heuristic purpose 'ontological'. It is in the light of such heuristic purose that Sarvajfatman seems to use the phrase, " ... Brahman in its inward form alone is the locus of knowledge and ignorance." in contradistinction to the phrase, " ... Brahman in its non-dual blissful nature can- not be the'locus of knowledge and ignorance .... "

178 Anandagiri gives MU I. i. 9, "Yassarvajnah sar- vavit " ("He who is omniscient, all-knowing."), as an exam- ple of sruti, and BHG VII. 10, "Buddhimatamasmi ' ("I am the

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intellect of those possessed of intellect.") as an example of smrti.

179 For example, in the case of the rope-snake, the + rope does not mistake itself for the snake, nor does it know itself to be the rope -- only a conscious entity (caitanya) indulges itself in ignorance. If, in fact, an insentient entity were taken as the locus of knowledge, it then could no longer be regarded as being insentient.

180 With this statement the last of the four impro- per alternatives for the jnanajfanasryaya (locus of know- ledge and ignorance) is ruled out. Ne may briefly summa- rize the four by stating that the jhanajnanasraya cannot be:

1. advayanandabrahman, because we never have the experience that it is ighorant (mudha).

2. Isvara, because it is omniscient.

3. jagat, because it is insentient (jada).

4. jIva, because no jIva exists in. the state of deep sleep when ignorance does indeed exist (i.e., the jIva is vyabhicarin with respect to ignorance during the state of deep sleep), though. jIvatva is inferred to exist in a potential form at that time.

Though the first three alternatives seem to be quickly dis- missed as obviously untenable, the last, which is advoca- ted by Mandana Miśra (see S. Kuppaswami Sastri's edition of Brahmasiddhi, Madras Government Oriental Series No. 4, Madras: 1937, pp. 10-12, as well as SS II. 138, 174) and later on seems to find support in the thought of Vacaspati Misra and the BhamatI school, is thoroughly examined by Sarva- jhatman in the following pages of PP.

181 versal (jati) : JIvatva -- if ore were to take this as the uni- "the state of being a jIva", then Sarvajfat- man would be open to the objection of the Nyaya-Vaisesika who holds that the relationship between an individual (vy- akti) and a universal (jati) is an eternal one called in- herence (samavaya, see TS 79), namely, that if the univer- sal called JIvatva exists in the state of deep sleep, then

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a corresponding individual jIva must exist there also, and thus opening the way for the possibility of the jIva ser -- ving as the locus of ignorance. by his use of the word, "jIvatva" However, it is clear that Sarvajnatman does not intend the universal, but simply the basic adventitious li- mitation (upadhi) that covers all the active characteris- tics, such as being the agent (kartrtva), the enjoyer (bhok- trtva), and so on, that are associated with the jIva as that which wanders through the world of mundane existence (i.e, as a samsarin) Sarvajñatman does not admit the presence of such characteristics in the state of deep sleep because a) the sense organs which connect the jIva with external objects in the waking state, and thus perpetuate the illusion of such characteristics. are completely merged into the atman, and b) the mental impressions (vasana-s) derived from the waking state which perpetuate the illusion of such charac- teristics in the dream state', are completely absent in the state of deep sleep. Thus, this active jIva-condition (jT- vatva = samsaritva) cannot be present, in any full sense, in that state of deep sleep; it exists there only potenti- ally (Saktimat -- see n. 183 below for the macrocosmic sta- tement of this potentiality) and in order to account for the subsequent reappearance of the same jTva.

1°2 The process of the jIva's return from the state of, deep sleep, and the logic of its being the same jIva that entered into the state of deep sleep, are discussed by Sankara at BSBH III. ii. 9, and BUBH II. i. 19.

183 The inference would run: 'At the time of deep sleep, JIvatva is potential because the jIva re-awakens af- terwards. The macrocosmic application of this inference is made by Sankara at BSBH I. iii. 30: "PralTyamanamapi cedam jagacchaktyavasesameva pralfyate. Saktimulameva ca prabhavati; itarathakasmikatvaprasangat. '("Moreover this universe, when it is being merged, is merged so that only what is potential remains. And that root of potentiality alone is what unfolds [as the unverse at the time of cre- ation]; otherwise there would be the unwarranted conclusion that (the universe] would be without a cause.")!

184 What is meant by direct (aparoksa) experience is perception (pratyaksa), and what is meant by indirect (paroksa) experience is inference (anumana). The idea of the statement is that ajnana, which is directly experienced

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at the time of dee sleep, cannot have an indirectly expe- rienced jIva as its locus. Cf., nandagiri: jIvatva- sya sausuptikasya śaktiśesasya anumitasyāpi tatkāle kayāpi vidhaya sphuranabhāvāt na tada sphurato 'inanasya tadāsra- yatvasiddhirityarthah. ; which seems to be based on the ac- cptance of the principle that a thing which is directly ex- perienced should not have something which is inferred as its locus.

185 This, according to Anandagiri, is a response to the following objection: "Nanutthitena sausuptaiIva- tvam saktisesamanumeyam paroksataya parisphurati: tena tad- āšrayatayā jīvasyāpi sphuranat yuktamajnanasrayatvam. ("That jIvatva existing at the time of deep sleep, which is inferrable as potential by the person who has re-awaken- ed, is. experienced as non- immediate; through this, the jf- va too is experienced as the locus of that jIvatva; for this reason it is proper to say that the jfva is the locus of ajfana .... "). In other words what is being stated is that, if one can, upon waking, infer that jTvatva had ex- isted at the time of deep sleep, so that a type of jIva is, in retrospect, experienced as existing at that time, why then not let aifana have its locus in this jTva which is inferred to exist then? As stated in the previous note, Sar- vajnatman's response to this is that in considering the locus of ajfana to be an inferred thing, one cannot escape the conclusion that ainana must then itself be an inferred thing, which goes against the fact that aifana is directly experienced at the time in question.

186 In addition to Sarvajfatman's response, as ex- plained in the previous two notes, Anandagiri supplies the argument that to regard the jIva as something inferred goes against the Advaita Vedanta notion that it is a thing which is directly experienced: "Na hi jIvasya paroksatvam kena- ciddrstamistam va 'aham' ityaparoksatvat, ākasasya ca sāk- sipratyaksatvena paroksatvanabhyupagamat .. ( No, for one perceives or accepts the fact that the jIva is non-immediate on account of the fact that we all have the direct percep- tion 'I', and because the akasa is directly experienced by the perception of the Witness. ).

187 This is the exact opposite of Sarvajmatman's position as stated, for example, at SS I. 319: "Asrayatva- visayatvabhaginī nirvibhagacitireva kevala." ("Undivided Ab- solute Consciousness serves as the locus and object [of ig- norance].").

193

188 BUBHV I. 1v. 290:

Pramatradyutthiteh purvam cidanyananvavattamo- Visesana cidevaika svanubhutyaiva gamyate

We follow the editor's suggestion of " ... cidanyananvavata- man .... " for " .cidanyanacottamah and Anandagiri's explanation : susuptyavasthāyam cidātmano 'nyena visa- yavişayitvena, asrayasrayitvena ca tamaso sambandhaccid- atmaiva .. ... because in the state of deep sleep, ig- norance has no relation' in the form of content and contain- er, or locus and thing resting on the locus, with anything other than the cidatman, there is only the cIdatman [at that timel .... ").

189 The idea is that since ignorance is beginning- less, it cannot have anything that is an effect (karya) and thus possessed of a beginning as its locus, otherwise, an impossibility would result, since ignorance could be present before the coming into existence of the effect, therby being without any locus.

190 m parinamatvat .... " ... parinamitvāt .... should be changed to " As borrowed from Sankhya-Yoga, this term finds a similar use in Advaita Vedanta, namely, sig- nifying an actual transformation of some material base as opposed to an illusory transformation (vivarta) of a given base. Here it seems to refer to the Advaita Vedanta no -. tion that perceptual cognitions are a result of an actual transformation of the internal organ into the form of the object being cognized. VEDP I. 18 describes such a pro- cess:

Tatra yatha tatakodakam chidrannirgatya kulyāt- mana kedarān pravisya tadvadeva catuskonadyākaram bhavati tatha taijasamantahkaranamapi cakşuradidvā- ra nirgatya ghatādivisavadesam gatya ghatadivi- sayakarena parinamate. Sa eva parinamo vrttir- ityucyate.

(Concerning this, just as the water of a tank; having gone out of an opening and having entered

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the fields through channels, becomes just like them, that is, becomes a form having four sides etc., so also does the internal organ, whose na- ture is light, go out through the sense of sight etc., and having gone to the place where there is an object such as a pot etc., it transforms into the form of the object such as pot etc ..

tion.) That very transformation is called a modifica-

191 Kutastha -- namely, the atman.

192 Parinamin -- namely, the antahkarana.

193 As Anandagiri explains it: "Cidatmano buddhi- vyavadhanena jnanasrayatve buddhivisistasyaiva bodhyatvam

through the intervention of the intellect, then the result phalam .... (If the cidatman were the locus of knowledge

is that only that thing qualified by the intellect [i.e., the jIval is the one that is to be instructed .... "). The qualification bodhya (that which is to be instructed) is meant to refer to that entity which is to be instructed in the manner of attaining the final realization of the unity of atman and Brahman. The parabrahman or jada (insentient matter) cannot be instructed because the former is above all desires such as the desire for instruction and because it consists, in essence, of pure knowledge itself, while the latter is simply insentient and therefore has no capa- city for instruction at all. This assumption that the jTva is the only entity that is fit for instruction leads to the following set of assertions: a) if the thing qualified by the intellect is that which is suitable for instruction, then it alone can. be ignorant (i.e., the locus of ignorance); b) the thing qualified by the intellect is the jIva; c) therefore the jIva is the locus of ignorance (Anandagiri: "Nanu visis- tasya bodhyatve tasyaivājatvābhyupagamadviśistasya ca jī- vatvājjIvasyaivaj nanasrayatvam baladapadyetetyasankya. ... ") Again this is the position of "andana Misra and the BhamatI school and it directly opposes Sarvajfatman's own position.

194 There should be a danda after " ... antahkarana- Sabalatvad .... " -- see Appendix p. 227 line 11

195

195 T The idea is that there is no intervening thing between Brahman and its relation with ignorance that could be taken as accounting for that relationship.

196 What is meant by this is that the realtion with ignorance is not natural (svabhavika) to Brahman but that it is adventitious and occasioned by ignorance itself. An- andagiri also quotes Suresvara (SV. 176) on this:

Nasyavidyetyavidyāyamevasitva prakalpyate Brahmadvara tvavidyeti na kathancana yujyate.

(No: only when ignorance exists is it possible to say that ignorance belongs to it [Brahman], But ignorance is not possible by. means of Brahman. )

The verse has been slightly altered by Anandagiri to suit his own pupose since "Brahmadrstya. appears in the An- anda Ashrama edition (1937) of SV for "Brahmadvara .... hers. The importance of making the point that Brahman has nothing to do with the bringing about of the relationship with ignorance is that it avoids the unwarranted conclu- sion that if Brahman were responsible for such a relation- ship, Brahman being eternal and omnipresent, that relation- ship could never cease and the attainment of knowledge and liberation would become impossible.

197 As has been shown in the previous note, the Ad- vaitin cannot afford to make Brahman the occasioning factor in.the relationship with ignorance, and thereby he is for- ced to assume the ignorance itself is this occasioning fac- tor. Such an admission involves theifault (dosa) of being based on itself (atmasraya), 1.e., an explanation of a thing as depending on itself. However, in the case of the rela- tionship with ignorance, the Advaitin does not treat the at- masraya which is concluded about it as a vicious one. In- stead, being the only acceptible alternative, he regards it as admissible and alludes to the case with difference (bhe- da) as a similar example. The point of the allusion is that with difference, we encounter the same problems, as are the case with ig- norance, in trying to explain the relationship of difference to the things which it differentiates. That is to.say, a

.

196

given difference will involve two entities a and b, but it must not reside in a unity which is composed of the iden- tity of these two entities a and b and thereby cause their difference, otherwise the wery concept of oneness upon which difference depends for its counter-positive (pratiyogin) would vanish. A and b therefore, must already be different before a diffèrence "x" could differentiate them, and this difference 'x" by which a and b will differ enters by means of a difference which already must exist and thus it is de- pendent on difference. In this way difference can be re- garded as being based on itself (atmasraya). SarvajMatman makes this same allusion to difference in explaining the origin of ignorance at SS I. 55.

198 "Tasmadavidusa evāvidyā, avidyayaiva cāvidyā- vattvam. "-lit .: "Therefore ignorance exists only in the Faultless One, and its possession of ignorance is due to that very ignorance alone.". -

199 "Brahma va idamagra asIt Tadatmanamevavet. Aham brahmasmiti. Tasmat tat sarvamabhavat. -- BU I. iv. 10.

200 Anatman -- namely,the antahkarana, etc ..

201 With this paragraph, Sarvajfatman is entertain- ing a possible objection (pūrvapaksa). Carvajfatman's own position (siddhanta) is that Brahman has a relation with transformations (parinama-s) such as knowledge, through the outer cloak of the antahkarana (see PP trans. p. 115 above). The purvapaksin proposes that the JIva (i.e., the visista which' has the antahkarana as its visesana) is that which is connected with knowledge and action (jhanakarmadhikaritva), which is simply to say that the jIva is the one who strives (sadhaka) for the fulfilment of the jhanakanda and karma- kanda portions of the. Veda. However, Sarvajnatman goes on to say that if this were the case, then the purvapaksin is forced to admit the unwarranted conclusion that the jiva must also be the one that reaps the rewards (phalin) of the striving for the fulfilment of those two portions of the Veda (the rewards are apavarga or release = moksa, and svar- ga or heaven), because it is only logical that the person who strives (sAdhaka) for anything be identical to the per- son who reaps the fruit (phalin) of that striving.

202 - For example, that. the jIva is the sadhaka and that Brahman is the phalin.

19

203 Akrtabhyagamakrtavipranasaprasanga -- see note 173 above and SS III. 30.

204 Mahapralayadi -- as Anandagiri explains, the "adi" stands for deep sleep (susupti) and swoon or coma (murccha).

205 Thus the point being made is that in order for the jiva, which is the visista (qualified entity), tc be the one which is liberated and not the pratyagatman, and due to the fact that the attainment of moksa (liberation) requires enormous amounts of time, amounts of time that span even the periods of cosmic dissolution, the jIva as visista must also persist through all these times or it could not be the one that strives for, and reaps, the rewards of libe- ration. However, the thing that qualifies (visesana = an- tahkarana) the jIva as the qualified entity (visista) is destroyed at times such as mahapralaya, so that jrva can- not persist through them and therefore cannot be the entity that undergoes liberation.

206 As, for example, a pot -- once it has been sma- shed it does not reform itself after some time.

20? Visesana -- namely, the antahkarana.

209 Name and form (namarupa) is a term used in Ad- vaita Vedanta to indicate everything other than Brahman " ... na ca brahmano 'nyannamar@pabhyamarthantaram. nothing except Brahman is different from name and form -- BSBH I. iii. 41). It has both a manifest (vyakrta) and an unmanifest (avyakrta) form (as at BSBH II. 1. 17: akrtannamarupatvaddharmadavyakrtanamarupatvam dharmanta- ram."). Nāmarupa is a descriptive two-element formula that reduces phenomenal existence down to its basic conceptual components : name, and the objectifiable content of name (one essentially inseperable from the other) Its double nature (manifest and unmanifest) is used by Sańkara to acco- unt causally for the multiplicity of phenomenal existence and its intrinsic structure. For an analysis of Sankara's use of the term consult Paul Hacker's "Eigentümlichkeiten der Lehre und Terminologie Sankaras", ?eitschrift Der Peut- schen Morgenlandishen Gesellschaft 100 (1951) pp. 246-246.

198

The fact/ of the sameness of name and formrising up after each cycle of dissolution is specifically dealt with by Sankara at BSBH I. ili. 30 where, for example, he states the following:

Drstanusravikasukhaduhkhavisayau ca rāgadvesau bhavatah, na vilaksanavisayāvityato dharmadharma- phalabhutottarā srstirnispadyamānā pürvasrstisa- drsyeva nispadyate.

(Desire and aversion have as their concern the pleasure and sorrow for those things which have been see or previoulsy heard about, they are not concerned with anything elsel hence a new creation is the result of merit and demerit [of the crea- tures that existed in the previus creation] and

tion."). it is set down as similar to the previous crea-

209 In searching for some entity that does in fact persist through the times such as the cosmic dissolution, the purvapaksin proposes that it is the essence (svarupa) underlying the visista, and that beeause it persists in this fashion it can serve to recognize the possible conti- nuity between the visesana which existed prior to dissolu- tion and the visesana which exists after it. In this way, some scope might remain for his position that the jIva and not Brahman is both the bound and liberated entity. How- ever, this is exactly what Sarvajnatman has been saying all along, namely, that it is the essence (svarūpa = visesya = pratyagbrahman) which truly undergoes bondage and release, and which is the real locus of ignorance and knowledge. Thus the purvapaksin is in fact admitting the position of. the siddhantin here.

210 .. apadyate. The text seems to be punctuated wronglv here.

dhi .... Dvaitadaršanavibhramasyājhānāsrayatvādupā- should be ... apadyate dvaitadarsanavibhramasya- jHanasrayatvat. Upadhi ..... (see Appendix p. 228 1l. 8-6). The reason dvaitadarsanavibhrarasyajhanasrayatvat is why the essence (svarupa) as recognizer (pratyabhijhatr) is the locus of ignorance. That is to say, the recognition of the qualification (visesana) is an error of perceiving duality (dvaitadarsanavibhrama) since it implies seeing the

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visesana as different from the atman, and such a perception is rooted in ignorance making the person who has it posses- sed of ignorance.

211 The fault referred to is akrtabhyagamakrtavi- pranäsaprasanga (the admission of what is not done and the destruction of what has been done -- see note 203 above). A clearer paraphrase of the intention of the sentence would run as follows: Due to the fact that the jIva is an effect of ignorance and therefore cannot serve as the locus of ig- norance, the essence alone must be the locus of ignorance and the locus of all its effects, and thus the essence is both the striver (sadhaka) and the reaper (phalin) -- for this reason (that the striver and the reaper are the same) we cannot be taken to task for admitting that the same j va which performs certain karma-s will not reap their re- sults, and thus that moksa would be impossible.

.212 That is to say, because of the preceeding rea- sons one cannot say that the jIva is bound and released, even though we hold that it is the essence (svarupa = at- man) by taking on the outer coat of the antahkarana (an- tahkaranakancukadvarena or visesanadvarena, compare a si- milar use of kaMcuka at SS III. 132) which is entitled to perform karma, we do not mean to say that the essence be- comes the jiva and is entitled to perform karma in that Qualified (visista) form alone. What we mean to say is that the intervention of the antahkarara in the case of accounting for the locus of knowledge (i.e., is entitled to knowledge and action -- jhanakarmadhikarin) is a logical necessity (see top half of PP trans. p. 115) and we never mean to say that the atman transforms itself into the jfva and in that way is the locus of ignorance. However, one must notice that it is a drawback of Sarvajfatman's meta- physics that he does not further explain the nature of this relation that the atman has with the antahkarana when it takes it on as an outer coat, but simply implies that it produces no change in the atman.

213 III. 7: Sarvajfatman makes a similar statement at SS

Brahmaiva samsarati mucyata etadeva dauvārikam bhavati samsaranam tu tasya

200

Muktih punarbhavati cidvapusaiva tasya svajnatah svamahimapratibodhatasca.

(Brahman alone undergoes transmigration and it alone is freed; its transmigration coes about by means of an intervening factor, while it is released in its pure consciousness alone; [the former] comes about due to its own ignorance and [the latter] due to the knowledge of its own greatness. )

The commentaries explain that the intervening factor refer- red to in the second line of the verse is the subtle body (lińga).

214 And thus also the locus of ignorance.

215 See p. 31 lines 18-19.

216 "Na ca brahmana istam cikIrsuna sastrarthavi- parītakalpanaya svārthaparityagah karyah." -- BUBH I. iv. 10 p. 61. This phrase occurs in the context of a polemic be- tween Sankara and (according to the commentaries) Bhartr- prapanca as to whether the word 'brahman" in the opening phrase of BU I. iv. 10 (i.e., "Brahma va idamagra asIt. Tadātmanamevavet. Aham brahmāsmiti. Tasmat tat sarvam- bhavat. -- Indeed Brahman was all this in the beginning. It knew only itself in the form of the cognition, 'I am Brahman.'. Therefore it became All.") means the pure Brah- man (para), which is what Sankara asserts, or whether it means the conditioned Brahman (apara) or a brahmana as stri- ver (sadhaka) for liberation, which is Bhartrprapanca's view. Both of them seem to assume that this opening phrase of BU I. iv. 10 describes the fact that the entity which is re- ferred to by the word "brahman" is first of all described as bound, then becomes aware of the cognition 'Iam Brah-

All). man' and through that attains liberation (i.e., 'becomes The objection which immediately preceeds those words of Sankara that are quoted in our text runs as follows: "Brahmani sādhakatvakalpana asmadādisviva apesalā 'tadātra- namevavettasmattatsarvamabhavat.' iti, iti cet."( It is sil- ly to imagine that Brahman is a striver just like us and thus say that 'It krew only itself, therfore it became All. ") .- Sankara's response carries in it the intention that one

201

should not feel that one is doing anything demeaning to the absolute and pure nature of Brahman by allowing it to ser- ve as, the locus of ignorance, or to be such things as the striver and reaper, because the superimposition of these things upon Brahman does not in any way affect its true na- ture. In addition to this, the words that immediately fol- low the quotation taken from Sankara are: vāksama yukta bhavatah." "Na caitāvatye- ("Nor is it proper that you should be intolerant about just that much."); and it is these words which seem to serve as the basis for the quotation from Su- resvara which immediately follows in our text.

217 The verse is BUBHV I. iv. 1279:

Aksama bhavatah keyam sadhakatvaprakalpane Kim na pasyati samsaram mayyevājnānakalpitam.

That is, only on me as the pratyagatman.

218 That is to say that a jIva is not the locus of knowledge and ignorance.

219 ... ajhanakalpitanāmajfanakalpitabhedānam. -- that is, to the jIva-s which is Mandana Misra's position.

220 Pratibimbakalpa -- that is, the jIva taken as possessing a consciousness which is a real reflection of that pure caitanya which is Brahman. This is the position of the Vivaranas.

220 This verse is BUBHV I. iv. 298:

Parakpravanaya drstya dhIstho jño 'jñanamatmani, Vyomakārsnyādivattajam sambhavayati na svatah

Again here we have a reference to the Advaita Vedanta the- ory of perception, in which a mode of the internal organ (antahkaranavrtti) goes outward through the channels of the sense prgans and takes on the form of the object to be per- ceived. The verse states that the knower within the intel- lect (dhi = buddhi), that.is, that knower associated with

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the intellect or the jIva (as antahkaranavisista) assumes itself to be the locus of ignorance. The point of the si- mile of the ether is that, though it is not an object of senuous perception, ignorance causes us to imagine that. the blueness which we do perceive resides on it.

222 Vyañjaka -- usually employed to indicate the fac- tor that renders something that is immaterial and eternal, material and non-eternal, e.g., the individual (vyakti) is the manifesting factor (vyanjaka) of a universal (jati which is the thing to be manifested (vyangya).

223 Pratyabhijña -- Anandagiri does not gloss this word, and its use here does seem peculiar; perhaps Sarva- jmatman merely means experience (anubhuti) by it.

224 That is, the nature of manifesting the thing which is to be manifested (vyangya) as contained within themselves (i.e., the vyañjaka-s).

225 Anandagiri notes that this example is intended for those who accept the view that universals exist every- where (sarvagata) including in their particulars, a view accepted by the Nyaya-Vaisesikas and the MImamsakas. The examples that follow this one are intended for those people . who hold that a universal pervades only its particulars.

226 Hrasvadirghaplutadi -- see P I. ii. 27 and com- mentaries on this. The three terms refer only to the len- gth of vowels in words. For example, the short (hrasva) vowel is that which has one measure (matra) and takes one unit of time (kala) to pronounce, "u" in the word "madhu"- (honey). as the vowels "a" and The long (dhIrgha) vo- wel has two matra-s and takes two kala-s to pronounce, as the vowel "i" in the word "gaurT" (female buffalo). The prolonged (pluta) vowel has three matra-s and takes three kala-s to pronounce, and it is marked by the figure "3" in writing, as in the phrase, Devadatta. ") where the vowel "Devadatta3 anvasa. " ("Be seated "a" is prolonged.

. 227 1 Karanabhivyaktidvarena -- Abhyankar in his A Dic- tionary of Sanskrit Grammar, 1961), in the entry for "karana' (Baroda: Oriental Institute,

XXIII. 2 as enumerating its five forms! cites TattirIya Pratisakhya Anupradanatsam- şargātsthanātkaranavinyayāt/ Jāyate varnavaisesvam pari-

203

namatca pancamat." ("From the five: augmenting, blending, the location, the position of articulation, and transfor- mation, the distinctiveness of letters is produced.") He also provides a commetary for this passage which runs:

Akarasya tavat -- anupradanam nadah. samsargah kanthe, sthanam hanu, karanavinyayah osthau, parimānam mātrakālah. Anupradanadibhih pan- cabhih karanairvarnanām vaišesyam jayate.

(There is this much concerning the letter "a" -- augmenting means resonance, blending is in the throat, the location is the jaw, the position of articulation is the lips; [and) the extent is the duration of the measure. Through these five instruments of articulation beginning with aug- menting, there is produced the distinctiveness of letters.).

It seems that the last of these, namely, parimana as matra- kala is the one which is meant in our example.

228 Thus, of these examples is: the basic proposition illustrated by all 'Vyañjako vyańgyam svagatatvena vyan- jayati.'(The manifesting factor manifests .that which is to be manifested as if that thing to be manifested were con- tained within it.). .The examples therefore fall into the following pattern:

Vyajaka Vyańgya Svagatatvena

a) gopinda gotva b) hrasvadi sabda gopindagatatvena

c) manyadyartha dehagatamukha hrasvādigatatvena manyadyarthagatatvena

In terms of the explanation of the manner in which the ji- va seems to appear as the locus of ignorance, which all the above examples are meant to clarify, we obtain the fol- lowing corresponding pattern:

204

Vyaßjaka Vyangya Svagatatvena

antahkaranopa- pratyakcaitan- hitajiva antahkaranopahita- yasrayājfana jIvagatatvena

This same type of statement is made by Sarvajnatman at SŚ TI. 192.

229 The two correlating terms used here are pra- tIyamana and sphutatara Anandagiri helps us with these two odd terms when he says that they respectively refer to nir- vikalpaka (indeterminate) and savikalpaka (determinate)

pratIyamanatvam nirvikalpakapratItivisayatvamiti vivekah. cognitions : 'Atra pratIteh sphutataratvam savikalpatvam

What Sarvajfatman seems to intend here is that in the state of deep sleep bare ignorance is aprehended, while in the waking or dreaming states ignorance is perceived as dif- ferentiated into and mixed up with its effects. The in- ference in the sentence runs as follows: The antahkarana or the jIva are the manifesting factors of ignorance be- cause whatever is the manifesting factor must be positively and negatively concomitant with the thing to be manifested and the antahkarana and the jIva as qualified by it exhi- bit such a concomitance.

230 This verse is from NAIS III. 58:

Narte Bahyām vrttimanutpādya vyaktih svānnāhamo yatha 'ntahkaranam tadvadadhyantasya vyaktiranjasi.

231 This seems to refer to the phrase: ". .karane caksusi viparītagrāhakādidosasya daršanāt." (" .. because we see that faults such as those which occasion perceptions contradictory to reality exist in that organ which is the eye."), occuring at BHGBH XIII. 2.

232 Since ignorance is ultimately an unreal entity, it ultimately does not even have its locus in Brahman. Sar- vajfatman construes Sankara's statement that ignorance re- sides in the organ as an heuristic assertion, which by fir- mly assigning ignorance to the antahkaraya, calls attention to the fact that though Advaitins talk about ignorance as

205

resting on Brahman it, being an ultimately unreal entity, cannot even have its locus there, and to the fact that Brahman ultimately has no relation with ignorance whatso- ever. Sarvajñātman cannot disregard this statement made by Sankara since its apparent implication, namely, that the antahkarana is the locus of ignorance, puts a direct strain on Sarvajfatman's consitency regarding his position that the pratyagatman alone is the locus of ignorance. He is also compelled to appropriate the statement, in one manner or another, into his own viewpoint, due to the obviously authoritative position that Sankara's words command in the Advaita Vedanta tradition; a position which he himself of- ten calls upon throughout his work. This is a recurring problem in all the Indian commetorial traditions; whenever an author who is relatively later on in a tradition seeks to 'fill out' the words of his predecessors, and especially the often skeletal statements of the founders of those tra- ditions,'his attempts at establishing an overall consist- ency for the statements which he is 'filling out', as well as at setting those statements in the light of his own con- temporary polemical concerns, should not necessarily be construed as compromising the statements of those earlier writers, though this does not preclude the fact that dis- tortions are quite a real possibility. In our case, Sar- vajnatman does not seem to have compromised the words and philosophical position of Sańkara.

233 . .tasya mastake taddhi ksipati .... " -- lit. .. throws it on the head of that [internal organ]

234 Cf., Sāńkhyakārikā 62:

Tasmanna badhyate napi mucyate napi samsarati kaścit, Samsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāsraya prakrtin

(Therefore no [soul (purusa)] whatsoever is bound, nor release, nor is subject to transmigration, It is nature which resides in the infinite existing entities, which is subject to transmigration, is bound, and is released.)

Being bound, etc., prakrti has to be the locus of ignorance, and the antahkarana, according to the Sankhyas, is an evo-

206

lute of prakrti. Thus the implication of the above kārika is that the antahkarana, rather than pure consciousness, is the locus of ignorance.

235 The reference is to Istasiddhi VI. 8:

Svaruk ca bhati yattatra jnanajRanavibhagadhTh Ato 'vidya bhavedyasya bhavettadvisayaiva sā.

The first line of this differs slightly.with Hiriyanna's edition (Istasiddhi of Vimuktätman with Extracts from the Vivarana of Jhanottama, Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 65, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1933) which reads: "Svaruk ca bhati vattatra najnatajnavibhagadhih" and clearly deals with the fact that the distinction between object of igno- rance (ajñata) and locus of.ignorance (ajna) does not oc- cur with reference to the self-luminous consciousness. What the first line of this verse, as it stands in our text, is attempting to convey is that both knowledge and igno- rance must be assigned to the self-luminous Brahman, or in other words, that both knowledge and ignorance have their locus in the self-luminous Brahman.

236 The verse is from BUBHV I. iv. 342:

Tamah pradhānam ksetrānām citpradhānascidātmanām Parah kāranatāmeti bhāvanajfānakarmabhih.

The last line refers to the three auxiliary causes (saha- kärin) which aid Brahman in the creation of the universe. An auxiliary cause is something that aids in the production of a specific effect and yet is neither its material cause (upadanakārana) or instrumental cause (nimittakārana), as a potter's stick is the auxiliary cause in the case of the production of a pot from clay, which is its material cause, by the potter, which is its instrumental cause. The first of these, namely, bhavana is glossed as upasana or meditation by Anandagiri in his commentary to BUBHV I. iv. 1145 and 1149. Here it seems to be taken as Tthose things known though meditation' ("Bhavanaiñatani .") by Anandagiri. The second auxiliary cause, namely, JHana is meant to refer to the knowledge of past experien-

207

ces in the form of mental impressions (vāsanā-s or samskā- ra-s) which have derived from the experiences concerning the results of past actions. The last auxiliary cause, namely, karma is meant, to refer to meritorious and demeri- torious actions (dharmadharmarupakarma-s). Thus there are three auxiliary causes which aid Brahman in the creation of the universe. It is in this way that we can set Sureś- vara's text in line with Sankara's explanation of the phrase: ""am vidyakarmani samanvarabhete purvaprajña ca." ( "Know- ledge and actions and prior experience take hold of it i.e., the departing soul " -- BU IV. iv. 2). It is from these that the jIva is able to cultivate a new body upon the death of the old one.

237 That is, the antahkarana as consisting of mind (manas), intellect (buddhi), the I-faculty (ahamkara), and thought (citta).

238 This metaphor of the body as the citadel of the soul occurs again at CHU VIII. i. 1; MU II. 1i. 7; BS I. ii1. 14 (see Sankara on these passages).

239 This verse is SS ITI. 16:

Karrendriyani khalu pañca tathāparāni Puddhindriyāni mana ādicatustayam ca, Pranadipancakamatho viyadadikam ca Kāmaśca karma ca tamah punárastamī pūh.

240 The point of this is that neither the word "ig- norance" (avidya) in the sentence that immediately precedes the verse quoted from SS III. 16, nor the word "darkness' (tamas) in the verse itself, may refer to primordial igno- rance which is the cause of the universe and thus the cause of the body itself (see SS III. 9). This is so because the body is an effect of ignorance, meaning that if that same ignorance is again regarded as one of the components of that effect, then the contradiction that the cause produces it- self as one of its effects would arise, leading to a break- down of the distinction between cause and effect. Thus, the two words mentioned here refer to an effect of ignor- ance that occurs within the boundaries of bodily existence, an effect such as an error in perception .*

208

241 This last statement is, according to Anandagi- ri, to be viewed as a response to the possible objection that Sarvajfatman has dealt only with the concepts of ig- norance (avidya) and bondage (bandha) in a one-sided fa- shion, leaving out an explanation of the meaning of know- ledge (vidya) and liberation (moksa). hi vidyavrttamityasankya nirupadhikam pratyagbrahmarupam He states: "Kim tar-

parākrtāsesanarthakam paramānandātmakam prageva darsitam (Having in mind the doubt, What then is the function of knowledge?', he says that it is that very thing which has been explained earlier i.e., in the four previous chap- ters as having the form of the pratyagbrahman which is with- out adventitious limitations, which has all suffering des- troyed, and which consists of supreme bliss .... ").

APPENDIX

Pañcaprakriya*

[1. Śabdavrttiviveka 7

Dipavatsarvavijñeyavijfanotpattihetave

Cidvivartaya nityaya namo vedāya vedhase.

Athatah šabdavrttiprakārabhedan vyākhyāsyāmo vedār-

thajnananairmalyasiddhaye. Tisrah Sabdasya vrttayah pra-

siddhilaksanavunavrttaya iti loke prasiddhah. Prasiddhi-

sabdena mukhya vrttirabhidhIyate. Yasyārthasya vācaka-

tvena vrddhavyavahāre yah śabdo grhītaśaktiko bhavati

tasya tenaiva prayojakena tatraivarthe vrttih mukhya vrt- 4 tirityucyate. Yatha sasnadimadakrtau grhItasaktikasya

gośabdasya "Gāmānaya." ityādiprayoge tatraivārthe vrttih. Laksanā tu punah mukhyarthaparigrahe pramanantaravirodhe

sati mukhyarthasambandhadarthantare vrttih. Yatha "Gaň-

• "This is a rendering into Roman script of Sarvajfat- man's Pafcaprakriya which is found in DevanagarT script in R. Chintamani's Pancaprakriya of Sarvajñatman with the Commentaries of Anandajfana and Pūrnavidyamuni, University of Madras, Bulletins of the Sanskrit Dept. No. 4. 1946, which has served as the basis for my translation.

209

210

gāyām ghosah prativasati." iti prayoge gangāsambandhāt

gańgātTre gangāsabdasya vrttih. Guņavrttistu mukhyārtha-

. parigrahe pramānāntaravirodhe sati mukhyārthaguņayogād-

arthantare vrttih iti; yatha "Simho devadattah." iti

krauryaśauryādisirhagunayogāt simhaśabdasya devadatte

vrttih. Yadyapi parasabdasya paratra vrttih ityetadrūpan

samanam laksanagunavrttyoh tathapyanayoravantaralaksana-

bhedena bhedah. Evametāstisrah sabdasya vrttayo vyākhyā-

tãh.

Etasam tisrnām mukhyagunavrttyorekavidhatvameva.

Laksanā punastrividhā -- jahallaksaņā ajahallaksaņā jahad-

ajahallaksanā ceti. Tatra jahallaksanā nāma Sabdasya

mukhyarthaparityagena arthantare vrttih; Yatha gangasab-

dasya svārtha svārthamatra parityagena tIramatre vrttiņ.

Ajahallaksana tu punah mukhyārthamaparityajya krtsnameva svarthamupadāya arthantare vrttih; yatha "Sonastisthati."

ityasvalaksanayām śonasabdasya sonimanam grhītvaivaśva-

vyaktau vrttih. Jahadajahallaksanā tu mukhyārthapari-

grahe sati mukhyārthaikadeśaparityāgena śabdasyaikade-

šāntare vrttih; yatha "So 'yam devadattah." iti vākye so

'yampadayoh desakālaśabalavācinoh desakālabhāgaparityāgena

devadattavyaktau vrttih. Evamesā trividhā laksaņā loke

prasiddha. Nanu mukhyāguņalaksaņāvrttnām madhye katamā

-=--

211

pratyagātmani sabdasya vrttiriti, tatra brumah -- nukhyam

vrttim varjayitva gunalaksanāvrttyoh pratyagatmanyapra-

tisedhah. SasthIgunakriyajatirudhInam laukikanamabhāvāt

pratyagatmani mukhya vrttih pratisedhyata eva. Na khalu

"Neti neti." pratiseddhasamastavisesane pratyagātmani

vāňmanasagocarātīte sasthyādisambhavo 'sti, yena mukhyã

vrttirghateta. Tasmād gaunī laksanā va sabdasya pratyag-

ātmani vrttih.

"Pratyaktvādatisūksmatvādātmadrstyanuśīlanāt/"

iti gunayogādahamādisabdasya gaurī pratyagātmani vrttir-

angIkrtaiva. Laksanāpi jahallaksanā ajahallaksarā ca

nesyate; jahadajahallaksana tvangikriyate paroksyasadvi-

tIyasabale vyutpannayoh tattvampadayoh ekāmsaparityāgenām-

sāntare vrttisambhavāt 'So 'yam.' ityādivākyasthapadayor-

iva. Tasmāj jahadajahallaksanayā pratyagātma bodhyate;

'na gayatrivaisvanaradisabdavat svarthaparityagenajahal-

laksanayā; nāpi "Yajamānah prastarah.", "Yajamāna ekaka-

palah.", ityādivat svarthaparityāgena jahallaksanayeti

siddham.

Sabhasajfanavact yadi bhavati punarbrahmasabdastathāham-

!

212

śabdo 'hamkaravācī bhavati tu jahatī laksanā tatra pakse

Nauresa rauti loham dahati visadharao rajjuragre tavasā-

vityatrevātmavastunyapi na khalu tadā kascidapyasti dosah

Idameva vrttitrayamangIkrtya "Samarthah padavidhih." ity-

atra sūtre jahatsvārthājahatsvārtha jahadajahatsvārtheti

bhāsapadapraksepena traividyayrddhah laksanāvibhagam ca-

kruh. Na caivam mantavyamlaksanayapyatmano bodhyatve kar-

matvaprasanga iti, a [avidya dhyaropitataddharmavinivarta-

katvat sāstrasya. Sastram hi pratyagātmani avidyādhyāro-

pitamataddharmam nivartayatyeva kevalam, na tu tam karmT-

karoti; atah "Yato vaco nivartante." ityādivirodho 'pi

nastyeva. Aupanisadatvavisesanamapi pratyarātmanah sās-

trasya tadvisayāvidyānivartakatvena karmatvabhāve 'pyupa-

padyata eva. Tasmānmukhyavrttiparihāreņa laksanayā vā

gunavrttya va yathabhagam pratyagatmani pratipādyamāne na

kąścidvirodha iti laksanāgunavrttišaranena mumuksunā krtan-

vayavyatirekena bhāvyam -- iti.

Bāhyābhyantaravastūni yanmahimnā cakāsati

tasyai kūtasthanityāyai mahatyai samvide namah

213

ŚrImaddeveśvaramghrisphutakamalarajahpatasamparkaputah sarvajnātmā samastaśrutipathakusalah sabdavrttiprabhedam Vyācakhyavetamevam yatijanamanasi jñānavaimalyasiddhyai

śabdajfānam nidānam bhavati hi jagatah śreyasah preyaśca

iti sabdavrttivivekah

DvitTyam Prakaranam

[i1. Mahavakyarthavivaranam

Bhāti višvam yadajnānād yadjnānācca nivartate

Tasmai bodhasvarūpāya namah śuddhāya sārngine.

Athato vedantamahavakyarthe vyakhyasyamah. "Aham

brahma." iti mahāvākyārthajnānādeva mumuksūnām mokso bha-

vati. Mahāvākyarthajnanam ca bhavati 'Aham, brahma' iti

padadvayarthaparijnanat. Padadvayarthau ca dvividhau,

vacyau laksyau ca. Tatra vacyau sabalau; laksyau suddhau.

Prānapindātmakakāryaśabalam pratyakcaitanyamapi daiva- .. paryantam [ ... amadhidaivaparyantam] ahamsabdavācyam. Pra-

napindakāranāvidyāsabalam advayānandacaitanyam brahma-

sabdavācyam. Etaduktam bhavati -- sadvitIyam pratyagrupam-

ahamsabdavācyam paroksyasahitamadvayanandacaitanyam brah-

masabdavācyamiti tayorahambrahmasabdavācyayoh karyakārana- sabalayoh padarthayoh samanadhikaranyavisesanavisesy abhā-

vena virodhasphurane sati ubhayatra upadhiparityāgah kri-

214

215

yate; suddhau padarthau ca laksyate. Tatra ahampadena

pranapindatmakakaryasadvitTyabhagaparityagena pratyakcai-

tanyabhago laksyate. Brahmapadena ca pranapindātmaka-

kāranāvidyāpāroksyabhāgaparityāgena advayānandacaitanya-

bhago laksyate. Evam pratyakcaitanyamahampadena, adva-

yanandacaitanyam brahmapadena, laksayitvāvatisthamānasya

yajfadiksapitakalmasasya sarvakarmakandaphalabhutasya

sarvakarmasamnyāsinah saksātkrtabrahmānam jIvanmuktam

samyagjnanagnidagdhasamastaduhkhanidanam sarvalaksanasam-

pannam svajnanakalpitasvapnadrsyakalpitagurumiva kalpita-

sabrahmacarisahasraparivestitam gurumupasannasya tatpra-

sadalabdhasravanamanananididhyasanabhyasaniras tasambņava-

naviparītabhavanatatparyajnanasamsayaviparyayasya param-

esvaranugrhTtasya adhikarinah "Brahmaivahamasmi.", "Aham-

eva brahma.", iti padadvayalaksitayorahambrahmapadārthayoh

"Aham brahmasmi." iti mahavākyādanubhavaphalaparyantam-

ekatvajnanamutpadyate, adhikarinah pramitijanako vedah

iti nyāyāt. Tasmājjnānodayādajfaņatackāryanivrttau bādhi-

tanuvrttya jIvanmuktarupena parabrahmatājIvanmuktyoh yu-

gapadanubhavavirodhena kancitkālamavasthitasya sarIrāram-

bhakayoh punyapapayorupabhogadeva ksapanāt, sancitkarma-

nam samyagjnanagnidagdhatvat, agaminosca punyapāpayoh a-

karanāt, kathamcitkarane tayorapi jnanadaslesādvartamana-

216

dehapate sati -- hetvabhave phalabhavat -- Sarirantaranut-

patteh sarvagatatvasarvajhatvasarvesvaratvasarvātmatva-

satyasankalpatvadīnām ajnanakalpitānām gurvākāsādipra-

pancavat ajfānābhāve yadyapyabhavah, tathapi nirgunabrah-

maparagamastavedasakhopanisadgatapunaruktasamastapadopa-

samhārana vidhimukhena pravrttamahāvākyasesāvāntaravākya- . parimanaparijnanābhyupagamāt, samanadhikaranyavisesana-

viśesyabhāvena virodhasphurane laksyalaksanabhāveną he- . yamsahanopadey amsopadananyayopapatteh, padarthajfanasam-

utthavakyarthajnanasamuladahadagdhajagatparisistanitya-

Suddhabuddhamuktasatyaparamanandadvayacitpratyagbrahra-

svarūpāvasthānalaksanamātyantikam kevalyam viduso bhava-

tyeva. "Acāryavān puruso veda tasya tāvadeva ciram yā-

vanna vimoksye atha sampatsye." iti "Tasya ha na devaś-

canābhūtyā Isate." ityādiśruteh. Utkrāntigatyāgatikāra-

nābhavat tatpratisedhasrutesca sadyomuktireva jIvanmukti-

srutismrtInam kalpitajIvanmuktaguruvisayatvāt sisyasya

viduso jIvanmuktyabhyupagame ca jnanadagdhabhasamatrarū-

pam sisyam pratyupadestrtvāsambhavad viduso jIvanmukteh

prayojanabhavat ciraśrutiścājnananidrabhihananāpanayana-

matravilambikaivalyābhiprāyatvādyuktatareti kecit.

humanyavasyati namasyati vāsudevam

217

sangam nirasyati tapasyati tattvamartham

Samnyasya -karma pari [vari]vasyati veditāram

dhanyo jayatyayamaho munirekadandT. ..

ŚrIdevesvarapādapańkajarajassamparkapūtātmanā

sarvajnātmagirānkitena muninā vyākhyānametat krtam,

Brahmatmaikyaparasya vedasirasah samnyasinam sreyase

tairevam nijadharmapalanaparairnityam nisevyam tu tat.

iti mahāvākyārthah samāptah

TrtIyam Prakaranam

[iii. Tattvampadārthavyakhyanam7

Mahadādijagadyasmājjātam rajjubhujangavat

Tam namami sadānanadamantardhīnrttasāksinam

Tacchabda sacchabda vacyamavidyāsabalam brahma.

tasmādākāsavāyutejo 'bannāni panca mahabhutani kramena

jātāni. Annasabdena prthivyucyate. Tasmada sata a ka- sah. Ākasadvayuh. Vayostejah. Tejasa apah. Adbhayo

'nnam. Annasabdavācya prthivT. EvametānyapancIkrtama- hābhūtāni. Tebhyah saptadasakam lingamutpannam. Vāk- pādapānipāyūpasthākhyani panca karmendriyāni. Śrotra- tvakcaksurjihvaghranamiti panca buddhindriyani. Prana- panavyanodanasamana iti panca vayavah. Manobuddhiścety- antahkaranadvayam; samsayātmakam manah, niscayātmikā bud- dhih -- ityekamantah [mevantah]karanamubhayatha vyapadisyate, kriyābnedāt, pācakalāvakādivadityetat saptadasakam liń-

gamu [lingamityu]cyate. ApancIkrtapancamahabhutani tat-

218

219

kāryam ca saptadasakam lingam hiranyagarbhah ta[eta]tsū- ksmasarTramatmanah trivrtkaranasrutisiddhani pañcIkrta-

mahabhutani. Tebha utpannamadhidaivam brahmandam; adhyat-

mam adhibhutam ca karaśiraścaranādimallokaprasiddham sthulasarTrajatam. Etani pancIkrtapaMcamahabhutāni tat- tat- kāryam ca brahmandam praninam sthulasarIrajātam ca sar- vam viradityucyate. EtatsthulasarIramatmanah. Ekameva . sthūlasarīram virādākhyam; ekameva sūksmasarIram hiranya- garbhakhyam; eka eva sarIradvayabhimanī jIva tvampadār-

thah; sacchabdavacyam.brahmaiva sarTradvayanupravistam jalasūryavad ghațākāsavacca prānadhāranakriyayogāj jī-

va ityucyate. Sa ca jIvah jagratsvapnasusuptisāksI jäg-

ratsvapnasusuptivyatirikto nirguno niravayavo nissango

nityasuddhabuddhamuktasatyaparamanandadvayas vabhavah pa-

ramātmaiva trisvapi kalesu sannapyantahkaranasannidhanaj

jagratsvapnasusuptirantahkaranavasthah kriyakarakaphalani cavikrtah pasyati. Indriyairarthopalabdhirjagaritam sthu-

lakarmanirmitam; karanesupasamhrtesu jāgaritasamskārajah

ksudrakarmanimitto vasanarupahastyadivisayah svapnah; . sthulaksudrakarmadvayoparase tatkrtajagratsvapnadvayopa-

ramād vatakanikayamiva vatavrksasyantahkaranasya sacchab- .. davācye māyavini brahmani sabale karanātmanāvasthānam su- . suptih. Evametāni jāgradādisthānani jIvah kramato 'kra- .

220

matasca pasyati. Evamavadhārya pūrvam samādhyārambhakāle

mumuksuh paścānniścale 'ntahkarane jāte ksetrajātam sar- vam kramena pravilapayet, ksetrajñam ca parisesayet. Pañ- cIkrtapancamahabhutebhyo yadutpannamandadi tatsarvam pañ- .. cIkrtapafcamahābhūtavyatirekena nāsti, yathā mrdutpanno

ghato mrdvyatirekena nasti, tatkaryatvat. Evam pancIkrta- pancamahabhutāni apancIkrtapancamahābhūtavytirekena na santi. IdanIm hiranyagarbhamatrasuksmasarIramātran pari- śistam. Tatrapi saptadaśakam lińgamapancīkrtapañcamaha- .. bhūtavyatrekena nasti, yatha mrdutpanno ghato mrdvyatire-

kena nāsti, tatkāryatvāt. IdānImapancIkrtapancamahābhu-

tāni parisistani. Tatrāpyannasabdavācyā prthivī udaka-

vyatirekena nāsti, udakam tejovyatirekena, tejo vāyuvya-

tirekena, vayurākāsavyatirekena, ākāśah taccabdavācyamāyā-

vibrahmavyatirekena; māyavyapi suddhabrahmavyatirekena

nasti. Idanimantahkaranabhavat jagratsvapnasusupt Inam-

abhave jIvatvavarjitapratyagatmacaitanyasvabhavo nitya-

suddhabuddhamuktasatyaparamanandadvayasvabhavam brahma

tattvampadarthau parisistau. Tatra "Brahmaivahamāsmi.",

"Ahamevabrahma." iti taptaparasugrahanaparyantadardhyopeto

yastattvamasivākyarthah karatalanyastamalakvadanubhava-

paryantena jnanena jānatisa mucyata eva, "Ācāryavan puru-

so veda tasya tavādeva ciram." iti śruteh.

iti tattvampadārthavyakhyanam'samaptam

Caturtham Prakaranam

[iv. Avantaravakyarthavyakhyanam

Satyanandādirūpāya sarvalokaikasāksine

Namo vedantavedyaya guruve bhedabhedine.

Athato 'vantaravākyartham vyakhyasyamah, vidhivad-

upasannaya nityanityavastuvivekādisadhanacatustayasam- pannaya brahmanaya sravanamanananididhyasanadividhipre-

ritāya yataye mukhyadhikarine; anyesam sravanadividhi-

preranamantarena pratisedhabhāvamātrena adhikāritvādevā-

mukhyatvāt.

Tatravantaravakyārthastavad brahmātmaikatvalaksana-

mahavakyarthanvayitattvampadarthadvayameva. Tatra "Sat-

yam jnanamanantam brahma.", "Anando brahreti vyajānāt."

1 ityadināvantaravākyena sādksad brahmapadartho nirupyate.

Anrtajadaparicchannaduhkhaviruddham vastu satyajnananan-

tadisabdaih brahmasabdārthatvena nivedyate, "Satyam jña-

namanantam brahma.", "Anando brahmeti vyajānāt." iti ca.

221 ....

222

Tatha hi -- satyatvāt nanrtam brahma; jnanatvāt na jadam;

anantatvat na paricchannam; bhedabhavatrayabhyam virud-

dhamityarthah. Tatha anandatvat nirduhkhamiti ca nived-

yate. Tasyaiva brahmanah tathanivedyamanasya anantyopa-

pādanāya pancavidhāni yuktyarthavādavākyāni vidhiprati-

sedhacodanarthasesabhutastutinindarthavadavākyavat srsti-

sthitipralayapravesaniyamanavadini. Tatra "Yato va imāni

bhutani jayante. Yena jatani JIvanti. Yatprayantyabhi-

samvisanti. Taddhijijāsasva. Tadbrahmeti." iti srsti-

stutipralayavakyani. "Tatsrstva. Tadevanu pravisat."

iti pravesavākyam. "BhIsasmadvatah pavate. BhIsodeti

suryah." ityadiniyamanavakyam. Etaih pancavidhaih sam-

bhavanarthavadavakyaih tajjatvat tallatvat tadanatvat

tatpravistatvat tanniyatatvacca tattavanmātram jagaditi

0 yuktyupabrmhitaih brahmana anantyadyupapädane krte brah-

mapadārtho niscito bhavati. Brahmapadārthagatā jHanavi-

paryasa vinasta bhavantIti brahmapadarthanirupanaparavan-

taravākyarthavyākhyanam.

Tatha athal tvampadarthanirupanaparavantaravākyar-

thamapi darsayisyamah. Annamayapranamayamanomayavijnana-

mayānandamayakhyasopadhikatmalaksanakosapancakośanyāso

nirupadhyatmasvarupanirupanartham, musanisiktadrutatamradi-

pratimāvat pūrvenātmanā samānasyottarātmano 'tra kathya-

223

manatvat: anyatha tadanupayogat, ittham ca upayogat; na

hi amukhyamarthamanupanyasya mukhyasyārthasya saukaryena pratipadanam sambhavati, arundhatIkathanavat; na hi sthu- . lam tarakamamukhyamarundhatImanuktva tatsamIpavartinI suksma mukhyarundhatT saukaryena nirdestum sakyate; tad- vat kośapancakamanuktvā na mukhya ātmā vaktum sakyata iti

nirupadhya padhika tmasvarupakathanarthameva sopadhikanam kośātmanām kathanam, munjesIkānyāyena kosapancakadātmanig- karsopapatteh. Tatha ca srutyantaram --

Angusthamātrah puruso 'ntarātmā sadā janānām hrdaye

samnivistah, Tam svaccharTratpravrhenmunjaddvesIkam dhairyena. -

iti. asmātkosapancakādvilaksanah pratyagātmā sarvaša-

rTresveko mahavākyarthānvayI tvarpadārtha iti srutau ko-

şapancakopanyāsasya tatparyam. Tatha jagratsvapnasusup-

tivilaksano jagratsvapnasusuptisambandharahito 'dhyatma-

dhibhutadhidaivaśarTrastha ekastvampadārthah, avasthatra-

yasya vyabhicaritvat; atmanascavasthatrayanuyayino vya-

bhicaritvat; vyabhicarinam ca sarpadandadharabhucchidra- balIvardamutritatvadivanmithyātvāt; avyabhicarinaścātma-

224

no rajjvađamamsavat satyatvaditi. Tasya "Traya avasthāh

trayah svapnāh." ityādisrutau avasthātrayasyopanyāsasya

tatparyam svarthe purusarthabhavat, brahmatmaikatvajnane

ca "Brahmavidapnoti param." iti purusārthaśravanāt, "Pha-

lavatsannidhavaphalam tadangam." iti nyayat. Ato 'sad-

anrtajadaparicchinnaduhkhaviruddham yat satyajnananantan-

andalaksanam brahma tat tvamasi iti mahāvākye tacchabdena

svavācyasabalabrahmagatapāroksyāmsaparityāgena laksayi-

tavyam. Yathoktasca pratyagatma tvamsabdavacyasabala-

gatasadvitIyamsaparityagena svavacyasadvitIyatvasabala-

tvampadarthabhidhanadvarena tvamsabdena laksayitavyah ja-

hadajahallaksanaya; anyathā sadvayam advayam, pratyaksam

paroksam -- iti tatvamasimahavākyarthapratipattau virodha-

prasangat. Evam padarthadvayam sodhayitva vyavasthitam

tadeva "Tattvamasi." ityacaryo bodhayati. "Tattvamasi."

ityādimahāvākyena sa ca mumuksuh yathoktam brahmaivāham,

yathoktah pratyagātma ahameva, ahameva ca yathoktah pra-

tyagatma, tadyathoktam param brahma -- iti vyatiharena brah-

matmanorekatvam drdham pratipadyate. Tatasca samsārāda-

cirena mucyate, "Tasya tavadeva ciram. " ityadiśruteh ..

ityavāntaravākyārthavyākhy ānam

2

Pancamam Prakaranam

[v, Bandhamoksavicarah

Svajnanakalpitajagatparamesvaratva-

jTvatvabhedakalusIkrtabhumabhāvā,

Svābhavikasvamahimasthitirastamohā

pratyakcitirvijayate bhuvanaikayonih.

Avidyāvasthayam tu sābhasajňanadvārena suddhasaiva

brahmanah prakrtinimittakaranatvam Isvaratvam sāksitvam ca kāryaprapancamIsitavyajIvabhedam dršyam cāpeksya bha-

vati; yatha suddhasyaiva pratyagātmanassābhāsakāryakara-

nasambandhadvarena niyojyatvakartrtvabhoktrtvapramatrtva- sambandhah, na karyakaranasamghātadivisistasya, tadvat.

Taduktam --

Aisvaryam kāranatvam ca sāksitvamapi cātmanah.,

Sadesitavyakaryarthasaksyarthenasya samgateh.

225

226

iti. Tasmād brahmaiva samsarati sabhāsasvāvidyayā sva-

vidyaya ca brahmaiva mucyate. Samsārascāsya brahmano jI-

vatvesvaratvajagadbhedasrayatvam; tannase svarupasthitih

moksah; "Yo vai bhuma tadamrtam, atha yadalpam tanmart-

yam." iti sruteh. Brahmanasca pratyagrupenaiva jñanājña-

nāsrayatvamucyate. Ahametavantam kālam nājñasisamātmānam;

idanīmacaryaprasādāt [idanIm janamIti] jnanajnanayoh pra-

tyagatmasrayatvanubhavat nadvayanandasvarupena brahmano jnanajfanasrayatvam, advayanandasvarupam brahma mudham-

ityadyanubhavabhavāt. MāpIśvarasya pratibimbasya jñana- janasrayatvam, Isvarao mudha ityadyanubhavabhavat. Tś-

varasya sarvajfatvasrutismrtilokaprasiddhavirodhacca.

Napi jagato jnanajnanasrayatvam, jadatvaprasiddheh. Napi

jIvakhyapratibimbasya jnanajnanasrayatvam, susuptikale sarvopadhipralaye jIvatvam saktimadavidyāyāmavasthitamiti punarutthanalingenanumeyameva bhavati, na tvaparoksataya

paroksataya va susuptikale jivatvasya sphuranamasti. Na

ca parokse jIvatve jIvasyaparoksatvam sambhavati. Tatra

jIvāsrayatvam cet, ajhanamapi paroksameva syāt; na caitad-

drstam; tasmat pratyagbrahmana evajnanitvamabhyupaganta- vyam, susuptikale pratyakcaitanyasrayatvenaivājnānasya

sphuranat. Na cajnanasya visayāsrayavibhāgenāvasyam bha-

vitavyamiti codyamasti, susuptau tadabhavadeva; taduktam

227

värtikakāraih --

Pramatradyutthiteh purvam cidanyanacottamah nanvayattamo-7

Visesanā cidevaika svānubhūtyaiva gamyate.

iti. Tatrajnanasyanaditvat antahkaranakancukadvāram vi-

naiva caitanyamasrayo bhavati; jñanasya tu parinamitvad-

antahkaranakancukamaparidhāyaiva caitanyamāsrayo bhavati.

Kutasthasya parinamidvaram vinaiva parināmasambandhaviro-

dhāt. Ato bodhyassabalapriyātmā na paro nāpyacetana iti

šabalātmano bodhyatvavacanam jIvājnānapaksasya sādhakam

na bhavati. Brahmājnanapakse 'pi jnanasrayatvasya brah-

mano 'ntahkaranasabalatadvaratvadanadyajnanasambandho 'pi

brahmano 'jmanasambandhadvaraka eva, na brahmadvarakah.

Napyajmanantarasambandhadvarakah, bhedasya bhedāntarana-

peksatvavadajnanasambandhasyapyajnanantarasambandhanape-

ksatvat. Tasmādavidusa evavidyā, avidyayaiva cāvidyāvat- tvam. Tasmadbrahmaiva samsarati brahmaiva mucyate "Brah-

ma vā idamagra asīttadātmānamevāvedaham brahmāsmIti tas-

mattatsarvamabhavat." ityadisruteh. Yadi punaranātmavi-

sistasya jIvapratibimbasyaiva jnanakarmadhikāritvam syāt, .. na punarjIvatvakancukadvārena pratyagbrahmanah, tada vi-

228

sistarūpenaiva tasya sargagoksanvayo vaktavyah, sādhaka-

syaiva phalitvat. Anyathanyasya sadhakatve 'nyasya ca

phalitve akrtābhyāgamakrtavipranāsaprasańgāt; višesanasya

ca mahapralayadau nastasya punarutthanabhavat; nastotpat-

teśca lokavedaviruddhatvat. Samananamarupapratyabhijnaya

tadeva visesanamidānImiti vaktumasakyam. Višesananāśād

visistasya visesanapratyabhijānta[jnatu]rabhāvāt svarū- pasyaiva pratyabhijnatrtve svarupasyaivajnatrtvamapadyate.

Dvaitadarsanavibhramasyajnanasrayatvadupadhivisistatadva-

rena svarupasyaiva sadhakatve svarupasyaiva phalitvasam-

bhavannoktadosah. Tatha brāhmanādisarIravišistatādvāre-

natmanah karmadhikaritve brahmanadisarTravisistarupenai-, vātmano bhoktrtvam syaditi codyam nāvatarati, viśistasyā- . .. sadhakatvat, svarupasyaiva ca sadhakatvat. Tasmad brah-

maiva samsarati svajnanat, svajnanacca mucyate. Na ca

brahmanassadhakatve 'Advayanandabrahma mudham.' ityadya- nubhavabhavo dusanam, pratyagrupena brahmano mudhatvasa- · dhakatvābhyupagamādityuktam. Taduktam bhasyakaraih "Na

-ca brahmana istam cikIrsunā sāstrārthaviparTtakalpanayā

svarthaparityāgah karyah." iti. Vārtikakārairapyuktam --

Aksama bhavatah keyam sadhakatvaprakalpane

Kim na pasyati samsāram mayyevājnānakalpitam.

229

iti. Tasmadbrahmaiva samsarati brahmaiva mucyate; na tu

jTvanam jñanaj nanasambandhah, bandhamoksanvayo va. [Etena7 ajnanakalpitānāmajnānakalpitabhedānām vā pratibimbakal-

panam va bimbasthanIye brahmani ajnanamiti paksasya nir-

astatvat. Yattu

Parakpravanaya drstya dhIstho jño 'jnanamatmani

Vyomakārsnyādivattat[ttajjam sambhāvayati na svatah.

iti dhIsthasyajnanamuktam, tadantahkaranopadhikasya ji- . . varūpasya svakāranajnanapratyabhijfavyamjakatvābhiprāyena, nājnanasya jIvāśrayatvabhiprāyena. Pratyakcaitanyasryam-

eva hyajnanam jIvah svagatatvenabhivyanakti, vyanjakanam bahunamevamsvabhavatvat; tatha hi sabaleyadayah pindan sarvagatatvenaiva vyañjayanti 'Sabaleyo gauh, bāhuleyo

gauh, mundo gauh.' iti. Tathā hrasvadIrghaplutādayo dhva-

nibhedah karanabhivyaktidvārena Sabdamapi vyañjayantah

svagatatvenaivābhivyañjayanti hrasvo 'kāro dIrgho 'kāro

ityadi. Tatha manikrpānadarpanādayo mukhasyābhivyanjakan . svagatatvenaiva mukhavabhivyanjayanti. Tasmādabhivyañja-

kānām bahunāmayameva svabhavo loke samadhigatah yadutā-

bhivyangyam svagatatvenābhivyajayanti iti. Tasmadantah-

230

karanasya tadupadhikajIvasya vajnanasrayatvabhave 'pi

pratyagātmāsrayājnānābhivyanjakat vādyuktameva tadgata-

twenajManasya sphuranam 'Aham na janamIdam.' iti. Asti

cantahkaranasya tadupādhijTvasya vajnānābhivyanjakatvam;

tadabhāve susuptyādau pratyagātmāsrayasyājnanasya pratī-

yamanatve 'pi sphutatarapratItyabhavat; tadbhave ca ja-

garite sphutatarapratIteh; uktam ca vartikakārairantah-

karanāderajnānasyabhivyamjakatvam

Bāhyam vrttimanutpādya vyaktih syānnāhamo yathā larte 'ntahkaranam tadvaddhvāntasya vyaktirañjasI.

iti. Yadapi gItāsu ksetrajnādhyāye sthitvā bhāsyakārena karanasyājnānitvamuktam, tadapi pratyagātmano jnānitva- sya paramarthatvapavādārtham, na tvantahkaranasyajnani- tvasamarthanartham, pratyagātmano 'jnanitvasya paramar- thatve prapte 'jñanabhivyanjakasya karanasya tadajnanam- iti tasya mastake taddhi ksipati, pratyagātmanastu tat- sambandho ma bhuditi; na tvantahkaranasyajnanasambandho . viviksitah, sankhyasiddhantasvIkāraprasangat, bhasyantara- P. 7 virodhacca. Tasmadbhagavatpadiye darsane pratyagatmana

eva jñanitvamajnanitvam ca, Taduktamistasiddhikaraih -- ..

231

Svaruk ca bhati yattatra jnanajnanavibhagdhIh

Ato 'vidya bhavedyasya bhavettadvisayaiva sā.

ati. Tasmāt sabhasapratyagajnanameva paramatmanah kse- traksetrajnatmakajagatkaranatve dvaram. Tatrajnanavati-

kaści rtici dābhāsapradhānadvāravastambhena ksetrajña-

kāranatvam, ajnanapradhānadvāramādāya ksetrakāranatvam.

taduktam --

Tamah pradhanam ksetranam citpradhanascidātmanām Parah kāranatameti bhāvanajnanakarmabhih.

iti. Atraksetrajasabdena puryastakopadhipatitacidabhāsa-

grahanam. Karmendriyapafcakam, buddhIndriyapancakam, an-

tahkaranacatustayam, pranadipancakam, bhutapancakam, avi-

dyā, kamah, karma -- iti puryastakam. ..

Karmendriyani khalu panca tathaparani

budhIndriyani manaadicatustayam ca,

Prānādipancakamatho viyadādikam ca

kamasca karma ca tamah punarastamī puh.

232

Avidyeti mithyājnānam, avidyākāryaprakaranāt. Atra tamo-

grahanamavidyavrttametatparamatmanah. [vidyavrttam tu]

pűrvoktamiti.

iti srīmatparmahamsaparivrajakācāryasya sar-

vajnatmanah krtau pañcaprakriyākhyam praka-

ranam samaptam.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sanskrit Texts

Annambhatta. Tarka-Samgraha of Annambhatta With the Au- thor's Own Dipika and Govardhana's Nyaya-Bodhini. Edited with Critical and Explanatory Notes by the Late Y. V. Athalye, Together with Introduction and English Translation of the Text by the Late M. R. Bodas. Bom- bay Sanskrit Series, No. 55. Second Edition. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1074.

Dharmaraja. Vedantaparibhasa. Edited with an English Trans- lation by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. Madras: The Ad- yar Library and Research Centre, 1971.

Gautama, Vatsyayana, and Viśvanātha. Nyayadarśanam. Edi- ted by Jivananda Vidyasagara. Calcutta: 1919.

Iśvarakrsna, Sāmkhyakārikā. Edited and Translated, with Vacaspati Nisra's TattvakaumudI, by Ganganatha Tha. Poona Oriental Series 10. Poona: 1957.

Jaimini, Sabara, Kumarila. ŚrImajjaiminipranītar Mīmāmsā- darsanam.' Edited by K. V. Abhyankar. Anandasrama Sanskrit Series No: 97. Six vols. (vols. 1-3 contain- ing Sabarabhasya and Tantravartika, and vols. u-6 con- taining Tuptika) Poona: Anandasrama Press, 1970-74.

Kumārila. Slokavärttika of Srr Kumarila Bhatta with the Commentary Nlyayaratnakara of SrI Parthasarathi Misra. Edited and Revised by Svāmi Dvārikadasa Sastri. Pra cyabharati Series No. 10. Varanasi: Tara Publica- tions, 1978.

Tantravartika. See under Jaimini.

Mandana Miśra. Sastri. Brahmasiddhi. Edited by S. Kuppaswami Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Se- ries No. 4. Madras: 1937.

234

Pānini. The Astadhyayi of Panini. Edited and Translated into English by S. C. Vasu. Two vols. Delhi: Voti- lal Banarsidass, 1977.

Patañjali. Vyakarana-Mahābhasya. Edited with Translation and Explanatory Notes by S. D. Joshi and J. A. F. Rood- bergen. Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit Nos. 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10. Six vols. Poona: University of Poona, 1968-1975.

Sadānanda. Vedānta-Sāra. Edited with Inroduction, Trans- lation and Explanatory Notes by M. Niriyanna. Poona Oriental Series No. 14. Second Edition. Poona: Ori- ental Book Agency, 1962.

Sankara. Brahmasutrasānkarabhāşya. Edited by Srisatyan- andasarasvatIsvamI. cond Edition. Satyanandagranthmala No. 1. Se-

[1970] Varanasi: Govindamatha, samvat 2025

PancIkaranam (Text and the Varttika with Word for Word Translation .... ). No editor given. Third Edition. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1976.

SrImadbhagavadeIta (AnandagirikrtatIkasamvali- tasankarabhāsyasametā). Edited by Kašinathasāstrī. Anandasrama Sanskrit Series No. 34. Poona: Anandas- rama Press, 1936,

Isādi-Dašopanisadāh Sankarabhāsyayutah. Edited by Pandit Laksmanasastrī. Vānivilāsagrathamala 6. Banares: Vani Vilas Sanskrit Press, No date.

Sankara's Upadesasahasrī. Critically Edited with Introduction and Indices by Sengaku Mayeda. Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1°73.

Sarvaiñātman. Pafcaprakriya of Sarvaifatman with the Com- mentaries of Anandajfana and Purnavidyamuni. Fd. T. R. Chintamani. Bulletins of the Sanskrit Department of the University of Madras No. 4. Madras: University of Hadras, 1946.

"Pramanalaksana". Edited by T. R. V. Dikshitar and f. R. Chintamani, Journal of Oriental Research (Madras), X (1936), 1-8; XV (1945-1946) 9-16.

235

Pramanalaksanam of Sarvajfatmamuni. Ed. E. Easwaran Nampocthiry. Kerala University Sanskrit De- partment Publication No. 8. Trivandrum: Department of Sanskrit University of Kerala, 1973.

SamksepasārIrakam (Agnicitpurusottamamiśrakrta- subodhinītIkayā RāmatIrthaviracitanvayarthaprakasikaya TIkaya ca Sametam). Tastri Edited by Vaidyopāhva Ranganātha Tnandasrama Sanskrit Series No. 83. Poona: Fnandasrama Press, 1918. SamksepaśārIraka. Edited with Madhusudana Sa- rasvati's Sarasamgraha by B. S. Vajhe. Two volumes. Kashi Sansxrit Series No. 18. 1924.

Suresvara. Naishkarmya-Siddhi of Sri Suresvaracārya. Edi- ted by Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati. Holenarsi- .pur: The Adhyatma Prakasha Press, 1968.

PancIkaranavārttika. cIkaranam ... See under Sankara. Pam-

Brhadaranyakopanisadbhāsyavārtikam (Anandagiri- krtasastraprakasikākhyatīkasamvalitam). Edited by KasInāthasastri Agase. Pt. 1 Šambandhavartikam. An- nandasrama Sanskrit Series No: 16. Poona: Anandas- rama Press, 1936.

TaittirTyopanisadbhasyavartikam (Anandapiri- krtatIkāsamvalitam). dits. Edited by the Anandasrama Pan- Anandasrama Sanskrit Series No. 13. Poona: Anandasrama Press, 1977.

Vatsyayana. Nyayabhasya. See under Gautama.

Viśvanātha. Nyāyabhāsyavrtti. See under Gautama.

Translations

Patañjali. Vyakarana-Mahābhasya. See under Sanskrit Texts above.

Sankara. The Bhagavad-Gita with the Commentary of Sri Sankaracharya. Translated from Sanskrit into English by A. Mahadeva Sasry. Sixth Edition. Madras: V. Ra- maswamy Sastrulu & Sons, 1972.

2

236

The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad with the Commentary of Sankarācārya. Calcutta: Translated by Swami Fadhavananda Advaita Ashrama, 1975.

The Chandoryopanisad a Treatise on Yedanta Phi- losophy Translated into English with the Commentary of Sankara). Translated by Ganganatha Jha. Poona: Ori- ental Book Agency, 1942.

That Thou Art by SrT Samkara (Chapter Eighteen of the "padesa Sahasr). Translated by A. J. Alston. Second Edition. London: Shanti Sadan, 1977.

Upadesa Sāhasrī Trans lated by Swami Jagadan- anda. Fifth Fdition. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna "ath, 1973.

Vedanta-Sutras with the Cormentary by Sankara- cārya. Translated by Jeorge Thibaut. Two vols. Celhi: lotilal Banarsidass, 1073.

Sarvajnatman. The Samksepasarfraka of Sarvajnatman. Edited and Translated by N. Veezhinathan. Madnas University Philosophical Series No. 18. Madras. Uni- versity of Wadras, 1972.

Sarvaj Hatman's SamksepasarIrakam I Kapitel; Einfuhrung, Ubersetzung, und Anmerkungen. Trarslated by T. vetter. Verdffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Sudasiens Heft Il. Wien: Her- mann Böhlaus Nachf., 1972.

Sureśvara. Pancikaranavarttika. cIkaranam. ... See under Sankara. Pañ- under Sanskrit Texts above.

Realization of the Absolute (The "Naiskarmva Siddhi" of Srr Suresvara). Translated by A. J. Alston. London: Shanti Sadan, 1971.

The Sambandha-Vartika of Suresvarācarya. Edi- ted and Trans lated by T. M. P. Mahadevan. Madras Uni- versity Philosophical Series No. 6. Madras: Univer- sity of Madras, 1972.

.. Suresvara's TaittIrivopanisadbhasyavartikam. Translated by J. M. Van Boetzelaer. Orientalia heno- Traiectina 12. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971.

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