1. Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism Bimala Krishna Matilal OUP

THE LOGICAL ILLUMINATION OF INDIAN MYSTICISM

BY BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics

An Inaugural Lecture DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD ON 5 MAY 1977

DELHI OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS

Oxford University Press OXFORD LONDON GLASGOW NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE THE LOGICAL ILLUMINATION OF WELLINGTON BADAN NAIRONI DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA CAPE TOWN INDIAN MYSTICISM KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE JAKARTA HONG KONG TOKYO DELHİ BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI It is sad that death has taken Professor Zaehner so suddenly from our midst. During his time as Spalding Professor of Bimal Krishna Matilal, 1977 Eastern Religions and Ethics, Professor Zaehner published a large number of books and articles, and actively participated in many live issues of today in the field of religion, philosophy, morality, and mysticism. He initiated many controversial discussions in the field of drugs, the typology of mysticism, and religion and modern society. Of his many concerns, I wish to choose two main problems for discussion this evening. My choice has been guided by considering not only the purpose of First published by the Clarendon Press, Oxford 1977 the Spalding Professorship at Oxford but also the avowed in- First Indian impression 1978 terest of my two predecessors, R. C. Zaehner and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. First, Professor Zaehner profoundly, and I think justifiably, disagreed with such persons as Aldous Huxley concerning the value of mysticism ('oriental mysticism', to be sure) as a philosophia perennis. Second, Professor Zaehner entertained some deep-seated misgivings about the implicit amorality of a monistic metaphysical position, which is regarded as the bedrock of eastern mysticism. My comments this evening will be broadly related to these two major issues. Mystical doctrines that arise from Vedanta, Buddhism, Zen, and Taoism, Professor Zaehner argued, speak of a timeless state of Being, which transcends good and evil, right and wrong, and all the opposites and contradictions, that bedevil human life. The thinking of the Pre-Socratic philosophers of ancient Greece was, in this respect, remarkably similar to that of the Indian philosophers and Printed in India at Pearl offset Press 5/33 Kirti Nagar Industrial area, New Delhi 110 015 mystics. But a very important and striking contrast between and published by R. Dayal, Oxford University Press, 2/11. Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi 110 002

eastern mysticism and mysticism in the Christian tradition is that the latter, unlike the former, is overwhelmingly God- attempt here is to show how this has been done, and with what orientated. The metaphysical foundation of eastern mysticism success. is centered upon beliefs that are often expressed as 'All is One The idea of mysticism has mystified many of us, including and One is All' and 'The One IS, all else is illusion'. Professor Professor Zaehner. His attempt to understand the Zaehner argued that there is a moral ambivalence in these phenomenon was commendable. In today's world, we have a thoughts so deep-seated that it may lead to disastrous results in bewildering variety of publications on Advaita Vedānta and our everyday behaviour. He contended, for instance, that the Mähāyana Buddhism along with a widespread proliferation of gruesome murders perpetrated by Charles Manson and the some popular forms of these two religious systems-so 'Family', which shocked the world in 1969, were simply an bewildering, that an academic or professional philosopher example of the extremes to which we can be led by the today may hesitate to embark on a serious discussion of these amorality of monism expressed in such phrases as 'the union of two systems. This is a pity, for these two systems of Indian opposites' and 'transcendence of good and evil'. 1 philosophy were in fact as serious as any philosophical system, I will start with a remark made by Professor Zaehner in his either in the East or in the West/When one reads any standard last book. Observing that the so called perennial philosophy of original text of either Advaita or Madhyamika philosophy, the union of opposites is expounded alike by Heraclitus and one cannot but admire greatly the intellectual honesty and the Upanisads, he went on to say, 'But it (the perennial professional sophistication of its author. In contrast, philosophy) needs to be rigorously checked by the rational numerous modern publications are remarkable for the sheer mind which it would destroy' (Our Savage God, p. 102). In the obscurity and inanity of their presentation, and, as Professor same vein, he glorified Aristotle as the intellectual father of 'Zaehner has regretted,3 the intelligent layman in the West the Western world, 'for he was the first to think analytically (and, I might add, in the East too) seems to be swallowing about mystical experience, finding thereby the only truly book after book of this kind. And this only lends support to the human answer to the mystery because his answer was reached wellknown maxim of Tertullian: Credo quia absurdum, 'I by thought, which alone distinguishes man from other believe it because it is absurd'. animals, not by ecstasy and Platonic madness.'2 Following the To prove my point about the seriousness and lead suggested in the few lines just quoted, I wish to attempt a professionalism of Indian mystical philosophers, I will deal rational presentation of some philosophical doctrines of India with two standard texts, in particular: Nāgārjuna's that are usually associated with mysticism: Advaita Vedānta Vigrahavyāvartanī and Srīharşa's Khandanakhandakhādya. A and Mähāyana Buddhism. Although my own philosophic con- brief review of a few points described in either of these two tex- viction is different and forces me to be critical of monistic ts will, I think, dispel any illusion that the so called Indian metaphysics (and in this regard, I find myself in agreement mysticism is fairly represented by the vague generalities and with my immediate predecessor), it seems undeniable that a naive beliefs that we often hear today. number of respectable writers on Advaita and Mādhyamika in Whatever one may feel about the content of the doctrines of ancient and medieval India examined their own doctrines as the philosophers I have mentioned, one cannot help ap- well as those of their rivals in the light of reason and logic. My preciating and thinking highly of the form in which they were put. One can go even further: the form itself tells us something 4 5

that is generally overlooked in present-day discussions of these doctrines, and that is that these authors intended their readers. In brief, these texts were very far from being rhap- sodies of mystical experience, or what Professor Zaehner called writings to be available for rational discussion. They were in 'ecstacy and Platonic madness'. fact writing for intelligent and critically minded readers and While I stress the value of the form of these texts, I am not pleading for the silence of mystic communion. I firmly nevertheless aware that human beings crave content. And I believe that the very form in which these texts have been cast acts as an invitation to scholars and intellectuals to examine am certainly not one to shirk the substance of these texts while

them dispassionately and in the light of reason. only praising their form, For indeed these works do intend to

First of all, let us note that these texts were written in correct convey a message, and that message is often more than strictly philosophical. I consider it my duty as a scholar to make this and technical Sanskrit. And Sanskrit is a very difficult language (in all probability, it was not a spoken language message as clear and as forceful as it must originally have ap- peared to these authors themselves. This is by no means a when these texts were composed). It was a language that could be learned, not in any transcendental state of euphoria, but simple task.

only after years of formal study of its grammar and syntax. 4 Nāgārjuna wrote his Mādhyamika-kārika primarily to show

This, in my opinion, already acted as a 'corrective' check on the essentially conditional and provisional nature of the dhar-

the class of people whom these authors were addressing and ma theory of the Abhidharma school, and along with this he wanted to expose the necessarily provisional nature of any writing for. Second, these authors used formal arguments-Indian philosophic theory of reality. Nāgärjuna argued: A thing is

syllogistic forms, to be sure-at almost every step of their always without its own-nature (svabhava), empty or devoid of

discourse. They clothed their doctrines in a technical (logical) what may be termed its essence or being. For the assumption

vocabulary that presupposed a thorough-going and systematic that a thing has its own-nature runs contrary to our empirical evidence as well as to our reasoning. Experience reveals the training in logic and the pramana-sastra (epistemology or the happening of events only, no own-nature, no essence. The study of the means of knowledge). In fact the vocabulary of the pramana-sastra implies a universe of discourse that .not own-nature (which, with some reservations, can be rendered as the essence) of a thing is conceived as the unchanging, un- only is commonly shared by all the different schools of Indian philosophy but also tends to be global in its meaning. If we use derlying core, and this conception is held by Nāgārjuna to be

'logic' in a broad and liberal sense, then, as I have argued incompatible with the commonsense notion as well as the

elsewhere, it would be difficult to talk about any inherent philosophic notion of change.

distinction between Indian logic and Western logic.5 And Nāgārjuna used the familiar paradox of causation, i.e., the

these authors, apart from everything else, were astute logicians paradox of change and permanence. This paradox, according

(in, at least, an Indian sense of the term). Thus, nobody who to Nagārjuna, shows that a thing cannot possess its own-

had not spent several years in formal study of the technical nature; its essence. If a thing has its own-nature it cannot

vocabularies of Indian logic would find it easy to follow these change, for that would go against the presumed un-

texts, much less to comprehend and criticize these doctrines. changeability of own-nature; and if the thing does not have its

This probably acted as an additional corrective check upon own-nature then change cannot take place either, for 'change' means transformation of the own-nature into something else.6

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Nāgārjuna's argument can be briefly stated as follows. that he is supposed to convey. If, however, 2 is accepted then

Everything is empty or devoid of its own-nature because we have a partially paradoxical situation, viz., if this negation

everything is 'dependently originating'. The implicit premiss is is true then it is also false because the negation is also included

that the own-nature of things and the fact of their dependent in 'everything'.

origination cannot go together. The presence of one implies The second pair of alternatives is formulated as follows:

the absence of the other. It is also suggested by Nagarjuna's 3. Everything is empty, but this negation is not empty

argument that the fact of dependent origination of things (i.e., TRUE); 'Everything' does not include this

(viz., A arises when B is there) is given to us by experience (and negation. the Buddhist is simply drawing our attention to this fact of ex- 4. This negation, along with everything else, lacks its perience), and the own-nature is an a priori assumption. And own-nature, is FALSE. thus, since one contradicts the other the Mādhyamika draws Note that 3 accords a special status to the negation in the conclusion that all things are empty (of their own-nature). question, for it says, in fact, that everything except this In the Vigraha-vyāvartanī, Nāgārjuna raises a fundamental negation is empty. Thus, the opponent is justified in asking for issue in philosophy. It is in fact a basic problem in the the ground on which such exception is to be made (visesahetuś philosophy of logic, Indian logic, to be sure. Posing as a Nyāya ca vaktavyah). With 4, we are back to the same problem as opponent Nägärjuna asks the following question: If everything with 1, namely, Nāgārjuna fails to communicate his message. (including statements) is empty then the statement that states The third pair is stated as follows: that everything is empty is also empty and thus loses its asser- tive force or its claim to truth. And, if this latter statement is 5. The negation is also empty (false) just as everything

not intended to be empty then one has to state the ground for else, but even so it successfully conveys its meaning.

such a preferential treatment of this particular statement (i.e., 6. Everything except this negation is empty, and

one has to explain why, while all other statements are empty, therefore the negation successfully conveys its

this particular one is not so).' Nagārjuna says that a disputant meaning.

in this case can formulate three pairs of alternatives (satkotika- There is very little difference between 3 and 6. But 5 obviously

vada),8 which I shall expound below. 'Everything is empty' is leads to the awkward position that even a false negation can

actually a negative statement, a negation (pratisedha), for it is successfully negate. If this is admitted then one might as well

a rephrasing of 'nothing has its own-nature'. Now the first two stipulate that even a false thing can function successfully.

alternatives are suggested as follows:9 (If everything is empty To simplify matters for our discussion, let me substitute for

then) the statement of Nagarjuna, 'Nothing has its own-nature' (I

1. the above negation is itself empty, does not have its will call it NS), the statement 'No statement is true' or 'All

own-nature, and thus it is improper (anupapanna), statements are false'. Instead of talking about things we talk

FALSE, about statements. As far as I can see, this does not misin-

or 2. the negation itself is not empty, it does have its own- terpret his philosophical motivation, for instead of referring to

nature, and thus it is not improper, it is TRUE. the 'world of things' we are referring to the 'world of state-

Note that if 1 is accepted, Nāgärjuna fails to convey the truth ments'. Thus, the 'own-nature' of a thing is represented here

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by the truth of a statement, and the lack of 'own-nature' by the falsity (lack of truth) of the statement. In fact, a Nāgarjunian that if we suppose 'Everything is empty' to be itself empty, we

might happily agree to translate 'Everything is empty' as 'Every will have to admit at least one non-empty thing, i.e., one thing

statement is false', for all statements may be viewed as that does not lack its own-nature. Now, to hold that some

prapaňca and therefore belonging to the samurti level, which statement is true, we are committed to presuppose the exist-

will imply that they are false from the point of view of the ence of a true statement, different from NS. If the argument

paramartha or Ultimate reality. so far has been right, it will then seem possible for us to settle

Let us assume that NS = 'Norstatement is true'. an empirical question on logical grounds. Note that there is no

We will now be in a better position to locate the logical dif- logical incompatibility in supposing that NS is the only

ficulties which the 'emptiness' doctrine of Nāgārjuna might statement in a Nāgārjunian world. But we cannot count NS to

possibly face and also to find a way out of those difficulties. It be false unless there exists another true statement in that world

is difficult not to recall the ancient Liar paradox of (a contingent fact). Note that although the opponent to alter-

Epimenides, who apparently said, himself being a Cretan, native 5 above does not explicitly raise this point it is never-

that all Cretans are liars (this is, at least, taken to be one ver- theless an implicit difficulty in alternative 5.

sion of the Liar paradox). But I shall try to avoid any facile To avoid the above problem, we might use an exceptive

comparison between the two, and instead limit myself to the clause (see alternatives 3 and 6), and say that NS is:

logical problems raised by NS in the Indian context. It will be 'No statement except this one is true.'

noted that NS may be paradoxical but is not a proper an- This way of avoiding the problem arising from self-reference

tinomy.10 will not lead us to any logical difficulties;12 but the opponent

If NS is asserted to be true, we have already a counter- will still press Nāgārjuna to supply a factual reason for this

example which will make NS false. In other words, as long as exception. Nāgārjuna, in this respect, does not enjoy the

NS is itself counted as a statement, if we claim it to be true, we privilege that is apparently available to Epimenides.

will be forced to admit its falsity. But this is not properly an- Epimenides, for example, can claim that all Cretans except -

tinomical, for if we assume NS to be false, we do not have any himself are liars, and hence the paradox will disappear. But

way of deducing from this assumption that it is true. Thus, we Nāgārjuna's situation is different. If NS is said to have a

can, and obviously Nagarjuna can, consistently hold NS to be special, in fact unique, status of being true while all other

false. But then we are obliged (and so is Nāgarjuna) to answer statements are false, the opponent will insist that NS cannot in

at least two further questions. First, if NS is false, it fails to that case be considered to be a statement. This is what is ac-

communicate the message of Nāgarjuna. Note this is what is tually meant by the technical fault called drstāntāsiddhi. The

actually claimed by the opponent of Nāgarjuna in the above said fault has at least two consequences. First, the NS in this

alternatives 1 and 4. In Indian terminology, NS, under this in- case would be an entirely solipsistic statement which nobody

terpretation, is no longer a deśanā, it does not serve any pur- will be able to understand. Second, if all statements except NS

pose. Second, to suppose that NS is false is also to suppose are false, then falsity becomes a necessary character of a

logically its contradictory, i.e., 'Some statement is true' to be statement, and thus it would not be proper any more to call

true. Translated back in the 'thing-talk', we will have to say NS a statement. The underlying principle is this: if all mem- bers except one, say a, of a class possess a property, then there

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=.- is a very strong reason to disqualify a from the membership of my point.' Vv., v. 30 that class. This argument is sound as long as we talk in terms Nāgarjuna's point seems to be this. Only a proposition can be of natural classes (where membership is subject to empirical true or false. But since NS is not claimed as a proposition, we discovery). cannot even begin to think of its contradictory, viz., 'some To assist Nägärjuna, we may note that he has a very easy statement is true'. Thus, Nāgārjuna has almost turned the way out. For he can consistently hold that no statement is true tables against his opponent. But one may now suspect that he without ever asserting NS.13 Although this seems to be his final position, it is interesting to see how he eventually reaches is trying to score a point only by leaving us in the quicksand of

it. He observes: a very strange philosophic debate-a debate where the winner

'Therefore, just as my statement is empty, all things are wins only by violating the ground rules! If Nāgārjuna did not have any position or proposition to defend, why did he enter empty. And hence the lack of own-nature of all things is the debate in the first place? He has two different answers to proven in both ways.' Vv., p. 127, ll. 6-7. this charge. The first answer is somewhat illuminating, for it 4- This would appear to be a quibble. Is Nagarjuna saying that if explains what the Madhyamika philosophy is all about, while a negation (pratisedha) is false, it only intensifies the force of the second is posed as a counter-question. that negation? No, for that would be a very odd view and Nagarjuna first says that NS can provisionally be proposed would deny the practical validity and utility of logic. Nägārjuna is in fact trying to say something else: as a thesis for a debate only from the point of view of

'If I had propounded a thesis to be proven (pratijnā), cer- samvyavahara, conventional or provisional reality. 'We do not, in fact cannot, make our point without having tainly then I would be at fault. But I do not propound any recourse to samvyavahāra ( = samurti). Vv., v. 28cd. thesis to be proven, and therefore I am surely not at fault.' In the Madhyamika-kārika, he has already emphasized that Vv., v. 29 If this is not satisfactory, Nagarjuna continues: there are two levels of truth: the samurti or the provisional and the paramärtha or the ultimate. The Buddha has taught his 'Thus, as long as all things are empty, completely unarising doctrine in terms of these two levels of truth. Nāgārjuna (?upasanta) and devoid of any essence, how can a statement repeats here: qualify to be a thesis to be proven? And if so, how can any 'We cannot state that all things are empty without recourse fault attach to us-a fault such as the disqualification of a · to ordinary human behaviour (i.e. an utterance). For the statement from being considered as a thesis?' Vv., p. 127 ll. teaching of the doctrine (dharma-desana) cannot be con- 19-20 ducted without recourse to vyavahara. ' Vv. p. 127, ll. 1-3 - Briefly, if NS is claimed to be a thesis, it can be either proved To explain: The teacher-philosopher has only two choices. He or disproved, be either accepted or rejected. But since can remain silent, but then he fails in his duty as a teacher and Nāgārjuna does not make such a claim, the attack of the op- no longer remains true to his profession. Or, he can teach his ponent would be wide of the mark. Moreover: 'If I (wish to) establish any fact through such means of doctrine using the ordinary vehicle of communication, i.e.,

knowledge as perception, I would offer it for either ac- speech, but he can do so only at the risk of being misunder- stood and misinterpreted. In the first case, he cannot instruct ceptance or rejection. But since I do not, you cannot refute the disciples at all, and in the second case, he runs the risk of

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misleading his disciples. Nāgārjuna clearly prefers the second alternative: the risk of a wrong lead is better than no lead at special status, so that NS can convey its meaning without itself

all! Thus, the force of vyavahāra is admitted, and Nāgārjuna being considered as either true or false.

enters into the debate. Now, if he seems to be misleading or The opponent apparently has two other alternatives open to

not following the ground rules, it is, according to him, the him: (a) He may say that one means of knowledge is

fault of the medium he has chosen, and the medium has been validated14 by another means of knowledge. But then he will

chosen in the absence of any better alternative. have to admit that at least one means of knowledge is self-

Nāgārjuna's second reply comes in terms of a counter- validating. (b) He may claim that a means of knowledge is

offensive. The opponent accepts certain ad hoc rules of a validated by the truth or fact it reveals, and the fact it reveals

philosophic debate. The debater states his position, viz., a is validated by that very means of knowledge. But then

thesis to be proven or disproven. He also accepts a system of Nagarjuna has placed his opponent where he actually wanted

pramānas, means of knowledge, by means of which he intends him to be. The means of knowledge and the truths they reveal

to prove (or disprove) his thesis. His crucial assumption is that thus stand together and fall together. To establish a truth you

there are means of knowledge or pramanas, which establish need the means of knowledge, and to validate the means of

facts or truths (arthas or prameyas) expressed by the thesis. knowledge you need a truth. This, Nāgārjuna insists, spells

Nāgārjuna argues: out only a variety of the vicious circle. 15 This may remind us of the old and rather trivial controversy 'If those facts are established through the means of of the chicken and the egg. But Nagarjuna's point is not - knowledge (pramānas), tell me then how those means of necessarily trivial. He is not asking 'Which came first? the knowledge are themselves established?' chicken or the egg?' He raises instead a pertinent question,

'If the means of knowledge are established by another set of viz., if one asserts that the pramānas (means of knowledge)

means of knowledge, infinite regress follows. For the first establish the prameyas (truths), is it not then equally possible

cannot be established, nor the middle, nor the last.' Vv., vv. to assert that the prameyas validate the pramānas? Or, to use

31, 32. the well-known simile of Nägärjuna, if one can say that the

To avoid this quandary, the opponent might say that the father generates the son, it is then equally sayable that the son

means of knowledge are self-validating or self-established, and generates the father, for without a son how could one be a father?16 The point of all this is that the opponent's almost un- hence they do not need anything else to establish or validate them. But then, Nagarjuna argues, the means of knowledge flinching confidence in the pramana system as the best method

would enjoy a unique status in this world, for while everything of establishing truths, is hereby shown to be based upon some

else stands in need of being proven by a means of knowledge, very questionable hypotheses, and he is forced to abandon his

they themselves do not. Now the tables seem to be turned insistence that a philosophic debate should strictly be con-

against the opponent, for Nāgārjuna can ask him to explain ducted and regulated by a pramāna system.

the ground for according such a unique status to the The textual tradition of ancient India speaks generally of

pramāņas, means of knowledge. Remember Nāgārjuna him- three types of 'formal' philosophic debate: vāda, jalpa, and

self did not claim anything more than this for NS, viz., a vitanda. '7 The first is said to be characterized by what may be called the philosopher's search for the truth. This type of

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debate is used to explain and clarify some philosophic position (thesis) to those who wish to understand it (e.g., the pupils). enjoys an unfair advantage which is not allowed to his op-

Each debate has two sides: the proponent and opponent. In ponent. The debater is exclusively concerned with finding fault with the opponent's thesis, but the opponent cannot do the vda type of debate, however, both sides are committed to the same, for the debater may have no thesis of his own or no find a correct position and establish the same with the help of position to defend.18 --- accredited means of knowledge (pramāna) as well as by valid hypothetical, or inductive, or dialectical reasoning (tarka). But in spite of the denunciation of vitanda by Vātsyāyana,

Here, a position is defended only with valid reasoning and many respectable philosophers regarded this negative form of debate as a very useful and effective philosophic method. In refutation is conducted by locating fallacies in the counter fact, vitanda is not necessarily a futile wrangling. Even thesis. This debate is concluded as soon as the truth is Akșapāda Gotama did not think so. According to him, as we established. have seen above, a vitanda consists not in defending any view The second type of debate (jalpa) is characterized not so but in refuting another view. Thus, while determination of much by the philosopher's search for the truth as by the truth is the goal of the first type (vada) and victory is the goal disputant's drive for victory. Thus, in the second type, not only of the second type (jalpa), the goal of the third type (vitanda) is valid reasonings, etc., are applied, but also, to ensure victory ¡ either of them or both. For, the mystic or the monistic over the opponent, sophistry and trickery become part of the philosopher may take the position that the refutation of wrong rules of the game. Each side tries to establish a thesis and views will be tantamount to the establishment of the truth. In refute a counter thesis, and victory can be achieved, as in war, by either fair or unfair means. A false rejoinder or a criticism other words, for the mystic, the truth is self-evident as soon as · the veils of wrong views are lifted. And if truth is established in to confuse the opponent or to confute the issue is permissible in this debate. this negative way, victory is also achieved. This interpretation

The third type of debate (vitanda) is cryptically described in of vitanda (contrary to Vatsyāyana's comment) is supported

the Nyayasutra 1.2.44 as one that is concerned with only the even by some Naiyāyikas, e.g., Sānātanī.19 Mystics and monistic philosophers of India used vitanda or refutation of the thesis but not with the establishment of any counter thesis or counter position. It is a negative debate negative argumentation as a very fruitful philosophic activity.

where the disputant's responsibility lies only in refutation. And in this regard they were joined by the Cārvaka sceptics

Commentators from Vātsyäyana onwards remarked that and the agnostics. Monistic philosophers generally believed in

vitanda, i.e. this third kind, is no better than useless wrangling an Ultimate Reality which is ineffable in principle. Thus, the

: and is a very disreputable form of debate. In other words, this ultimate reality cannot directly be the subject of any

debate has all the faults of the second form of debate (jalpa) philosophic discourse (which is only prapanca). Faced with

but lacks all the virtues of the first type. Vātsyāyana main- this problem, the monistic philosophers chose vitanda, i.e., the

tained that vitanda is actually an embarrassment to the respectable form of the negative argumentation that I have

philosophers, and that it is even worse than jalpa, for the vic- discussed above, as an expedient to communicate their

tory in this form of debate is not only unfair but also un- message. We may doubt whether Nagarjuna can strictly be

deserved. It is an inglorious victory, for the debater in this case called a mystic. But we cannot doubt that he expounded the tattva (truth) simply by not talking about it:

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'Not a word was uttered by you, O Master, and (yet) all the refutation of the opponent's position in a debate. Ryle com- disciples are refreshed (satisfied) by the shower of (your pared strong reduction with 'destruction-tests' of the engineers teaching of) dharma. '20 and physicists to determine the strength and usefulness of One of the effective ways of conducting vitanda, i.e. the metals etc. He has, however, argued that there is a con- negative form of philosophic debate, is to use the well-known structive side to the strong reductio. For, he says, 'Absurdities pattern of philosophic argument called prasanga. That are the original goad to philosophical thinking; they continue Nāgärjuna greatly favoured the use of prasanga can hardly be to be its scalpel' (p. 12). He also compared strong reductio denied.21 The prasanga form of argument, which I am in- with the threshing operation by which chaff is separated and clined to translate as reductio ad absurdum, is very suitable discarded and grain is collected. But I believe, a Nāgārjuna or for the destructive use which the debater in vitanda is par- a Srīharșa would hesitate to assign such a positive character to ticularly interested in. Briefly the method is this. The debater the prasanga as 'collecting the grain' after the threshing. takes the purported thesis of the opponent, or a set of in- Rather, it would be urged by an Indian prāsangika that after terrelated ideas or concepts accepted by the opponent (such the flail with its winnowing fan has blown away the chaff of as, motion, time, and causality), and deduces from it (logical) misconception and wrong thesis, the truth will shine by itself consequences which would be shown to be either inconsistent in its own glory. Prasanga and vitanda cannot tell us what is with the original thesis or the original set of concepts, or true or what exists, but they can certainly tell us, if they are decidedly absurd in the light of our everyday experience. properly employed, what is not true and what does not exist. Thus, the original position of the opponent will be reduced to Srīhara in the Advaita Vedānta tradition was a worthy suc- a nonsensical claim. I recommend reductio ad absurdum as a cessor of Nägarjuna in the use of the above method as an translation of prasanga, for the method is strikingly similar to essential part of philosophic activity. Srīharsa was an original the reductio ad absurdum described by Professor Gilbert Ryle thinker of the Vedanta school. He had the boldness to in his Inaugural Lecture at Oxford: 'A pattern of argument claim-and he made good his claim-that as far as which is proper and even proprietary to philosophy is the philosophical method is concerned there exists very little dif- reductio ad absurdum. This argument moves by extracting ference between a Mädhyamika and a Advaita-Vedāntin, or contradictions or logical paradoxes from its material.'22 Ryle even between a mystic and a Carvaka nihilist. distinguished the weak Euclidean reductio from the strong The reductio is not the only form of argument used by reductio that is generally used by philosophers. In Euclidean philosophers, a point already conceded by Ryle.23 We can Teduction, the truth of a theorem is proved by deducing from think of philosophers as divided into two main groups: the it contradictory consequences which are in conflict with the prasangika (the vitandin) and the pramana-vadin. The first axioms of the system or with consequences drawn from them. group consists of those who use only the reductio and the Here the truth of the theorem is made dependent upon the negative form of debate, while the second group comprises assumption of the truth of the axioms. It is weak in the sense those who would establish, in addition to the reductio, a that it shows only that either the theorem is true if the axioms system of pramänas or accredited means of knowledge on the are true or that both are false. basis of which they would construct a system. One of the Prasanga, like the strong reduction, is a tool for the platitudes of the pramāna-vādin, i.e., the second group of

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philosophers, is that a philosophic debate cannot properly prior refusal to accept a pramāņa system. (Kk. p. 7) begin unless both parties entering it first admit that 'You seem to be using the refusal to admit the existence of pramanas-i.e., means of knowledge such as perception and pramanas as a new kind of silencing charm. But did not inference, and logical fallacies-are acceptable realities. For Brhaspati, in spite of this charm, write the Lokāyata-sutras? it is only with the help of such concepts that a philosophic Did not the Buddha also teach the Mādhyamika texts debate can properly proceed. This was the well expressed view (debating against the rival philosophers)? And did not of Vātsyāyana and many pramāna-vadins against the negative Sankara write his commentary on the sutras of form of debate. Bādarāyaņa?' Srīharsa, in the beginning of his Khandanakhandakhādya, One may note that citation of the above counter examples by attacks the above platitude and, in order to reject it, he first Śrīharșa eventually proves that alternatives 2 and 3 are also resolves it into four possible alternative meanings: the wrong. platitude may mean The opponent might rejoin that these counter examples do 1) that debaters who do not admit a pramāna system are not constitute real philosophical debates since they are in- unable to start a debate, capable of proving or disproving anything. For as long as the or, 2) that the pramanas are directly related to the debate as pramanas, etc., are not admitted nothing can strictly be cause to its effect, proved or disproved. Anticipating this rejoinder, Srīharsa or, 3) that it is the practice of all people and philosophers replies as follows. First, one may enter a debate only by alike first to accept a system of pramanas and then to provisionally accepting some pramanas and logical fallacies. enter a philosophic debate, But this provisional acceptance (abhyupagama) on his part or, 4) that without the acceptance of pramanas and logical does not entail acceptance of the existence of pramānas, etc. fallacies, the twin goal of a debate, viz., the establish- For, by using prasanga or reductio the debater can show that ment of truth and determination of victory, will never if the opponent accepts a pramana, say p, then the logical con- be achieved. (Kk. p. 6) sequence of p will either be inconsistent with p (directly or in- directly) or it will be patently absurd. This expedient of Srīharșa rejects, as anyone could have guessed, all the four provisional acceptance seems to be an echo of Nāgārjuna's ap- alternatives. peal to the vyavahara level of truth for making possible a The first alternative is untenable, for such philosophers as philosophical discourse. Cārvāka and Mādhyamika do enter into serious philosophic Second, Śriharsa insists that even such a provisional ac- debates despite their refusal to admit the existence of a ceptance is not essential to the debater's position. True, in the pramana system. Indeed, if such debates did not exist, your context of a debate, we need to determine what counts as good attempt (i.e., the attempt of a pramāna-vadin) to refute and successful argument and what counts as bad and un- such debates (viz., vitanda) would be the most unusual successful argument. But a Mādhyamika or a Cārvāka will behaviour (on your part). (Kk. p. 7) remain satisfied as long as he can determine that certain Srīharsa argues that it is in fact unfair to shut the door of the arguments are invalid. Thus, a Mādhyamika or a Cārvāka is philosophic debating room to someone just because of his qualified to enter into a debate if he is capable of locating

20 21

some logical defects (fallacies) in the opponent's argument. He arguments of Nagarjuna. The religious literature of the East is

can very well maintain an indifferent attitude (udasina) very rich in this respect. There are unique passages from the toward the pramanas. For it is the opponent who will need the Upanisads, for example, which are grand, elevating, and en-

service of pramanas to establish the truth of his claim. The op- joyable irrespective of their claim to truth. For many they ponent such as the Naiyāyika cannot be satisfied, as ap- represent genuine expressions of mystical experience. For

parently the Mädhyamika or the Vedäntin debater can, with others, they embody metaphysical speculations, for still others devising a refutation of the refutation devised already by his poetry. Thousands of other religious texts have been written in rival. For while inconsistency (or absurdity) may guarantee the this manner. There is naturally a danger that uncritical ap- falsity of one's claim, consistency does not guarantee its truth. praisal of these texts may degenerate into inanities. But the

Only a pramana can establish such a truth. critical philosophers of India, who were also mystically in- Moreover, Sriharsa argues, even the fourth alternative given clined, often made mysticism philosophically attractive and above is wrong. For, in debate there will be a neutral judge intellectually stimulating. I have tried to show how serious was (madhyastha) who will decide who has won. If he finds that their attempt, and how near they came to succeeding in it. one debater (be he a Mādhyamika or a Cārvāka) has not Even without sharing the philosophical views of Buddhism and violated the conventional rules of the debate while the other Vedãnta, one can very well appreciate their aesthetic appeal, has done so, he will declare the first as victorious. And this their beauty, and their grandeur.

does not entail, as far as Srīharsa can see, that the victorious From a philosophical point of view, one may argue that no debater must first accept a system of pramānas. If you now ask dispassionate judgement is possible without proper analysis the victorious debater how then the truth is to be established, and clarification of the doctrine we wish to judge. In order he will shrug it off by pointing out that truths are self-evident. even to criticize these doctrines, one needs to understand them When the chaff is winnowed away, only the grain of truth clearly. Thus the spirit of what I have called in another con-

remains. text 'intellectual non-violence' has been shown surprisingly I have now concluded my illustrative exposition of the uses of and conspicuously by the Jaina philosophers of India: any logic and arguments made by the so called mystical criticism must be preceded by a proper and total under- philosophers of India. Let me come back to my original standing of the doctrine one tries to criticize. It is, of course, theme. My personal philosophical view does not, I must ad- possible, though perhaps not probable, that if one fully under- mit, coincide with that of either Mahayana Buddhism or Ad- stands these mystical doctrines, one would find very little in

vaita Vedānta. But I must emphasize at the same time that them to be critical about. One may still reasonably assume these two philosophical systems of the East were not the work that a rational comprehension of them is possible. But my of fools. I think I have given enough evidence already to show feelings is that total understanding in this case will probably that neither of the two systems constituted a philosophy of be ever elusive. Using an analogy which Freud applied to his 'woolly ideas', as is sometimes thought today. Of course, there own theories, I am tempted to say that they are like the pain- are texts containing a popular and poetic presentation of these | tings of Rembrandt-a little light and a great deal of systems. And the emotional appeal of such presentation can darkness.

strike chords untouched by the debate of Sriharsa or rational If total understanding through rational means will always

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be elusive, one may argue, why try at all? Why, indeed? It is a fact that Šriharsa, Nāgārjuna, and Dinnaga have been ac- with it, a very useful enterprise. Rasa, or aesthetic pleasure

cused by fellow-Buddhists and fellow-Vedäntins of indulging that is derived from a poem, music, or a painting, is not

in a profane and debased enterprise. The Taoist says, 'The always satisfying by itself. For a theory of beauty or aesthetics

fish trap exists because of the fish, once you have got the fish plays often an important role in such enjoyment. In the same way we see that the taste of mystical experience was not you can forget the trap.' The above charge, I think, is mistaken on at least two enough for many ancient Indians, for they fabricated or con-

counts: First the logical arguments are useful, for they illum- structed the most amazing illumination of mysticism through

inate the mystical instead of deepening its mystery. In fact, the the use of logic. They wished to comprehend rationally what

logical is indispensable (to, at least, a large number of people) they apparently experienced through mystical insight. Or, as

for the illumination of the mystical. One needs the fish-trap if some would like to put it, they were driven to their mystical

one hopes to catch the fish at all. You can kick the ladder away conclusion by the force of their logic.

only when you have climbed up the wall, not before. Or, to use Let me turn now to the second concern of Professor Zaehner. Do the mystical philosophers of the East, by the analogy mentioned by Candrakīrti, one can forget the raft preaching the doctrine of an ineffable ultimate reality, blur after one has crossed to the other shore. Second, the human mind is an incurably restless organ. One can repeat the the all-important distinction between good and evil? Do they

parable of the Monkey and the Crooked Hair (where in order develop a completely amoral position by asking one to trans- cend good and evil? In a bitter vein, Professor Zaehner stated to prevent the monkey from engaging in mischief the master ordered him to straighten a naturally crooked hair, in which in his last book that in the light of such an amoral philosophy

task he had since then been constantly engaged). Professor B. of monism, it would be impossible to distinguish between a

Scharfstein has put it very nicely: Charles Manson and Mother Theresa. The question of

Who with the wit to use it (the mind) can keep it still for long? A relation (or the lack of it) between morality and the so-called

daydreaming pianist will hammer with his fingers on invisible keys, a poet monistic mysticism is a very intricate one. Many issues have to will mutter with fragmentary eloquence, a bright man will reason, quietly if be resolved first and more technical distinctions have to be in- he must, but impatient to express himself aloud. And just as a rationalist troduced and emphasized before we can even meaningfully may sometimes break out into mystical poetry, mystics, unable or unwilling to check themselves, break out into reason, and some of them, after they address ourselves to this important question. So I will not go have tasted the forbidden pleasure, go on enjoying it until one is led to into it here. 'suspect that they are anti-rational mystics by name but reasoners by nature, While I concede that the salvational aim of Indian with the normal, unmystical lust to defeat the enemy.24 Thus we have to reckon with the force of the rational com- mysticism is not always compatible with a moral aim, I must

ponent of human mind. The rational component will go on emphasize that the so-called monistic philosophy of the East

performing its function eyen if it is only to justify the so-called certainly cannot endorse a Charles Manson, as my predecessor

'irrational' propensities. For example, many people feel that it feared. Charles Manson's quoting of the Bhagavadgita is no

is not enough to have'a religious faith, but that such faith more surprising than the devil's quoting the Bible. In defence

requires, or must admit of, rational support. Belief in theos of monism, one can add that no Vedäntic or Buddhist

(God) is often not enough, and hence theology becomes, along philosophers of repute ever suggested that men should aban- don the good-evil distinction before they have achieved Nir-

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vāna. Rather it has always been emphasized that one cannot He always emphasizes that there are two quite different levels gain liberating knowledge without having lived a perfectly of reality-the provisional or conventional, and the ultimate. moral life. Any mystic of the past or the present will no doubt Nāgārjuna says quite explicitly: 25 agree. The mystic claims simply that when one realizes the 'He who does not understand the distinction of the two ultimate reality-the 'cosmic consciousness'-the good-evil levels of truth (reality), does not understand the truth of the distinction sloughs itself off as an inessential and unnecessary doctrine of the Buddha.' detail, for 'evil has been overcome' and without 'evil' 'good' 'Like a snake grasped at the wrong end, or a craft wrongly loses its original meaning. learnt, the emptiness doctrine, when it is wrongly un- The above idea, as far as I can see, is not quite foreign to the derstood, destroys a person of poor intelligence.' Christian tradition. It was, for example, St. Augustine who At the everyday level of reality, the good-evil distinction is, of rejected the Manichaean conception of an ultimate dualism of course, very important, indeed vital. Thus, morality is as good and evil (which was probably borrowed from Zoro- much a concern for the mystical philosopher as it is for any astrianism) and formulated his theodicy. Augustine argued non-mystical thinker. that evil has no independent existence, since it is only a Even the so-called illusory or fictional nature of the privation or perversion of something good. And man is said to everyday world should not foster amorality in our everyday be intrinsically good, though corruptible. The Indian mystic, behaviour. For the everyday level of reality (i.e. samvrti) is no however, solves the problem in a slightly different way. He less important for the mystic in his striving for salvation or nir- argues that good exists at two levels, which we may distinguish vaņa. Nāgārjuna insists: 26 as good, and good2. What is good, is contrasted with evil, 'The Ultimate Reality cannot be taught without recourse to and at the ordinary level, dualism of good, and evil prevails. everyday reality. And nirvāna cannot be attained without But good, and evil are also intimately related to each other. the understanding of Ultimate Reality.' They, like light and darkness, stand together and fall In fact, it is a common mistake-a mistake that is un- together. Thus, when evil is eliminated, good, is also fortunately being perpetuated by many today-to describe the eliminated, and good2 then makes its presence felt. This is the samurti, i.e. the everyday world, as an illusion or even an ap- ultimate good which is said to be beyond good and evil. pearance. It is, I think, improper to assume that the so-called When avidya is destroyed, suffering or duhkha vanishes itself, appearance-reality distinction, so well-known in Western not because it is an illusion but because it is conditioned by philosopy, will also hold for Nāgarjuna and Sankara. Of avidyä. To use a simile: as long as there is night, darkness and course, it is said that the everyday world is not real. But an ob- light (from lamps, etc.) fight each other, but when the sun ap- ject can be said to be not real in two very different senses. The pears and destroys darkness, lamp-light, etc., are also ren- so-called object may be non-existent, and hence deserves to be dered insignificant. called 'not real'. On the other hand, a toy gun, for example, Thus, the mystical transcendence of good and evil does not can be said to be 'not real' because it is a toy gun. A toy have any immoral, moral, or even amoral sense. Each mystic elephant (to use an image of the Lankāvatāra-sūtra) does not (whether a Vedäntin or a Buddhist), on the other hand, has possess the own-nature or svabhava that it is supposed to been deeply concerned with moral life in the everyday world. possess or that it professes to possess.

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Similarly the everyday world, it is argued, does not embody the svabhava or essence it professes to embody. It falls short of sequently morality is part and parcel of the same pursuit. the ideal of svabhava, and in this sense it is unreal. Thus, Thus, I believe that it is possible fully to vindicate morality in · samsāra or samurti is not a mere appearance, still less an mysticism, even in the monistic mysticism of the East. illusion-it is something that is not quite successful in em- bodying an own-nature, svabhava.27 It seems to be Before I conclude, I wish to make some general observations misrepresentation to call the everyday world an illusion, or about the aim and purpose of the Spalding Professorship at identical with the Red King's dream in Alice's adventures. the University of Oxford. The express aim of the late Mr. Proper understanding of the distinction between samurti Spalding was to bring together the world's great religions 'in and paramartha, between the everyday reality and the closer understanding, harmony and friendship'. Professor ultimate reality, is, as has already been emphasized, the key to Zaehner in his inaugural address said (p. 17): 'The only com- the understanding of the nature of Indian mysticism. Samurti mon ground is that the function of religion is to provide is not identical with illusion although it may be inclusive of release. There is no agreement at all as to what it is that man that which we call illusion. Thus, some philosophers (cf. must be released from. The great religions are talking at cross Bhāvaviveka, Prajňākaramati, etc.) try to distinguish bet- purposes.' While I do not disagree for a moment that the great ween the true samurti and the false samurti (tathya and religions of East and West differ greatly one from another, I mithya). False samurti refers to the illusory appearance of cannot help feeling that one is over-stating the case for distinc- things (mirage, etc.). But true samorti is the everyday world tion and antagonism if one thinks that they work 'at cross pur- where a spade appears as a spade and we are allowed to call a poses'. Here again there is a lesson to be learnt from the Jainas spade a spade. This is called samurti only because it covers and of India. The central philosophy of Jainism is sometimes .- conceals the ultimate nature of the objects we see. This is described as the non-onesidedness of truth (anekāntavada). In justifiable since samurti etymologically means covering and my opinion, this very important philosophic attitude derives concealing. In fact, each thing is said by the mystic to have its force from the value the early Jainas put on ahimsa 'non- two natures or aspects, one that is grasped by our ordinary violence'. As I have already pointed out, the Jainas carried the perception and intellect, and the other that lies concealed or principle of non-violence from the physical and practical hidden by the first but is revealed only to the perfect wisdom plane to the intellectual plane. Thus, 'respect for the life of or prajna-paramitā. Our worldly behaviour operates with the others' was eventually transformed into an obligatory respect first nature or the first aspect, while the second is operative for the views and beliefs of others. The Jainas claim that when only in nirvana. But the Indian mystic warns at the same time two or several parties are seriously and sincerely arguing regar- that it is the first alone that can lead us to the second. And ding the truth, it is seldom that one side is absolutely wrong, when one penetrates the second, the previous duality of nature while the other side is absolutely right. The world is not merges into one. That is what is called the mystic 'unity' or divided only into black and white, for there are innumerable oneness of reality. shades of grey in between. The Jainas contend that one should The everyday world is therefore vitally important to the try to understand the particular point of view of each mystic, it is important for his pursuit of nirvāna. And con- disputing party if one wishes to grasp completely the truth of the situation. The total truth, the Jainas emphasize, may be

28 29

derived from the integration of all different viewpoints tempting to frame a definition. Besides, it would be too am- (nayas). 28 If the problem of the divergence of the world's great bitious at this stage when there is much groundwork yet to be done. - religions is presented to a Jaina, he will comment as follows: I wish to make only an impressionistic suggestion. One can overstate the divergence and thereby undermine their One of the common factors in all the world's great religions common ground. This will foster antagonism and probably violence. Or, one can overstate the similarity and thereby blur is, as I see it, a belief that the unexamined life is not worth

the vital distinction, which will result in intellectual dishonesty living. In this sense, then, Socrates was a religious philosopher. All great religions, it seems to me, contain a belief that a cer- and barrenness. But we need not be caught between these two extremes. Our Jaina friend will humbly ask us to remember that tain control of the instincts is necessary for our civilized 2 living-a belief that the cultivation of certain positive there are many other sides of the question besides the one we, in this particular moment, have in mind. The total truth, the emotions, e.g., compassion and concern for other people or

Jaina claims, is ever elusive for a single individual (or a single other beings, is a necessary concomitant of any search for per-

creed) unless he happens to be omniscient. Or, following the sonal nirvana, freedom or salvation. In this sense, then Yud-

Buddha, one might say that emphasis on the similarity and dhisthira of the Mahabharata was an incarnation of dharma

sameness will be another form of eternalism or sāsvatavada, 'religious duty', for he lived a truly religious life, as Professor

and emphasis on the ultimate difference will be a form of an- Zaehner rightly pointed out in his Hinduism, and refused to

nihilationism (ucchedavada). But a follower of the Tathagata enter heaven, the so-called highest prize of his religious life,

should avoid both extremes and follow the Middle Way. without the animal, a dog, that loyally followed him to the

My intention here, I wish to emphasize, is not to refute the doors of heaven. This incident was, perhaps, the highest ex-

views of my predecessors. I have tried only to add a new pression of the religiosity that Yuddhisthira had in himAll

dimension to their thoughts by deriving lessons from my study great religions also include a belief that purely external cir-

of the Jaina and the Buddhist philosophy. cumstances cannot constitute the be-all and end-all of human

If the world's great religions do have a 'common ground', existence-a belief that the world we see only with our senses is

then it will be possible to define the term religion. But the not all that there can possibly be. Thus to me, to be religious

definition of religion has proved to be a notoriously difficult means to have a humility about what else there is. Moreover,

task. The problem is further complicated by the existence of all great religions contain a belief that people can be better

such non-theistic Eastern religions as Buddhism, Jainism, and than they are as well as a belief that people can experience

Vedānta. But the difficulty of defining religion adequately is more than they do.

not, I think, insurmountable. An adequate definition must One may claim that any adequate definition of religion will

underline the common characteristics underlying the diverse contain, among many other things, a reference to a higher

religious traditions of East and West. If such a definition can plane of existence, a 'deathless, painless' existence, or in Bud-

be formulated it will already be a step towards bringing the dhist terms, an unconditioned existence, which is in sharp

world's great religions to what may be called a 'closer un- contrast with the existing conditions of life, the mechanical,

derstanding'. This is not, however, the place to indulge in at the existential, the trivial, the non-final, or the non-essential world. Man's religious urge is invariably characterized by a

30 31

quest for this higher mode of existence. In Indian ter- speaking world, illustrates the point nicely:

minology, it would be stated as a contrast between the ... religious beliefs, whether savage, mythological or Christian, may or may not be true-in their nature they are not capable of proof or disproof-but paramārtha and the vyavahāra, between nirvāņa and samsāra. it is highly probable that they would have arisen in their identical forms Some philosophers would call it a contrast between the whether they were true or not ... But we must not forget that neurosis is an spiritual and the material, between the fragile and the im- expression of the same forces and conflicts that have led to the loftiest

mortal, between the infinite and the finite. Some historians of aspirations and profoundest achievements of our race, and that neurotics are often the torch-bearers of civilization. They may strain themselves in the religions have called it a distinction between the sacred and effort, but without that effort there would be no civilization.29 the profane. Controversy as well as scepticism about such The Vedic seer raised the question, 'Which god is really religious concepts as God, an after-life or nirvāna centres there, to whom we must offer oblation?' This shows that scep- around the question whether such a different (higher) plane of ticism is as old as the birth of civilization. But so is man's at- existence exists in some acceptable sense. But after many cen- tempt to comprehend rationally the religious and the mystical. turies of controversy it is now reasonably clear that its sup- Both the religious man and the rational man in our society posed existence can be neither proved nor disproved through today raise their eyebrows at the question of 'rational com- our accredited means of knowledge. Even the ancient Mīmāmsaka observed that ordinary pramānas, perception and prehension' of the religious and the mystical. For the rational man believes that religion is basically irrational; it is, at its inference, are powerless either to validate or to invalidate best, above and beyond reason, and, at its worst, is below religious concepts, and hence any attempt in this direction reason. The religious man will hesitate because, for him, would yield very little at the end. religion is based on experience or on faith or on both. Hence, Man's quest and concern for the sacred takes different forms he would argue, it is impossible for an agnostic, who lacks any and has different expressions all over the world. Hence the diversities and divergences of the world's great religions. The experience, either religious or mystical, to have a rational

sociologist will probably connect this concern with the realities comprehension of religion or mysticism. For a man may un- derstand the definition of drunkenness, but will never of the human situation, man's powerlessness and frustration rationally understand what it really is to be drunk. concerning scarcity and uncertainty, his lack of pre-vision of, But I think that this is another dichotomy that my Jaina and control over, events that are crucially important to his friend will advise us to avoid, for he believes that it is safety, happiness, and welfare. Classical psychoanalysis will mistaken. Man is a rational animal, but, what is more in- give a genetic explanation for this urge in terms of unconscious teresting, he is not exclusively rational. Hence, he continues to wish-fulfilment as well as in terms of a number of technical and clinical concepts such as anxiety, the defence- search for the 'promised' land, for the 'sacred', for nirvāna. It has been claimed by the sociologist that human civilization is mechanisms, the Oedipus situation and the problems of ob- but a fabrication of a child afraid to be alone in the dark. And sessional neurosis. But again, a genetic explanation (whether religion is part of that civilization. Man also has a monkey in- sociological or psychological) of our concern for the sacred side him, which prompts him to ask rational questions and and the higher form of existence does nothing either to prove demand rational answers. Otherwise, we would not have a or to disprove the sacred. A comment of Ernest Jones, whom Freud described as the greatest psychoanalyst of the English Socrates, or an Aristotle, or a Buddha, or a Nāgārjuna, or a

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NOTES AND REFERENCES Šrīharsa. As my predecessor used often to say, quoting a Vu. Vigrahavyā vartanī, Nāgārjuna. Edited by E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst. phrase of Al-Ghazali, 'for reason is God's scale on earth'.30 Melanges chinois et bouddhiques, Vol. IX, 1948-51, pp. 99-152. Dr. K. Bhattacharya translated this text with Introduction and Notes 'The I shall conclude, in a rather lighter vein, by referring to a Dialectical Methods of Nagarjuna' in Journal of Indian Philosophy (D. Reidel, few well-known metaphors. The ordinary man is probably a Dordrecht), Vol, I, No. 3, 1971. Passages quoted here are, however, from my counter-example to the concept of Buridan's ass. We all know Kk. Khandanakhandakhādya, Srīharsa. Edited by Dr. Navikānta Jhā. Kashi San- own translation.

what Buridan's ass3 did. He was given a choice to eat from skrit Series, Chowkhamba: Varanasi, 1970. An English translation of the Introductory portions of this text has been two equal bales of hay situated at equal distance from him. prepared with elaborate notes and explanation by Dr. Phyllis Granoff. The work But being unable to decide between the two equally balanced is awaiting publication in the Classical India Monograph Series (D. Reidel, Dor- alternatives, he chose to starve himself to death. The main drecht). Passages quoted here are, however, from my own translation. purpose of this story is to illustrate the problem of reasoned R. C. Zaehner: Our Savage God (London, Collins, 1974): ' ... and in our everyday world this ambivalence can have disastrous results', p. 15. choice in the absence of preference. But my point is slightly Ibid., p. 294 different. Ibid., pp. 14-15 I am tempted to quote the passage from Pancatantra (Kathamukha, beginning Buridan's ass was most probably a philosopher, certainly a with 'dvadasabhih varsaih kila vyākaranam fruyate'. See F. Edgerton's The Pan- logician. But an ordinary man even with reason chooses to act chatantra Reconstructed (A.O.S., New Haven, 1924) p. 4. The passage makes randomly under the circumstances. In fact, the ordinary man the point that before a pupil should start learning a sa stra, he must first spend twelve years in the study of grammar, etc. is worse off than Buridan's ass in this matter. He is torn and See my 'Double Negation in Navya-nyaya', forthcoming in Festschrift for tormented by the conflict between the taste of 'the tree of life' Professor D. H. H. Ingalls (D. Reidel). Mā dhyamika-sastra, Ch. 15, verses 8, 9. (Ed. P. L. Vaidya, 1960) and that of 'the tree of knowledge'. And reason cannot show We may note that the concept of 'own-nature' in Nagarjuna's writings is almost any evaluative preference of one over the other. His condition as ambiguous as the concept of essence of Aristotle or the theory of Forms in Plato. The following comment from the Madhyamika-karika, Ch. 15, verse 2, is comparable to that of one who is placed between two equally may be of some help: tempting glasses of juice-one containing, say, the juice of 'How could "own-nature" be something created? For 'own- nature' is (surely) uncreated (literally, "non-artificial" = religion and mysticism and the other that of rationality and akrtrima) and independent of others as well.' scepticism-and being attracted to both, tries, perhaps not Nyāyasutras 5.1.39-43 (Ed. G. Jha, Poona Oriental Series, 1939). Vv., p. 108 unreasonably, to partake a little of both. Thus, he may ask Vv. pp. 109-10 much in the same way the Vedic seer asked, 10 I have the following distinction of paradox and antinomy in my mind. A paradox 'To what god shall we offer oblation?' packs a surprise, but the surprise quickly dissipates itself as we ponder the proof. This is how W. V. Quine defines what he calls 'veridical paradox'. A 'falsidical 'KASMAI DEVĀ YA HAVIȘĀ VIDHEMA? paradox', according to Quine, packs a surprise, but it is seen as a false alarm when we solve the underlying fallacy. 'An antinomy, however, packs a surprise that can be accommodated by nothing less than a repudiation of part of our con- ceptual heritage.' The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, Revised & Enlarged Edition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1976, p. 9. This is similar to the point raised by Alonzo Church regarding the Liar Paradox (1946), p. 131. in review of A. Koyre's The Liar in The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 12 12 This point is mentioned by Nicholas Rescher in 'Self-referential Statement'. Sce his Topics in Philosophical Logic (D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1968), p. 16. 11 This point is derived from the comments of A. N. Prior. 'Fearing that nothing we fear is the case, asserting that nothing we assert is the case and so on, must be more difficult performances than we at first take them to be' (p. 74). Prior

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suggests that our problem may be over with the statement of Epimenides if we do not suppose that it is asserted by him. Prior actually follows here a suggestion of John Buridan. One of John Buridan's examples was 'No proposition is negative'. According to Prior, Buridan insists that the said proposition should be classified as a 'possible' one because things could be as it signified, even though it could not possibly be true. Prior contends, ' ... it can be that no proposition is negative, though it cannot be that 'No proposition is negative" is true.' (p. 144). See 'Epimenides the Cretan', and 'Some problems of self-reference in John Buridan', in A. N. Prior's Papers in Logic and Ethics (Eds. P. T. Geach & A. J. P. Kenny-London, Duckworth, 1976). The present note owes much to an in. formal discussion I had with my friend Professor Hans Herzberger regarding the

14 problem of self-reference. The Sanskrit word 'siddha' literally means 'accomplished'. It can be translated either as 'validated' or 'established' depending upon the context. I have taken some liberty in translation to make the point clear. 15 Faults like atmāsraya, anyonyāśraya, and cakraka can roughly be called varieties of vicious circle. See my The Navya-nyaya Doctrine of Negation (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 82-4. 16 Vy., verses 49, 50. 17 See Nyayasutras 1.2.1-3 See Vātsyāyana's comments under Nyāyasutra 1.1.1, beginning with 'vitanda tu parīksyate', p. 4 (Jha's edition) 19 The work of this author is unfortunately lost. Udayana referred to him as 'an an- cient Gauda Naiyayika', and so probably he hailed from Bengal. His in- dependent view about vitanda has been preserved by Udayana. See my Nyāya. Vaisesika p. 92 (Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1977), in A History of Indian Literature, ed. Jan Gonda, Vol. VI, fasc. 20 See G. Tucci, 'The Hymn to the Incomparable One', Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, New Series, 27, 1932, pp. 312-14. 21 It is, however, conceded that Bhavaviveka and the Svatantrika school tried to formulate a svatantra inference to establish the Madhyamika position (over and above the prasanga argument). 23 Gilbert Ryle: Philosophical Arguments: Inaugural Lecture at Oxford, (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1945), p. 6. 23 Ibid., p. 6. "I am not trying to prove that no other types of argument are proper to philosophy." 24 Ben-Ami Scharfstein: Mystical Experience (Blackwell, 1973; Penguin Book Inc., Baltimore, Maryland, 1974), p. 44. 25 Mādhyamika-Sāstra, Ch. 24, verses 9 & 11. 26 Ibid., verse 10 27 Ibid., verses 15-19 28 See my The Central Philosophy of Jainism: Anekantavada (forthcoming, L. D. Indological Institute, Ahmedabad). 29 Ernest Jones: What is Psychoanalysis? (London, Allen & Unwin, 1949), p. 105 30 Zaehner, R. C. At Sundry Times (London, Faber & Faber), p. 12. 31 The example, according to Nicholas Rescher, does not occur in Buridan's extant writings. But it is based on an illustration in Aristotle's De Caelo (295b32) that became a standard illustration in the Aristotelian tradition. Rescher, however, has traced the example in its essentially ultimate form in the Arabic philosopher Ghazali and cited a passage from Averroe's Tahafut-al-Tahafut. See Rescher's essay 'Buridan, Jean' in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. P. Edwards), Vol I.

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