1. Manadukya, Agamasastra of Gaudapada 1

DUE DATE SLIP GOVT. COLLEGE, LIBRARY KOTA (Raj.) Students can retain library books only for two weeks at the most.

BORROWER'S No. DUE DTATE SIGNATURE

THE AGAMASASTRA OF GAUDAPĀDA

CHECKED 2 3 APR 1959

EDITED, TRANSLATED AND ANNOTATED BY VIDHUSHEKHARA BHATTACHARYA Asutosh Projessor of Sanskrit. University of Calcutta

OF Checker

VANCEMENT OF ARÑIN

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA 1943 Dharatt Mandira KHURJA. (U. P.) Mailers, Order Sappliers, & Peblishm

PRINTED IN INDIA

PRINTED DY DHUPENDHALAL DANEAJEE.

AT TED CALCUTTA UNIVIRSITY PRESS, 48, HAZRA ROAD, BALLYGUNGE, CALCUTTA

1201B-Mey, 1913-E

AERBERT COLLE LIBRARY KOTAH,

TO

THE REVERED MEMORY

OF

GURUDEVA

RABINDRANATH TAGORE

bhedo yasya na vastuto'sti bhuvane prāci praticiti vā

mitratvam prakațikrlam ca satatam yenātmanaḥ karmaņā | viśvam yasya padam prasiddham anisam satye ca yasya sthitir bhūyāt tasya jayo raver anudinam tenāstu trptam jagat ||

CONTENTS

PAGE PREFACE vii-xvii Introductory vii Manuscripts ix Acknowledgment XV ABBREVIATIONS XIX

INTRODUCTION xxxi-cxliv S I. The Mandukya Upanisad and its Extent . xxxi § 2. The Relationship between the Prose Passages of the Mandūkya Upanisad and the Kārikas in Book ! xxxviii § 3. The Inter-relationship of the Four Books of the Āgamasastra xlvii S 4. The Text of the Agamasastra lvii § 5. The Readings of the Text 1x § 6. The Name of the Work 1xi § 7. The Author Ixiii § 8. The Date of Gaudapāda Ixxii § 9. Alleged Borrowing by Gaudapada . Ixxix §10. The Works of Gaudapada . . Ixxxix S1l. The Sources . lxxxx §12. The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad as the Main Upanisadic Source of the Agamasastra Ixxxxiii §13. Pre-Sankara Teachers of the Vedanta and their Works ciii

vi CONTENTS

PAGE §14. The Conspectus of the Contents of the Āgamaśāslra cxiii §15. The Philosophy of Gaudapada. . . cxxvii THE ĀGAMASĀSTRA 1-219

APPENDIXES 221-308

I. Māņdūkya Upanișad 223-228

A. Text 223-225

B. Translation 226-228 II. Variants 229-244 III. Index of Kārikās 245-248 IV. İndex of the Mandūkya Upanisad . 248 V. Index of Important Words in the Karikās . 249 VI. Index of Teachers and Works Quoted or Referred to in the Kärikäs of the Āgamaśāstra 256 VII. Index of Words in the Kārikās used in particular Senses originally or mainly in Buddhist Works 258 VIII. Index of Tibetan Verses 259 IX. Index of Teachers, Authors, Scholars, and Places, etc. . 259-264 X. Index of Works 265-273 XI. Index of Subjects 273-290 ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA 291-308

. PREFACE

Introductory

It was in July, 1919, that, in order to prepare some lectures for my pupils in the Visvabharati, Santiniketan, I had to read the Upanisads anew; and in doing so when 1, now with a little acquaintance with Buddhism. began to study the Āgamasāstra of Gauda pā da. popularly known as the Gaudapādakārika on the Māndūkya Upanisad, I was struck with its contents which were known to me before this quite in a different light. I found there something new. In 1922, in the Second All-India Oriental Conference held in this University, which was presided over by my esteemed friend, Prof. Sylvain Levi, then the first Visiting Professor of the Visvabharati, I read a paper on the subject, in which I said that a book under the title of The Āgamašāstra of Gaudapāda, embodying the result of my studies in it, would shortly be ready for the press. But, unfortunately, it could not be done earlier than now. However, I wrote some stray articles in English and Bengali on the subject. While they arrested the attention of certain scholars trained on modern lines, they gave rise to adverse criticism mainly from the orthodox section of my friends strictly following the indigenous interpretation of the Upanisad, given by Śankara, the commentator of the present work.

viii ĀGAMASĀSTRA

Not being satisfied with the interpretation offered by Śankara and his followers, or some other teachers I have attempted in the following pages to present to the readers my own interpretation of the work as I have understood. But in no way do I claim that my interpreta- tion is the interpretation, i.e., the interpretation intended by Gaudapāda himself. Gaudapāda has not appeared to me and said that mine is the true interpretation, nor has God told me anything to the effect, nor am I an omniscient being. It is quite natural and well-known to all that the same thing sometimes appears differently to different persons owing to a variety of circumstances. It would be sheer foolishness on my part, I am perfectly conscious, if I pretend to claim by writing the following pages any superiority to the commentator, whether he is or is not identical with the great author of the commentary on the Brahmasūtras, who is known by the same name, Śankara. I have simply put down my views here and I request my readers only to see if the text can be explaincd also in the way I have followed here. I may say here in the following words of Yasomitra (AKV1, p. 2) : yuktā ced grāhyeyam na ced ato 'nyathā vidhātavyā | na hi vişame'rthe skhalitum na sambhaven mādrsām buddhiķ li On points related to Buddhism, which are frequently raised in the course of my explanation, I have in many cases quoted in support of my views more passages than one, though a single passage could serve the

PREFACE

purpose; having meant them specially for these of my readers who are not adequately acquainted with Buddhist thoughts or have no easy access to Buddhist wrorks. In the present volume I have given a new edition of the text of the Agamasastra based on a number of MSS and different editions as described below, followed by an English translation. After this comes my annotation: .-- At the end there are Appendixes including the text and English translation of the Mandukya Upanised, Variants of the MSS used for the edition of the text of the Agamasastra, and different Indexes as the Contents will show.

Manuscripis -

Let us give here a description of the MSS. referred to above: 1. A1. Adyar Library. No. IX. G. 52. It is in folios 20-28 of the codex. Written in Devanagari on paper in black ink, punctuated with red marks, and bounded on either side by double lines. Size 12.3"x4.8". Eleven limes on' each page. No date, nor the name of the scribe. In this MS we have the MaU and the GK. 2. A2. Adyar Library. No. IX. F. 99. Fols. 30-39 of this codex contain the MaU and GK. Size 10"x6". Number of lines on each page 12 or 13. Written neatly in Devanagari on paper, punctuated and bounded on each side by a couble line. No date, nor the name of the scribe. II-1201B

ĀGAMASĀSTRA x 3. A8. Adyar Library. No. IX. F. 130. Fols. 38-53 of this codex, too, contain MaU together with the GK. Written in modern Devanägari on paper, bounded on each side by a triple line. Size 10.1"x5". There are 8 or 9 lines on each page. No date, nor the name of the scribe. 4. A'. Adyar Library. No. IX. B. 181. It is written on hand-made paper in Sarada script. There are 30 folios. Size 9"x6". Each page has 18-25 lines. The borders of the MS are completely worn out, and last 12 folios are torn and destroyed in the middle. It is written in black ink, but the numbers of the folios are given in English figures in red one. No date is to be found, but from the worn out condition of the codex it seems to be not less than two hundred years old. The name of the scribe is also not given. This codex contains different Upanisads, 19 in all, the Vedāntasāra (Saivadarśana), and the Taittirīya Brahmana, III. 10. 9-11. Here we have also the MaU and only the first prakarana of GK. 5. B1. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. No. 272 of 1879-80. It is written on paper in Devanāgarī. Size 10.5"x4.7". Originally it had 67 fols., but the first 15 fols. are missing, and so we have now only 52 fols. Each page contains 10 to 14 lines. It is dated as 1765 (bana-ańga-aśva-avanī), but it is not known whether it is Samvat or Śaka era. This MS contains only the last three Books of the GK beginning with the first kārika of Book II,

PREFACE xi

6. B2. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. No. 778 of 1891-96. It is written on paper in Devanāgari. Fols. 45. Size 9" x 5". Like the preceding one it, too, has only the last three Books of GK together with Sankara's commentary. The karikäs, specially those in the last Book are numbered very carelessly; thus the last kārika of the last Book is numbered as 93 instead of 100. No date, nor the name of the scribe. 7. D1. Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No. nil. Written neatly in Devanāgari on paper. Size 11.4" x 6". There is no date, nor the name of the scribe. It contains MaU and the GK together with the commen- tary of Sankara on both of them. Originally there were 42 fols., but fols. 18, 19, 30-35 containing kārikās 10-53 of the fourth prakarana are missing. In three or four cases some letters are lost, the paper being torn or damaged. In this MS b is written for both b and v. 8. D2. Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No. nil. Written neatly on paper measuring 11.2"x5.6" and bounded on both sides by thick lines. There are 69 fols. It contains the MaU and the GK with Sankara's commentary on both of them. No date, nor the name of the scribe. 9. D3. Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No. nil. Fols. 2-35: Size 12.2"x 5.5". Written neatly on paper in Devanagari. It contains the first 7 passages of the MaU, first 14 kārikas of the first prakarana of the GK and parts of Saikara's commentary with Ānandagiri's tīkā.

xii ĀGAMASĀSTRA

10. IO. India office. . No. 2783. In this codex there are three MSS, viz., (1) Prapañcasāravivaraņa, (2) Laghukaumudi, and (3) MaU together with the GK only up to the Book I. The ślokas of mangalācarana of Śankara's commentary are given with GK. The script is Devanāgari. No date, but it seems to be old. Almost correct. 11. K1. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśī (Benares). No. 290 (Cover No. 9). Written in Bengali character on paper. Size 9.2" x 4.2". Fols. 24. Lines in each page 7. There is no date, yet it appears to be very modern. Writer's name is not given. There are mistakes and omissions. The MS contains both MaU and GK. 12. K2. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāsī (Benares). No. 163. This is a part of a bigger MS of which we have only 24 fols. (29-52). Size 12"x5". Each page has 9 lines. There is no date, nor the name of the scribe. This MS contains only the third Book of the GK with Sankara's commentary. It is not quite correct. Some of the kārikas are here misplaced. 13. K8. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kaśi (Benares). No. 13 (Cover No. 4). Size 14.3"x6.2". Script Devanagarī. Fols. 10. Average number of lines in each page 13. Samvat 1907. Written at Vmndavana. The scribe is not mentioned .. It contains the original text of the MaU together with the commentary called Māndūkyopanişadarthaprakāśa. Though the name of its author is not mentioned here he is no other than Kūranārāyana, a follower of

PREFACE.

the Ramanuja school. This commentary is published in the Anandashram Series, No. 62. 14. K3. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśī (Benares). No: 304 (Cover No. 9). It-is-the first 12 fols. of a bigger codex. Size 10.3"x 5.4". Number of lines in each page 8. Written on paper in Bengali script. It .extends up to the karika 12 of Book I together with Śankara's commentary. No date. Appearance modern. No name of the scribe. : .15. PU'.The Panjab University Library, Lahore. No. 948. Script Devanagari. Fols. 9. Size 12".x 6". Lines on each page 13-18. Date about 1850 V.S .; as says one Bhojlal, a manuscript dealer and book- seller from whom it seems to have been secured .. · It contains MaU up to prabhavapyayau hi bhūtanām. atraite sloka bhavanti, and the GK of Book I. 16 .- PU2. The Panjab University Library, Lahore. No. 746. Script Devanagari. Fols. 142. Size 14" x7". Number of lines on each page varies from 13 to 18. No date, but said to be of about 1850 V.S. Obtained at Amritsar, and said to be of Kashmir recension. It contains the. MaU and the GK together with the commentary of Sank a.ra followed by Ananda -- giri's tīka: : 17. Ve. Visvabharati. No. 1317 .- It is written in Grantha character on palm-leaf. Fols. 58. Size 15.7" x 1.3". Lines 7-8 on each page. - It contains the follow- ing works (1) Srimad Bhagavadgita (fols. 1-29); (2) Isopanisad (fols. 30ª), (3) Kenopanisad (fols. 30b-32a), (4) Kathopanisad (fols. 32b-37*), (5) Praśnopanişad

xiv ĀGAMASĀSTRA

(fols. 37'-41ª), (6) Mundakopanisad (fols. 41a-44*), (7) Māndūkyopanisad with . GK (fols. 44'-52'), and (8) Taittiriyopanisad (fols. 52'-58). This MS seems to be about 150 years old, but there is no date nor the name of the scribe. 18. Vn. Visvabharati. No. 1632. Written on palm-leaf in Devanagarī. Fols. 13. Size 11.5"x4". Lines on each page 7-8. The scribe was one Vāsudeva Bhide, the son of one Nārāyana. It was written at Śripancavati in the presence of (god) Śrīrāma on the 7th day of the black fortnight of the month of Caitra in the Saka era 1733 (Prajāpati samvatsara)=1811 A.D. It contains the MaU with the GK beginning with the benedictory Vedic ślokas, bhadram karnebhiḥ° (RV, I. 89. 8), and svasti na indra° (RV, I. 89. 6) to which are added the first two ślokas, viz., prajñānāmśu° and yo viśvātmā° of Šankara with which he is said to have begun his commentary on the MaU. As regards the relationship of the MSS described above it may briefly be observed that A1 and A2 are from the same family and have close connexion with A3, IO, PU1 and PU2. B1 and B2 are closely related and so are D1 and D2. V5 and V" agree in many cases with -A1, A2, D1 and D2. Among the MSS mentioned above A1 and A2 are the worst giving very wrong readings. Yet, at least in one case (IV. 56ª) A1 with IO gives the right reading. See Introduction, §5. The Readings of the Text.

PREFACE XV

In addition to the MSS described above the readings · collected from the thirteen MSS, utilized for the prepara= tion of the second edition of the MaU and GK together with Śankara's commentary and Ānanda- giri's sub-commentary in the Anandashram Series, No. 10, have also been consulted. The MSS collected for that edition are mentioned here, where necessary, according to the abbreviations used there, viz., K, Kh, G, Gh, etc. Besides, such editions as of M a h eś a - candra Pala, Calcutta, 1806 Śaka era; of MM. Durgācaraņa Sankhya - Vedānta-tīrtha, Calcutta, 1331 Bengali era; and of Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 1993 V.S., have been consulted. The most important readings are discussed in their respective places in the main work, while variants will be found in the Appendix II, pp. 229 ff. See Intro- duction, § 4.

Acknowledgment

I am deeply indebted to the authorities of the follow- ing Institutions, who have kindly given me on loan the MSS described above: Adyar Library, Madras; Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona; Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore; Government Sanskrit College, Benares; India Office, London; Panjab University Library, Lahore; and Visvabharati Library, Santiniketan. I am thankful to my pupils Śri P. Anujan Achan, Government Archæologist, the State

xvi AGAMASĀSTRA

Museum, Trichur; Sri A. Chalamayya, Superintendent, the Orphanage, Pithapuram : Śrī Anukul Chandra Banerjee, M.A., B.L., Assistant Lecturer in Pali, and Śrī Ajit Ranjan Bhattacharyya, M.A., Ex-Puran- chand Nahar Fellow, both of the University of Calcutta; the first two kindly collated for me some of the MSS used in the present edition of the book, and the last two helped me in preparing two of the Indexes appended hereto. 1 am thankful also to Śri Din a ban dh u Ganguli, B.A., the able Superintendent, Calcutta University Press, for the kind care he has taken in carrying the book through the press, and to Sri Ramakrishna Chakravarti, M.A., of the same press for his very careful assistance in reading the proofs.

I am grateful to my friends Prof. Umeshchandra Bhattacharyya, M.A., and Pandit Narendra- chandra Bhattacharyya, Sāmkhya-Mīmāņsā- Vedantatīrtha, M.A. of our University, for their kindly reading some of the proof-sheets. I also offer my sincere thanks to my esteemed friend, Professor Vanamali Chakravarti, Vedantatīrtha, M.A., who has given me immense and invaluable help in various ways in my work. He has given me the benefit of discussing with him almost all the difficult points of the book; of reading proofs, and of giving various suggestions.

In conclusion I must express the deep sense of my gratitude to the authorities of the University of Calcutta,

PREFACE xvii

and specially to Dr. Syamaprasad Mookerjee, M.A., B.L., D.Litt., LL.D., Barrister-at-Law, M.L.A., President, Councils of Post-Graduate Teaching in Arts and Science, under-whose benign and sympathetic patronage the book is included in the publications of the University.

Brahmavihāra, CALCUTTA. VIDHUSHEKHARA BHATTACHARYA. May, 1943.

III-1201B

ABBREVIATIONS

Ānandagiri. AAA Abhisamayālankārāloka (Prajñāpāramitās, . Vol. I), Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. LXVII. AAS Abhidhammatthasamgaha with Vibhāvanī țīkā, ed. Fernando and Silva, Colombo, 1898. AK L'Abhidharmakośa de Va su bandhu traduit et ennoté per Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Paris, 1923-31. AKB Abhidharmakośabhāsya (Tibetan Text), BB. AKV1 A bhidharmakośavyākhyā of Yaśomitra, Fasc. I-II, BB. AKV2 Abhidharmakośavyākhyā of Yasomitra, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokio, 1932-1936. AmK Amarakośa. AN Anguttara Nikāya, PTS. AO Acta Orientalia. AP-Abhidhanappadipika, Colomuo, 1yvu. ĀŚ Āgamasāstra of Gaudapāda. AS - - Atthasalinī, PTS. Ācārānga Sutra, PTS ASP Astasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, BI. ASU . Astottarasatopanișad, ed. W. Laxman Shastri Pansikar, Nirnaya- sagar, 1917.

xx ÀGAMASĀSTRA

AU Ätmopanişad. AV Atharvaveda.

BA Bodhicaryavatāra, BI. BAP Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, BI. BB Bibliotheca Buddhica. Bbh Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokio, 1930. See BSB. BBU Brahmabindu Upanisad. BBV Brhadāraņyakabhāsyavārttika, Anandashram, 1892-94. BCK Buddhacarita Kavya, ed. Johnston, 1936. BG Bhagavadgītā. BI Bibliotheca Indica. BJS Brahmajala Sutta in DN, PTO. BP Bhagavata Purāņa. BS Brahmasūtras of B ā d arāyana. BSB Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokio, 1930. See Bbh. BU Brhadāraņyaka Upanișad. ChU Chandogya Upanisad. CN Chullaniddesa, PTS. CŚ Catuhsataka, Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts, ed. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, Visvabharati, Part II, 1931. CŚ* Catuhsatikā, ed. Haraprasad Shastri in the Memories of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. III, No. 8, pp. 449-514. CVP Cittavisuddhiprakaraņa, ed. Prabhubhai Patel, Visvabharati (not yet published). 'See JASB, 1898.

ABBREVIATIONS xxi

DA Divyāvadāna, ed. Cowell and Nail, Cambridge, 1886. DaV Der älter Vedanta von Max Walleser, Heidelberg, 1911. DB Daśabhümikasūtra, ed. Rahder, Paris, 1926. D- The edition of the MaU by Durgacarana. Sankhya-Vedanta-tīrtha, Calcutta, 1331, Bengali Era. DN Dīgha Nikaya, PTS. DP Dhammapada. DPA Dhammapada Atthakathā, PTS. DPP Doctrine of Prajñāpāramita, by E. O ber - miller, Acta Orientalia, Vol. IX. DS Dharmasamgraha, ed. Kaswara, Max Müller, and Wenzel, Anecdota Oxoniensia, Aryan Series, Oxford, 1885. DSn Dhammasamgaņi, PTS. DV Daśavaikālika Sutra, Devchand Lalbhai Pustakoddhārasamiti, No. 47. ERE Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, ed. Hastings. . Ex Expositor, PTS (Translation Series). Ge The edition of the MaU from the Gita Press,

GK Gorakhpur, 1893. Gaudapādakārika GM Ganaratnamahodadhi, ed. Bhīmasena Šarman, Prayāga (Allahabad), 1894. HU Hitopadesa, ed. P. Peterson, Bombay, 1887. HV Harivamsa. IU Isā Upanişad.

xxii ÃGAMASĀSTRA

JM · Jagadgururatnamālāstava of Sa d ā śiv a - brahmendra with the com. of Ātmabodhendra Sarasvatī included in Vedāntapancaprakaraņī, Šrīvidyā Press, Kumbhakonam. JS Jnanasarasamuccaya (Yes.ses.snin.po.kun.las- btus.pa), now only in Tibetan. Cordier, III. p. 298. JU Jābāla Upanisad. KIU Kaivalya Upanișad. KN Kūranārāyaņa. KnU Kena Upanişad. KP Kāśyapaparivarta, ed. Baron A. Von Staël-Holstein, Sanghai, 1926. KtU Kausītaki Upanișad. KU Katha Upanișad. KV Kathāvatthu, PTS. LA Lankāvatāra Sūtra, ed. Bunyiu Nanjio, Kyto, 1923. LC Laghucandrikā, Śrīvidyā Press, Kumbha- konam, 1893. LV Lalitavistara, ed. Le fm ann, Halle, 1902 and 1908. MA Madhyamakavatāra (Tibetan Text), BB, IX. French translation by Poussin, Le Muséon, 1907. -MAc Madhvācărya. MAK Madhyamakalankarakarika of Sänti- rakşita, Tibetan Text, Sde.dge, Sa, 53a1-56b8.

ABBREVIATIONS xxiii

MāU Māņdūkya Upanișad. MB Mahabharata, The South Indian Text, ed. T. R. Krishnamacharya and T. R. Vyasacharya, Kumbha- konam, 1906-1914. MBU Mandalabrāhmaņopanișad. MD Mimāmsādarśana. M The edition of the MaU by M ahe śa - candra Pala, Calcutta, 1806 Saka Era. MHK Madhyamakahrdayakārikā of Bh a vy a , Tibetan Text, Sde.dge, Dza, 1b1-40b7. MHKV Madhyamakahrdayakarikāvrtti Tarkajvālā of Bhavya, Tibetan, Sde.dge, Dza, 40b *- 32964. MK Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna, BB, IV. MKU Muktikā Upanisad. MM Maharthamañjarī with commentary, Pari- malā, TSS. MN Majjhima Nikāya, PTS. MNs Mahániddesa, PTS. MnU Mahanāradīya Upanisad (Minor Upanisads, Adyar). .MnU Manasollasa of Sureśvara, Nirnaya- sagar I'ress, Bombay, 1959, V.E., 1825 Ś. E. MP Manorathapūraņī, Mahamukutarājavidyālaya' Siam, 2463 Buddha Era. MPñ Milindapañha, ed. V. Trenckner, London, 1928,

.V ĀGAMASĀSTRA

MS or Mahāyanasūtrālankāra, ed. Sylvain- Lévi, MSA S Paris, 1907; French Tr., 1911. MSBT, MVBT, or MVST, q.v. MSt Mahāsaddanīti, ed. A. Seelananda Thera, Colombo, 1909. MSV Mīmāmsāślokavārttika, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, 1896. MT Madhyantavibhāgațikā, ed. S. Yamguchi, Nagao, 1934. MU Maitri Upanisad. MuU Muņdaka Upanișad. MV Madhyamakavrtti, ed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, BB. IV. MVBT Madhyāntavibhāgasūtrabhāsyaļīkā, ed. V . Bhattacharya and G. Tucci, Part 1, Calcutta Oriental Series, 1932. MVD Madhyantavibhanga Discourse, translated from Sanskrit by Th. Stcherbatsky, BB, XXX, 1936. MVT Madhyāntavibhāga țīkā of Sthiramati, édition per Susumu Yamaguchi Nagoya, 1934. MVg Mahavagga of Vinaya, ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1879. MVt1 Mahāvyutpatti, ed. Sakaki, Japan. MVt2 Mahavyutpatti, ed. Minaeff, BB. MVu Mahāvastu, ed. E. Senart, Paris, 1882-97. N Nāgārjuna.

ABBREVIATIONS XxY

NAT Nyayāmṛtatarangiņī of Rāmācārya, .. ed. T. R. Krishnacharya, Nirnayasāgar. NK . Nyāyakandalī on Prasastapādabhāsya, Vizia- nagram Sanskrit Series, No. 6, 1895. NPTU Nrsimhapūrvatāpanī Upanișad. NPU Nāradaparivrājaka Upanișad. NS Nyāyasūtra. NSi Naiskarmyasiddhi with Candrika, ed. G. A. Jacob, Bombay, 1891. . NSt Nirupamastotra in Two Hymns of Catuhstava of Nagarjuna, ed. G. Tucci, JRAS, 1932, pp. 309 ff. Nt Nirukta of Yāska. NUTU Nrsimhottaratāpanī Upanișad. P Puruşottama. Pān Paņini. PAS Prajñāpāramitārthasamgraha of Dinnāga as quoted by Obermiller in his paper The Doctrine of Prajnaparamitā, Reprint from Acta Orientalia, Vol. XI. PB Prasastapādabhāsya, ed. V. Dvivedin, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, No. 6, Benares, 1895. PD Pañcadaśī of Vidyāraņy.a. PO Poona Orientalist. PP Padma Purāņa. PS1 Paramārthasāra, of Ādiseșa, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, No. XII, 1911. IV-1201B

xxvi ĀGAMASĀSTRA

PS2 -of Abhinavagupta, ed. L. D. Barnett, JRAS, 1910, pp. 707 ff. PSB -of Ādiśesa, Transliterated Text, English Translation and Notes, ed. S . S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Karnatak Publishing House, 1941. PSP Pancavimatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. Nalinaksha Dutt, Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 28, 1934. PU Praśna Upanisad. PV Pramānaviniścaya of Dharmakīrtti, Tibetan Text. Cordier, III, p. 298. PVk1 Pramānavārttika of Dharmakīrtti, ed. Rahula Sankrtyāyana, Patna, 1938. PVk2 Pramānavārttika of Dharmakīrtti with Manoratha Nandin's Commentary, ed. Rahula Sankṛtyāyana, Patna. RPR Review of Philosophy and Religion. RUTU Rāmottaratāpanī Upanișad. RV Rgveda Ś Śankarācārya. SāS Sānkhyasūtra. ŚB Šatapatha Brāhmaņa. SDS Sarvadarsanasamgraha, BI, 1858. SK Sānkhyakārikā of Īśvarakrsņa. SKr Sūtrakrtānga Sūtra, Āgamodaya Samiti, 1917. SMV Śārīrakamīmāmsābhāşyavārttika, ed. Ananta- krishna Sastri and Ashokanath Bhattacharya, Asutosh Sanskrit Series, No. 1, Calcutta, 1941.

ABBREVIATIONS xxvii

SN Samyutta Nikāya, PTS. SNS . . Sandhinirmocanasūtra, Texte Tibétain, édité et tradiut per Etienne Lamotte, Louvain et Paris, 1935. SNt Suttanipāta, PTS. SP1 Saddharmapundarīka, BB, 1912. SP2 Saddharmapúņdarīka, ed. U. Wogihara, 1934. SR or SRS Samādhirājasūtra, ed. Rai Sarat Chandra Das Bahadur and Pandit Sarat Chandra Sastri, Fasc. 1, Buddhist Text Society, Calcutta, 1898. SS Subhașitasamgraha, ed. C. Bendall, Le Muséon, N.S. IV. 1903 ; V. 1904. ŚS Šikșāsamuccaya, ed. C. Bendall, BB, 1902. ȘS Saddarsanasamuccaya with Guņaratna's Com., ed. L. Suali, BI, 1905 ff. SŚP Saptaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. G. Tucci, Roma, 1923. SSS Sarvasiddhantasangraha, ed. Premsundar Bose, Calcutta, 1919. St. LA Studies in Lankavatara Sutra by D. T. Suzuki, London, 1930. ŚU Śvetāśvatara Upanisad, Anandashram, 1905. SV Sivasutravimarsini of Ksemaraja, ed. J. C. Chatterjee, The Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, Vol. I, 1911. TA Taittirīya Āraņyaka, Anandashram, 1898.

xxvili ĀGAMASĀSTRA

TAI Tattvaratnāvalī of Advayavajra.in A dvayavajrasamgraha ed. Haraprasad Shastri, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. LX, 1927.

TAk Tantraloka . of Abhinavagupta, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, No. XXX. TG Theragāthā, PTS. TJ Tarkajvālā, See MHKV. Tk Trimsika of Vasubandhu, ed. Sylvain Lévi in the Vijñaptimatrasiddhi, Paris, 1925. TM Tattvamuktäkalāpa and Sarvārthasiddhi of Venkatanātha Deśika with the Ānandadāyinī and the Bhāvaprakāsa, Bibliotheca Sanskritica, Mysore, 1933, 1940. TP Tattvaprakāśa, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, 1926. TS Tattvasamgraha of Šāntiraksita, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Nos. XXX - and XXXI, 1926. TSN Trisvabhavanirdesa of Vasubandhu, ed. Sujitkumar Mukhopadhyaya, Visvabharati, 1939. TŚP Tattvasaņgrahapanjikā of Kamalaśīla,

TTL See TS.

TU. Tripurātāpanī Upanișad. Taittirīya Upanișad.

ABBREVIATIONS xxix

TV Tantravarttika of Kumarila as printed with the Sabarabhasya on the MD, Ananda- shram.Series. U or UP Upanişad. :UC - - Uttaracarita -of Bh a va bhūti. US Upadeśasāhasrī. VāP Vāyu Purāņa. : Vbh - : Vibhangá, PTS. Vc or Vch Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. M a x Müller, Anecdota Oxoniensia, 1881. VeS Vedāntasāra, ed. G. A. Jacob, Nirnaya- ssgar Press, Bombay, 1894. ViP Vișņu Purāņa. ViS Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, La Siddhi de Hiuan- Tsang traduite et annotée par Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Paris, 1928-29. ViV Vigrahavyāvartanī, ed. K. P. Jayswal and Rāhula Sankrtyayana, JBORS, XXIII. Vk Vimśatikā of Vasubandhu. See Tk. VM Visuddhimagga, PTS. VP Vinayapitaka, ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1879-1883. VS Vājasaneyi-saņhitā. VSN Vișnusahasranāma, Bibliotheca Sanskritica, Mysore, No. 19. VSt Vaiśeșika Sūtra.

xxx ĀGAMASĀSTRA

VV Śrivātulasūtravrtti, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, No. 39. YB Yogācārabhūmi of Asanga, MS with the present author. YS Yogasastra of Hemacandra, Bibliotheca Indica, 1907. YS Yogasūtra. YV Yogavasistha Rāmāyaņa, Nirņayasāgar Press, 1918.

INTRODUCTION

§1. The Mandūkya Upanisad and its Extent

What work or works are we to understand by the name of MaU? And what is its real extent? It is generally believed that the MaU comprises only the twelve prose passages beginning with "om ity etad aksaram° " and ending with "ātmānam ya evam veda" (see pp. 223-25).1 It is also assumed that the kārikās of Gaudapāda are mere explanation of these passages. These two works are thus separate, though related to each other very closely as text and commentary. But this is not admitted on all hands. Some hold that the Upanisad is composed not only of the twelve prose passages referred to above, but also of the ` kārikās, twenty-nine in all, attributed to Gaudapāda, as contained in Book I. Thus according to them those prose passages and the kārikās in Book I are regarded as Upanisad or śruti.2 This view seems to have partly

1 Of these passages the first seven are found with slight variations in some cases also in NPTU, IV. 1-2; NUTU, II; and RUTU, 5. 2 In 1925 I had an occasion to write (IHQ, Vol. I, pp. 119ff.) with regard to the present subject that this view was at lea t as old as Madhvacarya (1199-1274 A.D.), the great champion of the Dvaita school of the Vedanta philosophy. For, according to him and his followers, such as Vyasa. tirtha and Srinivāsa, both. the prose passages and the kārikas referred to are handed down by Varuna in the form of a manduka 'frog' (see the commentary on the MaU by Madhvacarya with Sri-

xxxii ĀGAMASĀSTRA

been subscribed to by Śankara, the commentator of MaU, who says in the introduction to his commentary

nivāsîya, Kumbhakonam, pp. 2-3). In support of it Madhvācārya quotes the following two passages from the PP and HV respectively : (i) dhyāyan narayanam devam pranavena samthitah ! maņdūkarūpi varuņas tustāva harim avyayam !l (ii) iti maņdūkarūpī san dadarta varuņah śrutim | These lines are not found, so far as I know, in printed editions of the works. Here Madhvacārya writes (ibid., p. 2) : maņdūkarūpiņā varuņena caturupo naryano 'tra stuyate. He regards the karikts as montras which are said to have been visioned by Brahman, the creator. On this he quotes the following couplet not yet traced in the same work (p. 8) : brahmadrsțān ato mantrān pramāņam salilesvarah ! atra śloka bhavantīti cakāraivam prthak prthak !! Vyāsatīrtha's țīkā, too, introduces the kārikās under mantras. The commentator of NPTU, who is known by the name of Sankara- cary a and identical with the author of the Prapancasara, a Tantic work (see my paper, Sankara's Commentarics on the Upanisads, in Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silcer Jubilee Volumes, Orientalta, 2, pp. 101 ff. and against it Raghuvara Mitthulal Shastri : Proceedings and Transactions. Fijth Indian Oriental Conjerence, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 691 ff., as well as T. R. Chintamani : Proceedings and Transactions, Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1924, pp. 419 ff.) is also of the same opinion, though he does not give particulars as to whether the ri ' seer' of the Upanisad is Varuna or whether the karikas are seen by Brahman, the creator. Kuranārayana, another commentator of MaU belonging to the Ramanuja school of the Vedanta maintains the same view taking the kārikas in Bcok I as mantras, which, in his opinion, too, together with the prose passages form the original Upanişad. Appayya Diksita (a person different from the celebrated author of the Siddhantalesa) who is a commentalor of the one hundred and eight Upanisads, seems to subscribe to the same views, for his commentary on the Upanisad extends only up to the prose passages and the kārikas of Book I. See the Catalogue of Sonskrit Manuscripts in the Adyar Library, Vol. 1, Upanisads, pp. 116, 287-8. After what I wrote as above in 1925, so far as my information goes, it was B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma who in 1931 took up the case in right earnest and advocated it very strongly. His first paper (New Light on the Gaudapadakarika) appeared in RPR, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 35 ff. He wanted

$1] INTRODUCTION xxxiii

on it that the first of the four sections (prakarana-catustaya) of the Agamaśastra begins with "om ity etad aksaram°" (MaU, 1), though the question as to whether that particular section or all the sections are regarded as śruti or not is not raised by him. Leaving aside what is said by this Sankara whose identity with the great author of the commentary on the Brahmasūtras is doubtful,3 it appears plausible that the view under discussion dates back at least from the time of Rāmānuja (1055- 1137, A.D.), as he seems to quote in his commentary on BS, I. 1. 1, a kārikā of Gaudapāda (I. 16) as śruti.

mainly to show that Madhvacarya cannot rightly be accused of holding the view that the karkas in Book I are regarded as śruti, and form a part of the original MaU. In doing so he tried to demonstrate that teachers " of the three schools of Vedanta, such as Sankara, Anandagiri, Madhusūdana, Brahmānanda, Rāmānuja, Kūra. nārāyaņa, Mahācārya, Madhva, Jayatīrtha, Vyāsā- carya svamin, Ramacarya, etc.," are of the same opinion. In the same journal (RFR, 1932, Vol. III, No. 1; 1933, Vol. IV. No. 2) he wrote two papers more on the same subject. His writings gave rise to an interesting and long controversy in which took part some scholars, such as Y. Subrahmanya Sharma (RPR, 1933, Vol. IV, No. 3), and A. Venkata Subbiah (PO, 1936, Vol. I. Nos. 1-2), B. N. Krishnamurti's rejoinder being given in PO, 1936, Vol. I, No. 2, and 1937, Vol. II, No. 1. Besides, A. Venkata Subbiah wrote in IA, 1933, pp. 181 ff. an independent paper entitled The Māndūkyo- paniad and Gaudapada which deserves to be mentioned in this connection. 3 Those who think that the two Sankaras, the author of the Sarīrakabhasya on BS and the author of the commentary on AS, are one and the same should consider in the latter not only the question of mangalacarana, the inferior quality of composition of the slokas, the defect of metre (Anandagiri's explanation can hardly be accepted), and the gramma- tical mistakes, but also the explanation offered of such kārikās as I. 10, II. 37, III. 25, and IV. 83 as to whether it is possible for the former. Cf. here his explanation of the words bhuto and abhuta in III. 23 with that in IV. 3; of sambhuti in IlI. 25 with that of IU, 12. See note 2. V-1201B

xxxiv ĀGAMASĀSTRA

He writes : jīvasyaiva hi nirodhaḥ śrūyate° anādimāyayā supto yadā jīvaḥ prabudhyata (I. 16) iti ca. By the word sruyate evidently he regards the line as śruti. B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma thinks that the above date is to be pushed back to the time of Sureśvara, the author of the BBV or even that of Sankara, the author of the Sārīrakabhāsya on BS. But in spite of what he has said in support of the view one can hardly accept it when the statements made by the above two teachers themselves are taken into consideration. Sureśvara quotes ĀŚ, I. 11 (kāryakārana°) in his NSi, IV. 41, and tells us (Op. cit., IV. 44) that it is said by the revered Gaudas .' The word Gauda here refers to Gaudapāda. As regards Śankara, he, too, quotes in his commen- tary on BS, II. 1. 9, a kārikā of Gaudapāda (anādimāyayā°, I. 16), and says it is a saying of those teachers who know the tradition of the Vedanta," just as said by him in another case (BS, 1. 4. 14) with regard to another kārikā of Gaudapāda (mțlloha°, III. 15).€ Here Sureśvara and Śankara say in the clearest possible language that the kārikās referred to above are by revered teachers. Hence, according to them, they are not sruti.

4 evam gaudair dravidair nah pujyair ayam arthah prabhasitah. Th's line, as in the printed text is metrically defective. The word ayam seems to be omitted here. 5 atroktam vedāntasampradāyavidbhir ācāryaiķ. 6 tathā ca sampradāyavido vadanti. 7 For detailed discussion of this question readers are ieferred to the scholars and their papers mentioned in note 2 of this section.

§1] INTRODUCTION xxxv

In the face of this clear statement, the passages from some works attributed to Śankara, and as such of doubtful authority, which are quoted by B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma in order to support his view that the karikas of the Book I are sruti, do not, as it appears to me, carry any particular weight. Sureśvara's words, viz., vedāntokti with regard to GK, I. 14, and āgamaśāsana with regard lo GK, I. 3, which are quoted by him for the same purpose from BBV, I. 4. 615 and 744 respectively, do not necessarily imply that the kārikās are sruti iņ the primary sense of the word, for the same author, Sureśvara, takes elsewhere, as we have already seen, one (I. 11) of the GK kārikās of Book I in which the above two kārikās are included, as a statement of Gaudapāda .. We should remember here that the above phrases are applicable also to works of human origin dealing with the Vedānta or Āgama. That this controversy is not new, but an old one is known from the words of Ramäcarya, the author of the NAT, p. 223, where with regard to the two kārikās of Gaudapāda, I. 17 and 18, he raises the question as to whether they are sruti, and arrives at the conclusion that they are really so.8 Thus we reach the conclusion that at least from the time of Ramanuja, the author. of the Śrībhāsya of

8 See RPR, 1933, Vol. IV, No. 2. It is interesting to note here that some- times the kārikās of Book I of GK is referred to as Gaudapādīyoktasruti (LC, p. 580), and Māndūkyopanişadvivaraņa-Gaudapādīyavārttika (NAT, p. 123b). The reader may think over here as to how these two words are used here loosely.

xxxvi ĀGAMASĀSTRA [s1

BS, there were some authoritative teachers according to whom the karikas of Book I of the GK were regarded as sruti and as such they formed a part of the MaU. Speaking generally our old teachers were śraddhādeva, 'trustful,' to use the word of the Satapatha Brāhmaņa (I. 1. 4. 15), with regard to the authenticity of our sacred or Sanskrit texts. Any work dealing with Upanisadic matter would readily be accepled by them as Upanisad." Remcmber the number of Upanisads and their language, subject matter and the way of treatment therein. Are they all Upanisads, though they are called so? The Bhagavadgita is not an Upanisad in fact, yet, it bears the name. We all know its colophon in which occurs the following : ili śrīmadbhagavadgitāsu upanișatsu. And it is so only owing to the fact that it is like an Upanisad. The practice of taking what is actually not an Upanisad as an Upanisad appears to have been in existence from the time of Panini, as says Satyavrata Säma- śramin in his Trayiparicaya, Calcutta, 1893, p. 69. From his work (1. 4. 79)10 we may gather a word, upanisatkrtya, which means 'having made like an Upanisad.' Does it not lead us to conclude as above? But grammarians differ here on the meaning of the word Upanisad, according to some it being tattvajñāna, the 'knowledge of reality,' while to others, rahasya, a 'secret' or 'secret doctrine'. Let us take here the case of Puranas. A Purana is said to have 'five characteristics' (purānam pañcalaksanam). But there are Puränas which are, in 9 See Sankara on BG, II. 19 and 20 where he uses the words rc and mantra referring to the above two stanzas. 10 jīvikopanisadāv aupamye.

INTRODUCTION xxxvi1

fact, not so, though they are known to us under the same name. Similar is the case with regard to Upanisads and other works. It may be noted here in this connexion that it is not only the Book I of GK but also the remaining three Books of it which are sometimes held to be Upanisads, as Advaitaprakaraņa Up., Alataśāntiprakaraņa Up., etc." We have seen above that according to some authorities including specially Madhvācārya only Book I of GK is śruti, and the last three books are not so, and as such they do not form any part of MaU, as does Book I. In other words, they form a separate work or works with which the former has no connexion. If it is not so, it will be very difficult to explain as to why the last three Books are not commented upon by those teachers. Why have they explained only the Book I? It cannot be said that these last three Books were not known to them or in their time, as their existence before them can very satisfactorily be proved by the very simple fact that the great Sankara . who flourished long before them has quoted in his commentary on BS, 1. 4. 14, a kārikā (IlI. 15) from one of those three Books. ' The fact that they did not comment upon the last three Books can be explained in two ways. First, it might have been their honest belief that those three Books had no connexion whatsoever with the MaU which, accord- ing to them, comprised only the twelve prose passages

11 Cee MSS labelled ZZE of BBRAS. Similarly each of the five chapters of the NPTU is regarded as a separate Upanisad. The case is the same with the TU, the three chapters (Siksavalli, Brahma°, and Bhrgu°) of which are held to be three Upanisads.

xxxviii ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$2

and the twenty-nine karikas of Book I of GK. Secondly, it might be said that they could not explain them, for the dominant thoughts therein, viz., Advaitavāda 'absolute monism' and Vijñānavāda 'idealism' would go against their own views, viz., Dvaitavāda 'dualism' or Visisțādvaitavāda 'qualified monism.' The first answer seems to be more reasonable than the second, for had they known that the last three Books, too, were really included in or connected with the original Upanisad they would have undoubtedly explained them, as is done" by Purusottama, the grandson of Vallabhācārya, the great teacher of the Suddhadvaita 'pure monism' school of the Vedānta."

§ 2. The Relationship between the Prose Passages and the Kārikās in Book I

As Madhvācārya says,1 the twelve prose passages of the Upanisad are divided into four parts.2

12 I have seen the commentary only on the first two Books as edited by Bhatta Ramanatha Sastrin and published from Pustimārga- Karyalaya, Bombay, Vikrama 1980. That Purusottama wrole or intended to write his commentary also on Book IlI (Advaita Prakarana) is known from his own words (advaitakhye vicarayisye), p. 55. It seems that he commented or intended to do so also on the last Book. 13 It is known from the Tibetan sources that in about the first half of the eighth century A.D. the GK was regarded as an Upanisat sastra (gsan bahi.bstan. bcos). For Kamalaśila, a disciple of Šāntiraksita 1705-763 A.D.) and the author of the Panjika of his MAK quotes some kārikas from Books II and III of our work which he calls Upanisat Sastra. It is to be noted that Kamalasila's remark cannot be considered with reference only to the above two Books. 1 MaU with Srinivāsīyavrtti, p. 8. 2 Part 1, passages 1-6; Part II, passages 7; Pait IIl, passages 8-11; and Part IV, passage 12.

§2] INTRODUCTION xxxix

Just after each of them there is a line : atraite ślokā bhavanti 'here are these ślokas.' These introductory lines when compared with similar sentences in different Upanisads3 will show that the ślokas are quoted there only to support what has been stated before. And we have already seen that Madhvācārya and others, specially the former, say the very thing quite clearly. Thus it follows from it that the ślokas or kārikās were already in existence and the prose passages came into being afterwards. This will be confirmed if we compare the contents of the prose passages with those of the corresponding kārikās. The comparison will further show that it is the kärikas on which the prose passages are based and not vice versa. Supposing that the kārikās are explanations of the Upanisad, i.e., of the twelve prose passages which are generally held to be so, one may naturally expect to see the difficult points in the latter explained in the former. And it also goes without saying that an exposition may add something new to what is said in the original, but it does not or should not omit the most important and difficult words or points in it. "If these facts are borne in mind, it will be evident that it is the kārikas that should be regarded as the earlier work, and not the prose passages.

3 See BU, IV. 3. 11, 4. 8: tad ete śloka bhavanti; Op. cit., II. 2. 3, IV. 4 6, 7: tad esa śloko bhavati; ChU, II. 21. 3, III. 11. 1, etc .: tad esa ślokaķ; TU, II. 1. 1, 2. 1, etc .: tad apy esa śloko bhavati; ChU, III. 12. 5: tad etad ṛcābhyuktam.

xl ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$2

According to the general view, kārikās 1-5 are to be taken as the exposition of the prose passages 3-5.4 Now the words saptanga 'with seven limbs,' and ekonavimsatimukha 'with nineteen mouths' in the passages 3 and 4 are the most difficult and they are explained differently by different commentators5; but not even the slightest mention of them is made in the kārikās. Why should the karikas which are supposed to have been written in order to explain the text, i.e., the prose passages, omit these two important words? Again, in the prose passages 3 and 9 we have the word vaiśvānara and not viśva, while in the kārikās (1. 1-4, 19, 23) there is only visva and never vaiśvānara. Why is this discrepancy? A commentator is to explain what is actually found in the text, he is not allowed to take the liberty of changing it. Nor are the two words vaiśvānara and viśva identical or synonymous. It is difficult to account for this alteration. That it is owing to the exigency of metre is an absurd hypothesis.“ In this connexion, there are three words more, viz., jāgaritasthāna, svapna°, and sușupta° in the prose passages 3, 4 and 5 respectively. But they are entirely omitted in the karikas. But why? It cannot be explained away by simply saying that they are not so important or difficult as to require any explanation; for, in order to

It is to be noted that the first two passages have nothing in'the karikās as we have them before us. 5 See Ś here and on NPTU, IV; Madhva, KN, and P on the passages; Vidyaranya on NUTU, 1; and Narayana on RUTU, 3. 6 Nole there is prajñanaghana in the prose paceage 5, for which we have ghanaprajña in kārikā 1.

§2] INTRODUCTION xli

understand the main thought of the passages the importance of these three stages, viz., wakefulness, dream, and deep sleep, can in no way be ignored. The fact is that the kārikas are older, and from them, as well as from some older Upanisads, the MaU, i.e., the prose passages to which that name is usually given is compiled or made," and in doing so some of the thoughts of these kārikās and of some older Upanisads are here in the prose passages simplified, modified or explained adding something new. Thus, it appears, in the present case, the author of the prose passages having found the word visva in its special sense nowhere in the Upanisads8 seems to have substituted for it vaiśvānara which is used in such old Upanisads as ChU (V. 11. 12) and BU (V. 9. 1).9 Now the author of NUTU, I where the entire MaU is quoted with some slight variants,10 seeing both the words viśva in the kārikās and vaisvānara11 in the older Upanisads, has adopted both of them12 and simplified the text to some extent.13 As to why these two terms are taken together in NUTU and what is

7 See pp. 223 ff., and Deussen : Upanisads des Veda, p. 574. 8 Excepting perhaps MU, VI. 7 which is not so old. 9 On the greatness of Vaisvanara see RV, I. 59. 6; 98. 1; Nt, VII. 21-23; BS, I. 2. 32. 10 The MaU is almost entirely found also in NPTU, I. ll For a different view of Viśva-Vaiśvānara, Taijasa and Prājna cj. Īśvara and Prajna, Hiranyagarbha and Taijasa, and Vaisvanara and Taijasa in PD, I. 16-29. 12 Sthūlabhuk caturātmā viśvo vaiśvānarah prathamah pādaḥ. 13 This is also with NPTU, I. For example, suksma is substituted here for pravivikta in the kārikās. Here sūksma is undoubtedly simpler than pravivikta. For details the reader is referred to that Up, VI-1201B

xli ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$2

their special significance is clearly shown by Vid y a - ranya in his tika on it and in PD I. 28-29. See also VeS, § 17. Similarly the three states, jagarita, svapna, and susupta in the prose passages (3-4) are later additions from BU, or ChU, or both for a clear exposition of the terms bahisprajña, antahprajña, and ghanaprajña in kārikā 1. That the MaU (i.e., the prose passages) has drawn upon the kārikās and some other Upanisads can be gathered from the comparison of both the texts. In the kārikās we have simply ghanaprajña (1) and änandabhuj (3) or ānanda (4), while the prose passage (5) reads as follows (see p. 224) : yatra supto na kañcana kāmam kāmayate na kancana svapnam paśyati (BU, IV. 3. 9) tat sușuptam. susupta- sthāna ekībhūtah14 prajñānaghana (BU, IV. 5. 13) evānandamayo (TU, II. 5. 1) hy ānandabhuk cetomukhaḥ prājñas trtīyaḥ pādaḥ. Which of these two, the kārika and the prose passage, is the original, and which is the exposition, may now easily be ascertained. The word ghanaprajña in the kārika is no doubt, identical with prajnanaghana in a somewhat different form, and to explain it the prose passage has introduced the word ekibhuta found, in fact, in the form of ekibhavati in different Upanisads.15

14 CJ. ekibhavati, BU, 6. IV. 4. 2 (seven times). See PU IV. 2 (twice); NPTU. IV. 1; NUTU, 1. 15 See note 14.

§27 INTRODUCTION xliii

The karika I. 19 runs thus : viśvasyātvavivaksāyām ādisāmānyam utkaļam | mātrāsampratipattau syād āptisāmānyam eva ca i And the corresponding prose passage (9) is this : jāgaritasthāno vaiśvānaro 'kāraķ prathamā mātrāpter ādimattvād vā. āpnoti ha vai sarvān kāmān ādiś ca bhavati ya evam veda. ·It means that Vaisvanara whose sphere is the waking state is the first mātra 'measure,' the letter a, on account of obtaining (or pervasiveness) or on account of its being the first (apter adimattvad va). One who knows thus obtains one's all desires and becomes first of all. Now, if these two texts are compared it will at once be clear that the second is merely the exposition of the first with a tinge of the language used in the Brāhmanas. Here is one point more, In the first text the reason is advanced as to why Viśva (=Vaiśvänara of the second text) is to be regarded as the letter a. And the reason is sāmanya 'similarity'-similarity between Viśva and the letter a. And this similarity is 'beginning' (adi) or 'obtaining' or 'pervasiveness' (apti). Now, according to the order of Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña, Viśva is at the beginning or first (adi); just so is at the beginning or first the letter a of a, u and m of which Om is composed. Owing to this similarity Viśva is said to be identical with the letter a. The second similarity is apti which by Šankara is thus explained: As Viśva pervades all the visible world, so does the letter a all the speech. On account

xliv - ĀGAMASĀSTRA 1$2

of this similarity, too, Viśva is to be regarded as the letter a. The second text, however, gives a somewhat different explanation of this identity of Viśva and a. For, while the first text says that owing to both the similarities of adi and apti they are identical, the second text clearly says that it is owing to either of them (apter adimattvād va).16 All these seem to be later develop- ments. The case is exactly the same with kārikās 1. 20, 21 and the corresponding prose passages 10 and 11 of the Upanisad, to which the reader is referred. There is one thing more to be noted with regard to the kārika I. 21 and the corresponding prose passage 11 of the Upanisad. In the former one of the two similarities is māna 'measure' from vmā 'to measure' while in the latter the word is not mana, but miti ' measure' from 1/mi. Similarly, while in the former we have apiti 'disappearance' from api-vi, in the latter there is laya ' disappearance.' There is, however, no difference of meaning, as shown, in the two cases. Yet, how far such divergency between an original text and its explanation in Sanskrit can be accounted for is to be considered seriously. The conception of atman as having four fourths or quarters (catuspad) is not so explicit in the words of kārikas17 as in those of the Upanisad, 2. This idea

6 One may, however, say that the word va in the text may be taken in the sense of ca or api. But Śankara or Šankarānanda does not say so. 17 See I. 10-15 (where the fourth state is described), 24, and 29 (where- Onkara is described with or without mātrā).

§2] INTRODUCTION x/v

is, however, fully developed in the Upanisad 2 from the very beginning. This fact also goes to show the priority of the karikas. The distinction between Turya or Turīya 'fourth' and the other three, viz., Viśva, Taijasa and Prajña, as made in the kārikās (I. 10-15), has nothing correspond- ing in the Upanisad, but the nature of Turya, which is expressed in a kārika (I. 29) simply by two words, siva 'blissful' and dvaita-upaśama 'cessation of duality' is thus elaborated in two passages, 7 and 12, of the Upanişad : (i) nāntaḥprajnam na bahisprajñam nobhayataḥ- prajñaņ na prajñānaghanam na prajñam nāprajñam adrstam avyavahāryam agrāhyam alaksaņam acintyam avyapadeśyam ekātmapratyayasāram prapañcopaśamam śāntam sivam advaitam caturtham manyante. sa ātmã sa vijñeyaḥ. (ii) amātraś caturtho 'vyavahāryah prapañcopa- śamah sivo 'dvaita evam onkāra ātmaiva. samviśaty ātmanatmanam18 ya evam veda. These two passages are mere amplification or exposition of what is briefly said in the karika, I. 29, and consequently appear to be later developments, as shows also the language used here. Again, it is to be noted that though in the Upanisad (1) Brahman or Atman is said to have four quarters (catuspad) which are explained there later on (3-6), there is no express mention of them in the karikas which are supposed to be an explanatory work.

IS See VS, XXXII. 11 : atmanātmānam abhisaņviveśa.

xlvi ĀGAMASĀSTRA İ$2

Compare the kārikā I. 24 with the prose passage 8 of the Upanisad and it will be found that the former is explained in the latter in some detail and not vice Dersa. The kārikā (I. 6) opening the discussion about the origin (prabhava) of all things may be connected with the last part of the passage 6 of the Upanisad: prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām.1 Here prabhava is described in the kārikas I. 6-9 at some length, but apyaya 'disappearance' is not even touched in the kārikās. This would hardly be possible if the kārikās were meant to explain the Upanisad. All these considerations lead me to conclude as follows : (i) The karikas in Book I are not the exposition (vyakhyana) of the MaU. (ii) The MaU is mainly based on the kārikās," and not vice versa. (iii) And as such the MaU is later than the kārikās. 21 Here we must remember what Madhvācārya has said on the point. Serious charges may be and have been brought against him saying "that he is addicted to the fabrication of evidence and that he very frequently cites passages from books which do not and

19 It is taken from KU, I1. 2. 20 It has drawn much also upon some older Upanisads as will be seen from the text printed herewith, pp. 223 ff. 21 See Max Walleser: Der alter Vedanta, p. 5. He says that the karikas do not show that the Upanisad was before them.

§3] INTRODUCTION xlvii

did not at any time exist."22 Or Appayya Dīkșita in his Madhvamatavidhvamsana may give a list of such books, or may say of him : tathāpy ānandatīrthīyam matam agrāhyam eva nah | yatra vaidikamaryādā bhūyasy ākulatām gatā || 23 Or, again, most of the authorities cited by him in his commentary on the MaU may not be traced; or one may or may not.attach any value to the myth he has given us that Varuna having assumed the form of a frog received the mantras, i.e., the kārikas originally visioned by Brahman, the creator; yet, in the present case, we have to accept, as we have shown above, his view that the mantras or kārikas are older and on them is based our MaU.21

§ 3. The Inter-relationship of the Four Books of the Āgamaśāstra

It is generally held that the Āgamasāstra has four prakaranas or Books, viz., Āgamaprakaraņa, Vaitathyaº, Advaitaº, and Alātaśānti.° Here arise the following questions : Are these Books, in fact, four parts of the same work, or are they four independent treatises compiled in one volume? Again, is it that

22 A. Venkatasubbiah: IA, 1933, p. 189. 23 See RPR, Vol. II. p. 51. 24 This view was originally expre ssed by me long ago in IHQ, 1925, Vol. I, pp. 119-125, 295-302. Against this see S. K. Belvalkar's observa- tion in his Vedanta Philosophy (Sreegopal Basu Mallik Lectures), Part I, pp. 192-193. But 1 do not think that the modification of my opinion is necessary.

xlviii AGAMASĀSTRA

while one or more of the Books form a work, the remaining one or ones constitute another work? Śankara, the commentator, with his followers, holds that the four Books are the different parts of the same work entitled Ägamasāstra. And so, in order to show their mutual connexion first with reference to Books I and II, he writes just at the beginning of his commentary on Book II: "'When (the Reality) is known there is no duality'-This is already said (1. 18d),1 and it is supported by such srutis as 'There is only one without a second (ChaU, VI. 2. 1).' This is, however, only a statement of scripture (agamamatra). With a view to showing that the unreality of duality can be established also by reasoning (upapalti) Book II is begun with the words ' vaitathyam,' etc." Now, as regards the relationship between Books Il and lII observes (III. I): "The determination of

1 Ś could easily iefer here also to 1. 16, 17 and 29. Moreover, in the manner which he has adopted in showing the relationship between the first two Books the following might also be added in his favour, as in his opinion the Agamaprakarana begins with "Om ity etad aksaram ity adi," in other words, it includes the MaU. We read in the concluding karika (29) of Book I : dvaitasyopasama sivah, which is in fact the same as prapancopaśamam Sāntam sivam and prapancopasamo 'dvaitah of the MaU. 7 and 12 respectively. This very thing is re-assured in Book II. 35 by a phrase which is exactly the same in sense as the above, ie, prapancopasamo 'dvaitah. Again, in 1. 10 we have advaitah sarvabhavanam, and the same thing in one or other form is seen in many places in Book II: tasmad advayata siva (Il. 33) ; advaite yojayet smrtim (II. 35), advaitam samanuprāpya (II. 36). Cf. here also advaitam paramārtho hi (III. 18) And this truth is established there (l1. 1 ff.) by strong reasons showing the unreality (vaitathya) of all things as in dream. Thus does it not show that these two Books are closely connected with ench other ?

INTRODUCTION xlix

Om is made only by a proposition (pratijñāmatra): 'The Atman is the cessation of expression, blissful and without a second, (MaU, 12).' It is also said that 'When (the Reality) is known there is no duality' (I. 29). There in the Book called Non-reality (vaitathya). i.e., II, the absence of duality is set forth by the illustrations of dream, magic, castle-in-air, etc. (I1. 31), by reasons such as the 'capability of being seen (disuafua)" and 'the state of having the beginning and the end' (adyantavattva),s and also by reasoning (tarka). Now, it is asked: Is it that non-duality can be under- stood only by scripture or also by reasoning?' The reply is : It can be done also by reasoning. How is it? For this Book III is begun." Finally with reference to Book IV. S says in introduc- ing it : "Through the determination of Om non-duality is proposed (pratijnata). It is then established (siddha) by showing the non-reality of the different external objects (in Book Il). Again, in Book IlI it is directly ascertained by scripture (agama) and reasoning conclud- ing that it is the highest truth (III. 48). At the end5 it is hinted that the Dvaitins 'Dualists' and Vaināsikas 'Nihilists' are opposed to this view of non-duality which is the meaning of the scripture (agama), and their views are wrong views as they cause such evil passions as attachment and aversion, on

2 Where is it in Book II? 3 H1. 7. 4 advaitam kim ngamamīitreņa prntipattavyam āhosvit tarkeņāpi, 5 In fact, it is not 'at the end' (ante), nor is it in any of the original karlkas. It is the commentator's oton ohrmrvation, See the commentary on I1. 7. VIJ-1201B

1 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [§3

account of their mutual contradiction. As there is no place of evil passions in it, the view of non-duality is the right view, and as such it is praised. Now, here (in Book IV) having shown in details that their views are not right being mutually contradictory they are to be thrown away, and by doing so the establishment of the view of non-duality is to be concluded by the method of inference called avita" 'negative.' For this, (the Book called) ' The Cessasion of the Fire-brand' is begun." Let us now examine the above statement of S. By his observation regarding the connexion between Books I and II, he wants to mean that though it is said in Book I that there is no duality, yet, it is merely an expression of agama, no reason being offered there in its favour. And so in order to support it by reasons Book II is written. But is it really so? Is it that there is no reasoning at all in Book I? None can give the answer in the affirmative. Certainly various reasons are advanced in Book II, but it cannot be said that Book I is altogether conspicuous by their absence. For, they are to be clearly found in kārikas 16-18, though not to that extent as in Book II. Here arises a question : If the connexion between Books I and Il is really as it is shown by Ś to be, then why is it that the author of Book ll himself does not say so. just at its beginning, though he could do so easily? But instead of doing this he begins it without any reference to Book 1, only alluding to the

6 Ānandagiri unnecessarily takes it as āvîta saying that āvita is nothing but avila.

$37 INTRODUCTION li

opinion of the wise that all things in dream are unreal. He could also write here that the determination of Om is through the realization of non-duality which depends on the unreality of external things, which is dealt with in Book II. But he has not done so.

Let us consider here another point. We have already seen that in accordance with some teachers such as Madhvacarya, the MaU is composed of the twelve prose passages and the twenty-nine kārikās in Book I. It is quite clear from it that, in their opinion, the work is a complete one having no connexion with any of the remaining three Books of the AS. This view seems to be confirmed by the fact that its subject matter, i.e., the determination of Om, is here dealt with completely, as one can easily understand from the last two kārikās of Book I, after reading which one does not feel that anything more remains to be further discussed and elucidated; and, in fact, we see nothing directly of Om in the following Book or Books. Thus it follows that the treatise consisting of the karikas of Book I has no relationship to any of the Books that follow. It is also to be noted here that the views of the teachers referred to above cannot be ignored altogether. Further, if Book Il is a continuation of Book I, it could be expected that the former should somehow or other presuppose the latter. But does it do so? If so, where? Moreover, what does one lose if one takes Book II as an independent work on the advaita Vedānta? Does one find in reading this Book in that light anything improper, non-sensical or unintelligible without assuming

lii ĀGAMASASTRA [$3

its connexion with Book I? Or does onc really feel that without Book I it appears to be incomplete?7 That it is complete in itself will be clear if we attentively read at least the concluding portion of it, i.c., kārikās 35-38. Now with regard to the connexion belween Books Il and Ill let us remember what S says. His words, put briefly, would amount to this that non-duality can be understood not only by ägama, but by reasoning (tarka) as well. Consequently to exhibit the reasoning Book lII is required. If that is so, we shall have to accept that according to Ś the object of both the Books Il and lll is one and the same, i.c., giving the arguments for non-duality. In that case, why should there be two separate Books instead of one in which all could be included? This leads one to think of a different object for which Book III must have been written. And what this object was will be clear if one examines the contents with some amount of care. Here at the beginning (III. 1-2) the author tells us about 'non- origination' (ajāti) and having established it concludes in the end(Ill. 48) that it is the highest truth (uttama satya). In doing so he discusses the Vedanta, and in that connexion the absence of difference between Jiva and Brahman. He treats also of a samadhi 'intense abstract concentration' called asparsayoga meant for the realiza- tion of the Truth. It is not that there is no mention of non-duality in this

7 These questions with necessary modifications here and there should be put in discussing the relationship also of the following Books.

$37 INTRODUCTION liii

Book. It is there (III. 18),8 but only incidentally, and as such is not discussed. But can one say rightly that because of the mention of non-duality in this Book, Books II and Ill must have some direct connexion between them? If so, is it not that there will be no difficulty whatsoever in finding out a relationship between any two works on the same subject? But that relationship will certainly not be as that between the different chapters of the same work. It is to be noted that S himself has not suggested such relationship. Thus it appears to me that there is nothing against one's thinking that Book III, too, is an independent work on advaita Vedanta. We now come to Book IV. It has already been seen how S wants to connect it with the preceding Books. He assumes that the views of Dvaitins and Vainäsikas9 are to be shown in details10 in this Book as wrong, and by doing so the conclusion is to be established that the theory of non-duality is right. First, we are to examine here as to how far this assertion can be accepted. Let us take for granted that, as he says, owing to their mutual contradiction the views of the Dvaitins and the Vainäsikas are wrong and this is to be shown in detail in this Book. But where and how much is it done? Dvaitins are referred to by the word vadins 'disputants' only in two places (IV. 3 and 6); but even there in

8 Book III. 18: advaitam paramartho hi See Book I. 17: advaitam paramārthata. 9 See III. 17. 10 Com. on IV. 1: tad iha vistareņa anyonyaviruddhatayā asamyag- darsanatvaņ pradarsya, tatpratişedhenādvaitadarsanasiddhir upasamhartavyā.

liv AGAMASĀSTRA [$3

the first place, though only their mutual contradiction is simply referred to, no detail of it is to be found. There is no allusion to Vainasikas in this Book. But if by that word the Buddhists are meant, no mutual contradiction with the Dvaitins, (or among themselves,) is to be found of their views. On the contrary, the author of the AS has accepted or approved of them throughout the Book as the present writer has attempted to show. How is it then that in accordance with S, one can expect to understand from this Book that the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināsikas are wrong and the view of non-duality is right? Thus one can hardly connect in this way the present Book with the preceding one or ones. We should also remember here the questions that have already been put in discussing the relationship between Books I and Il. See p. lii. ls there then no relationship of any kind between Books IV and others? How can it be so? Certainly there is a relationship and it is rather a close one, as the following lines will show. A careful reader will see that a large number of expressions in various forms in the first three Books are literally quoted or alluded to in Book IV. And it will be noticed that some matters dealt with in the former are done so again in the latter. For instance, 1. 16e=III. 36ª= IV. 81ª; II. 6-7=IV. 31-32"; (cf. Il. 1, 4 with IV. 33, and Il. 2 with IV. 3412); III. 20-22=IV. 6-8"3; III. 29-30

11 See III. 2, 48: IV. 4, 5. 12 The second half is, however, identical. 13 Here is a slight variation, and it is that for the word bhava in the former there is dharma in the latter with regard to the first and the last kārikās.

§33 INTRODUCTION lv

=IV. 61-621; III. 48=IV. 71. Besides, such expressions or topics as the following are to be found in more than one Book: jneyābhinna jñāna 'the knowledge is not different from the knowable.' is in III. 33 and IV. 1; ajātivāda 'the theory of non-origina- tion' in III. 2 ff and IV. 3 ff. Such being the case it must be accepted that Book IV is rather closely related to other Books. But this relationship is not such as between a work and its different chapters on the following grounds : With reference to later Sanskrit works it is a well- known practice that their commencement is with a mangalācarana 'prayer for success' which includes a namaskara 'paying homage' to one for whom the authors have regard. Now, as we have at the very beginning of Book IV a kārikā embodying mangalācaraņa, it naturally induces one to think that it is not a chapter of any work, but itself an independent work. It is, however, true that mangalācarana is found not only at the commencement of a work, but also in other places of it, as in the case of the Nyāyakandali of Śrīdhara on the Praśastapādabhāsya, or of the Sañjivani of Mallinātha on the Raghuvamsa. But it is to be noted here that in such cases it is done in each of the chapters, and not in any particular one, whereas in the present case, here in AS we have it

14 With the following variations: For spandate mayaya manah in III there is cittam calati mayaya in IV, and for manah in III there is cittam in IV.

lvi ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$3

only in Book IV, so far as the extant editions and the MSS that are examined can show." Here we may remember a Buddhist work, viz., the Pañjikā of Prajñākaramati on the Bodhicaryāvatāra. It consists of nine chapters. Here the mangalācarana is only in the first10 and the last chapters, and not in others. Evidently the mangalācarana at the beginning of its chapter IX does not mean to say that it is an inde- pendent work. Considering the contents of this chapter of both the Bodhicaryavatāra and its Pañjikā, which deal with prajñāpāramitā, it appears to me that the only thing that can be said is this that the mangalācarana of the Pañjika simply suggests a special importance of both the works, the Pañjika and the BA. Thus the mangaläcarana of Book IV cannot conclusively show that it is an independent work and not the continuation of the preceding ones. But here is a thing which should not be left unnoticed. Both at the beginning and at the end of Book IV there is a mangalacarana in the form of namaskāra 'paying homage.' Does it not imply that the Book is an independent work and complete in itself? Let us discuss here another point. We have already seen that a number of kārikas in Books Il and Ill

15 We have some ground to think that at the beginning of Book I a few karikas are now missing. It is not improbable that there was a mangalacarana in those kārikās. 1G As the firet folio of the MS, the basis of the present edition (Bibliotheca Indica) of BAP is lost, and the second one, in some parts illegible, is broken down, the beginning lines of BAP could not be printed. Hence it could not be ascertained from the edition as to whether there is any mangalacarana at the beginning. Yet, from its Tibetan version we know that it actually exists. .

$4] INTRODUCTION lvii

are repeated in Book IV. Why is this repetition? Moreover, certain things treated of before are discussed again in Book IV; e.g., ajātivāda 'theory of non- origination' discussed in III is discussed again in IV. But why? A point discussed and settled once in a chapter may, if necessary, be alluded to in a subsequent chapter, but why should it be discussed and settled again? Is it not useless? Why should the author of Book IV indulge in such a useless action? This leads one to think that Book IV is an independent work in which the author has incorporated certain things that are already dealt with by him elsewhere, while others are discussed again more elaborately or in a different way. The discussion of the ajativada is an instance on the point. Thus we arrive at the conclusion that these four Books are four independent treatises and are put together in a volume under the title of the Āgamaśāstra.

§ 4. The Text of the Agamasastra

We are now to discuss a few points regarding the text of the AS, as we have now in the extant editions and the MSS examined for them. Here arises a question : Is it that the text is a complete one? It seems to me that the answer cannot be given in the affirmative. It will at once occur to the mind of a reader that the first kārika of Book I has found its place there quite abruptly. Without any reference to the three states, waking, dreaming and deep sleep as described in the VIII-1201B

lviii ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$4

prose passages of the MaU this kārikā is not intelligible.1 It appears therefore that one or more kārikās here are missing.2 It may be said that as in Book IV,3 so here, too, at the beginning of Book I, a mangalācarana is expected, but it is not found. Hence it appears that originally at least one kārikā was composed here for it, but sub- sequently somehow or other it was lost. This point of mangalācarana cannot, however, be much insisted upon. For, in the time of the author of the AS this practice of mangalācarana was not so much persisted in as in later days. The great Sankara, the author of the Sārīraka-bhāsya, does not follow it, so far as his undisputed works are concerned.1 So it may be that the author did not like it at the beginning of Book I, though he actually followed it in Book IV. Thus this point is not of much importance. Let one read kārikās 5 and 6 and say if there is any connexion between them. Kārika 6 seems to have come here all of a sudden. The commentator Ś is silent here on their mutual connexion. Does this not lead one

1 This fact should not, however, be taken as a rea on for supposing the pricrity of the MaU to the karikas refuted elsewhere on strong grounds. 2 According to also those who hold that the karikas of G a uda pād a are wrilten as an explanation (vyakhyana) of the MaU, one might naturally expect at the beginning some words to that effect, but they are not found. In accor- dance with this theory also at least one karika is lost here. 3 The commentary on the Sankhyakarika may also be added here, but it is not quite certain that its author and the author of AS, though both of them are known by the same name, Gaudapada, are identical. 4 It is disputed that the beginning ślokas of the commentary on the TU, which go by his name are actually written by him,

$4] INTRODUCTION lix

to think that a karika or karikas are missing here? They might have been in existence in the time of the commentator, and possibly they were commented upon by him, but all this was lost afterwards. Undoubtedly Om is one of the subject matters of Book I which consists of 29 karikās, but until kārikā 19 there is no mention whatsoever of the word. This does not seem to be quite proper. And here is one thing more to be borne in mind; it is this that without a knowledge of the fact that Om can be analysed into a, u, and m this kārika (19) can hardly be understood, so one expects here something like the prose passage 8 of the MaU.

With reference to some of the kārikās it appears to me that their original order has been somehow or other changed,so that their proper elucidation has been difficult. Let us take kārikā II. 33. I am afraid, it does not fit well here after karika II. 32. Its right place seems to be after II. 30. Similarly in Book IV kārikās 38, 39, 40 and 41 appear to be 40, 38, 41 and 39 res- pectively, as is discussed in a foot-note on p. 146. As regards IV. 77, it seems to me that between its two lines at least two more lines are lost, as will be seen from the discussion on p. 184, to which the reader is referred. This consideration coupled with that of the variants that are supported by S in his commentary, as I have discussed in their places, shows that the original text of the AS of Gaudapāda underwent some serious changes at least by the time of S, if not ealier.

lx ĀGAMASĀSTRA [95

§ 5. Readings of the Text

We may now speak here a few words with regard to the readings of the AS. The collation' of the MSS referred to above as well as of the different editions of the work has resulted in showing or suggesting true or better readings in many cases, which have mainly been discussed under the kārikas concerned, giving the grounds for the readings adopted. There are, however, other cases where i have not offered my reasons for selecting a particular reading, as they can easily be understood by the reader himself. Below will be found, for example, some notable readings that are chosen or suggested : 1. dve tu (1. 11d) for dvau tu. 2. samvrlatvam na (II. 4d) for samvrtalvena. 3. 'pi pratipadyate (II. 7a) for vipratipadyate. See IV. 32. 4. 'vyavasthitān (II. 13') for vyavasthitān. 5. nānyabhāvena (II. 34") for nātmabhāvena 6. sa-yatha (III. 11d) for kham yathā. 7. yad a° (IV. 12ª) for yady ao. As we have yadi in ", it cannot again be expected in a; nor can it, in that case, be construed properly. Besides, the reading yad a° is actually found in V5. 8. 'nādih (IV. 23ª) for 'nādeh, and jātir(d) supported by PU' for hy ādir. 9. samsāro nopalabhyate (IV. 56d) supported by A' and IO for samsāram na prapadyate.

For a detailed account see Appendix II, Variants, pp. 229-244.

$6] INTRODUCTION lxi

10. svabhāvena (IV. 57a) for sadbhāvena. 11. samvrtya (IV. 58b) supported by V" and $ for jäyante. 12. paratantro 'bhi° (IV. 73e) for paratantrabhio. 13. paratantro 'bhi° (IV. 74°) for paratantrabhio. 14. dharmadhatūh svabhävatah (IV. 81d) for dharmo dhātusva°.

§ 6. The Name of the Work

The present work popularly known as Māndukya- kārikā (or °kārikās) or Gaudapādakārikā (or °kārikās) is traditionally called Agamaśastra. It is owing to this fact that the commentary on it by S is called Agamaśāstra- vivarana.1 Sometimes it is named also Ägamagrantha or Upadeśagrantha as some of the colophons show (p. 244), occasionally both of these names are used together (loc. cit). It is also called or described as Māndūkyavārtiika,2 or Māndūkyopanisad-gaudapāda- vyākhyāna, or Gaudapādīyakārikā, or simply Gauda- padīya after its author, as is shown by some MSS. Again, sometimes it is referred to as Māndūkyaśākhā."

1 See the Colophons, pp. 231, 234, 236, 244. 2 The word Darttika is not properly used here, as the present work has not the characteristics of a varttika, for a Darttika is said to be a work which criticizes what is said, what is not said, and what is said wrongly in the original -work, as says Rajasekhara in his Kāvyamīmamsa, GOS, No. I, 1916, II. p. 5: uktānuktaduruktacintā vārttikam. 3 Sãyana on TA, VII. 1 (p. 483); VII. 2 (p. 570): mayamatram idam dvaitam advaitam paramarthatah iti māndukyasakhāyām śrutivākyam udahrtam l Here 1. 17 of our text is referred to. For other two namas see § 1, note 8, p. xxxv.

lxii ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$6

It may be noticed here that two MSS, D1 and D2, describe the work as Vedantamūla 'origin of the Vedānta' which is very significant. Now let us discuss as to why this book is called Āgamaśāstra. The word āgama among other things means ' a traditional doctrine' or 'anything handed down and fixed by tradition'; and sāstra gives the sense in such cases as the present one, of 'a religious or authoritative treatise.'4 Thus the compound word, Āgamaśāstra, means a sāstra pertaining to āgama, i.e., authoritative treatise which deals with or is based on a traditional doctrine or doctrines. That the Āgamaśāstra is in fact of such character is fully borne out through- out the book itself, as the following few lines will show. Besides the general meaning 'to remember' the root V smr figuratively means also 'to hand down memoriter, declare,' and so its past participial form smrta is used in the sense of 'handed down memoriter, or declared, mentioned,' etc. Thus the sentence sāstre smrtam means 'it is handed down memoriter or declared in a scripture.' And though the subject of the sentence is not expressed in this or similar cases, it is easily understood, it being a teacher or teachers or a similar person or

I For agama see MV, pp. 268-9. For the Buddhist interpretation of the word sastra one may be referred to MVST, p. 4 from which the following is quoted herc: yac chāsti ca kleśaripūn asesān santrāyate durgatito bhayāc ca | tac chāsanāt tranaguņac ca fastram® Il It is quoted also in MV, p. 3. For a description of sastras see Raja - sekhara, Op. cit., Il. For the significance and importance of the -word Sastra (Tibetan bstan. bcos, Chinese lun) mark its use in Nagārjuna's fundamental work, Madhyamakaśāstra.

$7] INTRODUCTION lxiii

persons who may or may not have been mentioned before. Now with regard to our case the word smrta is employed by our author not less than eleven times. This fact clearly shows that our author refers to or deals with some doctrine or doctrines handed down traditionally. This is clear also from his employment of the following phrases in the work : 1. satām iti viniścayaḥ (I. 6); 2. svapna āhur manī- șinaḥ (II. 2); 3. svapna āhuḥ prakāśitam (II. 3); 4. evam āhur manīsiņaḥ (II. 5); 5. drstam vedānteșu vicaksanaiḥ (II. 31); 6. iti tattvavido viduh (II. 34); 7. °munibhir vedapāragaiḥ | nirvikalpo hy ayam drstaḥ prapañcopaśamo 'dvayaḥ || (II. 35); 8. vādinaḥ kecid (II. 3) ; 9. vivadanto 'dvayā hy evam ajātim khyāpayanti te (IV. 4); 10. khyāpyamānām ajātim taih (IV. 5); 11. jātim icchanti vādinaḥ (IV. 6).6

§ 7. The Author

We have already seen,1 as the great Śankara says in his commentary on the BS, I. 4. 14 and II. 1. 9, that the work was by an Acarya 'teacher' to whom the tradition of the Vedanta was known. But the question

5 I. 1, 20, 26; II. 4. 7; III. 1; IV. 32, 46, 88, 90, 94. 6 Besides, the tollowing words may be referred to here: 1. anya (I. 7); 2. apara (II. 26); 3. aśramavrd (II. 27); 4. kālacintaka (I. 8); 5. kālovid (l1. 24) ; 6 gunavid (II. 20); 7. rittavid (lI. 25); 8. (dig-) vid (I1. 24); 9. padavid (II. 21); 10. pranavid (Il. 20) ; 11. buddhirid (ll. 25) ; 12. (bhuvana-joid (II. 24); 13. (bhuta-)vrd (I1. 20); 14. bhoktrvid (II. 22); (bhojya-wid (II. 22); 15. manovid (II. 25); 16. murtavid (II. 23) ; 17. laya-) vid .Il. 28); 18. lokavid (I1. 21) ; 19. sūksmavid (II. 23) ; 20. srstivid (II. 28); 20. sthitivid (II. 28). 1 See supra, § 1, notes 5 and 6, p. xxxiv. .

lxiv ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$7

is: who is that Acarya? That he is Gauda- pada2 is well-known traditionally and found in the colophons of each of the four Books in MSS of the original and its commentary. He is sometimes called Gaudapādācārya, Gaudācārya,4 or simply Gau da." From this we may think that his real name is Gauda, the words -pāda, -pada, -carana, or -acarya being added to it simply as honorific.' That his actual name is Gauda is stated very clearly by Bālakrşņānanda Sarasvatī (middle of the 17th century A.D.) in his SMV, p. 6, ll. 9-12. Now the question arises: Is the word Gauda his personal name or does it simply signify that he belongs to a country called Gauda? In Sureśvara's NSi, IV. 44, there are two words, Gaudas and Drāvidas, which refer to Gaudapādācārya, the author of the present work and the great Šankarācārya, the author of the Upadesasahasri, respectively, according

2 Sometimes we have Gaudapada (JM, 10) and Gaudacarana (SMV, p. 5, 1. 23). most probably for metrical exigency. 3 Ś on ŚU, I. 8 (p. 30). 4 PD, II. 23; Sayana on TA, VII. 2 (p. 565). 5 NSi, IV. 44. A Venkatasubbiah (JA, 1933, p. 193) is of the same opinion. " There is evidence to show that the country called Gaudadesa was once regarded as the land between 82° and 88e longitude and 25e and 28° latitude . along with the adjacent districts of North Bengal (Matsya P., XII. 30; Kurma P., Part 1, 20-9; Linga P., Part 1, I. 65, 34; JASB, 1908, pp. 273 ff.) Recent researches show that the country is identical with North Pengal. See Haranchandra Chakladar: Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. Ill, Part 1. pp. 43 ff.

. $7] INTRODUCTION 1xv

to the commentator, Jñanottama .8 It may be said that as Sankara is referred to by a name related to his native country, Dravida (i.e., Kerala, the modern Malabar), and not by a personal name, so the case must have been the same with Gaudapāda; in other words, he, too, must have been alluded to by a name connected with his country which is Gauda. Otherwise, why should Sureśvara mention him in a different way? Walleser (op. cit., p. 3) is of opinion that by the two words of Sureśvara, Gaudas and Drāvidas, we are to understand two Vedantic schools. If we are to know by the word Drāvidas a school founded by Śankara in Malabar (the representative work of which is here said to be the Upadesasāhasrī), we must take also the Gaudas as a native school established in North India in the land of Gaudas,9 which might have already been much advanced in culture. It is, however, immaterial, to my mind, to discuss as to whether the words actually refer to the two

8 It may be noticed here that in the second edition (Bombay Sanskrit Series, No. XXXVIII, 1906) of the NSi occurs the following line in Jñanottama's commentary on IV. 44: kevalānām api drāvidatva- prasiddheh. Seeing this the editor. Colonel G. A. Jacob writes in his notes (p. 247): "Who are the kevalas referred to in the commentary?" The fact is that the word kevala is wrongly written, or read, or printed for Kerala, the ancient name of the country. The same mistake occurs also in the revised ecition (1926) of the book, p. 193. 9 Walleser thinks that the country might bave been so named owing to much cultivation of sugar-cane (guda). Cf. the word pundra for North Bengal, which also means 'sugar-cane' (of red variety). IX-1201B

lxvi ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$7

representative teachers or to the two schools represented by them, both the interpretations being egually possible. It may be pointed out here that merely the word Gauda cannot invariably refer to one who is an inhabitant of the Gaudadesa. One may not actually be an inhabitant of it, yet, may be regarded as a Gauda. Abhinanda, the author of the Yogavasisthasāra or Laghuyogavasistha, though a Kashmirian, is called Gauda. Similarly Brahmãnanda, the well- known author of the Laghucandrika, though not born in Gaudadeśa, has the epithet Gauda, probably as he was educated in Gaudadesa, Bengal, being, as is said, a fellow student of Gadādhara Bhattācārya. One who has any connexion, past, present, or future, in respect of oneself or one's ancestors, with the Gaudadeśa may be a Gauda. On this one may be referred to MD, I. 3. 23 with Sabarasvämin's commentary in which it is said that a man who has set out for the city of Mathura is regarded as a Māthura ; similarly one who lives in the city of Mathura, or one who has come out from the city of Mathura is also called a Mathura.10

With regard to our author we should remember here the views of Balakrsnānanda Sarasvatī already once referred to. He writes (SMB, p. 6, Il. 9-12): There was in the country of Kuruksetra a river

10 mathurayām abhiprasthito māthura iti. mathurāyām vasan mathurāyā nirgafaś ca,

$7] INTRODUCTION lxvii

called Hirarāvatī." On its banks there were some Gauda people, the pre-eminent of whom was our author, and as he was absorbed in deep meditation beginning from the Dvapara age, his special name is not known to modern people and so he is celebrated by the general one.12 Let us notice here the observations made by Walleser (op. cit., pp. 6 ff.). He thinks there was none named Gaudapada who is believed to have been the author of the present work. By the word Gauda-padas we are to understand the four Books (prakaraņas) of the work and Gaudapādīyakārika is the name for the whole work, as found in MSS. This last title seems to be somewhat artificial and it can be guessed that the work was commonly known as Gaudapādī in the same way as the provincial expression Bhadracari for Bhadracarya. In fact both the titles Gaudapādī and Āgamaśāstravivarana have been shown by G. F. Hall in one of his contributions.13 Walleser says further that the quotations from later works correspond to his opinion that no teacher known as Gaudapad a was the author of the book, but it

11 It remains to be identified. It is doubtful if the name is correctly written by the scribe of the MS or read or edited accurately by the editors. 12 gaudacaranah kuruksetradesagata-hiraravatī-nadītīrabhavagaudajatiśresthāh deśaviśesabhavajātināmnaiva prasiddhāh, dvāparayugam ārabhyaiva samadhinisthatvenādhunikajanair aparijnātavisesābhidhānāh sāmānyanāmnaiva lokavikhyatāh. 13 Such practice is still very common in the country ; e.g., Vidyāsāgarī, a țīkā by nandapūrņa Vidyāsāgara on the Khandanakhandakhādya; Rāmabhadrī, a țīka on the Nyayakusumanjalt by Ramabhadra; so are Dinakarī, Rāmarudrī, etc. etc.

lxviii ĀGAMASĀSTRA

existed among the contemporary people as a funda- mental work of a school and not as a production of a definite author. He shows from the Tibetan sources1 that though the work was known to the Buddhist authors as a Vedantasastra in which the doctrines of the school are explained, nothing is known there of Gaudapāda who is supposed to have composed it. Šan k ara in his Śārīrakabhāsya quotes .twice, as shown above, from the work referring to our author (or authors) as those to whom was known the tradition of the Vedanta (vedāntārthasampradāyavid or simply sampradāyavid). The commentator, Govindānanda in his Ratnaprabhā and Ānandagiri in his Nyāya- nirņaya introduce the above opinion of Śankara as the 'approval of the old' (rddhasammati, BS, I. 4. 14 and II. 1. 9). Sureśvara has quoted two kārikās (NSi, IV. 41, 42; our text I. 11 and 15 respectively) mentioning their author as Gaudas (gaudaih),15 while he takes Śankara as the representative of the Drāvida tradition. In the commentary on the NSi Jñanottara describes the quoted passages as gaudapādīya-vākya. We have already seen in the PD (II. 28) the Gauda teaching, but the commentator, Ram akrsn a, does not know

1 That is, the Tibetan translations of Santiraksita's Madhyamakā- lankārakārika together with its commentary by Kamalaśila, as well as of Bhavaviveka's Madhyamakahrdayakārika and its commentary Tarkajvala by himself Vide infra. 15 It is, however, not true that Sureśvara never mentions the name Gaudapada, for he uses it at least for once in his BBV, IV. 4. 886 (p. 1866). In the same work he has also used the words gaudapadiya vacas (1. 4. 389, p. 510) and gaudācārya (II. 1. 386, p. 951).

$7] INTRODUCTION 1xix

the author, he describes the passage quoted as ācārya-16 sammati. Sadananda quotes in his Ves, § 33, two kārikās, III. 44, 45, referring as tad uktam, and Nrsimha Sarasvatī, the commentator, does not name their author simply alluding to them as vrddhasammati 'the opinion of the old.' R a m a - tīrtha, another commentator, says that it is a con- temporary opinion. Again, if we examine Kaśmīraka Yati, the author of the Advaitabrahmasiddhi (p. 277) we find no evidence that the Gaudapādakārikā was known to him as a work of a single author. Vijñānabhiksu has quoted kārikās (II. 32, III. 5, 26) from the work in his Sankhyapravacanabhāsya, (I. 45, 47; 153; VI. 50). But there is nothing to show that Gaudapāda was taken to be their author. Walleser thus says that not a single passage 17 can be quoted from all these texts which can make us believe that Gaudapadī had Gaudapāda as its author. We are told that Sankara received instruction from Govinda who was a disciple of G a u da pa d a with whom the former had a conversation and he had another conversation with Vyasa himself. The same sort of contradiction is found also with regard to the residence of Govinda; one source gives it as the banks of the Narmada and the other the Himalayas. This sort of things does not give us a historical clue.

16 Not Urddha-, as writes Walleser. 17 Excepting, as he himself has pointed out, one passage from S's commentary on the SU, I. 8, where the following line occurs: tatha ca sukaśisyo gaudapadacaryah. But that' the commentary is not by the great S is the view not only of Walleser but also of others including the present author.

İxx ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$7

Walleser thus finally observes that the whole tradition is fabulous, and with this the last of the arguments in favour of the authorship of Gaudapādi by a certain Gaudapada vanishes. And as one could not explain the word Gaudapādi one imagined a fictitious Gaudapäda. Now he adds that for the history of Vedanta we can gather from the preced- ing discussion that in a time considerably before the activities of San ka ra there existed a philosophical school in the country of Gauda and in the same district in which Buddhism flourished till the eighth century. This school for the first time put the traditions of the Vedas and Upanisads in the form of a śāstra, i.e., a school doctrine and embodied it in a collection of sayings (Spruchsummlung) consisting of the four pādas of the Gaudapādakārika. Already in the time of Sankara this text, the only older Vedanta text which has been preserved and perhaps the only one which was ever produced, enjoys high consideration quite independently of legendary traditions which connect Śankara with Govinda and Šuka with Gaudapada. The existence of the North Indian school at the beginning of the century preceding Śankara seems well-established.

We are, however, to consider here the following without entering into a hair-splitting discussion. There is a text before us known as the Āgamaśāstra or Gaudapādakārika, or passing under any other similar name; and of this text there must be an author. There may, however, be more than one author. The

$7] INTRODUCTION lxxi

work may represent the view of the predominant school of a particular people. But can we only for this reason think that it is the production of the whole people of the land? When a very prominent man of a country pronounces something in public, it may be regarded as the opinion of the country itself, and not as his personal view, though he may not consult the people of the country before doing so. In the same way, it appears to me, that the present work is by one person and yet, it represents the views of the entire country to which he belonged. But who is that person? He is one Gauda. When there is no contradiction nor any incongruity, why should we not accept the tradition, as far as possible? Thus, as we have already seen, the actual name of the author is Gauda, or with the honorific word -pāda or acārya added to it Gaudapāda, or Gaudācārya. .Much could be known of any author from the old records on which naturally one inclines to depend for ascertaining the truth. But they are so fantastic and self contradictory in the present case that it is almost impossible to find out the truth from them.18 These

18 On their unreliability observes S. K. Pelvalkar in his Vedanta Philosophy, Poona, 1929, pp. 231-232: "while all the other so-called Prācīna, Brhat, or Keraliya Sankaravijayas are prejuciced in favour of one or the other Pontifical See, and so contain almost shameless tampering of traditions and documents which is provable to the hilt even by the accusations on the score of falsification of records which each party finds it possible to bring against the other. When such is the case of the avowed followers of the School, it need hardly be wondered at if the pronounced opponents belonging to the Madhva and the Ramanujiya Schools have gone one better, and indulged in a merciless throwing of mud in the hope that some of it might stick,"

.

lxxii ĀGAMASĀSTRA 1$8

records are the accounts of the life of the great Śankara and those who were connected with him in some way or other.1 Rea ders desirous of knowing these legendary accounts of Gaudapāda are referred to those works themselves which are to be used very cautiously.

§ 8. The Date of Gaudapāda

Now let us discuss the date of our author, and in doing so we shall begin from one of the old accounts of the school already referred to, viz., JM, in which Gauda- päda is mentioned as having some connexion with a few Greeks. It is said there (10)1 that the feet of Gauda- pāda were adored by Ayärcya, and he was the preceptor of such Nisāka mystics as Apalūnya. Here Ätmabodhendra, the commentator, adds some- thing on the authority of such works as Gaudapadollasa of Harimiśra, and Patanjalivijaya (=°carita? of Rāmabhadra Dīksita). He writes that when Gaudapäda on a peak of the Himālayas was seeking after the truth of the self under the guidance

9 Gopinath Kaviraj singles out the following books in his learned Introduction (in Hindi) to the Brahmasutras published from the Acyuta Press, Benares, 1936, pp. 26 ff : (1) Sankaradigvijaya of Msdhavā - cārya (not of Vidyaranya ), (2) Sankaravijaya of Anandagiri, (3) Šankarābhyudaya of Rājacūdāmaņi, (4) Sankaravijaya of Cidvilāsa, (5) Sankaravijaya of Sadānanda, (6) Punyaślokamanjari of Sarvajña Sadāśivabodha, (7) Puņyaślokamañjarī-parišista of Ātmabodha. (8) Gururatnamala of Sadasivabrahmendra. Its tika, Susuma, by A tmabodhendra is a good one. 1 abhiyunjad-ayarcya-pūjyapādān apalūnyādinişakasiddhanetțn | atha gaudapadān phaņīfabhāsya-prathemācāryakaparditān prapadye!

$8] INTRODUCTION lxxiii

of Ś u k a,2 it was through his influence that the wrong Buddhistic views (sauddhodani-kadadhvanam) of the persons headed by Ayärcya who was being attended by such Yogins belonging to the Western border of the · country as Apalūnya and Damīśa (apalūnya- damīśādyaparāntyayogibhiś ca), as well as by Prāvrti, the Sākya chief of Taxila (takśaśilādhīśa-sakyaprāvrti- pramukhaih), were made to disappear. If here one turns over the pages of The Indian Travels of Apollonius of Tyana by Osmond de Beauvoir Priaulx, JRAS, 1860, pp. 70 ff., one will easily see that Apalunya in the Sanskrit text is no other than the Pythagorian philosopher Apollonius of Tyana, who flourished in the first century A.D. He travelled to India and came to the court of Phraotes who was the same as Pravrti in the Sanskrit text, the king of Taxila. And Damisa of our text is indentical with Damis,

2 In connection with Gaudapada's tapasya in the Himalayas the following story may be related here from Narayana's tika on MaU: The four parts of the MaU of the recension of the RV (yet, note that 'the Upanisad is said to belong to the AV) were explained by Gaudapada by his four Books (prakaranas). He was a disciple of Suka and the grand preceptor ,of S. He flourished at the end of the age called Dvapara. At the hermitage of Badarika by his devotion he propitiated Narayana and having obtained a boon from him he entered into a cave of a mountain, so that he would not look at the face of any one born in the age of Kali. In this state he was approached by S and requested to come out from the cave, but he did not comply with the request. Yet, having written the four Books of his woik on the leaves of a Banyan tree with ied chalk he gave them to S. Report of Sanskrit Manuscripts in Southein India by E. Hultzsch, No. III, p. 133, But there is no end of such legends on which one can hardly rely. X-1201B

lxxiv ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA [$8

the fellow traveller and friend of Apollonius. The last person in our text, Ay ärcy a, is the same and one, with larchas (probably a corruption from Rac'hyas, op. cit., p. 83, note), a Greek king.8 All this looks well, but do you gain anything from it about the date in question? The Greek account simply relates the travel of Apollonius,4 being completely silent about Gaudapäda. There is no doubt that some names of both the accounts are identical, but it does not follow from it that the persons having the same names are also identical. Supposing that the account is "true it will be for a further creation of confusion in settling the date even of the great S, into which we do not enter here as useless. Hence without having recourse to such legendary records for the determination of the date of our teacher

3 Perhaps it is M. Hiriyanna (IHQ, 1926, pp. 415-416) who has first made the identification. Sce also Gopinath Kaviraj, op. cit., pp. 22-23. 4 How far this account is true it is not easy to say, Priaulx, the author of the paper observes (Op. cit., p. 104): "of Damis's geogiaphy, I can only say that it reminds me of a fairy tale. ... Who shall explain these discrepancies, account for these mistakes and fix localities thus vaguely described?" "Reviewing the whole work of Philostratus (i.c., the original author of the life of Apollonius) it seems to me that Apollonius certainly pretended to have travelled through and made some stay in India, but that very possibly he did not visit it, our Damis never accompanied him; but if we may judge from cinnamon and pepper-trees ... fabricated this journal perhaps from books written upon India, and tales current about India, which he easily collected at the great mart for Indian commodities, and resort for Indian merchants-Alexandria."

$8] INTRODUCTION

we should take a safer course by which at least the uppe and lower limits of his time can be ascertained. I think we have no reason for discarding whi Walleser has said in this respect. So far thre Buddhist writers are known to us, who have actuall quoted Gaudapāda, viz., Bhāvavivek (cir. 500-550 A.D.),5 Śāntirakșita (705-762 A.D. and his disciple Kamalaśīla. Bhāvavivek is the author of the Madhyamakahrdayakārika as we as of its commentary Tarkajvala, the full title bein Madhyamakahrdayavrtti Tarkajvala. In chapter VIII ( his work Bhävaviveka reviews the system c the Vedantins as he does in other chapters the system of Sānkhya, Vaiśesika and Mīmāmsā In doing so Bhävaviveka in his TJ, VIII ha quoted passages from such texts as ChU, SU and Mul Besides, there are some other passages quoted, four c them (10-13) being very important in the preser connexion. While the first three have the close: relationship with three karikas of our text the last (i.e. TJ, VIII. 13) is entirely identical with III. 5 of ou

5 Or Bhavya, as he is sometimes called, or Bhavyavivek as suggested from the Tibetan sources (legs.ldan.hbyed). Bhavavivek was the founder of the Prasangika school of Nagarjuna's Madhyami system. He is much criticised by Candrakirtti in his MV, Bhāvaviveka' s Prajnapradipaśāstra (Nanjio, No. 1185) was translat into Chinese by Prabhakara Mitra in 630-632 A.D. He was junior contemporary of Dharmapala (Th. Watterr: On Yu Chwang's Travels in India, II. p. 222) who lived in the 5th century A .: (Winternitz: History of Indian Literature, Eng. Tr., 1933, Vol. p. 362). Thus it can be said that the date of Bhavaviveka is 500 A.I or a few years after it.

İxxvi ĀGAMASĀSTRA T$8

text. There is, therefore, not an iota of doubt here that the GK was known to Bhāvaviveka. With reference to the other three kārikas cited by Bhävaviveka, which are not identified in the GK, but have the closest relationship, we have to seek after another source. As regards Sāntiraksita he is the author among others of the Madhyamakālankarakārikā as well as of its commentary called Madhyamakālankāravrtti. Besides, his disciple Kamalaśila has written a Pañjika on the former work just as on the Tattvasamgraha. Šāntaraksita in his MAK, 93, discusses the views of the Aupanisadas (lit. Aupanisadānusārins, Tib. gsan.ba.pahi. rjes.su.hbran.ba.dag), and in doing so he cites there not less than ten kārikās from our text which is referred to by Kamalaśīla in his Pañjikā as an Upanișat śāstra." Now as we have seen above we cannot reasonably deny the existence of the GK before Bhāvaviveka who has actually quoted it. Thus one may ascertain that the time of Gaudapada is cir. 500 A.D. The following consideration, too, leads us to the same decision. Gaudapada has quoted almost fully, partially or substantially from works of some

6 Generally in Buddhist texts we come across similar words, as Aupanisadika (TSP, SI. 328), and Upanisad-vadin (BAP, pp. 455, 465), and not Vedāntavādin or Vaidāntika. 7 It may be noted that though Santiraksita has quoted here so many karikas from GK he has not done so at all in TS (Sls. 328-335) either from this or any other work. For the karikas quoted in Tibetan works see our text II. 3, 4, 5, 6, 18, 19, 20; III. 4, 5, 6, 8.

$81 INTRODUCTION lxxvii

celebrated Buddhist teachers who flourished between 200 A.D. and. 400 ,A.D. For instance, see our text, IV. 22a-b :

svato vā parato vāpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate | And read here. Nāgärjuna's (200 A.D.) MK, XXI. 13ab : na svato jayate bhavaḥ parato naiva jāyate | See our text, pp. 105 ff. and 127 ff. Again, we read in our AS, 7cd and 29cd : prakrter anyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhavișyati i| And in MK, XV. 8cd we have : prakṛter anyathābhāvo nahi jātūpapadyate |i The following line occurs in AS, IV. 4b : abhūtaņ naiva jāyate | And let us cite here the following from the CS, 373d of Nāgārjuna's disciple Āryadeva who probably lived, in the words of Winternitz (A History of Indian Literature, Eng. Tr., 1933, Vol. II, p. 350), "at about the turning point of the second and third century A.D." : nābhūto nāma jāyate il See our text III. 44 (pp. 77-78) : : laye sambodhayec cittam viksiptam śamayet punaḥ | sakasāyaņ vijānīyāc chamaprāptam na cālayet || With this read the following from MAS, XIV. 9cd_ 10ab of Maitreyanatha or Asanga (400 A.D.): . līnam cittasya ghņīyad uddhatam samayet punaḥ | šamaprāptam upekșeta tasminn alambane punaḥ ||

Ixxviii ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$8

Thus Gaudapäda guoting the above teachers can in no way be placed before them, in other words he cannot be assigned a date before 400 A.D. Here we are to consider another kārika of our author, i.e., IV. 13 which runs thus (see pp. 114-115) : jātāc ca jāyamānasya na-vyavasthā prasajyate | Compare this with the following line quoted in MV, p. 13 from the AKV :

utpannasya punar utpattau kalpyamānāyām ana- vasthāprasańgaḥ. Now this work, AKV, is by Yasomitra. Before he wrote his own commentary on the AK of Vasubandhu (400 A.D.) there were at least three commentaries, two of them being written by Gunamati (425 A.D.) and Vasumitra, as he himself says in the introductory slokas of his work. This shows that Yasomitra lived in the 5th century A.D. And so, if Gaudapāda's kārika (i.e., IV. 13) is in fact based on the above line of the AKV his date naturally falls in the 5th century A.D. Certainly this will militate against the traditional time of Sankara or the succession of teachers and disciples of his school. But how far the accounts of this succession can be relied upon is a question which has not yet been settled finally or satisfactorily. Are not the traditional succession lists kept in different Mathas unscrupulously manipulated? Under these circumstances we have no course left to us other than the evidences of

$81 INTRODUCTION lxxix

quotations and cross-references in early and reliable texts. 8

Let us discuss the question from a different point of view. There is a work Paramārthasara9 attributed to Śeș a who is apparently the mythical Śe s a, as he his referred to in the work itself as adhāra (8), i.e., jagad-ādhāra (87). From this some take him as Patañjali, the less mythical Ses a, the author of the Mahabhasya on Pānini.

It is also called Āryāpañcāsiti owing to the fact that it is composed in eighty-five stanzas in the Āryā metre, though in fact there are eighty-seven stanzas.10

8 Our old traditions are so divergent that according to them as well as the ·modern researches we shall have to place Śanka ra some time between . the 6th century B.C. and the 9th century A.D., viz., 6th century B.C., 4th century B.C., Ist century B.C., 4th century A.D., 6th century A.D., and the 9th century (788-820) A.D. The last date is now accepted by many a scholar. See Gopinath Kaviraj, op. cit., pp. 23ff; Belvalkar, op. cit., pp. 209 ff. 9 There are so far at least five editions of this book, the latest and critical one being by S .. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Transliterated Text, English Translation and Notes), Karnataka Publishing House, Bombay, 1941. 10 It may be that the first two stanzas which are not in Arya, but Upajati, were added later on. But, if it is so, as regards the first of them, it was added long before "Abhinavagupta who has adopted it just at the beginning of his PS2, 1. The last stanza (87 : vedanta°) does not also appear to constitute the original, being added by a second hand, as is suggested by Suryanarayana Sastri, op. cit., p. 40, note. Mark here the employment of the perfect tense, in the word babandha. The original number, 85, can however, be obtained by reckoning an additional stanza between 18 and 19 given from a MS in a foot-note in the Trivandrum edition (PS) being fully supported'by PS2, 9 (and not 6 as in PS3).

xxx ĀGAMASĀŚTRA [$8

It is a Vedantic work.11 Its excellence and impor-' ance can be understood by the simple fact that Abhinavagupta (in the end of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century A.D.), the great teacher of the Pratyabhijña school and Poetics, adapted it,12 though retaining the original title, for writing a manual of the Pratyabhijña school, by some omissions, additions, alterations and improvements.1 That it is an adaptation of the first work is known from the statement of- Abhinavagupta himself.14 In this work of Ses a there are some passages, or words, or thoughts that supply certain points of. resemblance to those of our AS. In order to see if this fact can throw any light on the question of the time of Gaudapāda we should like to discuss it in the following few lines. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (op. cit., p. viii) has noticed some of these points of resemblance15

J1 The last stanza (87) of it says that it was composed by its author having ooked through the entire Vedānta-Sastra. 12 V. V. Sovani: JRAS, 1912, pp. 257 ff; K. C. Pandey: Abhinavagupta, 1935, pp. 57 ff; S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri: NIA, Vol. I, pp. 37 ff. 13 For instance compare PS1, 35 and 36 with PS2, 36 and 37 respectively. Abhinavagupta's work contains 105 karikas, though he himself states that it has 100 karikas. On this see K. C. Pandey, op. cit.,' p. 56. 14 See PS2, 1 and 2. ly engar' s observation (JRAS, 1910, p. 1338) does not appear to be reasonable. 15 For easy reference I write below the karikas cf PS1 mentioning the numbers of the corresponding karikas of the GK : (a) prāņādyanantabhedair ātmānam samvitatya jālam iva | samharati vāsudevaķ svavibhūtyākrīdamāna iva l! PS1, 30. cf. GK, II. 19.

$81 INTRODUCTION İxxxi

and writes (p. ix) after discussing them as follows: "It seems plausible that Gaudapada was drawing on some earlier sources, agreeing in part, while rejecting in part, and that the rejection was not consistent or thorough. Such a hypothesis may well consider the Paramärthasāra the original drawn upon." There is not the least doubt that Gaudapāda has drawn much upon earlier works, as it is perfectly clear through- out his book,1 but can Sesa's PS1 be included in them, though it may appear to be so? In order to avoid prolixity I propose to discuss only two points raised by Suryanarayana Sastri

(b) tribhir eva viśvataijasaprājnais tair adimadhyanidhanākhyaih | jagratsvapnasusuptair bhramabhutais chāditam turyam || PSI, 31. cf. GK, I. 1-5; MaU, 3-7 (pp. 223-234). (c) mohayatīvātmānam svamāyayā dvaitarūpayā devaķ | upalabhate svayam evam guhagatam purusam ātmānam l| PS1, 32. cf. GK, II. 12. (d) jaladharadhumodgatibhir malinīkriyate yatha na gaganatalam | tadvat prakrtivikārair aparamrstah parah purusah || PS1, 35. cj. GK, III. 8. (e) ekasminn api ca ghațe dhūmādimalāvīte śeșāh | na bhavanti malopetā yadvaj jīvo 'pi tadvad iha ll PS1, 36. cf. GK, III. 5. (f) himaphenabudbudā iva jalasya dhūmo yathā vahneḥ | tadvat svabhāvabhūtā māyaisā kathitā visnob I PS1, 53 cf. GK, I. 9. (g) yad yat siddhantagamatarkesu prabruvanti ragandhah anumodāmas tat tat tesām sarvātmavādadhiyā || PS1, 65. cf. GK, IV. 5. (h) utpattināśavarjitam evam paramārtham upalabhya' kıtakrtyaḥ saphalajanmā sarvagatis tișthati yathesțam ! PS1, 79. cf. GK, III. 32. 16 For this the reader is referred to my Annotation of the AS, and the notes added thereto. XI-1201B

lxxxii ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$8

in the hope that this may decide the case. He writes: "Both are concerned with the three forms-Viśva, Taijasa and Präjña-as veiling the fourth which is the real.""7 This refers, as he says, to PS1, 31 and GK, I. 1 and 11. The most important thing to be pointed out here first is that between the two texts, AS and PS', the latter is cerlainly a later development, as a perusal of the texts will show. Let us, however, make an attempt to understand PS1, 31 as it is before us without taking any help either from the commentator or from Abhinavagupta.1 The word jägrat-svapna-susupla is an adjective of viśva- taijasaprājna. But what is to be understood from the abrupt statement that Viśva, Taijasa and Prajña are jagral, svapna and susupla respectively? What are these three, Viśva, Taijasa and Prajna? How can one know them? How is one to understand that there is only one and the same who is regarded as three (i.e., Viśva, etc.) owing to three different stages (i.e., jagrat, etc.)? How is it that turya undoubtedly referring to Vasudeva in the preceeding kārikā (30) is put in the neuter gender,

7 Is the last part of this statement exactly so? Do chadita in PS1, 31 (=avrta in P', 34) and -baddha in karyakāranabaddha and kāranabaddha in GK, I. 11 convey the same idea? We are to consider here GK, I. 15 and NSi (IV. 41, 42) where these two karikas of Ga udapād a are quoted. 18 He has here the following two karikas (PS', 34 and 35) : sṛstisthitisamhārā jāgratsvapnau sușuptam iti tasmin | bhanti turiye dhamani tathapi tair avitam bhati !! (In the first half of this karika in PS3 quoted in frot-note 2- spapnam is to he read as -svapnau .! jagrad viśvam bhedat svapnas tejah prakasamahatmyat prajāah suptāvastha jsnaghanatvat latah param turyam l

$8] INTRODUCTION lxxxil1

while the latter word is in the masculine? " Moreover, what is the significance of taih in the first half? If it is not superfluous, what is it that it refers to? How far are we justified with the commentator in taking the word with chadita in the second half? Again, why is it that eva * should be used in the first half after tribhir? All this taken together shows, as far as l can judge, that Sesa's work presupposes that of Gaudapāda, and not vice versa. Śesa had before him ĀŚ, I. 1-5 (as well as MaU, 3-7) upon which he has drawn adding something (adimadhyanidhana) more quite independently as he has done throughout his book. While in AS there are five kārikās, Še ș a has only one, and even in it he has made some addition. This on one hand and the metrical exigency on the other did not allow him, as seems to me, to express his ideas adequately with the result that there occurred some anomalies. Comparing PS1 and PS' with the GK here it appears to me that as Sesa could not express himself adequately and consequently his kārikā became obscure Abhinavagupta added here one kārikā more, as has already been pointed out, explaining all that was absolutely necessary for its proper elucidiation. Now, what is the source or sources of Abhinava's interpretation here (karikas 34, 35), without which we cannot understand the kārikā of Ses a? Certainly it was not only Gaudapäda, for such things as

19 Abhinava is quite jus'ified in putting turya in the neuter gender as he has before it (karika 34) dhaman, neuter, which is referred to by the former word and we can think that he got it from GK, I. 5, 22.

lxxxiv AGAMASĀSTRA [$8

srstisthitisamhara cannot be known from his work. One is therefore inclined to say with some amount of certainty that it was partly the work of Śes a, and partly the tradition connected with him, though under the present state of our knowledge we do not know if this tradition is recorded anywhere Nevertheless, we have to accept its existence, as we cannot explain the difficulties without it. The question arises here as to how Abhinava came to know that tradition. Does it not persuade onc to think that the distance of time between Ses a and Abhinava is not as wide as it is supposed to have been? What is there against thinking that PS1 and PS" belonged to the same period, though the former must have evidently been a little earlier? In this case the question of the interpretation of the present kārikā of Šes a given by Abhinava can very satisfactorily be explained. What is there that can be offered for pushing back the date of PS1 to a period before GKP Again, with reference to the creation of the world Ses a in his work which deals with the Vedanta has effected a synthesis of the Sankhya and the Vedanta systems by the introduction of the creation from Upendra (= Vişnu = Vāsudeva = Hari = Nārāyana-Paramātman= Brahman) through prakrti with the gradual evolution from it of buddhi (=mahat), etc. In the process of the creation he has accommodated also the theory of anda 'cosmic germ,' found, as for instance, in the Manusamhita, I. 8 ff. and the Visnu Purana, I. 2. 58 ff. Here we are to note what Kulluka observes on Manusamhita, I. 8:

§8] INTRODUCTICN 1xxxv

abhidhyanapūrvikām srstim vadato manoh prakțtir acetanā 'svatantrā pariņamata ity ayam pakso na sammataḥ. kintu tridaņdivedāntasiddhānta evābhimataḥ pratibhāti. It is further elucidated by him in another place (1. 15):

nanv abhidhyānapūrvakasrstyabhidhānād vedānta- siddhänta eva manor abhimata iti prāg uktam, tan na sangacchate. idānīm mahadādikrameņa srstyabhidhānād vedāntadarśanena ca paramātmana evākāśādikrameņa sṛstir uktā.° ucyate. prakṛtito mahadādıkrameņa sstir iti bhagavadbhāskarīyadarśane 'py upapadyata iti tadvido vadanti.20 Now Bhäskara is one of the post-Śankara commentators of the BS. Undoubtedly he was in the ninth century A.D. being criticised by Vacaspati Miśra (841 A.D.) in his Bhāmatī (BS, III. 3. 29). Śesa seems therefore to have been well acquainted with the Vedantic system maintained by Bhäskara and has then combined his theory with that of Ma n u and others according to whom in the process of ceation there intervenes the theory of anda. I do not therefore think that I can concur with Suryanarayana Sastri in suggesting that "the Paramarthasara is the original drawn upon." (p. ix).

20 See Bhäskara's commentary on the BS (Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, 1914), II. 1. 26: tataś ca brahmaņah pariņamanupapatteh pradhānam estavyam iti tātparyārthaļ. Udayan a observes in his Nyāyakusumāñjali, p. 332: brahmaparıņater iti bhaskaragotre yujyate.

lxxxvi ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA i$9

In passing we are to take up another question in this connexion. B. L. Atreya having noticed "much common between Kārikās (i.e., GK) and Yogavasistha not only in thought, but also in language" 21 concludes that the latter is prior on the following three grounds: (1) The kärikās do not form "an independent treatise on the Advaita Philosophy," being "a sort of commentary on the Mandūkya Upanisad." (2) "On the other hand, the philosopher Vasistha claims to have received his doctrines directly from the cosmic mind (Brahma) and to have realised their truth in his own experience. The philosophy of Vasistha includes almost all the views held by Gaudapāda." And (3) " Gaudapāda-kāvikas represent a later phase of the Advaita philosophy, when it tended to become critical, hostile and polemical towards other contemporary schools of thought, whereas Yoga- vasistha represents the earlier phase." As the space at my disposal does not allow me here to enter into a detailed discussion I desire simply to make a few observations as briefly as I can. I do not see thal I can follow the above arguments. For, sup- posing that the GK is a sort of commentary and Vasistha received his doctrines directly from Brahma, are we in any way justified in thinking that the YV is prior to the GK? Does it follow from that ? As regards the third argument of Atreya he thinks that the Advaita philosophy as represented in the GK is of a later phase, because it is "critical,

21 Yogavāsiștha and its Philesophy, 1932, pp. 14-15.

§91 INTRODUCTION lxxxvii

hostile and polemical towards other" systems. But may one ask here: Is there anything in the GK that may be regarded as " critical, hostile and polemical?" If so, what and where is it so? On the contrary, one may find there (GK, III. 17 ; IV. 3-6) clear non-hostility (avirodha), and there is no instance of anything that is critical and polemical. If, however, the mention of different views in the GK is meant thereby, the case is the same also with the YV.22 It is not always safe to conclude the priority or posteriority of one of two works simply seeing the same or similar passage, or thought, occurring in both of them. For instance, we read the following in the GK, II. 623 and IV. 31 :

ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamane pi tat tatha | The same line occurs also in the YV, IV. 45. 45 and a similar one in III. 11. 13, as quoted in our text, p. 142, note 3. Now, apart from the question of the date of the GK, can we determine with any amount of certainty the priority or posteriority of one, of the two works unless we take into consideration the other factors that are connected herewith? One may be referred here to the present Annotation on GK, IV. 31, and it will be found that the same thought only in slightly different words is expressed in such works as MK and AS, which are undisputably far earlier than YV. Now, if we see that Gaudapāda has abundantly drawn upon

c2 For instance, see III. 62. 10-11; 84. 22-27 vivadante hy asambuddhah svavikalpavijrmbhitaih). 23 Atrey a has noticed it.

lxxxviii ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$9

such earlier works can we ever think in this or similar cases that he has borrowed from YV, unless there is any strong ground for doing so? When there are two texts containing the same thing, one earlier and the other later, one may quole from either of them; but to decide definitely as to from which one it is actually done one should discuss carefully. Another instance of what is common to both GK and YV, as noted by Atreya, is the non-difference between the states of wakefulness and dream (jāgrat and susupta), as found in GK, II. 5 and YV, IV. 9. 11 ff. Here, too, when we see that the first half of the GK clearly refers to the BU, IV. 3-14 (see p. 19), upon which, just as upon other Upanisads, Gaudapâda draws so much, as is evident from the work itself,21 how can we think that YV is here the source of GK? On the contrary, a careful perusal of YV will at once show that in his answer to the question put to him by Räma about the difference between wakefulness and dream Vasistha has written a number of ślokas (YV, IV. 19. 9 ff), and attempted thereby only to explain what is very briefly stated in GK. Does this fact point to the priority or posteriority of YV to GKP2

24 See next section. 25 According to Atrey a the date of YV is the sixth century A.D. But his arguments do not appear to me to be strong or convincing. It may be noted here in this connection that there are two things that may specially be mentioned in Svami Bhumananda's paper entitled Priority of the Yogavasistha to Sankarācārya: (li Šankara quotes (BS, III. 4. 50, the Vasisthadharmasastra (ed, A. A. Fuhrer, Bombay, 18831, X.18;

§10] INTRODUCTION lxxxix

§ 10. The Works of Gaudapada

With regard to the works ascribed to G a u d a - p a da the only one that can be accepted with certainty as written by him is the S. The authorship of a few other books is ascribed to him. The most important- of them is a bhāsya on the Sankhyakarikā of Iśvarakrsna. There is a bhāsya under his name also on the Uttaragita. But there is no strong ground for holding that they are actually by Ga u dapāda, the author of the AS, nor is there anything of the nature that can decide the case otherwise, though I incline to subscribe to the view that they are not by Gaudapāda. A commentary, too, on the NUTU is attributed to him. There are three other works which pass under the name of Gaudapāda as their author. A commentary on the Durgāsaptasatī is one of them. This is referred to by the great Tantric teacher Bhāskararāya in his commentary on the same

and (2) mentions the name of Vasistha in his commentary on the BG, XIII. 4. But the question whether these two Vasisthas, the Vasistha of YV as well as the Vasisth a in the list of the teachers of the Sankara school are identical, remains to be settled, though according to some of the authors of the țīkas on BG, the Vasistha referred to by Śankara is the author of YV. 1 There is a manuscript, No. 1405, of this work in the Grantha character in the Visvabharati Library, Santiniketan. The following occurs there on folio 24a : kavacam bījam adistam argalā saktir ișyate | kīlakaņ kīlakam prāhuņ saptaśatyām mahāmanoh l iti gaudapādadhṛtavacanāt. And again: yady api vedāntamūrdhanyair gaudapādācaryaih sarvam idam nirviśesacitpratipādakaśāstraparatvena vyākhyātam.° XII-1201B

lxxxx ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$11

work.1 The other two are Tantric treatises, viz., Subhagodaya and Śrīvidyāratnasūtra. Here arises a question: Can we think that there are two Gaudapadas, one Vedantic and the other Tantric, being the authors of works on the Vedānta and Tantricism respectively? In the - Śrīvidyārnava which is a Tantric work by Pragalbhā - cārya, Šankarācārya is said to have been the founder of a Tantric school. There is in this work also a list of the succession of his teachers and disciples. But it seems impossible to reconcile this list with the traditional one of the Advaita Vedanta school. So the list in the Śrividyarnava hardly helps us in this matter. Nevertheless, we may simply note in the list given here that there are two Ga udapādas, one of them being mentioned as Ga uda (No. 55) and the other Gaudapādaka (No. 65)," who is, in fact, the same as Gaudapāda, the suffix -ka being evidently on account of the metrical exigency. On this the reader may form his own judgment.

§ 11. The Sources

The sources of the Agamasāstra, which one naturally desires to know, roughly fall into three classes, viz.,

2 It is said that there i. a bhasya on it by Sankara. In the verse containing the word as quoted by Rajendranatha Ghosa in his Advaitavada (in Bengali), p. 227, the ac'ual reading is Gaudapadakah. But Gopinath Kaviraj (op. cit .. p. 53), who has not quoted the verse, reads only Gaudapada leaving out the suffix -ka which seems to be right.

$111 INTRODUCTION Ixxxxi

(1) Vedic texts: Vedas and Upanisads, (2) Schools or Teachers, and (3) Buddhist works. With regard to class (1), these are mostly Upanisads, Vedas being quoted in not more than two cases (III. 24b and c). It is, however, to be noted in this connexion that when there is a passage which occurs both in a Veda and in an Upanisad it is very difficult to ascertain as to whether the reference is actually to the former or to the latter. For instance, here in III. 24b we have indro mayabhir iti. This is found in RV, VI. 47. 18 as well as in BU, II. 5. 19. How can we, in this case, ascertain that the reference is in fact to the one and not to the other? The case is exactly the same with the second instance (III. 24 c) of a quotation from a Veda. Similarly with regard to lI. 24 we know much of kala 'time' from the AV, XIX. 53, 54 and the SU, I. 2, IV. 1. But here it is very, difficult to conclude whether the reference is actually to the former or to the latter, or to the both of them. Again, the Kalavids 'knowers of time' are, as says Anandagiri, astronomers, and it is not impossible that our author might have alluded to some work of them, or simply to the view held by them or to their school. In the course of the present Annotation many references to different Upanisads have been inserted in support of a point or points in our text, but which of them, if any, is in fact meant by the author in any particular case we cannot say definitely. It may be that in some cases the Upanisadic authority, really meant by the author, is different from what the present

1xxxxii ÄGAMAŠĀSTRA [$11

annotator has quoted. For instance, with regard to pāda (1I. 21) which is capable of being interpreted differently, various references are given in the Annotation, or still other references may be shown. But it is not easy to ascertain the particular reference or references the author himself intended. Nevertheless, it is certain that the author had in his mind any one or more of these or similar passages when he was writing his book. Among the references in the Annotation the names of the Bhagavadgila (XIII. 22 in II. 22 of our text) and the Brahmasūtra (II. 3. 19-32 in II. 23 of our text) will be found. But we cannot be sure that these two works are actually drawn upon by our author, though they may elucidate the texts to some extent. Similarly for the explanation of our text there will be found some references in the Annotation to such minor Upanisads (for instance, in Il. 32) as Avadhūta Up., 8; Āśrama°, 4; Ātma°, 31; Jābāla°, 6; Tripurā- tāpanī°, V. 10; Brahmabindu°, 10. But whether these minor Upanișads are prior to the Āgamaśāstra is to be left as an open question, though some of them such as Brahmabindu° and Jābāla°, are before Śankara as is quite clear from his commentary on BS, III. 2. 18 and 4. 20 respectively. In five places (III. 12, 24, 25, 26 and 36) passages from Upanisads are expressly quoted, while in III. 11 and 23 the words Taittiriya and sruti are actually mentioned and in II. 3 a passage of the BU, IV. 3. 10 is clearly alluded to with the word śruyate. Similarly in II. 5 another passage from the same Upanisad (BU, IV.3.14)

§12] INTRODUCTION lxxxxili

is clearly referred to though with the word manīsins1 and not śruti as before and usual. In III. 12, 13 and 15 references to Upanisads are also very clear. In two or three more places (I. 2, 8, 9) references seem to have been made to Upanisads.2 It will be seen that no Upanisad is quoted or referred to by our author in his last Book, 'Alatasanti. There is absolutely nothing of the kind.3 As regards class (2) of the sources readers are referred to § 6: The Name of the Work of the present Introduction, p. lxiii, where the names of different schools or teachers alluded to in our text, are mentioned. It appears from these names that some of the schools or teachers mentioned by our author here were un- doubtedly prominent at his time, but gradually they have lost their prominence and have fallen almost into a state of oblivion. With regard to class (3) of our sources, i.e., the Buddhist texts, the reader is referred to the Annotation on II. 31, 32, 35 (cf. 38), 44, 46, and most of the kārikās in Book IV.

§ 12. The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad as the Main Upanișadic Source of the Āgamaśāstra In the preceding section we have seen that the BU is one of the sources of the AS in which there are

1 As in the Upanisad itself (BU, IV. 3. 14) there is atha khalv ahuh our author seems to have closen to take the nominative as manīsins and not sruti. See II. 1, 5; IV. 54, and Appendix X: Additional Notes, II, 1. 2 See the Annotation. With regard to the word durdarsa in IV. 100 we cannot say definitely that it refers to KU, II. 12, as it is often found also in Buddhist works.

lxxxxiv ÄGAMAĀSTRA 1$12

some quotations from or references to the former. In the present section it is proposed to examine to some extent the inter-relationship of these two works by which we shall see that the main Upanisadic source of the AS is the BU. From the text of the ÃS as it is before us it is quite clear that Gaudapäda has drawn much upon it. In fact, Book I of our text is mainly based on it. Nay, it may be declared that Book I of the ĀS is nothing but an epitome or essence of the BU, IV. 2-3 with some clear exposition and an addition of the upāsana1 'meditation' of Pranava or Om. By writing the first Book of the ÃS G a u da pa d a has in reality made a key to that portion of the BU, without which it would have been extremely difficult to understand its true significance. The opening part of the AS, i.e., the part dealing with the three divisions of the One (i.e., Purusa) such as Viśva, etc. (1. 1-4, 10), is to be found only in different words in the BU, IV. 2-3, as says Śankara very clearly on BU, IV. 3. 1 (p. 519)."

1 ll1. 1 and Appendix X on it. 2 atra ca jagratsvapnasusuptaturiyany upanyaslãny anyaprasangena indhah (IV. 2. 2), praviviktāharatarah 'IV. 2. 3), sarve prānāh iIV. 2. 4, sa esa neti neti (IV. 2. 41. idānīm jāgratsvapnādidvāreņaiva mahalā tarkeņa vistarato 'dhigamah karlavyab (p. 519). See here also Śankara's observation in showing the relationship between BU, IV. 2 and IV. 3 (p. 518): °vijnanam anandam brahmety avagatam. tad eva punar indhasamjnah praviviktāhāras tato 'ntarhīdaye lıngātmā praviviktāhārataras tataḥ pareņa jagadātma. See further on IV. 3. 1 (p. 519,.

§12] INTRODUCTION lxxxxv

We see in our text (I. 1-4, 10) that the One, i.e., Purusa3 (=Brahman=Ätman of the MaU, 2) owing to different states is called Viśva, Taijasa, Prăjña and Turya (or Turiya, I. 15). None of these names excepting Prājña (BU, IV. 3. 21 and 35) is, however, to be found in the BU. For Visva it reads (IV. 2. 2) Indha 'shining' which is the same as Indra, the former, as the Upanisad would say, being used by people cryptically.4 As to why the Purusa is called Indha Sureśvara says (BBV, IV. 2. 37) that 'because he shines day and night' (idhyate 'harniśam yasmād indhanāmā talaḥ pumān). This 'shining' implies, according to Ãnandagiri, his enjoyment of gross things in the waking state (sthūlārthabhoktṛtvena sadā jāgare sphūrteķ). Šankara is found to have employed both the terms in his commentary on the BU, Indha (BU, IV. 3. 1, p. 519) and Vaiśvānara (BU, IV. 2. 2-4, pp. 513-519), but not Visva, so far as goes my information, with regard to the commentary referred to. From the text of the BU (IV. 2. 3, 3. 11, 35) itself it appears that

3 As in the original of the text, i.e., BU, IV. 3 we have this word. 4 It is a well-known saying in Brahmanas that gods are fond of the cryptic, as it were, and dislike the evident 'paroksapriyā iva hi devāh pratyaksadvișah -BU, IV. 2. 2). Sureśvara says lin BBV, IV. 2. 37; p. 1365) that even now people do not like to call a superior person directly by his personal name : pratyaksanāmagıahaņam pradvișanti jagaty api | śreyāņso 'mukamiśiās ta ity uktim kāmayanti ca ! In referring to a superior person the use of amuka 'so and so' or uni in Bengali, is still found. It is to be noted that in the country, at least in Bengal, a woman does not call her husband by his name, but for it uses such words as uni,

lxxxxvi ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$12

if any other term for Visva is to be chosen from that work it is only sarīra 'existing in the body,' 'embodied.' But Gaudapāda has not accepted it, but has adopted a new name, Viśva, probably thinking the latter to be more expressive of the idea behind it. Finally in the hand of the author of MaU it has under- gone a further change in the form of Vaiśvānara 'common-to-all' perhaps for the same purpose. Of these names Turya (or Turiya) 'fourth' is evidently not a name in fact, but as it is described after the first three Visva, etc., it is so called, being their fourth. In the BU Indha-Indra is a name, no doubt, but Taijasa and Prajña were originally mere adjectives," becoming names afterwards. Sometimes the appellation Lingatman is found for Taijasa, as writes Śankara in his commentary on the BU, IV. 2. 3 (p. 515), IV. 3. 1 (p. 518). Similarly sausupta is used for Prājña as says Sureśvara (BBV, IV. 3. 5, p. 1377). Undoubtedly this word clearly expresses the state of the Person. As regards the wording of our text in the first Book of AS with which we are now concerned the following comparison may be made : (i) With regard to Visva our author writes (I. 2): daksināksimukhe viśvah." See here BU, IV. 2.2: indho ha nāmaisa yo ' yam daksine 'ksan purusah (=BU, II. 3. 5 ; IV. 2. 2; V. 5. 2, 4)."

5 See BU, 11. 5. 8. 6 Mark that the MaU is here silent. 7 The idea that a person is seen in the eye and specially in the right one is often found in Upanisadic texts. Besides the BU quoted above see ChU, IV. 15. 1, VII. 7. 4; KtU, IV. 2, 17; MU, V'I. 11. It simply signifies that

$12] INTRODUCTION lxxxxviı

(ii) In I. 2 we have ākaśe ca hrdi prajñah, and we read ya eso 'ntar hrdaya akaśah in. BU, II. 1. 17, IV. 2. 3, 4. 22. Cf. TU, I. 6. 1. (iii) In I. 3 there is praviviktabhuj,8 and in this connexion we read tasmād esa praviviktāhāratara ivaiva bhavati in the BU, IV. 2. 3. (iv) With regard to the third or susupta state of the Person in I. 3, 4 there is ānandabhuj or ānanda, and in BU, IV. 3. 32 we read eso sya parama ānandaḥ. See also, Op. cit., IV. 3. 33.9 It is to be noted here that the above conception of Purusa is found also in ChU, VIII. 7-12 in the course of Prajapati's instruction to Indra and Virocana. Here, too, the first three names, Visva, etc. are not given, Sankara has used different appellations for them; viz., for Viśva he writes Aksipurușa 'eye-person' (VIII. 7, 4, 79), or Chāyāpurusa 'shadow-person' (VIII. 10.4), or Chāyātman 'shadow-self' (VIII. 7.4, 8.1,2);10

he is visible to our eyes, and this means that he is the ordinary incorporated soul 'Sarira atman). This is quite evident from Gaudapada's employ- ment of the word -mukha after daksinaksi- (I. 1: daksinaksimukhe 'in the front of the right eye'). As to why the right eye is specially mentioned Sureśvara says (BBV. V. 2. 37-38, p. 1365) that it may be due to some excellence of the right eye, which might have been known to the smrti, or to the fact that the right limbs of a man is more vigorous than the left ones. Sometimes the left eye is also referred to (BU, IV. 2. 3). See below. See also 1. 4. 9 That the sentence yatia supto na kiñcana in the MaU, 5, p. 224, is quoted from the BU, IV. 3. 19 is alieady shown. Introduction: §2, p. xlii. 0 He uses this term also in his commentary on BS, I. 2. 13; on I. 3. 43 he has also śārīra. XIII-1201B.

lxxxxviii ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA $12

for Taijasa he has Svapnātman (VIII. 11. 1-2); and for Prajña he employs Susuptastha (VIII, 11. 1-2)."1 For Turya we have in the Upanisad (VIII. 12. 3)

11. It is to be noted that Sankara while in his commentary on BU gives all the three names, Vista, etc., he does not do so in the commentary on the ChU. It is further to be noticed that he, though so very fond of quoting Srutis does not refer to ChU in luis commentary on EU, nor BU in that on ChU. A few words may be added here as to why Visca is said to be in the eye or in the right eye and consequently is called Aksipurusa, Chayapuruta or Chayatman. To understand the Highest Self (paramatman) is very difficult for a man who is not properly trained. It took Indra, as says the ChU, VIII. 7. 3 ff., not less than one hundred and one years to realize him. So he is instructed to do it gradually, following the maxim of the view of the star Arundhali 'Alcor' belonging to the Great Bear (Arundhalidarsananyaya). The star being a very small one cannot be Seen at once. So a man in order to show it to another man firet points out to the latter somethings other than the actual star one by one and finally succeeds in doing so. Sankara writes (ChU, VIII. 12. 1) the same thing in another way : On the second night of the bright half of a month a man desirous of thowing a sccond man the fine moon fust points out a tree before the latter saying: 'See, there is the moon.' In the same way he points out to himr, a series of trees one by one and then the peak of a mountain, on which the moon is visible, and thus the second man actually sees her. Sim.larly in our case, the mind of an ordinary man being 100 much attached to external things cannot at once grasp the Highest Self who is extremely subtle. Therefore, he is first instructed to know his incorporated Self 'Sarira atman), o'her Selves or the different states of the Self being described gradually. Now, how to know the corporated Self? What is the best means for it? The sage of the Upanisads says: "Look here. Here is my right eye. Look at it. What do you find in it? " Certainly he would see himself reflected thereon And pointing out the shadow the sage would tell him 'Here is the Self.' This is elaborately desciibed in the episode of Piajapati and his two disciplcs, Indra and Virocana, in the ChU, VIII. 7-12, where it is said that the Self is to be seen not only in the eyes, but also on a looking glass adarsa, water 'ap), and an earthen jar filled with water (udasarāva). Śankara rightly adds here (ChU, VIII. 7. 4, also such things as the blade of a sword (khadgadi). See KtU, IV. 2, 11. 17-18.

§12Ì INTRODUCTION İxxxxix-

quite appropriately Uttamapurusa 'the Highest Self.' 12 That this conception of Purusa in ChU is a later development of that in , the BU goes without saying. Now, though the ChU like the BU is far earlier than our text, there is nothing which can show that it is the former and not the latter which has been drawn upon by our author; yet, we have already seen what can be said in favour of BU .- In support of the view that the main source of the AS is BU we may discuss here one point more. The idea of Brahman (=Purusa=Atman) as having four fourths or quarters (catuspad) at the beginning of the MaU is not a new one as it is found long before it even in the RV, X. 90. 313 as well as in ChU, IlI. 18. 2.14 The difference of these texts lies, however, in the fact that the quarters (pādas) are different in them. For instance, in the RV referred to above all the beings (visva bhūtāni) are regarded ás one quarter, and the remaining three quarters (tripād) are said to be in the heaven, while in the ChU, IV. 5-8

.2 See BG, XV. 17-18: uttamah purusas tv anyah paramatmety udahrtah yo lokatrayam avisya bibharty advaya īśvarah Ii . yasmāt ksaram atīto'ham aksarad api cottamaķ I ato'smi loke vede ca prathitah purusottamah !! Ś has here quoted no śruti. Śrīdhara refers to BU, V. 6. 1 (sa vā ayam atma), but not appropriately. 13 See ĀŚ, II. 21. 14 For minor Upanisads see Brahmopanisad, 2: tatra catuspādam brahma vibhāti; NPIU, V. I; NUTU, I; RUTU, 3: so 'yam atma catuspad.

ÂGAMAŠĀSTŘA ݧ12

the four quarters each consisting of four parts (catuskala) are named as Prakasavat 'shining,' Anantavat 'endless,' Jyotismat 'luminous,' and Ayalanavat 'having an abode.'15 In another place of the same Upanisad (III. 18. 1-6) the quarters of Brahman are described differently with reference to person (adhyālma) and with reference to divinities (adhidaivata). With reference to person they are speech (vac), breath (prāna), the eye (caksus) and the ear (śrotra) representing respectively with reference to the divinities fire (agni), wind (vāyu), the sun (aditya) and quarter (dis). But in the MaU the quarters are described quite in a new way and it is remarkable. It is said that these four quarters are nothing but the same Self with its four states. The first three of them are waking (jägrat), dreaming (svapna), and deep sleep (susupta). And the Self with them is called Vaiśvanara. 'common-to-all,' Taijasa 'brilliant,' and Prajña 'intelligent' respectively. The fourth state is the true or absolute essence of the Self having no connexion whatsoever with anything else. In this state the Self is regarded as santa 'quiescent,' siva 'blissful' and advaita 'without a second.' It is to be noted here that while in RV and ChU the Purusa or Brahman is represented as the Universal or World Self, in the MaU it is represented as the individual Self though ultimately in fact it is identical with the Universal Self. Now, it is remarkable that though in the MaU, as

15 For details see the Upanisad.

§12j INTRODUCTION ci

we have seen above, there is a clear mention and description of the four quarters of the Self (catuspad), in the AS it is not so. Even the particular word catuspad or any of its possible equivalents is not to be found here. Up to kārika 5 we come across the three- fold division of the Self, viz., Visva (instead of V aiśvānara as in the MāU, 3), Taijasa and Prājña (I. 1-4). It is clearly said in our text (I. 1-2) that the One exists in three ways in the body, and this idea is further expressed in I. 3-5. Yet, it cannot be said from this that the idea of four quarters is altogether unknown to the author of the AS, as it is implied in I. 10-15 in which the word turya or turiya, which is the same in meaning 'fourth,' as caturtha in the MaU, 7, is used. It is further implied by the author's employment of the word pada in I. 25.16 This difference between the AS and the MaU with regard to the idea of four padas, implied in the former and expressed in the latter, is significant. It shows that the origin of the AS is not the MaU, but the BU in which the idea of padas in this connexion did not then so develop.17 En passant we should like to discuss one thing more. There is a very striking difference at the very

16 See BU, IV. 1. 2-7 where each of the following six things, vac 'speech,' prana 'breath,' caksus 'eye,' srotra 'ear,' manas 'mind,' and hrdaya 'heart' is regarded as a pada. Consult Sankara and Sureśvara (BBV, IV. 1. 16 ff) according to whom each of the above six is explained as catuspada 'having four quarters.' .. 17 This fact will also show that the AS is prior to the MaU in which the obscure points of the former are made clear.

cii ĀGAMASĀSTRA İs12

beginning between the two texts, MaU and ĀS. It is this that while the MaU begins (1-2) highly extolling Om symbolically identifying it with Brahman-Atman, the AS has here nothing of the kind. It simply proceeds gradually to describe the One with its first three states, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña (I. 1-5) the fourth having come afterwards (1. 10). Here in the ĀS till kārikā 19 there is no mention of, or reference to Om. So it is to be found that here in our text mention is made first of the One and then of Om. This order is quite right and logical. For, here there are two things, the object which is to be approached or realized (upeya) and its means (upaya). And it is reasonable that the object is stated first and then the means. Here the object is the realization of the Purusa or Self in its absolute state and the means is the meditation of Om. This is done in the ÄS, but it is quite reverse in the MaU, for here the means Om is stated first and then gradually the object (3-7) which is repeated later on (12). The author of the MaU seems to have been much influenced by earlier Upanisads, (such as ChU, I. 1.1; TU, I. 8. 1) and too much bent on the glorification of Om, and this is why he has changed the reasonable order found in the ĀŚ. There is no upāsanā of Pranava in the BU and this is why our author of the AS did not include it in the main thesis of his work. Then independently of the BU in which no means for the realization of the object is shown Gaudapada has added the remaining portion of the first Book of his AS setting forth Praņava and its upāsana.

:$131 INTRODUCTION ciii

So far with regard to Book I. Let us now take up Book II and see the connexion it has with the BU. This Book is rightly called Vaitathya 'unreality' as it shows the unreality of the world in the waking state just like that of the experience in dream. This is the subject discussed herein by Gaudapāda with various arguments. And here, too, he has taken his stand on the BU, IV. 3, where it is clearly declared that the two states, waking and dream, are in fact one. Not only are passages quoted from the BU, or referred to by him (II. 3, 5), but they are supported by his own arguments. This will be quite clear if one takes pains to read BU, IV. 3 and the second Book of the ĀS. And it should be noted that here in the latter we find the oldest interpretation of that portion of the BU, though in a concise, yet, very substantial form. In . Book III we are referred to BU not less than six times (12, 13, 15, 24, 25 and 26). Thus we may safely - conclude that the main Upanisadic source of the AS is the BU.

§ 13. Pre-Sankara Teachers of the Vedanta and their Works

Setting apart what we know of the Vedanta from the Sruti-prasthana 'the Course of. Revelation' or the Vedic literature, i. e., the Mantras and Brāhmaņas including the Āraņyakas and Upanisads, as well as from the Smrti-prasthana 'the Course of Tradition or Remembered Texts', such as the Mahabharata with the

civ ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$13

Bhagavadgita, it may conveniently be divided into two, pre-Ś a n k a r a and post-Ś a n k a r a. Among the teachers of the pre-Sankara Vedanta the most distinguished is Badarāyana, the celebrated author of the Brahmasütras, the source of which is the Upanisads. It is the Brahmasūtras that constitute the Sutra-prasthana 'the Course of Sūtras.' We all know that the difference of opinions is but natural. Owing to various factors the same thing is viewed differently by different persons. So it is found in the Brähmanas that there are both the offering of obla- tion before sun-rise (anudita-homa) and the offering of oblation after sun-rise (udita-homa), there being a regular discussion thereof establishing that the latter is preferable and not the former (Aitareya Brāhmaņa, XXV. 5-6; Taittirīya Brāhmana, II. 1. 2-8 ; cf. how- ever, II. 1. 2. 12). There are also functions in these Brahmanas, which are discarded saying that these are not to be preferred (ādrlya) or performed (kārya), though they are actually enjoined by others. There are many such contradicting, obscure or dubious cases, and an attempt has also been made in later works to find out a solution of these problems.1 Now as with regard to karman the teachers had their different views, so they differed also on points of jñāna. In some cases they entertained even quite opposite views. For instance, with regard to creation while a sage of a certain Upanisad (i.e., TU, II. 7. 1;

1 For instance, see MD. X, 8. 6 with reference to Sodasigrahana.

§13] INTRODUCTION CV

see ChU, III. 19. 1) tells us: 'In the beginning, verily, this was non-existent (asad va idam agra asīd),' but from another text (i.e., Aitareya Aranyaka, II. 4. 1) we know: 'Verily, in the beginning this was only Self (atmā vā idam eka evāgra asīd).' And the follow- ing is found in the ChU, VI. 2. 1-2, evidently refut- ing TU, II. 7. 1 quoted above: "Verily, in the beginning this was, my dear, existent only one with- out a second. On this some say that verily in the beginning this was non-existent only one without a second; from that non-existent the existent was pro- duced. But, my dear, whence could it be ? How from non-existent could the existent be produced ? On the contrary, my dear, verily, in the beginning this was existent, only one without a second." From the above it is quite clear that all the śrutis do not always tell us the same thing, clearly there is difference among them.2 Such being the case the question arises as to which of them is to be accepted as valid and which is to be rejected as not valid. How can one say that this is valid, and that is not valid? For, as śruti there is no difference whatsoever.3 Therefore if you accept one, you will have to accept all of them. And in that case you cannot arrive at any definite

2 See with the Prakasa of Puny ara ja the Vakyapadiya of Bhartr- hari, I. 8: fasyārthavādarūpāņi nišcitya svavikalpajāh | ekatvinām dvaitinam ca pravāda bahudka smrtāh il 3 Sankar a has rightly observed (BS, III. 2. 15): nahi vedavākyānām kasyacid arthavattvam kasyacid anarthavattvam iti yuktam pratipattum pramānatvāviśesāt. XIV-1201B.

cvi ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$13

conclusion. And if there is no conclusion of any kind the teaching of the Vedanta has no value to a person as it does not or cannot lead him to his final goal. The Vedānta is not a science for mere speculation, for one is to adjust one's life according to it. For only in this way one can fulfil the mission of one's life. It was therefere felt absolutely necessary by the teachers to bring into a harmony, a compromise or a connected sequence, all conflicting, obscure or dubious statements of the sages of the Upanisads. This was the origin on one hand of the Mimāmsasutras with regard to the question of karman, and on the other of the Brahmasūiras in respect of jñāna.i

4 Let us however put here a question: Are we right in thinking that even through the methods or maxims (nyatas) shown in the Brahmesutras in connexion with the explanation of the Upanicedie texts, we can in all cases get their frue significance ? By ' true signifcence we mean the signifcance intended by their respective sages. It is true that the word asat may imply in some cases ' unfolded' or ' that of which the neme and form are unfolded' (avyakrta or atyckrlanemarupa) For instance, see asac ca rac ca parame vyoman (RV, X. 5. 7); or nased asin na sac asit tadanim, (Op. cit .. X. 129. 1). In such cases asat does not mean ' false, non-existent ' tnirupakhya asafi, as the son of a barren woman, though in cther cases it may actually mean so. Now considering the above passage of the ChU it is clear that the word asat in the TU quoted above is used in its literal sense, i.c., the sense of unreal non-existent (nirupakhya arat. though an attempt is made in explaining it away figuratively to mean ' unfolded ' (atyakrta) according to the subsequently established maxims of the Vedanta Eut a querticn arises: Well, in the TU the word asat may imply atyakrta as you maintain (see here BU, 1. 4.7: tad dhedam tarhy avyakrtem Esit), but how do you ascertain that this meaning is in fact in'ended by the sage himself? Hew o you lncw that he does nct want here to mean thereby absolutely non-existent Inirupakhya atat ? We can only accept that the meaning avyakrta is your explanaticn. Eut this may or may not be intended by the sage himtelf. There is this doubt that can hardly be remr oved.

$13j INTRODUCTION cvii

It is well-known that Jaimini and Bada- ray an a are the authors of the Mimāmsasutras and the Brahmasūtras respectively. But there are reasons to think that there were also other authors of the Mimamsa- and the Brahma-sutras which are different from the extant ones. For instance, Ba dar i, a teacher, is quoted not less than four times both in the present Mīmāmsā- (III. 1. 3; VI. 1. 27; VIII. 3. 6; IX. 2. 33) and Brahma-sūtras (I. 2. 30; III. 1. 11; IV. 3. 7; IV. 4. 10). From this it may appear that Badari was an author of both the sutras. But we cannot ascertain only from this that he was actually so. It may be that he had some views on some particular points of karman and Brahman and these are alluded to in those two works by their authors. Jaimini, as the author of the Mīmāmsāsūtras is known to us all. He is referred to eleven times in the Brahmasūtras on different topics (I. 2. 28, 31, 3. 31, 4. 18; III. 2. 40, 4. 2, 18, 40; IV. 3. 12, 4. 5, 11). Here, too, We may think that Jaimin i wrote also Brahmasūtras. But though from only this it is not safe to decide that he really did so, Sureśvara's Nsi (2nd ed. by Hiriyanna), p. 52, shows that it is a fact. Kāśakțtsna, a teacher, is quoted in BS, I. 4. 22, and his Mīmāmsa is mentioned not less than three times by Patañjali in his Mahabhasya. This Mīmāmsa may be both Karmamīmāmsa and Brahma- mīmāmsā (i.e., the Mīmamsāsūtras and the Brahmasūtras), 5 See Belvalkar, Op. cit., p. 140. 6 See Jaimini's Sarirakasutra in the Garbe-Festgabe, 1927. 7 Kielhorn, Vol. II, pp. 206, 249, 325.

cviii ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$13

or either of them, and in this case probably the latter. Bādarāyaņa in his BS refers also to Ā trey a (III. 4. 44), Āśmarathya (I. 2. 29, 4. 20), Kārsnājini (III. 1. 9)8, and Audulomi' (I. 4. 21, III. 4. 45, IV. 4. 6).10 Then comes a number of teachers, some of whom flourished before and some after the great Sa n kara. Some of them explained the BS of Badarayana, some the Bhagavadgita, and some an Upanisad or Upanisads. There were also some who interpreted more than one kind of the above works. This was done either by writing a gloss (vrtti) or a commentary (bhäsya). As we are concerned here with the pre- Śankara Vedānta the following teachers who are connected with it may be mentioned in this connexion. So far as we know the first of all these teachers is Bodhayana (about the first or second century A.D.). He wrote a lengthy gloss or commentary (vistirna vrtti) on the BS of Badaray a n a on which is based the Visistādvaita system of Rāmānuja, the Mīmāmsā- sūtras of Jaimini, and the Devatākānda, in other words, on the whole of the Mimamsasastra. This

8 He is mentioned also in MD, IV. 3. 17, VI. 7. 35. 9 The Bhedabheda doctrine of the Nim bar k'a school owes its existence to him. 10 To them may be added the namcs of Ka s y a p a alluded to by S a n - dilya in his Bhaktisutras, 29, and of such sages as Asita, Devala, Bhr gu, and Parasar a referred to in different works. But we do not know if they were the authors of different Brahmasutras or if any one of them wrote also Mimamsasutras, though we know something of their views from the fragmentary accounts available from certain books, some of which are referred to above.

$13] INTRODUCTION cìx

Urtti is called Krtakoti (Prapancahrdaya, TSS, p. 39; Journal of the American Oriental Society, 1911, p. 17). Next comes Upavarsa. He is credited with the authorship of a vrtti on both the Mimamsasutras and Brahmasūtras. This vrtti was, however, in fact a bhasya or Mahabhasya and consequently he was re- garded as a Mahābhāsyakāra as well as a Vṛttikāra, being the author of the vrtti. According to Rāmanuja (Vedārthasamgraha, p. 154) and Śrīnivāsadāsa (Yatīndramata- dīpikā, Poona ed., p. 2) Guhadeva, Kapar- dika (or Kapardin) and Bhāruci are three ancient Vedanta teachers and authors. The former two, being referred to by Ramanuja among the sistas 'wise men', seem to have been in favour of the Visistadvaita-vada. One Bharuci as an author of a Dharmaśāstra is mentioned in such works as Vijñāneśvara's Mitāksarā on the Yājña- valkya-smrti (I. 18, il. 124), and Mādhavā- cärya's țīkā on the Parāsarasamhitā (II. 2. 3, Bombay Sanskrit series ed., p. 510). It is not known if the Vedantic Bh a r u c i is identical with Bharuci, the writer on the Dharmasastra. If it is so, he may be held to have belonged to the first half of the ninth century A. D. Bhartrhari's name is found among a host of writers on the Vedanta (Siddhitraya, p. 5). He may be identified with the celebrated author of the Vakyapadiya (600-650 A.D.), the very first kārikā of which points to the Vedantic doctrine.

Cx AGAMASĀSTRA [$13

With him is mentioned in the same work Bh art !- mitra. According to the Nyayaratnakara on the Ślokavrttika (1. 10) he wrote a commentary on the Mimāmsāsūtras and made the Mīmāmsāsāstra atheistic. Whether this Mimamsist Bhartrmitra and the Vedäntic Bhartrmitra are one and the same is not known, nor do we know anything of any Vedantic work that might have been written by the latter. Brahmanandin (or Brahmānandin) is another teacher. He is known as the Vākyakāra or Chāndogyavākyakāra quoted or referred to by Rāmānuja in his commentary on BS and Ma d h u- sūdana Sarasvati in his țikā on the Samksepa- śārīraka (III.218-220). According to Bhāskara on BS, I. 4. 25, Brahmanandin approved the Parināma-vāda, but Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (Op. cit.) is of opinion that it was in fact gradually to lead one to Suddhadvaita-vada 'Pure monism' through the Vivarta-vada or the doctrine maintaining that the appearance of the universe is imposed on Brahman which is the only reality, the phenomenal world being held to be a mere illusion. After him is Dravidācārya or Dra- midācārya (cir. 750 A.D.). He was in favour of the Visistadvaita-vada ' Qualified monism' and as such is mentioned and quoted by R a m a n u j a in his com- mentary on BS. As Madhusūdana Sarasvatī says (Samksepasārīraka, III. 218-220), he wrote a bhāsya on Brahmanandin's vakyas owing to which the latter was called Vakyakāra (Brahmanandi-viracitā-

§13] INTRODUCTION cxi

nām vākyānām sūtrarūpāņām bhāșyakartā draviḍā- cāryo'pi). It is known from Ānandagiri's țīkā on Šankara's bhāsya on the ChU that Dravidā- carya wrote a vast commentary on the ChU compared with which Sankara' s commentary was a smaller one (alpagrantha). He is said to have written a bhāsya also on the BS. Brahmadatta was a renowned teacher of the Vedanta. In the Prapancahrdaya he is said to have composed a commentary on the BS. Some of his views are alluded to in such works as the Sarvārtha- siddhi (11.16), a tīkā by Venkatanātha dešika on his Tattvamuktākalāpa; Nsi, 1. 67-68 ; and Śankara's commentary on the BU, 1. 4. 7. One of them may be mentioned here and it is this that it is the long bhāvana 'meditation' of the know- ledge arising from the Vedānta-väkya and not the knowledge itself, as holds Śankara, that removes one's illusion. Some informations of him as collected by Hiriyanna will be found in Nsi (2nd ed.), p. xxiii, and the Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, Vol. II, Part I, p. 1 ff. See also Gopin a t h Kaviraj, Op. cit., p. 13 ff. Bhartrprapañca was also a great Vedāntic teacher before Sankara. It is known from the words of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (Samksepaśārīraka, I. 7) that Bh art r prapañc a explained the Sūtras of Vyāsa, i.e., Bādarāyaņa (kaiścit tatsūtram vyā- cakşāņair bhartrprapañcādibhiḥ). Yāmunācārya (Op. cit., p. 5) says that he was one of the writers on

cxii ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$13

the Vedanta, and we know from the introductory lines of Ānandagiri's tīkā on Šankara's bhāsyG of BU (p. 2) that while Śankara commented on the Upanisad belonging to the Kanva recension Bhart !- prapañca wrote his commentary on the text of the Madhyandina recension, and the former's commentary was bigger than that of the latter. In many cases Anandagiri in explaining Sureśvara's värttika on the BU, refers to or quotes from Bhartrprapanca. Of all the commentators before Śankara, the works of whom could not yet been discovered it is Bhartrprapañca whose quota- tions are now mostly available. For the fragments gleaned together from his writings by Hiriyanna sec The Indian Anliquary, 1924, pp. 76-86 ; and Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1925, pp. 439.

I should like to mention here one teacher more of the pre-San kara Vedanta. He is Sundara- pandya. He was a great Mimamsist and Vedantin of South India (8th century A.D.). His three kārikās (gaunamithyatva°) are quoted by Sankara in the last portion of his commentary on BS, 1. 1. 4. Amalānanda in his Kalpataru (BS, III. 25) quotes his other three kārikās (nihśreņyārohaņa- prāpya°). These last threc karikās together with two more are cited by Kumārila in his Tantravārttika (Benares ed.), pp. 852-853. It scems that these kārikās are from a värttika of Sundarapändya that he

§14] INTRODUCTION cxiii

wrote on some vrtti or bhasya of some unknown author.11 There were also some teachers who wrote inde- pendent works on the Vedanta and of these authors the most distinguished is Gaudapäda, the author of our Agamasastra which is the most important work, still extant, representing one of the most remarkable phases of the Vedänta. Here we find the first inter- pretation of some of the most important śrutis as we shall see later on.

§ 14. The Conspectus of the Contents of the Āgamaśāstra

Now we may give here a conspectus of the contents of our text, and in doing so Book I may conveniently be divided into two parts; part (i) containing kārikās I. 1-18, and part (ii) the rėmaining kārikās, i.e., I. 19-29. While part (i) discusses what is to be realized, part (ii) is devoted to show its means. It is well-known that in the Upanisads all thoughts centre round the Purusa (Atman= Brahman), 'Self' who is 'all that has been and that will be' (RV,X.90.2: puruşa evedam sarvam yad bhūtam yac ca bhavyam). He must be known, according to the sages of Upa- nisads, for the fulfilment of the mission of one's life.

" S. Kuppuswāmi Šāstrī : Journal of Oriental Research, 1927, p. 1 ff. On the main topic of this section see Gopinath Kaviraj, Op. cit., and P. V. Kan e: Proceedings and Transactions of the Fifth Indian Oriental Conference, pp. 937 ff. XV-1201B.

cxiv ĀGAMASĀSTRA $14

But how can he be known properly ? As he is ex- tremely subtle, Gaudapāda leads us gradually from the gross to the subtle, following our common and every-day experience. And in doing so he takes his - stand on such Upanisads as the BU and ChU, and shows (1. 1-5) that the self, though in reality, only one (eka eva) remains in the body in three forms (tridha dehe vyavasthitah), in accordance with his three states, jāgrat 'waking', svapna 'dream' and susupta 'deep sleep.' When the self is in the waking state he is called Viśva 'all' (because as an em- bodied one (sarīra) he is known to every man). In the state of dream he is named Taijasa 'brilliant' (because he himself is his light (svayamjyotis) in that condition ; i.e., he does not depend for his light on others for seeing things there, as he does in the waking state in which he is to take light from such things as the sun, the moon, and fire).1 In the state of deep sleep he is called Prajña 'intelligent' (because he is never dissociated from his intelligence).2 Viśva is the embodied self (śārīra ātman), hence it is metaphorically said that he remains in the front of one's right eye,3 meaning thereby that he may be seen reflected in one's right4 eye (or in such things as

1 See BU, IV. 3. 1-9 : svena bhāsa svena jyotısā prasvapity atrāyem purusah svayamjyotir bhavati. 2 BU, IV. 3. 23 ff .: yad vai tan na paśyati paśyan vai tan na paśyati. nahi drastur drster viparilopo vidyate 'vinasitvāt. na tu tad dvitiyam asti tato 'nyad vibhaktam yat paśyel. 3 See p. lxxxxviii 4 As the right portion of the body of a male person is said to be more powerful than the left the reflection therein is brighter. See p. lxxxxvii, note 7,

$14] INTRODUGTION*

water or a looking-glass).Taijasa is : in the, mind, as itcishere. that 'a man dreams. Prajña's. seat is inthe space oftone's heart .: Again, Visva has the consciousness of outside, Taijasa of inside, while Prajña has his consciousness compact .: These three enjoy or experien'ce the gross, the subtle and bliss 5 respectively. . In passing the author rèfers (I. 6-9) to the opinion of the sages that all things have their origin and mentions different theories or purposes of creation. The first 'theory' is this that one creates all as the rays of one's mind (ceto'msu). This simply means that it is the mind that appears in the form of the external world which has, in fact, no reality. This is the author's own view. Then he reverts to his main subject, the Self, and says (1-10) that besides his three forms or quarters (pādas) in, accordance with . the three. states, waking, etc., referred to above, there is one form more ; it is his real, natural or innate form. It has no, particular appellation .as. he is beyond all expressions and is designated by the simple word Tur y a (or Turiy.a) "fourth' as occupying the fourth place in order with the above three. This Turya is above all changes and duality, all-pervading, and when realized removes all miseries . - Gauda.pāda then shows (11-18) some points of mutual agreement and disagreement of these four forms or quarters (padas) of the Self, and says that one, if awakened from one's sleep due to illusion : BU, IV. 3 32 ff.

čxvi ÁGAMASĀSTŘA t$14

(māyā), can realize the state of Turya in which there is no duality at all. Duality, i.c., the expansion of the visible world, or the expressions, is mere illusion, and as such it has absolutely no reality. (Here it may be said that as there is no duality, in fact, it does not cease to exist. It is just a knot made and loosened by dint of illusion (mayayaiva krto granthir māyayaiva vimocitah).e Nevertheless, we have our common prac- tice with duality, but it is only for our instruction, i.e., it is only by that practice that we can understand and attain to the state of non-duality which is the highest (advaitam paramarthatah). Here ends the first part of Book 1. The second part (19-29) demonstrates the means for the realization of that non-duality or Turya. It is nothing but the upāsanā 'meditation' (dhyāna) of the Purusa (= Atman = Brahman), 'Self' through the symbol of Pranava or Om. In Book Il Gaudapāda discusses and es- tablishes the unreality (vaitathya) of the external world. For this purpose he begins this Book as Book I basing it on the BU, specially on its IV. 3. 8 ff. He says referring to the sages7 of that Upanisad that all things in dream are unreal on the following three grounds :

€ See the following saying of the Bha gavat (i.c., Buddha), as quoted in MV, p. 540: akafena kṛto granthir ākāfenaiva mocitah. 7 Gaudapād a does not employ here or elsewhere (i.e., II.5, cj. IV. 54) such words as rși or muni (II. 35) as is generally done in similar cases, but he has here the word manisin. This word, which is a Vedic one forming a phrase with ahuh, is used twice in our work (I1. 1, 5) as in KU, 1. 3.4 and BG, XVIII. 3 (with a variation that pra- is prefixed to ahuh).

$14] INTRODUCTION cxvii

(i) becuase the things (such as a mountain, or an elephant) seen therein are inside the body ; (ii) because the time being short one does not see the things having gone to those far places where one dreams them ; and (iii) because one on waking is not found in the place where one dreams oneself to be. Having supported this proposition (II. 3) by a reference to the BU, IV. 3. 10, he asserts (Il. 4) that the things in the waking state, too, are as unreal as those in dream, because in this state also the things are similarly inside the body, for the mind which appears in the form of different things around us is inside the body. Proceed- ing the teacher says (II. 5) on the authority of a scripture (BU, IV. 3. 14), supported by reasons, that the two states, dream and waking, are the same on account of the fact that the things experienced in them are of the same kind, there being no difference at all. Here, having offered one reason more in his favour and met an objection of his opponent, he says (II.9-10) that the experiences in waking and dream are egually unreal, both of them being the creation of the mind. Here arises a question (II. 11) : If in both the states the things are unreal, then who is it that cognizes them? Who is it that imagines them? The answer is given (II. 12-15) according to the decision of the Vedänta that it is 1the Self that imagines himself as the Self through his own illusion, and it. is he who cognizes the things. He creates some things in the mind which are not fixed and as such they vanish at once; and he creates also some other things in the mind

cxviii ÁGAMAŠĀSTRA [$14

which are outside and fixed. There is, however, no difference between these two sorts of creation-the creation of those inside which exists as long as exists the thought (citta), and the creation of those outside, which exists as long as exists the (notion of) the two, i.e., the perceptible (grähya) and the percipient (grāhaka); both of these two creations are only imagined and there is nothing for their difference. Again, the things which are within and not-manifest, and the things which are without and manifest are all imagined, indeed, the only difference there being that the latter are cognized by different organs of sense. As to the creation of the internal and external things he tells us (II. 16) that first one imagines oneself as a personal Self and then various things, internal and external, following the recollection of one's experience. Of this he says further (II.17-18) that as in the dark a piece of rope, or a continuous line of water, etc., not determinately known, is imagined to be a snake, so is imagined the Self. Now when the piece of rope is known determinately the things that are imagined there disappear at once,8 so is to be known about the ascertainment of the Self (Atman). It is an illusion of the Self owing to which he is imagined differently by differnt persons, such as the Breath (prāna) by those who know it, or Elements (bhutas) by those who know them (II. 19-30). But the reality is, con- cludes (II. 31-34) the teacher, that according to those

8 The illustration of rajju-sarpa which is so widely known in Vedantic works is found perhaps for the first time here in the AS. It is not in any of the Upanisads used for his Concordance by J a c o b.

$141 INTRODUCTION cxix

, who are well-versed in the Vedanta, the universe is just like a dream (svapna), or an illusion (māyā), or an imaginary town in the sky (gandharvanagara) .· The highest truth is that there is neither disappearance nor origination; neither bondage, nor one desirous of emancipation. The universe is not manifold, either through its own nature or through that of others; it is -neither different nor non-different. The sages (II. 35-38) who have fully mastered the Vedas have seen the truth that it is the cessation of the universe (prapañcopasama), which is free from duality. Having known this, therefore, one should meditate on non-duality, and having realized it, one should behave as a fool among the people becoming an ascetic, and realizing the truth inward and outward; should remain unmoved from it. Book .IlI is devoted to show the non-origination of the universe. The author proposes (III. 2) that nothing originates, and concludes (III. 48) that this is the highest truth: In the course of the discussion he says (III. 5ff) that as the space (akāśa or mahākāśa), owing to jars (ghaļas), assumes the forms of the spaces occupied by the jars (ghaļākāas), and these forms, when the jars are destroyed, merge into the space, even so springs up the Atman in the form of Jivas 'individual persons' owing to the conglomerations of the different limbs, etc., and when these conglomerations are destroyed the Jivas merge into the Atman. If the space occupied by one jar is soiled with dust or smoke, not all the spaces occupied by other jars are soiled therewith, even so (i.e., not affected) are the Jivas with reference to happiness, etc. The

CXX ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$14

forms, functions and names of the jars may be different, but the space is the same. This is the case also with Jivas. As the space of a jar is neither a transformation, nor a part of the space, so is a Jiva neither a trans- formation nor a part of the Atman. As the space is never soiled with a dirty thing such as dust and smoke, yet it appears to be so to the ignorant, so appears the Atman with impurities to those who are not en- lightened. In death or birth, in moving forward or backward, he exists in all bodies just like the space. All the conglomerations of limbs, etc., as in dream, are created by the illusion of the Ātman. Now having shown what the Jiva is according to the Upanisads (TA, II. 1-6 and BU, Il. 5) G a u d a - pä da says (III. 13) that the praise of the identity of the Jiva and the Atman as well as the censure of their difference in the Upanisads is reasonable. And so, though their difference is found in some Upanisadic texts it is merely attributable with reference to the future state, and certainly it is not in 'the primary sense (III. 14-16). Indeed in the scriptures the creation is described with various illustrations showing a distinction between the Jiva and the Atman. But in fact there is no distinction. It is only to lead one to the truth. For, there are three kinds of people, viz., of the lower, the middle, and the higher visions and in order to help them an upasana is meant here (by the description of the creation involving some distinction which is mere atiributive). Here (III. 17-18) with regard to the view of non-duality which he holds, our author says that it

$14] INTRODUCTION cxxi

does not conflict with that of the dualists and shows how it does not do so. Gaudapd a reverts now (III. 19-32) to his main proposition, i.e., non-origination and offers some argu- ments in favour of it, refuting the views of his opponents. He says that though it is said that it is the unborn that is born, it cannot be maintained. It is true that in the scriptures creation or origination is found both from the existent (bhuta) and the non-existent (abhūta), yet, that which is reasonable is to be accepted. In scriptures origination is said to be through illusion, it is denied there and its cause is negatived. Now, origination may be either of the existent (sat) or of the non-existent (asat), but neither of them is possible. That which exists may originate only through illusion and not in reality; because, if it originates in fact, it is to be accepted that the thing which had already been originated originates again. The origination of the non-existent is not reasonable either in reality or through illusion, as in the case of the son of a barren woman. As in dream so in waking there is only the mind, yet it appears in the form of the duality of the percipient and the perceptible. The duality is perceived by the mind, but when it becomes non-mind, i.e., when its function of thinking (manana) ceases, there is no duality. The author says here (III. 33-36) that the mind which becomes non-mind, and as such is free from the states of dream and deep sleep and has no determination (nirvikalpa), is identical with Brahman. XVI-1201B.

cxxii ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA [$14

This state of the suppressed (nigrhita= niruddha) mind is different from that in the deep sleep, because while in the latter it falls into a condition of stupidity (mūdha avasthā), it is not so in the former. This is attainable (III. 37-47) through an intense abstract concentration, called Asparsayoga 'contactless concen- tration,' which, though very difficult, can be realized gradually by the means suggested by the author. When by that process the mind is completely sup- pressed being free from the states at stupefaction and distraction, not moving at all and having no sense- image whatsoever, it becomes Brahman. And it is said that in this state it rests on itself (svastha), it does not originate and is identical with the knowable which also does not originate. Here the author concludes (III. 48) that there is nothing that originates, and this is the highest truth. Gaudapāda begins Book IV, unlike the first three ones, with his homage to the 'Greatest of men' and the teacher of the yoga known as Asparsayoga, whom the present writer thinks to be no other than the Buddha (IV. 1-2). Introducing his thesis (IV. 3) he says that there are two classes of disputants, one of them holding that it is the existent (bhta) that ori- ginates while the other says that which originates is the non-existent (abhūta). But the Advayas (=Advaya- vädins), i. e., Buddhists declaring that there is no or gination at all maintain that neither the existent nor the non-existent comes into being (IV. 3-4). G a u d a- pā d a who is a Vedantin subscribes to this last view

INTRODUCTION cxxili

and says (IV. 5): 'We approve of non-origination declared by them; we do not dispute with them, listen as to how there cannot be any dispute.' He then advances (IV. 6-71) various arguments gathered from Buddhist sources in support of the view attacking and refuting the theory of origination in different ways and arrives at the conclusion that non-origination is the highest truth. In the course of it he shows among others that though it is generally believed that a thing which is not born is born, it cannot be so in reality, for in that case it is to be admitted that nature changes; what is unborn must always remain unborn, it is its nature. Yet, if you say that it takes its birth, then evidently it changes. But what is nature does in no way change (IV. 6-10). The theory that the cause itself is the effect that is born (as held by the Sankhyas) cannot be maintained (IV. 11-13), nor can there be any reasonable relation- ship or order between the cause and its effect (IV. 14- 21). Again, nothing is produced either from itself or from other than itself; nor is there anything produced that is existent, non-existent, or both existent and non- existent (IV. 22). It is not possible to prove the beginning of a cause or of an effect, and as such neither of them comes into being (IV. 24). Gaudapada offers here some reasons in his support from the standpoint of the Vijñanavadins (IV. '25-39) showing that the external things are unreal though they appear to be not unreal ; they are, however, false as the experience in dream, being cog-

cxxiv ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA [914

nizable only by mind (cittadrśya). He tells us again (IV. 40-41) that origination cannot be established, for there is no non-existent arising from the non-existent, nor is there any existent arising from the non-existent ; there is no existent arising from the existent, and where is the non-existent arising from the existent ? It is true that the Buddhas have sometimes said of origination, but it is the instruction meant only for those who are afraid of the doctrine of non-origination (IV. 42). As an elephant. called by illusion is said to exist only owing to the perception and the common practice, so it is said that a thing exists (IV. 44). He -declares (IV. 45-46) that there is only vijnana without the two (i.e., the percipient and the perceptible), it is quiescent and has no origination (aja) ; it- does not move, it is not an object (vastu), yet, it appears to admit movements, it appears to be an object. Thus the mind and the objects have no origination. As a fire-brand being moved appears to be straight or crooked, even so the mind when it moves appears as the percipient and the perceptible (IV.42). And as the fire-brand when it does not move has no appearance of its being straight or crooked, even so when the mind does not move, it does not appear in the form of the perci- pient and the perceptible (IV. 48). We have already seen that causation (hetuphala- bhäva) is not reasonable. The author explains it further in the following few kārikās (IV. 53-56) for his main purpose of establishing non-origination. With the same object in view he refutes (IV. 57) like the Buddhists

§14] INTRODUCTION cxxV

theories of eternality (śaśvata) and annihilation (uccheda), and says (IV. 58) that it is in the empirical truth (samvrtisatya) that things are originated, but not in reality. From an illusive seed may come forth an illusive sprout. This sprout is neither eternal, nor has it annihilation. It is to be known with regard to all things. Therefore there is no room for the appellation of 'eternal ' and ' non-eternal' of anything (IV. 60). As in dream so in waking it is owing to illusion that the mind which is only one moves having the appearance of the external things. Whatever is experienced in dream is nothing but the mind, similarly whatever we see in the waking state is only the mind. As a creature formed of dream or made of illusion or by some supernatural power takes birth and dies, even so all these creatures exist and do not exist. Therefore there is no Jiva that takes birth, there is no possibility of it. That nothing originates is the highest truth (IV. 61-71). The duality consisting of the subject and the object is only the vibration (spandita) of the mind which has, in fact, no object, and consequently has no relation whatsoever to it (IV. 72-74). Owing to the persistent belief in what is non-existent (abhūtābhiniveśa) the mind relates itself to its objects, but when their absence is known it turns back from them having no relation at all (nihsanga). Now, when it so turns back and does not move onwards, that position of it is unwavering, it is then free from sorrow, desire and fear. , This is the field of the activities of the Buddhas. It shines forth once for all having no

cxxvi ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$14

origination, nor sleep, nor dream, and is the essence of reality (dharmadhātu, IV. 74-81).

This truth is, however, made obscure by the childish with their different notions; yet, one who can realize it attains the state of omniscience free from duality. And if it is so, what is beyond it that one may desire (IV. 82-85) ? The author then shows that it is through the 'supra-mundane' (lokottara) knowledge by the realization of which one may become omni- scient (IV. 86-89). Here he asks us to learn certain things from the Agrayana (=Mahayana) of the Buddhists giving some of its leading thoughts (IV. 90-95).

As the state of detachment (asangata) of our mind or knowledge is absolutely necessary, he tells us what it is and how it can be effected. Both the objects and their knowledge have no origination, and as there is no relation whatsoever between them the know- ledge is said to be free from attachment (asanga). If this state is not achieved, there is no disappearance of the 'cover' or 'obscuration' (avarana-cyuti) from which we suffer. But in reality there is no cover or obscuration of anything, all the elements of existence being naturally unsullied (IV. 96-98). Concluding, the teacher declares that according to the Buddha the knowledge is not related to its objects, and these two things, i.e., the knowledge and its objects, are not mentioned by the Buddha (IV. 99), for, in fact, he has said absolutely nothing.

§15] INTRODUCTION cxxvii

§ 15. The Philosophy of Gaudapāda

Let us now make an attempt to discuss a little the philosophy of Gaudapāda as it is in our text, though it has already been done to some extent in the preceding section, i.e., the Conspectus of the Contents. As some of the philosophical views of our teacher have already been shown incidentally they will not be repeated here. Indeed, much has been written on this by my predecessors, yet when a new annotation is added hereto the subject may be discussed anew according to the light derived from it. In doing so we should keep our minds free from the influence of later thoughts, for it is not always safe to explain an older text by the thoughts in a subsequent work or works. Now, it goes without saying that our teacher, Gaudapāda, isa Vedāntist and he mainly deals with the Vedanta in the present work declaring its conclusion (Il. 12, 31, 35). Naturally, therefore, as a Vedäntist, he treats his subject in accordance with the scriptures (śruti), yet, not without pure reasons. Direct or indirect, his reasonings are in many cases based on scriptures (II. 1-10; III. 24-26). But when there are contradictory scriptures, he says (III. 23) that those which are with reasons (yukti yukta) are to be accepted. Besides, throughout the work he has advanced a number of independent grounds which are very cogent. With a view to removing an appa- rent contradiction in the scripture he would interpret (III 14) a text in its secondary sense saying expressly

cxxviii ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$15

that the primary one is not reasonable. The well- known practice of explaining Upanisadic texts in their secondary senses among the later commentators of the Brahmasütras may be seen first here in G a uda- pāda's interpretation. Among the Vedantists Gaudapāda is an Advaitist, the highest truth to him being advaita 'non- duality* (advaitam paramārthataķ, I. 17; advaitam paramārtho hi, III. 18; advaite.yojayet smrtim, II. 36). He says (II. 31) that according to the Vedanta the universe is like dream or illusion or an imaginary town in the sky (gandharvanagara). There is no duality at all, it is mere illusion (I. 17). The statement of the duality in the scripture is intended for the instruction (of the ignorant), and so when the truth is understood the duality does not exist (I. 18) and its cessation is bliss (I. 29; see also II. 35). He says (I. 17) further that the duality is due to illusion (māya). In order to support this view he quotes scriptures (III. 24) which say 'There is no plurality (neha nānāsti kiñcana, BU, IV. 4. 19; KU, IV. 11)'; and ' Indra appears multiform through māyas' (BU, Il. 5. 19)'; and he concludes (III. 24) that 'He (Prajapati) is born variously, though (in fact) he does not take birth (VS, XXX, 19). Having thus offered the scriptural evidence for main- taining the view that the duality is mere illusion and as such it has no reality, Gaudapāda gives us some pure reasons. Here, too, first he refers us to a scriptural text (BU, IV. 3. 14) and says (Il. 5) that the two

§157 INTRODUCTION cxxix

states, dream and waking, are the same and one, because of the identity of the nature of the things experienced in them. That the things in dream are unreal is well-known to all and it is said also by the wise (BU, IV. 3. 8 ff ), and can be maintained on the following grounds :

The things (such as mountains) in dream are within as they are enclosed or in an enclosed place (II. 1, IV. 33); but if they are real it is impossible. The time being very short, or there being no fixed rule of time, it cannot be said that the dreamer really goes to the distant land dreamt of by him and sees things there. Nor is he seen there when he awakes (lI. 2, IV. 34). Again, when he awakes he does not find his friends and others whom he had then in dream grasped (IV. 35). Further, it is said in our scripture (BU, IV. 3. 10) that in dream there are no chariots, etc., yet, they are seen there. Similarly, in the waking state, too, the things we see around us are unreal on account of the fact that they are within (II. 4; IV. 33). That which is non-existent at the beginning and at the end is so also in the middle, i.e., at the present. There- fore, being like the unreal (such as mirage) the external things appear as not unreal (II. 6; IV. 31). In both the cases, dream and waking, things are only imagined by the mind. That which is imagined by the mind within is regarded as non-existent (asat), while that which is imagined by the mind without is regarded as existent; but the unreality of both of them is reasonable and a matter of experience (II. 9, 10). Whether in XVII -- 1201B.

cxxx ĀGAMASĀSTRA [§15

dream or waking, whatever is cognizable by the mind is unreal (cittadrsyam avastukam, IV. 36). Moreover, in both the states the mind though in its own nature is undoubtedly without the two (i.e., the percipient and the perceptible), yet it moves owing to illusion with the appearance of the two (III. 30; IV. 62). This duality comprising the movable and the unmovable is therefore perceptible only by the mind. Hence when the mind becomes non-mind, i.e., when it ceases from its function of thinking, no duality is experienced (II1. 31). The cessation of the function of thinking of the mind, or, in other words, the state of non-mind is reached when the mind through its knowledge of the truth of the Ätman does not think anything being non- cognizant owing to the absence of the things to be cognized (III. 32).1 We have seen above that the waking experience is as unreal as the dream experience both of them being due to mãy or mere imagination of the mind that moves on account of māyā (spandate māyayā manaḥ, IlI. 29 ; cittam calati māyayā (IV. 61). That all these external things are the creation of

1 Gaudapäda seems to have been fond of compromising conflicting views (III. 17; IV. 5) and so considering the opinion of the Dvaitins, i.e., those who maintain duality, he says (II1. 17 ff.i that they are firmly fixed in their own distinctive conelusions and contend one another, but his view dces not confict with thrm. In explaining it he says (II. 18) that the supreme reality is non-duality, yet, it is not that we do not admit duality, we do it; so there is no confict amongst us The only difference amongst us is this that while according to you duality is in reality as well as in appearance we hold that it is only in appearance on account of illusion, and not also in reality (III. 19),

$13] INTRODUCTION ckxxi

the mind is further said (IV. 72) and described ela- borately by Gaudapada (IV. 47-52) with a very apt illustration of the fire-brand (alata). A fire-brand, only when it is moved, and not when it is not moved, appears to be straight or crooked, or so. Now these appearances are not produced from anything other than the fire-brand. And when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it, nor do they enter into it. Similarly when the vijñana2 or mind moves and not . when it does not move, it appears in the form of the duality consisting of the percipient and the perceptible. These appearances are produced not from anything other than the vijñana ; and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it, nor they enter into it. He says again (IV. 63-66) that as animals seen in dream are visible to the mind of the dreamer and do not exist apart from it, and as such they are the mind of the dreamer, even so the animals seen in wake- fulness are visible to the mind of the waking one and do not exist apart from it, and as such they are the mind of the waking one. Clearly this is the Vijñānavada 'Idealism' before us. Now taking here into consideration the passages quoted under IV. 72 from the LA, and comparing the kārikās IV. 47-52 with the corresponding Buddhist passages quoted in the Annotation under IV. 52, one will be struck with the agreement between a Vedāntist and a Vijñānavadin. One will also be in

2 Mark here the use of the word vijnana in these karikas, and not of citta or manas.

cxxxii ĀGAMASĀSTRA L$15

a position to understand how far Gaudapāda is here influenced by the Buddhist thoughts and argu- ments. It is, however, to be noted that Gau d a- päda, though much influenced by the Buddhist thoughts, maintains his position as a Vedantist. It is true that he advocates the Vijnānavada, but certainly it is originally adopted by him from the Upanisadic source, i.e., BU, IV. 3. 14. on which is based his fundamental statement (lI. 5) that the two states, dream and waking, are one. This Upanisadic seed of idealism being influenced by its elaborate system in Buddhism and the vast literature on it by the Buddhist teachers who flourished before Gaudapāda, has developed into what we now find in the Agamaśāstra. But when there are the above and the similar germs of idealism in the Upanisads3 it must be accepted that it did not first originate with the Buddhists, though it has much developed in their system later on. There are thus two schools of Vijnanavadins, (1) Vedantists headed by Gaudapāda and (2) Buddhists with Maitreya at the head. In both the schools the external world is the creation or trans- formation of the mind. But while in the first the cause for that transformation is māya (III. 29; IV. 61) it is vāsanā (LA, X. 150)' in the second, both of them being without beginning (anādi). This māyā and vāsanā

3 See Aitareya Upanisad, III. 2-3; TU, III. 5 : vijñānam brahmeti vyajanāt. vijnanad dhy eva°. 4 bāhyo na vidyate hy artho yatha balair vikalpyate i vāsanair luditam cittam arthabhāsam pravartate !

si5j INTRODUCTION cxxxiii

may, however, be regarded as the same thing. For vāsanā, though explained as pūrva jñāna 'previous knowledge' is conceived as a cosmical force, trans- cendental illusion (The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, Leningrad, 1927, p. 209). The real difference then between these two schools in the present case is with regard to the intervention of the Atman with whom mäya is connected in the first, and his denial' in the second where the vasana is with the citta. Now, the maya of the Jiva referred to above like vāsanā has no beginning. He sleeps on account of it being himself deluded by it (I. 16; II. 19). He himself imagines himself and various other things through his own maya, some of them being within while others without (II. 13). These things, i.e., those which are within and exist as long as exists the thought (citta), as well as those which are without and exist as long as remains the notion of the two, are only imagined (1I. 14, 15). In the process of the imagination first he imagines himself as a Jīva ' personal soul' then various things, external and internal (II. 16). Conse- quently as in the dark, a piece of rope not known determinately is imagined to be a snake or a continuous line of water, etc., even so is imagined the self ; but when that piece of rope is known determinately the imagined snake, etc., vanish and there is no duality. So is to be known of the ascertainment of the self (II. 17, 18).

5 cittamātram na drsyo 'sti dvidhā cittaņ pravartate | grāhyagrāhakabhāvena ātmātmīyam na vidyate ! LA, III. 21

cxxxiv ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$15

But what is the characteristic of a Jiva ? As we have seen above, Gaudapāda explains it (III.3-9) by an apt illustration of akaśa 'space' or mahākāśa 'great space' and ghaļākāśas 'spaces occupied by different jars'. As it is owing to the condition (upadhi) of jars that the ākāsá is regarded as ghatākāśas, so it is on account of the conglomerations (of the different parts of the body) that the Atman is regarded as Jivas. Consequently as when the jars are destroyed spaces occupied by them are completely merged into the great space (mahākāśa), even so are merged the Jivas into Atman when the conglo- merations are destroyed. The spaces occupied by all jars are in reality only one; yet if the space occupied by one jar is covered by smoke or dust, etc., not all the spaces occupied by all other jars are connected with it. The case is the same also with the Jivas in regard to their happiness, etc., i.e., if one Jīva feels happiness or suffers pain, not all the Jivas are subjected to it. There may be different conditions (upadhis) ; their forms, func- tions and names may differ from one another, but as regards the space occupied by them there is no difference. Similar is the case with reference to the Jivas. Again, the space occupied by a jar is neither a transformation (vikāra), nor a part (avayava) of the space (ākāśa), similarly a Jiva is neither a transformation nor a part of the Atman. Gaudapada says further that the Ātman like the space remains in all the conglomerations or bodies which, too, have no reality as dream being the creation of the illusion of the Atman (III. 10). The Jīva is the supreme soul of the 'sheaths' (kośas) as

§15] INTRODUCTION CXXXV

described in the TU, II. 1-6, and the supreme Brahman or Atman is shown in the Madhuvidya section of the BU, II, 5. That the identity of the Jiva and the Atman without distinction is praised and their distinc- tion is censured in the scriptures is reasonable (III. 13), for though in some texts their distinction is to be found, those texts are to be taken in their secondary sense, the primary one being not reasonable (III. 14). Here the distinction is made purposely, it is made out of compa- ssion to help one of inferior vision in one's upasanā which is for such a person impossible without some sort of distinction (III. 11-16). It is not that such a distinc- tion must be a real one.

It is said that the mind becomes non-mind and Gaudapāda is definitely of opinion that Brahman is nothing but the mind that has become non-mind. He says that the mind in the state of susupta 'deep sleep' falls into a sleeping state (laya), but it does not do so when it is suppressed (nigrhita= niruddha), and indeed that is Brahman above fear and radiant with the light of jnana (III. 35). See IV. 77-81, and below. He expresses the same thing in other words saying that when the mind is completely suppressed (niruddha) and as such is free from all movements and does not perceive anything else it becomes Brahman (IIl. 46): yada na liyate cittam na ca viksipyate punaḥ I aninganam anābhāsam nişpannam brahma tat tadā # 'When the mind is not in the state of sleep, nor is

cxxxvi ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA [$15.

distracted again, and as such has no movement, nor any sense-image, then it becomes Brahman.'6 It is to be pointed. out that here for the first time, so far as goes my information, it is found that Brahman is nothing but the citta which by nirodha is anidra (I. 16; IlI 36; IV. 81 ;= alīna=amūdha), asvapna (I. 16, III. 36; IV. 81; = avikșipta), aningana (III. 46 ;= aksipia), and anābhāsa (III. 46 ;= nirābhāșa = nirākāra = arūpaka, III. 36). Another appellation of this citta is sanirvānaR 'with extinction' (III. 37), i.e. in this state it is extinct. It is jñana 'knowledge' or 'thought' but akalpaka (III. 33; = nirvikalpa) ' indeterminate' and consequently asanga ' having no attachment or relation to any object' (IV. 72, 96 ;= nihsanga IV, 79, see IV.99=nirvisaya, IV. 72).9 Being as such this jñana is not different from the knowable (jneyabhinna), which is Brahman (III. 33).

6 The first half of the kanka implies that in this state of the mind, which can be reached by Asparsayoga (III. 39-45; IV. 2) it is free from the condi- tions known in the Yoga systems as mudha 'stupefied' and viksipta ' dis- tracted' ( Vy a sa on the YS, 1. 1). These two are also expressed by our teacher as anidra ' sleepless' and asvapna ' dreamless' respectively (III, 36; I. 16; IV. 81). ' Vācaspati (YS, 1. 1): mūdham tu tamahsamudrekān nidravīttimat. ksiptād visistam. višeso' sthemabahulasya kādācitkaḥ sthemā. 8 Here sanirvāņa mind=amanībhāva (III. 31; MU, VI. 34; YV, III. 67. 8) ;= amanastā (III. 32; Mukti UP. Il. 29) =unmanībhāva Brahmabindu UP, 4) manahk(aya (MU, VI. 20) =manorāsa 'Mukti UP, II. 10, 35, 36, 39) =manolaya (Nādabindu UP, 47,= acıttatā (Mukti UP, Il. 20) = cittanāsa(Op. cit. II. 32, 34; Sandilya UP. in One Hundred and Eight Upanisads, Nirnayasagar, 1917, p. 358). 9 See the Annotation on IV. 72.

$15] INTRODUCTION cxxxvii

It is further said that in this state the mind rests in itself (svastha, III. 47 ;= atmasamstha, III. 34).10 This Brahman of G a ud a pa d a then points on one side to the state of kaivalya 'the state of being not connected with anything else,1 or the resting of the Drastr or Purusa 'Self' in himself (svarūpa, i.e., cin- matra 'pure thought'), as described in YS, I. 3,12 and on the other to the resting of the citta in the vijñapti- mātratā of the Yogācāras or Vijñānavadins. According to the latter citta, manas, vijñāna and vijñapti are synonyms.13 Therefore vijñaptimātrata is the same as vijñānamātratā which means the state of pure and simple vijñāna 'intellect' or 'consciousness.' Here in this state there is the highest cessation of the perceiving faculty of the mind.14 And this is in their opinion mukti 'deliverance.'15 This is also the 'highest place of Visnu' (KU, I. 3. 9; MU, VI. 26 ; RV, I. 22. 20; 154. 5 with a slight variation), not only according

10 This will remind one of the following in the ChU, VII. 24. 1-2 : Yatra nānyat pasyati nānyac chmoti nanyad vijānāti sa bhūma.° sa bhagavah kasmin pratisthita iti. sve mahimni. yadi vā na mahimnīti. 11 YS, IV. 34: puruşārthasunyānām guņānām pratiprasavah kaivalyam svarūpapratisthā vā citisakteh. 12 tada drastuh svarupe 'vasthānam. 13 Vk, p. 3; AK, II. 34; MV, p. 303; VM ed. D. Kos a m bi, XIV.82. MSA, XI. 47: parama upalambhasya vigamah; Tk, p. 29: acitto 'nupalambho 'sau; see TSN, 36. 15 viditva nairatmyam dvividham iha dhiman bhavagatam samam tac ca jñātvā pravisati sa tattvam grahaņatah | tatas tatra sthānān manasa iha na khyāti tad api tad akhyānam muktıh parama upalambhasya vigamah ļ MSA, 47. XVIII-1201B.

cxxxviii ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA [§15

to the Upanisadists,1e but also to the Vaisnavas (BP, II. 1. 19).17 One point is to be discussed here. Brahman of the Vedāntists or Gaudapāda (III. 30) is eternal (nitya), and if it is so, how can it be suggested, as done before, that Brahman and the citta in Vijñapti- mātratā are the same, for according to Yogācāras jñāna is not eternal, but momentary (ksanika) ? The follow- ing is the solution :- In the authoritative Buddhist works1 the following words are used for nirvāna: dhruva 'enduring' amṛta 'not dying', acyuta 'stable', aksara 'im- perishable', ajarjara 'not decaying' and apalokita1 'not broken down.' Certainly these words do not imply momentariness, but on the contrary some kind

The third and the first part of the fourth lines are explained there thus : tatas tatra tattvavijnaptimātrasthānān manasas tad api tattvaņ na khyāti vijñapti- mātram. tad akhyānam muktih. 1€ MBU, p. 12 : yan manas trijagatsrstisthitivyasanakarmakrt ! tan mano vilayam yāti tad visnoh paramam padam " 17 tatraikāvayavam dhyayed avyucchinnena celasā | mano nirvisayam yuktvā tataḥ kincana na smaret i padam tat paramam visnor mano yatra prasīdati " 18 VM, p. 224 : SN, IV. 369 ff; Poussin : Nirvana, ACNXXV, pp. 153-4. 19 Poussin has for it in French (Loc. cit.) with a query "le Soupçunne"' ('suspected' or 'surmised'). But as clear from Buddhaghosa on SN, IV. 370 (apalujjatāya apalokitam, it is derived from pra- vruj and not from pra Wluk as may appear. And so it can be said in the words of Yasomitra (AKV, p, 23) with regard to the derivation of the word loka that rujir iha grhito na lokib See my note, A passage oj the Abhidharmakosavyākhyā, in IHQ, Vol. II, pp. 418 ff., and Poussin's Rejoinder, p. 656.

$15] INTRODUCTION cxxxix

of-stability. Now the citta in the state of vijnaptimātratā is described variously according to the vareity of the aspects beginning from the 'Path of Illumination ' (darśanamārga) in Vasubandhu's Tk, 29-30.20 It is said there to be lokottara jñāna 'super-mundane knowledge,' āśrayaparāvtti (āśrayasya parāvrttih) 'the revolution or change of the recipient', i.e., the ' alaya- vijñāna,' and anāsrava dhātu 'undefiled element' which is dhruva 'enduring.'21 Here by the word aśrayaparāvrtti referred to above we understand, in brief, that owing to the elimination of the two sorts of evil condition (dausthulya), viz., the 'covers' or 'obscurations' (āvaranas), namely, the knowable (jñeya) and the passions (kleśas), the recipient (aśraya), i.e., ālayavijñana, turns back to its natural state in the form of advaya jñāna ' the knowledge free from the two,' i.e., the subject and the object. In other words, the alayavijñana which was before covered or obscured, the obscurations being now removed, gets its own innate state, i.e., the state of. advaya (= lokottara) jñana. This is called anāsrava dhātu ' undefiled element ' which is dhruva.

20' See our text, IV. 18, foot note 1, where these two kārikas with the introductory line of Sthiramati are quoted. 21 On these words the commentary of Sthiramati may be quoted here : aparicitatvat (Tib. hdras. par. ma. byas, pa. dan, for anucitatvat in the printed text) loke samudacarabbavat (for which Tib. suggests samudayābhavat reading kun. tu. ḥbyuň. ba. med. pa, dan), nirvikalpatvāt ca lokād uttīrņam iti jñanam lokottaram ca tad iti°. āśrayo 'tra sarvabījakam ālayavijñānam, tasya parāvīttir yā dausthulyavipākadvayavāsanābhāvena parāvīttiņ°. nirdausțbulyatvāt sa tu aśrayavigata ity anāsravaḥ°. dhruvo nityatvād aksayatayā°.

cxl AGAMASĀSTRA [$15

But what is the true significance of the word dhruva, that is intended here ? Among the 33 descriptive words for nirvana found in SN, IV. 368-373 and 46 synonyms for it in AP. 6-9, we have dhruva and never nitya. It is true that sometimes the words nitya, dhruva and śāśvata are used as synonyms (Pali vevecana = vivacana= paryāya), as says Buddhaghosa him- self on SN, I. 142."2 Yet, there is some difference in their meanings. For while śaśvata, according to him, means 'always existing' (sada vijjamānam) dhruva implies 'enduring' (dhuvam'ti thiram; he writes also on SN, IV. 370 : thiratthena dhuvam). Jaina teachers, too, are of the same opinion. In connexion with the definition of dravya ' subsiance'2 in their system they give the same explanation of the word dhruva or dhrauvya using the same or similar words.21 . In the older Upanisads Atman or Brahman is nitya and not dhruva. The word nitya implies that it does not admit of any change, while dhruva does not do so. Let us give here an illustration. If of a lump of gold a number of different ornaments is made one after another, their forms change, yet, through these changes

With regard to papaka ditthigata: idam niccam idam dhuvam idam sassatam. See also Sthiramati, Tk, 30, explaining dhruva as quoted in foot-note 21. 23 Tattvarthadhigamasutra, V. 29: utpadavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat. 24 Tattvartharajavarttika (Sanatana-Jainagranthamala, 1915), V 29 (dhrava =sthira) : Tattvadipika on Pravacanasāra (ed. A. N. Upa dhy e, 1935) II. 3 (dhrauoya= avasthiti): Tattvadipika on Pancāstisamayasāra (Rayacandra Jainaśāstramālā, 2nd ed.), 10: purvottarabhavocchedotpādayor api svajāter aparityāgo dhrauvyam; Sanmatitarka (Gujarāta-Puratattva-mandira, Ahmeda- bad, 1940 V.S), Gatha 12, p. 410 (dhrauvya=sthiti).

£15] INTRODUCTION cxli

the same gold continues to exist. Owing to this continuance it can be said that gold is here dhruva 'enduring ', but not nitya ' eternal'. The Ālayavijñāna is certainly momentary (ksaņika), as it changes every moment. It does not therefore move forward as one and the same (ekam abhinnam), but continues in an uninterrupted stream (santati) as the flood with its currents (srotasa oghavat). This continuity has no beginning, nor has it an end (anādi- nidhana) till nirvana. Now as through all the moments the Alayavijñana continues it is dhruva and not nitya. It may be pointed out here that there is more than one kind of nityata ' eternity' according to the primary and the secondary senses of the word; viz., (i) kūtasthanityata 'eternity as unchangeability' as of Ätman or Brahman of the Vedantists; (ii) pariņamanityatā 'eternity as trans- formation ' as held by the Sankhyas and the Jainas. To these two may be added, according to the Buddhists, (iii) one more, viz., santatinityatā 'eternity as continuance.' It may, however, be the same as parināma-nityatā. Where in such cases in Buddhist texts the word nitya is employed it is to be taken in this light. Now in support of the main problem we are here concerned with, the following couplet may be taken into consideration : prabhasvaram idam cittam prakītyāgantavo malaḥ 1 teşām apāye sarvārtham taj jyotir avinaśvaram ii 25

25 Quoted by Jayatirtha representing the views of the Vijnanavadins in his tika (sl. 30, on TAK, III, p. 35). It is already cited once more on p. 70 of our text.

ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$15

Mark that citta is said here to be avinaśvara jyotis the light that is not liable to be destroyed '.28 It may therefore be safely concluded that G a u d a- äda's Brahman and the citta in vijnaptimātratā f the Yogäcäras are in fact the same thing with the nly one difference that while the former is nitya the itter is dhruva ..

Let us remember here what Ga udapada says bout Brahman (III. 35-36, 46-47), as we have seen ist now from the Vedantic point of view, and compare with what he says in IV. 76-81 28 of the 'field f the activities (visaya) of the Buddhas' describing

26 See also the following : (ii tatrotpannapradhvamsi vijnānam anutpannapradhvamsi jñānam A, p. 157. See our text p 85, foot-note 2. (ii) Jnanasiddhi (Two Vajrayana Texts, GOS, p. 85), XV, 50, referring cittadhara ' current of thought ' (in the text read cittadharaiva for chitta. tāreva in 48) : anadinidhana sānta sarvadharmeśvarī ca sā | bibharti sarvarūpāņi satyadvayasamāśritā !! (iii) Op. cit., p. 75 : anādinidhanam śāntam bodhicittam. (iv) Op. cit., p. 86: jnānam amaraņam° anabhilāpyam. (v) Suzuk i writes in his Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism, 1907, 348: "Nirvana is sometimes spoken of as possessing four attributes; ) eternal (nitya), (2) blıssful (sukha), (3) self-acting (atman), and ) pure (suci). It is eternal, because it is immaterial; it is blissful, because is above all sufferings; it is self-acting, because it knows no compulsion; is pure, because it is not defiled by passion and error." 27 Brahman is that citta which is unwavering and has no sense-image r origination, nor sleep, nor dream : aninganam anabhasam (III. 46) and ajam lidram asvapnam cittam (III. 36). 2s The field of activities or the aim of the Buddhas is the unwavering ›sition of the mind having no origination, nor sleep, nor dream : cittasya lutpattih (IV. 77) and niscala sthitih (IV. 80), and ajam anidram asvapnam :tam (IV. 81).

$15] INTRODUCTION cxliii

and approving the views of the Buddhists ; it will then be clear that the same thing has been said by Gaudapāda in two places almost in the same words though from the two different standpoints. We have already discussed the Vijñānavāda as it is in our text. It may be noted here in this connexion that it is treated here by Gaudapada only with a view to the establishment of the Ajativada 'the Theory of Non-origination ' which is one of the most important topics of the philosophy of Gaudapada. Having proposed to show what it is first in III. 2 and then in IV. 5 he declares (III. 48) and affirms (IV. 71) that the highest truth is that nothing originates. For details the reader is referred to the Conspectus of the Contents (pp. cxiii-cxxvi) and the work itself, we should like to point out here only a few important aspects of it. The subject is dealt with by our author as a Vedantist separately in two places, Book II and Book IV. In the former he does so purely from the Vedantic point of view supporting his thesis by scriptures and grounds based on them or in favour of them, some of these grounds being strikingly similar to those offered by the Buddhists for the same purpose ; while in the latter, he expresses his approval on behalf of his schcol regard'ng ajali as declared by the Advayas or Buddhists saying that he does not dispute with them onthis point and asking his followers or the people at large to listen to him as to how there cannot be any dispute. He proceeds then to show throughout the Book IV the

CXAiV ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA [$15

arguments of the Buddhists taking even the actual words from their authoritative works in a number of cases. Readers are here referred to our text with Annotation. One point may be pointed out here. In Book IV Gaudapāda has discussed nothing directly of the Vedānta,20 as nothing Vedantic will be found therein. In explaining the Vedanta in accordance with his own light he establishes the Ajativada in Book IlI, as we have seen above. Then in Book IV he supports that theory referring to the Buddhists who also hold the same view independently of the Vedāntists. Gaudapāda says here that his school approves of what they say on this point and shows their arguments one by one. From this it may appear that whatever is said by Gaudapāda as the opinion of the Buddhists in that Book is approved or accepted by him. But can it be said strictly ? The Buddhists being the follower of the Middle Path (madhyama pratipad) reject both the extreme views of 'eternity' and 'annihila- tion' (śaśvala- and uccheda-vādas). This is alluded to in our text in IV. 57-60. But how can Gauda- pada as a Vedantist accept it when his Brahman in his own word (III. 33) is eternal (nitya)? Nevertheless, in the present case, Gauda pada seems to have accepted the middle theory, for, as the case is put here, there may not be raised any objection. Or it may be that Gaudapād a has here simply mentioned the views

29 Even such words as Brahman and Atman are not to be found there; - .

§15] INTRODUCTION cxlv

of the Buddhists as he has done it in some other cases in this Book. For instance, see IV. 90.

It is a very striking fact that some of the most remarkable doctrines as discussed and established by Gaudapāda have not been appreciated in subsequent works on the Vedanta even of the Advaita school; for instance, the peculiar conception of Brahman, the Ajātivāda, the Sarvajñatvavāda (IV. 85, 89) and the Vijñānavāda, besides what Ga udapāda approves of the views of the Advayavadins or Buddhists in Book IV. Even the great Śankara himself does not appear to subscribe to the above doctrines of our teacher. It need not, however, be said that his Mayāvada has undoubtedly got strong impetus from the first three Books of the ĀS. His Adhyāsavāda as explained by him in his Śārīrakabhāsya and other works has no mention in the ĀS, though a distant relationship may be found out. Here he is undoubtedly influenced by the Buddhist Vijñānavādins specially in explaining their doctrine of Trisvabhava or Trilaksana 'three characteristics' (IV. 74, pp. 175 ff).

Of the philosophy of Gaudapāda there is much more that deserves to be discussed separately, but in order to avoid prolixity readers are referred to the text itself, specially to its Book IV together with the new Annotation of the present writer, in which he has tried to explain many an important and hitherto obscure point of the work. From this, it is hoped, readers will be in a position to form their own judge- XIX-1201B,

cxlvi ĀGAMASĀSTRA [$15

ments as to how much Gaudapada is influenced by Buddhist thoughts and how much of them he has adopted into his own system of the Vedanta.3

30 One may consider here the following words in the Bhāvaprakasa (TM, Vol. Il, p. 415) referring to ĀS, IV. 11-23 : nanu mandūkyakārikasu Gaudapadacaryaih madhyamikoktayuktibhiķ kāryakaraņa- (for wrongly printed kāryākāraņa ) bhāvasya sāmvrtatvam sthāpitam.

BOOK I

1

bahisprajño vibhur viśvo hy antahprajñas tu taijasah ! ghanaprajñas tathā prājña eka eva tridhā sthitah li

'The all-pervading one is Visva 'all' when he has the consciousness of outside; he is Taijasa 'brilliant' when he has the consciousness of inside and when his consciousness is concentrated1 he is Prajna 'intelligent'. The one exists in three forms.'2

' Literally 'condensed' (ghana), in other words, when consciousness) does not admit of any distinction within itself, as is the case in wakefulness and in dream. 2 See I. 2

2

dakşiņāksimukhe viśvo manasy antas tu taijasah l ākāśe ca hrdi prājñas tridhā dehe vyavasthitaḥ #

'Viśv a is in the front of the right eye,1 within the mind is Taijasa, while Prajña is in the sky in the heart.2 Thus he remains in the body in three ways.'3

1 KtU, IV. 17; MU, VII. 11; ChU, IV. 15. 1, VII. 7. 4; BU, II. 3.5, IV. 2. 2, V. 5. 2, 4. 2 BU. II. 1. 17, IV. 2. 3. 3 See pp. lxxxxiv-Ixxxxvili and 1. 3.

2 ĀGAMASĀSTRA

viśvo hi sthūlabhun nityam taijasah praviviktabhuk ! ānandabhuk tatha prājñas tridha bhogam nibodhata ll

'Viśva enjoys what is gioss, Taijas a what is fine, and Prājña bliss. (Thus) know enjoyment to be of three kinds.'

4

sthūlam tarpayate viśvam praviviktam tu taijasam 1 ānandaś ca tatha prājñam tridhā trptim nibodhata l

'The gross satisfies Visy a, the fine Taijasa, and bliss Prāj ña. (Thus) know satisfaction to be of three kinds.'

5

trişu dhāmasu yad bhojyam bhoktā yaś ca prakīrttitah I vedaitad ubhayam yas tu sa bhuñjāno na lipyate l

'One who knows both what is said to be enjoyable, and what is said to be the enjoyer in three stages, is not tainted through enjoying.'

6

prabhavah sarvabhūtānām satām iti viniścayaḥ I sarvam janayati prāņaś ceto'msūn puruşah prthak #

' The settled opinion of sages is that all things have their origin. (Some hold that) the Breath,1 the Purusa (self), creates all .- the rays of the mind, differently.'

For the creation by Prana see BS, I. 1. 23. Prron is here Brahman.

ĀGAMASĀSTRA 3

The objective world is the vibrations of one's mind (citta- spandita, see IV. 72) which shines inside. These vibrations are called here rays (amsu) and assume different forms just like the rays of the sun on the clouds appearing in the form of the rainbow.

7

vibhūtim prasavam tv anye manyante srsticintakāh I svapnamāyāsvarūpeti srstir anyair vikalpitā

'Other theorisers about creation assert dogmatically that the creation (of the world) is (his) expansion,1 while others imagine that creation is of the nature of dream and magic."2

1 As in the Upanisads. TU, ll. 6. 1: so 'kāmayata kahu syāņ prajāyeya. ' This view is held by some of the Vedantists including our teacher (see II. 31) and the Buddhists, Madhyamikas and Yogacaras.

8

icchamatram prabhoh srstir iti sstau viniścitah I kālāt prasūtiņ bhūtānāņ manyante kālacintakāh ll

'Those who are assured about creation say that creation is the mere volition of the. Lord,1. and those who. theorise- about Time consider the creation of beings to be from Time.'2

1 See note on 1.7. Kuranarāyana, a follower of Ramanuja, says that they are Aupanisadas or the followers of the Upanisads, who say He is satyasankalpa 'one whose purpose is true or fulfilled' (ChU, 3.14.2). .. 2 They are Astronomers, See SU, 1.1; MU, 7: MB, XII. 224, 227; ȘS. pp. 10-11 and specially the hymns on Kala in the AV, XIX. 53, 54. *

.4 ĀGAMASĀSTRA

Now as regards the object of the creation the author says:

9

bhogārtham srstir ity anye krīdārtham iti cāpare I devasyaisa svabhāvo 'yam āptakāmasya kā spṛhā l

'Some (say) that the creation is for the sake of (his) enjoyment,1 while others (are of opinion) that it is for the sake of his sport.2 It is, however, the nature of the Shining One, for how can desire be in one for whom every object of desire is (already) secured." Küranārāyan a says here in his țikā: harer atrptasyaiva bhogartham srstir ity anye. Srinivasatirtha, an anno. tator of M a dhvācarya's commentary on MaU, clearly says that this view is held by Ramanuja or his followers (kecid rāmānujāķ).'

1 See BU, 1.4.17; ātmaivedam agra āsīd eka eva, so 'kāmayata jāyā me syad atha prajayeya vittam me syad atha karma kurviyeti. 2 See BS, II. 1. 33: lokavat tu lilākaivalyam; MU, VI. 1: viśvakrīdārati- prabhuh. 3 The second half of the karika is quoted as sruti in the Mādhvabhāsya on BS, II. 1, 33.

10

nivțtteh sarvaduhkhānām isānah prabhur avyayaḥ 1 advaitaḥ sarvabhāvānām devas turyo vibhuh smrtah l

'The Turya ' fourth one' is said to be all-pervading, efficient in removing all miseries, the shining one, change- less, and of all things without a second.'

1 The other three are already mentioned: Visva, Taijasa and Prãjña.

ÃGAMAŚÃSTRA 5

kāryakāraņabaddhau tāv isyete viśvataijasau I prājñah kāranabaddhas tu dve tu turye na sidhyataḥ i1

'It is held that those two, Viśva and Taijasa, are bound with cause and effect, Präjfia is bound with cause, but in Tury a neither of them can be asserted.'

Here according to the commentator 'cause' (kārana) is non- grasping of the truth (tattvagrahana), while 'effect' (kārya) is grasping. the truth otherwise (anyathagrahana). See 1. 15. These two are common to both Visva and Taijasa. In Prājfa there is only tattvagrahana, 'while in Tury a there is neither of them, Cf. PS1, 31 ; PS2, 34, 35.

! This karika is quoted in the NSi, IV. 41.

12

nātmānam na parāmś caiva na satyam nāpi cānrtam I prājnaḥ kincana samvetti1 turīyaḥ sarvadțk2 sadā ll

'Prãjña knows nothing-neither himself nor others, . neither truth nor falsehood; but Turiy a is always all-seeing.'1 As to why Prajña is bound with cause (tattvāgrahana) and Turiy a is not bound with either of cause and effect (anyathāgrahana) is stated in the following kārikā.

See BU, IV. 3. 21. 2 See IV. 84; Cf. satvajña, III. 36, 47.

6 ÄGAMASĀSTRA

As Prajña does not know anything he is regarded as bound with the cause (tattvagrahana) which is just like darkness (tamas).3 As regards Turiy a there being nothing except himself he is all-seeing and thus in the absence of all ignorance he is not bound in any way.

3 See US, XVIII, 26.

13

dvaitasyāgrahaņam tulyam ubhayoh prājnaturyayoḥ 1 bījanidrayutah prajnah sā ca turye na vidyate I

'Non-recognition of duality is common to both Prajña and Turya; but Präjña is with sleep which is a seed (i.e., cause of specific cognition), while it does not exist in Turya.' In this kārika the difference between Prajñ a and Turya is shown. In the text nidra 'sleep' implies tattvapratibodha 'non-realization of truth' (1. 15), and as it is the cause of specific cognition in dream and waking it is called bija 'seed'.

14

svapnanidrāyutāv ādyau prājñas tv asvapnanidrayā l na nidrām naiva ca svapna turye paśyanti niścitāh I

'The first two (Viśva and Taijasa) are with sleep and dream,1 Präjña is with dreamless sleep, while those who are certain (about the truth) see neither sleep nor dream in Tury a.' It follows, therefore, from the above that. Tury a is not bound either with cause or with effect.

1 Dream (svapna) is 'knowing otherwise' (anyathagrahana) and sleep (nidra), as said before, is 'non-cognition of truth' (tattvapratibodha). See I.15.

ĀGAMASĀSTRA 7

15

anyatha grhnatah svapno nidra' tattvam ajānataḥ l viparyāse tayoḥ ksīņe turīyam padam aśnute l2

'Dream is for him who takes the truth otherwise, and sleep is for him who does not know the Reality. The error in these two (svapna and nidra) being destroyed one attains the stage of Turīya.'

1 See YS, I. 10. 2 See NSi, IV. 42; US, xviii. 26,

16

anādimāyayā supto yadā jīvaḥ prabudhyate I ajam anidram asvapnam advaitam budhyate tadā "

'When the Jiva sleeping on account of illusion1 which has no beginning is awakened, he realizes (the state of Turya) which is unborn and in which there is neither sleep nor dream, nor duality.'

1 The commentator says that this maya is in the form of tattvapratibodha and anyathāgrahaņa. 2 See 1. 14, III. 36, IV. 81.

17

prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na samšayah I māyāmātram idam dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ l

'If the expansion of the (visible) universe (prapañca) were (really) existing it would have to cease to exist, no doubt, but this duality is mere illusion, in absolute truth there is non-duality.'

8 ĀGAMASĀSTRA

For the meaning of prapanca see Candrakirtti on MV, p. 350: te ca vikalpā anādimatsamsārābhyastāj jñānajñeya-vācya- vācaka-kartțkarmakriya-ghaļa-pața-mukuļa-ratha-rūpa-vedanā-strī- purusa-labhalabha-sukha-duhkha-yaśo-'yaśo-nindā-praśamsādi-lakșa- ņād vicitrāt prapañcād upajāyante. Op. cit., p. 373: prapañco hi vāk prapañcayaty arthān iti kṛtvā.

18

vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadi kenacit I upadeśād ayam vādo jñāte dvaitam na vidyate l

'False creation (vikalpa)1 would cease if it were created" by some one. This statement (of vikalpa) is for the sake of instruction. When (the Reality) is known there is no duality.' It means that if it is held, as we hold, that the vikalpa (=prapañca in the preceding kārika) 'false creation', i.e., duality, is made by some onc it must disappear. We say that it is said so in order to instruct the ignorant or stupid people, so that they may gradually arrive at the truth (ajnānām ava- bodhartham .- YV, III. 84.24). This will be clear from YV (1I1. 84.19-27), from which a few lines are quoted below. The second half of the karika is identical with YV. III. 84.25a and 27b with the single variation that in 26a there is avibodhād for our upadesad. The reading avibodhad, how- ever, seems to have actually been avabodhad. See the follow- ing from YV, III.84: upadeśāya sāstresu jātah sabdo thavārthajaḥ I pratiyogivyavacchedasamkhyālaksaņapaksavān l 19 bhedo dśyata evāyam vyavahārān na vāstavaḥ I vetālo bālakasyeva kāryārtham parikalpitaḥ i 20

1 -That is, duality which is only imaginary. 2 Lit. imagined.

1, 191 ĀGAMASĀSTRA 9

e"-mādimayī mithyāsankalpakalpanā matā i ajñānām avabodhārtham na tu bhedo 'sti vastuni i 24 avibodhād ayam vādo jñāte dvaitam na vidyate 1 jñāte saņsāntakalanaņ maunam evāvaśișyate I 25 vivadante hy asambudhāh svavikalpavijrmbhitaiḥ I upadeśād ayaņ vādo jñāte dvaitaņ na vidyate l 27

In a of the kārika KN reads na nivarteta for vinivarteta. Accordingly it would give the following meaning: vikalpa would not cease if it is created by some one, but the fact is not so, for it is mentioned only for one's instruction. KN, however, er ›lains it differently.

19

viśvasyātvavivaksāyām ādi sāmānyam utkațam i mātrāsampratipattau syād aptisāmānyam eva ca ll

'In the desire of saying that Visva is A and in knowing the measure1 the common quality 'first' (adi) as well as 'pervading' (apti) is quite apparent.' Ätman is to be meditated through the symbol Om, and for doing so these two must be regarded as identical. This identi- fication of Ätman and Om is described in this and the follow- ing two karikās. In the present kārikā the first part (pāda) of Ätman, viz., Visva, is identified with the first part or measure (matra) of Om, viz., the letter A. It is to be noted that Om results from the euphonic combination of the three letters (matras), A, U and M. In such identification there must be some common quality (samanya dharma) of the things to be

1 That is, in knowing the identity of the first matra of Om, i.e., A, with the first pada of Atman, i.e., Vis v a. See I, 20, 21, note I. 1201B-2

10 ĀGAMASÄSTRA [1,20

meditated as identical.2 In the present case there are two common qualities, 'first' (adi) and 'pervading' (apti). As Viśva is the first of the four padas of Atman, so A is the first of all the letters of which Om is composed. And, again, as the reward of one who understands this identity of Visva and A is far-reaching (for one attains thereby everything that one may desire), so is far-reaching A, for, as said in the sruti, A is all speech, as it manifests itself in different letters.3

2 See bhaktivada in Vedic texts: Nirukta, VII. 24: bahubhaktivādini brahmanani bhavanti; and the present writer's Vedic Interpretation and Tradition in the Proceedings of the Sixth Oriental Conjerence held at Patna, p. 498. 3 Sayana says in his commentary on the TA, VII : etad apy aitareyake samāmnātam akāro vai satvā vāk. saişā sparšosmabhir vyajyamānā bahvī nānā- rupa bhavati. This passage is quoted by commentators on the BG, X. 33. See AA. III. 2.3 with Sayana : tasyaitasyakaro rasah.

20

taijasasyotvavijñāna utkarso drśyate sphuțam 1 mätrāsampratipattau syād ubhayatvam tathāvidham Il

'In understanding that Taijas a is (the letter) U and in knowing the measure,1 the common quality 'subsequence' (utkarsa) as well as the state of being in (the middle of) both (ubhayatva) is clearly seen.' The common qualities required for identification of Taijas a with U are utkarsa 'subsequence' and ubhayatva which is the same as madhyasthatva 'intermediate position.'

1 That is, in understanding that the second matra of Om, i.c., U, and the second pada of Atman, i.e., Taijasa, are identical. See I, 19, note 1. and 21, note l.

1, 21] ĀGAMASĀSTRA =

Taijasa is subsequent to Viśva and U is subsequent to A; therefore there is utkarsa. Taijasa and U both are in the middle being between Viśva and Prājña and A and M respectively.

21

makārabhāve prājñasya mānasāmānyam utkațam l

mātrāsampratipattau tu layasāmānyam eva ca li

'In the identity of Prajña with (the letter) M and in understanding the measure the clear common quality is 'measure' (mãna) as well as 'disappearance' (laya).'

The commentator's explanation of the kārikā, as I understand it, is as follows: In involution Viśva and Taijasa enter into Prajña, while in evolution they come out of it; and as such they, as it were, are measured with P ra jñ a, just as grains of barley are measured with prastha 'a special standard of measure,' generally a basket made of bamboo or cane of particular capacity. In measuring the grains they are first put into the basket and then they are taken out. Now as Viśva and Taijasa enter into and come out of Prajñ a, so in pronouncing Om continually, A and U, as it were, merge into and emerge from M This is the first common quality, called 'measure' (mana) for the identi- fication of Prajña and M. The second common quality called 'disappearance' (laya) is this: In susupti 'profound, deep and undisturbed sleep' Viśva and Taijasa dis- appear in Prajña. Similarly in pronouncing Om, A and U seem to disappear in M.

I, 22-24 12 ĀGAMASĀSTRA

22

trişu dhāmasu yas tulyam sāmānyam vetti niścitah I sa pūjyaḥ sarvabhūtānām vandyaś caiva mahāmunih I 'One who knows what is equal and common in the three stages and is certain (about it) is a great sage worthy of veneration and praise of all beings.'

23

akāro nayate viśvam ukāraś cāpi taijasam i makāraś ca punaļ prājñam nāmātre vidyate gatiḥ l

'A leads to Viśva, U to Taijasa, and M to Prājña; there is no going to that which has no measure (matrā).'1

This is the consequence of one's meditating upon the symbol Om consisting of three matras, A, U and M. The last päda of the kārika speaks of the consequence of the meditation on 'the fourth' (Turya). In this state none is led to anywhere, it itself being the cessation of all duality (dvaitasya upaśamaḥ).2

1 That is, Turya. 2 See I. 29.

24

onkāram pādaśo vidyāt pādā mātrā na samśayah I onkāraņ pādao jñātvā na kincid api cintayet li

'One should understand Om with each of the pādas 'quarters'; no doubt, the pādas are the matrās 'measures." 1 It is said in the original Up, 8 : padā mātra mātrās ca padāh, which means that the quarters (padas) of atman are to be regarded as identical with the measures (matras) of Om.

I, 25-27] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 13

And having understood Om with each of the padas one should not think of anything else. 2

2 For d cf. BG, VI. 25 : atmasamstham manah krtvā na kiñcid api cintayet. See BP, II. 1.19.

25

yuñjīta praņave cetah praņavo brahma nirbhayam i praņave nityayuktasya na bhayam vidyate kvacit il.

'One should apply1 the mind to Om, for Om is Brahman in whom there is no fear. And nowhere is fear for him who is always fixed2 upon Om.'

1 That is, concentrate. 2 That is, whose mind is always fixed. -

26

praņavo hy aparam brahma praņavaś ca param smrtaḥ I apūrvo 'nantaro 'bāhyo 'naparah praņavo 'vyayah |I

'Om is said to be the lower, as well as the higher Brahman. Om is without any antecedent and unchanging, and it has nothing other than itself, nor has it inside or outside.'1

1 BU, IV. 5. 83 : anantaro'bāhyaḥ.

27

sarvasya pranavo hy adir madhyam antas tathaiva ca l evam hi praņavam jñātvā vyaśnute tad anantaram l

'Om is the beginning, middle, and end of all. Having known Om in this way one attains it1 immediately.'

1 Original tad. It seems to refer to Brahman in the preceding karika. The commentator takes it to refer to atmabhāva.

14 ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA [I, 28-29

28

praņavam hīśvaram vidyāt sarvasya hṛdi samsthitam1 1 sarvavyāpinam onkāram matvā dhīro na śocati2 #

'One should know Om to be the Lord present in the heart of all. Having understood the all-pervading Om a wise man does not grieve.'

1 BG, XIII. 17 : hṛdi sarvasya dhișthitam ; KU, II. 3. 17: sadā janānām hrdaye sannivistah. 2 KU. I. 2. 22 ; II. 1. 4, 3. 6.

29

amātro 'nantamātraś ca dvaitasyopaśama śivaḥ I onkāro vidito yena sa munir netaro janah i

iti gaudapādīya āgamaśāstra āgamākhyam prathamam prakaraņam samāptam.

'He and no other person is a sage (muni)1 who knows Om which has no measure, and yet has an unlimited measure, and which is the cessation of duality, and which is bliss.'

'Here ends, in the Āgamasāstra of G a u da pāda, Book One, called Traditional Doctrine.'

1 I. 22.

BOOK II

1

vaitathyam sarvabhāvānām svapna āhur manīșiņaḥ i antaḥsthānāt tu bhāvānām samvtatvena hetunā ii

'The wise say that all things in a dream are unreal, for they are within owing to the fact that they are enclosed.' See II. 4, IV. 33. Things such as mountains, elephants, etc., which are seen in a dream are not outside but inside the body. But as in reality they cannot exist within the body they must be regarded as unreal. Literally the karika means that owing to the fact that the things in a dream are enclosed (samvrta) they are inside (antahsthana), and hence they are unreal (vitatha). But it will be evident from karika IV. 33 in which this very thought is expressed in almost identical words, that the state of being enclosed (samurtatva) is not with reference to things (bhūtas), but to the place (pradesa). This explanation of the author himself may rightly be accepted here and also in kārika II. 4. See II. 2. That the things seen in a dream are inside the body is ex- plained in the following kārikā :

2

adīrghatvāc ca kālasya gatvā dešān na paśyati l pratibuddhaś ca vai sarvas tasmin deśe na vidyate !! 'The time being not long one does not see the things

16 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [II, 3

dreamt) by going to (different) places ; and no person, on waking, is in the place (where he dreamt himself to be).' It cannot be held that in a dream one goes to different places and sees things in those places, for one may see things in a dream in a very distant land, but the time being short it is impossible to think that the dreamer travels to that distant land and sees the things there. Moreover, it is found that a dreamer, on waking, does not see himself in the country where he dreamt himself to be. Thus it follows that the things seen in a dream do not exist in the external world. I. support of this view the author refers in the next karika to tl e BU, IV. 3. 10 :

3

abhāvaś ca rathādīnām śrūyate nyāyapūrvakam l vaitathyam tena vai prāptam svapna āhuh prakāśitam I 'The non-existence of chariots, etc. (seen in a dream), with the reason therefor, is learnt from the sruti.1 Therefore, it is

1 See BU, IV. 3. 10 which runs as follows : na tatra ratha na rathayogā na panthano bhavanty atha rathan rathayogan pathah sjate. In this passage tatra refers to svapna. See also IV. 3. 13 : svapnanta uccavacam iyamāno rūpāņi devaķ kurute bahūni ! uteva strībhih saha modamāno jaksad utevāpi bhayāni pašyan ! As regards the nyaya 'reason' referred to here, Purusottama writes: svapnānta uccāvacamīyamāna-iti mantreņānekarūpakaraņam uktvā tasmān nayatam bodhayed durbhisajyam hasmai bhavatity anena suptasya nirbandhena jagarane kastam āha yady anyatra gato bhavet tatkaranam na vaded (?) durbhaisajyam ca. yatra suptas tatraiva striyā svapne ramamānah skhalite jagrat tam bahih paśyet. yato na'pasyati tata karoti, yatah karoti tato rathādyabhāvāh. evam ca svapne pūrvam rathādyabhavah paścāt karaņād ityadinyāyapūrvakam.

II, 4] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 17

said that the unreality (of things seen) in a dream, as follows (from the foregoing arguments), is evident.'

In the next karika the author proceeds to show the unreality of things in the waking state also applying the same reasons :

4

antahsthānāt tu bhedānām tathā jāgarite smrtam l yatha tatra tathā svapne samvrtatvam na bhidyate1 1

'The same2 is declared of the things 3 in waking on account

I The actual reading of d in all printed texts and MSS. examined is samurta- tvena bhidyate which hardly gives any proper sense. The commentary does not help us on this point. It explains : antabsthanat samvtatvena ca svapnadīśyanām bhavanam jagraddrsyebhyo bhedah-'on account of being inside as well as of being covered the phenomena in a dream are different from those in waking.' But this explanation is hardly possible, for one naturally expects here to know the non-difference (abheda) and not the difference between the things in waking and in dream. Accordingly one might disjoin the sandhi in jagraddrsyebhyo bhedah in the commentary taking the last word as abhedah and not bhedah, though Anandagiri evidently accepts the latter. Apart from the propriety of that explanation the question is: How should one construe the second half of the karika ? What is the nominative of the verb bhidyate? According to the commentator it must be svapnadrsya bhava, but it is not in the text, nor can it be understood or supplied from any of the preceding kārikās. One may. however, take the line as samurtatve na bhidyate. In this case the nominative is vaitathya 'unreality' which is to be supplied from the preceding karika. The author wants here to show the unreality of the phenomena in the waking state just like that of those in a dream on the same ground, i.e., antahsthana which is due to samurtatva of the place. Thus it is said that the vaitathya of the things in waking does not differ from that of the things in a dream, for in both the cases samurtatva is the same, there being no difference whatsoever. 2 That is, vaitathyam already described in the preceding karikā. 3 The words bhuta (IV. 33), bhava.(II. 13, 16, 17, 19, 33 ; III. 20, 22), and bheda (II. 4, 5, 11, 12) are the same as regards the meaning. 1201B-3

18 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [1], 5

of the fact that they are inside ; for, as there (i.e., in waking) so in a dream the state of being enclosed does not differ.'4 See II. 1, IV. 33. I should, however, like to suggest the reading as samvrtatvam na bhidyale which makes the sense very clear. As to how the state of being enclosed (samvrtatva) does not differ in waking and dream, is discussed and shown in some of the following kārikās (II. 9, 10, 13, 14, 15 ; III. 29, 30 ; IV. 61, 62, 64-66), where it is fully explained, as the Vijñana- vadins would say, that there being no external thing in reality, whatever we sce around us either in waking or in dream is only imagined (kalpita) by mind which is inside our body and inside of a body is covered (samurta). Says Dinnäga in his Ālambanaparīksā, 6: yad antar jfieyarūpam tad bahirvad avabhāsate. Puruşottama writes here: jāgarita iti. bahir anubhavāt katham antalısthatvam ity ākāikşāyām svapnatulyatvād iti vaktum svapnasyaitattaulyam āha yathā tatreti. yathā jāgarite manodhyato 'rthah sarīrasamvrtatvena bāhyebhyo bhidyata iti sarirantahsthatvam tatha svapne 'pi pūrvam uktam. atas tattulyatvāt tathety arthah. ' The commentary reads in explaining the kārikā : jāgraddrsyānām bhūvānām vaitathyam iti pratijna. drfyatvād iti hetub. svapnadrsyabhavavad iti drstāntah. yathu tatra svapne dršyanam bhavanam vaitathyam tatha jagarite 'pi drsyatvam avišistam iti hetūpanayah. tasmaj jāgarite 'pi vaitathyam smrtam iti nigamanam.

Now the author goes to show further in the next karika that there is no difference between the two states, waking and dream ; in fact they are one :

5

svapnajāgarite sthāne hy ekam āhur manīșiņaḥ l bhedanam hi samatvena prasiddhenaiva hetunā ll

'The wise say that the two states, dream and waking, are

II, 6-7] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 19

one, on account of the identity of things (in those two states), for the reason that has been well established.' The first half of the kārika refers to BU, IV. 3. 14 : atho khalv āhur jāgaritadesa evāsyāia iti yāni hy eva jāgrat paśyati tāni supta iti. Here esah refers to svapna, as says Śankara: eşah svapnah. For svapnajagarite sthăne cf. BU, IV. 3. 9 : dve eva sthāne bhavataḥ. 'The reason that has been well established' (prasiddhenaiva hetunā) refers to antahsthāna already explained (II. 1, 4), Though in fact the objects of waking experience appear as real, still they are unreal. How it may. be so the author proceeds to say in the following karikās:

6

ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne'pi tat tatha l vitathaih sadṛsāh santo'vitathā iva lakșitāh l

See IV. 31. 'That which is non-existent at the beginning, and at the end, is so also at the present (i.e., in the middle); being like the unreal1 things still appear as not unreal' ; For a full discussion see IV. 31, which is identical with the present kārikā.

1 That is, being like mirage, etc., which are acknowledged to be unreal by all.

7

saprayojanatā tesām svapne 'pi pratipadyate1 I tasmād adyantavattvena mithyaiva khalu te smrtāh l

1 The reading of b generally found in editions and MSS. examined is svapne vipratipadyate ; but as the sense requires it should 'be svapne 'pi prati-

20 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [11,8

'that the things have some purpose also in dream is known. Hence owing to their having a beginning and an end, indeed, they are regarded as unreal.' For particulars see IV. 32 which is a repetition of the present kārikā.

padyate which is actually found in a MS., D2. in IV. 32 which is identical with the present karika. Here. too, MS. Vn. reads scapne ca prati°. It is supported also by MS. Ch () of the Comm. in Anandasrama ed. which has svapne prati° for svapne viprati°.

8

apūrvāh sthānidharmā hi yatha svarganivāsinām 1 tän ayam preksate gatvā yathaiveha susiksitah i

'(The phenomena of dream) are strange, like (the charac- teristics) of the inhabitants of the heaven; they are the charac- teristics of the person in the place (of dream, i.e., the dreamer himself). Just like one who is well trained here, he goes and sees them (in dream).' I confess this karika is not quite clear to me. I simply write what I have been able to gather from it in the light of the commentator. It is to be noted that in a I suggest the reading apūrvah sthanidharmah for apurvam sthanidharmah, so that the former can be connected with tan in c. For other readings see the commentary and the Appendix The kārika seems to say as follows: The phenomena of dream, on the analogy of which the objects of the waking experience are held to be unreal, are sometimes strange, as the characteristics of some gods, such as the thousand eyes of Indra, and this is the nature of the dreamer (sthanin 'one in the place' of dream) himself. And just as a man who is

II, 9-10] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 21

well trained goes to a place and sees there strange things, so he sees strange things in a dream.

The next two kärikas seek to establish the unreality of dream and waking experience alike :

9

svapnavṛttāv api tv antaś cetasā kalpitam tv asat l bahiś cetoghītam sad drstam vaitathyam etayoh li

'Even in the state of dream that which is imagined by mind within is (regarded as) non-existing (asat), while that which is cognized by mind without is (regarded as) existing (sat); (but) the unreality of (both of) them is a matter of experience.'

10

jāgradvīttāv api tv antaś cetasā kalpitam tv asat l bahiś cetogrhītam sad yuktam vaitathyam etayoh l

'In the waking state also, that which is imagined by mind within is regarded as non-existing (asat), while that which is cognized by mind without is regarded as existing, (sat); the unreality of (both of) them is reasonable.'

Cf. these two kārikās with IV. 63-66.

The opponent here says that it cannot be said that every- thing in the waking experience and dream is unreal, for there must be at least one thing real without which we cannot go on:

24 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [II, 14

14

cittakālāś ca ye 'ntas tu dvayakālāś ca ye bahiḥ l kalpitā eva te sarve višeso nānyahetukaḥ t:

'Those which are within and exist as long as exists the thought (citta), and those which are without and exist as long as remains (the notion of) the two (i.e., grahya 'perceptible' and grāhaka 'percipient'), are all merely imagined. And (in this respect) there is no difference on any other ground.' For dvaya see III. 29, 30 ; IV. 4, 24, 61, 62, 72, 75, 87. That in such cases dvaya 'twofold' means grahya and grāhaka, 'perceptible' and 'percipient' respectively, is quite clear from the words of the author himself (IV. 72b) : grāhya- grähakavad dvayam. It is also well known throughout the Buddhist literature, for instance, MS, XIV. 28 (p. 94) :

dvayagrāhavisamyuktam lokottaram anuttaram I nirvikalpam malāpetam jñanam sa labhate punaḥ ll

°dvayagrāhavisamyuktam grāhyagrāhagrāhakagrāhavisam- yogāt. Op. cit. XI. 32 (p 63) :

svadhatuto dvayabhasah savidyaklesavrttayaḥ ! vikalpāh sampravartante dvayadravyavivarjitāh Il

°dvayābhāsā iti grāhyagrāhakābhāsāh. dvayadravyavivarjitā iti grāhyadravyeņa grāhakadravyeņa ca.

See also the following quoted from the Aryadrdha- sayapariprcchā in MV, p. 463 : na hi kulaputra dvayaprabhāvitā tathāgatadharmatā. tatra ye dvaye caranti na te samyakprayuktā mithyāprayuktās te vaktavyāḥ. katamac ca kulaputra dvayam. aham rāgam prahāsyāmīti dvayam etat. aham dvesam prahāsyāmīti dvayam etat. aham moham prahāsyāmīti dvayam etat. -

D. 14-15] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 25

TS, 3,538 :

prakṛtyā bhāsvare citte dvayākārākalankite I dvayākārāvimūdhātmā kaḥ kuryād anyathāmatiḥ (tim) I1 dvayākārāvimūdhātmeti prahīņagrāhyagrāhakābhiniveśaḥ. -Pañjikā. Though both of the experiences, i.e., the experiences in dream and waking, are mere imaginations, and as such are not different, yet there is some difference between them with regard to the means of their cognition. This is shown in the next kārikā :

15

avyaktā eva ye 'antas tu sphuțā eva ca ye bahih I kalpitā eva te sarve viśeșas tv indriyāntare ll

'Those which are unmanifest within and those which are manifest without are all imagined indeed, but there is some difference owing to the difference of the organs of sense (with which they are cognized).' The experiences of dream being related only to the mind (manomātrasambandhat) are unmanifest (avyakta=asphuța); while those of waking being related to external senses, such as eyes, etc. (caksuradibhir indriyasambandhal) are manifest (sphuta). Hence it is to be admitted that there is some difference between them. But this difference is not due to any reality (astitvakrta) of external things; for the phenomena of dream, too, appear for the time being to be as real as those of waking. Therefore this difference lies in the fact that while the things within are cognized by mind, those without are cognized by external s senses. The following line of Ãnandagiri is to be noted here specially: ye manasy antarbhāvanārūpatvād asphuțā ye ca manaso bahir upalabhya- mānāḥ sphuțā bhavanti te sarve manaḥspandanamātratvena 1201B,-4

26 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [II. 15-16

kalpitah. Mark here manahspandana and compare the views of the Vijnanavadins which will be more and more evident as we proceed. Sec IV. 72. The creation of internal and external things are effected thus:

16

jīvaņ kalpayate pūrvam tato bhāvān prthagvidhān 1 bāhyān ādhyatmikāmś caiva yathāvidyas tathāsmrtih l

'First one1 imagines a personal soul (jiva)2, and then various things,3 external and internal.4 As one knows so one recollects.' Mark that it is a personal soul (jiva) that is first imagined, and then the other things. And it is so, because the imagina- tion of the latter depends entirely on that of the former. Says the commentator (II. 17) : jivakalpana sarvakalpanāmūlam 'the imagination of jiva is the root of other imaginations.' This imagination of a personal soul is what is called satkāyadrsti 5 or svakāyadrsli (MK. XXIII. 5), Pali sakkāyadi !! hi, 'theory of individuality' in Buddhism. It is generally known as ātmadrsti, Pali attadițthi, or atmavāda. Pali attavāda. This satkāyadrsți is fourfold : thinking that (i) rūpa (so also vedanā, samjñā,

1 It refers to atman ' self,' Il. 12, 13. 2 atman, sattva, jīva, jantu. purusa, pudgala, etc .. are synonyms, MVt1, §207 ; Abhidhānappadīpikā, 93; ŠS, pp. 172, 236; NS, Commentary, I. 1.2. 3 Such as präna ' breath,' etc., See II. 19-28. 4 MS, X1.5 (p. 55): tatra grāhakabhutam kāyādikam adhyātmikam grahya- bhutam bahyam. Sce also Vācaspati Miśra on the Sankhyakārika, 1. 5 See ZDMG, Vol. 64, pp. 581 ff ; AK, V. 7: The Basic Conception of Buddhism, pp. 77 ff,

II. 16] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 27

samskāra and vijñāna) is ātman, (ii) ātman has rūpa, (iii) rūpa is in atman, and (iv) ātman is in rūpa 6 This satkayadrsti is the source of all sorts of miseries in the world and consequently their cessation is effected only by giving it up (MK, XVIII, 2; MV. pp. 346,361; SS, p. 247). As to how the imagination of all other things is dependent on the satkayadrsti the following may be quoted from the BAP. pp. 491-92 : tathā hy atmānam paśyataḥ saņskṛteșu skandhadhātv āyatanesv aham iti drdhataram utpadyate snehah. tatas tadduḥkhapratikārecchayā sukhābhilāsī dosān pracchādya tadarthitayā guņādhyāropāt tatsādhanesu pravartate svopakāriņi vayam iti buddhir upajāyate aham mametì ca darśanāt. paripanthini vidvesah. tataḥ samastaduḥkhanidānam sarva eva klesopaklesa labdhaprasarah pravartante. ity atmamoha- pravartito duḥkhahetur ahankaro bhavati. tad uktam ācāryapādaiķ :

yaḥ paśyaty ātmānam tatrāsyāham iti śaśvatasnehaḥ I snehāt sukhesu trsyati trsņā dosāms tiraskurute l guņadarśī paritrsyan mameti tatsādhanāny upādatte · tenatmabhiniveso yavat tavat sa samsaran l ātmani sati parasamjnā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveșau I anayoh sampratibaddhāh sarve doșāh prajāyante ll7

6 To mention only a few see DSn, pp. 182-183, § 1003; MN, I, 300; SN, III. 16 ff. 42, 44, 46, 56, 102, etc ; MVte, § 208: rūpam ātmā svāmivat, rūpavān ātmā alankāravat, ātmīyam rūpam bhrtyavat, rūpe ātmā bhājanavat. The following may be quoted here which refutes the above view : rūpam nātmā rūpavān naiva cātmā rūpe nātma rūpam atmany asac ca l This is quoted in SS, p. 20; MV, p. 355.

7 These stanzas are from PV, II. 217-19. BAP reads tasyatraha° for tatrāsyāha°, paritrsan for °trsyan and tu for sa in kārika 1', 2° and 2d respec- tively. The last verse is quoted in AAA, p. 67; NK, p. 279. Ct. the views

28 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [I]. 16-17

yāthavidyas tathasmrtih 'as one knows so one recollects implies here that one's imagination of different things follows the recollection of one's experience.

of the Kapilas (Samkhyas) quoted here. See Aniruddha's Vrtti on the SaS, V 79; JA, 1902, Sept .- Oct., p. 291, AK, IX 230 : sāhankāre manasi na samam yāti janmaprabandho nāhankāras calati hrdayād ātmadrstau tu satyām ! anyaḥ šāstā jagati ca yato nāsti nairātmyavādī nanyas tasmad upasamavidhes tvanmatad asti margah 1 See also the Basic Conception of Buddhism, p. 72.

17

aniścitā yathā rajjur andhakāre vikalpitā sarpadhārādibhir bhāvais tadvad ātmā vikalpitaḥ l

'As in the dark a rope which is not determinately known is imagined to be a snake or a continuous line of water,1 etc., so is imagined the soul (atman=jīva).'?

1 See note 2. 2 In the commentary on sloka 93 of his Madhyamakalankara which is now available only in its Tibetan version, Tanjur{ Mdo, sa=XXVIII, 52'. 1-84' 7; Cordier: III. p. 311). Sāntiraksita quotes some kārikās from Books Il and III of our work. The following is the Tibetan version of the present kārikā : ji. Itar. mun. khun. ma. rtogs. te I thag.pa. sbrul gyi.rgyun.la sogs 1 dios por.rnam par. brtags pa ltar I de.bžin bdag. kyan rnam.par brtags ! In a Tib. has andhakārabile (mun. khun) for andhakare and in b it takes sarpadhārā as sarpasya dhara (sbrul. gyi. rgyun), and not as sarpa 'snake' and dhara 'continuous line'.

ÌI. 18-19] AGAMASĀSTRA 29

18

niścitāyām yathā rajjvām vikalpo vinivartate | rajjur eveti cādvaitam tadvad atmaviniścayah ll

'As the rope being determinately known the thing ima gined vanishes and there is non-duality-it is nothing but the rope, so is the ascertainment of atman According to Tib.' the reading rajjur eveti in c is rajjur ekaiva (thag. pa. gcig. nid), and it appears to be better. In d Tib. literally reads ātmāpi niścitaḥ (bdag. kyan. nes pa. yin) for ātmaviniścayah. It runs thus: ji.ltar. thag.pa nes rtogs na l rnam.par.rtog.pa.ldog.hgyur.te | thag.pa.gcig.ñid gñis.min.pa l de.ltar.bdag.kyan.nes.pa.yin t

19

prāņādibhir anantais tu bhāvair etair vikalpitaḥ I māyaiā tasya devasya yayāyam mohita svayam 1 *

'It (Atman) is imagined as Prana 'breath' or 'life' and other innumerable things.2 This is an illusion of it, the shining one,3 by which it itself is deluded.'4

1 See II. 12. 2 See Il. 20 ff. 3 See BU, IV. 4. 15 : yadaitam anupaśaynty ātmānaņ devam aājasā. 4 The following is the Tib. version : srog.la.sogs.pa. mthaḥ.yas.paķi ! dios po.de.dag.rnam.par.bratags l gan.gis.de.bdag.ñid.rmons l de.ni.lha.deḥi.sgyu.ma. yin ll In c the actual reading is dag for bdag and in d there is rgyu for sgyu. In c there are only six syllables instead of seven. One may, however, add here pa after rmońs.

30 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [II. 19-20

It is said that Atman is imagined as Prana and such other things. But what these things are is stated in the following kārikās (20-28) :

20

prāņā iti prāņavido bhūtānīti ca tadvidaḥ 1 guņā iti guņavidas tattvānīti ca tadvidaḥ I1

'Those who know prana 'breath' or 'life' (imagine) it as prana; those who know bhutas 'elements' as bhutas ; those who know gunas 'ingredients' as gunas, and those who know tattvas 'categories,' as tattvas.' The knowers of prana are some followers of Upanisads; their view is found in the following : MnU, III. 4: prano hy eşa yah sarvabhūtair vibhāti; PU. II. 4: prāņe sarvam pratișthitam : ChU, I. 11. 4-5: BU, IV. 4. 18; BS, 1. 1, 13. Ānandagiri says that they are the votaries of Hiranya- garbha, etc., Vaiseșikas and others. The bhutas 'elements' are nve, viz., earth, water, fire. air and sky (or ether). According to Madhyamikas and the Sautrantikas there are only four elements excluding the sky (CS, IX. 3, 5). The Vaibhāşikas, however, admit it as bhūia (AK, 1.8). Anandagiri says that the view referred to here is held by the Lokayatikas who maintain that the first four elements are the origin of the world.

1 The following is the Tib. version : srog du. rig.pas.srog.ces brjod I hbyun.po.yin.zes.de.rig.rnams I yon.tan.rig.mams. yon.tan.sñam l yan.dag.yin. zes. de.rig.rnams l Tib. yan, dag is generally used for Skt. samyak and sometimes for bhua; and paramartha; but it is only here in d, so far as I have noticed, that it is employed for tattva.

Il. 20-21] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 31

The gunas are the three constituent elements of Prakrti of the Sankhya philosophy, viz., sattva, rajas and tamas. As regards the tattvas Anandagiri says that the Saivas are referred to here, according to whom there are three tattvas, viz., ātman, avidyā and Siva.

21

pādā iti pādavido vișayā iti tadvidaḥ I lokā iti lokavido devā iti ca tadvidaḥ l

'Those who know padas 'quarters' (imagine it) as padas; those who know visayas 'objects' as visayas ; those who know lokas 'worlds' as lokas; and those who know devas 'gods' as devas.' Pada may refer to what is known from such passages as the following : RV. X. 90. 3 pādo 'sya viśvā bhūtāni tripād asyāmțtaņ divi ; ChU, III. 12.6 : pādo 'sya sarvā bhūtāni. 18.2; vāk pādaņ prāņapādaś caksuh pādo 'gniḥ pādo vāyuh pādaḥ; also IV. 6.3, 8.3. A says it alludes to the four padas of atman, viz., Viśa, Taijasa, etc., described above. According to A the visayas are the objects of senses (indriyas). They are five, viz., sound (sabda), the tangible (sparśa), colour (rūpa), savour (rasa), and odour (gandha). These are to be enjoyed again and again, and as such are regarded as tattva 'principle'. This view is, as À tells us, held by Vātsyāyana and others (vatsyayana-prabhrti). This Vätsyayana appears to be the author of the Kāmasastra. By 'others' we may take the Lokayatikas and some Tantrikas, Buddhist and Brahmanic. See The Basic Conception of Buddhism, pp. 62 ff .; SS, pp. 37 ff .; Cittavisuddhiprakarana;

32 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [11. 21-22

Visvabharati, 1933, p. 2. The following is quoted from the last mentioned work : svadhidaivatayogātma jagadarthakrtodyamaḥ I bhunjāno vișayān bhogī mucyate na ca lipyate u 17 yathaiva vişatattvajio vişam ālokya bhakşayan ı kevalaņ mucyate nāsau rogamuktaś ca jāyate I The lokavids are, according to A, the followers of the Puranas holding that there are three lokas 'worlds,' viz., bhū 'earth', bhuvas (bhuvar) 'atmosphere,' and svar 'heaven.' The devavids are, as says A, the followers of the Devatā- kanda, i.e., that part of the Veda (cf. Nighantu or Nirukta, VII) which deals with devatas 'deities.' They hold that karmaphala consequence of action' is given by Devatās, Agni, Indra and others, and not by God.

22

vedā iti vedavido yajñā iti ca tadvidaḥ I bhokteti ca bhoktrvido bhojyam iti ca tadvidaḥ li

'The knowers of the Vedas (imagine it) as the Vedas, the knowers of yajñas 'sacrifices' as yajñas, the knowers of the bhoktr 'enjoyer' as bhoktr, and those who know bhojya 'enjoyable' as bhojya.' According to À yajnavids are Baudhãyan a and othert. The bhoktrvids are the Sankhyas who maintain that atman is only enjoyer (bhoktr) and not also doer (kartr). Or see BG, V. 29: bhoktāraņ yajñatapasām; IX. 24: bhoktā ca prabhur eva ca; XIII. 22: bhartā bhoktā maheśvarah. See also our text, I. 9. In accordance with the same authority bhojyavids are the cooks (sūpakāras), for in their opinion food (bhojyam vastu) is the principle. Cf. TU, III. 2-1 : annam brahmeti vyajānāt; ChU, I. 3. 6: anne hīdam sarvam sthitam.

II. 23-24] ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA 33

23

sūkşma iti sūkşmavidah sthūla iti ca tadvidaḥ l mūrta iti mūrtavido 'mūrta iti ca tadvidah i

'Those who know what suksma 'a subtle thing' is (imagine it) as sūksma, those who know what sthūla 'a gross thing' is as sthula, those who know what mūrta 'an embodied thing' is as murta, and those who know what amurta 'non-embodied' is as amūrta.' Suksmavids are those who hold that the dimension of atman is like that of an atom (anu). 'Accordingly they would refer to all the Vaisnava teachers, such as Rāmanuja, Nimbārka, Madhva, and Vallabha. For the discussion see BS, II. 3. 19-32. See also MuU, III. 1 : sūksmāc ca tat sūkșma- taraņ vibhāti; 9: eșo 'ņur ātmā cetasā veditavyah; MU, II. 5 : sa va eșa sūksmo 'grāhyaḥ. Sthülavids refer to a class of Lokayatikas holding that the gross body is atman .-- Ã. Mürtavids are Agamikas, followers of Āgamas (Saivas and Vaişņavas). mūrtas trišūlādidhārī maheśvaraś cakrādidhārī vā paramārtho bhavati .- A. The following passage (BU, Il. 3. 1) may here be cited: dve vāva brahmaņo rūpe mūrtam caivā- mūrtam ca. Ā says Amūrtavids are Sunyavadins. But see the passage quoted above from the BU.

24

kāla iti kālavido diśa iti ca tadvidaḥ i vādā iti vādavido bhuvanānīti tadvidaḥ ll

'Those who know kala 'time' (imagine it) as kala, those who know dis-es 'directions' or 'quarters' as dis-es, those who know 1201B .- 5

34 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [II. 24-25

vadas 'discussions' as vadas, and those who know bhuvanas 'worlds' as bhuvanas.' Kalavids are astronomers. Kala is the cause of all cxistence. See AV, XIX. 53, 54; SU, 1. 2, VI. 1 : $S with Gunaratna, pp. 10 ff. The knowers of dis-cs, as says A, are svarodayavids, i.e., those who know good or bad omens by voices of birds, etc., holding that the dis-es are the highest reality. Vadavids are, according to the same authority, those who hold dhatuvada 'alchemy', mantravāda 'formulas of sacred texts,' or 'the science of magic.' and so on. Here vada may, however, refer to 'discussion' as in NS, I. 1.1, 2. 1. The knowers of bhuvanas are those who know the system of the worlds (bhuvanakosa) and say that there are in all fourteen of them. See ViP, XXXIII-LX (Bhuvanavinyasa and yotişpracāra).

25

mana iti manovido buddhir iti ca tadvidah l cittam iti cittavido dharmādharmau ca tadvidaḥ Il

'Those who know manas 'mind' (imagine it) as manas, those who know buddhi 'intellect' as buddhi, those who know citta 'thought' or 'consciousness' as citta, and those who know dharma 'duty' and adharma 'non-duty' as dharma and adharma.' Ã says that a particular section of the Lokayatikas who opine that manas is the self (atman) is referred to by the word manovid, and the knowers of buddhi are Buddhists who maintain that the intellect is the self (atman). The knowers of citta are evidently Yogacaras or Vijnanavadins. The knowers of dharma and adharma are the Mimāmsists,

I1. 26] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 35

26

pañcaviņaka ity eke sadviņśa iti cāpare l ekatrimśaka ity āhur ananta iti cāpare l

'Some say it to be consisting of twenty-five, some consisting of twenty-six, some consisting of thirty-one, while others to be endless in number.'

Here pancavimsaka refers to the opinion of the Sankhyas, accordingto whom there are twenty-five tattvas 'principles,' viz., 1. prakrti, 2. mahat, 3. ahankāra, 4-8. five tanmātras, 9. manas, 10-14. five jnānendriyas, 15-19. five karmendriyas, 20-24. five mahābhūtas, and 25. purușa.

By sadvimśa we are to understand the view of Patañjalas or the followers of the Yoga system. Their tattvas are the same as those of the Sankhyas enumerated above plus Isvara, the twenty-sixth.

The word ekatrimsaka refers to the view held by the Pasupatas. There are, in fact, thirty-six tattvas, viz., 1. siva, 2. śakti, 3 sadāśiva, 4. īśvara, 5. vidyā1, 6. purușa, 7. māyā, 8 kāla, 9. niyati, 10. kalā, 11. avidyā2, 12. rāga3, 13. prakrti or avyakta, 14. mahat, 15. ahankāra, 16. manas, 17-21. five jñānendriyas, 22-26. five karmendriyas, 27-31. five tanmatras, and 32-36. five bhūtas.4

As Nos. 8-12 are merely the manifestations (vibhūtis) of maya, as said by the commentator of the MM, p. 50, one may

1 Nos. 1-5 constitute the tattoa called pati. 2 This is according to MM, p. 50; but TP, III. 8 clearly reads vidya and the commentator explains it as asuddhavidyā. 3 Nos. 6-12 constitute the tattva known as paśu. 4 Nos 13-36 are included in the tattca named pasa See MM, verses 13.25 ; TP. II 5-11, III. 4, 12.

36 ĀGAMASĀSTRA ĮII. 26-28

exclued these five, thus making the number thirty-one as required in our text. There is one point to be noted here. According to TP, IV. 2, betwecn avyakta and buddhi or mahat there is an additional tattva called guna, but in MM it is not mentioned.

27

lokallokavidaḥ prāhur āśramā iti tadvidaļ 1 strīpumnapumsakam laingāh parāparam athāpare l

'Those who know lokas 'people' (imagine it) as lokus, those who know aśramas 'stages of religious life' as asramas, those who know lingas 'sexes' as a male, a female, or a eunuch, while others as para 'higher' and apara 'lower'.'

The lokavids or laukikas are those who hold that the pleasing of people (lokunuranjana) is the real thing .- A. See l1. 21.

The asramavids are, assays A, D a k s a and others. Probably they are the writers on religious laws (dharmasastrakaras), Laingas are grammarians, as says Ã.

Here parapara refers to those who say that two Brahmans are to be known, the higher and the lower. MU, VI. 1 : dve brahmaņi veditavye paraņ caivāparam ca .- Ā.

28

srstir iti srstivido laya iti ca tadvidaļ I sthitir iti sthitividah sarvam ceha tu sarvadā l

Il. 28-30] AGAMASĀSTRA 37

'Those who know sisti 'creation' (imagine it) as srsti,1 those who know laya 'destruction' as laya, and those who know sthiti 'continued existence' as sthiti.2 All (these imaginations) are always here."3

1 See 1. 7. 2 The knowers of sisti, laya and sthiti are, according to A, the Pauranikas 'knowers of Purenas.' 3 It (iha) refers to Atman.

29

yam bhāvam darsayed yasya tam bhavam sa tu paśyati I tam cāvati sa bhūtvāsau tadgraha samupaiti tam !

'Whatever thing is presented to him, he sees it; that (ciman) becomes it (i.e., the thing presented), and satisfies him. And the strong attachment to it (i.e., to the idea that herein lies the truth) takes possession of him.'

30

etair eşo prthagbhavaih prthag eveti lakșitah ! evam yo veda tattvena kalpayet so 'viśankitah i

'Verily it (atman) is considered different through these things that are not different from it. One who knows it in fact may imagine without any hesitation.'

When one sees a piece of rope as a snake, in fact, there is no difference between these two things, for the snake is nothing but the piece of rope which simply appears as a snake. Thus there is only the piece of rope and not the snake which is merely imposed thereon. In the same way there is only atman, all things other than that being mere imagined.

38 ÃGAMASĀSTRA II.30-31

The imagination referred to in d of the karika is with reference to the practical view of the things. There is no harm to the man in doing so when he knows the truth.

31

svapnamāye yatha drste gandharvanagaram yatha I tathā viśvam idam drstam vedāntesu vicakșaņaih ll

'As dream and illusion are seen, and as is the town of Gandharvas, so is seen all this universe by those who arc well- versed in the Vedantas.' The word gandharvanagara 'an imaginary town in the sky' 1 is not pre-Buddhist and is frequently used in Buddhist works. The thought, too, of the karika has often found expression in them. For instance, SR, IX (p. 29) :

yathaiva gandharvapuram marīcikā, yatharva mayā supinam yathaiva I svabhāvašūnyā tu nimittabhāvanā tathopaman jānatha sarvadharmān Il See MV, p. 178 ; MK, XVII. 33 : gandharvanagarākārā marīcisvapnasannibhãh 1 LA, X. 144 (p. 283) : gandharvanagarasvapnamāyānirmāņasādrśāh ! Op. cit. 875 (p. 374) : mayasvapnanibha bhava gandharvanagaropamah marīcyudakacandrābhāh svavikalpam vibhāvayet u

1 Tissendar writes in his Popular Scientifi Recreations: The mirage or Fata Morgana is a very curious but sufficiently common phenomenon and in the Asiatic and African plains it is frequently observed. * * * The Fata Morgana and the inverted images of ships at sea are not uncommon on European coasts. Between Sicily and Italy, this effect is seen in the Sea of Riggio with fine effect. Palaces, towers, fertile plain, with cattle grazing on them are seen with many other terrestrial objects upon the Sea .- The Palaces of Fairy Morgana, p. 649.

Il. 31-32] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 39

See also 279, 291 (pp. 301, 303). In showing the Buddhist view Ś a n k a 1 a quotes the follow- ing in his commentary on BS. II. 2, 28 : svapnamāyāmarīcyudakagandharvanagarādipratyayā vinaiva bāhyenārthena grāhyagrāhakakārā bhavanti. The author says in the karika that this view is of the Vedāntins. Śankara follows it, but Rāmānuja with others is of the opposite opinion saying (B.S., 1. 1. 1) : jagad api pāramārthikam eva jñāyate.

The following two kārikas show the conclusion :

32

na nirodho na cotpattir na baddho na ca sādhakaḥ I na mumukșur na vai mukta ity eșā paramārthatā li

'There is no disappearance,1 nor origination ; no one in bondage, no one who works for success; no one who is desirous of emancipation, no one who is emancipated .-- This is the highest truth.' This is what is the essence of Mahayana Buddhism. For the wording of na nirodho na cotpattih cf. the opening kārikā of Nagarjuna's MK, p. 3: anirodham anutpadam. See also BA, IX. 150: evam ca na nirodho 'sti na ca bhāvo 'sti sarvadā i ajātam aniruddham ca tasmāt sarvam idam jagat Il

LA, p. 191: aniruddhā anutpannāś ca bhagavata sarva dharmā deśyante. See also LA, II. 1, X. 1: utpädabhangarahito lokaḥ khapuspasannibha I

Lit. 'suppression,' 1

ĀGAMASĀSTRA

For bandha and moksa compare the following: CS, 179: kasyacit kenacit sārdham bandho nāma na vidyate 1 pareņa saha bandhasya viprayogo na yujyate ll

LA, 79b: nātra kaścin mahāmate badhyate na ca mucyate. Op. cit. X. 275: na mokșo na ca bandhanam l See also the Aryaratnakuta quoted in MV, pp. 49, 339 and : Chapter called Bandhanamoksaparīksa of MK with MV, /I from which we quote the following (5): atrāha. yady api tvayā samsāranirvāņe pratișiddhe tathāpi ndhamokau vidyete. na cāvidyamānasya bhāvasvabhāvasya ndhamokşau sambhavataņ. tasmād bandhamoksasadbhāvād łyata eva bhāvānām svabhāva iti. ucyate. syād bhavānam abhāvo yadi bandhamokşāv eva syātām. na tu sta ity āha- na badhyante na mucyanta udayavyayadharmiņa I Āryaratnakūļa in MV, p. 49: athayuşmān subhūtis tān bhikșūn etad avocat kutrāyușmanto tāh kuto vāgatāh. te 'vocan. na kvacid gamanāya na kutaś- d agamanaya bhadanta subhute bhagavata dharmo desitah. ıa. ko nāmāyusmatām sāstā. āhuḥ. yo notpanno na parinir- isyati. āha. katham yusmābhir dharmab śrutah. āhuh. na andhanāya na mokșāya. Cf. Sankhyakārikā, 62: . tasmān na badhyate nāpi mucyate napi samsarati kaścit ! samsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakrtih il We read in the MSA, VI. 2 (p. 22):

na san na cāsan na tathā na cānyathā na jāyate vyeti na cāvahīyate na vardhate nāpi visudhyate punar visudhyate tat paramārthalakșaņam ll

II. 32-34] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 41

The present kanka is widely quoted in minor Upanisads and other religious and philosophical works of the country sometimes with slight variations. For instance, see Avadhūtopanisad, 8; Atmopanişad, 31; Tripurātāpanyupanisad, V. 10; Brahmabindū- panisad, 10. The reason for what is said above is advanced in the follow- ing kārikā:

33

bhāvair asadbhir evāyam advayena ca kalpitaḥ I bhāva apy advayenaiva tasmād advayatā šivā !!

'It is (atman) imagined in the form of things which are really non-existent through that which is non-dual, and the things (themselves), too, are imagined through what is non-dual. Therefore non-duality is blissful.' The word advaya 'non-dual' means 'one free from both the perceiver and perceptible (grahyagrāhakarahita).' The imagination of atman as different things, such as prna, etc., which have no existence, is through the advaya. For the imagination mainly depends on it, just like the imagination of a snake on a piece of rope; no imagination of a snake is possible, if there is no rope. Similarly things are imagined through the advaya, ätman. It is the advaya through which there are both the imaginations, the imagination of atman as different things, and the imagination of the things themselves. Thus advayata 'the state of non-duality' being real is blissful.

34

nānyabhāvena nānedam na svenāpi kathañcana l na prthań nāprthak kiñcid iti tattvavido viduḥ Il

'It (the world) is not manifold either through its own nature 1201B .- 6

42 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [II. 34-35

or through that of another; there is not either the different or the non-different-the knowers of truth know this.' Here in the beginning of a I should like to propose to read nānyabhāvena, as I have done, for nātmabhāvena accepted by all, though the former is not supported by any edition or MS. known to me. My reason is this: The words ātmabhāvena (a) and svena (b) are in fact, one and the same in sense; they do not convey any difference in their meanings which is evidently required here. 1 am afraid, Ś's explanation1 can hardly be accepted being unwarranted and far-fetched, as it seems to me. Here atmabhāvena appears to be inexplicable. Having modified the reading as above, I think the words anyabhava and sva are actually the same as parabhāva 'nature of other' and svabhava 'nature of one's own' respectively, as thoroughly attacked, discussed, and finally refuted in MK and MV, XV (svabhāvaparīksā), pp. 259 ff. Cf. Nāgārjuna's pratityasamutpāda which is (MV, p. 3) anekārtham anānārtham. Candrakirti comments: ekaś cāsāv arthaś caikārtho 'bhin- närthah. na prthag ity arthah, nanartho bhinnarthah. prthag ity arthah. See MK, X. 16: ātmanas ca satattvam ye bhāvānām ca prthak prthak t nirdisanti na tān manye sāsanasyārthakovidān Il See our text IV. 91 with notes.

1 ātmabhāvena paramārthasvarūpeņa, svena prāņadyātmanā.

35

vītaragabhayakrodhair munibhir vedapāragaiḥ l nirvikalpo hy ayam drstah prapañcopaśamo 'dvayaḥ Il

'This cessation of the expansion of the universe, devoid of duality and imagination, is seen by the sages who have reached

11. 35] AGAMASĀSTRA 43

the other shore of the (ocean of the) Vedas and are free from attachment, fear and anger.' The word prapancopasama is nowhere found in the pre- Buddhist Brahmanic works. It is met with only in later and minor Upanișads (NPU, 4. 1; NUU, 1; RUU, 2; for prapañca see ŚU, 6.6; KIU, 17), including the MaU, 7, the existence of which before Š is doubtful. The word prapanca of prapancopasama is from pra- v pac or Vpanc 'to spread out, make clear, or evident.' With this is connected pajpanj from which pañjika 'a commentary.' Rājaśekhara writes in his Kāvyamīmāmsā, GOS, 1916, p. 5: vişamapadabhañjika panjika; and we read in Hemacandra's Abhidhānacintāmani, II. 168, 170: niruktam padabhañjanam, pañjikā padabhañjika. From this it appears that panjika is from bhanjika (from wbhanj; cf. vibhanga from this root in the sense of 'thorough explanation' used in Buddhist Sanskrit and Pali works). But philologically it can hardly be supported. Let it be as it may, the meaning of prapañca used frequently in subsequent Vedantic works is, according to that system, . 'expansion of the universe' or the 'visible world' (prapañcyata iti prapancah). But in accordance with the Buddhists it means 'verbal designation,' 'expression,' 'word' (prapancyate 'nena or prapancayatiti prapancah). Thus anything that is expressed by a word or the word itself is prapañca according to the Buddhists. (See The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, pp. 48, 91, 156, 209.) Candrakirtti writes in his MV, p. 373: prapañco hi vāk prapañcayaty arthān iti krtvā. prapañcair aprapañcitam (MK, XVIII. 9) vāgbhir avyakrtam ity arthaḥ. These words (vac) are naturally various as said in the same work, p. 350. See the passage quoted in our text, I. 17. prapañcopasama which is the same as prapañcoparama (MV, p. 1l) and prapañcavilaya (discussed by Ś in his commentary on BS, III. 2. 21) is moksa of the Vedantists belonging to the school of Gaudapāda followed by Ś, and nirvana of the

44 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [II. 35

Madhyamikas, and the object in view of Nāgārjuna in writing his MK as said in MV, p. 4: sarvaprapañcopasama- sivalakşanam nirvānam āstrasya prayojanam nirdistam. He himself says (MV, p. 11):

anirodham anutpādam anucchedam asāśvatam t anekārtham anānārtham anagamam anirgamam yaḥ pratītyasamutpādam prapancopaśamam śivam i deśayāmāsa sambuddhas tam vande vadatām varam l For a fuller explanation of prapañcopasama (and siva, MaU, 7) from the Buddhist point of view see MK, XXV. 24 with MV, p. 538: sarvopalambhopaśamah prapafcopaśamah sivaḥ ! iha hi sarveşām prapañcānām nimittānām ya upaśamo 'pravțttis tan nirvāņam. sa eva copaśama. prakrtyaivopaśāntatvāc chivaḥ. vācām apravrtter vā prapancopaśamaś cittasyāpravītyā šivaḥ. kleśaprahāņena vā prapařcopaśamo niravaśeșavāsanā- prahāņena sivaķ. jn̄eyānupalabdhyā vā prapancopaśamo jñānā- nupalabdhya sivaḥ. LA, X. 230 (p. 295):

sarvaprapañcopaśamād bhrānto nabhipravartate prajñā yāvad vikalpante bhrāntis tāvat pravartate t! For nirvikalpa see MV, p. 374: nirvikalpam hi tat (referring to tattva, MK, XVIII. 9). vikalpaś cittapracarah. tadrahitatvāt tattvam nirvikalpam. yathoktam sūtre. paramārthasatyam katamat. yatra jñānasyāpracāra kaḥ punarvādo 'ksarāņām iti. evam nirvikalpam. It is to be noted that it is vikalpa from which spring up rāga, dvesa, moha, etc. The word vedapäraga in the text may be taken here as vedapāra-ga and not veda-pāraga as above meaning 'one conversant with Vedānta (Veda-pāra).' Cj. vedāntesu vicaksanaih (II. 31).

II.36] ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA 45

36

tasmād evam viditvainam advaite yojayet smrtim l advaitam samanuprāpya jadaval lokam ācaret ll

'Therefore having thus known it (i.e., prapañcopaśama) one should fix one's memory on non-duality, and having realized non-duality should behave as a fool among people.' The word smrti, Pali sati, means one of the five balas 'strengths or powers,' or one of the seven requisites for attaining supreme knowledge (bodhyangas, Pali bojjhangas). See DS, LXVIII, XLIX ; MVT2, §§ 38, 39, Cf. ChU, VII. 26. 7 : āhāraśuddhau sattvaśuddhiņ. sattvaśuddhau dhruvā sınțtih. smṛti- lambhe sarvagranthīnām vipramoksaḥ. Here Ś explains dhruva smrti as continuous absence of forgetting (avicchinna avismarana). This is nothing but dhyana 'meditation.' Rämānuja in his commentary on BS, I.1.1 (ed. Nara- siņhācārya, Ananda Press, 1909, pp. 9ff.), supports it ; and Vācaspatimiśra, YS, I. 20, expressly says that smrti is steady and undisturbed meditation (smrtir dhyānam anākulam aviksiptam). The word smrti in the present kārikā should be taken in this sense. For d see S on BS, III. 4. 50, where he says : 'Let him be free from guile, pride and so on, not manifesting himself by a display of knowledge, learning and virtuousness. just as a child whose sensual powers have not yet developed themselves does not strive to make a display of himself before others (SBE).' He quotes here the following from a work (smrti) :

gūdhadharmāśrito vidvān ajñātacaritam caret / andhavaj jadavac cāpi mūkavac ca mahīm caret l

See Jābāla Up, 6 ; Āśrama Up, 4 ; Minor Upanișads, Adyar Library, 1921, Vol. I, pp. 154, 161, 184.

46 ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA LII. 37

37

nistutir nirnamaskāro niņsvadhākāra eva ca l calācalaniketaś ca yatir yādṛcchiko bhavet l

'Giving no praise, paying no homage, nor pronouncing svadha, with an unfixed home and acting at random, one should become an ascetic.' The word svadha (originally svadha' 'self-position,' 'self- power,' 'inherent power') is a Vedic exclamation mostly used in offering food to pitrs 'deceased ancestors.' It. also means the food for pitrs. In this case svadhakara would mean 'offering food to pitrs.' Calacalaniketa is, in fact, aniketa ol BG, XII. 9, and anilaya of BA, VIII. 29, 88, both meaning 'homeless.' Cf. apūrva iva sarvatra in BA, VIII. 16; anagāra 'homeless' or 'a homeless wanderer' in Buddhist literature, and in Jaina works (Aupa- pātikasūtra, ed. Leumann, 1883, §§. 27, 57, etc.). Here calācala in the compound calcalaniketa is taken by Ś as two words cala- and -acala-, and consequently he has fallen into a great confusion in explaining it. The fact is that calacala is one word meaning cancala 'intensely moving' i.e., 'absolutely not fixed.' See the Vārtika, 6 ('caricali°') in the Mahabhāsya on Paņini, VI 1. 12. For example, the following may be quoted : Šisupālavadha, XVII. 53 : calācalair anupadam āhatāh khuraiḥ ; Kirātārjunīya, XI. 30 : janmino 'sya sthitim vidyāl lakşmīm iva calācalam; Cāņakyanītidarpaņa (Bombay, 1867), V. 20 : calācale ca saņsāre dharma eko hi niścalaḥ. The word yadrcchika does not imply absolutely unrestrained movements, for that is impossible for such a man. See S on BS, III. 4. 28-31, 47-50. Mark the significance of the word yati lit. 'one who strives to restrain one's passions.' The

II. 37-38] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 47

following occurs in the NPU in the Minor Upanisads, Adyar, Vol. I, pp. 147, 153 : nirdvandvo nirnamaskāro niḥsvadhākāra eva ca. kasyāpi vandanam aktvā na-namaskāro na-svāhākāro na- svadhākāro na-nindāstutir yadrcchiko bhavet.

38

tattvam ādhyātmikam drstvā tattvam drstvā tu bāhyataḥ l tattvībhūtas tadārāmas tattvād apracyuto bhavet I iti gaudapādīya āgamaśāstre vaitathākhyam dvitīyam prakaraņaņ samāptam.

'Having realised the truth inward, having also realised the truth outward, one becomes the truth (itself), delighting therein and being such one should be unmoved from it. Here ends in the Āgamasāstra of Gaudapāda Book Two called Unreality.' The tattva referred to in the kārika is nothing but prapañco- pasama (II. 35) and this is for Vedantists moksa and for Buddhists nirvana= pratityasamutpāda=sūnya. The words adhyatmika and bahya are two opposite terms and can respectively be translated by 'subjective' and 'objective', or in some cases by 'inward' and 'outward' respec- tively, atman meaning 'body' and, according to those who believe in the existence of a separate soul, 'soul' as well. Here bähyatah is an adverb, and so ādhyātmika, too, may be taken as such. Or both of them are to be construed as adjectives. For the thought and wording of the karika see the following couplet quoted as a speech of Bhagavat in MV, p. 348 (Poussin JRAS, 1910, p. 137) : sünyam adhyātmikaņ paśya paśya sūnyam bahirgatam I na vidyate so 'pi kaścid yo bhāvayati sūnyatām li

BOOK III

1

upāsanāśrito dharmo jāte brahmaņi vartate 1 prāg utpatter1 ajam sarvam tenāsau krpaņah smrtaḥ il

'The dharma 'duty' relating to upāsana 'worship' arises when Brahman is born, but before birth all is unborn; therefore, that (dharma) is regarded as miserable.' Ś takes dharma to signify a worshipper (upāsaka, sadhaka). A simply follows him explaining: dehasya dhāraņad dharmo jivaḥ. Upāsanā depends upon the duality of an upāsaka 'wor- shipper' and an upasya 'one to be worshipped.' This duality also in its turn is possible only when that one Brahman is jata 'born', i.e., manifests himself in the form of this universe. His jäti or prajati 'birth' or' growing forth' or bahubhava 'bccoming many' is often found in the Upanisads : TU, Il. 6: so 'kāmayata bahu syām prajāyeya; ChU, VI. 2.1-3: tad aikșata bahu syām prajāyeya, 3.23: seyam devataikșata hantāham imās tisro devatā anena jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāņi. See BS with Ś, I. 1. 2, 5. Upasana literally means 'sitting near,' i.e., 'sitting near one who is to be worshipped.' In fact, upāsana, as Ś explains it, is a continuous course of thought (i.e., meditation), not disturbed by any other dissimilar thought upon an object supported by the scripture. So says S in his Introduction to ChU, I. 1. 1: upāsanam tu yathāśāstrasamarthitam kiñcid ālambanam upādāya tasmin samānacittavrttisantānakaraņam tad- vilakşanapratyayanantaritam. See his Com. PU, 5, and BS, I. 1.11.

1 This phrase, prag utpatteh, is used not less than eight times by $ in his comm. on the ChU, VI. 2. 1.

III. 2] ĀGAMASĀSTRA

2

ato vaksyāmy akārpaņyam ajāti samatām gatam | yatha na jayate kincij jāyamanam samantatah il

'I shall, therefore, so speak of that state of non-miserableness in which there is no origination (jati), and which (on that account) is the same throughout, as to show that the things which are (apparently) being born on all sides are none of them born at all.' The highest truth (paramartha), according to our author and the Madhyamikas as well, is that there is nothing that comes into being (jayate, III. 48). This ajāti or anutpāda (so frequently used in Buddhist texts) 'non-origination' is the main subject which the author takes up and discusses throughout the remain- ing portion of his book. See II. 32; III. 20, 38, 48; IV. 5,71. The word ajati occurs nine times in the work: III. 2, 38; IV. 4, 5, 19, 21, 29, 42, 43. The sameness (samatām gata, samata, sämya) of things is owing to their common quality of non-origination (ajati). The following is from the Aryasatyadvayavatara quoted in MV, p. 374: paramārthataḥ sarvadharmānutpādasamatayā paramār- thatah sarvadharmātyantajātisamatayā paramärthataḥ samāḥ sarvadharmāh. tat kasmād dhetoḥ. paramārthato nirvāņā- (nānā) karaņā hi devaputra sarvadharmā atyantanirutpādatām upādāya. tad yathāpi nāma devaputra yac ca mrdbhājanasyā- bhyantaram ākāśam yac ca ratnabhājanasyābhyantaram ākāśam ākāśadhātur evaisaḥ. tat paramārthato na kincin nānākaraņam. evam eva devaputra yah [sam]kleśa [ḥ sa] paramārthato 'tyantā- nutpādatā. yad api vyavadānam tad api paramārthato 'tyantā- nutpadatā. samsāro 'pi paramarthato 'tyantānutpādatā. yāvan nirvāņam api paramārthato 'tyantānutpādatā. nāta paramārthato nānākaraņam. tat kasmād dhetoh. paramārthato 'tyantān- utpādatvāt sarvadharmaņam. See SP, IV. 83 (p. 143): 1201B-7

50 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [III. 3

sarvadharmān samān šūnyān nirnānākaraņātmakān ! na caitān prekșate nāpi kiñcid dharmam vipaśyati sarvadharmah samāh sarve samāh samasamāh sadā l evam jnātvā vijānāti nirvāņam amrtam sivam ll For b of the karika see III. 38a; IV. 93c-d, 95a, 100b.

In the first kārika of this chapter mention of origination (jāti) of Brahman is made. Non-origination (ajati) is, however, said in the second, and the author promises here to explain it. Now from the following karika he proceeds to do so showing the real sense of origination and non-origination:

3

ātmā hy ākāśavaj jīvair ghațākāśair ivoditaḥ I ghațādivac ca sanghātair jātāv etan nidarśanam Il

'Atman has sprung up in the forms of Jivas 'individual selves,' just like the springing up of the akasa' 'space' in the form of ghaļākāsas 'spaces occupied by jars,' the conglomerations (of different limbs, organs of sense, etc.) being like jars and others. This is the illustration of origination.' It is with ghatas that ghatakasas are formed from the mahakasa. In the same way, it is with the conglomerations that Ätman is born in the form of Jivas. On the origination of Atman see BU, II. 1. 20; MuU, II. 1.1; MnU, 1.4; BS, II. 3.17 with Ś's Com. It is evident from the karika that the origination in both of the cases is not real, but imaginary. See TJ, VIII. 10, and cf. :

ghațasaņvrtam ākāśam niyamāne ghațe yathā t ghațo nīyeta nākāśam tathā jīvo nabhopamaḥ i TTU, V. 3.

1 This is generally called mahakafa in Vedantic and other works

III. 4-5] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 51

This is further explained in the following kārikā :

4

ghațādișu pralīneșu ghațākāśādayo yathā l ākāśe sampralīyante tadvaj jīvā ihātmani I

'As the jars, etc., being destroyed the spaces of jars, etc., are completely merged into space, so are (completely merged) the Jivas into Ātman ' This karika is quoted by Santiraksita in his commen tary on MAK, 93, and it runs as follows in its Tibetan version:

bum.pa.la. sogs. shig.1 pa.ni l [bum. paķi. nam. mkhaḥ.la.sogs. pa i] ji.ltar. nam.mkhaḥ.hdu.hgyur. ba i de.bshin. srog.kyan. nes.pa.yin ll

The second line of the verse is left out in Tib., and is reconstructed from Sanskrit by Wallesser: Der alter Vedānta, p. 20.

1 Read bshig for shig.

The following karika meets the objection that the Atman that springs up as different Jivas being one, if one jiva feels happi- ness or suffers pain. all the Jivas should have the same state of mind. But in fact it is not so :

5

yathaikasmin ghatākāśe rajodhūmādibhir yute ľ na sarve samprayujyante tadvaj jīvāh sukhādibhiḥ l

'As one ghatakaśa 'space occupied by a jar' being connect- ed with dust, smoke, etc., not all (ghatakasas) are connected with them, so are the jivas with reference to happiness, etc.

52 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [III. 6

The karika is quoted by Bhavya in his MHK, VIII. 13, the Tibetan version being as follows : ji.ltar.bum.pahi.nam.mkhaḥ.gcig I rdul.dan.du.bas.bsgribs.pa.na l thams.cad.de.bshin.ma.yin.ltar I bde.sogs.de.bshin.bdag.la.min Il Literally reconstructed it would read in Sanskrit : yathaikasmin ghatākāśe rajodhūmaiḥ [sam]āvīte 1 na bhavanti tathā sarve na sukhādi tathātmani i! The present kärika is quoted with the reading na ca sarve prayujyante for c and is attributed to the ViP by Vijñana- bhiksu in his comm. on the SaS, 1. 152; but it is not to be found there. See Ś's comm. on the VSN, p. 16.

6

rūpakāryasamākhyāś ca bhidyante tatra tatra vai l ākāśasya na bhedo 'sti tadvaj jīveșu nirņayah I

'Indeed forms, functions and names differ here and there, but there is no difference of the space ; similar is the conclusion with regard to jivas.' There are different things, earthen pots, cloths, etc., their forms, functions, and names all differing from one another, yet the akasa intercepted by them is in itself not different in fact. In the same way though jivas corresponding to ghaļakasas, etc., are different, Ātman correspnnding to akāsa or mahākāśa, etc., is not different. Cf. TJ, VIII. 12 : ji.ltar.bum.sogs.tha.dad.kyan I sa.la.tha.dad.hgah.yan.med 1 de.bshin.lus.ni.tha.dad.kyan l bdag.la.tha.dad.hgah.yan.med n

III. 7-8] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 53

It may thus be translated into Sanskrit:

bhinnesv api ghațādyeșu mrdi bhedo na kaścana I tathā dehesu bhinneśu na kaścid bheda atmani li

7

nākāśasya ghatākāśo vikārāvayavau yathā !

naivātmanaḥ sadā jīvo vikārāvayavau tathā l!

'As the ghatakasa is neither a transformation, nor a part of the akasa, so is always a Jiva neither a transformation, nor a limb of Ātman.'

8

yathā bhavati bālānam gaganam malinam malaiḥ! tathā bhavaty abuddhānām ātmāpi malino malaiḥ #

'As the sky appears to be soiled with dirt1 to the ignorant, so appears Ätman, too, with impurities, to those who are not enlightened.' For a and b see Š on BS, I. 1. 1 : ākāśe bālās talamalinatādy adhyasyanti. This kārika is quoted by Sāntiraksita, loc. cit. The Tib. version is as follows : ji. ltar.byis.pa.rnams.la. ni l nam.mkhaḥ.dri.mas. dri.can. hgyur I de.bshin. mi. mkhas.rnams.la.yan l bdag.ni. dri.mas.dri.can. hgyur l

1 Such as dust, smoke, etc., See III. 5: rajodhūmādibhiķ.

54 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [III. 9-11

9

maraņe sambhave caiva gatyāgamanayor api 1 sthitah1 sarvaśarīresu ākāśenāvilaksaņah ľ

In death and in birth, in moving forward and backward, (Atman) in all bodies exists just like the space.' In the origination and destruction of the ghaļākasa the mahākaśa is not affected. So is the case with Atman in regard to death, birth, etc., which are connected only with the bodies. See ChU. VI. II. 3 : jīvāpetam vāva kiledam mriyate na jīvo miiyate.

1 This is found in only one MS., the reading which is generally known is sthitau 'in standing.'

10

sanghatāh svapnavat sarve atmamāyāvisarjitāh l ādhikye sarvasāmye vā nopapattir hi vidyate l

'All conglomerations (of limbs, etc.) are like dream being projected by the illusion of Atman. As regards their superiority or the equality of all of them there is no ground.' The sanghatas, i.e., the bodies, having which the Atman is born in the form of Jivas, are like the ghaļas of ghāļākāsas. These sanghatas have, however, no real existence, nor is there, therefore, any ground for thinking of their superiority or equality among them.

In discussing what Jiva is the author says further: 11

rasādayo hi ye kośā vyākhyātās taittirīyake I tesām ātmā paro jīvaḥ sa-yathā1 samprakāśitaḥ ll 'The seaths such as consisting of the essence (of food)

III. 12] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 55

are described in the Taittirīyaka, i.e., Taittirīya Upanisad (II. 1-6), the supreme soul of them is Jiva, as it is made there clear.' 'There are five kośas 'seaths,' viz., annarasamaya or simply annamaya, prāņa°, mano°, vijñāna°, and ānanda°, i.e., consisting of the essence of food, breath, mind, understanding, and bliss respectively. These are explained in the TU, II, 2 ff. According to the five divisions of kośas Atman is also divided into five and are called after them, the last of them i.e., anandamaya, or in accordance with a different authority (see BS, I. 1. 12-19), the one on which rests the last of them is real Ātman. This is referred to in the present kārika by para ātman. And the author says that this is Jiva.

1 With some MSS. I read sa-yatha for kham yatha accepted by S and found in other MSS. In favour of the second reading compare d of the next karika, which is in fact identical. The word sayatha, Pali seyyatha, in the sense of tad yatha, is often used in Brahmanas and Upanisads. See PU, IV. 7, V1 5 ; MuU, III. 2. 8; ŚB, I. 2. 5. 24; 7. 3. 2; BU, II. 1. 20. Cf. in this connexion sa-yadi (=tad yadi), PU, V. 1, and Pali sa-ce for sa-cet (see p: 72, 1.2) in the same sense (Skt. tac cet).

12

dvayor dvayor madhujñāne param brahma prakāśitam I prthivyam udare caiva yathākāsah prakāsitaḥ l

'In the madhuvidya ( i.e., the Madhubrahmana section of the BU, II. 5) in each of the pairs, (such as) the earth and the inside (of the body), the supreme Brahman is made manifest, as is made manifest the sky (III. 3 ff.).' BU, II. 5, is called Madhubrähmana owing to the fact of its dealing with a particular Brahmavidya which is named madhuvidya or madhujñāna (as in our text) on account of the frequent use of the word madhu which is very important

6 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [III. 13

this connexion. Here there are some pairs of things, such s the earth and all beings (prthivi and sarvani bhūtāni), and in iese pairs it is shown that the person outside the body 1 the earth, etc., and the person inside the body are identical rith Atman, Brahman. Let the following passage be quoted ere (BU. II. 5. 1):

iyam pıthivi sarveşām madhv asyai prthivyai sarvāņi bhūtāni ıadhu. yas cāyam asyām prthivyām tejomayo 'mṛtamayah purușo as cāyam adhyatmam sārīras tejomayo 'mrtamayab puruso 'yam va sa yo 'yam atmedam amrtam idam brahmedam sarvam. 'This earth is the honey (madhu, the effect) of all beings, ad all beings are the honey of this earth. Likewise this right immortal person in this earth, and the bright immortal erson incorporated in the body (both are madhu). He indeed the same as the self, that immortal, that Brahman, that All.1

1 Tr. Max Müller, SBE.

13

jīvātmanor ananyatvam abhedena praśasyate I

nānātvam nindyate yac ca tad evam hi samañjasam !

'That the identity without any distinction of Jiva and tman is praised, and that their distinction is censured, this ecomes reasonable only on this hypothesis.' As regards the identity of Jiva and Atman see ChU, VI 8.7 at tvam asi); BU, I. 4. 10 (aham brahmāsmi), Il. 5. 19 (ayam mā brahma); MuU, III. 2. 9 (sa yo ha vai tat paramam rahma veda brahmaiva bhavati). As for the difference see U, I. 4. 2 (dvitīyad vai bhayam bhavati), IV. 4. 19, KU, 7. 10, 11 (mṛtyoh sa mṛtyum āpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati); U II. 7 (yadā hy evaişa etasminn u daram antaram kurute ha tasya bhayam bhavati).

III, 14] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 57

14

jīvātmanoh prthaktvam yat prāg utpatteḥ prakīrttitam I bhavişyadvrttya gauņam tan mukhyatvam na hi yujyate

'The difference of Jiva and Atman before creation, which is declared (in texts1), is attributive with reference to the future state; its primary sense is certainly not reasonable.'

It is only after creation that there is a distinction between Ätman and Jiva, but before it there is no distinction whatsoever. When there is no production of ghata 'jar,' and consequently no ghatakasa, there is no distinction between mahākāśa and ghațākāsa. Yet, one sometimes speaks of that distinction at that time, simply anticipating what is going to happen in the near future, that is, thinking of the imminent production of the ghata.

In his explanation of the karika S gives an apt example. He says that it is like the use of the following sentence which is very common: odanam pacati. The word odana means 'cooked or boiled rice.' Therefore literally the sentence means 'one cooks cooked rice.' But the rice which was already cooked or boiled does not 'require to be cooked again. Yet, the people say, 'He cooks cooked rice.' Clearly here this use is attributive and has reference to the future state of the unboiled rice. The people assume the future state as present. So is here the statement of difference of Atman and Jiva.

Ś says that in passages of the Upanisads about evolution and dissolution it is the unity of Atman and Jiva, which is sought to be established. This unity will be demonstrated in the text. First there is shown difference and then unity which is the conclusion. It is, therefore, in view of this future 1 Such as RV. X. 121.1: sa dadhāra pīthivīm dyām utemām | kasmai devāya havișā vidhema|| 1201B-8

58 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [III. 15-16

sense or state that the difference is stated. Thus it is only in its secondary, and not in its primary sense.

The author wanted (III. 2) to show that there is no origina- tion (jati), nor is there anything that comes into being (jayate). Having done so to some extent he now meets, in the next kārika, the objection that may be raised against this view, showing thereby also that there is, in fact, no distinction between Atman and Jiva :

15

mıllohavisphulingādyaih srstir yā coditānyathā I upāyaḥ so 'vatārāya nāsti bhedah kathañcana l

' The creation which is urged in different manners with the illustrations of earth, metal, sparks, etc., is only a means for an introduction (to the truth). There is in no way any distinction (between Ätman and Jiva).' For details see IV. 42. For the creation referred to see ChU, VI. 1. 4-5; BU, II. 1.20. VI. 2. 14 ; MuU, II. 1-1; MU, VI. 26.

As to how that creation and consequently the distinction between Atman and Jiva, though unreal, are a means for introducing one to truth is explained in the next kārikā:

16

āśramās trividha hnamadhyamotkrstadrstayah I upāsanopadisteyam tadartham anukampayā l 'There are three spiritual stages, viz., of lower vision, of middle vision, and of higher vision ; and this upāsana 'worship' is laid down for them out of kindness.' In fact there is no distinction between Ātman and Jiva, yet some distinction is attributed there, only to help people

III, 17-18] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 59

in realizing the truth by prescribing different upasanas according to their respective powers of vision. See III. 1. The word aśrama in the text is explained by Ś as asramin 'one with aśrama or religious state of life,' i.e., adhikrta 'an entitled one.' In all probability the original word was aśraya 'a recipient, a person or thing in which any quality or article is inherent or retained or received,' i.e., an adhikarin or adhikrta 'an entitled one.' See the use of the word in the following line from MSA, XVI. 69 :

nikrşțamadhyottamavīryam anyad yānatraye yuktajanāśrayeņa l atra aśrayabhedena vīryabhedo nirdistaḥ.

The author now mentions the opinions of the dualists, such as the Vaisesikas, the Sankhyas, etc., and shows that the decision arrived at by him, i.e., non-distinction (abheda), does not conflict with the views held by them :

17

svasiddhāntavyavasthasu dvaitino niścitā drdham t parasparam virudhyante tair ayam na virudhyate I

'The dualists are firmly fixed in their own distinctive conclusions and contend with one another, but this (our view) does not conflict with them.'

18

advaitam paramārtho hi dvaitam tadbheda ucyate I teşām ubhayatha dvaitam tenāyam na virudhyate I

'The supreme reality is non-duality, and duality is said

60 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [III. 19-20

to be of it a particular state or effect of it,1 while according to them (i.e., dualists) there is duality in both ways.2 Therefore it does not conflict.' So far as mere duality is concerned, it is not that we do not admit it at all, as you do; we do accept it. Hence there is no conflict. Between cause and effect there is, in fact, no difference (karyakaranayor abhedah), the effect being merely a particular state of its cause. So there is no independent exis- tence of the effect apart from that of its cause. In the same way duality is a particular state or effect of non-duality, being an illusion (II. 10). The only difference between us is that according to you duality is in both ways, in reality and also in appearance, while we say that though there is duality, no. doubt, it is not in reality, it exists only in appearance. See'next karika.

1 Cf. bheda with bhidyate in the following kārika. Š: paramārthatas caparamarthatas ca 'in reality and not in reality,'

19

māyayā bhidyate hy etan nānyathājam kathañcana I tattvato bhidyamāne hi martyatām amrtam vrajet i

'It (advaita) becomes different only through illusion, as the unborn (aja) can in no other way become different, for if it becomes in reality different the immortal would become mortal.' See IV. 6.

20

ajātasyaiva bhāvasya jatim icchanti vādinaḥ I ajāto hy amīto bhāvo martyatām katham eșyati li

'The 'disputants seek to establish the birth of an unborn

II1, 21-23] ĀĢAMAŚĀSTRA 61

thing. Now a thing which is unborn is immortal, and that being the case, how can it become mortal ? See IV. 6.

21

na bhavaty amrtam martyam na martyam amrtam tathā l prakrter anyathābhāvo na kathancid bhavisyati

'The immortal does not become mortal, nor likewise the mortal immortal. In no way can nature change.'

See IV. 7, 29.

22

svabhāvenāmṛto yasya bhāvo gacchati martyatām 1 kṛtakenāmrtas tasya kathaņ sthāsyati niścalaḥ l

'How can he, according to whom a thing which is naturally immortal becomes mortal, maintain that an immortal thing, when it becomes artificial, will remain changeless ?

See IV. 8.

23

bhūtato 'bhūtato vāpi srjyamāne samā śrutiḥ l niścitam yuktiyuktam ca yat tad bhavati netarat I

'As regards creation there are equal sacred texts ( stating

62 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [III. 24

creation to be) from the existent1 or from the non-existent.' But that which is ascertained and reasonable is (acceptable), and not the other.'

See IV. 3.

It says that in reality there is no jati ' origination' either from the existent or the non-existent, though there are śrutis supporting both the views equally. Therefore the author says that what is reasonable is to be accepted, as certain. And what is reasonable is pointed out in the next kārika.

According to Sankara bhütatah is paramārthatah, and abhulatah mayaya. But in IV. 3 he explains the same words saying bhūlasya vidyamānasya°, abhūtasya avidyamānasya.

1 sad eva somyedam agra asit *. ChU, VI. 2.1. 2 asad va idam agra asīt. tato vai sad ajāyata. TU, II. 7. 1.

24

neha nāneti cāmnāyād indro māyābhir ity api ! ajāyamāno bahudhā māyayā jāyate tu sah ľ

'From the sacred text1 "there is no plurality here"" and also from "Indra through mayas, etc.,"' (it is to be known

1 In the original amnaya means śruti. neha nānāsti kincana. BU, IV. 4. 19; KU, IV. 11. 3 rūpamrūpam pratirūpo babhūva tad asya rūpam praticaksaņāya 1 indro mayābhih pururūpa iyate yukta hy asya harayah sata dasa I RV, VI. 47. 18: BU, I1. 5. 19.

III. 25] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 63

that) it is through illusion that he4 is variously born, though * (in fact) he does not take birth.'5

4 It refers to Purusa, Prajapati. 5 The sentence ajayamano bahudha jayate in the text is taken from the VS. XXXI. 19(=TA, III. 13.I) which runs as follows: prajapatis carati garbhe antar ajāyamāno bahudhā vijāyate i tasya yoniņ paripaśyanti dhīrās tasmin ha tasthur bhuvanāni viśvā l The preceding stanza (18) is: vedāham etam purusam mahāntam ādityavarņam tamasaļ parastāt l tam eva viditvātimtyum eti nānyaḥ panthā vidyate 'yanāya I

25

sambhūter apavādāc ca sambhavaḥ pratișidhyate l ko nv enam janayed iti kāraņam pratișidhyate li

'By the denial of sambhuti 'birth' (in the sruti)1 birth is negatived; and (by the śruti) "who indeed would produce him "2 the cause of birth is denied.'

Here for the first time we have the oldest interpretation of the words sambhūti or sambhava and asambhūti or asambhava in IU, 12, 13, 14, which are so differently explained

1 tato bhüya iva te tamo ya u sambhūtyam ratāh. IU, 12. This is the second half of the verse the first half being: andham tamah pravisanti ye 'sambhūtim upāsate. 2 jāta eva na jāyate ko nv enam janayet punah. BU, III. 9. 28.

64 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [III. 25

by Ś and others.' Evidently Gaudapada takes here sambhūti (sambhava) in the sense of utpatti or jati, 'birth,' 'production,' 'origination.' This origination is negatived (ajati) herc, and that is one of the main points of the work of Gaudapada. For his use of the word sambhava see III. 9, 48; IV. 16, 38.

3 The following may be read with intereet. Here the meanings of the worda asambhutih, etc., are given according to S and others, The figures refer to the stanzas of IU, while those in brackets to the stanzas of the VS. Śankaro

12 asambhotih prakıtiķ, kāranam avidyā avyākrtākhyā. sambhttih ksrynbrahma, hiranyagarbhah. 13 sombhavah sambhütih, kuryabrahma. asambhavah asambhūtiņ, avyākrtam. 14 vinatah vintlavat kEryam. sambhutih avyākĮtam, avyākītopāsanā. (once taken as asambhūtih) Uvaļa 12 (9) asambhutih mrtasya eatah eambhavo nueti. mtta Etmano 'bhavah. eambhutih stmastitvam. 13 (10) sambhavah sambhavaparijfšnam (= sambhoti*) asambhavah 0 14 (11) eambhūtih jagatah sambhavaikahetuh param brahma. vinalah vinali fariram.

Mahidhara

12 (9) asambhutih asambhavam* mrtasya punah sambhavo năsti. sambhutih ātmE. 13 (10) eambhavaḥ kāryabrahma, asambhavah avyākṛtam. 14 (11) sambhotih vināsah param brahma. vināfadharmakam farīram. For the explanation given by the followers of Ramanuja and Madhvācarya see their respective works: commentary by Ra ng a rāmanuja, Anandashrama Sanskrit Serics; by Madhvācarya, in the Sacred Books of the Hindus.

III. 26-27] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 65

26

sa eșa neti netīti vyākhyātam nihnute yataḥ ! sarvam agrāhyabhāvena hetunājam prakāśate l

'(The sruti) "This is No, No" denies what is explained. Therefore by the reason of incomprehensibleness it is evident that all is unborn.' The sruti "This is No, No" refers to sa esa neti nety ātmāgrhyo na hi grhyate (BU, III. 9. 26; IV. 2. 4, 4. 22, 5. 15) -'That (Atman) is (to be described by) No, No. He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended.' But it appears, as thinks also the commentator himself, it alludes to the following śruti, too: athāta ādeśo neti neti (BU, II. 3. 6) 'Now follows the teaching by No, No.' For it is that śruti which denies both the forms of Brahman, viz., that which has form (murta) and that which has not form (amūrta). These two forms have already been described or explained in the text (BU, II. 3. 1).1 Things are either with or without a form, so when both of them are denied they cannot be comprehended. Thus it becomes evident that there is nothing that may have origination, in other words, all is 'unborn' (aja 'without generation)'.

1 dve vāva brahmaņo rūpe mūrtam caivāmūrtam ca°.

Now jäti or origination may be either of the existent (sat) or of the non-existent (asat). But both the cases are im- possible. The author shows it in the next kārikās :

27

sato hi māyayā janma jujyate na tu tattvataḥ 1 tattvato jāyate yasya jātam tasya hi jāyate l

'The birth of that which.exists can be reasonable only 1201B-9

66 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [III, 28-29

through illusion, but not in reality. He who holds that one is born in reality has to accept (the position) that what is born had, indeed, been born.' See IV. 58. See also IV. 13 with its explanation. Cf. CS, XI. 10 (260) with the note :

sambhavah kriyate yasya prāk so' stīti na yujyate 1 sato yadi bhavej janma jātasyāpi bhaved bhavaḥ II

28

asato māyayā janma tattvato naiva yujyate I

vandhyāputro na tattvena māyayā vāpi jāyate !

'The birth of that which does not exist is not reasonable at all through illusion or in reality. The son of a barren woman is not born either through illusion or in reality.'

The author now proceeds to show that the birth of the existent is possible only through māyā as said before (III. 27) :

29

yathā svapne dvayābhāsam spandate māyayā manaḥ l. tathā jāgrad dvayābhāsam spandate māyayā manaḥ I

'As owing to maya the mind in dream moves with appearance (or image) of the two (viz., the percipient and the perceptible, or in other words, the subject and the object), so owing to maya the mind in the waking state1 moves with the appearance of the two.' See IV .- 61 ..

1 See IV. 40.

III. 30-32] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 6ž -.

30

advayam ca dvayābhāsam manaḥ svapne na saņśayaḥ I advayaņ ca dvayābhāsaņ tathā jāgran na samśayaḥ 1

'There is no doubt that in dream the mind which is without a second is with the appearance of the two; so there is no doubt that in the waking state the mind which is without a second is with the appearance of the two.' See IV. 62.

31

manodrśyam idam dvaitaņ yat kiñcit sacarācaram 1 manaso hy amanībhāve dvaitam naivopalabhyate l

'This duality in whatever form, comprising the movable and the unmovable is perceived by the mind, but when the mind becomes non-mind (i.e., when it loses its own function of thinking, manana) duality is not experienced. See IV. 47, 48, 72. It means that the appearance of duality is nothing but the vibration of the mind (citta- or vijñana-spandita), and when this vibration is stopped there is no duality at all.

When the state of non-mind is reached is said in the following kārikā :

32

ātmasatyānubodhena na sankalpayate yadā l amanastām tadā yāti grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt l

' When by the knowledge of the truth of atman it (the mind) ceases from imagining it goes to the state of non-mind being non-cognizant in the absence of the things to be cognized.' See IV. 72, 79, 99.

68 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [III. 33

Mark here that d (grahyabhave tadagrahat) is identical with that of Tk, 28. See Vis, p. 584 ; LA, p. 169 ; and the note on IIl. of our text.

The next karika says that the mind which becomes non-mind 38 as described above, is, in fact, identical with Brahman :

33

akalpakam ajam jñānam jñeyābhinnam pracakșate I brahma jneyam ajam nityam ajenājam vibudhyate il

'The jñana that does not imagine (i.e., indeterminate) and is (consequently) unborn is, they say, not different from the knowable. The knowable is Brahman, the unborn and eternal one. So the unborn (Brahman) becomes manifest through the unborn (jñāna).' Here jnana which the commentator explains as jnaptimātra is in reality vijnana or citta 'mind' as spoken of above. See Vk, p. 3 : cittam mano vijnānam vijnaptiś ceti paryāyāh; MV, XVII. I (p. 308) : cittam mano tha vijñanam iti tasyaiva (=cittasyaiva) paryayāh ; AK, Il. 34: cittam mano 'tha vijñānam ekārtham; DN, I. 121; SN, II. 94. See III. 38, IV. 96. For ajam vibudhyate cj. 1. 16: advaitam budhyate tadā; III. 26: ajam prakasate. For the whole thought see III. 35, 46. ajenājam vibudhyate=ajena jñānena (=cittena) ajam jñeyam (Brahman) vibudhyate prakasate. The unborn knowable Brahman is manifest through the unborn knowledge (i.e., the mind when it ceases from its function), there being no difference between them. See III, 46, 47. akalpaka= nirvikalpa (III. 34)= asanga (IV. 72). See LA, p. 157: asangalaksaņam jñānam. For jneyabhinna ' not different from the knowable' see IV. 1. The author now goes to speak about the state of the mind described above :

III. 34-35] ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA 69

34

nigrhītasya manaso nirvikalpasya dhīmatah I pracaraḥ sa tu vijneyah susupte 'nyo na tatsamaḥ !

'That state (pracara) of the mind of a wise man which is suppressed and (thus) indeterminate is to be known; (the state of the mind) in deep sleep is different from that, it is not like that.' It is said here that the state of the suppressed and indeter- minate mind is different from that in susupti. Why it is so is stated in the following kārikā (III. 35). The word pracara which is the same as vihāra or bhümi, as the yogins and the Buddhists would express, means in such cases avastha 'state.' Our author uses (IV. 80) for it also vişaya. By nirvikalpa manas 'indeterminate mind' we are to understand that it recognises no such distinction as that of subject and object, etc. In Buddhist works dhimat is a synonym for Bodhisattva (MSA, XIX. 73).

The reason for what is said above is now offered as follows :

35

līyate hi sușupte tan nigrhītam na līyate I tad eva nirbhayam brahma jñānālokam samantatah l

'For in deep sleep it (manas) falls into a state of oblivion,' but it does not do so when suppressed. . Indeed, that is

1 Or, into a sleeping state, laya, see III. 41, 42.

70 ĀGAMASĀSTRA İII1. 36

Brahman, free from fear and radiant as jñāna2 on all sides.' It is clear here that the mind when suppressed, i.e., ceases from all of its activities, becomes Brahman. See ilI. 46. Cf. the following quoted by Jayaratha in his commentary on śloka 30 of TA (Vol, IlI, p. 23) presenting the views of the Vijnānavadins :

prabhāsvaram idam cittam prakrtyāgantavo malāh I teşām apāye sarvārtham taj jyotir avinaśvaram i

2 On jnānāloka Sankara writes: jnaptir jnānam atmasvabhavacaitanyam tad eva jñānam alokaķ prakāšo yasya tad brahma jāānālokam. For āloka see vibhāta (III. 36, IV. 81), and jyotis (III. 37).

Brahman referred to above is now further described in the following kārikā :

36

ajam anidram asvapnam1 anāmakam arūpakam I sakrdvibhatam2 sarvajñam3 nopacārah kathañcana l

'It is unborn, and has no sleep, nor dream ; nor has it name and form ; it is illumined once for all, and is all-knowing. And in no way is there access-concentration (upacara).' The state, i.e., the state of becoming Brahman as stated above, is, in fact, the state of samädhi 'intense abstract medita- tion,' as we shall see presently in the following two kārikās.

See l. 16" ; IV. 81a. 2 See IlI. 37ª; IV. 81' with the note; ChU, VIII. 4. 1-2: sakrd vibhāto hy esa brahmalokaķ. 3 III. 47.

III. 36] ÄGAMASĀSTRA 71

Now, there are two kinds or stages of samādhi, upacāra samādhi and arpana° (Pali appana). In the first the mind is concentrated on its object, but not uninturruptedly, for now it is so and the next moment it is not so, simply moving near (upacarati) the object just like a bee sitting gently inside a lotus in search of its honey. In the second, the mind is firmly and uninturruptedly fixed on the object. Because this state of samādhi 'gives (arpayati)' the one-pointed mind to the object it is called arpanā, as Buddhaghos a explains in his AS, p. 142 : ekaggam cittaņ ārammaņe appetīti appanā. Cf. p. 143: upagantvã vicaraņavasena upavicāro. Cf. also vicāra as explained in the Vibhāvanī Tika on the AAS, I. 17 :

santavutti vicāro cittassa nātipphandabhūto ākāse uppatitassa sakuņassa pakkhapasāraņam viya, padumassa uparibhāge paribbhamaņam viya ca padumabhimukhapatitassa bhamarassa.

The difference between upacära and appana is thus shown in VM, p. 126 :

duvidho hi samādhi upacārasamādhi ca appanāsamādhi ca. dvīh'ākārehi cittam samādhīyati upacārabhūmiyam (=upacārā- vatthāyam-Tīkā) vā parilabhabhūmiyam (=jhānassa adhigamā- vatthāyaņ-Tīkā).° dvinnaņ pana samādhīnam idaņ nānā- karaņaņ°. yathā nāma daharo kumārako ukkhipitvā țhapiya- māno punappunam bhūmiyam patati evam eva upacare uppanne cittam kālena nimittam ārammaņam karoti kālena bhavangam otarati.° yatha nāma balavā puriso āsanā vuțțhāya divasam'pi tițtheyya evam eva appanāsamādhimhi uppanne cittam saki bhavangavāram chinditvā kevalam'pi rattiņ kevalam'pi divasam titțhati.

The d of the kārika may be explained in another way. Brahman is described here by such words as aja, anidra, etc., but being beyond speech and mind it cannot be done so. This is said : nopacāraḥ kathañcana '(But) in no way there is any figurative (or metaphorical) expression (upacāra). See BSB, p. 44 :

72 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [II]. 37-38

sa punab pāramanthikab svabhāvah sarvadharmāņām nirvi- kalpasyaivn jnānasya gocaro veditavyah. sacet punar yathaivā- bhilāpo yeșu dharmeșu yasmin vastuni pravartate tadātmakās te dharmās tad vastu syāt. evam sati bahuvidhā bahava svabhāvā ckasyaikasya vastuno bhaveyuh. tat kasya hetoh. tathāhy ekasmin dharma ckasmin vastuni bahuvidha bahavo bahubhir abhilāpaih prajñaptaya upacārāh kriyante.°

The following two karikas say that this state of becoming Brahman is somādhi :

37

sarvabhilapavigatah sarvacintāsamutthitah ! suprasantah sakrjjyotih samādhir acalo 'bhayah i

'It is intense abstract concentration (samadhi) which is beyond all expression,' and above all thoughts,2 very calm and full of light burning once for all,3 unwavering and without fear.' In Buddhism there is a particular samadhi called acala (MVt,' 580).

1 anabhilāpya= okathya, AK, ii. 243. See IV. 24. 2 III. 38' : cinta yatra na vidyate. 3 III. 36°, IV 81 with note.

38

graho na tatra notsargaś cintā yatra na vidyate I ātmasaņsthaņ tadā jñānam ajāti samatām gatam l ' Where there is no thought 1 there is neither apprehension or abandonment (of any object). At that time the mind

1 III. 37'.

III. 38] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 73

(jnana=citta)2 rests in itself, is unborn and attains to the state of sameness.'3 . In this state the mind does not apprehend or abandon any of its objects and as such rests in itself (atmasamstha). The word atman in aimasamstha here means 'itself' (svarūpa) and not 'soul' (paramatman or Brahman) as distinct from the mind (jñāna). Cf. BG, VI. 25 : ātmasamstham manah kṛtvā na kiñcid api cintayet 'having made the mind resting in itself one should not think of anything.' Nilakantha writes here in his țīka on the word atmasamstha: ātmani svarūpe samstha sthitir yasya. This atmasamstha jñana is, in fact, in other words, vijnaptimatra or vijnanamatra of the Buddhist Vijnanavadins. The word vijñanamatru means 'simply vijñana,' and the state of being so is vijñānamātratā. When the vijñana does not apprehend any object whatsoever and as such rests only in itself this state is called vijñānamātratā. Says Vasubandhu (Tk. 28, ViS, p. 584) :

yadā tv ālambanam jñānam naivopalabhate tadā i sthitam vijnānamātratve grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt l

LA, p. 169: yadā tv ālambyam artham nopalabhate jñānam tadā vijnaptimatravyavasthanam bhavati. vijnapter grahyabhavad grāhakasyābhāvaķ. tadagrahaņān na pravartate jñānam. This is referred to in the following stanza of the KU, II. 3.10:

yadā pañcāvatisțhante jñānāni manasā saha 1 buddhis ca na vicestate tam ahuh paramam gatim Il

3 See III. 32, IV. 96, with notes. See III. 2; IV. 77, 80, 93, 95, 100. It is to be noted in these karikas that ajati or anutpatti and sama, or samya or samata are always used together. Cf. this with the quotation of MV in the note on III. 2 1201B -- 10

74 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [III. 39

In the Upanisads it is well-known that Brahman is vijnana (BU, III. 9. 28; TU, Il. 5 1, III. 5. 1., etc., vijñānamaya=vijñāna) or jñāna (TU, II. 11). This vijāna or jñāna is ātmasamstha jñāna or vijñānamātra. For atmasamstha jñāna see ChU, VII. 24. 1-2 : "Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, under- stands nothing else, that is the Infinite (bhūman).

'Sir, in what does the Infinite rest?' 'In its own greatness,-or not even greatness.' " 4

It is to be noted that in the beginning of the present chapter (III. 2) the author proposed 'ato vaksyāmy akārpaņyam ajāti samatām gatam,' here in the present karika he concludes the subject.

4 See my paper Evolution of Vijnanavada in IHQ, X, 1934, pp. 1 ff.

That samadhi which is nirvikalpa is further described in the next kārikā :

39

asparsayogo nāmaisa durdarsah sarvayogibhiḥ I yogino bibhyati hy asmad abhaye bhayadarsinaḥ I!

'This is what is called 'contactless concentration' (asparsa- 'yoga), very difficult to be realized by all yogins; the yogins shrink from it seeing fear where (in fact) there is no fear.' For asparsayoga see IV. 2. The Commentator explains the second half of the kārikā saying that though there is no fear in this yoga yogins (of lower order) are afraid of it thinking it to be one's own destruction

İII. 40-41] ÁGAMAŚÄSTRA 75

(atmanasarūpa). These people have no discrimination (avivekin),. and so they have fear though there is no fear. Vidyāraņy a quotes this kārikā in his PD, II. 29, intro- ducing it (II. 28) thus :

gaudācāryā nirvikalpe samādhāv anyayoginām ! sākārabrahmanisthānām atyantam bhayam ūcire il

Now the author proceeds to say that for the yoga referred to the control of mind is absolutely necessary, on which depend the absence of fear, and such other things :

40

manaso nigrahāyattam abhayam sarvayogiņām I duhkhaksayaḥ prabodhaś cāpy akșayā śāntir eva ca l

'The absence of fear, the destruction of misery, the awaking, as well as the eternal peace of all yogins depend on the control of mind.'

The next karika shows how the mind can gradually be controlled without difficulty :

41

utseka udadher yadvat kuśāgrenaikabindunā ! manaso nigrahas tadvad bhaved aparikhedataķ Il

'The control of mind without great pains is like the draining out of a sea by drops with the point of a kuśa grass.' The first half of the kärika refers, according to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (BG, VI. 23) and Rāmakrsna, a commentator of PD (XI. 109 ), where this

76 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [1I1. 42

kārikā is quoted, to an old story, (cf. Tittibhopākhyāna, HU, pp. 78-79 ) which runs, as given by Madhusūdana Sarasvati, as follows : Once upon a time the sea carried off with its waves the cggs of a bird which were laid on the beach. The bird got angry and determined to dry it up. He began to take out the water drop by drop with the tip of his beak and he could not be dissuaded from it by the birds related to him. In the mean time the divine sage Narada came there. He, too, asked him to turn back, but in vain. The bird said that anyhow he would dry up the sea either in this or in the future life. Fortunately Narada became very kind to him, and sent there Garuda, the lord of birds, for his help. Owing to the wind produced by the fapping of the wings of Garuda the sea began to dry up and thus being frightened gave back the eggs to the bird. The substance of the karika is that it is with determination and perseverance that mind is gradually controlled.

The author now suggests the means for controlling the mind :

42

upayena nigrhnīyad viksiptam kāmabhogayoh 1 suprasannam laye caiva yathā kāmo layas tathā l

'By the means1 one should control it ( mind ) when it is distracted in desire and enjoyment, and also when it remains at ease in the sleeping state, for the sleeping state is as ( bad ) as desire is.' Kārikās III. 42-46 are quoted and explained by M a dh u- sudana Sarasvatī in the commentary on the BG,

1 See III. 43-45.

İII. 43-44] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 77

VI. 26, and III. 44-45 a-b by Sadānanda in his VeS, §$32-33. According to the former kama ' desire' is the state of thinking of, or longing for enjoyment ( cintyamānāvastha ), while bhoga 'enjoyment' is the state of enjoying the desired things (bhujyamānavastha). Laya 'sleeping state' is, in his opinion, deep sleep (susupti), as supported by Gaudapāda himself (III. 35), but Sadānanda explains it by 'sleep' (nidra). Laya causes mental inactivity, and corresponds to the state called mudha 'infatuated' in the yoga philosophy. See Vyäs a on YS, I. 1.

The means referred to above are as follows :

43

duhkham sarvam anusmrtya kāmabhogān nivartayet |

ajam sarvam anusmrtya jātam naiva tu paśyati l

'Repeatedly remembering that all is misery one should turn back (one's mind) from desires and enjoyments.1 Indeed repeatedly remembering that all is unborn one does not see anything born.' The second half of the karika implies that when everything is unborn and consequently has no existence in reality there is no object for one's desire and enjoyment.

1 Or we may write for 'one should, etc.,' 'one should keep back (from the mind) desires and enjoyments' Thus, as says Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (BG, VI. 26), kāmahhogān in the kārikā may be explained as accusative plural or ablative singular.

44

laye sambodhayec cittam viksiptam śamayet punaḥ I sakaşāyaņ vijānīyāc chamaprāptam na cālayet il

'One should awaken the mind when it is in the state of

78 ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA [III. 44

sleep; when distracted one should pacify it again. One should also investigate if it is with the evil passions (sakasaya). And (finally) when it reaches the state of equanimity one should not cause it to move.' As regards the control of mind there are four impediments enumerated in our kārikās (III. 42-45) of which viksepa ' distrac- tion' and laya 'sleep ' have already been mentioned also in kārikā 42, the other two being kasaya and sukha-, or according to some (VeS, §33) rasa-asvada. The last term will be explained in the next kārika (45). We are concerned here with kaşaya. It means herc stabdhibhava 'becoming stiffened' of mind as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Sadananda would explain (loc. cit.). The primary meaning of kasāya is 'decoction,' so to say, of evil passions (rāga, dveșa, moha). Śankara explaining mrditakașāya in ChU, VII. 26. 2, writes : vārksādir iva kașāyo rāgadveșādidosah. It causes the stiffness of mind, owing to which it cannot be fixed on the object. Thus the kasaya, i.c., the evil passions, being the cause of stabdhibhäva, is explained by those authors to mean stabdhibhava. We may, however, take the word in its actual sense, i.e., the evil passions. Cf. MSA, XIV. 9c-d-10a-b :

linam cittasya grhņiyad uddhatam samayet punah # śamaprāptam upekșeta tasmin nālambane punaḥ I

See also XIV. 11.

For samapräpta in d which gives better sense (cf. samayet in d of the kārika) and is supported by VeS, with its Tikā Vidvanmanorañjanī, $33 and MSA quoted above, the reading found in editions and a very large number of MSS is samaprapta. It means one that has reached the state of equilibrium. Madhusudana Sarasvatī takes the word sama in the sense of Brahman.

[III. 45-46 ĀGAMASĀSTRA 79

45

nāsvādayet sukham tatra niḥsangaḥ prajñayā bhavet I niścalam niścarac cittam ekikuryāt prayatnataḥ il

'There (in practising yoga) he should not enjoy happiness.1 By wisdom2 he must be (then) free from all attachment. If the mind which is (thus) fixed goes out, by endeavour he should so do as to make it remain only in itself.' On ekikuryat 'should make one' the Commentator says : citsvarūpasattamātram evapadayet. Cf ekībhavati, BU, IV. 4.2; ekibhūta, MāU, 5.

1 There is a feeling of happiness from that condition of mind in practising yoga, and it should be avoided as it is an impediment. 2 Or, discrimination.

The next karika says that when the mind is thus completely controlled or suppressed (niruddha) and as such is free from all movements and does not perceive anything it becomes Brahman :

46

yadā na līyate cittam na ca vikșipyate punaḥ I aninganam anābhāsam nișpannam brahma tat tadā li

'When the mind is not in the state of sleep, nor is distracted again, and as such has no movement nor any senses-image, then it becomes Brahman.' See III. 35. The first half refers to two states laya corresponding to mudha and viksepa corresponding to viksipta in the Vyas a's commentary on YS, I. 1. See III. 42. See also anidra and

80 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [III. 46

asvapna in III. 36. The Commentator explains anābhāsa saying that it does not appear in the form of any of its objects which are imaginary (na kenacit kalpitena vişayabhāvenāvabhāsate). Ābhāsa is praticchāya 'reflection'. See BAP, V. 36. Or it may be taken in the sense of 'appearance,' namely, the appearance of any object. On d the Commentator says : yadaivamlaksaņam cittam tadā nişpannam brahma brahmasvarūpeņa nispannam cittam bhavatīty arthah. Cf. IV. 77 where he writes : cittasyeti yā mokșākhyā- 'nutpattih and on IV. 80 cittasya niścalā calanavarjitā brahma- svarūpaiva tadā sthitir yaişā brahmasvarūpā sthitiś cittasyādvaya- vijñānaikarasaghanalakșaņā. In this connexion the following may be quoted from the BA, IV. 15 : cittasya brahmatādikam which BAP explains : cittasya phalam brahmabhūyādikam. It is said here that the anegana and anābhasa citta becomes Brahman. With this compare the following : MU. VI. 24 (p. 143) :

mānase ca vilīne tu yat sukham cātmasākșikam I tad brahma cāmrtam śukram sā gatir loka eva ca ll

Mrtyujidbhatļāraka as quoted in SV, p. 99 : nirābhāsam padam tat tu tat prāpya vinivartate ! LA : IV. 16:

cittamātraņ nirābhāsam vihāro baddhabhūmi ca ! etad dhi bhasitam buddhair bhāsante bhāșayanti ca l X. 105 (p. 278).

cittamātram atikramya nirābhāse sthitam phalam ! X. 110 (p. 279). cittamātram atikramya nirābhāsam atikramet I nirābhāsasthito yogī mahāyānam na paśyate !l X. 257 (p 299)

III. 47] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 81

. tadā yogī hy anābhāsam prajnayā paśyate jagat I nimittam vastu vijñaptir manovispanditam ca yat l atikramya tu putra me nirvikalpas caranti te ! X. 94 (p: 277). etad vibhāvayan yogī nirābhāse pratișthate ! X. 235 (p. 296). ālambālambayvigataņ yadā paśyati saņskṛtam ! niścitam cittamātram hi cittamātram vadāmy aham Il mātrasvabhāvasamsthanam pratyayair bhavavarjitam 1 nisthabhavab param brahma etam mātram vadamy aham III. 25,26.

See also LA, p. 126 : matpravacane punar mahāmate vikalpakasya manovijnānasya vyāvṛttir nirvāņam. Šankara on BU, IV. 3.7 ( p. 587) : vijñānasya nirvāņam purușārthaḥ. · See III. 35, IV. 29 (comm. : ajātam yac cittam brahmaiva · jāyate), 48, 77, 80.

The citta that becomes Brahman is described in the next kārikā :

47

svastham sāntam sanirvāņam akathyam sukham uttamam ! ajam ajena jñeyena sarvajñam paricakșate l

'They say it rests in itself1 and is calm having nirvāņa; it is unspeakable and the highest bliss, unborn, and (identical) with the knowable, which is also unborn, and is all-knowing.' See III. 33, IV. 1. The word nirvāna has different meanings, such as 'delight', 'extinction', 'cessation', 'disappearance', 'calmed', 'quieted'.

1 Here svastha is atmasamstha, UII. 38.

• 82 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [III. 48

We may take it here in the sense of 'extinction' .. The extinction of mind means the disappearance of its function of thinking (manana or cintana), in other words, the amanībhava of manas referred to above (III. 31), and in MU, VI. 34. or vilaya of manas in MBU p. 12. This is also called unmanībhāva (BBU, 4), vttiksaya of citta (MU, VI. 34, p. 178), and the nirodha of vijñana (=nirvāna) in DN, I. 223 (viññāna- ssa nirodhena). Cf. YV, III. 67.8 : spandād bhavati citsargo niņspandād brahma śāśvatam 1 See also MU, VI. 24 (p. 143) :

manase ca vilīne tu yat sukham cātmasākșikam I tad brahma cāmṛtam ukraņ sā gatir loka eva ca Il For sarvajña see III. 36. The author proposed in the beginning of this chapter (III. 2) to speak of non-originatiop (ajati). Now having done so mainly with regard to Jiva and partly also to other things he concludes thus :

48

na kaścij jāyate jīvah sambhavo 'sya na vidyate I etat tad uttamam satyam yatra kiñcin na jāyate !1

iti gaudapādīya āgamaśāstre 'dvaitākhyam trtīyam prakaraņam samāptam.

'No individual soul is born, nor is there any possibility of it. This is that highest reality where nothing is born.

Here ends, in the Agamasastra of Gaudapāda, Book Thiee called ' Non-duality'.

1 See IV. 71.

BOOK IV

The proposition was enunciated (III. 2), discussed (III),. and finally established in the last line of the last karika of the last * Book, and it will further be affirmed later on (IV.71) that there is nothing that originates, and this is the highest truth. In order to further elucidate this view the author now begins the present Book of his Āgamaśastra. Its first two karikas form what is known in later Sanskrit works as mangalacarana 'salutation, benediction, or prayer for success.' The first karika is as follows :

jñānenākāśakalpena 1 dharmān yo gaganopamān 2 jfeyabhinnena3 sambuddhas tam vande dvipadam varam l

'Who has perfectly understood the elements of existence (dharma) that are like the sky, through the knowledge (jñana) which is not different from its object (jneya) and is also like the sky, to him, to the greatest of men, I pay my homage.' The author here pays his homage to duipadam vara ' the greatest of men.' Who is this duipadam vara ? The word duipad (RV, X. 165.1: sam no astu dvipade sam catuspade) or duipada literally 'biped' means in such cases 'man.' Words such as dvipadam vara or dvipadānam uttama (or agra) or duipadottama (Pali duipad'uttama) in compound are all synonymous. They are used both as adjectives and nouns.

1 IV.96 with . 2 IV.91. 3 III.33 ; IV.88.

84 ÃGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 1

As an adjective dvipadam vara is found in MB, Vanaparvan, 54.45 (:naisadho dvipadam varah) and also in Ādiparvan, 220.36 (with reference to Dhrtarastra : abhistausi ca yat ksattuh samīpe dvipadām vara).4 In Buddhist literature, both Sanskrit and Pali, dvipadottama or dvipad'uttama in Pali or any one of the synonyms mentioned above is used to mean the Buddha (AP, 1; MSt, p. 60, 1. 25; SNt, 83, 995, 998; MVt2, § 267; SS, p. 8, 57, here in the last place not less than thirteen times). Narottama (Pali nar'uttama) and puruşottama (Pali puris'uttama) are also used specially for the Bu d dh a [SNt, 544 (see DP, 78) 1021; MVt,2 § 1,40; MVu, Vol. II, pp. 194, 199, 232, 266]. On the other hand Ś takes dvipadam vara to mean puruso- ttama in the sense of Narayana.5 Now, which of them, the Buddha or Narayana, is really meant by the author himself can be decided if we consider the subject matter of the kārikā. There are mainly two points to be discussed here. First, jñāna 'knowledge' is said to be ākāsakalpa ' like the sky,' and again it is not different from the jneya ' the knowable,' i.e., the object of knowledge. And second, the dharmas, ' elements of existence' or 'things or objects,' are also gaganopama 'like the sky,' What are we to understand by the statement that jñāna is like the sky? One characteristic of jnana, according to both our author and the Vijñanavadins, is that it is asanga (IV. 72, 96) 'having no attachment, contact, or relation,'

4 Such instances are there many. See 1. 50.27. .5 It may be noted that so far as I know no word compounded with dvipad or dvipada is found in Brahmanic literature to mean Narayana. But thanks to a friend who points out that dvipadam varistha which, in fact, is the same as doipadam vara is applied at least once to Narayana (MB, Santiparvan, 343. 1). But it is to be noted that though here it refers to Nārāyana, no doubt, this Narayana is not God (isvara), but a sage (rsi) and hence a man, though an incarnation of the former.

IV. 11 AGAMASĀSTRA 85

i.e., it does not relate itself to its object, it does not cognize any object (agraha, III. 32), there being no object what- soever. See IV. 26, 27, 72, 96, 99, and the following from LA, p. 157: asangalaksanam jñānam.6 Now jñāna being asanga is compared here with the sky which is also asanga. See BAP, p. 359: evam° nişprapancatvād ākāśavad asangam anāspadamī aśesam viśam utpaśyāmaḥ.8 As regards the absence of difference between jñana and jñeya it is a well-known fact that this view is maintained by Vijñanavādins. According to them there is no reality in external things. Knowable is, in fact, inside being the trans- formation of vijnana, and only appears to be outside. Dinnāga says in his Ālambanaparīksa, 6 (quoted by Śankara in his commentary on BS, II. 2.28 and by Kamalaśil a in his Pañjikā on TS, p. 582 : yad antarjñeya- rupam tad bahirvad ababhasate9. And Dharmakirtti formulates it in his PV,10 fol. 274a, 1. 7 in the following

6 Sometimes there is made a difference between jnana and vijnana as the following passages of the same work (LA) will show saying that jnana is asanga; p. 157: tatrotpannapradhvamsi: vijñānam anutpannapradhvamsi jñanam; asangalakşanam jnanam vişayavaicitryasangalaksanam ca vijnānam; asangasvabhavalaksanam jñānam; aprāptilaksanam jñānam; ASP, p. 399: asangalaksaņā subhūte prajnāpāramitā. See also MV, p. 533; nimittālambanam vijnānam, jnānena hi sūnyatālambanena bhavitavyam, taccānutpādarūpam eveli, See IV. 96, notes. 7 As the editor, Poussin, has pointed out, this reading is supported by the Tibetan version where we have: lhag.pa.med.pa(asarga). gnas.med (anāspada). 8 See also BA with BAP, IX. 155. 9 The other half runs as follows: so 'rtho vijnanarupatvāt tatpratyayatayapi ca. See also TS, p. 582 : nīlapītādi yaj jnāne bahirvad ababhāsate | tatra satyam ato nāsti vijneyam tattvato bahih į 10 The book in its original Sanskrit is not yet found, but there is a Tibetan translation called Tsad.ma.rnam.par.nes.pa Pramānaviniscaya) in Tanjur, Mdo, G, fols. 250b. 6-329b.1. Cordier, III, p. 437.

86 ĀGAMASĀSTRA

line which is widely quoted1 in Brahmanical works in discussing vijninavada, a common subject for philosophical discussions found in them12 : sahopalambhaniyamad abhedo nilataddhiyoh (13 'On account of the regularity of the simultaneous percep- tion of the blue and its knowledge there is no difference between them.' This theory is based on such utterances of the Buddha as the following : cittamāttam bho jinaputra yad uta traidhātakam.1 'O the sons of Jina, the three planes are only mind.' The following may also be quoted in this connexion: Vk,1: vijiaptimātram evaitad; LA, X. 77 : vijnaptimātram tribhavam.

" Poussin has shown it in his Le Baddisime d'après les sources brahmaniques in Le Maseon, N. S 1901, pp. 161-52; Anandagiri and Vacaspati (Bhamafi) on BS, II. 2. 26: Tatparyatika, p 457; Ślokacarttika (tika), 290: Nyayakandal, p. 126: Adcaitabrahmaniddhi, (Bib. Ind.) p 93: Vivaranaprameyasamgrahc, p. 75. See also IHQ, Vol. IX. No. 4. 1933, pp. 979-80. 1: For instance, MD with Sabara. 1. 15: MSV. Niralambaoada and Sanyaoada, pp. 217-345: BS with S, I1. 2. 23. 13 The Tibetan version runs: lhan.cig.dmiss.pa.nes.pahi.phyirl são.das.de.blo.gshan.ma.şin | See IHQ, IX, pp. 279 ff. and PVk:, Il. 385-391: sakrtsašıvedyamānasya niyamena dhiya saha l visayasya tato 'nyatvaņ kenākārena sidhyati " bhedai ca bhrantavijaanair drsyetendav ivādraye ! samvittiniyamo nasti bhinnayor nilapitayob I nartho 'samvedanaļ kaścid anartham vāpi vedanam ! dntam samvedyaminam tat tayor nāsti vivekitā E tasmsd arthasya durvāram jaanakālavabhasinah 1 jnanad avyatirekittam* N DS. p. 49; SS, p. 19; TAl, p. 18. For further details see Levi : Mater- iaux pour l'etude du systeme Vijnaptimatra, Paris, 1932, D. 43.

IV. 11 ĀGAMASĀSTRA 87

etc. And from this it follows that in reality there is no external object as the foolish imagine,15 it being nothing but the trans- formation of the mind (vijñānapariņāma) owing to vāsanā.16 In this kārika jneya 'object of knowledge ' is to be taken in its ordinary sense and not in its particular significations, as in III.33, and IV.90. We are now to discuss the second point, i.e., the dharmas 'elements of existence' are gaganopama. From the absolute point of view (paramarthatah) the external things appear only in their imposed forms having no reality at all. They have not their intrinsic existence (nihsvabhava) and as such are void (sūnya) like the son of a barren woman. Hence they are gaganopama.17 Śāntideva says in his BA, IX.155 :

sarvam ākāsasankāsam parigrhņantu madvidhāh l

'Let those who are like me accept the doctrine that all is like the sky.' Why is it like the sky? Prajñākaramati explains : because it is imposed and devoid of reality (samāropitatattva- sunyatvat). We read the following in ASP, p. 297 : evam eva subhūte sarvadharmā ākāśagatikā ānāgatikā agati- kā ākāśasamāņ. yathākāsam anāgatam agatam akṛtam avikțtam anabhisamsktam asthitam avyavasthitam anutpannam anirud- dham evam eva subhūte sarvadharmā anāgatā agatā akītā avikrtā

15 LA, p. 285: bāhyo na vidyate hy artho yatha bālair vikalpyate | vāsanair luditam cittam arthābhāsam pravartate || 16 Tk, 1: atmadharmopacaro hi vividho yah pravartate | vijnanapariņamo'sau° !| Sthiramati writes here in his bhāsya: dharmanām tmanaś ca vijnānapariņāmād bahirabhāvāt. 17 BAP, p. 503 (with regard to anu) : ato 'bhiniskrsyamāno nisvabhāvatayā ākāšam sūnyam eva: See pp, 504-505,

88 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV.1

anabhisamskrtā asthitā asamsthitā avyavasthitā anutpannā ani- ruddhā ākāśakalpatvād avikalpāḥ. See BAP, p. 395, quoted above, and specially our text, IV. 93, Or because the dharmas are beyond enumeration (gananā- samatikranta), they are gaganopama.18 Or, it may be that as jnana is asanga and is thus like the sky, so are asanga the dharmas, and as such they are like the sky. Sce IV. 96. That the sky is asanga needs no ex- planation. One of the grounds on which this theory is based is that the things are nihsvabhava, i.e., without their own nature and con- dition or state of being (svabhava). And that which has not its own state of being is nothing but the sky and void (akasa, Sūnya).19 Or again, as in fact the things have naturally neither origina- tion nor suppression, they are like the sky. See LA, X. 172 :

aniruddhāh anutpannāh prakrtyā gaganopamāḥ 1 Ś does not explain here as to how jnāna is akasakalpa and the dharmas are gaganopana. He would, however, explain the non-difference of jnana and jneya saying that jneya refers to atman (or strictly atmans), land jñana is not different from atman.

18 ASP, pp. 278-279: sarvadharmā api subhūte 'cintyā atulyā aprameyā asaņkhyeya asamasamāh .* sarvadharma api subhūte ' samkhyeyā gaņanāsamati- krāntavāt. rūpam api subhūte 'samasamam evaņ vedanā samjnā samskārā vijñānam api subhūte 'samasamam evam sarvadharmī api subhūte samasamā ākāsasamatvāt subhūte sarvadharmāņām. BA, V. 12: durjanan gaganoparan on which BAP writes satravo hi gaganasamatvad aparyantāh. 19 See BAP, p. 503: ato 'bhiniskīsyuımāņo niņsvabhāvatayā ākāfam sūnyam eva; pp. 504-505 : tat ko 'tra kayah. tasya, pratyaveksamāņasya bhavati-ākāfa- samo 'yam kayah ° sarvam etad ākāśam iti paśyati °

IV. 1j AGAMASASTRA 89

Now the word dharma used here in this kārika and not ess than twenty-two times in this Book, 20 reguires some explanation. It is very widely used in such cases as the present one throughout Buddhist literature in Sanskrit and also in Pali.21 Figuratively it means a thing or object, a thing of which the senses or mind takes cognition and as such, it is synonym of such Sanskrit words as artha or padārtha or visaya or prameya. Literally it has among others the sense of nature, character, peculiar condition or essential quality, in Sanskrit svabhāva or svalaksana. It is derived from dhr 'to hold, maintain, preserve, keep.' Because a thing in whatever form it may be maintains its own characteristics or essential quality (svalaksana or svabhāva), it is called dharma. So we read in AKB, p. 6: laksaņadhāraņād dharmah (ran.gi.matshan. nid.hdzin.pabi,phyir.chos.te). See MV, pp. 304, 457. Buddhaghosa (AS, $94, p. 391 explains the term in the following words : (i) attano pana sabhavam dhārentīti dhammā, (ii) dhāriyanti vā paccayehi, (iii) dhāriyanti vā yathāsabhāvato'ti dhamma.22 According to it rasa, sparśa, etc., are dharmas. Only these are there and not also dharmins 'those endowed with or having a dharma,' as the Buddhists hold unlike such non-Buddhist philosophers as Naiyāyikas and Vaiseșikas, according to whom earth, or jars, etc., are dharmins, while their qualities, i.e., hardness (kathinya), etc., are dharmas. In Buddhist philosophy it is only the quality of tangibility called 'hardness' (kathinya, sparsa) that is regarded as existent, but

90 IV. 1, 6, 8, 10, 21, 33, 41, 46, 53, 54, 58, 59, 81, 82, 91, 92, 93, 96, 98, 99. It is used also in II. 25 and III 1, but evidently in a meaning different from that in Book IV. 21 For instance, ASP, p. 39: sarvadharma api devaputrā māyopamāh svapnopamāh ; DP, 279 (Maggavagga, 7) sabbe dhammā anattā'ti. 22 It is thus translated in Ex., p. 50: "Dharmas may be defined as those states which bear their own intrinsic natures, or which are borne by causes-in * elation, or which are borne according to their own characteristics." 1201B .- 12

90 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 1

there is no entity excepting it that we call earth, or the element of earth. Ärya d e v a says in his CS, 309 : kaļhinā dțsyate bhūmiņ sā ca kāyena grhyate i tena hi kevalam sparso bhūmir eșe ti kathyate # 28 'It is seen that the earth is hard and that is perceived with one's body. Thercfore it is said that the earth is only the quality of tangibility.' Thus, as says Stcherbatsky in his Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 26, 'If we say "earth has odour, etc.," it is only an inadequate cxpression; we ought to say "earth is odour, etc.," since beside these sense-data there is absolutely nothing the name could be applied to."" It is also to be borne in mind in this connexion that in the absolute truth there is nothing as avayavin 'one having portions' as in other systems. It is owing to this fact that expressions like the following are found in Buddhist works : nāstīha sattva ātmā vā dharmāstv ete sahetukāh | 25

. This theory of dharma seems to be exactly the same as that of the tattva of the Sankhyas. The word tattva (tat-tva) literally

" This is a reconstructed verse from Tibetan which runs: sa . ni. brtan . shes . bya. bar. mthon de.yan. lus. kyis. hdzin. par. hgyur | des. na . reg . pa . hbah . shig . hdi l sa .ho . shes. ni , bya . bar . brjod | See V, 82: AK and AKVI, 1. 35 (p. 69) : prthividhatuh katamaļ. khakkhatatvam iti vistarah; MV, pp. 66-67: iha tu kathinyādivyatirikta- prthivyādyasambhave sati na yukto viseşyaviseşanabhāvah." evam prthivyā- dinām yady api kathinyadivyatiriktam vicaryamānam lakşyam nāsti, laksyavyati- rekeņa ca lakşaņam nirāśrayam tathāpi samvītir eveti.° YB, 16': khakkhațatvam katamat, prthivi. This view is found also in the Garbhopanisad, 1: tatra yat kațhinam sā prthivī. 24 He quotes here the following from AKV.2 IX p 717: prthvi gandhavatīty ukte rūpa-gandha-spartebhyo nānyad darsayitum sakyate. Cf. Soul Theory, p. 742. " Quoted in MV, p. 355 as a saying of the Bhagavat.

IV.1j ĀGAMASĀSTRA

means 'thatness,' i.e., 'the state of that (referring to a thing and hence it signifies 'nature (svabhāva)' or 'true natur Thus, in fact, tattva is a guna, yet each of the twenty-f categories in the system is considered as a tattva (pancavims tattva), and not tattvavat 'having tattva.' When the thr gunas, viz., sattva, rajas, and tamas, are in equal cc dition (samyavastha), they are collectively called prakrti. is itself a tattva, it has no tattva.26 It consists in the thr gunas, it has no guna, though sometimes even in authoritati works it is loosely said that it has three gunas. Thus it is well-known fact that teachers belonging to other systems s that in Samkhya there is no difference between a guna and guņin or dravya27 (guņadravyayos tādātmyam), or betwe a dharma and a dharmin (dharma-dharminor abhedah).28 Says Aśvaghosa (BCK, XII. 76) : guņino hi guņānām ca vyatireko na vidyate 1 rūpoșnābhyām virahito na hy agnir upalabhyate l

" See Tattvayatharthyadipani included in the Samkhyasamgraha (Chi khamba Sanskrit Series), pp. 72-93: tattvānīti tāntrikī samjñā. tadart cātmanatmavivekapratiyogyanuyoginas tattatpadārthāh. tesām bhāvah tatpadanimittāni purusatvaprakrtitvādīni pañcaviņśatijātayah. dharmadhar abhedad vyaktayo 'pi tattvānīty ucyate. 27 Vasuvandhu gives (AK, IX. 290) the following definition of drai rejecting that of the Vaisesikas: vidyamanam dravyam iti. Yasomit adds: yat svalaksanato vidyamanam tad dravyam. He does not accept position that smrti, samskara, iccha, etc., are guņas as held by Vaiseși (Ibid). See AK, lII. 100"-b. But Vijñā nabhiksu who is undoubte much infuenced by the Nyaya and Vaisesika systems writes the follow 'in his commentary on SS, 1. 61: ayam ca pancavimsatiko gaņo dravyarūpa € dharmadharmyabhedāt tu guņakarmasāmānyādīnām atraivāntarbhāvah. Cf. I. dharmadharmyabhedad dravyanām api tanmātratā smrtā. 28 See Vijñānabhiksu on SS, Il. 5 where the followim quoted : śaktisaktimator bhedam paśyanti paramārthatah | abhedam canupasyanti yoginas tattvacintakah /|:

92 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV.1

It may be noted in this connexion that Vasubandhu in his Vijnanamätrasiddhi applies the term dharma to the tattvas of the Sankhyas (O. Rosenberg).29 It is not that in Brahmanical works the word dharma is not used in the above sense. For instance, see KU, I. 1. 21 : anur eşa dharmah.30 Yāska (Nt, 1. 20) writes sāksātkrtadharmānah. Here the word dharman differs from dharma only in form and not also in sense, as the former, too, means artha or padartha 'a thing.' Vacaspati explains in his Tatparyatika the word sākşātkrtadharman used by Vātsyāyana (NS, I. 1.7), saying sudrdhena pramāņenāvadhāritā arthā yena sa sākșātkṛtadharmā. Evidently he takes here dharman in the sense of artha. Vyasa in his commentary on YS, II. 17, explains drsya by buddhisattvopārūdhāh sarve dharmāļ. In our present Book here and in other places Ś takes dharma to mean atman. But this seems to be forced. To imply atman our author uses in every case åtman or jiva.31 Why should he employ in this chapter dharma for it? Undoubtedly these two terms are well-known in their meanings. So there is no ground for giving preference to such a word as dharma in the sense of atman. In all the twenty-two cases in the present Book dharma is easily construed in the sense of 'a thing,' literally 'an element of existence' as in Buddhist literature. But while in some of them S takes the word to mean atman, in others he could not do so. In some cases he did not explain the word at all, and certainly the meaning atman cannot be accepted

29 Stcherbatsky: The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 27, n. 2. 30 The commentator, S, explains the word dharma here saying atmakhya dharma. Undoubtedly ätman is a dharma as we have seen. But certainly it is not the actual meaning of the word though it may be implied with reference to the context. See also KU, II. 1. 14: evam dharman prthak pasyan. 31 See for atman I. 12; II. 12, 17; III. 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14; for jtva I. 16; III. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 48; IV. 63, 68, 69, 70.

IV: 11 ÄGAMASĀSTRA 93

in them. For instance, in the text sarve dharma mrsa svapne (IV. 33) the word dharma can in no way mean atman. In two cases he explains it saying hastyadīn bahyadharmān (IV. 41), and bähyadharmah (IV. 54). Once he writes atmāno 'nye ca dharmah (IV. 58). In one case (IV. 82), however, he gives the actual sense, i.e., vastu 'thing.'3& It can further be shown from the words of the author himself that in meaning dharma and bhava (=vastu=padartha) are identical. See the following passages : (i) ajātasyaiva bhāvasya (III. 20a) and ajātasyaiva dharmasya (IV.6ª). (ii) ajāto hy amrto bhāvaḥ (III. 20c) and ajāto hy amṛto dharmah (IV. 6c). (iii) svabhāvenāmrto yasya bhāvah (III. 22 c-d) and svabhāve- nāmrto yasya dharmah (IV. 7c-a). It is to be noted that while bhava is used only in the second and third Books33 of the work, dharma in the above sense is used only -in Book IV, and this is very significant indicating the Buddhist relationship of the subject dealt with in it. There is one thing more. It is said in the karika that he to whom the author pays his homage perfectly understood the dharmas. Here if he is meant to be Naray an a one would naturally ask : What is the authority for it? Where is it found that he actually did so? This question demands a reply from those who hold that Narayana is referred to here. Not only what we have seen above with regard to the first kärika, but also the whole chapter, as can be shown, is in favour of the Buddha.

32 The text is: yasya kasya ca dharmasya, and Ś explains: yasya kasyacid vastunah. This reading is in the MS ca of Anandashrama ed., the other readings add dvaya- before vastunah. 33 Kārikās II. 1, 13, 16, 17, 19, 29, 33; and III. 20, 22.

94 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV.2

2

In the second karika the author salutes the teacher of the asparšayoga:

asparśayogo vai nāma sarvasattvasukho hitaķ I avivādo 'viruddhaś ca desitas tam namamy aham l

'I salute him (who has) taught the asparsayoga which conduces to happiness of all beings and is beneficial and free from dispute and opposition.' I construe the karika taking yena 'by whom' as understood, thus differing a little from the commentator, S, who says that it is the asparsayoga that is saluted here. In the karika avivada refers to the fact that our theory is not contradicted by theories of other schools, and aviruddha implies that it involves no self-contradiction or is not against any other position held by us. Now what is the asparsayoga, by whom and where has it been taught? The word does not occur in the Upanisads, though $ says on Ill. 39, where also it is described, that it is well-known in the Upanisads (prasiddham upanisatsu). See also Ill. 37, 38. The following is found in KU, II. 3. 10 :

yadā pancāvatisthante jñānāni manasā saha buddhis ca na vicesțate tam āhuh paramām gatim #

'When the five (instruments of) knowledge stand still together with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state.' Similar statements are met with in other Upanisads.1 But though they in fact may point to what is called asparsayoga, zas will presently be explained, it is not termed asparsayoga.

For instance, BBU, 4-6; MU, VI. 34. See kārikā, III. 38.

IV. 2} ĀGAMASĀSTRA 95

The word asparsayoga literally means the yoga in which there is no contact, or the faculty of perception by touch: The author himself says (III. 37) it is a samadhi 'profound or abstract concentration,' it is very difficult to realize. It points to what is asamprajñata samadhi (YS, I. 2, 18, 51 with the scholiast Vyāsa),2 or nirvikalpa samadhi (PD, II. 28) of yogins. But nowhere in their systems, so far as my information goes, it is called asparsayoga.3 Why is it that the word asparsa is used here? I am inclined to think that it refers to the ninth or the last of the nine dhyanas or meditations called anupūrvavihāra (Pali anupubbavihara) or the successive states of dhyāna which the Buddha taught and are found frequently in Buddhist texts.4 They are as follows : I. Four rūpa dhyanas or the meditations of which rūpa 'matter' is the object, viz .- (i) prathama dhyana or the first stage of meditation. (ii) dvitiya dhyāna or the second stage of meditation. (iii) trtīya dhyana or the third stage of meditation. (iv) caturtha dhyana or the fourth stage of meditation. II. The four arüpa dhyanas or the meditations of which the object is not matter, viz .-- (i) ākāšānantyāyatana (Pali ākāsānañcāyatana) or the place of infinity of space.

I Vyāsa explains (YS, I. 2) it: na tatra kiñcit samprajñāyata ity asamprajñatah 'as nothing is known there it is called asamprajñata.' -3 Cf. asparsasamvitprapti used in explaining suarupalabha in the following line of the VV, p. 42: svarupalabhah samastakalpanottīrņatvād akṛtaka- niravakāsa-niruttara-nistaranga-niravadhi-nirniketāsparsasamvitprāptir bhavati. This is kindly pointed out to me by Dr. S. N. Sen Gupta of the Lucknow University. The following occurs in the same work (p. 4) in the course of the explanation of mahasunyatapravesa: kulakulavikalpadośojjhito'vyapadeśya- mahānirāvaraņa-niratyaya-vedyavedaka-niryukto varnāvarņanirvarņottīrņah sparsāsparsa-prathāparivarjita upacārāt paramākāsadyabhidhānair abhidhīyate. 4 AN, Vol. IV, pp. 410-448: nava yime bhikkhave anupubbaviharā°. nava yime bhikkhave anupubbavihārasamāpattio desissāmi, tam sunātha,

96 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV.2

(ii) vijnanānantyāyatana (Pali viñnāņanca°) or the place of infinity of pure consciousness. (iii) akincanāyatana (Pali akincañna") or the place of nothingness. (iv) naivasamjnā-nāsamjnāyatana (Pali nevasañnānāsaññā°) or the place neither of consciousness nor of unconsciousness. And the ninth is samjnāveditanirodha (Pali sañnāvedayita- nirodha) or the cessation or complete suppression of conscious- ness and sensation. As in the ninth or last stage of yoga or meditation not only sensation or consciousness, but also all the mental properties or mentals (caitta or caitasika dharmas), headed by sparsa (Pali phassa) 'contact,' are restricted or suppressed with the citta or mind itself, it is called asparsayoga. It is to be noted that the word sparsa employed here implies also the other mentals of which it is the first. The cessation of vedana is possible only when sparsa ceases, as is clearly shown in the SN, IV, p. 220 (XXXVI. 15.4) : phassasamudayā vedanā- samudayo phassanirodhã vedanānirodho. It means that sparsa is the cause of vedana, so when there is sparsa there is vedana, and when there is no sparsa there is no vedana. The fact that in this state of nirodha (which is the same as asamprajnata or nirbīja or nirvikalpa samādhi) the mind and its properties (citta and caitta or caitasika) completely cease to work is clearly described by Buddhaghosa in his VM, p. 552 .? It is said (III. 39) that asparsayoga is very difficult to realize. From this very fact the word asparsayoga may be explained

5 AAS, II. 2: phasso vedanā sañnā catanā° cetasikā sabbacittasādhāraņā nāma. For its explanation see Sthiramati on Tk, p. 20, ll. 1, 2, 7, 9, 10; p 28, 1. 18. ka nirodhasamapattīti. ya anupubbanirodhavasena cittacetasikānam dhammanam appavatti. See also SN, Vol. IV, p. 217 (=XXXVI. 11. 5): saññāvedayitanirodham samāpannassa saññā ca vedanā ca niruddhā honti,

IV. 2] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 97

quite in a different way. In Buddhist Sanskrit works there is frequent use of such words as sparsavihāra (MvVt1, 8349, 8351; Tk, p. 28, ll. 18), sparsavihāratā (MVt1, 6288), and asparśavihāra (AAA, p. 326; Tk, p. 28, II. 17, 19; p. 30, ll. 15, 20). Sthiramati explains the last word in his commentary on Tk, p. 28, 1. 18, saying : sparsa sukham tena sahito vihāraķ sparśavihārah, na sparsavihāro 'sparsaviharah. He says that sparsa means sukha 'joy, content, ease, comfort'; sparsavihāra is a state with it; and asparsavihāra is its opposite. In Tibetan sparsavihāra is translated by bde.gnas.pa, literally the Sanskrit equivalent to which is sukhasthiti (or sukhāva- sthiti) 'pleasant state.' In Pali sparsavihāra is phāsuvihāra in the same meaning.8 In this light asparsayoga in sense is nothing but asukhayoga (a-sukhayoga) meaning thereby 'a yoga which is not one that can be attained with ease.' This explanation is fully supported by what we know of it in III. 39: It is very difficult to realize and yogins shrink from it seeing fear though in fact there is no fear. We read in the present kārika that this yoga conduces to happiness of all beings (sarvasattvasukha). This is found also in Buddhist works where it is said (SN, Vol. IV, p. 228=XXXIV. 19. 20)9 that the highest bliss is felt in the sañnavedayitanirodha (or sammävedayita° according to the Chinese version. samma= samyg).

8 It is, however, to be noted that, strictly speaking, Pali phasu is not from Sanskrit sparsa the Pali form of which is phassa. In Northern Sanskrit Buddhist works Pali phasu is wrongly translated into Sanskrit by sparsa. See the Pali Dictionary of Childers, p. 982. Sometimes in Buddhist Sanskrit sukhasparsavihara is found for phasuvihara. It clearly indicates that the writers of the former did not think that mere sparsavihara could imply the sense of phasuvihāra. 9 idhānanda bhikkhu sabbaso nevasannānāsannāyatanam samatikkamma sañnāvedayitanirodham upasampajja viharati. idam kho ānanda eramhā sukhā aññam sukham abhikkantataram ca panītataram ca. See also the next paragraph (21) for the reply to a question raised here. Cj. AN, Vol. IV, pp. 414-418 1201B .- 13

98 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV.2

It may, however, be observed here that considering the use of the word sparsa, BG, II. 14, V. 27, and the explanations offered there by Ś and other commentators the interpretation as given in the present case as well as in IIl. 39 by Ś cannot be rejected. It is to be noted here that attempt has been made above to interpret the word asparsayoga in different ways, but it seems that the best interpretation may be found in Asanga's Yogācärabhūmi. After what is written above a transcription10 of that work has come to my hands and the following is quoted here from it : [78b] katham nirodham samāpadyamānasya naivam bhavati aham nirodham samāpadye vā vyuttișthe vā. samāpattikāle nirabhisamskāreņa cittanirodhāt.° katham nirodhād vyutthitas trīn sparsān sprsati ānijyam11 ākincanyam animittam. yad bhūyasā tasyāh samāpatter vyuttişthamānas trividhenālambanena vyuttisthate bhavā- lambanena vişayālambanena nirodhālambanena ca. taiś ca vyuttisthamāno yathākramam eva trīn sparšān sprśati. [79a] tatra bhavālambanena vyuttişthamānasya na bhavati cetasa injitatvam asmīty ayam asmīti bhavişyāmīti vistaraļ. ata āniñyam sparśam sprsatīty ucyate. vişayālambanena vyuttişthamānasya na rāga- kicanaņ bhavati na dveșakincanam bhavati na mohakiñcanam. tasmād ākifcanyam sparśam sprsatity ucyate. nirodhālambanena vyuttisthamānaḥ sarvanimittānām amanasikārād ānimittaņ dhātum avalambate. tasmād ānimittaņ sparśam sprśatīty ucyate.

(=XXXIV, 2.3) : kiņ pan'ettha (i.e., in nirvāņa) āvuso sāriputta sukham yad ettha n'atthi vedayitan'ti. etad eva khv ettha avuso sukham yad ettha n'atthi vedayitam. 10 This is made by Rahula Sankrtyayana, and he has kindly given it to me. An edition of this work is undertaken by the present author for the Asutosh Sanskrit Series, Calcutta University. 11 For the variants of this word see AK, IV. 107 (where different authorities are quoted'; MV, pp. 334-5; AKV2, pp. 389 ff.

IV. 2] ÄGAMASĀSTRA 99

We know from it that in the stage of nirodhasamapatti the citta or mind is completely suppressed, hence there is no experience whatsoever. But in the stage called vyutthana 'rising up' one has three kinds of sparsa 'experience,' known as āniñjya, akincanya, and ānimitta. The word sparsa in such cases means 'experience' or 'that which is experienced', v sprs meaning here 'to experience.'12 Now, because in the yoga called nirodhasamapatti there is no sparsa of anything, it is rightly named asparsayoga. It is said (III. 39c-d) of the asparsayoga that yogins or rather untrained ones shrink back from it, imagining fear where in reality there is no fear: yogino bibhyali hy asmād abhaye bhayadarsinah. But what is the cause of their fear? S rightly says that the so-called yogins think that it will annihilate the very self.13 Indeed, there is hardly any difference between a yogin in this state and a dead person, their respiration being completely stopped. So when the Blessed One entered that state, i.e., saññavedayitanirodha before his parinirvāņa, Ānanda took him to be dead. But the venerable Anuruddha said to him that that was not the case, the Blessed one only having entered the stage of the dhyana called sañnavedayitanirodha. After a short time, however, He passed away.14 It is therefore quite natural that an untrained yogin should be afraid of it, as of death. Yet there is a real difference between death and asparsayoga or sañnavedayitanirodha, and Buddhaghosa has explained it in his VM, p. 558, quoting a passage from the Suttapitaka. It says that all the conditions in both of them are one and the same excepting this that in the latter the heat of the body is not

12 See KnU, IV-2: te hy enan nedistham pasprsuh. [te hy enat prathamo vidancakara-this portion is grammatically defective and not in the Jaiminiya Brahmana, Chapter X which forms the KnU]; 3: sa hy enan nedistham pasparsa, sa hy enat prathamo vidāncakāra. 13 ātmanasarupam imam yogam manyamānā bhayam kurvanti. 14 Mahaparinibbānasutta, VI. 8-9 (=DN, Vol. Il, pp. 156-158).

100 ÁGAMASĀSTRA {IV.2

lost, that life does not come to an end, and that the organs of sense are not destroyed, while in the former all these are annihilated. We have seen in the present karika that this yoga is taught by the Buddha. It cannot be denied that up to the eighth of those successive states of dhyana (anupūrvavihāra) already explained, viz., 'neither-consciousness-nor-unconsciousness',there is nothing particularly Buddhist. For it is evident from Buddhist literature, both Pali and Sanskrit, that the Buddha's two tenchers Ālāra Kālāma (Ādāra Kālāpa) and Uddaka Rāmaputta (Rudraka Ramaputra) knew the seventh and eighth of the dhyānas, respectively."5 The Buddha was, however, not satisfied with what he had from his teachers, and he started thereupon to scek after a still higher state and succeeded in realizing it. It is this state which is called sañnavedayitanirodha or briefly nirodha. There is one thing more which suggests that the asparsayoga was not originally taught in the Brahmanic system of yoga. It is said in the karika that this yoga is 'not disputed' (avivada)1 and 'not opposed' (aviruddha). It is implied, as said before, from these two words that in the acceptance of the asparsayoga by the Vedantists, among whom the author himself is included, there cannot be raised any dispute or opposition, for there is nothing to be opposed even from their own point of view. Thus it is clear from what we have seen above that the real instructor of the asparsayoga, who is saluted here by the author, is no other than the Buddha. Let us now follow what the author has to say in this Book (IV). The subject matter of it is a-jati (=an-utpatti, an-utpada) 'non-becoming' or 'non-origination,' or, in other words, the doctrine that there is nothing about which it can be said that it is produced.

16 MN, Vol. I, pp. 8-9 (Ariyapariycsanasatta, I. 3.6.1; LV, Vol. I, pp. 238-239, 243-244 ; BCK, XII. 63, 83: Kern: Manual oj Buddhism, 1896, p. 55. 16 See IV. 5.

IV. 3-4] ÃGAMASÄSTRA 101

There are two classes of teachers: one (i.e., the followers of the systems of the Sankhya and the Vedanta1) holding the doctrine of actual existence of an effect in its cause (satkarya- vada), and the other (i.e., the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiseşikas2) maintaining the theory of non-existence of an effect in its cause (asatkaryavada). The author refers to these two views in the third karika which runs as follows:

3

bhūtasya jātim icchanti vādinaḥ kecid eva hi 1 abhūtasyāpare dhīrā vivadantaḥ parasparam l

'There are only certain disputants who maintain that jati · 'origination' is of a thing which is already existent, while there are others of firm resolve who hold that it is of a thing which is non-existent.3 Thus they dispute with each other.'

1 See SK, IX; BS, II. 1. 14-18 with $; $ on BU, I. 2. 2, (p. 20): kāryasya hi sato jayamānasya kārane saty utpattidarsanāt. Among the Buddhists the Vaibhāsikas maintain satkaryavada. See CS, IX. 15 and our text, IV, 11, note 1. 2 See NK, pp. 143 ff. Among the Buddhists Sautrantikas and Yogācāras hold asatkāryavada. CS, IX. 15. 3 The interpretation of the words bhuta and abhuta by S in the text here 1s quite different from that in III. 23, and it is very remarkable.

The Acarya now proceeds to mention in the next karikā the doctrine of the Buddhists who subscribe to neither of these two views asserting absolute 'non-becoming' (ajati) of things:

4

bhūtaņ na jāyate kiñcid abhūtam naiva jāyate | vivadanto 'dvayā hy evam ajātiņ khyāpayanti te ll

'That which is already existent does not come into being, and that which is non-existent does not also come into being;

102 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 4

disputing thus the followers of the doctrine of advaya assert absolute non-becoming (ajati).' Before discussing the meaning of the kārika it is to be noted that the reading that can reasonably be accepted in c is not vivadanto dvaya as in many editions, but vivadanto'dvaya with our MS. Me, and some editions.1 It is supported also by the commentary in those editions, as well as by the MS. Ka used in the Anandasram edition of 1900. The word advaya in the kārika is, in fact, identical in mean- ing with Advayavadin, which is well-known even to an ordinary reader of Sanskrit as one of the names for the Buddha.2 Some of the commentators of Amk explain advaya in advayavadin as advaita.3 But there is a marked difference between the two terms advaitavada and advayavada; while the former literally means the theory of non-difference, i.e., the non- difference between, or identity of (according to the school of Ś) Jiva and Brahman, the latter means the theory of 'non- two', i.e., neither of the two extreme views. The two (dvaya) or the two extreme views are as follows: The Buddha does not hold that anything exists, nor does he hold that it does not exist. He rejects both of these two extreme views and propounds his view taking a middle path (majjhimā patipadā or madhyamā pratipad). So according to

1 Such as of Maheśacandra Pāla, Calcutta, Saka 1806; Durgā- caraņa Sankhyavedantatīrtha, Calcutta, 1331, B.S .; and Gītă Press, Gorakhpur, 1993 V.S Amk, I. 1. 14; MVt1, 23; DA, p. 95: buddhānam bhagavatām mahākāru- nikanam advayavadinam. In the Index of words to the last work, the word advaitavadin is wrongly written. 3 For instance, Bhānujidīksita : advayam advaitam vadanty avaśyam; Kşīrasvāmin: advayam vijnānādvaitam vadaty avaśyam. Advayavadin, the exact Tibetan equivalent of which is ghis.su. med. pa . gsun ba, and Chinese pu-erh-yi, both literally meaning 'one who says . not two' is misunderstood in the Sanskrit-Tibetan-English Vocabulary (Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. IV, 1913), p. 2, for the word can n no way mean ' not doustful in his command' as it is explained there.

IV. 4] ÃGAMASĀSTRA 103

him nothing is existent, nor is anything non-existent; nothing comes into being (anutpada), nor does anything disappear (anirodha); nothing is eternal (asaśvata), nor has anything an end (anuccheda); nothing is identical (eka), nor anything differentiated (aneka); nothing moves hither (anagama), and nothing moves thither (anirgama).4 This advayavada is found throughout the Buddhist sacred literature both in Sanskrit and Pali.5 That the reading in c of the karika must be with the word advayah and not dvayah will

4 So says Nagarjuna, MV, p. 11: anirodham anutpādam anucchedam asāśvatam | anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam li yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaņ prapañcopaśamam śivam | desayāmāsa sambuddhas tam vande vadatām varam l 5 astīti kaśyapa ayam eko'nto nāstīty ayam dvitīyo'ntah. yad anayor dvayor antayor madhyam iyam ucyate kāśyapa madhyamā pratipad dharmānām bhūtapratyaveksā. KP, §60 (p. 90). See MV, p. 270. yad bhūyasā kātyāyanāyam loko 'stitām vābhinivisto nāstitām ca tena na parimucyate. Kātyāyanāvavada quoted in MV, p. 269. So writes Nāgārjuna: kātyayanāvavāde cāstī[ti] nāstīti cobhayam ! pratişiddhaņ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā || MK, XV. 7. astitva ye tu paśyanti nastitvam cālpabuddhayah | bhavānām te na paśyanti drastavyopasamam śivam || MK, V. 8. sammadițthi sammaditthīti bhante vuccati. kittāvatā nu kho bhante sammāditthi hotīti. dvayanissito khv ayam kaccāyana loko yebhuyyena atthitam ceva na'tthitam ca SN, II, p. 17 (XII. 15). lokasamudayam kho kaccāyana yathabhūtam sammappañnāya passato ya loke na'tthita sā na hoti. lokanirodham kho kaccayana yatha- bhūtam sammappañnaya passato ya loke atthitā sā na hoti" sabbam atthīti kho kaccāyana ayam eko anto. sabbam natthīti ayam dutiyo anto, ete te kaccayana ubho ante anupagamma majjhena tathagato dhammam deseti. SN, II, p. 17 (XII, 15). nityam iti kāśyapa ayam eko 'ntaḥ, anityam iti kāśyapa ayam dvitīyo 'ntah. yad etayor dvayor nityānityayor madhyam tad arūpyanidarsanam° | ātmeti kāsyapa ayam eko 'ntah. nairātmyam iti dvitīyo 'ntaḥ. yad ātmanairātmyayor madhyam tad.° samkleśa iti kāśyapa ayam eko 'ntah vyavadānam ity ayam kāśyapa dvitīyo 'ntah. yo'syāntadvayasyānupagamo (Text anugamah but see

104 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 4.

further be perfectly clear to anyone when one considers that in the preceding kārika two classes of teachers are referred to, who hold the theory of origination (jativada). According to one of them the origination is of the existent, while in accordance with the other, it is of the non-existent. These teachers are dvaitins 'advocates of dualism', viz., the Samkhyas, the Naiyayikas and the Vaisesikas. The teachers alluded to in the present kārika are, however, quite of a different view, They do not discuss as to whether the origination is of the existent or of the non-existent, but assert that there is no origination at all (ajatim khyapayanti te). Thus the teachers alluded to in kārikās 3 and 4 are different, though S takes them to be identical. As is evident, the main subject of this chapter is the theory of non-origination (ajativada). In different systems of Indian philosophy it is held that things around us have their origina- tion ; in other words, they are produced; they have their causes, they themselves being their effect. But it is the Buddhists who hold quite a different view emphatically denying the origination of anything in the world. Thus the first sentence of Nagarjuna's MK begins with anirodham

Tib. version: khas. mi. len. cin°) 'nudāhāro 'pravyāhāra iyam ucyate kaśyapa madhyamā pratipad dharmāņām bhūtapratyaveksā. KP, pp. 86-88. astīti nastīti ubhe'pi antā suddhi asuddhīti ime 'pi antā | tasmad ubhe anta vivarjayitvā madhye 'pi sthanam na karoti panditah į astīti nāstīti vivāda eșa suddhī asuddhiti ayam vivadah | vivādaprāptyā na dukham praśāmyate avivādaprāptya ca dukham nirudhyatel| SR, p. 30, quoted in MV, pp. 135, 270. bhavabhavadarsanadvayaprasango yavat tavat samsara ity avetya mumukşubhir etaddarsanadvayanirāsena sadbhir madhyama pratipad bhāvanīyā yathavad iti. MV, p. 276. See the whole of chapter XV.

IV. 41 ĀGAMASĀSTRA '105

anutpādam6 'having neither origination nor suppression.' This anutpada is thoroughly discussed and established in that work as in others. Let here be quoted only a few lines in translation from that book together with the commentary of Candrakīrtti (MK, I. 1 with MV, p. 12) : 'Now ... the Acarya, thinking the facility in refuting nirodha, after utpada is refuted, begins first with the refutation of the latter. Utpada of a thing may be supposed by the opponents from a cause which may be either it itself, or something other than it, or both, or again, from one which is no cause at all. But in no way it can be justified. So he (the Ācārya) says : "Nowhere and never are such things as are produced either from themselves, or from some other things, or from both, or from what is no cause at all."'7. This non-origination is asserted again and again in the same work and sometimes in identical words: na svato jayate bhavaḥ parato naiva jāyate I na svataḥ parataś caiva jāyate jāyate kutaḥ Il MK, XXI. 13. See XXIII. 20.

'A thing does not come into being from itself, nor from other (=not-itself), nor from both, itself and other. How can it come into being?'

6 For the order of these two words see Candrakirtti (MV, p. 12): atra ca nirodhasya pūrvam pratişedha utpādanirodhayoh paurvāparyā- vasthāyāh siddhyabhavam dyotayitum. vaksyati hi (MK, XI. 3; MV, p. 221) : pūrvam jātir yadi bhavej jarāmaraņam uttaram°. Our author, Gaudapāda, too, has followed the same order in his widely quoted kārika (III. 32) : na nirodho na cotpattih.° 7 idanīm° utpadapratisedhena nirodhapratisedhasaukaryam manyamana acaryah prathamam evotpadapratisedham ārabhate. utpado hi paraiḥ kalpya- mānaḥ svato vā parikalpyeta parata ubhayato 'hetuto vā parikalpyeta. sarvathā ca nopapadyata iti niścity aha : na svato nāpi parato na dvabhyam nāpy ahetutaḥ | utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāh kvacana kecanaļ MK, I. 1; MV, p. 12. 1201B .- 14

106 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV.4

Compare this with the following line from our kārika, IV. 22 which speaks for itself: svato vā parato vāpi na kincid vastu jāyate I 'Nothing is produced either from itself or from other.' For further details one may be referred to MK, I and XXIII with MV; C, XV. See also our kārikā, IV. 22. That there is no jati or utpada 'origination' is thus maintained also in a short line of the BA, IX. 106: evam ca sarvadharmāņām utpattir nāvasīyate ,8 'Thus the origination of all things is not known.' The first half of the present kārika is undoubtedly based on such statement as the following of Nāgārjuna (MK, I. 6): naivasato naiva sataḥ pratyo'rthasya yujyate I asataḥ pratyayaḥ kasya sataś ca pratyayena kiņ n3 For the wording in b of the kārikā (abhūtam naiva jayate) see CŚ, 373d (XV. 23d): nābhūto nāma jāyate. See here also Candrakirtti on CS, 366 (XV. 16): atrāha: jato na jāyate ajato 'pi na jayate.10 It may be noted here that in this book, too, the doctrine of non-origination is fully discussed. Ś explains the first half of the present karika as follows: bhūtam vidyamānam vastu na jāyate vidyamānatvād eva°. tatha abhūtam avidyamānam avidyamānatvān naiva jāyate śaśavişāņavat. 'The thing which is already existent does not (again) come into being owing to its very existence. And the thing that is

8 BAP runs here: evam eva yathoditanyāyena sarvadharmāņām sarva- bhavānām utpattir utpādo nāvasīyate na pratīyate. See the same work, pp. 355 ff .: na ca svaparobhayahetunibandhanam ahetunibandhanam vā bhāvasya janmatipesalam upapadyate. Here the subject is discussed to a great extent. 9 See MA, VI. 58; MV, pp. 82-83. 10 Reconstructed from the Tibetan version: hdir, smras. pa | skyes, pa. mi. skye, la. ma. skyes, pa. yan. mi, skye. ste |

IV.51 ĀGAMASĀSTRA 107

not existent does not come into being on account of its being non-existent, as, for instance, the horn of a hare.'11 Gaudapāda refers to the doctrine of ajati in the present karika, and accepts it in the next which runs as follows:

5

khyāpyamānām ajātim tair anumodāmahe vayam | vivadāmo na taiḥ sārdham avivādam nibodhata l

'We express our approval of ajati which they declare; we do not dispute with them, and listen how there cannot be any dispute.' It is to be noted here that G auda pa da is a Vedantist, and yet he accepts the doctrine of non-origination of the Advaya- vädins or Buddhists expressing his approval. He does not see any use disputing with them and invites apparently his Vedantist followers to listen to him as to why the view cannot be disputed. Like the Sankhyas, the Naiyayikas, and the Vaisesikas, etc., the Vedantists, are originally believers in the doctrine of origination, as is evident from the BS, I. 1. 2 (: janmādy asya yatah, 'From whom are the origination, etc. of this') which is based on such statements of the Upanisads as TU, III. 1. 1: yato vā imāni bhutani jatani° tad Brahma, That is Brahman from whom these beings are originated.' The reality of this origination or creation is denied later on in the school of S in the absolute truth. This is due to the doctrine of Gaudapāda who invites here his followers to listen as to how

1 Buddhapālita quoted in MV, p. 14: na svata utpadyante bhāvāh, tadutpādavaiyarthyad atiprasangadoșāc ca. na hi svātmanā vidyamānānām padārthānām punarutpade prayojanam asti. atha sann api jāyeta na kadācin na jãy eta.

108 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 6

the non-origination doctrine of the Advayavadins can be approved.

Having thus' introduced his readers to the subject he has to deal, the author now proceeds in the following kārikās to offer his arguments as to how the doctrine of jati cannot be justified. He says:

6

ajātasyaiva dharmasya jatim icchanti vādinaḥ ajāto hy amrto dharmo martyatām katham esyati |1

'Disputants are of opinion that there is birth only of that thing (lit. 'element of existence') which is unborn. But how is it that the thing which is unborn and (consequently) immortal should become mortal?'2 It means that the teachers of both the classes referred to in kārika 3 are agreed upon the point that birth is possible of what is unborn; for what is already born does not take birth again, and so it is useless to think of the birth of such a thing. Our author says that the birth of an unborn one cannot be justified, and he offers the following arguments: It is accepted on all hands that what has no birth (ajata) has also no death (amrta). Now when you say that birth is of an unborn one, you have necessarily to admit that it has death; and so it follows that you also admit the death of an immortal

I The kārikas 6, 7, and 8 of this Book are identical with the kārikās 20, 21 and 22 of the Book IlI respectively excepting only this that in karikas III. 20 and 22 there is the word bhava, while in IV. 6 and 8 the reading is dharma. For the words jata and ajata see MK, XX. 12-14. ' According to S the second half of the karika ('But how is it that the thing which is unborn and immortal should become mortal') means, in fact, that how it should take birth in reality. He writes: svabhavenamrto bhavo martyatām gacchati paramarthato jayate. III. 22.

IV.7]. ĀGAMASĀSTRA 109

one. Now an unborn one is by its own nature immortal. And this death of the immortal one is utterly absurd.

The author continues in support of his above statement:

7

na bhavaty amrtam martyam na martyam amrtam tathā ! prakrter anyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhavisyati 1

'The immortal does not become mortal and a mortal one does not also become immortal; for the change of nature can in no way be possible.' The second half of the karika is repeated in karika IV. 29, and seems to have mostly been taken here from Nagarjuna's MK, XV. 8, which runs as follows:

yady astitvam prakṛtyā syān na bhaved asya nāstitā l prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate l2

The author having shown here that nature does in no way change says in the next kärika that if a thing which in its own nature is unborn (ajāta) and hence regarded as immortal (amrta) comes into being (jayate) and thus becomes mortal (martya), then owing to this very fact it cannot remain changeless. The point is that which is unborn or immortal by its own nature should remain always so. But if you say that the unborn takes

1 See III, 21, and the note 1 on IV. 6. 2 The following may also be quoted here from the same work: prakrtau kasya cāsatyām anyathātvam bhavisyati | prakrtau kasya ca satyām anyathātvam bhavisyati || XV. 9. kasya syād anyathabhavah svabhāvas cen na vidyate | kasya syādanyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvo yadi vidyate || XIII. 4. kaķ svabhāvam prahāsyati | XXIII. 24. svarūpasyānyathabhāvāsambhavāt. Candrakīrtti on CŠ, VIII. 4 (179)a

110 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV.8

birth, or the immortal becomes mortal, evidently it undergoes a change. But no change of nature is possible. The karika runs :

8

svabhāvenāmțto yasya dharmo gacchati martyatām ! kṛtakenāmītas tasya katham sthāsyati niścalaḥ [11

'How can he, accoding to whom a thing which is naturally immortal becomes mortal2, maintain that an immortal thing, when it becomes artificial3, will remain changeless?' The following may here be quoted from Nagarjuna's MK, XV. 1-2 in which one should note the word krtaka:4

na sambhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktah pratyayahetubhiḥ i hetupratyayasambhütah svabhāvah krtako bhavet il svabhāvaḥ krtako nāma bhavisyati punaḥ kathaņ 1 akṛtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapeksaḥ paratra ca l

1 See III. 22. 2 That is, takes birth. See note 2 on IV. 6. 3 The word krtaka in the karika (al is to be explained faking it as noun, i.e., krtakatva, just as the word anadi in IV. 14 is evidently for anāditva. Anandagiri lends his support writing (III. 22) krtakeneti. krtakatvasya, yat kıtakam tad anityam iti.° Cf. Sayana who explains manasaspati (TA, VII. 6) as °patitva. 4 It ssems that our author had these karikas of Nagarjuna in his mind while writing his own and so he has unconsciously written krtaka instead of krtakatva as is required.

IV. 91 ĀGAMASĀSTRA 111

In order to explain as to how nature (prakrti or svabhava) cannot change Gaudapada proceeds to define it in the next kārikā:

9

sāņsiddhikī svābhāvikī sahajāpy akrtā ca yā l prakṛtiḥ seti vijñeyā svabhāvaņ na jahāti yā ll

'That is to be known nature (prakrti) which is self-existent,1 natural, innate, not artificial and one that does not give up its own being.' As regards svabhava Candrakirtti explains it follow- ing Nägārjuna in his MV, pp. 264-265, that it is nothing but always non-origination (sarvadanutpada eva). He says that by svabhava we are to understand that which is independent of other (paranirapeksa) and as such not artificial (akrtrima), and thus having no existence before it does not come into being (not abhutva bhavah). Therefore the svabhava of fire is nothing but its non-origination (anutpada), and not its heat, because it depends on its cause and conditions, and comes into being after having no existence at first2.

1 The word samsiddhika may also mean that which comes into being simultaneously (saha-utpanna) as illustrated by Gaudapada and Mathara (Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 296) in their commentaries on SK, XLIII of Isvarakışna: tatra sāmsiddhika yathā bhagavatah kapilasyādisarge utpadya- manasya catvaro bhavah sahotpannah. The explanation of S is as follows: samyak siddhih samsiddhis tatra bhavā sāmsiddhikī. yathā yoginām animādya- isvaryaprāptih prakītih sā." 2 MV, p. 265: sarvadānutpāda eva hy agnyādīnām paranīrapeksatvād akrtrimatvāt svabhāva ity ucyate.

112 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 10-11

Now having shown that there is no origination of anything the author proceeds to say in the next karika that there is also neither decay nor passing away :

10

jarāmarananirmuktāh sarve dharmāh svabhāvataḥ !

jarāmaraņam icchantaś cyavante tanmanīsayā l

All things are by nature free from 'old age' (decay) and 'death' (passing away), So the persons who believe in 'old age' and 'death' are reborn owing to their that very thought.' That there can be neither jarā nor marana is very elaborately established by Nagarjuna in his MK, XI. 3 ff. from which we cull the following two couplets ( 3 and 4): pūrvam jātir yadi bhavej jarāmaraņam uttaram 1 nirjarāmaraņā jātir bhavej jāyeta cāmrtah !! paścāj jātir yadi bhavej jarāmaraņam āditaḥ i ahetukam ajātasya syāj jarāmaraņam katham il For further details readers are referred to the original text of Nagarjuna with MV. The author attacks the doctrine of jati from different points of view and refutes it in the following way referring first to the followers of the Samkhya system who hold the theory of actual existence of an effect in its cause (satkāryavāda).1

11

kāranam yasya vai kāryam kāraņam tasya jâyate i jāyamānam katham ajam bhinnam nityam katham ca tat l

'(It is to be admitted by him) according to whom the cause itself is the effect, that it is the cause that takes birth (i.e., is Sce notes on IV. 3 and SK, IX.

IV. 11] ĀGAMAŚÃSTRA 113

produced). And in that case how is it that the thing which takes birth and is thus different (from the effect) can be regarded as unborn (aja) and how it can be permanent ?'1

In the Sankhya system prakrti or pradhana is held to be the first or original cause (mūla karana). It is 'unborn' (aja) and permanent (nitya). From it other things are gradually produced. This view is criticized in this and the following karikas by our author.

1 The point is that there must be some difference between that which is produced and that which is not produced (jayamana and aja). S explains the word bhinna in a different way saying that it means 'rent asunder', 'divided into parts' or 'opened' (vidīrņa, sphuțita) implying thereby 'subject to some change.' And that which admits of any kind of change cannot be permanent.

The identity of cause and effect may be viewed from two different points, viz., the cause is not other than the effect (karyabhinnam karanam), or the effect is not other than the cause (käranabhinnam karyam). But in neither case can the Samkhya system be defended, The object of the first viewpoint is shown in the present karika which says : If the cause is not different from the effect then it is to be admitted that it is the cause (and not the effect) that 'takes birth' (jayate) and thus, if you accept it, the cause cannot be regarded as 'unborn' (aja), as you hold it to be.

Now, in order to avoid this difficulty one may follow the - second point of view saying that the effect being not different from the cause the former is as aja as the latter ; and thus one cannot say that the cause is not aja. The author, however, says in the next kārika that this argument, too, cannot be accepted : 1201B-15

114 ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA [IV. 12-13

12

kāraņād yad1 ananyatvam ataḥ kāryam ajam yadi l jāyamānād dhi vai kāryāt kāraņam te katham dhruvam l

'If you hold that the effect is also 'unborn' (aja), for there is no difference of it from the cause (which is aja), then, how is it, in your opinion, that the cause is permanent when the effect is produced ?' 2

1 The reading should be here yad and not yadi as discussed elsewhere. 2 Ś explains c saying that how it is that the cause being not different from the effect, that is, being produced, can be permanent: jayamānād dhi vai kāryāt kāranam ananyan nityam dhruvam ca.

The author offers further grounds :

13

ajād vai jāyate yasya drstāntas tasya nāsti vai | jātāc ca jāyamānasya na-vyavasthā prasajyate I

'There is no illustration (to give) for him who holds that a thing is produced from what is unborn1. (On the other hand, if it is maintained that) a thing is born from what is born, then there follows no finality, it leads to an endless series of causes (anavastha).'

Here in the text in d na is to be taken with vyavasthā (as na-vyavasthā = avyavasthā = anavastha) and not with prasajyate. Ś explains: na vyavasthā prasajyate anavasthānam syad ity arthaḥ. The second half of the kārika means that if A is pro- duced from B which you take as produced (jāta), by the very fact that it is produced it must have been produced

1 That is, existing from all eternity.

IV. 13-14] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 115

from one C, and C, too, in the same way must have been produced from one D, and so on. Thus it is impossible to ascertain the ultimate cause of a thing.2

2 Cf. Candrakīrtti (MV, p. 15): na ca vidyamānasya punar utpattau prayojanam pasyamah, anavasthām ca pasyamah; AKV (quoted in MV, p. 13): utpannasya punar utpattau kalpyamanayam anavasthaprasangah; MA (quoted in MV, p. 13): jātasya janma punar eva ca naiva juktam; ŚS, p. 262 (from ASP): kim punar ayusman subhūte utpanno dharma utpatsyata utānutpannah. subhūtir aha. naham ayusman sāriputra utpannasya dharmasyotpattim icchāmi na cānutpannasyeti. CS, 260: sambhavaḥ kriyate yasya prāk so'stīti na yujyate | sato yadi bhavej janma jatasyapi bhaved bhavah !|

In support of this ajativada the author offers further arguments :

14

hetor adih phalam yeșām adir hetuh phalasya ca l hetoh phalasya canādih katham tair upavarņyate I

'How can those who hold that the antecedent of a cause is its effect and the antecedent of an effect is its cause, describe that there is no beginning of the cause and the effect?'

In c anādi means 'absence of beginning' (ader abhāvah). Š explains it by anaditva. Cf. krtaka in IV. 8c. Let us take here an example (IV. 20). As regards a seed (bija) and its sprout (ankura) it is said that they have no beginning, for it cannot be ascertained as to whether the seed was first and then the sprout, or the sprout was first and then the seed, each of them being dependent on the other for

116 ÄGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 14-15

their existence. Yet, they say that the antecedent of the sprout is the seed and that of the seed is sprout. This cannot be justified.

The point is further dealt with in the following karikas :

15

hetor adih phalam yeșām ādir hetuḥ phalasya ca l tathā janma bhavet teşām putrāj janma pitur yathā #

' To those who maintain that the antecedent of a cause is its effect and the antecedent of an effect is its cause, the production of a thing would be just after the manner of the birth of a father from the son.'

The point is that if it is held that the antecedent of a cause is its effect and vice-versa, then it would follow from it that as a cause produces its effect, so an effect, too, produces its cause ; and if one accepts it one would also accept that a son begets his father. But it is absurd.

Cj. Nagarjuna in his ViV, 50: pitra yady utpādynh putro yadi tena caiva putreņn | utpādyaļ sa yadi pita vada tatrotpādayati knh kam lļ Here in the second half yadi, though supported by the Tibetan text, seems to be redundant. See NS, II. 1. 41, IV. 1. 39; BA, IX. 114: pitā cen na vinā putrat kutaļ putrasya sambhavaļ ) . putrabhave pita nasti tathasattvam tayor dvayob lI

As regards the relationship between hetu 'cause' and phala 'effect' see MK, XX. specially XX. 20 : ekatve phalahetvoh syād aikyam janakajanyayo | prthaktve phalahetoh syāt tulyo hetur ahetunā ||

IV. 15-16] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 117

MV writes here: na cānayor ekatvam pitāputrayoś cakșuś- cakşurvijnānayor bījankurayoś ca aikyaprasangāt.

The next kärika says that there must be an order (krama) of a cause and its effect as to whether the cause or the effect precedes, otherwise there cannot be any relationship between them, and consequently nothing can be produced :

16

sambhave hetuphalayor eşitavyaḥ kramas tvayā I yugapat sambhave yasmad asambandho vișānavat !!

'As regards production (sambhava, i.e., jati) you must determine an order of the cause and the effect; for, if they are simultaneous they cannot be related ( to each other ), as the horns ( of an animal ).'

This argument is found in Buddhist works as shown below. As regards the production of an effect by its cause only three orders are possible, and not more. For, it may be said that first there is the cause and then the effect (pürva-krama 'prior order'); or it may may be said that first there is the effect and then the cause (apara-krama ' posterior order'); or, again, it may be said that the cause and the effect are simultaneous (sahakrama 'the order of simultaneity '). But it is clearly shown that none of' them can be justified. Says Nāgārjuna, MK, XI. 2: tasmān natropapadyante pūrvaparasahakramāh | 1

1 Candrakirtti introduces it (MV) saying: ata eva samsarabhavaj jarāmaraņād īnāņ pūrvāparasahakramā api na santītyāha. The following may be quoted here from MK, XI. 3-5: pūrvaņ jātir yadi bhavej jarāmaraņam uttaram | nirjarāmaraņā jātir bhavej jayeta cāmrtah | paścāj jātir yadi bhavej jaramaranam aditah | ahetukam ajātasya syāj jarāmaraņam katham || na jarāmaraņenaiva jātiś ca saha yujyate | mriyeta jayamanaś ca syāc cahetukatobhayoh !

118 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 16

Op. cit. XI. 6 :

yatra na prabhavantyete pūrvāparasahakramāh |

For details the reader is referred to the whole of the chapters XI and XII.

In the karika under discussion Gaudapāda referring to the krama of cause and effect refutes their simultaneity saying exactly what is said by Nagārjuna (MK, XX. 7) and his commentator Candrakīrtti:

phalam sahaiva sāmagryā yadi prādurbhavet punaḥ | ekakālau prasajyete janako yaś ca jāyate |ļ

'Should an effect come into existence just with its cause in its entirety then that which produces and that which is produced become simultaneous.'

Here Candrakīrtti adds: na caikakālayoḥ savyetara- govisāņayor janyajanakatvaņ drstaņ vāmadaksiņakarayoś caranayor va. 'But it is not seen that between two simultaneous things there is any such relation as between the producer (janaka) and the produced (janya), just like between the right and left hands or feet.' 2

This order of cause and effect has again been referred to later on (IV. 19) by the word kramakopa 'incompatibility of order.' 3

2 Sometimes the female breasts are cited as example in such cases. 3 See Candrakīrtti (MV, XI. 7-8): tatra yadi pūrvam kāraņam paścāt kāryam syād akāryakam kāranam nirhetukam syāt. atha pūrvam kāryam paścāt kāraņam evam api kāranāt pürvam kāryam nirhetukam eva syāt. atha yugapat karyakāraņe syatām evam ubhayam apy a[hetu]kam syāt.

IV. 16-17] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 119

Now, according to these three orders (krama) of cause and effect there may be three propositions respectively, viz., (i) the cause produces its effect, (ii) the effect produces its cause; and (iii) the cause and its effect produce each other.1 Of these three propositions the second2 is taken up in the following karikā :

17

phalād utpadyamānah san na te hetuh prasidhyati I aprasiddhah katham hetuh phalam utpādayisyati 2

-. 'Your cause coming into being from the effect cannot come into existence ; how will, therefore, the cause that has not come into existence produce the effect ?'

The argument of our author seems to have been based on what Nāgārjuna has said (MK, X. 10):

yo 'pekşya sidhyate bhāvas tam evāpekşya sidhyati | 'yadi yo 'pekşitavyah sa sidhyatām kam apeksya kaḥ l|

1 See here Nāgārjuna with Candrakīrtti, MK, XX. 5-7, and specially the following line (MV, p. 395, 1l. 5-6): yady evam phalasya hetor utpattau dosa evam sati sahotpannaiva sāmagrī phalasya janikāstu tad yathā pradīpaprabhāyāh.

2 It appears that a karika dealing with the first proposition is now lost between karikas 16 and 17. For, as the second and third propositions are discussed (IV. 17, 18), one may naturally expect to have the discussion also of the first proposition, but it is not to be found. Can we think that the author himself has omitted it?

120 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 17-18

Candrakīrtti explains it thus (MV, p. 208) :

tatra yadi yo 'gnyākhyo bhāvo yam indhanākhyam bhavam apeksya sidhyati, indhanākhyaś ca bhāvo yo 'gninātmasiddhya- rtham apekşitavyah, sa yadi tam evāgnyākhyam padārtham apekşya sidhyati, kathyatām idānīm sidhyatām kam apeksya ka iti. yadā cāgnyabhāve satīndhanasya siddhir peva nāsti tadā- kāraņasyendhanasyābhāvāt kutas taddhetuko 'gniḥ prasetsyati.

It says that if the fire is effected having regard to its fuel and the fuel is effected having regard to the fire, neither of them can be effected. See also the next kārikā (MK, X. 11):

yo 'pekşya sidhyate bhāva so 'siddho 'pekşate katham | athāpy apekșate siddhas tv apekșāsya na yujyate |

Mark here the use of the root sidh with or without the prefix pra- by Gaudapāda, Nāgarjuna and Candrakīrtti.

This point is further discussed in the following karikā :

18

yadi hetoh phalat siddhih phalasiddhis ca hetutaḥ 1 katarat pūrvam utpannam yasya siddhir apekșayā ll

'If the coming into being of the cause is from the effect and that of the effect is from the cause, which (of the two) has first come into being,-the coming into being of which is dependent?'

Read here the following quoted from N agarjuna's MK, X. 8 :

yadīndhanam apeksyāgnir apeksyāgniņ yadīndhanam | katarat pūrvanişpannam yadapekşyāgnir indhanam l/

IV. 18-19] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 121

MV (p. 207) runs here as follows :

asyendhanasyāyam agnir dahakah kartety evam yadīndhanam apekşyagnir vyavasthāpyate, asyägner idam indhanam karmety- evam agnim apekşya yadīndhanam, tat katarad anayoḥ pūrva- nispannaņ. kim indhanam yad apeksyagnih syat, utāgnir yam apekşyendhanaņ syat.

Mark the wording of c in both the karikas quoted above.1

1 See Poussin: JRAS, 1913, p. 139

The author proceeds to show very clearly in the next kārika as to how the Buddhas have explained the theory of ajati 'non-origination':

19

aśaktir aparijñānam kramakopo 'tha vā punaḥ i evam hi sarvathā buddhair ajātiḥ paridīpitā l

'As there is absence of capability, or complete ignorance, or, again, incompatibility of orders, the Buddhas elucidated (the theory of) absolute non-origination (ajati)'.

Against the theory of jati there are given three reasons in the present kārikā, viz., (i) aśakti 'absence of capability', (ii) aparijñāna 'complete ignorance', and (iii) kramakopa 'incom- patibility of orders'. Of these three the third, i.e., kramakopa has already been discussed in karika 16.1 But what do the other two terms asakti and aparijnana signify? The answer will be found in Buddhist works. In regard to aśakti it

1 On this as well as on asakti lasamarthya) one may be referred to the ksanabhanga-vada in the Buddhist section of the SDS. 1201B-16

122 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 19

refers to IV. 3 where two classes of teachers are mentioned, one holding satkāryavāda and the other asatkaryavāda. It has already been shown (IV. 4) that the Buddhists subscribe to neither of these two views. Nāgārjuna says (MK, I. 6), as has once already been quoted :

naivāsato naiva sataḥ pratyayo 'rthasya yujyate | asataḥ pratyayaḥ kasya sataś ca pratyayena kim ||

It says that one cannot be a cause of either an existent or a non-existent thing, for, how is it that there is a cause of a thing which is not in existence? And what is the use of a cause of that which is already existent? The opponent may say here: Well, when we speak of the cause of a non-existent thing we thereby mean to say that the cause is of a future thing. Candrakirtti replies (MV. on MK, I. 6) to it by quoting the following half of a verse in his MA (VI. 58) which is now available only in its Tibetan version edited by Poussin in BB (IX) :

bhavisyatā ced vyavahāra iștaḥ śaktim vinā nāsti hi bhāvitāsya | 2

It means that if you want to say that the cause is of a future thing, then owing to the want of energy that thing cannot come into being.

2 In Tibetan gal. te. hbyun. bar. hgyur. bas. besnad. hdod. na ! nus. pa. med. par. hdi.yi. hbyun. hgyur. med | The other half of the verse in Tibetan runs: phan. tshun. don. la. brten. pahi. grub. pa. ni | grub. min. ñid. ces. dam. pa. rnams. kyis. gsuns

It may be translated into Sanskrit as follows: parasparārthāśrayiņī ca siddhiḥ | siddhir bhaven neti hi sadbhir uktam||

IV. 191 ĀGAMASĀSTRA 123

The point here is this that in the coming into being of any- thing there must be some sakti 'energy', otherwise everything is possible from everything, or nothing is possible from anything. But the existence of such a sakti cannot be established. For, as discussed by Candrakirtti in his MA, VI. 57, it cannot be said that the sakti belongs to a thing 'that has come into being (jata), or to one that has not yet come into being (ajata). 3

I think this asakti is referred to here by Ga udapad a in his present kārika.

Now aparijñona in the kārikā seems to me to be nothing but pūrvaparāparijñana 'absolute ignorance of the first and last (points)' in kārika IV.21. And this pūrvaparāparijñana is in reality pūrvāparakoți-aparijnāna, that is, absolute ignorance of the first and last points, i.e., the beginning and the end of the world as well as anything in it. To this theme a whole chapter (XI) is devoted in the MK, owing to which it is called pūrvāparakoti- parīksa ' the Examination of the First and the Last Points.' Let here be quoted the first karika of it (XI. I) :

pūrvā prajñāyate koțir nety uvāca mahāmunih | saņsāro 'navarāgro hi nāsyādir nāpi paścimam (|

' The great sage said that the first point (of the world) is not known, for it is without the first and last points owing to the fact that it has neither the beginning nor the end.'

Candrakīrtti comments : koțir bhāgo deśa iti paryāyāh. pūrvā koțih pūrvo deśa ity arthaḥ. yadi hi saņsāro nāma kaścit

3 skyes. la. nus. pa. srid. pa, yod. ma. yin | ma. skyes. no. bo. lahan nus. yod. min. ni |

The Sanskrit rendering in prose may be: jate saktir na sambhavati, ajātasvabhāve' pi śaktir nāsti.

124 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV.19

syāt niyatam tasya pūrvam api syāt paścimam api ghațādīnām iva. uktam ca bhagavatā anavarāgro hi bhiksavo jātijarā- maraņasamsāra iti.4 tasmān nasti samsāraḥ pūrvāparakoļya- nupalambhād alatacakravad iti sthitam.

It is to be noted here that pūrvāparakotyaparijnāna (or °kotyanupalambha) is not only of the world, but also of every- thing. So says Nāgārjuna (MK. XI. 8):

pūrvā na vidyate koțiḥ samsārasya na kevalam | sarveșām api bhāvānām pūrvā koțir na vidyate||

'It is not only of the world, but also of every thing that there is no existence of the first point.'

Nāgārjuna proceeds to say (MK, XI. 2) :

naivāgram nāvaram yasya tasya madhyam kuto bhavet |

' How is it that that which has no beginning nor the end should have the middle? ' And the very thing is said also by our author (II, 6, IV. 31) :

ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne 'pi tat tathā | 5

' That which is not in the beginning, nor in the end, is so® also in the present.'

See IV, 31

4 See DA, p. 197, 1. 5; SN, Vol. Il, pp. 178, 193, Vol. III, pp. 149, 151, MP. I1. 3. 2 (pp. 50-51); KV, I. 1. 159.

5 adavante ca yan nasti madhye 'pi tat tathā. Nayopadesa, 14. jassa n'atthi purā pacchā majjham tassa kuo siyā. ĀS, 4.4.1.3. It is not also in the middle, as says $ (tan madhye 'pi nāstīti).

[IV. 19-20] ÃGAMASĀSTRA 125

It has been shown before that causation (hetuphalabhāva) in cases of origination is not possible. But one may meet the objection offering the example of seed and sprout (bija and ankura). For it is evident that a sprout comes into being from a seed and a seed from a sprout. There is an endless series of it, yet the fact cannot be denied. Thus by dint of the example causation is established. The author, however, says that the example does not establish any causation, though it may appear to do so, according to you. Therefore until it is established to the satisfaction of both the parties this example cannot be cited. Thus he says :

20

bījānkurākhyo drstantah sadā sadhyasamo hi naḥ I na ca sādhyasamo hetuh siddhau sādhyasya yujyate l

'To us the illustration of a seed and its sprout is always like a thing that is yet to be proved (sadhyasama). And a reason (hetu) which is like one that is yet to be proved (sādhyasama) cannot be used for establıshing a thing in question' .

Nāgārjuna has discussed (MK, X) the point thoroughly taking the example of fire and fuel (agni-indhana) and has arrived at the conclusion that there cannot be any causation (hetuphalabhava) of anything. Let us cite here only the following few lines from this work :

yad indhanam sa ced agnir ekatvam kartṛkarmaņoḥ | anyaś ced indhanād agnir indhanād apy rte bhavet |!

nityapradīpta eva syād apradīpanahetukaḥ | punar ārambhavaiyarthyam evaņ cāk> makaḥ satil| X. 1-2.

126 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 20-21

agnīndhanābhyām vyākhyāta atmopādānayoh kramaḥ Į sarvo niravaśeseņa sārdham ghațapațādibhiķ || X. 15.

Candrakirtti says on CS, IX.8 : tasmād evam hetu- phalabhāvavyavasthābhāvād dvayam api (hetu and phala) svarūpeņa na sidhyati.1 sādhyasama hetu is one of the fallacies of a reason (hetvā- bhasa). It is an assertion identical with the point to be proved, petitio principii. See NS, I. 2. 4, 8; V. 1. 4.

The word hetu has been used here in the karika in the sense of drstanta, as says S.

1 The Sanskrit text has not yet been discovered hence it is reconstructed (see my edition) from the Tibetan version which runs: dehi. phyir. de. Itar. na. rgyu, dań. ḥbras. bu. dios. po. rnam. par. gnas, pa. med. paḥi. phyir. gñi. ga. rań. gi. no. bos. grub. pas. yod. pa. ma. yin. no || See also the kārikā and MA, p. 150.

The opponent says referring to kārika IV. 19 :

21

pūrvāparāparijñānam ajāteḥ paridīpakam I jāyamānād dhi vai dharmāt katham purvam na grhyate l

' The absolute ignorance of the first and the last (points of a thing) is elucidator of non-origination; but how is it that the first (point) is not known (of a thing) which actually comes into being ?

The word pūrvāparāparijñāna has already (IV. 19) been explained. To the question raised above the author gives his reply in the following karika actually in the words of Nagarjuna and his followers :

IV. 22] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 127

22

svato vā parato vāpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate l

sad asat sadasad vāpi na kiñcid vastu jāyate l

'Nothing is produced either from itself or from other than itself, nor is anything produced which is existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent '1

The author wants to say here that should there be a thing that originates (jayate) one may say that it has its first point (pūrva koți), i.e., the state of its becoming or being produced, but in reality there is nothing of the kind. For the first half of the kārikā see Nāgārjuna:

na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate | na svataņ parataś caiva jāyate jāyate kutaḥ ||2 MK, XXI. 13, see also XXIII. 20.

' A thing comes into being neither from itself, nor from another, nor from both, itself and another; and that being the case, how can it come into being at all ?'

na svato nāpi parato na dvabhyām nāpyahetutaḥ | utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāh kvacana kecanal| Op. cit, I. 1.

' There are nowhere and never such things as are produced either from themselves or from others, or from both, or from one that is no cause at all.'

1 Here the point 'not existent-and-non-existent (na sad-asad)' may also be added. See IV. 83. 2 Quoted in BAP, p. 339, and SS. p. 18.

128 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 22-23

For the second half of the karika the reader is referred to the following line of Nāgārjun a (MK, 1.7) : na san nāsan na sadasan dharmo nirvartate yadā | katham nirvartako hetur evam sati hi yujyate li" ' When nothing existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent, comes into being, how is it reasonable to say that a cause brings about a thing?'

3 Sce: na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpyanubhayātmakam I catușkoțivinimuktaņ tattvaņ mādhyamikā viduḥi| This couplet is attributed to Sarahapad a in SS, p. 15 and found in a book Jnanasarasamuccaya, 28. The original Sanskrit of this work is not yet found, but there is a Tibetan version (Tanjur, Mdo, Tsh; Cordir. III, p. 29). Here the authorship of the original book is attributed to Aryadeva. In Tibetan it is called Ye. śes. sñin. po. kun. las. btus. pa. The present kārikā is quoted in BAP, p. 359, and many other books both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. In this connection see IV. 83-84, and atas tattvam sadasadubhayanubhayatmaka- catuşkoțivinirmuktam ūnyam eva in SDS (Buddhism cection). Bib. Ind., 1858, p. 14.

The next kārika is a reply to those who maintain the theory of origination (jativada) on the ground of the rule of cause and effect (hetuphalavyavastha) saying that both of them are without a beginning and as such cannot come into existence :

23

hetur na jāyate 'nādiḥ phalaņ vāpi svabhāvataḥ l adir na vidyate yasya tasya jātir na vidyate [1

1 All the MSS. utilized for the Anandasram editions as well as those (not less than sixteen) collected from different provinces and examined by myself including different extant editions read 'nadch for nadih in a and hy adir for jatir in d. With these original readings the karika hardly gives any appreciable sense. What does the second half with that reading (adir na vidyate yasya tasya hy adir na vidyate) mean? With the reading jatir for hyadir suggested by me the sense is quite clear and it is in one way supported by the explanation given by the commentator, Ś, who has twisted the text with the reading hy adih saying:

IV. 23-24] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 129

A cause as well as an effect having no beginning does not naturally come into being, for that which has no beginning has no origination.' Compare BC, IX. 123 : hetor ādir na ced asti phalasyādih kuto bhavet | 'Should there be no beginning of a cause how could an effect have a beginning ?'

yasmād ādiḥ karaņam na vidyate yasya loke tasya ādiņ pūrvoktā jātir na vidyate. The reason for suggesting 'nadih for 'nadeh is this that by doing so the meaning becomes quite clear and only as such is supported by the second half of the kārikā.

24

Now, a few words are necessary to introduce the words prajñapti and samkleśa in the next kārikā. We say 'It is a tree', and by saying so we affirm the existence of the tree. We know thereby that in reality there is a thing which is called 'tree.' But some thinkers including a class of Buddhists would utterly deny the existence of such a thing. According to them there is nothing that can be called a tree. That which is known to us as a tree is nothing but a mere under- standing (samkhyā), a designation (samjña); it is only making known to others (prajnapti), that is, the practical denomination, simply a common use (vyavahāra), it is merely a name (nāman) and nothing else. And it is only on account of its having the branches, the leaves. etc., that it comes under the generally understood term of 'tree.' Similarly there is nothing in fact like a branch, a leaf, and so on, it being merely a current term, an enumeration, a designation, an expression or a distinctive mark of discourse 1

1 DS, § 1308 (see Buddhist Psychology, pp. 340-341): katame dhammā paññatti. yā tesam tesam dhammānam sankhā samañnā pañnatti voharo nāmam nāmakammam namadheyam nirutti vyanjanam abhilapo. Compare here the theory against that of what is known as Avayavivada, BA with BAP, IX. 79 seq. and ASP, p. 97. There is also a small separate treatise entitled Avayavi- 1201B-17

130 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 24

The true literal significance of the word prajñapti, 'practical denomination', is 'making known' (bhāvasadhana); or 'that by which a thing is made known' (karanasādhana), i.e., name or term. Or, again, it may mean what is made known (karmasādhana).2 In the present case the word is used in either of the first two senses. On the use of the word prajñapti in Buddhist works Kumārila's observation (TV, I. 3. 12, p. 234) is interesting: sākyādigrantheșu punar yadapi kifcit sādhuśabdābhiprāyeņāvi- naşțabuddhyā prayuktam tatrāpi prajñapti-vijnapti-paśyatā- tişthatādiprāyaprayogāt kincid evāviplutam labhyate. kim uta yāni prasiddhāpabhrasțadeśabhāsābhyo `py apabhrastatarāni bhikkhave ityevamadini. See here its Tika Nyāyasudhā. As regards samkleśa it has also a special sense in Buddhist works. It is well-known in Buddhist literature along with its opposite term vyavadāna. They mean 'impurity and purification' respectively. See BA with BAP, IX. 28. By impurity the mind (citta) becomes impure and by purification it becomes pure. This samklesa is threefold: (1) kleśa 'passion' (i.e., rāga, dveșa and moha), that can be avoided by right view (darsana) and meditation (bhāvanā); (2) karman 'act,' bad (akuśala), and good-impure (kusalāsrava); and (3) janman 'birth' (or phala 'fruit', recompense thatprojects the existence). See Vis, pp. 214 ff. Let the following be quoted here from Tk, p. 28 :

tatra kleśakarmajanmātmakas trividhaḥ samkleśaḥ.

niraharana by Pandita Asoka in the Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, Bib. Ind., pp. 78 ff. The well-known 'Chariot Simile' in the Milindapañha, pp. 27 ff. (II. 1. 1) may also be referred to here. The Avayavivada is established among others in the following works of Brahmanic authority: NS, II. 1.33 ff., PB with NK on VSt., pp. 41 ff. z ASh, § 107 paññatti pana paññāpiyattā (Skt. prajñāpyatvāt) pañāatti. paffspanato (Skt. prajnapanatah) va pafifattīti ca duvidha hoti. Thus the first is karmasadhana and the second bhavasadhana,

IV. 24] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 131

The following occurs in MSBT, pp. 34-35 :

[kleśa eva śamkleśa iti kleśa]samkleśab. evam karma- [sakleśo] janmasamkleśaḥ. kleo hi pravartamānaḥ svaparāt- manor vyābādhakatvāt samkleśah. yathoktam sūtre3 rakto hi rāgaparīta ātmavyābādhāyāpi cetayate paravyābādhāyāpi cetayata ubhayavyābādhāyāpi cetayate. evam̧ dveşamohayor api jñātavyam iti. karma janma ca saņkleśapravartanād api saņkleśaḥ.

3 This is, as pointed out by S. Yamaguchi, from AN, III. 54.

Now, the opponent having his hold on the meaning of the word prajñapti as well as samklesa well-known among, and accepted by, Vijnanavadins, who maintain that there is, in fact, only vijñana and the external word has no reality at all, proceeds to refute their views, the purpose thereof being that if the existence of external things is once established one will have to accept their jati, too.

The kārikā runs thus:

prajñapteḥ sanimittatvam anyathā dvayanāśataḥ I samkleśasyopalabdheś ca paratantrāstitā matā ll

'The practical denomination (prajñapti) has its (objective) cause (nimitta),1 for otherwise there is the disappearance of the two; (owing to this fact) as well as the experience of

1 For nimitta see IV. 25, 27, 75, 77, 78; LA, pp. 225-226 : tatra nimittam punar mahāmate jac caksurvijnānasyābhāsām āgacchati rūpasamjnakam, evaņ śrotraghrāņajihvākāyamanovijñānānām sabdagandharasasprastavyadharma- samjñakam, etam nimittam iti vadāmi; p. 228: tatra mahāmate nimittam yat saņsthanāktivisesākārarūpādilaksaņam drśyate tan nimittam.

132 ĀGAMASĀSTRA LIV. 24

impurities (samklesa-upalabdhi) (their) existence is regarded as dependent (paratantra).2'

It says that it must be admitted that prañnapti must have its nimitta ; i.e., the objective cause ; for otherwise there will be no notion of the (dvaya)3, i.e., grāhya and grāhaka ' the percipient and the perceptible,' in other words, the subject and the object,-a fact that cannot be denied. And, again, owing to samklesa-upalabdhi it is also to be admitted that there must be some things (for example, as the Buddhists would say, skandhas, dhatus, ayatanas) that are the causes of these sam- klesas. Thus the things to which the prajnapti and the sam- kleśa-upalabdhi owe their existence are external and have their origination (jati). The argument advanced here has two parts: first, owing to the existence of prajñapti the existence of its cause, too, is to be admitted; and second, as there is the experience of samklesas there must be also their cause. Both the parts of the argument are taken from Buddhist works. As regards the first let us quote here a few lines from the LA, p. 104 :

punar aparam mahāmatir āha. nanu bhagavann abhilāpa- sadbhāvāt santi sarvabhāvāh. yadi punar bhagavan bhāvā na syur abhilāpo na pravartate, pravartate ca. tasmād abhilāpasadbhāvād bhagavan santi sarvabhāvāh. bhagavān āha. asatām api mahamate bhāvānām abhilāpaḥ kriyate yad uta śaśavişāņakūrmaromabandhyāputrādīnām loke drsto4 'bhilāpaḥ. te ca mahāmate na bhāvā nabhāvā abhilapyante ca. tad yad avocas tvaņ mahāmate abhilāpasadbhāvāt santi sarvabhāvā iti sa hi vādaḥ prahīņaḥ.

For the word paratantra see IV. 24, 73, 74. For dvaya see I1. 14; III. 29, 30; IV. 24, 61, 72, 75, 79, 87. 4 The printed text reads 'drsto which is evidently wrong.

IV. 24] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 133

"Mahamati says again : 'Is it not, O Blessed One, that all beings exist, for they all have their expressions (abhilapa). If, O Blessed One, there exist no beings there cannot be their expressions. Therefore, all beings exist on account of their expressions.' Says the Blessed One : 'There are, O Mahamati, expressions also for those which are non-existent, for example, the horn of a hare, the hair of a tortoise, the son of a 'barren woman, and so on. These are O Mahamati, neither beings, nor non-beings, yet they are expressed. Therefore, O Mahamati, the theory, as you say, that owing to expressions all beings exist, is lost.' " 5

The following couplet from the same work (LA. p. 105) supplies the gist of the above :

ākāśaņ śasaśmgam ca bandhyayāh putra eva ca | asanto hy abhilapyante tatha bhavesu kalpanā l

It is quoted in MV, p. 528, where occurs the following :

tatrāpi bhavakalpanapratişedhamātram nābhāvakalpanā bhavatvasiddher eveti vijneyam. bandhyaputra iti sabdamātram evaitat. nāsyārtha upalabhyate yasyārthasya bhavatvam abhāva- tvam va syad iti kuto 'nupalabhyamānasvabhāvasya bhāvā- bhāvakalpanā yoksyate.

The following is taken also from LA, p. 319 (X. 430):

asatsu sarvadharmesu prajñapti kriyate mayā | abhilapo vyavahāras ca bālānām tattvavarjitaḥ lI

It is to be noted that abhilapa and prajnapti are synonymous with each other. See DSn, § 1308, quoted above, p. 129.

5 See III. 37 : sarvabhilāpavigatah.

134 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 24

Now, as regards the second part we should like to quote a few lines also from a Buddhist work. Candrakirtti introduces the sixth chapter of the MK thus (MV, p. 137) : atrāha. vidyata eva skandha [yatana] dhatavaḥ. kutaļ. tadāśrayasamklesopalabdheḥ. iha yan nāsti na tadā[śraya]sam- kleśopalabdhir asti bandhyāduhitur iva bandhyāsūnoh. santi ca rāgadayaḥ klesāh saņkleśanibandhanam. 'Here (the opponent) says: "Verily there are the skandhas,6 ayatanas,7 and dhatus8. Why? Because there is experience of samklesas arising from them ; and because, on the other hand, there is no experience of samklesas arising from that which has no existence, as of a barren woman's daughter from a barren woman's son."' And there are attachment and other passions, the cause of samkleśa.

With regard to prajnäpti the following may also be quoted in this connexion :

prajñaptir nāmamātreyaņ' lakșmaņena na vidyate | LA, X. 23 (p. 267).

prajñaptimātram tribhavam nāsti vastu svabhāvataḥ | prajñaptiņ vastubhāvena kalpayisyanti tārkikāḥl| Op. cit, X. 86 (p. 275).

Now the author proceeds to give his reply to the above prima facie case :

5 Five: rūpa, vedanā, saņjñā, saņskāra, and vijñāna. 7 Twelve: six organs of sense and their objects, viz., six internal: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind; and six external : form, sound, odour, taste, contact and ideas. 8 Eighteen: six organs of sense, their six objects, and six kinds of consciousness arising from them. 9 Calcutta ed. has prajnaptinamamatredam.

IV. 25-26] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 135

25

prajñapteḥ sanimittatvam isyate yuktidarśanāt l nimittasyānimittatvam isyate bhūtadarśanāt i

'Seeing the reason (advanccd above) one wants (to say) that the prajnapti has its nimitta ; but seeing the reality (we) want (to say) that the nimitta is no nimitta at all. '

The opponent says, as we have seen, prajnapti must have its objective cause, but the argument drawn from the real nature of things points to the conclusion that what is called by him a nimitta (cause) is in reality no nimitta at all. The reason hereof is advanced in the following kārikā :

26

cittaņ na samsprśatyartham nārthābhāsam tathaiva ca l abhūto hi yataś cārtho nārthābhāsas tatah prthak #

'The mind does not touch (i.e. relate itself to) an object, nor does its appearance (arthabhasa), for the object is unreal and its appearance is not different from it. '

The mind has no contact with its object owing to the absence of the object itself. For in this theory (of the Vijñana- vadins) there is nothing but the mind (citta). Now it goes with- out saying that the mind having no contact with its object has in fact no contact also with its appearance (arthabhasa). The second half of the karika offers the reason hereof. It means that the object is unreal and it being so its appearance which depends on it is also unreal ; and thus both of them being unreal the latter is in this respect not different from the former. This being the case the mind can in no way be related either to its object or its appearance. Therefore it cannot be said,

136 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 26

as done in the first half of the preceding kārikā, that prajñapti has its nimitta. One must remember here that according to the Vijñanavadins there is no reality of external things. Let us read here the following from the MVBT, p. 10:

[°athavā cittacaitasikā rūpato dravyataś ca santīti yeșām drsțis teşām pratisedhartham uktam] abhutaparikalpo['stīti]. [tasmād] asti dravyataḥ. nāsti rūpam tadvyatiriktaņ. [nāsti] dravyata iti. kiņ kāraņaņ. yasmād dvayam tatra na vidyate. na hy abhūtaparikalpaḥ kasyacid grāhako nāpi kenacid grhyate. kiņ tarhi. grāhyagrahakatva [rahitaņ vastumātraņ. tathā hi vijnānād bahir na rūpādi grhyate svapnādivat vijnānam hi rūpādyā]bhāsam utpadyate. tasmān nirabalambanam eva svapnādāv ivānyatrāpi svabījaparipākād arthābhāsaņ vijnānam utpadyata ity eva jñeyam, grāhya[bhāve grāhako na bhavatīti grāhyābhāve grāhakābhāvo na yujyate. ato rūpam abhūtaparikalpān na prthagbhūtam]. The opponent may argue here: Well, according to you there are no external things. But you cannot deny that there is an appearance of things round us. It may be a false one in your opinion. Yet, it must have some cause. What is it? It is nothing but the contact of the mind with an object. Thus even for a false notion or impression (viparyasa) the existence of an object must be postulated. The author rejoins that it is quite true that even false impressions are possible only when there is a contact of the mind with an object, but when that contact itself is never and in no way possible there is no possibility also of them. How to explain, then, the false impressions? He would reply that it is the nature of the mind itself that even in the absence of any object it transforms into various objects under the influence of vasanas. For it is the seed of all (sarvabīja) having possessed the power of producing everything. Says Sthiramati (Tk, p. 36, 1. 7 on kārikā 17: sarvabījam hi vijñānam) :

tatra sarvadharmotpādanaśaktyanugamāt sarvabījam.

IV. 27-28] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 137

LA, X. 49 (p. 271) :

cittam vicitram bījākhyam khyāyate cittagocaram | khyātau kalpenti utpattiņ bālāh kalpadvaye ratāhl|

Proceeds our author :

27

nimittaņ na sadā cittam samsprśaty adhvasu trișu i animitto viparyasah katham tasya bhavisyati

'Never in the three divisions of time (i.e., the past, the present, and the future) the mind touches any cause (object), how is it then that a false impression would arise without any cause thereof ?'

See IV. 41, 77, 78; LA, X. 123 :

viparyāsasya vastutvād yad yad evopalabhyate | nihsvabhavam bhavet tad dhi sarvathāpi na vidyatell

That in the above kārikās (25-27) the doctrine of the Vijnanavadins is supported by our author is clearly admitted by Ś in the following words introducing the next kārikā (28) :

prajnapteḥ sanimittatvam ityādy etadantam vijnānavādino bauddhasya vacanam bahyarthavadipaksapratisedhaparam ācāryeņānumoditam.

Now the Acarya draws his conclusion from what is said above in this connexion :

28

tasmān na jāyate cittam cittadrśyam na jāyate I tasya paśyanti ye jātim khe vai paśyanti te padam i 1201B-18

138 ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA [IV. 28

'Hence neither the mind (citta), nor that which is cognizable by it (cittadrsya) is originated. Those who see its (i.e., of the citta and cittadrsya) origination see the (foot-) mark (of birds) in the sky. '

'Hence (tasmat)' refers to the reason advanced above in 26 and 27: because there is no contact of the mind with any object. The belief in the origination of things is as absurd as the seeing of foot-marks of birds flying in the sky.

For this simile compare DP, 93 (=TG, 92):

akāse va sakuntānam padam tassa durannayam |

This simile in our kārika can be better explained by what Buddhaghosa has said in his DPA on the above line: padam tassa durannayan'ti yathā ākāse gacchantānam sakuntānam imassiņ țhāne pādehi akkamitvā gatā idam țhānam udarena pahāritvā gatā idaņ sīsena idaņ pakkhehīti na sakkā natum evam eva" It says with reference to an Arhat that as in the case of birds flying in the sky it cannot be ascertained that they have gone away stepping on this spot with the legs and striking this spot with the wings, just so ...

A similar verse is quoted by S in IV. 91. It runs :

śakunānām ivākāse gatir naivopalabhyate | Cj. DP, 92:

ākāse va sakuntānam gati tesam durannayā |

The following is quoted by Sin his commentary on MU, III. 2.6:

sakunīnāmivākāse jale vāricarasya ca | padam yathā na drsyeta tathā jñānavatām gatiḥ li

IV. 28] ĀGAMAŠĀSTR 139

On such texts is based the following observation of S in his commentary on the BU, IV. 4. 6 (p. 637) :

ta utsahante khe' pi sākunam padam draștum.

For further details see IV. 91.

As regards the main proposition here the following lines from Aryaratnacūdaparipiccha (quoted in BAP, IX. 18, p. 392; MV, p. 62; ŚS, p. 235) deserve to be cited :

sa cittam parigaveșamāņo nādhyātmam cittaņ samanupaśyati na bahirdhā cittaņ samanuśyati.° sa cittamasamanupaśyan cittadhārām paryeșate kutaś cittasyotpattir iti. tasyevam bhavati. ālambane sati cittam utpadyate. tat kim anyad ālambanam anyac cittam. tadā dvicittatā bhavişyati. atha yadevālambanam tad eva cittam. tat katham cittena cittam samanupaśyati. na ca cittam cittam samanupaśyati. tad yathāpi nāma tayaivā- sidhārayā saivāsidhārā na sakyate chettum. na tenaivāngulya- greņa tad evāngulyagram šākyate sprastum. evam eva na tenaiva cittena tad eva cittam śakyam draștum.°

And the following is fiom KP, 149 (§102)' :

cittam hi kāśyapa parigaveşyamāņam na labhyate. yan na labhyate tan nopalabhyate. tan natītam. nanagatam, na pratyutpannam. yan nātītam nānāgatam na pratyutpannam tat tryadhvasamatikrāntam. yat tryadhvasamatikrāntam tan naivāsti naiva nāsti. yan naivāsti na nāsti tad ajātam. yad ajātam tasya nāsti svabhāvaḥ. yasya nāsti svabhāva tasya nāsty utpādaḥ. yasya nāsty utpāda tasya nāsti nirodhaḥ.° 2

1 See MV, p. 45 (KP =Ratnakūțasūtra): ŠS, p. 233; BAP, IX. 106 (p. 338). On citta see the work, pp. 142-150.

140 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 29

Having shown that the citta does not originate the Acarya comes to his main thesis, the theory 'of ajati 'non-origination.' Says he :

29

ajātam jāyate yasmād ajätiḥ prakrtis tataḥ I prakter anyathabhāvo na kathancid bhavisyati il

'As it is one unborn (ajata) that is born (jata), non-birth (ajati) is its very essence (prakrti). And there can be in no way any change of essence.'

For a see jāta eva na jāyate, BU, III. 9, 25; and ante ajātasyaiva dharmasya jatim icchanti vadinah, IIl. 20, IV. 6; and note on IV. 13. If a man is born it must be said that before his birth he was unborn, and this state of being unborn before the birth is his essence. Now, if it is accepted, and it must be accepted, as his essence, there cannot be his birth which is a change, for essence can in no way change, as essence and change are two contradictory terms. Similarly before a citta is produced it must be considered as unproduced, and that being its essence which can never change it cannot be produced at all. This law holds good wherever there is the question of jati. For the wording of the second half of the karika which is found also in III. 21 see MK. XV. 8 : prakṛter anyathābhāvo nahi jātūpapadyate.

On this point one may be referred to also : kasya syād anyathabhāvaḥ svabhāvo yadi vidyate ll tasyaiva nānyathābhāvo näpy anyasyaiva yujyate | yuvā na jīryate yasmād yasmāj jīrņo na jīryate || Op. cit., XIII. 4, 5.

IV.30] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 141

In the next kārika the author says that an advocate of the theory of jati cannot account for his two propositions : first, samsara 'continued existence'1 is without a begin- ning,2 but has an end; and the second, liberation is with a beginning, but has no end. He says :

30

anāder antavattvam ca samsārasya na setsyati | anantatā cādimato mokşasya na bhavișyati l

'It would not be established that samsāra is without a beginning, but has an end; nor would it be possible that liberation which has a beginning has no end.'

An advocate of the theory of origination has to admit that samsara has its origination; and if it is so, it must have a beginning. And that being so, the tenet that samsāra has no beginning cannot be maintained. Similarly according to him liberation also has its origination, and as such it must be with a beginning, and consequently must have an end, and in that case one cannot say that it has no end.

The point discussed in the next few kārikas is this that it is only when there is the existence of samsara that there arises the question as to whether it has or has not a beginning

1 khandhānam pațipāțī ca dhatu-āyatānāna ca | abbhocchinnam vattamanam samsāro ti pavuccati | 2 That samsara is anadi is admitted on all hands. As for Buddhists see MK, XI. 1 with its vrtti: pūrvā prajñāyate koțir nety uvāca mahāmuniķ | saņsāro 'navarāgro hi nāsyādir nāpi paścimam |

142 AGAMASASTRA [IV.31

or an end; but in fact it has no ezistence at all. Says the Acarya :

31

adav ante ca yan nasti vartamane pi tat tatha 1 vitathaih sadrtah santo 'vitatha iva laksitāh i| 1

'That which is not at the beginning, nor at the end, is not also in the present, (ie., in the middle") ;' being like the unreal things atill appear as not unreal.'

Compare here what Nagarjuna says in his MK, XI. 2: naivāgram nāvaram yasya machyam tasya kuto bhavet.

'How should that which has neither the erterior point, nor the posterior one, have the middle?'

Candrakirtti comments : agram ity adih purvam prathamam ucyate. avaram ity avasānam vyavaccheda ucyate. yasya samsarasya adir antaś ca pratisiddhah tasya madhyam kuto bhavisyati. tataś ca samjnamātrakam eva viparyāsaparavafamānasēnēm samsāra ādı- madhyavasānavirahitatvad akāśavad alātacakravad iti bhāvah

The following may also be quoted here : yassa n'atthi pura paccha majjham tassa kuo siyā : ĀS, I. 4. 4.3. adāv ante ca yan nāsti madhye'pi ca na tat tatha | Nayopadeśa, 14.

1 See Il. 6. I yad edev ante ca nasti vastu mrgetrsnikadi tan madhye'pi nartiti nifcitam loke. S on Il. 6. Cj. adev eva hi yan nasti kārapācambhavāt svay am 1 vartamtne'pi tan nāsti natas eyāt tatra kidrah | YV. 111. 11. 13.

IV. 31-32] ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA 143

na yat purastād uta yan na paścān madhye ca tan na vyapadeśamātram | bhūtam prasiddham ca pareņa yad yat tad eva tat syād iti me manīșā || BP, XI. 28. 21. That samsara has neither a beginning nor an end is fully discussed in MK with MV, XI.

Now, there are two kinds of things, one kind experienced in dream (svapna), and the other in wakefulness (jagrat); and it has been thoroughly established in Book II (Vaitathya Prakaraņa) that there is no difference between the states of dream and wakefulness, and so the things experienced in the latter are as false as those in the former. The author here puts forth the same argument in the same language with a view to show that the thing which is as false as that in one's dream cannot come into being in reality, and so the jātivada cannot stand. He says *

32

saprayojanatā teșām svapne'pi pratipadyate 1 tasmād adyantavattvena mithyaiva khalu te smrtāh Il

' That the things have some purpose in dream also is known; hence owing to their beginning and end, indeed, they are regarded as false .'

. One may object to the falsity of the phenomena of waking experience on the ground that they really serve some purpose; as for instance, water, when it is drunk, quenches one's thirst, while the phenomena in dream are not such. To this the author replies in the above karika. His point is this that the phenomena of dream are linked with one another by some purpose no less than those of waking experience. In dream also one drinks water to quench one's thirst. So the

144 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 32-34

phenomena like those in dream having a beginning and an end have no reality at all; for that which has a beginning and an end cannot be real, as the mirage. This kārika is identical with II. 7. See the note on it for a different reading. It is said that the things seen in the waking state are false, because, as regards nature, they have no difference from those seen in dreams which are evidently false. But why the latter are so the author says in the next few kārikas as in II. 1-10:

33

sarve dharmā mrsā svapne kāyasyāntar1 nidarśanāt I samvṛte2 'smin pradeśe vai bhūtānām darśanam kutaḥ #

' All things in dream are false as they are seen within the body; for how can objects be seen in this confined space (of the body)?'

1 For a see II. 1'. 2 II. 1d, 4d

34

na yuktaņ darśanam gatvā kālasyāniyamād1 gatau I pratibuddhaś ca vai sarvas tasmin deśe na vidyate l 2

'(In dream) the seeing (of a thing at a distance) having gone (up to it) is not reasonable; for there is no fixed rule of time for the act of going (there), and no persons being awake exist in the place (where they dream themselves to be).'

1 Cf. adīrghatvāc ca kālasya, II. 2a. 2 Identical with II. 2c-d.

IV. 35-37] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 145

35

mitradyaih saha sammantrya prabuddho1 na prapadyate I grhītaņ cāpi yat kicit pratibuddho na paśyati l

'When awake, he does not find his friends and others with whom he had deliberated, nor does he see all that which he had (then in dream) grasped.'

1 With a large number of MSS. I read this for sambuddha in printed editions.

36

svapne cāvastukaḥ kayaḥ prthag anyasya darśanāt | yatha kāyas tathā sarvam cittadrśyam avastukam l

' In dream the (active) body is unreal, for (quite) a different body is seen (in the place where one dreams); and as the body so all the things which are cognizable by the mind are unreal.'

37

grahaņāj jāgaritavat taddhetu svapna ișyate i taddhetutvāc ca tasyaiva saj jāgaritam isyate l

'The experience (of dream) being like (that of) wakefulness, it (wakefulness) is considered to be the cause of dream; and that being so it is (also) considered that wakefulness is real only to him (i.e., the dreamer).'

It is a fact that cause and its effect must be of the same nature. Accordingly wakefulness and dream being the cause and the effect respectively must be of the same nature. So if a dream is false wakefulness is also false. And as a 1201B-19

146 AGAMASASTRA UJV.37.39

dream appears to be real only to the dreamer, so wakefulness, too, is real only to an ordinery unenlightened man.'

1 J think the Jogical order of the following four karikrs, viz., 38.41 should be ne follows: 39, 41, 38 and 40, For the karikse 39 and 41 with 32.37 form the tame subject of discursion, i.e., the equslity of the states of dreuin and wakefulnese, while the ktrikse 38 and 40 are meant for showing the imnpostlbility of originstion directly. The traditionsl order ie shown in the present edition by the figures in porenthesis,

38 (39)

asaj jagarite drtvā svapne pašyati tanmayah i asat svapne 'pi drstvā ca pratibuddho na pašyati į'

'In the waking state one sees an unreal thing and being absorbed in it sees it (also) in a dream. And in a dream, too, one sees an unreal thing, but docs not see it when one awakes,'

To see the unreal is common to both the states, dream and wakefulness; the only difference between them is, however as stated in the kariks itself.

1 yathaiva kemin eupinšnti seviyn pratibuddhusetuh(?) purugo na patyati | SR, IX, p. 29.

39 (41)

viparyāsād yatha jāgrad acintyān bhūtavat sprset'1 tatha svapne viparyasad dharmams tatraiva pasyati #

1 For the uee of Weprs in euch casee eee IV. 27.

IV. 39.41] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 147

'As in the waking state2 through mistake one may see unthinkable things3 as real, so in dream it is owing to mistake that one sees things only in that (state).'

2 The word jagrad is taken here in the locative sense. See III. 29 together with S's commentary thereon and on IV. 40 (41): jagraj jagarite. Cf. IV. 65 and BU, IV. 3. 14 with the comm. jagraj jagaritadese. See also IV. 61, note 3. 3 Such as rajju-sarpa ' string serpent,' etc .- S.

Having established above that a thing which are as false as that in a dream cannot come into being the author shows his conclusion of the ajativada by some other arguments:

40 (38)

utpādasyāprasiddhatvād ajam sarvam udāhrtam I na ca bhūtad abhūtasya sambhavo 'sti kathañcana l

'As origination is not established all are said to be without origination. There is in no way origination of the non-existent from the existent.'

The origination of the non-existent, such as the horns of a hare, etc., is in no way seen .- S. In the next karika the author says with regard to causation referred to just now that it itself is not reasonable:

41 (40)

nāsty asaddhetukam asat sad asaddhetukam tathā l sac ca saddhetukam nāsti saddhetukam asat kutah l!

'There is no non-existent arising from the non-existent, nor is there any existent arising from the non-existent; again there is no existent arising from the existent and where is the non-existent arising from the existent?'

148 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 41

Here are four points :

(i) An unreal thing cannot have an unreal cause, (ii) nor can a real thing have an unreal cause; again, (iii) a real thing cannot have a real cause, (iv) nor can an unreal thing have a real cause.

Let us read here the following from MK, XXI. 12:

(iii) na bhāvāj jāyate bhāvo (ii) bhāvo 'bhavān na jayate l (i) [nābhāvāj jāyate 'bhāvo (iv) 'bhāvo bhāvān na jayate Il ]1

This is fully explained in MV. See the following from MK:

sadbhūtah kārakaḥ karma sadbhūtam na karoty ayam I kārako napy asadbhutaḥ karmasadbhutam ihate i VIII. 1.

satā ca kriyate nāsan nāsata kriyate ca sat 1 kartrā sarve prasajyante doșās tatra ta eva hi u VIII. 8.

nāsadbhūto 'pi sadbhūtam sadasadbhūtam eva vā l karoti kārakaḥ karma pūrvoktair eva hetubhiḥ # VIII. 10.

1 These last two lines of the karika missing in Sanskrit are rightly reconstructed by Poussin from the Tibetan which runs as follows: dios. med. dios. med mi. skye, ste | dňos, med. dňos. las. mi. skyeḥo || This karika is identical with CS, 364 (XV. 14) of A r y a de v a.

Having thus refuted the jativada and established thereby the ajativada of the Buddhists the author goes on to reconcile some statements made by the Buddhas themselves, which appear to be irreconcilable with the ajativada doctrine.

IV. 41-42] AGAMASĀSTRA 149

These statements, some of which are quoted in the foot-note,1 are in support of jati. Besides, the Buddhas are found to have instructed their followers on causation, as their well- known pratityasamutpada 'dependent origination itself shows very clearly.2 It must, therefore, be admitted that the Buddhas have not denied jati altogether. The Ācārya takes up the point and gives his reply in the following two kārikās, the first of which runs thus :

42

upalambhat samacārād astivastutvavādinām l

jātis tu deśitā buddhair ajātes trasatām sadā ll

'But jati is taught by the Buddhas for those who from their perception and common practice hold that things exist (in reality) and are afraid of (the doctrine of) ajati.' These people who are intent upon the reality of things around them are of a lower order and are consequently frightened when they hear of the doctrine of ajati and nairātmya (absence of atman, i.e., svabhāva 'nature") as taught by the Buddhas.3 The Buddhas are, however,

1 PSP, p. 9: buddha bhagavanta utpannāh, p. 79: pañcendriyāņi utpatsyante, p. 91: arhantah samyak sambuddha loka utpatsyante; SN. IV, p. 14: yo bhikkhave cakkhussa uppādo țhiti abhinibbatti pātubhāvo; MV, p. 145: uktam hi bhagavatā trīņīmāni bhiksavaḥ samskrtasya saņskrtalaksaņāni. samskrtasya bhiksava utpādo'pi prajnāyate vyayo'pi sthityanyathātvam apīti. na ca avidyamanasya kharavisāņasyeva jātyādilaksaņam asti. See also AN, I, p. 162. 2 SN, IV, p. 33: cakkhuñ ca paticca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviñnānam. advitīyam sivadvāram kudrstīnām bhayankaram | vişayaḥ sarvabuddhānām iti nairātmyam ucyate || asya dharmasya namno'pi bhayam utpadyate 'satah balavān nāma ko drstah parasya na bhayankarah | CS, 288-289. On the word nairatmya Candrakirtti writes here: tatratma nama yo 'parayattasvarupah svabhavaķ [tadabhāvo nairātmyam]. Tibetan: de. med. pa. ni. bdag. med. paḥo.

150 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 42

very kind-hearted and so in order to lead them easily and gradually to the truth (tattvavatara)4 followed the disposition of their minds and preached to them of jati, though in fact there is nothing of the kind. The author himself says elsewhere (III. 15) that the creation described differently in the Upanisads with illustrations of earth, iron, sparks of fire and such other things is meant only as a means devised for making one 'descend to', i.e., realize, truth (upāyah so'vataraya). This act is called avatāranasandhi 'intention of making one descend' of the Buddha.5 It has found its expression in Buddhist works from which some passages are quoted here in the foot-note.6

4 See MV, p. 340. 5 MS, XII. 16-17: tatravatāraņābhisandhīh śrāvakesu drastavyah, śāsanāva- taranartham anuttrasaya rupadyastitvadesanat. The word sandhi is here in the sense of abhisandhi.

6 lokāvatāraņārtham ca bhāvā nathena desitāh | traso narabhyate 'drste drste 'paiti sa sarvaśah | niyamenaiva kiñcijjne tena trāso vidhīyate || CŚ, 283. Candrakirtt i on CŠ, 183: tattvāvatārasopānabhūtatvāt pravīttyupadeśo'pi kartavyaḥ. lokāvatāropāyatvāt sadasadadidesanānām. Op. cit., 196. dharmadhator asambhedad yānabhedo 'sti na prabho | yānatritayam ākhyātam tvayā sattvāvatāratah |/ NSt, 21.

nānavadharya yathartham sūnyatām kaścic chaktaḥ samsāre sangam avadhūya nirvāņasprhām utpādayitum. sa ca śūnyatārtho jagatām atīvottrāsakaratvād apriyavedananipunapuruşeņa rājnah priyabhāryāmaraņakramāvedana-sauma- nasyotpādanavat kayāpi yuktyā vidusāvatāryah. CS,a p. 514. astitvanāstyadrstipatitānām tesām uttrāsah syād iti uttrāsyamānā mahāmate d ūre bhavanti mahayānāt. LA, p. 167. etāni kāśyapa panca bhiksusatāni drstipraskandhānīmām gambhīrām dharma- desanām nāvataranti nāvagāhante nadhimucyanta uttrasyanti samtrasyanti santrāsam apadyante. KP (=Ratnakūța) in MV, pp. 337-338. -

IV. 42] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 151

As regards the different modes of teaching of the Buddhas he following couplet may be quoted :

deśanā lokanāthānām sattvāśayavaśānugā ! bhidyate bahudha loka upāyair bahubhiķ kilajl"

'The teachings of the Lords of the worlds (i.e., the Buddhas) following the disposition of the people differ in the world in many ways according to the diversity of methods.'8

That was their 'skilfulness in method (upayakausalya) by which all discrepancies in their teachings are explained.

tatra tathagato mahākāruņiko lokatrāsapadaparihārārtham vyavahāravaśād uktavān utpadyante nirudhyante ca na catra kasyacid dharmasyotpado na nirodha iti. BAP, p. 589. evam ukte bhagavan ayusmantam sāriputram etad avocat. alam sāriputra etenarthena bhasitena. tat kasya hetoh. uttrasisyati sāriputrāyam sadevako loko 'sminn arthe vyakriyamane. SP, II, p. 36. aha. yad etad uktam bhagavata samskītā dharmā utpadyante nirudhyante cety asya tathagatabhasitasya ko 'bhiprayah. aha. utpadanirodhabhinivistah kulaputra lokasamniveśah. tatra tathāgato mahākāruņiko lokasyottrāsapada- pariharārtham vyavahāravasād uktavān utpadyante nirudhyante ca. na cātra kasyacid dharmasyotpādo na nirodha iti. ŠS, p. 263. See also MN, I. 136-137 ; SR, pp. 70-71.

T Bodhicittavivarana (Tib. version) 97-98. It is quoted in the Buddhist section of SSD. See The Basic Conception of Buddhism, pp. 27ff. Sometimes there is in d of the karika punah for kila.

s See kıtvā dharmesv avasthānam tattvam desemi yoginām | tattvam pratyatmagatikam kļpyakalpena varjitam i deśemi jinaputrānam neyam bālāna deśanāh | vicitrā'hi yatha maya drsyate na ca vidyate | desanapi tatha citra desyate vyabhicarini desanā hi yad anyasya tad anyasyāpy adeśanā | āture āture yadvad bhisag dravyam prayacchati [ LA. pp. 48-49. See also Op. cit, X. 611-613 (pp. 340-341); SP, pp. 44 ff .; SS, pp. 14-15; MV, pp. 359-360, 369.372.

152 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 42-44

Now, when there is in fact no jati it is certainly no good to teach it and consequently some evil would result from such teaching. The author, however, says that in reality there would arise no evil, or if it actually does, it would be very small which can easily be overcome (by following the path of the truth):

43

ajātes trasatām tesām upalambhād viyanti ye 1 jātidosā na setsyanti doso'py alpo bhavisyati I

'Those who (being instructed of ajati) go asunder owing to the perception (of things) and are afraid of (thinking) ajāti, are not affected with the evils resulting from (the perception of) jāti ; (or if there be any evil) the evil will be a small one.'

The reality of a thing cannot be proved on the evidence of mere perception and common practice. For an elephant called up by illusion (mayahastin) cannot exist in fact though we all may see it moving or carrying men. Thus the author says that it is only on account of perception and common practice that it is said of a thing that it exists, but in reality it does not :

44

upalambhāt samācārān māyāhastī yathocyate I upalambhāt samācārad asti vastu tathocyate l

'As an elephant called up by illusion is said to exist owing to perception and common practice, so on the same grounds it is said of a thing that it exists .* J

1 For maychastin see LA, X, 126: māyāhastī yathā citram patrāņi kanakā yathā tathā drśyam nmām khyāti citte ajñānavāsite |I

IV. 44-45] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 153

TSN, 27-28 : mayākītaņ mantravaśāt khyāti hastyātmanā yathā | ākaramātram tatrāsti hastī nāsti tu sarvathā || svabhāvah kalpito hastī paratantras tadakrtiḥ | yas tatra hastyabhāvo 'sau parinișpanna isyate |

In the next kārika the author says, as a Vijñanavadin can say, that there is only vijnana (=citta) 'mind', and nothing else, yet it appears variously :

45

jātyābhāsaņ calābhāsam vastvābhāsam tathaiva ca I

ajācalam avastutvaņ vijñānam śāntam advayam #

' There is only vijñana without the two (advaya),1 which is quiescent (free from all sorts of disturbances), it has no origin (aja 'unborn'),2 it does not move (acala), nor is it an object (avastutva),3 yet it appears to have an origin (jātyābhāsa), it appears to admit movements (calabhasa), and it also appears to be an object. It is to be noted here that vijnana,4 citta and manas are synonyms. See LA. X. 459 :

cittaņ vikalpo vijnaptir mano vijñanam eva ca | ālayas tribhavaś ceșțā ete cittasya paryayāh ||

1 The word dvaya refers to grahya and grahaka 'the percipient and the perceptible' respectively. 2 But truly speaking according to the Buddhist theory it cannot be described even as aja See IV. 74. 3 Literally, one that has no quality of an object. 4 Here in the kārika under discussion the word vijnāna does not refer to Atman or Brahman of the Vedantist. The following kārika (46) using citta which alludes to vijnana in the present kārika clearly bears it out. S takes here vijnana as vijnapti, but in the next karika (IV. 46) he interprets it in the sense of atman (: evam eva yathoktam vijnānam jatyadirahitam advayam ā tmatattvaņ vijānantaḥ). 1201B-20

154 ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA [IV. 45-46

Ak. II. 34:

cittam mano'tha vijñānam ekārtham. Cf. SN, II. 94.

What follows from this discussion is shown in the next kārikā :

46

evam na jāyate cittam1 evam dharmā ajāh smrtāh l evam eva vijānanto na patanti viparyaye !2

'Thus the mind is not originated, and thus the objects3 are declared to be without origination. Those who know it in this way do not fall into error.'

1 Cj. YV, III. 13-15 : evam na jāyate kicit.

2 See IV, 58.

3 Ś takes here the word to imply atmans, but in IV. 54 to mean external things (bahyadharmah); and in IV. 58 he writes atmano 'nye ca dharmah.

This truth is profusely illustrated in the next kārikas (47-52) by the simile of a fire-brand (alata). The author says, that as the different appearances of a fire-brand in motion, such as a circle or a straight line, do not come into existence from a thing other than itself, nor do they go out to a place other than itself when it is at rest, and at the same time they do not enter into itself, even so when the mind vibrates its appearances in the form of different objects they do not come into

IV. 46-481 ĀGAMASĀSTRA 155

being from any thing other than itself, and when it does not vibrate they do not go out anywhere, nor do they enter into it:

47

rjuvakrādikābhāsam alātam spanditaņ1 yathā ! grahaņagrāhakābhāsam vijñānam spanditam tathā2 |

' As a fire-brand being moved appears to be straight, or crooked, and so on, even so the mind when it moves appears as the perceiver (i.e., subject) and the perceptible (i.e., object).'

1 Comparing and considering all the readings in karikas 47-51 in connection with the use of vijnana and the derivatives of the root spand I think in the present kārıka one may incline to read alatam spanditam and not alataspanditam, a compound word, though the former is not supported by any MS consulted by me. In either case the import of the karika is the same. 2 Cf. cittaspanditam (with the variant cittam spandati vai sarvam) in IV. 72, with vijñanam spanditam (or vijñānaspanditam) in d of the present kārikā.

48

aspandamānam ālātam anābhāsam ajam yathā 1 aspandamānaņ vijnānam anābhāsam ajam tathā l

' As a fire-brand when it does not move has no appearance (of its being straight, crooked, etc.), and is (thus) 'unborn', even so when the mind does not move it has no appearance (of any subject or object), and is (thus) 'unborn.'

For anābhāsa in the text cf. arūpaka, III. 36. In the text alata supported by many MSS, is, according to lexicons, another form of alata.

156 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 49.51

49

alate spandamäne vai nābhāsā anyatobhuvah 1 na tato 'nyatra nispandān nālātam praviśanti te #

'The appearances in a moving fire-brand are not produced from anything other than it, and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it (the fire-brand), nor do they enter into it.'

50 na nirgatā alātāt te dravyatvābhāvayogataḥ 11 vijñāne 'pi tathaiva syur ābhāsasyāviśeșatah l

'They (i.e., the appearances) do not go out from the fire. brand, for they have no gualities of a substance (dravya), and with reference to the mind, too, they must be the same, for there is no difference in appearances.

lt is a substance, dravyd3 that can move from one place to another, but appearances are not substances, and hence they cannot move. The second half of the kārika says that as an appearance there is no difference whatsoever in the two cases, that is, the case of a fire-brand and that of the mind.

1 See IV. 52a-v.

51

vijñāne spandamāne vai nābhāsā anyatobhuvaḥ 1 na tato 'nyatra vijñānān na vijñānam viśanti te 1

' When the mind vibrates the appearances are not produced from anything other than it and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it (the mind), nor do they enter into the mind.'

IV. 52] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 157

52

na nirgatās te vijñānād dravyatvābhāvayogataḥ 1 1 kāryakāraņatābhāvād yato 'cintyāh sadaiva te l

'They do not go out from the mind, for they have no qualities of a substance, and as there is no state of cause and effect they are always unthinkable.'

All this is Buddhistic, and so are also arguments and the words as the following quotations will show : sa mahārāja tāvān abdhātur utpadyamāno na kutaścid agacchati° niruddhyamano na kvacid gacchati. Pitaputrasamāgamasūtra quoted in ŠS, pp. 247.

evam eva kulaputra teşāņ tathāgatānām kāyaparinișpattir na kutaścid daśa diśi lokād āgatā nāpi kvacid daśa diśi loke gacchati.° tad yathapi nāma kulaputra vīņāyāḥ śabda utpadyamāno na kutaścid āgacchati nirudhyamāno 'pi na kvacid gacchati na kvacit saņkrāmati.° ASP, pp. 515-516. anyato nāpi cayātam na tisthati na gacchati | māyātaķ ko viseso 'sya yan mūdhaiḥ satyataḥ kṛtam || māyayā nirmitam yacca hetubhir yac ca nirmitam | āyāti tat kutaḥ kutra yāti ceti nirūpyatām || BA, IX. 143-144. Cf. agacchaty anyato nāgnir indhane 'gnir na vidyate | MK, X. 13. atha paņditu kaś ci mārgate kuta 'yam āgatu kutra yāti vā | vidiśo diśa sarvi mārgato nāgatir nāsya gatiś ca labhyati || quoted in MV, p. 216; BAP, p. 533; ŚS, p. 240.

1 See IV. 50%-4

158 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 52-53

utpannasyāgatir nāsti niruddhasya gatis tathā | evam sati katham naiva bhavo māyopamo bhavet ||2 CŚ, 360.

2 This is reconstructed by the present author from the Tibetan text which runs : skyes. pa. la. ni. hon. ba, dan | de. bzin. hgags. la. hgro. ba. med | de. Itar. yin. na. ci. Ita. bur | srid. pa. sgyu. ma. hdra. ma. yin |l

It is shown (IV. 14-18, 52) that there is no causation (hetu- phalabhāva or kāryakāraņatābhāva). This is further explained in the following karikā :

53

dravyam dravyasya hetuh syād anyad anyasya caiva hi 1 dravyatvam anyabhāvo vā dharmāņām nopapadyate ll

'A substance can be a cause of another substance; and a thing can be the cause of a different thing only; but it is unreasonable to hold that things can have substantiality or mutual difference.'

A substance aust have three qualities, (i) origination (utpada), (ii) change (vyaya), and (iii) continuance (sthiti). But in fact there is no such thing called substance, as the Buddhists hold. See MK with MV, VII; AN, I. 152. Again, it is well- known that from one thing a different thing is produced, and not the same thing from the same thing ; for instance, from a seed there is the sprout. Thus there is a difference between a cause and its effect. But in reality this difference, too, cannot be maintained. See MK, X.1 and 15 : yad indhanam sa ced agnir ekatvam kartrkarmaņoḥ | anyaś ced indhanād agnir indhanad apy rte bhavet || agnīndhanābhyām vyākhyāta ātmopādānayoḥ kramaḥ I sarvo niravaseşeņa sārdham ghațapatādibhi I|

IV. 54-55] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 159

The author arrives at the conclusion :

54

evaņ na cittajā dharmāś cittam vāpi na dharmajam I evaņ hetuphalājātiņ praviśanti manīșiņah l

'Thus the things are not produced from the mind (citta= vijñana), nor the mind from the things. And thus the wise enter into (the doctrine of) the non-origination of cause and effect.'

Cf. IV. 46.

55

yāvad dhetuphalāveśas tāvad dhetuphalodbhavaḥ I kșīņe hetuphalāveśe nāsti hetuphalodbhavaḥ lI

'As long as there is a strong adherence to cause and effect there is the origination of cause and effect, but when the strong adherence to cause and effect is lost there is no existence of cause and effect.'

Here and in the next kārika (56) the word āveśa in the text is the same as abhinivesa (IV. 75, 79) 'strong adherence.' These are synonyms (to which graha and graha, may be added). The latter is frequently used in Buddhist works in which it is clearly shown that not only cause and effect but everything round us owes its existence to one's stong adherence to it. The following may be cited here :

tad yathāpi nāma mahārāja purusah suptah svapnāntare piśācena paritāpyamāno bhītaḥ sammoham āpadyate. sa śayita- vibuddhas tam pisācam tam ca moham anusmaret. tat kim manyase mahārāja samvidyate svapne piācah sammoho vā.

160 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 55-56

yāvad evam eva mahārāja bālo 'śrutavān prthagjanaś cakșușā rūpāņi drstvā upekşāsthānīyāny abhinivisate 'bhiniviș!ah san muhyati mūdho mohajam karmābhisamskaroti. ŚS, p. 254.

bālo mañjuśrīr aśrutavān prthagjano 'tyantaparinirvṛtān sarva- dharmān aprajānāna ātmānam param copalabhate, upalabhy [ābhinivisate abhinivistaḥ san rajyate dusyate muhyate. sa rakto duşțamūdhah san] trividham karmābhisamskaroti. MV, p. 296.

yas tu bhāvasvarūpam adhyāropya tadvigamāvigamata etā drsțīr utpādyābhiniviśate. tasyām abhiniveśo nirvāņapuragāminam panthānam viruņaddhi, samsārikeşu ca duķkheșu niyojayatīti vijñeyam. Op. cit., p. 537.

56

yavad dhetuphalāveśaḥ samsāras tāvad āyataḥ I kśīņe hetuphalāveśe saņsāro nopapadyate II

'As long as there is a strong adherence to cause and effect the world is extended, but when that strong adherence to cause and effect is lost the world is not possible.'

Thus having propounded to some extent the vijfānavāda our author proceeds incidentally to show also with the Buddhists that neither of the two theories, sasvatavada 'the theory that everything is eternal' and ucchedavada 'the theory that every thing has annihilation'1 can be maintained :

1 These two views are specially with regard to soul and world. See, for i nstance, DN, I. 13, 39; MK XXVII,

IV.57] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 161

57

samvrtyā 1 jāyate sarvam śāśvatam tena nāsti vai l svabhāvena2 hy ajam sarvam ucchedas tena nāsti vai l

'In the practical truth (samvrti) everything comes into being; hence there is nothing eternal. (On the other hand), everything is naturally without origination; hence there is no annihilation.' - It says that in the practical truth we say that a thing comes into being. In that case we cannot hold, so far as the practical truth is concerned, that there is any eternal thing. For that which has origination cannot be eternal, as an earthen jar. Again, as we have seen above, nothing has naturally any origination, and one that has no origination can have no annihilation also. It is a fact that a sprout comes out only if there is a seed and not otherwise. Now the sprout is neither identical with, nor different from the seed. When there is a sprout the seed is not completely destroyed, nor is it absolutely in the same state as before. Hence it can be said that there is neither eternality nor annihilation.3

1 See IV. 73. 2 All MSS. and editions examined by me read sadbhavena for svabhavena in c, yet I think the latter to be the actual reading. Everywhere in similar cases the author employs svabhava (III. 22, IV. 8, 10, 23, 81) and not sadbhava. In the same sense he uses also the word prakrti (III. 21, IV. 9, 29, 91, 92, 93, 94). If one accepts the reading sadbhävena the meaning will be, according to $, 'in transcendental truth' (paramarthasadbhavena-paramarthikasattaya). That the reading is svabhavena is supported also by IV. 29 in which we read ajatih prakrtih. 3 bijasya sato yathankuro na ca yo bīja sa caiva ankuro na ca anyu tato na caiva tad evam anuccheda-asaśvatadharmatā || mudrāt pratimudra drsyate mudrasamkrānti na copalabhyate | na ca tatra na caiva sānyato evam samskara 'nucchedasaśvatāh || LV, 210. 1201B-21

162 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 57

Some of the teachers hold either of these two theories, the sasvatavada 'the theory of eternality,' and ucchedavada 'the theory of annihilation.' But in the teachings of the Buddhas who maintain the Middle Path (madhyama pratipad), there is no room for any one of them. So his doctrine is said to be free from both the theories (anuccheda asasvata).4 This view of the Buddhists is too well-known to require here any particular treatment. The Buddhists also proclaim that there are two truths (satya) which they call samurti satya 'practical or empirical truth' and paramartha satya 'absolute or supreme or transcendental truth,' corresponding to vyavaharanaya and paramarthanaya of the Jainas, and vyāvaharika satya and pāramārthika satya of Ś respectively.5

sūnyata ca na cocchedaļ samsāraś ca na śāśvatam | karmano vipraņāśaś ca dharmo buddhena desitah || MK, XVII. 20. yasmāt pravartate bhavas tenocchedo na jāyate | yasmān nivartate bhāvas tena nityo na jāyate || CS, X. 25, utpadabhangarahito lokah khapuspasannibhaķ | sadasan nopalabdho 'yam prajñayā krpayā ca te i sasvatocchedavarjas ca lokah svapnasamah sada LV, X. 1-2.

4 anekārtham ananartham anucchedam asaśvatam į etat tal lokanathanam buddhanam (asanamrtam !| MK, XVIII. 11. For the ucchedavada and sasvatavada in Brahmanical literature sce Vyāsa on YS, II. 15, and MB, XII. 222 : ucchedanisthā nehāsti bhāvanithā na vidyate 1 6 evam sati ka ucchedah sāśvato va katham bhavet 1 5 5 dve satye samupaśritya buddhānām dharmadelanā | lokasamvrtisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthatah | ye 'nayor na vijānanti vibhāgam satyayor dvaych į te tattvam na vijananti gambhīram buddhatasane | vyavaharam anaśritya paramīrtho na desyate 1 paramārtham anāgamya nirvānam nadhigamyate || MK, XXIV. 8-10. duve saccāni akkhāsi sambuddho vadatam varo ! sammutim paramattham ca tatiyam nūpalabbhati || quoted by Buddhaghosa in the Atthakatha on KV, p. 30; Sumangala- vilāsini (DN: Poļthapādasutta), p. 251.

IV. 57-58] AGAMAŠASTRA 163

It may be observed here that these two truths are not specified in the Upanisads and I am inclined to think that S has accepted them in his system from the Buddhists through G a uda pada.

satya ime duvi lokavidūnām dista svayam aśrunitva paresām | samvīti yā ca tathā paramārtho satyu na sidhyati kim ca tītīyu || Pitaputrasamagama quoted in BAP, pp. 361-362.

saņvrtih paramarthaś ca satyadvayam idam matam | BA, IX. 2.

On the explanation of samurti see BAP, pp. 352 ff : samvriyata avriyate yathabhūtaparijūanam svabhavavaraņad avītaprakasanac canayeti samvrtih. avidya moho viparyas iti paryayah. MV, pp. 492-3: samantad varanam samvrtih. ajñānam hi samantāt sarvapadārthatattvācchādanāt samvrtir ity ucyate.° atha va samvrtih samketo lokavyavahāra ityarthah. sa cābhidhānābhi- dheyajnanajneyadilaksanah. loke samvrtir lokasamvrtih. See MA, VI. 28:

mohah svabhavavaraņad dhi samvītiḥ satyam tayā khyāti yad eva krtrimaņ | jagada tat samvrtisatyam ity asu munih padārthaņ krtakam ca samvītim || quoted in BAP, p. 353.

58

dharmā ya iti jāyante samvrtyā te na tattvatah 11 janma māyopamam tesām sā ca māyā na vidyate l

'The things which are said as generated are so in the empirical truth and not in fact. Their generation is like illusion, and that illusion, too, does not exist.'

The phrase 'generation is like illusion' may be explained saying that generation is like illusion, but itself is not illusion. The true sense is, however, not so. It says that generation is

1 See III. 27.

164 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 58-60

identical with illusion, there being no difference whatsoever between them (advayam advaidhīkāram).2

As regards the non-existence of illusion see yāvat pratyayasāmagrī tāvan māyāpi vartate | BC, IX. 10.

See also 27, 28.

2 See ASP, pp. 39-40 : kim punar ārya subhūte māyopamās te sattvā na te maya. subhutih° avocat. mayopamās te° sattva iti maya ca sattvās cadvayam etad advaidhīkaram iti, According to this Madhyamika theory even the Buddha and nirvana, and, if there is anything higher than nirvana, that, too, are illusion, i.c., those thing: and illusion are one and the same thing.

59

yatha māyāmayād bījāj jāyate tanmayo 'nkuraḥ I nāsau nityo na cocchedī tadvad dharmeșu yojanā i

' From an illusive seed comes forth an illusive sprout, and that (sprout) is neither eternal nor is attended with destruction. The same applies to all things.'

Cj. yathā hi krtakād bījāj jāyate tanmayo 'nkuraḥ | CS, X. 28.'

1 This is the reconstructed text from the Tibetan which runs: ji. Itar. sa, bon. byas. pa. las | myu. gu. byas, pa, skye. hgyur. ba |l

60

nājesu sarvadharmeșu śāśvatāśaśvatābhidhā j yatra varņā na vartante vivekas tatra nocyate ll

IV. 60-61] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 165.

' When all things are without generation, there is no room for the appellations 'eternal' and 'non-eternal'; for where words fail discrimination cannot be expressed.'

The following may be cited here : yasmāt pravartate bhāvas tenocchedo na jāyate | yasmān nivartate bhāvas tena nityo na jāyateļ| Cś, X1. 25.1

Now the Acarya takes up again the vijfanavada of the Buddhists showing that there is nothing but the citta which is the same as vijnana or manas 'mind' that is transformed into the external world. And in doing so he shows that there is no difference whatsoever between the experiences in the waking state and those in dream, as has already been shown.(II. 1-10) :

61

yathā svapne dvayābhāsaņ cittam calati māyayā l tathā jāgrad dvayābhāsam cittam calati māyayā i 1

' As owing to illusion the mind in dream moves with the appearance of the two (i.e., the subject and the object, or, in other words, the percipient and the perceived)2, even so owing to illusion the mind in waking. condition3 moves with the appearance of the two.'

1 This as well as the next karika is the same as III. 29 and 30 respectively with a few variants. 2 See IV. 72: grāhyagrāhakavad dvayam; IV. 75; Ś on III. 29, 30: grahyagrahakarupena dvayabhasam. In Buddhist works in such cases the word dvaya is frequently used in the same meaning. For instance, advayarthena paśyati, MS, XIV. 32; dvayagrāhavisamyuktam grāhyagrāhagrāhakagrāhavisam- yogāt, advayārthenāti agrāhyagrāhakārthena, Ibid, p. 94. See II. 14; III. 29, 30; IV. 62, 72, 75, 87. 3 The word jagrad is to be taken here in the locative case. See IV. 39, note and 62.ª

166 ĀGAMASĀSTRA İIV. 62-64

62

advayaņ ca dvayābhāsaņ cittam svapne na samśayaḥ 1 advayaņ ca dvayābhāsam cittaņ jāgran na samsayah l

'There is no doubt that in dream the mind which is without the two has the appearance of the two, even so there is no doubt that in the waking state the mind which is without the two has the appearance of the two.'1

See III. 30.

1 See IV. 61, notes.

63,64

svapnadṛk pracaran svapne diksu vai daśasu sthitān I aņdajān svedajān vāpi jīvān paśyati yān sadā ll

svapnadkcittadrśyās te na vidyante tataḥ prthak i tatha taddrsyam1 evedam svapnadkcittam isyate lI2

'The animals, oviparous or engendered by heat and moisture, which a dreamer moving in dream sees at any time in any of the ten directions, are visible (only) to the mind of the dreamer, and do not exist apart from it (i.e., mind); and this which is visible only to it (i.e., the mind) is to be accepted (lit. wished) as the mind of the dreamer.

1 See IV. 77. 2 See IV. 65, 66.

IV. 65-66] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 167

65,66

carañ jāgarite jagrad diksu vai daśasu sthitān l aņdajān svedajān vāpi jīvān paśyati yān sadā il

jāgraccitteksaņīyās te na vidyante tataḥ prthak i tathā taddrśyam evedam jāgrataś cittam ișyate |1

'The animals, oviparous or engendered by heat and moisture, which a waking one moving about in the state of wakefulness sees at any time in any of the ten directions, are visible (only) by the mind of the waking one and do not exist apart from it (i.e., the mind of the waking one); and this which is visible only to it (i.e., the mind of the waking one) is to be accepted as the mind of the waking one.'

In these four kārikas (IV. 63-66) it is said that whatever one sees in the waking state is nothing but one's citta 'mind', just as the things in one's dream. This view has repeatedly been expressed among others in LA, and specially in its Chapter X where the Buddha is reported to have said again and again that all the phenomena are citta (X. 483, 484, 692) : cittamātram vadāmy aham 'I say (all this is) only citta.' 2

The word cittadrsya here (IV. 64) and elsewhere (IV. 28, 36, 77) of which the equivalent is citteksanīya (IV. 66) is found in frequent use in LA, pp. 56 (four times), 79, 84 (twice), 93, 94, 186 (twice), 338 (twice), etc.

1 See IV. 63, 64.

2 See also X. 101: svacittābhiniveśena cittam vai sampravartate | bahirdha nasti vai drsyam ato vai cittamatrakam |i

168 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 67

67

ubhe hy anyonyadrśye te kim tad astīti cocyate l lakşaņāśūnyam ubhayam tanmatenaiva grhyate I

'You say that the cognition of both of them is dependent on each other, but you do not say what remains then. Both of them have no characteristics, yet they are cognized owing to their (previous) thought.'

In the text ubha and ubhaya refer to 'mind' (citta) and jivas or objects in general referred to in the preceding kārikās. Their cognition depends on each other; for no object is perceived without the thought of the object, nor is the thought of an object possible without the existence of the object.1 So they are interdependent in this respect. Owing to this interdependence neither of them is established as a real thing, and as such they have no characteristics and yet they are cognized owing to our previously existing thoughts of them.

The following may be quoted on this point :

atītam subhute cittam nopalabhyate. anägatam cittam nopalabhyate. pratyutpannam cittam nopalabhyate. VC, 39.

uktaņ ca lokanāthena cittam cittam na paśyati | na cchinatti yathātmānam asidhārā tathā manah lI BA, IX. 17-18.

sa cittam gaveşayamāņo nādhyātmaņ cittam samanupaśyati na bahirdhā cittam samanupaśyati na skandheșu cittam samanupaśyati. na dhātușu cittam samanupaśyati. nāyataneșu cittam samanupaśyati. sa cittam asamanupaśyamś cittadhārām paryeșate kutaś cittasyotpattir iti. ālambane sati cittam utpadyate. tat kim anyat cittam anyad alambanam. atha yad

I Ś writes : na hi ghatamatim pratyākhyāya ghato grhyate nāpi ghațam pratyakhyaya ghatamatih. tanmatenaiva taccittatayaiva.

IV. 67-68] AGAMASĀSTRA T69

evālambanam tad eva cittam. yadi tavad anyad alambanam anyac cittam tad dvicittatā bhavişyati. atha yad evālambanam tad eva cittam, tat katham cittam cittam paśyati. na hi cittam cittam samanupaśyati. tad yathā no tayevasidhārayā saivasidhārā sakyate chettum. na tenaivāngulyagreņa tad evāngulyagram sprastuņ śakyate. evam eva tenaiva cittena tad eva cittam drastum iti vistaraḥ. Āryaratnacūdasūtra quoted in BAP, pp. 392-393 ; MV, pp. 62-63 ; ŚS, p. 235.

For laksanāsunya which is the same as laksana° in meaning see the following : yad dhi cittam mahāmate na nityam nānityam na kāryam na kāraņaņ na saņskṛtam nāsamskrtam° na laksyaņ na lakșaņam° tad vānmātram° tad anutpannam yad anutpannam tad aniruddham° akaśasamam°. tatredam ucyate pramāņendriyanirmuktaņ na kāryaņ nāpi kāraņam | buddhiboddhavyarahitam laksyalaksaņavarjitam l LA, pp. 189-190.

tasmān na vidyate laksyam lakșaņaņ naiva vidyate | · lakşyalakşaņanirmukto bhāvo 'pi naiva vidyate I| MK, V. 5.

upāyadesanā mahyaņ nāham deśemi lakșaņam | bālā gıhņanti bhāvena lakșaņam laksyam eva ca || LA, X. 21.

ļakşyalakșaņavarjitam. Op. cit., X-224.

68-70

yatha svapnamayo jīvo jayate mriyate 'pi ca l' . tathā jivā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca il |201H-22

170 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 69-70

yatha māyāmayo jīvo jāyate mriyate 'pi ca 1 tathã jīvā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca li

yathā nirmitako jīvo jāyate mriyate 'pi ca l tathā jīvā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca ll

: "As a creature formed of dream, or made of illusion or supernatural power (nirmitaka1) takes birth and dies, even so all those creatures exist and do not exist.'

The word nirmita or nirmitaka in the above sense is frequently used mainly in Buddhist works. Among many others the following may be quoted here :

nirmitopamāḥ pratibimbopamāņ sarvadharmāh jñātavyāh. SR, p. 27.

acintiyān nirmita nirminotyā- deśeti dharmam bahu prāņakoținam | Ibid., p. 23.

· yathā nirmitakam sāstā nirmimītardhisampadā | nirmito nirmimītānyam sa ca nirmitakah punah ||2 tatha nirmitakākāraḥ kartā yat karma tat kṛtam | tad yatha nirmitenānyo nirmito nirmitas tathā || MK, XVII. 31-32.

ekasmim bhasamanasmim sabbe bhasanti nimmitā | ekasmim tuņhīm āsīne sabbe tuņhī bhavanti ca || DN, II. 212.

1 Ś. says nirmitako mantrausadhyadibhir abhinispāditah created by incantation , herbs, etc.' 2 Cf. Sūnyatāsaptati as quoted by Poussin in a note on MV, p. 330,

IV. 70-71] AGAMASASTRA

The following is the Sanskrit version : 'ekasya bhāșamāņasya sarve bhāșanti nirmitāh | ekasya tūşņīmbhūtasya sarve tūșnīm bhavanti ca ll Quoted as in Agama in MV, p. 331; DA, p. 166; AKV,1 p. 2 See Aryaratnakūțasūtra quoted in MV, pp. 336 f Āryagaganaganjasūtra quoted in ŚS, p. 270 ; BA, V. 57. C the nimanakaya of a Buddha. Poussin : The Three Bodi of a Buddha, JRAS, 1906, (Oct.) ; JA, 1913, pp. 581 f ERE, Vol. 9, pp. 852-853. The use of such words as nirmāna, nirmāņakāya, ar nirmanacitta occurs also in the Yoga system (YS, IV. 4, 5 wi scholiasts).

The use of the word nirmana in almost the same sen: can, however, be traced back to Upanisadic texts : ·. sa yatra prasvapity asya lokasya sarvāvato mātrām upādā svayam vihatya svayam nirmāya° prasvapiti. BU, IV. 3, 9. ya eşa suptesu jāgarti kāmam kāmam purușo nirmimāņaḥ KU, V. It appears, however, that it is the Buddhists who first use the word in that definite sense.

Now having thus established his thesis the author asser his conclusion in the following karika, which is already four once more (III. 48) :

71

na kaścij jāyate jīvaḥ1 sambhavo 'sya na vidyate I etat tad uttamam satyam2 yatra kiñcin na jāyate l

1 Cf. SR quoted in MV, p. 109 : na hi kaści jayati na ca mriyate. . 1. For the wording cf. etat tu paramam satyam, MV, p. 120.

.172 AGAMASĀSTRA İIV.71-72

'No Jiva of any kind takes birth, nor is there any possibility of it. It is that highest truth in which nothing originates.'

See III. 48.

Now it is affirmed in the next karika that the world consist- ing of the subject and the object has no reality at all, it being the creation of the movement of mind which in fact has no object at all, and as such it is held to be always free from any sort of attachment or relationship to an object (asanga) :

72

cittaspanditam evedam grāhyagrāhakavad dvayam | cittam nirvişayam nityam asangam tena kīrttitam.I

3.This duality which consists of the subject and the object (lit. the perceiver and the perceptible) is only-the vibration of the citta 'mind'. citta has no object, therefore it is said .to be always asanga 'having no attachment (or relation to an object).'

See IV. 79 (nihsanga). Cj. anābhāsa (=nirābhāsa), IlI. 46; "IV: 48. *""As'regards asanga see LA, p. 157 : asangalakșaņaņ jñānam vişayavaicitryasangalaksaņam vijñānam°, asangasvabhāvalaksaņam jñānaņ°, aprāptilaksaņam jnānam.

The following lines also from the LA may be cited here : ' - cittamātram idam sarvam dvidhā cittam pravartate | grāhyagrāhakabhāvena ātmātmīyam na vidyate ||. brahmādisthana(?)paryantam cittamātram vadāmy aham | cittamatravinirmuktam brahmadir nopalabhyate | . ' III. 121-122.

İV.72j AGAMASĀSTRA :173

cittamatram na drsyo'sti dvidha cittam hi drsyate | grahyagrahakabhavena sasvatocchedavarjitam II.

III. 65.

grāhyagrāhakabhāvena cittaņ namati dehinām drsyasya lakşaņam nāsti yathā bālair vikalpyate ||

X. 58.

taranga hy udadher yadvat pavanapratyeritāh | nįtyamānāh pravartante vyucchedaś ca na vidyate ll

alayaughas tathā nityam visayapavaneritaḥ | citrais tarangavijñanair nrtyamanah pravartate il

II. 99, 100 ; X. 56, 57.

Cj. (i) spandaspandasvabhāvam hi cinmatram iha vidyate | khe vata iva tat spandāt sollāsam sāntam anyatha ||

cittvam (?) cittam bhavitam sat spanda ity ucyate budhaih | dsyatvabhāvitam caitad aspandanam iti smrtam ||

spandāt sphurati citsargo niḥspandād brahma śāśvatam I * jīvakāraņakarmādyā citspandasyābhidhā smļtā (f

YV, III. 67.6-8.

(ii) svabhāvād vyatiriktam tu na cittasyāsti cetanam | spandād Įte yathā vāyor antaļ kim nāma cetyate ||

Op. cit., III. 66. 16.

Having shown that the duality consisting of the subject and the object is the creation of mind the author says in the next kārika that its existence is only in empirical (samurti) and -not - in. absolute. (paramartha) truth. For a thing which is

174 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV.72-73

dependent (paralantra) for its existence may exist in empirical and not in absolute truth:

73

yo 'sti kalpitasamvıtyā paramārthena nāsty asau ! paratantro1 'bhisamvrtya syan nasti paramarthataḥ i

'Whatever exists in empirical truth (samorti) which is imagined (kalpita) does not exist in absolute truth (paramärtha), for one that is dependent (paratantra, for its existence or origination) may exist (only) in empirical truth which is the cause (of existence or origination), and not in absolute truth.'

For the first half of the karika see IV. 57a and 58a-b.

1 Here the actual reading in all the editions and MSS. examined is paratantrabhi° and not paratantro'bhi° as given above. The reading in c of the next kārika (74), too, is paratantrabhi° in all of them excepting the MS. k of the Anandashram edition and the edition of Mahesacandra Pala, both of which read here paratantro'bhi°. As the sense requires and is supported by Buddhist works, as we shall presently see, the genuine reading here in the kārika (73) must be paratantro'bhi° (See the discussion in the body). Here abhisamvrti in this kārika (73) in meaning is, as appears to me, nothing but abhinişpatti samurti in karika 74. Now abhinispatti samurti means samurti which is the cause of existence, or appearance of thinge (abhinispadyate 'naya). One should therefore read paratantro'bhi° in 73 in accordance with the reading in 74. Otherwise the karikas cannot properly be explained. One can hardly ollow ·S who explains paratantrabhisamvrtya as parasastravyavaharena and paratantra- bhinispatya as parasastrasiddhim apeksya in 73 and 74 respectively. Whether one can read hi for 'bhi in c of the presant kārika may also be considered.

:. ' It follows from what is said above that a thing is to be regarded as having no origination (aja). Our author, however, says that this assertion can be made only so far as the empirical -truth is concerned, but in absolute truth even this is not possible,

IV. 73.74] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 175

for a dependent thing comes into being only in empirical truth :

74

ajaḥ kalpitasaņvītyā paramārthena nāpyajaḥ 1 paratantro'bhinispattyā samvītyā jayate tu saḥ l

'One (held) to be unborn (aja) is so in empirical truth which is imagined, but in absolute truth it is even not unborn; for that which is dependent comes into being in empirical truth, the cause of appearance.'

The words samurti and paratantra in kārikās 73. and 74 are very important and require some explanation. The first of them has, however, already been discussed above (IV. 56, 57) to some extent and the following may be added thereto. In the Madhyamika system as in the school of Vedānta samvrti satya is called also vyavahāra or vyāvahārika ('practical') satya. The two kinds of truth, samvrti, or vyavahāra or vyāvahārika and paramartha are regarded in Buddhism as the means (upaya) and the end (upeya) respectively.1

1 MA, VI. 80 quoted in BAP, p. 372 : upāyabhūtam vyavahārasatyam upeyabhūtam paramārthasatyam | See also MK, XXIV. 20 : vyavaharam anāśritya paramārtho na desyate į paramartham anagamya nirvanam nadhigamyate ||

In Pali Buddhism samvrti satya is sammuti sacca (Skt. sammati satya) 'truth by general consent'. Poussin writes (JA, 1903, Tome II, p. 302) : "vèrite conferme à l'assentiment universel mais erronè" ('truth conformed to universal assent but erroneous'). The literal meaning of the word samvrti is that by which (the true nature of a thing) is ' covered' (svabhāva-

176 AGAMASASTRA TIV.74

Daranat) and it is regarded as truth because it brings to light what is covered (aDriaprakasanal). See IV.57, and BAP on IX: 2 (p. 352). The following may be quoted here from MA, VI. 23 as cited in BAP, p. 361:

samyagmisādarsanalabdhabhāvam rūpadvayam bibhrati sarvabhāvāh | samyagdısam yo visayah sa tattvam mrsadrsam samvrtisatyam uktam |

Now as regards paratanira 'dependent' it has a 'special significance as evident from Buddhist sources. In Buddhism there are three characteristics (laksana) or natures (spabhaoa) of a thing, viz., (i) parikalpiia 'imagined', (ii) paralanira 'dependent', and (iii) parinispanna 'perfect'.1 Sometimes they are briefly called (i) kalpita, (ii) tantra, and (iii) nispanna respectively.ª Any object, for instance, an elephant, according to Madhyamikas or Yogacaras is sunya or merely a creation of mind, yet we know it as a particular object. This character- istic of it is an imagined one (parikalpita). Now the notion or imagination of the object depends for its being on its cause (or cause and conditions, heiu-pratyaya), and so the characte- ristic is called paratantra (=pratityasamulpanna). That the object is in fact always devoid of the imagined characteristics referred to above is parinispanna. It is so also because there

MVI1, LXXXVII; TE, 39; TSN, 1 : kalpitab paratantrai ca parinispenna eva ca | trayah svabhava dhiranam gambhirajneyam iryate l MVST, 1. 6: kalpitah paratantrai ca parinispanna eva ca |

LA, X. 374 : buddhya vivecyamanam hi na tar.tram nEpi kalpitam ] nispanno nesti vai bhavah katham buddhya prakalpyate

IV. 74] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 177

is perfect invariation or because it is free from any change.3 They are called 'nature' (svabhava) owing to such practice of the people though in fact they do not exist.4 V a s ubandhu gives here an example in his TSN, 27, 28: Suppose one creates an elephant by dint of one's spell. There the elephant appears, but there is only the form of the elephant, and in no way the elephant itself. Here the elephant is parikalpita; the form of the elephant is paratantra, and the absence of the elephant is parinispanna.5 Of these three laksanas or svabhavas6 the first, parikalpita, may roughly be compared in the system of the Advaita Vedanta of S

3 Tk, 40: avikāraparinispattyā sa parınișpannah ; MVBT, p. 19 : tasyā- saņskṛtatvān nirvikāratvena parinispannatvāt. 4 Writes Sthiramati in MVBT, p. 19: sa punar dravyato 'sann api vyavaharato 'stīti svabhāva ucyate.

5 māyākrtam mantravasāt khyati hastyātmanā yathā ākāramātram tatrāsti hastī nāstī tu sarvathā svabhavah kalpito hastī paratantras tadakrtih yas tatra hastyabhāvo 'sau parinispanna isyate || -Cf. MSA, XI. 19 : tadākrtiś ca tatrāsti tadbhāvaś ca na vidyate | 6 For casy reference the following may be quoted here : Tk. p. 39: yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate | parikalpita evāsau svabhāvo na sa vidyate || 20

(This is based on LA, p. 163: yat punar uktam bhagavatā yena yena vikalpena ye ye bhāvā vikalpyante na hi sa tesām svabhāvo bhavati parikalpita evasau°.) Sthiramati: adhyātmikabāhyavikalpyavastubhedena vikalpānām anantyam pradarsayann aha yenayena vikalpeneti. yad yad vastu vikalpyate." adhyātmikam bāhyam vāntaśo yāvad buddhadharmā api. parikalpita evāsau svabhāva ity atra kāraņam āha na sa vidyata iti yad vastu vikalpavişayas tad yasmāt sattvābhāvān na vidyate tasmad tad vastu parikalpitasvabhāvam eva na hetupratyayapratibaddha- svabhāvam.° palikalpitānantaram paratantrasvabhāvo vaktavya ity ata āha paratantrasvabhāvas tu vikalpah pratyayodbhavaḥ ! 1201H-23

178 ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA [IV. 74

with pratibhasika satya ' the truth that exists only in appearance'; as for example, mirage, or the appearance of a snake on a piece of string ; paratantra with vyâvahārika satya 'the practical truth' (this is called by the Buddhists samvrta 'pertaining to samvrti', or vyavahāra satya), the phenomena in the waking state are its examples ; and parinistanna with pāramārthika satya 'supreme or tanscendental truth', e.g., Brahman of the Vedāntins.7

Sthiramati : atra vikalpa iti paratantrasvabhāvam āha, pratyod- bhava ity anenāpi paratantrābhidhānapravțttinimittam āha. parair hetupratyayais tantryata utpādyata iti paratantra ity arthah. (As the sense requires the order of the last four words is slightly changed. See MVBT, p. 19: grāhyam grāhakam ca svabhāvašūnyatvād abhūtam apy astīti parikalpyata iti parikalpita ity ucyate, sa punar dravyato 'sann api vyavahārato 'stīti svabhāva ucyate. paratantraḥ paravaśo hetupratyaya- pratibaddhajanmakatvāt. p. 20: parair hetupratyayais tantryate janyate na tu svayam bhavatīti paiatantraḥ.) svato'nyahetupratyayapratibaddhā- tmalābha ity uktam bhavati. uktaḥ paratantrah. parinispannah katham ity ata aha nispannas tasya pūrvena sada rahitatā tu yā || 21 (MVBT, p. 19: kalpitena svabhāvena tasya yātyantašūnyatā | svabhāvaḥ parinispanno 'vikalpajñānagocarah il Vasubandhu says on the point, Op. cit., p. 20: grahyagrāhakl- bhavah parinispannah. In TSN, 3 sadā rahitatā of Tk. 21, aud atyantašūnyatā of MVBT referred to above are expressed by sadā 'vidyamānatā.)

Sthiramati : avikāraparinispattyā sa parinispannaļ, tasyeti para- tantrasya pūrveņeti parikalpitena. tasmin vikalpe grahyagrāhakabhavah parikalpita. tathā hi. tasmin vikalpe grāhyagrāhakatvam avidyamānam eva parikalpyata iti parikalpitam ucyate. tena grāhyagrāhakeņa paratantrasya s a dā sarvakālam atyanta rahita tā yā sā parinispannasvabhāvah. According to Buddhists nirodha, nirvana, and akafa are the examples of parinispanna.

7 For a detailed discussion and bibliography and sources, ancient and modern, see ViS, pp. 514-561; TSN; LA, pp. 126, 127, 169, 170, 176, etc .; MSA, Vi. 1, XI. 13, 38-41, XIX. 51, 78, 79; SNS, VI.

IV. 74 ĀGAMASĀSTRA 179

It is to be noted that samurti consists in parikalpita and paratantra svabhāvas and paramārtha in parinispanna. Thus it is rightly said in the kārika 73 that paratantra can exist only in practical truth (samvrti) and not in any way in absolute truth. This is fully explained by Prajñakaramati (in his BAP, pp. 354-355) saying that whatever comes into exis- tence (jäyate) does so being dependent on the entirety of the cause and conditions (hetupratyayasamagri), and that which is thus dependent for its existence has no existence in reality, like a shadow on a looking glass. Let the following be quoted here :

api tu hetupratyayasāmagrīņ pratītya māyāvad utpadyate. tadvaikalyato nirudhyate ca. hetupratyayasāmagrīm pratīlya jātasya parāyattātmalabhasya pratibimbasyeva kutaḥ satsva- bhāvatā. na ca kasyacid padārthasya paramārthato hetupratyaya- sämagrītah samutpattiḥ sambhavati.

Let us quote also the following few lines :

māyayā nirmitam yac ca hetubhir yac ca nirmitam | , āyāti tat kutaḥ kutra yāti ceti nirūpyatām || yad anyasannidhānena drstam na tadabhāvataḥ | pratibimbasame tasmin kṛtrime satyatā kutaḥ l| BA, IX. 144, 145.

yaḥ pratyayair jāyati sa hy ajāto na tasya utpādu sabhāvato'sti | yaḥ pratyayādhīnu sa šūnya ukto yah śūnyatām janati so 'pramattaḥ Il Anvavataptahradapasamkramanasūtra quoted in BAP, loc. cit. and MV, p. 239.

The subject under discussion is that nothing originates (etat tad uttamam satyam yatra kiñcin na jāyate, III. 48, IV. 71). It has been shown in establishing it that the notion of origina- tion is only in empirical reality and not in absolute reality in which we cannot assert the existence of even a thing that is without origination. The author now says in the next kārikā

180 ÁGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 75

that the notion of origination is due to a strong adherence (abhinivesa) to the unreal (abhuta) referring hereby to the two. (dvaya), i.c., the percipient and the perceptible (grāhya and (grāhaka) :

75

abhūtābhiniveśo 'sti dvayam tatra na vidyate | dvayabhāvaņ sa buddhvaiva nirnimitto na jāyate l

'There is a strong adherence to what has not been (abhūta1), for the two2 are not there. Just when he understands the non-existence of the two it goes beyond the range of its cause and does not come into being." The cause of origination is abhutabhinivesa. When one clearly understands the true nature of the two which have no existence at all that abhiniveśa goes away and consequently the notion of origination does not arise. Ś explains the word he (sah) in the original (c) in the follow- ing way : dvayābhāvaņ buddhvā nirnimitto nivṛttamitbyādvayā- bhiniveśo yah sa na jayate-'He who having understood the absence of the two is beyond the cause and (thus) whose strong adherence to the two which are false has turned back, is not born.' This explanation does not appear to be proper when one reads the karika under discussion with the kārika IV. 79, where the same phrase (dvayabhavam sa buddhvaiva, 75) occurs once more with a slight variation (vastvabhavam for dvayabhāvam), there being no difference of meaning (vastvabhāva= dvayābhava -S). Let the karika be quoted here : abhūtābhinivesād dhi sadrśe tat pravartate | vastvabhāvam sa buddhvaiva niḥsangam vinivartate l|

1 That is, 'unreal,' referring to the two (dvaya) that follows. 2 The percipient and the perceptible (grāhya-grahaka), see IV. 72. 3 See IV. 79.

IV., 75] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 181

How is it to be explained? The meaning is simple and clear. It says that it is only owing to one's persistent belief in unreality that it (citta 'mind') goes onward to a similar object (i.e., the mind relates itself to an unreal object), but as soon as one understands the absence of a thing it becomes free from contact and turns back. But here is a difficulty regarding grammar. In accordance with Panini, III. 4. 21, the agent (kartr) of both the verbs buddhva and vinivartate in the second half of the kārikā must be the same; but the fact is not so, for the agent of the former is sah, while that of the latter is tat in the first half. This anomaly is however found in writings even of such great poets as Kalidasa. He writes in his Raghuvamsa, 1.77 :

matprasūtim anārādhya prajeti tvām śasāpa sā | 1 In defence of Panini, or in other words, to meet the difficulty arising from his rule later grammarians say that such words as sthita and the like are to be understood in such cases, so that there may be the same agent of the verbs used.5 The use of the gerund in the Vedic language in this respect is not so strict as in the classical Sanskrit that follows Panini. See the following sentences in which the verbs have different agents : striyam drstaya kitavam tatāpa 'having seen

4 Mallināth a attempts to explain it away taking anāradhya in the causative sense (asevayitva). Similar instances are many : (i) yaj jñātvā neha bhūyo 'nyaj jnātavyam avaśișyate | BG, VII. 2. (ii) tac ca samsmrtya samsmrtya rūpam atyadbhutam hareh I vismayo me mahan rajan hrsyami ca muhurmuhuķ l BG, XVIII 77. (iii) mītam drstvā duḥkham bhavati, (iv) priyam drstva sukham syat, sukham utpadyate, etc. 5 See Samksiptasāra with Vitti and Țīkā ed., Šyāmācaraņa Kaviratna, Calcutta, 1318, B.S., Krdantapāda, 407; Mugdhabodha, ed., Subalacandra Mitra, Calcutta, 1316, B.S, Sūtra, 1116; Kalapavyākarana with commentaries ed. Gurunātha Vidyanidhi Bhattācāryya, Calcutta, 1835 Šaka, Krdvītti, Sūtra 433.

182 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 75

a woman (it) pains a gambler' (RV, X. 34. 11). Similar uses are found also in the Brahmanas. The following is from the Śatapatha Brāhmaņa : te paśava osadhīr jagdhvā apab pītva tata esa rasah sam bhavati 'the beasts having eaten the plants and drunk water-then the vital sap arises.'

Following this the line under discussion (IV. 79) would be explained by a grammarian thus: sa (yadā) vastvabhāvam buddhvaiva (bhavati tada) tan nihsangam vinivartate,-'just when he understands the absence of things it (mind) turns back being free from relation'. Now in the kārika (79) the word sa(h) must refer to one (understood) whose abhūtabhiniveśa is stated. In the same way, I think, the kārika 75, too, should be explained : It is the abhutabhinivesa itself and not the person whose abhütabhinivesa is alluded to, that does not arise (jayate).6

Naturally one has a persistent belief in the abhūta or unreal things, i.e., the percipient and the perceptible which have, in fact, no existence at all. So when one clearly understands their non-existence there is no room for that persistent belief to come into being. Now, as regards abhūtābhiniveśa compare abhūtaparikalpa of the Buddhists. Weread the following in the LA, pp. 149-150 : abhūtaparikalpa 'bhutaparikalpa iti bhagavann ucyate. katamasyaitad bhagavan dharmasyādhivacanau yad utābhūta- parikalpa iti kim vā prativikalpayann abhūtaparikalpo bhavati. bhagavān āha sādhu sādhu mahāmate° nmām grāhyagrāhakā- bhiniveśābhinivistānām ca° bāhyavicitrārthopalambhābhiniveśāc cittacaittakalāpo vikalpasamśabditaḥ pravartamānaḥ pravartata ātmātmīyābhiniveśāt.

€ Or one may take here nirnimitto na jayate with reference to yo 'sti kalpita* (IV. 73) and it may be explained saying that which is or originates in the empirical truth does not do so when one has no notion of the two (grahya and grahaka), there being no cause (nirnimitta) for origination.

IV. 75-76] ĀGAMAŠĀSTRA 18

The abhūtabhiniveśa in our work (IV. 75, 79) is, in fact abhuta-parikalpa of the Yogacaras. See the following line i the Madhyäntavibhanga (I. 2a-b) of Maitreyanātha:

abhūtaparikalpo 'sti dvayam tatra na vidyate | ?

From this it is perfectly clear that the first half of our kārik under discussion is in reality taken from Maitreyanätha

The word nimitta in nirnimitta 'devoid of nimitta' has. special sense in Buddhist literature. There is a very commo phrase : na nimittagrahi bhavati, Pali °ggāhī hoti, D5ņ, §: 1345-6. It means that when a nimitta 'specific appearance' of a thing is grasped in the way such as a male, a female pleasant, etc., a man is entangled in various worldly troubles and so it is advised that he should not be a nimittagrahi grasper of nimittas.' As the specific appearances are th causes of attachment, aversion, and delusion (raga, dvesa, an moha) they are called nimittas.9 See AS, p. 400.

This special meaning seems not to have been intended in th present case. We may take the word here as well as in IV. 7 and 78 in the sense of 'objective cause' which is expressed b: the word artha in IV. 24.

Having said as to how that persistent belief disappears, th author proceeds to discuss in the following karikas how th non-origination (anutpatti) of mind is effected which is to b realized:

7 MVBT, pp. 9 ff. On b of the karika Sthiramati writes: svatman avidyamānena grāhyagrāhakākāreņa prakhyāte [na vyaktam bhrāntirūpatvam]. 8 AKV as quoted in DS, p 41 : nimittam vastuno 'vasthaviseșo nīlatvādil Tr., p. 21, 1. 3: nimittam tad- (referring to vişaya) viśeso nīlapītādyālamban vyavasthākaraņam. See AS, pp. 291, 308.

9 AS, p. 400 : itthipurisanimittam vā subhanimittādikam vā kilesavatthubhūta nimittam.

184 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 76-77

76

yadā na labhate hetūn uttamadhamamadhyamān ! tadā na jāyate cittam hetvabhāve phalam kutaḥ !

'When the mind does not have any cause, superior, inferior, or middle, it does not originate; for how is there the effect in the absence of the cause?' Here hetu is nothing but nimitta in the preceding kārikā. See IV. 77-78.

77

animittasya cittasya yānutpattih samādvayā l ajātasyaiva sarvasya cittadṛśyam hi tad yataḥ

This kārika seems to have been handed down defectively. For, evidently in the first half the sentence is not complete, as the conjunctive pronoun yad (in feminine ya) requires the pronoun tad in feminine (in any case-ending), but it is not to be found in either of the two halves. Nor is there the antecedent of tad in the second half which clearly shows to have supported something stated before. But what is it? The explanation of S appears to be far-fetched and far from satisfactory, nor has he explained the word tad which has al- together been overlooked. It seems to me, therefore, that the above two lines are taken by mistake from two different kārikās of which the other two lines are lost. I leave the present kārikā, as it is before us, untranslated, as it does not give any complete sense, so far as I can understand. The first half may, however, be explained thus : The non-origination (anutpatti) of the causeless (animitta) 1 mind (citta) is the same (sama, i.e., unconditioned-always in the same condition) and free from the two (advaya, i.e.,

See IV. 75.

IV. 77-78] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 18

free from the notion of the grahya 'receptible', and the grahah 'recipient'). See kārikā IV. 80. For the word sama or sāmya see III. 2, 38 IV. 80, 93, 95, 100 with the author's explanation ; and MuU, II 1.3. cf. BG, V. 19 : nirdoşam hi samam brahma. See MV, pī 374-75 : mañjuśrīr aha. paramārthataḥ sarvadharmānutpād: samatayā parmarthataḥ sarvadharmātyantājātisamatayā par; märthata samāh sarvadharmah. For cittadrsya in the second half see III. 31, IV. 28, 36.

78

buddhvā 'nimittatām satyam hetum prthag anāpnuvat1 I vītasokam tadā 'kāmam abhayam padam aśnute l

'When one understands its2 true state of causelessness it (citta) does not have any other cause,4 and as such reache then a position 5 which is free from sorrow, desire, and fear.' I read with MS. D2 anāpnuvat for anapnuvan in editior and other MSS., construing it with citta referred to in th preceding kārika (77). It is to be noted that it is citta that referred to in kārikās IV. 76-80. In kārikā 79 the pronoun ta refers to citta, as says Ś, too, expressly. One may naturall expect to have its mention or reference also in the preser kārikā. To introduce a person who reaches the position is rathe abrupt. It is also to be considered that it is citta and not th person that is concerned with the cause or causes (IV. 76). In this case the grammatical difficulty is to be removed as i: IV. 75.

1 See the Variants. That is, of the citta 'mind.' See IV. 25, 26, 27, 75, 77. 3 That is, the state of being without the objective cause. 4 See IV. 76. 5 pada=sthiti, IV. 80. 1201B-24

186 ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA [IV. 78-80

Accepting the reading anāpnuvan the kārika may be translated thus : 'Having understood the true state of the causelessness and having no other cause one reaches then a position free from sorrow, desire and fear.'

79

abhūtābhiniveśād dhi sadṛśe tat pravartate I vastvabhavam sa buddhvaiva nihsangam vinivartate I

'Owing to a persistent belief in what is non-existent it goes onwards to a similar object, but as soon as one understands the absence of a thing it turns back being free from relativity.' The word sadrsa means what is thought to be similar to one in which one has strong or persistent belief. nihsanga means one beyond the reach of any connection with the object. For c one is referred to IV. 75. See III. 45; IV. 72, 75, 96, 99.

80

nivrttasyāpravrttasya niścala hi tadā sthitih I vişayah sa hi buddhānām tat sāmyam ajam advayam

'At that time when (the citta) has turned back from and does not go (again) onwards to (its object), its position is firm (i.e., unwavering in the least). That is the field of activity of the Buddhas,1 and that is the same,2 unborn, and free from the two.'3

1 Cf. IIl. 34: pracārah sa tu vijñeyah. 2 See III. 2, 38. See also Vch, p. 41: api tu khalu punah subhute samah sa dharmo na tatra kaścid visamah. tenocyate 'nuttarasamyaksambodhih. nirātmatvena niņsattvatvena nirjīvatvena nispudgalatvena samā sānuttarā samyaksambodhih. 3 The perceptible and the percipient (grāhya and grāhaka).

[V.80] GAMASĀSTRA 187

In c visaya may be taken in the sense of the object of knowledge. See III. 46 and IV. 77 from which it will be evident that this state is the summum bonum of both the Buddhists and the Vedantists, which they call nirodha or nirvana and brahman respectively. The Vedantist commentator, Ś, writes here very clearly that this state of mind is brahman : cittasya niścalā calanavarjitā brahmasvarūpaiva tadā sthitir yaişā brahmasvarūpa sthitis cittasyādvayavijñānaikarasaghana- lakşaņā. And again on IV. 77 he says : animittasya cittasyeti yā mokşākhyānutpattih.4 That this state of citta is the field of activity of the Buddhas is clearly said in Buddhist works :

cittamātraņ nirābhāsam vihāro buddhabhūmi ca / etad dhi bhasitam buddhair bhāșante bhāșayanti ca l LA, X. 105.

arthabhase ca vijnane jnanam tathatagocaram paravrttam nirābhāsam āryāņām gocaro hy asau il Op. Cit., X. 148.

This state is the same as what we know from such lines as the following from Buddhist works : vijnaptimātratāyām cittam avasthitam bhavati. Tk., p. 43. For the wording of c (visayah sa hi buddhānām) see CS, p. 497 : viayaḥ sa hi buddhānām; Vk, p. 6: yo buddhānām vişayah; p. Il: buddhagocaraķ; SŚP, p. 120, *5a : yatpramāņo buddhavişayaļ ; MSA, XX-XXI. 26: buddhānām vișayād api; LA, III. 80 : aryāņām gocaro yathā.

1 See cittam pravartate citram cittam eva vimucyate | cittam hi jayate nanyac cittam eva nirudbyate !! Op. Cit., X. 145.

188 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 81

This state of mind to which the Buddhas aspire is further described in the following kārik :

81

ajam anidram asvapnam prabhātam bhavati svayam i sakrd vibhāti hy evaisa dharmo dhatuh svabhāvatah ll

See III. 36. 'It shines forth itself having no origination, nor sleep, nor dream. Indeed, this object (dharma), the fundamental element (dhatu), is naturally illumined once for all.' The word dharma in the second half of the kārikā may be taken in its general sense, an element of existence, an object, thing. But considering the views of the Yogacaras, and specially what Vasubandhu and his commentator Sthiramati have said in describing this state of mind1 it is to be taken in the sense of a special kind of dharma, i.c., asrayaparāurtti 'revolution or change of the recipient (i.e., alayavijnana which is the seed of all, sarvabījaka).'2 A few words are here required with regard to the reading dharmo dhatuh svabhavatah. This reading is found in some of

1 See Tk, pp. 43-44: yadaivam vijnaptimātratāyām cittam avasthitam bhavati tada katham vyapadiśyata ity āha: acitto 'nupalambho 'sau jnānam lokoltaram ca tat | aśrayasya parāvīttir dvidhā dausthulyahānitaḥ || 29 sa evānāsravo dhātur anityab kuśalo dhruvah | sukho vimuktikāyo 'sau dharmākhyo 'yam mahāmuneh I 30 2 For paraurtti in asrayaparāvrtti we have sometimes parivriti or parivartana (Tib. gnas. gyur. pa, or gnas. yons. gyur. pa, or gshan. du. gyur. pa. See Tib. translation of Tk, Tanjur, Mdo, Si, Fol. 190a). For asrayaparavrtti see among others Tk, loc. cit .; MSA, XIX. 54; LA, p. 338; DB, App. p. 27,pp. 190ff .: tasya tatha paribhavitam tal laukikam parisuddham dhyānam āpāyikakleśapaksyam duşthulyam aśrayād apakarsati. acireņa tasya prahānād aśrayo'sya bodhisattvasya parivartate pāpakasyāpāyikasya karmano 'tyantam akaraņatāyai apāyāgamana- tayai ca. For its different explanation see ViS, pp. 609.612.

IV. 81] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 189

the MSS. of the Anandashram edition and in some others, too, examined by me, while others read dharmo dhātusva°. Ś accepts the latter and Ãnandagiri supports it sayin dhātusvabhāvata ity ekam padam grhītvā vyācașțe. This implies that the reading dhatuh sva° was also known to him. But neither of them seems to be very satisfactory and this leads the present writer to amend the reading as dharmadhatuh svabhävatah. The reading dharmo dhatuh appears to be due to the unfamiliarity of the commentators with the sigmficance of the word dharmadhatu which is quite appropriate here. Let us therefore explain the karika in this light. In accordance with this reading the second half may be translated thus : 'Indeed the essence of reality (dharmadhatu)3 is naturally illumined once for all.' See 1. 14, 16; III. 36, 37. For c see ChU, VIII. 4. 1-2 which is the same. See also NUU, 9; MkU, 2-23. We take the next three kārikās together. The kārikā 82 is incomplete and as such should be construed with 83.

3 The word dharmadhatu may be translated by 'the essence of reality.' It is devoid of the characteristics of subject and object (viyukto grahyagrāhaka- laksanena) or undifferentiated into subject and object (grāhyagrāhakarahita). It is a synonym for paramartha or paramārthatattua, MVt, § XCIX. 8; Tk, p. 41, 1. 26; BAP, p. 354: parama uttamo 'rthaļ. akrtrimam vasturūpam yadadhigamāt sarvāvrtivāsanānusandhiklesaprahāņam bhavati. sarvadharmāņām nihsvabhāvalā sūnyatā tathatā bhūtakoțih dharmadhātur ityādiparyayāh. Again, p. 421: bodhir buddhatvam ekānekasvabhāvaviviktam anutpannā- niruddham anucchedam aśāśvatam sarvaprapancavinirmuktam ākāśapratisamam dharmakāyākhyam paramārthatattvam ucyate. etad eva ca prajñāpāramitā- sunyatā-tathatā-bhūtakoți-dharmadhātvādirabdena samvītim upādāyābhidhīyate Writes Maitreyanatha MVBT,I p. 41): tathata bhūtakoțis canimittah pa[ramārthakaḥ) | dharmadhatus ca paryayah sunyatayah samasatah ! ananyathaviparyasatannirodharyagocaraih | hetytvāc caryadharmāņām paryāyārtho yathākramam i 1. 15-16. As regards dharmadhatu Vasubandhu says here (pp. 41-42) . aryadharmahetutvād dharmadhātub. āryadharmāņām tadālambanaprabhavatvād. hetvartho hy atra dhatvarthah (see Tk, p. 44, ll. 20, 21). On the last words

190 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 82-84

82

sukham ävriyate nityam duḥkham vivriyate sadā l yasya kasya ca dharmasya graheņa bhagavān asau l

83

asti nāsty asti nāstīti nāsti nāstīti vā punaḥ l calasthirobhayābhāvair āvmoty eva bāliśaḥ li

84

kotyaś catasra etās tu grahair yāsām sadāvṛtaḥ l bhagavan abhir asprslo yena drstah sa sarvadrk i

'It is the adherence to (an idea of) a thing-whatsoever it may be,1 by which bliss is constantly covered and misery is unfolded. The glorious one (dharmadhātu)- (i) is, (ii) is not, (iii) is and is not (i.e., both), or (iv) neither is nor is not (i.e., not both)-with these (notions) the childish obscure it (respectively2 in accordance with their own ideas of its being) (i) steady,3 (ii) unsteady, (iii) both,4 and (iv) the absence (of both).5

Sthiramati comments: svalaksaņopādāyarūpadhāraņo 'py ayam dhatusabdo vartata ity aha hetvartho°. The word dhatu also means one that supports its own particularity (svalaksana) and the secondary qualities of matter (upadaya or bhautika rūpa), including evidently, as observes Stcherbatsky (MVD, p. 050) also the primary qualities of matter (mahabhuta). Dharmadhatu also means the mental state considered as element (dhatu) owing to its ultimate reality. See Pali Text Society's Dictionary, s.v. dhamma; Compendium of Philosophy, pp. 254-255. 1 This adherence is mainly four-fold as shown in the next karika. 2 In explaining calasthira° in c of 83 sthira is to be taken first as required by the sense (arthakrama) even discarding the order of reading (pāthakrama). 3 That is, permanent. 4 That is, steady and unsteady. 5 That is, neither steady nor unsteady.

IV. 84] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 191

These are the four points by the adherence to which the glorious one is always covered, but (in fact) it is not touched by them. One who realizes it is omniscient.' In nāsti nāstīti vā in c of karīka 83 take the first na with both asti and nästi, as na asti and na nāsti. These four points are maintained by four classes of disputants according to their ideas of the Absolute, as it is permanent, not permanent, both, or not both. But some of the Buddhists (Vijñanavādins and Madhyamikas) do not subscribe to any one of these views, their point is quite free from all of them, while in the Vedanta the first point is avowedly held ; e.g., KU, VI. 12 and 13:

astīti bruvato 'nyatra katham tad upalabhyate | astīty evopalabdhavyah |

TU, II. 6.1: asti brahmeti ced veda santam enam tato viduh l MU, IV. 4: asti brahmeti brahmavidyāvid abravīt. As regards the position of the Buddhists it is also very clear : na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpy anubhayātmakam | catuskoțivinirmuktam tattvaņ mādhyamikā vidu iļ Saraha in SS, fol. 17.6

kāraņaiḥ pratyayais cāpi yesām lokah pravartate | cātușkoțikayā yuktā na te mannayakovidāh | LA, III. 20. punar aparaņ mahāmate bālapțthagjanā anādikālaprapañca- dausthulyasvaprativikalpanā nāțake nrtyanta svasiddhāntanaya- deśanāyām akuśalāḥ svacittadrśyabāhyabhāvalaksaņābhinivistā

6 Sce Museon, 1903, IV, p. 389. This kārika is widely quoted : JS, 28; SDS, Bauddhadarsana; SSS, IIl. 7 (with the reading na cobhābhyām vilaksanam in c); catuskoțivinirmuktam sūnyam tattvam iti sthitam-Ibid, 9; BAP, p. 359; SaS, 1. 44 (Vijñānabhiksu); Cf. BJS, II. 27 (=DN I, 27),

192 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 84

upāyadeśanāpāțham abhiniviśante na svasiddhāntanayam cātușkoțikanayavisuddhaņ prativibhāvayanti. LA, p. 171. yac ca mahāmate na kāryam na kāranam tan na san nāsad yac ca na san nāsat tac cātuşkoțikabāhyam. cātuskoțikam ca mahāmate lokavyavahāraḥ. Op. cit, p. 188.7 Cf. punar aparam mahāmate catustayavinirmuktā tathā- gatānāņ dharmadeśanā yad utaikatvanyatvobhayanubhaya- vivarjitā nāstyastisamāropāpavādavinirmuktā satyapratītya-' samutpādanirodhamārgavimoksapravttipūrvakā mahāmate tathā- gatānāņ dharmadeśanā. Op. cit., p. 96.

It is to be noted here that according to S the word bhagavat 'the glorious one' in 82d and 84c refers to atman. On the following grounds, however, I think, it is the dharmadhatu in 81c, which is alluded to.

The subject malter here in karikas 80-84 is the unwavering or the firm state of the mind which has turned back from and does not go onwards again to its object-the state which is dharmadhatu and to which aspire the Buddhas. This is further dealt with in the following two karikas (85-86). There is, therefore, no room for atman to which the word bhagavat may refer.

An objection may be raised here that the word bhagavat is used with reference to a conscious or sentient being, and as such it cannot refer to dharmadhatu which is nothing but the niscala sthiti of the mind. One can, however, meet it in the following way. Such common phrases as bhagavati śrutih, bhagavan vedah, bhagavatī bhavitavyatā, etc., will show that the word under discussion is employed also to non-sentient

7 Sometimes instead of the four points (catuskoti) referred to there are only first three excluding the last. See MK, I. 7, VII. 20; CS, XVI. 25; LA, p. 156. Sometimes only the first two are mentioned. See my paper, Catuskoti, in the Jha Commemoration Volumc, 1937, pp. 85 ff. where similar passages are quoted from Vedantic texts,

IV. 84] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 193

beings. It is found that anything, irrespective of its being sentient or otherwise, that is powerful or commands respect, regard, faith, confidence, or reverence may be referred to by bhagavat. It is also to be taken into consideration that this dharmadhātu is in fact Brahman of the Vedantists as shown in the clearest possible words by the author himself in III. 46 which we have already discussed. Again, the dharmadhatu is the same as what we understand by the word prajnapāramita .? And it is very well-known that prajnaparamita is reverently mentioned with the epithet bhagavati. Besides, this dharmadhatu which is the same as prajnaparamitā is nothing but advaya jñāna, i.e., the jñana which is free from the subject and the object, and this is identified with Tathagata as is evident from the following couplet from the PAS of Dinnaga as quoted by Haribhadra in his AAA, p. 28.8 prajñāpāramitā jñānam advayam sa tathāgataḥ | sādhyā tādarthyayogena tācchabdyam granthamārgayoḥ li

The first half of this karika is based on such old texts as the following : cittamātrāvatareņa prajñā tāthāgatī matā | LA, III. 43. See Ibid., pp. 187-190 ending with yat sarvaprapancātītam sa tathagatah. See also pp. 191 ff.9

7 See BAP, p. 421 : etad eva ca prajñāpāramitā-sūnyatā-tathatā° ādiśabdena" abhidhiyate. This passage is quoted once more. See IV. 81, note 3, p. 189. 8 See E. Obermiller: DPP, pp. 7, 45; SS, p. 14. 9 Let us quote here another passage which is very significant, though a little lengthy, from the same work, i.e., LA, pp. 191-193: na hi mahāmate abhāvas tathāgatagato° kintu mahāmate manomayadharma- kāyasya tathāgatasyaitad adhivacanam yatra (yat?) sarvatīrthakaraśrāvaka- pratyekabuddhasaptabhūmipratisthitānām avişayaḥ. solyo ?! 'nutpādas tathāgata- syaitan mahāmate paryāyavacanam. tad yathā mahamate indrah sakrah purandarah hastah karaḥ pāņis tanur deham sarīram prthivī bhūmir vasundharā kham ākāśam gaganam ity evamādyānām bhāvānām ekaikasya bhāvasya bahavah 1201B-25

194 ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA [IV. 84-85

tathatakareņa tathagatam I paśyāmy avikalpākāreņānupa- lambhayogena. evam anutpādākāreņa tathāgatam paśyāmi, yavad abhāvākāreņa tathāgatam paśyāmi.° SŠP, p. 119. For Tathagata see also MK, XXII. No objection can therefore be raised here with regard to the usc of the word bhagavat.

paryāyavācakāh sabda bhavanti vikalpitī na caişūm nāmabahulvād bhāvabahutvam vikalpyate na ca svabhāvo na bhavati, evam mahāmate aham api sahtyāim lokadhātau tribhir nāmīsamkhyeyasatasahasrair balānām śravaņāivabhāenm agacchūmi tais cībhilapanti mūm na ca prajīnanti tathāgatasyaile nūmaparyāyā iti, tatra kecin mahtmate tathāgntam iti mūm prajunanti. kecit svayambhuvam iti nīyakam vināyakam pariņīyakam buddham rsim vrsabham brahmaņam (v l. brāhmaņam, brahmāņam?) vişņum isvaram pradhānam kapilam bhūtīntam aristam neminam (arisțaneminam ?) somam bhāskaram rīmam vytisam sukam indram balim varuņam iti cnike samjānanti. apare 'nirodhānulpādam sūnyatām tathatāņ bhūta- tim bhūtakoțim dharmadhitum nivīņam nityam samatūm advayam anirodham nnimittam pratyayam buddhahetūpadefam vimoksam mūrgasntyāni sarvajñam jinam manomayam iti caike samjūnanti. evamādibhir mahtimnte° mūm. jantļ samjānanta udakacandra ivūpravișțnnirgatam, na ca bāla avabudhyante dvayūntapatitayā sanlalyā.

It is said in the preceding karika that one, who rcalizes that truth, becomes omniscient. The present kārika tells us that omniscience being realized, there is nothing that can be desired, for every desire is fulfilled thereby :

85

prāpya sarvajñatām krtsnām brāhmaņyam padam advayam l anāpannādimadhyāntam kim ataḥ param īhate l

'Having realized the full omniscience and (thercby) that state which is befitting a Brahmana,1 and frec from the

1 In Buddhist liternture a Brahmana is held in as much reapect as a Sramana, and this is evident from the well-known phrase Sramana-brahmana which is so frequently ueed. See DP, XXVI. Sometimes a true Brnhmana is regarded as, or identified with a Buddha ;

IV. 85-86] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 195

two,2 and has no beginning, middle and end, what may one desire beyond it?' It is to be noted that the final aim is described here to be the realization of omniscience (sarvajñatā, cf. sarvākārajñatā or bodhi) which can be asserted more preferably from the Buddhist point of view than from the Vedantist.

usabham pavaram vīram mahesim vijitavinam anejam nahātakam buddham tam aham brūmi brāhmaņam li Op. cit., XXVI. 40. It may be noted that according to Buddhists a Brahmana is so called because he is vahitapapa 'one whose sin is removed' (Op. cit., XXVI. 6). This is, however, far-fetched. The following may be quoted here: ye ca vahitapapatvad brāhmanāh pāramārthikah / abhyastāmalanairātmyās te muner eva śāsane ! ihaiva śramaņas tena caturdhā parikīrttyate | sunyah parapravāda hi sramaņair brāhmaņais tathā " TS, 3589, 3590. Kamalaśila writes on it in his Pañjikā: ata eva bhagavatoktam ihaiva śramanah ihaiva brāhmaņah sūnyāh parapravādāh śramanair brāhmaņair iti. 2 The subject and the object.

The following karika says that this realization of omniscience is the object of vinaya 'discipline' and real sama 'quiescence' and dama 'introversion' of the senses.

86

viprāņāņ vinayo hy esa śamaķ prākrta ucyate l damaḥ prakrtidāntatvād evam vidvān samam vrajet II

'This is, indeed, the discipline of the wise, and is said to be the natural quiescence, and the introversion (of the senses) owing to (their) being naturally introverted. Knowing thus one should become quiescent.' The reality set forth in the preceding kārikās (IV. 80-86) is further described in the next three karikas showing that that is the lokottara 'supra-mundane' knowledge through the realiza- tion of which one becomes omniscient :

196 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 87-88

87,88

savastu sopalambham ca dvayam laukikam isyate I avastu sopalambham ca suddham laukikam isyate I

avastv anupalambham ca lokottaram iti smṛtam i jñānam jñeyam ca vijñeyam sadā buddhaiḥ prakīrttitam l

'That which consists of the two, the object and (its) percep- tion, is regarded as mundane ; one without the object, but with the perception is regarded as pure mundane ; while one without the object and the perception is said to be supra-mundane .- This is to be understood to be the knowledge and the knowable1 as is always declared by the Buddhas.' In our ordinary experience when one perceives a jar there are both the object, the jar, and its perception. This knowledge is called laukika 'mundane', i.c., belonging to or occurring in ordinary life. When one, however, in a higher grade of wisdom, with the clear knowledge of unreality or the imagined or imposed form of the jar, perceives it, that knowledge is with perception, but not with the object. This is called 'pure mundane', i.e., it belongs to ordinary life and is covered (avrta); it is pure,-'pure' because it is not so obscure as the mundane, its obscurity having been removed to a great extent. Finally when the reality is perfectly realized, when the mind rests on itself being completely suppressed (niruddha) there is neither the jar, nor the perception, and as such this knowledge is regarded as lokottara 'supra-mundane,' surpassing the ordinary life. Of these three kinds of jnāna, viz., (i) laukika, (ii) śuddha laukika, and (iii) lokottara, the first is well-known to all and

1 We have already (IV. 1) seen that there is no difference between jñana and jneya. Or it may mean that whatever we may know by the terms jnana and jneya is only the three things mentioned in the kārikas.

IV.88] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 197

is met with in every system ; and the last two are to be found in Yogacara texts. For instance, MVT1, p. 19 :

paratantrasvabhāvo hi śuddhalaukikagocaraņ | Tk, p. 40: nirvikalpalokottarajñānadṛśye parinispanne svabhave adrste apratividdhe asaksatkrte tatprsthalabdhasuddha- laukikajnānagamyatvāt paratantro 'nyena jñanena na grhyate. na punar lokottarajnānaprsthalabdhenāpi jñānena na drśyate.

In LA, p. 156, these jñānas are found as (i) laukika, (ii) lokottara, and (iii) lokottaratama respectively. The difference is only in nomenclature and as such is not important, The LA, p. 157, describes them very clearly in the following words which deserve here to be considered carefully :

(i). tatra laukikam jñānam sadasatpakșābhinivistānām sarvatīrthakarabālapṛthagjanānām ca. (ii) tatra lokottaraņ jnānaņ sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhānām svasamānyalakșaņapatitāśayābhinivistānām. (iii) tatra lokottaratamaņ jñānaņ buddhabodhisattvānām nirābhāsadharmapravicayād anirodhānutpādadarśanāt sadasat- pakşavigataņ tathāgatabhūminairātmyādhigamāt pravartate.2

This reality with which we are concerned here is described by Vasubandhu in his Tk, verse 29 in the following words which may be quoted here :

acitto 'nupalambho 'sau jñānam lokottaram ca tat |

Sthiramati comments :

tad anena ślokadvayena darśanamārgam ärabhyottara- visesagatya phalasampattir udbhavita vijnaptimatrapravistayoginah. tatra grāhakacittābhāvād grāhyārthānupalambhāc ca acitto

2 Generally in Buddhist works things are divided into two categories, (i) laukika, and (ii) lokottara (see MV, p. 501); as for instance, all mental states are laukika excepting only nine, viz , four paths (maggas), four fruits (magga- phalas), and one uncompounded element (asamkhatadhātu), i.e., nibbana, -these are lokottara. DSn, § 1093, 1094.

198 AGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 88-89

nupalambho 'sau. aparicitatvāt3 loke samudācārabhavat nirvikalpatvāc ca lokād uttīrņam iti jñānam lokottaram ca tat. So far as goes my information, such division of jñana or jñeya is not to be found in Upanisads. Ś explains the above three kinds of jnāna as the conditions of (i) waking, (ii) dream, and (iii) sleep respectively (jagrat, svapna, susupti).

3 The printed text reads anucitatvat, but it does not give any appropriate sense. We should, therefore, read here aparicitatvat with the Tibetan version which has hdris.par.ma.byas.pa.

89

jñāne ca trividhe jñeye krameņa vidite svayam I sarvajñatā hi sarvatra bhavatīha mahādhiyah l

'The threefold knowledge and knowable being gradually understood everywhere spontaneously evolves here the state of omniscience of a man of high intellect.'1 That the jnana is trividha 'threefold' is just now seen in the preceding two kārikās. According to its function, too, it is trividha. We read in the LA, p. 157 : tatra trividham jnānam svasāmānyalaksaņāvadhārakam cotpāda- vyayāvadhāraņakam cānutpādānirodhāvadhārakam ca.2 The omniscience (sarvajnata) referred to is Buddhahood (buddhatva).3

1 The word mahadhi is nothing but dhimat which is a name for a Bodhisattva. See MSA, XIX. 73; MVt,1 627. 2 As regards the nature of jnana the following may be cited from LA, p. 157: asangalaksaņam jnanam. asangasvabhāvalaksanam jñānam.° aprāptilaksanam jnānam svapratyātmāryajnanagatigocaram apravesānirgamatvād udakacandravaj jale. 3 See BAP, pp. 447-8; ASP, pp. 42-3. Buddhatva=sarvajnatva consisting in (i) sarvākarajñutā, (ii) mārgajñatā, and (iii) vastujñāna.

IV. 89-90] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 199

J Ś explains sarvajñatā as sarvaś cāsau jñaś ceti sarvajñaḥ. tasya bhavah sarvajñatā. In the next karika the author tells his followers to understand certain things :

90

heyajñeyāpyapākyāni vijñeyāny agrayānataḥ1 | teşām anyatra vijñeyād upalambhas trișu smrtah l

'That which is to be abandoned, that which is to be known, that which is to be attained, and that which is to be matured are to be understood from the Agrayana. It is said that among them there is perception of the three, but not of that which is to be known.' The Agrayana in the text is nothing but the Mahayana. as is evident from a number of Buddhist works in which the word occurs as a synonym for Mahayāna.2 Now, what are we to understand by heya, etc .? As regards heya and jneya, if we follow here Asanga. they are paratantra and parikalpita svabhavas (see IV. 74-75) respectively.3 Apya (=prāpya) 'attainable' implies dharma

1 All the editions and MSS examined have 'yana instead of °yāna as expected. 2 MSA, p. 53: pițakatrayam sūtravinayābhidharmāh. tad eva trayam hīnayanāgrayanabhedena dvayam bhavati. See SP, III. 1, V. 61; MSA, p. 83; SRS (Rajendralal Mitra's Buddhist Manuscripts from Nepal), p. 229; LV, p. 408; VCh., pp. 30, 33. Sometimes it is also called Śresthayāna, Vch., p. 30. 3 Let us quote here the following from the MSA. XI. 13 (p. 58) : where heya and jñeya are explained : tattvam yat satatam dvayena rahitam bhrāntes ca samniśrayah śakyam naiva ca sarvathabhilapitum yac cāprapañcātmakam | jneyam heyam atho visodhyam amalam yac ca prakrtyāmalam yasyakāsasuvamņavārisadīsī klešad višuddbi matā ll

200 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 90

dhātu or dharmadhātu already alluded to (IV. 81),4 which is parinispanna, and pakya 'to be matured' refers to the act of maturing by discipline for the attainment of the Absolute. The last is not only for others, but also for one's own self.5 The second half of the kärika says that among these four things only three, i.e., heya, āpya, and pākya, can be perceived, but not the jneya or vijneya. For it is parikalpita 'imagined,' and a thing which is only imagined owing to its very nature cannot be perceived, just like mirage, as it

satatam dvayena rahitam tattvam parikalpitab svabhāvo grāhyagrāhaka- lakşaņenātyantam asattvāt. bhrānteh samniśrayah paratantras tena tatpari- kalpanāt. anabhilāpyam aprapancātmakam ca parinispannah svabhāvah. tatra prathamam tattvam parijneyam dvitīyam praheyam trtīyam visodhyam cāgantukamalād viśuddham ca praktyā. yasya prakrtyā viśuddhasyākāśa- suvarņavārisadīšī kleśad viśuddhiņ. na hy ākāādīni prakrtyā aśuddhāni. na cāgantukamalāpagamād esām visuddhir neșyate. 4 MSA, XIX. 56 : prapyam dharmadhatuh. 5 MSA, XX-XXI 42 : sattvaparipākacaryā dvayor eva paripācanārtham. paripācanam hy atra vinayanam; XVII. 3, 22, 36; XIX. 56; DA, p. 125; BBh, p. 22. As regards the maturation of one's own self (atmaparipāka) the following may be quoted from MSA, VIII. 1 : ruciņ prasādah praśamo 'nukampanā ksamātha medhā prabalatvam eva ca | aharyatangaiņ samupetata bhĮsam jinātmaje tat paripākalaksaņam !! rucir mahayanadesanadharme. prasādas taddeśike. praśamaḥ kleśānām. anukampa sattvesu, medha grahanadharanapratibedhesu. prabalatvam adhigame, ahāryatā marapravadibhiņ. prāhānikangaih samanvāgatatvam. bhĮśam iti rucyādīnār adhimātratvam darśayati, eșa samāsena navaprakāra ātmaparipāko veditavyah. See also, VIII. 11 : iti navavidhavastupācitātmă paraparipacanayogy atām upetaḥ | subhamayasatatapravardhitātmā bhavati sadā jagato 'grabandhubhūtah lļ KP, § 31: tad yatha kāśyapa tejodhātuh sarvasasyāni paripārayati evam eva kaśyapa bodhisattvasya prajnā sarvasattvānām sarvaśukladharmān pari- pācayati.° See also the stanza which follows it. In BBh, a whole chapter named Paripakapatala (VI) is devoted to it giving particulars. Cj. lokapakti 'maturation of the world' in the SB, XI. 5. 7. 1.

1V. 90-92] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 201

has no existence, it is merely an imagination, simply a word, only a name; it is not perceived, and hence there is no perception.6

6 It may be noted that sometimes five jñeyas are found (BAP, p. 447 : jneyam pancavidham), as says Sthiramati in MVTI, p. 6, viz , (i) the worlds tokadhatu), (ii) the living beings (sattva), (iii) the elements of existence (dharma), (iv) the discipline (vinaya), and (v) the means (upaya). These seem to have no connexion herewith. In the next few kārikas the author gives some leading . thoughts of the Agrayana alluded to above:

91

prakṛtyākāśavaj jñeyāh sarve dharmā anādayaḥ i vidyate na hi nānātvam tesāņ kvacana kiñcana l

'All the elements of existence are without beginning, and by nature they are to be known like the sky. Verily they have nowhere any variety.' For the first half of the karika see IV. 1, where we have already seen that things are just like the sky as said in such texts as the ASP, p. 297 : yathakasam° already quoted there. For the second half where it is said that there is no variety of things see the well-known Upanisadic texts : neha nanāsti kiñcana, BU, IV. 4. 19; KU. IV. 11; KtU, III. 8 ; NS, IV. 1. 34 ff (with Vatsyayana). See also our own text, II. 34, IV. 94, 100.

92

adibuddhah1 prakrtyaiva2 sarve dharmāh suniścitāḥ l yasyaivam bhavati kşāntiḥ so 'mrtatvāya kalpate l

1 See adau buddhāh, IV. 98; cf. ad'sānta, IV. 93, Tib. gzod ma.nas.shi.ba, from this one is to take adi- here for aditah meaning 'from the outset.' 2 See IV. 93. 1201B-26

202 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 92

'By the very nature all elements of existence are well ascertained as originally knowledge. One who has such acquiescence is fit for immortality.'

The word buddha in adibuddha means here bodha 'knowledge,'3 i.e., advaya jñana which is called Tathagata as we have already seen (IV. 82-84). See also SŚP, p. 124 :

tathāgatam bhadanta śāradvatīputra paryeşitukāmenātmā paryeşitavyab. ātmeti bhadanta śāradvatīputra buddhasyaitad adhivacanam.

All phenomena are only in their imposed or imagined forms, they being buddha, or bodha or jñana.

Cf. here the well-known phrase in later Vedantic works 4: nityasuddhabuddhamuktasatyasvabhāva for Brahman.

As regards the meaning of the word ksanti5 a few words are required here. Generally, ksanti means 'patience.' In Buddhism there are different ksantis of which the following three are often mentioned : (i) duhkhadhicāsanaksānti 'patierce accepting miseries,' (ii) dharmanidhyāna° 'patience by meditat- ing upon the elements of existence,' and (iti) parāpakāra- marșana° 'patience bearing injuries done by others.'6

Besides, in Buddhism it has other meanings. In explaining kşānti (Pali khanti) in AN, I. 94, the commentary, Manoratha- püraņī, writes: khamatīti adhivāsanakhanti. It says that khanti means adhivasana 'acquiescence,' 'consent.' or 'acceptance.' Again, we read in the AN, III. 118 :

imesam āvuso tiņnam puggalānam katamo te puggalo khamati abhikkantataro ca paņītataro ca.

3 Ś explains : adibuddhāh nityabodhasvarūpāb. 4 Such as VeS, pp. 38-39 (§ 28). Š: bodhakartavyatānirapekșatā. 6 As described in BA and BAP, VI (op. 172 ff); SS, IX (pp. 179 ff). Cf. DS, CVII,

İV. 92] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 203

The commentary explains khamati saying khamatiti ruccati. Accordingly the passage quoted above may be translated thus :

'Which of these three persons is, O friend, agreeable to you as the most excellent and exalted?'

Here evidently ksanti is ruci 'pleasure', 'liking.' This is quite clear also from a passage of the SNt, 897,7 where the commentator in his MNs explains khanti (ksanti) in the text by pema (preman) 'fondness, predilection,' chanda 'desire,' and rāga 'lust,' which are in fact, the same as ruci.8

Again, in Buddhist texts (CN, p. 164, see Vbh, p. 245) ksanti is described as synonymous with the following words : (i) drsti (Pali ditthi) 'view,' 'belief,' 'theory,' (ii) ruci 'pleasure,' 'liking,' (iii) labdhi (Pali laddhi) 'view,' 'belief,' 'theory'; (iv) adhyāśaya (Pali ajjhasaya) 'intention,' 'thought,' and (v) abhipraya (Pali adhippaya) 'intention,' 'opinion.' It is there- fore quite clear from the above that ksānti sometimes means drsti ' view'.9 And so far as I can understand in the present case it is used in this sense.

See SP, p. 136 ; MSA, XI. 52; SRS, VII; DS, p. 63; Poussin : MV, pp. 362ff., and AK, VI, pp. 165 ff., as well as the works quoted herein ; St. LA, p. 396.

7 ya kāc'ima sammutiyo puthujja sabbā 'va etā na upeti vidvā anūpayo so upayam kim eyya ditthe sute khantim akubbamāno il 8 See SN, IV. 348 : bhūtapubbam bhante cattvāro satthāro nānāditthikā nānākhantikā nānārucikā; MN, I. 487, II. 43. See also the Sumangalavilāsini on DN, II. 213 : khantīti tattha katamā khanti yā khamanatā adhivāsanatā acandikkam anasuropo attamanatā cittassāti evam vultā adhivāsanakhanti. 9 It may be noted that in Sanskrit, too, Vhsam is not always used in the sense of ' to be patient,' or 'to endure,' etc. Cf. UC, I. 14: tan no yad uktam asivam na hi tat ksamam te. Here ksama has nothing to do with 'patience' or 'forbearance,' etc. In Pali (DhA, I. 40) Vkhama is said to mean 'to be fit,' 'to seem good,' specially in such cases as yatha te khameyya 'as may seem good to you.'

204 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 92.93

It is well-known in Prajnaparamitasūtras and the works based thereon that all elements of existence are devoid of the characteristics of their own (nihsvabhäva), they neither originate (anutpanna), nor disappear (aniruddha), and as such they are quiescent from the outset (adisanta=prakrtisanta), and by the very nature they are merged in nirvana (prakrtinirvrta). This point is mainly described in the following kārikā :

93

ādisāntā1 hy anutpannāh prakrtyaiva sunirvrtāh l sarve dharmāḥ samābhinnā ajam sāmyam2 viśāradam®

'All elements of existence are quiescent from the outset, non-originated. and by the very nature perfectly merged in nirvāņa ; they are all equal and not different. (The absolute) is unborn, equal and fearless.' Let us quote here the following from MSA, XI. 51 : niḥsvabhāvatayā siddhā uttarottaraniśrayāt | anutpannāniruddhādisāntaprakrtinirvtāh || 4 Here follows the commentary : niḥsvabhāvatayānutpādādayah. yo hi nihsvabhāvah so 'nut- panno yo 'nutpannah so 'niruddho yo 'niruddhaķ sa ādiśānto ya ādisāntaḥ sa prakrtinirvrtah.

1 Tib. gzod.ma.nas.shi.ba, lit. aditah santah. 2 See III. 2, 38; IV. 77, 80, 95, 100. 3 See the note on vaisaradya in the next kārika. Cf. nirbhaya in I. 25, III. 35; and abhaya in IV. 78, and Upanisads, ChU, I. 4. 4, 5; IV. 15. 1. etc. 1 This is as reconstructed by Lé vi according to the Chinese version. The original Sanskrit is lost. The scribe has, however, given here a corrupted kārika and it is as follows : niķsvabhāvataya siddha uttarottaranihśrayāb : anutpado 'niruddhas cadiantih parinirvrtiķ !! See MSA., Tome Il (French Translation), p. 122.

IV. 93] AGAMASĀSTRA 205

'Owing to the absence of nature there are no origination, etc. That which is devoid of nature is not originated ; that which is not originated is not suppressed (destroyed) ; that which is not suppressed is quiescent from the outset; and that which is quiescent from the outset is naturally merged in perfect nirvāņa.' In the text sānti (connected with ādiśānta) and nirvrti or nirvana (connected with sunirvrta=parinirvrta) are actually nothing but apravrtti meaning 'not coming forth,' 'not arising,' 'not originating.' Elements of existence are ādisanta and su- (=pari-) nirvrta; it implies that originally they do not originate, and so to speak, they are in santi and nirvana. For the above explanation of the two words see MV, p. 529 : ya'pravrttis tan nirvaņam iti vyavasthapyate ; p. 538 : ya upaśamo 'pravrttis tan nirvāņam. Poussin observes (ERE, Vol. 9, p. 851): "From an absolute point of view (paramarthatas) there is no difference (nanabhäva)5 among things and the characters of things. Things are void (sunya) like the daughter of a barren woman; characters are void like the beauty of this unreal daughter. Things are void, because there is no real origination of things -if no origination, no destruction, an eternal non-existence. There is no difference between existence (samsāra) and nirvāna. Not being produced (anutpanna), not being destroyed, things are from the beginning quiescent (adiśanta), they are really, naturally (prakrtyā) in nirvāna (parinirurta)." For the wording and thought of the first half of the kārika the following passages, besides MSA, XI. 51 already cited (p. 204), may be quoted : (i) ādisāntā hy anutpannāh prakrtyaiva ca nirvrtāh | dharmās te vivrta natha dharmacakrapravartaneil6

5 See our text : vidyate nahi nānātvaņ teşām kvacana kiñcana, IV. 91, and also II, 34; III. 24; IV. 93-94. 6 Quoted in MV, p. 225, and SuS, p. 20 from Aryaratnameghasūtra. See Poussin : JRAS, 1910, pp 138-39; Sylvain Lévi : MSA, Tome II (French tr.), p. 122.

206 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 93.94

(ii) atah sattvāh prakrtyā parinirvrtāh | BA, IX. 104. (iii) tasmāt sarvadharmā anutpannāniruddhasvabhāvatayā ādisāntā prakrtinirvtāh. BAP, p. 589. (iv) paramārthasatyataḥ praktinirvāņatayādiśantatvāt. pra- ktinirvtatvāt sarvadharmāņām iti. Ibid, p. 385. (v) ādipraśāntā imi sarvadharmāh | SP, II. 68. The next kārika is in support of what is said in the preceding one :

94

vaiśāradyam tu vai nāsti bhede vicaratām sadā l bhedanimnāḥ prthagvādās tasmāt te krpaņāh smrtāh l

'But verily those who always move following difference have no intrepidity. Those who maintain that a thing is diverse1 (prthak=nānā) are prone to difference, and are, therefore, regarded as pitiable.' The word visarada in IV. 93 of which the noun, vaitaradya, is used here reguires some explanation. According to Ś they mean 'pure' (visuddha) and 'purity' (visuddhi) respectively. It is supported by Bhojarãja saying in his vrtti on YS, I. 47 that vaiśāradya means 'clearness' (nairmalya). This exposition is based on that of Vyasa on the same YS.2 The idea behind it may be explained in another way.3

1 See IV. 91 and note 5 on IV. 93. 2 aśuddhyāvaraņamalāpetasya prakāšātmano buddhisattvasya rajastamo- bhyam anabhibhutab svacchah sthitipravaho vaifāradyam. Woo d translates it thus: 'When freed from obstruction . by impurity the sattva of thinking substance, the essence of which is light, has a pellucid steady flow not over- whelmed by rajas and tamas.' 3 As in India the season sarad 'autumn' is particularly clear, anything in that season (sarada 'autumnal'), such as the mcon or water, is also clear. Thus Särada with the prefix vi- which here simply emphasizes the idea might have gradually been employed in the sense of 'clear,' its noun vaisāradya meaning 'clearness'.

IV. 94] ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA 207

The word visarada is, however, of doubtful derivation.4 The prefix vi- only intensifies the meaning of sarada one of the meanings of which is 'mature,' i.e., 'rich in years' (sarad 'a year'), 'old.' Accordingly the secondary meaning with the prefix vi- is pravīna 'clever.' As boldness (pragalbhatā) generally depends on one's maturity visarada also means 'bold' (pragalbha). In both Sanskrit and Pali the word śarada (Pali sārada) means apratibha or apragalbha 'timid,' 'not bold,'5 and vifārada (Pali visārada) is used to mean 'scholar' (pandita) and 'bold' (pragalbha).6 In Buddhist writings vaitaradya (Pali vesarajja) is explained as opposite to *śāradya (Pali sārajja) which means 'timidity.' That vaisaradya is 'intrepidity' (nirbhayata) is very clearly said in AKV2, p. 646.8 In Buddhism vaiaradya is four-fold, ciz., the vaisaradya regarding (i) the highest knowledge of all things (sarvadharmābhisambodhivaisāradya), (ii) the knowledge of destroying all the human passions (sarvāsravaksayajñana°), (iii) rightly describing the impediments (antarāyikadharmā- nanyathātvaniscitavyākarana°), and (iv) the rightness of the way leading to salvation (nairyanikapratipattathatvs°).9

4 It is read in the group of drdhadi (Panini, V. 1. 123), and Vardha - man a explains it in his GM, p. 221, taking it in the sense of pravīna 'skilful,' 'clever' : śāradaśabdaḥ pratyagravācī. yathā rajjuśāradam udakam, drsacchāradāh saktavah. sadyo hi rajjvoddhțtam udakam pratyagram anupahatam rajjuśāradam ucyate, sadyaś ca drsadā pistāh saktavo drsacchāradāh. sāradaftva)m pratyagratvam abhinavatvam. tad vigatam asya viśāradah pravīņah. pravīņo laksanaya. He himself is, however, not satisfied with it and goes on to say : athava vyutpattisunyah pravīņavācī viāradasabdah. 5 See AmK, III. 3. 95 : dvau tu śāradau | pratyagrāpratibhau vidvatsupra- galbhau visāradau I| AP, 984: sārado saradubbhūte appagabbhe mato tisu, 6 AP, 228, 959 : vutto visārado tīsu suppagabbhe ca pandite ll 7 vesārajjānīti ettha sārajjapatipakkho vesārajjam. MP cn AN, II. 8 ff. 8 nirbhayata hi vaisaradyam The Tib. term for caisaradya is mi.hjigs.po which means nirbhaya or nirbhayata. 9 MVtª, 8. In the same work (28) there is a different kind of vaisāradya which is also four-fold. Again, the following four-fold vaisaradya is enumerated

208 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 94-95

By modern scholars vaisaradya is variously explained or translated. Childers says (Dictionary, p. 564) it is 'confidence or fearlessness,' evidently taking viśārada to mean 'bold' (pragalbha). L é v i explains it as 'assurance' (MSA, French tr., p. 319). Kern in his Eng. translation of SP1 (SBE, Vol. XXI), p. 246, interprets (referring to Burnouf: Lotus, p. 396; S. Hardy: Eastern Monachism, p. 291) it as 'absence of hesita- tion.' But to be consistent with the explanations offered by Vyāsa and Bhojarāja, Kern's exposition of the word in his Histoire du Bouddhisme dans l'Inde (French transla- tion by G. Huet in the Annales du Musée Guimet, Tome X), Tome I, p. 283, deserves to be consulted in this connection.

in the MVu, Vol. II, p. 261 : (i) kaya°, (ii) vaca°, (iti) citta° and (iv) prthu°. The last term is not clear, and Senart supposes (p. 545) that it is prthag°. Still it is to be ascertained. In Śīlānka's țīkā on SKr, XIV. 17, visārada (Pkt. visāraya) is ex- plained as pratipādaka.

95

aje sāmye tu ye kecid bhavisyanti suniścitāh I te hi loke mahājñānās tac ca loko na gāhate il

'But only those who are quite certain about the aja 'unborn' and samya 'same'1 are possessed of great wisdom. The people, however, do not penetrate into it.'2

1 For aja and sāmya see IV. 77, 80, 93, 100. 2 It refers to aja and samya in the text. Ś explains tat taking it to signify the vartman 'way' of the sages which an ordinary man cannot grasp. Here S quotes the following from the MB(?) : sarvabhūtātmabhūtasya sarvabhūtahitasya ca | devā api mārge muhyanty apadasya padaișiņaḥ | śakunīnām ivākāśe gatir naivopalabhyate ll The first two lines with some variations in c are quoted also by S a y a n a in his commentary on the TA, VIII. 2 (p. 547). For sakuninam° sce Ś on BU, p 637 : ta utsahante khe 'pi sakunam padam drastum; DP, 92-93 (with Attha- kathā) : ākāse 'va sakuntānām gati tesam durannayā; Again, antarīksi fakunasya

IV. 95-97] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 209

Until and unless the knowledge becomes completely free from any relation to its object the highest cannot be attained. Therefore the knowledge must be asanga, i.e., detached from its objects. This state of its detachment is described in the following two kārikas (96, 97), the first of which runs :

vā padam, quoted from Āryaralnākarasūtra in MV, 90; tad yathāpi nāmākāse śakunipadam, SSP, p. 137; yathāntarikse fakuneh padam budhair, vaktum na śakyam na ca daranopagam, quoted by Poussin in his French tr. of MA, p. 12 in Le Muséon, 1907, p. 261.

96

ajeşv ajam asaņkrāntam dharmeșu jñānam ișyate l yato na kramate jñānam asangam tena kīrtitam l

'It is accepted1 that knowledge which is unborn does not go (i.e., relate itself) to the elements of existence, which are (also) unborn. As the knowledge does not go (to the elements of existence) it is declared to be free from attachment (asanga, i.e., free from any relation to its object).' See IV. 72, 79 (nihsanga), 97, 99 ; cf. agraha, III. 32. See also IV. 72 : cittam nirvişayam nityam asangam tena kīrtitam | See IV. 1, note 5 where passages are quoted to show that jñana is asanga. 1 Lit. desired (isyate).

97

aņumātre'pi vaidharmye jāyamāne 'vipaścitaḥ I asangatā sadā nāsti kim utāvaranacyuti Il

'If there be even the least difference (of elements of existence1 in the mind) of an unwise man, there is no state of

1 It is to be remembered that all elements of existence are in fact non-different : sarve dharmah samabhinnah (IV. 93), as we have already seen. - 1201B-27

210 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV.97

(its) being always free from attachment (asangata), not to speak of the disappearance of the covering. The state of being always asanga of jñäna or citta is referred to in the preceding kārikā (96). As regards ävarana 'covering' or 'obstruction', it is two-fold, (i) kleśa-āvaraņa and (ii) jñeya-āvaraņa2. kleśa literally means that which troubles one by the strokes of various kinds of misery, as Vãcaspati Miśra would explain it (YS, I. 24). Accordingly, as sinful desires, vices, or passions are for misery they are termed klesa. For the same reason it also means 'impurity', 'stain'. Sometimes the word stands for 'lust' or 'sensuality' (räga), 'aversion' (dvesa), and 'bewilderment' (moha). There are also ten kleśas, lobha, dvesa, moha, māna, etc. (DSn, §1548).3 For further details see Pali-English Dictionary, PTS, s.v. kilesa, and MV, p. 361. Kleśa-āvaraņa thus means the avarana 'covering' or 'obstruction' in the form of klesas. Until and unless they are destroyed (kletaprahana) the truth is not manifested, nor can one attain to the highest bliss.4 Kleśas are regarded as the mother of all mis?ries. Similarly jñeya is also an avarana. The word jñeya means 'knowable,' i.e., the dharmas 'elements of existence' which are not substantial and thus they have no reality. Yet one perceives them (jneyopalabdhi). And as long as one continues to do so one is far from the goal. Thus jñeya is regarded as an avarana,5

2 DS, CXV : MSA, IX. 3, 12, XX-XXI, 44; BA, IX. 55. 3 In YS, II. 3, 5-9, there are five kinds of klefa, viz., avidyā, asmitā, rāga, dueşa, and abhinivesa. 4 See MV, p. 538 : kleśānām apravrltyā vā prapañcopaśamah. 5 BAP, pp. 447 : kleśā evāvītih. jneyam cāvītir āvaraņam. °jñeyam eva samāropitarūpatvād āvrtih. Sometimes jneyāvarana is explained as jñcye āvaraņam (Tk, p 15: jneyāvaraņam api sarvasmin jñeye jñanapratibandhabhūtam aklistam ajnanam), 'the obstacle regarding the knowable,' (i.e .. the reality or the things in their true nature). See TSP, pp. 869-890. Sometimes (AN, III. 436; AK, IV. p. 201) there are three avaranas, (i) klesāvarana, (ii) karmāvaraņa (5 anantaryas and 10 akusala karmapathas), and (iii) vipākāvurana (8 aksanas),

IV. 97-98] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 211

and it must be removed (jñeyanupalabdhi) for the realization of nirvāņa. Jñeyāvarana disappears by one's realizing the unreality of the elements of existence as separate entities (dharma- nairātmya), while kleśāvarana goes away by the realization of the unreality of the individual ego (pudgalanairatmya).6 Or both the avaranas can be removed by the meditation on sūnyatā (BA, IX. 55). 6 LA, VII, p. 241: jñeyāvaraņam punar mahāmate dharmanairātmya- darśanaviśesād visudhyate. kleśāvaraņam tu pudgalanairātmyadarśanābhyāsa- purvakam prahīyate. See Sthiramati on Tk, p. 15. The removal of ävarana is referred to in the preceding kārikā, but in the next kārika it is said that, in fact, there is no āvarana at all : 98

alabdhävaranāh sarve dharmāh prakrtinirmalāh I ādau buddhās tathā muktā budhyanta iti nāyakāḥ ll

'All the elements of existence have always been without any covering and unsullied in their nature. From the beginning they are knowledge as well as in nirvāna (mukta)-this the Buddhas understand.' For adau buddhah see IV. 92,93. Because the elements of existence do not originate they are said as mukta, i.e., in sānti or nirvāna. On this see IV. 93, p. 205. For prakrtinirmala see IV. 91 ; MV, p. 539 : avāca 'nakşarāņ sarva šūnyāh sāntādinirmalāķ | ya evam jānati dharman kumaro buddha socyate il MV, p. 444 : prakrtiprabhasvarah sarvadharmāh; LA, X. 750, 753, 754 : prakrtiprabhāsvaram cittam ; ASP, p. 47 : ādi- śuddhatvād ādipariśuddhatvāt sattvasya ; CVP, 28 : ādisuddham anutpannam niņsvabhāvam anāvilam | jagad bhāvena sampaśyan na baddho na ca mucyate ||1 In the karika the word nayaka is a name for the Buddha, MVt1, §1. 20 ; AP, 4. 725; BA, II. 31, 66 ; ŚS, p. 5, 1. 8. 1 See Pouss in, JRAS, 1910, p. 139.

212 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV. 98-99

Let us remember here that at the very beginning of the present Chapter (IV. 1) the author has told us, that in the opinion of 'the greatest of men' (dvipadam vara), i.e. the Buddha, jnana and jneya are identical. He has also repeatedly shown above1 and specially in IV. 96, that jnäna is asanga as it does not relate itself to the dharmas or objects which have no reality. The author refers now to this fact and concludes showing the supreme truth that accord- ing to the Buddha there is in reality neither the jñana nor the jñeya or dharmas as he has said neither of them :

99

kramate na hi buddhasya jnānam dharmeșu tāyinaḥ I sarvadharmās tathā jnānam naitad buddhena bhāsitam Il

'According to the Buddha who instructs the way known to him (tāyin),2 jñana does not approach the dharmas (i.e., it does not relate itself to the objects).3 But all dharmas as well as jnana-this has not been said by the Buddha.'

1 See IV. 72, 79, 96. Cj. III. 32. 2 The word tayin is thus interpreted in BAP, p. 75 : tayinam ti. svādhigatamargadesakānām, yad uktam tāyah svadrstamārgoktih (PV, 2 145). See my paper, Pramaņavārttika of Dharmakirtti, IHQ, Vol. XIII, 1937. This explanation is partly followed by Udayanacarya in his Tātparyaļīkā- parisuddhi, Bib. Ind., p. 8 in explaining tayin in Vacaspati Misra's Tātparyaļīkā, 2 (aksapādāya tāyine): tāyī lattvādhyavasāyasamraksaņaksama- sampradāyapravartakaļ. Prajñākaramati in his BAP, p. 75, offers another explanation : athava tāyah santānārthah. āsamsāram apratisthita- nirvanataya avasthayinam. This word is widely used both in Buddhist (LV, p. 421; BA, IIl. 2; SPI, pp. 25, 57, 67, etc.,) and Jaina (YS, Vol. 1, pp. 1, 47: DV, p. 115) works and is misunderstood. Sometimes it is read as trāyin 'protector,' and tapin (as in the present case, see Variants', The word tayin as a name for Buddha is translated into Tibetan by sky.b.pa (MVt1, §1. 15) which suggests its Sanskrit equivalent trayin 'a protector.' See JRAS, 1910, p. 140; JPTS, 1891-1893, p. 53; JA, 1912, p. 243; Proceedings and Transactions of the Second Oriental Conference, Calcutta, 1922, pp. 450-1. 3 See IV. 96.

IV. 99] AGAMASĀSTRA 213

What is the significance of the second half of the kārikā : 'all dharmas as well as jnana-this has not been said by the Buddha?' Let us quote here a few passages showing that the Buddha has never said a word. (i) Nägärjuna in his MK, XX. 25 : sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapañcopaśamab śivaḥ | na kvacit kasyacit kaścid dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ li (ii) Tathāgataguhyasūtra quoted in MV on the above : yam ca rātrim tathagato 'nuttarām samyaksambodhim abhisambuddho yām ca rātrim upādāya parinirvāsyati atrāntare tathāgatena ekam apy akşaram nodāhrtam na vyāhrtam nāpi pravyaharati nāpi pravyāharisyati. (iii) LA, pp. 142-3 : yām ca ratrim tathagato 'bhisambuddho yam ca ratrim parinirvāsyati atrāntare ekam apy aksaram tathāgatena nodāhṛtam na pravyāharisyati. avacanam buddhavacanam. (iv) Nägārjuna in his NSt, 17 : nodāhṛtaņ tvayā kiñcid ekam apy akșaram vibho | krtsnaś ca vaineyajano dharmavarseņa tarpitaḥ If (v) Bhagavat quoted in MV, p. 264 and BAP, p. 365 (with a slight variation) : anakşarasya dharmasya śrutiņ kā deśanā ca kā | śrūyate deśyate cāpi samāropād anaksaraḥ4 iį (vi) LA, p. 137 : na me yānam mahāyānam na ghoșo na ca aksarāķ4 | (vii) LA, p. 48 : (a) tattvam hy akșaravarjitam ; p. 194 : (b) nirakşaratvād dharmasya. (viii) VCh, pp. 24: (a) tat kim manyase subhūte asti sa kaścid dharmo yas tathāgatena desitah. evam ukta ayusmān subhūtir bhagavantam evam avocat. yathaham bhagavan bhagavato bhāsitasyārtham

4 Cf. IV. 60: yatra varā na vartante.

214 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV.99

ājānāmi nāsti sa kaścid dharmo yas tathāgatenānuttarā samyak sambodhir ity abhisambuddhab nasti dharmo yas tathāgatena deśitaḥ. (b) p. 29 : tat kim manyase subhūte api nv asti sa kaścid dharmo yas tathagatena bhasitah. subhutir aha. no hīdam bhagavan nasti sa kaścid dharmo yas tathāgatena bhāsitah. ix) LA, p. 144: yasyām ca rātryām dhigamo yasyām ca parinirvrtah | etasminn antare nāsti mayā kiņcit prakāśitam ll (x) MV, p. 539 : avāca 'naksarāh sarva sūnyāh. Let us now make an attempt to understand the significance of such passages as cited above saying that the Buddha said nothing. This statement is on two grounds, (i) pratyatmadharmatā, i.e., the nature of (the highest truth) which is realized in one's own self, and (ii) pauranasthitidharmata, i.e., the nature of the elements of existence that remains from the past. This requires some explanation. As regards the first it is held that the . transcendental truth (paramartha) springs up only as an inward conviction (pratyatmavedya), it cannot be attained through instruction from another (aparapratyaya = paropadeśā- gamya), for it cannot be expressed by any speech or word. So we are told that for the noble the transcendental truth is silence. This is well-known also in the Vedanta .? Candrakīrtti writes (MV, p. 493) : sarva evāyam abhidhānābhidheyajnānajneyādivyavahāro'seșo lokasamvrtisatyam ity ucyate. na hi paramārthata eva tat sambhavati. kutas tatra paramārthe vācām pravrttiḥ kuto vā jñānasya. sa hi paramārtho 'parapratyayah sāntaḥ pratyātmavedya āryāņāņ sarvaprapancātītah. sa nopadiśyate na cāpi jñāyate.

5 See IV. 98 where the karika is entirely quoted. 6 MV, p. 56: paramārtho hy aryānām tūsnīmbhāvah. ? TU, II. 4. 1: yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha; KU, II. 3; BS, III. 2. 17; The Basic Conception of Buddhism, pp. 19 ff.

IV. 99] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 215

Thus the Buddha did not say anything in fact, yet the people according to their own dispositions think that he did so. We read therefore in a text, Tathagataguhyasutra, quoted in MV, p. 539, just after the passage (ii) cited above : atha ca yathābhimuktāh sarvasattvā nānādhātvasayās tām vividhām tathāgatavācam niścarantīņ samjānanti. teșām evam prthak prthag bhavati. ayam bhagavan asmabhyam imam dharmam desayati. vayam ca tathāgatasya dharmadeśanām śmumah. tatra tathāgato na kalpayati na vikalpayati sarva- kalpavikalpajālavāsanaprapañcavigato hi sāntamate tathăgata iti vistarah.° Continues MV : yadi tarhy evam [na] kvacit kasyaci[t kaści]d dharmo buddhena desitas tat katham ima ete vicitrāh pravacanavyavahārā jnayante. ucyate. avidyanidranugatanām dehinām svapnā- yamānānām iva svavikalpābhyudaya eşah ayam bhagavān sakalatribhuvanasurāsuranaranātha imam asmabhyam dećayatīti. The following may also be quoted here from the LA, p. 194 : na ca mahāmate tathāgatā akșarapatitam dharmam deśayanti.° punar mahāmate yo 'kşarapatitam dharmam dećayati sa pralapati. nirakşaratvād dharmasya. ata etasmāt kāraņān mahāmate uktam deśanāpāthe mayānyaiś ca buddhabodhisattvair yathaikam apy akşaraņ tathāgatā nodāharanti na vyāharantīti. tat kasya hetor yad utānaksaratvād dharmāņām. na ca nārthopasamhitam udaharanti. udāharanty eva vikalpam upadayanupadayan mahamate sarvadharmāņām sāsanalopaḥ syāt.° And the conclusion arrived at here is that one should rest on the sense and not on letters, for one who rests on letters not only ruins oneself, but also cannot make others understand : arthapratisaranena8 mahämate bodhisattvena mahāsattvena bhavitavyam na vyañjanapratisaraņena. vyañjanānusārī mahāmate kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā svātmānam ca nāśayati parārthamś ca navabodhayati. Op. cit., pp. 194-195.

8 In Buddbist Sanskrit texts we have often °sarana for °sarana in such cases

216 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [IV.99

" The second ground is this : The Buddha has said nothing, because what he is reported to have said was from the past. Nothing depends on the birth or absence of birth of the Tathagatas, the true nature of elements of existence remains always the same. This is meant by the statement that the speech of the Buddha is no speech (avacanam buddhavacanam). Taking both the grounds together the LA, pp. 143-144, says :

yad idam uktam bhagavatā yām ca rātrim tathāgato 'bhisambuddho yam ca rātrim parinirvāsyati atrāntara ekam apy akşaram tathāgatena nodāhrtam na pravyāharisyati avacanam buddhavacanam iti. kim idam sandhāyoktam.° bhagavān āha. dharmadvayam mahāmate sandhāya mayaitad uktam. katamad dharmadvayam. yaduta pratyātmadharmatām ca paurāņasthiti- dharmatam ca. utpādad va tathāgatānām anutpādād vā tathagatānām sthitaivaișām dharmāņām dharmatā dharmasthititā dharmaniyāmatā paurāņanagaramahāpathavan mahāmate.° tad yathā mahāmate kaścid eva purușo 'țavyām paryațan paurāņam nagaram anupaśyed avikalapathapraveśam. sa tam nagaram anupraviset tatra praviśya pratinivisya nagaram nagarakriyāsukham anubhavet. tat kim manyase mahāmate api nu tena purușeņa sa pantha utpādito yena patha tam nagaram anupravișto nagara- vaicitryam ca. aha. no bhagavan. bhagavān āha. evam eva mahāmate yan mayā taiś ca tathāgatair adhigatam sthitaivaișā dharmatā dharmasthitita dharmaniyāmatā tathatā bhūtatā satyatā. ata etasmāt kāraņān mahāmate mayedam uktam yām ca rātrim tathagato 'bhisambuddho yām ca rātriņ parinirvāsyati atrāntara ekam apy akşaram tathāgatena nodāhrtam nodāharisyati. The following may also be quoted here from the VCh, p. 243 just after the passage (viii) cited above :

tat kasya hetoh. yo 'sau tathagatena dharmo 'bhisambuddho desito va agrāhyah so 'nabhilāpyab. na sa dharmo nādharmab. tat kasya hetoḥ. asamskrtaprabhāvitā hy āryapudgalāh. It is thus quite reasonable that the author should declare at the end of his discussion the transcendental truth of jñana

IV.99-100] ĀGAMASĀSTRA 217

and jneya or dharma which he begins the chapter with and discusses it throughout. In the last karika of his work the author pays his homage to the highest truth to be realized, i.e., nirvana of the Buddhists, and Brahman of the Vedantins ;

100

durdarsam atigambhiram ajam sāmyam viśāradam l1 buddhvā padam anānātvam namaskurmo yathābalam l

iti gaudapādiya ăgamaśāstre 'lātasāntyākhyam caturtham prakaraņam samāptam.

'Having understood that state which is difficult to be seen, very deep, unborn,2 equal,3 fearless,4 and free from variety,5 we salute it according to our power. Here ends, in the Āgamaśāstra of Gaudapāda,

Book Four called the Cessation of the Fire-brand.'

The word pada 'state' in Buddhist literature is used also to mean nirvana.6 But though it cannot be taken as a peculiarity in that literature, for the word is employed in the similar sense, i.e., moksa or Brahman also in Brahmanical works,7 one is inclined to take it in the sense of nirvana considering all that is aiscussed in this chapter. The two epithets durdarsa and atigambhīra strengthen the view. In Buddhist literature

1 See IV. 93d which is the same as b of the present kārikā. 2 I. 16; III. 1, 19, 26, 33, 43, 47; IV. 11, 12, 13, 38, 46, 48, 57, 60, 74, 80, 93, 95, 96. 3 Il1. 2, 38; IV. 77, 80, 93, 95. 4 IV. 93. Cf. abhaya, IV. 78; nirbhaya, III. 35. III. 13; IV. 91; BU, IV, 4. 19; KU, IV. 10-11. 6 AP, 819: padam thane patittane nibbanamhi ca karane. 7 For instance, KU, II. 15, III. 7-9. 1201B-28

218 ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA [IV.100

sudurdsa (Pali sududdasa) is given as a synonym for nirvāņa (AP, 7) and the words durdrsa (Pali duddasa) ' difficult to be seen' and gambhira 'deep' are frequently used in connection with it.8 The word bala 'power' in yathabala refers to the well- known five-fold bala in Buddhism, viz., (I) śraddhā-bala, (2) vīrya°, (3) smrti°, (4) samādhi°, and (5) prajña°, or the power of faith, energy, recollection, contemplation, and wisdom respectively.9 By using the word it is implied that nirvāna is realized by the exercise of the five-fold power referred to. In the colophon for alata 'fire-brand' see IV. 47-50. The use of the word alatasanti 'cessation of the fire-brand' is very significant and appropriate indicating the quintessence of what is discussed herein. Poussin has traced (JRAS, 1910, p. 135) the simile of the firebrand (alatacakra) in the MU,10 VI. 24.11 But this simile can in no way be connected with the name of the present chapter, alataśanti. For the use of the simile in that Up, is

8 See nirvanarupo dharmo gambhiro durdrsas ca, LV, pp 509, 513, 515; gambhīram durdarsam sūksmam dharmacakram, Ibid, pp. 422, 436 (gambhīro durdrśo mama); ASP, p. 341: gambhīram iti subhūte sūnyatāyā etad adhivacanam° virāgasya nirodhasya nirvāņasya vigamasyaitad adhivacanam yad uta gambhīram iti; MVg, I. 5. 2 8 : ayam dharmo gambhīro duddaso. Cf. KU, II. 12 where durdarsa is used as an adjective of the deva referring, according to the Commentators, to atman. 9 AN, III. 12; DN, II. 120; etc, DS, XLVIII. These five are well-known also in the system of Yoga (YS, I. 20), though these are not described here as bala. According to scholiasts śraddha implies the clearness (samprasāda, prasada) of the mind. Vasubandhu (AK, VIII. 9) is of the same opinion. See ibid. also II. 25. 10 Maitrayana Brahmana Up. is another name for it. But it does not show any Vedic traces. From its language, style, and contents it appears that it belongs to a considerably later period. 11 It runs : alātacakram iva sphurantam ādityavarņam ūrjasvantam brahma tamasah paryapasyat. CowelI (Bibl. Ind.) translates it: "he beholds Brahman flashing like the circle of a whirling torch, in colour like the sun, full of vigour."

IV. 100] AGAMASASTRA 219

not for showing any unreality of Brahman but simply for indicating his splendour. On the other hand, here in our work, as well as in Buddhist works, frequently, and in every case, so far as goes my information, it is used as one of the numerous symbols of unreality.12 The following may be quoted here from CŚ, 325 : alātacakranimāņasvapnamāyāmbucandrakaiḥ | dhumikantahpratisrutkāmarīcyabhraih samo bhavaḥ li

Poussin observes (JRAS, 1910, p. 136) that the title of the fourth Chapter, alatasanti, cannot be said so far to be Buddhist, as the phrase alatasanti has not been traced in Buddhist books. We cannot however, think so. For, it may equally be said that it is not traced in any Brahmanic work older than the AS.13 Now, it may not be traced in Buddhist works, but the word alata as a symbol of unreality according to the Buddhists, of which their works are full,14 Is very well- known. Gaudapāda himself has used it as such in his ÄS not less than four times (IV. 47-50). He has shown taking the stand of a Buddhist, the unreality of the visible world comparing it with alata, and finding out the cause of its appearance and showing thereby as to how it ceases. And if it is so, we cannot say that the title of the chapter is not Buddhist.

12 Such as marumarīcika, gandharvanagara, khapuspa. See MVt1, 139. 21. 13 A similar phrase, mrgatrsnajalabhrāntisanti, occurs in YV, III. 6. 2. 14 See among others LA, pp. 9, 96, etc.

FINIS.

APPENDIXES

I

MĀŅDŪKYA UPANIȘAD

A

TEXT

1

om ity etad aksaram idam sarvam tasyopavyākhyānam1 bhutam bhavad2 bhavisyad3 iti sarvam onkāra eva, yac canyat trikālātītaņ tad apy onkāra eva.

2

sarvam hy etad4 brahmāyam atma brahma so'yam ātmā catuspād.

3

jagaritasthāno bahisprajñab saptāngo ekonaviņśatimukhaḥ sthūlabhug vaisvanarah prathamaḥ pādaḥ.

4

svapnasthano 'ntaḥprajnaķ saptānga ekonaviņśatimukhaḥ praviviktabhuk taijaso5 dvitīyaḥ pādaḥ.

1 ChaU, I. 1. 1: om ity akşaram° tasyopavyākhyānam; cj. TU, I. 8. 1: om itīdam sarvam. A4 omits it. 2 3 Cj. BU, III. 8. 3, IV. 6. 7: yad bhūtam ca bhavac ca bhavisyac ca. 4 For hy etad At tad. 5 A2 adds hiranyagarbho after it.

224 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Append. 1, A

5

yatra supto6 na kancana kāmam kāmayate na kañcana svapnam pasyati tat susuptam. susuptasthana ekībhūtah8 prajnānaghana evā9nandamayo hy anandabhuk cetomukhaḥ prājñas trtīyaḥ pādaḥ.

6

eşa sarveśvara1 esa sarvajña11 ℮șo 'ntaryamy12 esa yonih sarvasya13 prabhavapyayau14 hi bhūtānām.

7

nantaḥprajñam na bahișprajña nobhayataḥprajñam na prajñanaghanam na prajnam nāprajnam adrsļam avyavahāryam agrāhyam alaksaņam acintyam avyapadeśyam ekātmapratyaya- sāram15 prapancopasamam sāntam sivam advaitam caturtham manyante. sa ātmā sa vijñeyaḥ.

A4 susupto for supto, adds tu before kancana, and omits eva after °ghana. 7 BU, IV. 3. 19. 8 Cj. ekībhavati, PU, IV. 2; BU, IV. 4. 2. 9 BU, IV. 5. 13: ātmānantaro 'bāhyah krtsnah prajnānaghana eva. 10 BU, IV. 4. 22: sa vā eșa mahān aja ātmā yo yam vijnanamayah prāņeșu ya eşo 'ntarhṛdaya ākāsas lasmin chete° eșa sarveśvarah°. 11 MuU. I. 1. 9: yah sarvajñah; PU, IV. 10: sa sarvajnah. 12 BU, III. 7. 3: eșa ta atmāntaryāmī. 13 Cf. bhūtayoni, MuU, 1. 1. 6: yad bhūtayonim paripasyanti dhīrāh. 14 A2 prabhava°, D2 prabhavo° for prabhava°. KU, I1. 2. 11. 15 A1 reads nāntahprajñam na bahisprajñam after nāprajñam, and has na prajñam nāprajñam na ghanam na ghanaprajñam na prajñānaghanam for na prajnāna* nāprajñam. A4 omits na prajnānaghanam. After alaksanam A1 anigamano .(? alingam) adding to it bahthprajnam ($ reads in his commentary . a'aksanam alingam ananumeyam ityarthah) nantahprajñam and reading cintyam for acintyam. D1 and D2 add alingam before acintyam. A4 ekantam for ekātma-°, T' and V" aikātmyapra° for ckātmapra°.

Append. I, A] MĀŅDŪKYA UPANIȘAD, TEXT 225

8

so 'yam ātma 'dhyaksaram onkāro 'dhimātram pādā mātrā mātraś ca pādā akāra ukāro makāra16 iti.

9

jagaritasthāno vaiśvānaro 'kāraḥ17 prathamā mātrāpter18 ādimattvād vāpnoti ha vai sarvān kāmān ādiśca bhavati ya evam veda.

10

svapnasthanas taijasa ukāro dvitīyā mātrotkarșād ubhayatvād votkarşatīha vai jñānasantatiņ samānas ca bhavati nāsyābrahmavit kule bhavati ya evam veda.

11

sușuptasthāna prājño makāras trtīyā mātrā miter apīter vā minoti ha vā idam sarvam apītiś ca bhavati ya evam veda.

12

amātraś caturtho 'vyavahāryaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivo 'dvaita evam onkāra ātmaiva. saņviśaty ātmanātmānam19 ya evam veda.

iti māņdūkyopanișat samāptā.

16 A2 A3 IO °ras ceti for °ra iti. 17 A1 omits 'karah. 18 A1 prapter( ?), IO aptor for äpter. 19 VS, XXXII. 11 : ātmanātmanam abhi sam viveśa. A2 adds paśyati after °tmanam. K1 Ch Me repeat ya evam veda which follows. 1201B-29

B

TRANSLATION

1

Om, this syllable is all this. Its further explanation is : the past, the present, the future-all this is verily om. And whatever else that is beyond the thiee times, that, too, is verily Om.

2

Verily all this is Brahman; this self (atman) is Brahman. This same self has four fourths.

3

The first fourth is the Vaiśvanara 'common-to-all- men,' i.e., universal, (active) in the waking state, cognitive outwardly, having seven limbs1 and nineteen mouths2 enjoying the gross.

1 According to S who follows here ChaU, V. 18. 2, these seven limbs are described thus : The very bright one (sulejas), i.e., the heaven is the head. One with various forms (visvarupa), i.e., the sun is the eye. That which has various paths, i.e., the wind is the breath. The extended space (bahula) is the body. Wealth (i.e., water) is the bladder. And the earth is the feet. Here in the ChaU the number is more than seven. 2 I.e., the means for experience of objects. According to S these are the following : The five organs of sense (buddhindriya), the five organs of action (karmendriya), the five vital breaths (prana), the mind (manas), the intellect (buddhi), egoism (ahankara), and thinking (citta). For an explanation of the last four one may be referred to the following : mano buddhir ahankāras cittam karaņam āntaram ! samsayo niścayo garvah smaraņam vișayā ime ll These are regarded as 'mouths,' because these are the instruments with which one experiences the objects.

Append. I, B] MĀŅDŪKYA UPANIȘAD, TR. 227

4

The second fourth is the Taijasa 'brilliant,' (active) in the dreaming state, cognitive inwardly, having seven limbs and nineteen mouths, enjoying the subtle.

5

That is deep sleep in which one asleep desires no desire whatsoever, nor does he see any dream. The third fourth is Prajia 'wise.' He is in the sphere of deep sleep, and just unified, a cognition-mass, consisting of bliss and enjoying bliss having the mind as mouth.

6

This is the lord of all, this is the knower of all, this is the controller of all. This is the source of all, for this is the origin and end of beings.

7

Not inwardly cognitive, not outwardly cognitive, not both- wise cognitive, not a cognition-mass, not cognitive, not non- cognitive, not seen, not to be dealt with, not graspable, having no distinctive marks, not thinkable, not to be defined, the essence of the consciousness of the oneness of the self, the cessation of the expression,3 quiescent, blissful, without a second-(such) they think is the fourth. He is the self. He is to be realized.

8

The same self is om from the point of view of a syllable, and from the point of view of its measure, the fourths are measures and the measures are fourths, and they are A, Uand M.

3 Or, the expansion of the universe, as explained generally.

228 AGAMASĀSTRA [Append, I, B

9

Vaiśvānara 'common-to-all-men' who is (active in) the waking state is the first measure, A, on account of its obtaining4 (apti), or on account of its being the first. Verily, indeed, he obtains all desires and becomes first, who knows thus.

10

Taijasa 'brilliant' who is (active in) the sleeping state is the second measure, U, on account of exaltation or inter- mediateness. Verily, indeed, he exalts the continuity of knowledge, becomes equal," and none who does not know Brahman is born in the family of him who knows thus.

11

Präjña 'wise' who is (active in) the state of deep sleep is the third measure, M, on account of measuring and immerging. Verily, indeed, he measures all this and becomes (its) immerging-he who knows thus.

12

The fourth is without any measure, with which there can be no dealing, it is cessation of expression, blissful, without the second. Thus om is the self, indeed. Enters he with his self into the self-he who knows thus.

Here ends the Upanisad called Manduky a.

4 Or, pervading. & See the note in Hume's translation.

VARIANTS

BOOK I

1. a. All excepting A bahihprajño for bahisprajño. d. A* PU1 PUª smrtah, N Th matah for sthitah. 2. a. A2 dakşināgni°, V dakşiņeksi° for daksiņāksi°; D2 °mukho for mukhe. b. Te os ca for 's tu. c and d are omitted in A2. 3. a and b excepting praviviktabhuk are omitted in A2. d. A2 adds tan before nibodhata. 4. b. A2 ca for tu which is omitted in A4. c. A1 A2 K3 IO anardam for anandas; V° A' tu for ca; IO prajñah for prājñam. d. A3 trividha for tridha; A2 trptam for irptim; A1 A2 A4 K3 vijānata, KN vijānatha for nibodhata. 5. a. A1 dhāmastu for dhāmasu. b. K3 yas tu for yaś ca. c. D3 V" vastu for yas tu. 6. a. K3 bhūtānām for bhāvānām. b. D1 D' ity eva niscayah for °iti viniścayah; D3 sa niścayah for viniścayah. c. D1 sarve for sarvam; D1 D2 pranā, A1 prānām° for prāna°; A1 °ś cetostana, D3 PU2 ś ceto'msūn for s celo'msun. 7. a. A' D2 vibhuti pra°, A' vibhutih pra° for vibhūtim pra°; KN, prabhavam for prasavam; K4 pravadanty anye for prasavam to anye. c. A' °sarupeti for °svarupeti. d. Va vikalpyate, IO vikalpitāh for vikalpitā. 8. b. A2 omits vi of viniścitāh; Va srstir vie for srsļau vi°. c. K3 adds bhūtim before bhūtānām. d. A1 matyante, K1 mānte for manyante. 9. At the end of the karika IO adds the first two ślokas of Ś's commentary, viz., prajnūnāmśu° and yo viśvātmā.°

230 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Append. Il

10. a. A1 niurttih, Te nivrtte for nivrtteh. c. Ae °bhūtānām for °bhāvānām. IO omits the kārikā here, but reads it just after kārikā 12. 11. a. A1 A2 A3 D2 °buddhau for °baddhau. d. Ae Me V" D3 Vn A4 K' dvau tau, PU2 and the MSS ABCD F of NSi (pp. 194, 246) dvau tu, A1 A2 D1 dvaita, PU1 dvaitam, K3 PU2 dau tu for dve tu, while for this line K3 reads dvau turye na tu sidhyatah. 12. a. Va parai° for parām°. b. V" vānr° for cānr°, PU1 cāpi nānrtam for nāpi cānrtam. d. K3 Ae A1 A2 A3 D1 D3 Vn turyam tat (cf. S), KN turiyam for turīyah. 13. d. K3 tu for ca. 14. c. svapnam tu for ca svapnam. 15. a. D2 PU1 grahnatah for grhnatah. c. A1 'nayoh for tayoh. 16. b. A1 sa bu°, A2 svabu° for prabu°. c. D1 asuptam for asvapnam. c and d. A^ advaitam asvapnam for asvapnam advaitam. 17. a and b. A4 vidyate vivartate for vidyeta nivarteta. c. A4 sarvam for dvaitam. 18. a. K3 na nivarleta for vinivarteta; K1 omits it. b. K1 vikalpito for kalpito. 19. a. A1 °syadivi° for °syatvavi°. 20. a. All excepting A V" V" vijñāne for vijnāna. b. A' A2 A4 sphuļah for sphuļam. c. A2 saprati° for samprati°. d. A1 °vidhim for °vidham. 21. b. D2 PU2 mānam sā° for mānasā°. c. A2 saprati° for samprati°. d. A1 laye sa°, D2 layah sa° for layasã°. 22. a. All excepting PU1 yat for yah supported by S. b. D1 IO PU2 veti, K3 ceti for vetti; A4 tadvatah, K3 niścitam, PU1 niscittah for niścitah. c. Me sampū° for sa pū°. d. Me °caișa for °caiva. 23. a. D2 nayati for nayate. d. M and KN 'gatih for gatiḥ. 24. a. A1 onkāro for onkāram. 25. a. pranavo for pranave.

Books I, II]- VARIANTS 231

26. a. For this K1 pranavo brahmaparah brahma. b. A1 A2 A3 D1 D2 Me V9 Vn parah for param; IO parah smrtah for param smrtah. 27. d. A2 °tarah for °taram. 28. a. A4 omits hi before isvaram. b. A1 A4 Gh Ch J N Ve hrdaye sthitam for hrdi samsthitam. 29. b. A* smrlah for śivah. Colophon : A4 mandūkyopanişat samāptā. D1 D2 māņdūkyopanişadvyākhyāne gaudapādabhagavataḥ krtau onkāranirņayah prathamam prakaraņam. IO iti māņdūkyopanișat samāptā. K1 iti māņdūkyopanişadgaudapādavyākhyāne onkarākhya- prathamam prakaraņam samāptam. K3 iti māndūkyopanişat samāptam (sic). hare krsņa hare krsņa° PU1 prathamam prakaraņam. PU2 iti srīgovindapūjyapādasisyasya paramahamsaparivrājakī- cāryasya sankarabhagavataḥ krtāv āgamasāstravivarane prathamas prakaraņe māņdūkyavyākhyānam samāptam. Ve māņdūkyopanișat samāptā. V" iti māndūkyākhyam prathamam prakaraņam.

BOOK II

1. a. A2 °bhūtānām for °bhāvānām. c. A1 A2 Conc. bhedānām for bhāvānām. 2. b. Vª De dehān for deśān. c. Vª prabuddhaś for pratibuddhas. 3. Before this kārikā B2 reads here the kārika 4 once more. 4. b. A3 Ae B2 IO K1 Me PU2 tasmāt for tatha. d. All samvrtatvena for samvrtatvam na; A3 vidyate for bhidyate. 5. a. A2 omits svapna°; A° A3 B2 D1 D2 IO PU2 Vg V" *ritasthane for °rite sthane. 7. 6. PUª svapno for svapne; V9 ca prati°, all others viprati° for 'pi prati.°

232 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Append. II

8. a. A2 A3 B2 apürvasthānidharmo, A1 B1 D1 D2 Me PU1 PU2 V' V" apūrvam sthanidharmo for apūrvāh sthānidharmāh. c. V" matva for gantva. d. K1 V" yadaive° for yathaive.° 9. a. A1 °urttav ayam tv anta°, A2 °vattav arthesv änt', B1 J Jh Vn Urttav apy anta°, Gh C °urttapy anta°, IO °urttav apy anta° for "urttav api to anta°; K1 °svanta' for °tv anta°. b. V kalitam for kalpitam; B1 D1 D2 Gh J Jh K1 asat, A2 IO tad asat, A1 tad idam asat for to asat. c. A1 A2 B1 C D1 D2 IO Jh K1 N PU2 V" % cetasa for s ceto°, A1 A2 B1 IO add hi and C J Jh N add ca after grhilam. d. Vn vaitathyam ubhayor api omitting drstam, A1 K1 sadasator vaitathyam omitting drstam, B1 C D1 D2 IO J Jh N sadasator vaitathyam drstam, A2 sadasator vaitathyam yuktam. 10. a. A2D1 D2 anta°, V" hy anta° for to anta°. b. B1 D1 D2 Gh J Jh K1 V" asat, A1 A2 tad idam asat for to asat. c. A1 A2 B1 D1 D2 Gh J Jh K1 PU1 PV2 Vn °% cetasa for °ś ceto°, A1 A2 B1 IO add hi, the last one omitting sat, C J Jh N add ca omitting sad, A1 A2 B1 Gh J Jh add hi after grhitam. d. A1 A2 sadasator vaitathyam drstam, B1 D1 D2 Gh J Jh V" sadasator vaitathyam yuktam, K1 satyadator vaitathyam for yuktam vaitathyam etayoh. IO and P omit the kārikā entirely. 11. a-b. A2 adds tad after vaitathyam, V" bhedānām vaitathyam for vaitathyam bhedānām. c. V" ekatān for ka etān. 12. a. P atmani as a different reading for atmanam. b. K M° ātmadehah for ātma devah. c. V° bhogān for bhedān. 13. b. All except P vyavasthitan for 'vyavasthitān. c. A1 A2 B1 IO °s cittam for °s citta, B2 first °s cittam then the anusvara is struck off. 14. a. B1 °las ca for °la hi, K1 yetas for ye'ntas. b. D2 ya for ye. 15. d. A2 viseşā mānyahetukah (evidently for višeso nānya- hetukah) for visesas to indriyantare. After that reading the MS reads asti to indriyantare. 18. d. A1 A2 B' D' D2 PU' atmavi° for atmavi°. 19. a. Ae A2 B1 Me Vn °s ca for °s tu. b. D2 kalpitā for

Book II] VARIANTS 233

kalpitah. d. A1 A2 B1 B2 IO K1 PU1 sammo°, V9 yan mo° for 'yam mo° supported by S. 20. a. Ae A3 B2 D1 K1 IO PU1 PU2 Vn prāna for prāņā. b. D' bhūta iti for bhūtānīti. c. B1 guņa for guņā. d. K1 tadvivah for tadvidah. 21. b. A1 vişayā i bhūtānīti ca, A2 bhūvișayāti ca for vișayā iti ; PU1 adds ca after iti. c-d. A2 vedā iti cedavido yajña° (i.e., a and b of the next kārikā) for lokā iti lokavido. 22. a-b. A2 loka iti lokavido deva iti ca tadvidah for the whole line. Me adds ca after iti in a. c. A2 omits ca. d. Me V9 °jya for °jyam. K1 omits c and d. 23. d. Vª amürta for 'mūrta omitting ca after iti. 24. a. IO kālā for kāla. c. V9 pata iti vāta° for vādā iti vāda°. d. B1 V" bhuvanani ca for bhuvanānīti. 25. a. V4 ca tadvido, Gh C Ch mana° for mano°. 27: a. D1 D2 lokāloka°, IO lokāl loka” for loka lloka°. b. IO adds ca after iti. c. D1 D2 °napumsakapumlingah for °pum- napumsakam laingāh; PU1 lingāt, PU2 lingā for laingāh. d. DI D2 parasparam for paraparam; B1 alho° for atha°. 28. d. Ae Me Vn sarve for sarvam; Vn tehe tu samyatāh for ceha tu sarvadā. 29. a. K1 yad for yam. b. tad for tam; A2 san for sa. c. A1 vāvam vipra bhū for cāvati sa bhū°; vavati for cāvati. 30. d. V9 °yed yo vi° for °yet so 'vi°. 32. Before this kārikā A1 B1 and V" read :

tamah svapnanibham drstam varşabudbudasamnibham į nāśaprāyam sukhāddhīnam nāsottaram abhāvajam li

(a. C nabhasy abhra° for tamah svapna°; Ae śvabhra" for svapna°. d. Ae B1 abhāvagam, V" abhāvatah for abhāvajam). It is quoted by Ś in his commentary on the preceding kārikā as from the Vyäsasmrti. P takes it as one of the verses included in the text and comments upon it. b. V" baddho and sādhyakah for bandho and sādhakah respectively. 1201B-30

234 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Append. II

33. c. A1 atha dva°, A2 artha dvac for apy adva°. d. A2 yasmā° for tasmā", sivah for śivā. · 34. a. A2 nātmābhāvena, all others nātmabhāvena for nānyabhavena; J nābhedam for nanedam. c. A2 prthaktvāt prthak ki°, A3 prthaktvat prthaktvam ca, D1 prthan naprthat ki°, D2 prthaktvāprthak ki° for prthan naprthak ki°. - 36. b. B2 yojayot for yojayet. 37. a. PU1 nihstutir for nistutir, A2 °stuto for °skaro. 38. a. K1 matattva° for tattva°. Colophon : B1 iti śrīgovindabhagavatpūjyapādasişyasya paramahamsa- parivrājakācāryasya śrīsankarabhagavatpādasya krtāv āgama- sāstravivaraņe dvitīyam prakaıaņam vaitathyākhyam samāptam. K1 iti śrīmāņdūkyopanişadgaudapādavyākhyāne vetadhāsa (sic) dvitīyaņ prakaraņaņ samāptam. PU2 iti śrīgovindabhagavatpūjyapādasişyasya paramahaņsa- parivrājakācāryasya śrīśankarabhagavataḥ krtāv āgamaśāstra- vivaraņe dvitīyam prakaraņam vaitathyākhyam samāptam. Vº agamasastre vaitathyākhyam dvitīyaņ prakaraņam samāptam. Vn ·vaitathyakhyam dvitīyam prakaraņam.

BOOK III

1. a. A1 upāsāśri° for upāsanāśri°. b. A1 A2 A3 Gh NJ jñāte for jate. 2. b. D2 °sajati for °m ajati; A1 A2 IO yatha for gatam. c. A1 A2 tatha for yatha. In D1 the leaf containing karikas 2-7 is missing. 3. c. K1 ghatārvahavac ca for ghaļādivac ca. d. °tāv evan ni° for °tav etan ni°. 4. b. V9 °kāśoda° for °kasāda°. c and d are omitted in V". d. Me jiva for jiva. 6. a. For it K1 nūparāgasamasmāc ca; V" °s tu for °s ca. 7. c. Vª naivanmanah for naivātmanah. d. Va °rāvayau for °ravayavau. c and d are omitted in Vn,

Book IIIj VARIANTS 235

8. b. A1 gagamanam for gaganam; A2 malino for malinam. 9. c. All sthitau for sthitah in V9. c-d. V9 Jh °riresu hy aka°, A1 Vn °rireşv ākā° (but on margin °rīreșu ākā°) for °rīreșu ākā°. d. A2 °vicakşanah for °vilakşaņah. 10. b. A1 A2 B1 (on margin visa°) IO vivarjitäh for visarjitāh; Vg atma° for atma° and °rjitah for °rjitah. d. A1 bhidyate for vidyate. 11. d. A2 svayam ya, Ae B1 B2 IO PU1 PU2 V9 kham yatha for sa-yatha; A1 A2 kham samprakirti°, D1 D2 V" kham prakāsi° for samprakāsi°. 12. d. IO °kaśapra® for °kaśah pra°; V" prakāśam for prakāsitaḥ. 13. a. A2 °tmāno for °tmano°, A1 ajanyatvam for ananyatvam. c. A3 IO bhidyate for nindyate. d. A3 B2 C D1 D2 Me eva for evam. 14. c. Ch. gaunatvam for gaunam tan. d. A1 A2 B1 B2 DI D2 IO JN PU1 PU' V9 Vn hi na for na hi. 15. a. A1 A2 °lingais tu for lingadyaih. b. A2 vodita for coditā. 17. a. A2 susi° for svasi°; A3 sumiddhāvadāvasthāstu for a. 18. b. sad for tad. c. IO ubhayatā for ubhayatha. 19. c. °māno for °māne. 21. b. yatha for tatha. See IV. 7'. 22. d. A2 sthasya viniścitam for sthāsyati niścalah. 23. a. K2 bhuto 'bhuta° for bhūtato 'bhuta°. 24. a. A1 A2 caśrīyāt for camnāyad 25. c. A1 A2 kas to enam for ko no enam. 26. c and d are omitted in A2. The examination of K2 shows that the order of the karikas Nos. 25, 26 and 27 is actually the same as in other MSS, but owing to a mistake of the scribe in copying the commentary that order has been changed, they being copied as Nos. 25, 27 and 26 respectively. 27. a and b are omitted in A2. 28. c. A1 CD1 D2 P Vn °suto for °putro. 31. a. A1 A2 °mukha° for °drsya°; B1 sarvam for dvaitam. c. A2 manasã for manaso; B2 unmanī° for amanī°.

236 ÁGAMASÁSTRA [Append. İl

32. c. A2 amanaskam for amanastām. d. D2 grahyabhā° for grāhyābhā°. 33. b. A1 A2 jñeyam bhi° for jneyabhi°; pracaksyate for pracaksate. 34. c. A1 pracārah for pracārah. 35. a. Ch susuptau for suşupte. b. V9 suşuptasya ni° for sușupte tan ni°; A1 A2 na ni° for tan ni°. 36. c-d. K1 sarvajñopacārah for sarvajñam nopacārah. 37. a. A1 A2 °bhimānavimatah, IO V" °bhilāşavigatah for °bhilapavigatah. b. Vº °mujjhitah for °mutthitah. d. A1 'bhavah for 'bhayah. 38. b. B2 citā for cintā. c-d. A1 jnāyam ajnātih, A2 jnāyanajñatih for jñānam ajāti. 39. a. IO Va "yogo nāmāyam, A1 A2 °yogī namāyam, PD °yogo nāmaisah for °yogo vai nāma. d. A1 bhayadarśatah, A' tattvadarsinah for bhayadarsinah. 40. a. A1 IO nigraho yat tad, A2 nigraho yat tam for nigrahāyattam. 43. b. A1 A2 °bhogam for bhogan .. · 44. b. PU1 samayet for samayet. d. B2 samam präptam, all others samaprāptam for samaprāptam (=°t śama°) in VeS, § 33 and supported by Vidvanmanorañjanī; C vicālayet for cālayet. 45. a. VeS with Subodhini and Vidvanmanorañjani, loc. cit., rasam for sukham. c. A1 A2 niścitām ci°, IO niścitam ci°, Bª niścaramś ci" for niścarac ci°. 46. b. A1 A2 PU1 manah for punah. c. A1 aningita°, A* ' anangita°, B1 D2 alingana° for aningana°. d. K Me tatha for tadā. 47. d. A1 A2 sa sarvajñah parīksite for sarvajñam paricaksate. 48. b. B1 sambhāvo for sadbhāvo. Colophon : B1 PU2 iti śrīgovindabhagavatpūjyapādasişyasya paramahamsa- parivrājakācāryasya sankarabhagavatab krtāv āgamasāstravivaraņe advaitākhyam trtīyam prakaraņam samāptam.

Books III, IVJ VARIANTS 237

PU1 iti śrīgaudapādācāryaviracitam advaitākhyam trtīyam prakaraņam. V āgamasāstre advaitākhyam tītīyam prakaraņam samāptam, V" gaudapādīye advaitanirņayo nāma tītīyam prakaraņam.

BOOK IV

1. c. A1 samurddha°, A2 sambhinna° for sambuddha°. d. PU2 °ntaram for varam. 2. d. Vª darśata° for deśita°. 3. a. Vª jata° for jati°. b. B1 first sarva then corrected to kecid as in the text. 4. a. All excepting De GP Me dvaya for 'dvayah. d. A'A2 na jātim, V9 °ajātam for ajātim. 6. d. A2 martya nu for martyatām; A1A2 işyati for eşyati. 7. a. D1 marlye for martyam. b. D1D2 mrtyu° for martya°; A1A2 Jh V9 yatha for tatha. See III. 21b. 9. a. A1 nisvābhāvikī for svābhāvikī. b. IO krtā, B1 B2 K1 GP Me Vº akrta, A1 A2 amrtā, Jh krtakā, C °py ākrtā for °py akrtā; Jh yatha for ca ya. c. A1 °s ceti, A2 sveti, A3 °s seti for seti. K1 reads only d omitting other lines altogether. 10. 6. A1 A2' sarva° for sarve. d. A1 A2 tanmaya api for tanmanīşaya. It is to be noted that in D1 karikas from 10 to 53 are wanting. 11. d. B1 nityam bhinnam for bhinnam nityam; A1 A2 yat for tat. 12. a. A1 A3 Ae B1 B2 Me D2 V" yady ananyatvam, A2 yayam ananyatvam, V' yad anyatvam for yad ananyatvam. As the word yadi occurs in b here in a one should read yad as actually found in Vª though it reads in b tava for yadi. 13. c-d. A2 ° mānas tasya vyavathā for °mānasya na-vyavasthā. d. Vº prajāyate, PU1 PU2 prasajjale for prasajyate. 14. a. A2 ° di samam for ° dh phalam. IO omits the kārikā. 15. b. Vo adihetuh for adir hetuh; A1 A2 1O phalam ca yat for phalasya ca. d. A1 putra' for putrāj°.

238 ÁGAMAŠĀSTRA [Append. il

16. b. V9 °eşitah, B1 K1 °işitavyah for °eşitavyah. d. A2 vişayāvat for vişāņavat. 17. a. B2 phalatanupa° for phalad utpa°. b. A1 A2 to for te. 18. b. A1 hetuh, A2 hetusu for hetutah; C Jh phalasiddhih for phalasiddhih. c. A1 A2 param tat for katarat. B2 gives the number of the karika as 16 instead of 18 and henceforth the scribe counts the following kārikas accordingly, i.e., 17, 18, etc. 19. a. A2 atrokti° for aśakti°; A1 A2 °pavijñanam for °pari- jñānam. d. A1 A2 °jāti for °jātih ; A1 °vāpitā for °dīpitā. 20. b. A1 A2 °tamo for °samo; Ae A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 D1 IO PU1 PU2 Va Vn sah for nah in C D2. c. Ae A3 B1 B2 IO PU1 PU2 V9 V" hi for ca in A1 A2 supported by . 21. a. Gh parapari° for °parāpari°. b. V# °dipikam for dīpakam. 22. a. 1O omits v after svato. 23. b. Ae A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 DI IO Me PU1 PU2 cāpi for vāpi. d. PU1 on the margin jatir for hy ädir. 24. d. A1 A2 paratam nasti nāma tā (the former °tāh for.°ta) for the line; Vn °matam for mata. 25. a. A1 A2 prajñapte for prajñapteh. b. A1 bhukti° for yukti°; A2 anyatha dvayanasatah for b; K1 bhūta° for yukti°. c and d are omitted in K1. 26. a. Vª ° arthān for °artham. b. A2 nābhasam, Va arthābhāsas ta° for nārthābhāsam ta°. d. A2 IO °bhāsam for °bhasas; A1 tata, C tathā for iatah. 27. a. A3 sahā for sadā. b. pañcasu for °ty adhvasu. c. A1 viparyatsah for viparyāsah. 28. b. cittam for citta°. c. A1 jati, A2 yānti for jātim. d. Vª te for khe and khe for te. 29. a. A2 tasmād for yasmād. b. A1 A2 D2 tathā for tatah. c. A2 'nyatha for °r anyathā. 30. c. A1 anantabhāvadimato, A2 anantatā vādimate, C D2 anantatā ādimato for anantatā cādimato.

Book IV] VARIANTS 239

31. c-d. A2 santyevic, A3 D2 santo vi° (in the latter between santo and vi° there is an avagraha mark above the line and it seems to have been struck off) for santo 'vi°; A2 D2 laksitā for laksitāh. 32. b. All excepting D2 vipratipadyate for 'pi pratipadyate. See II. 7. 33. a. All sarve dha° for sarvadha° in A1; PU2 mrsãh for mrsā. b. A2 V9 kāryasya° for kayasya°. c. B1 B2 Me Vn samurtte for samurte. 34. a. A2 jñātvā for gatvā. b. A2 kālālaisyā° for kālasya°. d. IO darse for dese. 35. b. Ae A3 B' B2 K1 Me sambuddho for prabuddho. c. A2 D2 vāpi for cāpi. 36. b. D2 °s tadarsanāt for sya darsanat. 37. c. Ae B1 B2 PU1 V9 °tvat tu for °tvac ca. d. A1 A2 D2 sajāga® for saj jāga°. 38(39). b. A1 tanmaya for tanmayah. c. A1 A2 drstāc ca for drstva ca. 39(41). b. A2 °cintyat for °cintyan. c. Gh yatha for tathā; A1 A2 viparyāsam for viparyāsāt. d. A1 A2 tatra ca for tatraiva. 41(40). c. B2 sa for sac. 42. a. A2 upalambhāt for upalambhāt. d. A1 A2 °s ca satām, B1 °s trasyatām for °s trasatām. 43. a. A1 °s tu asatyam, A2 °s tu satam, D2 susatăim, B1 's trasyatam for °s trasatam. b. A1 D2 te for ye ; V first te then corrected to ye. 45. a. A1 A2 vastvabhāsam for vastvābhāsam. d. A1 sāntim, B2 santam for santam; D2 avyayum, V" sadvayam for advayam. 46. 'a-b: B2 cittacintam for cittam evam. c. V" °m ajānanto. PU2 jānanto, C vijñato na for vijananto. d. A1 tapati, A2 A3 tapanti for patanti. 47. d. All excepting B1 C Jh PU1 vijñanaspa° for vijñanam spa° 48. a. Ae A3 D' IO Me PU1 PU2 alātam for alātam. In A1 a and b are omitted, c. A1 °māna vi° for °mānam vi°,

240 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Append. Il

A2 reads c-d as a-b, and a-b as c-d with the following variants : . c. °māna vi° for °manam vi°, and °prajam for °m ajam. V9 is damaged here. 49. b. D2 B2 nābhāsa for nābhāsā; A1 A2 A3 Kh Gh JN "s cānyato for anyato. c-d. A1 nispandām nā°, A2 nispandā na, Gh nispandan nā° for nispandān na°. 50. a-b. B2 °nirgatālātā drac for nirgatā alātāt te dra°. c-d. A1 ° vāsya nābhāsasthāvi° for °va syur ābhāsasyāvi°. 51. c. A1 A2 A3 nispandam na for nispandan na. 52. a. K Jh °rgatā vijna° for °rgatās te vijna°; K Jh Me V9 ctā vijñānāt te, B1 °tā vijnānas te, B2 °tā vijñānā te, PU1 °t te vijñānāt for °tas te vijanad. b. A1 A2 A3 dravyatvam bha° for dravya- tvabha°. c-d. A1 °yogadānovittah, A2 yogād ato cittah for °bhāvād yato 'cintyah ; A3 cintya for 'cinlyah ; A1 Aª hi for te. 53. c. A2 °m anyathabha° for °m anyabha° .. 54. b. A2 B2 D1 Vº cäpi for vapi; A3 dharmajāh for dharma- jam. c. A2 °jatih for °jat'm. - 55. a. V" yad dhetu°, PU1 yava hetu° for yavad dhetu°. c. D1 D2 hetuh for hetu°. 56. d. Ae A3 B1 B2 D1 D2 Me PU1 Va V" samsāram na prapadyate, A2 samsāran nopapadyate for samsāro nopapadyate in A1 and JO. 57. a. A1 A2 svapnam for sarvam. b. Ae B1 B2 Me PU1 PU2 nästi tena vai for tena nāsti vai. c. All sadbhāvena for svabhāvena. d. A2 nāsmi for nāsti. 58. b. All excepting V" jāyante for samurtya supported by S. 59. a. A2 °ya jatā° for °yād bījā°. c. A1 A2 na sa for nāsau; A1 bocche° for cocche°. 60. a. A1 nādyeşu, A2 nājyeșu for nājeșu. b. A1 śāśvatā nāsti dhiyate, A2 śāśvatāśāśvato'bhidhā for this line. c. V °nyamūdyante vartante for na vartante. 62. a. Vª tu for ca. b. A1 A2 B1 DI D2 manah for cittam. c. Vº tu for ca. d. A1 jāgram na, A2 jāgreņa for ja gran na.

Book IV] VARIANTS 241

63. a. A1 A2 pracalan, C kvacaran for pracaran. b. A1 disam uithitān, A2 disamurcchitān for dasasu sthitān. c. A1 añjanān for andajān; B2 svapne for vāpi. 64. a. DI svapne for svapna°; A1 A2 °kim na, A3 DI °kitla° for °citta°. b. A1 A2 bhidyante for vidyante. c. A2 na drśya° for taddrsya°, A1 °m etedam for °m evedam. d. A1 kim ta°, A2 kam ta°, A3 D1 kitta° for citta°; K1 jagrataś ci° for svapnadrk ci°. 65. a. A1 A2 varam for carañ. a-b. Va tasmā diksu corrected to tac ca tyaksu for jagrad diksu. b. A2 dasmutthitān for daśasu sthitān. c. D1 cāpi for vāpi. 66. a. D1 cksinīyās°, Vn °ksanīyām° for °ksaņīyās°. b. A1 bhidyante, A2 bhidyanti for vidyate. c. A1 drsyam idam vedam for tad drsyam evedam. d. B1 jāgrac for jāgrataś. 67. c. C °drsyeta for °drsye te. b. A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 C Ch D1 D2 G IO K Me PU1 PU2 Vg ca for na. After this kārika D2 adds :

pramāņasūnyam ubhayam cittam caittam dvayam yataḥ / tanmatenaiva tac cittam tayaiva ca tad g!hyate |I

There are different readings for which see Ś's commentary (Ae) from which it is taken. Here d is defective of metre. - 68. d. Kh Gh N Jh na bhavanti for bhavanti na. 69. A1 A2 omit it. In A3 it is not in the body but on the margin by a second hand. b. K1 mriyate jāyate for jayate mriyate. d. Kh Gh N J na bhavanti for bhavanti na. 70. A2 Vn omit the kārikā. a, A1 K1 V nimittako, B1 B2 nirmittako for nirmitako. b. Ae D1 D2 Me va for ca. 71. c. A2 ya etad u° for etat tad u°; A2 V" sarvam, K1 patram for satyam. 72. a. For this A1 A2 cittam spandati me sarvam. b. D1 D2 grāhyam gra° for grāhyagra°. 73. c. All paratantrabhi° for paratantro 'bhi°. d. For this Vn paramarthena nasty asau. Then again it has c and d. 1201B-31

242 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Append. Il

74. a. A1 °samurttah for °samurtya. b. A2 °rtho na for °rthena. c. Ae A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 D1 D2 V9 V" paratantra° for paratantro'° in K Me. 75. c. V9 dvayābhāsam for dvayabhavam. d. A1 A2 tannimitto for nirnimitto. 76. a. PU1 labhyate for labhate. c. A2 tam for tada. d. hetubhāve for hetvabhāve. 77. c. A2 pūrvasya for sarvasya. 78. a. A2 satyam for satyam. b. For this A2 hetunyapyagate bruban ; V9 hetu - thag°, IO hetuprathag for hetum prthag°; Vn °napnuyat, others °napnuvan for napnuvat in D2. c. All excepting A2 V" tatha for tadā ; Ae Me kamam for 'kāmam. 79. a. A1 °nivesyadbhih, IO °nivesyaddhih for °niveśad dhi. c. A1 yas tva°, A2 yat toa°, B1 vastva°, V" dvaya° for vastca°; all excepting A1 and A2 sa buddhvaiva, A1 subuddhyaiva, A2 subudhyeva for sa buddhvaiva; A1 adds ca after buddhvaiva. d. A1 na niva°, A2 hi niva°, V" ca niva' for viniva°. 80. b. Gh niścalam for niścalā. c. A3 D1 V sā for sa ; A1 A2 Vn tu for hi. d. KMe svamya° for sāmya°; V" °jadvayam for °jam advayam. 81. a. A2 unnidram for anidram. b. A1 A2 prabhāvam for prabhatam. c. A2 vibhānto for vibhato. d. Ae B1 V9 dharmo dhatusva°, Gh dharmo dhātum sva° for dharmo dhaiuh sva°. 82. a. A' A2- aśrayate for āvriyate. b. A2 va Driyate, B2 Driyate, D2 va vriyate for vivriyate ; A1 tada for sada. c-d. For. this A1 A2 IO yasya dharmasya grahanam bhagavān api so 'śnute. . 83. b. V9 vai tor va. c. A' A2 °bhasair for bhavair. . 84. a. A3 catasro for catasra; A1 A2 cś ca, B1 °su for °s tu; C es ca tatparaya° for °s catasra eta°. b. A3 grhai° for grahai°; C°s tāsam for °r yasam. 85. a. D2 krsnakrtām (corrected by a second hand to sarvajñatām) sarvām for sarvajñatām krtsnām. b. A1 agrayam, D1 D2 avyayam for advayam. c. A1 anna° for ana°.

Book IV] VARIANTS 243

87. a. A1 avastu, A2 suvastu for savastu. c and d are omitted in K1. 88. a. V" °palam for °palambham. 89. a. B1 dvividhe for trividhe. b. D1 vindate, D2 vidate for vidite. 90. a. A1 A2 °jñeyasya vākyāni, IO °jñeyāpavākyāni for °jñeyapyapakyani. d. D2 °lambho° for °lambha°. 91. a. A1A2 A3 °vijñeyah for °vaj jñeyah. a-b. Ch reads sarve before jñeyah. b. All sarve dharma excepting A1 V# which read sarvadharmã. c. Vº ca for hi. 92. b. All sarve dharmäh excepting V° which reads sarva- dharmāh. 93. b. A2 prakrtau va for prakrtyaiva; A2 J sunirmitāh, V9. suniścitah for sunirurtāh. c. A2 Vª sarvadha° for sarve dha°. d. A1 A2 syāmam for sāmyam; A2 °radām for °radam. For d B2 prakrtyaiva sunirurtah repeating c and d as in the text. 94. c. A1 vedabhinnah, A2 vedābhinnāh, V" bhedanisthā for bhedanimnāh. 95. a. A1 A2 ajam for aje; A1 sāmyam for sāmye. b. A1 A2 vipaścitam, IO viniścitaih for suniścitāh. 96. a. A1 ajetyojam, Me aje 'py ajam for ajesv ajam ; D2 ajam krāntam for asamkrāntam. D1 and D2 add here sarvabhūtātma- bhutasya sarvabhūtahitasya ca which is found in Ś's com- mentary on the preceding kārika. 97. a. IO vaidharme for vaidharmye. d. A2 udäharane for utavarana° ; D1 °varanā° for °varana°. 98. c. A1 budhās, A2 buddhas for buddhās; A1 yuktā, A2 yukta for mukta. d. A2 budhyanti, IO budhyante for budhyanta. 99. a. A1 budhasya for buddhasya. b. A1 no manah, A2 first bodhinah then corrected to vyapinah, D1 D2 K1 Me PU1 tapinah, Ae tapi(yi)nah for tayinah. c. All excepting A1 A2 sarve dha° for sarvadha°. d. A1 budhena for buddhena. 100. a. V". durdaśam for durdarśam. b. A1 śyämam for samyam; A2 °radam for °radam. d. A1 manah kurmo, A3 manaskurmo, A2 D2 Vn namah kurmo for namaskurmo.

244 ÁGAMASĀSTRA [Append. II

Colophon : A1 A2 ity upadesagranthe 'lātasāntyākhyam prakaranam samāptam. A3 adds to the above only caturtham after prakaranam. B1 B2 iti śri govindabhagavatpūjyapādasisyasankarabhagavataḥ kṛtāv āgamasāstravivaraņe alātasāntākhyam caturtham prakaraņam samāptam (B2 sampūrņam). D' D2 iti śrigaudapādabhagavatab krtau agamagranthe upadesagranthe vedāntamūle gaudapādīyam caturtham prakaraņam. IO ity alātākhyam caturtham prakaraņam upanișat samāptam (sic). śiva siva ... (17 times). K1 iti māņdūkyopanişadgaudapādavyākhyāne. PU1 iti śrīmadgaudapādācāryakrtau māņdūkyavārttike alāta- sāntyākhyam caturtham prakaraņam samāptam. prakaraņa- catusțayātmakaņ sāstraņ sampūrņam. PU2 iti śrīgovindabhagavatpūjyapādasişyasya śrīśankara- bhagavataḥ krtav agamasastravivaraņe alātaśāntyākhyam caturtham prakaraņam samāptam. Vª iti śrīgaudapāda-āgamasāstre alātasāntyākhyam caturtha- prakaraņaņ samāptam. V" iti śrīgaudapādīye upadeśagranthe alataśāntyākhya- caturthaprakaraņam.

III

INDEX OF THE KĀRIKĀS

akalpakam ajaņ jñānam, III. 33 alāte spandamāne vai, IV. 49 akāro nayate viśvam, I. 23 avastv anupalambham ca, IV. 88 ajaḥ kalpitasaņvrtyā, IV. 74 avyaktā eva ye 'ntas tu, II. 15 ajam anidram asvapnam, III. aśaktir aparijnānam, IV. 19 36; IV.81 asaj jāgarite drstvā, IV. 39 ajātaņ jāyate yasmāt, IV. 29 asato māyayā janma, III. 28 ajātasyaiva dharmasya, IV. 6 asti nasty asti nastīti, IV. 83 ajātasyaiva bhāvasya, III. 20 aspandamānam alātam, IV. 48 ajātes trasatām teșām, IV. 43 asparśayogo vai nāma, III. 39; ajād vai jayate yasya, IV. 13 IV. 2. ajeșv ajam asamkrăntaņ, IV. 96 ātmasatyanubodhena, III. 32 aje sāmye tu ye kecit, IV. 95 ātmā hy ākāśavaj jīvair, III. 3 anumatre 'pi vaidharmye, IV. 97 ādāv ante ca yan nasti, II. 6; ato vaksyāmy akārpaņyam, III. 2 IV. 31 adīrghatvāc ca kālasya, II. 2 adibuddhaņ prakrtyaiva, IV. 92 advayaņ ca dvayābhāsam, Ill. ādisāntā hy anutpannāh, IV .- 93 30; IV.62 āśramās trividhā hīna-, III. 16 advaitam paramārtho hi, III. 18 icchāmātram prabhoh srstir, I. 8 anādimāyayā supto, I. 16 utpādasyaprasiddhatvat, IV. 83 anäder antavattvam ca, IV. 30 utseka udadher yadvat, III. 41 animittasya cittasya, IV. 77 upalambhāt samācārāt, IV. 42, aniścitā yathā rajjuķ, II. 17 44 antahsthānāt tu bhedānām, II. 4 upāyena nigrhņīyat, III. 42 anyatha grhnatah svapno, I. 15 upāsanāśrito dharmo, III. 1 apūrvaņ sthānidharmo hi, II. 8 ubhayor api vaitathyam, II. 11 abhāvaś ca rathādīnām, II. 3 ubhe hy anyonyadrsye te, IV.67 abhūtābhiniveśād dhi, IV. 79 Įjuvakrādikābhāsam IV. 47 abhūtabhiniveśo 'sti, IV. 75 etair eso 'prthagbhāvaih, II. 30 amātro 'nantamātraś ca, I, 29 evam na cittaja dharma, IV. 54 alabdhāvaraņāh sarve, IV. 98 evam na jāyate cittam, IV. 46

246 AGÁMASĀSTRA [Append. II]

oņkāraņ pādaśo vidyāt, I. 24 trişu dhāmasu yad bhojyam, I. 5 kalpayaty ātmanātmānam, II. 12 dakşiņākșimukhe viśvo, I. 2 kāraņaņ yasya vai kāryam, duḥkham sarvam anusmrtya, IV.11 III. 43 kāraņad yady ananyatvam, durdarsam atigambhiram, IV. IV. 12 100 kāryakāraņabaddhau tāv, I. 11 dravyam dravyasya hetuḥ syāt, kāla iti kālavido, II. 24 IV. 53 kotyaś catasra etās tu, IV. 84 dvayor dvayor madhujñāne, kramate na hi buddhasya, III: 12 IV. 99 dvaitasyāgrahaņam tulyam, I. 13 khyāpamānāmajātiņ taiļ, IV. 5 dharma ya iti jayante, IV. 58 grahaņāj jāgaritavat, IV. 37 na kaścij jāyate jīvaḥ, III. 48; ghațādișu pralīneșu, III. 4 IV. 71 carañ jāgarite jagrat, IV. 65 cittakālā hi ye 'ntas tu, II. 14 na nirodho na cotpattir, II. 32

cittam na samsprśaty artham, na nirgatā alātāt te, IV. 50

IV. 26 na nirgatās te vijnānāt, IV. 52

cittaspanditam evedam, IV. 72 na bhavaty amṛtam martyam, III. 21; IV.7 jarämaraņanirmuktāh, IV. 10 jāgraccittekșaņīyās te, IV. 66 na yuktam darśanaņ gatvā, IV. 34 jagradvrttav api tv antas, II. 10 jātyābhāsam calābhāsaņ, IV. 45 nākāśasya ghațākāśo, IIl. 7

jīvam kalpayate pūrvam, Il. 16 nājesu sarvadharmeșu, IV. 60

jīvatmanoḥ prthaktvam nātmānam nāparāmś caiva, I. 12 yat, III. 14 nānyabhāvena nānedam, II. 34

jīvātmanor ananyatvam, III, 13 nsty asaddhetukam asat, IV.40

jñane ca trividhe jneye, IV. 89 nāsvādayet sukham tatra, Ill. 45 . jñāņenākāśakalpena, IV. 1 nigrhītasya manaso, III. 34

. tattvam adhyatmikam drsțvã, nimittam na sadā cittam, IV. 27

II. 38 nivrttasyāpravṛttasya, IV. 80

tasmād evam viditvainam, II. 36 nivṛtteḥ sarvaduņkhānām, I. 10

tasmān na jāyate cittam, IV. 28 niścitāyām yathā rajjvām, II. 18

taijasasyotvavijñāne, I. 20 nistutir nirnamaskāro, II. 37 neha nāneti cāmnāyāt, III. 24 trișu dhāmasu yat tulyam, I. 22 pañcavimśaka ity eke, II. 26

Append. III] INDEX OF THE KĀRIKĀS 247

pādā iti pādavido, II. 21 yathā nirmitako jīvo, IV. 70

. pūrvaparaparijnānam, IV. 21 yatha bhavati balanām, IIl. 8 prakṛtyākāśavaj jfeyāļ, IV. 91- yatha mayāmayād bījāt, IV. 59 prajnapteh sanimittatvam, IV. yatha mayamayo jīvo, IV. 69 24,25 yathā svapnamayo jīvo, IV. 68 praņavaņ hīśvaraņ vidyāt, I. 28 yathā svapne dvayābhāsaņ, IIl. pranavo hyaparaņ brahma, 1. 26 29,61 prapañco yadi vidyeta, 1. 17 yathaikasmin ghatākāśe, III. 5 prabhavaķ sarvabhāvānām, I. 6 yadā na labhate hetūn, IV. 76 prāņa iti prāņavido, II. 20 yada na līyate cittam, III. 46 prāņādibhir anantaiś ca, II. 19 yadi hetoh phalat siddhih, IV. 18 prāpya sarvajnatām krtsnām, yavad dhetuphalavesah, IV. IV.85 55;56 phalad utpadyamanah san, IV. 17 yuñjīta praņave cetah, I. 25 bahisprajño vibhur viśvo, I. 1 yo'sti kalpitasamvıtyā, IV. 73 bījankurākhyo drstāntah, IV. 20 rasādayo hi ye kośa, III. 11 buddhvā nimittatam satyām, rūpakāryasamākhyāś ca, III. 6 IV. 78 laye sambodhayec cittam. bhavair asadbhir evayam, II. 33 III. 44 bhūtato 'bhutato vā'pi, IIl. 23 lîyate hi susupte tat, III. 35 bhūtaņ na jāyate kincit, IV. 4 lokā'l lokavidah prāhub, II. 77 bhūtasya jatim icchanti, IV. 3 vikaroty aparān bhāvān, II. 13 bhogārtham sstir ity anye, I. 9 vikalpo vinivarteta, I. 18 makārabhāve prājnasya, I. 21 vijñāne spandamāne vai, IV. 51 mana iti manovido, II. 25 viparyāsād yatha jagrat, IV. 41 manaso nigrahāyattam, III. 40 vipraņām vinayo hy esa, IV. 86 manodṛśyam idam dvaitam, vibhūtim prasavam tv anye, 1. 7 III. 31 viśvasyātmavivakşāyām, I. 19 marane sambhave caiva, III. 9 viśvo hi sthūlabhun nityam, I. 3 māyaya bhidyate hy etat, III. 19 vītaragabhayakrodhair, II. 35 mitrādyaih saha sammantrya, veda iti vedavido, Il. 22 IV. 35 vaitathyam sarvabhavānām, II. 1 mellohavisphulingādyaih, III. 15 vaisāradyam tu vai nāsti, IV. 94 yam bhavam darsayed yasya, sa eșa neti netiti, III. 26 I1.29 saņvrtya jayate sarvam, IV. 57

248 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Append. III

sanghātāḥ svapnavat sarve, III. 10 | svapnadțkcittadrśyās te, IV. 64 sato hi māyayā janma, III. 27 svapnadṛk pracaran svapne, saprayojanatā teșām, II. 7 ; IV.32 IV.63 sambhave hetuphalayor, IV. 16. svapnanidrāyutāv ādyau, 1. 14 sambhūter apavadāc ca, III. 25 svapnamāye yatha drste, Il. 31 sarvasya praņavo hy ādir, I. 27 svapnavrttāv api tv antaś, Il. 9 sarvābhilāpavigataḥ, III. 37 svapne cävastukaḥ käyaķ, sarve dharma mrsa svapne, IV. IV. 36 33 svabhāvenāmṛto yasya, III. 22; savastu sopalambham ca, IV.87 IV. 8 sāņsiddhikī svābhāvikī, IV. 9 svasiddhāntavyavasthāsu, Ill. 17 sukham āvriyate nityam, IV. 82 svastham śāntam sanirvāņam, sūkşma iti sūkșmavidaḥ, Il. 23 III. 47 srstir iti srstivido, II. 28 hetur na jāyate'nādi, IV. 23 sthūlam tarpayate viśvam, I. 4 hetor ādiņ phalam yeșām, IV. svato vā parato vāpi, IV. 22 14; 15 svapnajāgarite sthāne, Il. 5 heyajñeyāpyapākyāni, IV. 90

IV

INDEX OF THE PASSAGES OF THE MĀŅDŪKYA UPANIȘAD

amatraś caturtho, 12 yatra supto na kañcana, 5 eșa sarveśvara eșa sarvajñah, 6 sarvam hy etad brahma, 2 om ıty etad akşaram, l sușuptasthānaḥ prājño 11 jāgaritasthāno bahișprajño, 3 so'yam ātmādhyakșaram, 8 jāgaritasthāno vaiśvānaro, 9 svapnasthānas taijasa, 10 nāntaḥprajñam na bahisprajñam, 7| svapnasthāno 'ntabprajñah, 4

V

INDEX OF IMPORTANT WORDS IN THE KĀRIKĀS

amśu, I. 6. advaita, I. 10, 16, 17; II. 18, akathya, III. 47. 36 ; III. 18. akalpaka, III. 33. adhvan, IV. 27. akāma, IV. 78. ananta, II. 19, 26 ;- tā, IV. 30; akāra, I. 23. -mātra, I. 29. akārpaņya, III. 2. ananyatva, III. 13 ; IV. 12. akrta, IV. 9. anapara, I. 26. akşaya, III. 40. anādi, IV. 14, 30, 91 .- māyā, akşimukha, I. 2. I. 16. agrayāna, IV. 90. * anānātva, IV. 100. agrāhyabhāva, III. 26. anapannadimadhyanta, IV. 85. ankura, IV. 59. anāpnuvat, IV. 78. acala, III. 37. anābhasa, III. 46 ; IV. 48. acintya, IV. 39, 52. anamaka, III. 36. aja, I. 16; III. 1, 19, 26, 33, 36, 47 ; IV. 11, 12, 13, aningana, IlI. 46.

40 (38), 45, 46, 48, 57, 60, 74, anitya, IV. 59. anidra, I. 16; III. 36 ; IV. & !. 80, 81, 93, 95, 96, 100. ajāta, III. 20 ; IV. 6, 21, 29, 42, animitta, IV. 27, 77, 78.

43, 77. aniścita, II. 17.

ajāti, III. 2, 38 ; IV. 4, 5, 19, 29. anukampā, III. 16.

ajānat, I. 15. anutpatti, IV. 77. anutpanna, IV. 93. ajāyamāna, III. 24. anupalambha, IV. 88. atigambhīra, IV. 100. advaya, II. 33, 35; III. 30; anrta, I. 12.

IV. 4, 45, 62, 80, 85 .- tā, anta, I. 2, 27 ; II. 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15 ; IV. 31 .- vattva, IV. II. 33. 30. 32-1201B.

250 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Appendix V

antar, 1. 2; II. 9, 10, 13, 14, 15; IV. 33 .- prajña, I. 1; amūrta, Il. 23.

sthana, II. 1, 4. amrta, III. 19, 20, 21, 22 ; IV.

anya, I. 7, 9; IV. 36, 53 .- 6, 7, 8 .- tva, IV. 92.

bhava, II. 34; IV. 53 .- arūpaka, III. 36. artha, IV. 26. hetuka, II. 14. anyathabhava, III. 21 ; IV. 7, alabdhāvaraņa, IV. 98. alāta, IV. 47, 49, 50. cf. alāta. 29. alpa, IV. 43. anyonyadrsya, IV. 67. Vav, avati, II. 29. apara, I. 9, 26; II. 13, 26, 27 ; avatāra, III. 15. IV.3. avastu, IV. 87, 88,-ka, IV. 36. aparikheda, III. 41. avitatha, II. 6. aparijñāna. IV. 19. avipaścit, IV. 97. apavāda, III. 25. aviruddha, IV. 2. apūrva, l. 26; Il. 8 .- sthani- avilakșaņa, III. 9. dharma, II. 8. avivāda, IV. 2, 5. apeksā, IV. 18. aviśańkita, Il. 30. apracyuta, II. 38. aviśeșa, IV. 50. apravrtta, IV. 80. avyakta, Il. 15. aprasiddha, IV. 17 .- tva, IV. 40 (38). avyaya, I. 10, 26. avyavasthita, II. 13 abāhya, I. 26. Vaś, aśnute, I. 15, IV. 78. abuddha III. 8 aśakti, IV. 19. abhaya, III. 37, 39, 40 ; IV. 78. aśāśvata, IV. 60. abhinispatti, IV. 74. Vas, asti, Il. 6 .- tā, IV. 24 .- abhinna, IV. 1. nāsti, IV. 83 .- vastutvavādin, abhilāpa, III. 37. IV. 42. abhisamvrti, IV. 73. asaņkrānta, IV. 96. abhūta, III. 23 ; IV. 3, 4, 26, 40 (38). -abhiniveśa, IV. 75, asanga, IV. 72, 96 .- tā, IV. 97. asat, Il. 9, 10; IV. 22, 38, 41 79. (40) .- hetuka, IV. 40. abheda, III. 13. asambandha, IV. 16. amanastā, III. 32. aspandamāna, IV. 48. amanībhāva, IIl. 31. asparśayoga, III. 39 ; IV. 2 amātra. 1. 23, 29. asprsta, IV. 84.

Åppendix V] INDEX OF WORDS IN KĀRIKAS 251

asvapna, I. 16; IV. 81 .- nidrā, utpatti, II. 32; III. 1, 14; IV. I. 14.' 18 ākāśa, I. 2; III. 6, 9, 12 .- kalpa, utpāda, IV. 40 (38). IV. 1 .- vat, III. 3. utsarga, III. 38. atman, I. 12; II. 12, 17 ; III. 3, utseka, III. 41. 7, 8, 11 .- mayavisarjita, III, 10. udadhi, III. 41. -viniścaya, II. 18 .- samstha. udara, III. 12. III. 38 .- satyanubodha, III. 32. udahrta, IV. 40 (38). adi, 1. 14, 19; II. 6; IV. 14, upacāra, III, 36. 15, 23, 31, 98 .- antavattva, upadeśa, I. 18. II. 7; IV. 32 .- buddha, IV. upapatti, III. 10. 92 .- mat, IV. 30 .- śānta, IV. upa-Vlabh, upalabhyate, III. 93 31. ādhyātmika, II. 16, 38. upalabdhi, IV. 24 ... ananda, I. 4 .- bhuj, 1. 3. upalambha, IV. 42, 43, 44, 90. āptakāma, I. 9. upāya, III. 15, 42. aptisamanya, I. 19. upasana, III. 16 .- śrita, III. 1. ābhasa, IV. 26, 49, 50, 51. ubhaya, 1. 5,- 13; II. 11 ; IV. āyata, IV. 56. 67 .- tva, I. 20 .- tha, III. 18. āyatta, III. -40. rjuvakrādikābhāsa, IV. 47. alāta, IV. 48. cf. alāta. ekatriņśaka, II. 26. āvaraņacyuti, IV. 97. onkara, I. 24, 28, 29 aśrama, Il. 27 ; III. 16. kalpita, I, 18; II. 9, 10, 14, 15. āśraya, III. 16. -samvrti, IV. 73, 74. icchāmātra, I. 8. kāma, III. 42 .- bhoga, III. 42. indra, III. 24. kāya, IV. 33, 36. īsāna, I. 10. karaņa, III. 25; IV. 11, 12 .- īśvara, I. 28. baddha ; 1. 11. ukāra, I. 23. kārya, IV. 11, 12 .- kāraņatā- uccheda, IV. 57. bhava, IV. 52 .- kāraņabaddha, ucchedin, IV. 59. 1.11. utkața, I. 19, 21. kāla, I. 8; II. 2, 24; IV. 34 .- utkarşa, I. 20. cintaka, I. 8 .- vid, II. 24. uttama, III. 47, 48 ; IV. 71 .- kuśāgra, III. 41 .. adhamamadhyama, IV. 76. kțtaka, III. 22 ; IV. 8.

252 AGAMASĀSTRA [Appendix V

krtsna, IV. 85. jarāmaraņa, IV. 10 .- nirmukta, krpaņa, III. 1 ; IV. 94. IV. 10. koți, IV. 84. vjā, jāyate, III. 2, 24, 27, 28, kośa, III. 11. 48 ; IV. 4, 11, 13, 21, 22, 23. V kram, kramate, IV. 96, 99. 28, 29, 46, 57, 59, 70, 71, 74, krama, IV. 16, 89 .- kopa, IV. 75, 76. 19. jāgarita, II. 4; IV. 37, 38, 65. krīdārtha, I. 9. -vat, IV. 37. kşānti, IV. 92. jāgrat, III. 29, 30 ; IV. 39, 61, 62, gagana, III. 8 .- upama, IV. 1. 65, 66 .- cittekşaņīya, IV. 66. gandharvanagara, II. 31. jata, III. 1, 27, 43 ; IV. 13. guņa, II. 20 .- vid, II. 20. jāti, III. 20; IV. 3, 6, 23, 28, gauņa, III. 14. 42 .- dosa, IV. 43 .- ābhāsa. graha, III. 38, IV. 82, 84. IV. 45. grahaņa, IV. 37 .- grāhakābhāsa, jīva, I. 16; II. 16; III. 3, 7, 11 ; IV.47. IV. 63, 65, 68, 69, 70 .- ātman, grāhyagrāhakavat, IV. 72. II1. 13, 14. grāhyābhāva, III. 32. jñäna, III. 33, 38 ; IV. 1, 88, 89, ghațākāśa, III. 3, 7 .- adi, Ill. 4. · 96, 99 .- aloka, IIl. 35. ghanaprajña, I. 1. jñeya, III. 33, 47 ; IV. 1, 88, 89, catuskoți (for koļyaś catasraḥ) 91 .- abhinna, III. 33 ; IV. I. IV. 84. tattva, 1. 15; II. 20, 30, 38; citta, II. 13, 25 ; III. 44, 45, 46 ; III. 19, 27, 28, IV. 58 .- vid, IV. 26, 27, 28, 46, 54, 61, 62, Il. 34. 66, 72, 76, 77 .- ikşaņīya, IV. tattvībhūta, Il. 38. 66 .- kāla, II. 14 .- ja, IV. 54. tathasmrti, II. 16. drśya, IV. 28, 36, 77 .- vid, II. tad-graha, II. 29 .- drsya, IV. 25 .- spandita, IV. 72. 64, 66 .- bheda, III.18 .- mata, calācalaniketa, II. 37. IV. 67 .- maya, IV. 38, 59. calabhasa, IV. 45. -vid, Il. 20, 21, 22, 23, '24. cinta, III. 37, 38. 25, 27, 28. cetas, I. 6, 25 ; II. 9, 10 .- amśu, tāyin, IV. 99. 1. 6 .- grhīta, II. 9. 10. turya, I. 10, 11, 13, 14. Wjan, janayati, I. 6. turīya, I. 12, 15. janman, III. 27, 28 ; IV. 15, 58. taijasa, 1. 1 ,2, 3, 4, 23.

Åppendix V] INDEX OF WORDS IN KĀRIKĀS 253

taittirīyaka, III. 11. nihsanga, III. 45 ; IV. 79. dakşiņākșimukha, I. 2. niḥsvadhākāra, II. 37. dama, IV. 86. nigrhīta, III. 34. darśana, IV. 34, 36. nigraha, III. 40, 41. dubkha, III. 43 ; IV. 82. nitya, I. 3 ; III. 33 ; IV. 11, 72, -kşaya, III. 40. 82 .- yukta, I. 25. durdarśa, III. 39 ; IV. 100. nidarśana, III. 3. drstanta, IV. 13, 20. nidrā, I. 14, 15. deva. I. 9, 10; II. 12. 19, 21. nimitta, IV. 25, 27. deśita, IV. 2, 42. niyata, II. 13. dravya, IV. 53 .- tva, IV. 53; niyama, IV. 34. ābhāvayoga, IV. 50, 52. nirodha, II. 32: dvaya, IV. 72, 75, 87 -- kāla, II. nirnamaskāra, II. 37. 14 .- nāśa, IV. 24 .- abhāva, nirnimitta, IV. 75 .. IV. 75 .- ābhāsa, III. 29, 30. nirbhaya, I. 25 ; III. 35.

IV. 61, 62. nirmitaka, IV. 70. dvi, 1. 11 .- pad, IV. 1 ;- nirvikalpa, II. 5 ; III. 34. vara (for dvipadām vara), nirvişaya, IV. 72. IV.1. niścarat, III. 45. dvaita, I. 17, 18 ; III. 18, 31. niścala, III. 22, 45 ; IV. 8. 80. dvaitin, IlI. 17. niścita. I. 14, 22; II. 18; III. 17, 23 dharma, II. 25 ; III. 1 ; IV. 1, nișpanna, IlI. 46. 6, 8, 10, 21, 33, 39 (41), 46, nistuti, Il. 37. 53, 54. 58, 59, 60, 81, 82, 91, nispanda, IV. 49. 92, 93, 96, 98, 99 .- adharma, II. 25 .- ja, IV. 54 .- dhātu, nyāyapūrvaka, Il. 3. pada, IV. 100. IV. 81. dhāman, I. 5, 22. pañcaviņśaka, Il. 26.

dhara, II. 17. paratantra, IV. 24, 73, 74.

dhīmat, III. 34. paramārtha, 1. 17; II. 32; III.

dhīra, I. 28 ; IV.3. 18 ; IV. 73, 74.

na-vyavastha, IV. 13. paridīpaka, IV. 21.

nanatva, III. 13; IV. 91. pūrvāparaparijnāna, IV. 21. prakrti, III. 21 ; IV. 7, 9, 29, nayaka, IV. 98. 92, 93 .- dantatva, IV. 86, iāsti, IV. 83. -nirmala, IV. 98,

254 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Appendix V

prajñapti, IV. 24, 25. māyā, Il. 19, 31 ; Il1. 19, 24, 27, prajñā. III. 45. 28, 29, IV. 58, 61 .- upama, praņava, I. 25, 26, 27, 28. IV. 58 .- maya, IV. 59, 69. prapañca, l. 17 .- upaśama II. -matra, I. 17 .- hastin, IV. 35. 44. pra-budh, prabudhyate, I yajña, II, 22. 16. yati, II. 37. prabuddha, IV. 35. yathavidya, II. 16. prabhava, I. 6. yugapad, IV. 16. prabhu, I. 8, 10 ; II. 13. yogin, III. 39, 40. pralīna, Ill. 4. laya, Il. 28 ; III. 42,44 .- sāmānya, pravivikta, I. 4. I. 21. pra-v sañj, prasajyate, IV. 13. Vli, līyate, III. 35, 46. prasava, I. 7. loka, II. 21, 27, 36; IV. 95 .- prasūti, I. 8. uttara, IV.88. prājña, 1. 1, 3, 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, laukika, IV. 87. 21, 23. vandhyāputra, Ill. 28. prāpta, II. 3. vara, IV. 1. prāpya, IV. 85. vastu, IV. 22, 44 .- abhāsa, IV. . phala, IV. 14, 15, 17, 18, 23, 45. 76. bahis, II. 14, 15 .- citta, II. 13. vi-vkr, vikaroti. II. 13.

-- cetas, II. 9 .- prajña, I. 1. vikalpa, I. 18 ; II. 18.

· bīja, I. 13; IV. 59 .- nidrāyuta. vikalpita, 1. 7; II, 17, 19.

I. 13 .- ankurākhya, IV. 20. vi- kşip, vikșipyate, lll. 46.

buddha, IV. 19, 42, 80, 88, 98, vijñāna, IV. 47, 48, 50, 51, 52.

99 vijñeya, IlI. 34 ; IV. 9, 88, 90.

buddhi, II. 25, -- (tad) vid, II. 25. vitatha, II. 6; IV.31.

brahman, I. 25, 26; III. 1, 12, viniścaya, I. 6.

33, 35, 46. viparyaya, IV. 46.

bhāva, II. 1, 13, 16, 17, 19, 29, viparyāsa, I. 15 ; IV. 27, 41.

33 ; III. 20, 22. vipaścit, IV. 97.

bhūta, 1. 8 ; III. 23 ; IV. 3, 4. vipra, IV. 86.

manas, I. 2; II. 25 ; III. 29, 30, vibhu, I.,1, 10.

31, 34, 40, 41. vibhūti, 1. 7. viveka, IV. 60.

Appendix V] INDEX OF WORDS IN KĀRIKĀS 255

viśārada, IV .. 93, 100. sama, III. 23, IV. 77, 93 .- viśesa, II. 14, 15. tā, III. 2, 38 .- tva, II. 5, viśva, I. 1, 2, 3, 4, 23 ; II. 31. samācāra, IV. 42, 44. -taijasa, I. 11. samādhi, III. 37. vișāņavat, IV. 16. sambuddha, IV. 1. veda, II. 22, 30 .- pāraga, II. 35. sambhava, III. 9, 25, 48 ; IV.

-vid, Il. 22 .. 16,71. vedānta, II. 31 .- niścaya, II. 12. sarvajña, III. 36, 47 .- tā, IV. vaitathya, II. 1, 3, 9, 10, 11. 85, 89. vaidharmya, IV. 97. sādhya, IV. 20 .- sama, IV. 20. vaiśāradya, IV. 94. sāmānya, I. 19, 22. vyavasthā, IV. 13. sāmya, IV. 80, 93, 95, 100. vyavasthita, I. 2 ; II. 13. sidh, sidhyatah, I. 11;

śama, IV. 86 .- prāpta, III. 44. setsyati, IV. 30, 43. śānta, III. 47 ; IV. 45. siddhi, IV. 18, 20.

sānti, III. 40. sukha, III. 45, 47 ; IV. 2, 82. śāśvata, IV. 57 .- aśāśvatābhidhā, sunirvrta, IV. 93.

IV. 60. sușupta, III. 34, 35. śiva, I. 29 ; II. 33. sūkșma, II. 23. śruti, III. 23. sṛșți, I. 7, 8, 9; II. 28; III. 15; sadviņśa, II. 26. -cintaka, I. 7. samvrta, IV. 33 ;- tva, Il. 1, 4. sthāna, II. 5, 11. samvṛti, IV. 57, 58, 74. sthanidharma, II. 8. saņśaya, I. 17, 24; III. 30; IV. 62. sthūla, I. 4; II. 23 .- bhuj, I. 3.

samsāra, IV. 30, 56. -(tad-) vid, Il. 23.

samsthita, I. 28. V spand, spandate, III. 29.

samkleśa, IV. 24. spandamāna, IV. 49, 51.

sanghāta, III. 3, 10. spandita, IV. 47.

sambhava, IV. 40 (38). smṛta, I. 10, 26; II. 4, 7 ; III. sat, 1. 6; II. 9; III. 27 ; IV. 22, 1 ; IV. 32, 46, 88, 90, 94.

37, 41 ; (40) .- asat, IV. 22. svapna, I. 14, 15; II. 1, 3, 4,

sattva, IV. 2. 5, 7, 31 ; III. 29, 30 ; IV. 32, satya, I .. 12; III. 48 ; IV. 71, 78. 33, 36, 37, 38, 39 (41), 61, 62, saddhetuka, IV, 41 (40). 63 .- maya, IV. 68 .- māyā.

256 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Appendix VI

II. 31 .- vat, Ill. 10 .- vrtti, | hetu, II. 1, 5; III. 26 ; IV. 14, II, 9. 15, 17, 18, 20, 23, 37, 53, 76, svabhāva, I. 9; III. 22; IV. 8, 78 ;- abhāva, IV. 76 .- phala, 57. IV. 16 .- phalājāti, IV. 54 .- svamāyā, II. 12. phalāveśa, IV. 55, 56 .- svastha, III. 47. phalodbhava, IV. 55.

VI

INDEX OF TEACHERS AND WORKS QUOTED OR REFERRED TO IN THE KĀRIKĀS

N.B .- Words with a hyphen indicate that they are nol actually used, but reconstructed from the contexts. Buddhist works may be taken with discretion.

Advayas, IV. 4. Kaļha Upanișad, I. 28, IIl. 13, Anyas, I. 7. 24 Aparas, II. 26, 27 ; IV. 3. Kālacintakas, I. 8. Abhidharmakośavyakhyā, IV. Kalavids, II. 24. 13. Gunavids, II. 20. Amürta-vids, II. 23. Catuhśataka, IV. 59. Aşļasāhasrikā Prajñāpăramita, Cittavids, Il. 25. IV. 13, 91. Chandogya Upanisad, III. 13, Āśrama-vids, II. 27. 15. Īsā Upanișad, Ill. 25. Tattvavids, II. 34. Ekas, II. 26. Taittirīyaka (=TU), III. 11.

Appendix VI] INDEX OF TEACHERS AND WORKS 257

Trimśikā, III. 32. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, II. 6, Deva-vids, Il. 21. *31, 32, 35 ; III. 21 ; IV. 7, 10, Dvaitins, III. 17. 16. 17, 18, 19, 22, 29, 31, 41. Dharmadharma-vids, II. 25. Yajña-vids, II. 22. Padavids, II. 21. Lankāvatārasūtra, Il. 31, 32; Prāņavids, II. 20. IV. 24, 44, 72, 82, 83.

Bṛhadāraņyaka Upanișad, I. 1, Laya-vids, II. 28.

2, 9, 12; II. 3, 5; 1II. 12, Loka-vids, II. 21, 27.

13, 15, 24, 25 26. Laingas, II. 27.

Bhagavat, II. 38 ; IV. 71. Vājasaneyi-samhitā, III. 24.

Bhuvana-vids II. 24. Vadavids, II. 24.

Bhoktrvids, II. 32. Vādins, III. 20; IV. 3, 6.

Bhojya-vids, II. 22. Vedapāraga, II. 35.

Madhyantavibhangasūtra, IV. Vedānta-vicakșaņas, II. 31.

75, 90, 92. Vigrahavyāvartanī, IV. 15. Sūkșmavids, II. 23. Manovids, II. 25. Srstivids, Il. 28. Mahayanasūtrālankāra, III. 16, 44. Sthitivids, II. 28. Mūrtavids, II. 23. Sthūla-vids, II. 23.

33-1201Bs

VII

INDEX OF WORDS IN THE KĀRIKĀS USED IN PARTICULAR SENSES ORIGINALLY OR MAINLY IN BUDDHIST WORKS1

grayāna, IV. 90. paramārtha, IV. 73, 74. .dhvan, IV. 27. paridīpaka, IV. 21. .bhilapa, III. 37. paridīpita, IV. 19. bhisamvrti, IV. 98. pācya, IV. 90. labdhāvaraņa, IV. 98. prakṛtinirmala, IV. 98. sparśayoga, III. 39, IV. 2. prajñapti, IV. 24, 25. dibuddha, IV. 92. prapañca, I. 17 .- upasama, II. idiśānta, IV. 93. 35. cşānti, IV. 92. :atuskoți, (for koļyaś catasrah), buddha, IV. 19, 42, 80, 88, 98, 99. IV. 84. āyin, IV. 99. māyāhastin, IV. 44.

desita, IV. 2, 42. lokottara. IV. 88.

dharma, IV. 1, 6, 8, 10; 21, 33, laukika, IV. 87.

39, (41), 46, 53, 54, 58, 59, viśārada, IV. 93, 100.

60, 81, 82, 91-93, 96, 98, 99. vaisāradya, IV. 94.

āyaka, IV. 98. saņvṛta, IV. 33.

nirmitaka, IV. 70. samvrti, IV. 57, 58, 74

paratantra, IV. 24, 73. 74. saņkleśa, IV. 24. sunirvrta, IV. 93.

1 See the Annotation. It is to be noted that all the words excepting only two or three are in Book IV.

VIII

INDEX OF TIBETAN VERSES

dňos. med. dios. med. mi. ji. ltar. mun. khun. ma. rtogs, skye. ste, 148. te, 28. ji. ltar. thag. pa. nes. rtogs. na, gñis. min. yid. ni. rmi. lam. na, 29. 304. ji, Itar. bum. paḥi. nam. mkhaḥ bum.pa.la.sogs.shig.pa.ni, 51. cig, 52. srog. du. rig. pas. srog. ces. ji. Itar. bum. sogs. tha. dad. brjod, 30. kyan, 52. srog.la.sogs.pa.mthah.yas.paḥi, ji. ltar. byis. pa. rnams. la. ni 53. 29.

IX

INDEX OF TEACHERS, SCHOLARS AND PLACES, ETC.

.N.B .- Teachers mentioned in Appendix VI are not included here.

Abhinanda, Ixvi Advayavādins (=Advayas; Abhinava, or Tib. gñis. su. med. pa. gsun. Abhinavagupta, lxxix, Ixxx, pa ; Chinese pu-êrh yü),-102, lxxxii, lxxxiii, Ixxxiv. 107, 108. Advaitist, cxxviii. Āgamikas, 33. Advayas (= Advayavadins), Ālāra Kalama (= Ādāra Kalāpa), cxxxxii, cxxxxiji, 101, 102. 100.

260 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Appendix IX

Alexandria, lxxiv. Belvalkar, S. K., xlvii, lxxi, Amalänanda, cxii. lxxix, cvii. Ānanda, 99. Bhagavat, cxvi, 47, 213, 306. Ānandagiri, xxxiii, l, Ixviii, Bhartrhari, cv, cix. lxxxxi, lxxxxv, cxi, cxii, 17, Bhartrprapañca, cxi, cxii. 25, 30, 31, 33, 36, 110. Bharuci, cix. Aniruddha, 28. Bhaskara, lxxxv. Anuruddha, 99. Bhāskararāya, lxxxix. Apalūnya (=Apollonius), lxxiii. Bhāsyakrt, cxi. Apollonius (=Apalūnya), lxxii, Bhattācarya, Gadādhara, lxvi; lxxiii, lxxiv. -Gurunātha Vidyānidhi, 181. Appayya Dīkşita, xlvii. Bhāvaviveka (=Bhavya, Bhavya- Āryadeva, lxxvii, 90, 128, 148. viveka, Tib. legs.ldan.hbyed), Asanga, lxxvii, 98. lxxv. Asita, cviii. Bhavya, 52. See Bhāvaviveka. Āśmarathya, cviii. Bhojarāja, 208. Astivastutvavādins, those who Bhrgu, cviii. hold that the (external) Bodhāyana, cviii. things are real, 149. Bodhisattva, 69. Astronomers, 3. Brahmadatta, 301. Aśvaghosa, 91. Brahmananc'in, or Brahmā- Ātmabodha, lxxii. nandin, cx. Ätmabodhendra, lxxii. Brahmānanda, xxxiii, cx. Ātreya, B. L., lxxxvi-lxxxviii. Buddha, 84, 93, 148, 149. Audulomi, cviii. Buddhaghosa, cxxxviii, cxxxx, Aupanişadas (Tib. gsan.ba. 71, 89, 96, 99,. 138, 162. paḥi. rjes. su. hbran. ba. dag), Buddhapalita, 107. lxxvi, 3. Buddhists, cxliii, cxliv, 101, 107, Aupanişadikas, lxxvi. 132, 141. Ayārcya (=Iarchas), lxxii. Burnouf, E., 208. Badarāyaņa, civ, cvii, cviii, cxi. Candrakīrtti, lxxv, 8, 43, 105, Bādari, cvii. 106, 109, 111, 115, 117, 120, Badarikā (a hermitage), lxxiii. 122, 126, 142, 149, 150, 214. Bagchi, P. C., 306. Baudhãyana, 32. Chakladar, Haranchandra, lxiv. Chāndogyavākyakāra, cx. .

Appendix IX] INDEX. OF TEACHERS, ETC. 261

Childers, R. C., 97, 208. Ghosa, Rajendranatha, lxxxx. Chintamani, T. R., xxxii. Ghose, Sachindranath, 291. Cidvilāsa, lxxii. Glasenupp, H. Von, 304. Cordier, P., 28, 128. Govinda (=Govindapāda), Ixix, Cowell, E. B., 218. lxx. Dakşa, 36. Govindānanda, lxviii. Damis (=Damīśa), lxxiv. Guhadeva, cix. Damīśa (=Damis), lxxiii. Guņaratna, 34. Deussen, Paul, xli. Hall, C. F., lxvii. Devala, cviii. Hardy, S., 208. Dharmakīrtti, 85. Haribhadra, 193. Dharmapala, lxxv. Harimiśra, lxxii: Dhimat, 69. Hemacandra, 43. Dinnaga, 18, 85, 193. Hirarāvati (a river), lxvii. Dravidācārya (Dramilā°), cx, cxi .; Hiriyanna, M., lxxiv, cvii, cxii. Durgācārya, 298. 301. Ekas, 35. Huet, G., 208. Fuhrer, A. A., lxxxviii. Hultzsch, E., Ixxiii. Gauda (Gaudapāda), lxiv, lxxi. Īśvarakrsņa, lxxxix, 11I. Gauda (country), lxvi. lyenger, lxxx. Gaudācārya, lxiv, lxxì. Jacob, Colonel, G. A., Ixv, Gaudadeśa, lxvi. cxvii. Gaudapada, xxxi, xxxili-xxxv, Jaimini, cvii,; cviii. Iviii. lix, lxiv, lxvii, lxviii, Jayaratha, 70. lxix-lxxvi, lxxviii, lxxx-lxxxiii, Jayatirtha, xxxiii, cxli, 70. lxxxvi-lxxxviii; lxxxx, lxxxxiv, Jnanottama, lxv. lxxxxvi, lxxxxvii, cii-cxiii; Kalidāsa, 181. cxv, cxvi, cxxi-cxxiii, cxxvii, Kamalaśīla, xxxviii, lxviii, lxxvi. cxxviii, cxxx-cxxxii, cxxxiv, Kāne, P. V., cxiii .. cxxxvii, cxxxviii, cxlii-cxlv, Kapardika (Kapardin), cıx. 43. 46, 64, 77, 105, 107, 11l, Kāśakṛtsna, cvii. 118, 123, 163, 217, 219, 291, Kāśyapa cviii, 103, 139. 295, 298, 302. Kavirãj, Gopinath, Ixxii, lxxiv, Gaudapādācārya, lxiv, lxix. lxxix, lxxxx, cxi. Ģaudas, xxxiv, Kaviratna Śyāmacaraņa, 181,

262 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Appendix IX

Keilhorn, F., cvii. Nārāyaņa, xl, Ixxiii, 84, 93. Kern, H., 100. Narmadā, lxix. Kosambi, D., cxxxvii. Narottama, P. Nar'uttama, 84. Kşemarāja, xxxiv, xxxv. Nilakaņtha, 73. Kşīrasvāmin, 102. Nimbārka, cviii. Kullūka, lxxxiv .. Nisaka mystics, lxxii. Kumarila, cxii, 130. Obermiller, E., 193, 307. Kūranārāyaņa, xxxii, 3, 4,.9. Pala, Mahesacandra, 102, 174. Kurukşetra, lxvi. Pandeya, K. C., lxxx. Leumann, E., 46, Pāņini, xxxvi, 181, 207. Lévi, Sylvain, 86, 204, 205, 208. Parāśara, cviii. Lokāyatikas, 30, 31, 33, 34. Pāśupatas, 35. Mādhavācārya, Ixxii. Patañjali, cvii. Madhusūdana, see Sarasvati. Paurānikas, 37. .Madhva or Madhvācārya, xxxi- Philosophers, non-Buddhist, 89. xxxiii, xxxvii, xxxviii,.xxxix, Phraotes (=Pravrti), lxxiii. xl, xlvi, li, 4, 33, 64. Pousin, Louis de la Vallée, Madhyamikas, 3, 176, 191. cxxxviii, 47, 85, 170, 175, Mahābhāsyakara, cix. 203, 205, 209, 218. Mahāmati, 133, 169. 192. Prabhākara Mitra, lxxv. Mahidhara, 64. Prabhrti (=Phraotes), lxxiii. Maitreya or · Maitreyanatha, Pragalbhācārya, lxxxx. lxxvii. cxxxii, 183. 189. Prajñākaramati, lvi, 87, 179. Mallinatha, Iv. . Priaulx, Osmond de Beauvoir, Manu, lxxxv. Ixxiii, lxxiv. Mațhara, 111. Puņyarāja, cv. Mimāmsists, 34. : Purușottama, xxxviii, 16, 18, 22, Mitra, Rajendralal, 199. 23, 84. -Suba'chandra, 181. Rājacūdāmaņi, lxxii. Nāgārjuna, Ixii, lxxv, lxxvii, 39, Rājaśekhara, lxi. 42, 44, 103, 104, 106. 109, 110- Rāmabhadra Dīksita, Ixxii. 112, 116, 117-120, 122, 124- Ramācārya, xxxiii, xxxv. 128, 142, 213. Rāmakrsņa, Ixviii 75. Naiyāyikas, 89, 101, 104, 107. Ramanuja, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxv, Narasiņhācārya, 45. cviii-cx, 45. 64.

Appendix IX] INDEX OF TEACHERS, ETC. 263

Rāmatirtha, Ixix. Sarma, B. N. Krishnamurti, Rangarāmānuja, 64. xxxii-xxxv. Ray Govinchandji, 291. Sarvajna Sadāśivabodha, Ixxii. Rosenberg, O., 92. Śāstrī, Kuppuswami, S., cxiii. Rudraka Ramaputra (=P. Ud- -Raghuvara Mitthulal, xxxii. daka Rāmaputta), 100. -S. S. Suryanarayana, lxxix, Sabarasvāmin, Ixvi, 86. lxxx, lxxxi, lxxxv. Sadānanda, lxix, Ixxii, 77, 78. Sastrin, Bhatta Ramanatha, Sadasivabrahmendra, lxxii. xxxviii. Sāmaśramin, Satyavrata, xxxvi. Sautrantikas, 101. Sāmkṛtyāyana, Rāhula, 98. Sāyaņa, Ixi, 10, 110, 208. Šāņdilya, cviii. Senart, E., 208. Śankara, xxxiii xxxv, xxxvii, Sen Gupta, N. N., 95. xliv, xlviii, xlix, l, lviii, Ixiii- Śesa, lxxix, lxxx, lxxxiii, lxxxv. lxv, lxviii-lxx, lxxii, lxxiii, Sharma, Y, Subrahmanya, lxxviii, lxxxv, lxxxviii, Ixxxix, xxxiii. Ixxxx, lxxxxiv-lxxxxix, ci, Śilańka, 208. ciii-cv, cviii, cxi, 19, 22, 45, Śrīdhara, lv. 50, 52, 53, 62, 64, 70, 78, 85, Śrīdharasvāmin, 294. 94, 107, 111, 115, 128, 139, Śrīnivāsadāsa, cix. 147, 153, 168, 170, 174, 177, Śrīnivāsatīrtha, xxxi, 4. 180, 208, 291, 293, 295, 296, Stcherbatsky, Th., 90, 92, 299, 300, 303. 304. Śankarānanda, xliv. Sthiramati, cxxxix, clx, 87, 96, Sankhyas, lxxv, 35, 90, 104, 97, 136, 177, 178, 183, 188, 107. 190, 197, 201, 211. Sankhyavedantatirtha, Durga- Śuka, lxx, Ixxiii. caraņa. 102. Sundarapāņdya, cxii. Śantideva, 87. Sūnyavādins, 33. Śantirakșita, xxxviii, lxviii, Sureśvara, xxxiv, xxxv, lxiv, lxxvi, 28, 51, 53: lxv, lxviii, lxxxxv-lxxxxvii, ci, Sarahapāda, 128, 191. cvii, cxii. Sarasvatī, Bālakrsņānanda, lxiv. Suzuki, D. T., cxlii. -Madhusudana, xxxiii, cx-cxii. Svāmin, Bhūmananda, lxxxviii. -Nrsimha, lxix. Takşaśila (Taxila), lxxiii.

264 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Appendix IX

Tāntrikas, 31. Venkata Subbiah, A., xxxiii, Tathägata, 202. xlvii. Udayana, or Udayanācārya, Vidyāraņya, xlii, lxxii, 75. . lxxxv, 212. Vidyāsāgara, Ānandapūrņa, Uddaka Ramaputta (=S. lxvii. Rudraka Rāmaputra), 100. Vijñānabhiksu, Ixix, 52, 91, Upadhye, A. N., cxl. 191. Upanisadists, cxxxviii. Vijñānavādin or Vijñānavādins, Uvața, 64. cxxiii, cxxxi, cxxxii, cxxxvii, Vācaspati Miśra, lxxxv, cxxxvi, cxli, cxlv, 34, 70, 73, 84-85, 26, 45, 92. 210, 308. 135, 136, 137, 153, 191. Vaibhāșikas, 30, 101. Vijñāneśvara, cix. Vaināśikas, xlix, liii, liv. Vyāsa, lxix, cxi, cxxxvi, 77, 79, Vaiśeșikas, lxxv, 30. 89, 91, 92, 95, 206, 208. 101, 104, 107. Vyāsācāryasvāmin, xxxiii. Vaisņavas, cxxxviii. Vyäsatīrtha, xxxi, xxxii. Vākyakāra, cx. Vrttikāra, cix, 302. Vallabha, or Vallabhacārya, Wallesser, Max, xlvi, lxv, lxvii, xxxviii, 33. Ixix, Ixx, lxxv. Vardhamāna, 207. Watter, Th., lxxv. Vārttikakrt, 292. Winternitz, M., lxxv, Ixxvii. Vasiştha, lxxxvi, lxxxviii, lxxxix. Woods, J. H., 206. Vasubandhu, cxxxix, 73, 91, Yamaguci, S. 131. 92, 178, 188, 189, 197, 218. Yāmunacārya, cxi. Vasumitra, lxxviii. Yāska, 92, 298. Vātsyāyana, 31, 92, 201. Yaśomitra, x, lxxviii, cxxxviii, Vedāntin, 39, 178, 217. 91. Vedantists, cxxvii, cxxviii, cxxxi, Yati, Kaśmīraka, lxix. cxxxii, cxxxviii, cxli, clxiii, Yogacāras, cxxxvii, cxxxviii, clxiv, 3, 43, 47, 107, 153, 3, 34, 101, 176, 188. 193, 195.

X

INDEX OF WORKS

N.B .- Abbreviated names are given here in full

Abhidhammatthasamgaha, 71, Anavataptahradāpasaņkramaņa 96 Sūtra, 179. Abhidhänacintāmaņi, 43 Anguttara Nikāya, 95, 97, 131, Abhidhānappadipikā, cxl, 26, 149, 158, 202, 207; 210, 218. 207, 211, 217. Annales du Musée Guimet, Abhidharmakośa, Ixxviii, 208. cxxxvii, 26, 28, 68, 72, 90, Annals of the Bhandarkar 91, 98, 154, 203, 210, 218, 301. Oriental Research Institute, Abhidharmakośabhāsya, 89. lxìv. Abhidharmakośa v y ā k h y ā, Āraņyaka, Taittiriya, lxi, lxiv, lxxviii, cxxxviii, 90, 115, 171; cxx, 110, 208, 296. 183, 207. Āryapancasīti, Ixxix. Abhinavagupta, lxxx. Aştasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, Abhisamayālankarāloka, 27, 193. 87, 88, 89, 115, 129, 157, 164, Ācārāngasūtra, lxxxvii, 124, 142 198, 201, 211, 218. Advaitabrahmasiddhi, lxix, 86. Asutosh Sanskrit Series, 98. Advaitasiddhi, 291. Atthakathā of Kathāvatthu, Āgamagrantha (=Gaudapāda- 162. kārikā), lxi. Atthasālini, 71, 89, 130, 183. Āgamaśāstra, xxxiii, xlviii, liv, Aupapātika Sūtra, 46. lv, Iviii-lx, lxii, lxx, lxxvii, Basic Conception of Buddhism, lxxx, lxxxiii, lxxxxxii-lxxxxiv, The, 26, 28, 31, 43, 151, 214. lxxxxix, ci-ciii, cxiii, cxviii, Bauddha Gana O Dohā, 305. cxxxii, 14, 47, 82, 83. Bhadracarī (=Bhadracaryā), Āgamaśāstravivaraņa, lxi, lxvii. lxvii. Ālambanaparīkșā, 18, 85. Bhadracarya · (=Bhadracari), Amarakośa, 102, 207. lxvii, 34-1201B.

266 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Appendix X

Bhagavadgita, xxxvi, lxxxxlii, Buddhist Psychology, 129. lxxxxlix, cviii, cxvi, 10, 13, Cāņakyanītidarpaņa, 46. 14, 22, 46, 73, 75-77, 181, 299. Catalogue of Sanskrit Manus- Bhamati, lxxxv. cripts, A, Adyar Library, Bodhicaryavatara, lvi, 39, 46, xxxii. 80, 85, 88, 106, 116, 130, 157, Catuśataka, lxxvii, 40, 101, 163, 164, 168, 171, 179, 202, 106, 109, 115, 126, 148-150, 210-212. 158, 162, 164, 165, 187, Bodhicaryavatāra-pañjikā, lvi, 27, 192. 80, 85, 87, 88, 106, 127, 128, Central Conception of Bud- 130, 139, 151, 157, 163, 169, dhism, The, 90, 92. 175, 176, 179, 189, 191, 193, Cittaviśuddhiprakaraņa, 31, 198, 201, 202, 210, 212, 213. 211. Bodhicittavivaraņa (Tib. ver- Compendium of Philosophy, sion), 151. 190. Bodhisattvabhūmi, 71, 200. Conception of Buddhist Nir- Brhadāraņyakabhāşyavārttika, vāņa, The, 43. xxxv, lxxxxv-lxxxxvii. Cullaniddesa, 203. Brahmajalasutra, (P. °sutta), 191. Daśabhūmikasūtra, 188. Brāhmaņas : Daśavaikālikasūtra 212. Aitareya, civ, Devatākaņda, cviii, 32. Jaiminiya, 99. Dhammapada, 84, 89, 138, 194, Śatapatha, xxxvi, 200. 208. Taittirīya, civ. Dhammapada-Ațțhakathā, 138. Brahmamīmāmsā, cvii. Dhammasangani, 27, 133, 183, Brahmasūtras, xxxiii, xxxvii, 197, 210. lxiii, lxxxv, lxxxxii, lxxxxvii, Dharmasamgraha, 45, 86, 183, cvi-cix, cxi, cxii, 2, 4, 33, 39, 202, 203, 210, 218. 45, 46, 50,53, 55, 86, 101, 127, Dharmasastra, cix. 294, 299, 300, 302, 303. Dīgha Nikāya, 68, 82, 160, 162, Buddhacarita Kāvya, 91. 100. 170, 191, 203. Buddhisme d'après les sources Dinakarī, lxvii. Brahmaniques, Le, 86. Divyāvadāna, 124, 171, 200. Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, Six, Durgasaptaśati, lxxxix. 130. Eastern Monachism, 208.

Appendix X] INDEX OF WORKS 267

Encyclopædia of Religion and Journal Asiatique, 28, 171, 175, Ethics, 171, 205. 212. Expositor, 89. Journal of the Asiatic Society Gaganagañjasūtra, Arya-, 171. of Bengal, lxiv. Ganaratnamahodadhi, 207. Journal of the Pali Text Gaudapādakārikā, xxxii. xxxiv, Society, 212. xxxv-xxxviii, lxi, lxix, lxx, Journal of the Royal Asiatic lxxvi, lxxx-lxxxiv, lxxxvi- Society of Great Britain and lxxxviii. Ireland, lxxx, 47, 121, 171, Gaudapādī (=Gaudapāda- 205, 211, 218, 219. kārikā), lxvii. Kalāpa-vyākaraņa, 181. Gaudapādīya (= Gaudapāda- Kalpataru, cxii. kārikā), lxi, lxviii. Kāmaśāstra, 31. Gaudapādīyakārikā, lxi. Karmamīmāņsā, cvii. Gaudapādīyoktaśruti, xxxv. Kaśyapaparivarta (=Ratnakūța- Gaudapādollāsa, lxxii. sūtra), 103, 104, 139, 150, Gilgit Manuscripts, 306. 200. Gururatnamālā, Ixxii. Kathavatthu, 124, 162. Harivamśa, xxxii. Kātyāyanāvavāda, 103; Histoire du Bouddhisme dans Kāvyamīmāmsā, lxi, 43. l'Inde, 208. Khaņdanakhaņdakhādya, Ixvii. History of Indian Literature, A, Kirātārjunīya, 46. by M. Winternitz, lxxv, Krtakoți, cix. lxxvii. Laghuyogavāsistha, lxvi. Indian Antiquary, xxxiii, lxiv, Lalitavistara, 100, 161, 162, cxii. 199, 218. Indian Historical Quarterly, Lankāvatārasūtra, cxxxii, cxxxiii, xxxi, xlvii, lxxiv, 74, 86, 212. 38-40, 44, 68, 73, 80, 81, 85- Jagadgururatnamālā-stava, lxxii. 87, 131, 133, 134, 137, 150- Jaina works, 46. 153. 167, 169, 172, 173, Jha Commemoration Volume, 176-178, 182, 187, 188, 192, 192. 193, 197, 198, 203, 211, 213, Jnanasarasamuccaya (Tib. 219, 306. Ye.ses.nin.po.kun.las.btus.pa) Lotus (=Le Lotus de la Bonne 128. Loi), 208.

268 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Appendix X

Madhyamakakārika, lxi, lxxvii, Mahaniddesa, 203. 27, 40, 42, 44, 103-106, 108- Mahāparinibbānasutta, 99. 110, 112, 116-120, 122-125, Mahārthamañjarī, 35, 36. 127, 128, 134, 140-143, 148, Mahāsaddanīti, 84. 157, 158, 160, 162, 169, 170, Mahavagga, 218. 175, 192, 213. Mahāvastu, 84, 208. Madhyamakahṛdaya k ārik a, Mahāvyutpatti, 45, 84, 97, 102, lxviii, lxxv, 52. 176, 189, 198, 211, 212, 219. Madhyamakahrdayavṛtti Tarka- Mahāyānasūtrālankāra, lxxvii, jvalā, lxxviii, lxviii. cxxxviii, 24, 40, 59, 69, 78, - Madhyamakālankāra k ā r i k ā, 150, 163, 165, 177, 178, 187, lxviii, lxxvii, 28, 51. 188, 198, 200,203-205,208,308. Madhyamakāvatāra, 106, 115, Majjima Nikāya, 27, 100, 151, 122, 123, 163, 175, 176, 209, 203. 210. Mānasollāsa, 295, 300, 301, 302. Madhyamakavrtti, lxii, 8, 24, Māņdūkyavārttika (=G a u d a- 27, 38, 40, 42, 44, 47, 49, pādakārikā), lxi. 73, 85, 89, 90, 98, 103-107, Māņdūkya Śākhā, lxi. 111, 112, 115, 117-121, 133, Māņdūkyopanișad - Gaudapāda- 134, 139, 143, 148-151, 157, vyākhyāna (=Māņ dūky a- 169-171, 179, 185, 197. 203, kārikā), lxi. 205, 209-211, 213-215, 304. Māņdukyopanişadv i v a raņa- Madhyamakaśāstra, Ixii. Gaudapādīyavārttika, xxxv. Madhvamata-vidhv a m s a n a, Manorathapūraņi, 124, 202, 207. xlvii. Māņdūkyopanişad and Gauda- Madhyāntavibhāgaļīkā, 197, 201. Madhyantavibhanga, 183. pāda (a paper), xxxiii. Manual of Buddhism, 100: Madhyantavibhanga Discourse, Memoirs of the Asiatic Society : 190. of Bengal, 102. Madhyantavibhan gasūtra- Matériaux . pour l'étude du bhāsyațīkā, Ixii, 131. 136, 176-178, 183, 189. système Vijñaptimätra, 86.

Mahābhāsya Milindapañha, 130. (of Patañjali), Mīmāmsādarśana, Ixvi, 86. lxxix, cix, 46. Mimāmsā, cvii. Mahābhārata, ciii, 3, 84, 162, 208. Mīmāmsāślokavārttıka, 86.

Appendix X] INDEX OF WORKS 269

Mimāmsāsāstra, cviii, cx. Pañcaviņśatisāhasrikā Prajíiā- Mimāmsāsūtras, cvi-cviii, cx. pāramitā, 149. Mitākșarā, cix. Pañjikā (on Bodhicaryāvatāra), Mŕtyujidbhattāraka, 80. lvi. Mugdhabodha, 181. Pañjika (on Tattvasamgraha), Naişkarmyasiddhi, xxxiv, lxiv, lxxvi, 25 85, 195. lxv, lxviii, lxv, lxxxii, cxi, 294. Paramarthasara, Ixxix, lxxx- Nayopadesa, 124, 142. lxxxv. New Light on the Gaudapāda- Patañjalicarita, Ixxii. kārīkā (a paper), xxxii. Patafjalivijaya, lxxii. Nighantu, 32. Pandit (a magazine), 308. Nirukta, xli, 10, 32, 92. Paņini, xxxvi, lxxix. Nirupamastotra, 150, 213. Phaņibhāsya (=Patañjali's Nirvāna, cxxxviii. Mahābhāsya), lxxii. Nyāyakandali. lv, 27, 86, 101, Pitāputrasamagamasūtra, 157. 130. Poona Orientalist, xxxiii. Nyāyakaņikā, 308. Popular Scientific Recreations, Nyayakusumānjali, lxvii, lxxxv. 38. Nyayamrtatarangiņī, XXXV. Potthapādasutta, 162. Nyāyanimņaya, lxviii. Prajñāpāramitārthasamgraha, 193 Nyāyaratnākara, cx. Prajñaparamitāsūtras, 204. Nyāyasudhā, 130. Prajñapāramita, The Doctrine Nyāyasūtra, 92, 116, 126, 130, of, 193, 307. 201. Prajñāpradīpaśāstra, lxxv. On Yuan Chwang's Travels Prakāśa, cv. in India, lxxv. Pramāņavārttika, 27, 85, 86, 212. Outlines of Mahayana Bud- Pramāņaviniścaya (Tib. Tsad. dhism, cxlii. ma.rnam.par.nes.pa), 85. Palaces of Fairy Morgan, 38. PrapancahĮdaya, cix, cxi. Pali-English Dictionary Prapancasāra, xxxii. (Childers), 97, 208. Praśastapādabhāșya, lv, 130. Pali-English Dictionary (PTS), Pravacanasāra, cxl. 190, 210. Proceedings and Transactions Pañcadasi, xli, lxiv, 75, 95. of the Second Oriental Pañcāstisamayasāra, cxl. Conference, 212.

270 ĀGAMAĀSTRA [Appendix X

-Third Oriental Conference, Samkşepaśārīraka, cx, cxi: xxx11. Samkşiptasāra, 181. -Fifth Oriental Conference, Samyutta Nikāya, cxxxviii, cx, xxxii. 27, 68, 96, 97, 103, 124, 149, Puņyaślokamanjarī, lxxii. 154, 203. Puņyaślokamañjarīparisișta, lxxii. Sandhinirmocanasūtra, 178. Purāņas, xxxvi, 32. Šankaravijaya of Ānandagiri, Bhagavata, 13, 143, 294, 302. lxxii. Harivamśa, xxxii. Śankaravijaya of Cidvilāsa, Kūrma, lxiv. Ixxii. Linga, lxiv. Śankarābhyudaya, lxxii. Matsya, Ixiv. Śankaradigvijaya of Mādhavā- Padma, xxxii. carya, lxxii. Vişņu, 52. Śankaravijayas, lxxi. Rāmabhadrī, lxvii. Śankara's commentarics on the Rāmarudrī, lxvii Upanisads (a paper), xxxii. Ratnacūdapariprcchā, Ār y a-, Sānkhyakārikā, lviii, 40, 101, 139. 111,112. Ratnacūdasūtra, 169. Sankhyasamgraha, 91. Ratnākarasūtra, Ārya-, 209. Ratnakūțasūtra, Ārya-, 40, 139, Sankhyasūtra, 28, 52, 91, 191. Sankhyapravacanabhasya, lxix. 171. Sañjīvanī, Iv. Ratnameghasütra, Arya-, 205. Sanmatitarka, cxl. Report of Sanskrit Manus- Sanskrit-Tibetan-English Voca- cripts in Southern India, by · bulary, 102. E. Hultzsch, Ixxiii. Saptaśatikā Prajnāpāramitā, 187, Review of Philosophy and 194, 202, 209. Religion, xxxii, xxxv, xlvii. Sacred Books of the East, 45, Sārīrakabhāşya, xxxiii, lviii, lxviii, cxlv. 208. Sarvadarśanasamgraha, 121, 128, Şaddarśanasamuccaya, 3, 34. 151, 191. Saddharmapundarīka, 49, 151, |Śarvasiddhantasamgraha. 191. 199, 203, 206. 212. Šārīrakamīmāņsābhāsyavārttika, Samadhirājasūt:a, 38, 104, 146, lxiv, lxvi, 304. 170.171, 203. Sarvarthasiddhi, cxi.

Appendix X] INDEX OF WORKS 271

Satyadvayāvatāra, Ārya-, 49. Tattvaratnāvali, 86. Siddhāntaleśa, xxxii. Tattvasamgraha, lxxvi, 25, 85, Siddhitraya, cix. 195. Śiksāsamuccaya, 27, 115, 139, Tattvasamgrahapañjikā, lxxvi, 157, 160, 171, 202, 211. 210. Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Tattvayātharthyadīpani, 91. Jubilee Volumes, Orientalia, Theragāthā, 138. xxxii. Three Bodies of a Buddha, Śiśupālavadha, 46. The, 171. Šivasūtravimarśini, 80, 294. Tibetan, 52, 53, 85, 86, 90, 106, Ślokavärttika, 86. 122, 126, 128, 148,.149, 158. Soul Theory, 90. 164, 188, 204, 212. Śrībhāsya, xxxv, 302. Trayīparicaya, xxxvi. ŚrīnivāsīyavĮtti, xxxii, xxxviii. Trimsikā, cxxxvii, 68, 73, 87, 96, Śrīvidyāratnasūtra, lxxxx. 97, 130, 136, 176, 177, 188, Śrīvidyārņava, lxxxx. 189, 197, 211. Studies in the Tantras, 306. Trisvabhavanirdesa, cxxxvii, Subhagodaya, lxxxx. 153, 176, 177. Subhāșitasaņgraha, 27, 84, 86, Two Vajrayāna Texts, cxlii. 128, 193. Upadesagrantha, lxi. Sușumā, lxxii. Upadeśasāhasrī, lxiv, lxv, 6, 7, Suttanipāta, 84, 203. 294. Sumangalavilāsinī, 162, 203. Upanișads, xxxvi, cxxxii, 94, Śūnyatāsaptati, 170. 107, 15C. Sūtrakrtāngasūtra, 208. Advaitaprakaraņa, xxxvii. Tanjur, 28, 85, 128, 188. Aitareya, cxxxii. Tantrāloka, cxli, 70. Alātaśāntiprakaraņa, xxxvii. Tantravārttika, cxii, 130. Ãśrama, Ixxxxii, 45. Tarkajvālā, lxxv, 50, 52. Ātma-, lxxxxii, 41. Tathāgataguhyasūtra, 215. Avadhūta, lxxxxii, 41. Tattvadīpika, cxl. Bhrguvallī, xxxvii. Tattvaprakāśa, 35, 36. Brahma, lxxxxix. Tattvamuktākalāpa, cxi, cxlvi. Brahmabindu, lxxxxlii, 41, 82," Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, cxl. 94. Tattvārtharājavārttika, cxl. Brahmavallī, xxxvii.

272 ÄGAMAŚĀSTRA IAppendix X

Brhadāraņyaka, xxxix, xli, Minor, 45, 47. xlii, xxxi-lxxxxix, ci-ciii, Muktikā, cxxxvì, 189. cxiv- cxvii, cxx, cxxviii, Muņdaka, lxxv, 33, 55, 58, cxxix, cxxxii, cxxxv, 1, 185, 295, 302. 4, 13, 29, 33, 50, 55, 58, Nādabindu, cxxxvi. 62, 63, 65, 74, 79, 81, Nṛsimhapūrvat ā p a n i, xxxi, 101, 139, 140, 147, 171, xxxvii, xli, xlii, lxxxxix, 201, 208, 217, 294. 43, 47,300. Chandogya, xxxix, xli, xlii, Nrsimhottaratāpanī, xxxi, xli, xlviii, lxxv, lxxxxvi-c, cii, xlii, 43, 300, cvi, 31, 45, 48, 56, 58, 62, Praśna, xlii, 22, 30, 48, 55, 70, 74, 78, 189, 204, 295, 295, 299, 306. 302. Ramottaratāpanī, xxxi, Garbha, 90. lxlxxxix, 43, 300. Īśā, 63. Sān lilya, cxxxvi. Jābāla, Ixxxxii, 45. Śiksāvalli, xxxvii. Kaivalya, 43. Śvetāśvatara, 3, 23, 34, 299, 302. Katha, xivi, lxxxxiii, cxvi, Taittiriya, xxxvii, xxxix, xlii, cxxxvii, 14, 56, 62, 73, 92, 94, 171, 191, 201, 214, 217, lviii, cii, civ, cv, cxxxv, 3, 48,55,295. 218, 294, 299, 304. Tripurātāpani, lxlxxxii, 41, 50. Kauşītaki, lxxxxvi, lxxxxviii, Upanișads des Veda, xli. 1, 201. Upanişat śāstra, xxxviii, lxxvi. Kena, 99. Mahānāradīya, 50. Uttaragītā, lxxxix. Uttaracarita, 203. Mahānārāyaņa, 302. Maitrāyaņabrāhmaņa, 218. Vajracchedikā, 168, 186, 199, 213, 216. Maitri, xli, lxlxxxvi, cxxxvi, Vaiśesikasūtra, 130. cxxxvii, 1, 3, 4, 33, 36, 58, Vākyapadiya, cv, cix. 80, 82, 94, 138, 218, 295, 299. Vātulasūtravṛtti, Srī, 95. Maņdalabrāhmaņa, cxxxviii. Vārttika (on Pāņini), 46. Māņdūkya, xxxi-xxxiii, xxxvi, Vedänta, Der älter, xlvi, 51, xxxvii, xli, xlii, xlvi-xlix, Vedanta Philosophy (Sree- Iviii, lxxxiii, lxxxvi, lxxxxvii, gopal Basumallik Fellowship - lxxxxix, c-cii, 43, 44, 79, 293. Lectures), xlvii.

Appendix XI] INDEX OF SUBJECTS 273

Vedantasāra, xlii, lxix, 78. Visuddhimagga, cxxxviii, 306. Vedarthasamgraha, cix. Vivaraņaprameyasamgraha, 86. Vedas, 32. Ye.śes.snin.po.kun.las.btus.pa Atharva-, lxxiii, 3, 34. (Jñanasarasamuccaya), 128. Rg, xli, Ixxiii, Ixlxxxi, lxxxxix, Yājnavalkyasmrti, cix. c, cxiii, cxxxvii, 31, 57, 62, Yatīndramatadīpikā, cix. 83, 302. Yogācārabhūmi, 90, 98. Vājasaneyisaņhitā, cxxviii, 63. Yogaśāstra, 212, 295. Vibhanga, 203. Yogasūtras, cxxxvii, 77, 79, 92, Vibhāvani, 71. 95, 171, 206, 210, 218. Vidyāsāgarī, lxvii. Yogavasistha, lxvi, 'lxxxvi- Vidvanmanorañjanī, 78. Ixxxix, cxxxvi, 8, 82, 142, Vigrahavyāvartanī, 116. 154, 173, 219, 293. Vijnanavada, Evolution of, 74. Yogavasistha andits Philosophy, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, €8, 73, lxxxvi. 130, 178, 188. - Yogavāsișțhasāra, lxvi. Viņśikā, cxxxvii, 68, 187. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Mor- Vişņusahasranāmabhāșya, 295. ganländischen Gesellschaft, Vişnusahasranāman, 52. 26

XI

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

P .= Pali, S .= Sanskrit

akalpaka, indeterminate, agra, first, 124, 141. cxxxvi, 68. Agrayana, same as Mahayana, aksara, imperishable, cxxxviii. cxxvi, 199. aksipurușa, eye-person, lxxxxvii, acittata, mindlessness, cxxxvi. lxxxxviii. acyuta, stable, cxxxviii. akșipta, not distracted, ajarjara, not decaying, cxxxviii. cxxxvi. ajāta, unborn, 140. 35-1201B

274 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Appendix XI ·

ajāti, non-origination, cxlii, 100, anāmaka, without a name, 70. 140. See anutpatti, anut- anānārtha, not diverse, 103. pāda .- vāda, theory of anāsrava dhātu, undefiled ele- non-origination, cxliv, cxlv, ment, cxxxix. 49, 50, 72, 104, 105, 107, 115, aningana not moving, cxxxvi, 127, 147-149. 79, 80 .. attaditthi (P.), S. ātmadrsți, anidra, without sleep, cxxxvi, theory of individuality, 26. 70, 71, 79. -vāda (P.), S. ātmavāda, 26. animitta, having no cause, atyantānutpāda, absolute non- synonymous with dharma- origination, 49. dhatu, q. v., 189, 194. advaya, non-dual, 41, 42, 44, anirodha, having no suppres- 67; same as advayavādin; sion, 103 .- anutpāda, having Buddhist, 101-102; free from neither suppression, nor the two, 153, 166, 184-185 ; not origination, 194. two, i.e., the two extreme anilaya, homeless, 46. views, such as the existent anirgama, not going out, 103. and non-existent, 102-103. See anuccheda, without annihila- drașțavyopaśama and prapañ- tion, 103. copaśama .- jñana, knowledge anutpatti, non-origination, 73. of, cxxxix,-ta, non-duality, anutpanna, not born, 206. 41, 44 .- vāda is different anutpāda, non-origination, or from advaitavāda, 102, 103. without origination, 49, 103, advaita, 4, 7, 29, 59 .- vāda, 111, 161, 162. See ajāti. 102 .- Vedänta, 177. anuditahoma, sacrifice before adharma, 34. sunrise, civ. adhyāsavāda, cxlv. anupubbavihāra (P.), S. anu- anāgāra, homeless, 46. pürva°; a particular kind of anantavat, endless, c. yoga, 109. anāgama, not coming, 103. anupūrvavihāra, P. anupubba°, anādi, without beginning, cxxxii .- nidhana, without q. v., 100. anekārtha, not one thing, 103. destruction, cxli. anta, extreme, 103, 104. anabhasa, having no appear- antarjñeya, knowable inside. ance, cxxxvi. 79, 89. 155. 172. 103

Appendix XI] INDEX OF SUBJECTS 275

anyathatva, change, 109. See | artha, object, is unreal, 135. anyathābhāva. -ābhasa, appearance of, aparijñãna, complete ignorance, 135, 136 .- krama, order of 121-123. See purvāparāpari- sense, 190. jñāna. arpaņā, P., appanā, fixing of apalokita, cxxxviii. the mind on the object in aprthak, not diverse, 41. meditation, 71. apragalbha, not bold, 207. alata, firebrand, cxxxi ; simile apratibha, not ready-witted, of, 154-156 .- cakravat adi- 207. madhyāvasānavirahita t v ā t, abhāvakalpanā, assumption of 142, 308 .- śanti, cessation of, the absence of a thing, 133. lxxxxiii. abhiniveśa, adherence, 159, alina, not sleeping, cxxxvi. 160, 220. avatāra, descent, causing abhilapa, expression, 72, 132, descent, 58. 133. avatäranasandhi, intention of abhüta, that which has not causing descent, 150. been, unreal, cxxi, cxxii, avayava, a part, cxxxiv. 135 .- abhiniveśa, adherence avayavin, a whole, 90. to, cxxv, 180, 182, 183, 186; avayaviväda, theory of the whole -parikalpanā, supposition as distinct. from the parts, · of. 136, 183. 129, 130. abhūtvā bhavah, coming into avara, last, 124. being having no existence avasthiti, enduring, cxl. See before, Il1. dhrauvya. amanastā, mindlessness, 67. avikșipta, cxxxvi. amanibhava, becoming non- avidyā, 35, 210. mind, cxxxvi. avyakta, the unevolved pri- amūdha, not stupefied, cxxxvi. mordial element, 35, 36. amrta, immortal, 108-110. avyākrta, unfolded, cvi .- arundhati, the star alcor, nāmarūpa, name and form, lxxxxviii .- darsananyāya, cvi. the maxim of seeing, lxxxxviii. aśakti, absence of capability arūpaka, without a form or re- (in regard to origination), Aected image, cxxxvì, 70, 155. 121-123.

276 AGAMASĀSTRA [Appendix Xİ

asanga, free from attachment, ākāśakalpa, like the sky, 83, 84, i. e., relation to objects, 88. cxxxvi, 68, 85, 209 .- lakșaņa, ākiñcanya, nothingless, 99. characteristic, 68. āgama, 171. asat, non-existent, cxxi; it ācāryasammati, concurrence of does not arise from the non- teachers, lxix. existent, nor from the exis- ātman, self, origination of, 50; tent, 147. nirupākhya asat, springs up as Jiva, 50; it false, cvi. does not exist, 192; is a asatkaryavada, the theory that name for Buddha, 202. the effect is not existent (in -drsți (P. attaditthi), theory its cause), 122. of individuality, 26; -naśa, asamprajñāta samādhi, a kind destruction of, 75; -nai- of yoga, 95. rätmya, the state of non- asambhava, non-origination, 63; self, 103 ;- bhava, the state different interpretation of, of, 13 ;- vāda, theory of, 64. 26 ;- viniścaya, ascertain- asambhuti, non-origination, 63. ment of, 29; -samstha, asti-nasti, P. atthi-n'tthi, is resting in itself, 72, 73, 81. and is not, 103, 104. -tā, atmīya, relating to ātman, 172. -tva, 103, 109. adiśānta, quiescent from the asparśa, absence of contact, outset, 204, 205. 305 .- yoga (Tib. mi. reg.pabi. ādțtya, to be preferable, civ. sbyor.ba), a profound and adhyātmika, relating to self, intense abstract concentra- inward, subjective, 47. tion of mind, cxxii, cxxxvi āninjya, immovable, 99. 74, 94, 99; discussion on, animitta, having no cause, 99, 96, 100, 305 .- vihara, un- 189. pleasant state, 97 .- samvit- āpya, obtainable, 199. präpti, attainment of contact- ābhāsa, appearance, image, less consciousness, 95. 156. asmitā, egotism, 210. äyatanavat, having an abode, c. asvapna, without dream, cxxxvi, äryagocara, the scope of the 70. Ãryas, 187. See buddha-

Appendix XI] INDEX OF SUBJECTS LII

alambana, support, 296. upadhi, condition, cxxxiv. ālaya or alayavijñāna, receptacle upāya, means, cii. intellect, cxli, 173, 188. upāyakauśalya, skilfulness. in ālāta same as alāta, q. v., 155. method, 151. avarana, covering, 209-211. upayadeśanā, instruction of the -cyuti, disappearance of, method, 169. cxxvi, cxxxix, 209-210. uditahoma, a sacrifice after āveśa (=abhiniveśa), adherence sunrise, civ.

to, 159. upāsana or upāsanā, medita- aśrama, a stage of religious life, tion, lxxxxiv, cii, cxx, cxxxv,

36. 44, 295-98. ahamgraha°, 296; āśraya, recipient, cxxxix, 59. pratīka°, 296, 297 ; brahma°, -parāvrtti, revolution or 296. change of the recipient, i.e., upeya, object, cii. alayavijnana, cxxxix, 188; ekī-v kr, to make one, 79. -parivrtti, same as parā- ekibhuta, that which has become vrtti, 188. one, 79.

Indha, lxxxxv. om, 9, 12-14. Indha-Indra, lxxxxvi. karman, action, civ, cvi,

īśvara, 35, 84. cvii. uccheda, annihilation, cxxv, kalpita, same as parikalpita, 160, 162, 165. -nișțhā, firm assumed, supposed, 176, - adherence to, 162; -vada, samvrti, assumcd. practical the theory of, 162. truth, 174, 175. utkarsa, excellence, pulling up- kaşāya, evil passion, 78. wards, 298. kāraņa, cause, 114. -abhinna uttrasa, terror, 150, 151. kārya, the effect is not utpatti, birth, 39, 106. different from its cause, 113. utpāda, birth, 105, 106, 147. kāryakāraņatābhāva, causation, udaśarāva. an earthen vessel 158.

full of water, civ. kāryābhinna kāraņa, the cause unmanībhāva, absence of is not different from its mind, cxxxvi, 82. effect, 113. upacāra, a stage of samādhi, kāla, time, 3, 33. a figurative application, 70-72. kuśalāsrava, good-impure, 130.

278 ÁGAMASĀSTRÁ [Appendix Xİ

kūțasthanityatā, eternity as un- gaganopama, like the sky, 83, changeability, cxli. 88. kaivalya, the state of being not gandharvanagara, an ima- connected with anything ginary town in the sky, cxix, else, cxxxvii. 38. koți, extreme, 141. gambhīrajñeya, the knowable kośas, sheaths, cxxxiv. that is profound, 176. krama, order. pürva°, prior, guņas, qualities, ingredients, 30. 177 ; para°, posterior, 177; 36; identity with dravya, of, 91 saha°, simultaneous. 177. gunin, one with guņas not -kopa, incompatibility of different from gunas, qua. the order of cause and effect, lities, 91. 121. ff. grahaņagrāhakābhsa, with kleśa, passion (rāga, dveșa, and the appearance of the perci- moha), 130, 210 ; five-fold, pient and the perceptible, same as samkleśa, 131. -- 155. āvaraņa, kleśas as covering, grāhaka, percipient, 24. 209, 210. grāhya, perceptible, 24. kșanabhangavāda, the theory catuskoți, four points, 191, 192. of momentariness of things, calacalaniketa, with an un- 121. fixed home, 46. kşaņika, momentary, cxli. citta, mind, cxxx, cxxxiii, kșānti, P. khanti, acquiescence, cxxxv, cxlii ; it does not relate 201, 202; duķkbādhivāsana", itself to an object, 135, 137, patience accepting miseries, 138 ; itis the seed of all, 137; 202; dharmanidhyāna°, it has no origination, 137, 154 ; patience by meditating upon it is not found, 139, 168; the elements of existence, duality is only it, 172 ; all 202 ; parāpakāramarșaņa°, thisisit, 167, 172; without the patience bearing injuries objective cause it is moksa, done by others, 202; ruci. 187; when without an objec- liking; chanda, desire ; tive cause it has no origina- labdhi, view, 203. tion, 184; this non-origination khandha (P.), S. skandha, is unconditioned and always q. v., 141. the same and free from the

Appendix XI] INDEX OF SUBJECTS 279

two, 185; nothing to be jagarita, wakefulness, 145-147. seen by' it, 137, 138; no jāgrat, wakefulness, 165, 167. Brahman (creator), etc., ex- jāti, birth, origination, 50, 108; cepting it, 172 ; nothing visible dispute on, of the existent, excepting it, 173 ; it is in the and of the non-existent, 101 ; form of the subject and the neither of the existent nor of object; 173 ; it is with and the non-existent, 101; of without movement (spandita), different things, 149; teach- 173 ; the creation is owing to ing of and its significance, its movements, 173 ; cessa- 149. -vada, theory of. 104. tion of its movements is 128, 148; refutation of, 105f. Brahman, 79; asanga, with- jīva, cxxx 50; neither a transfor- out relation, 172 ; ākāśasama, mation nor a part of Ātman, like the sky, 169; nirvisaya, 7 ; nirmitaka, i. e., made without the object, 172 ;- by supernatural power, 170 ; abhiniveśa, adherence to, 167; māyāmaya, i. e., made of -īkşaņīya,-drsya, (cf. mano illusion, 170 ; svapnamaya, drsya, 67) to be seen by, cxxiv, i.c., made of dream, 169. 145, 166, 184 ;- dhārã, conti- jñāna, knowledge, civ, cvì, nuity of, 139 ;- nāśa, dis- cxxxv, cxxxviii, 68, 83-85, appearance of, cxxxi ;- mātra, 88 ; akalpaka, 68, 83 ; aja, pure, 186-187, 167 ;- spanda 68. 209; anutpannapra-

. (or cit°) is expressed by such dhvamsi, 85 ; anutpādarūpa, terms as jīva, etc., 173. 85 ; (cf. anutpādalakșaņā cinmātra, pure thought, cxxxvii, prajñāpāramitā, 85 ;) aprāpti- chāyatman, atman in the form lakşaņa, 85, 198 ; asanga, 68, of a shadow, lxlxxxvii, 85, 209 ; asangalakșaņa, 68, lxlxxxviii. 85, 172; asangasvabhāva- chāyāpurusa, a person in the lakşaņa, 85, 172, 198 ; ākāśa- form of a shadow, lxlxxxvii, - kalpa, 83; atmasamstha, lxlxxxviii. 72-74 ; ālambanam nopa- janmasaņkleśa, impurity labhate, 73 ; alambyam through the birth, 131. ' artham nopalabhate, 73; janya-janaka, to be produced jñeyabhinna, 68, 83 ; trividha, and the producer, 118, .viz., svasāmānyalakşaņāva-

280 ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA [Appendix XI dhāraka, utpādavyayãvaº, object ; is prajñāpāramitā, the and anutpādānirodhāva°, 198; highest excellence of wisdom; niḥsanga, 209 ; vijñaptimātra- ātman, 193, 194, 202. tve sthitam, 73; vijñapti- tantra, same as paratantra, q.v., mātravyavasthitam, 73; not 176. mentioned by the Buddha, tanmātra, a subtle and primary 212. element, 35. jñeya, knowable, 68, 83, 84. 88, 198, 199; referring to tamas, darkness, one of the three constituents of the Brahman, 68 ; referring to primeval cause in the Sankhya, the objective world, 83, 87. 31. -abhinna, not different from, täyin, one who instructs the cxxxvi, 68, 83 ; is transforma- tion of vijñāna, s. v., 85, 86; way known to oneself, 212. turīya, same as turya, q. v., -āvaraņa, covering of, 210 ; lxxxxv, lxxxxvi, ci, cxv, -anupalabdhi, non-percep- 5, 7. tion of, 210; -upalabdhi, turya, fourth, referring to the perception of, 211. Self in its unconditioned jyotișmat, luminous, c. state, lxxxxv, lxxxxvi, ci, cxv, tattva, category, 30, 31, 35; 4, 5, 6, 7, 12. truth, 37, 44, 47.65, 66; same taijasa, brilliant, referring to the as dharma in Buddhism, 90- 92. -agrahaņa, non-grasping Self in the dreaming state, of, 5 ;- apratibodha, lxxxxv, lxxxxvi, lxxxxviii, realization of, 6, 7 ;- avatara, non- c-cii, cxiv, cxv, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 10-12, 31. causing descent or leading to, 155 ;- avatāraņābhisandhi, teachers, pre-Sankara, of the intention of leading one to, Vedānta, ciii. 150 ;- pratyätmagatika, know- trasat, being terrified, 149, 152. able only by oneself, 151. trāsa, terror, 150. tathata, suchness, highest truth, trilaksana, doctrine of three 189, 193, 194. characteristics, cxxxxv. tathagata, Buddha, 151, 215; trisvabhāva, doctrine of three is advaya jñana, knowledge characteristics, cxxxxv. having not the two as its darśana, view, 130; -märga, . path of illu illumination eu

Appendix XI] INDEX OF SUBJECTS 281

dausthulya, bad condition of 204, 206; alabdhāvaraņa, the mind, 188. See klesa- without covering, 211 ; and jñāna-āvaraņa, adinirmala, unsullied from dravya, substance, identical the beginning, 211 ; ādi- with gunas, qualities, 91 .- śuddha, originally pure, 211; tva, the state of, 156. adiparisuddha, perfectly pure drastavyopaśama, cessation of from the beginning, 211; the visible, 103. adibuddha, originally know- dvaya, the two, referring to ledge, 201-202, 211 ; ādišānta, grāhya, perceptible, and quiescent from the outset, grāhaka, percipient, 24, 66, 204-206; nihsvabhāva, with- 67, 132, 165, 172, 180; refer- out innate characteristics, ring to the two extreme views, 204; prakṛtinirmala, naturally 102. See advaya. -abhāva, unsullied, 211 ; prakrtinivțta, absence of, 180; -ābhāsa, naturally merged in nirvāņa, appearance of, 66, 67, 165- 204-206 ; prakṛtiprabhāsvara, 166 ;- nisrita, P. nissita, naturally shining, 211; su- regarding to, 103. nirvrta, well merged in dvicittatā, the state of with two nirvāņa, 204-205 ; equal, not minds, 139. different, without origination dvipad or dvipada, biped, man, and disappearance, 204- 83. -uttama, -vara, great- 205; not mentioned by the est of men, referring to the Buddha, 212 ; use of, in the Buddha, 83. sense of element of exis- dvesa, aversion, one of the ten tence, in Brāhmanical works, impurities, 210. 93 ; significance of the use dvaita, duality, 67. of, in Book IV, 92; same dharma, duty, 34, 48; same as as bhava in meaning, 93; the tattva of the Sankhyas 92; dharma and dharman are two an element of existence, a different words for the same thing (artha, padartha) 89; thing, 92 .- kāya, cosmicalbody definition and explanation of the Buddha, 307 .- dhātu, of, 89; details thereof, 87- essence of reality, cxxvi, 88 ; like sky, 83, 87, 88 ; 188-190, 192-194, 199, 200 .- anutpanna, not produced. nairātmya, unreality of, 211.

282 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Appendix XI

dharmin, according to the | nitya-anitya, eternal and not Buddhists there are only eternal, 103. dharmas and no dharmin as a nimitta, cause (objective), 131; separate entity, 89-90; views rūpasamjñaka°, śabda°, of the Sankhyas, Vaiśeșikas gandha°, rasa°, sprastava°, and Naiyāyikas on, 90. dharma°, 131, 132; specific dhätu, organs of sense, their · appearance of a thing (ava- objects, and the conscious- sthāviseșa), 183; not touched nesses arising from their con- by mind, 137 .- grahin, tact, 141 .- väda, alchemy, 34. percipient of, 183. dhyāna, meditation, twofold, niralambavāda, the theory of rūpa and arūpa, each of advocating the absence four kinds, 95-96. of the support of mind, dhruva, enduring, cxxxviii, 86. cxxxix, cxl, cxli. dhrauvya, the state of being nirākāra, formless, cxxxvi. nirabhasa, without any sense- enduring, cxl. See sthiti image, cxxxvi, 80, 81, 172, and avasthiti. 187. See anabhasa. na-vyavasthā, absence of niruddha, completely sup- finality or conclusion, 114. pressed, cxxxv. naman, 129. nirodha, disappearance. 39, 105; nāna, manifold. 41. briefly for samjnāvedita- nidrā, sleep, 6, 7, 294. nirodha, an intense abstract nihsanga, free from attachment, meditation, 100. -samāpatti, cxxv. 79, 180, 186. a kind of intense abstract nihsvabhava, without innate meditation, 99. characteristics, 87, 137; --. nirnānākaraņātmaka, essentially ta, 189, 204. not diverse, 50. nigrhīta, suppressed, cxxii, nirmāņa, magical creation, 171. . CXXXV. -kāya, supernatral body of nitya, eternal, cxxxviii, cxxxix, the Buddha, 171; -citta, cxli, cxliv. -ta, eternity, mind of, 171. 'cxli. kutastha°, as unchange- nirmita or nirmitaka, created ability, clxxxxi; santati°, by supernatural power, 170, as continuance, cxxxxi, 171.

Åppendix XI] INDEX ÔF SUBJECTS. 283

nirvāņa, apravrtti, not coming parinirvrta, perfectly merged in forth, not arising, cxxxviii, nirvāna, 204, 205. See su- cxlii, 50, 81, 205. nirvrta. nirvisaya, objectless, cxxxvi. parinispanna, perfect .- lakșaņa, nirvikalpa, indeterminate, cxxi, characteristic, -svabhava, cxxxvi. · nature, 176-179, 197, 200.

nispanna, = parinispanna, paripāka, maturation, 200;

CXXXV. atma°, of one's own self, nairātmya, the state of being 200; sattva°, of the people, without atman, i.e., svabhāva, 200. nature, 149. A. Nyāya, 91. paripācana, maturation, 200. para°, of others, 200. pañcavimśaka, a collection of paśu, a person in bondage, 35, twenty-five, 35. pakya, to be made matured, pañjika, commentary, 43. 199, 200. paññatti (P .. ), S. prajñapti, q. v. Pāśupata, a philosophical pada, state, 194. system, 35. paratantra, dependent, 132, the order of 174-177, 179 .- laksaņa,- pāțhakrama, reading, 190. svabhava, characteristic of. pāda, quarter, 9, 31. nature of, 176, 177, 199, 200. pudgalanairātmya, unreality of paranirapeksa, independent of the individual ego, 211. others, 111. purāņasthitidharmatā, the nature paramārtha, absolute truth, 49, of the elements of existence, 87, 108, 205, 214 .- naya, that remains from the past, view ;- satya, truth, 162, 163, 214. 173, 189; as upeya, to be purușa, person, 35. approached, 175. purvāparakoțiparīksā, examina- parikalpita, imagined .- lakșaņa, tion of the first and the last characteristic,-svabhāva, points of the world, 123. nature, 176-179, 199, 200. purvāparakoļyaparijñāna, abso- parinirvāņa, 99. lute ignorance of the first and pariņāma, transformation, last points of the world and cxxxxi .- nityatā, eternity as, things, 123. cxlxxxi ;- vada, theory of, cx. prthak, different, 41.

284 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Appendix XI

prakāśavat, shining, c. prājña, intelligent, the self in prakrti, primeval cause of the the state of deep sleep, Sankhyas, 31 ; nature, 61, 109, lxxxxv, lxxxxvi, lxxxxviii, c, 111, 140, 201, 204. ci, cii, cxiv, 1, 2, 4-6, 11, 12. pracara, state, 69. phassa (P.), S. sparśa, touch, prabhu, powerful, 22. contact, 97. pradhāna, primeval cause of phāsu (P.), pleasant, 97. - the Sankhyas, 113. vihāra, state, 97. prajñapti, P. paññatti, practical bāhya, external, 47. -artha, denomination, 130, 131 ; a thing, is vijñānapariņāma, derivation of, in Pali, 130, transformation of conscious- 132-134; there is only ness, 87. prajñapti and not anything buddha, same as bodha, i.e., real (vastu), 134, 135, advaya jñāna, 201. -gocara, 137. sphere of the Buddha, 187; prajnāpāramitā, asańgalakșaņā, -bhumi, the field or having the characteristics of activities of Buddhas, 187 ;- not attachment or relation, vișaya, province of Buddha, 193. 187. praticchãya, reflection, 80. bījānkuradrsțānta, the illustration pratityasamutpāda, dependent of the seed and its sprout, 125. origination, 47, 103, 176. buddhi, intellect, 34, 73. Pratyabhijñā, a school bhaktiväda, secondary sense of of Indian Philosophy, a speech, 10. lxxx. bhañjikā, explanation, com- prapañca, expansion of the mentary, 43. universe, visible world, ex- bhãva, object, 17, 23, 26, 28, pression, 8, 42, 43-45, 47 .- 29, 41, 60, 61, 108 .- kalpanā, upaśama, cessation of, cxix, 42-45, 47. -vilaya, dissolu- assumption of, 133 ;- abhāva-

tion of, 43 .- vilayavāda, 301. kalpanā, imagination of an

prabodha, awaking, 75. object and non-object, 133; -abhavadarsana, the view pravīņa, clever, 207. prastha, a special standard of of an object and non-object, 104 ;- nișțhā, firm adherence measure, 11. to, 162.

Åppendix XI] INDEX OF SUBJECTS 285

bhavanā, meditation, 130. pariksaya, complete, destruc- bhuvanakośa, the system of the tion of, 293 ;- praśamana, world, 34. cessation of, 293; laya, dis- bhūta, existent, cxxi, cxxii; appearance of, cxxxvi ;-- elements, cxviii, 30, 35; spandita, vibration of, 26. object, 17, 144. -koți, manovijñānavyavrtti, ceasing to highest point of truth, 189, exist of the consciousness of 194. the mind ; this is nirvana 81. bheda, object, 17, 18, 22. mantravada, formulas of Brahman, is the cessation of sacred texts or the science the movement of the citta, of magic, 34. 173; is the citta when free martya, mortal, 108-110. from movement and sense- mahat, the second tattva in the image, 79; (creator) and Sankhya system, 35, 36. others are nothing but citta, 172. mahajnana, with great wisdom, 208. brähmaņya, befitting a mahākāśa, cxxxvi. Brāhmaņa, 194, 195. Mathur, a city, lxvi. mahādhi, one with high intel -. lect, Bodhisattva, 198. majjhimā pațipadā (P.), S. Mahāyāna, 39, 199. madhyama pratipad, middle mātrā, measure, 9, 12. path, 102, 104. māna, measure, 1l. Madhu Brāhmaņa, a particular maya, illusion, cxvi, cxix, section of the Brhadāranyaka cxxxii, cxxxiii, 35, 62, 164, Upanișad, 55. 165; has no beginning, 7; is Madhuvidyā, a particular seen, but does not exist, 151, Brahmavidya, cxxxv, 55. 163 .- vāda, cxlv ;-- hastin, an madhyama pratipad, middle elephant called up by, 152, path, 102, 104. 153. madhystha, standing on an inter- mārgajñatā, the state of the mediate position, 10. knower of the path, 198. manana, thinking, cxxi. mukti, cxxxvii. manas, 67, 68 .- kşaya, destruc- mūdha, stupefied, cxxxvi, 77,294. tion of, cxxxvi; -näśa, dis- mṛditakaşāya, one with pas- appearance of, cxxxvi ;- sions removed, 78.

286- : ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Appendix Xi

mokșa, 43, 47. vastu, a thing, the real, cxxiv, yuktiyukta, reasonable, cxxvii, 198 .- abhava, absence of, 61. 180 .- jñana, the knowledge yoga, 35, 77. of, 198. rajas, one of the three consti- yadrcchika, accidental, 46. tuents of Prakrti of the vāsanā, impression on the mind Sankhyas, 31. of the past ideas, cxxxiii, rāga, lust, 210. cxxxiii, 87. lakşana. characteristic, 168; vikalpa, false idea, creation, 8 .. hot taught, absence of, 169. viksipta, distracted, cxxxvi, 77, lakşaņāśunya, without any 79. characteristic, 168. vikșepa, distraction, 79. 295. laksya, to be defined, 169; vijñapti, consciousness, cxxxvii, not taught, absence of, 68, 153 ; synonymous with 169. vijñāna, q.v .- mātra, 73, 86. laya, disappearance, 11, 37 ; -ta, cxxxvii, cxxxviii, cxlii. the sleeping state of the 73, 187, 188 ; °vyavasthāna mind, cxxxv, 69, 76, 77, (jñāna), 73. 294. vijñāna, P. viññāņa, conscious- lingatman, lxxxxvi. loka, people, 36 .- anurañjana, ness, cxxxii, cxxxiii, cxlii, 68, 73, 85, 87, 154-57; there . pleasing of, 36 ;- avatāraņa, is only it, and nothing else. making descent of, 150: See 153; utpannapradhvamsi, 85; tattvāvatāra, sattvāvatāra .-- nimittalambana, vișayavaici- uttara, supra-mundane, cxxvi, tryasangalakșaņa, 85 ; syno- cxxxix, 195-198 ;- uttama, above supra-mundane, 197; nymous with ālaya, citta, -dhatu, the world, 201 ;- ceșțā, tribhava, manas, vikalpa, vijñapti, 68, 153-154, pakti, maturation of the world, 201 ;- samvti satya, as well as with jñapti .-

practical or empirical truth nirodha, suppression and nirvāņa, extinction of, is puru- of the people, 214. laukika, mundane, 196, 197. şärtha, 82, 81 ;- pariņāma, transformation of, 87 ;- vada, śuddha°, pure, 196, cxxxi, cxxxii, cxlii, 86, 136 ; 197. -spandita, vibration of, 155.

Appendix XI] INDEX OF SUBJECTS 287

vidya, one of the tattvas in the vaiśāradya, P. vesārajja, Pāśupata system, 35. intrepidity ; derivation and viparyasa, false notion, 136, meaning of ; four-fold, 137. 206-208. vipraņasa, disappearance, 162. Vaiśvānara, belonging to all vibhu ; all-pervading, 1, 4. men, lxxxxv, lxxxxvi, c, ci. vibhūti, expansion, 3 ; mani- vyaya, change, 158. festation, 35. vyavadāna, purification, 103, . vivacana, synonym, cxxxx. 129. Vivartavāda, the doctrine main- vyavahāra, common use,. 129. taining that the appearance -naya, practical point of of the universe is imposed view, 162 ;- satya, empirical on Brahman, cx. truth, 162, as upāya, means, visārada, scholar, bold, 207. 175. Viśiștādvaitavāda, cix, cx. vyāvahārika satya, empirical viśva, the embodied self in the truth, 175, 178. waking state, lxxxxiv- śakti, one of the tattvas in the lxxxxviii, cii, cxiv, 1, 2, 4-6, Pāśupata system, 35; energy, 9, 11, 12, 31. 91, 121-123 ; cannot be estab- vișaya, field of activities, 69, lished in the coming into 187 ; object of senses, 31. being of anything 123 .- mat, vihära, field of activity, 69, one with, 91. No difference 187. -between sakti and śaktimat, vrttiksaya, loss of the action 91. of the mind, 82. saņkleśa, impurity, 129, 130. vrddhasammati, approval of śama, equanimity, 77 .- prāpta, the old teachers, lxix. one that has reached, 77. veda-pāraga, 44. śanti, peace, 75. vedapāra-ga, 44. . śarad, autumn, 207. vevacana (P), S. vivacana, q.v. sārada, timid, not bold, Vedānta, xlvi, lxxxiv, 44, 101, 207. 175, 214. śāradya, P.sārajja, timidity, 207, vesārajja (P.), S. vaisāradya, q.v. 308. vaitathya, unreality, ciii, 15. sārira ātman, incorporated soul, 16, 47, lxxxxii, Ixxxxviij.

288 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Appendix XI

sastra, Chinese lun, Tib. sakkāyadițthi (P.), S.satkāyadrsți, bstan.bcos, lxii. the theory of individuality, śāśvała, eternal, always existing, 26-27. cxxv, cxl, 160 .- aśaśvatābhi- samkleśa, impurity, 129, 130. dha, appellation of eternal 131 .- upalabdhi, experience and non-eternal, 164 .- vāda of, 131, 132. the theory of eternity, cxliv, saņkhyā, understanding, 129. 162. sa-ce (P.), in the sense of tac śiva, one of the tattvas in cet. See sa-yathā, sa-yadi. 55. Pāśupata system, 35 ; calmn, samjñā. consciousness, 96; 50. sada°, one of the tattvas designation. 129 .- vedita- in Pāśupata system. nirodha, a samadhi in Śuddhadvaitavada, the theory Buddhism, 96, 99, 100. See of the Pure Monism, cx. saññāvedayita° S. samjñā°, śuddhi-aśuddhi, purity and q. v., 96, 99, 100. Accord- impurity, 104. ing to Chinese P.samma°, S. šūnya, 47 .- tā, 47, 189, 211. samyak° for saññac. -pravesa, maha-, 95. sati (P.), S. smțti, meditation, śramaņa brāhmaņa, 194. 45. śrutiprasthāna, the Course of sat, existent, not arising from Revelation, ciii. the existent or the existent, Śresthayāna, same as Mahā- cxxi, 147-148. yana, 199. satkāyadrsti, P. sakkāyaditthi, sadvimśa, consisting of twenty- q.v. six, the philosophical system satkāryavāda, the theory of Patañjali, 35. that the effect exists in its samvitti, consciousness, 86. cause, 101, 102; Buddhist samviti, covering, i.e., empiri- views on, 101. cal truth, 161, 163, 173, 175. sattva, one of the constituents -satya, empirical truth, of Prakrti in the Sankhya 162. See kalpitasamvṛti, system, 31; people .- avatāra, satya. causing the descent of, or samsära, 141, 143, 160, 162, leading the, 150 .-- paripāka, 205. the act of maturing the, sakasāya, with passions, 77. 200.

Appendix XI] INDEX OF SUBJECTS 289

satya, truth, 162; vyavahāra°, sa-yatha, in the sense of tad practical; paramärtha° or yatha. See sa-ce, sa-yadi. pāramārthika°, transcenden- 55. tal, 162, 175, 178; prātibhā- sa-yadi, See sa-ce, sa-yatha. sika°, existing in appearance, 55. . 178; vyāvahārika°, 162, 175, sarva, all .- jña, knower of, 178; samvrti°, empirical, 162. omniscient, 70 ;- tā, tva, 194, sadbhāva, 161. 195, 198, 199. sarvajnatva -:. sanimitta, with (objective) vāda, cxxxxv. sarvabīja, seed cause, 131. of all, 136 ;-- ka, 188. sanirvāņa, extinct, cxxxvi, 81. sahaja, innate, 111. santati, continuance, cxli .-- samvrta, pertaining to samvṛti, nityatā, eternity as continu- g. v., 178. ance, cxliv. sāmsiddhika, self-existent, sandhi, =abhisandhi, intention, 1II. 150. Sankhya, 101, 102. sama, always in the same sadhyasama, that which is condition, 73, 184, 185 .- tā, yet to be proved, 125. . 49, 72, 73, 194 ;- prāpta, 78, sāmānyadharma, common See samaprāpta. quality, 9. samādhi, intense abstract sāmya, =sama, q. v., 208, meditation, 70-72, 74. vajro- 217. pama°, thunderbolt like, sukhasthiti or sukhavasthiti, 307. pleasant state, 97. sambuddha, perfectly under- sunirvrta, perfectly merged in stood, 83. nirvāņa, 204, 205. sambhava, origination, 63, 115; sușupta, referring to Prājña, is not of the non-existent from lxxxxvi; deep sleep, 34 .- the existent, 147; possibility, stha, one in the state of deep 171. sleep, lxxxxviii. sambhuti, birth, 63; various sușupti, deep sleep, 34. explanation of, 64. sütraprasthana, the Course of sammuti (P.), S. sammati, Sűtras, civ. general consent, 162 .- satya, srsti, creation, 37. truth bv. 175. stabdhibhava, stiffness. 78.

290 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Appendix XI

sthiti, continued existence, 37; svabhāva, nature, no origination the position, of citta, 186; of, through cause and condi- the niścala or unwavering tion, 110; cannot be artificial. position of the citta is 110; is always non-origina- the field of the Buddhas, tion, 111; refutation of, 140. 186. svarūpa, natural state, cxxxvii. sthanidharma, 20. svalaksaņa, own characteristic, sthira, cxxxix. See dhruva. 89. spandita, vibration, cxxv. svastha, restingin itself, cxxxvii, sparśa, . P. phassa, touch or 81. contact, 99; is three-fold, svābhāvika, natural, 111. ānīnjya, ākincanya and ani- hetu, cause; nirvartaka, mitta, 99 .- vihāra, (for P. bringing about, 128; nimitta, phāsu°, Tib. bde. gnas. pa), objective, 184 .- pratyaya, pleasant state. condition, 176 ;- sāmagrī, smṛti, meditation, 45; codes of totality of, 179 .- phala, effect law handed down memoriter, of cause, 159; their relation- 45 .- prasthana, the Course of ship is not possible, 115-121 ; Tradition or Remembered -bhava, causation, cxxiv; Texts, ciii. not possible, 125, 158 ;- svadha, kāra, the exclamation ãveśa, adherence to, 159, svadhā, 46. 160 ;- udbhava, arising of, svapna, dream, cxix, 6, 7, 15- 159 ;- vyavasthā, a settled 19, 38, 66, 67, 143-146, 165, rule of, there is none, 166, 295 .- atman, in the state 126. of, lxxxxviii .- drs, dreamer, heya, that which is to be 166. abandoned, 199.

ADDENDA ET CORRIGĒNDA

INTRODUCTION

P. xlix, note 2. Certainly this reason drsyatva is not in our text, but in Sankara's own commentary (II. 4 : drsyatvad iti hetuh).It may be noted here in this connexion that in the later Vedantic works drsyatva is one of the main hetus for inferring that the outward world is false (Advaitasiddhi, Advaitamanjarī ed., p. 2: vimatam mithyā drśyatvād). P. lxxxix. As regards the commentary on the NUTU, I am thankful to Sachindra Nath Ghose of Benares for his kindly sending me a trans- cription of it made by himself in Bengali characters from a MS in the library called Mālatīsaradāsadana of R a y Govinchandji in Benares. It is not complete and runs up to pratyagekarasah of the original text in the ninth and the last section. Yet, it contains a separate loose page in which the last portion of the commentary is copied. Here in some of the colophons it is called Vivarana, while in others Vivrti. According to the present MS this commentary is by Gaudapãda as is quite clear from the colophons, some reading Śrī- gaudapādīya° and others śrīśukayogīndraśisyaśrīgauda- pādācāryakrti°. It begins thus : śrīgaņeśaya namah. śrīnrsimhāya namah. nirastasakalānarthaparamānandarūpiņe | nṛsimhāya namaskurmah sarvadhīvțttisāksiņe || 1

292 ĀGAMASĀSTRA |Intro.

yatpādābjarajoleśasamparkāt sahasā sakrt | sarvasamsārahīno 'ham tān nato 'smi gurūn sadā || 2 tāpanīyarahasyārthavivrti[r] leśato mayā | kriyate 'lpadhiyām tasmāt kşantavyam ksatam uttamai || 3

iha pūrvasmin granthe nṛsimhākārabrahmavişayā nirupādhikabrahmavidyāphalādhigatā. tathā hy uktam värttikakrdbhiķ nrsimhabrahmavidyaişā vyākṛtā jñānasiddhaye | And it ends thus : tāpanīyarahasyārthadīpikā timirāpahā į gurvanugrahalabdhaișā satām astu sukhāptaye || saccidanandapūrn[āya ] pratyagekarasātmane | tejase mahate bhūyān namah pumsimharūpiņe ll yasya samsmṛtimātreņa taranti bhavasāgaram | tam nato 'smi gurum bhaktyā dhiyā vācā ca karmaņā || iti śrīmatparamahaņsaparivrājakācāryaśrīmacchuka- munīndrasişya-śrīmadgaudapadamuniviracite uttaratāpa- nīyavivaraņe navamaḥ khandah. śubham astu. śrī- lakşmīnsiņho rakșatu mām. nrsimhārpaņam astu. tāraņe vatsare māsi srāvaņe 'sitapakșage | pañcamīrevatīyukte tithau kumbheśapattane || nṛsimhatāpanīyākhyațīkāņ gaudābhidhām satīm | vyāseśvaro 'likhat svast[y]ai nrsimhas tena nuștha(tusya?)tām | It is interesting to note that the following passage from this Vivarana (pp. 25-26) is identical with that in

İntro.] ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA 29:

Śankara's commentary on the MaU, 11, excepting a few unimportant variations as noted in the foot-notes : mīyate iva hi viśvataijasau prājñena pralayotpattyoḥ praveśanirgamābhyām prastheneva yavāh. tathonkāra- samāptau punaḥ punaḥ1 prayoge ca praviśya nirgatāv2 ivākārokārau makāre 'ntye 'kşare ekībhūtāv ivākārokārau. tathā sușupte prājñe viśvataijasau°.3 minoti jāgradādi- yāthātmyam jānātīty arthaļ.4 apītiś ca jagatkāraņātmā caa bhavati.

P. cxxxv. Regarding the identity of citta and Brahman, see YV, III. 64.31 ; 65. 3; 66. 14 ; 96. 56, 66, 73; IV. 35. 20-23, 54. 20. From these verses we can gather that jiva, cit, atman, brahman, sūnya, nairatmya, etc., are the different expressions of citta. From the same authority (III. 122. 35) we also know that such names are made by the authors of sastras in order to supply some terms required by them :

sāştrasamvyavahārārthaņ tasyāsya vitatākrteb | cidbrahmātmeti nāmāni kalpitāni krtātmabhiḥ |/

P. cxxxvi, note 8. For manahksaya there is manah- pariksaya in YV, III. 116. 13. It has also. manonāśa (III. 95. 35-36) and manahpraśamana (III. 122. 27).

1 Ś omits it. 2 Ś nirgacchata. 3 For susupte °taijasau° Ś has viśvataijasau sușuptakāle prājñe. -4 Ś minoti ha vā idam sarvam jagad. 5 Ś omits it.

294 AGAMASĀSTRA [Book İ

BOOK I

5. It is quoted in SV, p. 27. 6. On the creation from Prana see KtU, III. 3 and BS, I. 1. 23, 28. Here in the kārikā we have an Idealistic view (Vijñānavāda). 9. For āplakāma see BU, IV. 4. 6. For bhogārtham srstih see Šrīdharasvāmin on BP, Ill. 7. 4: avidyopādher jīvasya bhogārtham īśvaraḥ srstyādi karoti. 10. See BU, IV. 2. 4; 4. 22; 5. 15. 12. The word sarvadrs in sense is the same as sarvajña 'omniscient' (III. 36). His omniscience is, according to San k a ra (BS, I. 1. 4), on account of his capacity for all knowledge (sarvajñanaśaktimattvenaiva sarvajñatvam abhyupagantavyam), or owing to the fact that he is never dissociated from his intelligence, i.e., all-embracing knowledge (Op. cit., I. 3. 42: sarvajñatvalaksaņayā prajñayā niyatam aviyogāt). On this kārikā as well as on I. 15 see Upadesa- sāhasrī, XVIII. 26. 13. In this and the following karikās nidrā in sense is, in fact, susupta. Here nidrā is said to be bīja 'seed', i.e., origin, because nidra being non-realization of truth is the cause of both dream and waking. See Upadeśasāhasrī, XVIII. 26 as quoted in NSi, IV. 43 : suşuptākhyam tamo 'jñānam bījam svapnaprabodhayoḥ | atmabodhāgnidagdham syād bījam dagdham yathābhavam | This explanation of bija slightly differs from the one given before on p. 6. 14. See l. 16; III. 35. 36; IV. 81. In the fourth state, Turva there ic no pidra por soahne

Book I] ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA 295

while nidra means the laya or mūdhà 'infatuated' state of the mind, svapna indicates the state called viksepa 'distraction'. This state of Turya is the state of Brahman. 15. For b of the karika cf. YS, I. 10: abhava- pratyayālambanā vīttir nidrā. This kārikā is quoted in NSi, IV. 42. 16. This kārikā is quoted in MnU, I. 13, with the reading ajanmanidram for ajam anidram in c. 17. The following is quoted as from G a u d a- pāda in Šankara's Vişnusahasranāma-bhāsya, Mysore ed., p. 18: yad yad dvaitam prapañcasya tan nivartyam hi cetasā | manovrttimayam dvaitam advaitam paramārthata || 19. The Pranava-upäsana referred to here. is well- known in Upanisads, older and later alike (ChU, I. 1. 1, 4. 1; PU, V. 1-2 ; TU, I. 8. 1; MuU, II. 2. 6; MU, IV. 4. 37). Here a few words are necessary for the real significance of upāsana (sometimes upāsanā), which is enjoined (yuñjīta pranave cetah, I. 25) and described to some extent here by our author. The word upāsana is derived, as well-known to all, from upa-vas literally 'to seat near at hand (in order to honour or wait upon),' and figuratively 'to do homage, worship, be devoted to', etc. But in such Upanisadic texts as mano brahmety upāsīta (ChU, III. 18. 1), or, sa yo nama brahmety upāste (Op. cit., VII. 1. 5), it has some special meaning. The first sentence quoted above does not mean 'One should worship the mind as Brahman,' nor do we understand from the second sentence 'He who worships the name as Brahman.' In both of the cases upa-v/as

296 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Book I

or upāsana gives the sense of meditation (dhyāna). It is in the words of Sankara a continuous flow of one and the same idea having an alambana 'support' recommended by the scripture, unmixed with other ideas. (BS, IV. 1. 7: upāsanaņ nāma samānapratyayapravāha- karanam. See ChU, 1. 1. 1 and our text, p. 48). The best älambana for the upasana of Brahman, as in the present case, is Om. We read in the KU, I. 2. 17 : etad alambanam śrestham etad ālambanam param | etad ālambanam jnātvā brahmaloke mahīyateļ] The meditation of Om as Brahman, just as the meditation of an image (pratima) as Visnu 'the all- pervading one', is the means for the realization of Brahman. It is to be noted, according to Šankara's school, that while Brahmajnana leads one immediately and directly to moksa, Brahma-upāsana does not do so, it helps one in gradually attaining to it and to prosperity. Sankara says, it effects the purity of the mind and making the truth clear thereby helps us in acquiring the knowledge of Brahman. Besides, there being an ālambana 'support ' it is easy to make an upāsana. It is to be further noted that there are two kinds of upāsana, that involving the contemplation of the Self (ahamgrahopasana), and that which is symbolical or concerned with external symbols (pratīkopāsana). In the former, the Self, the Paramatman, is contemplated in his conditioned form (saguna) with the idea that 'I am he'. For instance, we read in the TA, VII. 6: sa ya eso 'ntarhrdaya ākāśah, tasmin ayam puruso manomayo 'mrto hiranmayah.

Book II ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA 297

'It is that space within the heart. Here is the Person, formed of thought, undying and golden'. Here the person (i.e., Paramatman) within the space of the heart with those qualities is to be meditated with the thought that ' I am the Person'. But where a worldly or external thing which is other than Brahman is contemplated being regarded as a higher god or Brahman himself that contemplation à or upāsana is symbolical (pratīkopāsana). For instance, in the case of the text, mano brahmety upasīta (quoted above), the mind is to be contemplated as Brahman. So here is another instance of pratikopāsana. For details see BS, III. 3 and IV. 1. Now with regard to our own case, Om is to be meditated as the Self, and so we have also here an instance of pratīkopasana. The three measures (matrās) of Om are to be meditated as Viśva, Taijasa and Prajña respectively. And that Om which has no measure (amatra), i.e., the measures of which are not considered separately, and which is thus immeasurable (amaira), or which, in other words, is with unlimited measure (anantamatra) is to be meditated as Turya. It is said that in an upasana one thing is to be viewed as another thing; for instance, here the first measure of Om, a, is to be regarded as Viśva. It amounts to saying that these two things are identical. But how can this identity be possible ? The answer is this that such identity is by no means actual, but owing to some common quality (samanyadharma) of the two the identity of which is intended. This is a well-known 38-1201B

298 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Book I

practice among us. We say of a brave lad that he is a lion (simho manavakah), though in fact he is not so. It is only on account of the common quality, bravery, of the lad and a lion that we identify them employing the phrase .. Simply following this method of expression our teacher has shown some common qualities of the Purusa and Om (1. 19 ff.) owing to which their identity has been made possible. Let us remember here the following line of Yāska in his Nt, VII. 24: bahubhaktivādīni brāhmaņāni bhavanti. It means that the Brāhmaņas have a great deal of bhaktivada. But what is bhaktivada? Durgäcārya says in explaining the above line of Yāska: bhaktir nāma guņakalpanā. tena kenacid guņena brāhmaņam sarvam sarvathā varņayati. tatra tattvam. anvesyam. It says that bhakti means assumption or consideration of a quality by which a Brahmana describes all things in all kinds of way. But the truth must be investigated there.

I. 20. Evidently the meaning 'subsequence' of the word utkarsa as given in the translation (p. 10) is far- fetched. The explanation as offered in'the Vivarana attributed to Gaudapãda on the NUTU, 2 (see pp. 291 ff.) seems to be better. Besides 'excellence', the word utkarsa means 'attracting' or 'pulling up- wards'. Taking this last sense the Vivarana says that among the three components, a, u and m of Pranava a is guttural and u is labial. So while a is pro- nounced from the lower part (throat) of the mouth, u is done from the upper one (lips). Such being the case, in pronunciation u is, as it were, pulled upwards,

Book 1Ij ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA 299

Or it may be that u is higher than a, because the former is manifested on the lips filling completely or stepping beyond the throat, and because it is manifested with an effort more than that required for the latter. Let the passage be quoted here as 'it is in the transcription (p. 25) : akārād utkarşa ūrdhvam ākrsta iva hy ukāra[ḥ] pranave drśyate. taijasaś ca viśvata[ḥ]. svapnādișu akārata utkrstah. uttamo vā ukāraḥ vyāptyatiśayād balātiśayāc akārasthānam kaņtham vyāpya ati- kram [y? ]a osthasthāne hi tasyabhivyaktiņ. tenākārādhi- kavyāptimattvenokta ukāra virāja iva hiraņyagarbhaḥ. balātisayatvam ca kharaprayatnavyangyatvāt praņa- vasthokārasya mandaprayatnavyangyam akāram apeksya. The utkarsa 'excellence' of Taijasa in this respect in relation to Viśva is this that the former is nearer by one step than the latter to Turīya. 26. See MU, VI. 5; PU, V. 2 : etad vai satyakāma param cāparam ca brahma yad omkāraḥ. 28. Note 1. Add SU, III. 13 ; IV. 17. Note 2. Read 21 for 22.

BOOK II

1. The phrase, ahur manīsinah, is often used not only in our text (1I.5, IV. 54), but also in an Upanisad (KU, III.4) itself and the BG (XVIII.3). 4. It may be noted that samurtatva is referred to by Ś in his commentary on BS, III. 2. 3.

300 AGAMASASTRA İBook tİ

. 5. Cf. MnU, I. 8-11 : antar asminn ime loka antar viśvam idam jagat | bahirvan māyayā bhāti darpaņe pratibimbitam || svapne svāntargatam viśvam yathā prthag aveksyate tathaiva jāgratkāle 'pi prapañco 'yam vivicyatām || svapne svasattaivārthānām sattā nānyeti niścitā | ko jāgrati viśeșo'sti jadānām āśunāśinām | svapne prakāśo bhāvānām svaprakāśān na hītaraḥ | jāgraty api tathaiveti niścinvanti vipaścitaḥ // For prasiddha see Ś on BS, 1.1.22. 7. P. 20, 1. 1. Read 'That for 'that. 9-10. Cf. MnU, 1. 7-8. 21. P. 31, 1. 17. For 6.3, 8.3 read 6-8. 24. P. 34, 1. 16. Read jyoti° or yoti°. 32. P. 41, 1. 1. Read kārikā for kānkā. 34. For anyabhāva see IV. 53. A piece of crystal which is naturally white be- comes red in contact with a red flower, yet, it cannot be said that it is red either in its own nature (svabhāva) or in the nature of other (anyabhava). It is true that under the circumstances it looks red, yet it is actually not so, it only appears to be so, for its innate whiteness does in no way change. See Sankara on BS, III. 2. 11: na hi svacchah san sphațiko 'laktakādyu- pādhiyogād asvaccho bhavati, bhramamātrtvād abhi- niveśasya, upadhīnām cāvidyāpratyupasthāpitatvāt. 35. P. 43, 1. 5. Read NPTU, NUTU and RUTU for NPU, NUU and RUU respectively, and vpaj-pañj for pajpañj in 1. 10.

Book III] ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA 301

For the Prapancavilayavada showing the rela- tionship between the karma- and jñana-kandas in connexion with niyoga one may be referred to Hiriyanna : Journal of Oriental Research, 1927, pp. 109 ff, and the original authorities cited therein. 36. The smrti quoted here is Vasisthasmrti or Vasistha-dharmaśāstra. Ś quotes here also the following couplet which is not traced : yam na santam na cāsantam nāśrutam na bahuśrutam | na suvrttaņ na durvīttam veda kaścit sa brāhmaņa || 38. For the stanza, śūnyam ādhyātmikam° see AK, IX. 250. For pasya the reading is also pasyan.

BOOK III

1. The upāsan mentioned here may refer also to Pranava-upāsana in I. 19 ff. See III. 16. For the true significance of upāsana or upāsană see pp. 295 ff., and modify the Annotation here in accordance with it.

2. See MnU, III. 9 : ghațākāśo mahākāśo ghațopādhikrto yathā | dehopādhikrto bhedo jīvātmaparamātmanoh lį and III. 25-26 : dehendriyamanobuddhipranāhamkārasamhatam || ātmasankalanād ajñair ātmatvam pratipādyate ļ vahnidhīḥ kāsthalohādau vahnisamkalanād iva || According to Brahmadatta, one of the Samuccayavādin Vedantist, Brahman has both origina- tion (utpatti) and disappearance (laya). See Proceed-

302 ÄGAMASÁSTRÁ İBook ÌII

ings and Transactions of the Fourth Oriental Congress, pp. 188-89 ; Śrībhāsya, I.4.2 ; Mahanārayanopanisad, 1.4 ; ViP, VI.40.39. 4. Cf. BP, XII, 5.5 :' ghațe bhinne ghațākāśa ākāśaḥ syād yathā purā | evam dehe mrte jīvo brahma sampadyate punaḥ || 6. P. 52, 1. 26. Read 11 for 12. · 11. This kārikā supports Śańkara's second interpretation (idam tv iha vaktavyam°) refuting that of the Vrttikāra in the Anandamayādhikarana of the BS, I. 1. 12-19. On this see MnU, III. 27-31 also : deham annamayaņ kośam āviśyātmā prakāśate | sthūlo bālaḥ krśaḥ krsņo varņāśramavikalpavān | prāņakośe 'pi jīvāmi kșudhito 'smi pipāsitaḥ | samśito niścito manya iti kośe manomaye || vijñānamayakośastho vijānāmīti tisthati | ānandamayakoşākhye tv ahankāre purākrtaiņ || . puņyair upāsanābhiś ca sukhito 'smīti modate | evam kañcukitaḥ kośaiḥ kañcukair iva pañcabhiḥ || paricchinna ivābhāti vyāpto 'pi parameśvaraḥ | 12. Cf. ChU, I. 9. 1, VIII. 14. 1 ; BS, I. 1. 22, 3.41. 14. See RV, I. 164. 20 ; ŚU, IV. 6-7; MuU, IIl. 1. 1-3. 15. P. 58, 1. 18. Omit IV.2.14. 16. P. 59, 1. 14. Omit etc. 17. See IV. 5. 23. Gaudapād a says here that between the

Book III] ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA 303

two statements in the scripture that which is with a reason is acceptable. Cf. S on BS, II. 1. 4:

yathā ca śrutīnām parasparavirodhe saty- ekavaśeneta- rā nīyante evam pramāņavirodhe 'pi tadvaśenaiva śrutir nīyeta. drstasāmyena cādrstam artham samarthayantī yuktir anubhavasya samnikrsyate, viprakrsyate tu śrutir aitihyamātreņa svārthabhidhanāt. On reasoning (tarka) see S on BS, II. 1.11. With regard to yukti we may remember here what is said in YV, II. 18. 2-4 about the two śāstras, ārsa 'derived from rsis' and paurusa 'derived from men'. The author says that a sästra, though it is a paurusa, deserves to be accepted, if it is reasonable. One must follow reason. A speech, if reasonable, must be accepted even from a child, but that which is not reasonable should be rejected like a piece of straw though it might be uttered even by Brahman, the creator. That man is certainly not wise who rejecting the beautiful water of the Ganges flowing before him drinks from a well thinking only that it belongs to his father :

api paurușam ādeyam śāstram ced yuktibodhakam | anyat tv arsam api tyājyam bhāvyam nyāyaikasevinā | yuktiyuktam upādeyam vacanaņ bālakād api | anyat tmam iva tyājyam apy uktam padmayoninā | yo 'smattātasya kūpo 'yam iti kaupam pibaty apah | tyaktva gangam purastham tam ko na sasty atigarhitam |

27b. Read yujyate for jujyale. 29, P. 66, 1. 19. Add the after with,

304 ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA [Book IV

30. Here is the Tibetan version : gñis: min. yid. ni. rmi. lam. na gñis. su. snan. ste. the. tshom med | de. bshin. gñid. kyis. ma. log. tshe | gñis. min. gñis. snan. the. tshom. med || P. 67, 1. 5. Read the two for a second. 31. For manodrsyam see cittadrsyam, IV. 28, 36, 77. P. 67, 1. 13. Read perceptible for perceived. 2. P. 68, I. 2. Read ViS for Vis. and add 38 after III. 35. Note 1. Add 44, 46 after 42. 36. Note 3. Add cf. sarvadrs, I. 12 ; IV. 84. P. 70, 1. 6. Read TAk for TA. 39. Read vai nāma for nāmaisa. 46. P. 80, 1. 24. Read buddha° for baddha° .. P. 81, 1. 13. S shows here the Buddhist views. On the next line read 549 for 587.

BOOK IV

1. P. 86, last line. Read TA' for TA1. P. 89, 1. 6. Add a after is, and sva before laksana° on l. 14. P. 91, ll. 29, 32.° Read SaS for SS. P. 92, note 30. On the word dharma quoted from KU see Glasenapp: Buddhism in Kathopanisad in the New Indian Antiquary, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 138 ff., and Stcherbatsky, Op. cit., p. 68 ff; SMV, pp. 136-7, See also MV p. 355 : nāstīha sattva ālmā vā dharmās tv ete sahetukāḥ.

Book IV] ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA 305

2. The word asparsayoga is found at least once in a Buddhist work. See Bauddha Gāna O Dohā, Sahityaparisad Granthavali 55, 1323 B.S., p. 19. Here the Sanskrit tika which is not edited critically and full of mistakes reads referring to a yoga asprsayogotvāt for which the Tibetan version (Tanjur, Narthang, Rgyud, Tsi, 175a.4) has mi. reg. pahi. sbyor. bahi. phyir. te clearly suggesting its Sanskrit equivalent asparsayogat. The only notable difference between the two versions, Sanskrit and Tibetan, is this that while the former has asprsa the suggested reading in the latter is asparsa. But considering the uncritical way in which the edition of the Sanskrit text is prepared and the well-known occurrence of the word sparsa it naturally occurs to one's mind that the reading asprsa for asparśa is a misprint or a mistake of the scribe of the MS used for that edition. Another difference is the use of -toa in the Sanskrit text, which is not to be found in the Tibetan one. According to the former the latter should have been written sbyor. bahi. nid. kyi for sbyor. bahi. But it is often found in Tibetan versions of Sanskrit texts that nid for -tva- (or eva) is not used even when it is necessary; on the contrary, it is employed when it is not required at all. 4. P. 102, 1. 6. For our MS. Me and some read Me and some other. 11. P. 113, 1. 5. Read kāraņa for karana. 12. Note 1. . Here 'elsewhere' refers to Variants, p. 237. 20. P. 125, last line. Read cākramakah. 39 -- 1201B

306 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Book IV .

23. Note 1. PU actually has jatir in the margin for hyadir in d. Read here edition for editions. P. 130, 1. 31. Read AS for ASh. 24. P. 132, note 3. Add 62 after 61 and omit 79. 28. P. 138, 1. 26. Read MuU for MU. 30. Note 1. The couplet is from VM, Simon Hewavitarane Bequest ed. p. 407 with the variant khandhānam ca pațipāti in a as in Bhāratīya Vidyā Series ed., Part I, p. 282. 31. The first half of the kärika is identical with that of YV, IV. 45. 45. 33ª. In such cases (viz., IV. 10, 91-93) one may be inclined to read with some of the MSS (i.e., A1,A2, V9) sarvadharmāh for sarve dharmāh agreeing with Bud- dhist works. 38. Note 1. In b read pratibuddhavantah as in Gilgit Manuscripts, Vol. II, p. 100. 42. P. 150, note 5. Read MSA for MS. 51°. Read nispandāt for vijnānāt. 58. For the first half see IV, 57a. For d see LA, pp. 28-49 : vicitra hi yatha māyā drśyate na ca vidyate. See our text, p. 151, note 8. Read BA for BC on p. 164, 1. 5, and krtako for tanmayo on 1. 19. 60°. See IV. 99. 71. Note 2. It is a speech of Bhagavat. 72ª. See LA, I1. 151-152 : vijñānabījam spandate®. 74. P. 177, 1. 16. Read nāsti for nāstī- 81°. Read vibhato for vibhati. P. 188, Note 2. For the meaning of the word paravrlti see P. C. Bagchi: Studies in the Tantras, Calcutta University, 1939, pp. 87 ff.

Book IV] ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA 307

83ab. Read asti-nastīti. nasti-nastītio for °asti nāstīti nāsti nāstītio. 84d. For sarvadrś cf. sarvajña (I. 12, III. 36) and sarvajñatā (IV. 85. 89). On this see E. Obermiller (The Doctrine of Prajñapāramitā, etc., p. 44): "When the Bodhisattva° has attained the highest of the Unimpeded Paths in the Path of Concentrated Contemplation, he is considered to have terminated his course of training in the path. This last moment of Concentrated trance called the 'thunderbolt-like' (vajropama samadhi) is charac- terized by the removal of the most subtle forms of defilement and of ignorance. It is simultaneous with the final momentary Illumination (ekaksana-abhisam- bodha), and the culmination of the Bodhisattva's intuition of the absolute. All the factors for the attainment of the Omniscience of the Buddha are now brought to accomplishment. Owing to this, the representation of the Absolute appears in its full light ; the differentia- tion to subject and object ceases to exist, the accidental obscurations which had hitherto separated the Germ of the Absolute in the living being now completely vanish, and the Germ now coalesces with the Unique Ultimate Essence which is personified as the Cosmical body (dharmakāya) of the Buddha".1

1 " At the second moment we have the last Path of Deliverance (vimukti- marga). At that time the double representation (i.e., of subject and object) disappears, and the object of Concentration (in its true aspect) becomes one with the knowledge cognizing it like one particle of water uniting with another (chu-la chu bshag-pa-Itar=jale jalaniksepavat). In the aspect of this intuition all the things cognizable in their varieties become directly perceived like a myrobalan (amalaka) fruit on the palm of the hand (karatalamalakacat)."

308 ĀGAMASĀSTRA [Book IV

The special Omniscience which is peculiar only to the Buddha (sarva-ākāra-jñāta) is the knowledge of all the aspects of existence as being devoid of an inde- pendent separate reality and as not being liable to origination from the standpoint of the Absolute". Op. cit., p. 64. See Vācaspatimiśra's Nyāyakaņikā (Reprint from the Pandit), pp. 110, 147, 205. 90. See MSA, XIX, 56: pañcavidham hi vastu bodhisattvānām aprameyam. paripācyam vastu sat- tvadhātur aviśeşeņa. visodhyam lokadhātur bhājana- lokasamgrhītaḥ. prāpyam dharmadhātuḥ. paripācana- yogyam vineyadhātuḥ. samyagdeśanāvastu vineyo- pãyadhātuḥ. 94. P. 206, note 2. Read Woods for Wood. P. 207, 1. 13. The word śāradya actually occurs in Sanskrit as in parisacchāradya. It means sankoca 'shrinking'. In Tibetan for it we have bskumps. pa from skum. pa 'to contract.' See MV, p. 46; ŚS, . p. 296. 99. P. 212, note 2, 1. 31. Read skyob. pa for skyb. pa. 1.00. For durdarśa see KU, 1. 2. 12. For alāta see MV, p. 219: pūrvāparakoțyanupalam- bhad [alāta]cakravat (mgal. meḥi. hkhor. lo. bshin. no); p. 221 : ādimadhyāvasānavirahitatvād alātacakravat.