1. Mandukya Nikhilananda R K Mutt

SLHI

DELHI UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

DELHI UNIVEPSITY LIBRARY

Date of release for loar ook should be returned on or before the date last stamped below. Iverdue* charge of 5 Paise will be collected for each day the is kept overtime,

" If the sole object be the attamment of the Highest Truth (the supreme goal of existence) the single Upanshad of Mandukya is sufficient " -- Mluektikopanishad

"The Upamshad (Mandukya) with the Kanka embodies in itself the Quintessence of the substance of the entire philosophy of Vedanta " -Sankara ..

THE MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

WITII GAUDAPĀDA'S KĀRIKĀ

Sri Ramakrishna Centenary Publication

THE

MÅNDŪKVOPANISHAD

WITH

GAUDAPĀDA'S KĀRIKĀ

AND

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

TRANSI ATED AND ANNOIATED

BY SWAMI NIKHILANANDA

WITH A FOREWORD BY

SUBRAHMANYA IYER

AM AMAKRISHNA

SRI RAMAKRISUNA ASHRAMA MYSORE, 1936

Publshed by THE PRESIDENT SRI RAMAKRISHNA ASHRAMA MYSORF

All Rights Reserved

PRINTED AT THE BANGALORF PRESS, BANGALORE CIY

To

IIS HIGIINESS

SRI KRISHNARAJA WADIYAR BAHADUR IV G C.S I., G B.E .

MAHARAJA OF MISORE

AS A MARK OF THE HIGHEST ESTEEM FOR THE^ REMARKABLE EXAMPLE HE IIAS SET BY IIIS UNDEVIATING STEADFASTNESS IN THE PURSUIT OF TRUTHI, WHEREVER FOUND IN ART, RELIGION, SCIENCE OR PHILOSOPHY, OF WHATEVER AGE OR COUNTRY.

" If thou wouldst master caie and pam, Unfold this book and read and read agam Ets blessed leaves, whercby thon soon shalt see The past, the present, and the days to be With opened eyer .. .. C. R Hames,

CONTENTS

PAGES Foreword "i-ix Prefaco xi-xlin Vedie Invocation 1-6 Chapter I. Agama Prakarana 7-97 Chapter II. Illusion 98-151 . Chapter III. On Advaita .. 155-212 Chapter IV. Quenchmg of Fire-Brand . 243-359 The Concluding Salutation by Sri Sankara- chârya .. 360-361

' The unique feature of Mandukya hes in this that while all the other Upanishads deal with the several phases of Vedanta, such as Religion, Theologv, Scholasticism, Mysticism, Science and Philosopby, Mandukya deals exclusively with Philosophy, as defined by the most modern authoritees. The thiee fundamental problems of philosophy. accoiding to this special treatise, are (1) the nature of the evternal (material) and the incernal (mental) worlds, (2) the nature of consciousness and (3) the meaning of causality. Each of these subjects is dealt with m a chapter The emaming chapter sums up the whole at the very com- mencement There is nothing more fot philosopby to do Wlule it shows how the most advanced modein sciences and r odern philosophies are approaching its conclusions, it gives to the world of oui own times its central doctune that partial data give parbial truth, whereas the totalty of data alone gives perfect truth. The 'Totality' of data we have only when the three states of waking, dream and deep-sleep are co-ordinated for investigation Endless will be the systems of philosophy, if based on the waking state only. Above all masmuch as this philosophy holds that 'satisfaction' is no cuterion ol tinth the best preparation for a study of Vedanta Philowphy is a traming in scentific method, but with a determination to get at the very end ' To stop not till the goal (of Truth) is reached '" V S. I.

FOREWORD.

N ) one that knows anvthing of the philosophy ot the Upanishads can be said to be ignofani of the place that Mandalya U paneshad with its Kanhas occuptes m it If a man cannot afford to study all the hundred and more Upamshads, it will be enough, it is declared in the Muktikopanishad, if he ieads the one Upamshad of Mandukya, smce, as Sankara also says, it contams the quintessence of all of them Thoroughly to grasp the philosophy taught mn Mandukya, one needs' a knowledge ol the whole field of ancient Indian thought Such bemg the nafure ot this work," one with my himitations of knowledge cannot presume to be able to do any justice to its merits and that m, what is called a. "Foreword". And yet if I agreed to write a foreword to Swami Nikhilanandaji's most valuable publication it was not because I had any thought that this well-known and learned author of the translations of Vedantasara and Drg Drsya Taveka and frequent writer to many 4 leadig Incan journals on religion and philosophy. needed an mtroduction to the literary woild Nor did I think that I could add anything of value to his critical and scholarly preface and notes. On the other" hand, I consented because I felt that this was an o, ortunity for me to mndicate in some measure the place of Gaudapāda not among religiomsts, theolo- gians, scholastics or mystics Hfut among philosophers F

FOREWORD

In avhat high regard he is held by the Vedantins of the past is well known But the esteem that he commands among distinguished men of our own times has yet to be pointed out With this object m view and also with an idea ot acknowledging my own mdebtedness to some of them I have ventured to say a few words. Of two such renowned personages of our day one was my most revered Guru the late Sri Satchidananda Sıvabhinava Narasımha Bhāratı Swam of Sringeri, who introduced me to the study of the Kankas, at whose feet I had the mestmnable privilege of sitting as a pupil Here, a short account ot my first lesson in Gaudapada may not be considered irrelevant by the reader The very first day I paid my respeets to the Swami more than forty years ago. I started thus. : "The follower of every religion thinks that his faith, his seripture or his mterpretation of it reveals the highest truth and that they are therefore superior to other faiths, scriptures or mterpretations This notion has contributed not a little to the misfortunes of man- kind in this world. The case is not far different with many of those that are called philosophers Though they have not instigated men to cause bloodshed, as mere religionsts have done and are still domg, yet they have made their followers delight rather m their ' points of difference than in those of agreement How then is a Hindu in any way better than a Mahomedan or a Christian ? Or, again, if truth or ultimate truth, a something common to all mmnds, cannot be rationally renched, is not philosophic enquiry a wild goose chase.

FOREIORD . 111

as so many modern and honest thmkers have held ? Lastly, as regards truth itself. everyone, even a tool thiks that what he knows is the truth " The Swami m ieply said, "What you say may be true with regard to mere sehgion, mysticism, theology or scholasticism which are nustaken for philosophy It may be so with the early or mtermediate stages i philosophy But Vedanta, particularly its plulosophy, is something different It starts with the very question vou ask It sets before itselt the object of finding a truth, Free trom all dispute' and ' Not opposed to any school of thought or rebgion' or mterpretation of seriptwes Its trnth is mdependent of sect, creed, colour, race, sex, and belief And it aims at what is Equally good for all beings'." Then, I said, that I would devote the whole of my life to the study of Vedanta, it the Swami would be so gracions as to intro- duce me to a Vedantm, past or present, that did not or does not claim superiority for his religion over others on the authority of his own seiipture, who does not refuse to open the gates of his heaven to those that difter from him, but who seeks only such philosophic tuth as does not lead to chfferences among men. Imme- diately the revered Guru quoted three verses from Gandapāda, Kūrikās II-1, III-17 and IV-3, and explained them, the substance of which has been quoted" above. "If you want," he added, "truth mdisputable by any one and truth beneficent to all mene nay, to all boings, read and inwardly digest what Sankara's teacher's teacher, Sn Gaudapada says m hs Kārıkūs."

11 , The other entuent per onage to whom fone xx of my effort to muike a pritil atmly of Gandap Is His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore, Sri Knt raja Wathyar Bahadur IV. Ihx profound and . tenstve knowledge of philosophy and partieularh hs high regard for Mandakya Upanishad and de Kariās, led to frequeut, talks on the topis dealt with therein. His Highness who is acrustomed to meetmg leamned scholars. pions religionists, and deep thinkers of all types and of different countries, is a most dis- interested crtic. This drove me to the necessity of 'ascertaming how far Gaudapada's views are of value from the standpoint of the student of western seienee und philosophy and how far the ancient Vedin could stand the fire of modern eriticiam, particularly of science, a knowledge of which is so indispensahle to the study of philosophy nowarlays. In this connection, 1 must not forgot to mention that my debt is also immense to Mr. K. A. Krixhna- swami lyer, the Vedantin of Bangalore, and to those Swämis of the Sri Ramakrishna Order, that huv devoted their hfe to the philosophicut pursuit truth both from the ancient and from the moderu view-pomts and that have been with me at Mysore, After studymg Gaudapāda for a time I turned to "the Upanishads and to Brahma-Sutras as interpreted by Sankara, under the Sringer Swami's invaluable gudance J have now for mote than forty years read and re-read them in the light of the Swami's teachings and I find that Vedanta is far m advance, not merely 1

FOREIVORI

he most modern western plulosophie thought, also of setentifie thought, so lar as its pursuit of u wledge for its own sake is concerned. To refer 0 mstance or two Two thousand years ago andapada antieipated what science is just beginning to guess m regard to causal relation without a knowledge of which Vedanta can never be understood. The meaning of Truth' which is still a matter of dispute among many philosophers, has been investigated by him more deeply than has yet been done by other thinkers. Vedanta m its highest, that is its philosophic aspect can have no sigmficance to one who has not realized the pportance of the most fundamental question in philog . ophy What is trutb, particularly 'Ultimate Truth' ? How is it to be tested ? It is the Upanishads that answer it by declaring that Ultimate Truth 1s that which admits of no difference of view of any kind, as two plus two are equal to four. Gaudapāda and Sankara follow this doctrme m all its imphcations It assigns to religious faith, theology, scholasticism, , 'ysticısm, art and science, their respective places in tho one grand edifice of human knowledge, as u whole. Gaudapāda rejects no kind of knowledge or experience. Even the views of his opponents, he welcomes and accepts as parts of the knowledge that leads to the attamment of truth and Ultimate Truth. His dis- tinction lies in the emphasis he lays on the impossi- bility of reaching the highest truth unless the totality of human exporience or knowledge be taken into .

V1 FOREIVORD

consideration Others generally build their systente on the waking state alone. But the pllosophers ( the Upamshads hold that unless the three states t* waking, dream and deep sleep be co-ordinated, ther . cannot be adequate data for the enquiry regarding UIt mate Truth This is a matter still unknown to Euroj and America Nor has the West as vet evaluate conceptual knowledge. The relation of nund to it ideas or contents is another problem that has not : q yet been even dreamt of in Western Philosophy To one desirous of making a scholarly study t .Vedanta, the historical side of the evolution of plt as sophic thought m India is of great value. One ca 4 . showever, easily obtam this information in any of modern text-books on Indinn philosophy. B. 1€ though Gaudapada could be fairly apprecited ev without such background, yet, his commentat Sankara and his followers cannot be fully comprehend without a previous acquaintance with the sever systems of Indian thought. Swami Nikhilanand 1 has therefoie furnished valuable notes to make su matters clear. One point, however, needs to be referre ith to here," as it is of special interest to modern thinke gl The several theories of perception, for instance h'as discussed in the Kamkas, it being taken for grante yet causal relation is an unquestionable fact. Li v ell true philosophers, he starts with the perceptual . ow and pursues the enquiry. If the word "real " A1 confined to percepts, Gaudapāda is not a roalist the word "ideal " be confined to what is known withi

FOREWORD apart from the senses, he is not an ideahst. Bnt he admits that the concepts, real and ideal, are of value as steps leading to the Iighest truth which is beyond ideal- sm' or realism, or spmntuabsm, all of which only refer to ' vaking experience. To him the external world as well as the internal is unreal. But his philosophy does not lead to illusionism, as the goal. The relation between mind and matter, idea and sense objects, or even mind ind its contents is a matter of dspute to this day. @ But Jaudapada's explanation may or may not he accepter, vthe estent to which it is confined to the waking state. does not, however, affect m the least his conclusion hich w based on the three states. He demes the tegory of relationship in what is Ulmate Truth Nor es he admit ' Satisfaction' (Anandam) to be a test of it. Another important feature is that he is a thinker of e most rational type, which Sankara's mterpretation i him, pomts out, The "philosophic method" (prakriya) escribed here clears so many misapprehensions regard- ng the meaning of philosophy, in general. Philosophy, according to Gaudapada and Sankara, is an interpretation of the totalty of human experience of the whole of life from the standpomt of Philosophy, therefore, is the whole, of which ion, Mysticism (Yoga), Theology, Scholasticism, and Science are but parts. . Snch philosophy Gr at ianta as ignores any part or parts, is no Vedanta. 1 fact it employs the scientific method more rigorous- v than modern science does. Gaudapada's and ankara's view of philosoply is being echoed gnd

Vin FOREWFORD

re-echoed by modern Western thinkers m defining it. These ancient philosophers further declare that all other kmds of experience and knowledge are but several stuges in the evolution of life and philosophic thought. And the objert sought by philosophy, as lhese two pre-eminent Hidu philosophers say, is the happmess (Sulham) and welfare (Hutam) of all beings (Sarva Sattva) in this world (Iharva). Gaudapada is little known in the West. There is not the least doubt that his work will opon new vistas of thought to Western enquners and will make them turn to the East for more light. Without the slightest fear of exaggeration. it may be sarl that in no other part · of the "world" has man dared to pursue truth with the degree of devotion, and particularly of determination with which he has done in India. It is in India alone that one sees the seeker sacrificing not merely all his material belongings as in other countries, but nlso every feeling, thought, view, or perception to which he may, at the start, be uttached. Till one makes sure that one's mind has been completely purged of all preconceptions or prejudices which are the offspring of altachment, one cannot hope to command the coneen- tration of mind needed for climbing the topmost steps leading to truth. One of the greatest characteristics of phlosophy in Indta-not Inchan theology and the like -- is the perfection to which the method of climinating preconceptions is carried. And to do this one must be a dhira (hero). Many such matters of great value are ably dealt

FORBWORD א1

with by the Swmiji in the body of the work. This distingmshed and learned author has done a real service to such earnest seekers after truth, as arc determined to reach the end. wherever Englsh is known, by trans- latmg this pniceless work of Sri Gandapada, the first Vedantic philosopher, known to Indian history m what is said to be the post-Upanishadie or modern period.

V SUBRANNANYA 1YER

PREFACE.

THE Manduhya Upanishad, hke Mundaka, Prasna and some minor Upamishads, forms part of the Atharva Veda. It is one of the shortest of the ten principal Upamshads. Gaudapada has written two hundred and fifteen verses known as the Kārka to ex- plain the Upanishad and Sankara has written a cem- mentary on both the Upanishad and the Karka. Anandagirı mn his Tika explains at greater length San- kara's commentary. The Mandakya Upanishad, hke other Upanishads, disensses the problem of Ultimate Reality. The knowledge of Brahman or Arman, the goal of exis- tence, is its theme. Unlike most of the Upanishads, it does not relate any anecdote or any imagmary con- versations to elucidate the snbject-matter. It is also. silent about mtuals and sacrifices in any form as they are irrelevant to the metaphysical discussion of Reality. It goes straight to the subject. The extreme brevity of its statements has been the cause of despair to superficial readers who are unable to understand its real significance. The well-known method of Vedanta to arrive at Reality is what is known as "Vichara". This Upa- " nishad also follows the same method. In the first place Atmun is associated with the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep, and, then, these states are shown to merge in Turiya or the Ultimate Reality.

xii PREFACE

And mn the sequel it is pomted out that the non-dual Atman is identical with the three states and therefore all that exists is Brahman The nature of the Ultimate Reality has been described mn the seventh "text of fhe Upanishad. As the generality of men cannot realize the Ultimate Reahty which is beyond all categories of time, space and causation, it is sought to help them to do so by means of a symbol. The symbol selected by the Mandukya Upamshud as well as the other Upamshads is Aum, the word of all words. Aum consists of three sound symbols, viz .. A, U, and M. These three de- noting the gross, the subtle and the causal aspects of Brahman (from the relative standpomt)y have been equated with the three states mentioned above, which contain the totality of man's experience. The method adopted by the Upanishad and followed by Gandapada for arriving at Reality is to analyse our experience Through the contemplation of the three sound symbols as the three states, the student, endowed with the mental and moral quahfications required for the understanding of Vedanta, is helped to reach the Ultimate Reahty. The Kārika of Gaudapāda is divided into four charters (prakaranas) (1) Āgama (Seripture) (2) Vmtathya (the illusoriness of sense-experiences), (3) Advaita (non-duality), (4) Alatasanti (the quenchmg of the fire-brand). The first chapter deals with the problem of-Reality from the standpoint of the Vedas The three subsequent chapters demonstrate the sanie truth by means of reason.

PREFACE xni

Sankara, who has commented only on Vedantic works of the most anthoritative charactel, such as the Gita, the Upamshads and the Subas, has deemed it necessary to write a commentary on Gaudapada's Karika. This indicates the supreme importance and value of this treatise to the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta. Who was Gaudapada ? Tradition makes him the teacher of Govmda who was the teacher of Sankara. Tt is said that Gaudapada wrote, besides the Kārtka on Māndūkya Upanishad, commentaries on the Sankhya system and Ultara Gita But there does not exist. much evidence to support it. Anandagir says in his Tika on Sankara's commentary on the Kānka (4-1) that Gaudapada performed great austerities mn the Badarikaśrama, in the interior of the Himalavas, m order to propitiate Narayana who is worshipped there as the God-Man. Narayana being pleased with his devotion revealed to him the secret of the Advaita Vedanta. Gaudapāda salutes this Nārāyana in the opening verse of the fourth chapter of the Kārıka, In the face of the controversy regarding the date of Sankara, the date of Gaudapada cannot be defimtely fixed. The generally accepted date ot Sankara's birth, one agreed to by Bhandarkar, Pathak and Deussen, 788 A D. is not free from objections. Accord -- ing to Swami Prajnanananda Saraswati and a few other scholars, Sankara flourished before Christ. Some emment scholars, by an exammation of the literary style of Sankara and the histoucal and other reference3,

PRŁŁICE

push back his date to the second century B.C. Their contention cannot be lightlv brushed aside. One fact, however, can be asserted without fear of contradiction that Gaudapada is the solitary philosopher, known to ts,-who, before Sankara, gave a rational explanation of the Advaita Vedanta which is the objective ot the Upamshadic teachings. Even the Sutrus of Badarayana are not free from u priort reasoning, that is, reasoning conditioned by the tradition and the authority of the Seriptures. It is only Gaudapada that has successfully demonstrated In his Karika that the non-dual Atman declared in the Upanishads as the Ultimato Reahty is not a theological dogma, and that it does not depend upon the mystie experiences of the Yogis, but that it is a metaphysical truth which satisfies the demands of universal tests and which is based upon reason independent of scriptural authority. Gaudapada, as already stated, follows, in the first chapter of his book, the traditional method of basing his conclusions on the authority of the Serip- tures and demonstrates that the aim of the Sruti is to establish the non-dual Atman as the ultimate autho- rity. In the following chapters he re-establshes the same truth through reasouig alone and thus meets the arguments of the Buddhists and other thinkers , who do not adnut the authority of the Vedas. Sankara refers to this mn his commentary on the first verses of the last three chapters of the Kārila. Here, we deem it necessary to review some of the observations of the latest among well-known authors.

PREFACE XV

Professor S. N. Das Gupta, M.A, Ph D, in his cele- . brated work, A IIrstory of Indian Philosophy, (pp. 423-429) regardmg Gaudapada and his philosophy writes : "Gaudapada thus flourished after all great Buddhist teachers Asvaghosha, Nāgārjuna, Asanga and Vasubandhu, and I believe that there is sufficient eudence i his Kamkas for thinking that he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered that the teachings of the Upanishads tallied with those of Buddha Thus at the beginning of the fourth chapter of his Karikas he says that he adores that grent man (duipudam varam) who by knowledge as wide as the sky realized (sambuddhu) that all appearances (Dharma) were like the vacuous sky (gaganopamam). He tbus goes on to say that he adores him who has dictated (desita) that the touch of the untouch (Asparsa Yogu -- mrobably referring to Nirvana) was the goal that pro- duced happiness to all beings and that he was neither in disagreement with the dortrine nor found any contradiction m it (anvada amruddhascha). . . .. In IV 19 of his Karika, he agam says that the Buddhas have shown that there is no coming mto being m any way (sarvatha buddharrajati paridrpitah) Agam in IV 4.2. he says that it was for those realists (vastuvadis), since they found things and could deal with them and were afraid of non-being, that the Buddha had spoken of origination (jati). In IV. 90 he refers to" Agrayana which we know to be a name of Mahayana. Again, mn IV. 98 and 99, he says that all ppemrances are 'pure and vacuous' by nature. These the Buddha,

YVI PREFACE

.the emancipated one (mukta) and the leaders know. It was said by Buddha that all appearances were know- ledge He then closes the Kankas with an adorahon which in all probabilaty also refers to the Buddha .. Gandapada does not indicate his preference one way or the other (2e, regarding the theomes of creation), but rlescribes the fourth state .. In the third chapter Gaudapada says that truth is like the void (Aka a) which is conceived as taking part in birth and death, coming and gomg and as existing in all bodies, but, however it be concerved, it is all the while non- different from dkasa .. He should awaken the mind (citta) into rts final dissolution. . All tho Dhannas (appearances) are without death or decay. Gaudapada then follows a dialectical form of argument which reminds us of Nāgarjuna .. All experi- ences (pragnaph) are dependent on seasons, for other- wise both would vanish ... When we look at all things in a connected manner they seem to be de- pendent, but when we look at them from the point of view of Reality or truth the reason ceases to be reason. .... Therefore neither the mind nor the objects seen by it are ever produced Those who perceive them to suffer production are really traversing the reuson of vucuily (Kha) It is so obrious thut these doctrines are borrowed from the Madhyamika ' doctrines, as found mn the Nagarjuna Karkas and Vijnanąvāda doctrines as found in Lankavatāra, that it is needlass to attempt to prove it. Gaudapāda assimilated all the Buddhist Sunyavāda and Vijnāna-

PREFACE AVI#

vada teachingy and thought that these hold good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upanishads It is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or a Buddhist, so long as we are sure that he had the highest respect for Buddha and for his teachings which he believed to be his .... .He only incidentally suggested that the great Buddhist truth of mdefinable and unspeakable Vijnana or vacuty would hold good of the highest Atman of the Upanishads, and thus lard the foundation

lines of a revival of the Upanishadic studies on Buddhist ." (The English words in italics are ours.) Our interpretation of the passages in the above quotation will be found m the body of the book Prof. Das Gupta has given his own mterpretation of the : Karika, without attaching any value to the commentary of Sankara or the Tika of Anandagir and it is clear from the point of view of Prof. Das Gupta that Sankara ' has failed to understand the sense of the Karika. This attempt of Prof. Das Gupta to interpret the Kariha according to his own view is no doubt responsible for ascribing to Gaudapada the views which, according to us, he never seems even to have dreamt of cherishing. Prof. Das Gupta tries to prove that Gaudapada was possibly a Buddhist and that his philosophy was borrowed from Buddhsm We shall therefore offer a few words cf eriticism regarding the views of Prof. Das Gupta It has not been setiled that Gaudapada flourished after the Buddhist philosophers, Asvaghosha, Nagar- juna, Asanga and Vasubandhy. Some recent researches

XV111 PREF 1CE

"reveal that he hved long before them. This is, however, a point for the student of history of literature. Further. the standpoint and the conclusion of Gaudapada's philosophy, however, are fundamentally different from those of the Buddhist thinkers named above There is no evidence in his Karka to show that Gaudapada was possibly a Buddhast. There is positive proof on the other hand to show that he was not a Buddhist. Gaudapada humself states, for instance, in the clearest possible language at the conclusion of the Kāmha (IV 99) that "This (his own view) is not the view of Buddha." Sankara m his commentary of this Kārika says that the essence of the Ultimate Reality, which is non-dual and which is free from multiplicity of the perceiver, perception and the perceived, has not been taught by Buddha. In its refutation of the reality of the external objects and in asserting that all objects are mere acts of mind (manahspandanam), the Buddhist Vijnanavada, no doubt, approaches the non-dual consciousness of the Upanishads, but the knowledge of the non-dual Atman, which alone is the Ultmate Reality, can be found in Vedanta alone. We are of opmnion . that Buddhist metaphysical thought is nearest to Gaudapāda's Kārikas Further corrobo- ration can be found in Sankara's commentary on Karikis IV. 28 .and 83. Prof. Das Gupta, in order to prove his conclusion, has given huis own iterpretations. One studying the Upanshads and the Karikas in accordance with the six canons (lingam) of interpretation, viz., the

PREFACE XIx

beginning and the conclusion (upakrama and upasam- hara), repetition (abhyasa), originalty (apurvatā). result (phalan), eulogy (arthavada) and demonstra- ton .(upapall), will find that the aims of the Upa- mshads and the Kanka are identical, namely. the establishment of the non-dual self as the Ultrmate Realty and this cannot be found in the teachings of the Buddhist philosopheis At the begmning ot the fourth chapter of the Kāriha, Gaudapada does not adore Buddha but Narayana who is worshipped in Badarikasrama through the symbol of Man, The word Dharma used by. Gaudapada does not mean appearance Dhaimi' literally means 'attribute', which is, according to the Vedanta philosophy, non-different from the substance -- as the heat and the light are non-different trom the sunshme 'Dharma' is used by Gaudapada to mean Jiva which if taken as attribute of Brahman is non- different from it , Gaudapada has admirably proved in his Kanka that all Dharmas or Jwvas are identical with the non-dual Brahman and therefore they are ever- pure and ever-illumined. The word 'Dharma' has been used in the plural sense in view of the multi- plicity of the Jrvas from the standpoint of empirical experience. Gaudapada contends that what others, from their relative standpoit. take to be multiple Jwas, is nothing but non-dual Brahman The analogy of Dharma to Akasa, based upon vacuity, is far- fetched. The real point of analogy lies in their all- pervasiveness, purity and subtle nature. But Dharma

PREFICE

is not really identical with dkasa as the latter is known, from the empirical standpoit, to contain the element of insentiency (jada). The adoration referred to in IV. 2 is not directed to Buddha, as hinted by -Prof. Das Gupta, hut to Nārayana./ The translation of the word 'Asparsayoga' as the 'tonch of the untouch' does not convey any meaning. It certamly does not refer to Nirvana as suggested by Prof. Das Gupta, if Nervana means total anmhilation. We piefer to translate the word as the Yoga which is not related to anythmg. Apparently there is a .contradietion mvolved m the word. The word . Asparsa' meaning freedom from relationship refers to the non-dual Brahman alone But Yoga signifying union mdicates duahty Gaudapada designates the path of knowledge described in the Kārika and in Aduata Vedanta as Asparsayoga inasmuch as the word Yoga was used in lis time also to denote the method of attaining to the Ultimate Reality. In the Bhagavadgita, for instance, Yoga is used in different senses. Yoga is also used in the broad sense, of ' dis- cipline' or 'path' .. That this method is free from all relationship has been demonstrated in the Kārika. The Ultimate Reahty taught in the Karka and Advaita Vedanta cannot be Nirvana if that word mcans, as is known from the-study of some of the Buddhist writers, the total negation of everything But whether Buddha himself used the word in that sense is doubtful. The non-dual Brahman taught (vide Chapter III and II. 23 of Kanka) in the Advaito Vedanta is free from hostility

PREFACE

and contradiction as according to this philosophy non- dual Brahman alone exists. Hostility and contradic- tion are inherent in all dualistc systems of thought Gandapada has, no doubt, used the word 'Buddha' several times in the Karika. But the word does rot refer to the traditional founder of Buddhism, as Prof. Das Gupta seems to suggest. It only means the knower of Truth The word ' Agruyana' in IV. 90 may be made to indicate ' Mahayana' only by a fanciful resemblance of words. The word really means 'Prathamatah' v.P in the first place, otherwise one cannot get any mean- ing out of the Karika text in which the word occurs. Piof. Das Gupta complains that Gaudapada does not indicate his preference one way or other' regarding the theory of creation. In the Agama Prakarana (Kārika, 7-9) he enumerates several current theories of creation given by those who accept creation as a tact. He calls these theorisers mere speculators on the process of creation (srstichintakah). Those to whom creation is real are certainly at liberty to advance any theory according to their tastes. But none of these speculators proves the reahty of creation one rational grounds. Gaudapada is not in the least interested in these theo- ries. He questions the reahty of the act of creation, from the standpoint of the ultimate truth. Creation may be a fact to those who, like children, take empirical. knowledge to be ultimate truth. Gaudapada, through- out his Karika and particularly m the fourth chapter. clearly demonstrates that the category of causahty cannot be applied to the nom dual Itman. Absolutt

XXII A PRLFACE

non-manifestation (ajat) is the only truth Centuries before Hume and Bradley, Gaudapada proved that causalty has no basis m fact. Creation indicates an unsatisfied desire on the part of the creator If-the Ultimate Reality be complete or perfect m itselt and self-satiated (aplakama), then the act of creation can never be predicated of it. Hegel contradicts himself when he says that a logical necessity impels the evolu- tion of the Absolute. Schelling's explanation that the evolution of the Absolute into ego and non-ego can only be understood by an intellectual inturtion, is mysti- . cism or mystification, but not rational truth If there be no creation how can one explain the multipherty of empirical expeuence m the universe ? Gaudapāda by an mnexorable logic proves that this is the very nature , of the Effulgent Being (Devasya eshu svabharah). Whalever one experiences is only non-dual Brahman. All this is verly Brahman. Non-dual Brahman alone is Diagnosis of the headache of a headlens man (habandha) is ludicrous and irrelevant If the mam- fested manifold had ever existed, then one would think of its ongination or destruction. That we sce duality is due to our ignorance of the true nature of Reality which is non-dual Brahman. Again this ignorance (Maya) does not exist from the standpoint of Reality Maya is only hn explanation of creation given by those who hold creation to be a fact. Therefore Gauda- pada sums up his philosophy, 'None (is) m bondage, none liberated, this is the ultmate truth' (II. 32). No Jiva is ever born', Such birth is unreal. This

PREFACE

indeed is the highest truth that nothing whatsoever is born' (III 48). Gaudapada, no doubt, says that dItman is hke Ākāsa (III. 3). But voidness is not the point of analogy. He mtends to convey the idea that dtman, like the Akasa is subtle, without parts and all-pervadng. Gaudapada was well aware of the fallacy of Nagarjuna's reasonmg. Void or a negation cannot be the substra- tum of an dlusion. The illusion of the mirage, the snake or the silver must have a positive substratum in the form of the desert, the rope or the mother-o'- pearl. Sankara aptly critcises the position of the Buddhist mhhsts as lacking in mtelligence, for they, in spite of the very faet of cognition and experience, describe everv thing, including their own experienee, as mere void. Theiefore the Ultimate Realty is not a void or a negation. Without a positive Reality we can- not affirm our empirical experience. But this affirma- tion is not a co-relative of negation. Our relative experi- ences have the dual predicates of affirmation and nega- tion The Ultimate Reality is free from affirmation and negation, the mnevitable characteristics of the relative. The translation of the first lme of the 44th Kārka, of the third chapter as "He should awaken the 'mind' (cutta) mto its final dissolution (laya)" does not convey the correct meaning. Gaudapada uses the word 'laya m the sense of decp sleep or Yogic Samadhs. Samadh s the last word of the Yoga- mystics. According to t *s an obstacle to the realsation

PREFACE

exhaustion of the mquiring mind It is because.the Yogis look upon mind as separate from Atman, that they seck to control it in Samadhr. But Gaudapada says that the mind is the non-dual Atman. Therefore there docs not arise any question of controlling it. The mind and its activities (prachara, Comp. III. 34) are nothing but non-dual Brahman, ever-pure, ever- free and ever-illumned. It is only due to ignorance that one perceives the dualty of the subject-object relationship m the activities of the mind But a - knower of truth perceives everywhere and in all activities only the non-dual Brahman (Gita, IV. 24). Hence Gaudapada warns the student against the trap of the Yogic Samadh, as deseribed in the line quoted above (IlI. 44) which teally means that one should awaken the mind from the (inertia of) laya (Samadhr or deen sleep) by the repeated practice of disorimina- tion. The Vedantic Samadhi does not signity the ealization of Truth with closed eyes. It means the Shon of Truth with cyes open on every object. A Medantist thus describes the Samadh, "With the disappearance of the attachment to the body and with the reahzation of the Supreme Self, to whatever object the mind is directed, one experiences Samadhu." All Dharmas according to Candapada, are without deuth or decay (IV. 10). Prof. Das Gupta, as we have atready pomted out, wrongly translates n7 appearance. 'Appenrance' is certamly at eppearance, i.e., death and decay. K

PREFACE xxv

which does not exist at the beginning or at the end (II. 6). Any appearance is perceived by Atman only so long as that particular condition of his mind which gives rise to the appearance lasts. But Dhorma cant be said to be without decay or death only if it means Jiva which is the same as the non-dual Brahman. We are afraid the translation of the 24th Kamkr (Chapter IV) as "all experienee is dependent on reasons" (snanilatvam) is not correct. This Kamha gives the view of the opponent (Pwvapaksha) who. asserts the reality of the external objects. The oppo- nent says that all subertive experiences have their `cause' (not 'reason') in external objects as otherwise there would exist no vanety mn expenence Further as no true explanation can be given of the pam and misery we experience, Gaudapada refutes the view of the ieabsts with the arguments of the Buddhist idealste in the next Kanka. Gaudapada saya If this be the contention of the opponent that external world oť objects create subjective idea, we ask, What causes the external world or objects ? The realist cannot point out any such cause. Hence the argument of causality based upon such experience fails. The position is summed up in the statement that the argu- ment of so-called external cause (viz., the external objects) is not vald A knower of truth does not see any object other than ideas which, being identical with the mind, are the same as the non-dual Brahman. In TV 28 Gaudapada refutes the Buddhist idealists ' and wall Ha onstes the views of the

XXVI PREFACE

Vijnanavadins for the refutation of the realistie theory of consciousness which is, according to that school of thought, momentary, subject to birth and death and full of misery. He says that those who hold mind to be subjeet to birth and death, ete , are really like those who scek to trace the foot-prints of birds mn the skv. The translation of this Karika (IV. 28) as "Those who .. .. vacmty" given by Prof. Das Gupta, dloes not seem to be correet. As we have already stated, Prof. Das Gupta tries to prove that Gaudapada has borrowed his ideas from the Buddhist philosophers His enitieism and estimate of Karika appear to be prejudiced. Gauda- pada may have "assmmilated all the Buddhist Sunya- rada and Vijnanarada teachigs," but this does uot prove that he "thought that these hold good of the Ulhmate Truth preached by the Upamishads." Madhusudan Saraswati and Vachaspati Misra may have assimilated the entne Nyaya system of thought but this does not prove that the Nyaya views hold good of the trnth estabhshed in the Advarta Siddhi or Bhamati. Every philosopher, worth the name, studics outemporary systems of thought. He may even Wotrow some lines of arguments from others for pur- poses of explanation. Sankara hrmsclf has done so. But it is a trvesty of truth to call Sankara a crypto- Buddhit (Prachchhanne Bauddha), as some of the dualists have donn TTT the Karika Gauc' not seen anywhere in

Buddha, +he, fol

PREFACE xxvil

Granting that Gaudapada had "the highest respect for Buddha", every Hmdu and everv lover of truth cherishes a similar feeling ot the highest regard for the Compassionate One But this does not prove that they necessarily accept all that Buddha or Buddhism teaches In fact the Hindus recogmsed ' centuries ago and even now recognise Buddha as one of the Auntars of Vishnu like Rama and Krishna. Gandapada does not certainly "incidentally snggest that the great Buddhist truth of mdefinable and un: * speakable Vijnana or vacmty would hold good of the highest Atman of the Upanishads " To assert this is to pervert the real import of the Karka. On the other hand, Gaudapada emphatically declares (IV. 28) that he accepts the conclusion of the Buddhist Vynana- vadins in order to refute the realist's contention of the reality of the external objects But neither the Vijnanavadins nor the Sunyavadins have got anything to say regarding the non-dual Atman, which can be realized only through the rigorous pursuit of truth which the Advaita system alone does. Gaudapada does not let an opportumty pass without criticising the Madhyamika view of absolute mihilism. .The estimate of Gaudapāda and his Kārkā as given by Prof. Das Gupta in his History of Indian Philosophy, does not indicate the high water-mark of unbiassed judgment. Prof. Radhakrishnan gives an estimate of Gaudapada's philosophy in his well-knowa Indian Philosophy (Vol. II, pp. 452-465). He thinks the .

Axvil PREFACA

use of some words m the Kartka is pecularly Buddhistic We have answered ths pomt in our criticism of Prof Das Gupta's remarks. It may be stated here that it is a favourite method of Gaudapāda and Sankara to put one school of thought agamst another and ultunately show the untenability of both. Even the conclusions of the Buddhist philosophers can be found in some place or other of the Upanishads. It only proves the fact that at that time certain philo- sopheal terms were the common property of Indian thought m general One cannot accuse a modern philosopher it he uses the arguments of modern science m order to refute the contontions of his opnonents or establish his own position. Prof Radhakrishnan says that both "Bādarāyana and Sankara strongly urge that there is a genume difference between dream experience and the waking one and that the latter is not independent, of existing objects." According to Gaudapāda there is no differ- ence between the dream and the waking states front the standpoit of the Ultimate Reality. Thus an attempt is made to point out the difference between Gaudapada's system and that of Sankara. Agam it s said that "in Gaudapada the negative tendency is more promment than the positive. In Sankara we have a mote balanced outlook " We disagree 1 with Prof. Radhakrishnan. In his commentary on Brahmu Sutras Sankara, no doubt, makes a dis- tinction between the waking and the dream states. But that is done fron the empirical standpoint We

PREFICE

have not seen Sankara anywhere declaring the renlitw of both the states, from the standpoint of Ultimate Truth Gaudapada also admts the two states of waking'and dream on the empircal plane, m which our expemences are associated with external objects and ther absence (IV 87). But the next Kanka indicates the Ultimate Reality to be that in which there is neither any object, nor the idea ot experieneig it. We do not know of any difference between the thoughts of Sankara and Gandapada. Had it heen so Sankara would not have written a commentary on the Karika Nowhere m his explanation of the Karika does Sankara point out his disagreement with the views of Gaudapāda It cannot be said that the views of Sankara as embodied m the rommentary on the Karka are different from those expounded in the commentaries on the Upanishads, the Brahma- Sutras and the Gita Even the acutest critic of Sanicara has not heen able to point out any inconsistency in the writings of Sankara Sir Radhakrishnan makes the following remarks regarding the philosophy of Gaudapada "The general idea pervading Gaudapada's work, that bondage and hberation, the mdividual soul and the world. are all unreal, makes the caustie critic observe that the theory which has nothing better to say than that an unreal soul mn trymg to escape from an unreal bondage in an unreal world to accomplish an unreal supreme good, may itself be an unrenhty. It is one thing to say that the secret of existence, how the unchangeable reality

PREF1CE

Jexpresses itself in the changing universe without forfciting its nature is a mystery, and another to rlismiss the whole changing universe, as a mere mirage. If we have to play the game of hfe, we cannot do so with the conviction that the play is a show and all the prizes in it are mere blanks No philosophy ran consistently hold snch a theory and be at rest with itself. The greatest condemnation of such a theory is that we are obliged to occupy ourselves with objects, the existence and value of which we are continually denying m theory. The fact of . the world may be mystemous and inexplicable. It only shows that there is something else which includes and transcends the world: but it does not imply that the world is a dream " The mam difference between the Advaita and other systems of thought is that the former does not find any reason for beheving in the reality of the proress of becoming whereas the latter pin their faith to evolution, creation or manifestation as veul. Some ' Advaitic philosophers in order to explain the fact t of the mamfester manifold (which is perceived) adopt their theory of Vwarta according to which Brahman appears as the world without forfeiting its essential nature. It is like the rope appearing as the snake. Other schools of thought give other explanations of the process of becoming and not one of these explanations can be supported by reason. Gaudapāda by an irrefutable logic disproves the reality of causation in the fourth chapter of Kārika, and posits the Ajātevāda

PRLFACE * xxx1

according to which Brahman or Reality has nover become the universe No one can ever prove the apparent mystery of one becoming the many, for, the many does never really exist Neither Gaudapada nor Sankara ignores those who believe in the reality ot the external objects or of the mamfested mamfold on account of their percervig those objects through the instumentality ot the sense organs or their attachment to the particular avocations of life (IV. 42). They are generous enough to say that any defect that may attach to the belief mn the reality of the external objects is not at all serous. If . these iealists will only pursue truth they will see that to the non-dual Atman causality or duahty can never be applied (IV 42). The generahty of mankmd bereft of the power of discrimmation Is, no doubt, satisfied with empirical ex 'lence .- - Let it do so But it is the aim of the philosopher that is bent upon the discrimination of the real and the unreal to point out the truth, the Ultimate Reality even if it proves the unreality of the tinsels and baubles of sense-perception The non-discriminating mind, no doubt, plunges headlong into the play of hte taking every experience to be real and takes the prizes of such experience But it is only a philosophic mind that sees that the so-called play is but an unreal = 'shadow show' and all the prizes are more blanks. Is that not, also the conviction of all sober-minded persons, when they, m thenr maturity of thought, take a retrospective view of life ? ®

PREFACE

. There are two ways of enjoying a theatrical show. Both spectators and those who take part in the show enjoy it The actors identily themselves with their respective characters and take the show as real There- fore they cannot be said to enjoy the show m reality. But the spectators on account of their detached outlook, vith their knowledge of the unrcalty of the show, really enjoy it . The existence of external objects depends upon the belief that they exist (IV 75) No one has vet been able rationally to demonstrate that things exist inde- . pendently of the percciver's mind. Even the thing-in- itself of Kant is a mere hypothesis based upon the belief m rausality. Kant by making the things-m- themselves which are beyond the categories of time, space and causality, the cause of the phenomena is inconsistent with himself But, a mere belief in the existence of the external objects does not prove the reality of their existence Even in common parlance it is said that all that glitters is not gold. The 'hay, wood and stubbles' of the world, when tested by the fire of the philosopher's reasoning, are found to be unreal. It is certamly not irrational in a philosopher to pursue truth and to demonstrate that the game of life which he plays is a mere show and that 'all the - prizes in it are mere blanks'. All of us, in a rare moment of discrimination and reflection, reahse that 'the world is a dream' To our utter disillusion- ment we ultimately discover that we occuy ourselves with objects the existence and value of ivhich must

PREFACE

really be no more than those of appearances A student must be disappomted if he expects Advaita Vedānta to pomt out to him the means of enjoying pleasures, which 'depend upon the subject-object relationship, which is based upon duality of existence The only anu of Vedanta is to dehypnotise the mind which has been hypnotised into the hehef that duahty really exists. The only positive satisfacton guaranteed to a Vedant- ist is that he will no longer be deluded by ignorance which paints the unreal or the seeming as the real. For, in the language ot Sankara, the knowledge of Reahty destroys one's hankering after objects which are unreal just as the knowledge of the mother-o'-pearl (mistaken for silver) removes the delusion regarding the silver. Ths knowledge may be chimerical to those who are still attached to the tinsels apd gew-gaws of the world and the prizes it offers, but it is of supreme value to the seeker of Reality. Sır S. Radhakrishnan seems to suggest that Sankara thinks waking experiences to be more real than the dream ones Ths view may bo true from the non- philosophical standpoit. The distinetion between the reality of the waking and that of the dream experiences is said to depend upon the sense-organs apparently indicating reality We create a false standard of reality mn our relative plane of consciousness and thus hold one set of experiences to be more real than another. But does Sankara say anywhere that waking experiences are real from the standpornt of the Ultimate Truth ? All oar experiences, whether

xxxiv PREFACE

waking or dream, are possible if we believe the act of creation to be real. What is the view of Sankara regarding creation ? When the opponent (Purva- pakshen) tries to find mconsistencies in the different accounts of creation given in the Vedas, Sankara says in various places, for mstance, in the introduction to the fourth chapter of the Aitareya Upanshad as fol- lows: "Here (i.e, the theories and stories of creation), the only fuct mtended to be conveyed is the realization of Ålman, the rest is but attractive figure of speech; and this is no fault. It seems to be more reasonable . that the Lord, omniscient, omnipotent, did, hke a magician, display all this illusion to facilitate explana- tion or comprehension, inasmuch as stories, although false, are easily understood by all. It is well known that there _' no truth to be attained from accounts of creation (as they are false); and it 18 well estabhshed in all the Upanishads that the end attamed by the conception of the unity of the Real Self is Immortality." Does it differ from the views expressed by Gaudapāda regarding creation ? He also says. "Evolution or creation as described by illus- trations of earth, iron, sparks of fire, etc., has another meaning, ie, they are only the means to the reahza- tion of the unity of Existence. There is nothing like distinction (in" it)" (III. 15). Does Vedänta take away from man his zeal for work 2 Does Vedanta teach pessimism ? Many a Western and Eastern critic of the philosophy of "Advaita holds that it makes a man only a

PREF.CE xx xV

dreamer, a sky-gazing spectator. This is a wrong interpretation of Vedanta. Vedanta never teaches one to fly away from the world or to shut himself up in caves and forests. Many a poetic picture has heen drawn of the Vedantie seer hving the hfe of a recluse far away from the maddening crowd of ignoble strife. But this is not true. Sankara, 'the hon of Vedanta.' Swami Vivekananda, `the paragon of the Vedantists' (as Prof James of America characterised hun) of the modern times, lived m human society and made the mightiest efforts for the uplift of humanity They dedicated their lives to the amehoration of mankmnd. Vedanta has nothing to do with pessimism or optimism, or any 'ism' for the matter of that. It only teaches Truth If the renhzation of Truth stand as an impedi- ment to human progress, then the charge agamst Vedanta as the enemy of progress may be well justified. Nothing wonderful will happen to the world if the entire mankmnd be converted to Hinduism, Christianity, Buddhism, or Islam or to any other religion. But assuredly something marvellous will happen if a dozen of men and women pierce the thick walls of the church, temple, synagogne and reahze the Truth. Again 'Truth is no monopoly of a recluse or a misanthrope ' or a bigoted thinker The ancient Rishis of the , Upamshads breathed the free air of Truth, sang the song of freedom and emoyed the truth of life. Many of their highest teachings were imparted in the crowded courts of kings. The message of the Gita, the excellent vade mecum of Vedanta, was dihvered on the battle-

xxxvi PREFACE

field, where the grimmest realities of life were faced and battles fought. Arjuna after realizing the Vedantic Truth did not flee away from the world, but girded his loins with fresh vigour and strength to discharge his duty (svadharma). After Sri Krishna had delivered his message, Arjuna said, "Destioyed is my delusion, and I have got back the memory of my real nature through Thy grace, Oh Krishna. I am now firm, my doubts are gone. I will carry out Thy word." Straightway he plunged into the terrible battle of Kurukshetra and performed his duty. Renascence of Indian lfe, in its various aspects, political, social, material, æsthetic and relgious, always followed the restoration of the Truth of Advaita to its pristmne glory The Upanishads, the Gita, Buddha, Sankara and Ramakrishna stand at the crest of the mighty tidal waves of India's renaissance. And all of them taught the essental truth of Vedanta in different forms The greatest tragedy of life is to think that no work is possible without a firm belief in duality and subject-object relationship: Men say that no work is possible without the consciousness of egoism and agency. On the other hand selfishness, sordidness, jealousy, passion, etc., which are manifested in our daily activities, are due to a belief in the reality of the subject-object relationship. The mightiest achieve- ments that have really transformed the fate of humanity have bcen done by those who have had no thought of their ego. Sri Krishna says in the Gita, "He who is/

PREFACE xxxviɨ̀

free from the notion of egoism, whose intelligence, is not affected (by good or evil), though he kills these people, he kills them not, nor is bound (by action)." The artast or the musician shows himself at his best when he feels himself one with his art. Sri Rama- knshna never had the idea of agency in the work of his spiritual ministration. He used to say, "Perform your work keeping always the knowledge of Advaita in your pocket." Is it possible to do any work which always implies the triad of perceiver, perceived and pereeption, if one be established m non-dual Brahman ? The idea may involve a logical or psychological contradiction, but this position can be fully justified from the meta- physical standpoint. One pursuing Truth disinter- estedly, when once establshed in Advaitic Truth, can see this world of multiphcity and at the same time know it to be the non-dual Brahman, pure, free, and ever-illumined. A knower of Truth may move and act in the world like an ordinary man. He feels hungry and thirsty. He goes to sleep when tired. He feels compassion for the misery of oshers and tries his utmost to alleviate it; but at the same time he sees everywhere the non-dual Brahman alone, ever-free and ever-pure. Sr Krishna also says in the Gita, "The offering is Brahman, the. claritiod butter is Brahman, mn the fire ot Brahman offered by Brahman, by seeing Brahman in actions, he reaches Brahman alone" (Gita, IV. 24). We admit that this position is most difficult to be comprehended by those who are

xxxnii1 PREFACE

not trained m Advaita. Truly says Gaudapāda, "Those few alone are known in the world as of high intellect who are firm in their conviction of the unborn and undivided Brahman The ordinary people cannot understand them or their action " (IV 95). He himself charactenses the teachıngs of Karka as verv deep (ahgambhiram) and extremely difficult to be understood (durdarsam) (TV. 100). .The superficial critie often asks how it is possible to apply the teachings of Vedanta to our practical everyday hfe, if we are taught continually to think of . the unreality of the world. How can the truth of non-dual Brahman, as taught by the Vednta, help one to work for mdividual or collective progress ? Vedanta certainly does not help us to bring grist to our individual or national mill. It certamly does not tell us how to increase our capacity to enjoy the pleasures derived trom material objects But Vedanta really teaches us how to enjoy the world after realizing Its true nature To embrace the universe after realizing it as the non-dual Brahman, gives us peace that passeth all understandigs Says the seer in the Isa Upamshad, "All ths-whatsoever moves m the earth-should be realized as permeated by the Lord (Atman). Enjoy (the world) by renunciation (of the illusory names and forms). Covet not anybody's wealth." Does Vedanta really ask us to negate the world ? Does it renlly teaeh us to negate the existing objects? A student of the Kartka will at once realize that there Is nothing to be nogated or added. That which exists

PRFFACE xXXI

can never be non-existent. Brahman alone is existent on account of its persistence in all acts of cognition. Names, forms and relations are illusory on account of their changeability and negatabilty. Vedanta teaches us to realize the world as Brahman and then be one with it. Vedanta teaches us to see Brahman everywhere even in the so-called illusion. An ilusion can never be real and it is percerved on account of our ignorance. A Vedantist does not negate the world which, being Brahman, can never be negated. It only asks the student to know the real nature of the world. A knower of truth, as we have alroady stated, does his duty or work in the world. But the knowledge of Truth makes all the difference in his attitude towards the world. Where the ignorant person sees non-Brahman, the Jnan realizes Brahman alone. A Jnani just exercises his understanding, and then uses the same sense-organs in dealing with the same external objects. He sees everywhere the non-dual Brahman. One often hears in Europe and America that Vedanta is pantheism or idealism. Many foreign critics characterise Vedanta as illusiomsm. The critics only look at the Vedantic truth from the relative standpoint. From the standpomt of the Ultimate Truth Vedanta is not idealsm, as it does not see, in the Platonic fashion, the duahty of illusory external objects and the reality of ideas. Nor does Vedanta teach, like the Buddhist idealists, that ideas, which alone are real,.have birth, death and the characteristics of misery.

xl ' PREFACE

Vedantic truth is different from Kantian dualism which makes a distinction between noumena and phenomena. Berkley says that all external objects are but idcas in the percerver's mind and God or the cosmie mind sends these ideas. Vedanta says that God is also an idea and the plurality of ideas and their relationship cannot be proved to be real. Vedanta is not certamnly pantheism as it does not recognize any Cod, independent of the Self, who is the universe. Vedanta denies causality from the highest standpoint and thus mnvalidates the process of becoming Vedanta, like Hegel, says that Reality is thought but denies the evolution of the Absolute Biadley says that tme, space, or causal relation cannot apply to the Absolute but at the same time he says that the Absolute ' some- how' becomes the manifested manifold. Gaudapada denies the manifestation, evolution or the becoming of Ātman. The conclusion of Vedanta can be summed up in four words " All this is Brahman." Only the non-dual Brahman exists. There is no phenomenal Jiva about whom birth and death can be predicated. If one sees such birth, etc., it is due to his ignorance of the nature of Realty. Again this ignorance is not real (IV. 58). Jivas are all peace from the very beginning, cver unproduced and indestructible by their very nature, and therefore, eternal and iseparable. All this is unborn and enlghtened Brahman (IV. 93). The Jivas ate ever free from any obstruction (as obstruction does not exist) being entirely pure by nature. They

PREFACE xli

are all-light and ever-liberated from the beginning (IV. 98). As Brahman alone exists there is nothing which can be accepted nor anything injurous which can be shunned The Teachings of Gaudapada can benefit only those that are equipped with the Sadhana Chatushtaya or the fourfold pre-requisites of philosophical discipline, such as discrimiation, non-attachment (renunciation), self-control and an nrepressible hankering after the reahzation of Truth. Any one who undertakes the study of the Kamka in a dilettante fashion will see in it no- thing but confusion and may even be misled. Gauda- pada has dealt with all the problemns of philosophy following the scientific method of the modern times. The careful reader will find mn the Karika the solution of such outstanding problems of philosophy as perception, idealism, causality, truth, Reality, etc. Every verse of the Karka demands profound thinking before it can be understood and appreciated. But people will rather die than think. The glory and value of the Mandukya Upanishad has been infinitely enhanced by the Karika of Gaudapada. We are not aware of any other Enghsh translation of the Mandukyu Upanishad with the Karka and Sankara's commentary than the one by Mamlal N. Dvivedi pubhshed in 1894 For the most part the translation is rohable and we have looked mto it while preparing our translation. We have felt that exhaustive notes are necessary for the average reader to under- stand the real import of the Karika and Sankara's

PREFACE

commentary. Therefore we have tried to elucidate Gaudapada and Sankara with copious notes. We are profoundly grateful to Mr V Subrahmanya Jyer, the retired Registrar of the Mysore Universitv, for explaimng to us the abstruse philosophy of the Kanka. Mr Iyer, the courageous thinker, taught us that no philosophy can live to-day in anything but a fool's paradise, unless it ventures out into the open but biting air of eritical reason as natural science does. Philosophy, hke science, is vitally concerned with reasoned or rationally demonstrable truth and must not depend upon mere mystic vision or tradition or authorty. The seed which ripens into vision may be a gift of the gods but the labour of cultivating it so that it may bear nourishing fruit is the indispensable function of arduous scientific or rational processes of thought. Mr. Subrahmanya Iyer has laid us under an additional debt of obligation by revising the entire book in its manuscript form and agreeing to stand sponsor to it in placing it before the public. Above all, we cannot adequately express our deop sense of indebteuness to the distinguished Ruler of Mysore, His Highness the Maharaja, Sri Krishnaraja Wadıyar Bahadur IV. Not only his philosophic knowledge, but also his philosophic life, has become a household word m the State and throughout India. The days that we spent breathing the spiritual atmos- phere created all around by the Temple on the Chamundi Hill, at the foot of which is situated His Highness's famous and picturesque capital, were among the

PREFACE

happiest. His great devotion to Sri Ramakrishna, the teacher of Universal Love, lends an additional charm to his hfe. And we felt that the best way in which we could acknowledge all that we owe to Mysore and its famous Ruler would be to bring out a work of this kind, associating it with the name of the royal Vedantin, who is himself an ardent admirer of Sri Gaudapāda.

Vedanta Socrety, Providence, SWAMI NIKHILANANDA. Rhode Island, U.S.A., 24th June, 1932.

Aum Salutatton to Brahman.

THE MÃNDŰKYOPANISHAD.

VEDIC INVOCATION. O Gods ! Auspicious sounds may we hear with the ears Auspicious forins may we behold with the eyes. May we, full of praise of the Highest, enjoy, in healthy body with perfect limbs, our allotted years, (may we be) the beloved of the Gods. Aum Peace! Peace ! Peace !

INVOCATION BY SANKARA.

I bow to that Brahman that (during the wakmg state) after having enjoyed (experienced) all gross objects by pervading the entire universe through the ommpresent rays of its iminutable consciousness that embraces the entire vanety of the movable and the immovable objects, that again, after having digested, as it were,-that is to say, experiented within (m the dream state)-all the variety of objects produced by desires and brought into existence by the mind, enjoys bliss in deep sleep and makes us experience through Maya, the bliss; which, furthor, is designated, in terms of Mayd, as the fourth (Turiya), and which is supreme, immortal and changeless. May that Turiya that, (through Maya) having identified itself as the entire universe, experiences

2 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

(in the wakmng state) the manifold gross objects of enjoyment through ignorance and attachment, that again during the dream state, experiences, being en- lightened by its own hight, the subtle objects of enjoy- ment, the objects that are brought into existence by its own internal organ, and which, lastly, in dreamless sleep withdraws all objects (subtle as well as gross) withm itself and thus becomes free from all distinctions and differences,-(May this Turya that) is ever devoid of all attributes, protect us SANKARA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE UPANISHAD COMMENTARY. With the word Aum, etc., begins the treatise, consisting of fourl chapters, the quintessence" of the substance3 of the import of Vedanta ^ Hence" no separate mention is made of the (mutual) relationship, the subject-matter and the object to be attamned (Matters usually stated in an mtroduction to a study of any Vedantic treatise). For, that which constitutes the relationship, the subject-matter and the object of the Vedantic study is evident here. Nevertheless, that one desirous of explaining a Prakarana (treatise), should deal with them is the opinion of the scholastic. This treatise must be said to contamn a subject-matter on account of its revealing6 the means (for the realiza- tion of Atman) that serves the purpose, or the end to be attained. It therefore possesses, though indirectly, 'specific relationship', 'subject-matter' and the end to be attained'. What then, is that end? in view? It is thus explained. As a man stricken with disease

MINDUKYOPANISHAD 3

regains his normal8 state with the removal' of (the cause of) the disease, so the self labouring under mfis- apprehension, owing to identification!0 of itself with misery, recovers its normal11 state with the cessation (of the illusion) of dualty, which manfests itselt as the phenomenal unverse. This realization of non- duahty is the end to be attamed This treatise is begun for the purpose of revealing12 Brahman inas- much as by knowledge (Vidya) the illusion of duahty, caused by ignorance, is destroyed. This is established by such seriptnral passages as 'For where there is, as it were. dnality,' 'where there exists, as it were, another, there one sees another, and one knows another. But where all this has, verily, become dtmnn (for one), how should one see another, how should one know another ? ' The first chapter, then, seeks, by dealing specifically with the Vedic texts,13 to indicate the (traditional) means to the realization of the essential nature of Atman and is devoted to the determination14 of the meaning of Aum The second chapter seeks rationally15 to demonstrate the unreality of duality, the illusion (duality) being destroyed, the knowledge of non- duality (becomes evident), as the cessation of the imagination of snake, etc, in the rope reveals the real . nature of the rope. The third chapter is devoted to the rational demonstration of the'truth of non-duality, lest it should, in like manner,10 be contendod to be unreal. The fourth chapter is devoted to the rational refutation of the other schools of thonght which are

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

antagonistic to the truth as pointed out in the Vedas and which are opposed to the knowledge of the Advaitic Reality, by pointing out their falsity on account of their own mutual17 contradiction.

1 Fow chapters-2e, the Mandahyopansshnd with the Karda by Gaudapada treated in four chapters : vi , the Apama Fraharanu, the Vaitathya Prakmana, the Advaia Prakarana and the Alala- Santi Prakarana The mere Upanishadie portion without the Karila does not present a full view of the philosophic gystem of Vedanta which secka to intorpret human knowledge as a whole (vdr Foreword). 2 Quintessence-It is becauso the Mandakya bruti confines itself only to the establshment of non-dualty without contro- verting the doctries of the other systems Mandakyopanishad aptly describes thai Mandakyn alone, among the Upamishads, Is sufficient for liberation (the attainment of truth). Of H10FH- कमवालं सुभुक्षणां विमुत्तये. & Subvtance-The doetrine of the non-differonce of Jiva and Brahman & Vedanta-It literally means the last portion of the Vedas which is inentical with the Upamshads. The word also signifios the essence of the Vedas Vedantic works usually deal with the following the fitness of a pupil for the study of Brahmavidya, the qualification of the teacher, the nature of Jira and Brahman, and finally the non-difference or non-dualty of the two. & Ienre, etr -Sankaca treats the Mandabyopamshad and the Karika not as a Sāsira but as a Prakarana (treatse) A Sāstra though relaled to a particular end m view deals with varieties of topics. But a Piakarana is a short manual which confines itself to some esyential tomes of a Sastra, All the arguments of the Mandakyopamshad with Karila ultimately pomt to the establsh- ment of the attributeless Brahman, thus serving the purpose of a , Pratarana which i8 defined as follows : - शास्त्रैकदेशसंबन्धं शास्त्रकार्यान्तरे स्थितम्। आहुः प्रकरणं नाम भ्रून्थभेदं विपश्चितः ॥

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 5,

The other Verantio texts also establish the truth of non-duahty but they mcidentally discuss various other philosoplcal doctries. A Pralmana (treatise) has four indispenaable elements (aa) literally, "what sticks to another", namely, the deter- mination of the fitness of the student for the study of the treatise (अधिकारी), the subject-matter (विषय), the mutual relationship (ua) between the treatise and the subject-matter (which is that of the explainer and the explamned) and the object to be attamned by the study, i.e, it4 utility (प्रयाजन). € Revealing, eic .- Though lberation is attaied through the knowledge of the non-duahty of Jum and Brahman and not as a result of the study of seriptures, yet the seuptures indirectly help the attainment of this knowledge by pomting to the illusory tharacter of dualty. ? Obect-Is the knowledge something to be produced or i it ever-existent ? In the former case, it would be like other effects, impermanent, and in the latter case, the means pursued would be futile. The reply is that though the Knowledge of Atman is eter- nally oxistent, yet it is obscured by ignorance in the Jum. The am of Sadhand is to remove this obstrnetion Thus Sūdhană serves a nseful purpose though it does not make the student attamn anything new. 8 Normal state -- The sick man thinks that he has lost the normal state during the period ot his illness. Removal, etc -This is done by means of medicine, etc. 10 Identification, etc -This sufferig is due to the illusion of duality, such as egoism, etc., caused by ignorance which does not exist in reahty. Otherwise its destruction would be an imposyt- bility 11 Normal state-This state being in itself perfect, cannot be transcended hby any other state. 12 Revealing, etc .- Tlis is done bv the removal of ignorance which is the cause of the illusion of duality 13 Vedic terts-The first chapter of the Mandakyopanishad, namely, the Agama Prakarana, consists mainly of the Upamshadie texts. The doctrines contained therein are establshed rationally in the following three chapters

6 MANDUKYOP.1NISHAD

14 Determination -- This would enable the student to attain the knowledge of the self, whose real natmie is revealed by the do- monstration of the unreahty of duahty which is an illusion Aiman is reahzed through such knowledge. Therefore the mchrect result of the explanation of the ieal nature of Aum leads to the attain- ment of the summum bonum The rational treatment will follow 15 Rationally-With the disappearanco of the sense of reahty with regard to illusions, there spontaneously anises the knowledge of truth Gandapada in the sccond, thnd and fourth chapters of the Kanha, ratonally presenis the truth, presented in the first. 10 In lake manner -Therc may be a doubt regarding the very existence of Reahty when duality 19 iemoved. The aigument followed by the author of the Kanka is that the knowledge of Renhty is such that it is never contiacieted. 17 Hutual contradiction -The contradietions are pointed out with a view to estabhshing the truth of non-dushsm-a coursel frequently pursued both by Caudapada and Sankara.

CHAPTER I.

ĀGAMA PRAKARANA

(TuE UPANISHADIC CHAPTER.)

I.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY SANKARA. How does, again, the determination of (the mean. ing of) Aum help the realization of the essential nature of Atman? It is thus1 explained : The Sruti2 passages such as these declare' thus "It4, is Aum." "This (Aum) is the (best)5 support." "'Oh, Satyakama, Ite is the aim which is also the higher and the lower Brahman." "Meditate' on the Self as Aum." " Aum, this word is Brahman." "All' this is verily Aum." As the rope, etc., which are the substratum of such illusions (misapprehensions) as the snake, etc., so 1s the non-dual Atman, which is the ultimate Reality, the substratum of such imnginations as the vital10 breath (Pranu), etc., which are unreal. Similarly, Aum is the substratum of the entive illusion of the world of speech having11 for its (correspohding) contents such illusory objects as Prana, etc., imagined in Atman. And Aum is verily of the same12 essential character as the dtman; for it is the name for Atmon. All illusions, such as Prana, etc., having Atman for therr substratum and denoted by words-which are but modifications13 of Aum-, cannot exist14 without names (which are but the modification of Aum). This?

8 MANDÜKYOPANISHAD

Is supported by such Srute passages as "The modi- fication15 heing only a name arising from spoech." "All this related to It (Brahman) is held1 together by the cord17 of speech and strandst8 of (specific) names." "All these (are rendered possible in ex- perience) by names," etc -

1 Thus-The reason given heie chiefly depends npon the scriptural anthority, berense the first chapter of this work lays emphasis on the seriptural toxty 2 Siult pas ayes-For detalled explanations of these passages the reader is referred to the respective Upamshads in hich they ocenr 3 Decime-The ultmate relationship between Aum and Brahman is thus explamed The pheuomena of the world conast of ideas or the mental states. Ideas dopend upon words for therr expresyion. The utterance of the word Aum (A U M) gives the elue to the pronunciations of all the words or sounds used by humau beings The various parls of the vocal organ used in the utterance of sounds come in contact with each other whie pronouncing the word Aum, Therefore, Aum is the matrix of all sounds which in their diversified forms give rise to words used in the language. 'The substratum of phenomena is Brahman The substratum of al sounds, as seen above, is Aum. The sounds signifying the phenomena are non-different fiom the phenomena as both are illosions When the illusion cisappears the substratum alono remains which, being one, admits of no differenec. Tence Brahman is Aunt. 4 It is, etc -Kathopanishad, 1.2 15 When Aum is uttored with concentration there arises the consciousness of Brahman in the mind. Therefore Aum is the nearest symbol helping the con- centration of the' mind leading to the realzation of Brahman The principle of this process is known as 1. 4 . Best-Kathopanishad, 1. 2 17. This is the best symbol of Brahman likc an image (qRTHT) of Vishnu. e IL is, ete-Prasnopanishad, 5. 2. "The knower through ttie suppoit (of the Aum) aftains to one or the other." Through

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 9

the meditation of Aum one can realize both the Para (attributeless) Brahman and the Apara (associated with names and forms)" Brahman. 7 Meditate -- One, who seeks to reatize the Self through "one- pointed" tonrentration on Aum, feels that the gross umverse (symbolsed by A) is absorhed mto the subtle (U) and (7) mto the - causal (Mf) and finally the umverso dependent upon causal relation As withdrawn into the transcendental which is known as Amatra and which cannot be designated by any letter or sound. ' 8 Ths word, eh -Tarttirwyopamshad, 1 S I fum indicates that both Sayuna and Narguna Biahman have the same substratum which is the Nngung (attributeless) Brahman or the lghest Reahty.r D AU this is, ete -Both, i.e., Aum and Brahman, are the support of everything, they form the most umnversal concupt. Therofore the knowledge of din and Brahman is idential 10 Tital lneath-The non-dual Brahman, being the only existing Reality, does not admnt of any other existence. Therefore Prana, ete and their effcots are but imagiations which are unrenl, having Brahman for their substratum,-like the illusion of snake super. imposed upon a rope 11 Haning, etc -Piana, etc., are merely modifications of speech because they cannot be concerved of without names As agam names are nothing but different mamifestations of Aum, therefore Prana, eto., have Aum for their substratum 12 Same nature-The name and the thing idicated by it are identical in as much as both are mental (Kalpanika). 13 Modifications-All sounds are included mn "A"-the first letter of the alphabet (Of. The Alutr passage, अकारो वे सर्वाव्राक). "A" is the cluef constituent of Aum. Therefore all imaginations (te, the objeets denoted by them are identical with the sounds associated with thom) cannot exist apart from Aum. 14 Cannot erst, etc .- The puipose of the Brute is to show the identity of the name and the object Ths can be understood from the standpoit of idealism which explains everything as mere iden or a mental state or content. 15 Modification-Chhand. Up., 0. 1. 4. 10 Held with-i.e, Pervaded.

10 MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

17 Cord-It standa for the general (HTHI-A). 18 Atrands-They denote the particular (fasra). Therefore it is said - हरि: ओम्। ओमित्येतदक्षरमिदं सर्व तस्योपव्याख्यानं भूतं भवद्धविष्यदिति सर्वमोंकार एव। यञ्चान्यत्त्रि- कालाततिं तदप्योंकार एव ।१॥ Harih Aum. .4um, the word, is all this. A clear explanation of it (is the following). All that is past, present and future is verily Aum, That which is beyond the triple conception of time, is also truly Aum. ŠANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Aum, the word, is all this. As all diversificd objects that we see around us, mdicated by names, are not different1 from their (corresponding) names, and further as the different names are not different from Aum, therefore all this is verily Aum. As a thing is known through its name, so the highest Brahman is known through Aum alone. Therefore the highest Brahman is verily Aum. This (treatise) is the explanation of that, tasya, that is, of Aum, the word, which is of the same nature as the higher as well as the lower Brahman. U pavyakhyanam means clear explanation because Aum is the means to the knowledge of Brahman on account of its having the closest proximity to Brahman. The word 'Prustutam' meaning commences' should be supplied to complete the sentence (as otherwise, it is

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 13

incomplete) That which is conditioned by the trip .. (conceptions of) time, such as past, present and future is also verily Aum for reasons already explained All that is beyond the three (divisions of) time. ie, un- conditioned by time, and yet known by their effects, which is called 'Avyakrita', the unmanifested, etc. -- that also2 is verily Aum.

1 Not different-That the name and the ohjeet denoted by it are identeal is understood from the standpoint of ideahsm which explains everything cognied or perceived as only a form of thonght. 2 Also, eic -Because the effeet is non-difterent from the causo,

II.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY SANKARA.

Though the name and the object sgnified by the name are one and the same, still the explanation1 has been given (here) by giving prommence2 to the name (Aum). Though in the Upanishadic passage,-" Aum, this word, is all this ?- explanation has been furnished by giving prominence3 to the name (Aum), the same thought is again expounded by giving prominence to the thing significd by the name. The object is to realize the knowledge of the oneness of the name and the thing signified by it. Otherwise, (the explanation) that the knowledge of the thing is dependent on the name, might suggest that the oneness of the nanie and the thing is to be taken only in a figurative4 sense. The purpose of the knowledge of the unity (of the name and the thing sigmfied by it) is to simultancously remove, by a single effort, (tha illusion of) both the -

10 MANDOKYOPANISHAD

ame and the thing and establish (the nature of) Brahman whichs is other than both. Therefore the Sruti says, " The quarter (Padas) are the letters of Aum (Maba) and the letters are the quarters."

1 Erplanation-i,e, of what is mtended to be tanght by tho Upanishade text 2 Prominonre-Becanse Aum is the first word of the first Upamshad TThe purport of the sentence is that Aum is the symbol, the most universal, for all the phenomona of the woild Therefore prominence i4 given to lum (3TRTET). 3 Prominence-The second Upanishad is "All this is, truly, Brahmau." Honce the emphasis is on 'All this'-which is the object (+T) ignifled by dum. 4 Figurative- u.c., the mere convention of calling a thing by a parteular name. 5 Which is, etc .- The knowledge of the attributeless Brahman is possible only when the illusion of both the name and the thing agnified by it is removed.

Therefore it says :-

सर्वे ह्येतङ्वह्मायमात्मा ब्रह्म सोडयमात्मा चतुष्पात् ॥।२॥

All this is verily Brahman. This Atman is Brahman. This Atman has four quarters.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. All this is verily Brahman. All that has been said to consist merely of Aum (in the previous text) is Brahman. That Brahman which has been described1 (as existing) inferentiallya is now pointed out, as being directlys perceived, by the passage, "This Self is Brahman". The word this, meaning that which appears

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 13

divided into four quarters,4 is pomted out as the mner -. most Self, with a gestures (of hand) by the passage, "This is Atman". That Atman mdicated by Aum, signifying both the higher and the lower Brahman, hasf four quarters (Padas), not indeed, like the four feet (Padas) of a cow,? but lke the four parts (Padas) of a com8 known as Karshapana The knowledge of the fourth (Turya) is attained by merging the (previous) three, such as Viswa, ete., in it ine the order of the previous one, in the succeeding one. Herei0" the word 'Pada' or 'foot' is used m11 the sense of instrument The word 'Pada' is again used in the sense of an object when the object to he achieved is the fourth (Turiya)

1 Described-1,e., by the Srutr 2 Inferentially-1e., we cannot direcily perceive its presence but we ean infer it. It is opposed to TYTTH5T which refers to the knowledge of a thing that is not chrectly perceived but about the existence of which one becomes absolutely certain by means of what is known as reahzation 3 Drectly-The word yRT&, nowadays, is apphed, especially in the Nyaya Phlosophy, to the knowledge of the objects of sense- perception But oocasionally it is used, in the Upamshad and the Vedantie text, in the sense of T9TTT. 4 Four quarters-Namely, Viswa (the waking stato), Taiasa (dream state), Prama (Sushuph or the state of dreamless sleep) and Turiya which is same as Brahman or Atman These four quarters correspond to the three Matras of dum and the Amatra of Awm, A, U and M are the three Matras. The fourth, which is known as Amåtra or without a letter, has no corresponding letter or sound. This is silence or Atman corresponding to Turiya, The idea of sound suggests the idea of soundlessness or silence from which sound may be said to proceed.

14 MĀNDŪKYOPANISIIAI

5 Gesture-te., by placing the hand on the region of the heart 'whoh, in popular belief, is the seat of dtman. Has, etc .- The four quarters are imagined in Alman to facı- hitate the understanding of the pupil 7 Cow-Because cow has actually four feet which are unrelated with one another. $ Coin-Karshapana is a coin made up of four quarters, A quarter-Karshapana is merged in the half-Karshapana, the half is merged in the three-fourth-Karshapana and the three- quarters ultimatoly is merged in the full Karshapana. . 9 In the, etc -- Viswa is meiged m Tarjasa, Taiasa in Prajna and finally Prajna is merged in Turiya, 10 Here-It is because the fourth state is realized by means of merging the three states in it. 11 In the sense of-It is becanse the altention is here drawn to the fourth state which is tho object of the enquiry.

III.

Howl four quarters are said to be in Atman 1s thus2 explamed .- जागरितस्थानो बहिष्प्रज्ञः सप्ताङ्ग एकोनविशतिमुखः स्थूलमुग्वैश्वानर: प्रथम: पाद: ॥३॥ The first ,quarter (Pūda) is Varswanara whose sphere (of activity) is the waking stale, who is conscious of external objects, who has seven limbs and nineteen mouths and whose experience consists of gross (material) objects.

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Jagaritasthana, i.e., his sphere3 (of activity) is the waking state. Bahisnprajna, i.e., who4 is aware of

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 15

objects other than himself. The meaning is that consciousness appears, as it were, related to outward objects on account of Avidya. Similarly Saptanga, r.e., he has . seven5 limbs. The Srult says, "Of that Varswanaa Self, the effulgent region is his head, the sun his eye, the an his vital breath, the ether (Akasa) the (middle part of his) body, the water? his kidney and the earth his feet." The Ahavaniya fire (one of the three fires of the Agmhotra sacrifice) has been described as his mouth in order to complete the imagery of the Agnhotra sacrifice He is called Saptanga because these are the seven limbs of his body. Sımilarly he has nmneteen mouths. These are the fives organs of perception (Buddhindriyas) ; the five9 organs of action (Karmendriyas) ; the five10 aspects of vital breath (Piana, etc ), the mind (Manas) the intel- lect (Buddhi) ; egoity (Ahamkara), mind-stuft (Chitta). These are, as it were, the mouths, t.e., the instruments by means of which he (Varswanara) experiences (objects). He, the Varswanara, thus constituted, experiences through the mstruments enumerated above, gross objects, such as sound, etc. He is called Vai- śuanura because he leads all creatures of the universe in diverse ways (toll the enjoyment of various objects) ; or because he comprises all beings. Following the grammatical rules regarding the compound which gives the latter meaning, the word that is formed is Viswa- nara, which is the same as Vaiswanara. He is the first guarter because he is non-differont from the totality of gross bodies (known as Virar), He is called first12 ~

16 MĀNDŪRYOPANISHAD

(quarter) because the subsequent quarters are realizod through him (Vaiswanara). (Obyection)-While the subject-matter under discus- sion treats of the innermost Self (Pratyuk Atma) as having four quarters-in the text, "This Atman is Brahman"-how is it that (the external dniverse consisting of) the effulgent regions, ete., have been desoribed as its limbs such as head, etc. ? (Reply)-This, howevor, is no13 mistake, because the object is to describe the entire phenomena, melud- ing those of gods (Adhe-dawva) as having four quarters from14 the standpomt of this Atman known as the Vimt (i.c., the totality of the gross universe). And in1 this way alone is non-duality establshcd by the removal of (the illusion of) the entire16 phenomena. Further, the one Atman is realized as existing mn all beings and all17 beings are seen as existing in Alman. And, thus alone, the meaning of such Sruti passages as 'Who sees all beings in the Self, ete." can be said to be established. Otherwise,18 the sub- jective world will, vorily, be, as mn the case of such philosophers as the Samkhyas,1 limited by its (one's) own body. And if that be the case, no room would be left for the Advaita which is the special feature of the Srut. For, in the case of dualty, there would be no difference between the Advaita and the Samkhya and other systems. The establshment of the identity of all with Atman is sought by all the Upanishads. It is, therefore, quite reasonable to speak of the efful- gent regions, eto., as seven limbs in connection with the

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 17

subjective (mndividual self, Adhyatma) associated with the gross bodv, because of its identity with the Adhi- darva (comprising the super-phvsical regions) universe from the standpoint of the Virat (the totality of the gross physical universe). This is further known from such characteristic indication (of the Sruti), as "Thy20 head shall fall", etc. The identity (of Adhyatma and Adhidarva) from the standpoit of the Virat indicates similar identity21 of the selves known as the Hranyagarbha and the" Taijasa22 as well as of the Unmanifested23 (Iswara) and the Prajna. It is also stated in the Madhu Bralmana, "This bright immortal person in this earth and that bright immortal person in the body (both are Madhu). ' It is an estabhshed fact that the Self in deep sleep (Piajna) is identical with the Unmanifested (Iswura) because24 of the absence of any distmnction between them. Such being the case, it is clearly established that non-duahty is reahzed by the dis- appearance (of the illusion) of all dualty. 1 How, etc .- The reason for doubting is that Atman is without parts. 2 Thus, etc .- Four quartery are merely assumed to fachtate understanding by the unenlighlened, 3 Sphere, etc -It is because the Self idontifies itself with the experiencer in the waking stato. 4 Who is aware, etc -Consciousness (Pajna), really speaking, is identical with Self. It cannot be related to external objcets because nothing exista outside consciousness Owing to Ajnāna (ignoranco), the Buddthi Vritt (mental modification) objectifies .itaclf into what are called material entitios, ego and non-ego, These material objects do not possess any independent existence,

18 MANDOKVOPANISIAD

Both the Frith and its objeets are imagined in Htman. From " the standpoint of Itman it does not experienee any ohject oxternal which is rotally non-evistent 5 Seren-Tls assumption is based upon seriptural authority. Of. Chhand. Up., 5. 18. 2. Effulgent, etc -t.e , Dyuloka or the sky with its lumnary bodies suoh as the sun, the moon, the stars, ete 7 Water-The word " Rayt ", meaning ' Food " and " wealth ", also indentes " water " by winch whatever is " food " grows, lning- ing in its turn " wealth". & Five orquns, etc,-namely, the ougan of sight, sound, smell taste and toueh. Fwe oigans, etr, -- numely, hands, feet and organs of specch, generation and evacuation. 1Fire airs or humomr s, rto .- 11 . Prana, Apana, Samana, Vyana and T'ding 11 To the enjoyment, ele,-He makes people enjoy plensure and pain necording to their virtuous or vicions deeds 12 Firal-The word does not denote any priority of creation. It is called fbst berauap fom the standpomnt of Viuswonmg or the waking state alone one can uuderstand the other states, i.e., as has been pointed out under the first Upamshad, we see first how from the waking state the dreum state and the state of dreamlons sleep are known. 13 No mistake-The subjective is known as tho Adkyatma. The Adhinnira comprises the objective umverse icluding the apheres of the sun, the moon,-the stars, ete. Adhyatma is non-different froni Adhidawa because both these, as has already been pointed out, aro but ideas imagmed m Aban. Hence there is no mistake in assnm- ing Adhulaunka members as forming the hmbs of the Adhyalma 1k From the standpornt, eto -The gross physical aspeets of both Adhyatma and Adhidaiva, known as Virat (te, the totahty of all physical bodies), form'the first quarter of the Atman or Brahman. The subfle or Sukshma (namely, the Apanchikrita) aspects, known aa the Htranyagarbha(t,e , the totality of the subtle), form the second quarter of the Atman or Brahman. The Karana or cansal aspect

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 19

known as the Jryalrita (unmanifested) or the Iswara comprising both the Adhyatma and Adhidana i the third quarter And the transcendental (Turiya) which is beyond all causal relations and which is the ultimate substratum of all appearances, mz., Virdt, Hwranyagurbha and Isuwa, is the fourth quarter In all these in- stances there is non-difference between the Adhyūtma and Adhidaina Therefore there is no mistake in applying tho limbs ot Adhidaiva to Adhyā'ma li In this way alone -- te, by merging ench of the three stat0s step by step. in the Turiya or the transcendental. 18 Entire, elc .-- i.e., from Brahma or the highest cosmic being _. to the mere blade of grasy 17 111 beings-i.e., they are seen as mere imagination upon Ălman Compare the following couplet from the Manu Amrite.

सर्वभूतस्थमार्मानं सर्वभूतानि चात्मनि। संपश्यन्ञात्मयाजी वे खाराज्यमधिगच्छति॥ 18 Otherwise-n.e, by admitting the dnahtv of Adhyatma and Adhidarra 19 Samthyas-The Sambhya doctrine admits the plurahty of souls as based upon mamifoldness of experience The Vedantin explains the plurahty to be due to Amdyā 20 Thy head, eic -Le , if thou worshippest the effulgent region which is but a part of Varswrnara as the Vaikuanara itself. 21 Identiy-Le , in the spiritual plane 22 Tayasa-The mchvidual self while dreaming is called Taviasa. 23 Unmanifested, etc -The identity of Iswara and Pragna The inchvidual solf in the state of deep steep (Sushapt) is called Prājea 24 Because, ete -The Prajna or the causal self withdraws mto itself at the time of deep sleep all distinotions of objects as well as the objects themselves experienced m waking and dream states. The Iswara (the cosmic soul) too at the time of dissolution withdraws into itvelf all distipctions expenenced m the planes of Pirat und Huanyagarbha wlnch correspond respectively to the waking and the dream states of the subjectrve

MANDOKVOPANISHAD

IV. समस्थानोऽन्तःप्रज्ञः सप्ताङ्ग एकोनविंशतिमुखः प्रविविक्तमुक्तैजसो द्वितीय: पादः ॥४॥ The second quarter (Pāda) is the Tarjasa whose sphere (of activity) is the dream, who is conscious of internal objects, who has seven limbs and nineteen mouths and who experiences the subtle objects. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY He i called the Svapnasthana because the dream (state) is his (Tarjasa) sphere. Wakig consciousness, being associated as it is with many means,1 and appearing2 conscious of objects as if external, though (in reality) they are nothing but states3 of mind, leaves in the mind corresponding4 impressions. That the mind (in dream) without" any of the external means, but possessed of the impressions left on it by the waking consciousness, like6 a piece of canvas7 with the pictures painted on it, experiences the dream state also as if it were l'ke the waking, is due to its being under the influence of ignorance, desire and their action.8 Thus' it is said, "(And when he talls asleep) then after having taken away with him (portion of the) impressions'from the world during the wakmng state (destroying and building up again, he experiences dream by his own light)" (Brhd. Up., 4.3. 9). Simi- larly the Athurvana, after introducing the subject with "(all the sencss) become one in the highest10

MANDOKYOP INISHAD

Deva, the mid," continues "There the god (mindy enjoys mn dream greatness"1i (Prasna Up.). Fromh the standpoint of the sense-organs, the mind is internal. He (the Taijasa) is called the Antahprajna or conscious of the internal bccause his consciousness in dream becomes aware of the mental states, which are impressions left by the previous waking state .. He is called the Taijasa because he appears as the subject though this (dream) consciousness is without any (gross) olyect and is of the nature of the essence of light. The Viswn (the subject of the waking state) experiences consciousness associated with gross ex- ternal objects; whereas, hore (in the dream state), the object of experience is consciousness consisting of Vasanas (the impressions of past experience). There- fore this experience is called the experience1a of the subtle. The rest is common (with the previous Srutt): This Tarasa is the second quarter (of Atman)

I Means-Subject-objeet relationslnp, agency, instrumentahty, ete. 2 Appearing-Accorrling to Vrdanta, external objects, perceived by the sense-organs, have no abvolute reahty. They appear as real on aecount of Avidya. Then realty cannot be proved for the aimple renson that they become non-existent whon their ossential character is enquired mto. 3 States of mind-Eaternal objeers aro nothng but mental enistonts produced by mrdyu. Theie are no suoh mdepen- dent external ennties as objects, and they are but creations of the mind. In fact we are not conscious of any external objects independent of the mind, We take our mental creations to be such objects. Again these who seek for the cause of these mental oren. tions or ideas, which we thik we see as external objects, are led mto 3

22 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

a logical regressus. This causal chain leads nowhere It will he shown later on that the whole idea of canse and offeet is unreal. 4 Corresponding, etc .- that is, like those experienced in the wak- ing state. Those impressions are subsequently repioduced mn the form of dream-objects 5 Without any, etc -It is because in dream no other separate entity than the mind of the dreamer, is present Like a piere, eto -Dream experiences appear av ieal as the expeuencee of the waking state. ? Inke a mece of canvas, ele -The picture painted on a piece of canvas appears to possess various dimensions though, in reahty, the picture is on a plane surfare Simlaily, dream-experiences, though ieally stotes of mind, appear to be characterized by the presence of externality and internalty 8 Action-The word "Karma" is used in Vedanta in more senses than one, ' Karma" primarily means "aotion " Et also aignifies the destiny forged by one in one's past incarnation or present : the store of tendencies, impulses, characteristcs and hahtts, which dotermine one's future embodiment and environment Another meaniug of "Karma", often used in reference to one's caste or posi- tion in life, is ritual, the course of conduet, which one ought to follow in pursuance of the tendoncies acquired in tho past, with a viow to work them out The meanmna of the word, here, is tho ton- dencies gencrated in the mind by the actrvities of tho waking state Avidya gives rise to Kama or desire, and this, in ats turn, mpels a man to action. 9 Thus, etc .- The causal ielation between the waking and the dream states is sought to be established here ou seriptural authority. 0 Highest, etc -I6 14 beranse mn the dream stato the JJara is avsociated with the Upadh of mind Il Greatness-The Jira in sleep, characterizer hy darkness, possesses the light by means of w hnch the subject-object relationship. is seen. The greatness of mind consists in the fact that in dream it can transform itself into kuowledge, act of knowing and the object of knowledge. 12 From the standpoint of-From the standpomi of the waking state alone, when the sepse-organs are active, one ran review the

23

dream expenences and thus come to know the internal activity of the mind which aets in the dlream stato mdependently of the sense- organs of the waking state 13 Erperience of the subtle-The experieuces of waking and dream states aro of the same nature, for in both th' statos the pei- eeiver is aware only of his mental statey whieh ate not related io any exfernal objeets, as they are non-evistent From the stand- point of dream, dream objeetsare ay gross and material as those ov- perienced in the waking state From the view-point of the waking stafe alone, one may mfet that the droam objerts are subtle, that is, composed of mere impressions of the waking state, masmuch as m the droam state no external (that is. cross) ohjert evi-ts at all.

यत्र सुपो न कंचन काम कामयते न केचनखम पश्यति तत्सुषुप्तम्। सुपुप्तस्थान एकीमूतः प्रज्ञानघन एवाऽडनन्दमयो व्वानन्दभुक् चेतोमुखः प्राज्ञस्तृतीयः पाद: ।।५।।

That is the state of deep sleep wherein the sleeper does not desire any objects nor does he see any dream. The third quarter (Pāda) is the Prajna whose sphere is deep sleep, in whom all (experiences) become unified, who is verily, a mass of consciousness entire, who. is full of bliss and who experiences bliss, and who is the path leading to the knowledge (of the two other states).

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The adjectival clause, viz., "Wherein the sleeper," ete., is put with a view to enabling one to grasp what

24 MINDUKVOPANISIAD

the state of deep sleep (Sushupts) sigmfies, inasmuch as sleep characterized byl the absence of the knowledge L

of Reality is the common feature of those mental modifications which are associated with (waking, that is) perception2 (of gross objects) and (dream. that is the) non-perception3 (of gross objects). Or4 the object of the mtroduction of the adjectival clause may be to distinguish the state of deep sleep (of the sleeping person) from the two previons states as sleep "characterized by the absence of knowledge of Realty Is the common feature of the three states. 'Wherein,' that is.to say, in which state or time, the sleeping person does not sce any dream, nor does he desire any desirable (object). For, in the state of deep sleep, there does not exist, as in the two other states, any desire or the dream experience whose characteristic is to take a thing for what it is not. He is called the 'Sushuplasthana' because his sphere is this state of deep sleep. Similarly it is called Ekibhuta, i.e., the state in which all experiences become unified-a state mn which all objects of duality, which are nothing but forms5 of thought, spread over the two states (nit., the waking and the dream), reach the statee of indis- orimmation without losing then characteristics, as the day, revealing phenomenal objects, is enveloped by the darkness of night. Therefore conscious experiences, which are nothing but forms of thought, perceived during dream and waking states, become a thick mass (of consciousness) as7 it were (in deep sleep), this state of deep sleep is called the ' Prajnanaghana' (a

.

AIANDOKYOP INISHAD 25

mass of all consciousness unified) on account of the absene of all manifoldness (discrimmation of variety). As at nght, owing to the indisermination produced by darkness, all (percepis) become a mass (of darkness) as it were, so also in the state of deep sleep all (objects) of consciousness, verily, become a mass (of conscious- uess). The word 'era' (verilv') in the text denotes the absences of any other thing except consciousness (in deep sleep). (At the time of deep sleep) the mind is free from the miseries" of the efforts made on account » of the states of the mind being involved in the rcla- tionship of subject and object . therefore, itais called the Anandumaya, that is, endowed with an abundance of bhss But this is not Bhss Itself; because it10 is not Bhss Infimte As m common (experience) parlanee, onc, free from efforts, is called happy and enjoyer of bhss As the Pragnall enjoys this state of deep sleep which is entirely free from all efforts, there- fore it is called the 'Anandabhuk' (the experiencer of bhss). The Sruft also says, "This is its highest bhss." It is called the 'Cetomukha' because it is the doorwayI2 to the (cognition) of the two other states of conscious- ness known as dream and waking. Or because the Ceta (the perceiving entity) characterized13 by (empiri- cal) consciousness (Bodha) is its doorway leading to the experience of dreams, ete, therefore it is called the 'Cet ukha.' It is called Pragna as it is conscious of the y'st and the future as well as of all objects. It is caued the Prajna, the knower par tacellence, even in deep sleep, because14 of its having been so in :

26 WANDUKYOPANISI ID

the two previous states. Or it is called the Pramna because its peculiar feature is consciousness15 un- differentiated. In the two other states consciousness exists, no doubt, but it is (there) aware of (the experiences of) variety. The Prajna, thus described, is the third quarter.

L By, etc -- The mere absence of destre or objects associated with waking oi dream states is no characteustie of the Highest Know- ledge, for, deep yleep, swoon, ete, are charactorized by such - absence. Therefore the Knowledge of Realty is true Jnanam 2 Perrephon-In the waking state one is aware of the mental modifications wInch are known as the perception of gross physical objeety. 3 Non percephon-Dream expenence is here designated as "non-perception", as it is distanrt from tho perception ot groys objects of the waking state. In the dream atate the objects of perception, which are also modifications of the mmd. are but tho subtle impressions left by the objeets of the waking state That the dream objeets are such can only be known from the experienec of the waking state 4 01-The commentator gives two meanings of the first sen- tence of the text The first meaning lays emphasis on "yatra", i.e., wherein, hecausc we are dealing here with the three states. The natural meaning of the text is that after describing the states of waking and dream the Srute proceeds to describo the state of Sushupti or deep sfeep which is said to be distinguished from the two other states in not having desire, ete , the common feature of the other two states And such a distmetion has to be made because all the three states have the common feature of the absence of knowledge of Realty The second meaning emphasizes the word "supla" and explains it thus in this connection Jagrat, Suapna and Sushuph are the three states which hars tor ther perceiver one who experiences the three states Though the per- ceiver of the three stater has three different appellations yet the word "supta" is used as the common term for them by Sruti in a ppecial sense, to denote the absence of knowledge of Reality.

MANDUKYOPANISHAD .27

Therefore, in this sense, though the word "supta" means the same as the experiencer in the state of Jagut and Swapna, yet it s* differentiated from the latter by the adjeetiral phrase, "Whercin the sleeper does not see, ete " 5 Forms of thovght-Mental or thought forms arise in Atman, which constitute external and internal objects. State of indiscriminahon -This is known in the empirical language as the causal state. Ono viewing sushupti from the waking state takes it to be the cauyal state because he finds that the experionces of jam at and swapna merge m sushuptt. The mind moving within the sphere of causalty further takes sushupti to be the cause of the waking and the dream states, believing the former to be antecedont to the Jatter. 7 As it were-As suggested in tho previous noto sushupti 1s deagnated as the state of canval umty because the waking man looks npon it as the cause of waking and dream experiences But even sushupts is also a mritti or an idea of the waking man, which arises in his mind on account of his seeking for a cause of the waking and dream experiences. Therefore the unaty experiencod in sushupti as understood by the wakeful man is not the unity of Brahmajnana- otherwise the re-appearance of multiphcity as roal in the waking state would not be possible 8 Absence, etc -The state of sushuptt is characterized by the absence of objeets which one perceives in the waking or dreaming state 9 Mhseres of the efforts-The perceiver i the agrat and swapna states who always experences subject-object ielationsbip, finds its absonce in sushupti 10 Jt is not, etc -The sushupts is not the state of Bhas Infinite becausc the perceiver from the waking standpomt associates deep sleep with tho Upadh of the idea of the causal state 11 Prajna-The experiencer of sushupti That the Prama, in deep sleep, enjoys bhiss is viewed from the waking state 12 Doorway-Sushupti is the doorway because it leads to the experence of the waling and drenm states The state of unifiod existence of sushupti, wherein all divorsities chsappenr, is the in- varable anteeedent of the waking and dream experiences Henec it is looked upon as the eause of the two ot her states

28 MANDOXYOPANISIAD

18 Chmacterazed, elc -It is because the consciousness. present ' m sushupti, is a necegsary condition for becoming awaie of the states of jagrat and awapna. No oxperience is possible without consciousness. 14 Because, etc .- Though there are no specifie states of conscious- ness m sushuptt still it is known as Prajna or the knower par ercellence because all previous states of consciousness experienced in jam at and swapa are the same as that of sushupti. 18 Consciousness, etc .- This consciousness, which exists Prajna m deep sleep appears as particniar (faarg) states of consciousness in jagrat and srapna

VI.

एप सर्वेश्वर एष सर्वज्ञ एषोऽन्तर्याम्येष योनि: सर्वेस्य प्रभवाप्ययौ हि भूतानाम् ॥६।। This is the Lord of all; this is the knower of all; this is the controller within; this is the source of all ; and this is that from which all things originate and in which they finally disappear. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. This in its patural1 state, is the Lord (Iswara) of all. . All, that is to say, of the entire physical and super-physical universe. He (Iswara) is not something ". separate from the universe as others2 hold. The Śruti also saya, "O good one, Prāna (Pragna or Iswara) is that in which the mind is bound " He is omniscient because he is the knowers of all beings in their different conditions. He is the Antaryamin, that is, he alone - entering into all, drects everything from within.

MANDOKYOP ANISI 1D 29

Therefera Ho is called the origin of all because from ' him proceeds the universe characterized by diversity, as describad before. It being so, He is verily that from which all things proceed and in which all diy- appear. 1 Nillarrl state-Prajna is the natural state because m deep sleep ay divermties of waking and dream states merge. This stato, heing free from the conditions of the waking and dream states, mani- feste fa gararked degree Pure Consciousness. Others-The Naryaylas and others admit an extra-cosmic creafor:Shokara has refuted this theory in the commentary on Vedania' Hutra (2-2-37) When sceking for tho canses unjodtse; Yedanta posits Prajna as' ther material as effipiemt ruase of the umver.e. 3 Knowe-The Ltman is the witness of the thed ét, present and futuie, Knowledge of the thres the cemmon knower of all Here commence Gandapada in explana- tion of the Mandukya wy GAUT Regarding tbid hese Slokas.

OMMENTARY. che foregoing (taxts) there are

akes up the precetling six texts of the Ud is upon them as follows - बहिष्प्रज्ञो विभुविश्वो ह्यन्तःप्रज्ञस्तु तेज़स घनप्रज्ञस्तथा ग्राज्ञ एक एव त्रिधा स्मृत

Viswa (the first quarler) is he pre pervading ho experiences the external (gro, Taiinsa

30 MANDŪKYOP INISIAD

(the second quarter) is he who cognizes the (the sublle) objects. Prajna is he who is a mass rous- ness. It is one alone, who is thus known states. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

' The implication of the passage is hat Atman is (as witness) distict from the t tes (witnossed) and that he is purel and un IS astablshed by his movig in three states, in3 n, and also on account of the knowledge, "I resulting from thee rience which unites h membry. The Sna corroborates it by tratiansof the, gre atc.

1 Pure-The fieas of pur krity, weal and wo and pain, ete., are the chara the statos and d any way, pertain to Atnay w the wilneas of sdates The Jina or the refleete hess, whinb is with Atman, falsely identinien hims sstates and himself to be impure, miserable, etcn aver-puro. 2 Umelated-No relation of any ki at of c8 exists between the three states and Afnah That Atman is unrelated is further known alone

experiences of the waking state do noth in in the dream state, nor those of the dreanr ts of deep sleep duccession-Though it appears that dItman idontifie with enc of the thiee states for the time being, yet the fat he mores from ene state to another without being affect * that fir is only the witness of the three atates 4 Unids dn-From the standpomt of common experien find a relatonship between past, present and future. This to the unifying power of memory Even this rolationship be expenenees i poserbte only if an dtman is posited as the witna

MANDOKYOPANISIID 31

Illustation, etc .- This is taken fom the Brhd Up As a power -. ful fish swims from one bank to another unimpeded by the curient+ of the uvev, so also .Iman moves mn the three statey totally un- affected by them As no characteristies of the banks, good or bad, affect the fiyh, so also no expenences of the three states affect the pure natmie of .Itman Another ilustiation is that of the bird, wh'eh fies unobstrueted in the aky and unattached to the surround- ing lands KARIKA

दक्षिणाक्षिमुखे विश्वो मनस्यन्तस्तु तेजसः। आकाशे च हृदि प्राज्ञस्त्िया देहे व्यवस्थितः ॥२॥/

2 Viswa is he who cognizes in the night eyr, Taijasa is he iho cogmices in the mind within and Prajna is ke who constitutes the Akasa in the heart Thus the one Atman is (pereeired as) threefold an the (one) body SANKARA'S COMMENTARY,

This verse is itended to show that the threefold. experience of Vaśwo, etc. (Taijasa and Prajna) is realised in the wakig1 state alone Dakshinakshi: The means of perception (of gross objects) is the right eyc. The presence of Viswa, the cognizer of gross objects, is chiefly felt there. The Sruti also says, -The person that is in the right eye is known as Indha-the Luminous One" (Brhd. Up.). Indha, which means the effulgent one, who is the Vaiswanara and also known as the Virat Atman (the totality of gross bodies), the percerver in the sun, is the same2 as the perceiver in the eye. (Objection)-The Hiranyagarbha is distinct from . the knower of the body (Kshetra) who is the cognizer,

32 MANDŪK YOPANISHAD

'the controller of the right eye, who is also the general experiencer and who is the Lord of the body. (Reply)-No, for, in realty, such a distinction 1s3 not admitted. The Sruti says, "One effulgent being alone is hidden in all beings." The Smrihi also says : "Me do thou also know, O Arjuna, to be the Kshetsana (the knower of the body) in all Kshetas (bodies)" (Gita, 13. 2). "Indivisible, yet it exists as if divided „ mn beings" (Gītā, 13. 16). Though the presence of Viswa is equally felt mn all sense-organs without distmction yet the nght eye is particularly singled4 out (as the chief instrument for its perception), becnuse he (Vaśwa) makes a greater use of the right eye in perceiving objects. (The right eye is made here to represent all the sense-organs.) The one, who has his abode in the night eye, having perceived (external) forms, closes the eye; and then recollecting them within the mind seest the very same (external objects) as in a dream, as the manifestation of the (subtle) impressions (of memory). Ass is the case here (waking), so also is the case with dream. Therefore, Taijasa, the perceiver in the mind within, is verily the same as Vrswa. With the cessation of the activity known as memory,? the perceiver (in the waking and dream states) is unified8 with Pragna in the Akasa of the heart and becomes verily a massI0 of consciousness, because there is, then, a cessation of mental. activities. Both perception and memory are forms of thought, in the absence of which the seer remains indistinguishably11 in the form of Prana in

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 33

the heart alone. For, the Sruty2 also says, "Prana " alone withdraws all these within " Taijasa is identical13 with Hiranyagarbha on account of its existence being realised m mind. Mind is the characteristie indica- tion14 (of both). This is supported by such seriptural passages as "This Purusha (Irranyagarbha) is all mind," etc. (Objection)-The Prana (vital breath) of a deep sleeper is manifested 15 The sense-organs (at the time of deep sleep) are merged in it. How, then, can it (Piana) be said to be unmanifested ? (Replv)- This is no mistake, for the unmanifested10 (Aryakrita) 18 charactensed by the absence (of the knowledge) of time and space. Though Prana, in the case of a person who identifies himself with (particular) Piana, appears to be manifested (during the time of waking and dream), yet even m the case of those who (thus) identity themselves with indivi- dualized Prana, the Prana, during deep sleep, loses (such) particular identification, which is due to its limitation by the body, and is verily the same as the unmanifested. As mn the case of those who identify themselves with individualzed Pranas, the Prana, at17 the time of death, ceases to be the mamfested, so also in the case of those who think of themselves as identified with the individuahzed Pranas, the Prana attams to the condition like the unmanifested, in the state of deep sleep. This Prdna (of deep aleep) further contains the seed (cause) of (future) creation18 (as is the case with the dvyakrita). " The cognizer of the

34 VANDOA YOP ANISH.17)

two states-deep sleep and Avyakrita-is also onel@ (ms., the Pnre Conscionsness). It (one in deep sleep) is identical20 with the (apparently) different cognizers identifymg themselves with the conditioned (in the states of waking and dream), and therefore such attri- butes as "unified," "mass of all consciousness," ete., as desembed above, are reasonably applicable to it (one in deep sleep). Other21 reason, already stated, supports it How does, indeed, the word Prana2 apply to the Aryalita (unmanifested) ? It is supported by the Srati passage, "Oh. good one, the mind is tied to the Prana." (Objection)-In that Sruti passage, the word Prana indicates Sat (Existence), ir, the Brahman, (not the duyakruta) which is the subject-matter under discussion, as the text commences with the passage, "All this was Sut in the beginning." (Reply)-This is no mistake, for (in that passago) the Sat is admitted to be that which contains within it the seed3 or cause (of creation). Though Sal, i.c., Brahman, is mdicated in that passage by the word 'Piana', yet the Bramman that is indicated by the words Sat and Prang (mn that connection) is not the one who is free from its attribute of being the seed or cause that creates alla4 beings. For if in that Śrutr passage, Brahman, devoid of the causal relation (i.e., the Absolute) were sought to be described, then the Sruti would have used such expressions as "Not this, Not this", "Wherefrom speech turns back", "That " is something other than both the known and the un-

MINDOKYOPANISIIAD 35

known", ete The Smritt also deelares. . It is neither. Sat (cxistence) nor dsat (non-existence)" (Gita). If bv the text were meant the (Absolute) devoid of cansal relation then the coming back, to the relative plane of consciousness, of those who were m deep sleep and unified with Sat at the time of Pralaya (cosmic dissolu- tion), could25 not happen. Further. (m that case) the hberated souls would again come baek to the relative plane of consciousness ; for, the absence of seed or rause (capable of giving birth to the world of names and forms) wonld be the common2f feature of both. Further, mn the absence of the scerl#7 (cause, t.e. at the time of Sushupt and Prulaya) which can be destroyed by Kuowledge (alone). Knowledge itself becomes iutile. Therefore the word Sut (the text of the Chhandogyu Upanishad, the passage under diseussion) in that aspeet in which causality is attrbuted to it, is mdicated hy Prana, and accordingly has been described in all the Srulis as the cause.28 It is for this reason also that the Absolute Brahman, dissociated from its causal attribute, has been indicated in such Srult passages as "It is beyond the unmanifested which is higher than the manifested", "He is causeless and is the substra- tum of the external (effect) and the internal (cause)", "Wherefrom words come back .. ", 'Not this, not this", ete. That which is designated as Prajna. (when it is viewed as the cause of the phenomenal world) will be described as Turiya separately when it is not viewed as the cause, and when it is free from all phenomenal relationship (such as that of tha body, ete.) t.e., mn its ~

36 MĀNDUKYOPANISHAD

, absolutely Real aspect. The causal condition is also verily expemenced in this body from sach29 cognition of the man who is awakened from the deep sleep, as "I did not know anything (at the time of deep sleep)". Therefore it is said that (one) Atman is perceived as threefolda0 in the (one) body.

1. Wabing state ulone -- From the ordmary empirieal standpomt, Fiswa, Taijam and Piajna are generally relatod to three states, us , waking, dream aud deep sleop But the three states are com- prehended from the standpomt of the waking state alone. That droam and deep sleep are twostates, having diffetent charaeteristies, is known i the waking state alone. Therefore these two becomo known to the waking conveiousness. Besides jagrat (waking), in so far as it denotes the ahsence of the knowledge of Realty, oovels the dream and sleep states as well The thee apparent cognisets known As Viswn, Taijasa and Piajna are reallv one, hecauve a pluralty of perceivers in the same state, namely, the waking, and in the same body is an ahsurdity, as that would preolude the possi- bilty of the continuity of perception as revealed through memory. Therefore the apparently three rhffeient porecivers are identioal and then apparent distinetion is due to thei identifioation with the three states 2 Same-It is hecause, as already shown, the Adhidawa is identical with Adhyatma. r 3 Is not admited-The difference is only imaginary and empirieal and due to the ident.fication with different hodies. Really spoaking, ono Atman alone manifests itself in different forms, mierocosmie or macrooosmic. W 4 Singled out-This assettion is based upon seriptural authonty. In actual experience also one finds that the right oye is more efficient in the perception of objects than the left one 5 Nees, ete -Viswa, the perceiver of gross objects becomes Taijusa when he closes the eyes and thinhs within his mind about the gross ohjects C'ognisers of dream and idens (in the waking state) are identical. Both, tiz., ideas and droam objects, possess, for the time being, the same characteritios.

MANDOA YOPANISHAD 37

6 s. etc -There is no differenee whatever between the dream state and the state of imagmation mn the waking In hoth the states, the perceiver cognizes the impressions of gross physical objects experienced in the preceding states The ouly difference between the states of dream and imagination (in the waking state) i9 that dream represents a whole state whereas the refleetion repro- sents the pait of a sfate, 7 Memory-Memory is also a form of mental aetivity implying subjeet-objoct relatienslup. The impres ions of gross external oljeets perecived in the waking state manifest themselves m the forms of memoty and dream S Umified-That N, this state i- characterised by the abyenoe of subjeet-object ielationship Becomes verdly, ete .- Wheuevet in the waking state the mind ceases to be active, i e., whenever ideas chsappear from it, the state 1s saul to be Sushuph Even memory does not tunction thon Tus state is ieutieal with deep sleep, when subjeot-object rolation- ship 19 absent This state is postted from the actual experience of the change from a state which was wthout the dnal relationship of subjcot aud objeet The expenence of the three states and the transition from the one to the other proves that there is only one perceiver who is the witness of the three states and their suceession. 10 Mass of, ete .- That is, there is no partieular cognition in that state. 11 Imdistinguishably-ir, m unmamfested form. 12 Sruti-See Brhd. Tp. 13 Identcal-That Viswa and Vuat as well as Prama (deep sleep) and Iswara (unmanifested) are identical, has been already shown Now it is pointed out that IIranyugarbha is identical with Tajasa. Huanyagarbha and Tagasa are only what are termed as the cosmie mind and the individuat mind respectively. Really speaking, macrocosm and mictocosm, both heing mere forms of thought, are identioal Therefore the pereervor.' Huanyagarbha and Tayasa are ilentcal hecause they are also mere forms of thought. Their difterent appellations are due to their identification with different Upadhis (adjunets) namely, the thought of cnacrocosm and microcosm. 14 Indwation-Both are formed of the same stuft or the mind.

38 MANDOKYOPANISHAD

15 Munifested-The manifestation of the activities of the Prana f of a deop sleeper is witnessed by on-lookers. 10 Unmanifested-The charactenstics of mamfestedness and unmanitestedness of Piana aie predicated of it from the siandpomt of waking and sleep states respcotively 17 At the time of death-This illustration is given on the hasis of the serptural authority Comp. Brhd Up., 44.2. 18 Cenhon-Both the states of Avyalnta and deep sleep (bere called Prana) are followed by a state in which names and forms are mamfest On account of the identity of effects, the causes are also saul to be identical 19 One-The identity of deep sleep and Aryalrita is turthor demonstrated from the identity of then common cognizer, rr, Pure ('onsciousness 20 Idential-The moaning is that the peteeiver of the three states 19 one and the same 21 Othn, efr -nz, the idenuty ot Adhyatma and dhidmra. 22 Prana-The contention of the objeetor is that the oidinary meanng of Piana is vital breath having five aspools, 112 , Piana, Apana, Samanu, Tyana and Udana 23 Seed-That ws, the Saguna Brahman 24 All, etc .- Both ammate and mamimate 25 Conld not, etc .- Tor, after the reahsation of tho Absolufe Biahman retarn to the plane of ignorance is not possible. But the person who goes mto the Sushuph or the doyal rita state withoat attaming Jnanam again ietuins to the plane of ignorance It 14 the Knowledge of Btahman alone whieh is the conchition of liboration but rot mero absence of duality unthout kwowledye, whieh ean be experienced m deep aleep, swoon or trance 20 Common feature-If Existence tree from causal relation, i e , the Absolute Brahman, be the meaning of Sat in the seriptural passage under dison-sion, then the reverting of the deep sleeper, who has not yet attained to Jnanam, to the dual plane of consciousness would not be posuble. And it a person. after reahsing the Absolute Brahman, i8 to come back to the state of dualty, then Jnanam or hberation would be impermanent The meaming is tlus. At the time of Pralaya when thenereated beings become uinfied with Sat

MINDŪKYOPANISHAD 39

ot Ixistonce they do not become really the Hosolute Bahman, They ' remain only in a seed or potential condition and theiefore they re-appear at the time of creation. Simlarly, an ignorant person who goes into deep sleep retams in a latent foim, all his previous imptessions of dualty and gets them haek after coming down from the state of Sushuph. But a Jnani, onee reahsing his idontity with Absolie Brahman, never comes baek to the sense (of the reality) of tlual existence 27 NSeed-The enusal standpomt compuves talse apprehension and non-apprehension as wel as then efleets The Naryaml as affim ths causal standpoint, populaily known ay the cosmic ignorance, to be a Padartha ot idependent category whioh arises in the absence of the contnet of the sense-organ with its object Therefore .fnanam, acemiding to them, is a negation or .Ibham. Bul according to Vedanta, .1manam i not purely a negation (cha- racteriing the dcarina aspeet), but a negation continued with an affirmation or creation (Vilskepa aspeet). It is not an mdepend- ent categiry but dependent upon present conseiousnew and com- prohended by it Thi ignoranee i destroyed by the knowledge of truth. 29 Canse-It 1s because a causal explanation is necessor 29 Such coynthion-The expouence ot the absence ot knowledge in Sashupt is posible only for a man who is awakened from deop sleep From the pereeption in the waking state of a change mvolving names and forms, he thinks of the previous state of deep sleep as devoid of them. Theiefore tho knowledge of deep sleep is possiblo only in the waking state Ths shows thet Sushuph is knowable only in Jagrut consciousness 30 As thirefold-The meaning is this That the Itman i the witness of the threc states i known fom the perception of the change of one state into another. The dtman is the witness not only of the three states but also of their coguizels, mis., Trswa, Tayasa and Prana. In this hody and m the Jagat state alone, the three- states as well as then cognizors aie percerved

विश्वो हि स्थूलमुड्नित्यं तैजस: प्रविविक्तमुक। आनन्दभुक्तथा प्राज्ञस्त्रिधा भोग निबोधत ॥ ३॥

40 MANDOKYOPANISUAD

3. Viśwa always experinces the gross (obeet), Taijasa the subtle and Prajna the bhssful Know these to be the threrfold experienees. स्थूलं तर्पयते विश्वं प्रतिबिक्तं तु तैजसम्। आनन्दूश्च तथा प्राझं त्रिधा तृप्तिं निबोधत ॥ ४॥ 4. The gross (object) salisfies Viswa, the subtle the Tanasa and the blissful the Pramna. Know these to be the threefold satisfaction. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY Verses 3 and 4 have already been explained. त्रिपु धामसु यद्धोज्यं भोक्ता यक्ष प्रकीर्तितः । वदैतदुभयं यस्तु स भुञ्जानो न लिप्यते ॥५॥ 5. He who knows both the expericneer and the obgects of esperience that hare been desoribed '(to be associated) with the three stares, is not affected though cpemeneing the objects (thereof). v SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. In the three states, namely, waking, ete the one1 and the same object of experience appears in threefold forms as the gross, the subtle and the blssful. Further. the experiencer (of the three states) known (differently) as Viswa, Taijasa and Prajna has been described as one on account of the unity2 of consciousness implied in such3 cognition as Iam that' (common to all conditions), as well as from the absence* of any distinetion in res- pect of the perceiver. He who knows the two (experi- encer and the objects of experience), appearing as many

MANDUKYOPANISH1D 41

in the form of subject and objects of experionce, though enjoying them, is5 not affected thereby , because" all objects (of experience) are experenced hy one subject alone. As (the heat of the) fire7 does not increase or decrease by consuming wood, etc., so also nothings is added to or taken away (from the knowingness or awareness of the .Itman) by its experience of that which is its object 1 One and the same, etc .- It is because the experiences of the threc states are only the different forms of thought or ideas Unity of, etc-That the experiencer of tho three states is one and identical is also percerved in the waking consciousness. 3 Such cognition, etr -This cogmtion takes the following form I, who now have been percerving objeets in the waking state, had seen forms (ideas) in dream and experienced nothing in deep sleep 4 Absence, etc .- There 19 nothing to suggest that the expeuencers of the three states are different. 5 Ta not, etc -He who knows that the three states are one and that their perceivers are also one, is not affeeted hy the experiences of the states, nor does be identify himself with the (apparently separate) peroeivers thereof. He is not aftected becnuse he clearly pereeives that objeots which appeared as real in the waking and dream states dsappear agam in the deep sleep. Therefore he 19 convinced of the unreality of dream and waking ex- petiences. As a witness, he views unaffected the oropping up of these ideas of expeuenee (in dream and waking) and also therr disappearance (mn Sushuptt). G Becausc-t.e., it is becnuse one Atman in three foums alternate- ly pereeives the emetgence and disappearance of the experiencer and all objects of experience Hence ho knows them to be unreal, 7 Does not, etc,-The principle of heat remains the same irres- peetive of the quantity ot wood it consumes. 8 Nothing, etc -The Selt or .Tman, when it knows that it 14 the witness of the thee states, is not subjeci to any modification by the experience of the objeois thereof. Because he knows these

42 MANDOKYOPANISH1D

objects (mnelnding ther perceivers) as mere #a: t9raa or his own thoughts, and hence unreal An imagmary tiger or the one seen in dream cannot harm its pereoiver प्रभव: सर्वभावानां सतामिति विनिश्चयः । सर्व जनयति प्राणश्चेतोंशन्पुरुषः पृथक्॥ ६॥ 6 Il is thoroughly estableshed that the coming into effeot can be predicaled only of all posrtroe intines that erist The Prana manifests all : the Purusha ereates the conscious beings (the hivas) in therr munifold form separately. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

The manifestation can be predicated of positive? entities comprebended as the different forms of Viswa, Tajasa and Prajna-whese existence, of the nature of illusory names and forms caused by an mnate Avidya (ignorance), cannot be denied. This is thus explamed later on "Neither in reality nor in illusion can the son of a barren woman be said to be born."' For, if things could come out of non-entity, Brahman whose evistence is inferred from experience2 will itself be rendered a non-entity because of the absence of means of compre- hension. That the snake (in the rope) appearing as such on account of an illusory cause (Maya) which itself is the, effect of ignorance (Amdya), pre-exists in the form of the rope is a matter of common experience. For by no one is the illusion of the rope-snake or the mirage, etc., ever perceived without a substratum. As before the illusory3 appearance of the snake, its existence was certainly there in the rope, so also all4

MĀNDUKYOPANISHAD 43

positive entities before their manifestation certainly exist m the form of a cause, r.e., Prana. The Srutt also declaies this in such passages as: "All this (the phenomenal universe) was verily Brahman at the beginning" and "All this oxisted, at the heginning as Atman." Prang manifests all As the rays proceed from the sun, so also all different centres of conscious- ness (1.e., the Jwras) which are hke the (many) reflections of the same sun m the water and which are mamfested differently as Viswa, Taijasa and Prajna, comprising various physical forms of gods, animals, etc., proceed from the Purushas The Purusha manifests all these entities called as hving beings, which are different from manimate objects, but of the same nature as itself (Purusha), like fire and its sparks and like the sun with its ieflections in water. Prana, the causal self, mamfests all other entities like the spider producig the web There are such scriptural passages in its support as, "The sparks from the fire, etc." 1 Posatire, elc .- Karkas from 6 to 9 give different views of the manifestation The Kanka under discussion pomts out that the manfested universe is not non-existent like the son of a barren woman, It has an empmical existence. The object of this is only to show that no causal relation can be predicated of Brahman as Prajna unless we admit the positive existence of the world. The detailed discussion about causality will be found in the body of the Kārıkā. 2 Wall itself-Those who depend upon causality to prove the exitence of Brahman cannot but beleve in the existence of the manfested objects through which alone they mfer Brahman as the cause of all. 3 Ilusory-Vedanta makes a distinction between Audya. and Maya, from the causal standpoint Maya is associated with Jswara

44 MANDOKYOPINISIAD

and it presents the vatiety in the umverse. Comp Vedanta Subia, L 1.4.3 and 2.1 14. 4 AU-It means here only the mammaie objects as the mani- festation of the mammate is ascribed to the Purusha. 5 Pwusha-It is mdicated hy the text as well as the commentary that there are two mamfestors, namely, the Purusha and the Prana The Purusha manifests the Jvas and Prana the inanimate objects. From the empirical standpomt we see two kinds of manifestations. ne, the sentiont andl the insentient. Theretore we naturally ascube theye to two manifestors, vi., Purusha and Prana (The general prmciple of causalty is that the like prodnces the hko.) Bat, in renlty, Piang is identioal with Purusha. Brahman is looked upon as the manifestor of the universe; when he manifests the insentient objeots he is said to be Prana, aud when he manifests the sentient beings he is called Piusha

विभूति प्रसवं त्वन्ये मन्यन्ते सृष्टिचिन्तकाः । स्वममायासरूपेति सृष्टिरन्यैर्विकल्पिता ।।७।।

7. Those who think of (the process of) creation believe at to be the manifestation of the superhuman power of God; while others look upon it as of the same nature as dream and illusion

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

Creation is the manifestation of the superhuman power of God1; thus think those who reflect on (the process of) creation. But2 those who intently think3 of the Ultimate Reality find no interest in (the theory of) creation.' It (that no mterest should be attached to the act of creation) is also supported by such Sruti passages as, "Indra (the great god) assumed diverse forms through Maya". The juggler throws the thread up in the sky, climbsr by it with his arms, disappears

45

from the sight (of the spectators), engages himself in a fight (in the sky)in which his limbs, having been severed, fall to the ground and he rises up again. The on-looker, though witnessing the performance, does not evince any interest in the thought in regard to the reality of the jugglery performed bv the juggler. Siilarly there is a real juggler who is other than the rope and the one that climbs np the rope. The manifestation of deep sleep, dream and wakmg is analogous to the throwing up of the rope by the juggler (in the above illustiation) and the (empirical selves known as) Prajna, Viśwa and Taijasu, related to the three states, are similar to the juggler, who appears to have climbed up the rope. As he, the juggler, remams on the ground unseen (by the on-lookers) having veiled himselt, as it were, by his illnsion, so also is the truth about the Highest Reabty known as Turya.$ Therefore those 1 noble souls seeking Moksha evince iterest in the contemplation of this (the Tunya) but not in the crea- tion which is futile The word, 'Scapnamagasa- rupa'-meaning, alike dream and illusion -- is intended to show that alle these (false) notions (regarding manı- festation) belong only to those who imagine the proeess of creation or mamfestation. 1 God-He 19 naturally the Personal God This is the theietio theory of creation 2 But -The seekers after God as creator may be either those who hold that creation is real or those who hold that orention is illusocy Tn the latter case Sankara compares the seckers after truth to those who are interested mn the magioian and not in the magioal feats

46 MANDŪKYOPANISIIAD

3 Intently thint-he, still purainng the law of causation. Those who uphold the Maya theory of the world see the illusion and infor Turiya as tho Transcendental Cause. 4 uriyu-The text contemplates two alternative theories of oreation (afe) namely, (1) creation is real in so far as it is mere manifestation of God's real power, (n) creation being mamfested as an illusion by God (सवप्रमाया). Both the alternative theories lay omphasis on the act of creation and this is pomted out by Sankara mn his commentary Sankara indicates in Ins commentary that those who seok the Inighest Reahty (qTAT4) aie not interested m any theory of creation 5 Futile-The truth about the Highest Realty can be realised only by the highest Knowledge and not by any thought bestowed apon creftion. 6 All thew, etc .- Because Maya is also admitted to bo a fact by the Mayacadins, their theory does not also convoy the highost truth.

इच्छामात्रं प्रभो: सृष्टिरिति सृष्टो विनिश्चिताः । कालात्प्रसूति भूतानां मन्यन्ते कालचिन्तकाः ॥८।।

8. Those who affirm (the emrstence of the) manifested objects attribute this manifestation to the mere will of God, while those who look upon time as real declare time to be the manifestor of all berngs

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

The manifestation proceeds from the mere will of God because His will in reality cannot1 but achieve its purpose. Such objects as pot, ete, are but2 the (manifestation of the) will (of the potter). They can never be anything external or unrelated to such will. Some say manifestation proceeds from time.

MAN DOKYOP NISHAD 47

1 Cannof. elc -It is because they look upon the world as real, therefore they affirm that God whose will manifests the world cannot hut be ieal 2 But-The potter, first of all, conccives in lus mind the name and form of the oljeet and then creates it भोगार्थ सृष्टिरित्यन्ये क्रीडार्थमिति चापरे। देवस्यैष स्वमावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा ॥ ९॥ 9. Others think that the manifestalion is for the purpose of enoyment (of God) while still others attribute it to mere dwersion (on the part of God). But it is the rery nature of the Effulgent Berng (Atman) (for). what other desire is possible for Him whose desne is always in the state of fulfilment ?

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY Others thmk that the purpose of manifestation is only the enjoyment (by God of the objeets so created), . that creation is merelv a diversion of God These two theories are refuted (by the author) by the single asser- tion that it is the veryl nature of the Effulgent (Brahman) Thus taking this standpoint (the nature of (the Effulgent Being) alla the theories (of ereation) herein (stated) aie refuted3 for the reason mdicated by : "What could be . je desire for manifestation on the part of Brahman whose desires are ever m a state of fulfilment ?'' For the rope, ete., to appear as snake, no4 other reason can be assign? i than Aridya. 1 Very natue-According to Gaudarada, what others see as the cieated universe, is nothing but the very natute oressence of Brahman, Brahman alone exsts What others designate as the

48 MANDCKYOPANISHAD

unverse of names and forms-subject to birth, change, death, ete - is nothing but the non-dual Brahman. That one sees the world of dualty mstead of the non-dual Brahman and seeks its cause is due to Avidyd or ignoiance 2 All, the, etc, -- The following theories of ctoation have been stater mn the preceding Slokas of the Karila, (i) Creation is the manifestation of the divine power of God(K.6) (u1) Croation is the manifestation of the nature of dream or illusion (K. 6) (nt) Creation is the mamfestation of the Divine Will which cannot but be fulfilled (K 7). (Iv) Creation is the manifestation which procceds fiom "time ". Ifwara is indifferent about it (K 7). The above fom theones of creaton may be classed as cosmo- logical. The following two theotes which may be designated as teleological are given m Kārıka 9 (v) Creation is for the purpose of the enjovment of God (vi) Cieation is an net of God's sport Now all these theories aie refuted by the sunple statement that Brahman, whose desies are always m a state of fulfilment, cannot oreate the world for any purpoye whatsoever No causal theory can explain the relation of the appearance of the world to Brahman. The assumption of will, desiro, enjoyment, diversion, etc., as the causes of crestion is due to Amdyn or ignorance of the human mind iegarding the real nature (आत्मकामत्व, आप्तकामत्व, ETH7T) of Brahman. It only reveals the ignoranco (HIT) of the human mind in regard to the origin of the world which is one of the ohjeets displaying God's superhuman powers. Those who look upon the net of creation as real and tl en explam it as of the same nature as dieam and illusion, forget t iat dream and illusion are, after all, unreal and hence thoy cann , explain the supposed reahty of the act of creation, Therefore, mamfestaton is not an act of creation. No uill ean be the causz of creation because a will imples an effort at gratfying son e unsatiated desire. Brahman Is Bliss (THIF) whioh means the absence of all wants Therefore the Divine Will cannot be the cause of the universe, The human mind, subfeet to Maye, asoribes will, diversion, eto , as the cause of erention. The aseriptioy is itself Maya. Therefore it stands to

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 49

reason that if anybody sees creation, it is only due to Māya. Thetefore all thooues regarding creation are mn faot HI, that is, due to the ignorance of the mind that sees it. Viewed from the relative standpomt this Mayd mheres either in Brahman or m the perceiver. Assigning a substratum for Maya denends upon one's standpomt. Viewed from the foiya standpoint Maya has its loeus in Brahman 3 Refuted, ete -The two theoues imphed by the first line of tho Karika are refuted smply becanse " emjoyment " and " diversion" cannot be proved to be the objeet ot cieation. Creation or mani- festation imphes some adventtious or extornal factor, which idea is refuted by the statement ot the Seripture that "It is the very nature of the Effulgent Biahman." 4 No other reason-Comp the Soriptural passage, STrEH: T. :- which means that it is the Atman that appears as Ilaia The appeaiance is due to Maya and no oxternal

SANKARA'S INTRODUCTION TO UPANISHAD The fourth' quarter which now comes in order (for explanation) has to be described. This is done mn the words of the text "Not conscious of the internal object." It (Turya) does not admit of description or mdication by means of words, for all uses (affirma- tive or negative) of language fail to express it There- fore Turiya is sought2 to he indicated by the negation. of all attributes (characteristics). (Objection)-Then it becomes mere void or Sunya. (Reply)-No,3 because it is impossible for false mnagmation to exist without4 a substratum. The illusion of silver, a snake, a man or mirage, ete., cannot be conceived as existing without the (corresponding) substiatum of the mother-of-pearl, rope, stump or desert, etc.

50 MANDOKYOP INISHAD

(Objection)-If that be the case, Turiya ought to bo indicatable by words and not by the negation of all attributes. For, it is the substratum of all imaginations such as, Prana, etc., mn the same way as jars, etc., which being the substratum of water, ete, are mdi- cated as such by words. (Reply)-The idea of Prana, etc., (supposcd to exist mn Turiys) is unreal like the false idea of silver, etc , in the mother-of-pearl, etc. A relation" between real and unreal cannot be expressed by words becanse such relation is, itself, non-existent. Turwa cannot be the objeet of any other mnstrument of knowledge (such as direct perception) like the cow, ete., because of its nnique nature, owing to the absence ol Upadhes. Atman cannot have anything like a generic property, hke the cow. ete., because it is devoid of all Upadhis or attributes , it has neither generic nor specific characteristies because it is one, without a second. It cannot be known by any activitv (proceeding from it) as m the case of a cook; because it is devoid of all actions It cannot be described by attributes such as blue, ete., because it is without any attribute. There- fore it follows that Turya cannot be mdicated by any name. (Objection)-Then it (Turya) would be like the "horns of a haie" and hence one's pursuit of it must be futile.6 (Reply)-No, the knowledge of Turiga as identical with Self (Atman) destroys the hankering after objects? which are non-self just as the knowledge of mother-of-

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 51

pearl (mistaken for silver) removes the desire for (illu- sory) silver. For, once the identity of Turiya and Sell is realised there is no possibility of one's being deludeds by ignorance, desire and the like misapprehen- sions (which are the effects of ignoranre) a'nd there is no reason for Turiya not being known as identical with the Self For all the Upanishads poit out to this end . only as is evident from the following "That thou art", ' This Atman is Brahman", "That is real and that is Jbnan", "The Brahman which is duertly and immediately cognized'', "He ishoth without and within, as well as causeless", "All this is verily dtmen", ete. This very Ahnan has been described as constituting the Highest Reality and its opposite9 and as having four quarters Its unreal (illusory) form has been described as due to ignorance, lke the illusion of snake in the rope, having for its characteristies the three quarters and being of the same nature as the seed10 and the sprout. Now is described (in the following Srutt) Turyu which is not of the nature of cause but which is of the nature of the Highest Reality corres- ponding to the rope-by negatmgl the three states, enumerated above, which correspond to the snake,12 ete. 1 Fowrth qumter-The " fourth" is not the fourth stute or condihon in which Atman is to be viewed. Turiye which is mdicnted here as the "fonrth " comes in only for conuideration after the three states have been conwdered Atmun itself does not admit of any condition or state Waking, dream and doep sleep aro its three states or quarters and Turya, as will be seen later on, is present in all those thior Turrya is designated here as the fourth because in the preceding texts, threequarters of Itman have been explained. It has oceupied the "fourth " place in respeet of explanations.

52 MANDOKYOPINISHAD

2 Sought to be, etc -It is because it cannot be direetly poited out like other objeets of perception. 3 No, etc .- The oontention of the opponent is this . You say that Turiya 3s not vord (शून्य) as the ilustou (विकल्प) of Prana, ete., cannot subgist without a suhstratum wluch is Turiya In that case Turiya is not non-indicatable as it can be indmnated as the substratum of Prang, ete. Therefore it must he quch as can be indieated But you say that it is arrived at by mere negation and thorefore non-indicatable by words. It Tawniya is indicatable as a substrafum, then it becomes indicatable bv that wheh is super- inposed upon it as is the oase with a pot which is indiontable by the water in it In that case you contradiot yomself as you have aheady sar that Brahman is unindicatable by any word To tlus our ieply i9 - We would hke to ask you if (i) your idea of indientabihty of Brahman as the yubstratum is that of illusory suporimpowtion, or (u1) is that of ieal superimposition. It cannof be thereby illusory superimpontion because the super- imposition, in that case, would not uppear as existing as it does From the standpoint of the empirical ieahty of the appearanoo whoh is experienced by the ignorant persons, we say that Turrya is indioatable by the illusory ideas that are superimposed upon it And if you admit the ideas (fa-5c4) ol Prana, ete., as unreal, then there is no disagieement between us Again this mdicatability of Turye as a substratum cannot be (due to) real superimposition or the superimposition of reahty For, as the idea of silver that is superimposed upon tho mother-of- pear' is unreal, so also the idea of Prana, ete , that is superimposed upon Furiya 's equally unreal. There cannot be any relationship between a real substratum and the anreal foim supemmposed on it Therefore the conclusion is that if one takes his stand upon the cansal or relative plane, then Turiya may be mdicated as a sub- stratum of the illusory ideas of Prana, etc. But from the stand- point of Truth, Twiye cannot he mdicated hy any word which imphes relationship. And Sruti also denies all relauonship m Brahman.

VINDOKYOPANISHD 53

4 Wathout, etc .- No illusion can he dissociated from the idea of existence The first impression that one gets of an illusion is that it exists and later on its existence is traced to a positive substratum. 5 Relation-Indicatabihty by words is possible in the following instances only. (1) Possessive case, (11) conventional meaning of a word, (i) generie or specific property, (iv) activity, (v) attribute and substance But none of these apphes io Turiya because it as one without a second and also it 19 without any attribute Hence Turya cannot be indicated by any word G Futile-It is because no benefit can acerue fiom the knowledge of somathing which is as unreal as the " mare's nest" 7 Objects -- Such as the illusory worldly objects to which the ignorant are attached. s Deluded-Delasion is the cause of all human misery. 9 Its opposde-t e , the illusory objeets. As a matter of fact, only Brahman existy and He is the One and All. Nothing called unreal ever exists What appears to the ignorant as unteat or illusory is also Brahman trom the bighest Adwaitic standpomt, Therefore Brahman comprises everything. 10 Seed and sprout-The three states are charactensed by the relation of cause and effect as the seed and the sprout are. 11 Vegutang, ete .- The stadent, at fir,t, by the process of nega- tion sepaiates Brahman fiom the superimposition and then realises that what has been negatedl as superimpostion is, mn faet, the very nature of Brahman This is the highest Adwaitic realsation 12 Anake, etc -The rope is often muistaken for a snake or a garland or a stick, or a streak of water oi a fisyure in the gronnd.

VII.

नान्त: प्रज्ञं न बहिप्प्रज्ञं नोभयतःप्रज्ञ न प्रज्ञानघनं न प्रज्ञं

नाप्रज्ञम्। अदृष्टमव्यवहार्यमग्राह्यमलक्षणमचिन्त्यमव्यपदेश्य- मेकात्मप्रत्ययसारं प्रपश्चोपशमं शान्तं शिवमह्वैतं चतुर्थ

मन्यन्ते स आत्मा स विज्ञेय:॥७ 4

54 MANDOKYOPANISHAD

Turiya is not that which is conscious of the internal (subjective) world, nor that which is conscious of the external (objective) world, nor that which is conscious of both, nor that which is a mass all sentiency, nor that which is simple consciousness, nor that which is insentient. (It is) unseen (by any sense organ), not related to anything, incomprehensible (by the mind), uninferable, unthinkable, indesmibable, essentially f of the nature of Consciousness constituting the Self alone, negation of all phenomena, the Peaceful, all Bliss and the Non-dual. This is what is known as the fourth (Turiya). This is the Atman and it has to be realised.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

(Objection)-The object was to describe Atman as having four quarters, By the very descriptions of the three quarters, the fourth is established as being other than the three characterised by the " consciou's of the subjective " ete Therefore the negation (of attributes relating to the three quarters) for the purpose of indicating Turiya imphed in the statement, "Turwya is that which is not conscious of the subjective " ete, is futile. (Replv)-No. As the nature of the rope isl real- ised by the negation of the (illusory) appearances of the snake, eto., so also it is intended to establish the very Self, which subsists in the three states, as Turrya.

MMANDOKYOPANISHID 55

This2 is done m the same way as (the great Vedic statement) " Thou art that". If Turya were, m fact, anything different3 from Jtma nu sbsistmg in the threc states, then, the teachings of the Seriptures would have no meaning on4 account of the absence of anv mstru- ment of knowledge (regardig Turye). Or, the other (mevitable) alternative would be to declare absolute mbilsm (a) to be the ultamate Truth. Lke the (same) rope mistaken as snake. garland, ete. when the same Atman is mistaken as Antahprana (conscious of the subjective) etc. m the three states associated with different characteristies, the knowledge, resulting from the negation of such attrbutes as the conscious of the subjective, etc., is the means of establishing the absolute absence of the unreal phenomena of the world(imagined) mn Atman. As a matter of fact, the two5 results, namely. the negation of (superimposed) attributes and the dis- appearance of the unreal phenomena happen at the same time. Therefore no additional6 instrument of knowledge or no other7 effort is to be made or sought after for the reahsation of Turiya With the cessation. of the idea of the snake. etc , in the rope, the real nature of the rope becomes revealed and this happens simultaneously with the knowledge of the distinction between the rope and the snake. But those who say that the know- ledge, in addtion to the removal of the darkness (that envelopes the jar), enabless one to know the jai, may as well affirme that the act of cutting (a tree),,in addi- tion to its undoing the relation of the members of the body mtended to be cut, also functions (in other ways)

56 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

in other parts of the body. As the act of cutting in- tended to divide the tree into two is said to he complete with the severanre of the parts (of the tree) so also the knowledge employed to perceive the jar covered by the darkness (that envelopes it) attains its purpose when it results in removing the darkness, though that is not the object intended to be produced. In such case the knowledge of the jar, which is mvariably10 con- nected with the removal of the darkness, is not the result accomplshed by the mstrument of knowledge Lukewise, the knowledge, which is (here) the same as that which results from the negation of predicates, directed towards the discrimmation of such attributes as "the conscious of the subjective ' etc., superimposed upon Atman, cannot1 function with regard io Turiya in addition to its act of negating of such attributes as "the conscious of the subjective " which is not the object intended to be produced. For, with the negation of the attributes such as conscious of the subjective, ete., is12 accomplished simultaneously the cessation of the distinction between the knower, the known and the knowledge Thus it will be said later on, "Dualty cantot exist when Gnosis, the highest Truth (non-duality), is reahsed." The knowledge cannot exist even for a moment immediately after the moment of the cessation of duality. If it should re- main, there would18 follow what is known as regressus ad infinitum, and consequently duality will never cease. Therefore it is established that the cessation of such unreal attributes as "conscious of the subjective" etc.>

MANDŪA YOPANISIIAD 57

superimposed upon Atman isH simultaneous with the manifestation of the Knowledge which, in itself, is the means (miamanu) tor the negation of dualty. By the statement that it (Turya) Is "not conscious of the subjective " is indicated that it 1s not "Taiasa". Similarly by the statement that it is "not conscious of the objective " it is denied that it (Turya) is Viswa. By saying that it is "not conscious of either ", it is denied that Turya is any mtermediate state between15 the wakmg and the dream states By the statement that Turiya is " not a mass all sentiency ", it is denied that it is the condition of deep sleep -- which is held to be a causal1e conditon on account of one's mahility to distinguish the truth fiom error (in deep sleep). By saying that it is "not simple consciousness", it is im- phed that Turwya cannot17 simultaneously cognize the entire world of consciousness (by a single act of con- sciousness). And lastly by the statement that it is "not unconsciousness ", it is implied that Turiya is not insentient or of the nature of matter. (Objection)-How,18 again, do such attributes as "conscious of the subjective," etc , which are (directly) perceived to subsist in Atman become non-existent only by an act of negation as the snake, ete (percerved) in the rope, ote., become non-existent (by means of an act of negation) ? (Reply)-Though19 the states (waking and dream) are really of the essence of consciousness itself, and as such are non-difterent from each other (from the point of view of the substratum), yet one state is seen

58 MANDOKYOPANISHAD

to change20 into another as do the appearances of the snake, water line, ctc, having for their substratum the rope, etc. But the consciousness itself is rcal because it never changes (Objection)-Consciousness is seen to change (dis- appear) in deep sleep. (Reply)-No, the state of deep sleep is a matter of experience.21 For the Sruti says, "Knowledge of the Knower is never absent." Hence it (T'wriya) is "unseen"22, and because it is unseen therefore it is "mncomprehensible".23 Tunya cannot be apprehended by the organs of action. Alakshanam means "uninferable",2 because there is no Linga (common characteristic) for its inference. Therefore Turiya is "unthinkable"25 and hence "indescribable"26 (by words). It is "essentially27 of the nature of consciousness consisting of Self " Turiya should be known by spotting that consciousness that never changes in the three states, viz, waking, etc., and whose nature is that of a Unitary Self. Or,28 the phrase may signify that the knowledge of the one Atman alone is the means for realising Turiya, and therefore Turiya is the essence of this consciousness of Self or dtman. The Sruta also says, "It should be meditated upon as Atman." Several attributes, such as the "conscions of the subjective" eto., associated with the manifestation (such as, Viśwa, etc.) mn each of the states have already been negated. Now by describing Tunya as "the cessation of illusion", the attributes which characterise the three states, viz.,

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 59

waking, etc., are negated. Hence it is ' ever29 Peace- ful" .e, without any manifestation of change-and "all30 bliss". As it is non-dual, i e., devoid of illusory ideas of distinction, theiefore it is called " Turiya", the "Fourth",31 because it is totally distinct (in character) from the three quarters which are mere appearances. "This, indeed, is the Afman and it should be known," is intended to show that the meaning of the Vedic statement, "That thou art", poits to the relationless Atman (Turiya) which is hke the rope (in the illustration) different from the snake, line on the ground, stick, etc, which are mere appearances. That Atman which has been described mn such Śruti passages as " unseen, but the seer", " the consciousness of the seer is never absent", etc., should be known (The incomprehensible) Turwya "should be known", and this32 is said so only from the standpoint of the previously unknown condition, for duality cannot exist when the Highest Truth is known

1Is realsed-The rope did not cease to be the rope when it appeared as the snake The rope, again, is seen in its true nature when the snake idea is removed, Similarly; dtman appears as Viswa, Tayasu and Prama mn the three states ,And the same Atman is lealsed as Turiya when the upadhes, namely the states, are negated Turya is not a sepaiate entity nor is it a fourth state succeeding the three other states The real nature of Turwya cannot be realised without the negation of the upadhis of the three states 2 Ths as, etc .- The renl sigmficance of "That thou ait ", is Turiya and it is realised when the controry qualties, known as the ' wpadhis, indicated by the words "That " and " thou " are ehmi- nated. Similarly, the Scripture by the hegative process, removes

60 MANDOKYOPANISIAD

the upadhis of the Atman when associated with the three statos and this reveals its eteinal identity with Turiya Difjerent-From the relative oi cauyal standpoint, the Atman associated with any of the thiee states is, no doubt, different from T'uriya But fiom the standpomt of Turya there is no difference whatsoever between it and the Itman associated with the three states. As a matter of fact, it is Twiya as the witness (aTfer) that is rovealed out by the three states & On account of -- Ignorant person, for whom Seupture is pre- sorihed for the attainment of Knowledge, moves in the relative plane of the three states To him the Seripture suggesis the evammation of the three states in order to arrive at the Knowledge of Turiya If Turiya were something totally separate fiom and essentially unconnected with the three states and if the three states were not the means of reahaing Twnyn, then no other instrument of Knowledge wonld be left for the renhsation of Turwyu It cannot be contended that one can get the Knowledge of Turya from the Seripture, Because the Seripture also teaches about Turiya by the method of repudiation (ryara) of the superimposed attri- butes () t.e., by negating the upadhis which wero supemmposed upon Turiya If Tunya weio something totally different from the tluee states, then no serptural teaching would be effective in establishing it If Turiya cannot be established through the examination of the Atman qualified by the three states, by following the scuiptural method of negation, then one is faced with the only alternative that the Ultimate Realty 18 total non-existence () because no other reality remains after the negation of the upadhis of the three states if the existence of Turiya be demied. 5 Two results-The instrument of ] Knowledge (प्रमाण) by means of which we become aware of the result of the negation of the upadhis, namely, the three states, reveals the relationless Tunya. It is like the seemg of the real rope (which is never absent) with the cessation of the illusory idea of the snake. It must be carefully noted that the realisation of Turtya is not the result of the Pramana by means of which we become aware of the negation of the attributes of Atman, mz, the thiee states. The two results are simultaneous-and not successive in time as the language

MĀNDŪKYOPANISIIAD 61

seems to imply. It is beoause no new entity known as Turiya 1s tscovered (or eomes into existence) after the negation of upadhis. Twrya is always piesent Therefore there is no possibilty of taking Turiyg as the result of the negation of the upadhis, riz , the three states Turya being charnetemsed by non-duahty there is no subject-object relation hip in Tunya in which case alone an instrument of Anowledgo would have a meaning 8 Additional intrument, ete - No mnstrument of Knowledge onn estabhsh Tunya on account of its non-relational and non-dual nature Even the funetion of the Srun which indicates T'uriya is only to negate what is unreal, relative and non-Brahman. 7 Other effort-Eveu contemplation, eto , which are the essential features of Yoga cannot estabhyh Turiya, because it cannot be prored that Yogie contemplation can yield such Knowledge. Thercfore the roalisation of Turiya cannot be charactorised as the result of any partionlar mstrnment of Knowlerlge or of any Yogic practice S Epables, etc -This means that the inytrument of Knowledge, besides removing the darkness onveloping the Jar, also yields another positive iesult that is the mamfestation of the Jar. 4 Apirm-Tlus means that the act of eutting, besides severing the party to which it is dueeted also funetions mn other ways But this is abyurd becausr we have no knowledge of any other effect on the tree produeed by the art of outtmg 1

10 Tnrariably, etc .- It i9 because the Jar always exists oven when it is enveloped in darkness. 11 Cannot funchon-It is because Turya isKnowledge itself. Hence no instrument of Knowledge can act upon it. Turya does not stand in need of any demonstration or proof because it is ever- exitent, The mstrument of Knowledge only removed the super- impositions falsely attributed to .Itman. The mstrument of Knowledge (perception) continues to acl upon an object till the object is revealed (as Brahman). 12 Is accomphshed-The istrument of Knowledge, mvariably connected with its employer and an object, can aot anly in the plane of duahty With the negation of dualty, tho instrument of Knowledge itself hecomes meffective, for it cannot function the

62 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

next moment The idea of time is also annihilated with the de- struction of dualty. When the non-dual Turiya is realsed, all Ideas of the mstrument of Knowledge, the employer and the object with their distincuon are destroyed Only Brahman 1s 13 Would follow, ete -It is because a second mnstrument of Knowledge would be reqired to negaie the residual Knowledge or mstrument and a third would be necessary to negate the second and so on ad infinitum An aigument ending mn a regressus is not allowed in logical diseusmon. 14 Ja simultaneous-Here Pramana is the Jnanam that results from the negation of attribntes And through this mstrument of Knowledge alone we kuow that all relative ideas have been negated. Simultaneously with this assurance, Turiya is teahsed. 15 Intermediate, etc .- It is the state when one expemences some- thing hke a "day dream " that is, he half sees the one and half sces the other. 16 Causal condition-By sceing the manifestation in the waking state one naturally infers that the preceedig state, that is Sushupti, Is the cause of both the waking and dream experiences, In Sushupt, specific states of consciousness, which manifest them- selves as different objects in dieam and waking states iemam in a state of indistingushabilty In deep sleep, no distictions are perceived 17 Cunnot, etc .- By this aie denied such attributes as ommi- science, etc., associated with Iswma 18 How, etc -The contention of the objector is this. That the idea of the snake, etc , in the rope is an illusion is a matter of common experience When the error is poited out, the idea of the'snake disappears Therefore the idea of such a snake can be said to be non-existent But this is not the case with the attri- butes of Itman which are sought to be negated Such atfributes are directly perccived by everyone and do not vanish even though they are negated Therefore the phenomena ot the threo states connot be said to be non-existent on the analogy of the rope and the anake 19 Though, eto .- The reply is that the attributes, rec., the three states, can be demonstrated to be non-existent (unreal) by the act of negation. The illustration of the snake and the rope is quite

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 63

opposite The ideas of the snake, the water-line, etc , for which the rope is mistaken are first pointed ont to be illusion because they are subject to change Therefore, such objects as are indi- cated by the ideas are non-existent Similarly it is a matter of common experience that the states of Jagrat, Swapna and Sushupti are snbject to change Therefore they are negatable In any one state the two other states aro negated Besides, in the state of waking one can realise the thiee states as following one another Therefore the three states partake of the nature of umcality as distinguished from Reahty which 14 never subject to any change. Now, what is Reahty ? From the examination of the three states it becomes clear that though the states are changing and negatable, the consciousness which is present therein is constant and ivariable Change of one state to another cannot affeot the unchanging nature of Consciousness itself Therefore pure Consciousness is real. Hence it follows that by constantly examining the changeable and negatable charaoter of the attributes, mz, the three states, one can realse their non-existent or umreal nature The fallacy of the contontion of the objector is due to the partial examination of Realty in only one state in which case the changeable nature of the attributes cannot be realised But the examination of the three states at once demonstrates their changeable and negatable nature and points out that consciousness itself which is the sub- stratum of the changing attributes is the only Reahty 20 Change-That i9, no one is aware ot consciousness in deep sleep. 21 Erperience-Consciousness cannot be dissociated from the state of deep sleep Sushupti is experienced from the Jagrat state, that is to say. Tunya m Jagrat state knows that it experiencod deep sleep. Otherwise Sushuph would have nevet been Rnown to exist at all 22 Unseen-It cannot be recognised by any organ of perception lt is because Tunya is the negation of all the attributes. It cannot he made the object of any sense-organ 23 Incommehensible-It cannot come withtn the cogmzance of senses, therefore Turya cannot serve any purpose (541). 24 Unanferable-" Existence, Knowledge and Infinity," by which Brahman is described in the Teilurya Upanishad are not

64 MANDOKYOPANISHAD

to be considered to he real and positive attubutes for the purpose of drawing an mference about Brahman They only seive a negative purpose indicating that Brahman is other than non-truth, non-consciousness and non-mfinity. Besides, mference requires d common feature which always presupposes more objects than one. But Brahman is one and without a second, thercfore no inferenee is possible regarding Brahman 25 Unthinkable-It is because the predicates by which we can think about an entity have been totally elmmated from Turiya 20 Indescribable-Turiya cannot be deseribed by words because it is unthinkable That which one thinks m mind, is expresser by wouls. 27 Essentially, ete -The elmmation of all the attuhntes may make Tunya appear as a void to the anwary student Theretoro it is deserined as a positive existence wlnch can be realised by spotting it as the changeless and the constant factor in the thiee states The states, no doubt, do change but there is a umty of the subjeet impled in the conscious experience of "T am that pereeiver " common to all the three conditions. 28 Or-The alteruative meaning is that through consciousness of Self alone, which forms the basis of the three states, we can de- monstrate Turiya which transcends all the states, or m other words, because there is Pure Consciousness, changeless and consiant, known as Turiya, theicfore we are aware of self-consciousness in the three statey 20 Ever-peaceful-Free from attachment of love and hate, ›.e., changeless and immutable 30 All Bhss-Pine and embodiment of the highest Bliss. 31 Fourth-This does not sigmify any numerical relationship with the three other states narrated previously Tuniya is called the " fourth" because it occupies the " fourth " place in order of explanation of Brahuman of which the three states have previously been dlealt with. 32 This is, rtc -The statement that "It should he known", cannot be propeily made with iegard to the non-dual Atman whioh is ieomprehensible, etc. This olyection is, no doubt, valid trom the standpoint of Turya whete there caunot be a separate knower

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 65

of Atman But Turya is certamly unknown from the standpomt of any of the three states, and fiom that dual standpomt it is per- fectly legitimate to speak of Brahman av something " to be known".

Here appear the following stohas :-- निवृत्तेः सर्वदुःखानामीशानः प्रभुख्ययः । अद्वैतः सर्वभावानां देवस्तुर्यो विभु: स्मृतः ॥१०॥ 10 In it which is indrcated as the changeless and the Supreme Lord, there as a cessation of all meseries. It is the one without a second, among all entties. It is known as the Turya (Fourth), effulgent and all-pervading. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. In (the Knowledge of) Isana, meaning the Turiya Atman there is a cessation1 of all miseries charactersed by the three states, er , Prina,2 Tarusa and Vrśwa. The word 'Isana' is explamed as 'Prabhu', t.e., the one who brings about the cessation of miseries It 1s because misery is destroyed hy one's Knowledge3 of it (Turiya) 'Avyaya means that which is not sub- ject to any change, t.e, which does not deviate from its own nature How 2 It is so because. Turiya is non-dual, all4 other entities being illusory (unreal) hke the idea of the snake, etc., imagined in the rope. It is he who is recognised as the Dera (on account of his effulgent nature), the Turiya, the Fourth, the Vibhu," that is the all-pervading one 1 Cessation-The three statos are said to he mn the Atman because we, as Twiya, cognize them. Therefore all misery as well as its canse associated with the three states, ure imaginod by us to subuist mn Turya. It is because we do not reahse we

66 MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

identify ourselves with the states that we suffer from various kinds of miseries But a complete cessation of miseres ensues if we reahse the Atman as Turiya and thus wilness the appearance and disappearance of the ideas, uz, the states without identifying ourselves with them. 2 Prajna-The state of Sushuph, devoid of the Knowledge of Tunya on the part of the sleeper, is charactensed as unhappiness. 3 Knowledge-Thongh Turiya is constant m all the states, yet we suffer from miscry hecause we are not aware of the existence of the Turiye. It is only the Knowledge of Turya that can destroy migery. 4 All other, etc -- Thongh Viswa, ete., are percerved, they are really illusory like the ideas of the snake, eto., in the rope. Turiya alone is real Every part of Viswa, Taijasa and Prama is nothing but Turya as every pait of the illusory snake is the rope. Therefore from the highest standpomt only Turiya 1s. Recognised-That is Tuniya, as such, is known from the realisation of the wise 6 Vibhu-Turya is called Vabhu becuuse it pervades all the three states कार्यकारणबद्धी ताविष्येते विश्वतैजसौ।

प्राज: कारणबद्धस्तु द्वौ तौ तुर्ये न सिध्यतः ॥११॥ 11. Viśwa and Taijasa ane conditioned by cause and effect. But Prajna is conditroned by cause alone. These two (cause and effect) do not exist in Turiya. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

The generic' and specific2 characters of Vaśu, ete., are described with a view to determining the real natmie of Turiyn. 'Karya' or effect is that which 1s done, i.e., which has the characteristic of result. 'Kmana' or the cause is that which acts, t.e., it is the state m which the cffect remams latent. Both Viśwa

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 67

and Taijasa, described above, are known as being conditioned by cause and effect,3 characterised by both non-apprehension and mis-apprehension of Reality. But Prajna is conditioned by cause alone. Cause, characterised by the non-apprehension of Reality, is the condition of Pragna. Therefore these two, cause and effect, 2.e., non-apprehension and mis-apprchension of Reality, do not exist, t.e., are not possıble in Turiya.

1 Genenc-The generie or the common characteristic of Vaśwa and Taigasa is that they are, both, characterised by the conditions of cause and effect. 2 Specific-The special characteristic of Prajna 19 that it 18 cbaracterised by the causal conditions alone 3 Cause and effect-Causal state (aTr) is that in which we do not know (अग्रहणं) the Tiuth Fiom it follows the esult (फलं) which is the mis-apprehension of Truth (अन्यथाग्रहणं), It is because one does not know the rope (T) one mistakes it for the suake (4). Piajna or the state of non-apprehension as such is naid to be the cause of the Tiswa and Tuyasa or the states of m1s- apprehension. In dream and waking states there are both non- apprehension and mis-apprehension of Renlity. But mn deep sleep, there is only non-apprehension As a matter of fact these two conditions, mis-apprehension and non-apprehension, cannot be experienced separately They have been differently elassified only to facilitate understanding

नाऽडत्मानं न परांश्चैव न सत्यं नापि चानृतम्। प्राज्ञ: किंचन संवेत्ति तुर्य सत्सर्वद्ृक्सदा॥ १२॥

12. Prajna does not know anything of the self or the non-self, nor truth, nor untruth, But Turtya is cver existent and ever all-seeing

68 MANDŪKYOPANISIIAD

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY, How is it that Prajna is conditioned by cause ? And how is it, again, that the two conditions of non- apprehension and mis-apprehension of Reality do not exist in Turrya ? It is because Prajna does not, like Viswa and Taijasa, perceive anything of the dualityl, external to and other2 than itself and borna of the cause known as Avidya, therefore4 it is conditioned by darkness characterised by non-apprehension of Reality which is the cause of mis-apprehension As Turiya exists always, ever all-sceing, on account of the absence of anything other than Turya, it is never associated with the causal condition characterised by non-apprehension of Reahty Consequently mis-appre- hension of Reahty which is the result of non-appre- hension is not found in Turiya. For, it is not possible to find in the sun, whose nature is to be ever-luminous, anything contrary to light, viz., darkness, or any other light different from itself. The Srutr also says : "The Knowledge of the seer is never absent " Or the , phrase may be explained thus . Turrya may be de- signated as ever all-seeing because it subsists in all, . in dream and wakmng states and all the seers that cognise them (mn those states) are Turya alone This is also borne out by the following Sruti passage, "There is no seer other than this." 1 Duality-This dual world is true from empirical standpoint Prajna does not perceive it 2 Other than, elc -Prajna does not see the external world or the non-solf. Therefore it does not see itself. Ego can be cognized only in relation rto the non-ego

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 69

3 Born, etc .- That is untruth It is because Praja does not see the unreal external world produoed by uidya, therefore it is not aware of mis-apprehension 4 Therefore-It is because it is in the seers and the things seen in both the states, it is ever all-seeing द्वैतस्याग्रहणं तुल्यमुभयोः प्राज्ञतुर्ययोः । बीजनिद्रायुतः प्राज्ञः सा च तुर्ये न विद्यते ॥ १२ ॥ 13 The non-cognition of duality as common to both Prajna and Turiya. (But) Prajna is assocraled with sleep in the form of ouuse and this (sleep) does not exist tn Tunya. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Ths sloka is meant to remove a doubt that bas arisen incidentally. The doubt is this How is it that it is Prajna alone and not T'urya which is bound by the condition ot cause, since the non-cognition of duality is the common feature of both ? This doubt is thus removed1. The meaning of the phrase Bija- nidiayuta is . Nidra or sleep is characterised by the absence of the Knowledge of Reality This is the cause which gives rise to the cognition of varieties. Prajna is associated with this sleep which is the cause. It is because Turiya is ever all-seeing, therefore the sleep characterised by the absence of the Knowledge of Reality does not exist in Tunya. Therefore the bondage in the form of causal condition doès not exist in Turiya, 1 Removed-The contention that Turya and Pramae are both characterser by the condition of cause on account of the common feature of the non-percoption of duality in both the cases, is due

70 MANDŪKYOPINISHAD

to a wrong inference based upon insufficient data, The Prajna 18 thought to be the causal state because it is the immediately preceding condtion of the manifestations ot the waking state, etc But this does not apply to Turiya because it is not the immediately preceding condition of any state Turya is not a state which 18 antecedent or subsequent to any other state It is the sub-stratum of all the statos Turrya is non-dual, changeless and puie con- yciousness itself. Hence it cannot be said to pioduce anything. Therefore causal condition cannot obtain in the case of Turiya Turiya associated with causal condition would be the same as the Pragna

न निद्रां नैव च स्वमं तुर्ये पश्यन्ति निश्चिताः ॥ १४ ॥ 14 The first two (Viswa and Tarjasa) are associated wth the conditions of dream and sleep ; Prajna is the condition of sleep without dieam. Those who have Tnown the truth see nerther sleep nor dream in Turiya SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Svapna or dream is the mis-apprehension1 of duality like that of the snake mn the rope. Nidsa or sleep has already been defined as darkness characterised by the absence of the Knowledge of Reahtv. Viswa and Taijasa are associated with these, vis, the conditions of dream and sleep Therefore they have been de- scribed as conditioned bv the characteristics of cause and effect. But Prajna is associated with sleep alone without dream, therefore it is described as conditioned. by cause only The Knower of Brahman does not see them (dream and sleep) mn Turiya,2 as it would be inconsistent like seeing darkness in the Sun There- foreª Turiya has been described as not associated with the conditions of cause and effect. *

MĀNDŪKYOPANISIIAD 71

1 M1s-apprehension-ie, when one, then, thinks of Htman as endowed with body, etc. 2 Turiya-Amana and its effeets cannot exist in Turiya w hich is Pure Knowledge, & Therefore-It I8 because there is no Nidra or slecp in Turiya. अन्यथा गृह्ृतः स्वप्ो निद्रा तत्वमजानतः । विपर्यासे तयोः क्षीणे तुरीयं पदमर्नुते ॥ १५॥

15. Svapna or dream is the wrong cognition of Reality. Nidra or sleep is the state an which one does not know what Reality as. When the erroneous knowledge in these two disappears, Turiya is realized SANKARA'S COMMENTARY When is one estahlished in Turiya ? It is thus re- phed During the states of dream and waking when one wrongly cognizes Reality like the perception of the snake in the place of the rope, he is said to be experiencing dream1 Nidra or sleep,ª characterised by the ignorance of Reality, is the common feature of the three states. Viswa and Tayasa, on account of their having the common features of Svapna (dream) and Nidra (sleep), form a single class. That Nidra (sleep) which is characterised by the predominance of wrong apprehension (of Reality) constitutes the state of inversion which is Svapna (dream). But in the third state, Nidra (sleep), alone, characterised by the non-apprehension of Reality is the only inversion. (This forms the second or the other class implied mn the text which speaks only of dream and sleep as covering the three states.) Therefore when these

72 MANDÜK YOPANISIAD

two classes of the nature of effect and cause, character- ised by the mis-apprehension and non-apprehension respectively (of Reality), disappear by the destruction of the inversion characterised by effect and cause, by the knowledge of the nature of the highest Reality, then one realises Turiya which is the goal. Then one does not find in Turya this condition, the characteristics of which arc these two (effect and cause), and one thus becomes firm in the Highest Reality which is Turiya. 1 Dienm-Svapna mcludes dream and waking states, ordmnarily so called, as in both the states there is a wiong apprehension of Realty The mvergion (ubsence of the Knowledge of Reality) whuich is the charactoustic ot sleep is found m dream and wakig also. In other words, this is the common chalactenstc of all the three states. 2 Nidra-Nidra includes the thee states of waking, dream and sleep, ordmamly so-called, as all the three states are charnctersed by the absence of the Knowledge of Reahty The inversion, characteristie of Nidra, is the non-apprehension of Reahty and this is the only feature of Prajna, But Soapn (dream) including the waking state also is characterised by both non-apprehension and mis-apprehension of Reality. अनादिमायुया सुप्ती यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते । अजमनिद्रमस्त्ममद्वैत बुध्यते तदा ॥१६ ॥ 16. When the Jiva or the indrridual soul sleeping (i.e., not knowing the Realrty) under the influence of the buginmngless Maya, is awakened, rt, then, realises (in itself) the non-duality, beginningless and dreamless. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. One who is called the Jiva,1 the individual soul, (whose characteristic is to be) subjoct2 to the law of

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 73

transmigration, sleepings under the influence of Maya which is active from time without' beginning and which has the double characteristics of non-apprehending (on account of its being of the nature of the cause) and mis-apprehending Reality, experiences such dreams as, "This is my father, this is my son, this is my grand- son, this is my property and these are my ammals, I am their master, I am happy, I am miserable, 1 have suffered loss on account of this, I have gained on this account." ... When the Jiva remains asleep experi- encing these dreams in the two states,5 he is then thus awakened6 by the gracious teacher who has fumself realsed the Reality indicated by Vedanta. "Thou art not this, of the nature of cause and effect, but That thou art." When the Jwva is thus awakened from slecp, he, then, realises his real nature. What is his nature ? It (Self) is birthless, because it is beyond cause and cffect and because it has none of the characteristics7 such as birth, ete., which are (inevitably) associated with all (relative) existence. It is birthless, i.e., it is devoid of all changes associated with the objeet of (relative) existence including the conditions of cause and eftect. It is Anidram (sleepless) because there does not exist in it Nidra (sleep), the cause, ot the nature of the dark- ness of Audya, which produces the changes called birth, etc. Turyu is free from Svapna (dream) because it 1s free from Nidra (sleep) which is the cause of misappre- hension of Reality (dream). „ It is because the Self is free from sleep and dream therefore the Jiva, then, realises himself as the Turiya Atman, birthless and non-dual.

74 MANDUKYOPANISHAD

1 Jia-It is the Paramatman or the Supreme Self who is thought to appear as world-bound on acconnt of his assuming the charac- teristies of the Jwna, we., binding himself with the cham of cause and effeot. Nubject, etc -- i e., world-bound 3 Sleeping-Sleep or ignorance is the common characteristio of the threc states. See Kārıka 15 4 Tame unthout, etc -Maya is said to be Anad or begmningless from the standpoint of the relative, because it is something for which we cannot think of a cause From the Absolte standpoint, Maya does not exist 5 Two states-This covers the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep. See commentary of the previous Karika. e Arglened-Awakening or reahsation of Knowledge is possible only for one who is asleep, he , who is ignorant 7 Characteristics-All entities of relative existonce possess bix characterstes, such as birth, duration, gruwth, chango, decay and death Brahman is free from them. 8 Then-That is to say, when he is taught by the Gurte what his leal nature is. Tor the realisation of the Supreme Reality a competent teacher is absolutely necessary who alone is capable of dispelling the doubts that crop up in the mind of the student during the period of his inquiry mnto Truth प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत निवर्तेत न सशय: । मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः ।।१७।। . 17. If the perceived manifold were real then certainly il would disappear This duality (that is cognzed) is mere illusion (Mava). Non-duality is (alone) the Sumeme Reulity. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY If the knowledge of non-dualty (Turiya) be possible after the disappearance of the perceived manifold, how could non-dluality be said to evist (alwavs) while the

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 75

pereeptual manifold reniams ? This is explamed thus : This would have been true if the manifold seally existed.2 This manifold being only a false imagination, hke the snake in the rope, does not really exist There 18 no doubt that it would (certainly) disappear if it seully existed.3 The snake imagined in the rope, through false concepuion, does not really exist and therefore does not disappear4 through correct understanding Nor, similarly, does the illusion of the vision conjured up by the magician exist and then chsappear as thongh a veil thrown over the eyes ol the spectators (by the magician) is removed. Similar is this duality of the cognized universe called the phenomenal or manifold, (मायामात्रं द्वेतं) a mere illusion. Non-duality Turiya lke the rope and the magician (in the illustra- tions) is alone the Supreme Reality 5 Therefore the fact is that there is no such thing as the mamfold about which appearance or disappearance can be predicated.

1 If-Tls is the contention of the opponent Your asgertion that there is anything like the non-dual Turiya cannot be a fact, for, a second entity known as the manifold umverse does exist, and perceived. But if you say that the realisation of the non-dunl Turiya is not mconsistent with that of the dual mamifold, because Turiya can be reahsed as such only by the destruction of the man- fested mamfold, then, so long as the mamfold is there as reality and does not disappear, Turiyu cannot be establshed as the eternally evistent non-dualty

2 Easted-The manifold does not exist in the sense of a separate Reality. If it hud any such existence then alone could it obstruct the eternally non-dual nature of the Turiya by the appenrance (of the mamfold). If anyone says that the manifold disappears it is only because he beheves in its reclity. But this is not the

76 MANDOKYOPANISH.ID

Truth, because the appearance of the manifold is only an illusion and not a roality 3 Renlly existed-People say that duality disappears only because they beleve in its reality But really dualty does not evist, therefore it does not disappear. If any one believes in the realty of such illusory appearance then can one beleve in the reahty of the disappearance, 4 Does not dsappear-The rope is mistaken for an illusory snake There is no real snake When one is pomted out the real rope, no such thing as a snake actually disappears, for no such thing as a real snake existed It is the illusion due to ignorance that makes one see the snake which disappears but no real snake The illusion disappears because it is not a reahty That which 1s liable to be negated cannot be said really to exist at all 5 Supreme Realily-That is, it is never absent If one con- tends that Turiya does not exist when the mamfold is seen, we reply that the manfuld is nothing but Brahman, only the illusion which mamfests the manifold as separate from Brahman comes and goes but the manifold, having for its sub-stratum Brahman, always exists This Kiriki deals with the crux of the Vedanta Philosophy Vedanta says that non-duality (Taniya) alone is renl and cver- existent But the opponent poits out to him the fact of the existence of the universe which icontestably provos duality. TE this universe be real, then non-duahty (Tunya) cannot be a fact. If non-duality is realised only after the disappearance of the ob- jective universe, then non-duality cannot certainly exst so long as the umverse exists Vedanta shows ita boldest gemus in answeung this question. It at once statos that non-dual Brahman alone exists Whatover is, is nothing but Brahman. The mamfold is Brahman. As Brahman, it always exists and never undergoes any change If a man realises the universe as Brahman, then he is never subject to any illusion regarding ity reahty The differenoe betwoen a Jnani and an -ljnant is that a wise man sees the umverse as Brah- man and therefore never sees in it any appearance or disappearance. But the ignorant person beheves in the reahty of the universe as apart from Brahman and therefore talks about its disappearance.

MANDUKYOPANISHAD 77

What really disappears is the illusion that the mamfold exists as something other than Brahman The universe as Brahman does not appear and disappoai. It always is The meamng of the disappearance of the universe really means the disappearance of one's notion of the illusion, (ie, the existence of the universe as something other than Brahman) It is lke the illusion conjured up by the magician, which comes and goes without affecting the real nature of the magieian When the real natme of the rope 18 pointed out, what disappears is only the illusion wlch presented the rope as other than it is. The on-looker, after his eiror is pomted out, realises that what he consideied as snake is rcally the rope. It is illusion which made the rope appear as other than what it 1s. Knowledge removes this illusion. This illusion is unsubstantial and unreal, hence its appearance and dsappearance cannot affect the nature of Roality.

विकल्पो विनिवर्तेत कल्पितो यि केनचित्। उपदेशादयं वादो ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते ॥ १८॥ 18. If anyone had ever imagined the manrfold ideas (such for instance as the teacher, the taught and the scrip- ture), they might dasappear. This explanation is for the purpose of teaching. Duality (implred in explanahon) ceases to exist when the highest truth is known.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

(Objection)-Howl could (dualty implied mn) ideas such as the teacher. the taught and the soripture dis- appear ? (Reply)-This is thus explamed, If2 such ideas had ever been imagined by someone then they might be supposed to disappear. As the manifold is like the illusion (conjured up by the magician or) of the snake in the rope, soa also are the ideas of the teacher, etc.

78 MANDOKYOPANISHAD

These ideas, namely, the ideas of teacher, taught, and scripture are for the purpose of teaching which are (therefore appear) true till one realiscs the highest Truth But duality does not evist when one, as a result of the teaching, attains to knowledge, i.e .. realises the highest Reality 1 How could, etc-If even the idea of teachor, etc , existed, non-dualty could not be established. If such ideas be meant for the purpose of iferring Turya, as the smoke is thought of for inferring fire, then duality cannot be refuted For, the experience of smoke and fire, as existing together, does not demonstrate non- duality. 2 ff, etc -Such ideas as teacher, student and scripture havo their apphcabilty till one reahses the highest truth of non-dualty (Tunya). Such ideas, possible only from the standpoint of ignor- ance, cannot contradict Turiya because thev are unreal and negatable by knowledge The analogy of the smoke and fire 18 not appropriate Brahman cannot be logically inferred from the world hke the fire from the smoke. For, fire and smoke are ob- jective realities of the same order and seen to exist togother hy & perceiver That is not so with Brahman and the world But the seeing of an object imples the seer So Brahman may only be indicated 3 So also, etc -The entire mamfold is an illusion, it is not a realty. It appears as real till one attains to the highest knowledge. The idea of the teacher, eto., is a part of this mamfold Hence sucht ideas have no absolute reality. The appearance is also due to the non-apprehension of Reahty. 4 For the pupose of-If one sees duahty and seeks an expla- nation, one of the explanations offered is that ideas are iagmned for the purpose of attaining the Truth. It has been seen in the previous Karila that the manifold is Brahman As the wave is non-different from water, so also the world is non-different from Brahman. The idea that what we 4ee is not Brahman and has got such attributes as birth, change- ability, destruotion, etc., is illusion which being negated enables

MANDŪK YOPANISHAD 79

one to realse the Iuighest Truth Simdarly various ideas one has with regard to the mamfold, are non-different from Brahman Even the so-called illusion of the manifold universe has no exist- ence other than that of Brahman As the wind that arises from the air, disappears in the air and is identieal with the ai, so also the mamfold is non-different from Brahman As in dream, the objects that are experienced as the elephant, ete , with then names and forms are nothing but the mindstuff, so also in the state of ignor- ance what are expe ienced as the olyjeets with therr distmetive names and forme are nothing but Brahman As in the same dream the iden that I have seen an elephant is non-different from the mindstuff which creates the clephant, so also the idea that thete i8 a distinction between the teacher, etc, ie not separate from Brahman. The cognition of ideas as teacher, etc., as separate from Brahman is due to one's still persisting in the relatrve plane, and this is explained as being useful for the reahsation of Truth But after the enlghtenment these ideas are reahsed as non-different from Brahman The highest Truth is that the manifold as well as varous thoughts associsted with it are identical with Brahman The non-duahty (Turiya) alone 18 VIII

सोडयमात्माSघ्यक्षरमोङ्कारोडधिमात्रं पादा मात्रा मात्राश्च पादा अकार उकारो मकार इति ।।८॥। The same Atman (which has been described above as having four quarters) is, again, Aum, from the point of view of the syllables (3THT). The Aum with parts is viewed from the stand- point of sounds (letters, ar.). The quarters are the letters (parts) and the letters are the quarters. The letters here are A, U and M. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. In the word Aum prominence is given to that which is indicated by several names. The word Aum which

80 MANDŪKYOPINISHAD

has been explamed before as Aunan having four quar- ters is agamn the same Atman described here from the standpomt of syllable where prominence is given to the name. What is agam, that syllable ? It is thus rephed Aum. It is that word Aum which bemg divided into parts, is viewed from the standpoint of let- ters. How ? Those which constitute the quarters of the Atman arel the letters of Aum What are they ? The letters are A. U and M.

In the first Upamishad it is said, "Aum, the word, is all this. ' The word Aum is the name (3TT9TH) which idicates every thing (3T4) past, present, future and all that which is beyond even the conception of tume Thus Aum is the name for Brahman. The second Upanishad declares that Brahman is the Atman. The AItman with its four quurters has been explmined mn tho following Upamshads Therofore all these explanations are ot Aum from the standpoint of Atman where prominenee is given to that which is indicated by names. Now the same Aum is ex- plained from the standpoint of the word itself, that is the name which indiontea Atman or the Supreme Reality The highest truth as explamed above by the process of the refutation of the erroneous superimposition can be grasped only by the students of sharp or middling mntelligence. But those ordnary students who cannot entet upon philosophical reflection regarding the Supreme Realty as given mn the provious texts, are advised to concentrate on Aum as the symbol of the Ultimate Reality. 1 Are, ele,-It is because the quarters and the letters are identical.

IX.

जार्गरितस्थानो वैश्वानरोडकार: प्रथमा मात्राSडतेरादिम्त्वा- द्वाऽपोति ह वै सर्वान्कामानादिश्व भवति य एवं वेद ।।९।।

MANDOKYOP INISHAD 81

He who is Vaiśwanara, having for its sphere of activity the waking state, is d, the first letter (of Aum) on account of its all-pervasiveness or on account of being the first (these being the common features of both). One who knows this attains to the fulfilment of all desires and becomes the first (of all). SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Points of spemfic resemhlance hetween them are thus pomted out. That which is Vriswanar, whose sphere of activitv is the waking state, is the first letter of Aum. What is the common teature between them ? It is thus explamed . The first point of resemblance is pervasiveness.1 All sounds are pervaded2 bv A This is corroborated by the Sruti passage, "The sound A is the whole of speech " Similarly the entire universe 1s pervaded by Varswanura as is evident from such Śruti passages as, "The effulgent Heaven is the head of this, the Vaiswanara Atman," ete. The identity of the name and the object, mdicated by the name, has already been described. The word 'Adimal' means that this has a begmning. Ass the letter 4 is with a beginning, so also is Varswanara. Varswanara is identical with A on account of this common feature. The knower of this identity gets the following result4 : One who knows this, h.e., the identity described above, has all his desires fulfilled and becomes the first of the great.

1 Pervaswveness-d (ar) pervades all sounds It is present in all sounds. No articulate sound can be produced without

82 VANDOKYOPANISHAD

opening the mouth and the sound that is thus produced is A

2 Perraded, etc .-- It has been already stated that the knowledge of all other states are possible only from the waking state The three states constitute our entire experience of the umveise. Therefore the waking state pervades the whole of the universe $ As, elc .- This is the second point of resemblance A is the first of all sounds or letters Therefore d has a beginning because no other sound or letter precedes A. Similarly from our common experience it 1s known that the states of dream and deep sleep are preceded by the waking state which is therefore the fust of the three states 4 Result-The enumeration of the meriis is for the purpose of inducing students to understand the meamng of Aum.

X

खप्नस्थानस्तैजस उकारो द्वितीया मात्रोत्कर्षादुभयत्वाद्वोत्कर्ष- ति ह वै ज्ञानसंततिं समानश्च भवति नास्याब्रह्मवित्कुले भवति य एवं वेद ॥१०।।

Tarjasa, whose sphere of activity is the dream state, is U (s), the second letter (of Aum) on account of superiority or on account of being in between the two. He who knows this attains tó a superior knowledge, is treated equally by all alike and finds no one in his line who is not a knower of Brahman.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. He who is Taijasa having for its sphere of activity the dream state is U (#), the second letter of Aum. What is the pomt of resemblance ? It is thus replied :

MANDOKYOPANISUAD 83

The one common feature is superiority The letter TI is, as it were, 'superior" to A ; similaily Taijasa2 1s superior to Viswa Another common feature is * the letter U (s) is in between the letters A (3T) and M (#) Similaily Tayasa is in between Visma and Pramna Therefore this condition of heig in the middle is the common feature Now is described the result of this knowledge. The knowledge (of the knower of this identity) is always on the increase, a.e., his power of knowing increases considerably. He is regarded in the same way by all, ? e , his enemics, like his friends, do not envy him. Further, in his family not one is born who is not a knower of Brahman 1 Superior -As a matter of fact, d beig the first of all sounds is superior to all letters But U coming after A may be said to be supenior to d in an mdirect way. 2 Tayasa-Tayasr is superior to Viswa as it is associated with ideas (in dream state) whereas Viswa is associated with gioss objects (in the waking state) In dream alone one realises the world as states of mind (H:1q=), which knowledge bmgs the student nearer to truth

XI.

सुषुप्तस्थान: प्राज्ञो मकारस्तृतीया मात्रा मितेरपीतेवा मिनो- ति ह वा इद सर्वमपीतिश्च भवति य एवं वेद ।।११।। Prajna whose sphere is deep sleep is M (H) the third part (letter) of Awm, because it is both the measure and that wherein all become one. One who knows this (identity of Prajna and M) is able to measure all (realise' the real nature

84 MĀNDŪXYOPANISIAD

of the world) and also comprehends all within himself. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

One who is Prajna associated with deep sleep is M (#), the third sound (letter) of Aum. What is the common feature ? It is thus explained. Here this is the common feature The word Mitt in the text means "measure". As barley is measured by prastha (a kind of measure), so also Viśwa and Tayasa are, as it were, measured1 by Prajna during their evolution (in) and ivolution (98) by ther appearance from and disappearance into Prajna (deep sleep). Similarly' after once finishing the utterance of Aum. when it is re-uttered, the sounds (letters) A and U, as it were, merge into and emerge from M. Another common feature is described by the word "Apiteh" which means "becoming one". When the word Aum is uttered the sounds (letters) A and U becomes one, as it were, in the last sound (letter) M. Similarly, Viśwa and Taijasa become one (merge themselves) in Prajna in deep sleep. Therefore, Prajna and the sound M are identical on account of this common basis ` that underles them both. Now is described the merit of this knowledge. (One who knows this identity) comprehends all this, i,e, the real4 nature of the uni- verse. Further he realses himself as the Atman, the cause of the universe, t.e., Iswara. The enumeration of these secondarys merits is for the purpose of extolling the principal meats (of knowledge).

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 85

1 Measured-Both the waking and dream states appear (during their evolution) from and disappear (at the time of their involution) into deep sleep, Thesefore Prama Is, as it were, the contamer in which Visia and Tavjase are contamed The nature of Viswa and Tayasa (non apprchension of Reahty) 19 known from the nature of Prama-becanse it is the cause of the two other states. Therefore Prajna is here described as the meusure of the two other states. 2 Simalarly-When the word 'AUM' is uttered quichly several umes, the sound actually heard is Maum and not Aum, in whioh oase it may be said that the soundy A and 77 emerge out of and merge into M. 3 Berome one-i.e, merge themselves 4 Real Nuture -- That 19, the universe experenced in the dream and waking states is of the same stuff as the Pramna. ' 5 HSecondary merits-The enumeration of these secondary merits is for the satigfaction of those that still move in the causal plane

Here appear the following slokus :- विश्वस्यात्वविवक्षायामादिसामान्यमुत्कटम्। मात्रासंप्रतिपत्तौ स्यादाप्तिसामान्यमेव च ॥१९।। 19. When the idenhty of Viswa and the sound (letter) A is intended to be described, the conspicuous ground is the circumstance of each being the first (in their res- pective position), another reason for this rdentity is also the fact of the all-pervasrvcness of each.

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

When the Srutt intends to describe Viswa as of the same nature as A (sT), then the most prominent ground is seen to be the fact of cach being the first, as de- seribed in the Upanishad discussed, above. "Matra- sampratipath" mn the text means the identity of Viśwa

86 MINDŪKYOPANISIAD

and A. Another prominent reason for such identity is their all-pervasiveness. तैजसस्योत्वविज्ञान उत्कर्षो दृश्यते स्फुटम्। मात्रासंप्रतिपत्तौ स्यादुभयत्वं तथाविधम् ॥२०॥

20, The clean ground of realising Taijasa as of the same nature as U is the common feature of " Superority". Similarly another, plain reason of such identity is their being in "the middle".

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY When Taijasa is intended to be described as 'U', the reason of then being 'Superior' (in respective cases) is seen to be quite clear Their being in 'the middle' is also another plain ground. All these explanations are as before.

मकारभावे प्राज्ञस्य मानसामान्यमुत्कटम्।

मात्रासंप्रतिपत्तौ तु लयसामान्यमेव्र च ॥२१ ।।

21. Of the identity of Prajna and M (H) the clear reason is the common feuture, 1.e, they both are the 'measure'. The other reason for such identily is another common frature, namely, all become one an both Prajna and U. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Regarding the identity of Prdjna and U the plain common features are that both of them are the 'measure' as well as that wherein all merge.

MĀNDOKYOP NISHAD 87

त्रिषु वामसु यत्तुल्यं सामान्यं वेत्ति निश्चितः । स पूज्य: सर्वभूतानां वन्दश्चैव महामुनिः ॥२२॥ 22. He who knows wuthout doubt, what are the 'common features' an the three stales, rs worshupped and adored by all beings and he is also the greatest sage.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

One who knows positively, i e., without a shadow of doubt, the common1 features that are found in the three states, is worshipped and adored in the world. . He is a knower2 of Brahman.

1 Common features-That is, the three quarters of Atman, viz, Viswa, Tayusa and Prajna associated with waking, dream and deep sleep states are identical with the thiee sounds (letters) of dum, uz, A, U and Mf iespectively foi reasons stated above. 2 Knower, ete -The hnowel of this identity is highly extolled for this reason . From the standpoint of Atman, Vifwa merges in Tuyasa and Tayasa in Piaja, similarly from the standpoint of Aum the sound A merges in U and U merges in Mf. The quarters of Alman are identical with the sound of M. He who knows this identity also knows that the entire unverse of the dream and waking experiences emerges from and merges mto Prajna This Prajna is Brahman though it appears as the causal self (ater) to those whose mind still moves in the plane of causahty It is only the knower of Brahman that knows Pragna as Turiya."

अकारो नयते विश्वमुकारश्चापि तैजसम् ।

मकारश्च पुनः प्राजञं नामात्रे विद्यते गतिः ॥२३॥

23. The sound (letter) A helps its worshipper to attarn to Viswa, U to Taijasa, and M to Prajna. In the "Soundless" there is no attarnment.

88 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Having identified the quarters of Atman with the sounds (letters) of Aum, on account of the common features stated above, he who realises the nature of the sound Aum, described above, and meditates upon it, attamns to Viśwa through the help of A. The meaning is that he who meditates on Aum havingl for his support A becomes Varswanara.2 Similarly, the meditator of U becomes Taijasa.3 Again the sound M leads its meditator to Prajna 4 But when M too dis- appears, causality5 itself is negated and therefore about such Aum, which thus becomes soundless, no? attain- ment can be predicated.

1 Hauing, elo-ie, one who meditates on dum laying emphasis upon A or the waking experiences, reahsos the entre universe expenenced in the waking state as comprehended in the sound A. 2 Vaitwanara-Vaiswanara is the macrocosmic aspect of Viswa and the same as Virat. 3 Taijasa-ie., the Hiranyogarbha One who moditatos npon Aumkara laying emphasis upon U, reabses the world as forms of thought hke one expemenced mn dream. Such worshipper attams to Hiranyagarbha who is tho cosmic mind 4 Prajna-That Is, Téwara Piajna is the cause of the experiences of the waking and deam states as well as it is that wherein all these finally disappear Iśirara is also be who is the cause of the Umverse as well as that of its final disappearance. The meditator on M/ merges A in U and U in M. That is, he merges the gross univeise of the waking state in the world of ideas experienced in dream and finally realses the dream as ono with the state of deep sleep. 5 Causahty-It is tho idra of causahty which makes a man thuink that he realses the same world after Sushupt whch he had seen belore goig to sleep.

MĀNDŪKYOPANISIAD 89

Soundless-i e., it cannot be identified with any of the sounds or their corresponding statos 7 No, ete -Because soundless Aum is the same as Tunya Brahman XII.

अमात्रश्चतुर्थोऽव्यवहार्य: प्रपञ्चोपशमः शिवोऽद्वैत एवमों- कार आत्मैव संविशत्यात्मनाSडत्मानं य एवं वेद ॥१२।। That which has no parts (soundless), in- comprehensible (by the aid of the senses), the cessation of all phenomena, all bliss and non- dual Aum, is the fourth and verily the same as the Atman. He who knows this merges his self in the Self.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY The srara (soundless1) is that which has no parts (sounds, ete., or letters). This partless Aum which is the fourth, is nothing but Pure Atman. It is incomprehensible, because both speech and mind which correspond to the name2 and the object disappear or cease, the name and the object (that is indicated by the name) which are only forms of speech and mind cease or disappear (m the partless Aum). It is the cessation3 of the (illusion of) phenomena and all4 bliss and therefore identical with non-dualitys. Aum, as" thus understood, has three sounds which are the same as the three quarters and therefore Aum is identical7 with Atman. He who knows this morges8 his sell in the Self which is the highest Reality. Those who know Brahman, ie, those who realise the highest

90 MANDOKYOPINISHAD

Reality merge into Self, because m their case the no- tion of the causahty which corresponds to the third quarter (of Atman) is destroyed (burnt). They' are not born agam, because Turya is not a rause For, the illusory snake which has merged in the rope on the discrimination of the snake from the rope, does not reappear as before, to those who know the distinction between them, by any effort10 of the mind (due to the previous impressions) To the men of dull and mediocre intellect who still consider them- selves as students of philosophy, who having renounced the world, tread on the path of virtue and who know the common features between the sounds (WET:) and the quarters (or parts) as described above,-to them Aum, if meditated upon in a proper way, becomes a greatil help to the realisation of Brahman. The same is indicated in the Karila later on thus "The three inferior stages of life, etc ... ... " (Mand. Kārika, Advarta Chapter, 16.)

1 Soundless-It is because Amatra Aum cannot he oxpressed by any sound. It is relationless and therefore it cannot be properly described as the substratum of three other sounds. Sound points out by contrast, the soundless Aum All sounds must, at some time or other, merge in soundlessness. This Amatra Aum 1s idenneal with Turiya Atman as described in a previous text (Upamshad 7). 2 Name, elc .- Name is but a form of speech or sound All objeets are again forms of mind, Both the name and the objeet are therefore more ideas (H:q=aH). They disappear with the disapfearance of the mind at the dawn of knowledge There- fore soundless Aum, like Tunya, cannot be expressed by a name or pointed out as an object Therefore it is incomprehensble.

MĀNDŪKYOPANISIIAD 91

3 Cessation-As the rope is iealised when the illusion of snake disappears, similarly paitlesy (soundless) um is reahsed when the illusion of duahty vanishes. 4 All bless-This iy a state of infimte and eteinal bhss hecauso no illusion which is the cause of misory exists theie. Fomth-Amatra is called fourth because it oceupies the fourth place in order of explanation of Aum, of which three other states have previously been doalt with Fourth does not sigmfy any numerieal telationship with the thiee agpeets of Aum desoribed previously 5 Non-duahty-From the standpomt of the relative world, the soundlos state is the substratum of all illusory appearances. One can speak of dnahty only m the relative world 6 As thus, elc,-i e, with reference to the identity of the sounds and quaiters as explamed above. 7 Identical with-Three quarters, mz , Viswa, Tarjasa and Prajna are imagmned to subsist mn Atman Viswa merges in Tayusa, Tayasa in Prajna and finally Prana which is looked upon as the cause of the two preceding states merges in Turiya Atman. Smnlarly the three sounds, A. U, and M ultimately merge in the soundless Aum. In soundlegs Aum, the three sounds become identical with it as the thiee states are identical with Turiya from the absolnte standpoint Therefore Tunya Atman is the same as soundless Aum. 8 Merqes-That is, the knower realses himself as Turiya. 9 They are, ele -It may be contended that like a man coming back to the realm of duahty having experienced deep sleep, the knower of Self who has identified himself with Turiya may elso come back to the illusory umverse, for Piajna and Turiyu are identical having a common feature of the perception of non-duality. This contention is without ground, because Tunya is not a cause Hence it cannot give rise to the woild of illusory' exporience Unlike Prajna it is beyond all relations of cauve and effeet There- fore one who has identified himself with Turiyg can never see the illusion of the manifold 10 Dffort of mind-All efforts of mind are nothing but ideas. Our so-called illusory experiences and their opposite in the relativo

92 MĀNDŪKYOPANISIIAD

plane are nothing but ideas (मनःस्पन्दनम्) To a man who has realised ideas as non-different from Brahman, no illusion whioh is of the nature of existence separate from Brahman, is possible 11 Great help-Those students who cannot at once think of soundless Aum or Tunya Atman pioceed step by step and ultimately realise the highest Truth (Here ends the Mandukya Upanishad with the Commentary of Sankara.) The following verses explain the foregoing Upanishadic texts :- ओंकारं पादशो विद्यात् पादा मात्रा न संशयः । ओंकारं पादशो ज्ञात्वा न किंचिदपि चिन्तयेत् ॥२४।। 24 (The meaning of) Aumkara should be known guarter by quarter. There is no doubt that quarters are the same as the sounds (letters). Having grasped the (meaning of) Aumkara nothing else should be thought of. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

Here are, as before, the following verses - Aumkara should be known along with the quarters ; for. the quarters1 are identical with sounds (letters) because of their common features described before. Having2 thus understood Aumkara, no other object, seen or unseen, should be thought of, for the knower of Aumkara has all his desires fulfilled. 1 Quarters-It is because the quaiters of Atman are identified with the sounds (letters) of Aum. Therefore Aum should be meditated upon as Atman, Haring, etc .- That 1s, by reahsing Aum as Brahman.

MĀNDŪKYOPANISUAD 93

युञ्जति प्रणधे चेतः प्रणवो ब्रह्म निर्भयम् । प्रणवे नित्ययुक्तस्य न भयं विद्यते कवचित् ॥२५॥

25. The mind should be unifiedl with (the sacred syllable) Aum. (For) Aum is Biahman, the ever-fearless. Ie who is always unified with Aum knows no fear what- ever. SANKARA'S COMMKNTARY.

The word Yunnta means to unify, i.c., to absorb. The mind should be absorbed in Aum, which is of the nature of the Supreme Realty, as explained before The Aum is Brahman, the ever-fearless He who is always unified with Aum knows no fear whatever; for the Sruti says, "The knower of Brahman is not afraid of anything " He who is proficient or perfect mn the knowledge of Aum, acquired by an enquiry into its parts, 2.e., he who has unified him- self with the soundless (partless) Aum by meiging the three sounds In it, has anmhilated the entire dualstic illusion and thereby attamed to the supreme goal But those who cannot do so and those who always depend upon the teachings of others for aoquiring knowledge, should meditate upon dum in the manner desoribed in the Srat.

प्रणवो ह्वपरं ब्रह्म प्रणवश्च परः स्मृतः । अपूर्वोऽनन्तरोऽबाह्योऽनपर: प्रणवोऽव्ययः ॥२६॥

26. (The sacred syllable) Aum is verily the Lower Brahman, and it is also admitted to be the Supreme Brahman. Aum is without beginning (cause), unique, without anything outside itself, unrelated to any effect and changeless.

94 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

SANKARA'S COMMFNTARY.

Aum is both the Lower' Brahman and the Supreme Twsiya. When from the highest standpomt, the sounds and quarters disappear (mn the soundless Aum) it is verily the same as the Supreme Brahman It is without cause because no cause can be predicated of it It is unique because nothing else, belonging to any other species separate from it, exists. Similarly nothing else exists outside it. It is also not related to any effect (because it is not the cause of anything). It is without cause and exists overywhere, both inside and outude, like salt in the water of the ocean I Lower Brahman-That Is, the Brahman which is looked upon as the cause of the umverse. The dull and mediocie intellect should meditate upon fum as described in the first line of Kankū The second line describes the soundless aspect of Aum or the Turiya Atman which can be understood only by one possessing the keenest intellect. सर्वस्य प्रणवो ह्यादिर्मध्यमन्तस्तथैव च। एवं हि प्रणवं ज्ञात्वा व्यश्नुते तदनन्तरम् ॥२७॥ 27. Aum is verily the beginning, middle and end of all. Knowing Aum as such, one, without doubt, attains immediately to that (the Supreme Reality). SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

Aum1 is the begmning, middle and end of all, that is, everything origmates from Aum, is sustamed by it and ultinately merges m it. As2 the magician, etc. (without undergoig any change in themselves) stand in relation to the ifusory elephant, (the illusion of)

MANDŪKYOPANISIAD 95

snake-rope, the mirage and the dream, etc., so also is the sacred syllable Aum to the manifested manifold such as Akasa (ether) etc. The meaning is that he who knows thus, the Aum, Atmun, which, like the magician, etc, does not undergo any change, at3 once becomes unified with it 1 Aum .- When a cuuse, eto, of the universe is sought, Aum is poited out as such. This i9 in accordanee with the Parinama- zūda 2 As the magician, etc -This 18 from the standpomt of the Vwartarada The magician, the rope, the desert, etc., appear as the elephant, the snake, the mirage, ete., without undergoing any change in thomselves Similarly Aum also, from the relative standpoint, appcars to have become the entire manfested mani- fold without undergoing any change in itsolf But from the stand+ point of soundless dum, there is no manfested mamfold. It 18 not the cause of anything noi does it appear in any way other than itself Aum is inferied as is a juggler (HRrlfa) by those who see tho fact of creation and explain it as Maya. Therefore, the idea of the juggler is also an illusion and it lasts as long as we look upon the mamfold as Maya. It vamishes as soon as the Mayā or illusion disappears 3 At once-Jnana or knowledge is alune the cause of Mukti which does not depend upon anything else The moment we know the real nature of Aum, we become unified with it. प्रणवं हीश्वरं विद्यात् सर्वस्य हृदि संस्थितम्। सर्वव्यापिनमोंकारं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति ॥२८॥ 28. Know Aum to be Iswara, ever present in the mind of all ; the man of discrimination reahsing Aum as all- pervadang, does not grieve. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Know Aum as the Iswara present in the mind, which is the seat1 of memory and perception, of all

96 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

things. The man of discrimination realising Aumkara as all-pervading2 like the sky, ae, knowing it as the Atman, not bound by the law of transmigration, does not grieve, for, there is no cause3 of miserv for him The Semptures also abound in such passages as, "The knower of Atman goes beyond grief " 1 Seat, etr -The knowledge of past and present consists of ideas in the mind of the perceiver. From the recollection of the past one forms the idea of the future 2 All-periading-From the highest standpoint Aum is not confined to any particular space. It is beyond the limtation of time, ypacc, etc. Theiefore the knower of the all-pervading Aum tranycends guief wluch is the outcome of hmitation. Aum is ealled all-pervading because whatever we perceive or cognze 18 in consciousness. 3 Cause of misery -One can go beyond gref only by reahsing the highest Truth by Vureke or discrimination of real and umeal. अमात्रोऽनन्तमात्रश्च द्वैतस्योपशमः शिवः ।

ओंकारो विदितो येन स मुनिर्नेतरो जनः ॥२९॥ 29. One who has known Aum which is soundless and of ifinite sounds and which is ever-peaceful on account of negation of duulity is the (real) sage and none other.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

Amatra1 or soundless Aum signifies Turiya. Mātrā means "measure", that which has mfinite measure or magnitude is called Anantamūtra That is to say, it is not possible to determine its extension or measure by pointing to this or that. It is ever-peaceful on account of its beig the negation of all dualty. He who knows Aum, as explamed above, is the (real) sage

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 07

because he has realised the nature of the Supreme Reality. No2 one else, though he may be an expert in the knowledge of the Scriptures, is a sage. 1 Amatra-It is because there is no sound or part beyond the AUM, ie., the soundless and partless quarter (Amatra) is not indicated by any lotter. 2 No, etc,- Book-learmng without the duect reahsation of Truth is of no value.

Here ends the first chapter of Gaudapada's Kārıkā with the Commentary of Sankara.

Aum Salutation to Brabman. CUAPTER II.

ILLUSION.

वैतथ्यं सर्वभावानां स्वम् आहुर्मनीषिणः। अन्तःस्थानात्तु भावानां संवृतत्वेन हेतुना । १ ॥ 1. The wise declare the unreality of all the objects seen an the dream. they all being located withen (the body) and on account of their berng in a confined space. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

Aum It has been aheady said, "Duality does not exist when (true) knowledge arises" and this is borne out by such Sruti passages as, "It (Atman) 1s verily one and without a second", etc. This is all based merely on the authorityl of the Srute. It2 is also equally pos- sible to determme the unreahty (illusoriness) of dnality through pure reasoning and for this purpose is begun the second chapter which commences with the words, Vaitathyam (umealty) etc. The word, Vartathyam sigmfies the fact of its being unreal or false. Of what is this (unrealty) predicated ? Of all objects, both internal3 and external,4 perceived in the dream. It is thus declared by the wise, .e., those who are experts in the use of the means (pramanas) of arriving at true knowledge. The reason of this unreality is stated thus For, the objects perceived are found to be

MINDŪKYOPANISIIAD 99

located within the body. All these entities such as a mountain, an elephant, etc , perceived in the dream are cognized there5 (t.e. within) and not outside the body. Therefore they must be regarded as unreal. (Objection) -- This ("being withmn") is no valid reason A jar and other things on account of their being perceived within a cover, such as a cloth, ete, (eannot be called unreal).

(Reply)-On account of their being confined in a limited space, that is, within the body (where dream objects are cognized). It is not possible for the moun- tam, the elephant, etc., to exist in the limited space (within the nerves6 of the body) which are within the body. A mountam does not or cannot exist inside? a body 1 Authority of the Srut-The subject-matter, namely, the illusormess of duality, has been proved mn the first chapter solely on seriptural authority. 2 It is, etc -Sankara contends that the illusormess of the duality can be proved by reasoning also indepen lently of Srut. The Seripture, no doubt, convinces those who beheve in its autho- rity. But the metaphysies of Vedanta can hold its ground against thoye who do not beheve in the authority of the Vedas, eg., the Buddhists, the Jains, the Chamakas and others All fair dis- cussions are based on reason which is the common platform for all. It betrays ignorance of highei Vedanta to say that tho reason- ing employed in the Vedanta philosophy to arrive at the ultimate Truth is always subservient to senptural authonty. The second chapter of the Karika establishes the unreality .of dualty through reasoning independent of seriptural authouty. 3 Internal-i.e., such ideas as those of happiness, muisery, etc. 4 Erternal-eg., a pot, a mountain, ote. This distinchon betwcen internal ideas and external objeots is made heie from the

100 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

dream standpomt But from the waking standpoint all dream experiences are internal. 5 There-i e., within the body The dream is an activity of the mind and according to the common-sense view, mind is within the body. Therefore objecta seen in dream are said to exist within the body Nerues-It is said in the Soriptures that the mind moves about during the time of sleep along some nerves and this produces the dream experiences 7 Inside, etc .- If a mountam cannot exist within a body, it is still more impossible for it to exist within a nerve, which is an old world view. अदीर्धत्वाच्च कालस्य गत्वा देशान्नपश्यति। प्रतिबुद्धश्च वै सर्वस्तस्मिन्देशे न विद्यते ॥ २ ॥

2. On account of the shortness of lrme it is not possible for the dreamer to go out of the body and see (the dream objects). Nor does the dreamer, when he wakes up, find himself in the place (seen in hes dream). ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY. That all that is percerved to exist in dream is located in a limited space, is not a fact. For, a man sleeping in the east, often finds himself, as it were, experiencing dreams in the north Anticipating this objection (of the opponent) it is said .- The dreamer does not go to another region outside his body where he experiences dream. For, it is found that as soon as a man falls asleep he experiences dream objects, as1 it were, at a place which is hundreds of Yojanas2 away from his body and which can be reached only in the course of a month. The long period of time which is necessary

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 101

to go to that region (where dream objects are perceived) and again to come back (to the place where the sleeper lies) is not found to be an actual fact. Henre on account of the shortness of tnne the experiencer of the dream does not go to another region. Moreover. the dreamer when he wakes up, does not find himself in the place where he experiences the dream. Had the man (really) gone to another place while dreammg and cognized (or perceived) the dream-objects there, then he would have certamly woke up there alone. But this does not happen Though a man goes to sleep at night, he feels as though he were seeig' objects in the day-time and meeting many persons. (If that mecting were realy he ought to have been met by those persons (whom he himnself met during the dream). But this does not happen, for if it did, they would have said, "We met you there to-day " But this does not happen Therefore one does not (really) go to another region in dream 1 4s it uere-The dream experiences. though they appear to be real to the dreamer, are not really so The expeniences of dream are unreal on account of the absence of the appropuate time and place with whtch such experiences are associated. And this umeahty can be known from the waking condition alone. The unreahty of dieam-experiences i proved here from the standpoit of time and space. Even those who believe in the reahty of time and space oannot hut admit the illusoriness of dream-experiences 2 Yojana-It is a measure of distance of eight or nine miles. अभावश्च रथादीनां श्रूयते न्यायपूर्वकम्। वैतथ्यं तेन वै प्राप्तं खम्र आहुः प्रकाशितम् ॥ ३॥

102 MANDOKYOPANISHAD

3. Following reason, (as idrcated above) Śruti de- clares the non-emrstence of the chariots, ete. (perceived in dream) Therefore it is sard (by the wise) that Sruti itself declares the illusoriness (of the dream-expenences) established (by reuson). SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. For this reason also the objects percerved to exist in dream are illusory. For, the absence of the chariots, etc., (perceived in dream) is stated by Sruti, m such passages as "Therel exists neither chariot, etc.", its assertion being based on reason 2 In the opuon of the wise, t.e., the knowers of Brahman, the illusoriness (of the dream objects) has been established on the ground of their being perceived within the contracted space in the body. The Sruti only reiterates it in order to establish the self-luminosity3 (of Atmun) in dream. 1 There, etc .- Comp Brhd Up , 4.3.10. 2 Reason-The reason, as adduced m the previous Kārdla, is the absence of the appiopriate time and space for the real exist- ence of such dream objects, 3 Self-luminosity-Comp. Brhd Up., 4,3 14. Mere examina- tion of the waking experiences cannot prove that Atman is self- lummous. FoL, it may be conteuded that various activities, asvociated with the waking state, ate due to the tunchioning of the sense-organs under the influence, as the Sruti says, of the varous luminous deities as the sun, the fire, ete But in sleep various achvitios are experienced by the dreamer and these acti- vibes, m the absence of the funchonings of the sense-organs, are due to the self-luminosity of Atman अन्तःस्थानात्तु भेदानां तस्माज्जागरिते स्मृतम्। यथा तत्र तथा सने संवृतत्वेन भिद्यते ॥४॥

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 103

4. Different objrcts cognased in dream (are illusory) on account of their being perceived to exist. For the same reason, the objects seen in the waking state are illusory. The nature of objects is the same in the wahang state and dream. The only difference is the hmitation of space (associated with dream objects) SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The proposition to be establshed (Pratyna) is tho illusormess of objects that are perceived in the waking state. "Bemg percerved" is the " ground" (hetu) for the inference They are hke the objects that are percewved in dream, is the illustration ((a) As the objects perceived to exist in dream are illusory so also are the objects perceived in the waking state. The common feature of "being perccived" is the relation (Upunaya) between the illustration given and the proposition taken for consderation. Therefore the illusormess is admitted of objects that are perceived to exist in the waking state. This is what is known as the resteration (Nigamanam) of the proposition or the conclusion The objeots perceived to exist in the dream are different1 from those perceived in the waking state in respect of then being perceived in a limited space within the body. The fact of being scen and the (consequent) illusoriness are common to both.

1 Different-Thuis difference is noted only from the waking condition, No inappropriateness of space is noticed during the dream. Sankara's commentary on the Karika is m the form of a syllogism.

104 MANDOKYOPANISHAD

खमजागरितस्थाने ह्वेकमाहुर्मनीषिणः । भेदानां हि समत्वेन प्रसिद्धेनैव हेतुना ॥ ५ ॥ 5. The thoughlful persons speak of the sameness of the waking and dream states on account of sunilarity of objects (percewved in both the states) on grounds already described. ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The identityl (of the experiences) of the dream and waking states is declared by the wise on account of the rcason, already stated, ? e., the experience of objects (in both the states) is associated with subject-object2 relationship. This Kaha onunciates the conclusion that has already been arrived at in the previous m- ference by the wise. 1 Jdentity-Sometimes expeuience is said to be of three kinds : Pāramarthika, Prathibhasila and Vyavaharika, making the last two different from each othet. Gaudapida does not make any dstinction between the dream (HfHE) and waking (T) experienees Comp Kanka II (Ist chapter). z Subjert-ohject-The two factors, namely, the seer and the seen, are equally present in both the waking and the dream states. The dream and the waling experience+ are identical becauso both are characterised by the same condition, riz, the character- istic of "being porceived." Therefore they. hoth, are unreal. The reason of "being seen", as already described, is a matter of common experience. आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा। व्वितथैः सद्वशाः सन्तोऽवितथा इव लक्षिताः ॥ ६॥ 6. Thut which is non-existent at the beginning and in the end, is necessarily so (non-existent) in the middle.

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 105

The objects are like the illusions we see, still they are regarded as if real. ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY The objects perceived to exist m the waking state are unreal for this reason also,1 ae, they do not exist either at the beginning or in the end. Such objeots (of experience) as mirage, ete., do not evist either at the beginning or in the end Therefore they do not (really) exist in the middle also This is the decided3 opinion of the world. The different objects percerved to evist in the waking state are also of the same3 rature. Though they (the objects of experience) are of the same nature as the illusory objects, such as mrage, etc., on account of their non-existence at the begmning and in the end, still they are regarded as real by the ignorant, that is, the persons who do not know Atman. 1 Also-Tlus is an additional ieason for the illusoriness of the waking objects. 2 Decided, etc .- The reason for the illusoriness of the objeots perceived to be real is that such (illusory) existence is not perceived at the beginning or in the end If it be contended that the per- ceived object exists at the beginning as the cause, it will be shown later on that this causal conception is itself illusory. 3 Same, elc -i.e., illusory. According to Caudapida, illusory objects are those whioh have no existence at the begmming and in the end This 19 exactly the characteristie of objects perceived to exist outside of us. Changeability is the characteristic of all percerved objects. Change imphes non-existence at the begmnng and in the end. As all perceived objects are of this nature, there. fore thoy are called illusory. In this Kariks emphasis is laid on the non-existence of the perceived objects at the beginning and in the end. The ego is the percoiver (Dry) ot all oljects seen, The ego does not change

106 MANDOKYOPANISHAD

as it is the witness of all changes. The perceived objects are known to be illusory or unreal in compansou with the percerver. सप्रयोजनता तेषां खने विप्रतिपद्यते। तस्मादाद्यन्तवत्वेन मिथ्यैव खलु ते स्मृताः ॥७॥ 7. The seruing a purpose (as means to an end), of them (the objects of waking experience) is contradicted (opposed) in dream Therefore they are undoubtedly admitted to be illusory on account of their (both waking and dream) being with a beginning and an end. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. (Objection)-The assertion that the objects per- ceived to exist in the waking state are illusory like those of the dream state is illogical It is because the objects of the waking experience, such as food, drink or vchicles, etc., are seen to serve some purpose, that is, they appease hunger and thirst as well as do the work of carrying a man to and fro. But this is not the case with the objects perceived in dream. There- fore the conclusion that the objects perceived in the waking state are unteal like those seen in dream is mere faney (Reply)-It is not so. (Objection)-Why ? (Reply)-It is because the serving as means to some end or purpose which is found m respect of tood, drink, etc., (in the waking state) is contradicted in dream., A man, in the waking state, eats and drinks and feels appeased and free from thrst. But as soon as he goes into sfeep, he finds himself (mn dream)

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 107

afflicted with hunger and thirst as if he were without food and dumk for days and nights. And the contrary also happens to be oqually true A man satiated with tood and drink in dream finds himselt, when awakened, quite hungry and thirsty. Therefore the objects peiceived in the waking state are contradieted in dream Hence, we think that the illusoriness of the objects perceived mn the waking state like those of cheam need not be doubted Therefore1 both these objects are undoubtedly admitted to be illusory on account ot thenr common feature of having a begmning and an end

) Therefore-Therefore the original assertion that the objects seen in the waking and dream states are illusory on account of their bemg characterised by a begmning and an end need not be doubted The test of reabty is thought by some to be " what works " (as the Arthakniyakaryaiadins hold) As the dream objects do not work in the waking state therefore they are unreal The Vedanti says that dream objeots aie means to dream ends as the wakmg ones are to waking ends A sense of cansal ielation 18 present in the dieam mind as in the waking mind But what 1s considered logical sequence m the waking state is not thought to be such in the dream Each has its own notion of propnety and cach is stultifiod by the other in spite of its appearing to be real. अपूर्व स्थानिधर्मो हि यथा खर्गनिवासिनां। तानयं प्रेक्षते गत्वा यथैवेह सुशिक्षितः ॥ ८।।

8. The objects (percerved by the drenmer), not usually met with (in the waking stute) undoubtedly, oue therr existence to the (peculiar) condition in which the cognizer, that is, his mind, worhs for the tinte beeng. as in the case

108 MANDŪKYOPANISIAD

of those residing in heaven. The dreamer associating himself (with the dream conditions) expernces those (objects), even as the one, well-instrucled here (goes from one place to another and sees objects belonging to those places). SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

(Objection) -- The assertion about the illusoriness of objects perceived in the waking state on account of their similarity to those perceived in the dream state is not true. (Reply)-Why ? (Objection)-The illustration does not agrec with the thing to be illustrated. (Reply)-How ? (Objection) -- Those objects that are cognized in the waking state are not seen in dream. (Reply)-What then are they (dream experiences) ? (Objection)-A man perceives in dream objects which are never usually seen in the waking state. He finds himself (mn dream) to be with eight hands and seated on an elephant with four tusks. Simlarly various other unusnal (abnormal) objects are seen in the dream. These (dream objects) are not hke other illusory objects. They are, without doubt, real (in themselves). Therefore the illustration does not agree. Hence, the statement that the waking experiences are unreal hke those of dream is not correct. (Reply) -- No, your conclusion is not correct. You think that the objects perceived m dream are extra- ordinary (not like those usually seen in the waking

MĀNDŪKYOPANISIAD 109

state), but these are not absolutely real in themselves. What, then, is their nature ? They1 are only peculiar to the circumstances of the perceiver associated with those (dream) conditions, 2 e., of the dreamer assomated with the dream-conditions As2 the denizens of heaven, such as Indra, ete., have the characteristies of being endowed with a thousand eyes, ete (on account of the very condition of their existence in heaven), so also there are the (peculiar) unusual (abnormal) features of the dreamer (on account ot the pecuhar condition of the dream state). These3 (dream experiences) are not absolutely real like the absolute roality'of the percerver. The dreamer associated with the (dream) conditions, while in the dream state, sees all these abnormal or peculiar object which are but the imaginations of his own mind. It is like the case of a man, m the wakmg expemenre, who is well-mstructed regarding the route to be taken to reach another country, and who while going to that country sees on the way objects belonging to that locality. Hence as4 perception of snakein the rope and the mirage in the desert which are due to the (mental) conditions of the perceiver are unreal, so also the objects, transcending the limits of the waking experience, perceved in dream, are unreal on account of their being due to the (peculiar) condition of the dream state itself. Therefore the illustration of dream is not mcorrect. 1 They are, etc .- The dream expériences have no causal rela- tion with the waking experience. A causal relation between two ohjeets of waking experiences, as will be seen later on, cannot be proved to be true. The slojects of our experiences, whether in

110 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

dream or waking state, ale but the creations of the mind (y) and it is due to ignorance that we relate them causally In dream, mind is associated with those experiences which are realized as creations of dream. 2 As, elc .- It is only some particular forms of thought which croate heaven, eto , with their pecuhar denizens They are not absolutely real but are only our imaginations The moment we imagine heaven, we imagine it also to be peopled with Indra, ete , in as much as m our mind Indra, etc, are ever associated with heaven. 3 These, etc,-The expenencos of dream are not real because of their changing nature. But the perceiver of dream is real because it is unchangeable and witnesuing the changes Even the so-oalled sentient beings we perceive in dream are insentient because they are also objeets of perception (E) and they appear and disappear 4 As, etc -The illusory perception of mirage, ete , is due to the pecuhar mental condition of the cognizer. These illusions last as long as the mental conditions that create them last The object perceived to be real in the waking state, the illusions experiencec in that state and the objects percoived mn the dream state have the same nature, t e , they are all seon (E") and as such they au all forms of thought (भनःस्पन्दनम्) Honce they are all illusory No reality can be attached to any of them. It has been said before that both the dream and waking expe riences are alike in nature But a hne of demarcation is soughi to be drawn between them, contending that the dream percept being most of them queer, fantastic and even unnatural, the hk of them do not find a place in the world of the wakeful man, Bu such percepts, however grotesque or abnormal, appear perfeotly normal to the dieamer. The dreamer evidently has his own notior of space, distance and form But his standards have no appli calhty to the wakefuf man And the notions of the latter nl regard to space, eto., have no place in the dreamer's world, thougl for each everything is normal and real. स्त्रमवृत्तावपि त्वन्तश्वेतसा कल्पितं त्वसत्। बहिश्वेतोगृहीत सद्दृष्ट वैत्थ्यमेतयोः ॥ ९ ॥

MANDOK YOPANISHAD 111

जाग्रद्वृत्तावपि त्वन्तश्चेतसा कल्पितं त्वसत्। बहिश्चेतो गृहीतं सद्युक्तं वैतथ्यमेतयोः ॥ १० ॥ 9-10. In dream, also, whot is rmagined uithin by the mind is illusory and what is cognied outside (by the the mind) appears to be real. But (in truth) both these are known to be unrenl Sumilarly, in the waking state, also, what as imagined within by the mind is illusory : and what is experienced outside (by the mind) appears to be apal. But in fact, both should be rationally held to be uneal. ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY Having refuted the contention of the opponent that there evists no similarity between objects of the waking state and the abnormal (unusual) objects seen in dream, (the text proceeds to point out) the truth of the objects of waking state being (unreal) like those of dream In the dream state also those which are mere modifications of the mind, cognized within, are illusory. For such internal objects vanish the moment after they are cognized. In that very dream such objects as pot, etc , cognized by the mind and percen ed by the sense-organs, eyes, etc., as existing outside, are1 held to be real Thus, though all the dream experiences are, without doubt, known" to be unreal, yet they arrange themselves as3 real and unreal Both kinds of objeets (in dream), imagined by the mind internally and externally, are found to be unreal. Similarly (in the waking experience) objects known as real and imaginary (mental) should be rationally held to

112 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

be unreal. Objects, iternal and external, are creations of the mind (whether they be in the dream or in the waking state). Other things have already been ex- plaincd. 1 Are held to be reat-That is, by the subject in the dream. 2 Known, etc .- We know the illusoriness of the dream experi- ences from the waking state. 3 As, efc -re., at the time of dreaming. Tlus is anothei ground for proving the similarity of the dream and the waking states and the consequent umoality of the latter. It may be contended that mn the waking state we make a distmotion between "real" and " unreal" and that the latter corresponds to all dream objects. To this the reply of the Vedantast is . In dreams also we make a distmction between "real " and "unreal". We yee unreal objects in dream and feel surprised when the pioture wears off, which impiession we consider umeal mn dream itself. Therefore there exists a sense of distinction between the "real " and the "unreal" in the one state as m the other. For, while the dream lasts, to the dreamer not only are dream objects real but also is the dream state a waking one. The whole of dream experences is known to be illusory only from the waking stand- point Simlarly the whole of waking experiences, meluding iis so-called subjeetive imaginations and objeotive realities, is equally uthreal from the standpoint of true knowledge. उभयोरपि वैतथ्यं भेदानां स्थानयोर्यदि। क एतान्बुध्यते भेदान्को वै तेषां विकल्पकः ॥ ११ ॥

I1 If the objests cognazed in both the condilions (of dream and of wahing) be illusory, who cognires all these (illusory objects) and who again rmagines them? SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

The opponent asks, "If the objects, cognized in the waking and drenm states, be devoid of reahty,

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 113

whol is the cognizer of these,-objeets imagined by the mind, both inside (subjective) and outside (objective) ? Who is, again their imaginer ?" In short, what is the support (sub-stratum) of memory and knowledge ? If2 vou sav none, then we shall be led to the conclusion that there is nothing like Alman or Self. 1 Who, ete .- It is the subject (ot the ego) who, remembruing his past experienees, has similar expeuences m the present We can mnfer a subjeet only from the facts of memory and experionce. If experience and memory be umeal, the subjeet also would be unreal or non-existent 2 Jf, ete .- If the Self (Atman) and the objeetive would ho unreal, then all categories of experience, ut , knower, known and know- ledge become mere illusion That is the same as beheving in absolute mhilism in which the eustence of even Atman or Solf is denied But this contention is ivald One cannot deny the existence of AItman For, one who refutes Atmun, takes the position of Atman. Therefore the theory of the non-existence of Atman cannot be admitred.

कल्पय त्यात्मनाSSत्मानमात्मा देवः खमायया। स एव बुध्यते भेदानिति वेदान्तनिश्चयः ॥ १२ ॥ v 12. Atman, the self-luminous, through the power of has own Maya, mnagines in himself by himself (oll the objrets that the subuct experiences within or iithoutj. He clone is the cognier of the ohjerts (so created). This is the decision of the Vedanta. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY .. The self-luminous1 Atman himself,2 bya his own Mayi, imagies4 in5 himself the differente objects, to be deseribed hereafter. It is like the imagining of the 4

114 MANDŪKIOP,INISHAD

snake, etc., in the rope, etc. He? himself cognizes them, as8 he has imagined them There9 is no other sub- stratnm of knowledge and memory. The aim of Vedanta is to declare that knowledge and memory are not without support as the Buddhistie nihilists maintain. 1 Self luminovs-The self-lummosity of Atmun is predicated fiom the relative standpoint, Objeets, otherwise insentiont, appear sentient ou account of the conscious Atman pervading everywhere. " Himself-There is no extra-cosmc creator of the universe who, like the potter, is separate from his creation 3 By hs own Maya-When one looks upon the crcation as a fact and seeks its cause, Mayh or ignorance is pointed out as such cause. The Mfaya mheres mn Brahman as viewed from the same cansal standpomt It is hhe the ignorance which, inhonng mn the perceiver, makes him see his own mind appearing as various dream objects The causal ignorance which makes Atman appear as the manifested mamfold, is here called Maya. 4 Imagines-There is no actual creation It is an imagination due to the ignorance of the perceiver 5 In himsel/-From the causal standpoint Atman is both the material aud the efficient cause of the umverse. There is no mert matter or anything else, separate from Atman, winch he has fashoned mto the umverse 6 Different objects-\ll perceived objects consisting of the ego and the non-ego 7 He himself-Atman creates this world with his own Maya and then he himself being iefleoted m Buddhi (mind), appears as Jira who perceives the ohjects 8 As he, etc -Agency, efe., associated with Atman, are not absolutely real. It is because the Atman imagines himself, owing to Maya, as an agent, that he is looked upon as the subjert. 9 There is, etc .- Knowledge and memnry, categories of relative pereeption, inhere m the Atman (Self from the suhjeetive stand- point) and i the creator (Brahman from the objective standpoint). Biahman and Atnan are identical

MANDŪKYOPANISIIAD 115

This illusory Jira, Bwara and the world last as long as the ignorance (Maya) lasts Sobpsism cannot be huid against Vedanta. For, according to Vedanta, the ego is not the creator of the non-ego They come into existence together One cannot exist without the other From the telative standpoint both ego and non ego are the produets of mentation of Ifwmra or the coemie mind.

विकरोत्यपरान्भावानन्तक्षित्ते व्यवस्थितान्। नियतांश्च बहिश्चित्त एव कल्पयते प्रभुः ॥ १३ ॥ 13 The Lord (Atman), with hs mind turned out- ward, varously rmagines the darerse objects (such as sound, ete ), which ave alseady in his mand (in the form of Vasanas or Sankalpas or desues). The Atman again (unrth his mind turned unthin), imayines in his mind various (objects of) ideas.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. How does he imagmne the ideas ? It is descmbed thus .- The word " Vikaroti" means creates or imagines, ie., manifests in multiple forms. Loid, r.e., Atman, with1 his mind turned outward, imagmes in diverse forms various objects, perceived in the (outside) world, such as sound, etc., as well as other objects,2 and also various objects permanent (such as earth, ete ), and impermanent,3 ie, which exist only for the moment, ie, as long as that imagination lasts-all beig of the nature of subtle ideas (Vasanas) in his mind and not yet fully manifested Similarly, turning his mind within, the Lord imagines various ideas which are subjectrve. 'Prabhu" in the text means the Lord (Iswaiu), i,e., the Atman.

116 MANDŪKYOPINISHAD

1 With hia, ele -The distinetion of objecta as internal and external is due to the association of the two organs of perception, namely, mind and sense-organs. When mind alone is concerned we cognwe mternal objeets, when sense-organs are associated with mind we perceive external objects. or m other words, the Atman with the association of sense-organs externahses the iternal ideas, 1.e., makes them appear as gross physical objects This division of externalty and internaltty is not real 2 Other, ete -Such as heavenly woild, ete, mentioned in the scriptures. 3 Impermanent-Such as hghtning, ete. As a potter or a weaver, mn order to prodnce a pot or a cloth, first of all, imagmnes these mn his mind and subseqnently manifests them outside, associating them with apmopriate names and forms; so also the great Loid, first of all, conceives in hs mind, as an idea. the exteinal world to be and then projeets it outsule associating at with suitable names and forms The woild that is veen extended m tumne and space, with its peimanent and impermanent objects as well as the various ideas which are distmguished from matter, are all nothing but the ideas mn the mind of the Creator, te , Atman This dtmun or the causal Self creates by lus imagmauon the ego and the non-ego as well as their mutual relationship श्री चित्तकाला हि येऽन्तस्तु द्वयकालाश्च ये बहिः। कल्पिता एव ते सर्वे विशेषो नान्यहेतुकः ॥ १४ ॥

14 Those that are cognised withn only as long as the thought of them lasts, as well as those thal are per- ceived by the senses and that conform to two pornts of timc, are all mere imagination There is no other ground for differentrating the one from the other. ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY. A1 doubt is raised as to the statement that every- thing is mere imagination of mind like the dream.

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 117

For, the imagination of mmd, such as desire, etc., determined2 by mind, is different from objects3 per- cerved to exist outside, on account of the latter being determmed by two pomts in time. This objection is not valid. "Objects perceived to exist within, only as long as the thought about them lasts," sigmfy those (subjective) ideas which are only determmed by mind, ae, such objects have no other time to determine them except that wherein the idea m the mind exists (when imagmmng such ideas) The meaning is that such (subjective) ideas are experienced at the time when they are imagined. "Objects related to two pomts of time" signify those external objects which are cognizable by others at some other point of time and which cognize the latter in ther turn There- fore such objects are said to be mutually linuted by one another As for evample, when it is said that he remains till the cow is milked, the statement means, 'The cow is milked as long as he remams and he ie- mains as long as the cow is milked " Af similar instance is the following. 'It is like that, that is like this " In this way, the objects perceived to exist outside mutually determine one another. Therefore they are known as " Duayakalah," that is, related to two points in time. Ideas perceived within and exist- ing as long as the mind that cogmizes them lasts, as well as the external objects related to two points in time, are all mere imagmnations.7 Thes peculiar characteristic of being related to two pomts in time of the objects that are perceived to 'exist outside is not 6

118 MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

due to any other cause except their being imagineď by the mmd. Therefore the illustration of dream well applies here.

1 A doubt -- ze, the imaginary objeets exist only as long as the mind that imagines them lasts. They have no existence be- yond that time But the external objects that are perceived in the waking state evist at other times also even when the mind does not imagine them Therefore external oleets cannot be proved to be illusory by the mere illugtration of dream exporiences 2 Determined, etc .- The mental magmnation has no correspond- ing teality eviyting outside Such magmary idea, as the objective illusion of the snake in the rope, cieated within by the mind, is of the nature of mind and is peicerved to exist within the mind alone. Such ideas exist only as long as the perceiving mind exists, They cannot be proved to exist by any othor instrument of knowledge. 3 Olects, etc -But the different external objects aie mutually cognied by one another from different points in time The consciousnoss that such object exists does not depend upon the perceiving mind alone Therefore such objects eannot be of the same nature as dieam or imaginary objeots. s Which are, etc -ie , external objects are perceived by other minds existing pievious to or subsequent to the present per- ceiving mind S He remains, elc .- The two external objeets of cognition, e.g., the milking of a cow and the remaimng of a man are mutually related to each other in two points m ume The cow may be milked independent of a man's existence and a man may exist independently of the millang of the cow. Those objeets that are in this manner mutually cognized are said to answer to two points in time. 6 A similar istance-As long as a pot serves a purpose, so long it is said to exist. Iere also the time is the limiting factor Thus all objeots that are percerved to exist outside are determined by the prevent or any other time. They are independent of the mind of tho perceiver , They are, rathei, dependent upon the time in which they exist.

VINDŪKYOPANISHAD

7 Imaginations-That a thing exists mdependent of the per- ceiving mind is also an idea. That the world existed before I wus boin or will contmue to exist after I die oi that many tlngs evist at present of which I am not conacious,-these are all mere ideas an my mind at the present time Past, present and future are no- thing but ideas present in the mind at the moment. 8 The peculi, ete .- This oan be better undeistood from the analogy of the dream A man may dteam for five minutes in which time he may see objects existing during as many vears, Different objeets percerved in dream answeung to different pomis in time are but the imagmnation of the dreamer who only dreams for a few moments Simdlarly mn the waking state R man, by mere force of imagmation, sees objects conforming to different pomts in time extending hundreds of years Though from the waking standpomi dream objects are known to be illugory, yet they are perceived to be actually existing at the time of dream. Similaily it is quite reasonable to beleve in the illusory nature of the wakmg experience fiom the standpoint of truth There is no difierence between the objects perceived in dream and waking states on account of their possessing a common feature, namely, "capubilty of being seen" अव्यक्ता एव येडन्तस्तु स्फुटा एव च ये बहिः । कल्पिता एव ते सर्वे विशेषस्त्चिन्द्रियान्तरे ॥ १५॥

15. Those that exist within the mind (as mere sub- jective imaginations) and are known as the unmanifested as well as those that erist anthout in a manifested form (as percewed objects),-all are mere imnginations, the difference lying only in the sense-organs (by means of which the latter are cognuzed). SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Though1 the objeets perceived within, as mere mental impressions, are unmanifested, and though2 the objects perceived outside through the sense-organs

120 MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

such as eyes, etc., are known as manifested (gross entities), yet the distmnction3 is not duc to anything substantial in the nature of the (two kinds of) objects. For, such distinction is seen in dreams as well. What is, then, the cause of this distinction t It4 is only due to the difference in the use of sense-organs (bv means of which these objects are perceived). Hence, it is established that the objects perceived in the waking state are as much imagination of the mind as those seen mn the dream.

1 Though, etc .- Objects peiceived within the mind are mere pioduets of imagmation. The charactensuc of such objects is their unmanifestedness Therefore they aie known as "ideas" in contradistinction to "gross" objeets perceived outside 2 Thorgh, etc .- Those peicerved to exist outside and cognized by different sense-organs are known as gross mamfested objects and as such they are distinguished fiom ideas in the mind, 3 The distinchon, etc .- This distinction between the gross ob- jects and the subtle ideas is not due to anything substantial or real in the very nature of the objects. They belong to one and the same class, i e, both these are mere forms of thought or the imagmned ideas of the perceiver Though there is this distino- tion of mamfestedness and unmamfesterness, yet one cannot be less illusory than the othei. For, we aee the same distinction in dream experiences as well, yet the whole of dream is illusory or imagmation of the mind It as, etc -Tlus distinction is due to the following reason. Ideas are cognized wthmn the mind External ohjects are per- ceived by sensc-organs such as the eyes, ete. The distinotion regardmng the natmie of percerved objects is due to the natuie of the organs by means of which they are porceived In spite of this difference ideas and physical objects do not admit of any distmetion as regards their ieal natme. In dreams also there are sensc-organs of the dream. There is therefore no real difference.

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 121

जीवं कल्पयते पूर्व ततो भावान्पृथग्विधान्। बाह्यानाध्यात्मिकांश्वैव यथाविद्यस्तथास्मृतिः ॥।१६॥ 16. Furst of all, is imagined the Jiva (the embodred bring) and then are rmagined the vamous entinies, ob- jechwe and subjectiee, that ie peicerred. As as (one's) knowledge so is (onc's) memory of it.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. What is the source of the imagmation of various objects, subjective1 and objective,2 that are perceived and appear to be related to one another as cause and effect ? It is thus explained -The Jwa is of the nature of cause and effect and is further characterised by such ideas as "I do this, I am happy and miserable " Such Jiva is, at first, imagined3 in the Atman4 which is pure and devoid of anv such characteristics, like5 the imagmnation of snake in the rope Then for the knowledge of the Jiva are imaginede various existent entities, both suhjective and objective, such as Prann, etc., constituting different ideas such as the agent, action and the result (of action) What is the cause of this imagmation ? It is thus explamed: It, the Jiva, who is the product of iagmation and competent to effect further imagmnation, has its memory deter- mmed by its own mherent knowledge. That is to sav, its knowledge is always followed by a memory, similar to that knowledge. Hence,7 from the knowledge of the idea of cause results the knowledge of the idea of the effect. Then follows the memory of both cause

122 VANDŪKYOPANISHAD

and effect. This memory is followed by its knowledge which results in the various states ot knowledge characterised by action, actor and the effect. These are followed by their memory, which, mn its turn, is followed by the states of knowledge In this way are imagined various objects, subjective and objective, which are perceived and seen to be related to one another as cause and effect.

1 Subjective-Such as, pam and pleasure, knowledge, attach- ment, eto, 2 Oleclive-Such as, vanous objeets perceived outside of us. These objeets appear to cause various subjective feelingy m us, which, in their turn, seem to cieate external objeet- Thereforo, subjective and objective entities appear to be mutually related as cause and effect 3 Imngied-The Atman itself imagines the idea of a Jiva through the power of Maya d Atman-Atman, pure and umelated, appears as the substratum of all ideas 5 Like, elc -No illusory superimposition is possible without a real substratum. This is the reply to the Buddhistie nilnhsm. 6 Imagined-That is to say, by the Jwva itself through the power of Maya which is postulated from the causal standpomt. 7 Hence, etc .- It is seen from common experience that the idea of food and drink is followed by the idea of satistaction One is not possible m the absence of the other Following this method of agreement and difference we imagme thus From the idea of knowledge of food ete., which is the cause, follows the idea of the knowledge of satisfaction which is the eftect Next day, we get the memory of this cause and effect experienced on the pre- vious day. Then we have the idea of a duty which may be de- serbed as a iesult of the previous experience. Accordingly we begmn the act of cooking, etc, with the help of rioe, fuel, eto. After eating the food thus prepared, we derive certain definite states of knowledge characterised by the idea ot satisfaction, etc.

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 123

This satisfaction mheres in us as the memory which stimulates us, next day, to similar action We perform the action which 18 followed by an idenucal result Thus ideas succeed one another and appear to be related as cause and effeet. That these ideas need not have any counterpart in the grous phyuoal world of the waking state can be understood by the analysis of the dream experionces. As a matter of faet, it eannot be rationally proved that even, in tho waking state, an ideu cun produce a correspond- ing effect in the world perceived to exist outside of us,

अनिश्चिता यथा रज्जुरन्धकारे विकल्पिता। सर्पधारादिभिर्भीवैस्तदवदात्मा विकल्पितः ॥ १७॥। 17. As the rope, whose nature is not really known, is imngined in the daak to be a snake, a wuter-hne, etc., so also is the Atman imagined (in rarious ways). SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. It has been said that the imagination of Jiva (the Jra-idea) is the source of all (other) imaginations (1deas). What is the cause of this Jwva-idea ? It is thus explained by an illustration :- It is found in the common experience that a rope, not known as such, is imagined, mn hazy darkness, as snake, water-line, stick or any one of the many similar things. All this is due to the previous absence of knowledge regarring the real nature of the rope. If previously the rope had been known in its real nature, then the imagmation of snake, etc., would not have been possible, as in the case of one's own fingers Similarly, Aiman has been variously imagined as Jara, Prana and so forth1 because It is not known in Its own nature, 1.e., pure2 essence of knowledge itself,

124 MANDUKYOP.INISHAD

the non-dual Atman, quite distmet fiom such pheno- menal characteristacs indicated by the relation of cause and effect, cte., which are productive of misery, This is the unmistakable verdict of all the Upanishads. 1 So forth, ete -e g, the ideas of agent, enjoyer, ote. 2 Pure, elc .-- i.e., without birth, death, form, eto निश्चितायां यथा रज्ज्वां विकल्पो विनिवर्तते। रज्जुरेवेति चाद्वैतं तद्वदात्मविनिश्चयः ॥ १८ ॥। 18. When the real nalure of the sope is ascertarned all illusions about it disappear and there arrses the convic- tion that it is the one (unchanged) rope and nothing else; even so is the nature of the coninction regarding Atman. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. When it is determmed that it is nothing but the rope alone, then all illusions regarding the rope disappear and the (non-dual) knowledge that there exists nothing else but the rope, hecomes firmly establshed. Similar is the knowledge,-hke the light of the sun -- produced by the negative scriptural statements which dony all phenomenal attributes (in dbnan),-statements like "Not this","Not this", etc., leadmg to the knowledge of the real nature of Atman, as " All this is verily Atman", "(It is) without cause and cffect, without mternality and externality", "(It is) ever without and within and beginningless", "(It is) without decay and death, immortal, fearless, one and without a second." प्राणादिभिरनन्तैश्च भावैरेतैर्विकल्पितः । मायैषा तस्य देवस्य यया संमोहित: स्यम् ॥ १९॥

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 125

19. The Atman is imugined as Prana und other endless obccts This is due to Maya (ignorance) of the luminous (Atmau uself) by which It is (as it were) deluded.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. It it be definitely ascertained that Atman is verily one, how could it be iagined as the endless objects like Prana, etr., having the chaiacteristies of the pheno- menal experience ? It is thus explained -This is due to the Maya (ignorance) mnhering in the lummous Atman As the illusion conjured up by the juggler makes1 the very clear sky appear covered with trees blooming with flowers and leaves, so2 does this luminous Atman become deluded, as it were, by his own Māya. "My Maya cannot be easilv got over" declares the Gīfã.

1 Makes, etc .- Even when, under the mfluence of the juggler's illusion, the sky appears to be filled wth trees, oto., it does not, in realty, lose its natural clearness 2 So, etc .- Maya as the explanation ot the mamfold is from the causal standpoint Even when Alman appears to be transformed into the universe, it does not, in realty, lose ita non-dutal character.

प्राण इति प्राणविदो भूतानीति च तद्विदः । गुणा इति गुणविदस्तत्वानीति च तद्विदः ॥ २०॥

20. Thosel that know only Prana,2 enll It (Atman) Prana, thoses that know Bhutas call It Bhutas,4 thoses knowing Gunas call ft Gunasf, those? knouing Tattvas, call It Tattvas8.

126 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

1 Those -- e.g., the Vaiseshilas and the worshippers of Hiranya- garbha, etc. 2 Prana-They hold Prana, ie., Dirunyagmbha or extra- cosmic Gnd, to be the onuse of the univeise This is mere imagi- nation of the mind. There is no rational proof of the reality of an extra-cosmie God or Person as the cause of the world. 3 Those, etc -e g., the Charvakas or the atheists. 4 Bhutas-They designate the four elements, such as, carth, water, fire and air, which arc directly peiceived by them, as the cause of the universe. The insentient elements cannot be the cause of the sentient beings Therefoie this theory also 1s an imagination 5 Those, elc .- e g , the Samkhyas. Gunas-According to the Samkhyas, the stute ot equilibrium of the three Gunas, ms , Sattra, Rias and Tamas, produces Mahat, etc , and through them the umverse. This is also meie idea. 7 Those, etc .- i.e,, The Sawas. 8 Taltvas-The Sawas onumerate three Tattvas or categoues, viz., Atma, Ardya and Siva as the cause of the umverse, This is also an imagination and hence untenable. For, Siva bemg an entity sepaiated from Atman, becomes an objeet like a pot, ete,

पादा इति पादविदो विषया इति तद्विदः ।

लोका इति लोकविदो देवा इति च तद्विदः ॥ २१ ॥

21. Those acquainted with the quarterst (Padas) call It quarters, those2 with obects, the ohectsa, those with Lokas, the Lokass ; thosef with Devas, the Devas .?

Thesc different conceptions of Atman me nothing but imagi- nations of the mind. I Quarters-eg, Viswa, Tarjasa and Prajna Atman, being without parts and also unrelated, cannot be really divided into quarters or parts 2 Those, etc .- i.e, thmkers hke Vatsyayana, etc.

NANDŪKYOPANISIIAD 12'

a Obects-Such as, sound, colour, ete , ze , the objeets percerved by the different sense-organs The objeets, on account of their changeable and negatahle nature, cannot be the Ultimate Reality. 4 Those, ete .- i,e., the Pauramikas or the behevers in Mythology. 5 Lokas -- such as Bhuh, Bhuruh and Spah These being three in number are limted 6 Those, eto -ie, the Karmn Mimamsaas or tho bohevers in the Karma portions of the Vedas, 7 Deoas-Such as Agni (Ihire), Indmn, etc Acemding to this themy, Agni, Indra, cte., the various ronycrous deities, though not occupying the actual position of God (Kwwa), apportion the results of our varous works. The conception of a separate God is not necessary They cannot be the Ultimate Realty.

वेदा इति वेदविदो यज्ञा इति च तद्विदः ।

भोक्तेति च भोक्तृविदो भोज्यमिति च तद्विदः ॥ २२॥

22. Those knowing the Vedus cull It the Vedas1 ; those2 acquarnted with the sacrifices, call It the sacrifices3 (Yagna), thoses conversant with the enjoyer, designate It as the enjoyers and thoset with the object of enjoyment, call It such.

1 Vedas-e.g , the four Vedas, Rg, Yajus, Sama and Atharva. These Vedas cannot be the Cltimate Reahty masmuch as they are sounds. 2 Those, ete-ie , sages such as Bodhayana and others who are adept m the performance of sacufices 3 Sacrifices-The upholders of sacufices and rituals like the Yngnas think that sacrifices, such as Jyotishtoma, ete., constitute the Highest Reahty. But this is also an illusion. For, according to them, the sacrifice signifies the objeet (offered), the derty and the aet of offering. Any one of those, singly, does not constitute sacrifice. Again three of them, combined together, do not consti- tute any roal entity. 1

128 MANDOKYOPANISIIAD

4 T'hose, ete -- viz , the Samlhyas 5 Enoyer -- According to the Samkkyas the Ultimate Realty is the Purusha who is not the agent or doer but a meie enjoyor This theory is not rational, for enjoyment means some change in the enjoyer which thus contradicts the idea of his being eternal and changeless. If enjoyment be predicated as the inheient nature of Purusha, then the coneeption of extraneous objeets, conducive to its enjoyment, is inconsistent 6 Those, elc-That is, the cook, to whom the only iealty appears to be delicious dishes.

सूक्ष्म इति सूक्ष्मविदः स्थूल इति च तद्विदः । मूर्त इनि मूर्तविदोऽमूर्त इति च तद्विद, ॥ २३ ॥

23. The Knowersl of the subtle designute It as the subtle2, the Knowers3 of the gross call It the gross.4 Thoses that are familiar unth a Personality (harnng form), call It a persone, and those? that do nol belicu an any- thang harng a form call It a voul 8

1 Knowers-i.P., those who behiere (or take) the Aiman to be subtle like an atom 2 Nubtle-This theory is miational, for, we fecl consciousness simultaneously all over the body. 3 Knouers-A sect of matenalists who beleve the gross body to be real. 4 Goss -- The gross hody cannot be the Ultimate Reahty as a dead ol sleeping man, in spite of the body being mn existence, 1s uncongcious Any single limb of the hody is insentient There- fore even their aggregate cannot constitute the conscious Reahty. 5 Those, etc -ve., the Agamihas who beheve a person, e.g, Siva with a trident or Vishnn with a disc, to be the Ultimate Reahty These are al-o imagmnary e Peson-This is also an illusion 7 Those, ets -ie , the Buddlste rituahsts.

MĀNDŪKYOPANISIIAD 129

8 Voud-The idea that the Ultmiate Reahty is an absolute void is also an illusion, as a void cannot be the substratum of the positive fact of the empirical umverse

काल इति कालविदो दिश इति च तद्विदः ।

बादा इति वादविदो भुवनानीति तद्विदः ॥। २४ ।।

24. The Knowers! of time call It hme2 . the Knowers of space (ether) call It space (ethes). Those versed an disputation call It the moblem in dispute and the Knowers of the woilds aill It the worlds 3

I Knowers, elc .- Such as the astiologers. 2 Time-This theory is also fallacious as tie is tvided mto various paits as moment, minute, hour, ete Time is alo an olect of the perceiving mind 3 Worlds-This i9 also an illusory conception.

मन इति मनोविदो बुद्धिरिति च तद्विदः । चित्तमिति चित्तविदो धर्माधर्मो च तद्विदः ॥ २५॥

25. The Cognizers' of the mind call It the mind2; of3 the Buddht (intellect) the Buddhis; of the Chitta (mend-stuff), the Chitta5, and the Knowers of Dharma (rghteousness) and Adharmna (unnighteousness) call It the one7 or the other.

1 Cognitera, etc -re, a sect of the matemahst4. 2 Mind-This theory is not also tenable as nund is also an object, an instrument of the perceiving ego. 3 Of, ete .- They are a elass of Buddlusts 4 Buddhi-This is also a wiong view of the Reality, as the funetionings of Buddhi disappear at the timne of deep sleep. Further Buddhi is also an objeet cognized Ly the perceiver.

130 MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

S Chatta-Chitta is an aspect of mind which has no particular external form. It cannot be Atman for the reasons given regarding mind. e Knowers, etc -ie , the Mimamsahas 7 The one, etc --- None of these can be the Ultimate Realty because they have no absolute standard. They vary with different conditions of time and country

पञ्चविंशक इत्येके षड्विंश इति चापरे। एकत्रिंशक इत्याहुरनन्त इति चापरे ॥ २६ ॥

26. Somel say that the Reality consists of twenty-five categorier, others2 twenty-six, while there are others3 who conccive It as consisting of thirty-one categories and lastly people are not wanting who think such categores to be infinite.

1 Some-i.e., the Samkhyas according to whom the Realty consista of twenty-five categories, riz , Pralriti, Mahat, Ahamlara, five Tanmatras (subtle elements), five organs of rerception, five organs of action, five objects, mmd and the Purusha 2 Others-1.c., the followers of Patanjal who add Iśwwra to the categories of the Samkhyas 3 Others-1.e., the Pasupatas who add to the categories of Samkhyas sıx more, viz , Rāga, Audyā, Kala, Kala, Mayā and Niyati. The mutual contrachctions among these different schools prove the fallacious character of their theories The difference of opinion is due to the ignorance of the nature of Renlity.

लोकाँछोकविद: प्राहुराश्रमा इति तद्विदः। स्त्नीपुंनपुंसकं लैङ्गा: परापरमथापरे ॥ २७ ॥ 27. Thosel who Inow only to please others call It (Reality) such2 pleasure, thoses who are cognizant of the

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 131

Asramas call It the Asramas , the grammarians call It the male, female or the neuter, and others know It as the Paras and Apara. 1 Those, etc,-he., a sect of the atheists 2 Such, etc -This is also a delusion as it is impossible to please everybody on account of the different tastes of the people. 3 Those, ete .- he, men hko Daksha, ete. 4 Para, ete .- ie., the Biahman who is regarded ay high and low. An entity, subject to divimon of any sort, ean never bo the Supreme Reahty. सृष्टिरिति सृष्टिविदो लय इति च तद्विदः । स्थितिरिति स्थितिविदः सर्वे चेह तु सर्वदा ॥२८ ॥

28. The Knowers of ercation call It creation , the Knowers of dssolution deserbe It as dissolution and the belrevers an subsistence believe It to be subsistence. Really speahing, all2 these ideas are always imogrned" in Atman.

1 Knowers, elc .- i.e., the Pawamikas (the behevers m Mythology) who believe in the reahty of creation, preservation and destruction. 2 All these-i.e, those enumerated above and which may he enumerated by others mn future 3 Imagined-So long as men are given to imagming, they have recourse to all such imaginations regurding Atman But Abnan, from its own standpoint, doeg not imagine anything. It is because all these ideas, deseribed above, are mere imaginations, that they cannot be the underlying Reality. ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY, 20-28 Prana means Prajna (the Jiva assomated with deep sleep) and Bijatma (the causal self). All the entities from Prana to the Sthii (subsistence) are

132 MANDOKYOPANISHAD

only various s effects of Prana. These and other popular ideas of then kind, imagmed by all beings, are hke the imagmations of the snake, ete., in the rope, ete. These are through ignorance (falsely) imagined m Atman which is frec1 from all these distmetions These fancies are due to the lack of determination of the real nature of the Self This is the purport of these slokas. No attempt is made to explam the meaning of each word m the texts beginning with Prana, etc , on account of the futility of such eftoit and also on account of the clearness of the meaning of the terms. ! Freer fromn, ete -Atman is free from all these imagiations Tb is because of the iguorance of the real nature of the Aimun that it is thought to be the substratum of all imagmahons No ugeful pupoye can be served by the diseusson of magi. nations which are unreal and illusory.

यं भावं दर्शयेद्यस तं भावं स तु पश्यति । तं चावति स भूत्वाडसौ तद्ग्रहः समुपैति तम् ॥२९। 29. He (the inqurer) cogmzes only that rdea that is presented to him (by the toacher). It (Atman) assumes the form (of what is cogmzed) and thus protects (the inquirer) Possessed by that (idea) he realiscs it (as the sole essence). SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. What more is to be gained (by this kind of endless (hseussion) ? Whatever idea or interpretation of such things as Prana,1 ete., narrated above or omitted, is shown to the mquirer by the teacher or other trust- worthy person, be 'realses' that as the sole essence

MĀNDŪKYOPANISIAD 133

(Atman), i.e., he understands that as "I am that or that is mme". Such conception about Atman as is revealed to the iquirer, appears to him as the sole essence and protects hm, a.e, keeps him away from all other ideas (because it appears to him as the highest ideal). On3 account of his devotion (attachment) to that ideal, he reahses it as the sole essence, te., attams hig identaty with it

I Prunu-All mtermetations of Atmen minst he melnded in the Prhna as Prana or the causal Self, is the highest mamfestation of .Itmun mn the relative plane Reab's's, ch .- It is hecause such inqurei, for want, of piopet disorinnation, accepts the words of the teacher as the highest truth. The teacher also, reahsing the hmited mtelleetual capaeitv of the student, tearhes him, at first, only a partial view of truth. 3 On account, etc .- Such student only gets a partial view of Reahty though he takes it as the sole esseuce He shuts luis eyos to other views On account of lus single-minded devotion to that ideal he becomes mntolerant of other view-pomts But he who takes a parhicular fanoy to be the Realty and condemns other' fancies as untine, has not realised the Iighest Tiuth. For, to a knower of Realty, all imaginations are identical with Brahman and hence have the same value This is the mstake generally commtted by the mysties who, fot want of the faculty of iational diseumination, do not see any truth in the views of others

एतैरेषोऽपृथग्भावैः पृथगेवरेति लक्षितः ।

एवं यो वेद तत्वेन कल्पयेत्सोSविशङ्कित: ॥३०॥

30. This Atman, though non-separate from all these, appears as it were separate. One who hnows this truly imaines (interprets) (the meaning of the Vedas) without hesitation.

134 MĀNDŪKYOPINISIAD

SANKARA'A COMMENTARY. Though this Atman is verily non-separatel from these, the Prana, etc.,-like the rope from such imagi- nary ideas as the snake, ctc.,-it appears as separate to the ignorant persons. But to the Knower (of truth), the Prana, etc., do not exist apart from Atman, just as the snake, etc., falsely imagined m the rope, do not exist apart from the rope. For, the Śruti also says, "All that cxists is verily Atman" One who thus knows truly, that is, from scriptures as well as by reasoning" that Prana, etc., falsely imagined in Atman, do not éxist separately from Atman (as in the illustra- tion) of the (illusory) snake and the rope, and further knows that Atman is ever pure3 and free from all imagmations,-construes,4 withont hesitation, the text of the Vedas according to its division.5 That is to say, he knows that the meaning of this passage is this and of that passage is that. None but the Knower of Atinan is able to know truly the (meaning of the) Vedas. "None but the Knower of Atman is able to derive any benefit from his actions," says Manu.

1 Non-separale-It is bocause that which iN superimposed caunot exist apart from the substratum. Theiefore the Prana, eto., which are superimposed upon Atmax, are non-separate from Atman from the standpomt of Reahty 2 Reasoning-That is, the reasomng descnbed mn the fourth text of this chapter That which is accepted on the anthority of the Srutt can also be demonstrated by reasoning 3 Euer pure, etc -Even while Atman is imagined by the ignoiant as Prana, ete., it is known to the Jnaui (Knower of Truth) as pure and simple and free from all imagmations. For, to the Jnani snoh imaginations as Piana, eto., are identical with Atman.

MANDOKYOPANISUAD 135

For him, Atman never undergoes any morhfications. He knows "All that exists is verily Atman " 4 Construes-A Knower of Reahty does not follow anv fixed rule for the mterpietation of the Vedas "A Knowet of Reahty is never a slave to the Vedas But whatever interpretation he gives of tho Vedas is then real meaning " (Anandagiri). 5 Dumsion-That i4 to say, the Knowledge portion of the Vedas, vis, the Upamshad direettv lends to the non-dual Bruhman whereas the Work-portion (t.e , the Karma-Landa) explamns Reahty fiom the causal or telative standpoint aud thuy mdireetly indicates it. स्न्नमाये यथा दृष्टे गन्धर्वनगरं यथा। तथा विश्वमिदं दृष्ट वेदान्तेपु विचक्षणैः ॥ ३१ ॥ 31. As are dreams and ilusion or a castle in the air seen in the sky, so is the unirerse owewed by the wise in the Vedanta. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY The unreality of duality has been demonstrated by reason 1 The same also can be deduced from the evidence2 ot Vedanta scriptures Therefore it IS stated .- Dream and illusion, though unreal in their true nature, are admitted mn spite of their unieahty as real by the ignorant As an imaginary city m the sky, filled with shops full ot vendable articles, houses. palaces and villages frequented by men and women, though appearing real to us, is seen to vanish suddenly as dream and illusion, which are known to be unreal (though they appear to be real),-so also is perceived this entire duality of the universe to be unreal. Where is this taught? This is thus taught m the Vedanta scriptures. "There is no multiplicity here." "Indra

136 MANDOKYOPANISHAD

(assumed diverse forms) through the powers of Maya." "In the beginning all this existed as Brahman " "Frar rises verily from duality." "That duality does never exist" "When all this has become Atman then who ean see whom and bv what ?" In these and other passages, the wise men, i.e., those who see the real nature of things, declare (the unreal nature of the universe). The Smrii of Vyăsa also supports this view in these words -- "This duality of the univerxe, perceived by the wise like a hole seen in darkness in the ground, is unstable like the bubbles that appear i ram-water, always undergoing destruc- tion, ever devor of bliss and ceasing to exist, after dissolation."

1 Reason-It has been demonstrated at the beginning of this chapter that the illusion of dualty can be established by teason idependent of Seriptures. Eridence, etc -If a conclusion arrived at by ieasoning and cotruborated by actual experience is further supported by the wurds of the teacher and the Seriptures, then alone it can be aceepted as true.

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्दो न च साधकः । न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥ ३२।। 32. Therr is no dissolution no birth, none in bondage, none aspiring for wisdom, no secker of liberation and none librrated. This is the absolute truth.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. This verse sums up the meaning of the chapter. When duality is perceived to be illusory and Atman

MANDUK YOPANISHAD 137

alone is known as the sole Reality, then it is clearly establshed that all our experiences, ordmary or reli- gious (Vedie), verily pertam to the domain of igno- rance. Then one perceives that there is no dissolution, ie., destruction (from the standpoint of Reality) ; no birth or creation, t.e., coming into existence; no one in bondage, we, no worldly being, no pupilage, a.e., no one adopting means for the attamment of liberation, no seeker after liberation, and no one free from bondage (as such bondage does not exist). The ultimate Truth is that the state of bondage, etc., cannot exist m the absence of creation and de- struction. How can it be said that there is neither creation nor dostruction ? It is thus replied .- There is no duahty (at any time). The absence of duahty is indicated by such scriptural passages as, "When duahty appears to exist .. . ." "One who appears to see multiplicity "All this is verily Atman." " Abnan is one and without a second.' "All that exists is verly the Atnian", etc Birth1 or death can be predicated only of that which exists and nevor of what does not exist, such as the horns of a hare, etc. That2 which is non-dual (Advawa) can never be said to be born or destroyed. That it should be non-dual and at the same time subject to birth and death, is a contradiction in terms. It3 has already been said that our dual experience characterised by (the activities of) Prana, ete., is a mere illusion having Atman for its substintum, like the snake magmned in the rope which is its substratum. The imaginatron characterised by

138 MĀNDŪKYOPANISIAD

the appearance of the snake in the rope cannot be produned from nor dissolved in the rope4 (i.e., in any external object), nor is produced from the imaginary snake or dissolved in the mind,5 nor even in bothG (i e., the rope and the mind). Thus? dualty being non- different from mental (subjective) imagination (can- not have a beginning or an end). For,8 dualty is not pereeived when one's mental activities are controlled or in deep sleep Therefore9 it is established that duality is a mere illusion of the mind. Hence it is well said that the ultimate Realty is the absence of destruction, etc., on account of the non-existence of duality (which exists only in the imagination of the mind). (Objection)-If this be the case, the object of the teachings should be directed to prove the negation of duality and not to establish as a positive fact non- duality, masmuch as there is a contradiction (in em- ploying the same means for the refutation of one and the establishment of another). If this were admitted, then the conclusion will tend to become Nihilistic10 in the absence of evidence for the existence of non- duality as Reahty; for, duality has already been said to be non-existent (Reply) -- This contention is not consistent with reason. Whyll do you revive a pomnt already estab- lished, nie., that it is unreasonable to conceive of such illusions as the snake in the rope, ete., without a sub- stratum ? (Objection)-This analogy is not relevant as even

MANDŪKYOPANISIIAD 139

the rope, which is the substratum of the imaginary snake, is also an imaginary entity (Reply)-It is not so. For,12 upon the disappear- ance of the imagmnation, the unimagined substratum can be reasonably said to exist on account of its un- imagined character. (Objection)-It may be contended that like the nnagination of the snake m the rope, it (the unnmagi- nary substratum) is also unreal. (Reply)-It cannot be so. For, it (Brahman) is ever unimagined, because it is like the rope that is never the object of our imagmation and is real even before the knowledge of the unreality of the snake. Further,13 the existence of the subject of imagination must be admitted to be antecedent to the imagination. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that such subject is non-existent. (Objection)-How14 can the scripture, if it cannot make us understand the true nature of the Self (which is non-duality), free our mind from the idea of duality? (Reply)-There15 is no difficulty. Duality is super- imposed upon Atman through ignorance, like the snake, etc., upon the rope. How is it so ? I am happy, I am miserable, ignorant, born, dead, worn out, endowed with body, I see, I am mamfested and unmamfested, the agent, the enjoyer, related and unrelated, decayed and old, this is mine,-these and such other ideas are superimposed upon AItman. The notiont of Atman (Self) persists in all these, because no such idea can ever be conceived of without the notion of Atman.

140 MANDOKYOPANISUAD

It is like the notion of the rope which peisists in (all superimposed ideas, such as) the snake, the water-line, etc. Such being the case, the serpture has no function with17 regard to the dmman which, being of the nature of the substantive, is ever self-evident The function of senpture is to accomplish that wluch is not accom- plisbed yet. It does not serve the purpose of evidence if it i9 to estahlish what has been already established. The Annen does not realse its own natural condition on account of such obstacles as the notion of happiness, ete , superimpesed by ignorance, and the true natmre is reahser only when one knows it as such. It18 is there- fore the scupture, whose purpose is to remove the idca. of happiness, ete , (associated with Atman) that produces the consciousness of the not-happy (ie., attributeless) nature ot Atmian by such statements as "Not this" "Not this ", "(It is) not gross ", etc. Like the persist- ence of Atman (in all states of conscionsness) the not- happy (attributeless) characteristic of Atman does not inhere in all ieas such as of bemg happy and the like. If it werp so, then one would not have such specific experience as that of being happy, ete, superimposed upon .Itman, in the same manner as coldness cannot be associated with fire whose specific characteristic is that of heat. It is, therefore, that such specific charactcristics as that ot being happy, ete., are imagined in Atman which is, undoubtedly, without any attributes. The suriptural teachings which speak of dtman as being not-happy, ete., are meant for the purpose of removing the notion that Atman is associated with such specific

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 141

attributes as happiness, etc. There is the following aphoristic statement by the knowers of the Agama. " The valdity of seripture is establshed by its negating all positive characteristics of Atman (which otherwiso cnnot he indicated by scuptures) " 1 Birth, rte -Bnth or death can be imagined only m the realm of duahty. But hiom the standpomt of the Ultimate Reahty, dualty is as non-existent as the hoins of a hare. Therefore, from the standpoint of Realty buth oi death is meonceivable, as neither buth noi death can be imagined of the horns of a hare ol the son of a barien woman 2 Thal, etc -Buth ot death implying an antecedent or subsequent non-existence carnot be conceived of non-dual Atman which is ever-existent Further, hirth or death implying a ohange cannot be bionght about except by another factor w hich hings about the change This position is also untenable from the non-dual standpoit. Non-duality beig the only Realty, there is neither bnth nor death from the standpoint of Truth 3 It, eto -The dealings mn the plane of duality, which is illusory, are also illusory from the standpomt of Truth Therefore all dealings in the dual realm are meie imaginations like our dealings with the false snake perceived in the iope. 4 The rope, ete .- This is the refutation of the realistic contention. The illusion of the mind which perceives the snake in the tope does not exist in the iope. For, such illumion, in that case. would have been experienced by all When an explanation is sought, from the empimcal standpomt, of the illusion of the snake in the rope, it is, no doubt, said that the rope moduces the illnsion This explanafion may be justified when such illusion is admutted to be & fact, But ftom the standpoint of Ulumate Realty, illusion does not exist; hence no birth and disappearance onu be medicated of anything non-existent or illusory 5 Mind-This is the iefutation of the contention of the idenlists. The illuaon of the snake in the iope cannot be produced hy the mind. It is because our subjective idca does not correspond to the objects perceived outsde. Therefore the illusion cannot be produced by the mind alone. Further, from the standpoint of

142 MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

Truth, mind, associated with its dual functionings (sankalpa and mihalpa) does not exist-as a ieahty Being non-existent in itself it cannot produce anything new. 6 Both-This may be taken as the refutation of the Kantian view that our perceptions in tho dual world are caused both by mind and external objects (things-in-themselves) The contention of Kant cannot also he coneet, as thing-in-itself being unknown and unknowable and also being beyond the law of Cansation cannot produce anything Agam, From the non-dual standpoint both mind and the external object (the thing-m-itself) are known to be non-eistent Hence they cannot pioduce any- thng now, 7 Tpts, etc -Duul pereeption is totally non-different from the yubjeetive imagination which prodnees the illusion of the snake in the rope All illusory objeets being non-existent from the stand- point of Truth, the duahty is also non-existent from the stand- point of the Ultunate Realty 8 For, eto -It is because in the state of trance or deep sleep, the mind, with its double aspects (of imagmnation and volition), docs not exist Therefore no duality can be perceived in the abgence of the mind. 9 Therefore-It is because duality 14 perceived when mind functions and it is not perccived when mund does not funetion. Therefore the existence of duality depends entirely upon the imagination of the perceiving subjeet 10 Vikilistic-This is the contention of the Buddhistic Nihilists who, after the negation of duality, find void as the only Realty 11 Why, ete .-- An illumion cannot exist withont a substratum. The imagination or nlea of the snake cannot be perceived without "the auhstiatum of iope Therefore the illusion of dualty must thave the non-dual Itman as its suhstratum. 12 For, etc -Unlebs one is aware of an nnimagmed factor (Atman), one cannot know that this or any object is unreal We knnw of a thing as unreal only as distingmshed from something which is teal. The illustration of the snake and the rope is given only for the purpose of an analogy No exaot analogy can be given with regard to non-dualty as it is one without a second. Analogy always belongs to the realm of duality

MANDOKYOPINISHAD 143

13 Furthe-Without a perceiver, there cannot be any imagi- nation. Even if our analysis of the dualistie world leads to the experience of the void ot total negation, as the Buddhists contend, there must be an erperiencer of this negation. If the mind always seeks the cause of the substratum, the discussion ends mn a segressus But even then theie is a peieerver of that regressus without wluch the argument of "regrevous ad infinutum" is not possible. Therefore no one can escape the "Perceiver " (Drg) which is the Atman 14 How, etc -Scriptures can be apphed only to the sphero ef dualty In the absence of duahty, senptures cannot function In your opimon duahty consisting of brth, death, etc., does not exist, Therefore soripture is also an illusion Hence seripture cannot remove dualty and lead to the reahsation of non-duality or Atman. 15 There, ele -From the standpoint of ignorance, ' duahty certainly exists as we see it Therefore scripture is a means to remove this illuson of dualty 16 Votion-Atman persiats through all our experiences, for at no time is it posuble to concerve that Atman, in the form of the perceiver (Drg) is absent or non-existent 17 With reyard, etc -The serpture cannot chreetly desciibe the real nature of Itman. It serves no purpose for the knower of the Ultimate Reality. 18 It as, ete -The scripture serves a negative purpose, i.e., it helps us to remove all adjectives, which are the ideations (wittis) of our mind, generally associated with itman By associating AItman with any adjective such as the condition of being happy, etc , we make it an objeet (vishaya). But Atman is the eteinal subject-or witness of all ideas

भावैरसन्भिरेवायमद्वयेन च कल्पितः । भावा अप्यद्वयेनैव तस्मादद्वयता शिवा ॥ ३३ ॥।

33. Thas (the Atman) is imagined both as unreal obects that are perceived and as the non-duality. The objrcts (Bhavas) are imagined in the non-duality itself. Thercfore, non-deality (alone) es the (highest) bliss.

144 MANDŪKYOPANISH 1D

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The reason for the interpretation of the previous verse is thus stated : Just as in a rope, an unreal snake, streak of water or the like are imagined, which are non- separate (non-dual) from the existing rope,-the same (rope) being spoken of as this snake, this streak of water, this stiek or the like,-even so this Atman is imagined to be the innumerable objects such as Prang, ete, which are umteal and perceived only through ignorance, but not fom the standpoint of the ultimate Realty. For, unless the mind is active nobody is ever able to percerve any objert But no action is possible for Atman. Therefore the objects that are perceived to exist by the active nund can never he imagined to have existeuce fron the standpoit of ultimate Reality. It is there- fore this (non-dual) Atman that alone is imagined as such illusory objects as Prana, etc., which are percerved, as well as the3 non-dual and ultimately real Atman (which is the substratum of illusory ideas, such as Prana, ete.) in the same manner as the rope is imagined as the substratum of the illusion of the snake. Though4 always one and unique ( e., of the natnre of the Atman), the Prana, ete, the entities that are perceived, are imagined (from the standpoint of ignorance) as having the non-dnal and ultamately real Atman as their sub- stratum. For, no illusion is ever percerved without a substratum. As "non-duality " is the substratum of all dlusions (from the standpomt of ignorance) and also as it is, in its real nature, ever unchangeable, non-duality alone is (the highest) bliss even5 m the state of imagi-

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 145

nation, i.e., the empirical experiences. Imaginations alone (which make Piang, ete , appear as separate from Atman) are the cause of misery These imaginations cause fear, ete , hke the imagmations of the snake, ete, in the rope. Non-dnality? is free from fear and there- fore it is the (highest) bliss,

1 UnrintIt is herau-o the one characteustic of these percerved forms of objects is them changeabihty 2 For, ete -From the standpomt of Ultimate Reahty, there is no lalpana, or ideation wluch mahes the Bharas or the percoived objects appear as separate fiom Brahman From that stand- point Brohman is always, everything and everywhere This ideation is due to ignorance-an explanation which is given from tho empmical standpomt. 3 The non-dual, ete-This nou-dual characteristic of the Abman is a corielative of the dualty Hence this conception of non-duality is not free fiom ignoiance. In contrast to the changeable Bhaas, the Itman is imagmed as the non-dual entity. Hence they stand and fall togetber Atman is beyond all Kalpana or mental activity Therefore Atman, from the huighest standpomt, cannot be called one, if the term is used as a contrast to the many or dualty. Non-duahty is a uegation of all thought of duahty. 4 Thouph, efc .- Such entities as Prana, cte., which are perceived to exist, are from the highest standpomt identical with Atman. They are hke the dream objects which are found, on waking up, to be identical with the mind Only from the waking standpoit we know them ay illusion, and seeling a causo for such illusion we pomt out Atman as its substrafum 5 Duen, elc -Even when the mind moves in the omprrical plane, It attains peace when it discoveis the umtv undeilying the VaLIety Non-duahty alone rispels our doubt and makes us happy e Misery, ete -Kalpuna ot imagination that makes the Bharas, or the olyeots that aie perceivel, appear as separata from Biahman is the source of fear, as in that 'state of duality people

146 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

mte assadled with all kinds of fear ansing from hatred, jealousy, ammoaty, ete. When the snake, imagined in the rope, 18 perceived to be other than the rope, it gives nse to all kinds of fear, eto. 7 Non-duality, etc .- When the student attais to the state of non-dualty, he enjoys real bliss, as in thut state there oxists notlung of which he ean be afraid $The verse explamns the previouy one as well as the two other veryes in the Agama Pralarana (17 and 18) The lughest teaclng of Vedanta i4 that Brahman alone is real What are known as Bhara or multiple phenomena are nothing but Brahman, As the anahe is identical with the rope from the standpoint of knowledge, or as the dream oljeets are nothing but the mmnd, so are the various objeets perceived by us nothing but Brahman. When ove perceives the snake as other than the rope, he is afraid. Thi fear i9 hased upon ignorance Similarly, when one finds the omeets av separate from Atman he feels attached to or disgusted with them and sutfers accordingly But the lighest bliss is reahsed when one finds everything as Brahman Fiom the standpoint of Truth, Prapancha or the phenomenal woild or even the idea of pereerving them does not exist as separate from Brahman. Therefore no bnth or death can be predioated of what exists in that state. Therefore to a man of the highest wisdom there 19 nothing to be added to or subtracted from. All is non- dual Atman. Even what appears as unreal Bharas to the ignorant is non-dual Jtman to the Jnani. नाऽडत्मभावेन नानेद न स्वेनापि कथंचन। न पृथड्नापृथक्किंचित् इति तत्वविदो विदुः ॥ ३४॥ 31. This manifold does not exist as identrcal with Atman uor does it ever stand independent by itself It s ncither separate from Brahman nor is it non-separate. Thes is the satement of the wise. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Why is non-dnality called the highest bhss ? One suffers from misery when one finds differences in the

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 147

form of multiplicity, ie, when one finds an object separate from another For,1 when this manifold of the universe with the entire relative phenomena consist- ing of Prana, ete, imagined in the non-dual Atman, the ultimate Reality, is realised to be identical with the dItman, the Supreme Reahty, then alone multiphcity ceases to exist, ie, Piana, etc., do not appear to bo separate from Atman. It2 is just like the snake that is imagined (to be separate from the rope) but that does no longer remai as such when its true nature is known with the help of a lght to be nothing but the rope This manifold (Idam) does never really exist as it appears to be, that is to say, in the torms of Prann, etc, because3 it is imaginary just like the snake seen in the place of the rope. Therefore different objeets, such as Pranu, ete., do not exist as separate from one other as a buffalo appears to be separate from a horse The idea of separation being unreal, there is nothing which exists as separate from an object of the same nature or from other objects (of different nature). The Brahmanas, ve, the Knowers of Self, know this4 to be the essence of the ultimate Reality. Therefore the implication of the verse is that non-duality alone, on account of the absence of any cause that may bring about misery, is verily the (highest) bliss. 1 For, ete-Does thuis insentiont manifold exist as ono with Atman? This position is untenable as the sentient Atman and insentient universe can never be identical. For, if it be admitted that the manifold is identical with Atman which is one and with- out a second, then multipheity cannot exist 3 Il 28, ttc .- The snake wlch in the darkness appearod to be

148 MANDOA YOPANISHID

separate from the rope is known, with the help of a light, to be the same as the iope. The hght does not show that the rope 18 identical with the snake, as such identity is an impossibility, but it revenh that the only thing that exists is the rope and even that whick appeared as the suake in the dark was nothing but the rope. Sumdarly, Ttman aloue exists and the phenomenon, which appears through ignoiance to be sepaiate fiom .Itman, is also Alman from the standpoint of truth. 3 Berause It is beonuse the idea of separation is unieal A pot is known only m ielation to a cloth or another object One rannot totally exclude another. Therefore the objects, that are priceived to exist, ate not mutually mdependent from the stand- pomt of truth It is the non-dual Atman alone which appeats an mnltiple objects. having relations through ignorance. 4 This-ie., duality or multiphcity does never exist, as it cannot be demoustrated

वीतरागभयक्रोधैर्मुनिभिर्वेदपारगैः । निर्विकल्पो ह्ययं दृष्टः प्रपञ्चोपशमोदयः ॥ ३५॥

35. By the wise, who are free from attochment, feur and anger and uho are well versed in the meaning of the Vidas, ths (Atman) has been verily reulised as totally deyid of all imaginations (such as those of Prana, ete.), free from the ilusion of the manifold, and non-dual. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The perfect knowledge as described above, is thus extolled.1 The sages who are afways2 hec from all blemishes such as attachment, fear, spite, auger, etc., who are given to contemplation, who can discriminate Fetwpen the real and the unreal and who can grasp the essence of the meaning of the Vedas, t.e., who are well versed in the Vedanta (?e, the Upamshads) do" realise the real nature of this Atman which is free from

VADCKYOP INISHAD

all imagmations and also tree from the illusion of the mamfold. This Atman is the total negation of the phenomena of duality and therefore it is non-dnal. The intention of the Sruti passage is this. The Supreme Self can be reahsed only by the Sannyasms (men of re- nuneiation) who are free from all blemishes and who are enughtened regarding the essence of the Upantshads and never by others, ie, those vam fogimans whose mind is clouded by passion, ete., and who find truth only4 in their own creeds and opinions.

1 E.tolled-The purpose of this praise is to attract the attention of the pupils towards the tealsation of Truth. 2 Always-The student fmls to reahse Truth if his mind is, at any moment, clouded by passion, ete It is therofore laid in the Vedanta that a student, before aspuing to reahse Truth, must be well-estabhshed in the foutfold pre-iequmsites, such as, discri- mination between the real and the umeal, renunciation of the unreal, total self-control and a strong hankenng after reahsation. 3 Do reulisc-This is to refer to the contention of the agnosties that Reahty is evei unknown and unknowable. Reahty can centainly be known and reahsed if the student has got the necessary eqmpments for such reahsation A Only, etr -It is only the ignorant person who says that hs vision of Realty is alone true. But to a wise man everything is Brahman To him anything that may be called non-Brahman is ever non-existent

तस्मादेवं विदित्वैनं अद्वैते योजयेत्स्मृतिम्। अद्वैत समनुप्राप्य जडवल्लोकमाचरेत् ॥ ३६ ।।

36. Therefore knowing the Atman to bc such, fix your attention on non-dunhty. Having realised non- duality behave in the world like un insensible object. 7

150 MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

SANKARA'S COMMENIARY.

As non-duahty, on account of its being the negation of all evils, is bliss and fearlessness, therefore knowing it to he such, cirect vour mind to the realisation of the non-dual Atman In other words, concentrate your memory to the realisation of non-duality alone. Having known this non-dual Brahman which is free from hunger, ete., unborn and directly perceptible as the Self and which transcends all codes1 of human condurt, ie., by attaming to the consciousness that 'I am the Supreme Brahman,' behave with others as one not knowing the truth, that is to say, let2 not others know what you are and what you have become.

1 Codes, elc -It is because tho non-dual Biahman is beyond the duahty of the mamfested mamfold 2 Let not, etc .- A wise man does not broadcast hs realsation before the world The sentence may mean that a wise man, on account of his being established in the non dual Atman, does not see others as separate from him ; and therefore he does not assume conscioualy the role of a Knower (Jnanz).

निस्तुनिर्निर्नमस्कारो निःखधाकार एव च। चलाचलनिकेतश्च यतिर्यादच्छिको भवेत् ॥ ३७ ॥

37. Thr man of self-restruint should be above all prnase, slutution and all rutes preserbed by the Smrit in conneepion with the departed ancestors. He should have this body and the Atman as his support and depend upon charces, i.e., he should be satrsfied wth those things for his physical wants, that chaner hengs to hem.

WIVDOKYOPANISHAD 151

SANKARA'S COMMENIARY. What should be his code of conduct in the world ? It is thus stated .--- He1 should give up all such formal- ities as praise, salntation, ete, and he free2 trom all desires for external obicets. In other words, he should take up the life of a Paramahamsa Sannyasin3 The Srutt also supports this view m such passages as, "Knowing this Atman. ", elc. This is further approved m such Smriti passages as. "With their consriousness in That (Brahman), their self bemg That, intent on That, with That for therr Suprome Goal. .. " (Gita), etc The word "chalam" mn the test agmfying "changing' mdirates the "body" because it changes every moment The word "Achalam" sigmfving "unchanging" mdicates the 'Knowledge of Self" Hes has the (changig) body for his support when he, for the purpose of such acti- vit'es as cating, etc., forgets the Knowledge of the Sell, the (real) support of .Itman. unchanging like the Akasa (ether) and relates himself to egoism. Such5 a wise man never takes shelter under external objects. He entirely depends upon enumstances, that is to say, he maintains his body with food or strips of cloth, etc. as are brought to humn bye mere chance. 1 He, elc .- No wie man recites any hymns to the derhes or bows down before them, as he has no desues which ean he fulfilled by then favour or grace, The word suadhs in the text refers to the ceremonies known as Saddha, a rite peiformed for tho propitia- tion of the departed aucestors. Every offering in that ceremony is accompamied by the utterance of that word. The sense is that the wise man renounces even those ackons conneeted with the dead which are obhgatory for all people of the three higher castes.

152 MAN'DOK\ OPANISHAD

This is because the man of Knowledge, on arcount of his realsation of the non-dual Atman, does not find anything separate or different from his own self. Free, ete -It is beenuse such ohjects do not exist for a Knower of Truth 3 Pmamahnmsa Sannyaan -- Such a man belongs to the highest order of monhs and moves in the world hke other men; only he dues not declare that he is a Knower of the Highest Reality 4 He, ele -A wae man, in this text, is said to have both body and self for lus abode, The meaning is this When he medi- tates on the Itman, detaching his mind fiom all external desires, then he 14 said to have Itman for his suppoit and ahode But when hia mind comos donn to the consctousness of the body on account of his fecling the nece sity of food, ete., he is said to have his body'for his support and abode Rach, ete .- The wise man, descubed in this verse, never takes the ' external objects as real" hke the ignorant persons. But the word " yati " (man of self-eontrol) does not signify the man of the highest realisation, as it is not at all poysible for the latter to forget at any time the Knowledge of Brahman, This verse rofers to the student aspiring after the highest Knowledge The next verse indicates the condition of a Jnam & By mere, ete -That is to say, such a man does not make any conscious effort to procure his food or clothing.

तत्वमाध्यात्मिक दृष्टा त्त्त्वं दृष्टा तु बाह्यतः । तत्त्वीभूतस्तदाराम: तत्त्वादप्रच्युतो भवेत् ॥ ३८ ।। 38. Haing hnown the truth regarding what emxsls ulernally (1.e., wulnn the body) os well as the truth re- garding what eaists externally (1.e, the eaith, etc.) he benomes one oeith Reulity, derives his pleasure from It aad acrer devuites fiom the Real. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The truth1 regarding external objects such as the earth, ete., and the truth regarding mternal objects,

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 153

characterised by body. etc., is that these are as unreal as a snake seen in the rope, or objects seen in dream or niagic. For, there are such Sruti passages as, "modification boig only a name, arismg from speech, etr " The Srutt further declares, "Atman is both within and without, birthless, causeless, having no within or without, entire, all-pervading hke the Alasa (ether), subtle, unchanging, without attributes and parts, and without action. That is True, That is Atman and That thou art " Knowing it to be snch from the pomt of view of Truth, he becomes one with Truth and derives his enjoyment2 fiom Truth and not from any external3 object But a person,4 ignorant of Truth, takes the mind to be the Self and beheves the Atman to be active like the mind, and becomes active. He thus thinks his self to be identified with the body, etr., and deviated from Atman saymg, "Oh, I am now fallen from the Knowledge of Selt." When his mind is concentrated he sometimes thinks that he is happy and one with the Self He declares, "Oh, I am now one with the essence of Truth " But,5 the knower of Self never makes any such statement, as Atman is ever one and changeless and it is impossible for .Itman to deviate from its own nature. Thee consciousness that "I am Brahman" never leaves him. In other words, he never loses the consciousness regarding the essence of the Self The Smrin supports this view in such passages as 'The wise man views equally a dog or an outcaste". "He sees who sees the Supreme Lord romaming the same, m all beings." (Gita.)

154 MANDŪKVOPINISHAD

1 Truth, ete -Body, mind, ete., and the earth, the sun, ete., when looked upon as separate from the self, are as illusory as the snake seen mn the rope, ete But every unreal superimpostion, from the standpomt of Truth, is identical with the substratum as dream objeets are one with the mind and the snake is one with the ropr. 2 Enjoyment-Theie being no existing entity other than Atman, this thought makes a man happy 3 Erterant objerts-It is because no objects external or separate from him exist 4 Nmne parson, ete -Tlis is the case with those yogis and mysties who think that Atman ean be realised only hy withdrawing the mind from external objeets and concentinting it on some- thing witfun, 3 But, ete -It 14 because even when the mind is active and oreating ideas, the man of reahsation knows it to be Atmun If one sees multipheity, this multiplicity is nothing existent which can make the non-dual Itman become dual The act of hecommg, creation or mamfestation is an illusion The rope never hecomes the snake. e The consciousnes :- Even whon a Jnamt eats or drmnks or does any other act he only sees the non-dual Brahman He never deviates from the real His condition has thus been described in the Gite "Brabman is the offeung, Brahman the oblation, by Brahman is the oblation ponred mto the fie of Brahman, Brahman verily shall be renched by him who always sees Brahman in action " The state of a student has been deserbed in the previous verse. A student, when urged by hunger and thirst, thinks himself as some- thing different from Reality. A mystie oi a yogr thinks that he can realse Truth ouly by withdrawing his mind from tho external objects. Bnt a man of the highest realsation, who knows that he is the Supreme Realty, never loses that consciousness and even in the midst of the world keeps intact the Knowledge of his identity with the non-dual Brahman.

Here ends the Gaudapada Kanka on Illusion and Sunkara's Commentary on the Chapter.

Aum Salutation to Brabman. CHAPTER IIT

ON ADVAITA.

उपासनाश्रितो धर्मो जाते ब्रह्मणि वर्तते। प्रागुत्पत्तेरजं सर्व तेनासौ कृपण: रमृतः ॥ १ ॥ 1. The Jiva betahing itself to devotion (upasana) thinks itself to be related to the Brahman that as supposed tn have mamfested Himself. He is send to be of narrow antellect because he thanks that before creation all wns of the nature of the unborn (Reality). SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. While determimng the meaning of Aum, it has been stated in the form of a proposition that "Atman is the negation of phenomena, bhssful and non-dual". It has been further stated that "Duality does not exist when the Realty is known". Further, in the chapter on illusion, the absence of duality has been established by the illustrations of dream, magic, castle-in-the-air, etc, and also by reasoning on the grounds of ' the capability of being seen" and ' the being finite"', etc. Now it is asked whether non-duality can be established only by scriptural evidence or whether it can be proved by reasoning as well. It is said m reply that it is possible to establish non-dualty by reasoningl as well. How is it possible ? This is shown mn this

156 NANDŪKYOPANISIIAD

chapter on Adenita. It has been demonstrated in the last chapter that the entire realm of dualism mcludig the objeot and the act of devotion is illusory,2 and the attrbuteless, non-dual Atman alone is the Realty. The woid "upasanasria" mn the text, meaning the onea betaking himself to devotion, sigmfies hun who has recourse to devotional exercises as means to the attain- ment of liberation and who further thinks that he is the devotee and Brahman is his object of worship. This Jiva or the embodied being further thinks that through devotional practices he, at present related to the cvolv- ed4 Brahman (Personal God), would attam to the ulti- mate Brahman after the dissolution of the body Prior5 to the mamfestation, according to this Jiva, everything ineluding itself, was unborn In other words he thinks, "I shall, throngh devotional practices, regain that which was my real nature before manifesta- tion, though at present I subsist in the Brahman that appears in the form of the manifold." Such a Jiva, that is, the aspirant, betaking itself to devotion, inas- much as it knows only a partial aspect of Brahman, is called of narrowe or poor i intellect by those who regard Brahman as eternal7 and unchanging. The Upanishad of the Talavikara (Kena) supports this view in such statements as, "That which is not exprosvert by speech and by which speech is expressed, That alone know as Brahman and not that which people here adore", etc.

1 Rensoning-The truth arrived at by reasomng may be corroho- ratud by one's own experience and further supported by the Sruti.

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 157

2 Iucory-It i5 because these belong to the realm of duahty. 3 One, ete -- One who does not know the eternal and unchangmg nature of the Self, thinks of himself as separate or different from his real nature and has recourse to varous spirituat practices in order to rogain hig Brahmic nature, which he thinks he does, after death. Compare the Christian view of the " Fall of man". These VIOwa are given in the Hindu seriptues also but refuted at the end from the standpoit of Truth, which is thit even when a man thinka humsolf to be ignorant and tues to attam Knowledge by means of spnitual practices, he is Brahman The nature of the non dual Biahman nover undergoes any change or transformation. There is no act of crontion. 4 Ecolved Brahman-The Jwa in his state of imaginary " fall" woryhips a Personal God ot a Coamie Soul. He cannot think of the non-dual Self, but he imagmnes the Suguna Brahman to be Reality 5 Prio-This ignorant Jivn thiks that only after death he will reahse his eteinal Brahmic nature, which was his real naturo before he came into dual existence Nanow-It is because an ignorant person has no idea of tho changeless non-dual Self Foi, according to hu view the non-dual Self is also limited by time and change which characterise the dual universe. 7 Eternnt, ete -According to the Knower of Truth, Brahman never undergoes any mamfestation. The phenomena of birth and death are mere illusion

अतो वक्ष्याम्यकार्पण्यमजाति समतां गतम्।

यथा न जायते किंचित् जायमानं समन्ततः ॥ २॥ 2. Therefore I shall now describe Brahman which 18 free from limtations, unborn and which is the snme throughout ; and from this, one understands that it is not (in reality) born though it appears to be manifested everyihere.

158 MÅNDÜKYOPANISHAD

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. One unable to realse Atman, which is both within and without and birthless, and therefore beheving one- self to be helpless through Aidya, thinks, "I am born, I subeit mn the Brahman with attributes (saguna) and though devotion to It I shall become Brahman", and thus becomes Kmipana (narrow-minded) Therefore, I shall describe Brahman which has never been subject to any limitation and which is birthless (changeless). The narrowness of mind has been described in such Sruti passages as, When one sees another, hears another, knows another, then there is hmitedness (littleness), mortality and unreality." "Modification is only a name arising from speech, but the truth is that all is clay", rte. But contrary to it is the Brahman known as Bhuma (great) which is both within and with- out and which is free from all himitations I shall now describe that Brahman, free from all limitations, by realising which one gets rid of all narrowness super- imposed by ignorance. It (Brahman) is called Ajati, birthless, masmuch as none knows its birth or cause. It is the same always and everywhere How is it so ? It is because there does not exist in it (Brahman) any inequality caused by the presence of parts or limbs. For, only that which is with parts may be said to be born (or to have taken new form) by a change of its parts, But as Atman is without parts, it is alwaya the same and even, that is to say, it does not manifest itself in any new form through a change of the parts. Therefore it is without birth and free from

MĀNDŪKYOPANISIIAD 159

limitation. Now listen as to how! Brahman is not born, how it does not undergo change by so much as a jot, but ever remains unborn, though it appears, through ignorance, to be born and to give birth to others, like the rope2 and the snake.

1 How, etc .- Brahman is always non-dual evon durmng the pereeption of duahty by tho ignorant Non-duahty is the Reality and duality Is dlusion. 2 Rope-The trnth is that the rope does not become or produce tho snake It is only through ignorance that one sees the snake in the rope Silarly Brahman which is birthless, canseless, changeless and attributeless is magied by the ignorant as producing or becoming the universe. आत्मा ह्याकाशवज्जीवैर्घटाकाशैरिवोदितः । घटादिवच्च संघातैर्जातावेतनिदर्शनम् ।। ३॥।

3. Ātman may be said to be similar to Ākāsa (ether) mumifested in the forms of the Jivas (embodied selves) which may be compared to the ether enclosed in pots. Again, as pots, etc., are sard to be produced from the Ākāsa (ether), similaily (gross) bodies are said to be evolved fiom the Atman. This is the illustration of the mrfestation (from Biahman, if any)

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. It has been said in the previous text, "I shall now describe Brahman, birthless and free from all narrowness". Now I shall give an illustration and a reason to substantiate the proposition. As the Supreme Atman is like the dkasa, subtle, without parts and all-pervasive, it is compared to the Akass.

160 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

The Supreme Self again, who is likened to the Akasa, is sad to be manifester as the emborlied beigs (Jwas) or Kshrbajnas (Knowers of bodics), and are likened to the Ghotakasas or the Akasa enclosed in jars This is the Sumeme Self which is like the Akasa. Or the sentence may be explained thus: As the totality of the dkasa enclosed withmn the pots is said to constitute what is known as the Malākasa or the great expanse of ether, similarly the totality of the rmnbodied heigs (Jwvas) constitutes the Supreme Being. The creation or manifestation of the Jwas (emboded beings) from the Supreme Self, as stated in the Vedanta, is hke the creation or manifestation of the Ghatahasa (h.e, the ether enclosed in a jar) from the Mahakasa (or the great and undifferentiated ether). That is to say, creation or manifestation is not1 real. Asª trom that Akasa are produced such physical objects as the pot, etc , similarly fiom the Supreme Self which is like the Akasz, are produced the entie aggre- gate of material entities, such as the earth, ete., as well as the mdividual bodies, all3 characterised by causality, the entire' produetion being nothine but mere imagina- tion like that of the snake m the rope. Therefore it is said. "The aggregates (ot the gross bodies) are pronueed like the pot, ete." Whens the Srutt, with a view to the enhghtenment of the ignorant, speaks of the cieation or manifestation (of the Juus) from the Abnan, then such manifestation, being admitted as a fact. is explained with the help of the illustration of the creation of the pot, ete, from the Akasa.

MANDOK Y OPANISHAD 161

1 Not real-As the Ilasa does not really create the Ikāsa enclosed within the pot, ete , but appears as enelosed ou account of the association of the npadhis ot the pot, ete., sunilaily the Supreme Self does noi mamfest or crcate any Jwg but appears as Jwas on account of its aysociation with the upadhi of ignorunee (Amdya). This is an explanation of ereation fiom the empirical standpoint when such ereation is admitted as a fact. But from the standpomt of Reahty theie i no creation. 2 As, rtc -The pot, cte, cannot be pioduced without space. They evist m space Similaily no physical body can exist without the substiatum of .Itman. Therefoie, Itman is sad to have created the physical bodies 3 All, etc -All phenomenal objerts are characteused by the law of cause and effect 4 Entve, ele -Vedanta accepts both the theories of Fararta and Parmnama as explanation of the phenomenal universe Brahman is imagined to manitest himself as the universe through Maya, and then the universe follows the law of causation 5 When, etc .- ('reation thiough Maya i4 only an explanation of the umverse when one takes it to be ieal, It is not truth. Maya is ouly a statement of fact, an explanation of the world we perceive in a sfate of ignorance From the standpoit of Renhty neither the untverse nor Maya exists Bralman alone exists.

घटादिषु प्रलीनेषु घटाकाशादयों यथा।

आकाशे संप्रलीयन्ते तद्वज्जीवा इहाडडत्मनि ॥४॥ As on the destruction of the pol, etc., the ether enclosed in the pot, ete, merges an the Akasa (the grent erpanse of ether), similarly the Jivas merge an the Atman. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. As the creation of ether enclosed witlin the pot, ete., follows the creation of the pot, ete., and as the merging of the same ether (in the Mehakasa) is conscquent on the destruction of the pot, ete. ? in the same manner

162 MĀNDŪK VOPANISIID

the creation or manitestation of the Jira follows that of the aggregate of the body, ete, and the merging of the Jiru in the Supreme Self follows in the wake of the destruction of the aggregate of the body, ete The meaning is that neither the ereation nor destruction is in itself real (from the standpomt of the Absolute) Both the creation and destruehon of the utverse, and conse- quently its existence, are due to ignoranee. In truth, there is neither ereation, nor existence, noi destruetion Destruction 18 imposuble in the absence of oreation Therefore, the Srut passages deseribing the process of creation and destruction do not antagonive the reahty of the non-dual Atman, as such fact is admitted py the Advarin to be posible m the iealm ot ignorance, यथकस्मिन्घटाकाशे रजोधूमादिभिर्युते । न सर्वे संप्रयुज्यन्ते तद्ूज्जीवाः सुखादिभिः ॥५॥ 5. As any portion of Akasa enclosed an a pot being soiled by dust, smoke, ete., all such other portions of Ākasa enclosed in other pots are not sorled, so is the happiness, eto, of the Jivas, re. the happiness, misery, etc., of one Jiva do not affect other Jivas.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The dualists contend that it one Atman cxists in all bodies then the birth, death, happiness, ete., of one Atman (as Jion) must affect all and, further, therel must follow a confusion regarding the results of the action (done .by mdividuals). This contention is thus refuted. As2 the Akasa enclosed within one jar being soiled by dust, smoke, etc, does not make the dIkasn enclosed, in other jars soiled with the

MINDOKYOPANISHAD 163

dust and the smoke, so all created beings are not affected by the happiness, ete., (of one JJur). (Objection)3-Is it not vour contention that there is only one Atman ? (Reply)-Yes, we admit it Have you not heard that there is only one Atmnan like the all-pervading sky, in all bodies ? (Objection)-Ifa there be only one Alman then it must always and everywhere feel misery and happiness. (Reply)-This objection cannot be raised by the Samkhyas For,s the Samkhyas do not admt that misery, happiness, etc., ever chng to the 'Atman; for they assert that happiness, misery, ete., belong inseparably to Buddh.s Further, there is no evidence for mmagining multiplicity of dtman which is of the very natme of knowledge (Objection)-In the absence of the multiphcity of Atman the theory that the Pradhana or Prakritz acts for the sake of others7 does not hold good. (Reply)-No, this argument is not valid, for whatever the Pradhans or Prkmh may he supposed to accomplish by itself for another cannot inseparably inhere in Alman. If bondages and liberation accom- plished by the Pradhana inseparably inhered in the multiple Purushas, then the theorv that the Pradhana (Prakritt) always acts for the sake of others would not be eonsistent with the tinity of Abnan existang everywhere. And the theorv of the Samkhyas regarding the multipucity of Aiman would be reasonable. But the SamkAyrs do not admit

164 MANDÜKYOPANISID

that the purpose of bondage or hberation can ever be inseparably associated with the Purusha For, they adnnt that the Purushas are attributeless and are centres of Pure Consciousness Therefore,9 the very existence of the Purusha is their support for the theory that the action of Pradhana is directed to serve the purpose of others (the Purnshas). But the supposition of the maltiphcitv of Purushas need not be made for this purpose, Therefore the theory of the Pradhana seeking to serve the purpose of others cannot be an argmment for the supposition of the multiplicity of Atman. The Samkhyas have no other argument in suppoit of their supposition regarding the multiplicity of dtman The Pradhana takes upon itself hondage and hberation only through the instrumentality10 of the cmistence of the other (the Purusha) The Purusha which is of the very nature of knowledye, is the cause of the activity of the Pradhana by the fact of its very caistence and not on account of its any specifiol quahties So it is throngh ignorance alone that people imagme the Purusha (Atman) to be many and also thereby give up the real12 miport of the Vedas. The Voisrshikas13 and others assert that attributes such as desire, ete , are inseparably related to Atman. This" view is also not correct. For, the Samskaras (the impressiona) which are the cause of memory cannot have any inseparable relation with Atman which has no1 parts. Further, if1s it be contended that the origin of memory hes in the contact of Atman with the mind, we say that this contention is not valid;

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 165

for, in that case there will be no rule regarding memory. Memory of all things will come simultaneouslv. Besides17 mind can never be related to the Atman which is devoul of all sensations such as touch, ete, and which belongs to a class other than that of the mind. Further, the Vuiseshikas do not adnut that the attributes (guna) such as forms, ete, (Rupas), action (Karma), generahty (Samanya), partieulasity (Tiseshe) and mherence (Samavaya), can exist independently of the substance (Dravya) If these are totally independent of one another, the contact hetween the dinman and desire, etc., and also between the attributes (guna) 'and the substance (Dravya) will be an absurdity.

(Objection)-The contact characteused by an m- separable inherence is possible in the case of entities where such relation is proved to he nnale. (Reply)-This1s objection is not vald; for such innate relationship cannot be reasonable, as the Atman, the ever permanent, is antecedent to the resires, etc., which are transitory. And if desires, etc., be admitted to have inseparable inate relationship with dtman, then19 the former would be as permanent as such innate attributes of Atman as greatness, etc. That is not desirable, for then there would be no room for hberation of the Atman Further, if inseparable relationship (Samaraya) were something separate from the substanee, then another factor must be stated which can bring about the relationship between Samarayu and the substanre,-as in the case of the

166 VANDÜKYOPANISHAD

substance and the attributes, Nor can it be stated that Samavaya is a constant inseparable relation- ship with Atman; for, m that case, the Atman and Samaraya on account of their constant and mseparable relationship ean never be diffeient from one another. If, on the other hand, the relationship of Samavaya be totally different from the Atman, and the attributes also be different fom the substance, then the possessive case cannot be used to indicate their mutual relation which is possible only when the two terms connected by the possessive are not totally different If Atman be inseparably connected with such categories as desires, ete , which have both "beginning" and "end", then it would itself be impermanent. If Atman be considered to have parts and undergo changes, like the body, ete., then, these two defects always associated with the body, etc, would he inevitable in the case of the Atman. (Therefore the conclusion is that) as the Alasa (ether), on account of the superiposition of ignorance (-Imdya), is regarded as soiled by dust and smoke, in hke manner, the Atman also, on account of the limiting condition of the mind caused by the erroneous attribution of Avidya, appears to he associated with the contamination of misery, happmess, etc. And such being the case. the idea of bondage and liberation, bemg empirical in nature, dory not contradict (the permanent nature of Atman from the standpomt of Truth). For, all the disputants admit the relative experence to be caused by Avulyā and deny its existence from the standpoit of the

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 167

Supreme Reahty. Hence it follows that the supposition of the multiphcity of dtman made by the logicians is without basis and superfluous.

1 There -- In the case of the unity of .Itman, the ection of ono idividual must affeet other- who are not responstble for the aotion, Then there cannol be any poyble relation between action and the results of actious The law of causahty becomep futile 4 As-The reply is that birth, death, misery, happine w, ete., ate admitted to be facts expemenced m the piacheal woild. There the multipheity of Itman 19 also admitted. But this multiplieity of Atman i due to the lmtations of the (upadhi) of the mind caused by Aewlya (ignoiance), wlch does not exist in the Supreme Realty 3 Obechion-TIs olyection w supposed to be ramed by the adberents of the Samkhyu philosophy 4 If, etc .- The contention of the Samlhya philosopher is that in case the unity of dtmun is upheld, one must always feel miserable or happy as the result of the good and the bad actions ot others muat afteet hım For, ete .- According to the Samlhya thery, the Atman er the Pwrusha is without parts and attmbutes and is of the very nature of consciousness Prahnh or Pradhana is msentient, dull, and endowed with the quahties of misery, happmess, etc, All the activities of Pralriti are duected to serve the puipose of the conscious Purusha Praknt, being isentient, cannot enjoy the reyult of her own work According to the Samkhya theory, Prakitt is one, hut the Purnshas are as numerous as there are hodies. Each Pwrusha by coming in contact with Prabriti catches the rellection of misery or happiness, which are the churacteristies of the latter (Prabrili) and thinks itself as happy or miyerable. 8 Buddht Accorring to the Samkhya philosophy there are twenty-five entegories. Buddh is tirst evolved ay the result of tho contact of Prarih with Purusha The thiee quahties of Satteu, Raas and Tamas which give rise to misery, happiness, eto., lie in an undifferentiated state mn Prakritt, Bot when Pralritt

168 MANDKYOPANISHAD

evolves into Buddhi, these quahties become differentiated Henee, musery, happiness, etc , have been stated as mseparably related to Budohs 7 Othera-i.e, the Purushas. See note Ante 5. 8 Bondage, ele -- Aecurding to the Samkhya philosophy the contact of Piahiitt with Purusha causes the latter to fall into bondage But as soon as Punesht reahses his independence, he 18 lberated. Therefore, according to the Samkhyas, Prakrili 1s the caure of bondage and hberation and the Purusha, m itselt, 18 of the very natue of knowledge All the activities of Pralrit, which are otherwise meamngless, are direeted to make the Purusha reatre lis ieal nature Thr fore, ete,-Accoiding to Vedanta, the ileas of both bondage and hberation belong to the world of relativity It is due to ienotance Fiom the standpomt of Truth, there is neither bondage hor hberation, for the Atman is always free 10 Instrumentality, ete -Vedanta does not disagree with this position Aecording to it, the fact of the multiphoity of relatire phenomena 14 explamed by the presence of the non-dual Atman Every illusion has ity substratum. 1L Specifie quahtirs-This is the view of Patanjal. Accord- ing to his system, known as the philosophy of Yoga, there is an Iswara or Personal God. possessed of attubutes, who is the cause of creation 12 Real unport, etc,-he., the non-dual Itman is the only Reahty 13 Vmrseshikas-The followers of the Varseshiha philosophy hold that there aie six categories, viz., Dravya (substance), Gund (quahfy), Karma (activity), Samanya (generality), Vrsesha (partieulatity), and Samaraya (inherence) All these categories exist mdependently of one another The Druvya or substanco (Atman) has nine special attributes, us., Buddhi (intellect), Sukha (happmens), Dahha (miery), Ichha (desne), Dresha (aversion), P'ruyatna (effort), Dharma (merit), Adharma (demerit) and Namskara (impresuon). 1 This, et .- If desire, ete, are msepaiably conected with Atman, then desire, misery, bappiness, ete., of one boing would imply those of anothor.

MANDŪKYOPANISIIAD 169

15 No part-If it be contended that deuire, ete , inhere m one part of the Jtman, then the reply i9 that Atman unhke the pot, ete , has no paits,

10 Jf, elc -The opponent contends that the origin of memory is to be found in the contaet of the mind with .Iban. But thiy argumeut is not valid. For, Atman is ever mesent In that caso the mete effort of the mind to remember anything should bring its memory. But this does not happen In spite of all om nfforf4 we often fad to bring back the memoty of many past events. Farther, Atmas is mchvimble and withont parfs. Thorefore any impiession that auses in the .Itman cannot be confined to any particular patt of the Atman If such be the case, then all beigs should remember a thing at the same time Still another difficulty of this theory is that, Atman being without pacts, one should remember all things at one and the same time Hence no rule exists regarding memory.

17 Besides, etc -Contaet is possible between two fhingy of the same species

18 Thas objertion, ete -Sankara euticises this view of the relation between aubstance and qualty If the two are mseparably related, the mseparability must refer to place, tme or nature. The two are not inseparable in place, since we see the redness of a red lotus chsappearing If mseparalahty in time is the essence of the Samaraya relation, then the right and the left horns of a cow wonld be related m that way If it 13 msepaialhty mn nature or chaiacter, then It would be imposwhle to make any further distiction between sulstance and quahty, since the two are one 1D Then, etc,-But we know that desues, efc., are impermanent.

रूपकार्यसमाख्याश्च भिदन्ते तत्र तत्र वै।

आकाशस्य न भेदोऽस्ति तद्वज्जीवेषु निर्णयः ॥ ६ ॥

6. Though form, funchon and name are diffeiont here and there yer this docs not imply any differene: in the

170 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

Akasa (which is one). The same is the conclusion (truth) with regard to the Jivas. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY (Ohjection)-If1 Atman be one then how is it possible to justify the variety of expemiences pomtmg to the multiplicity of Atman (which is explained as being) duc to Avdya (ignorance) ? (Reply)-This is thus explained In our common experience with regard to this Akasa (which is really one), we find varety of forms, such as large, small, etc., in respect of the Alasa enclosed in a pot, a water-bowl and a cover Similarly there are various functions (of the same dkasa) such as fetchung water, preserving water and sleeping Lastly there are various names as the ether enclosed in a jar (ghata), the ether enclosed in n water-bowl (kanaka), etc .. caused by different upadhis. All these different forms, functions and names are matters of common experience. This variety ot experience caused by different forms, etc , is not true from the standpoint of the ultimate Reality. For, in renhty Akasa never admits of any varety. Our empirical activities based upon the difference in Akasa are not possible without the instrumentalty of an adventitious upodhi.2 As in this illustration. the Jivas (embodier bemgs) which may be compared to the Ikasn enclosed in a jar, are regarded as different, this differences being caused by the wpadhis. This is the conclusion of the wise. This text gives one of the explanations of the empirieal world as stated hy the wise.'

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 171

1 Jf, ele -The contention of the opponent is this. The variety of names, forms and funetions is an indubitable experience of the relative would. This can be explamed only if we admit the multiphcity of Atman Theiefore theie are infirte number of Itmans, each having a diffeient name and form and each performing a different function The unty of Atman cannot explain this variety Upadh-ie, the form of a pot, water-bowl, ete. Difference-The apparent differenco m our emurient experience is caused by upadhis wluch ar unreal These upadhis nre unreal on account of their changeable and negatable nature Therefoie from the standpoint of Reahty, aitman, like the ALasa, is only one and without a second This explanation that this apparent differenee of the empirical expenence is caused by Arulya 1s given from the ielative standpoint when such difference is admitted as a faet. But from the standpoint of the ullimate Reahty, the diffeience doos not exist

नाSडकाशस्य घटाकाशो विकारावयवो यथा। नैवाऽडत्मनः सदा जीवो विकारावयवौ तथा ॥ ७॥

7 As the Ghatakasa (i.r., the ether portioned off by the pot) is neither the (evolved) effect nor part of the Akasa (ether), so es the Jiva (the embodred being) neither Ih effect nor part of the Atman SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

(Objection)-Our experience of the variety of forms, functions, etc., associated with the ether enclosed in the pot, etc., is true from the standpomt of the ultimate Reality (and not illusory, as you say) (Reply) -- No, thist cannot be so For, the ether enclosed in the pot cannot be the evolved effeet of the real ether in the same way as the ornament,2 etc., are

172 MÄNDŪKYOPANISIAD

the effect of gold or the foam, bubble, moisture, ete., are the effect of water, Nor, again is the Ghatakasa (the Ilasa in the pot) similar to the branches and other parts of a tree. As Ghatakasa is neither a part nor an evolved effect of the Akasa, so also the Jir (the embodied being), compared to the Akrsa enclosed in the pot, is neither, as in the illustrations given ahove, an effect nor part of the Atman, the ulti- mate Reality, which may be compared to the Muhakasa (i.r , the undifferentiated expanse of ether). Thero- fore, the relatrve experience based upon the multiplicity of Ahmrm is an illusion (from the standpomt of the ulti- mate Reality). L The, ete .- For. it is admitted by all that the ether is without parts and cannot undergo any modhfication 2 Ornument, etc .- We explain a necklace or foam, ete, as the modification of gold or water respectively We also explamn the branches or the leaves as the parts of the tiee But Jwvd is neither morfication, nor mamfestation, nor part of the Atman Jiva 1s Alman it-elf which never undergoes a change

यथा भवति बालानां गगनं मलिनं मलैः ।

तथा भवत्यबुद्धानामात्माऽपि मलिनो मलैः ॥८॥ 8. As the ether appears to the ignoranl children to be sniled by dirt. simalaity, the Atman also is regarded by the ignorant as soiled. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Ast the diversity of experiences such as forms, functions, ete., is caused by the admitted differences of the Ghatakasa, ete , so also is the experience of birth,

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 173

death, etc., consequent on the perception of the dhffer- ent Jivas, due to the limitations caused by Aridya (ignorance). Therefore the contamination of misery, action and result (of action) caused by dridya does not really inhere in the Itman. In order to establish ths moamng by an illustration, the text says -- As in our ordinarv experience it is found that the indisereet regard the Alasa (ether), -- which, to those who know, the real nature of a thing by diseriination. is never soiled bv any contammnation -- as soiled with cloud, dust and smoke, so also the Supreme .Itman, the Knower, the mnermost Self directly perceived withmn, is regarded by those who do not know the real nature of the mnermost Self as affected by the evils of misery, action and result. But this is not the case with those who can discriminate. As mn the desert are never found foam,2 waves, etc., though thirsty creatures falsely attribute these things to it, similarly the Atman also is never affected by the turpidity of misery,3 ete, falscly attributed to it by the ignorant.

The opponent may contend thus .- The statement that the Jaras are neither an evolved effect nor a part of Brahman but identical with it is not correct. For, Brahman 1s ever pire and non-dual whereas the Jivas are many and ever affected by the contammation of passion, attachment, ete This text refutes ths contention 1 ds, etc-In our relative experience we make a dutmnction between the diffcient forms of .Ilasa enclosed hy a jar, an eye of a needle, or an extensive field. Thw knowledge of distmnetion, caused by various upadhis, umieal fiom the standpoint of Truth, makes ns assoomte the undifferentiated .Ikas with different forme,

174 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

funotions and names. In lke manner, ignorant persons make a hstinction of the Jiras by associating the Atman with the attri- butes of different bodies, ete., and consoquently think of the Atman as suffering from the effects of birth, death, misety, ote. This distinction in the non-dual Atman which gives rise to the notion of birth, death, etc , is due to .iuidya which is subjeetive or whtch procecds fom the perceiver. This distiction does not, mn reality, exist; hence Atman is ever uncontaminated by the ovils of birth, death, ete. 2 Foum, ete .- The iguorant, subjeot to the illusion of the mirage, assoemte the desert with foam, waves, ete All the waters of the mirage, taken as ieal by the ignorant, do not soak one gramn of sand in the deseit as this water is unreal. Similarly all the evils attributed falsely to the Atman by undiserinunating peryons do not make it lose its innate purity by so much ay an iota, 3 Misery-Misery or Kleon has been defined by Patanjal as that which causes misery to the Juas, This Klesa is of five kinds, vis,, Amdya (ie , thmking the body which is non-self as the Self), smita (ie., regarding the Atman as one with Buddhi or mind), Raga (we., attachment), Dvesha (i e, the anger which a man feels when his desire to attam a partionlar object 1s frustrated), Abhimersa (i.e., the fear of death, ete.)

मरणे संभवे चैव गत्यागमनयोरपि। स्थितौ सर्वशरीरेषु आकाशेनाविलक्षणः ।। ९ ।।

9. Atman, an regard to its birth, death, goung and coming (i.e., transmigration) and its enistang in differ- ent bodies, is not dissumnilas to the Akasa (ve., the Ghatakasa or the (ther portioned off by a mar).

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

The point which has been just stated is again thus developed :- Birth, death, etc., of the Atman as seen in all bodies is like the creation, destruction, coming,

VANDOKYOPANISHAD 17

goig and existenee of the Ghatalesa (or ether enelosed withmn a jar.) It may be contended that the Jon after death, as a result of the mortorious deeds done in this hte, ges to heaven Hf a sinner, he is thrown into hell. After his enjoyment of happiness or misery m heaven or hell, he agam takes birth In due course he departs from tlis wodld This theory of transmigration 1 mconsistont with that of the non-dual .Itman The text iefutes this eontention All these divetse expemenees regaiding Atmun are due to Aralyn and therefore not xeal Lnke the ether, Abnan which is pire, undiffeientited and one, ran never be subject to hamsmgration, etc., wlch are falely superimpoged upon it through Ardya. संघाताः समवत्सर्व आत्ममायाविसर्जिताः । ॥आधिक्ये सर्वसाम्ये वा नोपपत्तिर्हि विद्यते ॥ १० ॥

10. All aggregutes (such as body, ete ) are produoed by the illusion of the Atman (ve., the percerver) as in a dream. No rahonal arguments can be adduced to establish ther realaty, whether they be equal or superior (to one another). SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The aggregates of body, etc., answering to the pots, etc., m the illustration, are produced, -- like the body, ete, seen i dream or conjured up by the magician- by the illusion1 of the diman, t.e., the Avidya (ignorance) which is m the perceiver. That2 is to say, they do not exist from the standpoint of the ultimate Reahty. Ifa it be argued. m order to establish their reality, that there is a superionty (among the created beings),-as in the case of the aggregates of cause and effect constitutig gods who are superior to lower

176 MIANDOKYOPANISHAD

beings, such as birds and beasts-or that there is an equahty (of all created beings), yet no canse4 can be set forth regarding their creation or reality As there Is no cause therefore all these are due to Amdya or ignorance ; they have no real evistence.

1 Iluuon, elc-If one, subject to Aridya, sees multiphoitv, thon this dvidye is in the perceiver Audya is not objective, v e,, it does nof exist ontade the pereeiver. Thal i4, ete -As in the case of the dieam objeets, etc., which have no real exitenee 3 1/, ete .-- The opponents mav argue that the bodies of gods, eto., on ,account of their supemorty and adorabihty caunot bo unreal Tlis is an argument of the ignorant, as all bodies, whether helonging to gods or lower animals, are constituted of five elements. Hence there is no intrinsic difference between gods and other heinge It is like the various objects seen m the dream, sueh as gods, birds, men, beasts, ete. They are made of the same thing, mz, the mind-stuff. Therefore, they are of the same nature and known to be unreal when the dream vamshes. Similarly a wise man knows all bothos from Brahmi to the blade of grass to be unreal 4 Canse-The idra of creation or coming into existence i9 due to Arilyu With the removal of Imdya, the idea of creation also vanishes This topie will he dieussed at full length later on

रसादयो हि ये कोशा व्याख्यातास्तैत्तिरीयके। तेषामात्मा परो जीव: सें यथा संप्रकाशितः ॥ ११ ॥।

11. The Supreme Jiva (i.e, the non-dual Brahman) is the solf of the (fire) sheuths, such as the physical, ete., which have been explained in the Taittriyaka Upanishad. That the Supreme Jiva is like the Akasa has already been degeribed by us (in the third verso of this chapter).

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 177

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Now statements are made in order to show that the existence of the essence of Atman whirh is non-dual and withont birth, ete , ran1 as well be proved on the evidence of the Srut. Rasa, eta , are the avee sheaths such as the physical sheath (Amnarusomaya), the vital shrath (Prangmaya), ete These are ealled "sheaths" (kose) because they3 are like the sheath of the sword, the mievious4 sheaths being outer than the following ones. These have been clearly explained in the Taittinyaka, i e., m a chapter of the Taitturyaku- sakha Upanishad It is the Self (Atman) of these sheaths. By It, the mnermost Self, the five sheaths are regarded as ahve. It is agam called Jara as it is the cause of the life of all. What is It? It is the Snpreme Self which has been described before as "'Brahman which is Evistence, Knowledge and Infinity". It has been further stated that from this Arman the aggregates of the body known as Rasn, etc., having the characteristics of the sheath, haves been created by its (Aiman's) power called ignorance, this creation being like the illusory creation of objects seen in a dream or in a performance of jugglery. We have described this Atman as the ether (Alasn) in the text, "The Atman is verly hke the Akasa" (Gaud Kanka, 3 3). This Atman cannot be established by the reasoning of a man who follows the logician's method of arguments as the Aiman referred to by us is different from the Atman of the logieians. 1 Can, ete -That Jug is identieal with' the non-dual Brahman

178 MANDŪKYOPANISHIAD

has aheady boen estabhshed though reasou. Now the same is again moved by the evidence of the Vedas 2 Fine, eto-The fve sheaths aie the Annamayalosa (the phycal sheath), the Pranam yulosa (the vital sheath), the Manomayalosa (the mental sheath), the Vijnanamayakosa (the wheath of intelleet) and the Anandamayalosa (the sheath of Bliss). 3 They, ete .- The Losus me compared to sheathy As the sheath is external to the sword, so also the Losas are external to the Atman which is the innermost Self ot all 4 Piemous, efe .- The Annamayakosa 1 the sheath wherein is oneased the Pranamayakosa, the Pranamayakosa s the shoath wherem is encased the Manomuyakosa and so on The Ananda. mayaloga is encased in the Fynānamayakosa, D Har been, cte -This 19 no real creation The phenomena of creation, which is illusory, are regarded as such from the empirical standpoint 6 Ransoniny-The rational piocess of arnving at the Truth sought in the Velanta philosophy is munly described mn the Kariks of Gaudapada. This conuists of the analysis of the three states, known as the waking, the dream and the deep sleep and the co-onlnation of the expenences of these states

द्वयोद्वयोर्मधुज्ञाने परं ब्रह्म प्रकाशितम्। पृथिव्यामुदरे चैव यथाऽडकाशः प्रकाशितः ॥ १२॥ 12. The description by pars, as that of the Akasa, which is in the carth as also in the stomach (though referred to separately), applres eyually to the Supreme Brahman desembed in the Madhu Brahmana (a chapler in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad), as being both in the corporeal (Adhyatma) and i the celestial regions (Adhi- daiva). SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Moreover. mn the wordsI . All this is the Supreme Atman, the Brabman, the bright, the immortal Person

MANDŪKVOPANISIAD 179

who is both the celestial (superphysical-Adhdana) and the corporeal (ddhyatma), who is m this carth as well as the Knower ineorporated in the body", -Brahman alone is described in order to mdicate the hmit at which dualitv vanishes. Where does this oceur? It is thus rephed -- It ocenrs in the Madhu Brahmana chapter wluich is known as the chapter deahng with the Knowledge of Brahman. It is becanse therem is deserbed the neetar, (te, immortality) which is known as Madhu, i e., honey, as it gives us the highest bhss. This Brahman is hke the Akasa which is said to he the same or identical though separately mdiented as existing in the carth and mn the stomach

1 W'ords, etc-The text of the Brihadaranyala Upanishad (2 5 1) referred to here hegms thus "Tlns earth is the honey (Madhu, the effect) of all beings and all beings are honey (Madhu, the effeet) of this earth Lakewise this bright, itmortal person In this earth, and that bught immortal person mcorporated in the body (both are Madhu) He is mdeed the same as that Self, that Immortal, that Brahman, that All" The purport of this Sruti pasyage iy this . The Supreme Brahman alone, has been described as existing in all the pairs of the corporeal (Adhyatma) and the superphysical (Adhulana)

जीवात्मनोरनन्यत्वमभेदेन प्रशस्यते ।

नानात्वं निंदते यच्च तदेवं हि समञ्जसम् ॥ १३ ॥

13. As the identity of Jiva and Atman, through their non-dual churacter, is prarsed and multiphicity is condemned (in the serptures), therefore, that (non-duality) alone is rational and comect.

180 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

The Shastras1 as well as the sages like Vyasa, ete, extol the identity of Jua and the Supreme Self through the negation of all differences- the conclusion arnved at by reasoming and suppoited by the seriptures. Further, the experiences of multiphcity which are natural (to the ignorant) and common to all beings- the view propounded by those who do not understand the real miport of the Shastras and who mdulge m futile reasoning --- have been condemned2 thus "But there is certamly nothing corresponding to the dual existence," "Fear arises trom the consciousness of duality," "If he sees the slghtest diffprence (in Atman) then he is overcome with fear, ' 'All this is vcrily Atman. ' "He goes from death to death who sees here (in this Abpan) multiplicity." Other Knowers of Brahman as well as the scriptures (quoted above) extol identity (of Jia and Brahman) and condemn multiplicity. Thus alone this praise and condemnation can easily be comprehended. in other words, it accords with reason. But the false views (vainly) advanced by the logicians,3 not easy of comprehension, cannot be acepted as facts

) Shasbas-Comp. "One who knows Brahman venly becomes Brahman." 2 Condemned-That which is condemned cannot be Reahty. 3 Logician-Tlus refers to the followers of the Varseshika and other sy tems of thought There i9 no semptuial quotation which praises duality and condeins non-duahty (Adiata).

MANDOKYOPINISHAD 181

जीवात्मनोः पृथक्त्वं यत् प्रागुत्पत्तेः प्रकीर्तितम्। भविष्यद्वृत्त्या गौणं तन्मुख्यत्वं हि न युज्यते ॥ १४ ॥ 14 The separateness of Jiva and Atman which has been declared in (the ritul portion of the) Upanishad, dealing with the origin (of the universe), is only figuratire, brcause this portion (of the Vedas) desenibes only what 28 to be. This stalement regarding separateness can netr have any meaning as fruth

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. (Ohjection)-Even the Srutt has already declared the separateness of the Jiuu and the Supreme Self in that part of the Upamshad which describes the creation (of the universe), ie., in the ritual portion (Karmalanda) of the Vedas The texts of the Karma- kanda, reterred to here, describe the Supreme Purusha who had multiple desire, mn such words as, "desirous of this," "desirous of that," "He,1 the Highest, sup- ported the heaven and the earth," etc. This being the case, how is it possible, when there is a conflict between the knowledge portion and the ritual portion of the Vedas, to conclude that the unity underlying the meaning of the knowledge portion (of the Vedas) is alone reasonable and accurate ? (Reply) -- Our reply is as follows .The separate- ness (of Jiva and Puramatman) descrbed in the Kamnakanda (ritual portion of the Vedas)-anterior to such Upanishadic statements dealing with the creation of the universe as "That from which all 8

182 MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

these beings emanate," "As small sparks (come out) from fire," "The Akasa has evolved from that which is this Atman," "It saw," "It created heat"-is not real from the absolute standpoint. (Objection)-What, is it then ? (Reply)-It has only a secondary meaning. The separateness (between Jiva and Paramatman implied in these passages) is like that between the undifferen- tiated2 ether (Muhahasa) and the ether enclosed in the jar ((hatalasa) This statement is made with re- ference to a future3 happening as in the case of another statement we often make, "He is cooking rice." For, the words describing separateness Jun and Paramatman) can never reasonably uphold such sepa- rateness as absolutely real, as the statements regarding the separateness of Atman only reiterate the multiple experiences of those beigs who are still under the spell of their mborn4 Avidya or ignorance. Here5 in the Upanishads, the texts regarding the creation, destruction, etc., of the universe are meant only to estabhsh the identity of Jivg and the Supreme Self, as is known from the texts, "That thou art," "He does not know who knows I am another and he is another". In other words, in the Upanishads the purpose of the Srute is to estabhsh the identity (of Jrr and Brahman) Keepmg in view this identity which is going to be established later on, the (dualistic) texts only reiterate the common6 experience of multi- plicity (due to ignorance). Therefore these (dualstic) texis are only metaphorical Or the Kamka may be

MANDŪA YOPANISHAD 183

explained thus The serptuial text, "He is one and without a second", declares the (complete) identity of Jara and Brahman even before creation, denoted by such passages as, ' He saw," "Te created fire," etc. The culmmation is, agam, that identity as is known from snch Srutt passages as, "That is the Reahty; He is the Atman. That thou art". Now, if keeping in view this future identity, the scparateness of Jug and Atman has been declared in some texts, it must have been used in a metaphorical way as is the case with the statement "He is cooking rice". 1 He-i.e., Hiranyagarbha or the cosmic soul 2 Undifferentiated, etc -The difference betweon the Ghatakasa and the Mahakasn is only due to the upadh or the hmitmg adjunct of the ghata or the jar In reality it i the idontical Akash that is perceived in tho great expanse of the ether, as well as in the jar. Similarly, the Jira is thought of as different fiom the Atman when the former is hmited by the upadhis of Antahkarana and body 3 Future, ete .- The Vedas make the statement egarding the sepalateness of Jwa and Brahman keeping in view the experienco of multipheity by the ignorant people The idea of past, present and future is formed only m the realm of ignorance, When the grain (ie, the uncooked rice) is boiled, people say that the rice (cooked rice) is boiled This sort of statement is comimon parlance. Here the present tense is used keeping m view a future happening. Smilarly the seriptures speak of duabty before creation with a view to indicating the future state of Knowledge when multiphoity is known to be unreal. 4 Inborn-It is because no cause can be traced of .Imdyū. 5 Here, ek .- The aim of the duahstic statements of the Sruti i9 to estabhsh ultimately the identity of Jie and Brahman The Upamshads accept the empirical view of the world ay it appears and explam it by saying that Brahman who is hoth tho material and efficient eause of the univere, created the woud with all its bemys and then entered into all ay the hving Self, This explanation

184 MANDŪKVOPANISHAD

estabbshes the umty of Brahman and Jwva, the apparent difference being ascribed to ignorance The import of the Sruti 1s this. The non-dual Brahman alone exists. He is birthless, causeless and changeless If one sees multiplicity that is also Brahman The experienee of multiphcity m the non-dual Brahman 19 due to Ardyū & C'ommon, etc,-This is due to ignorance.

मृल्लोहविस्फुलिङ्गादयैः सृष्टिर्या चोदिताऽन्यथा। उपायः सोऽवताराय नास्ति भेद: कथंचन ॥ १५॥

15. (T'he scrptural statements regardang) creahon as illushated by exumples of eaith, uon, sparks, etc., or otheruse, (only) serve the purpose of (ultrmately) explain- ing the unity (of Jiva and Brahman). (Really speahing) multiplicity does not erist in any manner.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

(Objection) -- Before1 creation all this might have been unborn, one and non-dual, but atter creation, all this evolved world and the embodied beings (Jivas) denote multiplicity. (Reply)-No, it cannot be so. For, the scriptural passages dealing with creation have another meaning. Ths difficulty raised here has already been solved by the statements that2 the aggregates (entities) of body, etc., like dream-objects, are produced through illusion of the subject (Atman) and that creation and the differenres of the Jivas are like the creation and the differences of the Ghatakasas, r.e., the bits of Akasa enclosed in different jars. The soriptural3 statements dealing with creation and differences (of the created

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 185

beings), have again been referred to here m order to show that such statements regarding creation have the purpose of determining the umty of Jera and Brahman. 'Thet (theory of) creation has been described in the |scripture throngh the illustrations of earth, iron, sparks, etc, or otherwise; bnt all these modes of creation are meant for enhghtening our intellert so that it may comprehend the identity of Jera and Brahman It is just like the story" of the organs of speech (val:), ete., being smitten with evil by the dswrns (demons) as deseribed in the chapter on Prana (vital breath), where the real purpose of the Nrute is to demonstrate the special importance of Prana. (Objection)-Wef do not accept this meaning as indicated. (Reply) -- Your contention is not correct. For? this story about Prana, etc, has been differently narrated in different recensions of the Vedas If the story of Pranu were hterally true, then there should have been one version only in all recensions. Different versions of contradictory nature would not have been narrated. But we do come across such different versions in the Vedas. Therefore the scriptural passages recording stories of Prana are not meant to serve any purpose of their own, i.e., they should not be taken literally. The serptural' statements regarding creation should also be understood m a sumlar manner. (Objection)-There have been difterent creations in different cycles Theretore, the seriptural state- ments regardmg ereations (of the universe) and stories

186 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

(of Prana) are different as they refer to the creations in different cycles. (Reply)-This contention is not valid. For, they (the illustrations of earth, iron, etc., as well as the stories of Prana) serve no other useful purpose than clearing our intellent as stated above No one can imagme any other utility of the seriptural statements regardmg creation and Prana (Objection)-We9 contend that these are for the purpose of meditation so that one may ultimately attain to that end (Repty)-This is also not correct, for no one desires to attam his identity with the dispute (in the case of the Prann narrative), or with the creation or destruction (In the case of the scriptural statements regarding crea- tion, ete ) Therefore we have reasonably to conclude that the scriptural statements regarding creation, ete, are for the purpose of helping the mind to realse the oneness of Atmun, and for no other purpose whatsoever. Therefore, no multiplicity is brought about by creation, otc.

1 Before, etc .- There are defimte scriptural statements regard- iug ereation These statements aro literally true. Thereforo multiplcity cansed by creation is also true 2 Thot, ote ~In Karilas 3 and 10 (Chapter IlI), it has been estahlsher that the perception of ego and non-ego as separate Irom Brahman i4 due to ignorance. 3 Neriptural, ete-It has been explained m the previous text that the seriptural statements regarding creauion, ete., are for the purpove of explaining the dlusory nature of the universe to those who tak it as teal But the puipose of thuis Karld is to enable us to uoderetand the identity of Jara and Biahman

MINDOKYOPANISHAD 187

4 The crention, etc -The meaning i that we shonld not take these seriptural statements m the hteral senve but must get at their underlying sgnificance . 5 Story, ete -The reference is to the second pait of the firat chapter of the Chhandogya Opamishad This story cannot bo accepted in a hteral sense as the organs of speeeh, ete., being them. selves meonscions, eannot quanel with one another The sigmi- ficanee of the story is to demonstiate the superiority of Prana oves other Indriyas (otgany) The story referred to here is a4 followy . The Devas and the .Asuras, both of the raee of Prajapati, fought with one another The Deens (Gods) and the Asuras (Demons) are explamed as good and evil mchnations of man The Deras took the Udgitha, thinking that they would be able to van- quish the dsuras with it. The Udgithe stands for the sacrificial act to be performed by the Udqatri, the Samaneda priest, with the Udgitha hymny They meditated on tho Udguha as the breath in the nostril, but the dsuras smote the breath with evil Then they medhtated on Udgitha as the speech, the eye, the ear, the mind; but all these sense-organs were smitten with evil by the Asuras. Then they meditated on Udgitha as Prana (vital breath) and the .1suras farled to smite it with evil. Therefore Prana is superior to all sense-organs We, etc -We do not accept your explanation, for, the organs of speech, ete , have been designated as gods. Therefore they cannot be insentient matter ? For, etc-This story about Piana has been differently stated in different Upamshads This cannot happen if the story is to he accepted as hterally true S Reriptural, ete -The story regarding ereation, as mn the case of Prana, has beeu differently stated in diffeient parts of tho Upamshads. In some places we iend that the tkasa was fiist evolved, agam we find that the fire was first evolved and still mn another place it is mentioned that Prana was hrst evolved. Therefore, on account of the bontradietory natmes of these etories they should not be taken as trne. They serve some ofher purposo, as., the estabhshment of the absence of variety, or the onenoss of Itman (Btahman). We contend, etc .- It is saul in the Autt that the worshipper ultimately reahses the oneness of Itman

188 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

आश्रमास्त्निविधा हीनमध्यमोत्कृष्टदृष्टयः । उपासनोपदिष्टेय तदर्थमनुकम्पया ॥ १६ ॥ 16. There are thice stages of hfe comesponding to three,-the lower, the middle and the Ingh-powers of comprehension. The seripture, out of compassion, has taught thrs devolion (or discipline) Jor the benefit of those (who are not yet enlightened). SANKARA'S COMMFNTARY. (Objection)-If according to such Sruli passages as "Atman is one and without a second ", otc, the Atman alone, the one, the eternally pure, illumined and free, is the highest and the ultimate Reality and all else is unreal, what then is the purpose of the devotion and spiritual practices implied m such Srutel passages as " Oh dear, Atman alone is to be seen ", "The Atman who is free from .. "He desired ", ", "It should be worshipped as Atman ",, etc. Further, what is the utility of Karma (Vedie works) like Agnihotra, etc. 2 (Repiy)-Yes, listen to the reasons. Asrama signi- fies those who are competent to follow the disciplmes of life as prescribed for the different stages.2 The word (m the text) also includes those who belong to the (different) castes3 and therefore who observe the rites (prescribed for those castes). The application of the word " Asrumn " implies that these castes are also three in number. How ? It is because they are endowed with three kinds of intellect, mre., low,4 middle5 and high.e This drsciphne, as well as the (various)

MÄNDŪKVOPANISIIAD 189

Karmas (works) are prescribed for the Asramis of low and average mtellect, by the Srute, out of compassion, so that they also, following the correct disciplines, may attain to the superior knowledge. That7 this discipline is not for those who possess the right understanding, i e., who are already endowed with the Knowledge of Atman which is one and without a second, is supported by such Śruti passages as "That which cannot be known by the mind, but by which, they say, the mind is able to think, that alone know to be Brahman, and not that which people here adore ", "That thou art ", " All this is verily Atman", ete.

In the previons Kankas it has been proved that the soriptural statements regarding creation. etc, do not conflict with the non- dual Atman, This Karika states that the presemiption of various disciplines associated with different Varnas and Asramas also does not contradict the view of the non-dual Atman The statements regarding creation, etc., as well as the various spmritual disciplines are only meant for the unenlghtened in ordet to assist them to understand the oneness of Atman, 1 Sruh passages-It is because all these Sruti passages reqwre, on the part of the students, either meditation, or spiritual disci- phnes or devotion This has no meaning if the non-dual Atman tlone is the Reahty 2 Stages-These are the orders of Brahmacharya, Garhasthya, Fanamastha and Sannyāsa. Castes-The word Varna, here, imphes the three castes, viz., the Brahmana, Kshatriya and I'orsya. $ Low-Those who look upon the phenomenal nniverse (the Karya Brahman) as real, are said to possess low intellect. Middle-Those who worslip the Karana Brahman, that 18 the Brahman as the cause of the umverse, are sid to possess mecioore intellect, because they still hve on the causal plane. F

190 VANDOKYOPANISIIAD

6 Hagh-Those who have iealied the non-dual (Adiaua) Atman are said to possess superior power of understanding. 7 That, etc -As the possessor of the knowledge of non-dual Atman is free from all distinction of Asama and Varna, it is there- fore not necessary for him to perform any Veile work or practise any spiritual disciphne The meaning of the Kanka is this. The Asamas and the Varnas deseribed in the Sruk, and the differeut functions ascribed ito them have only a diseiphnary value, the main purpose is to train the ytudent to understand the unity of Jara and Brahman. सवसिद्धान्तव्यवस्थासु द्वैतिनो निश्चिता दृढम्। परस्परं विरुध्यन्ते तैरय न विरुध्यते ॥ १७ ॥ 17. The dualrsts obstinutely cling to the conclusrons arrived at by therr owmn enquiries (as being the truth). No they contradict one another; whereas the Advaitin finds no conflict with them. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The knowledge of the non-dual Self is established by both seriptnres and reasonmg. Therefore, it is alone the perfectknowledge. Other views, on account of their being devoid of the bases of scriptures and reasoning, lead to false systems. The views of the dualists are false on account of this additional reason, that they are the fruitful sources of the vices of attachment and hatred, ete. How is this ? The dualists following the views of Kamla, Kanada, Buddha and Jina, ete, hold firmly to the conclusions as outlined and formulated by therr respeetive schools. They' think that the view they hold is alone the ultimate Reahty, whereas other vicws are not so. Therefore they become attached to their own

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 191

views and hate others whom they consider to be opposed to them. Thus being overcome with attach- ment and hatred, they contradict one another, the reason being the adherence to their own convictions as the only truth But our vicw, mz., the unity of Atman, based upon the identity of all. supported by the Vedas, does not couflict with others who find contra- dictions among themselves, -- as2 one's hmbs such as hands, feet, ete, do not conflict with one another. Ience, the purport of the Sruti is that the knowledge of the oneness of Atman, as it is free fiom the blemish of attachment and aversion, is the true knowledge.

'This Karila proves the superority of the Adada knowledgo over other views as it does not contradict the scriptural statements regarding creation and exercises (Upasana), and also because it does not clash with other theones Adada alone harmomses all other doctrines and theories. It alone gives the rationale of other relative views regarding Truth 1 They, etc -It is because the dualists take the relative truth to be the ultimate view of Reahty 2 As, elc -If in the couise of physical movements, the hands ot feet strike any pait of the body, the body does not feel irritated as the body knows the hmbs to be its own mtegral parts. Sunilarly the non-dnalist, on account of his knowledge of identity with all created beings and thoughts, does not feel angered at the hostihty of his opponente, as he knows his so ealled opponents 10 be his own self. The Knower of Brahman realses the entire world as the projection of his thought (Kalpana) The thoughts are also ilentical with Brahman as the various dream-objeots are identieal with the nund. Therefore the theories of othors are not in confhet with non-duahty hecause they are also identical with Brahman. Comp. the seriptural passage "All this 1s verily Brahman".

192 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

अद्वैतं परमार्थो हि द्वैतं तद्भ्ेद उच्यते। तेषामुभयथा द्वैतं तेनायं न विरुध्यते ॥ १८॥

18. As non-dualty is the ultimate Reality, therefore duality is sard to be its effect (Karya or Bheda). The dualists percerve dualrty erther way (i e., both in the Abso- lute and in the phenomena). Therefore the non-dual position does not conflct with the dualrsl's position. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

How is it that the non-dualist does not conflict with the dualist' The reason is thus stated .- As1 non-duahty is the ultmate Reahty, therefore dualty or multipheity is only its effect The scrptural passages such as, "He is one and without a second", "He created fire", etc , support this view. It2 is further borne out by reason as duality is not percerved in the states of swoon, deep sleep or trance (samadhr), m the absence of the activity of the mind. Therefore duahty is sand to be the effect of non-duality But the dualists perccive duahty alone either3 way, that is, both fiom the absolute and the relative standpoints. As duality is perceived only by the deluded and non- duality by us who are enlghtencd4, therefore our view does not clash with their views. For, the soripture also says, 'Indra (the Supreme Lord) created all these diverse forms through Maya", "There exists nothing like dualty". It5 is like the case of a man on a spiri- ted clephant, who knows that none can oppose hım, but who yet does not drive his beast upon a lunatic

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 193

who though standing on the ground, shouts at the former, "1 am also on an elephant, drive your beast on me", Therefore, from the standpomt of Reality, the Knower of Brahman is the very self of (even) the dualists. Hence, our, ws., the non-dualistc view does not clash with other views.

It mny be asked in view of the diffotenoes between the duahstie and the non-dualstie views, how it can be said that the latter does not find any contradiction with the former. The fext of the Kinka gives the reply. It says that the so-called dnahty does not exist at all Whatever exists is non-dual Brahman alone. There- fore, the non-duahst cannot quarrel with a thing which is abso- Jutely non-existent 1 As, elc,-We learn from seuptural evidence that dualty 1 the effect of the non-dual unity The effeet, relatively speaking, is other than the cause, otherwise one cannot make a diyfinction between the cause and the effect Agam the Srutz says that all effects consisting of names are mere figmes of speech, hke the effects of clay, and therefore unreal The cause, hke the clay, alone is roal Therefore effects, beig unreal, cannot contradict the cause. Hence non-duahty does not clash with dualty. Here the word "Bheda," mplying effert is not osed in the Samlhya isense of modification 2 Il 1s, ete -One perceves duahty on account of the activity of the mind. When the mind is at rest, dualty is not percerved as mn the case of deep sleep, swoon or Samadh Therefore duality is the effoct The non-duahst admity the fact of duahty during the state of ignorance But he donies its reahty. Therefore from the standpomt of Reahty, non-duahty does not contrachet dunlity, as the latter is really non-evistent 3 Bither way-That is to say, the dualst holds duahty both as the highest Reality aud as the relative Realty 4 Enlightened-It 1 because our view is supported both by seriptie and ienson. S It is, etr .- The duahst is self-deluded hke the madman who, \hough standing on the earth, thinks that he is roally on an

194 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

elephant. The person who is driving the elephant does not listen to the foulish ery of the lunatic. Similarly, the dualst possessed of a partial view of the truth, thmks of himself as having realsed the ultimate Truth, and throws his challenge to the non-dualist calling upon him to refute his position. But the non-dualist, secure in hig position, langhs at this challenge and he bears no ill- will against the dualst as he is the very self of the duahst, his so-called opponont

मायया भिद्यते ह्येतनान्यथाडजं कथंचन। तत्वतो भिद्यमाने हि मर्त्यताममृतं व्रजेत् ॥ १९ ॥ 19. This unborn (changeless, non-dual Brahman) appears to undergo modification only on account of Maya (illusion) and not otherunse. For, if this modification were rcal, the Immortal (Brahman) would become mortal. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. If duality1 were the effect of non-duality, then it could be contended that duality also, like the Advarta, is the Supreme Reality. In order to remove this doubt which may crop up in the mind of some, it is said that non-duality which is the Supreme Reality appears manifold thiough Maya', like the one moon appearing as many to one with defective eye-sight and the rope appearing (to the deluded) as the snake, the water-lmne, ete. This manifold is not real, for Atman is without any part. An object endowed with parts may be said to undergo modification by a change of its parts, as clay undergoes differentiation into pots, etc. Therefore the purpoit is that the changeless (unborn) Atman whch is without parts cannot, in any manner, admit of distinction excepting through Maya or the illusion

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 195

of the perceiver Ifa the appearance of manifold- ness were real, then the Atman, the ever-unborn and non-dual, which is, by its very natnre, immortal would become mortal as though fire would become cold (whieh is an absurdity). Thet reversal of one's own nature is not desired by any-as it is opposed to all means of proofs. Therefore the Reality -- which is Atman- changeless and unborn, appears to undergo a modifira- tion only through Maya. Hence it follows that duahty is not the ultimate Reality.

1 Duality, etc-Fot, the effect always partakes of the nature of the cause. 2 Maya-Maye explams the appearance of the manifold con- sistently. not the Parinamavada (or the theoty of aetual trans- formation) adumbrated by the Samkhyas. 3 If, etc-For, by changing into the universe, the non-dual Atman which is admitted to be immortal, would undergo destruction and become mortal A thing cannot retain its own nature while undergoing & change 4 The reversal, etc -One of the tests of Reahty 1s that it never admits of any change of its inate nature. The non-dual .Itman, being the Reahty, can never really change into the dual universe. Therefore the act of cication or modification is an illusion Hogel's theory of logical necessity or Bradley's Absolute somchow becoming the phenomena cannot be borne out by icason,

अजातस्यैव भावस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः ।

अजातो ह्यमृतो भावो मर्त्यतां कथमेष्यति ॥ २०॥

20. The disputants (1.e., the dualists) contend that the ever-unborn (changeless) entity (Atman) undergors a change. How could an entity which s changeless and immortal partake of the nature of the mortal ?

196 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Some interpreters of the Upanishads, whot are garrulous and who put on the airs of the Knowers of Brahman, admit that the Reality-the Atman -- which is by nature ever-unborn (changeless) and im- mortal, really passes2 into birth (ve., becomes the umverse). If,3 accorng to them, the Atman really passes into birth, it must undergo destruction. But4, how is it possible for the Atman which is, by its very nature, ever-unborn (changeless) and immortal to become mortal, ue, to be subject to destruction ? It can never become mortal, which is contrary to its very nature. 1 Who, etc - 1.e., who, in reality, do not know anything about Brahman. 2 Passes, etc -- That is, it creates itself into the mamifold universe. a [f, etc-For, destruction is the ievitable consequence of all objeets that are born 4 But, etc .- Birth means change of nature. An entity cannot be changeless while giving birth to other objects. Ience the theory that Atman somehow changes into the universe is fallacious

न भवत्यमृतं मर्त्य न मर्त्यममृतं तथा। प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न कथचिद्भविष्यति ॥ २१ ॥

21. The mmortal cannot become mortal, nor can the mortul ever become umnmortal. For, it is never possible for a thing to chonge its naluse. SANKARL'S COMMENTARY As in comnion experence the immortal never be- comes mortal, nor the mortal over becomes immortal;

MANDŪKYOPANISMAD 197

therefore it is, in no way, possible for a thing to reverse its nature, te., to become otherwise than what it is. Fire can never change its chararter of being hot. खभावेनामृतो यस्य भावो गच्छति मर्त्यताम्। कृतकेनामृतस्तस्य कथं स्थास्यति निश्चलः ॥ २२ ॥ 22. How can he, who belives that the natumlly immortal entity becomes mortal, maintain that the Im- mortul, after passing through chanye, retuns ats change- less nature ? SANKARA'S COMMENTARY The disputant who maintams that the naturally immortal entity becomes mortal, ie., really passes into birth, makes1 the futile proposition that that entity before rreation is by its very nature, immortal. How can he assert that the entity is of immortal nature if it be admtted that it passes2 into birth ? That is to say, bow can the immortal retam its immortal nature of changelessness if it should undergo a change ? It cannot, by any means, be so. Thoses who hold that the Atman passes into birth (ie,, undergoes a change), cannot speak of the Atman as ever birthless. Everything, according to them, must be mortal. Ience* there cannot be a state called hberation. It may be contended that Brahman, as the cause, is immortal before creation But as effeet, subsequent to the creation, it be- comes mortal Therefmie there is no contrachietion in associating with Brahman both unmortal and mortal aspeots which apply to its two states. Ths Karila refutes this contention. 1 Makes, eta -For, according to these dispntants, the cause (i.e , Brahman), even before creation mast contam within it the

198 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

powsibihty of change; otherwise it cannot undergo a change. If this were admitted then the cause can no longer be called immortal. 2 Passes, etc .- If an entity undeigoes a change, that shows its impermanent churaeteristio inasmuch as it admits of the destruc- tion of its mnherent nature. 3 Those, dc -The so-called Absolute of the duahsts is also a mortal entity. Foi, nothing that passes through birth, can be ummortnl. 4 ITenre, etc -That is to sav, Mukt oi liberation in the sense of an unmutable and permanent condition becomes an absurdity.

भूततोऽभूततो वाऽपि सृज्यमाने समा श्रुतिः । निश्चित युक्तियुक्तं च यत्तद्भवति नेतरत् ॥ २३ ॥ 23. The passing into birth may be real or illusory. Both these views are equally menhoned an the Sruti. That which is supported by Sruti and corroborated by reason, is ulone true and not the other. ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY. (Objection) -- Those1 who do not admit the change or the passing into birth of Brahman, cannot justify the scriptural passages which support creation. (Reply)-Yes, we also admit the existence of seriptmal texts supporting creation as actual. But such texts serve other purposes Though the question has already been disposed of, the contention is here again made and refuted mn order to allay all doubts regardig the applicabilty or otherwise of the scup- tural texts to the subject-matter2 that is going to be dealt with The scriptural text regarding creation is the same, whether the creation of things is taken in the real sense or as a mere illusion produced by the juggler.

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 199

(Objection)-If words admit of metaphorcal and direct meanings, it is reasonable to understand the words according to their direct meaning. (Reply)-We do not adinit it For,s creation, in any sense other than illusion, is unknown to us, and further, no purpose is served by admitting (the art of) creation. All4 creation, whether metaphorieal or actual, refers to the apparent ereation caused by dvulya but not to any creation from the standpomt of Reality. For the scripture says, "Though existing both within and without, he (the dtman) is (really) changeless". Therefore we have stated m the foregoig part of this work only what is snpported by reason and finally determined by the Sruti m such words as, ' He is one and without a second and is free from birth and death". That alone is the true import of the serpture and not anything else.

1 Those, etc -There are some scriptural passages wluich state that the Aban brings about the creation by following the law of cauyality. 2 Subect matter-The purport of the Sruh is not to estahlish any act of creation, whether actual or illusory, but to prove the Ajat or eternal changelessness of Brahman 3 For, cte -According to the Adrauu plulnsophy, all crention, whether actual oi metaphorical (secondary), whether in dream or in the waking state, is equally illnsory fiom the standpoint of Reality. Further, if creation be admitted as real, no purpose whatyoevor is served by creation, It does not help anyone to attain to lberation. d All, etc .- The ereation of olyeets in dream is called metaphori- cal or secondary m compaison with the creation of objects such as pot, ete., in the wakmg state As the dream objeets become unreal in the waking state, smularly the, objects perceived in the

200 VANDŪKYOPANISHAD

wakmng state are known to he unreal when one attains to the know. ledge of Atman Therefore from the standpomt of Atman, all objects, perceived in dream or the waking state, are equally unreal. नेह नानेति चाऽऽस्नायादिन्द्रो मायाभिरित्यपि। अजायमानो बहुधा मायया जायते तु सः ॥ २४ ॥ 21. From such seriptiral passayes as, "There is no mrlhplicity in Atman," "Indro, through Maya," ue Tnonr thut the Atman, though ever unborn, venly appears to hare become many (only) through Maya. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY, It mny be asked how the changelessness (Ajati), of Atman is the final conclusion of the Sruti In reply it is said that if creation were real, then the exist- ence of the variety of objects would be absolutely real. Consequently there ought not to be sciiptural texts im- plying their unrealty. But there are such scriptural texts as, "In this (Atman) there is no multiplicity," etc., which negate the existence of duality Therefore creation (imaginary) has been imagmed in order to help the understanding of the non-dualty of Atman It1 is hke the story of Prana And this is further borne out by the use of the word, " Maya," denoting unreahty (in connection with creation) in such scrip- tural texts as "Indra2 through Maya assumed diverso forms". (Objection) -- The word denotes knowledge (Pragna). (Replv)-It is true, but sense-knowledge is illusory. The word' "Maya" is used to denote that (sense-) Inowledgr. Hence thore is no blemish (m such

MANDŪKYOPANISIIAD 201

use of the word) The word ' Mayabhih" (through Maya) m the scriptural text means through sense- knowledge, which is illusory. For, the senpture again says, 'Though unborn he appears to be born in many ways " Therefore Atman passes into birth through Maya alone. The word "Tu" ("verly") in the text (of the Karika) denotes certainty, that is to say, it4 indicates that crcation is possible only through Maya or illusion and not mn any real sense. For, hirthlessness and birth in various forms cannot be predicated of the same object, as fire cannot be both hot and cold. Further, from such Srutt passages as "How can theie be any delusion and any grief for him who sees unitv," ete, we know that the knowledge of the umty of Atman is alone the conelusion of the Srut on account of the (good) result it brings to the knower Agam, the perception of differentiation im- phed by creation has been condemned mn such Śruti passages as, "He goes from death to death (who sees here many)".

1 It is, ete .- As the Siuh described the disputes of Prana and the sense-organs in order to prove the superiorty of the vital bieath (Mukhya Prana), so also creation has heen deserbed m order to help the understanding of the student to giasp the unity of .Itman. (See Karika 3-15 ) 2 Indra-The word is used here in the sense of the Supreme Lord 3 The uord, etc .- The word "Maya" is sometunes used to denote empirieal knowledge or the knowledge derived by the contaot of the sense-organs with their objeets This knowledge does not indi- cate the Highest Consciousness or the knowledge of Reahty. Henco creation though Maya i neces ily illnsory.

202 MANDUKYOPANISHAD

4 It, elc .- If one beleves in creation then the only plausible explanation is that of the Vivartaiada and not any other theory such as Parmāmarada.

संभूतेरपवादाच्च संभवः प्रतिषिध्यते। को न्वेनं जनयेदिति कारणं प्रतिषिध्यते॥ २५॥ 25. Again, by the negation of creation (Sambhuti) the passing into birth is refuled. Causality (in respect of Atman) is denied by such a statement as, "who can cause il to pass into burth ?" SANKARA'S COMMENTARY By the condemnation of Sambhult (a.e, Hiranya- garbha) as something fit to be meditated upon, in such Sruti2 passage as, "They enter into blind darkness who worship Sambhuti," the whole3 creation (evolution) is negatived. For, if Sambhuti were abso- lutely real, then its condemnation, in such manner, would not be reasonable. (Objection)-The4 condemnation of Sambhuti is meant here for co-ordinating Sambhute with Vinasa™ as is the case with the Śrut passage,6 "They enter into blind darkness who worship Avidya." (Reply)-Yes, it is indced true that the condemna- tion of the exclusive worship of Sambhutr is made for the purpose of co-ordinating the meditation regardmng Sambhuti with the Karma (ritual) known as Vinasa. Still it should not be forgotten that as the purpose of the Karma known as Venasa is to transcend death,- whose nature is the desire consequent upon the m- born ignorance of - man-so also the anm7 of the

MĀNDŪKYOPANISUAD 203

co-ordination of the meditation on Derata (i.e, Sambhuti or Hiranyagarbha) with the Karma (ealled Vinasa), undertaken for the purpose of the purification of the mind of man, is to transcend death,-whichs is of the nature of the attachment to work and its results characterised by the dual hankering after the end and the means For, thus alone man becomes free from death which is of the nature of impurity and is charae- teused by the dual impulse of end and means There- fore the co-ordination of the meditation on Devata and of Karma-which is Avidya -- leads to freedom from death. Thus' the realisation of Vidya (the highest knowledge), characterised by the identity of the Supreme Self and Jiva, is inevitable10 for one who has transcended death,-of the form of Audya and characterised by the dual impulses (of the means and the end),-and who is established mn renunciation and also devoted to the meaning of the import of the Upanishad. It is therefore said thus1: Brahmamdya (ie, the knowledge of Brahman),- which is the means for the attamment of Immortality and which is (from the relative standpoint) subsequent to the state of the antecedent dndya (ignorance),- being related to the same person (who is still in the state of ignorance), is said to be co-ordinated with duidyd Hence the negation of Sambhut is for the purpose of condemnation as it serves a purpose other12 than the knowledge of Brahman which (alone) is the means to the attainment of Immoriality. Though it serves the purpose of removing impurity yet the

204 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

devotion to Sambhuti does not enable one to realise (directly) immortahty. (Thorefore the condemnation of Sambhuti is reasonable). Hence, Sambhuti, being thus negatived, it can be said to have only a relative existence. Having regard to the unity of Atman, the ultimate Reality, creation (symbolised by Heranya- gortha) which is known as immortal13 (only from the relative standpoint) is negated Such14 being the case, who ran bring ito being the Java who is seen as created only through illnsion (Maya) and who exists only while ignorance (Avidya) lasts? This Jia reverts to its original nature (of Brahman) with the disappear- ance of Avidya. For, no one can verily bring into being the snake (falsely) superimposed upon the rope through Aidya and which disappears when one knows (the true nature of the rope). Therefore no one can pro- duce or create the Java. The words "Ka nu" ("who can ?") in the text, being in the form of interrogation, refute the idea of causality. The purport of the Kantka is that theie can be no cause of a thing which is seen to be born only through ignorance and which disappears with the destruction of the said ignorance. The Srut also says, "This'5 Atman is not born from any cause nor is anything born from it."

1 Sambhuti-The word "Bhuli" means "Aisvarya' () he,, power, and the word Sambhut mdicates one who possesses all power. It is a deity known as Hwranyagarbha (The Golden Germ) who is the first of all the evolved effects and from whom, ag the matrix, the whole evolution proceeds. It is described m the I'idantic texts as the summation of all subtle bocies.

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 205

2 Brute passage-This is a quotation from the Isa. Upanishad (12). This Kanld is based on this toxt of the Tpamshad. 3 Whole, etc .-- By the condemnation of Hrunyayarbha from whom the entire ereation is sarl to procerd, the whole of the subsn- quent efect is negatived Therefore the entue effect wluch is seen in the form of the manitold, is unrea! 4 "he, etc .- The toference is to the text of the Ia-Upanishad (14) which tuns thus. "Those who womhip the unmamfested Prakruts and Hnunyagmsbha (Destrnetion, Vinaón) together, get ovet death through the worship of Ihranyagurbha and attain im- mortaltty through the worship of Praliih". "The contention of the opponent is this The condemnation of Sambhut is not for the purposo of proving its unreahty. Its purpose is to combine the worship of Prakrih and Hiranyagurbha, The exclusive worship of Iuanyagarbha I9 condemned (See Sankara's Commentary on verse 14 of the Jsa-Upanishad) 5 Vinasa-The word ' Panasa' means that object whose characterishc attribute ia destruction, the abstract being here used for the concrete Tinasa means the worshp of Iwrunya- qaibha The contention of the opponent 1s that the purpose of the condemnation of the exclusive worshp of Sumbhuti 1s to presertbe the co-ordmation of its meditation with some rituahs- tic woiship and not to imply the unreality of Sambhuti ot the first cause, e Srutt, etc -The reference ia to the 9th verse of the Isa- Upansshud which condemns J'idya (the exclusive meditation on the deities) and Aridya (the excluave ntuahstic ceremonies with- out any meditation) and prescubes their co-ordination 7 Lim, elc .- The purport of the 9th verse of the 1sa- Upunishad is this -Audya is comething other than Julya or knowledye, hence st is Karma for Karma is opposed to knowledge. Those who are continously peiforming Agnihotra-saenfiee, ote., alone, fall into darknes. Those who having gien up Knrma, are always bent upon acquiring tho knowledge of the deities, fall into gieater darkners Who knows that both these shoukt simul- taneonsly be followed by the came person, he alone, so combimng the two, gadually secures the one deurable end. That 13 to say, his mind is purified of all impurities. The pure mind, then, in able

206 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

to grasp the meaning of the Upamishad which alone enables the student to Anow the Ulhmate Reality. The aim of such Karma as the Agnihoba sacrifice, ete., prescnbed by the seripture, is to turn the mind of the student away from the pursuit of worldly objeets, not sanctioned by the seriptures By the co-ordination of Karma with meditation (on the deities) the student frees hmm- self from all impulse of desires Even then he has not realised the highest Truth which i9 possible only through Jnanam or knowledge. 8 Which t, etr -Doath means the endless cyele of birth and death which ws mevitable unless one has attained to the know- ledge of Brahman The ondiess chum is caused by the desire for relative objects 'hus, etc -The knowledge of Brahman can never be combined with the co-ordmnation of Karma and Upasana as the latter belongs to the realm of ignorance Bralmamdya and ignorance aie as unrelated a light and dai kness. 10 Ineuitable-There 19 no other obytacle for the realisation of the Supreme Reahty when all the ipurities have been emoved by the practice of Karma and Upasana. 11 Thus, ete -No co-ordmation is possible between tho know- ledge of Brahman and any other relative knowledge Still it Is found that the student, at first, through a process of relative know- ledge gets his mind purified and then beoomes fit for Brahma- Jnanam Thus from a relative standpoit it is seen that the knowledge of Brahman arises subseguent to the relative know- ledge, Really speakig, the knowledge of self is ever present and ignornace is non-eustent As from the relative standpoint it is yeen that an ignorant person gradually attains to the highest knowledge, thereforo from that standpomt Vidya and Audya are said to be related to the same person. 13 Other than, etc -That is to say, the purpove of the medita- tion on Sambhuti is the purification of the mind. As this is not the same as the knowledge of Brahman, therefore, Sambhut, Is condenined 13 /mmortal-In comparison with the phenomenal Ju, Sambhut or Hnanyagurbha is said to be immortal, as the cosmic soul exists even after the death of the Jeva. But from the

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 207

standpomt of Brahman, franyngmbhe is also mortal and imperma- nent. Therefore it is condemned 14 Surh, ete -There ia no aet of creation hom the standpomt of Reahty; because the very iea of creation is due to ignorance Creation is an idea of the nund and hence negated 15 "Ths. elr -That is to say, the idea of causahty cannot apply to Brahman It is only an explanation apphed in the phenomenal world due to the ignoranee of the real nature of Brahman,

स एप नेति नेतीति व्याख्यातं निह्नुते यतः । सर्वमग्राह्यभावेन हेतुनाडज प्रकाशते ॥ २६ ॥ 26. As the Bruti passage, "It is not thes, not this," on account of the incomprehensibility of Atman,' negates all (dualishc) ideas described (as the means for the attainment of Atman), therefore the birthless (Atman alone) exists (and not any duality). SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The Mrutl in such passage as, "This is the final instruction It is not this, not this," has determined the nature of Atman by the refutation of all specific characteristics. But knowing this Atman to be m- comprehensible2 (to the ordinary mind), the Sruti has agam sought to establsh the very same Atman through other means and finally refuted what have been described (as the means for the attainment of Atman). That is to say, the Aruti, m such passage as, "It is not this, not this," demonstrates the mcompre- hensibility ot Atman or in other words, refntes the idea that Atman3 can be realised or undeistood Those4 who do not understand that the means (suggested for the reahsation of Atman) have only one purpose,

208 MĀNDŪKYOPANISIAD

wz., the realisation of the end (i e, the non-dual Atman), make a mistake by thinking that what are suggested as the means have the same reality as the end. In order to temove this error, the Srut negates the realitys of the means bye pointmg out the incompre- hensibility of Atman, as its reason. Subsequenily,7 the student knows that the means serve their purpose by pointmg only to the end and the end itself is always one and changeless. To such a student the knowledge of the unborn Self which is both withmn and without reveals itselt & I The Sruti-The reference is to the Brihudaranyala Upanishal (2. 3. 1) which beginy with the statement. "There are two forms of Brahman, the material and the immaterial, the mortal and the immortal, the solid and the fluid .. " The chapter ends thus : " Next follows the teachung (of Brahman) by . No, no', for, there 1s nothing else higher than this (if one says) : 'it is not so' ." Those who cannot meditate on Brahman, hee from all attributes, are advised to concentrate on some characteristics (of Brabman) supermposed upon Brahman for the facilty of meritation Then the students are asked to negate those attributes also, bccause thus alone oan they realise the undifferentiated Brahman which alone is the Supreme Reality 2 Incomprehensible-It is because the knowledge of the Self is extremely subtle. 3 Atman, etc,-That is to say, the Atman is never the effeet of any thought or words It is not an object of meditation or speech. For it is our very self. Thus the Sruts advises the studonts to dis- sociate from dtman all words, or thoughts which were at first accepted as means for its reahsation That which is thought by the mind i meroly an idea. It is changeahle and negatablo. Hence it 1 not Reahty Therefore any idea associated with Atman 14 not the Atman itself. 1 Thnee, etc -The upwary students, unable to understand the real simifcance of Tedanta, make the mstake of thinking that the

MANDOKYOPINISUAD 209

attributes which are superimposed upon Brahman are as real ag Brahman itself That is to -ay, they thinh that these attributes have an mdependent evistence 5 Reality-That m to say, a reahty mdependent of Brahman. 6 By pointeng onl-'This is the Advatie method of ieasoning. Brahman or Atman, bemg bevond tune, space and oamsality, is over incompiehenable thiongh any emparical meanse 1t is the eteinnt suljeet having no oljeet thiough which one can compiehend it. Ths meompiehemibihty of Jonun is the very reason for ietutiug any characteristie that may be otherwee assorialed with it If Atman can be known hy any poutive attubute, it no longer remains incvmprehenuble. It becomes an objeet of ou thought like any other perceived object Such Atman can nover be the changcless Absolute 7 Sulsequently, ete -The dicrimnating student, through lus superior power of reavoning, refutes all attributey falely super- uuposed upon Atman He realses that there attrihutes hare no independent reahty Then he understandy that all attributes are the same as the non-dual Biahman, as one who knowa the true nature of the rope realses that what he formerly thought of as the snake is nothig but the rope That whieh was superimposed upon the rope i9 identical with the substratum Only the idea of tho existence of the snake apart fiom the rope 19 illusion. Sumdlarly all attributes of Atman, such as materialty or immaterilty, eto., are, m reahty, identiral with dtman To concede any separate existence to the attributer mdependent of Atman is ilusion Itman, the non-dual, changeless and causeless Reahtv, alone oxsts, All that exists is Alman Even that wlnch is smagined as means for the reahsation of .Itman rs nol separate from Abnan as the reflection of an object is not sepaiate from the oljeet 8 Itaclf-That is to say, the final rovelation of Itman does not depend apon Sruti ot anything else. A knower of _Itman renhyes that Jtman always evists and is self-luminous, no external mrans can illumine Itman

सतो हि मायया जन्म युज्यत न तु तत्त्वतः । तत्वतो जायते यस्य जातं तस्यं हि जायते ॥ २७ ॥

210 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

27. That which is ever-emstent appears to pass unto birth through illusion (Maya) and not from the standpoint of Reality. He who thinks that this passing into buth is real asserts, asa matter of fact, that what is born is born again (and so on unthout end).

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Thus hundreds of seriptural passages conclude that the essence which is the non-dual and birthless Self, existing both within and without, is the only Renlity, and that nothing else, besides the Self, exists. Now, if order to determme this very Reality through reason, again it is stated .- (Objection)-It may also be the fact that if Reahty be mcomprchensible then the knowledge of Self is unreal. (Reply)-No, this cannot be, forl the effect is com- prehended. As the effects, that is to say, creation (of new things), come from a really existent magician through Maya (magic), so also the comprehension of the effects, in the form of the creation of the universe, leads us to infer the cxistence of the Atman, the Supreme Reality, who, hke the magician, is, as it were, the substratum of the illusion which is seen in the form of the creation of the universe For, the creation of the universe is possible only from a Reahty, i.e., an exist- ing rause, hke the birth of the effects, such as the elephant, ete., conjured up through illusion (by an existing magician): and this creation is never possible with a non-existing cause. It is not, however, possible

MANDŪKYOPANISH ID 211

for the unborn dtman to really pass into birth Or,2 the first line of the text may be explained mn another manner. As a really existing entity, such as the rope, etc, passes into such effeets as the snake, ete, only through Maya and not in reahty, similarly, the real and the incomprehenssble Atm is seen to pass into birth, in the form of the aniverse, like the iope breoming the snake, only through illusiou The birthless Atman cannot pass into birth hom the stand- pomt of Reahty. But the dispntant who holds that the unborn Aunen, the Supreme Realty, is really born in the form of the universe, cannot assert that the unborn is born, as this implies a contradiction.8 In that case he must admit that, in fact, what is (already) born, agam passes mto birth. If, thus, birth is predicated of that which is already born, then the disputant is faced with what is known in logic as negiessus ad infinitum. Therefore it is established that the Essence which is Atman is ever unborn and non- dual It has already been establshed on scriptural evidence that the Atman wluch is the Supreme Realty is birthles and non-dual. All duahty is mere imagination due to ignorance and hence unreal. This is now estabbshed independently by reason Sankata always mamtais a dual aspeet. For those who beleve in seripture, Sankara quotes the seripturo to establsh ls pomt Again for those who do not bebeve m the Veday as the supreme authorty but who depend upon reason alone, Sankara gives rational proof ubout lns conchision 1 For, etc .- The opponent boheves in causahty but demieg Atman. This is mogienl. If one admita the creation of the um- verse then one must beheye in ity cause alo Evory effeet pre- supposes a cause. Even every illuuon must have a subsiratum.

212 MANDOKVOPANISUAD

A posrtive effect canunt be produced fiom a non-existing cause. The poution of the Adraitin is this . If you beheve in the universe as a created entity, you must admit its canse, namely, Brahman The poutive effeet of the univerve cannot come from a non-existing couse. Brahman oi Atman does not reallv cieate the univerge not transform itself into the universe, as the ropo does not really oreato the snake sor dors it become the snake The appediance of tieahon i9 due to ignorance. Therefore the theory of Mayn or puarta which pors a ieal Atman is the best possible explanation of the umvore when such unverse is reoognised as a fact 2 Dr, etr The first mnterpretation of the first line poinis to Itman as the mstrumental canse (Nimitta Karana) of the univeise, though the voty perception of the crealion is due to illusion Ths inter- pretation gives stress on the Realty of Atman The second inter- pretation gives stress on the fact that the idea of the unborn dtman paswing into turth is due to ignorance The process of ereation and ereation itself ate illusoly. 3 Contraichon-It is because the unborn cannot gire birth tn a new thing. It this causality be adntted then the so-called unborn cause must iself come from another cause and so on ad mfnitum Thus we never come across an unborh cause. Theie will he thus an endless past in the case of causes and an equally endlesx future in the case of effects. If the cause produces an effect that effect, in its turn, must produce new efteet and so on ad tnfimtum (Hegel's position) 'Thus there can be no mukti or hbera- tion wlnch means freedom from the causal chuin

असतो मायया जन्म तत्त्वतो नैव युज्यते । बन्ध्यापुत्रो न तत्वेन मायया वाऽपि जायते ॥ २८॥

28 The unreal cunuol be born erther really or Ihrough Maya. For the son of a barren woman is born hether in reality nor in illusion. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. There are those who hold that all things are un- real, that the non-cxistent produces this world. But

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 213

production, by the non-existent, of any thing either m ieality or m illusion is not possible For we know nothing hke it m our expenence As the son of a barren woman is not seen to he bomn mither really or through Maya, the theory of the non-existeuce of things is in truth' untenable.

If the ultimate tealty he non-existent, then it ranngt pass inta mth Agam if what we percoive be uwreal, its produetion is like. wise ipo ible In either case cau-ahty is umeal We have seen from the previons Kanka (27) that the Reahty, which is the unborn Atman, eannot be amd to paes into larth, withont our beig forced into an mnfnite regress Tlus Kanla shows that moduction i8 an impossibilty if the ultimate reahty be non-evistent, or f the thing we perceive be unreal. So, causahty or modnetion or pasving into birth is an absutdity 1 In truth-In cave the Itman 1s a Reahty, the pasuing into buth may be explained by Maya; but in this case even that explanation cannot hold, for there is no evidence in our actual experience to justify the presumption that either something comes out of nothing or nothing comes out of sometlung

यथा खन्ने द्वयाभासं स्पन्दते मायया मनः । तथा जाग्रद्द्वयाभास स्पन्दने मायया मनः ॥ २९॥

29, As mn dream the mind acts trough Mavă piesenting the appearance of duality, so also u the waking state the mind acts, through Maya, presenting the appearance of duality. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

How is it possible tor the Reahty to pass mnto birth through Maya ? It is thus replied :- As the snake imagined in the rope, is real1 when seen as the rope, so

214 MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

ulso the mind,2 from the standpoint of the knowledge of the ultimate Reality, is seen to be identical with Atman. This mind, m dream, appears to us as dual in the forms of the cogniset and the cognised through3 Maya, as the snake appears to be separate from the rope through ignorance. Simlarly, mdeed the mind acts (in a dual form) in the waking state through Mayā. That4 is to say the mind appears to act.

I Real, ete,-The snake is unreal when we try to see it as sepa- rated from the rope But when the real natme of the rope is known then it is realised that the snake, which appeared, is really identical with the iopc. The substratum (.dhishthanu) is the same as that which is superimposed (Aopa) upon it Mind-The mind as the substratum of the dream experiences, is identical with reahty or Atman 3 Through Maya-In dream we have the experience of the sepaiate existence of the perceiver, the objeet of perception and the act of perceiving But in the waking state we know theso three- fold experieners to be nothing but the nund so appearing The iden that the dream experiences are different from the mind is due to the ignorance which exists in the dream state The knower of the real natute of the rope finds it to be identical with the snake. That, etr .- For, in reality Biahman does not act The action of the mind is due to Maya The Sruh also says that mind in reality is Brahman

अद्वयं च द्वयाभासं मनः सने न संशयः । अद्ठयं च द्वयाभासं तथा जाग्रन संशयः ॥ ३०॥

30. There is no doubt that the mand, which is, in fact, non-dual appears as dual in dream; en the like manner undoubtedly that which is non-dual, appears as dual in the waking state also.

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 215

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

Really speaking, the snake is ientical with the rope. In the like manner, the mind which is non- dualt as Abnan appeais undoubtedly in dual forms m dheams. Verly m dheam, such objeets of perception as elephants, ete., or their perceivers such as eyes, ete., have2 no existence mdependently of conscious- ness (mind). Simlar3 is the rase m the wakig state as well For (consciousness) mmd, which is the high- est Reality, is common to both.

The opponent may contend that the mevious Karikt admity duahty This Kanta show, that the perception of duahty is due to nur ignorance. The only Reahty, both in the dieam and the waking states, i mind or consciousness which appears as dual, ie, the perceiver and the peteeived, on account of ignorance 1 Non-dual, etr -Thi is known m Sushupt or deep-sleep when the mind remains as pure and non-dual 2 Hare, etc .- That the perceiver and the perceived in the cheam state kave no existence independent of the mind is hnown in the waking state, 3 Similar, ete .- In the waking state also what is perceived 19 only the act of the mmnd The name consciousneas is common in both the states. The nlea of a muind baving the dual characteristieg of determination and volition is superimpo-ed upon the subytratum, i.e., consciousnesy and as a result, the phenomenal world is per- ceived It should not be thought that there is any ofher cauve for the appearance of duahty eveepting ignorance

मनोदृश्यमिदं द्वैतं यत्किंचित्सचराचरम्। मनसो ह्यमनीभावे द्वैतं नैवोपलभ्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

31. All these dual olgects, commising everything thut is morable and immorable, percr ired by the mind

216 MINDŪKYOPANISHAD

(are mind alone). For, duality is never experienced when the mind ceases to act SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. It has been said that it is the mind alone which appears as dual (objects) like the appearance of the snake in the rope But what is its proof ? Our answer is this. We make the statement on the strength of an inference following the method of agreement and difference The proposition is that all this duality perceived as such hy the imagmation of the mind is, in reality, nothing but the mind. The reason for such inference is that duality is perceived when the mind acts and it vamshes when the mind ceases to act ; that is to say, when the (activity, 2.e., the Vrilti of the) mind is withdrawn1 unto itself by the knowledge got through discrimination, repeated practice and rennnciation, -like the disappearance of the snake in the rope-or dunng deep sleep.2 Hence on account of the disappear- ance ot duality it is established that duality is unreal or illusory. That the perception of duahty is due to the action of the mind is further proved in this Kārıkā.

1 Withdiaun, ele -- Thuis may he called Samadh But Vedanta does not prescribe any mechamcal method for the attamment of ths state. The Vedantic method for the control of the mind 1s the discrimmnation between the real and the unreal (repeated drcrimnation), all based upon reasoning Deep sleep-Although there is a dulerence, Sushupti has often been pointed out hy the Vedantic seers as similar to the stato of Nirmlalpa Samadhi, Sushuph is the state when the mind erases to aet. C'onsequently in it duality is not pereerved.

217

आत्मसत्यानुबोधेन न संकल्पयते यदा। अमनस्तां तदा याति ग्राह्यामावे तदग्रहम् ॥ ३२ ।। 32. When the mind does not imagine on account of the hnomledge of the Trath which is Atman, then it ccases to be mind and brcomes free from all idea of cng- nition, for mant of obyerts to be cogmised. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. How does the mmd become naught ? It is thus rephed .- The Itman alone is the Reality likel the clay ; as in the Sruti passage, " All modifications are mere names arising from efforts of speech The clay alone is real." That knowledge of the reality of Atman comes thiongh the scripture2 anr the teacher. The mind having attained to that knowledge does not imagine, as3 there remams nothing to be imagmed The mind then is like fire when there is no fuel to burn. When the mind thus does no longer imagine, it censes to be mind, that is to say, the nund, for want of any object to be cognised, becomes free from all cognition. 1 Like, ete -The only rcahty m the pots, jars, plates, etc., (made of clay) is the clay The names and foims, on account of their changealahty and nrgatalhty, are uureal Fimilaily the only reality in thus untverse 15 .Ibman alomne, all other ohjeets which are mere acta of mind, bemg changeable and negatable, are unrenl. 2 Serpture, etc -The scripture and the teacher only tell the student what is not Abnan They follow the negativo method for poiting out the Renhty, which is the ratumnal method pursned in this philosophy. 3 A4, elo .- The aots of mind wheh eonjuro up the world of duahty belong to the emprrical realm, ie, to the realm wheremn

218 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

the duality of the subject and the object is recogmsed Bui such action becomes impossible in the absolute state where there is no conscinusness of subject and objeet In that state Biahman alone a iealised and hence the mind, consishing of determination and vohtion, ceases to exist. Then mind becomes identical with Brahman which is tree from all duality of cogmition.

अकल्पकमजं ज्ञानं ज्ञेयाभिनं प्रचक्षते। ब्रह्मज्ञेयमज नित्यमजेनाज विबुध्यते ॥ ३३ ॥

33 The krowledge (Jnanam) which is unborn and fice from all imaginations is ever inseparable from the Anowable The immutable and buthless, Brahman 1s the sole object of hnowledge barthless is knorn by the birthless.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. If all this duality be illusory, how is the knowledge of the Self to be realised ? It is thus replied .- The Knowers of Brahman deseribe knowledge, r.e., the mere essence of thought, which is unborn and free from all imagmations as1 non-different from Brahman, the Ultimate Reality, which is also the object of knowledge. This is supported by snch scriptural passages as, "Like heat from fire, knowledge (or Jnanam) is never absent from the knower (Atman)." "Brahman is Knowledge and Bliss," "Brahman 1s Reahty, Knowledge and Infinity," etc. The knowledge, of which Brahman is the object, is non-different from (the knowahle) Brahman, as is the heat from the fire. The Essence of the Self, which is the object of knowledge, verily knows itself by means of unborn knowledge

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 219

which is of the verv nature of tman. Brahman which is of the nature of one homogeneous mass of eternal consciousness, does not depend upon another2 instrument of knowledge (lor its ilhmnnation), a9 18 the case with the sun, which bemg of the nature of contmnuous light (does not require any mstrument to illumine itself)

1 ts non-different, rh -The Jnanam or knowledge is the same as Brahman, otherwre no knowiedge would be able to tell us what Brahman i9 Daiknesy cannot illummate the sun Only the hght of the sun which is the sun itself, can illumine the sun. 2 Another instrument-Such as seripture, ete., which nly tell us what is not self When the Jnant does any work in the woild, which impbes dualty to the ignoiant petson, ho knows that the doer, the deed and the object of the act aie all Brahmian Sumlarly to the Jnant, even when he acts mn this empirical world, the knower, the Anow- ledge and the objeet of knowledge are all Drahman And yet all these, being of the nature of Brahman, are without buth (.ja).

निगृहीतस्य मनसो निर्विकल्पस्य श्रीमतः ।

पचारः स तु विज्ञेयः सुषुप्तेडन्यो न तन्समः ॥३४॥

31 The behariour of the mind which is under control, 1.e., mhich is free from all imaminunons und which as endowed vith drscriminahon, should be known. The condition of the nand in deep aleep is of annther sort and not like thot.

BANKARA'S COMMENTARY It has been stated before that the mind, free from imagmation on account of the knowledget of Truth, which is Alman, becomes tranguil for want of external

220 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

objects, like the fire not fed by fuel. Such mind may be said to be under control. It has been further stated that duahty disappears when the mind thus ceases to act. The Yogis should particularly know the behavioure of the mind which is thus brought under discipline, which is free from all imaginations and which is possessed of discrimination

(Objection)-In3 the absence of all specific conscious- ness the mind, m the state of deep sleep, behaves exactly in the same manner as does the mind of a man under centrol. What is there to be known in the absence of all specific knowledge ?

(Reply)-To this objection we reply thus -Your ohjection is not valid. For, the behaviour of the mind in deep sleep, overcome by the darkness of delusion caused by ignorance, and still full of many potential desires which are the seeds of numerous future un- desirable activities, is qute different from the behaviour of the mind well under control (free from Kalpanas) and free from the darkness which produces activities that give rise to numerous afflictions, and from which has been burnt away by the fire of self-knowledge the ignorance which contains the harmful seed of all po- tential tendencies to act. The behaviour of the latter kind of mind is quite different 4 Therefore it is not hke the mind in deep sleep. Hence the behaviour of such mind should be known. Thiss is the purport. 3 Knowledge, cle .- This implies the diserimination between real and unreal

MANDŪKYOPANISIIAD 221

Behariour-The word " Prachia" in the text implying behaviour or activity shows that by " Nypraha " or disciphne 18 not meant the Yogie diseiplme leading to Nirrilalpa Samadhi; for, mn that state the mind lovey all netivity and movemont. To a Jnim the Prachara or the ideaton of the mind 19 nlo Brahman. Thcrefoie thee ideations should he examied or analysed

3 In the, ete -The opponent evidently istakes the Verlantic tranquillity of mind aruved at hy discununation, ete., for tho yngre Samodh whieh is oultivated by contollng the activitirs of the mind. Henee hw objeetion to yngn tranee, like deep aleep, is asociated with abvence of mental dleation Sanhara in hrs ('om- mentary on the Bmahmasibn (2. 1 9) and in various other places puts yoyie Samadht and deep sleep undet the samne category. 4 Different-It 19 because the mmd of the Jnani is always established mn Brahman,

5 This, elc -The purpmt is that the mind of a man, who has not known the Truth of Self, hecomes absoibed in Audyd at the time of deep sleep or Somadh Such mind is free from all activities and remais in a motionless, & e, inactive condition, concealing within it all the seeds of future dual actisihes Bnt the mind of a Jnans 18 well under diseiphne Ly the constant practice of chserimination. That mind is always saturated with the thought of Brahman Hence the mind of a Jnani does not loso its activities which are identical with the non-dual Biahman itgelf

लीयते हि सुपुप्ते तन्निगृह्दीतं न लीयते।

तदेव निर्भय ब्रह्म ज्ञानालोकं समन्ततः ॥ ३५ ॥।

35 As the mind is unthdrarm at the time of deep sleep and not so in the case of the (Tedantie) discipline, (therefore, there is a diffrience beturen the condition of the mind of a steeper and of a Jnam.) That (mind of a Jnani) brcomes ienhcal unth fewless Brahman whose all-round illumination is conscinusness alone.

222 MANDŪKYOPANISIAD

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

Now is stated the reason for the distmnction between the behaviour (of the mind ot a sleeper and of a JJnans). The mind in deep sleep, with the desires which are the cause of all experiences during the state of ignorance, goes1 back to the seed-like condition of potentiality characterised by the undifferentiatede feature of daik- ness; but the3 mmd (of a Jnan) which is disciplined by chiserimination is not so withdiawn, that is to say, does not go back to the seed-like state of daikness Therefore is made the distinotion between the behaviour of the mind in deep sleep and that of a Jnani whose mnd is under control When the mind becomes free from all ideas of the pereerver and the percerved -- the dual evils caused by ignorance -- it verily becomes one with the Supieme and the non-dual Brahman. Therefore the mmnd becomes free from all fear, for, in that state, the peiception of duality, which is the cautse of fear, is absent Brahman is peace and fear- lessness Having realsed Brahman, the Jnani is not afraid of anything This is thus further amplfied . Jnanam means the essence of Knowledge, i.e., the consciousness which is the very nature of Atman or the Self. Brahman is that whose expression is the Knowledge thus described. In other words, Brahman is the one mays of sentiency. The word, "all-round" in the text, implies that this knowledge of Brahman is without break and all-pervading hke the ether.

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 223

It is imphed in the previous text of the Kariln that there is a difference between the mind of a Jnani and that of a deep sleeper. The reason for this difference is stated in this Kariha. I Goes bach, ete -For, an ignorant man, when he wakoy up from deep sleep, again experiences these deares. Therefoie the desnes are said to remum m a potential state in deep yeep. 2 Undifferentudled, et - It is beenuse the expemence of drep sleop is chaisetensed by the abnee ot all that 19 known. The man desenbing the ennchtion of deey deep says, ' I know nothmg dunng that state". 3 The mind, etc -But the case of a Jnin is quite different. By the practice of drerimmation, he ean distinguish the reality from the unreabty All oljects of cogmtion, being changeable and negatable, aie known to the Jnam as umeal Therefore the hnowledge of Brahman does not denote a state in whieh the desires remain in potential condition Foi, the deures of a Jnant aro destroyer for evci by the knowledge of the non dnal Brahman. Hence, a man having attamed to the knowledge of Brahman does not experience any desre, which imphes cogmser and cognised, The Jnan knows the activities of his mnd as identical with the non-dual Brahman 4 Withont break, fte -That is to say, the Jnam may be engaged in any acfivity, but in everything he reahses Brahman alone, The experiences of a Jnant have thus been desembur i the Gio (4.24) "Brahman is the offeriy, Brahman is the oblation pomred mto the fne of Biahman, Brahinan venly shall be reached by Inm who alwayy sees Brahman in action"

अजमनिद्रमखप्नमनामकमरूपकम्।

सकृद्विभातं सर्वजं नोपचारः कथंचन ॥ ३६॥.

36. (This Brahman is) birthless, free from sleep and dream, unthout name and form, ever-rffulyent and omnis- cient. Nothing has to be done in any way (unth respeet to Biahman).

224 MĀNDŪK YOPANISIAD

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

Brahman is both within and without as well as unborn, as there is no cause for its passig into birth. For, we have already stated that (the phenomenon of) birth is seen on account of the ignorance (of the real nature of a thing), as' is the case with the rope giving birth to the (illusion of the) snake. It is birthless be- enuse all ignoranee is destroyed by the knowledge of Truth which is the dtman. Hence it is free from sleep2, for. Atman, wlnch is, by nature, non-dual, is always free from sleep the nature of which is that of beginning- less deluion characterised by ignorance Therefore it is free from dream3 Names and forms that are ascribed to it are due to the ignorance of its real nature. These names and forms are destroyed by Knowledge. It is like the (destruction of the illusion of the) snake seen in the rope. Hence Brahman cannot be described by any name, nor can it be in any manner described by any form To support this, there are such Sruti passages as. "From which words come back ", ete Moreover, it4 is ever-effulyent or it is of the very nature oi efful- gence. Fors, it is free from (the ideas of) mamfestation and non-manifestation characterised by wrong appre- hension and non-apprehension. Apprehension and non- apprehension are (as mseparable) as day and night. Darkness is the characteristic of ignorance. These are the rauses of the non-manifestation (of the real nature of Atman). Theses are absent in Atman, Moreover, Atman is always of the nature of consciousness and effulgence. Therefore it is reasonable to speak of

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 225

Atman as cver-eftulgent. It is all-knowmg, that is to say, Atman is all that evists and Atman is sentiency itself. As regarde such Brahman (te, the knower of such Brahman) no action ean be enjomed, as may be in the case of others, who (on account of then ignoranee of the real nature of Biabman) aie asked to mractie concentration, ete, on the nature of dItman The7 pur- port i that besides the destruction of ignoranep it 18 not possible to presenbe any duty (for the knowledge of Brahman), as Brahman is always of the nature of purity, knowledge and freedom The nature of Brahman, which is the suhject-matter under diseussion, is thus deseribed m other ways The purport of the Karda is that apart from the reahsation of one's rentity with the attributeless Biahman no action i to be done by hun, The categomenl imperative of Kant haw no meaning for a knower of Atman Yonc Samadhs is not the same as the goal of Jnana Foga as deserbed m the philmophy of Advaita Vedantn or the Kanla. 1 s, etr .- The phenomenon of the rope producing the snake is due to ignorance of the real nature of the rope 2 Sleep-Sieep or Nuba means the non-apprehension of objects, as is the chatacteristic of the mind in deep sleop In tho causal woild this Wwha oi inmianee is known as begmmngles, as no beginning of it can be fouud. 3 Dream-The dhieam or Stapan 1s charaeterned by wrong appiehenmion of objeets This is not powible mn the oase of Atman which is of the nature of eternal purity, knowledge and illumiation 1 It is, ele .- The Itman is that whieh gives uy the iden of hght It i4 not itself what is deseubed as hght & For, ctr .- The ideas of non-apprehenuon and wrong appie- hension ave corclatives Ono imphes the other Sundarly the ideas of manifestation and non-manifestation are correlatives. Whon an emprieal Jun become, obhyons of himself, a4 mn deep sleep, he is said to be m a state of non-manifestation characterised

226 MANDŪK YOPANISHAD

by the non-pereeption of oljeots. Similarly, the ompirical JJirg is said to be manifeyted, ay m dream or waking state, when he appre- hends objects m a wiong way, ie , not as they ate in their true character which is the non-dual Brahman, But Brahman cannot be identified with the dualstie concepts of non-ipprehension or wrong appehension and non-mandfestation or manifestation, ns it is the witness of all those conditions. 6 Theye me, ele .- The ideas of manifestation and non-mamfesta- ton cannot mnhere mn Itmen from the standpoit of Realty. These me attributed to Jtman, as one says that Atman is unmam- fested to us previous to the reahsation of knowledge and it is mani- tested to us suhsequent to thut reahsaton These statements are made from the empirical standpoint But Brahman is always of the nature ot illumination which never decreases or mcreases by any' extianeous cnoumstancos In common parlance the advent of day and night i9 associated with the rising and the setting of the sun. But the qun neither rises nor sots, It is always brighi and effulgent If one takes his stand in the sun ho sees neither the night nor its correlative the day. But if a man 19 away from the sun, he imagies the using and setting of the sun and consequently experiences day and night which have no mean- ing fiom the standpoint of the sun 7 The purport, etc -All imaginations iegarding Samadhi, ete , may have then appheation in the state of ignorance when one does not realne the ever-illumined nature of his self. सर्वाभिलापविगतः सर्वचिन्तासमुत्थितः ।

सुप्रशान्तः सकृज्ज्योतिः समाधिरचलोऽमयः ॥३७॥ 37. (This Atman is) beyond all erpression by words, beyond all acts of mind; (Itis) all peace, eternal effulgence, free from achvity and feur and attainable by concentrated understanding (of the Jiva) SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Now is explained the reason for defining Brahman as withont name, etc., as described above. The word

MANDŪKYOPANISIIAD 227

Abhilapa, meaning expression, denotes here the instru- ment of sound by which all sounds are expressed. Brahman is beyond speech. The mstrument of sound is used in the senve of metonymy, ne, i also imphes other instruments of sense-knowledge. The purport Is that the Atnutn is beyond all external sense-organs. Simdarly, it is beyond all artivities of the mind. The word " Chinta " in the text stands for "nund " (or the internal organ of thought) For, the Sruti says, " It is verily without Prana and withont mind ", "It is ligher than the impemshable Supreme" It is all peace as it is free from all distinetions. The Almen is ever-eftul- gent,-that is to say, bemg of the nature of self-cons- cousness which is its very essence, it is efernal hght. The LItman is denoted by the woid Samlhy as it can be realsed only by the knowledge ansing out of the deepest concentration (on its e-sence) or, the dmman is denoted by Samadht herause the Jiva concentrates his mind on Atman. It is immovable, u.c., bevond change. Hence, it is fearless as it is free from change. 1 Samadhe-This state of complete identity with non-dual Brahman, arrived at as a tesult of diserimination and negation of phenomena, is the Vedantic conceptin of Samadhi (which is yute dfterent from any myshenl or mechamcal state de-embed as Samadhi in the Yoya sy-tem).

ग्रहो न तत्र नोत्सर्गश्चिन्ता यत्र न विद्यने। आत्मसंस्थं तदा ज्ञानमजानि समनां गतम् ॥३८।। 38 In that Brahman which is fiee from all acts of mind there is neither any uleu of acceptance nor any idra

228 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

of giving up (of anything). Established in the Atman (Self), knowledge attarns to the statr of birthlessness and sameness, that as to say. changelessness

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

As Brahman alone has been described in the previous text as Samadh (ic., the sole object of concentration) and as free from activity and lear, therefore in that Brahman therel is nothing to accept nor is there any- thing to give up For, aeceptance or abandonment is posable only where there is change or the possibibty of change. But both these are inconsistent with this Brahman-as nothing else exists which can cause a change in Brahman, and further because Brahman is without parts, Therefore, the meaning is that mn Brahman there is no possibihty of either accepting or giving up anything The purport of the Karka is this . How can there be any acceptance or abandonment (in Brahman) where, m the absence of the mind, no2 men- tation whatsoever is possible ? When the knowledge of Reality which is the Self, ensues, then Knowledge, for want of any object to rest upon, becomes3 established in Atman, like the heat of fire (mn the absence of fuel). Ajan, u.e, free from birth. It attains to the state of supreme non-duality. Thus is concluded, by means of reasoning and serptural authority what was stated be- fore as a proposition in the following words. "Now J shall describe the non-dual Brahman which is free from limitation and birth and which is the same every- whee". Everything else, other than the knowledge of

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 229

Reahty which is the Self, birthless and homogeneons, implies limitation. The Brut also says, "O Gargi, he who departs from ths worldl without knowing that Imperishable One, is, inderd, narrow-minded." The purport is that everyone, ieahsing ths knowledge, beromes established in Biahman and attams to the fultilmnent of all desires

Tls Karila tells us that the changeless non-runt Brahman 14 beyond all mjunction-, mandatory or prohilitory, as omjomed by the seriptures or socicty. The e munetions apply only to the iealm of ignorance. 1 There is, ete -All ethies, preseribing moral codes to be followed or immoral nets to be shunned, apply to the dual wodd They have no meamng m respeet of Brahman or the Knower of Brahman, which are itentical 2 No mentahon-Fot, it is the activihes of the mind alone wluch conjuie up the phenomena of a dual world with all its mjunetions, prohthitory or mandatory. 3 Becomes, etc -Know ledge of Prahman is the same as Brahman.

अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम दुर्दर्शः सर्वयोगिभिः । योगिनो विभ्यति ह्यस्मादभये भयदर्शिनः ॥ ३९॥

39 Ths Yoga. whch is not in touch writh anythingr is hard to be attained by all Yogis (in goneral) The Yogis are afraut of it, for they see far in it ichere there is really feurlessness. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Thought such is the nature of the knowledge of the Supreme Reality, yet it is deseribed in the Upanishads2 as the Yoga not in touch with anything; for, it is free from all touch implying relations (between objects).

230 MNDOKYOPANISHAD

Tt 19 hard to be attamed by the Yogus3 who are devoid of the knowledge prescmbed m the Vedanta philosophy. In other words, this truth can be realised only by the efforts culmmating mn the knowledge of Atman as the Sole Reahty The Yogis shrink from it, which is free from all fear, for4 they think that this Yoga brmngs about the annihdlation of their self In other words, the Yoms who are devoul of discrimmation and who, tluough fear, apprehend the destruction of their self, are alrud of it which is, in reahty, fearlessness 5

1 Though de .- The word " Yoga" sigmfying umion, genorally means contaet between two But the Jnana-Yoga (u.e., union thongh knowledge) 19 not m tonch with any idea or object, as there is nothing else but the non-dual Brahman Therefore it 1s ralled the Aspo,sa-Yoga, ie., a spitnal disciphne which does pot adnut of telation or touch with anything else. t is Purt in

Upamishnds-The Upamshad says that the knowledge of Atman is ever uncontaminated by any touch of woik, smnful or virtnous

3 Yogis-That is to say, those who ale called Foges according to Pa'anjalt Their an is to attam to the trance-condition by some mystical or mechanical means and thereby become oblivious of the nseries of the world. But Verlanta says that the world as ut is, if seen i its true charaeter, 19 Brahman

For, eic .- The so-called Yonis are afraid of losing their mndt- vidual consctoueness which is the pivot of enjoyments in the relative world. But Vedanta says that the tine nature of an indi- vidual is his ientity with the non-dual Brahman The idea of individual existenee is due to the ignorance of one's own nature.

3 Feurlessness -- Brahman is tearless because it is ever-free, ever- illummed and ever-pure There is nothing else of which it enn bo afrax1. Fear comes from the sense of dnahty.

MANDOKYOPANISH1D 231

मनसो निग्रहायत्तमभयं सर्वयोगिना(णा)म्। दुःखक्षयः प्रबोधश्चाप्यक्षया शान्तिरेव च ॥४०॥। 40. The Yogis (who do not follom the method of Jnana-Yoga as deseribed in the Kanka) demnd on the conbol of thew mind for fearlessness, destrwetion nf misery, the knowledge of self and cternal peare.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

Thosel who regard mind and the sense-organs, when seen apart from thei wlentity with the very nature of Brahman, as mere iaginaton,-like that of the snake when seen apart from its ientity with the iope-and who thus denv the sole reality of the mind and the sense-organs (independent of Brahman), te, those who look upon themselves as of the very nature of Brahman, spontaneously enjoy, as quite natural to them, fearlessness and eternal peace known as Freedom, for which they (the Jnan's) do not depend upon any extraneous thing (such as the control of the mind, ete.) We have already stated that no duty, whatsoever, existy for the Jnant. But those other Yogis who are also traveising the path (leading to Truth), but who possess inferiore or middling understand- ing and who3 look upon the mind as separate from hut related to Atman, and whod are ignorant of the know- ledge regarding the reahty of .Itman-the Yogis belong- ing to this elass can experience feurlessnesa as a result of the discipline of the mind, To them the destruc- tion of misery is also dependent upon mental control.

232 MANDŪKYOPANISIIAD

The ignorant can never experence the cessation of msery. if the mind, (considered) related to Atman, becomes active. Besides, their knowledge of self 1s dependent on their control of the mind And similarly, eternal peace, known as Moksha (or liberation), in them ease, depends upon the mental discipline

Ths Karika apphes to those who look upon the mind as separate from Itman and think that peace, knowledge, ete., depend upon its coutrol. Those, utt -The Jnani knows the miud and sense-organs to bo identeal with the non-dual Brahman. It is like the identity of the nake with the iope Ay the snake in the illusion of the snake in the rope has no cxistence apart from the rope, similarly the mind has no evistence sepaiate fiom Brahman. To see the mind as separate from Biahman is a fieak ot imagination They, the Jnan,, knowing tls truth, do not caze for the control of the mind For, the mind, as such, does not exist for them One who reahses mind as Brahman, finds spontaneously peace, fear- lessness, ete. Fear, miserv, ete., aie the outcome of duality, Dual- ity is scen on necount of the activity of the mind. But the Jnani dees the identity of the mind and Brahman Therefore duality does not exist for him, Wence he does not expeuence any fear, misery, ete Therefore, peace, fearlessness, etc , mn his case, are natoral. - Infenor, elc .- That is to say, they do not pogsess the sharp intelleet which can distingwsh the ieal fiom the umeal. For them, the Yogic practices are recommended 3 Who, ie -It is because they find the mind as separate from Biahman that they iry to Leep it under control. According to them, the mind is neted upon by .Ifman. 1 Whn me, etc -- For they see a duahty of the Atman and the mur!, 5 Bat, rte -The Toges thik that misery is caused hy the aoti- vities of the mind, Hence they dhireet all thei energy to the suppiesin of the Vrales of the mnd. But the Friths reappear if the attempt is shghtly relaxed The Yoms, on account of

MĀNDŪKYOPANISIAD 233

their ignorance of the real nature of the mind, fight with their own shadows The Jnam, on the other hand, reahcey the mind as well as all its activities as idenheal with the non-dual Brahman. Ilonoe the aotivitres of mind do nol stand in the way of his etemal happmess उत्सेक उदधेयेद्व कुशाग्रेणैकबिन्दुना। मनसो निग्रहस्तद्वत्भवेदपरिंग्वेदतः ॥ ४१॥ 41. The nund can be brought wnder contol only by an unrelenting effort lihe that which is reqrired to empty an ocean, diop by drop, with the help of a (blade of) Kusa- grass SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. As one may try to empty the ocean, by draming off its water drop hy drop, with the help of a (blade of) Kusa-grass; even so mav one control the mind by making the same cffort with a heurt which becomes neitherl depressed nor tired. This Karka gives us an iea of the effort that a Yogi ahould make to control his mind completely. But it appears that the cumplete suppression of the mental Writisis impos able in tls way. And as the happiness of a Yogi is dependent upon such suppression, he can never attan to eteinal Truth by the Fogic method. Jnana. yoya is the royal road for the attaiment of eteinal Truth and peace, 1 Neuthes demessed, ee -The Yog at every step meets with defeat. While closing the eyes, he sees no objeet, with the eyes open, he peiceives the phenomenal world. In either eaye, ho does not ieahse Rahman But these must not demess lus heurt. उपायेन निगृह्लीयादविक्षिप्तं कामभोगयोः । सुप्रसनं लये चैव यथा कामो लयस्तथा ॥ ४२ ॥ 12. The mind dstracted by desires and enjny- ments as also the mnd enjoying pleasure in oblirion

234 MANDŪKYOPNISHAD

(trance-like condition) should be brought under discipline by the pursuit of mroper means For, the state of oblivion is as harmful as desires

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. fs untirmng effort the only way for brmging the mind under disciphne ? We say, in reply, no. One shoukt, with untiring effort, follow the means, to he stated presently, in order to bring the mind under discipline, that is to say, bring it back to Atman,' when the nund is turned towards objects of desires and enjoy- ments The word "Laya"2 in the text mndicates Sushupti, ie, deep sleep m which state one becomes oblivious of all things. The3 (injunction implied in the) words "should be brought under disciphne", should also be apphed in the case of the muind when it feels happy, that is to say, free from all worries in the state of Luya oi oblivion Why should it be further brought under disciplme if it feels pleasure (in that state) ? It is thus replied. Because the state of oblivion is as+ harmful as desire, the mind should be withdrawn from the state of obhvion as it should be withdrawn from objects of enjoyment A student practising Yoga meets with four kinds of obstacles whch are in his way of realising the Highest Reality They are known as Laya (a state of oblvion analogous to Yogic Samadlhs or deep sleep), Vikshepa (distraction), Sukha (happmess in temporary success) and Raga (attachment to any particulai phase of reali- sation). The mind should be tramed to keep away from these obstacles. The means are described in the next Kūrıhā. 1 Himan-It is because the ultimate aim of all spiritual prac- tices is the reahsation of Atman or the true nature of the Self

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 235

2 Laya-The state of Laya reahsed by the Yoge m Namadh 19 non-different from the state of Sushupti or deep sleep. Both are characterised by the absence of subjeet-objeet relationyhip Apnin in both these stntes, the student is uot aware of the real naturo of hs self The difference between the two states is this The Yogı can mnduce Samadhi at his mere wil, but Neshuph, for an ouh- nary man, 19 not under his eontiol. 3 The wonds, elc - -The state of Sumadhi mdueed by Yogn should not be consmlered as the goal. No doubt, one feel a sort of pleasme m such Samadh on account of the ab-enee of worrieg consequent on the withdrawal of the mind from externt ofeets, but this does not inceate that the Yoge has reahsed the Supremr Truth. Seeking after pleasure or the avoidance of misery mndiontes the exhanstion ot the inquiriny mind The real seeker after Truth cannot rest satisfied till he has attamed to It 4 ,1s hamful, ete -It is because both the-e states are charac- terred by the absence of the knowledge of Itman Tlutst for external objects and attachment to the pleasmc one feels mn Samarhz, are equally ha'mful for the reahsation of Truth A Yogt can realise Truth if he supplements his own method by the Vedantie dreiphne, of diserimination between the real and the umeal, and mectation on the narure of Ibnnn

दुःखं सर्वमनुस्मृत्य कामभोगान्निवर्तयेत्। अजं सर्वमनुस्मृत्य जातं नैव तु पश्यति ॥ ४३ ॥।

43. The mind should be turned back from the emoy- ment of pleasures. remembering that all this is attended with misery. If it be romembered that ererything as the unborn (Brahman), the boin (duality) will not be sren. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY What is the way of diciphning the mind? It is thus rephed: Remember that all dualty is caused by Aridya or illusion and therefore afflieted with misery. Thereby dissuade the mind from seeking enjoyments

236 MÂNDŪKYOPANISHAD

produced by desires. In other words, withdraw the mind from all dual objects by impressing upon it the idea of complete non-attaclment Realise from the teachings of the seriptures and the Acharyas that all this is verily the changeless Brahman. Then you will not see anything to the contrary, ws, dualty; for it does not exist. It has been said in the previous Karka that the mind should be disciplned by following the right method This verse of the Kanla pomts out complete detachment to be the right method 1 Ill duality, rte -All dual objeets, on account of their change- able and negatable nature, are attended with misery. 2 Not-attachment-It imples the spirit of dhspassion for all dual objects, because they are always aysociated with misery.

लये संबोधयेच्चित्तं विक्षिप्ं शमयेत्पुनः । सकषायं विजानीयात्समप्राप्ते न चालयेत् ।। ४४।। 44. If the mind becomes inactwe in a state of oblimon awaken it again If i is distracted, bring it back to the state of tranquillity. (In the entermedrary state) know the mind containiny within it desrres in potential form. If the mind has altarned to the state of eguilibrum, then do not disturb it again. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. When' the mind is immersed in oblivion, a.e., in Susbupti, then rouse it up by means of knowledge and by detachment. That is to say, turn the mind to the exercise of discrimmation which leads to the knowledge of the Self. The word "Chitta" in the text bears the same menning as "Mands" or mind.

VAVDOKYOPANISHAD 237

Bring2 the mind bark to the state of tranquillity if it is distracted hy the various objects of desires. When the mind is thus, by constant practice, awakened from the state of inactavity and also turned bark from all objerts, but not yet estabhshed in equihbrium," that is to say, when the mnd still dwells in an inter- mediary state, -- then knowd the miind to be possessed of attachment. That is to say, the mind contams within it the seeds of desires for enjoyment and inactivity Froms that state also. bring the mnind, with care, to the reahsation of equihbrium Once the mind has realsed the state of eymhbrium, that is to say, when it is òn the way to realise that state, then do not disturb it agam In other words, do not turn it to the external objeets. 1 When the, etc -Ths is the warning given against puisuing the Yogic Samadht as the state of the highest spiritual reahsation. The mind seeking after Truth and frightened at the immenuty of effoits necessary for its ieahsation, often veeks ielef in Samadhi. The commentator exhorty us to practise disermmnation even when the mind nasses into the passivity of Samadh and to extricute it from that state by cultivahng the spirt of non-attachment to any pleasure experienced in the state of Samadhi, The object of hfe os not to enjoy any bhss arrsing out of mactivity as one experiences in Samadki or deep seep, but to know the real nature of the Self. 2 Bring, etc -The Yogic method may be followed with eertain advantages by the student of mediere itelleet who wants to turn his turbulent mind from the purant of external objert, The Yoqic method gives him control over his mmd Bnt even m sneh eave, Yogu serves only a temporary or subordmnate purpo-e. 3 Equihbrium-That is to way, the non dual Brahman whch is charneterised by sameness thioughout 4 Know, de .- This is another atate of the nund. In this stato the mind is roused fiom the tate of muotivity. It is also with. drawn from objects But it has not yet realised its identity with the

238 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

non-dual Brahman. In this itermediary state, the mind contains, in potential form, the desires for the enjoyment of external objeets or the bhss in a state of inactivity. o From, elc -This intermedialy state also should not he taken as the state of Ultimate Realisation.

नाऽडस्ादयत्सुखं तत्र निःसङ्ग: प्रज्ञया भवेत्। निश्चलं निश्चरच्चित्तमेकीकुर्यात्प्रयत्नतः ॥। ४५।। 45. (The mind) should not be allowed to enjoy the bliss that arises out of the condtion of Samadhi. It should be freed from attachment to such happmess through the expicise of discrimnation. If the mind, once uttaining to the stute of steadiness seek: externality, then at should be umfied with the Atman, again, with efforts. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The seeker should not taste that happiness that is expenenced by the Yoges secking1 after Samudhi. In other words, he is not to be attached to that happiness What then should be done by the student ? He should be nnattached to such happmess, by gaining know- ledge through discrimination, and think that whatever happiess is experienced is talse2 and conjured up by ignorance. In other words, the mind should be turned back from such happiness. When, however, having been once withdrawn from happmess and fixed to the state of steadiness, the mind again manifests its outgoing propensities, then control it by adopting the above-mentioned3 means, and with great care, make it one4 with Itman. In other words, make the mind attain to the condition of purc existence and thought.

MANDUKYOPINISHAD 239

The purpose of this Kanka is to dissuade the mind fom enjoy- ing the happmness that the Yomws expenence in the state of Samodh. 1 Seeling, etc .- That 1s to say, mn the state of Samadhi, the Yoyin fadls to see that tho non-dunl Brahman alone eusty He seeks Numadhi hecause he behevey in the esistence of the mind as separate from Atman, and therefore tues to wontrol it. By some mechamcal means he brmg the mind to a stafe of machvity and thus makes hunself feee from all worttes But this is not the Vedantic goal of Truth. 2 Palsc -- All objeets which are experienced by us are change. able and negatable Therefore they are unreal 3 Abore-mentioned-ie , diserimination, ete. 4 One. rir -The real truth is that the mind is identieal with Atmnn Mind is Itman It i9 only throngh ignorance that we separate the mind from Itman,

यदा न लीयते चित्तं न च विक्षिप्यते पुनः । अनिङ्गनमनाभासं निष्पन्नं ब्रह्म तत्तदा ॥ ४६ ॥

46 When the mind does not merge in the inachrity of oblimon, or bcome distracted by desires, that is to say, ichen the mind becomes qurescent and does not give nse to appearances, ul verily becomes Brahman

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

When the mind, brought under disriphne by the above-mentioned1 methods, does not fall mto the oblivion of deep sleep, nor is distracted by external objects, that is to say, when the mind becomes qmescent2 like the flame of a hght kept mn a windless place; or whena the mind does not appear in the fomn of an objeet, -- when the mind is endowed with these charac- teristies, it verily becomes onet with Brahman,

242 MANDOKYOPANISHAD

words, no Jim can ever be born, as the cause which may produce it does not exist. Of all the (relative) truths described above as means (for the realisation of the Ultimate Reality), this alone is the Supreme Truth that nothing whatsoever is ever born m or of that Brahman wlch is of the nature of the Ultimate Reality. Vanous empmioal means such as the practice of Yonn, eto., have been suggested above. If these means which naturally are related to the dual realm be true, then the position of the non-dual Brabman cannot he maitamed If these means be untrue, then they cannot serve any purpose. To remove this difficulty thie Karika suggests that these means help us to reahse Brahman. but they do not ieveal Brahman. 1 Mcans-These means have their nppheatnhty only in the realm of dualty where a man, through ignorauce, does not know Is real nature 2 The truth, ele -The Ultimate Truth is that there is only one entity which may be ealled either as Jira or as Brahman The Jera as separate from Brahman, does never exist.

Here ends the third chapter. on Illusion, of the Kanta of Gaudapada with the Commentary of Śri Śankara.

Aum Salutation to Brabman. CHAPTER TV. QUENCHING OF FIRE-BRAND.

ज्ञननाSSकाशकल्पेन धर्गान्यो गगनोपमानू। ज्ञयाभिनेन संबुद्धस्त वन्दे द्विपदां वरम् ॥ १ ॥ 1. I bow to tuet best among men who by means of hnowledge, which is hhe Akasa and non-dfferent from the object of knowledge (Le , the Dharma), reulsed the natwe of the Dharmas (ie, the Jivas) whrch are, aguin, like the Ākāsa SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The proposition regarding Adraun (as the Supreme Truth) has been based upon senptural evidence, byl determining the nature of Awm. That moposition has been estabhshed by provmge the unreahty of the distmnction imphed by the extemnal objects (of experi- ence). Agam the third chapter dealing with Adrana has directly established the proposition on the authouty of scripture and reason with the concluding statementa that ' Ths alone is the Ultimate Truth". At the end of the previous chapter it has been hinted that the opinions of the dualists and the mhilists, who are opposed to the philosophy of Adinta which gives the true impoit of the seriptures, bear the'name of true philosophy. But that is not tme becunse of their mutual contracchons and also because of their being vitiated by attachment to their own opinions and

244 MANDOKYOPANISHAD

avermon to those of others. The philosophy of Advaita has been extolled as the nght philosophy on4 account of its beig free from any vitiation (referred to above regarding the theories of the dualists and mhilsts). Now is undertaken the chapter styled Alatasanti (1e., on the quenching of the fire-brand) in order to conclude the final examination for the estabhshment of the philnsophy of Adrnda, by followig the process known as the method' of disagreement, which is done by showig here in detail that other systems cannot be said to be true philosophy For there are mutual contradictions iphed m them. The first verse has for its purpose the salutation to the promulgators of the philosophy of Adraita, conceiving him as identical with the duaa Truth. The salutation to the teacher is made m commencing a seripture in order to bring the undertaking to a successful end. The word "dkasakalpa" in the text means resembling Jkasa, that is to say, slightly? different fiom Akasa. What is the purpose of such knowledge which resembles Tasa Bv such Knowledge is known the nature of the Dharmas> (t e., the attributes of Atman). The attributes are the same as the substance. What is the nature of these Dharmas? They also can be known by the analogy? of Akasa, that is to say, these Dharmas also resemble Ikasa. The word "Jneyabhinna" m the text is another attribute of "Jnanam" or Knowledge and means that this knowledge is not10 separate from the Annans (Jrvas) which are the objects of knowledge. This identity of the knowledge and the knowable is

MANDOAYOP INISHAD 245

like the identity of firell and heat and the sun and its hght. I bow to the God, known as Nariyana,12 who by knowledge, non-different from the nature of .Imwmn (the objeet of knowledge) and which resembles Akasa, knew the Dharmas which, agam, mav be com- pared to Mlas The import of the words " Dinpadam Vanon" (Supreme among the bipeds), is that Narayana is the greatest of all men, characterised by two legs, that is to say, he is the "P'urushottamu"', the best of all men. By the adoration of the teacher it is implied that the purpose of this chapter is to establish, by the refutation of the opposite views, Adwuitn whiah gives the philosophy of the Ultimate Realitv. characterised by the identitv of the knower, knowledge and the object of knowledge.

1 By the, etc -This has been done m the first chapter of the book, riz, the Agama Pralarana which deals with the subjeet- matter from the seriptural standpomnt. Pioming, etc -This has been done in the second chapter 3 Sutemrnt-Comp the 48th verse of the Karika of the third chapter, , On account, ete -- One of the tests of Trnth i- that it does not contrathet anything The Ultimate Truth is that hy knowing which feything else ran be known The fart of non-duahty satisfies ths condition and therefore it is called the Ultimate Truth or Reality. Method of, etr -- This m one of the procewses of mference; the other is known as the method of agreement. It has heen shown i the seeond chapfer that what is cauved or what comes ito being is unreal Hfere it is shown that what is not untruth is not caused also. That i to say, the Karila will show m this chapter the absence of caw-ality mn Ifman and thus estabhsh the Ultimate Reality of Self. 10

246 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

G Promulgator, eto .- Narayana or the Lord Himself 18 saad to be the promulgator of this philosophy which was handed down to Gaudapada. The salutation is mare to Narayana at the commencement of the chapter 7 Slightly, elc -Alasa or ether contains withmn it elements of inert matter Therefore it is slightly different from knowledge which is all sentienoy The analogy is made with reference to the all-pervading characteristic of .Ilasa which is similar to Jnanam or knowledge 8 Dhar mas-The word " Dharma " hterally means " attribute ". Attrihute, according to Vedanta, i9 non-different from substance Hence " Dharma " also is non-different from Brahman The word Dhuma is, m the text, synonymous with knowledge or Jnanam. The word " Dharma " is used by Gaudapada to mean "Jwn" or embodied being "Jua" is identical with "knowledge ", "Brahman" The plural number is used on account of the plurahty of ' Jwvas," whioh is admitted from the empincal standpomt " Analogy, etc .- The Jiva is, as Brahman is, mn reality, as all- pervading as the Alasa (or Jnanam), 10 Not separate, etc -If knowlodge is mtrinsically separate from its object, ie, the Jna or the Biahman, then one can never know, by such knowledge, the nature of Jia or Brahman The knower, knowledge and the object of knowledge are really identical and denote the same Realty 11 Fare, etc .- That is to say, from the standpoints of the fire and the sn, the heat and the light are identical with the fire and the sun. 12 Narayana-The story rans thus :- In ancient times Gauda- pada retired to Badarkasrama, in the interior of the Himalayas, and there worshipped with great austerity the human figure of the Almighty Lord

अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम सर्वसत्वसुखो हितः । अविवादोऽविरुद्धश्व देशितस्तं नमाम्यहम् ॥ २ ॥

2. I salute this Yoga known as the Asparsa (i.e., free from all touch which implies duality), taught through

MANDŪKYOPANISUAD 247

the scripture,-the Yoga which promotes the happiness of all beings and conduces to the well-being of all and whach as free fiom strife and contradictions. SANKARA'R C'OMMENTARY. Now salutation is made to the Yoga taught by the Advaita Philosophy, in order to extol it over all the other systems. The word Asparsayoga' in the text means the Yoga which is always and in all respects free from sparsa or relationship with anything and which is of the same2 nature as Brahman This Yoga is well known as the Asparsnyogu to all Knowers of Brahman, This Fogn is conducive3 to the happiness of all beings. There are certain forms of Foga, such as Tapas or austerity, which, though conducive to the supreme happiness, are associated with misery. But this is not of that kind Then, what is its nature? It tends to the happiness of all beings It may how- ever be contended that the enjoyment of certain desires gives pleasure but certamly does not tend to one's well-being. But this Asparinyoya conduces to both4 happmess and well-bemg. For, it never changes its nature. Moreover, thise Y'ogn is free from strife, that is to say, it never indulges in any passage-at-words, which is mevitahle in all disputes consisting of two opposite sides Why so ? Fer, it is non-contradictory? in nature. To this kind of Yoga, taught in the serip- ture, I bow.s

1 Asparsayoga-As a matter of fact there is a contradietion involved in this word For, the word " Aspursa", meaning free- dom from relation, indicates only non-duahty which by its very

248 MANDOKYOPANISH.1D

nature has no contact with any external thing, ay such a thing is ever non-existent The word Yoga, meaning 'contact' implies more than opc Gaudapäda names the path of knowledge as Asparsayogn, as the word Yoga was used at lus time also to denote the method for reahsing the Ultimate Truth 2 Same natue, etc -The Jnanam through which the aspirant realses Brahman 19 identieal with Brahman itself. 3 Conducire, elc -Because Jnana Toga is the surest and moqt dueat method for the realisation of the highest Truth 4 Both, etr -It is because the aim of this J'oga is the realisation of Self which 14 ot the nature of Existence-Knowledge-Blss Absolute 5 For, elc -The iden of duahty and change, implying loss, 1s at the root of all msemes. Ths Yoga enables us to ieahse the Self which is free from all idens of change, This Yoga, ete -The non-dualst knows that even those who come to quarrel with him are, in reahty, his own selt, Theiefore he does not look upon any one as his opponont 7 Non-contradictory-One who knows everything as his own self does not contradiet others For, one camot contradict his own self 8 Bow-The salutation is meant to direct the attention of the atudents to this most valuable and easy way of reahsing the Truth.

भूतस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः केचिदेव हि। अभूतस्यापरे धीरा विवदन्तः परस्परम् ॥ २ ॥

3. Quarrelling among themselves, some disputants postulate that an errsting entity undergoes evolution, whereas other disputants, proud of their underslanding, maintain that cvolution proceeds from a non-existing entity. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

Hlow do the duahsts quarrel with one another ? It is thus replied .1 Some disputants, such as the

MANDOKOP INISHAD 249

followers of the Samkhyn system, adnnt production as the effect of an entity that is alrrady existent. But this is not the view of all the dunlist. For, the intelligent followers of the Nydya and the Vaiseshikn systems, that is to say, those who believe that they possess wisdom, maintain that evolution proeeeds from a non-existing cause. The meaming is that these disputants, quarrelling among themselves, elam victory over their respective opponents 1 The disputation among the dualsts is mentimed here in order to make clear the non-contradotory naiure of the non-dualists. All the duabsty beheve m the set of creation or evolution

भूत न जायतें किचिदभूत नैव जायते। विवदन्तो द्वया होवमजाति ख्यापयन्ति ते ॥। ४ ॥

4. The ezistent cannol (aguen) pass anto (birth) existence. Nor can the non-existent be born or come into being as emstent. Thus disputing among themselres, they, as a matter of fact, tond to estallish the Advaita merr and support the Ajati or the absolute non-erolution (of what exists). SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. What do they, by refuting each other's conclusions and quarrelling among themselves, really establish ? It is thus rephed -- No' entity which is already in existence can again pass into birth. The reason is that as entity, it already exists. It is just like the Atman, which already heing in existence, cannot be born again as a new entity. Thus argues the supporter

250 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

• of evolution from non-ens (re., from a non-existing cause) and refutes the Samkhya theory that an existing cause is born again as an effect. Similarly, the follower of the Samkhya theory refutes the supporter of the mon-ens view regarding creation by a non-existing cause. He declares that a non-existing' cause, on account of its very non-existence, cannot, like the horns of a hare, produce an effect Thuss quarrelling among themselves, by supporting "existent" and "non-existent" causes, they refute their respective opponent's views and declarc, mn effect, the truth that there is no creation at all.

1 No, elc .- This is the view of the followers of the Naiyayikn and Vaiseshika systems. According to them, an existing entty cannot be born as an eftect If an entity already exists, it is not said to be produced again Ths view can be stated thus -A cannot produce B, as A is always A and B is always B It may he contended that A + G may produce B Therefore C is something whch does not exist mn the cause A. Therefore the effect B does not come out of the cause A. 2 Non-cxisting, elc .- This is the view of the followers of the Samkhya system According to them, the existig entity cannot undergo any anmhilation; nor can the non-existmg entity pass into existence. The existing entity is existent in times, past, present anrl future. A non-existmg entity, such as the child of a barren woman, is always non-existent By "birth ", the Samkhyas mean mamfestahon and by "death', they understand the return of the effect into the cause The sesame seed produces oil. It means that oil, already existent in the seed, manifests itself in the form of the effeet when the seed (the cause) is pressed, But one cannot get oi by pressing sand, as oil is never present in the sand. The elay which contams in potential form the pot, manifests the pot. Again the destruction of the pot means its going back to the original cause, rz., the clay. There is no absolute destruction of the pot.

MANDUKYOPANISHAD 251

3 Thus, elc -Both the theories are based upon causahty. But by xefuting each other, thev, m faet, iefnte enmvahty itself. For, if an existmg thing is produced fom an exi-ting canse (ay the Samikkyas profe-4) then there cannot be, m truth, anv causal rela- tion Simdlaily, it is ahuud to say that a potive thung can be produeed by a non evgting canse Thus the entire theory of cauenhity is refnted Ts onty e.tabh hes the adann ponhon of shat wlch means that there i no art of ereation or manifesta- tion.

ख्याप्यमानामजञाति तैरनुमोदामहे वयम। विवदामो न तैः सार्धमविवादं निबोधन ॥५ ॥।

5. We approre the Ajat or non-crcation deelarrd by them We do not quarrel unth them Now, hear from us (the Ulhmale Reality) which is free from all disputa- hons.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

We simply accept the view of the Ajati or the absolute non-causation declared by them' and say, "Let it be so". We do not quarrel with them by taking either side in the disputation. In other words, hke them, we do not quarrel with each other. Hence, Oh ye pupuls, know from us the Ultimate Realty as taught by us, which is free from dispute.

1 Them-The followers of tho Namkhyn as well as the Nyaya and the Vaiseshila vystem -. Both sehools by finding fault with each other's vwwa regarding ' cousal' relation, tend to esfablish the truth of hatt or the ahsolute non-mamfestation of Jtman With jegard to causality, we aecept that theory that is not refuted by any party, but which must be admitted ly all, re , stjāti,

252 MANDOXYOPANISHAD

अजातस्यैव धर्मस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः । अजातो ह्वमृतो धर्मो मर्यतां कथमेष्यति ॥ ६॥ 6. The disputants (1.e., the dualrsts) contend that the ever-unborn (changeless) entity (Atman) undergoes a change. How dors an entity which s changeless and mmortal partake of the nature of the mortal ?

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The word "di putant" in the text includes all the dualists, rv., those who believe that evolution proceeds from an existing cause, as well as those who believe its opposite. This verse has already been commented upon. For the commentary and the note of this Korika see Karika 20 of the previous chapter

न भवत्यमृत मर्त्य न मर्त्यममृत तथा। प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न कर्थचिद्दविष्यति ॥ ७॥। 7 The ammortal cannot become mortal, nor can the mortal erer become immortal. For, it is neuer possible for a thing to change its nature.

सभावेनामृतो यस्य धर्मो गच्छति मर्त्यताम्। कृतकेनामृतस्तस्य कथं स्थास्यति निश्चलः ॥ ८॥ 8. How can he, uho believes that the naturally immortal entity becomes mortal, maintain that the im- mortal, after passing through birth, atains its changeless nature ?

WANDUKYOPANISHAD 253

SINKARA'S COMMENTIRY. These verses have already been explained. They are repeated here m order to justify our view that the disputants mentioned above only contradict each other. See Kamlas 21 and 22 of tho previous chapter

सांसिद्धिका स्वागाविर्का सहजा अकृता च या। प्रकृतिः सेनि विज्ञया स्वमावं न जहाति या ॥ ९ ॥ 9. By Prakriti or the inherent nature of a thing is understood that which, when ucquied, becomes com- pletely part and parcel of the thing, that which in rts very characterishe quality, thut which is purt of it from its very birth, thut which does not depend upon anything eatraneons for its ongin and that which nerer ceases to be atself. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Even1 the nature of a thing in ordmary experience does not undergo any reversal What is meant by the nature of a thing ? This is thus rephed .- The word "samaiddhi" means "complete attainment". The nature of a thing is formed by such complete attain- ment as in the case of the perfected Yogis who attam to such superhuman powers as Anima,2 ete. These powers thus acquired by the Yogis never undergo any transformation in past and future. Therefore these form the very nature of the Yogis. Similarly, the characteristic quality of a thing, such as heat or hght of fire and the like, never undergoes any change either in time or space. So also the nature of a thing which F

254 MANDŪKYOPINISIAD

is part of it from its very birth, as the flying power of the bird, cte, through the sky, is called Prukritr. Anything else which is not pioduced by any other cause (except the thing itself), such as the running downwards of water is also called Prakrti, And lastly, anything which3 dloes not ccase to be itself 19 known popularly to be its Prakrile. The purport of the Kanka is that if in the case of empirical entities, which are onlv imagined,4 then natie or Prakrir does not undergo any change, then how should it be otherwise in the case of the immortal or unchanging nature regarding the Ultimate Reality, whose very Prakriti is Ajati or absolute non-manifestation. 1 Even, etc -The purport is that if the nnchangeabihty of the nature of a thing 19 noticed in ordinary experiences, then it apphes with greater force to Brahman whose changeless and imortal nature can never undergo any transformation. 2 Anima-There are eight superhuman powers which the Yogis can attamn to as the result of their yonc perfection. The word ' Anima' means the power of becoming as small as an atom. 3 Whih, etr .- As the charactersties of a jar or the jarness of it which depends entirely upon the jar and not upon anything else 4 Imagined-According to Advaita Vedanta the character- isties of entities of ordmary expenence, which are thought of as unchanging by the dualsts, are meie imagmation जरामरणनिर्मुक्ता: सर्वे धर्माः स्वभावतः । जरामरणमिच्छन्तश्च्यवन्ते तन्मनीषया ॥ १०॥ 10. All the Jivas are, by their very nature, free from senility and death They think, as u were, that they are subject to these and thus by thes very thought they appear to deviute from their very nature.

MÅNDŪKYOPANISHAD 255

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. What is the hass of that Prakrih whose change is imagined by the tsputants ? What, again, is the defeet in such nagination ? This is thus replied :- The words "Free from senility and death," in the text sigmify freedom from all changes1 characterised by senihty, death, ete. Who are thus free (from all changes) ' These are all the Jirus, who are, by their very nature, free from all changes. Though the Jivas are such by their very nature, yet they think, as it were, that they are subject to semlity and death. By such imagination2 about their selves, like the imagina- tion of the snake in the rope, they (appear to) deviate from their nature. This happens on account of their identification, through thinking, with semlty and death. That is to say, they (appear to) fall from therr real nature by this defect in their thought

1 Changes-There are wx changes associated with objeets m nature. They are birth, existence, growth, maturity, decay and death 2 Imaginahon-That the Jiras are subject to birth and death 1s a mere imagination. These states do not exit exeept in the thought of the thinker. Even when the Jua thinky himself to be sabject to birth and death, he w, in tealty, free from theso changes. Such nnagination cannot affret his real nature as all the water of the mirage cannot soak a grain of sand in the desert. There is no change of Reahty in Prakrih. If one seey any change it is due to hws Kalpanå. The rope never becomes the snake.

कारण यस्य वै कार्य कारणं तस्य जायते।

जायमानं कथमजं भिन्नं नित्यं कथं च नत् ॥। ११।।

256 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

11. The disputant, according to whom the cause it self is the effect, mnintains that the cause itself is born as the effect. How as i possible for the cause to be unborn if it be said to be born (as the effect) ? How, again, is it sad to be eternal if u be subject to modification (i.e., birth) ? SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

How is it that the Samkhyas, who believe in the evolution of an existing cause, mamtam a view which is irrational ? It is thus rephed by the followers of the Vaiseshika system . Those who say that the cause, that is to say, such material cause as clay, is, in itself, the effect: or in other words those disputants who assert that the cause itself changes into the effect, maintain, as a matter of fact, that the ever-existent and unborn cause, namely the Pradhana, etc., is born again as the effect, such as Mahat, etc. If Pradhana be born in the form of Mahat, ete, then how can it be designated as birthless 2 To say that it is unborn, i.e., mmutable and at the same time born, i.e., passing into change, involves a contradiction. Further, the Samlhyas designate Pradhana as eternal How is it possible for Pradhana to be eternal1 if even a part of it be affected by change? In other words, ordmary experience does not furnish us with the mstance ot a jar, composed of parts, which, If broken in any part, can still he called permanent or immutable. The purport is that a contradiction is obvious in the state- ment that it is affected partly by change and at the same time it is unborn and eternal.

VANDOKYOPANISHAD 257

1 Eternal-According to the Samkhya theory, the Pradhana o1 Prakriti is composed of three party. mi., Snttna, Rins and Tamus. An entity compoed of parts oan never be termed eternal or permanent. That which i4 eompesed of purts, must, in courie of time, undergo decomposition

कारणाद्यद्यनन्यत्वमतः कार्यमज यदि।

जायामानाद्धि वे कार्यात्कारणं ते कथं घ्रुवम् ॥१२ ।। 12. If, as you sny, the cause is non-different from the effect, then the effeot also must be unborn. Further, how can the czuse be permanent af it be non-different from the effect which is born ?

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

This verse is meant to make the meaning of the previous one cleaier. If your object be to mamtam that the unborn cause is identical with the effeot, then it necessarily follows that the effect also becomes equally unborn. But thist is certainly a contradiction to say that a thing is an effect and at the same time unborn There is a further difficulty. In the case of identitye of the cause and the effect, how ean, according to you, the cause, which3 is non-different from the born effeet, be permanent and immutable ? It is not posible to imagine that a part of a hen is being cooked and that another part is laying eggs.

If the identity of eause and effoet be maintuined then it may be asked if tho cause be ideutieal with the offeet or if the effect bo identical with the cause. In the former ease of nlentity, tho effeot becomes unborn and in the latter case the cause becomes something born and loses its immutable and permanent chaieter.

258 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

I This, etc .- For, an effect is that which is born out of a cause. 2 Identity, etc .- If the cause and effect be ulentical, then how oan one distinguish hetween the cause and the effect ? 3 Whirh is, etc .- If the cause is identical with the born effect then the can-e cannot be called permanent and immutable, as hirth meant change This view avoids this difficulty by denying any act of birth in the cause. Thore is only one existence, vis., Brahman, which is called the cause by the ignorant poople whose mind is still moving in the causal plane. अजाद्व जायते यस्य दृष्टान्तस्तस्य नास्ति वै। जाताव्व जायमानस्य न व्यवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥ १३ ॥ 13 There es no ilushation to support the view of hun who snys thut the effect is born from the unborn canse. Again, if it be said that the effect is produced from a cause which is iself born then it leads to a regressus ad mfinitum. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Moreover, the disputant' who says that the effect is produced from an unborn cause, cannot furnish an illustration to support his view. In other words, it is consequently established that nothing is born from an unborn cause as there is no illustration to support this view. If,2 on the other hand, it be contended that the effect is born from a born cause, then that cause must be born from some other born cause and so on, which position never enables us to reach a cause which is, in itself, unborn. In other words, we are faced with an infinite regress. 3 Disputant-The follower of the Samkhya system contends that such effects as Mahat, etc., are evolved from the unborn

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 259

Pradhana, the cause being non-different from the effect. The Karka disproves this theory of the Samkhyas ay well as the creation theory of some Vedantists. This theory is a matter of inference But there is no illustration to draw the inforonce 2 If, elc .- If the etfect be produeed from a horn causo (i.e., a cause which i9 the effeet of some other eause), thon there will be an ondless regress and we shall never arrive at a cause which is, itself, unborn.

हेतोरादि: फलं येपामादिर्ेतुः फलस्य च। हेतोः फलस्य चानादि: क्थ नरुपवर्ष्यते ॥ १४ ॥

14. How can they, who assert that the effect is the cause of the cause and the cause is the cause of the effect, maintarn the beginninylessness of both the cause and the effoet ? SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

The Srun, in the passage, "When all this has, verily, become his Atman," declares, from the stand- point of the Ultimate Reality, the absence of duality. From this standpoint of the seriptural text, it is said : The cause,1 w.e., the merit (Dharma) and the demerit (Adharma), etc, has, for its cause, the effect, viz., the aggregate of the body, ete. Similarly, the cause,ª inz., merit and demerit, etc., is the cause of the effect, viz., the aggregate of the body, ete. How can dis- putants3 who maintam this view, rie., that both the cause and the effect are with beginning on account of mutual interdependence of the cause and the effeet, assert that both the cause and the effect are with- out beginning ? In other. words, this position implies

260 MANDOKYOPANISHAD

an inherent contradiction.5 The Atman,e which 18 eternal and immutable, can never become either the cause or the effect

1 Cuuse, rtr .- The birth in a body produces the effeet, vis, the merit and the demerit 2 Canse, ete .- The merit and the dement determine the birth in a body. Thus it i seen, according to this view, the cause pio- duces the eftoct and the effeet, in its turn, produres the cause 3 Despulanty-The is the view held by the Munamsalas They mamtam that the endless cham of hfp and death, consisting of the cause and the efteet, i6 withont beginning. It ie just yke the beginningleysnesy of the hen and the egg This view is true irom the telatiye standpomt + With brginning-It is becnuso the cause has its heginning in the effeet and the effect has its beginning mn the canse. 5 Conpradirtion -- It I4 because the Mimamsakas admitting the begintung of the cause and the effect, agamn assert that both are without begining B Atmun, etc -The opponent may contend that the Atman has become both the cause and the effect The cause and the elfect may have s heginnng because both are the modifications of Itman But from the standpoint of theit substratum, us, the Atman, they are without beginning This contention is base- lew-as the Jtman whioh is immutable, eternal and withont paits cannot uindergo any modifcation in the forms of cause and effeet.

हेतोरादि: फल येषामादिर्हेतुः फलस्य च। तथा जन्म भवेत्तेपां पुत्राज्न्म पितुर्यथा ॥ १५॥

15. Those who maintain that the effect is the cause of the cause and the cause is the cause of the effect, de- soribe, as a matter of fact, the evolution after the manner of the birth of the father from the son.

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 261

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

How does the contention of the opponent imply a contradiction 2 It is thus replied -The admission that the cause is produced from an eflect, which is itself born of a cause, carries with it the coutradiction which may be stated to be like the birth of the father from the son.

संभवे हेतुफलयोरेपितव्यः क्रमस्त्वया। युगपत्संभव यस्मादसंबन्धो विषाणवत् । १६ ।। 16 In case causality be still maintarned, the order in whach cause and effect succeed each other must be stated. If it be sard that they appear sumultancously, then they, being like the lwo horns of an animal, cannot be mutuully selated to each other.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY, If it be contended that the contradiction, pomnted out above, cannot be valid, then the opponent should determmne the order in which cause and effect succeed each other. The opponent has to show that the "cause" which is antecedent, produces the "effect" which is subsequent. For the following reason also, the order of "cause" and "effect" must be shown. For if cause and effect arise simultaneously, then they cannot be related as the cause and the effect, as it is impossible to establish the causal relation between the two horns of a cow produced simultaneously. This Karila refutes causality from the point of time.

262 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

फलादुत्पद्यमानस्सन्न ते हेतुः प्रसिध्यति। अप्रसिद्धः कथं हेतुः फलमुत्पादयिष्यति ॥ १७ ॥

. 17. Your cause cannot be established if it be produced from the effect How can the cause, which is itself not established, give birth lo the effect ?

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. How can there be no causal relation ? It is thus replied .- The cause1 cannot have a definite existence if it is to be born of an effect which is, itself, yet unborn, and therefore which is non-existent like the horns of a hare Howe can the cause contemplated by you, which is, itself, indefinite and which is non-existent like the horns of a hare, produce an effect ? Two things which are mutually dependent upon each other for their pro- duction and which are like3 the horns of a hare, cannot be related as cause and effect or in4 any other way. This Karika proves that the very idea of the causal relation involves an absurdity. The contention of the opponent is this ;-- The cause and the effect are dependent upon each other for their mutual production. A house is built for the purpose of living. The thought of living results in the btulding of the house. The absurdity of ths contention is thus shown .- The general law of causalitv is that the cause is antecedent and the effect is sub- sequent to and dependent upon a cause. If the effect be the cause of a cause, then the cause is said to be born from some- thing which is not yet in existence If the cause is to be produoed from a non-existent effect, thon the cause itself becomes non- existent. And the cause, being itself non-existent, can but produce an effeet which also is non-existent. Thus both cause and effect become non-existent like the horns of a hare. There- fore they cannot be related as cause and effect, which relation can subsist only between two existing entities.

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 263.

1 Cause, etc -If you say that the cause is produced fiom the effect (which, itself, on account of its appearing after cause, is yet non-existent), then cause cannot be estabhshed For, in that case it is also non-existent, as it is admitted to be the product of an effeet which is, itself, non-existent 2 How can, elc -If the canse itself be thus proved to be non- existent, how can it, then, produce an effect ? If it cannot prodnce an effect, how do you call it the cause ? 3 Inhe, elc .- It is because both the cause and the effect have been proved to be non-existent 4 In any, elc -Any other relation, such as that of the container and the contamed, between two things which are non-existent becomes an absurdity

यदि हेतो: फलात्सिद्धिः फलसिद्विश्च हेतुतः।

कतरत्पूर्वनिष्पन्न यस्य सिद्धिरपेक्षया ॥ १८॥

18 If the cause is produced from the effect and if the effect rs, again, produced from the cause, which of the two is born first upon which depends the birth of the other ?

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

Though any relation between cause and effect has been found to be an impossibility, yet it may be contended by the opponent that the cause and the effect, though not causally related, yet depend upon each other for their mutual existence. As a reply to this contention we ask. Which of the two, the cause and the effect, is antecedent to the other, upon the previous existence of which, the subsequent existence of the other is dependent ?

If both the cause and the effect are mutually dependent, then how can we say that one is prior to the other ? If the priority of

264 MANDOK YOPANISHAD

one cannot be estahhshed, then it cannot be proved that one is dependent upon the other for its existence.

अशक्तिरपरिज्ञान क्रमकोपोडथ वा पुनः ।

एवं हि सर्वथा बुद्रैः अजातिः परिदीपिता ॥ १९ ॥ 19. The inabilty (to reply), the ignorance (about the matter) and the impossilnlity of (establisheng) the order of succession (of the cause and the effect) clearly lead the unse to stich to their theory of ubsolute non-evolution (Ajati).

NANKARA'S COMMENTARY

If yon think that this' cannot be explamned then this inabilty shows vour ignorance, that is to say, it demonstrates that you are deluded regarding the Know- ledge of Reality Again, the order of succession, pomnt- ed out by you-that the effect comes from the cause and the cause comes from the effect-is also mconsist- ent.2 Thus is shown the iproprety of the causal relation between the cause and the effect. This3 leads the wise among the disputants, by showing the fallacy in each other's arguments, to declare, in effect, the non-evolution of things (which is our opmion).

1 Ths, rtc .- That is to say, wlch one of the cause and the cffcot is antecedent and which is subsequent. It is hecause both are mutually dependent 2 Inconsistent-See the previous Kārilā 3 T'las, etc -The followers of the Samlkya as well as of the Nyayn and Patseshihe systems, supporting respectively the evo. Intion of things from an eusting and non-existing cause, indicate the fallacy in each other's arguments It has also been demon- strated that there canuot be any order of succession of cause and

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 265

effect in the evolution Thus the disputants ultimately support the view of Ajal or non-evolution of things as stated by us.

बीजाड्कुराख्यो दृष्टान्तः सदा साध्यसमो हि सः । न हि साध्यसमो हेतुः सिद्धौ साध्यस्य सुज्यते ॥ २० ॥ 20. The illustration of the seed and the sprout is itself a malter which is yet to be moved. The middle term (that as, the illustration) which is itself yet to be proved (to be true) cannol be used for establishing a proposition lo be mroved SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. (Objection)-We have asserted the causal relation between the cause and the effect. But you have raised mere verbal1 difficulties to show the inconsistency in our statement and made a caricature of our standpoint by pomting out its absurdity like the birth of the father from the son or a causal relation between the two horns (of a bull), etc. We do not, for a moment, admit the production of an effect from a cause not already existent or of a cause from an effect not established. (Reply)-What is, then, your contention ? (Objection)-We admit the causal relation asª in the case of the seed and the sprout. (Reply)-To this we reply as follows :- The illus- tration of the causal relation existing between the seed and the sprout is itself the same as the major term in my syllogism, that is to say, the3 illustration itself is to be proved (Objection)-It is apparent that the causal relation of the seed and the sprout fs without beginning.

266 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

(Reply)-It is not so The beginning of all ante- cedents must be admitted, as is the case with the conse- quents. As4 a sprout just produced from a seed Is with heginning, similarly the seed also, produced from another sprout (existing in the past), by the very suc- cession implied in the act of production, is with begin- ning. Therefore all antecedent sprouts as well as seeds are with beginning. As every seed and every sprout, among the seeds and the sprouts, are with beginning, so it is unreasonable to say that any one of these is without begmning. This is also equally applicable to the argument of the cause and the effect (Objection)-Each of the serles of the seeds and the sprouts is without beginning. (Reply)-No. The unity or oneness of such series cannot be justificd Even those who maitam the beginninglessness of the seed and the sprout, do not admit the existence of a thing known as the seres of the seed and the spiout apart from the seed and the sprout. Nor do they admit such a series in the case of the cause and the effect. Therefore it has been rightly asked, "How do you assert the beginninglessness of the cause and the effect ? " Other explanations being unreasonable, we have not raised any verbal difficulty. Evene in our ordinary experience expert logicians do not use anything, which is yet to be established, as the middle term or illustration in order to establish relation between the major and the minor terms of a syllogism. The word Hetu or the middle term is used here in the sence of illustration, as it is the

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 267

illustration which leads to the establishment of a pro- position. In the context illustration is meant and not reason.

1 Verbal, etc -The opponent contends that the difficulties raised are merely verbal 2 As an, etc .- It is like the production of the seed from the sprout and vice versa. 3 The illustration, etc .- Sankara contends that Il is to be proved that the seed is produced from a beginningless sprout or the sprout is produced from a beginningless seed 4 As a apouf, eic -The opponent contends that the bija (seed or cause) is without beginning (Anadt) because he wants to make it Aje or beginningless. But Sankara says that every byg or seed is produoed and therefore every bya is with begining. Hence the cuuse cannot be .ija or buthless 5 Each, etc .- The opponent contends that there is a series of sced and theie is another series of sprout. From the 'seed series' is produced the ' spiout series ' and vice versa, Similarly, from the ' cause series ' is produced the ' effect series' and vice veraa. 6 Euen, elc -The illustration of the seed and the sprout has been given by the opponent to prove the beginninglessness of the cause and the effect. But Sankara contends that the beginning- lessness of the seed and the sprout in the illustration has not yet been proved, As a matter of fact it has been shown that both the sced and the sprout are with beginmng. Hence this illustration which is, itself, not proved cannot be admitted in support of the contention

पूर्वापरापरिज्ञानम् अजातेः परिदीपकम्। जायमानाद्धि वै धर्मात् कथं पूर्व न गृह्यते । २१ । 21. The agnorance regarding the antecedence and the subseguence of the cause and the effect clearly proves the absence of evolution or creation. If the effect (Dharma,

268 MANDOKVOPANISHAD

i.e, the Jiva) has really been produced from a cause, then why can you not point out the antecedent cause ?

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

How do the wise assert the view of Ajati or absolute non-evolution ? It is thus replied :- The1 very fact that one does not know the antecedence and the subsequence of the cause and the effect is, in itself, the clearest mndication of absolute non- evolution. Ifª the effect (Dharma, .. e., the Jiva) be taken as produced (from a canse) then why cannot its antecedent cause be pointed out ? It goes without saying that one who accepts birth as a fact must also know its antecedent cause. For, the relationship of the cause and the effect is inseparable and therefore cannot be given up. Therefore the absence of know- ledge (regarding the cause) clearly indicates the fact of absolute non-evolution.

1 The rery, etc -The fuct of birth can be said to be established if the order of the succession of cause and effect be estabhshed. In the absence of such order there cannot be any birth or evolution. 2 If, elc -The idea of 'cause' cannot be thought of without the idea of ' effect ' and vire rersa Therefore we cannot say which one is antecedont. Hence the idea of evolution (Janma), i,e, an antecedent cause giving hirth to a subsequent effect, is due to ignorance or Andya.

स्वतो वा परतो वाडपि न किचिद्वस्तु जायते। सदसत्सदसद्वाऽपि न किंचिद्वस्तु जायते ॥। २२ ॥ 22. Nothing, whatsoever, is born either of rtself or of another. Nothing is ever produced whether it be being or non-being or both being and non-being.

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 269

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. For this reason, also, nothing whatsoever is born. That1 which is (supposed to be) born cannot be born of itself, of another or of both. Nothing,2 whether it be existing, or non-existing, or both, is ever born. Of such an entity, birth is not possible in any manner whatsoever. Nothings is born out of itself, r.e., from its own form which m itself has not yet come into existence. A jar cannot be produced from the self- same jar A thing cannot be born from another thing. which is other than itself, as a jar cannot be produced from another jar, or a piece of cloth from nother piece of cloth. Similarly, a thing cannot be born both out of itself and another, as that involves a contra- diction.4 A5 jar or a piece of cloth cannot be produced by both a jar and a piece of cloth. (Objection)-A jar is produced from clay, and a son is born of a father. (Reply)-Yes, the deluded use a word like "birth" and have a notion corresponding to the word. Both the word and the notion are examined by men of discrimination who wish to ascertain whether these are true or not. After exammation they come to the conclusion that things. such as a jar or a son, etc., denoted by the words and signified by the notions, are mere verbale expressions. The scripture also corroborates it, saying, "All effects are mere names and figures of speech". If the thing is'ever-existent, then it cannot be born agamn. The very? existence is the reason for non-evolution. A fathers or clay is

270 MÄNDŪKYOPANISHAD

the illustration to support the contention If these objects, on the other hand, be non-existent, even then they cannot be said to be produced The very non- cxistence is the reason The horns' of a hare are an illustration. If things be both existent and non- existent, then also, it cannot be boin For, such contradictory idcas cannot be associated with a thing Therefore it is established that nothing whatsoever is born. Those10 who, again, assert that the very fact of birth is born again, that the cause, the effect and the act of birth form one unity, and also that al objects have only momentary existence, mam- tain a view which is very far from reason. For a thing immediately after being pomted out as 'It is this," ceases to exist and consequently no memory of the thing is possible in the absence of such cogmtion

There are six possible alternatives in the case of the birth of a thing. It is either born of itself, or of another, or of both. That which is born is either existing or non-existing or both This Karika shows the absurdity of all these posihons and conclusively establshes the theory of absolute non-evolution I That, etc-That is to say, the three alternatives are demied regarding the cause 2 Nothing, etc -In other words, the three alternatives are denied regarding the effeet a Nothing, etc .- Birth always means change If a thing produces another thing, it cannot do so without a change in ilself. If it undergoes a change, it ceases to be the thing itself Therefore & thing cannot be the cause of the same thing A jar cannot be the cause of the very same jar. + Contradichon-For, a cause cannot, at the same time, combine within it two contradictory aspects

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 271

5 A jar, elc-Therefore an object which is supposed to be born cannot be born from a cause which is both existing and non-existing. 6 Verbal, eic -It 1s because the birth of a son or the production of a jar cannot be proved 7 The very, etc -- Birth sigmfying a change would indicate that the thing, before it was born, had been non-existent This previous non-existence cannot be reconciled with the idea of its ever-existenec. 8 Fathe, etc -If the son or the jar be ever-existent, then they cannot be born from a father or clay 9 Horns, elc .- Horns of a hare are ever non-existent. Hence no buth can be predicated of them 10 Those, etc -This is the view of the Buddhist idealists. According to them, no exteinal objects, corresponding to our idea of them, exist Idea alone is real. One idea gives birth to another idea These ideas are momentary The moment an idea is cognised as such, it vanshes giving birth to another idea. All our notions regarding the cause, the effect and the act of birth form only one umt idea, But this position is absolutely untenable If one idea be immediately succeeded by another idea, then the antecedent idea is no longer cogmised by u9. In the absence of such cognition, no memory is possible If an idea has only a momentary existence, then our very possibility of experience be- comes an absurdity If there cannot be any memory of the antecedent idea, then it is not possible to establish a causal rela- tion between the antecedent and the subsequent ideas.

हेतुर्न जायतेऽनादे: फल चापि स्वभावतः आदिर्न विद्यते यस्य तस्य ह्यादिर्न विद्यते ॥ २३ ॥ 23. The cause cannot be produced fiom an effect which is without beginning, nor is the effect born of its orn nature (itself). That which is wrthout beginning is necessarily free from birth. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. In accepting the begmninglessness of the cause and the effect you are forced to admit the absence of birth,

272 MANDŪKYOPANISIAD

regarding them. How is it so ? The1 cause cannot be produced from an effect, which is without beginning. In other words, you do not certainly mean that the cause is produced from an offect which is, itself, with- out beginning and free from birth. Nor do you2 admit that the effect, by following its own inherent nature, (2 e., without any extraneous cause) is produced from a cause which is unborn and without beginning. Therefore3 by admitting the beginninglessness of the cause and the effect, you, verily, accept the fact of their being never produced. It is because we know from common experience that what is without beginning is also free from birth which means a beginning. Beginning is admitted of a thing which has birth, and not of a thing which has none. 1 The cause, etc .- The beginnangless effeet cannot produce a For, otherwise it cannot be itself an eftect. An effect, sigmfying brth, must have a begmmng Agam, if the cause be produced from an effect, then the cause, itself, cannot be without beginning. 2 You, etc .- It is because if the effect be produced from a cauge, it cannot be hegmningless. 3 Therefore, etc -- If the cause and the effect, on account of their being never born, be ever free from birth, they cannot be cause and effect For, the words are always associated with birth. Henee the opponent by admitting the begmmnglessness of cause and effeet accepts, as a matter of fact, the theory of Ajati or he stultifies hımself

प्रज्ञप्तेः सनिमित्तत्वमन्यथा द्वयनाशतः । संक्ेशस्योपलब्धेश्र परतन्त्रास्तिता मता ॥ २४ ॥ 24. Subjective Anowledge must have an objectwe cause ; otherwise both must be non-existent. For this

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 273

reason as well us that of the experience of pain, the existence of extermal objects, accepted by other thinkers, should be admitted.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

An objection is raised m order to strengthen the meaning already stated. The word Pronapt in the text signifes "knowledge", te, the experience of such notions as that of sound, etc. This (subjective) know- ledge has a cause, ie, an (external) agent or object corresponding to it. In other words, we premise that knowledge is not merely subjective but »has an object outside the perceiving subject. Cognition of sound, etc, is not possible without objects. For, such experience is always produced by a cause. In1 the absence of such (external) object, the vamety and multiphcity of experiences such as sound, tonch, colour, uiz, blue, yellow, red, ete, would not have existed. But the varieties are not non-existent, for these are directly perceived by all. Hence, because the variety of manifold experiences exist, it is necessary to admit the existence-as supported by the system of the opposite school-of external objects which are outside the ideas of the perceiving subject The subjective knowledge has one characteristic alone, i e., it is of the very nature of illumination, It does not admit of any variety within itself. The variety of experiences of colour, such as blueness, yellowness, etc., cannot possibly be explamed, by merely imagining a variety in the subjective knowledge, without admitting variety

274 VANDOKYOPANISIAD

of external objects which are the substratum of these multiple colours In other words, no variety of colour is possible in a (white) crystal without its coming in contact with such adjuncts as the external objects which possess such colours as blueness, etc. For this additional reason also one is forced to admit the exis- tence of external object,-supported by the scrpture of the opposite school,-an object which is external to the knowledge (of the perceiving subject). Misery2 cansed by burns, etc., is experienced by all. Such pam as is caused by buins, etc., would not have been felt in the absence of the fire, ete, which is the cause of the burns and which exists independent of the knowledge (of the perceiving subject) But such pam is experi- enced by all. Hence,3 we think that external objects do exist. It is not reasonable to conclude that such pain is caused by mere subjective knowledge. For,4 such misery is not found elsewhere.

Ths Kanla gives the views of the dualgts who believe in the realty of external objects They argue thus -- Knowledge is not povsible without the contact with an external object Mental impiessions are always created by onr coming mto contaet with objects that he outside of us Besides, no variety is possible mn the knowledge of the pereeiving subject without a corresponding Variety existing outade of it. From the expenence of such knowledge as that of colour, form, ete , one must admit the existence of objeets outside the perceiving mind corresponding to the sub- jective impresyions. Again, difierent experiences give rive to different feehngs, such as pleasant or otherwise, which also are impossible in the ahsence of external objects All these arguments compel one to believe in the reality of external objeets 1 In, etc -Otherwise there would he no idea of variety and objects corresponding to such ideas.

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 275

2 Misery, etc -A man may create ideas, but he cannot create pam Therefore, the pain mnst have an exteinal canse. 3 Hence, etc -The contention of the opponent is that there must exist cansal relation between objects and our knowledge of them, 4 For-That is to sav, that the pam of burn 19 oxpen- enced only when the limb comes m contact with fhre and not when it is besmeared with sandal-paste, ete Therefore, misery, pain, etc., are not possible in the ahsence of a cause,

प्रज्ञप्तेः सनिमित्तत्वमिष्यते युक्तिदर्शनात्। निमित्तस्यानिमित्तत्वम् इष्यते भूतदर्शनात् ॥ २५॥ 25 From the point of view of reason a cause for the subjective impression must be assigned But from the standpoint of the highest Reality or the true nature of things, we find that the (so-called) cause (of the subjective ampression) is, after all, no cause.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. To1 this objection, we reply as follows .- We admit that you posit a cause of the suhjective experience on account of such arguments as the existence of the variety (mn the objective world) and because of the experience of pam Stick for a while to your argument that reason demands that an cxternal object should exist to produce a subjective impression (The opponent)-Please let us know what you (Advartin) are going to say next. (Reply)-Yes, the2 jar, etc, posited by you as the canse, that is to say, the cause of the subjective impres- sion, are not, according t3 us, the external cause, the

276 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

snbstratum (of the impression) ; nor are they the cause for our experiences of variety (Objection)-How ? (Reply)-We say so froma the standpomt of the true nature of Reality When the tre nature of clay is known, a jar does not exist apart from the clay as exists a buffalo in entire mdependence of the horse. Nor does cloth exist apart from the thread Similarly the threads have no existence apart from the fibres. lf we thus proceed to find out the true nature of the thing, by goig from one cause to another, till language or the ebject denoted by the language fails us, we do not still find any (final) cause "Bhiladarsanad" (from the true nature of the thing) may be "Abhutadarsanad" (from the unrealty of the experiences). According to this mterpretation, the meaning of the Karika is that we do not admit ex- ternal objects as the cause on4 account of the unreality of these (external) objects, which are as unreal as the snake seen m the place of the rope The (so-called) cause5 ceases to be the cause as the former is due to the illusory perception of the perceiver For, it (the external world) disappears in the absence of such illusory knowledge. The man in dreamless sleep and trance (Samadhi) and he who has attained the highest knowledge do not experience any object outside their self as they are free? from snch illusory cognition. An object which is cognised by a lunatic is never known as such by a sane man, Thus8 is answered the contention regarding the Causality based upon the

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 277

arguments of the perception of variety and the exist- ence of pam

Realism which is always associated with causality is now refuted by ıdealısm 1 To, elc -That is to say, the objection as set forth in the previous Kārılā, 2 The jar, etc .- The external jar is not the cause of om mental impresmion (idea) of the jar Nor is the external jar the substratum upon which the idea of the jar is suporposed. 3 Trom the, elc .- It is becanse from the standpoint of ultimate Truth the external jar does not, as such, exist That which really exists is clay (without form) which, bemg associatod with name and form, appears as the jai. Name and form, being mere ideas of the mmnd, are illusory Therefore, the jar has no real existence independent of the clay If the opponent contends that the external objects ereate the subjective ideas, we ask for a cause for the exter- nal objects The opponent cannot point out such a cause, Hence the argument of causality faily 4 On arcount of, eto -That is to say, no external object exists as snch What is taken as the external object is merely the idea of the perceiver When the snake 18 perceiver in the rope, that perception, beig illusory, cannot be called the knowledge of any mdependent reality called snake. Similarly, the perception of the external objeet, being illusory, cannot pomt to the existence of any such object as an independent reahty 5 Cause, etc .- Seeking a causc for subjective ideas is due to ignorance (1vidya). 6 For, etc .- When this ignoiance, ie, the behef m causahty, csappears the external world itself disappoars. 7 Tree, etc .- That is to say, they are no longer suhject to the law of cansahty. Hence they do not see any external world as an independent realty. 8 Thus, etc -The opponent contends that. external objects must exist as we are conscious of the vanety of subjective impressions, Another reason for the existence of the external object is our experionce of pain The mmd may create an idea, but it will not cause pain to itself. To this contention the followmg 11

278

reply is given -We may have consciousness of variety or pain in the absence of external objects One is conscious of the vauety of objocts in dream He feels pam mn dream But the dream experionces are only the subjective impressions in the mind of the dieamer No external object cxists, at that time, which corresponds to the dream experiences. Therefore, sulyective impregmions need not be necessarily produced by a really existing external object There is no proof that exteinal objects independently of the mind exist The subjective impression of the snake in plaep of the rope is pioducod in the absenve of an external snake Fiom the standpoit of realty, nothing exists but the self or Atman. Perception of any other existonce is due to illuvion. The mmd, in ignorance, seeks a cause, and thereby mnfeis an exteinal world

चित्तं न संस्पृशत्यर्थ नार्थाभास तथैव च ।

अभूतो हि यतश्चार्थो नार्थाभासस्ततः पृथक् ॥ २६ ॥

26. The mind is not related to the (external) obgeats .. Nor are the deas wohch appear as external obgects, reflec- tions upon the mind It is so because the objects are non- existent and the ideas (which appear as enternal objects) me not separate from the muind.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

Because there are no external objects as cause, the mind does not relate itself to external objects which are supposed to be the cause of the subjective impres- sion. Nor is the mind related to the ideas which appear as external objects, as the mind, like1 the dream-mind, is identical with such ideas. It2 is because the external objects such as sound, ete., percerved in the waking state, are as unreal as dreanf-objects, for3 reasons stated

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 279

already. Another reason is that the ideas appearing as external objects are not different from the mind It4 is the mind alone which, as in dream, appeais as external objects such as the jar, ete.

1 Lake, etc .- In dream one expeuenees various external objects. But it is found in the waking state that it is mmd alone which appears as objeets seen m dream The mind is identical with these ideas Thetefore there cannot be any causal ielalion between the mmd and the ideas 2 It is, ctc -Therefore theie cannot be any causal relation between the mind and the non-existing external objects 3 For reasons, etc-This has been treated in the second ohapter of the Karha and in other places of the Kartha 4 It as, ete -It is self alone which esists All that are pereeived by the deluded ay external objects are nothing but the Self There is only non-dual Atman The duahty is due to illusion

निमित्तं न सदा चित्तं संस्पृशत्यध्वसु त्रिषु। अनिमित्तो विपर्यासः कथं तस्य भविष्यति ॥ २७॥

27 The mind does not enter anto causal relation in any of the three perinds of time How can the mind be ever subject lo delusion, as there is no cause for any such delusion ?

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. (Objection)-The mmd appears as the jar, ete., though such objects are non-existent. Therefore there1 must exist false knowledge. Such being the case, there must be right knowledge somewhere (in relation to, or as distmguished from, which we point out false knowledge).

280 MÄNDŪKYOPANISIIAD

(Reply)-Our reply to this contention is as follows . -The mind certamly does not come in contact with a canse -- an external object-in any of the three periods of time, past, present or future If the mind had ever truly come in contact with such objects then such rela- tion would give us an idea of right knowledge from the standpomt of Reality. And mn relation to that know- ledge, the appearance of the jar, ete., in the mind, in the absence of the jur, etc, could have been termed as false knowledge. But never does the mind come in contact with an external object (which does not mn reality exist). Hence how is it possible for the mind to fall mnto error when there is no cause for such an assumption ? In other words, the mind is never subject to false knowledge. This2 is, mdeed, the very nature of the mind that, it takes the forms of the jar, ete., though in reality, such jar, etc, which may cause the mental forms, do not at all exist.

1 There muat, etc .- Otherwise one conld not be awaie of the external jar, ete., which do not. really exist. One cannot be aware of wrong knowledge unless one knows what right knowledye is. The opponent intends to prove the positive existence of Andya -- whioh causes illusory knowledge

2 This is, ete,-This is what is known as Audya or the ignorance of the real nafure of Reahty On account of this ignorance the mind, which is the same as the non dual Atman, appears to take the form of the exteinal oljeets. This false knowledge is not a correlatire of true knowledge. Ths false knowledge regarthing the existence of the external ohjects is due to the ignorance of the nature of Reality, Seeking after the cause of Amdya is itself the characteristie of the ignorant mind wlnch has not yet been able to freo itself from the delnsion of causality.

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 281

तस्मान्न जायते चित्तं चित्तदृश्यं न जायते।

तस्य पश्यन्ति ये जाति खे वै पश्यन्ति ते पदम् ॥ २८।।

28. Therefore neither the mand nor the obects per- ceived by the mind mre ever born Those who perceive such buth may as well discover the foot-prints (of the birds) an the sky.

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY The verses of the Kanka from 25 to 27 give the views of a class of Buddhistic thinkers, known as the Vynanaradins1 (the subjective idealists) who thus refute the views of those who maintain the realty of external objects. The2 Advaitie teacher (Gauda- pada) approves of these arguments. Now he makes use of these very arguments of the Vynānavadins as the ground (middle term) for refuting the conclusions of the subjective idcalistsv This Karka has this end in view. The subjective idealst admits that the mind, even in the absence of the (external) jar, etc., takes the form of the jar, etc. We also agree with this conclusion because this is in conformity with the real nature of things. In the like manner, the mind, though never produced, appears to be produced and cognised as such Therefore the mind is never pro- duced, as is the case with the object cognised by it. The Vimanavadins who affirm the production of the mind and also assert that the mind is momentary, full of pain, non-self in nature, etc., forget that the real3 nature of the mmnd can never be understood by the

282 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

mind (as desenbed by them). Thus the Vijnanavadins who see the production of the mind resemble those who (profess to) see in the sky foot-prmts left by birds, etc. In other words, the Vinanavadins are more audacious than the others, vrt., the dualsts. And the Nihilists4 who, in spite of the perception of the visible world, assert the absolute non-existence of everything including their own expemiences, are even more auda- cious than the Vijnanavadins. These Nihilists take the position of those who claim to compress the whole sky in the palms of then hands The threc Kanlas, mz, 25, 26 and 27, give tho views of the Buddhist idealist who refutes those that believe in the reahty of the external objects This Kariha refules the position of the Vijnana- vădın 1 Tynanaradins-They belong to the school of subjective idealism in the Buddlustic system of thought According to this school, all objeets are pre-existent in the subjeet in the form of Vasanas (Ideas). Cause is only a subjective idea It doos not exist as external object with which we associate it Further, according to this school, all ideas aie momentary 2 The Adunta, etc .- Gaudapada accepts the views of the Tijnanaradins only in respeet of the non-existence of external objeets. He also agrees with the Vynanavadins that the so-called external objects are nothing but the state of the mind (chitta- spandanam). 3 Real nature, ete -It is because the mind, according to the Vijnanacadins, is momentary. The consciousness of one moment is unrelated to that of the next moment. Such being the case, in the absence of an unchanging entity it is not possible to know the ohange of consciousness from one moment to another Therefore it is absurd to assert that the mmnd is born every moment and that it is full of misery, etc. For, there is no percerver, accord- ing to the Vijnanaradins, which cap cogmze this momentary change of consciousness as well as its painful and non-Atman character.

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 283

4 Nimnhsis-The position of the Nihilists who affirm the non- existenoe of everything, including the perceiver, is even more untenable. If all that exists is really a void, then there must be a percerver of this void Otherwise who will as-ert that everything is vold 9

मज्ातं जायने यस्मात् अजातिः प्रकृतिस्ततः । प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न करथंचिद्धविष्यत ॥ २९ ॥

29. (In the opinion of the disputants) that which is unborn is suid to be born. For, its very nature is to be ever unborn It is nener possible for a thing to be other than what it is

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. For reasons already stated it is established that Brahman is one and unborn This verse summarises the conclusion of what has already been stated in the form of proposition The unborn mmnd, which1 is verily Brahman, is imagmned by the disputants to be born. Therefore (according to them) the ever-unborn Is said to be born. For, It is unborn by its very nature. It2 Is simply impossible for a thing, which is ever-unborn by nature, to be anyhow born, that is to say, to be anyhow otherwise than what it is.

1 Whach, etc -It has been aheady seen that the mind 19 never born. Therefore the mind is Brahman. non-dual and immutable, The disputants, on account of ignorance, see the modifioations and change in the mind. The very nature of the mind is that it is one and without a second, and free from change or birth. 2 It is, etc -The absolute mumnd does not m any way undergo any change. Even through delusion the mind cannot be said to pass into birth If it were so then it cannot be said to be unborn and unchanging in nature,

284 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

अनादेरन्तवत्वं च संसारस्य न सत्स्यति । अनन्तता चाऽडदिमतो मोक्षस्य न भविष्यति ॥ ३०॥

30. If the world be admitted to be beginningless (as some disputants ussert), then it cannot be non-eternal. Moksha or hberahon cannot have a beginning and be eternal. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Here is another defect in the arguments of those who maitain that the Alman is, in reality, subject1 to both bondage and hberation. If the world (i.e., the state of bondage of the Atman) be without begin- ning or a definte past, then its end cannot be estah- lished by any reason In ordinary cxperience, there is no instance of an object which has no begmning but has an end. (Objection)-We2 see a break in the beginningless continuity of the relation of the seed and the sprout. (Reply)-This illustration has no validity; for,3 the seed and the sprout do not constitute a single entity. In the like manner, liberation cannot be said to have no end if it be asserted that liberation which is attamed by acquisition of knowledge has a (definite) beginning. For, the jar, etc., which have a beginning have also an end. (Objection)-There4 is no defect in our argument as liberation, not being any substance, may be like the destruction of a jar, etc. (Reply)-In that case it will contradict your pro- position that liberation has a positive existence from

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 285

the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality. Further, liberation being a non-entity, like the horn of a hare, cannot, ever, have a begmnning.

This Karika gives us the reason for the statement that Atman is ever-pure, ever-frce and ever-existent Itman, conceived ay snch, 19 not a theological dogma, nor is it bayed upon the mturtion of the myste, but it is a metaphysioal faot 1 Sulect, efc .- That is to say, the dItman is bound during the state of ignorance and it becomes free with the aequsition of know- ledge. Those who make ths contention accept the bondage of Atman as a fact 2 We see, etc .- The opponent contends that the relation of a yeer and a tree, though without beginnmg, is seen to come to an end when the tree dies without leaving a seed 3 For the seed, etc .- The seed and sprout do not constitute a single series. Every time a now seed and a new sprout are seen to be produced Therefore both the seed and the tree have definite beginning 4 There is, etc -The opponent contends that a non-entity results from the breaking of a jar. This non-ontity has a beginining (in the brcaking of the jar) but it is eternal. Liberation (Molshu) mn the form of the destruction of the bondage (bandha), not being any substance, can he eternal like the deshuction of a jar which, though not a substance and though with beginning, is without end. This is the contention of the opponent.

आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेडपि तत्तया।

वितथेः सदृशाः सन्तोऽवितथा इव लक्षिताः ॥३१॥।

31 That which is non-cxistent at the beginning and in the end, is necessarily so (non-existent) in the middle. The objects we see are illugions, still they are regarded as if real.

286 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

सप्रयोजनता तेषां खनने विप्रतिपद्यते। तस्मादाद्यन्तवत्वेन मिथ्यव खलु ते स्मृताः ॥ ३२ ॥ 32. The serving of some purpose by them (i c., the obects of wrahing experience) as contradicted in dream. Therefore they are doubtlessly recognised to be illusory (by the unse) on account of their haing a beginning and an end. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. These two verses have been explamed before m the chapter on Illusion (Chapter II. 6, 7). They are quoted here agam in connection with the topics which are discussed in relation to the unreality of the uiverse and liberation. The opponent may contend thus -Let the state of libera- tion have a beginning and an end What is the harm in thus conceiving the state of lberation ? The reply is that if a thing has a beginning and an end, it does not exist in the middle also. That is to say, it has no existence whatsoever That we see its existence is due to our ignorance. The famlar instance is that of the mirage. The mrage has no existence prior to its vision by the deluded and it does not exist when the illusion vamshes That we see the mirage at all is due to our ignorance Therefore if we accept the idea of liberation as conceived by the opponent then it would be non-existent The opponent may agam contend that one cannot quench his thirst with the water of the mirage But hberaton is conducive to our mfimte happiness. The reply to this contention is that liberation as conceived by the opponent, being illusory, serves no purpose whatsoever If liberation has both begmning and end, then it would be hke our dieam or wak- ing experiences, In the waking state a man may feel that he hay enjoyed a hearty feast, but immediately after going to sleep he may experience in dream ravenous hunger In that case the waking ex- periences do not serve him a lasting purpose. Any experience which has a beginning or an end is illusory from the standpoint of Reality.

MANDŪXYOPANISHAD 287

सर्वे धर्मा मृषा खमे कायस्यान्तर्निदर्शनात्। संवृतेऽस्मिन्प्रदेशे वै भूतानां दर्शन कुतः ॥ ३३ ॥ 33 All objects cognised in dream are uneal, because they are seen within the body. How is it possible for things, that are perceived to exist, to be really in Brahman which is indivisible and homogenevus ? SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. This and the following verses are meant to explam in detail one of the previous Karihas which states that the (so-called) cause (of the opponent) is, really speak- ing, no cause at all (Ref Veise 25, Chapt. IV ) The purpose of the Kanka is to show that Brahman, birthless and non-dual, is alone exiytent, for, the waking experiences, on account of their having a begmmng and an end, are unreal hke the dream ones, Therefore, what is seen i9 Btahman alone The dream objeots are seen within the body, hence they are unreal as things like a mountain, efc., cannot exist within the body. Simi- larly, all our waking experiences are supposed to be within the body (of the Vual). Hence they are alo illusory from the standpoint of Reahty The Virat itself is in the self (Atmun) which eannot, in reahty, contam multiphcity Therefore waking experiences are illusory The dream experiences are conuidered illusory as time and space corresponding to such experiences do not conform to the tune and space of the ceamer. In like manner wuking experiences are also illusory as they, really speaking, cannot exist in the Self (Atman) which is one, non-dual and homogeneous and which cannot contam any space for the existonce of ahen objects. न युक्तं दर्शन गत्वा कालस्यानियमाद्गतौ। प्रतिबुद्धश्च वै सर्वस्तस्मिन्देशे न विद्यते ॥ ३४॥ 34. It is not possible for a dreamer to go out in order to experience the (dream) objects on account of the

288 MANDŪKYOPANISII1D

discrepancy of the time involved in such journey Again, on being awake, the dreamer does not find himself in the pluce (where he dreamed himself to be). SANKARA'S COMMENTARY The time and space involved m undertaking a journey and m coming back, have a definite and fixed standard in the waking state. These are seen to be reversed1 in dream On account of this iconsistency it can be positively said that the dreamer does not actually go out to another place during his dream experiences 1 Rerersed-In dream which may last for a few minutes, a man may have experence of events which may take years to happen. Therefore the idea of time and space experienced in dream is illusory मित्रादैः सह संमन्त्रय संबुद्धो न प्रपद्यते। गृहृीतं चापि सत्किंचित् प्रतिबुद्धो न पश्यति ॥ ३५॥ 35. The dreamer on being awake, realises as illusory all the conversation he had had with frrends, ete., during the dream state. Fuither, he does not possess, in the waking state, anything which he had acquired in dream. ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY. A man, in dream, holds conversation with his friends, ete But, on being awake, he finds it all as unreal. Further, he possesses in dream, gold, ete., but, in the awakened state be realises all these posses- sions to be unreal. Though he goes to other countries in dream, he does not, in reality, make any such journey.

MANDOKYOPANISHAD 289

The conversations, ete , held m dream, become umeal in tho waking state Simdlarly, seriptural diseussions, ete., with the sages, held in the waking state. aie known to be illusory when one attams the ultimate Reahty. For, all beings are ever free. There is no hondage or ignoranee, really speaking, which requires to be removed by religious practices The wise man knows the study of the sciiptures, ete , uidertaken for the attamment of knowledgo, as Illusory as dream experienees, foi, the dItman is ever free, pure and ilfummed. Even the cating, drinking, ete , which a knower of Truth performs, are dissociated from all ideas of subject-objeet relationship Even while talking, doig, ote., he is conscious of the non-dual Biahman alone The am of the senptural study, religious practices, etc., is to dehypnotise us from the hypnotie iden that we aie not Biahman

सप्ने चावस्तुक: कायः पृथगन्यस्य दर्शनात्। यथा कायम्तथा सव चित्तदृश्यमवस्तुकम् ॥ ३६॥ 36. The body active in dream is umeal as the other body, guite distinct from it, is perceived. Lrke the body. everything, cognised by the mind, is unreul. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The body, which appears to be wandering in the dream, is unreal, for, another body, quite different from it, is seen in the spot where the dreamer lies. As the body perceived mn the dream is unreal, so also all that is cognised by the mind, even in the waking state, is unreal; for, all these perceived objects are mere different states of the mind. The significance of this chapter is that even the waking experiences, on account of their being sımilar to the dream experi- ences, are unreal. The body which is active in the waking state lies motionless in the bed when the dieamer perceives that he is wandering at

290 MĀNDŪKYOPANISIAD

various place> Therefore from the standpomt of the waking state, thia dream body is unreal. Similarly, from the standpoit of the ultimate Reality the body percerved in the waking state-the body which 19 felt to be honoured or insnlted by the fmends or enemies-is also unreal. It is becanse this body is also an idea in the mind of the pereeiver As dream objects are unieil on ac- count of their being percerved by the mind, so also the objects of the wakiny expenonce are unreal on account of the very same ieason. Beig percerved by the mid is the common factor m both wakmng and droam states. Therefore the experiences of both the states hear with them the stamp of umealty

ग्रहणाज्जागरितवत्तद्वेतुः खप्न इष्यते । नद्धेतुत्ात्त तस्यैत सज्जागरितमिष्यते ॥ ३७॥ 37 As the experience (of objects) in dream is similar to the experience' (of objects) in the wahing state, therefore it is thought that the wahing experiences are the cause of the dream-expenences. On account of this reason, the wuking experences (supposer to be the cause of the dream) appear as real to the dreamer alone (but not to others). SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. For this reason also, the objects experienced in the waking state are unreal The dream experiences, like the waking ones, are characterised by the subjoct- object relationship. On account1 of this similarity of perception the waking state is said to be the cause of the dream state. In other words, it is contended that the dream state is the effect of the waking one which is the cause. It that be the case, t.e., it the drean be the effeot of waking cxperiences, then the waking expericnces are real to the perceiver of the dream alone (t.e, who takes the dream to be real)

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 291

and to no one else. The purport2 of this Kamka is that the dream appears to us real, that is to say, dream objects appear as objects of common experience and therefore real to the dreamer alonc. So also the experiences of the waking state, being the cause of the dream, appear as if they were within the common experience of all and therefore real. But the objects perceived mn the waking state are not common to all. Waking experiences are verily like the dream ones.

1 On account, etc -In the dream state, dream objects appear as ieal To the dieamer, the dream state is the waking state One knows the dream state to be unreal only from the wakmg state As a matter of fact, we aie aware of a succession of waking states alone. When we know a previous waking state to he unreal, we call it dream state Without dream one could not know the waking state to be real. Similarly one could not know the waking state as real without the unreal dieam state We speak of the waking state as the cause of the dream state on account of the cognition of the subject-object idea present in both the states, But, ieally speak- ing, there is no causal relation hetween the two states The waking state appears real only to him who looks upon dream also as real and who secking a cause for the dream, takes the waking state as the cause of the dieam 2 The purport, etc -It may be contended that dream experi- ence is private, its objects and actions beig cogmised by the dreamer and none else But the waking experience is not private. It is universal. But this is not a fact, The dieam universe has not only its suns, moony and stars, but also its human demzens who perceive them ay our fellow-beings of the waking universo do an the waking world. The distmetion of private and pubho to maik the objects of one state from those of the other is futile The truth is that as in the dream, the action of the mind creates the idea of a universe with the sun, the moon, friends and foes, etc., similarly in the waking state also, the mind creates the idea of a universe with oll its contents

292 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

उत्पादस्याप्रसिद्धत्वादजं सर्वमुदाहृतं। न च भूतादभूतस्य संभवोडस्ति कथंचन ॥ ३८॥

38. All these are knoum as unborn, as crenhion or evolution cannot be established as a fuct It is ever impossible for the unreal to be born of the real. ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY (Objection)-Though the waking experiences are the cause of the dream ones, still the former cannot be unreal like the latter The dream is extremely evanescent whereas the waking experiences are seen to be permanent. (Reply)-This1 is true with regard to the people who do not possess discrimination Men of discrimi- nation do not see the productione or the birth of any- thing. as creation or evolution cannot be established as a fact Hence all this is known in the Vedantic books as unborn3 (i.e., non-dual Brahman) For the Sruti declares, "He (the Atman) is both within and without and is, at the same time, unborn." If you contend that the illusory dream is the effect of the real waking state, we say that your contention is un- tenable. In our common experience, we never see a non-existing thing produred from an existing one. Such non-existing thing as the horn of a hare is never seen to be produced from any other object. 1 This, etc -It is true that the time standard of the waking state does not apply to the dream state. But the standard with which tho dreamer measures the time of his dream experences seems to him perfectly consistent mn the dream state

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 293

2 Production, etc -That is to say, wise men do not beheve in causality 3 Unborn-That 1s to say, wise men see everywhere the non- dual Brahman alone which has no birth or change

असज्जागरिते दृष्टा खमे पश्यति तन्मयः । असत्खपेऽपि दृष्टा च प्रतिबुद्धो न पश्यति ॥ ३९ ॥ 39. Being deeply impressed with the (reality of the) unreal objects which a man sees in the waking stute, he sees those very things in dream as well. Moreover the unreal objects cognased in the dream are not seen agarn in the waking state. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

(Objection)-It is you who stated that the dream is the effect of the waking experience. That being the case, how do you refute causality ? (Reply)-Listen to our explanation of the causality, referred to in that instance. One perceives in the waking state objects which are unreal lke the snake imagined in the rope. Being deeply impressed hy such (illusory) perception, he imagines in the dream, as in the waking state, the subject-object relationship and thereby perceives (dream) objects But though full of the unreal seen in the dream, he does1 not see those (unreal) objects, over again, in the waking state. The reason is the absence of the imaginary subject- object relationship (one experiences in dream). The word "cha," "moreover" in the text denotes that the causal relationship between the waking and the dream states is not afays observed. Similarly,2

294 MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

things seen in the waking state are not, sometimes, cognised in dream. Therefore the statement that the waking condition is the cause of the dream is3 not made from the standpomt of the ultimate Reality

1 Does not, ete -Tlus shows that the causal law is not seen be- twoen tho waking and the dream states Simdarly, ete .- This is another reason to show that the causal relation does not exist between the wakmg and the dream states. 3 Is not wade, elc -Waking state is said to be the cause of the dream only from the empirical standpoit From the subsequent waking standpoit we call the antecedent dieam stato as unreal But we do not find a causal relation between the antecedent dream state and the subsequent waking one because we view it from the waking standpomt-when the dream is over. Objects seen in dream could have been seen even now in the waking state it the waking state were a part oi continuation of the previous dream state

नास्त्यसद्धेतुकमसत् सदसद्धेतुकं तथा। सच्च सद्धेतुकं नास्ति सद्धेतुकमसत्कुतः ॥ ४०॥ 40. The unreal cannol have the unreal as its cause, nor can the real be produced from the unreal. The real cannot be the cause of the real. And it is much more ampossible for the real to be the cause of the unreal.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

From the standpomt of the ultimate Reality, things can, in no way, enter into causal relation. How ? An umeal cannot be the cause of another unreal. An1 unreal entity such as the horns of a hare, which may be said to be the cause of another unreal entity such as a castle in the air, has no existence whatsoever.

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 295

Similarly,2 an object hke a jar, which is perceived and which is the effect of an unreal object like the horns of the hare, is never existent. In3 like manner, a jar which is perceived and which is the effect of another jar that also is perreived to exist, is, in itself, non- existent. And4 lastly, how is cxistence possible of a real object which is the effect of an unreal one ? No other causal relation is possible nor can be conceived of. Hence the men of knowledge find that the causal rela- tion between any objects whatsoever is not capable of being proved The causal relation between the waking and the dieam states has been stated from the empmcal standpomt alone. But it cannot be estabhshed fiom the standpoit of Truth Furthei, no cansal relation, whatsoever, is admissible 1 An umreal, etc -This refutes the contention of the Buddhistic mhilists 2 Sumilarly, ete -This is the refutation of the Nyaya school. & In like, etc -This refutes the Samkhya school of causabty. 4 And lastly, etc .- A class of Vedantists hold that the ever- existent Brahman is the cause of these illusory phenomena This Is the refutation of that school of thought All the four systems of thought refuted above bcheve in causalty, in some form or other विपर्यासादयथा जाग्रदचिन्त्यान्भूतवत्स्पृशेत्। तथा खने विपर्यासात् वर्मास्तत्रैव पश्यति ॥ ४१ ॥। 41. As one in the waking state, through false knowledge, handles, as real, obects whose nature cannot be described; sunilarly, an drcam also, one percewes, through false knowledge, objects whose emrstence is possible in that condrtion alone.

296 MANDŪKYOPANISHAJ

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY. This verse intends to remove the slightest possibihty of the causal relation between the waking and the dream states, though both are unreal. As in the waking state, one, through want of proper discrimmation, imagines the snake seen in place of the rope as really true,-the nature of which, in fact, cannot be really determined,- so also m dream, one, through want of discrimination, imagines as if one really perceives such objects as elephant, etc These dream objeets, such as elephant, etc., are peculiar to the dream condition alone, they are not the effect of the waking experiences

The nature, etc .- The snake seen mn place of the iope cannot be called eithor existent or non-existont If it be really existont then it cannot cease to exist And if it be ically non-oxistent then it cannot appear as existing This is called Anirvarhaniya or the mdescribable nature of the sense-objects

उपलम्भात्समाचारात् अस्तिवस्तुत्ववादिनाम् । जातिस्तु देशिता बुद्धैः अजातेस्त्रसतां सदा ॥ ४२॥ 42. Wise men support causality only for the sake of those who, being afrard of absolute non-mumifestation (of things), stich to the (apparent) reality of (external) objects on account of their perception (of such objects) and their faith in religious observances. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Wise men, t.e., the exponents of Advaita Philo- sophy. have, no doubt, supported causality. But they have done so only for those who have little dis- crimination but who are eager (to know the Truth)

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 297

and who are endowed with faith. These people assert that external objects exist because they perceive them, and also because they cling to the observances of vamous duties associated with the different Varnasl and Asramas.2 Instructions regarding causality are only meant for them as3 a means to (some other) end. Let them hold on to the idea of causality But the students who practise disciplmnes m accordance with Vedanta Philosophy will, without such belief m causality, spon- taneously get the knowledge4 of Self, unborn and non- dual. This causality is declared not from the stand- point of the ultimate Reality. These students, who5 beheve mn scriptures, and who are devoid of discrimina- tion, fear the idea of absolnte non-manifestation on account of their gross intellect, as they are afraid of the annihilation of their selves It6 has also been stated before that these scriptmral statements (regarding crea- tion) are meant as a help to our higher understanding of Reality (In realty, there is no multiplcity.) If eausalty be a fiction, then, it may be asked, why the serip- tures speak of Brahman as the cause of the universe. This Karka gives a reply to this question, The aim of the scripture is to enable the students of medioere or dull intellect to understand the Supreme Reality with the help of causal arguments. 1 Varnas-That is, the four castes, me., the Brahmin, the Kshatriya, the Vaisya and the Sadia. e Asramas-The four stages of hfe, viz., Brahmacharya (student period), Garhasthya (the houscholder's stage), Fanaprastha (the period of retirement from the active duties of hfe) and Sannyisa (the monastic stage). 3 As a means, etc .- The ordmary people on account of the per- ception of the apparent objeets end also on account of their attach- ment to life, cannot understand the truth regarding the non-dual

298 MĀNDŪKYOPANISIIAD

and changeless Brahman They beheve in the illusory idea of causality For the benefit of such poople, the wise men admit that Brahman is the cause of creation (ide Vedanta Sntra, Ist chapter, second aphorism) But as the cause is idontical with the effect, thorefore the universe is identical with Brahman In this way, the students are taught that all that exists is Brahman. Thus by the constant study and meditation on the seriptures, the students gradually reahse the nature of Supieme Reality which i9 free from all change and evolution Duality cannot be established as tho Supreme Reahty either by reason or soriptmie. The apparent dualty is admitted from the relative standpoint 4 Knowledge, ete -This knowledge can be diicetly obtamed by students of clear perception, following the methods given in this Upanishad and the Kanha Who Felieve, etc .- That is to say, those who accept the literal meaning of the seriptural statements regarding creation, ete. o It has, etc,-Vide Kārikā 3. 15.

अजातेस्त्रसतां तेषामुपलम्भाद्वियन्ति ये। जातिदोषा न सेत्स्यन्ति दोषोप्यल्पो भविष्यति ॥ ४२॥ 43. Those who, being afrard of the truth of absolute non-manifestation, and also on account of their perception (of phenomenal obects), do not admit Ajati (absolute non- creation), are not much affected by the evil consequent on the belief in causality. The evil effect, if any, as ruther insignificant. ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Those who on account of their perception (of the phenomenal objects) and attachment1 to the various duties of caste and other stages of hfe, shrmnk from the non-dual and unborn Atman, and believing in the cxistence of dual objects, go away from the self, that is to say, pin their faith mn duality,-these people

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 299

who are thus afraid of the truth of absolute non-manı- festation, but who are endowed with faith and who stick to the path2 of righteousness, are nota much affected by the evil results consequent on such belief in causality. For, they also try to follow the path of dis- crimmation. Even if a httle blemish attaches to such persons, it is isignificant, being duc to their not having realised the Supreme Truth This shows the catholcity of Advaita Vedanta which is a sharp contrast to the narrowness of theologians. Advaita philosophy recognises the value of different relgious practices suited to diverse temperaments This Kanka further admomshes us not to find fauits with othes. 1 Altachment, etc -See the pievions Kānha. 2 Path, etc-That is to say, those who strictly observe the formal mjunctions of rehgion These people also, at last, acqure the virtue of disoumination which alone enables one to realise Truth 3 Not much, etc -The Gita also says that a sincere soul which is anxious to realise Truth, surmounts all difficulties. The adherents of religions, if they are sincere and earnest, ultimately acquire those firtues which enable them to realise Truth

उपलम्भात्समाचारान्मायाहस्ती यथोच्यते। उपलम्भात्समाचारादस्ति वस्तु तथोच्यते॥ ४४ ॥ 44. As an elephant conjured up by the magioian, on account of its being perceived and also on account of its answering to the behaviours (of a reul animal), as sard to exist, so also are objects saul to exist, on account of their being perceived and also on account of ther ansuering to our dealings with them (In truth, the objects of sense perception are as unreal as the magicran's elephant.)

300 MANDORYOPANISHAD

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. (Objection)-Objects answering to the fact of duality do exist, on account of such evidence as our (direct) perception of them and also on account of the possibility of our dealings with them. (Reply)-No, this objection is not vahd. For, direct perception and the possibility of dealing practi- cally with objects do not always prove the existence of objects. (Objection)-How do you say that our contention admits of irregularity ? (Reply)-It is thus stated The elephant conjured up by a magician, is, verily, perceived as the real elephant. Thongh unreal, it (the magic elephant) 1s called the (real) elephant, on account of its being endowed with such attributes of an elephant as the possibility of its being tied up with a rope or being climbed upon, etc. Though unreal, the magic elephant is looked upon as (a real) one. In like manner, it is said that multiple objects, pomting to duality, exist on account of their being perceived and also on account of the possibilty of our dealing practically with them Hence the two grounds, adduced ahove, cannot prove the existence of (external) objects establishing the fact of duality.

जात्याभासं चलाभास वस्त्वाभासं तथैव च । अजाचलमवस्तुत्वं विज्ञानं शान्तमद्ठयम् ॥ ४५ । 45. Consciousness which appears to be born or to move or to take the form of matter, is really ever unborn,

MĀNDŪKYOPANISIIAD 301

immovable and free from the character of materialty, it is all peace and non-dual. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. What is that entity-the ultimate Reality-which is the substratum1 of all false cognitions as causahty (creation), ete. ? It is thus replied -Though unborn it appears to be born. As for example, we say that Devadatta is born. Again it appears to move (though it is free from all motion) ; as we say, "That Devadatta is going". Further, it appears as an object in which mnhere certain qualities For instance, we say "That Devadatta is fair and tall" Though from the stand- point of the ultimate Reahty, Consciousness2 is ever unborn, immovable, and not of the character of material objects, yet it appears as a Devadatta who is born, who moves and who is known to be fair and tall. What is that entity which answers to these descrip- tions ? It is Consciousness which, being free from birth, change, etc., is all peace and therefore non-dual. 1 Substratum-From the standpomt of Realty, the Atman is not even a substratum, for, nothing whatsoever exists, m rela- tion to which the Self can be called the substratum. The epithet of " Substratum " is used in connection with Atman only from the relative standpoint. 2 Consciousness-That 1s, Atman एवं न जायते चित्तमेवं धर्मा अजाः स्मृताः । एवमेत्र विजानन्तो न पतन्ति विपर्यये ॥ ४६ ॥ 46. Thus the mind is never subject to birth or change. All beings are, thus, free from birth Those who kenow the Truth are never subject to false knowledge.

302 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Thus, that is to say, for the reasons stated above, the mind is free from birth Similarly the Dhurmas, that is, the Jwvas, are also unborn. This is the state- ment of the Knowers of Brahman. The1 word "Dharmah" (ie, "Selves") is metaphorically used in the plural sense, in consequence of our perception of variety which is, in reality, the appearance of the non-dual Atman as different corporeal beings. Those who know the consciousness,2 stated above, which is the essence of the Self, non-dual and free from birth, etc, and, accordingly, renounee the hankering after all external objects,-they do not fall any more into this ocean of the darkness of Avidya The Śrut also says, "Where is grief or delusion for the one who realises non-duality ?" 1 The word, ete -The ultimate Reality cannot be said to be one or many For, these predicates, bemg correlatives, apply to the relative world, The word " Dharmah " has boen used mn the plural number to indicate that all that exists is Atman If one sees multiphcity, it is also the non-dual Atman The refleo- tions of the sun, caught in the milhons of waves and bubbles, are nothing but the reflection of the self-same sun. Snmlarly the same Atman alone is perceived whether as objects of our waking state, or the ideas of dream or the undifferentiated consciousness of dreamless sleep. 2 Consciousness-That is, Biahman or Atman. ऋजुवक्रादिकाभासमंलातस्पन्दितं यथा। ग्रहणग्राहकाभासं विज्ञानस्पन्दित तथा ॥ ४७॥ 47. As a fire-brand, when set in motion, appears as straight, crooked, etc., so also Consciousness, when set in

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD S03

motion, appears as the percerver, the percewved, and the lke. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. In order to explain the truth regarding the ultimate Reahty already stated, it is thus said .-- As mn commion experience it is noticed that a fire-brand1 when moved, appcars straight, crooked, etc., so does Consciousness appear as the perceiver, the perceived, and the hke What is that which appears as the percciver, the per- ceived, etc .? It2 is Consciousness set in motion There is no motion in Consciousness It only appears to be moving This appearance is due to Avdya or ignorance. No motion is possible in Consciousness which is ever immovable. It has already been stated that Conscious- ness is unborn and immovable. 1 Fare-brand, etc -If a fire-brand be moved swiftly it makes a cirele, a straight line, or a crooked lme according to the move- ment. When the fire-biand is moved, it does not really make any figure. In reahty, there is only a pomt which appears as vari- ous figures 2 I4 18, elc-Consciousness only exists, It is evor undifferen- tiated. Motion in Consciousness makes it appear as the perceiver, the perceived, etc. There is no motion, really speaking, mn Con- sciousness The ignorant only imagme illusory subjects and objects which are the basis of our sense perception,

अस्पन्दमानमलातमनाभासमज यथा। अस्पन्दमानं विज्ञानमनाभासमज तथा ॥ ४८॥ 48. As the fire-brand, when not in motion, is free from all appearances and remarns changeless, similarly, consciousness, when not in motion (imaginary action), is free from all appearances and remarns changeless.

304 MANDUKYOP 1NISHAD

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY As that verv fire-brand, when not in motion, does not take any form, straight or crooked, ete becomes free from all appearances and remams changeless, so also the conscousness, which appears as moving through1 ignorance, when dissociated from the idea of motion on the cisappearance of ignorance, becomes2 free from all appearances, as those of birth, ete., and remains unborn and motionless. I Though, etc -The appearance of forms mn Consciousness is due to the projecting power (Vrkshepa Sakt) of Avidyū 2 Recowes, ete,-That 1s to say, the Consciousness (i e , Atman) i9 seen as it really is. The fire-brand, when at rest, has no figure. as it is a point only Even when movod, the fire-brand is, really, nothing but a point. It only appears as a circle or straight line. Similarly, even during the state of ignorance, Consciousness always remains what it is, m , changeless and mo- tonless. It appears to be changing and possegung forms only on account of the ignorance of the perceiving mmnd.

अलाते स्पन्दमाने वै नाऽडभासा अन्यतोभुवः । न ततोऽन्यत्र निस्पन्दान्नालातं प्रविशन्ति ते ॥ ४९ ॥ 49. When the fre-brand is in motion, the appear- ances (that are seen in it) do not come from elsewhere. When the fire-brand is not moved, the appearances do not go elsewhere from the motionless fire-brand Further, the appenrances, when the firc-brand is not moved, do not enter into the fire-brand tself. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Moreover, when that very fire-brand is in motion, the appearances, straight or crooked, etc., do not come

MÅNDŪKYOPANISIIAD 305

to it from anywhere else outside the fire-brand. Nor do the appoarances go elsewhere from the fire-brand when it is motionless Nor, agam, do the appearances enter into the fire-brand when it is motionless.

What actnally exists is a poit But the mind, on account of its ignorance, sees in it various forms.

न निर्गता अलातात्ते द्रव्यत्व्ाभावयोगतः । विज्ञानेऽपि तर्थैव स्युराभासस्याविशेषतः ॥ ५० ॥

50. The appearances do nol cmerqe from the fire- brand because they are not of the nature of u substance. This also apphes to Consciousness on account of the simi- larity of appearances (in both cases). SANKARA'S COMMENTARY Moreover, those appearances do not emerge from the fire-brand as something that comes out of a house The reason is that appearances are not of the nature of sub- stance. The appearances have no realty. Entrance, etc , can be said of a real thing but not of anything un- real. The appearance of birth, etc, in the case of con- sciousness is exactly sinular; for,1 appearances are of the same nature in both the cases.

1 Fo, ete .- In both cases, appearances are due to tho ignorance of the peroerver. Birth, death, etc., are, really speaking, illusory. They have no real existence. Thereforo these are called mere appearances.

विज्ञाने स्पन्दमाने वै नाडडभासा अन्यतोभुवः । न ततोऽन्यत्र निस्पन्दान विज्ञानं विशन्ति ते ॥।५१॥

306 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

न निर्गतास्ते विज्ञानादूद्रव्यत्वाभावयोगतः । कार्यकारणताभावाद्यतोऽचिन्त्याः सदैव ते ॥ ५२ ॥ 51-52 When Consciousness is assocrated urth the rdea of actimty (as in the dream and waking states), the appearances (that are seen in it) do not come from el sewhere When Consciousness is maclive (as in deep sleep) appearances do not go elsewhere from the rnactive Consciousness. Further. appearances do not enter into it. The appemrances do not emerge from Consciousness because they are not of the nature of a substance. These , are aluays beyond our comprehension on account of therr not being subject to the relation of cause and effect. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY How are the two appcarances similar ? It is thus replied :- The fire-brand and the Consciousness are alike in all respects. The only special feature of Con- sciousness is that it always remains immutable 1 What is the cause of such appearances as birth, et, in Con- sciousness which is ever immutahle ? In2 the absence of rausality, it is not reasonable to! cstablish the relation- ship of the producer and the produced (between Con- sciousness and appearances). The appearances, being illusory, are ever unthinkable3 The purport of the whole thing is this :- As the fire-brand (which is merely a point) is associated with forms, straight, crooked, etc., though, in reality, such crooked or straight forms are ever non-existent, so also, pure Consciousness is associated with the ideas of birth, etc., though such ideas as birth, ete., are ever non-existent. Hence these

MINDŪKVOPANISIAD 307

ideas of birth, etc, associated with Consciousness are illusory.

When Consciouyness is said to be active as in the wnking and the dream states, the forms of birth, ete., that are cogmsed mn thoso states do not come from elNewhere outade Consciousneys. For, such forms are not seen to exist elyewhore outaide one'4 own consciousness Again, when, as in deep sleep, Consciousness re- mams mactive, the foums of buth, death, ete , do not go elsewhere from the Consciousness in which they were perceived during the waking and the dream states Foi, no one is conseious of snch a happening. No one ever knows the exitence of anything ontsido one's own consciousneys Further, when Consciousness remains inactive, as in deep sloep, the forms, ete , peiceived in the waking. and the dream states, do not geem to merge in Consciousness For. Consciousness which is non-dual and beyond the ideas of time, spacc, eto, cannot be the cause of multsple objects existing in time and space The objeets seen mn the dieam and the waking states, being ever unreal, cannot be saul to emerge from or merge, in Consciousness, -1 1 Immutable-C'onseiousneys is called immutable as it is fiee from the idea of space and time 2 In the, etc -The idea of causality is due to Aridya 3 Erer unthinkuble -- The ideas seen mn the dream and the waking states cannot be said to be non-existent because they a1e perceived Nor ean they be said to exist because they are not perceived in deep sleep. Therefore it is impossible to determine their real natme. Hence they are as illusory as the snake seen in the rope.

द्रव्यं द्रव्यस्य हेतु: स्यादन्यदन्यस्य चैव हि। द्रव्यत्वमन्यभावो वा धर्माणां नोपपद्यते ॥ ५३ ।। 53 Substance may be the cause of another substance. That which is not substance may be the cause of another which is not substance But the Jivas (or beings) cannot be possibly anything like substanee or other than substance.

308 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. It has already been establshed that the essence of Self is onel and unborn2 Those who iagine causal relation in Atman must admit that substance may be the canse of another substance and that3 which is other than substance may be the cause of something else which is also other than substance But a thing itself cannot be the cause of itself. Further, we do not find in common experience a non-substance which is in- dependently the cause of something The selves (i,e., the Jivas or beings) can be called neither substance4 nor others than substance Hence the Jivas or selves cannot be the cause or effect of anything Therefore Atman, being neither substance nor other than sub- stance, is neither the cause nor the effect of anything.

1 One-That is to say, Atman which is free from any attribute. 2 Unborn-That is to say, Atman being without parts, is not a substance. 3 That which, etc -That is to say, an attribute such as colour or form. 4 Substance-It is because a substance has always parts 5 Other than, etc,-It is because a non-substance (r.e, an attri- bute) cannot be conceived of independently of a substance,

एवं न चित्तजा धर्माश्चितं वापि न धर्मजम्।

एवं हेतुफलाजाति प्रविशन्ति मनीषिणः ॥ ५४ ॥ 54. Thus (external) appearunces (objects) are not caused by the mand nor is the mind produced by them. Hence men of drscrimination hold the princrple of the ubsolute non-evolution or negation of causality.

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 309

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Thus, for1 reasons already stated, the mind Is verily of the nature of the essence of the Self. External2 objects are not caused by the mind nor is the mind the product of the external objects That is becanse all (external) entities are mere appearances in Conscious- ness. Thus neither the (so-called) effect comes from the (so-called) cause nor the cause from the effect. In this way is reiterated the absolute non-evolu- tion of causality. In other words, the knowers of Brahman declare the absence of causality with regard to Atman 1 For, etc -The reason is that the real nature of Atman 1s free from all modifications and not of the natuie of an empirical substunce 2 External, etc -The popular belief that the thought of the pot in the potter's mind is the cause of the pot and that the external pot gives rise to the idea of the pot in the mind is entrely erroneons. For, the idea of causality has been proved to be an illusion

क्षीणे हेतुफलावेशे नास्ति हेतुफलोद्द्वः ॥ ५५॥ 55. As long as a man persists in the belref in causality he will find the worhing of cause and effect. But when attachment to causality vamshes, cause and effrct become non-exrstent. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. What happens with regard to those who cling to the belief in cause and effect 2 In reply, it is said :- As long as there is faith in causality, as long as a 12

310 MĀNDŪKYOPANISIIAD

man thinks, "I am the agent, these virtuous and vicious deeds belong to me. I shall enjoy the results of these actions, being born in course of time, as some being," in other words, as long as a man falsely attributes causality to Atman and devotes his mind to it, cause and effect must operate for him; that is to say, the man must without intermission be subject to birth and death, which are the result of his attachment to the belief in causality. But when attachment to causality, due to ignorance, is destroyed by the knowledge of non-duality as described above, -- hke the destruction of the possession of a ghost through the power of incantation, medicinal herb, etc.,-then on account of the wearing away of the illusion of causahty, do cause and effect cease to exist. Ths Karika tells us that the chief duty of the student 19 to analyse the law of causalty and find its illusory nature, The attainment of knowledge solely depends upon this undeistanding of the causal law. यावद्वेतुफलावेशः संसारस्तावदायतः । क्षीणे हेतुफलावेशे ससारं न प्रपद्यते ॥ ५६ ॥ 56 As long as there is farth in causalty, the (end- less) chain of birth and death will be there. When that faith is destroyed (by knowledge) birth and death become non-existent ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY. What is the harm if the law of cause and effect continues to operate ? In reply we say -- As long as faith in causality is not destroyed by nght knowledge,

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 311

our course (of birth and death) in this world will con- tinue. But when that faith is destroyed (by right knowledge) the world also ceases to exist for want of any other cause for its existence. संवृत्या जायते सव शाश्वतं नास्ति तेन वै। सद्भावेन ह्यजं सर्वमुच्छेदस्तेन नास्ति वै ॥ ५७ ॥ 57. All thas is seen to be born on account of the illusion of experience (due to Avidya) ; therefore nothing is permanent. All, again, as one with the Ulhmate Reahty is unborn. And therefore there is nothing like destruction SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. (Objection)-Nothing else venly exists except the unborn Atman. Then how can you speak of the origmn and destruction of the cause and the effect as well as of (the chain of birth and death constituting) the world ? (Reply)-Listen. The word Samvrit in the text signifies the (illusory) experiences of the empirical world which are caused by ignorance. All this is born of this power of ignorance which brings into existence the illusory experiences of the world. For this reason, nothing is permanent in the realm of ignorance. There- fore it is said that the world, having the characteristics of origination and destruction, is spread before us (i.e., the ignorant persons). But as one with the ultimate Reahty, all this is nothing but the unborn eItman. Therefore, in the absence of birth, there cannot be any destruction, viz., the destruction of cause or effect.

312 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

The opponent contends that if nothing but hirthless and non- dual Atman exists, then the statements regarding the origin and the destruction of the umverse as given in the previous Kanka become irrelevant and contracictory. The ieply is that there 1s no contradiction as the two statements are made from two different standpoints. From the standpoint of the ultimate Reahty there is neither birth nor death But from the relative standpomt, which conjures up before our vision the world of name and form, there are bnth and death. Imagine a rope lying on the road. The wiae man knows it as the rope alone. But the deluded person sees it as the snake and being afrard of it, takes to his heels in spito of the assurance of the wise man that it is the rope and not the snake. Now the rope and the snake are both facts from the two standpomts The wise man sees the iope and the ignorant person sees the snake Thorcfore the atatement of the gnorant man does not contrarhot the state- ment of the wise one The ideas of birth and death are possible only from the relative standpoint The wise man sees everything as the non-dual dItman. Therefore he cannot see the possibility of destruction of anything Comp Kānkā, 1 17 and 1. 18.

धर्मा य इति जायन्ते जायन्ते ते न तत्वतः । जन्म मायोपमं तेषां सा च माया न विद्यते ॥ ५८ ॥ 58. Those Jivas (entitres) or beings wre sard to be born. But that birth is never possible from the standpoint of Reality. Their birth as hke that of an illusory obgect. That illusion, agrn, is non-emstent. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY Those, again, who imagine the birth of the Jivas and other entities, do so only through Samvriti or the power of ignorance as stated in the preceding Karika The Juans are seen to be born only through ignorance But from the standpomt of the Supreme Reality no

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 313

such birth is possible. This1 (supposed) birth of the Jwas through ignorance, described above, is like the birth of objects through illusion (Maya). (Opponent)-Then there must be something real known as Maya or illnsion 2 (Reply)-It is not so. That Maya or illusion is never existent. Maya or illusion is the name we give to something which2 does not (really) evist (but which is percerved).

I This, ete -The birth of Jwas is exactly hke the production of things by a Juggler. These things such as a mango troe or the hare produoed by the Juggler do not exist Simdarly the Jivos, ete , whose lirth and death are seen by ns in ignorance, do not exist, when the Truth is known. 2 Which, etc -That i to say, Maya or illusion does not exist from the standpomt of Reahty.

यथा मायामयाद्वीजाज्ायते तन्मयोडड्कुरः । नासौ नित्यो न चोच्छेदी तद्वद्भर्मेषु योजना ॥। ५९॥।

59. The illusory sprout comes forth from the iln- sory seed. This ilusory sprout is nerther permanent nor destructible The sume applies to Jivas.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY Now is the birth of Jivas, that are seen to exist, illusory ? To this question, our reply is as follows .- From1 an illusory mango seed is born a mango sprout which is equally illusory This sprout2 is neither permanent nor destructible, simply because it does not exist In3 the like manner, idens of birth and death are apphed to the Jicas. The purport is that

314 MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

from the standpoint of the ultimate Realitv, neither birth nor death is apphcable to Jivas.

1 From, etc .- This is a familar illustration often used by the Vedantie writers In India, certain Jugglers produce from illusory seeds illusory trees full of illusory fruits. 2 This sprout, eic .- Birth and death can be predicated of objects that exist. But the mango tree produced by a Juggler is non- existent Hence neither birth nor death is possible for such a mango tree. 3 In the, etc -The Juras, endowed with birth and death, are seen on account of our ignorance. From the standpoint of Truth, such Jiras do not exist Hence birth and death are umeal fiom the standpoint of Truth. But buth and death aro true, as in the case of the illusory mango tree, from the standpomt of ignorance.

नाजेषु सर्वधर्मेषु शाश्वताशाश्वतामिधा। यत्र वर्णा न वर्तन्ते विवेकस्तत्र नोच्यते ॥६० ॥ 60. The epithets of permanence or impermanence cannot be apphied to unborn Jivas. That which is in- describable by words cannot be discriminated (as wal or unreal). SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

From the standpoit of the ultimate Reality, no epithet such as permanencel or impermanence, nor any sound corresponding to such names, can be applied to Jwas (selves or beings) which are eternal, birthless, and which are always of the nature of a homogeneous consciousness. That by which an object is designated is known as "Varna" or name associated with a sound. The words fail to denote the nature of Atman. It cannot be discrimmated as this or that, permanent or

MÀNDÛKYOPANISHAD 315

impermanent. The Saut also says, "Whence words fall back", etc. 1 Permanence, etc .- Such epithets as permanence or imperma- nence which are correlatives, are apphed to the objeots of the rela- tive world

यथा खमे द्वयाभासं चित्तं चलति मायया। तथा जाग्रदूद्वयाभासं चित्तं चलति मायया ॥ ६१ ॥ अद्वयं च द्वयाभासं चित्तं खने न संशयः । अद्यं च द्वयाभासं तथा जाग्रन् संशयः ॥६२॥ 61-62 As in dream, the mind is seen to aot through Maya manifesting the appearance of duality, so also in the waking state the mind is seen to nct, through Maya, producing the appearance of duality. There is no doubt that the mind which is, an fuct, non-dual, appears as dual in dream ; i the like manner, undoubtedly, the waking state, which is non-dual, appears as dual SANKARA'S COMMENTARY That pure consciousness which is non-dual (from the standpoint of the Supreme Realty) is sought to be descnbed by words, is due to the active condition of the mind (which is due to Aidya). This description (of the non-dual Atman by words) has no meaning from the standpomt of the Ulbmate Truth. Thesel verses have already been explained. It may be contended that if the Atman cannot be described by words, why then should the scholars have taken the pains to nse words to denote Atman, In reply it is said that what is described by words by scholars is not the non-dual Atman but a duality,

316 MANDKYOPANISHAD

peiceived on account of the activity of the mind, associated with the subject-object relationship which is the characteristic of the relative plane of existence. The Ultimate Reality is the absence of ideas or desenptiong 1 The verses, etc .- Vide Chapter III, 29-30

खमदृक् प्रचरन् खमे दिक्षु वै दशसु स्थितान्। अण्डजान् स्वेदजान्वाऽपि जीवान् पश्यति यान् सदा ॥ ६३ ॥ 63. "The whole variety of Jivas, born of eggs, morsture, etc., always seen by the dreamer when he goes about (in his dream) in all ten direchions (have no emslence apart from the mind of the dreamer) SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Here is another reason which also shows us that duahty describable by words, does not exist The beings or Jwvas, born1 of eggs or moisture, which a dreamer gomg about in all ten directions perceives in his dream conction as existing, (have, as a matter of fact, no existence apart from the mmd of the dreamer). (Objection)-Suppose we admit this. But what are vou driving at ? (Reply)-Our reply is as follows .- I Born of, etc .- The beings that are perceived to exist may be divided into four olasses, e g., those that are born of the womb, the egg, the moisture and the soil.

स्वमद्क्चित्तदृश्यास्ते न विद्यन्ते ततः पृथक्। तथा तद्दृश्यमेवेदं सवपदक्चित्तमिष्यते ॥ ६४ ॥ 64. These (beings) which are obects of the mind of the dreamer have no emrstence apart from Ins mind.

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 317

Similarly, this mind of the doramer is admitted lo be the object of perception of the dreamer only. (Thereforc the mind of the dreamer is not sepmate from the dreamer hamself ) SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Those1 beings percerved by the mind of the dreamer have no existence outside the mind of the person who dreams about them. Itª is the nund alone which imagmes itself to have assumed the forms of many diversified beings Similarly,3 that mind of the dreamer is, again, perceived by the dreamer alone. Therefore there is no separate thing called mind which is apart from the dreamer himself

1 Those, etc,-The truth about this statement is clearly under- stood mn the waking state 2 It is, etc .- In the dream, the mind alone objectifies itself into the perceiver and the perceived 3 Smilarly, etc -The mind of a man is not perceived by any other being excepting himself The perceiving ego is also created by the mind The ego and the non-ego come into existence together Therefore, the charge of solpsism cannot be levelled ngainst the Vedantist.

चरन् जागरिते जाग्रद्विक्षु वै दशसु स्थितान्। अण्डजान् स्वेदजान्वाडपि जीवान्पश्यति यान्सदा ॥ ६५॥ जाग्रच्चित्तेक्षणीयास्ते न विदन्ते ततः पृथक्। तथा तद्दृश्यमेवेदं जाग्रतश्चित्तमिष्यते ॥ ६६ ॥ 65-66. The whole vurety of Jivas, born nf eggs, moisture, etc., always seen by the waking man when he goes about (in his waking conditeon) in all ton direchions,

318 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

is only the object of the mind of the waking man. These Jivas ure in no way apart from the waking mind. Sime- larly, the mind of the waking man is admitted to be the object of perception of the waking person only. (There- fore the mind is not separate from the percerver.) ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY The Jwas, perceived in the waking state, do not exist fnywhere except in the mind of the perceiver, for, they are not seen independent of the mind. These Jiras are similar to the Jwas, perceived in the dream, which are cognized by the mind of the dreaming person alone That mind, agam, having the characteristic of perception of Jivas is non-different from the perceiver of the waking condition, because1 it is seen by the perceiver, as2 is the case with the mind which perceives the dream. The rest has already been interpreted (in the previous verses) 1 Because, elc -Mind 1s identical with the Reahty or Atman, When the Realty is characterised by the perception of the subject- object idea (through ignorance), it is called the mind. And when it remains free from any such idea, it is called Atman. From the standpoint of Reahty, the perceiver, the object and the mstrument of perception are one. The causal relation, like the external objects, is in the mind of the perceiver 2 As is the case, etc -In dream, the dream-mind which sees objects (non-different from itself) is identical with the dreamer

उभे ह्यन्योन्यदश्ये ते कि तदस्तीति नोच्यते। लक्षणाशून्यमुभयं तन्मतेनैव गृह्यते ॥ ६७ ॥ 67. Both (the mind and the Jiva) are obgects of perception to each other. Which then can be sard to

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 319

erist independent of the other 2 (The reply of the wise is in the negutive). Both are devord of the marks by which they could be distnguished. For, erther can be cognized only through the other

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY,

Both the mind and the Jirns,1 or in other words, the mind and its modifications (which are seen as external objects) are each an object of perception to the other. In other words, one is perceived only through the other The mind exists only in relation to the Jia, etc., and the Jwa and objects exist only in relation to the mind. Therefore they are each an object of perception to the other Hence2 wise men assert that nothing whatsoever, neither the mind nor its object, can be said to have any existence (if either be considered by itself) (from the standpoint of either the idealist or the realist). As in the dream the elephant as well as the mind that perceives the ele- phant, are not really existent, so also is the case with the mmd and its objects of the wakmg condition. How is it so ? For both the mind and its objects have no proof of their existence (independent of each other). They are each an object of perception to the other. One cannot cognize a Jar without the cogmtion of a Jar; nor can one have a cognition of a Jar without a Jar. In the case of the Jar and the cogmition of the Jar, it is not possible to conceive the distinction be- tween the instrument of knowledge and the object of knowledge.

320 MANDOKYOPAN SHAD

This verso refutes the contention of the school of thought which asserts that the ego creates the non-ego. 1 Jwas.They melude all objects perccived by the mind. 2 Ilence, etc -They exist, with relation to one another, only in the relative plane of consciousness The existence of the variety of objects is possible only whon one object is perceived only in relation to the other Therefore the triad of "Knower," "Known" and "Kuowledge," mutually dependent upon one another, is possible only in the realm of ignorance. यथा स्ननमयो जीवो जायते म्रियतेऽपि च। तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ॥ ६८ ॥ यथा मायामयो जीवो जायते त्रियतेऽपि च। तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ॥ ६९ ॥ यथा निर्मितको जीवो जायते म्रियतेडपि वा। तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ॥७0 ॥ 68-70. As the dream-Jiva comes into being and disappears so also all Jivas (percerved in the waling conditon) appear and disappear. As the magician's Jiva comes into being and passes away so also all Jivas (pescewved in the wking condition) appear and drsappear. As the artificial Jiva (brought into exstence by in- cantation, mericinal herb, etc ) comes into being and passes away so also all the Jivas (percerved in the waking condition) appear and disappear. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The "magician's Jiva" means that which is con- jured up before our vision by the feat of a magician.

MANDÜKYOPANISHAD 321

The "artificial Ji" is that which is brought into existence by means of mcantation, medicmal herb, etc. As the Jwvas born of egg, etc., and created in dream, are seen to come into existence and then to pass away, so also the Jucas, such as human beings, etc., seen in the wakmg state, though really non-evistent (appear to come into existence and then pass away). These1 are merely the imagination of the mind. € It may be contended that if the Jwas perceived in the waking #tate be unreal, then then birth and death, which are objeots of common experience, become an impossibility This Karila says in reply that as in the case of dream-beings, etc , really non-existent, birth and death are possible, so also the appearance of birth, etc., is possible mn the case of beings that are perceived in the waking state 1 There are, etc .- In other words, the Jwvas, perceived m the waking state, with all concomitant appearance of birth, death, etc, are mere results of the objectifying tendency of the mind, and nothing moro

न कश्चिज्जायते जीवः संभवोऽस्य न विद्यते। एतत्तदुत्तमं सत्य यत्र किंचिन्न जायते ॥ ७१॥ 71. No hand of Jiva is ever born nor is there any cause for any such histh. The Ultrmate Truth is that nothing whatsoever is born

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

It has already been stated that the appearances of birth, death, etc., of the Jivas are possible only in the empirical plane, as is the case with the dream-beings. But the Ultimate Truth is that no Jwa is ever born. The rest has already been stated.

322 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

This is the repetition of the last verse of the third chapter of the Kānkā

चित्तस्पंदितमेवेदं ग्राह्यग्राहकवद्द्वयम्। चित्तं निर्विषयं नित्यमसंगं तेन कीर्तितम् ॥ ७२॥ 72. Thes perceived world of dualrty, charaoterised by the subject-object selationship, is verily an act of the mind. The mind, again, (from the standpoint of Reality) is rithout touch with any obect (us it is of the nature of Atman). Hence u is declared to be eternal and un- attached. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The whole world of duality consisting of the subject and the object is, verily, an act of the mind. But from the standpoit of the ultimate Reality, the mind, which is verily the Atman, is1 unrelated to any object. On account of the absence of relation (with any object), the mind is declared as eternal and unattached The Śruti also says, "The Purusha is always free from relation." That which perceives objects outside of it, is related to such objects. But the mind, havmg no such external object, is free from all relations.

1 Is umrelated, etc .- The objects and their rolation with the mind are perceived only in the state of ignorance. Even when the ignorant person peroeives the mind to be associated with the subject- objeet relationship, the mind, truly speaking, is non-dual, un- attached and absolute. The mind is, in roalty, free from all ideas of the subject-objeot relationshp. The idea of the object is superimposed upon the mind through ignorance. These objects have no existence apart from tho mind. This has been already establshed by the dream- apalogy. Therefore from the standpomt of the ultimate Reahty.

MANDKYOPANISHAD 323

the mind is ever unrelated to objects, as such objects do not exist Hence mind 18 Atman or Reality.

योऽस्ति कल्पितसंवृत्या परमार्थेन नास्त्यसौ। परतन्त्राभिसंवृत्या स्यान्नास्ति परमार्थतः ॥ ७३ ॥ 73. That which exists on the strength of the illusory experiences does not, really speaking, earst. That which, agmn, is said to eaist on the strength of the mews supported by the other schools of thought, does not, really speaking, emist. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. (Objection)-It has been said that the mind is free from the relation with any objects, as such objects do not exist. But this non-attachment regarding the mind cannot be maintamed inasmuch as objects in the forms of the teacher, the scripture and the pupil exist. (Reply)-There is no such defect in our contention. (Objection)-How ? (Reply)-The1 existence of such objects as the scripture, etc., is due to the empirical experience which is illusory. The empirical knowledge in respect of scripture, teacher and taught is illusory and imagined only as a means to the realsation of the ultimate Reality. Therefore seripture, ete., which exist only on the strength of illusory empirical experiences, have no real existence. It has already been said that duality vanishes when the ultimate Reality is known. Agam, the2 objects (which appear to come into existence through the illusory experiences),

324 MANDÜKYOPANISHAD

supported by other schools of thought as existent, do not, when analysed from the standpomnt of the ultimate Reality, verily exist. Hence it has been rightly said in the previous Karika that the mind is unattached. 1 The euistence, ek -That is to say, the seripture, the teacher and the taught have meaning only in the state of ignoiande. The purposo of these ideas is to help the ignorant person to realize Truth. Compare with the Kanka 28 m the Agama Prakarana, 2 The oljects, etc -- The Vaiseshika school of thought maitains the existence of Six categoriey. But those categories are non- existent from the standpoit of the ultimato Realty. These aro percerved to exist only in the plane of our empirical experiences. अर्जः कल्पितसंवृत्या परमार्थेन नाप्यज: । परतन्त्राभिनिष्पत्या संवृत्या जायते तु सः ॥ ७४ ॥ 74. Atman is called unborn (Aja) from the stand- point of the illusory empirical eaperiences It is, truly spcaking, nol even unborn. That unborn Atman appears to be born from the standpoint of the orhef of the other schools of thought. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. (Objection)-If scriptural teaching, etc, were illusory, then the birthlessness of Atman, as taught by scripture, is also due to illusory imagnation, (Reply)-This is, indeed, true. The Atman 1s said to be unborn only mn relation to illusory em- pirical experiences which comprehend ideas of scripture, teacher and taught. FromI the standpomt of the ultimate Reality, Atman cannot be said to be even unborn. The2 Atman which isrsaid to be unborn only

MÅNDŪKYOPANISHAD 325

as against the conclusion of those schools (which mam- tain that Atman comes into existence), appears to be born to the ignorant Therefore, the notion (based upon illnsion) that Atman is unborn has no bearing on the ultimate Reahty

1 From, etc -The rdea of birthlessnegs is the correlative of the idea of hnth Hence both the idoas belong to the realm of ignor- ance. Apan, as it really is, cannot be desenbed ether as born or unborn Nothing can be piedieated of Atman from the stand- point of the ultimate Reahty. 2 The Atman, eic -The Samkhya School of thought, believing in causality, asserts the birth of Atman. As agaist tlus conclu- sion, it is mamlamed that Atman 14 unborn (dje). This asser- tion regarding the birthlessness of Atman is also due to Audya inasmuch as it amis at the refutation of the opposite theory. This theory of the .Itmen beig ever unborn is based upon the illusory idea regarding its birth It may be contended that the birthlessness of Atman w not an illusory idea but truth In reply it is said that the predicate of birthlessness cannot have any application with regaid to the ultimate Reahty Because Atman is considered to be unborn only from the standpomt of an illusion that it is born ence, being correlative of an illusion, the bnthlessness of Atman also becomes illusory The real nature of Atman cannot be determined by any instrument of knowledge which has its applicability only in the relative plane.

अभूताभिनिवेशोऽस्ति दवयं तत्र न विद्यते। द्वयाभावं स बुद्ध्वैव निर्निमित्तो न जायते ॥ ७५॥

75 Man has mere persistent belief in the reality of the unreal (which is duality). There is no duality (corresponding to such belief) One who has realsed the absence of duality is never born agarn as there remarns, no longer, any cause (for such birth).

326 MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. As objects are, really speaking, non-existent, there- fore people who believe in their existence have, in fact, attachment for duality which is unreal It is a mere belief mn the (existence of) objects which (really speaking) do not exist. There is no dualty. The cause of birth is this attachment. Therefore one who has realised the unreality of duality is never born again as he is free from the cause (of birth), viz., attachment to the illusory duality.

यदा न लभते हेतू नुत्तमाधममध्यमान्। तदा न जायते चित्तं हेत्वभावे फलं कुतः ॥ ७६॥ 76. When the mind does not find any cause, superior, anferror or middling, it becomes free from burth. How can there be an effect urthout a cause ? ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The superior cause consists of those Dharmas (i.e., duties of life), wholly virtuous, which are prescribed according to different castes and stages of hfc, and which when performed without any attachment to the result, enable one to attain to the position of gods, etc. The middling cause consists of those duties, mixed with certam irreligious practices, the observance of which enables one to attain to the position of man, etc The inferior cause consists of those particular tendencies, characterised by mreligious practices alone, which lead one to the position of lower creatures, such as beasts, birds, etc. When the mmd, realising the

MANDŪKVOPANISHAD 327

essence of Self which is one and without a second and which is free from all (illusory) imaginations, does not find the existence of any of the causes, superior, mferior or middlng, all imagined through ignorance,- like a man of discrimination not seeing any dirt which & child sees in the sky-then it does not undergo any birth, t.e., it does not objectify itself as god, man or beast, which are the effects of their respective causes (enumerated above). No effect can be pfoduced in the absence of a cause, as sprouts cannot come forth in the absence of the seed

All, etc -All beings, from the angel to the beast and the bird, belong to the realm of ignorance

अनिमित्तस्य चित्तस्य याऽनुत्पत्ति: समाऽदया। अजातस्यैव सर्वस्य चित्तदृश्यं हि तद्यतः ॥ ७७॥

77. The non-evolution (1.e., the state of knowledge) of the mind, which is unborn and free fiom causal rela- ton, is ubsolute and constant Everything else is also equully unborn. (So what is true of the mind is true of everything elsc as well.) For, all duulity is merely an obectification of the mind.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. It has already been stated that in the absence of a cause, the mind is not subject to birth. But what is the nature of that non-evolution of the mind ? It is thus replied .- The canses of birth are meritorious actions and their opposite. The state of absolute non-manifestation of the mind,-known as liberation

328 MÅNDŪKYOPANISHAD

(knowledge) and free from causalityl on account of the realsation of the Supreme-is2 always constant under all conditions and absolute, that is, ever non- dual. Even3 before the attamment of knowledge, the mmd always remains non-manifest and non-dual. Even prior to the realisation of the highest knowledge, the idea of duahty (% e, the subject and the object) and the idea of birth are merely an objectification of the mmnd Hence the non-evolution of the mind which is always4 free from change or birth is constant and absolute. In othcr words, it cannot be said that this non-evolution or liberation sometimes exists and some- times disappears. It is always the same and changeless.

It may be contended from the previous Kanka that hberation deperds upon the external factor of time This contention 18 answered in this verse 1 Which, etc .- The causes of birth, in the form of meritorious and vicious deeds, are seen to exist only durmg the state of ignorance. 2 Is always, etc -All duality, due to the objectification of the mind, is unreal. There is no cause for the mind which is absolute, eternal, immutable and all-sufficient, to pass mto birth There- fore from the standpoit of Reahty, the mind or Jwva is always liberated. He is ever free from bondage which is non-existent. 3 Eren before, ctc -It may be objected that liberation is possible only during the state of knowledge, while the Jiva is bound during the state of ignorance. In ieply it is said that from the standpoint of Reahty ignorance does not exist Even when a man looks upon himself as subject to birth and death and lving in the plane of ignorance, he is, really speaking, Atman free and non-dual Even when the rope is seen to be the snake by the ignorant mmnd, it is nothing but the rope. Smnularly the Atman never deviates from his real nature though he appears as Jwva during ignorance. The idea of birth, death, ete., is mere unreal imagmation,

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 329

4 Always-That is to say, the mind is really free from birth, ete., even when the ignorant persons see it coming into existence and agam disappearing बुद्ध्वाऽनिमित्ततां सत्यां हेतुं पृथगनाप्तुवन्। वीतशोकं तथा काममभयं पदमश्नुते ॥ ७८॥ 78. Hamng (thus) realsrd the ubsence of causality as the ultimale Truth, and also not finding any other cause (for barth), one altains to that (the state of lberation) which is free from grief, desire and fear ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY Through1 the reasoning indicated ahove, one knows the absence of duality, which is the cause of birth, and thus realises absolute non-causation as the ultimate Truth, Fuither, he2 does not see the reality of any- thing else as cause, such as religious merit, ete., which may enable one to attain to the position of gods, etc. Thus freeing himself from all desires, he attams to the highest state, ve , hberation (knowledge) which is free from desire, grief, ignorance and fear. That is to say, he no longer becomes subject to birth and death. 1 Though, etc,-All dual objects are illusory like dream objects on account of their being perceived. See Karika 4, Chapter II. 2 IIe, elc .- The meutonous or vicious deeds, as well as gods, men or birds and beasts whch are the results of those actions, belong to the realm of ignorance, अभूताभिनिवेशाद्वि सदृशे तत्प्रवर्तते। वस्त्वभावं स बुद्ध्वैव निःसंग विनिवर्तते ॥ ७९॥ 79. On account of aitachment to the unreal objects, the mind runs after such objects. But it comes buck (to is

330 MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

own pure state) when i becomes unatlached (lo obgects) realising therr unreality SANKARA'S COMMENTARY Attachment to the unreal objects is due to the firm belief that dualty exists, though in reality such duality is ever non-existent. On1 account of such attachment which is of the nature of delusion caused by ignorauce, the mind runs after objects corresponding to those desires. But when a man knows the unrealty2 of all duality of objects,1 then he becomes indifferent to them and turns away his mind from the unreal (objects) to which he feels attached. 1 On account, etc .- It is desire, due to ignorance, that creates objects around us. 2 Unreality, etc -The only way to become detached from the world is to know its unreal nature by following the Vedantio method of reasoning. The Yogie method of mechanical concentra- tion may make the mind oblivious of the world for the time being, but when that concentration is relaxed, the world with its objects again appears as before Vedantic Knowledge alone convinces one of the illusory nature of the world.

निवृत्तस्याप्रवृत्तस्य निश्चला हि तदा स्थितिः । विषयः स हि बुद्धानां तत्साम्यमजमद्यं ॥ ८0 ॥ 80. The mind, thus freed from attachment (to all external objects) and undistracted (by fresh olyects) attarns to its stale of Immutability Being actually realised by the wise, it is undifferentiated, birthless and non-dual. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. When the mind is withdrawn from all dualty of objects, and when it does not attach itself to any other

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 331

objects,-as no such objects exist-then the mind attains to the state of immutability which1 is of the same nature as Brahman This2 realisation of the mind as Brahman is characterised by the mass of unique non-dual consciousness As that condition of the mind is3 known (only) by the wise who have known the ultimate Reabty, therefore that state is supreme and undifferentiated, birthless and non-dual.

1 Which is, elc-The mind free fiom ielativity and objectif- cation is the Brahman, 2 This, etc .- The mind free from the subject-object relation- ship has the same characteristic as Brahman, 3 Is known, etc -This state of the mind, which is the highest Realty, can be known with the help of reasoning Seripture, which also belongs to the realm of relativity, cannot deseribe Brahman or the Supreme Reality

अजमनिद्रमखमं प्रभाते भवति स्वयं। सकृद्विभातो ह्येवैष धर्मो धातुखभावतः॥ ८१॥ 81. (Reality uhich is) free from brth, and (which is) free from sleep and dream, reveals itself by rtself. For, this Dharma (1.e., Atman) is from its very nature ever- luminous SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

The nature of that which is realisable by the wise is again described -It (Atman) reveals itself by itself. It does not depend for its revelation upon any exter- nal' light, such as the sun, etc. Self-lummosityª 1s its very nature. It is ever-luminous. This is the inherent characteristic &f the Dharma, known as Atman.

332 MANDUKYOPANISHAD

1 Eute nal, etc -The Atman itself is the substratum of every- thing Therefore it cannot be dependent upon anything else. 2 Self-luminosty-The Atman is called self-luminous as, in the state of deep sleep, the ical natmre of Atman is revealed though all external instiuments such as the sense-organs, the mind, etc . then remain inactive. The text characterises Atman as free from dieam and sleep. Dicam idicates the wrong appohension of truth while sleep stands for its non-apprehension The waking state is omitted as because erther it is included in the dream state or it stands for the state of knowledgo.

सुखमात्रियते नित्यं दुःख विव्रियते सदा। यस्य कस्य च धर्मस्य ग्रहेण भगवानसौ ॥ ८२ ॥

82. On account of the mund apprehending single objects, the Bliss (1.e., the real essence of the self) always remains concealed and misery comes to the surface. Therefore the ever-effulgent Lord (is not realised though taught again and agam by scnplures and teachers) SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

How is it that the people, at large, do not realise Atman, which is the Supreme Reality, though It 1s agam and agamn thus explamed ? To this the follow- ing reply is given -- On1 account of the mind appre- hending through attachment, single objects of the world of duality, the blissful nature of Atman is easily covered. The reason for this concealment is only the perreption cf duality. There is no other cause for it. Moreover, misery" is brought to the surface. The knowledge of the Supreme Realty is extremely hard to attain. The Lord, the non-dual Alman, the effulgent

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 333

Being, though agam and agam taught by the Vedanta sciptures and the teachers, is not therefore compre- hended The Srul also says, "One who speaks of Atman is looked upon with wonder and he who has obtained and who has realised it, is equally an object of wonder."'

1 On account of, e'c -That i4 to say, people on account of their false piejudices aysociate dtman with various illusery ideas. Atman is free from all uleas (Kalpann) See next Kanka, 2 Misery-In reahty there is no misery. Bliss alone, which is the characteustic of Atman, exists But nusery is experienced when the Bhssful Atman is not known 71

अस्ति नास्त्यस्ति नास्तीति नास्ति नास्तीति वा पुनः। चलस्थिरोभयाभावैरावृणोत्येव बालिशः ॥ ८३ ॥ 83. Cnldish persons verily cover It (fat to know 1t) by predicating of It such attributes as existence, non- existcnce, existence and non-emstence and absolutt. non-eristence, derwed respectively from therr notion of change, immovability, combination of both and absolute negation. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY Attachment of the learned to such predirates1 as existence, non-existence, etc., serves verily as a veil between them and the Supreme Realty What wonder is there that childish persons on account of their undeveloped mtellect are unable to grasp Atman! This Karka brings out the aforcsaid idea. Some2 disputant asserts that Atman exists. Another3 dispu- tant, uz, the Buddhist, says that it is non-existent.

334 MANDUKYOPANISHAD

A third4 disputant, the Jaina, who is a pseudo-nihilist, believing in both the existence and non-existence of Self, proclaims that Atman both exists and does not exist. Thes absolute nihilist says that nothing exists. at all. Hee who predicates existence of Atman associates it with changeabilty in order to make it distinct fiom such impermanent objects as a jar, eic. The? theory that Arman is non-existent, i.e, mactive, is held on account of its undifferentiated nature Tt8 is called both existent and non-existent on account of its being subject to both changeability and immuta- bility Non-existence is predicated of Atman on account of everything ending mn absolute negation or void. All the four classes of disputants, mentioned above, asserting existence, non-existence, existence and non-existence, and total non-existence (about Atman), derived respectively from their notion of change- abihty, immutabilty, combmation of both and total negation, reduce themselves to the position of the childish, devoid of all discrimination; and by associa- ting Atman with all these illusory ideas (Kalpana) cover Itsº real nature. If these (so-called) learned men act as veritable children on account of their ignorance of ultimate Reality, what is to be said regardmg those who are, by nature, unenhghtened !

1 Predicates, etc -There precicates of Atman are due to the illusory ideas (Kulpana) regarding its real nature 2 Some disputant-This refers to the follower of the Varseshila theory He asserts there is an Atman which is separate from the body, sense-organ, Prana, etc. It is tho knower and enjoyer of misery and happiness.

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 335

3 Another, etc -This iefers to the followers of subjective ideahsm among the Buddhists known as Kshaniha Vignanavarins According to them, the Atman, though separate from body, etc , is identieal with Burdht or mtellect It is not permanent. Our consciousness which disappears after only a moment's existence is the only reahty Any reahty, in the sense of a permanent enuity, 19 non-existent 4 The thud, etc -This refers to the followers of the Jama school of thought. According to tls sehool, Atman 1s both existent and non-existent, Though Atman is separate from the body, yet it has the same size as the body. It exists as long as the body exisrs and it is destroyed with the destruction of the body The Absolute, etc .- This refers to the extreme school of Buddhism known as the Nilnhstie school. According to the tollower of this theory, theie is no permanent Reality like Atman. All things end in destruction Therefore absolute negation is the highest truth The word "non-existence" has been repeated in the verse in order to show the determined beliof of the milnhst m his own opimion. He uho, ete .- According to the Vaiseshika theory the nature of Atman is changenble as it, at different times, becomes subject to happiness, misery, desire, knowledge, eto The Atman is designated as existent in order to distinguish it from all objects of an mpermanent nature, such as a pot, eto 7 The theory, etc -The subjective idealist asserts that Atman has a momentary existence, and as having existed only for a moment, it cannot be subjeet to any change or modification 8 It is, etc -The Jarna school predicates both existence and non-existence of Atman as it partakes of the nature of both " Its veal nature-The real nature of Atman is that it is frec from all ideas or Kalpana. People clinging to their jet theories, on account of ther false attachment, cannot know the reul nature of Atman कोट्यश्चतस्र एतास्तु ग्रहैर्यासां सदाऽडवृतः । भगवानाभिरस्पृष्टो येन दष्टः स सर्वदक् ॥ ८४॥ 84. These are the four alternatie theories regarding (the nature of) Atman, on account of attachment to which

336 NANDŪKYOPANISHAD

It always remains covered (from one's virw). He uho has known that Atman is ever-untouched by any of these (predicates) indeed sees all.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

What is the nature of the essence, t.e., the ultimate Reality, by knowing which people are purged of their stupidity and are really made to attain to wisdom ? It is thus rephed. There are four alternate theories regarrng Atman such as, It exists, It does not exist, etc, mentioned m the works of those who are fond of disputations The Atman always remains covered and Idden from these vain talkers on account of therr attachment to their theories The thoughtfnl person who has reahsed the Atman, known only by the (correct understandmg of) Upanishads, as ever-untouched by any of the four alternative predicates such as It exists, It does not exist, etc, is the seerl of all, the omniscient and the real knower of the ultimate Reality.

1 Seer of all-All that oxists is Atman Therefore one who knows Atman knows all There remams nothing else for hu to be known

प्राप्य सर्वजतां कृत्स्ां ब्राह्मण्यं पदमद्वयम्।

अनापन्नादिमध्यान्तं किमतः परमीहते ॥ ८५॥

85 What else remains for him lo be desired when he has attained to the stute of the Brahmana-a state of complete omniscience, non-duality and a state which is without beginning, end or maidle ?

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 337

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Thel state of the Brahmana signifies the state in which one is established mn Brahman The Sruti says, "This is the cternal2 glory of the Brahmana." That state of Biahmana is free from beginning, end or middle. That is to say, that state of non-dualty is free from the (illusory ideas of) creation, preservation and destruction Having obtamed the whole3 ef omn- science, described4 above, i e , the state of Brahmana, a non-dual state without beginning, end or middle, which is the same as the realisation of Self, the summum bonum of existence-what else remans for lam to be desired ? In other words, all other strivings become useless tor him It is thus said in Gua, ' He has nothing to gamn by the artivities (of the relative world) " The contention of the opponent that even a Knower of Brahman should observe the ritualistic duties of daily life is refuted by this Kārılā. 1 The state, etc -He alone is the real Binhmana who has directly reahsed himself as Brahman. 2 Eter nal glory-That is to say, this state is free from all modifi- eations and changes, such as birth, death, etc 3 Whole, ete-Having realsed that state one becomes totally ommscient. There is nothing else for him to know It i9 because that state is the very essence of knowledge iself 4 Described abore-That is to say, the Brahman ts froe from the four alternative attributes or predicates refeired to in Kanla 83. विप्राणां विनयो ह्वेप शमः प्राकृत उच्यते। दमः प्रकृतिदान्तत्वादेवं विद्वाञ्शमें व्रजेत् ॥ ८६ ॥ 86. This (ie, the walisaton of Brahman) is the humality natural to the Brahmanas. Their banquillity

338 MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

(of mind) is also declared to be spontaneous (by men of discrimination). They are sud to have attarned to the state of sense-control (nol through any artificial method) as it comes quite natural to them He who thus realises Brahman which is all-peace, himself becomes peaceful and tranquil.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The humilty of the Brahmanas which is due to their reahsation of their identity with the Self, 1s quite natural This is (the real significance of) his humility. The tranquillity (of the mind which the Knowers of Brahman enjoy) is also natural and not induced by any artificial1 means Brahman is all- peace and tranquillity. Hence the Brahmanas are said to have controlled their sense-organs (from pursu- ing the external objects). This is also the cause of the tranquillity of their nature. Having realised Brahman which is, by nature, all-peace the wise man attams to peace which is the characteristic of Brahman. That is to say, he becomes identical with Brahman

It has been stated in the previous Karka that the Knower of Brahman need no lenger perform the daily ritualistic duties which are oblgatory for ignorant persons. This Kārka states that he also need not undeigo any Yogic or other practices mn order to acquire humility, control of the senses and tranquillity of the mind. One who is established m Brahman, non-dual and all-peace, naturally and spontaneously acquires these virtues. The wise man realises that Brahman alone exists. Therefore his mind does not run after external objects, simply because thoy are non-existent for hım. Realising Biahman everywhere, he does not show arrogance. Peace and tranquillty are quite fatural for him. Yoga pre- soribes varous artificial disciphnes for acquiring these virtues.

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 339

But he who clings to the Yogic practices, must be always on the alert lest ins mind should be diverted to external objects. The Vedantic method, depending upon discrimination, reveals every- thing as Brahman. Therefore for a Jnan, these virtues are quite spontaneous 1 Antficial, etc .- That is to say, the Yogic method.

सवस्तु सोपलम्भं च द्वयं लौकिकमिष्यते। अवस्तु सोपलम्भं च शुद्धं लौकिकमिष्यते ॥।०८७॥ 87. (Vedanta) recognises the ordinary (empirical) state of waking in which duahty, consisting of objects and ideas of comang in contact with them, is known. It further rrcognises another more subtle state (1e., the dream common to all) in which is experienced duclity, consisting of the idea of coming in contact wih the objects, though such objects do not exist

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

We have, so far, come to the following conclusions. The theories of mere disputants contradicting one another, are the causes of our existence in the relative (Samsans) world Further these theories are charactersed by partiality and aversion. Therefore these are merely false, as already shown by reasoning. On the other hand the philosophy of Advaita alone gives us true knowledge, as,-being free from the four alternative predicates referred to above,-it is un- touched by partiality and aversion and is all-peace by its very nature Now the following topic is introduced as an explana- tion of the Vedantic method of arriving at Truth The

340 MANDUKYOPANISHAD

word "Savastu" mn the text implies objects that are perceived in our empincal experiences. Similarly, the word "Sopalambha" in the text imphes the idea of one's coming m contaet with such objects This constitutes the world of duality, common to all human bemngs, and known as the waking state which is characterised by the subject-object relationship and which alone is the sphore of all our dealings including1 the scriptural, ete The waking2 state, thus characterised, is admitted in the Vedanta scriptures. There is another state which lacks the experiences (of the waking state) caused by external sense-organs But3 there exists m that state the idea of coming in contact with objects, though such objects are absent. This is admitted (in the Vedantas) as the dream state, whch is agam common to all, and different from and subtler than the gross state of waking The naturc of ultimate Reality has been hmted at by the refutation of ti theories hostile to the Advaita Philosophy Now is given the Adianta method of arriving at Truth which consists in the analysis and co-ordine ion of the experiences of the three states, mz, waking, dieam anu doep sleep 1 Including, etc -The soriptures, limuted to the sphere of duality, have no applcation to Atman 2 The waking, etc .- Vedanta admits the waking state as real so long as ignorance lasts, and further pomts that the analysis of the' axperiences of this state together with those of the two oth states leads us, indirectly, to the realisation of Atman. a Bit, elc-Though the objeets cxperienced in dream exist so long as the dream lasts, they are found to be non-exising from the waking standpomt The internality and the externality of noreeptions in the dream and the waking states are mere creations ie mind.

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 341

When we look at the objeets trom the waking standpomt alone we think them to be real When the same objects seen in tho dream are judged from the waking standpoint we know them to be mere ideas of the mind And analysis of deep sleep, m co- ordination with the experiences of the dream and the waking states, convinces us that everything is mund or Brahman This is the Vedantc method The tollowing verse gives a fuller explanation

अवस्त्वनुपलम्भं च लोकोत्तरमिति स्मृतम् । ज्ञानं ज्ेयं च विज्ञेयं सदा बुद्धैः प्रकीर्तितम् ॥ ८८। 88 There rs another state (admilled by the wise) which is free from contaet unth (external) objects and altogether free from the rdea of coming in contact with objects Ths state is beyond all empirical experences. The wise always describe the three, viz, Knowledge Knowledge of obgects and the Knowable as the Supreme Reality (which is ultimately knowable).

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The state in which one perceives any object1 nor peiceives the idea2 of erming in contact with such object-a state free from the relationship of subject and object-is called the highest state, which is beyond all empincal experiences. All empirical experiences consist of the subject-object relationship. This state is free from all such rel ion- ship and is the seed of futurc experiences. Thi is known as the state of deep sleep. That alone is Gled knowledge which is the reahsation of essener, t.e., the Supreme Reality, as well as the means to do so, eiz., the analysis of the states of gross experience, 13

342 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

subtle experience and the condition beyond all ex- periences. The4 three states, mentioned above, are the objects of knowledge; for, there cannot be anything knowable besides these three states. All entities falsely imagined by the diffcrent schools of the disputants are mcluded mn these three states That which is to be ultimately known is the truth regarding the Supreme Reality, known as Turya, i c., the know- ledge of Sell, non-dual and unborn. The illumined ones, ie, those who have seen the Supreme Reality have descubed these features (topics) ranging from the objecty of gross experience to the Supremely Knowable Self.

1 Obect, ete -- That is to say, the waking state. 2 The qden, elc -i e , the dieam state in whieh one, in the absence of external objects, seems to perceive such objects 3 This 29, et -In deep sleep one does not peicerve any object, gross or subtle. There is no experience in deep sleep which when judged from the causal standpoint, consists of mental modifica- tion,-as m the dieam,-due to the perception of external objects in the waking state Deep sleep is further chaiacterned by the total absence of the subject-objeet relationship In deep sleep one realises one's real self It has been characterised as contaiing the seeds of the two other states, only from the cansal standpomt. Again it is from the ielative standpomt that Twriya, the witness of the three states, is mentioned as the state of the Ultimate Knowledge. ' The three, ele .- All expeniences are limited to the three states Therefore the Truth discovered by the study of the three states is the Supreme Reality.

Therefore the Vedantic method of arriving at Realty is the co ordinated study of the three states Alf experiences are confined to the limits of the three states

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 343

ज्ञाने च त्रिविधे ज्ेये क्रमेण विदिते खयम्। सर्वज्ञता हि सर्वत्र भवतीह महाधिय: ॥ ८९॥ 89. Knowledge and the threefold knowable being Tenown, one after another, the knower possessed of the highest intellect spontaneously attavns to the state of knowledge enerywhere and in all things in this very life.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. The woid Jnanam signifies knowledge by which one grasps the significance of the three states The woid "Jneya" ot knowable, signifies the three states which should be known The first (knowable) consists of the gross statel of empirical experience. Then comes the state ot subtle2 experience mn which the first state loses itself, te., merges. And last comes deep sleep which is beyond all empirical experiences (gross or subtle) which resulty m the absence of the two previous states, t.e mn which the, two previons states merge. By the knowledge of these three, one after3 the other, and consequentlv, by the negation of the three states the Tunyn,d non-dual, birthless and fearless, which alone is the Supreme Reality, is realsed. Thus the knower (possessed of the highest power of discrimmation) attams in this very lfe the state of omniscience6 which is identical with the knowledge of Self He is called Mahadhth? or the man of the highest intellect as he has understood that which transcends all human experiences. His omniscience is constant and remains undimmished. For, the know- ledge of Selt once realised remains as such for ever.

344 MĀNDŪKYOPANISIAD

This is8 because the knowledge of the knower of the Supreme Reality does not appear and disappear like that of mere vain disputants.

The seuptural statements that the Atman being known, every- thing else is known, is explaıned in this Kārikā 1 Goss afate, ete .- That is, the waking state 2 Nubtle, etc .- Thnt is, the dream state 3 One after, elc -That is to say, by knowing that the waking state merges in the dream, and both these states meige in deep sleep, 4 Tho wya-Tmiya is conceived as the transcendental state from the relative standpomt. 5 In thas, etc -One need not wait for death or the other world for the realsation of the ultimate Truth. B Omnis mence-It is Atman alone which appears as the thiee states. Therefore when Abnan is reahsed, all objects mcluded in the thice states are known 7 Mahadhih-The knower ot Truth is designated as the possessor of the lughest mtellect for, the kecnest intellect alone can know Atman $ This 1s, etc -The appearance and disappearance of knowledge, often noticed m our empirical experience, due to the ignoinee of the real nature of the Self As the Jnant is free from ignorance, hiy knowledge is also constant This Kanla further elaborates the Advaita method of realising Self, To the man of the giossest intellect the object appears to be extraordinary. To the man of better discrimination, the objeet appears to be a mere idea or modification of the mmd The Jnani soes only the mind, undifferentiated, changeless and non- dual in whatever mannei the objeets appeal That which appears as ideas, associated with the relationship of subject and object, is known to the Jrant as mere non-dual mind or Atman This is better explamed mn the hight of the three states The gross external objeets percerved in the waking state are known to be ideas-as in dream. And the ideas of dream are known to be pure mind, non-dual and unchanging, as in deep slcop ideas dis- appear in the mind, This is the meaning of the merging of the

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 345

previous state of waking in the subsequent state of dieam and the ultimate merging of both states in deep sleep, which ineludes all the statey Ths method has been explained m the second Mantra of the Upanwshad with rofetence to AUMI "A" which stands for the waking experiences i9 merged in "U" wluch sigmfies dream state, "A" and "T"' are merged into "A" which indicates deep sleep All the three states merge in Turiya which Is Auman, Piom the absolute standpomt the undifferentiated mmd, free from the subject-objeet relationslnp, is the highest Reahty One who knows these becomes omnicient, He sees cverywhete the non-dual Atman alone That which appears to others os name, form, object or idea, is ieahsed by a Jnam to be Self alone. Atman alone exists.

हेयज्ञेयाप्यपाक्यानि विज्ञेयान्यग्रयाणतः । तेपामन्यत्र विज्ञेयादुपलम्भस्त्रिषु स्मृतः ॥ ९०। 90. The four things to be known first are :- the things to be avorded, the objects to be realsed, the things to be attained (by practice) and the thoughts to be rendered ancffective. Among these fom, the three things, excepting whal is to he reahsed, viz., the Supreme Reality, exrst only as imaginations. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

There may arise a doubt that the three states of empirical experience may constitute the ultimate Reality on account of their being pointed out1 as things to be gradually known. In order to remove this doubt it is said, the " Heyas" or things to be avoided are the three states of empirical experience, viz., the waking, the dream and the deep slcep. These do not exist in Atman just as the snake is not present in the rope. Therefore they should be avoided. The word Jneya,

346 MANDŬKYOPANISHAD

2.c., the thing to be known, in this text refers to the knowledge of the ultimate Realitv, free from the four2 alternative theories described before. The things to be acquired are the accessories of spitual realsation, uz., wisdom,a childliked mnocence and silence 5 These virtues are practised by the sages after they have renounced the threelolds desires The word "Pak yam" in the text mignifies the latent7 impressions which in due course attam maturity, viz, such hlemishes as attachment, aver ion. delusion, etc. These are known as Kashaya or the passions that hide the real nature of the soul. As a means to their reabsation of the Supreme Reality, sages should first of all be acquain- ted with these four things, ms., the thing to be avoided, the thing to be reahsed, the thing to be acquired and the thing to be rendered ineffective. These, however, with the exception of the thing to be known-that is to say, with the exception of the non-dual Brahman alone, the essence of the ultimate Reahty, that should be renlsed-are perceived9 on account of our imagmation This is the conclusion of the Knowers of Brahman with regard to the three things, uiz, those to be avoided, acquired, and those that are (awaiting maturity and therefore) to be made meffective. In other words, these three do not exist from the standpomt of the ultimate Reality. 1 Pointed out, etc-Compare Kūmkae 88 and 89 (Chapter 4). 2 Four, ete-Compare Kanka 83 (Chapter 4). 3 Wisdom-This wisdom congists of the itellecinal eapacity to know that the non-dual Brahmar alone is the objective of the Vedanta seuptures

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 347

4 Childlike, etc.That is to say, freedom from egoisn, vanity, etc 5 Silence-It means that intense concentiation on Bahman which makes one avoid all vain talk G T'reefold, etc -That Is, the desires for children, for wealth and tor heavenly felieity 7 Latent, ete -- An ignotant, man cheushes many vices, such as attachment, hatred, delusion, ete These aie known in Vedanta As Kashays Among those vices, the effeet of past work and thought, some are bearing frits which are seen mn our daily aeti- vities But others aie mere tendenciey and latent improssions waiting for favoutable conditions to manifest themselves, These latent impressions are known as "Pakys" Theso should be des- troyed by disorimmation S is a means, ete -The seeker after Truth should know the nature of the three things to be avoided, ete , because it helps hm in his spantual progiess 9 .Ire percened-Fiom the standpuit of the ultimate Realty, Biahman alone exists Dualty is perceived on account of illusion Therefore these three things are peiceived to exist only in the plane of ignotance. And this is due to ignorance On the acqura- tion ot knowledge one understands that there is nothing to be avoided or shunned as Brahman alone exists everywhere.

प्रकृत्याSSकाशवज्ज्ेयाः सर्वे धर्मा अनादयः ।

विद्यत न हि नानालं तेषां कचन किंचन ॥ ९१ ॥

91. All Dharmas (entities) are, by then very nature, beginningless und unattached hke the Akasa. There s not the slightest variety in them, in any way, at any tumne SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

Those who seek liberation should regaid, from the standpomt of the ultimate Reality, all Jrvas, as by their very nature without beginning, i.e., eternal,

348 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

and, like Akasa, subtle, free from all blemish and all- pervading. The plural number used with regard to the 'Jivas' may suggest multiplicity The sccond line of the Kamka is meant to remove' any such appre- hension. There is no multiplicity in the Jwas even2 in the slightest degree and under any condition. 1 To vemore, etc -The plural number is used in consideiation of the multiplicity of Jwas seen from the empmcal standpoint. Even though an ignorant person sees multiplicity of embodied beingy, yet, in realty, there exists nothing but the non-dual .Itman. 2 Eren, elc .- It is because the appaient multiphony is due io the obsey ion of the imagmaty time and space as well as causal relation. As Atman is ever free from time, space, and causal rola- tion, theiefore no idea of multiphoity can ever he apphed to Atman. आदिबुद्धाः प्रकृत्यैव सर्वे धर्माः सुनिश्चिताः । यस्यैवं भवति क्षांतिः सोऽमृतत्वाय कल्पते ॥ ९२ ॥ 92 All Jivas are, by therr very nature, illumaned from the very beginning: and they are ever unmutable an their nature. He who, having known this, sests anthout (sees the needlessness of) seeking further knowledge, s alone capable of realising the highest Truth. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Even the knowableness attributed to the Jwvas is also due to the illusion of empirical experiences. It cannot he applied from the standpoint of the supreme Reality. This idea is explamed in this text. The Jiras are illumined, by their very nature, from the very beginning That is to say, all the Jivas, like the sun which is of the very nature of eternal light, are ever illumined. No effoft need be made to define

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 349

their nature, as the nature of the Jira is, from the very beginning, well determined.1 It cannot be sub- ject to any such doubt as, "The Jwva may be hke this or hke that". The seeker of liberation who, in the manner above described, does not stand m need of anything else to make this knowledge certam to him- self or others,-just as the sun, by nature evor illu- mined, is never in need of any light from itself or others-who thus always rests2 without forming ideas of dualty regarding any further knowledge of his own self, becomes capable of realising the ultimate Reality. 1 Well deter mined-That is to say, all Juas are, ky then very nature, evet free, puie and illummed t 2 Rests, etc -That i to say, no duty nor any moral imperative can be apphed to the non-dual Atman. आदिशान्ता ह्यनुत्पननाः प्रकृत्यैव सुनिर्वृताः । सर्वे धर्माः समाभिन्ना अजं साम्यं विशारदम् ॥ ९३॥ 93. All Dharmas or Jivas are from the very begin- ning and by therr very nature, all-peace, unborn and completely fiee. They are characterised by sameness and are non-separate from one another. Therefore the Jivas ove the Atman unborn, always established in "sameness" and "punty" atself. ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY, Similaily, there is no room for any effort to make the Atman peaceful, for, all Jiras are, by their very nature, eternally peacefnl, unborn and of the nature of eternal freedom. All Juns are further, of the same nature and non-separate from one another. They being .

350 MANDŪKIOPANISHAD

the Atinun in their very essence, ever pure, unborn and established mn sameness, therefore the effort of attaming to lberation is meaningless For, if some- thing is accomphsbed with regard to an entity which is always of the same nature, it does not make any change in the thing itself The previous Kanka stated the condition which alone makes onc capable of attaining to hberation Bui, this liberation is not some- thing external or foreign to be aohieved or acquned The Self 1s, by its very nature, ever tree and illummed It has never ben covered with a veil Therefore one who understands the rodl import ot adradu Vedanta, realises himself as ever pure, free and illumined and ceases trom making eflorts at gaming further knowledge वैशारदं तु वै नास्ति भेदे विचरतां सदा। भेदनिम्नाः पृथग्वादास्तस्मात्ते कृपणाः स्मृताः ॥९४॥ 94. Those who always rely on (altach them selves to) separateness can never realise the innite purily of the Self. Therefore those who are drowned in the idea of separation and who assert the separateness of the Jivas are called narrow-minded ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY. Those who have realised the truth regarding the ultimate Reahty as descmbed above, are alone free from narrowness. Others are verily narrow-minded. This is thus described in this verse. "Drowned in the idea ot separation" means those who stick to the idea of separation, that is to say, those who confine them- selves to the multiplicity of phenomenal experiences. Who are they ? They are those who assert that the multiphcity of objects exists, i.c, the dualists They

MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD 351

are called "narrow-muinded" as they never realise the natural purty of Atman on account of their ever dwell- ing in the thought of multiplcity, ie, on account of their taking for real the duality of experiences imagined thiough ignorance Therefore it has been truly said that these peoplo are narrow-minded.

C'ompare " Whoever, O Gaigt, without knowing that Akshara (the Imperishable), offers oblations in ths world, sacrifices, and perfoims penance tor a thonsand years, his work will have an end. Whosoever, O Gaigi, without knowing tlus Alshara, departs this world, he is nanow-minded. But he, O Gargi, who departs this world, knowing this Alshara, is a Brahmana." (Br. Up., 3. 8 10.)

अजे साम्ये तु ये केचिद्धविष्यन्ति सुनिश्चिताः । ते हि लोके महाज्ञानास्तच्व लोको न गाहते ॥९५॥

95, They alone are said to be of the highest wisdom (intellect) who are fion in their corvichon of the Self. unborn and ever the same This, ordinary men cannot understand. SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

That this knowledge of the Supreme Realty is icapable ot being understood by the narrow-minded, by the unwise,1 ae, hy persons of small mtellect who are2 outside the knowledge of Vedanta,-is thus explained in this verse. Those few, even though3 they may be women or otbers, who are firm in their conviction of the nature of the ultimate Realtv, un- . born and undivided, are alone possessors of the highest wisdom. They alone know the essence of Reality. Others,4 a.c., persons of ordinary mtellect,

352 MANDŪKYOPANISHAD

cannot understand their ways, that is to cay, the Supreme Roality reabsed by the wise. It is said mn the Smitt -"Even the godss feel puzaled while trying to follow m the footsteps of those who leave no track behind, of those who realise themselves m all beings and who ave always devoted to the welfare of all. They leaves no track behind like the hirds flving through the sky."

I The umwwe-That is, men devord of diserimmation

Who are, elc -The Vedanta seuptures alone can ilumine 11 regarding the real nature of the Self But the real meaning ot the Vedanta can be understood only through reason 3 Bren though-The women and the Sudias weie intor- dicted from the study of the Upanishads though it was coneedled that they sould attain to the highe-t knowledge through Smrnh. This was the tradition in India during post-Upam-hadie age. But in the age of the Upamshads, women were certamly not precluded from seeking or attaming the highest knowledge Many inspiring portions of the Vedas were composed by women 4 Others, etc -Ordinary people cannot appreciate the life anr activities of the truly wise becauge the former do not under- stand the trulh about, and beheve in, the interdependenco of Brabman and phenomenal world Gody-That is to say, the beings thit are said to move in a higher plane of existence. They also stand slupefied before the Knowers of Brahman as the former have not yet transcended the realm ot duality & They lenve, etc -The wise, on account of their ieahsation of the non-dual Atman, never mamfest by way of advertisement, any supernatural characteristios by which the ordmary men could mark thei greatness. The life of the truly wive is perfectly natural though their angle of vision is totally different from that of the onlnary fotk. Hence nd one except those who have similar wisdom cun understand the nature of the wise.

MANDŪKYOPANISHAD 353

अजेष्वजमसंक्रान्तं धर्मेषु ज्ञानमिष्यते। यतो न क्रमते ज्ञानमसंगं तेन कीर्तितम् ॥ ९६ ॥

96. Knouledge (consciousness), the essence of the Jivas (who are unborn), is admitted to be itself unborn and umelated (to uny external object). Thas knowledge is proclarmod to be unconditioned as it is not related to any other object (which, really speaking does not-exrst).

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

What constitutos the highest wisdom (i.e., the wisdom of the knower of the non-dual Atman) ? This Is thus explamed. Knowledye which constitutes the essence ot the Dharmas (Jaras), unborn, immutable and identical with Atman, is also admitted to be unborn1 and immutable. It is just like the light and the heat belonging to the sun Knowledge, being ever unrclated to other2 objects, is said to be unborn As knowledge is, thus, unrelated to other objects, it is lke the Akaśa, called unconditioned or absolute.

1 E'nbor, elc -This refutes the theory of the Nyaya realisty who say that knowledge is an attribute of Atman and auses only by the contact of the mind with an external object It has aleady heen pomted out that the appearance of external olyects is due to illusion. But consciousness does not cease to cxist in the absence of objeets as m Yogn Samadhi or deep sleep. Therefore the rcal nature of knowledge is that it is unhorn and uuattached, Fiom

. the standpomt of Reahty the Jru 19 identical with conseyousness lke the identity of the sun with its heat and light, 2 Other objects-It is hecause such objeets do not, from ine standpoit of Reahty, exist

354 MANDOKYOPANISIAD

अणुमात्रेऽपि वैधर्म्ये जायमानेSविपश्चितः ।

असंगता सदा नास्ति किमुताऽडवरणच्युतिः ॥९७॥।

97. The shghtest idea of variety (in the Atman) entertained by the agnorant bars theu approach to the unconditioned. The destruction of the veil (covering the real nature of Atman) is out of the question.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY.

Tf persons. through ignorance, think,-as those who differ from us assert-that an entity (r.e., Jiva or Atman) does undergo the shghtest change, either subjectively or objectively, then such ignorant persons can never realise the ever-unrelatedness (of the Atman).1 Therefore2 it goes without saying that there cannot be any destruction of bondage (that is supposed to keep the Jwva bound to the world).

According to Aidial Vedanta the ultimate Reahty 4 immutable and non-dual Self. Knowledge is ever umelated to objeets as they do not, as such, exist The view of the opponent regarding the separate existence of ohjects cannot be uphold as it contradicts the unrelated nature of Atmnn which is udmittod by all schools of thought l Atman, ete-If the birth or ptoduction of an object be ad- mitted, knowledge must be related to it. Otherwise one cannot know its buth. In that case the absolute and umelater nature of knowledge cannot he maintained Therefore, elc-IF it be contended that knowledge is produeed or if it be said that knowledge (Consciousness or Atman) Is not birthloss by nature, then one cannot speak of liheration or the des- -4wotion of bondage, as theie is no guarantoe of the liberation beig permanent

MANDŪK YOPANISIIAD 361

by churning it with the (churning) rod of Is illumined reason.

यतप्रज्ञालोकभासा प्रतिहतिमगमत्खान्तमोहान्धकारो मज्जोन्मजच्च घोरे ह्यसकृदुपजनोदन्वति त्रासने मे। यत्पादावाश्रितानां श्रुतिशमविनयप्राप्तिरग्र्या ह्यमोघा तत्पादौ पावनीयौ भवभयविनुदौ सर्वभावैर्नमखे ॥। ३ ।। I make obeisance with my whole being to those holy feet-the dispellers of the fear of ths chain of births and deaths-of my great teacher who, through the light of his illumined reason, destroyed the dark- ness of delusion enveloping my mind, who destroyed for ." ever my appearance and disappearance m this tertible ocean of innumerable births and deaths, and who makes all others also that take shelter at his feet, attain to the unfailing knowledge of seriptures, peace and the state of pertect non-differentiation.

AUM PEACE! PEACE! PEACE!