1. Naiskarmya Siddhi of Suresvara A Monograph John Grimes Sat Guru Publications

Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series No. 136

The Naişkarmyasiddhi of

Sureśvara: A Monograph

Wydatek finansowany z projektu . Poszerzenie oferty John Grimes

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Published by : Sri Satguru Publications Indological and Oriental Publishers A Division of Indian Books Centre 40/5, Shakti Nagar, Delhi-110007 Professor R. Balasubramanian

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE x1

I. CHAPTER ONE - NAISKARMYASIDDHI

I.i The Title "NAISKARMYASIDDHI" 1

Lii Opening Prose Portion 2

The Essence of the Work 8

Liv Main Purpose of the Work - verses 2-8 15

II. CHAPTER TWO - KNOWLEDGE VERSUS ACTION

II.i Introduction 25

II.ii Bhatta Mimamsā 31

II.iii Prabhākara Mimāmsā 35

II.iv Argument by Reasoning 38

II.iv.1 Objection 38 Argument by Authority 40

II.v.1 Objection 41 Argument by Scripture 42

II.vi.1 Objection 43

II.vii Nature of Scripture 45

II.vii.1 Objection 47

II.viii Advaita Vedanta's Rebuttal 52

IL.ix Advaita Vedanta's Thesis 56

II.x Action Involves 'Doership' 64

II.xi Action is an aid to Liberation 66

viii Contents Contents

III. CHAPTER THREE - SAMUCCAYA IV.iv.4 Body is the not-Self - It is seen :94 IV.iv.5 Body is the not-Self - It does not persist 95 III.i Introduction 71 IV.v Distinction Between the Self and not-Self IIIii Action is Primary 73 Scripture 95 IIIiii Action and Knowledge are Equal 73 IV.v.1 Body is the not-Self - Chandogya Upanisad 95 III.iv A Knower's Relation to Action 74 IV.vi Discriminate Self from not-Self 96 III.v Grounds for Rejecting Conjunction of Action and IV.vi.1 Desire and aversion 96 Knowledge .76 IV.vi.2 Objection - Self is both subject and object - I 98 III.vi Brahmadatta 77 IV.vi.3 Reply - I 98 III.vii Mandana 79 IV.vi.4 Objection - Self is both subject and object - II 99 III.viii Role of sadhana 81 IV.vi.5 Reply - II 99 IV.vi.6 Reply - III 100 IV.vi.7 Reply - IV 103 IV. CHAPTER FOUR - NATURE OF THE SELF IV.vi.8 Reply - V 103 IV.I Introduction 83 IV.vi.9 Reply - VI 104 IV.ii Scripture Only Means to Convey Knowledge of IV.vi.10 Objection - Self is both subject and object - III 104 the Self 83 IV.vi.11 Reply - III 105 IV.ii.1 Scripture only means to convey knowledge of IV.vi.12 The One and the many 107 Self 83 IV.vii The Self 108 IV.ii.2 Objection - Heard text yet not understood - I 85 IV.vii.1 Self as saksin (witness) 108 IV.ii.3 Reply - I 85 IV.vii.2 Objection - Self is not unchanging 109 IV.ii.4 Objection - Heard text yet not understood - II 85 IV.vii.3 Reply - Sky and smoke 110 IV.ii.5 Reply - II 86 IV.vii.4 Reply - Boat and trees 110 IV.ii.6 Objection - sruti not necessary 87 IV.vii.5 Reply - Diamond 111 IV.ii.7 Reply 88 IV.vii.6 Reply - Advaita is not Sankhya 112 IV.iii Pramana (Valid means of Knowledge) 88 IV.vii.7 Why the mind is subject to change 113 IV.iii.1 Objection - Self not within scope of pramana 89 IV.vii.8 Self is One 115 IV.iii.2 Reply 90 IV.vii.9 Nature of the Self 116 IV.iv Distinction Between the Self and not-Self - IV.vii.10 Why not-Self is not real 118 Inference 92 IV.viii Summary - Self and not-Self 119 IV.iv.1 Body is the not-Self - Product of food 92 IV.iv.2 Body is the not-Self - Nature of food 92 IV.iv.3 Body is the not-Self - It ceases to be .93

Contents

V. CHAPTER FIVE - INTERPRETATION OF PREFACE

MAHĀ VĀKYA

V.i Introduction 121 The Advaita Vedanta sourcebook sampradaya

V.ii Aham Brahmasmi 124 (lineage) includes a class of independent expository V.ii.1 Aham Brahmasmi - I 124 Aham Brahmasmi - II works known as the siddhi-literature. These works V.ii.2 126 V.ii.3 Aham Brahmasmi - III 126 differ from Advaita's primary source-books

V.ii.4 Aham Brahmasmi - IV 127 (prasthana-traya) in that they set forth not only the

V.ii Tat Tvam Asi 128 essentials of Advaita but also present new facets by

V.ili. Tat Tvam Asi - I 128 way of dialectics with other schools. Four works in this group have attracted more reknown than the VI. CHAPTER SIX - SCRIPTURE others by virtue of their authoritative character as well as their polemics. These four are: Mandana's

VI.i Introduction 135 Brahmasiddhi, Suresvara's Naişkarmyasiddhi, Vimuk-

VI.ii Definition and scope 135 tatman's Istasiddhi, and Madhusudana Sarasvati's

VI.iii Work (How sruti conveys knowledge) 139 Advaitasiddhi

VI.iv Relation (to other pramanas) 141 Advaita Vedanta tradition also acknowledges the

VI.v Relation of Scripture to Reason 143 Naiskarmyasiddhi for a second reason. As a com-

VI.vi Status of Scripture 145 pendium of Advaita philosophy, it touches on all the salient features of that system.1 Consisting VII. CHAPTER SEVEN - THE LOCUS OF partly of verse and partly of prose, it presents a

AVIDYĀ clear, brief, and simple account of the Advaita doctrine. Its style is charming and Suresvara

VII.i Introduction 149 handles the philosophical arguments with ease.

VII.ii Key-concept 151 The work is divided into 423 stanzas connected by

VII.iii Nature of avidya 152 a prose commentary and is divided into four VIIiv Locus of avidya - I 152 chapters (of roughly 100 stanzas each). As well, it is VII.v Locus of avidya - II 157 important to the Advaita tradition for two

VIII. CHAPTER EIGHT - TRANSLITERATION OF THE NAISKARMYASIDDHI 1Suresvara himself describes it as such: asesa-vedantasāra-

Chapter One - Chapter Four sangraha-prakaranam - Naiskarmyasiddhi, sambandhokti to I.1. 163 -246

xii Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi xiii

additional reasons First, it was written by Suresvara (who was allegedly a Mimamsaka before cause of bondage and it can be removed only by his conversion to Advaita2). As a defence of right knowledge of the Self which is obtainable Advaita doctrine against Mimamsaka doctrine, it is from sruti texts. The first chaper deals primarily a classic. Second, Suresvara is known, respected, with 'action versus knowledge' as the means to

and honored in the Advaita tradition as part of the liberation. The second chaper focuses on the

authoritative triumvirate: Vyasa, Sankara, and distinction between the Self and the not-Self. The Suresvara. This gives him and his works an third chapter discusses the locus and content of

importance as an authority which cannot be ignorance as well as subjecting the sruti mahavakyas overlooked or overvalued. to a rigorous analysis. Finally, the concluding The central question that the book deals with is chapter summarises the first three chapters and 'liberation from transmigratory existence and the quotes illustrative passages from the Upadesasthasri means thereto'. Ignorance of the Self (Atman) is the and Mandukyakarika in support of what he has previously stated.

2Whether Suresvara was Mandanamisra or not is a There are a number of translations of the

controversial issue up to this day. See Sri Sankaravijaya of Naişkarmyasiddhi: M. Hiriyanna's Naiskarmyasiddhi

Anantanandagiri, canto 55, Ed., N. Veezhinathan, University of Suresvara with the Candrika of Jnanottama, A.J.

of Madras, 1971, p. 174; Cidvilasa's Sankaravijayavilāsa quoted Alston's The Realization of the Absolute, R.

in Introduction to Slokavartika, Madras University Sanskrit Balasubramanian's The Naiskarmyasiddhi of

Series, No. 13, p. x; Guruvamsakāvya, Sri Vani Vilas Press, Suresvara. This monograph differs from those in

Srirangam, Canto II, 41-50, 59; Sankaradigvijaya, Anandasrama that it is an attempt to present a lucid account of

Sanskrit Series, pp. 292-293; Brahmasiddhi, S. Kuppuswami, Suresvara's work by grouping the dialectics from

ed., Madras Government Oriental Manuscript Series, no. 4; M various parts of the work into topical sections.

Hiriyanna, "Suresvara and Mandanamisra," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, April 1923 and January 1924; S.K. Ramanatha Sastri, "Bhavabhuti and ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

his identity," The Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society, Rajahmundry, July 1926, vol. I, part 3, pp. 125-129; The Naiskarmyasiddhi was taught in the Master's

Ramakrishna Kavi, "Identity of Suresvara," Journal of the program at the Radhakrishnan Institute for

Andhra Historical Research Society, vol. V, part III, 1931, pp Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of

187-192; Suryanarayana Sastri, "Mandana and Suresvara," The Madras, for many years. The department has always

Journal of the Madras University, vol. XI, No. 1, 1939, pp. 30-40. been closely associated with Suresvara's various works, beginning with Suryanarayana Sastri and continuing through T.M.P. Mahadevan to R.

xiv Naiskarmyasiddhi NAIŞKARMYASIDDHI Balasubramanian, and it was there that I learned to love Suresvara. I would like to acknowledge my special indebtedness to Professor R. Balasubra- manian for introducing me to, and teaching me the CHAPTER ONE Naiskarmyasiddhi. Thanks also must be extended to the University of Madras and the University of Lethbridge for I. CHAPTER ONE - NAISKARMYASIDDHI providing me with the opportunity to learn, write, and refine this work. I.i THE TITLE "NAISKARMYASIDDHI" I would also like to thank Sri Satguru Publications, a division of the Indian Books Centre Suresvara selected the title of this work from and Naresh Gupta, the Director, for their assistance. Sankara's Bhagavadgita-bhasya.1 In Sankara's com- mentary, the state of 'freedom from action and its JOHN GRIMES influence' (naiskarmya) is described as equivalent to University of Lethbridge the state attained through renunciation (sannyasa). Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada This is a state in which one has transcended all actions (karma) through a proper and perfect know- ledge of the Self (Atman). It is the stage beyond all actions. Thus, Suresvara wrote the Naiskarmya- siddhi to stand as a compendium containing the essence of the Upanisadic teachings regarding Brahman, action, and knowledge. The initial prose portion introduces the idea of 'attainment' (siddhi) 'of a state wherein an individ- ual is free from' (nais) 'action' (karma) and all its in- fluences. This is followed by the first verse which stands as a benedictory stanza, as well as an epitome of the teaching of the text as a whole.

1 Bhagavadgitabhasya XVIII.49. asaktabuddhih sarvatra jitātmā vigatasprhah naiskarmyasicdhim paramam samnyasena 'dhigacchati

Naiskarmyasiddhi 3 2 Naiskarmyasiddhi advance. Not only does every deed produce its Lii OPENING PROSE PORTION direct result of pleasure or pain, but it also estab- lishes a tendency (samskara) to repeat the same deed The Naiskarmyasiddhi opens with a sambandhokti, in the future.3 The former aspect involves neces- a prose portion which is traditionally employed in sity while the latter, viz. tendencies, are under an Indian philosophical works to introduce new ideas individual's own control. at the beginning of a verse or text. Advaitic tradi- The links of the causal chain of suffering con- tion says that Suresvara initially wrote the verses tinue with: desire (raga) and aversion (dvesa).4 They and then, at the insistence of some friends, wrote are responsible for the above mentioned, previ- the prose portions to serve as a guide to under- ously performed, collected actions. In turn, a false standing the verses. Thus, the entire work, as we superimposition (adhyasa) is responsible for desire know it today, is partly in prose and partly in verse. and aversion.5 An uncritical acceptance of duality, In this opening prose section, Suresvara dis- which is but a non-enquiry (avicara) into the nature cusses the causal chain of suffering. He says, "From of Reality, is responsible for this false superimposi- the Creator on down, all living beings desire to tion. The mistaking of the Real for the unreal and avoid pain. . ."2 He points out the various links in the unreal for the Real rests upon a primary, and the karmic chain which culminate in the root-cause foundational, ignorance of the non-dual Self - even of suffering (duhkha) - which is the non-apprehen- as the fancied water of a mirage rests upon an indi- sion of the Self (Atman). vidual's ignorance of the nature of the desert. Why It is a truism to say that every living being de- does an individual see a mirage and not the sand of sires to avoid pain. However, the primary cause of the desert? Because one does not know that 'it' is pain, or suffering, is the embodied condition which merely sand and not water. The mistake is due to a every living being finds himself or herself in. wrong impression caused by: an ignorance of the Further, action or karma is responsible for this em- real nature of the object; a predisposition to see the bodied condition which cannot be escaped since it is unreal; a mistaken impression; and favorable con- rooted in one's previously amassed good and bad ditions. actions. This karmic law is an accepted, and funda- mental, tenet of all Indian systems. As well, note 3These are technically known as the 'phala' and the 'samskara'. that this karmic chain implies both that there is a 4Ibid., "karma nas ca raga-dvesapadatvad raga-dvesayos ca .. 5In his Brahmasutrabhasya, Sankara defines superimposition as necessary link between every event and its an- 'atasmin tad buddhih) - the cognition of something as something else. tecedent cause and, a possible freedom to ethically See Sankara's Adhyasa bhasya adhyaso namo atasmimstadbuddhih ity avocama'. 2Naiskarmyasiddhi, Book 1, introduction. äbrahmastamba-paryantaih

l Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 5

Since ignorance of the non-dual Self is the cause how of Brahman-knowledge. Its emphasis is on an of an individual's pain, one's aim should be to enquiry into, and an analysis of, whether it is by remove this ignorance (avidyalajnana). This is to be knowledge alone or by action or action-cum- accomplished by an enquiry into the nature of the knowledge that liberation (moksa) is achieved. Self. Even as light is the only remedy for the Philosophically speaking, this point touches the removal of darkness, so too, knowledge is the only heart of Advaita. Brahma-bhava is sva-bhava eradicator of ignorance. The light of correct knowl- Experience of the Absolute is experience of the Self. edge is the only dispeller of the darkness of igno- Liberation is not something alien to oneself, to be rance. No amount of actions can remove the illu- imported or created anew. It is one's very essence. sory water superimposed upon the desert's sand. The light is within, only one should see. There never was water there; there never will be There are those (Mimamsakas) who advocate water there; nor is there water there now. To that liberation is a product of action and those remove this wrong impression, all that is required, (Brahmadatta, Mandana) who advocate it is a prod- and all that will be successful, is solely the light of uct of action-cum-knowledge. However, in any right knowledge. form, action which is a product of ignorance, can- Action, which is the result of ignorance, cannot not destroy its source. Thus, 'right-knowledge' hope to destroy its parent and source. The delusive (samyag-jnana), according to Jñanottama, is different cognition of the not-Self cannot be removed by from: meditation (upisana); erroneous cognitions darkness which is its cause.6 Pain is the result of (jnana-abkīsa) - whether they be pseudo-knowledge- being embodied; being embodied is the result of generated or empirical-knowledge-generated (vyūva- previously acquired merit and demerit; merit and hārika pramāna); or action (karma). demerit are the result of action; action is dependent This is not to say that Advaitins do not recog- upon desire/aversion; desire and aversion are nize the usefulness of action. Though action does superimpositions; superimposition is caused by not produce liberation, still, actions must be per- non-enquiry; non-enquiry is the result of igno- formed until the rise of knowledge. There is an rance. Hence, ignorance is the sole and root cause of Upanisadic text, "Brahmins seek to realize Brahman suffering and can be removed only by knowledge.7 through the study of the Vedas, through sacrifices, The primary interest and over-riding concern of through gifts, and through austerity and fasting."8 the Naiskarmyasiddhi is this topic, i.e., showing the Through this performance (of action) there arises a purity enabling an individual to become eligible for 6Naiskarmyasiddhi 1.24 "ajnāna-hāna-mātratvān mukteh karma na sādhanam karmāpamārsti nājnānam tamasivotthitam tamali" 8Brhadaranyaka Upanisad IV.iv.22 "tam etam vedānuvacanena 7lbid., I. Introduction "ajñāna-nivrttesca samyag-jnāna. brāhmanā vividisanti yajnena dānena, tapasānāsakena"

6 Naiskarmyasiddhi

a true enquiry into Brahman. Suresvara says that Naiskarmyasiddhi 7

actions subserve knowledge only through the channel of purification. Thus, though actions are text is accepted without a proper enquiry, or if its not the proximate aid to liberation (antaranga- meaning is only superficially understood, the con- sadhana), they are the remote auxiliaries (bahiranga- sequences will not yield the fruits intended. sadhana). More of this later. Reasoning is both helpful and necessary in under- Returning to Jnanottoma's commentary, he says standing the teaching of the Scripture. It is true that that upasana, in a technical sense, means to medi- the Absolute is beyond reasoning and ungraspable tate upon something as something else (as enjoined by thoughts or through words. Nevertheless, rea- by Scripture), i.e., one should meditate upon the pranava 'Om' as 'Atman'.9 All worldly knowledge, as soning is useful, in a negative way, in so far as it can assure the individual as to what is not real. As well as all action, is dependent upon, and presup- well, language is useful and beneficial in indicating poses, duality. Since ignorance is nothing more the nature of the Absolute even if 'words fail to than mistaking multiplicity for the Reality, it is reach'. obvious that anything which partakes of, and is Valid knowledge is described as of two kinds: dependent upon, multiplicity cannot remove its that which relates to the empirical reality and that source (i.e., ignorance). which relates to the Absolute Reality.11 No other The aim of an individual is to remove igno- means of knowledge, excepting Scripture, can rance. The method to be employed is an earnest impart knowledge of supra-sensible facts. This is enquiry. The result to be obtained is right knowl- mere common sense. Perception and all the other edge. And right knowledge arises only from the empirical means of knowledge are limited to the Scripture (sruti).10 However, to say that Scripture is empirical world (by definition). Since all the things the basic authority for Advaita does not mean that in the phenomenal world possess certain fixed the Advaitin is a strict fundamentalist, a dogmatist, characteristics such as grossness, fineness, etc., or a literalist. It does not imply a 'blind acceptance name and form are their warp and woof. But the of' or 'unthinking belief in', the words of the Veda. non-dual Reality is trans-empirical, trans-sensual, Words are not mere isolated sounds. They convey free from all such distinctions. meaning and this meaning must be understood. Jnanottama's second elucidation points out that The emphasis here is placed upon their purport. If a right knowledge excludes every kind of erroneous

9Mu ndaka Upanisad 11.2.6 "aum ity evam dhyayathat manam". cognition (jnana-abhasa). These include both valid

10See Brhadaranyaka Upanisad III.9.26 "tam tva aupanisadam purusam empirical cognitions as well as erroneous ones. His

prcchami"; Also Brahmasutra I.1.4 'tat tu samanvayat. 11 Vedantaparibhāsa ch. 7, pp. 150-151 "evam nirupitānām pramānānam pramanyamdvividham, vyavaharikatattvavedakatvam pāramārthikatattvaveda-katvanccheti"

8 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 9

third point is one that Suresvara never tires of stat- the effect, the world, (Suresvara's snake) is unreal ing again and again, implicitly and explicitly, being but an illusory superimposition of ever- namely, that ignorance can never be removed by changing names and forms. The substratum means of action. Thus, the aim of the work is to (adhisthana), whether it be Brahman or a garland remove ignorance by means of an enquiry which never changes even though a universe of multi- will yield right knowledge. plicity or an individual snake is superimposed thereon. In actuality, there never was a world/snake there, nor will there ever be, nor is I.iii THE ESSENCE OF THE WORK there now. Advaita Vedanta is unique in stating that any The first verse, which stands as an invocation to reference to a theory of creation or causality is not secure the fulfillment of the work, contains the intended to expound creation or causality, but essence of the entire treatise implicitly. It alludes to merely to demonstrate the one non-dual Reality. how the entire universe comes into existence from The 'creation-texts' (srsti-vakya) allude to the uni- the non-dual Brahman. verse, not to teach creation or how causality works, but solely to culminate in conveying the non-dual khanilagnyabdharitryantam Brahman. srakphan ivodgatam yatah dhvantacchide namastasmai haraye buddhisak sine12 As food, too, is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz., fire. And as fire is an offshoot, seek after So much Advaitic thought is packed into this its root, viz., Being (Sat).13 verse! Suresvara, in citing the well-known rope- snake example, introduces, in cryptic form, the Gaudapāda said, Advaitin's theory of transfiguration or apparent change (vivarta-vada). Simply put, this theory of If creation is represented by means (of the causation states that the world is but an illusory similes of) clay, iron, sparks, and other things,

appearance superimposed by ignorance upon the that is only a means for making it understand

non-dual Brahman. The cause, Brahman, is real and ever remains the same (Suresvara's garland) while 13Chandogya Upanisad VI.viii.4; "tasya kva mūlam syad anyatrannat, evam eva khalu, saumya, annena sungenapo mulam anviccha. Quoted by Sankara in his Brahmasūtrabhāsya I.iv.14 p. 273. 12Naiskarmaysiddhi I.1. "Reverence to the Lord, the kDestroyer of darkness and Witness of the intellect, from Whom the world consisting of the five elements has come forth in mere appearance like the snake which appears to exist in a garland."

10 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 11

that (in reality) there is no difference (asatkaryavadins) contend that if such were not the whatever.14 case, causation itself would be rendered meaning-

According to Advaita, the universe is not said to less. If the effect is said to be 'pre-existent in the

be created. It is only the way in which Brahman cause', then the question logically arises as to the

appears under the limiting conditions of space and necessity for its production again? Following this

time. As an appearance, the universe is but a pro- logic, the cause and its effect must differ and the

jection of Brahman as invested with names and effect must be non-existent before its production by the cause. forms. Vivarta-vada affirms that the effect pre-exists in However, this position raises two fundamental

the cause in the sense that it is the cause which problems. First, the cause and effect relation in

appears as the effect. The effect is nothing new - it is regards to the material cause is unsatisfactory.

only the cause 'appearing' differently. Ordinarily, Nothing can come out of something unless it is

two things or events are said to be in a causal rela- already (pre-)existent in that something. If such

tion when one of them produces or brings about were not the case, then it would amount to dis-

the other. The cause is the one which produces and claiming the need for a material cause for the pro-

the effect is what is produced. The cause is said to be duction of an effect. A clay pot is dependent upon

different from the effect and prior to it. As well. in the material clay for its existence. And secondly, if

any process of causation, three aspects are involved: the efficient cause is separate from the material

the material, instrumental, and efficient causes. cause, then this implies a limitation upon its

A causal relation ordinarily implies that one Creator. For instance, God, as the efficient cause,

event or thing 'causes' another. Advaita maintains would be bound to work upon material indepen- dent of Himself. Furthermore, He would be limited that such a position is riddled with inconsistencies. Within the Indian philosophical tradition, two to creating only those forms which this given mate- rial would admit of. views of causation are maintained: Either the effect is pre-existent in the cause (satkaryavada) or else the Those who hold that the effect is pre-existent in

effect is non-existent in the cause prior to its pro- the cause (satkaryavadins), maintain that such must

duction (asatkaryavoda). be the case for otherwise, if the effect is not pre-exis-

The basic position of those who hold that the tent in the cause, anything could come out of any-

effect is a de novo creation from the cause thing - and then only sometimes. There would be no determinative cause for a specific effect. Milk

14 Mandukyakarika 11I.15. "m rllahovisphulinkhadhyaih srstdirya codita' could come out of sand, and then, only sometimes.

nyatha upay ah so'vataraya nasti bhedah kathamcana." Quoted by In rebuttal, their opponents object that if the

Sankara, ibid. effect pre-exists in the cause, why does it need to be

12 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 13

produced? Though this appears as a redundancy, origination.15 The universe is not a de novo cre- satkar yavadins reply that the effect is not in the cause ation, nor a transformation of something - but the as such - it is latent in the cause and has to be brought out. Thus, what was latent must become appearance of Brahman under certain limiting patent. adjuncts. Like every appearance, the world is not

However, still difficulties persist. Is the cause real (because, to the enlightened individual, it wholly transformed, or only a part of it, in the ceases to exist in its multiplicity). But, it is not

causal process? If the whole cause is transformed, unreal (for it appears to the senses). Being neither

then the cause ceases to be, and what happens to the real nor unreal, it can only be said to be non-real or

cause in which the effect is said to pre-exist? And, if mithya/sadasatvilaksana, anirvacaniya.

only a part of the cause changes into the effect, with Advaita's (provisional) theory of causation

the other part maintaining its substance, it will be implies six requisites:

like killing one-half of a chicken to eat and trying to keep the other half to lay eggs with. 1) There is a relation in terms of succession in

The satkaryavadins reply to this objection by the cause-effect relationship. The cause is

claiming that what is meant in saying that the cause always earlier and the effect is always later.

is transformed into the effect is that what was not 2) The relationship between the cause and

previously manifested is now made manifest. The the effect is an irreversible relationship. The cause always precedes the effect and never clay as cause does not disappear when the pot as vice-versa. effect is produced. What was the cause, is now the effect, persisting in it. 3) The relationship between the cause and

However, still the dialectics continues. The the effect is a necessary relationship and not a

opponent asks, what exactly does this contingent one. 4) Cause and effect are not completely 'manifestation' mean? The satkaryavalin is caught between the horns of another dilemma. Either one identical nor are they totally different. (If any

must admit that causation is redundant or else that two entities are absolutely different, they are

it is impossible. And so it goes - with each theory of not related by cause and effect, and if they are

causation destroying the other's position. If the absolutely identical, then they are the same effect is already existent, it is redundant to say that entity).

the already-existent is created. If the effect is non- 5) The relationship between cause and effect

existent, it can never be produced. Either alterna- is a one-sided relationship. The effect is

tive fails to satisfy the demands of logic. Thus it is that the Advaitin propounds a doctrine of non- 15 Vivartavada was spoken of as ajativada (theory of non-origination) by Gaudapāda in his Mandūkyakārika IV.5 "khyāpyamanamajatim ...

Naiskarmyasiddhi 15

14 Naiskarmyasiddhi is conveyed in the verse, The individual and the Absolute are one.'17 always dependent upon the cause and never The first verse of the Naiskarmyasiddhi conveys vice-versa. this oneness even in its benedictory stanza. 6) Between the cause and the effect, the cause alone is real 'Hari', the Lord, is in apposition to 'the witness These requisites logically lead to the discovery of the intellect'. The Lord is not somewhere that any theory of causation is impossible. From the else, above and beyond. Hari is within the seeming reality of a causal relationship at an empir- individual, here and now.18 ical level, one is led to the discovery that, philo- sophically speaking, there cannot be a logical causal relationship. An empirical practicality and appear- ance does not necessarily translate into a metaphys- I.iv. MAIN PURPOSE OF THE WORK ical reality (VERSES 2-8) By applying the above criteria to the famous rope-snake example of the Advaitins, the compre- According to Suresvara, he wrote this treatise to: hension and implications of vivartavada will become 1) obey his teacher's command, 2) expound jiva- clear. The rope is the cause of the snake in the sense brahma aikya, 3) show that knowledge of the Self that the snake pre-existed (so to speak) in the rope. destroys ignorance, 4) become clearer on the doc- It is only the rope that appeared as the snake. The trine, and 5) expound the essential nature of the snake had its origin in the rope. It was sustained by Self. the rope, and finally disappeared back into the rope. Sampradaya or tradition plays a role within All the time, there was nothing else present than Advaita philosophy which cannot be over-empha- the rope. The rope never ceased being a rope, even sized. Advaita Vedanta, as one of the orthodox while it appeared to the deluded individual as a (astika) schools of Indian philosophy, traces its snake. This is the very essence of the idea - a thing origins to the Vedas - an origin which is lost in the appearing differently without ceasing to be itself mists of time. All Advaitins acknowledge their lin- even during the different appearance. eage in a familiar śloka: Vivartavada may be said to imply the central teaching of Advaita. This is cryptically summed up in the saying: The Absolute is real; the world is 17jiva brahma aikya. non-real; the individual and the Absolute are not 18Naiskarmyasiddhi I.1. dhvantacchide namastasmai different.16 Or again, the central teaching of Advaita haraye buddhisaksine

16 Brahma satyam, jagan mithya, jivo brahmaiva na 'parah.

16 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 17

Narayanam Padmabhuvam Vasistam, Saktinca tatputra Parasaramca personal name, fame, or gain, but only to further Vyāsam Sukam Gaudapaam mahantam his own understanding, and if necessary, to correct Govinda yogindramathasya sişyam any defects in his knowledge.22 Srī Sankarācāryamathāsya The subject-matter of the treatise (visayam Padmapadamca Hastamalakamca sişyam prakaranam) concerns the essential nature of the

Tamtrotakam vartikakaramanuyanasmad Self (Atman).23 The Self is said to be the innermost Gurunt santata manatosmi Reality. For instance, an analysis of the five sheaths (panca kosa viveka) which covers the Self reveals that From the divine Lord Narayana, the first teacher, the Self persists in all the five sheaths even while up to Suka, the son of Vyasa, the line of succession they vary and undergo change. Such an analysis is from father to son. As well, the lineage up to reveals that what is grosser and more external and Suka is clouded in the mists of history, myth, and less pervasive is less real than what is subtler and legend. From Gaudapada onwards, the succession is more internal and more pervasive. This analysis no longer regarded as either divine or semi-divine, reveals that the Self is the subtlest, inmost being, but now rests in the hands of human monks. and therefore the most real. From the physical Continuing up to today, this tradition exists in an body, which is the grossest sheath, to the subtlest unbroken line. From teacher to disciple, the teach- sheath of enjoyment there is to be found both ing has been passed down the annals of time. Thus, impermanence and objectification. But the knower within Indian philosophy, tradition and modernity of all these sheaths is the subtlest, most pervasive meet - but never has tradition been discarded or of all. Even when all the objective elements are delegated to an inferior role. removed from the five sheaths, what remains is The point to be conveyed is that Suresvara offers pure Consciousness, awareness, the Atman. Even to reverence to his teacher (guru)19 in order to show: 1) say that nothing remains after dismissing all objec- that his tradition has an ancient and requisite tive names and forms requires a consciousness authority, 2) that he is obedient to his teacher's which witnesses the absence of any name and form. command instructing him to expound the This subtlest element of all is the witnessing Upanisadic doctrine,20 and 3) there are no defects in Consciousness which is incapable of being negated. this work because his preceptor is authoritative.21 Suresvara wrote the book, not out of any desire for 22Ibid., 1.6. "na khyati labha pujartham grantho'smabhir udiryate sva bodha parisuddhyartham brahma vinnikasāsmasu" 19Ibid., I.2. "gariyase namas 23 Ibid., 1.4. "yat-siddhav idamah siddhir yad-asiddhau na

20Ibid., I.3. " .. .gurv-anusiksayā". kimcanapratyag-dharmaika-nisthasya yathat myam vaksyate sphutamt" 21Ibid., 1.5. "guru naiva vedārthasya .. NST 4020

18 Naiskarmyasiddhi

Thus, Suresvara says, 'when the Self exists, the Naiskarmyasiddhi 19 entire world exists'. 'If the Self is non-existent, all else will be non-existent'. This type of reasoning is demonstrated by employing Suresvara's above- called the method of co-presence and co-absence mentioned use of the method of anvaya-vyatireka. (anvaya-vyatireka). Suresvara takes recourse to it in The four states of Consciousness - waking order to demonstrate that the Self, which is of the (jagrat), dreaming (svapna), deep sleep (susupti), and nature of Consciousness, is constant and necessary the fourth (turiya) show that the mind must func- and therefore real, while the phenomena which tion in order for determinate knowledge to arise. constitute the world are inconstant, contingent, and The first three states are mutually exclusive of one therefore non-real. If the Self can be established, all another. When an individual is awake, one is else can be established. But, if the Self cannot be neither dreaming nor asleep. The same holds true established, nothing else can be established. in regards to both dreaming and deep sleep also. According to Advaita, epistemologically speak- But the state of turiya is unique in that it persists in ing, all things are known or cognized because of the and underlies the other three. mind. Any act of perception involves the triputi In the waking state, the mind functions due to the cognizer, the cognized, and the act of cognition. the reflection of Consciousness in it. The same From the cognizer (cidabhasa), which is a reflection holds true in regards to the dreaming state. In the of consciousness residing in the intellect, arises a deep sleep state, there is no definite knowledge of valid means of knowledge (pramana) which is a objects because the mind is not functioning. Only modification of the internal organ (antahkarana Consciousness is present and this is demonstrated urtti). The consciousness, upon reaching the object, by an individual's exclamation upon waking. I assumes the form of that object. the modification is slept well' or 'I do not remember anything last the transformation of the internal organ and con- night' nects the cognizer with the object cognized. This is This sense of I is present throughout the three possible because ignorance has obscured the states, even though the three states are exclusive to omnipresent, intelligent Self and transformed itself one another. This personal identity which is estab- into the world of diverse kinds. lished in the three states referring them all to the The cidabhasa is a reflection of Consciousness in same individual is Consciousness. This 'I, which the internal organ. Without the functioning of the bears witness to the three states, is an awareness mind or the internal organ, no knowledge will which underlies them. It is called the 'witness con- arise. Pure Consciousness alone will not give rise to sciousness' (saksi caitanya). It is omnipresent in empirical knowledge. This conclusion can be one's consciousness and makes for one's sense of self-identity. In actuality, it is a non-dual condition without any subject-object distinctions. It is the experience par excellence. It is the expansive

20 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naişkarmyasiddhi 21

Consciousness which is ever-present - regardless of Ignorance (avidya) is called the seed of bondage whether the mind or objects are present or not. and the cause of empirical existence. It binds one to All this goes to show that the three states are not the wheel of birth and death. Its cause is the failure ultimate. They are transcended by turiya, which is to realize that one's own Self is the sole reality. Not ever-present. Thus, the plurality that is reflected in only does it conceal the real nature of the Self, but it these three states is not the final truth. Even also projects the non-real world of multiplicity though the stillness of deep sleep gives a foretaste upon it. Both the content and locus of ignorance is of the abiding Consciousness, it too must be tran- the pure Self.26 Upon its destruction (avidya-nasa or scended. avidya-nivrtti), liberation arises. Enlightenment is not something to be newly obtained, but merely the Here is a clear statement of the true nature of removal of ignorance. As Mandana said, the inner reality whose sole function is to exist "Liberation is the setting of ignorance."27 White as the witness and support of all. The existence and manifestation of all this world depends on cloth is already white. It is the contingent adjunct of its existence. If it did not exist, nothing dirt which makes it appear black. In order to make would.24 the cloth white again, one need not add whiteness to it. It will be enough to merely wash the dirt away. The subject-matter of the book concerns the As was mentioned previously, Brahman-knowl- nature of the Self. Verse seven mentions four edge obtained through the Vedanta texts is the elements of the subject-matter which should be means to attain the goal of life. Suresvara employs differentiated: Anartha or suffering, (which, accord- the analogy of fire in saying that it is the 'fire of ing to Suresvara, is an effect of the failure to appre- knowledge which burns away the ignorance of the hend the Self); anartha hetu or the cause of suffering Self'.28 Action cannot destroy ignorance for action is (i.e., ignorance); purusartha or the goal of life25 (i.e., not opposed to it. Action is not only dependent liberation or moksa); and purusartha hetu or the means to obtain the goal of life (i.e., knowledge of 26 According to Suresvara (and the Vivarana school), the content and the Self or atmajnana). locus of avidya is Brahman. According to the Bhamati school, the locus of avidya is the individual (jiva). See Chapter Three for a detailed

24Ibid. (my translation) discussion of this subject. 27See Brahmasiddhi. 25Four main values of life (purusarthas) are generally accepted in 28Compare: Chandogya Upanisad V.xxiv.3 - All his evils are burnt just Indian philosophy: wealth (artha), enjoyment (kama), righteousness as the soft fibres of the isika reed would burn, when thrown into a fire. (dharma), and liberation (moksa). The first is an economic value; the Bhagavadgita IV.37 - As the fire which is kindled reduces all fuel to second is a psychological value; the third is a moral value; and the ashes, O Arjuna, so does the fire of knowledge reduce all karmas to fourth is a spiritual value. The first two are secular values and the ashes. latter two are spiritual values.

22 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 23

be affected. Once the Self has been realized, multi- upon ignorance, but is, in fact, a product of igno- plicity loses its reality.

rance. Knowledge has been compared to fire. The anal- Where verily there is, as it were, a duality, ogy is apt for when fire burns an object, ashes are there one knows another. But when to the left over. So too, when the fire of knowledge burns Knower of Brahman everything has become the the actions-in-store (sancita karmas) and the actions- Self, what should one know and through what? yet-to-come (agami karmas), what is left over are the Through what should one know That owing to accumulated effects of past deeds which have begun which all this is known - through what, O fructify with the creation of one's present body Maitreyi, should one know the Knower?29 (prarabdha karmas). These actions are only destroyed when their force is spent. They can neither be averted, avoided, or changed either by knowledge or grace. Thus, while knowledge is said to remove the 29Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 11.4.14 "yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati, tad first two types of karma, prarabdha karmas must be itara itaram jighrati ... ". experienced. This is explained by relating it to the action of a rotating fan. Even after the power of the fan has been turned off, the fan continues to rotate until its accumulated force has been spent. In a similar manner, even though knowledge burns the actions-which-are-yet-to-come, the actions which are giving impetus to the present incarnation must be experienced. It is in this sense that the Advaitin claims that a liberated-while-living-in-a-body (jivanmukta) individual, is 'in the world, though not of the world'. The diversity of the world may continue to appear to the enlightened individual, even as the sun continues to appear to move across the sky though one is convinced that the sun is in reality, stationary. Pleasure and pain may continue to be experienced, yet to the jivanmukta, neither really matters anymore. There is 'no one' there to

II.i. INTRODUCTION

The over-riding concern, as well as the central topic, of the Naiskarmyasiddhi is to determine whether liberation (moksa) is to be attained by knowledge or by action. Traditionally the Vedas have been divided into two sections according to subject-matter: knowledge-section (jnana-kanda) and action-section (karma-kanda) It is precisely at this juncture that our controversy arises. Both the Mimamsaka and Advaitic traditions claim a com- mon end in view, i.e., to lead individuals to libera- tion. The Mimamsaka claim posits that this is to be achieved through action and the Vedantins put forth knowledge as the path to liberation. In this context, knowledge means knowledge of Brahman. It is the immediate intuition of the non- difference of the individual from Brahman. This is dealt with particularly in the Upanisads. Tradition claims that the rest of the Vedas deal primarily with rites, duties, and moral laws, in short, the action- section. Without stretching the issue, a certain unity can be found between the two sections in that both propose to lead an individual from the tempo- ral to the eternal. As well, Sankara said, "The section of the Vedas dealing with knowledge has the same import as that dealing with rites."1 The ques-

1 See Sankara's Commentary on the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad IV.4.22.

25

26 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 27

tion is: Is knowledge primary or is action primary There are six orthodox Indian philosophical or are they mutually efficient? systems that accept the authority of the Veda.4 The According to Advaita, actions, rites, and duties Purvamimamsasutra begins 'athato dharma jijnasa' - are preparatory to that Brahman-knowledge 'now therefore, an enquiry into dharma and the whereby liberation is attained. Actions purify the Uttaramīmāmsāsūtra begins, 'athāto brahma jijñāsa' - mind and prepare it for the liberating knowledge 'now therefore, an enquiry into Brahman'.5 Of which is to come. On the other hand, both Purva these two, the Purva Mimamsa upholds action and Mimamsa schools maintain the primacy of action - stresses the teaching contained in the earlier though they are split over the question as to whether there is such a think as knowledge of the portions of the Veda, especially the Brahmanas. Advaita Vedanta maintains that knowledge is the Self or not.2 sole means to liberation and stresses the latter Even the Mimamsakasadmit that action is the portions of the Veda, viz., the Upanisads. cause of bondage. However, they do not admit or According to the Purva Mimamsa school, the agree to the claim that all actions should be relin- essence of the Scripture is injunctions and com- quished. Only certain actions such as those which mandments which tell what ought-to-be-done are desire-prompted (kamya) or prohibited (vidhi) and what ought-not-to-be-done (nisedha). The (pratisiddha) should be abstained from. But an indi- be all and end all of the Veda is ritual injunctions. vidual should never give up the performance of "Other texts are authoritative only in so far as they obligatory (nitya) or occasioned (naimittika) actions.3 help the individual to action."6 Thus, any descrip- Their reasoning is: just as sin or negative karmic tive information which may occur in the Scripture consequences results from the performance of pro- derives its meaningfulness only from the impera- hibited actions, so too, will sin result from the non- tive statements therein. By themselves, existential performance of obligatory rites. According to statements are meaningless and have no indepen- Mimamsa, the Vedas are one's authority and as such dent logical status. It is only as complements of prescribe what one should do and prohibit what one should not do. Thus the issue becomes one of interpretation or exegesis. 4The six astika schools (Nyaya, Vaisesika, Sankhya, Yoga, Purva Mimamsa, and Uttara Mimamsa or Vedanta) all accept the authority of the Vedas, though the two Mimamsas especially emphasize this aspect.) However, Mimamsa and Vedanta are devoted specially to an 2The Bhatta school maintains that there is such a thing as knowledge exposition of the Vedic texts. Both systems emphasize an of the Self, but that it is not needed in order to obtain liberation. The investigation (mi mamsa) into the true import of the Vedas. Prabhakara school claims that there is no such thing as knowledge of 5Purvami mamsasutra I.1.1 and Brahmas utra I.1.1. the Self at all. 3 Naiskarmyasiddhi I.10. 6Mimamsasutra 1.2.1. This refers to the well-known division of the Veda into vidhi-vakya (injunctions) and artha-vakya (existential passages).

injunctions that such passages gain meaning (for the Scripture need not say anything about an exis- For instance, the knowledge that what was mis-

tent entity - as such things can readily be perceived taken for a snake is only a rope puts an end to one's

and are not therefore in need of the Scripture). The fears - which is definitely a purportful result.

Scripture, according to Mimamsa, is there to point The Mimamsaka claim that 'any sentence which

out the goal and to describe how to reach it. Its pur- does not have its purport in action is thereby a

pose is to inform individuals about what one mere statement of something which can be known

should and should not do. Knowledge of existential by one of the other valid means of knowledge' is

things is in no way conducive to this end. not necessarily true. There is no necessary reason

Therefore, the Mimamsakas contend that action that an established entity must be perceived by per-

alone will lead one to heave and, for this purpose, ception, etc. Perceptibility, etc. is not the criterion

the Scripture exists. for an established fact existing prior to being

Advaita, on the other hand, maintains that the known. An established fact may be imperceptible or

purport of the Scripture is not to command some- unknowable by a valid means of knowledge due to

thing to be done, but to point to certain self-evident its being either extremely subtle or lacking in dis- truths.7 It is an obvious fact that the Scripture is tinguishing marks. In fact the Advaitin asks, "How

composed of both types of passages: those which can that by which all the pramanas are established, be itself established by a pramana?"8 purport action as well as passages which are descrip- tions of existing states of affairs. In the Indian context, injunctive statements

The Mimamsakas declare that, by themselves, (vidhi-vakya) presuppose the achievement of vari- descriptive texts are meaningless. One need not do ous sorts of results as well as the recognition of an agent thereof while existential statements anything, nor can one do anything in regards to an established fact. However, the Advaitins reply that (siddhartha vakya) are declarations of facts and statements whose subject-matter exists already. In words cannot fail to reveal their meanings no matter to what purpose they are being employed. actuality, these two types of statements have no real

Some meaning is being conveyed and thus a state- logical relation to each other. Both types of state-

ment is not entirely meaningless. Action is not the ments are no doubt valid within their given con-

only bestower of meaningfulness. A descriptive texts. But what must be kept clearly in mind is the

statement conveys knowledge and since knowledge distinct subject-matter of each type of statement. Injunctive statements are valid with regards to removes ignorance, it is gratuitous to declare that knowledge about an established fact is meaningless. actions. Existential statements are valid with regards to facts. Both types of passages inform an

7 See Brahmasūtrabhāsya I.1.4. 8Brahmasūtrabhāsya II.1.4.

30 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 31

individual of something which that individual did not know before hand and could not have known otherwise. Thus, both types of passages function to we are ready to investigate the presuppositions and make something known. Neither type of passage subsequent consequences pertaining thereto. actually functions to produce activity. If, upon hear- The first systematic work on Mimamsa was the

ing either type of passage, one is desirous of per- Purvamimamsīsutra of Jaimini (c. 400 B.C.). The

forming some action, it is the desire that does the earliest extant commentary upon this work is the

prompting and not the statement itself. The aim of Bhasya by Sabara (c. 200 A.D.). Sabara's commen- the passage is to make something known, though tary was then interpreted by two great scholars, what the two types of passages make known is Prabhakara (c. 650 A.D.) and Kumarila Bhatta (c. 700 entirely different. One may perform an action, not A.D.). Since there are differences of interpretation

perform an action, or perform the action differ- between these two scholars, two sub-schools came

ently, according to one's individual whim, but in into existence named after them: the Prabhakara

regards to a fact, there is nothing to be done. school and the Bhatta school. Both of these schools

It is in this context that Advaita makes a distinc- maintain that action is the means to liberation - tion between 'knowledge' which is object-depen- though they differ regarding the question as to dent (vastu-tantra) and 'action' which is person- whether there is such a thing as knowledge of the

dependent (purusa-tantra). The former relates to Self (samyag-jnana). In Chapter One, verses 9-13 knowledge of a thing as-it-is. There is nothing to do present the Bhatta view and verses 14-21 present about it. As ignorance about an object disappears, the Prabhakara view.

knowledge of it arises on its own accord. On the other hand, the results of action are of four kinds: That which is produced (utpadyam), that which is II.ii. BHATTA MĪMĀMSĀ

attained (prapayam), that which is modified (vikar y am), and that which is A distinctive feature of Indian philosophy is the

(samskaryam).9 purified manner in which each school conducts a systematic

More than any other topic, the Naiskarmya-siddhi exposition of its own doctrine. The method of expo-

is concerned over the questions and conflicts aris- sition adopted by each philosopher is to establish

ing between the way of knowledge and the way of his own position through a progressive criticism of

works. With this short introduction to the problem, the rival views. These rival views are called the 'purva paksa'. They are examined in sequence, beginning with the least acceptable view, followed by each subsequent view being criticized in light of 9 Naiskarmyasiddhi 1.53 the prior objection. Finally, when even the most proximate view is rejected, the philosopher's own

32 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 33

standpoint or settled conclusion (siddhanta) is estab- lished. Thus, in every Indian philosophical classic prohibited (nisiddha), daily (nitya), and occasional

whose aim is to show through dialectics that the (naimittika).12

philosophical positions that oppose Advaita are not Self-interested actions are desire-prompted. They

tenable, there is a dialectical movement towards the are always accompanied by a specific type of fruit

author's final position through a progressive criti- (phala) which will manifest itself at some time in a

cism of other perspectives. future incarnation. The Veda states which type of

Suresvara states the rival (Bhatta) position as a self-interested action produces what particular fruit,

prima facie view (purva paksa). "Since liberation e.g., 'let him who desires heaven perform the

arises through ritualistic action (alone), what is the jyotistoma'. All such actions are performed for the

use of knowledge?"10 This is a reference to the fulfillment of some desire so that the performer

Bhatta position (see Sloka Vartika, sambandhaksepa thereof may enjoy the fruits of that action. Such

parihara section, verses 103-110).) Kumārila admits self-interested actions, along with all prohibited

that there is such a thing as Self-knowledge, but he actions, i.e., murder, etc., must be given up.

denies that it has any part in the direct means to Kumarila states that an individual must perform

liberation. In reference to the sruti statement, 'the the obligatory (nitya and naimittika) rites. According Self is to be seen',11 he concedes that this passage to an individual's position in life, certain obligatory

points to a knowledge of the Self. However, he Vedic duties must be performed, e.g., the daily

argues that even here, the true purport is an prayer as well as certain occasional duties, e.g., the

injunction to perform rituals. Quite implausibly, birth ceremony at the birth of a son. Not only will

Kumarila states that it is only if and when an indi- their performance destroy the demerit contracted by

vidual knows that his or her Self is a distinct indi- previous sins, but will also avoid accruing a sin of

vidual soul, separate from the body and immortal, omittance. Since the Veda has enjoined such actions

that that individual will engage in ritualistic as obligatory, their non-performance would pro-

actions for the sake of liberation. duce new demerit. Prabhakara, on the other hand,

According to Kumarila, liberation is obtained by actions alone. Four our purposes here, actions may be divided into four types: self-interested (kamya), 12See Mimamsa Paribhasa, p. 43ff. The traditional distinction divides action into two types: obligatory (nitya|naimittika) and non-obligatory (kamya). The former are commands which must be performed (categorical imperatives), either daily or on certain occasions, while the latter are injunctions which prescribe optional (hypothetical

10Ibid., 1.9. imperatives) rites. The performance of the obligatory rites does not

11Brhadāranyaka Upanisad II.iv.5. lead to merit, but their non-performance results in demerit. If the optional rites are not performed, no demerit accrues, but if they are performed, merit accrues.

Naiskarmyasiddhi 35 34 Naiskarmyasiddhi

maintains that the performance of obligatory, their the non-existence of a thing is known through non-

non-performance would produce new demerit. cognition. Even as non-cognition cannot account

Prabhakara, on the other hand, maintains that the for the cognition of positive entities, so too, the

performance of obligatory rites produces no posi- positive pramanas cannot serve as the means for

tive effects and must be performed merely to avoid cognizing negative facts. Since you too (the

the sin of omittance. Advaitin) accept non-cognition as a pramana, this

Kumarila's position is that if an individual does should be obvious and unquestionable.

not perform kamya and nisiddha actions - thereby On the next point both Mimamsa and Advaita

avoiding going to either heaven or hell, and per- are also in agreement. The present bodily existence

forms the daily and occasional prescribed rituals is due to karma-in-action (prarabdha karma). As well,

thereby avoiding new karma, one obtains libera- both schools agree that this stock of merit and

tion.13 demerit which has been set in motion in this pre-

At this juncture, the Advaitin raises a minor sent body can only be removed or exhausted by

objection. The present bodily existence is due to experience.

desire-prompted actions which were performed earlier. Isn't it enough for an individual to abstain from kamya and nisiddha karmas? Why must one II.iii. PRABHĀKARA MĪMĀMSĀ

perform nitya/naimittika karmas also? In other words the question is: 'Why does the (Bhatta) Prabhakara and his followers hold that there is

Mimamsaka say that the non-performance is a neg- no such thing as knowledge of the Self because

ative (abhaa) action. How can demerit arise from there is no valid means of knowledge (pramana) to establish it.15 As well, it is nowhere stated in the something negative? In other words, how can a Scripture that such a knowledge exists. The only positive something (demerit) arise from a negative something (non-performance)? authority that they accept is the Scripture and

The Bhatta answer is found in their acceptance of nowhere does Scripture say anything about 'atma-

non-cognition (anupalabdhi) as a valid means of jnana' as a means of release. These texts stress again

knowledge (pramana).14 Anupalabdhi is the pramana and again, without being able to emphasize

for non-existence. Just as the existence of a thing is enough, that the only means to liberation is

known through the other pramanas, perception, etc., through action. The Advaitin raises another minor objection here. The Mimamsakas presume that the Self 13Naiskarmyasiddhi I.10. 14 Mi mamsasutra 1.1.5. The Prabhakara School does not accept non- 15 Naiskarmyasiddhi I.14 sambandhokti: tat-pratipadaka-pramānabhavat. cognition as a valid means of knowledge.

36 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 37

(Atman) is revealed or made known by a valid means of knowledge (pramana). But, according to self-luminous and not an object of valid knowledge

Advaita, this is not so. The Self is not revealed by (aprameya).

sruti. The Self is self-luminous (sva-prakasa) and self- The Mimamsaka claims that the Scripture

established (pra-siddha). The work of the valid enjoins actions by means of injunctions (vidhi) and

means of knowledge called Scripture (verbal testi- that such actions produce liberation. Yet, at the

mony) is to remove all the false notions which same time, the Mimamsaka levels a charge of criti-

have been superimposed upon the Self. Its work is cism against knowledge because there are not to be found any injunctions within Scripture which per- purely negative. Secondly, all the pramanas function only due to tain to the view that knowledge gives liberation.

the presence of the Self or Consciousness. The Such a criticism is unfounded because, according to

Advaitin points out the even though all knowledge the Mimamsaka themselves, injunctions pertain to

of the myriad things of the world comes through the unseen fruits (adrsta phala) which are obtained

some means of valid knowledge, a means functions from actions (karma). Knowledge, on the other

as a means only through the help of Consciousness. hand, is said to give only seen fruits (drsta phala)

This Consciousness is presupposed in every act of Thus, why should the Mimamsaka raise the ques-

knowing and it is the basis of all knowledge. It is tion about the relation between injunctions and

only indirectly that all objects are established knowledge at all?

through a valid means of knowledge. They are The Prabhakara school offers three types of

established directly through Consciousness. And arguments to establish the conclusion that the

Consciousness is self-established. "Everything Scripture enjoins action and that it is action which

shines only after that shining light."16 Even as a gives liberation. These three types of arguments are:

light is needed to reveal objects in a dark room, but 1) by means of reasoning (yukti), 2) by citing the

no further light is necessary to reveal the light authority of one who knows (apta-vakya), and 3) by

itself, so too, is Consciousness self-luminous and citing Scripture (sruti).

self-established. Thus, though all the pramanas are dependent upon Consciousness, Consciousness is not dependent upon any pramana. Finally, it is merit and demerit, righteousness and unrighteousness (dharma and adharma) which are known through the Scripture. The Self is both

16 Katha Upanisad II.2.15

38 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 39

Advaita, on the other hand, claims that no

II.iv. ARGUMENT BY REASONING injunction is needed in order to remove ignorance which is the cause of bondage. The removal of By means of reasoning, the Prabhakara ignorance requires only knowledge - even as the Mimamsakas say that srutis and smrtis enjoin only removal of darkness requires only light. However,

action (karma) as their central teaching. Having the Mimamsakas disagree with this position. They searched high and low, they can find no injunction claim that the Advaitin proceeds on a certain pre- anywhere which enjoins knowledge as a means to supposition. Advaitins (wrongly) believe that liber-

liberation. ation is a mere removal or destruction of ignorance (avidya-nasa). They hold that where knowledge is, ignorance is not - and that this is precisely the defi-

II.iv.1. OBJECTION nition of liberation. The Mimamsakas do not agree to this definition and staunchly maintain that lib- The Advaitin raises an objection: What about eration is to be achieved only through actions. the sruti text, 'the Self is to be seen'? The Prabhakara The Advaitins maintain that liberation is possi-

answer is that this particular text refers to the Self as ble even during one's present bodily existence

an agent and not as you (the Advaitin) perceive the (jivanmukti).17 The liberated-while-living individ- Self. As was noted earlier, Mimamsa considers the ual is in the world, though not of the world. The Self as a separate individual soul who must engage continuance of the body is in no way incompatible in ritualistic action in order to achieve liberation. with the status of liberation. Liberation is but a Thus, this passage is really an injunction com- change in perspective. Before release, one took the

manding the Self to perform rituals. world of which the body is a part to be real; after

If the Advaitin claims that the Mimamsaka can- gaining liberation one realizes that the world is an not understand this text properly, perhaps the illusory appearance. If the body were real, then lib- Advaitin can point out which (as yet undiscovered) eration could come only after the destruction of the

pramana renders it meaningful from the perspec- body. But, since the body is not real, its continued

tive of knowledge. For, according to the appearance of disappearance is of no consequence. Mîmamsaka, one cannot meaningfully pursue an From the standpoint of the jivanmukta, there is no activity which does not have the sanction of body at all. Scripture or a valid means of knowledge. Any such On the other hand, the Mimamsakas say that

effort would be futile and could not possibly give liberation is possible only in an unembodied state.

the result of liberation. 17 Brhadāranyaka Upanisad IV.4.7.

40 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 41

Both schools actually maintain that liberation means 'there is no association with a body' of primary importance - with the latter giving (asariratva). They differ in that, while Advaita meaning to the former. interprets this statement figuratively, Mimamsa As we have already noted, the Mimamsakas con- interprets it literally. tend that since existential statements convey what Thus, to employ terminology which we just used is already known through other sources of knowl- in another context, Advaita says that liberation can edge, they are merely a restatement (anuvada) and be a seen fruit while Mimamsa defines liberation as dependent upon what they convey. Thus, in actu- an unseen fruit. ality, they are not a source of knowledge at all. For instance, when the text 'mediate on the Self' is considered the injunctive statement, the question II.v. ARGUMENT BY AUTHORITY arises, 'what is the Self?' Thus, the existential statement '(the Self is) satyam, jnanam, anantam',

To support their argument-by-reasoning, the clarifies and gives information to the injunctive Mimamsakas next proceed to substantiate their doc- statement. The existential statement gains validity

trine of action by claiming that Jaimini is a knower and meaningfulness by its act of clarifying the of the Veda's inner truth. At the very least, his word injunctive statement. is an accepted authority (apta vakya). Since he was On the other hand, injunctive statements do not an acknowledge authority on Vedic matters, when encounter such difficulties. What they convey he said "since the ultimate purport of the Veda is to (enjoining an action) cannot be known through any enjoin actions, the passages not enjoining actions other source of knowledge. Not only are they inde-

are (in themselves) purportless".18 pendent in respect of what they convey, but they are One traditional division of the Veda is into: also unique as a particular source of knowledge. For

injunctive statements (vidhi vakya) and existential instance, the text which enjoins the performance of

statements (siddhartha vakya). According to the offering in the fire (Agnihotra) conveys what Mimamsa, an existential statement is meaningful cannot otherwise be known. and valid only when it is made subsidiary to an injunctive statement. An existential statement must be construed along with an injunction. The II.v.1. OBJECTION

former is of secondary importance and the latter is The Advaitins raise an objection here. The argument that injunctive statements are primary

18 Mi māmsāsūtra I.2.1. and existential statements are mere restatements, secondary, and gain meaning only from injunctive

42 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 43

statements cannot be accepted. Does a sentence on Earth ever performing ritual works".19 The become a restatement when what it conveys is Mimamsaka interprets this verse to mean that the already given by some other valid means of knowl- edge? Or, does it become a restatement just because purport of the Veda is to enjoin actions.

it states something existent? Obviously the Advaitin will accept the claim that II.vi.1. OBJECTION a sentence is merely a restatement if it is not origi- nal and independent of what it conveys. But they Advaita objects to the Mimamsaka interpreta- object to the claim that a sentence becomes a tion of this Isa Upanisad passage in three ways: restatement simply because it intimates an existent Regarding agency, enjoyership, and eligibility. Per object - especially when what it conveys is entirely the former, according to Advaita, the Self (Atman) new and independent of any other means of valid is neither an agent nor an enjoyer. To support this knowledge. aspect of their objection, the Advaitin asks, Is 'x' The Veda is held to be impersonal (apauruseya). (Jaimini) the body, or is he the Self'? If he is the Thus Vedic sentences convey, whether they are Self, then, according to the Scripture, the Self is not assertive or injunctive, information which is new an agent (karta). This would have the consequences and cannot be conveyed by any other means. The of eliminating 'x' as the agent who performs actions Upanisads convey knowledge of the trans-empirical, and lives for 100 years.20 On the other hand, if 'x' is ever-existent Brahman. This knowlege is imper- the body, then, according to Jaimini, the results of sonal and independent of any other means of performed actions are to be achieved in a life yet to knowledge. Thus, it must be accorded validity, even come. Therefore, if one is the body and the body is as existential statements independent of injunctive perishable (which is accepted by everyone), then it statements. follows that this present body will never enjoy the fruits of one's actions. There is no third entity left

II.vi. ARGUMENT BY SCRIPTURE to enjoy the fruits of one's actions. The Self may survive death, but it is not an agent of action. The body may be an agent of action, but it does not sur- This argument takes two aspects: that which vive death.21 relates to the 'form' (Grammar) of Scripture and that which relates to the 'content' (Text) of 19İsa Upani sad 2. kurvann eveha karmāni jijiviset sata m samāh. Scripture. Regarding the actual text, the 20See Mundaka Upanisad III.1.1. - Two birds, ever united companions, Mimamsaka invokes the Isa Upanisad passage: "Let cling to the self-same tree. of these two, one eats the sweet berry. The an individual desire to live a hundred years here other looks on without eating. Also see Bhagavadgita. 21See Naiskarmyasiddhi 1.92-93.

44 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 45

Regarding eligibility, it does not arise in regards to the Self, but in regards to the body. According to II.vii. NATURE OF SCRIPTURE Advaita, the Self is pure, one, and non-dual. It is not revealed by any pramana. It is the non-self According to Prabhakara, knowledge of the Self which is revealed by valid means of knowledge. In cannot arise because the Advaitin seeks such practical life, the Self is confused with, and knowledge in scriptural statements (sruti vckya), and attempted to be known, through the adjuncts of the the central element of the Scripture is verbs (which body. But it is the non-self, specifically the body, signify action).23 The Mimamsaka seeks to justify which is composed of adjuncts or parts. The Self is this position by a theory of learning according to other than the non-self, even as the non-self is which the meanings of words are claimed to be other than the Self. The question Suresvara asks is, learnt only in the context of actions. For instance, 'which part of you is eligible - the body, the mind, children observe the actions which take place or the Self?'. around them and relate these actions to verbal Finally, the Self is not an enjoyer (bhokta). The commands which accompany them, i.e., the father body, along with adjuncts, is needed for pleasure says, 'bring the cow'. By a process of insertion and and pain to be experienced. Yet, the body, its elimination, the children come to understand the adjuncts like the mind, etc., and experience are all meanings of the words 'bring', 'cow', etc. Their external and objective while the Self is internal. claim is that it is only in such action-oriented There is no connection between the body which is command situations that words become meaning- subject to pleasure and pain and the Self which is ful. not. The Self is not affected by the mind. Thus it Taking this as one's example, it is easy to see makes even less sense to say that the Self is affected from where the Mimamsaka has come to claim by the senses, the body, or external objects, which that assertive statements are auxiliary to injunctive are progressively farther away. Therefore, the Self statements. It is only in injunctive statements that cannot be said to be an enjoyer and external things the verb is the principal part of speech. The other cannot be said to affect the Self.22 parts of speech such as nouns, adjectives, etc., have to be understood only as modifying the verb. And furthermore, the injunctive suffix within the verb is the most important factor. For, the injunctive suffix signifies what is technically called 'what-is-to-

22See Ibid. I.94. 23Ibid., I.19.

46 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 47

be-done' or the niyoga. Action, especially right action, is at the heart of their system. prescribe either a positive imperative or a negative

Extending the consequences of such a claim, if it prohibition is meaningless, according to the

is the case that secular words have action (niyoga) as Mimamsakas.25 For instance, the text: "He cried",

their purport, it must go without saying that the states that Agni cried in anguish and his tears

Veda has niyoga as its sole purport also. Why does turned to silver. This is just a descriptive statement

this follow? Secular objects are known through of what happened. As such, it is a siddha-vākya.

empirical means of knowledge (pramāna), i.e., per- Thus, if taken in isolation, such a statement has no

ception, inference, etc. If the Veda were to give meaning. The 'why' behind this statement is that

merely knowledge about the existent, it would not there is a prohibition behind offering silver as a gift

be an independent valid means of knowledge. Yet, in a sacrifice. The reason is that 'when Agni cried,

it is only the Veda that super-normal or extra- his tears turned to silver'. In this way, the descrip-

empirical actions or niyoga are known. It is for this tive narration of Agni's crying gains meaning by

reason that niyoga or right spiritual action is being related syntactically to the prescriptive text

described by the Mimamsakas as that which is prohibiting silver in a sacrifice. The same logic

novel and not known through any other valid holds good for the statement 'meditate upon the

means of knowledge except Veda (or sabda). Self' (Atma ityeva upausita). According to the

Therefore, the Mimamsakas declare that what Mimamsakas, this statement is meaningful only as

the Veda teaches is primarily action. It is not indi- a prescription to perform the act of meditation.

vidual desire which prompts action - but the cogni- tion of a command or niyoga. For instance, a ser- vant executes an act, i.e., cooking dinner, because II.vii.1. OBJECTION

his/her master commands him or her to do so even though the servant may not have any desire Sankara refuted the Mimamsaka claim that the

to do so of its own volition. Likewise, the Veda, verb (which denotes action) alone gives meaning to

which is the supreme master, issues certain com- the words of a sentence26 The basic position of

mands. Humanity's wisdom lies in obeying these Advaita claims that the purport of the Scripture is

commands. The Vedic niyoga is impervious.24 In to state the knowledge/fact of the ever-existent

short, the Veda is a niyoga-sastra - a text which teaches what-is-to-be-done. Any text which does not 25The Bhatta view holds that the motive for obeying Vedic commands stems from an individual's desire to acquire pleasure and avoid pain. The Prabhakara view believes that the Veda is not dependent upon the

24 Mimāmsāsūt ra 1.2.1. āmnāyasya kriyārthatvāt ānarthakyam human will. Both schools believe there is a necessity for obeying the

atadarthānām. commands of the Veda however. 26Brahmasutrabhasya, I.1.4.

48 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 49

Brahman. Words cannot fail to reveal their mean- Further, there are ample Vedic texts which do ings no matter to what purpose they are being have the purport of teaching Brahman27 in con- employed. Descriptive statements convey knowl- tradistinction to the Mimamsaka claim to the con- edge and as knowledge they remove ignorance. Thus, it is gratuitious to declare that knowledge of trary. By the application of the six criteria of mean- ing28, the purport or intended meaning of certain an established fact is meaningless. For instance, the statements can well be determined that Brahman is knowledge that what was mistaken for a snake is the content of the teaching of these Upanisadic only a rope, puts an end to an individual's fear - texts. These six criteria are fundamental to and this is definitely a purportful result. Mimamsaka thought and it would be farfetched, The Mimamsakas claimed that any sentence which did not have its purport in action was a mere indeed, to even try to employ them in interpreting these texts as exhorting action. There is an explicit statement of something which could be known by reference to Brahman in these texts and one should one of the other valid means of knowledge, e.g., not unwarrantedly understand any other meaning perception, etc. But, there is no valid reason or by twisting the texts unnecessarily. established law which declares that an established The six characteristic marks (sadlinga) are: the entity must be perceived through perception. harmony of the initial and concluding passages Certainly perceptibility is not the only criterion for (upakrama-upasamhara), repetition (abhyāsa), nov- an established fact to be know. An established fact elty (apurvata), fruitfulness (phala), glorification by may be imperceptible or unknowable (by percep- tion) due to its being either extremely subtle or lack- eulogistic passages or condemnation by deprecatory passages (arthavada), and intelligibility in the light of ing in distinguishing marks, i.e., protons or righ- reasoning (upapatti). teousness. For example, to show that the non-dual Brahman As well, an established entity may be impercepti- is the central teaching of the Upanisads, Advaita ble in differing senses. Brahman is said to be imper- aplies these six criteria to a passage in the sixth ceptible and realizable only in experience. chapter of the Chandogya Upanisad. The text opens Righteousness (dharma) is imperceptible while with the words, "As Being alone, O dear One, was being the result of an act. Dharma is known only this in the beginning, one only, without a second." from the Scripture while Brahman is ultimately The chapter ends with the words, "All this is of the unknowable. To know Brahman is to be Brahman. Knowlege of righteousness, leads to meaningful acts. But even knowledge of Brahman, though not 27 See Chandogya Upanisad VI.2.1; Aitareya Upanisad II.1.1.1; an act, is meaningful in that it removes ignorance. Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 11.5.19; Mundaka Upanisad II.2.11. 28See the introduction to the Bhamati: upakrama pasamhārav abhyāso, 'purvata phalam arthavado 'papatti ca lingam tatparya nirnaye

50 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 51

essence of it." Thereby is established that there is Certainly it is true, recognised, and accepted by all harmony between the beginning and concluding Advaitins that Brahman is an established fact (siddha passages. Within this chapter the statement 'that thou art' (tat tvam asi) is repeated nine times. That vastu). But this alone does not, nor cannot be the

the truth is the One, non-dual Brahman (which is reason why it (Brahman) should be perceived by the

the subject taught in this chapter) cannot be senses or other valid means of knowledge. An

obtained by any other means is also expounded established entity may or may not be perceptible to

herein. "He knows who has a preceptor; for him the senses. As was stated earlier, perceptibility is not

there is delay only so long as he is not free (from the criterion for an established fact existing prior to

the body), and then he becomes (with Brahman)", the operation of a valid means of knowledge.

speaks of the fruit or result of the knowledge of Jaimini's intention in saying that Scriptural texts

Brahman. The non-dual Brahman is glorified in not referring to any act are meaningless is only to show that the arthavada or eulogistic mean- such passages as, "Did you ask for that instruction by which the unheard becomes heard, the un- ing/condemnatory meaning (like the stories and myths which have no cognitive meaning in them- known becomes known, the un-understood selves) must be related to texts prescribing acts to becomes understood?" And lastly, this chapter acquire meaning. He does not refer to existential or presents for its teaching that Brahman is the One, negative statements (siddha and nisedha vakya) non-dual Reality. For instance, "Just as by means of which have their own meanings independently of a single lump of clay, all things earthen are known, all transformations are verbal and therefore are any act. Adherents of the Prabhakara position maintain only name; earth alone is real", such passages seek to establish the non-dual Brahman by means of ana- that even if knowledge of the Self were to exist - it doesn't, but suppose they were to grant such for the logical reasoning. sake of argument, even then it will not change the Secondly, it cannot be said that Scriptural texts claim that action is the central purport of the solely refer to an agent of action because there exist texts which explicitly deny the possibility of agent, Scripture. They osit that the relation between knowledge and action must be one of three types: act, and instrument thereof. For instance, there is either 1) knowledge is subsidiary to action, 2) action the text: "With what would he see what?"29 This is subsidiary to knowledge, or 3) their relationship text repudiates all distinctions possible upon the is on an equal footing.30 realization of the Self. No matter which of the three relationships is chosen, release must come through some form of

29Brhadāranyaka Upanisad II.4.13. 30Naiskarmyasiddhi I.20.

52 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 53

action. Knowledge alone, and by itself, is refuted. Knowledge can be found only in conjunction with duced - liberation is ever-existent (nitya); liberation

action in one of these three types of relationships. is not something to be attained - it is already

This being so, whether one accepts that spiritual attained; liberation is not something to be modified

knowledge exists or not, in any case it cannot, of - since the Self (Atman) is unchangeable (avikari) and

itself, lead to liberation. For every station of life immutable (kutastha); and liberation is not purifica-

(asrama), according to each individual's capacity, it tion - the Self is eternally pure. Action is itself an

is action which brings release. It is action through effect of ignorance and hence could never destroy it.

speech (study the Veda and speak the truth); it is Action and ignorance are not incompatible in

action through the mind (make the mind pure and regards to eithe their source, nature, effect, or field

tranquil); and it is action through the body (perform of operation.

the daily and ocasional duties) - karma through vak, Action cannot give liberation because liberation

manas, and kaya brings release and nothing else. is nothing more than remaining in one's own state (svarupa sthiti). It is only knowledge which can remove ignorance even as light is the only remedy

II.viii. ADVAITA VEDĀNTA'S REBUTTAL for darkness. Even as darkness cannot remove darkness, so too, action cannot remove ignorance. Action is dependent upon superimposition

According to Advaita, action (karma) cannot give (adhyasa) and superimposition is dependent upon liberation (moksa). This is due to the fact that the ignorance. Thus, every action is due to ignorance. effects of action are of four types and liberation does If this were not damaging enough, the Advaitin not fall into any of its four categories.31 The effects continues by saying that even if it were granted (for of an action pertain to either: origination (utpattih), the sake of argumentation) that liberation could be

attainment (apti), modification (vikrti), or purifica- achieved through action, still insurmountable tion (sarskrti). However, according to advaita, liber- problems would exist. The question can be posed, 'Is ation is but the destruction of ignorance (avidya liberation the effect of one action or of all actions nasa). We will go deeper into this later on, but for combined'?

now let it suffice to note that action cannot remove If liberation is the effect of one single action, then

ignorance (and thereby give liberation) simply all other actions are useless. If there is one single

because: liberation is not something which is pro- action. which confers liberation as its fruit, then all other actions would be rendered superfluous and useless. This would have the effect of rendering 31Ibid. I.23. These are listed in 1.53; in Upadesa Sahasri XVII.50; and in almost every single Vedic injunction as prohibited the Daksinamurti hymn with Suresvara's Manasollasa Commentary. (pratisiddha) since they would involve uselessness.

54 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 55

Advaita's view is not open to this criticism since it trans-empirical. The job of the Scripture is merely

maintains that liberation comes through the to suggest the means-end relation. Its role is purely

destruction of ignorance and all Vedic injunctions informative. The knowledge which Scripture gives,

have their validity only within the realm of igno- like all knowledge, is declared to be controlled by an

rance before liberation arises. already existent reality.32 As such it is revelatory

If liberation is the effect of all actions combined, and its function is merely to reveal the nature of a

then they, in combination, are the equivalent of thing.

one single action and this goes contrary to the If an individual is desirous of heaven, then an

Mimamsaka theory that actions are of various appropriate action must be performed. Scripture's kinds. Mimamsa claims that every kind of ritualis- work is to state this means-end relation. Do you

tic action, without exception, has its own specific want heaven?' - 'Then perform this yajna'.

result. Yet, how can every action give but a single Scripture does not, nor cannot, compel an individ-

result? Neither is it possible for a single individual ual to perform any action. All it can do is to inform to perform all the myriad actions which go with all what steps to take if a desire is present. It is the

the different stations of life (asramas). And if all the desire that leads to action and not the information

actions of one particular israma produce liberation, itself. One may perform an action, not perform that

then since in the cause there is a special excellence, action, or perform that action differently according

there must also be a special excellence in liberation. to one's individual whim - but, in regards to a fact

However, there are no gradations in liberation. there is nothing to be done. As Mandana said,

According to the Mimamsaka, specific actions 'Scripture gives one knowledge of the means to a

have specific fruits. Yet, there are no Vedic injunc- particular desire' (ista-sodhanata-jnana).

tions which delineate what particular action gives In concluding this particular rebuttal, Suresvara

liberation. The declared purpose of ritualistic makes a subtle dig at the Mimamsakas. He alludes

actions is to consume the effects of an individual's to a well-known story about an Indian mother-in-

previous sins. So, which action gives liberation? law and her daughter-in-law. The mother-in-law

Daily (nitya) and occasional (naimittika) actons had overheard her daughter-in-law telling a beggar

remove sins; self-interested (kamya) actions give to leave the premises because "Go away, we've

enjoyment; prohibited (pratisiddha) actions give sin. nothing for you here". Infuriated at her daughter-

There are no other types of actions. Thus, nowhere in-law, the mother-in-law shouts, "What right

does the Vedic orpus state that action gives libera- have you to tell beggars that we have nothing

tion. here?" Then the mother-in-law turns around and

As well, the sruti itself does not say that action gives liberation. According to Advaita, liberation is 32Sec Brhadāranyaka Upanisad IV.5.15 and 1.4.10.

56 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 57

yells at the beggar saying, "Go away, we've nothing for you here". If this action is based upon authoritative right

Suresvara is saying, 'your words are really our knowledge (pramana mulaka), either secular or

words' and 'you believe what we believe'. Since Scriptural, then Mimamsa is correct. On the other both Advaita and Mimamsa uphold the avoidance hand, if this action is based upon a wrong knowl-

of prohibited and self-interested actions, as well as edge (mithya jnana) and renunciation of action is

the fact that obligatory daily and occasional rituals correct, then Advaita's view is the right one. In

do not produce any positive results, our doctrines other words, does all prompting to action arise

really do not differ. Thus it follows, even on the from ignorance or is action the correct means to ful-

Mimamsaka's own principles, that liberation is not fillment, no matter what the end?

to be achieved through action. Suresvara says that 'sruti reveals like the sun reveals'. Even as the sun shines alike on the good

II.ix. ADVAITA VEDĀNTA'S THESIS and bad revealing both, so too, Scripture is value- free, commitment-free, neutral, revealing merely

After having refuted the Mimamsaka view that the means-end relation. Individuals' desire what is

liberation arises through action, Suresvara now pleasurable and dislike what is painful. Scripture

advances several arguments to support his con- tells what the means to the good are and how to

tention that liberation is but the cessation of igno- avoid the bad. It does not confer any power on any-

rance (which arises only through knowledge of the thing whatsoever. Desire and aversion are natural

Self). to individuals and are not something given by

Within the empirical world it is usually the case Scripture.

that an individual performs an action, or abstains An individual's personal conception of good and

from performing an action, according to that indi- bad, of desire and aversion arises from ignorance.

vidual's own personal desire or aversion. These People act due to wrong knowledge (mithya-jnana).

desires and aversions are determined by empirical They give value to things due to this ignorance.

sources of knowledge. But the problem which arises Being confused about what is really good (the Self),

concerning liberation is not empirical (drsta-phala) individuals resort to all types of desire and aversion

but trans-empirical (adrsta-phala). The individual in an attempt to obtain liberation. The Scripture is

desires liberation. The Mimamsaka claim is that most helpful in this endeavour because liberation

action is the means to liberation. But will a self- is a sphere which no other means of knowledge has

interested action, which is to give unseen future access to.

fruits (liberation), proceed and succeed along the That the Self is never separate from the good'

same empirical lines? the 'pleasant', the 'blissful' can be demonstrated through perception, inference, and revelation.

58 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naişkarmyasiddhi 59

Perceptual experience exists in the state of deep- Thirdly, there is the Scriptural authority which sleep. From the non-existence of pain and misery in declares 'anandam brahman' - the Self is bliss.34 the sleep state one can conclude that one is in a There are other texts like: "From bliss, indeed, all state of happiness or bliss. As the Scripture says, creatures come into being; in bliss they live; and "Crossing the bund of the experience of waking and unto bliss they return. Hence bliss is Brahman."35 dream, the purusa, though blind, becomes who who The nearer a thing is to the self, the dearer it is. is not blind, though wounded, becomes one who is Those who do not realize this fundamental fact and not wounded, though suffering from disease, consider things other than the self to be dearer meet becomes one who is not suffering from disease."33 with disappointment and disillusionment. Thus, This happiness is in the Self is directly experienced the Self is the real good. One should not give ulti- and not inferred. And because in sleep, this state of mate value to the things of the world, 'this vale of happiness is experienced, it testifies to the nature of tears'. If one acts due to wrong knowledge, misery the Self. will be the result. That the Self is blissful can also be demonstrated What Scripture does is merely to inform one of through inference. Every individual wants happi- this fact. It has no ability to confer power on any- ness. There is the evidence of everyone's individ- thing. It does not create the power in fire to burn; ual experience who say after waking up from sleep: nor does it create agency or enjoyership in the Self; 'Happily did I sleep; I knew nothing when I was nor does it create the attainability of heaven or asleep'. This reflective cognition of happiness is some other 'desirable' thing; nor does it create the grounded in the experience of sleep - for without instrumental nature of a sacrifice. the latter the former would not be possible. Nor Thus, after demonstrating that an individual may it be said that since in sleep there are no recog- who does not know the Self cannot attain the Self nized means of knowledge there can be no experi- through the performance of Vedic injunctions and ence of happiness or lack of misery. Such experi- prohibitions, Suresvara now goes on to show wthat ences require no instrument of knowledge for they no action can possibly acquire the Self because it is are self-luminous and self-revealed (thereby requir- already self-attained. The Scripture's real purpose is ing no external channel of cognition). Everyone to state the appropriate means for the attainment of seeks the Self because it is the source of happiness, the Self, as well as what to avoid. nay, it is happiness itself. Attainment may be said to be of two types and avoidance is likewise two-fold. There is the attain-

34Brhadāranyaka Upanisad III.ix.28. 33Chandogya Upanisad VIII.iv.2. 35Taittiriya Upanisad III.6.

60 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 61

ment of the unattained through ignorance and eternally is, and thus is already attained. It is there is attainment of what is really to be attained. through ignorance that one does not realize this. It Likewise, there is the avoidance of the avoided of is through knowledge that one attains the already its own accord, and there is the avoidance of what is attained (prptasya praptih). really to be avoided. The first type in each case is Now, since action itself arises from ignorance, it not attainment or avoidance in the real sense of the cannot remove or destroy ignorance. But

term. Something is already attained, or avoided, but knowledge is the opposite of ignorance, even as through ignorance one thinks that it is no so, i.e., light is the opposite of darkness, and thus knowl- discovering the gold necklance around one's neck edge removes ignorance even as the sun removes which was thought lost, or, avoiding a demon darkness.36 which turns out to be but a shadow. The real sense Suresvara anticipates a possible objection here. of attainment or avoidance occurs when one attains The Mimamsaka may say that it is true that libera- what was not previously attained, i.e., a wealth tion is not in a state of bondage. However, individ- which was not previously possessed or avoids what uals, Scripture, teacher, and all the other effects of needs to be avoided, i.e., a snake which is really pre- ignorance are (physically) in a state of bondage and sent. therefore liberation is something to be attained in These examples have been given by Suresvara in the real-sense-of-the-term. And if this is the case, order to demonstrate that the Scripture gives then this attainment must be obtained through information regarding things which exist empiri- action. cally. The sruti tells the appropriate means to attain Suresvara answers, 'no', because right-knowl- what is good and to avoid what is evil. But, and this edge is based on the self-revealed Brahman alone. is extremely important, the other two cases stand Right knowledge depends upon Scripture only for 'attained' or 'avoided' by their very nature. its arisal, but once risen, it does not depend on the Thus, liberation or enlightenment is but the dis Scripture for its removal of ignorance. Yet, as we pelling of the illusion that there is something to be observed earlier, action depends upon ignorance newly attained or avoided. Action cannot give this both for its rise and for the production of its effects liberating knowledge. It is not action, but knowl- after it has risen. edge which dispells ignorance. Ignorance is the only The Mimamsaka claims that knowledge of the obstacle to attaining the 'lost' necklace or of avoid- Self also arises from ignorance, even as action arises ing the demon. One obtains the objects of the world from ignorance, because it, too, presupposes differ- through action, but the Self is 'attainable' solely through knowledge. Since ego-hood or jiva-bhava doesn't really exist, it is already avoided. The Self 36Naiskarmyasiddhi 1.35. karn nāla mohapanuttaye samyag-jnanam virodhy asya tamisrasy nisuman iva.

62 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 63

ence (Scripture, teacher, pupil, etc.). And if this is so, then it also is not competent to remove igno- knowledge of the Self must arise only from igno- rance. rance. How is that? Because one must presuppose Not so, replies Suresvara, because even though difference, i.e., the knower, the known, and the act we admit that duality is present before this knowl- of knowledge must all be different. Yet, according to edge arises, once the knowledge of the Self does Advaita, the claim is put forth that anything which arise, duality disappears. Right knowledge makes a arises from ignorance is not competent to remove distinction only for its origination. But once it has ignorance. arisen, right knowledge needs nothing else to per- The Advaitin replies, it is certainly true that it form its work and its results arise immediately. would appear that in order for knowledge of the A second objection is then raised: We both Self to arise, there must be a distinction between the acknowledge that wrong knowledge exists and due teacher, the student, and what is taught. Such a to its presence an individual pursues empirical duality we do admit (even though it is ontologically things. It is your (Suresvara's) contention that right unreal) - until the knowledge of the Self arises. knowledge is needed to overcome wrong knowl- However, note that once knowledge of the Self edge. But why do you claim that wrong knowledge arises, duality disappears. Right knowledge, only for cannot (also) be removed by action? In order for an its origination by an ignorant individual, seems to individual to know that a demon is but a shadow, make a distinction. But, once right knowledge all that one need to is to move closer and thereby arises, it has no need of anything else (i.e., duality perceive that the 'demon' is but a shadow. in any of its manifestations) to do its work. As well, The Advaitin replies that it is not the act of mov- once right knowledge arises, its results occur ing closer which is the remover of the shadow- immediately. demon ignorance, but knowledge of the substratum To sum up: 1) Atma-jnana arises from avidya (in (adhisthana). Once the substratum of the error, or a qualified sense). The content of atma-jnana is the the shadow itself, is known, the ignorance van- Self (which removes all distinctions) while the con- ishes. The act of moving closer certainly may help tent of action is the not-self (which makes distinc- in obtaining this knowledge, but it is the knowledge tions). itself which is the remover of the ignorance - and 2) Atma-jnmna requires the help of ignorance only not an action alone. for its origination and not for doing its work. The Mimamsaka raises a third objection.37 As far Action requires duality both for its origination as as we can see, even according to Advaita, well as its work. 3) Knowledge is independent (sva-tantra) in doing

37Ibid., 1,35. its work, while action is always 'other-dependent' (para-tantra).

64 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi .65

4. Knowledge always gives immediate results destroyed, root and branch. Logic tells us that what while action gives results which involve a time-lag. has been sublated cannot later rise up to be a subla- (Besides the fruit (phala) of any action - which may tor. or not be immediate, there is a latent tendency Suresvara concludes that ignorance, once over- (samskara) which always involves duration). come by right knowledge, can never sublate knowl- edge. When right knowledge has sublated igno- rance, latent tendencies (vnsana or samskara) are II.x. ACTION INVOLVES "DOERSHIP" produced which in subsequent similar circum- stances arise up to prompt the seer to remember the The Mimamsakas raised an objection that right- truth.39 knowledge is sometimes contradicted by wrong- Action involves ignorance. Without ignorance knowledge, i.e., notions of doership still raise their there would be no life in the world in the ordinary head.38 The Mimamsakas concede for the sake of sense of that term. To press home his point, argument that atma-jnma has arisen. Still, a doubt Suresvara invokes the logical principles of co- lingers in their minds. Individuals are observed to presence and co-absence (anvaya-vyatireka): Given consider themselves as doers and enjoyers. This avidya, there is samsra. Given the absence of avidya, must mean that mithyajnana has sublated the there is the absence of samsara. Or, to state it in atma-jnana. Thus, they conclude that right knowl- other terms, those individuals who possess igno- edge can be sublated by wrong-knowledge on the rance and look upon themselves as such-and-such, basis of observed experience. a doer, enjoyer, etc., are servants to avidya and all The Advaitin answers: ignorance has two the imperious injunctions of the Scripture. Such an aspects: non-apprehension (agrahana) and mis- individual's acts sting him or her again and again apprehension (viparyaya). The former is 'not know- by the good or bad commandments of the Veda. ing the truth' while the latter is 'knowing the truth Being tied to the terrible ocean of pain called otherwise'. Both aspects are products of ignorance. samstra, birth follows death and death follows birth, When ignorance is removed, mis-apprehension is inexorably and inevitably. Ignorance (avidya), desire removed. When the cause of mis-aprehension is (kama), and action (karma) keep one tied to the removed, the effect or wrong knowledge is also wheel of existence. The great statements of the sruti removed. Thus, right knowledge is the sublator and are there to inform one as to the way to destroy this wrong knowledge is what is sublated. Being sub- bondage. The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad says: "When lated thusly, it cannot rise up again. It has been one is released from all the desires that bind the

38Ibid., I.38. 39Ibid.

66 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 67

heart, then mortals even here become immortal and realize Brahman."40 Such a one is akama, Thus, the mind should be made pure, clear, and nişkāma, atmakāma, and āptakāma. tranquil so that it will naturally and spontaneously incline towards the inmost Self. The nitya- naimittika karmas, when routinely performed, turn Il.xi ACTION IS AN AID TO LIBERATION the mind inwards and once their work is done, dis- appear of their own accord. This is their greatness According to Advaita, karma is an indirect aid to in that they purify the mind. The basis for the thesis liberation. As such, action has an important place that actions done in a pure spirit as offerings to God in the preparatory stages. It is said to be an indirect will drop away after purifying the mind finds its means (arudupakaraka). Suresvara says that dispas- justification in the idea that the Self is naturally sion or renunciation (vairngya) arises in the heart of pure. And, once the mind is pure, actions are an individual who has amassed much merit and unnecessary. has a mind which has been purified (citta-suddhi) by Suresvara quotes the Bhagavadgita to support performing nitya-naimittika karmas.41 this thesis: Vairagya, in this context, means a distaste for both heaven and hell, for this world and the next. It The sage uses action as the means for climbing

arises when an individual knows that the fruits of towards the heights of yoga. Restraint and

desire prompted actions are: impermanent, sur- serenity are the means for one who has attained.43 passable, and always mixed with suffering. When dispassion has arisen in one's mind, the alluring power of passion is no longer able to entice First one should plough the ground, then sow the seed and leave it alone to germinate. one in exchange for a prospective pleasure. As The initial stage is a preliminary renunciation or Mandana said, vividisa sannyasa. At this level, one renounces in order to fulfill one's desire to know. It is also called Because the Self as Consciousness is of the very nature of Brahman, reali-zation of Brahman sarva-karma-sannyāsa. This aspirant is a seeker, a

consists in the manifestation of one's own Self sadhaka. Next comes the vidvat-sannyasa or stage

that results from the rubbing away of when the aspirant is a knower, a siddha, an accom- impurities as if from a crystal.42 plished one. This is renunciation after knowing the truth

40 Brhadaranyaka Upanisad IV.iv.7. 41 Naiskarmyasiddhi I.45,47 42 Bralmasiddhi p. 121. 43 Bhagavadgita VI.3. See Naiskarmyasiddhi 1.51

68 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 69

Suresvara puts all this in a nutshell: obligatory and occasional actions lead to purification/merit. can never be a direct means to it. Moksa is not in Purification destroys one's demerit which leads to a need of action's acts - though action may serve as an pure mind. A pure mind leads to partial renuncia- aid thereto. tion and renunciation leads to a desire for libera- tion. A desire for liberation impells one to search for a means thereto and this search enables the mind to incline towards the Self. This leads to a complete renunciation which finally bestows libera- tion once ignorance is destroyed. If an individual studies the Upanisads and then declares that he hasn't obtained liberation, it is pre- cisely because he has not gone through the prepara- tory stages first. Action, by itself, cannot bring about liberation - but action is an indisputable aid thereto. This is a fact which is very often overlooked in summaries and criticisms of Advaita Vedanta. There is a very definite path of spiritual exercises (sadhana) and it behooves an individual not to become lost in the sublties of doctrine to the detri- ment of realization. The time honored proces is: sruti, yukti, anubhava. First comes 'hearing' the doc- trine. Until that is completely digested and made one's own, with all that it entails, one is not quali- fied or fit to enter into a critical and analytical dis- cussion of why moksa has not occurred As has earlier been explained, the result of action is that something is either: produced, attained, modified, or purified.44 Moksa has nothing to do with any of these. The Self is neither to be pro- duced, attained, modified, or purified. Thus, action

44Naiskarmyasiddhi I.53.

CHAPTER THREE

III. SAMUCCAYA

III.i. INTRODUCTION

Since it has been shown that action alone cannot remove ignorance, the possibility is raised of action- cum-knowledge as the destroyer of avidya.1 Suresvara is known as a champion of the view which maintains that liberation has nothing to do with the performance of actions. Three views are advanced regarding the joint operation of action and knowledge: Some hold that 1) knowledge is primary and action is secondary: 2) action is pri- mary and knowledge is secondary; and 3) knowl- edge and action are equally important. Suresvara refutes all of these views - whether propounded by Bhartrprapanca, Brahmadatta, or Mandana. Jnana-karma-samuccaya is of two kinds: sequen- tial combination (krama-samuccaya) and simultane- ous combination (sama-samuccaya). The first ques- tion the Advaitin asks an advocate of jnana-karma- samuccaya is, 'which type are you advocating'? Strictly speaking, the former is no combination at all. And regarding sama-samuccaya, it has three possible combinations: either action is primary or knowledge is primary, or they are of equal status.

1 See Naiskarmyasiddhi I.54-79.

72 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 73

Before considering the Mimamsaka's response, III.ii. ACTION IS PRIMARY let us analyze this theory of combination. According to Advaita, action can never be the Mimamsa claims that action (karma) is primary means and knowledge the end product. Why? and that knowledge (jnana) is secondary. In their Because liberation is said to be imperishable (nitya- phala) while the fruits of karma are only perishable parlance, action is the pradhana and knowledge is

(anitya-phala). Or, again, knowledge by its very guna. However, Suresvara objects to this position, and on three grounds. Firstly, according to Advaita, nature is pramana vastu tantra. That is, knowledge knowledge is the 'end' and action is the 'indirect can only be obtained through a valid means of means' thereto. This being the case, how can one knowledge (pramana) and, as the object, so the claim that they exist together (in combination) at knowledge. As we said earlier, knowledge is object- the same time? Their very relation is one of 'means dependent. But, action (karma or upāsana) is purușa and end' and, as such, this relation is not a combi- tantra. It is person-dependent. And lastly, the nation at all. Secondly, if action is a means to content of knowledge is Brahman/Atman which is knowledge and knowledge is a means to liberation, immutable (kutastha) and 'not what is to be then it follows that together they cannot be the accomplished through action (asadhya). The means to liberation. Finally, actions which are per- domain of ignorance is the unreal while the formed in a previous life can be the means to domain of knowledge is the real. They stand to one knowledge in a later life. If this is so, then the ques- another as: the contradictor and the contradicted; tion of a combination cannot arise. the lion and the sheep; the sun and the night; the destroyer and the victim. Now, mere action alone (kevala karma) cannot III.iii. ACTION AND KNOWLEDGE ARE EQUAL give liberation. This we have just determined. We shall proceed to show that even in combination, As for the third option, i.e., the status of action action cannot give liberation.2 Action may be the and knowledge being equal in regards to liberation, means to knowledge (as an aid). But, so long as this, too, cannot stand a close analysis. If action is action is present, liberation has not been realized. what is sublated, and knowledge is the sublator, When knowledge 'dawns', not only the means to it then where is the scope for a combination? is no longer needed, but it cannot exist at all. Ignorance is opposed to knowledge. Further, igno- rance is concerned with the unreal while knowl- edge is concerned with the real. Thus, even as light is opposed to darkness and can have no combina- 2Ibid., I.54.

74 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 75

tion, so, too, knowledge is opposed to ignorance given: and can have no possible combination. When an individual takes the stump of a tree for a thief, he becomes frightened and runs

III.iv. A KNOWER'S RELATION TO ACTION away.5

One who has secured the knowledge of Brahman Whenever knowledge functions as the prompter

is not subject to injunctions, either prescriptions or and action occurs for what is prompted, superimpo-

prohibitions. Why? "One who is free from the body sition or false knowledge will occur.

(videha) is free from doubt (vita sandeha) through the However, right knowledge of samyag-jnana does

practice of 'not-this, not-this'."3 Freedom from the not lead to action. If an individual has right knowl-

body is freedom from both the gross and subtle edge of the tree stump, flight will not be a logical

bodies. Freedom from doubt is freedom from the consequence. Likewise, if an individual has right

causal body. When this occurs, one looks upon the knowledge of the Self, such knowledge will never

psycho-physical organism as the non-self and pays be a factor in an injunction to action. The Self

no heed to their activity. neither acts nor is acted upon. To generalize this

Suresvara gives an analogy to exemplify this principle, since knowledge is opposed to action,

point: knowledge cannot be found in conjunction with action. Those that are of a similar nature can co-

Just as a child imagines that his clay elephant exist, but not those which are of a different nature.

is a real elephant and proceeds to play with it, so do the deluded people of the world super impose the body, etc. onto the Self and proceed to behave in various ways.4

Like in this example, conjunction between the imaginary and the real (or between action and knowledge) is admitted by the Advaitin in certain instances, i.e., in mithya jnma. Another example is

3Ibid., I. 58. 4Ibid., I. 59. 5 Tbid., 1.60.

76 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 77

III.v. GROUNDS FOR REJECTING are mutually contradictory in three essential CONJUNCTION OF ACTION AND KNOWLEDGE respects. They are opposed in regards to their:

In the Mimamsa-paribhasa there are listed the 1) source (hetu) principles or angatva-bodhaka pramana by which the 2) nature (svarupa) Mimamsakas decide whether something is sub- 3) effect (karya/phala)9 sidiary or not.6 These principles are defined as, "(characteristics) indicative of the subsidiary nature Regarding their source, the cause of knowledge is a of something to something else."7 They include: 1) valid means of knowledge (pramana) while the sruti or does the text speak of this? 2) linga or is there source of action is ignorance (avidya) or desire (raga) any mark to make this conclusive? 3) vakya or syn- plus aversion (dvesa). The nature of knowledge is iactical relation; 4) prakarana or context; 5) sthana or that it illumines, it is the light of the Self position or proximity; and 6) samakhya or designa- (prakasa svarupa), while the nature of action con- tion. ceals, is non-luminous. The effect of knowledge is Suresvara asks the question, 'does knowledge the destruction of ignorance (avidya nivrtti), while occur in the context (prakarana) of action?' If you the effect of action is either: produc- can show me an instance of such, then I would tion/attainment/ purification/modification. This have to conclude that they are related according to shows that knowledge and action cannot simulta- the accepted principles deciding such. They would neously co-exist since they are mutually contradic- then be in the relation of part to the whole (anga- tory in all three aspects. Therefore, they certainly angi). Therefore, can you show me a text which says cannot give rise to liberation by operating in con- to/no, you can't, for ... junction.

Knowledge never arises without first destroying ignorance and since the factors of III.vi. BRAHMADATTA action proceed from ignorance, knowledge and action can never be conjoined.8 After having established that liberation cannot Another reason for rejecting the doctrine of a be established through a conjunction of knowledge conjunction of action with knowledge is that they and action, Suresvara next takes up a variation on this theme, i.e., Brahmadatta's position. Brahmadatta held the view that ignorance is 6Mimāmsāparibhāsa 7 Tbid. 8Naiskarmyasiddhi I.65. 9 Ibid., I.66.

Naiskarmyasiddhi 79 78 Naiskarmyasiddhi

removed, not solely by knowledge, but through a remove ignorance. It is action-cum-meditation, or,

long and continuous meditation upon the non- to state the entire position, nitya-naimittika karmas

difference of the Self with Brahman. Thus, the plus upasana which yields liberation. Then, when

central teaching of the Upanisads is not to be found the body falls off, the meditator will attain union

in mahavakyas like tat tvam asi, but in meditation with God.

upon the Self (atmetyevopasita).10 After one has It would appear that Brahmadatta's position

studied the mahavakyas, one must then meditate implies that it is the practise of meditation plus

upon their purport. The upshot of the position is action which removes ignorance. The text conveys

that a time interval elapses between the acquisition indirect knowledge. With the aid of prescribed

of liberating knowledge and the subsequent libera- actions, along with meditation, this textual knowl-

tion. edge becomes immediate knowledge. But the ques-

The sambandhokti to verse 67 refers to two varia- tion arises whether it is meditation (or, meditation

tions of the Mimamsaka position. These two views cum action) which removes ignorance - or, is it the

have been identified by later commentators on the immediate apprehension (saksatkara) which re-

Naiskarmyasiddhi as belonging to Brahmadatta and moves avidya.

Mandana Misra.11 These views again surface in chapter III, verses 9-10, 89-93, and 119-126. Brahmadatta says, in a nutshell, that even as III.vii. MANDANA

there are injunctions in the karma-kanda of the Vedas, so too, injunctions appear in the Upanisads. Mandana's position is a slight variation of

Thus, the Upanisads enjoin meditation (upasana) Brahmadatta's view. Both Mandana and

upon Brahman/Atman. Assertive statements also Brahmadatta are Vedantins, but, according to

exist, i.e., satyam, jnanam, anantam, but they are sub- Suresvara, their tradition is not the true lineage

sidiary to injunctive texts. What the Upanisadic (satsampradaya). Mandana's view states that

texts convey (whether injunctive or assertive) is Brahman cannot be known directly through verbal

mediate knowledge (paroksa jnana). It is meditation knowledge (mahavnkya) because words convey

upon these texts which will enable mediate knowl- their meanings through complex sentences which

edge to give rise to immediate knowledge. Direct involve multiplicity and internal differentiation.

knowledge (sak sat kara) removes ignorance. Thus, Brahman is non-dual and therefore cannot be

action (meditation) has to be performed in order to known directly through the mere hearing of a Upanisadic text. Mandana's position may be conveniently 10Brhadāranyaka Upanisad I.4.7. summarized in a series of propositions: 11Jnanottama and Hiriyanna.

80 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 81

1 - A sentence, by its very nature, can convey Suresvara accepts the utility of meditation before only relational knowledge (samsrsta-visaya). the arisal of Brahman-knowledge. Mediation helps 2 - A sentence, by its very nature, can convey to remove the distractions in the form of doubt only mediate knowledge (paroksa-jnana). and/or erroneous cognition. Such distractions 3 - The Upanisads thus can convey only rela- must be removed and meditation is an acceptable tional and mediate knowledge (vak y artha). means of doing so. However, once the mind has 4 - Brahman is non-relational and immediate become concentrated through meditation and and thus the Upanisads cannot directly convey Brahman-knowledge arises, mediation no longer is Brahman. necessary. Brahman-knowledge, produced by the 5 - Knowledge from the Upanisads must be sruti text destroys ignorance and thus meditation, meditated upon in order to overcome this difficulty too, no longer has any scope for action. (prasamkhyāna/ abhyasa| u pasana). 6 - The results of meditation are immediate knowledge (avak y ūrtha). III.viii ROLE OF SĀDHANA 7 - Immediate knowledge removes ignorance (Brhadaranyaka Upanişad IV.iv.21 - 'vijnāya prajnām In regards to spiritual practices (s adhana) kurvita' - having known, one should attain that Suresvara acknowledges both external remote aids immediate knowledge') (bahiranga-sadhana) like nitya-naimittika karmas 8 - While practising mediation, one should which will help purify the mind and external prox- also do nitya and naimittika karmas (they are not imate aids (antaranga-sadhana) like the four-fold manditory, but they will help one for a quicker pre-requisites (sadhana catustaya). One cannot obtain achievement). The analogy given is from the Brahman-knowledge from these because, strictly Brahmasutra - one may take a horse or one may speaking, one needs a valid means of knowledge walk. Sankara interprets the horse against karma/ (pramana). These aids are only conducive to the for ploughing, while Mandana interprets it for origination thereof. karma). Thus, Suresvara also knowledges the principal proximate aids (mukya-antaranga-sadhana) or Suresvara also refutes this position. The crux of sravana, manana, and nididhy sana. First, one should the issue is not over the utility of mediation (which hear the text of which it has two parts: avantara Suresvara acknowledges as useful), but about the vakyas or subsidiary texts which do not give the stage when meditation is needed. In other words, is liberating knowledge, and mahavkyas or principal meditation needed before or after the origination of texts which give the liberating knowledge. Brahman-knowledge?

82 Naiskarmyasiddhi

Sravana or hearing the Upanisadic text removes any doubts that an aspirant may have in regards to CHAPTER FOUR the correct source of knowledge (pramana). Manana or reflection removes any doubts one may have in regards to the correct object of one's knowledge IV. NATURE OF THE SELF (prameya). 'O.k., there is Brahman but what is this Brahman like, i.e., saguna or nirguna?' Finally, IV.i. INTRODUCTION nididhyasana or contemplation is for removing any errors or the 'opposite stream of thought' Vedanta in general and Advaita in particular has (viparitabhwana). It is for making the mind firm in often been designated or defined as the science of its one-pointed fixity upon Brahman. the Self (Atman-vidy@). In the second chapter of his The Upanisads do not only teach the knowledge of Naişkarmyasiddhi, Suresvara makes a distinction Brahman. They also teach the oneness of the indi- between the Self and the non-self - both from the vidual with that Brahman (jiva-brahma-aikya). Not grounds of reason as well as from those of only do they teach that Brahman is 'x', but also ele- Scripture. He states some thirty-eight arguments to vate the individual by teaching that when one show how and why the Self is not the non-self. knows 'x' correctly, one is 'x'. While to maintain that meditation is necessary after the mahwikya is heard is to question the very IV.ii. SCRIPTURE pramana itself. One is questioning the source which is patently ridiculous. Before one hears, one can IV.ii.1. SCRIPTURE ONLY MEANS TO CONVEY question and even meditate. But after the knowl- KNOWLEDGE OF SELF edge that the mahavikya conveys arises, there is no longer any need to meditate. The knowledge conveyed by the six traditionally accepted means of valid knowledge (pramana) falls into two categories: That which relates to the empirical world and that which relates to the trans- empirical reality.1 All the six sources of knowledge, excepting 'words as knowledge' (sabda), relate solely to the empirical world. And of sabda, it consists of

1 Vedāntaparibhāsā VII, p. 150.

83

84 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 85

both that which is personal and conveys knowledge IV.ii.2. OBJECTION - HEARD TEXT YET NOT of the sensible and that which is impersonal and UNDERSTOOD - 1 conveys knowledge of the supra-sensible.2 Perception is limited to the physical world. All An individual has heard the great saying "that the objects in the phenomenal world possess thou art" and yet that individual still doesn't certain fixed characteristics such as grossness, fine- understand or know the Self. How to explain this ness, name and form. But the Self is trans-empiri- in light of what was just propounded? cal, trans-physical, trans-sensual and free from all distinctions. Thus perception can never reveal it. Inference, presupposes, and is dependent upon, IV.ii.3. REPLY - I perception. Comparison functions through a knowledge of similarity which presupposes differ- The answer to this objection occupies a major ence and then relates the two or more relata part of the second chapter of the Naiskarmyasiddhi. Postulation, too, presupposes difference. And non- Basically, if an individual who has heard one of the apprehension, by its very definition, cannot give mahaikyas still does not understand the Self, it is knowledge of the existent. Since the Self is ever- because that individual does not understand the existent, trans-sensual, non-different, distinction- meaning of 'thou' or the 'Self'.4 Is the Self: the less, one and non-dual - it follows that these physical body? the cognitive and conative organs? pramanas cannot reveal the ever-existent Self. the mind? cognition? the void? the agent of actions Material senses can never reveal a non-material and the enjoyer of fruits? a mere witness? or? We Reality. It should be obvious, therefore, that the will explicate the nature of the Self, but first there senses are limited to the material sphere and that are a number of minor objections which Suresvara the Self can be known solely through the great first introduces. statements of the Veda. "Brahman is known only through the Scripture" - "sastra yonitvat".3 IV.ii.4. OBJECTION - HEARD TEXT YET NOT UNDERSTOOD - II

The next objection is perhaps the most obvious and common one made. Not everyone who reads the text and hears the mahwikya obtains knowl- 2Ibid., IV, p. 116. 3 Brahmasūtrabhāsya I.1.3. 4 Naiskaramyasiddhi II.1

Naiskarmyasiddhi 87 86 Naiskarmyasiddhi

edge of the Self. If it is merely, and exclusively, hearing one of the Great Sayings which produces IV.ii.6. OBJECTION - SRUTI NOT NECESSARY

enlightenment, then how is it that most individuals who the Great Sayings are not Besides Scriptural statements, the objector states

enlightened? that there are a number of ways through which an individual may come to understand the 'Self'. The purva paksin claims that knowledge of the Self can be

IV.ii.5. REPLY - NECESSARY PREREQUISITES - II obtained without the aid of the mahavakyas in the Upanisads. For instance:

Like in every other religious system, Advaita Vedanta has certain conditions which must be 1 - Viraj gained knowledge of the Self

fulfilled before understanding dawns. These are: through mere reasoning;6 2 - Bhrgu gained knowledge of the Self

1 - Dispassion for the world (vairagya) by remembering and reflecting

2 - Longing for liberation (mumuksutva) upon its definition given by his father;7 3 - Approach a qualified teacher (guru) 4 - Association with a teacher leads to 3- Svetaketu gained knowledge of the

hearing a holy text Self by being told by his father;8

5 - Hearing a holy text leads to the 4 - The goblin (pisacaka) gained know-

mahaakya ledge of the Self by accidentally

6 - Proper enquiry according to the hearing of it.9

method of agreement and difference (anvayalvyatireka) These four examples are listed to demonstrate that historically there have been various ways in 7 - Comprehension of the text 8 - Destruction of ignorance (avidya-nasa) which individuals have come to understand the

9 - Attain final goal of life (purusartha)5 Self. They range all the way from a 'natural occurance' to a 'one-time accidental hearing' through a 'continuous pondering'. Thus, the

6Brhadāranyaka Upanisad I.4.2. 7Taittiri yaUpanisad III.1. 8Chandogya Upanisad Chapter 6. 9 Sankhyasūtrapravacanabhāsya of Vijnāna Bhiksu IV.2. 5Ibid. II.6-10.

88 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naişkarmyasiddhi 89

question arises, 'aren't there ways in which an Self does not fall within the scope of any of the individual may become enlightened other than pramanas'? The 'I' is knowable as the mind-body through the destruction of ignorance upon hearing complex by perception, etc. Thus, to declare that the and understanding the Vedic texts'? T' is known as the Self by 'words as knowledge' and as the psycho-physical organism by the other valid means of knowledge is to set up a conflict between IV.ii.7. REPLY what the various pramanas reveal. And, if the Self is attributeless, it is unknowable by any pramāna. As Suresvara maintains that it is the text itself, and well, you, yourself (the Advaitin) claim that 'it is only the text, which produces knowledge of the purportful scripture that is authoritative, and not Self. Any activity of an individual, either natural, scripture as such'. If scripture were to proclaim accidental, or deliberate, is only an accidental aid something absurd or non-sensical, one should thereto. Moksa does not come through action. Even immediately reject such. "Even a hundred scrip- if enlightenment appears to have arisen through tural texts declaring fire to be cold or non-luminous some action, it is only the unseen and apparently will not attain authoritativeness."12 Thus, you hidden functioning of Scripture (which has been must reconcile this statement (the mahwvakya heard on some previous occasion) which must be means that the Self is attributeless) with the responsible.10 obvious perception of the sense-organs which In modern times, the same type of question was perceive the T' as a psycho-physical organism. put to Ramana Maharshi.11 How is it that you gained enlightenment without performing any spiritual practices?' The Maharshi answered, IV.iii.1. OBJECTION - SELF NOT WITHIN SCOPE 'Obviously I must have performed many spiritual OF PRAMĀŅA practices in a previous life.' The opponent then asks, 'how is it possible to assertain the meaning of the mahwikyas since the IV.iii PRAMĀNA Self does not fall within the scope of any of the pramanas'? The I' is knowable as the mind-body The opponent then asks, how is it possible to complex by perception, etc. Thus, to declare that the ascertain the meaning of the mahavakyas since the 'I' is known as the Self by verbal testimony and as the psycho-physical organism by the other valid

10Naiskarmyasiddhi II.4. 11 See Collected Works of Ramana Maharshi. 12 Sankara's Commentary on the Bhagavadgtta, XVII.66.

90 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naişkarmyasiddhi 91

means of knowledge is to set up a conflict between what the various pramanas reveal. And, if the Self is Sense perception is limited to the world of phenomena. As regards transcendental truths, attributeless, it is unknowable by any pramana. As Scripture is the sole valid source of knowledge. well, you, yourself (the Advaitin) claim that 'it is purportful scripture that is authoritative, and not Only the empirical validity of perception and scripture as such'. If scripture were to proclaim other allied means of knowledge is a proven something absurd or non-sensical, one should fact; this is not controverted by the scriptures. immediately reject such. "Even a hundred What is controverted is its ultimateness, which scriptural texts declaring fire to be cold or non- is by no means a proven fact. Therefore there is

luminous will not attain authoritativeness."13 no conflict between perception and the

Thus, you must reconcile this statement (the maha- scriptures.15

vakya means that the Self is attributeless) with the As well, 'words as knowledge' .. obvious perception of the sense organs which perceive the 'I' as a psycho-physical organism. are true, not because it is a reliable person's statement (as the Naiyayikas have it), but IV.iii.2. REPLY because the knowledge that it gives is uncontradicted. "The capacity of words to

The Scripture is distinctive in that what is indicate a thing is intrinsically inherent in the words themselves and thus the truth of a known through it cannot be known through any statement is not dependent upon its maker. other means. As well, there is no conflict between Thus, while a statement may be made based 'words of knowledge' and the other valid means of upon an individual's knowledge, its validity is knowledge. Each is valid in its own sphere. its own and is not dependent upon the

Suresvara says, individual. In fact, Advaita maintains that all cognitions are intrinsically valid (svatah- siddha) and self-luminous (svatah-prakasa). 16 Each of the valid means of knowledge has the inherent capacity to convey knowledge. Their intrinsic validity cannot be maintained in case one is regarded as complementary to another.14

15 Advaitasiddhi, Ch. 1, section 18 Bombay, Nirnaya-sagar Press, 1937, 13 Sankara's Commentary on the Bhagavadgtta XVII.66. pp. 373-374. 14 Naiskarmyasiddhi III.86. 16Grimes, An Advaita Vedanta Perspective on Language, p. Also see, Vedantaparibhāsa IV, p. 116.

92 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 93

IV.iv. DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SELF AND NOT- SELF - INFERENCE and after it is rejected by the body, food is known to be other than the self. Thus, even in its in-between

IV.iv.1 BODY IS THE NOT-SELF - PRODUCT OF state, food should be recognised as being other than

FOOD the self. Even as a garland or sandal paste is some- thing which is different from oneself, so too is the

Suresvara begins a series of five inferences to body other than the Self.

demonstrate that the Self is not the physical body His first argument deduces that the body is the not- Thesis: The body is the not-self It is of the nature of food self because it is a product of food (annakaryatvat). 17 Reason:

Whatever is produced must also decay, and thus Example: What is of the nature of food

the body cannot be the Self. is the not-self, i.e., a garland or sandal paste

Thesis: The body is the not-self Application: The body is of the nature of

It is a product (of food) food which is invariably Reason: concomitant with the not- Example: What is a product is the not- self self, i.e., excreta The body is a product (of Conclusion: Therefore, the body is the Application: food) which is invariably not-self

concomitant with the not- self Conclusion: Therefore, the body is the IV.iv.3. BODY IS THE NOT-SELF - IT CEASES TO BE not-self Again, the body is the not-self because upon

IV.iv.2 BODY IS THE NOT-SELF - NATURE OF death it ceases to be (apayitvat).19 So long as one

FOOD dwells in one's body, one feels that one is the body. But once your body becomes a corpse and the dogs

Again, the body is the not-self because it is of the begin to fight over its remains, the body becomes an

nature of food (agantugatvat).18 Before food is eaten object of contempt. That which eventually dies,

17 Naiskarmyasiddhi 18Ibid., II.12. 19Ibid., II.13.

94 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 9

ceases to be, has an end. Thus, the body must be other than the Self. IV.iv.5. BODY IS THE NOT-SELF - IT DOES NOT PERSIST Thesis: The body is the not-self Reason: It is seen Again, the body is the not-self because it does not Example: What is seen is the not-self, persist (anavayat).21 This is a variation of the third i.e., like a jar inference (IV.v.3.) except that Suresvara gives Application: The body which is seen is another example. The body is perceived as an invariably concomitant with external object, like a pot, and its perceived continu- the not-self ity is broken (like dream-bodies which come and Conclusion: Therefore, the body is the go). not-self Thesis: The body is the not-self Reason: It does not persist IV.iv.4 BODY IS THE NOT-SELF - IT IS SEEN Example: What does not persist is the not-self, i.e., like dream Again, the body is the not-self because it is bodies which come and go seen (drsyatvat).20 Like a jar, the body is an object of Application: The body which comes and perception. What is seen is different from the seer goes is invariably conco- who sees it. Therefore, the body must be other than mitant with the not-self the Self. Conclusion: Therefore, the body is the not-self Thesis: The body is the not-self Reason: It is seen. Example: What is seen is the not-self, IV.v DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SELF AND i.e., like a jar. NOT-SELF - SCRIPTURE Application: The body which is seen is invariably concomitant with IV.v.1. BODY IS THE NOT-SELF - CHANDOGYA the not-self. UPANIŞAD Conclusion: Therefore, the body is the not-self. In support of Suresvara's contention that the body is made of food and hence is not the Self, he 20Ibid., II.19. 21Ibid.

:96 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 97

refers to the Chandogya Upanisad wherein it says, "Food becomes transformed into three parts as The Self must be discriminated from the not-self

mind, muscle, and faeces".22 Suresvara draws an because:

analogy between how one seed becomes threefold into chaff, grain, and straw and how eaten food 1 - So long as body identification lasts, one can neither know the import of becomes threefold as flesh, intellect, and excreta.23 the mahwikyas nor realize such. 2 - False knowledge (mithya jnana)

IV.vi. DISCRIMINATE SELF FROM NOT-SELF differs from right knowledge (viveka jnana). Even as a living individual

IV.vi.1. DESIRE AND AVERSION thinks that the physical body the four pall-bearers know the heavy weight of the corpse. Thus, discriminatory To prove his point, Suresvara gives an example knowledge knows the real weight of

to show that once an individual has correctly the body versus a false identification of

discriminated between the Self and not-self, desire the body which considers it light.

and aversion no longer affect such an individual. "If an individual has voided excrement, and now 3 - The physical body no more belongs to the Self than does blueness belong considers such as impure, what will they care if to the sky. others point out its impurity?"24 In a similar manner, once an individual has 4 - The notions of T and 'mine' are no

understood that the physical body is the not-self, more properties of the Self than

what will such an individual care if others praise or leanness or clothes are. They are

criticize it? Once an individual has known that they objective and subject to cessation. (See Brhadaranyaka Upanişad I.5.1-3 'annam are the immutable Self, what does it matter brahma') whether others praise or criticize? When this is accomplished, the bondage which derives from I' 5 - Even as fire does not burn up in its

and 'mine' is cut. own heat since heat is of its own nature, so too, if the not-self were the Self it could not be known as an object (since the two would not be distinct). However, the Self knows the not-self as an object and thus the two must be 22Chandogya Upanisad VI.5.1. distinct. 23Naiskarmyasiddhi. II.15. 24Ibid., II.16-17.

Naiskarmyasiddhi 99 98 Naiskarmyasiddhi

IV.vi.2. OBJECTION - SELF IS BOTH SUBJECT absent, the I is absent. However, the Self is, by AND OBJECT - I definition, omnipresent.

The Bhatta Mimamsakas raise an objection. They claim that the Self is an object of the ego- IV.vi.4. OBJECTION - SELF IS BOTH SUBJECT notion. They posit that the Self is both the knower AND OBJECT - II and the known. On the basis of each individual's personal experience, they claim as proof the cogni- The Mimamsakas continue their objection by tion I know myself'. stating that the Advaitin's reasoning process is incorrect. The Self is known as both the knower and the known through perception. It will not do IV.vi.3 REPLY - I for the Advaitin to raise an inferential reasoning process to refute perception since inference itself Suresvara replies that "that which is functioning rests upon perception.26 as the object of a knowing subject cannot have that knower as its own object".25 An object, viz., a pot, cannot simultaneously be an object of knowledge IV.vi.5. REPLY - II and the knowing subject. Any entity which is an object of knowledge cannot be the knowing subject Suresvara says that 'what is seen in a locus by a at the same time. Thus, he concludes that the ego- seer, is a quality that belongs to the locus'. For cognition cannot be both subject and the object. instance, in a red rose, the redness is seen in the To demonstrate why the I is like a jar, rose (locus) and belongs to the rose (locus). Thus, Advaitin's use an enquiry into the three states of the seer cannot be the seen; the knower is not the consciousness (avastha traya vicara). The Self or known. consciousness is present at all three levels or This is a slight variation from Suresvara's earlier waking, dreaming, and deep sleep. However, the T' replies. He has been demonstrating that the not-self or ego-notion is present only at the first two levels. is not of the nature of the Self; is not identical with It is not present in the deep-sleep state. This proves the Self; is other than the Self; cannot know the that the I is not the Self. When the mind is present, then the I' is present. When the mind is 26 All the Indian schools hold that inference is inferior to perception since inferences depends upon perception and cannot proceed 25Ibid., II.24. without it.

100 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 101

Self. Now, he shows that the not-self does not Suresvara analyses the statement, I know myself', belong to the Self; is not a quality of the Self.27 in three stages: jnanottama states that Consciousness or the knower or perceiver of the not-self (ego) is the 1 - At stage one, the Self is spoken of as witness-Self (saksin). The saksin is consciousness a 'knower' (jnata) to show a contrast marked by the internal organ (antahkarana-upahita- between the Self and the not-Self.

caitanya). It is always in relation to consciousness and the witness thereof. Even Suresvara admits 2 - At stage two, the Self is not a 'knower' but know-ledge itself (jnana). that the ego is given as an objective perception. What he denies is that the ego or not-self is the Self. 3 - At stage three, the Self is said to be Unlike the Mimamsakas who believe that the Self 'not-this, not this' (neti neti). In actual-

can be given as an object of knowledge, according to ity, the Self cannot be described in

Suresvara the Self is knowledge itself and not an words at all. "Words, along with the mind, return without reaching it."30 object thereof. If the Self is said to know itself, there are two alternatives possible. Either: 1) The whole Self IV.vi.6. REPLY - III knows a part of itself, or 2) A part of the Self knows another part of the Self. But, neither of these cases Even if the not-self or ego were a quality of the present a viable solution because: Self, it would still be unknowable unless the Self could know itself as an object (which is impossi- i) If a quality inheres in a substance, it ble).28 Furthermore, Suresvara adds a further reply is not different from what it inheres as to why the Self cannot know itself (or any quality in. Thus, it would not be possible for therein if - such exists) as an object, viz., the Self is the Self to know itself since there

partless, undifferentiated, and homogeneous.29 would be no knower different from the known.

ii) By definition, the Self is one and non-dual. Thus, there cannot be made a distinction between a substance and its qualities.

27 Naiskarmyasiddhi 11.25 iii) The Self is not made of parts. 28Ibid., IV.vii.3 +5. 29Ibid., II.26. 30Taittiri ya Upanisad II.iv.1.

102 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 103

iv) The Self is not an object of knowl- edge at all. According to Advaita, in moment, the Self cannot be both the seer and the

order to be an object of knowledge seen, the knower and the known. And to posit an

there are two conditions which neces- interval of time so that the Self can 'become' the sarily must be fulfilled. There must be known, the question again arises, who is the a pervasion by a mental modification knower of this 'later' Self? Either infinite regress (vrtti vyapyatva) and there must be a pervasion by objectified knowledge occurs or one must posit a not-self - of which both

(phala vyapyatva). Yet, in regards to the possibilities are absurd as we have just seen.

Self, there is no objectified knowledge (phala vyapyatva). Yet, in regards to the Self, there is no objectified knowledge IV.vi.7. REPLY - IV since the Self is not subject to objectifi- cation. If the not-self or ego were really a part or prop-

v) Suppose one assumes for the sake erty of the Self, then it would continue in deep

of argument that the Self is something sleep as well as after liberation. Yet, the T' is absent

known - the question arises, 'who or in deep sleep (as we observed earlier) and in libera- what knows the Self?'. It would either tion. If the 'I were a quality of the Self, it would be have to be i) another Self or ii) the present wherever the Self is. In reality, the T- not-self. notion belongs to the inner organ (antahkarana) and

But if a second Self knows the first not to the Self.31

Self, how is this 'second Self' known? One will land in an infinite regress with each prior Self having to be IV.vi.8. REPLY - V known by a subsequent Self. Or, if one says that the Self is known by the not- As well, the Self is eternal. If the I' belonged to self, that plainly absurd, for, the not- the Self, then the 'I' would also be eternal. This self is by definition material and insentient and therefore can know would render the Scripture futile. Not only would

nothing the Scripture's description of liberation be rendered void, but it would make its statements ridiculous Thus, the Self is never an object of knowl- concerning its exhortations to seek liberation.32 edge. The Self is the revealer of other things, of everything else, but it, itself, is never known by anything else. Nor can the Self be logically known in time (or at a later time). At one and the same 31 Naiskarmyasiddhi II.32. 32Ibid., II.33.

104 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 105

IV.vi.9. REPLY - VI IV.vi.11. REPLY - VII

The Self is immutable (kutastha); not subject to Recognition and memory prove the fact that the change (avikari). Thus, it is not a composite entity. Self is not the not-self. In order to know and The not-self is not a quality of it - even a changing quality. The colors of a mango change successively recognize a series, the knower of the series must be outside of it. Memory presupposes the identity and from seed to maturity, all the while fleetingly persistence of the individual. It is one and the same maintaining a reality as real as the mango itself. But individual who experiences objects and events and the Self is not like a mango.33 Suresvara quotes, remembers them later on as having occurred to "There is no break in the sight of the Seer."34 When there is a change in a substance's attribute, that individual. It is not as if one individual remembers another individual's experiences. it affects the character of the substance. A green As well, there is the element of recognition. mango is different from a ripe, red mango. Thus, When an individual remembers an object, they the not-self cannot be a part of the Self. Since the recognize that they are remembering what they not-self undergoes change, while the Self does not, have previously seen. Hence, it is evident that the the two cannot be related as substance and attribute. individual is not in constant flux. Thus, we can conclude that one thing cannot at

IV.vi.10 OBJECTION - SELF IS BOTH SUBJECT the same time be both seer and seen, Self and not- self. The seer cannot be seen by the object that is AND OBJECT - III itself the seen. Nor can sight see the seer. The not-seif cannot belong to the Self even as The third objection raised regarding the status of heat and cold or light and darkness are mutually the Self and the not-self posits that the Self need opposed to each other. The tip of the finger cannot not be viewed as being eternal, permanent, touch itself nor can one climb onto one's own unchanging, self-evident. Why not view the Self as shoulders. If the seer is the seen, then the seer (Self) the Buddhists do - as something ever-changing, in becomes an object of knowledge. And if everything constant flux. is the seen, then who is the seer? The Self cannot be known by the not-self; nor can it be known by another Self; nor will it help to say that it doesn't know itself. Thus, we must conclude that the Self and the not-self are neither identical nor related in

33Ibid., II.34. any way. Whether one invokes the sruti, i.e.,

34Brhadāranyaka Upanisad IV.iii.23. 'Brahman is nirguna', or one invokes the smrti, i.e.

106 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 107

The body is called the Field ... wise people say that the Knower of the Field is one who watches what IV.vi.12 THE ONE AND THE MANY takes place within the body ... know the Field is distinct from the Knower of the Field'35, or one The Advaitin must explain how the One, non- invokes reason, the not-self is different from the dual Self appears as many. The Self is one. It is only Self. through the multiplicity of objects that the one Reality appears to be many. Even as the one sun The world of the not-self has four qualities: appears as many due to its reflection is various vessels of water, or, how one and the same indi- 1 - falsity (mithya siddha) vidual is at the same time viewed as a friend, 2 - no definable essence (anat makam) enemy, father, son, employee, etc. through the eyes 3 - rooted in delusion (moha-mulam) of various individuals, so all distinctions in the one

4 - whose nature is inexplicable undifferentiated pure consciousness are due to its

(anirvacaniya).36 seeming associations with the physical world. Suresvara says, "Just as the sun is kidnapped by If one asks how this not-self is shown to be false, the waterpots and made to share their action, shape, Suresvara answers that it is impossible to establish and position, so is the Self appropriated by the the existence of any real entity other than the Self. multiple intellects of humanity".38

Therefore, the not-self is but a riddle, a sphinx It is possible for a plurality of seemingly contra which is impervious to all attempts to probe into its dictory attributes to co-exist if they are not real.

nature. "Wonder is its garment; inscrutable is its Thus a woman may invoke thoughts of beauty in nature."37 All enquiry into the not-self leads one the mind of a lustful man and thoughts of impurity into, and not out of, ignorance. It is on account of in the mind of a monk and thoughts of tastiness in

this puzzling nature that Advaitins call the not-self the mind of a dog - to use Suresvara's example

inexplicable. again. The Self is 'One only, without a second'. No thought can be satisfied with less than the uncom- promising primacy of the One as its ultimate truth. And only a non-dual One can be the unalterably fixed core underlying the universe of multiplicity. 35See Brhadaranyaka Upanisad III.viii.8; IV.ii.4 and Bhagavadgita This is because the Self is consciousness. chapter XIII. Consciousness can assume many forms without 36 Naiskarmyasiddhi II.44. 37 Pañcadāsi VI.139. 38Naiskarmyasiddhi 11.49.

108 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 109

endangering its non-duality. Even while being aware of the many, consciousness itself does not without the act of looking. The Self is not subject to

cease to be one. Everything is rooted in conscious- change; it is only the mind which changes. Though

ness. And even after the myriad possible objects are the Self is said to be the witness, really it is not.

elimanated, consciousness will still remain. Mental modifications come and go while the Self is permanent and unchanging. Their relationship is apparent and not real. To call the Self 'the witness'

IV.vii. THE SELF is but a contextual, a relative definition only.

Verses 57 through 89 of chapter two of the Naiskarmyasiddhi can be taken as one unit as they IV.vii.2. OBJECTION - SELF IS NOT

are all devoted to delineating the nature of the Self. UNCHANGING

As Suresvara says, Quoting two Buddhist texts, an objection is

The Infinite (bhuman), the partless, that raised that the Self is not unchanging.41 The

which is actionless and not the factor of any contention is that one is put between the horns of a action, the one that is beyond names and other dilemma regarding the question, Is the Self subject categories - that self-revealed Self is the Self to change or not?' Common experience says that known by the Self-realized sages. That is the the Self changes, and, if this is the case, then the Self we teach.39 Self is, ipso facto, impermanent. On the other hand, if the Self is not subject to change, then this implies

IV.vii.1. SELF AS SĀKSIN that the Self cannot be a knower. A rather simple and almost purile example is

The first definition of the Self that Suresvara given to show that the Self can neither be changing

gives is from an empirical point of view. If one nor unchanging. If the Self is like the 'sky', then it

presupposes that there are things-to-be-witnessed cannot be a knower or experiencer (though it is

and duality is assumed then the Self is a witness unaffected by rain and sun). If the Self is like the

(sak sin). Note, however, that Suresvara says, "as if 'skin', then it is mortal and impermanent (though

through half-closed eyes."40 This refers to the Self rain and sun exert their influence upon it).

as That which witnesses the dance of every intellect

39Ibid., II.57. 40Ibid., II.58. 41 Ibid., II.60-61.

110 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 111

IV.vii.3. REPLY - SKY AND SMOKE moving down a river, it is the boat that is moving

Suresvara responds to the opponent's objection and not the trees on the shore.44

with a counter-dilemma. He asks, 'when smoke rises into the sky, is the sky divided or not?'42 The example seems to be both a subtle dig at the oppo- IV.vii.5. REPLY - DIAMOND

nent's childish understanding and a reminder that subtle things like the sky and the Self are beyond Again, the Self is unchanged by changes which

the reach differentiation. of action, change, and even appears to happen within it, even as a diamond remains unchanged whether objects are reflected by its light or not. The radiant light of a jewel is said to

Therefore the ether can only be apprehended in illumine. But, the jewel is what it is, pure and

itself as ether without reference to brilliant, whether something is there to be

modifications and differentiations apparently illumined or not. introduced into it from without.43 In a manner analogous to the jewel, the Self reveals every mind by its light (of consciousness). For, if the sky is not divided (by the smoke), then Whether there are objects there or not, the Self is the smoke cannot be rising. On the other hand, if what it is - ever-luminous and ever-present. If the smoke is rising, the sky must be divided - but by objects are nearby, they are revealed. If there are not what, for the smoke doesn't divide it. In a similar objects, the Self remains what it always is. manner, when changes take place in the mind, the Though, in actual fact the Self does not truly Self seems to be affected - but it is not (even as the illumine. This is but a 'manner of speaking' sky is not affected by changes taking place within it). Figuratively speaking, from an empirical point of view, one says that illumination takes place due to the proximity of an object. But really speaking, it is IV.vii.4. REPLY - BOAT AND TREES but an 'appearance' for there is nothing truly real but the Self. Even as it is erroneous to think that the Self changes when the world of multiplicity is superimposed upon it, so too, when a boat is

42Ibid., II.62. 43Candrika 44Nai skarmyasiddhi II.63.

112 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 113

IV.vii.6. ADVAITA IS NOT SĀŃKHYA IV.vii.7. WHY THE MIND IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE It is the Sankhya school which recognizes the Self as a witness (saksin).45 There, both the Self 1 - The mind or the intellect (buddhi) is known to (purusa) and what is witnessed/the not-self (prakrti) be subject to modification because it does not simul- are equally real. The changeless purusa witnesses the taneously know all things, past, present, and future. various changes which the prakrti undergoes. But in All empirical knowledge involves two factors: an Advaita, the Self alone is real and the not-self is unmoving reflection of intelligence (cidabhasa) and unreal. a moving internal organ (antahkarana). Since con-

SĀŃKHYA sciousness or the Self is known to be unmoving, it ADVAITA must be the intellect which is subject to change.

• the world is due to - the world is due 2 - The Self neither hears, sees, desires, feels pain, prakrti to avidya pleasure, hatred, anger, or any of the dualities. the world is real - the world is These are all properties of the mind. All of these unreal (mithya) changes come one after another (krama drsti) and it the world in independent - the world is is the mind which changes. dependent 3 - The mind has a beginning and an end Thus, unlike in Sankhya, Advaita claims that Whatever possesses such attributes is subject to the entire universe appears and disappears in the modifications. Self like clouds appearing and disappearing in the sky. The Self is not subject to change and any seem- 4 - The Self is the witnesser of pain. Thus, pain ing duality does not touch the Self. It is the mind must exist in the not-self, i.e., mind and body, which seems to change and the Self remains because "a sufferer can never by.the Witness, nor untouched by it all. can the Witness be a sufferer."46

5 - There is an eternal stream of consciousness which flows regardless of the flux of pleasure and pain cognitions which come and go. it is the mind which has these partial cognitions (katipaya drsti)

45 Sankhyakārikā, verse XIX. 46 Naiskarmyasiddhi, II. 1.76.

114 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 115

And not only are these cognitions partial, but even IV.vii.8. SELF IS ONE at any given moment, one object is seen incom- pletely. Each mental cognition is different according The Self in the outcaste (candala) is one and the to its object - but the light which illumines these same as the Self in the Creator (Brahma). The

various cognitions is the same. one Light that exists in the two beings appears as many due to differentiations in the objects it

6 - The Self is a witness to the presence and illumines.47

absence of all the fluctuations of the mind. To say the the Self is here, in this place, and not Sometimes the mind functions and sometimes it there, in that place, is to miss it altogether. Neither does not. Sometimes one is awake, sometimes the church nor the temple, the saloon nor the dreaming, and sometimes in deep sleep. The mind dance hall, the saint nor the sinner can exhaust it. itself does not know, and cannot know that it No person, place, or thing has a monopoly on the functions thusly. Why? Because the mind cannot Self. be both the knower and the known. As well, how An objection is raised at this point saying that, 'if can one have deep sleep if the mind can know the Self is one in all bodies, then an enlightened itself? Deep sleep is defined as that condition individual (jivanmukta) must identify with the Self wherein the mind does not function. in all other bodies'. The consequences of this would

7 - The mind knows only that particular condi- mean that such an enlightened individual would be subject to every bound individual's sufferings. tion in which it happens to be in at any given Suresvara remarks that such is not the case moment. At that particular time it knows nothing before enlightenment, so why should it follow else. This proves that it is subject to modifications. afterwards. Before enlightenment occurs, one indi- And if the mind is continually changing, it must be vidual does not feel another's pain. Why should it the Self that is the witness thereto. For, as we be the case after mukti? The root cause of suffering observed earlier, in order to cognize a series (of is ignorance. When ignorance is destroyed, an appearances and disappearances) there must be individual is free from suffering. All along, the Self present a fixed immutable consciousness to witness has never changed, much less suffered. In the case such changes. of a mukta, neither his body nor other's bodies are any longer considered real. Thus, a mukta is not subject to the sufferings of either his own body or

47Ibid., II.88.

116 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 117

the bodies of others. All pain is then known for the illusion it really is. than the fact of one's own existence. It is self- To support this conclusion, Suresvara quotes the evident, direct, and immediate. No one is able to Vedic text: "Thou cannot see the Seer of seeing. disbelieve in one's own existence. "A person may With what, indeed, can one know the Knower of doubt of many things, of anything else; but one can knowing?"48 It is physical bodies which are subject never doubt one's own being."52 This is because to change and never the unchanging Self. the very act of doubting would be but an affirma- tion of one's very existence. "It cannot be proved since it is the basis of all proof and is established IV.vii.9. NATURE OF THE SELF prior to all proofs."53 What is mediate alone can be known through a (1) The Self is: Free from all qualifications pramana. The Self is immediate. Therefore, the Self (nirvisesana). It is not a whole inclusive of parts.49 cannot be known through a pramana and thus the Self is not an object of knowledge. The not-self There is nothing similar to it, nothing dissimilar to it, and it partakes of no internal variety.50 It is needs to be established by another (consciousness different from the phenomenal, the spatial, the plus an internal organ plus a valid means of knowledge) while the Self is self-established. temporal, and the sensible.51 (2) The Self is: Not an object of knowledge (3) The Self is: the basis of everything (adhistana). (aprameya). The psycho-physical organism, as well The relation between the Self and the not-self is as all physical objects, are known mediately. The inexplicable (anirvacaniya). Traditionally there are three basic types of relationship: mind is removed from the Self by one degree; the senses by two degrees; the body by three degrees; and the world by four degrees. But the Self is the 1 - inseparable external relation (samyoga); 2 - inseparable internal relation (samavaya); Knower and not what is known. The existence of the mind, senses, body, world can be established 3 - identity (tadatmya). only through empirical means of knowledge and However, the relationship between the Self and the proofs. Though the Self escapes objectification, it not-self cannot be the first two types since these are does not escape certainty. Nothing is more certain possible only between two entities which are both real (the not-self is not real). And it cannot be the

48Brhadaranyaka Upanisad III.iv.2; II.iv.14. 49 Brahmasūtrabhāsya I.3.1. 50 Pancadāsi 2.20. 52Ibid., II.3.7. 53Ibid. 51 Brahmasūtrabhāsya IV.3.14.

118 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 119

third type for the Self and the not-self are not iden- tical. Thus, though they are said to be related as the IV.viii. SUMMARY - SELF AND NOT-SELF

Revealer and the revealed, really speaking their relationship is inexplicable. The Self can be known by three criteria: self- established; attributeless; immutable.

IV.vii.10 WHY NOT-SELF IS NOT REAL 1 - The Self, being of the nature of conscious- ness, is self-established. l. It is only by and through

The not-self is not real because: consciousness that anything is known. The internal organ, as well as the pramanas function only with

1 - it cannot be established as real by itself (it is the help of consciousness, though consciousness doesn't need the help of anything to be aware. In insentient); every act of knowing, consciousness must be pre- 2 - it cannot be established as real by the Self; supposed. The not-self cannot know anything by 3 - it cannot be established as real by a combination itself because it is insentient. As well, mental of the Self and not-self since there can be no real modes are forever changing while consciousness is

relationship between them; ever-present. A series can never be aware of itself as a series and needs a permanent witness outside of

4 - it involves reciprocal dependency (anyon- itself to know it.

yasraya). That is, difference or bheda can be acknowledged and accepted only if an individual 2 - The Self is attributeless (nirguna). Nirguna

already knows that there are two entities, 'a + b', means that the Self transcends the phenomenal

and that 'a' differs from 'b' and vice-versa realm. The Self is undefinable and, strictly speak-

However, to prove the reality of difference, one ing, unknowable - which means that it is too great

must prove that there are two entities and to prove for words to describe and the finite mind to fathom.

that there are two entities, one must presuppose All that can be known is the not-self - which is then

difference. superimposed upon the Self. It is only the seen or the known which can have attributes while the Self

5 - it cannot exist separate from the Self. is beyond the relative concepts of unity or diversity.

3 - The Self is immutable (kutastha). It is that which presupposes phenomena. It is assumed as the foundation of all though it is not a substance in any sense of the word. Words denote things associ-

120 Naiskarmyasiddhi

ated with either a certain genus, an act, a quality, or CHAPTER FIVE a mode of relation. But the Self does not belong to any genus. Its immutable and devoid of all attributes and relationships. V. INTERPRETATION OF MAHĀ VĀKYA

V.i. INTRODUCTION

According to Suresvara, the knowledge that one obtains from sruti texts like tat tvam asil and aham brahmasmi2 is immediate and non-relational. Such texts signify the transcendental non-dual Reality. In another place I have maintained that within Advaita there is a tradition, which claims that first- level expresions directly name the fact of the non- dual Absolute and second-level language symbolically, figuratively, and secondarily does so.3 Here, our concern is with the ways in which Suresvara interprets these texts. Words convey their meaning through three kinds of signification, i.e., primary signification (mukhya-vrtti), secondary signification (laksana vrtti), and signification based upon a knowledge of a simi- larity of qualities (gauni-urtti). As well, one must take into consideration the co-ordinate relation (visesana-visesya-sambandha) of the words in the text.4 These are defined as follows:

1 Naiskarmyasiddhi III.1-3; 5; 9-10; 22-29; 53; 75-80; 117-122. 2Ibid., II.28-29; II.54-56; III.39-40. 3See Grimes, An Advaita Vedanta Perspective on Language 4See Vedantaparibhasa IV. p. 93-102 CTYTU 121 DIBLIOTENN LOZO

122 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 123

1- PRIMARY SIGNIFICATION: A word used to 3 - QUASI-INCLUSIVE: Jahad-ajahal- convey a sense (through either a genus (jati), quality laksana is when a part of the primary (guna), activity (kriya), or relation (sambandha) meaning of a word is given up and

which exists in the sense that is conveyed. part of it is retained, i.e., in the sen-

2 - SECONDARY SIGNIFICATION: When the tence, 'this is that John', the meaning of the word 'this' refers to John as literal meaning of a text is unintelligible, then one qualified by present time, place, etc., or more of the words constituting it must convey and the meaning of the word 'that' some other meaning that is invariably connected refers to the same John as qualified by

with the primary meaning. There are three types: past time, place, etc. The primary meanings of the two terms are incom-

1 - EXCLUSIVE: Jahallaksana is when patible. Thus, in quasi-inclusive im-

the implied meaning of a word of plication, part, of the meaning of the

expression excludes the primary words 'this' and 'that', viz., the indi-

meaning. The implied meaning is vidual John, is accepted and another

other than, but nonetheless related to, part of their meaning, viz., 'as qualified

the primary meaning which is by temporal and spatial aspects, etc.', is

comletely given up, i.e., in the sen- rejected.

tence, 'the village on the river', the primary meaning of the word 'river' is 3 - GAUNI-VRTTI: Signification based upon the

completely given up and the bank or knowledge of a similarity in qualities is when the shore, which is related to the river, is literal sense of a sentence is unintelligible and one implied. of the words in the sentence conveys some other

2 - INCLUSIVE: Ajahallaksana includes meaning which has the same qualities that are

the primary meaning in the implied present in its primary meaning. For instance, John

sense. Here, a meaning is implied is a lion' is unintelligible if it means that a man

which is other than the primary (John) is literally an animal (lion). But it makes

meaning of the word, yet which is sense to understand that John possesses the quali- related to it with the primary meaning ties of valour, cruelty, strength, etc. - the qualities not being given up, i.e., in the which are present in the primary sense of the word sentence, 'the school works today', the 'lion'.5 word 'school' indicates the members of the school. Thus, the primary mean- ing is maintained and included in the implied meaning. 5Gauni-vrtti resembles laksana-urtti. For their difference see Kumarila Bhatta's Tantravārtika or Sarvajnātman's Samksepasānraka.

124 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 125

4 - CO-ORDINATE RELATION: Sam anadhi- the expression, I am fair', so too, there is grammati- karanya is the grammatical principle which states cal co-ordination between 'I and 'Absolute' that one entity may have two aspects, i.e., a blue Suresvara replies that grammatical co-ordination lotus' has blueness' and 'lotusness'. need not imply identity. There are two types of

5 - SUBSTANTIVE-ATTRIBUTE RELATION: grammatical co-ordination: co-ordination in the sense of sublation (badhayam sām an ādhikaranya) Visesana-visesya-sambandha is the subject-predicate and co-ordination in the sense of oneness (aikye relation. The flower (lotus) is what is qualified by a sam an adhikaranya). One must employ this gram- color (blue). matical principle carefully. In the expression, 'I am This brings us to the heart of the matter. The fair', 'fairness' is a characteristic of the body, but, the Great Sayings appear to be unintelligible in their body is not T'. primary meanings. The word 'that' (tat) primarily Suresvara interprets this mahavikya by means of refers to Brahman (which is omnipresent, omni- the grammatical principle, co-ordination in the scient, omnipotent, etc.) and the word 'thou' (tvam) sens of sublation.7 He gives the example of the primarily refers to the individual self (which is judgement, 'this post is a man'.8 In one's earlier finite, limited, mortal, etc.). The same problem judgement, one believes that an object (a man) is a arises in regards to T (aham) and Brahman. Thus, it post. But a subsequent judgement, upon closer is with the above stated interpretive tools that scrutiny, reveals that it is post. Likewise, one's orig- Suresvara will attempt to overcome this dilemma inal judgement believes that the 'I' refers to one's and demonstrate that the Great Sayings do, in fact, ego-nature, while a subsequent judgement sublates coherently signify that Atman is Brahman. this earlier view and reveals that I' is the Absolute. Upon realization, the ego-nature is sublated. The T' V.ii. AHAM BRAHMĀSMI with adjuncts is not the Self; the T', in its essential nature, is the Self. V.ii.1. AHAM BRAHMASMI - I

In the text, 'I am the Absolute' (aham brahmasmi), the opponent claims that 'I' refers to one's ego- nature on the grounds of grammatical co-ordina- tion (samanadhikaranya).6 Just as their is grammati- cal co-ordination between the words T and 'fair' in 7Ibid., II.29. 8See Pancadast VIII.42f. and Siddhantalesasangraha I.34 where this 6 Naiskarmyasiddhi II.28. verse is discussed.

126 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 127

V.ii.2. AHAM BRAHMĀSMI - II

Suresvara demonstrates another way in which to V.ii.4. AHAM BRAHMASMI - IV interpret this mahwakya.9 In its primary (mukhya or prasiddha vrtti) meaning, I' equals one's ego- Finally, Suresvara interprets aham brahmasmi nature. Because this primary meaning is unintelli- directly or in a primary sense to mean I' am the gible, one must resort to a secondary meaning 'Absolute' on the strength of the knowledge that (laksana vrtti). The type of secondary meaning that the ego-notion cannot exist without the Self.11 All Suresvara invokes here is exclusive or jahallaksana. that is not the Self, is not Consciousness, is not-real The primary maning of I (consciousness with and therefore cannot even appear to exist without attributes) is completely given up and a secondary the aid of the Self. Thus, in a peculiar and interest- meaning (consciousness without attributes), other ing twist, T (or any word for that matter) must refer than but nonetheless related to the primary mean- to the constitutive being of anything whatsoever ing, is accepted. and as such designates that which is self-evident, immediate, direct, and certain, i.e., the Self.12 Thus, the word I' may be applied to the Absolute V.ii.3. AHAM BRAHMĀSMI - III by:

Suresvara demonstrates that there is still 1) grammatical co-ordination in the sense of another way in which aham brahmasmi can be sublation (II.28); interpreted.10 There exists a similarity between the 2) indirect exclusive usage (II.54); Self and the ego. Both have the common qualities 3) figurative usage (II.55); of subtlty, inwardness, and behave as if they are the 4) primary meaning (ii.56). perceiving Self. On this account, one may nterpret the text by means of signification based upon the Suresvara shows considerable ingenuity by knowledge of similarity of qualities (gauni vrtti). demonstrating that whatever sense one chooses to Thus, the Self is implied by a word (T) which take the word I' to man, whether primary, primarily refers to the ego - even though the ego is secondary, or figurative, the text is in any case material and insentient and cannot be equated with intelligible. Brahman.

11Ibid., II.56. 9 Naiskarmyasiddhi II.54 12This is the central topic of An Advaita Vedanta Perspective on 10Ibid., II.55. Language.

128 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 129

V.iii TAT TVAM ASI Now, a sentence sense (vakyartha) can be of two kinds: V.iii.1 TAT TVAM ASI - I 1 - RELATION OF DUALITY (bheda- According to Suresvara, the knowledge which is samsarga): derived from tat tvam asi is immediate and non- relational. Normally sentences are relational and In which the meaning of a yet we will observe that a relational sentence, tat sentence is conveyed through a tvam asi, will give a non-relational meaning. The relation obtained among the relational, verbal sense (vakyartha) of the text will words conveying the difference, give a non-verbal, unitary, impartite meaning i.e., 'bring the cow with a stick' (avak y artha). Suresvara is fond of emphasizing that (wherein, from the usage of the non-relational Brahman-knowledge arises from a various words, difference is relational sentence. known - stick/cow/bring/etc. There are three steps/considerations which must be taken into account in the understanding of a 2 - RELATION OF NON-DUALITY (abheda- mahāvākya: samsarga):

1 - GRAMMATICAL CO-ORDINATION In which oneness is known (sam an adhikaranya-jnana): This is the grammatical through the relation of the words, co-ordination or relation which exists between two i.e., 'blue-lotus' or 'tat tvam asi'. terms, i.e., blue lotus' or 'tat tvam asi'. This is of two kinds:

2 - SUBJECT-PREDIATE RELATION (visesana- i - RELATION WITH ONENESS visesyata-jnana): This is knowledge which has a (samsarga abheda): subject-predicate relation. In which there is oneness 3 - INDIRECT IMPLICATION (laksya-laksana- with relation; the object is sambandha-jnana): This is implied meaning inher- one though it has multiple ent in the terms of a statement.13 meanings/attributes.

13 Naiskarmyasiddhi III.3.

130 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 131

ii - IDENTITY STATEMENT: (svarupa abheda): hidden is really self-manifest.14 Or, as Gaudapada In which a non-relational said, "This view (that there is duality) is only for sentence in which two the sake of instruction. When the truth is known, entities referred to are all this duality is gone."15 actually identical/one Now, according to Suresvara, there are three steps or considerations to take in interpreting the Before we actually observe how Suresvara meaning of 'tat tvam asi': interprets the maharkya 'tat tvam asi', it should be noted that an understanding of a mahwvakya 1 - SĀMĀ NĀDHIKARANYA: The connotations of involves a two-fold benefit. Even in an empirical the two terms 'That' and 'thou' are different. 'That' ctatement which involves grammatical co-ordina- refers to Brahman which omnipotent, omnipresent, tion, there is this two-fold benefit. For instance, in omniscient, etc., and 'thou' refers to the individual the statement, 'blue lotus', both the color 'blue' self which is finite, bound, limited, etc. When the benefits as well as the flower 'lotus'. The idea of meanings of two words are different, one usually blueness' removes all other possible colors from thinks that their denotations are also different. the lotus and 'that which is blue is precisely a However, where there is grammatical co-ordina- 'lotus'. Thus, each is enriched and benefits from tion in a sentence, the things referred to are not their association. different. The words 'That' and 'thou' are in In a similar manner, 'tat', by its association grammatical co-ordination and thus refer to the with 'tvam' removes the misconception that it is same object, even as 'blue' and 'lotus' refer to the remote, unattainable, hidden, etc., and reveals itself same object. as that which is ever-manifest, immediate, direct, and the inner-most Self. In a similar manner, 2 - VISESANA VISESYA SAMBANDHA: In order 'tvam', in its association with 'tat' removes the to do justice to the different connotations of, and misconception that it is mortal, finite, bound, and the co-ordinate relation between, these two terms, imperfect and reveals itself as that which is self- Suresvara invokes the subject-predication relation. existent, ever-pure, ever-free, and immortal. Thus, In the expression, 'the blue lotus', one object is what was conceived of as the farthest of the far is denoted while, being a flower, also possesses a blue revealed as nearer than the nearest; what appeared color. Thus, though the two terms have different to be unattainable is already attained; what is ever connotations, they have the same denotation. This

14See Mundaka Upanisad I11.1.7-8. 15 Māndūkyakārikā III.18.

132 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 133

way of construing the meaning is known as 'identity which involves relation' (abheda-samsarga). each term. By removing omniscience, omnipo- tence, etc., from That and by removing limited- 3 - LAKSYA LAKSANA SAMBANDHA: There is a ness, boundness, fallibility, etc., from 'thou' - while

difficulty involved in interpreting 'tat tvam asi' by retaining the common element between them, i.e., abheda samsarga. It works well with 'the blue lotus' consciousness, he has demonstrated that tat tvam asi

because there is a 'subject-predicate relation'. But conveys a sense of non-relational identity.

with the mahwikya, there is an identity wherein Some implications from this interpretation

'Thou' cannot be an attribute of That'. Thus, one include: What we usually associate with 'thou'

must apply the relation of non-duality (svarupa (suffering, etc.) is cancelled by its association with

abheda). It would be unintelligible to identity That' 'That' and what we usually associate with That'

with 'thou' in view of the fact the determinants of (remoteness, etc.) is cancelled by its association with the two terms are mutually incompatible. In other thou'.17

words, this statement cannot be treated as an attributive judgement. The import of the statement is identity - but not a relational identity. Thus, the non-relational meaning of the text can only be revealed by a re-course to its implied meaning. Thus, according to Suresvara,

On our view, the relations such as sam anadhikaranya (which connect words and their meanings) directly bring out the non- verbal import of 'Tat tvam asi' like the identity of ether through the cancellation of the differ- ent adjuncts.16

What he has emphasized is that, in employing the secondary meaning of the terms in the mahavākya, he has removed the incompatible determinants of

16Naiskarmyasiddhi III.9. The sentence, the ether in the pot is the ether in the sky' is unintelligible without referring to the ether without any limiting adjuncts or qualifications. 17Ibid., III.10.

CHAPTER SIX

VI. SCRIPTURE

VI.i. INTRODUCTION

In the Naiskarmyasiddhi, Suresvara analyses Scripture under various topics:

1 - Definition and Scope; 2 - Work; 3 - Relation (to other pramanas); 4 - Status.

VI.ii. DEFINITION AND SCOPE

Suresvara states that no other valid means of knowledge, excepting the Scripture, can impart knowledge of supra-sensible facts:

The knowledge of the inmost Self which removes all need for further investigation arises with certainty from the texts like 'That thou art'. It does not arise from any other means of knowledge.1

1 Naiskarmyasiddhi III.67.

135

136 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 137

Perception is limited to the empirical world. All knowledge cannot reveal the Self. He sums up his the things of the phenomenal world possess certain position by saying, fixed characteristics such as grossness, fineness, etc. Name and form are their warp and woof. But the As the Self is of the nature of eternal Self is trans-empirical, trans-sensual, and free from awareness, as it stands in need of no other proof, all distinctions.2 as it is without physical qualities, as it is that about whose existence doubts can never arise, as Inference presupposes, and is dependent upon, it is the inmost Self, as it is an end in itself, as perception (according to Indian philosophy). For a it is not an object of knowledge, it is not cognized valid inferential cognition there must exist the through the valid means of knowledge like knowledge of an invariable relation between the perception, etc.5 middle and the major terms as well as the middle term must also be perceived as existing in the Sruti is superior to the other pramanas with

minor term. Thus, it is obvious that inference, regards to super-sensuous facts. In matters that are though an independent source of knowledge, is sensuous, however, Scripture is not the primary dependent upon perception and therefore, like means of knowledge. Even a thousand scriptural

perception, restricted to the empirical world of injunctions cannot convert a hat into a rabbit. sensible objects.3 Why would anyone not accept the authority of Knowledge involves the triple factor (triputi) of: the Scripture? Four reasons are advanced by

cognizer, object cognized, and the means of Suresvara in this regards.6 These are:

cognition. But the Self does not fall within the scope of knowledge as an object of knowledge. 1 - Restatement

Suresvara said, "Because the entire mechanism of 2 - Contradiction

knowledge relates to the external world, as far as 3 - Doubtful 4 - Uninformative one can understand, the ordinary modes of knowledge are only for producing knowledge of external objects."4 1 - The first objection against the sruti is that it is Thus, Suresvara puts forward various reasons merely a restatement (anuvada) of what is already why perception and the other valid means of known. However, this objection fails on two counts. First, by definition, as pramana sruti conveys knowledge which is not otherwise known. Purport

2See ibid., III.48. 3Ibid., III.51. 5Ibid., III.47-48. 4Ibid., III.52. 6Ibid., III.35-37.

138 Naişkarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 139

(tatparya), which signifies not only the meanings of the Self to those individuals who are fit or eligible individual words, but also the relation among the (adhikarin). meanings of the words syntactically conjoined, distinguishes Scripture as an independent means of valid knowledge. Secondly, while perceptions say VI.iii. WORK (How does sruti convey knowledge of that an individual is limited, bound, and finite, Scripture says that the individual is unlimited, Brahman/Atman?)

ever-free, and bliss. How does sruti convey knowledge of Brahman or 2 - The second objection against sruti is that its the Self? Sentences are said to give knowledge of their meaning through the knowledge of the information is contradicted by other pramanas. meanings of the words which constitute them. However, this objection fails to take into Thus, if one knew the meaning of the words 'tat' consideration that two pramanas can contradict each and 'tvam', one should know what 'tat tvam asi' other only in regards to the same subject matter. means. But sruti is a means of knowledge regarding super- Earlier (chapter five) we observed that words sensuous matters and perception, etc. are means of knowledge regaarding sensuous matters. Thus, they cannot signify the super-sensuous directly. A word is said to convey a primary signification when its have a different subject-matter (bhinna visaya) meaning is conveyed through either a genus (jati),

3 - The third objection sruti is that its information is quality (guna), activity (kriya) or relation (sambandha). Since the Self/Brahman does not doubtful Is this doubt due to: i) a defect in the posses any of these media, it is usually said that pramana or ii) a defect in the object (prameya)? In words cannot signify the Self/Brahman. order for a pramana to b considered a pramana, it Another reason for advancing that words do not cannot give doubtful information (prama karanam convey knowledge of Brahman/Atman is that there pramanam). Thus, it must be the objects of the is no knowledge of the significative relation world which have room for doubt. But, the Self is between the words and Brahman/Atman. The immediate and in regards to it there is no room for significative sense of a word is known through doubt. It is immediate and certain. perception, etc., by the mind. But in the case of Brahman/Atman, there is no external object which 4 - The fourth objection against sruti is that it the mind can know. Since Brahman/Atman is not conveys no information at all. Suresvara agrees if known by the mind, it also has no significative only the individual involved is an idiot, a dull relation of words which pertains to it. lump of clay. Otherwise, sruti conveys knowledge of

140 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 141

Thus, one generally resorts to a secondary be said to be known, and yet, there is no knower, no meaning of words in order to explain what, at first known, and no knowledge in such a situation. glance, appears unintelligible. In all, there are six "Through what should one know that owing to different methods which the Advaitin employes to which all this is known?"9 convey Self-knowledge linguistically.7 These are: the technique of prior superimposition and subsequent denial (adhyaropa and apavada); via VI.iv. RELATION (to the other pramanas) negativa; secondary implication (laksana); direct hearing (sravana); etymology; and silence. However, There is no conflict between the Scripture and in the Naiskarmyasiddhi, Suresvara mainly explores the other means of valid knowledge. We have secondary implication with one reference to direct already touched upon this earlier. The most telling hearing. argument of Suresvara is that their subject-matter It should be noted however, that even though differs. 10 All the means of knowledge besides words are generally said to 'return, along with the Scripture have as their ground and result mind, without reaching it', the Self is known. multiplicity/duality/difference. But the Scripture Sankara said, "Brahman is not a non-object in an teaches non-duality as its purport. absolute sense."8 Why? It is the object of the notion If an objection is raised that Scriptural statements of the ego and thus is immediately known by are existential and thus cannot convey anything everyone. No one says that I' do not exist and to say without an injunction, the answer is that even a such would be self-contradictory. Thus, the 'I'- descriptive statement conveys knowledge and as notion proves that Brahman/Atman is not knowledge, removes ignorance. Therefore, it is unknown entirely. The Scripture does not seek to establish the Self gratuitous to declare, like the Mimamsakas do, that knowledge about an established fact is meaningless as an entity referable objectively by the word `this'. without the support of an injunction. 11 Its aim is to remove the ignorance which imagines and superimposes on the Self, differences. When knowlege of Brahman/Atman occurs, not only is ignorance destroyed, but also the apprehending 9Brhadaranyaka Upanisad II.4.14.

consciousness which is included, ontologically, in 10Naiskarmyasiddhi III.44-45. 11 Ibid., sambandha to III.47. The example is given that existential ignorance, and is a product of it. Thus, the Self may statements have the same authority as a sentence used to awaken a sleeping individual. That is, the words with which one awakens a

7See my An Advaita Vedanta Perspective on Language. sleeping individual are not (for that individual) an authoritative means

8Brahmasūtrabhāsya I.1.1 'na tāvadayam ekāntenāvisayah' of knowledge for any object in the empirical world, however they are authoritative in waking him up to a new state of consciousness.

142 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 143

As we observed in the previous chapter, the Self doesn't fall within the scope of perception, etc. The etc. If this is the case, then perception, etc. may

reasons for this include: mislead one in the future too. The relation of Scripture to reason is one in

1 - the Self is immutable consciousness; which reason supports Scriptural statements. There

2 - the Self does not need the help of are numerous examples, i.e., in the Chandogya

perception, etc; Upanisad wherein Indra and Virocana learn from

3 - the Self doesn't have physical qualities Prajapati through an enquiry into the three states of

(nirguna); existence. Or, in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad

4 - doubt is not possible in regards to the Self; wherein Yajnavalkya tells Janaka to go deeper and

5 - the Self is an end in itself; deeper in his enquiry into 'what is the light?'

6 - the Self is not an object of knowledge.

Since the Self is not within the scope of perception, VI.v. RELATION OF SCRIPTURE TO REASON

etc., it follows that it is knowable by means of sruti alone. Suresvara does not deny the relation which

Scripture is the only valid means of knowledge exists between sruti and reason. In a number of

which does not depend upon perception at some places he states that reasoning must be employed to

stage or other. All the other pramanas thus presume aid in discriminating the Self from the not-self. 12

a relationship while the Self is relationless. Though reason is ancillary to Scripture, it is

For the sake of argument, even if a conflict exists important and must not be overlooked because it

between the Scripture and the other valid means of helps to both clarify the issues raised by Scripture

knowledge, the Scripture is final. Why? Because the and to assist in rendering the teachings of the

Scripture is authorless (apauruseya). Thus it is free Scripture intelligible. Without reasoning, the

from defects, either human or divine. All the other purport of the mahwakyas will not arise - even

valid means of knowledge are conditioned by other though mere reasoning by itself will not be

factors like perception, etc. They have been known sufficient. Thus, reasoning may be said to be

to mislead in the past, and are likely to do so in the necesary, though not sufficient, in understanding

future. For instance, perception has given contra- Scripture.

dictory knowledge. During the state of sleep, one thinks of oneself in bliss. Yet during one's waking Reason, however, has its limitations

state, perception shows the self to be bound, in pain,

12 Nai skarmyasiddhi III.33; 63; IV.15.

144 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 145

1 - It lacks certitude as it is only capable of giving 7 - Finally, one cannot bring all of the logicians of mediate knowledge which must eventually be the past, present, and future together in order to validated through some other knowledge. decide the entire ramifications, permutations, and combinations of logic. Thus, one will never know 2 - There is no finality in respect of its conclusion what the last word in logic is. since what is reasonable from one point of view or perspective may be untenable from another. 8 - In an inferential process, knowledge of the invariable relation between the middle and major 3 - Reason gives only relational knowledge. All terms (vyopti jnana) is necessary. In order to derive mental cognitions involve the duality of subject and object, substance and attribute, etc. But the Self the vyapti jnana, the minor term (paksa) must be perceived. Then one needs to know the relation of is non-relational and thus cannot be known the minor term to the middle and major terms. But exclusively through reason. how is one to get this relation when Brahman/Atman is imperceptible and has no 4 - Reason can tell what the not-self is and even relationships whatsoever? help discriminate the not-self from the Self, but it can never tell what the Self itself is. All this not withstanding, reason has a number of excellent qualities: 5 - The Buddhists relied exclusively on reasoning and thus were led astray. Without the assistance 1 - It is needed even to criticize itself. and guidance of the sruti, there is a danger involved 2 - It is needed to interpret the Scripture. in reasoning in that reason can prove any-thing to 3 - Scripture itself accepts it. be the case. Left to itself, reason can prove any number of inconceivable things. VI.vi. STATUS 6 - Another danger of reason is that an intelligent person can defeat someone less intelligent. A According to Advaita, Brahman/Atman alone is clever, quick intellect which has a defective real. The means to the knowledge of understanding may still prove itself right in the Brahman/Atman is sruti. Thus the question arises, face of someone with a slow, illogical mind whose 'what is the ontological status of sruti?' If it is real, under- standing is nevertheless correct. then the non-duality and central tenet of Advaita is destroyed. On the other hand, if it is unreal, then what is revealed by an unreal means of knowledge

146 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 147

should also be unreal. The words of a liar do not ignorance may dispell such. It is meaningful and lead to the truth. useful only to unenlightened individuals and Advaita accepts the ontological unreality of ceases to have value and use for one who has Scripture. However, it still maintains that Brahman-knowledge. Scripture, an unreal epistemological device, is the source and means for knowledge of the metaphysical Reality. To render this clearer it is necessary to distinguish between the ontological status of Scripture and its status as a valid means of knowledge. One aspect does not affect the other and the criteria of one is not the criteria of the other. Knowledge is held to be valid if it is unsublatable. As Brahman/Atman is eternal, immutable, and therefore unsublatable, knowledge of Brahman/Atman as given by Scripture is valid. This means that it is not necessarily true that what is revealed by an unreal means of knowledge must also be unreal. In fact, numerous instances can be cited to demonstrate that a non-real entity can give rise to valid knowledge. For instance, a lion roaring in a dream is an illusory animal and yet, it enables the dreamer to awaken from the dream. Likewise, a snake drawn on a piece of paper is not a real snake and yet, from one's perception of this 'paper-snake', knowledge of a real snake may be conveyed. Or again, the cognition of a 'rope-snake', which is not- really a snake, can give rise to fear, perspiration, trembling, even death, which are real. Thus, Suresvara declares that when the final truth of non-duality is realized, Scripture also becomes non-existent (yatra vedah avedah). The Scripture is intended as a methodogical device by means of which individuals who dwell in

CHAPTER SEVEN

VII. THE LOCUS OF AVIDYĀ

VII.i. INTRODUCTION

The question raised in the sambandha to the third chapter of the Naiskarmyasiddhi concerns the locus (asraya and content visaya) of ignorance (avidya). Sankara did not raise this question polemically. The generally held idea is that Sankara conceived of Brahman/Atman as both the locus and content of avidya. This idea stems from the fact that there are several places wherein he refused to answer the question, 'whose is avidya?', on the basis that to do so would imply that avidya was real.1 Suresvara was the first Advaitin to raise this question. Although all Advaitins subscribe to the doctrine of non-duality, they differ in their mode of expounding such. After Sankara, either by way of a sub-commentary (varttika), or a gloss (tika) on Sankara's bhasyas, there arose two distinct schools or traditions (prasthana) of thought within the Advaita lineage: the Bhamati and the Vivarana. The Bhamati prasthana has its roots in Mandana and flowered in Vacaspati's Bhamati. The

1 See Upadesasahasn XVIII.44f. and Bhagavadgitābhāsya XIII.2.

149

150 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 151

Vivarana prasthana has its roots in Suresvara and This disagreement served as the basis for the flowered in Prakasatman's Pancapadikavivarana and later distinction which came to be known as the

Vidyaranya's Vivaranaprameyasangraha.2 Bhamati-Vivarana distinction. It grew when No doubt these two schools differ in their Vacaspati, in his commentary on Sankara's interpretation of certain aspects of Advaita doctrine. Brahmasutrabhasya (called the Bhamati), attempted However, it can never be stressed enough, and it to reconcile Suresvara's position which that of

must always be remembered, that these differences Mandana. Vacaspati contended that avidya has the

are of an exegetical and not doctrinal nature. Both jiva as its locus and is indeterminable. Brahman,

of these schools are based upon, and owe allegiance will remain pure and unsullied by avidya and

to, Sankara. In their attempts to clarify, elucidate, thereby non-duality will remain.4 In contra-

and respond to contemporary objections to distinction to Vacaspati, Prakasatman refuted such

Advaita's philosophical position, these differences a view and held that Brahman itself is the locus and arose. And yet, in the view of Suresvara, these content of avidya.5 relative perspectives are intended only to help us Thus, the dialectics grew and an alive and

realize the inward Self.3 This is their real flourishing tradition developed. But it should

significance. always be kept in mind that these differences are

Mandana argued in favor of a view that the not irreconcilable within the framework of Advaita

individual self (jiva) should be regarded as the locus and therefore Advaita is not a house divided

(asraya) of avidya. Further, since this avidya obscures against itself. the essential nature of Brahman, avidya has Brahman as its object (visaya). Suresvara vehemently opposed VII.ii KEY-CONCEPT any degree of differentiation between the locus and content of avidya and maintained that Brahman itself is both (the locus and content of avidya). Ignorance (avidya) is the key-concept of Advaita. It is the device wherein the Advaitin explains how the One, non-dual Brahman/Atman appears as multitudenous. It is by means of this concept that 2 Amalananda's Kalpataru (a Commentary on the Bhamati) and Appayya Diksita's Commentary on the Kalpataru are other works in the Bhamati tradition. Padmapada's Pancapadika commences the 4See Preceptors of Advaita, p. 106. Navidya brahmāsrayā, kintu jive, sā

Vivarana line. tu anirvacaniya ityuktam tena nityasuddham brahma.

3Brhadāranyaka-upanisad-bhāsya-vārtika, I.iv.402. ya yā yayā 5 Ibid., p. 107. Na tāvadajnānam āsraya-visaya-bhedāpeksam, kintu

bhavetpuinsām vyutpattih pratyagātmani sā saiva prakriyeha syāt sādhvi ekasminneva vastuni āsrayatvam āvaranam cheti krityadvaya

sā canavasthita sampādayati.

152 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 153

Advaita delineates its epistemology, metaphysics, and practical teachings. For instance, epistemology individuals souls (jiva) having lost their identity

presupposes a subject-object duality. Metaphysics with Brahman, rest."6 As we have noted, all

must account for the problem of the One and the Advaitins subscribed to the doctrine that Brahman

many; the seeming plurality of the universe; is attributeless, undifferentiated, non-dual and that

Reality with form and Reality without form; the the universe of multiplicity appears due to

difference between the individual soul and the ignorance. However, the question arises, 'where is

Absolute. Practical teachings must explain bondage the locus of avidyd? If Brahman is really nirguna and

and liberation; ethics; aesthetics; and values; as well nirvisesa, then there seems to be no place for avidya

as the disciplines needed for obtaining release. All within it.

of this is intelligible and becomes meaningful only Avidya implies some entity to whom it belongs

in the light of avidya - according to Advaita. and some object to which it refers - at least from an empirical point of view. The disagreement comes over the locus of avidya - for all Advaitins posit that

VII.iii. NATURE OF AVIDYĀ Brahman is its content. This is obvious because the nature of avidya is to conceal and concealment is

According to Advaita, avidya has six aspects: possible only with reference to a self-luminous entity. As everything except Brahman is inert and

1 - It is beginningless (anadi); insentient, nothing but Brahman possesses the

2 - It can be terminated by knowledge (jnana- capability of necessity for being concealed

nivartya); All Advaitins subscribe to the position that

3 - It is a positive entity (bhava-rupa); Brahman, which is nirguna and nirvisesa, because of a 4 - Its ontological status is neither real nor defect (dosa) called ignorance (avidya/māya), has the unreal (anirvacaniya); entire universe super-imposed. The Bhamati 5 - It has the two powers of prior concealment (avarana) and subsequent denial (viksepa); school, first expounded by Mandana, says that the

6 - Its locus is either Brahman/Atman or the jiva jiva is the locus of avidya. Suresvara subjects this position to a number of objections. In the sambandha to chapter three of the

VII.iv. LOCUS OF AVIDYĀ - I Naiskarmyasiddhi, Suresvara gives four reasons why the jiva cannot be the locus of avidya.

Sankara said, "Avidya is paramesvarasraya, that is, it depends upon Brahman. And in it (avidya) the 6 Brahmasutrabhasya 1.4.3; also see: Brhadaranyaka Upanisad Bhāsya III.viii.12; Bhagavadgitābhāsya XIII.2.

154 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 155

1 - One objection is that it involves the fallacy of reciprocal dependence (anyonyasraya or petitio no fallacy of mutual dependence. One does not

principia). Suresvara states that it is fallacious to follow the other in time. He employs an analogy of

argue that the jiva is the result of avidya and, at the the seed and sprout series to elucidate the idea that

same time, avidya has to depend upon the jiva as its there is no chronological priority for either member

locus. It is well known that the effect (jiva) cannot of the series. As well, one may ask, 'what came first,

be earlier in time that its cause (avidya). It is also the chicken or the egg?' We know that there are

well known that a locus has nature different from chickens, eggs, seeds, sprouts, avidya, jivas, and to

that which it supports. Otherwise, there cannot be ask which came first is meaningless and irrelevant.

the relation of supporter and supported Anadiraprayojana ca avidya-avidya is beginningless

(ad hāra/adheya). and purposeless and thus all questions as to how,

(To be fair to the Bhamati school, they replied to why, when, and wherefore do not pertain to it.

this objection in two ways. First, it is pointed out Madhusudana Saraswati, in his Advaitasiddhi,

that avidya cannot be analysed in a logical, defends the view that the jiva, as the locus of avidya,

consistent, cogent manner. If this could be done, does not involve mutual dependence. He asks, If

then avidya would no longer be avidya mutual dependence is involved, is it in respect to

(anirvacaniya)! What holds true for the things of origin (utpatti) or knowledge (jnapti) or existence

the world is not, and need not be true of avidya. (sthiti)?' All three possibilities are untenable. There

Objects of the world must necessarily follow a is no mutual dependence in respect of origin, for,

causal sequence such that the effect can never be the both avidya and the jiva are beginningless. Nor is

cause of its cause. And again, no cause which has there mutual dependence in respect of their

not come into existence, can produce an effect. knowledge. Avidya is made known by consciousness

However, the space-time-causal sequence does not (caitanya) while the jiva-caitanya is self-luminous

hold good when applied to avidya. As Mandana and self-revealed. Thus it does not require the

remarked, "In avidya/ maya there is nothing which knowledge of avidya to be known and there is no

is inconsistent, improbable, illegitimate. If it mutual dependence involved. Lastly, though

conveys what is consistent and congruous, it ceases avidya is dependent on the jiva-caitanya, the jiva-

to be may a."7 caitanya does not rest on avidya. Thus, there is no

The second way in which Mandana refutes the mutual dependence. Nor can we say that one

critics objection is in showing that because both cannot be conceived of without the other, for,

avidya and the jîva are beginningless (anali), there is though the existence of avidya cannot be thought of apart from the existence of caitanya, the jiva-caitanya can be thought of apart from the existence of avidya. 7 Brahmasiddhi Part I, p. 10.

156 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 157

In reply, Sarvajnatman of the Vivarana school, then, what does this accomplish, what can avidya do points out that avidya presupposes the appearance of the jiva and hence cannot be its locus.8 Even if it being located in the jiva? It can't do anything over

is accepted that both the jiva and avidya are and above what it already does, i.e., its work is

beginningless, still, this distinction can only be concealment (avarana), yet it can't do this over and

made from the perspective of multiplicity. The above its locus.

idea of a jiva does not arise if one has realized 4 - Finally, the jiva has no possibility of Brahman. Thus, it follows that the jiva derives its existence from avidya - even if avidya does not obtaining knowledge. Ignorance must be in place where it is doing its work of concealing knowledge. necessarily require the notion of the jiva for its own That is its legitimate work. And knowledge must be existence. This relation is not one of cause and effect. To put it in philosophical jargon, it is a mode able to arise from avidya's destruction. But if avidya

of the pervaded and the pervader. is located in the jiva, then knowledge can never

Sarvajnatman puts forth two further counter- arise and liberation will be rendered impossible (as

replies to the Bhamati school's position which well as the sruti rendered useless).

involve: 1) the fact that the jiva is what is VII.v. LOCUS OF AVIDYĀ - 2 technically called a blend of Brahman and the internal organ. The consequences of this involve rendering avidya as residing in itself - which is Thus, Suresvara holds that Brahman/Atman is

absurd and impossible. 2) an analysis of the deep the locus of avidya, even as darkness is in the house

sleep state which demonstrates that avidya can be which it conceals. He says,

experienced even in the absence of the jiva.9 Hence, we conclude, as the only remaining alternative, that it is the Self alone which is 2 - The second objection raised by Suresvara is both the locus (asraya) of and the object (visaya) that the jiva is an embodiment of ignorance (ajnana- concelaed by ignorance.10 svarupa). How can ignorance be located in ignorance? However, this position is not without its critics. The first and most logical objection to Suresvara's 3 - Suresvara continues, 'suppose for the sake of position is: Brahman is of the nature of self- argument that avidya is located in the jiva', even luminous knowledge which is naturally opposed to

8 S amkepasāri raka II.209. 10 Naiskarmyasiddhi, sambandha to chapter III. 9Ibid.

158 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 159

avidya which is of the nature of darkness. Thus, Brahman cannot be the locus of avidya. magnifying glass, can burn a combustible substance Vivarana adherents reply to this objection by while that same light, by itself, cannot. saying that their true position has been A third objection contends that Brahman/Atman misrepresented. They make a distinction between is partless (nirvisesa). This has the consequence of Brahman-knowledge (svarupa-jnana) and mental rendering Brahman/Atman relationless, which, ipso cognitions (vrtti-jnana). Avidya, which is the potency facto, means that it cannot be a locus of anything let of Brahman, is the cause of both valid and alone avidya. In fact, there is nothing else for It to be erroneous cognitions (which are but vrttis of the a locus for! mind). Now the bottom line is that it is only In response, the Advaitin maintains that an urtti-jnana which is opposed to avidya and not individual must have knowledge of avidya, and svarupa-jnana. Brahman is of the nature of thereby a universe of multiplicity, in order to say knowledge and reveals everything, including that it is other than Brahman. If one does not know avidya. We observed earlier that there is no conflict that the universe exists, one cannot label it true or between the revealer and the revealed. false. As well, one must know the real nature of The second objection to the Vivarana position Brahman in order to say that the universe if false. It states that if Brahman/Atman is the locus of avidya is incumbent that ignorance be removed before one then it cannot remove avidya. This is due to the knows the real nature of Brahman. Thus, the critic above stated position which claims that is presupposing that avidya is real and locates Brahman/Ätman is not opposed to avidya if it is its somewhere. If an individual speaks of avidya, then locus. Brahman/Atman must be its locus, BUT, really there However, Suresvara never said that is no avidya at all. Relations pertain only at the Brahman/Ātman removes avidya. It is vrtti-jnāna relative level - not at the Absolute level. which removes avidya and not svarupa-jnana. Vrtti- Thus, according to Suresvara, Brahman/Atman jnana applies to the empirical or relative level. As a must be the locus and content of avidya. All that is valid/means of knowledge (pramana), it involves not Brahman/Atman is of the nature of ignorance the duality of a knower, what is known, and the and it does not make any sense to say that process thereby. This entire operation presupposes ignorance is located in what is of the nature of avidya. Even this very objection presupposes avidya. ignorance. If that were the case, there would be no If one asks why Brahman-knowledge as-it-is scope for ignorance's work of concealment in cannot remove avidya when Brahman-knowledge respect to the world of multiplicity. As well, what passed through a mental mode can, an analogy is owes its very existence to avidya, cannot be its given. The light of the sun, when passed through a support as well. Neither can the locus of avidya

160 Naiskarmyasiddhi

have a nature dependent upon, nor similar to, avidya - or vice versa. Avidya is unreal, from any Advaitin's perspective. Thus, in truth, it does not need a real residence anywhere. It is only from an ignorant individual's perspective that the question arises at all. This point cannot be stressed enough.

Transliteration of The Naişkarmyasiddhi

NAISKARMYASIDDHIH

prathamo 'dhyay ah

abrahmastambaparyantaih sarvapranibhih sarvaprakara syapi duhkhasya svarasata eva jihasitatvat, tannivrtty- artha pravrttirasti svarasata eva. duhkhasya ca dehopādā- naikahetutvād, dehasya ca pūrvopacitadharmādharma- mulatvadanucchittih. tayosca vihitapratisiddhakarmamūla- tvad anivrttih. karmanasca rāgadvesāpadatvad rāga- dvesayosca sobhanasobhanādhyäsanibandhanatvād, adhy- ā sasya cavicaritasiddhadvaitavastu nimittatvād, dvaitasya ca suktikārajatādivat sarvasyāpi svatah-siddhā- dvitiyatmanavabodhamatropadanatvadavyavrttih. atah sarvānarthaheturātmānavabodha eva. sukhasya cānāga- mapayino paratantrasyatmasvabhavatvat tasyānava- bodhah pidhanam. atas tasyātyantocchittāvasesa- purusarthaparisamaptih. ajñānanivrttesca samyagjñāna- svarūpa lābhamātrahetutvāt tadupādānam. ase sānārtha- hetvatmanavabodhavisayasya cānāgamikapratyaksādi- laukikapramānāvisayatvāt vedāntāgamavākyādeva sam- yagjnānam. ato sesavedāntasārasamgrahaprakaranamidam arabhyate. tatrabhilasitarthapracayaya prakaranartha- samsutranāya cāyamadyah slokah.

khanilagnyabdharitryantam srakphanivodgatam yatah dvantacchide namastasmai haraye buddhisaksine (1)

svasampradāyasya coditapramānapūrvakatvajnāpanāya vis- istagunasambandhasamkirtanapūrvikā gurornamaskārakriyā

163

164 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 165

alabdhvātisay am yasmād vyāvrttāstamabādayah gariyase namastasmā avidyāgranthibhedine (2) purusarthahetoravasistatvāt tadabhivyāh ārah

namaskāranimittasvāsayaviskaranarthah vedāvasānavākyotthasamyagjnānasusuksanih dandahityatmano moham na karmapratikulatah (8)

vedāntodarasamgūd h am samsārotsāri vastugam jñanam vyākrtamapyanyairvaksye gurvanusiksayā (3) pratijnat arthasamsuddhyarthampurvapaksoktih. tatra jñānamabhyupagamya tāvadupanyāsaḥ

k im visayam prakaranamiti cet, tadupanyāsah mukteh kriyabhih siddhatvājjnānam tatra karoti kim

yatsiddhavidamah siddhir yadasiddhau na kimcana katham chrnu tatsarvam pranidhyaya mano yatha (9)

pratyagdharmaikanisthasya yathatmyam vaksyate sphutam (4) akurvatah kriyāh kāmyā nisiddhāstyajatastathā nityanaimittikam karma vidhivac canutistha tah (10)

vivaksitaprakaranārthaprarocanāy ā anuktaduruk- tāprāmānya karanasankavyudasena svaguroh kim ato bhavati?

prāmānyopavarnanam kāmyakarmaphalam tasmaddevadimam na dhaukate

gurükto vedarāddhāntastatra no vacmy asaktitah nişiddhasya nirastatvānnārakim naity adhojanim (11)

sahasrakiranavyāpte khadyotah kim prakasayet (5) deharambhakayosca dharmadharmayorjnanima saha karm-

gurunaiva vedārthasya parisamāpitatvat prakaranoktau inah samanau codyapariharau

khyātyādyaprāmānyakāranāsanketi cet, tadvyudāsārtham vartamanam idam yabhyam sariram sukhaduhkhadam ãh a ārabdhampunyapapabhyam bhogad eva tayoh ksayah (12)

na khyatilābhapūjārtham grantho'smābhir udiryate svabodhaparisuddhyartham brahmavinnikasāsmasu (6) kāmyapratisiddhakarmaphalatvāt samsārasya tannirāsenaivasesānarthanirasasya siddhatvāt kim

anarthanarthahetupurusārthataddhetuprakaranārthasam- nityānust haneneti cet, tan na. tadakaranādapyan- arthaprasakteh grahajñāpanāyopanyāsah

aikātmyāpratipattir yā svātmānubhavasamsraya nityanust hanatas cainam pratyavāyo na samsprset

sā'vidyā samsrterbijam tannāso muktirātmanah (7) anadrtyatmavijnanamatah karmani samsrayet (13)

166 Naişkarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 167

abhyupetyaivam ucyate na tu yathavasthitatmavastu visayam jnānam asti, tatpratipādakapramānābhāvāt jnanabhyupagame'pi na dosah. yatah

yavantyas ceha vidyante srutayas smrtibhis saha karmano'ngāngibhāvena svapradhānatayā'thavā vidadhaty uruyatnena karmāto bhūrisādhanam (14) sambandhasyeha samsiddher jnane saty apy adosatah (20)

syat pramanasambhavo bhavad-aparādhad iti cet, tan yasmāj jnānābhyupagamānabhyupagame'pi na jñānān muktih na. yatah atah sarvāsramānām hi van manah kāyakarmabhih yatnato viksamāno'pi vidhim jnānasya na kvacit svanusthitair yatha sakti muktih syan nanyasadhanat (21) srutau smrtau va pasyami visvaso nanyato'sti nah (15) asadarthapralapo'yam iti dusanasambhavanāyāh a syāt pravrttirantarenapi vidhim lokavad iti cet, tan na. yatah iti hrstadhiyam vacah svaprajnadhmatacetasām ghusyante yajnasāl āsu dhūmānaddhadhiyām kila (22) antarena vidhim mohad yah kuryat samparayikam na tat syad upakaraya bhasmaniva hutam havih (16) dusanopakramavadhi jnapanay ah a

abhyupagata pramanya vedartha vij jaiminy anusasanac ca atrabhidadhmahe dosan kramaso nyayabrmhitaih vacobhih purvpaktoti ghatibhir natisambhramat (23) "amnayasya kriyarthatvad anarthakyam" ito'nyatha iti satopam ahoccair vedavij jaiminih svayam (17) caturvidhasyapi karmakāryasya muktav asambhavān na mukteh karmakāryatvam mantravarnāc ca ajnanahanamatratvan mukteh karma na sadhanam "kurvann eveha karmāni jijivisec chatam samāh" karmapamarsti najnanam tamasivotthitam tamah (24) iti mantro'pi nissesam karmany ayur avasrjat (18) karmakāryatvābhyupagame'pi dosa eva jñāninas ca vastuni vākya pramānyābhyupagamād, vakyasya ca kriyāpadapradhānatvāt tatas cābhipreta-jnānabhav ah ekena va bhaven muktir yadi va sarvakarmabhih pratyekam cedvrthanyani sarvebhyo'pyekakarmata (25) virahayya kriyam naiva samhanyante padanyapi na samasty apadam vākyam yat syāj jnānavidhāyakam (19) sarvaprakārasyāpi karmana utpattita eva visistasādhyābhi- sambandhān na pārisesyanyāyasiddhih

168 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 169

duritaksapanārthatvān na nityam syad vimuktaye bhrantivijnanam eva sarvapravrttinimittam tadā svargādiphala sambandhāt kāmyam karma tathaiva na (26) varddhamahe vayam hatah stha yuyam iti

pramānāsambhavāc ca hitam samprepsatām mohād ahitam ca jihāsatām

sādhyasādhanabhāvo'yam vacanāt pāralaukikah upay an praptihanarthan sastram bhasayate'rkavat (29)

nāsrausam moksadam karma sruter vaktrāt kathamcana (27) evam tāvat pratyaksanumanagamapramanavastambhad

abhyupagatabhyupagamac ca svasrunirgacchoktivad bhavato ātmano niratisayasukhahitāvyatirekasiddher, ahitasya ca

nisprayojanah pralapah sasthagocaravat svata evanabhisamabandhad, evamsvabhā- vyātmānavabodhamātrad eva "hitam me syad ahitam me ma

nisiddha kamyayos tyagas tvayapisto yatha maya bhūd" iti mithyajnanam tusarasuktikanavabodhottha-

nityasyāphalavattvāc ca na moksah karmasādanah (28) mithyajnanavat pravrttinimittamiti nirdharitam. sastram ca na padarthasaktyadhanakrditi. athaitasyaivottaratra prapañca arabhyate evam tavat "mukteh kriyabhih siddhatvat" iti nirasto'yam paksah. athādhunā sarvakarmapravrttihetunirūpanena na parinsim jihāsām vā pumsāh sāstram karoti hi yathāvasthitātmavastuvisayakevalajñānamātrād eva sa- nije eva tu te yasmat pasvadavapi darsanat (30) kalasamsarānarthanivrttir itimam paksam dradhayitukāma äha. iha cedam pariksyate. kim yatha pratisiddhesu uktam tavadanavabuddhavastuyathatmya eva vidhi- yadrcchikesu ca karmasu svābhāvikasvāsayottha- nimittavasad eva "idam hitam, idam ahitam" iti visesān pratisedhasastresv adhikriyata iti athadhuna visaya svabhāvanurodhena pravrttyasambhavam vaktukāma āh a parikalpya mrgatrsnikodaka-pipāsur iva laukikapramāna- prasiddhāny eva sādhanāny upadāya hitaprāptaye- 'hitanirasaya ca svayameva pra-vartate nivartate ca, lipsate'jnanato'labdham kanthe camikaram yatha

tathaivādrstārthesu kāmyesu nityesu ca karmasu. kim vānyad varjitam ca svato bhrāntya chāyāyāmātmano yathā bhayān mohāvanaddhātmā raksah parijihirsati eva tatra pravrttinivrttinimittam? iti. kim cato yady evam?, yac caparihrtam vastu tatha'labdham ca lipsate (31 & 32) sru, yadi tavād yathavasthitavastu samyagjnanam pramanabhut am laukikam agamikam va pra-vrttinimittam iti nisciyate, nivrttisastram ca nābhyupagamyate, tadā tatraitesu catursu visayesu praptaye parihārāya ca vibhajya

hatāh karmatyāgino, bhrāntivijnāna-mātrāvastambhād, nyay ah pradarsyate

alaukikapramanopattakarmanusthana-tyagitvac ca. atha mrgatrsnikodakapipasupravrttinimitta praptavyapariharyesu jnatvopay an sruteh prthak vadayathavastu krtvatha prāpnuyāt prāpyam tathā'nistam jahāty api (33)

170 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 171

athāvasistayoh svabhāvata eva tasmad duhkhodadher hetor ajnanasyapanuttaye samyagjnānam sup aryāptam kriya cen noktahetutah (37) varjitāvāptayor bodhādd hānaprāpti na karmaņā mohamātrāntarāyatvāt kriyaya te na sidhyatah (34) nanu balavad api samyagjnanam sad apramanotthenasamyag-

kasmat punaratmavastuyat hatmyavabodhamatrad evabhil- jnanena badhyamanam upalabhamahe yata utpannapara- mārthabodhasyāpi kartrtvabhoktrtvarāgadvesādyanava- asitaniratisayasukhavaptinissesaduhkha-nivrtti bhavato na bodhotthapratyaya avirbhavanti. na hy abadhite samyag- tu karmaneti? ucyate inane tadviruddhanam pratyayanam sambhavo'sti. naita- devam. kutah ? karmājnānasamutthatvan nai am mohapanuttaye samyagjñānam virodhyasya tāmisrasyāmsumān iva (35) badhitatvad avidyaya vidyam sa naiva badhate tadvasana nimittatvam yanti vidyasmrter dhruvam (38) nany ātmajnānam apy avidyopādānam. na hi sastrasisyācāry- ady anupaday atmajnanam atmanam labhata iti. naisa dosah. "karmajnanasamutthatvat" ity ukto hetustasya ca samartha- yata ātmajnānam hi svatassiddhaparamārthātmavastu- naa purvam evabhihitam "hitam samprepsatam" ity ādinā. svarūpamātrāsrayād evāvidyātadutpannakārakagrāma- tadabhyuccayartham avidyanvayena ca samsaranvayitvam pradhvamsi svatmotpattav eva sa strady apeksate, pradarsayisyamity ata ah a notpannamavidyanivrttau. karma punah svātmotpattāv utpannam ca. na hi kriya kārakanissprhā kalpa- kotivyavahitaphaladānāya svātmānam bibharti sādhya- brahmany adyatmake dehe latva natmeti bhavanam sruteh kinkaratam eti van manah kayakarmasu (39) mānamātrarūpatvāt tasyāh. na ca kriyātmajnanavat svātma- pratilambhakāla eva svargādi-phalena kartāram yasmāt karmājnanasamutthameva tasmāt tadvyavrttau sambadhnati. atmajnanam punah purusarthasiddhau nivartata ity ucyate notpadyamanasvarupavyatirekenānyad-rupāntaram sadh anantaram vapeksate. kuta etat? yatah dagdhākhilādhikāras ced brahmajnānagnina munih vartamanah sruter murdhni naiva syad vedakinkarah (40) balavaddhi pramanottham samyagjnanam na badhyate akanksate na capy anyad badhanam prati sadhanam (36) athetaro ghanataravidyapatalasamvitantahkarano'ngikrta kartrtvadyasesakarmadhikarakarano vidhipratisedhaco- svapaksasya hetvavastambhena samarthitatvān nirāsankam- danāsamdamsopadast ah karmasu pravartamānah upasamhriyate subhaih prapnoti devatvam nisiddhair nara kim gatim ubhabhyampunyapapabhyam manusyam labhate'vasah (41)

172 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 173

ābrahmastambaparyante ghore duhkhodadhau ghatiyantra- vairāgyam brahmālokadau vyanaktyatha sunirmalam (47) vad ārohāvarohanyāyenādhamamadhyamottamasukha- duhkhamohavidyuccapalasampātadāyinirvicitrayoniscan- yasmad rajastamomalopasamsrsta meva cittam dotpinjalakasvasanavegabhihatambhodhimadhyavartisu- kamabadisenakrsya visayadurantasunāsthānesu niksipyate skāl ābuvat subāsubhavyāmisrakarmavāyusamiritah tasmannityanaimittikakarmānusthānaparimārjanenapa- viddharajastamo-malam prasannam anakulam, sammarjita evam cankramyamāno'yamavidyak āmakarmabhih sphatikasilakalpam, bāhyavisayahetukena ca rāga pāsito jāyate kāmi mriyate cāsukhāvrtah (42) dvesātmakenātigrahabādi-senānākrsyamānam vidhūtāsesa- kalmasam pratyammātra-pravanam cittadarpanama- yathokte'rtha adaravidhanaya pramanopanyasah vatisthate. ata idam abhidhiyate

srutis cemam jagādārtham kāmasya vinivrttaye vyutthitāsesakāmebhyo yadā dhir avatisthate tanmūl ā samsrtir yasmāt tannāso'jnānahānatah (43) tadaiva pratyagatmānam svayam evāviviksati (48)

ka tv asau srutir iti cet atah param avasitādhikārāni karmāni pratyakpravanatva- sunau krtasamprattikāni caritārthāni santi "yada sarve pramucyanta" "iti nu" iti ca vajinah kāmabandhanam evedam vyāso'py āha pade pade (44) pratyakpravanatam buddheh karmany utpadya suddhitah krtārthānyastamāy ānti prāvrdante ghanā iva (49) esa samsārapantha vyakhyātah. athedānim tadvyāvrttaye karmāny ārādupakārakatvena yathā moksahetutām prati- yato nityakarmānust hānasyaisa mahimā padyante, tathābhidhiyate tasman mumuksubhih karyam atmajnanabhilasibhih tasyaivamduhkhataptasya kathamcit punya silanat nityam naimittikam karma sadaivatmavisuddhaye (50) nityehaksālitadhiyo vairāgyam jayate hrdi (45) yathokte'rthe sarvajnavacanam pramānam kidrg vairagyamutpadyata iti? ucyate "āruruksor muner yogam karma karanam ucyate narakad bhir yathasyabhut tatha kamyaphalad api yogarudhasya tasyaiva sama" eveti ca smrtih (51) yathārthadarsanāt tasmān nityam karma cikirsati (46) nityakarmanusthanad dharmotpattir, dharmotpatteh papa- evam nityanaimittikakarmānusthanena hanis, tatas cittasuddhis tatah samsārayathatmyavabodhas, sudhyamanam tu taccittam isvararpitakarmabhih tato vairagyam, tato mumuksutvam, tatas tadupaya-

174 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 175

paryesanam, tatah sarvakarmatatsadhanasamnyasas, tato kuto bādhyabādhakabhāvah? yasmāt yogābhyāsas, tatas cittasya pratyakpravanatā, tatas tat- tvamasyadivakyarthaparijnanam, tato 'vidyocchedas, tatas ayathavastvavidya syād vidyā tasyā virodhinī ca svatmany evavasthanam "brahmaiva san brahmapyeti" samuccayas tayor evam ravisarvarayor iva (56) 'vimuktas ca vimucyate" iti tasmad akārakabrahmātmani parisamāptāvabodhasyāsesa paramparyena karmaivam syad avidyanivrttaye karmacodanānām acodyasvābhāvyāt kunthatā. katham tat? jñānavan nāvirodhitvāt karmāvidyām nirasyati (52) abhidhiyate

na ca karmanah karyam any api muktau sambhavyate. napi brhaspatisave yadvat ksattriyo na pravartate muktau yat sambhavati tat karmāpeksate. tad ucyate. brāhmanatvādyahammānī vipro vā ksattrakarmani (57)

utpadyam apyam samskaryam vikaryam ca kriyaphalam yathay am drst anta evam darst antiko'pity etad ah a naivam muktir yatas tasmāt karma tasya na sadhanam (53) videho vitasamdeho neti netyavasesitah evam tāvat kevalam karma sāksād avidyāpanuttaye na dehadyanātmadrk tadvat tatkriy am viksate'pi na (58) paryaptamiti prapancitam. muktau ca mumuksujnanatad- visayasvabhavyanurodhena sarvaprakarasyapi karmano'- tasyarthasyaviskaranartham udaharanam sam bhava ukto "hitam samprepsatam" ity adina. yadrsas- cārādupakārakatvena jñānotpattau karmanām samuccayah mrtsnebhake yathebhatvam sisur adhyasya valgati sambhavati, tatha pratipaditam. avidyocchittau tu adhyasyatmani dehadin mūdhas tadvad vicesstate (59) labdhatmasvabhavasyatmajnanasyaivasad haranam sadha- katamatvam, nānyasya pradhānabhātasya gunabhūtasya na ca vayam jnanakarmanoh sarvatraiva samuccayam cetyetadadhunocyate. tatra jnānam gunabhūt am tāv-adahetur pratyacaksmahe. yatra prayojyaprayojakabhavo jnana ity etad ah a karmanos, tatra nāsmatpitrāpi sakyate nivārayitum. tatra vibhagapradarsanayodaharanam pradarsyate samnipatya na ca jñānam karmājñānam nirasyati sadhyasadhanabhavatvadekakal ana vasthiteh (54) stharum coradhiyal aya bhito yadvat palayate buddhyadibhis tathatmanam bhranto'dhyaropya cestate (60) samapradhanayor apy asambhava eva evam yatra-yatra jnanakarmanoh prayojyaprayojakabhavas bādhyabādhakabhāvāc ca pancāsyoranayor iva tatra sarvatray am nyay ah. yatra tu na samakāl am napi ekadesānavasthānān na samuccayata tayoh (55) kramenopapadyate samuccayah, sa visaya ucyate

176 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 177

sthānoh satattvavijnānam yathā nāngam palayane devan apyeti" iti sruteh. apare tu bruvate, vedāntavakya- ātmanas tattvavijnānam tadvan nāngam kriyāvidhau (61) janitam "aham brahmeti" iti vijnānam samsargātmakatvād, ātmavastuyāt hātmyavagahy eva na bhavati. kim tarhi? yasmād gunasyaitat svābhāvyam etadeva gangasrotovat satatamabhyasyato'nyad evavak- yārthātmakam vijnānantaramutpadyate. tad evāsesājñāna- yadd hi yasyanurodhena svabhāvam anuvartate timirotsariti, "vijnaya prajnam kurvita brahmanah" iti sruter- tat tasya gunabhūt am syān na pradhānād guno yatah (62) iti. asya paksadvayasya nivrttaya idam abhidhiyate.

yasmāt sakrtpravrttya mrdnati kriya karakarupabhrt ajñānam āgamajnanam sangatyam nasty ato'nayoh (67) karmaprakaranākānksi jnānam karmaguno bhavet yadd hi prakarane yasya tattadhngam pracaksate (63) evam tavad ananatve brahmani jnanakarmanoh samuccayo nirakrtah. athadhuna paksantarabhyupagamenapi pratya- svarupalabhamatrena yattvavidyam nihanti nah vasthanepurvavadanasvaso yatha tathabhidhiyate na tad angam pradhānam vā jnānam syāt karmanah kvacit (64) anutsāritanānātvam brahma yasyāpi vādinah tanmatenapi dussadhyo jnanakarmasamuccayah (68) samuccayapaksa vādināpy avasyam etad abhyupagantavyam yasmāt tasya vibhāgoktir dūsanavibhāgaprajñaptaye

ajñānam anirākurvaj jñānameva na sidhyati brahmatma va bhavettasya yadi vanatmarupakam vipannakārakagrāmam jñānam karma na dhaukate (65) atmanaptir bhaven mohad itarasyapy anatmanah (69)

idam caparam karanam jnanakarmanoh samuccayanibarhi tatra yadi tavad vastavenaiva vrttena brahma praptam ātmasvābhāvyāt, kevalam asuramohāpidhānamātram- hetusvarupakāryāni prakāsatamasor iva evānāpti-nimittam, tasmin pakse virodhini tato nasti sangatyam jnanakarmanoh (66) mohāpidhanabhangaya naiva karmāni kāranam evamupasamhrtekecit sva-sampradayabalavastambhad jñānenaiva phalāv āptes tatra karma nirarthakam (70) ähur, yadetadvedānta-vākyad "aham brahmeti" vijñānam samutpadyate, tannaiva svotpattimātrenājnānam nirasyati. anātmarūpake tu brahmani na karma sādhanabhāvam kim tarhi? ahanyahani drāghīyasā kālenopāsinasya sato pratipadyate, nāpi jñānam karmasamuccitam asamuccitam vā, bhāvanopacayān nissesamajñānamapagacchati, "devo bhūtvā

178 Naişkarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 179

yasmad anyasya svata eva sadhakasya brahmano'py anyatvam svata eva siddham. tatraivam siddhatvac ca na sadhyam. yatah

anyasyanyatmatapraptau na kvaciddhetusambhavah samanyetararupabhyam karmatmaivasya yoginah

tasmin saty api nānastah parātmānam prapadyate (71) nissvāsocchvāsavat tasmān na niyogam apeksate (77)

aparasmims tu pakse vidhih astu tarhi bhinnabhinnātmakam brahma. tatha ca sati jnana- karmani sambhavato bhedābhedavisayatvāt tayoh. tatra

paramātmānukūlena jnānābhyasena duhkhinah tāvad ayam paksa eva na sambhavati. kim kāranam? na hi

dvaitino'pi pramucyeran na parātmavirodhinā (72) bhinno'yam ity abhedabuddhim anirakrtya bhedabuddhih padartham alingate. evam hy anabhyupagame

itarasmims tu pakse vidher evanavakasatvam. katham? bhinnābhinna-padārthayor alaukikatvam prasajyeta. atha nispramanakam apy asriyate, tad apy ubhaya-

samastavyastabhutasya brahmany evavatisthatah paksabhyupagamad abheda-pakse duhkhi brahma syad ata

bruta karmani ko hetuh sarvananyatvadarsinah (73) āh a

sarvakarmanimittasambhavasambhavabhyam sarvakarma- bhinnabhinnam visesais ced duhkhi syad brahma te dhruvam

sankaras ca prāpnoti. yasmāt asesaduhkhitā ca syād aho prajñātma vādinām (78)

sarvajātyadimattvek'sya nitaram hetvasambhavah tasmat samyag evabhihitam na jnanakarmanoh samuccaya ity

viseşam hy anupādāya karma naiva pravartate (74) upasamhriyate

syad vidhir adhyatmabhimanad iti cen, naivam. yasmat tamo'ngatvam yatha bhanor agnes sitangata yatha vārinas cosnatā yadvaj jñānasyaivam kriyāngatā (79)

na cadhyatmabhimano'pi viduso'sty āsuratvatah viduso'py asuras cet syan nisphalam brahmadarsanam (75) yathoktopapattibalenaiva pūrvapaksayotsāritatvād, vak- tavyam navasesitam ity atah pratipattikarmavat pūrva-

ajñānakāryatvān na samakāl am nāpi kramena jnanakarmanor- paksaparihārāya yatkincid vaktavyam ity ata idam abhi-

vastvavastutantratvat sangatir astity evam nirakrto'pi dhiyate

kāsam kusam vāvalambyah a "mukteh kriyābhih siddhatvāt" ity ādy anucitam bahu

athadhyatmam punar yay ad asrito mudhatam bhavet yad abhani tad anyayyam yatha tadadhunocyate (80)

sa karotyeva karmāni ko hy ajñam vinivārayet (76)

180 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naişkarmyasiddhi 181

yo'yam kamyanam pratisiddhanam ca tyagah pratijnayate, sā pratijnā tāvan na sakyate'nusthātum. kim karanam? pāpāpanuttaye vākyāt prayascittam yathā tathā

karmano hi nirvrttātmano dvabhyam prakārabhyam nivrttih gamyate kamyahanartham nityam karma na vakyatah (83)

sambhavaty, arabdhaphalasyopabhogena, narabdhaphala- syāsubhasya prāyascittair iti. trtiyo'pi tyāgaprakāro'kar- athapi syat kamyair eva kamyanam purvajanmopacitanam ksayo bhavisyatiti. tan na. yatah trātmāvabodhat, sa tvātmajnānānabhyupagamād bhavatā nābhyupagamyate. tatra yany anupabhuktaphalāny anārab- dhaphalani, tanisvarenapi kenacid api na sakyante papmanam papmabhir nasti yathaiveha nirākriya

parityaktum. atharabdhaphalani tyajyante, tany api na kamyair api tathaivāstu kamyanam avirodhatah (84)

sakyante tyaktum. kim karanam? anivrtteh. anirvrttam hi evam tavat "mukteh kriyabhih siddhatvat" iti nirakrtam. cikirsitam karma sakyate tyaktum, pravrttinivrtti prati athātmajnānasya sadbhāve pramānāsambhava uktas tat- kartuh svatantryat. nirvrtte tu karmani tadasambhavad- duranustheyah pratijnātārthah. asakyapratijñānāc ca. na ca parihārāyaha

sakyate pratijñātum "yāvajjivam kāmyāni pratisiddhāni ca srutayas smrtibhis sākam anantyāt kāminām iha karmāni na karisyām" iti sunipunānām api sūksmāparādha- darsanat. pramanabhavac ca. na ca pramanam asti, moksa- vidadhaty uruyatnena karmāto bahukāmadam (85)

kāmo nityanaimittike karmani kuryāt, kāmyapratisiddhe ca varjayed, arabdhaphale copabhogena ksapayed iti. ānantyāc na ca bāhulyam prāmānye kāranabhāvam pratipadyate. ata äh a ca. na copacitanām karmanām iyattāsti, samsārasyānāditvāt. na ca kāmyaih pratisiddhair vā tesām nivrttir asti, suddhyasuddhisamye saty avirodhad ity ah a prāmanyaya na bahulyam na hyekatra pramanatām vastuny atanti manani tv ekatraikasya manatā (86)

na krtsnakamyasamtyago'nantatvat kartum isyate yat tūktam "yatnato viksamāno'pi" iti tatrāpi, bhavata nişiddhakarmanasceha vyafitānantajanmasu (81) evāparādhah. kasmāt? yatah

syan matam vyatitanantajanmopattanam karmanam 'parīksya lokān" ity ādyā ātmajnānavidhāyinīh naiskarmyapravanās sadh vih srutih kim na srnoși tāh (87) ksayo nityena tesam cet prayascittair yathainasah nisphalatvān na nityena kāmyāder vinivāranām (82) nanu "atmety evopasita", "atma va are drastavyah" ity- apurvabidhisruteh purusasyatmadarsanakriyāyam niyogo'

pramānābhāvāc ca. katham? vasiyata iti. naivam. apurusatantratvād vastuyāthātmya- jñānasya sakalanārthabijātmanavabodhotsārino muktihetor iti. vidhy abhyupagame'pi napurvavidhir ayam. ata ah a

182 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naişkarmyasiddhi 183

niyamah parisankhya va vidhyartho'pi bhaved yatah adhicodanam ya āmnayās tasyaiva syāt kriyārthatā anātmādarsanenaiva parātmānam upāsmahe (88) tattvamasyādivākyānambruta karmarthata katham (91)

yac coktam "visāso nanyato'sti nah" iti, tad api nidrātura- api ca, aikātmyapaksa ivadrstarthakarmasu bhavatpakse'pi cetasā tvayā svapnāyamānena pralapitam. kim kāranam? na pravrttirdurlaksyā. yatah hi vayam pramanabalenaikatmyam pratipadyamaha, aikātmyasya svata evānubhavamātrātmakatvāt. ata eva svargam yiyasur juhuyad agnihotram yathavidhi sarvapramānāvatārāsambhavam vaksyati. pramānavyava- dehād vyutthapitasyaivam kartrtvam jaimineh katham (92) sthayās cānubhavamātrāsrayatvāt. ata ah a na ca pratyakhyatasesasariradikarmasadhanasvabhava- vākyaikagamyam yad vastu nanyasmat tatra visvaset syatmamatrasya karmasv adhikārah yasmāt.

na'prameye svatassiddhe'visvāsah katham ātmani (89) sarvapramanasambhavyo hy ahamvrttyaikasādhanah yad apy uktam, "antarena vidhim" iti, tad apy abuddhi- yusmad artham anaditsur jaiminih preryate katham (93) purvakam iva nah pratibhāti. yasmāt kālāntaraphala- dāyisu karmasv etad ghatate. ātmalābhakāla eva phala- pravrttikāranābhāvāc ca. yasmāt dāyini tv ātmajñāne naitat samañjasam ity ah a sukhaduh khadibhir yoga atmano nahameksyate jnānāt phale hy avapte'smin pratyakse bhavaghātini parāktvāt pratyagatmatvaj jaiminih preryate katham (94) upakāraya tan neti na nyayyam bhati no vacah (90) k imca

yadapi jaiminiy am vacanamudghatayasi, tadapi tad- vivaksā'parijñānād evodbhāvyate. kim kāranam? yato na na tāvad yoga evāsti sarirenātmanah sadā

jaiminer ayam abhiprāya āmnāyah sarva eva kriyārtha iti. visayair durato nāsti svargādau syāt katham sukham (95)

yadi hy ayam abhiprāyo'bhavisyat, "athāto brahmajijñāsā. jadmady asya yatah". ity evam ādi brahmavastusvarūpa- yasmad anyatha nopapadyate matrayathatmyaprakasanaparam gambhiranyayasamdr- bdham sarvavedantārthamimāmsanam srimacchārirakam narābhimāninam tasmāt kārakādyātmadarsinam

nāsūtrayisyat. asūtrayac ca. tasmāj jaiminer evāyam abhi- mantra ahorarikrtya "kurvam" iti na nirdvayam (96)

prāyo yathaiva vidhivākyānām svārthamātre prāmānyam, evam aikātmyavākyānam apy, anadhigatavastupariccheda- yac coktam "virahayya" iti tadapi na samyag eva. tathāpi tu

sămyād iti. ata idam abhidhiyate. na yā kācit kriyā yatra kva cādhyāharanīyā, kim tu yā yatrābhipretasambandham ghatayitum saknoty ākānksām ca

184 Naiskarmyasiddhi CHAPTER TWO

dvitîyo'dhyayah vākyasya pūrayati saivādhyāharaniyā. evamvisistā ca kriyasmabhir abhyupagataiva. sā tūpāditsitavākyārthā- pratyaksādinām anevamvisayatvāt, tesām svārambhaka- virodhiny eva, nabhāt ārthaprādurbhāvaphaleti. sadbhāva- vikararahitatmavastuno nirdhatasesadvaitanartha- visayopanipātitvād, atmanas cāsesaprameyavailaksanyāt, sarvanarthaikahetvajnanapanodijnanadivakarodayahetu- syāparād hinaprakāsasya vijijnāpayisitatvād "asy" "asmi" tvam vastumātrayāthātmyaprakāsanapatiyasas tattvamasy- ityādikriyapadamsvamahimsiddharthapratipadanasamart- ader vacasa eveti bahvibhir upapattibhih pradarsitam. atas hamabhyupagantavyam, na viparitarthapratipadanaparam tadarthāpratipattau yat kāranam tadapanayanāya dvitiyo' dhyāya arabhyate

dhaved iti na danarthe padam yadvat prayujyate edhityadi tatha necchet svatah siddhārthavacini (97) sravito vetti vakyartham na cet tattvamasity atah tvampadarthanabhijnatvad atas tatprakriyocyate (1)

na ca yathoktavastuvrttapratipādanavyatirekena tattvam- yo'yam aham brahmeti vakyarthas tatpratipattir vakyad- asyādivākyam vākyārthāntaram vaktiti sakyam adhya- eveti pratyaksādinām anevamvisayatvād ity avādisam tasya vasātum ity āh a visuddhyartham anaikantikatvampurvapaksatvenopasthāp- yate tattvamasyādivākyānām svatassiddhārthabodhanāt arthantaram na samdrastum sakyate tridasair api (98) krtsnanatmanivrttau ca kascid apnoti nirvrtim srutavākyasmrtes cānyah smāryate ca vaco'parah (2) yasmād evam etatprasangena srotrantaropanyasam ubhayatrāpi sambhā- atah sarvāsramānām tu vānmanahkāyakarmabhih vanay ah a svanusthitair na muktih syāj jnānād eva hi sā yatah (99) vākyasravanamātrāc ca pisācakavad āpnuyāt tasmāc ca kāranādetad apy upapannam trisu yadrcchiki siddhih smāryamāne tu niscitā (3)

svamanorathasamklptaprajnādhmātadhiyām atah nayam anaikantiko hetuh. yatah srotriyesv eva vācas tāh sobhante nātmavedisu (100) sarvo'yam mahima jneyo vākyasyaiva yathoditah vākyārtham na hy rte vākyat kascij janāti tattvatah (4)

185

186 Naişkarmyasiddhi Naişkarmyasiddhi 187

vākyam ca pratipādanāya pravrttam sat pratipādayaty eva, sarvapramānānām apy evamvrttatvāt manyase tavad asmiti yavad asman na niyase svabhih krodikrte dehe naivam tvam abhimamsyase (13)

nāh amgrāhye na taddhine na pratyan nāpi duhkhini virodhah sad asity asmād vākyābhijnasya jāyate (5) sira ākramya padena bhartsayaty aparān sunah drstvā sād hāranam deham kasmāt sakto'si tatra bhoh (14)

nāviraktasya samsārān nivivrtsā tato bhavet na cānivrttatrsnasya purusasya mumuksutā (6) srutipariprapito'yam artho'natma buddhyadidehanta itidam ãh a

na cāmumuksor astiha gurupadopasarpanam na vinā gurusambandham vākyasya sravanam bhavet (7) busavrihipalal amsair bijam ekam tridha yatha buddhimamsapurisamsair annam tadvad avasthitam (15)

tathā padapadārthau ca na sto vākyam rte kvacit na ragadvesābhyam anvayavyatirekau ca tāv rte stām kimāsrayau (8) yathoktarthapratipattau satyam, vikriyate vipascid ity asyarthasya pratipattaye drstantah

anvayavyatirekābhyām vinā vākyārthabodhanam na syāt tena vinājnānaprahānam nopapadyate (9) varcaske samparityakte dosatas cāvadhārite yadi dosam vadet tasmai kim tatroccariturbhavet (16)

vinājñānaprahănena purusārthah sudurlabhah tadvat suksme tatha sthule dehe tyakte vivekatah tasmad yathoktasiddhyartham paro grantho'vartāryate (10) yadi dosam vadet tābhyām kim tatra viduso bhavet (17)

varcaskam tv annakaryatvad yatha natmeti gamyate tadbhagah sendriyo dehastadvat kimiti neksyate (11) etāvad eva hy "aham brahmāsmi" iti vākyārthāpratipattau kāranam yaduta buddhyadau dehante hy aham mameti

ädyantayor anatmatve prasiddhe madhye'pi kah pratiban- nissandhibandhano grahah. tadvyatireke hi na kutascid- vibhajyata, ekala eva pratyagatmany avatisthata ity āh a dhah ? ripau bandhau svadehe ca samaikātmyam prapasyatah vivekinah kutah kopah svadehāvayavesv iva (18) prāg anātmaiva jagdham sad ātmatām ety avidyayā sragālepanavad deham tasmāt pasyed viviktadhih (12) itas cānātmā dehadih

athaivam api madvacanam nādriyase, svayam evaitasmāc charirād asucirāser nirāso bhavisyasi ghatadivac ca drsyatvat tair eva karanair drseh svapne cānanvayāj jñeyo deho'nātmeti sūribhih (19)

188 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 189

dehādikāryakaranasamghātavyatirekāvyatirekadarsinah pratyaksata eva viruddham kāryam upalabhyate yatra yo drsyate drastra tasyaivāsau guno na tu drastrstham drsyatam yasman naiveyad drastrbodhavat (25)

caturbhir uhyate yat tat sarvasaktya sarirakam tūlāyate tad evāh amdhiyāghrātam ascetasām (20) pratyaksenaiva bhavadabhimatasya pratyaksasyābhāsi- krtatvāt sustham evānumanam. atas tad eva prakriyate. tatra

prasiddhatvāt prakaranārthopasamhārāyāh a ca vikalpadūsanābhidhānam

sthūl am yuktya nirasyaivam nabhaso nilatām iva natmana na tadamsena gunah svastho'vagamyate

dehamsūksmam nirākuryād ato yuktibhir atmanah (21) abhinnatvāt samatvāc ca niramsatvād akarmatah (26)

katham dehamsūksmam nirakuryad iti? ucyate na yugapan napi kramenobhayatha caikasya dharmino grahyagrahakatvam upapadyata iti pratipadanayah a

a hammamatva yatnecchā nātmadharmāh krsatvavat karmatvenopalabhyatvād apāyitvac ca vastravat (22) drastrtvenopayuktatvāt tadaiva syān na drsyatā kal antare ced drsyatvam na hy adrastrkam isyate (27)

vaidharmye drstäntah santu kāmam anātmadharmā mamatvādayo yathoktanyāya-

nosnimanam dahaty agnih svarūpatvād yatha jvalan balād anātmatayaiva ca tesu vyavahārād ahamrūpasya tu

tathaivātmātmano vidyād aham naivāvisesatah (23) pratyagatmasambandhitayaiva prasiddher, "aham brah- māsmi" iti srutes canātmadharmatvamayuktamiti cet, tan na

ekasyātmanah karmakartrbhāvah sarvathā nopapadyata iti srutvā, mimāmsakah pratyavatisthate, ahampratyaya- a hamdharmas tv abhinnas ced aham brahmeti vakyatah

grāhyatvād grāhyagrāhaka atmeti. tannivrttyartham āh a gauro'ham ity anaikānto vākyam tadvyapanetr tat (28)

yatkarmako hi yo bhavo nasau tatkartrko yatah katham vākyam tadvyapanetr tad iti? ucyate

ghatapratyayavat tasman nah am syad drastrkarmakah (24) yo'yam sthanuh puman esa pumdhiyā sthānudhir iva

atrāha pratyaksenatmanah karmakartrtvabhyupagame tat- brahmāsmiti dhiya'sesa hy ahambuddhir nivartyate (29)

pādopajivinānumānena pratyaksotsāranam ayuktam iti cod- yam. tannirākaranāya pratyaksopanyasah ahamparicchedavyavrttau na kimcid avyavrttam dvaita- jātam avasisyate, dvitiyasambandhasya tanmūlatvāt. ata āh a

190 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 191

nivrttāy am ahambuddhau mamadhih praviliyate ahambija hi sa sidhyet tamo'bhave kutah phani (30) sada'viluptasāksitvam svatassiddham na paryate apahnotum ghatasyeva kusāgriyadhiyātmanah (36) vivaksitadrst āntāmsajnāpanāya drstantavyākhyā etasmāc ca hetor ahamkārasyānātmadharmatvam- tamo'bhibūtacitto hi rajjvām pasyati rosanam avasīyatām bhrāntyā, bhrāntyā vinā tasmān noragam sraji vīksate (31) pramanaiscavagamyatvad ghatadivad ahamdrseh ananvayāc ca nātmadharmo'hamkārah yato rāddhih pramānānām sa katham taih prasidhyati (37)

ātmanas ced ahamdharmo yay an muktisusuptayoh dharmadharminos cetaretaraviruddhātmakatvād asangatih yato nanveti tenayam anyadiyo bhaved aham (32) dharminasca viruddhatvan na drsyagunasangatih ātmadharmatvabhyupagame'parihāryadosaprasaktis ca mārutandolitajval am saityam nagnim sisrpsati (38)

yady atmadharmo'hamkāro nityatvam tasya bodhavat tasmād visrabdham upagamyatām nityatve moksasāstrānām vaiyarthyam prāpnuyād dhruvam (33) drastrtvam drsyatā calva naikasminn ekadā kvacit drsyadrsyo na ca drasta drastur darsi drsir na ca (39) syat pariharah svabhavikadharmatvabhyupagame'py āmrādiphalavad iti cet, tan na sarvasamvyavahāralopasca prāpnoti. yasmāt

āmrādeh parināmitvād gunahānir gunantaraih drastāpi yadi drsyāy ā ātmeyāt karmatām dhiyah avikāri tu tad brahma na hi drastur iti sruteh (34) yaugapadyam adrsyatvam vaiyarthyam capnuyac chrutih (40) ahamkārasya cāgamāpāyitvāt, taddharminas cānityatvam prāpnoti kutah? yasmat

āgamāpāyinisthatvād anityatvam iyad drsih nāluptadrster drsyatvam drsyatve drastrta kutah upayann apayan dharmo vikaroti hi dharminam (35) syāc ced drg ekam nirdrsyam jagad vā syād asāksikam (41)

astv anityatvam kam upālabhemahi pramānopapannatvād iti uktayuktim drd hikartum āgamodāharanopanyāsah cet, tan na

192 Naişkarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 193

artam anyad drseh sarvam "neti nefiti" casakrt na ca viruddhadharmanam ekatranupapattih. kim karanam? vadanti nirgunam brahma katham srutir upeksyate (42) kalpitānām avastutvāt syād ekatrāpi sambhavah "mahābhātāny ahamkāra" ity etat ksetram ucyate kamanİyā sucih svād vity ekasyām iva yositi (50) na drser dvaitayogo'sti visvesvaramatād api (43) na cāyam kriyākārakaphalātmaka ābhāsa isad api adhuna prakrtārthopasamhārah paramarthavastu sprsati, tasya mohamatropadanatvat

evam etadd hirug jneyam mithyāsiddham anātmakam abhut abhinivesena svatmanam vancayaty ayam mohamūl am sudurbodham dvaitam yuktibhir atmanah (44) asaty api dvitiye'rthe somasarmapitā yathā (51)

kuto mithyāsiddhatvam dvaitasyeti cet vastuyat hatmyanavabodhapatalavanaddhaksah san

na prthan natmana siddhir atmano'nyasya vastunah subhruh sunasa sumukhi sunetra cāruhāsini ātmavat kalpitas tasmād ahamkārādir ātmani (45) kalpanāmātrasammohad ramety al ingate sucim (52)

tasmād ajñānavijrmbhitam etat sarvasyānarthajatasya jihāsitasya mūlam ahamkāra eva, tasyātmanatmoparagat. na tu paramarthata ātmano drsyah sabdadayah klpta drastr ca brahma nirgunam 'vidyaya tatkāryena vā sambandho'bhūd, asti, bhavisyati vā, aham tad ubhayam bibhrad bhrantim atmani yacchati (46) tasyāpariluptadrstisvābhāvyāt

tata eveyam abhinnasyātmano bhedabuddhih drsyanuraktam taddrastr drsyam drastranuranjitam a hamvrttyobhayam raktam tannase'dvaitatmanah (53) drg eka sarvabhūtesu bhāti drsyair anekavat jalabhājanabhedena mayükhasragvibhedavat (47) iha kecic codayanti yo'yam anvayavyatirekabhyam an- atmatyotsarito'hamkaro vakyarthapratipattaye, so'yam yathoktarthasya pratipattaye drstantah viparitarthah samvrtto, yasmad "aham brahmasmi" iti brahmah ampadarthayoh samanadhikaranyasravanad an- mitrodasinasatrutvam yathaikasyanyakalpanāt atmarthena samanadhikaranyam prapnoti. vaktavya ca abhinnasya cites tadvad bhedo'ntahkaranāsrayah (48) pratyagatmani tasya vrttir iti. socyate prasiddhalaksanā- gunavrttibhih apaharo yatha bhanoh sarvato jalapatrakaih tatkriyākrtidesāptis tathā buddhibhir ātmanah (49)

194 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 195

nājnasisam iti praha susuptad utthito'pi hi imam prasnikam uddisya tarkajvarabhrsaturāh ayodāh ādi vat tena laksanam paramātmanah (54) tvacchiraskavacojalair mohayantitaretaram (59)

pratyaktvād atiūksmatvād ātmadrstyanusīlanāt atrāpi codayanti. anubhavātmano'pi vikriyābhyupaga- ato vrttir vihāy anyā hy ahamvrttyopalaksyate (55) me'nabhyupagame'pi dosa eva. vasmad ah a

ātmana cavinabhavam atha va vilayam vrajet "varsātapābhyam kim vyomnas carmany eva tayoh phalam na tu paksāntaram yay ad atas cāh amdhiyocyate (56) carmopamas cet so'nityah khytulyas ced asatsamah" (60)

kīdrk punar vastu laksyam buddhijanmani pumsas ca vikrtir yady anityatā athavikrtir evay am pramāteti na yujyate (61) nāmadibhyah paro bhūma niskalo'karako'kriyah sa evātmavatām ātmā svatas siddhah sa eva nah (57) asya parihārah

ajnanotthabuddhyadikartrtvopadhim atmanam parigrhy- ürdhvam gacchati dhume kham bhidyate svin na bhidyate aivānvayavyatirekābhyām "aham sukhi duhkhi ca" ity- na bhidyate cet sthāsnutvam bhidyate ced bhidā'sya kā (62) ahamkārāder anātmadharmatvamuktam. kevalātmābhyu- pagame'sakyatvāt phalābhāvāc ca. athedānim avidyā- ity etatpratipattyartham ah a parikalpitam sāksitvam āsritya kartrtvādyasesaparināma- pratisedhāyath a avikriyasya bhoktrtvam syad ahambuddhivibhramāt nauyānavibhramād yadvan nagesu gatikalpanam (63) esa sarvadhiyam nrttam aviluptaikadarsanah viksate'viksamāno'pi nimisat tad dhruvo'dhruvam (58) yathoktārthāviskaranāya drst āntantaropādānam

nanu sarvasiddhāntānam api svasvadrstyapeksayopapan- yatha jatyamaneh subhrā jvalanti niscalā sikhā natvād, itaretaradrstyapeksaya dussthitasiddhikatvān, samnidhyasamnidhānesu ghatādhīnām avikriyā (64) naikatrāpi visvāsam pasyāmo. na ca sarvatārkikair adūsitam samarthitam, sarvatārkikopadravāpasarpanāya vartma ayam atrāmso vivaksita iti jñāpanāyāh a sambhavayamah. ucyate. visrabdhaih sambhavyatam anu- bhavamātrasaranatvāt sarvaptārkikaprasthānānām. tad- yadavastha vyanaktiti tadavasthaiva sa punah abhidhiyate bhanyate na vyanaktiti ghatādinām asamnidhau (65)

tatra ca

196 Naişkarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 197

sarvadhivyaījakas tadvat paramātmā pradipakah sarvak aram nirakarah svartho'svartham niringanah samnidhyasamnidhānesu dhivrttinām avikriyah (66) nistrikālas trikālasthamkutasthah ksanabhanguram (74)

na prakāsakriyā kācid asya svātmani vidyate nirapeksas ca sāpeksam paracim pratyag advayah upacārāt kriyā sā 'sya yah prakāsyasya samnidhih (67) sāvadhim nirgateyattah sarvadehesu pasyati (75)

maivam sankisthah samkhyaraddhanto'yam iti. yatah etasmāc ca kāranād ayam artho vyavasiyatām

yatha visuddha akase sahasaivabhramandalam duhkhi yadi bhaved ātma kas sāksi duhkhino bhavet bhütva viliyate tadvad atmanihakhilam jagat (68) duhkhinah sāksitā'yuktā sāksinoduhkhitā tathā (76)

tasmād esa kūtastho na dvaitam manāg api sprsati. yatah pūrvasyaiva vyakhyanartham ah a

sabdādyāk āranirbhāsāh ksanapradh vamsinir drsā narte syād vikriyamduhkhī sāksitā kā vikārinah nityo'kramadrg atmaiko vyāpnotiva dhiyo'nisam (69) dhivikriyāsahasrānām saksy ato'ham avikriyah(77)

evam ca sati buddheh parināmitvam yuktam evam sarvasmin vyabhicariny atmavastvevavyabhicaity anubhavato vyavasthapanayah a a titanagatehatyan yugapat sarvagocarān vetty atmavan na dhir yasmat teneyam parinaaamini (70) pramanatannibhesv asya nocchittir mama samvidah matto'nyad rūpam ābhāti yat tat syāt ksanapbhangi hi (78) tatas caitat siddham utpattisthitibhangesu kumbhasya viyato yatha apasyan pasyatim buddhim asrnvan srnvatim tathā notpattisthitināsās syur buddher evam mamāpi ca (79) niryatno'vikriyo'nicchann icchantim capy aluptadrk (71) sukhaduhkhatatsambandhānam ca pratyaksatvan dvisantim advişann ātma kupyanfim capy akopanah sraddhāmātragrahyam etat na

nirduhkho duhkhinim caiva nissukhah sukhinim api (72) sukhaduh khadisambaddham yatha dandena dandinam amuhyamāno muhyantim kalpayantim akalpayan radhako viksate buddhim saksi tadvad asamhatah (80) smarantim asmarams caiva sayanam asvapan muhuh (73) etasmāc ca hetor dhiyah parinamitvam yuktam

198 Naişkarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 199

yenaivasya bhaved yogah sukhakumbhadina dhiyah savasesaparicchediny ata eva na krtsnavit tam vidanfi tadaivānyam vetti nāto vikārinī (81) no cet parinamed buddhih sarvajna svatmavad bhavet (87)

asyās ca ksanabhanguratve svayam evātmā sāksi. na hi ato'vagater ekatvāt kütasthavabodham antarena buddher evavirbhāvatirobha- vādisiddhir asti candalabuddher yad drastr tad eva brahmabuddhidrk ekam tad ubhayor jyotir bhasyabhedad anekavat (88) parinamidhiyām vrttam nityākramadrgātmanā sadbhāvavikriyām eti vyāptam khenankuro yatha (82) kasmāt?

sata ātmanas cāvikāritve yuktih avasthādesakal adibhedo nasty anayor yatah tasmāj jagaddhiyām vrttam jyotir ekam sadeksate (89) smrtisvapnaprabodhesu na kascit pratyayo dhiyah drsavyapto'sty ato nityam avikari svayam drsh (83) sarvadehesv atmaikatve pratibuddhaparamarthatattva- syapy apratibuddhadehasambandhad ase saduhkha- evam tavat parabhyupagataprakriyāprasthānena nirastā- sambandha iti cet, tan na sesavikaraikatmyam pratipaditam upapattibhih athādhnā srautim prakriyam avalambyocyate bodhat prag api duhkhitvam nanyadehottham asti nah bodhādūrdhvam kutas tat syad yatra svagatam apy asat (90) astu va parinamo'sya drseh kutastharupatah kalpito'pi mrsaivāsau dandasyevāpsu vakratā (84) na ceyam svamanisiketi grāhyam. kutah? srutyavastambhāt

satsu bhāvavikāresu nisiddhesv evam ātmani sabdādyāk āranirbhāsa hanopadanadharmini dosah kascid ihāsaktum na sakyas tarkikasvabhih (85) bhasyety aha srutir drstir atmano'parinaminah (91)

prakrtam evopadaya buddheh parinamitvam atmanas ca kā tv asau srutih ?

kūtasthatvam yuktibhir ucyate "drster drast aram" atmanam na pasyer drsyamanaya praty artham tu vibhidyante buddhayo visayonmukhāh "vijñātāram are kena vijāniyād" dhiyām patim (92) na bhida'vagates tadvat sarvas tas cinnibha yatah (86) yasmat sarvapramanopapanno'yam arthas tasmad svasambaddhārtha eva ato'nyathāvādino jātyandhā ivānukampaniya ity āh a

sāvasesaparicchediny ata eva na krtsnavit

200 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 201

tad etad advayam brahma nirvikaram kubuddhibhih yasmat pramanaprameyavyavahāra ātmānavabodhāsraya jätyandhagajadrstyeva kotisah parikalpyate (93) eva, tasmat siddham atmano'prameyatvam. naiva hi karyam svakāranam atilanghyanyatrakaraka aspadam upani- pramanopapannasyarthasya asambhavanat tadanukam- badhnāti. ata āh a paniyatvasiddhih. tad etad ah a vyavadhiyanta evami buddhidehaghatadayah yady visesanam drst am natmanas tad ananvayat atmatvad atmanah kena vyavadhanam manag api (98) khasya kumbhādivat tasmād atmā syan nirvisesanah (94) svayam anavagamātmakatvād, anavagamātmakatvam ca atas cātmano bhedāsamsparso bhedasya mithyasvābhāvyād mohamātropādānatvāt ata ãh a pramanam antarenaisām buddhyadinam asiddhatā avagatyātmano yasmād āgamāpāyi kumbhavat anubhūtiphalārthitvād ātmā jnah kim apeksate (99) sāh amkāram idam visvam tasmat tat syat kacadivat (95) vaksyamānetaretarādhyāsasiddhyarthamuktavyatirekānu- sarvasyaivānumānavyāpārasya phalam iyad eva yadviveka- vädah grahanam. tad ucyate ghatabuddher ghatac carthad drastur yadvadvibhinnatā buddher anatmadharmatvam anumanat prasiddhyati a hambuddher ahamgamyad duhkhinas ca tatha drseh (100) ātmano'py advifiyatvam ātmatvād eva siddhyati (96) evam etayor atmanaimanoh svatak paratah siddhayor, yadyapy ayam grahitrgrahanagrahyagrhititatphalatmaka laukikarajjusarpadhyaropavad avidyopasraya evataretar- ābrahmastambaparyantah samsāro'nvayavyatirekābhyām- adhyaropa ity etad ah a anatmataya nirmalyavadapaviddhah. tathapi tu naivasau svatassiddhatmavyatiriktānātmaprakrtipadārthavyapāsra- abhrayanam yatha mohac chasabhrty adhyavasyati yah sāmkhyānām iva. kim tarhi? svatassiddhānuditāna- sukhitvādin dhiyo dharmāms tadvadātmani manyate (101) stamitakutasthatmaprajnanamatrasarirapratibimbitavicarit- asiddhātmanavabodhasraya eva, tadupadanatvat tasya, iti- dagdhrtvam ca yatha vahner ayaso manyate kudhih mam artham nirvaktukama āh a caitanyam tadvad ātmiy am mohāt kartari manyate (102)

rte jnanam na santy artha asti jnanam rte'pi tān sarva evayam atmānatmavibhagah pratyaksadipramana- evam dhiyo hirugjyotir vivicyād anumānatah (97) vartmany anupatito'vidyotsangavarty eva na paramātmavya-

202 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naişkarmyasiddhi 203

pāsrayah. asyās cāvidyayāh sarvanarthahetoh kuto nivrttir grāhakagrahanagrāhyavibhāge yo'vibhāgavān iti cet, tad ãh a hānopādānayos sāksi hānopādānavarjitah (108)

duhkharāser vicitrasya seyam bhrāntis cirantanī grāhakādinisthaiva grāhakādibhāvābhāvavibhāgasiddhih mül am samsāravrksasya tadbādhastattvadarsanāt (103) kasmān neti cet, tad āh a

tadbādhas tattvadarsanād iti kutah sambhāvyata iti ced, ata āh agopal avipalapanditam iyam eva prasiddhih svasadhanam svayam nasto na nasam vetty abhavatah ata eva na canyesām ato'sau bhinnasāksikah (109)

apramottham pramotthena jñānam jnanena badhyate grahakader anyasaksipurvakatvasiddheh svasāksino'py- ahirajjvādivadbādho dehādy ātmamates tathā (104) anyasaksipurvakatvad anavastheti cet, tan na saksino vyatiriktahetvanapeksatvād ata āh a laukikaprameyavailaksanyād ātmano nehānadhigatādhi- gamah pramanaphalam dhivannāpeksate siddhim atmāny asmād avikriyah nirapeksam apeksyaiva siddhyanty anye na tu svayam (110) avidyānāsamātram tu phalam ity upacaryate nājñātajnāpanam nyayyam avagatyekarūpatah (105) yato grāhakādisv ātmabhāvo'vidyānibandhana eva, tasmād anvayavyatirekābhyām vibhajyānātmanah, svayam yasmād ātmānavabodhamātropādānāh pramātrādayas, tasmāt utpattisthitinasesu yo'vagatyaiva vartate jagato'vikaraya'vehi tam asmiti na nasvaram (111) na vidanty atmanah sattām drastrdarsanagocarah na canyonyamato'misam jneyatvam bhinnasadhanam (106) svatassiddhātmacaitanyapratibimbitāvicāritasiddhikātmā- navabodhotthetaretarasvabhavapeksasiddhatvat svatas drastrader asad har anarupajnapanay ah a cāsiddher anātmano dvaitendrajālasya

bāhya ākāravān grāhyo grahanam niscayādimat na svayam svasya nānātvam nāvagatyātmanā yatah anvayy aham iti jñeyah sāksi tv ātmā dhruvah sadā (107) nobhābhyām apy atas siddham advaitam dvaitabādhayā (112) sarvakārakakriyāphalavibhāgātmakasamsārasūnya ātmeti, kārakakriyāphalavibhāgasāksitvād ātmanas, tad āh a yathoktarthapratipattidradhimne srutyudāharanopanyāsah

204 Naişkarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 205

nityāvagatirūpatvāt kārakādir na catmanah yatra tv asyeti satopam krtsnadvaitanisedhinim "asthul am" "neti neti"iti "na jayata" iti srutih (113) protsārayantim samsāram apya srausam na kim srutim (118)

sarvasyāsya grāhakāder dvaitaprapancasyātmanavabodha- ity om ity avabuddhātma niskalo'kārako'kriyah matropādānasya svayam seddhum asakyatvād, atmasiddhes virakta iva buddhyāder ekākitvam upeyivān (119) cānupādeyatvāt

a tmanas cen nivaryante buddhidehaghat adayah sasthagocarakalpās te vijneyāh paramārthatah (114)

kuto nyāyabalād evam niscitam pratiyate? yasmāt

nityām samvidam āsritya svatas siddhām avikriyām siddhayante dhiyo bodhas tams casritya ghatadayah (115)

yasman na kayacid api yuktya atmanah karakatvam kriyātvam phalatvam copapadyate, tasmād ātmavastu- yathātmyānavabodhamātropādānatvān nabhasiva rajo- dhumatusaranih aranilatvadyadhyaso, yathoktātmani sarvo'yam kriyākārakaphalātmakasamsāro'hammamatva- yatnecchādimithyādhyasa eveti siddham imam artham āh a

ahammithyabhisāpena duhkhy ātmā tadbubhutsayā itah srutim taya netiyuktah kaivalyam āsthitah (116)

tasyāsya mumuksoh srautad vacasah svapnanimittotsārita- nidrasyeveyam niscitār tha prama jayate

nāh am na ca mamātmatvāt sarvadānātmavarjitah bhānāv iva tamodhyāso'pahnavas ca tathā mayi (117)

so'yam evampratipannasvabhāvam ātmānam pratipanno'nuk- rosati

CHAPTER THREE

trtiyo'dhyayah

sarvo'yam pramitipramanaprameyapramatrlaksana, abrah- mastambaparyanto mithyadhyasa eveti bahusa upapattibhir atisthipam. ātmā ca janmadisadbhāvavikaravarjitah kutasthabodha eveti sphutikrtam. tayos ca mithyadhyasa- kūtasthātmanor nāntarenājnānam sambandho'nyatra codanā- pariprapitat yatha "iyam evarg agnih sama" iti. tac cajnānam svātmamātranimittam na sambhavatiti kasyacit kasmimscid- visaye bhavatity abhyupagantavyam. iha ca padarthadvayam nirddharitam atmanatma ca tatrānātmanas tāvan najnanenabhisambandhah. tasya hi svarūpam evajnanam; na hi svato'jnanasyajnanam ghatate. sambhavad apy ajnānasvabhāve'jnānam kam atisayam jana- yet? na ca tatra jñanapraptir asti, yena tatpratisedhā- tmakam ajnānam syāt. anātmanas cājnāna prasutatvāt. na hi purvasiddham sat tato labdhatma labhasya setsyata asrayasyasrayi sambhavati. tad-anapeksasya ca, tasya nissvabhavatvat. etebhya eva hetubhyo nanatma visayam ajñānam sambhavatiti grahyam. evam tavan nānātmano'jnānitvam, nāpi tadvisayam ajnānam. pārisesyād atmana evastv ajnanam, tasyajno'smity anubhava darsanāt. "so'ham bhagavo mantravid evasmi natmavit" iti sruteh. na cātmano'jnānasvarūpatā, tasya caitanyamātra svābhāvyād atisayas ca sambhavati jnanaviparilopo, jnana praptes ca sambhavas, tasya jnānakāritvāt. na cājnāna karyatvam, kūtasthātmasvābhāvyād ajnānānapeksasya cātmanah svata eva svarāpasiddher yuktam ātmana evājna tvam. kim visayam punas tad atmano'jnanam? atmavisayam iti brumah. nanv atmano'pi jnanasvarupatvad, ananyatvac ca, jnanaprakritivadibhyas ca, hetubhyo naivajnanam ghatate.

207

208 Naişkarmyasiddhi Naişkarmyasiddhi 209

ghatata eva. katham? ajnānamātranimittatvāt tadvibhāg- patitc bhavati. yadi punar, yadrcchatah pravartate, tadā na asya sarpatmateva rajjvāh. tasmāt tadapanuttau dvaitān- kascid dosa" iti. vidhipariprāpita iti brūmo. yata āh a arthabhavah. tadapanodas ca vakyad eva tatpadapadarth- ābhijnasya. ato vākyavyākhyānāyādhyaya arabhyate. samādisādhanah pasyed ātmany ātmānam añjasā tatra yathoktena prakārena tattvamasyādivākyonpani- anvayavyatirekabhyam tyaktva yusmad asesatah (4) vistapadapadarthayoh krtanvayavyatirekah yusmadarthe parityakte purvoktair hetubhih srutih viksapannasya ko'smiti tat tvam ity aha sauhrdāt (5) yada na tattvamasy ader brahmasmity avagacchati pradhvastāh am mamo naiti tadā girmanasoh srtim (1) atrapi codayanti samkhyah. "sa rirendriyamanobuddhisv anatmasv, atmeti nissamdhibandhanam mithyajnanam- yadaiva tadartham tvamarthe'vaiti tadaivavakyarthatam ajñanam. tannibandhano hy atmano'nekanarthasambandhas pratipadyate girmanasoh srtim na pratipadyata iti. kuta tasya cānvayavyatirekābhyām eva nirastatvān, nirvisayam etad adhyavasiyate? yasmāt tattvamasyādivākyam prāptam. tasmād vākyasya caisa mahimā yo'yam atmānātmanor vibhāga" iti. tannirākaranā- tatpadam prakrtārtham syāt tvam-padam pratyagatmani yedam ucyate nilotpalavad etābhyāmduhkhyanātmatvavārane (2) bhedasamvid idam jnānam bhedābhāvas ca sāksini evam krtānvayavyatireko vākyad evavakyartham prati- kāryam etad avidyāyā jnātmanā tyajayed vacah (6) padyata ity uktam atas tadvyāk hyānaya sutropanyasah jnatmana tyajayed vaca ity upasrutyaha kascit. mithya sāmānādhikaranyam ca visesanavisesyatā jnanavyatirekenātmanavabodhasyābhāvāt kim vākyena laksyalaksanasambandhah padārthapratyagātmanām (3) nivartyate? ajñāna hi nāma jnānābhāvas. tasya cāvastu- svābhāvyāt kutah samsārakaranatvam? na hy asatah saj- asmin sutra upanyaste kascic codayati "yo'yam vakyartha- janmesyate "kutas tu khalu somyaivam syāt" iti, "katham- pratipattau purvādhyāyenanvayavyatirekalaksano nyāyah asatah saj jayeta" iti sruter iti. atrocyate sarvakarmasamnyasapurvako'bhihitah, kim ayam vidhi- pariprāpitah, kim va svarasata evātra pumān pravartata iti. ajñata eva sarvo'rthah prāg yato buddhijanmanah kimcātah? srnu. yady atmavastusāksātkaranaya vidhi- ekenaiva satā sams ca sann ajnato bhavet tatah (7) pariprapito'yam nyayas, tada'vasyam atmavastusāksāt- karanāyavyāvrttasubhāsubhakarmarāsir. ekāgramanā, anva- sann ajñato bhavet tata ity uktam adhastanena slokena yavyatirekabhyām yathoktābhyam atmadarsanam karoti. ko'sau sann ajnāta ity apeksāyām tatsvarupaprati- aparisamapyatmadarsanam tatah pracyavamāna ārudha- pādanāyāh a

210 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 211

pramitsay am ya abhati svayam matrpramanayoh yatha buddhau purvayor evam ātmanity atidesena buddhi- svamahimnā ca yas siddhah so'jnātārtho'vasiyatām (8) sādharmyavidhānān, nanatvaprasaktau tadapavādārtham- āh a atra kecid ahuh. yatkimcid iha vākyam laukikam vaidikam vā tat sarvam samsargatmakam eva vākyartham gamayati. dharmadharmitvabhedo'syah so'pi naivatmano yatah atas tattvamasyādivākyebhyah samsargātmakam "aham brahma"iti vijnaya, tāvan nididhyāsīta yāvad avāk- pratyagjyotir ato'bhinnam bhedahetor asambhavat (13)

yarthatmakah pratyagatmavisayo'vabodnah "aham bhedahetvasambhavam darsayann ah a brahma" iti samabhijāyate. tasmād eva vijnānāt kaivalyam- apnofiti. tannirakaranāyedam ucyate na kasyāmcid avasthāy ām bodhapratyaktvayor bhida vyabhicaro'thava drsto yatha'hamtadvidos sada (14) samanādhikaranyader ghatetarakhayor iva vyāvrtteh syād avākyārthah sāksān nas tattvamarthayoh (9) yasmād ajñānopādānāyā eva buddher bhedo nātmanas, tasmād etat siddham kuto'vakyartho'vasiyata iti cet, , tatpratipattyartham visesana visesyayoh sāmarthyoktih kūtasthabodhato'dvaitam sāksāt tvam pratyagatmanah kütasthabodhad boddhri dhh svato hiy am vinasvarī (15) nirduhkhitvam tvamarthasya tadarthena visesanāt pratyakta ca tadarthasya tvampadenāsya samnidheh (10) athadhuna prakrtasyaiva parinaminah kutasthasya ca laksanam ucyate uktam sāmānādhikaranyam vise sanavisesyabhāvas c a samksepato'tha laksyalaksanavyākhyānāyāh a visesam kamcid asritya yat svarupam pratiyate pratyabhijñapramānena parināmi sa dehavat (16) kutasthabodhapratyaktvam animittam sadātmanah boddhrtāh amtayor hetus tabhyam tenopalaksyate (11) samanyac ca visesac ca svamahimnaiva yo bhavet

buddheh kutasthabodhapratyaktvanimitte boddhrtāprat- vyutthayapy avikāri syāt kumbhakasadivat tu sah (17)

yaktve ye tv asadharane, tayor visesavacanam a tmano buddhes ca bodhapratyagatmatvam abhihitam. tayor asādhāranalaksanābhidhanartham āh a boddhrtā kartrtā buddheh karmatā syād ahamtayā tayor aikyam yatha buddhau pūrvayor evam atmani (12) buddher yat pratyagatmatvam tat syād dehādyupāsrayāt ā tmanas tu svarūpam tan nabhasah susitā yathā (18)

212 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naişkarmyasiddhi 213

boddhrtvam tadvad evasyah pratyayotpattihetutah viruddhoddesanatvāc ca paroksyaduhkhitvayor avīvaksita- a tmanas tu svarupam tat tisthantiva mahibhrtah (19) tvam ity ãh a

tayoh kūtasthaparināminor ātmānavabodha eva sambandha- uddhisyamanam vakyastham noddesanagunanvitam hetur, na punar vastavah kascid api sambandha upapadyata äkanksitapadarthena samsargam pratipadyate (25) ity ãh a yata etad evam, ato'nupaditsitayor api tattvamarthayor- samyaksamsayamithyatvair ddhir eveyam vibhajyate visesana visesyabhāvo bhedasamsargarahitāvākyārtha- hānopādānatā'misām mohād adhyasyate drsau (20) lakşanāyaivety upasamhārah

kutah kūtasthātmasiddhir iti ced, yatah tado visesanarthatvam visesyatvam tvamas tatha laksyalaksanasambandhas tayoh syāt pratyagātmanā (26) na hanam hana matrena nodayo'piyata yatah tatsiddhih syāt tu taddhine hānādānavidharmake (21) katham punar avivaksitaviruddhanirasyamānasya

evam laksanam sarpavad rajjvāh praticah syād aham tathā tadbādhenaiva vakyartham vetti so'pi tadāsrayāt (27) agamapayihetubhyam dhūtva sarvan anatmanah tatas tattvamasityetadd hanty asmadi nijam tamah (22) iyam ca vakyarthapratipattir anvayavyatirekābhi- jñāsyaiva. yasmāt ityadi punah punar ucyate granthalaghavad buddhi- laghavam prayojakamiti. tatra yadyapi tattvamasyadi- yavad yavan nirasyay am dehadin pratyagancati vākyad upaditsitadvitiyatmarthavat paroksyasadviti- tavat tavat tadartho'pi tvamartham praviviksati (28) yarthah pratiyate. tathāpi tu naivāsāv arthah srutyā tatparyena pratipipadayisitah, prag apy etasya pratitatvad kasmāt punah karanad dehadyanatmatvapratipattav itimam artham ah a evātmā tadarthamātmatvenābhilingate, na viparyaya iti? ucyate. pratyagātmānavabodhasyānātmasvābhāvyāt, tad ity etat padam loke bahvarthapratipadakam tadabhinir-vrttas cayam buddhyadidehantas, tasminn aparityajya paroksyam abhidhanottham eva tat (23) ātmatvam avidya-krtam evātmatvam ivānātmatvam api sāvidyasyaiva. yato niravidyo vidvān avākyārtharūpa eva tvam ity api padam tadvat saksanmātrārtha vāci tu kevalo'vasisyate tasmād ucyate samsāritām asamtyajya sāpi syād abhidhānajā (24)

214 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naişkarmyasiddhi 215

dehadi vyavadhanatvat tadartham svayam apy atah na cānādare kāranam asti. yasmat sarvatraivanadara- pāroksyenaiva jānāti sāksattvam tadanātmanah (29) nimittam pramanasya pramanantarapratipannaprati- pādanam vā, viparitapratipādanam vā, samsayita- yathoktarthapratipattisaukaryaya drst antopādānam pratipadanam va, na va pratipadanam iti. na caitesam anyatamad api karanam asti. yata ah a pratyag udbhutapittasya yathā bāhyārthapitatā caitanyam pratyagātmiy am bahir vad drsyate tatha (30) mānantarānavastabdham nirduh khyatmanam añjasā bodhayanti srutih kena na pramānam itiryate (35) yasmad evam, ato visuddham avasiyatam na ca samsayitavyam avagamayati. yatah padany uddhrtya vākyebhyo hy anvayavyatirekatah padārthām llokato buddhvā vetti vākyārtham añjasā (31) sarvasamsayahetau hi niraste katham atmani jāyeta samsayo vākyād anumānena yusmadi (36) kutah punah sāmānyamātravrtteh padasya vākyartha- pratipattihetutvam iti? badham api ca

sāmānyam hi padambrūte viseso vākyakartrkah yatra syat samsayo nasau jneya atmeti panditaih srutyādipratibaddham sad visesartham bhavet padam (32) na yatah samsayaprāptir ātmano'vagatitvatah (37)

anvayavyatirekapurassaram vākyam eva sāmānadhi- anavabodhakatvam tu durotsaritam eva. yata āh a karanyadināvidyapatalapradhvamsadvarena mumuksum svārajye'bhisecayati na tv anvayavyatirekamatrasadh- bodhye'py anubhavo yasya na kathamcana jayate yo'yam artha ity ãh a tam katham bodhayec chastram lost am narasamākrtim (38)

buddhyadinam anatmatvam lingad api ca sidhyati anvayavyatirekapurassaram vākyam evāvākyārtharūpam nivrttis tavata nefity ato vakyam samāsrayet (33) atmanam pratipadayatity asya paksasya dradhimne sruty- udāharanam upanyasyati na kevalam anumanamatrasarano'bhilasitam artham na prapnotity, anartham capnofity ah a jighranimam aham gandham iti yo vetty avikriyah sa atma tat param jyotih sirasidam vacah sruteh (39) anadrtya srutim mohad ato bauddhas tamasvinah ā pedire nirātmatvam anumānaikacaksusah (34) yatha "tat satyam sa atma tattvamasi" ity asya sesatvenānvayavyatirekasrutir yathā "ya eso'ksini puruso

216 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 217

drsyate" ity ādyā "atha yo vededam jighrāni" ity antā. parāñcy eva tu sarvāni pratyaksādini nātmani tatha "aham brahmasmi" ity asya sesah praticy eva pravrttam tat sad asiti vaco'ñjasā (45)

ahamah pratyagātmārtho nirastāsesayusmadah tasmät pramātrpramānaprameyebhyo hīyamānopādi- bambhaniti srutir nyāyyā yo'yam ity ādinā'sakrt (40) yamanebhyo'nvayavyatirekabhyām munjesikāvad asesa- buddhivikriyasāksitayātmānam niskrsya, tattvamasyadi- katham punar ayam artho'vasiyate ahamvyājenātrātmārtho vākyebhyo'pūrvadilaksanam atmanam vijaniyat. tad etad

bubodhayisita iti? yatah āh a

eşa ātmā svayamjyoti ravisomāgnivāksu sah ahamduhkhi sukhi ceti yenay am pratyayo'dhruvah itesv astam drg evāste bhāsayams cittacestitam (41) avagatyanta ābhāti sa ma ātmeti vākyadhih (46)

nirnenekti ca prsto munih pramanantarānavastabdham nirastāsesakāryakāranātmaka- dvaitaprapañcam satyajnānānandalaksanam ātmānam "tat- ā tmanaivety upasrutya ko'yam ātmety udirite tvamasy", "aham-brahmāsmi", ity ādivākyam samsayita- buddheh param svato muktam ātmānam munir abhyadhāt (42) mithyajnanājnānapradhvamsamukhena sāksādaparoksāt karatalanyastāmalakavat pratipādayaty evety asakrd- yasmāc cātmātrāh amvyājena pratyanmātro jigrāhayișitas, abhihitam. tatra kecidāhuh 'tattvamasyādivākyair

tasmād ahamvrttih svarūpasya vilayenaiva vākyā- yathavasthitavastuyathatmyanvakhyananisthair, na yath- rthavagamaya karanatvam pratipadyata itimam artham okto'rthah pratipattum sakyate, bhidhāsrutitvāt tesām. na

āh a hi loke'bhidhasruteh pramānāntaranirapeksāya "nadyās fire phalani santi", ityadikayah pramanyam abhyupagatam. ato a hamvrttyaiva tad brahma yasmad eso'vagacchati niyogamukhenaivabhidhasruteh pramanyam yuktam prama- tatsvarupalayenatah kāranam syād ahamkrtih.(43) nantaranirapeksatvan niyogasya.' asya pariharartham aseşapratyakşadiprameyatvanirākaranadvāren ātindri- ata eva ca yah pratijnato'rtho "nah amgrahye na taddhine" yarthavisayatvad abhidhasruteh pramanyam suptapurusa- ityādih, sa yuktibhir upapādita iti krtvopasamhriyate prabodhakavākyasyeva vaktavyam ity ayam ārambhah

grhit h ampadārthas cet kasmaj jno na prapadyate nityavagatirapatvād anyamananapeksanat pratyaksādivirodhāc cet praticy uktir na yusmadi (44) sabdādigunahinatvāt samsayānavatāratah (47)

purvasyaiva slokarthasya vispastartham ah a trsnanist hīvanair nātma pratyaksādyaih pramiyate pratyagatmatvahetos ca svārthatvād aprameyatah (48)

218 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 219

srutir apimam artham nirvadati drsyatvad ghatavad deho dehavac cendriyany api didrksitaparicchinnaparāgrūpādi samsrayāt manas cendriyavaj jneyam manovan niscayadimat (54)

viparātam ato drstyā svato buddham na pasyati (49) tatha sakalakāryakāranāgamāpāyivibhāgasāksitvenāpi

nyayasiddham ato vakti drster drastārām atmanah na pasyet pratyagatmanam pramanam srutir adarat (50) prāg asad yāti pascāt sat sac ca yāyād asat tathā anatmabhijanam tat syad viparit ah svayam drsih (55)

anumānāvisayatve'nyad api kāranam ucyate tatra ghatādinām drsyānām anatmatvam drastrātma- purvakam pratyaksenaiva pramanenopalabhyanatmanas pratyaksasya paraktvan na sambandhagrahanam yatah cāsādharanan dharmān avadharya, tair drsyatvaga- ā tmano'to'numityāsyānubhavo na kathamcana (51) māpāyadibhir dharmaih sa rirendriyamanoniscayadivrttir anātmatayā vyudasyāh amvrttimato'pi drsyatvāvisesād evam ayam pramatrpramanaprameyavyavahārah sarva eva drastrpurvakatvam avasiyate. tad etad āh a parācinavisaya eva na praticinam atmanam avagahayitum alam. evam ca saty, anenaiva yathokto'rtho'vasātum sakyata ity ãh a ghatadayo yatha lingam syuh paramparaya'hamah drsyatvad aham apy evam lingam syad drastur atmanah (56)

pramānavyavahāro'yam sarva eva parag yatah nanu jagratsvapnasusuptesv suvicāryāpy ato'nena yusmady eva didrksate (52) dra strdarsanadrsyanam āgamāpāyadarsanād yat sāksikau tesāmāgamapāyau, sa agamapayavibhagarahita atmā yatha yannibandhanau yasmāt laukika pratyak sādipramananadhigamyo'ham jagatah prakāsāprakāsau, sa prakāsāprakāsavibhāga- brahmāsmīti vākyārthas tasmat rahitah surya iti. yadā caivam, tada vākya- vagamyasyārthasyānuditānastamita vijnānamātrasvabhāva- anvayavyatirekābhyām nirasyapranato yatah syanumānenaiva pratipannatvāt punar api vakyasya viksāpannasya ko'smiti tad asiti srutir jagau (53) nirvisayatvaprasangah. naisa dosah. lingavyavadhānena tatpratipatteh. nanu sāksādaparoksādātma- so'yam anvayavyatirekanyāya etāvān eva yadavasāno svabhāvenānātmano hānopādanayoh sambandhagrahanat, vākyārthas tadabhijnasya "aham brahmāsmi", ity āvir- kam atisa y am vakyam kuryat? maivam vocah. bhavati. drastrdrsyavibhāgenāgamāpāyisāksivibhāgena ca lingadhinatvat tatpratipatteh. na hi lingavyava- srutyabhyupagamatah samksipyocyate dhanenatmapratipattih sāksātpratipattir bhavati, "yam evaisa vrnute tena labhyah" iti sruteh. ata āh a

220 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naişkarmyasiddhi 221

lingam astitvanisthatvān na syad vākyārthabodhakam dāhyadāhakataikatra yatha syād vahnidārunoh sadasadvyutthitātmā'yam ato vākyāt pratiyate (57) jneyajnātrkataivam syad ahaminatroh parasparam (59)

nanu yadi vyāvrttasadasadvikalpajāl am vastv abhist am evam tavad avidyotthasyantahkaranasya bahyavisaya- vākyād bhavatas, tathāpi tūtsāryate vākyavisayā trsnā. nimittarupavacchedayah amvrttir vyapriyate. tayavacchin- yasmād antarenāpi vākyasravanam nirastāsesavikalpam nam sat kūtasthapratyagātmopādānāvabodharūpasyā- a gopal avipala panditam susupte vastu siddham, ato nartho vyavadhanataya visayabhavam pratipadyata iti. tatra

vākyasravanena. naitad evam. kim kāranam? sarvānartha- tayor jnatrahamtanipayor avabhasakavabhasyatvasamban- bijasyātmānavabodhasya susupte sambhavāt. yadi hi dhavyatirekena nanyat sambandhantaram upapadyate. susupte'jnānam nābhavisyad, antarenāpi vedāntavākya- ah amtarupam tv atmasātkrtva' hamkancukam pari- sravanamanananididhyasanany "aham brahmasmi" ity- dhayopakāryatvopakārakatvaksamah san, bāhyavisa-

adhyavasayat sarvapranabhrtamapi svarasata eva susupta- yenopakārināpakārinā vatmatmiy am s ambandham

pratipatteh sakalasamsarocchittiprasangah. na ca kaivalyāt pratipadyate. tadabhidhiyate punarutthanam nyayyam, anirmoksaprasangat. na ca "anya eva susupto'nya evotthita" iti sakyam vaktum, "nādrāksam- idam jñānam bhavej jñātur mamajnanam tathāhamah aham susupte'nyat kimcidapi" ityutthitasya pratyabhijnā- ajñānopādhinedam syād vikriyāto'hamo mama (60)

darsanāt. tasmād, avasy am susupte'jñānamabhyupa- gantavyam. nanu yadi tatrājnānam abhavisyad, ekasyaiva jnatur, antarbahyanimittabhedad vibhinne'pi rāgadvesaghatājnānādivat pratyaksam abhavisyad, yatheha visaya "idam" "mama" iti jñānam dvairūpyam jayata ity- loke "ghatam na jānāmi" ity ajnānam avyavahitam uktam. atropakriyamānāpakriyamānasyaiva jñātur visaye pratyaksam. atrocyate. na. abhivyanjakābhāvāt. katham mamapratyayo bhavati. viparyaye cedampratyaya iti

abhivyañjakābhāva iti cecchrnu katham avagamyate? avagamyatām anvayavyatirekā- bhyam. tat katham ity ãh a bah yam vrttim anutpadya vyaktih syan nahamo yathā narte'ntahkaranam tadvad dhvāntasya vyaktir āñjasi (58) anupakriyamānatvān na jnatuh syād aham mama ghatadivad idam tu syan mohamatravyapasrayat (61) kascid atikrāntam pratismrtya "drsyatvād aham apy evam l ingam syad drastur atmanah" iti niryuktikam abhihitam ity- mohatatkāryāsrayatvāj jnatrtvavikriyayoh pūrvatredam- äha. kim karanam? ahamtajjnatror vivekaprasiddheh mamajnananvayah pradaristah. athādhunā tadvyatirekena

yatheha ghatadevadattayor grāhyagrāhakatvena vyatirekapradarsanārtham āh a sphutataro vibhagah prasiddho loke, na tathehāh amkära- tajjñatror vibhago'stiti. tasmad, asadhv etad abhihitam iti. vikriyājnānasūnyatvān nedam na ca mamātmanah

atrocyate utthitasya sato'jñānam nāham ajnāsisam yatah (62)

222 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 223

ātmanatmavivekasyeyattapradarsanārtham āh a tasyāh khalv asyā avidyāyā bhrānteh samyagjñānotpatti- vākyapratyaksamānābhyām iyan arthah pratiyate dvārena nivrttih anarthakrttamohānir vākyād eva sadātmanah (63) bubhutsocchedini casya sad asityadina drdham dvitiyadhyayadau srotrcatustayam upanyastam. pratici pratipattih syān nāsau mānāntarād bhavet (67) tatra krtsānātmanivrttau satyām yah pratyagatmany avāk- katham punar vakyam pratipadayaty eveti ced, drstantoktih yarthatām pratipadyate, sa ksapitāsesāntarāyahetur iti, na tam prati vaktavyam kimcid apy avasisyate. yo'pi vakya- sravanamātrād eva pratipadyate, tasyāpy atindriya- jijnasor dasamam yadvan navātikramya tāmyatah saktimattvān na kimcid apy apeksitavyam asti. yas ca tvam eva dasamo'sīti kuryād evam pramām vacah (68) srāvita-tattvamasyādivākyah svayam evānvayavyatirekau krtvā, tad-avasāna eva vākyārtham pratipadyate'sāv api sa ca tattvamasyādivākyasravanaja pramotpannatvad eva

yathartham pratipanna iti purvavad evopeksitavyah. yah na ca naivam iti pratyayantaram jayate. tad etad drstantena pratipādayati punar anvaya-vyatirekau karayitvapi punah punar vakyam sravyate yathabhatarthapratipattaye, tasya krtanvaya- dasamo'siti vakyottha na dhirasya vihanyate vyatirekasya satah katham vākyam srāvyata iti? ucyate ādimadhyāvasānesu na navasv asya samsayah (69) navasamkhyāhrtajnāno dasamo vibhramād yathā na vetti dasamo'smiti viksamāno'pi tān nava (64) evam tat tvam asity asmad dvaitanut pratyagatmani samyagjñatatvam arthasya jāyetaiva pramā drdhā (70)

atha drstantagatam artham darstantikarthe samarpayisyann pratyagātmani pramopajayata ity uktam tatra codyate. "kim āh a yathaghatadiprameyavisaya pramā kartrādikārakabheda- apaviddhadvayo'py evam tattvamasyādinā vinā napahnavena jayate tathaivotāsesakarakagramopamardena kartuh pratyagātmani?" iti. ucyate vetti naikalam ātmānam nānvesyam cātra kāranam (65)

"nānvesyam cātra kāranam ity uktam, tat kasmād?" iti codite pratyaktā'sya svato rupam niskriyākārakaphalam advitiy am tadiddha dhih pratyagātmeva laksyate (71) pratyah anvesanasahisnutvat. "tat katham ity?" ah a yadmad evam seyam bhräntir nirālambā sarvanyāyavirodhini sahate na vicāram sā tamo yadvad divākaram (66) vipascito'py atas tasyam atmabhāvam vitanvate daviyass vindriyārthesu ksiyate hy uttarottaram (72)

224 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 225

āha. yadi vākyam eva yathābhūtārthāvabodhakam, atha kasya hetor avidyotthāpitasya kartrtvāder upadesa ity? ukte no'ham duhkhity anenabhisambandha atmayathatmy-

pratividhiyate ānavabodhahetuka eva. ato'hamartho'narthopasrstatvād, ajnānottohatvāc ca heya iti pratyaksatovasiyate. "tadarthe

bhrantiprasiddhya'nudyartham tat tattvam bhrantibadhaya kim heyam, kim vopādeyam iti navadhriyate." tata idam

ayam nety upadisyeta tathaivam tat tvam ityapi (73) abhidhiyate.

imam artham drst antena buddhav arohayati paroksyam yat tadarthe syat tadd heyam ahamarthavat praticevāhamo'bhedah pāroksyenātmano'pi me (77)

sthanuh sthānur itivoktir na nrbuddhim nirasyati vyánuvādāt tathaivoktir bhrāntimpumso na bādhate (74) "katham punas tadartho'dvitiyalaksanah pratyag- atmopasrayam sadvitiyatvam duhkhitvam niranvayam

yasmāc chrotrprasiddhānuvady eva tvam iti padam, tasmād apamudatiti? ucyate. na caitayor nivartakanivartyabhāvam

uddisyamana sthatvad duhkhitvader avivaksitatvam eva. vayam brumah. katham tarhi? tvamarthe pratyagatmani

vidhiyamanatve hi sati virodhaprasango, na tu praganavabuddhādvitiyatā sānenavabodhyate. ato'nava-

vidhiyamanārudyamānayor iti. svapradhanayor hi padayor bodhanirasena tadutthasya sadvitiyatvasya tvamartha-

virodhasanka samanyal ingitatvat tayor na viparyaye sthasya, paroksatvasya ca tadarthasthasya nirasanān, na vaiyadhikaranyādicodyasyāvasaro'stiti. tad idam abhi-

anāl ingitasāmānyau na jihāsitavādinau dhiyate.

vyutthitau tattvamau tasmād anyonyābhisamīksanau (75) tat tvamarthena samprtoko nanatvam vinivartayet

apästasamanyārthatvād, anuvādasthatvād, vidhiyamānena naparityaktaparoksyam tvam tadartham sisrpsati (78)

ca saha virodhad, duhkhitvāder astu kāmam jihāsitārthayor asamsargo yathopanyastadosavirahat, tattvamarthayoh "kasmāt punah kāranāt tadartho'dvitiyalaksanas tvam-

samsargo'stu nilotppalavad iti cen, naivam apy upapadyate. arthena pratyagatmana aprthagarthah sann avidyottham sa-

yasmat dvitiyatvam nihantiti?" ucyate. virodhat. tad ucyate.

tadarthayos tu nisthatma dvayaparoksyavarjitah samsāritādvitiyena pāroksyam catmana saha

nadvitiy am vinatmanam natma nitya drsa vina (76) prasangikam viruddhatvat tattvambhyam badhanam tayoh (79)

atraha. "kiniha jihasitam, kim vopaditisam?" iti. ucyate. pratyagatmārthābhidhāyinas tvapadād, ubhayam pratiyate tattvamarthayos tu bādhakatve' nyadapi kāranam ucyate

"aham duhkhi", "pratyagātama" ca. tatra ca pratyagātma-

226 Naişkarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 227

ajnatapurusarthatvac chrautatvat tattvamarthayoh iva pratiniyata eva bādhyabādhakabhāvah syāt. atas tad svam artham aparitiyajya bādhakau stām viruddhayoh (80) ucyate

evam tāvad yathopakrāntena prakriyāvartmanā pratyaksam cen na sabdam syac chabdam ced aksajam katham na pratyaksadipramanantarair virodhagandho'pi sambhavyate. pratyaksabhasah pratyakse hy agamabhasa agame (85) yadā punah sarvaprakārenāpi yatamānā naivemam vakyartham sambhavayamah, pratyaksadipramanantara- na ca pratijinahetudrstantanyaya iha sambhavati, virodhata eva, tasminn api paksa ucyate. sabdādinam pratyekam pramanatvad ata ah a

pratyaksadiviruddham ced vakyam artham vadet kvacit svamahimna pramanani kurvaty arthavabodhanam syāt tu taddrstividhyartham yosagnivadasamsayam (81) itaretarasācivye prāmanyam nesyate svatah (86)

yadā tu tattvamasyādi vākyam sarvaprakārenāpi na ca sukhaduhkhadisambandho'vagatyatmanah prat- vicāryamānam na kriyām katāksenāpi viksate, tadā yaksadipramanair grhyate, yena virodhah pratyaksādhi- prasamkhyānādi vyāpāro dussambhāvya iti. tad ucayate pramanair udbhavyate. katham? srru

vastvekanistham vākyam cen na tasya syāt kriyārthatā duhkhitāvagatau cet syān na pramīyeta sātmavat vastuno hy ekarūpatvād vikalasyāpy asambhavah (82) karmany eva pramā nyāyyā na tu kartary api kvacit (87)

bhinnavisayatvāc ca na pramanantaravirodhah katham? abhyupagame'pi ca prasamkhyanasatenāpi naiva tvam sambhāvitadosān mucyase. ata āh a ucyate

apurvādhigamam kurvat pramanam syan na cen na tat pramanabaddhamulatvad duhkhitvam kena varyate na virodhas tato yukto vibhinnarthavabodhinoh (83) agnyusnavannivrttis cen nairatmyam hy eti saugatam (88)

atha matam ya evam api bhinnavisayānām virodham vakti, so'trāpi virodham brūy at nirakuryat prasamkhyanamduhkhitvam cet svanusthitam nay am sabdah kuto yasmād rūpam pasyāmi caksusā pratyaksādiviruddhatvāt katham utpādayet pramām (89) iti yadvat tathaivay am virodho'ksajavākyayoh (84) nanu "prasamkhyānam nama tattvamasyadisab- pramānānām satām na virodhah srottrādinam iva bhinna- darthanvayavyatirekayuktivisayabuddhyamredanam abhi- visayatvāt. yayos cābhinnavisyatvam tayor ākhunakulayor dhiyate. taccanusthiyamananam pramitivardhanaya

228 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 229

paripurnam pramitim janajati, na punar aikagrya- sambandhartha eva vardhanayeti, yatha'sesasucinide strikunape kaminiti nirvastukah purusay asamatrajanitah pratyaya iti." tan na api pratyaksabadhena pravrttih pratyagatmani yatah "paranci khani" 'ty etasmad vacaso gamyate sruteh (95)

abhyasopacayad buddher yat syad aikagryam eva tat na hi pramanany abhyasat kurvanty arthavadbodhanam (90) abhyupagamyaivam ucyate na tu pramanam satpramānātarena virudhyata ity asakrd avocāma. yatrāpi

abhyasopacita krtsnam bhavana cen nivartayet vakyapratyaksayor virodhāsankā tatrāpi purusamohavasād

naikantiki nivrttis syad bhavanajam hi tatphalam (91) eva sā jayate na tu paramarthata iti. ata ah a

pramam cej janayed vakyam pratyaksadivirodhinim api cah a gaunim pratyaksatāmbrūyān mukhyārthāsambhavād budhah (96) duhkhy asmity api ced dhvasta kalpakotyupabrmhiā svalpiyo'bhyāsajā sthāsnvi bhāvanety atra kā pramā (92) tasyārthasya sukhapratipattyartham udāharanam

nanu sastrat sthasnutvam bhaisyati. naivam. yathavasthita agnis samyag adhite 'sau jahāsoccais ca mañcakah vastuyāthatmyavabobhamatrakaritvac chastrasya. na hi padarthasaktyad hanakrc chastram. prasiddham. ca loke. yatha tadvad ahamvrttya laksyate 'narhayapi sah (97)

kasmāt punah kāranāt sāksād evātmā nābhidhiyate kim bhavanajam phalam yat syad yac ca syat karmanah phalam anayā kalpanayeti tatrāh a na tat sthasnv iti mantavyam dravidesv iva sangatam (93) tvam ity etad vihayānyam na vartmātmāvabodhane yadapi pratyaksadipramanopatta, atmano duhkhitvam. samastihas tvamartho'pi gunalesena vartate (98) tathapi tattvamasyadivakyotthapratyaya eva baliyan iti niscaya'vyabhicaripramānyavakyopāttatvat prameyasya ca kasmāt punar hetor hy aham ity etad api gunalesena vartate svata eva nirduhkhitvasiddheh. pratyaksades tu na punah sāksād eveti. vidhūtasarvakalpanākār na- savyabhicāritvāt sambhāvanāyas ca purusaparikalpa- svābhāvyād atmanah. ata āh a nāmatravastambhatvac ceti.

nirduhkhitvam svatassiddham pratyaksādes ca duhkhitā vyomni dhūmatusārābhramalināniva durdhiyah kalpayeus tathā mūd hāh samsāram pratyagatmani (99) ko hy ātmānam anādrtya visvased bāhyamāntah (94)

230 Naişkarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi : 231

nanu sarvakalpanānām apy ātmany atyantāsambhave samāne 'hamvrttau kah paksapāte hetur yena vrttyantarāni vidhūyāh amvrttyaivātmopalaksyata iti. ucyate sayanah prayaso loke bodhyamanah svanamabhih sahasaiva prabudhyante yathaivam pratyagātmani (105)

cinnibheyam ahamvrttih praticivatmano 'nyatah pūrvoktebhyas ca hetubhyas tasmād ātmānayocyate (100) na hi namnasti sambandho vyutthitasya sariratah tathapi budhyate tena yathaivam tat tvam ity atah (106)

vrttibhir yusmadarthabhir laksyate ced drsih parah anatmatvam bhavet tasya vitatham ca vacah sruteh (101) yatha ca

bodhabodhau nabho 'sprst va krsnadhinidagau yatha yathoktena badhyetaratmakau syāt am tathehatmani gamyatām (107)

anena gunalesena hy atyahamkartrkarmayā laksyate 'sāv ahamvrttyā nāñjasātrābhidhiyate (102) "asatye vartmani sthitva" ity upasrutyativismito mahata sambhramena kascic codayati

nāñjasātrābhidhīyata iti ko hetur iti cet nasann upayo loke 'sti paramarthaviniscaye nasallingadd hi baspadeh kascid agnim prapadyate (108) sasthigunakriyājātirūdhayah sabdahetavah nātmany anyatamo 'mīsām tenātmā nābhidhiyate (103) ity evam codayed yo 'pi josayet tam ghatādinā sadasadbhyām vibhakto 'sau paryāyas ca na cānayoh (109)

yadi sabdo 'bhidhanābhidheyatvasambandhangik ārena nātmani vartate katham sabdad aham brahmasmiti samyagbodhotpattih. ucyate evam kucodyam unmulyathedanim prakrtam abhidhiyate. prakrtam canabhidheye katham abhidhasrutir avidya- dhvamsy atmani jnanam janayatiti. tatraiva kāranantaram asatye vartmani sthitva nirupayam upeyate ātmatvakāranād vidmo gunavrttya vibodhitāh (104) ucyate

atidusstho 'prabodho 'tra hanudity ātmaivāsya prabuddhatā katham punar abhidhanam abhidheyenanabhisambaddham nimittamatrad vyety esa nasagre badaram yatha (110) sad anabhidheye 'rthe pramam janayatiti s mu yathanabhisambaddham apy anabhidheye rthe anuditānastamitakūtasthabodhamātrasvābhāvyād ātmano 'vidyānirākaranamukhena bodhayafity āh a dussambhavyo 'vidyasadbhāva iti cen na. avidyaprasid- dhyaiva tatsadbhāvasiddher ulukanisavad ity ata idam ucyate

232 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 233

aho dhārstyam avidyāyā na kascid ativartate kuto 'vidyeti codyam syan naiva pragg hetvasambhavāt pramānam vastv anādrtya paramātmeva tisthati (111) kalatrayaparicchitter na cordhvam codyasambhavah (116)

yasmad avidyāprasiddhyaivāvidyasadbhavasiddhir ata yasmāt. tattvamasyādivākyam evātmano sesām avidyām ätmavastuvrttānurodhena na kathamcanāpi tatsambhāva- niranvayām apanudati tasmāt napy asti yata āh a addhatamam anadrtya pramanam sad asiti ye jnanam yasya nijamrupam kriyākārakavarjitam bubhutsante 'nyatah kuryus te 'ksnapi rasavedanam (117) sambhāvanāpy avidyāyās tatra syāt kena hetunā (112) evam apratihatam aham brahmeti pramām tattva- so 'yam evam anuditānastamitāvagatimātrasarira ātmāpi masyādivākyam kurvad api na pratipādayatiti ced sann avicaritaprasiddhāvidyāmatravyavahita evātathai- abhimatam na kutascanāpi pratipattih syād ata āh a veksyate yato 'tah idam ced anrtam bruy at satyām avagatav api anumānād ayam bhavad vyavrtto bhavam asritah na canyatrapi visvaso hy avagatyavisesatah (118) tato 'py asya nivrttih syad vākyād eva bubhitsatah (113) na copaditsitad vakyarthad vakyarthantaram kalpayitum bhāvavad abhāvād api nivrttir anumānād eva kim iti na yuktam. yasmat bhavatiti cec chrņū na ced anubhavo 'tah syat padārthavagatāv api na vyavrttir yathā yathā bhāvād bhavenaivāvisesatah kalpyam vidhyantaram tatra na hy anyo 'rtho abhavad apy abhavatvad vyavrttir na tathesyate (114) 'vagamyate (119)

yato nāunmānena vyāviddhāsesakriyākārakaphalātmani na ca yathabhimato 'rtho yathoktena nyayena navai svārājye 'bhisektum sakyate tasmāt yate. ko 'sau nyaya ity ah a

avidyanidraya so 'yam prasupto durvivekaya namadibhyo nirakrtya tvamartham nisparigrahah bhāvābhāvavvyudāsinya srutyaiva pratibodhyate (115) nissprho yusmadarthebhyah samadividhicoditah (120)

atrāh anuditānastamitavijnānātmamātrasvarūpatvād bhanktva cannamayadims tan pancanātmataya 'rgalān dussambhāvyā vidyeti. naitad evam. kutah. yata āh a aham brahmeti vakyar tham vetti cen nartha ihaya (121)

234 Naiskarmyasiddhi CHAPTER FOUR

caturtho 'dhyayah na ced evam upagamyate vakyasya pramanasya sato 'pramanyam prapnoti. tad ah a om purvadhyayesu yad vastu vistarenoditam sphutam'

yadartham ca pravrttam yad vakyam tatra na cec chrutam samksepato 'dhunā vaksye tadevasukhavittaye (1)

pramam utpadayet tasya pramanyam kena hetuna (122) samksepavistarabhyam hi mandottamadhiyam nrnam

atha manyase vastucyamanam ety antahkaranam tena bhanyate (2)

jāniy āc cet prasamkhyānāc chabdas satyavacāh katham a tmanatma ca loke 'smin pratyaksadipramanatah

pāroksyam sabdo nah prāha prasamkhyānāt tv siddhas tayor anatma tu sarvatraivatmapurvakah (3)

asamsayam (123) anatmatvam svatas siddham dehad bhinnasya vastunah

na ca yuktisabdāvrttilaksanāt prasamkhyānād yathāvat jnatur apy atmata tadvan madhye samsayadarsanam (4)

pratipattir bhavisyatiti sambhāvayāmah. yasmāt asad har anams tayor dharman jnat va dhumagnivad budhah

yuktisabdau purā 'py asya na ced akurutām pramām anatmano 'tha buddhyantan janiy ad anumanatah (5)

sāksād avartanāt tabhyām kim apurvam phalisyati (124) idam ity eva bahye 'rthe hy aham ity eva boddhari

athaivam api prasamkhyānam antarena prānān dhārayitum dvayam drst am yato dehe tenay am muhyate janah (6)

na saknosīti cec chravanādāv eva sampādayisyamah. katham kena punar nyāyenātmānatmanor asvamahisayor iva

prasamkhyānam srutāv asya nyāuo 'stv āmredanātmakah vibhagah kriyata iti. ucyate

Îsacchrutam samisrutam samyak srutvavagacchati (125) nyay ah purodito 'smabhir atmanatma vibhagakrt

nanu prasamkhyanavidhim anabhyupagacchatah tenedamartham utsarya hy aham ity atra yo bhavet (7)

pāramahamsi caryā bauddhādicaryāvad asā strapūrvikā prāpnoti tatas carudhapatitatvam syād asesakarmanām ca vidyāt tat tvam asmad bhavabhavadrsam sada

nivrttir na prāpnofiti. ucyate anantaram abāh yārtham pratyakstham munir añjasa (8)

tvamarthasyāvabodhāya vidhir apy asrito yatah ucyatām tarhi kayā tu paripāthyā vākyārtham vettiti.

tam antarena ye dosas te 'pi nay anty ahetavah (126) ucyate. anvayavyatirekabhyam

235

236 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 237

tyaktakrtsnedam arthatvat tyakto ham iti manyate budddhāv eva viveko 'yam yadanātmatayā bhidā nāvagacchāmy aham yasmān nijātmānam anātmanah (9) buddhim evopamrdnāti kadalim tatphalam yathā (14)

atha sa riradibuddhiparyantah sa sarvo natmaiveti pramānād viniscitya kim iti bubhutsato noparamate srnu so 'yam atattve tattvadrk

anumānapradipena hitvā sarvān anātmanah anucchinnabubhutsas ca pratyagg hetor anatmanah dolayamanacitto 'yam muhyate bhautavan narah (10) samsāraikāvalambinyā tadabhāv am dhiyepsati (15)

viveka ātmānatma- aviluptavijnānātmana ātmatvād eva nityasannidhyad yo yam anvayavyatirekajo

bubhutsuh kim iti na pratipadyata iti. yasmāt vibhagalaksano 'natmasthah sthanau samsayavabodhavat pratipattavyo 'yathāvastusvābhāvyān mrgatrsnikodaka- prabodhavad ity ata ah a yair adrāksit puratmanam yam anātmeti viksate drsier drast aram atmanam taih prasiddhaih pramitsati (11) samsarabijasamstho 'yam taddhiya muktim icchati saso nimilaneneva mrtyum parijihirsati (16) kasma' punar hetoh paracinabhih sabdadyavalehinibhir buddhibhir ātmānam anātmavan na viksata iti. ucyate asyarthasya dradhimne srutyudāha ranam

caksur na viksate sabdam atadātmatvakāranat yathaivam bhautika drstir natmanam paripasyati (12) imam artham puraskrtya srutya samyag udahrtam "yac caksuse" ti visrabdham "na drste" riti ca sphutam (17)

pratyaksadipramanasvabhavyanurodhena tavat tada buddhyantam apaviddhyaivam ko nvaham syam itiksituh darsanakāranam uktam. atha prameyasvabhavyanurodhena srutis tat tvam asity āha sarvamānātigāminī (18) pratisedha ucyate

dhivikriyasahasranām hanopādanadharminām esa samksepatah purvadhyayatrayasyartha uktah. so 'yam nyayyo 'pi vedantarthah sa stracaryaprasadalabhyo 'py sadā sāksinam atmanam pratyaktvan naham iksate (13) anapeksitasāstrācāryaprasādo 'nanyāpeksasiddha svabhāva- tvat kaiscic chraddadhanair na pratiyate. tesam kva punar iyam vivekabuddhih kim ātmany utānātmaniti. samgrahartham abhimatapramanyodaharanam kimcat ah. yady atmani kūtasthatvavyāghāto 'nātmadarsitvāt. athānātmani tasyapy acaitanyān na bhagavatpūjyapādais cāpy udāh āryevam eva tu vivekasambandha iti. ucyate. "dahyadahakataikatra" ity suvispasto 'smadukto 'rthah sarvabhutahitaisibhih (19) uktaparihārāt

Naiskarmyasiddhi 239 238 Naiskarmyasiddhi

kim paramātmana upadesa utaparamatmana iti. kim cat ah anyaccanvayavyatirekodāharanam. tathā

yadi paramatmanas tasyopadesam antarenaiva muktatvān nirarthaka upadesah. athāparamātmanas tasyāpi svata eva "chittva tyaktena hastena svayam natma visesyate tatha sistena sarvena yena yena visesyate (26) samsarasvabhavatvan nisphala upadesah. evam ubhayatrapi dosavattvād ata āh a visesanam idam sarvam sādhvalamkaranam yatha

"avivicyobhayam vakti srutis cet sya grahas tathā" avidyadhyastam atah sarvam jñata atmany asad bhavet (27)

iti paksam upādāya pūrvapaksam nisātya ca (20) tasmat tyaktena hastena tulyam sarvam visesanam anatmatvena tasmāj kno muktah sarvavisesanaih (28) tac cedam avivekat svato viviktatmane tat tvam asity upadistam jñātaivātmā sada grāhyo jneyam utsriya kevalah

yusmadasmadvibhāgajñe syād arthavad itam vacah aham ity api yad grāh y am vyapetangasamam hi tat (29)

yato 'nabhijne vākyam syād badhiresv iva gāyanam (21) drsyatvad aham ity esa natmadharmo ghatadivat tathānye pratyayā jñeyā dosās cātmā 'malo hy atah (30) tasya ca yusmadasmadvibhagavijnanasya ka yuktir upayabhāvam pratipadyate srru sarvanyayopasamgrahah

"anvayavyatirekau hi padarthasya padasya ca syad etad aham ity atra yuktir evāvadhārane (22) "nityamuktatvavijñānam vākyād bhavati nānyatah vākyārthasyāpi vijnānam padārthasmrtipūrvakam (31)

katham tau yluktir ity atrāh a anvayavyatirekabhyam padarthas smaryate dhruvam

"nādrāksam aham ity asmin susupte 'nyan manāg api evam nirduhkham atmanam akriyam pratipadyate (32)

na varayati drst im svam pratyayam tu nisedhati" (23) sad evetyadivakyebhyah prama sphutatara bhavet dasamas tvam asity asmad yathaivam pratyagatmani" (33) "evam vijnata vacyarthe srutilokaprasiddhitah srutis tat tvam asity āha srotur mohapanuttaye" (24) viksāpannasyodāharanam

tatra tvam iti padam yatra laksanayā vartate so 'rtha ucyate "navabuddhyapahārādd hi svātmānam dasapūranam

"a hamsabdasya ya nist ha jyotisi pratyagatmani apasyan jñātum evecchet svam ātmānam janas tathā (34)

saivoktā sad asīty evam phalam tatra vimuktatā" (25)

240 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naişkarmyasiddhi 241

avidyābaddha caksustvāt kamapahrtadhīh sadā viviktam drsim atmānam neksate dasamam yatha" (35) "anyathagrhnatah svapno nidra tattvam ajanatah viparyase tayoh ksine turiy am padam asnute" (42)

so 'yam evam avidyapatalavagunthitadrstih san katham tatha bhagavatpadiyam udaharanam utthapyata ity ãh a 'susuptak hy am tamo jnanam bijam svapnaprabodhayoh yatha svāpanimittena svapnadrkpratibodhitah atmabodhapradagdham syad bijam dagdham yatha karanam karma kartāram svāpnam naiveksate svatah (36) 'bhavam" (43)

anātmajnas tathaivay am samyak srutyavabodhitah evam gaudair dravidair nah pujyair ayam arthah gurum sastram tatha mud h am svatmano 'nyam na pasyati (37) prabhāsitah ajñānamātropādhis sann ahamādidrgisvarah (44) sa kim sakalasamsarapraviviktam atmanam vakyat pratipadyata uta netiti. atra brumah. kūtasthā- tatranyathagrahanavad anyathagrahanabijam agrahanam vagatisesamātratvāt pratipatter ata āh a anatmadharma evety ah a

dandavasananisthas syad dandasarpo yatha tatha idam jnānam aham jnat a jneyam etad iti trayam nityavagatinisth am syad vākyaj jagad asamsayam (38) yo 'vikāro vijānāti parāg evāsya tat tamah (45)

kuta etat. yasmāt yata etad evam atas tasyaiva bijatmanas tamasas cittadharmavisistasya svakāryadvitiyābhisambandho na tv pasyann iti yadāhoccaih pratyaktvam ajam avyayam avikarina atmana ity aha drstantena apūrvānaparānantam tvamā tad upalaksyate (39) rupaprakāsayor yadvat samgatir vikriyāvatah tattvamasyādivākyotthavijñānenaiva bādhyate. yasmāt sukhaduh khādisambandhas cittasyaivam vikārinah (46)

asmād yad aparamrūpam nāsțity eva nirūpyate tad etad anvayavyatirekābhyām darsayisyam āh a anyathagrahanābhāvad bijam tat svapnabodhayoh (40) samprasāde 'vikāritvād astam yāte vikārini asyarthasya dradhimna udāharanam pasyato natmanah kimcid dvifiyam sprsate 'nv api (47)

"kāryakāranabaddhau tāv isyete visvataijasau so 'yam kūtasthajnānamūrtir ātmā prajnah karanabaddhas tu dvau tau turye na sidhyatah" (41)

242 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 243

yatha prajne tathaivay am svapnajagaritantayoh pasyann apy avikāritvād dvitiy am naiva pasyati (48) kuta etajneyabhinnam iti. yatah

evam inanavato nasti mamah ammatisamsrayah pragatmabodhad bodho 'yam bahyavastupasarjanah bhasvatpradipahastasya hy andhakāra ivāgratah (49) pradhvastākhilasamsāra ātmaikālambanah sruteh (55)

tatra drstantah evam avagataparamarthatattvasya na se sasesibhavas tatkaranasyotsaritatvad ity ah a a prabodhad yatha 'siddhir dvaitad anyasya vastunah bodhad evam asiddhatvam buddhyadeh pratyagatmanah vāstavenaiva vrttena nirunaddhi yato bhavam (50) nivrttim api mrdnati samyagbodhah pravrttivat (56)

sa esa vidvān hānopādānasūnyam ātmānam ātmani pasyan sakrd atmaprasūtyaiva nirunaddhy akhilam bhavam dhvantamatranirasena na tato 'nyanyathamatih (57) sarvam evānujānāti sarvam eva nisedhati bhedătmalābho 'nujñā syān nisedho 'tatsvabhāvatah (51) desakāl adyasambaddhad desader mohakāryatah nanutpannam adagdham va jnanam ajnanam asty atah (58) sarvasyoktatvad upasamhārah samyagjnanasikhiplustamohatatkāryarūpinah paramärthātmanistham yat sarvavedantaniscitam sakrn nivrtter bādhyasya kim kāryam avasisyate (59) tamopanud dhiyām jñānam tad etat kathitam mayā (52) vāstavenaiva vrttenāvidyāyāh pradhvastatvān na kimcid etāvadihoktam avasisyata ity uktah parihārah. athāparas sāmpradāyikah

nehātmavin madanyo 'sti na matto 'jño 'sti kascana nivrttasarpas sarpottham yathā kampam na muñcati ity ajanan vijanati yas sa brahmavid uttamah (53) vidhvastakhilamoho 'pi mohakaryam tathatmavit (60)

evam ātmānam jnātvā kim pravartitavyam uta nivartitavyam yatah pravrttibijam ucchinnam tasmāt ähosvin muktapragrahateti. ucyate taror utkhātamulasya sosenaiva yathā ksayah jñeyābhinnam idam yasmāj jneyavastvanusāryatah tatha buddhatmatattvasya nivrttyaiva tanuksayah (61) na pravrttim nivrttim vā katāksenāpi viksate (54) athālepakapaksanirāsārtham āh a

244 Naiskarmyasiddhi Naiskarmyasiddhi 245

buddhadvaitasatattvasya yathest acaranam yadi amānitvādinisto yo yas cadveestrādisādha nah sunām tattvadrsam caiva ko bhedo 'sucibhaksane (62) jñānam utpadyate tasya na bahirmukhacetasah (68)

kasmān na bhavati. yasmat utpanna ātmavijnāne kim avidyākāryatvāt pravrttivan nivrttyatmakamanitvadayo nivartanta uta neti. neti brumah. adharmāj jāyate 'jnānam yathestacaranam tatah kim kāranam. niv rttisāstrāviruddhasvābhāvyat dharmakārye katham tat syad yatra dharmo 'pi nesyate (63) paramatmano na tu niyogavasat. katham tarhi. srnu

pratyacaksana ah ato yathest acaranam harih utpannatmaprabodhasya tv advestrtvadayo gunah "yasya sarve samarambhah" "prakasam ce" ti sarvadrk (64) ayatnato bhavanty asya na tu sadhanarupinah (69)

tisthatu tavat sarvapravrttibijaghasmaram jñanam yata etad evam atah mumuksyavasthay am api na sambhavati yathestācaranam. tad ãh a imam grantham upaditsur amanitvadisadhanah yatnatah syan na durvrttah pratyagdharmanugo hy ayam (70) "yo hi yatra viraktah syan nasau tasmai pravartate lokatrayaviraktatvan mumuksuh kim itihate" (65) na datavyas cay am granthah

tatra drstantah naviraktaya samsaran nanirastaisanaya ca na cayamavate deyam vedantarthapravesanam (71) "ksudhaya pidyamano 'pi na visam hy attum icchati mist annadhvastatrd janan namudhas taj jighatsati (66) jnātva yathoditam samyag jnāta vyam nāvasisyate na canirastakarmedam janiyad anjasa tatah (72) yato 'vagataparamarthatattvasya yathestacaranam na manāg api ghatate mumuksutve 'pi ca tasmāt nirastasarvakarmanah pratyakpravanabuddhayah niskāmā yatayah sāntā janantidam yathoditam (73) rāgo lingam abodhasya cittavyāy āmabhūmișu kutah sādvalatā tasya yasyāgnih kotare taroh (67) srimacchankarapadapadmayugalam samsevya labdhvocivān sakalapuruşārthasamāptikārino 'syātmāvabodhasya kutah jnānam pāramahamsyam etad amalam prasūtir iti. ucyate svantāndhakārapanut mã bhud atra virodhini matir atah sadbhih pariksyam budhaih

246 Naiskarmyasiddhi

sarvatraiva visuddhaye matam idam santah param kāranam (74)

subhasitam cārv api namahatmanām divakaro naktadrsam ivamalah prabhāti bhaty eva visuddhacetasām nidhir yathapastatrsam mahadhanah (75)

visnoh padanugām yam nikhilabhavanudam samkaro 'vapa yogat sarvajnam brahmasamstham muniganasahitam samyag abhyarcya bhaktyā vidyam gangam ivah am pravaragunanidheh prāpya vedānta diptām kārunyat tam avocam janimrtinivaha dhvastaye duhkhitebhyah (76)

vedāntodaravarti bhāsvad amalam dhväntacchid asmad dhiyo divyam jñānam atindriye 'pi visaye vyāhanyate na kvacit yo no nyayasalakayaivanikhilam samsārabijam tamah protsāryāvira kārsid guruguruh pūjyāya tasmai namah (77)

ASTYT

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As a compendium of Advaita John Grimes earned his B.A. from the Philosophy. The Naisakarmyasiddhi University of California at Santa Barbara touches on all the salient features of that and his Master's and Ph.D. degrees from the system. Consisting partly of verse and Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study partly of prose, it presents a clear, brief, in Philosophy, University of Madras. His and simple account of the Advaita major area of specialization is Advaita doctrine. Its style is charming and Vedanta. His publications include: A Con- Sureśvara handles the philosophical ar- cise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy (State guments with ease. The central question University of New York ; Oxford, and that the book deals with is 'liberation University of Madras), Sapta Vidha from transmigratory existence and the Anupapatti. The Seven Great Untenables means thereto'. Ignorance of the Self (Motilal Banarasidass), Quest for Cer- (Atman) is the cause of bondage and it tainity. A Comparative Study of Heidegger can be removed only by right knowledge and Sankara (Peter Lang) and An Ad- of the Self which is obtainable from śruti vaita Vedanta Perspective of Language texts. Implications for Religious Discourse (In- dian Books Centre). At present Grimes is an The Naiskarmyasiddhi consists of four chap- Assistant Professor at the University of ters, the fourth being a summary of the first Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada. three. The first chapter deals primarily with 'action versus knowledge' as the means to liberation. The second chapter focuses on the distinction between the Self and the not Self. The third chapter discusses the locus and content of ignorance as well as subjecting the śruti mahāvākyas to a rigours analysis. Finally the concluding chapter summarises the first three chap ters and quoted illustrative passages ISBN 81-7030-317-6

from the Upadesasahsri and Mandūkyakārika in support of what he Rs. 250-00 has previously stated. Grimes' book is an attempt to present a lucid account of The Naiskarmyasiddhi by grouping the dialectics from various parts of the work into topical sections. These topics consist mainly of : action (karma) versus knowledge (jñana), distinctions between self (atman) and not-self (māya) and various in- terpretations concerning the Great Saying (mahāvākya): aham brahmāsmi and tat tvamāsi.

As a compendium of Advaita John Grimes earned his B.A. from the Philosophy. The Naisakarmyasiddhi University of California at Santa Barbara touches on all the salient features of that and his Master's and Ph.D. degrees from the system. Consisting partly of verse and Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study partly of prose, it presents a clear, brief, in Philosophy, University of Madras. His and simple account of the Advaita major area of specialization is Advaita doctrine. Its style is charming and Vedanta. His publications include: A Con- Suresvara handles the philosophical ar- cise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy (State guments with ease. The central question University of New York ; Oxford, and that the book deals with is 'liberation University of Madras), Sapta Vidha from transmigratory existence and the Anupapatti. The Seven Great Untenables means thereto'. Ignorance of the Self (Motilal Banarasidass), Quest for Cer (Atman) is the cause of bondage and it tainity. A Comparative Study of Heidegger can be removed only by right knowledge and Sankara (Peter Lang) and An Ad- of the Self which is obtainable from śruti vaita Vedanta Perspective of Language. texts. Implications for Religious Discourse (In- dian Books Centre). At present Grimes is an The Naiskarmyasiddhi consists of four chap- Assistant Professor at the University of ters, the fourth being a summary of the first Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada. three. The first chapter deals primarily with 'action versus knowledge' as the means to liberation. The second chapter focuses on the distinction between the Self and the not Self. The third chapter discusses the locus and content of ignorance as well as subjecting the śruti mahavakyas to a rigours analysis. Finally the concluding chapter summarises the first three chap- ters and quoted illustrative passages ISBN 81-7030-317-6

from Upadesasahsri Mandukyakarika in support of what he the and Rs. 250-00

has previously stated. Grimes' book is an attempt to present a lucid account of The Naiskarmyasiddhi by grouping the dialectics from various parts of the work into topical sections. These topics consist mainly of : action (karma) versus knowledge (jnana), distinctions between self (atman) and not-self (maya) and various in- terpretations concerning the Great Saying (mahavakya): aham brahmasmi and tat tvamasi.