1. Philosophy of Hindu Sadhana (See Fundementals of Religion) Nalini Kanta Brhma.epub

Eastern conomy dition

Phílosophy of Híndu Sadhana

Nalini Kanta Brahma

PH

Philosophy of Hindu Sādhanā

Nalini Kanta Brahma, M.A., Ph.D. Formerly Professor of Philosophy, Presidency College, and Principal, Hooghly Mohsin College Kolkata

FOREWORD by Sri Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan

PHI Learning Private Limited New Delhi-110001 2007 PHILOSOPHY OF HINDU SĀDHANĀ Nalini Kanta Brahma

C 2007 by PHI Learning Private Limited, New Delhi. All rights reserved. No p art of this book may be reproduced in any form, by mimeograph or any other means, without permission in writing from the publisher

Originally published in 1932 by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., London. ISBN-978-81-203-3306-2 The export rights of this book are vested solely with the publisher .

Published by Asoke K. Ghosh, PHI Learning Private Limited M-97, Connaught Circus, New Delhi-1 10001 and Printed by Rajkamal Electric Press, B-35/9, G .T. Karnal Road Industrial Area, Delhi-110033.

To SRIJUKTA PRANGOPAL MUKHOPADHYAYA at whose feet I have learnt all that is of any value in my life and but for whose inspiring guidance this book could never have been written.

Foreword vii Preface

ix

Contents

Part I: SĀDHANĀ IN GENERAL Chapter 1 The Relation of Philosophy to Religion 3

Chapter 2 Sadhana: Its Place in Philosophy and Religion .... .. 14

Chapter 3 Distinctive Features and the Different Stages of Hindu Sādhanā .. .. 35

Chapter 4 Different Forms of Sadhana. .. 55 Chapter 5 A Historical Survey of the Different Forms of Sādhanā. .. 68

Part II: SPECIAL FORMS OF SĀDHANĀ

Chapter 6 Karma-Marga or the Path of Action 81 Chapter 7 Karma- Yoga .. .103 Chapter 8 The Yoga-System of Pata-jali 111 Chapter 9 The Path of Knowledge .120 Chapter 10 How to Attain Knowledge 147 Chapter 11 The Path of Devotion 195 Chapter 12 The Nature of Devotion 214 Chapter 13 The Determinants of Devotion 221 Chapter 14 The Tantra Form of Sādhanā .233 Chapter 15 The Different Stages of Sadhana and the Synthesis of Its Different Forms in the Bhagavadgitā .249 Appendix. 271 V

Foreword

In ÔHindu SādhanāÕ Dr. Nalini Kanta Brahma contributes a highly interesting and important work to the literature of Hindu Thought and Religion. His training as a student of Philosophy, his extensive studies in religious literature, and above all, his deep faith in the value of the Classical types of devotion and discipline, have enabled him to produce a book which will be invaluable to all students of Religion. The writer insists rightly on those characteristics of Hindu Religion which bring out its kinship with the higher religious thought of the world and also make manifest the attitude of broad toleration characteristic of the Hindu Religion. The book offers an illustration of what may be called the organic unity of higher religions. Though the writerOs interest is more on the practical side of Hinduism, there is a very clear discussion of the fundamental philosophical concepts underlying the Hindu Faith. I have no doubt that the book will be read

widely by all those interested in Philosophy and Religion.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN vii

Preface

The theoretical side of Indian Philosophy has been ably presented in the monumental works of Sir Sarbapalli Radhakrishnan and Dr. Surendra Nath Das Gupta. I have attempted in the following pages a presentation of the practical side of Hindu Philosophy as manifested in the different religious systems of the Hindus. It has been my special endeavour to show the essential connection between theory and practice, and to point out the true significance of the course of discipline prescribed by the different religious systems for the attainment of spiritual realisation. The subject is so very wide that it has not been possible for me to deal in detail with everything that ought to fall within its scope, and I have been compelled to remain satisfied, in most cases, with merely a general treatment. I have confined myself to the discussion of the orthodox forms of Hindu Sādhanā, and have not included Buddhistic and Jaina Sādhanā in this work.

The First Part of this book is devoted to the discussion of the function and characteristics of Hindu Sadhana in general. The Second Part deals with the particular forms of Hindu SadhanaÑ Karma, J-ana and Bhakti. We have included the Yoga form of Sādhana under Karma, and have taken the system propounded by Pata-jali as representative of the Yoga line of Sadhana. Although there are other forms of Yoga, such as Hatha-yoga, Laya-yoga etc., still they seem to be of the nature of preparatory disciplines, helping to make the vehicle,Ñthe body and the vital processes, fit for the higher processes, and are not possibly meant to be independent methods of realisation. The Tantric method of Sādhanā has been included under the Bhakti line, because it emphasises the aspect of upāsanāor worship.

ix X Preface

I have avoided technical discussions as far as possible, and it is expected that the book will suit the general reader, excepting a few portions. Those who do not possess special knowledge of philosophy would, however, do well to omit Chapter II, the concluding pages of Chapter X, and a few pages of Chapter XI.

I have not used italics for the Sanskrit words placed within brackets, as the brackets themselves, I think, mark them out sufficiently. Italics

have not been used also for words that have become very familiar through repeated usage.

In the Appendix, I have explained some of the terms and expressions used in the book, which could not be dealt with more elaborately in the places where they occur.

A great deal of difficulty has been felt in judging as to how much of the details of Sadhana ought to be included and how much to be left out. Sometimes I have felt that I am introducing unnecessary details, sometimes, that I have become unjustifiably brief; I do not know whether I have succeeded in steering a middle course between the two.

I have to express my gratefulness to Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Jogendranath Tarkatirtha for explaining some of my difficulties. I am deeply indebted to my friends, Professor Gopinath Bhattāchārya and Professor Asokenath Vedäntatirtha, for the ungrudging assistance they have rendered me in various ways in the preparation of this volume.

NALINI KANTA BRAHMA

Part I Sādhanā in General

1

The Relation of Philosophy to Religion

The human understanding has an innate tendency to occupy itself with the attempt at a solution of the mystery of the universe as soon as it finds itself free from the task of meeting the immediate necessities of life. It is in this innate tendency of the human mind that we are to look for the origin of science and philosophy. The human mind wants to find an explanation of the multiplicity and variety of the universe, desires to find out whether the seeming multiplicity can be traced back to any original unity, and whether the apparent disorder and disconnectedness can be interpreted to be only seeming and unreal appearances of a perfect law and harmony behind. This search for a common ground, this march of reason for finding out theOne which will explain all diversities, this innate hankering of the human reason for the One or the Ultimate Unity, and to be satisfied with nothing short of such a Unity, is perhaps all that ought to underlie the true spirit of philosophy. Science also seeks this unity, this explanation of the multiplicity by discovering a common ground,

a unity-in-multiplicity, but only in a limited sphere. Every science wants to find out laws or uniformities or unities in its own department; the task of harmonising the unities arrived at by different sciences is reserved for philosophy. The aim of philosophy is to find out the unity of knowledge that is free from all discord and

3

contradiction. The Absolute of philosophy must, ex hypothesi, be the highest synthesis to which nothing can form the antithesis, must be a unity that is ultimate, a unity in which there are no component elements that may call for a further explanation. It must be something or some stage where all whyOs are for ever stopped, where reason finds its fulfilment and feels that there is nothing further to reach or to attain. Unless such a unity is reached where there is the absence of all diversities calling for a further explanation, we cannot say that philosophy has attained its object. A pluralistic or a dualistic philosophy is itself its own refutation, because the ÔwhyÕ still remains, because there is still the residual multiplicity or diversity that calls for an explanation.

When a person reaches the Absolute Unity, he feels that all his faculties have attained their richest fruition, that he has attained perfect knowledge and that nothing remains unknown to him (yasmin vij-āte sarvamida vij-āta bhavati),1that nothing remains for him to be done, and that no desire remains unrealised.2This state is described in the Bhagavadgītā as follows:

Yal labdhvā cāpara lābha manyate nādhika tala Ñ Òattaining which nothing in this universe seems to be better.Ó3When a man has an inner vision, a direct experience of the Absolute, he feels an unspeakable joy prevading his whole system, and a sense of fulness and expansion is marked in every dimension of his being. The touch with the Absolute makes him full and perfect. This intuitive experience is the real test or criterion that tattva-j-āna or real philosophical knowledge has been attained. Until this intuitive experience of the Absolute unity is attained, reasonings and argumentations must continue. The inward march of reason for attaining the complete unity can never stop until the goal is reached, until all ÔwhyÕsO cease, and all diversities are explained away. This is the inherent nature of reason,Ñit moves forward until it reaches the highest synthesis, the absolutely homogeneous reality.

There is a considerable difference between the conception of philosophy as it is understood by Indian systems of philosophy on the

one hand, and as it is taken to be by Western thinkers on the other. Although we notice important points of similarity between the philosophical discussions of the Western thinkers and Indian systems

1. Chāndogya Upanilad, Chap. VI. 2. VyāsaOs commentary on Pāta-jalī Sūtras II, 27. 3.BhagavadgītāVI, 22.

of philosophy, still we cannot ignore the fundamental distinction between them. The import of the term ÔphilosophyO is very different in the one from what it is in the other. Philosophy, in the West, is the Ôthinking consideration of thingsÕ; it is the rational explanation of the universe as a whole, or in the language of Herbert Spencer, it is Ôcompletely unified knowledgeO. Philosophy, in the West, is, therefore, something purely intellectual. It is only one amongst various other subjects of study and, as such, bears no special importance. It is on a par with other subjects of theoretical interest and it does not make any difference whether a man is engaged in working out mathematical problems or is absorbed in reflecting on the nature and destiny of existence. Ignorance of philosophical truths does not import any serious shortcoming in the life of the individual. The transcendent merit and independent character of philosophy are not recognised at all, and philosophy is hardly anything more than an intellectual pastime. As Professor Radhakrishnan rightly observes,4 ÒIn many other countries of the world reflection on the nature of existence is a luxury of life. The serious moments are given to action, while the pursuit of philosophy comes up as a parenthesis. In the West even in the hey-day of its youth, as in the times of Plato and Aristotle, it learned for support on some other study as politics or ethics .... In India, philosophy stood on its own legs, and all other studies looked to it for inspiration and support.Ó

In India philosophy occupies a unique position. It has not only permeated the entire cultural life of India, but has even filtrated to the lowest strata of its society. Its origin is not in Ôthe thinking consideration of thingsO but in the attempt at reaching the summum bonum of life. Philosophy is the be-all and end-all of life;Ñit relieves man of the threefold miseries of life, bestows on him the richest wealth of salvation and thus emancipates him from fearful bondage.5 The intellectual discussions embodied in Indian philosophy are intended not merely to satisfy the need of the intellect alone, but to serve the more ultimate and fundamental need of the life of the individual, viz., the need of salvation. In India, philosophy originates when the need for emancipation is felt, when not merely

4. Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 22Đ23.

5. Seyal brahmavidyopanilacchabdavācyā tatparā lā saheto sa sārasyātyantāvasānāt. Introduction to Sal karaOs commentary on the BLhadara yaka Upanilad.

the leisured intellect or reason wants something to be occupied with, but when the entire man with all his faculties seeks something other than the objects of ordinary interest for the realisation of his true being. Hindu philosophy thus has its origin not merely in the love of wisdom or the desires of know (jij-asa), but in the desire for emancipation (mumukla). This is also, in a way, the main difference between science and philosophy. Science satisfies the intellect only, while philosophy ought to satisfy the want of the entire man. The highest end of philosophy, in the West, however, is generally to acquire wisdom for its own sake and not for any practical purpose. But, in India the theoretical character of philosophy has been entirely subordinated to its practical aspect, and philosophy is of value not merely because it increases knowledge but only because it bestows salvation. It is because of this predominantly practical character of Indian philosophy that it has been able to retain always its close connection with religion. The religious impulse in all countries shows itself prior to the philosophical. With the gradual growth of philosophical ideas religion stands behind and gradually becomes divorced from philosophy. In India, however, religion and philosophy have always kept pace with each other, and, in some cases, for example, in the Sa kara-Vedānta, philosophy and religion have even coincided. In most cases, philosophy forms the theoretical basis (in the shape of interpretation and justification) of religious or spiritual experience and the latter supplies the practical confirmation of the theoretical doctrines of philosophy. Here, not only is salvation the ultimate object of every system of philosophy, but we find that in some cases religious experience or realisation is supposed to be the fruition of ratiocination (vicara). In the Vedānta, for example, we find that intuition (darśana) is supposed to come after meditation (nididhyāsana), which, again, follows ratiocination (manana). First, ratiocination removes all doubts as to the impossibility of the experience and as to the possibility of the contradictory experience (asambhāvanā and viparīta-bhāvanā), and then meditation fixes up in consciousness the truth attained through ratiocination. It is this supreme concentration or meditation that is the immediate precursor to the revelation of the truth. This experience of the truth, this actualisation of the possibility established through reason, is what we may regard as the culmination of all philosophising in the religious experience. In systems other than intellectualistic, although the relation between philosophy and religion is sometimes reversed, that is, philosophy is supposed to justify and support the religious experience and, as such, to follow, and not precede, the religious

experience, still the close connection between them has never been lost sight of. Theory and practice have always been sought to be interwoven and they were never divorced from each other so long as India maintained her glory.

India perceived from the very beginning that the true aim of philosophy could not but coincide with that of religion, viz. the attainment of eternal truth and the highest end of life. She accordingly directed reason to help the cause of religion, and philosophy was subordinated to religion. But it is to be noticed that although the supremacy of religion was acknowledged, still the free pursuit of philosophy had never been hampered thereby, as it had been in the Middle Ages in Europe when philosophy was made to subserve the purposes of definite religious dogmas and was thus debarred from all genuine creativeness. In India we find that widely different philosophical systems have taken their rise out of the teachings of the Vedas which all the orthodox systems regard as their supreme authority. The Vedas are so comprehensive and record such widely varied experiences as to justify divergent systems of philosophy that draw their inspiration from them and appeal to them for support. We do not find narrow and definite dogmas and fully worked out systems of thought in the Vedas so that reason might feel constrained in interpreting and developing their teachings and suggestions. The Vedic texts could be shown to suit altogether different interpretations, and reason very often did not feel that it had to work under an authority which it could hardly justify. This peculiarity of the Vedic texts should never be lost sight of in trying to interpret Indian culture. Where the Sruti texts do not tally with the findings of philosophy, they have been given a meaning suitable to the purpose, and this is helped by the variety of interpretations which the Sanskrit idiom admits of. Even the Bhagavadgīta, a work of a much later age, contains teachings which have been utilised by diametrically opposed religious sects and their corresponding philosophical systems with advantage. Mr. Havell correctly observes that in India Oreligion is hardly a dogma but a working hypothesis of human conduct adopted to different stages of spiritual development and different conditions of life.Ó If philosophy serves the cause of religion, it does so not because religion is something different from it, but because it finds that in serving religion, it is serving its own best interests. In HegelOs words, we may say, Ophilosophy only unfolds itself when it unfolds religion, and in unfolding itself it unfolds religion.Ó6It is to be noted that in some of the Indian systems although intuition has been regarded as superior to reason inasmuch as it is the ultimate source of the realisation of the highest truth, still they have taken upon themselves the task of

proving that this intuition is not at variance with the demands of reason. This, in fact, they have regarded to be the special function of philosophy. They rightly recognise that the claims of reason are imperative in matters of philosophical enquiry, and that even the sublimest intuitions embodied in the Upani ads cannot be accepted in the sphere of philosophy until they find the approbation of reason. The approach to truth has been not through faith as opposed to reason, but through reason which culminates and is grounded in spiritual experience. If religion and philosophy have been here united in happy wedlock, it is because both, in their free pursuit of truth, have found their ways united in the goal.

The aim of the Nyaya and the Vaise lika, of the Salkhya and the Yoga, of the Vedanta and the Mīma sa, of the Buddhist and the Jaina, is the same, viz. the attainment of the highest end and complete emancipation from all misery. We cannot say whether the Vedānta or the Sa khya is a philosophy or a religion, nor should we feel compelled to answer whether even the Nyaya with its intricate subtleties of logical discussion is not also a religion. We read the description of Naiyayika Sannyāsinsin Gu laratnaOs commentary7 on a darśanasamuccaya, which shows that the Nyaya system had also a corresponding religious sect belonging to it. It may be safely asserted that in India philosophy and religion are but the theoretical and practical aspects of one and the same attempt at realising (and not merely knowing) the highest end of life.

It is sometimes argued that philosophy, being a critical study of things, ought to attach greater importance to reason than to faith, which is the basis of religion, and that India, in emphasising the supremacy of spiritual intuition over reason, has failed to develop the proper philosophical sense. This criticism can hardly be justified. India recognised fully the importance of rational justification of

6. Philosophy of Religion, Vol. I, p. 19. 7. Te ca dal adharā praul hakaupīnaparidhānāl kambalikā prāvl tā jalādhāri lo ... uttamā sa lyamāvasthā prāptāstu nagnā bhramanti, Ch. II, p. 49.

truths arrived at through intuitive experience, and in the rationalisation of experience, sensuous and spiritual, originated Indian Philosophy. Reason and Intuition have both been regarded as the criteria of truth. Even the Vedänta, which is supposed to base itself exclusively on the authority of the Sruti, admits that the Sruti is not the only prama aor instrument of knowledge. Ratiocination is regarded as helpful to the attainment of knowledge and to the proper interpretation of the Sruti. The Vedanta accords a very high place to anubhavaor direct experience, as it holds that the knowledge of

Brahman (Brahmaj-āna) has its culmination in anubhava or realisation. This is expressly stated by Sa kara in his Bhāllya(I, i, 2). In the matter of Brahma-jij-āsā(desire for the knowledge of Brahman), Śruti alone is not the pramā a or instrument of knowledge as it is in dharma-jij-āsā. Here Śrutias well as anubhava (direct realisation) is pramā a, inasmuch as the knowledge of Brahman culminates in realisation, and has, as its object, an accomplished fact.8The authority of the Śruti is, again, not a foreign imposition having no relation to experience. The Sruti merely embodies the experience of the adepts, which the novice himself is expected to realise in due course when he attains considerable progress in spiritual discipline. The highest truths, the central topics of all philosophical systems as well as of all religious doctrines, are generally attained through intuition and subsequently elaborated and justified by reason. That the importance of reason has not been minimised seems to be proved by the fact that the necessity of an epistemological study was felt by almost all the philosophical systems of India. A critical study of the pramalas or instruments of knowledge has found an important place in each of these systems. That epistemological discussions are markedly absent in the Upanilads, is a fact which is perfectly natural. It is only when the philosophical speculations are systematised into definite systems like the Nyaya and the Vaiselika, the Sa khya and the Yoga, the Mīma sa and the Vedanta, the Buddhist and the Jaina, that we can

8. Na dharmajij-āsāyāmiva śrutyādaya eva pramāla brahmajij-āsāyāl kintu śrutyādayo Onubhavādayaśca yathāsambhavamiha pramā am; anubhavāvasānatvāt bhūtavastuvi ayatvācca brahmaj-ānasya (Śāīkara-Bhālya, I-i-2).

Brahmajij-āsāyāntu sāk ādanubhavādīnā sambhaval anubhavārthā ca brahmajij-āsā ityāha anubhavāvasānatvāt. Bhamatī on the above.

expect epistemological enquiries. In other countries also we find that epistemology appeared very late in the history of philosophy and had no place in earlier philosophical speculations.

If we examine critically some of the best philosophical systems of the West, we may discover that in them also philosophy has interpreted and elaborated the experiences attained through sources other than reason. Even the great intellectual system of Hegel, for example, is based on the concept of unity-in-diversity or identity-indifference which can hardly be justified by pure logic or reason .*

• It may be noted, however, that Hegel wants us to believe his identityof-contradictories to be a logical category. Although narrow formal logic may not justify this transcendental notion, still the higher logic of Reason, Logic as Dialectic, regards this not only as a permissible category but as the only category that is true to experience. The correct analysis of experience shows the categories of ordinary Logic to be but barren abstractions which are hopelessly

inadequate to represent the richness of concrete experience. Nowhere in experience do we find Abstract Being or Pure unity that is free from all multiplicity;Nit is always a one-in-many or a many-in-one that characterises the real. In growth or development this unity-in- multiplicity is very much evident and we are forced to admit that the Real is both one and many and that its essential characteristic cannot be described either by a bare unity or by a mere plurality. If ordinary logic cannot comprehend and justify the combination of these opposed notions involved in the fact of experience, the only course left open to us is to transcend such logic and search for the higher logic of Reason that can regard the synthesis of opposites to be its central category.

It is interesting to imagine how Salkaracarya would criticise Hegel on this point. According to Śa lkara, it is against all logic to attribute contradictory notions to one and the same substance. Either the Absolute is one or not-one; it is either different or non-different from the many. It cannot be both one and not-one, both different and non-different from the many. Reason is one and logic also ought to be one. The so-called logic of Reason cannot be opposed to or at variance with the logic of the Understanding. If reason can justify even contradictions, then all necessity for logic disappears, and everybody ought to be allowed to say whatever he likes. If the ÔmanyO be found to rise out of the one, if they are contained in the one as the effect is in the cause, that shows that the supposed one is not really ÔoneO but is already potentially ÔmanyO containing in embryo the germs for the development of the differences constituting the ÔmanyO. The so-called Ôone-in-manyO is really a ÔmanyO. What appears to be ÔoneÕ to the ordinary man is found to be really ÔmanyO by the scientist: what appears to be Ôone-in-manyÕ to Hegel may really be something that is only a preparation towards the One. The one can never be nor generate

The Law of Contradiction denying the identity of opposites admits of no exception and stoops to no authority in the sphere of logic or reason. The Hegelian logic with its central category of Òsynthesis of oppositesÓ or identity-of-contradictories reveals to us a field of experience transcending the ordinary sphere of discursive intellect. It is quite possible that the genius of Hegel had gained the vision in some bright moment when ordinary Ôthought was not.Õ But the elaboration and justification of that truth have taken the form of a philosophy which recognises no other authority than that of reason. Philosophy or reason merely justifies a truth by finding out its criterion but does not itself reveal the truth. Bradley rightly thinks

the many. It is not to be supposed, however, that Śal karaOs One excludes the many and thus is limited by the same. The ÔmanyO are not real and have no essential Being. They, being not real, cannot form the ÔotherO to the One and hence cannot limit the One. It is true that the many are experienced. But the mere experience of a thing does not vouchsafe its reality. When there is the illusory experience of the snake, the experience cannot make the snake real. So merely from the fact of the experience of the many, we should not be led to suppose that the One generates the many, and be persuaded to accept the illogical position of supposing that contradictions are justifiable. The object of the illusory perception, viz., the snake, appearsto be real, though, in truth, it is not real. The rope is merely the substratum with the support of which the illusory snake appears. The rope does neither become the snake nor contain the snake within it as an integral element. The only difficulty for which Hegel is led to conceive of the One as one-in-many is the appearance of the many. Sa kara tells us that the appearance of the ÔmanyO can be explained as an illusory percept which does not in any way touch the unity of the One.

It is sometimes supposed that Sal karaÕs illusory object is also both real and unreal and hence is also open to the charge which is brought against Hegel. The illusory snake, it is urged, is real inasmuch as it appears; it is unreal inasmuch as it is contradicted by the later experience of the rope. But we may point out that this objection cannot stand. According to Sal Ikara, the

mere appearance of a thing does not constitute its reality. What appears may or may not be real (sat). The altogether non-existent (asat) cannot appear. The sky-flower, the square circle, the son of a barren woman, are examples of the non-existent (asat). The illusory snake, Śa karācārya tells us, is neither real (sat) nor altogether non-existent (asat). It is a false appearance (mithya) which being contradicted by the later experience of the snake is not real (sat); but by virtue of its appearing in consciousness is also not non-existent (asat). SalkaraÕs category of anirvacanīya lies intermediate between satand asat, which being merely contraries and not contradictories, can very well allow the middle concept.

that thought merely points to but cannot give us an immediate contact with reality.

It is to be admitted that philosophy rationalises truths gained in the form of experience belonging either to the sense-plane or to the higher domain of spiritual vision.9The task of philosophy, in the widest sense, is undoubtedly the rationalisation of experience. The Hindu term ÔdarśanaÕ suggests this close connection between philosophy and experience. It indicates, as Prof. Radhakrishnan rightly remarks, Òa thought system acquired by intuitive experience and sustained by logical thought.Ó10We must have experience to start with and to build upon. Without the foundation of experience, philosophy cannot perform any fruitful task. The truth that is acquired in the first instance by perception, sensuous or spiritual, when elaborated and conceptualised by means of logical categories, becomes fit for acceptance and use by all people. The intuition which belongs to the individual experiencer alone, when elaborated and justified by thought-concepts, is brought down to the level of the intellect (in the case of spiritual intuition) or elevated to the same (in the case of sense-intuition) as the case may be, and thus extended to the use of all human beings. In this sense, thinking is the resolution of private, individual experience in terms of universal logical concepts, the de- individuation of the private intuitions into overindividual, common thought-moulds whereby they become accessible to all minds and become the public property that we call by the name of science. As Whitehead puts it, OWhat is known in secret, must be enjoyed in common, and must be verified in common.Ó11 The purely speculative philosophy which hopes to gain truths with the help of reason alone and which does not build upon the sure basis of infallible and unerring deliverences of intuitive experience will fail to yield truths. A merely formal truth which consists in the consis-tency of ideas only, is after all only a possibility and not an actuality. While the actual is also possible and the real is also rational, the converse statement can hardly be justified. The authority that Hindu philosophy works under is only the mass of experience

9. OInstinct, intuition or insight is what first leads to the beliefs which subsequent reason confirms or confutes; ... Reason is a harmonising, controlling force rather than a creative one.Ó

Mysticism and Logic (B. Russel), p. 13 10.Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 43. 11.Religion in the Making, p. 123.

gained by the Indian lis, the perfect seers of truth, which has been embodied in the Sruti. Reason attempts to understand the truths embodied in the Śruti, to find out whether the truths can be interpreted philosophi-cally,12but does not itself yield the truths themselves which are gained by intuition.

12. Śabdāvirodhinyā tadupajīvinyā ca yuktyā vivecana mananam. Bhāmatī I, i, 2.

2

Sādhanā: Its Place in Philosophy and Religion

The essence of religion lies in the immediate experience of the divine. This experience presupposes as its essential condition various forms of discipline which, though very far removed and altogether different from the experience itself forming the kernel of religion, still represent its indispensable outer husk. They are the instruments or means which are helpful in leading up to the experience and, as such, in determining their value, we have to guard against the opposite errors of either identifying them with the experience itself on the one hand, or on the other, of rejecting them as altogether worthless for purposes of religion.

The term Ô SādhanāÕ is a current Bengali expression for the forms of discipline referred to above. The Sanskrit form which is more commonly used in this sense, is ÔSadhana.Õ Its literal meaning is Òthat by which something is performedÓ or more precisely Òmeans to an end.Ó In the sphere of religion, it is always used to indicate the essential preliminary discipline that leads to the attainment of the spiritual experience which is regarded as the summum bonum (the highest good or Siddhi, i.e., completion and perfection) of existence, and thus, though used in a technical sense,1it retains still

1. Sādhanā is that by which ÔSiddhiO or perfection is attained i.e., the instrument of perfection. 14

largely its literal meaning. Sādhanāincludes all the religious practices and ceremonies that are helpful to the realisation of spiritual experience, and therefore may be regarded as the practical side of religion which is its most important aspect, as distinguished from the

discussion of the theories of the relation of God to man and the universe and other such topics constituting its theoretical aspect which belongs more or less to the province of philosophy. As has been said, all true philosophy culminates in the religious experience2 (anubhavāvasānatvāt). Philosophy grows out of an experience which is more or less intuitive, and a philosophical system is an elaboration of the experience through reason. Reason can justify the experience, can at best show the experience to be consistent, but cannot yield the experience itself which transcends reason. Here we find the need for sādhanā.It is sādhanāwhich makes the realisation or the experience possible. Kant clearly perceives the inadequacy of reason for such a task. In the Critique of Practical Reasonhe uses the expression that Òthis thoughtcould not be realised.Ó3The realisation of a thought is what sādhanāyields us. Sādhanā is perhaps something that is very much like the working of what Kant calls the practical reason which makes realisation possible of what is merely apprehended by the theoretical reason as a regulative ideal or an Idea of Reason merely.

The inherent division between thought and being, idea and existence, which Kant notices, was long before perceived by the Hindu Seers, and was sought to be healed up by Sadhana. All the theories on the nature of truth but the Vedantic one fail to recognise that the slightest interval between idea and reality is an impediment to the attainment of truth. The realistic theory which maintains truth to be the correspondence between the idea and the fact is hopelessly inadequate to show us the way to the ÔfactO as distinct from the ÔideaO. We can compare one idea with another which is regarded, for the time being, as ÔfactÕ, but we can never discover extra-mental facts with which to compare our ideas and find out their correctness. The idealistic theory of coherence also falls short of supplying the adequate criterion of truth. The coherent and the consistent are only ÔpossibleO which may or may notbe ÔactualO. Truth is not merely the coherent but is the experiencethat coheres with other experiences, not merely the abādhita(non-contradictory) but the pratīti or

2.BhāmatīÑI, i, 2. 3.WatsonNSelections,p. 277.

realisation that is not contradicted.4The actual is ÔpossibleÕ, but is not merelythe possible.5There is a gap between possibility and actuality, and unless the ÔpossibleO which alone idealistic philosophy can claim to prove is also shown to be Ôactual,O truth is not attained, and KantOs criticism remains unanswered. As Radhakrishnan puts it, ÒAdmitting that the conceptual plan of reality revealed to thought is true, still, it is sometimes urged, thought is not identical with reality.

By compressing all concepts into one we do not get beyond concepts.Ó6

The Mima sa philosophy criticises both the Realistic theory of correspondence and the Idealistic theory of coherence and maintains that the truth or validity of a cognition cannot be determined by reference to anything other than the cognition itself. It accepts the self-validity of cognitions (svata prāmā ya) as opposed to the theory which maintains that the validity of a cognition is to be established by something other than itself (parata prāmāl lya). Whether it is held that the validity of the cognition is established by reference to the fact of its coherence with other cognitions or by reference to its workability, inasmuch as its validity is sought to be determined by something other than the cognition itself in every case, it comes under the theory of parata prāmā ya. The Mīma sakas think that every cognition is to be taken as valid so long as it is not contradicted (bādhita), i.e., proved to be false by something else. It cannot be held against this self-validity of cognitions, the Mīma sakas argue, that non-contradiction (bādhakābhāva) is the criterion which determines the validity of the cognition. If this noncontradiction is regarded as only temporary and belonging to the moment when the cognition arises, then this is not an adequate criterion of validity, because every cognition stands uncontradicted at the moment it arises. It may be contradicted at a subsequent moment when another cognition arises but not at the moment of its existence. Even an illusion stands uncontradicted so long as it lasts and is contradicted and corrected only by a subsequent experience. On the other hand, if the non- contradiction means non-contradiction for all

4. Cf.ÒThe whole of thought even when it has attained the utmost completeness of which it is capable, is only an abstraction from the fuller whole of reality.Ó

Studies in Hegelian Dialectic : p. 112. 5.Bhāmatī on Adhyāsa Bhā ya. 6.Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 40.

times, then this test cannot be applied by and come within the scope of the experience of human beings who, not being omniscient, cannot have knowledge of all times.7

If, however, it be maintained that it is harmony or consistency with other cognitions that determines the validity of a cognition, the Mīmā sakas ask: What is meant by this consistency? Is it consistency with (1) another cognition of the same object or (2) with cognition of other objects or (3) with the knowledge of its workability? If the first alternative is accepted, the subsequent cognition, being not materially

different from the antecedent cognition, cannot be accepted as the criterion of the latter. Moreover, this process of establishing the validity of one cognition by other cognitions cannot go on ad infinitum. Either it must stop where a cognition has to be accepted as self-evident and valid by itself or there is infinite regress. Kumārila points out that if cognition in one case can be regarded as valid by itself, what objection can there be to the self-validity of another,8viz., the first one? As regards the second alternative, it is never seen that the knowledge of one thing harmonises with or makes consistent the knowledge of another. What consistency, for example, can there be between the knowledge of a pillar and the knowledge of a jar?9The knowledge, Ôit is a jarÕ, does neither validate nor invalidate the previous correct or incorrect perception of a pillar. The third alternative also cannot be maintained. A cognition may be workable and may produce fruitful results although there may not be any reality corresponding to the cognition. In dreams, for example, a person may have his thirst satisfied to some extent by dreaming that he is drinking water, although water is not present as a real entity. Again, whether a

7. Nāpi bādhakābhāvaparicchedāt prāmā yaniścaya Sa hi tātkāliko vā syāt kālāntarabhāvī vā Tātkāliko na paryāpta prāmā yapariniścaye, Sarvathā tadabhāvastu nāsarvaj-asya gocaral

Nyāyama-jarī, p. 162. 8. Sa gatyā yadi ce yeta pūrvapūrvapramā atā, Pramāl āntaramicchanto na vyavasthā labhemahi. Kasyacittu yadī yeta svata eva pramā atā Prathamasya tathabhave pradveLa kilnibandhana.

ŚlokavārtikaII, 75 & 76. 9. Athānyavil layaj-anamapyasya sa Ivāda ucyate tadayuktam, adarśanāt; na hi stambhaj-āna kumbhaj-anasya sal vādal Nyāyama-jarī, p. 163.

cognition is workable and fruitful can be determined only after a person has set himself to action assuming the validity of the cognition. But if the validity is assumed in order to determine its fruitfulness and workability (arthakriyākāritā), then the validity is the means of testing its workability; and if workability, again, is regarded as the criterion of its validity, there is argument in a circle. If, however, a person sets himself to action without determining the validity of the cognition, then the whole process of testing becomes useless. The validity of a cognition is to be tested in order that one may not be disappointed in the course of the action, but if the action is performed before the determination of its validity, then the usefulness of testing no longer remains.10The validity must, therefore, be regarded as inherent in all the sources of knowledge, for, Oa power, by itself non-existent, cannot be brought into existence by another.Ó11It does not mean, however, that no cognition is invalid. A cognition becomes invalidated only when another cognition arises which is in discrepancy with the

former, or when defects in the instruments of knowledge (kara adola) are discovered.12The theory of self-validity holds merely that as soon as a cognition is had, the presumption is that it is valid, and unless its invalidity can be proved, it is to be accepted as such. The doubt that it may not be valid arises only when it is in conflict with another cognition. Where the knowledge of such defects does not arise, its invalidity is not to be assumed through doubt. If a cognition is doubted intrinsically without any reason, there would be no end to this doubting and absolute scepticism would result. The theories of parata prāmāllya, on the other hand, maintain, either as the Buddhists think, that the presumption is that every cognition is by itself invalid, and unless its validity can be proved by others it is to be regarded as invalid; or as the Nyāya thinks, that a cognition is neither valid nor invalid by itself, both its validity and invalidity being determined by reference to something else. The Naiyāyika argues that if a cognition is known to be valid as soon as it is generated, then we ought never to be disappointed when we are

10. Aniścitaprāmā yādeva j-ānat prav Ittisiddhau ki paścāt tanniścayena prayojanam. Nyāyama-jarī, p. 162. 11. Na hi svatoOsatī śakti kartumanyena śakyate. Ślokavārtika: II, 47. 12.Śāstradīpikā, p. 60; Ślokavārtika II, 86; and Śābara-Bhālyal, i, 5.

prompted to action through belief in its validity.13But the fact is that we aresometimes disappointed. Hence it is to be inferred that the validity of the cognition is not ascertained at the moment of its emergence. If it be argued that no action can follow in that case, it is replied that an action can follow even from a state of doubt.14It may be objected that there is an illusory cognition. When the shell is perceived to be silver, the percipient does not doubt whether it is silver or not, but takes it to be silver so long as the illusion lasts. Jayanta replies to this objection by saying that although the state of doubt is not experienced, still as the process cannot be characterised as one of definite validity or of definite invalidity, it cannot but be designated as doubt (sa śaya). If it be regarded as valid, disappointment cannot result from it; if, on the other hand, it be regarded as invalid at the very outset, then no action can be prompted by it.15 That the doubt is not felt is due to the long established habit of thinking that the object corresponding to the cognition is present along with the cognition itself. The Naiyayikas hold that the cognition cannot be supposed to supply its own validity as soon as it occurs, although there might be objection to regarding the stage as definitely a stage of doubt. It is the disappointment or success resulting from actions pursued in accordance with a cognition that determines its validity or invalidity. The objection that the dreamcognitions also have workability cannot stand, inasmuch as the workability of

cognitions that are experienced in the state of waking alone is under discussion, and because the dream-experiences are essentially different from experiences in the waking state, and also because in the state of waking nobody has ever seen the workability of the cognition of water where no water is really present. It is the capacity to lead to successful action (prav ttisāmarthya) that determines the agreement or correspondence of ideas with objects. The correspondence is known through workability; so ultimately, the Naiyāyika accepts the pragmatic test of truth.

It is difficult to see how the Naiyayika can find an escape from

13. Yadi tu prasavasamaya eva j-ānasya prāmā ya niścinuyāma tarhi tata_ pravartamānā na kvacidapi vipralabhyemahi. vipralabhyāmahe tu. Nyāyama-jarī, p. 169. 14. Sa śayādeva vyavaharāma iti: Ibid., p. 169

14. Ubhābhyāmapi rūpābhyāmatha tasyānupagrahāt, ahãt, SoÕya sa na Ibid., p. 169. śaya eva syāditi kil prakupyasi.

the Mīma sa arguments for self-validity. After all, the cognition arising from the successful acts that emerge from the idea has to be accepted as valid. We have to assume the self-evident character of some cognition or other. Moreover, the very fact that action proceeded from the cognition shows that the cognition had been accepted as valid prior to its test of workability. So the charge of petitio principiiagainst the pragmatic criterion seems to be wellfounded. We are led to believe in the self-validity of cognitions and recognise the inadequacy of all external criteria of truth. Some of the Naiyāyikas, however, admit the self-evident character of some cognitions. Udayana, for example, maintains that the consciousness of consciousness (anuvyavasāya) is self-evident.

Kant analyses the problem critically and declares that an idea can never lead us to its existence a-priori. He asks, OWhehter the proposition, that this or that thing exists is an analytic or a synthetic propositionÓ16and argues that Oif it be analytic, nothing is added unto the thought of a thing by predicating existence of it.Ó On the other hand, if it be a synthetic proposition the predicate of existence cannot here be added unto a thought or an idea without further knowledge on the point. This criticism not only is directed against Descartes and Leibnitz, but it anticipates and directs its force against the Hegelian Identity of Thought and Being. Kant points out that it is the Ontological argument seeking to justify the passage from Thought to Being that is really the basis of the Physico-Theological and the Cosmological arguments. In fact, all theories of truth ultimately have to fall back upon this problem, and the answer that they can give to

this difficulty really determines their value.

Kant frankly admits that the intellect cannot bridge over the gulf between idea and reality and hence cannot aspire after absolute and ultimate truth. The Supreme Being and other noumena are all Ideas of Reason, the truth of which cannot be tested and demonstrated (Cf. Sāl lkhya). As the Mima sa refutes the Nyaya arguments for the existence of God,17 so also does Kant refute the Cosmological and Teleological arguments. But according to Hegel, the gap between Spirit and Matter, Thought and Existence, Reason and Reality is not absolute. OAll that is rational is real and all that is real

16. Transcendental Dialectic, p. 207. WatsonOs Selections. 17. Īśvarecchā yadīlyeta saiva syāllokakāralam, Īśvarecchāvaśitve hi niOphalā karmakalpanā. SaLbandhākl lepaparihāra, verse 72.

is rational.Ó There is no gap between Reason and Reality; they are one and the same. There is no distinction at bottom between Logic and Metaphysics. Reason alone can reveal the real, and noncontradiction is the criterion of truth. The subject and the object are bifurcations of the Absolute, and the Absolute, as subject, recognises itself in the object and thereby makes the fact of knowledge possible. Dr. Mctaggart, however, points out that although Hegel has maintained that all that is real is rational, yet he does not mean that all that is real is merely reason.18But it is difficult to understand what Dr. Mctaggart really has in his mind. If the Absolute is of the nature of Reason, and if everything that is the expression of this Absolute Reason is real, how can Hegel do without maintaining that the rational is real? If the Real is something more than Reason, as Dr. Mctaggart seems to maintain, then there must be something besides Reason for the apprehension of Reality. It may be noted here that Śal kara does not agree with Hegel in maintaining the identity of the Real and the Rational. He perceives that the slightest interval or gap between the subject and the object is detrimental to the cause of truth. That there is something given which comes to us with a touch of foreignness cannot be ignored. To say that Reason is identical with Reality is a dogmatic assertion so long as the Absolute Reason is not perceived to be identical with the individual reason. That there is something external to and beyond the scope of individual reason, coming to the latter as given, is undeniable, and it is this distinction between the presented and the given, on the one hand, forming the object, and the subject, as the witness of the object on the other, that is the basis of the bifurcation of subject and object essential to all cognition. So long as the given, the ÔjalaO of the Vedānta, the object, the Ôd śya,Õ cannot be reduced wholly to (or incorporated in) the

Ôdra Ino or the atman, the eternal subject or, truly speaking, the self-luminous luminosity or cit, Idealism cannot be maintained as a living faith. To say that the object appears, though only as a presentation to the cognising subject, and yet to hold that there is identity of thought and being, to deny the gap between idea and existence, is to overlook the real significance of the genuine Ontological argument, and HegelOs position is fully open to the criticism of Kant. Mere thought or reason always moves

18. ÒAll that is real may be rational, but it will nevertheless remain true that all that is real cannot be merely reasoning.Ó Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, p. 112.

within its own sphere, and so long as there is the division of subject and object, the necessary bifurcation of intellect, it cannot bridge over the gulf between idea and existence. Anubhavaor experience (not sense-experience, according to Sā_kara-Vedānta, but subtle anubhavaof the very fine intuitive reason) can alone transform the possible into the actual, the ideal into the real. Bradley also recognises the inadequacy of the mere intellect to reach truth. The ÔthatO exceeds the ÔwhatÕ, and the ÔwhatÕ always points to something beyond itself.19For the apprehension of truth Ôanother element in addition to thoughtO seems to be required and this is suggested by the term Ôdarśana.Õ

The Hindus recognise that to assert the reality of an idea merely by referring to its value and contents and appealing to argumentations involves the fallacious procedure of begging the question. The idea exists because of the real, not that the real exists because of the idea. But the Vedäntic argument for the existence of Brahman is not open to any such charge. Brahman or the Absolute is not merely an idea that is supplied by reason and, as such, is not like HegelOs Absolute Idea. It is reality or vastu20which is anubhavagamya(realised in experience). As it is very subtle in its nature and is of the nature ofcit, it can only be apprehended in the deepest recess of oneOs consciousness.21It is ÔsvayalprakāśaÕ and ÔsvasalvedyaÕÑself-luminous and not revealed or proved by anything else. Here the Ontological Argument takes a different turn. It is not manana or reason that reveals its existence : that is hopelessly inadequate for the purpose.22It is nididhyāsanaor dhyāna (meditation) that gradually enlivens the idea and introduces force and freshness into the same and elevates it to the rank of a vastu, thus bridging over the gulf between the ideal and the real, between the subject and the object. The idea attains reality not as separate from

19. Appearance and Reality, p. 163.

20. Sadeva sadityastitāmātral vastu nirviśela sarvagatam. Sal karaOs commentary on the Chandogya Upanilad: Ch. VI, part 2, para. 1. 21. BLhacca taddivyamacintyarūpal Sūk macca tat suk matara vibhāti. Dūrāt sudūre tadihāntike ca Paśyatsvihaiva nihita guhāyām: Mu laka Upanilad: III, 7. 22. Yanmanasa na manute. KenopaniladI, 5. And again, Naiva vācā na manasāÑetc. Ka hopaniladII, vi, 12.

the subject having the idea, neither as distinct from the object of which it is the idea, but it is transformed into the real through the resolving of the subject and the object into the oneness of an allinclusive experience. To the Ontological Argument that regards God as an idea, He always remains an idea, and the transition from idea to existence cannot be justified. But the real Ontological Argument regards the Absolute to be the experience which is the prius of subject and object, of thought and reality, the source and fountainhead of all dualistic thought-relation. The Absolute, being not merely an idea as distinct from the subject but an experience in which the subject is resolved, asserts its truth or reality by its very presence and is free from all criticism from the level of the discursive intellect. The Ontological Argument is open to criticism so long as the distinction between the ideal and the real is retained by the everdividing intellect, and at that stage the transition from thought to existence is certainly a fallaciously bold step, but in the case of an experience where the distinction between the subject and the object is transcended, the Ontological Argument appears not only to be true but is almost a truism.

Unless the idea cease to appear as an idea related to a subject and also as the image of some object which is taken to be real, it cannot be accepted as true. In sense-experience, for example, the idea that is received can never be taken to be real in the highest sense of the term. It is real only in the sense that it appears. But all appearances are not real. Illusions and hallucinations are familiar experiences. The sense- impression comes as something forced upon us and with the marked characteristics of givenness and foreignness. Although the sensation is something mental, its outside-reference is equally prominent. An idea seems nearer to us and belongs more intimately to ourselves as the subject. The externality is reduced to a certain extent in this relation of subject to its ideas than in that of the subject to the sense- impression received from the outside. The sensation seems only externally related to the subject receiving it, and that also, not permanently but only occasionally. The thoughtidea, on the other hand, seems to belong to the subject more intimately and also more permanently. Here the not-self is not something altogether foreign to the self, but is an intimate possession of the self, over which it has

control and which is more or less permanently connected with it. It is thus one step in advance of the former position. But although the not- self is drawn a little nearer to the self in this relation, and the not-self relaxes a little of its element of foreignness, still here also the division between the subject and the idea, the thinker and the thought, raises the problem of the criterion of truth. The idea is still an unresolved element in the subject and makes its appearance before the subject, although as an integral element of the same. The svagatabheda(internal division) between the subject and its ideas, the division between the subject and the object, persists as the residuum and thus becomes an obstacle to the way of perfect knowledge which is identical with truth. The ideal of knowledge implies a position where the ideal and the real coincide, where thought and reality coalesce together, where all gap between idea and existence is completely bridged over. This can only happen where the experience is not a bifurcated dual relation between the subject and the object, the latter appearing neither as a sense- impression different from the subject nor even as a thoughtidea belonging to the subject.

The Vedänta speaks to us of an experience where the not-self is wholly resolved into the self, where the ÔgivenO completely disappears. The self or Atmanor Brahman of the Vedanta is not to be taken as the subject, but is something which transcends the distinction between the subject and the object, and is beyond all relational consciousness. The internal division between the subject and its ideas forming the object also disappears, and the experience is one of a higher type of immediacy transcending relational thought. The question of the criterion of truth cannot arise here at all, simply because there is no idea of whichwe have to determine the truth or falsity. Truth or falsity is ordinarily determined by referring to the relation of agreement or disagreement between the subjectÕs idea and some ÔotherÕ taken as the fact. But here the distinction between the subject and its idea is transcended and, as such, all interval between the subject and the idea which alone can raise the question of truth and error is bridged over. The idea is resolved into the subject and the subject remains not as a barren abstraction apart from the object (as is sometimes supposed), but the relational consciousness of the bifurcating, discursive intellect is elevated to the higher immediacy of intuitional apprehension. Where the self, as subject, knows the not-self appearing as the object, it is an instance of the one receiving or knowing an ÔotherÕ. This ÔothernessÕ gradually thins away as the object approaches nearer and nearer the subject, appearing, first, as the external object, then, as ideas related to the subject, and next, as ideas forming part of the subject itself. But it is only when the idea is completely merged in the

subject or rather, when the subject as the knower and the object as known resolve themselves into the nonrelational consciousness, that the ÔothernessÕ becomes completely extinct.23At any stage short of this, knowledge implies the grasping or acquiring bythe subject ofsomething that is (at least partially) other than itself, and, as such, implies a process, a movement depending upon some conditions. The unconditionality of knowledge alone can supply its own criterion or, more strictly, it is above the requirements of a criterion, inasmuch as it involves the complete annihilation of this ÔothernessÕ of the object and thus also of the very distinction between the subject and the object. Knowledge must, at the last step, be unconditional,Ñdepending upon no condition and no processÑmust be eternal and absolute, and must depend on nothing else as its further criterion. To ask always and for ever for a criterion of knowledge and truth and not to reach the goal is to declare the impossibility of knowledge and the bankruptcy of the human reason. The Objective Idealism of Hegel seems to commit a fallacy when it argues that as the object depends on the subject so also does the subject depend on the object. If it is the light of the subject that illumines the object and reveals the object, then it is an argument in a circle to hold that the subject, again, has to depend for its manifestation on the object. The light that belongs to the subject and which illumines the object should be supposed to be either the subjectOs own light or borrowed from something else, but in no case can it be supposed to be coming from the object, if the main contention of Idealism, viz., that the object cannot exist unrelated to the subject, be once accepted as true. We have to explain the revelation and consequently the existence of the object by the subject, of the subject again by something which is manifested through the subject, that is, by the pure consciousness (prakāśa) which is self-revealed. If, however, we turn round and hold that the subject is not manifested by something self-revealing but by the object, we can hardly escape a petitio principii. If it is seen that

23. Cf.and contrast Caird. OIf knowledge is the relation of an object to a conscious subject, it is the more complete the more intimate the relation, and it becomes perfect when the duality becomes transparent, when subject and object are identified .... When consciousness passes into self-consciousness.O

Critical Philosophy of Kant, p. 46.

the subject depends on the object, that would prove that neither the subject nor the object is the revealer, but both of them depend on something else for their revelation. Hegel really means that the Absolute is the source of all light,Ñthe correlativity of the subject and the object implying and pointing to the transcendent Idea. But if the Absolute, again, is regarded as the subject and is supposed to depend

for its manifestation on the universe through which it reveals itself, then the petitio principiican hardly be avoided. Sal kara clearly explains the difference between thisj-āna, where theātman alone shines unhampered and unresisted by any not-self, and all other forms of knowledge which have the not-self as their object, in the following words24:Ñ

ÒTherefore, j-ānaalone is all that the self acquires. The acquisition of the self is not like the acquisition of the not-self, an attainment of something new, getting of something which was not, because here there is no distinction between the gainer and the gained. Where the self acquires the not-self, there the self is the gainer, the not-self is the gained, and that is gained through some process effected by some agent, and that, being the acquisition of something not already possessed, is temporary.Ó

The knowledge which is knowledge of an object depends upon the latter and also upon some factors conditioning the process. The validity of this knowledge depends upon the reality of the object and the veracity of the process, and such testing of truth through an ÔotherÕ leads to infinite regress. Moreover, such conditional knowledge can never be eternal as it depends upon non-permanent conditions and, as such, can never be ultimate.

The Śruti declares that the self (ätman) is self-luminosity (svayaljyoti) and explains the term by stating that the self is its own light.25It does not mean that luminosity as an attribute belongs to the self because the self has no attributes. The self does not possess light but is light itself. The Sruti really means to state that the self is very different from all other objects which require for their revelation contact with the light caused by something other than themselves. The self requires no ÔotherO for its revelation but is its own light, and this is emphasised by the term ÔevaÕ in Ôātmaivāsya jyotihO.26Citsukhācārya argues that the self-revealing character

24. Commentary on the BLharara yaka Upanilad: I, iv, 7. 25. Ātmaivāsya jyoti B Up. IV, iii, 6. 26. Sarvabhāvānāmanyanimittaprakāśasa sargitvād ātmanyapi tatprasa- ganirākara āya svayal ljyotiriti viśel la lopapatte ātmaivāsya jyotiriti caivakārāt. Vivarala. Viz. Edn., p. 41.

(svaya prakāśatva) of the self cannot be refuted, first because of this express statement by the Sruti of the atmanas self-light; secondly, because the atmanis of the nature of consciousness (cit), and lastly, because the self is never the object (karma).27The self isconsciousness, and not that subjectof consciousness. In the passage of the Sruti where we find Ôthe sight of the seer is not lostÕ, Ôthe sight of the seerÕ

means Ôthe sight that is of the nature of the seerÕ or Ôthe seer that is indicated by the sight, O and not Ôthe sight that is related to the seerO (sa bandha), because that might have implied a difference of relata or substrata (adhikaral la) instead of an identical substratum.28

ÒSvaya IprakāśaÓ is defined by Citsukhācārya as, Owhat is fit for direct acceptance and transaction (aparok lavyavahāra) without being the object of the cognitive process.O

To the objection against this definition that as the selfrevealing (svaya prakāśa) ātman has no attribute (dharma) in the state of release (mokla), the ÔfitnessÕ cannot be regarded as the essence of svaya prakāśatva, Citsukhācārya replies that the expression, Ôthe svaya prakāśais fitÕ means merely that the svaya prakāśaself is not the substratum of what is contradictorily opposed to and implies the total negation of fitness,29and not that ÔfitnessÕ is an attribute that belongs to the svaya prakāśa self. He also points out that this answer is in line with the Naiyayika contention that the statement, Ôsubstance has attributes,Õ means merely that the substance is not the substratum of the total absence or negation of attributes. Again, the supposition of such an attribute as ÔfitnessÕ does not conflict with the central doctrine of the Vedänta, because in the state of bondage everyone admits the existence of the supposed (kālpanika) attributes. Sureśvarācārya says ÒWhy should you be unwilling to admit that the self is the substratum? Do you

27. Cidrūpatvādakarmatvāt svaya jyotiriti śrute Ātmana svaprakāśatva ko nivārayitu klama

Verse 3 in Citsukhi, Ch. I, N.S. Edn., p. 21. 28. Dra urd teriti dra dl Irūpāyā d lel DilakLaLo vā yo dra ā tasya ... iti sāmānādhi-kara lyena lal hyo sambandhasambhave vaiyadhikara yasya kalpanāyogāt. Ibid., p. 23. 29. Yogyatvātyantābhāvānadhikara atvasya tattvāt gulavattvātyantābhā

vānadhika-ralasya dravyatvavat. Citsukhī(N.S. Edn.), Ch. I, p. 9. Cf.Also Advaitasiddhi(N.S. Edn.), p. 768.

not realise that the entire universe is the superimposition of Nescience on that very self?Ó30Padmapādācārya also, in course of supporting the possibility of superimposition (adhyāsa), says, OBliss, experience of objects and eternity, although these attributes are not separate from consciousness, still they seem to be separate from it.Ó31The last portion of the definition of svaya prakāśatva, viz. ÒWithout being the object of the cognitive process,Ó excludes all objects such as the jar, etc., from coming under the category of the self-revealed (svaya prakāśa). Though these are directly experienced, they cannot be regarded as svaya prakāśa, being objects of the cognitive process.

The first part of the definition, again, excludes everything past and future, distant and inferential, from the scope of the svaya prakāśa, as these are not matters Ôfit for direct transactionO (vyavahāra).

The revelation (prakāśa) that we find in conscious processes is not due to any external light, viz., the light of the sun or the light of the moon, because there is consciousness even when all external light is absent; for example, in dreams. It cannot also be held that the mind supplies the light in dreams whereby the objects are seen, because the mind is, after all, merely an organ (indriya) which perceives things through the light of something else. Moreover, in dreamless sleep when the mind also is absent, the consciousness that persists cannot be anything other than the selfOs own light. Hence, the self-revealed character of pure consciousness (cit) and of the self which is of the nature of pure consciousness (cit) is established beyond all doubt.32The Vedantic epistemology attempts to establish the self-revealing character of knowledge and points out that while in other instances of knowledge this character is not evident to us because of its seeming connection with objects, it becomes clear to us when Brahman which is pure knowledge itself (j-ānasvarūpa) is realised. The knowledge that is gained through mental states (v tti) is ordinarily supposed to be due either to the activity of the mind alone or to the contact of the mind with external objects. It is only in the highest state of samādhi(absorption) or in aparok ānubhūti(direct

30. AkL ama bhavata keya sādhakatvaprakalpane, Kil na paśyasi sal sāra tatraivāj- ānakalpitam. 31. Ānando vi layānubhavo nityatvamiti santi dharmāl, Ap thaktveOpi caita_yāt pOthagivāvabhāsante. Pa-capādikā, p. 4. 32. See the argument in Citsukhī, pp. 22Đ23.

intuition of Brahman) that knowledge is revealed in its real nature (svarūpa) without the medium of any instrument or process. The possibility of such a state of processless apprehension is supplied by our daily experience of the state of dreamless sleep (sul upti). It is only after the realisation of the independent and self-revealing character of knowledge that one can understand the connection of knowledge with its objects (vilaya) to be external and illusory. It is to be remembered that in the Vedäntic system, the ätmanor the self is not the substratum (āśraya) of pure knowledge but is pure knowledge itself.33So, any discussion about the nature of the ātman is virtually a discussion on the nature of knowledge.34If the ātman is supposed to be cognised by something else, it becomes jalla. If, however, it be supposed that the ätmanis cognised not by anything else but that it itself becomes the subject (kart) and the object (karma) of cognition, that would lead to contradiction, inasmuch as one and the same thing

cannot be both subject and not-subject at one and the same time. Again, strictly speaking, the process of selfcognition can hardly have the self as its object (karma). The object (karma) is that in which the effect of something other than itself inheres (parasamavetakriyāphalaśāli hi karma). In self-cognition, the self which is supposed to be the object cannot really be the object, inasmuch as it is not something in which the effect of something other than itself (viz., the cogniser) inheres. Here the cogniser and the cognised are not different but are identical. If, however, it is held that there are two selves and that the cogniser-self is an entity other than the cognised self, then the self (ätman) that is supposed to be cognised would be reduced to the status of the not-self, being the revealed and not the revealer. Again, the cogniser-self, when cognised, would become in its turn the not-self, and thus instead of the self we would get only a series of not-selves ad infinitum. If, however, the self is supposed not to be the object but as the subject repealed in every act of cognition, then Vacaspati asks:N

What is the nature of the cognition in which the object (artha) and the self are revealed? Is it self-revealing (svayal prakāśa) or other- revealed (jala)? If it is supposed to be other-revealed (jala),

33. Tasmāt nirastasamastakala-kāvakāśamātmana 34. Vij-ānasvaprakāśatayaiva tadrūpasyātmana svaprakāśatvam. Citsukhī, Ch. I, p. 27. svaprakāśatā siddhā. Nayanaprasādinī Tīkā on Citsukhī, p. 21.

then the object and the self (vilaya and ätman) being also taken as ÔrevealedÕ and thus ja a, there will be no distinction between the revealer and the revealed, and the whole world would be without a revealer.35It cannot also be held that even though the salvit or consciousness does not reveal itself, it still reveals (j-äpayati) the objects and the self (just like the eye which not seeing itself still sees everything else), because what is signified by revelation (j-āpanam) of objects is nothing but the production of their cognition or awareness (j-ānajanana). If, however, this cognition (j-ana) that is produced is, ex hespothesi, ja a, that is, not self-revealing, then revelation or knowledge of a thing becomes impossible. This is a very strong point which Väcaspati puts forward in defence of the self-revealing character (svaya prakāśatva) of knowledge, and has to be clearly understood. Revelation means nothing but the generation of a process of consciousness, and if consciousness itself is not supposed to be self- revealing, then the case for all revelation is lost. Hence Vācaspati concludes that the process of consciousness (sal Ivit) has to be regarded as not dependent upon anything else for its revelation.36But the question next arises: Even granting that the sa lvitis self-revealed,

does this self-revealing character of the process of consciousness (sa vit) help the revelation of objects that are essentially jaa? It cannot be supposed that they are revealed because the conscious process (sal Ivit) that cognises them is selfrevealing in character, for a mere relationwith something selfrevealed does not qualify them for being revealed. A thing which is by its very nature (svabhāva) unrevealed cannot be supposed to be revealed merely because of its connection with something selfrevealing, because that would be like the absurd supposition of regarding the father also to be learned because his son happens to be learned.37It cannot also be supposed that it is the nature of the selfrevealing sa lvitnot only to reveal itself but also to reveal everything that comes into relationship with it; because, then also there will be room for the same absurd supposition pointed out

35. Jalaśced vilayātmānāvapi ja aviti kasmin kil prakāśeta, aviśe āt iti prāptamāndhyamaśe aya jagata

Bhāmatī on Adhyāsa-Bhā ya. 36. Tasmād aparādhīnaprakāśā salvid upetavyā. Bhāmatīon Adhyāsa-Bhā_ya. 37. Tat kil putra pandita iti pitapi panditoOstu. Bhāmatīon Adhyāsa-Bhā ya.

above. If it be argued that it is the nature of sa vitthat it reveals itself only in conjunction with the revelation of objects and the self, and that where there is no revelation of objects and the self, there is no revelation of salvit, the Vedäntist, in reply, would maintain that if the revelation of objects and the self be different from thesa vit, then the self-revealing character of the savitdisappears, inasmuch as it has to depend on something different from it for its revelation. If, on the other hand, it is not different from salvit, then the revelation of objects and the self, being non-different from sal lvit, becomes sal vititself, and thus there remains no force in the objection. Again, the consciousness of absent objects, viz., the past and the future, cannot be simultaneous or in conjunction with the objects themselves. Moreover, material things cannot be the object (vilaya) of the self (atman) which is of the nature of pure consciousness (prakāśa). These material things are always perceived as being external, having extension and magnitude, while the pure consciousness is felt to be wholly internal, possessing neither extension nor any magnitude. Therefore, the object as something different from the self-revealing consciousness is really indefinable in character.38This revelation or conscious-ness (prakāśa) is not felt to have any internal division of its own; neither can the division of the object which is indefinable (anirvācya) by itself introduce any division into consciousness which is determinate and definable, because that would imply determination of the determinate by something indefinable, which is absurd.39

Thus the Vedanta establishes that pure consciousness (cit or caitanya) is self-revealing and holds that an object becomes revealed only when it is in illusory identification (tādātmyādhyāsa) with pure consciousness. In fact, there is no revelation of the conscious or of the unconscious as such by another. The conscious is self-revealed and hence does not require a revealer, while the unconscious can never be revealed, not even by the conscious.

It can hardly be doubted that the svaya prakasaor the pure consciousness, if attained, would give us the ideal of knowledge. Bradley also maintains that the ideal of knowledge involves an

38. Tasmāt candre anubhūyamāna iva dvitīyaścandramā svaprakāśādanyoÕrthonirvacanīya eveti yuktamutpaśyāmal Bhāmatīon Adhyāsa-Bhā ya. 39. Na cānirvācyārthabheda prakāśa nirvācya bhettumarhati atiprasa- gāt. Ibid.

identity of thought and fact, which can never be given by relational thought implying an inherent division. OIn desiring to transcend this distinction thought is aiming at suicide.Ó40Again, OThought is relational and discursive, and if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide: and yet, if it remains thus, how does it contain immediate presentation?O This can only happen, Bradley says exactly in the vein of the Upanilads, where OThought would be present as a higher intuition, would be there where the ideal had become reality. It is this completion of thought beyond thought which remains for ever an other ... . Thought can understand that to reach its goal, it must get beyond relations. Yet in its nature it can find no other working means of progress. Hence it perceives that somehow the relational side of its nature must be merged and must include somehow the other side. Such a fusion would compel thought to lose and to transcend its proper self. And the nature of this fusion thought can apprehend in vague generality, but not in detail.Ó41

The objections of Neo-Realism which may have some force as against Western Idealism thus do not at all apply to Vedāntic metaphysics. Here the ÔgivenÕ is altogether eliminated, not by ignoring it but by transforming it. The question of criterion of truth implies the notion of a correspondence, which again involves two objects, but here the object (idam) is altogether absorbed into the subject (aham) and thus the ÔtwoÕ cease to exist and the question of truth or error thus has no application. The Vedanta is not an Idealism as against Realism; on the other hand, it clearly and emphatically supports realistic epistemology in many places.42It does not deny that there is a ÔgivennessÕ in knowledge which implies an outside reference, but only points out that the ideal of knowledge is attained only where this ÔgivennessÕ is

transcended, where the relation of correspondence, essential to true knowledge, is elevated into one of identity and ceases to be relative altogether. It not only maintains that reason points towards such an ideal but also shows us the way towards the realisation of that ideal. The method is Òvij-aya praj-al kurvītaÓÑÒmatvā ca satata dhyeyal,Ó43Ñone is instructed to have

40. BradleyÑ Appearance and Reality, p. 168. 41.Ibid., pp. 181Đ82. 42.Commentary on the BrahmasūtrasIII, ii, 21. Na hi tat puru atantra vastutantrameva hi tat See also Commentary on I, ii, 4. 43. See Sa karaOs Commentary on BLhadāra yaka Upanilad, I, iv, 7.

ceaseless meditation on the conclusions established by reason; deep, unabating and constant concentration on the firm and secure possession of reason, so that not only the conscious and selfconscious reason alone can accept it, but also that it may illumine and be accepted by the subconscious or the unconscious self as well, and thus lighten up the whole field of conscious-ness,Ñthe circumference and the margin as brightly as the focus and centre itself. This is what is necessary for realisation. It turns the rational into the real,Ñthis is realisation(making real) of the ideal attained by thought. It no longer remains merely an intellectual process as isolated from the emotional and the volitional, but becomes spiritual experience which comprehends and harmonises all the partial aspects within itself.

The bifurcation into the subject and the object, ahamand idamÑdra land dl Iśya, in fact, all dual relation as such, is the essence of creation which is the expansion of Māya (Creative Power). The real which is one and simple somehow appears in the dual aspect. Within the realm of this dual division, we never find the Real, but only an aspect of it. We meet with single complementaries, so to speak, the resultant of which alone can take us to the real. The real is prior to this division into related and opposed complementaries, which division is all that is meant by creation. This priority is not to be taken always as implying a temporal antecedence. The Vedānta gives us as its highest category the Absolute which does not enter into any temporal relation at all,Ñnot even as the support and originator of the temporal series. It regards creation as unreal (ajātavādaof Gaullapāda). The real is the prius of the divided complementary aspects, and can be apprehended only when we somehow transcend them.

Hindu Sādhanā aims at the attainment of a stage where the Ôaham- idamÕ division, the subject-object division disappears. The process is

different in different schoolsÑsome emphasising the subject factor and others the object factor. But the ideal is the sameÑthe transcendence of the dual bifurcation of Māya. Mere speculation is inadequate for the task. The thinker and the thought, the subject and the object involved in all thinking, present a duality and a gap that is unbridgeable in the plane of reason. Reason can at best only reduce the distinction to some extent, but howsoever may it attempt to bridge over the gulf, it fails to obliterate the last traces that remain. The Absolute of Hegel, is, after all, the Subject that has the object before Him, although this object is nothing foreign to Him, is no not-self to Him, but is only a self-evolved and selfposited externality which He has imposed or liked to impose upon Himself and which He transcends and resolves every moment. There is, in the Absolute, a svagata-bheda, in the language of the Vedanta. And thus because the Absolute is the Subject Himself, He can be grasped by the philosophic consciousness as a subject. ManOs consciousness of the Infinite would thus be GodOs consciousness of Himself as the subject. The Subject has a consciousness of Himself presented to Him as an object, i.e., in other words, the subject-object division remains to the end. The Vedantic Absolute, however, is not merely the subject. It is neither the object nor the subject, and therefore an apprehension of Brahman is impossible for one who has not become Brahman. Because there is not even the subject-object division in Brahman, Brahman can never be apprehended either as the subject or as the object. This is what we mean by real svaya prakāśatvawhere Being or Truth is not revealed as an object by any subject; nor does it reveal itself to anything other than itself, either directly or indirectly, on which its revelation may seem to depend even partially.

3

Distinctive Features and the Different Stages of Hindu Sādhanā

The very first thing that strikes us in dealing with Hindu Sādhanā is its all-comprehensiveness. All types of religious theories and all forms of religious practices find place in Hinduism. It is not easy to say definitely whether Hinduism is polytheistic or monotheistic, pantheistic or theistic, superstitious and magical or thoroughly mystical and philosophical, or whether it is a religion of love, or a religion of knowledge, or a religion of action, because we find elements of all of these within the compass of Hinduism. We find so much difference in the practices of the different religious sects and also in their basic theoretical principles that to attempt a systematic study of the general principles underlying the various forms of Sādhanā seems almost an impossible task. When we think of the sacrificial form of worship, the principal subject-matter of the Brähma a portion of the Vedas, and have in our mindOs eye a picture of the elaborate arrangement of the details enjoined in sacrifices, including the burning flame and the pouring of oblations into it and the loud reciting of the sacred texts, we can hardly also think that the very same Vedas in the Upanilad portions prescribe an absolutely detailless, speechless and actionless form of Sādhana as the only

35

means of attaining salvation. When we read the innumerable eloquent hymns in praise of God and enjoy the beautiful imagery and the lovely sentiments embodied in them, we hardly suspect that all these would also be represented as vain attempts at describing the Absolute which is really attributeless and formless. The Absolute, nirgulaBrahman is as much the ultimate, and the highest and the dearest object of worship to the Hindus as the concrete Personal God. The Tāntrikaengaged in seemingly ugly and objectionable and sometimes horrible practices in the darkest hours of mid-night at the dirtiest cremation ground, the Vail lava closely engaged in removing the minutest particle of dust from the temple of the Lord and carefully anointing his body with sacred marks of sandal, the Yogin sitting erect with winkless eyes practising concentration in various postures of the body, and the Vedäntist energetically performing the routine duties of life like an ordinary man and still all the while resting in the

Brāhmic(Absolute) consciousness, are all genuine representatives of Hinduism. In the face of these enormous diversities, it is difficult to point out the common features of the different forms of Hindu Sādhanā, and it is apparent that only a very general discussion is possible on the subject. It is to be noted, however, that these diversities are puzzling only so long as the basic truth underlying them is not discovered. As soon as it is realised that all the rituals are means towards the attainment of Absolute Harmony and Truth, the lost clue is found out and the differences in the practices of the various sects are understood to be meant only for persons of different equipments.

The Hindu religion bases itself primarily and fundamentally on actual living experience, its aim always being realisation or anubhūti of the ultimate truth. It is true that every other religion is also based on experience, the dogmas being merely Oattempts to formulate in precise terms the truth disclosed in the religious experience of mankind,Ó but in Hinduism experiencegets a special emphasis.1 Acceptance of the creed, belief in the dogmas, performance of the religious practices, and strict obedience to the ethical codes, none or all of these together can make a man religious unless he also participates in the spiritual experience. A manOs value in the sphere of religion is always judged by the quality and the intensity of his

1. ParokLa ko nu jānīte kasya ki vā bhavi_yati, Yadvā pratyak aphalada tadevottamadarśanam. Kulār ava Tantra, Ch. II, 89.

religious experience,2and the utility of the manifold practices always consists in their leading up to and helping the emergence of the spiritual experience.3The legends embodied in the Pura as are mainly allegorical renderings and descriptions of the various stages and kinds of religious experience undergone by adepts. These, in the shape of popular tales, help to generate feelings and sentiments which might ultimately yield us those religious experiences. The different philosophical systems are also attempts to rationalise the experience and thus to secure for the same a permanent abode in reason. The apparently unmeaning mantras (sacred lettered sounds) and yantras(mystical diagrams) are also symbols in words and shapes of the religious experience. The image of the Deity is also nothing but such a symbol. The experience is not only the central factor in the Hindu religion but we may regard that to be the one single fact in it that alone counts. As soon as the experience is gained, man attains perfection and his mission in life becomes fulfilled. Every sincerely religious soul yearns after this experience here and now, in this very

worldly existence. One who dies and goes away from this universe without attaining the experience (sāk ātkāra or anubhava) that is identical with mukti, has really lived in vain and has missed his chance in life. Even with all the other possessions, the want of this experience alone makes a man poorest, while its possession at once makes him the richest.4Had the dogmas, or the widely divergent symbols, or the innumerable religious practices heavily clashing with one another formed in any way thereal essenceof the Hindu religion, then the numerous religious sects, so fundamentally opposed to one another, could never have been all included in the common fold of Hinduism. While Hinduism regards these symbols and practices as useful so far as they are necessary preliminaries to the experience, it never loses sight of the fact that the spiritual experience itself is the all-important factor, and so long

2. The Bhagavadgītārefers to the superiority of the actual spiritual experience by the term ÔyogaÕ in the following śloka: VI, 46: TapasvibhyoOdhiko yogi j-ānibhyoOpi matodhikal, Karmibhyaścādhiko yogī tasmād yogī bhavārjuna.

3. Tavattapo vrata tīrtha japahomārcanādikam, Vedaśāstrāgamakathā yāvattattva na vindate.

Kular ava Tantra , Ch. I, 116. 4. Yo va etadak lara kOpa oOtha ya etadakLara gārgyaviditvāsmāllokāt praiti sa gārgi viditvāsmāllokāt praiti sa brāhma lal l. BOh. Up. III, viii, 10.

as the goal is not missed, it can always neglect the superficial diversities of the cloaks of religion.5The very same Tantras which are so particular about the strict observance of even the most unimportant ritualistic details declare unmistakably the futility of all these rituals when experience of the Absolute is attained. ÒO Goddess,Ó the Lord says, Othere is neither meditation nor concentration afterhaving attained all knowledge and experience, afterhaving realised the Essence of all Bliss, the Knowable in the heart of hearts; all the ritualistic observances are useless when Brahman is attained; of what use is the palm-leaf when the blissful southern wind blows?60At this stage, cessation from action is the highest form of worship, and silence is the best kind of japa (repeated utterance of mantras).Ó

The superiority and transcendence of the religious experience over the practices (anul lhnas) including all acts of morality have everywhere been emphasised in the Hindu Scriptures, and this emphasis is the source of much misunderstanding that still prevails as to the relation of morality and religion in Hinduism.7The moral life is the indispensable preliminary discipline to the religious8Ñthis is the central teaching of all forms of Hindu Sādhanā. Yamaand niyama(control and regulation) including truthfulness, purity of mind

and body, abstinence from actions causing the slightest pain to others, chastity in thought and action, etc., have been prescribed as the very first disciplines that must be undergone by every Sādhaka. The Bhaktivādins, who very often are supposed to belittle the life of

5. Nānāvidhairāgamamārgabhedairādiśyamānā bahavoObhyupāyā, Ekatra te śreyasi sampatanti sindhau pravāhā iva jāhnavīyāll. Nyāyama-jarī, p. 267. AlsoÑ Virodhamātra tvaki-citkaram Ibid., p. 267.

6. Samprāpte j-ānavij-āne j-eye ca h di sa sthite, Labdhe śantipade devi na yoga naiva dhāral lā. Pare brahmali vij-āte samastairniyamairalam, TālavIntena kil kārya labdhe malayamārute.

Kular ava, IX, 27 & 28. AlsoÑ

Akriyaiva parā pūjā maunameva paro japal. 7.BhagavadgītāXVIII, 17 and IX, 30. 8. Nāvirato duścaritānnāśānto nāsamāhital, Nāśāntamānaso vāpi praj-ānenainamāpnuyāt. Ka hopanilad, I, ii, 24.

penance and self-control, include in fact the essence of the same when they place great emphasis on Vidhidharmapālana, i.e., strict obedience to the injunctions of the Scriptures. The J-anavadins also regard the acquisition of la sampatti(six virtues) including control of mind and the sense-organs, etc., as essential to the acquisition of knowledge. We have to remember only that the aspect of moral preparation is thrown into the background when the Scriptures describe the content of the religious experience and emphasise its absolutely transcendent character.9The religious life or the spiritual content is above the distinctions of morality,10and the ethical life is shown to be short of the fulfilment that belongs to the spiritual experience alone. It is from this standpoint that the Bhagavadgīta says, OHe who finds karmain akarma, and akarmain karma, is intelligent, and united to the Divine, and the doer of all actions.Ó11 The ethical life culminates and fulfils itself in the religious experience which transcends it and does not exclude or ignore it. So, when Arjuna is advised to absolutely surrender himself to KL a forsaking all virtues and vices, he is really exhorted to rise up to the transcendent level of spiritual experience where the moral distinctions seem inadequate and inapplicable. In Hinduism, religion does not discard or annul morality but merely perfects and transcends the same.

The Hindu realises that the finite, individual human being has an element of divinity inherent in him, and that the experience of the Infinite is not the experience of anything foreign to him. Not only in the absolutely monistic system of the Vedanta do we find the doctrine

of the identity of the individual (Jīva) and the Absolute (Brahman), but even in the philosophical systems of the Bhakti School, we find that Hari(the Lord) is described as dehabh tāmātmā (the ätman or the self of the embodied beings). The course of Sadhana, for the Hindu, is only a history of the growth of the individual from the condition of little knowledge to omniscience, from a state of disharmony and discord to a state of harmony, balance and equilibrium, from a state of weakness and little energy to a stage of omnipotence, in short, from finiteness to infinitude.12

9.BhagavadgītāIII, 18 and IV, 18. 10. Yathām tena tOptasya nāhāre a prayojanam, Tattvaj-asya tathā devi na śāstre a prayojanam. 11. IV, 18. Kulār ava, I, 104. 12. See Paramārthasāraby Abhilava Gupta, Verses 9 and 16.

The aim of Sadhana is very well indicated by the prayer embodied in the mantra, OLead me from the unreal to the real, from darkness to light, from death to immortality.Ó13The gradual unfolding of the latent capacities of man in the direction of knowledge, power and holiness is the function and purpose of Sādhana. The Hindu recognises that this growth must be, by the very nature of the case, a slow process. Matter, which has somehow entangled and seemingly dominated the spirit, and has made the spirit, the eternal king, appear in rags, can be conquered only slowly and gradually. The Hindu is fully alive to the fact, as Mr. Mukherjee rightly points out, that ÒSpirituality is not the cult of contemptuous ignorance of matter, a way of talking and doing as if matter were a false bogey and myth, but of calm judicious treatment of matter with a view to its conversion or rebaptism. The lost sheep of Israel must come back at last: matter, as sound philosophy tells us, is an eject or reflex of the spirit into which it must be absorbed and incorporated again, not at once, but through a long and difficult process of discipline, education and redemption. The secret of its education the spirit is slow to find out, the means of its discipline the spirit is late in devising and commanding. Life must be lived in matter in such a fashion that it may rise to master at last.Ó14At one end, in the outermost direction of creation, we find dull, inert, passive matter which seems to be altogether devoid of consciousness; at the other end, we observe the; full-grown human being in whom consciousness achieves its highest manifestation. In the human level, for the first time, consciousness realises that it is distinct from and to a certain extent independent of matter, and the striving after complete independence of and freedom from the clutches of matter constitutes, in a sense, the whole course of Sādhana. In the mineral kingdom, consciousness is almost wholly enveloped by matter and seems to be entirely absent; in the vegetable kingdom, although there is a faint manifestation of consciousness, still

matter predominates and determines all conscious responses; in the animal world consciousness no doubt manifests itself in almost all the processes and activities, but it has not yet been able to discover that it has any superiority over matter. In man consciousness rises to selfconsciousness. Man alone in the whole gamut of creation can regard

13. Asato mā sad gamaya, tamaso mā jyotirgamaya, m tyor mām ta iii. gamaya. BLh. Up. I,

14.India: Her cult and Education, p. 52.

matter and its processes as his ideas and thus transcend the same. But even man works under a limitation; although he realises that matter is subordinate to spirit and that the spirit can conquer and control matter, still in actual experience he finds himself in most cases over- powered by matter and thus realises his subjection and finitude. In his helplessness he conceives of the Absolute spirit who not only keeps matter in entire subjugation but who is also its creator. The religious consciousness not only formulates the conception of the Absolute Spirit in whom matter is completely transcended, but also shows the affinity of the Absolute and the finite as spirit and prepares the way to their re-union. The element of matter that is still unreconciled in the finite human consciousness, and which very often thwarts him and makes him realise his finitude even in the presence of the idea of the Infinite, which he cherishes as an ideal to be realised by him in the future, necessitates the course of discipline or Sādhana which strengthens the finite consciousness step after step and gradually unfolds the infinitude that was all along latent in the same. Sādhanā becomes completed when no foreign element, no matter, no Ôother,Õ remains as an unresolved contradiction or opposition, and when the spirit has established its sovereignty not by opposing itself to matter, but by resolving matter completely unto itself. Sādhana thus unfolds the infinity of the finite spirit and gives the finite spirit the possession of sovereignty and makes it the de factoking which de juroit always is.

The ideal state of siddhi or consummation has been variously described from different points of view as perfect peace, balance, harmony, absolute fearlessness, freedom, liberation, etc., and the natural state, by contrast, is represented by such terms as disturbance, disharmony, discord, fearfulness, determination, bondage, etc. It is through Sādhanāthat we pass from dishar-mony to harmony, from multiplicity and variety to unity and oneness, and from a state of disturbance to a stage of perfect peace, and the whole course of Sādhanāprescribed by the different religious sects of the Hindus, although differing in forms and details, is always an embodiment of

the means and methods of attaining the stage of harmony and peace which is identical with freedom and liberation. The ideal of the Hindus is not, as some think misinter-preting the whole significance of their scriptures, total extinction or absorption or nothingness, but a stage of absolute peace, (śānti nirvā aparamām),15 infinite bliss (sukhamatyantikam),16 perfect harmony (nirdol lal samam),17 complete self-composure (sthirabuddhirasammū ha), 18and self-control, and absolute independence of the influence of everything forming the not-self (anta sukha, antarārama, etc).19The Salkarite Vedäntins, who are very often accused as being the prophets of the cult of total extinction, identify liberation (mokl la) with fearlessness (abhaya) and regard the conception of Jivanmuktias the central theme of their philosophy, and it is difficult to understand how they, of all persons, can be open to such a charge. Muktior the summum bonumis to them not a faroff ideal which may or may not be realised after death, but it is the state of perfect freedom and fearlessness which the Jīvanmukta realises here, on this earth, while holding this corporeal frame and moving and doing actions like ordinary human beings.20The more and more a human being reconciles disharmony and contradiction, nearer and nearer does he approach perfection, and mukti or liberation represents only the natural completion of the course of progress where perfect harmony is attained.

Great emphasis has been laid upon Ô harmonyÕ by almost all the important religious sects of the Hindus. The term ÔharmonyÕ is perhaps the nearest English equivalent of what the Hindus mean by Sattva. It is very djfficult to convey all the implications of the term by any single word in the English language. Sattvahas no doubt a pleasure-giving and a knowledge-giving aspect, but perhaps the aspect of harmony and balance is more prominent and may be regarded as more fundamental. Pleasure is undoubtedly connected with harmony, and the state of harmony is perhaps the best precondition of all revelation of truth. Acquisition of the sattva element (or rather of the preponderance of the same, as according to most of the Hindu systems, everything has elements of sattva, rajas and tamas) is regarded, by almost all the sects, as the conditio sine

15. BhagavadgītāVI, 15. 16. VI, 28. 17. V, 19. 18. V, 20. 19. V, 24. 20. Ihaiva brahmaiva san brahma apyeti na śarīrapātāduttarakālam. Śa karaÕs Commentary on the Blhad. Up.IV, iv, 6. Atha martyoOm to bhavatyatra brahma samaśnute Ka hopaniladII, vi, 14. See also BhagavadgītāVI, 19.

qua non of religious experience. The mind becomes fit for realisation,

becomes transparent (prasīdati), so to speak, when it is fixed in harmony (sattva).21The Bhagavadgīta tells us that Brahman is perfect harmony22, and also that to acquire yogais to acquire harmony.23The Chandogya Upanilad also tells us that constant meditation (dhruvā sm Iti) of the sacred texts leading to final emancipation can only come through the purification of thesattva.24 There are different grades and degrees of harmony marking different stages in the growth of the individual sādhaka. The state of consummation or siddhiwould indicate a stage of perfect harmony comprising within it bodily harmony, mental harmony and buddhic harmony.

The mind is ordinarily engaged in diverse things, and because of its functioning in various directions its energy becomes diffused. It is owing to this diffusion of energy that the mind fails to grasp truths clearly. According to the Vedänta, the ätmanor the self, in its essence, is all-knowing and is perfect prakāśa(revelation). This prakāśais eternal as it constitutes the very nature of the self that is eternal. The mind very often fails to grasp things clearly because ordinarily its powers are limited owing to the constant diffusion of its energy. When, however, mental energy is conserved through concentration, uncommon and wonderful powers are manifested by the mind. The highest development and purification of the intellect (Buddhi) seem to be the exact reflection of the Purula or the Self which is omniscient. But even the highest development of Buddhi is only a reflection of the Self, and not the Self as it is in itself.25 Buddhicrevelation is always dependent on some process, and

21. Sthita sattve prasīdati. 22. V, 19. 23. II, 48. 24. Chapter VII, XXVI. ÔSattvaśuddhiO here means the harmonious state of the mind. 25. According to the Sa khya, the Purula or the Self alone is conscious (cetana). Intellect (Buddhi) falls within PrakIti which is unconscious or jalla. The intellect (Buddhi) appears to be conscious and reveals things because of its proximity to the Purula. The knowledge that the intellect (Buddhi) has of the Purul Śalkara also says: la is only the knowledge of the reflection of the Purula.

Buddhistāvat svacchatvādānantaryāccātmacaitanyajyoti praticchāyā bhavati. Commentary on the BLh. Up. IV, iii, 7.

Buddhi is only an instrument or rather a mirror for the revelation of truths. The tmicrevelation alone is really free and independent, because it is revelation itself depending neither on any subject nor on any object. Buddhi becomes a fit instrument for revelation through concentration (dhyāna), and in the samādhior the sāk ātkārastate, the Buddhi merges into the Self which alone remains.

The Vedänta identifies the Absolute with the Self or ātman, and

regards the Self as the Highest Truth. If one can reach the deepest recess of oneOs self penetrating the different sheaths (koLas), one can know everything. Truth is not anything foreign to the self which comes from the outside, but it is something that lies eternally within and which the Buddhi does not really acquire, but only discovers or rather Ôre-learns,Õ in the language of Plato. We can never explain the problem of knowledge if we believe in a thoroughgoing Ôa- posteriorism.O Truth is not made, it is only discovered. It is an organic unity and not a mere aggregation of parts. The parts can never explain the whole which is always something more than the parts. The solving of an unsolved problem always involves an additional element which can never be explained by the conditions preceding the moment of the solution itself. The self is the whole that gives meaning to and is the source of all partial truths which emerge out of it.26The mind has only to concentrate its energies so that it may dive deep into the stream of consciousness and share the eternal flow, which is infinite as well as absolute. The Hindu has realised the eternal spring in the depths of his unerring, intuitive vision and has also discovered the means and the methods which can lead one to it.

The Self is not ordinarily realised by us because of its extreme fineness and minuteness.27 The Buddhi is to acquire microscopic vision (LIśyate tvagryayā buddhyā)28through repeated acts of concentration if it is to have an intuition of the Self. The whole aim of Hindu Sādhanāwith its innumerable details (which seem very often useless and unmeaning) is to graduallyeducate the mind

26. Cf. Plato: Othe real nature of education is at variance with the account given of it by certain professors, who pretend, I believe, to infuse into the mind a knowledge of which it was destitute, just as sight be instilled into blinded eyes.Ó

The Republic, Book VII. 27.Bhagavadgītā, XIII, 15. 28.Kal hopanillad, I, iii, 12.

towards concentration.29The rigid discipline enjoined by the Hindu Śāstras is not only immensely beneficial but absolutely necessary to the novice whose mind takes interest in everything that is presented to it and diffuses its energy over the same. The one peculiarity of Hindu Sādhanā that marks it off from most other religions is its emphasis upon minute and detailed regulation of life. It subjects to close scrutiny every action from the rising in the morning till the retirement in the evening and regards it as part of the religious discipline. It might certainly appear to be wholly unmeaning, if not altogether absurd, to many. But when we remember that Hinduism is anxious to provide a religion to suit people of all sorts of equipment from the very lowest up to the highest, we may realise the utility of many

disciplinary practices which, though useless to the advanced, are of considerable importance to the beginner. Hinduism does not enjoin the same discipline for all. It makes class-divisions according to the equipment and progress of the individual. This adhikārabhedavādaor doctrine of class-divisions in accordance with fitness has been the source of much misunderstanding. In order to appreciate the real teaching of the Hindu Scriptures, we must understand what adhikārabhedareally means. We all recognise that in education progress is possible only if lessons suited to the capacity and taste of the student are prescribed for him, and that progress is always retarded whenever the contrary happens. Religious discipline is, we have seen, nothing but the education of the spirit, and here also one can never ignore the differences in the capacities of different individuals. The spiritual guide (Guru) has always to discern the adhikāraor the stage of progress of the disciple before he can prescribe any course of discipline for him. The adhikārabhedavādais thus only a commonly accepted principle in all matters of education, and if the Hindu Religion has kept its eye open to such an important fact and has placed great emphasis on the same, it cannot be charged with lack of catholicity in that respect.

If Hinduism prescribes certain practices which are directly not of much religious value as compulsory for the novice sādhaka at a certain stage, it has also spoken in unmistakable terms of their futility to the adept.30Unless we view the teachings of the innumerable Hindu Sastras inculcating widely different doctrines and klmeÔpi 29. SthūleOpi niścalal ceto bhavet sūk meOpi niścalam. Kulār ava, IX, 4. 30.KulārLava Tantra, Ch. IX, 28 and 29: also Ch. II.

practices from a very comprehensive standpoint reconciling them all, we can never understand their real spirit. The key to unravel the real meaning of the Hindu Scriptures is to be found in the adhikārabhedavāda, and if we never forget that the different teachings are intended for people of widely divergent constitution and calibre and hence also that the difference does not signify any real contradiction, much of the difficulty that presents itself in the interpretation of the Sastras disappears. If the very same Scriptures tell us that Oit can be attained through the mind and mind alone,Ó and also that Òwords come back with the mind not being able to reach it,Ó the only reasonable interpretation that is possible of these texts is that they signify two different stages altogether, and not that the texts are worthless as presenting an unresolved contradiction. When the Sruti tells us that it can be attained through the mind alone, it is describing the mere beginning of the process, it is only showing

that the first steps in the way to the Absolute are through the mind and that also by the purified mind,31all physical instruments being altogether incompetent for the task. When, however, it is said that the mind cannot grasp it, it is describing the transcendental stage of attainment where the discursive mind, even though it is purified, fails.32Again, when the Scriptures tell us that the disciplinary practices are binding, and also that cessation from them is binding, and also that neither their performance nor their cessation is binding, we have to remember that these three teachings are for three distinct stages,Ñ the first for the neophyte, the second for the adept, and the third for the liberated (mukta).

31. SalkaraOs and AnandagiriOs reconciliation of the texts is to the effect that while the impure mind is incompetent, the purified mind is competent for the task.

Tadbrahmadarśane sādhanamucyate manasaiva paramārthaj-ānasa Iskltenā- cāryopadeśapūrvaka cānudra lavyam. Sa karaOs Commentary on BLh. Up. IV, iv, 19. Kevala mano bramāviLayīkurvadapi śrava lādisa Iskl Ita tadākāra AnandagiriOs Commentary on the same; 32. Phalavyāpyatvamevāsya jāyate.

śāstrakl Idbhirnirak Itam,

Brahma Jyaj-ānanāśāya v ttivyāpyatvami lyate. See SureśvaraOs Vārtikaand Sarvadarśanasa graha. This interpretation is not materially different from the orthodox

opinion on the point which regards the mind to be the instrument of the realisation of the mental process (vLtti) that arises from the great sayings (mahāvakya) and not of the realisation of Brahman itself.

The most striking feature of Hinduism is, as we have noticed, its elaborate discussion of details as to the means and methods of spiritual realisation. Most other religions concern themselves with the nature of the spiritual experience and give only broad hints as to the way of its realisation. The Hindus approached the subject in a truly scientific spirit, and with them Sādhana is a science of spiritual discipline. Experimental realisation is the method that is followed by them, and the utility of a practice or anuLhanahas always been tested by its practical demonstration.33Even with regard to the acquisition of theoretical truths, sometimes the method of experiment was followed. Indra, the king of the gods, had to undergo rigid discipline and perform penances (tapasyā) in order to realise the teachings of Prajapati. In the Chandogya Upanilad, we find Śvetaketu fasting for a fortnight in order to demonstrate the truth which his father Uddalaka was teaching him viz., that the mind was constituted of solid food (anna). When he found that abstinence from solid food had made him unable to remember anything, he realised for himself that the mind attained all its nutrition from solid food and was therefore constituted of the same.34

The Hindus have shown the whole course of spiritual discipline and have taken into account even the smallest thing that is of any help in the matter. Knowing full well that religion is a thing of the deepest consciousness, they still prescribed certain physical and physiological courses of training, because they never forgot that religious consciousness and all spiritual realisation were but the unfolding of the spirit embodied in the human form. The finite unfolds its latent infinitude gradually, but as it has assumed a body and is rather imprisoned by the same, its growth and development presuppose a similar development of the body also.35All-round development,Ndevelopment of the physical, mental, intellectual, moral and intuitional sides of life,Ñis necessary for genuine spiritual

33. KulārDava, Ch. II, 89. 34. Chapter VI, 7. 35. The Upani adic prayer Ôapyāyantu mamā gāni, O etc., indicates that purificatory development of the physical organs also is a necessary precondition to realisation. Cf.Also Manu: Ômahāyaj-aiśca yaj-aiśca brāhmīyal kriyate tanul. Cf.Plato: OWhile their bodies are growing up to manhood, special attention should be paid to them as a serviceable acquisition in the cause of philosophy.Ó The Republic, BookVI.

realisation, and therefore the Hindus have emphasised all of these aspects. They always prefer to follow the gradual course, the line of natureÕs own development and growth, rather than any artificial and abrupt method. The whole object of their Sādhana is to aid nature rather than to cripple or obstruct her by overstraining or by attempting to go against her. The body is an instrument for the expression of Sakti or Energy, and as such, the more perfect the instrument and the fitter the organism, the better will it express the Śaktiwhich is now hidden or latent in it. All Energy is NatureOs own, and the exercise and development of the instrument or the vehicle can only help to evolve or manifest(but not create) the latent energy. All acquisition and attainment presuppose proper equipment, and the first equipment for a thorough development as is involved in spiritual progress and realisation should be a healthy body, so perfectly attuned to the spiritual and physical laws that it is not ruffled by any passing breath of passions or lower emotions, so wellregulated and balanced, so well-controlled and disciplined that it will bear with perfect equanimity the buffets of lifeOs rude shocks which assail the body and the mind at every turn of life. The value of having a disciplined mind and body can never be over-estimated by a person who wants self- realisation;Ñthese are his priceless assets helping him in every situation of life.

In summing up the main points that have been discussed hitherto we find that a direct experience of the Divine, an immediate felt contact

with the Absolute, either in the aspect of Energy, or of Love, or of Bliss, or of Pure Consciousness (cit), or of pure Being (sat) is regarded as the goal of all spiritual discipline, and in this respect Hinduism is essentially a mystical religion. The experience of the individual sādhaka is here the criterion of the nature of spiritual progress attained.36Spiritual realisation is an affair between the individual and the Absolute, between whom nothing else intervenes. It is a Òflight of the Alone to the AloneÓ, as it is in Plotinus. Of course, it is never denied that the society reaps the fruits of the spiritual attainment of the individual, just as the individual also gains immensely from the attainment of fore-going sädhakas embodied in the general culture of the society to which he belongs. It is indeed a fact that Hinduism prescribes worship of gods and goddesses in which the whole community takes part, but it is to be noted that such

36.Cf.Hīnayana Buddhism and its Arhat ideal.

worship is not given a very high place so far as real spiritual progress is concerned. Sometimes, indeed, Sādhanā in groups or centres (Sa- ghas) has been recommended as very helpful,37but that is because it has been noticed that the efforts of a group of individuals working for a common purpose are likely to be producive of better results than the efforts of isolated individuals working singly. Here also we are not to lose sight of the fact that the individual attainment is the end, the individuals forming the group merely helping one another towards the attainment of the common end. The finite individual is somehow to be in conscious touch with the Infinite and thus to live not the isolated and limited. existence of bondage and imprisonment, but the free and unfettered life of mukti that is identical with perfect freedom. This partaking of the Infinite, this living in the Divine is what the Hindu means by religious experience, and this is his ultimate goal. This is what has been described as Brahmasadbhäva(residing or living in Brahman) or Brähmī sthitiand has been regarded as the highest thing in spiritual discipline.38

Hinduism does not stop like the mystic with merely describing the experience itself but is anxious also to find out the means for the attainment of the experience. Dhyāna(meditation) is the immediate precursor to spiritual experience or intuition. All mysteries are revealed through dhyāna, and Hinduism has concentrated on this dhyānaelement. The symbols that are taken recourse to are all helpful towards bringing about the dhyänastage. The image of the Deity or God-head, the geometrical figures representing the secret form (yantras), and the mantras(sacred words or letters) are all symbols that help dhyānaor meditation. These are claimed to be externalised or

materialised expression of the idea of the Divine, and, as such, they are supposed to elicit the same. Ritual worship and reciting the mantras (pūjā and japa) only help dhyānaby providing some concrete symbols which meditation may rest upon. The still more external physical and physiological disciplines are necessary in order that the body may be strictly under the control of the mind and may not offer any resistance when the mind wants to meditate. The acaras, Ñthe physical and physiological disciplines, regulation of

37. Bhagavadgītā, X, 9. 38. Uttamo brahmasadbhāvo dhyanabhāvastu madhyama StutirjapoOdhamo bhāvo bahi pūjādhamādhamā. Mahānirvāla TantraXIV, 122.

food and breath, etc., Ñonly fit the vehicle or the organism through which the experience is to be gained.

The marking of the stages in the course of Sadhana is tracing the history of the spiritual growth of man. Spiritual progress signifies the gradual unfolding of the element of divinity that is present to some extent in all human beings and the corresponding elimination or transformation of the animal side of their nature. The amount of progress is measured by the extent to which animality has been subordinated to or rather transformed into divinity. The ideal of spiritual progress or consummation (siddhi) refers to a state when the whole of oneOs nature becomes completely divinised. It ought to be clearly understood from the above that the Hindus mean by Liberation, a definite stage of progress in the life of the individual, something which is not acquired as an object different from himself, but is a state of the subject himself that is attained gradually through the development of his whole nature. The element of divinity is to be acquired by the spirit, little by little, through innumerable successive births until finally consummation is reached.39It is the animal element that undergoes change and transformation and is responsible for repeated births and deaths, and so when that element is completely eliminated, there remains no ground for further births and deaths, and immortality is attained.40

The growth of divinity presupposes the elimination of animality and thus Purification forms the essential preliminary to all Illumination. Great emphasis has been laid on this aspect of purification by all religious systems. Sādhanā really begins with purificatory discipline. The awakening of the higher self, the flashing of the divine spark in man, forms the initial step in the course of Sādhana. So long as the higher self is not recognised, the element of divinity not ÔawakenedÕ, as the mystics put it,41there can be no real desire and hankering for

spiritual progress. The higher self shows its contrast with the lower and establishes its superiority over the latter through its native glory. It reveals a spiritual nature that is inconsistent with the claims and realisation of the lower animal self and consequently demands a purification of the latter.

Purificatory discipline begins with regulated and methodical course of actions. The life of control (sa yamana) begins with the

39. Bhagavadgītā, VI, 45. 40.Ibid., XV, 5Đ6. 41. See The Essentials of Mysticismby Miss Underhill.

life of regulation (niyamana). The wayward, lower self, accustomed to submit to the demands of every impulse and passion, cannot be controlled and dominated by the higher self when the latter makes its first appearance as a mere foreigner having no authority. The higher self, at this stage, merely imposes method and regularity on the usual actions of the lower self and does not at once control them. Control, however, is gradually acquired through regulation; the lower self submits itself unconsciously, as it were, to the direction of the higher self. The higher self gains some amount of authority over the lower self when the life of control is established through regulated action. Fortitude or the power of endurance (titika) manifests itself at this stage as indicative of the authority gained by the higher self. Endurance has a physical as well as a mental side. The capacity for physical endurance is gained through difficult experiences in life, and unless this is acquired, even the best disciplined intellect fails in trying circumstances. But this bodily discipline is only a partial preparation for the virtue of fortitude (titikla), which involves more mental strength than bodily. Here the spirit or the self recognises its superiority and permanence over the transitory objects of nature and the fleeting states of pleasure that they give rise to. This mental strength is all that is implied by dhiratvameaning both patience and wisdom. When the changing vicissitudes of life do not affect and move the self and are recognised to be merely passing phases of the empirical conscious-ness, then the real superiority of the higher self is appreciated. Here we have to distinguish between these stages of titik aand dhiratva(fortitude and patience) on the one hand, and the stage of kāmakrodhavimuktiÑthe absence of all desires and passions, on the other. In the former, the capacity to resistthe force of impulse and desire is gained merely, but the desires and passions arise neverthe-less; in the latter, on the other hand, the desires and passions do not arise at all.42This last forms the highest stage in the life of control, when the lower self is so entirely subjugated and dominated

by the higher that it occasions no ripples in the stream of consciousness of the latter, and the control is perfectly spontaneous requiring no effort at all.

A higher stage is reached when the self feels its complete detachment from its lower nature and feels that it does nothing and directs none to do anything. If, in the former stage, it felt like the

42.Bhagavadgītā, Ch. V, 23 and 26.

master having the lower nature at its absolute command, now it feels completely detached and having no connection with anything else. Although the term ÔvaśiOÑis used in this connection,43emphasis is not on the ÔvaśitvaO or mastery over lower nature but on the feeling of detachment. The self feels that the lower nature is no part of itself, but that it is different from it, just as the owner is different from his house where he resides.

This isolation of the higher self and the corresponding elimination of the lower self lead to samadaranaor perception of the equality of all things. It is the lower nature that is responsible for all division and difference. The Pure Cit, the Pure Self which is allluminous or rather luminosity itself, is all-pervading and the same everywhere. It is kul lastha nityathat is free from all changes whatsoever, and not like the Sã khya Gu las, a pari āmi nitya, i.e., something whose identity can be discerned even amidst changes.44 So long as the connection with the lower nature is not perceived to be illusory, and the Pure Citor the Self is not recognised to be the truth, perception of inequalities and differences (vilamadarsana) remains. With the elimination, however, of the lower nature which is aupādhic(due to imposition), samadarśanaarises. Brahman or the Absolute Self is nirdol lal samamÑPerfect Synthesis or Harmony that is absolutely changeless and the same everywhere, and with the perception and attainment of this Highest Harmony, and with the steadiness of this attainment, ends the course of Sādhanā.

The course of this development has been viewed from various standpoints. It is a history as to how the higher self or the element of divinity gradually takes possession of and subdues the lower self until it is eliminated altogether; or how the dependence of the subject on the object is gradually lessened until finally the object merges entirely in the subject; or, again, how disharmony is lessened by and by until it disappears altogether; or how contradictions are more and more resolved into higher and higher syntheses until all are resolved in the Highest; or, again, how differences are gradually merged in the One,

unchanging, identi-cal Absolute. Sādhanā involves a struggle through which siddhi(consummation and success) is attained, and all struggle presupposes an alien element to be overcome. This resolving or overcoming of the alien element,

43.Bhagavadgītā, V, 13. 44.SālkaraÕs Bhālyaon the BrahmasūtrasI, i, 4. supposed or real, is common to all the conceptions, however they may differ otherwise in details and forms.

From another standpoint, Sādhana may be regarded as the attempt at bridging over the gulf between our surface consciousness and the vast expansive region of consciousness or citlying behind the superficial states of consciousness. Ordinarily the connection between the two regions seems to be lost and we are not aware of the experiences belonging to the deeper layer of consciousness. That there is another and a deeper level of consciousness behind the surface-consciousness seems to be abundantly proved by the phenomena of hypnosis, clairvoyance, thought-transference, etc. The theory of the sub- conscious and the modern emphasis on the problem by recent psychology have done much towards the understanding of the Hindu view of the Pure Cit, which however is not to be identified with sub- consciousness. The surface-consciousness is a bifurcated, or rather, a trifurcated manifestation of the divisionless cit, i.e., of the Absolute Spirit.45However strongly we may reject the compartment divisions of the Faculty Psychologists, we can hardly deny that the surface- consciousness reveals the predominance of or emphasis on one or other of the elements of thinking, feeling and willing in every mental state. Isolation and division, or rather, specialisation and distinction, characterise surface-consciousness which can therefore yield us only partial views of things. Hindu Sādhanā has for its goal a spiritual experience which is not a partial and one-sided realisation of the intellect, feeling or will, but which is the realisation by the entire individual through the whole dimension of his existence. Such an experience can be had only if one can dive into the serene and transparent lake of Infinite Consciousness or citunderlying the stream of surfaceconsciousness. This Bhuma Citis not infra-conscious or below the level of consciousness although it lies behind it as its sub-stratum. The surface-consciousness is a mere shadow, an outward expression, an imperfect image of, or a super-imposition (according to Śāl lkaraVedānta) on the Bhūmā Cit. The spiritual experience that apprehends

45. Ekamapi sva svabhāvamātmānam Grāhyagrāhakanānāvaicitrye āvabudhyate Paramārthasāra, verse 25. Also, dra Lā śrotā ghrātā ... ahameva racayāmi,

Ibid., verse 50

or realises this Bhūmā Citin its naked splendour can happen only when the divergent elements of surface-consciousness harmoniously blend into a synthetic whole and re-unite into the original bond out of which they seemed to emanate. As Tuckwell beautifully puts it,46 ÒIt is a sublime rational immediacy in which the elements of thought and feeling after having diverged and been distinguished in a reflective, self-conscious mind, meet and harmoniously blend once more.Ó

46.Religion and Reality, p. 311.

4

Different Forms of Sādhanā

Sādhanā begins with the consciousness of the existence of some Supreme Power, an intimate connection or rather a conscious union with which is deemed absolutely essential to the realisation of the summum bonum of life. This Supreme Power has sometimes been regarded as the Higher Self of man himself and not any foreign power with whom only an external connection could possibly be established. Sādhana, with the Hindus, thus means the conscious effort at unfolding the latent possibilities of the individual self and is hence limited to human beings alone. Below the human level, Nature is always developing and gradually maturing sub-consciously and unconsciously the hidden possibilities, and the whole process is at the sub-human level automatic. It is only in the human being that self- consciousness first arises, and the need for a fuller development is consciously felt. Here a new equipment, viz. a conscious effort apparently separate from the activities of nature, comes into being The spirit perceives vaguely its latent infinitude and realises gradually that its limitation and bondage are not inherent in its nature but are rather imposed on it, and wants somehow to shake them off and thus realise its full autonomy. Liberation or mukti is identical with freedom, and freedom is expansion. It is matter and contact with matter that have made the spirit appear limited. The deeper and deeper we dive into spirit, the more of expansion, freedom and light do we feel and enjoy, and Othe contrast is striking between the

55

melancholy meanness of matter and the magnificent generosity of spirit.Ó1The conscious urge of the finite to become more and more

expanded till it realises its infinitude is what is really meant by mumuk utva (desire for liberation) which forms the unmistakable first step in the course of Sādhanā.

I. Sādhanā may broadly be divided into two important phasesÑ(1) negative and (2) positive. These two sides are clearly marked in every important line of Sādhana. The negative side is commonly referred to as vairāgya (desirelessness), while the positive is designated abhyāsa (repeated practice).2The negative side represents the elimination of attachment to everything finite, while the positive aspect helps to bring out the element of infinitude in the vacuum created by the negative phase of Sadhana. The negative is thus logically prior to the positive aspect, but in reality the two aspects are intermingled and they help each other. The negative aspect is only preparatory and creates the proper field for the positive Sadhana. The value of the negative aspect consists in withdrawing the mind from things other than the object of interest, so that the positive aspect of concentrating the entire mind on the topic at hand may be fully serviceable. They are thus complementary aspects which together constitute the entire field of Sadhana. These two aspects are beautifully expressed in VyāsaOs Commentary on the Yoga Sūtras:3ÒThe stream of consciousness flows both waysÑ towards goodness as well as towards evil. That which is moving towards discrimination and leading to redemption is good, and the other which is indiscriminative and leading towards worldly affairs is evil. Through detachment the flow towards worldly concerns is checked, and through repeated attempts at discrimination, the flow towards spiritual progress is opened.Ó

In the J-ana-märga, the negative side is illustrated by such preparatory disciplines as nityānityavastuviveka (discrimination of the permanent and the transitory), ihāmutraphalabhogavirakti (indifference to pleasure of every kind either in this world or in the next), janmamtyujvarāvyādhidul Ikhado lānudar-śanam (constant perception of and reflection on the sorrows attending birth, death,

1. India: Her Cult and Education by P. Mukherjee, pp. 48Đ49. 2. Abhyāsavairāgyābhyāl tannirodha 1,12. Abhyāsena tu kaunteya vairāgyel P. Sūtras I, 12.

Bhagavadgītā, VI, 35. a ca g hyate

3. I, 12.

disease and old age). This negative attitude is perhaps summed up in what the Bhagavadgita describes broadly as aratirjanasa sadi4Ñ absence of pleasure in the company of worldly people. Nothing worldly and finite can yield pleasure to one who is in search after the Infinite.

The positive aspect is limited to śravala (hearing the sacred texts and understanding their meaning or arthānusandhāna), manana (reflection and ratiocination or tattvānusandhāna) and nididhyāsana (constant meditation on the conclusions established by ratiocination). This is summed up in what the Bhagavadgītā calls adhyātmaj- ānanityatvam5Nconstant living in things spiritual. If the negative phase of removing all obstacles is completely attained, śravala alone is competent for the acquisition of truth.6Great emphasis has been laid upon the negative aspect of Sādhana, not only by all the different sects of the Hindus, but by other religions of the world. This negative side is described as the stage of purgation which is the essential preliminary to all illumination.7The divine discontent, the unwillingness to be satisfied with the merely animal level of existence, is the first stage in the development of spiritual consciousness, and this, when earnest and real, cannot but lead to purgation or cittaśuddhi. The purification of the citta or mind is the one thing that is indispensable, and whatever differences might exist with regard to other points, all the different forms of Sädhana agree in holding that this is the basis of all true illumination.

In this connection it will not be out of place to mention that the real value of asceticism consists in providing a proper atmosphere in which the truly spiritual life can be lived, and that the disciplinary practices should always be regarded as merely a means to an end. Their Ònecessity isÓ, as Miss Underhill truly remarks, Òa purely practical question.O The detachment of the will and the senses is the essential thing, and if this can be attained without resort to physical expedients, these latter cannot only be eliminated, but persistence in them would be foolish, if not also absurd.

The Bhakti line of Sādhanā does not place much emphasis on this negative phase and regards vairāgya or desirelessness as not much helpful towards spiritual realisation.8By this we do not mean

4. Bhagavadgītā, XIII, 10. 5. XVII, 11. 6. Vākyāt tattvamatirbhavet. 7. See Mysticism by Underhill. 8.Bhāgavata Purā a XI, xx, 31.

that there are no preparatory disciplines in the Bhakti line of Sādhanā; these are not only many and multifarious, but they are here more obligatory than in other forms of Sadhana. All that we want to point out is that here the division into the positive and the negative phases cannot strictly be maintained. The negative line of Sādhanā does not necessarily precede the positive. Love of God is the one thing that is

essential, and indifference towards other things (vairāgya) is not to be sought separately. God and all that is GodOs are loved, and automatically everything other than God and the Divine ceases to be of any importance. T lātyāga (desirelessness) comes as a consequence of9 or rather pari passu with10 KIanillhaÑ(love of God). The Bhakti-märga points out that it is wrong psychology to try to drive out things from the mind and to make it a vacuum before filling it up with other things. If we fill up the mind with God, automatically other things disappear. This is the direct method of getting rid of worldly things and objects, and also of realising God.

In the Päta-jala-Yoga, we clearly find this division into the positive and the negative aspects. Pratyāhāra (withdrawing from things other than the object of meditation) forms the negative step, while dhāral ā (concentration), dhyāna (meditation) and samādhi (ecstasy) constitute the positive aspect. The negative precedes the positive and prepares the vacuum that is to be filled up by the positive. We find here a distinct methodological difference with the Bhakti-märga. The reciting of the name of God, the Bhakti school tells us, removes all obstacles. According to Pata-jali, on the other hand, obstacles are to be removed first, through yama, niyama, āsana, prā āyāma and pratyāhāra, and preparation is to be achieved before there can be dhāra ā and dhyāna. Although the Bhakti school sometimes tells us that the name of the Lord is to be recited being purified in mind and body and being free from all sins, still the purification itself, it is urged, is attained by the recitation of the name itself.

In the Tantras, we find bhūtasuddhi or purification of the gross, the subtle as well as of the causal bodies. This is purgation or purification of the sinful body and involves the removal of all sins

9. Vairāgyasya bhaktijanakatve eva do o na tu bhaktijanitatve. ViśvanāthaÕs Mādhuryakādambinī, p. 120. 10. Bhakti pareśānubhavo viraktiranyatra caila trika ekakāla Bhāgavata Purā a.

and taints, acquired and inherited. This is what prepares the vacuum that is next filled up by the Mat kā or the pure spiritual creative Energy, which is the mother of all feelings and ideas (bhāva), as alphabets are the mother of language (bha a). This corresponds to ÔCreation of the NewO of the Western Mystics.

II. We may adopt another principle of division which is closely connected with the previous one. Sadhana has an exoteric and an esoteric, a bahira-ga and an antara-ga aspect. The bahira- ga aspect is only preparatory and is rather remote from the spiritual experience while the antara-ga Sādhanā is very near to and closely intimate with

anubhava or experience. The antara-ga sādhanā of almost all schools is dhyāna. It is nididhyāsana with the Vedāntist; it is dhruvā sml ti or smara a (constant memory of God) with Rāmānuja; it is dhyāna and samadhi with Pata-jali; it is loving communion and blessed relationship with God, according to Śri Caitanya and his school; it is mantracaitanya (rousing or vivifying the thought-power underlying the mantras) according to the Tantras, where the mantra and the devatā (the sacred word and the deity) become one, and the individual (Jīva) participates in the life of the Absolute (Siva). The samādhi of Pata-jali corresponds to tne j-āna of the Vedāntist, the nirgulā sādhyā bhakti of the Vail Lava, and the pūjā (worship) and homa (oblation signifying self-surrender) of the Täntrika, and everywhere dhyāna or meditation on the Absolute or on the identity of the individual and the Absolute is regarded as the immediate means to the end. All other processes are merely helpful towards dhyāna. Thus, according to the Bhakti school, the vidhimärga enjoining the strict observance of the injunctions of the Sāstras and the performance of all duties enjoined in the Scriptures, is merely a stepping stone to the raga-marga or the spontaneous and loving worship of God, where smara a or dhyana becomes the chief, if not the only, Sādhanā. In the Vedānta also, vicāra has nididhyāsana as its end, and even the still more remote disciplines of discrimination, desirelessness, self-control, etc., also help to prepare the body and the mind for dhyāna. In the Pāta-jala-Yoga, yama and niyama (self- control), āsana (bodily posture) prā āyāma (regulation of breath), pratyāhāra and dhāra ā (withdrawal and concentration) are all remote processes leading up to dhyāna which directly yields samādhi. In the Tantras also, the real pūjā begins with the dhyāna of the identity of the Jīva and the Siva, and the other processes of āsana-śuddhi (purification of the seat), bhūtaśuddhi (purification of the different bodies) and māt kānyāsa (filling them up with centres of divine energy) etc., are all devices for creating a field where dhyāna becomes spontaneous and easy.

III. We may notice three important divisions from another standpoint. In the Vedas, we find the division into the Karma-kān a, the Upāsanā- kān a and the J-ana-kan a, corresponding respectively to the Salhitas, the Brahmalas and the Upanil lads, and since then, this tripartite division has somehow got hold of the minds of common people. The division of Sādhanā into Karma-mārga, Bhaktimārga and J-āna-mārga has been adopted generally, and we shall elaborately deal with these three later. The Bhagavadgītā openly speaks of two divisionsÑKarma and J-ana,11instead of three. Sometimes the Vedas also are said to have two important branches onlyÑKarma and J-āna. But this bipartite division does not in any way conflict with the

tripartite one we have already adopted. Bhakti or Upāsanā comes under Karma and is not always given a separate place. The ALLā- gayoga of Pata-jali, all the Vai Lava schools, the Tantrika and Pāśupata forms of Sādhanā, and the sacrificial forms of Sādhanā as prescribed in the Vedas would all come under Karma. Under J-āna, we have the Salkhya and the Vedanta forms of Sādhanā.

We can mark three distinct stages among the various forms of Sādhanā. The Vedic sacrifices form the first stage. The Gītā speaks of these as dravya-yaj-a (sacrifice of material things and objects). Here God is conceived of as the Almighty Power who is propitiated with the sacrifice of animals and material objects. Here great importance is attached to the details of the process and even the minutest omission is not condoned.

In the second stage, the stage of Upāsanā, mental sacrifice is added unto the material and we find that the sacrificial objects, the materials of worship, the flawlessness of the process itself, do not count so much as the feeling of reverence or worship. The bhäva or the bhakti (devotion) becomes the most important element in worship (Bhāvagrāhī janārdanal). God is no longer the Almighty Power that merely governs, but He is now sought as the Holiest of the Holies and as Perfect Love who is infinitely compassionate towards His children and who resides in the bosom of their hearts. Now the offering is love that establishes relationship between the

11. III, 3.

worshipper and the worshipped. This is bhajana or upāsanā, the essence of Bhakti-yoga. This is the basis of Sādhana advocated and elaborated in the Purala Literature. The hymns in praise of the Lord, the offerings of leaves and flowers, and of fruits and water, and the reciting of the name of the Lord, mingled with love and reverence,Ñ these form the items of worship in the Purala period.

In the last and the highest stage, we find vicāra and j-āna occupying the most prominent place. This is spoken of as j-āna-yaj- a in the Bhagavadgīta,12and is said to be superior to all other forms of worship. Here the externality of God is replaced by internality and philosophy becomes the highest form of religion, and the constant meditation of the Absolute with a view to its realisation becomes the chief element in the course of spiritual discipline. The Sā khya and the Vedänta, in common with Buddhism, recognise that philosophy is not merely the theoretical basis of religion, but that the highest form of religion is also identical with philosophy. The moral and other

preparatory religious disciplines only make the vehicle fit for the high intellectual development or philosophical abstraction that is essential to all revelation. This sublime philosophical discipline that is most adjacent to the realisation of the Absolute is identical with what is spoken of as aupani adic Sādhanā. The Absolute is identical with the atman or the Self, and meditation on the nature of the atman would reveal the Absolute. The Absolute is now recognised to be not merely consisting of feeling and love and intelligence, but is apprehended as transcending all these and hence to be reached by the ätman which also transcends intellect, feeling and love. God is not any foreign Power or even any Person other than our own selves, but He is our Higher Self. We have not to reach God and to attain Him as we attain things other than ourselves, but we have merely to unfold our own latent infinitude and gradually grow until we reach the highest expansion. Attainment of God thus cannot be had by propitiatory sacrifices or by any other form of worship, but it implies only a realisation of oneOs real nature, only an expansion or a sublimation of oneOs own self. It is thus not merely having something or seeing something, but it is essentially being something. This form of Sādhanā is peculiar to the Vedänta, and although we find similar thoughts in Plotinus and Spinoza, a methodical and full treatment of this ātmopāsanā or worshipping God as oneOs own self,

12. Śreyān dravyamāyādyaj-āj j-ānayaj-al parantapa. IV, 34.

is perhaps the monopoly of the highest achievement of the Hindus, I mean, of the Vedanta. Mukti or Liberation is identical with the highest stage of expansion (Brahma-bhāvaśca mok ah). Brahman literally signifies the most expanded state. According to the Vedānta, to know Brahman is to be Brahman, and this only means that Brahman is the highest expanded state of the Self, and, as such, it cannot be known as an object but can be reached or realised only by undergoing the required development and expansion. The J-änin or the liberated is not a Ôspiritual freak,O as sometimes a mystic is wrongly supposed to be, but the man or the super-man Owho has grown up to the full stature of humanity and united himself with that source of Life which is present everywhere.Ó

These three stages give us three different conceptions of God, viz. God as the Almighty Power, God as the Supreme Person with whom we can enter into relationship of love, and God as the Self. While primitive religions mostly belong to the first type, and the higher religions of other countries belong mostly to the second, Hinduism has elements of all of these three. It is no wonder, therefore, that some

foreigners not acquainted with the all-comprehensive spirit of Hindu culture, would find in Hinduism nothing but polytheism or animism of a crude sort, while others would find in the Bhagavadgītā, that priceless treasure of the Hindus, only a recapitulation of Christianity, while others, again, would be puzzled with a degrading non-moral, if not also immoral, pantheism and with the hopelessly contradictory statements throughout the Upanilads. The so-called theism of the West is only an integral element in Hinduism and can be found abundantly in the Pural las. The Bhakti form of Sadhana, either of the VailDava or of the Saiva Schools, is essentially theistic, and if the supra-theistic position advocated by the Upani ads and the Vedānta cannot be appreciated fully by the theists of the West, it is because of its constituent elements which evidently transcend theism. The three stages described above would correspond roughly to the (1) A- gāvabaddha, (2) Pratīka and (3) Aha graha forms of Upāsanā. The first is a many-sided form of worship involving a plurality of details. The course is not yet single-centred, and materials for progress and development are gathered from many sources. Just as the physical development has its many-sided activities, so also in the a-gāvabaddha form of worship, there are multifarious processes, all working for spiritual progress. But although here the sources are many and separate, it is to be remembered that all of them have the same end in view. In order that the whole system, the full organism may work, it is necessary that all the parts,Ñthe individual centres and organs, should be made fit through exerciseÑand this is perhaps done by a- gāvabaddha upāsanā. This is also the end of karma which prepares the vehicle, and which also is many-sided and various.

The second form of upāsanā, viz., pratīkopāsanā concentrates on one particular form. It regards one symbol as the representative of everything. Just as the brain is the centre of the organism, so also does the pratika symbolise the source of the universe, and the worship of the pratika symbolises the worship of everything. Here the source is found out and worship is concentrated on this source. Here we find the transition from the ÔmanyO to the Ôone.O No longer is there any need for the multifarious activities in different directions, but now all actions turn towards the centre, the Symbol or the Pratika. This Pratīka worship is the common characteristic of all forms of Bhakti upāsanā, viz., the Vai ava, the Śaiva and the Śākta. The pratīka symbolises the one all-engrossing object of adoration, worship and love. It is the creator, preserver and destroyer of the universe and is present always in everything. The emphasis here is on the object and it is pre-eminently an objective Sādhanā.

The third form is designated ahalgraha upāsanā which is subjective

par excellence. Here the object of worship is not different from the subject himself. The Self is not to worship any God different from itself, because there is nothing different from the Self.13The Self is infinite and absolute, and Sādhana helps merely to reveal its latent infinitude and absoluteness. If in pratīka- worship we have found the transition from the many to the one, we find in aha graha upāsanā, the transition from the one-in-many or the many-in-one to the One without any division, the transition from the dualism of subject and object to the oneness or identity between the two, viz., the Self and the Brahman. In the first form, the worshipper finds that ÔmanyÕ to be worshipped and worships them all; in the second, the ÔmanyO reduce themselves to the One and only the One Absolute is worshipped, but still the duality between the worshipper and the worshipped remains prominent; in the third, even this duality vanishes.

Upāsanā implies a close contact, an intimate relationship, a nearness and a proximity, or rather, an identity of levels, between the 13. Brahmasūtras IV, i, 4.

worshipper and the worshipped, and the ahal graha upāsanā, in identifying the two, leads us to a position which should be regarded as the highest stage of attainment that can be conceived. Even the least trace of duality that is thought to be essential to worship or to a relation of love by all the adherents of the Bhakti school (either in this land or in the West), is, theoretically at least, detrimental to the highest realisation. If it is a fact that the more we approximate the ideal, the better we can understand and love the same, it is only reasonable to argue that the very best love and attainment would imply a stage where there is not the least difference between the worshipper and the worshipped 1eaving any room for duality. This principle is adopted in the Tantras which declare that it is possible to worship Siva only after becoming Siva, though they do not advocate an absolute monism like Śa Ikara. The dhyāna of the deity to be worshipped precedes the worship itself, and in the process of dhyāna the sadhaka is to identify himse1f with the deity itse1f.

The three great forms of Sādhanā, J-ana, Yoga and Bhakti are not arbitrary divisions but based on important principles. Sādhanā may proceed by emphasising the subject or by emphasising the object. The object-factor is emphasised by the Bhakti schools, while the subject by the J-ana and Yoga schools. The Yoga-system, again, gives primacy to will, and the development of the subject is sought to be attained through the education of the will. It is the will that manifests the whole personality of man, and reason, being only a partial element in

his constitution, need not be separately trained. We find no important place ascribed to reason in the system propounded by Pata-jali, although it is regarded as a sub-division of the Sā khya, which is pre- eminently an intellectual system. The KāpilaSā khya and the Vedānta, both preaching J-ana-yoga ascribe the primacy to reason which alone can control the other elements, because the other elements are subordinate to reason. J-ana and Yoga are thus two sub-divisions of the subjective form of SādhanaÑone intellectualistic and the other voluntaristic, and they preach two distinctly opposite methods of attaining the end. In one sense, Sadhana is nothing but the establishment of harmony and balance in an apparently disharmonious and unbalanced state. This can be done in two different ways. We may control the 1ower centre by means of the higher, or we may seek to control the higher centre through the help of the lower. The first is attempted by J-ana and the second by Yoga. These two represent entirely different methods of procedure; some persons are not fitted for the one and some, not for the other. As Vaśi ha says, ÒO Räghava, there are two ways of destroying or controlling the mind (citta),Ñviz., Yoga and J-āna. Yoga is suppression of the mental states, while j-āna is right perception. Some are incapable of attaining yoga; others cannot have j-āna. It is because of this fact that the Lord Siva spoke of these two methods.14

These two, J-ana and Yoga or rather J-äna and Karma, are the high roads to the attainment of success. For men of higher attainments, j- ana or vicāra is efficacious. The Buddhi controls the mind, and the mind controls the sense-organs. This can happen to persons in whom reason is not only awakened but has also established its native supremacy over the subordinate elements,viz., impulses and instincts. This conquest of unreason by reason, of the body by the mind, of the mind by the Buddhi, of the lower by the higher, is real conquest, because it alone is permanent, inasmuch as it follows the real order of things. The other course, where the mind is sought to be controlled by the processes of the body, and where the Buddhi is sought to be fixed through mental processes of concentration and meditation, where the higher, in other words, is sought to be controlled by the lower, is at best an auxiliary process and may not be any-thing better than a temporary attainment. Yoga wants to control the mind primarily through physical and physiological processes. It is true that the mind is intimately connected with the body, and it is normally expected that the regulation of the physical and physiological processes would lead to a corresponding regulation of the mental processes. The Yoga system, the Täntrika method and the Bhakti-märga come under the second form of Sādhanā, viz., seeking to control the higher centre by

means of the lower. The utility of the physiological processes prescribed by these forms of discipline can be very well understood when we think that breath and rhythm and harmony of notes are things that can be caught hold of by almost all persons, while very few persons can get hold of reason by which they are to control mental processes. Herein lies the special achievement of the Hindus that they have a course

14. Dvau kramau cittanāśasya yogo j-āna-ca rāghava, Yoga v ttinirodho hi j-āna samyagavekLa am. Asādhya devo jagāda parama kasyacid yoga kasyacittattvaniścaya, Prakāśau dvau tato śivah.

Yoga-vasi ha.

ready for everybody who seeks spiritual progress; while they prescribe J-ana for the advanced, they prescribe Yoga and Karma for the beginners. 15

But it is to be noticed that the physiological processes prescribed by the Yoga system can only help to induce the corresponding mental states but cannot compel their emergence. The mind represents a higher category than the body and, as such, the mind cannot be controlled by the body. It is seen in actual practice also that the physiological processes that induce concentration on one occasion fail to produce it on other occasions. But such is not the case when the higher centre is at work and seeks to control the lower centres. The body, like a servant, obeys the mind, and whenever the meditative mood (dhyana) emerges, the body knows it and places all its resources under the absolute disposal of the mind for its every possible help. Man is under the control of the senseorgans and impulses so long as he does not realise the supremacy of his mind and reason, but once the superiority of reason is recognised and asserted, the impulses never fail to obey the same.

The greatest help can be derived when these two methods are combined. On the one hand, the higher reason may show us that the self has no real connection with the mind (manas) and the external object, and may thus cut at the very root of all attachment; on the other hand, the physical and physiological processes which are the concomitants of harmonious mental and Buddhic states, may be taken recourse to in the expectation that the very same mental and Buddhic processes would recur. This is the secret and the real utility of physiological processes included under Hindu Sādhanā. As these accompany certain mental processes, they may, when repeated, induce the very same mental processes. The Lange-James theory in modern Psychology also lends support to this view. The essence of

spiritual realisation is the consciousness of unity with the Divine, the perception of the Eternal and the Absolute in and through the individual, and any process or condition, whether physiological or mental, that helps to induce that meditative, serene and balanced state of the soul where such realisation becomes possible, has been regarded by the Hindu as of immense value for the sadhaka or the person who seeks spiritual advancement.

The Bhakti line of Sadhana lies intermediate between J-āna 15.Bhāgavata Purāla XI, xx, 7Đ9.

and Karma. It does not, like Karma, rely entirely upon the lower processes and seek to control the higher by the lower; nor, like J- āna, does it solely rest upon the transcendent functioning of reason. It seeks to elevate human consciousness through the divine emotion of love which subdues all lower passions and impulses. Love can perform all that higher reason can command, if not even more, and all this is done with ease and spontaneity. Bhakti combines law with love, vidhi (obligatory rites and processes) with rāga (spontaneous love), and thus it seeks help from the body and its processes also. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has rightly observed that Bhakti is closely allied to both Karma and J-ana, and that it removes all obstacles.16 As it combines both forms of Sadhana, viz., controlling the higher by the lower and also the lower by the higherÑit also achieves its end quickly.

16. Ubhayānugatā hi sā sarvavighnāpanodinī. Introduction to his commentary on the Bhagavadgītā.

5

A Historical Survey of the Different Forms of Sadhana

It is difficult to attempt a history and chronological survey of the different forms of Sadhana. The general difficulty of determining the dates of the earliest works of the Hindus pursues us here also. Moreover, all the different systems can be traced to the Vedas which are the earliest records of Hindu culture. It is believed that the J- anamārga has its source in the lg-Veda, the Bhakti in the AtharvaVeda, and that the Yoga has its origin in the Sama-Veda. The three divisions of the VedasNthe Sa hitas, the Brahma as and the UpanilladsÑare also regarded as teaching Karma, Upāsanā and J-āna respectively. The Vedas are regarded as eternal and uncreated, and are supposed to be revealed to Brahmā in the very beginning of creation. If the Vedas are the sources of the different forms of Sādhana, then,

according to the orthodox view, all these must have been present eternally. Again, God Siva Himself is represented to be the author of the Tantras which are now believed by scholars to belong to a much later age than that of the Upani ads. The Sage Vyasa is credited with the authorship of the Mahabharata and the Pura las, and also of the Bhagavadgīta and the Brahmasūtras. Now, in the face of these statements, it is difficult to reconcile any attempt at a chronological survey with the orthodox opinion of the Hindus.

68

But although definite and accurate evidence of historical priority and posteriority can hardly be found out, still it is possible to some extent to mark out periods when particular lines of Sādhanā came into special prominence. It seems hardly probable that at a particular age allmen adopted the Karma line of Sādhana, or that at another period all men could follow the Upanillador the J-anaform of Sādhana. The truth rather seems to be that the various forms of Sādhana had their adherents in almost all ages,Ñtheir differences merely suiting the capacities (adhikāra) of different men. By a particular period of Sādhanā, we mean, however, an age when that particular line of Sādhanā suited the needs and capacities of the majorityof men. The periods of rise and fall, of revival and decline, of the different forms of Sādhanā are also to be understood in this limited sense, and we may attempt a historical study of the various forms of Sādhanā, bearing this fact in mind.

The commonly accepted division is: (1) the Vedic, (2) the Pauralic and (3) thirdly, the Tantric methods of Sādhana. In the early period of the Vedic Age, Sādhana mainly consisted of sacrifices (yaj-a) and worshipping such gods as Agni(Fire), Sūrya (Sun) and Vāyu(Wind), etc. The inner significance and the mystery involved in the Vedic method of Sādhana are not now intelligible to us and, at present, we can only remotely guess its real implications, and that also, only with regard to a few of its items. Even in the Sal hita portion of the Lg-Veda, unmistakable anticipations of the transcendental monism of the Upanillads present themselves, and it is difficult to think that the Vedic mantras and sacrifices implied nothing more than a crude polytheism. One portion of the Sa hitas could not be teaching polytheism, while another was undoubtedly proclaiming absolute monism. The mystic symbolism of the KarmaKa a of the Vedas has become a sealed book to us and we have lost the key with which to unlock its mysteries. The attempt at a reconciliation of the apparent polytheism and monism of the Vedas by referring the different mantras to different historical periods does not seem to be well-

grounded. The real meaning of a great work cannot be appreciated if we shirk the responsibility of facing its apparently contradictory doctrines and try to reconcile them by referring them to different authors and different periods of history. The very same Upanilad, in the same chapter, and sometimes in the same verse, gives us contradictory statements.1These contradictions are not real, but are merely attempts at describing the Indescribable and are hints for transcending the lower categories of discursive thought. Sometimes, Brahman has been described as vital air (prala), sometimes as mind (manas), sometimes as gross body (anna), and sometimes as the Self. These are certainly intended for men of different equipments and attainments (adhikāra) and do not reveal any real contradiction.

In the later period of the Vedic Age, the Age of the Upanil ads, emphasis was laid on Knowledge (J-ana). The futility of the sacrifices and other Vedic rituals for the attainment of highest salvation was proclaimed, and intellectua-lism had its undisputed sway. Sādhanā, in this period, mainly consisted of philosophical reflection and highly abstract thinking as to the nature of the Self and ultimate Reality. The God of Religion became identified with the Absolute of Philosophy, and this Absolute, again, came to be interpreted in terms of the Self. Religion became purged of all dogmas and attained its highest development culminating and coinciding with the highest ideal of Philosophy. It was found out that the Self of the individual human being (Jīva) was really infinite and identical with the Absolute (Brahman), and that the possibility of all religion presupposed some such identity. The finite could never aspire to the realisation of the Infinite and a living communion with the same, had it been really finite and devoid of a latent infinitude. To reach the Infinite, one has to dive into the depths of oneOs own existence, and discover beneath the limitation and finitude of oneOs body, sense-organs, mind and intellect, the really illimitable Self that is eternally free. The realisation of the Absolute is not, in any sense, an object- consciousness, but only self-knowledge; and that, not as the subject, but as pure Citor unconditional revelation.

The most striking point in the Vedic period is that the conception of a Personal God, as found in Concrete Theism, is absent both in its earlier and later stages. The Vedic gods,ÑSun, Fire etc. do not seem to satisfy the requirements of the One God of religion, and are merely Powers worshipped for the attainment of

1. TejomayoOtejomaya kāmamayoÕkāmamaya krodhamayoÕkrodhamayo dharmamayoÕ- dharmamaya BOh. Up.IV, iv, 5. Dūrāt sudūre tadihāntike ca. Mul Daka Up.III, i, 7.

particular ends. Although the god Rūdra is mentioned in several hymns, he does not hold the same position as the Siva or Maheśvara of the Saivas and is not one of the trio,ÑBrahma, VilOu and Maheśvara. The mantras and the sacrifices and the rituals of worship are the unfailing means of pleasing the Vedic gods and deriving from them favour and advantage. There is hardly any conception of Grace or the descending of the Infinite into the level of the finite. The conception of God as Infinite, coming into relationship with the finite individual in order to satisfy his religious need, is absent in the earlier Vedic period. The Upanilads, representing the later Vedic period, preach abstract monism and identify the Absolute of philosophy with the God of religion. The aspect of a concrete God, entering into personal relations with individual human beings, does not seem to find any place in the purely monistic philosophy of the Upanilads.

Just as the polytheism and the elaborate details of the KarmaKaLa of the Vedas had led by way of reaction to the detailless and speechless intellectualism and abstract monism of the Upani ads, so also did the extreme intellectualism and highly abstract philosophy of the Upanilad Age set people in search of a more concrete principle that might appeal to their feelings as well as suit their average intellectual capacities. The Pura las fulfilled this want by supplying the conception of the Personal God and preaching the Bhakti cult. The triad,NBrahma, Vil lu and Siva, Ñappear prominently, for the first time, in the Pural las and, whenever each is referred to, He stands as the Supreme God, ruling the whole universe and the destinies of all beings. God is no longer conceived of as a limited Power or Powers, nor is He the transcendent Brahman or the intellectual Ideal of the Upani ads. He resides in the hearts of all beings and as antaryāminguides their destinies and courses of action. He is to be realised not by the philosophical argumentations of the intellect but through devotion (bhakti). He is not only Omniscient and All- powerful, but is also All-merciful. Out of infinite compassion for His creatures, He descends to the level of finite human beings and, taking their hands, raises them up to His Blessed Abode. As Omnipotent, Absolute and Full, He is in want of nothing and is not to be won over by means of sacrifices or gifts, worship or prayer, mantras or works. As All-merciful and the fulfiller of all wishes, however, He comes to satisfy the religious need of the individual whenever it is sincerely and eagerly felt. He is thus to be attained by devotion and devotion alone.

The Pural las abound in legends about the birth and deeds of God in His various concrete manifestations. Apparently, the legends are intended to attract the attention of ordinary people and to preach to them a store of religious knowledge in the garb of ordinary stories.

Very often the legends signify deep spiritual truths which become revealed through ceaseless meditation on the inner meanings of the symbols embodied in the legends. The myths are not the creations of unbridled imagination conceived in the childhood of the race, but represent Ogenuine spiritual experiences obtained and always obtainable by special methods and capable of special experimental demonstration.Ó2The symbolism of the romance of gods and goddesses, embodied in the Purallas, is intended to attract people by their apparently charming and simple contents. It is impossible to believe that the race that had produced the sublime philosophy of the Upani ads could be indulging in fairy tales and vain mythology in the period immediately following. The Purā las were intended to popularise the monistic teaching of the Upani ads by means of the doctrine of the Personal God, on the one hand, and the presentation of the highly abstract spiritual truths through concrete stories, on the other. By offering the spiritual truths in the shape of attractive tales, the Pura las attempted to get hold of the attention of the common mass of people through the direct method of teaching. The rigid asceticism of the Vedic Period and the high ideal of renunciation of the Upani ad Age could no longer tempt people to the spiritual cause, and so, the commands of the Vedas and the abstract philosophy of the Upanilads had no influence whatsoever on the majority of men. The Puralas taught, not like a master enforcing punishment for violations, but like a friend advancing good counsels on the merits of the cause. The age of the Pura as unmistakably reveals an age of reaction and an age of decline, where we notice a transition from transcendental monism to concrete theism, from sublime philosophy to garbed mythology, from the life of pure reason to the life of flowing emotions, from high philosophising to ritualistic worship.

The Tantric method of Sadhana came into prominence perhaps later than the Purā las, although some of the Tantras might be earlier than most of the Pural as, and the philosophy of the Tantras served

2.India: Her Cult and Education by P. Mukherjee.

as the basis of the Bhakti form of Sadhana inculcated by the Pura las There is so much similarity between the Paural lic and Tantric teaching that it seems unjustifiable to regard them as two distinct forms of Sadhana. The union of Siva and Sakti (God and Goddess) of the Tantras corresponds to the union of Lakl Imī and Nārāya la in the Pa-carātra and the Vai ava Purālas. Māyā-śakti, niyatiand kālacorrespond to the six ka-cukas(limiting forces) mentioned in the Śaiva systems. The eternal connection between Sabdaand Artha, and the regarding of Sabda-Brahman and ParaBrahman as two aspects of

the Supreme Lord, emphasised by the Tantras, find expression in the Puralas3and the Bhakti texts as the doctrine of the identity of the nāma(name) and the nāmin(the God bearing the name). The nime laand unme acorrespond to anugraha and nigraha. The soul is debarred from realising its natural perfection owing to the malas(fetters) of (1) atomicity (a utva), (2) impotence (ki-citkaratva) and (3) ignorance (aj-ānatva), just as owing to the ka-cukas, in the Śaiva system, the soul appears to be limited.4In fact, the Tantras and the Pural as preach almost the same philosophy as well as the the same method of realisation. Both emphasise the importance of worship and rituals and maintain that a difference exists normally between the individual (Jiva) and the Absolute (Siva). But it is to be noticed that there is an important point of difference. While the Tantras have retained much of the absolute monism of the Upani ads by holding that the ultimate goal of the Jīva (individual) is to be united with Siva (Absolute),5the Puralas, and the Bhakti cult based on the same, have tended towards dualism and have preached an ultimate difference between God and the individual. It is to be remembered, however, that the earliest works on the Bhakti cult, viz.the Pa-carātra Sa hitas, and some of the Tantras, do exhibit clearly the Advaitic influence and show that the sharp antagonism between J-äna and Bhakti Schools is of a much later origin. In the Padmā Tantra, for example, Brahmā puts the question OWhat is the difference, O Highest Spirit, between Thee and the liberated soul? Ó,Ñto which the Lord answers ÒThey (the

3. Bhart harialso establishes the essential connection of Sabda and Artha; Vākyapadīya, Ch. I. 4. See Paramārthasāra, verse 17. 5. Cidātmasattve bhedānupapatte KlemarajaOsCommentary on Sivasūtravimarsinī, p. 6 Ciddharma sarvadehelu viselo nasti kutracit. Vij-ānabhairava.

liberated) become I; there is no difference whatsoever.Ó If we leave aside the doctrine of Mäya which later came to be regarded as the distinguishing feature of Advaitism, we can meet with many such advaiticpassages in the Pa-carātra Sa hitās. 6

The Tartras seem to have arisen out of the Atharva-Veda,7and they occupy themselves with various topics connected with magic or Black Art which have hardly any connection with spiritual culture and development. The same emphasis on the efficacy of mantras is observed in the Tantras as in the Atharva-Veda. The Täntric method of Sādhanā combines elements of yoga, worship, prayer and meditation on the identity of the individual and the Absolute, and thus shows evident signs of eclecticism. The way in which the element of yogais

incorporated in the Tantric form of Sādhana, and emphasised in some of the later Pura as, leaves no doubt as to the prevalence of the Yoga method of Sadhana prior to the Tantric and the Pauralic ages. The wide influence which the Yoga form of Sadhana exerted on the other forms can be traced throughout the history of Hindu Sadhana. The Tantras accepted the monistic philosophy of the Upani ads, appreciated the value of worship and prayer along with the Bhakti schools and, like the Yoga system, laid great emphasis on the intimate relation between the body and the mind and also on the discovery and culture of the most important bodily centres and processes connected with the mind. The special emphasis which the Tantras lay on the Sulumna nallīand the six Centres (L l-Cakra) show not only the importance that has been ascribed by them to the Yoga method but also the nature of the development that the Yoga method had derived from them.

The Tantras preached an easy and short method of spiritual achievement, and sought to provide persons of all grades of equipment with suitable courses of discipline. The Täntric method of Sādhanā was of a highly mystical type, and much of it was expressed through dark symbols, the key to which rested only with the initiated. The Tantra is really an occult science and, like all occultism throughout the world, veiled its teachings under the garb of cryptic words and symbols. People, uninitiated in the mysteries of deep spiritual significance embodied in the symbols, very often misinterpreted these latter and engaged themselves in dark and

6. Introduction to Ahir. Salhitāby Dr. Schrader. 7. The Śukranītisāraexplicitly states that the Tantras are derived from and are a continuation of the discipline of the Atharva-Veda. Ch. IV, Sec. iv.

obscene and definitely immoral practices with the false idea of following the genuine Tantric methods.

With the appearance of Buddhism we find a new epoch in the history of Indian thought and civilization. The preachings of Buddha indicate a definite reaction against ceremonialism and superstition in religion, uncritical dogmatising in philosophy, and unholy and immoral practices in life. It was the mission of Buddha to show that religion was a thing of the deepest consciousness of the individual and had very little to do with the rituals and cruel and unholy practices with which it was not only sought to be associated, but which were regarded by the mass of people to constitute the very essence, if not the whole, of religion. Buddhism was an attempt to purge religion of its inessential associates which very often hinder true religion rather than reveal and develop the same, and to found it on the secure basis

of morality, on the one hand, and to deliver it from the clutches of lifeless and abstract metaphysics, on the other. In Buddhism we thus find the very same lofty ideal of the Upanilads, the supremely transcendent nirvā aÑthe absolutely free and unresisted experience that is altogether sufferingless, but not the doubtful dogmas of religion and the dogmatic tenets of speculative philosophy. The influence of Buddhism on later religious doctrines and philosophical systems can hardly be overestimated. It is very much doubtful whether India could now boast of the lofty idealism of Sal kara and the absolutely dogmaless religion of the Vedänta as her high water-mark in the sphere of philosophy and religion but for the purifying and critical influence of Buddhism all over the country. The significance of the distinguishing characteristics of Pre-Budhistic Hindu thought and culture and the Post-Budhistic forms of thinking and discipline cannot be fully comprehended if we fail to attach due importance to the contributions of Buddhism. Hinduism has been able to maintain its own so long because of its wonderful powers of assimilating new forms of thought and culture to itself. When Buddhism developed into mahāyānism, it was gradually absorbed into the ātmavādaof the Upani ads, and Sal kara and Gau lapāda incorporated the important elements of Buddhism in that form into their philosophy.8

8. The decline of Buddhism may also be traced to the degrading and revolting doctrines and practices of the vajrayana. The evidence of the depths of immorality to which Buddhism was degraded in the mediaeval age is to be found in the two works of the vajrayanaschool published in the GaekadOs Oriental Series, (1) Praj-opāyaviniścayasiddhiof Ana-gavajra and (2) J-ānasiddhiof Indrabhūti.

Śal Ikara emphasised that the possibility of all religious and philosophical attainment depended on the recognition of the fundamental identity of the Absolute and the individual. If the individual is ultimately finite, there is no chance of his ever reaching the Infinite and the Absolute. Philosophy as well as Religion aims at the attainment of the Absolute, and ex hypothesisuch attainment must be denied to the individual human being, if he is after all finite. Śal kara, therefore, maintained that the individual (Jīva) was not really finite but was at bottom identical with the Absolute, and that all finitude was illusory. Emancipation from bondage does not depend on any process or action, but results from or, strictly speaking, is realised by the knowledge that the individual is really identical with the Absolute. There is no bridge from bondage to freedom and the soul does not really attainfreedom, but the fact is that the soul that is eternally free merely recognises its freedom.

The true significance of the transcendental idealism and the superior logic of Salkara could not be comprehended by the ordinary mass of

people, and the misunderstanding was the source of many abuses in social and religious practices. The doctrine of the identity of the individual and the Absolute produced in the minds of common people the impression of the futility of all religious and moral obligations, and a very low standard of morality prevailed in the centuries following the age of Sa kara. The numerous Buddhist Tantras display a standard of morality that cannot but be regarded as a great fall from the lofty ideal of the Buddha and Sa lkara. Ignorance of the hidden meaning of the secret symbols of Tantrism as well as of the true significance of the sublime idealism of ŚalkaraÕs philosophy, was to a very great extent responsible for the heinous and obscene practices and the low standard of morality prevailing in the society when Śrī Caitanya appeared as the great religious reformer. Before his advent, Rāmānuja helped, to a great extent, to remove from Southern India some of the defects in religious practices, arising from the misunderstanding of SalkaraÕs philosophy, by preaching the doctrine of qualified Monism in opposition to the Absolute Monism of Salkara. In Bengal, the home of Tantrism, however, RāmanujaOs philosophy could wield no great influence, and the abuses of Tantrism continued unabated. It was Śrī Caitanya who, by his character, practices and philosophy, exerted an influence in Bengal that could be likened to the influence of the Buddha in his time all over India, and helped to eradicate most of the evils then existing. All the four important Vai lava Schools founded by Madhva, Nimbarka, Vallabha and Ramanuja, show marks of strong reaction against the absolute monism preached by Sa kara on the theoretical or the philosophical side, and against the evil and definitely immoral practices, falsely supposed to be enjoined or at least allowed by the Tantras, on the practical side. All of these Vail ava sects attempted to revive the old Pauralic method of Sadhana and fought hard against the Tantric methods of worship. Great emphasis was laid by them on śuddhācāraand śuddhāhāra,9 purity of practices and purity of food, in both of which fields, the false interpretation of Täntrism had been responsible for most serious abuses. The doctrine of the identity of the individual and the Absolute, which was regarded as the root cause of all those abuses, was also most vehemently opposed, and each of those Vail lava sects declared with all the force at its command that the individual could never be identical with the Absolute and that it was blasphemy even to think of that. Śri Caitanya, who founded a very important Vai ava sect in Bengal, also preached that the individual was at all stages the servant of the Lord, and to serve God was his mission. As Paurā ism could be best understood as a reaction against the high intellectualism of the Upanilads, on the one hand, and the Karma doctrine of the Vedas, on the other, so also the revival of

Paurā lism in the Vai lava schools, which might be styled Neo- Paurā ism, might be explained as a reaction against the Absolute Monism of Sa kara, on the one hand, and against the Tantra practices, on the other. Vail lavism has not yet lost its influence and it is undoubtedly the fact that it is one of the most, Ñif not themost,Ñpowerful influences that are shaping the religious destinies of India to-day. But it is also to be admitted that Täntrism had already become too powerful in some parts of the country to be eliminated altogether by any subsequent religious movement, and Vai Lavism had to incorporate many Tantric elements before it could make any appeal to the people. To-day, we find Paura ic and Tāntric elements combined in our daily worship;Ñin our morning and evening prayers we recite Vedic as well as Täntric hymns; in the process of initiation (dīkla), the Vedic as well as the Tantric forms are

9. Āhāraśuddhau sattvaśuddhi , sattvaśuddhau dhruvā sm til Rāmānuja takes āhāraśuddhiliterally while Sa kara interprets it in a more comprehensive sense to include all that is gathered by the senses from the outside. RāmānujaOs emphasis produced an efficacious discipline.

combined. We thus find that Tantrism has somehow saturated almost every sphere of our spiritual discipline. Whether one is a Sannyāsin or a householder, a Vedāntist or a Vai lava, a Śākta or a Śaiva, now-a- days, he combines the Vedic, the Paurā lic, and the Tantrika methods of Sādhanā. The Vīja mantrawith which the Sādhaka is initiated is supplied in almost all cases by the Tantras; the Upāsanā or worship of the Deity is mostly in accordance with the Pural las; and, in theory, the Upani ad philosophy or the philosophy of the Gīta, the epitome of the teachings of the Vedas, is generally accepted.

Part II Special Forms of Sādhanā

6

Karma-Mārga or the Path of Action

The earliest form of Sadhana advocated by the Vedas is Karma. The Karma-Mīmā sā Philosophy also is perhaps the earliest of the six Darśanas preserved to us.1The term ÔKarmaÕ was very often used in the Vedas in a limited sense to denote sacrifice. In the broad sense, it includes all actions, physical and psychical, although there is a tendency to limit karmato actions performed by the body only. Such mental processes as meditation and reflection (dhyāna and vicāra) are generally excluded from the province of Karma by the Vedāntists; for

example, when they recommend abstention from all karmas in the vividi lā sannyāsastage, they do not yet prescribe abstention from dhyānaand vicāra.

All the schools of Sadhana agree in holding that the realisation of the highest end (siddhi) is impossible unless one is purified in mind and body, and that this purification can come through karma alone. The impurities that have somehow crept into the human system can only be removed through constant action and exercise of the organs and faculties. Sa kara rightly maintains that śuddhi or purification is impossible without action or movement.2The indispensableness of karma for the attainment of purification has been emphasised by all the schools of religious thought.3

1. KeithÑThe Karma-Mīmālsā, p. 5. 2. Na hi acalato śuddhirastiÑBha ya on Ch. Upanillad. 81

But although there is common agreement as to the purificatory function of karma, there is yet a great deal of controversy with regard to the utility of karma in the later stages of the course of spiritual discipline. The Vedänta, for example, thinks that karma remains far behind and cannot help us in climbing the highest steps of the ladder of spiritual realisation. Vcaspati argues that karma is useful in the attainment of self-realisation or liberation only indirectly through the generation of the desire to know (vividila). The desire for knowledge goads one to listen and ratiocinate with concentrated attention, and then comes the non-discursive apprehension or intuition resulting from the great text, OThat art Thou.Ó Karma has no scope in the matter of determining the implication of the text, OThat art Thou,Ó whereby it might be supposed to have any utility either for meditation or of its result, intuition. It is to be understood hereby that the question of the adequacy of karma for the purpose of liberation (apavarga) is to be alotgether thrown out of court.4Karma is not only not helpful but sometimes positively distracting and injurious in the higher stages of development. The Pūrva-Mīma sa, on the other hand, maintains that knowledge (j-ana) alone can never yield liberation, but must be joined with karma for attaining the same. OThat the fruits of karma will expire merely from knowledge is not at all a reasonable doctrine.Ó5Where it is said that the fire of knowledge destroys all karmas, it is only the manifested stage (sthūlāvasthā) of karma that is referred to as destroyed and not their latent stage also. Even j-āna

3. Tathā hi āśramavihitanityakarmānu hānāddharmasamutpādastata BhāmatīlII, iv, 26. Tāvat karmālli kurvīta na nirvidyeta yāvatā. pāpmā vilīyate.

Bhāgavata Purāla XI, xx, 7. 4. Vividilul khalu yukta ekāgratayā śrava amanane kartumutsahate, tatoOsya tattvamasīti vākyānnirvicikitsaj-ānamutpadyate. Na ca

nirvicikitsal tattvamasīti vakyarthamavadharayata karma yadhikāroÕsti yena bhāvanāyāl vā bhāvanākārye vā sāksātkāre karma lāmupayogal Etena vIttirūpasāk ātkārakāryeOpavarge karma āmupayogo dūrannirasto veditavyaL.

BhamatīlII, iv, 27. 5. Karmak ayo hi vij-anadityetaccapramal lavat, Phalasyālpasya vā dānal rājaputrāparādhavat. Ślokavārtika, SambandhākLepaparihāraVerse 96.

(knowledge) is not able to change the character or the real nature of things (vastusvabhäva). By the destruction of things is meant their assuming the latent or rather the potential stage (śaktyavasthā) as distinguished from the manifested stage, and even when j-āna (knowledge) is supposed to destroy karma, it can only destroy the manifested stage of karma and not its potential stage, because no other form of destruction is anywhere possible.6Hence karma cannot be uprooted totally by means of knowledge (j-ana), because the potential stage (śaktyavasthā) of karma is not opposed to it (j-āna) and, as such, may remain simultaneously with it. It cannot be maintained that as karma results from ignorance (aj-āna), it can never remain simultaneously with knowledge (j-äna) which is opposed to it, because knowledge can only prevent the performance (anu hāna) of karma but cannot uproot its potentiality. Therefore, knowledge cannot be the cause of liberation,7inasmuch as karma is not totally extinguished through j-āna(knowledge). Kumārila argues, further, that if ignorance is the cause of the generation of karma, then with the removal of ignorance, all that can follow is the want of further production of karma, and not the want of the fruits (the result) of karma, viz. bondage.8Had bondage been due to karma, it could have been removed with the cessation of karma, but as bondage is due not to the actual performance of karma, but to the mere fitness for karmas (yogyatāmātranibandhana), it cannot be

6. Na hi j-anamapi vastusvabhāvānyathākara akLamam aya ca vastūnā vināśo yacchaktyātmanāvasthānam na hi anyād śo vināśa kvacidapi sambhavati, sa katha_ j- ānena kriyate j-ānāgni sarvakarmāli bhas-masāt kurute tatheti vacana tu sthūlakarmavināśābhiprāyamiti.

Nyāyaratnākaraon Verse 96. 7. Tacchaktyapratiyogitvānna j-āna mok akāraLam,

Karmaśaktyā na hi j-āna virodhamupagacchati. Ślokavārtika, Sambandh, Śloka 94. If it be supposed that: Karma āmapyaj-ānameva nidānam, ato nil panne j-āne karmanirodhānmokLa siddhatyeva. The answer is, No, Yadyapi ni panne j-ane na karmānu īyeta tathapi saktyavasthānāl karma j- ānenānirākara ādbandha syādeveti: Nyāyaratnākaraon Śloka 95. 8. Utpattau karmalā ce lamaj-āna kāra lal yadi, Tannāśāt syādanutpattiste ā na phalavarjanam. Ślokavārtika, Sambandh,Verse 101.

removed with knowledge, because although the actual performance

ceases, the fitness remains even after j-āna is attained.9

Knowledge of the Soul or atmancan only prevent further accumulation of karma, but the karmas already performed can expire only when their fruits (suffering or enjoyment) have been reaped. There is, then, no further birth of the body, because no karma is left for reaping the fruits whereof the body should come into existence. Therefore, one who is desirous of attaining liberation should refrain from all prohibited (niliddha) and fruitful (kāmya) karmas, and should perform only compulsory (nitya) and occasional (naimittika) rites in order to avoid sin.10These compulsory and occasional rites (nitya and naimittika karma) are generative of such fruits as life in heaven etc., only when these latter are desired, but when these are performed without any desire for such fruits, no fruit accrues, and, therefore, these do not produce bondage through further accumulation of fruits. The person who has attained knowledge of the self (atma-j-ana) becomes free from all desire relating to the not-self including the body and the whole universe, and hence he is the person who attains liberation through performance of nityaand naimittikakarmas. Thus, according to Kumārila, knowledge is only an auxiliary to karma so far as it makes the performance of nityaand naimittika karmas possible without desire for their fruits, viz. life in heaven etc., otherwise, the performance of nityaand naimittika karmas on the one hand, and the non-performance of kāmya(actions performed for some definite end) and niliddha(prohibited) karma, on the other, and the reaping of the fruits of the previous karmas, extinguish all karma and thus produce liberation. The bondage that is due to karma ceases with the total extinction of all karma. The auxiliary character of j-ānais held by all the thinkers of the PūrvaMīmā Isā school, although the order given by Kumārila is sometimes changed and it is held that knowledge destroys the accumulated results of karma, while the performance of nityaand naimittikarites prevents further accumulation.11

9. Karmanimitto hi bandha karmaniv ttau naśyet, yogyatāmātranibandhanastu bandha tasya vij-āne satyapi yogyatvānapāyāt na nivartteteti.

Nyāyaratnākaraon Verse 101. 10. Mokl na prav Nityanaimittike kuryāt pratyavāyajihāsayā. ārthī na pravartteta tatra kāmyaniliddhayol,

Sambandhāk epaparihāra, Śloka, 110. 11. Cf. Bhāl lacintāma i, p. 57 (Benares Edition).

It is to be noticed that, according to the Mīmā sā view, liberation (mokla) implies the cessation of bondage and hence also the cessation of karma and of the body that is the result of karma. It is the relatedness or relation to the body that is signified by bondage, and hence in liberation or want of bondage, it is the want or negation of this body-relation that is implied. Liberation happens when the body

that has arisen is destroyed, and there is no further birth of a fresh body. According to Kumārila, liberation can be supposed to be imperishable only if what is producedin liberation is of a negative character (i.e.is of the nature of negation or abhāva), everything positive that results from causes being perishable. What is produced as the result of the effort of the individual is merely the destruction or cessation of misery and of the karma and the body responsible for misery.12This destruction or cessation of the body, although resulting from causes, is still imperishable, because destruction cannot be again destroyed; otherwise, it would imply non-destruction of the destroyed thing. The cessation of misery (dul lkhaniv_tti) is to be supposed as of the nature of a negation or non-existence that is produced (janyābhāva or dhva sābhāva), and not of the nature of absolute non- existence (atyantābhāva); because, otherwise, the effort of the individual needed for the attainment of liberation would be meaningless. The Eternal Bliss that is manifested and experienced in the state of liberation is not anything that is produced or generated; it belongs to the atman as its very nature or essence. Hence there is no inconsistency in supposing it to be eternal (nitya) although it is positive (bhāvatmaka), because it does not result from causes.

Prabhākara also agrees with Kumārila in asserting that mok a implies the cessation of the body and of the karma responsible for it. He defines mok aas the absolute extinction of the body due to the total exhaustion of all merit and demerit.13

This emphasis on karma as the essential and important factor in

12. Śarirasambandho bandhal, tadabhāvo mok a tena nil pannānā dehānā va pradhval sābhāva yaścānutpannānāl prāgabhāva sa mok la karmanimittaśca bandha karmak ayādeva na bhavatīti.

Nyāyaratnākara on SambandhŚloka 106. Na hyabhāvātmaka muktvā mokLanityatvakāra lam, Na ca kriyāyā kasyāścidabhāva phalami_yate.

SambandhākDepaparihāra,Śloka, 107. 13. Ātyantikastu dehocchedo ni se adharmadharmaparik ayanibandhano mokLa Prakaral lapa-cikā, Tattvāloka, p. 156.

the attainment of liberation marks the essential characteristic of the path of Action or the Karma-marga. While the Mīma sa lays stress on the compulsory and occasional duties, Vedic sacrifices etc., the Gītā lays emphasis on desireless actions in every sphere of life and deals with the term ÔkarmaO in its widest sense. The Vedic sacrifices now appear to present-day thinkers to be mostly meaningless and superstitious practices of the uncivilised which can have hardly any intimate connection with religion in the highest sense of the term. But

we have to remember that the Vedas contain mostly very brief symbols of religious practices which signify much more than they superficially appear to mean. It is impossible to understand the proper significance of mystic symbols unless we can have in our possession the appropriate keys to unlock them. In some of the most important Upani ads, in the BIhadara lyakaand the Chandogya, for example, the Vedic sacrifices and practices have been shown to be so intimately related with the highest philosophical knowledge14that it would be arrogant dogmatism to deny any deeper significance underlying the seemingly irreligious and unmeaning practices. The words used are very often metaphorical, and the ceremonies performed are mostly symbolical representations of highly abstract truths. But it would be dogmatism in the opposite direction to try to impose our own meanings on them when we have lost the proper methods of interpreting them. We should remain silent as to their proper significance so long as we have not been able to rediscover the methods of interpreting those mystic symbols, but we should never allow ourselves to think that they are all meaningless and are of no great worth in the realm of spiritual discipline, because on this latter supposition we can never understand the internal connection of the diffrerent chapters of such great works as the Blhadaral lyakaand the Chāndogya.

Leaving these Vedic sacrifices as a subject which we are not competent to discuss, we shall engage ourselves with the discussion of karma in the sense in which the Gita uses the term. We shall also discuss in a separate chapter the Yoga system of discipline which occupies a very prominent figure in the Path of Karma.

We can best understand the value of the different forms of Sādhanā, if we consider the respective contributions of each towards the development of the Sadhaka for the attainment of his goal.

14. See BLh Up., Ch. I and Chan. Up., Ch. IV, 5Đ14.

Karma, Bhakti and J-āna are not to be regarded strictly as independent forms of Sädhana in the sense that only one of them is sufficient for the attainment of the goal. These three are intimately connected with one another, and the co-operation of all of them is necessary for the realisation of the ideal. Modern Psychology no longer believes in the compartment division of the Faculty Psychologists, but firmly establishes the inter-connection of the various aspects of the mind. The secret which Psychology discovers is that when each aspect of the mind works in moderation, it helps the development of the others along with it, but if any one aspect is given

undue emphasis it rather eclipses and paralyses the growth of the other aspects. This working in moderation is also emphasised in the Gītā where we find Yoga described as ÔsamatvamÕ (balance). We call them different lines of Sadhana because they represent three different aspects of the mind, each of which may be given emphasis and special attention while the others develop along with it. A Karma-Yogin, far from being devoid of Bhakti and J-ana, necessarily becomes a bhaktaand a j-āninat a certain stage of his development. Similar is the case also with the bhaktaand the j-anin. A Karma-Yogin is one who builds his growth upon the aspect of willing or action, who develops all his faculties and brings them into fruition mainly relying on the development of the active side of his nature. The development of the entire man is absolutely necessary, and this is attained by different men possessing different temperaments through the emphasis on either the active or the emotional or the intellectual side of oneÕs nature. The natural bent or aptitude determines the particular line of Sādhanā for every particular Sādhaka, but it is never to be forgotten that the particular line is merely an occasion or the main support for the development of all the different aspects.

Karma, Bhakti and J-ana may be regarded as disciplines suiting three different stages in the course of development of the Sādhaka. The Sādhaka has to begin with karma, that being perfectly suitable to the beginner who is not yet purified in body and mind. It is karma that purifies the mind of the Sadhaka and makes him fit for the acquisition of higher truths. At this stage, the daily routine, consisting of worship, prayer, reading of sacred texts, etc., is followed merely because it is prescribed by the Sästras, and not because the Sädhaka enters into the spirit of those practices. The daily routine of karma is to him now only a means to the end. But gradually the means itself becomes the end, and the worship of God, prayers, etc., are no longer performed with a view to an end, but they themselves become pleasant, and a natural attraction is felt towards the object of worship. Worship and service now become a work of love, and to put it in the language of Dr. Martineau, Othe life of the LawO is now converted into Othe life of Love.Ó

The stage of karma next gives place to the stage of bhakti or devotion, where a spontaneous and natural attraction for the object of worship characterises the mental attitude of the Sādhaka. This natural attraction necessarily draws the Sädhaka nearer and nearer to the object of his worship, and gradually the division between the ideal and the actual becomes healed up, until ultimately the ideal is reached, and the Sadhaka attains consummation by being merged and absorbed in the Infinite, and thus enjoys the unbounded extension,

bliss and illumination that characterise the Infinite. This is the stage of J-änaimplying identity and absolute absorption of the finite in the Infinite.

All controversy arises when this aspect of mutual co-operation is lost sight of, and undue importance or unmerited neglect is accorded to one or other of these aspects. Karma has very often been given a very subordinate place by the advocates ofj-ānaand bhakti. It is urged that only at a lower stage when the Sädhaka has not attained fitness for either bhaktior j-āna, karmais necessary, but when he has attained the requisite fitness, all karmasshould be renounced.15According to the advocates of the J-āna-mārga, j-āna and karmacannot exist simultaneously, because they are absolutely opposed to each other; so, a person who has attained knowledge (tattva-j-āna) cannot perform any action. Action or karma implies desire as its source or spring, and desire unmistakably involves ignorance (aj-āna) or false superimposition on the nature of the self (atman). So long as the real nature of the self is not veiled (avLta), and there is not the imposition of the attributes of the not-self on the self, no desire can arise and hence there cannot be any action (karma) in the ordinary sense of the term. Sa kara emphatically declares that karmaand j-ānaare incompatibles, because one is the result of ignorance (avidya) and the other involves true knowledge (vidyā). By karma, Śa kara means only actions that proceed from

15. Tāvat karmāli kurvīta na nirvidyeta yāvatā, Matkathāśrava ādau vā śraddhā yāvanna jāyate. Bhāgavata PurālaXI, xx, 7.

desire as their spring, and not bodily activities of every kind. Some later Vedäntists, however, could not appreciate his teachings thoroughly, and formed a mistaken conception of his view of the incompatibility of j-anaand karma. They interpreted ÔkarmaÕ to mean Ôbodily activity, and hence supposed that karma or bodily movement of any sort could not be cosnistent with j-āna. The cessation of bodily activities seemed to them to be necessary for j-āna, and in their zeal for neglecting karma, they sometimes even forgot that their master had taught the incompatibility ofj-ānaand karmaonly whenj-änahad been reached and not before that stage.16 This false interpretation of Sal karaOs teachings is very much responsible for the absolute breach between karmaand j-āna, action and knowledge, which is sometimes found among the modern followers of Salkara. Progress and development of every sort depend upon the harmonious working of both the active and the contemplative, the karmaand the j- anaaspects of our nature, and when any one of these aspects is

neglected to over-emphasise the other, downfall is sure to follow. The teacher of the Bhagavadgita saw in his prophetic vision the wretched condition which is sure to follow an absolute division and breach between karmaand j-āna, and therefore almost in every śloka, seeks to warn us against such a false doctrine. He teaches us that it is karma that forms the fountainhead of j-ana, that it is action that leads to and culminates in knowledge,17 and that it is sacrifice that pleases the gods,18and in order that human life may be carried to its fruition, the close reciprocity between action and knowledge should never be neglected. Success is ensured only when the bow of Arjuna is combined with the intelligent consciousness of K a.19

Mr. Brooks, in his Gospel of Lifeemphatically declares himself against the views holding a false incompatibility between j-āna and karma, and regards such views as absurd. OThe doctrine of the incompatibility of j-ānaand karmamakes God a fool. Read verse 22

16. Apeklate ca vidyā sarvā yāśramakarmā i nātyantamanapek aiva ... utpanna hi vidyā phalasiddhil prati na ki-cidanyadapekLate, utpattil prati tu apeklate.

ŚalkaraOs commentary on the Brahma SūrasIII, iv. 26. 17.BhagavadgītāIV, 34. 18. B.G. III, 11. Here ÔSacrificeO probably stands for Karma, and ÔgodsO represent ÔilluminationÕ or knowledge. 19.Ibid., XVIII, 78.

of Chapter III where Śri Kl a declares Himself as the typical Karma- yogi, and then pass on to the definition of the jnanias Ôone with HimselfÕ (VII, 16 and 18)Ñand frankly confess that if Karmayoga must cease when j-ānais reached, the Bhagavadgītā ... had better be thrown away.Ó P. 202, Vol. I.

The doctrine of the incompatibility of j-āna andkarma, which has created much controversy and misunderstanding, is very often misunderstood, and the interpretation which the Salkarites sometimes put upon the writings of Sa kara is very often responsible for the criticism that is too often directed against them.20Salkara emphatically declares no doubt that j-ānaand karma, knowledge and action, are absolute incompatibles, and the two cannot exist together. The presence of the one must necessitate and imply the absence of the other, just as light must dispel darkness and darkness must disappear in the presence of light. In the sense in which Śa lkara declares this, it is impossible to refute him. Brahma-j-āna or aparok lanubhutiof the self implies a state where the division into subject, object and the process of cognition implying a relation between the two (the tripu i), has altogether disappeared, and where the self or ātmanis only infinite

illumination and infinite expansion and infinite bliss, and where all categories such as the subject etc., are found to be hopelessly inadequate to describe the self. The self is realised to be something far above and altogether different from the category of the doer, the agent (kartll). And once this anubhūti or j-ānais attained, it is never lost. No action or karma can proceed from a person who, in the very act of realisation of the self, has identified his essence and whole being with that self, which is certainly not the agent. The Bhagavadgīta abounds in passages implying this view of the self, viz., as the non-doer of any action. This is described by the word Ôkevala.Õ ÒHe does not know the truth who, because of his impure intellect, thinks and finds the self, which is kevala, i.e.motionless and changeless, as the agent.Ó (XVIII, 16). So long as the Sādhaka does not attain this aparok änubhuti(the direct realisation of the self), all actions proceed from him as the subject and the agent; but as soon as the real nature (svarūpa) of the self is directly realised, action, in the usual sense of the term, cannot proceed from him. It is not to be thought, however, that all bodily movements must cease as soon as j- ānais attained, and that the

20. PrakāśānandaOs views in Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī.

j-ānin, from the moment he attains j-āna, remains perfectly inert as a stone.21Salkarācārya himself, must have composed many books after he had attained j-āna, and must have travelled very far in order to preach his doctrines to all parts of the country. He certainly could not hold a doctrine, the falsity of which he was realising every moment, not excluding the moment in which he was actually writing or teaching the doctrine to his pupils. Sa kara certainly could not have meant the incompatibility of j-ānaand all bodily movements, whatsoever, in the shape of actions; there cannot be perfect cessation of bodily activities so long as life lasts. All that he meant is that all karmas or actions become bādhita, i.e., cease to be karmas, as soon as one realises the true nature of the self as the non-doer, i.e. as akart. From the standpoint of the tman, all karmas, at this stage (i.e. when j-ānais attained) cease to be karma, inasmuch as they are found not to proceed from the self. Sa kara maintains this position in innumerable places in his commentaries on the Gita and the Upani ads. We may take two prominent instances from the Gītā. In alkaraÕs commentary on the 20th verse of the 4th Chapter, he clearly tells us that the j-änin, even doing, does nothing, because of his realisation of the self as the non-doer (ni kriyātma-darśanasampannatvāt naīva ki-cit karoti sal). Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, following Sa kara, comments on the 8th sloka of the 5th Chapter thus: Because he finds the non-agency of the self in all actions, therefore, he is not attached to any action,

although he performs all sorts of actions.22

This main teaching of Sal karācārya has too often been misunderstood and misinterpreted. Wherever Sa kara emphatically protests against the compatibility i.e.the simultaneouspresence, of j-ānaand karmain an individual Sädhaka, he means nothing else than that the notion of the agency of the self, implied in avidyāand karma, cannot exist simultaneously with the notion of the nonagency of the self implied in j-ana. From this he concludes that

21. ÒIt is not to be apprehended, however, that all actions must cease of the person whose mind is free from all desires; neither the operations of the bodily organs such as the eyes, etc., nor mental operations need be absent.O Na ca nirvāsanamanaskasya jīvanahetuvyavahāro lupyeteti śa-kanīya ki cak urādivyavahārasya lopa ki vā mānasavyavahārasya.

Jīvanmuktiviveka, p. 57. 22. Yasmāt sarvavyāpāre vapyātmanoOkart tvameva paśyati ata kurvannapi na lipyate iti yuktamevoktam.

there cannot be any vidhior compulsion for the j-anin, and that nothing binds him. He has no duties kāryamor kartavyam, which mustbe done, and the non-performance of which leads to pratyavāya or sin. This absence of all feelings of compulsion, constraint or bondage, marks an important characteristic of the liberated soul, and Sa kara, as the champion of muktior liberation which is the consummation and summum bonumof human existence and which gives eternal happiness and bliss, in his great enthusiasm, sometimes uses terms which are liable to be misinterpreted. The absence of kāryamor kartavyamkarma (duties) does not imply the absence of allkarma (actions). The Lord Himself says: ÔAlthough nothing is to be attained by me and nothing is before me as my duty, still I perform actions always vigilant.O In this passage, the first part describes the mental condition of the liberated j-ānin, and the second, the nature of the karma that such a j- äninperforms. The actions that are seen to be performed by the j- änincan hardly be termed actions (karma), inasmuch as the self has been realised by him to be akart or non-doer.

Some of the followers of Sal Ikara, viz. the Sal karite Sannyāsins, however, sometimes interpret the above teaching in a sense which, instead of being suitable to the stage of j-āna or liberation, rather suits aj-anaand bondage. They hold that the J- anin should notperform any action, because all actions imply distraction (viklepa). But is not this sort of akarmaor cessation from actions itself a sort of bondage? Do not these ÔshouldO and Ôshould notO imply compulsion and constraint? If it be held that the J-anin does notperform any action, in the ordinary sense of the term, then, the position of the J-ānavādins is perhaps better understood.

At a certain stage in the course of Sādhanā in J-āna-mārga, retirement from active life is indeed prescribed and recommended for the Sadhaka. This is known as the stage of vividi āsannyasa. When the Sādhaka has reached the stage of dhyānaor nididhyāsana, i.e. when he finds that meditation has become spontaneous with him and he feels pleasure in withdrawing from the external world and retiring within, then, it is beneficial to the Sädhaka not to engage himself in any outward action, because such actions would interfere with the natural and easy flow of his meditation and thus would retard his progress. (Cf. Gītā XVIII, 51Đ53; VI, 10). This retirement from active life is needed temporarily in order that the stage of dhyāna may attain maturity and consummation and thus lead to j-āna. But after j-ānais attained, there is no vidhior nilledha, no injunction, positive or negative, no compulsion and regulation for the conduct of the j-ānin. It is better to say that, at this stage, actions come out automatically and spontaneously from the j-änin, rather than that he performs actions.23The self remains an impartial spectator or rather, not even a spectator, but merely the substratum upon which the whole show of actions rests. Actions do not proceed from will or desire (kāmasa kalpavarjita), but they come out spontaneously. The individual consciousness of the j-äninbecomes identified with the Cosmic consciousness (Brahmavid becomes Brahman), and his actions are now no longer controlled by the individual centre of consciousness, but are taken up, guided and directed by the Cosmic consciousness. The j-äninbecomes perfectly identified with the Absolute, and he does not feel, either in the consciousness side or in the bodily side, any individual centre of activity with which he may identify himself. It is from this standpoint alone that we can understand the stage of the liberated j-ānin(Jīvanmukta) and can have an idea as to how actions may be performed without the least touch of desire or the working of the individual will.

Mr. Brooks24and late Lokamānya Balga-gādhar Tilaka25have both fought against the view that holds J-ānaand karma to be absolutely antagonistic to each other and that the j-āninshould perform no karma. But it is to be noticed that their criticism is effective only against the wrong and rather superficial interpretation of ŚalkarācāryaOs doctrine. Their findings hardly touch the main teachings of the Sa kara-Advaita system. They do not seem to recognise the important distinction between the Vividi ā Sannyāsa and the Vidvat Sannyasastages. It is interesting to note that while Mr. Brooks at least in a footnote26guesses the real meaning of Sal kara and gives him credit for the same, Lokamānya Tilaka, in his voluminous and scholarly work on the Bhagavadgīta, does not seem even to hint

at the real meaning of Śa karācārya. The very simple thought that Śal karācārya could not have preached a

23. Ayatnopanīte vakLi digravyel luyathā puna Nīrāgameva patati tadvat kārye u dhīradhīl.

Yoga-vāśi_ ha 24. See BrooksO Gospel of Life, Vol. I. 25. See his Bhagvadgītāor Karma-Rahasya. 26. ÔCease from actionO does not mean Ômake your bodies motionless.Õ It means ÒRealise your self actlessat the back of an action,Ó III, 27Đ29, IV, 18Đ24, V, 8Đ11, 13Đ21, XIII, 26, 27.

doctrine which he was contradicting every moment with every word he was uttering or every letter that he was writing (inasmuch as all these implied the simultaneous existence of j-ānaand karma), and that some deeper meaning must have been underlying his teachings, did not occur to the learned author.

Lokamānya Tilaka is on very strong ground when he urges that the Bhagavadgītā prescribes Karma-yoga as an independent line of Sādhana which is to be practised from beginning to end, and that karmas are not merely stepping stones or mere Ôladders,O as Mr. Brooks calls them,27 to the attainment of j-āna, to be given up after j- änahas been attained. The partiality and one-sidedness of almost all the commentators who establish the supremacy of j-ana and the subserviency of karma, have been rightly pointed out in his scholarly work. That Karma-yoga and J-äna-yoga have been recognised to be two independent courses of discipline from the very earliest times have, I think, been abundantly proved by him. An impartial student of the Bhagavadgīta would, I hope, certainly recognise in it an attempt to revive an old doctrine (and this the Lord himself speaks out in the beginning of the 4th Chapter) and to establish that karmas need not be renounced either in order to attain j-āna (i. e. before j-ānais reached) or even afterj-ānais attained. Its main aim certainly seems to be to fight against the doctrine which holds that karamas mustbe given up in order that liberation may be attained. That the Bhagavadgītā establishes Karma-nil haor Karmayoga as an alternative to Karma- tyāgaor J-āna-nil hais evident, and in this attempt it has been necessary on some occasions to overestimate the one, because the establishment of the view that karmas need not berenounced, seems to be its aim. It has practically admitted the truth and suitability of the other theory, viz. that karmas are not necessary after j-ānais attained,28which Mr. Tilaka calls nivltti-mārgaor j-āna-nillhā, and does not speak much about it; its only aim being to establish the adequacy and truth of the other theory, viz. that karmas may beperformed even after j-āna is attained, and that such karmas do not cause bondage to the j-ānin. Lokmānya Tilaka rightly points out that,

in the Upani ad age, karmas were given a subordinate place, and that the Gita is rather a protest against this neglect of karma. Mr. Brooks also finds in the Gita, Oan out and out protest, a solemn warning against the fatal tendency to

27.Gospel of Life, Vol. I, Notes, pp. 87Đ88. 28. Tasya kārya na vidyate, III, 17.

part asunder that which God unites in oneÑsoul and body, knowledge and action, theory and practice, science and art, wisdom and work, Śalkhya and Yoga,Ñthe tendency that was then making (and has since largely made) of India a land of actless wisdom and wisdomless action, of sterile abstraction and senseless customÓ. Vol. I, Chap. I, pp. 78Đ79, The Gospel of Life.

Lokamānya Tilaka goes too far when he tells us that the Bhagavadgītā places Karma-yoga far above J-āna-yoga, and that karmas must bedone by allat all stages.29Here he seems to forget what he has taken great pains to establish elsewhere, viz. that there are twodistinct courses of SadhanaÑone supporting actions and the other condemning or giving up actions, and that both of these views and courses of actions are equallygood and useful. (Chap. XI, Page 313 of the Bengali Translation). After quoting such ślokas30 as ÒThere are two forms of ni hain this world, as I have related beforeÑthe Salkhya or J-āna- yogafor the wise and Karma-yoga for the yoginsÓ, OOthers through the help of Śā khya-yogaand, again, others through Karma-yoga,Ó ÒThere are two lines upon which the Vedas restÑone dealing with desires and karmas, the other dealing with niv tti i.e., cessation from desiresÓ etc., it is nothing but partisanism to hold that the Bhagavadgīta imposes an obligationfor allto perform actions at allstages.31 All that the Bhagavadgīta seems to establish is that actions do not touch the j- äninand cannot cause bondage to him; but to infer from this that it holds that actions must be done by the j-āninis surely an unjustifiable leap.32The view that we have supported seems to be evident from the use of such terms as Ôapi or Ôeven thoughÕ in the following ślokas: ÒHe who is evercontented and does not take recourse to the means necessary for attaining an end really does nothing, even thoughhe may engage himself in actions, renouncing all attachment for the results of his actionsÓ (IV, 20)ÑOdoes not earn sin thereby althoughhe may perform actions renouncing all consciousness of the agency of the selfÓ (IV, 21); Òis not bound by his actions althoughor even though

29. Chap. XI, Pages 310 and 321 of the Bengali Edition of TilakaOs Gītā. 30.Bhagvadgītā V 2; XIII, 54. 31.TilakaÕs Gītā, Chapter XI (page 334 of the Beng. Edn.). 32. The Yoga-VaśilLhathus contradicts the view of Lokamānya Tilaka:Ñ Samādhimatha karmāli mā karotu karotu vā,

HOdayenastasarvaśo mukta evottamaśayal Nai karmyeLa na tasyarthastasyarthoOsti na karmabhi Na samādhānajapyābhyā yasya nirvāsana mana

he may actÓ (IV, 22); Òis not bound, even thoughhe may actÓ (V, 7); Othat yogin resides in me, whichever situation he may live in Ôacting or non-actingÕ (VI, 31); Òis not bound, even thoughhe may commit murderÓ (XVIII, 17). There are many such passages which unmistakably suggest that the Gita is doing nothing more than merely defending Karma-yoga or the path of action, and is showing that there is no fear of sin or bondage even though one performs karmasafter he has attained tattva-j-ana; to rule niv tti-mārgaout of order, or to show that it is an inferior course, seems to be far from the mind of the teacher of the Bhagavadgīta. Wherever it fights against cessation from action, it is only taking up its weapon against the tāmasa, false tyāga(cessation) due to idleness, or dread of troubles and anxieties (rājasa tyaga), and not against niv tti or cessation that may come as a natural consequence of j-āna. Lokamānya Tilaka puts emphasis upon the word Ôvisillyate.O But it is to be remembered that emphasis upon such individual words, ignoring and neglecting the whole drift of the texts, hardly brings out the real sense of the teachings. ÒKarmayogais better than KarmasannyāsaÓ. (V, 2) and Òkarma is better than absence of karmaÓ (III, 8); these expressions indicate merely the superiority of karma over akarma, before j-ānais reached, and not after j-anais attained. If the occasional use of such terms as ÔvisilyateO is to be given importance, what shall we say of such expressions as tasya kāryal na vidyate(III, 17)ÑÔfor him there are no actions, ÕÑÔneither acting nor causing to actO (V, 13)ÑÔhe who has renounced all actionsO (XII, 16 and XIV, 25) etc .? If we take these expressions at their face value, the whole purpose of the Bhagavadgītā, viz. to defend Karmayoga, that is to say, that karmas may beperformed without detriment after j-ānais attained, seems to be baffled.

The interpretation which Lokamānya Tilaka puts upon certain words and expressions is not only curious but also interesting. We may take one exampleÑÔtasya kāryal na vidyateÕ (III, 17). The śloka runs thus: ÒHe who takes pleasure in his self, is contented with the bliss that the self offers, and remains wholly absorbed with his self, has no duties or actions to perform.O The learned author explains the last part of the śloka thus: Such a person has no actions for his own self(tasya) to perform, but he should or must do actions for the sake of others. The emphasis is on the word ÔtasyaÕ.

What strikes the reader of Lokamānya TilakaOs learned book is that the author does not seem to distinguish between karmas performed by

the Karma-yogin and those performed by the J-ānayogin, between SāttvikīBuddhi and transcendent j-āna. There are occasional references to the transcendent nature of j-āna, but he hardly makes any use of the same. He cannot find, for example, any great truth in such sayings as ÒFor the yoginwho has been satisfied by drinking the nectar of j- anaand has attained consummation and summum bonum, there is nothing which remains to be done, and if anything such remains, he has not attained tattva-j-ana.Ó33ÒIt is an ornament to us that after Brahman and ātmanhave been realised, no duties remainÓ etc.34The fine distinction which he seems to make between ÔdesiresÕ (vāsanā) and attachment (asakti), and the view he holds that desires should remain, while attachment should be sacrificed, can (page 325) hardly be supported. Even lokasa graha or serving the cause of the world (world-at-onement), when it comes as a sal kalpaor a desire, itself becomes a source of bondage, and the success or failure of such an enterprise must affect in some way, however slightly it may be, the doer of the action. It is the absence of all sorts of kāmanaand sal lkalpaÑall sorts of enterprise with an end in view (although the end may be as sublime as the serving of the world-cause), that marks the action of the j-ānin. (Cf. IV, 9; II, 71, etc.). The sort of action which Lokamānya Tilaka has always in view as the ideal seems to be hardly anything above the level of Sättvika-karma, and it is not the karma that accompanies transcendent j-āna. The distinction between J- ānāgni-dagdhakarma(karma or actions, the seeds of which have been burnt in the fire of knowledge, i.e.actions which are not rooted in the self, but only appear on the surface) and sāttvika-karma(actions done selflessly without any desire for the fruits of the actions, e.g., perfectly moral actions) is lost sight of. Lokamānya Tilaka seems to adopt the Kantian doctrine that actions done from the sense of duty alone, and not from any selfish motive or inclination, mark the behaviour of the j-ānin. This is the meaning which he gives to the famous śloka of the Bhagavadgīta which we have previously explained: OFor such a man, there are no actions for himself but he has to act for others.Ó

33. J-ānām tena tLptasya kltakL Ityasya yoginaL, Na cāsti ki-cit kartavyamasti cenna sa tattvavit. Uttara Gītā, verse 223. 34. Ala-kāro hyayamasmāka yad brahmātmāvagatau satyāl sarvakartavyatāhāni .. Śa karaÕs Commentary on the BrahmasūtrasI, i, 4.

But actions done for the good of others, actions done from the sense of duty, are, at best, only moral actions. This standpoint is to be distinguished from the supra-moral, trenscendent standpoint preached by the Bhagavadgita and the Vedanta Philosophy, Ñthe standpoint, viz. which declares that there is such a stage attained by the j-ānin, when the distinction between the ÔmoralÕ and the ÔimmoralÕ, based

on the consciousness of ÔoughtÕ and ÔshouldÕ implying an ideal lying at a distance from the progress attained, appears to be meaningless and without any significance whatsoever. The j-āninis absorbed in the Absolute consciousness, and finds the Absolute in all. The moral distinctions, like all other distinctions based upon a partial standpoint, can have no meaning as applied to the Absolute.35 When the j- aninperforms actions, he does not select a particular line of action, because it is good as distinguished from some other line which is bad, but the fact is that good actions (i.e.actions which are classified as good by people) come out of him automatically and spontaneously. It is not an act of choice or deliberation with him. The continuous performance of good actions has created in the j-ānin, during the preparatory period, a fixed habit of taking always the noble line and now, when j-anais attained, goodness becomes his nature.36The distinctions which form the essence of the moral life become transcended in the perfectly religious life, not in the sense that religion dispenses with morality, but in the sense that from a higher standpoint, the distinctions seem to be meaningless. Kant hints at this stage, (although he does not reap the full benefits of these teachings in his philosophy), when he says, ONo imperatives hold for the Divine Will, or in general for a holy will, ÔoughtÕ is here out of place, because the volition is already of itself necessarily in unison with the law.Ó (Metaphysics of Morals, WatsonOs Selections, p. 31). So far as the domain of ethics and morality is concerned, the conflict of inclination and duty, and the consciousness of ÔshouldÕ and ÔoughtÕ seem to be essential. Where Ôought becomes out of place,O ethics passes its own boundaries and culminates in religion, and therefore Kant did not think of it much so long as he was confined to the discussion of morals. It is strange to note that Lokamānya Tilaka also quotes the above sentences in his work on

35. Nistraigulye pathi vicaratā ko vidhil ko nil ledhal 36.Cf.SūreśvaraOs Nai_karmyasiddhiIV, 69. Cf.Also the explanation of actions of the Buddha or the Bodhisattva who has become sarvaj-a, in Tattvasa graha.

the Bhagavadgīta, but does not find his way to appreciate the words of Śalkarācārya where he says that for a Vedāntist who has realised Brahman, there is absence of all Ôoughtness.O37Perfect appreciation of the words of Kant, quoted above, cannot but open unto one the sense of the Vedantic teaching that moral distinctions seem out of place in the realisation of the Absolute or Brahman. To act solely from the motive of doing good to others is no doubt a very good action, but still the motive is present, although quite selfless. The Bhagavadgītā teaches us to rise above all motives, whether good or bad, all kāmanāswhatsoever. (Cf. VI, 18, 24. II, 71. IV, 19). Good actions done

from selfless motives may create merits and virtues (pulyas), but these also bind us. The actions of the j-āninare absolutely unmotived, and the spring of action is not any feeling of want from within; the self or ätmandoes not take part in the action, and ÔgoodÕ and ÔbadÕ (śubha and aśubha) are forsaken by him (XII, 17). It is difficult to compare their actions with the voluntary actions of ordinary persons. The actions of the j-äninare not actions in the ordinary sense of the term; they resemble more the automatic, reflex, and habitual actions of ordinary men than the voluntary actions.38

The Vedantic teaching of the transcendence of moral distinctions is very often misinterpreted. Western Scholars generally take ÔtranscendenceÕ to mean neglect, and interpret the Vedāntic teaching to mean that a j-aninmay perform any action he likesÑ good or bad; he has not to obey moral laws. They seem to forget that the j- ānindoes not willingly and consciously choose any action, and that if there is no compulsion for him, if he does not obey any moral law, it is not because he violates those laws,39but becaus he finds no laws as obligatory on him. Goodness becomes part of his nature and, therefore, does not appear to him as something which should be adopted. Many Indian scholars, again, do injusice to the Vedānta, quite unawares perhaps, from a very different standpoint. In their zeal to save the Vedänta from the unfounded attacks and criticisms of Western scholars, they ascribe to the Vedänta views which do not adequately represent it. They hold that the Vedānta teaches us to

37. Abhimānābhāvācca samyagdarśina ŚalkaraOs Commentary on the BrahmasūtrasII, iii, 48. 38. Vāsanāhīnamapyetaccak urādīndriya svata Pravartate bahi svārthe vāsanā nātra kāralam. UddālakaOs words quoted in Jīvanmuktiviveka, pp. 58, id 59. 39. Na ca niyogābhāvāt samyagdarśino yathel lace āprasi-gah. Śa karaÕs Commentary on the BrahmasūtrasII, iii, 48.

engage ourselves in good actions, and that moral discipline forms the essential basis for tattva j-ana, and that the Vedānta nowhere teaches the transcendence of moral distinctions. They forget that the difficulty of Western scholars lies not in appreciating the preparatory-stages where moral discipline is emphasised, but in understanding the stage of j-āna, the final stage when all that is attainable is attained, and where, it is urged, moral distinctions have no scope and are transcended. To argue that the Vedänta does not hold that the j- anintranscends moral distinctions,40and that motives, both good and bad, are equally absent in him, is to misrepresent Vedāntic teachings. Śalkara holds that the ordinary instruments of knowledge as well as all Śastras including the Vedas hold good only with regard to the

actions of individuals living under the influence of Nescience.41The moral codes and the Sastric injunctions are all inapplicable to the stage of realisation that is free from Nescience. The ÔoughtÕ implies an agent and an action; but unless there is the imposition of self-hood on the body and the senses, there cannot be any action (prav_tti). The pure, unattached (asa-ga) self also can have no action (prav ltti) unless there is the superimposition of Maya. The Ôoughtness, O which is the essence of morality, can have no application to the pure self, which neither moves nor is moved, and absolutely transcends the realm of desires and desire-begotten actions. Such cheap defence of Vedäntic thought can hardly remove the objections brought against it by western scholars, just because the difficulty is here more ignored than faced. It cannot be denied that the Vedantic thought can hardly remove the objections brought against it by western scholars, just because the difficulty is here more ignored than faced. It cannot be denied that the Vedänta, while emphasising very strongly the necessity of moral discipline and regarding this to be the very basis of tattva-j-āna, proclaims with equal emphasis that at the stage of tattva- j-ānaall moral distinctions appear meaningless. The Yoga- Vāśil havery clearly marks the distinction between these two stages and says:42

40. See Avaitavādaby Kokileswar Sastrī, Ch. IV. 41. Avidyavadvilayā yeva pratyak ādīni pramā āni śāstrā ī ceti. Introduction to Śa karaOs Commentary on the Brahmasūtras. Yāvaddehātmavij-āna bādhyate na pramālata Prāmā ya karmaśāstrāl lāl tāvadevopalabhyate. 42. Śubhāśubhābhyā mārgābhyā vahanti vāsanāsarit, Pauru ena prayatnena yojanīyā śubhe pathi. AśubheLu samāvi lal śubhelvevāvatāraya, Sv manal purul lārthena balena balināl vara.

ÒThe stream of desires flows along two courses, good and bad; through strong efforts, it should be directed along the good course.Ó

ÒWhen the mind is bent upon evil desires, O thou mightiest of the heroes, you should keep it engaged in good and holy ones through effort of will.Ó

These couplets indicate the stage of preparation where moral excellence is strongly emphasised, and where the constant performance of holy deeds and the constant meditation of holy thoughts, purity of both body and mind, are urged to be absolutely essential. But there is another stage,Ñwhere the moral realm passes into the spiritual, where moral distinctions are transcended,Ñwhich is described in the Yoga-vāśil Thathus:43

ÒPerform good actions prescribed by the spiritual preceptor and the

Śāstras, so long as you do not realise the Absolute Truth; afterwards, when you have realised the Truth and have become rid of impurities and anxieties, you have to give up even the host of good desires, you, who have to rise above alldesires, whether good or bad.Ó And again:

ÒHe is truly liberated who remains unmoved and unanxious after forsaking alldesires from his mind.Ó The Bhagavadgīta also, in innumerable places, speaks of the giving up of alldesires, good and bad. To mention only a few instances, OMy devotee, who has given up both good and evil, is dear to meÓ (Bhagavadgīta XII, 14); and Ogiving up alldesires without exceptionÓ and Owho has forsaken everyactionÓ (Bhagavadgītā XII, 14). In the B lhadāral yaka Upani Dad, we find44: ÒWhen alldesires which exist in his heart leave him, he becomes immortal in this mortal frame and enjoys and realises Brahman even here.Ó Instead of denying that the Vedanta really describes a stage beyond the sphere of morality, we have to point out that as the Vedāntic experience, implying a transcendence of moral distinctions, comes after the severest moral discipline, which can, in no case, be excused, but is rather regarded as essential and compulsory, it cannot justly be charged with ignoring or neglecting the development of the

43. Tata pakvakaLāyel vij-ātavastunā, ŚubhoÕpyasau tvayā tyājyo vāsanaugho nirādhinā. la nūnal

44. IV, iv, 7.

moral side of our nature. The Vedänta only points out that there is something to be achieved even beyond the highest moral progress, and reveals to us the nature of the transcendent spiritual experience in which the fulness of bliss and the expansion of consciousness transport ourselves to the realm of the Absolute, where all distinctions,Ñintellectual, moral as well as emotional,Ñlose their meaning and merge themselves in the higher and all comprehensive experience.

7

Karma-Yoga

The meaning of the term ÔkarmaÕ is perplexing to scholars. In the Vedic texts, the term ÔkarmaO is often synonymously used with Ôyaj- aÕ or ÔsacrificeÕ. The Mīma sā school of philosophy, founded by Jaimini, uses the term mainly in that sense. The Puralas and Sm tis use the term to mean such actions as daily worship (sandhyā etc.), fixed religious observances, fastings, etc., and divide all such karmas into three groups, viz., nitya, Ñcompulsory daily actions (such as ablutions, morning, noon and evening prayers, etc.), naimittika,Ñ actions to be done on particular occasions, and kāmyaÑactions performed in order to attain some definite end. The Bhagavadgītā generally uses the term in a very wide sense, and means by it all actions,Nanything that is done by the body, the sense-organs, the mind (manas) and the intellect (buddhi) (V, 11). In one place (VIII, 3) alone, the term ÔkarmaÕ is explained specially to mean sacrifice or offering (visarga, i.e., tyagā) that generates and maintains living beings. But that the term is used in a technical sense in the śloka referred to (VIII, 3), is evident from almost every other occasion of the use of the term where it is always taken as a genus including every sort of action under it (XVIII, 3, 5, 6, 7; V, 8, 9; II, 9, 5, etc.). The followers of Karma-Yoga take the word in this general sense, and we shall also use the term in this sense.

It is to be carefully noted that by Karma-Yoga, we do not mean the philosophy of the Pūrva Mīmāl sā school founded by 103

Jaimini. According to the Gīta, the sacrificial rites and ceremonies advocated by the Karma-mīmāl sā philosophy can at best award to the doer (yajamāna) residence in heaven, that is, a better life with regard to enjoyment of pleasures than this earthly life, but they are thoroughly incompetent to award liberation (mok a), although Kumārila thinks to the contrary.1Such karmas earn merit (pulya) for the agent, and in recognition of those meritorious actions, residence in heaven for a certain fixed period, varying according to the quality and quantity of the merits earned, is granted; but as soon as the period is over, the agent has again to enter earthly existence.2But Karma-Yoga awards liberation (mokla) to the sādhaka, and when the yoga is fully attained, there is no longer any fear of fall or re-birth (XV, 6; VIII, 15,

16). The Vedic sacrifices and all actions advocated by the Karma- mīmāusā school have, for their end, something of impermanent worth, but Karma-Yoga has for its end the highest that can and should be achieved, viz., the Absolute and nothing short of the same (II, 45, etc.).

The conscious union between the Absolute and the finite, or the yoga between the Divine and the human, is attained through karma or action, according to Karma-Yoga. This yoga depends upon and implies development and evolution of the finite individual, and Karma-Yoga seems to confer the required development and growth through actions performed methodically and in the manner prescribed. The individual human being, it is urged both by the J- anavadin and the Karma- yogin, contains within him immense possibilities which, when fully developed and rightly cultured, open up the centre of infinite energy, the inexhaustible spring and source of unbounded expansion and limitless bliss, and thus install the finite on the throne of the Infinite and the Absolute. It is held that every jiva (individual) is potentially Śiva and that the Absolute is identical with the consummated and perfected jiva. The limited individual with his imperfections and defective development fails to realise the universal centre of energy within him, and thus feels his limitation and finitude in every aspect of his life and so thinks himself to be wholly dissociated from, or, at best, only an infinitesimal portion of, the universal centre. But when this very individual attains consummation and all his powers are fully developed, he finds that his individuality is merely the vehicle through which the universal

1. See Ślokavārtika, Sambandhāk epaparihāra, verse 110. 2.B.G.IX, 20 and 21.

centre of energy is manifesting itself, and he identifies his whole essence with this universal energy. No longer is he able to mark out his limited existence as a separate individual possessing a limited store of energy, a limited span of consciousness and a limited enjoyment, but he now finds the One Absolute Being, the One limitless Consciousness and Bliss, pervading and reigning everywhere undivided, the same in him as also outside of him.3

Every action, performed selflessly and without attachment for its consequences, purifies the agent or the doer, and helps his forward march in the attainment of perfection or the realisation of the Absolute. The Absolute cannot be realised by the ordinary individual human being because of the darkening of his vision and intellect by the operation of māya manifested through the triple attributes of sattva, rajasand tamas.4The attention paid to the finite insignificant

things of this universe, and the attachment felt towards them, create in the individual soul a leaning towards the finite and hence also a limitation which obscures the self-shining lustre of the limitless Absolute consciousness. The attraction felt towards the agreeable, and the repulsion for the disagreeable, produce a state of disharmony, and disturb the quiet and harmonious equipoise of the all-luminous and the ever blissful soul. It is this attraction and repulsion (raga and dvel la) that are responsible for the veiling of the luminous Absolute, and when these can be got rid of, the Absolute is realised by us as identical with our essence. J-āna-Yoga prescribes vicāra for renunciation of desires and of the attachment following from them, while according to Karma-Yoga, actions performed without desire for their consequences, and done from a sense of duty alone and under the guidance of the Lord of the universe (II, 48), are gradually successful in removing the impurities existing in the form of innumerable desires (vāsanā). The desires are like the waves that continuously create ripples on the otherwise ever unruffled surface of the ocean of the self and thus disturb its natural transparency (prasāda). When desires are controlled, and actions are performed selflessly leaving no trace of their effects in the form of attachment (either as attraction or as repulsion), then the natural equilibrium and transparency of the self seem to be restored. (II, 64 and 65).

The law of Karma, universally accepted by the systems of Indian Philosophy, states that every karma or action has its own 3.B.G.XVIII, 20 and VI, 30 and 31. 4.Ibid. VIII, 13 and 15.

consequence which cannot be escaped by the agent in any way. All actions, whether good or bad, produce merit and demerit (pulya and pāpa) constituting ad a, which have to be reaped by the doer either in this life or in lives hereafter,5and thus create bondage. Individuality and limitation are regarded as sources of bondage, and all births and 1ives, whether in an exalted rank in heaven or in an inferior one in hell, are equally condemned as impediment to liberation.6The J-anavadins hold that karmas or actions always are the sources of bondage and should be relinquished by one desiring liberation (mokl la). But the Karma-yogins tell us that actions do not always bind us; if performed ÔintelligentlyÕ, they not only do not bind us but positively help us in attaining liberation. Actions done without yoga, actions not grounded in the ultimate principle of consciousness and done only in obedience to the impulses and desires of the moment, lead us astray and sever us from our fundamental essence and hence cause our bondage in the form of births and deaths.7But actions done from the sense of duty, actions done with a

view to worship the Lord of the universe, actions done from the sense of ÔequalityO (samatvabuddhi), do not create further desires and thus do not produce attachment, and are hence helpful in gradually preparing the agent for liberation (mokla), and do not become the source of bondage. Actions, done with a limited vision in order to fulfil small selfish ends, become, in the long run, detrimental to the best interests of the doer, and cause bondage and misery, although temporarily they seem to serve his interests; but actions done from a compre-hensive outlook, from the spirit of sacrifice, ultimately serve to root out all individual limitations in the shape of selfish desires and attachment, and thus liberate the agent of these actions from the chains of misery. The Bhagavadgīta places great emphasis on the term Ôyaj-aÕ and points out the widely differing results of karma in the following lines8:ÑOAll actions other than those performed with the spirit of yaj-a (sacrifice) bind the individual.

ÒHoly people partaking only of the remains of yaj-a (all that

5. Nābhukta kLīyate karma. 6. Karmabhir badhyate jantur vidyayā ca pramucyate. 7. Yukta karmaphala tyaktvā śāntimāpnoti nai hikīm, Ayukta kāmakārel nibadhyate. Bhagavadgītā V, 12. la phale sakto

6. III, 9.

remains after all duties have been performed) become absolved from every sort of sin; but the vicious who cook for themselves alone (i.e., who care for nobody else than their own selves) suffer the consequences of their sin.Ó9

ÒAll these people conversant with the truth and principle of yaj-a become free from their sins by means of yaj-a; those who partake of the nectar of the remains of yaj-a attain the Absolute or Brahman.Ó10

It is important to understand what the Bhagavadgīta means by the term Ôyaj-aÕ in the above texts. The term usually means sacrifice and sacrifical rites. Commentators on the Gīta also take the term in that sense. The offering of things and articles to the gods is the usual meaning of the term yaj-a11in the Mīmā_sā. But in these texts, it seems that the term may have been used in a wider sense meaning tyāga or the spirit of renunciation itself. The karma or action that is self-centred (ātmakāra āt) is placed in opposition to yaj-a, which indicates that the latter term is used for selfless or God-centred actions. Actions done for the good of others, actions which imply denial of the bodily self and realisation of the higher self, actions which are, therefore, tyāgātmaka (involving renunciation), not only do not bind the doer but positively help the agent to attain 1iberation.

The whole drift of the teachings of the Bhagavadgītā points towards such a liberal interpretation of the term Ôyaj-aO in the texts quoted. If the term Ôyaj-aÕ is taken in the technical sense to mean Vedic sacrifices, in the ślokas quoted above, it is difficult to reconcile this view with that taken by the Bhagavadgīta in the ślokas12where it is stated that sacrifices as prescribed in the three Vedas award to the doer only residence in heaven for a long period; but after the expiry of that limited period, the agent has again to take birth in this mortal universe. In śloka 31 of the IV Chapter, it is stated that those who partake of the remains of yaj-a, attain eternal Brahman and, unless we interpret here yaj-a in a wider sense to include all actions involving tyāga (renunciation), it would go against the central teaching of the Bhagavadgītā, viz., the superiority of the Karma-Yoga as a means of liberation (mok a-mārga) over

9. III, 13. 10. IV, 31. 11. Devatoddeśena dravyatyāga . 12. IX, 20 and 21.

karma or yaj-a in the Vedic sense followed by the Pūrva-mīmā Isā school.

Principal Rāmendrasundara Trivedī also supports this interpretation. He holds that Ôyaj-aÕ and ÔtyagaÕ are synonymous terms and that there is no compulsion to take the term Ôyaj-aO in the limited sense of Vedic sacrifices.13Etymologically, the term means tyāga or dänaÑfrom the root yaj which means giving up or bestowal.

Yaj-a, in this wide sense, seems to be the essence of all dharma (morality and religion) and forms the soul of Karma-Yoga. This universe is, according to the g Veda, the result of a mahāyaj-a (great sacrifice) on the part of the Supreme Person. The world is a vis li which literally means Ôa throwing outOÑa giving out, a sacrifice on the part of the Lord. What formed His own being got expressed and manifested externally in the shape of the universe, and thus the whole affair of creation is regarded as a sacrifice. This visarga, this sacrificing of oneOs self from which others develop and multiply, is the real nature of karma as applied to the universe as a whole and its Lord. The individual joins himself with this worldprocess, this act of renunciation, through which and by which the universe lives or has its being, when he performs a tyāgātmaka karma, i.e., an action involving a denial of his bodily self but ultimately leading to the expansion of his higher self. Such karma or action is really action for the sake of yaj-a (yaj-ārtha karma), action serving the purpose of the creator. The word Ôyaj-aO also means the Lord, the Iśvara of all sacrifices or Villu. Enjoyment of worldly objects (bhoga) interferes with the plan

of this universe, and disturbs the world-balance and harmony by creating an excess of attachment for some particular thing. It is renunciation (tyäga) or sacrifice that restores the equilibrium and re- establishes the lost harmony. The world-cause and the purpose of God are thus served by tyāga, i.e. yaj-a, but are baffled by exclusive bhoga (enjoyment). Renunciation expands the self of the individual and frees him from limitation and bondage, because it is through renunciation alone that he can join himself to the cosmic law. It is to be noted, however, that acts of renunciation here mean only those actions which are performed without any desire,Ñselfish or selfless.

It is interesting to note how the English equivalent of the term 13.Karma-kathā, pp. 205, 206 and 208.

Ô yaj-aÕ is used literally in the sense of offering to God or gods as well as in the sense of Ôgiving up of something for some higher imperativeÕ. The term Ôyaj-aO is not used in this liberal sense so freely in Sanskrit literature. But although commentators on the Gītā do not interpret the term in this liberal sense, still there is good reason to suppose that its interpretation in the sense of its English equivalent in the way in which we have attempted and which finds strong support in such an erudite scholar a Principal Trivedī, would explain the views of the Bhagavadgīta more satisfactorily. In the Gīta itself we find such terms as dravya-yaj-a, tapo-yaj-a, j-āna-yajna etc., which indicate that the term yaj-a is used in a general sense, and this view is confirmed specially in śloka 25 of Chapter IV, where the expression Ôdaival yaj-amÕ (sacrifices held in honour of gods) is used to convey the technical sense of yaj-a meaning sacrifices to gods, the term ÔdaivamÕ qualifying the general sense of yaj-a. All limitation is due to attachment and desire (āsakti and vāsanā), because these restrict the unlimited flow of the stream of consciousness by forcing it to be directed along a special limited channel and thus stopping its flow in other directions. All desires imply some imperfection or want, and all actions take their rise in order to fulfil some desire and thus remove the want in that particular sphere. So long as wants remain, imperfection exists, and actions are necessary for removing the imperfection. Actions bridge over the gap between imperfection and perfection, and it is karma alone that can lead one from bondage to freedom. Karma not only proceeds from desire and is the realisation of desire, but it also helps to eradicate desires if performed in a disciplined and detached manner. The Karma-yogin believes that by performing actions in a regulated and methodical fashion, it is possible gradually to arrive at the stage of desireless action, and it is through actions alone that one can reach nail Ikarmya i.e. transcendence of all karmas.14Desire begets desire and there is no end

of actions performed from desire. But desireless actions lead to j-āna and final cessation of desire. Here the Karma-yogin differs from the J- äna-yogin who holds that actions can never eradicate desires, which rather imply desires as

14. Asakto hyācaran karma paramāpnoti pūru all. Bhagavadgītā III, 19. AlsoÑ

Na karma lāmanārambhāt nai <armya puru oOśnute. Ibid.III, 4.

their spring or source, and that it is knowledge alone that is competent for the task. According to the Karma-yogin, it is karma (action) alone that can remove wants and desires, and can thus prepare the condition that is indispensably necessary for the realisation of the Absolute and so also for mokla. The more numerous the wants and the more manifold the desires, the greater is the necessity for karma; and it is only the wise man, unmoved by any desire, and feeling the necessity for nothing, who requires no karma.

8

The Yoga-System of Pata-jali

The Yoga line of Sadhana is very old and is still current as one of the main forms of Sādhanā. It is an independent line of Sādhanā competent to achieve the highest end by itself, and there are many sects which rely on it entirely without depending on anything else. But it is not merely a sectarian discipline limited to the yogins, but is rather a universal discipline that is adopted to some extent by almost all the religious sects of the Hindus. Its chief merit lies in its being a practical religion free from all dogmas and presuppositions, and thus, having no dogma of its own, it does not conflict with any system. Its method is entirely scientific, every step in the graded course of discipline being based on experimental realisation. Although it is distinguished as theistic Sāl khya from Kāpila-Sā khya, commonly regarded as atheistic, still the position that God occupies in the system of Pata-jali is very unimportant. The end or the goal isyoga, but this yoga is not union with God, as we have interpreted it previously, but is samadhi or the suppression of the changing states of the mind. Not the realisation of God, but the realisation of the Pure Ego or the Self, is the goal to be achieved. Meditation of God only forms one of the many methods of attaining concentration. It is really interesting to find that Hinduism, so often charged with narrow-minded sectarianism, could preach a universally accepted

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religious system which did not feel the least hesitation in declaring worship of God to be only a means,Ñand that also not an indispensable one,Ñto the realisation of the goal.

Pata-jali accepts the Sa khya view of bondage and liberation. The bondage of the Purula (self) is due to ignorance and indiscrimination (aviveka), and liberation (kaivalya) can come from discriminative knowledge (vive-kakhyāti) alone. The bondage manifests itself through the fivefold miseries (kleśas) which human beings become subject to in consequence of a mistaken identification of the pure, cetana Puru a and the unconscious (jaLa) Prak ti or rather the sattva aspect of Prak ti. The miseries are (1) Ignorance (avidyā), (2) egoism (asmitā), (3) attraction (rāga), (4) repulsion (dvel la) and (5) willingness to live (abhiniveśa). All of them result from want of discrimination between the pure Self and unconscious PrakLti, between Citand jalla, which somehow have become joined together from beginningless time, which joining and connection have veiled the real nature of both Puru la and Sattva, of Cit and jal a, and have made their discrimination difficult. As soon as the real nature of the Purula or the Self is apprehended through samadhi, when all the modifications of citta are suppressed, discrimination results and its conjunction with Prak ti ceases, putting an end to all the miseries. All karmas result from the kleśas (miseries) and cease with their cessation. The Purul la thus becomes liberated and remains ever in its serene purity and eternal freedom.

Although, in theory, Pata-jali accepts the Sa khya view, he recommends an absolutely different method for the attainment of the end. The Salkhya follows the intellectual method and seeks to attain the required discrimination through reason directly. But the Yoga system prescribes a different method for attaining the necessary discrimination. It is primarily a voluntaristic system that hopes to develop reason through the education and exercise of the will. The discrimination comes as a result of samädhi where the will is perfectly fixed and absolutely controlled. The Yoga thus begins with the regulation of the will and prescribes regulated conduct (yama and niyama) at the very beginning of the course of spiritual discipline. Reason cannot establish its supremacy over an unruly and uncontrolled will, and thus the Sa Ikhya method is not helpful to one having a perverted will. Thus there arises a miserable cleavage between the intellect and the will, and Ôthe bondage of PassionÕ, as Spinoza puts it, continues in spite of the argumentations put forward by the intellect. But when reason unfolds itself through the

concentrated and controlled will, it attains an easy mastery over passions which cannot raise their heads because of the cessation of all opposition and dualism between intellect and will. The perfected will becomes identical with reason, and when the modifications of citta cease, the Pure Self manifests itself in its native splendour and glory.

The Yoga System is methodologically different from the Sal khya and the Vedänta in another important respect. While the Sā khya seeks to control the lower by means of the higher, the sense-organs by means of the mind, the mind by means of the Buddhi and so on, the Yoga proceeds from the opposite direction and hopes to get hold of the higher with the help of the lower. Here the mind is sought to be controlled through the regulation of breath (prā āyāma) and the posture of the body (asana). Although the Yoga holds that the mind can be controlled by means of physiological processes, it is not to be regarded as a materialistic system on that account. The mind (manas) and the intellect (buddhi) are products of unconscious (ja la) Prakl ti, according to the Sal khya; and hence, according to the western conception of materialism, the Sāl khya and the Yoga may very well be regarded materialistic. But we should be very cautious before we interpret these systems as materialistic in the western sense of the term. Both the Sā khya and the Yoga hold the independent and fundamental existence of the Purul la which is Pure Cit (spirit) and maintain that all the activities of the Prak Iti are for the PuruLa. Thus we find that here materialism is not opposed to spiritualism but is rather absorbed in the latter. It does not find any contradiction or inconsistency in maintaining that while the mind is the product of Matter or Prak ti, Prak ti herself works for the benefit and enjoyment of the Spirit (Purula).

The Yoga System has discovered the secret connection between prala (breath) and manas (mind), and the Yoga claims to have attained a scientific truth and discovered a law in this respect. Although Pata-jali also refers to vairāgya (detachment) as a complementary means for the control of the mind,2thus hinting at the Sāl khya method, it is clear that the emphasis has been laid on abhyasa (constant practice) signifying the lower method.

The Hindu believes that the conscious life of reason and will is only the surface-level of a wider and more expansive mental life of 1.Pāta-jala Sūtras I, 34; and II, 48. 2.Pāta-jala Sūtras I, 12 and 16.

the individual, and the modern view of the sub-conscious mental life, as manifested in hypnotic and clairvoyant phenomena, has a deeper

significance and a larger meaning for him. Such a sub-conscious, which is not infra-conscious at all but is rather a widening of surface- consciousness, is not the irrational or rather the non-rational, crude beginning of mental life out of which the conscious life of reason emerges, but is the expansive field of consciousnessÑ undivided and unlimited, and is the real life of reason and will which all mental processes point towards as their source, substratum and goal. The Pure Self or Cit that is apprehended or ÔappreciatedO when the divergent flow of modifications (vltti) stops or ceases, is nothing other than this vast expansive region of consciousness (bhūmā caitanya). So, while the significance of the Hindu view of this Pure Self or Cit is being increasingly brought home to us by the modern emphasis on the sub- conscious and, in fact, finds a great deal of support from the recent developments in modern psychology, it is to be borne in mind that the Pure Cit of the Hindu is still something more than what the modern conception of the sub-conscious implies. The Pure Cit is really infinite (bhūma) and transcends the distinction of sub-consciousness and surface-consciousness. The sub-conscious, so far as it is supposed to be infra-conscious and anti-intellectualistic, being more irrational than rational, has no similarity with theBhūmā Cit. The sub-conscious helps us to understand the conception of Pure Cit only so far as it shows us the possibility of a more expansive consciousness than our ordinary consciousness. Modern psychology has shown us a deeper layer of consciousness which is infinitely more powerful than our surface- consciousness and which forms our real Self. That suggestions given to the sub-conscious Self are capable of controlling all our physical and mental processes and of working apparent miracles, has been abundantly proved by recent psychological observations. We may take this hint from modern psychology and attempt to interpret the Yoga and the Sāl khya on this line. The Yoga attempts to arouse and modify our subconscious Self indirectly through the help of physiological processes such as prā āyāma (regulation of breath) etc .; the Sā khya attempts a different line through intellectual exercise and direct ratiocination. We may notice another important point of difference. Modern Psychology explains how the conscious is modified and controlled by the sub-conscious, but the Yoga System further shows us how we can modify the sub-conscious by the conscious, how the accumulations of the repeated exercises of processes of surfaceconsciousness help to influence the sub-conscious depths and modify them permanently.3

The Yoga may very well be described as the science of mental discipline. The perfect control or inhibition of the modifications or modes of consciousness (cittav_tti) is the end to be attained, and this

is obtained in different degrees in the varying forms of samādhi. The samādhi state is the fruition and consumma-tion of the dhyāna state or the stage of meditation, and here the object alone occupies the field of consciousness, the thought of the distinction between the meditator and the meditated even being absent.4The highest form of samādhi is nirvikalpa or nirvīja (objectless and supportless), where the self shines pure and single, being absolutely undisturbed by any modification or even the tendency to any modification whatsoever. Here the nirodha (suppression) is complete, and the isolation of PuruLa and Sattva (PrakIti) is perfect. The different stages of the savikalpa or savīja (having an object or support) samādhi gradually prepare the yogin for the attainment of the nirvikalpa state. This really objectless and supportless samādhi yields the realisation of the genuine nature (svarūpa) of the Self, and attaining this state of perfect isolation, one becomes absolutely free from the bondage of births and deaths resulting from indiscrimination. This state of complete isolation is attained through the highest stage of indifference (para vairāgya) or the divine discontent that knows no satiety. Through repeated attempts at perfectly emptying the consciousness of all modificactions whatsoever, a permanent disposition towards inhibition becomes established, and a spontaneity is attained in this direction.5There is a great gap between savikalpa and nirvikalpa samādhi, and nothing but vairāgya or dissatisfaction with the state already attained in the highest form of sampraj-āta samādhi can bridge over the gulf. Persistence in and repeated efforts at transcending the sampraj-āta state can alone lead one to the objectless state. The mind at first becomes accustomed to be concentrated on gross things (vitarka samādhi) and gradually learns to concentrate on fine and subtle objects (vicāra samādhi). Both of these forms of samādhi have some object as their support. The mind

3. Te pratiprasavaheyā sūkl mā Pāta-jala Sūtras II, 10. 4.Pāta-jala Sūtras III, 3. 5.Ibid.I, 18.

or the citta becomes fully flavoured (väsita) with the object and, in fact, assumes the shape of the object. The object gives its own stamp to the mind (citta) and shines alone in the field of consciousness. The subject recedes in the background because of the extreme emphasis on the object. The samadhi state may be generally described as one in which the subject and the object do not appear as distinct but become identified as one. In the ānanda and the asmitā samādhi (the two higher forms of savikalpa samādhi), the emphasis gradually recedes from the object to the subject, and the subject itself presents as the object, and although not entirely objectless like the nirvikalpa, they are

to a very large extent free from the foreignness and outsideness of the object, and are really intermediate between vitarka and vicāra samādhi on the one hand, which have some outside object as their support, and nirvikalpa samādhi, which has no object whatsoever, on the other. In every form of samādhi, there is some sort of tripulīvilaya or some amount of receding of the triune division of consciousness into the subject, object and process. Either the subject, or the object, or even the process itself, attains supremacy and seems to occupy the whole field of consciousness for the time being, and samadhi has really been classified into these three heads according as it has as its support in one or the other of these three. But it is to be noted carefully that although the division into the subject, object and the process does not present itself clearly in the samädhi state, due to the emphasis in each case on one or other of the three elements, still the tripartite consciousness or tripulli is not altogether absent in any of the forms of sampraj-āta or savikalpa samādhi. It is only in the nirvikalpa state that the tripuli vanishes entirely, and there is no division into subject, object and process. Thus the tripul ivilaya holds only relatively with regard to other forms of samadhi and absolutely only to the nirvikalpa which alone is really nirvīja and asampraj-āta (objectless and divisionless).

The mind prepares itself for samādhi through dhāra ā and dhyāna (concentration and meditation). Dhāra a is described as the fixing of the mind at some particular centre of the body or on some object,6and dhyāna is defined as the ceaseless and uninterrupted flow of the same state of consciousness.7 The samādhi praj-ā (intuition gained in the samādhi state) is absolutely unerring, and only the deep diving into the transparent lake of consciousness

6.Pāta-jala Sūtras III, 1. 7.Ibid.III, 2.

beneath the ceaseless flow of mental modifications, running in divergent directions, can reveal truth. Inference and testimony can give us only knowledge of the general nature of things; the individualities and peculiarities of things always elude their grasp.8 Ordinary sense-perception also is deceptive at times; and, therefore, for the correct view of things, we have to rely on samādhi intuitions. By means of pratyāhara (withdrawal), the mind collects itself from divergent channels and through concentration and meditation becomes firmly seated on the object. Although yoga is defined as suppression (nirodha) of the mental states, it involves, in reality, an expansion. The stream gains in intensity and strength when its flow in divergent directions is checked and suppressed. For practising

concentration any object that suits the taste of the individual may be taken recourse to. Meditation of God, or of a person who has risen above worldly pleasures and pains, above all attractions and repulsions, or of any luminous body, or of any other wordly object, may equally solve the purpose. Here we find the truly scientific nature of the Yoga system. God and the wordly objects are placed on the same footing as means towards the attainment of concentration.

The Yoga system regards moral and physical discipline to be indispensable preliminaries to spiritual progress. Yama(control) and niyama (regulation) sum up all that may be included under moral discipline, while āsana (postures of the body) and prālāyāma (regulation of breath) constitute the physical. The regulation and control of the moral life; strict purity of both body and mind; truthfulness in deed, words and thought; abstinence from cruelty, stealth and sensual pleasures in thought as well as in deed; Ñare some of the virtues that must be acquired before one can aspire to attain the yogic state. The strength of the body is to be gained by means of the various forms of sana (postures of the body) and regulation of breath (pral lāyāma). Pratyāhāra and dhārā aÑ withdrawal and concentration or fixationÑbecome easy to one who has acquired a controlled will, through yama and niyama, and a well-disciplined strong body, through the practice of āsana and prā āyāma. Dhyāna (meditation) comes as a result of repeated attempts at concentration, and samādhi ensues as the natural

8. Śrutānumānapraj-ābhyāmanyavi ayā viśe ārthatvāt. Ibid.I, 50. Nahi viśesela k tasa- keta śabda VyāsaOs commentary on the above.

completion of the long continued flow of meditation. Prala is the Primal Vital Energy, and it is so intimately related to the mind that the slightest change in the one induces change in the other. The breath is regarded as the index of the mind, and the regulation of the breath is taken recourse to in order to regulate the mind. The healthy regulation of breath produces a harmonious circulation which leads to a healthy working of the nerves and the brain, which, again, corresponds to the harmonious working of the mind. The Yoga system is broadly divided into two sub-divisions,ÑHa ha-Yoga and Rāja- Yoga. The former lays emphasis on the physical processes, while the latter emphasises the mental process of concentration and meditation. In Pata-jali we have the combination of both these forms.

One of the four chapters of the Sūtras of Pata-jali is devoted to bibhūtis or miraculous powers attained by the yogin. These powers are by themselves not of much spiritual value, and it is possible to attain

the highest spiritual realisation without these powers. Far from being aids to spiritual progress, they very often retard progress and become causes of the downfall of the yogin. The yogin, who is allured by the pleasures and glories that those powers bring with them, cannot rise higher up and often, through excessive misuse and abuse, loses his powers and becomes degraded. But from another standpoint the powers are of great utility. Every process has its attendant bibhūti or power, and the attainment of the power indicates that the process has been successfully performed and completed, and that the yogin has made himself fit for the next higher step. The powers naturally follow from the successful accomplishment of the processes and, as such, demonstrate the utility and efficacy of the processes themselves. The Yoga system claims to be an experimental science and undertakes to demonstrate the results of the disciplinary practices at every step. The bibhūtis (miraculous powers) generate confidence in the mind of the yogin as to the infallibility of the Yoga system and thus encourage him in his arduous and difficult task of attaining the goal.9

The Yoga system finds out that reason cannot uproot the miseries and dispel ignorance, because, working in the surface level of consciousness, it cannot cope with the permanent dispositions (sal skaras) of the mind. The whole man must rise up and awake

9.VācaspatiÕs Tīkāon Yoga SūtrasIII, I.

and fight against the dispositions and permanent tendencies of the mind that are obstructive to his best welfare. The discrimination between Cit and jala, between Spirit and matter, that is necessary for final emancipation, can only result from infinite expansion of the physical and the mental sides of our life. All expansion comes from methodical exercise and regulated control of faculties and powers. The Yoga system seeks to apply this secret knowledge, viz. that methodical and regulated exercise alone can yield expansion, to the practical side of the Hindu religion. It advocates the regulated exercise of the body and its vital process, the methodical control of the will, and the slow and gradual growth of reason, as the indispensable preliminaries to the full and perfect spiritual development. The narrow, piecemeal development of reason to the neglect of the other sides of life cannot yield the expansion that is needed. The physical, the moral and the intellectual sides of life must be developed together in order that all- round progress may be attained. Regulation and control do not suppress but expand, and these are the only ways of expansion and development.

The Yoga seems to be preliminary to the Vedānta. The discrimination

that is finally yielded by the Yoga is regarded by the Vedānta as only a preparatory discipline to the attainment of j-āna. The Yoga is suited to those in whom reason has not yet established its natural supremacy, while the Vedanta is only for the decidedly philosophical type of people who are guided by Reason alone.

9

The Path of Knowledge

The J-ana line of Sādhana is fundamentally different from all other forms and stands really unique in the history of the world. It is not the worship of God as an object different from the self and is not a discipline that leads to the attainment of anything distinct from oneOs own self. It may be described as ātmopāsanā (the worship of God as oneOs Self). It is a discipline that believes in the absoluteness of the self and recognises no other reality than the ätman or the self. It finds consummation1in the realisation of the true nature of the Self which is identical with Brahman or the Absolute. OThe Self is dearer than the son, dearer than wealth, dearer than everything else, and is the innermost essence of beings.Ó2The body and the life contained in it are nearer to the self than the outward things, viz., son and wealth, but the self is even more adjacent than the body or the vital breath. Therefore, the self is the nearest and, as such, the dearest thing in this universe and this self is to be realised and attained. The realisation of the self by the self is not like the knowledge of the not-self by the self, not like the attainment of an object by the subject, is not the result of a process and is not dependent on any condition. That which is dependent on a process and is conditional is fleeting and temporary, and so, the worship of an objectÑ(anātman) by the subject (ātman) must, at the last step, give us something that

1. Tadāhuryad brahmavidyaya sarval 8.BLh. Up.I, iv, 9. 120 bhavilyanto manulyā manyante. 2.BDh. Up.I, iv,

is not permanent. If the Absolute or God is worshipped as an object, if He is in any way supposed to be different from the self, if there is the slightest interval (vyavadhäna) between Him and His worshipper; if, in short, He is supposed to be grasped or realised by the subject which even partially falls short of Him, it necessitates a process (kriyā) to bridge over the gap, and what comes as the result of a process cannot be permanent. The J-āna-märga recognises this inherent defect in all other forms of Sādhanā but ātmopāsanā, where the self worships not anything different from itself but merely its own higher essence. Pure consciousness or Cit which has been expressed by the terms ÔatmanÕ and Brahman in the Upani ads has no gap (anantara) and no ÔoutsideÕ or ÔotherÕ (abahya), and is thoroughly a homogeneous identity (ekarasa). Unless the Cit, that manifests itself as the subject in the individual (jīva), realises such an absolutely homogeneous, innermost essence and becomes merged in, or rather identifies itself with the same, there cannot be mukti or release from the bondage of repeated births and deaths, and there is no conscious attainment of

immortality. As Cit or the inner essence of the spirit is perfectly homogeneous (ekarasa) and does not admit of any self-division (anantara), it is not liable to destruction, and true immortality or perfect freedom and unconditionality mark its natural characteristics.

In other forms of Sādhana, God is realised as an object, as something different from the subject. In the highest stage of realisation, according to the Bhakti-märga, there is the realisation of God both within and without (antarbahi sāk lātkāra).3In the sampraj-āta samādhi state of Pata-jali, there is the shining of the object as it is in itself. There remains a thorough object-consciousness in both of these experiences. Through constant meditation the interval between the subject and the object is gradually bridged over, and ultimately, when the subject or the thinker-element is completely swallowed up, as it were, by the object, then the experience of the Absolute results. But even at the highest stage of such realisation, the critical mind may question the value and truth of these experiences, inasmuch as the experience comes as something different from and other than the experiencer. The Absolute Idea of Hegel, although free from contradiction, appears to finite reason to be the highest synthesis of all theses and antitheses. But, after all, the gap between the finite and the infinite requires a further criterion for its validity.

3.Bhaktisandarbha, para. 1.

The realisation through meditation and love, which Royce4and McTaggart5in the West, and the Bhakti schools in India, have emphasised, or the realisation through argumen-tation and analysis, which the Nyaya Philosophy relies on, or the realisation through higher speculation and synthesis, which the Sā Ikhya and Hegel have adopted, are all cases of realisation ofsomething bythe subject, and as such, are indirect (vyavadhānavat) and hence require an additional proof for their veracity. But the realisation that the Vedānta aspires after is something that results when even the least interval (vyavadhāna) between the subject and the object disappears, and where the Pure Cit shines as the self and does not appear either as the subject or as the object, where there is no subject-object consciousness at all, where there is no apprehension ÔofO something ÔbyÕ some other thing, where the distinctionless and divisionless apprehension establishes its native fundamentality and superiority over the determinate perceptions of ordinary consciousness.

So long as anything other than the self is worshipped, it is an indirect worship. It is true that very few people will deny that Cit or the Spirit is the underlying reality, and all that appears as the object depends for

its existence on that Cit. But whereas in other forms of Sādhana, we worship the object (anätman) and hence worship the Cit in disguise, the J-āna-Sādhana begins with Cit directly and realises it, pure and naked. However one may conceive of God as the Absolute Spirit or Pure Cit, still so long as it is held that God is to be realised as an object, He becomes jala, anātman, because all objects are such. The J- ana Sadhana is a worship of the Higher Self by the lower Self, of the atman by the purified mind, of the Cit by the Cit. Here realisation is not the attainment of something that was not, or that is foreign to the self, but is only the unfolding of the latent infinitude of the apparently finite. The appearance of the Infinite as the finite, the manifestation of the Absolute as the relative, of the Omniscient as the ignorant, is the working of Māya. Logically, the finite can never be deduced from the Infinite, and the finite can never reach the Infinite. The Vedānta holds that in the religious consciousness the finite does not reach the Infinite, but it is the

4. The Conception of God, p. 260. 5. OI want to assert that as life became perfect, all other elements would actually die awayÑthat knowledge and volition would disappear, swallowed up in a higher reality, and that love would reveal itself not only as the highest thing, but as the only thing in the universe.Ó Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, p. 252.

Infinite that realises its own infinitude. What appears to be the finite individual is not really finite but infinite, the finitude being only the superimposition of Māyā.

The Vedäntic doctrine of the distinctionless Cit as the ultimate Reality rests on its logic of Identity. The changes that a thing seems to assume do not affect the thing itself but are merely superimpositions on its identical essence. The manifold appearances cancel one another leaving the undifferentiated identity at their background and source as the only real. The nirvikalpa perception that is free from all relational content is the fundamental experience upon which the relational (savikalpa) experience is superimposed. The relational consciousness involves a contradiction inasmuch as it fails to retain the identity of things. If instead of saying ÔS is SÕ, we say ÔS is PÕ, we have to answer the question, how is P related to S? P is either different from or not different from S. If P is different from S, the proposition involves a false statement; on the other hand, if P is not different from S, then it is equal to the statement ÔS is S.Õ In no case, then, are we entitled to go beyond Identity. Again, nonidentity or difference (bheda) cannot be maintained because of the following argument also: Does the difference lie in things distinct or non-distinct (bhinne vā abhinne va)? If we hold the first, that the distinction lies in things distinct, then this would lead to infinite regress, inasmuch as we shall

have to answer the same question with regard to the difference (bheda) that causes the distinction of these distinct things. If, on the other hand, we take up the second alternative, then that would be supporting a contradiction, viz., that difference exists in non-distinct things. As we cannot support difference in either of the alternatives, we are compelled to subscribe to the doctrine of Identity. Madhusūdana argues that if difference be regarded as of the nature (svarūpa) of things, then the apprehension of the difference of two things, such as a pillar and a jar, involves a petitio principii; because the jar can be known as different from the pillar only when the pillar has been known previously; and the pillar can be known as different from the jar only through a prior knowledge of the latter.6It is to be noted in this connection that the

6. Bhedasya svarūpatve ... stambhakumbhayo parasparabhedagrahoOnyonyabheda- grahasāpek a iti anyonyaśrayal.

Advaitasiddhi, p. 787, N.S. Edition. See also Ma lanaOs arguments in his Brahmasiddhi, discussed in Das GuptaOs A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II; Citsukhi, pp. 166Đ67; and Vivaraa, p. 33.

Vedäntic conception of the nirvikalpa state is very different from the Nyāya view. The Nyāya infers an undifferentiated, non-relational state below the threshold of consciousness in order to explain the relational experience of the conscious level. The nirvikalpa state is a mere presupposition of conscious experience rather than a definite content of experience. The Vedanta and the Mima sa, on the contrary, hold that the nirvikalpa or the non-relational apprehension is a thing of direct experience and is rather the fundamental form of experience upon which relations are imposed.7The non-relational state of apprehension is not only above the threshold but transcends and sublates all relational consciousness. Rāmanuja, on the other hand, would maintain that the fundamental experience is not absolutely non-relational. Although the relational content is not so explicit in the primary experience, still it is not a pure identity devoid of all relational content. His ÔnirvikalpaO contains materials for relation and is rather an implicit relation not distinctly elaborated and differentiated. Both Śa Ikara and Rāmānuja hold that the nirvikalpa is primary and that the savikalpa comes later, in opposition to the Nyāya view which regards the savikalpa to be the immediate experience and the nirvikalpato be inferential and derivative. But whereas Sa karaOs ÔnirvikalpaÕ is an absolutely distinctionless and divisionless identity, RāmānujaÕs ÔnirvikalpaÕ is merely an implicitly differentiated background that develops into relations. Rāmānuja holds that indeterminate perception cannot be the apprehension of an absolutely undifferentiated object, because all knowledge has as its object

something that is qualified by some specific attribute. When an individual is perceived for the first time, we have an indeterminate perception; when we perceive it for the second time, there are recognition and memory which turn the indeterminate into a determinate perception. This is very much like the distinction which some psychologists draw between perception as cognition and perception as recognition. The Buddhist regards the non-relational, direct experience of the particular as alone valid. The relational or conceptual knowledge that arises in its train is not the true measure of reality. The perception involving judgment is a synthesis of a subjective and an objective factor or, strictly speaking, is a transmuted idea remotely derived from the objective datum. It is not true and its validity is nil.8

7. Cf. Śāstradīpikā, pp. 109Đ112. 8.Cf. Nyayabindu and DharmottaraOs Commentary, Ch. I. And also Tattvasa graha Śls. 1206 ff.

The Sa khya and the Vedanta declare that bondage and misery owe their origin to Ignorance, and that it is knowledge alone that can remove them. Freedom results from right knowledge, that is, knowledge of the ultimate and the Absolute Reality, knowledge of the Eternal order of the Universe. Socrates taught us similarly that virtue was knowledge, and Spinoza also declared that freedom was identical with absolute knowledge, and that eternal happiness and the highest possible satisfaction of the mind could spring only from knowledge sub specie aeternitatis. The Upanilads and the Bhagavadgīta abound in passages9which clearly indicate emphasis on J-ana or Knowledge as the only way to salvation.

It is very difficult, indeed, to understand exactly what the Upanilads and the Bhagavadgīta mean by the terms Ôj-anamO and vij-ānam.Õ It is clear enough that we are not to mean by such words anything of the nature of what we ordinarily mean by knowledge. If we take the ordinary sense of the terms, we cannot explain such passages as:

ÒAnyadeva tadviditādatho aviditādadhiÓ (Kenopanillad I, 3).

ÒThat is different from all that is known and all that is unknown; that is, it is neither known nor unknown.Ó ÒHe who thinks that Brahman is not known, i.e. is not the object of the processes of knowing, knows it properly; he who thinks that Brahman is known to him, knows it not; so, Brahman is not revealed to those who think that they know, but is revealed to those who think that they know it not10, Ofrom which words come back with the mind, failing to attain it.Ó The Bhagavadgītā also says11: ÒI know all

that is past and present, all that will be and all that has been, but none has been able to know me.O We find also statements in the Upani ads and in the Bhagavadgīta which seem to contradict the view that the ultimate Reality cannot be known. The

9. (a) ÒTarati śokam ātmavit.Ó (b) ÒTameva viditvātim Ityumeti,

Nānya panthā vidyateÕyanaya.Ó (c) ÒBrahmavidāpnoti param.O (d) ÒJ-anena tu tadaj-ānal nāśitamātmana_,

Telām ādityavajj-āna 10.Kenopanillad II, 3. prakāśayati tatparam.Ó

11. VII, 26.

Ka hopani lad clearly statesÑ manasaivedamava-ptavyam.12ÒIt is to be attained through the mind and mind alone.Ó The Bhagavadgītā, again, says13: ÒHe who knows me as beginningless and as never born and as the Lord of the universe, etc.Ó, OHe who finds me everywhere, and sees everything in me, etc.Ó14

These contradictory passages clearly indicate that the Upani ads and the Bhagavadgīta have in view a different kind of apprehension of the ultimate Reality from what we are familiar with in ordinary knowledge. While denying straightforwardly that there can be any knowledge of the Absolute in the ordinary sense, they proclaim loudly that experience of the Absolute is not only possible, but that this experience is of the nature of aparok anubhūti, the most direct and intimate, the clearest and the fullest experience, and that this experience alone gives us salvation. It is not only the source of infinite joy and happiness, but is itself the fullness of feeling, the blissful state which has been described as ānandam. It is this experience or Ôaparok änubhūtiÕ that has been identified with the ultimate Reality and also with the stage of liberation or mukti. This experience or anubhūti is our goal, and, when attained, it reveals its superiority over every other experience or type of experience.15This j-ana leads to liberation and is at the same time the liberated state; and it is, therefore, that in the Bhagavadgīta we find the ultimate Reality described as both Ôj-ānamÕ and Ôj-ānagamyamÕ, as the goal as well as the means to attain the goal. This experience or anubhūti is, in a sense, beginningless and endless, and thus coincides with the ultimate Reality having these characteristics. When one attains this experience, one feels and sees that it was there from all eternity, and that it did not begin to exist from any moment. It was only enveloped somehow in ignorance, and when this ignorance is removed, it shines out in its full glory. It is to be understood clearly that the Absolute or the

ultimate Reality is not any thing or object

12. IV, 11. 13. X, 3. 14. VI, 30. 15.Cf. Plato OIn the world of knowledge the essential form of the good is the limit of our enquiry, and can barely be perceived; but when perceived, we cannot help concluding that it is in everv case the source of all that is bright and beautiful: in the visible world giving birth to light and its master, and in the intellectual world dispensing immediately and with full authority, truth and reason.Ó The Republic, Book VII.

and, therefore, its knowledge is very different from knowledge of objects.16To know it is to be it. In the Mu aka Upanilad17we find the sayingÑBrahma veda brahmaiva bhavati. This saying can be appreciated only when we understand that Brahman is of the nature of experience (anubhūti), because to know an anubhava is to have the anubhava or experience, and it is to be it. It is from this standpoint alone that we can also understand such sayings as Olesser than the least, greater than the greatestO,18OIt is at once far and nearÓ,19 Òit is neither existent nor non-existent.Ó20All these seemingly contradictory characteristics apply to j-āna or anubhūti. So long as we do not attain the experience, that is, so long as we do not have it, it seems very far from us and hardly attainable; but as soon as it is attained, we feel that it was very near to us, that it was within our hearts. A moment before its revelation it seemed to be non-existing, but now, when it is attained, it is realised that it has been existing from all eternity.

A distinction has always been drawn in Vedäntic 1iterature between parok aj-āna and aparok ānubhūti. Sometimes the word Ôvij-ānaÕ is used to indicate the latter. In the Bhagavadgītā (XVIII, 42) we find that Śrīdhara Svamin, in his commentary, explains Ôj-ānamO to mean ÔŚāstrīyal j-ānam,Õ i.e., knowledge that is acquired through the reading of the Sästras, and differentiates it from Ôvij-anam,Õ which is intended to mean anubhava or realisation or appreciation or direct acquaintance. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī also explains ÔvijnanamÕ as the ÔanubhavaÕ or realisation of the identity of the self and the Brahman. Again, while commenting on Ôj-ānavij-ānat ptātmā kū astho vijitendriya lÕ (VI, 8), Madhusūdana Sarasvatī says that it is direct realisation in oneOs anubhava of what has been previously ascertained by argumentsÑtadaprāmālyaśa-kānirākara-l laphalena vicāre a tathaiva tel lal svānubhavenāparok līkaral am. This clearly indicates that parok a and aparok a j-āna are different. Again, the fruits of the two are mentioned to be different. Parok la j-āna or inferential and indirect knowledge only redeems wrong actions performed unconsciously, but aparok a j-āna or direct realisation dispels the root

cause of all actions, viz., the primaeval Ignorance, just as the midday sun dispels all darkness.

16. BL h Up. Bhāllya I, iv, 7. 17. Yo ha vai tatparamal brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati. II, ii. 9. 18.Ka hopanillad II, 20. 19.Mu laka III, i, 7 and Bhagavadgītā XIII, 15. 20.Bhagavadgītā XIII, 12.

The Vedantic distinction between parokl la and aparokl la is different from the Nyaya-Vaise ika and the Buddhist distinction. According to the Nyaya system, the contact with the sense-organs (indriyasannikar a) is essential to aparok a or pratyak a j-āna,21 and where this relation is wanting, it is parok la. The manner of cognising thus determines its parok atva and aparok atva. According to the Buddhist, it is not the manner of cognising, but the nature of the object of cognition, that determines the distinction.22According to the Vedäntist, however, the nature of the cognition itself distinguishes parokla j-āna from aparok a j-āna. If there is cognition of existence merely, and only the barriers covering the existence (sattāvara la) of the object are removed, it is parok a j-ana; on the other hand, if not only the existence of the object is cognised, but the object is revealed in its svarüpa, that is, the barriers covering the revelation (prakasavara a) of the object are removed, then there is aparokl la j- ana. The Vedantins have dis-tinguished three states or stages of veils (āvara as) which are due to Nescience (avidyā). Nescience (aj-āna) is accordingly divided into three categories, viz., asattāpādakāj-āna (that which causes the thing to appear as nonexistent)Ñthe nescience veiling the existence aspect of the reality which is Spirit (2) abhānāpādakāj-āna, that is, that which covers its revealing aspect and makes it non-revealing, and (3) the anānandāpādakāj-āna, that is, that which covers the bliss-aspect of the Spirit. The first veil is removed by indirect, discursive knowledge (parokla j-āna). The second veil is removed by partially direct knowledge which we have in our self- consciousness. The third is destroyed only by full intuition (aparokLānubhūti).23

Now, what do we mean by this Ô aparok lanubhutiÕ? It is the most direct and intimate realisation of oneOs own self by the self. When and where the self is conscious of itself not through the intervention of anything forming the not-self, then the self may be said to have an aparok ānubhūti of itself. Nothing but the self shines then,Ñthe distinction of the knower, the known and the knowing, Ñthe division into the agent, the object, and the action is nullified or submerged in the self. This stage is described in the BL hadāraLyaka Upani lad as follows:240Where everything has been submerged in the

21. IndriyasannikarLalakLala pratyakl ah. Siddhāntamuktāvalī. 22.Cf. ArthaparokLatvameva j-ānāparok atvam. 23.Advaitasiddhi, Siddhāntabindu, and Pa-cadaśī, Ch. VII. 24. Yatra vā asya sarvamātmaivābhūt ... tat kena ka vijānīyāt. II, iv, 14.

self, and when the self alone shines, through which instrument will anything be known?O This is realisation of the self not through any karal a or instrument such as manas or buddhi, etc., but this is realisation of the self by itself when all karalas or instruments have ceased to operate. Ex hypothesi, there can be such aparok ānubhūti in a single case, viz., the selfÕs realisation of itself (ätmabodha). In every other experience, however much we may approach this aparok anubhūti, we still fall short of the same. This realisation, as we shall show later, is altogether different from the ordinary ways of knowing. It is really advitiyam (without a second) and there is nothing like it. Sa kara took great pains to establish this fact, viz., that this aparok ānubhūti or ātmabodha is something transcendent in nature, and that even the nearest approximation to it is something altogether different from it. When a person has this aparok ānubhūti, he feels himself free from every sort of bondage, and discovers his real svarūpa (essence) which was never in bondage. This ÔanubhūtiO once attained, is never lost.25In other instances of immediate knowledge, e.g., in the perception of the jar, the veil is withdrawn only temporarily, and the unveiling persists only so long as the modalised consciousness, viz. the process of perception, endures, the curtain of ignorance again covering the object as soon as the process of cognition passes away. But in the immediate apprehension of Brahman, the Primal Ignorance is removed permanently, and hence nothing remains which could again veil the object. Thus, the intuition of Brahman, once gained, is never lost and endures for ever, and we shall see that this is the point of difference between the aparok lanubhūti of Sal kara and the samādhi of Pata-jali.

In the West, the law of relativity reigns supreme in the sphere of knowledge. Knowledge is a relation between the self and an object forming the not-self. Even when we come to Hegel, we find that the thesis necessarily involves the antithesis, and that the synthesis harmonises and reconciles the opposition within itself. Every individual self acquires its meaning through its relation to other selves in the society. Self-consciousness involves a distinction

25. Ghalādau gha ādigocarav ttikāle evāparok yam, tadv ttyuparame tu punaraj-ā- nāntarak tabhedaprāptyā svavyavahārānukūlacaitanyābhedābhivyaktyabhāvāt nāparok lyam, brahmali tu mūlāj-ānanivl Ittau punarāvaranak tabhedāprasaktyā brahmaj- ānānantaral sadaivaparok yamiti visela sūcayati.

K Jananda TirthaOs Commentary on Siddhantalesa, Ch. III.

between the self and the not-self, although the not-self is here not anything material or external. The ideas of the self form the not-self to the self. Self-consciousness is the realisation of self as it is related to its own ideas. But it should be noted that although there is no relation of the self with any Ôother, still relativity is not transcended here. This relational knowledge, however, can hardly be regarded as the ideal of knowledge. To know an object as it is related to other objects or to the self, that is, to know an object from a particular standpoint, is not to know it thoroughly or in its svarūpa. This is relative knowledge and not absolute. Here, as Bergson says, Ôwe move round the objectO and we do not Ôenter into it.O26That should be the ideal of knowledge where we know the object as it really is, and not as it is influenced, mutilated, and disturbed by other objects or even by the subject. It is true that in ordinary cases of knowledge it is not possible to transcend the distinction between the knower and the known, and that it is very difficult to get rid of all disturbing factors or upādhis, but there is no reason why it should not be conceded that such a state, where the object alone shines uninfluenced by any other disturbing factor, if attained, will satisfy the ideal of knowledge. This non- relational state of appreciation is the ideal which ordinary knowledge involving a necessary bifurcation points to, and is generally known by the term ÔintuitionO in Philosophy.

Intuitive knowledge is direct, immediate and non-relational. In this respect, it differs widely from intellectual knowledge and is sometimes sharply contrasted with it. Thought always proceeds through relations and studies reality from a distance. The intellect divides reality into artificial segments and deals merely with concepts or ideas and not with facts. For thought, the division of reality into a ÔthatÕ and a Ôwhat,Õ an ÔexistenceÕ and a Ôcontent,Õ is essential, and Bradley rightly points out that Owithout an idea there is no thinking, and an idea implies the separation of content from existence.Ó This isolation and abstraction form the essence of thinking, and as the intellect can never transcend the dualism of the ÔthatÕ and the Ôwhat,Õ it fails to give us knowledge of reality. In judgment there is always the distinction of idea and reality, and thought is never the thing itself but is merely ofit and about it. Intuition not only possesses the directness and immediacy of senseexperience but also is as unerring and infallible as Instinct. Pata-jali emphasises this aspect of Intuition. Intuition, according to Pata-jali,

26.Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 1.

is lambharā, i.e., absolutely infallible and true, and arises only when there is adhyātmaprasāda, which implies the transparent serenity of

the soul due to oneOs becoming an adept in the concentration on subtle things.27Meditation and concentration (dhyāna and dhāra ā) lead to absorption (samädhi), and it is in this stage of absorption that praj-ā (intuition) results. The subject, at this stage, rises to the level of the object, and the object, being in the same level with the subject, becomes completely and faithfully revealed. The marginal consciousness disappears altogether and the entire field of consciousness becomes saturated by the object. This is really what Pata-jali means by tatstha and tada-janatā.28Bergson might be hinting at some such thing when he describes Intuition as Ôintellectual sympathy.Õ The word ÔsympathyÕ is very suggestive. That the object can be known fully and truly only when the subject places itself in the level of the object is indicated very clearly by the term ÔsympathyÕ. In Bergson, however, it is a bare hint. Pata-jali goes far beyond this mere suggestion indicated by Bergson and explains fully the nature of and the methods of attaining this sympathy, and elaborates this conception of sympathy to its culminating phase in his conception of samādhi as tada-janatā.

Spinoza notices another aspect of Intuition and holds that Intuition gives us the most comprehensive view of things and studies them from the standpoint of eternity. The discursive understanding views things from a very narrow standpoint and can therefore yield only partial knowledge about them. Intuition is Ôunderstanding at a glance and not by a process,O Spinoza says. It gives us knowledge of the whole, and involves a simultaneous and synthetic presentation of the eternal order of things, as distinct from the successive and analytical presentation of the intellect. Pata-jali agrees with Spinoza on this point. His commentator Vyāsa uses the term kramānanurodhī, 29which means that in Intuition the presentation is not gradual and successive but all at once. From intuitive knowledge springs the highest possible satisfaction of the mind, inasmuch as intuitive knowledge depends on the mind so far as the mind is eternal.30It is this aspect of Intuition which distinguishes it very clearly from sense-knowledge and instinct. Instinct is very much

27. Yoga SūtrasI, 48. 28.Ibid.I, 42. 29.Commentary on Sūtra I, 48. 30.Ethics V, 31.

specialised and works in a limited sphere. It lacks comprehensiveness and is almost blind inasmuch as it entirely ignores all other aspects but its own sphere of action. Sense-knowledge is adventitious and represents merely a passing phase of the mind and is very much removed from the working of the eternal aspect of the mind which

Spinoza refers to here. SpinozaÕs intuition is intellectual, It springs from knowledge of the ultimate reality in its aspect of totality and eternity. From this standpoint Intuition seems to be an extension and consummation of reason, and appears to be more intimate with reason than with sense.

Intuition thus has the directness and immediacy of senseexperience, the infallibility of instinct, and the comprehensiveness, permanence and expansion of intellect or reason. Bergson hints at a valuable truth when he declares that Intuition is Oinstinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and enlarging it indefinitelyÓ.31The immediacy of senseexperience disappears in the intellectual level, and the non-relational knowledge gives place to the conceptual and the relational. The expansion that the intellect acquires, is at the expense of directness and infallibility of instinct. Intellect can work in almost every sphere, but the knowledge it gives us is always mediate, indirect and conceptual (parokla). There is a gap between idea and fact, between the conceptual and the real, which the intellect fails to bridge over, and thus it can never give us aparok a, that is, immediate, naked appre-hension of reality. Instinct, again, though infallible, is very much limited in its application. Instinct thus becomes contrasted with Intellect, and they appear as thesis and antithesis. Bergson emphasises the distinction between these two and regards them as merely divergent developments of the original life principle, the ÔLlan vital. O Intuition ought to be regarded as the higher synthesis of instinct and intelligence, which may be characterised as the higher immediacy of reason attained through the mediacy of the intellect and developed from the lower immediacy of sense. Bergson fails to realise the full value of a synthesis, and in his eagerness to fight against the intellectualism of Hegel, fails to appreciate the merit of the dialectic method, which is perhaps the most valuable and permanent contribution of Hegel to the cause of philosophy. The march of life as well as the march of reason is dialectical. The

31.Creative Evolution, p. 176.

undividing, unreflective instinct, negated by the dividing, reflective intellect, fulfils itself in the non-relational comprehensive immediacy of Intuition. Intuition combines in itself the highest discrimination with the highest assimilation. BergsonÕs Intuition is not a synthesis of instinct and intelligence, but is opposed to intelligence and is merely instinct at its best. His extreme anti-intellectualism deprives him of the full benefit of his Intuitionism.

The contention that the self is intuited or realised not as an object is known, but in a way very different from all ordinary ways of knowing, seems to be exactly echoed in AlexanderÕs philosophy, where he introduces the distinction between ÔenjoymentÕ and ÔcontemplationÕ as two kinds of knowledge.32The mind ÔenjoysÕ the act of knowing which is lived by the mind, while it merely ÔcontemplatesÕ the objects presented to it as entities distinct from it. ÔEnjoymentÕ consists in the realisation of the mindOs own act, while ÔcontemplationÕ is the thinking of the object by the subject, of the lower by the higher, which lower is body in relation to the higher which is mind. The mind can ÔenjoyO itself and ÔcontemplateO other objects, but itself cannot be ÔcontemplatedÕ as an object. It could be supposed to be contemplated only if we could find a higher category than mind in relation to which it might form the lower as an object. ÔKnowledge of selfÕ is thus very different from Ôknowledge of an object.Õ In the latter case, the ÔofÕ means reference, while in the former, ÔofÕ means apposition. In knowing an object, the act of knowing is directed upon the object, but in knowing the self, the self consists in the knowledge itself. In other words, there is no knowledge of the self, but knowledge and self are identical. As Alexander says ÒMy self-knowledge is knowledge consisting in myself.Ó33The essence of the mind or the self is awareness; or rather, the mind is identical with awareness. The question of an awareness or knowledge of this awareness can hardly arise, because neither the conception of a self- division into a subject and an object, nor of another mind of which the mind could form an object, is binding on us from the empirical point of view. To be aware of the awareness, which is self, is just to live the awareness, to ÔenjoyO itself in its own act. This ÔenjoymentO of Alexander seems so far almost identical with or at least a very near approach to the Vedāntic

32.Space, Time and Deity I, pp. 12Đ13. 33.Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society IX, 26Đ27.

Ô aparok ānubhūti.Õ A direct apprehension, awareness or realisation that is not the awareness of any object by any subject, where the awareness is the very essence of the thing which is supposed to be cognised, where, in other words, to know is to be, i.e. to realise or enjoy itself,Nseems to be common both to AlexanderOs ÔenjoymentÕ and Sal karaÕs ÔaparoklānubhūtiÕ. AlexanderÕs ÔenjoymentÕ is also something sui generis just as the Vedantic intuition is.34

But when we examine carefully, we find a world of difference between the extreme RealistÕs ÔenjoymentÕ and the extreme IdealistÕs Ôaparok änubhūti. Õ It is the seeming meeting of extremes and not the

actual coincidence of identicals. In every act of knowledge, Alexander thinks, the mind ÔenjoysO its own act and is conscious of itself as an entity distinct from the object it Ôcontemplates.Õ The self is known in Ôenjoyment,Õ the not-self through Ôcontemplation.Õ ÔEnjoymentÕ only serves to point out the distinction of the self from the not-self, which two are distinct entities with Alexander. The distinction between ÔcontemplationÕ and ÔenjoymentÕ is thus helpful in pointing out that the not-self is an entity distinct from the self and is thus not to be supposed as coming out of the self through self-division. Alexander is in dread of the idealistic doctrine of self-consciousness and is not sure as to whether this doctrine or the doctrine of representative perception has caused Othe greater havocÓ in philosophy.35The consciousness of the not-self through ÔcontemplationO is no hindrance to the ÔenjoymentO of the self, in Alexander; but, according to the Vedänta, the faintest trace of the consciousness of the not-self forms the greatest impediment to the realisation of the self. The self is not realised as an entity distinct from other entities forming the not-self, and nothing forms the ÔotherO to the self of the Vedanta. While the self is realised, all notself disappears, because the not-self, being merely a false superimposition on the self, can no longer persist when the locus (adhil lhāna) of the superimposition is perceived. The self cannot be conscious of its existence as a distinct entity by the side of the object; and hence, the ÔenjoymentÕ of the self cannot be simultaneous with the ÔcontemplationÕ of the object. Alexander, in maintaining the simultaneous presence of ÔenjoymentÕ and Ôcontemplation,Õ36the

34. Basis of Realism, ×3. Space, Time and Deity II, p. 75. 35.Basis of Realism, p. 283, × 3. 36.Space, Time and Deity, Vol. I, p. 13.

consciousness of self and of the not-self together, is evidently referring to the dividing mind that is conscious of itself as distinct from the non-mental, to the subject for whom the object is something given as distinct from itself, and not to the self-illumined (svaya prakāśa) self, which is the indivisible prius of all subject and objectconsciousness, and for which there is no division between subject and object. The absence of self-division of the mind proves, for Alexander, not the unreality of objects, but only the independent reality of them; whereas in the Vedänta, the want of self-division of the self proves the falsity of all appearances in the shape of the object and of all object- cognitions. AlexanderÕs ÔenjoymentÕ does not transcend ÔcontemplationÕ but exists side by side with it; the Vedāntic aparok ānubhūti, on the contrary, transcends all objectconsciousness and sublates the same. Alexander opposes objective Idealism by

maintaining that the object does not come out of the mind, and hence becomes a Realist; Sa kara also opposes selfdivision (svagata bheda) and maintains that the object is no part of the self which is experienced to be the only real in aparok anubhūti, and hence is only a super-imposition, a vivarta of the self, and thus becomes an extreme Idealist holding the existence of nothing but the self, pure and unmodified. Both differ from the objective Idealist;ÑAlexander, to become a Realist, Salkara, to become a stricter and a more thorough- going Idealist.

Royce uses the term ÔappreciationÕ instead of ÔintuitionÕ and draws a distinction between Ôthe world of appreciationÕ and Ôthe world of description.37There are many experiences which come to us in such a fashion that although they bring with them the best criterion of reality and affect the deepest core of our hearts, still we cannot apply to them the ordinary categories of space, time, causality, number etc., which are the only available modes of describing reality. We cannot fully (or in some cases, even partially) describe to our fellow-beings what these experiences are and what they do signify. There is something indescribable in them, and this element of indescribability constitutes much of the life of the thing or event. We appreciate the experience, but we cannot describe it. We cannot hold that merely because an experience is indescribable, merely because it cannot be suitably expressed by the rigid

37.The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, pp. 388ff.

categories of the understanding, it is on that account unreal.38 A mother appreciates what motherly affection is, but she cannot describe it, she cannot express how she loves her child. We can not say that an experience is illusory or merely subjective simply because description by the categories of the understanding fails to express it. Rather, we should argue that there are experiences beyond this world of description, and that there is a world of appreciation, where souls communicate with souls without the intervention of the material universe, where the limitations of human experience are transcended, where the ordinary categories have no scope and where altogether different categories are in vogue. When one begins to participate in the world of appreciation, one may begin to realise that the world of description (i.e., the world of science and the world of the ordinary man) is only an appearance, a shadow, of the Ôworld of appreciation.O

Appreciation is the realisation of a thing exactly as it is a part of oneÕs own experience. A person may understand the meaning of a

poem or the reasonableness of an argument, but this is not appreciative knowledge of the poem or the argument. It becomes an appreciation to him only when it becomes a part of the stream of his consciousness. I may be said to have an appreciation of a piece of painting when exactly the same ideas which preceded the actual outlining of the scene in the mind of the artist are reproduced in me; that is, when I, for the moment, coincide with the mind of the artist so far as this particular occupation is concerned. When my will actually coincides with the will of the artist, the manifestation

38. The unreality of the descriptive knowledge is emphasised greatly in the Nyāyabinduand DharmottaraOs Commentary, Ch. I. Cf. Na khalu ikDūkDīragu ādīnā madhurarasabheda śakyal This seems to be an adaptation of Da sarasvatyākhyātum. linÔswords:Ñ

Ikl lūkl liragul lādīnā mādhuryasyāntara mahat, Tathāpi na tadākhyātu sarasvatyāpi śakyate.

Kāvyādarśa 1, 102. This seems to be exactly what Russell means when he says that Ôsense- dataO can be known by ÔacquaintanceO only and not by description. That description falls short of experience by a large distance is proved by the Buddhists (see Tattvasa grahaCh. on Pratyakla) and the Nyāyasūtras(II. 2) on the relation of word and what is implied by it, i.e., the objective reality sought to be represented by it.

of which is the piece of painting, then only I have a real appreciation of the same. There is a great deal of difference between this appreciation and imagination. Imagination is the process where we get only a mental copy of a description, which itself is the outward manifestation or symbolisation of an inner will. In appreciation, on the other hand, the will directly has cognisance of another will. It is a direct acquaintance of the self with another self so far as this is possible. To understand the meaning of a poem through the exercise of oneOs imaginative powers is very different from appreciating it by placing oneself in the position of the poet and experiencing the inner workings in the mind of the poet while he is engaged in mentally composing the poem. The poem itself is a thing in the world of description, while the mental preparation for the poem is an event in the world of appreciation. This appreciation is svarūpa-j-āna, that is, knowing a thing by being it, by identifying the inner life of one with the inner life of another. Material bodies can only be described by us, they cannot be appreciated. We can acquire intellectual knowledge of them, but we can have no appreciation of them. Knowledge through appreciation is something like thought-reading, where the intermediaries or outward expressions of thought have been dispensed with. When the finite will can identify itself with the world-will, it can have an appreciative knowledge of the universe, where the categories of space, time and causality, etc., are hopelessly inadequate and useless. The self can directly know or appreciate only selves, and this

appreciation is knowledge not through the intervention of any expression or outward manifestation or description of an idea. This is the only consistent knowledge by acquaintance. It is not possible to have knowledge by acquaintance of sense-data, as Bertrand Russell supposes,39simply because matter is farthest removed from consciousness, and ÔappreciationÕ or ÔacquaintanceO in its proper sense can exist only between objects which are very intimately related.

There is of course a difference between RoyceÕs Ôappreciation and Śa karaÕs aparok ānubhūti. There may be appreciation by the self of other selves, but there can be aparok anubhūti of only oneOs own self. Royce can speak of a world of appreciation; but in ŚalkaraÕs aparokl lanubhuti, there is no such thing as the world, there is not the least trace of anything but the selfÑekamevādvitīyam

39.Mysticism and Logic, Sec. X, p. 211.

(one without a second). Sa kara tells us of a state of experience where there is unqualified unity, where there is not a society of selves, but where there is only the self, one without a second, pervading the whole of consciousness and so also the whole universe, and resting in its own glory (sve mahimni). This experience is nothing short of the experience of the Absolute and the Infinite. We may here recall the glorious passage in the Chändogya Upani ad describing the Bhūmā:40ÒWhere nothing else can be seen, nothing else can be heard, and nothing else can be known but this, that is the Absolute Experience. That which is limitless is a1so endless or destructionless; so, everything which has a limit is bound to destruction. This Bhūmā rests on its own glory or rather it does not rest on anything at all. This Bhūma is below us and is also above us, is behind us as well as in the front of us, is to the south of us, and to the north of us, this Bhūmā is everything.Ó In aparok anubhūti, when the self finds the self directly, jagat or the material world, which is the source of multiplicity, disappears altogether. All not-self is gone, the not-self even in the form of ideas disappears. Even ideas are, in a sense, detached existences from the self. The ideas seem to come out of the self, and, therefore, to some extent, are distinct from the self. The stage of willing, before there has been any ideation, seems to be more intimate to the self. That which is the prius of all ideation, the stage where there has not been any expression even in the form of ideas, seems to be peculiarly intimate and nearest to the self. At this stage, there is no externality, no outwardness, not the least trace of any not-self. At the stage of ideation, there seems to be an apparent self-division of the self into itself and its ideas as the not-self, although the so-called not-

self is still nothing outside the bigger circle of the self. This is perhaps the stage of selfconsciousness described by Hegel. Although this is an advance on RussellÕs Realism which speaks of acquaintance of sense- data, still it cannot be regarded as a specimen of perfect Idealism, inasmuch as it does not clearly tell us of the stage of primaeval unity where there is not even the distinction of the self and the ideas forming the not-self. It is because of this that the Vedanta speaks of knowledge through ideation and reasoning as parok a and indirect. It wants us to go further still and discover a stage which is prior to the stage of ideation, where the self alone shines, and which it designates by the

40. Chapter VII, 24Đ25.

name of aparok ānubhūti. Knowledge through ideas gives us merely descriptive knowledge, and, therefore, there can be aparok a only of the unmanifested or the avyakta cetana. So, the self cannot have aparokL laof material bodies or of their copies or of sense-data, or even of ideas and memories and images, but it can have aparoksaj -ana only of itself. This knowledge is not so much a knowledge of the thing as it is identical with the thing.

The highest conception of Intuition is found in the Vedänta. Here we find absolutely non-relational knowledge in the strictest sense of the term. Sense-knowledge is not really non-relational or immediate, inasmuch as there is here, in the sub-conscious background, an incipient preparation for a discernment of relations which manifest themselves explicitly as soon as it is superseded by intellectual knowledge into which it passes. That which grows into a relational knowledge cannot be absolutely non-relational, but must at least be implicitly relational. The immediacy of the intuitive experience that transcends (and is thus posterior to) the perception of relations, and not the vague non-relational deliverance of sense that is as yet incapable of discerning relations, can alone be properly termed non- relational. BergsonOs ÔintuitionO also is not really non-relational. It is the concrete and living experience, not yet symbolised in abstract concepts, which one gathers flowing with the stream, so to speak. But this intuition can hardly give us svarūpaj -āna or absolute acquaintance, which Bergson claims for it, because here also an element of relativity remains, viz., the memories and the living experiences constituting the concrete life of the individual.

Moreover, BergsonOs ÔintuitionO is at best an Ôobject-cognition.Õ RoyceÕs Ôappreciation also involves a cognition of the object. But Vedäntic Intuition is not the cognition of any object, nor is it even

self-consciousness as is very often supposed. It is neither the cognition of the object nor of the subject, but it absolutely transcends all subject and object-consciousness. The Vedanta really leads us to a dizzy height in the summits of speculative thinking and takes us to the innermost point in knowledge which seems to contradict itself. It speaks of an intuition or knowledge where there is neither any knower nor anything known, where there is neither the subject nor the object, nor even any process. It requires abstraction of the deepest sort in order to appreciate the truth embodied in this sublime philosophy. It cannot be held that knowledge without the distinction of the knower and the known is an absurd thing, and that the Vedānta, in indulging in these unmeaning and contradictory statements, has really taken a suicidal step. The Vedänta definitely states that the intuition which it speaks of transcends our ordinary, discursive knowledge and implies tripul i-vilaya or annihilation of the threefold division into subject, object and process, involved in ordinary knowledge. Knowledge through an ÔotherO or a not-self is relational and conditional, and therefore, so long as there is the distinction between the knower and the known, the subject and the object, the self and the not-self, the ideal of knowledge or absolute truth is not attained. Hence the Vedänta is in search of absolutely unconditional knowledge which is neither dependent on any object nor on any subject, and it finds this goal realised in its conception of svayal prakāśa j-āna, the nearest English equivalent to which is Ôunconditional revelation.O It is a unique category in the history of human thought, and its supremely transcendent character very often eludes the grasp of even the most powerful intellect. This svaya prakāśa j-āna or intuition does not reside in the subject nor is conditioned by any object, but it rests in its own glory. It is not a process at all, but is an eternal fact; it reveals itself and is never generated or conditioned. The least trace of the not- self, the bare presence of an ÔotherO or any foreign element, in knowledge, whether in the shape of the subject or in the form of the object, is detrimental to its unconditionality and makes it fall short of the ideal. The ätman of the Vedänta, which is very often translated by the word Self, is very different from the subject. The subject is the substratum or seat of knowledge (āśraya), but the ātman is j- ānasvarūpa or revelation itself. Herein lies the difference between HegelÕs Absolute and Sa IkaraOs Brahman. The former represents the category of the Subject as transcending the category of Spinozistic Substance, whereas the latter transcends the category of the Subject as well as that of Substance. The division into the subject and the object falls within the not-self, and the Pure Cit or ätman is above both subject and object. Although the Absolute has sometimes41been described as the seer and the knower, it is to be remembered that

through those statements the Vedanta is merely attempting to lead us to the Highest Reality by means of intermediate, lower categories (following the

41. Vij-ātāramare kena vijānīyāt. BOh. Upanillad.

method of Arundhati Nyaya),42and is not really describing the Highest category itself. The Highest category is that which is never bādhita (contradicted), and the criterion of Vedäntic intuition being the supreme knowledge rests on the fact of its being not contradicted by any experience at any time. The absolutely non-dualistic intuition, when attained, contradicts all previous dualistic experiences and establishes itself superseding them all, but as it is not contradicted by any other experience, it is superseded by none. The Vedantic criterion of truth thus agrees with the general idealistic criterion of non- contradiction, and the Vedäntic Brahman represents an experience that transcends even the notion of the Subject.

The Vedänta merely shows us that we have to pass from the conception of Brahman as object, to its conception as subject, and then from the notion of the subject to the conception of Pure Cit and Anandam, which is not the support of J-āna but is J-ana or revelation itself. When we find the famous mantra, viz., ātma va are dral avya śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavya 43(the self is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought and contemplated), we are led to suppose that the self is something to be known and cognised and cannot but be an object of cognition. But a little later, we are reminded that what is cognised is after all jal la, that the object of cognition cannot be Cit just because it is an object. The self as Cit can never be known by anything else; it can never be the object of cognition as it must always be the knower.44The way in which the objectivity of the self is denied, and the force and emphasis with which its subjectivity is sought to be affirmed and established, seem to leave hardly any doubt as to this being the real meaning of the Upani ads. But this also is transcended. So long as there is anything else other than the self to form the not- self, the self manifests itself as the subject, but when the not-self vanishes, being completely

42. This is the method of leading one to a very subtle thing not directly but through less subtle things gradually. Arundhatiis a star of very small magnitude and cannot easily be observed. But, if one is first referred to Vaśil greater magnitude, and then referred to Arundhati, he can very easily perceive the same. ed to Arundh ha, the star that is very near Arundhatibut of

43. BLh. Up. II, iv, 5. 44. Yeneda sarval vijānāti tal kena vijānīyāt, vij-ātāramare kena vijānīyāt. BLh. Up. II, iv, 14.

merged in the reality of the self, no longer does the self manifest itself as the subject, but it reveals itself as Pure Cit, and getting rid of all upādhis (adjuncts), shines in its own glory. This is the point of difference between Kant and Śa kara. That the categories are a priori forms of the human understanding Sa kara also will admit, but he does not hold that they are necessary in the sense that they can never be got rid of. The categories are only limiting adjuncts falsely imposed on the self, and it is only right knowledge that is necessary for their dismissal. It is only when the subject-object relation is completely transcended that we can regard the problem of truth and knowledge ultimately solved.

Pata-jali also speaks of this svarūpaj-āna or knowledge of the self as it really is. When the cittav Ittis (mental states) are fully controlled, then the dra or the seer or the self is free from all disturbing influences and can be experienced just in its svarūpa. In the samādhi state, preparations for which are made through dhāra lā and dhyāna (fixation and meditation), the object is revealed in its svarūpa. Pata- jali speaks of praj-ā or intuition which is acquired in the samādhi state. This intuition which reveals the truth, and which is free from the least touch of error, is different from knowledge acquired through testimony or inference. Inference and testimony can give us only sāmānyaj-āna or knowledge of the general character of things. They can give us no viśelaj-āna or knowledge of the individuality of the thing. But intuition takes us to the very heart of things, reveals their speciality or individuality, and gives us an appreciation of them which is something unspeakable. The Sage Vyasa says45Ñwords can never express what is peculiar to the individual. Distant and very subtle things cannot be grasped by ordinary perception. But we should not suppose that a thing does not exist, merely because perception, inference and testimony cannot give us knowledge of it. The existence of an object is not disproved merely because certain sources of knowledge fail to supply us with its knowledge; rather we have to find out some other prama a or source of knowledge, and Pata-jali gives us a new source of knowledge, and this is intuition or samādhi praj-ā which is unerring.

In the nirvikalpa samādhi state, the self is realised directly in its real nature by the self. This is very near to Sa karaOs aparokDānubhūti. But there seems to be a point of distinction. The self is

45. Na hi viśelela ktasa-ketal śabdal. Yoga Sūtras I, 50.

here perceived as different from the not-self. The discriminative

knowledge (viveka-khyāti) is the highest form of knowledge, according to the Śa khya and Yoga. The samādhi state, even in its nirvikalpa form, is at best a withdrawal and a merging into the self. The universe remains as a real not-self which the self can withdraw from but cannot resolve into itself. This is laya-samādhi (absorption) as distinct from the bädha-samādhi (transcendence) of Vedänta. In the latter, the not- self is resolved into the self, and nothing but the self is real. So, whereas in Pāta-jala-samādhi, the aloofness and withdrawal of the self from the not-self become the source of liberation (kaivalya), and, as such, mokla (liberation) and vivekaj -āna (discrimination) become dependent upon a process, the Vedāntic j-āna is eternal (nitya) and is not dependent upon any process or condition. The j-āna is not produced or generated (utpādya), does not come to exist from a previous stage of nonexistence, because it eternally is. There can be no transition from ignorance to knowledge, from finitude to infinitude, from bondage to liberation. The spirit is eternally free and there is no liberation from bondage, whether it is the Ôbondage of sense,Õ as Plato thought, or the Ôbondage of Passion,Õ as Spinoza conceived it. That which comes to be must have an end, and if j-āna or mok a is a thing attained and not present eternally, it is bound to perish and can never hope to yield final beatitude and everlasting bliss. If the bondage is absolutely real, if the PrakIti or the universe is real in the absolute sense, freedom is bound to be an illusion. If, on the other hand, the universe is only an adhyāsa or a superimposition, if the bondage is only due to ignorance, which ignorance also is illusory, if the self alone is real and eternally free, then alone can we speak of Infinite Freedom and Eternal Liberation. Although the nirvikalpa samādhi of Pata-jali is commonly regarded as identical with Vedäntic Intuition, and it is supposed that there is no vyutthäna (passing off) from the same, yet it is to be admitted that the former, being dependent upon a process, cannot be altogether free from a chance of destruction. We have to keep in mind that the term ÔliberationÕ does not at all express Sa lkaraOs idea of mokla, because whereas liberation implies previous bondage, SalkaraÕs mok a is emphatically denied any such implication. Pata-jaliOs samādhi is like touching a point gained by the removal of disturbances; Sal karaOs J-āna is the feeling of a vast expansion which not only is now, but was and will always be. In the nirvikalpa samādhi state, the not-self is ignored and not felt, whereas in Vedāntic Intuition the not-self is a resolved contradiction and is eternally negated in Brahman. That the nirodha samādhi (objectless samādhi) is itself the consummation of a process is evident from the term Ônirodha-parilamal046used by Pata-jali himself. The stage of nirodha or complete inhibition is a state which the citta or the mind acquires.

When, through repeated attempts at objectless samādhi, the mind acquires a permanent disposition towards that direction and overrules its natural tendency of the downward movement towards objects, it may be said to have acquired the disposition of nirodha. The citta (mind) being composed of the three gu las undergoes changes, and nirodha (inhibition) and ekāgratā (one-pointedness) are but different stages of the change.

There is thus a great deal of difference between the Intuition of Pata- jali and Vedāntic Intuition. The former begins to appear at a certain definite stage of samādhi, while the latter has no beginning at all. The former depends on a particular change that the mind (citta) undergoes, although this change consists of the relatively unchanging and fixed state of the mind (citta), but the latter is entirely unconditional (svaya prakāla).

To ask for a criterion of truth of such intuition from the standpoint and level of the intellect is to attempt to judge the higher category by means of the lower, which is not only unjustifiable but almost impossible. If the intellect is to establish its claims always by an appeal to the senses, and if everything that the intellect attains is to be rejected unless it is verified by the senses, then we have to take up a position which is worse than the crudest Empiricism. It is easy to see that the intellect, being a higher category than sense, cannot and should not be tested by sense which is lower than itself. Intellect can never be the judge of Intuition, because ex hypothesi Intuition transcends intellect. Thought can only point towards the ideal of knowledge that is reached by Intuition, but can never attain it so long as it remains thought. But inasmuch as Intuition is the fruition of intellect, it never goes against intellect. An intuition that opposes itself to reason is not a genuine intuition at all; it is a mere pseudointuition. It is the task of philosophy to try to translate and understand analytically in terms of thought or conceptual thinking what has been presented in the living experience of intuition. It must

46. Vyutthānanirodhasa skārayor abhibhavaprādurbhāvau nirodhak a acittānvayo nirodhaparilāmal. Yoga SūtrasIII, 9.

start from experience and it must recognise experience to be the goal of all philosophy. Philosophy cannot give us an experience of the actual,Nit attempts to show what is possible, not what is but what may be. The merely possible demands a verification or rather an actualisation in concrete experience. This is supplied by Intuition. A philosophy that does not base itself on this solid footing of perfect experience is a merely barren speculation that moves in the sphere of

ideas alone, detached from reality. This is what distinguishes HegelÕs Idea from Sal IkaraOs Brahman. The latter is a concrete experience in ecstatic intuition, while the former is only the highest achievement of reason. Mr. Bhattacharyya rightly says that OIf HegelÕs notion be the truth of discursive understanding, the intellectual or ecstatic intuition of Vedänta is the truth of the speculative consciousness. If HegelÕs thought is concrete and creative, it is not as thought but as reality or being, i.e., as ecstatic identity of thought and being.Ó47It is to be noticed that by concrete experience we do not mean senseexperience. That would be returning to crude Empiricism, and a philosophy that exalts sense over reason really sounds its own deathknell. The concrete experience of supra-intellectual Intuition comes only when reason attains its fruition and consummation, and where the halting, hesitating, bifurcating and analytical reason has given place to a fixed and firm, clear and distinct, unerring and direct, intuitive vision. This intuition is like the vision of the genius in whom reason has taken a permanent and solid footing, and where the revelation seems to be spread out, as it were, before the eyes rather than laboriously reached by the intellect. The Hindus metaphorically speak of an Ôeye of intuitionÕÑthe Ôj-āna-netraÕ in order to express perhaps the easy and spontaneous working of the mind in intuition. The inspirations that come to the genius are not derived from any mysterious source other than reason, but they come so directly, so easily, so forcibly and with such a mark of givenness that they seem to come from some other region than the kingdom of conceptual thought. The truth is that so perfect has been the training of reason that it does not now work piecemeal but joins itself with the aspects of feeling and will, and derives the elements of spontaneity and immediacy from them, and it now delivers its judgments with the clearness of a sense-perception. The born musicianOs ear for music, the inspiration of the born poet and the intellectual intuition of the

47.Studies in Vedāntism by K.C. Bhattacharyya.

philosopher-sādhaka, do not differ in kind but only in subject-matter. It is to be noticed that Vedantic Intuition is not like the intuition of the mystics. Although it is declared to be indescribable like all mystical experience, still it is not attained in the same fashion as mystical experiences are supposed to be. The Vedantic experience comes after a long course of intellectual discipline and appears only as a fruition or the perfection of the intellect, and is not anything opposed to the intellect. Vedäntism is not to be classed under mysticism, if by the latter we mean something which is Òin essence little more than a certain intensity and depth of feeling in regard to what is believed about the universe,Ó as Russell takes it to be.48 We

may hint at the essence of Vedäntic intuition in the words of Professor Radhakrishnan: OIt is when thought becomes perfected in Intuition that we can catch a vision of the real. Intellect in the sense of mere understanding, working with the limited categories of time, space and cause, is inadequate. Reason also fails though it takes us beyond understanding. We have to pass beyond thought, beyond the clash of oppositions, beyond the antinomies that confront us when we work with the limited categories of abstract thinking, if we are to reach the real, where manOs experience and divine Being coincide.Ó49

48.Mysticism and Logic, p. 3. 49.Indian Philosophy, Vol. I.

10

How to Attain Knowledge?

In the last chapter we have sought to understand what aparok ānubhūti, i.e., tattvaj-āna or ātmabodha, is. We shall now discuss the means whereby it may be possible to attain this tattvaj- ana. It should be clearly understood, however, that this tattvaj-āna or anubhava is not at all dependent on processes, is not produced out of these processes, and is not related to them as an effect to the cause. It is something transcendent and independent and, in a sense, beginningless. Nothing can produce it and nothing can destroy it.1 Even the so-called avidya or ignorance is only a temporary and seeming veiling of it from the side of jīvacaitanya (individual consciousness); really it is not veiled at all. As it reveals itself and everything else, it is not and cannot be veiled or unveiled by anything. It is not sādhya, i.e., capable of being produced, but it is nityasiddha, i.e., eternally complete. Vidyāor the processes of knowledge merely help to dispel ignorance, as there is nothing else to be done with regard to the eternally existing Brahman, which is also eternally attained in the form of the self.2As it is eternally complete Being, its so-called instruments (sädhana) can only be of the nature of knowledge, where the thing known is not really produced by knowledge, but the previous ignorance about it is removed through it. No action can serve as means to the attainment of Brahman inasmuch as karma is of help only when something, not attained, has to be attained, when something has to be actually produced through action;Ñit has no scope for the seeming attainment, or rather reattainment, of something already attained and possessed eternally. The attainment or realisation of the Absolute (Brahman) is like the getting of the forgotten necklace worn on oneOs own neck. While

wearing the necklace on the neck, a person forgets it and searches for it very seriously in other places, but when the mistake is corrected by some one else, he at once finds that nothing new is produced, nothing is really removed; only he becomes fully conscious of the real state of things. Here also in tattvaj-āna, one finds and realises oneOs self as it is, eternally existing in its svarūpa, never undergoing any bondage or never being veiled by any disturbing influence or upādhi. The problem then arises: Is karma altogether useless in the attainment of the Absolute? An affirmative answer to the question would conflict with such texts3of the Śruti or SmIti as, OHe who knows Brahman and performs virtuous deeds attainsO and, OIt is said, Oh Great Sage, Knowledge and Karma are means to the attainment of the same.Ó There is the grand text of the Sruti OThe Brahma as seek to know Him through the Vedic texts, sacrifices, charity, penance, and resignation (sannyāsa)Ó which also seems to imply the instrumentality of karma in the matter of the realisation of the Absolute. Vācaspati argues that in this text it is not the intuitive knowledge (brahmasak atkara), but merely the desire for the same (vividil lā), that has been supposed to be resulting from the

1. Cf.Plato: OIts object will not be to generate in the person the power of seeing; on the contrary, it assumes that he possesses it though he is turned in a wrong direction, and does not look to the right quarter; and its aim is to remedy this defect.Ó Also, Othe virtue of wisdom does most certainly appertain, as it would appear, to a more divine substance which never loses its energy, but by a change of position becomes useful and serviceable or else remains useless and injurious.Ó

The Republic, Book VII. 147

2. Na tatra avidyāniv Itteradhika kāryamastīti avidyāniv Ittau vidyāya upayoga Citsukhī, Ch. III. Iha tu avidyāpidhānāpanayamātrameva nāparam utpādyamasti.

Bhāmatī I, i, 1. Vidyādoes not generate any apūrva (future result) by itself, but merely helps to 10 by itself, remove ignorance, and hence mok ais not caused by knowledge and therefore not non- eternal.

Ibid. I, i, 4. 3. Tenaiti brahmavit pulyakIt. Tatprāptihetur j-āna karma coktal mahāmune.

karmas mentioned. The emphasis is evidently on the desire for knowledge and not on the knowledge itself.4Karma only removes the obstacles that stand in the way of the emergence of the desire for Brahmaj-āna and cannot produce j-āna itself.

According to Prakāśātman, the author of Pa-capādikāvivarala, however, the emphasis should always be placed on the object of the desire and not on the desire itself. As when it is said, OHe is desirous of killing by means of a sword,Ó it is meant that the sword is instrumental to the killing and not to the desire for the killing. So the

text of the Śruti has to be interpreted in the sense that sacrifices, etc., are instrumental to the production of the knowledge (vidyā), and not merely to that of the desire for knowledge (vividilā), as Vācaspati supposes.5

It is not to be supposed, however, that this view of Vivarala conflicts with the view which regards the abandonment of karma as the means of attaining knowledge. According to him, karma is to be practised so long as the spontaneous inward turn towards the ātman (pratyakprava latā) is not clearly felt, but is to be given up after that state is attained. Sureśvarācārya also says, OHaving realised the inward turn towards the self through purification attained by means of actions (karma), they are to be given up as no longer useful, just as the clouds disappear after the rainy season is over.Ó

It may appear at this stage that if according to Vivara a also, karma is useful only in producing the earnest desire for the attainment of the self and the consequent inward turn towards the self, there is hardly any difference between the views of Prakāśātman and Vācaspati. But the difference may be noticed in this way. According to Vivarala, karma produces knowledge (vidyā) through the desire for knowledge (vividilā), and hence, on this theory the fruits of karma can not disappear till knowledge arises; whereas on the theory of Vācaspati, the fruits of karma (i.e., the ad ILa generated through karma) may disappear with the mere emergence of the desire for knowledge (vividilā). Karma, being supposed to be productive merely of the desire for realisation (vividila), cannot be supposed to

4. Veditumicchanti na tu vidanti ... vedānuvacanasyeva yaj-asyāpīcchāsādhanatayā vidhānam. AlsoÑ

Vividi opahāramukhenātmaj-ānotpattāvasti karma lāmupayoga Bhāmatī III, iv, 26. 5. Vivarala, p. 174.

be of necessity persisting till the realisation itself happens, as its end is fulfilled with the emergence of the desire alone.6

According to Citsukhācārya, karma produces knowledge (j-āna), and mokla or liberation results from knowledge. Karma is, therefore, indirectly instrumental to mok a or liberation. It is not to be supposed that karma and j-ana are both useful to mok a directly. Karma removes obstacles in the shape of destroying the effects of evil deeds and thus prepares the way to the attainment of knowledge (vidyā). This vidyā or knowledge, once mature, is capable of awarding salvation (mokla) without requiring any help from karma.7 Karma

leads to j-āna and it is j-āna that directly leads to salvation. All the scriptural texts indicating the co-operation (samuccaya) of j-āna and karma are to be interpreted as holding that these two are successive and not simultaneous.8The grand text of the Śruti, ÒBy means of sacrifices, etc.Ó also indicates the usefulness of these karmas in generating knowledge and not liberation (mokla).9The famous mantras of the Isopanilad, ÒInto a blind darkness they enter who follow after Ignorance; they, as if, into a greater darkness who devote themselves to Knowledge alone,Ó and Oby Ignorance crosses beyond death and by Knowledge enjoys Immortality,Ó10implying the utility of both karma and j-āna, are also to be interpreted in the way above indicated. The sense of a ÔbeforeÕ and an ÔafterÕ (paurvāparya) is clearly indicated by the suffix ÔktvacÕ in Ôtirtva.Õ After having crossed beyond Death (representing the evil deeds which act as obstacles to the attainment of knowledge) through avidyā or karma, one enjoys Immortality through Knowledge. Those who do not purify themselves through the performance of nitya and naimittika karmas, but renounce them before the attainment of mature

6. Vividi arthatvapakLe tu śrava ādiprav_ttijananasamarthotka kOtārthateti nāvaśyal lecchāsampādanamātrela vidyotpādakatvaniyama

Siddhāntaleśa, Ch. III, 1. 7. Vidyā tu paripakvā karmanirapek aiva mok lal sādhayi_yatīti. Citsukhī, Ch. III, p. 347. 8. Sarvā yapi samuccayavacanāni paramparāsamuccayapratipādanaparā ītyabhyupeyam. Ibid., p. 346. 9. Satyādīnā j-ānasādhanatval j-ānasyaiva mokLasādhanatvamityabhyupeyam. Vividi āvākye yaj-ādīnā vij-ānasādhanatva- syāyadh tatvāt. Ibid., p. 347. 10.V, 9 and 11.

knowledge, can not attain liberation (kaivalya) because of the impurities remaining in their souls. Nor can they achieve any progress because they have already renounced purifying and meritorious actions. Hence, their greater degradation is referred to in the mantra quoted above as Ogreater darkness.Ó

It may be argued that if karma be supposed to be instrumental, even indirectly, to liberation (mokla), it, being generated by some causes (kItakatvāt), has to be admitted as perishable (anitya). This, however, would go against the teaching of the entire Vedāntic literature regarding mok la (liberation) as nitya. Citsukhācārya argues that this objection cannot stand, because karma does not generate liberation, but merely destroys or puts an entire stop to bondage. Liberation is not produced; bondage only is removed. It should not be supposed, however, that as the destruction of bondage is produced by means of karma and hence is perishable, mokDa (liberation) which is simultaneous with the removal of bondage is, likewise, perishable. As

destruction cannot be destroyed, the destruction of bondage would be imperishable, and mok a which is accompanied by the destruction of bondage would also be imperishable.11

We find that the J-anavadins are unanimous in holding that karma is of immense value so far as it helps to remove the obstacles that lie in the way of attaining transcendental wisdom (J-ana). These obstacles may be regarded from one standpoint to be mainly physiological and mental. Pata-jali mentions nine such obstacles which hinder the attainment of yoga. Bodily diseases, inherent unfitness, doubt, indifference, idleness, attachment, error, failure to attain concentration, and inability to persist in the state of concentration even when that is gained; Ñthese nine are the impediments to yoga. These obstacles are removed through repeated attempts at practising concentration on a single object (ekatattvābhyāsa). So long as the mind and the body are not habituated to bear the heavy strain involved in concentration and meditation, resistance is felt in the nerves and the brain, whenever the Buddhi attempts to soar to its highest flights. When, however, through repeated movements in a particular direction an easy pathway is formed, energy flows

11. Na caivamapi karmasādhyatve mok asyānityatvadoLa tadyathehetyādiśrutel kOtaka tad anityamiti nyayacceti yukta ; bandhapradhva se karma yat lāmupayogāt bandhapradhva sasya k takatveOpi nityatvāt, anyathā na lāna liprasa-gāt.

Citsukhī, Ch. III, p. 343

spontaneously in that direction and no resistance is offered any longer by the body and the mind. It is karma that ensures progress in every direction. Through disciplined exercise of the instruments, viz., the body and the mind, their capacities are increased greatly and they become gradually fit for mirroring the light of transcendental knowledge (j-ana). The citta (mind) that had a natural bent outwards so long as the obstacles were not removed, now acquires a spontaneous inward bent and becomes pratyakpravala when the impediments are got rid of. This removal of obstacles or impurities is also described as the purification of the citta (mind). Karma fulfils its task when this purification is attained, and the unmistakable sign of this purification is the spontaneous tendency of the mind to flow inwards, i.e., towards the self (ātman).

It is sometimes argued that karma cannot be supposed to be instrumental to knowledge (j-āna) inasmuch asj-āna can result only from such pramālas as Perception, Inference, Authority, etc. Sacrifices and such other karmas are not included under the prama as and hence cannot be supposed to be the cause of knowledge.12 To this

objection it may be replied that karma is instrumental in causing hearing (śrava la) and ratiocination (manana) etc., which are the direct pramā las of knowledge, and that although not directly the instrument of knowledge, it should be regarded as a genuine instrument of the same. An instrument does not cease to be an instrument merely because it is indirect and remote.13

Now the question arises as to the nature of the karmas that are useful to knowledge. According to the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāya a, it seems that not only the compulsory duties of the fourfold aśramas but also such practices as recitation of mantras (japa) are useful. Amalānanda, in his Kalpataru, expressly supports14this view, laying emphasis on the sutra OIt is also seen that persons not performing the duties of the fourfold aśramas become fit.Ó15It is to be noticed that almost all the Vedäntic thinkers agree in holding that only nitya karmas are useful towards j-āna, kāmya karmas being always excluded. The former, by removing obstacles, help the emergence of

12. Pramā ādhīnasya j-ānasya yaj-ādyajanyatvāt, na hi pratyak ādimadhye yaj-ādaya ki- cit pramālam.

Nayanaprasādinī Tīkā on Citsukhī. 13. Paramparāsādhane vapi loke vedeOpi kāra atvābhyupagamāt. 14.Kalpataru, Ch. III, iv, 36. 15.Brahmasūtras III, v, 36.

j-āna; but the latter, giving rise to their fruits, far from being auxiliaries, become positive hindrances to j-āna. Sarvaj-ātmamuni, however, thinks that both nitya and kāmya karmas are useful. The text of the Śruti, referring to sacrifices, makes no reference to their performance either as nitya or as kāmya;hence, we are to suppose that both are helpful for the purpose.16But all these karmas, whether these are nitya or kāmya, are only remotely related to j-āna; the nearest, that is, the most proximate instrument being śama (control of inner organs), dama (control of external organs) etc. These proximate instruments will include vairägya (detachment) on the one hand, and śraval a, manana and nididhyasana, on the other.

We may point out here that nothing short of a direct vision or intuition of the self can dispel the wrong notions or incorrect ideas about it. This intuition is to be as clear and as direct as our ordinary perception. The Vedānta tells us that the multiplicity (nānātva) and variety of the universe or jagatprapa-ca, the duality of pleasure and pain, and the consciousness of the body as the self, are all unreal; but, we find that all these are facts which are revealed to us by our sense- organs and the mind in ordinary perception, external and internal. Now, no amount of reasoning is competent to convince us that all

these are illusory. The Vedānta Paribhāllā rightly holds that it is impossible to get rid of an aparok a bhrama or an illusion which is based upon direct perception by means of parok aj-āna or indirect and inferential knowledge; and so, Vedāntic tattvaj-āna must be of the nature of an aparok aj-ana. 17Jagat or the world and all its facts are directly perceived and felt by us. Even if they be ultimately unreal or illusory, their illusoriness can be felt by us only when we have a pratyak a or an experience which is more steady, more permanent and more convincing than that of the multiplicity of the world. It is because of the absence of this pratyak a that we find that persons well acquainted with the Vedänta Sastras, and fully agreeing with the arguments and conclusions of the Vedanta philosophy, cannot realise its teachings in actual experience. Jagat or the world does not actually appear to them as a bhrama or an unreal appearance, although for argumentOs sake they hold that to be the case. One argument may displace another, one parok a (indirect

16. See Salk epaśārīraka. 17. Tajj-ānam aparok arūpa , parok atve aparok abhramanivartakatvānupapattel Ch. VIII.

knowledge) can drive away another parok a, but it cannot dismiss an aparok la (direct knowledge), even when the latter has an illusion as its content. Therefore it is that the Vedantic advaitatattva or the identity of the self and the Brahman cannot be realised merely by the help of argumentation. For such a realisation, aparok ānubhūti or direct acquaintance or rather appreciative intuition is essential.

The Siddhāntaleśa also argues that the superimposition of agency on the pure consciousness, although a superimposition, is still directly felt and the self always is perceived to be the agent. So long as the Pure Cit is not perceived directly, the superimposition cannot be removed. It has been held that knowledge of the Sastras merely helps to remove the notion of the absolute reality of Māya or Nescience, and that Māyā ceases to exert her influence on the practical affairs of life and becomes altogether inert only when Brahman or the Pure Cit is directly realised in consciousness.18 Although the Vedanta notices the wide difference that exists between parok a and aparok a j-āna, still it has been equally emphatic in holding that it is the former alone that can lead to the latter. Reason prepares the way for the intuition by removing all doubts as to the possibility of the experience, that is, by removing the veil of asattāpādakāj-āna. The Vedānta represents the J- ānamārga, which holds that direct realisation of the Real can be had only through the perfection of oneOs intellectual capacities, which again involves certain preliminary courses of discipline. Vicāra or

constant meditation and concentration on spiritual problems or rather on the nature of Reality, that is, on the nature of the self or ātman, when it is done by śuddhānta kara a (purified intellect), prepares the sādhaka for the realisation of the self.

It may be argued, at this point, that even the direct perception of Brahman cannot dispel the Primal Ignorance. If the intuition of Brahman is supposed to remove Ignorance, it cannot co-exist with Ignorance. But the modalised state of consciousness having Brahman for its object, being the product of Ignorance, has to co-exist with it. The material cause (upādāna) everywhere co-exists with the effect (kārya), and hence Ignorance, which is the material cause of the entire universe including the process of cognising Brahman, must be

18. Sastre a nasyet paramarthabuddhi Kāryak Lama naśyati cāparok āt. Prārabdhanāśe pratibhāsanāśa, Eva kramānnaśyati cātmamāyā.

supposed to co-exist with it, and hence also cannot, at the same time, be supposed to be dispelled by the same. The Vedantists answer this objection by saying that although in most places the rule that the material cause co-exists with the effect holds good, it does not hold good in this case (where knowledge and ignorance relate to the same object), as it does not hold good where a piece of cloth is destroyed by contact with fire. The contact with fire has as one of its material causes the piece of cloth which it destroys.

But even supposing that the direct knowledge of Brahman (brahmākārā v tti) is thus capable of removing its own material cause, viz., Ignorance, the further question, viz., how this intuition of Brahman (brahmākārā v ltti), again, which itself is included under Ignorance, would come to an end, remains. The reply to this question is given by the Vedäntists by citing other instances where a thing after destroying other things destroys itself. The case of the particles of the kataka fruit applied to water, which, after removing other impurities in water, destroy the impurities contained in themselves, is cited.19Some refer to the drop of water which falls on a piece of red- hot iron and, after destroying its heat, disappears itself. Others, again, cite the example of the fire that burns the heap of grass and then gets extinguished. There is no rule that there must remain something in addition to the object that is destroyed for the destruction of the thing, as we find an exception to it in the case of the extinction of fire when there is no fuel. As we find that where fuel is present, something additional, viz., the sprinkling of water, is necessary for the extinction of fire, but where fuel is not present, nothing in addition to fire is needed for its extinction; so also, it may be supposed that although an

additional something is necessary for the extinction of processes of knowledge other than that which dispels the Primal Ignorance, nothing additional is needed for the disappearance of the knowledge that dispels the Primal Ignorance.

Some, however, object to the very possibility of Ignorance being removed by the intuition of Brahman on the ground that as,

19. Na ca karmāvidyātmakal kathamavidyām ucchinatti karmalo vā taducchedakasya kuta uccheda iti vācyam. Svajātīyasvaparavirodhinā bhāvānā bahulam upalabdhe Yathā paya payoÕntara jarayati svaya-ca jīryati yatha viLal vi antara śamayati svaya-ca śāmyati yatha va katakarajo rajoOntarāvile pāthasi prak ipta rajoOntarali bhindat svayamapi bhidyamānam anāvila patha karoti eva karmāvidyātmakamapi avidyāntarālyapagamayat svayamapyapa

gacchatīti. Bhāmatī I, i, 1.

after all, the intuition itself is a vtti (modalised process) and, as such, jalā, it cannot dispel Ignorance. The darkness of ignorance (aj-āna) can only be removed by the light of caitanya, and not by anything jal la which itself is dark. It is the light of caitanya which underlies the process of cognition of Brahman that should be supposed to dispel the darkness of Ignorance, and not the process of cognition itself.

A serious objection to the above view, that it is caitanya itself and not any v tti (modalised state) that dispels Ignorance, may be put forward by saying that the same caitanya which is the support of aj-ana (Ignorance) as its witness (sāk in) cannot also be supposed to be its destroyer. The answer of the Vedäntist to this objection is to the effect that although caitanya, in its isolation, (svarūpa) does not dispel Ignorance, still when the modalised state (vLtti) is superimposed on it, it removes the same, just as the rays of the sun, normally illumining the grass, burn that very grass when they are reflected on the gem known as Suryakānta.

Padmapādācārya maintains, on the other hand, that the knowledge of Brahman dispels only Ignorance. Knowledge is directly opposed to Ignorance and, as such, it dispels only Ignorance.20The universe (prapa-ca) disappears only because its material cause, Ignorance, disappears. So, knowledge dispels Ignorance directly, and the disappearance of the universe (prapa-ca) results indirectly from it. Knowledge of Brahman is included under prapa-ca and, as such, disappears with the disappearance of prapa-ca. To the objection that if prapa-ca is not destroyed by knowledge, then prapa-ca is not indescribable (mithyā), because mithyātva (indescribability) consists in the destructibility by knowledge (j-āna-nivartyatva), it may be replied that although prapa-ca does not cease directly with knowledge, still

the cessation of prapa-ca results indirectly from it, inasmuch as knowledge dispels Ignorance and the removal of Ignorance causes the cessation of prapa-ca, and the criterion of mithyātva, that it ceases with knowledge, holds good. This view is consistent with the conception of Jivanmukti, when it is supposed that although knowledge has removed Ignorance, the ÔamplificationsO or rather ÔprojectionsÕ of Ignorance, viz. the body of the liberated etc., persist, because these are not directly and immediately destroyed by knowledge. If, however, it be held that prapa-ca also

20. J-ānamaj-ānasyaiva nivartakam. Pa-capādikā, pp. 1 and 2. Also Vivara a, pp. 5 and 6. And Vivara aprameyasa graha, pp. 7 and 8.

is directly destroyed by knowledge like Ignorance, then Jīvanmukti becomes impossible, as the body also must cease along with Ignorance. The interval that Padmapāda supposes to exist between the disappearance of Ignorance and the cessation of its products justifies the persistence of the body of the Jivanmukta and his actions after the acquisition of knowledge.

The conception of Jivanmukti has been the source of much discussion and controversy. If there is no intuition of Brahman (brahmasāklātkāra) while the individual sadhaka holds the corporal frame, the very possibility of the experience may be doubted and the texts of the śruti are not confirmed by experience. If, however, it is held that the individual sadhaka gains the necessary intuition while retaining the body, the difficulty of explaining the persistence of the body after knowledge (tattvaj-ana) and the liberation consequent on it are attained, arises. The body and the actions performed by the body are due to Ignorance, and when knowledge results, Ignorance must disappear, being very much opposed to the same. If the material cause disappears, the effect can no longer persist; and hence, if the body persists, that shows that Ignorance still persists and liberation has not been attained. In other words, liberation conflicts with the presence of Ignorance, and the movements of the body are evident indications of the persistence of Ignorance.

The Vedäntists thus feel the difficulty of reconciling the conception of mukti with the persistence of the body and its actions, and yet the conception of Jivanmukti may be regarded as the pivot of Vedāntic thought and culture. Attempts have been persistently made by all the teachers of the Vedäntic school to explain away the difficulty. According to some,21 knowledge dispels Ignorance instantaneously and directly, but it does not destroy the effects of Ignorance directly, and hence the body and its movements may and do continue for some

time.22This persistence of the effect after the disappearance of the material cause, viz. Ignorance, is what constitutes the residuum (leśa) of Ignorance.

According to Vivarala, knowledge (tattvaj-āna) results from its own instruments, but the karmas that have already begun to produce results (prärabdha), acting as an obstacle or an impediment (pratibandha), become the cause of the consciousness of duality

21. Cf. VivaraLa, pp. 5 and 6. Vivara aprameyasa graha, pp. 7 and 8. 22.See Pa-capādikā.

(dvaitadarśana) at times. The tattvaj-āna that has arisen, although not mature enough or competent to dismiss the consciousness of duality wholly, still dispels other actions, ignorance and attachment (rāga), etc. It should not be supposed, however, Prakāśātman argues, that this is tantamount to holding the simultaneity or togetherness (sāhitya) of the consciousness of identity of Brahman and the individual (jīva) on the one hand, and the consciousness of duality on the other. He maintains that at times there is the realisation of the identity, while at other times because of some defects caused by the prārabdha karma there is the consciousness of duality.23He qualifies this statement by saying that even the consciousness of duality is not a consciousness of duality as real but only as an unreal appearance (dvaitadarśanābhāsa). Prakāśātman, although admitting the possibility of the experience of duality even after the realisation of Brahman, still strongly opposes the view that maintains that there cannot be direct realisation of Brahman so long as the body persists. Direct realisation is possiole for those alone who possess a body and whose body persists due to prārabdha karma. It is through direct realisation (aparok adarśana) that karma becomes extinct, and the great sage Vyāsa and others attained direct realisation while retaining their bodies.24

According to others, avidya (Ignorance) has two aspectsÑthe veiling (āvara la) aspect and the projective or creative aspect (viklepa). Knowledge or revelation (prakaśa) is opposed to the veiling (āvarala) aspect of Ignorance, and hence it is the veiling (avara a) aspect only that is removed by knowledge. The creative aspect (vik lepa), however, persists even after knowledge, and it is this residual portion of Ignorance (avidyāleśa) that explains the persistence of the body and the actions of the liberated individual (jīvanmukta).

The teachers think that by these devices they can escape from the difficulty of regarding the beginningless avidyā (Ignorance) as divided into parts. They have to admit a residuum of avidyā in order

23. Na vaya sahitya brūma kadācidasa praj-ātātmaikatvadarśana kadacidarabdhakarmopasthapitadosanimittadvaitadarśana ceti.

Vivara a, p. 284. 24. Na caparokl adarśanamantarela kl tsnakarmavināśa prārabdhakarmavataśca tattvadarśana saśarīrasyaiva sambhavati vyasādīnā ca saśarīrāl lāmevāparokLadarśana śrūyate.

Ibid., p. 284.

to explain the persistence of the body of the liberated soul (jīvanmukta), and yet to hold the indivisibility of the beginningless avidyā. It is not a portion or segment of avidyā that remains, but it is only the effect of avidya, on the first theory, and an aspect of it, on the second, that persists, and thus the indivisibility has been sought to be maintained.

It cannot be objected to the first view that the effect cannot persist after the disappearance of the material cause, because the Naiyāyikas also hold that the colour (rupa) of the jar does not disappear at the moment (kLa a) of the destruction of the jar, but persists for another moment (klala). If it is argued that it awaits the destruction of the samavāyī cause, the Vedāntists also may argue similarly that the body of the liberated persists, because it awaits the destruction of the karma that has begun to work (prārabdha).

Others try to justify the persistence of avidyaby means of a simile. Just as the smell of garlick persists even after the pot where it was kept has been washed and cleaned, so also a residuum of avidyā (sal skāra) persists even after it has been removed.

There are other Vedantists who hold that through knowledge, Ignorance (avidyā) does not become altogether extinct, but only loses its force to such an extent that it is no longer productive of consequences, just as the burnt piece of cloth may remain without any workability. So, it is neither the effect nor an aspect of avidyā that persists, but it is the entire, undivided avidyā that persists in an extremely weakened form so that it is no longer productive of results.

The Nyayam ta urges the following objections against the above attempts at the solution of the difficulty: (1) Although action (kriyā) and knowledge (j-ana) may have their after-effects (sa skāra), Ignorance (avidyā) cannot have any such after-effect (sa skāra), and hence the persistence of the body of the Jivanmukta cannot be regarded as due to the after-effect of Ignorance. If, however, it be regarded that the after-effect (sa Iskāra) persists in order to explain the persistence of prärabdha karma and of the body of the Jīvanmukta, then that would imply that Ignorance has not been destroyed which

still persists as the after-effect. (2) It is never seen that anything exists for many moments (k a a) in the absence of the samavāyi cause. (3) If the preceding knowledge of Brahman is not competent to drive out Ignorance altogether, the subsequent knowledge, having nothing additional in its content to the preceding one, cannot be supposed to be competent for the same.25(4) The term ÔleśaO cannot mean Ôconstituent partÕ (avayava), because Ignorance (avidyā) is without any parts (niravayava), and hence the illustration of the burnt piece of cloth cannot apply here.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī attempts to answer these objections one after another.26To the first, he replies that other things than action and knowledge are also seen to have sa Iskaras27 (after-effect), just as the vessel is found to possess the fragrance of flowers even after the flowers have been all taken away. Destruction (nāśa) does not always involve the destruction of the salskāra (after-effect). We find an exception in the case of destruction of knowledge where the salskāra persists. So, the fact that the after-effect of avidyā (Ignorance) persists does not prove that avidya has not been destroyed. He answers the second objection by saying that if the Naiyāyika can assume the persistence of the effect after the destruction of the material cause for one moment only, there should not be any objection to the VedāntistOs supposition of the persistence of the effect for many moments, because the whole question centres round the question as to whether the effect may or may not persist after the disappearance of the material cause. Once this question is decided in the affirmative, the question as to whether the persistence is for one moment (kLala) only or for many moments becomes immaterial.28It is interesting to remind one of the couplets of Vidyaral lya29in this connection. ÒThey (The Naiyayikas) assume the persistence of the effect after the disappearance of the material cause without the least show of reason; is it impossible for us to hold the very same thing with the authority of the Sruti, of reason and of the experience of the adepts on our side? Ó Madhusūdana answers the third objection by pointing out that the very first knowledge that arises destroys Ignorance and nothing has to be added unto that knowledge to destroy Ignorance. Only because of the counteracting

25. Na hi pūrvaj-ānāniv ttasyādhyastasya tadanadhikavi ayela pāścātyenāpi nivOtti sambhavati. 26. Advaitasiddhi,Ch. IV, N.S. Edition, p. 890. 27. Na ca kriyāj-ānayoreva sa skāro nānyasyeti vācya nilsāritapu_pāyā sampulikāyāl pu pavāsanādarśanāt. 28. Satyupapadake kLalaga Advaitasiddhi, p. 890. lakalpanāyā aprayojakātvāt.

26. Vināk odakLama māna tair v Śrutiyuktyanubhūtibhyo vadatā ki thā parikalpyate, nu dul śakam.

Pa-cadaśī.

agency (pratibandhakatva) of prārabdha karma, the effect cannot fructify fully, but as soon as its counteracting agency is over, the effect fructifies fully. Lastly, Madhusūdana argues that the term ÔleśaÕ does not mean ÔavayavaÕ (part) but ÔākāraÕ (form), and avidyā (Ignorance) has been declared to have many forms.30The Vedāntists may maintain that the kārin (the thing having form) may disappear while the ākāra (form) may continue, just as in the case of the universal (jāti) and the individual (vyakti), the Naiyāyikas maintain that the jäti persists even after the individuals perish.31So, the Vedantists also are justified in holding the persistence of the ÔleśaÕ, that is, the ākāra (form), of avidyā even after Ignorance has disappeared.

We have so long considered attempts at justifying the conception of Jīvanmukti through the supposition of a residuum of avidyā in various shapes. But there are thinkers who cannot tolerate the idea of the simultaneous presence of knowledge (vidyā) and Ignorance (avidyā) in any shape at all. Sarvaj-ätmamuni, for example, holds that when knowledge arises, nothing of Ignorance, no residuum of it in any shape, can remain, because Knowledge and Ignorance are contradictorily opposed to each other.32He is therefore compelled to deny the existence of the Jivanmuktas. One who has attained knowledge and liberation cannot have Ignorance any longer, and hence his body and all its activities must cease along with knowledge. Liberation is not consistent with the existence of the body, and hence it is videhamukti that alone is justifiable The Sruti texts such as ÒHe attains Brahman and becomes Brahman here in this very life,Ó etc., seeming to support the conception of Jīvanmukti, are, in his opinion, merely eulogistic (arthavāda), attempting to tempt people to adopt the command contained in the texts Òshould be listened to,Ó etc. There is also no necessity on the part of the Sastras to support the conception of Jīvanmukti.

Prakāśānanda also adopts a similar view.33He argues that it cannot be maintained that owing to the efficacy of prārabdha karma corporeal existence does not cease, because, being a product of Nescience, the prarabdhaitself cannot exist after Nescience has been

30. Indro māyābhil pururūpa īyate. 31. Ākāriniv ttāvapyākārasyānuv ttir vyaktiniv ttāvapi jāteriva. Advaitasiddhi, Ch. IV, N.S. Edition, p. 890. 32. Virodhisāk Dātkārodaye leśatoOpyavidyānuv ttyasambhavāt. 33. Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī, pp. 157Đ161, Pandit, Vol. XII.

destroyed by knowledge, just as the cloth cannot exist when the

threads constituting it have ceased to exist.34Nor can it be argued that Nescience itself continues for some time in order to supply an occasion for the fruition of actions that have already begun to produce results (prärabdha), because this would mean that knowledge does not possess the character of destroying Nescience (avidya). It cannot also be held that Nescience, as veiling power, ceases with the rise of knowledge, but Nescience, as projecting power, continues to exist for some time, because there are not two Nesciences. Nor can it be supposed that Nescience, though one, has twofold power, because if Neiscience disappears with knowledge and if it is one, it cannot also be supposed to be persisting, for one and the same thing cannot both be and cease to be. The argument (which Madhusūdana Sarasvatī also advances)35that with the cessation of prārabdha, knowledge, being unobstructed by the same, destroys Nescience, cannot also be supported; because, when with the cessation of prārabdha, bodily existence has ceased, knowledge itself is notand hence cannot destroy Nescience, the former knowledge obstructed by Nescience, because of the obstruction, could not also operate as the destroyer of Nescience (avidya).36The term ÔleśaÕ (residuum) does not apply to Nescience which hardly can have any after-effect or fringe (sa skāra). The ÔleśaÕ itself is an effect of avidyā and, as such, ought to disappear along with it. The example of the arrow shot from the bow does not prove the persistence of prārabdha, because the analogy is not strict. The arrow, the substratum of the motion, is not destroyed in the former case; but in the latter, the substratum of prārabdha, viz. Nescience, is destroyed. That the consensus of opinion is in favour of Jīvanmukti does not mean much, because in the absence of proof, universality of belief signifies merely the leading of the blind by the blind.37

34. Prārabdhasyāpi avidyākāryatayā tadabhāve sthātumaśakyatvāt tantvabhāve pa asyeva.

Ibid., p. 157. 35.Advaitasiddhi, Ch. IV, p. 890, N.S. Edition. 36. Prarabdhanāśe dehapatanāntara j-ānasyaivābhāvāt pūrvaj-ānasya ca prārabdhena pratibaddhatvāt. Siddhāntamuktāvalī See Pandit, Vol. XII, p. 158. 37. Na ca jīvanmuktau sarvalaukikī prasiddhir avyāhateti vācya pramālavirahe la prasiddher andhaparamparārūpatvāt. Ibid., p. 153, Pandit, Vol. XII.

To me it seems that both of these kinds of attempts at solving the seeming inconsistency involved in the conception of Jīvanmukti are out of mark. The conception of Jivanmukti is not so needless in the Vedäntic system, that it may be easily dispensed with, as Sarvaj -ātmamuni and Prakāśānanda think. The Vedānta establishes Brahman not merely on the authority of the Śruti but also on the

realisation or experience38of Brahman. Moreover, if Jīvanmukti is denied, teachers of the Vedänta, who have realised Brahman and not merely philosophised about the same, would be wanting, and hence the J-ana line of Sadhana would come to an end, because, according to the Vedänta, the direct realisation of Brahman, which is Absolute Truth, can hardly be had without the assistance of the spiritual teacher39to whom Brahman has been revealed. The defence that Prakāśānanda puts forward that although no teacher in the absolute sense or pāramārthika upado exists (because one who realises at once ceases to have earthly existence), yet knowledge can arise through an imagined teacher (kalpitena guru lā), does not satisfy and can hardly be accepted as the intention of the Sruti. If the Sruti means that direct realisation can come only from contact with one who has directly realised, that is not achieved by this ÔimaginedO teacher. The attempt to save the consistency of the Vedäntic position by denying Jīvanmukti seems to be like curing the disease of the patient by destroying his vitality. The crowning achievement of Vedāntism consists in its declaration that liberation is not a far off ideal, but may be and is attained here, in this very life while holding the corporeal frame, and if that very conception is dismissed, then the Vedānta is deprived of its richest treasure.

On the other hand, the maintenance of a residual Ignorance (avidyāleśa) in order to support Jīvanmukti, seems to be thoroughly inconsistent with the central Vedantic teaching that knowledge dispels Ignorance. If Ignorance is indivisible because of its beginninglessness and if it is opposed to knowledge, the persistence of any residual factor of Ignorance after knowledge is attained, cannot be maintained. Either the whole of Ignorance disappears with all its offshoots, or else knowledge has not arisen. There is hardly

38. Bhāmatī on I, i, 2. 39.Chān. Up. VI, 14. OHe who has a teacher knowsÓ; and Ounless it be taught by a teacher there is no way to it, but when it is declared by another, Dearest, then it is easy to understand.Ó Kalha Up. I, ii, 8 and 9.

any intermediate stage between the disappearance and nondisappearance of Ignorance. Either knowledge has arisen and Ignorance has disappeared, or if Ignorance has not disappeared, knowledge cannot have arisen. Attempts at maintaining Jīvanmukti through the conception of the residual persistence of avidyā seem to be only makeshifts or rather a camouflage to hide the real difficulty. Even the arguments of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī which we have stated earlier are effective not so much as a defence of the Vedantic position as a counter-criticism of the Nyäya position. They show, in other

words, that the principle is not peculiar to the Vedänta alone but that the Nyaya philosophy also adopts the same. This is no solution or explanation of the difficulty; it merely helps to silence the opponent. The vigorous and almost unassailable logic of Vedāntism seems to be here at an end, and here also, as in Plato, metaphors and similies seem to take the place of stern dialectic in order to escape from a real difficulty.

I think the solution ought to have taken a different turn. Instead of making futile attempts at reconciling incompatibles,viz., Ignorance and Knowledge, the Vedäntist has to maintain strongly that in the Vedantic system Knowledge and Ignorance are not really incompatibles. It should be clearly understood, however, that by Knowledge we mean here the pāramārthika j-āna (transcendental knowledge) and not the modalised consciousness (v lttij-āna) of Brahman. The former (transcendental knowledge) is not only not opposed to Ignorance but is its substratum. It is only the modalised consciousness of Brahman (brahmākārā v tti) that opposes itself to Ignorance (avidyā) and removes Ignorance by generating knowledge of Brahman. The Pure Cit or J-ānasvarūpa is the identical support (āśraya) of the empirical states of both knowledge and ignorance, having respectively the contents ÔI knowO and ÔI do not know.Õ Transcendental Knowledge and Ignorance belong to different orders of reality and, as such, Ignorance and its products become incompatible with Knowledge, only when Ignorance and Knowledge are taken to be both ultimately real; but when it is perceived that while Knowledge is real, Ignorance is anirvacanīya (indescribable), then all incompatibility ceases. Ignorance vanishes not as a real object, but the disappearance of Ignorance means merely the disappearance of it as real. As anirvacanīya, however, it never conflicts with Knowledge, and there is no compatibility in its simultaneous presence with Knowledge. As a matter of fact, Brahman supports avidyā, and all avidyā appears with Brahman as its substratum.40The world forms no ÔotherO to Brahman and there is no incompatibility in the simultaneous presence of both, because while Brahman is real (sat), the world is anirvacanīya (indescribable). The universe (jagat) is not anything from which release has to be effected by means of withdrawal or conquest, simply because it is not a real something that is an ÔotherO to or is distinct from the liberated J-änin, so that either an withdrawal from or an annihilation of the universe would be necessary for liberation. It appears to be real through Ignorance and this Ignorance has to be dispelled in order to perceive its falsity (mithyātva). It is a correction of the error that is needed and hence it is knowledge that secures liberation through the correction of the error. The Vedantic view of

liberation is very different from the Stoic conception of freedom. Liberation does not mean an withdrawal from a real universe, as the Stoics conceive it, but it is merely the knowledge that the unreal universe is really unreal and not real as it appears to be. While the Stoic conception of freedom may be profitably compared with the Sa khya view of liberation (which holds that the udāsina Puru la is the unruffled seer or spectator of the Prakuti and that the Purula, in isolation, as wholly withdrawn from Prak ti, attains liberation, although Prak ti remains as something real and distinct from Purula), it forms a very inadequate parallel to the Vedantic view denying the reality (satta) of the universe. The Vedāntic Brahman transcends the universe in the sense that the reality of the former sublates the reality of the latter, because they are not reals of the same order and plane. The reality of Brahman reduces the universe to the category of anirvacanīya or mithyā, and, therefore, the Vedānta is never tired of repeating that with the consciousness of the reality of Brahman, the consciousness of the reality of the world disappears. This does not mean, however, that the world ceases to exist which previously was really existing; for, as a matter of fact, the world has never been, and is not, and will never be a real in the absolute sense of the term, because Brahman is not something which ever begins to be real and which previously was not, but is Eternal Being itself, and in its presence, the world is for ever mithyā or anirvacaniya. Hence if we thoroughly understand this Vedantic conception of transcendence, we are not at all entitled to raise the question that so often seems to

40. See Vivarala, p. 14.

puzzle us, viz., what becomes of the world or of the body of the J- ānin, after liberation is attained? The answer is plain and the reason evident. Nothing happens to the world: the world remains what it was, an eternal anirvacanīya;Ñonly the previous erroneous conception of it as real (sat) is now supplanted and corrected by the present conception of it as anirvacaniya, that is, as a mere illusory superimposition on Brahman. Something can happen only to things real;Nwhat is not real and only an illusory superimposition cannot undergo any process. Only its conception may be changed; and so, the Vedāntic liberation is not so much a negation of existence as a transcedence of conception. This transcendence, again, is not to be taken in the Bradleyan sense. The world is in no way ÔtransmutedO or ÔtransformedÕ in order to form an element in the life of Brahman. It cannot be argued, however, that the world would fall outside Brahman if it is not included within it and thus would form an other to Brahman, thus interfering with the absolute monism of the Vedänta; for the world is not real and hence the question as to its

position within or outside Brahman is without any real import. The Ôposition of a non-existent realO is a meaningless phrase. The empirical consciousness, yielding the reality of the body and the other constituents of the universe, has got such a firm hold on us, that although temporarily, on logical considerations, we seem to agree with the transcendental point of view regarding the empirical consciousness as unreal (mithya), we cannot stay there long and the empirical consciousness drags us down, and again we seem to be troubled with the question as to whether the presence of the body would not imply a remnant or a residual ignorance. We again come to think that the universe (jagat) and Brahman, or Ignorance and Knowledge, are both real, forgetting that while the latter is real (sat), the former is not so. It cannot be argued, however, that if Ignorance and Knowledge are not opposites and incompatibles, why should not knowledge appear so long as the individual is enveloped by Ignorance; because, we have to remember that they cease to be incompatibles only when Knowledge is attained and the real characteristic (svarūpa) of Ignorance as anirvacanya is realised. So long, however, as Ignorance is supposed to be real, it conflicts with Knowledge which is the Real. It is only when one is realised to be real, and the other to be false (mithya), that the conflict between the two, viz., one real and another seeming real, disappears.

The above interpretation is quite in keeping with the view of Väcaspati when he tells us that if the quality of having a body (saśarīratva) had been real, then it could not be removed so long as the individual lived, but as the fact of having a body or the bodyconsciousness is not real but is only an appearance due to false superimposition, it can be dispensed with even while the individual lives.41Sa karācārya also says that the bodilessness (aśarīratva) of the wise man, even while living, is established because of the fact that the possession of the body or the body-consciousness is due to illusory superimposition.42

A further question is sometimes raised at this point. Granting that the body of the liberated (jīvanmukta) may not be opposed to his Knowledge and, as such, need not be explained as due to any residual Ignorance, still, it is urged, the actions performed by the Jivanmukta cannot be explained without any residual Ignorance, because an action implies not merely a body but a bodyconsciousness as well. As body and the movements of the body have workability (arthakriyākāritva) even after liberation is supposed to have been attained, some sort of residual Ignorance has to be maintained in order to explain the presence of the upādhi (vehicle) through identification, or even a make-believe identification, with which the

fruitful action results. The body and the actions of the body do not become altogether non-existent (tuccha), and so long as they possess workability (arthakriyākāritva), their appearance has got to be explained. That the liberated can perform actions is evident from the instance of the actions performed by God Himself who says, ÒAlthough for me there is nothing in the three worlds which has not been attained or is to be attained, still I perform actions.Ó He also says that He performs actions Ovigilant and without remissionÓ (atandrita).43The actions of God do not imply any Ignorance on His part, as He is eternally free from Ignorance. His actions do not proceed from Ignorance and hence do not bind Him. So also the actions of the liberated are not due to false superimposition (mithyāj- ana) and hence also do not involve Ignorance. The

41. Yadi vāstava saśarīratval bhavet, na jīvatastannivartteta mithyāj -ānanimittantu tat, taccotpannatattvaj-ānena jivatāpi śakya nivarttayitum.

Bhāmatī on I, i, 4. 42. Tasmānmithyāpratyayanimittatvāt saśarīratvasya siddhath jīvatoÕpi viduloOśarīratvam. Commentary on the Brahmasūtras I, i, 4. 43.Bhagavadgītā III, 22 and 23.

identification with the body and the body-consciousness are of the nature of make-believe (āhārya-adhyāsa) both in the case of God and that of the Jivanmukta. The only distinction is that whereas Iśvara has an eternal upādhi with which He identifies by means of a conscious make-believe, the JīvanmuktaOs body or upādhi is continued as part of the Māyā upādhi (cosmic consciousness) of Iśvara. Just as Īśvara is maintaining the whole universe through His Mãya, so also the body of the Jivanmukta is maintained not through the JivanmuktaOs desire (because he has become desireless) but as part of the cosmic existence. The Jivanmukta only identifies, by means of a make-believe (āhārya- adhyāsa), with the body retained for cosmic purposes by God and is seen to perform actions. It is to be clear noted that this theory of the continuance of the body of the Jivanmukta as part of the cosmic existence is not open to the objections which Madhusūdana Sarasvatī urges against the Mädhva doctrine of liberation through the grace of God. According to the author of the Nyayaml Ita, even those who have attained direct intuition (aparok Jaj-ana) have to continue their earthly existence in obedience to their prārabdha karma because of their failure to attain that supreme Devotion (paramakāhāpannā bhakti) which yields the Grace of God that is competent to bestow liberation. This Mädhva theory thus makes liberation dependent on the Grace of God and not on knowledge alone and thus conflicts with the fundamental doctrine the Advaita Vedānta. Madhusūdana objects to this doctrine by holding that if liberation is made to depend on GodÕs Grace, this would conflict with the famous Śruti text, ÒHe has

to wait so long,Ó etc., which clearly indicates that after the realisation of Brahman one has to wait for nothing else but the extinction of the karmas that have already begun to fructify. It cannot be understood from the Sruti text that GodOs Grace is an essential condition that has to be satisfied before liberation can be attained.44The texts of the SmIti45 and the Pura as supporting the view that GodOs Grace is instrumental to the cessation of the prarabdha karma and the attainment of liberation, are to be taken as merely eulogistic (stutiparā), inasmuch

44. Tāvadevāsya ciramityādiśrutyā asya utpannatattvasāk ātkārasya prārabdhakarma- klayamātram apek alīya kaivalyasampattyartham iti pratipādanena īśvaraprasādāpek āyā vaktum aśakyatvāt.

Advaitāsiddhi, Ch. IV, p. 892, N.S. Edition. 45. Maccitta Bhagavadgītā XVIII, 58. sarvadurgā i matprasādāttariDyasi.

as they are in conflict with the Sruti text. As regards the Sruti text that tells us about the Grace of God, viz .: OHe alone realises or attains whom It (The Self or the Paramatman) selects or favours; It reveals its own essence to him,Ó it is clear that the Grace helps the realisation of Brahman and not liberation after realisation has been attained. Liberation requires nothing else than realisation (sāklātkāra). Moreover, it need not be supposed that GodOs Grace is helpful to destroy the prārabdha karma, because that can as well happen independently of GodOs Grace through the reaping of the fruits of those karmas. These objections of Madhusudana to the Madhva theory do not affect us. We do not maintain that liberation depends on GodOs will. Our view is clear on the point. Liberation is attained as soon as knowledge or the intuition (tattvasāk ātāra) has been gained, and there is no interval between the realisation and liberation. We have rather strongly repudiated all attempts at maintaining any such gap (vyavadhāna). Liberation is simultaneous with realisation irrespective of the fact whether the body persists or not. We have shown that the question of the persistence of the body is altogether immaterial after j-āna (realisation) has been attained. We have only held that the body of the Jivanmukta which has ceased to become a part of hismelf may be preserved and maintained by God if it is necessary for cosmic purposes. The Jivanmuktadoes neither gain nor lose anything through the persistence or nonpersistence of his body. He has risen above the plane of gains and losses, and moreover, the body which he has realised to be something false (mithya) can no longer add anything to his possessions.

On the theory which we have formulated above, we need not assume the presence of a residual Ignorance (avidyāleśa) in order to account

for the persistence of the body of the Jivanmukta. The centre of individual consciousness (jivacaitanya) which had been so long maintaining the body through a conscious identification with it, now having been consciously identified with the universal consciousness (brahmacaitanya), ceases to be responsible for its maintenance as an individual (because its individuality has ceased), and delegates, as it were, the function to the universal consciousness; or, more strictly speaking, the body, finding no individual centre as its sustainer, delegates itself to the universal consciousness which is the common and universal sustainer of all things. So long as cosmic purposes require its sustenance, the body of the Jīvanmukta is preserved, but as soon as the cosmic purpose has been achieved, it no longer remains. It is the māyā upādhi of Iśvara and not his own residual ignorance that thus accounts for the body of the Jivanmukta. As soon as he has attained j-āna, he has identified himself with Brahman and has ceased to work as a separate individual centre. But the upādhi of the individual, although resting to some extent on his own will, does not depend on it only. As a part of the wider cosmic upadhi, it cannot have an extinction merely through the extinction of the individual centre supporting it. Cosmic upādhi (Māyā) can support it if the cosmic purpose is served by its continuance.

That the body and its movement and enjoyment may continue for othersO purposes is also admitted by the Vedāntic authorities. Śal kara, for example, maintains that the j-ānin may indulge in actions for the purpose of teaching others, having no purpose to be attained for himself.46Vidyäralya also states that bhoga (enjoyment or suffering) may be due to oneOs own desire (sveccha) or to othersO desires (pareccha).47 So the doctrine that the body of the Jivanmukta persists after j-āna is attained owing to cosmic purposes, and not as a result of any residual ignorance on the part of the Jivanmukta himself, does not in any way conflict with the central Vedantic doctrine. Rather it saves us from holding the unsatisfactory theory that although Ignorance is dispelled by Knowledge, something of it remains. No reason can be put forward as to why knowledge would not be competent to remove the indivisible avidyā totally and why a part or rather an aspect of it would remain as an inexplicable surd even after knowledge has been attained. In unambiguous terms Śal kara repudiates the theory of the persistence of the prarabdha karma, even after the realisation of the Supreme, which is so commonly taken recourse to by almost all the eminent Vedāntists claiming support from the Śruti. ÒThe prārabdha does not exist after the realisation of the Real (tattvaj-ana), because of the non-existence of the body, just as the dream does not exist after awakening. The

actions of another life that are designated as prārabdha can never exist, because the human soul has no other life. This body is as much an illusory superimposition as the body created in dreams, and how can that which is false have any birth; and without any birth, how can there be prärabdha? The entire universe, including the

46. Svaprayojanābhāvāt lokasal grahārtha pūrvavat karma li pravl IttoÕpi. Commentary on Bhagavadgītā IV, 20. 47. See Pa-cadaśī.

body, is the outcome of Ignorance, and when knowledge arises, the body or rather the whole universe, being perceived to be false, how can prärabdha remain? The Śruti speaks of the persistence of the prärabdha only to satisfy the intellect of the ignorant.48When the Śruti speaks of the extinction of karma in the mantra, Ôhis karmas come to an end, when he realises the Absolute,Õ by the use of the plural number, the Sruti means evidently to include the prārabdha also. The Ignorant alone maintain the persistence of the prārabdha (after j-āna has been attained) by sheer force without any reason whatsoever (balät), and two evils come out of this doctrine, viz., the disproof of the absolute monism of the Vedänta and the want of confidence in the absolute authority of the Śruti.Ó49

It is difficult to understand how in spite of such express statements of Śal karācārya himself, his followers could attempt to support the absolute monism (advaitavāda) of the Vedānta by reference to the prārabdha karma. Really, if any single thing remains, after Brahman is realised, as a separate reality other than Brahman, then it defeats the purpose and contention of the Advaita Vedānta. If, again, Knowledge (tattvaj-āna) or realisation is not competent to uproot all karmas which form the impediment to liberation, then the very competence of knowledge (j-ana) as the means of liberation is to be questioned. Either we have to agree with the teaching of the Bhagavadgītā that Òall karmas are reduced to ashes by the fire of knowledgeÓ, or we have to give up the central position of the Vedānta, viz., that knowledge and knowledge alone secures liberation. To argue that the prārabdha persists even after tattvaj-āna (realisation) is attained is to side with the Mima sakas preaching that that knowledge can destroy karma is without any foundation.50

We have attempted to explain the persistence of the body and the seeming body-consciousness of the Jivanmukta without assuming the persistence of either avidyā (ignorance) or karma in any form on the part of the Jīvanmukta himself. We have also shown how without subscribing to the theory which holds that the entire universe is the creation of the individual (jīva),Ñ(the dDi-s li-vāda),Ñit is

possible to explain the persistence of the body of the Jīvanmukta in consistency with the Vedantic position.

48. Aj-ānajanabodhārtha prarabdha vakti vai śrutil 49.AparokLanubhūti, verses 90Đ99. 50. Karmak ayo hi vij-ānādityetaccāpramā avat. Sambandhāk epaparihāra, verse 16.

One objection may be urged against the view that we have upheld on the ground that the body of the Jivanmukta is the product of his own Ignorance and, as such, cannot be supposed to continue after the disappearance of his Ignorance. Those who hold that Cosmic Ignorance (Māyā) and individual Ignorance (avidyā) are different, maintain that while Iśvara is the material cause of the material things such as the sky etc., jīva is the material cause of his mind (anta karala), etc. Even those who maintain the non-difference of Māyā (Cosmic Ignorance) and avidyā (individual Ignorance), hold that although Iśvara is the material cause of the five elements and other things of the universe, and that although on the supposition of the identity of Māya and avidyā, He should also be supposed to be the material cause of the mind of the jīva (anta kara la), still an exception must be made in the case of the latter where the individual Ignorance of the jiva is the cause, inasmuch as the identity of antal Ikara la (mind) and the individual (jīva) is perceived. It is because of this fact of jīva being the material cause of his body, mind, etc., that in the Adhyāsa Bhālya of Śa Ikara, the superimposition is shown to take place in the individual and not in Īśvara.51In the Pa-capādikā- Vivara a also, Prakāśātman points out in the discourse on pratikarmavyavasthā that while BrahmanConsciousness reveals all objects, being in inherent contact with them all as their material cause, the Jiva-consciousness, being limited limited to the anta kara la (mind), can reveal only those objects that are in contact with the anta lkaral la (mind).52

To this objection it may be pointed out that the theory that jiva and not Iśvara is the cause of the mind and other things, is not maintained by all Vedantists. There is the clear text of the Sruti to the effect that the entire phenomenal universe with which we deal is the creation of Īśvara. ÒFrom it proceed the vital breath (prala), the mind (manas) and all the organs, ether (akāśa), air, fire, water and earth which is the supporter of the entire universe.Ó53And the jiva is 51. E 51. Evamaha pratyayinamaśel lasvapracārasāk ili pratyagātmanyadhyasya ta-ca pratyagātmānal sarvasāk la tadviparyaye lanta kara lādi vadhyasyati.

52. Anta karal āvacchinno hi jīva pratibimbasthānīya paricchinnastatsa Is lameva vilaya prakāśāyet brahma tu bimbasthānīya sarvagatatvāt sarvam

avabhāsayil lyati. Vivarala, pp. 71Đ72.

53. Etasmāj jāyate prā lo manal sarvendriyāli ca, Kha vāyur jyotir apa pl thivī viśvasya dhāri i. MulI, 2.1.3.

only responsible for the phenomenon of dream (svapnaprapa-ca) and the illusory subjective experiences.54If the body and the mind of the Jīvanmukta have proceeded out of the Cosmic Cause, there is no inconsistency in supposing that they may exist for cosmic purposes even when there is no purpose of the individual to be served by them. As jīva is responsible for illusory experiences and dreamcreations only, these alone need disappear along with the cessation of the individual Ignorance. There is no longer any identification of the self with the body after j-ana is attained, and all illusory superimposition ceases for ever for the Jīvanmukta.

It seems evident that those who have denied Jivanmukti and also those others who have been compelled to admit the persistence of a residual Ignorance in some shape or other, have all been influenced unconsciously or sub-consciously by the deep-rooted conviction in the reality of the world. They somehow cannot get rid of the impression that transcendent knowledge (j-ana) and body, Brahman and the universe, are opposed to each other, forgetting that transcendent knowledge, by virtue of its very transcendence, cannot be and is not opposed to anything. From the standpoint of the individual consciousness also we find that while the experiences of the waking state (jägrat) conflict with those of the dreaming state (svapna), and these two again conflict with the state of dreamless sleep (sulupti), the transcendent (turiya) consciousness conflicts with none of these states and rather acts as the substratum of them all. This transcendent (turīya) consciousness is not, truly speaking, a state at all, although it is commonly designated as the fourth state distinct from the states of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep. It is designated as the fourth only to mark out its essence as transcending all the three individually and collectively and not to point it out as another individual state on a par with the other states. The transcendent (turīya) consciousness supports and is ever equally and individually present in the states of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep. If we think that rising to the transcendental consciousness (turiya) would involve a cessation of the waking and dreaming states, we would be confusing the state of dreamless sleep (su upti) with the transcendental consciousness (turiya). While the former, viz. dreamless sleep (sulupti), is conflicting with the states of waking and dreaming (jägrat and svapna), the latter, viz. turīya, does not conflict with any state at all. Nothing can disturb the

54.Siddhāntaleśa, Ch. I, p. 69.

transcendent serenity of the turiyaconsciousness, and its seeming compresence with the unreal (mithya) states belonging to lower orders of reality can neither touch its sublime heights nor soil its eternal purity.

The states of consciousness are not states of the self (ätman) in the sense in which attributes are attributes of a substance. They do not also come out of the self in the ordinary sense in which an effect proceeds from the cause. They are in a peculiar relation to the self. While the self is their only support and substratum, the se1f neither generates them nor acts as the substance in which they reside.55 They are merely unreal appearances (mithyā prapa-ca) that manifest themselves having the self as their locus (adhil hana), just as the illusory snake manifests itself having the rope as its locus. The snake is not the effect of the rope nor its attribute, but it is an illusory appearance that has the rope as its locus. The snake is perceived to be an illusion as soon as the locus, viz. the rope, is perceived, and it is no longer taken to be real. If there is any manifestation of the snake even after the rope is seen, it is no longer the appearance of the snake as real, but only an unreal appearance that is at once realised to be the rope appearing falsely as the snake. If we compare the world-process to the dancing dolls, the Jivanmukta may still notice the dancing of the dolls, may still observe the world-process, but will not mistake the dolls to be real creatures from their false appearances but will take them as dolls, i.e., as unreal appearances.

This conception of liberation that it is merely a rising to the transcendent consciousness which eternally persists, is supported logically and philosophically by the Vedāntic doctrine of superimposition (adhyasa). The world is a false superimposition on Brahman and, as such, has not to be falsified again (because it is eternally false), but its falsity is to be understood, to be felt and perceived. What is superimposed falsely on a thing is indescribable (anirvacanīya), being neither real nor unreal. The mirage, for example, in a desert that appears falsely to be water, is neither real nor unreal. It is not real because what appears to be water is not really water; that is to say, there is no water in the desert where there is the appearance of water. Again, we are not justified in designating the mirage as altogether non-existent, as otherwise its appearance

55. Na ca matsthāni bhūtāni paśya me yogam aiśvaram, Bhūtabh nna ca bhūtastho mamātmā bhūtabhāvana .. Bhagavadgītā IX, 5.

cannot be explained. What appears cannot be altogether non-existent like the sky-flower or the square circle. We cannot also hold that although the mirage may not be real as indicative of water, still the mirage as a mirage is a real appearance; because, the mirage does not appear as a mirage but as water which it is not, and it cannot on that account be real. On the other hand, we cannot hold that although the appearance of the mirage as water is false, still water exists as a real, for example, in the Ganges, because, when the mirage appears as water, it does not appear as water in the Ganges which is absent from vision, but as water present to the perceiver before him. It follows, therefore, that the mirage is real neither as a mirage nor as water, because as soon as a mirage appears to be a mirage, the mirage no longer persists as a real,56and the water that is real as a distant entity is different from the mirage that appears as real present to the vision of the person under illusion.

The Vedäntists, in common with the Naiyāyikas, oppose the Prabhakara view which holds that the illusion results from nondiscrimination (vivekāgraha) or want of discrimination between the perceptual knowledge of the presented object and the memory of the recalled object. The illusory perception of the conch-shell as silver is really made up of two distinct states of consciousness, the objects of both of which are real. There is the perception of the presented object from which merely the knowledge OIt isÓ (idam), and not the total knowledge, viz. ÒIt is conch-shell,Ó results. There results also the memory of silver (rajatam) which has some similarity with conch- shell. Now, from the combination of these two states which are in themselves valid, and because of want of discrimination between them, there results the state of consciousness OIt is silverÓ, and this is the analysis of the process of illusion. Thus the consciousness expressed in the statement OThis is silverÓ is not erroneous cognition (bhrama), because both of these factors, the one presentational and embracing the ÔidamO, and the other representational and embracing Ôthe silverÕ (rajatam), are true. Error results only from the non- discrimination of the two states as distinct. This view is opposed on the ground that from mere non-discrimination which has a negative character no positive error as is found in illusion can result. Ignorance has to be distinguished from error.

56. Na bādhyeta yadi marīcīn atoyātmatattvān atoyātmanā g hlīyāt toyātmanā tu g hlan kathamabhrānta katha vā abādhya . Bhāmatī on Adhyāsa Bhā ya.

There is no error in not knowing a thingÑthat is merely want of knowledge; error results only when one thing is mistaken for another. The Prābhākara attempt to dismiss all errors and to regard all

knowledge as valid, and particularly in the present instance, to save illusion from being regarded as false knowledge by maintaining that it is a case of compound knowledge made up of two items of valid knowledge, does not succeed. There is here not merely want of discrimination between conch-shell and silver or between the perceptual process and memory, but there is a positive identification of one thing with a different thing. If there had been merely perception of ÔthisÕ (idam) and ÔsilverÕ separately, then nobody would be drawn towards the object presented. One who wants silver approaches an object which he perceives to be silver. If the perception has as its content merely ÔthisO (idam) and not Ôthis is silverO, the person wanting silver would not approach the object. When, again, the perception has as its content ÔsilverÕ and not Ôthis is silverÕ, then also the person wanting silver would not approach the object, because nobody approaches ÔsilverÕ merely or silver that is absent but only the silver that is present to him. If it be argued that the person wanting silver may approach the object, because although he does not know that it is silver, he also does not know that that is not silver, the answer is that the other alternative that he might ignore the object as well from that very consideration is also equally possible.

According to the Naiyayikas, perceptual error consists in the apprehension of an object as other than what it is (anyathākhyāti); for example, when the flickering rays of the Sun instead of appearing as such are perceived to be water, that is, as something which they are not, erroneous cognition results.57What is illusorily perceived is actually presented, and not merely represented or recalled in memory. The silver that is perceived in the shell is not merely remembered as the Prabhakaras think, but is somehow or other presented to consciousness, because otherwise there would not have been any activity on the part of the subject to reach it. Again, the cognition of silver is a single act of perception and not the compound of two mental processes, presentation and recollection. The silver that is cognised is apprehended as something that isbeing experienced in tbe present (anubhūyamānatayā) and not as something

57.Nyāyavārttika I, i, 4.

experienced before (anubhūtatayā).58There is a presentation of silver which exists somewhere else, but due to some defects, the silver that is not present before the perceiver is perceived to be present before him. The presentational character of the cognition of silver cannot be explained on the Prābhākara view, and hence the Naiyāyikas suppose that the silver must be supposed to be actually perceived and not merely remembered. As in J-analak alasannikar a, although the

fragrance of the sandal wood is not in actual contact with the eyes, still there is a visual perception of the fragrant sandal wood, so here also the silver, although not in contact with the sense-organs of the perceiver, but lying somewhere else, is still presented as though it is in actual contact with them.

The Vedäntins object to this Naiyayika view on the ground that the silver existing somewhere else and not really present to the senses can never be an object of perception. The silver that is perceived is felt to be present before the perceiver, and the silver that is absent can neither be the object of the perception nor can it produce the activities on the part of the perceiver. If, however, an absent object even may be an object of perception, then all inferences will be useless. The Vedäntins think that the silver that is presented in illusory perception is not silver that is real either there or anywhere, but is something indefinable that lasts so long as the illusion lasts. The important contribution of the Naiyayika, viz. the contention that the process of illusion is really presentational in character, is incorporated in the Vedäntic view. But while the Nyaya view is open to the objection that there cannot be the contact of the sense-organs with an absent object, the position of the Vedanta is free from any such charge.

The conclusion that follows is that the mirage or the silver is neither real, nor unreal, nor both real and unreal. It cannot be both real and unreal because two contradictories cannot characterise one and the same thing. It cannot be altogether unreal i.e., non-existent (asat), because had it been so, it could not have been experienced at all. It is not real because neither the illusory (adhyasika) water nor the illusory silver can satisfy the thirsty or the needy man. It is therefore a false appearance (mithya, an Ita) which is thoroughly indefinable (anirvācya). Its seeming reality vanishes with the consciousness of the reality of its locus by whose support it appears.

58. Anubhūtataya hi na rajatam atra prakāśate kintvanubhūyamānatayā. Nyāyama-jarī, p. 180.

It is then perceived to be false, and for the consciousness of its falsity, all that is required is knowledge, and its destruction cannot happen through anything else and does not await anything else but knowledge. What has its origin in false knowledge can disappear only through right knowledge, the coarser things like material processes (karma) being totally incapable of touching it.

From the above view of illusion (adhyāsa), it follows that what is superimposed is real neither as an object presented, as the Naiyāyikas think, nor as an object previously experienced and now remembered,

as the Prābhakaras think. The superimposition is only a presentation which is sublated by the later experience of the locus and, as such, though not altogether non-existent (asat) like the skyflower, it is still altogether indefinable (anirvacanīya) and false (mithya). The silver that seems to be presented does in no way belong to the shell as its attribute or part, nor is it produced by it as its effect. It seems to be presented, and the presentation has to be accepted as a fact not further explicable and to be regarded as false after it has been sublated by the later experience. The inexplicable silver lasts so long as the illusion lasts, and even when the cognition of silver is sublated by the cognition of the shell, the fact that the silver previously appeared as a presentation reduces it to an indefinable and not to an utter non-existent. The body is only such a superimposition on the soul, and the whole world is also such a superimposition on Brahman. Although the distinction is drawn sometimes between vyāvahārika (empirical or phenomenal) reality and prātibhāsika (illusory) reality, still, strictly speaking, from the standpoint of the absolute (pāramārthika) reality, the distinction disappears, and everything that seems to appear other than Brahman has only a prātibhāsika (illusory) existence.

The Vedantic psychology of illusion thus furnishes the Vedäntist with a justification for his metaphysical theory and his transcendental experience. We find in the fact of illusion something which presents itself as real but the reality of which vanishes as soon as it is contradicted and sublated by the cognition of its locus. The Vedantist bases his metaphysics on this fact of experience and holds that a similar relation exists between the soul and the mental and bodily states, as also between Brahman and the Universe (jagat). He also interprets his spiritual intuition (aparok ānubhūti) and attempts to understand the same in the light of this common experience of individuals.

Though the Vedantic experience of the Absolute is declared to be indescribable and unspeakable like all mystical experiences, it is not attained in the same fashion as mystical experiences are commonly supposed to be. The Vedāntic experience or ātmadarśana comes after a long course of intellectual and other forms of discipline, and appears only as the fruition or completion of thoughtprocesses. Atmā vā are drallavyal śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavya Ñthe ātman or the self is to be seen, to be heard, to be justified by reason, and to be contemplated. The Upani ads seem to concentrate all their attention upon these three processesNśrava a, manana, and nididhyāsanaÑas the only auxiliaries and preparatory stages of tattva-j-āna. Of course, there are other processes, but they only prepare the sādhaka for śrava a,

manana and nididhyāsana. It is to be remembered that the Vedānta does not speak of an intuition which is to be reached by ways opposed to those of the intellect; rather it clearly emphasises the fact that the intuition is only a perfected stage or paripākāvasthā of thought, meditation and concentration. Prof. Radhakrishnan aptly says that it is Òwhen thought becomes perfected in intuitionÓ, that we get a vision of the real. This is the point of difference between Vedantism and ordinary mysticism. Mysticism does not discuss in detail the way to the mystical experience; very often it merely declares that it lies in directions opposed to those of the intellect.59But according to the Vedānta, intuition is not opposed to the intellect, but it merely transcends the intellect and is the fruition of the intellect.

Vairāgya Ñ(detachment and dispassion) is regarded as the conditio sine qua non of Vedāntic intuition. Pata-jali also regards vairāgya60to be the only means helpful towards the attainment of the highest stage of samādhi. The Kal hopani ad proclaims that unless a man refrains from evil deeds and becomes quiet, peaceful and deeply concentrated, he has no chance of attaining knowledge and salvation. It might seem a little perplexing as to what intimate connection there can be between detachment and j-äna. A little reflexion will show, however, that the depth of concentration that is needed for the Vedantic intuition cannot be consistent with even the least attachment for any object in this universe or in any other. The intuition can be had only by the most pointed intellect (dl śyate

59.See Mysticism by E. Underhill. 60. P.Sūtras IV, 29 and III, 49.

tvagryayā buddhyā), and because of its extreme fineness, Brahman eludes the grasp of reason.61If this intuition is described as the highest form of self-consciousness or the apprehension of the self by the self, we find that here we require the inwardmost turn of the Buddhi which alone can yield the intuition which the Vedanta speaks of. There is no not-self, no distinction of the cogniser, cognised and cognition, and there is tripulīvilaya. This immediate experience of the perfected reason transcends its prior dialetical movement and discursive function. So long as Buddhi retains the slightest tendency towards turning outwards, it cannot reach the innermost point in the inward direction. Attachment implies an outward movement of the mind, and that is wholly inconsistent with the thorough inward bent of reason which alone can hope to attain the intuition that the Vedānta speaks of.62Although the term Ôj-anaO is used to signify Vedantic intuition, we should be very careful not to confound this intuition with what is ordinarily meant by knowledge. In senseknowledge as well as in intellectual knowledge, the reason is in the object-attitude. Reason

occupies itself with an ÔotherÕ in the form of the object in all forms of knowledge including scientific knowledge. Only in Vedāntic intuition, reason is engaged with no ÔotherÕ but with its very self. So long as reason is occupied with concrete things, it does not really turn inward and, therefore, self-intuition does not arise. But with its gradual development, reason learns to take pleasure in finer and finer, and more and more abstract things, until finally it becomes wholly absorbed in its own self. The authority and deliverances of the highest reason are much clearer and stronger than those of its cruder stages and, therefore, the intuition of its perfected stage establishes its supremacy over its previous deliverances with a native authority that is undisputed. The higher experience thus transcends the lower and establishes its own truth in defiance of the latter which is referred to a lower order of reality.

61. Ka hopanillad III, 12; and Bhagavadgītā XIII, 15. 62.Cf. Plato: OSuch a person will be temperate and thoroughly uncovetous; for he is the last person in the world to value those objects, which make men anxious for money at any cost.O The Republic,Book VI. OWe cannot doubt that when a personOs desires set strongly in one direction, they run with corresponding feebleness in every other channel, like a stream whose waters have been diverted into another bed.Ó Ibid.

It is to be noted carefully that this vairāgya (complete detachment and desirelessness), which is essential to Vedantic intuition, is not any artificial suppression of desires or a temporary attainment. It must be the permanent disposition of the soul acquired through a long course of healthy discipline and development. The desirelessness should emerge as the normal outcome of the realisation of the finitude and worthlessness of desires, as contrasted with the transcendent infinitude of the self supposed to have the desires. The finitude and smallness of all objects of desire must somehow impress the mind before there can be genuine desirelessness. OThat man attains happiness and peace in whom all desires enter without affecting him in any way, just as the waters enter the immoveable ocean without effecting any change in the same, and not the man who is subject to desires.Ó63

Vidyāra ya mentions the worship of nirgula Brahman (attributeless Absolute) as another means of attaining knowledge (vidyā).64As śraval la with the help of manana and nididhyāsana is the means indicated by the Sa khya line of Sadhana, so the worship of nirgu a Brahman is also to be regarded as another such means indicated by the term ÔyogaO in the text Ôtatkara al sa khyayogabhipannam. O The Śruti in many places prescribes the worship of the Absolute.65It cannot be supposed that as Brahman has been described as full of Bliss

etc., the worship of such Brahman does not prove the possibility of worshipping the attributeless Brahman; because, although in some texts Brahman has been described as possessing attributes, in others, it has been described as not possessing attributes,66and the texts supporting worship apply to the worship of Brahman which has been described both as full of attributes and as devoid of attributes. The texts prove that the One Indivisible Homogeneous (akha Laikarasa) Brahman can be

63. Bhagavadgītā II, 70. 64.Pa-cadaśī, Dhyānadīpa. 65. Deva ha vai prajapatimabruvanna Jora Jīyā Isamimamātmanamo lkāra no vyacaklva. N si hottaratāpanī Up. I. Omityeva dhyayatha ātmānam. MulLaka Upanillad, 2.2.6. Yal punareta trimātre lomityetenaivakLare la para purul lam abhidhyāyīta Praśnopanilad, 5.5. 66. Asthūlamana u, etc.

worshipped without any detriment to its nature as nirgul a (attributeless).67

This view of Vidyaral lya might seem to be directly conflicting with the famous mantra of the Kal lhopani lad, ÔKnow that to be Brahman and not this that is worshippedO, which expressly rejects the possibility of worship of the attributeless Absolute (nirgul la Brahman). But are we to reject the text of the Mu lakopanil lad enjoining the worship of Brahman merely because it conflicts with the text of another Upani ad? If we answer in the affirmative, then, we shall be under the necessity of supposing that Brahman cannot be known at all and of rejecting the entire Vedāntic literature as false, because there is the mantra, ÔIt is different from anything that is knownO. Such contradictory passages are not rare in the Upani ad literature, and the proper way of dealing with them seems to be to try to interpret them in such a way that they can be reconciled, and not to reject one or other or both of them on the ground of conflict. When we find such contradictory statements as ÔBrahman can be knownÕ and ÔBrahman cannot be known,O or ÔBrahman can be worshippedO and ÔBrahman cannot be worshippedO, perhaps the intention is to indicate that while Brahman cannot be known and worshipped as an object (vastu), its knowledge and worship are not to be denied altogether.68

The Vedäntists admit however a difference between these two methodsÑthe Salkhya method of realisation through reflection (vicāra) and the Yoga method through worship (upāsana). The former speedily produces the result viz. realisation of Brahman, in the cases of persons free from all sins and obstacles (pratibandhaka), while the latter takes a longer time to effectuate the same. The former, i.e. the

Sā khya method, is thus the high road (mukhya kalpa) to attainment, the latter being merely an alternative route (anukalpa).

In both of these methods, it is the fixation or concentration of mental processes (pratyayābhyāsarūpam) known as prasa-khyāna that forms the instrument of the realisation of Brahman. The Yoga method prescribes this concentration as an inherent element in

67. See Siddhāntaleśa, Ch. III. 68. Śrutyantareśu brahmavedanaprasidhher avedyatvaśrutir vāstavāvedyatvaparā cet, ātharva ādau tadupāsanaprasiddhestadanupāsyatvaśrutirapi vastuv ttaparāOstu. Siddhāntaleśa, Ch. III.

upāsanā (worship), while the Sa khya method also prescribes the same under the name of nididhyasana that comes after manana (reflection). The Ka hopani lad mentions this concentration (dhyana) or meditation to be the instrument of the realisation of the Absolute in the mantra, OThen meditating he realises the distinctionless Absolute.Ó In the Brahmasutras69also we find this meditation mentioned as the instrument of the realisation of Sagula Brahman.

It may be objected that this nididhyāsana (concentration), being not included under the pramāl las (instruments of knowledge), cannot be supposed to be productive of correct knowledge (pramā), and hence if the realisation of Brahman be supposed to be produced through this nididhyāsana, that also would fall outside the sphere of right knowledge (prama). Knowledge, not derived through the accepted pramā as (instruments of knowledge), cannot be taken as true (pramā)70even if by chance the knowledge corresponds to fact. The essence of valid knowledge (pramätva) consists not merely in the absence of discrepancy of facts (abādhitārthakatvamātram) but in the knowledge or awareness of the absence of such discrepancy (abādhitārthaj-ānatva). Hence although concentration might reveal real facts, still it cannot be supposed to yield valid knowledge (pramā). The correspondence with facts may, in same cases, be merely casual, and unless there is definite awareness of the correspondence, there is no valid knowledge (pramātva).

In answer to the above objection, it may be pointed out, however, that the general rule that knowledge, not yielded by the accepted pramā as, cannot be regarded as valid, does not always hold good. Knowledge gained by God (Iśvara) through the processes of His Māyā, for example, is certainly valid, although it is not derived from the common sources (pramalas), and hence concentration (prasa-khyāna) should also be similarly regarded as yielding valid knowledge, although not included under the commonly accepted pramālas

(sources or instruments). Again, as the realisation of Brahman which this nididhyasana (concentration) leads to, is supported by pramā as (sources of knowledge), the nididhyāsana itself becomes virtually a pramālla.71As Amalānanda says OThe

69. III, iii, 51; and IV, i, 12. 70. Pramā āmūlakasya pramātvāyogāt, Siddhāntaleśa, p. 453. Chowkhamba Edition. 71. Prasa-khyānajanyasya brahmasāk ātkārasya pramā amūlakatvāt pramā atvām. Ibid., Ch. III.

direct intuition that results from meditation on the sublime texts of the Vedänta cannot be invalid, inasmuch as it strengthens the original source (prama a) itself.Ó72What is taught by the Śruti finds its demonstration in the Vedantic intuition, and hence the intuition supporting the validity of the Śruti texts becomes itself valid. But to suppose from this argument that the validity of the Sruti becomes thus dependent on the intuition or on meditation that leads to that intuition, would be entirely erroneous. The validity of the intuition and of the processes leading to the intuition is sought to be proved by reference to the support that the intuition lends to the Sruti texts, and not the validity of the Sruti by the intuition. That would be putting the cart before the horse.

According to Vācaspati and Prakāśātman, it is the mind (manas) that is the instrument of the realisation of Brahman. Meditation (prasa- khyana) may be regarded as an instrument only so far as it is auxiliary to the mind. This view is supported by the Sruti texts such as ÒThis self is to be known by the mindÓ, OTo be always seen by the mind and mind aloneÓ etc. In the Pa-capādikāVivaralā, we find the mind (anta lkara la) referred to as the instrument of the knowledge of the self as knower (pramat l) and of the objects of knowledge. In the Bhamatī also, we find this statement, OThe mind, full with the mature reflection on the meaning of the great Vedānta texts, identifies the directly apprehended self, i.e., the ÔtvamO rid of all upādhis, with the Absolute, i.e., the ÔtatÕ.Ó73

Vācaspati argues, further, that this realisation (anubhava) is not identical with the nature of Brahman (brahmasvabhäva) so that it has to be supposed as not generated, but he holds that this realisation is one of the modes of consciousness (i.e., of the mind) having Brahman as its object. It cannot be argued that this doctrine of the realisation of Brahman through the mind conflicts with the selfrevealing character of Brahman, because it is the Brahman devoid of all upādhis that is self-revealing (svaya prakāśa), and not the Brahman that is perceived through the modalised states of consciousness (v ltti).

Nididhyāsana is the immediate precursor or the nearest antecedent to j-āna. The stage of deepest concentration or the stage

72. Kalpataru. 73. Tasmān nirvicikitsavākyārthabhāvanāparipākasahitam anta kara la tva padārthasyāparok asya tattadupādhyākārani edhena tatpadārtham anubhāvayatīti yuktam.I, i, 1.

of mature meditation, when nothing but the object of meditation is in the field of consciousness, when all influences from the external world find the gate-ways closed due to the fully concentrated attention on the object, when also nothmg from within the region of sub- consciousness can rise up to the surface due to purification attained through a long course of discipline; in short, when nothing from the outside or the inside disturbs concentration, then this stage reveals or finds revealed the svaya prakāśa or self-luminous j-āna. The Vedānta teaches that this is the way to have direct acquaintance of the self and of the Absolute. This nididhyāsana or dhyāna reveals or rather takes us to j-ana. Long and continuous concentration reveals the truth, Ñand this is found to be proved in the case of the experience of distant objects through meditation on them. Dhyāna alone takes us to the heart of the object, can make us enter into the object, can lift us to the level of the object, can prepare us to have acquaintance with the object by being, in a sense, identified with the object. This dhyāna or concentration is regarded by the Vedānta as a new source of knowledge and, in a sense, the only source of acquiring knowledge that is absolute. Everywhere we find the importance and usefulness of this dhyāna or concentration. Where there is deep concentration, there is the revelation of truth. It is observed that nothing really great can be achieved in any sphere without this deep concentration. The Chändogya really gives us the entire secret about this method of attaining knowledge in the sublime passage where it speaks of Dhyāna: ÒDhyāna is better than citta; the world seems to be meditating, the heavens seem to be meditating, so also do the waters, the mountains, gods and men: therefore, it is that those who attain greatness among men do so as the fruits of dhyāna; on the other hand, those who are not great always quarrel with one another and speak ill of others.74Thus, those who are masters surely attain their greatness through dhyāna; therefore, worship dhyāna. Ó75

Dhyāna (meditation) is concentrated cit, and dhyāna reveals because everything is, in reality, cit. In the case of Vedäntic intuition, the dhyāna takes the form of an aha graha upāsanā, and the meditation is on the identity of ätman and Brahman, of the self and the Absolute. Dhyāna everywhere removes the gap between the

74. Cf. Plato: ÒSurely little-mindedness thwarts above anything the soul that is destined ever to grasp truth.Ó 75. Chapter VII, vi. The Republic, Book V.

meditator and the meditated, and here also it raises the individual to the level of the Absolute.

This dhyāna or nididhyāsana, which takes us to samādhi or j-āna, again, comes as a result of manana or reflection. The Chandogya tells us76Nwhen one reflects, then only one knows,N nothing can be known without reflecting on it. It is this reflection or manana that prepares one for nididhyāsana or dhyāna. Reflection or manana implies a rational justification of the subject, without which it can never have a permanent hold on the mind. It is this that makes secure the foundation of a principle. We are to learn from the Vedas, such truths as ÔThat art ThouÕ (tattvamasi), ÔAll this is BrahmanO (sarva khalvida Brahma), ÔAll this is ātmanÕ (ātmai-veda sarvam), etc., and then we are to try to see the reasonableness of these propositions by means of favourable arguments and rational discussions, and then after establishing their reasonableness and accuracy conclusively and removing all doubts about them, we are to concentrate our attention on them constantly, and then these truths will be revealed to us in an intuitive vision. It is to be noticed that the moments of deepest concentration (nididhyāsana) cannot and do not come to us by chance, but only as the result of a long continued course of intellectual discipline. Just as the stage of j-āna or samādhi is only the fruition of nididhyāsana or dhyāna, so also this stage of dhyāna or nididhyāsana, is only the fruition of manana (reflection). It begins to work from the moment when all doubts and perplexities and ambiguities about the position have been completely uprooted by means of reflection. It may be argued that argumentation or reasoning (manana) may be helpful in removing doubts and errors with regard to external things where there is possibility of hindrance to the working of the prama as; but as regards the selfluminous self, reasoning (manana) is useless, there being no hindrance to the revelation of the self-revealed.77It is seen that the

76. VII, xviii. 77. Nanveval bahirarthe prama apratibandhasa bhavāt tadvigamāya bhavatu tarkopakāro na tathātmani svaya Iprakāśe pratibandhābhāvād iti .. loke tāvad vilayasyāparokLatā sālvidabhedād vā vi layasyāvyavadhānatayā svasal vijjanakatvād vā pramālakāra endriyasa Iprayuktatvād vā bhavati, uktakār atrayahīneOnumeyādau paroklatādar anat; tatra brahma la eva sarvasalvidupādānatvād brahmākaraśabdapramā ajanyasa vedaneOpi tadabhinnatayā vā tajjanakatayā vā brahmāpi prathamam evaparok latayāvabhāsate, tacca cittasyātisūk meOnekāgratādoād viparyayasa skāradol ācca pratibaddha bhrāntyā parok la

vadavabhasate. Vivara a, p. 103.

direct acquaintance (aparoklatā) of objects results (1) where the object appears as identical with or non-different from the state of consciousness (sal lvit); or (2) where the object generates its corresponding state of consciousness without any interval (vyavadhāna) or gap; or (3) where there is the contact with sense- organs which are the sources or instruments of knowledge. Where none of these causes is present, as in inference, there is indirect knowledge. Brahman itself, being the material cause (upādāna) of all states of consciousness (sal Ivit), must reveal itself directly in the particular state of consciousness which has Brahman as its content. As a matter of fact, Brahman which always is really directly apprehended, seems to be only known indirectly through mistake. The mistake is due to the mindOs want of concentration on things very subtle and also to the mindOs deep-rooted disposition towards error. Hence there is necessity for reflection and other processes in order to remove this error, in order to bring into direct acquaintance what through error seems to be only indirectly known. Śrava la or listening to the Vedic texts can produce direct acquaintance of Brahman only when sacrifices and other actions have previously removed all impediments, when control of sense-organs (śama), etc., have stopped the mindÕs activities in opposite directions, when ratiocination has shown the possibility of the experience of Brahman (brahmasā- klātkāra), and when intense and long meditation on the subtle nature of Brahman and ätman has helped to create the disposition of concentration on Brahman, and thus when all the defects of the mind that are responsible for the creation of the illusion of indirect knowledge have been removed.78Roughly speaking, there are four kinds of defects: (1) the defects of the body, viz. diseases, etc .; (2) the defects of the sense-organs, viz. their tendency to look outwards (bahil prava atā); (3) the defects of the mind, viz. doubt and indecision; and (4) the defects of the Buddhi, viz., want of concentration and meditation. The first kind of defect is removed through regulated and selfless actions; the second, by means of strict discipline and control and the habit of withdrawing the mind from

78. Yaj-adinibarhitakalma apratibandhal śamādiniruddhaviparītaprav ttidoa mananasandarśitaprameyādisambhāvanāgu apradīpojjvalitam atisūk matarabrahmātmaviLayanididhyāsanapracayaparinirmitatadekāgrav ttigu la cendriyal pārok yavibhramanimittapratibandhanirāsena śabdādevāparok aniścayanimitta bhavati.

Vivarala, p. 103.

objects (pratyāhāra); the third, by means of reflection (vicāra); and the fourth by means of meditation (dhyana) and absorption (Samādhi).

The manana or reflection, again, is dependent on śraddhā which implies, according to Sal kara, attachment to and confidence in the subject to be discussed. No one engages himself fully in a subject for which he feels no attachment, that is to say, for the success of which he does not feel pleasure or pain; nor can he work hard for a subject in which he has no confidence. This śraddhā is given a very important place in Vedāntic literature. When one attains śraddhā, he can have manana;79absence of śraddhā implies absence of manana, and so also absence of dhyāna and j-āna. The Bhagavadgītā says, OHe who is respectful attains Knowledge.Ó80This śraddhā is regarded as the starting point, as the conditio sine qua non of all j-āna. No amount of reasoning can help us to understand a theme, if we are not favourably disposed towards it. He who has no confidence in the Sāstras (āstikyabuddhi) can never hope to realise their teachings, because of the simple reason that without this confidence it is impossible to have the necessary application that is competent to reveal the truth. This is the case everywhere. A person can realise only what he wants to realise (Cf. JamesOs Will to Believe).

This confidence or śraddhā, again, rises out of ni hā or whole- heartedness in serving and following the spiritual guide in every way. The Chandogya says: Yadā vai nisti hati atha śraddadhati81Ñwhen one has wholeheartedness, then one acquires confidence. In the Bhagavadgīta also we find: OTry to acquire tattvaj-āna by bowing down to, by asking reverential questions to explain your difficulties to, and by serving the tattvadarsins or seers of truth, and they will instruct you.Ó82To apply oneself wholeheartedly to a subject is the surest means of entering into its secret. Without this whole-heartedness, there cannot be confidence, and without confidence, there can be no revelation. The Bhagavadgīta always lays emphasis on the word ÔananyaÕ which means that God is to be served Ôwithout being occupied with anything else.Õ ÒTo those who think of me and me alone, and of nothing else, and serve me in

79. Chāndogya Upanillad VII, xix. 80. IV, 40. 81. VII, XX.

this way, I myself carry everything which they do not possess and also guard all that they do possess.Ó83In another place, we find, OI am to be attained only by bhakti or devotion which knows of nothing else but me.Ó84This ananyatva or whole-hearted application to the subject is the secret of success. This whole-hearted application can only come through klti which is explained by Sallkara as the control of the sense-organs and the attempt to fix attention on a particular subject.

These disciplinary practices ensure the wholehearted application; so, these should be followed strictly in order that tattvaj-āna may be acquired. The anu hānas or practices, then, are the all important factors, because they form the starting point. When they are observed strictly, then nil ha or whole-hearted application comes, and then śraddhā, manana; and nididhyāsana follow in due course, and ultimately tattvaj-ana is attained. That this indriyasa yama or control of the sense-organs is the starting point is also emphasised by the Chandogya: When ahara-suddhi or purity in all that is gathered by the sense-organs is attained, then there is sattva-śuddhi or transparency or perfection of the intellect, and when the intellect becomes thus completely purified, then there is dhruvāsm Iti or constant and continuous recollection of the truths which have been learnt by śravala or hearing from the mouth of the spiritual guide and from the Śāstras. And after this dhruvā sm ti has been attained, there is total extinction of all misery due to ignorance. Sal kara adds in his commentary that as āhāraśuddhi or purity of the material collected by the sense-organs is the first step and the others follow it one by one, so this should be acquired at the outset. No creature ever performs an action which does not lead to pleasure or which is not at least supposed to lead to some sort of pleasure. This k ti implying control of sense-organs must, therefore, be supposed to lead to pleasure or happiness; otherwise, no body would apply himself to it. Now, it should be understood clearly that if one performs these rather unpleasant disciplinary practices, one will attain happiness and pleasure that will more than compensate the pains attending the performance of the practices in the beginning. This hope of future happiness alone can rouse a man to action.

All happiness and pleasure abide in the Bhūmā or the Infinite and the Absolute. ÒThat which is Infinite is Bliss and there is nothing of blessedness in anything finite; in fact, the Infinite is of the nature

83. IX, 22. 84. XI, 54.

of perfect Bliss.Ó85In the Bhagavadgīta also, we find, ÒAttaining which nothing else is felt to be more desirable, and resting where, even the greatest pain cannot affect; Ó86and again, Othis state is one of supreme happiness and blessedness which can be felt only by the soul and cannot be grasped by the senses.Ó87 As all happiness lies in the Infinite, as the Infinite is rather identical with Bliss, so this Infinite is to be sought after. All our miseries and troubles are due to our attachment for finite things. The finite is by its very nature limited, and all limits resist us, and whenever we meet with resistance, we feel pain. But it is because we apply ourselves to objects having a limited

scope and a specified duration that our freedom or unresistedness only lasts for a very short time, after the expiry of which we again feel discontented. We try another finite thing and become again disappointed. Nothing seems to satisfy us permanently simply because our objects of desire are always finite, and finite things are incapable of yielding us permanent happiness. Theoretically, only that which is niratiśaya, that which has nothing greater than it, in short, the Infinite or the Bhūmā, which we have described in the preceding chapter, can only give us permanent happiness. This Bhūma is bound to be the Absolute of philosophy, simply because nothing is beyond it and it contains everything. This conception of the Bhūmā or the Infinite is the starting point of Sadhana, and it is also its goal. In order that one may begin Sādhana or apply one-self to the rudimentary practices, one must have some conception of the Infinite which is to be understood as the source of real and abiding happiness, and the sādhaka attains the goal when he realises this Infinite in concrete experience. It is this Bhumā or the Infinite that is the seat and source of all happiness, and it is this conception of the Bhūmā that also prompts us to attain happiness. This is what moves us forward and this is also the goal to be attained. It is outside of us in the form of the goal; it is inside us in the form of the conception or the idea. This is the real Absolute where we find the identity of the self and Brahman, the complete merging of the not-self in the Self.

Really, all bondage is nothing but ignorance. This ignorance consists in remaining satisfied with the finite or the small (alpa), which is martya or destructible. It is not to know the finite as finite,

85.Ch. Up. VII, xxiii. 86. VI, 22.

not to have any idea or impression of the Bhūmā or the Infinite; it lies in not realising the finite to have a finis or limit or end. Therefore it is that nityānityavastuviveka or the discrimination between the permanent and the transitory has been regarded as the indis-pensable first step to the Vedāntic Sādhanā. As soon as a person has a glimpse of the Bhuma or the Infinite, the Indestructible and the Permanent, he realises the unbridgeable gulf of distinction between the Infinite and the finite, and immediately there arises ihāmutraphalabhogavirakti or indifference to all finite enjoyment either here or in life after death; because, after all, finite things are short-lived and there is no abiding happiness in them. Real Sādhana begins with this apprehension or rather a glimpse of the Infinite. That alone can attract us which comes within the range of our experience. So long, the finite things were objects of attraction, because the finite alone had been experienced by us. But now that the Infinite comes within the range of our vision, it

allures us infinitely, and the attraction of finite things appears to be very feeble as contrasted with the attraction of the Infinite. It is at this stage that k ti comes on the scene, because nothing short of the Infinite can satisfy now, and any suffering that may have to be experienced for its attainment seems trifling as contrasted with the abiding happiness that it will bring in. Then the sādhaka acquires Ia sampatti (six virtues)Ñśama, dama, titiklā, uparati, samādhāna and śraddhā,Ñthrough strict observance of the religious practices and other disciplinary courses. At this stage, he becomes really Ômumuk uÕ and he seeks nothing else but liberation from bondage. He wants with his whole self the realisation of the Bhūmā or the Infinite, and ultimately he attains perfect satisfaction by realising the same within him and finding it to be identical with his own self. The alsampattis, beginning with the control of the senses, only prepare the sādhaka or the seeker of truth for attaining competence for manana or vicāra, that is, for deep reflection on the nature of spiritual truths. This is known as vivekayogyatālābha. According to the Vedāntic mode of thinking, right reflection and correct reasoning can only be performed by a purified intellect or Ôśuddhacitta,Õ the śuddhi or purification coming as a result of the strict observance of religious rites and disciplinary courses. So, while śrava la, manana, and nididhyāsana may be regarded as antara-ga sādhanā (processes intimately connected with j- āna or aparok ānubhūti) of j-āna, being its immediate antecedents, the actions or karmas purifying the intellect, may be regarded as rather bahira-ga Sādhanā or processes remotely connected with j-āna.

[Some are of opinion that the great Upani lad texts alone are the only instruments that are adequate for the realisation of Brahman. That the mind is not competent for the task has been expressly stated in the Ka hopanil lad thus: OThat which is not known by the mind.O It can hardly be maintained that the reference is to immature mind and not to all minds in general; because, in the text, no distinction is made between immature mind and mature mind, and because the mind has been taken simply in the general sense of the term. But one may argue that if the incompetence of the mind is supposed to be declared by the above text, the incompetence of words, the constituents of the Vedantic texts, has also been no less forcibly expressed by the very same Upanilad in the mantra, OThat which is not expressed by words.Ó To this objection it may be replied that although the direct acquaintance of Brahman throughsabdamay be denied by those who hold that the mind and not words (sabda) is the instrument, the instrumentality of śabdain the generation of indirect knowledge cannot be denied by them even; for, otherwise, Brahman itself whom they seek to know, is not established. So, although śabdamay not be

the instrument of direct knowledge (śaktimukhena), still it must be regarded as an instrument of indirect knowledge (lak āmukhena).

Some are of opinion that as direct acquaintance of Brahman is absolutely necessary for the removal of Ignorance causing a direct illusion, śabdamust be supposed to be producing not merely indirect knowledge but also direct acquaintance. There is no other source of knowledge in the matter of Brahman except śabda; and if this śabda also be supposed to be incapable of producing direct acquaintance necessary for liberation, then liberation itself would become impossible, and the Sruti texts declaring the possibility of liberation would be without foundation (anirmokLaprasa-gāt).

It may also be supposed that although śabda, by itself, is incapable of producing direct knowledge, it may do so with the help of meditation (nididhyasana), just as it is seen that the mind of the lover can have a vision of his distant beloved when it is aided by deep concentration or meditation. 88

On epistemological grounds, again, some of the Vedäntists hold that śabdais competent to yield direct acquaintance of Brahman. The directness of cognition or knowledge, according to them, consists in its having a direct thing directly presented as its object. It is not the source of knowledge that guarantees the directness or immediacy of cognition, but it is the nature of the object that determines the same. It is not to be supposed, however, that this involves a petitio principii, because they do not hold at the same time that the directness of the thing consists in its being the object of direct knowledge. That object is direct for that subject which is identical with or non-different from the corresponding subject-consciousness. External objects perceived directly are objects of direct knowledge, inasmuch as the identity between the subjectconsciousness and the object-consciousness in those cases is manifested through the corresponding modifications of consciousness (v tti). Brahman is by its very nature direct, not depending for its directness like material objects on anything else, viz., the subjectconsciousness, and hence the knowledge acquired of it through śabdacan never be indirect. The directness of the object, viz. Brahman, makes all knowledge acquired of it (through śabda) direct and immediate (aparok la).

Advaitavidyācārya differs from the above view on the ground that the criterion would not apply to the immediate apprehension of Bliss (svarūpa-sukha), as there is no differentiation in that state between the subject-consciousness and the object-consciousness, and that the difficulty cannot be overcome by holding the untenable doctrine that

the consciousness itself becomes the subject and the object (svavil ayatvalaklal lasvaprakāśaniledhāt). He holds that the directness of knowledge does not consist in the directness of the object but it is the non-difference or identity between the objects and the consciousness that is coherent with the workability of those objects (tattadvyavahārānukulacaitanyasya ta tadarthabhedal) that constitutes the immediacy of knowledge. The immediacy belongs to consciousness itself (caitanya) and not to the modes of consciousness (vItti). Where the modes of consciousness seem to produce immediate cognition as, for example, in the perception of the jar, it is because the mode or modification is identical with consciousness that it can produce immediate knowledge. So the criterion given by Advaitācārya will hold good with regard to modalised consciousness as well as to the immodalised absolute consciousness (svarūpasukhānubhūti). 89

It is to be noticed, however, that the identity between the subject- consciousness and the object-consciousness, or rather between consciousness and its modalised states, that is sought in immediate knowledge (aparokl la), must be an identity between the two forms of consciousness so far as both of them are unveiled. If, however, one of the two is veiled and the other unveiled, then immediate knowledge does not result. It is because of the veiling of consciousness due to ignorance (aj-äna) that, in the state of bondage, the individual soul (jīva), although in reality identical with Brahman, has no immediate apprehension of it.]

11

The Path of Devotion

The aim of all higher forms of religion seems to be the realisation of the Ultimate Reality. While the nature of the Ultimate Reality and its relation to the universe and to the human beings are variously interpreted by the different forms of religion, it is unanimously held that realisation (anubhava) or direct experience of the Absolute is the end. The term ÔreligionÕ literally means Ôbinding again.Õ The tie that indissolubly binds together the finite individual and the Absolute has somehow been apparently lost to the ordinary individual. Religion seeks to re-establish the bond that seemed to be lost. The followers of the J-ana-marga express this by saying that somehow aj-āna (ignorance) has enveloped the truth from our view; it is Māyā that has cast a veil upon the Absolute; and when j-āna (true knowledge) re- appears, the Ultimate Reality is revealed and reveals everything. The aim of Sādhanā in J-āna-mārga, therefore, is to remove ignorance (aj- āna) and to rise above the veil of Māyā, and thus to acquire tattva-j- āna, i.e., direct realisation of the Ultimate Reality. The followers of the Bhakti-marga also have for their end the realisation of the Absolute. Jīva Gosvāmin, in his Bhakti-sandarbha, states that the end is anubhava (prayojana-ca tadanubhaval l, and this anubhava is direct experience both within and without (sa ca antarbahi sāk lātkāralakl la lal.1The different märgas or paths state the different ways of reaching the same end or goal. The Absolute and the individual are eternally related; religion only seeks to

1.Bhaktisandarbha, p. 6 (Berhampore Edition) 195 re-establish or to raise into self-consciousness the bond that always is but which seems to be apparently lost.

All the Bhakti schools agree in thinking that the Absolute cannot be reached by knowledge, as the J-āna-vādins hold. They regard devotion (bhakti) as the essential and the most effective means to the realisation of God. Rämanuja thinks that the mere listening to the scriptural texts (śrava a), mere ratiocination (manana) and mere meditation (nididhyäsana) have no competence for reaching the (Absolute) Self, because the Sruti herself says, ÒThe Self can be acquired neither by ratiocination (pravacanena), nor by meditation (medhayā), nor by the hearing of many scriptural texts (bahunā

śrutena), but is realised by him alone who is selected by the Self.Ó2He who is dearest is selected,3and that those who are joyfully devoted to God are dear unto Him is expressed by the Lord Himself.4There is a difference of opinion as to whether supreme devotion is by nature unmixed with knowledge (j-āna-śūnyā), or is attended by knowledge (j-ānamiśrā). According to Rāmānuja, devotion, in its highest stage even, includes knowledge within it, and he expressly states that the direct realisation of Brahman (aparokl aj-āna) is nothing but knowledge that assumes the form or nature of devotion (bhaktirūpāpannal j-anam).5Although devotion is regarded as the most essential and effective means of Godrealisation, still this devotion does not exclude knowledge. He emphasises that knowledge alone (kevala j-ana) without devotion is not sufficient for salvation, but he does not think that knowledge is not useful or that it is opposed to or very different in nature from devotion. Vallabhācārya also thinks similarly that though devotion must be given the supreme place, still knowledge has its uses. Nimbārka holds that Bhakti involves a knowledge of God and of the relation of God to the individual soul (jīva) and thus includes knowledge as one of its constituent factors. The realisation of Brahman brings devotion with it.6Madhva believes in the usefulness of rituals and the added efficacy of them when they are performed with knowledge. In all the four great schools of Vai avism we thus

2. Kal h. Up. 2, 23, and Mul Up. III, ii, 3. 3. Priyātmā eva vara Śrībhālya, I, i. 1. īyo bhavati.

4.Bhagavadgītā X, 10, and IX, 29. 5. Brahmasāk ātkāralak lal la Śrībhāllya, I, ii. 23. bhaktirūpāpanna j-ānam.

6.Commentary on Brahmasūtras I, i, 7.

find that devotion attended by knowledge (j-ānamiśrā bhakti) has been recommended. But the Bengal school of Vai Javas founded by Śrī Caitanya differs considerably from the other schools so far as this issue is concerned. They hold that the best form of devotion (uttamā bhakti) stands by itself and is not only not in need of knowledge and karma but is by nature not mixed with them (svarūpasiddhā). Supreme devotion is characterised by them as attributeless (nirgulā), self-subsistent (kevalā), pure (śuddhā) and primary (mukhyā). The purity of devotion is retained when it is not mixed with anything else, viz., karma, knowledge (j-ana) and the processes of yoga.7 As distinguished from this Supreme Devotion which stands by itself (svarūpasiddhā), there are two other forms (or rather stages) of devotion known as āropasiddhā (that which attains the form of devotion by virtue of its being supposed to be productive of the fruits

accompanying devotion), and sa-gasiddhā (that which attains the form of devotion by virtue of its being associated with the constituent elements of devotion). This school goes so far as to say that even in dreams it cannot be supposed that transcendent devotion (nirgulā bhakti) requires the help of j-āna, karma and yoga for the fulfilment of its end;8but, on the other hand, unless j-āna, yoga and karma are attended with devotion, they are incapable of producing their respective results and work entirely in vain.9Moreover Bhakti can secure speedily all that is secured by karma, yoga and j-āna, but these latter without devotion can produce nothing. Jīva Gosvāmin holds that knowledge (j-ana) is only subsidiary to or the by-product of devotion (bhakti) and has no independent function in the realisation of the Absolute.10

We have to remember, however, that this emphasis on devotion and the corresponding neglect of knowledge (j-ana) does not so much imply a difference as to the goal of Sādhanā as they do indicate the difference in the ways whereby the goal may be reached. Although the first steps in the various paths differ considerably from one another, still the ways unite in the goal. At the lowest stage, devotion (bhakti) is more of the nature of blind faith than of real

7. ViśvanāthaÕs Commentary on his own work. Bhaktirasām Itasindhubindu, Verse 1. 8. Bhakte svīyaphalapremasiddhyai svapneOpi na tattat-sāpek tvam. Mādhuryakādambinī by Viśvanātha. 9.Bhāgavata Purā a X, xiv, 4. 10. Bhaktereva avāntaravyāpāro j-āna na p Ithagityarthal Bhaktisandarbha.

experience, and, as such, it conflicts with the rudimentary stage of knowledge (j-ana) that is hardly anything more than mere intellectual discussion (vicāra). Devotion, at this stage, rests on a very insecure foundation, as it implies either a mere mystic sense of the unknown or the clinging to a cherished faith or desire not allowed to establish its relations with other contents of the mind. It cannot thus bear the searching scrutiny of reason. But when it develops into its highest stage, it becomes identical with the realisation that reason also offers as its highest fruition. At this stage j-āna and bhakti become identical and are merely two words or names for the same experience. Here j- āna stands for aparok ānubhūti or direct realisation, and bhakti stands for premāsvādana or the enjoyment of absolute bliss. These are merely descriptions of the same experience from different standpoints. In one, there is description of the experience from the standpoint of cit; in the other, from the aspect of ānandam. Spiritual experience is an experience, where the intellect, the will or feeling do not work piecemeal and in separation, where no one works in opposition to or

preponderates over the others, but is an experience which the whole man realises with Ôthe entire dimensions of his existence.O It is not an intellectual process, it is not an emotional experience, it is also not an active attitude. It is an experience where the intellect, feeling and will attain their richest fruition and consummation, and any question of preponderance of the one over the others is bound to be absurd. The preparations for this highest experience are made through different forms of discipline emphasising one or other of the cognitive, affective and conative aspects of the mind, but once the experience is reached, all distinctions disappear and there is the self-same realisation, viz., ekamevādvitīya satÑOne and only one Reality, akha laprakāśa, unbounded and entire revelation and also advayānandam, unspeakable and never-ending joy or bliss. These three are imperfect descriptions from different aspects of the same experience which is, in fact, indescribable.

In the sense of realisation or anubhava, that is in the highest stage of their development, j-äna and bhakti mean the same thing and the terms have been used synonymously in the spiritual texts. Thus prema or love has been described as Ôhlādinīsārasamavetasal lvitsārabhūtabhaktyaparaparyāyaj-ānaviśelah,Õ that, is, Òa kind of realisation or j-āna synonymous with bhakti, being the essence of all knowledge mixed up with the essence of all bliss.Ó The highest spiritual experience is bound to be, as we have seen, the consummation of all intellectual, emotional and active consciousness. Nārada also describes prema as sūk Imataramanubhavarūpam, that is, as of the nature of subtler, deeper and more intimate anubhava (experience) than ordinary experience. In the Bhagavadgīta, we find that the marks of a bhakta (devotee) and a gulātīta j-ānin are described almost identically. Moreover, we find: OOf the four classes of devotees, the j-anin, who is always attached to me, and who is also ekabhakti, i.e., who has single-hearted devotion towards me, is the best.Ó

It is clearly indicated here that j-ānin is ekabhakti, and that the j-ānin is the best bhakta (devotee). Baladeva Vidyabhū a a also says that j-āna is of two kinds and that bhakti is a kind of j-āna. J-āna is nirnime a īk la la or winkless gaze and uninterrupted realisation, while bhakti has a nime la and an unmela, a closing and an opening, of the eye-lids signifying the stages of severance (viraha) and union (milana). The Bhakti-marga lays special stress on the personality of God and regards the Personal God as the Absolute or the Highest Reality. Like all theistic religions, it emphasises the duality involved in the relationship. Religion is a relation between two persons, viz., the finite

person in the shape of the bhakta (devotee), and the Absolute, the Lord of the universe (Bhagavan), representing the other person. While the individual soul is liable to pain, God is never so liable. The individual soul is controlled (niyamya), while God is the Controller (niyant). According to Rāmānuja, the individual soul is a part (auśa) of Brahman, though by this part is not meant a segment cut out of the whole, since Brahman is absolutely divisionless. The individual soul is a part in the sense of the effect which has no reality apart from Brahman, just as the light coming from the fire or the Sun is a part of it.11The individual soul may be regarded also as an attribute (viśel lal a) of Brahman. But although the attribute is related to the substance as a part is to the whole, still they are seen to differ in essential character. Even in the state of release, the individual soul does not become identified with the Absolute (Brahman) but only attains the nature of Brahman and is no longer subject to the law of Karma.12The individuality of the soul is not

11.RāmānujaÕs Bhāllya on the Brahmasūtras II, iii, 45. 12.Śrutaprakāśikā I, i, 1.

lost, only the sense of separateness disappears in the state of release. According to Nimbārkācārya, the individual soul is both distinct and not-distinct from the Absolute. The soul possesses attributes different from those of Brahman and hence is different from Brahman. From another standpoint, again, the individual soul cannot exist apart from Brahman and hence is not different from Brahman. The individual soul is only a ray of Brahman.13It is absolute submission to God (prapatti) that is the means to liberation. He thinks that in Godrealisation, there is not the perception of identity of the individual with the Absolute, as Sal Ikara holds, but there is merely the knowledge of the real nature of the Supreme Reality and of the individual. According to Vallabhācārya, again, though the individual soul is in essence identical with the Absolute, still it is related to the Absolute as the part is to the whole, just as the spark is related to the fire out of which it arises. Here the part does not differ qualitatively from the whole as it is in Rāmānuja, the distinction being merely a quantitative one. In the state of liberation, the individual soul attains oneness of quality with God. Even after liberation the individual souls may perform karma and become the associates of God.14 According to Madhva, the individual soul is different in nature from Brahman. The individual soul is atomic in size, while Brahman is infinite and all- pervading. The individual soul is dependent on the Lord and is of limited power. In the state of release, the individual soul becomes established in its real nature and attains fellowship with God.15According to Madhva and the Caitanya school of Vai Lavas, the state of release, being the state of perfect consciousness, never

obliterates the distinction between the individual and the Absolute, which distinction is real, Ñthe obliteration of distinction between really distinct things happening only in the unconscious state of deep sleep.

The distinction between finite personality and the Absolute seems to be essential to the conception of Bhakti. In this respect, it differs considerably from the other two paths, viz., the J-ana-marga and the AL Lā-ga-Yoga-marga of Pata-jali. The Advaita-Vedanta of the school of Śa karācārya does not recognise any distinction in essence between the individual (jiva) and the Absolute (Brahman) and does not regard the Personal God to be the highest reality. In

13. Commentary on Brahmasūtras II, iii, 42. 14.ADubhālya I, i, 1. 15.Commentary on Brahmasūtras I, i, 17.

fact, it does not admit that there are different grades of reality from the paramarthika(true philosophic) point of view. The ALLā-gaYoga- mārga of Pata-jali also does not lay any great emphasis on the distinction between the finite and the Infinite. In the nirvikalpa samādhistage, the atmanalone shines in its full glory, and the jīvātman(finite self) becomes perfectly identified with or rather becomes the very Paramatman(the Absolute self).

All the Bhakti schools, including the school founded by Śrī Caitanya, have attempted to refute Sa karaOs doctrine of the identity of the Absolute and the individual and to justify thereby their emphasis on devotion and the distinction between twopersons (viz., the Absolute and the individual) which it implies. The philosophical theories of the different schools supply the rational ground of the spiritual experiences embodied in the religion preached by them and vary according as the spiritual experiences of the teachers and founders of the different sects themselves differ. But whatever other differences there may exist with regard to the philosophy of the different schools, they agree in holding that the Absolute and the individual are not identical.

Rāmānuja holds that the absolutely distinctionless and divisionless Brahman which Śa kara seeks to establish cannot be proved to be real. It cannot be said that the divisionless Brahman is realised in nirvikalpa (indeterminate) perception; because the nirvikalpamerely implies a state where a thing is apprehended without someparticu1ar features (viśela), and it does not mean the apprehension of a thing devoid of allparticular features.16 The apprehension of such a thing is never found and is a1so not reasonable. Every apprehension is of the

nature of Ôit is suchÕ and, as such, implies the presence of some particular features. Perception, implying always the apprehension of some feature or other, cannot give us knowledge of featureless Brahman. Inference, being based on things acquired through perception, cannot also establish such Brahman. Therefore, Rāmānuja concludes, the absolutely attributeless Brahman is without any proof.

The view that in dreamless sleep (suL lupti) there is no cognition of anything particular (viśe La), but only the cognition of the nirvisela self, cannot also be maintained. If in the expression, ÔI did know

16. Nirvikalpakal lal Śrībhālyal, i, 1. nāma kenacid viśelela viyuktasya graha na sarvaviśe arahitasya.

nothingÕ, the term ÔnothingO is taken in its strict sense, then, even the self also comes under it. If, however, it means things other than the cogniser, then the cogniser as the subject of the cognition cannot be supposed to be the attributeless (niviśel la) self. The argument that seeks to deny the self as the cogniser, after having established it as the identical subject of the cognition in the states of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep and having designated it as the OIÓ (aham), can only please the gods (who do not reply).17

The self cannot be regarded as identical with knowledge or cognition (j-ana). It is the subject of cognition and not the cognition itself. That the cognition belongs to the self and is an attribute (dharma) of the self is evident from the nature of all cognitions which take the forms ÔI knowÕ, Ômy knowledge arisesÕ, or Ôknowledge arises in meÕ.18If it be supposed that in the state of liberation (mokla) the ÔIÕ- consciousness does not persist, then this would amount to holding that liberation is identical with the destruction of the self (ātmavināśa). The ÔIÕ-consciousness is no attribute or adjunct of the self so that the self might, in its real essence (svarūpa), even exist without it, but forms the very essence of the self.19Had the self been only cognition or cognisedness (j-aptimätram), then the self would not have appeared as the cogniser when it identifies itself with the body which is not-self, but ought to have appeared as mere cognisedness.

The argument of the Salkarites, that the distinction between the Absolute and the individual cannot be maintained, inasmuch as distinction (bheda) is not apprehended in perception where we become aware only of the existence of objects and not of their distinction from other objects, and also because such distinction cannot stand the scrutiny of reason, cannot be supported.20

17. SuDuptisamayeÕpi anusandhīyamānam ahamartham atmāna j-ātāram aham iti

parām śya na ki-cit avedi amiti vedane tasya prati lidhyamane ... tam imam artha devānāmeva sādhayatu.

ŚrībhālyaI, i, 1. 18. J-ānantu tasya dharma aha jānāmi j-āna me jātamiti cāhamarthadharmatayā j-ānapratītir eva. Ibid., I, i, 1. 19. Na ca ahamartho dharmamātral yena tadvigameOpi .. svarupamavati heta, pratyuta svarūpamevāhamartha ātmana I, i, 1. 20. Sanmātragrāhityena na bhedavilayam. Ibid., I, i, 1.

Perception not merely gives us knowledge of facts but also of the distinctions that belong to the facts (bhedaviśi lavil ayam).21

The Śruti texts declaring that the Ultimate Reality is one without a second do not mean that Brahman has no internal division, but only indicate that Brahman does not require the help of anything else but itself for the creation and maintenance of the universe. The repeated rejection of plurality and difference (bhedani ledah) in the Śruti only implies that Brahman is one with the entire universe being its cause and controller. The individual soul (jīva) is related to Brahman as the body is to the soul, and as these two are united in one, so also the Jīva and Brahman. As the body is not identical with the soul, so also the individual cannot be identical with the Absolute.22Rāmānuja thinks that this view is supported directly by such sūtrasas Ôdifferent because of the distinctionÕ23and Ôadditional or different because of the reference to distinctionO.24It cannot also be supposed that though the individual and the Absolute are not identical in the state of bondage, still they become identical when Nescience is removed through knowledge, because the individual which canbecome veiled by Nescience can never be supposed to be such as to be beyond the scope of Nescience altogether. This distinction between the individual and the Absolute, viz., that while the former comes within the clutches of Nescience, the latter never does so, is emphasised greatly by Rāmānuja and is regarded by him to be fundamental. In the state of liberation, the individual only acquires some characteristics similar to those of God, but does not and cannot become identical with God, because one thing cannot become another which it is not.25Identity is explained by Rāmānuja to mean not an undifferenced unity, but a unity that contains and admits of distinctions within it though not outside it. He is as emphatic as Sa kara in declaring that there is nothing other than Brahman, meaning by the ÔotherO something different in character

21. Cf. Vedānta-DeśikācāryaÕs Sarvārthasiddhi. V, 14. 22. Jīvaparayorapi svarūpaikya dehātmanoriva na sambhavati. Śrībhā yal, i, 1. 23.BrahmasūtrasI, i, 22. 24.Ibid., II, i, 22. 25. Paramatmatmanor yoga paramārtha itīlyate, Mithyaitadanyaddravyal hi naiti

taddravyatā yatal VilLu PuralalI, xiv, 27. Cf.also ÔMama sadharmyamO in BhagavadgītāXIV, 2.

(vijātīya bheda) or something different from it but belonging to the same class (sajātīya bheda); only he would not, like Salkara, regard this ÔotherO as implying the internal division (svagata bheda) also. He thus agrees with Hegel in maintaining the concrete universal or the Identity-in-Difference. His emphasis on love and devotion finds its parallel in the philosophical systems of Royce and McTaggart.

Rāmānuja concludes that as the three main doctrines of absolute monism (advaitavāda), viz., the existence of a distinctionless (nirviśe a) real, the unreality of the world and the identity of the individual and the Absolute, cannot be supported, there must be some other means to the realisation of God than mere knowledge. Had every other thing but Brahman been merely illusory superimposition, then knowledge alone might have been competent for the task. But as it is not the case, devotion (bhakti) is necessary for the realisation of God.

Jīva Gosvamin is the most prominent and the most brilliant of the Bengal Vai avas who have attempted a thorough philosophical justification of the path of Devotion. In his Bhagavatsandarbha, he says that the very same non-dual Reality appears to the Vedāntic seers as Brahman and to the Bhāgavatas as God (Bhagavān) possessing Infinite Power and Energy (Sakti). The Vedäntins either are incapable of experiencing the infinite variety of the inherent Energy (svarūpaśakti) of that Reality, or do not discriminate between Energy (Sakti) and the possessor of that Energy (Saktimān) and hence describe that Reality as distinctionless Brahman.26The Bhagavatas, on the other hand, distinguish between Energy and the possessor of Energy, and hence describe the Reality as God (Bhagavan) who possesses Infinite Energy and Power.27 According to the Vedäntins, the distinction between Energy and the possessor of Energy cannot be maintained, because the ultimate Reality is described to be non-dual (advaya), and non-duality excludes all sorts of division including the inherent division of Śaktiand Śaktimān. The Absolute is of the nature of Knowledge (J-āna) and is neither the subject of knowledge nor the instrument of knowledge, and

26. Satyāmapi śaktivaicitryā tadgraha āsamarthe cetasi ... tadevāviviktaśaktiśaktimattābhedatayā pratipadyamāna vā brahmeti śabdyate. lalsandarbha, Ch. II, page 50. 27. Viviktatād śa śaktiśaktimattābhedena pratipadyamānal vā bhagavāniti śabdyate. Ibid., page 50.

hence cannot be supposed to be the possessor of Energy. It cannot be

held that this Energy constitutes its essence (svarūpa), because this svarūpaśaktihas to be supposed either as something additional (atiriktā) to the ultimate Reality or as something not-additional (anatiriktā). If the former alternative is taken, then it cannot constitute its svarüpa; if the latter, however, is taken, then, why should it be itsEnergy and not itself?28Therefore, the Energy that has to be admitted because the effects that come out cannot otherwise be explained, is really indefinable (tattavā-tattvābhyām anirvacanīyā), and hence is false (mithyā) and cannot be regarded as svarūpaśakti. Jīva Gosvāmin attempts to refute the above arguments by holding that the svarūpaśaktiof the Absolute has to be admitted because its effects, viz.the universe, etc. are seen to exist. Energy (śakti) is an attribute of objects and is responsible for the differentiation of effects produced from different causes. Even in the case of illusory superimposition (vivarta), the substratum of the appearance of silver can be only shell and similar substances but not burnt wood; and Brahman and nothing else can be the substratum of the appearance of the world. The question has to be answered as to whether Brahman has anything to do in causing the appearance of the world or not. If the answer is in the negative, then the world has to be explained as the product of Nescience only. But is this Nescience something additional to Brahman? If it is supposed to be additional, then the absolute unqualified monism of the Vedanta is gone. If, however, this Nescience is not anything additional, but has its substratum in Brahman, then it is the Power of Brahman that is productive of the universe. The state of liberation is a state where absolute bliss is experienced by the self, and is not absolute bliss itself. Bliss, not revealed to and not experienced by the self, becomes either reduced to an unconscious entity (jal la) like material objects, or else is to be regarded as void (sūnya), because it is not experienced either by oneOs own self or by anyone other than the self. Nobody can have any longing for such a state. But as the state of liberation is regarded by the Vedantins also as the summum bonum, it is to be interpreted as the state where the self remains with its inherent energy, and not as a state where the self exists devoid of all attributes. Jīva Gosvāmin agrees with Rāmānuja in holding that

28. Sā ca tadatiriktānatiriktā vā, ādye katha svarūpatvam antye ca katha śaktitvam. Sarvasalvādinī, p. 23. there is no apprehension of an attributeless (nirviśel a) object by any of the instruments of knowledge.29

Jīva Gosvāmin makes it clear that there is distinction (bheda) as well as non-distinction (abheda) between Energy and the possessor of Energy. Because Energy cannot be conceived or thought of as identical

with the thing of which it is the Energy, it is to be regarded as distinct; again, as it cannot also be thought of as something different from the thing, it is to be regarded as nondistinct or identical.30And as it is hardly intelligible how something can be both distinct and non- distinct from an identical thing, the relation is regarded as inconceivable (acintya) or inexplicable. That which transcends reason and seems to be opposed to it is to be regarded as inexplicable (acintya) and as due to the māyāśakti of God.31

While discussing the relation of the individual to God, Jīva Gosvāmin says that there is a difference between them, and points out that the Gita by referring to the Puru ottamaas different (anyal) from both kl laraand akl laraPuru la has made the distinction quite clear. The individual, being different from God, can never become God but has to worship God in order to be free from the clutches of PrakIti.32While God is pure (suddha) and infinite, the individual is impure and finite. But although there is this difference, the Scriptures have spoken of the identity of the individual and the Absolute to those who want to proceed by the path of Knowledge, but have declared their difference to those who wish to follow the path of Devotion.33Jīva Gosvamin agrees with Ramanuja in holding that the Śruti texts seeming to preach identity only mean to show that the Absolute is one with his powers, and that so far as the entire universe has come out of Brahman and is being supported by it, it is not different from Brahman. They cannot mean the negation of all

29. Saviśe avastuvi ayatvāt sarvapramā ānām. Sarvasa vādinī, p. 26. 30. Tasmāt svarūpādabhinnatvena cintayitumaśakyatvād bheda bhinnatvena cintayitumaśakyatvād abhedaśca. Ibid., pp. 29Đ30. 31. Seyal bhagavato māyā yannayena virudhyate. MaitreyaOs words quoted in Paramātmasandarbha, p. 270. 32.Paramātmasandarbha, p. 212. 33. Tattvaj-ānecchūn prati śāstram abhedam upadiśati bhakticchūn prati tu bhedameva. Paramātmasandarbha, p. 225.

multiplicity and the absence of even an internal (svagata) or an inherent (svarūpa) division. Jīva Gosvāmin thinks that it is ridiculous to suppose that the Sruti, after establishing and explaining the rise of multiplicity out of Brahman by such texts as ÔI shall be manyÕ etc., should in the end mean to really deny all multiplicity (nānātva).34

Although the Caitanya school declare themselves as belonging to the Madhva Sect, they have greater affinity with Nimbārkācārya than with Madhva so far as their philosophical doctrines are concerned. Their doctrine of inexplicable difference-and-identity is held by Nimbārka also.35

The realisation of the Absolute is, as we have seen, the goal of all religion. But the realisation can be had in two different ways, (i) by emphasising the object-factor in consciousness or (ii) by emphasising the subject-factor. The Bhakti-marga takes the first method, and the Yoga and J-āna-mārga take the second. The Bhaktimārga wants to realise the Infinite as an object of consciousness, and thus the duality between the sevya(the Lord) and the sevaka(the devotee), that is to say, the duality between the object ÒanandaÓ (bliss) and the subject experiencing the ānanda(joy), remains final. The bhakta(devotee) looks for the manifestation of the Infinite in outside objects and in his own heart, as one object among other objects. His is the objective point of view at its maximum. The object is the sole occupier of the field of consciousness, the object saturates his entire mental horizon, and the subject has no consciousness of itself as distinct from the consciousness of the object. There is no self-consciousness but there is object-consciousness alone. The object, the Infinite, the ÒKI Oa- ajagarÓ or the Serpent-K a (the Lord metaphorically described as the Serpent) devours up the finite subject. This is the highest stage of Bhakti where nothing but God shines in consciousness. Here the object is the all-important factor; the subject merely keeps pace with the object unawares. Psychology will very easily testify to this state of consciousness in what is known as the process of spontaneous attention. The object may be so interesting that it occupies the subjectÕs attention without the subjectOs awareness of the same. The subject is not conscious of any effort or strain, and if the object is interesting beyond measure, the subject forgets himself altogether and loses himself, as it were, in

34. PratiDedhavākyena bādhyeta iti upahāsyam idam. SarvasaIvādinī, p. 44. 35. See Commentary on Brahmasūtras.

the object. Sādhanā in Bhakti-mārga lays emphasis on this aspect of the problem. OFollow the object, concentrate your attention on the object, love it with all your heart, seek nothing else, think of nothing else, make it your own, dedicate your whole self to it and you will realise it.Ó This seems to be the sum and substance of Sādhanā in Bhakti-mārga. It places before the subject an object which, because of its infinite beauty and attractiveness, is expected to spon-taneously captivate the mind of the worshipper and thus raise the latter to the level of the object.

The Yoga-märga of Pata-jali, on the other hand, holds that the Absolute is to be realised within as the subject, and not outside as the object. The Absolute is the Higher Self, the Paramatman, and as such

we have to intensify the powers of the subject in order to realise it. ÒIn the beginning, take any object which is pleasing to you and which interests you,36and concentrate your attention on it and thus intensify your own powers. Then, gradually rise up from the object-attitude to the subject-attitude and try to see within. Rise higher up and beyond mind and intellect, beyond citta and aha kāra, and try to realise the fully developed self, the subject or the Paramātman. Place yourself entirelr in the subject-attitude, where no object, not even the sākli- vl tti(the idea that I am observing), not even the idea that I am the subject, should come as an object of consciousness, and then you realise the Infinite.O This is the teaching of the Yoga-märga. The Infinite is expressed in and through the subject as well as the object. By intensifying the object, we may realise the Infinite, and also by intensifying the subject, we may attain the same goal. Here, in the Yoga-mārga, the Absolute is realised as the subject, the subject realises the subject, and thus all duality seems to disappear.

The Yoga-märga seeks to intensify the subject by withdrawing it from all objects. The subject is ordinarily occupied with many objects, and because its energy becomes thus diffused and dissipated, it cannot ordinarily realise itself to be infinite and absolute. When the subject is completely withdrawn from all objects, and when nothing diffuses its energy by drawing it outwards, then it shines in full glory. The Yoga- märga thus may be described as a process of withdrawal and hence also as a negative process.

The Bhakti-marga, on the other hand, seeks to intensify the subject through the object. It rather withdraws from and denies 36. Yathābhimatadhyānād vā. Yoga Sūtras, I, 39.

the subject, in order to realise the Infinite as the object. It wants to merge the finite subject in the object which appears to be much more developed and expanded than the subject. It may be described as a process of expansion and thus also as a positive process of Sādhanā, of course, from the objective point of view. The objective point of view is the view of the ordinary man and first appears in consciousness. From the subjective point of view, however, the Yoga-marga should be described as positive, and the Bhakti-mārga as negative.

The J-ana-märga also does not realise the Absolute as the object and thus far agrees with Yoga-märga. But there is a difference between the two. If the Yoga-märga is entirely subjective, and the Bhakti-mārga is entirely objective, the J-ana-mārga may be described as both subjective and objective. It is the synthesis and reconciliation of the seemingly opposed partial theories. The Absolute, according to the J-

ana-marga, is the self and is to be realised as such; but this self is not the antithesis of any object but is the highest reality where the subject and the object merge themselves in the Absolute. It is not to be declared as the subject, if by it we mean something different from the object; in fact, the tripu īor the tripartite division into subject, object and process is entirely absent from the category of the Absolute. If the J-āna-mārga recommends a withdrawal of consciousness from objects in the first instance, by its Ôneti netiÕ, it does not stop with this negative process. The withdrawal or the negative attitude is only preparatory to the stage of highest expansion. The Vedänta which declares that Brahman alone is real, almost in the same breath proclaims that everything is BrahmanÑsarva khalvida Brahma. These double aspects, the withdrawal and the expansion, characterise the transcendence implied in J-āna-märga, and distinguish it clearly from Yoga-märga and Bhakti-mārga. The yoginfinds the subject, pure and in isolation from everything else, in the nirvikalpa-samādhistate and experiences a blissful state which surpasses all joy and in which the subject or the self alone shines and experiences itself. But when the samadhistate passes away, that is, when there is vyutthānaor descent from that state of ecstasy and deepest concentration, the yoginis confronted with objects around him which he cannot connect with his previous samadhicexperience. The yoginonly learns to withdraw, and in the state of deepest withdrawal and concentration, has an experience which he does not and cannot transfer to other spheres of his existence. Although he understands that the experience gained in the moment of withdrawal and concentration, that is, in the samādhi state, is higher and far more valuable than the experience of the vyutthänastage, still the yoginfails to connect the two differing experiences. But the j-anindoes not feel any such difficulty. He realises that the transcendent self is not opposed to, and does not exclude, anything. The self alone is real, because everything is the self. The outside object from which there was at first the withdrawal is recognised afterwards by the j-äninto be nothing but the product of the kinetic avidyā, the self or the citbeing merely the passive locus (adhil häna). The self alone is real, not as the subject denying or withdrawing from the object, but as the eternal reality pervading and underlying all appearances of the object, which after all are nothing but illusory superimpositions.

The Yoga-märga finds out the subject in its absolutely pure stage and misses or rather ignores all objects. It finds the Absolute Reality as the eternal subject only, where there is not the least objectivity, where nothing forms the not-self to the self. In the nirvikalpa-samādhistate, the atmanis the dral Ilor the seer or the absolute subject as it is in

itself, i.e., in its svarūpa.

The J-ana-mārga, however, rises above the conception of the subject. Brahman transcends and at the same time, reconciles and includes within itself all subject and object. Brahman does not exclude anything; it does not withdraw from or negate objects. It is rather the highest synthesis or category where we can equally say ÔBrahman is allO and Ôthere is nothing but Brahman, sarva khalvida Brahmaas well as ekamevādvitīya Brahma. Here, in j-ānaor aparok länubhütiÑthe ÔtatÕ and the ÔtvamÕ, the Absolute as object and the Absolute as subject become identified and identical. The ahal lvl ttior sāk liv ltti, the ÔseerÕ aspect, is even annulled, and the subject ätman, which is absolute, is merged in the object Absolute, resulting in an ineffable experience,Ñcall it bliss, call it joy, call it anubhūtior call it j-āna. The ÔtvamO pure or the subject is attained by Yoga; the ÔtatÕ or the Absolute as object is attained by Bhakti; and it is J-ana alone that identifies and reconciles the two aspectsÑthe subject-Absolute and the object-Absolute, in the highest synthesis, the indescribable advaitaexperience, where the Absolute is neither the subject nor the object, where it is everything but nothing in particular, where it is beyond all categories, beyond all characteristics, where it is itself and nothing further can be said of it. The nirvikalpa-samādhistate and the aparokl lanubhutiof the

J-āna-mārga are almost identical experiences, because the self is experienced in itself directly in both without any medium or instrument or any disturbing factor; but whereas in the nirvikalpasamādhistate, the self is more of the subject that withdraws from and rather negates the object, in the aparok ānubhūtiof j-āna, the Self or Brahman is seento transcend, embrace, harmonise and reconcile the subject and the object. Here, in J-āna, the widest expansion is reached. The Absolute is the subject within and the object outside,Ñit is nowhere lost. There is no ignoring, no withdrawing and no negating, but there is rather a conscious transcendence which does not go against any category but goes beyond all of them.

Discipline or Sādhanā in Bhakti-mārga seems to be comparatively easier to most persons than Sadhana in other paths. It is easy because it follows the objective path and deals with concrete things. A particular method is neither easy nor difficult in itself absolutely. It is easy for the man having a natural bent towards it; it is difficult for one who has no aptitude towards the same. But, although absolutely nothing is easy and nothing difficult, still generally it is possible to mark out one method as easier than another. The objectrouses the

attention of the child and attracts and interests him long before he has any idea of the subject. ManOs attention is naturally and primarily directed towards the object; it is only late in life that he learns to see within and notice the subject. The Bhakti-märga places before the devotee an object that attracts and interests. This attraction is spontaneous and, as such, it seems to guide the bhaktafurther and further on, without any great difficulty. In Bhakti-marga there is no great strain because there is no attempt to go against oneOs grain. Here the instruction is to follow the normal bent of oneOs mind; only one has to follow it up to its source. If beauty attracts, the instruction is to follow the beautiful to its source and reach and enjoy the source of all beauty. If fragrance attracts, if gentle touch allures, if sweet taste enchants, the same instruction is given, viz., to follow that which attracts to its source. The Absolute is manifested everywhere as the object. This attraction, this tempting, this alluring and enchanting are all visible manifestations, very sure indications or gestures whereby the Absolute is drawing the finite individual to His side. The finite object interests us, attracts us, because the Absolute, the Source of all beauty, truth and goodness, is underlying it. The attraction is the bond that connects the Absolute and the individual, and the individual by following this chain of attraction, if only he persists still the end, is sure to reach the other limit, the goal of the chain, viz., the Absolute. It is only because there is no persistence in following the chain, it is because now one object, now another, attracts us, it is because now we are drawn towards an object, but next moment we are repelled from it, that the goal cannot be reached. It is to be noticed, however, that the enjoyment of objects should be performed in such a way that it may gradually turn the attention of the enjoyer (bhoktl l) from the object of enjoyment to the cause or the source from which the object has emerged into existence; otherwise, if the enjoyment confines the attention of the enjoyer merely to the surface aspect of the objects of enjoyment, then it can never lead him to the desired goal. One should enjoy in order to realise the truth underlying the object of enjoyment and should not be so much engrossed with the object as to be deprived of the capacity of looking beyond it to its source.37

The J-āna-mārga is a difficult course of discipline, because it wants to realise the Absolute, as it is in itself, pure and entire, unenveloped by any upādhi(adjunct) or āvara la(veil), and, therefore, until the end is reached, until the goal is realised, the whole process of discipline (sādhanā) seems to many to stand upon no concretely realised experience, but upon mere bhāvanāor meditation, which is at the outset hardly better than mere imagination. It is because of this that the J-ana-märga can suit only those who live in the high intellectual

plane and have definitely and decidedly transcended the sense-region, only those to whom ideation is no mere imagination or faint reproduction of sensation or perception but is very much adjacent to realisation. It is only when the creative force of the idea that is just prior to its concretisation in reality is fully experienced and realised that the J-ana-mārga ceases to appear as a method of empty abstractions. The pseudo-sadhaka, who attempts to follow this course without having acquired the necessary equipment through previous discipline and training, almost always hopelessly fails to achieve the goal. But whatever may be the difficulty at the outset, once the goal is reached, and the Absolute is realised in its purity, there is no longer any risk or fear of losing the ground attained. The quality of the achievement is so perfect that it

37. Bhogaiśvaryaprasaktānā tayāpah tacetasām, Vyavasāyātmika buddhi samādhau na vidhīyate. B.G.II, 44.

more than makes up all the troubles that had to be undergone in the beginning of the struggle. In the Bhakti-märga, on the other hand, the devotee begins with the concrete manifestation of the Absolute, however enveloped it may be, and with its support rises upwards. In attraction is manifested the hlādinī śakti(the Bliss-Energy) of the Lord, and relying on this alone one may reach the Absolute. From the very beginning, the Bhakti-märga gives the devotee something real, some concrete manifestation of the Lord, although not pure, although partial (in the terminology of the Bhakti-śästras), but still something that genuinely reveals God. Therefore it is that although the same goal38is reached by both Bhakti and J-ana, still while Bhakti easily and gradually leads the bhaktastep by step from lower to higher manifestations of the Absolute, and, in the end, reaches the highest, the J-ana-märga leads the sādhakadirect to the Absolute. The short cut, the straight way, is always found to be much more strenuous and difficult than the long, roundabout way. The danger of Bhakti-mārga is that the devotee mayremain satisfied with something short of the highest manifestation of the Absolute, because he always feels the joy coming from the Absolute, although through upādhisor veils. The most brilliant light that comes through the thinnest transparent glass may be taken to be the pure unveiled light itself. The danger of J-āna- märga, on the other hand, is that the j-āninmay very well mistake his kalpanā(imagination) or bhāvanā (meditation) to be the realisation itself (anubhava) and may not realise the Absolute at all. The j- änineither realises the Absolute, pure and entire, or gets nothing; the bhaktarealises something but may not get the allor the highest. It is not to be supposed, however, that the bhaktadoes not reach the Highest or that the j-anindoes not realise the Reality. We have merely

indicated the lines which the shortcomings maytake.

38.BhagavadgītāXII, 4.

12

The Nature of Devotion

Bhakti is attraction towards the Absolute. ŚālDilya defines bhakti as supreme or sublime attachment to the Lord of the universeÑSa parānuraktirīśvare (Sā lilya Sūtras, 2). This attachment to Īśvara or the Absolute marks the genuine characteristic of bhakti. When an individual, instead of being attached to the ordinary finite things of the universe, begins to feel an attraction towards the everlasting and the permanent, when the individual learns to respect and love the beauty of the grand and the sublime and ceases to be moved by the temporary lustre of the fleeting and the small, then and only then, may be found in him the germs of bhakti or devotion. The word ÔparãÕ in the above-quoted definition is also very significant. True or fully developed bhakti is parā anurakti or supreme attachment towards the Absolute. Nārada also defines bhakti as parama-premarūpā, 1that is as of the nature of intense love. It is to be noticed here that the emphasis is put on the intensity of the process as well as on the object of devotion. Wherever there is attraction towards the Absolute, there is the beginning or germ of bhakti; supreme attraction or intense love, however, only indicates its highest phase of development.

It is held that the nature of this intense love or supreme attachment is really indescribableÑanirvacanīyal premasvarupam.2 It is like the experience of taste by the dumb person who can enjoy

1. Sā kasmai paramapremarūpā: Nārada Sūtras, 2. 2.Ibid., 51. 214

it to his heartOs content but cannot describe it to others. Its indescribability is not to be regarded as the proof of its unreality. Words cannot express it because they are not competent for the task, and not because it does not exist. This intense love is incapable of being described, because it is bereft of all qualification (gularahitam). Herein all desires are absent (kāmanārahitam). It is a form of very subtle feeling or experience, much deeper and more penetrating than what language or description can catch hold of (sūk mataram anubhavarūpam). It flows on ceaselessly and grows in intensity and volume every moment. But although indescribable, this experience is the grandest in human life. Attaining this experience, a man desires nothing, laments nothing, resents nothing, revels in nothing, strives for nothing, but becomes quiet, full with joy and finds bliss within his

self.3

Bhakti is taken by Rāmānuja to mean constant and unfailing recollection and meditation of the supreme LordÑeval Irūpā dhruvānusm Itireva bhaktiśabdenābhidhīyate.4This dhruvā sm ti or constant meditation when deepened to the extreme becomes equal to and takes the form of sak atkara or direct perception.5This dhruvā sm ti or constant memory shows the intensity and nature of the attachment for the object recollected. It is to be understood that there is no effort of memory here. The object occupies the attention of the devotee spontaneously and is always in his mind almost like an ÔinsistentÕ or a ÔfixedÕ idea. That only can always occupy our attention spontaneously which is very dear to us and which we love with all our heart.6When we can devote ourselves wholeheartedly to the object of our adoration, when nothing else draws us, when nothing else pleases us, then only, dhruva sm ti or constant memory is possible, and this dhruvā sm lti is Bhakti or devotion proper. Sacrifices and other such actions are the means to attain this constant memory of God.

The Nārada-Pa-carātra gives us a good summary of the definitions of Bhakti. OBhakti or devotion, according to Bhilma,

3. Nārada Sūtras, 52 & 54. 4.Śrī Bhāllyal, i, 1. 5. Bhavati ca sm ter bhāvanāprakar āt darśanarūpatā. Ibid.I, i, 1. 6. Ata sāk atkararupa sm ti smaryamā ātyarthapriyatvena svayamapyatyarthapriyā yasya sa eva pareLātmanā varal īyo bhavati. Ibid., I, i, 1.

Prahlāda, Uddhava and Narada, is attachment, mixed with love, towards ViLlu i.e. Lord of the universe, and is the absence of attachment towards everything else.Ó7Here we get the essence of Bhakti clearly stated. In the Bhāgavata Pura a and in the Bhagavadgīta we always find this aspect of Bhakti emphasised. The essence of Bhakti is ananyaśaral atva or rather ananyatva. It demands exclusive attention paid to its object. It is not enough that the greatest attention or the largest part of attention be paid to it, but it wants that nothing else should be attended to. We find in the Bhagavadgītā, for example, the śloka, ÒI am easily accessible to one who constantly thinks of me everyday, and thinks of nothing else and thus is always attached to me.Ó8Again,ÑOI am capable of being thus known, seen, and entered into, only through Bhakti or devotion which knows nothing other than me.Ó9The essential point, in fact, the whole of Bhakti consists in ekaśara latva, which means placing one-self entirely under the disposal of the One, Supreme Lord of the universe.

The highest form of Bhakti requires that there should be arpal la or real dedication to God of everything that the devotee, as an individual, separate from the Lord, possesses. The devotee should have no separate pleasure from that of the Lord, just as the true lover does not feel pleasure in anything but the joy of his beloved only. This is what the great sage, Närada, the prince of the devotees, means by tadarpitākhilācāratā or the dedication of all actions whatsoever to Him, and by tatsukhasukhitvamNexperiencing pleasure in the pleasure of the beloved. The Vrajagopīs (the milkmaids of Vrindāvana), for example, did not think of their own happiness, but they always concentrated their attention on pleasing Sri K la, the Lord of their hearts. This is what distinguishes true love or prema from mere sensual appetite or kāma. In the former, the happiness of the beloved is the end; in the latter, oneOs own pleasure is the spring of the action. The devotee is to forget everything that rouses his sense of separate individuality, and is to merge himself in the thought of the Lord, in singing hymns in His glory, in conversing about Him, and in doing actions which please Him. He always occupies himself with the Lord and, if there is forgetting even for a moment, then, the bhakta or the devotee feels the great uneasiness

7. Quoted in Haribhaktivilāsa XI, 382. 8.Bhagavadgītā VIII, 14. 9.Ibid., XI, 54.

and extreme misery for want of Him.10These are really the true marks of devotion. Royce has beautifully expressed this aspect of Bhakti or devotion by the term ÔLoyaltyÕ. He describes ÔLoyaltyÕ as Òthe willing and thorough-going devotion of a self to a Cause.11 And this ÔCauseÕ appears in some personal shape in religion, and is loved before the self chooses its service. The presence of the cause or the object of religion, in the world of the finite individual, is a Òfree gift from the realm of spiritÓ, a gift which the individual receives not because of himself, but because of the willingness of the whole universe to show him Ôthe way of salvation.Õ ÒThe object, first, compels your love. Then, you freely give yourself in return.Ó This free giving, whole-hearted, full and total giving, which thinks of no gains or losses of the individual, which always feels himself better and better realised through loyalty and absolute surrender to the cause, and never knows of any disappointment, having discounted all personal defeats, is the sum and substance of Bhakti. This absolute surrender or complete resignation to God is known as prapatti, and is regarded by almost all the Bhakti schools as a very important element in Sädhana. The finite individual, through the exercise of his limited powers alone, can never reach God unless he resigns himself entirely

to the mercy of God. It is the Grace (prasāda) of God that alone is competent to award salvation. All the other disciplines only prepare the devotee to offer himself completely to God (ātmanivedana). According to one School, viz. the Southern School, however, this resignation (prapatti) is not one among many means, but is the one that is competent to secure salvation. God, according to this School, is not merely the goal (sadhya), but also the means to the goal (sādhana). Everything necessary for the salvation of the devotee is done by God when the devotee completely surrenders himself to the Lord. This School lays great stress on two verses of the Bhagavadgītā, where the Lord says, OTaking refuge in me, even persons of evil birth, females, Vaiśyas and Sūdras attain the highest goalÓ; and, ÒTake refuge in me alone, I shall liberate thee from all sins.Ó

Rūpa Gosvāmin, in his Bhaktirasām tasindhu, refers to uttamā bhakti or highest devotion as Othe loving worship and service of

10. KLa lavismarale paramavyākulatā. Nārada Sūtras. 11.Sources of Religious Insight, p. 206.

Lord K La, uninterrupted by the desire for anything else, and unenveloped by j-āna, karma, and such other thingsÓ.

This definition sums up in a sense all the important characteristics of Bhakti; but, in the literal sense of the terms used, the definition cannot be accepted universally. The terms, ÔanyābhilālitāśūnyamÕ (free from all worldly desires) and Ôānukūlyena K lānuśīlanamÕ (loving worship of KI la) are unobjectionable and have been previously explained. The only difficult expression is Ôj-ānakarmādyanavLtamÕ, which means, according to Rūpa Gosvamin, that true Bhakti is not covered by knowledge (j-āna) and action (Karma). This is in direct opposition to RamanujaOs notion of Bhakti, which is j- ānakarmānugl hītam. But, it is possible that Rūpa Gosvamin also does not mean that knowledge and actions should be excluded from the highest devotion; because the devotion that is completely dissociated from all knowledge, is hardly of any great value, and also because, actions done for the service of the Lord form the essence of Bhakti. He possibly means that true Bhakti or devotion is spontaneous; that is to say, is not generated by any such knowledge that this will lead to some gain or reward. Devotion is love or attachment which waits for no reason. Here karma possibly means all other actions but those necessary for the service of the Lord. Viśvanātha Cakravartin interprets ÔkarmaÕ in this sense, but takes knowledge (j-āna) to mean Òthat which seeks to attain the absolutely divisionless Brahman, and not that which seeks to know the nature of God who is to be

worshipped.Ó12

The essence of Bhakti is love, and it is this love that individuates the object of devotion. The Lord of the devotee is an object of exclusive interest to him, and is supposed to be specially connected with him by a particular tie of relationship, and to be always looking after his welfare and saving him from all sorts of danger and downfall. The very thought that the Lord is his master or his beloved, and his alone in a peculiar sense, fills the mind of the devotee with an overflow of joy. This intimate tie of relationship between the Lord (Bhagavān) and the devotee (bhakta) established through pure love is perhaps what the Vai Lavas mean by sa bandhasthapana. When the attachment towards the Absolute rises to such an intensity that the Absolute is felt to be an object of exclusive interest, so that nothing else can take its place or be

12. Commentary on Bhaktirasām tasindhubindu, p. 2.

substituted for it, then only, this attachment may be described as Bhakti which is true love. There can be but one beloved for the true lover, Ôone exclusively interesting object serving particular exclusive interest.Õ Although the same object, viz. the Absolute or the Lord, is the goal of all bhaktas or devotees, still each will regard his God or object of love to be bound with him by a special tie in such a manner that none else can satisfy him or take his GodOs place. God, although Absolute, has become to the devotee an individual God, as it were, and the devotee himself regards him to be a servant of the Lord, being also specially marked in such a manner that none other can serve his Lord in exactly the same way. This individuating aspect of Bhakti which is all love, is very well brought out in the following couplet attributed to Hanumān, the devotee of Lord Räma: OAlthough the Lord of Vaiku ha and the husband of mother Janaki may be the same identical person as ultimate Reality, still, to me, the lotus-eyed Rāma is everything.Ó

Josiah Royce lays special stress on this aspect of love. It is love and love alone that can supply the principle of individuation. OThe child individuates the toy (only when he loves the toy) with an exclusive love that permits no other. He indeed knows not why he feels thus.Ó13This Ôpermitting no otherO and Ôknowing not whyO are the characteristics of true love and Bhakti, which we have referred to before by the terms ananyatva and ahetukī.

When an object is thus loved exclusively, then, automatically attachment for other objects disappears. Attachment for one and one

alone necessarily implies non-attachment for every other object, and this indifference towards other objects increases with the intensity of attachment for the one. Thus, it is held that vairagya or detachment of the bhakta (devotee) comes as a consequence of love towards the Infinite.14This vairagya is thus natural and spontaneous, and comes as a matter of course. The Bhakti-mārga here recognises an important truth which is so greatly emphasised by modern psychology. It is impossible to uproot or even to suppress altogether our desires and impulses, and every attempt to suppress them forcibly results in great injury to the mind. The only safe and successful method for attaining the purpose is to divert our desires in another direction which is attractive and, at the same time, beneficial to us. The Bhakti-mārga rightly emphasises that KODa-nillhā or

13.The Conception of God, p. 261. 14.Mādhuryakādambinī, p. 120.

devotion and love towards the Lord, must always precede t ātyāga (indifference to and renunciation of worldly pleasures). It is putting the cart before the horse when it is supposed that vairagya or indifference precedes devotion to the Lord. It is to be noticed, however, that these two, devotion and indifference, influence each other. Unless there be a little indifference towards worldly pleasures, one hardly finds pleasure in devotion to the Lord; and, again, unless one be devoted to the Absolute, there can hardly be real vairāgya or indifference. ÒThe outward loss, the outward renunciation, can be achieved when inward mastery or kinghood is attained. From the worldly point of view we become ready to renounce everything only when we become rich from the other point of view.Ó15

It is sometimes said that j-āna andvairāgya are not helpful to those who follow the path of devotion. OTherefore, to the Yogin, who is devoted to me with his heart wholly given to me, neither j-āna (learning) nor vairagya (indifference) is generally of any good.Ó16

Here Ô j-ānaÕ means merely vain intellectual discussion, and vairāgya possibly implies forcible suppression of all desires. These may not help the devotee or bhakta, but true j-āna, which is direct realisation of truth, and true vairagya or the spirit of renunciation, that should come as a natural accompaniment of devotion, can never be supposed to be absent from genuine devotion or Bhakti. In other places, the Bhägavata Purā a rightly emphasises the connection of bhakti with j- āna and vairāgya, and regards these three as bound up in indissoluble connection. ÒThe Yogins (i.e. those who want to realise God following some method) reach my feet undaunted for their greatest good,

through bhakti mixed up with j-āna and vairāgya. Ó In many other places, the Bhāgavata Purāl la shows this connection of bhakti with j- āna and vairāgya. We cannot reconcile these seemingly contradictory statements of the Bhagavata Purala, as illustrated by the ślokas quoted, unless we interpret the terms Ôj-anaÕ and ÔvairagyaÕ, in the first śloka, in the way we have indicated. This point is very clearly indicated in the following śloka: OThe Yoga of devotion, being fixed on Lord Väsudeva, brings forth instantaneously vairāgya (non- attachment) and j-āna (knowledge) that is revealed directly.Ó17

15. Lectures of Svāmī Rāma Tīrtha, Vol. I, Lecture 6. 16.Bhāgavata Purā a, XI, xx, 31. 17. I, ii, 7.

13

The Determinants of Devotion

The essence of Bhakti, we have seen, consists in spontaneous and unrestricted attachment to the Supreme Person, who is the Lord of the Universe. The highest stage of Bhakti is described in the Bhāgavata Purā la as nirgul a bhakti. The aspects of natural spontaneity and easy continuity of the flow of attachment are especially emphasised in the highest stage.1Such supreme devotion can have, strictly speaking, no cause, but is really eternal and uncaused. It is beyond the chain of causes and effects. The Gauliya school of Vail avas founded by Śrī Caitanya, who have analysed the conception of Bhakti and its auxiliaries in a masterly way, and have shown uncommon powers of penetration and exposition in the discussion of that abstruse subject- matter, hold that kl a-prema (devotion to the Lord) eternally is (nitya-siddha), and never comes into being (sadhya).2Here we notice the wonderful similarity in conception between two opposed schools of thought. According to Sa kara, the radical non-dualist, mok a or liberation is an eternal fact and never comes into being. The Bhakti- vadins of the Gau iya school, who are opposed to Sa karaOs Absolute Monism, also hold that Bhakti, in its highest conception, can never come to exist as the result of processes.3 This position seems to be, no doubt, paradoxical; but logically, this should be regarded as the only tenable position. From bondage to freedom, from finitude to perfection, there is an unbridgeable gulf. Spiritual realisation supposes the elevation of the finite to the level of the infinite, and unless the finite is already even potentially and implicitly infinite, such realisation seems impossible. The processes that lead up to the result, the auxiliaries that lead to the realisation, seem all insufficient

towards the content of the realisation itself. No addition of finites can ever produce the infinite, and to say that the infinite or even the apprehension of the infinite is dependent on and caused by finite processes, is to hold that even an inadequate cause can produce the effect. This is the real difficulty that was perhaps sought to be emphasised by the old Eleatic maxim, Ex nihilo nil fit as well as by the well-known śloka of the Bhagavadgītā, Ònāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sata_, etc.Ó The goal seems to be far in advance of the processes leading up towards it, and even the last step in the process seems to be but an approximation towards the end. The really transcendent nature of the summum bonum or the highest good, designated as J-āna by one school, and Prema or Bhakti by the other school, which alone can be imperishable, being above all temporal processes whatsoever, has been sought to be emphasised by this conception of nityasiddhatā or eternal completedness. Whatever is dependent on any process cannot but perish, and whatever is perishable can never yield everlasting bliss, which alone is regarded as the highest good both by the Vedantins and the Bhakti-vadins. The highest good thus is that which is ultimately real and eternally is, and spiritual realisation is this highest good, whether we designate it as Bhakti or J-ana. The spiritual realisation (anubhava), both as Prema and J-āna, is thus an eternal fact, not conditioned by any process. What is conditioned is not the transcendent realisationÑ but only some lower stage or stages of the same. The Vedāntins designate this lower stage as aparā vidyā, as distinguished from parā vidyā which stands for the transcendent experience. The Caitanya school describe this lower stage as sāttvikī bhakti, meaning by it the devotion that is due to the preponderance of the element of harmony

1. MadguDaśrutimātreDa mayi sarvaguhāśaye, Manogatiravicchinnā yatha ga-gambhasoOmbudhau. Bhāgavata Purāla, III, xxix, 22. 2. Nityasiddhasya bhāvasya prāka yam hOdi sādhyatā Bhāktirasām tasindhu, I, ii, 2. 221

2. Kamapi hetumanapek amā a eva svecchyaiva avatarate ... bhagavata bhakterapi svaprakāśatā siddhārthameva hetutvānapek atā. iva tadrūpāyāl

ViśvanāthaÕs Mādhuryakādambinī.

(sattva), and thus not absolutely unconditional, (kevalā) like that transcendent devotion which they describe as nirgul la bhakti. 4 The citta (mind) requires perfect purification if it is to mirror this allluminous revelation or realisation. Prema or j-āna, that is, the realisation itself, is unconditional revelation; but, the condition of purification is only necessary for the mind and the intellect in order that they may be fit instruments for mirroring that revelation. The essential point that is to be marked in this connection is that,

according to these schools, the highest experience or realisation transcends the Buddhic consciousness, and that the pure ātmic experience is above the duality that is involved in ordinary selfconsciousness. If it seems unintelligible to our ordinary discursive consciousness as to how an experience or realisation may not depend on Buddhic conditions, it is because we are still confined to the hard barriers of the rigid categories of the intellect, and not because such an experience does not exist. It is because of this limitation that we suppose that all our knowledge is dependent on Buddhi, and that all knowledge is only the result of the functioning of the Buddhi. Similar is also the case with Bhakti or devotion which seems to be the result of the functioning of the citta. But, we may be perhaps nearer the truth if we avoid the inadequate category of causality in this connection and seek to describe the fundamental fact of spiritual realisation or experience through the metaphor of the instrument or the mirror. The Buddhi and the citta are merely instruments or mirrors for the reflection and manifestation of the fundamental fact. They do not condition the fact which is unconditioned and unconditional, but they merely reveal or rather become occasions for the revelation of the eternally revealed fact. We may remember in this connection the Platonic view which regards all knowledge as mere relearning or recollecting what was known before. Here also we get the same emphasis on the unconditionality and fundamentality of all realisation or experience constituting knowledge (j-āna).

What, then, is the place of the Sadhanas or determinants and auxiliaries of Bhakti? They merely serve to purify the mind (citta) so that it may become a suitable mirror for the reflecting of Bhakti which is eternal and unconditioned. They help merely to prepare the

4. Yaddhetutval śruyate tat khalu j-ānā-gabhūtāyā sāttvikyāl eva bhakter na tu nirgulāyā premā-gabhūtāyā Mādhuryakādambinī.

ground for the emergence of the experience, but cannot and do not condition the same.5The highest experience, which is termed nirguā bhakti, is beyond the chain of causes and effects, and should not be regarded as an effect that necessarily follows from any condition. This fact is also emphasised in another way by the doctrine of Grace, which is a very important conception in almost all the theistic religions, laying stress on the aspect of Love or Bhakti. It is held that the realisation of God cannot be claimed as a matter of right, nor does it necessarily follow as a consequence of good deeds, or of penances, or of sacrifices, or of profound learning; but, it is exclusively the award of Divine Mercy. They only receive it who are elected or specially

chosen by God.6

Kāśmīr Saivism lays special emphasis on Divine Grace which they designate as Śaktipāta or the descending of the Divine Energy into the heart of the sadhaka (devotee). It is held that liberation depends exclusively on this Grace of God7 and that the time required for the attainment of salvation is determined by the intensity of the force with which the Divine Energy enters or penetrates into the heart of the devotee (anugrahaśaktividdhahl Idaya).8

The ordinary superficial meaning ascribed to Grace would make God an arbitrary Power, having little or no regard for the merits and demerits of people. This can hardly be accepted as the true significance of the doctrine of Grace. In India specially, where the law of Karma has held unquestioned authority and has exercised its influence over all the different schools of philosophy,Ñalike on heterodox Buddhism and Jainism, as on the orthodox Saukhya and Vedānta, the Nyaya and the Vaise ika, Na doctrine which seems apparently to be conflicting with the law of Karma, should not be accepted at its face value. The attempts that are sometimes made to save the difficulty by saying that although God can liberate souls, without taking any account of their Karma, by virtue of His omnipotence, still as the law of Karma is due to His mere wish for the joy of sport, He does not like to violate the law,9are not

5. Bhaktirasām tasindhu, I, ii, 2. 6.Mu laka Up. III, ii, 3; and also III, i, 8. 7. Parameśvarānugrahopāya eva svātmaj-ānalābha .. YogarājaOs Commentary on Paramārthasāra, Verse 96. 8. Paramārthamārgamena jhaliti yathā gurumukhāt samabhyeti, Atitīvraśaktipātāt tadaiva nirvighnameva śiva

6. See LokācāryaÕs Tattvatraya, p. 108. Paramārthasāra, Verse 96. Also RāmānujaÕs Commentary on the Brahmasūtras, II, ii, 3.

satisfactory. If He abides by the law of Karma, there is no room for the operation of Grace; if, however, there is the operation of Grace, the law of Karma is violated. Perhaps the meaning underlying the fact of Grace is something deeper. The realisation of the Absolute, the spiritual experience of the Infinite, the direct communion with God, yields an apprehension of something too high to be within the reach of the finite. This fact of coming down of the Infinite to the finite is regarded by devout souls, having the experience of the Infinite, as an act of Grace. Whether we call it the elevation of the finite to the Infinite, or the coming down of the Infinite to the finite, it cannot be explained in any other way but as an act of Divine Mercy. The fact is that the Infinite transcends the finite and is beyond any addition of

finites; and so, the experience of the Infinite brings along with it such a feeling that it immensely surpasses all preparatory conditions towards it. The goal or the result so absolutely transcends even the last step towards it that the preceding conditions seem to be hopelessly inadequate for its explanation. The highest truth, the transcendental vision, flashes on the consciousness with such suddenness, and is felt to be such a novel experience or revelation that it is thought of as coming from Beyond, from the realm of the Transcendent.10The doctrine of Grace seems thus also to emphasise the unconditionality of the spiritual experience. In this connection, it may not be out of place to mention that for the Vedantists, who hold that the finitude of the individual (jīva) is only apparent, and that there is perfect identity (abheda) between Brahman and the Jīva, it has not been necessary to lay any special stress upon the doctrine of Grace. The spiritual intuition, according to them, is only the rea1isation of the true character of the so-called finite. It involves neither an elevation of the finite nor the descending of the Infinite. Here the truth reveals itself dispelling the darkness of Ignorance. The doctrine of Grace which serves to bridge over the supposed gulf between the finite Jivaand the Infinite Lord is not a necessity for the Vedānta inasmuch as it denies any real difference between the ultimate nature of Jīvaand Brahman. It is to be noted, however, that although Grace is not supposed to be indispensably necessary for salvation by the Vedäntins, they do not think that there is no room for Divine Grace to operate nor that it is not usefu1. The Divine Grace may be the cause of illumination which directly leads to salvation. Śrī HarDa thinks that it is through

10.Cf. Carlyle.

the Grace of God that the desire for the realisation of non-duality arises.11Madhusudana12also admits that there is no objection to regarding the Divine Selection (varal la) or Grace as the cause of revelation; only the supposition that realisation (j-ana) is in need of the Divine Grace in order to be competent for liberation,13 is opposed by the Vedantins. There is nothing intervening, not even Divine Grace, between realisation (j-āna) and liberation (mokla). As soon as realisation arises, liberation at once happens. But before realisation occurs, Divine Grace may be operative. Liberation happens directly from illumination which alone is competent to remove the darkness of ignorance causing bondage through false superimposition.

The Sādhanas or disciplinary practices have been broadly divided into two important groups: (1) those belonging to the outer circle, or exoteric; and (2) those belonging to the inner circle, or

esotericÑdescribed in the Bhakti Śāstras, as vahira-ga and antara-ga Sādhanā. The first group represents the remote conditions, while the second group includes the more intimate and immediate steps to the goal. The first set of auxiliaries is to be taken recourse to so long as no spontaneous attraction is felt towards God and the things Divine. The second group becomes helpful only to the advanced sādhakas who feel a genuine love for God and to whom everything relating to God becomes a source of infinite pleasure. These two are distinguished as Sādhanā in vidhimārga and that in rāgamārga. The distinction corresponds to MartineauOs discrimination between the Ôlife of the LawO and the Ôlife of Love.O There is for the probationers the rigid discipline of the life of Law (vidhimārga). At this stage the injunctions of the Sastras are to be strictly adhered to.14All omissions and neglect are regarded as sins which have to be atoned for. But, in the life of Love, there are no fixed rules or laws which have to be obeyed unconditionally. Now, the principal and, in a sense, the only practice (sādhana) becomes

11. Īśvarānugrahāde ā pulsāmadvaītavāsanā, Mahābhayak tatrā lā dvitrā yadi jāyate. Kha Danakhal Iakhādya, Verse 25. 12. Bhaktijanyeśvaraprasādasyāpi tatsāk ātkārasvarūpa evopayogasya.

Advaitasiddhi, p. 892 (N.S. Edition). 13. See Nyāyām ta. 14. Śrava akīrtanādīni śāstraśāsanabhayena yadi kriyante tadā vaidhī bhakti .. Bhaktirasām tasindhubindu, p. 11.

confined to meditation (smara a) of God15and His attributes and sportive actions (lila). Loving meditation (dhruva sml ti) and spontaneous self-surrender (ätma-nivedana) constitute the prominent marks of this stage. The first course of discipline (vidhi-mārga) prepares the sädhaka (devotee) for the second. One who is born with a natural and spontaneous attraction towards God need not go through the rigid preparatory disciplines, but is competent (adhikārin) for the second stage. The only end of the disciplinary practices, belonging to the first stage, is to help the growth of spontaneous attraction; and so, where the latter already exists, the former can serve no useful purpose.

The later Bhakti schools, especially the VailLava school founded by Śrī Caitanya, have laid great emphasis on the second form of Sādhanā, viz. the loving worship and service of God. Here God is no longer the omnipotent Power whose commands are obeyed under compulsion and for fear of His displeasure. Now, the devotee enters into loving relationship with God who not only constantly looks after his welfare, but is as dear to him as oneOs brother and friend, or as oneOs own

child, or as the beloved. God no longer compels attention through His omnipotence16(aiśvarya) but becomes the object of constant meditation of the devotee through His loving affection and charming features (mädhurya). He is either the very kind and affectionate master who rules not by force but by love, and in whose willing service the devotee attains the highest satisfaction and pleasure17(this being known as upāsanā or Sādhanā in dāsya bhāva); or He is the affectionate child of the devotee himself, appearing as the Bāla Gopāla (this being upāsanā in vātsalya bhāva); or, He is the dear friend (sakhā) of the devotee (this being upāsanā in sakhya bhāva); or, He is the most beloved to whom the devotee completely surrenders himself and everything that is his own (this being upāsanā in madhura bhāva). Some of these latter forms of Sadhana, as also the sentiments involved in them, are hardly without their parallels in the religious history of the world. To

15. Tatra rāgānugāyā smara asya mukhyatvam.Ibid., p. 12. 16. Na hi kena kutracit śāstradl lyā lobhal I kriyate kintu lobhye vastuni śrute d le va svatal I eva lobhal utpadyate. Ibid. rāgānuga bhaktif .p. 14. 17. Nijābhimatavrajarājasevāprāptilobhena yadi tāni kriyante tadā Bhaktirasām tasindhubindu, p. 12.

worship God as oneOs own child seems not only unnatural, but sounds altogether strange, and it passes oneOs understanding to comprehend the real meaning and worth of this form of Sādhana. Unless one is moved affectionately by the līlā or the playful activities of the Bāla Goplala or the boy-K Da to such an extent that the lila is always before his mindOs eye and that he feels an interest in the things, just as the parents feel in the doings of their children, one cannot even imagine what underlies this form of Sādhana. In the West, we very often hear of the metaphor of marriage with God, closely resembling the upāsanā inmadhura bhava; but, there it is hardly more than a symbolical description of the union with God. The Vai Lava schools, however, have not remained satisfied merely with a description of the yearning of the soul and of her union with God, but have given us a definite line of Sādhana in this direction and have elaborately dealt with the same.

The Bhakti schools of Sādhana realise that one-pointedness or real devotion can be gained through the sublimation of our natural and instinctive impulses and tendencies. We naturally love our children, friends and our beloved. If we can love God as we do love our friends and children, or even as the unchaste woman loves her paramour (which illustration is very often cited to show the spontaneity and the intensity of the attraction), then only our love towards God is firm and fixed, spontaneous and natural. The mother does not love her child for any gains, and so when the devotee has such natural, motherly

affection towards God, or spontaneous love for Him, then only, is he secure in his love. So the Bhakti-vādins advise people to take recourse to upāsanā in rāga-mārga. One is instructed to get hold of one or other of these natural relationships and attempt, through constant contemplation of and constant occupation with the Divine object of love, a sublimation of the natural feeling. Real nirgulā bhakti is perfect spontaneity of love reaching such an intensity and pitch that the devotee completely forgets himself. The complete absorption of the self marks the intensity of love and it reaches the level of the nirgulā stage when one is literally carried beyond oneself. We have to take hold of some such relationship where we are spontaneously drawn to the object of love,18and, then, we are to divinise the relationship by and by. God

18. Vrajalīlāparikarasthaś -gārādibhāvamādhurye śrute dhīriya lobhotpattikāle śāstrayuktyapek ā na syāt. mama bhūyāt iti

Rāgavartmacandrikā, p. 63.

is Love and can be realised only in and through Love, and, therefore, we can reach Him only through a gradual sublimation of our spontaneous experiences where we love and are loved. It is not by suppression or extinction of feelings or emotions, but only by a divine transformation of them, that we can hope to reach God who is Sublime Love. This is the special message of the Bhakti schools of Sādhanā, and they can claim justly to have got hold of the easiest and safest course of attaining the goal.19Here, the devotee follows the line of his natural inclination, and hence, progress is made almost unawares without the least strain on his part. We do not hear much of this form of Sadhana in the Vedas. The earliest Scriptures, which clearly and unmistakably proclaim this particular line of Sādhanā, are perhaps the Nāradīya section of the Sāntiparvan of the Mahābhārata, the Bhagavadgītā, the Bhāgavata Purā la and the Pa-carātra Literature in general. The Nārada Sūtras and the Sa ilya Sūtras also are authoritative sources of this form of Sadhana. In the Vedas we find the sacrificial forms of worship constituting the Karma-kā la on the one hand, and the aupani ada or intellectual form of Sādhanā, constituting the J-ana-kalDa on the other. The Bhakti form of worship does not attain any distinct place in the Vedas. Vil lu or Kla, the Supreme Lord of the Bhakti-vadins, does not hold any supreme position in the Vedas, and worship of God in any personal form, as leading to final emancipation, is not prescribed there. The Mahābhārata, refers to Sāttvata-vidhi, at the end of the 66th chapter of its Bhil Ima-Parvan as Dr. Schrader points out in his Introduction to Pa- carātra and Ahirbudhnya Salhitā (pp. 14Đ15), and so, some sort of Bhakti-form of worship must have been present at the time of the

Mahābhārata. This would unmistakably point towards a Pre- Buddhistic origin of this line of Sādhanā. The Bhagavadgītā not only deals with the Bhakti-form of Worship definitely and exhaustively, but attempts to justify its claims as an independent form of Sādhanā. This tendency of the Gīta is marked in many places. The very fact that the Gītā takes so much pains to establish the claims of Bhakti proves that even at the time of the Gita, the Bhakti form of worship had not got a firm hold on people. It was still necessary to fight against the Karma- kāl La of the Vedas, proving the transitoriness of the fruits of karma in general, on the

19. Dhāvannimilya vā netre na skhalenna patediha. Bhāgavata Purāla, XI, ii, 35. See also Bhagavadgītā VIII, 14.

one hand, and also to show that J-āna or intellectual realisation was not the only way of attaining salvation, and that unswerving, wholehearted and one-pointed devotion to God was an equally efficacious and also the easier course. The Gīta recommends the Bhakti line of Sādhanā as the easiest way of attaining the goal (Ch. VIII, 14 and Ch. XII, 5). So, although the Bhakti cult became prominent rather late in history, still it has justified its existence and has proved to be of special merit by virtue of its suitability to men of all equipments.

We have already indicated that Bhakti is of two kinds Sādhyā Bhakti and Sädhana-Bhakti, or Bhakti as the realised goal and Bhakti in the form of the auxiliaries which lead to and help the realisation itself. We have unfortunately only one term, viz. Bhakti, to indicate both the process and the goal; and so, the terms Sādhyā (goal) and Sādhana (means) are prefixed to Bhakti to distinguish the two, the goal and the means. The sadhanas are generally regarded as nine in number20and sometimes the following five are selected as the most prominent, viz., hearing and reciting the sacred texts, repeating incessantly the name of the Lord, companionship of holy people, residing in the holy abodes of the Lord Śri Kl la, and loving worship and service of the Lord.21Compassion for all creatures, attachment towards the name of the Lord and service of the Vai avas, Nthese three also are sometimes separately pointed out as being of special importance. Any one of these alone is competent to generate bhakti, and there are various sorts of devotees practising either single or many items. Companionship with holy people is given the foremost importance in all VailLava Literature inasmuch as it is responsible, in most cases, for the distinct turning point in the life of the sadhaka. Holy persons always engage themselves in topics concerning God, and their discussions are always peculiarly convincing, because they describe

their own innermost experiences which cannot but generate some sort of emotion in the minds of the listeners.22The sacred texts are nothing but expressions and symbols of experiences realised by the religious consciousness in its deepest moments, and it is only natural that the same experience or intuition will be elicited by those texts in the hearts of the persons constantly meditating on them. If the text is a genuine record of any spiritual

20. Śrava la kīrtanal VI o śmaral pādasevānam, Arcana vandana dāsya sakhyamātmanivedanam. 21.Caitanyacaritām ta, pp. 294. 22.Bhāgavata Purā a III, xxv, 24.

intuition and forms the nearest and the most intimate symbolic expression of the same in words, it cannot but be of help in eliciting the same or similar intuition in others. As Whitehead beautifully puts it, ÒThe expressive sign is more than interpretable. It is creative. It elicits the intuition which interprets it. But it cannot elicit what is not there.Ó23This explains why there is the wholesome advice of reading only the texts composed by the is or the Seers of truth, which always embody deep spiritual experiences. Reciting the name of the Lord has also the very same effect. The name is the nearest expressive symbol of the experience of the Divine, and it is believed that constant repetition of the name together with meditation (bhāvanā) may result in yielding the very same experience. The OM has been referred to in the Upani ads as the nearest symbol of the Absolute,24and the Vail avas speak of the identity of the name (nama) and the Lord bearing the name (namin). The secret of the doctrine is perhaps this. The name is no arbitrary sign invented by the human intellect to designate a particular person, as we do now when we invest the child with a name, but it is the spontaneous expression in sounds of the deepest spiritual experience, and forms the vibrational symbol of the same. The vibrations embodied in the name are the very first materialised expressions of the purely spiritual and ideal experience. It is for this reason that there exists a very intimate relation between sound and feeling, and that, in most forms of Sādhanā, rhythmic sound (mantra or näma) is prescribed in order to elicit the feeling and the idea, of which the mantra or the nama is the expression. The forms of the Divine Being worshipped in images are still more materialised expressions of the same. The poet expresses his experiences and feelings through words and vibrations, the painter gives vent to the very same thing by means of colours and shapes, the clay-modeller and the sculptor take recourse even to the solid earth and stone for the same purpose. The näma and the rūpa, the names and forms, of the Divine being are similarly more or less concretised expressions and symbols of the religious experience which could not have been

communicated and made a universal possession in any better way or in any finer form. These

23.Religion in the Making, p. 118. Cf.also, Tasya vācaka pra lava Pāta-jala Sūtras I, 27. 24. Abhidhāna nedi ham. ŚalkaraOs commentary on the Chāndogya Upanilad I, i, 1.

are meaningless if they do not elicit the original intuitive experiences of which they were intended to be expressive symbols; but so far as they perform their function faithfully, they are of priceless value to the religious life and consciousness.

Residing in holy places and companionship with holy people also have the same end in view. Holy places abound with holy men, and there, the atmosphere is surcharged with things, symbols and ideas which are divine and holy. Holy associations keep one in contact with sacred thoughts and experiences, and throughout the episodes narrated in the Puralas, and especially in the Bhāgavata Purā la, this fact is repeatedly illustrated.

The Sadhaka wants to have an experience or realisation of God, and anything that is associated with God is eagerly and earnestly taken recourse to by the Sādhaka. Some symbols are very intimate and beautifully expressive, while others are rather remote and not so suggestive. There are some expressions which appeal to almost all, while others manifest themselves only to the chosen few. But anything that symbolises and expresses the spiritual experience and, as such, is helpful in eliciting the religious consciousness, is a useful auxiliary and should not be ignored by the seeker of spiritual experience.

14

The Tantra Form of Sādhanā

The Tantras are mainly divided into two groups: Āgamasand Nigamas. The first group includes those which were spoken by Sadāśivato the Devi, and the second represents those in which the Devispeaks to Sadāśivaor Maheśvara. The Tantras claim their origin from the Vedas and thus attempt to establish their antiquity and authority beyond any doubt. References to lalcakrabheda or penetrating the six cakras(centres of the body) may be found in the Praśna Upani ad, and much of the black art, dealt with in some of the Tantras, may be found in the Atharva-Veda. The sacred syllable OMoccupies a very important position both in the Vedas and the Tantras.

The Tantras reveal an element of eclecticism, and whatever may be said with regard to the antiquity of them all form the orthodox point of view, some of them undoubtedly manifest influences of the Epics and the Puralas, and are probably not much earlier than the Mahābhārata. Some of them are pre-Buddhistic, no doubt, as some Buddhist works contain unmistakable references to Tantrism.1The Tāntric form of Sādhanā probably came into special prominence when on the one hand, the elaborate details enjoined by the Vedic sacrifices, taking a long time to be performed, could not be accomplished by short-lived people of feeble attainments, and

1. Tattvasa graha, p. 905. See also Introduction to Sādhanamālā, page xvii by B. Bhattacharyya (GaekwadÕs Oriental Series).

233

when on the other, the Upani ad method of acquisition of transcendent knowledge surpassed the intellects and equipments of most people.2The Puralas were at this time preaching the Bhakti cult in order to place before people an easy method capable of being grasped and followed by all. But these could not reconcile themselves satisfactorily with the Vedas and the Upanilads, the accepted and time-honoured authorities, and seemed to promulgate something foreign to them. The Tantras offered themselves to the people at this stage, containing within them the essentials of the Vedic sacrifices and oblations,3and the essence of the monotheistic philosophy of the Upanilads, of the Bhakti cult preached by the Purāl las, of the Yoga method propounded by Pata-jali, and of the mantra element of the Atharva-Veda. The philosophy of the Tantras, which is a reconciliation of the absolute monism of the Upani ads and the dualism or qualified monism preached by some of the Pura as, and the Tantric method of Sādhanā, which combines in it Yoga and Bhakti, mantraand homa(oblation), j-anaand karma, prove beyond doubt that Tantrism can be best studied as the synthesis of all that was good in the various forms of Sādhana in vogue and, as such, its claim to be the shortest route to the summum bonum, and its promise to its adherents of the easy and speedy attainment of the end,4are perhaps justified.

Täntrism is suited to men of all equipments. It contains within it, as we have already indicated, elements of all the important forms of Sādhanā. It promises to award to the Sādhaka not merely liberation (mukti) but also enjoyment (bhukti), not merely final beatitude (niśreyasa) but also progress (abhyudaya).5While it preaches something very like the philosophy of the Upanilads and holds that the individual (jīva) can become and does actually become

2. Mahānirvāla TantraIX, 13 3.Cf.Mathitvā j-ānada lena vedāgamamahārl lavam, Sāraj-ena mayā devi kuladharmal samuddh lta KulārDava Tantra II, 10. 4. Darśane u ca sarvelu cirābhyāsena mānavā Mok labhante kaule tu sadya eva na sa śaya Ibid.,II, 21. Ciraya svalpaphaladal ka-klante samaya Sukhena sarvaphaladal kula Ibid.,II, 76. koOpi tyajatyaho.

3. Japan bhuktiśca muktiśca labhate nātra sa Iśaya Ibid.,III, 96.

the Absolute (Siva), it does not, like the Vedanta, hold on that account that the world-process (prapa-ca) is unreal (anirvacanīya). Its philosophy is thus somewhat different from the Absolute Monism of Salkara, on the one hand, and from the qualified Monism of Rāmānuja or the doctrine of identity-in-difference (bhedābhedavāda) of Nimbarka and Jīva Gosvamin, on the other. It holds that the individual (jīva) becomes identical with the Absolute (Siva) when liberation is attained, and that there is no difference, in essence, between them. This distinguishes it from the philosophy of the Bhakti schools which agree in maintaining a difference of some sort or other even after liberation. Again, by maintaining that the Jīvabhāvais real and not illusory, and that the many do actually come out of the One, it distinguishes itself from the Māyā-vada of Sal kara.6The individual has in him the element of infinitude and absoluteness; otherwise, all sādhanāwould have been futile, and spiritual realisation would have been a myth; but this infinitude has to be realised and actually attained.7The KulDalinī Śakti(Serpent Power) brings about the union of the individual and the Absolute, and makes the realisation of the absoluteness and infinitude of the individual possible. The absoluteness is not anything foreign to the individual to be acquired from outside, but is inherent and latent in him to be gradually unfolded and realised. It is through the effort of the Sadhaka and the grace of the Spiritual Guide (Guru) that the Serpent-Power which ordinarily lies dormant at the foot of the spinal column becomes awakened and joins itself to the Absolute that resides in the thousand- petalled lotus in the highest centre of the cerebrum.8The ÔSerpent PowerO or ÔKulIalinī SaktiÕ is the expression used by the Tantras to indicate the Spiritual Power or Energy of the individual human being (jīva). In the worldly individual, this Spiritual Power sleeps; it is awakened or becomes

6. Advaita kecidicchanti dvaitamicchanti cāpare, Mama tattva na jānanti dvaitādvaitavivarjitam. KulārDava, I, 110. 7. Yathā dhyānasya sāmarthyāt kīloOpi bhramarāyate, Tathā samādhisāmarthyat brahmabhuto bhavennara .. Ibid.IX, 16.

8. Suptā guruprasādena yadā jāgarti ku Jalī, Tadā sarvā i padmāni bhidyante granthayoOpi ca, Tasmāt sarvaprayatnena prabodhayitumīśvarīm, Brahmarandhramukhe suptā mudrābhyāsa samācaret.

Śivasa hitā.

active through sadhanaor regulated effort to arouse and intensify the spiritual energy that is latent in every man. The individual becomes the Absolute, the Jiva becomes Siva,9when the lower self of man realises its higher being and becomes identified with the Higher Self. This is nothing other than the Upani ad view that Brahman or the Highest is oneÕs own Self (ätman). But whereas the Vedānta thinks that this realisation can be had through meditation (bhāvanā) alone, the Tantra recommends the joining of kriyā with bhāvanā, the supplementing of the intellectual process by physical and physiological exercises. According to the Vedānta, that the Jīva is Śiva is an eternally accomplished fact; according to the Tantras, the absoluteness (Sivatva) is to be attained through some process.10

For the attainment of the end, the Tantra takes the help of the Vedic rituals, of the Bhakti method of worship and prayer, and of the Yoga method of regulation of breath, etc. The Tāntric Sādhanā is not detailless and speechless like the aupani adaform of Sādhanā; but, when compared with the Vedic sacrifices, it seems to be only an apology for any ritual worth the name. The Tantric method is really a short cut and an abbreviation. It seeks to penetrate into the inner meaning of the rituals prescribed by the Vedas and only retains them in the smallest degree in order that they may serve as symbols helping to remind one of the secret mysteries embodied in them. The Vedic worship would be nothing better than childOs play and foolish fetishism if no allowance is made for the deep symbolism that it conveys. Täntrism retains much of the symbolism of the Vedas and, in some cases, extends those symbols to newer spheres and associations. The ceremony of homa(pouring oblations to fire), for example, is retained in the Tantra and forms the most important finishing item in every ritual; but the Tantra lays more emphasis on the inner meaning of homaas implying complete self-surrender than on the outward process. The Tantra has no hesitation in prescribing the alternative of recitation of mantras in lieu of offering oblations, and prescribes the ceremony as obligatory only in order that the inner meaning may emergy out of the symbol.

The Tantras lay great emphasis on Upāsanā, and this seems to be derived from the Pura as. The worship of the deity, and the 9. Jīva śiva śivo jīva sa jīva kevala śiva Kulār avaIX, 42. 10. Karmabaddha sm to jīva karmamukta sadāśivah.

Ibid., 43.

recitation of hymns and kavacasin honour of the deity form important elements in the Tantras as well as in the Pura as. But there is a marked difference in one important item between the two forms of Sādhanā. The Tantrika worshipper identifies himself in meditation with the Deity he worships and places before himself the fully blossomed condition represented by the Deity as the ideal to be realised. The Paura ika worshipper, on the other hand, can never think of the identity between himself and his Deity, and always bears in mind the immense difference between the infinitude of God and the finiteness of man. Here we observe that the Tantra accepts the Absolute Monism of the Upani ads and regards the identity between the Jiva and Siva, the individual and the Absolute, as the supreme ideal, although this ideal is to be realised through upāsanā. Kāśmīr Śaivism accepts in unambiguous terms the Upani adic doctrine of the identity of the Absolute and the individual and holds that the Absolute Himself (Siva) assumes the form of the individual11(jīva) and various other things of the universe, just as the white crystal assumes many colours. 12The synthesis between the Upani ads and the Puralas, which the Tantra sought to bring about by accepting the philosophy of the former and the practical method of the latter, eminently suited the requirements of the people for whom it was intended. While recognising the difference between the individual and the Absolute, the worshipper and the worshipped, the difference which common people could in no way forget and which was emphasised by the Bhakti cult, the Tantras maintained that the attainment of the summum bonumconsisted in overcoming that difference by unfolding the latent absoluteness of man.

In the Tantras, the position of special importance is assigned to mantras. The deity is identical with the mantra, and the latter is the infallible means of liberation. Mantraliterally signifies something which saves (trayate) through reflection (manana) on it.13 As sacrifices occupy the foremost place in the Vedic method, and hymns in the Paural lic, so do mantrasform the most important item

11. Bhoktā ca tatra dehī śiva eva g hītapaśubhāva Paramārthasāra, verse 5. 12. NānāvidhavarLānāl rūpa dhatte yathaOmala sphal likal Ibid. verse 6. 13. Manana viśvavij-āna trā la sa Isārabandhanāt Yata karoti sa siddha mantra ityucyate tatal Pi-galā Tantraquoted in Sāradātilaka.

in the Tantras. The mantrais not a mere word14or symbol of expression, but is a concentrated thought of great power revealed to the i or the adept Sädhaka in the hour of his profound illumination.

The devatãor deity that is supposed to be the special object of the mantra, or rather as identical with the mantra, perhaps stands for the illumination embodied in the mantra. Anyone who can, with the help of recitation and meditation of the mantra, attain the required elevation of thought where the mantrabecame revealed, can also experience the illumination or the devatawhich the mantra stands for or signifies. At this stage the mantrabecomes cetana (illuminative) and creative as well. The vibrations embodied in the mantrasare, from the worldly (laukika) point of view, merely physical processes, and the mantrasare really nothing but words to the uninitiated; but to the initiated and the adept, they are illuminative as well and appear to be identical with the deity (devata) which they represent.15 Illumination is latent in the mantra ordinarily, and so long as the meaning or the significance of the cetanaembodied in it is not unfolded, the mantraremains a mere word; but as soon as the latent illumination is revealed, the mantra appears as conscious energy and is understood to be possessing wonderful capacities. The Tantra believes in the eternity of the mantrawhich it designates as Sabda Brahman. ÒThe Śabda Brahman and the Para Brahmanboth are my eternal bodies.Ó All the principal sects belonging to the Tantra method, viz.the Sāktas, the Saivas and the VaiLavas lay all their emphasis upon mantraand nāmaand build their philosophy and practice upon the above declaration of the Tantra. According to the Vail lavas, the namaand the namin, the name of the Lord and the Lord Himself, are identical, just as according to the Śāktas and the Śaivas the mantraand devatāare one. The eternal connection that exists between Sabda and ArthaÑthe Logos and the Real, as the Mīma sakas put it, justifies the mantraand the practices connected with them that are prescribed by the Tantric schools. OThrough repetition (japa) of the sacred syllables (mantra) alone, one attains salvation,ONthe Tantra declares thrice in order to show the infallibility of the method.

The Hindus built their whole Sadhana upon Sabdaor the

14. ... mantre cākLarabhāvanā ... kurvā lo naraka vrajet. 15. Gurudevatāmanūnāmaikya sambhāvayan dhiyā. Prapa-casāra Tantra, VI, 121.

Vedas. The Sabda pramāl la is the infallible means of right knowledge, according to the Hindus. The eternal Vedas, not created by any person, became revealed of themselves to Brahmā, the Creator. Brahmā learnt everything about creation from the Vedas and then began to create the universe. The Hindu lis discovered the Great Energy (Vira Sakti) which is the source of Creation, and Nāda, Prala, Sabda, etc. are only synonyms for that Cosmic Energy.16

ThisŚabdaor Nādaas Cosmic Energy is the soul of this universe and, as the breath of living beings, constitutes their life. This Nāda, as vibration, is the source of the universe and, as illumination, is also conscious. The gross form of this Nadasupports the things of the universe as their soul, and its subtle form, again, is represented by the Absolute goddess (Parameśvarī) as Cinmayī Kalā. The Hindus attempted to realise the subtle form through the gross one, and to reach illumination by generating the corresponding vibration. The recitation of the mantras, the breathing exercises, the repetition of the name of God,Ñall aim at awakening illumination through vibration.

The Tantras explain clearly that Citand Śabda, illumination and vibration, represent two parallel aspects, the subtle and gross forms, of the same thing. Nada or Sabda is the very first manifestation of Citand is just adjacent to it. The external things and their shapes are materialised forms of vibrations, and in them the Cit becomes more latent and hidden. In Nādaor vibration, the Citis not so materialised but retains much of its fluidity, and it is because of this fact that it is easier to awaken the Citelement in and through vibration (Nāda) than through external things and forms. Nāda is really intermediate between Citand jala, being neither so solid as external things nor so fine and absolutely immaterial as Cit. The utility and efficacy of NādaSādhanā cannot be over-estimated. It is the invaluable discovery of the Tantras and their priceless gift to the world, that vibration (Nāda) and illumination (j-āna) are two parallel manifestations of the same Cosmic Energy or Saktiand that, as such, the one can lead to and awaken the other without fail. The vibrations can be easily got hold of in the forms of breath (prala) and sound (dhvani), and the Citcan be realised through them, which, by itself,

16. Brahmāl la granthametena vyāpta sthāvaraja-gama Nāda prā aśca jīvaśca gho aścetyādi kathyate. Prapa-casāra. eludes the grasp of even the most discriminative and intelligent amongst men.17

The Dhvanior Nada(Sound) acquires immense strength when joined with the Sul lum ā Nā iwhich is supposed to be the central nerve of the nervous system. The Su lum ais really the point of harmony and is represented to exist intermediate between the ILaand the Pi-galā, on the left and the right respectively. It is the nervous or physical counterpart of synthetic and harmonious thought. As thought attains great strength when this synthetic point is reached, so also does sound gain immensely in strength when the point of synthesis, which is marked by a peculiar resonance, is reached. The rhythmic and harmonious sound is the nearest and the most immediate physical

expression of Citor consciousness and is thus expected to awaken illumination. Much stress has been laid upon this Su um lain the Tantras. The mantras, which remains mere dead letters, so long as they are not uttered with the Su lum la joined unto them, acquire wonderful powers as soon as the Sul lum a joins with them.18The Tantras recognise six important centres (cakras) in the Nervous System, and the Sulum a Nalī passes through all of them. In the ordinary normal state of the individual, the Sul lum ā is not ÔawakenedÕ or recognised, and the path through these centres to the thousand-petalled centre in the cerebrum (Sahasrāra) is also closed. Through proper exercise (kriyā) and meditation (bhāvanā), these centres begin to work and the working of the Sulum la is clearly perceived. The KulLalinī Sakti, which remains latent and dormant in the Muladhara, passes along the Sulum la to the Sahasraraand becomes fully awakened there. What this SuLum a is, it is very difficult to explain in physiological terms. But there is not the least doubt that some physiological process within the centre of the Nervous System, and which the Tantras have discovered to be most intimately connected with consciousness, is implied by it. And there is also hardly and doubt that the Sul Juml la implies the harmonious working of all the parts of the nervous system, and represents the working of the system as a whole rather than any particular process. It seems to be a higher point of harmony than what is implied by the kumbhaka or the equalisation of respiratory processes in Pāta- jalayoga. Prālaand Nāda, breath and sound, both are concomitants of

17. SūkOmadhyāna maheśāni kadācinnahi jāyate. Yāmala Tantra. 18. See Tantrasāra.

consciousness; but harmonious sound seems to stand more adjacent to the consciousness than harmonious breath.

The gross body is to be harmonised through regulated physical postures (āsana); the internal vital processes are to be harmonised through regulated breath (prālāyāma); the higher cerebral centres are to be harmonised through regulated sounds (Nada with Sulumlā); and the mental processes are to be harmonised through meditation (bhāvanā); and thus, harmony in the physical, physiological and mental spheres has to be attained in order to prepare the proper pre- condition for spiritual realisation. In fact, thought, sound or vibration, and motion are the three principal factors in creation and they represent the three stages of the same energy in three different planes. That there are points of harmony in thought, harmony in sound and harmony in motion is clearly perceptible, though their location in the nervous centres has not yet been scientifically traced. The Tantras

found in harmony the secret of all realisation, and preached a method that sought to attain harmony in all planes and sides of existence. Harmony lies in the middle of two extremes, and the Sulumla also lies between the extremes of Ia andPi-gala. In one word, Sulum lā is harmony, and to discover this reconciliatory meeting-point (sandhi) or the point of synthesis or harmony (Sul lum a) in everything, seems to be the central aim of the Tantric method of Sādhanā.

A difficulty presents itself in this connection because, the internal connection between words (Sabda) and their meanings or rather the objects represented by them (artha), as upheld by the Mīmā_sakas and supported by the Tantras, is not admitted by the modern science of Philology. The Naiyayikas and the Vaiselikas deny the uncreatedness (apauruleyatva) of the relation between words and objects, and maintain that God established the conventional relation19in the beginning of creation. Philology goes further and denies even any God-made connection between them. The connection is only conventional, and the differences in various languages can hardly reconcile themselves to any doctrine of the eternity of fixed connection between the meaning and the particular sound. But it is clear that the whole basis of Tantric Sadhana as well as of all those forms of Sadhana which base themselves on Sabda or

19. Tasmāt īśvaraviracitasambandhādhigamopāyabhūtav ddhavyavahāralabhatadvyutpattisāpek la śābdoÕrthamavagamayatītī siddham. Nyāyama-jarī, p. 246.

mantras becomes shaken if the view of philology be accepted and found true. If there is no necessary connection between the mantra and the artha(meaning), between the Sabda and the devatā(deity), between the vibration (Näda) and the illumination, then the whole process of seeking to derive the latter from the former must be futile. There seems to be a contradiction between the philosophy of the Tantras and the Mīmāl Isā philosophy on the one hand, and the Science of Philology on the other, and unless the contradiction can be reconciled, the Tantras seem to be based on very insecure grounds.

Although the Tantras would claim for their doctrine the support of experimental test20and would accept the challenge of demonstrating how the devata(deity) becomes realised through the mantras, yet so long as no sound theoretical basis for the practical demonstration is discovered, it becomes difficult to rely merely on the experiences of individuals. The Tantra offers an elaborate discussion as to the nature and forms of Sabdaand does not rest content merely with pointing out the means of practical realisation. Here, as elsewhere, the general conclusion holds; and philosophy and practice, as we have observed

before, go hand in hand. There is not the least doubt that Tantrism has engaged itself more with practical methods of realisation than with philosophical discussions, and that emphasis has been laid on the practical side rather than on the theoretical, yet it is also true that it has not been slow to justify its methods by a sound philosophy at its back.

The Tantra recognises four distinct forms and stages of Sabda, viz. Parā, Paśyantī, Madhyamāand Vaikharī Vāk. None of the first three stages is audible and it is Vaikharīor the manifested sound that alone is audible. The Vaikharī is uttered through the mouth, the Madhyamāremains in the heart, the Pasyantiin the navel, and the Parain the lower abdomen.21The Para Sabdais entirely unmanifested and undifferentiated,Ñit is the ultimate source of the Vaikharīsound and the vākya. The Paśyantīand the Madhyamāare the intermediate stages between the absolutely undifferentiatedPara and the fully manifested Vaikharī. Modern Philology deals with

20. Kula pramālatā yāti pratyakLaphaladal yatal , PratyakLa-ca pramālāya sarvelāl prālinā priyal , Upalabdhibalāttasya matā sarve kutārkikāl

Kulār Iava, II, 87Đ88. 21.Prapa-casāra Tantra, II, 43.

Vaikharī vakya or manifested sound only, and thus fails to discover the eternity of necessary connection that exists between the primal sound and its corresponding idea or object. By Sabda Brahman or Nāda, the Tantra does not mean Vaikharī or manifested sound, but the Para Śabdaor Dhvanithat is the dynamic source of the universe. Dhvaniis different from uttered sound and represents the primal vibrations that cause the universe. The correspondence that exists between Para Śabdaand Caitanya, between the Primal Sound and Consciousness, at the source, cannot be observed in the manifested stage of Vaikharī. The differences in various languages are inevitable, because all of them build themselves on Vaikharī or manifested sound which cannot express itself except through differences. The various words representing the same object may seem to be arbitrarily chosen, but the Dhvanior the vibrations constituting the essence of the object and the substratum of the manifested words is the same in all. If Philology could further penetrate into the constitution of the word and look beneath the surface of manifested sound, it could possibly discover that primal source, the Para Sabda which is not different in different languages, but is the same unchanging substratum of them all, and could declare with the Tantras that there was an absolute and universal correspondence between Sabdaand Artha. Arthais the conceptual form raised in some part of the seat of the mind by sensuous reflection or memory. Immediately such a form is raised, a

corresponding acoustic sa skārais raised and causes a corresponding stimulation in the centre of Sabda. This Sābdikastimulation is the earliest form of sabdacorresponding to the artha. As thought-forms, both the sabdaand the arthaare indissolubly allied. And they are said to have one source, the ku Idalī śaktior spiral energy at the Mūlādhāra cakra, the basic plexus, where the central nervous system has its root. Synthetically, from this spiral energy which is supposed to be composed of 50 radical elements of vibration or var as, corresponding on the vocal side to the fifty Sanskrit letters, all śabdasand corresponding arthas, whether in the subtle plane or in the gross plane, are formed. The Parāstate, at the Mūlādhāra, and the Paśyantīstate, at the Svādhilthāna, are the kāral aor potential states of creative quiescence and creative readiness of the fifty elementary letters (varlas) in the ku alī śakti. The Madhyamāstate, in the Malipūraand Anāhata, is the sūk ma(subtle) state of creative activity whereof the subtle body of indriyasis the product. The Vaikharīstate, in the Viśuddha, is the sthūla(gross) state consisting of the sthūla(gross) expression of name and form. This is jaivas i. Cosmically, Paraand Paśyantīrepresent Iśvara Śakti, Madhyamā represents Hira yagarbha Śakti, and Vaikharīrepresents Virā Sakti. There is no contradiction between philology and the philosophy of the Tantras, as they are working on different planes. An insoluble difficulty and perhaps an unresolvable contradiction would have troubled us if the Tantras had exhausted all their philosophy on the Vaikharisound or if Philology would have claimed to discover anything behind the uttered sound, and if still they preached different theories on the relation of Śabdaand Artha.

The Tantra recognises three distinct stages of Sādhanā and marks out five sub-divisions of the entire course of discipline. The three stages are Purification (suddhi), Illumination (sthiti) and Unification (arpala), corresponding roughly to Karma, Bhakti and J-āna. The five sub-divisions are ablution (snana), gratification (tarpa a), meditation (sandhyā), worship (pūjā) and complete selfabnegation (homa). The first two snānaand tarpala, are processes of purification. The individual has to undergo various disciplinary processes in order that he may purify himself and unfold his latent infinitude. The process of Bhūtaśuddhialso implies this process of purification or purgation. The gross body, the subtle body and the casual body, all have their respective taints, and these have to be got rid of before there can be union of the individual and the Absolute. This purification the Tantra seeks to attain through both bhāvanā (meditation) and kriyā, through the harmonious working of both the mind and the body. The Sadhaka meditates on his identity with the Parama Siva(the Absolute) and,

through this meditation on the state of absolute purity, becomes able to make some amount of progress towards attaining purification. On the other hand, there are the bodily disciplines and the reciting of the mantras, helping to discard the impurities and strengthen meditation. The very first process is snänaor ablution which signifies the throwing off of impurities, and the next is tarpal athrough which the higher and better sides of the centres of energy are opened up. The t pti (satisfaction) comes as the result of snäna, and signifies the higher pleasure or satisfaction that is felt as soon as impurities are got rid of. These two, snänaand tarpala, prepare the Sädhaka for the next stage. Meditation and worship (sandhyā and pūja) of the Divine, become possible only when a divinity has been earned through the prior purificatory processes. OOnly the Divine can worship the DivineÓ is more than true. Real worship signifies that state of supreme attraction which can exist only between things of very similar nature. The worship of Śiva, who represents absolute purity and goodness and is accordingly described as all-white, is only possible by a heart that has also freed itself from all impurities. This is the stage of Bhakti and is very much like the stage of Illumination described by the Western Mystics. Here we find the splendour of the Absolute illumining the purified individual and attracting him towards it. Through karma or purificatory action, the individual is now able to perceive the glory of the Holiest of the Holies, and so he yearns after reaching and realising the same. There is now the hankering of the little-knowing after the Omniscient, of the partially pure after the absolutely Pure, of the man of little energy after the All-Powerful. The deep attraction and the consequent worship and service follow from the Illumination of the finite by the Infinite, of the small by the All-pervading.

The next stage is the stage of complete self-surrender and absolute merging. This is the stage of unification and is described in the Bhagavadgīta22by the word ÔvisateOÑOenters or merges into meÓ. This is what is signified by homa, the culminating process in Tāntric Sādhanā. The Jīva-Saktiwhich, through purification, previously attained an element of divinity and became Deva-Sakti, now becomes identified with Śiva-Śakti. There is at this stage, no worship, no distinction between the worshipper and the worshipped, between the teacher and the taught, between the finite and the infinite, between the individual and the Absolute, but now there pervades an incomparable Bliss that is Eternal and Infinite.

The study of the Tantric method of Sadhana gives one the impression that the full correspondence between the mind and the body was observed by its formulators, and that the human body was regarded by them as the exact physical counterpart of the entire scheme of

spiritual discipline.23The absolute (Paramaśiva) resides in the cerebrum (Sahasrāra). The spiritual guide (Guru), who is, in essence, identical with Parama Śiva, also has his real habitation there. The Jiva- Śaktilies dormant in the lowest centre at the root of

22. Bhagavadgītā, XVIII, 55. 23. Brahmapadme p thivyāntu vartante mānu lādaya ,Eva cakre sarvadehe bhuvanāni caturdaśa. Pratideha pareśāni brahmā la nātrā sa Iśayal Nirvāl la Tantra.

the spine (Mūladhara) and passes through the gradually higher and higher centres in the base of the penis, navel, heart, throat and forehead to the cerebrum. Great emphasis is laid on the cerebrospinal axis. The different nerve centres may symbolise the lower deities which are all subordinate to the controlling cerebral centre (Parama Śiva). The Sul lum lais the innermost nerve-current that joins the lowest and highest nerve-centres, the Jiva and the Siva. The bondage of the individual consists in his being determined by the lower nerve- centres; liberation, again, happens when the highest centre controls and subordinates all the other lower centres. The conscious working at the higher centres, the definite turn from the control by the lower self to that by the Higher, is perhaps what is signified by the awakening of the KulDalini Śakti. There are twitchings (granthis) or knots of the nerves, we are told, which obstruct and hinder the working of the highest cerebral centre from permeating through the lower centres. These ÔtwitchingsÕ or ÔknotsÕ perhaps indicate the defects in the arrangement of the nervous system of the ordinary individual. The Sādhaka has to get the whole arrangement of the nervous molecules reshuffled and reintegrated in such a way that they may no longer obstruct the free flow of the spiritual energy from the highest centre to the lowest.

The Nervous System, with the help of the vitual and respiratory systems (Pra a and Nāda), forms the exact physiological counterpart of the stream of consciousness, and the Tantra shows us innumerable methods of getting hold of and controlling the latter by means of the former. Although the Tantras preach the identity of the individual and the Absolute much in the strain of the Upanil lads, yet there is a world of difference so far as the methods of realisation are concerned. While the Vedanta recommends the method of transcendent wisdom, the method of sublime philosophy, the method that could be followed only by men of exceptionally high intellectual and moral attainments, the Tantra prescribes a method helpful even to men of lower equipments, a method which utilises physical and physiological processes for the attainment of spiritual realisation.

The Tantra is really an epitome of all the Scriptures of the Hindus, and

contains within its compass almost all the special characteristics of the various forms of Sadhana. If Tantrism prescribes actions of the most rudimentary type and seems to be very much particular about their infinite details, it, again, prescribes meditation on the identity of the individual and the Absolute and thus reminds us of the high transcendent philosophy of the Upanilads. It prescribes different methods and rules for the conduct of life for men of different equipments and capacities. It distinguishes three classes of Sādhakas in order of merit, viz. the Paśu, the Viraand the Divya. The Paśuis a person who has not yet attained self-control but is attempting to have mastery over his passions and impulses. The Virais the Sādhaka who has attained complete self control and does not forget himself even in the most trying and tempting circumstances. He is not only allowed, but is definitely instructed to include, such things as wine, meat, etc. as articles of offering to God. The Paśuis not allowed even to touch or to have a sight of those things.24The method prescribed for the Vira or the Kaulais beset with danger. It is more risky than the holding of a snake or clasping round the neck of a tiger. The DivyaSādhaka need not undergo the trials that the Virahas to pass through and is allowed to take substitutes of all material things in his process of worship. He does not require the help of external objects for rousing his spiritual sentiments, and the meditative mood emerges spontaneously in him. Apart from this class division of the Sadhakas, the Tantras also mention different kinds of Acaras, to be followed and practised by the different classes of Sädhakas at different stages of their development. The vedacara, which forms the first and the lowest stage, and which comprises the vedic rites that are to be practised strictly, is very different from the kauläcāra, which forms the highest stage, and which does away with all rules and injunctions of the Sastras. For the kaula, there is neither any vidhinor any nilledha, neither merit nor demerit, neither virtue nor sin. Each class of sādhakas must follow its own line of development according to its capacities and attainments, and the neglect of this is very often the source of dangerous consequences. OWhat is meat for one is poison to anotherO, although a trite saying, is most true in the sphere of spiritual discipline. When we remember how the Tantra recognises three distinct types of Sadhakas according to their respective capacities and temperaments (adhikāra), and also how it combines within itself Karma, Bhakti and J-ana, and follows the philosophy of the Upani lads, the Karma of the Vedas, and the Upāsanāof the

24. Anāghreyal anālokyamasp śya-cāpyapeyakam, Madya mā_sa Kulār ava, II, 124. paśūnāntu kaulikānā mahāphalam.

Purallas , and also how it shows us the entire course of spiritual discipline beginning with the lowest physiological processes and ending with the sublime philosophical intuition, we ought to have no hesitation in declaring that the Tantras sum up all the important features and elements of Hindu Sādhanā.

15

The Different Stages of Sadhana and the Synthesis of Its Different Forms in the Bhagavadgīta

The Gīta is the richest treasure amongst the spiritual possessions of the Hindus. It is a beautiful synthesis of all the divergent lines of thought and practice that have found a permanent footing in the history of the cultural development of the Hindus. The Gita has been described as the essence of the Upanilads, but its real description ought to be much more comprehensive. It is theScripture of the Hindus which has remarkably stood above all partisan controversies and one- sided extremes and, at the same time, has not fought shy of any difficult problem and controversial matter, but has shown a wonderfully transcendent spirit of synthesis and compromise. The problems that form the important topics of the Gita reveal how difficult a situation had to be tackled and solved by its author. The old Vedic religion no longer satisfied the aspirations of people after the lofty ideal preached by the Upanilads. The high abstract ideal, the Nirgu laBrahman of the Upanil ads, also could no longer be very well grasped and realised or followed by the average run of people, who had fallen much below the level of attainment of the golden age of the Upani lads. The controversy as to the

249

superiority of nirgulaand nirākāra upāsanā(worship of the abstract Impersonal Absolute) over sagul laand sākāra upāsanā(worship of the Concrete Personal God) or otherwise, the contro-versy, in other words, as to the respective merits of the ideals of J-āna-mārga and Bhakti- mārga respectively, seems to have been no less prominent at the time of the Bhagavadgita than it is now. The Mima sa view of the obligatoriness of Karma could not be wholly supported; the Upanilad view of the abandonment of all Karma, on the other hand, could not be also recommended. The worship of many gods and goddesses inculcated in the Puralas had come into vogue, and that had to be reconciled with the monotheistic worship of the one Supreme God. It

was no easy task to harmonise and reconcile Polytheism and Monotheism, Karma and Karma-less J-ana, Abstract Monism and Concrete Theism, Yoga and Bhakti, Sa khya and Pūrva-Mīmā_sā, the Puralas and the Upani ads. And the synthesis and reconciliation that have been effected are deep and penetrating, and no mere cheap and superficial aggregation of inherently conflicting dogmas and theories. The solution of the different problems that has been offered by the Gītā is the presentation of a higher category, a synthesis from a broader angle of vision, which includes within itself all the partial views as its different aspects and thus removes their contradiction and conflict.

In the Gita we can find Karma, Yoga, J-ana and Bhakti, in fact, all the different forms of Sadhana that are current; but we should not approach the Gita in order merely to find in it an account of one or other of those various forms of discipline, as is done by the sectarian commentators of old, and even by such modern interpreters like the late Lokamānya Tilaka who, while professing to be entirely non- sectarian, finds in the Gita the teaching of the cult of Karma chiefly. The Gīta is pre-eminently the scripture of synthesis, and to force on it sectarian views seems to be an entire misinterpretation of its spirit. It is only when we want to learn how Karma, Yoga, J-ana and Bhakti, all may converge and be utilised towards the attainment of spiritual consummation, that we approach the Gita in the most reverential spirit as our sole saviour and guide. If we want, on the other hand, to be partisans of one school or another, there is no dearth of scriptures coming to our help,Ñthe entire Mīmā Isā, Sa hitās, Brāhma as and Smltis for Karma; the Upanilads, Brahmasūtras and the inexhaustible store of Vedantic literature for J-ana; the Pural las and the Tantras, really innumerable, the Nārada and the Sā lilya Sutras, the innumerable works of the four schools of Vailavas and the Bengal Gosvāmins for Bhakti; the Pāta-jala-Sūtras, with commentaries, and countless other literature for Yoga. After having attempted a treatment of these various forms of Sādhana separately in the preceding chapters, we shall seek light, in these closing pages of our work, from the most illuminating and the most sacred scripture of the highest synthesis, the unique achievement of the Hindus in the sphere of Sādhanā or spiritual realisation, in that spirit of synthesis and harmony that mark the very essence of the ODivine Song.Ó

The central teaching of the Gīta is to attain Yoga and be a Yogin (VI, 46 and VIII, 27). The Yogin is better than the j-ānin, the karminand the tapasvinÑthe wise, the active and the ascetic. The Yogahere spoken of is not the Yogaof Pata-jali or Yogain any technical sense, but it indicates the union with the Divine, or what the Gītā mentions as

Brähmicconsciousness, that resting and living in the Divine, in the Absolute, which is the sum and substance of spiritual realisation. The Yukta, the Bhakta, the Sthita-praj-a, the Gulātīta, all imply a permanent resting in and union with the Divine, and these are the ideals which the Gita wants us to realise. This Yoga leads to final emancipation (mok a) and nirvā aand eternal bliss (śānti), and to attain this yogais the end of all spiritual discipline. The Gīta itself sums up its teachings in its last utterance, OBecome me-minded, devoted to me, to me do sacrifice and adoration; infallibly thou shalt come to me, for dear to me art thou. Abandoning all laws of conduct, seek refuge in Me alone. I will release thee from all sin; do not grieve.Ó Here the Lord is not telling us anything different from what He has said throughout the eighteen chapters of the Gīta, and is not over- emphasising Bhakti, as many think, to the detriment of J-ana and Karma, but is merely summing up, for the benefit of Arjuna through infinite kindness towards him, the elaborate discussions incorporated in the Gita. The OComing to MeO or to God, constant living in the God-state or Brähmic consciousness, is the end to be achieved, and to that, the Memindedness,Ó the God-mindedness, devotion to God, are the means. In this śloka, Śri K la clearly tells us that J-ana (me- mindedness), Bhakti (devotion), the Karma (sacrifice and adoration) are all means to the same end and are not independent of one another, but mutually supplement each other in achieving the goal. Not only is this śloka told twice, once in the Ninth and again in the Eighteenth chapter, in order to show its importance, but its substance is again given in the next śloka (and in the eighth verse of Chapter XII), where Śri KIIIa exhorts Arjuna to take refuge in God alone. To be always in God-consciousness and to act from God-consciousness would represent all that the Gita teaches us.

It is generally believed that the first Six chapters of the Bhagavadgītā deal with Karma, the second six chapters deal with Bhakti, and the last six deal with J-āna. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī emphasised this division and remarked that as Karma and J-ana were remote from each other, one had been placed first and the other last, and Bhakti, being intermediate between the two and helpful to both, had been placed in the middle. Although the division implies much ingenuity of thought, it is not to be taken strictly; the fourth and the fifth chapters, for example, tell us much about J-äna; the Eighteenth chapter summarises all that is important in Karma, Bhakti and J-ana; and the main topics of all the three are introduced and discussed in brief in the second chapter. And, moreover, although emphasis is to be found in places on Karma, in other places on Bhakti and in others, again, on J-āna, in the Gītā itself, the supreme end cannot but be, as we have

indicated before, the reconciliation of all these three. The Gītā tells us clearly that the three ought to be regarded not as divergent paths leading to different goals but as disciplines suiting different stages of development and converging towards the same end.

In the eighteenth chapter, the crowning achievement of synthesis, we find the proper places assigned to Karma, Bhakti and J-ana. By the performance of respective duties assigned to each man, people attain success and perfection, through the removal of sins and obstacles. Karma thus prepares the vehicle and brings fitness for the attainment of truth by making persons thoroughly detached, selfrestrained and desireless.1This is the first step in the ladder of spiritual realisation, where the Sadhaka enjoys the bliss of freedom and liberation (mukti). The freedom from the yoke of desires and impulses, the feeling of mastery over passions and prejudices, and the rising above all attachment and subordination, yield a sense of expansion which, being tasted for the first time and in contrast with the previous stage of contraction and bondage, seems to be the highest stage of liberation that one can aspire after. This stage,

1. XVIII, 45 and 49.

therefore, is also described as siddhior perfection in the Gīta.2But, this is far short of the ideal, the stage of consummation. After the siddhior fitness attained through Karma, comes Sā khya-j-āna when one finds the self to be above all sorrows and desires, to be always blissful, transcending all attractions and repulsions, and the same in all. This is Brahmabhūtabhāvaor the stage of being Brahman or the Infinite. All finitude and limitation are transcended, and the Sādhaka not only catches a glimpse of the Infinite, but becomes part and parcel, nay, the perfect counterpart of the Infinite. The Brahmabhūtastage is identical with what the Bhaktivādins call Para Bhakti.3This is what is represented by the Rādhātattva. Rādhā is the Mahābhāva, the infinite counterpart, in and through which alone the Infinite Lord can manifest Himself. The full display, the consummate sport of the Infinite, can only take place in an infinite partner. Only the Infinite can be the playmate of the Infinite. And thus Rādhā and KIIDa, Sakti and Siva, both being infinite, coalesce into one another and together form the Absolute. In this stage of Para Bhaktior Brahmabhūtabhāvaalone, the state, in other words, of being the infinite counterpart and partner of the Absolute, can one truly appreciate the Absolute, can see It as It is in Itself; and, this acquaintance and appreciation obliterate all barriers between the Knower and the Known and perform the coalescence of both.4

In the state of Para Bhakti or what is otherwise described as Brahmabhūtabhāva, there is the perception of equality of all things. There is infinite expansion of the Sädhaka, and the differences and inequalities of finite things lose themselves in the Infinite. But still there are, as it were, two infinitesÑthe knower and the known, the sadhakaand the IDa, the bhaktaand the Bhagavan. In the next stage, there is complete merging of the two and the two coalesce completely into One.

It is to be noted carefully that the Para Bhakti, (supreme devotion) spoken of above, is not anything different from J-āna, but is only a stage of the same just below the highest. It represents sama- darśana(perception of equality) which is just below advaitadarśana(perception of oneness). Karma removes all obstacles and produces fitness for the attainment of Bhakti and J-āna. The Bhakti stage is the stage of attraction and deep attachment towards the

2. XVIII, 45. 3. XVIII, 54. 4. XVIII, 55.

Absolute. It is the indispensable preliminary to all j-āna or anubhava. Unless one is supremely attached to an object, so that nothing else even slightly attracts him and the entire undivided attention of the mind falls upon the same, the secret about the object is not revealed. J-āna is realisation (anubhava) that is identical with complete merging of the subject and the object, towards which the attraction involved in Bhakti was approaching. Karma collects, Bhakti attracts, and J-āna realises. Karma removes barriers and prepares opportunities for connection, Bhakti effects the connection, and J-āna brings about complete unification.

As regards the different lines of Sadhana, it seems that the Bhagavadgītā clearly recognises two alternative routes of Bhakti and J-āna, and is at great pains to show that both are equally efficacious in leading to the goal.5The line of Bhaktiis easier than that of J-āna, but both unmistakably lead to the realisation and attainment of God. In the tenth verse of the thirteenth chapter, while enumerating the means of attaining supreme realisation (j-āna), Śrī Bhagavān speaks of ceaseless devotion towards Him also as an important means, and by using the word ÔcaOÑ(mayi cananyayogena bhaktiravyabhicārilī), perhaps intends it to be taken as an alternative to the line of Sā khya discrimination which he had been discussing. In the fourteenth chapter, again, while enumerating the marks and characteristics of the gulātīta, Śrī K la uses almost the very same words with a

ÔcaÕÑ(mā-ca yaÕvyabhicāre a bhaktiyogena sevate),6 clearly indicating the Bhakti line of Sādhanā to be as helpful as the line of Sā khya J-āna. The same alternative is also perhaps indicated in XVIII, 56, and again, in XII, 6, by using the words ÔapiÕ and ÔtuÕ respectively. And the reason why both lead to the same goal is also stated in the last verse of the fourteenth chapter, where Śri KD00a says that OHe is the support of Brahman, of eternal and everlasting supreme Bliss which is identical with MokDa.Ó The Brahman of the Śālkara Vedānta, which is not definitely referred to anywhere in the Gita, is neither higher nor lower than its Puru ottama. The Puru lottama certainly transcends the category of Sā Ikhya AkLara Puru la which excludes Prak ti, but cannot be supposed to be transcending Vedäntic Brahman which excludes nothing. The Puru lottama is a beautiful synthesis of the Sal khya PuruLa, of the nirguo gu iof the Upani ads, and of the Concrete

5. XII, 4 and V, 5. 6. XIV, 26.

Personal God of the Pural las, and stands really unique. Through this category of the PuruLottama, the Gīta has been able to reconcile Bhakti and J-ana. The Purul lottama serves well as the Concrete Personal God of the Bhaktivadins, on the one hand; it is as transcendent as the Absolute NirgulaBrahman of the Upani ads, on the other. He is above all oppositions and transcends all contradictions, and like the Brahman of the Vedanta, is above all staticity and dynamicity, above inertness and activity, as much above the inert, immobile, static Sā Ikhya Purul la as above the flowing, mobile Prakl ti. The PuruLottama, on the one hand, accepts the offerings made by the devotee of leaves and flowers, of fruits and water,7 supplies the devotee with all that he wants, releases him from all bondage and sin and suffering;8on the other hand, He is not at all concerned in the affairs of this universe, is neither friendly nor inimical to anybody,9does create neither the actions nor the agency of people.10All beings reside in the Purul lottama and yet they reside not in Him.11The Puru ottama supports the three worlds, is the supreme Lord of all beings, directs all beings residing in their hearts,12and yet does nothing, remaining like one indifferent, everything being done by PrakIti.13The Vedantist can find in the Puru ottama everything of his Brahman, the two catagories being equally transcendent and absolute, and yielding the highest synthesis, the Ônirdo la samam,Ô demanded by reason. But whereas the Vedantic Brahman is merely Impersonal and Abstract, the Puru ottama is the Concrete representation of the same in order to satisfy the demands of Bhakti. But this Concrete Personal God, the Purul ottama, is no mere small divinity or limited

God worshipped ordinarily by common people, but He is the Supreme Lord, the One Absolute without a second, the Source, Sustainer and the Destroyer of all things. The Gita really performs a wonderful task and offers us a synthesis of the Concrete and the Abstract, of the Personal and the impersonal, the Sagu aand the Nirgu la, of Bhakti and J-ana,Ña synthesis which is as profound as instructive, as illuminating as

7. IX, 26. 8. XVIII, 66 and XII, 7. 9. IX, 29. 10. V, 14. 11. IX, 4 and 5. 12. IX, 18. 13. XIII, 29 and III, 27.

useful. Just as the Gīta is not the Scripture of the false j-ānin, who cannot find a place in his mental horizon for the bhakta, nor of the narrow bhakta, who shudders at the name of vicāraand vairagya, so also the Purul ottama, or the Ideal that the Gīta offers us, is neither the Brahman of the narrow, pseudo-Vedantist, falsely supposed to be aloof and different from everything of the universe, nor the limited Personal God, the K a or ViLLu of the narrow-visioned false Bhakta.

The line of Karma is not a separate line in the Gītā. Bhakti and Karma both are included in Yoga. But this Yoga may be of two kinds. In the sixth chapter, mainly Päta-jala-Yoga is discussed. After that is finished, in the first verse of the seventh chapter, Śri KIDa says, ÒListen now to that mode of knowing me in my entirety through practising yogaunder my support and with full attachment to me.Ó Here Śri KILa is clearly introducing a new method, another new sub-division of Yoga, something different from what he had been discussing in the sixth chapter. This is Bhakti-Yoga, which Pata-jali also refers to as an alternative means of attaining samādhi in his sūtra, Īśvarapral lidhānād vãÕ, Ôor through meditation on GodÕ, but which he leaves without any further elaboration. The using of the term ÔsamagramÕ (in my entirety) also indicates that while Pāta-jalaYoga can give us only partial attainment, Bhakti-Yoga can yield us perfection. No such distinction of Bhakti and J-ana as to the nature of attainment is made anywhere.

Karma is prescribed for one who is trying to ascend the path of yoga; cessation from Karma is helpful to one who has already realised yoga. Men cannot realise God owing to their ignorance and sin arising from desires and aversions. When, however, their sins are destroyed through the performance of virtuous deeds, then people worship God

with firm determination and are saved.14Actions done in the spirit of sacrifice, actions performed from God-consciousness, that is to say, God-centred actions, or actions done being firmly fixed in yoga, alone may be regarded as really virtuous deeds that lead to emancipation, because all other actions are sources of further bondage. Sacrifices purify men, and the partakers of the remnants of the sacrificial offerings reach the eternal Brahman.15All karma leads to J-anaand the utility of karmas lies in their being the means to the attainment of J- ana, which is identical with mok aor emancipation.

14. VII, 27 and 28. 15. IV, 30.

Karma, performed desirelessly and selflessly, leads to eternal peace, because desires are the only sources of bondage. This is the secret of karma (karmarahasya). The same karma which, being ego-centred, binds us, becomes the means of our emancipation, being performed God-centred. It is our ignorance, selfishness, and desires and impulses that bind us, and, it is illumination, knowledge, unselfishness and desirelessness that liberate us. It is the motive and the manner of the action that are important, not the action which is indifferent in itself. The Gīta accepts the Mīmā Isa view that karmas are the means of attaining dharmaand thus also of mok a, and holds that the abandonment of karma is not necessary for the attainment of j-āna. But the karmas are to be performed without attachment and without desire for their fruits. The Gīta is as relentless in its rejection of works performed with desire (sakāma karma) as it is all-praise for desireless works (nil kāma karma). The Mīmāl Isā ideal of sakāma karmacan never yield us mok la(true liberation) or the highest perfection attaining which no man ever returneth into worldly existence. Persons, following the injunctions of the Vedas and performing sacrifices as prescribed by them, attain heaven and enjoy the heavenly blessings as the result of those meritorious works, but on the expiry of the period of enjoyment allotted to the meritorious deeds, again enter into worldly existence, and thus those who desire fruits of their actions cannot be free from births and deaths.16Desires for small things hinder the emergence of true knowledge; for, the self, being occupied with those insignificant desires, finds no leisure for knowing itself.17The man who is at the mercy of desires is led astray and can never attain bliss (santi), but that man alone who is firm and fixed, and in whom all desires enter as the waters enter the unruffled and constant ocean without effecting any change, attains happiness and bliss.18ÒKarma is far inferior to Buddhi-Yoga; therefore, perform all works being fixed in Buddhi, because works done from desire make men narrow-visioned and poor.Ó19He who performs all works, being

fixed in Buddhi or being completely desireless, relinquishes all good and evil, and thus frees himself from the bonds of karma.20

16. IX, 20 and 21. 17. VII, 20. 18. II, 70. 19. II, 49. 20. II, 50, III, 9.

The Gita beautifully reconciles the Mimal sa view of compulsory performance of works with the Upanil ad view of the renunciation of works by placing itself at a transcendent standpoint from which karma and tyāga(renunciation) acquire new meanings altogether. Real tyāga(renunciation), according to the Gītā, is renunciation of desires; and the abandonment of works (karmatyäga), taught by the Upanilladas, ought to be interpreted as renunciation of desire for the fruits of the actions, and not as cessation from all work.21This renunciation of desire and attachment is sāttvika tyāga, a renunciation which is identical with reconciliation, which is not so much a giving up of anything as different and foreign as a taking in of everything as friendly and allied, the absence of desire and attachment producing the harmony through the removal of all foreignness and making the reconciliation possible. This is the secret underlying tyāga, and here we find the true spirit of renunciation. Renunciation is prescribed for the individual for the realisation of his affinity with other individuals and things of the universe. Sāttvika tyāgathus implies the forsaking of impulses and desires which separate us from others and truly bind us, and does not involve abandonment of deeds which purify and expand our vision and thereby show our affinity, if not also identity, with others. Other forms of tyāga, viz. rājasa and tāmasa tyāgaor the abandonment of actions through indiscrimination and idleness, or from the sense of pain attending actions, do not reconcile the agent with, but only alienate him from, the action. Tyāgaor renunciation always expands and, when real, must help to widen up the vision of one who renounces, and does never imply any giving up or loss which may produce narrowness and contraction. Renunciation implies a rising above and a real transcendence over the things that are renounced and, in no case, does it signify any negation or opposition. This really transcendent character of tyāgais indicated in the Gītā after it has defined the different forms of tyaga. OThe renouncer, saturated with sattva, fixed in intelligence, and free from all doubts, does neither refuse the unpleasant karma nor welcome the pleasant.22 Performance of action is not opposed to ÔtyāgaÕ or renunciation, but it is āsaktior attachment that opposes itself to tyägawhich is identical with anāsakti(non-attachment).

21. XVIII, 2 and 11. 22. XVIII, 10.

From the standpoint of Salkhya J-ana or higher knowledge, again, all karmais akarma, because the Self never does anything. The PrakLti is the agent, the Purula being indifferent to all her actions. Even while actions are being performed by the tattvaj-änin, he knows that he is not doing anything.23A person who identifies his Self with his mind and body thinks that he performs actions, and becomes bound by those actions through his ignorance and indiscrimination; but he who knows his Self and realises its really transcendent character, perceives that his Self is touched by no action and that it really performs none. Thus the Gita, while prescribing karma in no ambiguous terms24also retains the Upani ad view of akarmaas its ideal. All works, done without desire and attachment, purify and lead to the attainment of the Supreme, and thus become akarma, being sources of liberation, and not of bondage as all karmas generally are. From the standpoint of the transcendent Puru la or the Self also, all karmas are at bottom always akarma. This is the synthesis of the Karmakalla and the J- anakalLa of the Vedas, of the Mīma sa and the Vedanta, of karmaand akarma, offered by the Gita. The apparent contradiction betweenkarmaand akarmareconciles itself either if we rise up to Sālkhya j-āna, to that transcendent wisdom when outward cessation from work (akarma) is deemed as work or karma (there being internal processes), and work (karma) becomes regarded as absence of work or akarma(not being performed by the Self); or, if works are performed without desire and attachment from a sense of duty alone. It is to be noted that this desirelessness comes not from the realisation of the transcendent self but through Karma-Yoga or Buddhi-Yoga, with a view to be free from virtue and vice and thus to attain liberation.

We have attempted to show how Karma, Bhakti and J-āna may be regarded as three different stages in the course of discipline or Sādhanā which the individual Sadhaka passes through. We have seen, in other words, how every Sädhaka has the Karma stage, the Bhakti stage and the J-ana stage in his course of Sādhana. It is to be remembered that in this attempt we have used the terms Bhakti and J-äna, not in their technical sense, but in their broad sense, meaning, by the former, a leaning or an attraction and, by the latter, realisation or anubhavain general. It will not be out of place now to attempt to nd 9. 23. V, 8 and 9. 24. III, 8, 19.

find out the common elements that may be present in the different forms of Sädhana when they are taken as independent methods of realisation.

The regulation and control of the instinct and impulses, of the movements of the body and the sense-organs, are regarded as the indispensable first step in all the forms of Sādhana. The method of control is different in the different forms. The Gīta advocates the higher method, and teaches us that the sense-organs are to be controlled with the help of the mind.25It is by fully realising the terrible consequences and the utter harmfulness of the wayward, unregulated movement of the sense-organs that the control is to be effected gradually. Mere forceful suppression of them is of no permanent value. The best and the most effective method of being rid of them is to concentrate oneself wholly on God and to love God as the highest object of oneOs affection and devotion. The word Òmatparal IÓ is used in many ślokas26to indicate this attitude of the mind. It is by getting rid of the attachment belonging to their objects that the sense-organs can be controlled permanently; merely stopping their functions forcibly for some time or removing the objects from their range of operation cannot secure the desired control. There must be an inward vision or at least a glimpse of the Infinite which generates a spontaneous attraction towards the Absolute, before there can be complete ignoring or neglect of all finite objects towards which the sense-organs are drawn.

The next step is the control of the mind. Here also it is the Buddhi, that is, the principle that is higher than the mind, that must come to our help. The elements that are responsible for the impurities of the mind are rajasand tamas; the former is responsible for distraction (viklepa) or want of concentration and hence also, for the desires and impulses that toss the mind hither and thither; and, the latter is responsible for its dullness, inertia and ignorance. It is through the preponderance of the sattvaelement that rajasand tamas elements are, at first, subordinated (abhibhūta) and, then, altogether suppressed (līna). The intensity and supremacy of the sattvaelement are identical with the development and perfection of the Buddhi, and it is through this highest perfection of the Buddhi that the impurities of the mind can wholly be got rid of. When both the rajasand the tamas, both the distracting and the stupefying elements, completely

25. III, 7 and 41. 26. II, XII, 6. vi, 14.

disappear, one feels a very soothing and, at the same time, an exhilirating grace or transparency of the intellect (prasāda). The mind now gets rid of its dullness and inertia and feels itself very fit; at the same time, its attention is not dispersed or scattered due to the distracting activity of the rajaselement. It thus enjoys a harmonious

equipoise, a healthy state of spontaneous bliss, and attains a transparency or clearness that is fit for revealing the highest truth. This feeling of prasadais a marked stage of realisation in all the forms of Sādhana. Its constituents are an element of unbounded happiness and a sense of uncommon luminosity of the intellect. These two, happiness and illumination, sukhaand prakāśa, are the characteristics of the sattva gu a also. The elements, viz. rajasand tamas, that were responsible for misery and stupefaction, now being completely absent, the sattvaelement manifests itself entire and unresisted, in both of its aspects. The Gīta clearly tells us that Othe person who is self- controlled and whose mind and sense-organs deal with objects, being completely free from the feelings of attraction and repulsion, attains prasāda. As soon as prasāda is attained, all misery disappears, and the Buddhi becomes firmly concentrated and fixed.Ó27In the Yoga sūtras, Pata-jali also tells us that this prasāda is gained when one becomes an adept in nirvicāra samādhi. The Bhaktiśāstras describe this stage as the śānta avasthā, or rather, as the śāntabhāva. The Gītā uses the words,28śāntarajasamand akalmal am, to indicate the absence of the rajasand the tamas elements respectively. The Bhagavata Pulāla says,29Owhen one becomes fixed in sattva, then one attains prasada.Ó The preponderance of the sattvaelement begins to manifest itself from the stage of dhāra ā(fixation) in the Pātanjala Yoga and gains its highest intensity in nirvicāra samādhi. In the J-ānamārga, this prasādaelement is to be noticed both in its vicāraor mananaand vairāgya. The vicarashows the transparency of the intellect, and the vairāgyashows the happiness that is felt within and which makes all pleasures coming from worldly objects appear altogether worthless. In every form of Sädhana, the end is to intensify the sattvaelement and to gradually eliminate the rajasand the tamaselements. And, as such, this feeling of prasāda, which is merely a manifestation of the intensity of the sattvaelement, and involves the corresponding

27. II, 64 and 65. 28. VI, 27. 29. Sthital sattve prasīdati.

elimination of the opposing rajasand tamaselements, is common to all the different forms of Hindu Sadhana. This is the common resting place of the different paths, and here, the realisation of the different Sādhakas is found to be identical.

The process of purification, being thus completed, the Sadhaka now makes rapid progress. The next stage is the stage of Dhyāna. There is now a spontaneous inward turn that is constantly felt by the mind. This is what the Gīta describes as dhyānayogaparo nityamand

adhyātmaj-ānanityatvam. At this stage all attachment for external objects disappears, and one longs for solitude and retirement. The cittanow becomes pratyakprava a, that is to say, the mind now gravitates and has its natural tendency towards the Self. This corresponds to the vividi lā sannyāsastage of the J-ānamārga. The Sadhaka feels that all bodily actions act as impediments or obstacles, inasmuch as they interfere with the spontaneous meditation (dhyāna) that is constantly going on in the mind. He renounces all prescribed and routine duties, because he finds that they no longer help the emergence of j-ānafor which they are intended. Dhyāna or meditation is the immediate precursor to j-āna, and anything that obstructs dhyānashould be renounced by one who desires j-āna. In the Yoga method, this stage is plainly designated as the stage of dhyāna, where the mind has to make no effort for concentrating itself on the object, but where, due to the previous repeated efforts at concentration, the mind has acquired a spontaneity in that direction. In the Bhaktiśāstras, this is described as dhruvā sm tiwhich is nothing but spontaneous memory and meditation. What the Bhaktivādins describe as the dāsya, sakhya, vātsalyaand madhura bhāvas are nothing but the manifestation of this dhyänastage at different intensities. There is not merely the state of blissful prasāda or śānti, resulting from the removal of the disturbing elements (anarthaniv_tti); but, now a distinctly positive turn or an inward current is felt. This also is nothing but the working of the sattva elementin its highest intensity and absolutely unalloyed purity. At this stage, the Buddhi acquires the most intense state of concentration, and this is the highest development and expansion that the Buddhi can reach. The Samādhistate of Pata-jali is, in essence, nothing but a prolongation or an extension of this stage. This corresponds to the nididhyāsanastage of J-ana, and is also a very marked stage of realisation or anubhūti. The spontaneous withdrawal of the mind that necessarily stops all its outward activities, the positive discomfort that is felt in the company of men and things causing the least distraction, are experiences that are had by every Sādhaka at a particular stage, whatever may be his particular line of Sādhanā. The quietude that is felt at this stage is inconsistent with activity or movement of any sort. There is a relation of opposition or antagonism between this restful stage of the mind and the stage of its restless action; the former can appear only by overcoming or resisting the latter, but the two cannot work simultaneously.

The final stage is the stage of transcendence. The Sdhaka now crosses beyond the realm of the gu as altogethe and feels or enjoys the freedom that is absolute in the fullest sense of the term. All distinctions are due to and created by the gul las, and they hold good

only in the world constituted of these gu as. At the transcendent heights which the Sadhaka now climbs, the gulashave no scope at all and hence, the distinctions that are all created by them disappear totally. The distinction between the external and the internal, between work and cessation from work, between restless distraction and quiet meditation, ceases to appear as anything real. It is the characteristic of the gullasthat no one of them can attain predominance without overcoming and resisting the others. Hence, at the previous stage, viz. the stage of Dhyāna, the working of therajas and the tamaselements had to be stopped entirely in order that the sattvaelement could work at its highest intensity. But, at this stage of transcendence, the absence of this relation of antagonism amongst the gu lasforms the most prominent characteristic. This is described in the Gītā as the nistraigul lyaor the gul lātītastage. In answer to the question of Arjuna as to how to mark out the guätitaor the person who has transcended the gulas, the Lord says,30OHe who neither resents the presence of illumination, action and indiscrimination (these three being the work of sattva, rajasand tamasrespectively), nor welcomes their absence, is known as the gulatita.Ó The gulas go on doing their work of themselves. He does not identify himself with any or all of these gul las, because he has realised the Self that is beyond them, and consequently, he remains altogether indifferent to and is not touched at all by the working of the gul las. The transcendent Self is not in a relation of opposition with any of the gul las, and hence, the gul lātīta, who has realised the Self and who

30. XIV, 22.

always lives and moves in that transcendent sphere, does not come into conflict with the working of the gu las. The Self, on the other hand, that identifies itself with a particular gul laat a particular time finds the working of the other gu lasclashing with the former, for the time being. The gu ātitahas not to stop his outward activities in order to have the inner vision. His tattvaj-anaor intuition never leaves him, and nothing,Ñneither the con-sciousness of any outward object nor the performance of any elaborate process of action,Ncan form any impediment or opposition to it. This, the author of the Vārtikapoints out, is the distinction between the meditator (dhyat) and the possessor of transcendent knowledge (tattvaj-änin).31If the presence of an alien object or a process interferes with and disturbs the knowledge, then it is to be understood as meditation and not as tattvaj-āna. It is meditation which, as it implies the continuous flow of identical or at least similar ideas, comes into conflict with the presence of dissimilar or opposite ideas; because, here the distinction between ÔsimilarÕ and Ôdissimilar,Õ between sajātīyaand vijātīya,

still remains. But in tattvaj-āna, there is no such distinction between sajātīyaand vijātīya, because duality, which is the ground of all conflict, the source of all opposition, has disappeared completely.

In the Yoga Sūtras of Pata-jali, we find that in the stage of Kaivalya, the gu asfind their function fulfilled and they cease to have any further authority and influence. This is attained in the mature state of nirvikalpa samādhi. The means to overcome the authority of the gulasis to intensify the sattvaelement and to persist long in the Samādhistate that comes as the result of the preponderance and purification of the Sattva element. This is the sadhanathat is everywhere adopted. The transcendence comes not by neglecting or ignoring the gulasbut by purifying them. It is the preponderance of the Sattvaelement that overcomes rajas andtamas, and it is throughthis Sattvathat one can transcend even the Sattva element. The Bhaktivādins speak of nirgu āand kevalāBhakti meaning by it the stage of transcendence. At the highest stage of realisation, the Lord is seen not merely within, in meditation (dhyāna), but is also noticed everywhere in the external world. OThe devotee does not become conscious of material objects when he looks at them, but finds God in every object to which his eyes are

31. Na buddhil mardayan d lo gha latattvasya veditā, Upam Idnati ced buddhil dhyātāsau na tu tattvavit.

directed.Ó God is no longer sought as something different from the universe, but is found everywhere in the universe. What, at the previous stage of his realisation, seemed to be like blasphemy to the bhakta(devotee), now appears to be not only true but to be the highest truth.

If, at the pre-Sadhana stage, the mind gravitated towards worldly objects (vi aya), the centre of gravitation changes, at the dhyānastage, and the mind feels a spontaneous, natural tendency of movement towards the Self, which tendency is described as pratyakprava atā. In the stage of transcendence, however, there is absence of all such tendencies or leanings in any special direction. The Absolute is the same everywhere; It is present equallyand identicallyin this object as well as in that, here as well as there, to the right as to the left, to the north as to the south, to the east as to the west, upwards as well as downwards; or truly speaking, to the Omnipresent Absolute, these space and time divisions do not hold at all. When the Self is realised to be the Absolute, when all plurality is found to be unreal, when the Absolute Self is recognised to be the only reality, how can the distinctions presented by the manifold appearances of the universe

have any real meaning or ultimate significance? Now, rest and motion, staticity and dynamicity, inaction and action, and such other pairs of opposites which derive their meanings only as correlatives, cease to have any sense and significance. The meaning, that is derived from and grounded in duality, disappears with the perception of the illusoriness of the duality itself. Movement and absence of movement can have any meaning when there are at least twothings fromone of which it is possible to move tothe other. But if there is only one Single Being, there can be no movement; and, in the absence of movement, rest, which has all its meaning as contrasted with and in opposition to movement, also ceases to have any meaning. In the transcendent stage, there is neither any upward movement nor any downward motion, neither any progress nor any downfall. These are conceptions that are wholly inapplicable to the Absolute. At this stage, the Sādhaka passes beyond the realm of all coming and going, beyond the influence of all gravitation and levitation, and reaches the land of the Absolute whence there is no further return. This final stage of realisation that yields the feeling of fulfilment and consummation to the Sadhaka, is common to all the forms of Sadhana and, although there might be minor differences in the details of the realisation, there is hardly any doubt that the broad features of this stage, indicated above, are almost the same in them all.

The Gīta effects an impartial synthesis of the different forms of Sadhanā, and the truth underlying the seeming partiality towards Karma and Bhakti in some places is realised when we remember that after the intellectualism of the age of the Upani ads, it was necessary for the Gita to advocate the cause of Bhakti and Karma. The J- anamarga, being the accepted line of Sadhana in the Upani ad age, needed no special advocacy and support by the Gīta. The Upanilads had proclaimed the futility of Karma in yielding mok aor the summum bonum, and it was declared that tattva-j-anaalone was competent for the task. Karmas cannot but yield fruits, and the fruits of all actions, good or bad, only cause further bondage and can in no way lead to emancipation. Thus an opposition between j-āna and karma, one yielding mokl laor freedom, and the other producing bondage, became current in the age of the Gita. The Gita, being specially intended for reconciling all oppositions, took as its special mission the synthesis of J-āna and Karma. It was for the Gītā to advocate the cause of desireless worksÑ(nilkāma karma), and to show that those works did not produce any fruits and, as such, could not be sources of bondage. The physical performance of the action, involving physiological movements, is not in any way opposed to j-āna, the two being things of two altogether different levels. The Karma that results from

ignorance, the Karma that follows from desire implying indiscrimination, is contradictory to j-āna, because it is only ignorance that opposes itself to knowledge. Provided that tattva-j-āna is present, karmas may or may not be performed, without any gain or detriment. The j-änin gains nothing through action and loses nothing through inaction.32The teaching of the Gīta is that karma cannot clash with j-ana; in the first place, because the latter absolutely transcends the former, and a relationship of opposition is possible only between things of the same level; in the second place, because desireless works, (nilkāma karma), far from being sources of bondage, are infallible means of attaining liberation. All Karmas reach their fruition and culmination in knowledge (j-āna),33and karmas, by removing all obstacles and sins, prepare the ground for the attainment of knowledge. That is false knowledge

32. III, 18. 33. IV, 34.

or pseudo-relisation which opposes itself to action and demands cessation from karma. Genuine realisation or real tattva-j-āna synthesises all oppositions and is not opposed to anything. Desire and attachment must be transcended before there can be true realisation, because these cannot co-exist with knowledge. The physical performance of the karma, bereft of desire and attachment, is not only not contradictory to knowledge, but is rather definitely preparatory to it.

In the Gīta, the emphasis on Bhakti is no less prominent than the advocacy of Karma, and this also was perhaps needed after an age which had placed too much emphasis on the Impersonal Absolute of the Upani ads. It was necessary to proclaim in no ambiguous terms that the worship of and devotion to the Concrete Personal God could unmistakably lead to the realisation of the Supreme and the achievement of the highest and, and that there was no difference at bottom between the Nirgula Brahmanof the Upani ads and the Purulottamaor the Personal God. Bhakti is as sure a means as J-anato the attainment of the Highest, and is also the easier way of approaching the goal. Two things strike us in our perusal of the Gītā: (1) the repeated declaration that Bhakti can attain the Highest and that those who are attached to God are bestunited to the Godhead; and (2) that Karma should not be given up and may exist simultaneously with J-äna. The way in which these two views are supported clearly indicates that the Gita was defending and advocating specially the cause of Bhakti and Karma, both of which had been neglected in the Upanilad age. The Gītā was clearly fighting against the mistaken views that had sprung up, viz., (1) that the realisation of the Bhakti

form of Sadhana was inferior to that of the J-ana line; and (2) that Karma should be given up, being incompatible with J-āna.

The Gita points out the true interpretation of the famous Upanilad text, often quoted by the advocates of Intellectualism, OImmortality and emancipation are gained by knowing Him alone: there is no other means of liberation.Ó34The text is generally interpreted by the Intellectualists placing the emphasis on the term ÔknowingO. Which ÔknowingÕ they oppose to ÔfeelingÕ and ÔwillingÕÑBhakti and Karma. But this interpretation is hopelessly narrow and one-sided. The true interpretation perhaps ought to be by

34. Taveva viditvātim Ityumeti nānyal panthā vidyateÕyanāya.

the emphasis on the expression ÔHim alone, Ô tamevaÕ. The Gītā exclaims, ÒSeek refuge in Me alone, māmekam, resounding the Upani ad text ÔtamevaO. In another śloka, the Gīta uses the very same words tameva śara la gacchaÑÔseek refuge in Him aloneÕ. Herein lies the entire substance of the Gita and the Upani ads, in fact, of all literature dealing with spiritual realisation (MokLaśāstra). The realisation of the Supreme Person,Ñthe Source and the Sustainer, the Creator and the Destroyer,Ñis all that is necessary. To look always to the centre and not at the circumference, to the source and the primal cause and not at the derived effects, to the Infintie and not at the small things and concerns,Ñthat is God-realisation and residing in God-consciousness. This is the widest expansion man can reach and, at this stage, he really transcends the physical and the mental, the intellectual and the moral, the social and the merely religious points of view. The infinitude and limitlessness, the expansion and freedom, mark the prominent characteristics of spiritual realisation. It does not matter whether we call it realisation of God or of the Absolute, of the Personal or of the Impersonal, but if we miss the infinitude and expansion, then everything is lost. The Gita had anticipated the degeneration of the worship of the Personal God and had warned us against that contingency. The worship of the limited gods or smaller divinities, the Gīta tells us, produces fruits speedily; but, as it is not the worship of the Infinite God, who is the Lord of all the worlds, it is of temporary value. This is the danger of the worship of the Personal God,Ñit soon degenerates into the worship of a limited Power having a fixed shape and form. Although all divinities are forms of the One God and have their source in Him, still as they are limited manifestations and are worshipped as such without full knowledge of their Infinite substratum, emancipation from finitude cannot result from them. Thus, while the Gita strongly advocates the worship of the Personal God and regards the Bhakti line of Sadhana as the easiest

method of attaining the highest end, it, at the same time, repeatedly declares that as soon as the Personal God ceases to be regarded as the Infinite and becomes worshipped as a limited divinity, all hope of attaining liberation (mokLa) is lost.

The Gīta is as emphatic in condemning the abuses of the different forms of Sadhana as it is eager to advocate their merits. If the real j- aninhas been praised as GodOs very Self35and J-ānahas

35. VII, 18.

been described as the best purifier and destroyer of all sins, the false J-ānin has been equally condemned as the mistaken Sannyāsin, who gives up all works prescribed by the Vedas without attaining any genuine realisation,36and has been supposed as much inferior to one who has attained yogaor union with the Divine. If the Gītā praises renunciation (sannyäsa), it is renunciation of desire and attachment, and not the abandonment of works. It is as emphatic in its condemnation of false sannyāsa(renunciation), as eloquent in its praise of real sannyāsa(renunciation of desire) that is identical with J-āna. If the Gita praises Karma, it is only desireless works that are advocated to the utter condemnation of works done from desire and attachment. The J-ana that is identical with the realisation of the Supreme is regarded as superior to everything else; but, mere intellectual argumentation is condemned as a thing of much inferior worth. If the Gita supports the worship of the Personal God, who is Absolute and Infinite and the Lord of all the worlds, it condemns in unmistakable terms the worship of the smaller divinities.

36. VI, 1. Ajātavāda

Appendix

Gaulapāda, in his MāLukyakārikā, holds that the highest truth about creation is that the world has never been created at all. The world is an illusory appearance merely and has never come into real being. Just as the snake that is falsely perceived in place of the rope does not exist and has never come into being, so also the world that falsely appears as an existent real is merely an illusory superimposition on Brahman. There is, in the absolute sense, neither creation nor destruction of the universe. The creation of the world is like the creation of dream-images, illusions and hallucinations, which appearfor the time being without possessing any reality; and its destruction only implies the awakening from the dream-state and the consequent disappearance of dream-images or hallucinatory

experiences.

Bhūtaśuddhi

This is the process of purifying the elements (bhūtas) of which the body is composed. Brahman alone is absolutely pure, being thoroughly divisionless and changeless. The different elements of the gross body are to be realised in meditation as being dissolved into the subtle body (sūk ma śarīra) out of which it had evolved. The subtle body, again, is to be realised as dissolved in its source, viz. the casual body (kara a śarīra). The Mahator rather the PrakLti, which is the fundamental source of all bodies, has, again, to be supposed as dissolved in Brahman which is the support of Prak Iti or Māyā according to the Vedänta. This realisation of Brahman being the source of the elements of the body purifies the taints attached to those elements. This mental process of realising the processes of

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involution and evolution, of meditating that all the elements have their ultimate being in Brahman and have all proceeded from Brahman, and the corresponding physiological process of carrying the spiritual energy (ku lalinī śakti) from the lowest centre of the nervous system to the highest and the reverse process of carrying it from the highest to the lowest, constitute Bhūtaśuddhi. The process is both bhāvanātmaka (involving meditation) and kriyātmaka (involving physiological process). The sinful body is, first, to be dried up and, then, to be burnt altogether. To realise the Source, which is absolutely pure, is the means that is adopted to remove the taints that appear to have become attached to the elements proceeding from the Source. After the sins have been thus completely burnt up, the sādhaka is to realise in meditation that a stream of nectar flowing from the highest centre of the cerebrum bathes his entire system. The sādhaka thus attains godlike purity (deva-bhäva) and becomes fit for worshipping the deity.

Māt kānyāsa

By means of Nyāsathe sadhaka is to identify the different centres of his body with the different parts of the body of the deity. After the purification of the sinful body and the formation of the spiritual body, the sädhaka attempts to infuse his body with the spirit of the deity. The mat kāsare the fifty letters of the Sanskrit alphabet. The world proceeds from the Sound or the Logos comprising the māt kās. The nyāsaproduces the feeling of identity between the sādhakaand the

devatā(deity), and by means of māt Ikānyāsa, the sādhaka becomes devatämaya(filled up with the spirit of the deity). The physiological process consists in uttering particular letters of the Sanskrit alphabet and touching simultaneously some specified parts of the body.

Prārabdha Karma

Karma is generally divided into three groups: (1) Sa-cita, (2) Āgāmi, and (3) Prärabdha. The Sa-citakarma is the vast store of accumulated actions done in the past, the fruits of which have not yet been reaped. The Agamikarma is the action that will be done by the individual in the future. The Prarabdhakarma is the action that has begun to fructify, and the fruits whereof are being reaped in this life. It is a part of Sa-citakarma, inasmuch as this also is an action done in the past. But the difference between the two is ordinarily supposed to be that whereas the Sa-citakarma is not yet operative, the Prārabdhahas already begun to operate. According to the Hindus, the fruits of all karmas have to be reaped, and the character and circumstances of the life of the individual are determined by the previous karmas. The Prārabdhais the most effective of all karmas, because its consequences cannot be avoided in any way. Through religious discipline (sādhanā), it is possible to abstain from future actions (āgāmi karma) and to avoid the consequences of all accumulated actions that have not yet begun to operate, but the Prarabdhathat has already begun to fructify, must have to be reaped.

SamādhiÑLaya-pūrvaka and Bādha-pūrvaka

The samadhi or absorption that is gained through the processes of Pāta-jala-Yoga is known asLaya-samādhi. The yoginrealises that the effect is contained in the cause, and passes from the gross elements to the subtle ones, from the subtle elements to the ahalkāraor I- consciousness, from aha kārato the mahat, from the mahattattvato Māyā, and from Māyāto the Universal consciousness or Cit. There is a conscious transition from the many to the One, and the many are resolved into the One, as the effect is resolved into the cause. The effect is not realised to be unreal, but is found to have its substratum in the cause. In Badha-Samadhior the absorption that is gained through Vedäntic J-äna(transcendental knowledge), on the other hand, the One is realised to be the only real, and the many are found to be unreal appearances that were previously superimposed on the One. The ÔmanyÕ that were appearing as real become now contradicted (badhita) and are realised as wholly illusory, being existent neither in the present nor in the past and the future.

SannyāsaÑVividilā and Vidvat Vividi ā Sannyāsa

Sannyāsa is the fourth and the last āśramawhich the Hindu takes up after passing through the stages of a brahmacārin(unmarried student), a g hastha(married householder) and a vānaprastha (retired householder living in the forest). The Sannyāsinis free from the obligation of performing the compulsory observances (nitya karma) and other duties prescribed by the scriptures. When a man takes up the life of a Sannyäsin, being desirous of acquiring tattvaj- āna(knowledge of ultimate Reality), and gives up all rituals and observances prescribed by the scriptures, he is said to have the vividi aform of sannyāsa, the literal meaning of the term Ôvividilao being Ôdesire for knowledgeO. When the sadhaka feels a spontaneous learning towards meditation (dhyana) or even towards philosophical reflection (vicara), he finds that the performance of the routine duties interferes with his reflection and meditation; he, therefore, takes up Vividi a Sannyāl ain order to avoid the interference caused by the observance of the Sastric duties. According to Śa kara, only the Brahma as are entitled to take up this form of sannyasathat is prior tothe acquisition of knowledge.

Vidvat Sannyāsa

This is the form or stage of Sannyasa where actions of all description cease to be compulsory, and which the Sädhaka attains afterthe acquisition of knowledge (tattva-j-āna). The karmas that are necessary for the acquisition of knowledge cease to be of any use afterknowledge has been acquired. At the vividi ā stage, the sādhaka renounces the karmas with some purpose in view; at the vidvatstage, on the other hand, the sannyāsinbecomes perfectly desireless and does not renounce actions in order to fulfil any desire or purpose. Actions are no longer prompted by any desire, and they either cease altogether or are performed automatically and spontaneously being not motived or desired at all. According to Sa kara, any person who acquires tattvaj- anaalso attains this stage of Sannyāsa, and it is not confined, like the Vividil la Sannyasa, to the Brahmalas alone.

lalcakra

Lallcakra means the six centres of the body that are designated as Mūlādhāra, Svādhil Ihāna, Ma ipūra, Anāhata, Viśuddhaand Āj-ā. These are the dynamic centres where the spiritual energy becomes vitalised and finds special expression. All of these centres are placed in the Su lum a, or rather in the innermost nervous current of the

Su lum awhich is known as the citrili nali, and they form the ascending steps whereby the spiritual energy passes from the foot of the spine to the cerebrum. When an easy pathway is formed along the Suluml la through these centres, and the spiritual energy encounters no resistance in its movement upwards and downwards, then there is lalcakrabheda, which literally means the penetrating of the six cakras(mystical centres). The Mūlādhāra cakrais situated between the base of the sexual organ and the anus. It is regarded as the seat of the spiritual energy and hence is known as the ādhārapadma. These centres are metaphorically described as lotuses. The Mūlādhāra is supposed to be a four-petalled lotus. The Svādi hāna cakrais situated at the base of the sexual organ and is a six-petalled lotus. The Malipūrais situated in the region of the navel and contains ten petals. The Anähatais placed in the region of the heart and is a twelve- petalled lotus. The Viśuddha cakrais at the lower end of the throat and has sixteen petals. The Āj-a cakra is situated in the space between the two eyebrows and is a two-petalled lotus. In the cerebrum, there is the Sahasrāra Padma, the thousandpetalled lotus, which is as white as the silvery Full Moon, as bright as lightening, and as mild and serene as moonlight. This is the highest centre and the goal, and here the spiritual energy manifests itself in its full glory and splendour.

a sampatti

Dal sampatti means the six virtues, viz .: śama, dama, titik ā, uparati, samādhānaand śraddhā. Śamaimplies the control of the internal organ or the mind. The mind is controlled when it can concentrate itself always on the desired object. Damais the control of the external sense- organs,Ñboth the organs of knowledge as well as those of action. Titik ameans the power to endure the extremes of heat and cold, hunger and thirst, and such other painful sensations of the body. Śal kara takes it to mean the endurance of all sorts of misery and pain without any attempt at relieving them and without entertaining any anxious thought or sorrow for their continuance. Uparati implies the withdrawal of the mind from all external objects. Samādhānais the fixation of the mind on the Self (ätman) which is identical with the Absolute. Śraddhāimplies the confidence in the teachings of the Scriptures and of the spiritual guide (Guru).

Svagatabheda

Bheda or distinction is of three kinds: (1) Vijātīya, (2) Sajātīyaand (3) Svagata. The Vijātīya bhedais the distinction that exists between things belonging to different classes as, for example, the distinction between a tree and a cow. The Sajātīya bhedais the distinction that exists

between things belonging to the same class as, for example, the distinction between one man and another. The Svagata bheda is the distinction between the whole and the part of one and the same thing as, for example, the distinction between the tree and its branches, leaves, stem, etc.

Su um lā, Il lā andPi-galā

These three are the most prominent among the innumerable nālīs or nerves in the Nervous System. Of these, again, the Suluml la is the most important, being the point of harmony of the other two, and lying as it does in the middle. The Il lais on the left side, and the Pi- galais on the right. The I ais of a grey colour, while the Pi-galais red. The Sulum ais described as Brahmavartman or the pathway to Brahman. While the IL lãand the Pi-galãare outside the spine, the Sul lum lais situated within the spinal column and extends from the foot of the spine to the brain. While the Ia represents the Moon and the Pi-galathe Sun, the Sul lum la represents the Moon, the Sun and Fire, and is composed of all the three gu las(trigu lamayī). There is the vajril li nalī within the Su lumla, and the citri ilies within the vajrili.

UpāsanāÑAha graha, Pratīka andA-gavabaddha Aha graha Upāsanā

This is a form of worship where the Absolute is taken to be identical with the worshipperOs Self. Here the Self is supposed to be not merely a symbol or manifestation of the Absolute but is regarded as the very Absolute itself. Of course, the realisation of the identity of the Absolute and the Self cannot be had when the worshipper engages himself in the process of worship (upāsanā), because the realisation of such identity makes all processes of worship whatsoever (involving a dual relationship) impossible. It is to be understood that in the beginning, or at the starting-point of this form of worship there is merely the theoretical conception of this identity between the Self of the worshipper and the Absolute that is worshipped, and the realisation of this identity is had only when the goal is reached. This Aha graha Upāsanāis prescribed in the Vedāntic system of Sādhanā, through such mantras as ÒĀtmetyeva upasīta,O ÒAhal brahmasmi,Ó ÒTattvamasiÓ etc.

Pratīka Upāsanā

This is the form of worship where a particular thing or object is taken as the representative symbol of God or the Absolute, and the Symbol (pratīka) is worshipped being regarded as God or the Absolute

Himself. It is to be understood clearly that the pratika is merely the symbolor representativeof God, and is not regarded as identicalwith God. God is sought to be realisedthroughthe pratīka and not asthe pratīka. The Sadhaka is to suppose that the pratīka is God (pratīke brahmad li), and not that God is the pratīka(brahme pratīkadl Li), because the finding of God in the pratikasublimates or divinises the pratika, while the reverse process of finding the pratīka in God is of no use at all, inasmuch as brahman or God is infinitely superior to the pratīka. ÔMano brahmetyupāsītaO ÒWorship the mind as BrahmanÓ, and OWorship the Sun as BrahmanÓÑ Òāditya brahmetyupāsītaÓ are the mantras whereby this form of worship is prescribed. All the Bhakti Schools of Sādhana advocate this form of worship.

A-gāvabaddha Upāsanā

This form of Upāsanābelongs to the sphere of Karma Sādhanā. Here the worshipper is instructed to regard particular elements (a-ga) of Karmopāsanāas representing different gods. The particular element which is taken as the representative is not the symbol of the One God who is Absolute but is regarded as the symbol of a particular god or of a particular aspect of the Absolute Reality. ÒĀditya sāma ityupasītaÓ Oworship the Sun as representing SamaÓ is an illustration of this a-ga upāsanā. Here the worship is necessarily pluralistic and many-sided.

Yantra

The yantrais the mystical diagram, engraved on metals or drawn on the earth temporarily at the time of worship, that represents the deity (devatā) that is worshipped. The design of the yantravaries according as the object of worship (devatā) varies. The yantra is supposed to be the seat or the body of the devatā, while the mantra is identical with the Deity itself. The Deity is invoked into the yantra, and the worshipper prays to the Deity, who is, in essence, all-prevading, to reside in the yantraduring the period of his worship.