1. Philosophy of the Upanisads Deussen

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THE

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

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The Religion and Philosophy of India

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF

THE UPANISHADS

BY

PAUL DEUSSEN

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF KIEL

AUTHORISED ENGLISH TRANSLATION

By Rev. A. S. GEDEN, M.A.

TUTOR IN OLD TESTAMENT LANGUAGES AND LITERATURE, AND CLASSICS,

WESLEYAN COLLEGE, RICHMOND

Edinburgh : T & T. CLARK, 38 George Street

Printed . . . 1906

Reprinted . . . 1908

Reprinted . . . 1919

128019

PREFACE

Dr. Deussen's treatise on the Upanishads needs no formal

introduction or commendation to students of Indian

thought who are familiar with the German language.

To others I would fain hope that the translation here

presented, which appears with the author's sanction, may

serve to make known a work of very marked ability and

of surpassing interest. As far as my knowledge extends,

there is no adequate exposition of the Upanishads available

in English. The best was published by Messrs. Trübner

more than a quarter of a century ago, and is in many

respects out of date. As traced here by the master-hand

of the author, the teaching of the ancient Indian seers

presents itself in clearest light, and claims the sympathetic

study of all lovers of truth.

For the English rendering I am alone responsible.

And where I may have failed to catch the precise meaning

of the original, or adequately to represent the turn of

phrase, I can only ask the indulgence of the reader. Dr.

Deussen's style is not easy. And if a more capable hand

than mine had been willing to essay the task of trans-

lation, I would gladly have resigned my office. With

whatsoever care I can hardly hope entirely to have

vi

PREFACE

escaped error. But for any indication of oversight or

mistake, and any suggestion for improvement, I shall be

most grateful. The work has exacted many hours that

could be ill spared from a very full life. If however it

conduce in any way to a better understanding of the

mind and heart of India I shall be amply repaid.

A. S. GEDEN.

PREFACE BY THE AUTHOR

The present work forms the second part of my General

History of Philosophy. It is however complete in itself ;

and has for its subject the Philosophy of the Upanishads,

the culminating point of the Indian doctrine of the

universe. This point had been already reached in Vedic,

pre-Buddhist times ; and in philosophical significance has

been surpassed by none of the later developments of

thought up to the present day. In particular the Sâñkhya

system has followed out lines of thought traced for it in

the Upanishads, and has emphasized realistic tendencies

already found there (infra, pp. 239–255). Buddhism

also, though of entirely independent origin, yet betrays

its indebtedness in essential points to the teaching of

the Upanishads, when its main fundamental thought

(nirvânam, the removal of suffering by the removal of

trishṇá) meets us expressed in other words (union with

Brahman by the removal of kâma) in the passage from

the Bṛihadâraṇyaka quoted below.1

The thoughts of the Vedânta therefore became for

India a permanent and characteristic spiritual atmosphere,

which pervades all the products of the later literature.

1 Brh. 4. 4. 6, infra p. 348.

vii

viii

PREFACE BY THE AUTHOR

To every Indian Brâhman to-day the Upanishads are what the New Testament is to the Christian.

So significant a phenomenon deserved and demanded a more comprehensive treatment than it had yet obtained.

And my hope is to remove in some measure the cloud which hitherto has obscured this subject, and to exhibit order and consistency in place of the confused mass of contradictory conceptions, which alone had been supposed to exist.

If the result is not a uniform and unified system, there is yet found a regular historical development, the key to which is an original, abrupt and daring idealism ; and this in its further progress by a twofold concession, on the one hand to traditional beliefs, and on the other to the empirical prepossessions natural to us all, was gradually developed into that which we, adopting Western phraseology if not always in a Western sense, call pantheism, cosmogonism, theism, atheism (Sâñkhya), and deism (Yoga).

Chap. ix., “The Unreality of the Universe” (pp. 226-239), which by its paradoxical title attracts attention and provokes contradiction, or the final survey at the close of the book (p. 396 ff.), may well serve as a first introduction to these oriental teachings.

A remarkable and at first sight perplexing feature in this entire evolution of thought is the persistence with which the original idealism holds its ground, not annulled or set aside by the pantheistic and theistic developments that have grown out of it.

On the contrary it remains a living force, the influence of which may be more or less directly traced everywhere, until it is finally abandoned by the Sâñkhya system.

Adopted by the Vedânta it is proclaimed as the only “higher knowledge” (parâ vidyâ),

and contrasted with all those realistic developments

which together with the creation and transmigration

doctrines are known as the “lower knowledge” (aparâ

vidyâ), and are explained as accommodations of the written

revelation to the weakness of human understanding.

This accommodation theory of the later Vedântist teachers

is not wholly baseless, and needs correction only in the

one point that this adjustment to the empirical capacity

of the intellect (which works within the relations of time,

space and causality) was not intentional and conscious,

but unconscious. In this shape the idea of accommodation

becomes a key which is fitted to unlock the secrets not

only of the doctrinal developments of the Upanishads,

but of many analogous phenomena in Western philosophy.

For the practice of clothing metaphysical intuitions in the

forms of empirical knowledge is met with not only in

India, but also in Europe from the earliest times. And

for that very reason no account would have been taken

of it had not Kant demonstrated the incorrectness of

the whole procedure, as I hope to show in detail in the

later parts of my work.

P. DEUSSEN.

CONTENTS

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS :

THE SECOND PERIOD OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY, OR THE CONTINUANCE AND CLOSE OF THE TIMES OF THE BRÂHMANAS

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

I. The Place of the Upanishads in the Literature of the Veda . . . . . . . . 1–15

1. The Veda and its Divisions . . . . 1

2. Brâhmaṇa, Âraṇyaka, Upanishad . . . . 2

3. The Upanishads of the three older Vedas . . . . 5

4. The Upanishads of the Atharvaveda . . . . 7

5. On the Meaning of the word Upanishad . . . . 10

II. Brief Summary of the History of the Upanishads . 16–38

1. The earliest Origin of the Upanishads . . . . 16

2. The extant Upanishads . . . . 22

3. The Upanishads in Bâdarâyaṇa and Ṡankara . . . . 26

4. The most important Collections of Upanishads . . . . 33

III. The Fundamental Conception of the Upanishads and its Significance . . . . 38–50

1. The Fundamental Conception of the Upanishads . . . . 38

2. The Conception of the Upanishads in its relation to Philosophy . . . . 40

3. The Conception of the Upanishads in its relation to Religion . . . . 44

xii

CONTENTS

THE SYSTEM OF THE UPANISHADS

PAGE

Introduction

.

.

.

.

.

51

-53

FIRST PART : THEOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE

OF BRAHMAN

I.

On

the

Possibility

of

Knowing

Brahman

.

.

.

54-85

Is

the

Veda

the

Source

of

the

Knowledge

of

Brahman

?

.

.

54

Preparatory

Means

to

a

Knowledge

of

Brahman

.

.

60

Sacrifice

.

.

.

.

61

Asceticism

(

tapas

)

.

.

.

65

Other

Preliminary

Conditions

.

.

70

The

Standpoint

of

Ignorance,

of

Knowledge,

and

of

superior

Knowledge

in

relation

to

Brahman

.

.

74

II.

The

Search

for

Brahman

.

.

.

.

85-99

The

Âtman

(

Brahman

)

as

the

Unity

.

.

.

85

Bâlâki's

Attempts

at

Explanation

.

.

87

Sâkalya's

Attempts

at

Explanation

.

.

88

Six

inadequate

Definitions

.

.

89

Definitions

of

the

Âtman

Vais´vânara

.

.

90

Nârada's

gradual

Instruction

.

.

92

Three

different

Âtmans

.

.

.

94

Five

different

Âtmans

.

.

.

97

III.

Symbolical

Representations

of

Brahman

.

.

99-125

Introduction

and

Classification

.

.

.

99

Brahman

as

Prâna

and

Vâyu

.

.

101

Other

Symbols

of

Brahman

.

.

111

Attempts

to

interpret

the

symbolical

Representations

of

Brahman

.

.

117

Interpretations

of

and

Substitutes

for

Ritual

Practices

.

119

IV.

The

essential

Brahman

.

.

.

.

126-157

Introduction

.

.

.

126

Brahman

as

Being

and

not-Being,

Reality

and

not-Reality

.

128

Brahman

as

Consciousness,

Thought

(

cit

)

.

.

132

Brahman

as

Bliss

(

ânanda

)

.

.

140

Negative

Character

and

Unknowableness

of

the

essential

Brahman

.

.

146

V.

Brahman

and

the

UNIVERSE

.

.

157-179

Sole

Reality

of

Brahman

.

.

157

Brahman

as

the

cosmical

Principle

.

.

159

Brahman

as

the

psychical

Principle

.

.

166

Brahman

as

a

Personal

God

(

îs´vara

).

.

.

172

CONTENTS

xiii

SECOND PART : COSMOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF

THE UNIVERSE

VI. Brahman as Creator of the Universe . . 180-201

1. Introduction to the Cosmology . . 180

2. The Creation of the Universe and the Doctrine of the

Âtman . . 182

3. The Creation of Inorganic Nature . . 186

4. Organic Nature . . 195

5. The Soul of the Universe (Hiranyagarbha, Brahmán) . . 198

VII. Brahman as Preserver and Ruler . . 202-219

1. Brahman as Preserver of the Universe . . 202

2. Brahman as Ruler of the Universe . . 206

3. Freedom and Constraint of the Will . . 208

4. Brahman as Providence . . 211

5. Cosmography of the Upanishads . . 214

VIII. Brahman as Destroyer of the Universe . . 219-226

1. The Kalpa Theory of the later Vedânta . . 219

2. Return of Individuals into Brahman . . 221

3. Return of the Universe as a Whole into Brahman . . 223

4. On the Origin of the Doctrine of the Dissolution of the

Universe in Brahman . . 225

IX. The Unreality of the Universe . . 226-239

1. The Doctrine of Mâyâ as the Basis of all Philosophy . 226

2. The Doctrine of Mâyâ in the Upanishads . . 228

3. The Doctrine of Mâyâ as it is presented under empirical

Forms . . 235

X. The Origin of the Sâñkhya System . . 239-255

1. Brief Survey of the Doctrine of the Sâñkhya . . 239

2. Origin of Dualism . . 244

3. Origin of the Evolutionary Series . . 246

4. Origin of the Doctrine of the Gunas . . 250

5. Origin of the Doctrine of Emancipation . . 253

THIRD PART : PSYCHOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE

OF THE SOUL

XI. The Supreme and the Individual Souls . . 256-263

1. The Theory of the later Vedânta . . 256

2. Originally only one Soul . . 257

3. The Individual Souls by the side of the Supreme . . 258

4. Reason for the Assumption of Bodily Form . . 261

xiv

CONTENTS

XII. The Organs of the Soul.

1. Later View

263

2. The Âtman and the Organs

265

3. Manas and the ten Indriyas

271

4. The Prâna and its five Varieties

274

5. The Subtle Body and its ethical Qualification

280

6. Physiological Conclusions from the Upanishads

283

XIII. The States of the Soul

296-312

1. The Four States

296

2. The Waking State

300

3. Dream-sleep

302

4. Deep Sleep

305

5. The Turîya

309

FOURTH PART : ESCHATOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF TRANSMIGRATION AND EMANCIPATION, INCLUDING THE WAY THITHER (PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY)

XIV. Transmigration of the Soul

313-338

1. Philosophical Significance of the Doctrine of Transmigration

313

2. Ancient Vedic Eschatology

317

3. The Germs of the Doctrine of Transmigration

324

4. Origin of the Doctrine of Transmigration

328

5. Further Development of the Doctrine of Transmigration

332

XV. Emancipation

338-361

1. Significance of the Doctrine of Emancipation

338

2. Origin of the Doctrine of Emancipation

340

3. The Knowledge of the Âtman is Emancipation. Characteristics of those who are emancipated

344

4. The Doctrine of Emancipation in Empirical Form

355

XVI. Practical Philosophy

361-395

1. Introduction

361

2. Ethics of the Upanishads

364

3. The Sannyâsa

373

4. The Yoga

382

XVII. Retrospect of the Upanishads and their Teaching

396-412

1. Introduction

396

2. Idealism as the Fundamental Conception of the Upanishads

398

3. Theology (Doctrine of Brahman or the Âtman)

401

4. Cosmology and Psychology

405

5. Eschatology (Transmigration and Emancipation)

408

Index I. Subjects

413

" II. Reference

418

THE

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

A. INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY

OF THE UPANISHADS

I. THE PLACE OF THE UPANISHADS IN

THE LITERATURE OF THE VEDA

1. The Veda and its Divisions

It will be remembered that our earlier investigations led

to a classification of Vedic literature into four principal

parts, which correspond to the four priestly offices at the

Soma sacrifice ; these are the Ṛig, Yajur, Sâma, and

Atharvaveda, each of which comprises a Saṁhitâ, a Brâh-

maṇa, and a Sûtra. The Brâhmaṇa (in the wider sense of

the term) is then further divided by the exponents of the

Vedânta into three orders, which as regards their contents

are for the most part closely connected with and overlap

one another, viz.—Vidhi, Arthavâda, and Vedânta or

Upanishad. The following scheme may be helpful in

retaining in the memory this primary classification of

the Veda :—

I. Ṛigveda. II. Sâmaveda. III. Yajurveda. IV. Atharvaveda. A. Saṃhitâ. B. Brāhmaṇa. C. Sûtra. a. Vidhi. b. Arthavâda. c. Vedânta. (Upanishad.)

2

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

A further preliminary remark is that each of the above twelve parts of the Veda has been preserved as a

rule not separately, but in several often numerous forms,

inasmuch as each Veda was taught in different S´âkhâs

(literally, “branches” of the tree of the Veda), i.e. Vedic

schools, which in their treatment of the common subject-

matter varied so considerably from one another that,

in course of time, distinct works were produced, the

contents of which nevertheless remained practically

the same. In particular, each of the three ancient

Vedas (in the case of the fourth the relations are

usually different) comprises not one Brâhmaṇa, but

several; and similarly there exist for each Veda not

one but several Upanishads. On this subject more will

be found below.

2. Brâhmaṇa, Âraṇyaka, Upanishad

The link between the Upanishad and the Brâhmaṇa

with its very different spirit is as a rule not direct,

but established ordinarily by means of an Âraṇyaka or

“forest-book,” to the close of which the Upanishad is

attached, or in which it is included. The name is given

either because (as Oldenberg supposes, Probl., p. 291), on

account of its mysterious character it should be imparted

to the student not in the village (grâme), but outside

of it (araṇye, in the jungle) (cp. the narrative, Brih.

3. 2. 13, and the names rahasyam, upanishad), or

because from the very beginning it was “a Brâhmaṇa

appointed for the vow of the anchorite.”1 The contents

of the Âraṇyakas perhaps favour rather the latter con-

ception, so far as they consist mainly of all kinds of

explanations of the ritual and allegorical speculations

therein. This is only what might be expected in the life

1 Âraṇyaka-vrata-rûpam brahmanam, Sâyaṇa : see Aufrecht, Einl. zum Ait.

Br., p. iii., and cp. Deussen, Upan., p. 7.

of the forest as a substitute for the actual sacrificial

observances, which for the most part were no longer

practicable ; and they form a natural transition to the

speculations of the Upanishads, altogether emancipated

as these are from the limitations of a formal cult. The

connecting-link is never wanting where the written

tradition of a S'âkhâ has been handed down unbroken

(as is not the case with the Kâthaka, S'vetâs'vatara,

Maitrâyanîya), for both the Aitareyins and Kaushîtakins

of the Rigveda and the Taittirîyakas and Vâjasaneyins

of the Yajurveda possess together with the Samhitâ their

Brâhmaṇa with Âraṇyaka and Upanishad. Even then,

if in the schools of the Sâmaveda the name Âraṇyaka is

not employed, yet there also the introductions to the

Upanishads 1 bear throughout the character of Âraṇyakas.

This succession of ritual allegorical and philosophical

texts, which is really the same in all the S'âkhâs, may

be due partly to the order of thought adopted for the pur-

poses of instruction, in which the Samhitâ would naturally

be followed immediately by the Brâhmaṇa (so far as this

was generally taught, cp. Oldenberg, Prol., p. 291) ; the

deep mysterious meaning of the ceremonies would then

be unfolded in the Âraṇyaka ; and finally the exposition

of the Upanishads would close the period of Vedic in-

struction. As early, therefore, as S'vet. 6. 22 and Muṇḍ.

3. 2. 6, and thenceforward, the Upanishads bore the

name Vedânta (i.e. "end of the Veda"). On the other

hand it is not to be denied that the order of the texts

within the canon of each S'âkhâ corresponds generally

to their historical development, and that the position of

the several parts affords an indication of their earlier or

later date. If, however, these two factors that determined

the arrangement, namely, the tendency to a systematic

classification of the material for instruction and the

1 Chândogya Upan. 1-2, Upanishadbrâh. 1-3.

4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

preservation of the order of chronological development, do actually for the most part coincide in their result, this is very simply explained on the supposition that in the course of time the general interest was transferred from the ritualistic method of treatment to the allegorical, and from that again to the philosophical. Moreover, the separation of the material is by no means strictly carried out, but in all three classes, Brâhmaṇas, Âraṇyakas, and Upanishads, there are found occasionally digressions of a ritual as well as allegorical or philosophical nature. Especially noteworthy, however, and demanding explanation is the circumstance that, apart from this occasional overlapping of the subject-matter, the broad distinctions between Brâhmaṇa Âraṇyaka and Upanishad are by no means always correctly observed; e.g., among the Aitareyins the matter of the Brâhmaṇa extends into the Âraṇyaka, while with the Taittirîyakas the close of the Brâhmaṇa and the beginning of the Âraṇyaka agree throughout, and the dividing line is entirely arbitrary. This state of things is to be explained probably only on the supposition that the entire teaching material of each Sâkhâ formed originally a consecutive whole, and that this whole was first in the later times distinguished into Brâhmaṇa Âraṇyaka and Upanishad, on a principle which did not depend upon the character of the subject-matter alone, but which, though in general correspondence with it, was in fact imposed from without. Such a principle we seem to be able to recognise in the later order of the four âśramas, by virtue of which it became the duty of every Indian Brâhman first as brahmacârin to spend a portion of his life with a Brâhman teacher, then as grihastha to rear a family and to carry out the obligatory sacrifices, in order thereafter as vânaprastha to withdraw into the solitude of the forest, and to devote himself to self-discipline and meditation, until finally in extreme old age,

UPANISHADS OF THE THREE OLDER VEDAS

5

purified from all attachment to earth, homeless and without possessions, free from all obligations, he wandered about

as sannyâsin (bhikshu, parivrâjaka), awaiting only his spirit's release into the supreme spirit.

In the instruction communicated to him the brahmacârin was put in possession of a rule of conduct for his entire future life.

From the Brâhmaṇa he learnt how, as grihastha, he would have to carry out the ritual of sacrifice with the aid of the officiating priests;

the Âraṇyaka, as indeed is implied in the name, belonged to the period of life as vânaprastha,

during which for the most part meditation took the place of the sacrificial acts;

and finally the Upanishad taught theoretically that aloofness from the world which the sann-yâsin was bound to realise in practice.

Therefore it is said of him, that he should “live without the (liturgical) precepts of the Veda,” but yet “recite the Âraṇyaka and the Upanishad of all the Vedas.”1

And as ordinarily Âraṇyaka and Upanishad were blended together, so until quite late times, as we shall see, no strict line of demarcation was drawn in most instances between vânaprastha and sannyâsin.

3. The Upanishads of the three older Vedas

As the Brâhmaṇas formed the ritual text-books of the Vedic S'âkhâs, so the Upanishads attached to them were originally nothing more than the text-books of dogma,

a fact which accounts especially for the identity in them all of the fundamental thought, which is developed at greater or less length and with the utmost variety.

The earliest rise of the S'akhas or Vedic schools, on which this community of the ritual, and with it the philosophical tradition depends, is to be sought in a time in which the contents of the Saṁhitâ were already substantially fixed, and were transmitted from teacher to pupil to be committed to memory.2

1 Âruṇeya-Up. 2.

2 Cp. Chând. 6. 7. 2.

6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

On the other hand the necessary ritual allegorical and dogmatic explanations were communicated to the

pupils extempore, and from these subsequently the oldest Indian prose took its rise. The result was that

the common material of instruction, which in its essential features was already determined, received very various

modifications, corresponding to the idiosyncrasy of the teacher, not only in regard to execution and mystical

interpretation of the particular ceremonies, but also because one laid greater stress on the liturgical, another on

the dogmatic teaching. Hence it is that the Upanishads of the individual schools differ so greatly in length.

In the course of centuries the originally extempore instruction crystallised into fixed texts in prose, which

were committed to memory verbatim by the pupil, while at the same time the divergences between the

individual schools became wider. It is therefore quite credible that Indian writers should have been able to

enumerate a considerable number of Ŝâkhâs, in which each Veda was studied. But it is equally intelligible that

of these many Ŝâkhâs the majority disappeared in the struggle for existence, and that for each Veda only a few

prominent Ŝâkhâs with the Upanishads belonging to them have been preserved. We must limit ourselves here for

general guidance to a mere enumeration of the eleven extant Upanishads of the three older Vedas, with the remark,

however, that in the case of several of these it is doubtful whether they are correctly attributed to the Ŝâkhâ

concerned. A further discussion of this point will be found in the Introductions prefixed to my translations of

the sixty Upanishads.

Upaniṣad. ŜÂKHÂ.

I. Rigveda.

Aitareya Upanishad.

Kaushîtaki Upanishad.

Aitareyins.

Kaushîtakins.

UPANISHADS OF THE ATHARVAṆA

7

II. Sâmaveda.

Chândogya Upanishad.

Kena (Talavakâra) Upanishad.

Tândins.

Jaiminiyas (Talavakâras).

III. Yajurveda—(a) Black.

Taittirîya Upanishad.

Mahânârâyana Upanishad.

Kâṭhaka Upanishad.

S'vetâs'vatara Upanishad.

Maitrâvaṇîya Upanishad

(b) White.

Bṛihadâraṇyaka Upanishad.

Îs'â Upanishad.

Taittirîyakas.

Kâṭhas.

(wanting.)

Maitrâyaṇîyas.

Vâjasaneyins.

4. The Upanishads of the Atharvaveda

The case is entirely different with the numerous Upanishads which have found admission into the Atharva-veda. It is true that several of them trace back their doctrine to S'aunaka or Pippalâda, or even (as the Brahma-Up.) to both together; and according to the tradition communicated by Nârâyana and Colebrooke, not only single treatises, but complete series of Upanishads were attributed to the S'aunakîyas or Pippalâdis.

But the contradictions of these accounts, as well as the circumstance that the most diverse Upanishads refer their doctrine to the alleged founders of the Atharvaveda S'âkhâs, S'aunaka and Pippalâda, suggest the conjecture that we should see in this little more than an arbitrary attachment to well-known names of antiquity ; just as other Atharva-Upanishads trace back their doctrine to Yâjñavalkhya, to Aṅgiras or Atharvan, or even to Brahma Rudra and Prajâpati.

Moreover the names of the Atharva-Upanishads (apart from a few doubtful exceptions, as Mâṇḍûkya, Jâbâla, Paiṅgala, Shavank) are no longer, as is the case with the Upanishads of the three older Vedas, formed on the model of the names of the S'âkhâs, but are derived partly from the contents and partly from any accidental circumstance.

This proves that in the Atharva-Upanishads we must not

8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

expect to find the dogmatic text-books of definite Vedic schools.

Many indications (of which more will be said hereafter) point to the fact that the leading ideas of the Upanishads, the doctrine, namely, of the sole reality of the Âtman, of its evolution as the universe, its identity with the soul, and so forth, although they may have originated from Brâhmans such as Yâñavalkhya, yet in the earliest times met with acceptance rather in Kshatriya circles 1 than among Brâhmans, engrossed as the latter were in the ritual. It was only later on that they were adopted by the Brâhmans, and interwoven with the ritual on the lines of allegorical interpretation.

Under these circumstances it is very probable that the âtman doctrine, after it had been taken in hand by the Sâkhâs of the three older Vedas, was further prosecuted outside of these schools, and that consequently in course of time works were published, and have been partially at least preserved, which occupy a position as compared with the Upanishads of the Rig Sâma and Yajurvedas precisely similar to that of the Saṁhitâ of the Atharvaveda to their Saṁhitâs. And as at an earlier date hymns of various kinds found admittance into this Saṁhitâ, which were partly of too late composition for the older Saṁhitâs, and partly were despised by them ; so now again it was the Atharvaveda which opened its arms to the late born or rejected children of the spirit of âtman research. The consequence of this generosity was that in course of time everything which appeared in the shape of an Upanishad, that is a mystical text,

1 As an illustration of the different relation of Brâhmans and Kshatriyas to the novel doctrine of the Âtman, Brih. 3-4 may be referred to, where Yâjnavalkhya, as exponent of this new doctrine, is met with jealousy and doubt on the side of the Brâhmans, but by the king Janaka with enthusiastic assent. To this question we return later (infra, p. 17 ff.).

whether it were the expression merely of the religious

philosophical consciousness of a limited circle or even an

individual thinker, was credited to the Atharvaveda, or by

later collectors was included in it without further hesita-

tion. The regularity with which a given text reappears

in the different collections forms, as far as we can see, the

sole mark of its canonicity (if we may use the word in

such a connection). Guided by this principle we have

gathered together in our translation of the “Sixty Upani-

shads” all those texts which seem to have met with

general recognition. Referring then for further details

to the Introduction there to the Atharva-Upanishads, we

propose here, for the sake of a general survey, merely to

enumerate the more important of these works according

to the fivefold classification which we have made of

them.1

I. Pure Vedânta Upanishads.—These remain essenti-

ally faithful to the old Vedânta doctrine, without laying

more definite stress than is already the case in the older

Upanishads on its development into the Yoga, Sannyâsa,

and Vaishnavite or S'aivite symbolism :-

Muṇḍaka, Praśna, Mâṇḍûkya (with the Kârikâ);

Garbha, Prâṇagnihotra, Piṇḍa;

Âtma, Sarvopanishatsâra, Gâruḍa.

II. Yoga Upanishads.—These from the standpoint of

the Vedânta treat predominantly and exclusively of the

apprehension of the Âtman through the Yoga by means

of the moræ of the syllable Om :-

Brahmavidyâ, Kshurikâ, Cûlikâ;

Nâdabindu, Brahmabindu, Amṛtabindu, Dhyâna-

bindu, Tejobindu;

s'ikhâ, Yogatattva, Haṁsa.

III. Sannyâsa Upanishads.—As a rule these are

equally one-sided, and enjoin and describe the life

1 Following, in reality, Weber's example.

10

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

of the Sannyâsin as the practical issue of Upanishad teaching :-

Brahmâ, Sannyâsa, Âruneya, Kanthas'ruti;

Paramahaṁsa, Jâbâla, Âs'rama.

IV. S'iva Upanishads.—These interpret the popularly

worshipped S'iva (Is'âna, Mahes'vara, Mahâdeva, etc.) as a

personification of the Âtman :-

Atharvas'iras, Atharvas'ikhâ, Nîlarudra;

Kâlâgnirudra, Kaivalya.

V. Vishṇu Upanishads. — These explain Vishṇu

(Nârâyana, Ṇṛisiṁha, etc.) similarly in the sense of the

Upanishad teaching, and regard his various avatâras as

impersonations of the Âtman :-

Mahâ, Nârâyana, Âtmabodha;

Ṇṛisiṁhapûrvatâpanîya, Ṇṛisiṁhottaratâpanîya;

Râmapûrvatâpanîya, Râmottaratâpanîya.

5. On the Meaning of the Word Upanishad

According to S'aṅkara, the Upanishads were so named

because they “destroy” inborn ignorance,1 or because they “conduct” to Brahman.2 Apart from these inter-

pretations, justifiable neither on grounds of philology nor

of fact, the word Upanishad is usually explained by

Indian writers by rahasyaṁ (i.e. “secret,” Anquetil’s

secretum tegendum). Thus it is said, for example, in

Ṇṛisiṁh. 8 four times in succession iti rahasyaṁ, instead

of the earlier usual form iti upanishad (as is found e.g. at

the close of Taitt. 2 and 3, Mahânâr. 62. 63. 64). In older

passages also, where mention is made of Upanishad texts,

such expressions are used as guhyâ' âdes'âḥ,3 paramaṁ

guhyaṁ,4 vedaguhyopanishatsu gûdham,5 guhyatamaṁ.6

1 S'aṅkara on Br̥ih. p. 2. 4, Kâṭh. p. 73. 11.

2 Id. on Taitt. p. 9. 5, Mund. p. 261. 10.

3 Chând. 3. 5. 2.

4 Kâṭh. 3. 17, S'vet. 6. 22.

5 S'vet. 5. 6.

6 Maitr. 6. 29.

MEANING OF THE WORD UPANISHAD

I I

The attempt to maintain secrecy with regard to abstruse and therefore easily misunderstood doctrines has numerous analogies even in the West. To the question why He speaks to them in parables Jesus answers, öτι ὐμîν δέδοται γνôναι τὰ μυστήρïα τῆς βασιλεïας τῶν οὐρανῶν, ἑκείνοις δὲ οὐ δέδοται.1 Pythagoras requires of his pupils μυστικὴ σïωπή, mystical silence. A saying is preserved of Heracleitus, τὰ τῆς γνώσεως βάθη κρύπτειν ἀπιστή. Plato finds fault with the art of writing on the ground that it οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν οἶς δεî γε καὶ μή.2 And Schopenhauer demands of his readers as a preliminary condition that they should have grappled with the difficulties of Kant.

The same feeling inspires the warning repeated again and again in the Upanishads, not to impart a certain doctrine to unworthy students.

Ait. Âr. 3. 2. 6. 9 :—“These combinations of letters (according to their secret meaning, their upanishad) the teacher shall not impart to anyone who is not his immediate pupil (antevâsin), who has not already lived for a year in his house, who does not himself intend to be a teacher.”

Chând. 3. 11. 5 :—“Therefore only to his eldest son shall the father as Brahman communicate it (this doctrine), but to no one else, whoever he may be.”

Briih. 6. 3. 12 :—“This (the mixed drink, mantha, and its ritual) shall be communicated to no one, except the son or the pupil.”

S'vet. 6. 22 :—“Give it (this supreme secret) to none who is not tranquil, who is not a son or at least a pupil.”

Mund. 3. 2. 11 :—“None may read this who has not observed his vow.”

Maitr. 6. 29 :—“This most mysterious secret shall be

1 Mt. 13. 11.

2 Phaedr. 275, E.

12

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

imparted to none who is not a son or a pupil, and who

has not yet attained tranquillity."

Nṛsiṁh. 1. 3 :—“But if a woman or a S'ûdra learns

the Savitṛi formula, the Lakshmî formula, the Praṇava,

one and all go downwards after death. Therefore let

these never be communicated to such ! If anyone

communicates these to them, they and the teacher alike

go downwards after death.”

Râmap. 84 :—“Give it not (the diagram) to common

men.”

The same explanation is to be given of the striking

feature, which is constantly recurring in the Upanishads,

that a teacher refuses to impart any instruction to

a pupil who approaches him, until by persistence

in his endeavour he has proved his worthiness to

receive the instruction. The best known instance of

this kind is Nac'iketas in the Kâṭhaka Upanishad, to

whom the god of death vouchesafes the desired instruction

on the nature of the soul and its fate only after the young

man has steadily rejected all attempts to divert him from

his wish.1 Indra deals in a similar way with Pratardana,2

Raikva with Jânas'ruti,3 Satyakâma with Upakosala,4

Pravâhaṇa with Âruṇi,5 Prajâpati with Indra and

Vairoc'ana,6 Yâjñavalkya with Janaka,7 S'âkâyanya with

Bṛhadratha.8

From all this it follows that the universal tendency

of antiquity, and of the circle which produced the

Upanishads, was in the direction of keeping their

contents secret from unfit persons, and that the Indian

writers were practically justified in explaining the term

upanishad by rahasyaṁ, “secret.” Less easy is it at

first sight to understand how the word upanishad has

1 Kâth. 1. 20 f.

2 Kaush. 3. 1.

3 Chând. 4. 2.

4 Chând. 4. 10. 2.

5 Chând. 5. 3. 7, Bṛih. 6. 2. 6.

6 Chând. 8. 8. 4.

7 Bṛih. 4. 3. 1 f.

8 Maitr. 1. 2.

MEANING OF THE WORD UPANISHAD

come to signify "secret meaning, secret instruction, a

secret." For upanishad, derived as a substantive from

the root sad, to sit, can only denote a "sitting"; and as

the preposition upa (near by) indicates, in contrast to

parishad, samsad (assembly), a "confidential secret

sitting," we must assume, even if actual proof is

wanting, that this name for "secret-sitting" was used also

in course of time to denote the purpose of this sitting,

i.e. "secret instruction." Just as the German "college"

has been transferred from the idea of "convention" to

that of the subject-matter of instruction; so that in such

an expression as "to read, to hear, etc. a lecture" the

original meaning of college (from colligere, to collect) is

altogether forgotten, as in the case of the Upanishads the

original conception of "sitting." Similar instances are

quite common, as for example the φυσιϰαι ἀϰροάσεις of

Aristotle or the διατριβαι of Epictetus no longer signify

lectures, conversations, but definite written compositions.

Another explanation of the word upanishad has been

recently put forward by Oldenberg, according to which

upanishad, precisely as upâsanâ, would have originally

meant "adoration," i.e. reverential meditation on the

Brahman or Âtman.1 The suggestion deserves attention,

but is open to the following objections. (1) The words

upa + âs, "to sit before someone or something (in adora-

tion)," and upa + sad (upa + ni + sad does not occur in

the Upanishads), "to seat oneself before someone (for the

purpose of instruction)," are, according to prevailing usage,

to be carefully distinguished from one another. Even if

in the older texts the linguistic usage was not yet

rigorously fixed, yet in the Upanishads (as a glance at

Jacob's concordance proves), upa + âs is always "to

worship," never "to approach for instruction," and upa +

sad always "to approach for instruction," never "to

1 Zeitschr. d. Deutsch. Morgenl. Gesellschaft, Bd. 50 (1896), p. 457 f.

14 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

worship"; and the reason for forming the substantive upanishad not from upa + sad, but from the rarer upa + ni + sad, was perhaps merely that the substantive upasad had been already adopted as the name of a well-known ceremony preliminary to the Soma sacrifice. (2) Even if mention is frequently made of worship of Brahman or the âtman, especially under a definite symbol (as manas, prâna, etc.), yet, strictly speaking, the âtman is not like the gods an object of worship, but an object of knowledge. Kena 1. 4 f.,—"that shouldst thou know as Brahman, not that which is there worshipped" (na idam yad idam upâsate); Chând. 8. 7. 1,—"the self (âtman) . . . that ought man to search after, that endeavour to know"; Brih. 2. 4. 5,—"the self, in truth, should be seen, heard, understood, and reflected upon, O Maitreyî," etc. The two passages of the Upanishads also, which Oldenberg cites in proof of worship offered to Brahman, tell in reality in the opposite direction. In Brih. 2. 1, Gârgya declares his worship of this or that as Brahman, until finally the king breaks off the inquiry with the words, "with all that it is not yet known" (na etâvatâ viditam bhavati). Then he imparts the teaching concerning the deep sleeper, and closes with the words, "his upanishad" (secret name, not worship) "is 'the reality of realities,'" i.e. the essence which is implied in all empirical existence. And if in Brih. 1. 4 the proposition is laid down that not the gods but the âtman alone should be worshipped, by this is to be understood merely a polemic against the worship of the gods, not a demand to "worship" the âtman as though it were only a god. This word is applicable, therefore, solely to the gods, and is used of the âtman only by zeugma,1 and the proof of this is found

1 If this is disputed, then, to be consistent, from passages like Brih. 2. 4. 5,—"the âtman in truth should be seen and heard," etc., the conclusion must be drawn that the âtman is visible and audible.

MEANING OF THE WORD UPANISHAD

in what follows when it is said,—“He who worships

another deity, and says ‘He is one, and I am an-

other,’ that man is not wise.”1 Without, however, such

a conception of the îtman as “He is one, and I am

another,” which is here interdicted, worship is altogether

inconceivable, but not perhaps knowledge by immediate

intuition (anubhava). (3) An attempt to apply the hypo-

thesis under consideration throughout to the existing facts

would demonstrate its impossibility. Thus in Taitt. 1. 3

the secret meaning (upanishad) of the combination of

letters (saṁhitâ) is explained, and this being concluded

various rewards are held out in prospect to him “who

knows these great combinations as thus expounded”

(ya evam etâ mâhâsaṁhitâ vyâkhyâtâ veda). Here

merely a knowledge of the combination of the letters is

required; there is no mention of any worship in the entire

paragraph. Or if we take the certainly ancient passage

Kaush. 2. 1–2, where it is said of the beggar, who knows

himself as the Self of all beings,—tasya upanishad ‘na

yâced’ iti, “his secret sign is not to beg”; it would be

very difficult to say what suggestion of “worship” is

found in phrases like these.

If the passages collected in my index to the

Upanishads under the word Upanishad are examined, it

will be at once evident that, taken together, they

involve the meaning, “secret sign, secret name, secret

import, secret word, secret formula, secret instruction,”

and that therefore to all the meanings the note of secrecy

is attached. Hence we may conclude that the explana-

tion offered by the Indians of the word upanishad

as rahasyaṃ, “secret,” is correct.

1 Ḅ̣ih. 1. 4. 10.

16

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

II. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE HISTORY OF THE

UPANISHADS

1. The earliest Origin of the Upanishads

The word Upanishad occurs with three distinct

meanings as—

(1) Secret word.

(2) Secret text.

(3) Secret import.

(1) Certain mysterious words, expressions, and formulas,

which are only intelligible to the initiated, are described

as Upanishad. These contain either a secret rule for

action and behaviour, as the na yác‘et of Kaush. 2. 1, 2,

quoted above, or secret information on the nature of

Brahman. When, then, the latter is described as satyasya

satyam1, or tad-van2am (the final goal of aspiration), there

is added, “thou hast been taught the Upanishad.” Of a

similar nature are secret words like tajjalân,3 “in him

(all beings) are born, perish, and breathe,” or neti neti.4

And when the worship of Brahman under such formulas

is enjoined, it is not implied that upanishad signifies

“worship,” but only, as already pointed out, that medita-

tion on Brahman under these mysterious terms must take

the place of the worship of the gods.

(2) The extant texts themselves, as well as the older

texts underlying them, are called Upanishads. Accord-

ingly in the Taittirîyaka school especially a section often

ends with the words,—iti upanishad.

(3) Very frequently it is not a word or a text, but the

secret allegorical meaning of some ritual conception or

practice, which is described as upanishad; e.g. in Chând. 1.

1. 10,—“for that which is executed with knowledge,

1 Brịh. 2. 1. 20, 2. 3. 6.

2 Kena 31 (4.6).

3 Chând. 3. 14. 1.

4 Bṛih. 2. 3. 6, and often.

with faith, with the upanishad (knowledge of the secret meaning of Udgîtha as Om), that is more effective.

The question suggests itself, which of these three significations is the original. We might decide for the third, and suppose that an allegorical interpretation was assigned to the ritual, and the Upanishad doctrine developed thence. This, however, apparently was not the case, and there is much to be said for the view that, as already observed above, the conceptions of the Upanishads, though they may have originated with the Brâhmans, were fostered primarily among the Kshatriyas and not within Brâhman circles, engrossed as these were with the ritual.

The Upanishads have come down to us, like the rest of the texts of the three older Vedas, through the Brâhmans. All the more striking is it, therefore, that the texts themselves frequently trace back some of their most important doctrines to kings, i.e. Kshatriyas. Thus, in the narrative of Chând. 5. 11-24, five learned Brâhmans request from Uddâlaka Âruni instruction concerning the Âtman Vais´vânara. Uddâlaka distrusts his ability to explain everything to them, and all the six therefore betake themselves to the king As´vapati Kaikeya, and receive from him the true instruction, the defectiveness of their own knowledge having first been made clear.

In Bṛih. 2. 1 (and the parallel passage, Kaush. 4), the far-famed Vedic scholar Gârgya Bâlâki volunteers to expound the Brahman to King Ajâtaśatru of Kâsî, and propounds accordingly twelve (in Kaush. 16) erroneous explanations ; whereupon to him, the Brâhman, the king exhibits the Brahman as the âtman under the figure of a deep sleeper, prefacig his exposition with the remark, “ that is a reversal of the rule, for a Brâhman to betake himself as a pupil to a Kshatriya in order to have the Brahman expounded to him ; now I proceed to instruct you.” In this narrative, preserved by two different Vedic

18 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

schools, it is expressly declared that the knowledge of

the Brahman as âtman, the central doctrine of the entire

Vedânta, is possessed by the king; but, on the contrary,

is not possessed by the Brâhman “famed as a Vedic

scholar.”1 In Chând. 1. 8–9, two Brâhmans are instructed

by the king Pravâhaṇa Jaivali concerning the âkâs'a as

the ultimate substratum of all things, of which they are

ignorant. And although it is said in Chând. 1. 9. 3

that this instruction had been previously imparted by

Atidhanvan to Udarasândilya, yet the names allow of

the conjecture that in this case also a Brâhman received

instruction from a Kshatriya. Similarly Chând. 7 contains

the teaching given by Sanatkumâra, the god of war, to

the Brâhman Nârada. Here the former pronounces in-

adequate the comprehensive Vedic learning of the Brâh-

man with the words: “all that you have studied is

merely name.”2 Finally the leading text of the doctrine

of the soul's transmigration, which is extant in three

different recensions,3 is propounded in the form of an

instruction given to Âruṇi by the king Pravâhaṇa Jaivali.4

The king here says to the Brâhman :—“Because, as you

have told me, O Gautama, this doctrine has never up to

the present time been in circulation among Brâhmans,

therefore in all the worlds the government has remained

in the hands of the warrior caste.”5

When we consider that the passages quoted discuss

such subjects as the knowledge of Brahman as âtman,6 the

knowledge of this âtman as the all-quickener,7 and the

1 Kaush., l.c.

2 Chând. 7. 1. 3.

3 Chând. 5. 3–10, Brih. 5. 2, and with considerable variations Kaush. 1.

4 In Kaush., l.c., by C'itra Gângyâyana.

5 Chând. 5. 3. 7 ; in Brih. 6. 2. 8 the words are :—“As surely as I wish

that you, like your ancestors, may remain well-disposed to us, so surely up

to the present day this knowledge has never been in the possession of a

Brâhman.”

6 Brih. 2. 1, Kaush. 4.

7 Chând. 5. 11 f.

fate of the soul after death,1 that is, precisely the most

important points of Upanishad teaching ; that not only

is the king represented in them as endowed with wisdom,

but is expressly contrasted with the Brâhman who is

ignorant or deluded ; and that these narratives are

preserved to us by the Vedic Sâkhâs, and therefore by

the Brâhmans themselves ; we are forced to conclude, if not

with absolute certainty, yet with a very high degree of

probability, that as a matter of fact the doctrine of the

âtman, standing as it did in such sharp contrast to all the

principles of the Vedic ritual, though the original concep-

tion may have been due to Brâhmans, was taken up and

cultivated primarily not in Brâhman but in Kshatriya

circles, and was first adopted by the former in later times.

The fact, moreover, which is especially prominent in the

last quoted passages, that the Brâhmans during a long

period had not attained to the possession of this knowledge,

for which they nevertheless display great eagerness, is

most simply explained on the supposition that this teach-

ing with regard to the âtman was studiously withheld

from them ; that it was transmitted in a narrow circle

among the Kshatriyas to the exclusion of the Brâhmans ;

that, in a word, it was upanishad. The allegorical method

of interpreting the ritual in the light of the âtman

doctrine, though it may have been already practised

among the Kshatriya circles, was probably undertaken on

a larger scale after the adoption of the new doctrine by

the Brâhmans. It would follow that the third of the

above-mentioned meanings of the word upanishad as

"secret import" (of some ritual conception) is probably

in the first instance secondary. If we ask further, which

of the two other meanings, (1) secret word, (2) secret text,

is the more primitive, it would seem that a transition

from the second to the first is with difficulty intelligible,

1 Chând. 5. 3 f., Bṛih. 6. 2.

20

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

but that the first passes into the second by a natural and

readily comprehended change.

We may therefore assume that the doctrine of the

âtman as the first principle of the universe, the gradual

rise of which we have traced through the hymns of

the Rigveda and Atharvaveda, was fostered and pro-

gressively developed by the Kshatriyas in opposition to

the principles of the Brâhmanical ritual ; whence the new

knowledge was expressed in brief words or formulas, intel-

ligible only to the initiated, such as tadvanam, tajjalân,

satyasya satyam, samyadvâma, vâmanî, bhâmanî, etc.

A formula of this kind was then called an upanishad,

inasmuch as the condition of its communication and ex-

planation was the absence of publicity. Such formulas

were naturally accompanied by oral explanations, which

also were kept secret, and from these were gradually

developed the earliest texts that bore the name of

Upanishad. The manner in which the formulas tad

vai tad1 or vi-ram2 are discussed may serve as examples

of such secret words accompanied by secret explanation.3

In these and similar ways the secret doctrines, i.e. the

vidyâs, arose, of which mention is so frequently made in

the Upanishads. Their authors or exclusive possessors

were renowned in the land. Pilgrims sought them, pupils

served them for many years,4 and rich gifts were offered to

them5 in order thereby to gain the communication of the

1 Br̥ih. 5. 4.

2 Br̥ih. 5. 12.

3 The explanations given of these secret words are not always in

agreement. The definition of Brahman as pûrṇam apravarti is approved in

Chând. 3. 12. 7, but in Br̥ih. 2. 1. 5 (Kaush. 4. 8) is regarded, on the contrary,

as inadmissible. Of still greater interest is the case of the Upanishad Br̥ih.

16. 3, amritam satyena channam, understood by others as anritam satyena

c'hannam ; so also Br̥ih. 5. 5. 1 (anritam ubhayatah satyena parigṛhîtam), which

again is otherwise explained in Chând. 8. 3. 5. Similarly the saying of the

ancient ṛishis, pâṅktam idam sarvam, is differently construed in Br̥ih. 1. 4. 17

and Taitt. 1. 7.

4 Chând. 4. 10. 2.

5 Chând. 4. 2. 1.

vidyā. In the case of some of these vidyâs the name of

the author is preserved. Several of them, in fact, are

equipped with a formal genealogy, which recounts the

original author and his successors, and usually closes with

the injunction to communicate the doctrine only to a

son or trusted pupil.

A suitable field, however, for the successful development

of these doctrines was first opened up when they passed

from the Kshatriya circles, where they had originally

found a home, by ways that a few illustrations have

already taught us to recognise, into the possession of

the Brâhmans, whose system of scholastic traditions was

firmly established. The latter eagerly adopted the âtman

doctrine, although it was fundamentally opposed to the

Vedic cult of the gods and the Brâhmanical system of

ritual, combined it by the help of allegorical interpreta-

tion with the ritualistic tradition, and attached it to the

curriculum of their schools. The Upanishads became the

Vedânta.

Soon also the Brâhmans laid claim to the new teaching

as their exclusive privilege. They were able to point to

princes and leaders, as Janaka, Jânas'ruti, etc., who were

said to have gone for instruction to Brâhmans. Authorities

on the ritual like S'ândilya and Yâjñavalkhya were trans-

formed into originators and upholders of the ideas of

the Upanishads, and the âtman doctrine was made to pre-

suppose the tradition of the Veda :—“ Only he who knows

the Veda comprehends the great omnipresent Âtman,” as

it is said in a passage of the Brâhmaṇas.1

After the Upanishad ideas had been adopted by the

S'âkhâs, and had been made a part of their Vedic system of

instruction, they passed through a varied expansion and

development under the hands of the Vedic teachers. To

begin with they were brought into accord with the ritual

1 Taitt. Br. 3. 12. 9. 7.

22 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

tradition by interpreting the latter (in the Âraṇyakas) in the spirit of the âtman doctrine; and thus the adherents of the Ṛigveda brought it into connection with the uktham (hymn), those of the Sâmaveda with the sâman, and those of the Yajurveda with the sacrifice, especially the horse-sacrifice as being its highest form. The new doctrine, however, was further developed in a manner which altogether transcended the traditional cult, with which, indeed, it often found itself in open contradiction. In regard to this an active communication and exchange must have existed between the different schools. Definitions which by the one were highly regarded failed to meet with acceptance in another. Teachers who in the one Sâkhâ exercised supreme authority are found in another in a subordinate position (Âruṇi), or are altogether unknown (Yâjñavalkhya). Texts appear with slight variations in the different Vedic schools, whether borrowed directly or going back on either side to a common original. Other texts are met with side by side in one and the same Sâkhâ in numerous recensions, often very similar, often widely divergent from one another. This rich mental life, the details of which can scarcely be further reproduced, may not improbably have lasted for centuries; and the fundamental thought of the doctrine of the âtman have attained an ever completer development by means of the reflection of individual thinkers in familiar intercourse before a chosen circle of pupils, and probably also by public discussions at royal courts. The oldest Upanishads preserved to us are to be regarded as the final result of this mental process.

2. The extant Upanishads

Owing to the manner in which the Upanishads have arisen from the activity of the different Vedic schools and their intercourse one with another, we are unable to lay

down any precise chronological order of succession among them. All the principal Upanishads contain earlier and later elements side by side, and therefore the age of each separate piece must be determined by itself as far as this is possible from the degree of development of the thoughts which find expression in it. Here, where we still treat of the Upanishads as a whole, we can only attempt a rough and approximate determination of the period to which in general an Upanishad belongs.

We distinguish first four successive periods of time, to which the Upanishads as a whole may be assigned.

I. The ancient Prose Upanishads.—

Bṛihadâranyaka and Chândogya.

Taittirîya.

Aitareya.

Kauṣîtaki.

Kena.

The last-named stands on the border-line.

These are collectively the Vedânta texts of the actually existing S'âkhâs, and in their earlier parts are usually closely interwoven with Brâhmaṇas and Âraṇyakas, of which they form the continuation, and whose ritualistic conceptions are interpreted by them in various allegorical ways. It is only the later, and as we may suppose younger texts which emancipate themselves from the ritual. The language is still almost entirely the ancient prose of the Brâhmaṇas, somewhat ponderous stilted and awkward, but not without natural charm. The order adopted above is in general chronological. The Bṛihadâraṇyaka and Chândogya are not only the richest in contents, but also the oldest of the extant Upanishads. As compared also with one another, the Bṛihadâraṇyaka, as we shall often see, shows almost without exception greater originality in the grouping of the texts. On the other hand the literary outlook of Chând. 7. 1. 4 (7. 2. 1, 7. 7. 1) is materially

24 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

broader than that of Ḅrih. 2. 4. 10 (4. 1. 2, 4. 5. 11).

Taittirīya in its essential part is still later than Chândogya; cp. Chând. 6. 2 (three elements) and Taitt. 2. 1 (five elements). Aitareya is later than Chândogya (in Chând. 6. 3. 1 there are three kinds of organic beings, in Ait. 3. 3 four), and than Taittirīya (cp. Taitt. 2. 6, “after that he had created it he entered into it,” with the more elaborate description Ait. 1. 3. 12). Kaushītaki, finally, is later than all those named; for Kaush. 1 is less original than Chând. 5. 3 f., Ḅrih. 6. 2, and Kaush. 3 must be later than Ait. 3. 3, Kaush. 4 than Ḅrih. 2. 1. Kena stands on the border-line of this period, and by virtue of its first metrical portion already belongs to the succeeding epoch.

II. The Metrical Upanishads.—The transition is made by Kena 1–13 and the verses Ḅrih. 4. 4. 8–21, undoubtedly a later addition. There follow—

Kâṭhaka

Îs'â.

S'vetâs'vatara.

Muṇḍaka.

Mahânârâyaṇa.

The last-named makes use of Muṇḍaka, and Muṇḍaka appears to use S'vetâs'vatara. Îs'â seems on the whole to be less fully developed than S'vetâs'vatara, and to be freer from sectarian bias ; but in numerous instances it is found to be dependent on Kâṭhaka.1 That S'vetâs'vatara is later than Kâṭhaka is not open to doubt; on the contrary, it is very probable, on the evidence of several passages,2 that Kâṭhaka was directly employed in the composition of S'vetâs'vatara.

The difference between this period and the preceding is very great. The connection with the S'âkhâs appears

1 Cp. especially Îs'â 8 with Kâṭh. 5. 13.

2 Collected in Deussen, Upan., p. 289.

sometimes doubtful, sometimes artificial, and in any case is loose. Allegories framed after the manner of the

Âranyakas are wanting. The thought of the Upanishads is no longer apprehended as in course of development,

but appears everywhere to have been taken over in its entirety. Individual verses and characteristic phrases con-

stantly recur. The phraseology is already formed. And the language is almost throughout metrical.

III. The later Prose Upanishads.—

Pras’na.

Maitrâyanîya.

Mândûkya.

In this third period the composition returns again to prose, but a prose which is markedly different from the

archaic language of the ancient Upanishads, although it does also take on, especially in the Maitrâyanîya, an archaic

colouring. The style suggests that of the later Sanskrit prose ; it is complex, involved, and delights in repetitions.

The dependence of the thought on that of the earlier Upanishads is made manifest by numerous quotations and adap-

tations. That Pras’na is later than Munḍaka is proved by the fact that the latter is quoted in Pr. 3. 5 ; it is

older, however, than Maitrâyanîya, for it is itself quoted in Maitr. 6. 5. The position of Mândûkya is difficult to

determine, owing to its brevity ; yet the theory concerning Om in Mând. 3 seems to be more advanced than that

of Maitr. 6. 4. The greater number of the Upanishads hitherto mentioned have found admission, sometimes with

very doubtful right, to a place in the three older Vedas. Only three of them—namely, Munḍaka, Pras’na,

and Mândûkya—appear to have belonged from the beginning to the Atharvaveda, the two first-named

certainly as the original legitimate Upanishads of this fourth Veda. These two are ascribed to Saunaka and

Pippalâda, the founders of the S’âkhâs of the Atharva-

26

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

veda. The later collections of Atharva Upanishads

begin as a rule with the Munḍaka and Pras’na, and these

two alone can be proved to have been known to and

employed by Bâdarâyaṇa and S’aṅkara.

IV. The later Atharva Upanishads.—Later theo-

logical treatises retain still the form of Upanishads as a

convenient method of literary composition that carries

with it a degree of sanctity; while the thought concerns

itself partly with the continuous development of older

themes, or refrains from deviating from the beaten tracks

(Garbha, Prâṇâgnihotra, Piṇḍa, Âtma, Sarvopanishat-

sâra, Gâruda), partly turns its attention to the glorifi-

cation of the Yoga (Brahmavidyâ, Kshurikâ, Câlikâ,

Nâdabindu, Brahmanbindu, Amṛitabindu, Dhyânabindu,

Tejobindu, Yogas’ikhâ, Yogatattva, Haṁsa), or of the

Sannyâsa (Brahmâ Sannyâsa, Âruṇeya, Kaṇṭhas’ruti,

Paramahamsa, Jâbâla, Âs’rama). The difference between

the two tendencies shows itself also in the fact that

almost without exception the Yoga Upanishads are com-

posed in verse, those of the Sannyâsa in prose with

occasional verses inserted. A further class of Upanishads

is devoted to the worship of S’iva (Atharvas’iras, Atharva-

s’ikhâ, Nilarudra, Kâlâgni rudra, Kaivalya), or of

Vishṇu (Mahâ, Nârâyana, Âtmabodha, Ṇrisimhatâ-

panîya, Râmatâpaṇîya, and endeavours to interpret

these in the light of the âtman doctrine. They are

composed for the most part in prose with an inter-

mixture of verse. All of these Upanishads were received

into the Atharvaveda, but met with no recognition from

the leading theologians of the Vedânta.

3. The Upanishads in Bâdarâyaṇa and S’aṅkara

The earliest traces of a collection of Upanishads are

found within the books themselves. Thus the mention in

S’vet. 5. 6 of “the Upanishads that form the mystical

portion of the Veda" (veda-guhya-upanishadah), and

also the passage S'vet. 6. 22, "in former times in the

Vedânta was the deepest mystery revealed," seem to look

back to the older Upanishads as a self-contained whole

which already claimed a certain antiquity. A similar

inference may be drawn from a thrice recurring verse 1

which speaks of ascetics (yatis) who have "grasped the

meaning of the Vedânta doctrine." Still more clearly do

the Upanishads appear as a complete whole when, in

Maitr. 2. 3, the doctrine concerning Brahman is described

as "the doctrine of all the Upanishads" (sarva-upanishad-

vidyâ). That in so late works as the Sarva-upanishad-sâra

or the Muktikâ Upanishad the Upanishads are assumed

to be a whole is therefore of no further importance.

It was undoubtedly on the foundation of older and

earlier works that Bâdarâyana formally undertook an

epitome of Upanishad doctrine in the Brahmasûtras,

the foundation of the later Vedânta. He shows that

Brahman is the first principle of the world, samanvayât,

"from the agreement" of the Upanishad texts,2 and

proclaims the fundamental proposition "that all the

texts of the Vedânta deserve credence" (sarva-vedânta-

pratyayam).3 Which Upanishads, however, were recog-

nised by him as canonical cannot be ascertained from

the sûtras themselves owing to their brevity, but only

from S'ankara's commentary, and the decision therefore

remains in many instances doubtful, since we do not

know how far S'ankara followed a reliable tradition. Only

in the first adhyâya is it possible to determine with

greater certainty the Upanishad texts which Bâdarâyana

had in his mind, where he undertakes to establish the

teaching concerning Brahman in twenty-eight Adhikaranas

(sections) based on as many passages of the Upanishads.

1 Mund. 3. 2. 6, Mahânâr. 10. 22, Kaiv. 3.

2 1. 1. 4.

3 3. 3. 1.

28

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

Here, as in his entire work, the number four plays a decisive part in the arrangement of the material. Of the twenty-eight fundamental passages, twelve are taken from the Chândogya, four from the Brihadâranyaka, four from the Kâthaka, four from the Taittirîya and Kaushîtaki (two from each), and four from the Atharva Upanishads, namely, three from the Mundaka and one from the Prasna.

The following scheme1 shows that the order of the passages, as they are found within each of the Upanishads which he employs, is strictly observed, while in other respects the passages appear interwoven in a manner for which we seem to be able to find a reason here and there in the close connection of the subject-matter.

(1) 1. 1. 12-19.

Taitt. 2. 5.

(2) 20-21. Chând. 1. 6. 6.

(3) 22. Chând. 1. 9. 1.

(4) 23. Chând. 1. 11. 5.

(5) 24-27. Chând. 3. 13. 7.

(6) 28-31.

Kaush. 3. 2.

(7) 1. 2. 1-8. Chând. 3. 14. 1.

(8) 9-10.

Kâth. 2. 25.

Kâth. 3. 1.

(9) 11-12.

(10) 13-17. Chând. 4. 15. 1.

(11) 18-20.

Brih. 3. 7. 3.

(12) 21-23.

Mund. 1. 1. 6.

(13) 24-32. Chând. 5. 11-24.

(14) 1. 3. 1-7.

Mund. 2. 2. 5.

(15) 8-9. Chând. 7. 23.

(16) 10-12.

Brih. 3. 8. 8.

(17) 13.

Prasna, 5. 5.

(18) 14-18. Chând. 8. 1. 1.

(19) 19-21. Chând. 8. 12. 3.

(20) 22-23.

Mund. 2. 2. 10.

(21) 24-25.

Kâth. 4. 12.

(22) 39.

Kâth. 6. 1.

(23) 40. Chând. 8. 12. 3.

(24) 41. Chând. 8. 14.

(25) 42-43.

Brih. 4. 3. 7.

(26) 1. 4. 14-15.

Taitt. 2. 6.

(27) 16-18.

Kaush. 4. 19.

(28) 19-22.

Brih. 4. 5. 6.

1 From Deussen, System des Vedânta, p. 130.

BÂDARÂYAṆA AND S'AṆKARA

29

The striking preference for the Chândogya suggests that an earlier work due to the school of this Upanishad was already in the hands of Bâdarâyana, into which he or one of his predecessors worked sixteen extracts of importance derived from another S'âkhâ, being guided further by the principle that the original order of the extracts should be maintained. Besides the Upanishads named, Bâdarâyana may with some confidence be shown to have used the S'vetâs'vatara,1 Aitareya,2 and perhaps Jâbâla.3 With regard, however, to the formula of imprecation quoted in Sût. 3. 3. 25, which according to S'aṅkara should find a place “at the beginning of an Upanishad of the Âtharvaṇikas,” and which is nowhere known to exist, I would now suggest (since throughout their works Bâdarâyana and S'aṅkara make use only of the Muṇḍaka and Praśna from the Atharva Upanishads, consequently recognise none but these, and since they appear to recognise the authority of the Upanishad that follows the imprecation formula), that the suspected formula may once have stood at the beginning of one of these two, perhaps of the Muṇḍaka Upanishad ; somewhat after the manner in which the S'ânti formulas precede the Upanishads in some manuscripts, and in others are wanting.

To the Brahmasûtras of Bâdarâyana is attached the great commentary of S'aṅkara (circa 800 A.D.), to whom are ascribed, besides other works, the commentaries on the Brîhadâraṇyaka, Chândogya, Taittirîya, Aitareya, S'vetas'vatara, Îs'â, Kena, Kaṭha, Praśna, Muṇḍaka and Mâṇḍûkya, which are edited in the Bibl. Ind., vols. ii., iii., vii., viii. Commentaries therefore of S'aṅkara are missing on the Kauṣîtaki, which was first elucidated by S'aṅkarânanda (a teacher, according to Hall, Index, p. 98. 123, of Mâdhava, who flourished 1350 A.D.), and on the Maitrâyaṇîya, which Râmatîrtha expounded.

1 Sût. 1. 4. 8-10. 2 Sût. 3. 3. 16-18. 3 Sût. 1. 2. 32.

The commentaries, however, on the eleven Upanishads named are to be attributed in part probably not to S'ankara himself, but merely to his school, since the explanations given in the Upanishad commentaries often fail to agree with those in the commentary on the sûtras.

The commentary on the Mândûkya which is extant under the name of S'ankara treats this and Gaudapâda's Kârikâ as one, and seems to regard the whole as in no sense an Upanishad (p. 330 : vedânta-artha-sâra-saṅgraha-bhûtam idam prakarana-catushtayam 'om iti etad aksharam' ityâdi arabhyate); and with this would agree the fact that the Mândûkya is not quoted either in the Brahmasûtras or in S'ankara's commentary on them, while two verses from the Kârikâ of Gaudapâda1 are cited by S'ankara2 with the words, atra uktam vedânta-artha-sampradâyavidbhir âcâryaih.

In his commentary on the Brahmasûtras only the following fourteen Upanishads can be shown to have been quoted by S'ankara (the figures attached indicate the number of quotations),—Chândogya 809, Brihadâranyaka 565, Taittirîya 142, Mundaka 129, Kâthaka 103, Kaushîtaki 88, S'vetas'vatara 53, Pras'na 38, Aitareya 22, Jâbâla 13, Mahânârâyana 9, Îs'â 8, Paingi 6, Kena 5.

Although S'aṅkara regards the texts of the Vedânta which he recognises as a uniform and consistent canon of truth,3 yet he seems still to have had in his hands no

1 3. 15 and 1. 16. 2 P. 375. 3, 433. 1.

We may compare his exposition on sûtra 3. 3. 1, p. 813 :—“How then can the question arise, whether the doctrines concerning the âtman are different or not different ; for we cannot suppose the aim of the Vedânta is to teach a plurality of Brahmans, like the existing plurality of phenomena, since Brahman is one and immutable. So it is not possible that concerning the immutable Brahman various doctrines should exist ; for to suppose that the actual fact is one thing, and the knowledge of it another, is necessarily a mistake. And even supposing that in the different Vedânta texts various doctrines were taught concerning the immutable Brahman, only one of these could be true ; the remainder on the other hand would be false, and the con-

collection of Upanishads, since he looks upon the greater

number of them as still forming the concluding chapters

of their respective Brâhmaṇas, to which therefore he is

accustomed to refer at the commencement of the

Upanishad commentary. Thus in the introduction to the

commentary on the Kena1 he quotes its beginning as

"the beginning of the ninth adhyâya;2 before it works

have been thoroughly discussed; the acts of adora-

tion also of the prâṇa which serves as the foundation

of all works were taught; and further those also which

relate to the Sâman that forms a branch of the works.

Next followed the consideration of the Gâyatra-sâman, and

finally the list of teachers. All the above belongs still

to works," etc. On Chândogya, p. 2 :—"The entire ritual

has been rehearsed, as also the knowledge of Prâṇa-Agni,

etc., as divine." On Taittirîya, p. 2 :—"The appointed

works which serve to atone for transgressions that have

been committed, as also the works desirable for those who

covet a definite reward, have been rehearsed in the pre-

ceding parts of the book (pûrvasmin granthê)." On

Brîhadâranyaka, p. 4 : "The connection of this (Upani-

shad) with the sphere of works is as follows," etc. On

Îs'â, p. 1 :—"The mantras îs'â vâsyam, etc., do not apply

(as we should expect) to works, but reveal the nature of

the âtman who is independent of works." On Aitareya,

p. 143 :—"The works together with the knowledge rela-

tive to the lower Brahman are remitted," etc.

As may be inferred from the comments quoted, all

these Upanishads appear to have been still regarded by

S'aṅkara as the concluding portions of their respective

sequence would be loss of confidence in the Vedânta. (This, however, in

Sankara's eyes would be an ἀπάγωγὴ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον). It is therefore

inconceivable that in the individual texts of the Vedânta a difference of

doctrine on the subject of Brahman should find a place."

1 Bibl. Ind., p. 28.

2 In the recension published by Örtel it belongs to the fourth adhyâya.

32 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

Brâhmaṇas. On the other hand a similar connection with the part of a preceding work is wanting in the case of the commentaries on Kâṭhaka and S'vetâs'vatara. So also with Muṇḍaka and Pras'na, which are treated by S'aṅkara as one. In the introduction to Pras'na, p. 160. 2, he remarks :—“in order to examine further the subjects taught in the mantras (of the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, as it is rightly glossed), this Brâhmaṇa (the Pras'na Upanishad) is undertaken.” Since, however, the Muṇḍaka and Pras'na exhibit no relationship at all, and since they are attached further to different S'âkhâs of the Atharvaveda (those of S'aunaka and Pippalâda respectively), this unity under which S'aṅkara treats of them is probably to be explained merely from the fact that as early as his time they were linked together as the first beginning and foundation of a collection of Atharva Upanishads. At that time probably the collection consisted only of these two, for otherwise it is hardly likely that the others would have been ignored by S'aṅkara so completely as was in fact the case. It is true also that the annotator Ânandajñâna remarks at the beginning of S'aṅkara's commentary on the Mâṇḍûkya : “Beginning with the Brahma Upanishad (he intends probably the Brahma-vidyâ Upanishad) and the Garbha Upanishad, there are extant besides many Upanishads of the Atharvaveda. Since, however, they are not employed in the S'ârîrakam (the Brahmasûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa), he (S'aṅkara) does not expound them.” But the reason assigned is perhaps not conclusive; for which Upanishads are found in the S'ârîrakam, and which not, could only be determined by tradition or from S'aṅkara himself. It must therefore have been tradition or S'aṅkara himself that excluded other Upanishads from the Canon, whether because they were yet unknown, or because they were not yet recognised as Upanishads. And thus in fact S'aṅkara describes the Mâṇḍukya, upon which nevertheless, together

IMPORTANT COLLECTIONS OF UPANISHADS

33

with Gauḍapâda's Kârikâ, he had himself commented, not

as an Upanishad, but as "a literary composition contain-

ing the essence of the Vedânta (vedânta-artha-sâra-

saṅgraha-bhûtam prakaraṇam).

4. The most important Collections of Upanishads

The further history of the Upanishad tradition is for

a time shrouded in darkness, and only conjecturally are we

able from the existing collections of Upanishads to draw

some conclusions as to their origin. These collections or

lists fall from the outset into two classes, in so far as

they either contain the Upanishads in their entirety, or

limit themselves (at least as far as the original design is

concerned) to the Upanishads of the Atharvaveda. Of

the former class is the Canon of the Muktikâ and the

Oupnek'hat, of the latter that of Colebrooke and

Nârâyana.

Since the Upanishads of the three older Vedas con-

tinued to live in the tradition of the S'âkhâs, as long as

these survived the secure transmission of the Upanishads

concerned was assured. It was otherwise with the

Atharvaveda, which was not employed at the sacrifice,

and in consequence had no such firmly established

tradition of the schools as the text of the three older

Vedas upon which to rely for its preservation. This is

shown not only by the indifference from which its Saṁhitâ

has suffered, but also by the freedom with which it ad-

mitted new compositions. The latter would assuredly

have been impossible as long as the tradition was under

the protection of regular Vedic schools, maintaining them-

selves from generation to generation according to the

rules of their guild. Hence is to be explained the exten-

sive irruption of newly composed Upanishads into the

Atharvaveda. As early as S'aṅkara we find the Muṇḍaka

and Pras'na united together (sup. p. 32), and on these as

3

34 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

foundation a collection of Atharva Upanishads appears to

have been gradually built up, which eventually comprised

34 pieces from Mûṇḍaka to Nrisimhatâpanîya, and

included also some whose claim to the name of Upani-

shads had never been previously recognised ; just as in

the judgement of S'aṅkara the Kârikâ of Gauḍapâda

on the Mâṇḍûkya Upanishad, and indeed this treatise

itself (sup. pp. 30, 33), had no claim to the position of an

Upanishad. These 34 primary Upanishads of Colebrooke's

list were later extended to 52 by the addition not only of

a number of recent compositions, but most remarkably

by the side of and among them of seven of the recognised

texts of the older Vedas, viz.—35–36 Kâṭhaka, 37 Kena,

39–40 Brihanṇârâyaṇa (= Taitt. Âr. x.), 44 Ânandavallî

(= Taitt. Up. 2), and 45 Bhriguvallî (= Taitt. Up. 3).

In this manner the collection of 52 Upanishads first made

known by Colebrooke originated, the strange combination

of which we attempted to explain 1 on the hypothesis that

at the time and in the region where this collection was

finally put together the three older Vedas were cultivated

only in the S'âkhâs of the Aitareyins, Tândins (to which

the Chândogya Upanishad belongs), and Vâjasaneyins.

Accordingly the Upanishads of the remaining S'âkhâs

(with the exception of the Kaushîtaki, S'vetâs'vatara, and

Maitrâyaṇîya, which were perhaps already lost or not

recognised) were inserted in the existing collection of

Atharva Upanishads with a view to their safe pre-

servation. 2

The collection of Nârâyana is in exact agreement with

that of Colebrooke, apart from a few variations in the

1 Deussen, Upan., p. 537.

2 An apparently older list has been preserved in the Atharva-paris'ishta

2. 13 (Berliner Handschriften, 2. 88), which reckons only 28 Atharva Upani-

shads, omitting the texts of the older Vedas, but in other respects, as far

as it goes, agrees with the lists of Colebrooke and Nârâyana with a single

exception.

order of the later treatises. The 52 Upanishads of Colebrooke are however reduced to 45, seven sectarian texts being then added to form Nos. 46–52, viz.—two Gopâlatâpanîya, Ḱrishṇa, Vâsudeva with Gopîcandana, S'vetâs'vatara, and two Varadatâpanîya. This inter-relation is to be explained on the theory that the number 52 had already gained a kind of canonical authority before the desire was felt to insert seven additional texts, which had now for the first time come into existence or obtained recognition. The end was attained by uniting portions that had originally belonged together, and so reducing the existing 52 numbers to 45. Thus room was found for the seven new texts within the number of the 52, thereby facilitating the recognition of the complete list as canonical.

The collection of 108 Upanishads, which the Muktikâ itself regards as later, appears to belong to an entirely different region (probably the south of India), and to a considerably more recent time. This collection includes all the treatises of Colebrooke (except the Nilarudra, Pinḍa, Mahânârâyana, Âs'rama) and of Nârâyana (except the Varadatâpanîya), although for the most part under different names and sometimes expanded by later additions to thirty or forty times their original extent. Added to these are the 11 Upanishads of the three older Vedas complete, with the exception of the Mahânârâyana, and about seventy new texts found nowhere else. The circumstance that in this collection the Upanishads of the three older Vedas also find a place, and that at the very beginning of it, points to a time and region in which a living and reliable tradition of the S'âkhâs no longer existed; of which fact a further and yet stronger proof is the bold attempt, made without a shadow of justification, to assign 10 of these 108 Upanishads to the Ṛigveda, 19 to the White and 32

36 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

to the Black Yajurveda, 16 to the Sâmaveda, and 31 to the Atharvaveda, — a procedure against which

the ancient Vedic schools would have strenuously pro-

tested. In other respects this collection is of great

interest for the later history of the Vedânta (perhaps

mainly or exclusively among the Telugu Brâhmans), and

deserves closer examination now that it has been made

accessible in the Devanâgarî edition of 1896. Previously

there had existed only an edition in the Telugu character.

It is worthy of note also that S'ankarânanda's readings

often agree with those of the 108 Upanishads against

those of the 52 and of Nârâyana.

A position apart both from the 52 and the 108

Upanishads is occupied by that collection of 50 Upani-

shads which, under the name of Oupnek'hat, which was

translated from the Sanskṛit into Persian in the year

1656 at the instance of the Sultan Mohammed Dara

Shakoh, and from the Persian into Latin in 1801–02

by Anquetil Duperon. The Oupnek'hat also, like the

Muktikâ collection, professes to be a general collection

of Upanishads. It contains under twelve divisions the

Upanishads of the three older Vedas, and with them

twenty-six Atharva Upanishads that are known from

other sources. It further comprises eight treatises peculiar

to itself, five of which have not up to the present time

been proved to exist elsewhere, and of which therefore a

rendering from the Persian-Latin of Anquetil is alone

possible.1 Finally, the Oupnek'hat contains four treatises

from the Vâj. Samh. 16. 31. 32. 34, of which the first is

met with in a shorter form in other collections also as the

Nilarudra Upanishad, while the three last have nowhere

else found admission.2 The reception of these treatises

1 See Deussen, Upan., p. 838 f.

2 These, as belonging to the early history of the Upanishads, I have

translated and discussed sup. I. 1 pp. 156 f., 290 f., 291 f., 335.

from the Saṃhitâ into the body of the Upanishads, as though there were danger of their otherwise falling into oblivion, makes us infer a comparatively late date for the Oupnek'hat collection itself, although as early as 1656 the Persian translators made no claim to be the original compilers, but took the collection over already complete. They seem, indeed, to have regarded it as originating in a period long past.1 Owing to the excessive literality with which Anquetil Duperron rendered these Upanishads word by word from the Persian into Latin, while preserving the syntax of the former language,—a literality that stands in striking contrast to the freedom with which the Persian translators treated the Sanskrit text,—the Oupnek'hat is a very difficult book to read ; and an insight as keen as that of Schopenhauer was required in order to discover within this repellent husk a kernel of invaluable philosophical significance, and to turn it to account for his own system.2

An examination of the material placed at our disposal in the Oupnek'hat was first undertaken by A. Weber, Ind. Stud., i., ii., ix., on the basis of the Sanskrit text. Meanwhile the original texts were published in the Bibliotheca Indica in part with elaborate commentaries, and again in the Ânandâs'rama series. Max Mûller translated the twelve oldest Upanishads in Sacred Books of the East, vols. i., xv. The two longest and some of the shorter treatises have appeared in a literal German rendering by O. Böhtlingk. And my own translation of the 60 Upanishads (Leipzig, 1897) contains complete texts of this character which, upon the strength of their regular occurrence in the Indian collections and lists of the Upanishads, may lay claim to a certain

1 See Deussen, Upan., p. 535.

2 Schopenhauer's judgement on the Oupnek'hat is quoted in Deussen, Upan., p. vi.

38 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

canonicity. The prefixed Introductions and the Notes treat exhaustively of the matter and composition of the several treatises, and there is therefore no necessity to enter here further into these literary questions.

III. The Fundamental Conception of the Upanishads and its Significance

1. The Fundamental Conception of the Upanishads

All the thoughts of the Upanishads move around two fundamental ideas. These are (1) the Brahman, and (2) the âtman. As a rule these terms are employed synonymously. Where a difference reveals itself, Brahman appears as the older and less intelligible expression, âtman as the later and more significant ; Brahman as the unknown that needs to be explained, âtman as the known through which the other unknown finds its explanation ; Brahman as the first principle so far as it is comprehended in the universe, âtman so far as it is known in the inner self of man. We may take as an example the passages from S'âtap. Br. 10. 6. 3, Chând. 3. 14,1 whose sole fundamental thought consists in this, that the universe is Brahman (sarvam khalu idam brahma), and the Brahman the âtman within us (esha ma' âtmâ antar hridayye, etc.).2 Another example is furnished by the story of Gârgya (Br̥ih. 2. 1, Kaush. 4), who endeavours in vain to define the Brahman, until finally he is referred by the king to the âtman for its

1 Translated in I. 1 pp. 264, 336.

2 Böhtlingk maintains * that I had “not known (!) that esha ma' âtmá antar hridayye is everywhere subject.” He himself, however, involuntarily bears testimony to the correctness of my translation, when, immediately after his rendering in § 3, “this my Self in my innermost heart,” in § 4 where the same phrase recurs he translates precisely as I do, “this is my Self in my innermost heart.”

• Berichte der Sächs. G. d. W., 1897, p. 84.

explanation. The difference between Brahman and âtman emerges most clearly where they appear side by side with one another in brief sayings. The passage Br̥ih. 4. 4. 5 may serve as example :-“ truly the Brahman is this Âtman ” ( sa vá' ayam âtmá brahma ).

If for our present purpose we hold fast to this distinction of the Brahman as the cosmical principle of the universe, the âtman as the psychical, the fundamental thought of the entire Upanishad philosophy may be expressed by the simple equation :-

Brahman = Âtman.

That is to say—the Brahman, the power which presents itself to us materialised in all existing things, which creates, sustains, preserves, and receives back into itself again all worlds, this eternal infinite divine power is identical with the âtman, with that which, after stripping off everything external, we discover in ourselves as our real most essential being, our individual self, the soul. This identity of the Brahman and the âtman, of God and the soul, is the fundamental thought of the entire doctrine of the Upanishads. It is briefly expressed by the “ great saying ” tat tvam asi, “ that art thou ” ( Chând. 6. 8. 7 f. ) ; and aham brahma asmi, “ I am Brahman ” ( Br̥ih. 1. 4. 10 ). And in the compound word brahma-âtma-aikyam, “ unity of the Brahman and the âtman, ” is described the fundamental dogma of the Vedânta system.

If we strip this thought of the various forms, figurative to the highest degree and not seldom extravagant, under which it appears in the Vedânta texts, and fix our attention upon it solely in its philosophical simplicity as the identity of God and the soul, the Brahman and the âtman, it will be found to possess a significance reaching far beyond the Upanishads, their time and country ; nay, we claim for it an inestimable value for the whole race of mankind. We are unable to look into the future, we do

not know what revelations and discoveries are in store for

the restlessly inquiring human spirit; but one thing we

may assert with confidence,—whatever new and unwonted

paths the philosophy of the future may strike out, this

principle will remain permanently unshaken, and from it

no deviation can possibly take place. If ever a general

solution is reached of the great riddle, which presents

itself to the philosopher in the nature of things all the

more clearly the further our knowledge extends, the key

can only be found where alone the secret of nature lies

open to us from within, that is to say, in our innermost

self. It was here that for the first time the original

thinkers of the Upanishads, to their immortal honour,

found it when they recognised our âtman, our inmost

individual being, as the Brahman, the inmost being of

universal nature and of all her phenomena.

2. The Conception of the Upanishads in its Relation

to Philosophy

The whole of religion and philosophy has its root in

the thought that (to adopt the language of Kant) the

universe is only appearance and not reality (Ding an sich);

that is to say, the entire external universe, with its infinite

ramifications in space and time, as also the involved and

intricate sum of our inner perceptions, is all merely the form

under which the essential reality presents itself to a con-

sciousness such as ours, but is not the form in which it

may subsist outside of our consciousness and independent

of it; that, in other words, the sum-total of external and

internal experience always and only tells us how things

are constituted for us, and for our intellectual capacities,

not how they are in themselves and apart from intelli-

gences such as ours.

It is easy to show how this thought, which met with

adequate recognition first in the philosophy of Kant, but

THE UPANISHADS AND PHILOSOPHY

41

which existed in less clearly defined form from the earliest

times, is the basis and tacit presumption, more or less

consciously, of all philosophy, so far at least as this

name is not made to serve as a mere cloak for empirical

sciences. For all philosophy, as contrasted with empirical

science, is not content to learn to know objects in their

circumstances and surroundings, and to investigate their

causal connections ; but it rather seeks beyond all these

to determine their nature, inasmuch as it regards the sum-

total of empirical reality, with all the explanations offered

by the empirical sciences, as something which needs to be

yet further explained; and this solution is found in the

principle which it sets forth, and from which it seeks to

infer the real nature of things and their relation. This

fact, then, that philosophy has from the earliest times

sought to determine a first principle of the universe, proves

that it started from a more or less clear consciousness that

the entire empirical reality is not the true essence of

things, that, in Kant's words, it is only appearance and

not the thing in itself.

There have been three occasions, as far as we know, on

which philosophy has advanced to a clearer comprehension

of its recurring task, and of the solution demanded : first

in India in the Upanishads, again in Greece in the philo-

sophy of Parmenides and Plato, and finally, at a more

recent time, in the philosophy of Kant and Schopen-

hauer. In a later work we shall have to show how

Greek philosophy reached its climax in the teaching of

Parmenides and Plato, that this entire universe of change

is, as Parmenides describes it, merely phenomenal, or in

Plato's words a world of shadows; and how both philo-

sophers endeavoured through it to grasp the essential

reality, τὸ ὄν, τὸ ὄντως ὄν, that which Plato, in an expression

that recalls the doctrine of the Upanishads no less than

the phraseology of Kant, describes as the αὐτὸ (ātman)

42 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

καθ' αὐτό (an sich). We shall then see further how this same thought, obscured for a time under the influence of Aristotle and throughout the Middle Ages, was taken up again in quite a different way, and shone forth more clearly than ever before in the philosophy founded by Kant, adopted and perfected by his great successor Schopenhauer. Here we have to do with the Upanishads, and the world-wide historical significance of these documents cannot, in our judgement, be more clearly indicated than by showing how the deep fundamental conception of Plato and Kant was precisely that which already formed the basis of Upanishad teaching.

The objects which lie around us on every side in infinite space, and to which by virtue of our corporeal nature we ourselves belong, are, according to Kant, not "things in themselves," but only apparitions. According to Plato, they are not the true realities, but merely shadows of them. And according to the doctrine of the Upanishads, they are not the âtman, the real "self" of the things, but mere mâyâ,—that is to say, a sheer deceit, illusion. It is true that the term mâyâ occurs for the first time in S'vet. 4. 10 ; and therefore some writers, whose recognition of a fact is obscured by the different language in which it is clothed, have hazarded the assertion that the conception of mâyâ is still unknown to the more ancient Upanishads. How in the light of this assertion they find it possible to comprehend these older Upanishads (Bṛihad. and Chând.) they themselves perhaps know. The fact is they are penetrated throughout by the conception which later was most happily expressed by the word mâyâ. In the very demand which they make that the âtman of man, the âtman of the universe, must be sought for,1 it is implied that this body and this universe which reveal

1 Bṛih. 2. 4. 5 : âtmâ vâ' are draṣṭavyâḥ, s'rotavyo, mantavyo, nididhyâsitavyo ; Chând. 8. 7. 1 : so' nveṣṭavyâḥ, sa vijijñâsitavyaḥ.

THE UPANISHADS AND PHILOSOPHY 43

themselves to us unsought are not the ātman, the self,

the true reality ; and that we are under a delusion if, like

the demon Virocana,1 we regard them as such. All worldly

objects and relationships are, as Yājñavalkhya explains in

Bṛih. 2. 4. 5a, of no value for their own sake (as “things

in themselves”), but for the sake of the ātman ; nay, they

exist solely in the ātman, and that man is utterly and

hopelessly undone who knows them “apart from the

Self” (anyatra ātmano). This ātman, he concludes,2 is

Brāhman and warrior, is space, gods, and creatures, “this

ātman is the entire universe” (idam sarvam yad ayam

ātmā). As when a man touches the instrument3 he at

the same time elicits the notes, so when a man has

comprehended the ātman he has with it comprehended

all these things :—“Verily he who has seen, heard, com-

prehended and known the Self, by him is this entire

universe known.”4

Immediately connected with these conceptions, and

probably even with this passage from the Bṛihadāraṇyaka,

is the expression in the Chândogya Up. 6. 1. 2, where

that which in the former place was the climax of a de-

velopment is assumed and becomes the theme advanced

for discussion :—“ Dost thou then ask for that instruction,

by which the unheard becomes (already) heard, the un-

comprehended comprehended, the unknown known ?

“What then, most noble sir, is this instruction?”

“Just as, my dear sir, from a lump of clay everything

that consists of clay is known, the change is a matter of

words alone, a mere name,5 it is in reality only clay,—

thus, my dear sir, is this instruction.” Here the manifold

change of the one substance is explained as mere word-

play, mere name, exactly as Parmenides asserts that all

1 Chând. 8. 8. 4. 2 L.c. 2. 4. 6.

3 Bṛih. 2. 4. 7 f. 4 Bṛih. 2. 4. 5b.

5 vácârambhaṇam vikáro, nâmadheyam.

44

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

which men regard as real is mere name.1 Later passages

employ language that is based on these conceptions, “nor

is this even a plurality,”2 and the verses preserved in

Bṛih. 4. 4. 19 :3—

In the spirit should this be perceived,

Here there is no plurality anywhere.

From death to death again he rushes blindly

Who fancies that he here sees difference.

Apt and striking also is the remark of a later

Upanishad 4 that no proof of plurality can even be offered,

“for no proof is possible of the existence of a duality, and

only the timeless âtman admits of proof,” (i.e. we are

incapable of knowing anything outside of our own con-

sciousness, which under all circumstances forms a unity).

It is clear from the foregoing :—(1) That the view

which later was most explicitly set forth in the doctrine

of mâyâ is so far from being strange to the oldest

Upanishads that it is assumed in and with their funda-

mental doctrine of the sole reality of the âtman, and

forms its necessary complement ; and (2) that this funda-

mental doctrine of the Upanishads is seen to be in mar-

vellous agreement with the philosophies of Parmenides

and Plato, and of Kant and Schopenhauer. So fully

indeed is this true, that all three, originating from different

epochs and countries, and with modes of thought entirely

independent, mutually complete, elucidate, and confirm

one another. Let this then suffice for the philosophical

significance of the Upanishads.

3. The Conception of the Upanishads in its Relation

to Religion

The thought referred to, common to India, Plato, and

Kant, that the entire universe is only appearance and not

1 τὠ πάντ' ὄνομ' ἐσται, ὅσα ἰρότοί κατεθέντο πέποιθότες εἰναί ἄληθη.

2 Kaush. 3. 8.

3 cp. Kâṭh. 4. 10-11.

4 Ṇṛisimhott. 9.

reality, forms not only the special and most important theme of all philosophy, but is also the presumption and conditio sine quâ non of all religion. All great religious teachers therefore, whether in earlier or later times, nay even all those at the present day whose religion rests upon faith, are alike unconsciously followers of Kant. This we propose briefly to prove.

The necessary premisses of all religion are, as Kant frequently expounds :—(1) The existence of God, (2) the immortality of the soul, (3) the freedom of the will (without which no morality is possible). These three essential conditions of man’s salvation—God, immortality, and freedom—are conceivable only if the universe is mere appearance and not reality (mere mâyâ and not the âtman), and they break down irretrievably should this empirical reality, wherein we live, be found to constitute the true essence of things.

(1) The existence of God will be precluded by that of space, which is infinite, and therefore admits of nothing external to itself, and nothing within save that which fills it, i.e. matter (the most satisfactory definition of which is “ that which fills space ”).

(2) Immortality will be precluded by the conditions of time, in consequence of which our existence has a beginning in time by conception and birth, and an end in time by death ; and this end is absolute, in so far as that beginning was absolute.

(3) Freedom, and with it the possibility of moral action, will be precluded by the universal validity of the law of causality, as shown by experience ; for this requires that every effect, consequently every human action, should be the necessary result of causes which precede the action, and which therefore in the actual moment of action are no longer within our control.

The question as it concerns God, immortality, and

freedom, stands on an altogether different footing if this entire empirical reality, the occupant of space and time, and ruled by causal laws, is mere appearance and not a disposition of “things in themselves,” to use Kant's words; or is mere māyā and not the ātman, the “self” of things, as the Upanishads teach. For in this case there is room for another, a higher order of things, which is not subject to the laws of space, time, and causality. And it is precisely this higher order of things set over-

against the reality of experience, from the knowledge of which we are excluded by our intellectual constitution, which religion comprehends in faith by her teaching concerning God, immortality, and freedom. All religions therefore unconsciously depend on the fundamental dogma of the Kantian philosophy, which in a less definite form was already laid down in the Upanishads. These last therefore by virtue of their fundamental character lie naturally at the basis of every religious conception of existence.

By the side, moreover, of this their value for religion in general they have a special and very remarkable inner relation to Christianity, which we cannot state more briefly and clearly than by repeating in the present connection, where this consideration is essential, what has been before said on this subject.1

The Upanishads, it was pointed out, are for the Veda what the New Testament is for the Bible. And this analogy is not merely external and accidental, but is fundamental and based upon a universal law of development of the religious life which is acknowledged on both sides.

In the childhood of the human race religion enacts commands and prohibitions, and emphasizes them by promises of reward and denunciations of punishment;—it addresses itself to the self-interest, which it assumes to

1 Deussen, Sechzig Upanishads, Vorrede.

be the centre and essence of human nature, and beyond which it does not go.

A higher grade of religious consciousness is attained with the knowledge that all actions which depend upon

the motives of expectation and fear are of no value for the ultimate destiny of mankind; that the supreme

function of existence does not consist in the satisfaction of self-interest, but in its voluntary suppression ; and that

herein first the true divine reality of ourselves, through the individual self as through an outer husk, makes itself

manifest.

The primitive standpoint of righteousness by works is represented in the Bible by the Old Testament law,

which corresponds in the Veda to that which the Indian theologians call the karmakāṇḍa (the department of

works), under which name is comprised the whole literature of the Hymns and Brāhmaṇas, with the

exception of portions intercalated here and there in the spirit of the Upanishads. Both the Old Testament and

the karmakāṇḍa of the Veda proclaim a law, and hold out the prospect of reward for its observance and of

punishment for its transgression. And if the Indian theory has the advantage of being able to defer retribution

in part to the future, and by that means to relieve the conflict with experience that raises so many difficulties

for the Old Testament doctrine of a retribution limited to this world ; it is, on the other hand, the distinguishing

characteristic of the Biblical law of righteousness, that it pays less regard than the Indian to ritual prescriptions,

and in their place lays greater stress on a habitually blameless course of life. For the interests of human

society this advantage is very great. In itself however, and as far as the moral value of an action is concerned, it

makes no difference whether a man exert himself in the service of imaginary gods or in that of his fellow-men.

48 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

So long as his own well-being lies before him as the ultimate aim, either is simply a means to this selfish end, and therefore, like the end itself, from a moral point of view is to be set aside as worthless.

The recognition of this is seen in the New Testament doctrine of the worthlessness of all works, even those that are good, and in the corresponding Upanishad doctrine that altogether rejects works. Both make salvation dependent not on anything done or left undone, but on a complete transformation of the natural man as a whole. Both regard this transformation as a release from the bonds of this all-embracing empirical reality, which has its roots in egotism.

Why then do we need a release from this existence? Because it is the realm of sin, is the reply of the Bible. The Veda answers : Because it is the realm of ignorance.

The former sees depravity in the volitional, the latter in the intellectual side of human nature. The Bible demands a change of the will, the Veda of the understanding. On which side does the truth lie? If man were pure will or pure intelligence, we should have to decide for one or the other alternative. But since he is a being who both wills and knows, the great change upon which the Bible and the Veda alike make salvation depend must be realised in both departments of his life.

Such a change is, in the first place, according to the Biblical view the softening of a heart hardened by natural self-love, and the inclining it to deeds of righteousness, affection, and self-denial. It is however, in the second place and side by side with this, the breaking forth upon us of the light of the great intellectual truth, which the Upanishads taught before Kant, that this entire universe, with its relations in space, its consequent manifoldness and dependence upon the mind that apprehends, rests solely upon an illusion (māyā), natural indeed to us owing to

THE UPANISHADS AND RELIGION

49

the limitations of our intellect; and that there is in truth one

Being alone, eternal, exalted above space and time, multi-

plicity and change, self-revealing in all the forms of nature,

and by me who myself also am one and undivided, dis-

covered and realised within as my very Self, as the âtman.

As surely however as, to adopt the significant teach-

ing of Schopenhauer, the will and not the intellect is the

centre of a man's nature, so surely must the pre-eminence

be assigned to Christianity, in that its demand for a

renewal of the will is peculiarly vital and essential. But

as certainly as man is not mere will, but intellect besides,

so certainly will that Christian renewal of the will make

itself manifest on the other side as a renewal of know-

ledge, just as the Upanishads teach. "Thou shalt love thy

neighbour as thyself" is the requirement of the Bible.

But on what grounds is this demand to be based, since

feeling is in myself alone and not in another? "Because,"

the Veda here adds in explanation, "thy neighbour is in

truth thy very self, and what separates you from him is

mere illusion." As in this case, so at every point of

the system. The New Testament and the Upanishads,

these two noblest products of the religious consciousness

of mankind, are found when we sound their deeper

meaning to be nowhere in irreconcilable contradiction, but

in a manner the most attractive serve to elucidate and

complete one another.

An example may show the value of the Upanishad teach-

ing for the full development of our Christian consciousness.

Christianity teaches in spirit, even if not always in the

letter, that man as such is capable only of sinful, that is

selfish actions (Rom. 718), and that all good whether of

purpose or achievement can only be wrought in us by God

(Phil. 213). Clearly as this doctrine—for him who has

eyes to see—is formulated not so much in individual

expressions as rather in the entire system as such, yet it

50 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

has been difficult at all times for the Church to rest satisfied with it. She has sought perpetually an opportunity of co-ordinating her own imperfect remedial measures, and of leaving open a side-door for human co-operation,—clearly because behind the sole operative power which makes God the source of all good she saw standing like a frightful apparition the grim monstrosity of predestination. And indeed this presents itself as an inevitable consequence as soon as we connect the Christian conception of the sole agency of God, as profound as it is true, with the Jewish realism adopted from the Old Testament, which sets God and man over-against one another as two mutually exclusive subsistences. In this darkness there comes to us light from the East, from India. It is true that Paul also hints at an identification of God with the αὐθρώπoς πνευματικός (1 Cor. 1547), it is true that Kant endeavours to explain the marvellous phenomenon of the categorical imperative within us on the theory that the man as real (“thing in itself”) lays down the law to the man as phenomenal; but how slight the significance of these timid and groping essays as compared with the profound and fundamental conception of the Vedânta, which makes its appearance everywhere in the Upanishads, that the God, the sole author of all good in us, is not as in the Old Testament a Being contrasted with and distinct from us, but rather—without impairing his absolute antagonism to the depraved self of experience (jîva)—our own metaphysical I, our divine self, persisting in untarnished purity through all the aberrations of human nature, eternal blessed,—in a word, our âtman.

This and much more we may learn from the Upanishads,—we shall learn the lesson, if we are willing to put the finishing touch to the Christian consciousness, and to make it on all sides consistent and complete.

THE SYSTEM OF THE UPANISHADS

INTRODUCTION

By a system we understand an association of thoughts,

which collectively belong to and are dependent on a

single centre. A system has therefore always an individual

author, whether he have himself originated the thoughts

brought together in the system, or have only adjusted

to one another and welded into a consistent whole im-

perfect thoughts derived from without. In this sense a

"system of the Upanishads," strictly speaking, does not

exist. For these treatises are not the work of a single

genius, but the total philosophical product of an entire

epoch, which extends from the period of the wandering

in the Ganges valley to the rise of Buddhism, or approxi-

mately from 1000 or 800 B.C. to c. 500 B.C., but which is

prolonged in its offshoots far beyond this last limit of

time. Thus we find in the Upanishads a great variety

of conceptions which are developed before our eyes, and

which not seldom stand to one another in irreconcilable

contradiction. All these conceptions, however, gather so

entirely around one common centre, and are dominated

so completely by the one thought of the sole reality of

the âtman, that they all present themselves as manifold

variations upon one and the same theme, which is treated

at one time more briefly, or again at greater length,

now from the starting-point of the empirical consciousness,

and now in abrupt contradiction thereto. Accordingly

all individual differences are so entirely overshadowed by the one fundamental conception, that while it is true that we have before us in the Upanishads no defined system, we are able nevertheless to trace the gradual development of a system. This latter then consists in the increasingly thorough interweaving of a fundamental thought originally idealistic with the realistic requirements of the empirical consciousness, which make their influence more and more felt. That this is so will appear in the course of our exposition. These tendencies reached their climax first in post-Vedic times in the general system at once theological and philosophical, which was shaped by the hands of Bâdarâyana and his commentator S'ankara, and in which full account was taken of the demands both of the idealism and the realism (by distinguishing between a higher and a lower knowledge). As the System of the Vedânta this became in India the universal foundation of faith and knowledge, and has remained so up to the present day, though undergoing great development on every side. It falls naturally into four main divisions, as follows :—

I. Theology ; the doctrine of Brahman as the first principle of all things.

II. Cosmology ; the doctrine of the evolution of this principle to form the universe.

III. Psychology ; the doctrine of the entrance of Brahman as soul into the universe evolved from him.

IV. Eschatology and Ethics ; the doctrine of the fate of the soul after death, and the manner of life which is therefore required.

The growth also of the System of the Vedânta, as it is disclosed to us in the Upanishads, may with similar propriety be discussed under these four principal heads, and the subdivisions which the nature of the subject suggests. We propose to endeavour to collect under each

heading all the relevant passages of the Upanishads recognised by the later Vedânta, and where a development of thought presents itself in them we shall in many instances be furnished with a safer ground for determining the chronological position of a text as compared with earlier and later treatments of the same theme. The gain for philology therefore will consist in the provision of a more secure basis for the chronology of the Upanishad texts according to their relative age; while on the philosophical side we may hope for a deeper insight into the rise of one of the most remarkable and prolific creations of thought that the world possesses.

FIRST PART OF THE SYSTEM OF THE UPANISHADS

THEOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF BRAHMAN

I. On the Possibility of Knowing Brahman

1. Is the Veda the Source of Knowledge of Brahman?

Bâdarayâṇa begins the S'ârîraka-mîmâṃsâ, in which is contained the oldest systematic epitome of the Vedânta doctrine, with the following four sûtras :-(1) atha ato brahma-jijñâsâ, iti, " next what is called the search after Brahman"; (2) janma-âdi asya yata', iti, "(Brahman is that) from which is the birth etc. (i.e. birth, continuance, and end) of this (universe)"; (3) s'âstra-yonitvâd, iti, " an account of its originating from the (sacred) canon " (i.e. according to one explanation, because the sacred canon is the source of the knowledge of Brahman as already defined. To the objection that the canon has in view not knowledge but worship, it is then said); (4) tat tu, samanvayât, " that however on account of the agreement " (of the assertions respecting Brahman, which, if they concerned acts of worship alone, would be unnecessary, or even impossible). To establish in particular cases this agreement of all the Vedânta texts in their assertions respecting Brahman is the aim of the entire work of Bâdarâyaṇa and S'aṃkara. For them the whole of the Veda is of supernatural origin, breathed forth by Brahman (according to a passage to be discussed immediately), and

SOURCE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN 55

therefore infallible. From it they construct their entire

doctrine, and only in instances where the meaning of the

Vedânta text is doubtful do they call in the aid of

experience to give the casting vote.

The question arises, what is the teaching of the Upani-

shads themselves with regard to the sources from which

the knowledge of Brahman is to be derived ?

The very oldest Upanishad texts take for granted a

rich store of literary works (transmitted of course only

orally). In Br̥ih. 2. 4. 10, for example, it is said :-“ Just

as, when a fire is laid with damp wood, clouds of smoke

spread all around, so in truth from this great Being have

been breathed forth the Rigveda, the Yajurveda, the Sâma-

veda, the (hymns) of the Atharvans and the Angirases, the

narratives, the histories, the sciences, the mystical doctrines

(upanishads), the poems, the proverbs, the parables, and

expositions,—all these have been breathed forth from him.”

This passage is in many respects instructive. In the

first place we infer from it that there are only three

Vedas,1 and that the hymns of the Atharvans and

Angirases are not yet recognised as Veda. The first

trace of such recognition is perhaps Br̥ih. 5. 13, where,

together with uktham, yajus and sâman, a fourth kshatram

is named. This may denote the Atharvaveda, which

stands in a closer relation to the warrior caste, and serves

especially to ward off misfortune (trâyate kshanitos, as

kshatram is etymologically explained). To the same pur-

port is Br̥ih. 6. 4. 13, where a son who has studied one,

two, or three Vedas is distinguished from one who knows

“all the Vedas,” i.e. probably all four. The âtharvana

first appears as a fourth veda in Chând. 7. 1. 2, and under

the name atharva-veda in Muṇḍ. 1. 1. 5 ; the latter name

therefore is first met with in the Atharva Upanishads.

1 So generally in the older Upanishad texts, cp. the index to my

“Upanishads” under “Triple knowledge.”

56 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

The above passage from Bṛih. 2. 4. 10 further enumerates a series of works the meaning of which is sometimes doubtful, but which have probably been in part incorporated in the Brâhmaṇas, in part mark the beginnings of the later epic. It is, however, especially noticeable that the "mystical doctrines" (upanishadah) appear only in the eighth place after itihâsah, purâṇam, and vidyâ, and are therefore under no circumstances reckoned to belong to the Veda. They had not yet become Vedânta. If therefore, finally, the later teachers of the Vedânta found on this passage their dogma that the entire Veda is breathed forth from Brahman and is therefore infallible, their conclusion would carry with it the infallibility also of the other works enumerated, and is certainly incorrect. For the passage originally asserts only that, like all other natural phenomena, the products of the mind also through-

out the universe are derived from Brahman.1 Precisely the same series of literary works, though with a few additions, is enumerated again by Yâjñavalkhya in Bṛih. 4. 1. 2, is explained as "speech" (vâc'), and is found to be inadequate to convey a knowledge of Brahman. At the close of this discussion therefore, Janaka, although he has "equipped his soul with that mystical doctrine," has "studied the Vedas and listened to the mystical doctrine,"2 yet is unable to give any account of the fate of the soul after death. From this it is clear that what was then understood by upanishad did not of necessity include an exposition of the highest questions; exactly, indeed, as in Chând. 8. 8. 5 the erroneous teaching that the essential being of man consists in the body is characterised as asurâṇâm upanishad.

1 The passage is taken up also in S'vet. 4. 18, "from him wisdom proceeded forth at the very beginning" (cp. S'vet. 6. 18, Mund. 2. 1. 4), and further in Maitr. 6. 32.

2 adhîtaveda and ukta-upanishatka, Bṛih. 4. 2. 1.

SOURCE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN

57

The insufficiency of all Vedic, and in general of all existing knowledge is still more clearly laid down in Chând. 7. 1, where Nârada acknowledges to Sanatkumâra :

—“ I have studied, most reverend sir, the Rigveda, Yajurveda, Sâmaveda, the Atharvaveda as fourth, the epic and mythological poems as fifth veda, grammar, necrology, arithmetic, divination, chronology, dialectics, politics, theology, the doctrine of prayer, necromancy, the art of war, astronomy, snake-charming, and the fine arts,—these things, most reverend sir, have I studied ; therefore am I, most reverend sir, learned indeed in the scripture, but not learned in the âtman. Yet I have heard from such as are like you that he who knows the âtman vanquishes sorrow. I, however, most reverend sir, am bewildered. Lead me then over, I pray, to the farther shore that lies beyond sorrow.”

Another proof that the study of the Veda does not touch the most important questions is afforded by the great transmigration text, which has been preserved in a threefold form in Chând. 5. 3–10, Brih. 6. 2, and with considerable variations in Kaush. 1. In all three recensions S'vetaketu professes to have been taught by his father Âruni, but fails to answer the eschatological questions propounded by the king Pravâhaṇa (in the Kaush., Citra), and returning in anger to his father reproaches him :—“ So then, without having really done so, you have claimed to have instructed me” ; 1 “it was imagination, then, when you previously declared that my instruction was complete.” 2

The same thought is expressed in Chând. 6. 1, where (in a manner otherwise irreconcilable with the passages already quoted) S'vetaketu is sent from home by his father Âruni to study the Brahman (i.e. the Veda). After twelve years

1 Chând. 5. 3. 4.

2 Brih. 6. 2. 3.

58 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

Vedas (i.e. the Samhitâs only of the ṛic, yajus, and sâman, for from these only is he subsequently tested infra Chând. 6. 7. 2), and returned home full of conceit and arrogance, believing himself wise." He fails, however, to answer his father's questions on the One, the Self-existent, with whose knowledge everything is known, — "assuredly my reverend teachers did not themselves know this; for had they known it, why did they not tell it to me ?" Whereupon Aruṇi imparts to him the perfect instruction.

This is the standpoint of the Taittirîya Upanishad also, when it teaches1 that the âtman of the mind (manomaya, "composed of manas") consists of yajus, ṛic, sâman, instruction (âdes'a, i.e. probably the Brâhmaṇa) and the hymns of the Atharvas and Aṅgirasas ; and proceeds to explain this entire âtman of the mind as a mere husk, which we must strip off in order to penetrate to the real essence of man or of nature.

The doctrine set forth in these examples finds direct expression also at an early period :—“So then, after that the Brâhman has rejected learning (pâṇdityam nir-vidya), he abides in childhood” ;2 “He sought not after the knowledge of the books, which only gives rise to words without end” ;3 “ Before whom words and thought recoil, not finding him”,4 “Not by learning is the âtman attained, not by genius and much knowledge of books.”5 In Muṇḍ. 1. 1. 5 also the four Vedas are enumerated, and together with the six Vedâṅgas are reckoned as inferior knowledge (aparâ vidyâ), through which the imperishable Being is not known.

This attitude of aloofness towards the Vedic knowledge is altered at first gradually and in general, as the texts of the Upanishads gain fixity, and become the

1 Taitt. Upan. 2. 3.

2 Bṛih. 3. 5. 1.

3 Bṛih. 4. 4. 21.

4 Taitt. 2. 4.

5 Kaṭh. 2. 23.

SOURCE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN 59

Vedânta.1 Henceforth they, and the Veda with them, are regarded as sources of the highest knowledge. A first trace of this change is shown in Bṛih. 3. 9. 26, where Yâjñavalkhya inquires after the purusha of the upanishad doctrine (aupanishada purusha); this S'âkalya does not know, and thereupon acknowledges defeat. Further, in Chând. 3. 5. 4, where the Veda is explained to be nectar, the Upanishads, the gṛihyâ' âdes'âh, are the nectar of nectar. In Kena 33 the Upanishads are apparently attached to the Veda, or more precisely comprise a brief summary of the entire Vedic material of instruction under the Veda; for there the Vedas are explained to be "the sum of the parts" (vedâh sarvâṅgâni), the "secret doctrine of Brahman" (brâhmî upanishad, in contrast with other unrecognised Upanishads, such as the âsuraṇâm upanishad referred to above). With the adoption of the name Vedânta the Upanishads are seen to be completely naturalised in the Veda. The term first occurs in S'vet. 6. 22 :—"From of old was the deepest secret disclosed in the Vedânta." This transfer of the Vedânta to antiquity (purâkalpa) seems to show that the author looks back to the Bṛih., Chând., and other Upanishads of which he makes use from a certain distance. It might, however, be understood as a mere expression of the high value attached to them, a value that increases with the lapse of time. The Vedânta texts appear completely established in their later position as sources of the knowledge of Brahman, which is to be gained through the interpretation they offer, in the verse which occurs Muṇḍ. 3. 2. 6 :2—vedânta - vijñâna - sunis'citu - arthâh, etc., "they who have correctly (su) penetrated the meaning of the Vedânta knowledge." With this Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 3-4 agrees, where the Upanishads, and the syllable Oṃ as their most essential element, are described as the bow,

1 sup. p. 21.

2 Also Mahân. 10. 22, Kaivalya 3.

60

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

with which men shoot at Brahman as the mark. It is

otherwise, however, in Muṇd. 1. 1. 5, where all the four

Vedas are rejected. The latter passage seems therefore

to be derived from an earlier period.

2. Preparatory Means to a Knowledge of Brahman

In later times a kind of via salutis was constructed in

the four āśramas, or life-stages, according to which every

Indian Brāhman was under obligation to devote himself

first as a brahmacārin to the study of the Veda, then as

grihastha to the duties of the sacrifice and other good

works, next as vānaprastha to the practice of asceticism

in the jungle, and finally towards the end of life as pari-

vrājaka (bhikshu, sannyāsin) to a wandering existence

without possessions or home, awaiting only his soul's

release and its reception into the supreme ātman.

As originally conceived we find these three āśramas in

Bṛih. 4. 4. 22 :—“The Brāhmans endeavour to know him

by study of the Veda (brahmacārin), by sacrifice and alms-

giving (grihastha), by penance and fasting (vānaprastha);

he who knows him becomes a muni; to him the pilgrims

journey, when they yearn for home (parivräjaka).” Here

a certain value as preparatory means to a knowledge of

Brahman appears to be assigned to the duties of the later

āśramas (i.e. study of the Veda, sacrifice, asceticism).

In Chând. 2. 23. 1 it is still more clearly expressed :-

“There are three branches of duty : sacrifice with study

of the Veda and almsgiving is the first (grihastha);

asceticism is the second (vānaprastha); the student

(brahmacārin) who lives in the house of his teacher is the

third, provided that he remains always (as naishṭhika) in

the teacher's house. These all carry as their reward the

divine worlds ; he, however, who abides steadfast in Brah-

man wins immortality.” This passage names only three

āśramas, recognises their value, but contrasts with all

THE FOUR AS'RAMAS

61

three the "abiding steadfast in Brahman" ; and this last

is then subsequently developed into a fourth âs'rama. An-

other passage 1 endeavours by a series of bold etymologies

to prove that sacrifice, silence, fasting, and a life in the

forest (the pursuits, that is to say, of the grihastha and

vânaprastha) are essentially brahmac'aryam ; which

term must be understood to include here not only the

student-period, but in a broader sense, as the repeated

reference to it shows, the entire course of life of a Brâhman

regarded as the way that leads to the âtman. In all that

this aim requires-that would seem to be the meaning

of the passage-lies the peculiar value of the observances

of the âs'ramas. More definitely in Kena 33, asceticism,

self-restraint, and sacrifice (tapas, dama, karman) are

described as the preliminary conditions (pratishṭhâḥ)

of the brâhmî upanishad, i.e. of the real mystical

doctrine which reveals Brahman. And in Kâṭh. 2. 15 all

the Vedas, all the practices of tapas and the brahmac'aryam,

are described as means by which the syllable Om

(here equivalent to the knowledge of Brahman) is to be

sought as the final aim. The observances of the âs'ramas

are recognised also in Muṇḍ. 2. 1. 7, in so far as these

(tapas, s'raddhâ, satyam, brahmac'aryam, vidhi) are here

described as a creation of Brahman.

With regard to the particular âs'ramas, the study of

the Veda has been already discussed above, and we pro-

pose here merely to summarise the most important teach-

ing of the Upanishads concerning sacrifice and asceticism.

3. The Sacrifice

The older Upanishads were so deeply conscious of the

hostile character of the entire ritualistic system of the

Brâhmans that they could concede to it only a relative

recognition. It is true that direct attacks are rarely found

1 Chând. 8. 5.

62

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

in the extant texts. Antagonistic explanations, however,

of the sacrificial rites are all the more frequently offered by

way either of allegorical interpretation or of the substitution

of other and usually psychological ideas in their place.

There is a note almost of mockery in Br̥ih. 1. 4. 10

when it is said :—“ He who worships another divinity

(than the âtman), and says ‘it is one and I am another,’ is

not wise, but he is like a house-dog of the gods. There-

fore just as many house-dogs are useful to men, every

individual man is useful to the gods. Now the theft of

only one house-dog is displeasing, how much more of

many? Therefore it is displeasing to them that men do

not know this.” The remark of Yâjñavalkhya also, in

Br̥ih. 3. 9. 6, sounds very contemptuous :—“ What is the

sacrifice ?—brute beasts !” nor is it less so in Br̥ih. 3. 9. 21,

where it is said that Yama (the god of the dead) has his

abode in the sacrifice, but the sacrifice in the fees.

Daring remarks like these we do not find in the

Chândogya, unless it be in the “Song of the Dog” in

Chând. 1. 12, which seems to have been originally a satire

on the greedy begging propensities of the priests, to

which in later times an allegorical interpretation was

given. In Chand. 1. 10–11 also the story is told, not

without a malicious pleasure, how the three priests

assembled at the sacrifice were put to confusion by a

wandering beggar; and in Chând. 4. 1–3 Jânas'ruti,

“ rich in faith, open-handed, munificent” (sraddhâdeyo,

bahudâyî, bahupâkyaḥ), is compelled not without humili-

ation to seek instruction from a poor vagrant.

According to the general view, sacrifice and good

works give admission only to the “way of the fathers”

(pitriyâna), which after a temporary sojourn in the moon

leads back to a new earthly existence. As early as Br̥ih.

1. 5. 16 it is said :—“ by the labour (of the sacrifice) is the

world of the fathers won, by knowledge the world of the

gods" ; and other passages describe the way of the fathers which leads back again to earth as the fate of those " who worship in the village with the words ' Sacrifice and deeds of piety are our offering,'" 1 " who by sacrifice, almsgiving and ascetic practices gain the (heavenly) worlds," 2 " who worship with the words ' Sacrifice and deeds of piety are our work '" 3 " regarding sacrifice and deeds as the highest good, they know no better and are befooled." 4

Not rarely a meaning suitable to the new doctrine is read into the existing sacrificial rites. In Bṛih. 1. 4. 6, for example, the five daily offerings (mahâyajñâḥ) are interpreted as a sacrifice to the âtman ; and in Chând. 4. 11–14 the three sacrificial fires are explained as forms of the âtman's manifestation (eshâ asmadvidyâ âtmavidyâ c'a).

Yet more frequently conditions of the âtman, as embodied in the world of nature or of man, were substituted for the ceremonies of the ritual. In Bṛih. 3. 1, in place of the four priests as organs of the gods, there are found speech, eye, breath and manas as organs of the âtman. In Chând. 4. 16 the wind is explained to be the essence of the sacrifice, mind and speech the essence of the sacrificing priests. In Ait. Âr. 3. 2. 6, Bṛih. 1. 5. 23, and Kaush. 2. 5, inhalation and speech replace the agnihotram ; and this thought is further developed on the basis of Chând. 5. 11–24 into the theory of the prânâgnihotram, a fuller discussion of which will be given below. The substitution also for the sacrifice of the man, his organs and bodily functions, is greatly favoured. For example, in Chând. 3. 16 the three life-periods take the place of the three pressings of the soma, in Chând. 3. 17 human activities of the various acts of the soma festival, and in Mahânâr. 64 the bodily organs of the implements of the sacrifice. This last thought is

1 Chând. 5. 10. 3. 2 Bṛih. 6. 2. 16. 3 Pras na 1. 9. 4 Muṇḍ. 1. 2. 10.

64

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

carried out in extreme detail in Prâṇâgnihotra Up. 3-4.

The verse Taitt. 2. 5 also belongs here, inasmuch as,

correctly translated, it asserts,—“ He presents knowledge

as his sacrifice, knowledge as his works.”

It is first in the later Upanishads that we meet with

a more friendly attitude towards the sacrificial cult. In

Kâṭh. 1, 17, in a style altogether excessive and opposed to

the upanishad spirit, there is promised for the fulfilment

of certain ceremonies and works “ the overstepping of birth

and death,” “ entrance into everlasting rest ”; and in

Kâṭh. 3. 2 the Nâciketa fire is explained as the bridge

which bears the sacrificers to the supreme eternal Brahman,

to the “ fearless shore.” Here even if we make allowance

for poetical extravagance of expression, a co-operation at

least with the cult for the attainment of salvation is

asserted. Ś'vet. 2, 6–7 marks a further step in ad-

vance :—

Where Agni from the chips of wood

Darts forth, where Vâyu too appears,

Where the Soma also flows freely,—

There is the manas developed.

By Savitar, at his impulse,

Delight yourselves in the ancient prayer;

If there you take your stand,

The deeds of the past soil you no more.

The expression here used, “ Delight yourselves in the

ancient prayer ” (jusheta brahma pûrvyam) indicates that

a former practice is reintroduced and held in honour.

This reaction attains its climax in the Maitrâyaṇîya Up.,

which explains at the very outset 1 that “ the fire-laying

for the ancestors ” is in truth “ a sacrifice to Brahman ”;

and in the fourth Prapâṭhaka ventures the thought that

without study of the Veda, observance of caste-duties,

and the following of the due brâhmanical order of life

1 Maitr. 1. 1.

according to the âs'ramas, the deliverance of the natural âtman and its re-union with the supreme âtman are impossible. The key to the understanding of this reaction is given by the polemic against the heretics which is found in Maitr. 7. 8-10. Brâhmanism, in view of the con-sequences which the attitude of the earlier Upanishads had entailed in Buddhism and similar manifestations, returns to its original position.

4. Asceticism (tapas)

A feeling of admiration has always been excited when, contrary to the natural desires which all experience for life, pleasure and prosperity, there has been exhibited a self-mastery, which voluntarily submits to privations and sufferings either for the sake of the well-being of others, or independently of this external and as it were accidental aim, which indeed as far as the real worth of the respective actions is concerned is in itself without significance. An act of self-denial would seem the more pure the less it were combined with any external end, and the more it were undertaken with the sole object of subduing the selfish impulses of nature. It were as though a super-human, supernatural power had been thereby manifested in man, which, springing from the deepest roots of his being, exalted the door far above the world of men with its selfish interests, yea even above the world of the gods, and in another and higher order of things than ours assigned to him his place.

It is a tribute to the high metaphysical capacity of the Indian people, that the phenomenon of asceticism made its appearance among them earlier and occupied a larger place than among any other known people. (We leave out of consideration at this point the later misuse of asceticism in the interest of merely selfish aims to excite wonder or to secure profit.)

As early as the creation myths we saw how the creator of the universe prepared himself for his work by the practice of tapas ; in which word the ancient idea of the “heat” which serves to promote the incubation of the egg of the universe blends with the ideas of the exertion, fatigue, self-renunciation, by means of which the creator is transmuted (entirely or in part) into the universe which he proposes to create. According to this conception, everything that is great in the universe is dependent on tapas. In a later hymn of the Ṛigveda also,1 truth and right, and with them the entire universe, are born of tapas. From śrama (toil) and tapas the first-born Skambha arose and permeated the universe,2 in tapas he was rocked on the surface of the primeval waters.3 By the tapas with which he discharges his duties the student of the Veda, according to another hymn,4 satisfies his teacher, the gods, and the realms of space, ascends on high as the sun, protects both worlds, etc., in his course of life as a Brâhman. By tapas the ruler protects his kingdom, the gods have escaped death, the student of the Veda practised tapas in the primeval ocean, when he, creating the universe, stood on the water's surface. And as early even as the Ṛigveda the seven ṛishis together betake themselves to the practice of tapas ;5 and the souls on their entrance into heaven are apostrophised :—

Which invincible by tapas,

Have won their way by tapas to the light,

That have accomplished the severest tapas —,

To these now enter in !6

Another hymn of the Ṛigveda7 portrays the inspired muni as with long hair, in dirty yellow robes, girt only with

1 X. 190. 1.

2 Atharvav. X. 7. 36.

3 Atharvav. X. 7. 38.

4 Atharvav. XI. 5.

5 Ṛigv. X. 109. 4.

6 Ṛigv. X. 154. 2.

7 Ṛigv. X. 136.

the wind he roams on the desert paths. Mortals behold only his body. But he himself, endowed with super-

natural power, flies through the air, drinks with the storm-god from the bowl of both the oceans of the universe, on

the track of the wind is raised aloft to the gods, transcends all forms, and as companion of the gods co-operates with

them for the salvation of mankind.

By the time of the oldest Upanishad texts the ascetic life has already been elevated into a special “calling,”1

which assumes equal rank by the side of the position of householder. Men abandon household goods and family,

as Yâjñavalkhya does in Brih. 2. 4, and depart into the solitude of the forest in order to practise tapas, and by

gradually increasing privations and penances to destroy in themselves the last remains of dependence on earthly

existence.

It remains to inquire what attitude was adopted by the authors and defenders of the doctrines of the

Upanishads in presence of this cult of an ascetic ideal.

The Chândogya Upanishad sets before us in the first place Upakosala, a student of the Veda, who grieves2

that the teacher refuses to impart to him knowledge, and falling sick declines to take nourishment. To the invita-

tion to eat he replies :—“Alas, in mankind there are such troops of desires. I am full of sickness, and incapable of

eating.” (In these words the characteristic motive of Indian, as of all asceticism, is evident.) Thereupon the

three sacrificial fires take pity on him, and the instruction which they give to him begins with the words :—

“Brahman is life, Brahman is joy (kam), Brahman is space (kham).” It is implied in these words that Brahman, as

the principle of life, of bliss (kam = ânanda, as in Chând.

1 dharmaskandha, Chând. 2. 23.

2 tapo brahmacârî, 4. 10. 2-4.

7. 23 sukham), and of infinity, is not to be attained by

the way of a gloomy asceticism.

In Chând. 2. 23 tapas is spoken of as the especial

obligation of the anchorite. As such, a recognised position

is accorded it by the side of the student and householder.

All three “bring as their reward the divine worlds ; he,

however, who abides steadfast in Brahman wins im-

mortality.” This is not in contradiction with the

statement of Chând. 5. 10. 1, that the way of the gods,

which leads to Brahman without return, and marks still

for the present time the loftiest aim, is promised to those

ye ca ime'ranye 'sraddhâ tapa' iti upâsate ; for these

words mean, “ those who worship in the forest using the

words ‘faith is our asceticism.’” The reference is to the

anchorite; but something else—viz. faith—is here sub-

stituted for the asceticism which is his calling.

To the same effect the Bṛihadâraṇyaka Upan. expresses

itself when, reproducing this passage in an appendix,1 it yet

more definitely opens up the prospect of the way of the gods

to those alone “ who observe faith and truth in the forest ” ;

but on the other hand offers only the way of the fathers in re-

turn for sacrifice, almsgiving, and asceticism. Of these last

it is said2 that through them men seek to know Brahman,

vividishanti. More directly still Yâjñavalkhya expresses

himself in Bṛih. 3. 8. 10 :—“ Of a truth, O Gârgî, he who

does not know this imperishable one, and in this world sacri-

fices and distributes alms and does penance (tapas tapyate)

for many thousands of years, wins thereby only finite

(reward).” Bṛih. 5. 11 again teaches that sickness the

procession to the grave and cremation are the best

asceticism (paramam tapas). Here, then, the suffer-

ings of life and death are rated higher than artificially

induced penances.

We meet with a disposition more favourable to asce­ti-

1 Bṛih. 6. 2. 15.

2 Bṛih. 4. 4. 22.

cism as early as the Taittirîya Upanishad. The first part which is appointed for the student demands of him1

asceticism and the study of the Veda, and quotes in this connection the views of two teachers, of whom the one

requires "asceticism alone," the other only study of the Veda, "for this is asceticism." The Upanishad adopts

an intermediate position by its demand for asceticism combined with the study of the Veda. In the last and

latest part2 a higher value is placed upon asceticism, where Bhrigu is repeatedly urged by his father Varuṇa :-

"By tapas seek to know Brahman, for tapas is Brahman." Following his injunction, by progressive tapas he rises

step by step to the recognition of food, the vital breath, manas, knowledge, and finally bliss as Brahman, and with

this last the highest degree attainable by tapas is reached. The Mahânârâyana Upan., which is attributed to the

Taittirîya school, is much later still ; in 62. 11 it sets nyâsa, "renunciation," above asceticism, thereby preparing the

way for the standpoint of the Sannyâsa Upanishad ; of which later. Kena 33 also, as already mentioned, reckons

tapas among the foundations (i.e. the presuppositions, pratishṭhâh) of Brahman ; and according to S'vet. 1. 15,

16 ; 6. 21, the knowledge of Brahman is based upon âtmavidyâ (the text of the Vedânta) and tapas.

A step, however, far beyond all the preceding is taken by the Muṇḍaka and Pras'na in their reproduction of the

above-mentioned theory of the Chând. and Brihad. concerning the ways of the gods and the fathers with a

characteristic variation. In Muṇḍ. 1. 2. 11 the way of the gods is promised to those "who practise asceticism and

faith in the forest" (tapah-s'raddhe ye hi upavasanti aranye) ; and Pras'na 1. 10 offers it to those "who have

sought the âtman by asceticism, the manner of life of a Brâhman, faith and knowledge." It is remarkable that

1 Taitt. 1. 9.

2 Taitt. 3.

70 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

in Mund. 3. 2. 4 a spurious tapas is mentioned (tapas alingam), i.e. probably one that lacks the characteristic mark of knowledge.

As was to be expected, in the Maitr. Upan. is revived the ancient Vedic standpoint in regard to tapas, in presence of Buddhist and other errors.

It is true that asceticism alone does not suffice, for in Maitr. 1. 2 it is practised in the severest form by Brihadratha without procuring for him the knowledge of the âtman.

As a preliminary condition, however, it is indispensable :—“ without being an ascetic it is impossible either to attain the knowledge of the âtman, or to bring work to fruition.”1

5. Other Preliminary Conditions

In the older Upanishads we are repeatedly met by the prohibition to communicate a doctrine or ceremony to anyone except a son or a pupil adopted by the rite of upanayanam.

In Ait. Âr. 3. 2. 6. 9 the mystical meaning of the combinations of the letters must be “ communicated to no one, who is not a pupil, who has not been a pupil for a whole year, who does not propose himself to be a teacher.”2

In Chând. 3. 11. 5 the doctrine of Brahman as the sun of the universe should “ his father make known as Brahman to his eldest son alone, or to a trusted pupil, but to no one else, whoever he may be.

And though he were to be offered in return for it all the kingdoms of the ocean-girdled earth, yet should he bethink himself ‘the other is of greater value.’”

In Brih. 6. 3. 12 also the ceremony of the mixed drink “ must be communicated to none but a son or a pupil.”

Similarly in the Upanishads we find men and gods taking the fuel in their hands, and submitting to the con-

1 na tapaskasya âtmagâne 'dhigamah, karmasiddhir vâ, Maitr. 4. 3.

2 cp. also Ait. Âr. 5. 3. 3. 4.

OTHER PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS

71

ditions of pupilage, just as according to Chând. 8, 11. 3

Indra himself was obliged to live with Prajâpati as a pupil

for one hundred and one years in order to obtain the perfect

instruction. Other examples are Kaush. 1. 1, 4. 19, Brih.

2. 1. 14, Pras'na 1. 1, Mund. 1. 2. 12.

Yet in the earlier period this demand is still not

absolute. In Chând. 4. 9. 3 it is merely said that

"the knowledge which is gained from a teacher (as

opposed to supernatural instruction by beasts, fire, geese

or ducks1) leads most certainly to the goal"; and in

Chând. 5. 11. 7 the king As'vapati instructs the six

Brâhmans who approach him with the fuel in their hands

(in token of their wish to become pupils) anupanîya,

"without first admitting them as his pupils." So also

in Brih. 2. 4 Yâjñavalkhya instructs his wife Maitreyî,

and in Brih. 4. 1–2, 3–4 the king Janaka, who yet were

not strictly his pupils; and in Brih. 3 he imparts in-

formation on the deepest questions (as e.g. Brih. 3. 8,

in the conversation with Gârgî) in the presence of a

numerous circle of hearers, and only exceptionally, when

he desires to explain to Ârtabhâga the mystery of the

soul's transmigration, does he retire with him into

privacy.2 Ordinarily, however, a teacher is necessary to dis-

perse the mist of empirically acquired knowledge from our

eyes (ἀχλỳν δ᾽ ἀπὸ ὤμμ᾽ ὀφθαλμῶν ἕλεν, ἣ πρὶν ἔην,—as

Schopenhauer represents the spirit of Kant saying to him

in the words of Homer), and of this in particular the

beautiful passage in Chând. 6. 14 treats :—" Precisely,

my dear sir, as a man who has been brought blindfold

from the country of Gandhâra (beyond the Indus), and

then set at liberty in the desert, goes astray. to the east

or north or south, because he has been brought thither

blindfold, and blindfold set at liberty ; but after that

someone has taken off the bandage, and has told him,

1 Tauchervogel, "divers."

2 Brih. 3. 2. 13.

72 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

'In this direction Gandhâra lies, go in this direction,' instructed and prudent, asking the road from village to village, he finds his way home to Gandhâra; even so the man, who in this world has met with a teacher, becomes conscious, 'To this (transitory world) shall I belong only until the time of my release, thereupon shall I go home.'"

The teacher is represented as indispensable to knowledge in Kâṭh. 2. 8:—“Apart from the teacher there is no access here” ; from which the incidental conclusion may be drawn, that at the time of the Kâṭh. Upan. the older Upanishads were not yet committed to writing.

The later Vedânta mentions, side by side with the external (vâhya) means to a knowledge of Brahman (study of the Veda, sacrifice, almsgiving, penance, fasting), as more direct (pratyâsanna) means the following : tranquillity of mind, self-restraint, renunciation, patience, collectedness.1 This requirement may be traced back to Brih. 4. 4. 23 :—“Therefore he who knows this is tranquil, self-restrained, self-denying, patient, and collected."

It is true that a doubt arises whether this passage has reference to the means of acquiring the knowledge of Brahman, or rather to the fruits of that knowledge (whether bhûtvâ here signifies "after that he has become," or "since he is"). By the later Upanishads it is understood already, as later still by S'aṅkara, in the first sense, e.g. Kâṭh. 2. 24 :—“No one who has not ceased from violence, who is restless, unsubdued, whose heart is not yet tranquil, can by searching attain unto him."

The expressions here used, avirata, as'ânta, asamâhita, refer back unquestionably to the s'ânto, dân'ta', uparatas, titikshuh, samâhito bhûtvâ of the passage from the Brihadâraṇyaka. The same is true also of pras'ântacittâya, s'amânvitâya, declared in Muṇḍ. 1. 2. 13 to be presuppositions of instruction.

1 Cp. also Vedântasâra 17–23.

OTHER PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS 73

In later Upanishads this preliminary requirement is connected with the demand already referred to for a teacher. E.g. S'vet. 6. 22 :—“Impart it to no one, who is not tranquil (na apras'ântâya), who is not a son or a pupil (na aputrâya as'ishyâya vâ).” Similarly, and perhaps with a reminiscence of this passage, in Maitr. 6. 29 :—“This profoundest mystery of all is to be revealed to no one, who is not a son or a pupil (na aputrâya, na as'ishyâya), and who has not yet become tranquil (na as'ântâya).”

The finding a teacher, and the five requirements of tranquillity of mind, self-restraint, renunciation, patience, collectedness, are the preliminary conditions that continually recur. With them others are occasionally mentioned; for example, in Chând. 7. 26. 2, purity of food, and as a consequence purity of nature (sattva-s'uddhi). The latter, like so much besides from Chând. 7, is reproduced in Mund. 3 in the verse 3. 2. 6, and thence passed over into Mahânâr. 10. 22 and Kaivalya 3–4. In Kâth. 6. 9 an indefinite requirement is laid down, that a man should be “prepared in heart and feeling and spirit”; and in Mund. 3. 2. 10–11 participation in the Brahmavidyâ is combined with the preliminary condition of the fulfilment of the “vow of the head” (s'irovratam), by which is probably to be understood, not as S'ankara s'irasi agnidhanam, but merely the practice, which is already implied in the name Mundaka, of shaving the head bare. In still later Upanishads also we occasionally meet with special limitations on this participation. Thus Nrisimhap. 1. 3 prohibits the communication of the maxims of the members (not the king of the maxims1) to a woman or a S'ûdra, and Râmap. 84 enjoins that the diagram must not be imparted to common (illiterate, prâkritâ) men.

1 Mantrarája, i.e. the charm or magical song.

74

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

6. The Standpoint of Ignorance, of Knowledge, and

of superior Knowledge in relation to Brahman

The general view that lies at the basis of the Upani-

shads is that Brahman, i.e. the âtman, is an object of

knowledge. “The âtman, in truth, should be seen, heard,

comprehended, reflected upon.”1 “The Self . . . that

should we search for and endeavour to know.”2 To the

same effect are numerous other passages. And the aim

of all the Upanishad texts is to communicate this

knowledge of Brahman.3

Very soon, however, it came to be realised that this

knowledge of Brahman was essentially of a different

nature from that which we call “knowledge” in ordinary

life. For it would be possible, like Nârada in Chând. 7.

1. 2, to be familiar with all conceivable branches of

knowledge and empirical science, and yet to find oneself

in a condition of ignorance (avidyâ) as regards the

Brahman. This thought, originally purely negative,

became in course of time more and more positive in its

character. It was negative in so far as no experimental

knowledge led to a knowledge of Brahman; and it was

positive in so far as the consciousness was aroused that

the knowledge of empirical reality was an actual

hindrance to the knowledge of Brahman. The concep-

tion of avidyâ was developed from the negative idea of

mere ignorance to the positive idea of false knowledge.

The experimental knowledge which reveals to us a world

of plurality, where in reality only Brahman exists, and a

body where in reality there is only the soul, must be a

mistaken knowledge, a delusion, a mâyâ. This is a very

noteworthy step in advance. It is the same which

Parmenides and Plato took when they affirmed that the

knowledge of the world of sense was mere deception, εἶδωλα ;

1 Bṛih. 2. 4. 5. 2 Chând. 8. 7. 1. 3 brahmavidyâ, âtmavidyâ.

which Kant took, when he showed that the entire reality of experience is only apparition and not reality ("thing in itself"). It is of the greatest interest to follow up the earliest foreshadowings of this thought in India, and to trace how the term avidyâ passed from the negative idea of ignorance to the positive idea of a false knowledge.

The first suggestion of this is found already in the Rigveda, where in X. 81. 1 it is said of the great All-father that he, when he entered into the lower world, was prathamac'had, "veiling his original nature."1 Further, an obscure passage of the S'atapatha Brâhmaṇa2 describes how Brahman, when creating the upper and the lower worlds together with their gods, "revealed" himself, how he projected himself into them by means of his two "great immensities" (abhi'va), his two "great appearances" (yaksha), that is to say by means of his names and forms, but how he himself "entered into the half beyond" (parârdham agac'hat).

The further development of these thoughts is found in the Upanishads. In Brih. 1. 6. 3 the world of names, forms, and works is defined (by means of one of those brief mystical formulæ, of which perhaps the most ancient "Upanishads" consisted, sup. p. 16 f.) as amritam satyena channam, "the immortal (Brahman) veiled by the (empirical) reality." The explanation of the formula is added immediately :—"The Prâṇa (i.e. the âtman) to wit is the immortal, name and form are the reality; by these the Prâṇa is veiled." As here (and in Taitt. 2. 6,—"as reality he becomes everything that exists ; for reality is the name given to it"), so also in Brih. 2. 1. 20 the word satyam denotes the reality of experience; in this latter passage it is said in another "Upanishad" with an added explanation :—"Its Upanishad is 'the reality of reality,'

1 mukhyam, nishprapanc'am, pâramârthikam rûpam âvrinvan, Sâyana.

2 11. 2. 3.

76 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

(satyasya satyam); that is to say, the vital spirits (together with the worlds, gods, and living creatures, as we may infer from that which precedes) are the reality, and he is their reality." He is—so we are to understand —in the so-called reality that part of it which is actually real. This is also the meaning of the illustrations in Bṛih. 2. 4. 7–9 : the âtman is the musical instrument (drum, conch, lyre), the phenomena of the universe are its notes; just as the notes can only be seized when the instrument is seized, so the world of plurality can only be known when the âtman is known; only of him is there knowledge, all else is “not knowledge.” Similarly Chând. 6. 1. 3 teaches that the “transformation” of the âtman into the manifold world of phenomena is only vâc'ârambhanam, “a matter of words,” or nâmadheyam, “a mere name,” and that “in reality” there exists only the One Being, i.e. the Âtman. It is only of him therefore that a real knowledge is possible. All experimental knowledge, the four Vedas and the whole series of empirical sciences, as they are enumerated in Chând. 7. 1. 2–3, are, as is there said, nâma eva, “mere name”; and Nârada, deeply versed as he is in them, finds himself in “darkness,” from which first by the knowledge of the âtman is he guided across to the other shore.1 Souls and the “real desires” by which they are affected for continued life after death in the world of Brahman are, as expounded in Chând. 8. 3. 1–2, by the empirical knowledge which teaches annihilation at death “veiled in unreality. They really exist, but unreality is spread over them.” And “just as he who is ignorant of its hiding-place fails to find the golden treasure, though he pass and repass it continually, so all these creatures fail to find this world of Brahman though they daily enter into it; for by unreality are they turned aside.”

1 Chând. 7. 26. 2.

IGNORANCE AND KNOWLEDGE

77

What is here described as empty word, mere name, darkness, unreality, i.e. the entire empirical knowledge of things, is further denoted by avidyâ, “ignorance.” This term occurs perhaps for the first time in Bṛih. 4. 4. 3, 4, where it is said of the soul, when it casts off the body in death, that it “ dismisses ignorance” (avidyâm gamayitvâ).

Ignorance is henceforth the knowledge that rests on experience ; true knowledge is only of Brahman. Like Plato’s teaching that only the eternal is an object of ἐπιστήμη, while of the world of phenomena subject to the flux of Heraclitus only a δόξα is possible, in Śvet. 5. 1 the explanation is given :—“ Ignorance is the fleeting, knowledge is the eternal,” i.e. it is an object of knowledge. Kâṭh. 2. 1–6 contrasts ignorance and knowledge with poetic vividness ; the goal of ignorance is pleasure (preyas), the goal of knowledge is salvation (śreyas). The former says, “this is the world” (ayam loko) ; the gaze of the latter is directed on another world :—

Widely different indeed and contrasted are the things

Which men call knowledge and ignorance,

I see Naciketas endeavouring to gain knowledge ;

The troop of pleasures has not deluded thee.

Wandering in the depth of ignorance,

Deeming themselves wise and learned,

Thus aimlessly fools tramp hither and thither,

Like blind men led by comrades blind as they.

The last verse is further amplified in Muṇḍ. 1. 2. 8–10 ; and both verses are quoted in Maitr. 7. 9. The subject is similarly treated in the verses Bṛih. 4. 4. 11–12, which are a later insertion (cp. Kâṭh. 1. 3) :—

These worlds indeed are joyless,

Shrouded in thick darkness ;

Into them after death all go

Who are unenlightened and ignorant.

1 ksharam tu avidyâ hî amṛitam tu vidyâ.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

Yet he who perceives the âtman,

And is conscious that "I am he";

What desire what love could he still have

For the body racked with pain !

The infatuation of ignorance is yet more strongly depicted

in Is'â 3 :—

This universe indeed is demon-haunted,

Shrouded in thick darkness,

Therein go to death all

Who have slain their own souls.

Since the knowledge of the âtman is contrasted with

the reality of experience as the realm of ignorance, it

cannot be gained by mere speculation (tarka) concerning

it, but only by a revelation communicated through

the teacher.1 According as the âtman is conceived as

a divine person, this revelation is represented as an act of

his grace :2—

Not through instruction is the âtman won,

Not through genius or much book-learning;

Only by the man whom he chooses is he comprehended :

To him the âtman reveals his essence.

Another verse,3 which in all probability originally pro-

mised the vision of the âtman concealed in the heart to

him who "by pacifying the organs of sense" 4 has become

"indifferent" (aśvatu), has received a theistic colouring

in S'vet. 3. 20 and Mahânâr. 10. 1, in that it represents

the knowledge of the âtman (whose abode is here also still

in the heart) as received "by the favour of the creator." 5

A still more pronounced theism, that has wandered far

from the original conceptions of the doctrine of the âtman,

is exhibited by the entire S'vetas'vatara Upanishad, and

1 Kâṭh. 2. 7-9. 2 Kâṭh. 2. 23, repeated in Muṇḍ. 3. 2. 3.

3 Kâṭh. 2. 20, as read by S'ankara.

4 dhátu-prasádád ; cp. Chánd. 6. 15, átmani sarvendriyâṇi sampratishṭhápya.

5 dhátuḥ prasádád.

especially by the prayers for spiritual enlightenment to

Savitar, Rudra, and Brahman which are interwoven with

it in 2. 1–5, 3. 1–6, 4. 1.

The doctrine thus far set forth, according to which

Brahman or the ātman, becomes known by virtue of a

(metaphysical) knowledge, is transcended within the

limits of the Upanishads themselves by another and

undeniably more profound conception, according to which

there neither is nor can be a knowledge of the ātman as

the sole all-pervading essence of things. For such know-

ledge assumes a knowing subject and a known object, and

therefore a dualism; the ātman, however, forms an absolute

unity. We propose briefly to trace the development of

this thought under the guidance of the texts.

The primitive source of the entire conception of the

unknowableness of the ātman is to be found in the

speeches of Yājñavalkhya in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka; and

the daring and abruptness with which the doctrine is

here introduced, as well as the originality of the method

by which it is established, seem to point to an individual

as its author. In his discourse with Maitreyî Yâjñaval-

khya propounds, in Brih. 2. 4. 12, the paradoxical asser-

tion,—“after death there is no consciousness”; and

proceeds to confirm it with the words:—“For where

there is as it were a duality (in reality there is not),

there one sees the other, smells, hears, addresses, compre-

hends, and knows the other; but where everything has

become to him his own self, how should he smell, see,

hear, address, understand, or know anyone at all? How

should he know him, through whom he knows all this,

how should he know the knower?” On careful

consideration two thoughts will be found to be implied

here: (1) the supreme ātman is unknowable, because

he is the all-comprehending unity, whereas all knowledge

presupposes a duality of subject and object; but (2) the

80 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

individual ātman also ("through whom he knows all this") is unknowable, because in all knowledge he is the knowing subject ("the knower"), consequently can never be object. Essentially these two thoughts are one; for the individual ātman is the supreme ātman, and in proportion as we rise to this knowledge the illusion of the object vanishes, and the knowing subject alone remains without object; and this subject, alike in its waking hours and in dreams, fashions the objects outside of itself,—“for he is the creator."1 The same thought is found in five other passages in the speeches of Yājñavalkhya, and these we quote partly abridged :—“Thou canst not see the seer of seeing, thou canst not hear the hearer of hearing, thou canst not comprehend the comprehender of comprehending, thou canst not know the knower of knowing."2 “In truth, O Gārgī, this imperishable one sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, comprehends but is not comprehended, knows but is not known. Beside him there is no seer, beside him there is none that comprehends, beside him there is none that knows."3 The same words recur almost unaltered in Bṛih. 3. 7. 23 at the close of a paragraph, and on this account the association of the thread of the universe with the inner guide appears to be less primitive. In Bṛih. 4. 3. 23–31 it is said of the deep sleeper:—“When then he does not see, yet still he is seeing, although he sees not; since for the seer there is no interruption of seeing, because he is imperishable; but there is no second beside him, no other distinct from him, for him to see." The same is then repeated of smell, taste, speech, hearing, thought, sensation, and knowledge. “For (only) where there is as it were another is the other seen, smelt, tasted, addressed, heard, conceived, felt, and known.” And in Bṛih. 4. 4. 2, of the dying it is said:—“Because he has

1 Bṛih. 4. 3. 10. 2 Bṛih. 3. 4. 2. 3 Bṛih. 3. 8. 11.

KNOWLEDGE IN RELATION TO BRAHMAN

81

become one, therefore he sees not as they say (in reality

he continues ever seeing), because he has become one,

therefore he does not smell, taste, address, hear, conceive,

feel, or know the other, as they say."

If we consider the originality, the close reasoning, and

(as we shall see later) the agreement of the thoughts in

the passages quoted with the other views of Yâjñaval-

khya, we shall be led to regard as very probable the

dependence of all the passages that remain to be quoted,

and therefore of the entire further development of the

doctrine of the unknowableness of the âtman, on the

thoughts, perhaps even on the text of the Bṛihadâraṇyaka.

The two passages from the Chândogya, which we have

now to cite, may be regarded as early examples :—“ His

relations seat themselves around the dying man, and ask

him, ‘Do you recognise me ; do you recognise me?’ As

long as his speech has not yet entered into the manas, his

manas into the prâṇa, his prâṇa into the heat, the heat

into the supreme godhead, he recognises them. But

after that his speech has entered into the manas, his

manas into the prâṇa, his prâṇa into the heat, the heat

into the supreme godhead, then he no longer recognises

them.”1 This passage, self-contained as it is, nevertheless

appears in its leading ideas to be dependent already on

the last-named passage of the Bṛih. 4. 4. 2, since the

reverse relation is not in any case admissible. In Chând.

6. 9 and 6. 10 also the doctrine of unconsciousness on

entrance into the Existent, set forth in the illustrations of

the bees and the rivers, seems to be indebted to the passage

first adduced from Bṛih. 2. 4. 12 :—“After death there is

no consciousness.” And similarly the following words in

Bṛih. 2. 4. 14 are echoed in Chând. 7. 24. 1 :—“If a man

sees no other (beside himself), hears no other, knows no

other, that is the infinite (bhûman); if he sees, hears,

1 Chând. 6. 15. 1–2 ; cp. 6. 8. 6.

6

82 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

knows another, that is the finite (alpam). The infinite is the immortal, the finite is mortal." The suddenness and disconnectedness with which this idea is introduced seems to indicate dependence on the thoughts of Yâjña-valkhya.

It is primarily due to the influence of this conception that, later on, in opposition to the general tendency of the Upanishads to seek after and to expound the knowledge of the âtman, the theory is more and more elaborated that the âtman (whose unknowableness, as we shall see subsequently, had been already so strongly emphasised by Yâjña-valkhya with his neti neti) is no true object of knowledge.

That knowledge of the âtman, which sets it as an object over-against itself, and which therefore is still infected with duality, now appears as a lower standpoint, which must be transcended in order to attain to complete oneness with Brahman, with the âtman.

This view is set forth for the first time clearly in the magnificently elaborated description of the universe in Taitt. 2.

The author of this text begins with the incorporation of the âtman in the material world and the human body, as the self dependent on nourishment.

From this as mere external covering he advances, penetrating deeper and deeper into the kernel of the living being as it here presents itself, to the self of life, of mind, and finally of knowledge, i.e. the vijñânamaya âtman.

This last, however, to which Brahman is an object of knowledge, is also a mere outer covering of the self composed of bliss, which realises its oneness with Brahman.

At this point the question is propounded :-

Whether any ignorant man departing reaches yonder world?

Or whether perchance the wise departing wins the other world?

Neither the one nor the other is in effect the answer conveyed by the following words, which describe how

KNOWLEDGE IN RELATION TO BRAHMAN

83

Brahman in creating the universe enters into it as Being,

expressible, self-dependent, consciousness, reality, while it

in harmony with its own nature persists as the Opposite,

inexpressible, independent, unconsciousness, unreality.

Bliss consists in the sense of oneness with the latter :

—“For when a man finds his peace and resting-place in

that invisible, unreal, inexpressible, unfathomable, then has

he attained to peace.1 If, however, a man admits therein

an interval, a separation (or ‘ever so small a separation’

between himself as subject and the âtman as object),

then his unrest continues ; it is moreover the unrest of

one who imagines himself wise (while making Brahman

the object of knowledge).” For no language, no con-

ception, is adequate to express Brahman :—

Before whom words and thought recoil not finding him,

Who knows the bliss of this Brahman,

For him nothing excites terror any more.

If, however, Brahman cannot be reached by the way

of knowledge, how can union with him be accomplished ?

This is the question with which the following texts are

occupied. In Kena 3 a student propounds the question :—

That to which no eye penetrates,

Nor speech nor thought,

Which remains unknown, and we see it not,

How can instruction therein be given to us !

And the answer is suggested (Kena 3 and 11) :—

It is distinct from the intelligible,

And yet it is not therefore unknown !—

Thus have we from our forefathers

Received in turn the instruction.

Only he who knows it not knows it,

Who knows it, he knows it not ;

Unknown is it by the wise,

But by the ignorant known.

1 abhayam gato bhavati, like Janaka, whom Yâjñavalkhya exhorts,—

abhayam vai Janaka prápto 'si. Bṛih. 4. 2. 4.

84 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

Our knowledge is addressed to the external world, but there is another way :-

Outwards the Creator pierced the holes,

Therefore men look outwards, not inwards;

The wise man right within saw the âtman,

Fastened his gaze on himself, seeking the eternal.1

"Fastened his gaze on himself" is literally "turning round the eye"—âvrittacakshus.2

Here within us the reality of the âtman becomes an immediate certainty : 3—

Not by speech, not by thought,

Not by sight is he comprehended;

"He is !" by this word is he comprehended,

And in no other way.

"He is !" thus may he be apprehended,

In so far as he is the essence of both;

"He is !" to the man who has thus apprehended him,

His essential nature becomes manifest.

The polemic against knowledge grows in intensity.

Thus in a verse inserted later in Bṛih. 4. 4. 10 :-

In dense darkness they move,

Who bow the knee to ignorance;

In yet denser they

Who are satisfied with knowledge.

This verse is repeated and further amplified in Îśâ 9-11 (in dependence on Kena 3) :-

Other than that to which knowledge leadeth

Is that to which leadeth ignorance !

Thus have we received the teaching from our forefathers.

He who recognises both wisdom and ignorance (as insufficient),

He through both overpasses death and wins immortality.

With this is connected the demand for the suppression

of the perceptions of the senses which trick us with a

1 Kâṭh. 4. 1.

2 cp. Jacob Böhme's "averted eye."

3 Kâṭh. 6. 12, 13.

false knowledge. As early as Bṛih. 1. 5. 23 the injunction is given :-“ Therefore must one vow only be observed ;

suppressing the activities of the other organs of sense, a man must inspire and expire.” Chând. 8. 15 demands that

a man “ reduce all his organs to inactivity in the âtman.” Muṇḍaka 3. 1. 8 craves for jñânaprasâda, “ cessation

of knowledge,” and in 3. 2. 7 together with works represents the vijñânamaya âtman1 also as becoming one with

the supreme eternal. And Maitr. 6. 19 directs that the consciousness, together with the subtle body (lingam)

that sustains it, should be immersed in the unknown :-

That which abides in consciousness

Unknown, beyond conception, wrapped in mystery,

In that do thou immerse consciousness

And the lingam, bereft of its foundation.

All these requirements are part of the Yoga system, of which we shall learn to know more later as a Praxis, by

which it is hoped to effect that metaphysical union with the âtman by artificial means.

II. The Search for Brahman

1. The Âtman (Brahman) as the Unity

As early as the times of the Ṛigveda a perception of unity had been reached, to which expression was given

in hymns like Ṛigv. I. 164, X. 129. After this, however, there remained the further task of defining more closely

the eternal unity which underlies all the phenomena of nature. Of such inquiry the hymn Ṛigv. X. 121 is the

chief example, which, to the nine times repeated question, “ Who is the god to whom we are to offer sacrifice ?” in

the tenth verse gives the answer : “ Prajâpati ! It is thou

and no other, who holdest in thy embrace all that has

1 Taitt. 2. 4.

come to be." We have already traced in detail1 how this

search was prosecuted through the period of the Brâh-

manas, how Prajâpati was gradually displaced by Brahman,

and how finally the most definite expression for the

object of man's search was found in the conception of

the âtman. Âtman is the Indian expression for that

which we are accustomed to call "first principle," and is

distinguished from the latter only by its defining in a

clearer and more striking manner than any Western

equivalent the one eternal problem of all philosophical

research ; for it invites us to lay hold of the individual

self of man, the self of the universe, and to strip off from

man and from nature everything which does not approve

itself as this self, as the peculiar, most profound, and

ultimate essence of things. At the same time, the less

definite Brahman is often enough employed to express

the first principle. This is the case in the passages to be

discussed immediately, Bṛih. 2. 1. 1 (Kaush. 4. 1), Bṛih.

4. 1. 2–7, Chând. 5. 11. 1. Similarly S'vet. 1. 1 opens

with the question,—"What is the first beginning, what is

Brahman?"—and according to Pras'na 1. 1 and in the

Ârsheya Upanishad, wise men come together in order to

search for "Brahman."

The terms Brahman and âtman both denote, there-

fore, the first principle of the universe, and in this sense

are ordinarily employed in the Upanishads as synonymous,

and are interchanged with one another in the same text

or stand side by side, as in the question proposed in

Chând. 5. 11. 1 :—ko nu âtmâ, kiṁ brahma? where

S'ankara remarks that Brahman denotes the term to be

defined, vis'eshyam, and âtman that which defines it,

vis'eshaṇam, (which is true in general, if not precisely so

here), that by Brahmaṇ the limitation implied in âtman

is removed, and by âtman the conception of Brahman as a

1 Einleitung und Philosophie des Vedu, p. 132 f.

DEFINITIONS OF BRAHMAN

87

divinity to be worshipped is condemned. Both expressions however are, as this remark already shows, of indefinite con-

notation. The conception of Brahman is very complex, and the conception of the âtman is a negative and relative

idea, which declares to us rather wherein the essence of man and of the universe is not to be sought, than affords

us any positive information as to its real nature. Pre-

cisely in this its philosophical value consists. For the essence of things remains, as far as its nature is concerned,

eternally unknown ; and every attempt to make it an object of knowledge compels us to impose upon it defini-

tions which are borrowed from that sphere of experimental knowledge that alone is accessible to our intelligence, and

these again do not penetrate to the essential reality of things. From this realistic tendency the many false or

imperfect attempts to explain Brahman and the âtman arise, which are rejected by the teachers of the Upanishads

themselves, and which we have now to discuss.

2. Bâlâki's Attempts at Explanation

According to a narrative preserved in a twofold recension, in Brih. 2. 1 and Kaush. 4, the learned, famous,

and proud Brâhman Bâlâki Gârgya approached the king Ajâta'satru with the offer :—“ Allow me to explain to you

the Brahman.” He then endeavours twelve times in suc-

cession (in Kaush. sixteen times) to define the Brahman as the soul (purusha) in the sun, moon, lightning, ether,

wind, fire, water, etc. ; and in each case the king confutes his definition by pointing to the subordinate position

which the corresponding purusha occupies in the whole of nature. The Brâhman is silenced, and the king pro-

ceeds to instruct him, using the illustration of a deep sleeper. That in which his vital breaths (prânấh) lie

dormant, and from which they issue on his waking, and with them all worlds, gods, and living creatures, is the

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âtman. This is the Brahman that Gârgya undertook in

vain to explain. The reader's expectation of a more

precise account of the relation of Brahman to the purushas

of Gârgya is not fulfilled in either recension. They both

are satisfied to show how on waking the prânas (speech,

eye, ear, manas) proceed from the âtman, and as being

dependent on them all worlds, gods, and living creatures.

3. S'âkalya's Attempts at Explanation

In a similar way, in Br̥ih. 3. 9. 10–17, 26, Vidagdha

S'âkalya attempts to define Brahman as forming the

climax of all that the word âtman denotes (sarvasya

âtmanaḥ parâyanam). After, however, having eight

times in succession propounded a one-sided view that

represents the earth, love, forms, ether, etc., as its basis,

he is corrected by Yâjñavalkhya, who points out to him

that that which he explains as the climax of all the

word âtman denotes (sarvasya âtmanaḥ parâyanam

yam âttha) is, on the contrary, only a subordinate purusha

that rules in the bodily forms, in love, the sun, sound, etc.

"He however," Yâjñavalkhya proceeds in Br̥ih. 3. 9. 26,

"who oversteps these purushas (is superior to them),

separating them one from another and turning them

back (i.e. inciting them to activity and recalling them),

this is the purusha of the Upanishad doctrine concerning

which I ask thee." S'âkalya is unable to name it, and

for the error of having passed off a subordinate purusha

as sarvasya âtmanaḥ parâyanam must atone by his

death.1

1 This is the meaning of the passage as I propose to assign the dialogue.

The traditional view, which is less satisfactory, represents Yâjñavalkhya as

raising the question with regard to sarvasya âtmanaḥ parâyanam, and indicat-

ing as its basis, earth, love, forms, ether, etc. ; and the error of S'âkalya would

then consist in his naming in answer not the âtman that Yâjñavalkhya expects

in answer, but only a subordinate purusha that rules in the bodily forms, in

love, the sun, sound, etc.

DEFINITIONS OF BRAHMAN

89

4. Six Inadequate Definitions

Precisely as in Ḅṛih. 2. 1 twelve defective (ekapâd) definitions of Brahman are criticised, in Kaush. 4 sixteen, and in Ḅṛih. 3. 9. 10-17 eight, so in Ḅṛih. 4. 1 there are six ; and here Janaka approaches Yâjñavalkhya after having fortified his soul with mystic doctrines, upani-shads, as the traveller provisions his ship or waggon.1

These “upanishads” consist in six definitions of Brahman enunciated by other teachers, as speech, breath, eye, ear, manas, and heart. All these definitions may still be found in the extant texts, if not always exactly under the names assigned. For instance, for vág vai brahma see Pañc'av. Br. 20. 14. 2, Chând. 7. 2. 2 ; for práṇo vai brahma, Ḅṛih. 1. 5. 23, 3. 7. 1–2, Chând. 4. 3. 3, 7. 15, Taitt. 3. 3, Kaush. 2. 1, 2, 2. 13, Pras'na 2. 13 ; c'akshur vai brahma, Chând. 1. 7. 4, 4. 15. 1, 8. 7. 4, Kaush. 4. 17, 18, Ḅṛih. 2. 3. 5, 5. 5. 4 ; s'rotram vai brahma, Taitt. 3. 1, Kaush. 4. 14 ; mano vai brahma, Chând. 3. 18. 1, Ait. 3. 2 ; hṛidayam vai brahma, Chând. 3. 12. 4, 8. 3. 3, Ḅṛih. 5. 3 ; cp. also in general Chând. 3. 18, where vâc', práṇa, c'akshuh, s'rotram form the four feet of Brahman, and Chând. 4. 8. 3, where práṇa, c'akshus, s'rotram, manas are one of his four feet.

These and all similar definitions, whether they are historical or only invented to give colour to historical tendencies, arise from the endeavour to know that which is essentially unknowable ; for which purpose no resource is open but to conceive it with conscious or unconscious symbolism under the form of some one of its phenomenal appearances.

The criticism to which Yâjñavalkhya subjects these six definitions of Brahman as vâc', prâṇa, c'akshus, s'rotram, manas, and hṛidayam consists in explaining them as mere “supports” (âyatana), by means of which six corresponding attributes

1 Ḅṛih. 4. 2. 1.

90 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

that are assumed to belong to the divine Being as prajñâ, priyam, satyam, ananta, ânanda, sthiti, manifest themselves in the space which is common to all six as basis (pratishṭha). If, however, we seek to ascertain further the nature of these six attributes, we are referred back again to their six manifestations in space as vâc, prâna, cakshus, srotram, manas, hṛidayam. And so, thrown backwards and forwards between the phenomenal forms of experience, and the empirical attributes of the divine Being which find expression in them, we learn that phenomena can only be explained by phenomena, and that it is not in this way that we can arrive at a knowledge of the nature of the Godhead. Yâjñavalkhya accordingly himself adopts another way,1 and, starting from the question what becomes of the soul after death, first of all sketches a picture of the individual soul as it dwells in the heart encompassed and nourished by the veins, and extends its feelers, as it were, in the two eyes; then suddenly draws aside, like a veil that hides it, this entire individual soul, so that before and around and in us we see only the one omnipresent supreme soul. And thus the question concerning the future existence of the individual receives its answer in that it is deprived of all justification, and falls to the ground meaningless. Nor have we even to-day any better reply to give.

5. Definitions of the Âtman Vais´vânara

Owing to the ambiguity of the word the conception of the âtman, like that of Brahman, gives rise to several misunderstandings. One of these was due to the fact that beyond the cosmological meaning of the âtman as first principle of the universe there was discerned its psychical meaning, the embodiment of this principle in the self. It is thus with the five Brahmans, who in

1 Bṛih. 4. 2.

DEFINITIONS OF THE ÂTMAN VAIS'VÂNARA

91

Chând. 5. 11 meet and propound the question:—“What is our âtman, what is Brahman?” They betake themselves with this question to Uddâlaka Âruni, who they know is even now engaged in studying the Âtman Vais'vânara, i.e. the âtman as the all-pervading first principle of the universe.

Uddâlaka mistrusts (rightly, as his later answer proves) his ability to satisfy them, and all six proceed according to king As'vapati Kaikeya for instruction concerning the Âtman Vais'vânara.

The king first asks the six Brâhmans in succession what it is that they “worship” as the âtman.

He assumes, as this expression shows, that the Brâhmans who apply to him for instruction are still entangled in the error of regarding the âtman as an object of worship existing outside of themselves, like a new kind of divinity.

This assumption is confirmed, inasmuch as the six inquirers explain the âtman in succession as the heaven, the sun, the wind, space, water, and the earth, therefore as something objective.

The king rejoins:—“You all, to judge from your answers, conceive of this Âtman Vais'vânara as though it were something separate from yourselves, and thus you consume your food.

He however who worships this Âtman Vais'vânara thus (placing his outstretched hand on his head from the forehead to the chin) as a span long (prâdes'amâtram abhivimânam), he consumes the food in all worlds, in all beings, in all selves.

And of this very Âtman Vais'vânara (measured on the head as a span long) the bright (heaven) is the head, the all-pervading (sun) is the eye, the (wind) on its lonely path is the breath, manifold (space) is its trunk, its bodily frame, riches (water) its bladder, the earth its feet.”

The suggested movement of the hands, without which the passage is unintelligible, may with certainty be inferred from the original of our text in S'atap. Br. 10. 6. 1, where they are actually made.

In other respects also the

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

original passage referred to possesses several advantages,

especially in its discussion not of the Âtman Vais´vânara,

but of a symbolical interpretation of Agni Vais´vânara,

" the all-pervading fire," as a first principle of the

universe. In this light the defective answers of the six

interlocutors are far more intelligible than if they inquire,

in the first instance, as is the case in the secondary re-

presentation of the Chândogya, concerning the âtman as

" Brahman " (first principle). The question in this form

and the inquiry for the Âtman Vais´vânara would, strictly

speaking, exclude from the very beginning such erroneous

answers as were given by all six Brâhmans.

6. Gradual Instruction of Nârada

It is not always opponents or pupils who betray their

entanglement in incorrect or defective conceptions of

Brahman. We repeatedly meet with a Brâhman inquirer

who, like Sanatkumâra in Chând. 7 or Bhṛgu in Taitt. 3,

makes his way through a succession of inadequate con-

ceptions in order step by step to rise to an ever purer and

more refined knowledge of the Brahman or âtman. The

most complete example of this kind is Chând. 7, where

Sanatkumâra begins his instruction of Nârada by declar-

ing the whole of the experimental knowledge that he has

acquired to be mere name. Speech is greater than name,

manas greater than speech, and in this way the inquirer,

ever advancing, is led upwards from the conditioned to the

conditioning, from great to greater by successive stages,

in which Brahman is apprehended as nâman, vâc, manas,

saṅkalpa, cittam, dhyânam, vijñânam, balam, annam,

âpas, tejas, ákása, samara, ás´á up to prâna (the individual

soul) ; and from this last to bhûman, the absolutely " great,"

the " unlimited," beyond which there is nothing, that com-

prehends all, fills all space, and yet is identical with the

self-consciousness (ahaṅkâra), with the soul (âtman) in

GRADUAL INSTRUCTION OF NÂRAḌA

93

us. The greatness of this final thought impresses us as

in strange contrast to the laborious series of conceptions

by which we ascend to it. It was probably intended for

more patient readers than are to be found at the close

of the nineteenth century, and was evidently meant, by

passing from the visibly great to a still greater, to serve

the purpose of exciting expectation to the highest pitch.

Otherwise, in this transition from name to speech, from

this to the intellectual faculties (mind, judgement, thought,

intuition, knowledge), from these through the intermediary

of force to the four elements (food, water, heat, space),

and from these through memory and expectation to prâna,

it is impossible, in spite of the rich poetic ornament with

which these ideas are set forth, to discern a satisfactory

reason for this progressive advance; and the question is

perhaps justified, whether the author himself was entirely

in earnest, or whether these ideas from name right up to

prâna were not all more or less intended to serve as mere

foil, in order to set in so much clearer light the absolute

unconditioned and unlimited nature of the âtman, as

lying above and beyond all thought. It is on other grounds

remarkable that, in connection with all the members of the

series that precede prâna, rich reward is promised to the

man who “worships as Brahman” name, speech, mind,

etc. The author therefore admits the possibility of

“worshipping as Brahman” all these things, and in the case

of many of them this may actually take place in a more

or less consciously symbolic manner. For ordinary men,

relying on their empirical consciousness as though on a

rope, prefer to worship rather than to know. To such an

end the absolute is naturally only with difficulty or not

at all adapted. The use of symbols therefore for its

expression is inevitable, and these in the hands of the

multitude very readily become idols. The manner also is

remarkable in which our author passes from prâna, the

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

individual soul, for which the distinction of subject and

object still exists, to bhûman, the supreme soul, for which

these like all distinctions have no meaning. We seek,

he says, the truth. This depends on knowledge, this

again on thought, this on faith, this on self-concentration,

this on productive power, this on pleasure (sukham,

more usually ânanda, the so-called bliss), which exists in

the unlimited, the bhûman. Gradually, therefore, from

the sphere of the intellectual in which differences obtain,

we are led upwards through an ever-increasing blending

of subject and object to a region in which all distinctions

are lost in the All-one.

7. Three Different Âtmans

The âtman is, as has often already been pointed out,

an idea capable of very different interpretations. The

word signifies no more than “the self,” and the question

then arises what we regard as our self. Three positions

are here possible, according as by the âtman is understood

(1) the corporeal self, the body; (2) the individual soul,

free from the body, which as knowing subject is contrasted

with and distinct from the object; or (3) the supreme soul,

in which subject and object are no longer distinguished

from one another, or which, according to the Indian con-

ception, is the objectless knowing subject. The narrative

in Chând. 8. 7–12 furnishes an illustration of these three

positions. “The self (âtman), the sinless, free from old

age, from death, and from suffering, delivered from hunger

and thirst, whose wish is true, whose decree is true, that

ought we to seek, that endeavour to know.” Impelled by

this craving, the god Indra and the demon Virocana set

off, and betake themselves to Prajâpati for instruction.

His first lesson is as follows :—The self is that which is

seen in looking into the eye of another, into a brook of

water or a mirror, which is reflected again in an image

THREE DIFFERENT ÂTMANS

complete even to hairs and nails, which decked with fair clothing appears fair, in a word, the body ; “that is the self, that is the immortal, the fearless, that is Brahman.”

The answer satisfies both pupils, and they depart home-

wards ; but Prajâpati looking after them says :—“ So they depart, without having perceived or discovered the self.”

Virocana and the demons rest content with this answer, and therefore all demon-like men, seeing the self in the body, deck the human frame with all kinds of finery, as though it were destined for a future life, a world beyond.

Indra, on the contrary, reflecting that this self is exposed to all the sufferings and imperfections of the body, and perishes at death, feels (what everyone may feel) that no change which passes over us can affect us, and returns to Prajâpati.

Prajâpati now communicates to him the second answer :—the self is that which roams about untrammelled in dreams ; “ that is the immortal, the fearless, that is Brahman.”

But even with this answer Indra cannot remain satisfied.

The dream-self is not, it is true, affected by the injuries which the body experiences from objects, but yet it is virtually affected by them, seeing that it proceeds to create an objective world over-against itself.

The third answer of Prajâpati now follows :—“ When a man is so completely wrapped in slumber, has reached so perfect a rest, that he does not perceive any dream-image, —that is the self,” thus he spake, “ that is the immortal, the fearless, that is Brahman.”

A further objection on the part of Indra, that this amounts to entrance into a state of annihilation, Prajâpati removes by showing that the cessation of the distinction of subject and object, as this is attained in deep sleep, is rather an entrance into the fullest light, a personal identification with the supreme spirit, which as the knowing subject in us is unaffected by any change of organs or objects.

The meaning of this narrative is clear.

In response to the question, What is the

96 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

self? three answers are possible, according as we adopt the standpoint of materialism, realism, or idealism. (1) The material (demoniac) answer runs,—the self is the body, and perishes with it. The theologians of the Vedânta understand even here the individual soul, and do violence to the text by transforming the man who “is seen ” in the eye (mirroring himself) into one who “sees ” in the eye, because otherwise Prajâpati “ would have been a deceiver,” since he says in fact even of this first self,—“ that is the immortal,” etc. Prajâpati, however, is here the representative of nature, which never speaks falsely, and yet shows itself in a certain sense double-faced, inasmuch as to the two most important questions which we can put, the question concerning freedom and the question concerning immortality, it gives to the ordinary empirical consciousness two answers, which appear to be in contradiction with one another. If we regard our actions, we see that they all necessarily proceeded from their causes (character and motive) in harmony with the law of causality ; and yet we bear within ourselves the invincible indestructible consciousness of freedom and responsibility for these actions. Similarly with the question of immortality. If we look without, we see our entire self entering into existence as body and perishing ; and yet we are invincibly conscious within of the eternity of our being : sentimus experi-murque nos aeternos esse, as Spinoza says. It is on this consciousness, and not on personal longings, that all proofs of the immortality of the soul depend. This consciousness is which, clothed in empirical forms, (2) from the realistic standpoint exhibits the self as the individual soul, and to this the second answer of Prajâpati refers. Very beautiful is his illustration of this consciousness of a soul, free from the body and yet real and individual, by means of the dream-state, as being the only state of which we have experience, in which the soul may be observed bound by

corporeal conditions but not under the limitations of individuality. This entire individual soul, however, is a false conception arising from the fact that we transfer the forms of our intellectual judgements, and especially the most general of them, the necessary existence of an object for a subject, into a region where they have no validity. From this point consciousness leads on (3) to the idealistic standpoint, which recognises only the one supreme soul, existing in everything, and embodied in each in its entirety. In it there is no duality, no subject and object, and consequently no consciousness in an empirical sense. Thus far it may be compared to a deep dreamless sleep. Later on we shall learn to recognise besides waking slumber and deep sleep a fourth (turīya) state of the soul, in which that unification, which ensues unconsciously in deep sleep, is to be realised in a consciousness which is perfect though not resting upon experience, or directed towards objects external to itself.

8. Five different Âtmans

As in the passage from the Chândogya discussed above three âtmans are distinguished, the corporeal individual and supreme, so a paragraph in Taitt. 2, which occupies a more advanced and developed position, assumes five âtmans (or purushas) by further division of the intermediate individual âtman into the principles of life, of will, and of knowledge. Thus are constituted the âtmans annamaya, prânamaya, manomaya, vijñânamaya, and ânandamaya, which are manifested alike in mankind and in nature as a whole. The first four of these, like sheaths or husks (termed later kos'as), surround the fifth as the true kernel. Stripping off these sheaths one by one, and gradually penetrating deeper, we finally reach the innost essential being of a man and of nature.

(1) The annamaya âtman, "the self dependent on food,"

98 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

is the incarnation of the âtman in the human body and in material nature; the bodily organs are its constituent parts. (2) Within this is contained the prânamaya âtman, "the self dependent on the vital breath," the âtman as the principle of natural life. Its constituent parts are the vital breaths in man (inhalation, inter-halation, exhalation), but also in a cosmological sense the whole of space is its body, the earth its foundation. By stripping off this âtman also as a sheath we reach (3) the manomaya âtman, "the âtman dependent on manas" (volition), whose constituent parts are stated to be the four Vedas with the Brâhmaṇas (âdes'a). According to this definition we are to understand by it the principle of the will (manas) embodied both in men and in gods, i.e. of purpose directed to selfish ends. For it is this that on the human side is expressed in the Vedic sacrificial ritual.

(4) Deeper still is found the vijñânamaya âtman, "the self dependent on knowledge," which, as the accompanying verse declares, offers knowledge in place of sacrifice and works, while recognising and worshipping the deity as a separate and independent being. This position also we must abandon like a sheath, in order finally to penetrate (5) to the ânandamaya âtman, "the self dependent on bliss," as the innermost kernel of man and of nature as a whole. This âtman dependent on bliss, "before whom words and thought recoil, not finding him," is no longer an object of knowledge. It is, in contrast with the reality of experience, that which lies beyond on the other side, unutterable, unfathomable, an unconsciousness, a not-reality. "For it is he who creates bliss. For when a man finds resting-place and peace in that invisible, unreal, unutterable, unfathomable one, then has he attained to peace. When, however, a man assumes therein an interval, a separation (between himself as subject and the âtman as object), then his unrest is

SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATIONS OF BRAHMAN 99

prolonged. Moreover, it is the unrest of one who deems himself wise (while making Brahman an object of knowledge)." 1

III. Symbolic Representations of Brahman

'1. Introduction and Classification

By a symbol (σύμβολον) the ancient writers understood the visible sign of an invisible object or circumstance. The word itself may be derived from the piecing together (συμβάλλειν) of a broken ring or the like carried by guests, messengers, etc., as their authorisation, to the other half that has been laid by, or simply from the mutual understanding (συμβάλλειν) on which the recognition of this visible token depended. An illustration lying very near to hand for the conception of a symbol is furnished by the words which language uses. These are to be regarded collectively as the visible signs of the invisible ideas which they represent, and therefore Aristotle pertinently remarks :—τῶν δὲ ὁπομάτων ἐκαστον σύμβολον ἐστιν : 2 and ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολον, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. 3 So also the Church calls its sacraments and doctrinal formulæ symbols. They are the external tokens of adhesion to its fellowship.

The Indian word for symbol, pratīkam, depends upon a similar conception. It denotes originally (from prati-añc) the side "turned towards" us, and therefore visible, of an object in other respects invisible. In this sense the teachers of the Vedânta often speak of symbols (pratīkāni) of Brahman. They understand by the term definite representations of Brahman under some form perceptible by the senses, e.g. as name, speech, etc., 4 as manas and

1 Taitt. 2. 7.

2 De Sensu I. p. 437.

3 De Interp. I. p. 16.

4 Chând. 7.

100 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

âkâs'a,1 as âditya,2 as the fire of digestion,3 or even as om,4

which for the purpose of worship are regarded as Brahman,

and are related to the latter as the images of the gods

(pratimâ, arcâ) to the gods that they represent.5 As

early as Bâdarâyana6 the distinction is drawn between

the worshippers of Brahman under such symbols and

the worshippers of Brahman "endowed with attributes"

(saгуна). The latter possess a knowledge of Brahman,

and pass accordingly by the devayâna, which leads to

Brahman ; while the worshippers of the symbol are by

it hindered from discerning Brahman,7 and hence they

receive as fruit only the reward specified for each symbol.8

In the sequel this distinction is not consistently main-

tained. The worship of Brahman by means of the syllable

om leads, according to Prasna 5. 5, by the devayâna to

Brahman, and the worship of Brahman as prâna is usually

assigned to that branch of knowledge which concerns itself

with qualities, and only exceptionally9 to the symbolical

worships, to which, nevertheless, it belongs according to

passages like Brih. 4. 1. 3 (prâna by the side of vâc',

manas, etc.), 2. 3. 4 (with âkâs'a), Chând. 3. 18. 4 (sub-

ordinated to manas, by the side of vâc', etc.).

Nevertheless the definite conception of the symbol is

wanting in the Upanishads, just as the word pratîkam in

this sense is not there found. When, however, in the

extracts discussed in the preceding chapter10 certain

concrete representations of Brahman are rejected as

inadequate, though they are acknowledged to be

1 Chând. 3. 18. 2 Chând. 3. 19.

3 Brih. 5. 9, Chând. 3. 13. 8. 4 Chând. 1. 1. 1.

5 cp. S'ankara on Brahmasûtra, pp. 147. 14, 189. 8, 217. 10, 835. 9, 1059. 6 ;

on Chândogya, pp. 9. 8, 10. 1, 21. 3.

6 Sûtram 4. 3. 15–16, cp. 4. 1. 4.

7 P. 1135. 7, pratîka-pratîkânatvâd upâsanasyu.

8 E.g. Chând. 7. 1–14.

9 E.g. on Brahmasûtra 4. 1, 5.

10 Brih. 4. 1; Chând. 5. 12–17, 7. 1–14.

meritorious, as is shown by the promise of a reward, we are able, as is the case with so many doctrines of the later Vedânta, to trace in passages like those quoted the earliest rise of the conception of the symbol.

By symbol in a wider sense we understand all the representations conceived with a view to the worship of Brahman, himself incapable of representation, under some one of his phenomenal forms ; and therefore especially as prâna and vâyu, as âkâsa, manas, and âditya, as the fire of digestion and the syllable om. To the discussion of these symbols in the present chapter must further be added the symbolical interpretations of ritualistic conceptions, and finally the substitution for liturgical practices of others which are related to the âtman doctrine.

2. Brahman as Prâna and Vâyu

No natural phenomenon bears so ambiguous a character, none appears to be derived so immediately from the most intimate essence of things and so fully to reveal it, as the phenomenon of life, manifested in the activity of all the vital organs (prânas), but above all in the process of breathing (prâna) which determines the life itself. Hence as early as the Brâhmaṇa period the central significance of prâna (breath or life) was discussed together with its superiority to the other prânas (vital forces, as the eye, ear, speech, manas), and its identity with Vâyu, the god of the wind as the vital breath of the universe, was discussed. All these discussions are continued in the Upanishads, especially in the older texts, which yet are unable to apprehend the first principle of the universe otherwise than in its most obvious phenomenal forms ; until the prâna, whether by a process of subordination or identification, retires more and more behind the âtman, and appears only as an occasional synonym for it.

That the body of all (organic) beings can be sustained

102

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

only as long as the prâna inhabits it, is taught in a

passage frequently misunderstood, Chând. 1. 11. 5 :-

sarvâni ha vâ' imâni bhûtâni prânam eva abhisamvis'anti,

prânam abhyujjihate. This does not mean, as S'ankara

and many with him explain it, that beings enter (at

death) into prâna, and are thence born anew, but rather

the contrary :-" All these creatures " enter with the breath

(into the body), and with the breath they again depart

out." The best illustration is furnished by the metaphor

Pras'na 2. 4, which contains possibly a reminiscence of

our passage, and by Brahma Upanishad 1, which is

dependent upon it. The illustration is employed, it is

true, not of living beings, but of the individual organs

in their relation to the prâna. " Just as the bees all

follow the queen bee when she comes forth, and so long as

she tarries all tarry, so also speech, manas, eye, and ear."

The prâna is the fundamental and constant part of the

sixteen of which man consists. In Brîh. 1. 5. 14 this

is illustrated in mythological language by the example

of Prajâpati, who loses a sixteenth part each night with

the waning of the moon :-" And after that at new moon

he has entered with the sixteenth part into everything

which has breath, thereupon is he born on the following

morning (as the crescent of the new moon)." Here

Prajâpati, after the loss of his fifteen changeable parts,

continues to exist at the new moon with his sixteenth

" unchangeable " (dhruva) part solely as prâna in all

living beings. From a physiological point of view this

thought is explained in Chând. 6. 7 ; man cousists of

sixteen parts, of which after a fifteen days' fast only one,

the prâna, survives. An enumeration of these sixteen

parts is undertaken in Pras'na 6. 3-4 :-" He (purusha)

reflected, 'With the departure of what shall I myself

depart, and with the remaining of what shall I remain?'

Accordingly he created the prâna"; from which, as the

passage goes on to declare, the fifteen other parts originate. Here, in harmony with the later date of the

composition, the prâṇa is dependent on the purusha, i.e. the âtman, but is still at the same time its empirical

representative. As such, as the bhûman brought within the circle of experience (in the distinction of subject and

object), the prâṇa makes its appearance already in the beautiful description of Chând. 7. 15 :-“ As the spokes

are inserted into the nave of the wheel, so everything is inserted into this life (prâṇa). The life advances by the

life (the breath), the life (breath) gives the life, it becomes the life. The life is father and mother, the life is brother

and sister, the life is teacher and Brâhman. Therefore if a father or mother or brother or sister or teacher or

Brâhman is used roughly, men say of you, ‘Fie, you are a parricide, a matricide, a murderer of brother or sister,

of teacher or Brâhman. Should he, however, strike even these with a spear, after the life has departed (on the

funeral pyre) and they are burnt to the last hair, then it is not said, ‘ You are a parricide, a matricide, a murderer

of brother or sister, of teacher or Brâhman ’; for the life only is all this.” The comparison that occurs here of the

prâṇa to the nave of a wheel, in which all the spokes meet, is found again : (1) of the prâṇa, in Pras’na 2. 6, in

the hymn to the prâṇa here inserted, though derived from an earlier period, and which recalls not only Vâj. Sanh.

34. 5, but also in many ways Atharvar. 11. 4 ; (2) of the prâṇa, which is already identified in the second

place with Prajñâtman in Kaush. 3. 8 (for which is substituted, in Kaush. 4. 20, the figure of the chieftain

and his people) ; (3) of the âtman, in Brih. 2. 5. 15, cp. 1. 5. 15 Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 6 Pras’na 6. 6, and interpreted in

S’vet. 1. 4, in terms of Sâṅkhyan thought.

The superiority of the prâṇa to the other vital organs (eye, ear, speech, manas, etc.) is illustrated by the

104 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

parable of the rivalry of the organs, which forms a favourite

theme of the Upanishads. In order to test which of them

is the most essential, the prâṇas (eye, ear, speech, etc.)

one after another leave the body, which nevertheless still

continues to exist; but when the prâṇa proposes to

depart, they become conscious that none of them can

exist without it. This narrative, known by the name

of prâṇasamivâda, is found in Chând. 5. 1. 6-12, Brih. 6.

1. 7-13, Kaush. 2. 14, cp. 3. 3, Ait. Âr. 2. 1. 4, Prasna

2. 2-4.1 The most original form is preserved unquestion-

ably in Chând. 5. 1. 6-12. The vital organs (only speech,

eye, ear, and manas are mentioned besides prâṇa) come to

Prajâpati, contending for precedence. His decision is

given :-“That one amongst you, after whose departure

the body finds itself in the worst condition, has the

precedence among you.” Thereupon in succession speech,

eye, ear, and manas depart, without the body on that

account ceasing to exist. “Thereupon the prâṇa proposed

to go forth ; but as a noble steed (if he breaks loose) tears

away the foot-ropes that hold fast his feet, so he tore

away with him the other vital breaths. Then they all

came to him and said :-‘Worthy sir, thou art he ; thou

hast the precedence over us, only go not forth.’” Brih. 6

1. 7-13 relates the story almost in the same words, but

with the substitution of Brahman for Prajâpati, the

addition of a sixth organ, and the further elaboration of

the illustration of the steed. All these variations are in

favour of the originality of the version of the Chândogya.

Kaush. 3. 3 supplies only an argument which assumes

the narrative in the form indicated. Kaush. 2. 14

represents all the organs as going forth together, but

returning separately ; on the return of the prâṇa the

body revives. Here the motive for the united departure

1 A further recension, according to Weber's statement, occurs in Kaush.

Ar. 9. On Brih. 1. 5. 21, cp. also infra.

is wanting. Ait. Âr. 2. 1. 4 twice brings to a settlement

the question which of the prânas is uktham, by the

collapse of the body on the departure of the prâna, and

again by its revival when the prâna returns. In this

case an inferior impression is created both by the

doubling of the proof of superiority, and by the applica-

tion of the story to the glorification of the uktham.

Pras'na 2. 2–4 represents the prâna indignant at the

behaviour of the others preparing forthwith to depart,

whereupon speech, manas, eye, and ear are carried away

with it, and beg the prâna to remain. This is clearly an

abbreviated form of the original narrative ; what is new

is only the substitution of the illustration of the queen

bee for that of the steed. These relations are of interest,

since they supply a foundation for the chronology of the

corresponding texts.

Connected with this narrative of the dispute of the

organs for precedence is another of the strife of the gods,

i.e. the organs, against the demons. We limit ourselves

to a comparison of the two chief recensions, Br̥ih. 1. 3

and Chând. 1. 2.1 Of these two, Br̥ih. 1. 3 is unquestion-

ably the more original. In order to vanquish the demons

the gods, i.e. the organs, speech, smell, eye, ear, manas, and

prâna, instruct one of their number to sing the udgîtha.

Speech essays the task, but while singing is overcome

with evil by the demons. A similar fate overtakes in

succession smell, eye, ear, and manas. Finally prâna

undertakes it, and the assailing demons are scattered

before him like a clod of earth when it falls on a stone.

Thereupon prâna leads the others away beyond the reach

of evil and death, whereby speech goes to Agni, smell to

Vâyu, the eye to Âditya, the ear to the heavenly regions,

the manas to the moon. All these deities then, in order

1 Other discussions of the same theme will be found in Talav. Up. Br. 1.

60, 2. 1–2, 2. 3, 2. 10–11.

106 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

to enjoy food, enter again as speech, smell, eye, ear, and

manas into the prâna. The same idea is found in Ait.

1–2, adapted to the conception of the purusha as the

primeval man. To these legends Brîh. 1. 3. 19 attaches

a glorification of the prâna as Ayâsya Ângirasa, as

Brihaspati and Brahmanaspati, as Sâman and even as

Udgîtha. Previously he sang the udgîtha, now he is

the udgîtha. It is quite clear that we have here an

amalgamation of two texts originating from different

points of view. We now understand the strange version

of our story in Chând. 1. 2, where the gods in their

strife against the demons approach the individual organs,

not for the purpose of securing that the udgîtha shall be

sung by them, but in order to worship them as udgîtha.

The author of this section found the story of the strife

followed already (just as is the case still in the Brihad.) by

a worship of the prâna as udgîtha. Both pieces, though

radically different, and only by accident standing side by

side, were blended into one whole, whereby the narrative

entirely lost its original character.1

The last-quoted legend suggests already that the

prâna is not merely a psychical but also a cosmical

principle, that it is not only the breath of life in

men, but also the universal breath of life which prevails

throughout the whole of nature. This transition is very

natural. Among the most diverse peoples, from the

purusha of the hymn Rigv. X. 90 to the giant Ymir of

the Edda, we meet with the tendency to regard man-

kind as a microcosm, and vice versâ the universe as a

makranthropos. This thought depends, in the first

instance, upon the fact that that which is manifested in

nature as a whole, with all its phenomena, finds its most

definite and complete expression in man. But in detail

also the human organism enters into manifold relations

1 See further, Deussen, Upan., p. 66 ff.

BRAHMAN AS PRÂNA AND VÂYU

107

with the external world. By means of its various organs

and functions it extends itself, as it were, over-against

the surrounding phenomena of nature, and accommodates

itself to them. The organs of nutrition correspond to

the constitution of food, the breathing organs to the

atmosphere; the structure of the feet corresponds to the

earth, upon which they will have to move; and in the

curvature of the head the vaulting of the heaven seems

to be reproduced.1

It is perhaps due to considerations of this nature that

as early as the hymn of the purusha,2 describing the

transformation of the primeval man into the universe, his

head becomes the heaven, his navel the atmosphere, his feet

the earth, his eye the sun, his manas the moon, his mouth

Indra and Agni (fire), his ears the heavenly regions, and

his prâna the wind. In general, precisely as we were led

to recognise in prâna the central organ of life, as ex-

plained above, so that which corresponds to it in the

universe, the wind, must become the vital principle of

nature, whether we regard it merely as the prâna that

pervades the whole universe, as in the hymns elsewhere

quoted,3 or contrast vâyu and prâna as cosmical and

psychical analogies, as is the case in the following

passages.

In Brih. 1. 5. 21–23 the narrative of the rivalry of

the organs appears in a new form, in so far as side by side

with the psychical organs, speech, eye, ear, and prâna,

their cosmical equivalents also, fire, sun, moon, and vâyu,

come forward in mutual rivalry. Since these last cannot

be said to depart from the body, this feature of the

narrative is necessarily omitted, and there is substituted

for it in the case of the psychical organs exhaustion, in

the case of the cosmical a temporary entrance into repose.

1 cp. Plat. Tim. 44 D.

2 Rigv. X. 90. 13–14.

3 Atharvav. 11. 4 and Pras’na 2. 5–13 ; cp. Deussen, Upan., p. 562.

108

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

Only prâṇa and vâyu do not become exhausted ; accordingly the others take refuge in them, and at the close

it is said that the sun rises and sets in the (cosmical) prâṇa. A similar conception lies at the foundation of the

magnifying of the wind in Ḅṛih. 3. 3. 2 :— “The wind

therefore is the particular (uyashti), and the universal

(samashti).” In another version of the same narrative,

Ḅṛih. 3. 7, the wind (cosmical and psychical) is celebrated

as the thread of the universe (sûtram) which holds together

all beings:—“By the wind as thread, O Gautama, this world

and the other world and all creatures are bound together.

For this very reason, O Gautama, it is said of a dead man,

‘his limbs have been relaxed’; for by the wind as thread,

O Gautama, were they bound together.”1 Just as the

prâṇa binds things together from without, so, as is ex-

plained in the following words of Ḅṛih. 3. 7. 3–23, the

Antaryâmin (inner guide), i.e. the âtman, rules them from

within. The connecting together prâṇa and antaryâmin

is part of the attempt, thus early made, to advance from

the symbolical method to that of abstract conception, of

which more will later be said.

Since it has been already shown in Ait. Ḅṛ. 8. 28 in the

brahmanah parimarah, the “dying (of the foes) around

the magic spell (uttered by the king),” how the natural

phenomena, lightning, rain, sun, moon, and fire, become

extinct in the wind and emerge from it again, Kaush. 2.

12–13 proceeds to teach the devatâ parimarah, the

“dying of the gods around (the prâṇa).” The cosmical

divinities (fire, sun, moon, lightning), and the corresponding psychical divinities (speech, eye, ear, manas) do not

die, when their brahman (here, their phenomenal form)

vanishes ; their brightness only they deliver over to other

gods, while they themselves with their prâṇa enter, the

cosmical into vâyu, the psychical into prâṇa, which in

1 Ḅṛih. 3. 7. 2.

essence are one :—“ All these divinities therefore enter

into the prâna, and die in the prâna ; they are not, how-

ever, lost when they enter in, but arise again from him.”

Here vâyu-prâna appears as the true first principle of

the universe, while the “ brahman ” is to be interpreted as

only its manifestation in natural phenomena, and there-

fore is apparently subordinated to the prâna.

The entrance of all the gods of nature into vâyu, and

of all the gods of the senses into the prâna which is

identical with it, is also the theme of a discussion which

is frequently met with, but occurs in its best and probably

most original form in S'atap. Br. X. 3. 3. 5–8. There in-

quiry is made for “ the fire, which is this universe,” and

the answer is given,—“ In truth, the prâna (breath, life)

is this fire. For when a man sleeps, his speech enters

into the prâna, the eye enters into the prâna, the manas

enters into the prâna ; and when he awakes, from the prâna

are they reborn. Thus in relation to the self. Next in

relation to the gods. In truth, Agni is that which this

speech is here, yonder Âditya is this eye, yonder moon

this manas, and the heavenly regions this ear. But yonder

vâyu (wind), which purifies there as it blows, is this prâna

(breath). When now the fire (agni) is extinguished, it is

blown out in the wind ; therefore we say, it has been

blown out, for it is blown out in the wind. And when the

sun (âditya) sets, it enters into the wind ; and similarly

the moon and the heavenly regions are dependent on the

wind ; and from the wind they are reborn. He therefore

who departs from this world knowing this enters with his

speech into the fire, with his eye into the sun, with his

manas into the moon, with his ear into the heavenly

regions, with his prâna into vâyu ; for from them he has

arisen, and from these divinities, whom he ever loves,

united to them he finds rest.” This speculation was later

110 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

on associated with the legend of S'aunaka and Abhipratârin,

who during a meal were importuned by a brahmac'ârin,

who proposed to them a riddle on this subject. In

this form, which is apparently no longer preserved, the

narrative became again the groundwork of Talav. Up. Br.

3. 1-2, where the text is further elaborated and ex-

pounded, and also of Chând. 4. 2-3, which seems to be

more faithful to the original form. The whole discussion,

however, together with the legend, is comprised within

a second legend, while (quite incongruously) both the

discussion and the story of the beggar student are put

into the mouth of Raikva as he gives instruction to

Jânas'ruti.1

Conceptions such as those referred to account for the

fact that in the Upanishads we frequently meet with the

explanation that Brahman, whose nature it is sought to

ascertain, is the prâna, the breath of life that pervades

both the universe and the human body. This is the case

in the definition of Br̥ih. 4. 1. 3, judged by Yâjñavalkhya

to be inadequate, prâṇo vai brahma ; or Br̥ih. 5. 13, where

uktham, yajus, sâman, and kshatram (i.e. probably the

four Vedas, as the sum of all that was originally denoted

by brahman) are explained as the prâna. We shall meet

later on with other passages of this character, in which

the prâna is recognised as a first principle, but imme-

diately set aside, as for instance Chând. 4. 10. 5, prâṇo

brahma, kam brahma, kam brahma ; and we propose

to cite here two more passages only, Kaush. 2. 1 and 2. 2,

in which a beginning seems to be made towards such a

superseding of prâna. Both passages, the one on the

authority of the Kaushîtaki, the other on that of the

Paingya, explain the prâna as brahman. Both draw

thence the inference that he who knows himself as the

prâna that fills all things does not need to beg for food

1 cp. Deussen, Upan., pp. 117-120.

(na yác'et is his “upanishad”), since he enjoys nourishment in all beings. According to the first passage, speech,

eye, ear, and manas are the servants of prâna; according

to the second, they encompass it, speech around the eye,

this again around the ear, this around the manas, and this

around the prâna. But of the last also it is said, He is

set around (ârundhate). Around what is not stated.

But in this may be found the first intimation of the great

truth formulated in Taitt. 2. 2, that the prânamaya

âtman also is not the kernel, but only the innermost

sheath.

3. Other Symbols of Brahman

The two most important types besides the prâna

under which Brahman is to be worshipped appear to be

manas and âkâs'a. The principal relevant passage is

Chândogya 3. 18 :—“The manas is to be worshipped as

Brahman ; thus far in relation to the self. Next in

relation to the godhead ; the âkâs'a (ether, space) is (to be

worshipped) as Brahman. Thereby both are taught, that

in relation to the self, and this in relation to the godhead.”

It is further expounded how Brahman as manas has as his

four feet the cosmical organs, speech, breath, eye, ear, and

similarly as âkâs'a the cosmical gods, fire, wind, sun, and

the heavenly regions. A passing attempt to elevate the

manas (the will) into a universal principle has been else-

where cited.1 Unfortunately the attempt is not carried any

further, but the manas is allowed to remain a mere symbol

of Brahman. Besides our passage, Chând. 7. 3 may be

quoted, where the manas occurs as the third of the

symbols there enumerated, beyond which there is a still

higher ; and Bṛih. 4. 1. 6, where the upanishad mano vai

brahma is attributed to Satyakâma (inconsistently with

1 Einleitung und Philosophie des Veda, p. 206 ; for an estimate of this

conception we refer to the discussion there.

112 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

the instruction given to him in Chând. 4. 9. 3), and is regarded as inadequate. By the side of the manas the passage quoted above names the âkâs'a (ether, space ; strictly speaking, space conceived as a material element) as a symbol of Brahman (for an alternative and parallel explanation of it as Brahman can only be intended to be understood symbolically), no doubt on account of the omnipresence of space ; just as a passage often quoted by S'ankara but not yet identified says of Brahman that he is âkâs'avat sarvagataś ca nityah "omnipresent like space, eternal," and Newton designated space the sensorium of God, while Kant a century later showed the god, whose sensorium space is, to be the intellect (manas) in our inner self. In older texts of the Upanishads, âkâs'a (space) is frequently explained to be Brahman, without any clear consciousness that this representation is merely symbolical. Chând. 1. 9. 1 :— "It is the âkâs'a, out of which all these creatures proceed, and into which they are again received, the âkâs'a is older than they all, the âkâs'a is the ultimate end." Bâdarâyana is right in asserting1 that by the âkâs'a here Brahman is to be understood, "because his characteristics" are found. So also in Br̥ih. 5. 1. 1, in an appendix containing much that is old :—" Om ! the firmament is Brahman, the primeval, air-filled firmament." And again probably in Chând. 3. 12. 7–9 :—"This so-called Brahman is the same as yonder space without man ; and yonder space without man is the same as this space within man ; and this space within man is the same as this space within the heart. That is the perfect, the immutable." It was soon, however, felt that the representation of Brahman as âkâs'a could only be tolerated in a symbolical sense. Gârgya, in Br̥ih. 2. 1. 5,2 explains the spirit in space as Brahman, and the answer is given (obviously directed

1 Sûtr. 1. 1. 22, âkâsas tul-lingât.

2 cp. Kaush. 4. 8.

against the passage from Chând. 3. 12. 9 just cited), that it is only " the full, the immutable." In Chând. 4. 10. 5 kham (space) is playfully identified with kam ( = ânanda, bliss). In Chând. 3. 18. 1, âkâs'a is, as we saw, only in a symbolical sense together with manas admitted as Brahman as an object of worship. Thus in Chând. 7. 12 the âkâs'a appears as a mere symbol, beyond which there is a greater ; and in Chând. 8. 1. 1, characteristically diverging from the above quoted passage Chând. 3. 12. 7–9, it is no longer a question of regarding space in the universe as Brahman, or space in the heart, but that which is within this space (tasmin yad antar). We are unable therefore to agree with Bâdarâyana when, in the student's benediction Chând. 8. 14, he proposes to understand Brahman by the âkâs'a. The meaning rather is, perhaps intentionally, directed against such an interpretation :-The âkâs'a is that (only) which holds asunder name and form ; that which is in these two (te yad antarâ), that is Brahman, that is the immortal, that is the âtman. That is to say, Brahman has been expanded into names and forms, according to Chând. 6. 3. 3. The most decided polemic however against a confusion of âkâs'a and Brahman is in Bṛih. 3. 7. 12 :-“ He who, dwelling in the âkâs'a, is distinct from âkâs'a, whom the âkâs'a knows not, whose body the âkâs'a is, who rules the âkâs'a from within, he is thy soul, the inner guide, the immortal.”

As early as the period preceding the Upanishads we were able to discern a series of attempts to regard the first principle of the universe as inherent in the sun, but at the same time by means of metaphorical interpretations to advance beyond this conception as being merely symbolical. These attempts were continued in the Upanishads. In Kaush. 2.7 a ceremony is taught, which by means of a worship of the rising mid-day and setting sun delivers from all sin

1 cp. also Bṛih. 3. 8. 11, 4. 4. 17, 20.

8

114 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

committed by day or by night. Chând. 3. 19. 1 enjoins in

addition the worship of the sun as Brahman ; and that this

representation is merely symbolic appears from what follows,

where the sun is regarded not as the original creative

principle, but, falling back upon representations discussed

elsewhere,1 as the first-born of creation. With the attempts

to which reference is there made to interpret these views

of Brahman as the sun, and to see in the natural light

a symbol merely of the spiritual light, is to be classed

especially the paragraph Chând. 3. 1–11, which undertakes

on a larger scale to depict Brahman as the sun of the uni-

verse, and the natural sun as the phenomenal form of this

Brahman. It may be regarded as a further endeavour to

penetrate beyond the symbol to the substance when, in

a series of passages, it is no longer the sun, but the

purusha (man, spirit) in the sun, and the corresponding

purusha in the eye that is described as Brahman. In

Chând. 1. 6–7 it is said in an adaptation of the Udgîtha

(which the Udgâtar had to sing) ; as the Udgîtha is lord

over ric' and sâman, so over the cosmical gods is lord

" the golden man (purushai), who is seen within the sun

with golden beard and golden hair, altogether of gold to

the finger-tips" ; and over the psychical gods " the man

who is seen within the eye." The former is lord over the

worlds which lie beyond the sun, and over the desires of

the gods ; the latter over the worlds which lie on this

side of the eye (therefore within man), and over the desires

of men. According to Mahânâr. 13, the ric', sâman, and

yajus (and therefore the Brahman embodied in the Veda)

are compared to the orb of the sun, its flame, and the

purusha in this flame,—“ as this triple knowledge does

he gleam, who as golden purusha is therein in the sun" ;

while the identity of this purusha with that in men has

been already asserted in Taitt. 2. 8 :2—“ He who dwells

1 Allgemeine Geschichte, I, 1. pp. 253, 251. 2 cp. also Taitt. 3. 10.

OTHER SYMBOLS OF BRAHMAN

here in men and that one yonder in the sun are the same."

This thought is further developed in Br̥ih. 5. 5, where

among other things it is said :—“ Yonder man who is

in the orb of the sun, and this man who is in the right

eye, these two depend on one another. The former

depends by its rays on the latter, and this by the breath

of life on the former. This one, when he determines

to go forth, gazes at that orb of the sun pure (from rays) ;

those rays do not interfere with him.” Accordingly

in Br̥ih. 5. 15 the dying man entreats the sun :—

“ Disperse thy rays, concentrate thy splendour ; yea, I

see thee, thou lovely form ; and he there, that man there,

I am he himself.” A similar conception underlies the

explanation of themselves given in Chând. 4. 11–13 by

the three sacrificial fires in their instruction of Upakosala

as the man in the sun, the moon, and the lightning ;

whereupon the teacher in a subsequent correction

remarks :—“ They have told you only its environment,

but I will tell you its real nature . . . the man who is

seen in the eye, he is the âtman—thus he spake,—he is the

immortal, the fearless, he is Brahman.” Sun, moon, and

lightning are, as he further shows, only the uppermost

stations of the way of the gods, by which “ the man who

is not as a man ” (purusho 'mânavah) guides the soul to

eternal union with Brahman. These views are apparently

criticised in Kaush. 4, when Gârgya among his sixteen

definitions of Brahman proposes the man in the sun, the

moon, the lightning, and the right eye, and is therefore

turned away by Ajâtaśatru.

Prâna, manas, âkâśa, and âditya are the most

important symbols under which the worship of Brahman

is enjoined. Theoretically, indeed, all the objects of wor-

ship recognised and enumerated in Chând. 7. 1–15, viz.—

nâman, vâc, manas, saṁkalpa, cittam, dhiyânam, vijñâ-

1 cp. also Îśâ 16.

2 cp. Br̥ih. 2. 1.

116 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

nam, balam, annam, âpas, tejas, âkâs'a, smara, âs'â, práṇa

are to be regarded as such; and the modes of representa-

tion of Brahman as vâc, práṇa, cakshus, s'rotram, manas,

hr̥idayam, which in Br̥ih. 4. 1 are treated as imperfect

and yet are not rejected, stand in a similar position, and

so also annam, práṇa, cakshus, s'rotram, manas in Taitt.

3. 1. The warmth of the body and the buzzing in the

ear do duty also as symbols of Brahman on the ground of

Chând. 3. 13. 7–8, where it is said of the light which is

above the heaven and at the same time within men, i.e.

of Brahman :—“His sight is that here in the body when

he is touched a warmth is felt; his hearing is that when

the ears are kept closed there is heard, as it were, a hum-

ming like a crackling as of a roaring fire. This ought we

to worship as his sight and his hearing.” Just as the

section from which this passage is taken stands in a

peculiar, still unexplained relation to the doctrine of the

âtman vais'vânara and the práṇâgnihotram connected

with it,1 so the parallel doctrine of the agni vais'vânara2

is attached to a cognate expression in Br̥ih. 5. 9, which

traces back the buzzing in the ear and the fire of digestion

to the vais'vânara fire in men (just as in Chând. 3. 13. 7–8

the humming in the ear and the bodily warmth is traced to

the Brahman fire in men). Both amount essentially to the

same thing, since, according to the doctrine of the práṇâ-

gnihotra (which will have to be further considered later

on), digestion is a consumption of the sacrificial food by

the fire of práṇa; and this we have already learnt to

recognise as a symbol of Brahman.

Among the symbols by which the suprasensible

Brahman is represented to sentient perception is finally

to be reckoned the sacred syllable om, which of all the

symbols came to be the most important and fruitful. It

was closely connected with the yoga practice, one of the

1 Chând. 5. 11–24. 2 S'atap. Br. 10. 6. 1.

INTERPRETATION OF SYMBOLS

117

most peculiar phenomena of Indian religious life, which later on will claim consecutive treatment.

4. Attempts to interpret the Symbolical Representations of Brahman

It is a weighty saying, that we must not put new wine into old wine-skins. But this requirement (like so many other of the requirements of Jesus) is on too lofty a plane, too unpractical, takes too little account of human relations and weaknesses, to be capable of more than approximate fulfilment. For it lies in the nature of things, that advance in the religious sphere can never be simple and absolute, but rather that by the side of the newer and better that which is old and dead must ever be still preserved, because it is regarded as something sacred.

We shall see later how entirely Christianity was compelled to put its new wine into the old skins. Philosophy pursues a somewhat more untrammelled course. External liberty, however, is still not internal ; and even in the course of development of the newer philosophy from Cartesius to Kant and onwards (to the greatest of all the battles for freedom that mankind has ever waged), we are only too often reminded of Goethe’s grasshopper “ that ever flits, and flitting leaps, and still in the grass sings its old song.”

It was exactly the same in India. Those symbolical representations of Brahman as prâna, âkâs’a, etc. were too deeply rooted in the consciousness for it to be possible to throw them overboard without further trouble. There followed a series of attempts to preserve the symbols, while combining with them a truer conception of Brahman. The section Kaush. 3-4 is especially typical of this method of procedure. The important fact, taught principally by Yâjñavalkhya, and perhaps first grasped by him, that Brahman, the âtman, must be sought above all

118

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

in the knowing subject, i.e. in the consciousness (prajñâ),

had found a place alike in the schools of the Sâmaveda,1

and in those of the Rigveda; although the latter, to judge

from Ait. Âr. 2. 1–2, adhered especially closely to the

symbolic representation of Brahman as prâṇa. While,

however, amongst the Aitareyins the new knowledge of

Brahman as prajña (consciousness) is attached immedi-

ately to this representation,2 the Kaush. Up. endeavours

to effect a reconciliation of the two by means of the

equation, prâṇa = prajñâ. Kaush. 3 shows in a better way

how the objects of sense are dependent on the organs of

sense. and the latter in turn on the consciousness (prajñâ,

prajñâtman). But like a false note there runs through the

whole the assertion put forward again and again:—“What

however the prâṇa is, that is the prajñâ, and what the

prajña is, that is the prâṇa.” The sole reason advanced

for this bold identification is,—“for both dwell united in

the body, and unitedly depart out of it.”3 A similar

attempt to identify the prâṇa and the âkâs'a, and both

with ânanda, “bliss,” which forms the essence of Brah-

man, is found in Chând. 4. 10. 5 :—“Brahman is life

(prâṇa), Brahman is joy (kam = ânanda), Brahman is

the expanse (kham = âkâs'a); to which the fires that

impart this instruction add in explanation :—“In truth,

the expanse, that is the joy, and the joy, that is the

expanse”; and they expound to him how that Brahman

is life and the broad expanse. A still more compre-

hensive blending of symbols with reality is undertaken

by the very complex paragraph, Bṛih. 2. 3. Here “two

forms” of Brahman are distinguished, the material (mortal,

abiding, existing), and the immaterial (immortal, departing,

other-worldly). (1) The material Brahman is physical

nature and the human body; the sun and the eye are its

1 Chând. 8. 12. 4, Kena 1–8.

2 Ait. Up. 3 = Ait. Âr. 2. 6.

3 Kaush. 3. 4.

essence. (2) The immaterial Brahman is vâyu and âkâs'a, prâna and the void in man; the purusha in the sun and the eye is its essence. Thus far therefore we are dealing with the symbolical. But this is abruptly transcended when the purusha is further identified by means of the famous formula of Yâjñavalkhya neti neti and the upanishad satyasyâ satyam borrowed from Bṛih. 2. 1. 20 with the unknowable super-essential Brahman. A similar blending virtually takes place in Bṛih. 3. 7, when vâyu-prâna as the world-thread (sûtram) and the âtman as the inner guide (antaryâmin) are discussed in the same context, and are therefore probably identified. The prayer of the student also in Taitt. 1. 1 1 is remarkable, because a perfectly clear consciousness of the symbolical representation of Brahman by vâyu is therein expressed :—“ Reverence to Brahman ! Reverence to thee, Vâyu ! for thou art the visible Brahman, thee will I recognise as the visible Brahman.” In later texts prâna has become occasionally a synonym for âtman, as in Kâṭh. 6. 2; or is made dependent on the latter, as in Pras'na 3. 3, where the prâna (perhaps following Ṛigv. X. 121. 2, Kâṭh. 3. 1, and anticipating the “ reflection ” between souls and objects in the Sânkhya philosophy) is described as the copy or shadow (c'hâyâ) of the âtman. It was reserved for the reactionary spirit of the Maitr. Up. 6. 1–8 to rehabilitate prâna and âditya, and to enlarge upon their identity as well as the manner of their worship in tedious speculations.

5. Appendix: Interpretations of and Substitutes for Ritual Practices

The partial interpretation in the oldest parts of the Upanishads of certain ritual conceptions and practices which are deeply rooted in consciousness in the light of the doctrine of Brahman, and the partial substitution for

1 cp. also I. 12.

them of new ceremonies more in harmony with the spirit

of the new doctrine, is related to the symbolical view of

Brahman. We propose briefly to indicate the leading

characteristics on both sides.

That India more than any other country is the land

of symbols is owing to the nature of Indian thought,

which applied itself to the most abstruse problems before

it was even remotely in a position to treat them intelli-

gently. As early as the period of the Brâhmanas the

separate acts of the ritual were frequently regarded as

symbols, whose allegorical meaning embraced a wider

range. But the Âranyakas were the peculiar arena of

these allegorical expositions. In harmony with their

prevailing purpose, to offer to the Vânaprastha an equi-

valent for the sacrificial observances, for the most part no

longer practicable, they indulge in mystical interpretations

of these, which are then followed up in the oldest Upani-

shads. In the latter we often see the fundamental con-

ception of the âtman doctrine appearing in symbolical

guise, and we should be disposed to trace in allegorical

speculations of this nature the earliest origin of the

Upanishad doctrine. That it is not so, that the doctrine

of the âtman as the sole reality has not been developed

originally from ritualistic conceptions, but was adapted to

them first in later times, we have inferred above (p. 17 ff.)

from the tradition surviving still in numerous instances

in the Upanishads, that it was kings, i.e. Kshatriyas,

from whom the Brâhmans first received the most import-

ant elements of the âtman doctrine. This they then

appropriated in their own way, combining it in allegorical

fashion with the entirely heterogeneous methods of the

ritual. This view finds an unexpected but all the more

valuable confirmation in the manner in which the different

schools of the Veda arrived at the conception of the âtman,

or the prâna as its precursor. It is evidenced, that is to

say, by the fact that each Veda starts from the ritual service peculiar to it, the adherents of the Ṛigveda from the uktham, those of the Sâmaveda from the udgîtha, and the schools of the white Yajurveda from the aśvamedha, in order by a symbolical interpretation to arrive at the conception of the prâṇa or âtman. It is however inconceivable that the âtman doctrine should have originated on so different yet parallel lines of development, while the facts are completely explained on the supposition that the doctrine of the prâṇa-âtman was taken over from another source, and harmonised by each school to the best of its ability with the ruling ideas of its ritual. This we propose to illustrate by a few examples.

The chief function of the priests of the Ṛigveda is the recitation of the s'astram (hymn of praise), which was chosen for the purpose on each occasion from the hymns of the Ṛigveda. The uktham however is “the most beautiful, most famous, most potent among the s'astras.”1 This is identified by the Aitareyins under several allegorical forms with the prâṇa;2 while the Kaushîtakins identify the uktham with Brahman (materialised in ṛic', yajus, sâman).3 As the priests of the Ṛigveda regarded the uktham as the climax of their service, so those of the Sâmaveda looked upon the chanting of the udgîtha, which was similarly identified with the syllable om, the prâṇa, the sun, or the purusha in the sun and the eye ; while in Chând. 2 the complete sâman, whose climax is formed by the chanting of the udgîtha, is compared with various cosmi-

cal and psychical conditions. The early portions of the Upanishad - Brâhmaṇa, which, including the Kena Upan., belongs to the Talavakâra school of the Sâmaveda, is concerned with allegories of an entirely similar character. For the priests of the Yajurveda who are entrusted with the carrying out of the sacred rites a similar part is taken

1 Kaush. 2. 6. 2 Ait. Âr. 2. 1-3. 3 Kaush. 2. 6.

by the act of sacrifice itself, and here again also it is the highest of all the sacrificial observances, viz. the horse-sacrifice (âs´vamedha), with which Brih. 1. 1-2 begins, in order to recognise in the steed the universe, into which Prajâpati is transformed with the object of again offering himself in sacrifice. In Taitt. Saṁh. 7. 5. 25 also this allegorical interpretation of the horse of the sacrifice as the universe is found, and in Taitt. Up. 1. 5 in a different way the interdict of the sacrificial animal is broken through, in that a fourth sacred word of the sacrifice mahas, which must denote Brahman, is added to the three bhûr bhuvah svar, which are interpreted as earth, atmosphere and heaven. The remaining schools of the Yajurveda appear to have started in their allegorising from another aspect of the cult, from the disposal of the sacred fire-altars, as may be inferred from Kâṭh. 1 and Maitr. 1. 1.1 Throughout, however, we see how the ritual representations are, according to the Vedic schools themselves, only different means whereby expression may be given under an allegorical garb to thoughts common to all.

Of other allegorical interpretations we will cite further only that of the Gâyatrî, the first in order of Vedic metres, consisting of three feet (— — — — —, thrice repeated), to which an imaginary fourth was afterwards added. In this quadrupedal form the Gâyatrî is a symbol of Brahman, who is likewise four-footed. Later on we shall have to consider this four-footed character of Brahman, and its connection with the four states of the soul, waking, dreaming, deep sleep, and turîya. In their manner of treatment of the symbolical Gâyatrî the two chief texts adopt entirely different methods. According to Chând. 3. 12, the text of the Veda and all created things, the earth, the body, the heart, and the vital organs, these six form the one sixfold foot of the Gâyatrî, and the three remaining feet2

1 cp. Maitr. 6. 33.

2 With reference to Ṛigv. X. 90, 3.

are immortal in heaven, and are symbolised by space, the

physical body and heart ; in Bṛih. 5. 14, on the contrary,

three feet of the Gâvatṛî appear under a material form

as the worlds, the vedas, and the vital breaths, while only

the fourth (turîya) is transcendent, and finds expression

symbolically in the sun, the eye, truth, power, and life.

In this way on the rise of the new teaching an attempt

was made to preserve the traditional heirlooms of the

ritual, while transforming them into symbols of the âtman

doctrine. Soon however men went further, and en-

déavoured to supersede the most important of the tradi-

tional observances by other ceremonies adapted to the

teaching concerning the âtman. In Bṛih. 3. 1, for

example, for the four priests (hotar, adhvaryu, udgâtar,

brâhman) the four cosmological and the corresponding psych-

ical phenomenal forms of the âtman are substituted (as

fire and speech, sun and eye, wind and breath, moon and

manas), and instead of the usual rewards there was

introduced union with the âtman as realised in the

universe. Similarly in Chând. 4. 16. 2, instead of the

brâhman his manas is introduced, and instead of the hotar,

adhvaryu, and udgâtar, the vâc embodied in them.

A further attempt to transcend the sacrificial ritual

is found in the conception of the man himself and his

life as an act of service. Thus in Chând. 3. 16 the three

periods of human life appear in place of the three bruisings

of the Soma, and in a different way in Chând. 3. 17 the

functions of hungering, eating, begetting, etc., replace the

chief acts of the Soma sacrifice. In detail this thought is

carried out by assigning the different organs and functions

to the requirements and acts of the sacrifice,1 and else-

where with still greater elaboration.2

Finally, in many of the instances enumerated it

remains doubtful whether it is intended merely to inter-

1 Mahân. 64.

2 Prânâgnih. Upan 3–4.

124

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

pret allegorically the still existing sacrificial cult, or to set

it aside and replace it by physical and psychical conditions.

The latter is distinctly the case with the last and most

important phenomenon that we have to notice, where the

agnihotram is replaced by the prána-agnihotram.

The agnihotram, consisting in a twice repeated liba-

tion of boiled milk, which was poured into the fire every

morning at sunrise and at sunset every evening, and

thus was offered to the gods, and with them to all beings,

had to be maintained throughout his life (yāvaj-jīvam) by

the man who had once entered into the estate of a house-

holder. After the prâna, indwelling in us all, had been

introduced in place of the gods, the attempt was made to

replace the agnihotram or fire-sacrifice by a prána-agni-

hotram, a sacrifice offered in the fire of prâna. The con-

tinual inspiration and exspiration necessary for the

maintenance of life (prâna) might be regarded as such.

A first trace of this idea may be found in the words of

Bṛih. 1. 5. 23 :—“Therefore if a man would observe a

vow, he should inhale and exhale and wish, ‘May not

evil or death seize me.’”1 This “inner agnihotram”2

occurs with a more developed character and a clearer

repudiation of the agnihotram cult in Kaush. Up. 2. 5 :—

“These two sacrifices (of inspiration and speech, i.e. ex-

spiration3) are endless and immortal ; for whether awake

or asleep they are continually being offered. The other

sacrifices, on the contrary, are limited, for they consist

of works. Therefore the wise men of old (who in the

Upanishads are cited quite commonly as authority when

novel ideas are introduced) did not offer the agnihotram.”

Like the breathing here, so the nutrition of the body also

might be conceived as a sacrifice offered in the fire of diges-

1 cp. also Ait. Âr. 3. 2. 6. 8.

2 ântaram agnihotram ? cp. also Kaush. Âr. 10.

3 cp. Pras’na 4. 4 : “The two libations of the exspiration and inspiration.”

tion (identified in Br̥ih. 5. 9 with the agni vais´vānara),

and be substituted for the traditional agnihotram. Here

also is found the first trace of the thought in Br̥ih. 1. 5. 2 :

—“ For all food which he (who knows this) consumes, that

he presents (to the ātman and through it) to the gods.”

An amplified description of this new kind of agnihotram

appears first in Chând. 5. 19–24. There is no further

need of a specially prepared milk offering, “whatever

food is nearest to hand, that is suitable for sacrifice.”1

Sacrifice is offered also in the âhavanîya fire of the

mouth, since the five libations, of which this sacrifice

presented to the prâna consists, viz.—the inspiration, inter-

spiration, expiration, the all- and up-breathing, and with

them the corresponding five organs of sense, are for

the benefit of the five nature gods and the five world

spheres.2 In a neighbouring passage the rinsing of the

mouth customary before and after eating is conceived as

a swathing of the prâna with water.3 Both acts, the

nourishing and the swathing of the prâna (with obvious

reference to Chând. 5. 24), are connected together, and

provided with corresponding rules in Maitr. 6. 9. Accord-

ing to this passage also, the customary agnihotram seems

to be superseded by the prânâgnihotram (âtman eva

yajati), while in the appendix Maitr. 6. 34 both are pre-

served side by side in that the agnihotram restored to

its rightful position is conceived as the “openly made”

prânâgnihotram. A final step in this development is

indicated in the Prânâgn. Up. 1–2, which, presupposing

apparently all the passages just quoted, declares the

customary agnihotram to be superfluous, and for the

prânâgnihotram prescribes a minutely elaborated ritual.

1 Chând. 5. 19. 1.

2 cp. the more detailed discussion in Deussen, Upan., p. 146 f.

3 Chând. 5. 2. 2 ; cp. Br̥ih. 6. 1. 14.

126 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

IV. The Essential Brahman

1. Introduction

In the later Vedânta, by a combination of his three essential attributes, Brahman is described as sac'cidâ-nanda, i.e. as " being (sat) mind (cit) and bliss (ânanda).

This name does not occur in any except the latest of the Upanishads, and has not yet been found in Bâdarâyana or S'ankara.

We are able however, with a measure of probability, to trace in the Upanishads the steps that led up to it, inasmuch as the more reflection on Brahman was emancipated from symbolic representations, the more it was concentrated on these three ideas, just as occasionally also a combination of them was attempted.

Thus at the close of his great discussion with the nine interlocutors, Yâjñavalkhya declares, turning to them all:1 “ Brahman is bliss and knowledge ” (vijñânam ânandam brahma);

and in the following section,2 where he reduces six symbolical methods of representation to their true value, satyam, prajñâ and ânanda also appear side by side with three other attributes of the divine being.

Taitt. 2. 1 approximates yet closer to the character of the formula that was customary later, when it is said in a poetical passage that forms the climax of the development of thought :-

He who knows Brahman

As truth, knowledge, infinite (satyam jñânam anantam),

Hidden in the cavity (of the heart) and in farthest space,

He obtains every wish

In communion with Brahman, the omniscient.

Since here, at the opening of the Ânandavallî, a reference to Brahman as ânanda (bliss) would be entirely in place, while there was no special occasion to describe

1 Bṛih. 3. 9. 28.

2 Bṛih. 4. 1.

THE ESSENTIAL BRAHMAN

127

the Brahman as anantam (infinite) just at this point where stress was to be laid especially on his indwelling in the heart, the suggestion has been made1 that anantam might not improbably be an ancient error, ratified after a time by tradition, for ānandam, which arose from the fact that the three predicates were taken for nominative, a position very rarely occupied by ānandam. If this is accepted we should have here the earliest occurrence of the formula so celebrated in later times. It must be admitted however that the force of our argument is weakened by the consideration that it is apparently a quotation that lies before us, and that this as such may not so confidently be brought into harmony with the following words. It is also difficult to understand how, assuming the universality of the reading anantam, a tradition of ānandam (in sac'cidānanda) could have maintained itself by its side. A combination of the four predicates mentioned is found in the somewhat late Upanishad Sarvopanishatsâra, No. 21, where Brahman is defined as “true, knowledge, infinite, bliss.”2 An explanation of these four conceptions is added, and then it is said :“That of which these four realities (being, knowledge, infinite, bliss) are a characteristic, and which subsists without change in space, time, and causality (des'a-kála-nimitteshu), is called the supreme âtman or the supreme Brahman, indicated by the word ‘that’ (in tat tvam asi).”

Thus we see the origin of the formula sac'-cid-ânanda, which appears as such first (apart from Taitt. 2. 1) in Nrisim̐hottaratâp. 4. 6. 7 and Râmapûrvatâp. 92, Râmottaratâp. 2. 4. 5, and is subsequently employed times without number. Let us also use it as a framework in

1 See Deussen, Üpan., p. 225.

2 satyam jñānam anantam ānandam brahma; for which Codex क, with a more definite reference to Taitt. 2. 1 and Brih. 3. 9. 28, reads,—satyam jñānam anantam brahma, vijñānam ānandam brahma.

128 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

order to summarise the most important conceptions of

the Upanishads under the headings,—Brahman as sat,

as cit, and as ânanda. In the present chapter we have

yet to discuss the contradictory nature of Brahman and

his unknowableness.

2. Brahman as Being and not-Being (sat and asat), as

Reality and not-Reality (satyam and asatyam)

As early as Ṛigveda X. 129. 1, with a degree of philo-

sophical insight remarkable when the date is considered,

it is said of the primeval condition of things, the primeval

substance, therefore of Brahman in the later sense, that

at that time there was na asad, na u sat, “neither not-

being nor yet being.” Not the former, for a not-being

neither is nor has been ; not the latter, because empirical

reality, and with it the abstract idea of “being” derived

from it, must be denied of the primeval substance. Since

however metaphysics has to borrow all its ideas and

expressions from the reality of experience, to which the

circle of our conceptions is limited, and to remodel them

solely in conformity with its needs, it is natural that in

process of time we should find the first principle of things

defined now as the (not-empirical) being, now as the

(empirical) not-being. The latter occurred already in the

two myths of the creation :1—“This universe in truth in

the beginning was not-being ; for they say, What was

this not-being?”2 and “This universe in truth in the

beginning was nothing at all. There was no heaven,

no earth, no atmosphere. This being that was solely

not-being conceived a wish, May I be,”3 etc. Simi-

larly, in some passages of the Upanishads : — “This

universe was in the beginning not-being; this (not-

being) was being. It arose ; thereupon an egg was

1 See Allgemeine Geschichte, 1. 1, pp. 199, 202.

2 Ṣatap. Br. 6. 1. 1. 1. 3 Taitt. Br. 2. 2. 9. 1.

BRAHMAN AS BEING AND NOT-BEING

129

developed," etc.1 And in Taitt. 2. 7, where the verse is quoted :—

Not-being was this in the beginning ;

From it being arose.

Self-fashioned indeed out of itself,

Therefore is it named “well-fashioned.”

The preceding words show clearly how this is to be understood, for there at the beginning the verse is quoted, “ He is not as it were not-being, who knows Brahman as not-being,” and it is then further explained how Brahman creates the universe, and as the (empirical) not-being, the unreal, is contrasted with it as the being, the real. “ After he had created it, he entered into it ; after he had entered into it, he was :—

The being and the beyond (sat and tyat),

Expressible and inexpressible,

Founded and foundationless,

Consciousness and unconsciousness,

Reality and unreality.

As reality he became everything that existed ; for this men call reality (tat satyam iti âc'akshate).” A similar distinction is drawn as early as Bṛih. 2. 3. 1,—“In truth, there are two forms of Brahman, that is to say :—

The formed and the unformed,

The mortal and the immortal,

The abiding and the fleeting,

The being and the beyond (sat and tyam).”

This passage, in spite of the air of a compilation which the chapter of which it forms the opening wears, gives an impression of greater age, and perhaps the passage from the Taittiríya is connected with it, and develops the thought further by more clearly contrasting Brahman as the beyond, inexpressible, foundationless, unconscious, unreal with the universe as the being, expressible, founded, conscious, real. At the same time this decides the question, which may well

1 Chând. 3. 19. 1.

130

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

have agitated men's minds at that time, whether the universe originated from the being or the not-being; at which question the (probably older) passage Chând. 6. 2. 1 glances :-

"Being only, my good sir, this was in the beginning, one only and without a second. Some indeed say that this was not-being in the beginning, one only and without a second; from this not-being being was born. But how, my good sir, could this be so? How could being be born from not-being? Being therefore rather, my good sir, this was in the beginning, one only and without a second."

In harmony with the position thus taken up in the following exposition of Chând. 6, Brahman is usually named sat "being" or satyam "reality."

The word satyam (reality) also is used precisely as sat with a twofold meaning. While it denotes Brahman in the section Chând. 6 just referred to (so especially in the well-known formulas,—tat satyam, sa âtmâ, tat tvam asi), and is found with this meaning in Br̥ih. 5. 4, in the same Upanishad Br̥ih. 2. 1. 20 satyam is on the contrary the reality of experience, and Brahman is contrasted with it as satyasya satyam, that which alone in this reality is truly real :-"Its secret name (upanishad) is 'the reality of reality'; that is to say, the vital breaths (prânâh) are the reality, and it is their reality." The same words recur in Br̥ih. 2. 3. 6; that they are here borrowed is evident from the fact that reference to the empirical reality as "the vital breaths" (prânâh) was justified by the preceding words in Br̥ih. 2. 1. 20 only, and not in Br̥ih. 2. 3. 6. In Br̥ih. 1. 6. 3 also, as in these passages, satyam denotes the real in an empirical sense :-"It is the immortal, veiled by the reality (amritam satyena channam); the prâna, that is to say, is the reality; by these that prâna is veiled." The words amritam satyena channam appear to be one of

1 = 2. 3. 6.

BRAHMAN AS BEING AND NOT-BEING

those ancient mystical formulæ, accompanied by their

explanation, which we have already conjecturally assigned

as the oldest form of the Upanishads. Since the opposite

of satya (true) is usually anṛita (untrue), it is perhaps

conceivable that the formula in another recension took the

form anṛitam satyena cḥannam. This would explain the

curious play upon the word satyam which is carried out

in Bṛih. 5. 5. 1 :—“This satyam consists of three syllables.

The first syllable is sa, the second ti, the third yam.

The first and the last syllables are the truth (satyam),

in the middle is the untruth (anṛitam); this untruth is

enclosed on both sides by the truth (anṛitam ubhayatah

satyena parigṛhîtam); by this means it becomes an

actual being” (by Brahman the universe acquires its

reality). The three syllables are differently explained

in Chând. 8. 3. 5, sa as the immortal, ti as the mortal,

and yam as the point of meeting (yam, yac’chati) of

both ; and again differently in Kaush. 1. 6 the syllable

-tyam in the word satyam has reference to the gods and

the vital breaths (external and internal nature), and the

syllable sat- to the “being” distinct from the gods and

the vital breaths, and exalted above them.

For the later Upanishads the question whether Brah-

man is (not-empirical) being or (empirical) not-being has

no further significance. These, like all other pairs of

opposites, are transcended by Brahman. He is “neither

being nor not-being” ;1 “higher than that which is and

that which is not” ;2 he comprehends in himself empirical

reality, the realm of ignorance, and eternal reality, the

kingdom of knowledge :—

Two there are that in the eternal infinite supreme Brahman

Lie hidden, knowledge and ignorance ;

Ignorance is fleeting, knowledge eternal.

Yet he who as lord ordains them is that other.3

1 S'vet. 4. 18.

2 Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 1.

3 S'vet. 5. 1.

132 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

3. Brahman as Consciousness, Thought (cit)

The conception of the ātman implies that the first principle of things must above all be sought in man's inner self. The inner nature of a man however is not accessible in the same way as his exterior. While the external appearance as body with all its organs and functions is exposed to view, and both the outer form and the inner play of bones and joints, of sinews, muscles and nerves, lie open to investigation on all sides, the knowledge of our inner nature is very limited and one-sided. We have no immediate perception of the body from within in the totality of its organs and their functions, like our view of it from without. Rather is our inner nature like a great house with many floors, passages and chambers, of which only a part is illuminated by a light burning in an upper storey, while all the rest remains in darkness, but is none the less real and existing. On first entering such a house, the mistake might easily arise of imagining the light the centre of the house, and that the accommodation of the latter extended only as far as the rays of the light reached, and all else since it was invisible might be regarded as altogether non-existent. It is due to this cause that the philosophising spirit of mankind in India, Greece, and modern times has with remarkable unanimity fallen into an error, which we can most briefly describe by the word intellectualism, and which consists in the belief that the innermost essence of man and of the universe, call it Brahman, first principle or deity, can bear any similarity or analogy or identity with that which we meet with here “behind man's pale forehead,” as consciousness, thought or spirit. Yet whatever judgement may be passed on the value of this conception, in any case the entire development of philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to the present with few exceptions has been dominated

by the thought that the nature of the soul, and in connection therewith the nature of god, is to be conceived

as something related or analogous to human thought, as reason, spirit or intelligence. And as in Western philosophy

the origin of this thought may be traced as far back as Xenophanes (οὐλὸς ὁρᾶ, οὐλὸς δὲ νοεῖ, οὐλὸς δὲ τ’ ἀκούει), and

Parmenides (τῶιτὸ δ’ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὗνεκέν ἐστι νόημα),

so in India the leading advocacy if not the earliest origination of the very same idea is attached to the name of

Yâjñavalkhya. All his views put forward in the Bṛihadâranyaka Upanishad centre in the conviction that

Brahman, the âtman, is the knowing subject within us ; and on this very account, as we shall see later on, is unknowable.

Thus in Bṛih. 3. 4 he is invited by Ushasta to explain “the immanent, not transcendent Brahman, that

as soul is within all.” For answer he refers to the soul, which by inspiration and exspiration, by the intermediate

and the up-breathing, manifests itself in experience as the vital principle. To the objection that this is only

to point to the fact, not to give an explanation of it, he rejoins :—“ Thou canst not see the seer of seeing,

thou canst not hear the hearer of hearing, thou canst not comprehend the comprehender of comprehension, thou

canst not know the knower of knowledge ; he is thy soul that is within all.” And to confirm the assertion that

the knowing subject here characterised by him constitutes not only the essence of the soul but, in and with that,

the essence of the godhead, he adds, “ Whatever is distinct from that is liable to suffering.”

He concludes therefore his description in Bṛih. 3. 8. 11 of the almighty being who sustains and pervades space,

and with it the entire universe, with the words :—“ In truth, O Gârgî, this imperishable one sees but is not seen,

hears but is not heard, comprehends but is not compre-

134 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

hended, knows but is not known. Beside him there is none that sees, beside him there is none that hears, beside him there is none that comprehends, beside him there is none that knows. In truth, O Gârgî, in this imperishable one is space inwoven and interwoven." (It cleaves, according to Kant, to the knowing subject.)

In the instruction given to Maitreyî, in Brih. 2. 4. 11, Yâjñavalkhya compares the âtman to the ocean. As this is the meeting-place of all waters, so the âtman as eye is the meeting-place of all forms, as ear of all sounds, as nose of all smells, etc. For the correctness of our view of this passage let Brih. 1. 4. 7 in the first instance bear testimony :-" as breathing he is named breath, as speaking speech, as seeing eye, as hearing ear, as understanding mind; all these are but names for his operations." So also Chând. 8. 12. 4 :-" When the eye is directed on space, he is the spirit in the eye, the eye (itself) serves (only) for seeing ; and if a man desires to smell, it is the âtman, the nose serves only for smelling ; and if a man desires to speak, it is the âtman, the voice serves only for speaking ; and if a man desires to hear, it is the âtman, the ear serves only for hearing ; and if a man desires to understand, it is the âtman, the mind is his divine eye. With this divine eye, the mind, he perceives these joys and delights therein." If we consider that this thought is here somewhat abruptly joined on to that which precedes, and in general occupies an isolated position in the circle of the ideas of the Chândogya, while with Yâjñavalkhya it forms the central point of all his reasoning, it becomes probable that borrowing has taken place on the side of the Chândogya. The same may be true of the entire exposition of Kaush. 3, which traces out in detail the dependence of the objects of sense on the organs of sense, and of the latter again on the prajñâtman, the "self-consciousness" (repeatedly

explained as identicaI with the âtman); whereupon it is

said in close accord with the above passages :--" Into

him as eye all forms are gathered, by the eye he reaches

all forms; into him as ear all sounds are gathered, by the

ear he reaches all sounds," etc.

The most complete exposition by Yâjñavalkhya of his

theory of the âtman as the knowing subject, persisting

without change through the states of waking, dreaming,

deep sleep, death, migration and final deliverance of the

soul is found in the incomparable section Bṛih. 4. 3-4.

Here the king Janaka first proposes the question,—

" What serves man for light ?" Yâjñavalkhya returns an

evasive answer,—the sun serves him for light. When,

however, the sun has set ?—The moon. And when this

also has set ?—The fire. And when this also is ex-

tinguished ?—The voice. And when this also is silenced ?

—" Then is he himself (âtman) his own light." " What do

you mean by self ?" " It is the spirit behind the organs

of sense which is essential knowledge, and shines within

in the heart." The further description is given how this

spirit, while remaining the same, roves through this

world in waking and dreaming, through the world of

Brahman in deep sleep and death; how in waking it

surveys the good and evil of this world without being

moved thereby, " for nothing cleaves to this spirit " (the

knowing subject stands opposed to everything that is

objective); how in dreaming it builds up a world for

itself, " for it is the creator "; how finally, in deep dream-

less sleep, wrapped round by the self that consists of

knowledge, the prâjñâ âtman, i.e. the absolute knowing

subject, it has no consciousness of objects, and yet is not

unconscious ;—" when then he sees not, yet is he seeing,

although he sees not; since for the seer there is no inter-

ruption of seeing because he is imperishable; but there

is no second beside him, no other distinct from him for him

136 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

to see."1 Compare the cognate passage Ḅrih. 2. 1. 17–20,

according to which on falling asleep all the prânas (eye,

ear, etc.) enter into the âtman, and on waking all the vital

spirits, worlds, gods and living beings spring forth from

him again like sparks from the fire. The above passage

Ḅrih. 4. 4. 1 f. further describes how at death all the vital

powers gather around the knowing subject, in orderwith him

to go forth to a new incarnation,—“because he has become

one, therefore he does not see, as they say ” (in reality he

continues ever seeing); and how finally after deliverance

has been attained the body is cast off like the skin of

a snake, “but the bodiless, the immortal, the life is pure

Brahman and pure light ” (i.e. the knowing subject).

“In truth,” it is said in conclusion, “this great un-

begotten self is of the vital organs that which consists of

knowledge.” This identity of Brahman with the knowing

subject, which forms the ruling conception in the thought

of Yâjñavalkhya, is most clearly expressed in a (certainly

later) modification of the illustration of the lump of salt

(preserved in its original form in Ḅrih. 2. 4. 12):—“It is

like a lump of salt, that has no (distinguishable) inner or

outer, but consists through and through entirely of savour ;

so in truth this âtman has no (distinguishable)inner or outer,

but consists through and through entirely of knowledge.”2

How deep Yâjñavalkhya’s conception of Brahman as

the knowing subject has penetrated we see from the fact

that it dominates the entire succeeding development of

ideas, as we propose briefly to show.

In the first place, we must here recall to mind the

description of Brahman as “the light of lights.”3 This

expression is nothing more than an epitome of the thought

expounded above, that the âtman is itself its own light,

1 Ḅrih. 4. 3. 23.

2 jyotishâm jyotis, Ḅrih. 4. 4. 66 ; taken over thence in Mund. 2. 2. 9, Bhag. Gîtâ 13. 17.

3 Ḅrih. 4. 5. 13.

when sun, moon and fire cease to shine. Thus too is to be explained the splendid verse that occurs thrice in different schools :1—

There no sun shines, no moon, nor glimmering star, Nor yonder lightning, the fire of earth is quenched ; From him, who alone shines, all else borrows its brightness, The whole world bursts into splendour at his shining.

The original position of this verse is in the Kâṭhaka Upanishad, though this treatise otherwise frequently betrays its dependence on Bṛih. 4. 3-4.2 Of Chând. 8. 12. 4 we have already spoken above. When further it is said, in the well-known passages Chând. 8. 3. 4 and 8. 12. 3,3 that the soul in deep sleep is raised from out of this body, enters into the purest light (param jyotis) and thereby assumes its proper form, the peculiar designation of Brahman as param jyotis may well recall Yâjñavalkhya's conception of the âtman, which as the knowing subject is its own light.

Associated with this thought, and like it of great antiquity in India, is the conception of the divine world as an eternal kingdom of light, in contrast to the darkness of this earth.4 This conception is combined further on with the philosophical thought that the âtman as the knowing subject is its own light, to form the frequently recurring idea of the eternal day of Brahman. This is the case perhaps as early as Chând. 3. 11, where the description is given how the sun after the close of the thirty-one world-periods will “no longer rise or set, but remain stationary in mid-heaven” ; how moreover for the wise this condition is already attained now, so that for them there is perpetual day (sakṛid-divâ ha eva asmai bhavati).

1 Kâṭh. 5. 15, S'vet. 6. 14, Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 10.

2 cp. Kâṭh. 4. 3–5, 5. 8.

3 cp. Maitr. 2. 2, Brahma Up. 1.

4 cp. the proverbial sayings quoted in Bṛih. 1. 3. 28, Chând. 3. 17. 6.

138 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

More is found in Chând. 8. 4. 2, where Brahman is compared to a bridge :-“ Therefore, in truth, even the night, if it crosses this bridge, is changed into day, for this world of Brahman ” (which is in the heart) “ is perpetual light (sakrid vibhâta).” The following passages are dependent upon this :-“ the darkness gives place, now there is no longer day nor night ” ; 1 “ when the darkness (of ignorance) is pierced through, then is reached that (which is not affected with darkness ; and he who has thus pierced through that which is so affected, he has beheld like a glittering circle of sparks Brahman bright as the sun, endowed with all might, beyond the reach of darkness, that shines in yonder sun as in the moon, the fire and the lightning ” ; 2 meditation on om leads in the highest degree “ to the eternal day of Brahman, whence is the source of lights ” ; 3 “ for him (the sannyâsin) there is neither day nor night ; therefore it was said also by the ṛishi, 4 ‘ for it is a perpetual day ’ ; 5 in yoga the spirit becomes “ wholly the light of knowledge alone, the eternal, sleepless and dreamless, without name and form, altogether resplendent, 6 omniscient,—to him worship is of no more account ” ; 7 “ the eternal, free from slumber and dreams, is then his own light ; 8 for ever light 9 is this being, this essential being in himself.” 10

That the âtman is the knowing subject within us, and cannot therefore be an object of worship, is enforced also in the opening verses of the Kena Upanishad. Here in connection with a verse preserved in two very different forms in Bṛih. 4. 4. 18 and Kena 2, which demands that the eye shall be acknowledged solely as eye, the ear solely as ear, 11 etc., and that accordingly they shall be regarded

1 S'vet. 4. 18. 2 Maitr. 6. 24. 3 Nâdabindu 17.

4 Chând. 3. 11. 3. 5 Kaṭhas'ruti 2. 6 Chând. 8. 4. 1.

7 Gaudapâda (on the Mândûkya) 3. 35.

8 op. Bṛih. 4. 3. 14, Kâth. 5. 15. 9 Chând. 8. 4. 1.

10 Gaudapâda, ib., 4. 81. 11 Bṛih. 4. 4. 18.

BRAHMAN AS CONSCIOUSNESS

139

as mere instruments,1 the thought is further developed

that speech, thought, eye, ear and the organ of smell do

not aid in perceiving Brahman, but themselves first, as

objects, are perceived by Brahman as the subject.2

The conviction that the ātman is the knowing subject

has finally found an entrance also into the schools of the

Rigveda, although these are wont more usually to exalt

the ātman as prāṇa or purusha (in the sense of Rigveda

X. 90). With this is immediately connected, in Ait. 3,

the doctrine that the ātman is not that with which we

see, hear, smell, speak or taste (the organs of sense), but is

solely and alone consciousness (prajñâ):—“Everything

that this heart and mind are, reflection, meditation, delibera-

tion, invention, intelligence, insight, resolve, purpose, desire,

suffering, recollection, idea, force, life, love, will,—all these

are names of consciousness. All gods, all elemental forces,

all beings, “ all this is guided by consciousness, grounded in

consciousness ; by consciousness this universe is governed,

consciousness is its foundation, consciousness is Brahman.”

The second of the schools of the Rigveda, Kaush. 3 and

4, proceeds on somewhat different lines. Here the tradi-

tional view of Brahman as prāṇa is combined with the

new recognition of Brahman as prajñâtman (the self of

consciousness) by means of the assertion which accom-

panies an admirable proof of the dependence of all the

objects and organs of sense on consciousness, and which

is constantly repeated :—“ what the prâṇa is, that is the

prajñâ, and what the prajñâ is, that is the prâṇa.” This

identification of conceptions so heterogeneous seems to

show that the doctrine of Brahman as the knowing subject

(prajñâ) among the Kaushîtakins, and probably also

among the Aitareyins, is borrowed, and presumably is

adopted from the circle of thought of Yâjñavalkhya.

1 Kena 2 ; cp. in illustration Chând. 8. 12. 4, Kaush. 3. 8.

2 Kena 2–8.

140

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

In the later philosophy this doctrine has shaped itself

into the broader conception of Brahman or the âtman as

the “spectator” (sâkshin). This occurs first in S'vet. 6. 11

(sâkshin) and Pras'na 6. 5 (paridrashtar), perhaps in

connection with Brh. 4. 3. 32 (salila).1

4. Brahman as Bliss (ânanda)

It is essential to the deeper religious consciousness to

regard the earthly life not as an end in itself, but merely

as a road by which we must travel to our true desti-

nation. The three great religions of mankind therefore,

Brâhmanism, Buddhism, and Christianity, and not less

the philosophy of Schopenhauer, which represents Chris-

tianity in its purest form, agree in teaching that the

highest aim of our endeavour is deliverance from the

present existence. This view assumes that this earthly

existence is a condition from which we need deliverance,

and is to that extent a conception of it which has been

briefly and well described as pessimism,—although recently

the sensational philosophy has laid its hands upon this

word, and has practised so childish a play upon it that

we shrink from using it any longer. The pessimistic view

of life is only so far justified as it is a presumption of the

doctrine of deliverance, so far therefore as it belongs, for

example, to the real and original Christianity : ó kóσμος öλος

ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ κεîται.2 In this sense pessimism is also the

latent underlying view of the Upanishad teaching. And

which are founded upon it, as well as some of the more

recent Upanishads, take pleasure in dwelling upon this

theme, as will subsequently be shown ; for men lend a

willing ear to the story of their own sufferings. In

1 Further references are given in the Index to the Upanishads under the

word “spectator.”

2 1 Jo. 519.

BRAHMAN AS BLISS

141

contrast to these the older Upanishads are content in a

discreet and, as it were, modest style to recall occasionally

the nature of existence, full of suffering and exciting

longings for deliverance. Nor is this ever done in a better

or more fitting manner than in the difficult words that

suggest a wide experience,—ato 'nyad ârtam, " what is

distinct from him, that is full of suffering."1 Contrasted

with all that is distinct from him and therefore involved

in suffering, Brahman is described in one of the passages

where this formula occurs as that which " oversteps

hunger and thirst, pain and illusion, old age and death,"2

or according to other passages as "the self (âtman), the

sinless, free from old age, free from death and free from

suffering, without hunger and without thirst."3 " His

name is 'exalted,' for he is exalted above all evil,"4 etc.

All these frequently recurring descriptions are summed up

in the designation of Brahman as ânanda, " bliss."

The view that the gods, in contrast to the suffering

world of men, enjoy an untroubled felicity, is probably

common to all peoples. But in the Upanishads bliss

appears not as an attribute or a state of Brahman, but as

his peculiar essence. Brahman is not ânandin, possessing

bliss, but ânanda, bliss itself. This identification of

Brahman and ânanda is effected through the medium of

the view that, on the one hand, the deep, dreamless sleep,

by destroying the existing contrast of subject and object,

is a temporary union with Brahman ; while on the other

hand, since all suffering is then abolished, the same state

is described as a bliss admitting of no enhancement.5

1 Br̥ih. 3. 4. 2, 3. 5. 1, 3. 7. 23. 2 Br̥ih. 3. 5. 1.

3 Chând. 8. 1. 5, 8. 7. 1. 4 Chând. 1. 6. 7.

5 cp. Plato, Apol. 40d, where Socrates speaks of a night ἐν ᾗ οὔτ' ὄναρ κατἐδαρθεν

ὤστ'ε μὴ8 ὄναρ ἰδεîν, and is of opinion that even the King of Persia has not

many days or nights which are comparable with this in happiness ; cp. Shake-

speare also, Hamlet, III. i.,— "and by a sleep to say we end The heartache

and the thousand natural shocks That flesh is heir to,—'tis a consummation

Devoutly to be wish'd."

142 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

We propose now to show how the conception of Brahman as bliss is originally based on these ideas. Here too the Bṛhadâraṇyaka takes the leading place.

"When however he is overcome by deep sleep, when he is conscious of nothing, then the veins called hîtâh ("beneficent") are active, seventy-two thousand of which ramify from the heart outwards in the pericardium; into these he glides, and reposes in the pericardium; and like a youth or a great king or a great Brâhman enjoying an excess of bliss (atighnîm ânandasyâ) reposes, so he also then reposes."1 This passage2 appears to be traceable back to the detailed description of deep sleep in Bṛih. 4. 3. 19–33, which, although it does not yet define the number of veins, in its exaltation of bliss in 4. 3. 33 gives the key to the atighnîm ânandasyâ, and in general (apart from interpolations) makes an impression of greater originality.

Here, after a description of deep sleep as the state "in which he, fallen asleep, experiences no further desire, and sees no dream image," and after mention of the veins, the transition is described from the dream consciousness to the consciousness of deep sleep,—from the consciousness of being this or that to the consciousness of being all (aham eva idam sarvo 'smi), whereby subject and object become one; it is then said :—"That is his real form, in which he is exalted above desire, and is free from evil and fear.

For just as one who dallies (the original meaning of ânanda) with a beloved wife has no consciousness of outer or inner, so the spirit also, dalllying with the self whose essence is knowledge (prâjñena âtmanâ, i.e. with Brahman) has no consciousness of inner and outer.

That is his real form, wherein desire is quenched, and he is himself his own desire, separate from desire and from distress. Then the father is no longer father, the mother no longer mother, the worlds no longer worlds, the gods no longer gods.

1 Bṛih. 2. 1. 19. 2 Like its parallel, Kaush. 4. 19.

gods, the vedas no longer vedas, etc., all contrasts have disappeared, “then is he unaffected by good or evil, then has he subdued all the griefs of his heart.” This state is then further described as one of pure knowledge, of existence as subject without object (cf. the νόησις νοήσεως), and it is then added,—“This is his supreme goal, this is his supreme happiness, this is his supreme world, this is his supreme bliss; by a small portion only of this bliss all other creatures live.” In explanation of this sentence (which for that reason is probably original here, and borrowed from this place in Taitt. 2. 8, where the thought is further developed) the proof is finally offered by means of a progressive advance through six (in Taitt. 2. 8, ten) grades, how the highest human bliss is only a billionth part (in Taitt. 2. 8, a hundred trillionth) of bliss in the world of Brahman,—“and this is the supreme bliss, this is the world of Brahman” (which is in the heart).

In this passage of the Ḅrihadâraṇyaka we evidently have before us the origin of the doctrine of Brahman as bliss. The entire passage treats of deep sleep, and describes it on the one hand as union with Brahman, on the other as a state of supreme unsurpassable bliss, until in the concluding words,—“this is the supreme bliss, this is the Brahman world,”—the identification of Brahman and bliss is complete. That by “the Brahman world” is to be understood not the world of Brahman, but Brahman as the world (not brahmāno lokaḥ, but brahma eva lokaḥ) is already justly remarked by the commentator, p. 815. 5. and 915. 7. Accordingly the entire doctrine of Brahman as bliss appears to rest upon this passage, in which we are able to observe its birth,1 and the consideration of the remaining passages that contain this doctrine makes it appear quite possible that they are all derived from our

1 The description of all the gods as ânanda-âtmanah, given as early as Śatap. Br. X. 3. 5. 13, is an entirely different thing.

144 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

passage, Bṛih. 4. 3. 19-33. We have already discussed Bṛih. 2. 1. 19 (and Kaush. 4. 19). The word ânanda does not occur in the Chând. Up.; but when it is said in Chând. 4. 10. 5 :—“ Brahman is life (prâna), Brahman is joy (kam), Brahman is space (kham),” kham stands here for âkâ'sa and kam for ânanda; and the formal setting side by side of the three ideas, prâna, ânanda, âkâ'sa gives the impression of a later attempt at harmonisation. Chând. 7. 23 also, where pleasure (sukham, here = ânanda) is identified with Bhûman (yo vai bhûmâ tat sukham) by the following description which is given of bhûman as the knowing subject without object suggests the conjecture of a dependence again on the circle of thought of Yâjñavalkhya. The Kaushîtaki Upanishad celebrates Brahman, as noticed above, as the prâna identical with the prajñâ, and accordingly employs the word ânanda only in its original meaning of “sexual desire.” It is all the more surprising that in Kaush. 3. 8, after it has just been said that we ought not to seek for ânanda but for the ânandasya vijñâtar, there is immediately added :—“ This prâna however is the prajñâtman, is bliss (ânanda), never ageing, and immortal.” Here the borrowing of the word ânanda from another circle of thought is quite unmistakable.

The chief passage treating of Brahman as bliss is the Ânandavallî, Taitt. 2.1 Where the annamaya, prânamaya, manomaya and vijñânamaya âtman are in turn stripped off as mere husks in order to penetrate to the ânandamaya âtman as kernel. Of this âtman consisting of bliss it is then said :—“ Love is his head, joy his right side, joyousness his left side, bliss his trunk, Brahman his under part, his base.” Brahman, that is here described as the base of the self consisting of bliss, is originally non-existent (i.e. only metaphysically existing), and fashions

1 Taitt. 3 is only an imitation.

himself out of himself, as is further said, therefore is he named well-fashioned. “What this well-fashioned one is,

in truth, that is the essence ; for when a man receives this essence, then is he full of bliss ; for who could breathe,

who live, if that bliss were not in the ākās̄a (the void, from which the universe originated). For it is he who

creates bliss. For when a man finds his peace, his resting-place, in that invisible, unreal, inexpressible, unfathomable

one, then has he attained to peace.” Further, a warning is given against pushing the craving for knowledge too

far, and against continuing to distinguish in the self consisting of bliss a subject and object, whereby again a man

would fall under the dominion of fear. Then Taitt. 2. 8 follows with the heading,—“This is the treatise on bliss

(ānandasya mīmāṁsā).” Here we find the very same ascription of power to bliss which is already known from

Br̥ih. 4. 3. 33 ; in the latter passage it stands naturally as explanatory of the preceding sentence, while in Taitt. 2. 8

it is introduced under an especial title, and without such connection with the preceding. This circumstance, as

well as the increase of endowment from six limbs to ten with several details, makes it probable that the two texts

do not spring from a common source, but that Taitt. 2. 8 depends directly on Br̥ih. 4. 3. 33. If this is

accepted, then Taitt. 2 might prove to be directed polemically against Br̥ih. 4. 3–4. For the expression

vijñānamaya ātman (purusha) denotes, in Br̥ih. 4. 3. 7, 4. 4. 22,1 the knowing subject apart from object, and

therefore the supreme ; while in Taitt. 2. 5 this vijñānamaya is conceived as subject contrasted with

object, and contrary to Br̥ih. 4. 3 is brought down to a mere preliminary grade of the ānandamaya.

All later passages depend partly on Br̥ih. 4. 3,2 partly on Taitt. 2, as for example Mahānār. 63. 16, Maitr. 6. 13,

1 cp. 2. 1. 16.

10

2 cp. Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 7, Māṇḍ. 5 with Gauḍ. 1. 3–4.

146 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

6. 23, 6. 27, 7. 3, Tejobindu 8 (ānandam nandana-atītam), Sarvop. 9–13, etc. The earliest description of the

annamaya, etc. as “sheaths” (kos'as) is found perhaps in

the verse Maitr. 6. 27. Several of the later passages add

the conception of the ānandamaya as the innermost

kernel (corresponding to the original intention) ; others, in

the poetical description of it in Taitt. 2. 5, still discern

a multiplicity (priyam, moda, pramoda, ānanda), and

conceive it therefore as a fifth sheath, in which brahman,

designated in Taitt. 2. 5 the “foundation,” holds its place

as kernel ; a view which gave rise in the later Vedânta to

an important discussion.

5. Negative Character and Unknowablenesss of the

essential Brahman

We have seen how the descriptions of Brahman as

being, thought and bliss (sac-c'id-ânanda), which are

common in the later Vedânta, are founded on the ancient

Upanishads, and how their statements concerning Brahman

may be comprehended under these three ideas. But no

definite conclusion is by this means reached on these

lines as to the nature of Brahman. For the being, which

Brahman is, is not to be understood as such being as is

known to us by experience, but is rather, as we saw, in an

empirical sense a not-being. The descriptions of Brahman

as the knowing subject within us are usually accompanied

by the assertion that this knowing subject, the “knower

of knowing,” remains himself always unknowable, the

intention being merely to deny thereby of Brahman all

objective existence.The bliss also, which is described as

the essence of Brahman, is not such a bliss as we know

or experience, but is only such as holds sway in deep

dreamless sleep, when the distinction of subject and object

and therefore consciousness has ceased. Accordingly all

three definitions of Brahman as being, thought or bliss

are in essence only negative. Being is the negation of all empirical being, thought the negation of all objective being, bliss the negation of all being that arises in the mutual relation of knowing subject and known object; and therefore as the final result and main dogma of the Upanishad teaching the conclusion is reached, as far as his peculiar and essential being is concerned, Brahman is absolutely unknowable.

This unknowableness of Brahman, the âtman, is already most emphatically declared by the ancient Upanishads. Yâjñavalkhya sums up his speculations concerning the âtman no less than four times1 in the celebrated formula :—“ He however, the âtman, is not so, not so (neti, neti). He is incomprehensible, for he is not comprehended ; indestructible, for he is not destroyed ; unaffected, for nothing affects him ; he is not fettered, he is not disturbed, he suffers no harm.” “In truth, this great unbegotten self does not grow old or decay, and is immortal, fearless, is Brahman.”2 “That it is, O Gârgî, which the wise call the imperishable (aksharam) ; it is neither thick nor thin, neither short nor long, neither red (like fire) nor fluid (like water), neither shadowy nor dark, neither wind nor ether (space), not adhesive (like gum), without taste or smell, without eye or ear, without speech, without understanding, without vital force and without breath, without mouth or size, without inner or outer ; never consuming anything, nor consumed by any.”3

It is upon these passages that the amplifications of the later Upanishads depend. Thus in Kâṭh. 2. 18, where it is said of the “seer” (vipas'cit, i.e. the knowing subject) :—

The seer is not born and does not die,

He does not originate from any, nor become any,

The Ancient One, from everlasting abides everlastingly,4

Nor is he slain, for it is the body that is slain.

1 Br̥ih. 4. 2. 4, 4. 4. 22, 4. 5. 15, 3. 9. 26,—a fifth occurrence, Br̥ih. 2. 3. 6, is borrowed.

2 Br̥ih. 4. 4. 25.

3 Br̥ih. 3. 8. 8.

4 Br̥ih. 4. 4. 18.

148 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

Similarly in Mund. 1. 1. 5 :-“The higher (knowledge)

however is that by which that imperishable one1 is

known ; that which

Invisible, incomprehensible, without genealogy, colourless,

Without eye or ear, without hands or feet,

Eternal, pervading all and over all, scarce knowable,

That unchangeable one

Whom the wise regard as being's womb.”

Further :-

“That which remains inaudible, intangible, invisible,

Which can neither be tasted nor smelt, imperishable,

That abides eternal, without beginning or end, greater than the

greatest,

He who knows that has escaped from the jaws of death.”2

And :-

“He stretches himself around, without frame or sinews,

Pure, untainted, invulnerable, free from evil,

Gazing forth, by himself alone, all-embracing,

For each after its kind has he for all time determined the goal.”3

The passage Chând. 8. 1. 54—“that is the âtman, the

sinless, free from old age, free from death and suffering,

without hunger or thirst,” seems to depend on Bṛih. 3. 5,

—“that (âtman), who oversteps hunger and thirst, pain

and illusion, old age and death.” In Chànd. 6. 8–16, on the

other hand, the various phenomena of nature that engage

attention are traced back to their unknowable source, of

which it is said in the celebrated refrain nine times

repeated :-“What that subtle being (i.e. that unknow-

able, animan) is by which this universe subsists, that is

the real, that is the soul, that art thou (tat tvam asi),

O S'vetaketu ?”

The unknowableness of Brahman, which in the above

passages led to a denial to him of all empirical predicates,

is expressed in poetic style also by ascribing to Brahman

1aksharam, cp. Bṛih. 3. 8. 8. 2Kath. 3. 15.

3Îs'à 8. 4= 8. 7. 1.

the most contradictory and irreconcilable attributes, as shown in the following two passages :-

"He stays, yet wanders far from hence,

He reposes, yet strays everywhere around,

The movement hither and thither of the god,

Who could understand besides me?"1

"One,—motionless and yet swift as thought,—

Departing, not even by gods to be overtaken;

Standing still he yet overtakes all runners,—

In him the god of the wind interwove the primeval waters.

Resting is he and yet restless,

Afar is he and yet so near!

He is within all,

And yet yonder outside of all."2

Here the opposite predicates of nearness and distance, of repose and movement, are ascribed to Brahman in such a manner that they mutually cancel one another, and serve only to illustrate the impossibility of conceiving Brahman by means of empirical definitions.

The impossibility of knowing Brahman is however most clearly expressed in the formula of Yâjñavalkhya already quoted,—neti, neti (na iti, na iti), "it is not so, it is not so." As to its original meaning there is some doubt. According to Hillebrandt,3 na is not the negative, but an affirmative particle signifying "in truth," "it is."

Or the formula might be rendered ‘na iti na’ iti, Brahman "is not not," is the negation of negation, "a denial of a denial," the "nihtesniht, daz é was denne niht," as M. Eckhart expresses it.4 These ideas however are opposed not only to the consistency with which in the four passages in which this formula originally appears5 it is applied to the elucidation of a series of negative predicates,6 but also

1 Kâth. 2. 21. 2 Îs'â 4-5.

3 In a review of my translation of the Upanishads, Deutsche Literaturz.. 1897, p. 1929. 4 ed. Pfeiffer, pp. 322, 539.

5 Brih. 4. 2. 4, 4. 4. 22, 4. 5. 15, 3. 9. 26. 6 agrihyo na hi grihyate, etc.

150

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

to all the Indian explanations of the formula with which

we are acquainted. Such an explanation is already offered

in Brih. 2. 3. 6 :—na hi etasmid—iti neti—anyat param

asti, “for there is no other (definition) beyond this, that

it is not so”; or (less appropriately), “for there no other

beside this (Brahman), therefore it is said, it is not so.”

According to this explanation na iti stands for na evam,

as Bâdarâyana already explains :1—prak?ita-etâvattvam hi

pratishedhati, “for it (the passage) denies the aforesaid 2

being-so-and-so,” and S’ankara (while giving the two ex-

planations quoted above) confirms this sûtra. Similarly at

an earlier period :—

The saying, “it is not so, not so,”

Rejecting all that can be expressed in word;

As the assertion of unknowableness proves,

Can only be referred to Him.3

We have already learnt from the philosophy of Kant

that the entire empirical order of things is subject to the

laws of space, time and causality,4 and that the self-exist-

ent, or in Indian language Brahman, in contrast with the

empirical system of the universe, is not like it in space

but is spaceless, not in time but timeless, not subject to

but independent of the law of causality. This proposition

could not express an eternal truth valid alike for all ages

and peoples without having been anticipated by all the

metaphysicians of the past, and therefore also in the

Upanishads. We propose to investigate this point here,

merely prefacing the remark that those ancient times were

frequently unable to formulate the idea of a spaceless,

timeless, causeless existence in its abstract simplicity, but

only to conceive its representation in experience. On

this assumption spacelessness is regarded as a disengage-

1 Sûtram 3. 2. 22. 2 Brih. 2. 3. 6.

3 Gaudapâda, Mândûkvyakârikâ 3. 26.

4 des'a-kâla-nimítta, as it is already expressed in a later Upanishad, and

quite a dozen times by S’ankara.

BRAHMAN AS INDEPENDENT OF SPACE 151

ment of Brahman from the laws of space, which assigns

limits to everything and appoints it a definite place and no

other, while Brahman is described as omnipresent, all-pre-

vading, unlimited, infinitely great and infinitely small.

Similarly the timelessness of Brahman appears as freedom

from the limitations of time, as an eternity without begin-

ning or end, or again as instantaneous duration occupying no

time (as lightning). And finally, Brahman's independence

of causality is exhibited as freedom from all the laws of

becoming, the universal rule of which is causality, as cause-

lessness, absolute self-existence, and unchanging endurance.

(1) Brahman as spaceless. In Bṛih. 3. 8. 7 it is

said :—“That which is above the heaven, O Gârgî, and

that which is beneath the earth, and that which is between

them, the heaven and the earth, that which men call the

past, present and future, that is woven within and

throughout in space.” “But wherein then is space woven

within and throughout?” The answer is given in a

magnificent description of Brahman as the imperishable

(aksharam), and in conclusion it is said :—“In truth, in

this imperishable one is space woven within and through-

out, O Gârgî.” “This Brahman is independent of earlier

and later, of inner and outer ; this âtman is Brahman, the

all-perceiving.”1 “The front (eastern) regions of the

heaven are his front organs, the right (southern) regions

of the heaven are his right organs, the hinder (western)

regions of the heaven are his hinder organs, the left

(northern) regions of the heaven are his left organs, the

upper regions of the heaven are his upper organs, the

lower regions of the heaven are his lower organs, all the

regions of the heaven are all his organs.”2 “It however

(the unlimited, the bhûman) is beneath and above, in the

west and the east, in the south and the north ; it is this

whole universe. — Next for the self-consciousness : I

1 Or all-prevading, sarvânubhû, Bṛih. 2. 5. 19.

2 Bṛih. 4. 2. 4.

152 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

(aham) am beneath and above, in the west and in the east, in the south and in the north; I am this whole universe.—Next for the soul (ātman): The soul is beneath and above, in the west and in the east, in the south and in the north; the soul is this whole universe."1 Cp. the passage Maitr. 6. 17 :-“ Brahman in truth was this universe at the beginning, the one, the infinite; infinite towards the east, infinite towards the south, infinite in the west, infinite in the north, and above and beneath, infinite on all sides. For him there is no eastern, or any region of the heaven at all, no athwart, no beneath or above." In Chând. 3. 14. 3 also :-“This is my soul (âtman) in my heart, smaller than a grain of rice or barley or a mustard-seed, than a grain or the kernel of a grain of millet; this is my soul in my heart, greater than the earth, greater than the air, greater than the heaven, greater than these worlds." Passages like these are in the mind of the writer when in a frequently recurring verse2 Brahman is named “the smallest of the small and the greatest of the great”; and when the epithets “omnipresent”3 and “all-prevading”4 are applied to him. The description also of him as “indivisible”5 implies independence of space, since all that is in space is divisible. Since further all that is in space as being divisible involves a plurality, to deny all plurality of Brahman6 amounts to a rejection of the predicates of space as in Kâth. 4. 10-11 :-

That which is here is also there,

That which is there is also here;

From death to new death he rushes

Who fancies that he here sees difference!

1 Chând. 7. 25.

2 Kâth. 2. 20, S'vet. 3. 20, Mahân. 10. 1.

3 sarvaga, S'vet. 6. 17, Muṇḍ. 3. 2. 5; sarvagata, S'vet. 3. 11. 21, Muṇḍ. 1. 1. 6.

4 vibhu, Kâṭh. 2. 22, 4. 4; vyâpaka, Kâṭh. 6. 8.

5 nishkala, S'vet. 6. 19, Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 9; akala, S'vet. 6. 5, Pras'na 6. 5, Maitr. 6. 15.

6 As in Kaush. 3. 8 (no etan nânâ), Br̥h. 4. 4. 19.

BRAHMAN AS INDEPENDENT OF TIME

153

In the spirit should this be noted,

Here there is no plurality at all;

From death to new death he strides,

Who fancies that he here sees difference!

(2) Brahman is timeless. Even more definitely than

of space, the predicate of time is denied of Brahman.

This is already the case in some of the passages quoted.

Further in the descriptions of him as "independent of

past and future";1 "Lord of the past and future";2

"exalted above the three times";3 at whose feet time rolls

along, as it is said in the splendid description of Bṛih.

4. 4. 16–17 :-

At whose feet rolling on

In years and days time passes by,

Whom as the light of lights the gods

Adore, as immortality.

On whom the fivefold host of living beings

Together with space4 depend,

Him know I as my soul,

Immortal the immortal.

More profound still is the thought of Maitr. 6. 15 :-

"In truth, there are two forms of Brahman, time and

not-time. That is to say, that which existed before the

sun is not-time, and that which began to be with the sun

is time, is the divisible." Perhaps this beginning of time

at a definite moment is to be understood here only in a

figurative sense, as in Plato.5 Just as Brahman's inde-

pendence of space is figuratively represented not only

under the figure of infinite vastness, but also at the same

time of infinite littleness,6 so his independence of time

appears on the one hand as infinite duration,7 on the other

1 Kâṭh. 2. 14. 2 Bṛih. 4. 4. 15, Kâṭh. 4. 5. 12. 13.

3 S'vet. 6. 5. 4 Bṛih. 3. 8. 5 Tim. 37 D seq.

6 Smaller than a grain of rice, etc., Chând. 3. 14. 3 ; smallest of the small,

Kâṭh. 2. 20 ; of the size of a needle's point or the ten-thousandth part of the

tip of a hair, S'vet. 5. 8–9.

7 anâdi, anantam, Kâṭha. 3. 15, S'vet. 5. 13 ; sanâtana, Kâṭh. 5. 6,

Kaivalya 8, etc.

154 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

as an infinitely small moment, as it is symbolically represented in consciousness by the instantaneous duration of

the lightning, or of the flash of thought. This is so as

early as Vâj. Samh. 32. 2. The principal passage is

Kena 29-30 :—“ Concerning it this explanation is given.

That which in the lightning makes it lighten, and men

cry ‘ah’ and shut their eyes,—this, that men cry ‘ah’ (is

its explanation) in relation to the godhead. Now in

relation to the self. When something enters as it were

into the soul, so that thereby a man is reminded of some-

thing in an instant, this idea (is its explanation).”

Further descriptions of Brahman as lightning are found in

Brih. 2. 3. 6, 5. 7. 1, Mahân. 1. 8. Taken together, their

aim is to lay stress upon his instantaneousness in time,

that is in figurative language his timelessness.

(3) Brahman is independent of causality. Causality

is nothing else than the universal rule according to which

all changes in the world proceed. Where there is no

change there is no causality. It amounts therefore to an

assertion of Brahman’s independence of causality when, as

early as the most ancient Upanishad texts, although they

are not yet able to grasp the conception of causality in the

abstract, all change is denied of Brahman. This is the

case when, in Brih. 3. 8, Brahman is celebrated as “ the

imperishable ” (aksharám). Only of this is knowledge

possible, as Plato also teaches, while of all that is subject

to the flux of becoming there is merely δόξα, to use Plato’s

word, or ignorance, as it is said in S’vet. 5. 1.1 The

absolute changelessness (i.e. independence of causality) of

Brahman is very definitely expressed in passages like Brih.

4. 4. 20 :—

As unity we must regard him,

Imperishable, unchanging,

Eternal, not becoming, not ageing

Exalted above space, the great self.

1 ksharam tu avidyâ hi, amritam tu vidyâ.

BRAHMAN AS INDEPENDENT OF CAUSALITY 155

That no becoming touches the essential reality of things is taught by Chând. 6. 1. 3 :—“ Change (vikâra) is a mere matter of words, nothing but a name.” And in Kâṭh. 2. 14 Brahman is sought for as one that is—

Independent of good and evil,

Independent of becoming and not-becoming,

Independent of past and future,

That thou seest to be such, declare.

And of the “ seer” (i.e. Brahman as the knowing subject) it is said in Kâṭh. 2. 18 :—

The seer is not born, and does not die,

Springs not from any, nor becomes any ;

From everlasting he abides for ever the ancient one,

He does not perish, for it is the body that perishes.

An emphatic repudiation of becoming is contained in a passage that has been misunderstood by both Indian and European commentators, Îs'â 12-14 :—

Into dense darkness he enters

Who has conceived becoming to be naught,

Into yet denser he

Who has conceived becoming to be aught.

Different is it from coming into being,

Different also from not coming into being ;

Thus have we from the ancient seers

Received the doctrine.

He who knows (as non-existent)

Both becoming and not-becoming,

He passes through both

Beyond death, and has immortality.

That by sambhûti and asambhûti here must be understood the coming into being and passing away (in place of the opposition of contraries) is put that of contradictories) is confirmed by Gauḍapâda also :—

By combating the sambhûti 1

A coming into being is repelled ;

“ Who could bring him forth ?”

This saying 2 shows him to be causeless. 3

1 Îs'â 12. 2 Brih. 3. 9. 28. 3 Mâṇḍûkyâ-Kârikâ 3. 25.

156 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

The same thought is elsewhere developed in detail,1 that the relations of cause and effect (kâranam and kâryam), source and result (hetu and phalam), perceived and perceiving, are unthinkable of the self-existent (Brahman).

The result of all the investigations of the present chapter is to show that in his essential nature Brahman is and remains completely unknowable. Neither as the (metaphysical) being (sat), nor as the knowing subject within us (cit), nor as the bliss (ânanda) that holds sway in deep sleep when the opposition of subject and object is destroyed, is Brahman accessible to knowledge. No characterisation of him therefore is possible otherwise than by the denial to him of all empirical attributes, definitions and relations,—neti, neti, "it is not so, it is not so." Especially is he independent, as we have shown, of all limitations of space, time and cause, which rule all that is objectively presented, and therefore the entire empirical universe.

This conclusion is already implied in the first sentence with which Indian philosophy begins in the Ṛigveda,—in the thought, namely, of the essential unity of things. For this unity excludes all plurality, and therefore all proximity in space, all succession in time, all interdependence as cause and effect, and all opposition as subject and object.

In another connection2 passages have been already discussed which assert the absolute unknowableness of Brahman. Here we append to them merely a beautiful story which S'ankara3 reports as śruti, and which therefore he derived possibly from a lost or still unrecognised Upanishad.

When Bâhva was questioned by Vâshkali, he expounded the nature of Brahman to him by maintaining silence, as the story relates. " And he said, 'Teach me, most reverent

1 Mândûkya-Kârikâ 4. 11-31. 2 Supra, p. 79 ff. 3 On Brahmasûtra, 3. 2. 17.

sir, the nature of Brahman.' The other however remained

silent. But when the question was put for the second or

third time he answered, 'I teach you indeed, but you do

not understand ; this âtman is silence.'

V. BRAHMAN AND THE UNIVERSE

1. Sole Reality of Brahman

Brahman is the âtman, " the self," is that in men and

in all the objects of the universe which remains over when

we abstract from them everything in them that is not-self,

alien or different. There is however in the whole universe,

alike in heaven and on earth, nothing besides the âtman :

—"There is no second outside of him, no other distinct

from him"1 "There is here no plurality at all,"2 and

consequently there can be no question of anything existing

outside of the âtman, of a universe in the proper sense of

the term. With the knowledge of the âtman therefore

everything is known :—" In truth, he who has seen, heard,

comprehended and known the âtman, by him is this entire

universe known,"3 just as with the sounding of the drum,

the conch-horn or the lyre, all the notes, as it were, of

these instruments are already coincidently sounded.4 The

doctrine of the âtman is that very instruction, which was

asked for in Chând. 6. 1. 2 :—"by which (even) the

unheard becomes (already) heard, the uncomprehended

comprehended, the unknown known"; the âtman is

" that with the knowledge of which this entire universe

becomes known."5 As from a lump of clay all that

consists of clay is known, from an ingot of copper all

that consists of copper, from a pair of nail-scissors all

1 Bṛih. 4. 3. 23-30.

2 na iha nānâ asti kiñcana, Bṛih. 4. 4. 19, Kâṭh. 4. 10-11.

3 Bṛih. 2. 4. 5. 4 Bṛih. 2. 4. 7-9.

5 Muṇd. 1. 1. 3.

158 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

that consists of iron,—“the change is a mere matter of

words, nothing but a name,”—so with the knowledge of

the âtman all is known.1 The distinguishing essence of

the fire, the sun, the moon and the lightning has vanished,

the change is a mere matter of words, nothing but a

name.2 This was recognised by the ancient seers when they

said :—“No longer now can anyone bring before us any-

thing which we have not (already) heard, understood and

known.”3 Therefore for him who knows the âtman the

unknown is only “as it were” (iva) unknown ;4 there is

only “ as it were ” a duality,5 “ as it were ” another,6 “ as it

were” a plurality,7 and it happens only “as it were” that

the âtman imagines an object or is moved towards it.8

Strictly speaking, such an “as it were” or iva should be

supplied to every page and every line in which the

Upanishads are concerned with something other than the

âtman. It is however very easily understood that this

is not always done. And just as Parmenides and Plato,

without thereby involving themselves in self-contradiction,

regard the very universe, whose reality they deny, from

that standpoint of experience which is natural to us all as

though it were real ; so we are not to discover a contradic-

tion when the teachers of the Upanishads occasionally

regard and treat the universe as real from the standpoint

of realism, of avidyâ, where indeed we all begin and on

which all practical living is based, so long as in the back-

ground of consciousness the conviction remains unmoved

of the sole reality of the âtman, and thence determines,

even if only tacitly, all the thoughts. Probably however

a contradiction was introduced when and in proportion as

the realistic view implanted in us all by the nature of our

1 Chând. 6. 1. 3–5. 2 Chând. 6. 4. 1–4. 3 Chând. 6. 4. 5.

4 Chând. 6. 4. 7. 5 dvaitam iva, Bṛih. 2. 4. 14. 6 Bṛih. 4. 3. 31.

7 nânâ iva, Bṛih. 4. 4. 19, Kâṭh. 4. 10, 11.

8 dhyáyati iva, leláyati iva, Bṛih. 4. 3. 7.

intellect so completely gained the upper hand that the

fundamental conception of the Vedânta of the sole reality

of the âtman became obscured by it. Wherever this

occurs in the Upanishads the original standpoint of the

Vedânta is abandoned, and another standpoint prevails,

that of the later Sânkhya system, whose primary origin

we shall have to look for in that realistic tendency of the

mental constitution of man which can never be entirely

suppressed, and whose origin and gradual accession of

strength within the sphere of the Upanishad doctrine itself

we shall have to consider and trace out in a later connection.

For the moment however we turn aside from this, and

hold fast to the pure and original Upanishad doctrine,

that it is the standpoint of avidyâ which we take up

when we proceed now to consider Brahman in his

relations to the universe, (1) as the cosmical principle,

(2) as the psychical principle, and (3) as a personal god

(îśvara).

2. Brahman as the Cosmical Principle

The relation of the first principle of things to created

nature, or to use popular language, of God to the universe,

is a problem which can never be completely solved, for a

solution is excluded by the constitution of our intellectual

powers. In proportion as we attempt to understand that

relation—that is, to conceive it under the categories of

our intellect, space, time and causality—we fall into an

erroneous, or to put it more mildly into a figurative

representation of the facts; and in proportion as we

endeavour to rise above a mere figurative representation

we are compelled to relinquish a real understanding.

Four stages may be distinguished in the comprehension

of that problem, which we may describe, at first in general

and with reservation of their special application to India,

as realism, theism, pantheism and idealism.

(1) Realism.—Matter exists independently of God, and from eternity. God is degraded to a mere world-fashioner (δημιουργός), or, so far as creative power is transferred to matter itself, is altogether set aside, as in the Sāṅkhya.

(2) Theism.—God creates the universe out of nothing, and the latter then has a real existence independently of God. This is the standpoint of the Old Testament. As soon as the attempt is seriously made to grasp the relation of God to the universe, in proportion as this takes place God becomes more and more entangled in the universe, until He is completely merged in it and disappears. Theism degenerates into pantheism, which is its necessary consequence. The later philosophy furnishes an example. After Descartes had attempted to formulate in logical terms the theism of the Middle Ages which was based on the Old Testament, we see how, under the hands of his successors Geulinex and Malebranche, God is more and more absorbed into the universe until finally He becomes completely identified with it. The same thing occurs in the pantheism of Spinoza. It is remarkable that this decisive refutation of that Biblical view of the universe which originated from Judaism and was adopted in the Middle Ages was effected by a Jew.

(3) Pantheism.—God creates the universe by transforming himself into the universe. The latter confessedly has become God. Since it is real and also infinite, there is no room for God independently of the universe, but only within it. The terms God and universe become synonymous, and the idea of God is only retained in order not to break with tradition.

(4) Idealism.—God alone and nothing besides him is real. The universe as regards its extension in space and bodily consistence is in truth not real; it is mere illusion, as used to be said, mere appearance, as we say

to-day. This appearance is not God as in pantheism,

but the reflection of God, and is an aberration from the

divine essence. Not as though God were to be sought

on the other side of the universe, for he is not at all

in space ; nor as though he were before or after, for

he is not at all in time ; nor as though he were the

cause of the universe, for the law of causality has no

application here. Rather, to the extent to which the

universe is regarded as real, God is without reality.

That he is real, may the sole reality, we perceive

only so far as we succeed in shaking ourselves free

theoretically and practically from this entire world of

appearance.

All these stages are represented in the teaching of

the Upanishads, and thus it presents a very varied

colouring of idealistic, pantheistic or theistic shades

without becoming contradictory in the proper sense of

the term. For the fundamental thought, that is held

fast at least as a principle at all stages, even at the

lowest which maintains the independent existence of

matter, is the conviction of the sole reality of the âtman ;

only that side by side with and in spite of this conviction

more or less far-reaching concessions were made to the

empirical consciousness of the reality of the universe,

that could never be entirely cast off ; and thus the

universe disowned by the fundamental idealistic view of

the sole reality of the âtman was yet again partially

rehabilitated. This was effected either by regarding it

pantheistically as an apparition of the only real âtman,

or theistically as created by and out of the âtman, but

yet contrasted with it as separate, or realistically as

prakriti occupying from the very beginning an inde-

pendent position by the side of the purusha, although

in a certain sense dependent on the latter. Of the

theistic conception, and the realistic that paved the way

162

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

for the Sâṅkhya, both of which make their appearance only occasionally, we shall have to speak in a later connection. Here we propose in the first instance to enter upon the fundamental idealistic view, in order to show how by accommodation to the empirical consciousness, which regards the universe as real, it passes over into the pantheistic doctrine, which is the prevailing one in the Upanishads.

Strongly idealistic, and at the same time expressing most clearly the peculiar spirit of the Upanishad teaching, are the passages which declare that with the knowledge of the âtman all is known,1 and which accordingly deny a universe of plurality.2 But with this thought a height was reached on which a prolonged stay was impracticable. Passages therefore of this kind are comparatively rare. The universe was still something existing; it lay there before their eyes. It was necessary to endeavour to find a way back to it. This was accomplished without abandoning the fundamental idealistic principle, by conceding the reality of the manifold universe, but at the same time maintaining that this manifold universe is in reality Brahman.3 Idealism therefore entered into alliance with the realistic view natural to us, and became thereby pantheism. This was the case already in the definition of Brahman as satyasyaya satyam, “the reality of reality.”4 The universe is reality (satyam), but the real in it is Brahman alone. The same is true when in Chând. 6. 1 f. the rise of the manifold universe from the sole existing one is traced in a realistic manner, accompanied by the repeated assurance that all these changes are “dependent on words, a mere name.” With

1 Bṛih. 2. 4. 5, Chând. 6. 1. 2, Mund. 1. 1. 3.

2 nu iha náná asti kiñcana, Bṛih. 4. 4. 19, Kâṭh. 4. 10-11.

3 sarvam khalu idam brahma, Chând. 3. 14. 1.

4 Bṛih. 2. 1. 20.

BRAHMAN AS THE COSMICAL PRINCIPLE 163

this are connected the numerous passages which celebrate

Brahman as the active principle through the entire

universe :—“ He is all-effecting, all-wishing, all-smelling,

all-tasting, embracing all, silent, untroubled.”1 “The

âtman is beneath and above, in the west and in the

east, in the south and in the north; the âtman is this

entire universe.”2 “The sun rises from him, and sets

again in him.3 All the regions of the sky are his

organs,4 the four quarters of the universe (east, west,

south, north), the four divisions of the universe (earth,

air, sky, ocean), the four lights of the universe (fire, sun,

moon, lightning), and the four vital breaths (breath, eye,

ear, manas), are his sixteen parts.5

Fire is his head, his eyes sun and moon,

His ears the regions of the sky,

The revealed Veda is his voice,

The wind his breath, the universe his heart, from his feet is the

earth,

He is the inmost self in all things.6

In what manner however is the relation of Brahman

to this his evolution as the manifold universe to be con-

ceived? We should say :—As identity, in this following the

later Vedânta, which appeals to the word used to express

attachment.7 But this word is a mere makeshift; there

is still always a broad distinction between the one

Brahman and the multiplicity of his appearances, nor

were ancient thinkers or indeed any thinkers before

Kant able to rise to the conception that the entire

unfolding in space and time was a merely subjective

phenomenon. Here a further concession must be made

to the empirical consciousness, tied down as it is to space,

1 Chând. 3. 14. 2. 2 Chând. 7. 25. 2 ; imitated in Mund. 2. 2. 11.

3 Bṛih. 1. 5. 23, Kâṭh. 4. 9, and similarly as early as Atharav. X. 8. 16.

4 Bṛih. 4. 2. 4. 5 Chând. 4. 4-9. 6 Mund. 2. 1. 4.

7 Chând. 6. 1. 3 ; Sûtra 2. 1. 14, tad-ananyatvam, ârambhaṇa-śabda-âdibhyah.

164 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

time and causality. Brahman was regarded as the cause

antecedent in time, and the universe as the effect pro-

ceeding from it ; the inner dependence of the universe

on Brahman and its essential identity with him was

represented as a creation of the universe by and out

of Brahman. We find ourselves at a point where we

apprehend the creation theories of the Upanishads,

unintelligible as they are from the standpoint of its

idealism, from an unconscious accommodation to the

forms of our intellectual capacity. The further elabora-

tion of the doctrine of the creation of the universe will

occupy us in the chapter on the Cosmology. Here only

a few passages need be quoted, which set before us the

"Just as the spider by means of its threads goes forth

from itself (tantuna uccaret), as from the fire the tiny

sparks fly out, so from this ātman all the spirits of life

spring forth, all worlds, all gods, all living beings."

The illustrations of the spider and the fire are further

elaborated in Mund. 1. 1. 7 and 2. 1. 1 :-

As a spider ejects and retracts (the threads),

As the plants shoot forth on the earth,

As the hairs on the head and body of the living man,

So from the imperishable all that is here.

As the sparks from the well-kindled fire,

In nature akin to it, spring forth in their thousands ;

So, my dear sir, from the imperishable

Living beings of many kinds go forth,

And again return into him.

That the material substance of things also is derived

solely from Brahman is taught in connection with the

illustration of the spider in S´vet. 6. 10, where Brahman

is described as the god " who spiderlike by threads which

proceed from him as material (pradhânam) concealed

BRAHMAN AS THE COSMICAL PRINCIPLE 165

his real nature." The last words mean that Brahman, by

not (in a theistic sense) bringing objects forth from him-

self, but (in a pantheistic sense) changing himself into the

objects, " has concealed his real nature " (svabhávato . . .

svam ávrinot). In this sense it is said as early as Rigveda

X. 81. 1 that Vis'vakarman by his entrance into the lower

world was " concealing his original state " (prathamácchad).

Similarly Br̥ih. 1. 4. 7 declares that the âtman has

" entered " into this universe " up to the finger-tips, as a

knife is hidden in its sheath, or the all-sustaining fire

in the fire-preserving (wood). Therefore is he not seen ;

for he is divided ; as breathing he is named breath, as

speaking speech, as seeing eye," etc. According to Br̥ih.

1. 6. 3, the âtman is amŕitam satyena c'hannam, " the

immortal, concealed by (empirical) reality " ; and in Br̥ih.

2. 4. 12 it is said :—" It is with him as with a lump of

salt, which thrown into the water is lost in the water, so

that it is not possible to take it out again ; whence how-

ever we may always draw, it is salt throughout." The

same thought is developed, perhaps on the basis of this

passage in the narrative of Chând. 6. 13. That objection

was taken to such a method of representation is shown by

the parallel passage Br̥ih. 4. 5. 13, where the words quoted

above from Br̥ih. 2. 4. 12 are altered as follows :—" It is

with him as with a lump of salt, which has no (distinguish-

able) inner or outer, but throughout consists entirely of

taste," etc. In a similar way efforts are made in other

passages to show that Brahman by his transformation into

the universe has forfeited nothing of the perfection of his

own nature. As early as Rigveda X. 90. 3 it is said that

all beings are only a fourth of the purusha, while the three

other fourths remain immortal in heaven. The same

teaching is found in Chând. 3. 12. 6, the verse from the

Rigveda being repeated, and similarly in the concluding

verse Maitr. 7. 11 ; while according to Br̥ih. 5. 14, one

166

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

foot of Brahman (under the figure of the Gâyatrî) consists

of the three worlds, the second of the triple knowledge of

the Veda, the third of the three vital breaths, while the

fourth exalted above the dust of earth shines as the sun.

Still more clearly is it taught already in S’atap. Br. 11.

2. 3 that Brahman, after having created the three worlds

with that which lies above and beyond them, himself

entered “into that half beyond.” The infinite nature

of Brahman is also taught in harmony with Atharav.

X. 8. 29 by the verse Bṛih. 5. 1 :-

Though a man journey from the perfect to the perfect.

Yet that which is perfect yet remains over and above all.

The same theme is elaborated in greater detail in the

beautiful verses of Kâṭh. 5. 9–11 :-

The light, as one, penetrates into space,

And yet adapts itself to every form ;

So the inmost self of all beings dwells

Enwrapped in every form, and yet remains outside.

The air, as one, penetrates into space,

And yet adapts itself to every form ;

So the inmost self of all beings dwells

Enwrapped in every form, and yet remains outside.

The sun, the eye of the whole universe,

Remains pure from the defects of eyes external to it ;

So the inmost self of all beings remains

Pure from the sufferings of the external worlds.

3. Brahman as the Psychical Principle

Brahman is the âtman. The first principle of all

things is not, as might be imagined, in part only, but un-

divided, completely and as a whole present in that which

I with true insight find within me as my own self, my ego,

my soul. Of the value of this thought which governs all

the speculations of the Upanishads we have formed an

BRAHMAN AS THE PSYCHICAL PRINCIPLE 167

estimate in the Introduction.1 Here we propose to select from the large number of passages which give expression to it only so many as are necessary in order to show that this thought also, precisely as that of Brahman as first principle of the universe, is in its original purpose idealistic, that is, denies the multiplicity of the universe around us ; but that it receives a gradually increasing realistic colouring in proportion as we endeavour to conceive it under the forms of our knowledge, adapted as these are to realism.

Yâjñavalkhya begins his instruction of Maitreyî in Bṛih. 2. 4 with the words:—“In truth, not for the husband’s sake is the husband dear, but for the sake of the self (the soul, âtman) is the husband dear.” Similarly all the objects of the world,—wife, sons and possessions, the estate of a Brâhman or a warrior, worlds, gods, living beings and the entire universe are dear to us not in themselves or for their own sake, but only for the sake of our own self. How this is to be understood is shown by the conclusion which immediately follows, and which is inferred from it :—“The self, in truth, should be seen, heard, comprehended and reflected on, O Maitreyî ; in truth, he who has seen, heard, comprehended and known the self, by him this entire universe is known.” This implies that all reality is and remains limited to our own self, and that we know love and possess all things in the universe only so far as they subsist in our consciousness, as they are grasped and entertained by our knowing self; there is no universe outside of the âtman, our self, our soul. This is the standpoint of complete idealism, which denies the reality of the manifold universe, as it is further expounded by passages like Bṛih. 2. 1. 16 and 20, where it is taught that all worlds, gods and living creatures spring from the spirit consisting of knowledge (vijñânamaya purusha) like sparks from the fire ; or, as in Bṛih. 3. 4 and 3. 5, where

1 Sup. p. 39 f.

168 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

inquiry is made for the “ Brahman that is within all as soul,”

and the answer is given :—“It is thy soul, that is within

all,” which as the knowing subject remains unknowable 1

and with the consciousness of which the whole universe,

all children, possessions and wisdom vanish into the

nothingness which they really are.2 In the latter passage

an inclination is already revealed towards the realism

which is natural to us all, inasmuch as the existence of the

external world is not denied ; the objects are there, but

as far as their essential nature is concerned they are

nothing but the âtman alone. Similarly in the important

and well-known passage Chând. 6. 8–16, where a series of

mysterious phenomena and relations of nature and life are

traced back to their unknowable original source, and of

this it is then said in a nine-times repreated refrain :—

“ What that subtle being (that unknowable, animan) is,

of which this whole universe is composed, that is the real,

that is the soul, that art thou, O S'vetaketu !”

This doctrine of the sole reality of the âtman, the soul

in us, is in opposition to our innate and invincible convic-

tion of the reality of the external world that surrounds us,

and this opposition is intentionally brought into relief in

a large number of passages, which with great boldness of

metaphysical insight identify the soul in us as the incon-

ceivably small with nature without us as the inconceivably

great. “ He is all-effecting, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-

tasting, embracing all, silent, untroubled ;—this is my

soul in my heart, smaller than a grain of rice or barley, or

a mustard seed, than a grain or the kernel of a grain of

millet ; this is my soul in my heart, greater than the

earth, greater than the atmosphere, greater than the

heaven, greater than these worlds.”3 “ In truth, great

as is this world-space, so great is this space within the

heart ; in it are contained both the heaven and the earth ;

1 Bṛih. 3. 4. 2 Bṛih. 3. 5. 3 Chând. 3. 14. 2.

BRAHMAN AS THE PSYCHICAL PRINCIPLE 169

both fire and wind, both sun and moon, both lightning and stars, and whatever is possessed or not possessed in

this life, all that is therein contained."1 "Now however the light which shines there beyond the heaven behind all

things, behind each, in the highest worlds, the highest of all, that is assuredly this light which is here within in

men."2 The soul, as these passages teach, embraces the universe ; it is moreover as it were all - pervading, the

antaryâmin, the "inner guide" in everything :-" He who dwelling in the earth is distinct from the earth,

whom the earth knows not, whose body the earth is, who rules the earth from within, he is thy soul, the inner

guide, the immortal."3 This speculation is then further extended to several cosmical and psychical relations, and

it is said in conclusion :-" He sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, comprehends but is not comprehended,

knows but is not known. There is no seer beside him, no hearer beside him, no comprehender beside him, no

knower beside him. He is thy soul, the inner guide, the immortal. All that is distinct from him is liable to

suffering." According to this, the antaryâmin, i.e. the power that dwells and rules in everything, is in its essence

consciousness ; for, as is stated in Ait. 3. 3, all gods, all substances and all organic beings, "all this is guided by

consciousness, based upon consciousness ; by consciousness the universe is guided, consciousness is its foundation,

consciousness is Brahman."

Although according to this and many other passages the first principle of the universe dwells within us as

consciousness or the knowing subject, yet its seat is not in the head but in the heart. "In truth, this great

unborn self is that among the vital organs which consists of knowledge (vijñânamaya). Here within the heart is a

cavity, therein he resides who is the lord of the universe,

1 Chând. 8. 1. 3. 2 Chând. 3. 13. 7. 3 Bṛih. 3 7. 3.

the governor of the universe, the chief of the universe ; he

is not exalted by good works, he is not degraded by evil

works ; he is the lord of the universe, he is the governor

of living beings, he is the protector of living beings ;

he is the bridge which holds asunder these worlds, and

prevents them from clashing together."1 Kaush. 3. 8

may perhaps be derived from this passage:—"He is

the protector of the universe, he is the governor of the

universe, he is the lord of the worlds; and this is my soul,

that ought men to know." Similarly numerous passages

in the later Upanishads celebrate Brahman as "implanted

in the cavity of the heart."2 The identity of the âtman

in us with the âtman of the universe is expressed by the

tat tvam asi of Chând. 6. 8–16, and also by the etad vai

tad, "in truth this is that," of Bṛih. 5. 4, which is prob-

ably an imitation of the other. The same formula is

found twelve times in Kâṭh. 4. 3–6. 1 in a prose passage

appended to the verses. The highest bliss, according to

Kâṭh. 5. 14, consists in the consciousness of this thought.

We quote in this connection only Kâṭh. 4. 12–13 :—

An inch in height, here in the body

The purusha dwells,

Lord of the past and the future ;

He who knows him frets no more,—

In truth, this is that.

Like flame without smoke, an inch in height

The purusha is in size,

Lord of the past and the future ;

It is he to-day and also to-morrow,—

In truth, this is that.

As here the purusha is compared to a smokeless flame,

so in imitation of this passage, in S'vet. 6. 19, it is

1 Bṛih. 4. 4. 22 ; an indirect reference to Bṛih. 3. 8. 9.

2 nihito guhâyâm, first in Taitt. 2. 1 ; then Kâṭh. 1. 14, 2. 20, 3. 1, 4. 6–7 ;

Muṇḍ. 2. 1. 10, 3. 1. 7, etc.

BRAHMAN AS THE PSYCHICAL PRINCIPLE 171

likened to a fire whose fuel is consumed;1 while in S'vet. 5. 9 the contrast between the âtman within us and the

âtman in the universe is pushed to an extreme :—2

Split a hundred times the tip of a hair,

And take a hundredth part thereof ;

That I judge to be the size of the soul,

Yet it goes to immortality.

The description of the âtman as a smokeless flame in the heart has been developed in the Yoga Upanishads into

the picture of the tongue of flame in the heart, the earliest occurrence of which is perhaps Mahân. 11. 6-12.3

We saw above how the doctrine of Brahman as the cosmical principle was represented in accommodation to

the empirical mode of thought as a creation of the universe in time by Brahman as its first cause. The

same spirit of accommodation lies at the basis of the form assumed by the doctrine of Brahman as the psychical

principle, viz., that Brahman after having created the universe enters into it as the individual soul. “This

universe was at that time not unfolded; but it unfolded itself in name and form. . . . into it that (âtman) entered

up to the finger - tips. . . . this therefore which here (within us) is the âtman is the trace (to be pursued) of

the universe; for in it the entire universe is known,” etc.4 The last words prove that the entrance of the soul, as

described, into the universe which it has created is merely a metaphor designed to render intelligible the assumed

identity of the soul with the first principle of the universe. It then however more and more stiffens into an actual

realism, as the following passages show. “Into citadels he entered as a bird, into citadels as a citizen.”5 “So

1 Similarly Maitr. 6. 34, Brahmavidyâ 9, Nṛsiṁhott. 2.

2 Surpassed however in Dhyânab. 6.

3 cp. Brahmavidyâ 10, Yogas'ikhâ 6, Yogatattva 9-11, Maitr. 6. 30.

4 Bṛih. 1. 4. 7.

5 Bṛih. 2. 5. 18.

172

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

into these three divinities (the three elements) that divinity entered with this living self, and separated out from one another names and forms."1 "After he had practised self-mortification he created this entire universe, whatever exists ; after he had created it, he entered into it."2 The same conception, even more realistically depicted, is found as early as Ait. 1. 11, 12:—"And he considered,—In what way shall I enter into it? . . . so he split the crown of the head, and entered through this gate." The later the realism is, the more pronounced it becomes. Maitr. 2. 6 may serve as an example : Prajâpati created numerous creatures, "these he saw standing unconscious and lifeless like a stone, motionless like the trunk of a tree ; therefore he had no joy ; and he resolved,—I will enter into them, in order to awaken consciousness within them ; accordingly he made himself a wind, and determined to enter into them," etc.

We see therefore the original idealism by reason of a progressive accommodation to the demands of our intellectual capacity harden into a realism, which in no respects falls behind the Semitic.3

4. Brahman as a personal God (îśvara)

The attempt to clothe the fundamental idealistic conception which refuses to recognise a universe independent of the âtman, and which lies at the foundation of the thought of the Upanishads, in intelligible, i.e. realistic forms, led at first, as we saw, to a pantheism which concedes to the empirical consciousness the reality of the universe, and at the same time asserts the sole existence of the âtman by declaring that this entire universe is nothing else than the âtman. This assertion was essentially dogmatic, and amounted to this, that the universe as a phenomenal form of the âtman took up a

1 Chând. 6. 3. 3. 2 Taitt. 2. 6. 3 Gen. 27.

BRAHMAN AS A PERSONAL GOD

173

position over-against the ātman itself as a second ;

although the endeavour was strenuously made to reconcile

this contradiction by the reiterated assurance that the

universe is identical with the ātman, the infinitely great

without us with the infinitely great within. A further

step in the same direction that tended towards realism is

implied when the ātman as first principle is contrasted

not only with the universe, whose outward form it has put

on, but also with the ātman within us with which it is

originally identical. Thus is brought into existence the

theism which is found in some of the later Upanishads. It

has not arisen from the ancient Vedic polytheism, but first

makes its appearance long after this has been superseded

by the ātman doctrine ; the ātman is not a "god," deva,

in the ancient Vedic sense, but he is the "lord," īśvara.

The difference of the two modes of representation will

become clear if we first gather together the most im-

portant data with regard to the position of the ancient

Vedic gods in the Upanishads.

The existence of the ancient Vedic gods Indra, Agni,

Varuna, etc. is as little denied by the Upanishads as that

of the Greek by Xenophanes. But as by the latter all

the other gods equally with men are subordinated to the

one god (εἰς θεòς ἕν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος), so

in the Upanishads all the ancient Vedic gods are created

by the ātman and dependent on him. From the ātman

proceed, like the sparks from the fire, all worlds, all living

beings, and no less all gods ;1 on him all the gods depend ;2

by him they were created as the guardians of the

universe ;3 "therefore when the people say of each separate

god, 'Sacrifice to this, sacrifice to that,' (it should be known

that) this created universe proceeds from him alone ; he

therefore is all the gods. This (creation) here is an over-

plus of creation of Brahman. Because he created the

1 Bṛih. 2. 1. 20. 2 Kâth. 4. 9. 3 Ait. 1. 1. 3.

174 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

gods higher (than he himself is), and because he as mortal created the immortals, therefore is it called the overplus of creation" (atisṛṣṭi).1 It is further related2 how the âtman created the divine Kshatriyas (Indra, Varuṇa, Soma, etc.), Vais'yas (the Vasus, Rudras, Âdityas, etc.), and S'ûdras (Pûshan). According to Bṛih. 1. 3. 12-16, it is the organs of the prâṇa, viz. speech, smell, eye, ear, manas, which are by him led beyond the reach of death, and now continue to exist as the gods Agni, Vâyu, Âditya, the heavenly regions and the moon. The number of the gods was in Vedic times usually given as thirty-three. The vague and arbitrary character of this reckoning Yajñavalkhya, in Bṛih. 3. 9. 1, brings home in the following way :-

Why thirty-three? why not three hundred and three? or three thousand and three? or both together (3306)? and if we say thirty-three, it might just as well be reduced to six, or three, or two, or one and a half, or one, which is the prâṇa. All these numbers, 3306, 33, 6, 3, 2, 1½, as the manifold forces, parts and organs of nature, come back finally to a unity,—“ the prâṇa, thus he said, this men call Brahman, the yonder (tyad).” The dependence of all these nature-gods on Brahman is described in the myth of Kena 14–28 :—Agni is unable to burn a blade of grass, Vâyu is unable to blow away a wisp of straw, apart from the will of Brahman, which is effective in all the gods. Brahman dwells, according to Bṛih. 3. 7, as the inner guide (antaryâmin) in all parts of the universe, and no less in all the corresponding gods. All the gods pursue their tasks, according to a verse preserved in Taitt. 2. 8 and Kâṭh. 6. 3, “ from fear ” of Brahman ; and according to Kaush. 1. 5, even Indra and Prajâpati, the door-keepers of the heavenly world, are not able to prevent the entrance of the soul of him who knows Brahman, or to turn it back. And just as the power of the gods is

1 Bṛih. 1. 4. 6.

2 Bṛih. 1. 4. 11–13.

BRAHMAN AS A PERSONAL GOD

175

dependent on Brahman, so their knowledge also is im-

perfect ; they are not in possession from the very beginning

of the knowledge of Brahman.1 Accordingly in Chând.

8. 7 f. they depute Indra to obtain from Prajâpati the

knowledge of the âtman, and for the first time, after they

have obtained it, they worship him in the world of

Brahman as the self ; thereupon they possess all worlds

and ali desires.2 In this respect the gods have no

advantage over men:—“Whoever of the gods perceived

this (‘ I am Brahman’) he became Brahman ; and

similarly of the rishis, and similarly of men. . . . And

to-day also, he who knows this ‘I am Brahman’ becomes

this universe ; and even the gods have no power to

prevent his so becoming; for he is the soul (âtman) of

it.”3

These passages make clear the part which the gods

play in the texts of the oldest Upanishads. It is quite

a different matter however, not to be confused with

the other, when individual gods appear occasionally as

symbolical representatives of the âtman, as for example

Indra in Br̥ih. 1. 5. 12, Ait. 1. 3. 14, Kaush. 2. 6, 3. 1,

Varuṇa in Taitt. 3. 1, or Prajâpati in Chând. 8. 7 f.

The monotheism which meets us in some later Upani-

shads has not been developed from this ancient Vedic

polytheism, which still has its echoes in the Upanishads,

but from entirely different premisses. The proof of this

is furnished already by the external fact that the personal

god of the Upanishads, usually and apart from exceptions,4

is called not deva (god), but îs', îs'a, îs'âna, îs'vara (the

lord), and in later times commonly parames'vara (the

supreme lord). As these names already show, we must

look for the origin of the theism of the Upanishads in such

1 cp. Br̥ih. 1. 4. 10, 4. 3. 33, 5. 2. 1, Taitt. 2. 8, Kaush. 4. 20, Kaṭh. 1. 21.

2 Chând. 8. 12. 6.

3 Br̥ih. 1. 4. 10.

4 Such as Kaṭh. 2. 12. 21, S'vet. 1. 8, and frequently.

176

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

texts as celebrate the âtman as the "inner guide" (antaryâmin) in all the parts and forces of nature and of mankind,1 and which represent all effects in the universe as the result of his command (pras'asanam), as in Ḅrih. 3. 8. 9 :—"At the bidding of this imperishable one, O Gârgî, sun and moon are held asunder," etc. Here it is the "imperishable" (aksharám, neuter) that is spoken of, which for the moment is poetically personified. This is not yet theism, but only the first step towards it. Similarly in Ḅrih. 4. 4. 22 :—"Here within the heart is a cavity, therein he dwells, the lord of the universe, the governor of the universe, the chief of the universe ; he is not exalted by good works, he is not degraded by evil works ; he is the lord of the universe, he is the governor of living beings, he is the protector of living beings ; he is the bridge that holds asunder these worlds, and prevents them from clashing together." The same is the case with the temporary personification of Brahman as the refuge of love, the lord of love, the lord of brightness ;2 and in the injunction of Îs'â. 1 also, "to sink in god" the universe (îs'â vâsyam idam sarvam) there is still no theism, for the god who is here referred to is, as the following verses show,3 the âtman within us. The doctrine of a personal god, and with it predestination, appears to be taught also in Kaush. 3. 8 :— "He is not exalted by good works nor degraded by evil works, but it is he who inspires to do good works the man whom he will lead on high out of these worlds, and it is he who inspires to do evil works the man whom he will lead downwards. He is the guardian of the universe, he is the ruler of the universe, he is the lord of the worlds,—and he is my soul (âtman), that ought man to know." As the last sentence shows, it is still man's own self again that determines him to good or evil, and accordingly there is still no theism. The latter first

1 Ḅrih. 3. 7. 3–23.

2 Chând. 4. 15. 2–4.

3 vv. 6, 7.

certainly appears, where the âtman is contrasted not only with the universe, but also with the self within us. This seems evidently to be the case first in the Kâṭhaka Upanishad, where in 3. 1 the supreme and the individual self are distinguished as light and shadow ; and according to 2. 23 the knowledge of the âtman depends upon a kind of free grace :-

Only by the man whom he chooses is he comprehended, To him the âtman reveals his essence.

Whether Kâṭh. 2. 20 also is to be understood in a theistic sense depends upon whether we read dhâtu-prasâdâd "by the repose of the elements," or dhâtuh prasâdâd "by the grace of the creator" (having regard to the majesty of the âtman). On the recurrence of the verse in S'vet. 3. 20 and Mahân. 1.10 it is in any case to be interpreted in a theistic sense.1

We come next to the S'vetâs'vatara Upanishad, the leading example of the theistic teaching of the Upanishads, in which God and the soul, though their original identity is not denied, are yet clearly distinguished from one another. Thus in S'vet. 4. 6, 7 it is said :-2

Two bright-feathered bosom friends Flit around one and the same tree; One of them tastes the sweet berries The other, without eating, merely gazes down.

On such a tree the spirit, depressed, In its weakness mourns, a prey to illusion, Yet when it gazes worshipping on the might And majesty of the other, then its grief departs.

These verses are repeated in the Mund Up. 3. 1. 1, 2, but since elsewhere this Upanishad breathes a pantheistic spirit, they are probably borrowed here from the theistic S'vetâs'vatara. But in the latter also traces of the

1 cp. also S'vet. 6. 18, âtma-buddhi-prasâdam. 2 Interpreting the verse Rigv. I. 164. 20.

idealism that regards everything besides the âtman as unreal, and of the pantheism that identifies the universe with the âtman, both of which were taken over from the earlier Upanishads, continue to exist side by side with the theism; thereby making its representations often contradictory and philosophically unintelligible. This is the case when in 4. 10 the universe is declared to be mâyâ (illusion) caused by the supreme god; although with the reality of the universe the reality of god also in lost, and only the âtman within us survives as real. Or when in S'vet. 1. 6 the distinction of soul and god (the swan and the drover) is explained to be illusory, and at the same time the removal of this illusion appears as a grace of the supreme god, who is thereby first contrasted with the soul as another. Hence it follows that the S'vetâs'vatara is a work brimful of contradictions. It is like a codex bis palimpsestus. Beneath the characters of theism are discerned, half obliterated, those of pantheism, and under the latter again those of idealism. Just as in the later Vedânta, so already in S'vet. 5. 5, 6. 4, 6. 11, 6, 12 the task of bringing works to maturity and apportioning their fruit to the souls is indicated as the chief function of îs'vara; although to the Upanishad also this entire conception of the is'vara, as later in the Vedânta, proves to be merely exoteric, and is not to be derived with certainty from 3. 7.

The theism of the S'vetâs'vatara is adopted and further developed by the later Upanishads, which endeavour to establish a connection with the popular religions by attaching the âtman of the Upanishad doctrine to the cult of S'iva (the beginning of which we may observe in the S'vet. Up.) or of Vishṇu. But even in them the original idealism, which dissolves universe and god in the âtman, reveals itself. This is the case in Nṛsiṁhottara-tâpanîya Up. 1, where the "fourth" and highest state of the soul, the turîya, is distinguished from

its three states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep, and is represented as the abyss of the eternal unity, in which all distinctions of being and knowing vanish, the entire expanse of the universe is obliterated, “and even īśvara (the personal god) is swallowed up by the turīya (the fourth), by the turīya.”

SECOND PART OF THE SYSTEM OF THE UPANISHADS

COSMOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE UNIVERSE

VI. Brahman as Creator of the Universe

1. Introduction to the Cosmology

The sûtras of Bâdarâyana define Brahman as that janma-âdi asya yata' iti, "whence is the origin, etc. (i.e. the origin continuance and end) of this (universe)." This definition goes back in the first instance to Taitt. 3. 1:—"That in truth out of which these creatures arise, whereby they having arisen live, and into which they at death return again, that seek thou to know, that is Brahman." It is to be noted however that in this passage of the Upanishad there is no mention as in the sûtra of an origin continuance and end of the universe as a whole, but only of the individual beings. The case would be different with a still older passage, Chând. 3. 14. 1, if we could follow S'ankara :—"Assuredly this universe is Brahman ; it should be worshiped in silence as Tajjalân." The word Tajjalân is a mysterious name of the universe as identified with Brahman that occurs only here, and it is explained as follows by S'ankara on Chând. 3. 14. 1 :—"From this (tad) Brahman by development into fire, water, earth, etc. the universe has arisen (jan); therefore it is called taj-ja. So on the reverse path to that by which it has arisen it disappears (lî) into the very same Brahman, i.e. it is absorbed into his essence; therefore is

BRAHMAN AS CREATOR

181

it called tal-la. And in the same way finally it is

Brahman in whom the universe at the time of its origin

breathes (an), lives and moves; therefore is it called tad-

anam. Therefore in the three periods (past, present and

future) it is not distinct from the essential Brahman, since

there is nothing which lies outside of and beyond these."1

When Böhtlingk2 declares this explanation of S'ankara to

be ungrammatical, on the ground that upâsita must have

an object, and accordingly proposes to find the secret name

in jalân alone, he is met by the entirely analogous case

of Kena 31, tadd ha tad-vanam nâma, tad-vanum ity

upâsîta-ryam; in other respects no alteration would be

introduced. According to S'ankara's view therefore we

should have before us already in the name tajjalân

(= tad-ja-la-an) a summarising of the three attributes of

Brahman as creator preserver and destroyer of the

universe. Whether this is correct, whether in so ancient

an Upanishad it is possible to assume already the doctrine

of the destruction of the universe, and whether we ought

not rather here also to think of a simple destruction of

individual beings, will later on become a subject of

investigation. Meanwhile we propose to arrange our

presentation of the cosmology according to these three

attributes of Brahman, and accordingly to treat in order

of Brahman as creator preserver and destroyer of the

universe. When moreover S'ankara asserts in the passage

quoted, and in many others, that the whole doctrine of the

creation is not to be understood in a literal sense, but should

be employed merely to teach the essential identity of the

universe and Brahman, this also needs a fuller investigation

and discussion of the question how far a creation of the uni-

verse is possible from the standpoint of the âtman doctrine.

1 cp. the consistent explanation which S'ankara gives on Brahmaŝutra

1. 2. 1, for which see p. 87 of my translation.

2 Berichte der Süchs. Ges. d. W., 1896, p. 159 f.; 1897, p. 83.

182 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

2. The Creation of the Universe and the Doctrine

of the Âtman

We have above in the first part of our work learnt to

recognise a series of descriptions of the creation of the

universe from the Hymns and Brâhmanas, and to point

out as a feature common to many of them that (1) the

original principle, (2) creates matter out of itself, and then

(3) as first-born enters it. We propose in the first place

briefly to survey here the chief passages that set forth this

doctrine.

Rigv. X. 129 :— In the beginning there is only

‘that one’ (tad ekam). It exists as a dark undulation,

shut in by a shell (apraketam salilam), out of

which by tapas that one was first born as Kâma or

Manas (that is to say, according to the conception of

vers. 4).

Rigv. X. 121:—Prajâpati begets the primeval waters,

and issues forth from them as golden germ (hiranya-

garbha).

Rigv. X. 81, 82 :—Vis'vakarmaṇ fashions the worlds

sunk in the primeval slime, i.e. in the primeval waters,

and then issues forth from these waters as the primeval

germ that conceals all the gods.

Rigv. X. 72 :—Brahmanaṣpati fashions the aditi

(salilam, uttânapad, sad), and himself issues forth from

it as Daksha.

Rigv. X. 125 :—It is Vâc that at the beginning actuated

the father of the universe, and then was again born in the

waters of the sea, in order to distribute herself over living

beings.

Rigv. X. 90 :— From Purusha (as Âdipurusha, Sây.)

is born Virâj, and from the latter again Purusha (as

Nârâyaṇa, the “son of Purusha,” or “son of the waters,”

i.e. Hiranyagarbha).

S'atap. Br. 6. 1. 1 :—Purusha Prajâpati creates the

waters, enters into them as an egg in order to

be born from them, and issues forth from them as

Brahman.

Atharav. 11. 4 :—Prâna begets the universe, and

issues forth from it as first-born (as apâm garbha,

v. 26).

Atharav. 10. 7. 7, 8 :—Skambha, in whom Prajâpati

sustained and nourished the whole universe, entered into

the universe with a part of himself.

Taitt. Âr. 1. 23 :—Prajâpati, building up the worlds,

entered as first-born of the creation with his own self into

his own self.

Vâj. Samh. 34. 1-6 :—The mind (manas) includes all

things in itself, and dwells in men as immortal light.

The motive of the conception that dominates all these

passages may be described to be the recognition of the

first principle of the universe as embodied in nature as

a whole, but especially and most of all in the soul (the

universal and the individual soul). Hence the idea arose

that the primeval being created the universe, and then

as the first born of the creation entered into it. This

traditional view we shall find appearing frequently even

in the Upanishads.

In what way however is this possible, since the entire

doctrine of the creation of the universe and of the entrance

of the creator into the universe that he has created is in

contradiction to the âtman doctrine of the Upanishads,

strictly interpreted ?

The assertion is frequently made by the Upanishads,

as we saw,—and this is involved in the very conception of

the âtman,—that the âtman is the sole reality, that there

can be nothing beside it, and therefore with the knowledge

of the âtman all is known. From this point of view no

creation of the universe by the âtman can be taught, for

there is no universe outside of the âtman. But the loftiness of this metaphysical conception forbade its maintenance in the presence of the empirical consciousness which teaches the existence of a real universe. It was necessary to concede the reality of the universe, and to reconcile with this the idealistic dogma of the sole reality of the âtman by asserting that the universe exists, but is in truth nothing but the âtman. Even from this standpoint, which declares the identity of the âtman and the universe, no doctrine of the creation of the universe was possible. It was only by making a further concession to the empirical consciousness, and maintaining no more than an actual identity of the âtman and the universe, never carried out in detail, but framed on a causal relation between the âtman as first cause and the universe as its effect,—it was only then possible and necessary to formulate a theory to explain how the universe as effect had proceeded from or been created by the âtman. This step involved a further inevitable consequence. According to the creation doctrine the universe had come forth from the âtman as another distinct from it. It was necessary to secure its return into the âtman if the original fundamental doctrine of the sole reality of the âtman were not to be absolutely rejected. This motive gave rise to the doctrine that the âtman as soul (universal and individual soul) had entered into the universe that it had created, as we find the doctrine set forth in the Upanishads. It was then possible for the authors of the Upanishads side by side with their fundamental idealistic view to maintain in a modified and more developed form the traditional doctrine of the Ṛigveda, according to which the first principle creates the material universe and then as first-born enters into it. When therefore the professors of the Vedânta, Bâdarâyaṇa,

1 Sûtra 2. 1. 14.

Gauḍapâda,1 and Sankara,2 maintain that the sacred writings teach a creation of the universe only by way of concession to man's faculty of understanding, their assertion is not to be entirely rejected.

It needs to be modified only in the one point that this is not a conscious but an unconscious concession made to the empirical view that demands a real universe held together by causal connections of space and time ; and with this limitation even the Upanishads, in spite of their âtman doctrine that denies the existence of the universe, teach its creation by the âtman and the latter's entrance into it, as the following passages show :-

Br̥ih. 1. 4. 7 :—“The universe before us was once not unfolded ; it was then unfolded in name and form ; . . . that âtman has entered into it up to the finger-tips, as a knife is hidden in a sheath, the all-sustaining (fire) in the fire-preserving (wood).”

Chând. 6. 2, 3 :—“Alone existing, my dear sir, was this in the beginning, one only without a second. . . . It proposed :—I will become many, will propagate myself ; thereupon it created the heat.” From heat water proceeds, from water food (i.e. the earth).

“That divinity proposed :—I will now enter into these three divinities (heat water and food) with this living self (the individual soul), and unfold thence name and form.”

Taitt. 2. 6 :—“He (the âtman) desired :—I will become many, will propagate myself. Accordingly he practised self-mortification. After having practised self-mortification he created the entire universe, whatever exists.

After having created it, he entered into it.”

Ait. 1. 1 :—“In the beginning this universe was the âtman alone ; there was nothing else there to strike the

1 Mândûkya-kârikâ 1. 18, 3. 15.

2 On Brahmasûtra 4. 3. 14, and frequently.

186 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

eye. He deliberated :—I will create worlds; accordingly

he created these worlds, the ocean, atmosphere, death, the

waters." Further in 1. 3. 11 :—"He deliberated :—How

can this (human frame) exist apart from me? And he

deliberated :—In what way shall I enter into it? . . .

accordingly he split open the crown of the head, and

entered by this door."

As far as the relative age of the passages quoted

is concerned, the order that I have chosen may be

expected to prove the order also of history. Bṛih. 1.

4. 7 is the least developed. Chând. 6. 2, 3 describes

the process of creation in detail, but recognises only

three elements. Taitt. 2. 1 represents the five elements

as proceeding from the âtman. Ait. 3. 3 cites the five

elements, and describes them for the first time

with the later technical term pañc'a mahâbhûtâni;

the finished picture moreover in Ait. 1. 3. 11 of the

âtman's entering into man by the seam of the skull

makes this passage appear as the latest among those

quoted.

3. The Creation of Inorganic Nature

In the whole of nature no distinction is so sharply

drawn as that between the inorganic and the organic ; and

this distinction dominates the Indian view of nature also

in so far as they both, the inorganic no less than the

organic, are derived from the âtman, but in quite a

different sense. All organic bodies, and therefore all

plants, animals, men and gods, are wandering souls, are

therefore in essence the âtman itself, as it, for reasons

which have still to be considered, entered into this mani-

fold universe as wandering individual soul. Inorganic

bodies, on the contrary,1 i.e. the five elements, ether, wind,

1 Named mahâbhûtâni on account of their bulk by Ait. 3. 3, Maitr. 3. 2,

Prânagnihotrop. 4.

fire, water, earth, though they are ruled by Brahman,1 and remain under the protection of individual deities,2 yet are not wandering souls, as are all plants, animals, men, and gods, but are only the stage erected by Brahman on which the souls have to play their part.

Before we consider the origin of the elements from Brahman, and in the immediately following section of the entrance of Brahman into them as the soul, a few words of introduction are necessary on the creation myths of the Upanishads.

It was shown above (pp. 183–186) how it became possible for the teachers of the Upanishads, in spite of the doctrine of sole existence which they defended, and which denied the existence of the universe outside of the âtman, by an unconscious approximation to the empirical view to adopt the traditional scheme of the creation myths.

Thus in Chând. 4. 17. 1–3, and in a briefer form Chând. 2. 23, a creation myth is reproduced, in part verbally, which we have already come to know from Ait. Br. 5. 32 and S'atap. Br. 11. 5. 8.3

A creation myth is attached to the conception of the egg of the universe, whose earliest origin we have found in the “vital force that was enclosed in the shell,”4 and in the “golden germ”;5 and the progressive development of the same idea met us already in S'atap. 6. 1. 1 and 11. 1. 6.

This myth is preserved in Chând. 3. 19 :—“This universe was in the beginning not-being ; this (not-being) was being. It arose. Then an egg was evolved. It lay there a whole year long. Thereafter it split open ; the two halves of the shell were, the one of silver, the other of gold ; the silver half is this earth, the golden is yonder heaven,” etc.

(On these predecessors the representation in Manu 1. 9–13 depends.)

The conception of the egg of the universe appears in

1 Brih. 3. 7. 3–14. 2 Brih. 2. 1. 5–8, 2. 5. 1–10.

3 Deussen, Allgemeine Einleitung u. Philosophie des Veda, pp. 183, 189.

4 Ṛigv. X. 129. 3. 5 hiranyagarbha, Ṛigv. X. 121. 1.

188

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

a more characteristic context together with that of the

premundane purusha

1

in the creation myth at the

beginning of the Aitareya Upanishad that belongs to

the Rigveda :—“ In the beginning the âtman alone was

this universe ; there was nothing else at all to meet

the eye. He deliberated :— I will create worlds.”

Accordingly after he had created the earth and the

atmosphere, the waters above and below, he drew forth

the purusha from the waters, and gave him shape.

Brooding over these waters they opened “like an egg,”

the mouth, nose, eyes, etc. of which are then developed,

and from them the eight psychical organs, and from

these in turn Agni, Vâyu, Âditya, etc. as the eight

guardians of the universe, who finally take up their

abode in men as speech, breath, sight, etc. Although

however the human frame is thus animated by the

organs of sense that spring from the purusha, it can only

exist after the creator through the fissure of the skull

(vidriti) has entered into it as individual soul. The

tendency of this myth is clear. The purusha, that in

Rigv. X. 90 had been the first principle, becomes here

a power dependent on the âtman ; and similarly only the

organs of man's soul are ascribed to the purusha, but the

soul itself to the âtman.

The most original and significant creation myth of

the Upanishads is the representation of the evolution of

the universe from the âtman in Bṛih. 1. 4. Here the

traditional form of the creation myth appears only as

a veil lightly thrown over the whole. The aim is not

to relate a consistent history of the creation, but rather

in a series of loosely connected creation pictures to teach

the absolute dependence of all existing beings on the

âtman. Accordingly the perpetual return of created

things into the âtman is used to show how the division of

1

Rigv. X. 90.

the universe into male and female, and then into the different species of animals by the flight of the female before the male, how the evolution of name and form, and the entrance of the âtman into them, together with the creation of the castes of the gods and afterwards of men, etc., how all this signifies only the self-evolution of the âtman to become the manifold universe, and the essential identity of all its phenomena with the âtman. Through the consciousness “I am Brahman” (aham brahma asmi)1 the âtman becomes the universe, “and to this day whoever knows this ‘I am brahman’ he becomes this universe ; nor have even the gods power to prevent his so becoming. For he is its soul (âtman).” Thus the traditional doctrine of the creation is preserved only as an external form. It serves merely to exhibit the sole reality of the âtman under the different phenomena of the universe.

From this lofty standpoint we see the Upanishads ever turning back to the realism natural to us, in order to teach in detail a creation of the universe, and of the elements of which it consists.

Like the Greek philosophers, Philolaus, Plato and Aristotle, most of the Indian thinkers distinguish five elements, — ether, wind, fire, water and earth. A dependence however of the Greek idea on the Indian, or the Indian on the Greek, is not to be thought of for this reason, if for no other, that the order of the elements is different, inasmuch as the Greeks place fire between ether and air, the Indians air between ether and fire. Further also because on both sides independently of one another the simple observation of nature led to the thought of the five compound states of matter, viz. the solid, fluid, gaseous, permanently elastic and the imponderable, as the five component parts of the material universe, to which correspond, as we shall see, the five

1 Bṛih. 1. 4. 10.

190 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

specific energies of the organs of sense. The result is that both in the Greek and in the Indian philosophy we see the doctrine of the fivefold character of the elements gradually formed out of simpler conceptions.

The oldest element with the Indians is water. As early as Rigv. X. 129. 3 the first principle appeared as a “dark undulation” (apraketam salilam). In Rigv. X. 121. 9 Prajāpati begets “the great sparkling waters.”

These again appear in Rigv. X. 82. 1 as the primeval slime in which in the beginning heaven and earth were plunged; and in Rigv. X. 72. 4-6 as the “wave-surge,” that is identical with Aditi, etc. In the Upanishads also the conception of the primeval waters still survives. “The waters are the body of that prāṇa!”1 “This earth,

the air, the heavens, the mountains, gods and men, domestic animals and birds, vegetables and trees, wild creatures down to worms, flies and ants, are nothing but this water under solid conditions, they are all nothing but this water under solid conditions.”2 In Kaush. 1. 7 also Brahman speaks to the soul that knows itself to be identical with him :—“The primeval waters in truth are my universe (as hiranyagarbha), and it is thine.”

In Kâṭh. 4. 6 again it is said of the purusha that he existed before the primeval waters; and the latter are to be understood in the following verse3 by “Aditi the sustainer of the god that springs forth together with them to life.” It also “dwells in the cavity of the heart” (in which according to Chând. 8. 1. 3 heaven and earth are confined), that is the primeval waters also are a product of the âtman dwelling in the heart. There-

in, according to Îsâ 4, Mâtaris'van, (i.e. probably the prâṇa) has already interwoven the primeval waters; according to Mahânâr. 1. 4 he has sown by water the

1 Brih. 1. 5. 13. 2 Chând. 7. 10. 1. 3 cp. Rigv. X. 72. 5, supra.

germ of life on the earth. The cosmogony also of Ait.

1. 1 is to be explained on the same principle. It seems

to be especially closely connected with Rigv. X. 82. 1.

There it is said that in the beginning the worlds were

plunged in the ghritam of the primeval waters, and that

the creator, having first fastened the extreme ends (which

could only stand fast out of the waters), spread out

heaven and earth between them. This gives the key

to Ait. 1. 1, where it is said:—“He deliberated :—I will

create worlds, the ocean, the realms of light, death, the

waters (ambho, māricīr, maram, āpas). That is the

ocean, beyond the heaven ; the heaven is its floor. The

atmosphere is the realms of light. Death is the earth.

The waters are whatever is beneath it.” After this

description we have the waters as the two ends of the

universe, above and below, and between them the clear

atmosphere (hence called māricīr), and the dark earth

(hence dead), i.e. the sūrtam and the asūrtam rajas of

Rigv. X. 82. 4. By a reference to this passage the

otherwise isolated description of the construction of the

parts of the universe in Ait. 1. 1 seems to find a complete

explanation. The same Upanishad further on 1 enumerates

the five elements as usually given by later writers.

A further step is taken in Brih. 1. 2. 2, where we find

the one element of the primeval waters replaced by three.

Here also Prajâpati forms the water by his song of praise.

From its churning the earth arises, fire from the labour

and heat involved in the movement.

The leading authority for the number three of the

elements is Chând. 6. 2. Here the waters are no longer

the starting-point, but take their place between the

subtler fire and the grosser earth. The tendency to choose

for common subjects mystical terms intelligible only to

the initiate (which in the Brahma­sûtras is carried to an

1 Ait. 3. 3.

192 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

absurd extreme) is exhibited in the description side by

side with water whose name is retained of fire as tejas

(heat), of earth as annam (food). The evolution of these

three elements from one another and ultimately from the

self-existent, i.e. Brahman, is systematically described

and established:—“He proposed:—I will be many, will

propagate myself. Accordingly he created heat (tejas).

This heat proposed:—I will become many, will propagate

myself. Accordingly it created the waters (âpas).

Therefore when a man feels the heat of pain or perspires,

water (i.e. tears, sweat) is produced from the heat. These

waters proposed:—We will become many, will propagate

ourselves. Accordingly they created food (annam).

Therefore when it rains, abundant food is produced, for

from the waters is produced food for man’s eating.”

Then after the account of the entrance of the self-existent

as individual soul (jîva âtman) into the three deities that

he has created, i.e. into the elements, there follows next

the order of development from one another, how the self-

existent “made threefold” the elements that he had

created, and alloyed each of them with constituent parts

of the other three. Thus for example it is shown of fire,

sun, moon and lightning, that the red in them consists

of heat, the white of water, the black of food. According

to this the substances recurring in nature are not pure

elementary substances, but compounds of which, as

Bâdarâyana says,1 vais’eshyât tu tadvâdas tadvâdah;

which admits of a literal rendering, denominatio fit a

potiori. In this theory of the threefold division of the

primitive elements lies the earliest germ of the later

distinction of pure substances (tanmâtra) and gross

elements (sthûlabhûtâni). This distinction is first drawn

in Pras’na 4. 8, where there are distinguished—“The

earth and the earth-substance (prithivî c’a prithivîmâtrâ

1 Sûtra 2. 4. 22.

c'a), the water and the water-substance, heat and the heat-

substance, the wind and the wind-substance, the ether

and the ether-substance." The expressions here used,

prithivîmâtrâ, apomâtrâ, tejomâtrâ, vâyumâtrâ, âkâ-

samâtrâ, were later comprehended under the term tan-

mâtra, " subsisting from this alone," which is found first in

Maitr. 3. 2, and later on in Prâṇâgnihotrop. 4, Mahop. 1.

(A derivation from tanu-mátra, as might perhaps be

maintained, is not to be thought of, after what has been

said.) In the verse Manu 1. 27 (which is disconnected

from the context) the tanmâtras are referred to as anvyo

mâtrâh, and in the Sânkhya philosophy they play an

important part, as will later be shown. Bâdarâyana does

not name them, and S'ankara1

mentions them as technical

terms of the Sânkhya only to reject them, although in his

doctrine of the subtle body a kindred conception finds a

place. The three elements having been increased to five,

each was then conceived as fivefold instead of threefold, in

such a way, according to the Vedântasâra, that half of

each of the fivefold elements was pure, and the other half

was made up of the remaining four elements; so that e.g.

natural water consists of a half water together with an

eighth of earth, fire, air and ether. The theory how-

ever propounded in Vedântasâra 128 in connection with

this triple or fivefold distribution, according to which the

earth can be smelt, tasted, seen, felt and heard, water be

tasted, seen, felt and heard, fire be seen, felt and heard, the

wind felt and heard, and the ether merely heard, must not

be regarded as suggesting it. For this theory implies not

the compounded but the uncompounded elements, which

as they proceed forth from one another preserve the

attributes of the elements from which they have pro-

ceeded (the wind can be heard as well as felt, because it

has proceeded from the audible ether). On the contrary,

1 In his commentary on 2. 2. 10, 14.

194 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

the theory is opposed to the triple or fivefold distribution, since for example the fivefold ether, for the very reason that the four other elements are intermingled in it, can no longer be merely audible, but must be capable also of being felt, seen, tasted and smelt. Beyond however the observation that in all of them there are traces of all,1 we were able to indicate, as suggesting the triple or fivefold distribution, only the fact that the human organism, although it takes up nothing but simple substances as food, yet assimilates from them all three elements, food water and heat, which according to the description attached to the threefold distribution of the elements in Chând. 6. 5 are requisite for its growth.

A great advance on the passage discussed,2 which represents only three elements, viz.—fire water and earth, as proceeding forth from Brahman, is found in the later insertion of ether (or space, âkâs'a) and wind (vâyu), which in earlier times, as we saw, had themselves been regarded as symbolical representations of Brahman, as the two subtlest elements between Brahman and fire. By this means the number of five elements was obtained, and this with few exceptions was assumed by all the later philosophers of India. The earliest passage that represents the five elements as proceeding forth according to the scheme laid down in Chând. 6. 2, the first from Brahman and each in succession from its immediate predecessor, is Taitt. 2. 1 (enumerations like Brih. 4. 4. 5 do not enter into consideration), a passage which has acquired a fundamental meaning in Indian philosophy :— “From this âtman, in truth, has the ether (space) arisen, from the ether the wind, from the wind the fire, from the fire the water, from the water the earth.” This number of five elements corresponds, as we shall see later, to the

1 cp. πᾶν ἐν παντὶ μερίχθαι, Anaxagoras in Ar. Phys. 1. 4. 187 b 1.

2 Chând. 6. 2 f

number of five organs of knowledlge (hearing, touch,

sight, taste, smell) which has suggested if not the primary

enunciation, yet the definite arrangement of the five

elements. Each element has its assigned quality (sound,

resistance, colour, flavour, odour), and besides this, as

already remarked above, the qualities of those elements

out of which each has proceeded. Later passages of the

Upanishads, in which the five elements are partly enumer-

ated, partly referred to, are Ait. 3. 3 (still unarranged);

S'vet. 2. 12, 6. 2 (cp. also Kâṭh. 3. 15); Pras'na 6. 4,

Maitr. 3. 2, 6. 4, Âtma 2, Piṇḍa 2, Prâṇâgnihotra 4.

4. Organic Nature

The essential identity of the universe with Brahman

is thus represented as a creation of the universe by

Brahman with a view to suit man's intellectual capacity,

which is adjusted to relations of cause. According to

the meaning of the Indian word for creation, sṛishti, this

is to be thought of as a discharge, a setting free or

emission, an emergence therefore of the universe from

Brahman; although this is really in contradiction with

the fundamental dogma of the sole reality of Brahman.

The doctrine therefore of the creation of the universe, if

this last were not to be contrasted with Brahman as a

second and foreign, demanded for its completion the idea

that Brahman himself having created the universe entered

into it as soul. “Into it (the universe) that one

(the âtman) has entered up to the finger-tips.”1 “There-

upon that deity (Brahman) entered into these three

deities (the elements) with this living self (jîva âtman,

the individual soul), and separated out thence name and

form.”2 “After he had created it, he entered into it.”3

“Thereupon he cleft asunder here the crown of the head,

and entered through this gate.”4 Brahman creates the

1 Br̥ih. 1. 4. 7. 2 Chând. 6. 3. 3. 3 Taitt. 2. 6. 4 Ait. 1. 3. 12.

196 'THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

organisms as citadels (puras), and then enters into them as citizen (purusha, i.e. as the soul), cp. Bṛih. 2. 5. 18 :—

As citadels he created the bipeds,

As citadels the quadrupeds also ;

Into the citadels he entered as a bird,

Into the citadels as citizen.

All living creatures, and therefore all plants, animals, men and gods, are abodes of this character, into which Brahman has entered as individual soul.

From him the gods in their many forms have sprung,

The blessed ones also ; from him, men, cattle and birds,

Inspiration and exspiration, rice and barley,

as it is expressed in Muṇḍ. 2. 1. 7, echoing Ṛigv. X. 90. 8 and Atharvav. XI. 4. 13. Accordingly all living creatures are Brahman :—“ This (consciousness, i.e. the âtman) is Brahman, this is Indra, this is Prajâpati, this is all the gods ;

it is the five elements, earth, wind, ether, water, lights ;

it is the tiny living creatures, and whatever is similar to them ; it is the seed of one and another kind ; it is that which is born of an egg or the mother's womb, of sweat or from a shoot ; it is horses, cattle, men, elephants,—all that lives, all that walks or flies, all that is motionless.”1 By the “ motionless ” (sthâvaram) the plant world is to be understood. On the entire passage S'ankara remarks :—

“ Thus in the individual bodily forms from Brahman down to a blade of grass (brahmâdi-stambaparyanteshu, an expression frequently employed later) Brahman assumes this or that name and form.” A division of organic beings into three classes, “ born from the egg, born alive, and born from the germ,” is found as early as Chând. 6. 3. 1, to which the foregoing (later) passage adds as a fourth class, “ born from sweat ” (insects and the like). In each of these phenomenal forms the entire Brahman dwells.

1 Ait. 3. 3.

ORGANIC NATURE

197

Brahman is called Sáman, "because he is equivalent (sama) to the ant, the gnat, the elephant, these three world-regions, to this entire universe."1 Chând. 6. 11. 1 furnishes an example of the animation of plants in the case of the tree which exists "penetrated through and through by the living self (jîva âtman, the individual souls), exuberant and joyful." That the migration of soul extends to the plant world also is taught by Kâṭh. 5. 7 :-

The one enters into the maternal womb, Incorporating himself in bodily form, Into a plant another moves, Each according to his works or knowledge.

According to the above the migration of souls extends to the world of the gods :-"As a sculptor takes the material from a statue, and chisels therefrom another newer fairer form, so this soul also, after it has shaken off the body and rid itself of ignorance (temporarily), creates for itself another newer fairer form, whether of the fathers or the Gandharvas or the gods or Prajâpati or Brahman or other beings."2 The coming forth of the creatures from Brahman, after their entrance into him (in deep sleep and in death), like the nectar of the flowers into the honey or the rivers into the ocean, takes place unconsciously :-"Therefore in truth none of all these creatures when they come forth again from the self-existent one know that they come forth again from the self-existent one ; that whether they were tiger here or lion or wolf or boar or worm or bird or gadfly or gnat, whatever they may have been, thereto are they again fashioned."3 Cp. the similar and perhaps borrowed enumeration in Kaush. 1. 2

-"Whether in this world he be worm or fly or fish or bird or lion or boar or stinging insect or tiger or man, whatever he was formerly, in this or that place is he reborn, each according to his works or according to his knowledge."

1 Br̥ih. 1. 3. 22. 2 Br̥ih. 4. 4. 4. 3 Chând. 6. 10. 2.

198 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

A mythical description of the origin of human and animal kinds is given in Bṛih. 1. 4. 3-4. The ātman is originally neither male nor female, but (as in the myth of Aristophanes in Plato Symp. 189 C seq.) an undistinguished union of the two, which is cleft asunder, and in the act of begetting attains to a fresh unity. Thereupon the female flees, and hides herself successively in the different species of animals, the cow, horse, ass, goat, sheep, down to the ant; the ātman however pursues her through all the forms, and thus begets individual creatures of each kind. We might be tempted to read a deeper meaning into this myth. The male principle would be the will which desires to manifest itself, the female the essence of the forms (the Platonic idea) which although derived from the will is yet distinct from it and flees from it, until the creative will gains the mastery, in order in it to give expression to all its own being. In any case the myth asserts that all animal and human forms are essentially similar, and are alike incarnations of the ātman.

In what follows1 is described how the ātman creates above and beyond himself the various classes of gods :— “Because he created the gods to be higher (than he himself is), and because he being mortal created the immortal, therefore is he called the overplus of creation (atisṛishṭi).” This much at least is implied, that the ātman incorporated in man contains in himself the principle of all higher worlds and beings.

5. The Soul of the Universe (Hiraṇyagar-bha, Brahmán)

The soul of the universe is related to the body of the universe as the individual soul to its body. This as denoted by Brahmán (masc.), distinguished from Brahman (neut.) the first principle, or even by Hiraṇyagar-bha which

according to Ṛgv. X. 121. 1 came forth as the first-born of creation from the primeval waters which were created by the first principle. Because it is the first principle itself which appears in its creation as first-born, therefore the latter also is denoted by Brahmân with change of gender and accent, as though it were Brahman personified. In the texts of. the older Upanishads this conception is but little developed. In Brih. 4. 4. 4, as quoted above, Brahmân (unquestionably to be taken as masc.) also appears together with Prajâpati and the other gods as an example of a soul subject to transmigration. In Ait. 3. 3 Brahmân is named at the head of the living beings, in whom the âtman manifests himself.1 In Kaush. 1 again, where this Brahmân conceived as a person receives the souls as they arrive in the other world, his identity with Hiranyagarbha is indicated by the closing words :— “The primeval waters, in truth, are my universe, and they are thine.”2 Otherwise in older texts the personal Brahmân3 is mentioned only as the bearer of the divine revelation4 who communicates it to mankind. So in Chând. 3. 11. 4, 8. 15, Mund. 1. 1. 1–2, and frequently in later Upanishads.

This conception of the first-born of creation as the original source of all wisdom is carried further first in the S'vetâs'vatara Upanishad (which in general inclines towards a personification of the divine), and here it is described as the Brahmân, Hiranyagarbha the “golden germ,” or even in one passage5 with a poetic and metaphorical use of the

1 In this passage also it is natural to read esha brahmá instead of esha brahma, as it is printed by an oversight in Ait. Âr. 2. 6. 1. 5, p. 299. 3 ; cp. also the words of Sâyana, that immediately follow :—anena pul-liṅgena brahmas'abdena ‘Hiraṇyagarbhaḥ samavartata agre’ ity-âdi-s'âstra-prasiddhah prathamah s'arîrî vivakshitah.

2 Kaush. 1. 7.

3 Or occasionally in his place Parameshthin or Prajâpati, e.g. Brih. 2. 6. 3, 4. 6. 3, 6. 5. 4.

4 As Vena before him, cp. Allyemeine Einleitung, p. 252 f.

5 5. 2.

200 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

word as the "red wizard," kapila rishi,1 an expression that has led many into the mistaken belief that here, in a Vedic Upanishad, Kapila the founder of the Sânkhya system was named as the first-born of creation! Had the author of our Upanishad, so strongly opposed to all dualism and atheism, known him (which we do not believe), he would have assuredly characterised him with altogether different epithets. The opinion that Kapila is here named is only possible so long as the passage is isolated and treated without regard to the connection of the Upanishad as a whole, which in four other passages gives expression to the very same thought that occurs here. It celebrates Rudra (Siva), in whom it sees the primeval being, as the original source of all wisdom:—“from him wisdom emanated at the very beginning”;2 “he is called the primal purusha, the great one.”;3 it is he “who created the god Brahmân in the beginning, and who communicates to him the Vedas also”;4 “who formerly begat Hiranyagarbha”;5 “who himself saw Hiranyagarbha arise”;6 and with reference to the last passage it is then said :—“He who in spirit went pregnant with that first-begotten red wizard (kapilam rishim),7 and saw him born.”8 The word tam pointing back, and the expression jâyamânam c'a pas'yet, compared with pas'yata jâyamânam 4. 12, assuredly place the reference to the latter passage, and consequently to Hiranyagarbha, beyond doubt.

Of later Upanishads mention must be made that according to Nârâyana 1 Brahmân originates from Nârâyana, and that according to Atharvas'iras 6 the egg of the universe originates from Rudra, according to Mahâ 3 from Nârâyana, and Brahmân from this in turn. He is also indicated as the source of knowledge in Pinḍa 1,

1 i.e. red like gold. 2 S'vet. 4. 18 ; cp. Brih. 2. 4. 10. 3 agryah purusho mahân, 3. 19 ; cp. mahân âtmâ, Kath. 3. 10, 6. 7. 4 6. 18. 5 3. 4. 6 4. 12. 7 Mentioned in 3. 4 and 4. 12. 8 5. 2.

THE SOUL OF THE UNIVERSE

201

Gâruda 3, and (under the name Hiranyagarbha) Mahâ

4. In contrast with the self-conscious jîva (the individual

soul) Hiranyagarbha is described in Ṇṛiṣiṅhotp. 9 as "self-

conscious of all " (sarvâhammânin).

To the series of primeval beings, primeval waters, and

first-born (Brahmân, Hiranyagarbha) there corresponds

the description of purusha, avyaktam, and mahân âtmâ

given after abandoning the mythological form in Kâṭh. 3.

10–11, 6. 7–8, as the three earliest principles. Here, in con-

trast with the individual âtman, the mahân âtmâ (the great

self, corresponding to the mahân purusha of Sʼvet. 3. 19),

is the soul of the universe, i.e. the "self-conscious of all "

Hiranyagarbha. Buddhi is still subordinated to the mahân

âtmâ in Kâṭh. 3. 10. A combination of the two leads

later on to the cosrnical intellect (mahân, buddhi) of the

Sâṅkhya philosophy. On other lines the νοῦς of the Neo-

platonists that emanates from ἕν, just as the "pure knowing

subject" (the eternal eye of the universe) of the philosophy

of Schopenhauer, corresponds to the cosmical intellect as

sustainer of the universe (Hiranyagarbha, Mahân). For

the metaphysical comprehension of the universe this idea

is indispensable. We know (and the Indians knew also

as early as Bṛih. 2. 4. 5) that the entire objective universe

is possible only in so far as it is sustained by a knowing

subject. This subject as sustainer of the objective universe

is manifested in all individual subjects, but is by no means

identical with them. For the individual subjects pass

away,1 but the objective universe continues to exist without

them ; there exists therefore the eternal knowing subject

also (Hiranyagarbha) by whom it is sustained. Space

and time are derived from this subject. It is itself accord-

ingly not in space and does not belong to time, and there-

fore from an empirical point of view it is in general non-

existent; it has no empirical, only a metaphysical reality.

1 "After death there is no consciousness," Bṛih. 2. 4. 12 ; cp. 3. 2. 12.

202 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

VII. Brahman as Preserver and Ruler

1. Brahman as Preserver of the Universe

Since in reality the âtman alone exists, and the universe, so far as it has a general existence, is essentially only the âtman, it follows that the things of this universe, so far as we may concede to them a reality at all, can only hold it in fee from the âtman. They are related to the latter as the sparks to the fire whence they leap forth, and with which they are essentially identical in nature:—“As the tiny sparks leap forth from the fire, so from this âtman all vital spirits spring forth, all worlds, all gods, all living creatures.”1 This illustration is expanded in greater detail in Muṇḍ. 2. 1. 1:—

As from the well-kindled fire the sparks,

Essentially akin to it, leap forth a thousandfold,

So, my dear sir, from the imperishable

The varied living creatures come forth,

And return into it again.

All the things of the universe are, as this passage asserts, “essentially akin to it,”2 are the âtman himself, and it is he alone who lies outspread before our eyes as the entire universe :—

Fire is his head, sun and moon his eyes,

His ears the regions of the sky,

His voice is the revelation of the Veda,

Wind is his breath, the world his heart, from his feet arises the earth,

He is the inner self in all creatures.3

How the one âtman is expanded into the manifold universe remains a mystery, and can only be explained by illustrations. Thus in Chând. 6. 12 the teacher causes a fruit of the Nyagrodha tree (whose shoots grow downwards

1 Brih. 2. 1. 20 ; cp. Kaush. 4. 20.

2 sarûpa, or svarûpa, “having its form.”

3 Muṇḍ. 2. 1. 4.

and strike new roots in the earth, so that a whole grove springs up from one tree), to be brought and opened, and after the student has found in it only a quite small kernel, and within this nothing at all, the teacher addresses him :

—“ The subtle essence, which you do not observe, my dear sir, from this subtle essence in truth this great Nyagrodha tree has sprung up. Be confident, my dear sir, whatever this subtle essence is, of which this universe is a subsistence (a ‘having this as its essence,’ aitadâtmyam), that is the real, that is the soul, that art thou, O S'vetaketu.”

The expansion of the unity into plurality is elucidated also by the frequently misunderstood comparison of Kâṭh. 6. i :—

With its root on high, its shoots downwards, Stands that eternal fig-tree.

All who here take mula in ûrdhvamûla as plural, and render “ die Wurzeln,” “ the roots,” “ les racines,” etc., have failed to grasp the meaning of the comparison, which consists precisely in showing how from the one Brahman as root the multiplicity of the phenomena of the universe arises. The universe therefore is likened to an as'vattha tree, in the case of which, like our own linden, from the one root the rich variety of its branches and shoots springs.

The difference is that in the as'vattha which represents the universe the one root Brahman is above, and the many shoots of its manifestations are here below on the earth. It is altogether misleading to think here of the Nyagrodha tree (ficus indica), which sends its shoots into the earth where they strike new roots. The as'vattha (ficus religiosa) is entirely distinct from it in growth and foliage. It is interesting to see that the passage of the Kâṭhaka discussed is to all appearance already referred to in S'vet. 3. 9.¹ When it is said in this passage :—“ rooted

¹ As also Mahânâr. 10. 20.

204 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

in heaven like a tree the One stands,"1 the explanation is found in the passage Kâṭh. 6. 1, and only there.

From the universal diffusion of the âtman its omni-presence in the phenomenal forms of the universe results, as is described in Kâṭh. 5. 2, where use is made of the verse Ṛigv. IV. 40. 5 :2—

In the ether he is the swan of the sun, in the air Vasu,

The priest at the altar, the guest on the threshold,

He dwells in man and at a distance, in law, in space,

He as supreme Right springs forth from the waters, from cattle, right, and the hills.

With a reference to the verse Vâj. Saṁh. 32. 4, the divine omnipresence is depicted in Ś'vet. 2. 16–17:—

He is god in all the regions of the universe,

Born of older time and in the body of a mother ;

He was born, and will be born,

Is present in men, and omnipresent.

The god, who is in the fire and in the water,

Who has entered into the entire universe,

Who dwells in vegetables and in trees,

To this god be honour, be honour!

It is a consequence of the omnipresence of the âtman that all creatures share in the bliss which is his essence (sup. p. 140 ff.) :—“ From a small portion only of this bliss other creatures have their life ”;3 “ for who could breathe, who live, if that bliss were not in the âkâs'a; for it is he who creates bliss.” 4 Therefore longing for the âtman is innate in all beings, and equally for him who knows him-self as the âtman :—“ His (Brahman's) name is ‘longing for him’ (tadvanam), as ‘longing for him’ ought he to be worshipped. He who knows himself as such, for him assuredly all beings long.”5

1 cp. also the tree of the universe in Ś'vet. 6. 6.

2 = Mahânâr. 10. 6, cp. the further references there.

3 Bṛih. 4. 3. 32.

4 Tâitt. 2. 7.

5 Kena, 31 ; cp. the saying of Aristotle, κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώµενον.

BRAHMAN AS PRESERVER

205

Every effect in the universe is wrought by the

âtman :-“ It is he who causes the man whom he will lead

on high from these worlds to do good works, and it is he

who causes the man whom he will lead downwards to do

evil works.”1 Even the gods do their work only by virtue

of the power which he confers on them ; no blade of grass

can be consumed by Agni, or swept away by Vâyu, apart

from the will of Brahman.2

The most beautiful picture of the omnipotence of the

imperishable one, i.e. the âtman, is found, partly de-

pendent on the hymn to Prajâpati in Ṛigv. X. 121, in

Yâjñavalkhya’s discourse with Gârgî, Bṛih. 3. 8. 9 :-

“ At the bidding of this imperishable one, O Gârgî,

sun and moon are kept asunder ; at the bidding of this

imperishable one, O Gârgî, heaven and earth are kept

asunder ; at the bidding of this imperishable one, O

Gârgî, the minutes and the hours are kept asunder, the

days and nights, the fortnights, the months, the seasons

and the years ; at the bidding of this imperishable one,

O Gârgî, the streams run from the snow-mountains, some

to the east and others to the west, whithersoever each

goes ; at the bidding of this imperishable one, O Gârgî,

men praise the bountiful givers, the gods desire the sacrificer,

the fathers the offerings to the dead.”

This passage, in which all dispositions in space and

time, as well as every effect in nature and every desire of

men, gods, and manes are ascribed to the âtman, has been

often imitated. The comparison of the âtman in Bṛih.

4. 4. 22 3 to a setu, a word that denotes not only the

(connecting) “ bridge,” but also the (separating) “ dike,”

depends probably upon its first part which speaks of the

power of the âtman to keep asunder :-“ he is the Lord

of the universe, he is the ruler of living beings, he is the

protector of living beings ; he is the bridge which (the

1 Kaush. 3. 8. 2 Kena, 17-23. 3 Quoted in Maitr. 77.

206

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

dike which) keeps asunder these worlds, to prevent their

clashing together." The last words recur in Chând. 8. 4. 1 :

—"The âtman, he is the bridge (the dike) that keeps

asunder these worlds to prevent their clashing together."

When however it is further said :—"This bridge neither

day nor night cross, nor old age, nor death, nor suffering,"

etc., we have, with a sudden change of the point of view,

in place of the dike that separates the relative parts of the

universe, a bridge that connects the present with the future

world. And this circumstance affords probably a reliable

proof of the important conclusion that the similarly sound-

ing words are derived from Bṛih. 4. 4. 22, and their original

meaning being lost were reproduced in Chând. 8. 4. 1. The

conception thus modified of the bridge of immortality is

then further taken over, apparently from Chând. 8. 4. 1,

by Śvet. 6. 19 and Mund. 2. 2. 5. The entire preceding

paragraph in Mund. 2. 1 is in reality an interweaving of the

passage quoted 1 with Rigv. X. 90 and other additions.2

2. Brahman as Ruler of the Universe

When it is said in the words quoted from Bṛih. 4. 4. 22,

and also in Kaush. 3. 8 (probably in imitation of this

passage):—"He is the protector of the universe, he is the

ruler of the universe," two things are implied : (1) that

the âtman as protector of the universe maintains things

in their condition. This point has been already dis-

cussed,—and (2) that he as ruler of the universe guides

the creatures in their action. For this latter statement

the principal chapter to be considered, together with

several that have been already quoted, is Bṛih. 3. 7, which

treats of the âtman as the antaryâmin, i.e. the "inner

guide." Yâjñavalkhya begins his instruction on this

subject in Bṛih. 3. 7. 3 with the words:—"He who

dwelling on the earth is distinct from the earth, whom

1 Bṛih. 3. 8.

2 See Deussen, Upan., p. 550 f.

BRAHMAN AS RULER

207

the earth knows not, whose body the earth is, who rules

the earth from within, he is thy soul, the inner guide,

the immortal." What is here asserted of the earth is

then further affirmed, with continual repetition of the

same formula, of eleven other natural phenomena (water,

fire, atmosphere, wind, sky, sun, heavenly regions, moon

and stars, ether, darkness and light), then of all living

creatures, and finally of the eight organs (breath, speech,

eye, ear, manas, skin, intellect, seed) ; all these natural

phenomena, living creatures, and organs are thus the body

of the âtman, but are distinct (antara) from him, do not

know him, and yet are ruled by him from within. The

passage also is frequently used in the sequel. This is

especially the case in Mândûkya 6, and in its reproduc-

tion in Nrisim̐hap. 4. 1, Nrisim̐hott. 1, Râmott. 3 ; also

Brah­mop. 1 and Bâshkala. A (worthless) definition of

the Antaryâmin is given in Sarvopanishatsâra No. 19 :-

"When the âtman as the cause of the natural constitution

of compounds endowed with the supreme (conscious-

ness) etc., appears in all bodies, like the string threaded

through the store of pearls, he is then called the inner

guide" (antaryâmin). In the Vedântasâra § 43 the

antaryâmin is identified with Îs'vara. A similar place

is held by it in the system of Râmânuja.

To the antaryâmin of Br̥ih. 3. 7 there corresponds

in the "honey-doctrine" of Br̥ih. 2. 5 the "mighty im-

mortal spirit" (tejomaya amṛitamaya purusha), who

dwells in all cosmical and psychical phenomenal forms, and

therefore renders possible their mutual influence. Here

also the valuable fundamental thought is presented in a

form which for us has little attraction, in that the same

stereotyped formula is repeated fourteen times in succes-

sion, a different idea being employed each time :—"This

earth, so the section begins, "is the honey of all living

creatures, is the honey of all living creatures ; but that which

208 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

on the earth that mighty immortal spirit is, and that which .

in relation to the self that corporeal mighty immortal spirit

is, it is even that which is the soul (âtman) here. This is

the immortal, this is Brahman, this the universe." The same

which is here affirmed of earth and body is then further

affirmed, with invariable repetition of the same formula, of

water and seed, fire and speech, wind and breath, sun and

eye, etc. The eye is nourished (exists) by the sun, and the

sun by the eye (it would not be there if no eye beheld it),

and this mutual dependence is only possible because in both

the same mighty immortal spirit, i.e. the âtman, dwells.1

By the side of these leading passages it will be

sufficient merely to make brief mention of the twelve or

sixteen purushas put forward as Brahman by Bâlâki

Gârgya in Bṛih. 2. 1, Kaush. 4, with which Ajâtas'atru

contrasts the âtman as he "who is the creator of all

those spirits, whose work this universe is."2 Just as the

eight purushas regarded as the âtman by Vidagdha

S'âkalya in Bṛih. 3. 9. 10–18, 26 (corporeality, desire, the

sun, hearing, the shadow, the mirror, water, the son), with

which Yâjñavalkhya contrasts the "spirit of the Upani-

shad doctrine" (aupanishada purusha), "who impelling

asunder these spirits, and driving them back, steps over

and beyond them," i.e. who spurs them on to their work,

recalls them from it, and is pre-eminent over them.3

3. Freedom and Constraint of the Will

In connection with the doctrine of Brahman as ruler

of the universe, we propose briefly to consider the question

of the freedom and constraint of the human will. Since

the entire universe, so far as in general it has any exist-

1 In the introduction to our translation of this paragraph (Upan., p. 420)

we have already called attention to the similar teaching of Kant of the

"affinity of phenomenal forms," which is possible only through the

"synthetic unity of apperception," i.e. through the knowing subject.

2 Kaush. 4. 19.

3 Bṛih. 3. 9. 26.

ence, is only the self-manifestation of the âtman, there can be as little question in the Upanishads as with Spinoza of a freedom of the will within the range of nature. Such a freedom would assume a different character of the âtman. The standpoint of the Upanishads therefore is a rigid determinism :1—“ Man is altogether fashioned out of desire (kâma) ; according to his desire is his discernment (kratu) ; according to his discernment he does his work (karma).”2 “At the bidding of this imperishable one, O Gârgî, men praise the bountiful givers, the gods desire the sacrificer, the fathers the offerings to the dead.”3 They all, men, gods and fathers, cannot act otherwise than is in harmony with their nature. “ For just as men here below pursue the aim after which each aspires, as though it were done at command, whether it be a kingdom or an estate, and live only for that (so in their aspiration for heavenly reward they are the slaves of their desires).”4

The words that immediately follow stand in sharp contrast to this statement. Just as Kant, after having in the most decisive manner affirmed the empirical constraint of the will by the eclipse of the sun which may be calculated beforehand, forthwith asserts in the very same line “that man is free,”5 so it is said further on in the passage quoted :—“Therefore he who departs from this world without having known the soul or those true desires, his part in all worlds is a life of constraint ; but he who departs from this world after having known the soul and those true desires, his part in all worlds is a life of freedom.”6 The meaning of this contrast is evident ; as sharers in the continuity of nature we are, like it, subject to necessity ; but we are free from it as

1 Brih. 4. 4. 5.

2 Compare the similar remark in S'atap. Br. X. 6. 3, and Chând. 3. 14. 1.

3 Brih. 3. 8. 9.

4 Chând. 8. 1. 5.

5 Krit. d. prakt. Vernunft, p. 120, Kehrb.

6 Chând. 8. 1. 6 ; cp. the similar statements in Chând. 7. 25. 2, 8. 5. 4.

210 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

soon as, by virtue of the knowledge of our identity with

the âtman, we are set free from this continuity of nature.

That the âtman is exempt from the constraint of causality

we have already seen (p. 154 ff.). Each of us is this eternally

free âtman. We do not first become the âtman, but we

are it already, though unconscious of the fact. Accord-

ingly we are already free in reality, in spite of the absolute

necessity of our acts, but we do not know it. “Just as

he who does not know the hiding-place of a treasure

of gold does not find it, although he may pass over it

again and again, so none of these creatures find the world

of Brahman, although they daily enter into it (in deep

sleep); for they are constrained by unreality.”1 “Those

therefore who find this world of Brahman by Brahma-

câryam (a life spent as a Brahman student in study and

self-mortification), of such is this world of Brahman, and

such have part in all worlds in a life of freedom.”2 The

constraint of the will, absolute as it is, yet belongs entirely

to the great illusion of the empirical reality, and vanishes

with it. The phenomenal form is under constraint, but

that which makes its appearance in it, the âtman, is free.

The real consistency of the two points of view is expressed

in the words :—“It is he who causes the man whom he

will lead on high out of these worlds to do good works,

and it is he who causes the man whom he will lead down-

wards to do evil works.”3 How this thought assumes the

form of a doctrine of predestination, in proportion as the

âtman is conceived as a personal god, has been already

shown (p.172ff.). But the entire doctrine of predestination,

like the theism on which it depends, is in the Upani-

shads only an attempt to express in empirical forms

what is essentially foreign to them. The eternally free

âtman, who determines our doing and abstaining, is not

another, contrasted with us, but our own self. Therefore

1 Chând. 8. 3. 2. 2 Chând. 8. 4. 3. 3 Kaush. 3. 8.

BRAHMAN AS PROVIDENCE

211

it is said of the ātman :—“ He fetters himself by himself

(nibadhnāti ātmanā ātmānam), like a bird by its nest.”1

And in Pras‘na 3. 3 the answer to the question, how the

ātman enters into this body is given :—“ he enters into

this body manokṛitena,” which if we follow S’aṅkara would

here mean “ by the action of his will,” although grammar

requires a different conception (as mano-kṛitena, “ un-consciously),” an objection which (in spite of Rigv. I. 187. 7)

it is difficult to pass by with a sandhiḥ ārshaḥ (as Anan-dajñāna says).

4. Brahman as Providence

While the control of the universe may be ascribed to

an impersonal principle (acting as antaryāmin, “ inner

guide ”), Providence implies a personal God. In

harmony with this in the ancient Upanishads we see

a belief in Providence, like theism, make its appearance

only here and there as a poetical form of representation.

It is only in the later Upanishads that with the personi-fication of the ātman belief in a divine providence also

acquires a firmer consistency. The conception of Ait. 1. 2

is mythical throughout, describing how the deities, (i.e.

the organs of sense and the corresponding nature gods),

produced by the ātman from the purusha, plunge into the

ocean, suffer hunger and thirst, and then receive from the

ātman mankind allotted to them as a domicile, in which

they may enjoy food, which they are then however

compelled to share with the demoniac powers of hunger

and thirst. The “ well-being ” also (i.e. probably “ adapt-ability ”) which in Taitt. 2. 7 is declared to be the

essence of the universe, and (by means of a play on the

words sukṛita and svakṛita) is deduced from the fact that

the universe is only a self-manifestation of the Brahman

who is essentially bliss, can only be regarded as the first

1 Maitr. 3. 2.

212

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

germ of a belief in a providence that guides to ends.

Such a providence appears more clearly as early as Kâṭh.

5. 13 :-

He who as the eternal creates the temporal,

Himself pure bliss, as spirit creates the spirits, as one the many,

He who, the wise, sees them dwell in himself,

He alone and no other has eternal peace.

The concession which the first half of this verse makes to

theism is retracted in the second half, and it is character-

the second half is altered in a theistic sense :-

He who by examination (sânkhyam) and devotion (yoga)

Knows this primeval one as god, is freed from all fetters.1

A significant advance in the direction of theism and

belief in providence is found in the thought which is

repeated from Kâṭh. 5. 13 in Îs'â 8, where it is said

(word for word) :-“ The wise, thoughtful, all-comprehend-

ing, self-existent one has assigned ends yâthâtathyato

for all time.” The word yâthâtathyato, interpolated later

as the metre shows, gives evidence of a further advance

upon the original verse; “in proportion to the quality,”

i.e. according to (yathâ) the works of the individual soul,

so (tathâ) has the wise thoughtful one (kavir manîshî)

determined beforehand the ends (the fruit of actions, the

doing and suffering of each soul). This is already, unless

we have read too much into the verse, the part which

îs'vara plays in the later Vedânta. The works of the

soul are the seed-corn, which in close correspondence with

its quality is made to grow by god as the rain ; just as by

the seed the plant, so by the works of the earlier existence

the future life is determined both as regards its doing and

its suffering. A clear distinction between these two is not

1 According to some, the author here, as a foundation for his theism

appeals to the atheistic Sânkhya system !

BRAHMAN AS PROVIDENCE

213

to be found even in the later Vedânta. In general this later

Vedânta standpoint is anticipated by the S'vetâs'vatara

Upanishad, which in harmony with its theistic colouring

depicts the âtman as " the overseer of actions,"1 " the only

free one, who multiplies the one seed of many who are by

nature free from actions,"2 who apportions to each his

qualities,3 who executes justice, restrains the evil, allots

good fortune,4 " who, himself colourless, but endowed

abundantly with powers, assigns the numerous colours

to appointed ends,"5 who brings to maturity the actions

of the soul :-

When every birth comes to maturity with his being,

Whatever is to ripen, he makes it all to grow;

He as one, guides here all and each,

Apportioning to each his peculiar gifts.6

It is moreover characteristic of this Upanishad (which

we compared above to a codex palimpsestus), that the

ancient Upanishad thought ever and anon makes itself

apparent through this elaborate theistic doctrine of re-

compense ; by virtue of which it is God Himself who

fetters Himself as soul to continually new forms cor-

responding to the actions that have been committed :-

As soul he chooses many forms both gross

And subtle, corresponding to his virtue;

And that which bound him by the power of his work and of himself

To this, binds him also to another.7

We see therefore the thinkers of the Upanishads, after

they have wandered in obedience to the empirical determi-

nation of their intellect, into realistic modes of repre-

sentation, constantly returning to the original idealism.

1 S'vet. 6. 11.

2 S'vet. 6. 12 ; in reality the soul is actionless like the âtman, which it is.

3 S'vet. 6. 4.

4 S'vet. 6. 6.

5 S'vet. 4. 1.

6

7 S'vet. 5. 12.

214

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

5. Cosmograpy of the Upanishads

The views that are found in the Upanishads with regard to the universe and its parts are scanty in detail, and possess little consistency.

As concerns, to begin with, the geographical horizon, it is seen to be essentially limited by the ranges of the Himâlaya and Vindhya on the north and south,1 and by the river basins and mouths of the Indus and Ganges on the west and east.

Day is born in the ocean towards the east, night in the ocean towards the west.2 “These streams, my dear sir, flow in the east towards the morning, and in the west towards the evening ; from ocean to ocean they flow (uniting together), they become open sea.”3 What lies beyond these limits appears to be unknown.

Only in a quite late Upanishad that is founded upon the Râmâyana is mention made of Lañkâ in (sic) Ceylon4 and similar names.

But even the country of the Indus appears as almost unknown.

Noble steeds are brought thence,5 perhaps salt also ;6 the people of Gandhâra (west of the Indus, and south of Peshawar) appear in Chând.

6. 14 as distant ; the Brahman students penetrate in their wanderings as far as the Madras (on the Hyphasis).7

Just as Yâjñavalkhya appears as the greatest personality in the Upanishads, so Janaka appears as the centre of the intellectual life of the court that surrounds him ; he is king of Videha (north-east of Patna),

where in Bṛih.

3. 1. 1 the Brâhmans also of the Kurus and Pañcâlas (who dwell farther west, between the Ganges and the Jumua) gather together to the great

1 Kaush.

2 Bṛih.

3 Chând.

6. 10. 1 ; whether we are to think here with S'ankara in loc. of a return of the water of the sea into the rivers by means of clouds and rain is in view of the wording of the text very questionable ; cp. Chând.

4 Râmapûrvat.

5 Bṛih.

6 Bṛih.

2. 4. 12, 4. 5. 13 ; cp. Maitr.

7 Bṛih.

3. 3. 1, 3. 7. 1.

COSMOGRAPHY

215

argumentative contest described in Bṛih. 3. 1-9. Together with these, reference is made to the courts of Ajâtas'atru, king of Kâs'i (around Benares),1 and of Jîvala, king of the Pañc'âlas.2 The Kekayas, on the upper course of the Hydraotes, as repositories of the knowledge stored up in the Upanishads, seem to belong to the far north-west; whose king As'vapati imparts instruction on the Vais'vânara to the six Brâhmans who approach him.3 Apart from these, in the enumeration in Kaush. 4. 1 of the peoples who have sought the renowned Vedic scholar Gârgya Bâlâki, are named probably all the tribes who took an active part in the intellectual life of the period. They are these :— the Us'inaras, Satvans, and Matsyas, west of the Jumna; the Kurus and Pañc'âlas between the Jumna and Ganges; the Kâs'îs east of the latter, and still farther east the Videhas. No common name for the Aryan races or their country is found in the ancient Upanishads. In Nâdabindu 12 for the first time Bhâratam varsham occurs as a name of Âryan India. The “five races of five”4 appear to denote merely the indefinite multitude5 of all the races of mankind.

The earth is surrounded by water.6 According to a late text, it has oceans, mountains, and seven islands or continents.7 The conception of heaven and earth as the two halves of the egg of the universe recurs.8 A similar view appears to lie at the basis of the cosmography described in Bṛih. 3. 3. Here the same concentric arrangement holds in the universe as in the different layers in an egg, viz.—(1) in the middle the (inhabited)

1 Bṛih. 2. 1, Kaush. 4.

2 Chând. 5. 3-10, Bṛih. 6. 2 ; for whom in Kaush. 1 C'itra Gângyâyana is introduced.

3 S'atap. Br. 10. 6. 1, Chând. 5. 11-24.

4 pañca pañcajanâh, Bṛih. 4. 4. 17 ; cp. the remark there.

5 cp. pañcanadam, Allgemeine Einleitung, p. 73.

6 Chând. 3. 11. 6.

7 Nṛisiṁhap. 1. 2, 5. 2.

8 Chând. 3. 19.

216 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

world, (2) around this the earth, (3) around this again the

sea. The world is in breadth 32 days' journey of the

chariot of the sun; the earth 64, the sea 128; according

to which measurement the diameter of the egg of the

universe would amount to 416 courses of the sun.

"There," i.e. where heaven and earth as the two layers of

the egg of the universe meet one another, "is a space as

broad as the edge of a razor or the wing of a fly " (between

the two layers), through which access is obtained to the

place where the offerers of the horse-sacrifice are, i.e.

probably to the "back of heaven" (nâkasyâ prishṭham)

mentioned in other passages as being "free from suffer-

ing,"1 where according to Taitt. Âr. 10. 1. 52 union with

Brahman is obtained,2 but according to Vâj. Saṁh. 15. 50

recompense for good works, and the latter according to

Muṇḍ. 1. 2. 10 3 is transitory. A second scheme of

cosmography, though put forward by Yâjñavalkhya in

Bṛih. 3. 6 in the same context, is irreconcilable with that

mentioned in Bṛih. 3. 3. According to this theory the

universe inwoven with the water is besides "inwoven and

interwoven" with ten other layers, i.e. is overlaid by them,

or, perhaps more correctly, is altogether surrounded by

them. These ten layers (the worlds of the wind, the

atmosphere, the Gandharvas, the sun, moon, stars, the

gods, Indra, Prajâpati and Brahman) recall the degrees of

bliss of Bṛih. 4. 3. 33 and Taitt. 2. 8, as well as the

stations of the way of the gods.4 The difference is that in

these, as we shall see later, measurements of time and space

are co-ordinated together, exactly as in Chând. 2. 10. 5

similar terms are added together without consideration.5

The prevailing view in the Upanishads is the

1 nâkam=na akam, Chând. 2. 10. 5.

2 brahma salokatâ ; cp. also Mahânâr. 1. 1, 10. 21, 63. 5.

3 cp. Kâth. 3. 1.

4 Chând. 4. 15. 5, 5. 10. 1–2, Bṛih. 6. 2. 15, and especially Kaush. 1. 3.

5 cp. also Bṛih. 1. 1.

COSMOGRAPHY

217

traditional one, according to which there are three world-

regions, earth, air and heaven, to which Agni, Vâyu and

Âditya correspond as rulers.1 The fragment of a verse

also which is inserted in Chând. 8. 5. 3 is to be interpreted

in this sense (that this is so is shown by Atharav. 5. 4. 3

also) :—tritîyasyâm ito divi. The reference is not here,

as often elsewhere, to three heavens, but the words mean,

—“In the heaven, which is (reckoned) the third from

here.” According to Ait. 1. 1. 2 the primeval waters

extend above and below the three regions (earth, air and

heaven). Br̥h. 3. 8. 4 teaches that all three are inwoven

in the âkâs'a, as the latter in Brahman. Very often earth,

air and heaven are denoted by the three mystic syllables

of the sacrifice (vyâhritis) bhûr, bhuvah, svar. In Taitt.

1. 5 a fourth mahas is added to them, denoting probably

Brahman. Later, three higher worlds, janas, tapas, and

satyam, were imposed above these four, and so the number

seven was obtained, the first mention of which as far as

our knowledge goes is in Mund. 1. 2. 3, and the first

enumeration of them in Taitt. Âr. 10. 27–28. Later lists

are given in Nâdabindu 3–4, Nrisim̥hap. 5. 6. In course

of time a distinction was drawn between bhûr, bhuvah,

svar, mahas, jana(s), tapas, and satyam as the seven

upper worlds, and atala, pâtâla, vitala, sutala, rasâtala,

mahâtala, talâtala2 as the seven lower. Even this number

was exceeded, and in Atharvas'iras 6 nine heavens, nine

atmospheres, and nine earths are reckoned.

The number also of the heavenly regions is differently

given. In Chând. 4. 5. 2 four are enumerated (east, west,

south and north ; five in Br̥h. 3. 9. 20–24; six in Br̥h.

4. 2. 4, Chând. 7. 25; eight (four poles, and four intermediate

between the poles) in Maitr. 6. 2, Râmâp. 71–72, 87, 89.

1 Chând. 1. 3. 7, 2. 21. 1. 3. 15. 5, Br̥h. 1. 2. 3. 1. 5. 4. 3. 9. 8. Pras'na

5. 7, etc.

2 Ârun̥eya Up. 1 ; cp. Vedântasâra § 129.

218 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

Astronomical conceptions are only slightly developed in the Upanishads. Sun and moon enter principally into consideration, in so far as they form stations for the soul on its journey to the other world, a subject that will later demand treatment. If the texts of Chând. 4. 15. 5, 5. 10. 2 are to be followed, the sun is nearer to us than the moon. The red white and black aspects of the sun depend, according to Chând. 3. 1 f., on the juices of the different Vedas dissolved in it. According to Chând. 6. 4. 2–3, sun and moon also, like everything else in the universe, consist of the three elements; the red in them of fire, the white of water, the black of earth. The sun moves in winter and summer alternately for six months to the south and six to the north.1 It is disc-shaped (mandalam).2 The purusha of the sun dwells therein, who is usually hidden by the rays,3 but by these same rays is brought into connection with the purusha in the eye,4 or with the veins of the heart.5 The moon is (as in Rigv. X. 85. 5) the soma cup of the gods, which is alternately drained by them and again filled;6 on the other hand, the waxing and waning of the moon depend on the arrival of the dead therein and their return.7 The two conceptions are combined in Brih. 6. 2. 16. According to Brih. 1. 5. 14, the moon is Prajâpati as prâna, whose fifteen parts alternately disappear and are again restored. At an eclipse the moon is held in the jaws of Râhu.8 All night long the moon holds on her course among the other constellations (nakshatram), on which she depends like the Sâman on the Ric'.9 The same 27 constellations are traversed, according to Maitr. 6. 14, by the sun on his yearly journey, and therefore on each of the twelve

1 Chând. 4. 15. 5, 5. 10. 1–3, Brih. 6. 2. 15–16.

2 Brih. 2. 3. 3, 5. 5. 2–3, Mahânâr. 13.

3 Brih. 5. 5. 2, 5. 15, Îs'â 16. 4 Brih. 5. 5. 2. 5 Chând. 8. 6. 2.

6 Chând. 5. 10. 4.

7 Kaush. 1. 2, 2. 8 ; differently in 2 9.

8 Chând. 8. 13. 1.

9 Chând. 1. 6. 4.

months ⅞ alsha tras, i.e. nine quarters (navâms'akam) of them are covered. The planets (grahâh) are first mentioned in Maitr. 6. 16. In a very late text1 their number is given as nine, and therefore together with sun and moon Râhu and Ketu also (the head and tail of the dragon) are reckoned with them. S'ukra, Venus,2 and Sâni, Saturn are especially mentioned with Râhu and Ketu.3 Of movements affecting the cosmos there are mentioned in Maitr. 1. 4 :—“the drying up of great seas, shattering of mountains, oscillations of the pole-star (dhruva), straining of the ropes of the wind (which bind the constellations to the pole-star), sinkings of the earth, and overthrow of the gods from their place.”

As curiosities of natural science we will cite further that the rain has its origin from the sun,4 while heat occasions storm and rain,5 just as indeed in men warmth draws forth sweat and heat tears of pain ;6 also that according to Maitr. 6. 27 “a piece of iron buried in the earth enters forthwith into the substance of the earth.” The anatomical and physiological views of the Upanishads will later on be discussed.7

VIII. Brahman as Destroyer of the Universe

1. The Kalpa Theory of the later Vedânta

Before we trace in the Upanishads the development of the doctrine of Brahman as destroyer of the universe, it is worth while to glance at the theory of the later Vedânta, which is the result of this development. According to the Vedânta system, the actions of each life-history find their precisely equivalent recompense in the

1 Râmottarat. 5. 2 Maitr. 7. 3. 3 Maitr. 7. 6.

4 Mahânâr. 63. 16, Maitr. 6. 37 ; cp. Manu 3. 76. 5 Chând. 7. 11. 1.

6 Chând. 6. 2. 3.

7 Chap. XII. 6.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

next succeeding life. Each life both in doing and in suffering is only the fruit of the actions of a preceding birth. Hence it follows that each existence always pre-supposes an earlier, that consequently no existence can be the first, and that the migration (samsâra) of souls is maintained from all eternity. The absence of a beginning of the samsâra (samsârasya anâditvam) is therefore a necessary consequence of the Vedânta teaching ; and this is not only assumed by Gaudapâda1 and defended by S’ankara, but occurs also already in the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa,2 and is actually found in some of the later Upanishads.3 This absence of a beginning to the circuit of the souls' migration is in contradiction to the numerous creation theories of the Upanishads, which collectively teach a creation of the universe at one time, as is at once proved by the constantly recurring expression, “At the beginning.”4 In order to assert the absence of a beginning of the samsâra as demanded by their system, and yet to uphold the Upanishad doctrine of a creation, the theologians of the Vedânta conceive the creation of the universe as an event recurring periodically from all eternity. The universe created by Brahman persists through an entire world-period (kalpa), after which it returns into Brahman, only to issue again from him ; since at each dissolution of the universe there are the works of the soul that still survive, and these demand for their expiation a renewed existence and therefore a re-creation of the universe :-

All living beings, O Kaunteya,

Return back into my nature

At the end of the world ; at the world's beginning

I re-create them anew.5

1 Mâṇḍûkya-kârikâ 4. 30.

2 2. 1. 35.

3 e.g. Sarvop. 23 ; cp. the drastic description of Yogatattva 3–5.

4 agre, Ait. 1. 1. 1, Chând. 3. 19. 1, 6. 2. 1, Brih. 1. 2. 1, 1. 4. 1, 10, 17, 5. 5. 1, Taitt. 2. 7. 1, Maitr. 2. 6, 5. 2.

5 Bhag. Gîtâ 9. 7, cp. 8. 17–19.

BRAHMAN AS DESTROYER

221

For proof S'ankara relies, as perhaps Bâdarâyana before him,1 on the verse in Rigv. X. 190. 3 :—

Sûryâ-candramasau dhâtâ yathâpûrvam akalpayat,

in which according to the context yathâpûrvam signifies only “one after the other,” not as S'ankara maintains,2 “as before.” The other passage also, on which his theory rests :

—“I will enter into these three divinities with this living self,”3 does not prove, as he believes, that the “living self” existed already before the creation. This entire conception of a periodically recurring creation and destruction of the universe is still entirely foreign to the older Upanishads. In order to trace its origin we shall have to distinguish, (1) the return of individuals into Brahman, (2) that of the universe.

2. Return of Individuals into Brahman

The first starting-point of the conception of Brahman as destroyer of the universe is formed probably by the fact of death, which presents itself as the result of experience, and engages attention at all times, and therefore also as early as that ancient period. After men had become accustomed to see in Brahman the power which as prâna brings forth and sustains life, it was an easy step to restore it to the same power “when it wearies of bearing the burden,” and to see in Brahman as prâna “the cause of death and of life.”4 Therefore as early as S'atap. Brâh. 11. 3. 3. 1 we find it said :—“Brahman handed over the creatures to death”; and in S'atap. Brâh. 13.7. 1. 1 again :—“He sacrificed himself in all beings, and all beings in himself.” This thought is further expanded by the Upanishads. In Brih. 1. 2. 1 “death and hunger” (mrityur, as'anâyâ) figure as creators of the universe :—“all that he created he resolved to devour;

1 2. 1. 36.

3 Chând. 6. 3. 2.

2 p. 495. 7.

4 Taitt. Âr. 3. 14. 1-2, Atharvav. 11. 4. 11.

222 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

because he devours (ad) everything, therefore is he the

Aditi (the infinite)." And in Br̥h. 1. 5. 3 Prajâpati

creates the all-embracing principles, manas, speech and

prâṇa, as food for himself. In the words of Kâṭh. 2. 25 :-

He consumes both the Brâhman and the warrior,

As though they were bread soaked in the sauce of death,

a poetical echo of passages of this kind seems to be before

us. In Chând. 1. 9. 1 it is said of the âkâs'a (ether,

space, as the symbol of Brahman):-"It is the âkâs'a

whence all these creatures proceed, and into which they

again descend." And in Taitt. 3. 1 a distinctive mark

of Brahman is given :-"That in truth out of which

these beings arise, by which they when they have arisen

live, into which they at death again enter, that seek to

know, that is Brahman." In all these passages the

reference is solely to the descent of individual beings

into Brahman, not to that of the universe. So also in

Muṇd. 1. 1. 7, where Brahman is compared to the

spider, which sends forth the threads and draws them

in again ; and in Muṇd. 2. 1. 1, where living beings in

their numerous kinds issue forth from the imperishable

and enter into him again. In the same sense it is said

of the âtman in Mâṇḍ. 1. 6:-"He is the cradle of the

universe, for he is the creation and the end of living

beings"; and in Nârây. 1 of Nârâyana :-"All gods, all

ṛishis, all metres, and all creatures originate solely from

"Nârâyana, and are lost in Nârâyana." We may compare

also the beautiful verses of C'ûlikâ 17-18 :-

In him in whom this universe is interwoven,

Whatever moves or is motionless,

In Brahman everything is lost,

Like bubbles in the ocean.

In him in whom the living creatures of the universe

Emptying themselves become invisible,

They disappear and come to light again

As bubbles rise to the surface.

RETURN OF INDIVIDUALS INTO BRAHMAN 223

To these passages also the doctrine of the disappearance of the universe in Brahman appears to be still unfamiliar. And therefore we must hesitate to find it with S'ankara in the mystical name Tajjalán,1 discussed above;2 since this idea is still foreign to all the rest of the Upanishads, and the conception of Brahman as the cause of the rise, continuance and disappearance of individual beings is sufficient to explain the term. Still less can we refer the words of Vâj. Samh. 32. 8,

tasmin idam saṁ- cā vi- cā eti sarvam,

to a dissolution and re-creation of the universe. Judging from the entire context, they signify only that the vein is " the centre and circumference of the universe."3 The case stands otherwise with the repetition of these words in S'vet. 4. 11.4 Here from their relation to the other passages of the S'vet. Up. they gain a new significance, which we now proceed to discuss.

3. Return of the Universe as a Whole into Brahman

Among the new and fruitful thoughts in which the S'vet. Up. is so rich is to be counted that also of the periodical dissolution and re-creation of the universe by Brahman. " He (Rudra as a personification of Brahman) dwells in the creatures, and burning with fury at the end of time he as lord dashes to pieces all created things";5 he regulates all the aims of the creatures, "until finally the whole is lost in him, who is the beginning."6 And we must understand similarly the words of Vâj. Samh. 32. 8 quoted above, when they recur in this connection;7 it is god, "in whom the universe

1 Chând. 3. 14. 1. 2 p. 180 f.

3 cp. the translation, Allgemeine Einleitung u. Philosophie des Veda, p. 294.

4 And in Mahânâr. 1. 2, which is dependent upon it.

5 S'vet. 3. 2.

6 S'vet. 4. 1.

7 S'vet. 4. 11.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

is lost and reappears" (yasmin idam sam̀-c'a vi- c'a eti sarvam). This process however of the creation and dis-

solution of the universe is not unique, but is continually being repeated. In S'vet. 5. 3 "the god, who many times

spreads forth one net after another in space and again draws it in," is compared to a spider.1 The reason also

for this periodically recurring re-creation of things is indicated in S'vet. 6. 3-4, where it is said, following upon

a description of the work of creation :-

That which he created he then takes back again,

Becoming one with the being of being ;

In order then . . .

To begin afresh the work rich in the guṇas,

Apportioning to each their attributes.

That it is only the soul's actions which prompt the creator to "apportion to each all their attributes (sarvân bhâvân viniyojayet) is asserted by the immediately succeeding

words :-

Where they are not there action comes to nought,

Thither he departs actionless, in reality another ;

i.e. where the bhâvas which constitute the empirical nature are destroyed by knowledge, actions come to nought, and a re-creation no longer takes place.

The following passages from later Upanishads that treat of Brahman as destroyer of the universe are noteworthy :-

"It is he who, when the universe is dissolved, alone remains on the watch ; and it is he who then (again) from

the depths of space wakens to life the pure spirits." 2

"When Rudra lies in the coils of the snake, then created things are absorbed into him. When he draws breath,

the darkness arises, from the darkness water," etc. ; 3 cp.

1 As in Muṇḍ. 1. 1. 7 ; cp. S'vet. 3. 1, 6. 10.

2 Maitr. 6. 17.

3 Atharvac'iras 6.

DISSOLUTION OF THE UNIVERSE

225

the preceding passage :-“ He who consuming all the forces

of life, while consuming them, as the eternal one gathers

together and again evolves them,” etc.1 This passage may

however also be understood of sleeping and waking.

The fire that destroys the universe (saṃvartako 'gnih)

is mentioned in Atharvaśikhâ 1, and in the two reproduc-

tions of this passage, Nṛiśiṃhap. 2. 1 and Nṛiśiṃhott. 3.

We close with the beautiful verse Kaivalya 19, where he

who knows himself as the âtman speaks :-

In me the universe had its origin,

In me alone the whole subsists,

In me it is lost,—this Brahman,

The timeless, it is I myself !

4. On the Origin of the Doctrine of the Dissolution of

the Universe in Brahman

Brahman is the womb whence all living beings proceed,

and it was very natural to assume that they return at

death into Brahman whence they have come forth ; for as

Anaximander already says :-“ that from which existing

things originate, into it they necessarily also disappear.”

Accordingly we see formulated, as was shown above, in

the texts of the oldest Upanishads and even earlier, the

doctrine of Brahman as destroyer of individual creatures.

Thence has been developed first in later times, from the

S'vetâs'vatara Upanishad and onward, the doctrine of

the periodical destruction of the universe by Brahman,

precisely as the teaching of Heracleitus that all things

come forth from fire (ὅδὸς κάτω), and return into it (ὅδὸς

ἄνω), signified originally a twofold process linked

together everywhere in the universe in the rise and

disappearance of individual creatures, which was then

however generalised, whether by Heracleitus himself or by

his successors the Stoics, into a periodically recurring dis-

1 Atharvâiras 4.

15

226 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

solution of the universe in fire (ἐκπύρωσις) and reconstruction out of it (διακόσμησις). Of the causes which in Greek philosophy may have led to this generalisation we learn nothing more precisely. In India to a great extent it gave support to the doctrine of recompense, inasmuch as the latter, as already shown, was only capable of being reconciled with the doctrine of a creation, if for the single creation taught in the ancient Upanishads there was substituted an eternally recurring process, a re-creation of the universe occurring after each dissolution, and determined by the actions of the souls. On its very first appearance the doctrine of the dissolution of the universe is connected with that of recompense, as is shown by the passages quoted above,1 and especially S'vet. 6. 4 (" where they are not, there work comes to naught"). Whether however the original motive for the doctrine of the dissolution and periodical reconstruction of the universe lay in the wish to maintain, after the manner of the later Vedânta, the traditional doctrine of creation side by side with the later doctrine of recompense ; or only in the natural attempt to generalise the dissolution of objects, which experience showed to be the case, into a universal dissolution, just as the entire doctrine of a creation of the universe originally rested on a generalisation of the observed origin of individuals,—to decide this is perhaps not possible in presence of the partial and ambiguous expressions of the S'vet. Upanishad.

IX. THE UNREALITY OF THE UNIVERSE

1. The Doctrine of Mâyâ as the Basis of all Philosophy

When Kant in his inquiry into the capability of the human intellect drew the conclusion that the entire

DOCTRINE OF MÂYÂ

227

universe, as we know it, is only appearance and not reality, he said nothing absolutely new, but only in more intelligible demonstrated form uttered a truth which in less intelligible shape had been in existence long before him ; which indeed as intuitive half-unconscious knowledge had from the very beginning formed the basis of all philosophy. For if the objects of the universe were not, as Kant asserted, mere phenomena, but exactly as they appear to our consciousness in space and time had a real existence apart from that consciousness and in themselves, then an empirical discussion and inquiry into nature would lead to final and sufficient conclusions respecting the essence of things. In opposition to this empirical method of treatment philosophy from the very beginning has endeavoured to find the essential nature, or as it is usually expressed, the first principle of the universe. This search moreover always assumes the consciousness, even if still quite undefined, that this first principle, this essence of things, is not given already in the objects themselves, as they present themselves to our eyes in space and time ; that, in other words, the entire aggregate of experience, external and internal, always shows us merely how things appear to us, not how they are in themselves. And the more definitely conscious the several schools of philosophy are of their proper function as opposed to the empirical science, the more clearly does this knowledge come to the front. This is the case in Greek philosophy, when Parmenides asserts the empirical reality to be mere show, or Plato to be mere shadows 1 of the true reality ; and in Indian philosophy, when the Upanishads teach that this universe is not the âtman, the proper “self” of things, but a mere mâyâ, a deception, an illusion, and that the empirical knowledge of it yields no vidyâ,

no true knowledge, but remains entangled in avidyâ in

1 Rep. vii. i.

228 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

ignorance. Since the expression mâyâ in this sense can be pointed out only comparatively late, not earlier, that is to say, than S'vet. 4. 10, the theory has been propounded that we ought to recognise in this doctrine a secondary speculation only developed in course of time from the theory of the universe adopted in the Upanishads. We propose now to show that this is not the case, but rather that the older the texts of the Upanishads are, the more uncompromisingly and expressly do they maintain this illusory character of the world of experience ; but that this peculiar and apparently far-fetched idea is seldom expressed in absolute simplicity, and usually appears under forms which are completely explained as an adoption of the empirical modes of knowledge which are natural to us all, and refuse to be shaken off.

2. The Doctrine of Mâyâ in the Upanishads

There are in the literature of the Upanishads some texts which, judged by all external and internal criteria, claim a higher antiquity than others; as for example the chapters of the Bṛihadâraṇyaka Upanishad, where Yâjñavalkhya's views of the universe are developed.1 We shall see how in these chapters more distinctly than in any other place the doctrine of the sole reality of the âtman and the unreality of a manifold universe outside of the âtman is enunciated. First however we propose to show how, as early as the ancient Vedic philosophy that preceded the Upanishads, the seed was sown which by Yâjñavalkhya, whoever he may have been, was developed into the great fundamental thought of the Upanishads, which occupies the attention of all succeeding ages.

We saw2 how as early as the later hymns of the Rigveda the thought was introduced, which here as always marks the first step in philosophy, the thought

1 Bṛih. 2. 4, and 3. 1–4. 5.

2 Allgemeine Einleitung u. Philosophie d. Vedu, pp. 103–127.

of the unity of existence. It involves, if only in germ and half unconsciously, the knowledge that all plurality

—consequently all proximity in space, all succession in time, all interdependence of cause and effect, all contrast

of subject and object—has no reality in the highest sense. When it is said in Ṛigv. I. 164. 46 :—ekam sad viprā

bahudhā vadanti, "the poets give many names to that which is only one," it is implied therein that plurality

depends solely upon words ("a mere matter of words," as it is said later),1 and that unity alone is real. In the

attempt also to define more closely this unity, as we have traced it through the period of the Hymns and the

Brāhmaṇas, the thought more or less clearly finds expression that it is not plurality that is real, but only

unity ;—"the one, besides which there was no other" ;2 "the one, inserted into the everlasting nave, in which all

living beings are fixed."3 When also it is said :—"This entire universe is the purusha alone, both that which was

and that which endures for the future,"4 it is implied that in the entire universe, in all past and future, the one and

only purusha is the sole real. The common people however do not know this ; they regard as the real not the

stem, but "that which he is not, the branches that conceal him" ;5 for that "in which gods and men are fixed like

spokes in the nave," the "flower of the water" (i.e. Brahman as Hiraṇyagarbha), "is concealed by illusion."6

This idealism, which denies the existence of the manifold universe, gained strength and complete definition by the

introduction and ever firmer grasp of the conception of the

1 Chānd. 6. 1. 3.

3 Ṛigv. X. 82. 6.

5 asac-chá́khā́m pratishṭhántīm, Atharvav. X. 7. 21 ; cp. also Dhyânab. 10.

6 máyā́, Atharvav. X. 8. 34 ; on passages like these, and the verse Ṛigv. VI. 47. 18, interpreted in a similar sense as early as Brih.2 5. 19.—indro

máyā́bhiḥ pururūpa' īyate,—the later introduction of the term máyā́ into philosophy in Śvet. 4. 10 may depend.

230 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

âtman or self. This conception, as has often been pointed out, is essentially negative, and to that end claims to strip off from an object all that can be stripped from it, which therefore does not belong to the inalienable substance of its self, and is accordingly not-self. So long as only the âtman of an individual was taken into consideration, this not-self might perhaps be the self of another individual, and consequently real ; so soon however as the conception of the âtman of the universe, the “great omnipresent âtman,” 1 which is “ greater than heaven space and earth,” 2 was attained, that which as not-self was excluded from the âtman was by that very fact excluded from the sum of being, and therefore from reality. This cosmical âtman moreover, which admits no reality outside of itself, was at the same time present, small as a grain of rice,” etc., 3 whole and undivided in a man's own self ; and this identity of the cosrnical and the psychical principle was always visibly preserved by the word âtman :-the self in us is the pathfinder of the great omnipresent Âtman. 4 It is precisely this thought that is the starting-point of the teaching of the Upanishads, as it recurs almost word for word in the first instance in one of the oldest texts, Br̥ih. 1. 4. 7 (which rests on the authority of Yâjñavalkhya, Br̥ih. 1. 4. 3) :-“this therefore is the trace of the universe, which is the âtman here (in us), for in it man recognises the entire universe, . . . therefore is this dearer than a son, dearer than a kingdom, dearer than all else ; for it is closer than all, for it is this soul (âtman).”

A further amplification of this thought, which as already said goes back probably to the authority of Yâjñavalkhya, is found in the discourses of Yâjñavalkhya with his wife Maitreyî, the high antiquity of which is testified both on internal grounds and by the double

1 Taitt. Brâh. 3. 12. 9. 7. 2 S'atap. Brâh. X. 6. 3. 3 S'atap. Brâh. X. 6. 3. 4 Taitt. Brâh. 3. 12. 9. 7.

DOCTRINE OF MÂYÂ

231

recension of it, in two collections which antedate our Upanishad, and were first united with it at a later period.1 Yâjñavalkhya begins his instruction with the sentence :— “In truth, not for the husband's sake is the husband dear, but for the self's sake is the husband dear.” The same is then asserted, with constant repetition of this formula, of wife, sons, kingdom, Brâhman and warrior castes, world-regions, gods, living creatures, and the universe ; they are all dear, not on their own account, but for the sake of the self. By the self is to be understood here, as the conclusion of the paragraph shows,2 the consciousness, the knowing subject within us. And the thought is that all objects and relations of the universe exist for us, and are known and loved by us only in so far as they enter into our consciousness, which comprehends in itself all the objects of the universe, and has nothing outside of itself. Therefore it is said further :—“The self in truth we should comprehend, should reflect upon, O Maitreyî. He who has seen, heard, comprehended and known the self, by him this entire universe is known.” As the notes of a drum, a conch-shell, or a lute have no existence in themselves, and can only be received when the instrument that produces them is struck, so all objects and relations of the universe are known by him who knows the âtman.3 In the âtman as the knowing subject space with all its contents is interwoven ;4 all the heavenly regions are its organs ;5 the universe of names forms and works, “although it is threefold is one, that is the âtman” ; he is the immortal, which is concealed by the (empirical) reality,6 he is the reality of reality ;7 from him spring forth, as sparks from

1 Brih. 2. 4 and 4. 5 ; cp. Deussen, Upan., pp. 376–378.

2 Brih. 2. 4. 14.

3 Brih. 2. 4. 7–9.

4 Brih. 3. 8. 11, 4. 4. 17.

5 Brih. 4. 2. 4.

6 amṛitam satyena cchannam, Brih. 1. 6. 3.

7 satyasya satyam, i.e. that of the reality which is truly real.

232 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

the fire, all the vital spirits, all worlds, all gods, all living creatures; 1 in him they all are fixed, like spokes in the nave of a wheel; 2 "he oversteps in sleep this universe, and the forms of death"; 3 only "as it were" he plans and moves; 4 only "as it were" is there a duality; 5 only "as it were" does another exist; 6 he stands as spectator alone and without a second; 7 there is in no wise a plurality: 8 —

In thought should it be heeded,

Here is no plurality anywhere;

By death is he bound fast to death

Who here contemplates plurality.

The passages quoted belong almost entirely to the oldest Upanishad literature that we possess, and thus we meet, not for the first time in the later stream of this literature but equally at its beginning, a distinct entirely self-consistent idealism, connected with the name of Yâjñavalkhya, and according to which the âtman, i.e. the knowing subject, is the sustainer of the universe and the sole reality; so that with the knowledge of the âtman all is known. This thought which first makes its appearance in the discourses of Yâjñavalkhya in the Ḅrihadâranyaka is never again surrendered, and dominates, it is true with certain empirical modifications of which it will be necessary subsequently to treat, the entire development of the doctrine of the Upanishads up to its conclusion with Bâdarâyana and S'ankara. In the Upanishads we find it appearing in different forms. Thus upon it depends the question, which stands at the commencement of the Mund. 1. 3 :—"What is that, most worthy sir, with the knowledge of which this entire

1 Ḅrih. 2. 1. 20.

3 mrityo rûpâni, Ḅrih. 4. 3. 7.

5 Ḅrih. 2. 4. 14.

7 Ḅrih. 4. 3. 32.

2 Ḅrih. 2. 5. 15.

4 Ḅrih. 4. 3. 7.

6 Ḅrih. 4. 3. 31.

8 Ḅrih. 4. 4. 19.

universe becomes known." The same question moreover,

going back to Bṛih. 2. 4. 5 (and 1. 4. 7), forms also the

starting-point of a text so old as C'hând. 6. 1. 2 :—"Have

you then sought for the instruction according to which

(even) the unheard becomes (already) heard, the uncom-

prehended comprehended, the unknown known?" The

expressions s'rutam, matam, vijñâtam recurring here

already in the same form suggest a dependence of this

passage on Bṛih. 2. 4. 5. In another way also we seem

to be able to render this dependence very probable. We

have already above found the Chândogya Upanishad

reproducing word for word the passage in Bṛih. 3. 8. 9

touching the âtman as holding apart the phenomenal

forms of the universe, as it was condensed in the descrip-

tion of the âtman as " the bridge that holds apart from

one another," 1 and betraying its dependence on the first

passage by the fact that it no longer correctly interprets

the meaning of the repeated words, since immediately

after it represents the bridge separating the phenomenal

forms of the universe as a bridge uniting the present world

with the next. The case is exactly similar when the

assertion of Bṛih. 2. 4. 5 that with the knowledge of the

âtman all is known reappears in Chând. 6. 1. 2 in the

request for the instruction by which even that which is

still unheard, uncomprehended, unknown becomes already

heard, comprehended, known. For the true answer to

this request clearly consists in the fact that, as Bṛih.

2. 4. 5 and Muṇḍ. 1. 1. 3 agree in stating, with the

knowledge of the âtman all is known. The author

however of Chând. 6. 1 f. does not give this answer,

but develops instead of it his theory of the three

primitive elements, heat water and food, with the

knowledge of which everything in the universe is known,

1 Bṛih. 4. 4. 22 :—esha setur vidharaṇa' eshâm lokânâm asambhedâya ; cp.

sa setur vidhṛitir eshâm lokânâm asambhedâya, Chând. 8. 4. 2.

because it is only a compound of these ;1 and further, in the three similes of the (white) clay, the (red) copper, and the (black) iron,2 this tracing back of the white red and black element in things to water heat and food is already foreshadowed.

The author therefore has failed to understand the meaning of the request for that with the knowledge of which all is known (i.e. for the one âtman) ; or rather, has intentionally altered it, and that in a sense which, while he sees the unchangeable not only in the “ one without a second,” but in his triple classification also into heat, water and food, abandons the monism of the doctrine of the Upanishads and arrives at a triad of invariable essences combined in unity, thereby laying the earliest foundation for the Sâñkhya doctrine of prakriti and the three gunas combined in it.

Otherwise and apart from this resolution of the unity into a triad, he holds fast to the fundamental proposition of Yâjñavalkhya, asserting that all change is “a mere matter of words, a simple name,” and that in truth there are only heat, water and food,3 although these last also, according to his own theory,4 are merely transformations of the “ one without a second.” Therefore as a matter of inference in any case the qualification “ depending on words and a mere name ” would seem to underlie his judgement.

All this shows that here the fundamental monistic position of Yâjñavalkhya has been taken over from tradition, but its bearing is no longer perfectly understood.

We meet further on with the same fundamental principle of the sole reality of the âtman (the knowing subject) and the unreality of all else, when it is said in Taitt. 2. 6 of the empirical reality :—“ for this men call reality ” ; and when in Ait. 3. 3 it is explained that all the phenomena of the universe are “ guided by conscious-

1 Chând. 6. 4. 2 Very different from the similes of Bṛih. 2. 4. 7 f. 3 Chând. 6. 4. 4 Chând. 6. 2.

ness, founded in consciousness"; and when in Kaush. 3. 8

the proposition "this also is still a plurality" is interpreted

to mean that as the spokes in the nave so "the elements

of being are fixed in the elements of consciousness, and

the elements of consciousness in the prâṇa," seeing that it is

the self of consciousness and bliss, undecaying and immortal.

In later Upanishads we have to note that the

emphatic denial of plurality in the verse quoted from

Br̥h. 4. 4. 19 is repeated and amplified in the verses

Kâṭh. 4. 10–11; and that finally, in S'vet. 4. 10, the

advance of the realistic spirit of the Sâṅkhya, is opposed

by the assertion that the whole of prakr̥ti is mere

mâyâ. Faithful to the fundamental principle of

Yâjñavalkhya, the Îsâ Upanishad in its opening words

requires us "to sink the universe in God," and adds to

the denial of plurality in verses 12–14 the denial of

change. Muṇḍ. 1. 1. 3 makes inquiry, as has been shown,

for the âtman as that with the knowledge of which all

is known. Mâṇḍûkya 7 describes the âtman as "effacing

the entire expanse of the universe, tranquil, blissful, free

from duality." And even the late Maitr. Up. 6. 24

explains the proposition that all plurality is mere appear-

ance by the brilliant comparison of the âtman with an

alâtacakram, a spark which, made to revolve, appears

as a fiery circle. An expansion of this illustration is

given by Gauḍapâda in the Mâṇḍûkya Kârikâ 4. 47–52;

and this entire work is in general an eloquent exposition

of the thought of the sole reality of the âtman, which

is traced back to the oldest Upanishad texts, and is

thenceforward uninterruptedly maintained.

3. The Doctrine of Mâyâ as it is presented under

Empirical Forms

The philosophy of Yâjñavalkhya, as it meets us in

the Br̥had. Up., can be comprised in the sentence :--The

236 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

âtman is the knowing subject in us. Hence it follows immediately :—(1) That the âtman, as the knowing subject, is itself always unknowable ; (2) that there is not and never can be for us reality outside of the âtman (a universe outside of our consciousness). Both consequences are recognised and clearly stated by Yâjñavalkhya ; they mark the climax of the philosophical conceptions of the Upanishads, the first for theology, the second for cosmology ; and together they seem to bar any further progress in philosophical thought. The inquiring mind of man could not however rest here ; in spite of the unknowableness of the âtman, it proceeded to treat the âtman (i.e. God) as an object of knowledge ; and in spite of the unreality of the universe outside of the âtman it proceeded to concern itself with the universe as though it were real. This gives rise in theology to numerous methods of representing the âtman by the help of metaphor, and these, though they are based upon an inadmissible drawing of the âtman down into the sphere of human knowledge, play around the accepted fundamental dogma of the unknowableness of the âtman, and are resolved again into it. And the result of this very application of the categories of empirical knowledge beyond their rightful limits is that in the cosmology the traditional pantheistic, cosmogonistic and theistic ideas re-assert themselves even subsequent to the knowledge of the sole reality of the âtman ; while they endeavour in various ways to bring a firm conviction of the reality of the external universe, such as is derived from the empirical capacity of the intellect, into harmony with this fundamental doctrine of the sole reality of the âtman. The fundamental doctrine is thus clothed in the empirical forms of knowledge which are innate within us and assert their right ; while the metaphysical dogma is gradually more and more superseded by empirical intellectual methods. In this way is originated a series

of conceptions which, following up what has already been said, we propose here at the close briefly to survey ;

they remodel the original idealism into the theories of pantheism, cosmogonism, theism, atheism and deism.

(1) Idealism.—The âtman is the sole reality ; with the knowledge of it all is known; there is no plurality

and no change. Nature which presents the appearance of plurality and change is a mere illusion (mâyâ).

(2) Pantheism.—The fundamental idealistic view,

whose originality and high antiquity is certified by the texts of Yâjñavalkhya, unites with the conviction of the reality

of the external universe, founded on the empirical view, to form the doctrine which occupies the largest place in the

Upanishads. The universe is real, and yet the âtman is the sole reality, for the âtman is the entire universe. We may

describe this theory as pantheistic, although in its origin it is very different from modern pantheism. The pantheism

of the later philosophy has been developed as an inevitable consequence from the theism of the Middle Ages; the

pantheism of the Upanishads is founded on the attempt to assert the doctrine of the sole reality of the âtman over-

against the obtrusive reality of the manifold universe.

The Upanishads find a peculiar pleasure in identifying the âtman as the infinitely small within us with the âtman

as the infinitely great outside of us.

(3) Cosmogonism.—The identity of the âtman and the universe could never be more than a mere assertion. In

order to make it intelligible, a further step was necessary which transformed empirical methods of regarding things

into metaphysical by substituting for an identity, perpetu-

ally asserted but never comprehensible, the relation of causality that experience had made familiar, and by

conceiving the âtman as cause, which produced the universe from itself as effect. It then became possible to return

to the old cosmogonies, and to revive them on the basis

238 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

of the originally antagonistic Upanishad doctrine. After creating the universe the âtman enters into it as soul. By this definition the doctrine that the âtman, i.e. the self, the soul in us, is identical with the first principle of all things, is brought into harmony with the doctrine of a creation of the universe out of the âtman.

(4) Theism.—The doctrine that the âtman created the universe, and then as soul entered into it, is not yet theism. This step is first taken when a distinction is drawn between the âtman as creator of the universe and the âtman entering into the creation, i.e. between the supreme and the individual soul. They are opposed, at first insensibly, as light and shadow,1 then with ever-increasing clearness, until the complete theism of the S´vetâs´vatara Upanishad is attained. It is characteristic of this work that, side by side with its proper theism, all the preliminary steps are retained.

(5) Atheism.—By this separation of God and the soul the existence of God himself was brought into question. The soul was contrasted with him, existed therefore independently and apart from him. The sole function remaining for God was to fashion forth material nature as the arena of recompense for the actions committed by the independent souls. It was only necessary to transfer the powers needful for this purpose to matter itself, and God as creator of the universe would be superfluous. Henceforward there exist only souls (purusha), burdened with their actions and receiving recompense from birth to birth, and the primitive matter (prakriti), which evolves from itself perpetually anew the stage for this recompense. This is the transition from the Vedânta doctrine of the Upanishads to the Sânkhya system, the origin of which from the Upanishad teaching will be more closely considered in the next chapter.

(6) Deism.—When from considerations of practical

1 Kâṭh. 3. 1.

ORIGIN OF THE SÂṄKHYA SYSTEM

239

convenience there is attached to the atheistic Sâṅkhya teaching, in a purely external manner and without affecting the essential principles of the system, the doctrine of a personal god, there is produced the Yoga system, which will be discussed later, and which is rather deistic than theistic. It is distinguished from the deism of later times by the fact that the latter had endeavoured to find a safe method of eliminating from the natural order of things God who had been retained only nominally as cause of the universe ; while the Yoga was concerned to restore the conception of God already eliminated in the Sâṅkhya to a system which had been devised without it. The two methods lead to the same result. The system stands by itself ; and the conception of God is preserved side by side with it, but exerts no further influence on its teaching.

X. The Origin of the Sâṅkhya System

1. Brief Survey of the Doctrine of the Sâṅkhya

The rise of the Sâṅkhya system, the authorship of which is attributed to the entirely mythical Kapila, is one of the most difficult and obscure problems in the region of Indian philosophy. Our previous investigations will enable us to face this question from the right standpoint. It will be shown that the Sâṅkhya in all its component parts has grown out of the Vedânta of the Upanishads, and is nothing more than an extreme carrying out of the realistic tendency, whose appearance and gradually increasing influence we have already traced within the limits of Upanishad teaching itself, in the pantheistic cosmogonistic and theistic changes of the fundamental idealistic view. We premise a brief summary of the leading points of the later Sâṅkhya teaching, since this is essential for the understanding of what follows.

240 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

The fundamental conception and ultimate assumption of the system is the dualism of prakriti (nature) and purusha (spirit). There exist together with and in one another from eternity two entirely distinct essences, but no attempt even is made to derive them from a higher unity or to trace them back to it.

(1) The purusha, already existing from the first as a plurality, the knowing subject, as it is disengaged from and contrasted with all that is objective.

(2) The prakriti (pradhânam), comprising everything that is not purusha or subject, everything therefore which in any way has merely an objective existence, whether it is still undeveloped (avyaktam, natura naturans), or already developed (vyaktam, natura naturata).

Purusha and prakriti, subject and object, are closely connected together from eternity, or rather appear to be so, and the sufferings of existence are dependent on this apparent connection, the removal of which the Sânkhya system sets before itself as its proper aim.

This object is attained as soon as the purusha recognises its entire distinctness (viveka) from the prakriti. This separateness has existed in fact from the beginning, but unknown to itself; when once this knowledge has been gained, none of the sufferings of the universe are any longer its sufferings. But they are also no longer those of prakriti, since all the latter's sufferings, as soon as it ceases to be “reflected” in the purusha, or “enlightened” by him, are no longer experienced and consequently are no longer sufferings. Deliverance is found in the dissolution of this bond between purusha and prakriti, which has an only apparent existence from eternity. For the purusha this consists merely in its ceasing to illuminate the sufferings of prakriti; for prakriti, on the other hand, in that its sufferings are no longer illuminated, consequently are no longer experienced, and therefore cease

to be sufferings. Deliverance is therefore an event which

does not concern the purusha (to it nothing happens), but

the prakṛiti ; whence is derived the assertion, strange at

first sight, that “not the purusha, but the prakṛiti only is

fettered, is a wanderer, and delivered.” 1

This process of deliverance is to be conceived as in-

dividual. There are a multitude of pūrushas existing from

the beginning. Some of these attain to knowledge, others

do not; the prakṛiti which is attached to the one gains

deliverance, but not that which is bound to the other.

The inference is that for prakṛiti also the process of

deliverance is not cosmical but psychical and individual.

The plurality of purushas involves a plurality if not of

the prakṛiti, yet of that element in it which enters into

activity. Behind the prakṛiti again, individualised as the

lingam, stands the universal cosmical prakṛiti, of which

no further mention is made. In any case, the entire

process, which we have now to describe, is to be conceived

as repeated for each individual purusha, and therefore as

psychical and individual.

The prakṛiti, in order to bring about in the purusha

the recognition of its distinctness, and therewith its own

release, unfolds itself repeatedly before the eye of the

purusha. Since the purusha is individual, the self-

unfolding of the prakṛiti, which ceases in the case of the

purushas that have been delivered, but is perpetually

renewed in the case of the imprisoned ones until they

gain deliverance, must be conceived as individual. It

consists in the evolution of the Mahân (the Buddhi, “the

great,” “the consciousness”) from the prakṛiti, of the

Ahaṅkâra (the “I-maker”) from the Mahân, and from

the Ahaṅkâra on the one hand manas and the ten

indriyas (the organs of knowledge and of action), and on

the other hand the five tanmâtras (subtle elements), and

1 Sâṅkhya-kârikâ 62.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

from these finally the five bhûtas (elements). The following scheme may serve to mark the relation :-

The eighteen first products of prakriti, viz.—mahân, ahaïkâra, manas, indriyas, and tanmâtras, form the subtle body, which surrounds the soul, and accompanies it on all its wanderings. It is termed lïngam, because it is the “ mark ” by which the different purushas are distinguished ; for in themselves these collectively are mere knowing subjects and nothing more, and would consequently be completely identical and indistinguishable, if they had not their proper lïngas (empirical characteristics), differing from one another. All lïngas of course originate from the one prakriti; but the latter consists of the three guṇas (best translated “ factors ” ; cp. guṇayati, “ to multiply ”) sattvam (the light, clear, intellectual), rajas (the active, strenuous, emotional), and tamas (the dark, gloomy, inert) ; and the different qualities of the lïngas depend upon the different combination of the three guṇas. The proportion of the three guṇas in the lïngam appears to vary, and to this cause are due the fifty bhâvas or states of the lïngam.

Every life-history is a new self-unfolding of the prakriti before the purusha concerned by means of the lïngam. From the tanmâtras contained in the lïngam arise (afresh,

as we must suppose, at each self-unfolding, each life-history) the bhûtas or gross elements (ether, wind, fire, water, earth). The consequence is (1) that each purusha, as it has its own lingam, possesses also its own gross world of matter, arising out of it ; and (2) that for the purusha which has gained deliverance, since there is no further unfolding of the lingam, no gross world of matter any longer exists. So that the Sânkhya system also is essentially idealistic, strenuous opponents as its interpreters are of the idealism of the Buddhists.

Certainly behind the individual unfoldings of prakriti by mahân, ahañkâra, manas, etc., there must exist a corresponding general unfolding of a cosmical mahân, ahañkâra, manas, etc. Yet this thought occurs quite incidentally, plays no part, and seems like a forced concession to realism. It is impossible in fact to see what purpose it would serve, since each lingam evolves from itself afresh in each life-history the five gross elements, and therefore the external world of matter.

The original purpose of the system appears to have been different. The entrance of the ahañkâra or "I-maker" into the order of development points to this, and is only intelligible if it is in it that the transition lies from an evolution that is universal and cosmical to one that is psychical. The prakriti common to all is undoubtedly cosmical, and the buddhi also seems to be cosmical, as its name mahân, "the great," indicates, as the intelligence that issues from the unconscious and sustains the phenomenal universe ; 1 a psychical offshoot of it however as individual buddhi is introduced into the lingam. The essential element of the lingam is therefore the ahañkâra, as the principle of individualisation, from which are derived on the one hand the individual intelligence (manas and the indriyas), on the other hand the tanmâtras, and from

1 The Hiraṇyagarbha of the Vedânta.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

the latter the gross elements, renewed for each individual.

When finally the interpreters justify the series buddhi,

ahaṅkāra, manas by pointing out that the manas frames

the ideas, the ahaṅkāra appropriates them to itself

individually, and the buddhi stamps them as resolves

(adhyavasāya), a dependence of the buddhi on ahaṅkāra

and manas would be inferred; which again would lead us

to expect precisely the reverse genealogical succession.

The more closely this system is investigated the more un-

satisfactory and incomprehensible from a philosophical point

of view will it be found to be. The whole becomes intelligible

for the first time when we regard it as the final resultant and

the blending together of a series of very heterogeneous ideas,

which have been handed down from earlier times, and the

origin of which we propose now to point out in detail.

2. Origin of Dualism

As there can be, to use popular language, only one

God and no more, so it is involved in the nature of a

philosophical principle to be a unity, from which the

variety of the phenomenal universe is derived. It follows

that monism is the natural standpoint of philosophy, and

wherever dualism has appeared in its history it has

always been the consequence of antecedent stress and

difficulty, and as it were a symptom of the wane of the

philosophising spirit; just as the dualism of Empedokles,

Anaxagoras and Democritus was occasioned by the

apparently irreconcilable opposition of the doctrines of

Heracleitus and Parmenides, and the dualism of Descartes

had its ultimate source in the unnatural separation of the

abstract and the concrete representations (cogitatio and

extensio), which began with Plato and Aristotle. In a

similar way the dualism of the Sāṅkhya doctrine also cannot

be regarded as a primitive view of nature; for how should

two principles like purusha and prakṛiti, distinct from

first to last, be accidentally lighted upon in infinite space and infinite time, and further be so marvellously suited to one another that they could unite to evolve a universe? The result attained is rather to be conceived as the consequence of a natural disintegration of the doctrine of the Upanishads, as we propose now to show.

The thought of the Upanishads in its pantheistic form asserted, as above shown, that Brahman created the universe and then as soul entered into it.1 The individual soul is in no respect different from Brahman, but is very Brahman complete and entire. Individuality as much as the plurality of souls is mere appearance. This appearance however is transformed into reality as the method of empirical knowledge gains acceptance. Pantheism becomes theism, according to which the individual soul makes its appearance over-against the supreme soul with a reality of its own, and the result is the plurality of individual souls,—the first dogma which divides the Sâñkhya from the Vedânta, and consequently the first reductio ad absurdum of this theory of the universe.

For the soul remains as before, in accordance with Yâjñavalkhya's teaching, the knowing subject. A plurality of knowing subjects! What philosophical mind can admit this thought? The knowing subject is in me (aham brahma asmi) and nowhere else, for everything beside me is object, and for this very reason not subject.

A further consequence of theism is atheism. The division of the âtman into supreme and individual souls must lead to the destruction of the one branch, the supreme soul, since it had derived its vital force solely from the âtman existing in me, which indeed alone exists. After its separation from the latter it could only with difficulty be maintained at all. No more was necessary than to transfer the creative faculties (the gunas, viz.—sattvam,

1 tat srishtvâ tad eva anuprâvis'at, Taitt. 2. 6.

246

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

rajas and tamas) to matter itself, and God became superfluous. The S'vet. Up. protests in vain against the irruption of the realistic tendency, in vain asserts that it is the divine power that lies hidden in its own gunas,1 that the threads of the web of the pradhânas proceed only from God,2 that indeed the entire prakriti is only an illusion wrought by God.3 When the existence of God was no longer certified by my âtman, the attestation of him in general ceased to be sufficiently strong to prevent his being abandoned by the unscrupulous realism of the Sâñkhya; and in this way from the ancient trinity (god, universe, and soul), which was in reality a unity,4 the dualism of prakriti and purusha originated. Nothing further could then be determined as to their origin, or how they came to be so suited to one another as to be able to combine for a common end, as the strong man blind and the lame man with sight.5

3. Origin of the Evolutionary Series

As early as the cosmogony of the Rigveda there usually appears at the head of the development of the universe a triad of principles, in so far as (1) the primal being evolves from out of himself, (2) primitive matter, and himself takes form in the latter as (3) the first-born of creation.6 This series of the three first principles, which becomes more and more typical, is the ultimate basis of the three highest principles of the Sâñkhya,-(1) purusha (2) prakriti, and (3) mahân (buddhi); except that the purusha, in consequence of its division into supreme and individual souls, and the consequent inevitable destruction of the first (the primal being), continues to exist only in

1 S'vet. 1. 3.

2 S'vet. 6. 10.

3 S'vet. 4. 10, mâyâm tu prakritim vidyâd, mâyinâm tu mahes'varam.

4 S'vet. 1. 7. 12, etc.

5 Sâñkhya-kârikâ 21.

6 Hiranyagarbha, Brahmân; sup. p. 182 f.

EVOLUTIONARY SERIES

247

its derivatives, the individual souls. And these last as such are no longer a first principle, but, as was shown in the previous section, appear in co-ordination contrasted with the prakṛiti. An early foreshadowing of this view may be found already in Ḅṛih. 1. 4. 6, when it is said :-““ This only, food and eater, is this entire universe.”” These words are at any rate interpreted of prakṛiti and purusha in the oldest exposition of the Sâṅkhya philosophy known to us 1 in a chapter which by the direct contrast it sets up between purusha and prakṛiti opposes itself not only to the teaching of the Upanishads, even where a tendency towards the Sâṅkhya is already observable, but also to the remaining parts of the same Upanishad.2 This origin of the three highest principles of the Sâṅkhya explains also the phenomenon which was formerly unintelligible, that the intellectual element, after having been assigned to the purusha (the knowing subject), and therefore apparently dismissed, re-appears on the objective side as buddhi or mahân, i.e. ““ the great.”” This term appears (as far as we know) in all the passages where the gender can be determined to be masculine,3 and is found as early as the Upanishads. So perhaps in the verse quotation Kaush. 1. 7 in the form ṛishir brahmanayo mahân; as the mahân âtmâ of Kâṭh. 3. 10, 13 and 6. 7 ; as the aḡryah purusho mahân of S'vet. 3. 19, understanding the expression to mean ““ the first arisen great purusha,””

3. 4, 4. 12, the ṛishih kapilah agre prasûtah of 5. 2, the jñah sarvagah of 6. 17, and the Brahmân of 6. 18, to whom the primal being delivered the Vedas, and from whom ancient wisdom has issued forth in 4. 18. It is, as a comparison of these passages proves, Hiraṇyagarbha,

1 Maitr. 6. 10.

2 e.g. 5. 2 and 6. 11-13.

3 It occurs mostly in compounds as mahad-âdi, mahat-tattvam, ““ the essence of the great.””

248 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

first-born in Rigv. X. 121 from the primeval waters, the intelligent principle of the universe, the mind as sustainer of the phenomenal universe, which divested of mythological form comes forth in the Sânkhya as the mahân, the cosmical buddhi, from the prakriti. From this in turn the ahaṅkâra as the individual principle is evolved, on which again depend the individual organs of knowledge (manas and indriyas), and their objects (tanmâtras, bhûtas). By its entrance into the lîngam (the psychical organism) the mahân or buddhi acquires a psychical significance as the organ of judgement by the side of its original cosmical meaning.

At the basis of the entire formation of this series appears to be the thought that evolution from the primeval being adopts the same order as the return into it, only in a reverse direction. Now the Upanishads teach a threefold return into Brahman,—(1) in sleep, (2) in death, and (3) in yoga ; and in the description of this threefold entrance into Brahman all the principles gradually come to light which in the evolutionary scheme of the Sâṅkhya are united into one. We will establish this in a few leading passages.

(1) In the deep sleep, which is an entrance into Brahman, according to Chând. 4. 3. 3, speech, eye, ear and manas enter into the prâna; and according to Pras‘na 4, in dream-sleep the indriyas enter into manas, and both in deep sleep into the tejas. In the words that follow 1 the entrance of the five bhûtas and the five tanmâtras into the âtman is described, together with the five organs of knowledge and the five of action, and also manas, buddhi, ahaṅkâra,cittam, tejas, prâṇa, and the functions that belong to them. It is not expressly stated that the order of entrance corresponds to the series given from last to first, but on the analogy of other passages it is quite admissible.

1 Pras‘na 4. 7 ff.

EVOLUTIONARY SERIES

249

(2) At death, according to Chând. 6. 8. 6,1 speech

enters into manas, manas into prâna, prâna into tejas,

tejas into the supreme godhead. Just as here by speech

all the indriyas are apparently intended, so by tejas we

seem to be obliged to understand all the three primeval

elements (tejas, âpas, annam, of which indeed, according to

Chând. 6. 5. 4, speech, prâna and manas consist), which, as

we shall see later, have been developed into prakṛiti with

its three guṇas.

(3) In yoga, according to Kâṭh. 3. 10–13,2 the senses

and their objects are absorbed into manas, the latter

into buddhi (= jñâna’ âtmâ = sattvam), this again into

mahân âtmâ, and this finally into avyaktam (= s’ânta’

âtmâ), by which means the purusha is isolated from them

all, and its deliverance is effected. We should thus obtain

for the return into the first principle at death yoga and

deep sleep respectively the following succession :3—

At Death

(Chând. 6. 8. 6).

In Yoga

(Kâṭh. 3. 10–13, 6. 7–11).

In Deep Sleep

(Prâs’na 4. 7).

parâ devatâ

purusha

âtman

tejas (âpas, annam)

avyaktam (s’ânta’ âtman)

prâṇa

tejas

{

mahân âtmâ

buddhi

}

{

cittam

ahaṅkâra

buddhi

}

manas

manas

manas

vâc’ (etc.)

arthâḥ and indriyâṇi

tanmâtra, bhûta, indriya

With these steps of the involution into the primeval

essence (that are found at death, in deep sleep, and in

yoga) should be compared the steps of the evolution of

things from the primeval essence, as they appear first in

Muṇḍ. 1. 1. 8–9, 2. 1. 2–3 (not yet perfectly distinct, a

1 cp. 6. 15. 2.

2 Kâṭh. 6. 7–11 is in essential agreement.

3 The order in Pras’na 4 is doubtful.

250 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

few points remaining doubtful) and in a more intelligible

form in the later Sâñkhya :1—

Muṇḍ. 1. 1. 8-9. Muṇḍ. 2. 1. 2-3. The Later Sâñkhya.

yah sarvajñah, sarvavid purusha

annam (=avyâkritam, S'aṅk.) aksharam

prâṇa (=Hiraṇyagarbha, práṇa

S'aṅk.)

manas manas, and

organs of sense

satyam, lokâh, karmâṇi the elements

}prakṛiti || purusha

mahân

ahaṅkâra

tanmâtra manas and indriyas

bhûtas

A comparison of these tables renders it very probable

that the true motive for the order of evolution in the

Sâñkhya doctrine is, together with the triad of first

principles adopted from the Ṛigveda (primal being,

primitive matter, Hiraṇyagarbha, which become purusha,

prakṛiti and mahân), the succession of entrance into

Brahman in deep sleep, death and yoga, which is taught

in the Upanishads. And thus it becomes intelligible that

when the later followers of the Sâñkhya endeavour to

justify their order by the psychological process in learning,

they can do it only in an artificial way that from a

philosophical point of view is unsatisfactory.

4. Origin of the Doctrine of the Guṇas

The most characteristic feature of the Sâñkhya system

is the doctrine of the three guṇas, which depends upon

the thought that the three forces that are active in the

psychical organism, viz.—sattvam, rajas and tamas (which

approaches the modern distinction of sensibility, irrit-

ability and reproduction) are also present in prakṛiti, and

constitute its entire substance.2 Novel as this doctrine

1 First perhaps in Maitr. 6. 10.

2 The prakṛiti is in essence nothing but potentiality (therefore avyaktam),

i.e. the aggregate of the three factors (guṇa, formed after dviguṇa, triguṇa, etc.,

DOCTRINE OF THE GUNAS

251

appears on its first introduction in the S'vetâs'vatara

Upanishad,1 it yet depends upon older premisses. We

begin accordingly with the verse S'vet. 4. 5 :2—

The one she-goat, red and white and blackish,

Casts many young, which are fashioned like to her;

The one ram leaps on her in the ardour of love,

The other ram abandons her, his companion.

That this verse expresses the fundamental thought of

the Sâñkhya doctrine is not open to question. The

manifold relations of the many purushas to the one

prakriti cannot be more effectively illustrated than by the

manifold relations of the many rams to the one she-goat.

Under these circumstances the reference of the description

of the she-goat as “red, white and black” (lohita-s'ukla-

krishṇa, according to the reading of S'ankara) to the

three guṇas of which prakriti consists is inevitable. At

the same time however these three expressions, both by

the names themselves and by their order, which according

to the Sâñkhya doctrine ought to be different, point back

to Chând. 6. 4, where everything in the universe is shown

to consist of the three elements (which have proceeded

from the one existing being), heat, water and food. There

is present in all things (fire, sun, moon and lightning are

given as examples) the red (lohita) heat, the white (s'ukla)

water, and the black (krishṇa) food. The recurrence of

these expressions in the same order in S'vet. 4. 5 proves

that they are beyond question correctly referred by

Bâdarâyaṇa and S'aṅkara3 to Chând. 6. 4. We must

cp. gunayati, to multiply), which are involved in all existing things ; and

all psychical organisms (liṅga) together with material nature (bhûta), which

is merely their foil, are derived from the various combinations of these

(anyonya-abhibhava-âs'raya-janana-mithuna). Everything that is is therefore

a product of sattvam (joy, φιλíα), rajas (pain, νêikos), and tamas (indifference,

apathy).

1 1. 3, 4. 5, 5. 7, 6. 3–4, 6. 11, 6. 16.

2 = Mahânâr. 10. 5.

3 Sûtra 1. 4. 8–10.

252 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

nevertheless agree with the opponent whom S'aṅkara introduces in referring the verse with the following words to the Sâṅkhya doctrine :—“In this verse by the words

‘ red and white and black’ are to be understood rajas, sattvam and tamas. The red is rajas (emotion), because it naturally makes red (puts into agitation, rañjayati) ;

the white is sattvam (essentiality, good), because it naturally makes bright; the black is tamas (darkness), because it naturally darkens. It is the equilibrium of these guṇas, which is described here according to the quality of the parts of which it consists as ‘red and white and black.’ And because this is primitive it is called ajâ (the she-goat, and also ‘the unborn’), while the followers of the Sâṅkhya say of it,—‘ primeval nature creates, but is not created.’1 . . . That primitive substance therefore brings forth many young endowed with the three guṇas; and of it is it said that the one unborn (or ram, ajâ), i.e. the one purusha, ‘cherishes’ (leaps upon) ‘her in the ardour of love,’ in inclination, attachment ; while he in consequence of ignorance regards her as his own self, and accordingly from inability to distinguish looks upon himself as the vehicle of lust, indifference and blindness (which compose the essence of sattvam, rajas and tamas), and therefore remains ensnared in the migration of souls ; while on the contrary another ‘unborn,’ i.e. a purusha, who has gained the knowledge of difference and is no longer attached to it (‘it,’ that is to say, the primeval substance), ‘abandons’ her, ‘the companion,’ whose enjoyment has come to an end; he therefore abandons her, that is to say, he is delivered from her.”

In this controversy both sides are right. The Vedântist, inasmuch as the verse unquestionably refers back to Chhând. 6. 4; and the Sâṅkhyist, inasmuch as the

1 Sâṅkhya-kârikâ 3.

DOCTRINE OF THE GUṆAS

253

three constituent elements, which according to Chând. 6. 2 proceed from the ‘one without a second,’ and of a mixture of which everything in the universe consists, have been psychologically transformed into the three guṇas. These three likewise are the primal elements, only that each of these primal elements has become the vehicle and expression of one of the three fundamental psychical forces which rule in our inner being. Since the word guṇa (factor) would apply equally well to the primal elements and the primal forces (there is implied in it nothing more than that everything which originates from the primeval substance is “threefold,” trigunam); and since in all the passages of the S'vet. Up., in which it occurs for the first time,1 it may very well be understood still as fundamental element in the sense of Chând. 6. 2, and the related verse S'vet. 4. 5, nothing prevents us from assuming that that transformation of the three primal elements into three primal forces,—or rather, the conception of each of the three primal elements as vehicle of a definite primal force,—has been first developed later on in direct connection with the above verse.2 The process was completed with and by the introduction of the names sattvam, rajas and tamas, which in the sense here in question are not authenticated earlier than Maitr. 3. 5, 5. 2, etc.3

5. Origin of the Doctrine of Emancipation

Both Vedânta and Sâṅkhya proclaim as their fundamental view the proposition :—Deliverance is gained by knowledge. This proposition is in harmony throughout with the assumptions of the Vedânta teaching, but not with those of the Sâṅkhya.

According to the doctrine of the Upanishads, the âtman

1 1. 3, 4. 5, 5. 7, 6. 3–4, 6. 11, 6. 16.

2 S'vet. 4. 5.

3 On Atharvav. X. 8. 43, cp. Allgemeine Einleitung, p. 324.

254 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

alone is real. The manifold universe is an illusion. This

illusion is penetrated by the awakening of knowledge,

and it is in this that deliverance consists. Here all is

perfectly consistent.

It is otherwise in the Sâṅkhya. Here matter is as

truly real as the soul, and therefore cannot be recognised

by the latter as an illusion, as in the Vedânta. The

illusion, which has to be penetrated, is concerned in this

case solely with the union between prakṛiti and purusha.

This thought however cannot be sustained from a philo-

sophical point of view. For a union either really subsists,

or it does not. If it is real no advance of knowledge can

lead to a dissolution of the union, but at the most to a

clear consciousness of it, whereby however it is still

far from being dissolved. The keen sword of knowledge

can cleave the mist of an illusion, but cannot sever an

actually existing union. If, on the other hand, the union

between the two realities purusha and prakṛiti is not real,

it has no existence at all. It is then not true that purusha

"enlightens" prakṛiti, not true that prakṛiti "is reflected"

in purusha; and this illumination or reflection may not

be employed to explain the phenomenon of suffering, for

it does not itself exist.

The pessimism also by which the Sâṅkhya system is

dominated testifies to the derivative character of its theory

of emancipation. Even the ancient Upanishads occasion-

ally refer to the painful nature of existence,1 and according

to them too with the illusion of empirical existence the

possibility of the suffering involved in it disappears.2

This however is still only an indirect result, and the chief

stress is laid on the deliverance from natural avidyâ by

the knowledge of the âtman. It is otherwise in the

further course of development. The pessimistic view

1 ato 'nyad ârtam, Bṛih. 3. 4. 2, 3. 5. 1, 3. 7. 23.

2 tarati s'okam âtmavîd, Chând. 7. 1. 3.

comes increasingly to the front. It occupies a greater space already in Kâth. 1, a still greater in the speech of Bṛihadhratha in Maitr. 1. The climax of this pessimistic movement is reached in the Sâṅkhya system, which regards philosophy as a whole as no more than a search for means to avert the threefold suffering.1 Such a standpoint, where it makes its appearance in philosophy, is everywhere a symptom of exhaustion. Philosophy is originally based on a pure desire for knowledge, and knows no other aim than the search for truth. Only when this desire is weakened does philosophy become a mere means to an end, a remedium for the suffering of existence. This was the case in Greece in the schools that succeeded Aristotle ; it was so also in India in the Sâṅkhya system and in Buddhism.

1 Sâṅkhya-kârikâ 1.

THIRD PART OF THE SYSTEM OF THE

UPANISHADS

PSYCHOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL

XI. The Supreme and the Individual Souls

1. The Theory of the later Vedânta

The Vedânta of S'ankara and his school makes a distinction between the supreme soul (paramâtman) and a multitude of individual souls (jîva âtman, s'ârîra âtman). The former is omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent; the latter are limited in wisdom, power and capacity of movement. The former is neither active nor passive, and is therefore free from the very beginning; the latter are active and receptive, and are therefore entangled in the eternal round of saṁsâra, and stand in need of deliverance. Yet the individual âtmans are not properly distinct from the supreme âtman. Each of them is in full and complete measure the supreme âtman himself, as he manifests himself, though his real nature is concealed by the upâdhis (manas, indriyas, etc.). These upâdhis are unable to change his real nature, as little as the purity of the rock crystal is destroyed by the red colour with which it is externally smeared. Rather is it solely avidyâ, ignorance, which imposes the upâdhis on the supreme âtman, and thus comes to regard him as an individual âtman. Accordingly the

SUPREME AND INDIVIDUAL SOULS

257

entire individual soul as such has no reality, and yet

the system cannot avoid treating it as a reality, and

discussing in detail its organs and attributes, its wander-

ing and final deliverance. This internal contradiction

inherent in the system, as well as the designation of two

different and yet not different entities by the one word

âtman, points to the conclusion that the whole theory of

a twofold soul, supreme and individual, is of secondary

origin. We have now to trace its rise in the Upanishads.

2. Originally only one Soul

The texts of the oldest Upanishads do not recognise

two souls, but only one. "It is thy soul, which is within

all."1 He who while dwelling in the earth, the water, the

fire, in space, wind, heaven, sun, etc., is distinct from them,

whose body they are, who rules them all from within, "he

is thy soul, the inner guide, the immortal. He sees but

is not seen, hears but is not heard, comprehends but is

not comprehended, knows but is not known; there is

none beside him that sees or hears or comprehends or

knows."2 This âtman who alone exists is the knowing

subject in us, and as such sustains the whole universe

of conceptions, in which is everything and beyond which

nothing, and with the knowledge of the âtman therefore all

is known.3 This is the point of view of pure idealism,

which denies the existence of a manifold universe, and

of everything outside the knowing subject. It becomes

pantheism, when it concedes a relative existence to

the universe, but identifies this entire universe with

the âtman, the knowing subject. Such an identi-

fication however, often as it is repeated, is always

very obscure, and in order to bring it within the range of

empirical comprehension a return is effected to the old

cosmogony, and it is taught that the âtman created

1 Bṛih. 3. 4. 1, 3. 5. 1.

17

2 Bṛih. 3. 7. 3-23.

3 Bṛih. 2 4. 5.

258 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

the universe and then entered into it as soul :—anena jīvena ātmanā anupravis'ya.1 Here for the first time we meet with the word jīva ātman, which later denotes " the individual soul" as contrasted with the supreme. But no such contrast yet exists here. It is the ātman himself who alone exists and creates the universe, who as jīva ātman enters into the universe that he has created.

Neither from the point of view of pure idealism, nor in its empirical varieties of pantheism and cosmogonism, does any opposition exist between the supreme and individual souls. The contrast between them is first seen at the moment in which the ātman who creates the universe and then enters into his creation becomes a duality, the parts of which are set over-against one another. We have described this further accommodation to the empirical consciousness as theism, since here the original unity of the ātman is divided into God and the soul.

3. The Individual Souls by the side of the Supreme

All the Upanishads, even the oldest, when they discuss the conditions of bondage in the saṁsâra and of deliverance therefrom, distinguish between the imprisoned soul and that which has been delivered, between the soul entering on deliverance and that to which it enters in ; and thus often enough a poetical personification of the two conditions is arrived at, as of the souls imprisoned in saṁsâra, and of the divine emancipated souls. An example is furnished by Chând. 3. 14. 4 :—“To him shall I departing hence enter in ”; or Kaush. 1, where a description is given how the souls that reach the other world appear before the throne of Brahmân (masc.), and are questioned by him with regard to their knowledge. The answer however that is rendered :2— “ The self of every being art thou, and what thou art, that am I." proves that these

1 Chând. 6. 3. 2.

2 Kaush. 1. 6.

SUPREME AND INDIVIDUAL SOULS

259

poetical contrasts remain throughout dominated by the

consciousness of the unity of the âtman. A real dis-

tinction between the individual and the supreme soul is

first found in those texts in which the latter becomes

concrete in the idea of a personal god over-against the

souls, whose “grace” then is the condition of deliverance.

This first occurs, as we saw before, in the Kâṭhaka

Upanishad, and in harmony with this we meet the first

real distinction of supreme and individual souls in

Kâṭh. 3. 1 :-

Two, quaffers of the recompense for their deeds,

Yonder in the other world, entered into the pit ;

Light and shadow are they called by him who knows Brahman.

The unity of the two souls here distinguished is ex-

pressed in the fact that the “quaffing of the recompense”

which is true only of the individual souls is ascribed to

both, and also that the supreme soul is designated as the

light, to which the individual soul clings as mere unsub-

stantial shadow.1 On this passage Pras’na 3. 3 probably

depends :-“From the âtman this prâna originates ; as

the shadow on a man, so it projects itself on the other.”

In the words that immediately follow2 we meet also for

the first time with the description of the individual soul as

the bhoktar, the “enjoyer,” that through the whole course

of life has to enjoy, i.e. to expiate the fruit of the works

of the preceding life. This enjoyer, the individual soul,

results from the union of the âtman (the supreme soul)

with the organs, manas and the indriyas.3 The description

of the individual soul as bhoktar recurs in S’vet. 1. 8, 9, 12 ;

5. 7. The borrowing from Kâṭh. 3. 4 is, to judge from the

entire relation of the two works, quite beyond doubt.

Precisely the same contrast between individual and

supreme souls is stated with remarkable heightening of the

1 cp. Kâṭh. 6. 5.

2 Kâṭh. 3. 4.

3 Kâṭh. 3. 4.

260

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

effect in S'vet. 4. 6–7,1 adapting the verse Ṛigv. I.

164. 20 :2—

Two fair-plumaged close friends

Surround one and the same tree ;

One of them tastes the sweet berries,

The other, without eating, only gazes downwards,3

To such a tree the spirit sunk down

In its impotence mourns, a prey to delusion,

Yet when it worships and beholds of the other

The omnipotence and majesty, then its grief departs.

The entire adhyâya, S'vet. 5, serves as a further exposition of this contrast. Here, to begin with, vv. 2–6 depict the supreme soul, how at the beginning it gave birth to Hiranyagarbha (kapila ṛishi) as first-born, how it ever expands and contracts the web of the broad universe, how as Îs'vara exacting recompense it makes to grow and brings to maturity the fruit of all works. Then follows in vv. 7–12 the description of the “other” (the expression links itself with the verses 4, 7 already quoted), i.e. the individual soul :-

7. The doer of works of inevitable result, abundant in fruit,

Yea and the enjoyer of that which he does,

He wanders as lord of life, in every form,

Wrought of the three guṇas, on triple path, even according to his work.

8. An inch in height, shining like the sun,

Endowed with thought and self-consciousness,

By virtue of his buddhi, his âtman,

The other appears, small as a needle's point.

9. Split a hundred times the tip of a hair,

And take therefrom a hundredth part,

That deem I the size of the soul,

And yet it wins immortality.

1 Mund. 3. 1. 1–2 also is probably dependent on it.

2 On the original meaning, cp. Allgemeine Einleitung, pp. 112, 113.

3 Ṛigv. I. 164. 20.

SUPREME AND INDIVIDUAL SOULS

261

10. He is neither male nor female,

And yet is he not neuter ;

Even according to the body which he chooses,

He resides in this or in that.

11. Through the delusion of thought, touch, sight,

He moves as soul, in harmony with his work,

By the eating, drinking, begetting, which he himself effects,

Changing here and there into various forms.

12. As soul he selects many gross forms,

Many subtle also, corresponding to his virtue ;

And that which fetters him by force of his deeds and self

To these, fetters him also to others.

The individual soul is here contrasted with the supreme

soul as being endowed with saṅkalpa (the activity of the

manas), ahaṅkâra and buddhi, enjoying the fruit of its

action; and is described in a descending scale as “an

inch in height,” “small as a needle’s point,” small as the

ten-thousandth part of the tip of a hair,—“and it,” so it is

further said, “ wins immortality”; i.e. after getting rid of

the delusion of empirical reality, we recognise this infinitely

small individual soul as identical with the infinitely

great supreme soul. The clear distinction and yet repeat-

edly asserted identity of the two is already the stand-

point of the later Vedânta, as it has been characterised above

at the beginning of this Chapter.

4. Reason for the Assumption of Bodily Form

If however the individual soul is a mere apparition as

compared with the supreme soul, how comes the eternally

free and blessed supreme soul to assume this apparitional

form, and as individual soul, having strayed from its true

being to become fettered, to wander and to suffer? This

question first arises in the latest Upanishads, and the

answers to it are very indefinite and unsatisfactory.

In Pras’na 3. 1 the question is proposed:—“Whence

262

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

does this prâṇa (the individual soul) originate, and how

does it enter into this body ? and the answer runs :—From

the âtman (the supreme soul) this prâṇa originates ; as the

shadow on a man, so he projects himself on it ; and he

enters into this body manokritena." This term S'aṅkara

explains as manah-saṅkalpa-icchâ-âdi nishpanna-kar-

manimittena, " because of his works which have origin-

ated from the will, desire, etc. of the manas "; thus

actions and imprisonment in the saṁsâra as their

inevitable consequence would be the result of the free will

of the soul. It must be admitted that this explanation

is disputable on grammatical grounds, since manokritena

can only be resolved as mano-(a)kritena, and would

mean,—Without assent of its will, contrary to its will

the soul is involved in the saṁsâra.

The answer which is given to the same question in

Maitr. 3. 2, falling back upon the terminology current

later in the Sâṅkhya, shows a deeper insight. After

establishing the distinction between the immortal (supreme)

âtman and the natural (individual), it goes on to say

here :—“ Assuredly his immortal âtman continues to

exist (uncontaminated) like the drops of water on the

lotus flower (which only apparently assume its colouring) ;

but yet this âtman is overcome by the guṇas of prakṛiti.

Being thus overcome then it falls into an illusion, and

because of this illusion it fails to recognise the august and

holy creator subsisting in itself; but torn asunder and

defiled by the stream of guṇas it becomes without

support, weak, broken down, sensual, disordered, and

a prey to delusion fancies ‘This is I,’ ‘This is mine,’

and fetters itself by its own action, as a bird by its nest.'

Finally the verse may be quoted which forms the con-

clusion of the Maitr. Up. 7. 11 :—

To taste of reality and illusion

The great Self becomes twofold.

ORGANS OF THE SOUL

263

According to this the individual soul would be dependent

on the desire of the supreme soul to experience the illusion

of a life in the world as well as eternal reality.

In ancient times therefore the same difficulties were

encountered which meet us when we search for causal

relations in a sphere which by its very nature is beyond

the reach of the entire rule of causality.

XII. The Organs of the Soul

1. Later View

Here also it is worth while to begin with the teaching

of the later Vedânta in order then to trace in the sphere

of the Upanishads the development which led up to it.

In agreement with the views of modern physiology,

S'aṅkara distinguishes (1) manas and indriyas (the

organs of relation), and (2) the five prânas (the organs

of nutrition), with which are associated as accompanying

upâdhis of the soul (3) sûkshmam sarîram, the subtle

body, and (4) a factor that changes from one birth to

another, karma, the actions of each several existence.

(1) To the brain as the central organ, and its two

dependents the sensile and the motor nerves, corresponds

the relation of manas (mind and conscious will) to the

five jñâna—indriyas, or organs of knowledge (these are,

following the order of the five elements to which they

correspond,—hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell), and

the five karma-indriyas, or organs of action (speech,

hands, feet, and the organs of generation and secretion).

The jñâna-indriyas convey the impressions of the senses

to the manas, which manufactures them into ideas

(saṅkalpa). On this side therefore it corresponds to our

mind. These ideas are then formed into resolves

(saṅkalpa) by the manas in its function as “conscious

264 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

will," and are carried into execution by the five karma-indriyas. The assigning a common organ (manas) for mind and consscious will, and a common function (saṅkalpa) for ideas and resolves corresponds to the physiological fact, according to which the brain both shapes the impressions of the sensible nerves into ideas, and also carries into execution these ideas, so far as they become resolves of the will, by means of the motor nerves. Manas in S'aṅkara's view is the sole internal organ. Buddhi, ahaṅkâra and c'ittam, which are treated as separate organs by the Sâṅkhya and Yoga, are with him merely functions of manas.1

(2) Breathing, circulation of the blood, and nourish-ment equally with the quickening of the body are the functions of the prâṇa, which penetrates the whole body in its varieties as prâṇa, apâna, vyâna, udâna and samâna. According to S'aṅkara, the prâṇa causes exspiration (uc'chvâsa), the apâna inspiration (nis'vâsa).2 The vyâna sustains life when the breath is arrested. The samâna is concerned with digestion. The udâna effects the departure of the soul from the body at death. According to other teachers,3 the prâṇa serves for breath-ing, the apâna for evacuation, the vyâna for quickening, the udâna for the departure of the soul, the samâna for the assimilation of food.