1. Ramanuja on the Upanishads Raghavachariar S.S

ŚRĪ RĀMĀNUJA

ON

THE UPANISHADS

LIBRARY

L.No. E 671 433

ACC No

15189

BY

S. S. RAGHAVACHAR, M.A.

Head of the Department of Philosophy, Mysore University.

Prof. M. RANGACHARYA MEMORIAL TRUST,

TRIPLICANE, MADRAS-5.

Price Rs. 10/-

First Edition—March, 1972.

R65,0°N72.

Acc NO 15199

Copies can be had of :

M. O. KRISHNAN,

16, Sunkuwar Street,

Triplicane, Madras-5.

ACADEMIC RESEARCH MELIARY Acc. No 15199 Date

Vidya Press, 16, Sunkuwar Street, Madras-5.

P R E F A C E

I deem it a great honour that I was invited to deliver these lectures

on 'Sri Ramanuja on the Upanishads' under the auspices of

the Prof. M Rangacharya Memorial Trust.

Prof. Rangacharya was a Guru in his generation, by the

manysidedness of his academic attainments, his outstanding qualities

as professor and his devoted and most competent contributions to the

advancement of learning. He represented the highest qualities of

intellect and moral and spiritual fervour.

To us of the succeeding generation, he has bequeathed works of

lasting value. His lectures on the Gītā are monuments of devoted

exposition, vastly erudite, eloquent and profound and deeply moving

in their integrity of perspective. Expositors of the Gītā, of all

persuasions, resort to them for gaining authentic information and

insight. There is hardly another exposition of the great scripture,

coming up to this level of luminous clarity and breadth of compass,

vibrant with the spirit of live piety. His translation of the

Śrībhāshya of Rāmānuja with an exhaustive analytical table of

contents laid the foundation for all subsequent studies of the great

classic. Even George Thibaut is heavily indebted to this masterly

ground-work. To the cause of Viśishtādvaita Prof. Rangacharya has

contributed further through many of his monographs and minor

writings. In works of pure literary and scientific value in the field

of general Sanskrit scholarship, his services have been immense.

His contempories, eminent in their own fields, bear abundant

witness in their writings to his personality, to his moral stature,

dignity of bearing, inestimable qualities of the heart and range and

depth of knowledge. To be associated with an organization devoted

to his memory is a distinction to be devoutly coveted.

The worthy son of Prof. Rangacharya, Prof. Sampatkumaran,

inheriting the high culture and interests of his father, has borne

with me with admirable patience. But for his accomodation to me,

in the matter of time and other matters, I would have hardly

delivered these lectures. However, it did come about that I could

deliver three lectures on my theme, on 26, 27, 28th of January 1971.

They were rather long for lectures but appear condensed in the form

of a book. They remain unaltered. Prof. Sampatkumaran kindly

undertook to publish them, and he has borne the brunt of the

publication. He has corrected the proofs, arranged the material into

suitable divisions with appropriate titles, and has verified and

translated in his Foot-notes all the passages quoted in the body of the

lectures. He is the learned translator of Rāmānuja's commentary on

the Gītā, and all his gifts and attainments have been brought to

bear upon this publication. My deepest gratitude goes to him in all

humility and appreciation. I am also thankful to the appreciative

audience and the presidential remarks of Swami Paramatmananda,

Principal Parasuram and Justice V. V. Raghavan, and to Dr.

V. Raghavan who inaugurated the series of lectures.

II

I may mention in passing that the works of Rāmānuja are all

available in print, fortunately in good editions. Apart from

Srī Appanagarāchārya's editions, we have the Srībhāshya with the

S'rut iprākās'ikā published by Sri Uttamoor Virarāghavāchārya. The

Gītā-bhāshya with the Tātparyachandrikā is available in several

editions. Srī Appanagarāchārya's edition is quite good. The

Vedārthasangraha is available with the Tātparyadīpikā in the

edition by the Tirupati-Tirumalai Devasthanam Publication

Department, in addition to the older edition by Pundit Rāmamiśra

Sāstri of Benares. All the three works are available in some of the

South Indian scripts also. The other works of Rāmānuja are also

available. The Gadya-traya has been published with the three

commentaries of Sudarśana Sūri, Periya Āchchān Pillai and Vedānta

Deśika. Thus the fundamental texts are at the disposal of the

critical student.

As for the translations in English with introductions and notes,

we are equally well provided. The Srībhāshya has been translated

by Prof. M. Rangacharya himself, and George Thibaut has translated

it for the Sacred Books of the East series. While the former carries

an illuminating analysis of contents, Thibaut contributes a

penetrating comparative study. The Vedārthasamgraha has been translated by Dr. van Buitenen, Prof. M. R. Rajagopala Iyengar and myself. All the three translations carry heavy introductions. The English translation of Rāmānuja's Gitābhāshya by Govindāchārya Svāmin is out of print, but there is a condensed rendering by Dr. Buitenen and an accurate and full translation by Prof. M. R. Sampatkumaran. I have also presented the substance of the Bhāshya in my work, Sri Rāmānuja on the Gītā. This gratifying record is presented for purposes of acknowledging with pleasure the complete availability of the basic material.

III

It is also a matter of satisfaction that polemical reconsideration of Rāmānuja's standpoint is not wanting. Pandit Ananta Krishna Sāstri engaged himself for a long time in his scholarly career in the refutation of Viśishtādvaita. He provoked vigorous replies from Sri A. V. Gopālāchārya, Sri V. S. Varadāchār, Sri Uttamoor Virarāghavāoharya and Sri D. T. Tāṭāchārya. Sri Virarāghavāchārya's Paramārthabhūshana is a massive vindication of Vedānta Deśika's Śatadūshani. Sri Polaham Rāmāswmy Sāstri, in his interesting work, Dramidātreya-darśanam, contended that there was no Bodhāyana-vritti, which Rāmānuja claims to be following, that Taṅka and Dramiḍa were straightforward Advaitins of the Saṅkarite type and that Srikanṭha's Viśishtadvaitic commentary on the Sūtras was pre-Rāmānujite. These issues are examined thoroughly by Sri D. T. Tāṭāchārya in his Viśishtādvaita-Siddhi and the Viśishtadvaitic tradition on these questions is defended. Even Vidvān K. S. Varadāchārya of the Mysore Oriental Research Institute argues for the late character of Srikanṭha's Bhāshya. Sri Tāṭācharya's treatise is a substantial work in the field. The late lamented Parakāla Svāmin of Mysore, Abhinava Raṅganātha Brahma-tantra Svāmin, produced a modern commentary on the first all-important adhikarana of the Śribhāshya, in which a complete defence of Rāmānuja is worked out in the most scholarly navīna-tarka style. Incidentally, this work performs a unique service in that it traces Rāmānuja's statements of the Advaitic pūrva-paksha to the great early treatises in Advaita and thus vindicates the authenticity of Rāmānuja's version of Advaita. It also shows in

vi

great detail how Rāmānuja's criticisms of Advaita apply with

undiminished cogency to the later statements of the Advaitic position

such as the Advaita-siddhi of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. This is a

work of great length and immense value.

Among the modern writers in English on Indian philosophy,

Dr. Radhakrishnan attempted a critical estimate of Viśishtādvaita

in the concerned chapter in his Indian Philosophy. Prof.

P. N, Srinivasachari, in his magnum opus, The Philosophy of

Viśishtādvaita, took note of these critical observations and rebutted

them in detail. It is an open secret that Dr. Radhakrishnan himself

propounds an Idealistic Monism which deviates substantially from

the world-denying Absolutism of Saṅkara. Dr. K. C. Varadachari,

Prof. R. Ramanujachari and Prof. K. Seshadri have done valuable

work in the exposition of Viśishtādvaita. Dr. B. N. Krishnamurthy

Sharma has been labouring for nearly three decades to establish the

superiority of Dvaita theism. His main point is that the organic

relation of the world to God recognized in Viśishtādvaita does

compromise the transcendence and self-sufficiency of God. It has

been pointed out in reply that the learned Dvaitin does justice

neither to Madhva, to whom the world is eternally real and eternally

belongs to God, all through His own will, nor to Viśishtādvaita,

which upholds reciprocal relation and not reciprocal dependence. It

is good that sectarian controversies are alive and necessitate repeated

'study of the classics.

By some of the recent Western students of Vedāntic schools,

some new problems are raised. For instance, Dr. van Buitenen and

Dr. Lester opine that the full-fledged doctrine of prapatti is an

invention of later Viśishtādvaita and that Rāmānuja himself is no

party to that exaltation of prapatti. With a view to support this

conjecture, they have been obliged to regard the Gadya-traya as

spurious. There is no evidence for the supporting hypothesis, and

the later elaborations of the doctrine of surrender are fully found in

essentials in the writings of Rāmānuja. Anyway, this is an

interesting historical problem.

Another equally interesting position is taken up by Dr.

J. G. Wilson. He regards Rāmānuja's criticism of Saṅkara's

Advaita as of the same type as the attack on metaphysics and

vii

theology on the part of current linguistic philosophy. This equation is rather surprising; for, unlike the modern linguistic critics of theology, Rāmānuja has a metaphysico-theological doctrine of his own, possibly more open to attack on the principles of the recent positivism than even that of Saṅkara. Dr. Wilson seeks to rescue Saṅkara on the plea that the latter uses language in an evocative sense, somewhat on the lines of the poetic use of language or the ethical use of language addressed to conation, and not in the propositional manner of metaphysical or theological affirmation. This is a defence worse than the attack. Saṅkara's words are to be denied on this hypothesis all factual significance. This is a point on which Saṅkara has fought with the Pūrva-mīmāṁsakas and has tried to demonstrate the assertive nature of the Upanishadic statements. Even in the mystic use of words, the intimation of the metaphysically ultimate reality is intended. This two-fold misinterpretation of the two classical philosophers is certainly due to the desire to assimilate their positions to those taken up in the current controversies of the linguistic and analytical philosophers. The assimilation obliterates their identities.

There is a recent work on the Pāñcharātrāgama by Dr. S. B. Bhatt from Poona. It is interesting because of the novelty of its conclusions and not because of any solid substantiation. The author maintains that the Pāñcharātra is Advaitic in its philosophical position. This may be readily granted, and it should also be noted that Rāmānuja's philosophy is also Advaitic in an important sense. But the author does not argue in this direction. He thinks that the Pāñcharātra is Advaitic in the traditional Saṅkarite sense. The implications are double-edged. In this view, it is not only Rāmānuja that misunderstood the Pāñcharātra: even Saṅkara who launched a considerable attack on it, misunderstood it in holding that it was anti-Advaitic. The author himself does not hold the Pāñcharātra in high esteem. He institutes a contrast between the Pāñcharātra and Viśishtādvaita. He belittles the Pāñcharātra a great deal and pays glowing tributes to Rāmānujīte philosophy. It all comes to asserting that the Āchāryas of all the schools of Vedānta were wrong in their understanding of the Pāñcharātra and that what they hopelessly misunderstood is worth much. This is research that carries one nowhere. It is good that the traditional identification of the philosophy of the Pāñcha-

viii

rātra is called in question and thereby a need to go back to the

local classics of the tradition emerges.

IV

Passing over all these textual and scholastic material, it is

worth-while to examine how the philosophy of Rāmānuja stands in

the context of modern thought. This may not be for the purpose of

assessing it from the standpoint of current philosophic schools whose

vogue may after all be transitory. Nor are they beyond criticism.

But a reaffirmation of the system must take cognizance of relevant

contemporary thinking.

In general, Rāmānuja's approach dissolves radical differences

from the Absolute Idealism of the close of the last century. That

Idealism was attacked by distinguished thinkers such as Pringle-

Pattison and G. E. Stout precisely on grounds similar to those on

which Rāmānuja based his attitude to Advaita. Much in the Realist

Epistemology of the present century confirms and supplements the

realist strand in Viśishtādvaita. Its theistic standpoint is out of

harmony with the naturalistic trend of the prevailing philosophies of the

times. That standpoint, based as it is, on the Upanishadic revelation,

would find many anti-intellectual systems such as Bergsonianism,

Pragmatism and Existentialism congenial ; but Rāmānuja, though

sensitive in a final sense, to the claims of revelation and mystical

experience, would not subscribe to a total abdication of Logic.

American personalism as presented by Brightman, for instance, is

very close to Viśishtādvaita, but its panpsychism and admission of

surd evils brings out certain essential differences. The metaphysics

of Whitehead bears strong resemblances to Viśishtādvaita. But in

the purely logical sphere, Rāmānuja is committed to the subject-

visheshya, of which all else, inclusive of the world of nature and

finite spirits, constitutes the predicate, 'visheshana'.

It is desirable to exhibit how fundamental to Rāmānuja's thought

is the category of the substance, dravya, and to confront the recent

Whitehead-Russell deposition of it. It is true that British

Empiricists, beginning with Locke, progressively liquidated the

ix

concept of substance. But with the abandonment of the tradition

the exploded category re-enters the field. Hegel substituted

'subject' for 'substance'. This does not affect Rāmānuja's

philosophy adversely, as after all, the ultimate 'substance' is he

the ultimate 'st' jr'. for fl n final viśeṣṭā is the Paramātman.

Bradley, in his throughoutgoing polemics, demolished the disputed

category of substance. But it is doubtful whether, in his final

conception of the Absolute and its appearances, he has not re-

admitted the category. At least one of his profoundest critics,

J. S. Mairhead, does think that he has. "Nevertheless, in

Bradley's conception of everything finite as 'adjectival' to the

Absolute as the one eternal substance, it seems to have found its way

back". (Platonic Tradition in Angloaxon Philosophy,

page 467). "The admission is implicit in the position of the Idealistic

logicians that the hypothetical and disjanotive judgements are

grounded in the categorical and that ultimately Reality is the subject

of all affirmations. Bradley's condemnation of thought on the

ground that it involves the dualism of the 'that' and the 'what'

carries no conviction to even fellow idealists, not to mention his

epistemological critics such as G. F. Stout.

It is too early to predict that the Rassellian position regarding

the subject-predicate propositions is final. 'Even' in Whitehead's

final metaphysical position, that view appears to have been

superseded, and the old modes of thought rooted in the category of

substance re-appear irrepressibly. This is what Mairhead has to say

on this question : "It is difficult to see how a philosophy can claim,

as the philosophy of Organism does, to be carrying on the tradition

that 'the things which are temporal arise from participation in the

things which are eternal' and that 'the two sets are mediated by a

thing which combines the actuality of what is temporal with the

timetlessness of what is potential' without this idea". (Platonic

Tradition in Angloaxon Philosophy, page 436).

Enough provision is made in Rāmānuja's philosophy for the

category of relation apart from the category of qualities. In fact, the

realm of non-substance, 'dravya', includes qualities, process,

potentiality and also conjunctive relation. It remains to be worked

out whether th - specific doctrine of substance and non-substance

runs against any thing infallibly established in modern philosophy.

The substance is the principle of permanence amidst change, the source

of creative change as agent and the inseparable and unitary locus of

the manifold of properties. Permanence, activity and unity are the

normal connotations of the concept. How far they are dispensable

in a complete philosophy is worthy of investigation. Whitehead

designates his ultimate metaphysical principle as 'substantial

activity' (Science and the Modern World, page 177, Mentor

edition), meeting all the requirements of the doctrine of substance.

One additional aspect of substance is independence or self-determined

B

existence, not requiring any other ground of existence or conceivability.

lity. If this aspect is fully elaborated, we see, as in Spinozism,

there can be only one substance. This is a consequence altogether

consistent with Viśishtādvaita. God is the one subject of which

everything finite is a predicate.

Somewhat in similar strain, it is desirable to indicate the

position of Viśishtādvaita in relation to the anti-theistic trends in

recent thought. Logical positivists like Antony Flew (' Theology and

Falsification ' in The Existence of God, edited by John Flick)

demand that we must be able to specify what should occur in order

to falsify or refute the hypothesis of God. If we are not able to do

that, if we cannot exactly determine the experiential fact or facts,

which would constitute a refutation, the propositions asserting divine

existence are to be condemned as meaningless. The demand is part

of the philosophy that propounds verifiability as the test of truth.

There is no finality in that extreme form of empiricism ; and

verifiability, if rendered logically sustainable, lands itself in

coherence. In that extended and 'weakened' philosophy of verifi-

eation, it is easy to specify what should be the state of affairs for

rendering the affirmation of Brahman as in Viśishtādvaita false.

It should be possible to offer a complete explanation of a finite fact

in terms of the finite itself, it should be possible to dispose of

the garden of the famous parable (Ibid.) as we please, even to

alienate it, without self-contradiction and without a deadlock in the

transaction. It is the contention of the philosophy in question that

the situation cannot be so managed. In reality, the very notion of

truth, of which verification is upheld as the proof, cannot be

conceived or explained without reference to the absolute whole.

It is this argument of the inconceivability of the opposite that is

the fundamental assertion of the Upanishads. The Logical

Positivists try to reduce logical necessity to the necessity of analytical

propositions, and that reduction has not succeeded. The whole

structure of thought, it is to be maintained, collapses if the

implication of the Absolute Spirit is discarded. The untenability of the

finite as such is what is asserted again and again in the Upanishads.

Therefore, it is in the fitness of things that efforts should be taken to

make out the message of the Upanishads.

An humble attempt in this direction is made in the following

pages. Taking the Upanishadic heritage in all its compass, and

under the guidance of Rāmānuja's interpretation, we are to

reconstruct the doctrinal substance of the Upanishads.

I once again pay reverential homage to the memory of Professor

M. Rangacharya and record my deep gratitude to Professor

M. R. Sampathkumaran.

February, 1972,}

Mysore.

S. S. RAGHAVACHAR

PUBLISHERS' NOTE

As Professor S. S. Raghavachar has indicated in his Preface, three lectures delivered by him at Madras in January 1971 are now published in the form of this book. And we publish it in the confident hope that it will fulfil a long-felt need. There is a widespread impression that Rāmānuja's thought derives more from the Gītā, the Brahma-sūtras and other such secondary sources of authority than from the basic fountainhead of Indian thought, the Upanishads. The fact that he wrote no separate commentaries on the principal Upanishads as Saṅkara had done before him, and that it was left to Rāgharāmānuja many centuries later to explain the Upanishads from the point of view of Viśishtādvaita seems to lend colour to this view. But those who have studied the Śrībhāshya and the Vedārthasamgraha of Rāmānuja feel no such inadequacy in his presentation of Vedānta.

This is because he has explained in his works more or less all passages of philosophic significance in the principal Upanishads. The Vishayavārthapīkā of Rāgharāmānuja which brings together all texts explained under the Brahma-sūtras demonstrates how comprehensively this work has been done, and how Rāmānuja has not evaded or slurred over any text of importance. In fact, Rāgharāmānuja's commentaries on the Upanishads quote extensively from the Master's own explanations. Under the Sarvavyākhyānadhikarana of the Śrībhāshya, Sudarśana Sūri shows how Rāmānuja's explanations of crucial texts help us to interpret every text of any importance in the whole range of Upanishadic literature.

Professor S. S. Raghavachar has now sought to bring this out clearly by a convincing demonstration of the range and quality of Rāmānuja's comments on and exposition of some 15 Upanishads. He has assembled together for the first time what Rāmānuja has said in various contexts and more than one work about every one of them. The corpus of interpretation thus made available is substantial and, indeed, impressive in its bulk. A more bird's-eye-view of all this material is enough to show that in Rāmānuja's works we have,

for all practical purposes, an Upanishad-bhāshya also. Professor

Pagliavachar has thus blazed the trail for those who may offer more

detailed studies of the theme.

Even after all this has been said, there may be a doubt in

certain quarters whether exegesis of ancient texts has any relevance

to us in the twentieth century. In his stimulating Preface, he has—

though quite briefly—dealt with the problems raised in regard to

Rāmānuja by the prevailing trends in the world of philosophy. I

dare not follow him into those abstruse regions, but shall try, from

the point of view of the layman, to supplement what he has said by

quoting a few sentences from the Lectures on the ‘Gītā’ by my

father, the late Professor M. Rangacharya, intended to explain in a

popular way the value and significance of revealed scriptures.

"We speak of the Veda as being divinely inspired. To the

Christian, the authentic will of God is made manifest in the Bible.

The Koran is held in similar sanctity by the Moslem. Even to the

Buddhist who professes no positive faith in any deity, the ipsissima

verba of the Enlightened One glow with inspiration.

"What after all is this inspiration? Why is peculiar sanctity

attached to the words of these great teachers of mankind, the sages

and founders of religions? In all their cases we find that inspiration

came to them unbidden, that suddenly and without any conscious

effort of their own, they felt themselves uplifted to regions of ecstasy

where the secret of the universe and the riddle of existence were laid

bare before their vision…It is as though some extraneous Power

chose them as the channels of a Revelation……We may thus derive

the authority of the śāstra from the rare insight and uncommon

knowledge of the founders of religions and propounders of moral

codes……Ultimately, we must trace their genius to the inflow of

divine energy into them." (Vol III, pp. 194-5).

The point that he makes is that the teaching of the śāstras

"is based on experiences that give us an insight into the nature of

our selves and of the right kind of relations that we ought to maintain

with the universe". (Ibid., p. 195.) The Upanishads are records

as well as interpretations of mystical experience, and as such,

have a perennial interest. And it so happens that such

xiii

experiences cannot be described without some kind of interpretation, explicit or implicit. If we try to interpret consistently and coherently their diversn statements, desaripions, parables and figures of speech, a few points of view, more or less convincing, emerge. Rāmānuja's is obviously one of the most important among these, and Professor Raghavachar has added to his considerable services to the interpretation of Indian thought by this critical study of Rāmanuja's exposition of the Upanishads, in the light of principles of exegesis as well as trends of modern thought. The Trust is happy to acknowledge its indebtedness to the learned Professor for these illuminating lectures and for his handsome tribute to Prof. M. Rangacharya in whose memory the Trust has been founded.

I feel embarraassed at the very nice things which Professor S. S. Raghavachar has said about me, evidently moved by his friendship for me. To admit this is the only way in which I can say thanks to him.

I am under obligations to all who helped me about the lectures and in their printing. It was through the good offices of Sri M. G. Srinivasan, G.D.A., R.A., Retd. Accounts Officer of the College of Military Engineering, Kirkee, Poona, who is now at Mysore, that the request for delivering these lectures was first conveyed to Prof. Raghavachar. Dr. V. Raghavan continued his kindly interest in the Trust, inaugurated the lectures and attended two of them. Swami Paramananda, Principal Parassuram and Justice V. V. Raghavan were good enough to agree to our request to preside on the three days. The Triplicane Cultural Academy co-sponsored the lectures. We have to express our gratitude to them all.

Sri M. C. Krishnan helped me to see the book through the Press and Sri R. Srinivasaraghavan prepared the indexes and the errata. My thanks to them.

March, 1972, Madras. M. R. Sampatkumaran.

CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE

...

...

PUBLISHERS' NOTE

...

...

xi

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

...

...

1

CHAPTER II

EIGHT UPANISHADS :

ĪŚA

...

...

7

KENA

...

...

8

KATHA

...

...

10

PRASNA

...

...

12

MUNḌAKA

...

...

14

MĀNḌŪKYA

...

...

15

AITAREYA

...

...

16

TAITTIRĪYA

...

...

18

CHAPTER III

THE CHHĀNDOGYA

...

...

26

Minor Passages

...

...

28

Śāndilya-Vidyā

...

...

34

Sad-Vidyā

...

...

38

Bhūmādhikaraṇa

...

...

50

Dahara-Vidyā

...

...

55

Summing Up

...

...

63

xvi

CHAPTER IV

THE BRIHADĀRANYAKA :

SECTION I ... ... 64

SECTION II ... ... 68

III Maitreyi-Brāhmaṇa ... ... 74

IV. Madhu-Brāhmaṇa ... ... 85

V. Ārtabhāga, Ushasta and Kahola ... ... 86

VI. Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa ... ... 90

VII. Akshiura-Brāhmaṇa ... ... 93

VIII. Sākalya's Questions ... ... 96

IX. Jyotir-Brāhmaṇa ... ... 98

CHAPTER V

FIVE MORE UPANISHADS :

KAUSHĪTAKĪ ... ... 115

S'VETĀS'VATARA ... ... 117

MAHOPANISHAD ... ... 119

SUBĀLOPANISHAD ... ... 120

MAHĀNĀRĀYAṆA UPANISHAD ... ... 121

CHAPTER VI

SŪMMING UP ... ... 129

INDEX OF QUOTATIONS ... ... 133

INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS & PROPER NAMES ... 137

TABLE OF TRANSLITERATION ... ... 149

BIBLIOGRAPHY ... ... 151

ERRATA ... ... 152

ŚRĪ RĀMĀNUJA

ON

THE UPANISHADS

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY

I

It is a pleasure for me to devote myself to a theme which has always fascinated me as holding furth prospects of good work, work that calls for more than ordinary effort and competence. It is not that I lay claim to the necessary ability, but only that I bring to the task the required realization of its importance. Impartfoot performance on one's part in a great venture such as this might provoke more competent Vedāntins to throw themselves into the field and produce correctives and contribute more substantially in furtherance of the aim. It is in this spirit of humble devotion to the task that I undertake to discuss Rāmānuja's interpretation of the Upanishads.

It is a recognised convention in the field of Vedānta that an āchārya, promulgating a new school of Vedānta, should work out his thesis on the basis of the Upanishads, the Brahma-Sūtras and the Bhagavadgītā. If his standpoint is sustainable in the light of this three-fold authority, then it stands established. Of these three, the Upanishads occupy the foremost position, as the Brahma-Sūtras is a treatise subsidiary to the Upanishads, and the Gītā, being a Smṛti, can ultimately enjoy only derivative authority, however great it may be in itself from the point of view of intrinsic RU-1

2

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

philosophic worth. It is for this reason that the term ‘Vedānta’

originally signified only the Upanishads, and it is only in the

subsequent history of Indian thought that it came to be applied to

the system of philosophy propounded by Bādarāyaṇa in his Sūtras.

How does Rāmānuja stand in relation to these fundamental

texts? His commentary on the BrahmaSūtras has received

widespread recognition. Its fidelity to the Sūtras has been accorded

glowing appreciation at the hands of modern scholars like Thibaut.

It has almost passed into the current understanding of the Sūtras,

that their teaching seems to receive more justice at the hands of

Rāmānuja than from Saṅkara. Not that this conclusion is not hotly

disputed, but there is a growing body of judgement from informed

and competent scholars in favour of Rāmānuja in general. It is not

to our purpose now to consider this issue, though such a re-examination

may yield further gains. In connection with the Gītā, the general

tendency among the recent commentators is to concede that it

bespeaks an activistic ethics, a theistic conception of the Brahman

and that it has as its last message the pathway of bhakti and

surrender to the Divine. These are the fundamental doctrines of the

Gītā according to Rāmānuja, and recent studies of the Gītā such as

that of Dr. Zaehner only confirm his findings. There is not much

difficulty in seeing, in Rāmānuja’s philosophy, an elaboration of what

the Gītā has as its central purport.

While Rāmānuja’s interpretation receives remarkable vindication

as an authentic exposition of the Sūtras and the Gīt¯a, we encounter

seemingly insurmountable difficulties when we take up his relation

to the Upanishads, which, after all, constitute the primary

documents of Vedānta. His fidelity to the later subsidiary and

derivative texts cannot amount to much, if as an interpreter of the

Upanishads he loses his case. It may be, even then, as a

philosopher he may retain his distinction, but as a bhāshyakāra, as

an orthodox interpreter of Vedāntic texts, he would be counted a

failure.

Therefore the examination of his claims to be a faithful exponent

of the philosophy of the Upanishads is an unconditional imperative.

Studies in this direction are hampered by two handicaps. In the

first place, writers who discard Saṅkara’s interpretation of the

INTRODUCTORT

Brahma-Sūtras and the Gītā with considerable heat pay him compliment that his interpretation of the Upanishads is 1 faithful than that of Rāmānuja. Thibaut and Zaehner are ty examples of this tendency. In the second place, whatever ma his justifcation, Rāmānuja has not produced the conventional of commentaries on even the the principal Upanishads. To 1 his understanding of the Upanishads in general and of spe passages therein, we have to study relevant statements in S'ribhāshya, Vedārtha-saingraha and the the Gītā-bhāshya. prejudicial verdict of Western scholars an: the absence of ready direct material tend to create a difficult situation on this questien.

II

It is into this difficult situation that we have to enter. It is to be supposed that Rāmānuja did not recognise the primacy of Upanishads. For him God Himself is to be named ' Anpanishc Parama-purusha ', ' the Supreme Spirit revealed in Upanishads '. God is also śruti-śirasī vidipta, specifc expounded by the Upanishads, the crown of the Vedas. Brahma-Sūtras simply bring out the essence of the Upanish The words of Bādarāyana constitute the nectar churned out of milky ocean of the Upanishads: " Pāriśarya-vachassud Upanishaddugdhābdhi-madhyoddhritām ". The Gītā teaches, according to him, bhaktiyoga, which, he says, was alre taught in the Vedānta: " Vedāntoditam.......bhaktiyogam. avatārayāmiśa ".

So tiere is no question of his not subseribing to the gen Vedāntic thesis of the ultimacy of the Upanishads in the realm scriptures. There is, however, the possib:lity of the adve conjecture that he was unequal to the task or that he found the te antagonistic to his point of view and hence avoided open confronta with them. It is a less risky device, it may be contended, to I and choose favourable passages and to press them to serve one's c preconceived system.

Such an explanantion of the lacunae in the interpretative writin Rāmānuja may not, perhaps, be repelled in an a priori manner.

SRI RĀMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

et us consider the adequacy of this charge. Rañgarāmānuja, who has

urnished the system of Rāmānuja with the conventional commenta-

ies on the Upanishads, can hardly be supposed to have done

nything by way of scholarship and philosophical depth that was

eyond Rāmānuja. In his commentaries, Rañgarāmānuja is

esponsible only for the interpretation of the less significant and less

ontroversial portions of the Upanishads. In the elucidation of all

ae peak passages and all that call for dialectical determination

l import, he invariably incorporates Rāmānuja's own elucidation

om the S'rībhāshya and the Vedārtha-saṅgraha.

The texts of the Upanishads themselves are not, after all, so

readfully intractable e for a Viśishtādvaitic commentator. Even a

sore radically antimonistic thinker can manage them and make them

ield a pure theism. Madhva illustrates this possibility in general.

s is an open secret that the Advaitic commentator can find delight

f only a very small number of mahāvākyas and that the rest of the

ulk of Upanishadic discourses he has to put down as inculcating

wer knowledge, aparā vidyā. Deussen himself, who identified

imself wholly with Saṅkara's approach to the Upanishads, had to

oncede that there is much in them which is purely pantheistic and

eistic, though in what he regards as their highest and characteristic

tterances, they proclaim, for him, an idealistic monism. An

dealistic monist can hardly do justice to the entire bulk of the

panishads without resorting to the compromising hypothesis of

preparatory non-sense' or 'concession to the vulgar' in regard

s the major portions of even the principal Upanishads.

In such an exegetical situation, with so high a proportion of

vourable texts, it is a wild conjecture to suppose that Rāmānuja did

ot engage himself in detailed exegesis on the Upanishads on account

the impossibility of making them support his philosophic

andpoint. On the contrary, there is a profound principle underlying

is position.

H eadmitś, with almost all the commentators of the Brahma-

utras, that they bring out the quintessence of the fundamental

panishads, and that, in a philosophically coherent pattern of

rought with all the requisite clarity. As such, he legitimately

esumed that the production of independent glosses on the several

INTRODUCTORY

Upanishads was not much of a desideratum. There was no such precedent in Pūrva-mīmāmsā either. Detailed commentary on the karma-kānda of the Vedas is almost a modern accomplishment on the part of Sāyana. So, as a vital part of the specific task that Rāmānuja set for himself as a commentator of the Sūtras, he undertook to elucidate the philosophically central affirmations of the Upanishads What area of the Upanishadic texts he brings within the scope of his interpretation will occupy us in the sequel.

In addition to the Śribhāshya wherein Rāmānuja's interpretation of the Upanishads is incorporated, there is the Vedārtha-samgraha, whose distinctive aim is to gather into focus the teachings of the Upanishads. According to Sudarśana Sūri, in this work Rāmānuja extracts the nectar of the Vedānta, meaning the Vedārtha-samgraha. The accuracy and adequacy of elucidation, and the resulting philosophy of the Upanishads as Rāmānuja understood them, constitute the theme of this discussion.

In principle, therefore, Rāmānuja has furnished us a commentary on the Upanishads, though not in a formal and conventional manner. It may also be added in passing that Rāmānuja's commentary on the Gītā also contains explanations of some important passages of the Upanishads along with a condensed enunciation of the philosophy of the Upanishads as a whole.

III

We will do well, at this stage, to take stock of the range of the textual data of the Upanishads that Rāmānuja actually subjects to interpretation in the course of his writings. While noting the ground he covers, it would be easy to examine the cogency of his explanations of individual passages. After this survey, we may review his understanding of the total perspective of the Upanishads. Raṅgarāmānuja attempted that same task and the outcome is his valuable Vishaya-vākya-dīpikā. In that work, he brings together Rāmānuja's exegesis of the Upanishadic texts in accordance with the sequence of discussion dictated

3

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

the Sūtras. The full volume of the interpretative material can also

be studied in relation to the individual Upanishads themselves,

disregarding the order of consideration adopted in the Sūtras. That

way we can bring in the material provided by the Vedārtha-

sañgraha also. This procedure appears to be suitable for making us

realize the immense range of the ground covered, and also appreciate

the justness of the discernment exercised in the selection of texts for

elucidation.

In this survey and inspection of date, we will be doing justice to

Rāmānuja, if we keep out of consideration the writings of Sudarśana

Sūri, Vedānta Deśika, Rangarāmānuja and Kūranārāyana. It may

well be urged that the school of Viśishtādvaita has a satisfactory

record on the matter, though Rāmānuja himself does not contribute

enough. To obviate that judgement, it is desirable to confine

ourselves to Rāmānuja's own discussion of the Upanishads.

CHAPTER II.

EIGHT UPANISHADS

ĪSA

The Īśa Upanishad is not particularly difficult, as far as the general trend of its thought is concerned. Rāmānuja quotes from it four passages :

"Īśāvāsyamidam sarvam" (1) ;

"Kuroanneha, karmāṇi jijīviṣet satam samāh ; evam tvayi nānyatheṣṭa na karma lipyate naraḥ" (2) ;

"Sa paryagācchhukramakāyam avranam asnidāpiravat, suddhām apāpaviddham" (8) ;

"Vidyaṁ chāvidyāṁ yad tadvedobhayāṁ saha; avidyayā mrityuṁ tīrtvā vidyayā amritamaśnute" (11).

They are quoted respectively under the Śrībhāshya (III. 4. 14 ; III. 4. 13-14 ; I. 1. 1 ; and I. 1. 4).1

It is significant that the omnipresent reality exercising sovereignty over this entire cosmic scheme is named ‘Īśa’ meaning ‘Ruler’. The third passage, though quoted in the course of a

1. The texts may be thus rendered: "By the Lord is all this pervaded" : "Doing works only here, one should wish to live for a hundred years ; in regard to you (the rule is only) in this manner, there is nothing other than this; works do not taint (the disinterested) man" : "He understood Him to be bright, bodiless, scathelss, without siness, pure and untainted by evil" : "He who knows both vidyā (knowledge) and avidya (works) together, destroys, by means of vidyā (works), mrityu (death) (causing spiritual stagnation or death) and then, by means of knowledge, attains immortality".

8

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

śīroapakṣa supporting the Advaitic view of mokṣa, suggests that

Iśa has both positive and negative attributes. The second passage is

interpreted as permitting the performance of action throughout one's

life, even though the primary means of salvation is the contemplation

of the Lord. The fourth passage also brings out the synthesis of

karma and jñāna as elements in the perfect way. Avidyā is karma

in the sense of being other than vidyā, and it serves the purpose of

eradicating the accumulated results of past karma and thus

facilitates the emergence of vidyā, which effectuates the realization

of Brahman.

It is to be noted that the enigmatic terms, ‘sambhūti’ and

‘asambhūti’ (12, 14), receive no explanation, and we have to

Sudarśana Sūri and Vedānta Deśika for the only plausible explanation.

It is a pleasant surprise to find Vinoba Bhave approximating to that

explanation. The ecstatic declaration (16), ‘Yo'sau asau puruṣaḥ

so'hāmasmi’ ("He who is that Spirit, I am He"), has to be

construed on the lines of the exegesis offered in connection with

“Aham Brahmāsmi” (“I am the Brahman,” Bṛḥ. Up̣. III. 4. 10).

The aesthetic aspect of the Deity definitely posited in the expression,

‘kalyāṇatamaṁ rūpam’ (16), is taken up in the discussion of the

topic in Vedārtha-sangraha, wherein the Upanishadic expression,

‘kalyāṇatama-rūpa’ is explicitly used by Rāmānuja. (V. S.

page 333).

KENA

The Kena Upanishad clearly divides itself into two parts.

The first part, while denying the possibility of knowing the ultimate

reality through sense-knowledge, asserts that that reality lies at the

foundation of all such knowledge. While we are not wholly bereft

of the glimpses of Brahman, we miss its immanency if we claim to

have exhaustive understanding of it. The second part of the

Upanishad maintains that whatever power and glory that the finite

beings, even of the exalted status of gods, possess, are derivative,

as they are bestowed on them by Brahman. The position is almost

the same as that enunciated by the Gītā (X) at the end of the

vibhūti-yoga.

EIGHT UPANISHADS

9

The two parts are connected in the thought that what constitutes

the actuating power behind our knowledge is the source of whatever

measure of worth we possess. We owe our knowledge to Brahman,

and from It we derive all our attributes of power and glory. Indra is

a god of high distinction according to the Upanishad, precisely

because he raises himself to the realization of this derivativeness of

status. The Bhāgavata sums up the Upanishad in this inimitable

verse.

"Yo'ntaḥpravisṭya mama vācam imāṃ prasuptāṃ

sañjīvayatyakhilaśaktidharassvadhāmnā1 Anyāṃścha hast-

charanaśravaṇtudāgādin prāṇān namo Bhagavate Purushāya

Tubhyam" (IV.9.6).2

From this Upanishad, Rāmānuja selects three passages for

elucidation, quoting them respectively under Śrībhāshya (I.1.1.),

(I.1.4)and (I.2.1) :

(i) "Yasyāmatāṃ tasya matāṃ, matāṃ yasya na veda saḥ:

avijñātaṃ vijānataṃ vijñātamavijānataṃ" (II.3) ;

(ii) "Nedam yadidaṃ upāsate" (I.5-8) ;

(iii) "Prāṇasya prāṇaḥ" (I.1).3

The first passage means for him not the utter unknowability of

Brahman for whatever reason, but the impossibility of complete and

exhaustive understanding of It for the reason that It is infinite. The

arrow shot into the sky eventually returns to the earth, not because

there is no further space for it to traverse, but because the energy

2. "You, who. having all powers, enter into my sleeping organ of

speech and other organs of sense and action like hands and feet, ears and

skin, and vitalise them with Your own power-to You who are the Lord

and Supreme Self, salutations."

3. (i) "He who is of opinion (that Brahman) is unknown-to him He is

known; he who is of opinion (that He) is known to him-he does not know :

to those who know well, (He) is known: to those who do not know well,

(He) is unknown: to those who do not know well, (He) is known." (ii) "Know thou that alone to be Brahman, not this which

they worship". (iii) "(He is) the Life of life."

RU—2

10

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

that caused its flight is exhausted. Humble confession of this failure

to comprehend the boundless is a sure mark of wisdom and true

insight.

The second passage does not record the depreciation of

upāsanā, as against philosophical knowledge. It just means that

Brahman is other than what the unregenerate mass of mankind is

devoted to. It is a call to a change of direction of devotion and

not to an abandonment of the attitude of devotion. In fact, great

devotees like Prahlāda have prayed :

"Yā prītir avivekānāṁ vishayeshvanapāyini

tāmanusmratas sā me hṛdayāt māpasurpatu".4

(V. P. I. 20. 19)

The third passage indicates that Brahman is the basis, support

and controller of life.

KATHA

It is difficult to pick out passages from the Kaṭha Upanishad as

the ones that have received interpretation from Rāmānuja. As a

matter of fact, almost the entire Upanishad is expounded by him in

the course of his commentary on the following sections of the

Braḥma-Sūtras : I. 2. 9; I. 3. 23 ; I. 3. 40; and I. 4. 1. The

fundamental argument of the text is traversed in the commentary

without omitting any important pronouncement. It is the considered

opinion of T. S. Rawson who has written an exhaustive treatise on the

Upanishad that Rāmānuja's interpretation is the best guide to its

philosophy. Be that as it may, it is adequate for our purpose to note

that it receives substantial elucidation.

Some major points in that elucidation may be noticed somewhat.

The third boon asked by Nachiketas is not enlightenment, according

4. "The kind of never-ceasing love which the foolish have for worldly

pleasures, may such love (for You) never leave my heart, ever

remembering You."

EIGHT UPANISHADS

11

to Rāmānuja, as to whether or not there is survival of man's

personality after death. Rāmānuja reviews the story of Nachiketas

up to this point and shows the absurdity of taking Nachiketas as being

uncertain on the question. It is really a prayer for knowledge about

the destiny of the finite soul in the state of final liberation. The

word, 'prete' (I. 20), may mean one who is dead and therefore refer

to a partial and transitory separation from the body; but it can also

mean one winning complete and final emancipation from embodiment,

as it does in the discourse of Yājñavalkya to Maitreyī (Bṛih. II. 4).

Really, the perplexity here concerns not 'immortality' but 'life

eternal'. Hence, Yama's answer constitutes a complete philosophy,

comprising the knowledge of man and God and of man's attainment

of God.

The final ideal of life and state of attainment is conveyed by

the ancient Vedic expression, 'Tadviṣṇoḥ paramam padam'

(III 9), as the highest seat of Vishṇu, identifying thereby the

Ultimate Spirit the 'Puruṣa' of the Upaniṣad, with the Vishṇu

of the Ṛgveda This Puruṣa is an 'to be ' sā kāsti sā parā

gatiḥ' (III. 1) signifying that the supreme Duty is man's highest

goal and sole refuge.

Priorities in the matter of regulation, among the factors of life,

for the purpose of moving towards God, are laid down in the

Upaniṣhad, according to this interpretation, and the final feat in

this process is the appropriation of God Himself as a means by way

of surrender to Him: 'Tasya cha vasīkaraṇam tachchharaṇā-

gatireva' (S. B. I. 4. 1).

The transcendent reality of God is not to be explained away by

a misconstruction of Divine immanence :

"Nityo nityānām Chetanaśchetanānām

Eko bahūnām yo vidadhāti kāmān,

Tatmatsthām ye 'nupaśyanti dhīrāḥ,

Teshām śāntiḥ śāśvati neta eśām" (V. 13

5

5. "That one Eternal Self who fulfils the desires of many eternal

selves—to them who perceive Him as seated in the self there is lasting

peace, not to others"

12

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

The position outlined herein is ultimate. And only the grace

in response to this devotion can bring about man's emancipation,

the vision of the Supreme.

"Nāyamātmā pravacanena labhyo

Na medhayā na bahunā śrutena,

Yamevaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyas

Tasyaiṣa ātmā viṛṇute tanūṁ svām" (II. 23).6

This sentiment or conviction is so deeply embedded in

Upanishadic thought that another fundamental Upanishad, the

Muṇḍaka, also contains it in the same words (III. 2. 3).

PRAŚNA

The Praśna Upanishad is a delightfully conceived work. In

its six sages approach one preceptor, Pippalāda, for enlightenment.

They are all Brahma-śiras and Brahma-nishṭhas and are in search

of the Supreme Brahman. They go to Pippalāda, thinking that he

would impart to them complete wisdom. The sage directs them to

stay with him for a year under the required spiritual discipline and

allows them to put whatever questions they desire to ask. He

promises to answer them completely if he has the requisite

understanding.

While the opening and the general scheme of the Upanishad

are such, of the six questions put by the six pupils, not all are of

philosophical value, though none lacks in traditional value. Only

the fourth and fifth questions are truly philosophical and spiritual in

significance. The fourth question by Gāṛgya relates to states of

consciousness such as dream and sleep, and also contains a pointed

question as to that on which all that exists is founded. After a brief

account of the states of consciousness in the manner characteristic of

the Upanishads, a grand statement of the ultimate metaphysical

6. "This Self cannot be gained by reflection on Vedic teaching

(pravacana), nor by steady meditation (medhā), nor by largely hearing

(the scriptures). Whomsoever this (Self) chooses, by him alone is He reached. To him this Self reveals His own form."

EIGHT UPANISHADS

13

position is framed. The fifth question by Satyakāma concerns the

fruition of meditation on Oṁ, the sacred verbal symbol of reality.

We do expect Rāmānuja to take up for appreciation the

metaphysical answer to the fourth question. But we do not find him

doing so. That the whole of Nature, in its rudimentary and

elemental forms as well as in its gross shapes, and all our senses and

modes of consciousness along with their respective objects, do rest on

the Supreme Self is a declaration that would magnificently suit his

philosophical standpoint. That the knowing and active self in man,

vijñānātmā, does also rest on the imperishable Supreme Self is

almost a literal anticipation of the full-fledged Viśishtādvaitic

position. "Even as birds shelter themselves in their tree-homes,

even so all that is abides in the Supreme" (IV. 7). He who

comprehends this truth is said to know all and enter into all

(IV. 11). It may be that this grand passage is left without any

comments by Rāmānuja because there is no uncertainty in its import.

Sudarśana Sūri explains Bādarāyaṇa's silence on the Purusha-sūkta

in such a manner.

But the fifth question, that from Satyakāma, and Pippalāda's

answer, are discussed under the Brahma-Sūtra (I. 3 12).

Meditation on one element of Oṁ leads to worldly prosperity.

Meditation on two elements leads to heavenly felicity. Meditation

on the whole of it, inclusive of its three elements, makes for the

realization of the Supreme Brahman. In reality, praṇava (or the

syllable Oṁ) is the pathway to the lower Brahman conceived as

desirable earthly and heavenly conditions and also the pathway to the

supreme good of beholding Brahman in Its natural exaltation, which

is named the higher Brahman. Such unrestricted communion with

Brahman, which is śānta (changeless), ajara (free from old age

and death), abhaya (free from fear) and amṛita (immortal) and which

the wise ones behold, is the Ultimate Blessedness, the Brahman

(V. 7). Rāmānuja argues that the Brahman spoken of here is the

Ultimate Self and no creature-self such as the Brahmā of popular

cosmology.

The sweetness of this brief Upanishad is brought out even in

such brief comments, and the text as a whole is free from

obscurity.

14

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

MUNDAKA

The Mundaka Upanishad receives mention under two sections of the Brahma-Sūtras (I. 2. 23 and I. 3.1). Rāmānuja manages to bring in the entire Upanishad within the scope of his commentary on these two sections. No major or fantastic passage is left uninterrupted. This is a very impressive Upanishad throughout.

Sannaka, a great householder, approaches the sage, Angiras, in a proper way and submits to him the question: "By knowing what, revered sir, all this is known?" (I. 1. 3). The question already implies the acceptance of the philosophical position that there is a single unitary principle at the basis of the multiplicity of the observed world of actuality. The disciple simply seeks to know the determinate nature of that principle. It may be noted that this manner of inquiry is found in the great teaching of Uddālaka to Śvetaketu and of Yājñavalkya to Maitreyī. Rāmānuja gives a precise interpretation of the question and repudiates the suggestion that it implies the unreality of the 'many'.

Two kinds of knowledge are enumerated, and for Rāmānuja the subject-matter of both the kinds is Brahman Itself. The difference lies in that the lower knowledge is intellectual and is instrumental to the dawn of the intuitive knowledge of Brahman, which indeed is the higher knowledge. Then the nature of Brahman is briefly enunciated. The prima facie view that the description suits the root-principle of the material universe, the unthinking primordial matter, is refuted in considerable detail by Rāmānuja. There follows an evaluation of the life of action, ritualistic and ethical. Its insufficiency in the last analysis is brought out forcefully. The nature of Ātman as the ground and soul of the universe is resumed.

The account of Brahman as permeating and sustaining the cosmos is presented in an appropriately poetic way, somewhat antique, painting the cosmic form of the Deity pictured in the Gītā. The theme is continued, and to it is added the inculcation of devout meditation on Brahman. The possibility remains that the

EIGHT UPANISHADS

15

Brahman dwelling in the universe as the life of its life may be,

after all, the individual soul, either as it is or as it can become in

the state of perfection. It is decisively countered by the ancient

figure of the two birds, one subject to sorrow and the other, effulgent

and glorious, abiding in the same tree (I. 1. 1), that is repeated

here ; and that the Brahman, spoken of here, transcends and

surpasses the individual is effectively set forth. The doctrine of

grace, already noted in the Katha, is enunciated in an identical

verse (III. 2. 3), and the final consummation of grace is foreshadowed

in words of surpassing splendour.

We have thus indicated that every utterance of substance in the

Upanishad is taken up in Rāmānuja's interpretation and assimilated

into the systematic doctrine he elicits from the text

MĀNDŪKYA

The Māṇḍūkya has a dubious status among the Upanishads.

The Brahma-Sūtra does not allude to it according to any of the

commentators. What is still more surprising, no commentator, not

even Saṅkara, quotes from it in the course of commentaries on the

Sūtras, the Gītā and the other Upanishads. Only from the

Kārikās of Gauḍapāda, supposed to be an elaboration of the

Upanishad, quotations are found in the works of Saṅkara and

Sureśvara. Only one passage from the Kārikās (I. 16) is quoted in

Rāmānuja's Śrībhāṣya.

But a reputed commentary on the Upanishad and the Kārikās,

treating them together as one continuous whole, is available and is

ascribed to Saṅkara. A commentary attributed to Kūranārāyaṇa

Muni appears to accept part of the Kārikās as included in the text of

the Upanishad. Madhva has written a commentary on the

Upanishad, and he takes some verses of the Kārikās as forming

part of the Upanishad. The boundaries of the text of the

Upanishad are thus rendered indefinite. While the status of the

Upanishad is itself uncertain, the followers of Madhva contend with

heat that the Kārikās that the āchārya regards as forming part of

the Upanishad are positively so. Deussen shares the uncertainty

with regard to the genuineness and antiquity of the Upanishad.

16

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

The Upanishad itself, even if genuine and ancient, is thin in content. Its twin themes are the glorification of the praṇava and the analysis of the three states of consciousness—waking, dream and deep sleep—as being signified by the three constituents of Oṁ, namely, ‘a’, ‘u’ and ‘m’. The Upanishad ends up in the declaration of the self transcending the three states and regards that as the purport of ‘Oṁ’ in its integral wholeness.

The sanctity of the praṇava is a persistent part of the themes of all Upanishads and the inquiry into the three states of consciousness is also a recurrent concern. That the proper manner of construing the praṇava makes it signify the transcendent spirit beyond the empirical self is also stated elsewhere in Upanishadic literature. The special point of this Upanishad is its adjustment of the three states as meanings of the three sound-elements of Oṁ in their severity and the idea that the integral import of Oṁ is the stateless absolute spirit. Even that idea is not altogether an innovation, if we remember the fifth question answered in Praśna Upanishad.

While Rāmānuja offers no interpretation of the Upanishad, it is to be recognised that no significant part of its theme falls outside the scope of his understanding of the philosophy of the Upanishads. Its final message of the ātman beyond the three states, though immanent in them all, is the burden of the Brahma-Sūtras in the second pāda of the third adhyāya. ‘Na sthānato’pi parasyā, ubhayaliṅgam் sarvatra hi’ (III. 2. 11)⁷ precisely carries this message for Rāmānuja.

AITAREYA

The Aitareya Upanishad is celebrated justly for its opening declaration and its great conclusion.

7. “Not even on account of place (do evils pertain) to the Supreme (Braḥman); for He is described everywhere as being characterised by the double attribute (of freedom from evil and possession of auspicious qualities”)

EIGHT UPANISHADS

17

"Ātmā vā idameka eāgra āsīt. Nānyat kiñchana miṣhat. Sa īkṣhata lokānnu sṛijā iti" (I. 1. 1).

All this was Ātman only in the beginning. Nothing else was there. He resolved, 'Let me create the worlds". The fundamental reality of which the manifold universe is regarded as the consequence, is affirmed here in this initial statement to be Ātman, and the formation of the world is conceived as an act of will on the part of that primieoval Ātmun. This passage is used by Rāmānuja in the Vedārtha-saṅgraha in an important argument (211). It is also quoted wholly or in part several times in Rāmānuja's commentary on the Brahma-Sūtras.8

The climax of the Upanishad is contained in the concept of prajñāna. The varied expressions of consciousness in life are enumerated, and then it is asserted that the cosmos with all its living and non-living contents is rooted in prajñāna or consciousness, is guided by it and is established in it. This idealist thought of the supremacy of spirit culminates in the declaration that prajñāna is Brahman (III. 5. 3). The inclusive significance of prajñāna, its dominance in the scheme of things and the identification of the Ultimate Reality with Supreme Consciousness are the cardinal verities announced. Comprehension of the Supreme Consciousness is said to be the way to the final blessedness of life.

This passage, though fundamental in character, receives no exegesis from Rāmānuja, obviously for the reason that it contains no ambiguity and admits of no prima facie interpretation. That the individual who establishes communion with the Prajña Ātman attains the highest end of life excludes the possibility of taking prajñāna as the consciousness constitutive of the individual himself. Further, there are innumerable other passages in the Upanishads which define Brahman as 'jñāna', 'vijñāna' etc., and the interpretation they bear does apply to the present text also. Rāmānuja has furnished interpretation of this entire class of texts in

8. E. g., I. 1. 1, I I 12, I. 4 21, II. 1. 8, II. 1. 15, II. 1. 26, II. 4 1, III. 3. 17 and IV. 4. 18.

R U—3

1-

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

a general way, and that surely brings out the significance of the

passage in question. In between the opening passage and this

conclusion, the Aitareya Upanishad wanders through a number of

cosmological ideas hardly of a strictly philosophical character, and

Rāmānuja is silent on them.

TAITTIRIYA

The Taittiriya Upanishad is a marvellous composition that

captures readers or rather listeners with its music and provides

altogether a novel conception of the Supreme Reality, a conception

that is implied in the rest of the Up.nishadic literature but receives

explicit and adequate formulation only here. It may almost be said

that the Upanishad came into existence just to advance this

particular thesis.

Before entering into Rāmānuja's explanation of the Upanishad,

it is worthwhile attempting a brief analysis of the text. It consists of

three parts. The first part concerns itself with some nicer points of

Vedic learning and stresses impressively the duty of learning the

Vedas and also of imparting them. It has a beautiful discourse

meant for the Vedic student who has completed his formal education.

A comprehensive and sublime code of conduct is presented for his

guidance in life. There are some philosophical pieces also in the

chapter, but they are not the main theme.

In the second chapter the central philosophy of the Upanishad

is worked out. 'BrahmaVidāpnoti param' (II. 1. 1). "The

knower of Brahman attains the Highest". This is the fundamental

sūtra. It contains four constituents: Prahman, the knowing of

Brahman, the highest good and the attaining of it. The whole

chapter is a definition and elaboration of these four principal topics.

Brahman is defined (II. 1. 1) as That which is real (satya),

consciousness (jñāna) and infinite (ananta). The concept is

developed further, and a more concrete determination of the nature of

Brahman is attempted. Five levels of characteristion are portrayed,

and Brahman is identified progressively as anna-maya, prāna-maya,

mano-maya, vijñāna-maya and ānanda-maya : that is, as

EIGHT UPANISHADS

19

consisting of food, life, mind, knowledge and bliss. Each later category

is said to pervade and sustain the earlier one. The ānanda-maya is

the final concept, and it is at once higher, more pervasive and more

primordial than the earlier categories. Then a certain scale of

ānanda (or bliss) is pictured, and Brahman’s ānanda is said to be

beyond thought and expression. That the spiritual progress of the

individual culminates in the attainment of Brahman as ānanda-

maya is graphically described. With this account of Brahman, all

the three other topics stand explained. Knowledge of Brahman as

ānanda-mūya is the fundamental pathway and the attainment of

Brahman of that description is the highest goal. The manner of

attaining the goal is the realization, step by step through several

stages, of Brahman as ānanda-maya. There is no doubt that the

basic purport of the text is the characterization of Brahman in terms

of ānanda.

The third chapter is a recapitulation of the second in a different

setting. Bhṛgu approaches his father, Varuṇa, for knowledge of

Brahman. The father-cum-preceptor gives a definition of Brahman

as That from which all these beings of the world come into being, in

which they draw support for existence when they exist and to which

they return ultimately (III. 1. 1). He advises the pupil to discover

the principle, through personal exploration by way of reflection and

devout meditation. Bhṛgu traverses upwards through the categories

of anna (matter), prāṇa (life), manas (mind) and vijñāna

(consciousness) to ānanda (bliss). After the announcement of each of

the four earlier discoveries, Varuṇa exhorts him to meditate and

inquire further. Only when the discovery that Brahman is ānanda

is made, no further reference to the teacher is there and the teacher

stops advising further search. The picture of attaining Brahman,

the Anand-mva, H who is made up of bliss, which is given in

the second chapter, is rpnt`d in the third also in conclusion.

It is practically impossible to bring together all the references

that Rāmānuja makes to the Upanishad. His writings abound in

frequent utilization of the text, and its teaching enters into the core

of his philosophical conception. We can take note here only of

Rāmānuja’s interpretation of the most significant passages of the

Taittirīya, and that would surely give an idea of the volume of

elucidation we have from him.

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

(1) The Upanishad offers two definitions of Brahman.

'Satyam, jñānam, anantam Brahma' (II. 1. 1)9 is the first one.

It means, according to Rāmānuja, that Brahman is unconditionally existent, omniscient and infinite 'Jñāna' does not mean mere knowledge.

It means the knowing self, whose knowledge has no limitations.

'Ananta' signifies that Brahman has no spatial or temporal bounds and that there is nothing other than Brahman which Brahman does not maintain in existence as its dwelling soul.

It also signifies qualitative infinitude of perfections.

The defining proposition attributes to Brahman these characteristic and unique excellences.

The view that the proposition defines Brahman without attributing any characteristics to It is refuted at length.

The second definition, 'Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, jātāni jīvanti, yat prayantyabhisamviśanti' (III. 1. 1),10 is also a sound definition.

The implication of Brahman in the cosmic activities of creation, maintenance and dissolution is also fundamentally real.

While the first definition gives us just the substantive nature of the Supreme Being, the second one includes references to that and also brings out the cosmic self-manifestation of Brahman.

Of the two, the second is fuller and hence the Sūtrakāra adopts it.

The great Bhāgavata Purāṇa (I. 1. 1) has this definition as its first declaration of God's nature.

(2) That the cosmic aspect of Brahman is no phenomenal superimposition to be knocked down eventually is established by the fact that the Brahmānandavallī itself enunciates the truth of creation thrice :

'Tasmādvā etasmād ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtah' (II. 1. 1).

'So 'kāmayata bahu syām prajāyeyīti idam sarvam-asṛjata' (II. 6. 1).

'Tadātmānam svayam akuruta' (II. 7. 1).11

9 "Erahman is reality, knowledge and infinity".

10 "Desire to know well that from which all things are born, in which they live on being born, and into which they enter when they perish : that is Brahman."

11 "Indeed, from that same Self, the spatial ether came into existence"; "He desired 'May I become many and be born'...He created all this"; "Therefore He Himself made Himself (into many)."

(3) This creation is not just the setting up of the world or projecting it into existence. Brahman enters into the created world of living beings and non-living objects and thus becomes those beings, as it were. Creation is a self-formation of Brahman out of non-manifestation into the shape of the manifested world of actuality. Brahman becomes the world and hence the world is sukrita, created with consummate ease. The universe is guṇa, because God has taken it as His form. This process of ‘becoming’ does not affect the transcendent perfection of Brahman. This is the meaning of the statement, “Satyam் chaṅritaṁ cha satyaṁ bhavat” (II. 6. 1).12 The transcendent becomes immanent without losing its transcendence. Brahman is not merely the inner soul of all creation; it is by virtue of It that all the forces of cosmos observe the cosmic laws. “Bhishāsmād vātaḥ puvate, bhishodeti sūryaḥ, bhishāsmād agniśchandraścha, mrityur dhāvati pañchamaḥ” (II. 8. 1).13 The cosmic order is a proclamation of Divine Power.

(4) It is for this reason that the Upanishad describes the Supreme Ātman as Sārīra Atmā, Embodied Spirit. In reality, Brahman is the soul, and the cosmos of finite beings, conscious and unconscious, constitute Its body. It is this truth that lies behind the designation of the Brahma-Sūtra as the Sāriraka-Sūtra. What gets affirmed with great zest and grandeur in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka and Subālī Upanishads is incorporated in this Upanishad unmistakably.

(5) In the search for the Sārīra Ātmā the annamaya-purusha, prāṇamaya-purusha and manomaya-purusha are come across and discarded as not rising to that high status. The vijñāna-maya-purusha is the individual self and not the buddhi. ‘Vijñāna-maya’ is not something to which things merely happen. It is an

12. “While being the unchangeable (individual self) and the changeable (matter), He has (nevertheless) remained true to His own nature.”

13. “Through fear of Him the wind blows; through fear the sun rises; through fear of Him, fire and Indra (perform their duties); and Death runs as the fifth.”

22

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

active centre of existence by which moral initiative as action an-

sacrifice is taken. The B?ihadāra?yaka, if we take both the Kā?va

and Mādhyandina Śākhas, makes it clear that the vijñāna is the

finite ātman. It is neither the material antahkarana nor the

Supreme Ātman. It is also a dwelling place of the Antaryāmin,

like the material existents. Knowing or vijñāna is the unique

characteristic of the jīva, as the Brahma-Sūtra (II.3.19) asserts in

its expression, ‘jña’.14 The Supreme Self, therefore, is transcend-

ent of the vijñānamaya-purusha also. That the individual self

attains ānanda when it apprehends the Rasa, that is, Brahman,

clearly establishes the distinction between it and that which, when

apprehended, confers ānanda on it.

(6) Finally, the seeker after Brahman finds fulfilment in the

discovery that Brahman is ānandamaya, meaning ‘abounding in

bliss or joy’. Ānandamaya is the same as ānanda. ‘Ānanda-

maya’ does not imply that there must be some pain or evil also

in Brahman. It only means that Brahman’s ānanda is immense

and that every other pleasure is trivial in comparison. That several

parts of the Ānandamaya-purusha such as moda and pramod ?,

(which stand for varieties of bliss such as the joy experienced in

gaining a desired object and that on using it) are mentioned does not

prove that Ānandamaya is a composite product The figurati:e

account does not carry such a literal import. That Brahman is the

puchchha, the tail or base of Ānandamaya, on?y means that

Brahman is the root of Ānandamaya, not to be distinguished from

it. Brahman is the substantive essence and Ānandu is Its defining

ch racter. The distinction between Ananda and Anandamaya is

untenable, for both the second valli wherein Ānandamaya is men-

tioned and the third which identifies Brahman as Ānanda picture the

goal of all spiritual endeavour as lying in the ‘upasanikramana

(attaining and experiencing) of the Ānand.m:ya’. The special pur-

port of the Taittirīya is to declare the blissful nature of Brahman.

It is taught that Brahman is Ananda in and for Itself and that It

imparts Ānanda to Its devotee. The Upanishad says: ‘Raso vai

sa?: rasam் hye?āyam் labdhvā ānandī bhavati….. esahyera

14. J?o ‘ta eva: ‘‘It (the individual self) is the knower itself, becaue

of them (i.e., because of scriptural statements to that effect) ”.

BIGTH UPANISHADS

23

ānandayāti" (II. 7. 1).15 That the world contains the possibility for finite beings to be in it, to attain worldly pleasure in it and even to work out their supreme destiny in it, is due to the fact that it is filled with Ānanda "Kokyeuānyāt kah praņyāt yadeska āhāļa ānando na syā t" (II. 7. 1).16 A Godless universe could never be a 'vale of soul-making'.

In view of the infinitude of Divine Ānanda is sought he conveyed through a graded scale. Almost the same kind of gradation of ananda is worked out in the Brihadāraņyaka. At the conclusion of this scale occurs the famous sentence : "Yato vācho nivartante apāpya minasā saha" (II. 9. 1).17 This exalted confession of failure of thought and words is due to the excess of delight characterizing the realization of Brahman. It does not signify that Brahman is beyond words and thought altogether. Such an entity would be nothing, unless some intimation of its existence were available for human thought. How then can it be beyond all thought ?

To contend that the Absolute is not relative to thought is to bring it with it the realm of relativity, in so far as that contention itself is concerned. Thought which is so utterly vitiated and depraved ought not to be trusted when it condemns itself as not rising to the requirements of apprehending reality. It cannot command the stamina for even self-censure. To say that words fail, when Brahman is the subject-matter of discourse, is itself a triumphant way of conveying through words the profundity and magnitude of the theme. Perhaps it is the only way in which words can function in the context.

(7) Man exists in so far as he affirms the existence of Brahman who is Ānanda. He denies Brahman at the cost of his own existence. "Asanneva sa bhavati asad Brahmeti veda ohet. Asti

15. "Bliss indeed is He. Having obtained that very same Bliss, he (the individual self) becomes blissful.... For He Himself causes bliss."

16. 'If this Ākāśa (i.e., Brahman) be not Bliss, who indeed is there that can live, and who that can enjoy ?'

17. "Without being able to attain Him speech returns with the mind."

24

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

Bra .meti chedveda santamenai̇ tato viduḥ" (II. 6. 1).13 This

truth is parallelled by Tolstoy's experimental finding that he lived

while he affirmed God and seemed to get annihilated when he ceased

believing in God. Perhaps this conception of human existence is

what the Īśa Upanishad means by the word ‘sambhūti’. That

precisely is the meaning of ‘sambhūti’ according to Sudarśana Sūri

and Vedānta Deśika. ‘Sambhūti’, in that case, would mean coming

into being by virtue of cognizing the presence of God. God is not to

be contemplated upon as something remote, a transcendent something

that is incapable of immanence. The Upanishad is emphatic on the

point that Brahman is “nihitaṁ guhāyāṁ” (II. 1.1), dwelling

in the cave of one's heart.

The meditation advocated is said to generate fearlessness,

freedom from regrets and peace absolute, if it is ceaseless and

uninterrupted. It should be a deeply rooted and steadfast devotion.

If it is broken and unsteady, intervals of fear and anxiety are also

inevitable. This is Rāmānuja's understanding of the passage,

“Yadā hyevaiśa etasmin adrisṭe ‘nātinye ‘nirukte ‘niliyane

‘bhayaṁ pratisthāṁ vindate, atha so‘bhayaṁ gato bhavati.

Yadā hyevaiśa etasminn udaramantaram kurute ‘tha tasy a

bhayaṁ bhavati” (II. 7. 1).19 It is true that ‘antara’ may mean

both differentiation and interruption. In the present context, as opposed

to pratishṭhā (steadfast devotion), it could only mean, according to

Ruinēnuja, interruption or break in devotion. He quotes a sublime

pı̨āṇic verse expressing the same thought: “Yanmuhīrthaṁ

ksh ı̨aṁ vāpi Vāsudevo na chintayate sā hānis tanmuhach-

chhid, aṁ sā bhrān tis sa cha vikriyā” .20 The manner of the final

18. “Whoever knows Brahman as non-existent, he becomes non-

existent, indeed. Whoever knows Brahman as existent, him therefore

they know as existing.”

19. “For, indeed, when he obtains fearless support in that which is

invisible, incorporeal, indefinable, homeless, then he becomes one who

has attained freedom from fear. Therefore, whenever he causes the

small=st interruption in this (meditation that is based on Him), then indeed

there is fear for him.”

20. “If Vasudeva is not meditated upon (at least) for the short interval

of a muhuırta or even for a mere moment, that is loss, that is great weakness,

that is illusion, and that is uncoordinated and unnatural activity.” Cf.

Garu‘a Purāṇa, 234. 23.

EIGHT UPANIṢADS

attainment of Brahman is indicated by the expression, ‘āpnoti param’ (II. 1). It is further expanded by the statement, “Ānanda-mayam ātmānam upasaṁkrāmati”. This approach to the Supreme Self of the nature of joy need not be interpreted in the crude sense of journeying to Brahman.

(8) Unless the ‘upasamkramana’ is so badly interpreted, it cannot be proved that the Upanishad is speaking of the lower Brahman in this upasamkramana śruti. It just means the final and eternal blessedness of God-realization. The pilgrimage is by way of the ascent of the individual spirit to its ultimate abode of eternal life. In that state of ecstatic experience—and it is a state of experience and not annihilation of consciousness—the seeking soul achieves the presence of the all-knowing Brahman with all His perfections. “So ‘śnute sarvān kāmān saha Brahmanā vipaśchitā” (II. 1. 1).21 We have here neither the dissolution of individuality nor the merger of the individual into a qualityless Godhead. On the other hand, it is a rapturous vision of the God of inexhaustible glories, one of the glories being the liberated individual himself.

These are the landmarks in Rāmānuja’s explanation of the Upanishad.

21. “He attains with the omniscient Brahman all desirable qualities”;

RU–4

CHAPTER III.

THE CHHĀNDOGYA

Before entering into a consideration of Rāmānuja's treatment of Chhāndogya Upanishad, we may indulge in a generalization. We not ce a certain peculiarity in the older Upanishads, the Chhāndogya, Brihadāraṇyaka, Aitareya and Kaushītaki. We see them emerging out of the Brāhmaṇa type of lucubration and asoending to philosophiocal dialogues, unlike the later and shorter Upanishads like the Muṇḍaka, which are neatly philosophical and contain no pre-upanishadic elements. In the longer and older Upanishads, we find a good deal of matter pertaining to sacred ohants and works, and attempts to deal with the ritualistic religion in the language of symbolism.

Presentation of such mixed material partly belonging to the Brāhmaṇa level of religious culture and partly of the nature of clear articulations of high philosophical reflections, is characteristic of the few fundamental and early Upanishads. So even those who hold that the Upanishads embody a single and coherent phi'osophical doctrine can only be referring to the philosophical parts of the earlier Upanishads and the later class of the principal Upanishads. This heterogeneity and unevenness of quality is taken note of distinctly by the traditional commentators also. They differ from the modern Western scholars in this, that the latter extend such a characterisation to the strictly philosophical portions of the Upanishads also.

With a distinct understanding of this character of its structure, we may enter upon a consideration of the Chhāndogya. In its first five chapters, the text contains a good deal of non-philosophical matter, whilst the three later chapters constitute some of the loftiest utterances of the philosophy of the Upanishads That this Upanishad is a basic one can be made out from certain important historical facts. The Brahma-Sūtra follows the Upanishad so

THE CHĀNDOGYA

27

alonsely and its reference to the Upanishad is so absolutely

preponderating over that to any other Upanishad that several acute

modern students like Deussen conjecture that the Sūtra might have

originated just for systematising the thoughts of this Upanishad

alone. Even if this extreme hypothesis is not admitted, it stands as

an incontestable fact that the Sūtra concerns itself with the

Chhāndogya to the utmost extent.

According to Rāmānuja one Bodhāyāna wrote an extensive

commentary on the Brahma-Sūtra. Saṅkara nowhere refers to

Bodhāyana, but mentions an earlier Vrittikāra and also speaks of

one Upavarsha with considerable respect. Vedānta Deśika, in his

Tattvatīkā, seems to suggest the identity of Bodhāyana and

Upavarsha. In another context where Upavarsha is quoted by

Saṅkara, Sudarśana Sūri (under Brahma-Sūtra, III. 3. 53)

attributes the quotation to the Vrittikāra and, according to the

Viśishtādvaitic tradition, the Vrittikāra is always Bodhāyana.

Again, in the Viśishtādvaitic account of the history of Vedānta one

Vākyakāra, also named Taṅka and Brahmanandin, is said to have

written a commentary on the Chhāndogya named 'Vākyā'. In

this work he is supposed to have condensed the views of Bodhāyana.

This Vākya in turn is claimed to have been explained by one

Dram'1ārhārya, to whom there are plenty of references in Saṅkara.

Both Taṅka and Dramida are accepted as authorities by the

Adwaitins, as for instance, by Sarvājñātma-muni in his Saṅkshepa-

śāriraka

That a commentary on the Brahma-Sūtra could be summarised

in a commentary on the Chhāndogya could be explained only on the

supposition that the Brahma-Sūtra is closely woven with the

Upanishad, such that a commentary on the one could furnish

guidance for a commentary on the other. Such being the historical

importance of the Upanishad, we have to examine Rāmānuja's

contribution to the understanding of the Upanishad.

It would be a good method to consider first what may be called

minor passages, all of them occurring in the course of the first five

chapters, and then dwell on the major ones. Discussion of Brahman,

the ultimate metaphysical principle, in a straightforward manner,

may be taken as the criterion for the identification of the major

28

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISEADS

passages. What is philosophically significant, but does not deal with

Brahman and also what deals with Brahman through s·me mani-

festations of It in an indirect manner may be treated as minor.

MINOR PASSAGES

(1) Jānaśruti and Satyakāma : At the commencement of the

fourth chapter of the Upanishad (IV. 1. 3), we have the interesting

story of how Raikva came to teach Brahma-vidyā to Jānaśruti.

Jānaśruti was a good king who practised the kingly virtues to

perfection. But he had no knowledge of Brahman. That was a great

deficiency, for mere goodness without philosophic wisdom does not

take a man to the highest goal of life. Some supernatural beings,

pleased with his goodness, managed to instil in him a keenness for the

highest knowledge and made him aware of the presence of a great

sage in the neighbourhood by name Raikva. The king sought him

out and offered huge presents and begged for instruction. The sage

repelled him and called him a 'Sūdra'. The king enhanced his

gifts, and the sage consented to teach him and did so.

The point here is, according to Rāmānuja, that unless a

disciple serves the teacher for a sufficient duration or gives

him gifts commensurate with his material resources, the

instruction will not take roots in him and bear the desired fruit.

Hence, the apparent crudeness of Raikva's behaviour. It is hardness

proceeding from compassion. The fact that Jānaśruti is called a

'Sūdra' and that finally he receives the desired teaching has made

the author of Brahma-Sūtra raise the question whether Sūdras,

outside the pale of Vedic learning, could be entitled to the

knowledge of Brahman The Sūtrakāra, according to Rāmānuja,

answers the question in the negative and understands the term

'Sūdra', not in its conventional sense, but in the etymological

sense of one who 'suffers' and in the present case, for want of

knowledge of Brahman.

In support of this conclusion, the story of Satyakāma Jābāla is

brought in, which story follows this one in the Upanishad (IV.4.4).

The teacher, in that story, accepts Satyakāma as a worthy disciple

on the ground that he must be a Brahmin, because he has spoken the

truth. While the first story gives a dismal impression of the social

ethics of the Upanishad, the second one mitigates it by making

truth the necessary and sufficient demonstration of one's Brahmin-

hood. To admit such a purely ethical test of the higher caste, is to

undo the legitimacy of the social hierarchy based exclusively on

birth. It is to introduce a revolutionary principle, which in the

bhakti tradition as a whole worked in the future for the spiritual

elevation of the masses, from the standpoint of the right to God-

realisation

(2) The four stages of life: In the second chapter of the

Chhāndogya in section twentythree, we have an account of the four

āśramas—brahmacharya, gārhasthya, vānaprastha and sannyāsa

(the stages in life of the student, the married householder, the

wandering hermit and the ascetic). This seems to conflict with the

concluding passage of the Upanishad, wherein only the order of the

householder seems to be enjoined. According to Rāmānuja, the latter

injunction must be given a limited application and all the four orders

or stages of life are to be recognised. He does not subscribe to

Saṅkara's view that only the sannyāsin, supposed to be indicated

by the word, 'Brahma-samstha' (one who abides completely in

Brahman), is fit to attain final liberation. On the other hand, all

the four stages of life are useless from the point of view of salvation,

if one simply fulfils the requirement of one's stage, but lacks devotion

to Brahman. If he has that devotion, he can achieve liberation from

any of the four stages. 'Brahma-samstha' for Rāmānuja means

'one who is established in Brahman, i.e., devoted to Brahman

completely'. There is no rejection of sannyāsa, though there is no

exclusive exaltation of that order of life. The word 'tapas' earlier

in the context means for Rāmānuja both the vānaprastha and

sannyāsa stages, while according to Saṅkara it stands only for the

vānaprastha, Brahma-samstha alone referring to the sannyāsa.

That Rāmānuja's interpretation of 'Brahma-samstha' has great

plausibility and may even be made to include self-surrender to the

Supreme, is established by the reference, in the immediately

preceding section (II. 22) of the Upanishad, to those who surrender

themselves to Indra, Prajāpati and Mrityu with the exact formula of

self-surrender : "Indram் saraṇam் prapanno'bhīvam........

Prajāpatim் saraṇam் prapanno, bhūvam......Mrityum் saraṇam்

30 SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

prapanno'bhūvam" 22 That the way of surrenderer to the Deity is not absent in the Upanishadic conception of spiritual life is a fact worth serious consideration.

(3) Eschatology : The doctrine of karma and rebirth is one of the cardinal elements in Upanishadic thought. There is also the conception that, after death, those who have attained illumination in life will travel to the highest abode of spiritual felicity through a ' bright way ' of the gods, while those who have not attained it traverse other ways varying according to their conduct in life, to be ultimately reborn in the mundane world. These ideas are cast in eschatological frameworks of a somewhat pictorial character. The underlying principles are philosophical enough, but the presentation is made in a form which has no basis except textual sanction. The Chhāndogya Upanishad deals with these topics in the fifth chapter from section four to section ten. Rāmānuja discusses these sections in detail removing textual uncertainties, and brings them to harmony with the slightly varying accounts of the same matter in the other Upanishads. A consolidated and clear eschatological picture is worked out and is accepted as an authentic description of the life after death. In this, he propounds nothing that does not fall within the actual teaching of the Upanishads.

(4) Cosmic forces : We may now notice five passages of a more or less similar character. In each of them Brahman is named as one of the well-known cosmic forces. The Sūtrakāra, according to Rāmānuja, elucidates them thoroughly and discerns them as expounding Brahman. The first one occurs in I. 9, and in it Ākāśa is declared to be the primordial reality in which the world has its refuge. This surely means Brahman and not the physical ākāśa (or spatial ether). In the same chapter, in section eleven, Prāṇa is said to be the primordial Deity in which all beings have their being. ' Prāṇa ' in I. 11 is determined by a thorough discussion of the context to refer to Brahman and not to the conventional principle of prāṇa. In III. 13, some Jyotis is said to be transcendent of the

22. "I have surrendered to and sought refuge with Indra . ...I have surrendered to and sought refuge with Prajāpati.....I have surrendered and sought refuge with Mṛtyu."

THE CHHANDOGYA

31

highest heavens and to be the foundation of the universe, of even the highest worlds and also to be the jyotis in man. This primordial effulgence is not the physical light, but the light that is God. Such is the interpretation of the Sūtrakāra according to Rāmānuja. In XV. 5 is the declaration that the Person seen in the eye is the Ātman, is immortal and fearless, and that He is the Brahman.

This Person in the eye is not the image in the eye, nor the individual soul, nor any particular deity. He is the Supreme Brahman Himself. Again, in the fourteenth section of the eighth chapter, Ākāśa is said to be the immortal inner Brahman, who fashions the names and forms of the beings in the manifested world (VIII. 14. 1). This Ākāśa is Brahman and no lower category

(5) 'Vaisvānara': In XI. 5, we are told that five sages approach Uddālaka and seek from him enlightenment concerning the Ātman, the Brahman. Uddālaka realizes that he does not have the requisite knowledge, and he joins them in the search. All the six approach the king of Kekayas, Aśvapati, who ascertaining what they already know and imparts to them wisdom on that basis, comprehending and completing what they severally know. Aśvapati finally gives a connected and comprehensive account of the Supreme Reality called here 'Vaisvānara'.

This is a fairly extensive dialogue. Who is this Vaisvānara? The term itself is used in Vedic literature in four senses. It may mean the energy in the living body bringing about digestion, it may refer to the physical fire, it may stand for a specific deity in charge of the concerned force of nature, or it may denote the Supreme Reality, Brahman. Rāmānuja goes over the whole dialogue and determines that the term in the context signifies only Brahman. It is further added that Vaisvānara, comprehending the entire universe as His form, must be meditated upon as a totality and not in His fractional manifestations. The Vaisvānara is the Ultimate Self and not the lower categories going under that name.

(6) 'Kam and 'Kham': In the course of the instruction to Upakosala (IV. 10), an important and enigmatic pronouncement is considered, "Kam Brahme, kham Brahma". Satyakāma Jābāla, the preceptor, explains to Upakosala that what is 'kam' is 'kham' and what is 'kham' is 'kam'. 'Kham' means the boundless

space and 'kāmin' signifies pleasure or happiness. The meaning of each term is to be determined in the passage in the light of the other term. It does not mean, therefore, that Brahman is space and pleasure. On the contrary, it means that Brahman is boundless joy, transcending at once physical space and finite felicities. It is of the character of infinite joy in itself and the fount of infinite joy to the devotee, and thus, the great thought of the Taittirīya stands incorporated in the text in baffling abridgement Brahman is not a negative absolute, but the absolute of positive perfection effectuating abundance of life.

(7) The 'kapyāsaṁ' text : Now we are to consider a passage that has unique significance for Rāmānuja. Tradition records that was the interpretation of this passage by the teacher, Yādavaprakāśa, that made Rāmānuja realize painfully that his teacher could not rise to the height of intellect and spiritual perception needed for grasping the importance of the śruti. The passage is of the utmost significance for Rāmānuja, for it contains a clear affirmation of the aesthetic aspect of Brahman, which, for him, should go into the final characterization of the ultimate principle. The Vākyakāra and Dramidāchārya also appear to have exercised themselves seriously in elucidating its real meaning, if we admit the accuracy of the historical information supplied by Sudarśana Sūri. Rāmānuja discusses it both in the Sribhāshya and more copiously in the Vedārthasangraha.

It reads as follows : "Ya esho'ntaṛditye hiraṇmayah purusho drśyate hiraṇyaśmaśrur hiraṇyakeśa āpraṇakhāt sarva eva suvarnaḥ. Tasya yathā kapyāsaṁ pundarīkaṁ evam akśiṇī. Tasyoditi nāma. Sa esha sarvebhyah pāpmabhya udita. Udeti ha vai sarvebhyah pāpmabhyo ya evam veda" (I. 6. 6-7).23 The text announces the presence of the Golden Person in the sun. It is a recurrent theme in the Upanishadic literature that the Divine Spirit is luminously present in the sun. Often, it is also asserted

23. "This Person who is seen within the sun, He is brilliant like gold, has a golden beard, has golden hair and is altogether golden even to the very tips of His nails. His two eyes are like the lotus blossomed under the influence of the sun's rays. His name is Uditi (or High). This same above-mentioned Person has risen above all evil. He who knows (Him) thus rises, indeed, above all sins."

that the same Luminous Being abides in the eye that sees. In other

words, the same Supreme Spirit shines in the sun and the eye,

thereby intimating that It is the centre of the world of the knowable

universe and knowing subject. Its altogether radiant presence in

the sun is what is declared in the present text.

It goes on to assert further that the eyes of this Being are like

the lotus which is kapyāsa. Yādavaprakāśa, following Sañkara,

evidently seems to have interpreted the expression as signifying the

reddish hind portion of the monkey. Sañkara sees the repulsiveness

of the simile and hastens to add that it is only a simile with the lotus,

which alone is directly compared to the Divine eyes. Rāmānuja does

not see any necessity for such an expedient. He understands the

word, ‘kapyāsa’, as signifying the lotus displaying itself in all its

glory under the enlivening light of the sun, securely resting on its

flourishing stalk and growing luxuriantly in deep waters. The word,

‘kapi’, itself often means the sun in Vedic literature and Sañkara

himself takes it to mean the sun in his commentary on Vishṇu-

sahasranāma, if that is a work of his, as claimed by tradition and

as it was so regarded by even Parāśara Bhaṭṭa in his work on the

Sahasranāma.

Rāmānuja's long poetic compound is worth citing:

"Gambhīrāmhassamudbhūta-sumrishtanāla-ravikaravikāsita-

puṇḍarikadalāmālāyateksahaṇa" (Vedārtha-saṅgraha).24 All

this care and delicacy of feeling are intelligible in the light of

Rāmānuja's view that the beauty of form attributed to God is

absolutely real, as real as His very transcendent nature, His infinite

perfections and His creative self-manifestation through the worlds.

It is proclaimed by the same Vedāntic texts, on whose authority the

24. "He has eyes, long and clear like the petals of the lotus, unfolded

by the rays of the sun and growing on stout stalks from deep water."

Sudarśana Sūrī, commenting on Rāmānuja's explanation, observes that the

Vākyakāra has enumerated six interpretations of the term, ‘kapyāsaṁ’, of

which three are acceptable and three are not. All the three acceptable

views are here set out—opened by the sun, having stout stalks and

growing in deep water. The rejected explanations suggest that it refers to

the sphere of the sun, the posteriors of the monkey and a state of half

blossoming.

R U—5

34

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

other truths concerning Brahman are asserted. This sameness of the

source of knowledge is an important consideration. There is nothing

purely earthly in beauty as such, for even earthly beauty owes its

splendour to the ingression of the Divinity into it. The Bhāgavata

(X. 35. 9) puts the thought in inimitable words : "Vanalatāstarava

ātmani Vishnum vyanjayantya iva pushpaphalādhyāḥ". (The

trees and creepers were glorious with flowers and fruits, as if they

were showing forth the All-pervading One dwelling in them).

Sankara too acknowledges the aesthetic aspect of the Divine

principle and makes a striking observation in the course of his

interpretation of the passage in question. "The theme of even

secular music", he says, "is God Himself". Laukikeshvapi

gāneshu asyaiva gīyamātoam darsayati. (Brahma-Sūtra,

I, 10, 20). Thus, the passage in question attributing supreme beauty

to Brahman cannot be explained away, and it stands as stating a

fundamental character of ultimate reality, according to the

Chhāndogya.

There is a further point made in the comments quoted from the

Vākyakāra and Dramiḍāchārya in the Vedārtha-saṅgraha. They

are quoted as insisting that the beauty of God is a fact, because it is

apprehended by only a pure mind. The purity of the apprehending

mind guarantees the objectivity of what is apprehended. The text

adds that the Being spoken of here transcends all sin and that he who

comprehends it rises above the realm of sin. The attribute of

beauty is shown thereby to have as much of metaphysical ultimacy

as that of holiness.

SĀNDILYA-VIDYĀ

The justly celebrated section of the Chhāndogya (III. 14),

traditionally named Sāndilya-vidyā, is discussed in Brahma-Sūtra

(I. 2. 1). Its general import is not subject to much dispute among

commentators. Saṅkara does not find it possible to understand it as

representing what he regards as the highest philosophy of the

Upanishads, as evidenced, for instance, in what he says about it

in his commentary on it. He holds that it is inferior

to the sixth and seventh chapters of the Upanishad on the

ground that it pertains to the lower Brahman. In his commentary

on the Sūtra (III. 2. 11), he takes it as an illustration of the

savisesha exposition of Brahman, which is supposed to be

superseded by the niravisesha point of view. It is heartening to

note that the import of Śāndilya-vidyā as lying in a determinate

and cosmic Brahman is unambiguously acknowledged.

The estimate of it on the part of Advaita is not very disturbing to

a commentator like Rāmānuja, for whom the assumptions underlying

that estimate carry no conviction. It is yet to be proved that the

sixth and seventh chapters of the Chhāndogya teach what they are

supposed to teach, namely, Sañkarite non-dualism. It is also to be

established that the Upanishads contain anywhere the doctrine of a

Brahman both attributeless and acosmic. Even if they do, the

philosophy according to which such an Absolutism is the highest

truth, is yet to be vindicated. Until these assumptions are fully

demonstrated to be true, the relative estimate damaging the

philosophic claims of Sāndilya-vidyā is of no force. But the

admission that it proclaims Brahman as characterized by attributes

and as involved in the processes of the cosmos is of paramount value,

as far as the interpretation of it is concerned.

We may now try to understand Rāmānuja's elucidation of the

section as a whole. It begins thus: "Sarvam khalvidam Brahma-

Tajjalān iti tānta upāsīta" (III. 14. 1). We may translate it :

"All this is verily Brahman, because all this originates from,

ends in and subsists through Brahman. Hence one should meditate

on Brahman, having acquired mastery over the passions leading one

astray".

An identity statement such as 'All this is Brahman' may be

interpreted in several ways. (a) It may mean that Brahman is

superposed on 'all' for some specific purpose, even though 'all' is not

Brahman. (b) It may mean that what we take to be 'all', the

empirical manifold of existence, is not real and only Brahman is

real. The identification is for purposes of cancelling the affirmation

of 'all' and substituting, in its place, the affirmation of Brahman.

(c) It may mean that Brahman is really identical in substance with

all. This identity is of no value, if by 'Brahman' we mean nothing

36

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

over and above what we mean by 'all'. Such an identity amounts

to a denial of Brahman.

The alternative (d) is actually a denial of 'all'. The alter-

native (a) makes the identification a provisional expedient

not to be taken as serious truth. An illusionist monism which

denies the world of plurality, and a pantheism which denies the

transcendence of Brahman altogether are not legitimate imports of

an identity-statement such as the one under consideration. The

passage itself specifies the nature of the identity between Brahman

and 'the all'.

The world of plurality signified here by 'all this' is said to

originate from Brahman, to end 'in' Brahman and to subsist in

'Brahman'. It is on the ground of Brahman being the source, final

resort and sustaining ground that the world is said to be Brahman.

Brahman's transcendence of the world is not discarded, for to deny

the transcendence of Brahman is to deny Brahman. But

transcendence does not mean being out of relation or being merely

distinct. That would reduce Brahman to the status of one real

among other realities and render it finite. It means that the one

includes the many and is also what it is in itself. Rather, it includes

by virtue of what it is in itself. Thus, transcendence without

immanence cannot be the characteristic of the Infinite Reality.

What exactly does immanence mean? Can it mean that it is in

the finite in such a way that the finite is pushed out of reality by

this very permeation? This negativistic notion of immanence makes

the idea meaningless, as there is nothing in which Brahman is

immanent. Immanence can be conceived of as the presence of the

infinite in the finite, establishing the latter in existence and

continually imparting to it the power to be. That would make

immanence an affirmative and life-giving pervasion. It is this kind of

the immanence of the transcendent, an immanence that makes the

world of the many and does not negative it that is posited here The

realm of the finites is real, but it is real on account of the presence

of the infinite in it. It is this Brahman as sustaining the many that

the Upanishad holds forth as the object of meditation.

The text proceeds further. 'Atha khalu kratumayah purusho,

yathakratür asmin loke purusho bhavati tathetah prētya bhavati,

sa kratuṁ kuroīta" (III. 14. 1). " Man is indeed of the nature of deed. What he does here, he becomes when he dies. So let him do." Man's future is determined by what he does in the present. Therefore, let him engage himself in the present in the meditation on Brahman. Then, an account of Brahman's nature is offered. Brahman is manomaya, i.e., can be apprehended only by the pure mind. He is prāṇa-sāra, all life is His body. He is bhā-rūpa, supremely effulgent in form. He is satya-sañkalpa, His will knows no obstacles. There is no counterforce in existence that could thwart it. He is ākāśāatma: pervasive and pure like space, He is the soul of even space in which all beings take birth. He is luminous and sheds light on everything. He is sarva-karma : the entire universe is His work and all activities are His activities. He is satya-kāma : all objects of desire are His. He is sarva-rasa and sarva-gandha the abode of all sweet fragrances and all fine tastes. In other words, all sensuous splendours adorn Him. He has appropriated all this. He is avākī, speechless, because He is full and perfect, anāda.

Thus the Reality spoken of as Brahman is shown to be immanent in all existence as the sustaining ground and as characterized by exalted qualities constitutive of supreme perfection. This perfect and all-maintaining Spirit is said to dwell in the heart of man. The devotee has to see Him within his own inner being, as having established Himself there in a subtler-than-the-subtlest form. " Esha me Ātmā antarkṣidaya apiyān " (III. 14. 3).25

This installation of the Supreme Being, in the subtlest form, in the heart of the individual, is due to His compassion and He thereby makes Himself available for devout meditation. Even under this condition of subtlety, put on out of compassion, the natural infinity is not abrogated. His incomparable immensity and qualitative majesty are paradoxically present even in this self-imposed diminution. " Bsha me Ātmā anturhṛidaye jyāyān " (Ibid.).26 The ingression out of compassion and the absence of the loss of natural perfection thereby are additional perfections, and the total

25 "He is my Self within the heart exceedingly small".

26 "He is my Self within the heart, exceedingly great".

38

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

situation brings out the farther glory of God's inward appropriation

of the worlds. He who meditates on Brahman of this nature is said

to attain Him. He who meditates with certitude about Brahman

and about eventually attaining Him will attain Him assuredly.

"Esha me Ātmā antarhridaya etad Brahma. Etam itah pretya

abhisam̄bhavitāsmi iti yasya syād addhā na vichikits̆sti"

(III. 14, 4).27. "So said Sāndilya, (so said) Sāndilya" are the

concluding words of assertion : "Iti ha smāha Sāndilyah"

Sāndilyah" (Ibid).

Brahman is possessed of transcendent perfections and is the

power creating, sustaining and withdrawing the worlds. He takes

residence, as it were, in the centre of the individual for purposes of

his redemption, and even in this confined condition retains all His

infinitude. Such a descent and the resultant uplift of the individual

constitute additional aspects of perfection.

The Brahma-Sūtra makes clear, according to Rāmānuja, that

Brahman, whose attainment constitutes perfection for the individual,

meditation on whom brings about that consummation, who dwells

within the self of the meditating devotee, whose immensity and

perfections are affirmed therein and who is said to be the source,

sustenance and final resort of the universe, is not to be confounded

with the jīva, the finite individual self. No wonder the text is

relegated to a secondary status by Advaita. In fact, all passages so

relegated are found to be unyielding in their proclamation of a

determinate and cosmic Brahman, and it is to the seemingly less

certain passages that the interpreters of acosmic predilection should

resort as a haven of refuge. Whether the latter are dubious enough for

such exploitation is to be ascertained in the sequel, and the measure

of success obtained by such interpretation is also to be evaluated.

SAD-VIDYĀ

We now come to what is named Sadvidyā by tradition on the

ground that the term 'Sat' is its choice for designating the

Ultimate Reality. The whole of the sixth chapter of the Chhāndogya

27. "He is my Self within the heart, He is Brahman. After departing

from this world, I attain Him. He who has this conviction, to him there is no

doubt".

THE CHHANDOGYĀ

39

is taken up by this section. It consists of the sage Uddālaka's teaching to his son, Svetaketu. The teaching contains the most important declaration, ‘Tat-tvam-asi’, and Advaita Vedānta regards that as the final doctrine. Apart from this exaltation of the text on the part of Advaita, its intrinsic significance is also of the highest level in the view of the Brahma-Sūtra. Bādarāyana discusses it in several crucial adhikaranas. At least, the following contexts may be mentioned : I. 1. 5 ; I. 4. 23 ; II. 1. 5 ; II. 4. 17 ; IV. 1. 15 ; and IV. 2. 1. Apart from these specific adhikaranas, there is an extensive utilization and repeated elucidation of its purport in almost the whole of Srībhāshya. The main theme of Vedārtha-sangraha seems to be the interpretation of this fundamental text, if we examine the opening argument of the work. We may argue that Rāmānuja undertook to defend his philosophy as the import of this Vidyā, specially to counteract the ‘prevailing presumption’ that ‘Tattvamasi’ stands for pure Advaita of the Saṅkarite type. It would, of course, be unfair to urge, on the strength of other passages, that the Upanishads teach Dvaita or Viśishtādvaita. But he and his tradition value the text on its own merits, even apart from the requirements of polemical fairness. Śaṅkara Śrī remarks that it fulfils best the sixfold criterion governing authenticity upakrama and upasaṃhāra, abhyāsa, apūrvaatā, upapatti, arthapāṭa and phala.28 (Vedārthasangraha, 129).

Śvetaketu returns from his preceptor, puffed up with pride of learning. His father, Uddālaka, asks him : “Tamādeśam apraakshyah. Yena aśrutam śrutam bhavati, amatam matam, avijñātam vijñātam”? (VI. 1. 2-3). It means, according to Rāmānuja : “Have you enquired about that Ādeśa, by which the unheard becomes heard, the unthought about becomes thought about, and the uncomprehended becomes comprehended ?” Hearing, thinking and comprehending are too close to the śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana of the Brīhadāraṇyaka to be construed as

28. In exegesis the meaning of scriptural passages is determined with the help of the six criteria of 'the commencement-cum-conclusion, repetition, newness, being reasonable and appropriate, laudatory statements and declared results '.

40

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

intellectual processes different from those laid down in the other Upanishad. Ādeśa, for Rāmānuja, means God by whose command the worlds are ruled. The grammar of this exegesis is justified at length by Sudarśana Sūri and Vedānta Deśika. The question signifies that there is a supreme spiritual principle, by understanding which we understand the world of variety presented to empirical consciousness. In short, there is a unity at the heart of reality, and to grasp it is to comprehend the world of plurality in principle.

Rāmānuja sets aside the possible misinterpretation of this idea, that when we understand the One, we understand the unreality of the many. The Monistic thesis enunciated here is the same that Yājñavalkya propounds in his discourse to Maitreyī and that Śaunaka implies in his question to Añgiras in the Munḍaka. If the many is a false appearance of the One, on the comprehension of the One, the many simply cease as presentations, and they, having been so for objects of hearing, thought and comprehension, cease to be so hereafter. It is the sublation of the many and not its comprehension that issues from the understanding of the One in that case. Unless the knowledge of the One includes, in a positive sense, the knowledge of the many, the proposition underlying Uddālaka's question becomes meaningless.

Svetaketu is puzzled and wants to know how the knowledge of one thing can include the knowledge of anything else. He is still at the pluralistic stage of thought. Then Uddālaka removes the perplexity by introducing the idea of causation. He says that by understanding the properties of clay, we can understand the properties of clay-products. He also instances the cases of gold and golden articles, iron and iron-articles. He says that the effect is 'vāchārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mittiketyeva satyam' (VI. 1. 4), that is, is "modification, as also the name attained (by the cause, i.e., clay) for the purpose of speech to be followed by action: it (i.e., the effect) is all real as clay itself." On the strength of this passage, the unreality of the effect is asserted. Rāmānuja dissents from this exegesis and holds that the passage simply means that the cause itself acquires a new name and a new shape for purposes of fulfilling new uses. The clay-product is real only as clay. Not that the product is unreal, but that it is real only as a modification of clay.

THE CHHANDOGYA

41

Even if the principle of causation is admitted, the monistic proposition does not get to be intelligible, unless the entire world of plurality is shown to be the effect of a single cause.

The next assertion in the text meets that requirement. It is to this effect : "Sadēva somya idam agra āsit, ēkamēvā-dvītīyam" (VI. 2.1). It means : "This (world) was Being alone in the beginning, one only, without a second". Before creation, the world was one with Being. It was not non-existent, but existent in Being. This part of the sentence means for Rāmānuja the formulation of the Satkārya-vāda. The text expressly denies that non-being was the origin of the world. It objects : How can what is arise from a state of total non-being ? That means that the effect which is, could not come out of a cause in which it was not. The objection proves the existence of the effect in the cause on the ground that it is now. Far from annulling the reality of the effect, the argument makes reference to the reality of the effect for proving its existence anterior to its production.

This Being was 'one only'. For Rāmānuja the phrase means that it was not yet divided into a multiplicity in terms of names and forms. It was the undifferentiated potentiality of the multifarious world yet to be generated. It was 'without a second'. It was not simple matter for a conscious being to work upon and shape it into the world. It was itself that Supreme Conscious Self. Herein the material and efficient cause coincide, for the Primordial Being is omni-competent. That this is the meaning of 'without a second' is initially hinted at by the term, 'Ādēśa', and is clearly established in what follows immediately.

"The Being saw: 'Let me become many. Let me multiply'" (Tadaikshata bahusyām prajāyeya VI. 2.3) The language of this resolve on the part of the Being is significant. It desired to 'become' many and therefore 'to multiply'. This is not a case of 'making' but of 'becoming'. Hence, the identity of the material and spiritual causes is clearly brought out. The Being comes to be described here as exercising volition. "Tattejo'srijata. 'Tatteja ākshata bahu syām prajāyeyeti. Tadato'srijata...Tā āpa ākshanta bahuyah syāma prajāyemahiti. Tā annam asrijanta" (VI. 2. 3-4). "That (Being) created light. The light resolved, 'That I become many. Let me multiply'. It created water. The water resolved, 'May we become many. May we multiply'. They created food.

RC—6

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SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

' Let me be many and multiply'. It created the waters....The waters resolved, 'Let us become many and multiply'. So they created anna, the earth.

The progressive formation of the three primary elements is thus narrated. These three are given as illustrative of the creation of all the five elements. It is not that God willed light into being and afterwards light itself created the further factors. He enters into light and through it continues further creation. There is nothing that is not directly created by Him. This is the significance of attributing creative will to light and the waters. Embodied in them, he Creative Being fashions the next phases of creation.

These three elements, Deussen argues, suggested in latter hought the conception of the three gunas. It is hardly a tenable ypothesis. These are physical elements. But the gunas are definable only in relation to percipient purusas. The number hree and the ascription of colours to the three elements. red, white nd dark, have given rise to the wrong conjecture. The colours of he elements are sensed, while the colours ascribed to the gunas are sychical in character.

The Upanishad proceeds further and says : " Seyam tevataikshata hantāham imās tisro devatā anena jīvenātmanā-rupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāniti. Tāsaṁ trivritam rivritam ekaikām karavāniti, seyam devatās tisre devatā tenaiva jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākarot " VI. 3. 2-3).29 The Being, called the Ādeśa to start with and to which creative volition has been ascribed, comes to be described as he Deity now. The Deity, in question, resolved to make each lement threefold, by mixing them up appropriately to enter into hem, 'through this Ātman, the jīva', and differentiate names nd forms.

29. "This aforesaid Deity resolved, 'Indeed, entering those three eities (i.e., the elements of fire, water and earth) as the individual self hich is (a part c?) Myself, I evolve the differentiation of names and forms ; will make each of these tripartite, tripartite '. This aforesaid Deity, ntering these three deities as the individual self which is the Self, evolved is differentiation of names and forms "

THE CHHANDOGYA

43

Differentiation of names and forms just means the changing of

Its unmanifest being into clear manifestation in the form of the world

of diversity. The elements originally brought into being by the

Deity are mixed up, so that in each element you can see the other

elements also in some proportion. The Upanishad elaborately

works out this idea of the intermingling of elements. Into these

elements the Deity entered and gave them names and forms. As It

has entered them for that purpose, the names and forms given to the

elements and their products are names and forms of the Deity Itself

in Its condition of embodiment in them. In other words, the

Creative Principle took its abode in the creatures and rendered them

existent enough to bear names and acquire forms. Ultimately, all

names and forms are names and forms of the Indwelling Spirit.

The Upanishad says that the Deity resolved to enter the

elements and did so 'through this Ātman, the jīva'. The account

of entry causes difficulty to the interpreter. Does it mean that the

Deity entered the elements along with the jīva, suggesting something

analogous to the picture of two birds on the self-same tree? It cannot

be so interpreted. There is no basis for construing that the Deity

entered and also the jīva. There is no indication to show that the

two beings entered on an equal footing, nor does it mean that the

Deity entered through the instrumentality of the 'jīva'. The

jīva could never be a facilitating factor in the process. Nor can the

passage mean that the Deity only entered. Nor again can it mean

that it caused the jīva only to enter. Both the jīva and the Deity

must enter, but as one and not as two.

There are thus only two possible interpretations. It may be

that the Supreme Deity took on the character of the jīva, the

individual self, and entered. The difficulty in that position is to

admit individuation antecedent to the passage into matter. The

normal Advaitic view is that individuation results from embodiment

and is not its presupposition. The other possible view is that the

Deity takes up the individual self as its own body and that it enters

into the material world as embodied in the individual self. This is

the interpretation adopted by Rāmānuja. The Supreme Spirit enters,

clothed with the jīva as Its own body. To put it otherwise, the

jīva is caused to enter, carrying within itself the Supreme Devatā

as its own soul. It is not that the selves enter by separate acts of

44

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

entry ; only the one Supreme Self enters. But it enters the jīva first and appropriates it as Its own body. This entry into the jīva is maintained in the Taittirīya (II. 6) also. Then It enters the physical elements, appropriating them also as Its body.

The Deity has two bodies, first the individual self and then matter. Matter is the body of the individual self which is itself the body of the Deity, and is thus ultimately the body of the latter. The resulting manifold of names and forms applies to the material objects, through them to the selves incarnate in them and through these to the Ultimate Self dwelling in them. It is not that anything is at any stage bereft of the inner presence of the Deity for making the entry spoken of here and elsewhere in the Upanishads intelligible. There is no temporal commencement for Divine immanence. All that is meant is that the indwelling Deity wills to continue Its immanence in the altered state of explicit and manifested being of what It already dwells in.

The Upanishad gathers the various threads of thought and frames a comprehensive statement. It says : “Sanmūlāḥ somyemāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatanāḥ satpratishṭhāḥ” (VI. 8. 4, 6). The summary almost repeats in a clearer form the ‘Tajjalān’ (III. 14. 1) of the Śāndilya-vidyā. It means that all these creatures have Sat, the Primordial Being, as their source, have It as their sustaining principle when they are, and take shelter in It when they pass out of manifest existence. One of the two Taittirīya definitions coincides with this. Yet the Upanishads are supposed to set forth divergent currents of thought.

The nature of the Fundamental Being is sought to be conveyed by a series of analogies. That all beings, though so full of Sat, are unaware of It, is rendered intelligible by the analogy of honey (VI. 9) and rivers (VI. 10). That death means the departure of the spirit and not its cessation is conveyed by the analogy of the tree that withers away when the life-principle leaves it (VI. 11) That the individual soul sinks into Sat during deep sleep and death, and thus relapses to the causal state is also brought out (VI. 8). It does not perish in those states, but enjoys the joy of union with Brahman, undistracted by the concerns of the outer world of which it is unaware then. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka (IV. 3. 21) explains the state of sleep

by the analogy of the embrace of lovers. The Chhāndogya proceeds

to explain how what is too subtle for human comprehension is yet

the cause of the immeasurably vast universe : it is explained with the

help of the analogy of the invisible seed growing into a mighty

nyagrodha tree (VI. 12). Just as the salt that has dissolved in

water cannot be seen, but assuredly exists, because it can be tasted,

the Sat, not knowable by ways of ordinary knowledge, can yet be

apprehended by a method of knowledge suited to Its nature. Just as

a man kidnapped, blindfolded and released in an unknown country,

can return to his native land in due course through the direction of

others who know, men ignorant of the Sat can acquire knowledge

from the wise āchāryas (VI. 13, 14).

Incidentally, it is remarked that the final attainment of the Sat

occurs just when man is released from the bonds that tie him to the

earthly life. "Tasya tāvadeva chiram yāvan na vimokshye

atha sampatsye" (VI. 14. 2).30 This lays the foundation for the

standard doctrine of Vedānta that the prārabdha karma31 is

destructible only through its effects being undergone, while all other

forms of karma are liquidated through the knowledge of Brahman.

As in a trial by ordeal the honest man gets exonerated, there is

certainty that one who'knows the Sat will'realize perfection (VI. 16).

It is to be noted that Rāmānuja does not offer explanations of the

seven analogies, though what they aim at clarifying form part

of his exegesis of the Sad-vidyā as a whole.

Now we come to what may legitimately be regarded as the

-central affirmation of the Sad-vidyā and the text itself leaves us in

no doubt with regard to the weight it attaches to it. The statement

30. "So long as he is not freed from this body, so long there is

delay for him ; then he will be blessed '

31. Karma (or the effect of past deeds) that has begun to yield results

is prārabdha: the accumulated karma awaiting fructification is sañchita'

the results of present and future deeds are āgāmi, to be experienced in

some future birth or births. Every birth is due to a part of the accumulated

karma beginning to yield results. and the course of life in that birth is

determined by this prārabdha-karma.

46

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

is made nine times32 in a more or less systematic fashion in the

course of a growing presentation. It is evident that everything in the

dialogue is meant to lead up to this doctrinal climax: “Aitadātmyam

idam sarvaṁ. Tatsatyaṁ. Sa Ātmā. Tattvamasi S'vetaketo ”.33

It is desirable to go over each sentence in this declaration.

“Aitadātm yam idaṁ sarvam” . The sentence means, for

Rāmānuja, that all this, namely, the world of physical nature and

finite selves, is ensouled by the Supreme Being. The world is the

cosmic body of the Sat and has It as its soul.

“Tatsatyam ”. It is only by virtue of this immanence that the

world is real. Apart from this relation to the Supreme, it has no

reality.

“Sa Ātmā ”. He, the Lord, the Ādeśa, the Sat, the Supreme

Deity, who willed it into existence and entered into it in order to

impart to it concreteness of being, is its soul. While the first

sentence posits the relation from the standpoint of the world, this

sentence reaffirms it from the standpoint of the Supreme Brahman.

The fourth sentence in the passage is the conclusion of the

conclusion. “Tattvam-asi ”. This contains the culmination of

the philosophical vision of Uddālaka. The term, ‘Tat’ (that),

was one without a second before creation, which brought forth the

world and which sustains it from within in its manifested condition

of actuality. It also signifies all the attributes implied by the fact

that it produces the world ‘Tat’ (that) must bear all this richness

of connotation in order to be really meaningful.

‘Tvam ’, meaning ‘thou’, refers in the discourse to S'vetaktu,

and it should be taken as standing for the individual. What is the

32. VI. 8. 7; VI. 9. 4; VI. 10.3 ; VI. 11. 3 ; VI. 12. 3 ; VI. 13. 3 ;

VI. 14. 3 ; VI. 15. 3 and VI. 16. 3.

33. “All this has that (Sat or Brahman) for its Self. It is real (in

consequence thereof). He (Brahman) is the Self. That you are, O

Svetaketu.”

THE CHHANDOGYA

exact scope of its reference? It is involved in this studious detailing all

the mighty battles of Vedānta are wrought. We will undertake all

pole­mics and focus on Rāmā­n­uja’s positive undertanding of the

con­cept of ‘tvam’.

In the first place, it cannot refer merely to the physical

personality, which cannot be addressed and cannot be the recipient

of philosophical wisdom, So ‘tvam’ does not mean the body.

Does it mean the individual self/spirit and particular, named (the

jīva)? The dis­course, while explaining the entry of the Self within the

world of particulars, has made it clear ‘that the finite will not

even exist if the Supreme Self does not dwell in it. No term

applicable to the individual self is applicable only to it. Its

reference must extend to the indwelling Divine Principle also. In

fact, this reference to the higher reality is the primary denotation.

This applies to the terms, ‘tat’ ‘y­am’ too. All names and terms are

ultimately names and forms of the Supreme Self. Therefore, ‘tvam’

must be taken as signifying the Ultimate Self. The specificity of

this term, as different from the term ‘tat’, is that it signifies the

Divine Self as dwelling within the human self, the ‘total­ketu, which

itself dwells within the body of Svetaketu. In this totality that is

described as ‘tvam’, and in that totality the principal factor is the

immanent Divine Self and the subsidiary factor ‘the totality’ of

Svetaketu, in relation to which his body is the subsidiary factor. So

‘tvam’ (that ‘which’ ‘thou art’) is implicit in the

tad­vidvat.

The ‘verb ‘asti’ means ‘is’; the second person present

indicative singular, and effects the identification of the remaining of

‘Tat’ and ‘tvam’’. The causal Brahman is identified ‘with’ the

Brahman immanent in the effect. It is this level of self-knowledge

that Uddālaka forbid wanting in his son, and he accordingly imparts

it to him.

A slight indication of the way in which this text, ‘Tat-tvam-

asi’, is interpreted in Advaita may be brought in at this stage to

show why Rāmā­nuja rejects it as untenable. That would perhaps

bring the principle of his interpretation into clearer relief. On the

Advaita interpretation also, the term ‘tat’ stands initially for

Brahman, the source of the universe characterized by all

48

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

characteristics implied in being that. The word, ‘tvam’, stands initially for the individual self, subject to all imperfections characteristic of the finite individual. The identification of tat and tvam is certainly impossible as such.

Hence a drastic revision of their connotations must be worked out to facilitate the identification. In the revised scheme, all that the word ‘tát’ means by virtue of Brahman’s creatorship of the world gets abolished. Only the idea of Brahman being infinite and non-dual remains. In the same way, all that is understood by the word, ‘jīva’, its finitude, its subjection to evil, is to be rejected. Only its being the immediate and self-evident subject of knowledge is to be retained. The resulting import ‘that’ enters but of the identification is that the self signified by ‘that’ is immediate and infinite.

The double pruning down of the connotations of the two terms constitutes a great deal. The entire thought that Brahman is the creative source of the world is to be abandoned. The finiteness and evil associated with the individual self must be given just creations of misunderstanding and error. Rāmānuja rebuts this interpretation repeatedly, and most thoroughly in his Anandamayādhikarana as also in the Vedārthasamgraha. The gist of his argument can be indicated.

The whole of the Sadvidyā upto the declaration ‘Tattvamasi’ builds up the conception of Brahman as the source, and sustaining soul of the cosmos. It is on that premise that ‘Tattoamasi’ is constructed. One cannot demolish the premise and enjoy the conclusion. The ‘tat’ vanishes into nothingness, if every attribute distinguishing Brahman is drastically cut out. The subjection to evil characterising the jīva cannot be abolished by the hypothesis that it is just a fabrication of error. The liability to such an error is itself a fundamental evil, and as long as that is admitted, the identification of the jīva with the perfect Self is an absurd proposition. The pruning proposed is utterly unwarrantable. Hence Rāmānuja suggests that ‘tvam’ must not be methodologically understood as standing for the jīva but for the Supreme Self immanent in the jīva. Brahman which is the ground of the world is identified with Brahman, the ultimate self of all

THE CHANDOGYA

49

individual

self. This general thesis already propounded in the

sentences,

"Ātadatmyam idam sarvam. Tattvam asi

Ātmā", is particularized in conclusion, with reference to Śrībhāṣya,

in 'Tat-tvam-asi'.*

An impartial scrutiny of these two interpretations will disclose

an identity of intention in so far as both the commentators strive to

effect the signification of Brahman by both 'tat' and 'tvam'. On

the Advaitic view, to achieve that signification, Brahman should

be stripped of Its cosmic aspect, Its actual cosmic operations and all

that such operations imply by way of powers and

The individual also should be conceived as bereft of all

that constitutes his individuality and, in particular, the specific imperfections that make

him what he is in his mundane career. But the liability to such

self-imposed illusions is an imperfection that clings ineradicably.

• Advaita has a partiality for the negative descriptions of the

Ultimate. Saṅkara says that when absolute truth is to be conveyed, the

Upanishads adopt the negative method. (Brh. Up. Bhāṣya, II. 3). But

Sarvajñātma-muni holds that between the negative and positive statements,

the latter are of a higher status (Saṅkṣepasāriṅka, 122-126). While

Sureśvara interprets even 'Aham Brahmāsmi' which is but an

experiential rendering of 'Tattvamasi', as representing a negation. This is what is

called 'badha-bhūtārthadṛṣṭyā' (Naiṣkarmya-siddhi II. 29), or

'coordinate predication for purposes of sublation'.

But the author of the Vivarana seems to repudiate the negative mode

of interpretation outlined above. (See Pañcapañcikā, VII. 48,). Attribution

of two different features to Brahman through the terms, 'tat' and 'tvam', is

often construed as importing into It distinctions by way of such predicates.

For this reason, the terms, it is urged, must be interpreted as simply

negating what is opposed to their connotations and not as predicating

anything positively of the subject. The position is untenable for two

reasons. First, negative predication also does import the kind of

distinction sought to be avoided, unless it is utterly meaningless. Secondly,

negation to be significant must have a positive basis. So, in general and

with particular reference to 'Tattvamasi', the negativistic interpretation,

it is argued by Rāmānuja, is logically unsound. S. S. R.

RU -- 7

THE CHHANDOGYA

51

What is this prāṇa? Is it mere life-breath? Rāmānuja discards that identification. In the first place, the text speaks of prāṇa as father and mother. In the second place, it considers it as liable to be unkindly treated and injured. In the third place, the individual soul is so invariably associated with prāṇa that one could refer to it as 'prāṇa'. It could not be an inanimate and non-sentient principle. It has to be identified with the jīva, the individual self.

Nārada seems to be satisfied with this climax and does not enquire as to what is higher than prāṇa, as he invariably did with respect to every previously enunciated lower principle. Then, the preceptor himself introduces a new category under the name of 'Satya' and says that he who is devoted to Satya is an ativrādin. Nārada wants to be instructed about this principle and wants to become the ativrādin of Satya. Here the problem is whether the category of prāṇa itself is carried forward and the Satya spoken of is just truthfulness as a part of devotion to prāṇa. Every commentator strongly protests against this interpretation and all contend that Satya is a higher category and that the teacher is inducting Nārada to a higher and, indeed, the final plane of devotion. There is the extremely favourable word, 'tu' (but), in the sentence introducing Satya.

The teacher proceeds to indicate the steps necessary for the attainment of Satya. They are 'vijnāna', 'manana', 'śraddhā' 'nishthā' and 'kīti'. Rāmānuja explains in detail the appropriateness of this hierarchy of means. But one does not undertake to exert oneself through this rather strenuous procedure, unless Satya is something that could bring fulfilment to the seeker, unless it is of the nature of sukha (joy). Nārada eagerly announces that he resolves to devote himself to sukha. Then Sanatkumāra frames a definition of sukha. He says that only the 'Bhūman', the infinite or the immense, is sukha, and there is no pleasure in what is trivial. This Bhūman, introduced as defining sukha, which in itself is identified with Satya, needs an explanatory definition.

It is easy to see that in the passage 'Satya' means Brahman, which for the Upanishads is the Real in an absolute sense. It is also an established thesis that Brahman is of the nature of sukha or

ānanda. The Taittirīya has contributed that substantial thought to

the characterization of Brahman and even the Chhāndogya has said

that Brahman is ‘khaṁ’ and ‘kaṁ’, ‘infinite joy’. The purport

of this passage is to add, to the definition of Brahman, the concept of

‘Bhūman’, another word for ‘khaṁ’ and ‘ananta’ of the

Taittirīya.

But it goes forward and elucidates in a remarkable manner the

notion of ‘Bhūman’. Sanatkumāra offers the following definition of

‘Bhūman’: “Yatra nānyat paśyati, nānyat śrinoti, nānyat

vijānāti, sa Bhūmā. Atha yatra anyat paśyati, anyat śrinoti,

anyat vijānāti tad alpam” (VII. 24. 1). This means: “Where

one does not see another, does not hear another, and does not know

another, that one is the Bhūman. Where one does see another, hear

another and know another, that is trivial”. This is the literal

rendering of the sentence. “Where” does really mean “that in the

experience of which” according to Rāmānuja.

It is easy to take the statement as meaning that, in the

experience of the Bhūman, there is no cognitive relation to an

object other than the subject. Saṅkara takes it in that sense. He

adds that exclusion of the knowing of the object may still leave room

for the supposition that the subject knows itself. Such a self-

cognition would imply that the knowing self is its own object. But

which is dualistic in so far as it involves dualism of aspects, if not

dualism of entities. It is also a self-contradictory notion of the self.

The integral non-dualism of the Ātman would stand negated by that

supposition. Hence, in reality, knowing another entity as well as

knowing itself must be denied of the Absolute Self. A total negation

of the cognitive process either directed towards an external object or

towards itself is the fact of the situation for Saṅkara.

Rāmānuja would object to this interpretation. The passage in

question goes on to speak of the Ātman as ahaṁ, ‘I’, whose nature

lies in self-affirmation. Knowing other entities, entities other than

the knowing self, is also definitely asserted in the text. A great deal

of knowing is described as happening within the knowing self, when

this experience of the Bhūman occurs. The knower of the Bhūman

not merely knows It, but knows that from It originates the entire

empirical world. Therefore, there is no question of the annihilation

of the cognitive process.

Then what does it actually mean for Rāmānuja? He takes the

implication of infinitude seriously. Brahman is infinite. The

infinite is that within which falls everything that exists. Therefore,

when one is knowing the infinite, either by way of seeing, or hearing,

or knowing, there is nothing that falls outside the range of his

vision. The knowing is all-inclusive in scope and leaves no residue.

The nature of the joy that flows from Bhūman is infinite, as Brahman

is infinite. Hence he who is in communion with Brahman by way

of knowing, knows no sorrow, for Brahman is infinitely blissful.

The all-comprehensive being of Brahman and the all-comprehensiveness

of the joy that a seeker finds in Brahman are the principal

points in this interpretation. The ontological and exiological

plenitude is the fundamental import of the passage.

Nārada asks: 'On what is the Bhūman established?'

Sanatkumāra answers that It is established in Its own glory, suc

mahimni. This is a case of self-dependence. Even this might

create the misconception that the Infinite Reality derives something

from Its glories. The preceptor hastens to correct and says that It

is not established in anything, not even in Its glory. It is not that

the glories are denied. Sudarśana Sūri (under Śribhāshya, I. 3. 7)

puts the point very precisely. 'Na mahimnishedhah, api tu

vibhūtiṣvūpamahimāpratiṣṭhitatva-niṣedhaḥ' 34 God's glories

are gifts and not investments. The creative self-manifestation of God

is for imparting life out of His own abundance and not for rectification

of His own deficiencies. As this urge for self-impartation is an

eternal attribute, He manifests Himself through eternity.

He, the Supreme Ātman, described as the Bhūman of this

nature, is all-pervading. In that sense, 'Sa eva idam sarvam'

(VII. 25. 1), He alone is all this After all, the Śāndilya-vidyā

which said, 'Sarvam khalu idam Brahma' (III. 14. 1), did not

34 'There is no denial of glory. But there is denial of His being

established in the glory of the form of lordship (over all things derived

and controlled)'

54

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

say anything else. If the Bhūman is all this, the knowing self does

not stand outside Its range of being. It too is penetrated by the

Infinite and has It as its inmost self. Hence, Sanatkumāra advances

to what he mānes "ahankārādeśa", contemplation of Brahman as

one's own ego. 'I am all this' is the culmination of this process.

Nārada lamented, to start with, his ignorance of the Ātman.

Now he is told that the Ātman is omnipresent. He is all this,

"Ātmaiva idam sarvam". Nārada was sorrowing and wanted to

be ferried beyond the river of sorrow. Sanatkumāra now declares

that he who sees, thinks and understands the Ātman will find in the

Ātman itself every type of joy. He becomes Ātmarati, Ātmakrīḍa,

Ātmanitthina, Ātmānanda and Soarāt. He gets to have the Self

for his saṁtisfactiōn, the Self for his sport, the Self for his enjoyment

and the Self for his rapture. He becomes his own ruler, he becomes

free.

This Ātman, called progressively 'Satya', 'Sukha',

'Bhūman' and 'Āhaṁ', was said to transcend prāṇa, which in its

turn was shown to transcend a multitude of lower principles. What

is the ontological fate of those principles?

The discourse answers that question too. He who sees, thinks

and knows this Ātman will realise all those lower categories beginning

with prāṇa down to mantras and karma as coming into being from

Brahman. Brahman's causal relation to the realm of finite

existent is definitively formulated. From the standpoint of supreme

illumination, the cosmic aspect of Brahman does not get annulled,

but is re-affirmed as part of the ultimate truth The Ātman is no

doubt transcendent, but is also immanent. The immanence of the

transcendent Absolute in creative involvement with the world of

finites is taken as an irreducible fact. 'Ātmata eva idam sarvam'

(VII. 26. 1). Only from the Self does everything come into being

He who knows this goes beyond all affliction and achieves all-sided

perfection (VII. 26. 2)

The dialogue seems to end with an immediately valuable and

practical direction. "Āhāraśuddau sattvaśuddhīḥ. Sattva-

śuddhau dhruvā smṛtiḥ. Smṛtilambha sarvagranthinām

THE CHĀNDOGYÁ

55

oigromokshah" (VII. 26. 2).35 In the purity of food impregnated

here Rāmānuja sees the main principle of karma-yoga as explained

in his commentary on the Gītā. The purity of mind is the resultant

thereof. In the pure mind, dhyānā smriti or steady recollection

of the Lord arises. This for Rāmānuja is bhakti. Only the element

of love positrd in the Muṇḍaka and Katha must be,added to make

the smṛiti fall-fledged bhakti. When this bhakti is ripened into

fullness the letters of the soul drop off. Such is Rāmānuja's

understanding of the Bhūma-vidyā.

DAHARA-VIDYĀ

The eighth chapter of the Chhāndogya contains what is

traditionally called Dahara-vidyā. Its importance is fairly well-

established. There are versions of it in the Taittirīya (IV) and in

the Bṛhadāraṇyaka discourse of Yājñavalkya to Jāthṛ. As its

main purport seems to be the delineation of the Supreme Self as

residing in the heart of man, the parallelism extends even further.

The Saṃditya-vidyā, the Sad-vidyā and the Antar-yāmi-

brāhmaṇa are not far removed from this in their subject-matter.

The conception of Brahman as transcendent but still dwelling in the

centre of the individual, may even be claimed to be the fundamental

doctrine of the Upanishads. One will not be far wrong, if one

recognizes the Dahara-vidyā as a focal text in the entire bulk of

Upanishadic literature.

While this is the general impression, one is struck by Saṅkara's

attitude to it. He is of opinion that it does not embody the highest

teaching of Vedānta, but offers only a lower conception of Brahman

out of consideration for the dull-witted. This is a revealing

judgement and proves forcefully that this part of the Chhāndogya

does not present the concept of Brahman that Saṅkara regarded as

the true one. The depreciation may be questioned, and it may even

35. "When food is pure, the mind is pure. When the mind is pure,

the memory is firm. When (such) memory is obtained, there is the

loosenning of all knots."

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be doubted whether any other part of this major Upanishad propounds an attributeless and acosmic Brahman. But the admission that the vidyā in question does not support such a conception is a major gain for an exponent of the Upanishads who reads in them a philosophy other than that of Saṅkara. Even while introducing the chapter, Saṅkara announces that it concerns itself with a lower order of thought. Again, in the Sūtra-bhāshya, he maintains that the Dahara-vidyā of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka is higher (as it teaches Nirguṇa-Brahman) than this Chhāndogya text, which, according to him, represents Brahman as saguṇa. (Br. Sū. III. 2. 39). It must also be added that he does find difficulty in interpreting the Brahman of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Dahara-vidyā as wholly nirguṇa, but the incongruent elements in that passage are set aside as mere stuti. Whatever may be the final philosophy of Brahman in the Upanishads, the interpretation of the eighth chapter of the Chhāndogya is comparatively free from controversies, as it is recognized by all commentators as setting forth the Saguna-Brahman.

The Śrībhāshya discusses the chapter rather elaborately under I. 3. 13 and briefly under III. 3. 40. The Vedārtha-saṅgraha also elucidates the main points. So, there is ample interpretative material in the works of Rāmānuja bearing on the present passage. The human body is named the city of Brahman. The lotus-like heart within it is called the palace or temple within the city. In that abode there is a 'dahara ākāśa', subtle space and that subtle space itself must be investigated. The wording of the text is not clear whether the subtle space is also specified as the object of investigation. Rāmānuja exercises a great deal of exegetical subtlety and maintains that both the small space and what exists in it are to be investigated according to the text.

This space is identified with Brahman It can mean neither physical space, nor the individual self. The subsequent description of the space is provided to establish this identification. What is that which lies within the so-called space in the heart? Rāmānuja takes pains both in the Śrībhāshya and Vedārtha-saṅgraha to refute the suggestion that there is a Principle or Deity higher than the Dahara ākāśa 'dwelling in it. There seems to have been an ancient prima facie view, named 'Vyomātīta-vāda' in

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Viśishtādvaitic literature, which posited a Being higher than this principle of 'subtle space' in the heart. The text itself clarifies the position perfectly according to Rāmānuja, and he cites a more ancient authority in support, namely, the Vākyakāra.

That inner space is actually as vast as the outer space, and it contains within itself the immensity of the entire universe, with the earth and the heavens, all fires, all air, the sun and the moon, lightning and stars, all that is by way of pleasures and all objects of all aspiration. The substantive Brahman and the infinitude of Its contents, by way of all existents and values, must be made the object of contemplation. This Principle does not age even if It dwells in what ages, does not cease to be though It inhabits the perishable.

It is the Supreme Ātman. This Ātman is Satya and is the Brahman that is the abode of all. He contains perfections beyond number. He is apahatapāpman, (sinless), vijara (unaging), vimṛityu, (deathless), viśoka (sorrowless), vījighatsa (free from hunger), apipāsa (free from thirst), satyakāma (self-fulfilled) and satyasankalpa (self-fulfilling).

This string of predicates has a unique significance. In the first place, there are both negative and positive predicates. The negative predicates consietently deny, of Brahman, imperfections. The principle underlying negative accounts of Ultimate Reality is elucidated thereby. A general denial gets exactly determined through such particular negations. When Brahman is said to be attributeless, it just means that no attributes of the nature of imperfection characterize It. This is the Logical rule of exegesis called 'sāmānya-viseṣha-nyāya' which brings down the general to the particular. Further, the negative characterization of Brahman, however generally worded, must so restrict itself as to leave the affirmative characterisations actually formulated untouched. This is called utsargā-pavāda-nyāya which determines the force of exceptions to a general rule. In the present statement, the negations do not nullify the positive attributes, 'satyakāma' and 'satyasankalpa'. Thus, there is a twofold restriction in the interpretation of the negative predicates. A general negation has its scope delimited by the particular negations, and it is also limited by the actually asserted affirmative predicates

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The text proceeds further and tells of those who know nothing of

this Ātman and His attributes. They attain both in this life and

after death only perishable and limited pleasures. They are not

free. On the other hand, those who understand this Ātman and

His perfections attain everlasting good. They achieve freedom.

What prevents the appreciation of the exalted attributes of the Ātman

is called 'anrita'. The word means for Rāmānuja 'karma', as a

result of which Brahman's nature stands concealed from our view.

The situation is graphically pictured with an analogy. If there

is a great treasure buried underground and people above it are

unaware of its presence, it is so near them and still it is not theirs.

Similarly, Brahman lies very near us. It is in our own selves, and

we move about always in the greatest proximity to It, but still we

do not discover It, covered as our vision is by anrita. Brahman is

the supreme treasure hidden by our own unrigteousness.

When the jīva approaches this supreme light of Brahman, he

realizes his own essential nature. To miss Brahman is literally to

miss oneself. The state of self-manifestation in the commanding

effulgence of Brahman is clearly elucidated. Brahman is the

supreme object of attainment by way of apprehension and communion.

When this attainment takes place, the self of the seeker gains the

full dimensions of its own being. Brahman so sustains the world

nature preserved through the sustaining power of Brahman. It is

beyond time, beyond age, beyond death, beyond sorrow, beyond the

law of karma, and all sins fall away from It, because It is sinless,

apahata-pāpman or, achieving communion with Brahman, the

blind begin to see, the sorrowing ones begin to rejoice, night becomes

day and the state of perpetual illumination sets in.

At this stage (in Section 7) the Chapter moves on to what appears

at first to be a new theme. Eventually, its integral connection with

the Dahara-vidyā is explicated.

Prajāpati enunciates the nature of the individual ātman in

words applied to the Supreme Ātman so far. The ātman is

apahata-pāpman, vijara, vimrityu, viśoka, vijighatsa, apipāsa,

satyakāma and satyasankalpa.

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Indra, the chief of the gods, and Virochana, the chief of the asuras, listen to it. They approach Prajāpati for enlightenment concerning the ātman. He takes them as pupils and directs them to regard their physical personality belonging to their waking state of experience as the ātman. They are both satisfied and take leave. There is, however, this difference between them. Virochana is finally satisfied and goes back to his kingdom once for all. But Indra develops dissatisfaction with the teaching on his way back. He returns to the teacher and discloses his difficulties in accepting the position. Prajāpati takes him again under his direction and instructs that the dream-self is the ātman. Indra leaves the teacher apparently convinced. But, on his way back, he develops formidable objections to the doctrine taught. He comes back to the preceptor again and explains his objections. Prajāpati makes him live with him again and points finally to his self in the state of deep sleep as the ātman. As before, Indra accepts the teaching and leaves his teacher. Once more, he is assailed by doubts about the latest instruction. He returns to Prajāpati and presents his difficulties.

Now Prajāpati comes out with the final doctrine, as he is satisfied with the maturity of the disciple who does not accept what does not get approved by his own critical reflection. He tells Indra that the earlier teaching to him had to do only with the physical aspect of personality. The body is perishable and is heir to mortality. The real self transcends the body, though it inhabits the body in the state of bondage. It is this embodiment that makes it subject to mundane pains and pleasures. When it recovers its natural independence from the body, it is released from these dualities This individual ātman, named ‘samprasāda’ in the text, ascends above the body, approaches the Supreme Light and comes to be revealed in its own form. “Esha samprasāda asmāt śarīrāt samutthāya param jyotirupasampadya svena rūpeṇa abhinishpadayate. Sa uttamah purushah, sa tatrat paryeti jakshan kridan ramamāṇah” (VIII. 12 3).36 This samprasāda,

36. "Now this same samprasāda (the individual self), rising up from this body, attains the Supreme Light, and becomes manifest in his true nature. He (i.e., the Supreme Light or Brahman) is the Highest Person ; he (the released self) moves about there, eating, playing and enjoying."

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says Prajāpati, rises beyond this body and approaches the Supreme

Light and thereby its natural form, namely, it essential nature, gets

actualized. The liberation of the individual occurs only on his

attaining the Supreme, named here the Supreme Light. In that state

of exaltation, the individual does not acquire anything new. He

gets rather released into his own proper selfhood, as the hindrances

in the form of ignorance and evil to the exercise of his authentic

nature are obliterated. The ideal is not an escape from intrinsic

being, it is genuine self-attainment through an elimination of all that

is extrinsic. But it is self-attainment in and through the presence

of the Infinite Spirit.

Then it is stated: ‘Sa uttamah purushah’ (Ibid). "He is

the Highest Purusha". Now who is this ‘He’ that is the Highest

Purusha? Śaṅkara takes him to be the saṃprasāda who has

recovered his nature through enlightenment. Rāmānuja takes him to

be the Param Jyotis on approaching whose presence the

saṃprasāda has dehypnotized himself. The grammar of both the

explanations is full of complication. Śaṅkara connects the passage

with the Purushottama of the Gītā (XV), who, according to him, is

the Unconditioned Purusha transcending His own two forms of

conditioned existence, that conditioned by particularized and

manifested phenomenal adjuncts and that conditioned by the general

and unmanifested phenomenal adjunct. This is the only legitimate

interpretation for a school which does not posit a reality higher than

the pure and free ātman.

But the passage is definite that the liberation of the ātman is

owing to its approach, apprehension and communion with the

Supreme. Self-attainment is not an autonomous process; it occurs

as a part of the experience of the Supreme. Self-liberation is

precipitated, as it were, in the vision of God Hence superlative

excellence is to be attributed to the object of that liberating vision

and not to the self that gets liberated by that vision. The liberated

individual is uttama (highest) relatively to the inferior phases of his

life ; but That, on the experience of which he reaches that height of

self-hood, is surely uttama in an absolute sense.

Such considerations influence Rāmānuja to take the Uttama

Purusha as the universal and absolute Ātman, transcendent of the

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individual self even in its perfected state. But this transcendence,

though it bars identity, does not cancel the immanence so lovingly

and exultantly portrayed in the Dahara-vidyā. The Purushottama

of the Gītā causes no difficulty for Rāmānuja, for He is described

there in specifically cosmic terms. He is Īśvara, He fills the three

worlds and sustains all. If the whole of Dahara-vidyā is surrendered

to Saguṇa Brahman, there is not much point in claiming for the

liberated jīva all the attributes appropriate to that Brahman.

Both Saṅkara and Rāmānuja, when interpreting Brahma-

Sūtra (I. 3 15), hold that, while the account of the Ātman of the

Dahara-vidyā attributes to Him the maintenance of the beings of

the world, the enunciation of the nature of the ātman by Prajāpati

omits to do so. This difference surely implies distinction between

the Supreme and the individual self. In view of all this, it follows

that the Uttama Purusha is the Highest Ātman. The saṁprasāda,

who has become himself, enjoys supreme happiness ‘there’

('tatra'). This word, 'tatra', signifies for Rāmānuja the

Highest Brahman, the Uttama Purusha, the Supreme Light.

What is the connection between the Dahara-vidyā devoted to

the Supreme Deity dwelling in the heart and the discoursal as

Prajāpati purporting to make clear the nature of the individual as

transcending the three states, as being super-physical and as reaching

the consummation of being in the experience of Brahman? Are they

two independent units of teaching though loosely connected ? If the

two are to be treated as organically connected, which of the two is to

be looked upon, if either can be so looked upon, as the core of the

eighth chapter ? These are important textual questions.

Rāmānuja answers this enquiry with splended clarity, and the

answer enhances our appreciation of the original text. He asserts

that the teaching of Prajāpati is subsidiary to the Dahara-vidyā.

"Prajāpativākye muktātma-svarūpayāthātmya-vijñānaṁ daha-

ravidyopayogitayā uktam" (Śrībhāśya, I. 3. 19).37 The Dahara-

37. "In the teaching of Prajāpati the knowledge relating to the truth

concerning the essential nature of the released individual self has been

mentioned so as to be helpful to the meditation on the Dahara."

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vidyā is engaged in expounding the exalted perfections of Brahman.

It details His attributes, such as freedom from sin and the power of sustaining the cosmos.

The discourse of Prajāpati attributes to the liberated jīva many of the qualities ascribed to Brahman in the Dahara-vidyā.

This approximation in perfection is a result of the jīva's communion with Brahman.

That Brahman is such that he who approaches It gets conferred upon him many of the perfections characterizing Brahman, is an additional perfection of Brahman.

To put it in the language of religion, the Lord is such that those who worship Him are taken into fellowship with Him in holiness.

Being made holy in that manner, they contemplate the Holy One.

This, too, is a part of the bountiful majesty of God.

Rāmānuja says: 'Muktasya tadupasampattyā apahatapāmpatvādi-kalyāṇaguṇa-viśishta-svābhāvikarūpa-prāpti-kathanena, tad-dhetutva-rūpam Parama-purushāsādhāranam guṇam upadeshtum Prajāpati-vidyoktāsya jīvasya atra parāmarśah" (Śribhāshya, I. 3. 19).38

Rāmānuja discusses this question again under III. 3. 52.

He includes the jīva within the field of contemplation, when one contemplates on God.

The contemplating self is part of the all-inclusive Divine Principle.

It is also recognized that that Principle must be contemplated upon as dwelling within the individual self.

Hence the ahamgrahā-upāsanā of the Bhūma-vidyā.

Now the question is whether the individual self, taken up within the scope of devout meditation, should be taken as it is in its actual condition of imperfection, or in its unvarying essence common to both the conditions of bondage and release.

Rāmānuja argues that it should be thought of as it will be in the condition of liberation

The reason is that it is in its own proper excellence of being in that condition.

Further, there is the all-important consideration that by contemplating on that ideal state, we become duly aware of the grace of God that will effectuate it.

It would be an inadequate devotion to God, which does not take cognizance of the omnipotent grace of God that could render the contemplating soul perfect and self-fulfilled.

38. "The individual self mentioned in the teaching of Prajāpati is here referred to in order to teach—through recounting the attainment by the released self of auspicious qualities like freedom from sin on his reaching Him (i.e., the Dahara)—that peculiar attribute of the Higher Person which constitutes the cause of such (attainment by the individual self)."

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Brother Laurence, seeing a tree stripped of its leaves, and

considering that within a little time, the leaves would be renewed

and after that the flowers and fruit appear, received a high view of

the providence and power of God, which was never afterwards

effaced from his soul. Vastly superior and more philosophical is the

position here, as we have to do with perfection and the grace that

brings it about. Hence, the position of Prajāpati's instruction to

Indra in relation to the conception of Brahman as seated in the

heart is clearly established.

SUMMING UP

We have now traversed the whole of the philosophy of the

Chhāndogya under Rāmānuja's guidance. It is not that, though

considerably faithful to the Brahma-Sūtra, his fidelity to the

Upanishad is questionable. He appears to be so utterly faithful to

the Chhāndogya, that his being a dependable interpreter of the

Sūtras, which largely follow the thought-pattern of the Chhāndogya,

is an inevitable consequence.

CHAPTER IV.

THE BRIHADĀRANYAKA

I

The Brihadāranyaka is the biggest of the Upanishads, and in amplitude and height of vision it constitutes the supreme utterance of Vedānta.

In characterizing its contents, due notice must be taken of the fact that it is an old prose Upanishad just emerging out of the Brāhmana type of composition. Therefore, as could be fairly expected on the analogy of the Chhāndogya, Aitareya and Kaushītaki, it contains considerable matter that is hardly philosophical. Semi-mythological cosmology, psychology and speculation on rituals, old-world religious practices and eschatology are naturally found. As Rāmānuja has not produced a close and complete gloss, we are not guided by him in understanding these elements of the Upanishad. This is certainly a gap. But all, when he is criticised as deviating from the Upanishads, it is not his failure to do justice to the unphilosophical contents of those texts that is the principal point of attack. Does he fail the Upanishads, in so far as they put on record their philosophical discoveries, and spiritual experiences? That surely is the fundamental issue.

Two general propositions on the Upanishad in question may be made at this stage, and they may aid the comprehension of its focal value.

In the first place, the Brihadāranyaka seems to incorporate in itself the central teachings of all the principal Upanishads. We notice in it what may be called a confluence of all of them, and that, even verbally. The chronological ordering of the Upanishads is not quite material to this phenomenon. On can recognize in this

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Upanishad the meeting point of them all. The fact stands incontestably, whether the inclusiveness of the Upanishad is by way of recapitulation or anticiopation. The superficial view taken for granted by all writers on the subject that the Upanishads do not embody a single doctrine is seriously invalidated by a close scrutiny of this confluence of the several texts in the Brihadāranyaka.

Some crucial passages of the Īśa, Kena and Katha are parts of the Jyotir-brāhmaṇa in the fourth chapter of the Brihadāraṇyaka. The opening declaration of the Aitareya is almost literally repeated in the first chapter itself: Ātmaiva idam agra āsīt (I. 4. 1 & 17). Its conclusion that prajñāna is Brahmaṇ is identical with a number of statements in the Brihadāranyaka. ‘Vijñānam ānandam Brahma’ (III. 9. 28) is the grand conclusion of Yājñavalkhya's reply to Śākalya.

The Ākshara of the Muṇḍaka is the central concept of Yājñavalkya's second reply to Gārgī (III. 8). The fourth chapter of the Praśna is included unmistakably in the Mādhu-brāhmaṇa of the second chapter of the Brihadāraṇyaka (II. 5). The section contains in essence and also verbally the passage at the end of the third chapter of the Kauṣītaki also.

The Brahma-Sūtra (I. 1. 31) validly connects Indra's assimilation of himself to Brahman in the course of his instruction to Pratardana in the Kauṣītakī (III) with Vāmadeva's declaration to go into the meaning of ‘Aham Brahmasmi’ (I. 4 9-10), which itself restates the instruction of Uddālaka to Śvetaketu, namely, ‘Tat tvam asi’ (Chhāndogya, VI. 8.7), from the plane of intuitive apprehension. The entire Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa (III. 7) is repeated and also elaborated significantly in the Śīāa Upanishad. Whether the latter is an authoritative text may be disputed, but its reaffirmation of the philosophy of the Antaryāmin is beyond all dispute. Again, the teaching of Yājñavalkya to Maitreyī (II. 4 & IV. 5) centres round the thought that the Ātman is the highest object for man's search and that it is the Reality by knowing which we know everything. This theme is what is implied by Uddālaka's initial question to Śvetaketu in the Chhāndogya and by Śaunaka's enquiry addressed to Aṅgiras in the Muṇḍaka (I. 1. 3).

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The Brihadāranyaka openly incorporates within itself the doctrine that Brahman is ānanda, which doctrine is the distinctive theme of the Taittirīya. The actual gradation of ānanda presented in the Taittirīya is repeated in the Jyotir-brāhmaṇa of the Brihadāraṇyaka (IV. 3) with minor variations. The theme of the Māṇḍūkya, the philosophy of the three states of consciousness, is a commonplace of Upanishadic thought, and it is worked out in great detail in the Jyotir-brāhmaṇa. In fact, the Māṇḍūkya appears, in contrast, to be a digest of this fuller treatment.

The concordance between the Chhāndogya and the Brihadāraṇyaka is fundamental and extensive. That ‘Tatvamasi’ is repeated in different words in ‘Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi’ is one principal point of identity. That the Dahara-vidyā of the Chhāndogya is embodied in the equally great Jyotir-brāhmaṇa is a well-recognised fact. Even the Sūtrakāra (III. 3. 38) is convinced of it. Saṅkara qualifies the identification somewhat. His observation will occupy us in the sequel. But he does not reject the standpoint of the Sūtrakāra, but only adds a further consideration. There is also verbal correspondence between the Jyotir-brāhmaṇa and the Pratardana-vidyā of the Kaushītakī. The Sāndilya-vidyā of the Chhāndogya (III. 14) is repeated in an abridged form in the Brihadāraṇyaka (VII. 1. 1).

So, our first proposition that this Upanishad focusses in itself the major teachings of the principal Upanishads is decisively maintainable. The second general proposition that is equally maintainable is that the Brihadāraṇyaka exhibits an overwhelming unity of thought.

One of its basic ideas expressed even in the earlier part is contained in the declaration, ‘Aham Brahmāsmi’, and it permeates the entire philosophy of the Upanishad. To know the ‘many’ only as ‘many’ is to have knowledge that is akritsna, incomplete. Whatever is affirmed apart from Brahman repudiates the affirmation. There is no plurality in existence (I. 4. 7 & 10, II. 4 6 and IV. 4. 19). This is a recurrent theme and is set forth in different ways in almost every philosophical discourse.

Another formula is ‘Satyasya Satyam’. That Brahman or Ātman is the Reality of realities and that knowledge concerning It is

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the Truth of truths is repeated to bring out its importance (II. 1. 20,

II. 2. 6). A still more recurrent expression is ‘Neti, neti’,

meaning ‘Not thus, not thus’. This perhaps is a unique idea of this

Upanishad, and it is inserted into every important declaration of the

nature of Brahman (II. 3. 6, III. 9. 23, IV. 2. 4, IV. 4. 22 and

IV. 5. 15). The entire dialogue containing Yājñavalkya’s teaching to

Maitreyī occurs twice in the Upanishad (II. 4 & IV. 5) with only

slight variations. Yājñavalkya seems to open his philosophy with it

and conclude with it. It is the upakrama and the upasamhāra.

All the intervening discourses are to be interpreted, it seems, in

the light of this introduction and climax.

The sages, Uṣasta and Kahola, put an identical question to

Yājñavalkya (in III. 4 and III. 5 respectively) and elicit from him

the full doctrine of the innermost Brahman. This is not an isolated

discourse, as passages from it are found included in the teaching of

Yājñavalkya to Janaka himself. The latter dialogue contains ‘Neti,

neti’, which links it with several of the other discourses.

Yājñavalkya’s answers to Uddālaka concerning the Antaryāmin (III. 7)

and to Gārgī concerning the Akṣara (III. 8) are practically identical,

as both conclude with the thesis of the ‘Unseen Seer’, other than

whom there is no ‘seer’. The difference between these two sensed

by some interpreters will be considered shortly. The overruling

impression of identity of thought cannot be missed. It is impossible

to separate the ‘Antaryāmin’ expounded to Uddālaka from the

innermost Ātman, ‘Saroantara’, expounded to Uṣasta and Kahola.

The Ātman described as aja (unborn) and mahat (great), who

dwells in the heart of the individual, beyond the law of karma and

from whom the worlds draw their sustenance, forming the final theme

of the Jyotir-brāhmaṇa addressed to Janaka, cannot be distinguished,

without doing inexusable violence to the text, from the Ātman

preached to Maitreyī, the innmost Ātman expounded to Uṣasta and

Kahola, the ‘Inner Ruler Immortal’ set forth before Uddālaka and

the ‘Imperishable One’ portrayed to Gārgī.

An exegesis which cannot recognise this unified import of the

Upanishad is incompetent and self-condemned. The thesis glibly

advanced that even the same Upanishad often preaches divergent

doctrines appears wholly absurd when applied to the Bṛihadāra-

nyaka. Thus, the Bṛihadāraṇyaka, in addition to bringing

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together into a harmonious whole the teaching of all the other major

Upanishads, embodies in itself a single philosophical insight into

Ultimate Reality.

II

Now we shall go over the leading sections of the Upanishad and

study Rāmānuja's elucidation of them.

(1) 'Aham Brahmasmi' (I. 4. 10).

This is a good passage to begin with, and it is almost in the

beginning of the Upanishad. Rāmānuja discusses it repeatedly, and

we may just note one context in which it is dealt with as an

illustration (I. 4. 7). The passage is preceded by the statement,

"Sa yata ekaikam upāste na sa vedakṛtno hyesho'ta......

Ātmetyevopāsīta. Atra hyete sarva ekam bhavanti".39 Whoever

knows the different beings in their severalty does not know them.

To conceive them so is to understand them incompletely. To

contemplate the Real as ātman (i.e., as Its body, the individual self)

is the correct procedure laid down. All beings become unified in the

Ātman, (the Self of all), and in that unification lies the

completeness of our understanding of them.

Then occurs the statement, 'I am Brahman'. The ancient

sage, Vāmadeva, is cited as an example of one who accomplished

this unified vision. The passage adds that he who sees himself as a

worshipper worshipping a deity other than himself, does not know :

"Yo'nyām devatām upāste anyo'sau anyo'ham asmiti na sa

veda" (I. 4. 10).40. There are two unmistakable points here. To

39. "Therefore he who meditates (on the individual self) in severalty

(as having a particular name and form and as distinguished from Brahman

who is qualified by all names and forms), does not meditate at all hence

this (self) (meditated on as having a particular name and form) is not all

this...Let one meditate (on Brahman) as the self itself. In him indeed all

these become one (as His body)."

40. "He who worships the (Supreme) Divinity, thinking, 'He (the

Divinity) is different, I am different', he does not know."

know the the plurality of existents is to have only fragmentary

knowledge. To locate that plurality in the Ātman is to unify them

and complete our knowledge of them. When this unified knowledge

arises, the self that knows, cognizes itself as falling within the object

of its contemplation and has the experience, ‘I am Brahman’. In The

general unitary vision assimilates the particular subject of knowledge

into the object of contemplation.

For Rāmānuja, the depreciatory term, ‘akṛitsna’, applied to

pluralistic understanding, implies that the monism, of the ideal

experience is a completing complement of the affirmation of plurality

and not its cancellation. Plurality is not a sheer fiction; it is a

fragment of truth clamouring for completion in a comprehending

integration. And again the ‘I’ in ‘I am Brahman’ is neither to

be sublated in that experience, nor to be taken as co-extensive with

Brahman. It finds itself inseparably lodged in that Infinite Reality.

Sureśvara opines in his Naiṣkarmyaṣiddhi (II. 39) that the ‘I’

is negated in the unitary experience of ‘I am Brahman’. This

sense of the unitary proposition seems to have been refuted by the

author of the Vivarṇa according to the Pāñekadaśī (VIII. 46).

Even if the essential ‘I’ is taken into account, its identification with

Brahman requires the redefinition of Brahman in such a way that

its creative and cosmic aspects are discarded, for only on that

condition can the identification be effected. Only the ethereal self

stripped of its concrete individuality, can be one in substance with

the Absolute stripped of its concrete cosmic creativity.

According to Rāmānuja, neither that view of the individual self,

nor the required attenuation of the import of the concept of Brahman

finds support in the Upaniṣad What we have here is the

fulfilment of the individual self in the perception of itself as having

within the core of its being the Absolute Spirit, the infinite and all-

sustaining Divine presence.

2 ‘Neti, neti’ (III. 3. 6).

This fundamental proposition receives elucidation in the

Vedārthasaṅgraha and the Śrībhāshya (III. 2. 21). The formula

‘Neti, neti’ occurs five times in the Upaniṣad as noted before,

but it has a special force in the present context. What is more, this

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SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

seems to be a distinctive characterization of Brahman on the part of

the Upanishad.

The entire section, III. 3, needs consideration. The opening

announces that Brahman has two rūpas or forms, and they are

mūrta and amūrta, meaning ‘gross’ and ‘subtle’. The two forms

are found both in the cosmos and in the individual. In the external

cosmos, the gross form consists of all the elements other than air and

space. In the individual, it consists of factors other than breath and

the interior space. The cosmic aspect of the subtle form consists of

air and space, while in the individual it is made up of air and interior

space. The essence of the gross cosmic form is ‘that which burns’

and the essence of the subtle cosmic form is ‘the Person in the sun’.

The essence of the individual gross form is the eye and that of the

individual subtle form is ‘the Person in the right eye’. The sun and

Brahman.

Now, the text seems to deviate a little and proceeds to picture

the glory of the aesthetic form of Brahman. It attributes to

Brahman sensuous splendours. According to Rāmānuja, this doctrine

of the beauty of Brahman is a vital part of the teaching of the

Upanishads. We notice the aesthetic characterization of Brahman

throughout Upanishadic literature. Even if the Purushasūkta

expression, ‘ādityavarnam’, is understood as referring to the

brilliance of knowledge and not physical luminosity, there are other

passages that cannot be so explained away. The Chhāndogya

‘sarvagandha’, ‘sarvarasa’ (III. 14. 2) and ‘kapyāsaṁ

pundarīkam evam akshini’, (I. 6. 7), the Taittirīya ‘nilatonada-

madhyasthā vidyulle kheva bhāsvarā’ (Mahānārāyana, XI 12) and

the ‘kalyāṇatamaṁ rūpam’ of the Īśa (16) 41 are not interpretable

except by an aesthetic concept of the Divine Reality. The

Brihadāranyaka is making here a powerful affirmation of the same

aesthetic point of view. The Vishṇusahasranāma does not after all

41. “(He is) all (auspicious) odours, all (auspicious) tastes”: “His

two eyes are like the lotus opened by the sun”: “Shining like a flash of

lightning in the middle of a dark blue cloud”: “the most auspicious

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71

register a lapse from the Upanishadic heights, when it names the

Deity 'pushpahāsa', as having the beauty of the laughter of

flowers. The Vedārthasamgraha has a thorough discussion of this

question (pages, 303-335).

Now comes the controversial and crucial pronouncement, "Neti,

neti". It just means 'Not thus, not thus'. It may be taken as

negating the forms attributed to Brahman in the passage and the

repetition may be taken as ruling out the attribution of all conceivable

forms. Such is Śaṅkara's interpretation of the text. Brahman is

the Self in man, and in the condition of ignorance and misconception,

empirical qualities and forms get attributed to it. This misattribution

is in reality the essence of human bondage. When the Self is sought

after in Its real nature and is to be apprehended as It is in Itself,

this misattribution must be wholly cancelled. In fact, this process

of cancellation is the only way open for the acquisition of insight into

the inward and sole spiritual Reality. Saṅkara holds that all

positive accounts of Brahman such as "Vijñānam ānandatī

Brahma" (III. 9. 28) and 'Vijñānaghana eva Brahmātma', 42

relate to the conditioned Brahman and that when the unconditioned

and absolute Brahman is taught in the Upanishads, it is this

negative procedure that is adopted. The attempt of Sarvajñātma-muni

(Saṅkshepa Sārīraka, I. 251-256) to resone the positive statements

in the Upanishads from this inferior status does not signify much,

in view of the fact that even the most positive of statements, 'Aham

Brahmāsmi' is taken by Sureśvara as meaning the negation of

'Ahami' (Naishkarnya-siddhi, II 29).

Saṅkara hastens to correct this apparently nihilistic position by

asserting that the negative propositions such as 'Neti, neti'

culminate in being and not in non-being. The statement in

question is not 'abhävävasanā', but 'Brahmaiväsanā'. The

negation does not apply to Brahman, but only to the super-

imposed forms. That residual affirmation remains undiminished. In

fact, it is on the strength of this basic positivity that negations can

have meaning. Objective forms are cancelled and the pure subject,

42. "Brahman is consciousness, bliss": "Brahman, the Self, is only

a mass of consciousness".

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not to be brought within any objectifying cognition, stands unsublated

and unsublatable. This agrees perfectly with what he says in his

Brahm a-Sūtra-bhāshya of śūnya-vāda (nihilism) : 'Na hyayamin

sarvaprāmāṇa-prasiddho lokavyavahāro 'nyat tattvam

anadhigamya śakyate 'pahnotum, apavādabhāva utsargapra-

siddheḥ' (II. 2. 31).43 In support of this affirmative culmination of

negative statements, Saṅkara directs attention to what follows

"Neti, neti" in the text: "Nahyetasmād iti neti anyat-

paramasti" (II. 3. 6).44

This sentence of the Upanishad means, according to Saṅkara,

that 'there exists nothing other than Brahman'. That surely

restricts the scope of the previous negation and Brahman remains

unnégated. The sentence can also mean for him that "there is no

way of indicating Brahman other than this mode of negation as

expressed in 'Neti, neti'". Even on this meaning, negation is

not the last word in the text. We have the further remark that

Brahman's name is 'the Real of reals', 'Satyasya Satyam'

(Ibid.) 'That designation would be absurd, if the previous negation

were total and final.

Rāmānuja is wholly opposed to this interpretation of the text.

Such an+ interpretation, according to him, would reduce it to

nonsense. The two forms of Brahman spoken of may contain factors

that are matters of common experience. But the view of them as

forms of Brahman is what is presented by the text itself. The text

also adds some additional factors not belonging to common experience.

Thus the conception of the two aggregates of factors as forms of

Brahman is what is advanced by the scripture itself. Under this

circumstance, to negate them seems an illogical procedure. Śruti,

43. "Indeed, this process of the empirical world, established by all

criteria of valid knowledge, cannot be negated without arriving at another

principle altogether, for in the absence of exceptions what is general

prevails".

44. "There is nothing other than and different from This (Brahman)

described as 'Not this'." (Note that 'param' has to be understood as

'higher' rather than 'other', because 'anyat' indicates otherness and

'param' cannot also mean the same thing.)

THE BRIHADARANYAKA

in that case, would not be merely contradicting empirical knowledge,

wich is itself indefensible logically, but is stultifying itself. It

seems to be committing a mistake for the purpose of eventually

eliminating it.

It has been argued by Advaitins that the Śruti, first of all,

denies the independence of the empirical world by proclaiming it to

be a form of Brahman. Then it denies that it is in reality the form

of Brahman. That way the world gets denied both as independent of

Brahman and also as constitutive of Brahman's form. Completeness of denial is accomplished thereby. But the denial of the world

as the form of Brahman annuls the earlier denial of its independence.

The reality of the world gets triumphantly re-affirmed, in

consequence, as undivine and autonomous.

Rāmānuja takes, therefore, 'Neti, neti' as signifying that the

forms attributed to Brahman do not exhaust all the forms of

Brahman. There is determination here without negation. The

inadequacy of our characterization of Brahman in terms of the forms

enumeratd is the principal import of 'Neti, neti'. We have

predication here without pretension to completeness of predication.

The infinitude of Divine forms, the limitless glory of the Supreme

Being, is brought out by this apparently negative assertion ; for the

glory of forms is not just what the Śruti could measure out through

its limited appreciations. It is not a denial of what is affirmed,

but a denial of the denial of what is not affirmed in the finite

affirmation on hand. This exeges's is supported for Rāmānuja in

what follows in the text.

There are two profound affirmations following. The first of these

is : 'Nahyetasmād iti, netyanyad paramasti' (II. 3. 6). This

means that there is nothing high or great other than Brahman. The

Sankarite exegesis of this sentence, that there is nothing other than

Brahman, seems to overlook the fact that there

are two words here, 'anyat' and 'para', that the negation is of

the 'anyat-para', and that it will be tautological to make them

both mean otherness. This is a positive declaration of the absolute

eminence of Brahman. No more positive statement is conceivable.

The next sentence describes Brahman as 'Satyasya Satyam',

the Reality of realities. The text itself explains the latter

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SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

statement. The 'prānas' are real. The 'prānas' stand for individual selves as in the Bhūma-vidyā. These are more real than the material world, in so far as they maintain their substantive individualities through all eternity. No material object enjoys such imperishable individuality. Brahman is more real than these individual spirits also. The scope of the consciousness of Brahman knows no fluctuations, unlike that of the consciousness of the finite selves. This total self-maintenance makes Brahman describable as the reality of realities. This is also an emphatically positive characterization of Brahman. Hence the negation in 'Neti, neti' is a negation of limitations and not that of forms and attributes.

The principle enunciated repeatedly in the expression, 'Satyasya Satyam', may be restated. Matter, on account of its subjection to mutation of a more radical kind, does not admit of being affirmed as eternal being. Its nature includes an element of non-being. The finite spirits are immutable in their substantive self-identity and hence have a larger measure of being. But they too are liable to alteration, in so far as their quality of consciousness is concerned. In their lower levels of existence prior to final emancipation, they suffer varying diminutions of knowledge. Hence they too enjoy being that is not free from some measure of non-being. They are more real than matter, but not altogether real. The infinite Brahman is possessed of both enduring self-identity and eternal infinitude of knowledge. There is thus no element of non-being in It. So It is the Supreme Reality. There is the further point that no perfection attributed to It exhausts Its richness and glory. Negation of the nature of limitation of forms and attributes is negated by this 'Neti, neti'. Hence Its reality is unconditioned, as It is altogether free from negation, except of the nature of negation of negation. In fact, the idea of 'neti, neti' is an ingredient in the grander and fuller statement that Brahman is the 'Real of reals'.

III. MAITREYI BRĀHMANA (II. 4 & IV. 5).

The progression of the Upanishad takes us to Maitreyi Brāhmaṇa, which is undoubtedly one of the most fundamental parts of the Upanishad. Its weight is duly recognised by the text itself, as it repeats it at the end of Yājñavalkya's protracted philosophising.

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75

Yājñavalkya enters the Upanishad, as it were, with this dialogue and leaves it as his final message. The two versions (II. 4 and IV. 5) contain some minor variations. But the bulk and the order of thoughts remain unaltered. Rāmānuja determines the philosophy of this dialogue in his Śribhāshya under Adhikaraṇa 16 in the fourth pāda of the first Adhyāya.

Yājñavalkya communicates to Maitreyī, one of his two wives, his resolve to renounce the householder's life and offers to divide his belongings between the other wife, Kātyāyanī whose attitude to life is that of women in general (strīprajñā), and Maitreyī who is philosophical in outlook (Brahmavādinī). Maitreyī asks him whether even the greatest wealth could make her immortal, 'amṛitā'. Yājñavalkya denies the possibility and says that her life would only be like that of other persons of means. He generalizes and says that there is no hope of immortality through wealth : 'Amṛitāstva tu nāśāsti vittena' (II 4. 2). We come across this idea in the Katha wealth : 'Na vittena tarpaṇīyo manushyah' (I 27).

Maitreyī has no use for anything that could not be a means to immortality and wants from Yājñavalkya the knowledge that he has and which could bring about immortality. Now the immortality spoken of here is not mere deathlessness, for that absteriorises the jīva even in its course of transmigration and bondage. It can mean only eternal life, the life of perfection and blessedness which goes beyond the realm of life of which death is an inevitable part. It is not survival after death, but the death of death itself.

Yājñavalkya says that she was dear to him before and is now making herself more dear by this resolute and philosophical speech. The word used in connection with Maitreyī is 'priyā', and that seems to lead up to what Yājñavalkya starts by way of philosophical discourse to Maitreyī

The first major constituent of the instruction is advanced now. "Na vā are patyuh kāmāya patih priyo bhavati. Ātmanastu kāmāya patih priyo bhavati.....Na vā are sarvasya kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati, Ātmanastu kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati" (II. 4. 5. & IV. 5 6) This arresting and amply illustrated

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SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

fcr mula may be translated thus: "The husband indeed is dear, not

for the sake of the desire of the husband, but for the sake of the

desire of the Ātman.....No object that is dear is dear for the sake of

its own desire, but for the sake of the desire of the Ātman".

This concerns not the object of desire, but the subject of

desire. Tagore, quite contrary to all the traditional commentaries,

takes it as 'desire for ' and not as 'desire on the part of '. The

discoarse aims at inculcating the desirability of the pursuit of the

Ātman, which it actually does in the sequel. Therefore, no desire

for the Ātman is presupposed here. Only the desiring agent, the

subject that desires, is the point under discussion.

Yājñavalkya teaches here that whatever is dear is so, not because

of its own desire, but because of the desire on the part of the Ātman.

It is not because the object seeks fulfilment of its own desire that it

becomes dear, but it becomes dear as the Ātman seeks thereby to

fulfil its own desire. Not the desire on the part of the object, but

that on the part of the Ātman is the determinant of the interest,

love and pleasure that the object evokes.

Who is this Ātman whose desire is the cause of the fact that a

certain object is dear ? Is he the same as the subject to whom the

object is dear ? Does it mean that the self to which an object is dear

has made it dear to itself by virtue of its desire for it ? Rāmānuja

rejects this way of understanding the passage. The conclusion drawn

in the passage from this analysis of the determinant of the

phenomenon of things being dear, precludes for him that interpreta-

tion The conelusion urges that the Ātman should be sought. It

would be absurd to say that because objects are dear to us as we

desire them and not because they desire to be dear to us, we should

seek our own selves or self and not the objects. Because they fulfil

our own desires, we ought to seek them, and not the self, which

des'ras them to overcome its own deficiencies through them. The

desiring self is a poor self, as it seeks self-enrichment through the

realization of the objects of desire. There is no point in seeking it.

We should rather seek that which would make it fuller.

It may be that we seek the self to ascertain whether the poverty

that takes it desire is genuine or fancied. If it is the former, the

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77

desire is justified, and if it is fancied imperfection, enlightenment in that regard would put an end to desire. But then the very necessity for such critical discernment of the self, to decide whether it is imperfect (as desire implies) or perfect, presupposes imperfection in the matter of self-knowledge. A self that could so far miss its own nature and be in need of finding out whether it is too perfect to desire anything else or imperfect enough to gain by fulfilment of desire, is hardly a perfect and self-fulfilled being. When the self is imperfect that much, there is every reason for desire to arise, and the quest after such a self cannot be the sole quest of life. Hence the desire that makes objects dear to us cannot be the desire of the finite self.

Therefore Rāmānuja takes the Ātman here as standing for the Supreme Self. It is His will or desire, in response to our devotion, that lends attractiveness and desirability to the objects that happen to be dear to us, in proportion naturally not to our devotion to the objects, but to our devotion to Him. We read later on that the objects we love will repudiate us, if we seek them apart from the Ātman (II. 4. 6. & IV. 5. 7). It is implied that they conform to our desire in far as we succeed in locating them in the Ātman. If we wholly devote ourselves to the Ātman, it goes without saying that everything else brings us beauty and joy. The world becomes a 'mansion of delight' to one who is wholly after the Supreme.

From this analysis of the phenomenon of some things being dear, the discourse takes the next major step. Yājñavalkya says : ' Ātmā vā are darśanīyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo... Ātmano vā are darśanena śravaṇena matyā vijñānena idaiḥ sarvaiḥ viditam' (II. 4, 5).45 This statement contains two fundamental ideas.

(a) The Ātman has to be seen, heard about, reflected and meditated upon. The vision of the Ātman is, of course, the final phase in the pursuit. It has to be achieved through śravaṇa,

45. "The Self, indeed, my dear one, is to be seen, heard about, reflected on, and meditated upon. All this, indeed, becomes known, my dear, through the seeing, hearing about, reflection on and meditation upon the Self."

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'hearing' or learning from the scriptures under the direction of proper preceptors. This hearing has to pass into critical reflection (manana) on what the scriptures proclaim. The element of rational consideration is quite vital. No mere acceptance of sacred testimony will do. When reflection establishes conviction concerning Ātman, the process is not over. The conviction must be transformed into meditation (nididhyāsana). When meditation reaches the highest point of maturity, it almost acquires the condition of perception. It is this heightened and intensified meditation that effectuates the vision of the Supreme Ātman.

The familiar Vedāntic prescription of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana as the stages of the progress of the seeker to the realization of the Ultimate Spirit is laid down in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka in this passage. Of the three stages, the first two are preparatory and instrumental, and only meditation is the ultimate pathway. This meditation is no heartless dwelling on the theme, namely, the Ātman. Rather, it is full of love, such that without the meditation the seeker finds himself withering away. Meditation of this nature is named bhakti. The element of love is imparted into nididhyāsana on the strength of explicit statements in the Muṇḍaka and Kaṭha Upanishads.

Even if that extraneous authority is rejected, the discourse of Yājñavalkya itself takes place in the context of love Maitreyi is a loved one, her speech evokes love, and it is in the process of analysing why things are loved that the Ātman is introduced as the ground of the fact of our love of certain objects and situations. Yājñavalkya is advising that these objects which owe their lovableness to the desire of the Ātman to that effect must be set aside and that the Supreme Ground of all that is worthy of love must Itself be made the sole object of search. It cannot but signify that the search must be carried out with increasing love. It is only here that love is not misplaced. When the search culminates in meditation, the love characterizing the search also reaches its utmost height.

It is also to be noted that the Bṛhadāraṇyaka itself has declared that Ātman is the most lovable of realities and that the object of one's love does not pass away only when one offers one's love to the Supreme Ātman (I. 4. 8). In this atmosphere of

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79

absorbing concom with love, the nididhyāsana advocated by the

Upanishad cannot be loveless contemplation. It is loving meditation

or meditative love. It cannot be anything else. The picture of the

progress towards Ātman given here seems to be crying for the

right word, and that word is ‘bhakti’.

(b) The second important idea introduced in this brief statement

is that by learning about, reflecting and meditating upon and

perceiving Ātman, we understand everything else. Here we get

the initial proposition of the Sadvidyā and the essential enquiry of

the Mundaka. That idea is that Brahman or Ātman is the ground-

principle and that the infinite diversity of empirical existents gets

comprehended in principle when this basic reality is known, because

that diversity has issued out of this.

To put the matter in crude simplicity, the ‘one’ is the cause of the

‘many’, and therefore to know the ‘one’ is to know the ‘many’ in

essence and principle. It is likely to be argued that when the ‘one’

is realized, the ‘many’ is understood in the sense that the secret

that the ‘many’ are ultimately unreal is made out. Whether the

understanding of plurality promised here signifies the understanding

of its unreality is a question that is fundamental, and it must be faced.

For Rāmānuja the question is answered in what follows in the

discourse of Yājñavalkya. We are told : ‘Sarvam tam parādāt yo

‘nyatra Atmanam sarvam veda....Idam sarvam yadayamātma’

(II. 4. 6).46 Many factors of the empirical world of plurality are

mentioned and we are told that they repudiate him who sees them

apart from Ātman. In separation from the Ultimate Soul, they

defy all efforts to understand them. Hence this entire world is to

be seen in Ātman.

What is asserted here is that the world is in Ātman and not

that it is unreal. It is unreal if viewed as independent. But, as

falling within Ātman, it is real and gets understood in our

understanding of Ātman. There is no word suggesting that the

46. “All things reject him who knows all things apart from .itman......

All this, whatever there is, is Ātman”

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world of plurality repudiates him also who sees it as falling within Ātman. The offence is not affirmation of the world, but its affirmation as located outside the Supreme Self and as not being sustained by It. To place it as a factor within the Infinite is to see it aright, and there is no censure of that inclusive perspective. We have the conception of the unfairly treated Śāṇḍilya vidyā, with its 'Sarvam khalvidam Brahma' (III. 14. 1), lodged within the heart of Yājñavalkya's discourse. The Śāṇḍilya-vidyā said, 'Tajjalān', pointing out that all things originate from, are sustained by and get dissolved into Brahman. Corresponding to that, we have here the proposition that the world of scriptures and the world of actuality are breathed into existence by Ātman.

Even as smoke arises out of the burning of wet wood, the entire world of speech and all the worlds and beings are breathed out by Ātman: "Asyaivātāni sarvāṇi niḥśvasitāni" (II. 4. 10). The idea of creation is thus introduced, and it is clear that by knowing Ātman we know the worlds and beings, precisely because the latter originate from that Fundamental Principle. The Supreme Self creates and sustains within Itself what It creates. It follows that to know It is to comprehend the multiplicity.

The seeing of Ātman advocated as the supreme objective is arduous and requires tremendous discipline. It is to put forth forcefully this necessity of discipline that the analogies of controlling the sounds of the drum, the conch and the vīṇā (a stringed musical instrument) are brought in (II. 7.9), according to Rāmānuja. In the same way, the crucial points in the control of the various senses, motor and sensory, and also the mind are explained. This mode of interpreting is special to Rāmānuja, and we need not discuss it further, as it involves no serious philosophical issue and no other commentator would object to insisting upon discipline in spiritual life. Saṅkara takes all the analogies and the detailed mention of the basal factors of sense-experiences as bringing out the unitary basis of all existence. That is elucidated adequately for Rāmānuja by the thesis of creation that utilizes the analogy of smoke and the burning of wet wood.

The self that seeks immortality as Maitreyī does and is exhorted to seek Ātman by way of seeing, hearing, reflecting and meditating,

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81

must also be correctly conceived. Hence Yājñavalkya takes up the topic of the nature of the individual self. Rāmānuja is emphatic that this part of the teaching, though necessary, does not inculcate the final truth. The teaching concerning Brahman and meditation on Him is the central theme. The doctrine of the individual self is subordinate and instrumental to that teaching.

Rāmānuja says: "Paramapuruṣha-vibhūtibhūtāsya prāpturātmanas svarūpāyāthātmyam apavargasādhana-Paramapuruṣhī-vedanotayogitayāvagantavyam, na svata eva upāyatvena" (Sribhāshya I. 4. 19).47 The jīvātman is described as 'vijñānaghana' (a mass of intelligence), even as a lump of salt is 'saindhavaghana', or 'rasaghana' (a mass of taste). In its natural condition of purity, the individual self is a 'mass of intelligence', wholly consisting of the essence of knowledge, knowing itself and knowing all else that is real. It contains no dark point of unknowing in its entire being. But this substance of the nature of intelligence gets entangled in matter in the state of bondage, and its innate power of knowledge gets conditioned by this disabling alliance with what is material. Its knowledge in that state gets confined within the materialistic framework of consciousness. It seems to take birth in matter and perish with the body.

It is the termination of this type of body-determined consciousness that Yājñavalkya has in mind when he says that there is no 'consciousness' after 'death': "Na pratyā samjñāsti" (II. 4. 12). All the interpreters are agreed that 'pratya' here refers not to mundane death but to a total and final liberation from matter. It is not to death but to a state in which death is an impossibility. Maitreyī is confused and cannot help perceiving the contradiction between the nature of the jīva which is vijñānaghana and the extinction of its essential attribute of samjñā in its ideal state of life. Yājñavalkya corrects the misunderstanding and reiterates that the conscious self is imperishable (avināśin) and its attribute of intelligence is also indestructible (anuchchhiddharma).

47. "The truth about the essential nature of the attaining individual self who forms the glory of the Supreme Person has to be understood as being helpful to the knowledge of the Supreme Person that forms the means of final release, and not as being an independent means by itself."

R U—11

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What ceases in that state of perfection is the consciousness that proceeds from the erroneous identification of the self with the body. The knowledge that arises in a soul by virtue of its mistaking itself to be the body must cease, when the distinction between the body and the soul becomes an established fact for the soul in question. This dwarfed and mutilated expression of intelligence is put an end to in the ideal state. Maitreyi's puzzle must be taken as removed with this clarification.

In reality, the release into the higher life is not annihilation of consciousness, but a liberation of it into its natural magnitude. Why does Yājñavalkya adopt such a misleadingly negative manner of describing the ideal experience? The transition from the present degenerate phase of experience must be sharply marked, and negation is a suitable way of indicating that transcendence. Yājñavalkya works out the positive import of this experience in a further and truly sublime climax. This climax is fuller in the second version of the Maitreyi Brāhmaṇa (IV. 5). We shall do well to consider it.

In addition to the cessation of knowledge that occurs to an individual by virtue of his identification with the body, there is also the cessation of another kind of knowledge.

We imagine that the world consists of independent entities. The subject of knowledge is one such entity on that assumption, the object of knowledge is another, and whatever accessories there are for the achievement of knowledge by the independent subject of an independent object also form collectively an independent means of knowledge. These three factors are not only mutually independent, but are also conceived as independent of Brahman. Now there is a kind of seeing or knowing in this mistaken world of plurality. An alien subject comprehends an alien object through the aid of an alien means, and all the three are taken as subsisting apart from the unitary foundation. Knowledge of this kind is described in "Yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati tad itara itaraṁ paśyati" (IV. 5. 15) etc. Where there is duality as it were, there the independent knower knows the independent object of knowledge. The word, 'iva', meaning 'as it were', indicates that the duality is not a fact.

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This type of knowledge must surely cease when enlightenment arises and all the knowers, the objects of knowledge and the aids of knowledge are comprehended as existing within the Supreme Ātman

Ātman is the all-embracing field within which the situation of knowledge with all the factors involved obtains. “Yatra tvasya sarvam Ātmai vābhūt, tat kena kim paśyet?” (IV. 6. 15). Where Ātman is all in all, through what and what object can be seen? In other words, when all factors associated with knowledge are realised as located and established in Ātman, the knowing of a self-dependent object, by a self-dependent knower through self-dependent aids, cannot take place. Here the question is a refutation.

‘Ātmai vābhūt’ does not mean that Ātman ‘becomes’ all in some particular state. It means that It is understood as being all in all in this state. It is not to become all; It is all eternally, but is to be understood as such now. When Ātman is apprehended as all-sustaining, the knowledge—to call it knowledge at this stage would be wrong—as a process of bringing together three utterly separate existents is ruled out. That means that the ideal experience dissolves the so-called knowledge taking place in the unreal world of absolute plurality. The understanding rooted in plurality ceases to be, when the unity of Ātman embracing all existence becomes a fact of experience.

Yājñavalkya has thus explained what types of knowledge or experiences are put an end to in the realization of Ātman. What takes place by way of experience as a result of both the self’s misreading of its own nature as the body and of the mistaken notion of absolute plurality on its part, is extinguished in this supreme experience.

Now Yājñavalkya moves to another thought Ātman is the basic power supporting the self in all its knowing activity. How can this Ātman, so basic to all knowing, be Itself known without Its own grace? “Yenedam sarvam vijānāti, tam kena vijānīyāt?” (IV. 5. 15). This may be rendered: Through what (other aid) can He be understood by whose aid all this is understood? The significance of this question cannot be that understanding Ātman is impossible. That would be an absurd proposition in the context. After all, Yājñavalkya is preaching the necessity of understanding

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Ātman through darśana, śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana. The question could only mean that the understanding is impossible without the grace of Ātman. When comprehension of nothing else is possible without the aid of Ātman, it is all the more certain that there is no comprehension possible of the Supreme and Ultimate Power Itself without Its own grace to that effect. Our knowledge of It is a gift and not an achievement through other aids.

Now Yājñavalkya repeats the old formula, 'Neti, neti'. It means, in this context, for Rāmānuja, the transcendence and uniqueness of the principle in question. It does not mean a total denial of all adjectival determinations. The text itself offers a specific identification of what is denied : “Agrihyo na grihyate, asīryo na sīryate, asango na hi sajjate, asito na vyathate na rişhyati” (IV. 5.15).48 This is an important delimitation of the scope of negation meant by 'Neti, neti'. All that is given here as not characterizing Ātman is of the nature of imperfection. It is logical, therefore, to construe that the negative statements of a general character regarding the Ultimate Principle do not mean that It is wholly attributeless, but that It is free from imperfections.

The last pronouncement of Yājñavalkya comes in the form of a question again: " Vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt" (IV. 5 15). "Through what can you know the knower ?" he asks. Here again it is not the impossibility of knowing that is being asserted. The entire pursuit of Ātman by way of knowing that is proclaimed as the road to immortality, becomes untenable on that interpretation. What it precisely means for Rāmānuja is that unless one practises the meditation laid down here, to know Ātman is out of the question. The two culminating questions, "Yenedam sarvam vijānāti tam kena vijānīyāt?" (IV. 5. 15) and "Vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt ?" (Ibid.), do not rule out knowledge, but insist that the knowledge is unattainable except through grace won through devout meditation. 'Vijñātṛi' in the last question means the Supreme

48. "(This Ātman) is incapable of being perceived and is indeed not perceived, is incapable of being broken into pieces and is not broken, is not bound, does not suffer and does not perish."

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Knower with all His perfections and glories. The all-comprehending and self-sufficient knower is surely the absolute Ātman, the source of all beings and worlds, the knowledge concerning whom includes the knowledge of all else, and who abounds in all transcendent perfections beyond number and measure. There is nothing more to be learnt concerning immortality. Attainment of this experience of the Ātman is immortality, and the means for that consummation is the loving meditation formulated. This is all we ought to know.

IV. MADHU BRĀHMANA (II. 5).

The next Brāhmana (5th) in the second adhyāya of the Brihadāranyaka speaks glowingly of Ātman as tejomaya (shining with consciousness), amṛtamaya (free from death), purusha and Brahman, and as dwelling in both members of a series of pairs of objects which are mutually important to each other. In the enumeration of the series, the entire universe is brought in, and in each case one member of the mutually valued duality is microcosmic and the other macrocosmic. The purusha dwells as the light and bliss in both and comprehends them within the circle of His being. He is declared to be 'all this'. Among those entities in which He dwells, the individual selves are also clearly included. The concluding sentence sums up the final import: “Yathā rathanābau cha rathanemau chārāḥ sarve samarpitā evam evaśminn ātmani sarvāṇi bhūtāni sarve vedāḥ sarve lokāḥ sarve prāṇāḥ sarve ātmānaḥ samarpitāḥ” (II. 5. 15). In this Ātman all beings, all the Vedas, all the worlds, all the life-principles and all these souls are sheltered, declares this text, even as the spokes of a wheel are held by the outer ring and the central mechanism. This Supreme Ātman is beyond time and space and He is Brahman, He is all-experiencing: “Tad etad Brah-mādirvām anaparam anantaram abāhyam ayam ātmā brahma sarvānubhūḥ” (II. 5. 19).49

49. "This Brahman has nothing anterior and nothing posterior (i.e., is eternal); has nothing within and nothing without (i.e., is omnipresent); this Self is Brahman; It experiences everything (i.e., perceives all things at all times in all manner of ways)."

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Just prior to this last declaration, the passage contains the sentence : " Indre māyābhih pururūpa īyate " (Ibid). It means :

' God, by virtue of māyās, is seen as of many forms '. It may be construed that the principle of māyā the power of cosm`c illusion, is responsible for the presentation of the plurality of forms. Rāmānuja rejects this interpretation. The word, ' māyā ', means for him wondrous power. Even ordinary illusions come under this definition of māyā, for in an illusion we have an experience not generated by the corresponding object and thus the normal law of cognitive causation stands circumvented. The word is used many times in the sense of occult and extraordinary powers in purāṇic literature. The Vedic etymologist, Yāska, understands it to mean ' vayunam̀,

jñānam ', i.e., knowledge.

More decisive still is the fact that this sentence about God manifesting many forms through māyā is a quotation from the Rigveda (VI. 47. 18) ; and there, in that ancient text, it does not have the sense of illusion. Rāmānuja points to what the Rigveda says further in the passage. It says : " Bhūri Tvashṭeva rājati " (VI. 47. 19), meaning that He is surpassingly resplendent like Tvashṭri (the Creator). Rāmānuja argues that one who is overcome by illusion does not get resplendent thereby. Illusion is a calamity and not a glory. Even if the illusion is ours and not God's, it can be only a distortion and not a beautification.

Thus, the one clear mention of māya in this early Upanishad fails to support the later doctrine of māyā, and this should be remembered while reconstructing the final thought of the Upanishads.

V. ĀRTABHĀGA, USHASTA & RAHOLA

The third and fourth chapters of the Brihadāraṇyaka take us to an altogether new setting. Yājñavalkya first gives philosophical instruction to Maitreyī and he repeats it later on. But in between these two dialogues of instruction, we have dialogues of inquiry wherein he discourse under intellectual challenges from other sages and in answer to King Janaka himself. The portion of the Upanishad—the whole of the third chapter and the fourth except

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for the last section of instruction to Maitreyi—narrating these philosophical discussions constitutes a brilliant formulation in philosophical terms of the major thesis of the Upanishad. In this part of the text also there are some dull intervals, as some of the questions test Yājñavalkya on recondite and not philosophically important points of traditional thought. But the philosophically weighty matter predominates. It is a great pleasure to follow these inquiries.

The sages that challenge Yajñavalkya are Hotāśvala, Jāratkārava Ārtabhāga, Bhujyu Lāhyāvani, Uśasta, Kahola, Uddālaka, Gārgī and Sākalya. It is also to be remarked that the sages know the answers and want only to find out whether Yajñavalkya too knows them. The questions put by Hotāśvala and Bhujyu are of no philosophical significance. We get from Rāmānuja no elucidation of them, or of the answers to them.

Ārtabhāga : Jāratkārava Ārtabhāga does put an important question as to what remains of a man when he dies. In answer to him, Yājñavalkya tells him in secret the doctrine of karma. We have here a clear enunciation of that doctrine by the Upanishad : "Yad ūchatuḥ karma haiva tad ūchatur atha yat praśaśamsatuiḥ karma haiva tat praśaśamsatuiḥ punyo vai punyena karmana bhavati, pāpaḥ papeneti" (III. 2. 13).50 Rāmānuja finds that this discussion pertains not to release but to the transmigration of the unenlightened soul (S'rībhāshya, IV. 2. 12).

Saṅkara understands the context both in his Sūtra-bhāshya and his commentary on the Upanishad to deal with the release of the enlightened soul also.

50. "What they two (Yājñavalkya and Ārtabhāga) spoke about (as the cause of the embodiment of the embodied soul), it was indeed about karma that they spoke: what they two stressed (among the causes of embodiment), it was karma that they stressed. For indeed one becomes auspicious (i.e., gets a body which is the reward of virtue and which favours the practice of virtue) through virtue and one becomes associated with evil (i e., a body which is the result of evil deeds and which favours the practice of sin) through evil deeds."

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Ushasta : Ushasta puts the following question to Yājñavalkya :

" Yat sākshād aparokshād Brahma ya Ātmā sarvāntaras tam me vyāchakshva " (III. 4. 1).

This may be thus translated: “ Tell me of that innermost Ātman who is the Primary Brahman and who is an immediate presence ”.

Rāmānuja discusses this section and the next under the Brahma-Sūtras (III. 3. 35-37).

The term ' Brahman ' is used in connection with lower categories also sometimes.

Therefore, the question seeks information about the Fundamental and Primary Brahman.

This Brahman is presupposed by the question to be ' aparoksha ', that is, immediate.

That can be a possible character of only that Reality which is omnipresent and eternal and dwells in all.

Only the Infinite can be immediate in all experiences and to all subjects of experience.

The Brahman is also taken as " Ātmā sarvāntara ", the innermost soul of all and more inward than everything else in everyone.

Yājñavalkya propounds an answer straightaway somewhat in the manner of the Kena Upanishad and the Taittirīya.

He says that the soul of Ushasta—‘ esha te ātmā ’—is that principle.

Ushasta asks for elucidation.

Yājñavalkya elaborates by saying that Ātman is that which maintains life by way of the several life-breaths : " Esha te ātmā ".

Ushasta is not satisfied, and the answer of Yājñavalkya needs further elucidation for him.

Yājñavalkya goes on . " Na drișteh drashtāram paśyeh, na śruteḥ śrotāram śṛṇuyāt..... " (III. 4. 2).51

Ushasta is asked not to mistake this innermost Ātman with the seer of sights, the hearer of sounds etc.

The point of this explanation is not that the seeing self is not really the self, nor is it that the seer of the seeing is not to be seen.

Its significance for Rāmānuja lies neither in denying the cognitive activity of the self, nor in denying its cognisability.

Yājñavalkya is putting forward, according to Rāmānuja, the clarification that the innermost Ātman is other than the individual self which is the immediate subject of experiences like seeing.

Brahman's transcendence of the jīva is the idea in the explanation.

Kahola : Ushasta now retires from the conversation Then Kahola raises the same question and makes clear that he is repeating

51. " You should not see the seer of the sight, you should not hear the hearer of the act of hearing ... .

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Ushasta's question by the expression 'Yadeva' (III. 5. 1): he is referring to 'that very thing' which Ushasta asked about.

Yājñavalkya adds now a new thought to his exposition of the innermost Ātman. He says that this Ātman is beyond hunger and thirst, beyond old age and death and beyond sorrow and delusion :

"Aṣanāyāpīpāse sokam moham jarām mṛtyum atyeti" (Ibid.).S2

This makes it still more clear that the Self in question is altogether transcendent of the individual self which is subject to these infirmities.

The character of Brahman presented by Yājñavalkya, on Rāmānuja's interpretation, is Its utter inwardness and immanence in all as such : It is sarvāntara. The three elucidations offered by Yājñavalkya aim at rendering this character understandable. Hence the primary theme of this discussion is the ultimate fact of divine immanence.

The meditation on this primary Brahman is characterized by two features. First, it is said that the seekers who have found Brahman have renounced everything else. This idea of renunciation is again set forth in exactly the same words in Jyotirbrāhmaṇa (IV. 3). The repetition brings out the coherence between the two discourses and also lays down the spiritual necessity of renunciation.

The second feature consists of certain other accomplishments integral to the meditative approach to the Deity. They are pānditya—(learning), bālya (childlike nature) and mauna (reflection). 'Pānditya, according to Rāmānuja, is the product of both śravaṇa and manana. 'Bālya' means absence of ostentation, pretentiousness, and the habit of showing forth one's merits. Inward spiritual felicity arising from one's worth melts away when one gets himself rewarded for his worth by social distinction and public approbation. 'Childlike nature', in this context denotes the absence of self-display. Children do not cash their merits by publicity.

'Mauna' does not mean for Rāmānuja either manaṅa which is already included in pānditya or nididhyāsana (profound meditation)

52. "(He) transcends hunger and thirst, sorrow, delusion, old age and death."

RU—12

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which is the principal sādhana (Śribhāshya III. 4. 46-48). It stands here for cultivating remembrance of God even outside regular and systematic meditation on God.

The building up of this habit of mauna between serious meditations prevents too great and precipitous a fall when one comes out of such meditation. If one's habitual thoughts are directed to God, when one descends from the high altitude of deliberate prayer, one does not descend too much; and if normal thoughts are sufficiently high, ascending from them to intensive awareness of God is easier. Rise is easy and fall is not disastrous. It is not much of a fall if one falls high enough. To climb is easy, when one is standing already on heights. It is this mauna that is prescribed here It is called ‘samśilana’, assumed habit of reflection. Yājñavalkya concludes with the aphoristic declaration - everything else is miserable.

"Anyadārtam" (III. 5. 1).

VI. ANTARYĀMI-BRĀHMANA

Now the Upanishad moves on to a discourse (III. 7) in which is enshrined the fundamental conception of the philosophy of Rāmānuja. There is not much difficulty in interpreting it, as it is clear in itself and Saṅkara finds it so definite in its import that he is obliged to adjust it with his final philosophy by taking it as relating to the conditioned Brahman. though the condition is exalted : "Nitya-niratiśaya-jñānaśaktyupādhir Ātmāntaryāmīśvara uchyate". (On Brih. Up. III. 8. 12)53

That the passage gives a definitive shape to the doctrine of Brahman as the innermost reality in Nature and the individual is transparent. All later Vedic thought is moving upwards to this concept, and all the Upanishads in their major affirmations converge towards it. That it gets superseded by the characteristic philosophy of Yājñavalkya as expressed in the Ushasta-Kahola-brāhmanas, in

53. "The Self, when conditioned by eternal and unsurpassed knowledge and energy, is called the Internal Ruler and the Lord."

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the Akshara-brāhmaṇa, in the Jyotir-brāhmaṇa, in the Maitreyi-brāhmaṇa and also in the ‘Neti, neti’ formula is hardly a tenable thesis. These sections do nothing but approach the conception formulated here, and it is impossible to substantiate that they are different in purpose from this Brāhmaṇa, as we have seen already in the sections we have traversed. The story is continued with regard to the Akshara and Jyotis Brāhmaṇas, as we shall see. The Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa, now under discussion, cannot be evaluated as lower, on grounds of being either commonplace or being eccentric. It gathers into itself the entire philosophy of the Upanishads in general and the Bṛihadāraṇyaka in particular and frames the common intention with uncommon clarity, power and grandeur. As Rāmānuja says elsewhere : A theism to which the Deity and the world of creatures are utterly separate and mutually isolated entities is giving up all that the Upanishads stand for ; and a monistic philosophy which identifies the individual self and the Supreme Spirit, without the explanatory idea of Divine immanence in the finite, is a false monism. He puts it thus: “Na eva sarvātma-tvātirekeṇa Parasmīn Brahmani jīvātmānusandhānam, jīva eva Parabrahmatvānusandhānam tathyam bhavati ” (Śrībhāshya, III. 3. 37).54 Such a crude identity-philosophy takes away the majesty of the Godhead and does not constitute an exposition of that majesty. Rāmānuja is concerned to render the identification an integral part of the delineation of the glory of Brahman, such delineation being the central theme of the Upanishads. In other words, the philosophical core of the Upanishads can be preserved only on condition that the idea embodied in the Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa is accorded centrality of significance.

We may now go through the essential thoughts of the Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa. It is in answer to Uddālaka’s question If this Uddālaka is the same as the teacher of ‘Tattvamasi’ in Chhā̄ndegya (VI. 8. 7), Rāmānuja’s interpretation of ‘Tattvamasi’ in terms of the Antaryāmin gets some kind of an extrinsic confirmation also.

54. "Moreover, meditation on the Supreme Brahman as the individual self and on the individual self as the Supreme Brahman can never be based on truth, if His being the Self of all is excluded."

Uddālaka wants to know whether Yājñavalkya has understood the Antaryāmin and demands exposition thereof. Yājñavalkya gives an extensive and magnificent account of the Inner Ruler. He is said to be in the earth, water, fire, sky, air, heavens, sun, space, darkness, light, all beings, the life-breath, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, vijñāna and the genetic principle. The list seems to include much else in the Mādhyandina version of the Upanishad. In the latter, in the place of ‘vijñāna’, the term ‘ātman’ is used, lending support to the interpretation of ‘vijñāna’ as ‘jīvātman’ This Inner Ruler is said to be in all these macrocosmic and microcosmic principles and entities and also in what are posited in the scriptures.

The Subālopanishad (VII) which repeats this subject-matter, adds some more factors to the list. The intention is clear that the entire realm of finite being must be brought within the scope of the statement. The Inner Ruler is so much ‘in’ in this realm that the Upanishad elaborates by saying that He is ‘interior to’, ‘dwells’ and is within. He is ‘antara’. The beings within which He dwells do not know Him, ‘na veda’. It may be that some of them are inanimate. In that case, their presiding deities are to be taken as not knowing Him. Those which are endowed with the power of knowledge do not know Him. That in which He dwells in the interior of its being and which does not cognize Him, is said to be His ‘body’, ‘śarīra’. This is not an inoperative inner presence, pervasion without making any difference to what is pervaded. He rules what He pervades from within : ‘Antaro yamayati’. The Inner Ruler is also said to be ‘amṛita’, immortal. The epithet signifies His transcendence of all evil and imperfection. ‘He’, Yajñavalkya declares, ‘is your soul’ : ‘Esha ta ātmā’. The Mādhyandina recension has it as ‘Sa te ātmā’.

That God ‘is in all’, ‘dwells in all’, ‘the all know Him not’, ‘the all constitute His body’ and ‘He rules all from within’ is the main proposition here. The discourse proceeds further. It says : “Adṛishto dṛashtā…avijnāto vijñātā” (III. 7. 23). He is the unseen seer, the unknown knower. Though none knows Him, He knows all. He is the uncomprehended comprehender. When He is said to be the knower, the previously affirmed characteristics are not to be ignored. They are to be carried forward as attributes of the Inner Ruler, dwelling in all, holding all as His body

and raling all from within, the immortal soul of all, is unknown to

all, but knows all. There is no seer and knower other than this one :

" Nānyo 'to 'sti draṣṭā......nānyo 'to 'sti vijñātā " (III. 7. 23).

Does this mean that there is only one knower ? Rāmānuja's

interpretation makes out that meaning as superificial and piecemeal

exegesis. It means for him that there is no knower like God, a

knower who holds what he knows as his body and rules it from

within, just as He does with regard to the entire realm of finite

beings according to the earlier enunciation. There can be none who

knows Brahman in this manner. In other words, ' Nānyo 'to 'sti

draṣṭā' etc. simply means that the Antaryāmin described has no

further Antaryāmin in relation to Himself. He is the ultimate

Antaryāmin.

He, it is concluded, is the soul of Uddālaka. ' Sa ha ta Ātmā '.

almost reiterating what Uddālaka proclaimed to Śvetaketu in

" Tattoamasi " (Chh. Up. VI. 8. 7). The general principle that

the Antaryāmin is the soul of all and that all beings are His body is

given an immediate and telling application, All else is miserable,

trivial, ' ato'nyadārtam ' (III. 7. 28).

What this discourse does may be summarised. It expands the

cosmic role of Brahman in perfect clarity. It formulates the concept

of the world as the body of God. That body of Brahman includes

even the individual soul. Brahman's transcendence of His body

along with His immanence in it as the ' Inner Ruler Immortal ' is

presented in appropriate grandeur.

VII. AKSHARA-BRAHMAN !

The eighth Brāhmaṇa in the third adhyāya of the

Bṛhadāraṇyaka has come to be known as the ' Akṣara-

brāhmaṇa'. It is one of the strangest errors in the history of

Upaniṣadic exegesis that this has been taken as representing a

thought higlier than that of the proouling Āt / ir vi / mi / b / a / ... /

when 'n fact the tautllngs in buth llave prociam' the same c nclusiun

concculing the unknown luicuw uticr tlicu tlicu

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knower'. The earlier part of this discourse is frankly theistic, as it propounds a principle explanatory of the physical and moral orders of the universe. In essence, it is hardly less committed to the doctrine of an Absolute Being concerned with the cosmos than the thesis of the Antaryāmin.

This wholly insupportable distinction between the Akshara-vidyā and the Antaryāmi-vidyā seems to have originated from a commentator earlier than Sañkara to whom the latter refers (under Brih. Up. III. 8. 12) for purposes of refutation. Sañkara's own view refuses to posit an objective or ontological fall of the Akshara to the condition of Antaryāmin, but concedes that the Ātman in its unconditioned being is the Akshara describable only negatively; but that, viewed under a certain type of condition, no doubt not objectively conditioning it, but subjectively imposed by the observer, It is the Antaryāmin. To Rāmānuja it is evident that the entire attempt to break up the integral doctrine propounded in these two discourses into the higher and lower conceptions of Brahman is misconceived and is wholly without any basis in the text. His own interpretation of the Akshara-vidyā occurs in three places in the Śrībhāshya (I. 3. 9, II. 4. 13 and III. 3. 33).

Gārgī addresses an enquiry to Yājñavalkya, which she herself considers important, as to what is the warp and woof of the world. Yājñavalkya answers that it is the primordial ākāśa or space. She accepts this answer as sound and proceeds with the second enquiry which she considers more fundamental. She enquires as to what is the warp and woof of this primordial ākāśa itself. Yājñavalkya answers, "That is this Akshara". The term 'Akshara' means the 'Imperishable'. Then he plunges into a glowing account of the Akshara. In the first place, the Akshara is without all the properties of matter and all the organs and properties of living beings known to us. We should not be fooled by Yājñavalkya's negative mode of description and understand him as propounding an attributeless reality. All that is denied of the Akshara is of the nature of limitations and imperfections, and there is no reason for taking Yājñavalkya as meaning that the Akshara is 'sarva-vishesha-rahita', devoid of all attributes. Determinateness of character is not negated, but only materiality and the limitations

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characteristic of life. The Akshara is not altogether 'undistin-guished', but is only free from imperfections. That is surely a way

of being eminently 'distinguished' and determinative.

Then, Yājñavalkya proceeds to delineate the Akshara as

commanding the sun and the moon, the earth and the sky, time itself

in all its determinate forms, the rivers of the east and the west and

all the rest of the physical universe, bringing them into existence and

making them follow their determinate functions. It is the source of

the existence and ordered functioning of the multifarious factors of

the world of Nature. In the moral sphere, men are praised as worthy

and meritorious in proportion to their conformity to the command-

ments of the Akshara. He who dies, without understanding this

Akshara, however much he may have practised the conventional

modes of righteousness, will inherit only transient felicity after death,

and his life sinks into insignificance. He who understands the

Akshara also and passes away becomes a 'mass of Brahman'

(III. 8. 10).

Now Yājñavalkya repeats himself and concludes the discourse

with precisely the same declaration with which he concluded the

Antaryāmi-discourse. The Akshara is "the unseen seer, the

unheard hearer, the unthought thinker, the uncomprehended

comprehender. There is no other seer, no other hearer, no other

thinker and no other comprehender " (III. 8. 11). While he says

that the Akshara is the seer, we cannot take him as not carrying

forward in that statement all the previous descriptions of the

Akshara he has given us. This is a cumulative characterization, and

the Supreme Seer is the one affirmed before as transcending

materiality and animality, as commanding the universe into being

and order, as sustaining the moral order, as conferring everlasting

blessedness on those who know Him and as, in fact, the warp and

woof of the entire cosmos.

That He is 'unseen' simply implies that He is beyond all that

is known in our mundane experience and such ignorance of Him is

the cause of spiritual decline for creatures. That there is no other

'seer, knower' etc., simply signifies that there is no higher being

or entity commanding and sustaining the Akshara Itself, even as this

Akshara does in relation to the cosmos of empirical being and moral

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endeavour. This is an emphatic manner of conveying the absolute

supremacy of the Akshara.

Comparisons of the discourses for purposes of relative

evaluations is no doubt wrong, when a commentator holds them all

as presenting a single doctrine from various complementary and

supplementary points of view. But still it may be noted by us,

looking at them not strictly within the framework of Rāmānuja's

thought, that the Akshara-vidyā omits to state an essential truth so

well enunciated in the Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa. It does not have

anything corresponding to "antara", meaning " in the interior of ",

which is a prominent element in the Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa. But

for its general coherence with the rest of the discourses of

Yājñavalkya and the undeniable implication of Divine immanence

carried by what it explicitly propounds, the Akshara-vidyā could

almost be construed as advocating the thesis of dualistic theism.

Happily, it is rescued from this position by the two circumstances of

its coherence with the rest of the discourses and its implications. In

fact, the Akshara of this vidyā should be named Antarākshara.

The exposition of Brahman by Yājñavalkya addressed to

Ushasta and Kahola brings out specifically the fact that Brahman is

'sarvāntara', the innermost soul of all. But it does not attend to

the fact of Brahman being the ruler of all. The exposition addressed

to Gārgī brings out the fact of Brahman being the 'śāstā' or ruler

prominently. But it does not make a clear mention of Brahman

being the innermost core of all. The Vedic statement, "Antah

pravishtas śāstā" (Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, III. 21), that "He

who has entered within is the ruler", is partially elucidated by

each. The former elaborates the idea of 'antah-pravishta' (entering

within), while the latter does justice to the idea of 'śāstā' (ruler).

It is only the Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa that fully brings out the

philosophic import of that proposition by its concept of 'Antar-

yāmin', for the Antaryāmin is both 'antah-pravishta' and

'śāsta'.

VIII. ŚĀKALYA'S QUESTIONS

The ninth Brāhmaṇa of the third chapter of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka

does not have much original or fundamental ideas of philosophical

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importance. Its theme may be indicated in a summary fashion. The

sage who questions Yājñavalkya is one Śākalya. He wants to know

how many gods there are. Yājñavalkya mentions a great number of

gods in accordance with the popular belief of the Vedic people.

Under Śākalya's persistent questioning, the number gets progressively

reduced, and finally only one God is recognized by Yājñavalkya

(III 4. 9). Historically, this movement of thought from a supericial

polytheism to the fundamental theistic monism of the Upanishads is

very significant. The section corresponds in this respect to the

second half of the Ken·i Upanishad. That single Divine Principle is

described as 'Aupanishada Purusha' (III. 9. 26), the Supreme

Being revealed in the Upanishads. That is also a very significant

point in the section. Rāmānuja is greatly struck by this naming of

Brahman, and he uses the expression in a grand passage in his

Mahāsiddhānta (Śribhāshya, I. 1. 1).

The Aupanishada Purusha is characterized in a negative

manner also, and the 'Neti, neti' formuia as found in the

Jyotirbrāhmaṇa (IV. 4. 22) and the Maitreyi-brāhmaṇa (IV. 5. 15)

of the fourth chapter is inserted for that purpose here (III. 9. 26).

In the context, it can mean only transcendence of evil, as what is

denied of Brahman in 'Neti, neti' is exactly specified here, and

thus the scope of negation is restricted thereby to imperfection.

Yājñavalkya proclaims that the Supreme Reality is 'vijñānam

ānandam Brahma' (III. 9. 28) 55 and this is a grand positive

thesis. It is in consonance with a vast number of passages in the

Upanishads in general and also in the Brihadāranyaka itself. It

is strange that Śaṅkara singles it out as representing a lower

conception of Brahman, while interpreting the first instance

of 'Neti, neti'. 'Vijñānam ānandam Brahma', duly

combined with 'Neti, neti', as is done here, imparts as high an

understanding of Brahman as any other passage ever does in the

entire range of Upanishadic literature. This is a depreciation of

the great statement without any foundation whatever. Saṅkara's

fascination for the negative is at the bottom of this unfair estimate,

and Sarvajñātma-muni seems to be rather sound in denouncing the

overvaluation of the negative vākyas.

55. "Brahman is knowledge and bliss."

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In Rāmānuja's works, apart from quotations from this Brāhmaṇa, there seems to be no extensive use or substantial elucidation of it. Considering the poor value that Saṅkara himself attaches to it, this gap seems to be no serious deficiency in Rāmānuja's contribution to the understanding of the Upanishad. Rāmānuja's selection of passages for elucidation is mostly governed by the fact that they are alleged to be contrary to his philosophical standpoint. His proposed correction of the Advaitic elucidation of 'Neti, neti' does everything necessary for re-establishing the passage in its right status of philosophical ultimacy.

IX. JYOTIR-BRĀHMANA

The third Brāhmaṇa of the fourth adhyāya has come to be known as Jyotirbrāhmaṇa. With the fourth into which it overflows, it is certainly the greatest discourse in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka. Deussen describes it as 'incomparable'. It is the longest of Yājñavalkya's discourses. It is in this dialogue that we meet with almost all the other principal Upanishads. It is certainly a version of Dahara-vidyā which is the culmination of the Chhāndogya, as such is the view of Brahma-Sūtra (III. 3. 38-39). We find in it significant anticipations or recapitulations of the other Upanishads such as Īśa, Keṇa, Kaṭha and Taittirīya. Even that brief Upanishad, the Māṇḍūkya, is found here anticipated in impressive elaborateness. In fact, that Upanishad strikes one as too thin for its theme, unless one sees it as a summary of this dialogue, and if the latter is grasped in all its masterly treatment of the theme, that Upanishad appears rather a superfluous synopsis. It is unnecessary to exhibit in detail how the Jyotirbrāhmaṇa is a brilliant synthesis of all that the Upanishads stand for.

Taking the Bṛhadāraṇyaka itself, it appears that this discourse incorporates into itself the essential affirmations of all the several philosophical passages. 'Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi' (I. 4. 10), containing the unification of the jīva and Brahman, is almost the central point of this dialogue. The vijñānamaya ātman (IV. 3. 7) is made to pass into the Mahān Aja Ātmā (IV. 4. 22) The formula of 'Neti, neti' (IV. 4. 22) is there in all its force. The teaching to Maitreyī, 'Srotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ' (II. 4. 5), that the Ātman has to be heard about, reflected on and steadily meditated

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upon, is here unmistakably in "Vijñāya prajñām kurota" (IV. 4. 21), which may be translated as: "Having understood, let one practise supreme awareness". The ideal of sannyāsa inculcated in that dialogue and in the Kahola-brāhmaṇa is reiterated here with the required clarity. The doctrine of karma secretly communicated to Ārtabhāga is clearly set forth here also. What is contained in Yājñavalkya's replies to Ushasta, Kahola and Uddālaka, namely, the presence of the Supreme Ātman as the inner core of all existents and particularly of the individual soul, is part of the central doctrine here. The idea of Brahman as the Ruler, made prominent in the Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa and Akshara-brāhmaṇa is brought out here in a series of epithets asserting the lordly powers of the Universal and Infinite Spirit. In reality, the Jyotirbrāhmaṇa is enough by itself to refute once for all the ill-conceived notion that the Upanishads contain divergent doctrines and that even in a single Upanishad there is no unified philosophy.

This discourse starts as a dialogue of inquiry. Somewhat in the style of the other sages, Janaka challenges Yājñavalkya with a question as to what the 'light' is in a man's life (IV. 3. 2). Yājñavalkya starts by saying that the sun is the light Janaka asks as to what the 'light' is when the sun is set. In this early part of the dialogue, Janaka leads the conversation by his successive enquiries Yājñavalkya mentions the moon, fire and speech in succession. Finally, he arrives at the answer that the ātman or soul is its own light. By 'ātman' is to be understood the individual self in man whose essence is consciousness, 'vijñāna-maya' (IV. 3. 7). and this ātman is self-luminous as it were. Yājñavalkya says that the purusha is 'svayam-jyotis' (IV. 3. 9).

From this point onwards, Yājñavalkya takes the discourse into his own hands completely and develops his philosophy. Janaka occasionally speaks to convey his pleasure at the instruction and ask for more enlightenment. The discourse ceases to be one of inquiry and becomes instruction. It is in this stage of instruction that Yājñavalkya puts forward his magnificent argument in astonishing strides, widening the horizon of the discourse by every major step, and concludes with the fullest statement of the nature of Brahman and the manner of achieving the direct experience or vision of that Supreme Reality.

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Rāmānuja discusses parts of this discourse in several contexts in the Sribhāshya as also in the Vedārthasaṅgraha. But directly he interprets its central thought in two adhikaraṇas, I. 3. 42-44 and III. 3. 38-40. Its striking denial of plurality, ‘Neha nā nāsti kiñchana’, (IV. 4. 19), that ‘there is no multiplicity in this (Brahman)’, is elucidated also in the Vedārthasaṅgraha (page 80).

We may now proceed to understand this culminating discourse of Yājñavalkya as Rāmānuja expounds it. The section is identified as Daharavidyā in the Brahma-Sūtras themselves (III. 3. 38-40). Even as the Daharavidyā in the Chhāndogya (VIII. 7) describes the nature of Brahman and connects it later with the doctrine of the individual soul in the instruction of Prajāpati to Indra, in this version of Daharavidyā also we have the determination of both the individual ātman and the Supreme Ātman. The difference lies in the fact we start with the individual soul in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and conclude with Brahman, while in the Chhāndogya the sequence is reversed.

HEND. 151999

The teaching proceeds in three stages. We have first of all an account of the states of the individual soul. Then we have an enthusiastic and ecstatic presentation of the nature of the Paramātman. The last stage consists of the indication of the pathway to the attainment of Brahman.

The individual self is of the nature of self-consciousness, ‘svayaṁ jyotis’ (IV. 3. 9). The vijnanamaya passes through the three stages of waking, dream and deep sleep in his empirical and mundane career. In the waking state, he appropriates experiences through the senses called here the ‘prāṇas’ (IV. 3 7), and lives in pleasures and pains caused by his association with the body in accordance with karma. The jīva passes into dream-states also. The speciality of the dream-state is that in it the individual self moves in a world of unreality in comparison with the waking world. Rāmānuja contends that this is a special world, but it is not made or projected by the individual dreamer. The principal reason is that there are pleasures and pains in dreams also, and they must surely be due to karma by way of puṇya and pāpa. The text (IV. 3. 9) specificaly indicaies puṇya and pāpa as operating in this experience. Now this machinery producing experiences through the

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law of moral causation is not of the jīva's making, and he is not the force governing the operation of that law. Hence the Upanishad says, 'Sa hi kartā' (IV. 3 10). This means for Rāmānuja that God, the supreme law-maintainer of the universe, is the author of the dream-world also. That world, therefore, is not a subjective realm wholly set up by the dreaming individual. It obeys indubitably certain laws and the latter transcend his operative competence. This part of the teaching is explained under Brahma-Sūtra (III. 2 1-5).

The state of dreamless sleep is 'wonderful in many ways. Hence its perennial fascination for the Vedāntin. In it, the subject of experience is cut off from the objective world of waking experience. He experiences no outer presentation then and is 'freed from pleasures and pains resulting from such experiences In that stage, the familiar verities of waking experience are set aside. But the subject of experience is not extinguished. 'Na vijñātur vijñāter viparilopo vidyate' (IV. 3. 30). That is, there is no disappearance of the consciousness of the knowing self. He is imperishable and bears within himself the unextinguished light of consciousness ; unawareness characterizes his life then. He is unaware of himself and unaware of the Supreme Self also. The Supreme Self is said to take possession of him then, manifestly for purposes of rejuvenating him after the exhausting tribulations of earthly life. He is 'Prājña Ātmā sampri-shvakta' (IV. 3. 21), embraced by the Supreme Spirit. This unawareness is natural in that ecstatic union. The Upanishad offers the earthly analogy of the self-forgetful embrace of lovers.

Such a union is always there between God and the individual, but in the other two states, man runs after Godless trivialities and thus denies himself the infinite joy he could find within himself by turning to the Godhead there. In deep sleep, though he has not turned to God by a deliberate act of contemplation, the suspension of the Godless experiences of dream and waking releases the joy of union. This is a foretaste of the greater joy of union that would be man's, if only he too turns towards God. As it is, the initiative in the union is God's only. The Upanishad abruptly brings in Prājña in its account of deep sleep, and thereby it indicates that its ultimate design is to lead up to that reality. The Brahma-Sūtra (I. 3 42 13) points out that the distinction between the individual self and

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Brahman is clearly hinted here, as it is going to be hinted again in the account of death in the sequel.

That Brahman is of the nature of joy supreme and all earthly joys are parts thereof is a great theme for the sages of the Upanishads.

The refreshing experience of deep sleep and the serenity and healthful joy that mark it are linked in the dialogue with the nature of Brahman, as in that state the individual is said to be sheltered solely in Brahman for the time being.

It is a case of unearned joy and in the state of release and mystic devotion, the joy is made ours by our responsive initiative also.

At this point, Yājñavalkya allows himself to digress a little and easts himself into the theme of ānanda.

He says that Brahman is ‘paramā gatiḥ......paramā sampat......paramo lokah.paramo ānandah’ (IV. 3. 32), the supreme goal, the supreme treasure, the supreme world, the supreme bliss.

The Taittirīya ladder of ānanda is worked out with minor variations.

That the ānanda eharacteristic of Brahman is not the same as what one gets in sushupti (dreamless sleep) is made clear by the statement that the ānanda of Brahman comes only to him who is śrotriya, avrijina and akāmahata (IV. 3. 33), i.e., to one who is profoundly enlightened in the śruti, sinless and desireless.

So Brahman is the supreme refuge, the supreme treasure, the supreme world and the supreme ānanda for one who has conquered desire and sin and who is established in knowledge.

There is significance in describing Brahman as the supreme world.

It is not that Brahman is one object of interest among several objects of interest, all these together forming the world of ideal ends.

Rather, Brahman is the whole world of values, the supreme and all-inclusive end.

The original and primary argument is resumed.

The individual who lives in these three states is overtaken by death.

In death, named ‘utkrānti’, the cessation of life-functions takes place and the self is reduced to its bare essentials.

In this state also, the Prājña takes possession of it.

‘Prājñena Ātmanā anvārūḍhaḥ’ (ridden upon by the Omniscient Self) is the expression used.

This is also mentioned as a fact indicative of the otherness of the Supreme

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Self in the Sūtra (I. 3. 42). The individual discards the body and passes beyond, carrying with him the effects of his previous vidyā (loving meditation) and karma: he also carries with him his pūrva-prajñā (IV. 4. 2). This 'pūrva-prajñā', says Saṅkara, accounts for the phenomenon of genius and prodigies. He particnlarly

Now, what happens to the soul after passing out of the body at death? Here the discourse brings in the doctrine of karma and rebirth explicity. "Yathākāri yathāchāri tathā bhavati, sādhukāri sādhurbhavati, pāpakāri papo bhavati, puṇyena karmaṇā bhavati, pāpak pāpena; kāmamaya evāyam purushaḥ......yathākāmo bhavati tatkratu bhavati, yatkratu kurute tad abhi-sampadyate " (IV. 4. 5).58 This is perhaps the best and the clearest statement of the doctrine of karma.

On this principle, then, the soul that leaves the body at death takes another body for another life. In fact, it is only after taking hold of the next locus of re-incarnation that the former body is given up. The new life may be of any kind out of an indefinite number of alternative possibilities. The determining factor that determines the specific re-embodiment is karma. The first determinant in the entire chain culminating in rebirth is certainly kāma or desire, for desire determines deed or kratu, and kratu determines re-birth.

So far, the course of the bound soul caught up in the cycle of sāṁsara has been depicted. The pathway of liberation from this cycle is taken up now. He who is akāma, nishkāma, āptakāma and ātmakāma (IV. 4. 6), that is, one who has no desires, whose desires have left him, who has had his desires fulfilled and whose sole desire is the Ātman, has no rebirth to undergo, he is Brahman and attains Brahman. This means that he who is without desire because

56. "As one acts, as one conducts oneself, so one becomes. He who does good becomes good, he who commits sin becomes evil. One becomes auspicious by virtuous action and evil by sinful action......This self in the embodied state is made up of (i.e., is actuated by) desire......As one desires: as one resolves: as one acts: as one acts, so one attains results."

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he has conquered desire, passes beyond the realm of transmigration

through the strength of the desire that is fulfilled, for it is desire

for the Ātman. He is great in himself and attains the greatest of

the great, namely, Brahman. What the Chhāndogya expresses by

the words 'Param jyotirupasampadya svena rūpeṇa abhinish-

padyate' (Chh. Up. VIII. 12. 3) 57 is introduced here and the

reaching of Brahman is the destruction of the lower life characterized

by the round of the fruitless lives of karma.

What is that the reaching of which constitutes this sublime

consummation ? It is the great unborn Ātman, 'Mahān Aja Ātmā'

(IV. 4. 22, 24). He abides in the vijñānamaya ātman, who lives

amidst the prāṇās (senses) and with whom the spiritual instruction

of Yājñavalkya started. We have here something corresponding to the

"anena jīvena Ātmānā anupraviśya" (VI. 3. 2) of the

Chhāndogya. The actual words of the śruti might be interpreted

as meaning either that the Mahān Ātman dwells in the vijñāna-

maya ātman, as declared by the Chhāndogya text alluded to and as

more clearly enunciated by the Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa, or as simply

identifying the Mahān Ātman with the vijñānamaya ātman. The

latter interpretation has its analogue in 'Tattvamasi' (Chh. VI.8. 7)

and 'Aham brahmāsmi' (Brih. I. 4. 10). Rāmānuja does not

discuss the relative merits of the interpretations. It is as it should

be. As we have found in the case of the two latter identity-texts,

for him, the identity-texts are themselves immanence-texts.

There is no identity between Brahman and the jīva other than

immanence such that when we say that Brahman is the jīva, we

simply mean that Brahman is the inner soul of the jīva itself.

What we mean by identity in the context is that Brahman who is the

soul of the universe in its totality is the soul of the individual soul also.

The perfection implied in being the soul of the universe and the

perfection implied in being the soul of the individual are together

predicated of the self-same Brahman. Thus identity-texts

themselves turn out to be predicative texts. This is the

fundamental logic of 'sāmānādhikaraṇya', coordinate and

57; "In this manner only, this individual self, rising up from this

body, attains the Supreme Light and appears in his own form."

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1 1 5

complementary predication. It may be of interest to note that the

Mādhyandina version of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka is without this

reference to the vijñāna-maya ātman, rendering the text clearly

predicative and not an identity-text. This Mahān Ātman is said to

repose in the interior space or Ākāsa of the individual's heart. It

is this proposition that makes the vidyā of the Jyotirbrāhmaṇa a

case of Dahara-vidyā bringing out its fundamental unity with the

Dahara-vidyā of the Chhāndogya (VIII. 7). It also exhibits unity

with the abridged Dahara-vidyā of the Māhānārāyaṇopanishad.

There are some outstanding characterizations of the Supreme

Ātman. He is beyond the law of karma and thereby stands

distinguished from the individual self. He is 'sarvasya vasi',

sarvasyeśānah, sarvasyādhipatih, sarveśvarah, bhūtādhipatih,

bhūtapālaḥ' (IV. 4. 22).58 All these cumulatively represent him as

maintaining and controlling the entire universe as the Antaryāmin

This makes Him substantially cosmic. But His transcendence is not

to be ignored. He is to be apprehended as 'neti, neti' (Ibid.).

His nature is altogether beyond all that constitutes the imperfections

characterstic of matter and the finite spirits. That this is the

meaning of 'neti, neti' is well brought out by the specification by

the text itself of what stands negated by the formula. Further, we

have to recognize that there is no plurality: 'Neha nānāsti

kiñchana' (IV. 4. 19). This declaration of ultimate monism must

be properly understood. We have no right to take it as cancelling

the affirmation that He is the Lord of the universe.

Rāmānuja interprets the Sūtra, 'Ādarādalopah' (III. 3 39)

thus : 'Sarvasya vasi sarvasyeśānah....esha sarveśvara

esha bhūtādhipatiresha bhūtapālaḥ iti bhūyobhiṣṭya aiśvaryo-

padeśāt gunesho'darah pratīyate'.59 It does not appear that

Yājñavalkya is mentioning casually and without any philosophical

interest whatever, these glories and attributes of Brahman. The

58. "(He is) the controller of all, the ruler of all, the master of all, the

sovereign over all, the lord of all beings, the protector of all beings."

59. '" He is the controller of all, the ruler of all ....He is the sovereign

over all, He is the lord of all beings, He is the protector of all beings

(Bṛih. Up. IV. 4. 22)—therefore His sovereignty is taught often and often, and

therefore ardour is made out in (teaching) His auspicious qualities.'

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glorification comes, as if it was the principal purport of the teaching.

The denial of plurality must be, therefore, restricted in scope and

made supplementary to this basic purport.

It is eminently logical to see that a plurality not sustained by

the unitary Īśvara, is what is negated here. We have a monism no

doubt, but it is not a monism antithetical to the outspoken and

emphatically proclaimed theism. It is a theistic and not an atheistic

monism that the instruction propounds, even as the negation of 'neti,

neti' is the negation of evil and finitude. So what stands out as the

principal doctrine is the idea of Brahman as the 'Sarveśvara',

the Lord and Ruler of all. The individual self and the realm of the

non-self just constitute a part of the glory of God. We may interpret

this truth in the light of the Antaryāmi-brāhmanī. The finite

world is included in the 'sarva' (all) of which Brahman is the

vasī, īśāna, pati and pāla, controller, ruler, lord and protector.

To read a monism in the discourse other than this is to attribute to

Yājñavalkya sheer nonsense.

We may note the cardinal character of this vision of Brahman.

In the first place, it posits a transcendent reality. In the second

place, it holds that reality to be the controlling power immanent in

all finite existence. In the third place, the plurality that stands

appropriated by this reality as a part of its glory, bears the aspect of

completed and integrated plurality and not an incomplete (akṛitsna)

many and not such as to repudiate Him who asserts its being There

is transcendence, immanence and the consequent integration of the

manifold empirical actuality.

One may pause here to make an observation. It may legitimately be

objected that the vision outlined here may not be a veridical

experience and that the reality affirmed may not have objective being.

In other words, the whole conception of Brahman and the so-called

experience of Brahman may be challenged on grounds of lack of

proof. To picture Brahman on so grand a scale and to look forward

to a vision of It may be good poetry, even if be that much. But

on what logical foundation does the imposing superstructure stand ?

This is a challenge that a philosophy such as that of the

Upaniṣhads must face at some stage or other. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka

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has familiarised us with the thought that plurality as such is nothing complete. It is akṛitsna. Further, to posit such a plurality apart from a unitary substratum is to miss it wholly : it would repudiate him who posits it. Yājñavalkya's discourse to Maitreyī makes that principle clear. The world of diversity is incomplete in itself and this incompleteness is demonstrated by the self-contradictoriness of our affirmation of it as self-contained. Hence the Upanishads have it enunciated over and over again that to understand the 'many', we have to understand the 'One' of which they are the aspects. This basic monism would be the starting point, the first premise of the argument.

The basic reality, at once unitary and foundational in relation to empirical plurality, must be transcendent. It does not serve the requirements of the situation, if it is just one real among many reals or only an aggregate of the 'many'. It must go beyond what it has to render intelligible. Hence the formula of 'neti, neti' is the next important step of the argument. The discourse under consideration does well in including this vital idea of transcendence in the formula of 'neti, neti'.

This transcendence is not mere distinction or exclusiveness. If it were simply that and no more, we would have on hand two incompatible alternatives. Either the world or God would have to be conceived as the sole reality, unless we can embrace a meaningless dualism of two ultimate principles. The difficulty in such a position would be that neither of the two alternative contradictory conceptions would secure final acceptance and could be made the subject-matter of a triumphant affirmation. The 'one' that is set in such isolation from the 'many' can offer no explanation of the 'many', and would itself sink into the position of a 'one' among the many. It must incorporate the 'many' in itself and impart to it completeness, consistency and intelligibility. Hence the discourse speaks of God in exuberant reiteration as the Lord, Master and Saviour of the 'many'. That is a higher truth which includes what it supersedes and thereby renders it intelligible.

Truth does not sublate error, except in so far as the latter negates what is beyond it. On the contrary, it includes the element of truth embedded in error, negates the negations it contains and

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completes it in an ampler and therefore more harmonious affirmation.

The triumphant theory as contrasted with a disproved theory contains all that is sound in the latter, removes its exclusions by bringing in more facts and explains how it could explain what it did explain.

This inclusiveness is characteristic of the real. What simply transcends and does not include what it transcends is a weak alternative and is sure to be broken by what it does not include.

Therefore, the Upanishad takes care to regard the Supreme Brahman as taking into Itself the cosmos and upholding it from within.

This relation of ‘belonging’ to Brahman brings to the world of plurality order, harmony and coherence.

In so far as the plurality embodies the single ultimate principle, it becomes part of a single arrangement, gaining the completeness and intelligibility flowing from that integration.

It is this truth that the sentence, “Neha nā nāsti kiñchana” (IV. 4. 19), really sets forth.

The unity of the Absolute Principle, Its transcendence of the world of plurality, Its inclusion of that world and the consequent unification of it as an intelligible order are the principal facts of the metaphysical situation.

The idea or vision of Brahman would lose its claim to the ultimacy of truth, if it failed to provide for these fundamental facts.

Brahman is real, because It is one, because It transcends the ‘many’, because It includes the ‘many’ and because It imparts systematic unification to the ‘many’.

There is an ākāñkṣhā (need or expectancy) for It on the part of the many, It is aprāpta and abādhita (underived and unstultified) and there is bādha for Its bādhaka (stultification for what stultifies It) It is the pūraka—or that which completes—all knowledge.

A critical analysis of the notion of reality does render clear that only Brahman of this nature can be real and nothing else.

Brahman is truly ‘satyasya satyam’, the Real of the real.

A mysticism that obliterates the awareness of God, of the subject of experience and of the world and is just sentience and no more, does not rise beyond suṣhupti (dreamless sleep), and to this category belong all drug-mysticisms.

A mysticism that is intensely aware of the one Supreme Reality and does not relate the waking world of diversity to that inward reality is yet to develop and establish itself

as true. Mysticism is true in proportion to its power in transforming

the empirical plurality into a radiant manifestation of the Deity.

It is worthwhile considering here one important observation of

Śaṅkara. While agreeing with Bādarāyaṇa (III. 3. 39) in holding

that the Jyotiḥbrāhmaṇa inculcates a vidyā that is identical

with the Daharavidyā of Chhāndogya, he goes on to point out a

distinction. The Chhāndogya Dahara-vidyā, according to him,

deals with Brahman as characterized by attributes, and the

Dahara-vidyā of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka concerns itself with

Nirguṇa Brahman. It is difficult to maintain this distinction,

unless we discard that part of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka passage which

delights itself in delineating the cosmic glory of Brahman. The

strength of the import of ‘neti, neti’ cannot justify such an

exclusion of the seemingly vital part of the text. ‘sarvasyāṅṣi……

bhūtapālakaḥ’ (III. 4. 22), for the negation should be restricted in

the light of the affirmation that Brahman is the ruler of all, the

protector of all beings etc.: and the passage itself makes clear that

what is negated is of the nature of imperfection characteristic of

matter and the finite self.

That Brahman is nirguṇa in Its ultimate nature has to be

supported not merely by the desperate expediency of discarding the

Dahara-vidyā of the Chhāndogya as concerned with a lower view

of Brahman, but also by the more untenable expedients of writing

off genuine parts of the essential teaching of the vidyā as presented

in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka itself. It seems that one cannot read in this

‘incomparable’ dialogue of Yājñavalkya the doctrine of an academic

and attributeless Brahman, unless one cuts it down conveniently.

It is not that Yājñavalkya teaches the required monism by himself,

but that he is to be admonished into silence a great deal to yield that

wanted philosophy. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka at its best fails the cause

of Nirguṇa Brahman. Such is the position of Rāmānuja.

Another thought connected with this question may also be

mentioned. If the concept of Brahman as sarvaśarīra, the Lord of

all, so prominently advanced in the passage, is given serious

attention, the identity of the jīva with such a Brahman hinted at in

the text can only be on the lines propounded by the Antaryāmi-

brāhmaṇi and even the Dahara-vidyā of the Chhāndogya. A

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more radical and substantive identity is possible only, if Brahman is suitably divested, and our text runs counter to such an exegetical move. The glory of Brahman seems to be fundamental to it. We cannot take Brahman as presented in the text as ultimate and still posit such an identity. It is a question of redefining Brahman in order to provide for the required kind of identity with the jiva or redefining the identity in order to keep undamaged the full notion of Brahman. Rāmānuja prefers the second alternative, and for him the identification of the jiva with Brahman is itself a part of the glorification of Brahman.

The next fundamental element of the teaching of Yājñavalkya in the dialogue concerns the pathway to the attainment of Brahman. The dialogue is distinguished by its adequate handling of the theme. The ideal conduct of life, according to the passage, must include an element of action, and it thereby agrees with the Īśa Upanishad and anticipates the Gītā. It says: "Tametaṁ vedānuvach inena Brāhmanā vividishanti, yajñena dānena tapasā 'nāśakena" (III. 4, 22). 60 The author of the Sūtras takes note of this injunction and provides for moral activity in his scheme of Godward life. There is an interesting divergence of opinion among the interpreters of Saṅkara as to whether the passage holds that actions such as yajña (sacrifice) and, dāna, (charitable deeds) give rise to knowledge of Brahman or to a desire for such knowledge. It is unnecessary for us to enter into this exegetical controversy. Rāmānuja sees in the text a straightforward advocacy of karma-yoga (Śrībhāshya, III. 4, 26).

The text goes further and enjoins on the seeker of Brahman cultivation of certain dispositions and attitudes, which are more inward ethical requirements: "Sānto dānta uparatatitīkshuh samāhito bhūtvā 'tmānaṁ pasyet" (IV. 4. 23).61 A disposition marked by the conquest of the senses inward and outward,

60. "Brāhmaṇas desire to know Him who is thus, by reciting the Vedas, by sacrifices, by giving gifts, by religious austerities associated with fasting".

61. "Being tranquillized in mind, with the senses restrained, having given up desires, resigned, patient, having become absorbed in meditation, one should see the Self in (his own) self."

fortitude in bearing the ills of life, and a reflective or contemplative attitude pave the way for seeing the Supreme Ātman in the ātma-difficulty in harmonizing them with the active ethics of karma-yoga. But he solves the difficulty by a suitable distinction in karma. Karma can bind and also liberate. The restraints relate to worldly activity and the karma-yoga proper is devotion to liberating activity (S'rībhāshya, III. 4. 27). Of the three cardinal virtues taught by the Brihadāranyaka (V. 2. 3), dāna, dama and dayā, charity, self-control and compassion, two, dāna and dama, are incorporated in the ethical prescriptions here. We are to take that dayā is also included by necessary implication. Yājñavalkya repeats prominently what he introduced in his replies to Kahola and Ushasta and lays down the law of renunciation.

The question of renunciation is amply discussed by Rāmānuja (S'rībhāshya, III. 4. 17-20). He is of opinion that samnyāsa as an order or stage of life is definitely taught in the Vedāntic scriptures. All the three upper castes are eligible for it. For a view according to which sannnyāsa is indispensable for the higher life, it is an unbearable restriction to advocate it only for the Brāhmaṇas. Sures'vara is right in rejecting that restriction. For Rāmānuja, though the samnyāsa āśrama is a recognized mode of life for the spiritual aspirants, it is not absolutely necessary for spiritual progress. The spirit of sannnyāsa, renunciation and dedication, can be cultivated in the other āśramas also. Formal sannnyāsa is an alternative and not a universal necessity.

The actual knowledge of Brahman is to be acquired in two stages. The text says: “Vijñāya prajñām kurvīta” (IV. 4. 21). We have here what the Mundaka (I. I. 4) propounds in the thesis of the two vidyās of Brahman, parā and aparā, the higher and the lower. ‘Vijñāya’ refers to the attainment of knowledge through scriptural study and philosophical reflection bearing on it. The prajnā that follows from it is the meditative awareness of Brahman. It certainly requires to be cultivated, and hence a vidhi or mandate of the form ‘kurvīta’ is perfectly reasonable. It is also to be seen

62. "Having attained knowledge, let one practise meditation."

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that the two stages of knowledge, the intellectual understanding and meditative directing of thought, correspond to the śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana of the Maitreyī dialogue. The vijñāna consists of śravaṇa and manaṇa, while the prajñā advocated is the nididhyāsana. The first stage also recapitulates the ‘pāṇḍitya’ of the Kuḥola-brāhmaṇa. It also corresponds to the pravacḥana and bahuḍa śrutena, which the Muṇḍaka (III. 2. 3) and the Kaṭḥa (II. 23) regard as incompetent for bringing about the vision of the Ātman.

The nididhyāsana is the dhruvā smṛiti of the Bhūma-vidyā of Chhāndogya (VII). It consists of a steady contemplation of Brahman. It is upāsana or devout meditation. The object of this meditation is Brahman as dwelling in the soul of the meditator. The Bṛihadāraṇyaka is very emphatic on the point, and we have a clear denunciation of meditation in which the object is viewed as external and alien to the meditating subject: “Atmetyeva upāsīta… yo ‘nyāṁ devatām upāste ‘nyo’sāṅanyo ham asmiti na sa veda” (I. 4. 7,10).63 This clearly corresponds to the Taittirīya text, “Yo veda nihitaṁ guhāyāṁ……” (II. 1. 1).

This immanence in the individual must enter into the theme of meditation, and hence the Dahara-vidyā of both the Chhāndogya and the Bṛihadāraṇyaka locate the Supreme Ātman in the ‘interior of the heart’ and take pains to formulate a clear conception of the individual self. The Chhāndogya appends the teaching concerning the individual at the end of the Dahara-vidyā, and the Bṛihadāraṇyaka has it as the first part of the Dahara-vidyā. All this is conveyed in the abridged injunction, ‘Ātmanyeva ‘tmānaṁ paśyet’ (IV. 4. 23)64 of the dialogue. Rāmānuja definitely states that the jīva is ‘upāsya-koṭi-nikṣipta’, placed in the position of the object of meditation. This assimilation of the individual into the theme of meditation is a part of the general truth that Brahman has to be contemplated as possessed of all perfections and cosmic and

63. “One should meditate (on Brahman) as the self…..He who worships the Deity as different (from his self), thinking that that (Deity) is one and he another, does not know.”

64. “One should see the Self in the self.”

THE BRIHADARANYAKA

113

supercosmic glories. It is this all-inclusiveness of the object that

Bhūma-vidyā propounds, when it asserts that the experience is such

that one knows and sees nothing else. It is this totality of the

object of meditation that Yājñavalkya teaches in his instruction to

Maitreyī when he speaks of the state in which the Ātman becomes

everything : " Yatraitvāsya sarvam Ātmaivābhūt " .65

While elucidating the term, ' nididhyāsana ', it was forced

upon us that we must include in it the element of love. This

enrichment of the notion of meditation is to be admitted even without

reference to the explicit statement to that effect in the Mundaka and

the Katha. The Gītā elaborates the fundamental characterization of

upāsanā as bhakti, and that thesis is no innovation but only an

explication. Keeping out the bhakti-texts of the other Upanishads

and the Gītā, in the Brihadāranyaka itself the essential idea that

upāsanā must be of the nature of love can be discerned without any

uncertainty. The nididhyāsana of the Maitreyī dialogue occurs in

the grand context of love, and Yājñavalkya is simply holding forth

the Ātman as the supreme object of supreme love. Janaka is so

overwhelmed by the mood of devotion that Yājñavalkya sets up in him

that he surrenders himself and all that belongs to him to that great

teacher for loving service, ' dāsyā ' (IV. 4. 23). This is surely

guru-bhakti flowing from Deva-bhakti. It is impossible to miss in

all this the attitude of love. Hence the last step in the ladder of

human effort towards the realization of Brahman is prajñā of the

nature of nididhyāsana characterized by love and adoration. It is

the culminating sādhana of this description that Rāmānuja prays for

in the opening verse of his Śribhāshya, ' semushi bhaktirūpā ', that

his understanding should assume the form of loving devotion to the

Lord.

65. " ......in which (experience) to him all things are Ātman."

a —15

CHAPTER V

FIVE MORE UPANISHADS

THE KAUSHITAKI

There is no reason to belittle the Kaushītakī Upanishad. It

bears the character of a very old Upanishad like the Chhāndogya

and the Bṛihadāraṇyaka. It has been brought under discussion by

the Brahma-Sūtras in two sections (I. 1. 29-32 and I. 3. 16).

Saṅkara, Bhāskara and Rāmānuja agree that these sections of the

Sūtras elucidate some basic passages of the Upanishad. The

commentators make use of the Upanishad, even apart from these

two sections of the Sūtras. Like all the older Upanishads, it also

contains material not strictly philosophical. And there seems to be

no justifiable reason for not according to this Upanishad the status

of a primary scripture of Vedānta. Rāmānuja offers a very

substantial interpretation of its philosophical contents.

The first section in the Brahma-Sūtras to discuss this

Upanishad takes up a very important chapter (III) of the

Upanishad· and it alone will concern us here. Rāmānuja devotes

the maximum consideration to it. In intrinsic weight, the chapter

is as lofty as any of the best discourses of the Chhāndogya and the

Bṛihadāraṇyaka.

Divodāsa's son, Pratardana, does some extraordinarily good deeds.

The god Indra to whose world he goes as a reward of merit, is highly

pleased with him and offers to give him a fitting boon. Pratardana

does not name the boon and prays to Indra to confer himself what he

considers to be the highest good of man. 'If this is rather surprising,

Indra's response is still more surprising. He directs Pratardana to

direct his devotion to himself, that is, to Indra himself Then an

extraordinary glorification of Indra by Indra himself is recorded.

He narrates his own feats that are familiar to students of Vedic

mythology. He goes on to describe himself as the fundamental prāṇa. This is no simple breath, but a cosmic principle. Gradually,

he advances to a highly metaphysical plane.

Indra describes the s:ṇ: : :ty of the self in man to the various

organs and processes through which he functions. He points out

that this self, described as prajñātmā (subtle intelligence), truly

appropriate des gnation, is organically related to the material world,

described as bhūtamātrā (subtle matter). It is not as if there were

several prajñāmātrās and several bhūtamātrās mutually distinct

and separate. The Upanishad says, "No etan etan" (III. 9), that

this is not a bare multiplicity. The bhūtamātrās are established in

the prajñamātrās. That means that the material world rests on

the selves in an ultimate way. The prajñāmātrās, in their turn,

are established in the Supreme prāṇa.

The Upanishads are fond of using the simile of a wheel for

illustrating the formation of an organically united structure out of a

multiplicity of factors. But they can show no better use of this

simile than what we have here. The outer rim of the wheel rests

upon the spokes. Even so do the material elements of existence rest

upon the selves. The spokes are held together by the axle.

Similarly, the selves are supported and held up by the Prāṇa

(III. 9).

Now the discourse devotes itself to the delineation of the

Prāṇa. This Prāṇa is prajñātmā, ānanda, ajara and amṛta

(ibid). That is, It is of the nature of supreme consciousness and

joy, unaging and immortal. It is beyond the law of karma; on the

contrary, it actuates the agents that come under the law of karma

(Ibid). This Prāṇa is He who protects the worlds, rules over the

worlds, He is the Lord of all, Sarveśvara Indra says: "He is

my Ātman and one should meditate on Him as my Ātman" (Ibid.).

This is the substance of the third chapter of the Kauṣītakī.

Rāmānuja finds this instruction highly contributory to the right

formulation of the philosophy of the Upanishads. That the material

universe is subservient to the finite self and that the finite selves are

based on the Supreme Spirit are magnificent propositions for him.

The exact relation of the material universe and the finite selves to

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the Paramātman is describable in terms of the body-soul relationship as propounded in the Antaryāmi-brāhmana. Hence Indra does well in-instructing Pratardana to meditate on the Supreme as dwelling in his individual soul. In precisely the same way does Vāmadeva communicate his supreme experience of Brahman (Brih. Up., I. 4. 10). Happily the instruction here culminates in the proclamation of the cosmic glories of Brahman. There is no suspicion of the impersonal and attributeless Absolute here, no hint of the unreality of the many and intimation of the unity of the jīva and Brahman except in terms of Brahman’s immanence in the jīva.

The ióaly anomaly in the discourse is that Brahman is not presented as such but is said to be Indra, with the well-known explqits to the credit of that Vedic deity. He is identified with Prānā, and many of the empirical characteristics of the well-known life-breath are mentioned. How are we to résolve this tangle ? The difficulty of textual interpretation is genuine, and the Sūtrakāra handles the problem superbly. Rāmānuja interprets him as maintaining that three types of meditation on Brahman are possible.

Sometimes a physical principle máy be chosen for focusing attention upon and Brahman may be meditated upon as dwelling within that principle. That is the casé in the present discourse, as far as it deals with meditation on prāna. Sometimes a particular individual self, such as the jīva of Indra in the present text, may be made the field of contemplation, and Brahman may be worshipped as dwelling in the individual as his Ultimate Soul Sometimes Brahman may be meditated upon ápart from these embodiments, in His own intrinsic nature along with His inherent perfections That is also á distinct manner of devotion.

Hence nothing has gone wrong if Indra directs Pratardana to meditate on Brahman as the soul of Indra himself or as the soul of prāna. Through the cosmos also there runs a road to the Absolute Reality. But the essential principle is that our devotion to these lower principles must progress beyond them and must reach the Highest as embodied in them. There should be no crude identification of the ostensible object with the real inner object shining through it. This instruction of Indra does itself contain directions for all the three types of meditation on Brahman.

FIVE MORE UPANISADS

117

SVETASVATARA

The Svetasvatara Upanishad is certainly a late Upanishad,

but it is not too late for being authoritative. The Brahma-Sutra

elucidates its passages in one section according to Sankara himself

(I. 4. 8-10). According to Rāmānuja, it elucidates some other

passages in another section also (III. 2. 35).66 These two

commentators refer to its authority widely in the course of their

writings. Hence its status as a primary Upanishad cannot be

validly disputed.

The Upanishad as a whole provides a congenial climate of

thought for Rāmānuja. It ecstatically dwells on the inherent

attributes and glories of Isvara. It distinguishes the jiva from

Isvara any number of times. Hence, whenever Rāmānuja wants to

give clear instances of bheda-sruti scriptural texts, differentiating

the individual self from Brahman, he resorts to this Upanishad.

Prakriti is one of the eternal verities according to it. It is identified

with māyā and Isvara is said to be the wielder of māyā. It

explicitly sets forth the pathway of surrender and bhakti, using the

very words, ‘saranam prapadye’ and ‘sārabhakti’ (VI. 18, 23)67

There is nothing in the Upanishad which cannot and does not get magnificent interpretation at the hands

of Rāmānuja. He takes care to differentiate its philosophy from

Sankhya, so great is its insistence on prakriti. He also takes care

to show that its doctrine is not a dualistic theism. It is not that

there is a being higher than the Supreme Purusha who pervades the

66. Under I. 4. 8-10. the Chamasādhikarana, Svet. Up. (IV. 5) that

describes prakriti is discussed with cross-references to Brih. Up. (II. 2. 3)

and other passages in the same Upanishad as well as in the Chhandogya.

Both Sankara and Ramanuja consider this adhikarana as declaring that the

Svetasvatara text does not and cannot refer to ‘a prakriti independent of

Brahman, though they differ in various details of interpretation as

necessitated by their philosophic standpoints and other exegetical

considerations. The other aphorism in the Brahma-Sutra discussing a

Svetāsvatara passage occurs in the Parādhikarana. It is III. 2. 35, according

to Rāmānuja's numbering. Sankara reckons it as III. 2. 36, and he also

quotes Svet. Up. (III. 9), which Rāmānuja explains elaborately.

67. “I take refuge ”: “supreme devotion.”

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SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

universe. In principle and in essential details, the Śvetāśvatara stands for a sublime theism. There is no spec il need for exhibiting in detail Rāmānuja's fidelity to it.

Somewhat in the menner of Indra's instruction to Pratardana, this Upanishad also propounds three realities and three mitos of meditation on Brahman. The apparently pluralistic theism of the first proposition is corrected in the second proposition. It says :

"Etajjñeyam nityamevātmasthemin nātaḥ parami veditavyam hi kimchit. Bhoktā bhogyami preritārami cha matvā sarvam proktam trividham Brahmametat" (I. 12). 68 The first half of the verse makes it clear that the Supreme Being must be sought within the individual, as eternally abiding therein. There is said to be no other knowledge worth pursuing. The latter half of the verse is beautifully explained in the Vedārtha-saṅgraha (p. 135).

There are three entities. The bhoktṛi is the jīva enjoying and suffering in the course of his transmigratory existence. He trancends the body and attains perfection by the knowledge of Īśvara. There is the material world, the bhogya in which the jīva in saṁsāra finds his joys and sorrows and which is wielded by Īśvara. There is the third entity, Īśvara, who actuates all else. He is the Preritṛi, the Impeller. If the passage stopped at this point, it would be propounding only a pluralistic theism. But it goes beyond, aceording to Rāmānuja. "All this threefold Brahman", says the teacher, "stands expounded".

Brahman permits of a threefold presentation. Brahman may be conceived as Preritṛi the Supreme Actuator, and His intrinsic nature and powers and attributes are to be apprehended in th s aspect Brahman, having this nature and attributes, may be contemplated as the Supreme Soul indwelling matter, the bhogya. He can also be contemplated as the inner soul of the bhoktṛi, the jīva himself, This doctrine of threefold meditation on Brahman

68. "This (Brahman) thus described has to be known as eternally established in the individual self (as its Internal Ruler) : beyond this, there is nothing to be known. All this threefold Brahman stands expounded when regarded as th e enjoyer, the enjoyed and the Impeller."

FIVE MORE UPANḤĀḌE

119

cancels the apparent pluralism of the earlier enunciation of the three

categories.

That the theism taught in the Śvetāśvatara is a monistic theism

is the guiding thought of Rāmānuja in his explanation of this and other

similar passages of the Upanishad.89 We have, according to him,

no basis whatever in the Upanishad for an atheistic monism or a

pluralistic theism. It is a magnificent unfoldment of the concept of

the Antaryāmin, so well presented in the other Upanishads also,

in the appropriate style of high devotional poetry.

MAHOPANISHAD

Rāmānuja, we are in a position to assert at this stage, does not

leave out of account any major and ancient Upanishad in building

up the structure of his Vedānta. It has also to be recognized

definitively that not a single fundamental philosophical passage in

the body of the major Upanishads remains unexplained in his

Śrībhāshya, Vedārthasangraha and Gītābhāshya. He does take

a step beyond the conventional range of Upanishadic literature and

takes into account three other texts of the Upanishads. He is not

descending from the Upanishadic heights thereby, but is rather

scaling a new peak. These texts are an unfamiliar Mahopanishad,

a still more unfamiliar Subālopanishad and the Nārāyana-sūkta of

the famous and universally accepted Mahānārāyaṇīya Upanishad.

He advances an additional thesis on the basis of their authority.

That the Mahopanishad is no spurious Upanishad is proved by

Vıdānta Deśika on the ground that it is amply used as an authoritative

work by Yāmunāchārya in his Purusha-nirnaya, by Yādavaprakāśa

in his commentary on the Gītā and by Nārāyaṇārya, a follower of

Yādava, in his Tattva-nirnaya. (See the Sachcharitra-rakshā,

46-47).

All these texts identify the Brahman of the Upanishads with

Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Deity according to Vaishṇava philosophy and

69 Some commentators tend to view the Upanishad as Śaivite. On

this, see the next section.

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religion. Thibaut exercises a high degree of fairness of judgement in

saying that this is the only sectarian feature in the whole philosophy

of Ramānuja. (Introduction to his translation of Saṅkara's Sūtra-

bhāshya, xxxi). The Mahopanishad designates the ground

(kāraṇa) of the universe named variously in the various Upanishads

as 'Sat', 'Brahman' and 'Ātman' as Nārāyaṇa. There is

increasing determinateness in this series of terms, 'Sat'-'Brahman'-

'Ātman'-'Nārāyaṇa', and therefore the most determinate of the

designations must be accepted as final. The others are tentative and

inconclusive, while this contains the utmost particularization This

is the doctrinal purpose to which Rāmānuja puts the Mahopunishad.

SUBĀLOPANISHAD

The Subālopanishad repeats the Antaryāmi brāhmaṇa of the

Brihadāraṇyaka with great gusto increasing the range of illustrations

of the bodies of the Antaryāmin and identifies the Antaryāmin with

Nārāyaṇa. This seems to have been an ancient equation in Vedic

thought, for even Saṅkara, in his interpretation of the Brihadāra-

ṇyaka construes the Antaryāmin as Nārāyaṇa. The author of the

Nārāyaṇīya (xc. 5, 6) makes the observation that Saṅkara is no

partisan in his views and that the fact of his choosing to comment

upon Vishṇusahasranāma demonstrates that Nārāyaṇa is in reality

the Supreme Deity.

MAHĀNĀRĀYĀṆA UPANISHAD

The Nārāyaṇa Anuvāka of the Taittirīya collects together

all the terms used in the Upanishads for signifying the Ultimate

Reality such as 'Akshara', 'Śiva', 'Śambhu', 'Parabrahman',

'Paramjyotis', 'Paratattva', 'Pārāyaṇa' 'Paramātman',

and asserts that Nārīyaṇa is all this. The section seems to have no

purport other than this exact determination of the identity of the

Highest Reality as Nārāyaṇa. It is in continuation of the Dahara-

vidyā of the Taittirīya, but goes beyond it and includes in its scope

all the vidyās of the Upanishads. It connects itself with the

Purusha-sūkta unmistakably. The passage could only mean that

the Brahman of the Upanishads is Nārāyaṇa.

FIVE MORE UPANISHADS

This entire Nārāyanite exegesis is found in great detail in the

Vedārthasañgraha (page 210) and is also worked out briefly in the

S'ribhāshya (III. 3. 43). It is not, therefore, that Rāmānuja renders

into the Vedānta the concept of Nārāyana gathered from elsewhere,

from some alien and non-Vedic source, but that he finds in the body

of Upanishadic revelation Nārāyana represented as the Highest

Deity, the Supreme Reality. If he had failed to incorporate this

revealed truth in his philosophy, he would have been truly an

inadequate interpreter. His philosophy would have been a fragmentary

version of the teachings of the Upanishads. So his Vaishnavism is

something to which he is driven by the Upanishads and not

something he superimposes on them illegitimately. He says :

Vedavītpravaidairbrokta-vākyañgāyopabṛihitāśh

Vedāś sāñgā Elurīṁ grahūr jagajjanmādikāragam70

(Vedāntiṁtatatparaniḥ, p. 290)

70.' The Vedas with their auxiliaries and amplified and supported by

arguments from the writings of the best among Vedic scholars, speak of

Hari as the cause of the creation etc. of the world.

15—16

CHAPTER VI

SUMMING UP

We have gone though Rāmānuja's interpretation in some detail of

the major passages of the major Upanishads, and it is difficult

to establish that what remains over unexplained by him is anything but

the unessential husk of the Upanishadic compositions. Not much

remains now for us to accomplish by way of elucidating the treatment

of the Upanishads by Rāmānuja. It is to be noted that a profoundly

meaning discernment is displayed in the choice of texts for

explanation and a high degree of fairness is observable in the

repeated and thorough consideration bestowed on discourses on which

the other interpreters, particularly of the Advaitic school, based

their reconstruction of the philosophy of the Upanishads. It may

be appropriate to conclude this survey with the enunciation, on

Rāmānaja's part, of what he regards as the final and total message

of the Upanishads.

Śaṅkara has two remarkable pronouncements on the total drift

of the Upanishads in his commentary on the Sūtras. The first of

these runs as follows :

"Dvirūpā hi vedāntavākyānāṁ pravṛttitih, kvachit

Paramātmasvarūpāparijñānaparā kvachit vijñānātmanah Parā-

mātmaikatvopadeśaparā" (I. 3. 25).71

Śaṅkara here refers to "two kinds of statements in the

Upanishads. One kind seeks to set forth clearly the nature of

Brahman. The other kind seeks to teach the identity of the

71. "The indicatory force of Vedānta texts is twofold-being

impressed with the determination of the essential nature of the Supreme

Self in some places and elsewhere being devoted to instruction about the

oneness of the Supreme Self and the cognising subject."

SUMMING UP

individual self with the Supreme Self." Here we have a comprehensive declaration.

The other pronouncement occurs in the preface to the Ānandamayādhikarana (I. 1. 12) : "Dvirūpam hi Brahmāvagamyate, nāmārthaprakāśābhedopādhividhiṣṭhātṛ, tad viparītam che sarvopādhi- vivarjitam."

" There are two forms," it is stated here, "in which Brahman comes to be understood—as characterized by adjuncts of the nature of name and form entailing change and differentiation, and as the opposite of all this, transcending all adjuncts." These two forms in which Brahman is presented are not of equal philosophical value.

Saṅkara goes on to add : "Evaṁ sahasraśo vidyāvidyā-viṣayā-bhedaṅa dvairūpaṁ darśayanti vākyaṅi " (Ibid.).72 Of the two modes of the conception of Brahman, that of the conditioned Brahman is lower, inasmuch as it is meant for the consummation of the ignorant, while that of the unconditioned Brahman is for the enlightened and is therefore the higher and the ultimate conception.

Thus we gather that, according to Saṅkara, the ultimate affirmation of the Upanishads concerns the nature of Brahman or the identity of the individual apirit with Brahman. In the present. ation of the concept of Brahman, there are statements that do not rise beyond the realm of ignorance and misconception, and also those that deal with it in its true essence as open to comprehension by seekers with unclouded intellect.

Rāmānuja does not subscribe to this way of arranging the teachings of the Upanishads. He does not admit that there are any texts preaching an attributeless Brahman. If there were any, they would only be perpetrating an error. for the conception of an attributeless entity is fundamentally self-contradictory. To be real, according to him, is to be characterized by attributes.

72. "In this way the texts in their thousands show Brahman to be of two forms, according to the distinction between the objects of knowledge and ignorance."

124

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

Happily no Upanishadic passage commits the error of positing such an entity. If it did, far from meeting the spiritual requirements of an enlightened seeker after truth, it would only snare the seeker into a hopeless muddle.

The teaching of Brahman with attributes is not to present a 'conditioned' Brahman The attribute, 'eśeṣaṇa', is not the same as 'upādhi', the limiting adjunct Qualities are not limitations, for infinitude is itself a quality and implies infinitude of qualitative perfections, and limiting adjuncts are just obscurations or curtailments of qualities All empirical determination is negation, because what it affirms is finite and is thus conjoined to a negation. The infinite is determined absolutely, and the infinite determination carries the negation of all such negations. To escape the negative implication of empirical determination, it is hopeless to seek refuge in an indeterminate real, for the indeterminate carries to perfection, as it were, the limited negations of empirical determinations. The indeterminate real is a blank non-entity. The passage of thought from determinations to the indeterminate is to surrender partial negations in exchange for an infinity of negations. The true infinite is that in which determinateness reaches its fullness, and it is determined not against anything positive, but is such that it excludes all exclusions.

Hence Brahman with attributes is the only Brahman, and the Upanishads, in so far as they propound this conception, are addressed to the loftiest intellectual level. The doctrine that the Upanishads present Brahman under two forms, nirgụṇa and saguṇa, as attributeless and with attributes, and the view relating Nirgụṇa Brahman to vidyā or true knowledge and Saguṇa Brahman to avidyā or ignorance are thus radically wrong, according to Rāmānuja.

Rāmānuja would be critical of the supposition that the statements of the Upanishads concern either the nature of Brahman or the identity of the individual self and Brahman. The latter is not a distinct theme. It is subsumed in the former. It is also too rough and incomplete an indication of the relation between the individual and the Supreme Reality, which relation, according to Rāmānuja, obtains an ampler and logically more satisfactory formulation in the Upanishads.

SUMMING UP

120

The all-inclusive theme of the Upanishads is Brahman and Brahman alone. They discern the nature of Brahman as being real, conscious, infinite, perfect and blissful. They declare that Brahman is characterized by infinite perfections by way of exalted attributes and is altogether free from imperfections.

This is what is technically described as ‘vibhūyitī gatva’, being characterised in two ways. Brahman does have as Its or His glory the mundane world of gross nature and finite souls still in the state of bondage. There is also a higher realm of glory, consisting of Nature without its binding properties and the individual souls in the state of perfection. This aspect of Brahman is described as the ‘ubhaya-vibhūti’, the twofold glory, of Brahman. The fundamental and the only purport of the Upanishads is the proclamation of the Supreme Brahman in all His inexhaustible perfections and glories.

It is in the course of the complete articulation of the relation of Brahman to the realm of physical Nature and finite conscious personalities that the concept of their identity comes to be put forth by the Upanishads. In principle, therefore, it is not a distinct and independent theme. It falls within the inclusive theme of the nature and splendour of Brahman.

Now the relation between the finite world, both material and spiritual, and the Supreme Brahman receives a threefold presentation in the Upanishads on Rāmānuja’s interpretation. There are passages that sharply distinguish prakṛiti (matter), purusha (the individual self) and the Purushottama (the Supreme Person). They bring out the exalted qualities of the Purushottama and establish His transcendent supremacy. There are again passages that proclaim that prakṛiti and purusha, so distinguished from the Supreme Being, are constitutive of only His powers, glory and body and are part of Him. The thesis of the Upanishads does not terminate in the doctrine of distinctions. The lower realities are assimilated into the being of Brahman in the status of ‘body’ or ‘adjectival determination’.

If this step were not taken, we would have only a dualistic theism. Rāmānuja is emphatic that such a theism discards the whole of Vedānta. He says: “Kevalabhedādinām chātyantabhinna-yoh

126

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

kenāpi prakāreṇa aikyā sambhavā deva Brahmanā tmevādesṭā na sambhavatiṭi sarvavedāntapratiyā ges syāt" (Śrībhāṣya, I. 1. 1, Mahāsiddhānta).73

If the full implication of this truth is apprehended and we recognize that what we regard as the world of matter and souls is just an aspect or mode or embodiment of Brahman, we are obliged to affirm that Brahman is the sole reality as all finite existence is comprehended in the glory of Brahman. It is in this sense that the Upanishads declare that Brahman is all, and identify the world in all its states with Brahman. The identity meant here is not a mechanical and literal sameness of being, but the fact of the comprehension of the finite as an aspect of the full being of Brahman. It is inclusion rather than sameness

If the identity is understood in such a way that the distinctions enunciated and the body-and-soul relation formulated are set aside and total identity of substantive essence is asserted, we face, according to Rāmānuja, insuperable difficulties, both exegetical and philosophical. All the perfections of Brahman antithetical to such an identification with the finite, are to be discarded in such an interpretation. The imperfections of the individual soul that stand in the way of the identification are to be explained away as illusory. But the proneness to such illusions has to be predicated of the only conscious principle in the scheme, namely, Brahman. The outcome would be the assertion of an ineradicably finite spirit and no Supreme Brahman at all.

A more thorough-going negation of all that the Upanishads stand for is hardly conceivable. Hence the identity spoken of between the individual and Brahman must be interpreted in a way consistent with the retention of the supremacy and ultimate reality of Brahman

73. "The whole of the Vedānta will have to be given up by those who are strict dualists, pure and simple, as (according to their tenets) expositions of Brahman being the individual self cannot possibly arise, on account, indeed, of the impossibility of any kind of oneness whatever between two entities (such as Brahman and the self) which are radically different from each other."

and Its perfections, and that is possible only by assigning to the

individual the status of a subordinate element by way of body in the

total expanse of Divine existence. Such a position would also bring

out a further perfection of Brahman, that of being the inner soul of

the finite soul also.

Hence for Rāmānuja the core of the philosophy of the

Upanishads lies in the declaration of Brahman in all Its perfections.

He is not particular about the categorization of his position as

propounding bheda (distinction) or bhedābheda (distinction-cum-

identity) or abheda (identity or oneness). He says in a truly grand

passage of the Vedārthasaṅgraha (p. 182) that he upholds all the

three, bheda, bhedābheda and abheda, because such is indeed the

synthetic position of the Upanishads. Only the three points of

view are to be properly construed.

Rāmānuja is particularly happy when he has to formulate in a

synoptic fashion the teachings of the Upanishads. He offers his

formulation in six important contexts in his writings. He does so

twice in the course of the Mahāsiddhānta of the Jijñāsādhikarana

of the Śrībhāshya (I. 1. 1). First, while combating the Advaitic

interpretation of the śruti texts, he sets out his considered view,

taking care to concentrate on all those passages which seem

particularly favourable to Advaita. Again, towards the close of the

adhikarana, he attempts a grand outline of his understanding of

the Upanishads. Almost the whole of this latter outline is

incorporated in his commentary on the controversial 13th chapter of

the Gītā. The opening words of both these discussions are precisely

the same, "Atradaḥ tattvam"74 Similar statements of a

comprehensive nature are made in the introductory remarks of the

Vedāntadīpa and the Vedāntasāra.

In its essential nature, the whole of this Vedārthasaṅgraha is a

statement of his interpretation of the Upanishads. But within the

treatise there occurs the central part starting with 'Atrredam sarva-

sāstra-hridayam',75 and in this part he outlines his approach in

74. "The truth here is this."

75. "The heart of all the śastras here is this."

128

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

all its wide compass. He states therein that a proper elucidation must discern the basic harmony of doctrine and take the primary significance of every type of inspired utterance. He contends that the Upanishads proclaim a single coherent doctrine of Brahman, which unfortunately gets broken up into primary and secondary teachings by commentators who sponsor either an atheistic monism or a dualistic theism.

It is not that they offer solutions for the problem of the apparently divergent teachings of the Upanishads Rather, they introduce a divergence which is not there by their partisan and antecedent predilections. They surrender themselves to the texts imperfectly and attempt to extract support for their pre-formed views; and hence the stratification of the contents and the consequent ignoring of certain inconvenient aspects of the teaching are inevitable. We have seen how Saṅkara has to reject entire sections of the Upanishads such as the Sāndilya-vidyā, the Dahara-vidyā of the Chhāndogya and the Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa as doling out the doctrine of the lower Brahman, and how substantial parts of even those discourses such as the Sadṛpidyā, the Āksharabrāhmaṇa and the Jyotiṣyātmana supposed to be expounding the higher Brahman, are subjected to such subtraction.

The Upanishadic philosophy, when reconstructed in a spirit of thorough-going objectivity, is a coherent whole that does justice to all its principal parts. Rāmānuja lists the varied types of texts and elucidates them, giving them their due weight of significance and demonstrates the resulting unity of doctrine. There is no logic in the position of Advaita which attaches only secondary significance to texts that speak of the creation of the world by Brahman out of Itself. The passages that posit a knowledge which includes all knowledge, propound the creation-thesis, and to reject them is to destroy the foundation of the monism of the Upanishads. We cannot abolish the creation-thesis and flourish on the monism built up by the doctrine of creation.

As for passages that speak of Brahman as attributeless and refer to it in a negative way, they are to be understood as negative interpretations of Brahman. There is no going away from the texts which negative passages make clear that it is imperfection that

is denied of Brahman and some negative passages form part of larger discourses which characterize Brahman in an affirmative manner. The formula of 'Neti, neti' does either declare the inexhaustibility of the forms of Brahman or proclaim the fact of Its transcendence.

When the Upanishads speak of Brahman as jñāna or prajñāna, they just assert that consciousness is a primary attribute of the Supreme Reality and that the Supreme Self is self-luminous in the matter of knowledge. There is no element of 'unknowing' in Brahman. The Absolute is spirit fully and eternally awake to Its own plenitude of being. When Brahman is spoken of as ānanda, it means that It is blissful and perfect spirit and does impart joy to him who contemplates It. When all is said to be Brahman, the immanence of Brahman in all is meant and all finite reality constitutes a form or aspect of the Infinite Being.

When Brahman is said to be unknowable, only the possibility of complete understanding is being denied. When plurality is denied, it only means that plurality not permeated by the unitary ground is denied. When Brahman is spoken of as the Supreme Personality with countless holy perfections, it simply means that such is the final truth. When Brahman is said to be the Ātman and all else Its body, what is perfectly right is being said, as such a theistic monism is the final philosophy of the Upanishads.

Brahman is the ontological ultimate, and all characteristics implied by that fact are surely to be attributed to Brahman. Brahman is also the exiological ultimate and the famous Bhūma-vidyā and all the descriptions of Brahman as ānanda (or bliss) elucidate that position. Brahman is also the final redemptive power, and it is not that Brahman can be attained independent of initiative on Its part. Hence, all attributes constitutive of grace are to be attributed to Brahman. In short, the Brahman of the Upanishads is the paratattva, parahita and parapurushārtha, the supreme reality, the supreme way to redemption and the supreme goal.

It is often maintained that the distinctiveness of the teachings of the Upanishads, lies in the concept of an impersonal Absolute and the final identity of the individual spirit with it. This, according to

Rāmānuja, would be seeking originality at the cost of truth. Even otherwise, enough grounds for the claim of uniqueness do remain. The triumphant assertion of the immanent existence of the absolutely transcendent Brahman has a perfectly revolutionary character in the context of loosely conceived dualistic theisms and atheistic monisms. It is likely that this doctrine has affinities with all higher religions and philosophies. It is also true that Vedic thought itself has it in essentials. That only proves that the Upanishads as interpreted by Rāmānuja are a consummation of all aspirations, religious and philosophical. The uniqueness of the philosophy in that case lies in the clarity of vision and fullness of explication.

It is interesting to note that Rāmānuja's findings on the Upanishads have come to stay in Indian philosophy and have passed into the structure of other Vedāntic schools of interpretation. Jayatīrtha, after quoting the remarks that we have been discussing of Saṅkara in the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa on the two ways in which Brahman is presented in the Upanishads according to him, comments : “Tadidam anupapannam, Brahmano dvairūpyasya aprāmānikatvāt”.76 He does not elaborate in the context why he regards the conception of the two forms of Brahman as untrue

What follows is a glowing statement of the Dvaita view of Upanishadic philosophy : “Sarvānyapi Vedāntavākyānyasaṅkhyeya-kalyāṇa-gulākaram sakala-doshal-gandha-vidhuram ekarūpametva Brahma Nārāyanākhyaṁ pratipādayunti. Kintu kānichit sarvajñatva-sarveśvaratva-sarvāntaryāmitva-saundaryaudārya-guna-viśishtatayā Kānichit apahatapāmatva-nirdhukhitva-prākṛtavoigraharaḥitvādidoshābhava-viśishtatayā. Kānichit atīghanatājñāpgnāya vāñmanasōgōcharatvādy- kāreṣa. Kānichit sarvaparityāgena tasyairopādanāya advitīyatvena. Kānichit sarvasattāpratīti-pravṛttinimittatā-pratipatt-yartham sarvāmakatvena. Ityevamādyanekaprakāraih

76. This is thus against reason, as there is no valid source of knowledge showing Brahman to have two forms.

SUMMING UP

131

Paramapuruşe bodhayanti. Tataḥ eṣākulabuddhayaḥ sarvatrāpyakāriūpatām anarhusan dhādhā nā Vedān cchindanti,'

(Nāyasudhā, I. 1. 6). 77

It is evident that Rāmānuja's central contention is embodied in this view of the Upanishads. It rejects the two-level presentation of Brahman and subsumes the identity-texts under the comprehensive scheme of declaring the glorious nature of the Deity. The perspective of Rāmānuja concerning the Upanishads crystallizes itself in the subsequent evolution of Vedānta into a full-fledged formulation of their teachings. It looks as if they yielded their integrated meaning with no loss to any thread of statement, only if approached on the lines propounded by him. Far from Rāmānuja deviating from the teachings of the Upanishads, it is only his mode of interpreting them that would save a Vedāntin from doing violence to their import.

It was said above that Brahman is the ultimate reality, the ultimate good and the ultimate power effectuating the realization of the good There is nothing beside Brahman. Matter and finite selves are real only as adjectival to the Supreme. Their being does not constitute a limitation, because they themselves are parts of the splendour of Brahman. The speciality of Rāmānuja's thought lies

77. "All texts of the Vedānta declare, indeed, Brahman known as Narayana to be both of 'śre Form-as the mine of countless auspicious qualities and devoid of the slightest trace of all imperfection. But some (of them) (do so) by way of referring to His being qualified by the attributes of omniscience, sovereignty over all, rulership of all from within, beauty and magnanimity. Others by way of (referring to) His being negatively characterised by the absence of imperfections, such negative characterisations including freedom from sin, being devoid of grief, having no material body and so on. Others, again, by way of His being such as to be beyond the range of speech and mind and so on, in order to teach us the extreme difficulty of understanding Him. Yet others by way of His being one only without a second, as the object to be pursued through the renunciation of all else. Still others, by way of His being the self of all, in as much as He confers on all else being, activity and knowability. In these and many other ways, they teach about the Supreme Person. Therefore, confused minds cut the Veda into pieces, failing to hold on to the same form of Brahman in all (texts)."

not in the conception of the ultimacy of the Saguṇa Brahman, nor

in the emphatic declaration of the reality of the cosmos. It lies in

interpreting that reality as due to the selves and matter forming a

prakāra or mode or adjectival determinatien of Brahman. There is

nothing, therefore, in existence beside the Supreme Brahmin with

all His infinite attributes, the latter including all finite existents.

It is the conception of the adjectival status of Nature and finite

spirits that makes Rāmānuja's philosophy a monism. But it is a

monism that does not abrogate the concept of the Supreme Spirit, the

Highest Self. It is a monism to which God is the central reality.

Assimilation of the individual soul to God in the status of a prakāra,

does not entail the pruning away of the attributes of Godhead. On

the contrary, it enlarges our conception of Divine attributes, for the

jīva himself is an attribute of Īśvara.

For Rāmānuja and his school of thought, the Ultimate Spirit

holds all things within Itself and abides in all things. All that brings

about the perfection of the finite self forms a fundamental

characteristic of the Supreme Reality. What constitutes the final

perfection for that self is the realization, by way of experiential

apprehension, of the Infinite Divine.

Such is the final substance and the entire message of the

Upanishads, according to Rāmānuja. For his way of thinking the

concept of Nārāyaṇā, properly comprehended, embodies in itself this

philosophy completely. Hence one may, as well, conclude that the

whole teaching of the Upanishads stands summed up in a supreme

synthesis in the concept of Nārāyaṇa.

INDEX OF QUOTATIONS

Aitareya Upanishad : 16-18,63.

I. 1.1 17, 65.

III. 5.3 17-18.

Akṣara-brāhmaṇa :

91, 93-98, 128.

Ānandamayādhikaraṇa :

48, 123, 130.

Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa :

65, 90-93, 96, passim

II. 1.5 89

8 17

18 17

26 17

2.1 34

3.19 22

4.1 17

17 39

Bhagavadgītā : 1, 2, 3, 55, 110,

113, 119.

X 8

XV 60

Bhāgavata :

I. 1.1 20

IV. 9.6 9

X. 35.9 34

Brahma-Sūtra(s)

I. 1.1 17

5 39

12 17

20 34

29-32 114

31 65

2.2 14

9 10

3.1 14

12 18

15 61

16 114

19 62

28 10

40 10

42-43 101, 108

4.1 10

8-10 117

21 17

23 39

III. 2.1-5 101

11 16, 35

35 117 n.

36 117 n.

39 56

3.17 11

35-37 88

38 66

38-39 98

39 106, 109

51 27

52 62

IV. 1.15 89

2.1 89

4.18 17

Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad :

56, 65-118, passim.

I. 4.1, 17 65

7 68

7, 10 66, 112

8 78

9, 10 65

10 66, 68, 98,

104, 118

II. 1.20 67

2.8 117 n.

6 67

3.6 67, 72, 73

4 11, 65, 67,

75

BU-18

134

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

II. 4 2

75

5

75, 77

6

66, 77, 79,

98

10

80

12

81

5

65

15

85

19

84, 86

7. 9

80

III.

2 13

87

3

70

6

69

4

67

4 1

88

2

88

9

97

10

8

22

110

5

67

5. 1

89, 90

7

67, 90

23

92, 93

8

65, 67

10

95

11

95

12

90, 94

9. 23

67

26

97

28

65, 71, 97

14. 1

80

IV. 3

66, 89

2

99

7

98, 99, 100

9

99, 100

10

101

21

44, 101

30

101

32

102

33

102

4. 2

103

5

103

6

103

19

66, 100, 105,

108

21

99, 111

IV. 4 22

67, 97, 98,

109

22, 24

104, 105

23

110, 112,

113

24

98

5

65, 67, 75

6

75

7

77

15

67, 82, 89,

94, 97

V. 1.1

66

2.3

111

Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣhad,

Śāṅkarābhāṣya :

II. 231

72

III. 812

94

Chhāndogya Upaniṣhad :

I. '6 6-7

82

7

70

9

30

11

30

II. 22

29

III. 13

80

14

34, 68

1

35, 37, 44,

53

2

70

3

87

4

88

IV. 1. 3

28

4. 4

28

10

31

15

31

V. 11

31

VI. 1. 2-3

39

4

40

2. 1

41

3

41

3-4

41

8

2-3

42

8

44

4,6

44

135

INDEX OF QUOTATIONS

VI 3. 7

46, 55, 91

9 4

98, 104

44

10 3

46

11 3

44

46

12 3

46

45

13 3

46

13, 14

45

14 2

45

3

46

16 3

45

46

VII.

7 113

24. 1

105

52

25. 1

53

26. 1

54

2

54, 55

VIII. 7

100

12. 3

13. 60, 104

14. 1

31

Daharavidyā : 55-63, 177, 112,

passim

Garuḍa-Purāṇa : 234. 28

24

Gītā : See Bhagavadgītā

Īśa, Īśāvāsya Upaniṣhad : 7-8

1,2 7

8 7

11 7

19. 14

8

8, 70

16

Jyotir-brāhmaṇa : 98-11

See also Brihadāraṇyaka

Upaniṣhad, IV-8, 4.

Kaṭha-Upaniṣhad : 10-12

I. 20 11

27

75

II. 28

12, 113

III. 1 11

V. 9 11

13 11

Kaṇhitsaḳi Upaniṣhad: 114-116

III. 9 115

Kena Upaniṣhad : 8-10

I, 1 9

5-8 9

II. 3 9

Madhu-brāhmaṇa : 85-86

Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣhad : 105,

119. 120-121

XI. 12 70

Mahopaniṣhad : 119-120

Maitreyi-brāhmaṇa 74-85

Māṇḍukya-kārikās : 15

I. 16 15

Māṇḍukya Upaniṣhad 15-16

Muṇḍaka Upaniṣhad : 14-15

I, 1. 3 14, 65

111

II, 1. 1 15

III, 2. 3 12, 15, 112

Naiṣhkarmya-siddhi ;

II. 29 49, 69, 71

Nārāyaṇa Sūkta ; 119

Nārāyaṇīya:

XC 5.6 120

Nṛsiṃhadhi :

I. 16 121

Paṭohadāṭi :

VII. 46 49, 69

Praśna Upaniṣhad :

IV. 7 12-13

13

V. 7 13

15

Pratardana-vidyā :

66

Puruṣha-nirṇaya :

119

Puruṣha-Sūkta :

13,70

Ṛigvedā

VI. 47. 18 86

19 86

136

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

Saheharitrarakshā : 46-47 119

Sadvidyā : 38–50

Sāndilya-vidyā : 34–38

Saṅkṣepa-śārīraka : 27 122–256 49 251–256 71

Sribhāshya : I. 1. 1 9, 97, 126, 127 4 9 2. 1 9 3. 7 52 9 94 13 56 19 61 42–44 100 4. 1 11 16 75 91 81 II. 4. 13 94 III. 2. 21 69 3. 33 94 37 91 38–40 100 40 56 43 121 4. 17–20 111 26 110 27 111 46–48 90 IV. 2. 12 87

Srutaprakāśikā of Sudarśana Sūri: I. 3. 7 53 III. 3. 51 27

Subālopanishad : 119, 120 VII. 92

Sūtrabhāshya of Saṅkara : I. 1. 12 122 I. 3. 25 123 II. 2. 31 72 III. 2. 39 56

Thibaut's Introduction to Saṅkara's Sūtrabhāshya : p. xxxi 120 3

Svetāśvatara Upanishad : 117–120 I. 12 118 III. 9 117 n. IV. 5 117 n. VI. 18, 23 117

Tātparyadīpikā of Sudarśana Sūri: 32, 33, 39, 40

Taittirīya Āraṇyaka : III. 21 96

Taittirīya Upanishad : 18–25 II. 1. 1 18, 20, 24, 25, 112 44 6. 1 20, 21, 24 7. 1 20, 23, 24 8. 1 21 9. 1 23 III. 1. 1 19, 20 IV. 55

Tattva-nirṇaya of Nārāyaṇārya : 119

Tattva-tīkā of Vedānta Deśika : 27

Vedāntadīpa : 127

Vedantasara : 127

Vedārthasaṅgraha : 3, 4, 6, 33, 34, 48, 50, 56, 128

p. 135 118 p. 199 39 p. 210 121 p. 211 17 pp. 303–335 71

Vishayavakyādīpikā : 5

Viṣhnupurāṇa : I. 20. 19 10

INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS

AND PROPER NAMES

(Arranged according to the Sanskrit Alphabet.)

'a' : 16.

akāma : 103.

akāmahata : 102.

akitsna : 66, 69, 106,107.

Akshara : passim.

Aksharu.brāhmaṇa : a section of Brih Up., see 'Index of Quotations '.

Akshara-vidyā : meditation on Brahman as Akshara, 94, 96.

Angiras : the sage and teacher in Muṇḍ Up., described as being in close lineal descent from Brahmā the creator, 14,

40, 65.

aja : 67.

ajara : 13, 115.

ativādin : 50, 51.

Advaita : the monistic school of Vedānta, of which the most notable exponent is Sañkarā-chārya, passim : -in, a follower of this philosophical school,

passim ; -in, a follower of this school of thought.

Adhikaraṇas : sections or topics (particularly of the Brahma-Sūtras), passim.

adhyāya : chapter, passim.

ananta (m) : 18, 20, 52.

anādara : 39.

B U—19

anuchchhitti-dharma : indestructible, 81.

anṛita : lit. falsehood, here karma which brings about the loss of true vision, 58.

antahkarana : lit. the internal organ, the mind conceived as a material entity and differentiated from the immaterial self, 22.

antah-pravishta : (past participle) having entered within, 96.

antara: (noun) interval, difference, 24 ; (adjective) interior to, 92.

Antarākshara : He who is within and immutable, 96.

antaro yanayati : rules from within, 92.

Antaryāmin: the Ruler from within, the Internal Controller, passim.

Antaryāmi brāhmaṇa: a section of Brih. Up. 'See Index to Quotations'.

Antaryāmi vidyā : meditation on Brahman as the Internal Ruler, 94.

anna : 19, 42.

annamaya : consisting of food or matter, material, 18.

anyat: other, 72, 73;—para: great and other than, 73.

aparā: low, lower, 111;—vidyā, lower knowledge, 4.

aparoksha: immediate, perceptible, 88.

apahata pāpmā: sinless, devoid of evil, 67-8.

apipāsa: 57-8

aprāpta: 108.

abhaya: 13.

abhādhita: 108.

abhāva-vasanā: 71.

abheda: 127.

amūrta: 70.

amrita(ā): 13, 75, 92, 115;—maya, 85.

avākī: 37.

avidyā: 7n., 8; 124.

avināsin: 81.

avijina: 102.

Aśvapati: 31

asambhūti: lit non-existence; giving up of evil tendencies, 8

asi: 47.

Asuras: supernatural beings with evil qualities and in perpetual struggle with the gods, 59.

aham: 52, 54, 71

Aham Brahmāsmi. I am Brahman, 49, 65, 66, 68, 71, 98, 104.

ahañkāra-deśa: 54

ahañgraha-upasanā contemplation of Brahman as dwelling within the self, 52.

ākān̄kshā. 108.

ākāśa: Brahman, 23, 30, 31, 105, spatial ether, 94.

ākāśātman 37.

āgamīn: impending, future, 45.

āchārya: spiritual preceptor, teacher of philosophy and religion, 1, 15, 45.

āitmakāma 103.

āitmakīda 54.

ātman: the individual self, passim: the Supreme Self, passim.

ātmamithuna: 54.

ātmarati. 54.

ātmānanda: 54.

ātmā sarvatra: 88.

ādityavarnam: (accusative case) brilliant (lit. coloured) like the sun, 70.

ādeśa: 39, 42, 46.

ānanda,-maya: passim; -puruṣa: 21, 22;—adhikarana, a section of Taitt. Up., see 'Index of Quotations'.

āptakāma: 103.

Ārtabhāga. lit the son of Ritabhāga; he is also described as belonging to the gotra of Jaratkāru; he is one of the interlocutors of Yājñavalkya in Brh. Up., 86-7, 99.

āśrama(s) 29, 111.

Indra. the chief of the minor gods, passim.

īśāna: 106.

Īśvara: the Lord, the Supreme Ruler, 61, 106, 117-8, 132.

INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS AND PROPER NAMES

'u' : 16.

utkrānti : 102.

uttama : 60.

Uttama Purusha : 60, 61.

utsargāpavāda-nyāya: the principle which states that a general rule is set aside when an exception has to prevail, 57.

Uditi : 32n.

Uddālaka : 39, 40, 91-3.

Upakosaḷa : 31.

upakrama : commencement, 67.

Upaniṣads : the philosophical sections of the Vedas, passim.

Upavarṣa : 27.

upasamhṛtra : consolnion, 67.

upasamhramana : 23, 25 ; śruti : the scriptural text dealing with it, 23.

upādhi : 124.

upāsana(ā) : meditation, 10,112-3.

upāsya-koṭi-nikṣepā : 112.

ubhayalingagataḥ : 125.

ubhaya-vibhäti : 125.

Ushasta : 67, 87-90.

Ushasta - Kahola - brähmaṇa : sections of Brīh Up., 90.

Oṃ : 13, 16.

Aupanishada-(Parama)-purusha : 3, 97.

Kam : 31, 82, 52.

kapi : 83.

kapya-sarḥ : 32, 33.

karma : passim.

karma-kāṇḍa : the ritualistic portion of the Vedas, 5.

karma-yoga : the path of works to self-realisation and God-realisation, 55, 110-1.

kalyāṇatama-rūpa : the most auspicious and lovely form, 8, 70.

Kaḥala : a sage and son of Kaushītaka, 67, 86-9.

Kahola-brāhmaṇa: a section of Brīh. Up., 90, 112.

Kāṇva : a version of Brīh. Up., associated with the sage, Kapva.

Kātyāyani : 76.

kāma : 108.

kāraṇa : 120

kārikās : concise explanations and summing up in verse, 15.

kuroiṭa: let him do, potential 3rd person singular of Krī, to do, 111.

Kuranḍrayana : a Srivaiṣṇava ācārya who has commented on Tait. Up., 6.

kriti : volition. an internal stimulus leading to external activity, 51.

Kokāyaṣ: the people of a country which formed part of the Panjab, 31.

kratu : 108.

Khaṃ : 31, 52.

140

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

Gārgi : a learned lady descended

from Garga and the daughter

of Vachaknu, 65, 67, 87, 94.

Gārgya : a descendant of Garga

and the son of Sūryāyana, 12.

gārhasthya : the state of the

married household, 29.

gunas : constituents or attri-

butes of matter, 42,

gurubhakti : devotion to one's

spiritual preceptor, 113.

Gaudapāda : a predecessor of

Sankara in formulating Vedāntic

monism and the author of

kārikās on Mānd. Up., 15.

Janaka : a philosophical king of

Videha, 55, 67, 86, 99.

Jayatīrtha: a famous writer

belonging to Madhvāchārya's

pluralistic school, 130.

Jānaśruti : lit. the son of

Janaśruta : he is a king and

described to be the grandson

of Putra, 28.

Jāratkārava : one descended

from Jaratkāru, 87.

jijñāsādhikarana : the opening

section of Brahma-Sūtra (I.

1. 1. : it deals with the desire

to know Brahman, 127.

jlva : passim.

jivātman : the individual self,

81, 92.

jña : one who knows, 22.

jñāna : the path of meditation,

8; knowledge, 17, 18, 129 ; the

Self, 20, 129

Jyotir-brahmaṇa : a section of

Brh. Up., see 'Index of

Quotations '.

jyotis ; light, 30, 31.

Tan்ka : 27.

tajjalān: It is born out of Him,

is absorbed in Him and is

sustained by Him, 80.

tat : 46-9.

Tattvatikā : a commentary on

the Srībhāshya by Vedānta

Deśika, 27.

Tattvanirnaya : 119.

tatra : 61.

tapas : lit. penance, austerities :

hence stages of life where

these are practised, 29.

tu : 51.

tejomaya : 85.

tvam : 46-9.

Tvashtṛi : 86.

dama : 111.

dayā : 111.

darśana : seeing, immediate

experience, 84.

dahara : lit., small, subtle; the

small space in the heart which

is identified with Brahman,

61-2.

dahara-ākāśā - subtle space (in

the heart), 56.

Dahara vidyā : meditation on

Brahman as the subtle ether

in the heart, 55-6, 58, 61-2,

100, 105, 109.

INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS AND PROPER NAMES

141

dāna : 110,

dāsyāya : 113.

Divodāsa : a celebrated figure in Vedic literature, famous for his liberality and his war against Sambara, 114,

de vatā : divinity, 43.

deva-bhakti : devotion to God, 113.

Dramidāchārya : 27, 32, 34,

Dvaita : Vedāntic pluralism, of which the chief exponent is Madhvāchārya, 39, 130.

dhruvā smrti : 55, 112.

na veda : does not know : 3rd person singular of ‘vid’, to know, 92.

Nachiketas : a young boy who is taught the highest truths by the god of death, 10-1,75.

Nārada : a sage, 50-1, 53.

Nārāyana : 119-21, 131-2.

Nārāyana-anuvākhyā : lit. the section on Nārāyana, M. Nār. Up. XI., 120.

Nārāyanārya : 119.

Nārāyanīya : a famous condensation of the Bhāgavata by Nārāyana Nambādri, 120.

nididhyāsana : profound meditation, 39, 78-9, 84, 89, 112-3.

nirguna : without attributes, 56, 109, 124.

Nirguna-Brahman : the Absolute without attributes, 56, 109, 124.

nirviśesha : (adij) denying attributes, 35.

niṣkāma : 103,

niṣthā : firm conviction (that Brahman alone has to be heard about, thought about and contemplated upon), 51,

nihitaṃ guhāyaṃ : 84.

Neti. neti : 67-74, 84, 91, 97-8 105-6, 129.

nyagrodha : the Indian fig tree the banyan, 45.

Pañchadaśī : a well known work (in 15 chapters) on Vedāntiā monism by Vidyāraṇya, 49, 69.

pati : 106.

para (a) : 73, 111 :-m : 72.

Paramātman : the Supreme Self, 100, 116, 130.

Param Jyotis : the Supreme Light, 60, 120.

paratattva : the Supreme Reality, 120, 129.

parāpurushārtha : 129.

Parabrahman : 120.

parahita: 129.

Parāyana : 120.

parābhakti : 117-20.

Parāśara Bhatta : 38,

pāñditīya: 89, 112.

pāda : section, quarter, 18.

pāpa : sin, 100.

pāla : 106.

Pippalāda : 12-3.

puchehha : 22.

puṇya : meritorious or virtuous deeds or their effects, 100.

142

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

purāṇic : relating to a purāṇa, 24.

purusha : spirit, self, 11, 42, 85, passim.

Purushaniraya : 119.

Purusha-sūkta : a famous hymn in Rig Veda (X), 13, 70

Purushottama : the Supreme Person, 60-1, 125.

pushpahāsa : 71.

pūraka : 108.

pūrva-paksha : the antecedent view (of a’critie) which is to be refuted, a prima facie view, 8.

pūrva-prajñā : earlier knowledge or impressions from a previous birth, 103.

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā : ‘the earlier enquiry’, the systematic investigation of Vedic rituals, 5.

prakāra : 132

prakṛiti : material Nature, 117-8, 125.

Prajāpati : a Vedic god, 29, 30 n. : Brahmā the Creator, 58-61.

prajña : 101-2 ; -Ātman : 17.

prajñā : 111-3.

prajñātmā : 115.

prajñāna : 17, 65.

prajñātmātrā : 115, 129.

praṇava : 13, 16.

Pratardana : 65, 114, 116.

Pratardana-vidyā : the meditation taught to Pratardana, 66.

pratishṭhā : 132

pramoda : 23, 112.

Prahlāda : a great devotee of the Lord for whose sake He incarnated as the Man-lion to save him from his father, the Asura king, Hiranyakasipu, 10.

Prājña : the Omniscient (Self), 101-2.

prāṇa : life, 19 ; self. 50-1 ; the Supreme Self, 115-6 ; -māyā, 18, 27 ; -śarīra : 37.

prārabdha : 45n. ; -karma, 45.

Prīyā : (fem.) the dear one, 75.

‘prete’ : (locative case) in respect of one who is dead, 11.

pretya : after dying, 81.

Preṣiṭṛi : the Impeller, 118.

bahuśruta : by means of much hearing, 112.

brahmacharya : the state of one who is a religious student, 29.

Brahman : passim.

Brahmanandin : 27.

Brahma-nishṭhas : those attentive in the study of the Veda, 12 ; -paras : those devoted to knowledge of the Supreme Self, 12 ; -samstha, 29 ; -vādinī : a lady who discusses the Supreme Self, 75 ; -vidyā, 75 ; -vāsanā, meditation on the Supreme Self, 25.

Brahmā : 13.

Brahmānandavalli : a section of Taitt Up., 26.

Brāhmaṇa : that portion of the Veda which contains rules for the conduct of sacrifices and discusses their origin and significance, 26, 64.

INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS AND PROPER NAMES

143

Bādarāyaṇa : the author of the Brahma-Sūtrās and often identified with Vyāsa, 2, 3,

13, 39, 109.

bādha : 108 : ka : 108.

bādhārtha-samānādhikaraṇya: 49 n.

bālya : lit. the state of being a child, childlike qualities, 89.

buddhi : the intellect, 21.

Bodhāyana : 27.

bhakti : devotion to God, passim : yoga : the discipline of devotion to God, 3.

bhārūpa : 37.

bhāṣyakāra: writer of an exhaustive commentary, 2.

Bhāskara: a philosopher who hold the individual self to be both different from and identical with the Supreme Self, 114.

Bhujyu : 87.

bhūtamātrā : 115.

Bhūman : 51-4.

Bhuma-vidyā : 55, 62, 74, 112.

Bhūmādhikaraṇa : a section of Brahma-Sūtras, 50.

Bhrigu : 19.

bheda : 127.

bhedābheda: 127.

bhoktṛi : the experiencer, the enjoyer, 118.

bhojya : that which is experienced, 118.

' m ' : 16.

Madhu brāhmaṇa : a section of Bṛih. Up., 65.

Madhva: the great exponent of the Dvaita school of Vedānta,

4, 15.

mantras: Vedic hymns, 50, 54.

manana : critical reflection, 39,

51, 78, 84, 89, 112.

manas : 19.

manomaya: 18, 37 :-purusha:21.

mahat : 67.

Mahān (Aja) Ātmā: (n.) 98,

104-5.

Mahāsiddhānta : lit. 'the great conclusion'; a section of S'ribhāshya (I. 1. 1), where Rāmānuja argues out his case against Advaita, 97, 126-7.

mahāvākyas : lit. " great sentences"; certain scriptural texts regarded by the Advaitins as of such preeminent authority as to supersede and override all other statements and to require everything else to be construed in harmony with them, 4.

Mādhyandina S'ākhā : a branch of the Vājasaneyin school of the Yajurveda, 22,

92, 105.

māyā (s) : wondrous power (s),

86 ; matter, 117.

mūrta: 70.

muhūrta: a unit of time technically defined as equivalent to 48 minutes : the word is used to indicate any short interval of time, 24.

mṛityu : the effect of past karmas, 7 n. : the god of death,

29, 30 n.

medhā : 12 n.

144

ŚRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

Maitreyī : 11, 14, 40, 65, 67,

75, 78, 80, 82, 113.

Maitreyi-brāhmaṇa : a section

of Brih. Up., see 'Index of

Quotations'.

moksha : final emancipation, 8.

moda : 22.

mauna : 89, 90.

yajña : 110.

Yadeva : 89-2.

Yama: the god of death, 11.

Yājñavalkya : passim.

Yādavaprakāśa : a teacher of

Rāmānuja 32-3 ; a philosopher

of the bhedābheda school, 119.

Yāmuna charya : the greatest

figure in Viśishtādvaita

before Rāmānuja, 119.

Yāska : 86,

Raṅgarāmānuja: the author

of commentaries on the

principal Upanishads in

consonance with Rāmanuja's

thought and of a sub-comment-

ary on the Śrutaprakāśikā,

4-6.

rasa : bliss, 22,

rasaghana : 81.

rūpas : 70.

Raikva : 28.

Lāhyāyani: belonging to the

goitra of Lāhya, 87.

vayuram : knowledge, 86.

Varuṇa: a Vedic god : he is

stated to be the adoptive father

of the sage, Bhrigu, 19.

valli : lit. " creeper " : the word

is used to denote the chapters

of Taitt. Up., 22.

vaśī : 106.

Vākya : name of a commentary

on Chh. Up., 27 : statement,

27, 32, 34.

vānaprastha : 29.

Vāmadeva : an ancient rishi to

whom many hymns of the Rig

Veda are attributed, 65, 68,

Vāsudeva: the all-pervading

Lord, 24 n.

vijara : 57-8

vijighatsa : 57-8.

vijn̄ātṛi : 84.

vijn̄āna : knowledge, conscious-

ness, 17, 19, 65, 71, 57 ; the

finite self, 22 ; direct vision of

God, 51 :-maya: 18, 21, 98-100,

104-5 :-ghana : 71, 81.

vijn̄ānātmā : 13.

vijn̄āya : having attained know-

ledge, 111.

vidyā : knowledge, meditation,

passim.

vidhi : 111.

Vibhūtiyoga : the 10th chapter

of the Gītā, where the Lord's

association with glory every-

where is described, 8.

viml̥ityu : 57-8.

Virochana : 59.

Vivaraṇa : a famous commentary

by Prakāśātman on the

Pañchapādikā which is itself

a commentary by Padmapāda

on Saṅkara's Sūtra-bhāshya,

49, 66.

INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS AND PROPER NAMES

145

Viśishtādvaita : the school of

Vedānta in which Brahman

with attributes is the primary

reality, 6.

viśeshana : 124.

viśoka : 57-8.

Vishaya-vākya-dīpikā : 5.

Vishnu : 11.

Vishnusahasranāma : a prayer

containing the 1000 names of

Vishnu in the Mahābhārata

(xiii), 38, 70, 120.

vīnā : 80.

Vrittikāra : 27.

Veda(s) : 3, 5.

Vedānta,-ic,-in : passim.

Vedānta Deśika: a great ex-

ponent of Viśishtādvaita and

the leader of the 'Northern

School' among Rāmānuja's

followers, 6, 8, 24, 27, 40, 119.

Vedānta-dīpa : a brief com-

mentary on the Brahma-

Sūtras by Rāmānuja, 127 :

-sāra : an even more concise

commentary by Rāmānuja,

Vedārtha-sangraha : an outline

of the teachings of the Upani-

shads by Rāmānuja, passim.

vaibhava : 50.

Vaiśvānara : 31.

Vaishnava : relating to the

worship of Vishnu, 119.

Vaishnavism : the school of

thought which identifies the

Supreme Brahman with

Vishnu, 121.

80—20

Vyomatīta-vāda : the view that

there is something higher

than the ether of space (in the

heart), 56.

Śankara: the famous teacher of

Vedāntic monism, passim.

Śambhu: a name usually asso-

ciated with Śiva, 120.

sarīra: 92.

Śākalya : the son of Śakala and

one of the many who question-

ed Yājñavalkya, 87, 96-7.

Śāndilya: a famous sage, 86 :

-vidyā : the meditation taught

by him, see 'Index of

Quotations'.

śānta: 13.

Śārīraka-Sūtra : lit. the apho-

risms relating to the Embodied

Self; a name of the Brahmas

Sūtras, 21.

śāstā: 96.

Śiva: the Deity regarded as the

Supreme Being by one of the

sects of Hinduism, 120.

śūdra: 28, 119 n.

Śūnyavāda : philosophic nihil-

ism, 74.

śivite: advocating the supre-

macy of Śiva, 119 n.

Śaunaka : the seeker of instruc-

tion in Mund. Up., 14, 40, 65.

śraddhā : eagerness to learn

about Brahman. 51.

śravana: 77-8, 84, 89, 112.

śruti-śirasī vidipta: a phrase

from Rāmānuja's opening in-

vocatory verse in the Śrībhā-

shya : it literally means,

"brilliantly shining in the

head of the Vedas", 3.

146

SRI RAMANUJA ON THE UPANISHADS

śrotriya: 102.

Śvetaketu: the young man to whom the Sadvidyā is taught in:Chh. Up.,§ assim.

saṁśilana: 90.

samsāra: the recurring cycle of mundane existence, 103, 118.

saguna: having attributes, 56, 124.

Saguna-Brahman: the Absolute with attributes, 56, 61, 124, 132.

Saṅkṣepa-śāṅirākṣ: a brief compendium on the purport of the Brahama-Sūtras, see 'Index of Quotations'.

saṅchita: accumulated, 45 n.

Sat: That which is existent; Brahman, 38, 44-8, 120.

Satkāryavāda: the view that the effect is existent in the cause, 41.

Satya: real, 18: Brahman, the Real, 51, 54:—kāma: 37, 57-8:—saṅkalpa: 37, 57-8.

Satyakāmā: one of Pippalāda's diciples, 13: (Jābāla) dicipls and teacher in Chh. Up., 28, 31.

Satya-satyā sātyam: 66, 72-4, 108.

Sadevidyā: the teaching about the Brahman as the Existent, 38, 45, 48, 55, 79, 128.

Sanatkumāra: the teacher of Bhūma-vidyā, 50-4.

saṁnāsa: 29, 99, 111:—āśrama; 111:—in an ascetic; 29.

saṁnīd: 81.

sampradā: 59-61.

sambhūti: lit. existence: the experience of Brahman, 8, 24.

sarva: 106:—karma, 37:—gandha, 37, 70:—rasa, 37, 70:—viśesha-rahita: 94.

Sarveśvara: 106, 109, 115.

sarvāntara: 67, 89, 96.

Sarvajñātmamuni: a pupil of Sureśvara and a well known writer on Ādvaíta, 27, 49, 71, 91.

saviśesha: affirming attributes, 135.

Sāṅkhya: a school of ancient Indian philosophy which analyses the universe into matter and numerous selves, 117.

sādhana: means, the means of liberation, 90, 113.

sāmānādhikaranya: 104.

Sāyaṇa: a famous commentator of the 14th century on the Vedas, 5.

sukṭita: 21.

sukha: joy, pleasure, 51; God as infinite bliss, 54.

Sudarśana Suri: a great commentator on the Śrībhāshya and Vedārtha-saṅgraha (13th-14th centuries), 5, 6, 8, 24, 27, 32-3, 39, 40, 53.

Sureśvara: a well known writer on Ādvaīta, 15, 49, 69, 71.

sushupti: 102, 108.

Sūtrakāra: the author of the (Brahma-) Sūtras, 20, 28, 30.

A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The Preface contains a section devoted to the works of Rāmānuja principally used in these lectures. Additional bibliographical information about one of his works and about some works of others is given below.

Vedārthasamgraha of Rāmānuja : The page references are to the Tirupati-Tirumalai Devanthanam edition.

Sachcharitrarakshā of Vedānta Deśika : Published by P B. Annangarācharya, Kanchipuram.

The commentaries of Saṅkara on the Brahma-Sūtras and on the Upaniṣhads are available in various editions. So too are the Pañchadaśī and the Nuishkarmya-Siddhi.

ERRATA

The more important printing mistakes are given below :

Page

Line

For

Read

4

33

H eadmits

He admits

23

7

sought be

sought to be

5

XV. 5

IV. 15

31

13

XI. 5

V. 11

33

10

simile with

simile to

34

14

I. 10. 20

I. 1. 20

36

3

(d)

(b)

64

last line

On can

One can

70

27

akshini

akshini

70

29

k lyānatamam

kalyānatamam

80

628

Śandilya-vidyā

Śāndilya-vidyā

80

16

niśśvasitāni

niśśvasitāni

83

7

IV. 6. 15

IV. 5 15

92

16-17

'dwells' and is within

'dwells within'

122

28

ne ness

oneness

134

1a

VI 3

VI. 1