1. Sankhya Philosophy Stated Explained & Compared with Other Kindered Systems Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar 1871

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THE

SÂNKHYA PHILOSOPHY

Stated, Gxplained, and Compared with Lindned Systems

BY

RAMKRISHNA G. BHANDARKAR, M. A.

OF ELPHINSTONE COLLEGE. Koninklik iblotheck

BOMBAY:

PRINTED BY N. R. RANINA AT THE UNION PRHAS.

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THE SÂNKHYA PHILOSOPHY.

[A paper read before the Students's Literary and Scientific Society of Bombay, by Mr. Ram- krishna Gopal Bhandarkar, 13th March 1871.]

F the six systems of philosophy regarded as orthodox that of the Sankhyas is one. The Sânkhya doctrines claim a very high antiquity. Per- haps the earliest philosophical speculations of the Indian Aryas ran in this direction and in that of a kindred system known in later times as the Vedânta. Some of the terms characteristic of the Sankhya School are to be met with in the Upanishads;1 and though S'ankaracharya in his Vedanta Bhashya has brought forward very elaborate arguments2 to prove that they have no reference to that system but to his own, an unsectarian reader can have very little difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the Sankhya doctrines are set forth in those places. There is scarcely a Purana 8 that does not give an account of the creation of the universe in ac- cordance with this system; though in a greatly modified form and in a manner which indicates that the original significance of the Sânkhya doc- trines, as I conceive it, was not clearly understood. In the Bhagavad-gîta + allusions are now and then made to the philosopby of this school and several 1. Katha Bib. Ind. page, 114-15; Svet. Bib. Ind. page 336-37. and Maitrayaniya Upanishad 6-10. 2. Vedanta Sutra Bhashya chap I pada 4, adh, I-II. 3. See Bhagavata sk. IIl. chap. V; Matsya, Poona edn. Chap. III .; Agni, Bib. Ind. chap. 17, page 41; Markandeya, chap. 45, page 258, Bib. Ind. 4. Chap. III. 3, 27, 42.

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chapters are devoted to it in the S'anti-parva 5 of the Mahabharata. So that, it appears that the system along with or supplemented by the Ve- danta, with which however it is often confounded, has worked itself into the ordinary belief of the Hindus. But in spite of this, the Sânkhya philosophy has long been driven away from the curriculum of Sanskrit Students on this side of India, and I have not heard of any S'astri in the Marathi or Gujarathi country having devoted himself to it and nearly all know but little about it. But in the North and the Gaud country a better treatment is accorded to it. It is more generally studied and a chair for it exists in the Benares Sanskrit College. But from the mere fact that the doctrines of the Sankhyas are to be met with in very ancient works, it does not necessarily follow that these speculations were systematized at the time when those works were written. No fact is plainer in the history of Sanskrit literature than this that the body of notions embodied under each S'astra was not conceived at once by the cbief writer on the subject, but that before they were put into that shape, they had gone through a process of growth and development. But the Sankhya philosophy seems to have been very early reduced to a system. The name Sankhya about the etymology6 of which

5 Chaps 308-9, 312-17. 6 Muhabh. सांख्य दर्शनमेतत्ते परिसंख्यानमुतमं। एवंहि परिसंख्याय सांख्या: केवलतां गताः तत्वानि च च तुर्विशत् परि संख्याय,&c .; Matsya सांख्यं संख्यात्मकत्वाच् कपिलादिभिरु- च्य ते. In these सांखयं is derived from संख्य। 'number' and the S'astra is so called on account of its enumeration of the 25 principles. This etymology appears to be correct. The scholiasts explain the term by सम्यकख्यानं ज्ञानं true know- ledge. Seo S'ankara and S'ridhara on Gita 2-39; 3-8.

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there is much dispute could not have been invent- ed before the floating mass of the Sânkhya doctrines obtained fixity and stability. And this name occurs in one at least? of the earlier Upanishads and in the Bhagavadgita8 and other parts of the Mahabharata. The person to whom an almost unanimous tradi- tion ascribes the authorship of the system is Ka- pila. In the Bhâgavata he is represented as an avatara of Vishnu9; and his name occurs in the S'vetas'vatara Upanishad10 where the creator of the Universe is spoken of "as having nourished Kapila the R.ishi with knowledge and seen him born." S'ankaracharya whose great object is to show that the philosophy of the Sankhyas has no basis in the hallowed S'ruti considers the Kapila here alluded to, to be that R.ishi who burnt the sons of Sagara to ashes by a curse and not the author of the system he is combating.11 But the Bhâgavata re- presents the enemy of Sagara's sons to be the founder of the school of the Sankhyas,12 and there can be little occasion for the mention of such a person as the former, if he is to be considered as a different individual from the latter, in such & work as the S'vetas'vatara Upanishad, devoted as it is, to the investigation of the soul of the Uni- But which of the existing works on the system is to be ascribed to Kapila or whether any verse.

work written by him has come down to us at all, is a question which it is not very easy to answer. A collection of Sûtras entitled Sankhya-Pravachana is ascribed to him; but the very name of this work is unknown on this side of India. Madhava in his Sarvadars'ana Sangraha does not mention it 7 S'vetâs vatara, Bib. Ind. page 366. 8 chap. 3-3, 10 S'vet. Bib. Ind. p. 351-2. 9 I sk. 8. chap .; II sk. 7 chap.

11 अन्यस्य च कपिलस्य सगरपुत्राणां प्रतपुवीसुदेवनाम्नः EHTTTT | Vedanta Bhashya Chap. II. pada 1 sutra 1. 12 IX sk. 8 Chap.

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though in setting forth the doctrines of each school, he in most cases first gives the title of the work of the founder and in several, an analysis of its contents. The only Sankhya-Pravachana known to him is the leading treatise of the Yoga school of which he gives a short abstract; while his ob- servations on the Sankhya philosophy are based on Is'varakrishna's Kârikâs. The Sânkhya-Prava- chana, too, attributed to Kapila bears altogether a modern air about it. Next in importance to the leading treatise on a particular S'âstra is the bhâ- shya on it. Such bhashyas in the case of the other S'astras were written by persons, who, in consi- quence of their work, enjoy great reputation, and are to be referred to a pretty high antiquity. All subsequent writers never style their elucidatory works bhashyas but give them the name of vrittil or vartika. Such for instance is the case with the Mîmânsâ, Vedânta, Nyâya, and Vyâkarana bhâ- shyas, the authors of which, S'abara, S'ankara, Vat- syayana, and Patanjali are widely known and justly held in reverence,'and flourished, all of them, before the tenth century of the Christian Era. While the only bhashya on the Sankhya Pravachana, is that by Vijnanabhikshu who, Dr. Hall thinks, flourshed in the sixteenth or seventeenth century and not earlier than Madhava, since he does not appear to have known him. It is hard to believe on the supposi- tion of the high antiquity of the Sankhya-Prava- chana, that it could have remained without a bhashya for so many centuries, considering the importance of the S'astra itself. For these and other reasons, I think that the Sankhya Prava- chana is not a work of high antiquity, and could not have been written by Kapila. But there are several works of authority on the subject and among these, that of Is'varakrishna, the Kârikas, 13 The Vritti on the Vedanta sutra alluded to by S'ankara of course, existed before S'ankara.

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enjoys great reputation. Dr. Hall greatly praises Vijnâna Bhikshu, but to to me he appears to be a very unsafe guide, since his great object seems to be to bring the Vedanta and the Sankhya as close as possible. It is time now that I should enter into the philosophy of Kapila. The world is full of misery. Man's sufferings in it are of three kinds; those origi- nating with his body and his mind (Adhyatmika). He is liable to disease, such as fever, dysentery or cholera, and to mental anguish caused by such an occurrence as the death of a child, wife or friend. 2. Then again the creatures around him are often the source of great trouble to him. Mos- quitoes, bugs, snakes crocodiles, sharks, vultures2 tigers, wolves, and even his fellow men render his existence intolerable to him (Adhi-bhautika) And even the gods will not let him alone. They will send down lighting on his head, or blow away his house by a hurricane (Adhi-daivika). Nothing that we see, will free us from these evils. Even after death we have another existence in which our fate pursues us and we are again subjected to these very ills. The S'ruti tells us to perform sacri- fices or practise some other virtues and for these deeds, promises us a place in Heaven where we shall be happy. But even here, the happiness allow- ed us, is just in proportion to our deserts, and after a time, must come to an end. It is not pure, com- plete, absolute. How then to secure this absolute bliss or this absolute cessation from pain ? This is the problem Kapila has undertaken to solve. "Reflect," says he, "what your miseries arise from? If from the nature of your soul, there is no help for you. But they do not arise from the nature of your soul, their cause is totally different; separate yourself from that cause, and you will be happy." Then the nature of the soul and of the world which is the source of affliction, are set forth in the

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shape of twenty-five tatvas or principles, a knowledge of which is necessary for the attainment of eternal beatitude. The first is Prakriti or pradhana, the original principle or cause of all, which consists in the equipoise of the three qualities ; satva, light, brightness or goodness; rajas, passion or feeling, and tamas, darkness, pain, ignorance. The first is the soure of happiness, and its function is to render anything manifest and clear, from the second, ac- tion originates, and from the third, pain, stability, stolidity or stupour. From this pradhana is pro- duced by a process of development, the principle of mahat or buddhi which is translated intelli- gence but which I consider to be equivalent to finite or conditioned intelligence. This buddhi as- sumes four forms when the quality of goodness prevails in it over the other two; viz dharma or virtue, jnâna or knowledge, vairâgya or freedom from earthly affection, and ais'varya or magical power, such as is ascribed to a yogin. When the quality of darkness prevails, this same buddhi ap- pears in the form of adharma or vice, ajnana or ignorance, avairâgya or earthly affection and anais'varya or absence of extraordinary power. This mahat-tatva or buddhi gives birth to ahan- kara, consciousness of individuality or egoism; which in its turn, when satva or light is predominant, produces the five senses and the five organs of action. The five senses are seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and feeling; and the five organs of action are the speech, hand, foot, and tho organs of excretion and regeneration. Manas which sets in motion both these groups is an organ of sense as well as action. It is to be translated by the words will and attention. When in tho principle of consciousness, the quality of tamas or darkness prevails, it produces the five subtle elements, the rudiments of the objects of the five senses. And from these subtle elements are pro-

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duced in a developed or grosser form, akas'a or sky, tejas or light, prithivt or earth, vayu or wind, and apas or water, which are the objects of the senses of hearing, seeing, smelling, touch and taste, respectively. We thus get twenty-four principles, and the last is purusha or soul which is pure, eter- nal, and absolute. Purusha is incapable of actign, but has light and life, while pradhana or prakriti whose products we have noticed is achetuna i. e. has no life or light, but possesses the power of action. Purusha is like a pangu or man without legs who has got eyes, and prakriti has got legs but no eyes (andha). Hence left to themselves, the andha and pangu would not be able to move but if they agree that the pangu with eyes should sit on the shoulders of the andha, then they both can go over any distance they choose. In the same manner, if purusha and prakriti were dis- joined, the world would not exist, and it is their union that sets prakriti in motion and all things up to the five gross elements are produced. It is in consequence of this union that purusha appears to be active, though not so in reality, and prakriti has the appearance of something living or chetana. In every sensation or present act of sense, bud- dhi or intelligence, ahankâra or consciousness, manas or will and attention, together with the particular organ of sense, are concerned; while in a past or future act of sense i. e. in recall- ing a past or conceiving a possible sensation, the first three only are employed. These three, therefore, are internal faculties of cognition, and the organs of sense and action are called external faculties. These thirteen faculties together with the five subtle elements form what is called the sukshma s'arira or subtle body. At death, the gross elements of the human body only are destroy- ed, while this subtle body assumes several gross bodies and appears in the world again. If this

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subtle body is instinct with virtue it goes up, if with vice it goes below, if with jnana or real knowledge i. e. of course, of the twenty-five prin- ciples, it is cast off, and the soul attains Moksha or its original absoluteness. This, in brief, is the system of the Sânkhyas. To one who really attempts to understand it and to reduce it to a modern shape, not a few difficul- ties present themselves. What is the nature of this prakriti or pradhana which, united with the purusha, is said to be the origin of all things, and in what sense can it be said to produce intelli- gence and through it, ahankdra or consciousness, and through this again, the subtle elements and thence the world? The books themselves on the S'astra, do not explain this satisfactorily and Vijnana Bhikshu says that the order of produc- tion of these principles rests on the autho- rity of the S'astra alone and is a thing that cannot be proved.14 But a S'âstra which re- quires things to be taken on trust, is no S'âstra. The Puranas too afford us no help. The Matsya15

14 अत्र प्रकृतेमहान्महतोहंकार इत्यादि मृष्टिकमे शास्त्र मे- व प्रमाणम्।अनुमानेन सामान्यतः कार्याणां सकारणकत्व- मात्रसिद्धेः। न तु सृष्ट। भूतादिक्रमो वान्तःकरणादिक्रमो वेत्येकतरावधारकमनुमानं संभवति। Sankhya Sara. The only evidence for the production of Mahat from Prakriti and of Ahankara from Mahat is the S'astra itself; from in- ference, one can arrive only at the general conclusion that an effect has a cause ; but as to production, there can be no inference calculated to show whether the gross elements are first produced, and thence the internal organs,or these latter first and from them, the elements. 15 सविकारात्मधानाततु महत्तत्वं प्रजायते। महानिति यतः ्यातिलोंकानां जायते सदा॥ गुणेभ्यःक्षेभ्यमाणेभ्यस्त्रयो देवा विजजिरे। एकमूर्तिस्त्रयो भागा ब्रह्मविष्णुमहेश्वराः।

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9 tells us that from mahat-tatva is produced the Puranic Trinity. With an excess of satva, mahat is Vishnu, of rajas, it is Brahmâ, and of tamas, it is Rudra. And as a general rule, the Sankhya principles are represented by them as having been first produced or set in motion by the creator, at the time of the crea- tion, and are personified and put into the ranks ofgods.16 Colebrooke thinks prakriti to be " eternal matter, indiscrete, undistinguish- able, as destitute of parts." If so, it is like the eternal paramanus or atoms of the Vais'eshikas, and in this case the Sânkhyas ought to be con- sistent and represent, like the Vais'eshikas, the production of such things as dvyanuka, trasarenu (small pieces of matter) and ghata (pot) from it and not that of buddhi, jnâna, dharma, dayâ, ahan kara and such other purely mental states. We must also bear in mind, that the union of this pra- kriti with the soul is considered necessary for the production of the result though the soul is regarded as incapable of action. What is the necesity of this union, if prakriti were matter in the ordinary sense ? Professor Wilson also considers prakriti as the material cause of things. To me, however, the system of Kapila appears to disclose an idealistic view of nature. The position of Id- ealism is this. I know directly what passes in my consciousness. I am conscious of certain sensations of which, I believe myself not to be the cause. To account for them, I suppose the existence of an external nature. But this is simply an inference necessitated by the constitution of my mind, i. e. the external world, for me exists in consequence of a law of my intellect. Beyond my consciousness and my intellect, there is no warranty for the exis- tence of the external world. Whence arises the necessity of the supposition of its existence? 16 Bhagavata, SK. III. Chap. V. and Mahbh. S'antip.

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In consciousness, there are feelings and repre- sentations i. e. I feel myself tied down. to a particular state, my freedom is restrained; my free activity is limited. Who has limit- ed me? Certainly not the external world, for it is my own creation. It is to account for that limitation of my free activity that I posit it. The limitation is prior, the sup- position of the external world is subsequent. I feel my activity impaired, and so much as I feel is taken away from me, I attribute to something else. I simply objectivise my subjective feeling. We must then look for this limitation of the me in the state of the intellect previous to conscious+ ness; for when the me awoke, it awoke with its limitations, with the not me. These limitations, therefore, point to the nature of the intellect just as the little red, green, and blue clouds visible to the eye when it is dazzled, indicate the struc- ture of the organ itself and do not exist in themselves. This is the Idealism of Fichte, the German philosopher. Let us compare Kapila's system with it. We must here distinguish between four things. In the state of consciousness when the me feels itself limited, the intellect first of all posits or af- firms the me, and then opposes to itself the not me. The not me is apprehended as limiting the me, putting it into a definite state. The limitation of the me implies its previous freedom or un- limitedness. Had it not been absolutely free or unlimited it would not have felt itself limited. If finiteness were its nature these limitations would not awaken it., i. e. consciousness would be impos- sible. The four things then are :- the ego. i. e. the finite ego, the non-ego, the limitation or limit- ing, and the free, unlimited or absolute ego, i.e. the ego previous to consciousness. Now, Kapila's ahan- kara corresponds to the finite ego and the five subtle

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and gross elements together with their counter- parts, the senses, which without this ego would not exist in consciousness, and which consequently, in the language of our philosopher, are produced by the ego, correspond to the non-ego. The free, un- limited, absolute ego is purusha and its limitation by the non-ego is the bandha or sanga which ties us down to this world. But Fichte has told us that the limitation of the ego is the result of some- thing that had passed in the intellect previous to consciousness, previous to the positing of the ego. This, according to Kapila, is the principle of buddhi or mahat, which produces ahankara or the ego. But here there is a difference between the two philosophers, a difference due to the object with which each started in this inquiry. Kapila had in view the liberation of the soul from its fetters. Fichte wanted to explain the world. That limi- tation of the free ego, then, which Fichte derives from the nature of that ego is ascribed by Kapila to a cause which is distinct from it. It is pradhâna, a combination of the three qualities and its product, the principle of mahat. But this is not an external object in the ordinary sense, for buddhi and ahankara which are its im- mediate products and manas are, as we abserved before, called by the Sânkhyas, dbhyantara kara- nas (internal organs), and virtue, compassion, the faculties of acquiring knowledge &c. which are comprehended under buddhi are, of course, not external things which latter, as we have seen, are produced only after ahankara has been affirmed. Again, this remarkable peculiarity shows the logi- cal consistency of Kapila. To state that the me believes itself to have been absolutely free and un- limited and at the same time to deduce its limita- tions from its essence involves a contradiction. It is tantamount to saying that the absolutely free and unlimited is not free and unlimited, This is one

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of the charges brought against Fichte by his critics, from which Kapila escapes by affirming that since the absolute and the infinite cannot be conditioned and finite, the limitations are due to a distinct cause which in its nature is finite and whose finite -- ness, from its intimate connection with the infinite ego, the ego attributes to itself from ignorance. On this account, the system of Kapila is not a perfectly subjective Idealism as Fichte's is. Now, since all our cognitions and feelings are either good or bad, quiescent or active, true or false, right or wrong, the finite cause of all these must be composed of the three qualities, satva, rajas and tamas. The finite ego is either a cognizing or a moral subject; it is, therefore, prepared for these functions by buddhi which instills those principles into it. If it did not possess those principles or instincts, it would not be fit for an intellectual or moral life, and perception or action would not follow i. e. the fiuite ego would not be born at all. Hence it is, that it is said to be pro- duced by buddhi. Born with the intellectual and moral instinct, it realizes them and creates ob- jects suited to them and so the external world and the organs of sense and action come into exis- tence. We thus see that the system of the Sânkhyas distinguishes between the finite and the infinite soul, the limited and the free. The un- limited or infinite soul is not capable of our pre- sent life, the finite is; but this its finiteness is, ac- cording to the system, not its own attribute, but of another principle which, in reality, it is, that in conjunction with the infinite soul leads this moral and intellectual life which we call ours. If we se- parate ourselves from this principle, our bonds are broken, and we are again free and absolute. This is moksha. 17

17. As this is the central idea of many of the most important Hindu systems, and as it is often, by modern writers on Indian Philosophy, confounded with non-exis-

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This idea of the absolute or limitless soul and this kind of idealism more or less modified runs through all the religio-philosophical literature of the country.18 Indeed, if this were an isolated in- stance, grave doubts might reasonably be enter- tained about the explantion, I have attempted, of the Sankhya system. There are striking resem- blances between the metaphysics of Kapila and of the Buddhistic Schools. The Vedanta, also, bears some affinity to it. The Mayd of that system is often regarded as equivalent to pradhâna or pra- kriti, and the two expressions are frequently, in unsystematic works, confounded. The doctrines of the Yogachara School of the Buddhists are, that the only existing thing is the ego, and the external and finite world is a phantom. As to one whose eyes are affected with the disease called timira, two moons appear instead of one, so does the world ap- pear to exist to the ego affected with the disease called vasand (habit). This vasand assumes various forms and this it is, that leads the ego to picture to itself the external world and is the cause of all our feelings and passions. 19 The great object of a

tence or nihil, I quote the following lines from Words- worth, which would give an idea of what is considered to be the state of the soul after it is freed from the trammels of the world. What is meant is a condition in which "thought is not," in which the soul is free from any defi. nite representation. His spirit drank The spectacle: sensation, soul, and form, All melted into him ; they swallowed up His animal being ; in them did he live, And by them did he live; they were his life. In such access of mind, in such high hour Of visitation from the living God Thought was not ; in enjoyment it expired. This resembles closely the description of the freed soul given by the Vedantins, in particular. 18. Bhagavadgitâ, 3.27 and S'ântiparva, fol 210, Bom. edn. 19. Sarva-dars'ana Sangraha, Bib. Ind. pages, 16-17; S'ankaracharya's Bhashya, II-2-28.

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human being, therefore, ought to be, by practising the virtues and duties imposed by Buddha on his followers, to free the soul from this vasand, the root of all evil. 20 This, then, resembles the idealism of Kapila. The external world is reduced to states of consciousness and, along with our finite thoughta and feelings, is derived from a certain power called vasana which is not of the essence of the me and though it resides in it, is separable from it. Then by a transition not unusual in the history of Philosophy, the Madhhyamikas, another sect, deny the existence of both the internal and the external world, and end in nihilism. With them, vâsanâ is the cause of both, and when, by the discipline enjoined by their master, this is rooted out, nothing remains and this is their nirvana.21 Then, again, another school, that of the Sautrantikas, starting from a subjective basis, similarly with these two, admits the existence of external objects, but only as the result of an in- ference that cannot be avoided. They say that if the vasand producing such a representation as that of a blue object for instance, exists in the soul, it must always produce that representation, that is, we must always see a blue object. But we see it only occasionally; therefore, the cause of that representation must exist out of the ego.22 But the forms of external objects are supplied to them by the intellect; they are the creations of our mind.23 This external world, and the internal one of finite thoughts and feelings, are capable of 20. Sarva-dars'. p. 17. 21. Sarva-dars'. p. 15. 22. Sarva-dars.' p. 19. 23. Jagaddhara, in his commentary on Mâlati-Mâdhava,in- cidentally, gives the Sautrantika doctrine thus :- fofera वैति सौत्रान्तिकमतोपदर्शनम्। तत्र हि ज्ञानेन सवीपा- कारार्पणं विषये क्रियत इति तत्तदाकारस्पाभिव्यक्तिः।

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destruction or separation from the soul, (nirodha), and the way to this, is the discipline spoken of before (marga). When they are thus destroyed, pure intelligence alone remains, and the soul attains moksha.24 We thus see how closely these schools are connected. The philosopy of the Sau- trantikas may be compared to that of Kant, that of the Yogacharas to Fichte's, while that of the Madhyamikas is nihilism. But all the schools start from a subjective basis and are idealistic, in which respect they resemble the Sânkhya system. Professor Max Muller remarks in the Chips, that all authors who write on Buddhism always go on the supposition that the metaphysics of Buddhism were derived from Kapila, but he does not see any grounds for tbis belief. Such ideas as the transmigration of souls are common to all Hindu philosophers, wherefore their occurrence in the Sankhya and Buddhistic systems would not afford an indication of the one having borrow- ed them from the other. This is quite true, but the special co-incidences which he denies, I humbly think, do exist. Deriving the external world from states of consciousness; referring these along with the feelings and passions to a finite cause; and distinguishing this cause from the infinite soul are the essential doctrines of both the systems. The only difference is that the finite cause of the Sankhyas is indestructible, while that of the Buddhists is not. But this difference is more apparent than real. The pradhana of the Sankhyas is capable of separation from the soul and the word nirodha, used by the Sautrântikas to denote the disappeance of their finite cause, means much the same thing. However, even if we re- cognise a real difference on this point, it may well be considered as due to a further development of one and the same system. 24. Sarvadars' p. 22.

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Again, the denial of God, as the controller of the universe, which is common to both the systems, is not a mere accidental or general coincidence. It is a necessary consequence of the systems and indicates. their essential identity. The problem which both undertake to solve is, freeing the soul from misery. Misery arises from the external world and from our feelings. The external world is subjectivised and referred along with the feel- ings to a finite cause, the destruction of which sets the soul, infinite and absolute in its nature, at liberty. The problem is solved. And in this way of solving it, there is no room for a controller of the universe. The systems, however, do not deny the existence of gods or superhuman beings. They exist bnt their constitution is similar to that of man. There are prakriti and purusha, even there, but some of the effects of prakriti do not exist in their case. They have only subtle bodies or only the internal organs, and not the gross sub- stances with which we find ourselves united. There is another striking resemblance. Some Buddhistic schools give the order in which the world is produced, thus :- First of all there is ignorance from which arise feelinqs such as those of love and hatred. Then follows conscious- ness which gives birth to names and forms (the external world) and in this manner, the senses, the contact of the senses with the world, pleasure or pain, desire, virtue and vice, birth, old age, death, Tamentation, sorrow and distress, are, successively produced, one from the other.25 This order closely 25. अविद्यादीनामितरेतरकारणत्वादुपपद्यते लोकयात्रा। ते चाविद्याद योउविद्या संस्काये विज्ञानं नाम रूपं डायतनं स्पर्शो वेदना तृष्णोपादानं भवो जातिर्जरा मरणं शो- क: परिवेदना दुःखं दुर्मनस्तेत्येवंजा तीयका इतरेतरहे तुकाः। S'ankarâchârya's Vedânta Bhashya, Bib. Ind. p. 549, Vol. I. See also Govindananda on the same.

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resembles that of the Sankhyas. Ignorance cor- responds to pradhâna, love and hatred to buddhi, consciousness to ahankdra, and so on. The prin- ciple of both is the same, though there may be differences in the particulars. For these reasons, there is, I think, sufficient ground to believe, that though the Buddhistic systems may not have sprung directly from the Sankhya, they derived their origin from the same current of thought and are to be referred to the same or immediately successive ages. And having arrived thus far, the balance of probability is, in my opinion, in favour of the supposition that the Sankhyas preceded the Buddhists. Again, the Professor thinks the Buddhistic nir- vâna to be total annihilation, and refers to the sacred book Abhidharma said to have been writ- ten by Kas'yapa, the friend and pupil of Buddha. I have had no access to this book, but with due deference, I must say, that if Madhava has given the doctrines of the several sects rightly, the nir- vana of the Madhyamikas only is annihilation, while the summum bonum of the other schools is the separation of the free and unlimited soul from the finite force we observe in it, as the reader may have seen. 26 The coincidences between the Sankhya and the Buddhistic systems will derive greater significance if we compare and contrast the Vedanta with them. The absolute soul is the central idea of the Vedânta as well as of the Sânkhya. But the pro- blem with the Vedantins was not, simply to teach the way to eternal bliss, but also to restore the In- 26. Sarvadars': Madhy. परनिर्वाणं शून्यरूपं सेत्स्यति। Yog. निखिलवासनोच्छेद विगलित विविधविषयाकारे।पप्र- वविशुद्धविज्ञानोदयो महोदयः। Sautr. तदुभयनिरोधः। तदनन्तरं विमलज्ञानोदयो वा मुक्ति:। See also p. 116.

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dian race to the Sruti, which the Sankhyas had affected to reverence, and the Buddhists openly defied, and to God. Revelation is, therefore, the basis of the system. The second sûtra of Bâda- râyana, the first being simply introductory, brings in at once, the idea of God as the Creator of the world. According to the Vedanta, then, there is first, God and the individual soul. God is the sum total of the individual souls. He first creates the five elements, and from these five, the senses, and thence the two internal faculties (manas and buddhi). From the elements are also produced the organs of action, and the five winds in the body. The last seventeen constitute the. subtle body, which follows us after death; and the gross one is created by a certain elaborate. process of mixture, called panchikarana. The sum total of the subtle bodies with the soul in it is another body of God called Hiranyagarbha; and all the gross bodies. with the souls, consitute a third, distinguished by the name of Vais'vânara.27 Here, then, is an attempt to seek the absolute ob- jectively, which the Sankhyas arrive at, subjec -. tively. But equally with these, the Vedantins hold the subject also to be absolute. To establish identity betweeh these two, and secure moksha, finite thinking and the finite manifestations of the real or external absolute must be dissolved, buddhi and matter, the creations of God, must be destroyed. If by creation is to be understood a development of the Divine essence, this object cannot be gained. For the development must be as real as the essence itself. S'ankarâchârya, therefore, rejects this theory28 and attributes creation to a certain power 27. Vedânta Sara; Panchadas'i of Bharati-tirtha, viveka I. 28. S'ankaracharya's Bhashya II-1-14, Bib. Ind. p. 447, and 453 I. vol. This theory called parinamavada was afterwards taken up by Ramanuja, in whose hands, it became the basis of a religious system more practical than S'ankara's.

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in the Divine essence, which cannot be considered as existing, because its effects would no less exist, nor as non-existing, for the eftects are perceptible.29 It is maya or delusion which generates appearances, such as those of a mirage. And the individual soul which in its essence is the same as the Uni- versal soul, and is absolute, is enclosed by a similar veil of delusion and confounds himself with the creations of God's maya and attributes their finite- ness to himself. That the gross and subtle bodies are such creations is shown by the conditions in which we find ourselves, in sleep. In dreamy sleep, the gross body of flesh and blood does not exist for the individnal soul, while the subtle does, and this latter also ceases to be, in sound sleep. But even in sound sleep, the soul is still enveloped in avidya or ignorance which is maya itself as refering to the individual soul. These avidya and mâyâ are got rid of by the concentration of the mind in the manner prescribed by the Yoga philosophers, joined with moral discipline, and as the result of the process, the soul issues forth into its transcendent condition and is pure intelligence and joy.

29. सत्वासत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीयम्। Vedanta-Sara; न शून्यं मापिसद्यादृक्तादृक्तत्वमिहेष्यताम्। Bharatttirtha, Panch- Vivoka II,

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