1. Santarasa and Abhnivaguptas Theory of Aesthetics Masson J.L., Patwardhan M.V. BORI 1969

ŚĀNTARASA &

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S

PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

J.L.MASSON M.V.PATWARDHAN

BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE

ŚANTARASA & ABHINAVAGUPTA'S

PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

J. L. MASSON AND M. V. PATWARDHAN

Abhinavagupta is generally considered to be the greatest of the many Indian writers in the field of poetics. The breadth and profundity of his intellect, and the originality and brilliance of his critical insight, entitle him to a distinguished place in the ranks of philosophers of aesthetics of all lands and all periods of history.

This tenth century Kashmiri scholar advanced ideas in every way as interesting and sophisticated as those propounded by Aristotle, yet his work is virtually unknown in the West beyond a very small circle of Sanskritists. It is to remedy this situation by making some of the central insights of Abhinavagupta available to literary critics and the interested layman that the authors offer the present volume. Most of the material they present has never before been translated.

The introduction is meant primarily for students of comparative literature and the general reader. The body of the work is divided into two parts. In the first, the authors examine the various influences which went into the shaping of Abhinavagupta's philosophy of aesthetic experience, a unique synthesis of original insights into traditional Indian poetics with the Śaiva philosophy of Kashmir. They deal with such problems as : the nature of obscenity, the aesthetic enjoyment of tragic literature, the nature of poetic imagination, Tantric rituals as drama, and, above all, the relation between imaginative experiences and transcendent mystical experiences. In the second part of the work, the authors reproduce and translate everything written on the subject of śāntarasa ( " the aesthetic experience of tranquillity " ) prior to Abhinavagupta.

$ 6.— Rs. 25/—

SĀNTARASA

BY

J. L. MASSON

M. V. PATWARDHAN

BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, POONA

1969

ŚĀNTARASA

AND

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL SERIES No. 9

ŚĀNTARASA

AND

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

BY

J. L. MASSON

M. V. PATWARDHAN

BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, POONA

1969

Price Rs. 25

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY

DR. R. N. DANDEKAR,

HON. SECRETARY

BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE,

POONA-4.

For Jack and Diana

who made it possible

द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया

समानं वृक्षं परिपस्वजाते ।

तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति

अनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति ॥

"Two birds, deepest of friends,

live on the same tree.

One eats the sweet fruit.

The other, without eating, watches".

CONTENTS

Foreword

Preface

Abbreviations

Introduction

I-XVII

Part I.: Abhinava's Philosophy of Aesthetics.

A. Influences :

(1) Literary Influences—

(a) Aśvaghoṣa

3

(b) Ānandavardhana

6

(c) Bhaṭṭatauta

15

(d) Bhaṭṭanāyaka.

20

(2) Philosophical Influences—

(a) Vedānta

24

(b) Vijñānabhairava

27

(c) Yogavāsiṣṭha

29

(d) Kashmir Śaivism

33

(3) Influence from speculation on śāntarasa—

(a) Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa

36

(b) Anuyogadvārasūtra

37

(4) Tantric Influence—

Tantrāloka

40

B. Abhinava's Philosophy of Aesthetics.

(1) Translation of key passages from his philosophical

works and the Abhinavabhāratī

44

(2) Text and translation of the Locana on Dhvanyāloka, Uddyota II

60

(3) Text and translation of the Locana on Dhvanyāloka, Uddyota I

78

2

Page

Part II : Śāntarasa.

(A) Interpolated verses in the Nāṭyaśāstra ..

(B) Rudrata

..

..

91

..

93

(C) Dhvanyāloka, Uddyota III

..

..

94

(D) Locana on same

..

..

96

(E) Dhvanyāloka, Uddyota IV

..

..

103

(F) Locana on same

..

..

109

(G) Śāntarasaprakaraṇa from the Abhinavabhāratī

..

113

(H) Daśarūpaka and Avaloka passages

..

..

143

Part III : Conclusion :

(A) Verse from the Dhvanyāloka, Uddyota III, on devotion and poetry

..

..

153

(B) Locana on same

..

..

153

(C) Similarities between aesthetic experiences and mystic experiences

..

161

(D) Differences

..

..

162

Appendix—Later writers on śāntarasa and rasāsvāda ..

(1) Mammata

..

..

165

(2) Viśvanātha

..

..

165

(3) Rasagangādhara

..

..

168

Bibliography

..

..

179

Addendum

..

..

189

Index

..

..

195

Errata

..

..

..

..

205

FORWORD

I have great pleasure in writing a Foreword to this book by Prof. M. V. Patwardhan and Mr. J. L. Masson and in introducing the latter whom I have known intimately for some time and who was struck me with his flair for Sanskrit and its cultivation and for the literary study of Sanskrit literature, qualities which, undoubtedly, he has imbibed from his chief teachers L. Renou of the Sorbonne and Prof. D. H. H. Ingalls of Harvard. His association with these two scholars explains his association with me.

This monograph is on Śānta Rasa and Abhinavagupta's aesthetics as it emerges out of the philosophy of Rasa as expounded by him. It stems out of my Number of Rasas which at the time of its first appearance in the middle of the fourties, was the first detailed exposition of this important subject. In that work, I had also offered a critical edition of the section relating to the Śānta from Abhinavagupta's commentary on the Nāṭya Śāstra. Naturally, while the material given in the present study has already been known, the treatment of the authors has given it a freshness, illustrating the principles of novelty elucidated by Ānandavardhana in Uddyota IV of Dhvanyāloka. As Max Müller said, at every stage, a fresh study of a branch of knowledge is required. In the introduction, as also in the main part of their work, the authors have traversed a wide ground in respect of literature and response to it, and on the background of the latest writers, critics and philosophers in the West and the attempts of a few of them to interpret or understand the contributions of the Sanskrit writers, they have highlighted some of the most important ideas of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. The thought of these two masters of Sanskrit literary criticism, particularly of the latter, is examined on the background of their school of philosophy, Kashmir Śaivism. But as they go, the authors take in their stride many other related concepts which involve parenthetical treatment; added to these are the very large number of references to works and authors, but the reader should be able to follow the main theme of the authors namely the conception of Rasāsvāda as elucidated by the two great aesthetes Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta.

It would not be possible to fall in line whith the authors on some of the literary judgements that they have passed on Sanskrit poems and plays, e. g. those on p. ix of the Introduction. Also in some contexts of textual interpretation, the authors have expressed their disagreement with earlier writers and have given their own interpretation. However this is not the place to enter into discussion of details.

Not only does the study in the following pages show the extensive reading of the authors, but it also expressly mentions a chain of further studies, connected with the present one, which the authors have prepared.

As a member of the Indian Advisory Committee of the American Institute of Indian Studies, I am pleased that a Grantee of the Institute, one of the joint-authors of the Volume, has done remarkably well on his grant-programme in India.

Quite a few of the younger generation of American scholars are engaged in pure Sanskrit and Śāstraic studies, and by assisting them, the Institute is giving a fillip to Sanskrit studies.

Vijayādaśamī

20-10-1969

Madras.

V. RAGHAVAN

PREFACE

The present study grew out of a much larger work that the authors are presently completing. We have both been long interested in Sanskrit literary criticism. Professor Patwardhan has taught the Dhvanyāloka and the Rasagangādhara over a period of fifteen years to students in Fergusson College. Mr. Masson has translated and annotated the Dhvanyāloka and the first chapter of the Locana for his Ph. D. thesis at Harvard.

When we met we discovered a deep mutual interest in Abhinavagupta's Locana, the greatest Indian work on aesthetics, but a text so difficult that even the Pandits hesitate to teach it in the Pāṭhaśālās. We began meeting twice a week for 3–4 hour sessions to read and discuss textual difficulties in the Locana. We soon found that we shared nearly identical views on the major problems in this work. Gradually most of the textual mysteries began to yield up their secrets, and we decided to translate the entire Locana as a joint work.

The section on śāntarasa was originally to have been an appendix to this three-volume annotated translation. But we found that so many issues in the Locana had a direct bearing on the problem of śāntarasa that it really required a more extensive and separate treatment. Especially in reading the śāntarasa passage in the Abhinavabhāratī, a text of notorious difficulty, we found that our readings in the Locana were a great help to its elucidation. It is primarily as an aid to understanding this śāntarasa passage of the Abhinavabhāratī that we are publishing the results of our research. We regard this as an introduction to our translation of the Dhvanyālokalocana which will be published along with the Dhvanyāloka in the Harvard Oriental Series.

It is a pleasant duty to thank those who have helped us : Mr. Masson first read the Dhvanyāloka with the late Professor L. Renou in Paris, who maintained a lively interest in Sanskrit literary

theory and urged on him the necessity of doing serious work in this field. Professor V. Raghavan was kind enough to read with him daily the fourth Uddyota with the Locana. His pioneering work, " The Number of Rasas ", and his magnum opus, " Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa ", provided much of the stimulus for writing the present volume. Professor D. H. H. Ingalls read Mr. Masson's translation of the first and fourth Uddyota of the Dhvanyāloka and made many valuable suggestions on method which we have followed here. Mr. Masson also wishes to thank his old friends, Professor B. K. Matilal of the University of Pennsylvania, and Professor K. Bhattacharya of the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris, for stimulating discussions over the past years on many of these very topics. Several Pandits of the Deccan College have always been very happy to discuss many of the issues with us. We wish to thank especially Dr. V. W. Paranjpe and Pandit Srinivasashastri for their help. Mr. R. P. Goldman from the Sanskrit department of the University of Pennsylvania helped us to clarify many of our ideas on Sanskrit and general literature while reading the entire work in manuscript. We wish also to thank Mr. J. Losty of the Sanskrit Department at Oxford University for reading through the work and making numerous corrections in the English text, and for his pointed questions. Mr. Masson wishes to thank the A. I. I. S. for a fellowship from 1968-69 which made this study possible by supporting his research, during which time the present work was published. It is a great pleasure to thank our good friend Dr. S. D. Joshi for his constant encouragement. Dr. R. N. Dandekar kindly accepted the work for publication in the B. O. R. I. Oriental Series for which we are grateful. We wish to thank Dr. V. Raghavan, whose work in Sanskrit poetics is well-known to all scholars in the field, for writing the foreword to this volume.

Finally, Mr. I. R. Walavekar and his staff very efficiently and pleasantly saw this work through the press in the short time of two months, for which we remain indebted to them.

ABBREVIATIONS

( For details, see Bibliography )

A. Bh. Abhinavabhāratī, Abhinavagupta's commentary on the Nātya- śāstra.

Ānanda Ānandavardhana, author of the Dhvanyāloka.

Avaloka Dhanika's commentary on the Daśarūpaka of Dhananjaya.

BN Bhaṭṭanāyaka, author of the lost Hṛdayadarpana, often quoted by Abhinava.

B. O. R. I. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

BP Bālapriyā commentary on the Dhvanyāloka.

Bharata Author of the Nāṭyaśāstra.

D. Āl. Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana.

DR Daśarūpaka of Dhananjaya.

Dandin Author of Kāvyādarśa.

Gnoli R. Gnoli, author of “ The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta ”.

G. O. S. Gaekwad Oriental Series.

HC Hemacandra's Kāvyānuśāsana ( with his own commentaries ).

ĪPVV Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī of Abhinavagupta.

J. A. O. S. Journal of the American Oriental Society.

J. O. R. Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.

KM Kāvyamālā.

K. Mīm. Kāvyamīmāṃsā of Rājaśekhara.

KP Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammata.

KSTS Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies.

Kane P. V. Kane, author of “ History of Sanskrit Poetics ”.

Kaumudī The Kaumudī commentary by Uttuṅgodaya on the Dhvanyā- lokalocana of Abhinavagupta.

Locana Abhinavagupta's commentary on the Dhvanyāloka.

M. Bh. Mahābhārata.

NŚ Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata.

NSP Nirṇayasāgara Press,

Pandey

K. C. Pandey, “Abhinavagupta, an Historical and Philosophical Study”.

RG

Rasagangādhara of Jagannātha Panditarāja.

Raghavan

V. Raghavan, author of “The Number of Rasas”.

ŚR

Śāntarasa.

Śridhara

Śridhara’s comm. on the Kāvyaprakāśa, ed. by Sivaprasad Bhattacharya.

T. Āl.

Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta, in 12 vols.

VB

Vijñānabhairava, with comm. partly by Kṣemarāja, and partly by Śivopādhyāya.

VJ

Vakroktijīvita of Kuntaka.

VV

Mahimabhaṭṭa’s Vyaktiviveka.

Vāmana

Vāmana’s Kāvyālankārasūtra.

YS

Patañjali’s Yogasūtra.

YV

Yogavāsiṣṭhamahārāmāyana.

INTRODUCTION1

A word on methodology :2 Philip Rawson in a recent article on Indian

aesthetics writes : “ In fact I believe that in the field of aesthetics ( as in the

field of logic ) a great series of thinkers who lived in India and wrote in

Sanskrit between the fourth century A. D. and the thirteenth have put many

ideas which must be brought into our present-day debates on art-ideas which

1. It might be asked why we use the term “ æsthetics ” in the title when surely

“ poetics ” would have been more correct, since aesthetics is a wider concept, including

reflections on the experience of the beautiful in all art forms, and not only in literature.

This would be true were we to confine our attention only to the Dhvanyālokocana. But

the Abhinavabhāratī includes considerations of music and of dance as well as of litera-

ture, and it is clear, even if nowhere explicitly stated, that Abhinava intends his remarks

on the nature of imaginative experiences in drama and poetry to apply to other art

forms as well. If we were to sum up Abhinava's theory in one phrase as “ great art

demands the transcendence of self ” then we could surely apply this to music as well.

2. We presuppose on the part of our readers a certain familiarity with the

technical terms of Sanskrit poetics. For those who are reading about the field for the

first time, we would recommend the following works :

For a general introduction to Sanskrit poetry the reader cannot do better

than read D. H. H. Ingalls' humane study: An anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry

Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge, 1965. The two standard works on Sanskrit literary

criticism are : S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya,

Calcutta, 1960, and P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, Motilal Banarsidass,

Delhi, 1961. Kane is better than De on textual problems, but less full on the actual

theories. A concise but intelligent overview of the theory of suggestion can be found

in an article by J. Brough, “ Some Indian Theories of Meaning ”, Transactions of the

Philological Society, 1953, Oxford. An excellent book, which contains a very fine

chapter on the theory of dhvani is K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning,

Adyar Library and Research Center, Madras, 1963. A clear account by a good

modern Indian philosopher of many of the issues will be found in M. Hiriyana's Art

Experience, a collection of his essays on such questions as “ Art contemplation ”, “ Art

and Morality ”, “ The Philosophy of Æsthetic Pleasure ” and so on, Kavalaya

Publishers, Mysore, 1954. For those who read French, we would recommend the pioneer

study of the Indian theatre by Sylvain Lévi, Le Théatre Indien, reprinted with

Renou's article, “ La Recherche sur le théatre Indien depuis 1890 ”, Paris, 1963. The

Introduction to R. Gnoli's The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta, Rome,

1965 and now reprinted by Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1968, is excellent, though readers

might find the actual text difficult. K. C. Pandey's two works, Abhinavagupta, an

Historical and Philosophical Study Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1966, and Comparative

Aesthetics, vol. I, Indian Aesthetics (both second editions), Chowkhamba, Banaras,

1959, are also likely to prove difficult, though both works contain much valuable

information. The reader would also be well advised to read one or two of the texts

in translation. The most important work on theatre and on dramatic theory is the

Nātyaśāstra (ca. 3rd century A. D. ?) of which there is a new edition and trans-

lation by M. Ghosh, Manisha Grathalaya, Calcutta, 1957. Available translations are

( Continued on next page

II

शान्तरस

we can use on works of art as one uses a can-opener on a can, to get at the meat. Their writings could extend our conceptual armoury".1 While we agree with the sentiment, we disagree strongly with the method. In an article subtitled: "A Study in Indian Aesthetics", there is no mention of a single Indian critic ! One could contribute an entire negative bibliography on Sanskrit poetics which would illustrate the same fault : an insufficient acquaintance with the basic texts of Sanskrit literary criticism. Instead of vague generalisations ( or reinterpretations such as are found in the special issue of the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism on Oriental Aesthetics, Fall, 1965), we need detailed studies2 and especially translations into modern English of the major works of Sanskrit aesthetics. It is disturbing to think that there are no English translations at all of many of the most important works : the Vakroktijivita, the Kāvyamīmāṃsā, the Abhinavabhāratī, the Dhvanyāloka-locana, the Vyaktiviveka or the Rasagaṅgādhara.3 There is no readily available translation of Daṇḍin, or Bhāmaha, or Vāmana, and Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka is sorely in need of a new and better translation. We know that the Indians have creative ideas on such important issues as " the nature

Continued from previous page )

rare : The Dhvanyāloka the most important text on poetics will soon be published with a complete translation of Abhinavagupta's commentary, the Locana, by the authors. Meanwhile there is Jacobi's excellent German translation, Z. D. M. G. no. 56, Leipzig, 1902 and the translation into English by K. Krishnamoorthy, Poona Oriental Series, Poona, 1955. There is a French translation of Rājaśekhara's Kāvyamīmāṃsā (9th century ), a fascinating and eccentric work, by N. Stchoupak and L. Renou published by Société Asiatique in 1946 that is still in print. The second most important work on drama, though much later (10th century) than the Nāṭyaśāstra, has been translated by G. O. Haas, The Daśarūpaka of Dhanamjaya : A Treatise of Hindu Dramaturgy, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1962. A good translation of Mammata's Kāvyaprakāśa (11th century) has come out by G. Jha, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Banaras, 1967. Mammata follows Abhinava very closely, though he is more conventional in his opinions. It is by far the best of the "text books" that became so popular in the Sanskrit tradition. Similar to it, and even fuller in treatment, though less interesting, is the Sāhityadarpaṇa of Viśvanātha, translated by J. R. Ballantyne and P. Misra, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1965. An excellent and readable French translation of one of the later texts is Le Pratāparudrīya de Vidyānātha by Pierre Filliozat, Institut Fraṅçais d'Indologie, Pondichery, 1963.

1. "An Exalted Theory of Ornament", published in Aesthetics in the Modern World, edited by H. Osborne, London, Thames and Hudson, 1968.

2. Such detailed studies are to be found pre-eminently in the works of two modern Indian scholars, V. Raghavan, and the late Sivaprasad Bhattacharya. For details, see Bibliography.

3. A four-volume work is soon to appear on readings from literary criticism throughout the world. One volume will be devoted to Indian Aesthetics. It is being edited by B. K. Matilal of the University of Pennsylvania and will contain translations of all the major texts (excerpts only of course) by B, K. Matilal, V, Raghavan, M. Ghosh, M. V. Patwardhan and J. Masson.

of poetic imagination", "the dichotomy between learning and inspiration",

"linguistics and poetics", "the tension between pleasure and didacticism",

"poetry and philosophy", "effort and spontaneity", and so on. But what

exactly did the Indian writers have to say on each of these issues? We have

taken up one of these issues, śantarasa, for detailed discussion in this volume.

Śāntarasa might be translated as "the imaginative experience of tranquil-

lity". It is an issue on which there exists some confusion. Edgerton was able

to write, astonishingly, of śāntarasa: ".... that it is forbidden to use it in the

drama; it is inherently opposed to the very nature of the drama".1 This is a

simple misunderstanding of the texts. Such misunderstandings arise because

many modern writers are not taking the trouble to see just what the Sanskrit

writers on poetics have said. They are relying on secondary literature instead

of going directly to the original sources. In this way errors only compound

themselves. How will one be able to appreciate Sanskrit literature properly if

one is unware of just what it is that a cultivated audience expected from its

literature? And how can one know this, unless one reads Sanskrit literary criti-

cism? Here we must take sides in what seems to us a major issue concerning

the proper method of understanding Sanskrit poetry: Professor D. H. H.

Ingalls has written of A. B. Keith, whose two works, "A History of Sanskrit

Literature" and "The Sanskrit Drama" are standard reading in the field,

"that for the most part he disliked Sanskrit literature." After illustrating this,

Professor Ingalls remarks: "What is unjust in these judgments is that not once

does Keith apply the remarks of a Sanskrit critic to any of the Sanskrit works

he is judging."2 Professor J. Brough, a former student of Keith, responds

to this criticism by quoting a paragraph from Keith's "History of Sanskrit

Literature", after which he remarks: "I have re-read this paragraph with

close attention, but I have not been able to discover any hidden meaning in

it; and I do not understand how such words could be written by one who

'for the most part disliked Sanskrit literature.'"3 Professor Brough may

well be correct, for it is perfectly possible that Keith did in fact like much of

Sanskrit literature. But surely this is irrelevant. The point is not whether

Keith did or did not like Sanskrit poetry (since one can certainly understand

something for which one does not have great admiration), but whether he

understood it or not. Brough does not answer Ingalls' second charge, by far

the more important of the two. Did Keith judge Sanskrit literature accord-

ing to the highly developed canons of its own texts on literary criticism?

1. F. Edgerton, "Indirect Suggestion in Poetry", Proc. of the American

Philosophical Society, vol. 76, 1936, p. 704.

2. An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry, p. 50.

3. J. Brough, Poems from the Sanskrit, Penguin, 1968, p. 21.

Judging from his chapter on the theories of poetry in ancient India, one would guess not. He seems for the most part innocent of their more detailed doctrines.1 This is an important point of methodology. Before we can judge or even appreciate Sanskrit literature, we must understand it. As I. A. Richards often remarked to his students at Harvard : “We do not admire what we do not understand.” No amount of theory on methodology will help one to understand Sanskrit literature. There is only one method that counts : exposure to, and familiarility with, the texts. There is a perfectly straight-forward use of the word “ understanding ” which is too often ignored in the elaborate treatises now fashionable on “ methodology ” ( often, it seems to us, merely excuses for not dealing with the texts themselves ). The difficulties of interpreting a Sanskrit poem are considerably less in India than in the West. The meaning of a Sanskrit poem is rarely subjective. Either you have understood a verse or you haven’t. In a traditional Sanskrit class, the Pandit will ask a student after he has read a verse : artho jñāto vā na vā, “ Have you understood the meaning or not ?” This makes it far more easy to reach a concensus about a poem’s worth in Sanskrit than would be true in English literature.2 When we read a passage in one of these Sanskrit texts we know

1. For instance, on p. 386-397 of A History of Sanskrit Literature, ( Oxford, 1928 ) Keith is supposed to be explaining the theories of Jagannātha's Rasagangā-dhara, but everything he quotes is actually taken by Jagannātha from Abhinavagupta's Locana, a fact of which Keith seems totally unaware. Thus, he writes : “ The cause of this form of pleasure is a form of meditation ( bhāvanā ), consisting of continued application to the object characterized by the pleasure. It is quite different from the joy produced by the thought of the meaning of what is said to one, e. g. “ A son is born to you ”. But this example actually occurs several times in the Dhvanyālok-locana, ( e. g. p. 80, Bālapriyā Edn. ) 600 years earlier !

2. Not that the Indians ever made the fallacy of thinking that a poem was exhausted by what it meant. Far from it, they were likely to sin in the opposite direction, and suppose that a poem derived all its worth from how it was said ( vyañjanā ) rather than what it said. As I. A. Richards puts it : “ It is never what a poem says which matters, but what it is ”. John Wain speaks of the difficulty of pinpointing the elements in a poem that make for its success : “ But to illustrate these things in the concrete is to approach the vanishing conter of literary criticism, which, not being an exact science, is bound sooner or later to reach a point at which demonstration breaks down and is replaced by a shared sensibility ; though, of course, this point is very much more distant than the anti-critical writers on literature would have us think ”, Interpretations, edited by J. Wain, Routledge, London, 1955. For the Indians it was not only distant, but actually beyond the horizon. This is an important point to stress : the Indians simply cannot conceive. of arguing over the final worth or even interpretation of a poem in quite the same way as can be done to-day in Western literary criticism. It is of course true that finally the sahrdaya, the intelligent and responsive reader, is the final criterion. But generally, sahrdayas tend to agree amongst themselves to an astonishing degree. One has only to look at the interprétations of poems advanced in Sanskrit commentaries. They are usually very

( Continued on next page

immediately whether we understand it or not. If we do not, no amount of " methodology " will give us instant and magic insight into the meaning. It is only by reading further in the literature that understanding will be gained.

We feel that we have to speak of this because in a sense we are dealing with religious material, and the familiar criticism comes to mind that in order to understand Buddhism one must either be a Buddhist or at least belong to some religious tradition. Similarly, the argument goes, one must be " personally " concerned with the problems raised by śāntarasa and by religious ecstasy in general in order to understand the issues properly. To this belief we cannot subscribe. We can sympathise intellectually with the problems raised by śāntarasa without being personally moved by the issues in our everyday life. Certainly to have a profound understanding of Dante it is not necessary to be a believing Christian. We can respond to the power and grace of a mind without necessarily agreeing with what is said. Were it necessary to hold firmly to a set of immovable beliefs, then the whole of surrealism, in which our common expectations are constantly arrested, should possess no aesthetic significance. Literature does not depend for its power on a set of beliefs. Is the ghost of Hamlet real ? How can this matter for a proper appreciation of the play ? The important point is that it is real for the play. Are the punishments that Dante describes " real " ? They are real in the poem. Whether we believe in their objective reality or not has nothing whatever to do with our appreciation of the poem itself. Similarly, śāntarasa exists within the context in which we discuss it. We must judge these beliefs in the context of the works of literature in which they appear, and not in the light of our personal convictions, or we seriously restrict the possibilities of our own literary appreciation. We have elucidated certain difficult texts which describe ecstatic experiences. It should not be relevant what our own belief is as to the objective nature of these experiences.

A more important dichotomy than that between belief and scepticism has to do more directly with our method of work. This is the dichotomy between modern Western methods and the more traditional method of understanding.

Continued from previous page )

similar to one another. (This is surely why plagiarism in such matters was never considered to be a serious matter. Witness Hemacandra, who uses Abhinava's explanations of innumerable stanzas. He is not " cheating ", he is " agreeing ".) When a modern commentary like the Bālaspriyā follows Uṭṭungodayā's Kaumudī on the Locana, Rāmaśāraka is not being lazy or dishonest. This simply points to shared values in Sanskrit literary criticism. We know, for example, that Mahimabhaṭṭa and Kuntaka both disagree sharply with the views of the dhvani school, and with Ānandavardhana in particular. But their disagreements concern principles, and do not really extend to the interpretation of individual poems. When they explain the rasa of a poem there is remarkable agreement.

standing texts used by the Pandits. There need exist no opposition between

the two methods. In our cases, we have both profited greatly from our

study among the Śastrins, and we both possess an unqualified admiration for

the depth of their knowledge into a given śastra. On the other hand the

major part of our education has been along Western lines, and we see no

reason to abandon the critical principles it has instilled in us.

ABHINAVA'S ACHIEVEMENT

Abhinavagupta was without a doubt the greatest example in Indian

history of a literary critic who was also a philosopher of repute. Pandits will

often say of him that : alamkāraśastram tenaiva śastratvam prāpitam—“ He

alone turned poetics into a science.” There are virtually no important ideas

in later Sanskrit poetics that do not derive from him ( or from his influ-

ences )1. In his two famous commentaries, the Locana on the Dhvanyāloka,

and the Abhinavabhāratī on the Nāṭyaśāstra, he has dealt with almost every

important issue of Indian aesthetics. Neither work is meant to be primarily

philosophic—he deals rather with specific verses, and especially in the Locana

he performs brilliant feats of understanding and interpretation in discovering

the hidden “ suggested ” meaning in verses. ( There are numerous examples

of this; one thinks in particular of the enormous range of suggestion he is

able to derive from a single case of vastudhvani in the Dhvanyāloka )2. His

linguistic acumen is no less astonishing, and he often points to the suggestive

use of a case-ending, or even a particle. But we are concerned in this volume

with those passages, by no means rare, where he deals more with theory

than with its practical application. In extracting Abhinava's philosophy of

aesthetics, we have discovered that he is deeply concerned with religious

values in literature. In this he marks a decided break with his predecessors.

There is nothing particular religious about the Nāṭyaśāstra. As for the

Dhvanyāloka, which we believe to be the work of two different authors,3 the

1. Many of the ideas of later writers (especially Mammaṭa) which modern

writers mistakenly think to be original, derive ultimately and often literally from

Abhinavagupta. Thus S. K. De, “The theory of Rasa”, in Some Problems of Sanskrit

Poetics, Calcutta, 1959, p. 206, attributes to Viśvanātha the doctrine that “those very

things which are called cause of pain in the world….when consigned to poetry and

dramatic representation possess the right to be called, in consequence of their assuming

such a function, alaukika vibhāvas etc., and from them only pleasure ensues, as it does

from bites and the like in amorous dalliance”. But this doctrine is found first in the

Abhinavabhāratī, Vol. I, p. 292.

2. One thinks of his long explanations of the two last Prakrit verses quoted

under I, 4, on pp. 74–78 of the Locana ( B. edition ).

3. This is of course a very complex issue. Mr. Masson has written a long

article on the problem, arguing from internal evidence, that Ānandavardhana wrote

only the Vrtti, and that the Kārikās belong to an earlier author. The article will

appear soon.

kārikās present absolutely no religious aspect at all. There are no religious terms used, and no analogies drawn from religious literature. Even the term śāntarasa is never used.1 Āmandavardhana is a different matter. In his vṛtti religious preoccupations are evident. Unfortunately, his Tattvāloka,2 a work that dealt with the relation between poetry and philosophy, is lost, so that we cannot know how great its influence upon Abhinava was. At least his concerns within the Dhvanyāloka never culminate in a philosophic theory. It is only with Abhinava himself ( preceded, in all likelihood, by Bhaṭṭanāyaka in his lost Hṛdayadarpaṇa ) that specific religious doctrines are applied to aesthetics ( we do not of course distinguish sharply between religion and philosophy, for in Abhinava's case, as in much Indian writing, the two are nearly coterminous).

Abhinava is concerned with providing a stable philosophical foundation for his theories. We have tried to show in this volume how often Abhinava draws on śāntarasa for his major contribution to Sanskrit aesthetics, the theory of rasa. Reduced to its bare essentials the theory is as follows : watching a play or reading a poem for the sensitive reader (sahrdaya) entails a loss of the sense of present time and space. All worldly considerations for the time being cease. Since we are not indifferent (tatastha ) to what is taking place, our involvement must be of a purer variety than we normally experience. We are not directly and personally involved, so the usual medley of desires and anxieties dissolve. Our hearts respond sympathetically ( hṛdayasamvāda ) but not selfishly. Finally the response becomes total; all-engrossing, and we identify with the situation depicted ( tanmayībhāvana ). The ego is transcended, and for the duration of the aesthetic experience, the normal waking “ I ” is suspended. Once this actually happens, we suddenly find that our responses are not like anything we have hitherto experienced, for now that all normal emotions are gone, now that the hard knot of “selfness” has been untied, we find ourselves in an unprecedented state of mental and emotional calm. The purity of our emotion and the intensity of it take us to a higher level of pleasure than we could know before - we experience sheer undifferentiated bliss ( ānandaikaghana ) for we have come into direct contact with the deepest recesses of our own unconscious where the memory

1. Those rasas with which the Kārikās of the Dhvanyāloka are concerned are actually mentioned at some point or another. Thus Karuṇarasa is mentioned at II, 8 ; Bībhatsa at III. 4; Raudra at II. 9; Śṛṅgāra time and again, e.g. II. 7, II. 15, etc. But nowhere is Śāntarasa mentioned by name in the Kārikās. Ānanda, however, does interpret III. 30 ( p. 397 ) to be a reference to Śāntarasa, but it is possible that he has misinterpreted the verse.

2. Abhinava refers to it on p. 67 of the Locana in the first Uddyota, and again in the fourth Uddyota, p. 533,

of a primeval unity between man and the universe is still strong. Inadvertently, says Abhinavagupta, we have arrived at the same inner terrain as that occupied by the mystic, though our aim was very different from his. Such an experience cannot but make us impatient with the ordinary turmoil of emotions that is our inner life, and though Abhinava never explicitly says so, one cannot help feeling that he expects the reader to search out now these experiences on a more permanent basis.

We would be justified in asking why Abhinava felt it necessary to provide such a unified theory of rasa ( when Ānandavardhana for instance never felt the need to philosophise about rasa ), and especially a theory that depended so heavily on notions involving śāntarasa. We think there is a good reason : as a religious man, Abhinava must have been under a certain amount of at least internal pressure to justify his deep interest in purely secular literature. There has always been among Indian philosophers ( and Western ones too; one thinks of Plato )1 a certain distrust of poetry. There is the attack of Jayantabhaṭṭa, the great logician, on Ānandavardhana's theory of suggestion : "There is no point in arguing with poets,"2 or the famous remark with which Mīmāṃsakas3 were known to rebuke those interested in poetry : "One should avoid the useless prattle that is poetry."4

Abhinava undermined such opposition by attempting to show that the states of mind during religious experiences and during literary experiences bore a basic affinity to one another. Literature, he wished to prove, at least the best literature, is just one more expression of an ineffable transcendent experience. This was a daring move and one which might legitimately have been expected earlier.5 It is rather odd when one considers it, that nobody before

1. As Blake puts it so well: "This was the fault of Plato. He knew of nothing but virtues and vices and good and evil ".

2. यन्मन्यः पण्डितमन्मन्यः प्रपदेऽपि कंचन द्वनिम् ।

3. अथवा नेदृशी चर्चा कविभिः सह शोभते । Nyāyamañjarī, p. 45.

Abhinava can use his wit very trenchantly when he desires. He has no liking for Mīmāṃsakas and loses no opportunity to amuse himself at the expense of what he calls their dried-up minds. See for ex. Locana, p. 65, paśyata śrotriyasyokti- kauśalam. One thinks of the very funny verse manufactured by the Mīmāṃsā pandits in the Bhojaprabandha, भोजनं देहि राजेन्द्र धृतयुपसमनितंम् । "Give us, great king, food with butter and soup."

4. काव्यालापोऽपि वज्येत् । See Mallinātha on RV. I. 1.

5. All large generalisations are dangerous, but we cannot refrain from mentioning what we consider to be a fundamental dichotomy that runs through Sanskrit literature. That which is trivial and which does not look beyond itself is contrasted with that which is significant and transcendental. Witness the hatred most philosophers have envisced for the cārvākas who stress the absence of any numinous experience in life.

the Kashmir Śaivas thought of associating aesthetic experience with states of religious ecstasy, since the two have always been closely allied in India. Perhaps it was because the philosophical atmosphere of Kashmir Śaivism was so saturated with literature : we have only to glance at any single page of the Yogavāsiṣṭha to see how true this is. The most philosophic texts from this school bristle with terms taken from literature and literary criticism, just as conversely a work like the Dhvanyāloka is rich in philosophical implications and learning. For the Kashmir Śaivas generally, with their interest in Tantric ritual, sexual pleasure, indeed, aesthetic pleasure in general, was much less repugnant to them than it was to the Advaita tradition ( though we must not exaggerate this either, for did not the orthodox tradition itself ascribe to Śaṅkara the Amaruśataka?).

What are the advantages that such a theory provides for Sanskrit literature? They are many. (1) Such a philosophical justification must have helped to explain to Abhinava himself the nature of his interest in Sanskrit kāvya. If, as Kafka said, poetry should be a pick-axe to free the sea frozen within us, then most of Sanskrit poetry fails utterly. Most kāvya cannot reach us in our most primitive minds the way that Proust, or Lawrence, or Joyce can. In reading through the Dhvanyāloka, one is struck by the disparity between the theory and the literature to which it is applied. The poems themselves do not represent values more universal than their time. But the refined and subtle theories which Ānandavardhana employs, clearly do. For a modern scholar, it is easier to view these principles sub specie aeternitatis than to do so with the literature which illustrates them. The doctrine, oddly enough, is not significant merely as cultural anthropology, whereas many of the poems can only interest us for reasons other than their literary appeal. Abhinava surprises us by ascribing the fault to us and not to the poetry. He could hardly have been unaware of this more or less unspoken complaint of sensitive critics, that a certain amount of Sanskrit poetry was mere trivia. The criticism would apply equally to Sanskrit plays. If we demand of our best literature transcendence, then these works seen to fail us. But Abhinava, in order to prove the lack of sensitivity in such a view, uses a very new argument : he brings in the example of śāntarasa. The one thing that śāntarasa does that no other rasa can, is that it disturbs us. If we really believe the message that any successful play dealing with śāntarasa tells us, we hear what Rilke said was the final lesson of all great literature : “ You must change your life.” By powerful arguments, Abhinava attempts to show that this quality of transcendence, which we must admit in śāntarasa ( though his critics of course did not ), applies equally well to good literature. The greatest example, which Ānanda was apparently the first critic in Sanskrit literature to notice, is the Mahābhārata. Before Ānanda nobody ever consider-

x

ed the possibility of looking at a piece of literature as a unified whole, with

a single dominant suggestive atmosphere, and certainly not something of such

gigantic proportions as the Mahābhārata. But both Ananda and following

him, Abhinava, insist on the overwhelming experience that reading the Mahā-

bhārata provides. As unhappiness and doom succeed one another in a seem-

ingly endless display of the vanity of this world; as we slowly become aware

of the folly of trusting to the external world to bring happiness; as one after

another the heroes of the epic whom we have come to know over volumes

and volumes fade from existence and everything seems to dessicate and near

its end, the reader is invaded by a sense of doom, a sense of the uselessness of

strife, and he is eventually instilled with a craving for tranquillity, for an end

to human suffering and misery. If our reading is extensive enough, concen-

trated enough, with no distractions from the outside world, then we can

induce in ourselves a profound imaginative experience of tranquillity, śantarasa.

The Mahābhārata remains for Sanskrit literary critics the supreme example of

this mood, this imaginative creation. It is not surprising that Ānanda is at

his most eloquent when he describes this experience in great detail in the

fourth Uddyota of his Dhvanyāloka. The passage was clearly a powerful

influence in Abhinava's theories.

(2) If Abhinava was struck by the poverty of much Indian kāvya

(which, through a reinterpretation of its purpose, he felt need no longer be

considered trivial), he must have been equally disturbed by the lifeless quality

of much Indian philosophy. By eschewing the real world, it often found it-

self in the arid territory of the purely theoretic, with no tap-root leading into

the rich soil of real life as it is lived by men and women in a real world. An

English literary critic has recently berated this arid quality in surrealism :

" . . . reading surrealistic books, as in talking to hermits, one is often struck

by the impoverishment of fantasy when not continually cross-pollinated by

the external world. Paradoxically, fantasy is not enriched, but etiolated by

resolute subjectivism."1 Abhinava, by importing literary issues into

philosophy, was able to provide philosophical thinking with a literary quality

it previously lacked. Aesthetics now becomes a legitimate concern for the

philosopher.

(3) Abhinava discovered that great poems such as the Mahābhārata,

reach us beyond the conscious mind. One is reminded of Freud's great study

of Leonardo, when he speaks of the effeminate forms of Leonardo's " John the Baptist" and " Bacchus" : "They are beautiful youths of feminine

delicacy and with effeminate forms; they do not cast their eyes down, but

1. Miles Burrows, reviewing Surrealism and the Novel, by J. H. Mathews in

the New Statesman, December, 22, 1967.

gaze in mysterious triumph, as if they knew of a great achievement of happiness, about which silence must be kept. The familiar smile of fascination leads one to guess that it is a secret of love."1

( 4 ) Abhinava was not only a philosopher, he was also an authority on Tantric ritual. The rites he practised, probably even before he became interested in literary theory, must have provided him with his first contact with the kind of play-activity that he later found once again in the theatre. It seems to us no accident that Abhinava was more fond of the theatre than of any other form of literature. By establishing the intimate connection between theatre and ritual ( and thus by implication mythology as well ), Abhinava foreshadowed certain modern theories, even though he was not followed in this brilliant insight by any of his successors. The ramifications are many, and Abhinava often draws them in scattered places throughout his works. He is fond of the comparison of life with a drama and the resultant sense of unreality this gives. Dreams come up again and again in his works. In his Tantrāloka he speaks of man, the creator, as destroying the produce of his life, a dream. The external buildings, he says, are razed in the fire of his sudden awareness that he is Śiva, the great destroyer. Then follows the purely joy-filled dance of Śiva, the Tāṇḍava, that has no purpose other than to give expression to a sense of freedom and joy.2 On the other hand, one feels that Abhinava was not unaware of the enrichment that results from imaginative experiences. Even one's own childhood becomes an aesthetic object, something viewed with the dual detachment and involvement ( hrdayānupravesa, or hrdayasamvāda ) of the perfect spectator, the sahrdaya who is both moved and yet distanced from the object he contemplates. Has Abhinava in fact had an insight into the unconscious, and the value of imaginative understanding which Freud stressed as being essential to any true freedom from our own childhood traumas ?

( 5 ) Abhinava is able to restore to poets an important place in the intellectual hierachy by showing their underlying philosophical seriousness. One thinks he would have approved of Andre Malraux's comment : " Les grands artistes ne sont pas les transcripteurs du monde ; ils en sont les rivaux. " An advantage which might well pass unnoticed that Abhinava's system provides is the following : in Indian society, curiously enough, it was always the religious mystic who has been considered the maverick, who has been allowed the eccentric freedom that in the West we tend to associate with

1. S. Freud, Leonardo, pp. 162-163, Pelican Books, 1963.

2. See the very lovely verse from Vol. II of the Tantrāloka, p. 257, verse 286 :

अनन्त चित्रमद्रभैरवसारस्वप्रसादनः ।

धूपकः शिव एवाह इत्युड़ासि हुता शनः ॥

For the dance image, see A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 21.

poets. Edmund Wilson, in "The Wound and the Bow", documents the neurotic elements in many of the great poets of the nineteenth and twentieth century. The striking phrase of the title refers to the myth of Philoctetes, the Greek warrior who possessed a magic bow, but was forced to live in isolation on an island because of the insufferable odour that emanated from a suppurating wound on his ankle. Eventually his countrymen had to call him back, in spite of their disgust, because of his unerring weapon. Art extracts its own price. Of course in India the mystic was never both loathed and venerated, he was simply venerated. Nonetheless already in the Upaniṣads we hear of the mystic as being similar to a child in his unrestrained behaviour.1 The adjective sometimes applied to him is unmatta, mad. One thinks of the extraordinary passage in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad dealing with Raikva of the cart, who dares to call King Janaka but a śūdra, and who finally agrees to teach him for the pretty face of his daughter. He received his name from where he lived, underneath a cart. This has not generally been true of the artist. The poet has always been far more integrated into Indian society. India has not developed the sense of the loneliness of the writer, shunned by, and shunning, society. But Abhinava, by restoring to him his more important functions, also enables him to preserve his independence. It is now not only the mystic who opens himself to numinous experience. Is it significant that the only description of the poet as a man out of his ordinary senses that immediately comes to mind is from Uttungo-daya, Abhinava's commentator, in his fourteenth century commentary on the Locana, the Kaumudī ? There he says of the poet : "... the poet wants to write poetry in order to instruct those of delicateminds, people who are for the most part similar to princes, in the means of attaining the four goals of life through aesthetic enjoyment. First, by the stream that is rasa, to be aesthetically enjoyed by the presentation of the vibhāvas etc. that are at the root of the poem he wishes to make, his own heart which is like a great and immeasurably deep lake (of rasa) becomes filled, then he becomes as if possessed by a planet, as if mad, and finally he pours out his poetry, and turns the listener, the sensitive reader (sahrdaya), into the same (sort of madman as he has become)."2 But of course the artist is never in Sanskrit

1. Cf. Abhinava's Paramārthasāra, verse 71 : जड इव विच्छेदवादमति:. (8ilburn, le Parmārthasāra, P. I. C. 1., Paris, 1957, p. 60 ).
2. Kuppuswami Sastri's edition of the Dhvanyāloka, p. 170 : इदमत्र वरतत्वम्—कवयःि शुकुमारमन्सरां राजकुमारप्रायाणाम् आस्वादपुरस्कारण चतुर्वर्गोपाय- व्युत्पत्तिसंपिपादविषया काव्यं चिकीर्षुः, चिकीर्ष्यमाणकाव्यनिबन्धनविभावादियोजनास्वादनोत्तररसानुसृत- प्रवाहेण प्रथमं स्वयमेव परिपूरितगम्भीरतरनिजहृदयमहाहदो भूत्वा प्रहृष्ट इवोनमत्त इव काव्यं बहिः प्रसार्यं श्रोत्रामपि सहृदयानामात्मसमयानयोगक्षेमतां संपादयति ।

society an alien figure. When we read of Abhinava ( see below ) sitting in a grape garden, a single golden earring hanging from his ear, surrounded by magicians and 'women Yogins, playing on a lute with d̥utis by his side with cups of wine and lemons in their hands, this in no way makes him eccentric, at least to the Indian public. Even in the legend of his death, how he entered a cave with twelve hundred disciples and never returned, there is nothing "asocial" to shock the Indian.

( 6 ) One corollary of his theories, though again it does not seem to have been realised either by Abhinava or by his successors, is that rasa becomes available not only to poetry and the theatre but to all literature. Generally rasa is only possible in kāvya or nāṭya. But the Mahābhārata is after all already an exception since it cannot be considered kāvya in the strict definition of the term. Yet both Ānanda and Abhinava give it the careful literary attention it deserves. The claim was made by Kalhaṇa at the beginning of his Rāja-taraṅginī that his work on history contains śāntarasa :

" Considering how the life of creatures cracks after a few moments, one should understand ( why ) śāntarasa has been given the most important position in this work ( atra )." 1

It is all the more surprising then that Abhinava never thought of extending his theory to purely religious texts. After all the most obvious and in a sense the best examples of śāntarasa are to be found in religious and philosophical literature, and not in belles lettres. The Upaniṣads, for example, would surely have provided Abhinava with his finest examples. Today we can consider the Upaniṣads to be among the finest examples of world " literature ", though no text on literary criticism in ancient India ever thought of quoting them or deriving support from any of their beautiful lines. As the rhetoricians define literature, the Upaniṣads do not qualify. Abhinava's brilliant insight that what makes for literature is the quality of the sentiment and not adherence to formal rules, provided the opportunity for a re-definition that was curiously never taken advantage of. Even Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, who gives a more liberal definition of literature,2 does not depart from standard examples in his illustrations ( indeed he even regresses in including only his own works, thus furthering the greatest single misfortune of Sanskrit literary criticism, the divorce between what actually was written and what was supposed to be written ). No better example of śāntarasa could be found

1. Rājataranginī, I. 23, 4 ( Viśva Bandhu's edition, Hoshiapur, 1953 ) : क्षणमङ्कुरित जीवन्तौ स्कुरिते परिच्छिन्नत्ते । मूर्ध्नाभिषिक्तः शान्तस्य रसस्यात्र विचार्यताम् ॥

2. Rasagaṅgādhara, KM edition of 1939, p. 4 : रमणीयार्थप्रतिपादकः शब्दः काव्यम् ।

than the Pāli Mahāparinibbānasutta, the sober, moving account of the death

of the Buddha. Or even such prosaic but haunting lines as that of King

Janaka when his kingdom went up in flames : mithilāyām pradiptāyām na me

kimcana dahyate—“Nothing of mine is burned when Mithila is in flames.” 1

(7) Abhinava insists on the epiphany that poetry provides, on the

sense of camatkāra, of having our breath taken away. He compares it at one

place2 to a wondrous flower that suddenly bursts into bloom. He is parti-

cularly fond of a fine image in the Nātyaśāstra :

"The externalisation (bhāva) of that emotion (artha) which makes

an appeal to the heart is the source (udbhava) of rasa. The body it

suffused by it, as dry wood is suffused by fire." 3

(8) An advantage that Abhinava's philosophy provides for Sanskrit

literary criticism is that there need be no disagreements over significant lite-

rary experiences. Since the emotional experience in great literature is for

Abhinava and later critics who follow him (Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha, Jagan-

nātha, etc.) always the same, namely ātmānanda, "the bliss of the self", an

insoluble problem for Western literature has been solved. The problem is

that there is no guarantee that two spectators feel the same thing when view-

ing a work of art. To say "it depresses me" or "it thrills me", or "it

excites me", is often a comment on the viewer's own state of mind and not

on the work of art itself. Usually it is discovered in later conversation that

the work of art has acted as a catalyst, releasing some emotion long consi-

ously forgotten, dislodging it from its undercover. One might object that

Abhinava too is no longer speaking about the work of art on its own, but

about certain universal states of mind. This is true, but at least, if all literary

critics accept that this is the true function of literature, namely to induce

such a state of euphoria, then they have a common ground on which to argue

whether a particular piece of literature has been successful or not. And in

fact it is astonishing to note how great a concensus of opinion there is

in Sanskrit literature over what is good. The concensus lasts over the

centuries. There are few poets who have been considered great in the tradi-

tion long ago, but now forgotten. If one looks through the names of poets

that Abhinava constantly quotes, one is struck by how many of these are

poets we still read and admire today, 1000 years later. We are all aware how

1. Mahābhārata, XII. 178. Quoted by Śaṅkara in his bbāṣya on Bṛhadā-

raṇyaka Up. I. 4. 15.

2. Locana, p, 160, (B. P. edition ).

3. NŚ. VII, 7, Vol. I, p. 348. Quoted also in the Locanu, p. 39, It is errone-

ously ascribed by the editors of the ed. with Bālapriyā to Bhaṭṭanāyaka.

योऽर्थः हृदयसंवादी तस्य भावो रसोद्भवः ।

शरीरं ब्याप्यते तेन शुष्कं काष्ठमिवाग्निना ॥

in the West even thirty years ago “ great poets ” are now not much more than footnotes in college textbooks. Goethe is reported to have said that

he found “ the Inferno abominable, the Purgatorio dubious and the Paradiso tiresome. ” One thinks too of Donne, eclipsed for three centuries and only restored to honour through the critical efforts of T. S. Eliot. Such ups and

downs in Sanskrit literature are more or less impossible. ( There are of course other reasons for this as well. )

These are just some of the more general results of Abhinava's theories. The details will be found in the body of this work. We think it is clear that

the way for later writers on poetics to expand on religious and philosophical themes was provided by Abhinava. ( Surely, for example, the Bengal

Vaiṣṇavas, especially the two Gosvāmins, were inspired to their elaborate theories by the climate Abhinava created ). Abhinava's final theory bears a

remarkable similarity to what Aldous Huxley developed in his work “ The Doors of Perception ”. H. Osborne writes of this work as follows : “ Finally

it is sometimes asserted that works of art symbolize a metaphysical reality of which by our appreciative commerce with the work of art we become directly

and immediately aware. This is a view which many modern artists have themselves alleged. In his essay “ The Doors of Perception ” Aldoux Huxley

describes how under the influence of mescalin his ordinary perceptions were accompanied by an intense and inescapable feeling of revelation. He develops

the theory that artistic vision in general has this revelatory character and that the works of art which artists create communicate to us imperfectly the

revelation of ultimate reality which they have enjoyed. ‘ What the rest of us see only under the influence of mescalin ’, he says, ‘ the artist is congenitally

equipped to see all the time...It is a knowledge of the intrinsic significance of every existent. For the artist as for the mescalin taker, draperies are living

hieroglyphs that stand in some peculiarly expressive way for the unfathomable mystery of pure being ’. The statement that in the act of appreciating

a beautiful work of art we have immediate intuitive awareness of ultimate or pure being, takes us outside the confines of aesthetics proper. As ‘ emotive ’

descriptions of the artistic experience such affirmations are significant and must be treated with respect ”.1

We have seen some of the advantages that Abhinava's philosophy provided for literary criticism, all of which derive from his brilliant insights

into what lay behind imaginative experiences in literature. Let us now look far more briefly ( for they are less important ) at some of the disadvantages.

The chief danger, it seems to us, is the reductionism in his theories; how all

1. “ Aesthetics as a Branch of Philosophy ” by Ruth Saw and Harold Osborne, p. 31, in “ Aesthetics in the Modern World ”, London, 1968.

literature becomes reduced to a single experience. A similar criticism has been made of Coleridge : “ Coleridge's demand for unification and harmony entailed the conversion of the poetic into something other than the poetic, its subordination to philosophy and ultimately to religion ”.1 Perhaps the reason, in Abhinava's case, was that he was not himself a very good poet. He did of course write a good deal of poetry, but there are at the most three or four memorable verses in all of his work,2 and his poetry goes virtually unquoted in later critical literature. Perhaps he was prevented by his own intelligence from being direct and concrete.3 Had he been more of a poet, and more interested in the particular, would he have preached quite so reductionist a theory ? There are of course advantages to this ( a unified theory for one ) but it means forgetting what I. A. Richards has taught a generation of literary critics, namely that “ a poem does not stand for something else ”.4 Abhinava's strength lay in ideas, in conceptual thinking. He was not himself an artist, and one cannot help being reminded of Eliot's famous remark à propos Henry James, that he had a mind so fine that no idea could violate it !

There is a sense in which Abhinava confuses art and life when he insists on the primacy of śāntarasa. It is of course true that dramatists can be concerned with anything they like, including the experience underlying śāntarasa; but the point is not one of theoretic possibilities, but of what śāntarasa actually succeeds in the theatre. Abhinava's weakest point was that he did not really have any example of a great play in which śāntarasa was dominant, to lend credence to his theories. The Nāgānanda is the sole exception, and this could hardly be considered great literature. By seeing beyond literature to the universal experience that lies behind it, Abhinava is undermining the autonomy, the uniqueness of literary experience. He is in danger of turning literature into an icon, a representational object, an aid to devotion rather than an experience unique and precious for its own sake. “ Art ”, in C. S. Lewis' fine phrase, “ must be received, not used ”. Religion is not, after all, the same thing as literature, unless we dilute the definition of these two terms

1. Roy Park, “ Poetic Imagination in Coleridge and Kant ”, British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 8, no. 4, Oct. 1968, p. 343.

2. The one really fine verse in the Locana is quoted under III, 30, p. 397 : त्वां चन्द्रचूड़ सहसा स्पृशन्ती प्रणष्टं गाढवियोगतस । सा चन्द्रकान्ताश्रुपतितप्रिकर संवित्‌द्रिलीयापि विलीयते मे ॥

in which he puns very effectively in comparing sexual love and śānta.

3. Cf. the verse he wrote on p. 127 of the Locana and the absurdly long and tortuous commentary he writes on it.

4. Quoted by A. Alvarez, “ The Phoenix and the Turtle ” p. 5, in the work ed. by J. Wain already cited.

into harmlessness. The descriptions that Huxley gives of what he felt under mescalin are interesting pyschologically, but to claim that they are essentially literary is to forget the fact that great literature can never he unconscious and ephemeral. The efforts and pains of creation are conceptual, concrete and external. Dreaming is not, after all, making. That literature could point nowhere except to itself, must have somehow proved disquieting to Abhinava. He was too religious to allow that literature might be somehow “ useless ”, a goal in itself. ( Though rasa does involve surrender to the work of art, and Abhinava insists that one’s own self must be got out of the way before the work of art can truly be appreciated for its own sake.) It is significant in this respect that Abhinava shies away from the terms prīti “ pleasure ” and vinoda “ entertainment ”, to express the purpose of poetry. He prefers the religious word ānanda “ bliss ”. By insisting on putting such significance into poetry Abhinava is in danger of making much of Sanskrit literature top-heavy ; one is wary that it simply cannot bear the philosophical burden he places on it. One’s mind is irreverently invaded by an image of Kālidāsa sitting politely bored, listening to Abhinavagupta explain to him the deeper significance of his plays, his ears really attuned to the joyous shouts of the spring festival taking place outside.

ŚĀNTARASA

PART I

Abhinava's Philosophy of Aesthetics

INFLUENCES

Abhinava seems to us deeply concerned with four or five basic ideas : the relation of poetry to philosophy; the nature of suggestion; religious ecstasy ( and its bearing on literature ); drama and poetry, and ritual and drama. The question that must have helped him to bring all these elements together is one still asked today : how is it that we “ enjoy ” literary situations that are sad or tragic ? He sought the answer to this basic question in extraordinary states of mind, in ecstatic experiences. Nobody denied these in poetry or in religious literature generally,1 but in drama their existence was still debated. Śantarasa was not universally acknowledged as a legitimate element in drama. For Abhinava the question was not merely academic, for if he were not able to provide convincing arguments in its favour, he could hardly justify his interest in drama. Moreover he had no examples of a play in which śāntarasa played an important part, with the single exception of the Nāgānanda, largely a Buddhist drama, and of questionable literary excellence. By synthesising all of his pre-occupations into one system, a theoretical justification for śāntarasa could be made, with the ultimate result that the type of otherworldly or transcendental experience which the spectator undergoes during ŚR ( śāntarasa ) would be basic to all aesthetic experience. Such a system was not to be found ready-made. But Abhinava was able to take what he needed from different sources : from the Dhvanyāloka he took his theory of suggestion; from Bharata he took the starting point of his ideas on rasa and drama; from speculation on ŚR and from Kashmir Śaivism and Tantric works he took ideas on the relation of religious ecstasy to literature. The final end product was his theory of rasa in which he combines philosophy and poetics. There are, therefore, four major influences in his theories : poetics, philosophy, speculation on ŚR and ritual.

Before examining these influences more closely, we must note that while open to all of them, Abhinava had an extremely independent mind.

1. Since a great and undisputed literature already existed along these lines. One has only to think of Bhartrhari's Vairāgyaśataka.

2

शान्तरস

Not only is he not afraid to disagree with his own teachers,1 he is even able to disregard the great texts of the tradition : “ We don’t care in the least if it is described in this way in the Rāmāyaṇa itself. In fact, it might be described in the Veda itself, and we won’t be stifled by this fact ”.2 There are very few ideas which did not “ suffer a sea-change ” when immersed into the depths of Abhinava’s mind. On the other hand, he belonged to a tradition in which a careful grounding in the past was de rigueur, and it is not surprising to find that he has been greatly influenced by a large number of writers. To consider this plagiarism3 is as absurd as demanding that Coleridge ( like Lowell in “ The Road to Xanadu ” ) footnote all his allusions and quotations ! Abhinava has a very fine verse in the Abhinavabhāratī, right after giving elaborate expositions of his predecessors’ views on rasa, in which he justifies his urge to proceed further :

“ When intellectual curiosity ( dhīḥ ) climbs higher and higher and sees the truth ( arthataṭṭva ) without getting tired, this is because of the ladders of thought built by earlier writers ” .4

POETIC INFLUENCES

Abhinava was of course familiar with all the works on poetics extant at the time of his writing ( many of which are no longer available ). He is particularly fond of Bhāmaha, whom he often quotes in the Locāna.

1. On p. 314, A. Bh. Vol. I, Abhinava seems to disagree with Bharata concerning the definition of hāsya. Note Kane, H. S. P., p. 55. “ On p. 436 ( of the B, O, R, I. copy ) Abhinava appears to differ from him ( Utpaladeva, the author of the Pratyabhijñā, Abhinava’s teacher’s teacher ) उत्पलदेवादिस्वस्मत्परमगुरवो व्याचक्षते..... वयं तु मन्त्रः ।

2. A. Bh. Vol. III, p. 74 :

रामायणेऽपि तथा वर्णितमिति चेत्किमतः । वेदेऽपि तथा वर्ण्यतां न वयमती विरीयामः ।

3. Ānanda has some very perceptive remarks on plagiarism in the fourth Uddyota of the D. Al., stanzas 11–17. It seems to us possible that he was influenced by Gauḍavaḥo. We think in particular of verse 66 of Vākpatirāja’s, which is identical in sentiment with the Prākrit verse that Ānanda quotes on p. 527. Verses 85 and 86 of the Gauḍavaḥo also prefigure several of the ideas in the fourth Uddyota. There seems no reason for questioning the date of 700 A. D. ( Pandit, p. C of his ed. of the Gauḍavaḥo ) and it is therefore perfectly possible that Ānanda knew the work. Rājaśekhara, who knew Ānanda by name ( see p. 16 of the Kāvyamīmāṃsā ) systematised Ānanda’s views on plagiary. See K.M, p. 62.

4. A. Bh., I, p. 278. Also Gnoli, op. cit. p. 12 :

ऊर्ध्वंर्ध्वमारुरुक्षोः यदर्थतत्त्वे धीः पश्यति श्रान्तिमवेदन्यती ।

फलं तदाऽऽहुः परिकल्पितानां विचारसीपानपरम्पराणाम् ॥

The verse is quoted by Uṭṭuṅgodaya in his Kauṭmudī, p. 102 with some variation.

Udbhata,1 Vāmana and Daṇḍin all of whom Abhinava quotes, do not seem to have provided him with any of his major doctrines. Bharata’s Nāṭyaśāstra was of course a major influence or rather stimulus, to his ideas on rasa.2 Much of his technical terminology derives directly from the NS, as well as several more advanced ideas. All this is well-known so there is no need for us to provide illustrations. There is one “influence”, however, which seems to us to have been overlooked.3 This is Aśvaghoṣa's Saundarananda. There is of course no way of knowing whether Abhinava knew this work or not.3 However, in the light of his pre-occupation with ŚR, and of his good knowledge of Buddhism generally, there seems no real reason why he should not. Moreover, there seems some evidence, in the form of certain striking similarities, which suggests that he did know this remarkable poet. The dominant rasa in both the Buddhacarita and the Saundarananda (and most probably the dramas4 as well, to judge from the meagre fragments pieced together by Lüders ) is

1. E. g. Udbhata's lost Bhāmahavivaraṇa (see p. 68, K. Sastri's ed. ). Recently Professor Gnoli has published “Udbhata's commentary on the Kāvyālankāra of Bhāmaha”, ISMEO, Rome, 1962, editing the fragments found at Kifirkoth which he identifies with the commentary on the Kāryālankāra. If Gnoli is correct, fragment number 10 (p. 7-8) which deals with the Locana passage, should have been (without the pratīka) between abhidhānārthāh and śabdānām abhidhānam. But there is no room in the MS for such a reading. Therefore, if we are to retain Gnoli's theory, this will have to have occurred in the second half of line 2 of fragment 10. The only problem is that there does not seem, if we have correctly understood the accompanying photographs of the manuscripts, any room for this passage in the fragment in question. There seems to us no good reason why the pratīka, abhidhānārthāh should be repeated, nor can we seen any justification for the second member of a compound being explained before the first member. It is true that the author of these fragments accepted abhidhārttī and guṇavṛtti as śabdaryāparas, but why must we assume that the person holding such a view is Udbhata?

2. E. g. NS, vol. I, p. 272, G. O. S. ed. : न हि रसयते कश्चिद्रवतः; the definition of rasa: p. 288, रस इति कः पदार्थः ? उच्यते - आस्वाद्यत इति; VI. 38 (p. 294); p. 299 : स्थायिभावांश्र रसत्वमुपनय्यामः.

3. There is no quotation from Aśvaghoṣa in any of Abhinava's works. The quotations from Aśvaghoṣa in the anthologies (see Kāvyadarsaṅgamaśāstra, p. 29 ) are not found in any of his extant works. Rājaśekhara ( KM, p. 18 ) quotes a verse from the Buddhacarita ( VIII. 25 ), but this is not ascribed by him to anybody. Similarly the Bhojaprabandha takes over BC IV. 59. Neither of these passages is sufficient evidence to say that the author actually knew Aśvaghoṣa's work, since the quotations could have come down though the work be lost. Note that BC VIII. 25 is similar to Raghuvaṃśa III. 15, but the whole problem of Kālidāsa's borrowing from A. is not settled. On the whole, we are inclined to think that Kālidāsa did know Aśvaghoṣa, and was influenced by him. Johnston (op. cit, Int. to the English Tr. of the BC, p. LXXII ) thinks that Bhāmaha, in criticising ajihladat ( used in S. II. 30 ) may be referring to Aśvaghoṣa.

4. The fragments from the three dramas were edited by H. Lüders, " Bruch-stücke Buddhistischer Dramen ", Berlin, 1911, and Philologica Indica Göttingen, 1940.

śānta. The words śama and śānti occur constantly in both works.1 Further, at the end of Saundarananda2 there are two remarkable verses which might well have influenced Abhinava :

" And so this work, whose essence is liberation, ( was written ) so that people might obtain peace of mind, and not for amusement ( rataye ). I have written it in the form of a poem in order to engage the minds of readers interested ( primarily ) in other things ( and not in liberation ). The fact that I have dealt with things other than liberation is because of ( the book's ) poetic nature, and in order that it might appeal to the hearts of readers, just as a bitter medicine is mixed with honey in order to induce the patient to drink it ".3

Abhinava has used this very simile of medicine and honey in the Locana. Moreover, he insists, time and again, that poetry is more gentle than śastra ( which can be loosely translated as " philosophy " ), but that it leads to similar results. The last verse of the work is no less important :

" Since men are, for the most part, engrossed in sensual pleasures, and totally disinterested in mokṣa, I have said in this work, under the ( sweet ) disguise of poetry, that mokṣa is the highest ( truth ). Knowing this, ( the reader ) should with attentive mind ( avahitam ) accept from the poem that which leads to peace, and not ( only ) that which is pleasant. For gold is surely separated from mineral dust-particles " .4

If we suppose that Abhinava did know this poem, how do we explain the fact that he did not use Aśvaghoṣa's works, seeing that he could certainly

1. E. g. Saundarananda VII. 22; VIII. 56; XI, 5; XI, 33–34; XV, 49, a lovely verse that could be engraved on the tombstone of the twentieth century.

2. Note that in Saundarananda, XIV. 50, Aśvaghoṣa uses the expression śamasukharasā ! But there is no evidence, aside from the dubious expression rasāntara at BC VII. 51, that he knew either the NS or the rasa theory.

3. Saundarananda, XVIII, 63 :

इत्येपां व्यपाश्रयाल्ये न रतये मोक्षार्थमर्थाग्रभी कृतिः:

श्रोतॄणां ग्रहणार्थंमन्यमनसां काव्योपचारात् कृताः ।

यन्त्रौषधकृतम्नयदद्र्त हि मया तत्त्वव्यधर्माकृतं

पातुं तिक्तमिवौषधं मदयुर्तं ह्रयं कर्तु स्वादिति ॥

4. S. XVIII. 64 :

प्रायेणालोक्य लोकं विपर्ययतिपरं मोक्षास्त्रयित्वं सतां

काव्यव्याजेन तत्त्वं कथितमिह मया मोक्ष: परमिति ।

तद्बुद्ध्वा शामिक यत्नदवहितमितो ग्राह्यं न ललितं

पांशुभ्यो धातुजेप्यो नियतमुपकरं चामीकरमिति ॥

According to Johnston ( p. 164, notes ) the word upakaram is hapax since it occurs nowhere else in the literature. Perhaps like upakāra it means something like " useful ", " valuable ".

have argued with perfect justification that they are all good examples of SR? We think there is a plausible reason : although there are passages of real śānta poetry,1 nonetheless on the whole Aśvaghoṣa's position is directly opposed to the enjoyment of poetry for its own sake ( a position Abhinava defends, see below ). The whole of his work ( even the Saundarananda ) can be seen as a tract against just such frivolous activities as reading poetry and watching plays ! Śama is seen therein to be opposed to literary enjoyment, which after all implies a certain delight in the senses. Both Abhinava and Ānanda ( see below ), extol the great variety of this world. Two other, less probable reasons, suggest themselves : (1) Aśvaghoṣa was after all a Buddhist, and to quote him with approbation might have seemed odd. (2) In the verses quoted below there is real poetry. But there is a great difference between being told something, and actually experiencing it ( a problem which Abhinava and Ānanda are greatly concerned with, under the name of svasaṃveditatva ). Preachers inform us; only poets invite us to experience. Aśvaghoṣa is more often than not a preacher. Thus, the same ideas from the fine verses quoted in the notes are repeated time and again, especially in chapter XIV. But they make no impression, for they are merely bald statements — ideas rather than poems. As George Boas puts it, bluntly, in a lecture on philosophy and poetry : “ .... the ideas in poetry are usually stale and often false, and no one older than sixteen would find it worth his

1. Saundarananda, XV, 32 : अतीतेर्ड्वानि सङ्कृतः सजनो हि जनस्तव । अग्रामेऽपि चाग्यनिजनः सजनस्तेऽभविष्यति ॥ “ Further back on this long path those closest to you were strangers, and as you walk further into the future those who are now strangers will become close to you.”

S. XV, 33 : विदगानां यथा सायं तत्र तत्र समागमः । जातो जातस् तथा इलेषो जनस्य सजनस्य च ॥ “ Just as in the evening birds gather together in small groups, so also in various lives do people come together with their relatives. ”

S. XV, 34 : प्रतिश्रय्य बहुविधं संश्रयन्ति यथाश्रयगा: । प्रतियान्ति पुनर्लक्ष्यस्तद्रुज्झातिसमागमः ॥ “ Just as travellers meet for a few moments at various resting places along the road and then separate, so also does one come together with those one loves ( only for a moment. ) ”

In the next verse such meetings are compared to a fistful of sand, held together only by the hand : vālukāmuṣṭivaj jagat. Cf. MBh. XII. 28, 36 : यथा काष्ठं च काष्ठं च समेयातां महोदधौ । समेत्य च व्यपेयातां तद्रूूतसमागमः ॥

6

सान्तरसा

while to read poetry merely for what it says ".1 On the other hand, the real

poetry of the Saundarananda becomes “ part of the furniture of the mind",

and nobody who has read the fine verses from XV, 32–30 is likely to forget

them. But such verses are rare, and Abhinava may well have classified the

whole poem as “ didactic ”, thus dismissing it from serious literary considera-

tion, for the philosophical passages are of interest to the believer and to the

scholar, but not to the sahrdaya. But this is mere speculation.

With Ānanavardhana, however, we pass into the realm of certainty.

The influence of the Dhvanyāloka on Abhinava cannot be exaggerated. We

can safely say that the two greatest works in Indian literary criticism are the

Dhvanyāloka and Abhinava's commentary on it, the Locana. There are few

ideas in the D. Al. which Abhinava has not assimilated, often by dealing with

them in a more subtle manner. Those ideas however for which he owes less

to Ānanda, will be dealt with in the section on Abhinava himself. Here we

should like to call attention to certain key terms, which stand for important

concepts, from the D. Al. which might escape the notice of a hurried reader.

These are the terms which seem to us most important to Abhinava's theo-

ries. Before doing so, we should remember what dhvani is not. There is

nothing imprecise, or vague about dhvani, as many Western writers have

erroneously supposed, misled by the connotations of the word “ suggestive ”

in English. The concept is not a subjective one. There is nothing ineffable

about dhvani. It is important to realise this. Ānanda in fact spends a good

deal of energy in refuting the anākhyeyavādins, those who claim that, if

suggestion exists at all, it is beyond the realm of speech.2 Both vastudhvani

and alankāradhvani can be paraphrased, without losing their status as

poetry ( though of course they are no longer cases of dhvani by definition ),

but rasadhvani cannot. In fact, if we were to state what is the single most

important characteristic feature of rasadhvani, we would say that it is the

inability to lend itself to paraphrase. The reason this is so has to do with

1. G. Boas, “ Philosophy and Poetry ”, Wheaton College, Mass. 1932, p. 9.

2. The position of the anākhyeyavādins is given at the beginning of the D.

Al. p. 33 ( B. ed. ) : केचित्पुनर्लक्षणकरणशालिनोऽप्युद्यताः ध्वनेस्तत्त्वं निरुपंचरं सहदयहृदयसंवेद्यमेव

समास्यादवच्नतः। “ Some whose minds shied away from attempting a definition declared

that the truth of dhvani lay outside the realm of speech, and could only be internally

realised by a sensitive reader.” Ānanda replies to this at the very end of the first

Uddyota ( after K. 22 ). Again at the end of the third Uddyota, Ānanda comes back

to their views, informing us that the Buddhists claim that all things are beyond defi-

nition ( p. 519, B. ed. ). Note that the kārikās themselves never reply to the anākhyéya-

vāda. In the third Uddyota ( p. 403, and also p. 517–518 ) Ānanda, perhaps borrowing

from Vākyapadiya I. 35, says that only a jeweller can recognise the true value of gems

and whether they are genuine or synthetic ).

Ānanda's theory of the different functions that words fulfill in literature. We will deal with this only briefly, for while it is essential to Abhinava, it is an area about which the reader can find reliable information with no great difficulty.1 In essence it is this : Ānanda inherited from older works, two functions of words, abhidhā and lakṣaṇī. Abhidhā is denotation, the literal meaning of any utterance. Lakṣaṇā is more complex ( it has often been misunderstood ), but can be translated as secondary usage, including metaphorical usage. The time-honoured example, unfortunately not so simple to understand as has been thought, is gamgāyām ghoṣah, literally : " In the Ganges is a village of cow-herders. " If this sounds absurd in English so does it in Sanskrit, for the locative is not normally used in the sense of proximity. By " in the Ganges " is therefore meant " near the Ganges ", i. e. " on the banks of the Ganges ". This meaning ( known as the lakṣyārtha, as opposed to the abhidheyārtha ) is reached through lakṣaṇā. Until the time of Ānanda, these were the only two functions ( apart from tātparya with which we are not concerned here ) which writers, either on literature or philosophy, recognised. Ānandavardhana revolutionised the field of poetics by adding a third function, hitherto completely unsuspected : vyañjanā or " suggestiveness ". This śabdavyāpāra or " linguistic function " is active in all the three types of suggestion mentioned above. Both Ānanda and Abhinava spend a great deal of time justifying this function and defending it against detractors.2 They did this so successfull that, after one or two major critics ( Kuntaka and Mahimabhaṭṭa ), this function was universally acknowledged, and one finds no major work written after the eleventh century in which the author does not use it as an important element in his own theories on literature. To our mind, Abhinava's major contribution to this doctrine was to show that rasa is not niyata, i. e. " necessary ", thus differing from arthāpatti ( presumption, as used by Mukulabhaṭṭa in the Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā ) and from anumāna, which are logical processes. Direct statements " produce " results. Thus the phrase putras te jātaḥ.3 " A son has been born to you ", " produces " delight. This is not the case with aesthetic delight, which, according to Ānanda and Abhinava, can only be " suggested ". But there are a great many other ideas in the D. Al. not nearly so well-known, which must have exercised a certain fascination for Abhinava, as they still do for us, one thousand years later. The most important of these ( and certainly the least recognised by modern writers ) goes by the name of svaśabdaniveditatva. It is closely relat-

1. See the excellent chapter on metaphor in K. Kujunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, Madras, 1963.

2. Abhinava has a long defence in the Locana, p. 55–70 ( B. ed. ). The very long commentary ( p. 401–457 ) in the D. Al., third Uddyota, also is concerned with this.

3. Locana, p. 79, 80, 83.

IV

ed to the idea of vyanjanā. Can an emotion be conjured up by simply naming it ?1 When an author attempts to charge a situation with sensuality, for example, is it sufficient for a man to say to a woman : “ I want to sleep with you ”? If a character says to someone : “ I love you ”,2 this may or may not be the case, but as readers of literature we demand proof, and the only proof relevant to literature is the actual suggestion of the emotion in the work. Surely the great fault of Thomas Mann's

" Magic Mountain " is that while the first half of the book successfully creates the atmosphere of a sanatorium removed from the preoccupations of ordinary existence, the second half, in which Mann deals with philosophical and political ideas, fails to come to life. It is too intellectualised, too explicit- Mann seems to be writing essays, not literature. Settembrini's long discourses only arouse impatience to get on to the real fictional elements of the work. Ānanda saw this clearly (is he perhaps the first recorded literary critic to do so ?) : “ In a poem in which there is no description of the vibhāvas, etc., but a simple use of the word “ love ”, etc., how can there possibly be the slightest imaginative experience (on the part of the reader)? ”3 Abhinava was deeply impressed by this doctrine, as he tells us in the A. Bh. : “ It has been shown by the author of the dhvani (-āloka) and others, that rasas, etc., are never conveyed by the mere naming of the emotion ( to be suggest- ed ). This can be ascertained from my exposition called the Locana on the Sahṛdayāloka.”4 It is this doctrine that has led Ānanda to emphasise the extreme importance of the suggested element ( vyaṅgyārtha ) in literature, over and above the explicit element ( vācyārtha ). The whole first Uddyota of the D. Al. is devoted to establishing the existence of this suggested element, and to underlining its supreme place in poetry. At times, in fact, this seems excessive, for it often leads Ānanda to give critical acclaim to a poem that

we should judge less satisfactory5 and to deride a poem that we should

1. Note what Abhinava says in the Locana, p. 51, that rasa is “ never even in a dream svabhdavadavacya,” स्वप्रेऽपि न स्वभावद्वाच्य ।

2. There is a whole class of literature devoted to saying this same thing, on the part of women, by suggestion. They are always, as in D. Al. p. 71, cases of vastudhvani.

3. D. Al. p. 83 : न हि केवल्यकारादिशब्दमात्रात् विभावादिप्रतिपादनरहिता काव्ये मनागपि रसवत्त्वप्रतीति: ।

4. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 343 : स्वशब्दानाम्‌प्येभिर् वहि रसादीनां ध्वनिकारादिभिर् मीमांसितम् । तच्च मदीयादेव तद्विर्वणात् सहृदयालोकलोचनादवधारणीयम् । “ The only names that Abhinava uses for the D. Al. are kāvyāloka ( “ light on poetry ” ) and sahṛdayāloka ( “ light for the sensitive reader ” ). The name dhvanyāloka is thus actually a misnomer.

5. We think of the verse : सुवर्णपुष्पां पृथिवीं चिन्वन्ति पुरुषाख्याः । etc. given on p. 137 of the D. Al. as an example of arivakṣitavācyadhvani, and which is surely

( Continued on next page

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

9

prefer aesthetically, on the simple grounds that one contains suggestion and

the other lacks it. But as Ānanda was the very first critic in literary history

to have perceived the existence of the suggested sense, we must not complain

if he is carried away by enthusiasm at his discovery.1 There is however one

place in the D. Al. where Ānanda makes a very significant concession which

has been for the most part overlooked by the later tradition: in the first

Uddyota of the D. Al. he says that an emotional evocation can be " directly

and explicitly stated " if this statement is merely a recapitulation ( anuvāda )

of what has already been suggested.2

A doctrine which Ānanda never developed into a specific theory, but

which is nonetheless discernible from various passages and their underlying

assumptions in the D. Al. is the autonomy of literary experience. A poem

creates its own world, and must be consistent only with itself. It owes only

token allegiance to the outside world. The values of life are not necessarily

the values of literature. Ānanda says, very explicitly, in an important passage

in the third Uddyota, that questions of truth and falsity simply do not apply

to imaginative literature :

" In the field of poetry where we perceive suggested elements, truth

( satya ) and falsity ( asatya ) are pointless. To examine ( literature ) through

( the usual ) valid means of cognition would simply lead to ridicule. "3

The criteria by which we judge literature, he explains, are not those

which we apply in our everyday life. This theory culminates in the famous

doctrine of aucitya, literally " propriety ". He develops this concept at very

great length in the third Udyota, and culminates by saying :

" Except for impropriety, there is no other source of harming rasa.

The highest secret ( upaniṣad ) of rasa is following well-known ( canons ) of

propriety. "4

Continued from previous page )

inferior, as literature, to the verse quoted on p. 114 :

अनुरागवती सत्या द्विषत्स्तवःसः।

अहो दैवगति: कीदृक तथा न समागमः ॥

which is only an example of gunībhūtavyaṅgya.

1. A criticism levelled by his detractors in an amusing line in the D. Al.,

p. 25 : ध्वनिध्वंसनिरतैरिति यदेतदलक्षणं हृदयवामनानमुकुलितलोचनैरन्नुनीतमत तत्र हेतुर्न विभा: ।

2. D. Al. p. 81 : स्फुटतरं स ( namely रसप्रतीति: ) केवलमनूषते, न तु तर्कतता ।

3. D. Al. p. 455 : काव्यस्थ च व्यङ्गयप्रतीतानां सत्यासत्यानुपपन्नस्वप्रतियोचित्वमेवोति तत्र

प्रमाणान्तरच्यापारपरिक्षेपाहासैव सम्पद्यते ।

4. D. Al. p. 330 :

अनौचित्यादते नान्यद्रसभङस्य कारणम्।

प्रसिद्धौचित्यबन्धस्तु रसस्योपनिषत्परा ॥

10

शान्तरस

What Ānanda means by aucitya is not however what we associate with the word “ proper ”. Space does not permit us to go into the issue here,1 but at least one application of the theory, of great relevance to modern literature, should be briefly touched upon. This is the question of obscenity. The problem centres around the very beautiful eighth chapter of the Kumāra-sambhava in which Kālidāsa describes the love-making of Śiva and Pārvatī. Now Ānanda points out that this is tantamount to describing the love-making of one’s own parents,2 since Śiva and Pārvatī are considered in mythology to be the father and mother of the world. Ānanda, from the same passage,3 leaves us in no doubt that the passage is “ obscene ” ( asabhya ). But this does not mean either that it should be censored ( a qucstion Ānanda never even considered, for it would be considered hubris to do more than make literary judgments; an actual “ judge ”, deciding what people should or should not read, would be distasteful and indeed unthinkable in ancient India, as hopefully it is coming to seem to us today ) or that it is not great literature. The description may be obscene ( asabhya ) but it is not vulgar ( grāmya ), i. e. it may offend some people’s notion of propriety, but it is not on that account unrefined or without value. The reason, Ānanda tells us, is the literary skill with which the description is made. Kālidāsa was a consummate artist, and this is all that need concern the literary critic. Questions of morality are simply absurd. ( Though one might sympathise, partially, with Kenneth Tynan when he pleads that he should be allowed to criticise a play of Ionesco on moral grounds : “ If a man tells me something which I believe to be an untruth, am I forbidden to do more than congratulate him on the brilliance of his lying ? ” )4 Here is Ānanda’s remarkable passage : “ How is it that in such cases sensitive critics do not find the subject-matter utterly lacking in literary beauty ( cārutva )? It is because ( what would ordinarily be considered a blemish ) is cancelled out ( lit. concealed-tirohita ) by artistic genius ( kavishakti ). For there are two kinds of blemishes ( doṣa ) : ( 1 ) that due to the lack of intellectual refinement ( avyutpatti ) on the part of the poet, and ( 2 ) that due to the absence of genius ( śakti ). Now the fault that is due to a lack of intellectual refinement can sometimes be passed over by grace of ( the poet’s inborn ) genius. But a fault due to lack of genius will very quickly obtrude itself ( on the attention of the reader ) ... And so for example, great poets can describe the well-known sexual love, etc., among the very highest gods, and although they are improper, nonetheless, due to

1. See Raghavan, “ Some Concepts of the Alañkāra Śāstra ”, “ Aucitya ”, p. 194–257, Madras, 1942.

2. D. Āl. p. 332 : तत् पित्रोः संभोगवर्णनमिव ।

3. D. Āl. p. 332 : सुतरामसभ्यम् ।

4. See the London Observer for the week of June 5, 1968.

the saving power of their genius, such descriptions do not strike us as ( at all ) vulgar. An example is the description of the love-makiug of Pārvatī ( and Śiva ) in the Kumārasambhava."1

Another seminal idea of importance for Abhinava's later theories was the critical equipment necessary to appreciate this " suggested sense ". Kārikā 7 of the first Uddyota, has this remarkable verse :

" ( The suggested sense ) cannot be known merely through lexicography or through grammar. Only those concerned with the very essence of poetry have access to it."2

Here the author of the Kārikās is criticising what was until his time the very staple of the literary critic : technical knowledge. Reading through the works written before the D. Al., one is struck by the extraordinary perception of this remark. Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Udbhata and Bhāmaha are unbending in their concern with the technicalities of the language, with metre, with grammar,3 and, especially, with figures of speech. One is reminded of the situation today, where the battle still continues between the " academics " who insist on the importance, for understanding a work, of peripheral knowledge, and the " new " critics ( a term Ānanda uses of his school ) who insist on the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the poem. The difference, of course, is that it could be granted that anybody in ancient India who was interested in Sanskrit poetry automatically came armed with elaborate training in purely formal disciplines : grammar, prosody, logic. But Ānanda was the first to demand that another element be introduced : literary sensitivity. He was concerned with essentials, with the aesthetic impact of the work of art. This was revolutionary, but in a sense it never had the impact on later critical writers that one would expect it to have. The one great critic to assimilate this principle into his own literary criticism is Abhinava himself. For only Ānanda and Abhinava concerned themselves with wider issues of literary criticism. Thus in the fourth Uddyota4 of the D. Al.

1. D. Al. p. 316-317 :

कथमचारु तद्वार्तो विषयेऽर्थानां नावमार्गति चेत्, काव्यशक्तितिरोहितत्वात् । द्विविधो हि दोषः- कवेर्‌व्युत्पत्तिकृतो‌ऽदोषकृतश । तत्रव्युत्पत्तिकृतो दोषः शक्तितरस्फुटतल्लक्ष्यते । यस्तुशक्तिकृतो दोषः स झटिति प्रतोयते । ....... तथा हि महाकवीनामयुक्तमदेवताविप्रसिद्धसंभोग-शृङ्गारनिबन्धनानौचित्यो शक्तितरस्फुटत्वाद् ग्राम्यत्वेन न प्रतिभासते । यथा कुमारसंभवे देवोसमोग-वर्णनम् ।

2. D. Al. p. 93 :

शब्दार्थशासनज्ञानमात्रेणैव न वेद्यते ।

वेद्यते स तु काव्यार्थतत्त्ववेदिभि: केवलम् ॥

3. See " Grammaire et Poétique en Sanskrit " by L. Renou, Études Vediques et Pāṇiniennes, Tome VIII, Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne Paris, 1961.

4. D. Al. p. 529.

Ānanda judges both the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata as whole works of literature.

Later authors were content to simply enumerate once again the various technical factors in a given poem. Abhinava of course carried on the tradition of Ānanda by focusing on fundamental questions of the philosophy of aesthetics. Though he was followed in this by all later writers, he was the last to make any contribution to the field. What he had to say was new and intellectually daring. Later writers simply repeat his ideas, usually in a simplified form. But it seems to us very likely that Abhinava was encouraged to take this wider view because of the example that Ānanda set for him.

Another idea which Abhinava must have first assimilated from Ānanda is the extraordinary importance ascribed to the poet. Not importance in the worldly sense of the term, but his autonomy, his ability to create new worlds. This too was an idea barely foreshadowed in earlier criticism. Ānanda states his position in two very exceptional verses, which have impressed themselves on the imagination of all later writers :

" In the shoreless world of poetry, the poet is the unique creator. Everything becomes transformed into the way he envisions it.

If the poet is emotionally moved (lit. " in love " ) in his poems, then the whole world is infused with rasa. But if he be without an interest in the senses ( vitarāga ), then everything will become dry ( nīrasa )."1

1. D. Al. p. 498 :

अपारे काव्यसंसारे कविरेकः प्रजापति: ।

यथासौ रोचते विश्वं तथेदं परिवर्तते ॥

शृङ्गारि चेत्कविः काव्ये जातं रसमयं जगत् ।

स एव वीतिरागेशो रसः सर्वमेव निष्प्रभम् तत् ॥

These verses are quoted in the Agnipurāṇa 339, 10-11, Ānandāśrama ed. Abhinava explicity states that these verses are by Ānanda in the A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 295 :

तत्र एवं वक्तृ - ' शृङ्गारि चेत्कवि:' इत्यालम्बनद्वयध्वननचार्यण ।

So there can be no doubt that the Agnipurāṇa has borrowed the verses from Ānanda and not vice versa.

Note also the fine verse quoted immediately after these two :

भावानुचेतनानपि चेतनवच्चेतनाच्चितनवत् ।

व्यवाहर्यति यथेष्टं सुकवि: काव्ये स्वातन्त्र्यतया ॥

Note that Abhinava (p. 499) takes Śṛṅgāra in the second stanza to be an upalakṣaṇa for all the other rasas.

We should not interpret vitarāga to mean vairāgyavat and take it to be a covert reference to śāntarasa. For if this were so, nīrasam would make no sense even in its punned meaning. Vitarāga here simply means a poet not interested in rasa, emotionally uninvolved. The second half of the verse, therefore, means that if the poet is not very good ( not alive to the external world ) he will not be able to invest his poetry with any real interest.

ABAINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

13

Abhinava echoes this in his famous remark on poetic imagination ( pratibhā ) in the Abhinavabhāratī :

" The poet is like Prajāpati, from whose will this world arises. For the poet is endowed with a power to create wondrous and unheard of things.

This power arises from the grace of Parā Vāk ( " Highest Speech " ), which is just another name for poetic imagination ( pratibhā ), which has its seat in the poet's own heart, and which is eternally in creative motion ( udita )."1

It follows from this that for both Ānanda and Abhinava, there could be no end to this creative imagination and to the actual poetic situations it could envisage.

This is the theme of a whole section at the beginning of the fourth Uddyota of the D. Al., where we are told that there is no end to the themes of poetry, as long as one is endowed with poetic imagination.2 He gives a beautiful simile :

" Even though subjects may have been already used, thanks to the fact that they are associated with imaginative experience ( rasa ) in literature, they all appear new, just as trees appear new during the honey - months ( spring )."3

There is no end to the novelty of poetic themes,4 no way of exhausting the subject-matter of poetry :

" Thousands upon thousands of poets as eminent as Vācaspati himself might use ( various ) subjects ( in their poetry ), and yet, like primordial world-matter, they cannot be exhausted."5

This is a healthy emphasis on the primacy of the external world, and how it must always form the poet's major source of material.6

One is reminded of the passage from the Avimāraka : " How lovely is the great variety of this world !"7 This agrees with the emphasis the kārikās

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 4 :

कवेरपि स्वहृदयायतनसततगोभितप्रतिभामिधानपरवशवदनुग्राह्यशोभितवचित्रपूरवांनिर्माण-शक्तिशालिनः प्रजापतेरिव कामजनितजगतः ।

See also the Prākrit verse quoted by Ānanda in the fourth Uddyota, D. Al. p. 527.

2. D. Al. p. 537 :

न काव्यार्थविरामोऽस्ति यदि स्यात्प्रतिभाभरणः । IV. 6.

3. D. Al. p. 528 :

दृष्टपूर्वोऽपि वार्ता: काव्ये रसपरिग्रहात् ।

सर्वे नवा इवाभान्ति मधुमास इव द्रुमाः ॥ IV. 4.

4. D. Al. IV, 6.

5. D. Al. IV. 10 :

वाचस्पतिसहस्रैरपि यत्नतः ।

निवृत्ता सा क्षयं नैति प्रकृतिरिज्जगतामिव ॥

6. See also NS, I. 119 ( G. O. S. edition, p. 42 ).

7. Devadhar's edition of the Bhāsa plays, p. 132 : aho vicitrasvabhāvatā

( Continued on next page

14

शान्तरस

place upon love, of all the rasas. ( note that ŚR is never mentioned specifically in any kārikā of the D. Al.). In the second Uddyota when the guṇas ( linguistic qualities ) are being discussed, mādhurya “delicacy” is emphasised : “love alone is very delicate, for it is the most pleasing among all the rasas.”1 This is so, we are told, because “the mind, in love, becomes exceedingly sensitive ( is moved).”2 It is surely this emphasis3 that has led Abhinava, in the A. Bh., to make a profound philosophical definition of love. This occurs under NŚ. VI. 45, where Abhinava has a very long comment on Bharata's definition of śṛṅgārarasa. The section is, for the most part, very corrupt. However one passage can be translated :

"Someone objected as follows : how can there be only one rasa ( śṛṅgāra ) when there are so many different kinds of love ( rati ) according to the literary character in whom (love) exists ? The person objecting thus is not ( really ) acquainted with love. For all love is only one. It ( exists ) where there is not the separation of the one (?-ekaviyoga) (from the other ), because there is a mutual ( commingling ) of consciousness. This is why ( Bharata ) said : uttamayuvaprakṛtiḥ (this refers to p. 301, Vol. I of the NŚ : sā ca stripuruṣahetukā uttamayuvaprakṛtiḥ ) : “he is noble” and “she is noble” and so we get the dual compound uttamau. The same is true of yuvānau ( i. e. “he is young and she is young” and so the dual compound ). Now the word uttamayuva in this context refers to their consciousness ( i. e. their minds ), and not to their bodies. For this concept ( viz. nobility ), from the highest point of view, applies only to consciousness...”4

Continued from previous page )

jagataḥ. Cf. Auden, in the New Republic, Dec. 9, 1967 : “If today, it seems to me, the word “real” can be used at all, the only world which is real for us, as the world in which all of us, including scientists, are born, work, love, hate, and die, is the primary phenomenal world as it is and always has been presented to us through our senses, a world in which the sun moves across the sky from east to west, the stars are hung in the vault of heaven, the measure of magnitude is the human body, and objects are either in motion or at rest”. It is clear that this love for the human, for the particular and the imperfect (cf. Balzac : “Blessed are the imperfect for theirs is the kingdom of love”) is much closer to the hearts of Indian poets than of Indian philosophers.

1. शृङ्गार एव मधुरः परः प्रहादनो रसः । D. Al., II. 7.

2. आद्रत्वान् याति यतस्तत्राधिकं मनः । D. Al., II. 8.

3. See also III. 28 :

विशेषतस्तु शृङ्गारे शुचुमारतमो व्रासौ ।

"Especially in Śṛṅgāra, for it is the most delicate of all the rasas". See also D. Al. II. 11 and II. 15.

4. A. Bh. Vol. 1, p. 302 : अत एव यत्क्षोभिदचमत्कृत-रतराधारमेदेन भेदात् कथं एको रस इति । तदनभिज्ञतया । एकैव ह्यसौ तावती रतिः । यत्रान्योन्यसंविदा एकवीयोगो न भवति । अत एवो-

रस इति । तदनभिज्ञतया । एकैव ह्यसौ तावती रतिः । यत्रान्योन्यसंविदा एकवीयोगो न भवति । अत एवो-( Continued on next page

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

15

The above is meant only to give an idea of Ānand's influence. The actual influence of the D. Al, has been far more extensive than we are able to indicate here. We have not, for instance, dealt with such important themes as prādhānya, "predominance", and its importance for judging the status of a given poem, or of Ānanda's new ideas on figures of speech, or on saṅghatanā ( linguistic structure ). But what we have said should suffice to give the reader an idea both of the remarkable profundity of some of the views of the Dhvanyāloka, and of their importance for Abhinava's philosophy of aesthetics.

BHAṬṬATAUTA

Bhaṭṭatauta, Abhinava's teacher1 of dramatic theory, wrote a work entitled the Kāvyakautuka,2 now lost. On this work Abhinava wrote a commentary, also lost. It is thus not possible to determine just how many of Abhinava's ideas come from Bhaṭṭatauta. He quotes him often in the A. Bh., but many of the passages are too corrupt to understand. However, it is clear that Bhaṭṭatauta emphasised the drama ( over and above lyric poetry ). Thus Abhinava says :

" (Our) teacher says that rasa arises in a poem when there arises an experience ( on the part of the reader ) that is similar to direct perception (pratyakṣa) (of a drama). Thus he says in the Kāvyakautuka :

Continued from previous page

तमयुक्‍प्रकृतिः । उत्तमश्र‍ोत्तमा चोतमा । एवं युबानौ । तत्रोत्तमयुवशब्देन तत्त्वविदुच्यते । न तु कायः । चैतन्यस्थ‍यं हि परमार्थतः उत्तमयुवत्वं; विशेषः ।

Cf. Abhinavagupta's remarks about love in the Locana, p. 205 :

रतौ हि समस्तदेवतियादिनिरादृतिप्रशनवच्छिन्नैव वासनास्त इति न कश्चित्तत्र ताङ्‌ग्यो न हृदयसंवादमयः, यतस्त्रपि हि तत्‍चमत्कारोदयः । अतो मधुर इत्युच्यते । मधुरो हि शङ्‌करादिरसो विच्छिनोविच्छिनो वा स्वव्‍यसनातुरस वाझृततिरसतापद्‌भिलपणीय एव भवति ।

1. Generally whenever the term upādhyāya is used in the A. Bh. it refers to Bhaṭṭatauta.

2. असदुपाध्यायुक्ते काव्यकौतुकेऽप्यमिम्रायो मन्तव्यः । A. Bh. Vol. 1, p. 37 ; this is in the context of what constitutes "imitation" in the drama. Abhinava also wrote a commentary on this work : स चायमसदुपाध्यायसमद्‌भततोतै काव्यकौतुके, अस्माभिरश्‍व तद्विररणे बद्ध-तरकुतनिर्णय( i. e. विचार)पूर्वपक्षसिद्धान्त इत्यलं बहुना, Locana, p. 394.

See V. Raghavan, "Authors Quoted in the Abhinavabhārati ', J. O. R. Vol. 6, Madras, 1932.

V

16

शान्तरस

" In a poem that is not enacted, it is not possible to have a ( true ) aesthetic experience ( āsvāda ). When things ( bhāva ) such as gardens, one's beloved, the moon, etc., are well and elegantly described by a polished imagination, then they appear as if they are actually taking place before our very eyes ( i. e. as if we saw them acted out )".1

Abhinava improves on this :

" ... the actions of the actor have been devised in order that the spectator might obtain an aesthetic experience that is appropriate to direct perception ( as in the drama ), This is why Bharata has sanctioned the use of music, etc., in order to break the knots of the heart that is filled with anger and sorrow indigenous to it. For the text ( the Nāṭyaśāstra ? ) includes everything ( or : is meant for all people ). Therefore, rasas are only found in dramas, and not in the everyday world. This is what ( Bharata ) means ( to say ). And poetry is nothing other than drama." 2

But what is most significant for us, is the term pratibhā. It is clear from the quotations by later writers that Bhaṭṭatauta was greatly preoccupied with this term and the concepts that lay behind it. Hemacandra quotes three verses from Bhaṭṭatauta :

" It has been said that there can be no poet who is not ( also ) a seer. And a man ( becomes ) a seer because of his " vision " ( darśana ). Vision is the knowledge of the truth of the nature and properties of various things. A man is said in the śāstra to be a poet only because of vision. A man is said to be a poet in the world when he has both vision and ( the power of ) description. This is why, although the first poet ( Vālmīki ) was always gifted with a clear vision, as long as he did not actually describe ( things ) he was not known as a poet ( but only as a sage )". 3

1. A. Bh. Vol. p. 290 :

काव्यार्थविषये हि प्रज्ञाकल्पसंविदनन्दोदयै रसोदय इत्युपाध्याया:। यदाद्रु: काव्यकौतुके—

'प्रयोगवशान्नापत्रे काव्यं नाम्नाऽऽद्रियते संभ्रमा:' इति ।

वर्णनौकलिता भोगप्रौढोक्ल सम्यगगपिता: ।

उद्यानकान्तचन्द्रस्य भाव: प्रज्ञावतां स्कुटा: ॥' इति ।

2. A. Bh. Vol, I, p. 291 :

[तत्र ये स्वभावतो निर्मलमुकुरहृदयास्त एव संसारोचितक्रोधमोहाभिभाषपरवशमनसो न भवन्ति ।

तेषां तथाविधदृशकाव्यकारणेन समये साधारणरसनात्मकचर्वणाभ्यां रससंवेद्यो नाट्यलक्षण: स्कुट एव । ये त्वतथाभूतास्तेषां] प्रज्ञाचिततथाविधचर्वणालामाय नटतदप्रतिभया । स्वगतक्रोधशोकादिसंस्कृतहृदयाग्नि-

भजनाय गीतादिप्रक्रिया च सुनिना विरचिता । सर्वानुभावक हि शास्त्राभिमिति न्यायात । तेन नाट्य एव रसा

न लोक इत्यर्थ: । 1 काव्य च नाट्यमेव । See Addenda.

3. Hemacandra, Kāvyānuśāsana, p. 432, Parikh and Kulkarni's second edition, ( Bombay, 1964 ) :

( Continued on next page

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

17

The Kaumudī on the Locana quotes a very important verse that might well come from the Kāvyakautuka :

" There are two paths of the goddess of speech : one is the śāstra, and the other is poetry ( kavikarma ). The first of these arises from intellectual ability ( prajñā ), and the second from genius ( pratibhā )" .1

This propels us to the heart of a great controversy, the tension between " inspiration " and " learning".2 For pratibhā not only means creative, or poetic imagination, it also means " genius ", or " inspiration ". The term to which it is generally opposed is vyutpatti, " learning ", " intellectual refinement ". The dichotomy is very old in Sanskrit poetics. It held a particular fascination for Abhinava, for it involved him in one of his life-long preoccupations : the relation between philosophy and poetry. In a sense one can look at this dichotomy as finally touching the most famous dichotomy of all, that between the followers of the old school of poetics who believed in the paramount importance of alaṅkāras and guṇas, and the new dhvani school. For the older school emphasises the hard work that must go into creation, the need for being properly schooled. The new school on the other hand, emphasises imagination,3 inspiration, rasa and dhvani. This is expressed in the famous kārikā of the Dhvanyāloka where it is said that figures of

Continued from previous page )

तथा चाह भट्टातः ( sic ) :

नानुप्रे कविरित्युच्यस्प्रिश्न किल दर्शनात्।

विचित्रभावधर्माहृतस्वप्रख्या च दर्शनम् ॥

स तत्सदर्शनाद्देव शाब्दे पठितः कविः ।

दर्शनेन्द्रननाचाश रुन्धा लोके कवित्वति: ॥

तथा हि दर्शने सच्चे निलेक्यादिप्रकैरमुने: ।

नोदिता कविता लोके यावज्जाता न वर्णना ॥

1. Kaumudī, K. Sastri's edition of the D. Al. p. 170 :

ई वत्मनी गिरो देव्या: शास्त्रं च कविकर्म च ।

प्रज्ञोपेते तयोरेव प्रतिमोदेवमात्रकम्॥

This verse is quoted as the motto to a very fine article by T. N. Sreekantiya, " Imagination in Indian Poetics ", I. H. Q. Vol. XIII, No. 1, p. 1937. There he says :

" Quoted by Vidyādharacakravartin in his commentary on the Kāvyaprakāśa ( Trivandrum Edition Part I, p. 14). I am indebted to Dr. V. Raghavan of Madras for this reference. "

2. E. I. Daṇḍin KD, I. 103. Mahābhārata, XII. 260. 1. We even find the dichotomy in the Pali texts, e. g. Aṅguttara Nikāya II. 230. where four types of poets are described ( cintakavi, sutakavi, atthakari and paṭibhānakavi ) of which the last type, naturally superior, writes from " seizure " as it were.

3. The term pratibhā is often used in the D. Āl. e. g. I. 6 :

अलोकसामान्यमभियानक्ति परिस्फुरन्तं प्रतिभाविशेषम् ।

also, IV. 6 : यद् वात्प्रतिभागुणः ।

speech will come without any effort to the poet concerned with rasadhvani.1 Of course Ānanda himself was not unaware of the importance of guṇas and alaṅkāras ; it is only that for him and for Abhinava, they constitute the body, the externals of poetry. The argument is not confined to India. It is a matter of controversy whether a “ creative writing course ” is of any use to the young writer or not. There are those who argue that nobody ever learns anything from such artificial attempts to instil talent into students. Howard Nemrov once said in conversation that the only thing he really felt he should tell his class on creative writing was : “ Why don’t you write well? Why aren’t you good ?” On the other hand, there is general agreement that such classes do often manage to teach the already gifted student certain technical skills.

The most famous line on pratibhā, first quoted by Abhinava and later by a great many writers, belongs to Bhaṭṭatauta.2 It is : 3 “ Poetic imagination is that ( form of ) intelligence which shines with ever new scintillation ”.4 The whole verse is quoted as far as we know, only by Vidyācakravartin, in his Sampradāyaprakāśinī :

" Remembrance is that which refers to an object of the past. Mati refers to something that is still in the future, buddhi deals with that which is present and prajñā belongs to all three times ( past, present and future ). But pratibhā is that intelligence which shines with ever new scintillation. The poet is he who is skilful in descriptions animated by that ( pratibhā ). Poetry is that which the poet does ”.5

There is of course a long tradition behind this word. The most famous quotation is perhaps the verse from Bhāmaha that Abhinava quotes more than once :

1. II. 16 and vrtti thereon.

2. Several stanzas on pratibhā have been ascribed by Gnoli to Bhaṭṭatauta : “ Three stanzas, quoted by Hemacandra and probably taken from Bhaṭṭa Tota ”, Gnoli, op. cit. p. XX, Int. But this is incorrect, since the verses are from Mahimabhaṭṭa's Vyaktiviveka, II. 117-119.

3. प्रतिभा अपूर्ववसुनिर्माणक्षमा प्रज्ञा ।
   

4. Hemacandra, p. 3 quotes the whole passage : प्रज्ञा नवनवोन्मेषशालिनी प्रतिभा मता । तदुप्राणितजगद्वर्णननानिपुणः कविः ॥

5. Vidyācakravartin's comm. on the KP, the Sampradāyaprakāśinī, TSS. nos. 88 and 100, part I, p. 13 : स्मृतिर्येततीतविषया मतिरागामिभोंचरा । बुद्धिः सात्कालिकी प्रोक्ता प्रज्ञा त्रैकालिकी मता ॥

The rest is as given in the preceding note.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

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" Even a stupid man can learn the śāstra from the teachings of his professor. But poetry is only given to the person who has imaginative genius (pratibhā) and that only once in a while ".1

Abhinava and Bhaṭṭatauta must have known the fourth chapter of the Kāvyamīmāṃsā, most of which is given over to various views on pratibhā.2

Rājaśekhara defines it as : " That which causes to appear in the mind the collections of words, the technique of alaṅkāras, the caravans of meanings, the path of ( poetic ) expression, and other similar things as well ".3 He divides pratibhā into two sorts : (1) that which applies to poets ( kārayitṛī, or " creative "), and that (2) which applies to critics or readers ( bhāvayitṛī ).

" Creative imagination is of three sorts: sahajā, " inborn ", āhāryā, " acquired ", and aupadeśikī, " learned ". Poets too are divided into three classes, in accord with this scheme ( sārasvata, ābhyāsika and aupadeśika ).

He has many interesting and unusual observations on critics and poets in the rest of the chapter as well. One thinks in particular of the two poets, blind from birth,4 who are nonetheless endowed with " vision " ( pratibhā ).

But it is really only Abhinavagupta who enables the various insights into the nature of imagination to be coordinated into a philosophical whole, as we shall see when dealing with his philosophy of aesthetics in the next section. The fine image of Mahimabhaṭṭa was surely inspired by Abhinava's philosophic views on imagination :

" Pratibhā is that intellectual function of the poet whose mind is concentrated ( stimitā ) on thinking about words and meanings that are appro- priate to rasas. It arises for a moment from the contact of the poet's mind with the essential nature ( of the Ātman )."

1. Bhāmaha, Kāvyālankāra, I, 5 :

शास्त्रं हि तावद्गुरुपदेश्यं शिष्यो जडोऽपि यथाविधि व्रजेत् ।

काव्यं तु जायते जातु कसचिद्विभावाति भावतः ॥

2. On pratibhā see also : Vāmana, I, 3. 16; Yogasūtra, II, 36; also Kashmir Śaiva literature, e. g. Somānanda's Śivadrṣṭi, II, 64 (p. 78, KSTS, LIV, 1934); Vasu- gupta, Spandakārikā, IV, 7. See also L. Silburn, " Vātulanātha Sūtra " (Paris, 1957 ) p. 14 and p. 38. See also Int. to De's ed. of the Vakroktijīvita, pp. XXIV ff. For the term in philosophy, see G. Kaviraj, "The Doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy ", Annals of the B. O. R. I. V ( 1923-24 ), p. 1 ff. and 113 ff.

3. KM. ed. by C. D. Dalal and R. A. Sastry, revised ed. by Ramaswami Sastri Siromani, 3rd ed. Baroda, 1934, p. 11 :

या शब्दग्रामसार्थसार्थमलङ्कारतन्त्रयुगुक्तिमार्गमन्यदपि तथाविधमधिहृदयं प्रतिभास्यति सा प्रतिभा ।

Uktimārga might also mean racanā, riti, i. e. style.

4. op. cit. p. 12 यतो मेधाविकुमाग्रदासादयो जासन्धाः कवयः श्रूयन्ते ।

" It is that which makes the things that exist in all the three worlds seem as if they were right before our very eyes, and ( hence ) it is known as the third eye of Śiva ".1

It is clear that the striking image in this verse is borrowed from passages in the D. Āl.2 Abhinava is also greatly concerned with pratibhā as a philosophic concept. Thus we find it defined3 and very often referred to in his Tantrāloka.4

BHAṬṬANĀYAKA

As we have noted under the passages quoted from Bhaṭṭanāyaka in the Locana passage from the second Uddyota,5 Abhinava has very obviously taken many of his key notions on poetry from BN. The most important of these is sādhāraṇīkaraṇa, the power which enables a situation in literature to abstract itself from its unique application to one individual, and to be universally applicable. This is not a concept found in Ānandavardhana, nor in the Nāṭyaśāstra. The word that BN uses for it is bhāvanā. Abhinava6 quotes the first line of a verse that Hemacandra7 and Jayaratha8 give in full :

" ( There are three functions in poetry : ) abhidhā ( denotation, which, for BN, includes lakṣaṇā as well ), bhāvanā ( generalisation ), and the enjoyment that ensues. Both word and sense-figures belong to denotation. The whole collection of ( primary emotions such as ) love, etc., arises from bhāvanā.

1. Vyaktiviveka, II. 117–118, p. 452–453 ( Kashi Sanskrit Series 121 ) :

rasanugunācchabdārthacintāstamitamicchatas: |

kṣaṇaṃ sarvopasaṃsthasthaṃ prajñe pratibhā kave: ||

sā hi cakṣurmanogataśrutirūtatīyamiti gīyate |

yena sākṣātkṛtārtheṣu bhāvāntar lokyavartin: ||

2. D. Āl. p. 508 where the navā dṛṣṭi is referred to, and also D. Āl. p. 498, third verse.

3. T. Āl. XIII, 87.

4. Gnoli, quoting four very difficult stanzas from the T. Āl. ( XI, pp. 60–62 ), remarks : " Abhinava ..... stress ( es ) the fact that pratibhā does not exhaust itself in the poetical intuition, but is, in a broader sense, the same consciousness, the same Self. In the majority of men it does not succeed in liberating itself from the chain of relationships and practical interests which condition and constrict it, but, in the poet, it burns with a purified light – to shine out finally in all its fullness in the intuition of the saints. " Gnoli, op. cit. p. LI. Further references in the Tantrāloka are XIII. 90; 97; 101; 106; 112; 120 etc.

5. Below, we translate Abhinava's brief summary of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's views on rasa.

6. A. Bh. Vol. 1, p. 277.

7. See Hemacandra, op. cit. p. 96. See also Chintamani, " Fragments of Bhaṭṭanāyaka " J. O. R. vol. l. p. 271. It is quoted in the Rasagaṅgādhara p. 25 ( with the variant reading tadbhogikṛtir eva ca. )

8. Aluṅkārasaṅgraha, p. 9.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

21

The accomplished man ( siddhimänarah ) is permeated by the form of the enjoyment of that. "1

Of course Bhatta­nàyaka2 was himself influenced by the D. Al. ( though he is supposed to have written his Hrdayadarpana to demolish the idea of dhvani ) in granting that there is an element in poetry beyond denotation and secondary usage. In one passage in the Locana,3 Abhinava even says that BN is simply giving suggestion another name. But far more important for Abhinava was BN's views on religious ecstasy and poetry.

It may well be that Bhatta­nàyaka was the first person to make the famous comparison of yogic ecstasy and aesthetic experience. Unfortunately his Hrdayadarpana has been lost, and only quotations survive in the later Alarikära works. The Hrdayadarpana appears to have been either a commentary on the Nâtyasästra or an independent work criticising the theory of dhvani in the course of which he had occasion often to quote from the NS. Abhinava quotes Bhatta­nàyaka frequently in the Locana,4 not always to disagree with him. It is clear from many of his remarks that he had a high respect for him.

The first passage we quote and translate is one of exceptional interest, that must certainly have been of great importance for Abhinava's own theories. It is found on p. 5 of the Abhinavabhârati ( G. O. S. vol. I, 2nd ed. ) and is a commentary on the opening verse of the Nâtyasästra :5

" Bhatta­nàyaka6 however ( explains the verse as follows ) :

अभिधा भावना चान्या तद्रोगी कृतिरपि च ।

अभिधाधामतां याते शब्दार्थो लंकृति ततः ॥

भावनाभ्यै एपोडपि ग्राह्यारागिष्णो हि यतः।

तद्रोगी कृतिरपि व्याप्तये सिद्दिमात्रत॥

We are not certain about bhāvanābhāvyaḥ. Perhaps it should be translated as " to be reflected on in the mind by means of bhāvanā ", i. e. bhāvyaḥ would mean " to be reflected on ", bhāvanay bhāvyaḥ.

2. On Bhatta­nàyaka see Gnoli, op. cit., p. XX. Also Kane, H. S. P. p. 221—225. The date Gnoli gives is around 900 A. D. In any case he certainly lived after Anandavardhana in response to whose theory of dhvani his own work seems to have been written.

3. See Locana p. 188.

4. For all references in the Locana to BN, see Kane, op. cit. p. 223.

प्रणम्य शिरसा देवौ पितामहमहेश्वरौ ।

नाट्यशास्त्रं प्रवक्ष्यामि ब्रह्मणा यदुदाहतम् ॥

6. Udhāḥrtam, which simply means "spoken" is taken to be a pregnant use of the word by BN who interprets it as udāharaṇikṛtam. The drama is like life. It is essentially unreal, and yet it affects us profoundly. Most important of all, it is

( Continued on next page

"I shall ( now ) expound that drama which was promulgated1 by Brahman - the highest Self - as an illustration such that people might understand that worldly objects are insubstantial ( nissārabheda ), fabricated ( as they are ) by ignorance ( of the identity between the Self and Brahman ). Just as the unreal actions of Rāma, Rāvaṇa and others, which are essentially a figment of one's imagination and hence do not possess a single fixed form, but in a moment assume hundreds and thousands of forms; which though different ( in their unreality ) from dreams, etc., are still the outcome of mental imagination ( hrdayagrahanidāna ); which are enacted by actors who are almost like the creator of the world ( Brahmā ) and who have not relinquished their separate identity ( as persons in real life ) - those actions ( of Rāma and Rāvaṇa, etc. ) appear ( to us ) in a most unusually wondrous way; and though appearing like that, they become the means of attaining the (four) goals of life - in exactly the same way this universe consists of a display of unreal forms and names and yet through listening to and meditating on spiritual instruction, it leads to the realisation of the highest goal of human life ( namely mokṣa ).

Thus this stanza, by suggesting ( the attainment of ) the other-worldly highest goal of human life introduces śāntarasa.

' Depending on their respective causes the different rasas originate from śānta ( a state of mental calm ).'

Thus the present stanza ( NŚ, I. 1 ) conveys the higher purpose ( of drama ). " This is the explanation that Bhaṭṭanāyaka has given in his Sahṛdayadarpaṇa. As he said :

Continued from previous page ) the means whereby we may attain bliss, which is after all the same as the Self and therefore the same as mokṣa. A. Bh.Vol. 1, p. 5 :

भट्टनायकस्तु 'ब्रह्माणं परमात्मानं यदुदाहतंविविधाविरचितनिस्सारभेदग्रहे यदुदाहरणीकृतं तद्राख्यं तद्रक्ष्यामि । यथाहं कलपनामात्रसारं तत् प्वंवसस्थितेरकपुं शृण्वन् कलपनाशतसहस्रसहं स्वप्रादिविलक्षण- मपि सुततरं हृदयग्रहणनिदानमलकत्स्वालम्बनब्रह्मकल्पनातीपरचितं रामरावणादिचेष्टितमसकं कुतोडस्यार्थ- वृत्त्या भाति । तथैव भावनमापि च पुरमर्थोपायोऽमात् । तथैव तादृग्विश्वमेदमसकं नानारूपप्रपञ्चप्रोत्कमसर्थ च श्रवणमननादिवशेन परमपुरथप्रापकमिति लोकोत्तरपरमपुरुषार्थसाधनेन शान्तरसोपकर्षपोषणं भविष्यति । 'स्वं स्वं निमित्तमादाय शान्तादुपपद्यते रसः ' । इति ।

तदनेन परमार्थिकं प्रयोजनमुक्तं । इति व्याख्यानं सहृदयदर्पणे पर्यग्रहोत् ।

"नमृकैलोक्यनिमर्माणकत्वे शम्भो यत: । प्रतिबिंषं जगद्राख्यप्रयोगसिको जन: ॥' इति

1. It is not clear whether Abhinava accepts this justification of ŚR or not. Most likely he does, at least in great part, for he also quotes this stanza ( NŚ. VI, p. 335, in the interpolated Śantarasa section ) and also uses it in the third Uddyota of the Locana, p. 391, as a proof of the existence of Śāntarasa.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

23

" I pay my homage to Śiva the poet ( also the omniscient one – kavi ) who has created all the three worlds and thanks to whom ( yatah ) (sensitive) people are able to attain aesthetic bliss by watching the spectacle ( prayoga ) of the play that is our life in this world."

We can see prefigured in this fascinating fragment ( from a commentary on the Nāṭyaśāstra1 itself ?) many of the themes that were to occupy Abhinava so closely2 : the world as a drama, the individual as the actor, the illusion of drama and the illusion of existence, the acceptance of śāntarasa, the importance of mokṣa, Śiva as the cosmic poet, etc. How many more ideas would we find that Abhinava is indebted to BN for, if the Hrdaya-darpana were extant ?

The second passage from Bhaṭṭanāyaka is quoted in the Locana, under I. 6 (p. 91, Bālapriyā ed. ) :

" The cow in the form of speech gives a unique drink ( rasa ) out of love for her young.3 That ( rasa i. e. bliss ) which is ( laboriously ) milked by the Yogins cannot be compared to it. "4

Abhinava comments : " Without being possessed by rasa, the Yogins laboriously milk out ( bliss )."5

1. Note that in the Locana, Abhinava speaks of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's Hrdaya-darpana, whereas here he refers to the Sahṛdayadarpana, Are these just variant names for the same work ? K. C. Pandey ( Abhinavagupta, p. 200 ) suggests that the Hrdaya-darpana refers to a book that refuted Ānanda's theories, whereas the Sahṛdaya-darpana would have been a commentary on the NŚ. It is true of course that hṛdaya and sahṛdaya mean very different things, but Abhinava seems in the habit of calling a single work by different names. Thus he speaks of the Kāryaloka (i. e. the Dhvanyāloka ) of Ānandavardhana ( Locana, p. 2 and again Locana, p. 554 ) and later in the Abhinavabhāratī, Vol. I, p. 343, he calls the same work the Sahṛdayāloka. This is the name he uses in the second vol. of the A. Bh. as well.

2. It is clear that Abhinava has used the ideas contained in this important passage. But how did he feel consciously about it ? Did he accept the views or not ? It would seem that he does, and yet on p. 3, Vol. I of the A. Bh. he quotes the interpretation of his teacher ( Bhaṭṭatauta ) on this verse from the NŚ!

3. Surely Uttuṅgodaya is wrong in saying that ignorance is suggested by the word bāla :

बाले वागवदनाभिज्ञे उपासके वत्से च ।

The point is that the bāla (child ) is like the sahṛdaya, There can be no question of the sahṛdaya being ignorant.

4. यदाह भट्टनायकः

वागधेनुरनुद्गम्य एतत् हि रसं यद्वालरुण्यया ।

तेन नास्य समः स्यात्‌दुदुहे योगिभिरिह यः ॥

5. Locana, p. 91 :

तदावेशेन विनाप्याकान्त्या हि यो योगिभिरुदुध्यते ।

VI

24

शान्तरस

The point of the verse1 must be that rasa is superior to the bliss that Yogins achieve. The reason is that the Yogins must go through an elaborate process.2 But note that the verse could mean just the opposite, namely that the rasa the Sahṛdaya enjoys is not equal to what the Yogin enjoys. Tena nāsya samah does not specify whether it is superior or inferior. The verse is quoted in the context of poetry, and so the first interpretation ought to be the correct one. Furthermore, if it were not, Abhinava’s quoting it here would be out of place.3

PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES

Vedānta :

Not only was Abhinava, along with Ānandavardhana, assuredly the greatest thinker on aesthetic theory in India, he was also one of the greatest philosophical minds of mediaeval India. In Kashmir Śaivism, to which school he belonged, his word is considered authoritative in all philosophical issues. It has been suggested4 that he wrote his works on poetics after his major works on philosophy. One would, therefore, expect his aesthetic theories to have been influenced by his readings in Kashmir Saivism. But probably even prior to his writings on Kashmir Śaivism, Abhinava was exposed to earlier Advaita literature. There is of course his own commentary on the Gītā,5 and though

1. According to the K. the word vāg here means poetry :

वाक् काव्यात्मकया परिणममाना ध्वनिः ।

K. Sastri’s ed. p. 168-169.

2. As the Kaumudī on the Locana says :

आत्मान्तः प्रह्लादादिप्राप्त्यनन्तरपरमात्मतत्प्रपीडनोपायाश्रवणेsन्यर्थः ।

3. However, there is no doubt that in the third Uddyota, Locana, p. 510, Abhinava speaks of rasāsvāda as being only the reflection of a drop of the bliss that is parameśvarīśrāntyānanda. See our translation of this important passage below.

Note also the line that Abhinava quotes in the Locana ( p. 39 ) from Bhaṭṭanāyaka :

काव्ये रसयिता सर्वो न बोधो न नियोगभाक् ।

"In ( the realm of ) poetry anyone who feels aesthetic pleasure ( rasayitr ) is eligible for reading ), but not the cold rationalist ( boddhā ) nor the man willing to take orders ( from religious works—niyogabhāk )."

Abhinava makes this very charge against BN himself in the Locana ( p. 173 ), accusing him of being more a philosopher than a poet : न च……कल्पना युक्ता । जैमिनीयसूत्रे धीरें योऽज्यते न काव्येऽपि ।

4. See K. C. Pandey, Abhinavagupta, p. 30 for the chronological order of Abhinava’s works.

5. The Gītārthasaṅgraha, published in the NSP edition of the BG edited by Wasudeva Laxman Shastri Pansikar, with 8 commentaries, Bombay, 1912. It seems clear though that Abhinava was reluctant to comment on the Gītā. Not only is his

( Continued on next page

he himself does not often quote the Upaniṣads, there is little likelihood that he did not know them. He could not fail to have been deeply impressed with certain remarkable passages that have a direct bearing on his own aesthetic doctrines. We think of the beautiful simile in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka :

" Just as a man, when closely embraced by a woman he loves, knows nothing of the outside world, nor even of the inner one, so also does the ego ( puruṣa ) know nothing of the outside or of the inner when it is closely embraced by pure consciousness, the Self ".1

Then there are the passages from the Taittirīya Upaniṣad2 which are also quoted by Śaṅkara3 in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya.4

The phrase ānandaghana, used constantly in Vedānta works, obviously made an impression on Abhinava, for he uses it several times. One also thinks of such works as the Gauḍapādakaṛikās ( Āgamaśāstra ), which Abhinava must have known ( in fact, the doctrines in Kashmir Śaivism take over most of the major views of Advaita ), for example III. 42–45,5 where the four impediments in controlling the mind are mentioned. The four impediments are : vikṣepa ( distraction ); laya ( which Madhusūdanasarasvatī takes to mean suṣupti, in which he is supported by Gauḍapāda himself under III. 35 ); kaṣāya

Continued from previous page ) commentary unusually devoid of interest, but he himself hints that he did not really feel any inward compulsion to write it :

तचरणकमलमधुपो भगवान्द्रीतार्थसंग्रहं व्यधत्त ।

अभिनवगुप्तः सवदिजलोकलुतचोदनावशातः ॥

अत इदमवधार्य यथार्थमपि सर्वथा नैव ।

विदुपामभ्यूननीयं किल्यमिदं बान्धवार्थ हि नु ॥

In other words, he felt pressured to write it, and did it only for the sake of his relatives. ( op. cit., pp. 775–776 ).

1. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, IV, 3. 21 :

तस्मिन् प्रियया क्रिया संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरमेवं मेवायं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना

संपरिषक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम्‌ ।

A somewhat amusing verse on this very passage is quoted in the commentary to the Vijñānabhairava, under verse 69, p. 59 :

जायया संपरिषक्तो न बाधं वेद नान्तरम्‌ ।

निदर्शीनं शृतिः प्राह मुखस्त मन्यते विधिम्‌ ॥

2. raso vai saḥ and rasṁ haivāryaṁ rūdhvānanandī bhavati and vijñānaṁ brahma.

Taittirīya, II, 7.

3. II, 1. 12 : ( आनन्दमयोडश्यासात्‌ )

4. Note though how Saṅkara understands rasa :

रसो नाम त्रसिहेतुरानन्दकरो मदुराम्लादि: प्रसिद्धो लोके ।

5. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his Gūḍhārthadīpikā, N. S. P. Gītā with 8 comms., Bombay, 1912 quotes the verses and clearly explains them.

( stiffening of the mind ); and sukha, which Sadānanda in the Vedāntasāra1 (33) explains as rasāsvāda ! Here is the first half of kārikā 45 on sukham :

" In Yogic practices, one must not indulge in aesthetic pleasure ( sukham ). One should, through wisdom, remain unattached ".2

It would not be difficult, especially in a reductionist system ( where all, from the highest level, is pure Brahman ), to see how Brahman and rasa, or rasa and the sākṣin, the " witness " in the sense of pure consciousness, were all one, and identical with ānanda itself ( since Brahman is characterised as saccidānanda ). This may of course have something of hindsight in it, but it is doubtful whether Ānanda and thus Abhinava were not inspired to their doctrine of vyanjanā, at least in certain aspects, by the Vedānta notion of mukti,3 which is not produced, or created, but is made manifest (abhivyakta) through the removal of the āvaraṇas.

Already Bhavabhūti had used an important Vedānta simile in regard to rasa. In the Uttararāmacarita III. 474 he speaks of karuṇa as the one rasa of which all the others are simply vikāras, just as the bubbles and waves of the ocean are all forms of water.5 Abhinava applies a very similar notion to ŚR.6

1. Jacob's ed. p. 51, under number 33.

2. नास्वादयेत्सुखं तत्र निस्सङ्गः प्रज्ञया भवेत् । on which Madhusūdana comments ( under Gītā VI, 313, NSP ed. ) :

तत्र समाधौ परमसुखव्यञ्जककोटिपि सुखे नास्वादयेत्। एतावन्तं कालमहे सुखोति सुखास्वादरूपा

वृत्ति न कुयात्

There is a very interesting variant, quoted in the Vedāntasāra ( Jacob's ed., p. 51, under 33 ) : नास्वादयेद्रसं तत्र । Sadānanda says : अखण्डवसव्यानन्दावलम्बनेनापि चित्तवृत्तेः

सविकल्पानन्दास्त्वद्रं रसास्वादः । We can't help feeling that Sadānanda must have been aware of the famous comparison, brahmānanda (or even brahmāsvāda), and rasasvāda and this is his way of answering it. His point then, as Nṛsimhasarasvatī notes, is that the distinction is between nirvikalpasamādhi and savikalpasamādhi, two terms which must have influenced Abhinava's own thinking on rasāsvāda. For in sarvikalpasamādhi, the tripuṭī ( subject, object, knowledge ) is present, as it must be in rasāsvāda, but it is absent in brahmasvāda, where there is only one sākṣin, with no object to cognise, pure consciousness.

3. This similarity was already noted by Jacobi in his introduction to the Dhvanyāloka translation, p. 398.

4. Raghavan, " The Number of Rasas," p. 165 quotes this verse and explains it.

एको रसः करुण एव निमित्तभेदा- द्भिन्नः पृथक् पृथगिवाश्रयते विवर्तान् । आवर्तबुद्बुदतरङ्गमयान् विकारा- न्मभो यथा सलिलमेव हि तत्समस्तम् ॥

6. Cf. A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 335, basing himself on the famous verse in the NŚ, Vol. I, G. O. S. p. 335 :

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When we come to the influence of Kashmir Śaiva texts, we are on firmer ground. A work which seems to us to have had a decisive influence on Abhinava is the Vijñānabhairava, a work he often quotes.1 What is unusual about this work2 is its preoccupation with ecstatic experiences, and with exercises for inducing them. Here are some of the verses that undoubtedly captivated Abhinava :

" One should cast one's glance out into space, where there are no trees, no mountains, no walls ( to obstruct one's vision ), for when the nature of the mind ( which is to think about various objects presented to it) is suspended, all activities come to an end ".3

" Meditating on the knowledge ( that exists on its own ) between two thoughts, one should fix ( the mind) on that (empty) middle ( space). Suddenly abandoning both of them, truth will appear in the middle ".4

In these verses, one finds a certain preoccupation with aesthetic themes - a feature that is lacking in Advaita works. It is carried even further, when sexual comparisons, for which Kashmir Śaivism has a definite sympathy, begin to appear :

" Wherever the mind finds pleasure, one should firmly fix it on that object. For there the true nature of absolute bliss will manifest itself "5

Continued from previous page )

स्व सं निमित्तमासाद्य शान्ताद्राव: प्रवर्तते ।

भावा विकारा रक्ष्याः: शान्तस्तु प्रकृतिमतः।

विकार: प्रकृतेज्जात: पुनस्तत्रैव लीयते ॥

1. Only, as fas as we are aware, in the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivr̥timarśinī ( edited in three volumes by Madhusūdan Kaul Sāstri, NSP, Bombay, 1938, 1941 and 1943 respectively ). The work is quoted in Vol. I, 77, 80 and 287 and in Vol. II on p. 50, 179, 214, 262, 311, 427, and Vol. III, on p. 30, 52, 169, 346 and 386.

2. There is an interesting French translation of this remarkable text by L. Silburn, Le Vijñānobhairava, Publications de l' Institut de Civilisation Indienne.

3. VB, 60 ( p. 50 ) :

निर्दृश्व गिरिभित्त्यादिदेशो दृष्टि विनिक्षिपेत् ।

विलीनो मनसो भावे दृष्टिक्षीण: प्रजायते ॥

In fact Abhinava quotes this very verse in the IPVV twice, once on p. 311 of Vol. II, and again in the same volume, p. 427.

4. VB, 61 ( p. 50 ) :

उभयोर्भावयोर्जाने ध्यात्वा मध्यं समाश्रयेत् ।

युगपद् द्वयं त्यक्त्वा मध्ये तत्त्वं प्रकाशते ॥

This verse too is quoted by Abhinava in the IPVV, Vol. III, p. 346.

5. VB, 74, ( p. 62 ) :

यत्र यत्र मनस्तुष्टि मनस्तत्रैव धारयेत् ।

तत्र तत्र परानन्दरूपं संपवतते ॥

The commentator explains this to mean that one can fix one's attention on any attractive object, such as the lotus-like face of a beautiful woman, and find bliss of a transcendental nature therein.

"After the manifestation of the happiness resulting from the nourishing moisture produced in the body by eating a good meal and drinking, one should meditate on the state of fullness of the body ( at that time ). From this, absolute bliss will arise".2

The commentary explains rasa to mean the sense of "I-consciousness" and quotes the famous line from the Taittiriya already mentioned above.3

"The pleasure which terminates in the infusion of the power of bliss in a person on the achievement of sexual intercourse — that pleasure is one's own pleasure on the realisation of the essence of Brahman".4

Here the comparison that Abhinava will make between sexual experiences and ecstatic experiences, is explicitly stated. Note that the commentary speaks of the pleasure of knowing Brahman as being of the form of the resonance of a bell (ghanṭyanuranaṇa), a term that Ānanda applies to dhvani. He also speaks of sexual intercourse as the abhivyakti-kāraṇa (i. e. that which manifests or suggests) bliss,5 again a term that Abhinava uses of rasa. Verse seventy6 is another sexual verse where we are told that there is ānandasamplava, immersion in bliss, simply by remembering the various acts such as sucking (lehaṇa), fondling etc., indulged in during love-play. The interesting thing is that the commentary gives a

1. यासिन् यसिन्वस्तुनि मनोहरे कामिनी वदनकमलादौ मनः सज्जते, तत्रैव धारयेत्स्वरं कुर्यात्तमनः ।

2. VB, 72, ( p. 60 ) :

जगिष्युपानृत्कृतोल्लासरसनानन्दविजृम्भणम् ।

भावयेद्वन्दिरितावस्थां महानन्दस्ततो भवेत्॥

This verse too is quoted by Abhinava, in the ĪPVV, Vol, II, p. 179.

3. VB, p. 61 :

आइविमर्शसंचेतनं रसरूपो वा आनन्दः ।

4. VB, 69, ( p. 58 ) :

शक्तिसंगमसंविद्रुरुशाक्तावेशावसानिकम् ।

यत्सुखं ब्रह्मतत्त्वस्य तदेव स्वाक्यमुच्यते ॥

5. VB, p. 59 : the first passage is :

क्षीस्रानन्दनदविभूतानन्दशक्तिसमावेशान्ते यत् षण्णुरणनरूपं ब्रह्मतत्त्वस्य सुखं परब्रह्मानन्दः ।

The second is : क्षीरस्रुत्ु अभिव्यक्तिकारणमेव ।

6. The verse is :

लेहनमन्थनकोटौः क्षोभुकस्य भरत. स्मृतेः ।

शक्त्यभिवेशपि देवेशि भवेदानन्दसंश्रयः ॥

complex Trantric explanation, which, it says, is Abhinava's!1 Could this

mean that Abhinava had himself written a commentary on the Vijñāna-

bhairava, now lost ? Reading through the commentary on these verses by

Śivopādhyāya, one is struck by the fact that he too uses the terms of Abhinava

from aesthetics. Clearly he also felt their relevance here. Surely it is the

kind of speculation found in these remarkable mystic verses of the VB that is

responsible, at least in part, for Abhinava's own philosophy, where worldly

pleasures are not to be rejected.

Another work, of perhaps even greater importance, is the Yogavāsiṣṭha-

mahārāmāyana.2 This is one of the most extraordinary texts of mediaeval

India. To claim it for Kashmir Śaivism would be unjust, since the work

itself stresses the fact that it belongs to no one school. The terminology is

clearly heavily influenced by Kashmir Śaivism, but it is just as deeply marked

by Buddhism and by Advaita Vedānta. What we cannot know for certain is

whether Abhinava knew this text or not. There is a tradition current in

Kashmir that he commented on the YV.3 Dr. K. C. Pandey informs us that

he has seen parts of this commentary in manuscript form in Kashmir.

There is some likelihood that the author of the YV knew the Dhvanyā-

loka,4 and we already have quotations from the work by the thirteenth

century,so that it appears reasonable to say that it was written in Kashmir,5

sometime between the ninth century A. D. and the twelfth.6 The work is

1. VB, p. 60 :

इति अभिनवगुपादः !

2. Yogavāsiṣṭhamahārāmāyana, edition with the commentary Vāsiṣṭhamahā-

rāmāyanatātparyaprakāśa ( a singularly uninteresting commentary of very little help

in real difficulties ), by Wāsudeva Laxmaṇa Śāstri Paṇśīkar, NSP, Bombay, 1918, in two

volumes.

3. See K. C. Pandey, Abhinavagupta, p. 28-29 : " There is enough evidence to

show that he wrote many other works besides the above...His commentary on the Yoga-

vāsiṣṭha. We have no other source of information about it than a tradition current

among Kashmiriian Pandits ".

4. This was first pointed out by V. Raghavan, "The Date of the Yogavāsiṣṭha",

J. O. R. Vol. XIII, Part II, 1939, p. 121-123. The important verse of Ānanda that we

quote and translate later is copied almost identically in Vol. II, p. 1521 ( VIB, 190,

verse 89 ). YV, VI B, 197, verses 15-17 are very similar to the D. Āl. I, 4. There can

be little doubt that the YV is the borrower here.

5. See Raghavan, " The Yogavāsiṣṭha and the Bhagavad Gītā and the place

of origin of the Yogavāsiṣṭha ", p. 73, J. O. R. Vol. XIII, Part I, January-March 1939.

" Hence the suggestion that Kashmir was the place where the Yogavāsiṣṭha was

produced deserves acceptance, " op. cit., p. 82.

6. See Raghavan, op. cit., p. 128 : " What is the lower limit to the date of

the Yogavāsiṣṭha is a question which I can answer here. Scholars have up till now

pointed out Vidyāraṇya as the earliest to cite the Yogavāsiṣṭha. We can take up the

( Continued on next page

unique in many ways; one in particular interests us here : it is the only work in Sanskrit ( apart from the Mahābhārata) that illustrates one of Ānanda's and Abhinava's pet doctrines : the relation between śāstra and kāvya. The work itself1 says that it is meant as both, and all of its thirty-three thousand verses bear out this boast. Not only does it contain remarkable philosophical doctrines, but many of the passages are as complex and literary as any of the Mahākāvyas. The philosophical stories are replete with lyric descriptions of great beauty,2 and the very language itself gives evidence of a highly literary mind.3 The author was clearly aware of all the terminology from literary criticism,4 and makes use of it, thus illustrating Abhinava's very philosophy. If he preceded Abhinava, then we can be certain that

Continued from previous page ) lower limit to the date of the Yogavāsiṣṭha by a century. The Śaktimuktāvalī ( G. O. S. edn. ) was compiled by Vaidya Bhānu for Jalhana in A. D. 1258. On pp. 412, 417, 439, 448 and 451 of this anthology, the Yogavāsiṣṭha is extracted." Raghavan opts for between the 11th and the middle of the 13th century as the date for the YV. This is much closer to the truth than the unconvincing arguments of Atreya ( Philosophy of the Yogavāsiṣṭha ) and Dasgupta's claim that it should be dated before Śaṅkara. Had Abhinava known the work, it seems odd that he would not have quoted it anywhere. It is interesting to note that in the preserved portion of the commentary on the VB by Kṣemarāja, the direct disciple of Abhinavagupta, there are no quotations from the YV, whereas in the later commentary ( 18th cen. ) by Sivopādhyāya, there are numerous quotations. This seems to us to point to the fact that Kṣemarāja did not know the work.

1. YV, II, 18, 33 :

शाखं सुबोधमेवेऽं सालंकारविभूषितम् । काव्यं रसमयं चारु द्वष्टान्तैः प्रतिपादितम् ॥

2. On this aspect of the work, see J. Masson and B. K. Matilal, "A love-story from eighth-century India" In the Jadarpar Journal of Comparative Literature, 1966.

3. We think of such passages as III. 16. 1-17, with its descriptions of artistic delights. Also VIA. 104, 15-21 for a fine discourse on the ill luck of a woman in spring who is not able to make love with a man. The remarkable story of Gādhi ( V. 45-50 ), who dreams, in one second an entire life that turns out to have actually taken place in another dimension, is replete with the most extraordinary literary passages. There is no finer example in world literature of a profound philosophical mind with a genius for artistic description, even though many of the verses betray a certain lack of traditional literary education ( odd syntax, unorthodox similes etc. ). There is a fullness and an overflowing of the creative spirit in this work such as we have never come across in any other Sankrit text.

4. The word śama and its derivatives are to be found on virtually every page of the YV ( e. g. VI. 68. 29 ; V. 25. 4 ) ; viśrānti also occurs constantly ( e. g. IV. 39. 20 ; VI. 42. 3 ) ; camatkāra is also very common ( e. g. III. 14. 45 ) ; tanmayi is not a rare expression ( e. g. IV. 42. 11 ). Clearly the author is aware of the terms of literary criticism, for we find at VIB. 83. 6 : नान्यव्यवाचकसंम्बन्धे विना बोधो न जायते । VIB. 65. 1-5 contaias a number of puns on rasa and rasikajana.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

31

Abhinava derived a great deal of his inspiration from the YV, and if the author of the YV succeeded Abhinava, then it is just as clear that the YV derived its inspiration from Abhinava. In any case, both authors are closely related. One doctrine which is remarkably similar to passages from the VB and to passages in the Tantrāloka that we shall shortly examine, is the emphasis on being unfettered in one's enjoyment of life. Thus there is a passage where Vasiṣṭha tells Rāma that he, Rāma, is now a jīvanmukta, who knows that his consciousness is ever pure, and so he should : “ Drink, live, make love, for you have obtained the far-shore of worldly existence.”1

Such verses are not rare in the YV, e. g :

“ It is all the same (if the realised man ) be, with unbridled passion ( uddāmamanmatham ), given to heavy drink, or dance, or if, on the other hand, he abandon all society and go off alone to the mountains. ”2

The number of verses in which ānanda is described in terms to which we are now used from Abhinava, are legion. Here are just a few examples :

“ That is genuine happiness wherein the mind ceases to function. Such happiness is not possible in heaven, just as it is not possible for a house of ice to exist in the desert. ”3

And on a theme that Abhinava will develop himself :

“ Higher than a kingdom, than heaven, than the moon, than the status of Maghavan and even than the delight that arises in making love with one's beloved is the happiness proceeding from the extinction of desires. ”4

The YV tells us that “ all beings strive for bliss ”.5 Speaking of ātmānanda, a term of which the book is very fond, it says :

1. पिब विहर रमस्व प्राप्तसंसारपारः। YV. v. 50, 75.

2. YV. V. 56, 53 :

उद्दाममन्यः पानतत्परो वापि नृत्यतु ।

सर्वसङ्कपरिल्हागी सम्मोदयातु वा गिरौ ॥

3. YV. VIA 44, 26 :

यत्र नाम्युदितं चित्तं तत्‍त्रसुखमसृङ्खलम्‌।

न स्वर्गेऽपि सभारति मरीचि हिमगुहं यथा ॥

4. YV. V. 74, 44 :

अपि राज्यादपि स्वर्गादपि‍नन्दोरपि माधवात्‌।

अपि कान्तासमाश्लिष्यनन्दादपि परमं सुखम् ॥

We suppose that indu here means something like candrāloka.

5. आनन्दमेव भूतानि यतन्ते यानि कानिचित्‌। YV. VIA 108. 20.

VII

"That is the highest place, the peaceful way (i. e. state), the eternal good, happiness (śiva). Delusion no longer disturbs the man who has found rest (viśrānti) there."1

Such verses, many of them very lovely, could be multiplied indefinitely.2

1. YV, V 54, 70 :

तत्पदं सा गतिः शान्ता तद्ब्रह्म शाश्वतं शिवम् ।

तत्र विश्वान्तमाश्रित्य भूयः नो बाधते भ्रमः ॥

2. We have hardly done justice to the importance of this fascinating work. There are many more passages relevant to the issues we are considering here. We think of the extraordinary explanation at VI B 83, 18 of Śiva at the end of time dancing and : यथैक्यं हि तदृदृढे चिद्वनस्पन्दनं निजम् ।

It is almost identical with the explanation that Abhinava gives in the A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 21. The dance of Devī (at VI B, 85) is similarly explained and again linked up with the concept of spanda ( one of the key terms in Kashmir Śaivism ), so often used in the YV (e. g. at III. 67. 6 it is equated with cinmātra ). Many other passages bring to mind Abhinavagupta and his ideas on Śantarasa. Thus at VI B 39, 36 we are told : यथा नार्थो न संसारः शान्तमेवावशिष्यते ।

" when the world and the "I" disappear, only tranquillity is left." A verse that occurs frequently ( with minor variations ) is : न दुःखमस्ति न सुखं शान्तं शिवमयं जगत् ।

( VI B 37, 39 ) which we can compare with the NŚ, Vol. I,(G. O. S.), p. 334 and with the verse quoted below from the Viṣnudharmottarāpurāṇa. Śānta is said to be the end of desire for which there is nothing comparable in the universe : इच्छोद्दयो यथा दुःखमिच्छाशान्तिरयं सुखम् ।

एतथा न नरके नापि ब्रह्मलोकेऽपि नभूयते ॥

( VI B 36, 24 ) on which the commentary quotes the verse yac ca kāmasukham loke etc. (p. 1139 ), which Ānanda quotes in the Dhvanyāloka, p. 390. The tree that gives viśrānti is said (VI. B 44, 20 ) to be vairāgyarasapuṣṭātmā. A passage very interesting in the context of rasa is VI B 41, 5-6 :

चिच्चमत्कारमात्रात्मकल्पनारज्जनं हि ।

संस्यातुं केन शक्यन्ते खे जगच्चित्रपुत्रिका: ॥

रसभावविकाराद्यं रक्षण्यभिन्नयैव च ॥

परमार्थप्रति प्रायः खे स्फुरणस्यम्भार्तिका: ॥

Note the commentary on this (p. 1150 ) : चिच्चमत्कारमात्रात्मकमनो ये जीवास्तेषां कल्पना-मात्रात्मक रज्जनं रुलुमण्डनं खेच्छाराधिका नाट्यरसरङ्गमा यासाम् ।

जगच्चित्रपुत्रिका: खे नाट्यपुत्रिकाः पर-णानव्य: । रसैः शृङ्गारादिभिरमावः स्थायिभावविकारः कम्पादिविसंचारिभावैराढचर्य यथा स्वात्तथा ।

A similar verse, betraying the same knowledge of aesthetic theory is VI B 1, 18-19 :

रसभावनमन्तस्ते माळं भवतु कर्मसु ।

दारुयन्त्रमयैर्येषु परार्थमिव कुर्वतः ॥

नीरसाः एव ते सन्तु समस्तेन्द्रियसंविदः ।

आकारमात्रसङ्क्ष्या इमन्ततों लता इव ॥

on which the commentary (p. 1070 ) reads : यथा परेऽपि कौतुकार्थं नृत्यादि कुर्वत इव स्थितस्य दारुप्रतिकायनस्य नटवच्चेष्टारादिरसमावनं नास्ति तद्वत््वापि कुर्वतो विपयमुखे मुखं श्रयेय रसभावनं कौतुकादिषु भवितव्यर्थ: ।

( Continued on next page

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

33

There are many passages from Kashmir Śaiva literature that helped to stamp Abhinava's philosophy.

Here, for example, is a fine passage from the Parātriṁśikā1 :

" He sees, without any doubt, through the śaktis of Śiva ( as if things were ) right in front of him. This is the attainment of immortality, the experience of the Self. This is the initiation into Nirvāṇa, and that which establishes the existence of the world. "2

And here is an important verse from Somānanda's Śivadrṣṭi3 :

" When one attains great bliss, or when one sees a friend after a long absence, meditating on the joy that arises, one merges into it, and one's mind becomes one with it. "4

It is impossible to say how influential for Abhinava was the Tattvāloka of Ānandavardhana. The work has been lost, and unfortunately no quotations at all have been preserved. All we know of this work is what Abhinava tells us in the fourth Uddyota of his Locana5 : that it dealt, in great detail, with the relation between śāstra and kāvya, poetry and philosophy.

Continued from previous page )

On triṇāsantyāga ( cf. Ānanda's sthāyibhāva for śāntarasa, namely triṣṇā-kṣaya ), see V 24, 52. Note how dolls sing and talk with goddesses : VI B 6, 41. On the mirror image, cf. II 15, 6; II 13, 75. Note VI A 26-36 : nāhamasi na cānyoḍasti नाहमसि न चान्योऽस्ति न मनो न च मानसम् which is a verse quoted in the Tantrāloka, Vol. 11, p. 44. Cf. Tantrāloka, II p. 173. The V V. stresses the relativity of time ( and how profound experiences escape from ordinary notions of duration ) : III 60, 22 : क्षणः स्वप्ने भवेत्कल्पः कल्पश्व भवति क्षणः.

Finally one thinks of the awesome : maunam evānugisyate ( VI B 83, 29 ). "Only silence remains. "

1. Parātriṁśikāvivṛti of Abhinavagupta, ed. by M. R. Shastri, KSTS. No. XVIII, Bombay, 1918, p. 258-259.

2. साक्षात्प्रतव्यत्संदृश्यमाकृतो हृदशक्तिभिः ।

इयमेव हि निर्वाणदीक्षा च विश्वसृकावसाधिनी ॥

( इयं संवित्प्रकाशिता यावत् )

We are not sure how to take akṛtikh. Is it the subject of sākṣāt paśyati or its object ?

3. Utpaladeva's Śivadṛṣṭi, ed. by M. K. Shastri, KSTS, LIV. Srinagar, 1934, p. 12. The verse is also number 71 of the Vijñānabhairava. p. 60. Abhinavagupta quotes the verse in the ĪPVV. Vol. II, p. 50.

4. आनन्दे महति प्राप्ते वा बान्धवे चिरात् ।

आनन्दसुध्रुतं ध्यायात्तत्सन्मयो भवेत् ॥

5. Locana, p. 533 : एतद् ग्रंथकारण ( i. e. Ānandavardhana ) तत्त्वालोके कितलोचकमिह त्वस्य न मुख्योद्वसर इति नासाम्भितदत्तदृशिम् . It is clear from the Vṛtti passage on p. 533 of the D. Āl. that the work dealt with what Ānanda calls the śāstranaya and the kāvyanaya.

The Tattvāloka is also referred to by Abhinava in his Locana on Udd. I ( p. 67 ).

likely Ānanda was inspired to this from his speculations on the nature of the Mahābhārata as both a work of philosophy and a work of poetry. We can justly presume that many of Abhinava's ideas come from this text.

Another question that must go unanswered, though it is rich in possibilities, is Abhinava's debt to Buddhism. We simply do not know anything definite on this problem at all, though it is very tempting to speculate.

INFLUENCES FROM SPECULATION ON Śāntarasa

It is clear that Abhinava did have access to certain old manuscripts of the Nāṭyaśāstra in which nine rasas were enumerated, including śantarasa, and not the usual eight. Apart from the famous Kālidāsa passage which mentions only eight, there is reason to believe that Abhinava himself realised, with an extraordinary display of intellectual integrity, that eight was the older and more genuine reading. We say this because when he quotes the verse from the NS enumerating the rasas, in the Locana, he quotes the

1. Abhinava of course knew Dharmakīrti whom he refers to with great respect in the IPVV, e.g. Vol. II, p. 111 : प्रामाणिकैर्‌ध्वार्यधर्मकीर्तिराचार्यदिङिनागग्रन्थन्थानुरोधात्पक्षपातो‌दवमभिप्रेत, न पुनरस्य स्वरचितैर‌वरोधित्. He again refers to him by name at IPVV, I, 279; II, 46 and 174. He mentions the Pramāṇavārttika by name at several places in the IPVV. E.g. Vol. II, 220; 223; 228; 234; 400; Vol. III. p. 11; 72; 103; 127; 138; 140; 200; 389 and 397. In defending dhvani against those who claimed that it was ineffable, Ānanda has the following line : वचननिर्देश्यत्व सर्वलक्षणविषयं बौद्धानां प्रसिद्धं तत्तन्मतपरीक्षायां ग्रन्थान्तरे निरुपविष्यम्: इह तु ग्रन्थान्तरशरणत्वप्रकाशनं सहधयवैमनस्यप्रदायको‌पि न प्रक्रियते । Abhinava, commenting on this passage ( Locana, p. 519 ) remarks : ग्रन्थान्तर इति । विनि‌क्षेपिकायां धर्मोत्तरस्या विवृतिरित्थं प्रथकृता कृतैव तत्र्व तद्व्यास्यास्ततम्! It is really most unusual that Ānanda should write a commentary on a Buddhist text. This certainly shows that Buddhist doctrines must have exercised at least a fascination for Ānanda and thus for Abhinava as well. Under NS. VI. 45 (G.O.S. p. 299 ), there is Abhinava's odd remark that some who believe in Śāntarasā add the Buddha as the devatā :

बुद्ध: शान्तेष्टदृजोडधिगुते इति शान्तवादिन: कैचिद्रथान्ति । He then goes to remark : बुद्धो जिन: परोपकारकपर: पुब्बो वा । Is it not significant that the only drama that Abhinava quotes from in support of śāntarasa is the Buddhist drama, the Nāgānanda ? Oddly enough, however, there exists at present no Buddhist text on alañkāraśastra. It seems rather unlikely that Dharmakīrti wrote a work entitled simply "Alañkāra", as Kane has noted ( H.S.P. p. 65 ) : "So the Buddhist logician and philosopher Dharmakīrti may have been a poet, but there is nothing to substantiate the claim to regard him as a writer on Alaṅkāra". See Śivaprasada Bhattacharya, " Studies in Indian Poetics ", Calcutta 1964, which contains the reprint of an article entitled " The Neo-Buddhist Nucleus in Alaṅkāraśāstra ", though as Kane points out, the quotation from the Vāsavadattā is at the most ambiguous inspite of what Śivarāma says. There seems to us no likelihood that the kārikās of the Alaṅkārasekhara could be by Dharmakīrti though we have no space to give our arguments. Note finally that Abhinava often quotes one Rāhula, a commentator on the Nāyiaśāstra, and that this is a Buddhist name.

2. Vikramorvaśīya, II. 18.

3. NS VI, 15, quoted in the Locana on p. 83.

verses with only eight rasas. Moreover, throughout the A. Bh.1 he speaks, whenever he mentions śānta, of those who “read” śānta. We cannot therefore know how old the doctrine of ŚR is. The first author of known date to mention ŚR is Udbhata,2 who simply includes it in his enumeration of all the rasas without further comment or explanation. The interpolated śantarasa passage in the Nāṭyaśāstra, whatever it was (for it is clear that the present passage is not likely to be precisely the one that Abhinava commented on3), is nonetheless likely to have been the earliest reference to ŚR that Abhinava knew. If we, purely tentatively, place the core of the NŚ around the fourth century A. D., then all we can say is that ŚR must have been added to the text sometime before the time of Udbhata, i. e. the eighth century A. D. (unless we are to argue that it was Udbhata who first spoke of ŚR., which seems most unlikely in view of the fact that he has nothing whatever to say about it, beyond naming it). However, it is clear that for Ānanda, ŚR was a matter of controversy. Had the passage from the NŚ already existed, and had Ānanda felt that it was genuine, there would be no reason for him not to have mentioned this fact in his D. Āl., while discussing ŚR. The fact that he did not, makes us suspicious of its existence in his time. But if it was not existent, this means that it was added between the time of Ānanda and Abhinava, i. e. only a space of about one hundred years. Is this sufficient for Abhinava to speak of “old” manuscripts which contained the ŚR additions?

The influence on Abhinava of Ānanda’s speculation on ŚR will become clear from the passage we translate below. The importance of the NŚ passage (and related verses, which though they do not specifically mention ŚR, yet seem to Abhinava to imply it) will also be clarified in part II of this volume. But here we should say something of several passages4 which claim to be old, but which can at best be described as suspect.

1. E. g. A. Bh. Vol. 1, p. 299 and 332.

2. Udbhata, Kāvyālankārasārasaṅgraha, IV, 4.

Note that Vararuci’s Ubhayābhisārikā mentions a drama contest in which the phrase aṣṭau rasāḥ occurs (Catturbhāṇī, Madras, 1922, p. 13). See A. K. Warder and T. Venkatacharya’s recent translation, Madras, 1967.

3. For one thing he does not comment on all of the passage, and for another, the terms used contradict his own. Thus the sthāyibhāva is śama (which Abhinava attempts to interpret), and tattvajñāna is given (p. 332, NŚ. Vol.1, G. O. S.) as a vibhāva of śānta!

4. One should note too the passage from the VJ of Kuntaka. In his résumé of the fourth umeṣa, S. K. De quotes a line on this subject (p. 239, second edition): रामायणमहाभारतयोरैश्वर्य नित्याकृतित्व पूर्वसुरिभिरेव निरूपितम् | “Ancient sages have described śānta as the main rasa of both the Rāmāyaṇa and the

(Continued on next page

In the twentieth chapter of the Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa, we find the following stanzas :

" Śāntarasa is to be considered as independent and as standing separate." 1

The point here is that four of the other rasas give rise to four others according to Bharata. Since Bharata does not mention śānta, and since there are only an even number of eight rasas, there is nothing it could come from.

" O King, they say that śānta arises from vairāgya. It can be enacted by means of taking on religious paraphernalia and through such means as compassion for all beings, meditation, encouraging others towards the path of mokṣa etc." 2

" Śāntarasa is that wherein one feels the same toward all creatures, where there is no pleasure, no sorrow, no hatred and no envy." 3

It is clear that these lines are simply a pastiche of the various passages which the reader can see in Part II. It seems to us unlikely that this passage antedates Abhinava. The editor, Miss Priyabala Shah, thinks differently :

" Thus in the present stage of our knowledge, it would be safe to put Viṣṇudharmottara somewhere between the first or rather the second half of the fifth century A. D., and the first half of the seventh century A. D., i. e. between circa 450 and 650 A. D." 4 But in dating any Purāṇa text, to date more than single sections ( and indeed, perhaps more than single stanzas ! ), even very roughly, is a hazardous undertaking. It is perfectly possible that certain sections of the VDP are as old as Miss Shah claims the whole is, but

Continued from previous page )

Mahābhārata". This can only be a reference to Ānanda's fourth Uddyota ( Kōrikā 5, the vrtti on this ). The puzzling thing is that Ānanda describes karuṇa as the aṅgirasā of the Rāmāyaṇa, and not śānta ! ( Moreover, is it not a bit odd to refer to Ānanda as pārvasūribhih ? ) Note that the MS of the Vakroktijīvitam breaks off in the middle of a sentence discussing the Nāgānanda ( De, op. cit., p. 246 ) ( although Dr. Nagendra in his " Hindi Vakroktijīivita ) claims that the work cannot be said to be incomplete since it deals with all the six topics it mentions at I. 18, although of course there is no colophon ) and we cannot know, therefore, what rasa Kuntaka held to be the major one in the Nāgānanda.

1. Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa ( VDP ) p. 100, Vol. I, 9-11.

शान्तो रसः स्वातन्त्र्योद्गृहीत एव व्यवस्थितः : 1

2. शान्तस्य तु समुत्पत्तिं वैराग्यतः स्मृता ।

स चाभिनेयो भवति लिङ्गधरणतस्तथा ॥

सर्वभूतसुहृद्याद्यानमोक्षमार्गप्रवर्तने :

3. नाक्ति यत्र सुखं दुःखं न द्वेषो नापि मत्सरः ।

समः सर्वेषु भूतेषु स शान्तः प्रथितो रसः ।

4. VDP, third Kaṇḍa, Vol. I, O. I. Baroda, 1958, p. XXVI.

there is no likelihood that the same is true of the Alañkāra sections. It

would be preposterous to hold that such a composite and clearly derivative

work as the VDP ( indeed any Purāṇa ) actually originated an idea such

as ŚR.

This same reasoning can apply to the Jain text, the Anuyogadvāra-

sutra.1 We cannot of course say for certain that the following passage is

interpolated, and thus it could, in theory, be as old as the fifth century A. D.

But the possibility of interpolation, especially in the case of a text that

provides examples of numbered objects, is not unlikely. In any case, this

could not possibly lie at the origin of ŚR, especially since it is the only

reference to śāntarasa in Jain literature before the tenth century A. D.

णव कव्वरसा पणणत्ता, तं जहा—

वीरो सिंगारो अद्भुओ अ रोदो अ हसिअ बोद्धव्वो ।

वेलणओ बीमच्छो हासो कलुणओ पसंतो अ ॥

णिहोससमणसमाहाणसंभवो जो पसंतभावेण ।

अविकारलक्खणो सो रसो पसंतो त्ति णायव्वो ॥

पसंतो रसो जहा—

सव्भावनिब्भिगारं उवसंतपसंतसोमदिट्ठीअं ।

ही जह मुणिणो सोहइ मुहकमलं पीवरसीरीअं ॥

"There are nine2 rasas in poetry. They are :

'The heroic, the sexual, the wondrous,

the wrathful, as well as shyness,

the disgusting, the comic,

the pathetic and the calm'.

Śāntarasa is to be known as characterised by an absence of ( mental ) per-

1. We have used the Āgamodaya Samiti edition, Pothi form, Bombay 1924,

with Maladhāri Hemacandrasūri's ( not Hemacandra, the author of Kāvyānuśāsana )

Sanskrit commentary. We have just received a very fine edition of the Nandi-

suttam and the Anuogadadārām, ed. by Muni Punyavijaya, Pt. Dalsukha Mālvaṇia

and Pt. Amritlāl Mohanlāl Bhojak, Jain-Āgama Series No. 1, Shri Mahāvīra Jaina

Vidyālaya, Bombay, 1968. See p. 121, St. 262. For the date of this text see the exce-

llent introduction to this volume.

2. Note that bhayānaka is not included in this list. In its place is velanao

( vridanaka ), the sthāyibhāva of which is vridā, or lajjā ( p. 137-138 ). According to

the commentator, bhayānaka is included under raudrarasa.

38

turbation; as arising from composure of the mind divested of all passions and as marked by tranquillity.1

Here is an example :2

' Oh, ( look ) how the lotus-like face of the sage shines ! It is full of the beauty ( of mental calm ) and genuinely devoid of any contortions ( due to the upsurge of passions ), with its calm ( devoid of all urge to look at beautiful objects ) and gentle eyes unperturbed ( by anger, lust, etc. )' "

Even if both of these passages were older than Abhinava, there is little likelihood that he would have seen either.

TANTRIC INFLUENCE

The only contemporary description we have of Abhinavagupta is one of exceptional interest. Allowing of course for stylisation, the picture is nonethless extremely vivid. Abhinava is presented as a mystic of a most unusual sort : he is surrounded by women, playing a musical instrument ( it is not unlikely that this was at the time of Abhinava's life when he was expounding the text of the NS on music ), drinking wine and yet engaged in the most intellectual of pursuits, commenting on a text. The work is called the Dhanyasioka, and consists of only four verses. According to Prof. Pandey,3 the man who wrote them was a direct disciple of Abhinava, and actually saw him as he describes him in the verses. Here is our translation of this important passage :

" May the glorious god Dakṣiṇāmūrti ( Abhinavagupta ), who is an incarnation of Śiva, protect us ! Out of his deep compassion he has taken a new bodily form and come to Kashmir. He sits in the middle of a garden of grapes, inside a pavilion made of crystal and filled with beautiful paintings. The room smells wonderful because of flower garlands, incense-sticks and ( oil -) lamps. Its walls are smeared with sandal-paste and other such things. The room is constantly resounding with musical instruments, with songs and

1. Hemacandra explains nirdosa as hṛsādidosarahita. Samādhāna is composure of the mind : विषयवशोक्रोधनिवृत्तिलक्षणं स्वास्त्यम् । He takes praśāntabhaveṇa in the sense of krodhādiparītyāgajāyāmānah, " arising from the renunciation of anger, etc. ". But this involves repeating the idea conveyed by nirdosa. We, therefore, understand it as standing for praśāntabhävena upalaksitah ( the instrumental of characterisation-upalaksane tritīyā ), and take praśāntabhāva to mean praśāntattva, i. e. the same thing as sama.

2. Our translation of this stanza follows the commentary, p. 139. There is one puzzling word there ; on p. 140 the commentary writes : पद्य यो ! यथा मुनेःमुख-कमलं शोभते ! कथंभूतम् ? । सन्नावतो न मान्त्रानात्: Now what does this mātrsthānatah stand for ? Perhaps mātrsthānā is a wrong sanskritisation of maitthāna for māyāsthāna, i. e. " not with deceit, sincerely. "

3. K. C. Pandey, Abhinavagupta, p. 20.

with dancing. There are crowds of women Yogins and realised beings ( siddha ) with magic powers. It is equipped with a golden seat from which pearls are hanging. It has a soft awning ( talima ) stretched over it ( as a canopy ). Abhinava is attended by all his numerous students, with Kṣemarāja at their head, who are writing down everything he says. To his side stand two women, partners in Tantric rites ( d̥tī ), who hold in one hand a jug of wine ( śivarasa ) and a box full of betel rolls, and in the other hand a lotus and a citron. Abhinava has his eyes trembling in ecstasy. In the middle of his forehead is a conspicuous tilaka made of ashes. He has a rudrākṣa bead hanging from his ear. His long loose hair is held by a garland of flowers. He has a long beard and golden ( reddish-brown ) skin; his neck is dark with shining yakṣapaṇika powder. His upavīta string is hanging down loose from his neck. He wears a silken cloth ( as a dhotī ) as white as moonbeams, and he sits in the Yogic position called vīrāsana. One hand is held on his knee holding a rosary with his fingers clearly making the sign ( mudrā ) that signifies his knowledge of the highest Śiva. He plays on his resonating lute with the tips of the quivering fingers of his lotus-like left hand." 1

Clearly this is a picture of a Tantric rasika. It would be a grave error to suppose that Abhinavagupta accepted only a token form of Tantrism.2 The Kaula system on which he comments so elaborately in

1. The text has been edited by Pandey, op. cit. p. 738 from a single manu- script preserved in Banaras :

द्राक्षारामस् मध्ये स्फटिकमणिमये मण्डपे चित्ररम्ये पुष्पस्रग्धूपदीपैः परिमिलन् वच्चिते चन्दनाद्रेः। वातैर्गीतैः सनुते सततमुखरिते योगिनी सङ्घै- राकीर्णे स्वर्णपीठे रुद्रतिलकमतले बद्धमुक्ताविताने ॥

आसीनः क्षेमराजश्रितभिरखिलैः सेवितः शिष्यवर्गैः पादोपान्ते निपतणोरवहितहृदयैरुक्तमुक्तं लिखद्भिः। द्वात्रिंशद् पार्श्वस्थिताभ्यां शिवरसरकार्ङ्क पूर्णाम्बुजैवलपेटी दत्ताभ्यां विप्रकीर्णाभ्यां परिमरहरिणाम्भोरुहान्तर्लिलायाम्‌ ॥

आनन्दान्दोलिताक्षः स्फुटकृततिलको भस्मना भालमध्ये रुद्राक्षोल्लासिकर्णः कलितकचभरो मालया लम्बकुर्चे। रक्ताङ्घ्रि यक्षपङ्कोदसदितगळो लम्बमुक्तोपवीत- क्षौमं वासो वसानः शशिकरधवलं वीरयोगासनस्थः ॥

जान्वासक्तहस्तः स्फुटपरमशिवज्ञानमुद्राक्षस्र्त्रो वामश्रीपाणिपद्मस्फुरितनखमुखेर्वन्दिताद्वैतवाणाम्‌। श्रीकण्ठेशावतारः परमकरुणया प्राप्यकार्मीरदेश- श्रीमात्रः पातु साक्षाद्भिनववपुषा दक्षिणामूर्तिदेवः ॥

2. For good bibliographies on Tantrism, see M. Eliade, " Yoga, Immortality and Freedom ", Bollingen Series, Pantheon Inc. N. Y. 1958, and A. Bharati, " The Tantric Tradition ", Rider & Co., London, 1965.

VIII

40

ज्ञान्तरस

his Tantrāloka repelled all Westerners and most Indians who knew anything about it. This is a great pity, for it is surely one of the most interesting forms of practical mysticism ever invented. What concerns us here is the ādiyāga, the rahasyaṿidhi ( secret ritual ) belonging to the Kaula school. Abhinava devotes the whole of the 29th āhnika of the Tantrāloka1 to very elaborate explanations of this ritual. The text is extremely obscure on those passages that interest us the most, partly on purpose2 and partly because this subject has been rarely seriously studied, so that one is ignorant of most of the technical terms. In fact, apart from K. C. Pandey's use of the Tantrāloka in his work on Abhinavagupta, nobody else seems to have used, for any extensive purpose, this massive text.3 What is of interest to us is the similarity this process bears to a dramatic performance and the influence that this must have exercised on Abhinava's incipient theory of aesthetics.4 The ritual is in fact an elaborate play that takes the greater part of the day. The goal is the same as the goal in any ordinary drama, to reach a state of perfect equanimity, blissful repose, where the Dūti identifies herself with Śakti, and the male identifies himself with Śiva. As Abhinava puts it in an extraordinary verse in this section :

"I do not exist, nor does anyone else. Only as śaktis do I exist."5 "If one meditates, for even a moment, on one's real natural (Self) that is pure rest, then, one bocomes ( like ) a great bird, and finds a woman to make spiritual

1. Tantrāloka, Vol. XI, part II, p. 1-172.

2. Op. cit., p. 115, verse 169 :

न पथ्रते रहस्यवात् रूपतः: शब्ददैरयैः पुनः।

See also p. 19, Jayaratha :

स रहस्यवात् समयमदभ्राभवाच नेहाप्यामिः प्रदर्शितः।

3. Professor R.Gnoli writes to me (June 11, 1969 ) : "I have just completed the translation of the Tantrāloka by Abhinavagupta, which has kept me very busy for several years. The book will be shortly published by a Firm of Turin, in Italian ".

4. Although Kane ( H. S. P., p. 242 ) and K. C. Pandey ( Abhinavagupta, p. 33 ) place the Tantrāloka earlier than the Locana, this is due to what must have been a wrong reading in the early editions of the Dhvanyāloka in the Kāvyamālā edition.

There the reading was given as—

तदुक्तरीर्णे तु सर्व परमेश्वराद्रयं ब्रह्मेसच्चिदानुसारेण विदितं तत्रालोकग्रन्थं विचार्य।

These readings do not fit the context as well as the reading given by Kuppuswami Sastri in his edition, p. 125 :

तदुक्तरीर्णवे तु सर्व परमेश्वराद्रयं ब्रह्मेसच्चिदाकारार्ण न न विदितं तत्स्वालोकग्रन्थं विरचयतेत्सास्ताम्‌।

This is also the reading given in the edition with Bālapriyā.

5. Verse 64, p. 44 :

नाहमसि न चान्योऽस्ति केवलः: शक्तयरस्त्वहम्‌।

(इत्येवं वासनां कुयात्‌ संवेदा स्युतिमात्रतः॥ )

Note that the first part of this verse ( nāham asmi na cānyo 'sti ) is identical with a stanza in the Yogavāsiṣṭha, VI A, 26, 36, p. 828. It is found with variations, throughout the YV.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

love to ".1 Abhinava uses the same terms for both experiences.2 The

whole ritual, according to Jayaratha, in his remarkable commentary on the

Tantrāloka, is to "reveal" or "suggest" (abhivyakti)3 ātmānanda. The

strangest and the most disturbing element in the ritual involves the Dūti

(note the similarity to love-poetry, where every Nāyikā must have a Dūti).

The culmination of the ritual is concerned with this Dūti, who identifies

herself with Siva's Sakti. Jayaratha quotes a text to the effect that this Dūti

should be :

"One's own wife, one's sister, one's mother, one's daughter or one's

beautiful friend".4

But Jayaratha points out that Abhinava (?) did not accept one's own

wife as a Dūti, for one might conceive purely carnal lust in her case,5 which

goes against the whole ritual6 where the goal is to enter a state of pure

consciousness.7 The Dūti is very elaborately described in fourteen verses

from the Sritantrasārabhattāraka, with all the paraphernalia of a mahā-

kāvya.8 Now follow the ordinarily9 forbidden acts,10 the three makāras :

1. The rest of the stanza is taken from Jayaratha, p. 45 :

क्षणमध्यत्र विश्रम्य सदृशे यदि भावयेत् ।

तदा स खेचरो भुत्वा योगिनोमेलनं लभेत् ॥

2. Thus on p. 118, verse 176, the words camatkṛti, rasa and ānanda are all found.

3. The same idea is found in the Kulārnava-tantra, under V. 80 (Jivananda

Vidyasagara's ed.) :

आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो रूपं तच्च देहं व्यवस्थितम् ।

तस्याभिव्यक्तये मर्हं योगिभिस्तेन पीयते ॥

Cf. what Jayaratha says on p. 102 :

स्वानुभवमात्रैकस्वरूपस्यार्थस्य प्रकाशकामिव्यक्तिकमिलर्थः ।

4. Jayaratha, p. 72 :

स्वपत्नी भगिनी माता दुहिता वा शुभा सखी ।

5. Jayaratha, p. 73 :

स्वपल्नां हि रिरंसासंभवनाया अपि अवकाशः स्यात् ।

दूतीं कुयातु कार्या तु न पुनः काममोहितः ॥

6. Cf. p. 67, Jayaratha :

एवमेककुलमार्गानुप्रविष्टेन सर्वथा स्वात्मानन्दव्यञ्जकतामात्रपरतया सैवं, न तु तद्रर्थेन ।

(not out of greed).

7. Jayaratha, p. 72 : अनवच्छिन्नपरसंवित्स्वरूपावेशः ।

8. Jayaratha, p. 68-69.

9. Jayaratha often quotes verses in support of the seriousness of the aspirant,

e.g. on p. 67 (under verse 99) :

विना गुरूं बिना देवं मूढवत्परमेश्वरि ।

मध्यमांसादिनो निलयं पशवस्ते न संशयः ॥

10. Verse 10, p. 7 :

अत्र यागे च यद्रव्यं निषिद्धं शाक्तसंततो ।

तदेव योजयेद्भावं वामार्ष्टपरिशुद्धताम् ॥

wine ( madya also called Śivarasa at V. 17), meat ( māṃsam ) and lovemaking ( maithuna ). These three, when combined together, give the highest bliss ( ānanda ) and the highest bliss is none other than Parabrahman.1 Abhinava points out that this ritual expands ( vikāsa ) the heart, by inducing a state of complete freedom from desire ( nairākānksya), since one's body ( through the use of perfume, incense and flowers, verse 108, p. 77 ) and mind, are mutually satisfied. The actual sexual union,2 described in verse 50 is said to give rise to ānandaviśrānti, " rest in bliss", on which Jayaratha has the significant gloss (p. 36 ) of svātmacamatkāra. In his exposition, Abhinava uses the term sāanta several times (e. g. verse 133, p. 95 ) and many other words and concepts which were to form his theory of aesthetics. Finally one of the major verses makes this comparison that we have been drawing inevitable :

" Because of the flow ( rasa ) of desire, through the force of the relish ( carvanā ) of outward things, which are filled with one's own flow (?), one attains the state of complete repose ( viśrāntiḍhāma ) and all phenomenal objects ( comm. bhāvajāṭā ) are merged into one's own Self. "3

1. Verses 49–50. The verses actually dealing with intercourse(e. g. 111–117) are deliberately couched in obscure and symbolic terms, so that it is very difficult to understand precisely what is meant. There is no doubt that the sexual act is preceded by elaborate fore-play directly acted out, but symbolically interpreted. Thus Jaya-ratha on verse 114, p. 83 writes : अथ चात्र परस्परानालिङ्गनपरिचुम्बनादिलक्षणः क्षोभः। The passages concerning the actual ejaculation of semen are the most obscure of all. It is clear from p. 89 and elsewhere that the face of the śakti is the most important cakra of all, and it would seem, though we are not certain if we have understood the passages correctly (e. g. p. 88 ), that the man ejaculates in the mouth of the woman. From the many quotations that Jayaratha cites, it is obvious that there existed a very elaborate and serious literature on this subject, unfortunately lost today. In explaining the difficult verse on p. 91, ( verse 128 ) Jayaratha explains that the semen should be passed back and forth from the mouth of the woman to the mouth of the man, and finally poured into a consecrated vessel. Several verses from “ the āgamas ” are quoted in support, e. g. p. 93 :

वक्त्राद्वक्त्रप्रयोगेण समाहूय महारसं। तेन सन्तर्पयेच्चक्रीं देवताबीरसङ्कुतम्॥

Abhinava himself discusses various forms of ejaculation, all supported by ancient authorities. The subject, of enormous interest to students of religion and of psychology, deserves a close and impartial investigation.

2. T. Āl. verse 97, p. 64 :

आनन्दो ब्रह्म परं तच्च देहेऽत्र त्रिषु स्थितम्। उपकारि द्वयं तत्र फलमन्यस्तदात्मकम्॥

Dvayam in this verse is explained by Jayaratha as wine and meat. Anyad is sexual intercourse. Note that Abhinava himself, verse 99, and Jayaratha as well, are careful to point out that the reason for engaging in such rituals must be transcendental, and not lust or greed, p. 66–67.

3. T. Āl. 137, p. 97 :

रञ्जनकरसात्रिजरसङ्कारितबहिर्मुखचर्वणांशेन। विश्रान्तिधाम क्विचिद्‌दृश्य स्वात्मन्यथाप्यते॥

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

Abhinava uses very similar terminology1 when speaking of śṛṅgārarasa in the Abhinavabhāratī :

" The joys of sex really apply to those who are in love with one an-other. Because it is only when one is in love that there is continual ( dhārā ) repose in sheer happiness."2

Leaving aside the extremely curious sexual contacts with one's own family ( which require a very careful pyschological, or pyschoanalytic analysis if the significance is to be found ), there is nothing in the rest of the ritual that does not bear a close resemblance to the theatre. Surely such Tantric rituals affected Abhinava's views on the eventual goal of art, and led him to his transcendental theories on the aim of the aesthetic experience. The combina-tion was unique in all of Indian history, and has produced one of the great monuments to the complexity and profundity of the human mind. If we sneer at the sexual elements, we reveal more about our own inadequacies and parochialism than about the ritual itself. It is only a lack of respect for the texts that will allow us to dispense with such passages under the excuse that they are “ indecent ”, for this they are surely not.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

It is of course impossible to give more than a brief sketch of Abhinava's amazingly rich range of thinking on aesthetic topics. What we wish to do here is to quote two long passages from the Locana with a translation. In the first, Abhinava gives a brief survey of his own philosophy of aesthetics, the earlier draft of his famous statement in the A. Bh. on the rasasūtra of Bharata. The second passage we chose because it serves to illustrate how these principles will apply to a concrete literary situation. Before giving the

1. Note how similar this is to XXVIII. 20, p. 10 vol. XI of the Tantrāloka where the actual comparison with the theatre is stated :

यथा प्रेक्षणके तत्तद्रष्ट्रुसंविद्भेदिताम्।

क्रमोदितां सभृङ्गारत एव तावेदनावतु।

योगीभ्यासैक्रमोपात्तः, तथा पूर्णा स्वसंविदम् ॥

Note also the preceding verse, no. 18, where the participants in the mystic cakra must be pūrṇasamvid and capable of tanmayībhavana, again the very terms used by Abhinava in the Locana and the Abhinavabhārati :

तत्कृतेचारनिष्ठात ये केचित्पूर्णसंविदः ।

तन्मेलकसमासक्तस्तत्पूजारपरा: सदा ॥

The next verse ( p. 10 ) speaks of tanmayata.

2. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 302 :

रतिक्रीडासार्थं च ( रति: क्रिडा ) सा च ) परमार्थतः कामिनोरतिव ।

तत्रैव सुखस्य धाराविश्रान्ते:

The next line, beginning aparasya tu and ending paramo bhogah is, we feel, important, but unfortunately we are unable to make good sense of it,

passages however, we thought it would be helpful if we indicated certain

important ideas of Abhinava from his philosophical and literary works that

will serve as an introduction to the two difficult passages to follow. (As

the reader has probably already recognised by now, all of Abhinava is

more or less difficult. It is impossible, unfortunately, to read his works the

way one reads the Dhvanyāloka, with immediate comprehension. Almost

every sentence of Abhinava's is a puzzle which must be carefully pondered

before it yields up its meaning, and even then we are not always certain to

have understood correctly.)

In his philosophical works, we find Abhinava moving towards a

synthesis of aesthetic pleasure and philosophy. The most important passage

in this respect is from Abhinava's commentary on Utpala's vivṛti on the

Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā.1 Parts of it are corrupt, or at least we have not been

able to make perfect sense of every sentence. Here is a tentative translation2 :

" And so it has been said by Śrī Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa :3 " Whatever bliss

is to be found in all of the three worlds is only a drop from the ocean of

bliss that is the god ( Śiva ) to whom I bow down." And so when a gourmet

tastes drinks ( rasa ) such as a delicious beverage, he behaves very differently

from a glutton, and distinguishes carefully : "Ah, this is like this."4 As he

does so, since he takes rest in his Self as the knower, and takes into account

predominantly only that element, namely the knowing subject, he is called

bhuñjāna (" one who enjoys "). Whenever one completely passes beyond an

ordinary state ( anyathābhāva ) and enjoys happiness, because such possible

obstacles as ( the desire for ) material gain, etc., have been excluded, as for

1. ĪPVV. Vol. II, p. 178.

त्रैलोक्योदपयत्र यो यावानानन्दः कश्चिदीयते ।

स विन्दुर्यशि तं वन्दे देवमानन्दसागरम् ॥

इति श्रीमदनारायणेन । तथा च मधुरादौ रसे औदारिकाम्यवहारवैलक्षण्येन प्रवृत्त इदमित्थमिति

प्रमातरि विश्वमनुप्रविष्टमेव प्रथनतया विमर्शान इत्युच्यते । यत्प्रत्ययात्मनयेनैवस्थामावमतिक्रम्य

सुखमास्वादते अर्जुनादिसंभार्यमाणविविधान्तरनिरासरैद्यप्यतिनिर्विलक्षणतयैकारतदी नाट्यकाव्यादिविष्पे,

तत्र वीतरागत्वादेवासौ रसना चर्वणा निःश्वसितिः प्रतीति: प्रमातृताविश्रान्तरेव, तत एव हृदयेन परामृश्य-

लक्षणेन प्राधान्येनैकपदेर्यस्यावशिष्टस्यापि प्रकाशाभासस्य वेदविभ्रान्तिस्थानादरणात्सहृदयतांौचर्ये इति

निविड़तास्वादरूषार्ष रसनातद्रोधिकरीयांकाश्चित्रतयैष रसा नवेल्यमर्थोडभिनवभारल्यां नाट्यवेदविवृत्ती वितत्य

व्युत्पादितोडस्मिर्भिरिति । तत्कुतूहलो तामेवालोकयेत । इह तु प्रकृतविमर्शकारित्वात विततः ।

तसादनुप-चरितस्य संवेदनरुपतयानत्तर्यस्य स्वातन्त्र्यसेव रसनेन कवनतया परामृशः परमानन्दो निर्दिष्ट-

शृङ्कार उच्यते । तमथ सुस्थितं 'चमत्कुतेरभावात्' मधुरादिरसावृते तु विपयरसपक्ष्यवधानम् ।

ततोऽपि काव्यस्यादौ तत्क्षवधानशून्यता तत्तद्वधानसंस्कारान्वितस्यु । तत्रापि तु तथोदितव्यवधान-

शातिरसक्रियासावधानहृदया लभन्त एव परमानन्दम् ।

3. Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa's Stvacintāmaṇi, 61.

4. This phrase occurs often in the Locana, e. g. p. 97.

instance in the context of a play or a poem where śṛṅgāra, in which the pleasure experienced is different from the kind of pleasure we derive from objects in the world, ( is the subject matter ), because of the very disappearance of obstacles ( such as desire for material gain, etc., ) this is called rasanā, carvanā, nirvṛti, pratīti and pramātṛtāviśrānti ( “ rest in the Self ” ). And then because of not caring for the established element of illumination which rests on the object to be known, there is said to be sensitivity — the aesthetic experience whose nature is undisturbed relish, and which is designated ( āś saḥṛdayatā ) principally because of the hṛdaya ( heart ) consisting in consciousness ( parāmarśa ). And so aesthetic experience ( rasanā ) consists in tasting ( āsvāda ) without any obstacles. The idea that the states of mind which are the objects of this aesthetic experience are the nine rasas has been examined at great length in my commentary on the Nātyaveda, the Abhi-navabhāratī. Anyone interested in this question should, therefore, consult that book. Since it is not really germane to the present issue, I have not examined it at length ( here ). Therefore, parāmarśa, ( consciousness ), parā-mānanda ( highest bliss ), nirvṛti ( happiness ), are all called camatkāra, because of the completeness ( or compactness - ekaghanatā ) 1 of the aesthetic experience ( rasanā ). Therefore, he correctly said : “ Because of the absence of camatkṛti ”. In the tasting of a delicious beverage and other liquids, however, there intervenes a contact with an object of the senses, whereas in poetry and drama there is a far greater absence of such intervention, although even there, the latent impressions ( saṃskāra ) of such sensory contacts permeate the ( spectator ). Still, those whose hearts are careful to dispel the part of the customary intervention of sensory contacts will attain the highest bliss ”, 2

This passage 3 is quoted in the context of camatkṛti, 4 one of the

1. On ekaghanatā see Gnoli, op. cit. p. 58.

2. There are several difficulties in this text, and we are not certain of having understood the exact implication of some of the phrases. E. g. vyapadeśyāyavavasthita-syāpi prakāśābhāgasya vedyaviśrāntasya is not clear. In the expression tato’pi kāvya-nāṭyādau tadryavadhānaśānyatā, we take tato’pi to mean tato’pi adhikā and have translated accordingly. The words tasmād anupacaritāsya ... svatantrasyaiva rasa-naikaghanatayā are baffling.

3. After translating the above passage, we have found that Gnoli, in the second ed. of his “ The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta ” translates the very same text in his Introduction, p. XLIII-XLV, but, oddly enough, he does not give the reference. We are afraid that we cannot follow his translation. See however his Essenza dei Tantra ( Torino, 1960 ) an Italian translation of Abhinava’s Tantrasāra. Attention was first called to this important passage by K. C. Pandey in his Comparative Aesthetics, Vol. I, first ed. 1950, on p. 94. The reference he gives is Bṛhat Vimārśinī ( Ms. ) 407 ( I. 5. 11 ) ; to which he provides the text on p. 421–422.

4. See in V. Raghavan, “ Some Concepts of the Alaṅkāra Śāstra ”, the short essay on Camatkāra, p. 268-271.

46

key terms for Abhinava.1 He gives, in the A. Bh. a very lovely example of its use :

" Viṣṇu is still in a state of wonder ( camatkāroti ), for, how strange, the thighs of Lakṣmī as white as a sliver of the moon, were not broken by ( the churning of the ocean with ) Mt. Mandara." 2

He then provides the definition of camatkāra: 3 " It is defined as a seizure by joy ( bhogāveśa ), unbroken ( avicchinna ) and continuous satisfaction ( ātrptivyatireka )." 4

Another important concept found in this passage is the idea of vighnas, which Abhinava develops at some length in the A. Bh.5 In brief the theory is this : all the synonyms for aesthetic pleasure ( e. g. camatkāra, rasanā, āsvāda, etc. ) are just another name for consciousness that is devoid of any obstacle ( sakalavighnavinirmuktasamvittir eva ). It is only by removing these obstacles, seven in number, that we become totally receptive to a drama. These seven are: (1) lack of credibility ( ayogyatā ). One must be

1. Cf. Sāhitya-darpaṇa III, 2–3 ( Vṛtti ), रते सार शृङ्गारः; ascribed to Nārāyaṇa, Cf. Bhāskara's versified commentary on the Sivasūtra, I. 12 :

( विस्मया योगभूमिकां )

तद्विस्मितमिवेन्द जगत्समवलोकनं ।

विस्मयाविष्ट इव यस्तिष्ठति प्रतिभानवान् ॥

There is no doubt that this notion of being filled with wonder, of surprise, had a great appeal for Abhinava. He himself never tires of using the expression camatkāra, though it occurs only once in the Dhvanyāloka itself. There is no doubt that the Sivasūtras exercised an important influence on Abhinava. One thinks of the definition of śakti, I. 13 :

इच्छा शक्तिरुमां कुमारीं, on which Kṣemarāja comments :

योगिन् इच्छा परैव पारमेश्वरी स्वातन्त्र्यरूपा शक्ति;, कुमारी विषयर्गसंहारक्रीडापरा । ( p. 4).

Kṣemarāja's commentary will be found at the back of the volume which contains Bhatta Bhāskara's commentary, KSTS, Vols. IV, and V, edited by J. C. Chatterji, Srinagar, 1916.

2. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 279. The Prākrit text reads :

अज्ज वि हरिअ चमक्कह कह कह वि निअ मंदरेण दलिअइ ।

चंदकलादलसच्‍चाइ लच्छीअ अंगाइ ॥

For which the Sanskrit translation is :

अद्यापि हरिश्‍चमत्करोति कथमपि न मन्थरेण दलितानि।

चन्द्रकलादलसच्छायानि लक्‍ष्म्या अङ्गानि ॥

3. Op. cit., p. 279 :

स चमत्कस्यैव तिरेकेणाविःच्‍छेदो भोगावेśा इत्युच्‍यते । सुज्ञानस्यादृृतभोगस्‍पन्‍दनाविष्‍टस्‍य व मनःकरणं

चमत्कारमपि ।

4. See also the Alañkārakāstubha, Sivaprasad Bhattacharya's ed. p. 137 :

रसे सारश्‍ृङ्गारो यं विना न रसो रसः ।

which is quoted from another, untraced, source.

5. A. Bh., Vol. I, pp. 280–284.

able to sympathise ( hṛdayasamvāda ) with the events being portrayed. They cannot be completely beyond our scope of knowledge, whether that knowledge be acquired through our own past experiences or through our acquaintance with literature.1 ( 2 ) Too personal an identification. One must not feel that the drama is an actual event in the world. A certain aesthetic distance is necessary. This is the purpose of the nāṭyadharmī, those conventions found only in the theatre, e. g. unusual speech habits, dress etc. ( 3 ) An absorption with one's own feelings ( nijasukhādivaśibhäva ). One must overcome personal feelings in order to enter another person's feelings ( vastvantare samvidam viśrāmayet ). Music, decoration in the theatre, etc., all help to soften the spectator's hard sense of ego. The setting works on him and enables the spectator who is willing to respond to become a sahṛdaya, a man sensitive to literature. ( 4 ) Lack of proper means of perception ( pratītyupāyavaikalyam ). ( 5 ) Lack of clarity ( sphuṭatvābhāva ). Just as Abhinava insists on certain conventions in the theatre ( nāṭyadharmī ), so also he insists on their opposite as well, a certain realism ( lokadharmī ). Thus he says the acting ( abhinayana ) is in many senses very close to direct perception ( pratyakṣavyāpārakalpa ). ( 6 ) Lack of pre-dominance ( apradhānatā ). Abhinava feels that there are four major mental states, more important ( pradhāna ) than any others.2 He associates these four with the four goals of life. Rati, love ( the sthāyibhāva of śṛṅgāra ) corresponds to kāma. Krodha, anger ( the sthāyibhāva of raudra ) corresponds to artha. Utsāha, energy ( the sthāyibhāva of vīra ) corresponds to three ( kāma, dharma and artha ).

1. Cf. Abhinava, in the Locana, p. 331 : एतदुक्तं भवति-यत्र विनेयानां प्रतीतिक्षणण्डना न जायते तादृग्वर्णननियमः । तत्र केवलमानुप्र एकपदे सम्भाव्यलक्षणमसम्भाव्यमानसव्यमानस्यैव रसस्य हृदये सुरुचिप्रदर्शयित्व चतुर्वर्गोपायस्यापि लोभान् बुद्धी निवेशयति । रामादिषु तथा विधमपि चरितं पूर्वप्रसिद्धपरमार्थचित्रणसमप्रयोगैरपारदृश्यसत्यया न चकास्ति । अत एवं तस्यापि यदि प्रभावान्तरसमुचयेऽर्थस्तदा ताहशमेव । न त्वसंभावनापदे वर्णनीयमिति ।

2 This comes to the following: one should only describe such incidents as do not destroy the enjoyment of the audience. So that if ( one should say that ) a simple man crosses the seven oceans in one step, because it is impossible, it will strike the mind as untrue and so will cause even the teaching consisting in the means of attaining the four aims of life to seem false as well. But in the case of Rāma etc., even such ( inherently unreal ) feats as the one just described ( namely crossing the seven oceans ) do not seem false because such deeds are based on ( our ) trust that is generated by a series of earlier well-known narrative events. And so even other extraordinary feats of Rāma, when imaginatively described, will not seem false. But in any case one should avoid describing unlikely events ( unless they are vouchsafed by a narrative tradition ).

2. Note that Bharata ( NŚ. VI. 39-40 ) too has this doctrine of four prominent rasas which give rise to the other four in turn ( śṛṅgāra, raudra, vīra and bibhatsa ). But he does not include śānta, a fact of which Abhinava could hardly have been unaware, since in his commentary on the NŚ verses ( p. 295 ) he does not even give a variant reading that would include śānta.

Finally nirveda, world-weariness ( given here, then, as the sthāyibhāva of śānta, as opposed to the Abhinavabhārati, śantaraprakaraṇa passage ! ) corresponds to mokṣa. One of these must predominate in every drama. Abhinava explains that all of them contain a predominance of bliss ( sarve'mī sukhapradhānāḥ ), since in experiencing them, one is tasting one's own consciousness, which is a single compact mass of bliss ( svasamviccarvanārūpānandasāratvāt ). (7) The presence of doubt ( saṃśayaikaghanaśya.....ānandasāratvāt ). This refers to the fact that we cannot be certain what the anubhāvas are meant to represent. Tears, Abhinava tells us1 might be due to joy or to sorrow, and anxiety ( cintā ) might refer to vīrarasa as well as to bhayānaka. But when properly combined ( samyoga ) such doubts will not arise.

We can see from this that Abhinava places emphasis ( and not only here, but throughout both his major works on poetics ) upon the transcendental ( alaukika ) nature of our feelings during a drama. He has stressed over and over that there is not a direct correspondence between kāraṇa and vibhāva, or between kārya and anubhāva, for one refers to the world, and the other to art. Ordinary means of knowledge play no role in rasa :

" The enjoyment of an aesthetic experience consists of a transcendental wonder ( alaukikacamatkāra ) and is decidedly ( eva ) different from ordinary ( laukika ) knowledge such as ( is produced ) by memory and inference ".2

The sthāyibhāva that Abhinava speaks of is the same as vāsanā, an important word in his philosophy. It means the same as saṃskāra, latent impressions that we carry with us from birth to birth. In a sense it corresponds ponds to the Freudian unconscious. The sthāyibhāva would correspond to the conscious, for the vāsanā is aroused, awakened, and we then call it a sthāyibhāva. Now this doctrine enables Abhinavagupta to answer one of the great puzzles of literary criticism in the West. How do we explain the fact that we can appreciate a drama which deals with emotions beyond the range of our experience ? E. g. how is it that incest dramas grip those of us who have no experience ( at least consciously ) of such emotions ? The answer that Abhinava gives is ingenious. He claims that in our beginningless ( for it is an ādiom of Sanskrit philosophy that saṃsāra is anādi, though of course it has an end ) wanderings through the universe, we have had every conceivable experience, been open to every possible emotion. " Nothing human

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 284.

2. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 284 :

तथा हि लौकिकचिच्चैतस्यानुमाने का रसता । तेनालौकिकचमत्कारात्मा रसास्वादः स्‍वयं अनुमानलौकिकसंवेदनाविलक्षण एव ।

is foreign to us ”. In a brilliant passage,1 Abhinava examines each of the

nine sthāyibhāvas, and shows how we all possess each and every one of them.

For example, we all seek pleasure, and avoid pain, and are thus open to rati

( sarvo riramsayā vyāptaḥ ). He concludes : “ There exists no living being

who is devoid of the latent impressions of these mental states ”.2 What

happens after this sthāyibhāva is activated is hṛdayasamvāda, a word of which

Abhinava is very fond. It means “sympathetic response” and he uses it to

represent the state just before identification. It is made possible through the

existence of sādhāraṇikaraṇa, the factor in literature that makes all events

impersonal and universal, an idea that Abhinava borrowed from Bhaṭṭa-

nāyaka as we have already seen. This identification which then takes place is

what Abhinava calls tanmayībhavana, another key term. The word is already

used in a difficult verse from the Tantrāloka :

“ Those who do not identify ( with the object of contemplation ), who

do now know the merging of the body, etc., ( in that object ) and whose

intellect as a means of cognition is not merged ( in that object ) — they are

known as insensitive ”.3

It is defined elsewhere in the Tantrāloka, where we are told that

“ identification is the attainment of one's highest Self. It is the highest stage

of fulfilment, and there can be no further fruit after that ”.4 By “ further

1. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 282.

2. Op. cit., p. 282 :

न हि तच्चित्तवृत्तिवासनाशून्यः प्राणी भवति ।

3. T. Āl. ( Vol. II ) III, 240, p. 228 :

येषां न तन्मयीभूतस्ते देहादिनिमज्जनम् ।

अविदन्तो ममसेविन्मनास्वहृदया इति ॥

Note the commentary ( Jayaratha ) :

लोके हि सातिशाये गीतादौ विषयेतन्मयीभावेन सचमत्काराणां सहदया इति अन्यथा परहृदयगो

( अहृदया: ) इति प्रसिद्ध: ।

In order to overcome the difficulties in this obscure verse we construe : dehādi-

nimajjanam with avidanto as its object, and we dissolve the sandhi as avidanto

amagnasamvinmānāḥ. We understand samvit to mean intellect and māna to mean

“ a means or instrument of cognition ”. But in spite of these interpretations, we are

not really certain that we have correctly understood the meaning of the stanza.

4. T. Āl., IV, 209, p. 237 ( Vol. III ) :

तन्मयीभावनं नाम प्राप्नुयात्सानुत्तरात्मनि ।

पूर्णत्वस्य परा काष्ठा सेव्यत्र न फलन्तरम् ॥

Abhinava gives this definition in order to explain an exercise for inducing ecstasy

that he gives in the preceding verse, where we are told that just as one examines one's

own face again and again in a mirror and knows it to belong to oneself, so also examin-

ing oneself in the mirror of consciousness that consists in meditation, worship etc. one

sees Śiva and then one merges with him :

( Continued on next page

fruit " (phalāntaram), Jayaratha explains that Abhinava means the following : generally when we obtain something, we are left with further expectations. When we get what we want, we have further wants. Not so with this, for we have attained ourselves, and there is nothing further to desire.1 Immediately after tanmayībhavana, the last stage in the process of aesthetic experience, we come to the actual experience itself : rasa. Abhinava has played down both alaṅkāradhvani and vastudhvani in his Locana commentary, to give unique perference to rasa. Time and again he will say things like the following :

" By the word ucita ( proper ), Ānandavardhana shows that the only propriety ( relevant to poetry ) is the one with regard to rasa, and thereby he suggests that rasadhvani is the essence ( of all poetry ) ". 2

His definition of rasa occurs in such a context :

" When the suggested sense does not take the form of an alaṅkāra, then we say that it is plain vastu. The word plain ( mātra ) rules out its being anything else ( i. e. alaṅkāradhvani or rasadhvani ). Now rasadhvani is something else altogether. It belongs ( gocara ) only to the ( suggestive ) function in poetry. It is never included under worldly dealings ( vyavahāra ) and is never even to be dreamed of as being revealed directly through words. No, quite the contrary, it is rasa, that is, it has a form which is capable of being relished ( rasanīya ) through the function ( vyāpāra ) of personal aesthetic relish ( carvaṇā ), which is bliss ( ānanda ) that arises in the sahṛdaya's delicate mind that has been coloured ( anurāga ) by the appropriate ( samucita ) latent impressions ( vāsanā ) that are deeply embedded from long before ( prāk ); appropriate that is, to the beautiful vibhāvas and anubhāvas, and beautiful, again, because of their appeal to the heart ( samvāda ), and which

Continued from previous page )

यथा पुरःस्थे मुखुरे निजं वक्त्रं विभाव्यन । मूर्ध्नो मुद्रितदेवस्यां येनि निजात्मनः ॥ तथा विकलपमुखे ध्यानपूजार्चनात्मनि । आत्मानं मैरवं पश्यन्नचिरात् तन्मयीभवेत् ॥

1. In the commentary, p. 237, there seems to be some sort of misprint : anuttarātmani prāptheāpi kim bhavet ? This must stand for something like anuttarātmani prāptyāpi kim bhavet ? The commentary on this verse is particularly fine ( though we cannot make sense of the sākṛīkṣatre'pi tasyā tathākalpānāt ). It ends thus :

अतस्ततोन्तरेप्यडि फले फलान्तरं संभव्यम् — आकाराहन्तरस्यापि भावात्, यत्पुनः पारमार्थिकं पूर्णत्व, तत्र न फलान्तरं संभवत् — सर्वत्र एवं साकाङ्क्षत्व संक्ष्यात् ।

2. Locana, p. 45 :

उचिताश्रयेण रसविषयमेवौचित्यं भवतीति दर्शयन्न रसध्वनेरङ्गित्वं सूच्यति ।

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

51

are conveyed by means of words. That alone is rasadhvani, and that alone, in the strict sense of the word, is the soul ( of poetry )”.1

His definition of drama is equally difficult and philosophic :

" A drama is a thing ( vastu ) whose essence, so far as the spectator is concerned ( tadgrāhaka ) consists of rasa that can only be known by direct experience ( saṃvedana ) in the form of aesthetic enjoyment which is altogether different from correct knowledge ( samyagjñāna ), erroneous cognition ( bhrānti ), doubt, uncertainty, non-determination ( anadhyavasāya ) and ordinary knowledge ( vijñāna ). It is distinct from worldly objects, and also different from such things as their ( i. e. worldly objects' ) imitation, reflection and pictorial presentation ( ālekhya ), determination ( adhyavasāya ), fancy, magic shows, etc. ".2

Abhinava likes to insist on the autonomy of a work of art, on the fact that it is sui generis and need have no object corresponding to it in the real world. Thus he remarks of the dance that it imitates nothing in real life, but is pure creation, with no practical aim ( to be free of practical aims is for Abhinava one of the defining characteristics of drama, as indeed it is of all art ). Thus he remarks, d propos of Siva's famous cosmic dance, that it is the spontaneous expression of his overflowing bliss, in which no thought other than sheer creative beauty exists.3 The poet is very much like Siva; in fact, Abhinava often associates the poet, Siva and rasa all together. For

1. Locana, p. 51 :

तद्रपतावेव त्रुपलक्षितं वस्तुमात्रमुच्यते। मात्रमात्रं हि रूपान्तरं निराकतम्। यस्तु स्वम्रेडपि न स्वार्थदवाच्यो न लोकिकव्यहारपतितः, किं तु शब्दसमर्पणमाणहृदयसंवादसुनिर्भरविभावानुभाव-समुचितप्रभविष्ठतादिवासनानुरागचुकुमारस्वसंविददानन्दचर्वणाघ्यापाररसनियृपो रसः, स काव्यव्यापारैकगोचरो रसध्वनिरिति, स च ध्वनिरेवोच्यते, स एव मुख্যতया चात्मेति।

2. A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 3 :

तत्र नाट्यं नाम लौकिकवेदार्थवद्यतिरिक्तं तदनुकारप्रतिभम्बालिश्यसादृश्यादिरोपाध्यवसायो-त्प्रेक्षास्वप्नमयेनैवजालादिविलक्षणं तद्रह्रकस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानप्रतिष्ठितसामग्रीगणानवग्रहणप्राणभूतवैचित्र्यविसर्गविधायकतापन्नभक्तिशान्त्यभिनुत-न्तास्वादानुरूपसवेदनसंवेद्यं वस्तु रसभभावभितं वद्यादः।

For an elaboration of this passage ( and an explanation of how drama differs, qua anukāra from other imitative objects ) see A. Bh. I. p. 35-38, edited and translated by Gnoli, op. cit. p. 88-101, appendix I.

3. A. Bh. I, p. 21 :

शङ्करस्वेव भगवतः परिपूर्णानन्दनिर्भरौ भूतदेहोचचलदातरनिरवार् ( ह ) सुन्दराकारस्य अत एव नृत्यत् इतिकर्तव्यतानिर्वकल्यानन्दननुत्त्रमात्रस्थितस्य ।

M. K. Venugopalan suggests to us that perhaps the reading should be nirvāha.

Abhinava is very fond of the notion of overflowing ( see Locana, p. 86 ) with one's own bliss. He uses it often in the Tantrāloka and in the very first verse of the Locana he speaks of nijarasabharāt, the same expression.

instance in the Maṅgalaśloka to the fifth chaper of the A. Bh., he has a very

fine verse with a remarkable simile :

" We bow down to that sky-form of Śiva which acts as a preliminary

to the production of the play that is the creation of this world by providing

the proper moment ( avakāśa ) ( for the play ) ( also : by providing the space

in which creation is to be projected )"1

Here saṃsāra is compared to a drama. The creation of saṃsāra is by Śiva,2 the poet ( note the implication : both are unreal ). Reductive state-

ments dealing with identification are not uncommon with Abhinava.3 His

commentary on the NŚ. VI. 38, provides a good example and is itself intrin-

sically interesting. The verse from the NŚ reads :

" Just as a tree grows from a seed, and from the tree come flowers,

and from flowers fruit, so also rasas are the root, and from them are all

bhāvas derived "4

After a very involved commentary which we translate in full below5

Abhinava ends by saying: " The tree stands for poetry. Flowers, etc.,

1. A. Bh. I, p. 207 ;

संसरनाटच्यनिर्माणं यद्वकाशविधानतः:

पूर्वरङ्गतये व्योममूर्तिं तां शाक्षरीं नुमः ॥

2. There are said to be eight forms of Śiva, among which the last five are

the pañca mahābhūtas. Vyoma is the fifth. It is the pūrvaraṅga, the preliminary to

creation. The pūrvaraṅga forms a natural introduction to drama. Similarly Śiva's form,

namely ākāśa ( sky ) forms a preliminary to creation, because it provides the space

in which creation is projected.

3. E. g. A. Bh. I, p. 342 :

स्थायी प्रबन्धद्रह्ये व्यभिचारिभूतः

कामाकुलासु जनतासु महानुभावः ।

अन्तर्विभावविषयो रसमानुमृतिः

श्रीमान् प्रसरहृदयोत्कृष्ट मम चिन्त्रः ॥

यथा बीजाद् भवेद् वृक्षो वृक्षात् पुष्पं फलं यथा ।

तथा मूलेऽपि स रसः सर्वतः ततो भावाः व्युत्पाद्यन्तः ॥

5. A. Bh. I, p, 294 ( NŚ, VI. 38 ). The text has been edited by Raghavan

in " Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa ", Madras 1963, p. 532. The passage is extremely

important, and warrants a full translation. The text, as given by Raghavan reads :

न तु यदि भावेश्यो रसास्तहि कथमुचं 'न हि रसादृते कश्चिदर्थः' इति । तेन पूर्वं

त एवौह्यद्यै इलाशाङ्काह—यथैव बीजाद् वृक्षमूलत्वेन स्थित्वा तथा रसः, तन्मूलो हि प्रीतिपूर्विका

व्युत्पत्तिरिति । तत एव च व्यास्यानाहार्त् कविगतसाधारणीभूतसर्वविमललक्ष काव्यपुपरसरो नटव्यापारः ।

सैव संवित्परमार्थतो रसः । सामाजikस्य च तथा प्रतीतौ वरिष्ठत्वात् स श्रोदपोदरग्राह्यो विभावादिम्रतीतिरिति

प्रयोजने नालं काव्ये सामाजikाधियि च । न ( तद्? ) एव मूलबीजस्थान्या: ( य:? ) कविगतो रसः ।

कविभिः सामाजikतुल्य एव । तत एवोक्तं 'श्रुतिगगारी चेतकः' इलानन्दवर्धनाचार्येण । ततों वृक्षास्थानारूढ़ं

( Continued on next page

Continued from previous page )

काव्यम् । तत्र पुष्टस्थानীয়ोऽभिनयादिनटव्यापारः। तत्र फलस्थानীয়ः सामाजिकरसास्वादः । तेन रसमयमेव विश्र्वम् ।

अत्र च विज्ञानवादो, द्विधाभिधानं, स्फोटतत्त्वं, सत्कार्यवादः, एकत्वदर्शनमित्यादि च द्रष्टव्यमिति दिव मानाद्रवस्वरसत्वतोडन्यभिनयकुसुमसुन्दरार्कफुल्लमिव भावः प्रतीतां सृज्यत इति व्याचक्षते । तेः प्रकृतविरुद्धं सर्वं व्यास्यातम् । एवं हि भावस्वरूपकमपर्वतनवर्तिनिर्मुक्त स्वाद्रिल्यास्वां चैतत् ॥

Thus the idea is that all three views ( namely ) : (रसेस्यो भावाः , भावेस्थो रसाः. and परस्परसंवन्धादेतेषामभिनिष्पत्ति: ) are acceptable ( upagatah ) according to the diversity of the intention ( abhiprāyavaicitryeṇa ) : एवं त्रयेडपि पक्षः कर्थंचिदुपगता अभिप्रायवैचित्र्येणोति

तात्पर्यम् ।

stand for such activities of the actor as abhinaya, etc. Fruit stands for

the aesthetic enjoyment of the spectator. Thus everything ( or : the whole

world ) is made of rasa ?"1

For Abhinava, poetry and drama are essentially the same thing.2

Thus rasas are only to be found in drama, and not in the real world.3 And

What does Abhinava consider the purpose of drama and poetry to be ? What

is his stance on the largely unspoken but constant controversy between

vyutpatti (in the sense of moral or intellectual instruction ) and priti (pleasure)

as the goal of literature? Basically Abhinava holds that the major purpose

of art is pleasure. Thus in the Locana4 he says :

"Although knowledge and pleasure for the reader are both present, as

Bhāmaha5 has said :

' Study of good poetry confers fame and pleasure, as well as skill in

dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa, and skill, too, in the fine arts,'

nevertheless pleasure is the main thing. Otherwise, how would poetry, a

source of knowledge, comparable to a (loving ) wife, differ from the Vedas,

etc., which are also sources of instruction,6 comparable (in their manner of

instruction ) to a master, or from sources of instruction such as the itihāsas,

etc., which are comparable (in their manner of instruction ) to a friend ?7

1. Further on the tree analogy, cf. v. 24, p. 13 of the Parātrimiśikā of

Abhinava, edited by Pandit J.Z.Shastri, Srinagar, 1947, KSTS LXVIII :

यथा नृग्रोधबीजस्थः शकिरूपो महाद्रुमः।

तथा हृदयबीजस्थं जगदेतच्चराचरम् ॥

2. काव्यं तावन्मुख्यतो दर्शयितुं शक्यमेव । A. Bh., I. p. 291.

3. तेन नाट्य एव रसा न लोके इत्यर्थः । काव्यं च नाट्यमेव ॥ A. Bh., I. p. 291.

4. Locana, p. 40 :

श्रोतॄणां च व्युत्पत्तिरेव यत्पि सतः, यथौक्म—

'धर्मार्थकाममोक्षेषु वैचक्षण्यं कलासु च ।

करोति कीर्ति प्रीति च साधुकाव्यनिपुणं ॥' इति

तथा तत्र प्रोतिरेव प्रधानम्। अन्यथा प्रसुतोचितार्था वेदादिम्यो मित्रादिम्यश्च व्युत्पत्तिहेतुत्वात्सहितास्ति—

दिश्यो व्युत्पत्तिहेतुत्व्यः कोडस्य काव्यस्य व्युत्पत्तिहेतोर्जातु प्रसंहितवलक्षणयो विशेष इति प्राधान्य—

नानन्द एवौचितः । चतुर्वर्गव्युत्पत्तिरेपी चानन्द एव पार्यन्तिकं मुख्यं फलम्।

5. Bhāmaha, Kāvyālankāra, I. 2.

6. Vyutpatti most often means bahuśrutatā, learning. See Rudraṭa I, 18;

Mammaṭa, KP. I. 2 (vyavahāravid, explained in the Vrtti as rājādigyata-ucitācarapari-

jñānam ) and I. 3 (where the Vrtti explains the word nipunatā of the Kārikā by

vyutpatti, which is said to arise from महाकविसंविद्धान्तनिकान्यामितिहासादीनां च विमर्शनम् ),

and Rasagangādhara pp. 9–11 ( 1939, KM ed. ).

7. Cf. p. 8 of the Dipikā comm. on the Kāvyaprakāśa ( ed. by Sivaprasad

Bhattacharya ) :

( Continued on next page

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

55

And so delight has been mentioned ( here ) primarily ( as the purpose of poetry ). Even of instruction in the four goals of life delight is the final and major result .

Abhinava has an interesting passage in the third Uddyota of the Locana1 in which he repeats this fundamental distinction in method between history, philosophy and poetry. Since, he says, people, and especially people in important positions, must be made sensitive ( lit. "instructed", vyutpāadya ), the best way to provide them with this ethical and intellectual education ( vyutpatti ) is through poetry. The way to instruct people in the four goals of life is by entering their hearts ( hrdayānupraveśa ), which is just another name for imaginative experience in general ( hrdayānupraeśaś ca rasāsvāda-maya eva ). Abhinava ends by saying that prīti, pleasure, is the cause of vyutpatti ( prītir eva vyutpatteḥ prayojikā ). His concluding phrase leaves us wondering whether this whole doctrine was not inherited from his teacher :

" Rasa consists of pleasure, and rasa alone is drama, and drama alone is the Veda. This is what our teacher says ".2 Abhinava goes on to make this important remark : " Nor are pleasure and instruction really different things, for they both have the same object "3

Continued from previous page )

स्वादकाव्यरसोनिमित्तं शास्त्रमप्युपयुज्यते ।

प्रथमा्लीकमधवः पिबन्ति कडु भेषजम् ॥

( Readers ) use ( i . e . read ) even the śastras if they are mixed with sweet poetic rasas ( jnst as children will ) swallow bitter medicine if they first lick honey .

Curiously enough, according to Professor Bhattacharya, this is a quotation from the Hrdayadarpana ( see p . 8 , fn . 1 : भट्टनायककृतहृदयदर्पणे इति बहुत्रा कारिनिर्देशः ). But this cannot be correct, since the stanza is found in Bhāmaha, V . 3 . What are the works in Skt . that can be considered śāstras as well as kāvyas? Really only two : the Yogavāsisṭha and the Mahābhārata . It is a great pity that Ānandavardhana's Tattvāloka is lost, for it very probably dealt with this fascinating topic in detail ( see Locana, p . 67 and p . 533 ).

1 . Locana, p . 336 .

2 . Locana, p . 336 :

प्रतीतिः सा रसस्तदव नाट्यं नाट्यमेव वेद इत्यस्मदुपाध्याया: ।

3 . Locana p . 336 :

न चैते प्रीतिव्युत्पत्ती मिन्नरूपे एव, द्वयोरेकविषयत्वात् ।

What Abhinava means by ekavisayatvāt is brought out in the next sentence : विभावाद्यौचित्यमेव हि सत्यतः प्रीतिनिदानमित्यसकृतदर्शनम् . The aucitya of the vibhāvas etc . is the cause of the pleasure that we de rive from poetry . Similarly the aucitya of the vibhāva etc . is the cause of the edification that we derive from poetry .

This is stated by Abhinava in the next sentence ( p . 337 ) : विभावादीनां तद्रसौचितानां ( for which we should perhaps read तत्तद्रसौचितानां ) यथास्वरूपवेदनं फल पर्यन्तीभूततया व्युत्पत्तिरियुच्यते । Thus both prīti and vyutpatti depend on vibhāvādyaucitya . Both are the result of vibhāvādyaucitya . Abhinava's phrase drayor api ekavisayatvāt therefore means dvayor api sahahetukatvāt . Since both are the outcome of a single cause, they are not different from one another .

X

In this connection1 and in slightly more concrete terms ( the reader should not feel that the passages we translate in any sense exhaust the range of Abhinava's interest. For most of the Locana consists of very close textual remarks on specific verses. We have simply extrapoled the more abstract passages, since it is here that Abhinava deals with his philosophical views ), Abhinava has a very interesting passage in the A. Bh. on the NS. I. 108-110, on what drama does for the different kinds of spectators : 2

" Drama thus described 'creates mental repose ' ( viśrāntijananā, NŚ. I. 114 ), that is, it destroys the flow of pain for all spectators who are overcome either with pain such as comes from illness, who are afflicted with tiredness

1. One should compare the very interesting passage in the Daśarūpaka, and especially the commentary of Dhanika ( I. 6 ):

आनन्दनिष्यन्दिपु रूपकेषु न्युपपत्तिमात्रे फलमल्पबुद्धिः ।

योऽर्थपतिहासादिविद्वां स तु सै नमः स्वादुपात्रंमुखाय ॥

Āvaloka : tatra kathcit—

धर्मार्थकाममोक्षेषु वैचक्षण्यं कलासु च ।

करोति कीर्ति प्रीति च साधुकाव्यनिषेवणम् ॥

इत्यादिना चिन्तागदित्यादपत्ति काव्यफलत्वेनेच्छन्ति तत्रैव रसस्वसंवेद: परमानन्दरूपो रसास्वादो दशरूपाणां फलं न पुनरितिहासादिवत् त्रिवर्गादिनिवृत्तिमात्रामिति दशितम् । नम इति सौहृण्ठम् ।

" The silly man who says that as in the case of itihāsa, etc., so in the case of the different types of drama, which overflow with bliss, the only purpose is to impart moral and secular instruction — I bow low to him, who is averse to the pleasure arising from literature ".

( Note that the word sādhu can be construed with both namah and with tasmai; tasmai sādhunamah, " I bow low ( sādhu ) to him, and tasmai sādhuh, tasmai namah ". " May he fare well ( i. e. may god bless him ), I bow to him ". We think the correct reading is sādhu as an adverb and not sādhuh as an adjective going with alpabuddhiḥ. )

" In that connection some ( claim ) : " Reading ( and study — nīsevana ) of good poetry bestows pleasure and fame and skill in the fine arts ". ( Bhāmaha, I. 2 ).

By this and other verses they wish to show that the purpose of poetry is to give knowledge of the three goals of life etc. By refuting this, the author shows that the purpose of the ten drama-types is aesthetic enjoyment, which is of the form inwardly experienced ( svasamvedya ) and not merely of the highest bliss that is inwardly experienced ( svasamvedya ) and not merely of the highest bliss that is knowledge of the three goals of life etc. as is the case in itihāsas etc. ' I bow low ' is of course meant sarcastically "

2. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 39 :

एवंभूतं यत्नपूर्वं तत्परीक्षणां दुःखेन व्याध्यादिकृतान, श्रमेणाध्वक्लेशादिजेन, शोकेन बन्धुमरणादिकृतानातां पीडितानां तथा तपस्विनामनवरतकृच्छ्रचान्द्रायणादिचरणकलितदौर्बल्यतिस्थूलहृदयानां विश्रान्तिजननं दु:खविसरणविधातकं । प्रतिहतदुःखानां चाङ्गादात्मकधर्मादिकारणं यथायोगम् ।

तदथा शोकात्स्य धृतिभिर्य्यस्थिरतस्य कोऽपि । श्रामातस्य सुखम् । आदिग्रहणेन तपस्विनो मतिविवोधादय इति मन्तव्यम् । न चैतावदेव यावक्वालान्तरेऽपि(रवि)परिपाकं सुखमुपदेशार्ज जनयतीत्येवं दु:खितानां तत्प्रशम-

सुखवितरणकाङ्क्षासुखलाभः प्रयोजनम् । ये पुनरपि:खिता: सुखभूयिष्ठवृतय एव राजपुत्राद्यास्तेषां लोकदृष्टे धर्मादुपायवर्ग उपदेशकार्यंतनाल्यम् । लोकशब्देन लोकत्रयम् । न तु किं तु गुरूपदे शं करोति ।

किं तु बुद्धि विवर्धयति ।

which comes from the inconveniences caused by a long journey etc., or are suffering from sorrow as when one's relations, etc., die, or for ascetics whose minds are distressed by excessive weakness resulting from constant ascetic practices and from the cāndrāyana and other vows. When their sufferings are overcome, drama becomes the cause of dhṛti, etc., according to suitability (yathāyogam); thus dhṛti etc., (verse 113), having delight for their essence, apply in their proper order to the spectators afflicted with sorrows etc. For instance, (drama) gives courage to the person overcome with sorrow. For the man afflicted with illness it distracts his mind. For the weary man it creates happiness. The word "etc." (in verse 113) stands for such things as awakening of the mind, etc., in the case of the man who practises tapas. Not only (does the drama achieve) this, but it also gives rise at a later date (kālantare) to the result (paripāka) in the form of happiness that stems from instruction. In this manner the purpose (of the drama) for those who are unhappy (is threefold): it calms the pain of those who are grieved, it gives immediate pleasure, and it gives happiness later (through instruction, which if followed leads to happiness). As for those who are not in sorrow, but are almost always happy, such as princes, etc., even for them the drama provides instruction in the ways of the world and in the means leading to the (four) goals of life, such as dharma, etc. The word "world" means "ways of the world". Question: does the drama instruct the way a teacher (or an elderly person) does? (Answer:) No. Rather it causes one's wisdom to grow."1

In his commentary on the rasasūtra of Bharata, just before commencing a detailed statement of his own position, Abhinava quotes the first line of a very famous verse from the Śakuntala.2 Abhinava considered this verse to be the ideal introduction to his exposition of rasa. Since its exact significance has proved somewhat mysterious, we feel we are justified in introducing the two passages from the Locana with a short discussion on this passage. The verse reads:

"Seeing moving sights, and hearing soft sounds, even a man who is happy is filled with strange longing. Surely it is because he vaguely remembers, though he is not fully conscious, affections formed in an earlier life that are fixed inside him through the latent impressions they leave behind."3

1. A good summation of this whole theory is Abhinava's account at the beginning of the A. Bh., of what takes place when we actually witness a drama, G. O. S., p. 36. The passage has been edited and translated by Gnoli, op. cit. (p. 96).

2. The verse is quoted in the A. Bh., p. 279-280, (Vol. 1).

3. Śakuntala, V. 2:

रम्याणि वीक्ष्य मधुरांश्च निशम्य शब्दान् पर्युत्सुको भवति यत्सुखितोऽपि जन्तुः ।

तच्चेतसा स्मरति नूनमबोधपूर्वं भावस्थिराणि जननान्तरसौहृदानी ॥

Why then does Abhinava quote this ? 1 The reason we feel is this : Duṣyanta has an experience of rasa. 2 But it is not like any other experience in the world. He is not directly experiencing any kind of sexual pleasure, but the vibhāvas ( music and perhaps paintings as well ) call up to him some vague memories. This in its turn produces longing ( autsukya ) in him. It is an aesthetic experience. The memory involved is not of course like any other kind of memory, for it has no object. The bhāvasthirāṇi in the verse are the actual vāsanās. These vāsanās ( latent impressions ) are brought to life by his hearing the music, and they then bring to his aesthetic attention ( i. e. his deeper unconscious ) intimations of a pleasure he formerly had. But this pleasure is now no longer direct, it is purified, not directly stateable. It is thus a higher kind of delight than the original. 3 So Abhinava regards this verse as proof of rasa. 4

1. Hemacandra, Kāvyānuśāsana, II. 1. p. 99 : अत्र हि स्मरतीति या सृष्टिसत्प्रदर्शिता स न तार्किकप्रसिद्धा । पूर्वमेतस्यार्थस्याननु भूतत्वात् ।

अपि तु प्रतिभानापर्यन्तसाक्षात्कारस्वभावोऽयमिति ।

2. For Rāghavabhaṭṭa, the verse is a case of śṛṅgāra.

3. On p. 252 of the third volume of the ĪPV, Abhinava quotes the last lines of the same verse : bhāvasthitāni jananāntarasauhrdāni ( this reading of bhāvasthitāni instead of bhāvastheirāṇi is confirmed by Rāghavabhaṭṭa, who says that it is a well-established reading ). The context is extremely difficult to make out, since the text on which Abhinava is commenting is not extant, and none of the pratikas make sense. But it is clear that he is quoting this as an example of an emotion ( he seems to be discussing the distinction between various kinds of love; kāma, icchā, abhilāṣa, autsukya, etc. - किंचिन्तु स्वात्मविश्रान्तिमवान्तरमनागुरितविरोधमपेक्ष्यते यत्र सा इच्छा राग इत्युच्यते ।

आगूरितविरोधत่ายं तु काम इति ।) that has no direct object, but is aetherealised as it were, that is, " generalised " : आद्रियतेऽद्भुतलापमले यत्र न भावान्तरं सामान्या-

कारणापि वासनोद्मादमात्रणास्ते यथाह.......भावस्थितानि जननान्तरसौहृदानी ।

4. Note that according to Rāghavabhaṭṭa, the verse is a case of aprastutapraśaṃsā, and this figure of speech further suggests the sthāyibhāva of uninterrupted love ( aprastutapraśaṃsā, tena sthāyināḥ rater aricchedo dhavanitaḥ ). He also sees this as kāvyaliṅga, and hence as saṃsṛṣṭi. There are also three types of anuprāsa ( cheka, vṛtti and śruti ). He notes that the verse must be a case of rati ( i. e. śṛṅgārarasa-dhvani ) for otherwise there will be the dosa of having the major rasa cut midway : अन्यथा मध्ये विच्छेदानमहान् रसदोषः स्यात् ।

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

59

All of this culminates in what is lacking even in Ānandavardhana, a philosophical scaffolding on which to raise the structure of rasa. We are now ready to read the two important passages from the Locana.1

1. We have barely touched the surface of Abhinava's aesthetic philosophy. There are of course a great deal of interesting passages from his philosophical works which shed light on the issues discussed here. Lack of space prevents us from examining all of these passages here, but we cannot refrain from noting briefly at least some of them. The first verse of the last chapter of Utpalācārya's Īśvarapratyabhijñā ( Bhāskarī, vol. II, p. 280 ) reads :

स्वात्मैव सर्वजन्तूनांेक व महेश्वरः।

विश्वरूपोऽहमिति खण्डडमृशीबुद्धितः ॥

"The one highest God is the very Self of all beings. He assumes the form of everything. He is filled with the unbroken notion : 'I am this ( universe )'."

In his commentary to this Abhinava speaks of the consciousness that is not restricted by time and space, just as he speaks of the consciousness in a play that is not restricted by time and space ( e. g. Abhinavabhāratī, p. 280 ) : यतः संवित्तवभावोऽसौ संवेदक न देशोन त कालेन न स्वरूपेण कौडपि सेदः। And later in his Vṛtti : parānunmukhvasvatmanisṭrāntirūpāhamvimarśaparipūrṇaḥ. "Filled with the notion of 'I' ness which takes the form of rest in the self which is not directed towards anything else."

These are precisely the terms in which Abhinava speaks of the aesthetic experience.

See also Abhinava's Tantrasāra, p. 19, where two interesting verses sum up the third āhnika. The verses, oddly, are in Prākrit. Note that sain bhāi in the Prākrit should be translated into Skt. as svayam bhāti and not as satyam bhāti as in the chāyā given in the footnote on p. 19. Also, sarabhasa in the Prākrit should be translated as sarabhasa and not as sarahasya. Perhaps too one should emend vimṛstarūpam into vimṛśstarūpe to agree with darpane in the first line. The verse reads :

संवेअणिम्मलदप्पणम्मि सअलं फुरंतणिअसारं । आमरिसणरससरहसविमहडलरुवं सवं भाइ ॥

( With slight changes in the text .)

"The whole of one's very own essence, vibrating in the pure mirror of consciousness becomes manifest by itself; its ( the mirror's ) form having been rubbed quickly with the fluid in the form of āmarśana."

One of the finest verses is found in the Tantrāloka, Vol. II, p. 200 :

तथा हि मदुरे गीते स्पर्शो वा चन्दनादिके ।

माधुर्यस्थिगमे यासां हृदये स्पन्दमालता ।

आनन्दव्रातैः शैवैर्वा यतः संवित्तिः महोदया जन्तः ।

"That vibration which arises in the heart when one touches sandalwood etc. or hears soft singing - when one is no longer indifferent, that is known as the Śakti ( force ) of bliss through which one becomes "sensitive" ( lit. "endowed with a heart " ).

Note that Jayaratha quotes Vijñānabhairava, 73 ( gītādiviśayāsvāda etc. ).

When Abhinava speaks of the sense of the "I" changing, deepening, we are irresistibly reminded of a very moving and powerful poem :

"I have to tell

you ......your son is a mongol "

the doctor said.

How easily the word went in -

( Continued on next page

The first passage is extracted from the Locana on the second Uddyota of the Dhvanyāloka.1 As far as we know this is Abhinava's first systematic exposition of his own and earlier views on the nature of aesthetic experience :

Locana pp. 180-190.

ननूक्तं भट्टनायकेन—

रसो यदा पुरगतया प्रतीये तहिं ताटस्थ्येन स्यात् । न च खगतलेन रामादिचरितमहाकाव्यादसो प्रतीये । स्वांगमगलेन च प्रतीतो खात्मनि रसस्योपचिरेवा-भुपगता स्यात् । सा चायुक्ता सीताया: । सामाजिकं प्रतिविभाववल्लात् । कान्तावें सामान्यं वासनाविकासहेतुविभाव्रतां प्रयोजकम्मिति चेत्—देवतावर्णनादौ तदपि कथं । न च स्वकान्तास्मरणे मध्ये संवेइयते । अलोकसामान्यानां च रामादीनां ये समुद्रसेतुबन्धादयो विभावावस्थे कथम् साधारणं भजेयु: । न चोल्लासहादिमान् राम: स्मर्यते, अननुभूतत्वात् ।

शब्दादपि तथ्रपितपत्तौ न रसोपजनः । प्रत्यक्षादिव नायकामिथुनप्रतिपत्तौ । उत्पत्तिपक्षे च करुणस्योत्पाददृष्टे: किं तु करुणप्रेक्षासु पुनःप्रतीति: स्यात् । तन्न उदासितरिपि, नाय्यभिव्यक्तिः, शक्तिरुपस्य हि शृङ्गारस्याभिव्यक्तिविषयर्जनतारतम्यप्रवृत्ति: स्यात् । तत् तत्रापि किं स्वग्लोडमिघ्यते रसः परगतः वेति पूर्ववदेव दोषः । तेन न प्रतीये नोल्लसत्ये नाभि-व्यज्यते काव्येन रसः । किं तु वान्यशब्दवैचित्र्यं काव्यालं शृङ्गारादप्रसादात् । सत्त्राभिधायकलं वाच्यविपयं, भावकत्वं रसादिविषयं, भोगकृतं च सहृदयविषयमिति त्रयोन्तर्-भूता व्यापाराः ।

तत्राभिधागो यदि शुद्धः स्यात्ततन्त्रादिम्यः शाब्दन्यायेम्यः श्रेष्ठाव-

Continued from previous page )

clean as a bullet leaving no mark on the skin stopping the heart within it. This was my first death, the "I" ascending on a slow last thermal breath studied the man below as a pilot treading air might the buckled shell of his plane,

The poem ends with the grave insight this new "I" bestows :

You have a sickness they cannot heal, the doctors say: locked in your body you will remain. Well, I have been locked in mine. We will tunnel each other out. You seal the covenant with a grin.

( Jon Stallworthy, “ Root and Branch ”, Hogarth, London, 1968. ),

which is the same kind of pure and beautiful reconciliation that Abhinavagupta achieves in his finest moments of philosophy, a wisdom we appreciate in literature, but hope for in vain in life.

1. Dhvanyālokalocana, p. 180, Banaras edition with Bālapriyā, under II. 4.

छेककाराणां को भेद:? वृत्तिभेदवैचित्र्यं चारुत्वं चिच्छङ्करम्। श्रुतिदुष्टादिवर्जनं च किमर्थं? तेन रसभावनाख्यो द्वितीयो व्याप्रार:, यद्रसाभिधा विलक्षणैव । तच्चैतद्वक्तव्यं नाम रसानं प्रति यत्काव्यस्य तद्रभावादीनां साधारणत्वापादनं नाम । भाविते च रसे तस्य भोग: योडनुभवस्मरणप्रतिपत्तिभ्यो विलक्षण एव दृष्टिविस्तरविकासात्मा रजस्तमोविच्छेद्यानुविद्ध-

सत्त्वमयानिजाचित्तभवावनिवारिताविच्छिन्नान्तिक्लृप्तिः परब्रह्मास्वादसविधः । स चैव च प्रधानभूतोऽङ्गश: सिद्धरूप इति । व्याप्रतिनामाप्रधानमेवेति । अत्रोच्यते—रसस्वरूप एव तावद्-

प्रतिपत्तय: प्रतिपादिनाम् । तथा हि—पूर्वावस्थायां यत्: स्थायी स एव व्यभिचारिसम्पातादिना प्राप्तपरिपोषोऽङ्गकार्यगत एव रस: । नाद्ये तु प्रधुम्नमानवाच्यरसो इति केचित्। प्रवाह-

धर्मीणां चित्तवृत्तौ चित्तद्रुते: चित्तद्रुतिसन्तरण क: परिपोषार्थ:? विस्मयशोकक्रोधादेश क्रमेण तावत् परिपोष इति नानुकार्यं रस: । अनुकर्तरि च तद्रावे लयादनुसरणं स्यात् । सामजिकगते वा कक्ष्यमत्कार:? प्रयुक्त करुणादौ दु:खप्राप्ति: । तस्मात् तयं पक्ष: । कस्त्वहि ? इहानन्यस्यानुकर्तव्यानुकारो न शक्य:, निध्व्योजनश्व विशिष्टताप्रतीतौ ताटस्थ्येन व्याप्रतयभावात् ।

तस्मादनियतावस्थात्कं स्थायिनमुदिश्य विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिभि: संयूज्यमानैरयं रस: सुखदुःखादिविलक्षणा स्थायिन: प्रतिपत्तिरूपतया स्वद्रूपानुकारोऽभिन्नो नटैकगामिनी रस: । स च न व्यतिरिक्तमात्रारमपेक्षते । किं त्वनुकार्याभिमते नटत्के आस्वादयिता सामाजिक इत्येतावन्मात्रमद: । तेन नाट्य एव रस:, नानुकार्यादिषु कश्चित् ।

अन्ये तु—अनुकर्तरि य: स्थायिभावसोद्भिनियादिसामग्र्यादिदृक्तो भित्ताविव्ह हरितालादिना अश्वावभास:, स एव लोकोत्तरतया स्वादापरसंख्या प्रतीत्या रसमानो रस इति नाट्यादसा नाट्यरस: । अपेरे पुनर्विभावानुभावमात्र एव विशिष्टसामग्र्य समर्थनमाण तद्रभावनानुभावनीयस्थायिरूपचित्तवृत्तिवासनानुपर्षं स्वनिवृत्तिचर्वणाविशिष्टमेव रस: । तन्नाध्यमेव रस: । अन्ये तु शृङ्गारं विभावम्, अपरे शृङ्गारमनुभावं, केचित्तु स्थायिमात्रं, इतरेऽन्ये व्यभिचारिणम्, अन्ये तत्त्वयोगम्, एकेऽनुकायं, केचन सकलमेव समुदायं रसमाहुरित्यलं बहुना ।

काव्येऽपि च लोकनाट्याभ्यांस्थाननेयेन स्वभाववैचित्र्योक्तिककारणयेनैहिकप्रसन्न-

मधुरौज:शब्दसमर्थनमाणविमवादयोगादिमेव रसवता । अस्तु वात्र नाट्यादिचित्ररूपा रसप्रतीति:; उपाये वेलक्षण्यात् । इयमेव तावदत्र सरणि: । एवं स्थिते प्रथमपक्ष एवैतनि दूषणानि, प्रतीते: स्वपरगतवैदिविकलपनेँन । सर्वपक्षेषु च प्रतीतरपरिहार्या रसस्य । अप्रतीतं हि पिशाचवद्रुपवहायं स्यात् । किं तु यथा प्रतीतिमात्रेऽविशिष्टेऽपि प्रायशिकी आनुमानिकी आगमोत्था प्रतिभानकृत्या च प्रतीतिरुपायैवैलक्षण्यादनैव,

तद्वादियमपि प्रतीतौ इश्वरेणास्वादनभोगापरनामा तत्सिद्धान्मूताया हृदयसंवादाद्युपकृताया विभावादि-

सामग्र्या लोकोत्तररुपत्वात् । रस: प्रतीयान्त इति ओदनं पचतीतिवद्व्यवहार:, प्रतीयमान

एव हि रसः। प्रतीतिरेव विशिष्टा रसना। सा च नाट्ये लौकिकानुमानप्रतीतिरविलक्षणा, तां च प्रमुखे उपायतया संदधाना। एवं काव्ये अन्यशब्दप्रतीतिरविलक्षणा, तां च प्रमुखे उपायतयापेक्षामाणा !

तस्मादनुयोगपथः पूर्वपक्षः। रामादिचरितं तु न सर्वस्य हृदयसंवादीति महत्स-

हस्म । चित्रकाव्यानविशिष्टत्वाचेतसः । यदाह — “ तास्मनादिवं आशिषो नियतवत् ।

जातिदेशकालव्यहितानामन्यमानन्तर्य स्मृतिसंस्कारयोरेकरूपत्वात ” इति । तेन प्रतीतिस्था-

वद्रसस्य सिद्धा। सा च रसनारूपा प्रतीतिरुपयाते । वाच्यवाचकयोस्राभिधादिविविक्तो व्यञ्जनात्मा ध्वननव्यापार एव भोगीकरणव्यापारश् काव्यस्य रसविषयो ध्वननात्मकै:,

मानसंकिचित । भावकत्वमपि समुचितगुणालङ्कारपरिग्रहमक्रमस्माभिरेव वितत्य रक्ष्यते ।

किमेतदपूर्वम्? काव्यं च न रसान् प्रति भावकत्वमिति यदुच्यते, तत् भवतैव भावनादुपपक्ष

एव प्रत्युज्जीवितः। न च काव्यशब्दानां केवलानां भावकत्वम्, अर्थापरिज्ञाने तदभावात्। न च केवलानामर्थानां, शब्दान्तराण्यथंमालवे तद्योगात् । दृयोसतु भावकत्वमस्माभिरेवोक्तम्।

' यत्रार्थ: शब्दो वा तमर्थ व्यङ्ग:' इत्यत्र । तस्माद्व्यङ्गचकाव्येन व्यपारेण गुणालङ्कार-

चित्रादिक्ये तर्कृतयतया काव्यं भावकं रसान् भावयति, इति न्यायामपि भावनार्यां

करणांशे ध्वननमेव निपतति । भोगोडपि न काव्यशब्देन क्रियते, अपि तु घनमोहान्ध्य-

सड़्टटतानिवृत्तिद्वारेणास्वादापरनाम्नि अलौकिके हृदविस्तारविकासात्मनि भोगे कर्तव्ये

लोकोत्तर ध्वननव्यापार एव मुख्याभिप्तः । तच्चेदं भोगकृतं रसस्य ध्वननीयत्वे सिद्धे

दैवसिद्धम् । रस्यमानोदितचमत्कारान्तर्गतिवैचित्र्य-

स्यानन्यादृद्यादिवेनास्वादगणना न युक्ता । परब्रह्मस्वादरब्रहचारिवं चास्वस्य रसा-

स्वादस्याहमियुपमानातिरिक्तां रसस्वादोपायस्वप्रतिभिज्ञारूपां व्युपच्तिमन्ते करोतीति

कमुपलभामहं ।

Here is our translation of this complex passage :

Objection : 1 It has been said by Bhaṭṭanāyaka:2 “ Were rasa3 to

1. In the second edition of Gnoli's work, “ The Aesthetic Experience according

to Abhinavagupta ”, Chowkhamba, 1968, which has just appeared, he has added an

appendix in which he translates the passage. However, our interpretations differ so

often and so radically from his, that we felt we were not duplicating any labour by

translating this important passage. It did not seem to us necessary to point out all

the places where we differ.

2. This is an earlier version of what Abhinava later expands into the famous

commentary on the rasasūtra in the Abhinavabhāratī, Vol. I, p. 277 ff. This passage

forms the core of Gnoli's book. See also, for details on the views of Abhinava's prede-

cessors, Sankaran, “ Some Theories of Rasa and Dhvani ”, and P. Shastri, “ The

Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure ”.

3. We have found the following texts useful, either because they reproduce,

or because they expand these very arguments :

( Continued on next page

be apprehended as belonging to someone else (and not to the spectator),

then (the spectator) would remain indifferent (tātasthya). Nor can rasa,

which stems from a poem dealing with a subject like the life and deeds of

Rāma, etc., be apprehended as belonging to oneself. For if it were appre-

hended as belonging to oneself, we would have to say that real emotions (such

as sexual desire, etc.) arise in one’s own self (while witnessing a dramatic

performance). And that would be most improper in the case of (somebody

like) Sītā.1 For (she) cannot be the (ālambana) vibhāva2 with respect

to a spectator.3 Should it be argued that what causes (prayojaka) her

to become a vibhāva (cause) of arousing (vikāsa) latent emotions (vāsanā)

(of love, etc.) (in the spectator) is the fact that (she stands as a symbol

for) non-personalised (sādhārana) womanhood (kāntātva), we reply: how

would such a process be possible in the case of the description of gods, etc.?

Nor can it be said that during a dramatic performance (madhye) there is

(on the part of the spectator) a recollection of his own wife.4 How can

Continued from previous page)

(For full bibliographical information on each item consult the bibliography at

the end of the volume): (1) Sridhara's commentary on the Kāvyaprakāsa ; (2) Mānikya-

candra's commentary on the KP.; (3) Candīdāsa's commentary on the KP.; (4) Hema-

candra's Kāvyānuśāsana ; (5) Prabhākara's Rasapradīpa ; (6) Vidyādhara's Ekāvalī ;

(7) Vidyanātha's Pratāparudrayośobhūṣaṇa, and finally (8) Jagannātha's Rasa-

gaṅgādhara.

1. Abhinava, following Bhaṭṭatauta, uses this same argument against

Saṅkuka, A. Bh., p. 277 (Gnoli, p. 7) :

न हि ममेयं सीता काचिदिति स्वात्मीक्षतेन प्रतिपत्तिनंटस्य ।

"The actor does not think to himself : ‘Sītā belongs to me’.

2. BN means that Sītā is only a vibhāva with regard to Rāma, not to the

spectator. But what can this mean ? Vibhāvas are all in regard to rasa. After all, it

is not Rāma who experiences rasa in regard to Sītā, so how can she be his vibhāva ?

We must take the word vibhāva to be a loose usage for kāraṇa of true rati in Rāma,

but this has to do with the real world and not with rasa.

3. Bhaṭṭanāyaka (BN) uses sophistry to prove that rasa is perceived neither

as located in the sāmayika (ātmāgata) nor as located in someone else (e.g. the

character portrayed or the actor who presents that character). By ruling out both

the possibilities, ātmagatatva and paragatataa of rasapratīti, he comes to the conclu-

sion that rasah na pratīyate, "rasa is not perceived at all". According to BN we do

not have any perception (pratīti) of rasa, but only its enjoyment (bhoga or bhogi-

karaṇa). BN is not against admitting rasa in the sāmājika - he is against admitting

its pratyaya (perception) in the sāmājika. Instead of pratyaya, BN uses his own

terminology bhoga and bhogīkaraṇa. The difference between the two ideas seems to

us only one of terminology.

For the same arguments, see the A. Bh., p. 278, (Gnoli, p. 10).

4. We have translated this sentence as if it were a serious observation,

namely that when the spectator sympathises he does not remember his own personal

life. However, it is possible that it is meant humorously as well : “for God’s sake, you

do not want to have to remember your own wife when watching love scenes !”

XI

( uddīpana ) vibhāvas in the form of such deeds as building a bridge over the

ocean, etc., by extraordinary heroes like Rāma ever become generalised,

( since nobody else could ever do them ) ? Nor can it be said that Rāma, etc.,

as full of energy,1 etc., is remembered,2 because he has never actually

formed a part of our ( past ) experience ( such that now we could remember

him ). To perceive ( Rāma's ) energy ( utsāha, the sthāyibhāva of vīrarasa )

from a verbal source of knowledge ( śabda )3 is not to experience rasa,3

just as when we directly watch a couple making love there is no aesthetic

pleasure.4 As for the theory that rasas arise ( utpatti ), ( the difficulty is

that ) because of the ( spectator's ) ( real ) sorrow ( karuṇa, i. e. śoka ) he

would be genuinely unhappy and would no longer return to watch such

dramatic performances in which ( there was ) karuṇa ( rasa ) ever again.

Therefore rasa does not “ arise ” ( utpatti ), nor is it induced by suggestion

1. The important word is Rāma, to which utsāhādimān is simply an adjective.

The ādi stands for ratimān, etc., depending on the rasa. But none of these states form

part of our own experience of Rāma, since we never knew him. Even though the

spectator might apprehend the sthāyibhāvas like utsāha, etc., in Rāma, etc., from the

words actually used in the poem, still it will be only śabdajanyajñāna of the utsāha in

Rāma. This śabdajanyajñāna cannot lead to rasotpatti in the sahrdaya. The reason

for this is given in the form of an analogy in the next sentence : “ Just as when a

couple is actually observed ( pratyakṣa ) making love to each other, there is no

rasotpatti in the observer ( rasopajana means ratibhāñāvedana - an aesthetic experi-

ence of love ).” But we cannot quite see the point in the argument, in spite of the

analogy. However, to have seen this “ generalised ” nature of drama was one of the

great moments of literary criticism, and it appears that this view belongs to Bhaṭ-

ṭanāyaka, for Abhinava simply takes it over. Bhāvana is the same as sādhāraṇīkaraṇa.

Ānanda does not use this term.

2. The reason we cannot remember Rāma is that the definition of memory

in Sanskrit logic involves anubhava, direct experience.

3. The expanded version of this, A. Bh., p. 278 ( Gnoli, p. 10 ) reads :

न च शब्दानुमानादिस्थ्यसत् — ( where tat refers to उत्साहादिस्थायिभाव ) — प्रतीतो

लोकस्य सरसता युक्ता प्रत्यक्षादिवत् ।

What is BN's point ? Does he mean simply that we cannot have rasapratīti

through anumāna and śabda ?

4. Abhinava ( A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 278, Gnoli, p. 10 ) expands the analogy of

watching a couple making love by adding :

प्रत्यक् लज्जाजुगुप्सासङ्कादिस्ववृत्तिचित्तवृत्त्यन्तरौदास्यग्रहतया का सरसत्कथापि स्यात् ।

“ On the contrary, because one becomes preoccupied ( vyāgratayā ) with one's

own mental moods that arise, such as embarassment, disgust, or even sexual desire,

we cannot say that this is an aesthetic experience.” Cf. also Daśarūpaka IV. 39 and

the Avaloka thereon. Abhinava makes the same point on p. 35 of the A. Bh. ( Vol. I ) :

लौकिकामिश्रणैः श्वासौ(?) सांसारिकहृदयप्रक्रो(?)ध्यान्न(?)यित(?)पच(?)तरुम(?)दर्शनाकुलतया (?) मुख्यहृदयप्रयोगे(?)नष्ट(?)भावानुसंधि(?)

संपत्त्यभावात् ।

We take tatpratipattau in the last sentence of p. 181 to refer to utsāha

of the preceding sentence : न च उत्साहादिमान् रामः स्मृतः, as opposed to Gnoli who takes

it to refer to Rāma.

( abhivyakti ), for if ( such emotions as ) love, existing in a dormant form ( śaktirūpa ) ( in the spectator ), were to ( arise or ) be induced by suggestion, then there would occur the difficulty that to a greater or lesser extent ( tāratamya ) the spectators would make actual physical attempts to possess the object ( presented before them on the stage ).1 And if we held that rasa was aroused ( i. e. induced )2 by suggestion, ( we could ask the same question as before: ) is rasa existent in the spectator himself, or in someone else ? The same difficulties would arise now as arose before. Therefore rasa is not ( directly ) perceived ( pratīyate ),3 nor conjured up ( utpadyate ), nor suggested ( abhivyajyate ) by poetry. But poetic words are of an altogether different nature from ordinary words, thanks to the three functions ( trayaṁśatā ) possessed by them. Denotation ( abhidhāyakatva ) is concerned with the literal meaning; universalisation ( bhāvakatva ) is concerned with rasa, etc. ;4 and aesthetic enjoyment ( bhoktrtva ) is concerned with the sensitive reader ( sahṛdaya ). These are three ( separate ) functions which are the constituents of words used in poetry ( or literature ).

1. All later writers reproduce this phrase, viṣayārjanatāratamya but without explaining it or paraphrasing it. It is thus clear that nobody really knew what Abhinava meant. Gnoli takes it very differently from the way we have ( see op. cit. p. 45, 108 ). We take it to mean that the spectator would actually feel the need to acquire ( arjana ) the object ( viṣaya ) on the stage, i. e. he would want to get up and take Sita away. But the expression tāratamya is, we admit, inconvenient. We suppose the idea is that some people will make a greater effort ( i. e. will be more excited ) to attain the object, and others less. See Daśarūpaku IV. 39 and Avaloka on इतरेषाम् अस्यन्तनुरागापकर्षाच्छादः प्रसज्यतेन । Cf. the old story of the backwoodsman in tho gallery who shot the " villain " on the stage.

2. It is not clear to us just what Bhaṭṭanāyaka intends by the term abhi-vyakti. He must of course have known the doctrine of vyañjanā as put forth by Anadavardhana. Abhinava uses the term abhivyakti as synonymous with " suggestion ". Bhaṭṭanāyaka however understands " abhivyakti " to be a sort of production which he places on the same level as utpatti, since his argument śṛṅgārasya abhi-vyaktau, etc., really applies to utpatti-pakṣa. Abhinava points out that in a verse which he quotes from BN, the expression vyañgya occurs. The verse is :

भावसंयोगिजनाच्च्युत्कृष्टरससंचिरिगोचरः । आस्वादनात्मानुभवेत रसः काव्यार्थ उच्यते ॥

( Gnoli, p. 11, A. Bh. I, p. 279 ) on which Abhinava comments : इति तत्र व्यक्तिमानतया व्यङ्गो रक्ष्यते ( surely, though, the correct reading is lakṣyate ).

3. BN's stand that rasa is not perceived at all ( rasah na pratīyate ) is not reasonable. It is the same sophistic argument used in svagatatva and paragatatva, meant only to silence the opponent. Unless he could mean by pratīyate " direct experience ", which is of course not what takes place in the theatre, since, as BN already pointed out, we do not know the people on the stage and are thus not personally involved.

4. Rasādiviṣayam is problematic. We must understand ratyādiviṣayam, which is confirmed by the Rasapradīpa, p. 26.

66

शान्तरस

literature ( tatra ) denotation alone held sway, then what would differentiate śleṣa and other figures of speech from such devices as the use of words in two senses ( tantra ),1 etc., in scientific works ?2 Moreover ( if this were true ) then the different varieties of alliteration ( vrtti ) would be virtually useless. And what purpose would the avoidance of such faults as cacophony ( śrutidusta ),3 etc., serve? Therefore there is a second function4 known as generalisation ( bhāvanā ) ( responsible for bringing about the experience ) of rasa ( i. e. of the sthāyibhāvas ), thanks to which, denotation ( abhidhā ) assumes a new dimension ( vilakṣaṇā ). This function of universalisation ( bhāvakatva ) with respect to the rasas ( i. e. sthāyibhāvas ) is in fact ( nāma ) what is, in poetry, responsible for making the vibhāvas, etc., universal. Once a rasa ( i. e. sthāyibhāva ) has been thus universalised,5 its realisation ( bhoga, i. e. sākṣātkāra ) ( is possible ), a realisation which is different from the perceptions derived from memory or direct experience, which takes the

1. The Bālapriyā ( p. 182 ) explains tantra as follows:

तन्त्रे नामानेकार्थबोधेच्छया पदस्यैकस्य सकृतुचारणम् ! . . . . . शास्त्रे "हलन्तय""मिति पाणिनीयसूत्राद्दिव पादस्यैकस्य सकृतुचारणम् ! इलादित्यादिष्वेकार्थबोधसंमवादुभयोःप्तो न स्वादिस्वर्यः: " हलन्त्यम्", "इति

The point is this: In the sūtra of Pāṇini (I. 3·3: halantyam ), 'hal' stands for two completely different things: it means (1) the śivasūtra ( no. 14 ) hal, and (2) any one of the consonants. There is of course no camatkāra in this. Cf. Udd. III, Locana, p. 472. Cf. Vāmana's Kāvyālankārasūtra, IV. 3. 7.

2. At this point in the exposition of BN's views, the Śridhara commentary adds : तत्राप्य ( तत्राभिधा ) निरन्तरसान्तरार्थनिष्ठैव मुख्या|मुख्येन्दैः शब्दव्यापारः ! स शास्त्रेतिहासयोरपि यथाक्रमं शब्दार्थप्राधान्येन प्रसुमित्रसमितयोर्: साधारणः ! अन्यदर्शनादर्शयन् तु काव्यनाथ-योरपि, उपायप्राधान्येन जायायासमितवत् व्यवस्थितः: ! (S. Bhattacharya, op. cit. vol. I,p. 68). This makes it likely that this famous distinction of teaching like a master, and like a wife, was first invented by BN and not by Abhinava. Abhinava first mentions this on p. 40, of the Locana, and again on p. 336 and 399. The distinction between śāstra, ākhyāna and kāvya has already been made by BN in a verse that Abhinava quotes on p. 87 of the Locana :

शब्दप्राधान्यमाश्रित्य तत्र शास्त्रं पृथग्विदुः ! अर्थ तत्त्वेन युक्तं तु वदन्त्यालोक्यनमितयः !! इद्योरुंणत्वे व्यापारप्राधान्ये काव्यधीर्मवेत् !!

[ We Should read arthe tattvena as done by K. Sastri ( p. 161 ) ]. This is surely the inspiration for Abhinava's famous distinction, taken over by all later writers.

3. Śrutidusta is mentioned by Bhāmaha, I. 47, and by the Dhvanyāloka II. 14 and the Vrtti thereon. Abhinava (p. 214-215 of the Locana ) speaks of it as anitya because there are cases in which harsh sounds are appropriate, e. g. in raudrarasa. See also Uddyota III, parikaraśloka no. 1, on p. 302. Abhinava also refers to nityāni-tyadoṣa on p. 16 of the Locana.

4. Note that BN is arguing for a further power in poetry, beyond the literal sense. Most probably he derives this doctrine from Ānandavardhana.

5. Bhārite ca rase is really speaking an improper usage. Bhāvanayā samar-pite rase is what BN means.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

67

form of druti, vistara and vikāsa,1 and which approximates the bliss that

comes from realising ( one's identity ) with the highest Brahman ( para-

brahamāsvādasavidhah ),2 for it consists of repose in the bliss ( nirṛtiviśrānti )

which is the true nature of one's own Self, and which is permeated with

sattva ( guṇa ) intermingled with the diversity of rajas and tamas. It is this

aesthetic pleasure ( bhoga ) alone that is the major element ( i. e. purpose of

poetry ),3 and it is an accomplished fact ( siddharūpa ) ( since it consists in

blissful repose in the pure consciousness of the Self which is an accomplished

fact ) ( even though in relation to abhidhā and bhāvanā it is sādhya-rūpa, i. e.

to be accomplished). (All forms of) intellectual and moral instruction ( vyut-

patti ) ( in literature ) are in fact only subsidiary, ( pleasure being the major

goal of literature ).”4 We reply ( to these views of Bhatṭanāyaka ) as fol-

1. Note the Rasagaṅgādhara, p. 66 ( KM ed. of 1939 ) : गुणानां चैतेषां द्रुतिदीपि-

विकासाव्यतिरस्तत्रशृङ्गारद्रुत्यः कमेण प्रयोज्याः |

These terms are explained in the DR. IV. 43. Ānanda speaks of dīpti on

p. 209. See also Kārikā II, 9 (p. 208). Abhinava speaks of dīpti as being vikāsa-

vistāraprajjvalanāsvabhārā ( p. 208-209, Locana ). He also uses the verb dravati in

connection with karuṇa. Ānanda says that the mind, in karuṇa, is exceedingly moved

( ādrataṃ yāti, which Abhinava ( p. 207-208 ) explains as kāthinyaṃ tuṣyati ). This

certainly prefigures the theory. Is BN the first to use these terms? We think it

unlikely. See also Gnoli, p. 46, and Raghavan, Sr. Pr. p. 436.

2. Note the importance of the term savidhah, which means literally “near”.

We don't think it can be taken to mean simply “similar” here, since surely the

implication is that it is inferior. If this is the correct interpretation, then perhaps

the passage about the Yogins milking the cow of mysticism ( Locana, p. 91 ) should

be reinterpreted, in spite of what Abhinava says. (Note that this agrees with the

extraordinary passage in the third Uddyota, p. 510, where Abhinava unambiguously

states that rasāsvāda is inferior to brahmāsvāda ........ परमेश्वरविश्रान्त्यनन्दः प्रकृत्यते

तदानन्दविगुणंणमात्रावभासो हि रसास्वादः | See also Śridhara : भोगश्र् परानन्दसादृश्यं योगिगतो

ब्रह्मास्वादसनिकृष्टः | But not everybody thought that BN meant “inferior”. Mammaṭa, p. 60

(8. Bhattacharya's ed. from which the above quotation by Śridhara is taken ),

paraphrases as : brahmāsvādam iva. Note Hemacandra, p. 88: parabrahmāsvā-

dasodaro nimilitanayanaiḥ, which reminds one of the humorous passage in the

Dhvanyāloka, p. 26 : ध्वनिध्वानिरन्तः यदतदलकतैहैदयैर्मोन्मुग्धतैलाच्छलोल्लसत्, which Abhi-

navagupta will later defend as being one of the signs of ecstasy.

3. This is very important, for Bhaṭṭanāyaka may have been the first to

clearly say that vyutpatti is secondary to prīti. In this he is followed by Abhinava ( p.

41 — ānanda eva pāryantikam phalam; and third Uddyota, p. 336 where vyutpatti is

said to be an incidental result of prīti, though the passage is somewhat ambiguous ).

4. Govinda, in his Kāvyapradīpa, (p. 66) actually says that this view of BN is

in accord with the Sāṅkhya doctrine: उद्रेकश् स्वेतरावभिभूयावस्थानं इति सांख्यसिद्धान्तानुसरण

विवृणुते | Sattva, rajas and tamas are of course the three constituents of human nature.

As Jagannātha says ( p. 29, RG ), during rasapratīti, rajas and tamas are suppressed

by the preponderance of sattva, because of the power of the function called bhogakṛttva.

( Continued on next page

lows: the true nature of rasa is the subject of many different and controversial

views. For instance, some ( Lollata for example ) believe that that which is

known as a permanent emotion (sthāyibhāva) in its prior ( undeveloped ) form

( pūrvāvasthā ) becomes nourished ( i. e. developed, prāptaparipoṣa ) through

the introduction ( sampāata ) of the vyabhicārins, etc., and ( then becomes ) rasa

located in the character being portrayed (anukārya). Rasas are called nāṭyarasas

because they are used in drama. ( Objection to this view by Śaṅkuka : )1

what can it mean to say that one state of mind ( cittavṛtti ) is “nourished ”

by another state of mind, seeing that mental moods are in a constant state of

flux ( pravāhadharmin )?2 Wonder, grief and anger, etc., are not gradually

augmented (paripoṣa) (on the contrary, they diminish with time ).3 There-

fore there is no rasa in the character being portrayed.4 If one were to say

that it is in the actor (anukartr), (the difficulty is that) the actor would

then be unable to follow the tempo (laya),5 etc., (since he would be

Continued from previous pāge )

An excellent account of BN's view and its similarity to the Sāṅkhya is to be found

in Hiriyana, “ Indian Aesthetics ”, Proceedings and Transactions of the first Oriental

Conference, Poona, 1922, p. 246-247. “ The purpose of evolution in the Sāṅkhya is

bhoga and apavarga, and the use of this word bhoga in this passage constitutes a link

connecting the present theory with the Sāṅkhya.” ( op. cit. p. 247-248).

1. Here is a one-sentence summary of Saṅkuka's position by Prabhākara,

Rasapradīpa. p. 22 : विभावादिभिरिन्द्रियैर्मानोद्रव्यकयोगो रथादि: स्थायिभावो रस:

2. It is not clear whatSaṅkuka intends by pravāhadharmin. What does he mean

when he says that one mental state cannot nourish another, since any mental state is in

constant flux ? The analogy of a river does not hold good, for while it is in a constant

state of flux, it is nonetheless augmented by minor streams. Why should not a major

( or abiding, sthāyin ) mental state be intensified by subsidiary and fleeting mental

states ? Does Saṅkuka mean that there is no question of any mental state being

strengthened by any other mental state, since all of them are after all in a state of

flux- always changing -diminishing in their intensity with the passage of time ? But

this does not seem true. Does he mean that it is only in the theatre that one has a

concentrated mental mood, not in real life ? If so, would he argue that Rāma's love

was constantly changing ? Unlikely. What then could he mean ?

3. This passage has been expanded in the A. Bh. p. 274 : शोकस्य प्रथमं तीव्रत्वं

कालात्तु मान्द्यदर्शनम्। This is very true, and well observed, but what does it prove ?

Perhaps the point is that a mental state becomes intensified or weakened because of

the external objective stimulants, and not because of other mental states (like the

vyabhichāribhāvas ).

4. The sentence iti nāṅukārye rasaḥ is ellipticaI. It should be explained as

follows : अनुकार्ये ( रामादौ ) विषमाने: रस: सामाजिकेनास्वादित इति न युक्तम् । According to

Lollata, the spectator relishes the rasa ( i. e. ratyādisṭhāyibhāva ) which is located in

the character portrayed. Now Saṅkuka's view is that the spectator cannot be said

to enjoy the ratyādisṭhābhāva which is after all located in the character portrayed, who

is removed both in space and time from the spectator.

5. Note how the BP takes laya (p. 184 ): लयो नाम नृत्यगीतवाद्यानामेकतानतारूपं

साम्यम् । But we feel that Gnoli's interpretation, which we follow, is better (see his

Int. p. XVIII ).

absorbed in an aesthetic experience and unable to concentrate on his duties as an actor). If one were to say (that rasa, i. e. ratyādibhāva exists) in the karuṇa (rasa) (i. e. in tragic situations), etc., the spectator would experience (only) pain. Therefore this thesis is incorrect. What then is the correct view? It is not possible (precisely) to imitate any one particular mood because of the endless and ever-changing (aniyata) degrees of intensity (of the mental moods). Moreover it would be useless to do so, for if they were reproduced exactly (viśiṣṭatā), because (the spectator) would not be moved (tātaṣthya), there could result no edification (vyutpatti).

Therefore, (here is Śaṅkuka's view:)1 when this sthāyi(bhāva), whose nature is not definite (as regards its particular intensity) is combined with the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas, there results an experience (pratipatti) of the the sthāyi(bhāva) (love, etc.) which is inferred as existing in the actor (because he is for the time being the locus of the rati, etc.) and is (therefore) confined only to the drama. The nature of this experience is the enjoyment of the sthāyibhāva (love, etc.) (thus inferred as existing in the actor) and it is different from memory, because it is the object of the apprehension that "this Rāma (standing before me, as represented by the actor) is happy2 (because he is with Sītā)". This rasa does not depend on any other thing beyond the actor who is apprehended (by the spectator) as non-relisher (of the ratibhāva, etc., inferred by him as existing in the actor). Only that much3 (and nothing more is required for the aesthetic experience of the rasa). Therefore, rasa exists only in the drama, and not in the characters to be portrayed, etc. This is the view of some (i. e. of Śaṅkuka).

Others4 say: the appearance (semblance, avabhāsa) of a sthāyi (bhāva) in the actor, which has been brought about by the dramatic accessories (sāmagri) such as abhinaya, etc., is like the appearance (semblance) of a

1. This is a difficult passage. We take viśiṣṭa to mean niyata (definite, particular, precise.): नटेनानुकरणविधिगविशिष्ट (i. e. नियत) चित्तवृत्तिज्ञानं कतते। तेन च तदनुकरणमात्रं इति स्वीकते, सामाजिका अपि नासो परमार्थतः रसादिभावः। किंतु व्युत्पत्तिरसमवः। Very different, however, is Gnoli, p. 110.

2. Ayam rāmaḥ sukhi is explained by the BP (p. 185) as rāmo 'yam sitarisa-yakaratimān.

3. Adah means "idam". See Locana p. 160, where Abhinava uses the same expression. It occurs again on p. 239 and 258 of the Locana.

4. It is difficult to identify the person who held this opinion, number 4, given on p. 186. According to Mammata (K.P. IV, p. 88 of Jhalikar's ed.) the painted horse analogy (citraturagaṇyāya) belongs to Saṅkuka, whereas here it is given after his views have already been expounded.

horse ( drawn ) on a canvas by means of yellow pigment, etc. Because it is enjoyed by an act of cognition, which is otherwise called relish ( āsvāda ), and since it is transcendental, it is called rasa. And so the expression nāṭyarasāḥ is to be explained as nāṭyād rasāḥ, i. e. rasas arising from drama.

Others, however, say : the vibhāvas and anubhāvas alone, being presented ( to the spectator ) with the help of special stage-equipment ( acting, music, dialogue, etc. ) ( viśiṣṭasāmagrī ) and being linked ( anuṣakta ) with the instincts ( vāsanā ) appropriate to the mental state in the form of the sthāyibhāva which is sought to be produced ( vibhāvanīya )1 by these vibhāvas and which is intended to be brought within the purview of the experience of the spectators by means of these anubhāvas, these ( vibhāvas and anubhāvas ) becoming the object of the relish in the form of the bliss of the Self ( svanirvṛticarvanāviśiṣṭa ),2—well, these vibhāvas and anubhāvas themselves are rasa.

Therefore, rasas, are nothing but drama. Others say that rasa is the vibhāva alone, others that it is the anubhāva alone, and some that it is the sthāyibhāva alone. Others say that rasa is the vyabhicāribhāva; still others that the combination of these ( four ) is rasa. Some say that rasa is the conglomeration of all these ( five ) things. Anyway, this is enough now.

( Here then is my own, Abhinava's, position ) : rasa applies to ( non-dramatic ) poetry as well, where in place of realism3 ( lokadharminī ) and

1. This is a difficult passage. Tadvibhāvanīya means vibhāvavibhāvanīya, "The sthāyibhāva which is sought to be produced by those vibhāvas." Tadanubhāvanīya means anubhāva-anubhāvanīya, "The sthāyibhāva which is intended to be brought within the purview of the experience of the spectators by means of those anubhāvas."

विशिष्टसामग्रीं सपर्यमानं अभिनवदीक्षामध्य समाजिकानां पुरस्तादुपस्थायि नामम् ।

2. Note how similar this is to Abhinava's view.

3. On nāṭyadharminī and lokadharminī, see the long article by Raghavan, J. O. R., Vol. VII, 1933, p. 359–398, part I, and part II, Vol. VIII, 1934, p. 57–75. Lokadharminī refers to everything in the drama that is realistic ( and applies thus primarily to the prakaraṇa ), whereas nāṭyadharminī refers to all the conventions used only in the theatre : asides that nobody else can hear, monologues, talking animals, gods on the stage, etc. Note that in the thirteenth chapter of the Nāṭyaśāstra ( Vol. II, G. O. S. p. 214 ) when Bharata begins a long list of the lakṣaṇas of each, he speaks of loka-dharmin as svabhāvābhyāropagata ( XIII, 71 ). It is a very embracing topic with Bharata, and includes such diverse elements as the pravṛttis, the prakṛtis, the dance, etc. Note the very interesting verse that Abhinava quotes from his teacher ( Bhatṭatauta? — he only says: यथोक्तम् ):

यद्वास्ति न तत्रास्ति कवेर्वर्णनमर्हति

यत्रासंभवि तत्न स्यात्संभव्यत्र तु धर्मतः ।

The second half of the verse, unless one has sa sambhāvi, makes no sense. But the first is all right: “Not everything that is in the world deserves to be described by the poet in his plays,” Abhinava more than once points out that not everything in

( Continued on next page

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

71

convention ( nātyadharmī ) (that apply to the theatre) there are the two modes

of svabhāvokti1 and vakrokti which convey rasa by means of transcendental

( alaukika ) vibhāvas,2 etc., which are presented by words possessing such

qualities as clarity ( prasanna ), softness ( madhura ) and vigour ( ojasvin ).3

Continued from previous page )

the drama need correspond to real life. As proof of this, he points out that many

dances do not have anything to correspond to them in real life. ( What in the outside

world bears any resemblance whatsoever to Beethoven's last quartets?) Note too,

what Abhinava says in the A. Bh. vol. I, p. 269 : लोक तु कदाचिद्‌व भावत्यपि गृहीततया।

नाट्ये तु त एव जीवितम्‌। It may be that Abhinavagupta was the first writer ever to

have articulated this refutation of strict realism, which has now come to seem so

commonplace in modern literature that it needs no defence. This was not so, less than

fifty years ago.

1. These are parallel terms, svabhāvokti corresponding to lokadharmī and

vakrokti to nātyadharmī as applied to kāvya. Thus Abhinava is using the terms in

their widest sense. Bhāmaha too ( V. 66 II. 85, I. 30) uses vakrokti to apply to all forms

of alaṅkāra. But he defines svabhāvokti ( II. 93 ) as a separate figure of speech.

( Thus De's remark, Vakroktijīvita, p. 23 : “Kuntaka follows Bhāmaha in rejecting

svabhāvokti as an alaṅkāra” is not true. It stems from the qualifying phrase in

Bhāmaha : iti kecit praçaṣkate, which does indicate doubt on Bhāmaha's part, but not

complete rejection. ) Daṇḍin (II. 363) divides vāṅmaya into two realms : svabhāvokti

and vakrokti. See also Udbhata, III. 8-9. The most elaborate discuśsion on svabhā-

vokti is found in the first chapter of Kuntaka's Vakroktijīvita. Vakrokti of course

for Kuntaka is just what dhvani is for Ānanda, only it is even wider in its embrace.

Svabhāvokti is the alaṅkārya, the kāvyaśarīra to which vakrokti is applied. See the

valuable article by V. Raghavan, “History of Svabhāvokti” in “ Some Concepts, etc. ”.

It is tempting to see the division in Skt. poetry as that of realism and romanticism.

Certainly verses that illustrate svabhāvokti tend to be more simple and direct,

and to deal with less exalted subjects. Moreover, the passage from the Locana

supports this conjecture. There are not a great many Skt. poets who excelled in realism. Profes-

sor Ingalls has written about one who did, Yogeśvara, in two remarkable articles : “ A

Sanskrit Poetry of Village and Field : Yogeśvara and His Fellow Poets ” J. A. O. S.

vol. 74 (1954) pp. 119-131; and “ Yogeśvara and His Favourite Poets. ”, Dr. V.

Raghavan Felicitation Volume, Adyar Library Bulletin, Vols. 21-22, 1967-68,

Madras, pp. 185 ff. A poem that deserves to be much better known in this respect is

Abhinanda's Kādambarikathāsāra, quoted by Abhinava several times, which contains

some remarkable examples of well-observed minor moments in life.

2. Against Bālaṅpriyā (p. 186 ), we take alaukika to construe with the

vibhāvas, etc. In other words, the vibhāvas are alaukika in so far as they are called

vibhāvas. It would not make much sense to associate the word with the guṇas them-

selves.

3. These are the śabdagunas mentioned by Bharata, Daṇḍin and Vāmana.

Ānandavardhana completely altered the older teaching of Daṇḍin ( I. 41-42 ) and

Vāmana ( I. 2. 11 ) on guṇas by bringing them under his system of rasa. For him,

the guṇas are the properties of rasa (as opposed to the alaṅkāras ). See under II. 7

of the Dhvanyāloka. Instead of the usual ten guṇas accepted by Bharata, Daṇḍin

and Vāmana, Ānanda accepts only the three mentioned here. The concept is very

complex, and we have dealt with it at some length in our notes to the Locana

( Continued on next page

XII

Or we could even grant that aesthetic experience ( rasapratīti ) in poetry is distinct in nature from that experienced in drama, since there is a difference in the means whereby it is brought about ( in both cases ).1 Nonetheless ( tāvat ), the particular mode by which aesthetic experience is brought about is the only one that will be explained presently ( iyam eva ). This being the case, the criticism ( of Bhaṭṭanāyaka ) concerning the impossibility of rasa being found either in oneself or in someone else, applies only to the first view ( i. e. Bhaṭṭalollata's ).2 But in all the views ( so far expounded ) the unavoidable fact remains that rasa is perceived ( pratīti ).3 For if it were unperceived ( as Bhaṭṭanāyaka claims ), then we could have no dealings with it, just as we can have no dealings with goblins4 ( since such creatures do not really

Continued from previous page ) translation to be published shortly. Note that Abhinava, in his discussions on the guṇas, has occasion to develop a theory much like the one hinted at by the words druti, vistāra and vikāsa as used by Bhaṭṭanāyaka. Ādratā stands for druti. Dipti would be the equivalent of vistāra, and vyāpakatva ( or samarpakatva ) of vikāsa. They are of course associated with certain rasas. See the Locana on II. 7-10. The best treatment of the problem is to be found in P. C. Lahiri, "Concepts of Rīti and Guṇa in Sanskrit Poetics", University of Dacca, 1937, and V. Raghavan, Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa, pp. 249-251.

1. There should be a daṇḍa after upāyavilakṣaṇyād. Iyam eva begins a new sentence.

2. I. e. Lollata's views, which BN refutes so convincingly that Abhinava need not do the work again.

3. This is directed against BN. who had said earlier ( p. 182 ), tena na pratīyate...rasaḥ. Abhinava expands this on p. 277 ( A. Bh. Vol. I, Gnoli, p. 11 ): प्रतीत्य- दिव्यतिरिक्तश संसारे को भोग इति न विभा। रसेनेति चेत् साक्षिप्रतिपत्तिरेव । But this is perhaps to interpret BN too rigidly. By saying na pratīyate rasaḥ, obviously he could not be claiming that rasa does not exist, only that pratīti is not an adequate word to express how it is experienced. Perhaps ( if he is not merely to be sophistic ) BN means that it is not “ perceived ” the way other things are in the world, i. e. it is not the result of the ordinary pramāṇas such as pratyakṣa, etc. Moreover, Abhinava accepts what BN says about rasa being neither personal ( svagata ) in which case we would become physically involved, nor paragata, in which case we would be indifferent. Abhinava also accepts the reason for this statement : rasa is made universal, sādhāraṇīkaraṇa, which is one of the most important concepts of Skt. poetics, first met with ( under the name of bhāvanā ) in BN and universally accepted by later writers.

4. It would seem that Abhinava is saying that pisācas ( goblins ) are merely figments of the imagination. On p.277, vol. I of the A.Bh. ( Gnoli, p. 11 ) Abhinava says न चाप्रतीतं वस्तुस्वि व्यवहारयोग्यम् । If Abhinava is indeed saying that such things as goblins and ghosts are merely products of our fancy, he would be one of the few early Indians to hold such an unorthodox opinion. We think it very likely that this is what he means ( how else could we interpret the line ? ) for he has made similar statements earlier : in the first Uddyota, commenting on a verse by his teacher Bhaṭṭendurāja, he says : न हि चेतनोपालंभवद्‌वसंधर्माव्यभिचारिणोऽर्थो न च न हृद्य । ( p. 127 ).

exist outside of the imagination ). Moreover, though as cognition they are the same, nonetheless such forms of perception as direct perception ( pratyakṣiki ), inferential perception ( anumāniki ), that which arises from verbal testimony ( āgamotthā ), that which is caused by intuition ( pratibhāna-krtā ), and that which stems from yogic sight ( yogipratyakṣajā i. e. telepathy, etc. ) are distinguished from one another by the means through which they are brought about. So also the perception ( pratīti ) of rasa, for which other names are carvanā ( relish ), āsvādana ( gustation), bhoga ( enjoyment ), ( is a form of perception different from these other types of perception ), because the set of factors, namely the vibhāvas, etc., helped by sympathetic response ( hṛdayasamvāda ), etc., which lie at the base ( nidāna ) of the aesthetic experience are of a transcendental nature. When we say that “ rasas are perceived ” ( we are using language loosely ) like when we say that “ he is cooking the boiled rice ”1 ( odanaṃ pacati ) ( where to be more precise we should really say tandulān pacati, since odana is the finished product ), for rasa is the process of perception ( pratīyamāna eva hi rasah )2 itself; and rasanā ( aesthetic experience) is a particular kind of perception ( i. e. it is brought about by the sāmagri such as vibhāvas, etc., in literature ) ( pratitir eva viśiṣṭā rasanā ). This perception ( of rasa ) in drama is distinct from every-day cases of inference, though it depends on inference in the initial stages ( since one first infers from the vibhāvas, etc., the sthāyibhāva in the person being portrayed ). In poetry too this perception ( of rasa ) is different from other kinds of verbal cognition ( i. e. abhidhā, tātparya and lakṣaṇā ), but in the initial stages it depends on abhidhā as a means ( of reaching the suggested sense ). Therefore the pūrvapakṣa ( Lollaṭa's view )3 has been destroyed ( by Bhaṭṭanāyaka ) such that it can

1. This refers to the distinction between tandula, the raw rice, and odana, the finished product. Strictly speaking, we should say : tandulān pacati, “ he cooks the rice ” and not “ odanaṃ pacati. ” But the words are used loosely. In the same way, rasaḥ pratīyate is not strictly correct, for rasa is the finished product. What we should say is vibhāvādi pratīyate. Most probably this is what Bhaṭṭanāyaka meant as well.

2. Pratīyamāna eva hi rasaḥ means that rasa is the actual process of aesthetic experience, and not the object ( viṣaya ) of that process. Just as rasa is described as rasyamānatā, in the same way it is here called pratīyamāna ( i. e. pratīyamānatā, pratītiḥ, rasanā, āsvādah ). It is identical with experience—it is the aesthetic experience itself. In a similar fashion ( and this may well have been the inspiration for Abhinava's view ), the sākṣin, in Vedānta, does not really see another object, or even experience happiness, for it is sarvaprakāśaka, and actual sac-cid-ānanda itself. To say ātmānubhāyate is simply loose terminology, since this implies the tripuṭī, which is absent in true anubhava. Cf. A. Bh. p. 285 : हृद्यस्य कस्यचिद्रमेयभूतस्य रसस्यामावात् ।

3. We take this as a reference to Bhaṭṭalollaṭa's views on the strength of the equivalent passage in the A. Bh., p. 277 ( Gnoli, p. 11 ) : तत्र पूर्वपक्षोऽत्र भट्टलोल्लटपक्षे नश्युपगमादेव नश्युपगत इति तदूषणमनुपहतपक्षे मेव ।

never rise again. ( When Bhaṭṭanāyaka ) on his part says that ( extraòrdinary )

deeds of Rama ( such as building a bridge over the ocean, etc. ) do not win

sympathetic response from everybody,1 he is being very rash ( sāhasa )

indeed.2 For minds are characterised as possessing a great variety of latent

impressions ( vāsanā ). As has been said: “ Vāsanās are endless, because

desire is eternal ”. “ Though separated by species ( jāti ), place ( deśa ) and

time ( kāla ), nonetheless there is a correspondence between memory and

saṃskāras ( i. e. though several lives intervene, vāsanās still give rise to instinc-

tive reactions to external situations ).”3 Therefore it is now established

1. There is a very interesting passage in the A. Bh. Vol. II, p. 412, germane

to this issue. Here is the text:

यदि तु मुख्यतयैनैव देवचरितं वर्ण्यते तत्तावदिप्रलम्भकरुणाद्रुतभयानकरसौचितं चेतनिबध्यते तन्मानुपचरितमेक संप्रत्ये, प्रत्यूत देवाना मधियाध्यानं प्रसिद्धिविध्यात्कम् । तत् तु चोक्को दोषः, विप्रलम्भादि-

भावे तु का तत्र विचित्रता रंजनाया इति प्रमाणमेवात् । अत एव सहृदयसंवादोऽपि देवचरिते तुष्टे3म्, न च तेषां दुःखमस्ति । यस्त्वतीकारोऽपाये व्युत्पादनं स्यात्; नायिका तु दिव्याऽप्यविरोधिनी यथोर्वेशी नायकच-

रितैनैव तद्रसस्याक्षेपात् ।

“ If however the doings of Gods are described ( in a drama ) as the main thing,

then in case they are presented as appropriate to vipralambha ( śṛṅgāra ), karuṇa,

adbhuta, and bhayānaka, they will turn out to be only the doings of ( ordinary ) human

beings. If on the contrary, the ( genuine ) doings of Gods are presented unwittingly

( adhyā ādhānam ), that would offend what is generally well-known ( in the world as

possible in the case of human beings ). The blemish entailed thereby has been

( already ) stated. And if there is no presentation of rasas such as vipralambha

( śṛṅgāra ), etc., what charm can result therefrom, since entertainment ( of the

audience ) essentially depends on these ( i. e. on vipralambha, karuṇa, etc. ) ? Hence

it is, that sympathetic response ( from the spectators ) is difficult to achieve in the case

of the presentation of the doings of Gods. For they ( i. e. the gods ) are not subject to

any suffering, so that from the description of ( that suffering and of ) the means used

by them to overcome it, the spectators may derive instruction. There is however

nothing contradictory in introducing even a divine heroine ( as opposed to a hero ), as

for example Urvaśi ( in Kālidāsa's Vikramorvaśīyam ), for her actions are presumed

to be plausible because of the actions of the ( human ) hero ( in that drama ).

‘ We are not certain of the phrase : pratyuta devānām adhiyādhānam prasiddhi-

dhiraghatakam. Also, we are not able to understand the exact sense of the last

sentence : नायिका तु दिव्याऽप्यविरोधिनी, यथा उर्वेशी, नायकचरितैनैव तद्रसस्याक्षेपात् ।

2. This must be a reference to p. 181 of the Locana, where BN said : समुद्र-

सेतुबन्धादयो विवावन्त कथ साधारण्यं भजेते:। But what could he mean by this? The only

logical inference would be that virarasa in such cases is not genuine, since it involves

improbabilities. But this would be an odd position for anyone to take of the Rāmāyaṇa

( though Abhinava himself acknowledges the truth of this for all but the most famous

of exploits, when he says that in the case of the prakaraṇa, outlandish events should

not take place, since this will prove to be a righna for the spectator - see p. 331 of the

Locana ). Surely the whole point of the sādhāraṇikaraṇa doctrine is that it allows

such events to become impersonalised, and so imaginatively possible. Could BN have

actually said : रामादिचरितं न सर्वस्य हृदयसंवादी ?

3. Yogasūtra IV. 10, and IV. 9. On p. 282 of the A. Bh. Abhinava has a very

( Continued on next page

that there is the perception of rasa. Moreover (Bhatṭanāyaka is wrong, because) this perception in the form of aesthetic enjoyment (rasanā) does arise (utpadyaṭe). And in bringing about this perception (tatra) the function is the suggestiveness (dhvananā), i. e. the vyañjanā of the literal sense and denotative words,1 which is a function different from abhidhā. (What Bhaṭṭanāyaka calls) the function of aesthetic relish (bhogīkarana) with regard to rasa in poetry is nothing other than suggestiveness (dhvananā). As for bhāvakatva, which (for us) consists in the use (parigraha) of proper guṇas and alaṅkāras,2 we will speak of this in some detail (later in the second Uddyota). What is new about it? When you (Bhaṭṭanāyaka) say that poetry is the producer (bhāvaka) of rasas, through bhāvanā, you have yourself revived the theory of utpatti (which you supposedly destroyed).3 One cannot say that in poetry words alone are productive (of rasa)4 for

(Continued from previous page)

interesting passage where he justifies the nine sthāyibhāvas in all human beings (though some predominate in certain people and others in others), and ends by saying: न हिेतचिचत्सृष्टावसनाच्युतः प्राणी भवति । In the course of our beginningless journey through this universe, we have experienced all emotions. Thus nobody fully aware of his own humanity can fail to be moved by another person's experiences. On p. 283 (of the A. Bh.), Abhinava quotes a fascinating line from Patañjali II. 4: न हि चैत्र एकस्यां स्त्रियां रक्त इत्यन्यस्त्रीषु विरक्तः । "The fact that Caitra is in love with one woman does not mean that he is out of love with others." This is not meant humorously, but only that when Caitra is in love with one woman, this means that his love for that particular woman is dominant in his mind. It does not mean that his mind is altogether devoid of love for any other woman. He of course has love in his mind for other women also, but this love is more feeble than the other, and hence overpowered by the love he feels for a particular woman at any given moment.

1. Suggestion applies to the vācya (e.g. in vastudhvani, where the literal meaning suggests the vyaṅgyārtha) and to the vācaka (since vācakas are vyañjakas).

2. This is somewhat curious. Where has BN said that bhāvakatva is samuci-tagunālaṅkāraparigraha? For BN bhāvanā is sādhāraṇīkaraṇa. How can this be associated with guṇas and alaṅkāras? However, Abhinava himself, in the A. Bh. p. 277, uses these very words to characterise BN's views. The wording in the A. Bh. is slightly different: दोषाभावगुणालङ्कारमयत्वलक्षणं ...... भावक्तवव्यापारेण । The phrase nibhidanijamohasaṅkatakātkarin̄ā on p 277 of the A. Bh. vol. I, is puzzling. Perhaps we must read saṃkataniorttikātkarin̄ā.

3. This is well observed. It is true that BN must use some expression like utpādyate, regardless of what word he chooses. Thus when he says bhāvite ca rase (Locana p. 183), one must paraphrase by bhāvanayā samarpite ca rase.

4. Abhinava's point seems to be that BN said (Locana, p. 182) that there are three functions of words: काव्याश्रय: शब्दस्य व्व्यञ्जनात्प्रसादात् । But this is unfair of Abhinava, since he too says over and over that vyañjanā is a śabdavyāpāra. Surely Bhaṭṭanāyaka must have meant the same thing? It is most unlikely that he would have restricted the function to words. On the other hand, Abhinava himself has argued for the importance of śabda. Cf. the interesting passage at the end of the first Uddyota, p. 158-159.

76

if their meaning is not known, no rasa can arise. Nor can one say that it is meaning alone ( that gives rise to rasa in poetry ) for if the same meaning is expressed by other words ( śabdāntarenvārpyamāṇatve ) rasa does not arise.1 We ( the Dhvanivādins ) have explained that both word and meaning ( are helpful in the presentation of rasa ) when we said : “ Wherever a meaning or a word manifests a suggested meaning,”2 etc. Therefore by means of the function known as suggestiveness ( as a means ), and through ( the use of ) guṇas, alañkāras and propriety ( aucitya ), etc., as a procedure ( itikartavyatā ), poetry which is possessed of the power of conveying ( bhāvaka ) ( rasas ) conveys ( bhāvayati ) rasas, and in this three-fold scheme of bhāvanā ( as accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas )3 suggestiveness fits in as the means

1. Cf. what Ānanda says on p. 358 of the Dhvanyāloka, Uddyota III in the context of vyañjanā.

2. Dhvanyāloka I. 13. The whole verse reads :

यत्रार्थः शब्दो वा तमर्थमुपसर्जनीकृतस्वार्थी ।

व्यक्तः काव्यविशेषः स ध्वनिरिति सूरिभिः कथितः ॥

“ When the ( directly expressive ) word and the literal meaning both first subordinate themselves ( to the suggested sense ), the word subordinating its meaning and the literal meaning subordinating itself, and then reveal that ( suggested ) sense, that kind of poetry has been called dhvani by the wise. ” This is in fact the major definition of dhvani in the D. Āl.

3. In brief, the Mīmāṃsā position is as follows : bhāvanā, creative force, or creative energy, is of two kinds : (1) śābdī, and (2) ārthī. It is a particular kind of activity in an efficient or operative agent ( bhāvayitṛ ), which is conducive to the production of the effect ( or conducive to the coming into being of that which is going to come into being ). śābdī bhāvanā means verbal creativity, or word-efficient force. Śābdī bhāvanā is concerned with how the words in a scriptural or secular command operate in bringing about the fulfilment of that command. Ārthī bhāvanā is concerned with how a particular action ordered by the scriptures or by a human master is carried out by the person ordered to do it, with a view to achieving the expected result. In this passage we are concerned with ārthībhāvanā and not with śābdībhāvanā. Bhāvanā consists of three elements: (1) sādhya (objective aimed at by the action), (2) sādhana or karaṇa (the means leading to that objective) and (3) itikartavyatā (procedure to be followed in reaching the objective) (kim bhāvayet, kena bhāvayet, katham bhāvayet). According to Abhinava, Bhaṭṭanāyaka has borrowed the word bhāvanā from the Mīmāṃsakas. In karmakāṇḍa, in the case of a sacrifice like jyotiṣṭoma (jyotiṣṭomena seargakaṃ yajeṭa ), svarga is the sādhya. The jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice is the sādhana or karaṇa, and the performance of the minor sacrifices prayāja, anuyāja, etc., is the itikartavyatā. In poetry and drama, rasa (or rasāsvāda) is the sādhya, dhvavana or vyañjanāñyāpāra is the sādhana or karaṇa, and guṇālaṅkāraparityādi (i. e. samucit-tagunālaṅkāraparigrahā) is the itikartavyatā. Thus according to Abhinava, dhvavana is the karaṇa or sādhana by which rasāsvāda is brought about. This is what he means by the sentence इति ह्यर्थायमपि भावनायां करणां ध्वननमेव निपतति । He means that kāvya is the bhāvaka of the rasāsvāda, just as the performer of a sacrifice is the bhāvayitṛ (i. e. bhāvaka) of the svargalūpaphalā.

( karana).1 Nor does bhoga (aesthetic enjoyment) come about through the words used in poetry (alone), but rather (it comes about) through the removal of the obscuration (saṅkaṭa) (of the blissful nature of the Self) caused by the blinding darkness which is itself the result of deep ignorance (moha). In the transcendental (lokottara) aesthetic enjoyment (bhoga) that is to be brought about (in this manner), for which another name is āsvāda (enjoyment), and which consists of druti, vistara and vikāsa,2 suggestiveness alone (according to us, should be) given the highest place of honour (mūrdhābhiṣikta). When suggestiveness (of poetry in relation to rasa) is admitted, this so-called bhogakṛttva (of poetry) inevitably follows. For bhoga is nothing other than the inexplicable thrill of delight (camatkāra) that arises from aesthetic enjoyment (rasyamānatā). But it is not correct to say that aesthetic pleasure (āsvāda) is divided (only) into three, druti, etc., (because there are innumerable variations possible) on account of the endless variety created by the principal-subordinate relation among the (guṇas) sattva, etc. We admit (with Bhatṭanāyaka) that aesthetic enjoyment is similar to the joy (that comes from realising one’s identity with) Brahman.3 (We also admit with Bhatṭanāyaka4 that) the intellectual

1. This is BN’s own position. See A. Bh. p. 277 : चतुर्विधाभिनयरूपेण निविडनिजमोहस्कन्धोऽकारणिा विभावादिसाधारणीकरणात्मनोऽभिभातो हृदयेनानन्दोन भावकत्वव्यापारिणा भाव्यमानो-रसः etc.

2. This could not be Abhinava’s position, since on the next page (190) he will reject this three-fold classification (even though in the Locana comm. on II. 7–10 he develops a similar scheme). But if this is BN’s position, and not Abhinava’s, there should have been some indication to this effect. By ending it with dhvananavyāpara eva mūrdhābhiṣiktaḥ, he has inextricably woven in his own views.

Further on druti, vistara and vikāsa, see Mammata, KP. p. 474, Jhalkikar’s ed. Dipti is vistara, mādhūrya is druti, but for some reason vikāsa is not connected with prasāda, as one would expect. The scheme is accepted by Dhanamjaya.

3. Note how Mammata (p. 59, Jhalkikar’s edition) puts this : परिपुष्टं हृदयमिव प्रविशन् सर्वाञ्जनिमिवालिङ्गनु अन्यत् सर्वमिव तिरोदधत् ब्रह्मास्वादमिवानुभावयन् अलौकिकचमत्कारकारी चककारादिको रसः ! This is so well expressed that it has been copied by the Kāvyapradipa, p. 69. Such language became, surely on account of both BN and Abhinava, very common in describing rasa (whereas Ānanda does not use the word camatkāra in its technical sense), so much so that we find Kuntaka, in describing an exquisite verse (quoted in the Locana, p. 163 as well), using similar terms (De’s ed. of the Vakrokti-jiivita, p. 35) : अत्र क्रिमपीति (as an explanation of the line in the verse that reads हृदये किमपि ध्वनित्) तदाकर्णनविहितताचमत्कृतरानुभवेकाकारतवलक्षणमव्यपदेश्यंं प्रतिभाति ।

4. It would seem, as already noted, that for Abhinava, as for BN, prīti is the major goal of poetry. Cf. Locana p. 40 (under I. 1), तथापि तत्र प्रीतीरब प्रधानम् । Thus for Abhinava, vyutpatti becomes easier to accept (see p. 336 of the Locana) and is the result of prīti, but still the major point of poetry is delight. Of course vyutpatti means instruction in all the four varģas, including mokṣa (p. 41 : चतुर्वर्गव्युत्पत्तिरपि चानन्द एव पायेँनतर्क मुख्यं फलम्) with the result that vyutpatti and prīti (i. e. ānanda) amount finally to the same thing ; Cf. p. 336 : न चैते प्रीतिव्युत्पत्ती विरुद्धे एव, द्वयोरपि एकविषयत्वात् ।

refinement ( vyutpādana ) ( that results from poetry ) is different from that which comes from the śāstra through mandates ( śāsana ) and from the itihāsa through recommendation ( pratipādana ). In addition ( atirikta ) to the message that poetry provides for the readers in the form of the analogy that they must behave like Rāma,1 can we help it ( or : “ who is to be blamed ” - kam upālabhāmahe )2 if finally ( po ( vijrmbhā ) of their critical receptivity ? Therefore the following is established : rasas are suggested ( abhivyajyante ). They are aesthetically enjoyed3 by their very perception ( pratityā eva ca rasyante ) ( i. e. rasa is aesthetic enjoyment itself ).”4

And here, finally, is the application of this theory to what has been traditionally regarded as the first actual literary experience. We include here the Kārikāi and Ānandavardhana's Vrtti on it as well :5

( ध्वन्यालोकः, pp. 84–90 )

काव्यस्यात्मा; स एवार्थस्तथा चादिकवे: पुरा ।

क्रोशद्राहद्वियोगोत्थः शोकः श्लोकत्वमागतः ॥

विधिवद्वाच्यवाचकवचनप्रपञ्चचारुणा; काव्यस्स एवार्थः सारभूतः । तथा चादिकवर्वाल्मीके: निहतसहचरीविरहकातरक्रोधाव्द्रजानितः शोक एवं श्लोकतया परिणत: ।

शोको हि करुणस्थायिभावः । प्रतिपाद्यमानस्य चान्यस्य मद्दर्शनादौ रसभावकुलजागेय-

लक्षणं प्राधान्यात्।

1. This must be the source of the later dictum, so frequently met with ( e. g. K P. under I. 2 ) : रāमादिवद्वर्तितव्यं न रावणादिवत् ।

2. The idea is : this is the way things are, and nothing can be done about it, with the further implication that this is the way things ought to be as well. ( Ānanda uses this idea on p. 406 and Abhinava uses the expression kim kurmaḥ often ). Thus Gnoli's interpretation is incorrect.

3. Throughout the Locana, Abhinava has insisted on the importance of the sahrdaya, the reader. Cf. his opening stanza : kārisahrdayākhyam. See also the Kāvyamīmāṃsā, IV, where Rājasékhara divides pratibhā into two kinds : kārayitri and bhāvayitri, where bhāvayitri corresponds to this type of “ imagination ” that belongs to the reader, and which is a faculty he brings to his appreciation of poetry.

4. Note what Abhinava says in the A. Bh. p. 279 : अधिकारी चात्र विमलप्रतिभान-

शालीहृदयः । See the important definition of the sahrdaya, the “ sensitive reader ”, in the Locana, p. 38 : येषां काव्यानुशीलनाभ्यासवशाद्र्विशदīभूते मनोमुकुरे वर्णनीयतनुमधीभावनयोग्यता ते

स्वहृदयसंवादिभाजः सहृदयाः । “ Those people who are capable of identifying with the subject matter, as the mirror of their hearts has been polished through constant repetition and study of poetry, and who sympathetically respond in their own hearts—those ( people ) are what are known as sensitive readers. ” Abhinava then quotes a fine verse from the NS, VII, 7, G. O. S. Vol. I, p. 348 :

योऽर्थे हृदयसंवादी तथ्य भावो रसोद्भवः । हारो हि व्याπयते तेन श्लोकं काश्मीरवासिनः ॥

“ The externalisation ( bhāva ) of that emotion ( artha ) which makes an appeal to the heart is the source ( udbhava ) of rasa. The body is suffused by it, as dry wood is suffused by fire. ” Cf. Locana, p. 212.

5, D. Āl. I. 5. ( pp. 84–90, B. ed. ).

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

79

KĀRIKĀ V :

It is the ( suggested ) meaning alone that is the soul of poetry. Thus long ago, the sorrow of the first poet that sprang from the permanent disruption of the sandpipers' love-making was transformed into verse.1

VṚTTI :

That ( suggested ) sense alone is the essence of poetry - poetry which is beautiful because of a richness ( prapañca ) of structure ( racana ) and of varied words and ideas. And thus the sorrow that was aroused ( janita, i. e. uddipita ) by the cries of the Krauñca bird who was frightened ( kātara ) by the separation ( viraha ) from his murdered wife, in ( Vālmiki ) the first poet, was turned into a verse. For it has been stated ( in the present Kārikā ) that sorrow is the sthāyibhāva of karuṇarasa, ( and that it is only suggested and not directly expressed ). Although there are other varieties of the suggested sense, they are implicitly indicated through rasa and bhāva, because these are the most important.

Now here is the Locana passage, pp. 84–90 :

एवं ‘प्रतीममानं पुनरन्यदेव’ इतीयता ‘घनिस्वरूपं व्यासव्यातम्। अधुना काव्यात्मत्व-मितिहासविज्ञान च दर्शयति-

काव्यस्यात्मेति स एवति प्रतीममानमात्रेऽपि प्रकान्ते तत्तीय एव रसच्वनिरीति मन्तव्यम्। इतिहासवलात् प्रकान्ततत्त्वार्थवलाच्च । तेन रस एव वस्तुत आत्मा, वस्त्वलङ्काराच्चनी तु सत्व्या रसं प्रति पर्यवस्यते इति वाच्यादुदकृक्षे ताविल्यभिप्रायेण ‘घनि: काव्यस्यात्मे’ति सामान्येनोक्तम् । शोक इति । क्रौञ्चस्य इन्द्रियोगेन सहचारिणनोदृतेन साहचर्यञ्चसनेनोक्तितो यः शोकः स्थायिभावो निरपेक्षभावव्वादिप्रलम्भशृङ्गारोचितरतिस्थायि-भावादन्य एव, स एव तथाभूतविभावतुङ्खाकादनुभावचर्वणया हृदयसंवादतन्मयीभवन-क्रमादाक्षादमानां प्रतिपन्नः करुणरसूपतां लौकिकशोकव्यतिरिक्तां स्वाच्छदुतिसमा-स्वाद्यसारां प्रतिपन्नो रसपरिपूर्णकुम्भेचलनवच्चित्तवृत्तिभिः स्यन्दनस्वभावव्वगिलापदिवच्च सम-यानपेक्षतेपि चित्तवृत्तिव्यञ्जकत्ववादिति नयेनाकृततयैववेशराल्मुचितरादृ छन्दो-वृत्तादिनियन्त्रितश्लोकरूपतां प्राप्तः-

1. Cf. Raghuvamśa, XIV. 70 :

तामस्यगच्छच्छ्रुदितातुसारसी कविः कुशोद्वाहारणाय यातः ।

निषादविद्धाण्डजदर्शर्नोल्थः शोकतमापघत यस्य शोकः ॥

It is clear from the context that Kālidāsa means this verse to convey the compassion of Vālmiki, and thus the fact that he will accept the suffering Sitā, and take her into his āśrama. Thus Mallinātha remarks : तिरस्क्रामपि हु:खं न सेढे, किमुतान्ये-धामिति भावः । Bhavabhūti ( Uttararāmacarita II. 5 ) quotes the mā niṣāda verse from the Rāmāyaṇa, but he quotes it in the context of the first verse written in Skt., and not with regard to the compassion of Vālmiki,

XIII

मा निषाद प्रतिष्ठां त्वमगमः शाश्वतीः समाः। यकौञ्चमिथुनादेकमवधीः काममोहितम् ॥ इति ।

न तु मुनेः शोक इति मन्तव्यम्। एवं हि सति तदुदुःखेन सोडपि दुःखित इति कृत्वा रसस्यात्मेति निरवकाशं भवेत्। न च दुःखसंतापेषा दर्शेभि। एवं चर्वणोचितशोकस्थायिभावात्मककरुणरससमुचचलनस्वभावत्वात् एवं काव्यस्यात्मा सारभूतस्वभावोऽपर-शब्दवैलक्षण्यकारकः ।

एतदुक्तं हृदयदर्पणे - ‘यावत्पूणों न चैतन तावतैव वमयमुमु’ इति ।

अगम इति छान्दसेन्टाडागमेन । स एतथ्रैवकारणेऽनमाह-नान्य आत्मेति । तेन यदाह भट्टनायकः

‘शब्दप्राधान्यमात्रश्रितिय तत्र शाब्दं पृथग्विदुः । अर्थतचैतन्ययुक्तं तु वदन्त्यालम्बनमेतयोः ॥ दृयोगुणलवे व्यापारप्राधान्ये काव्यधीर्भवेत् ।’

इति तदपास्मात् । व्यापारो हि यदि छ्वनान्मा रसनावस्थभावस्तद्वापूर्वमुक्तम् । अथाभिधैव व्यापारस्तथ्यस्याः प्राधान्यं नेल्योभेदितं प्राक् ।

श्लोकं व्याचष्टे - विविघेति । विविधे ततद्विभिञ्जनैयैरसानुगुणयेन विचित्रे कृत्वा वाच्ये वाचकै रचनाओं च प्रपञ्चेन यचारु शब्दार्थोऽलङ्कारगुणयुक्तिमियर्थः । तेन सर्वत्रापि छ्वननसदृशेऽपि न तथा व्यवहारः । आत्मसदृशोऽपि कविचेद जीवव्यवहार इत्युक्तं प्रागेव । तेनैतद्रिवकारणं, यदुक्तं हृदयदर्पणे- ‘सर्वत्र तहि काव्यव्यवहारः स्यात् ’ इति । निहत-सहचरीति विभाव उत्कः । आक्रान्तितशब्देनानुभावः । जनित इति । चर्वणागोचरत्वेनैति शेषः ।

ननु शोकचर्वणातो यदि श्लोक उद्भूततस्तप्रतीममानं वस्तु काव्यस्यात्मेति कुत इत्याशङ्कयाह-शोको हीति । करुणस्य तच्चर्वणागोचरत्वान्तः स्थायिभावः । शोके हि स स्थायी-भावे ये विभावानुभावास्तस्मुचिता चित्तवृत्तिश्श्यर्यमाणत्वा रस इत्यौचिल्यादस्थायिनो रस-तापत्तिरियुक्ता । प्राक्लस्याविदितं परत्रानुमितं न विज्ञप्तितत्त्वं । संस्कारकमेण हृदयसंवाद-मादधानं चर्वणामुपयुज्यते यत् । ननु प्रतीममानरुपमात्मा तत् त्रिमेदं प्रतिपादितं न तु रसैकरूपं, अननेन चेतिहासेन रसस्थैयैवात्मभूतत्वमुक्तं भवतीत्युक्तं ।

प्रतीममानस्य चेति । अन्यो भेदो वस्त्वलङ्कारात्मा । भावग्रहणेन व्यभिचारिणोऽपि चर्व्य-माणस्य तावन्मात्रविश्रान्तावपि सथप्रतिष्ठामनवाप्यापि प्राणत्वं भवतीत्युक्तम् । यथा—

नखं नखाग्रेण विडङ्गनतीं विवर्तयन्ती विलोलं । आमन्द्रमाशिजितनूपुरेण पादेन मन्दं भ्रमालिखन्ती ॥

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

81

इस्यत्र लज्जाया: । रसभावशब्देन च तदभावसत्वप्रशमावपि संगृहीतौवेक । अवान्तर-

वैचित्र्येडपि तदेकरूपत्वात्। प्राधान्यादीति । रसपर्यवसानादित्यर्थ: । तावन्मात्राविश्रान्तो-

वपि चान्यशब्दवैलक्षण्यकारिवेन वस्त्वलंकारच्वनेरपि जीवितसवौचिल्यादुक्तक्रमिति भाव: ॥

TRANSLATION :

Thus by the Kārikā: pratīyamānām punar anyad eva, etc., he has explained the nature of dhvani.1 Now he shows, under the cover ( vyāja )2 of an incident from the epic ( itihāsa ), how it is the soul of poetry, KĀVYASYĀTMĀ SA EVA. Although the suggested sense in general is the point at issue, only the third ( type of the suggested sense known as ) rasa-dhvani, should be considered as ( the soul of poetry),3 because of the force of the epic quotation, and because of the force of the meaning of the Vrtti passages that immediately precede ( and follow ).4 Therefore really speaking, rasa alone is the soul ( of poetry ). Vastudhvani and alankāradhvani ( really ) finally end up in rasa.5 And since they too are far more important

1. Abhinava means that Ānanda has so far explained the nature of dhvani ( i.e. the suggested sense ) by means of the Kārikā pratīyamānām punaranyad eva etc. Now he will begin to expound how the suggested sense is the actual soul of poetry.

2. Vyājena, literally “ under the pretext of ”, “ under the guise of ”, which amounts to “ on the authority of ”, or “ taking the help of ”.

3. After rasadhvanih one must understand kāvyasyātmā.

4. We are not certain that we have understood prakrāntavrittigranthārtha-balāc ca, on p. 158 ( 84–85 B.P.). (References in this section are to the edition by Kuppuswami Sastri). We take it to mean : “ because of the force of the Vrtti both preceding and following ”. This must be a reference to iti sthitam ( p. 84 B. P.) which speaks of this kind of pratīyamānārtha ( i. e. rasādi ) as different from the vācya. The immediately following passage, vividha, etc., and in particular the words on p. 166, ( p. 90 B. P.) रसभावमुखेनैवोपलक्षणं प्राधान्यात् again speak of the third kind of pratīyāmānārtha ( namely rasadhvani ).

5. This is an important point that Abhinava comes back to again and again. He claims that Ānanda uses vastudhvani and alankāradhvani only to show the difference between the abhidhāryāpāra and the vyañjanāvyapāra. He does not intend these as examples of true poetry, for that title is reserved for rasa alone. Earlier (pp.50–51 B.P.) he had noted that one can often find vastu and alankāra as svāśabdavācya ( i. e. as no longer cases of dhvani ). What we think he means is that both of these are capable of paraphrase without any resulting decrease in the aesthetic experience ( which is already slight in any case ). But rasadhvani can never be paraphrased without destroying the poetry in it. In this Abhinava is in agreement with the “New Criticism”. Thus in a famous essay on Yeats' great poem “ Sailing to Byzantium ”, Elder Olson said : “ Although the argument as we have stated it clearly underlies the poem ( note : he has just finished explaining the “ argument ”, i. e. the vācyārtha of Yeats' poem ), it would be erroneous to suppose that this in itself constitutes the poem, for in that case there would be no difference between our paraphrase and the poem itself ”. He then

( Continued on next page

( utkrṣṭa ) ( or charming ) than the literal meaning, it was said ( in Kārikā 1 ) in a general way that dhvani is the soul of poetry.

ŚOKA. That sorrow, the permanent emotion ( belonging to karuṇarasa ) which arose because of the destruction of the coupling ( dvandva ),1 i. e. because of the destruction of the intimate physical contact ( sāhacarya ) of the Krauñca birds, owing to the killing of the female—2 this sorrow is different from the sthāyibhāva rati ( love ) that is appropriate to vipralambhaśṛṅgāra, because in it there is no hope of reunion ( nirapekṣabhāva ).3 The sorrow has become capable of being aesthetically enjoyed ( āsvādyamānātā ) through the following stages : first come the vibhāvas ( both ālambana and uddīpana ), and the anubhāvas ( i. e. the wailing of the male bird etc. ) that arise from them4 ( i. e. the vibhāvas ). By feeling these deeply ( carvaṇā ), the heart ( of the sage Vālmīki ) sympathises ( with the plight of the male bird ), and ( finally ) he identifies ( with the situation ). ( Once it is aesthetically enjoyable), it becomes karuṇarasa, where the sorrow ( felt ) is different from the ordinary sorrow we feel in everyday life. Its essence became capable of being enjoyed once the mind ( of the sensitive sage ) had melted5 ( to the point of total

Continued from previous page )

goes on to say, later in the same essay : “If the basic terms of a lyric poem do not receive their meanings from the chance associations of the reader, neither do they have their dictionary meanings ; like terms in most discourse, they take their significance from their context, through juxta-position to other terms with which they are equated, contrasted, correlated or combined.” ( From “Five Approaches to Literary Criticism” edited by W. Scott, N. Y. 1962 ).

1. Abhinava takes dvandva not to mean “ pair ” but to mean actual “ sexual intercourse ” ( sāhacarya ), a meaning the dictionaries do not seem to sanction.

2. For the significance of the change that both Abhinava and Ānanda make in the legend by having the female bird killed rather than the male, see J. Masson : “ Who Killed Cock Krauñca ; Abhinavagupta's Reflections on the Origin of Aesthetic Experience ”, Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, 1969.

3. This is a fundamental distinction that goes back to the NŚ VI, under verse 50 ( p. 309, G. O. S. Vol. I ):

कुरणस्त शोकश्रेष्विनिपतितेतद्जननविभावनावशवन्धनस्य सखो निरपेक्षभावः। औत्सुक्यचिन्तासमुत्थः

सापेक्षभावो विप्रलम्भः। एषमन्यः करुणोद्देश्य विप्रलम्भः इहति ।

The point is that in vipralambha there is some hope of being reunited. But in karuṇa there is none. This makes it much closer to “ tragedy ” than has generally been acknowledged. Thus in speaking of the Rāmāyaṇa, Abhinava will point out in his Locana to the fourth Uddyota ( p. 580 ) that Rāma and Sītā are “ permanently ” separated, thus showing that the final verses of the epic which speak of their re-union in heaven, have no impact on the reader in any aesthetic sense.

4. We take tadutthākranda to refer to both the cryings of the male and the female. It will also include her ( or his, as described in the Rāmāyaṇa ) writhing on the ground in pain, one of the anubhāvas.

5. Druti refers to the “ melting ” of the mind, i. e. to a state when the mind is exceedingly receptive. There is a very fine verse in Madhusūdanasarasvatī's

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receptivity ). ( And this aesthetic experience ) became transformed into a

verse ( śloka ) regulated by ( niyantṛitā ) proper1 ( words ) and metre, etc.,

because of the unartificiality ( akṛtakatā ) ( of the experience ) and the com-

plete possession ( of Vālmīki ). The emotional upheaval in the mind of the

sage was like the overflowing of a jug filled to the brim with water, or like

the cry of sorrow which is of the nature of the effusion of the mental mood

( of grief ). The words that the sage uttered ( on that occasion ) are

suggestive of the state of his mind according to the maxim that exclamations

( of joy, sorrow, etc. ) are suggestive of ( the relevant ) natural moods, even

in the absence of a fixed convention ( between them and mental moods,

unlike what is the case for words and their literal meanings ).2

" Oh hunter, may you never, for eternal years, attain to stability

( pratiṣṭhā ) ( in this world ) since you killed, from a pair of Krauñca birds,

the male ( when ) he was engrossed in love - making )."3

But it should not be supposed that Vālmīki was ( actually experiencing)

sorrow ( in the ordinary sense ). For if he were, ( that is, ) if he were pained

on account of the bird's pain, then the point of the Kārikā, that rasa is the

soul of poetry, would be without any basis in the present stanza.4 Nor is

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Sribhagavadbhaktirasāyanam, p. 14 ( verse 4 ), explaining the state of receptivity

that the mind adopts during an aesthetic experience :

चित्तद्रव्यं हि जगुवत्स्वभावाक्कठिनातमकम् ।

तापकैर्द्रवयितोयोगि द्वर्तं प्रतिपघते ॥

" The substance of which the the mind is made is like red sealing wax. By nature

it is hard. But when it comes in contact with the emotional states ( during an

aesthetic experience ) which act as heating agents, it becomes soft to the point of

fl owing". He takes this fine analogy a step further, and says that the mind is im-

pressed with the emotions it contemplates. First the mind becomes soft and pliable,

and then comes the hard substance like the drama or the play when the mind

receives its impression, the way sealing wax is impressed with a seal-ring.

1. In K. Sastri's edition we must understand śabda after samucita.

2. The point is that there is no fixed convention with regard to the mean-

ings of exclamations that we utter spontaneously. Thus, a shriek can be due to

either grief or joy, in the same way that tears can be. Nonetheless these signs of joy

or grief are " suggestive ". This is of course not true in the case of words and

their literal meanings, where there is a fixed convention.

3. Rāmāyaṇa, I. 2. 15.

4. As the Kaumudī says on p. 160: śokamātrasya rasatvāsambhavād. " If

this verse simply illustrated sorrow there would be no possibility of rasa " .

Abhinava's point is that karuṇarasa arose in the sage, and not the primary emotion of

sorrow. He has, therefore, interpreted the whole point of this example to be that

the situation described in the Rāmāyaṇa is one of rasapratīti on the part of Vālmīki.

For this to be the case, we must say that he was the audience, as it were, of his

own verse ! So, Abhinava envisages the situation something like this : Vālmīki sees

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84

it possible for somebody burdened with grief 1 to utter a verse (at the very moment of his sorrow ).

Continued from previous page )

the killing of the bird. He is deeply moved to the point of uttering a poem about it. But of course as long as he is simply in sorrow, that is, feeling one of the primary emotions that belong to real-life situations, he does not have the necessary " artistic distance " which would enable him to engage in poetic creation. So, at some magic point he stops feeling sorrow (if in fact Abhinava ever felt that he did ), and it is as if he were witnessing a drama in a play-house. It is at this stage of some distance that he speaks his poem. Each time he contemplates what he uttered, he is the sahrdaya, the rasika, the spectator (which would explain why he says kim idaṃ vyāhrtaṃ mayā at Rām. I. 2. 16). i. e. he is again in an alaukika state of aesthetic enjoyment. The śoka that he formerly felt has been transformed into art. While this is a pro-found interpretation of the famous incident,it should be carefully noted that this could hardly have been what the author of the episode in the Rāmāyaṇa had in mind. [ For the word śoka occurs again and again in the account: I. 2. 16 : śokārtena......mayā ; I. 2. 18 : śokārtasya......me ; I. 2. 29 : śocaṃ eva punaḥ krauñciṃ ; I. 2. 30 : punaḥ ......śokaparāyaṇaḥ. and in I. 2. 13 we read : kāruṇyam samapadyata, and in I. 2. 14 : karuṇa-veditvāt. ] Perhaps for the I. 2. 13 we read : kāruṇyam samapadyata, and in I. 2. 14 : karuṇa-veditvāt. ] Perhaps for the first time in any critical tradition, Abhinava has articulated the distinction between the " primary world " of actual events, and the " secondary world " of literature. These terms have been used by J. R. R. Tolkien in his essay " On Fairy-Stories ", published in " Tree & Leaf ", Unwin Books, London, 1964. See also " Secondary Worlds " by W. H. Auden, Faber & Faber, London, 1968. The world of the Rāmāyaṇa belongs to what Tolkien calls Faërie, " the perilous realm, and the air that blows in that country ". Mortal men only exist there when they are enchanted. In modern times, perhaps only Tolkien himself, in " The Lord of the Rings " has managed to create an entire " secondary " world. It is the greatness of Sanskrit literature that such autonomous worlds have been built — Kṛṣṇa's world in the Bhāga-vatapurāṇa, and the dream world of the Yogavāsiṣṭha. The sustained effort of imaginative creation evidenced in the latter work is to our mind unparalleled in any other literature.

1. Another point is that there can be no duḥkha in rasa, which is a synonym for ānanda, " bliss ", as Abhinava points out again and again. See De, H. S. P. Vol. II, p. 132, and note the passage he quotes from the Abhinavabhāratī :

सामाजिकानां हृद्यङ्कफले नाख्यं शोकारिफलम् ।

It is almost certain that Viśvanātha's remarks in the third pariccheda of the Sāhityadarpana were inspired by Abhinavagupta. There he says : ( p. 53, Vidyāsāgara's ed. ) ननु तहि करुणादीनां रसानां दु.खमयत्वादसत्वं न स्यात् ( precisely the objection that Abhinava records. )

करुणादीनपि रसते जायते यत्परं सुखम् ।

सचेतसामनुभावं प्रामाणं तत्र केवलम् ॥

He then goes on to show that what in the world is a source of unhappiness is transformed in the drama into happiness, for the vibhāvas are alaukika (an idea taken from Abhinava) :

अलौकिकविभावत्वं प्राप्तेभ्यः काव्यस्य सङ्क्रयात् ।

सुखं सञ्जायते तेभ्यः सर्वेभ्योडपि तु का क्षतिः ॥

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Thus then, because the nature of the present stanza is the complete overflow ( samucchalana )1 of karunarasa the essence of which is the sthāyibhāva sorrow, which is appropriate for aesthetic enjoyment, rasa alone is the soul of poetry, its very essence, which produces a charm far beyond the reach of other word-functions2 ( i. e."abhidhā and lakṣaṇā ). This is confirmed by ( Bhaṭṭanāyaka ) in his Hrdayadarpaṇa :

" The poet does not regurgitate rasa until he is completely filled with it ."3

( In the stanza quoted from the Rāmāyaṇa ) agamah4 ( is used in the sense of an augmentless Aorist ) retaining the augment as a Vedic peculiarity

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In the Vrtti to this śloka be gives his famous comparison of love-bites, which only produce, in their pain, pleasure :

तन्मयत्वे सुरते दनातादिविम्य इव सुखमेव जायते ।

But it must be pointed out that once again the source of this idea is Abhinavagupta. Thus in the Abhinavabhāratī, p. 285 ( Vol. I, G. O. S. ) we read : तथा लोकवचनशोकसंचारवर्णेडपि लोकेऽखिलोकस्य हृदयाविश्रान्तिनंतरतरायणनिविश्रान्तिशरीरत्वात which refers to precisely this. Cf. the Pratāparudrīya ( Madras, 2nd Ed., 1931 ), comm. p. 209 :

संयोगसमये शृङ्गारदर्शनोद्गाता क्रतुमद्गतभानुसत्त्वाकरुणाद्रव्युपपत्तेः See further the Rasa-gangādhara, p. 30–31 ( KM, 1939 ed.) and Raghavan, " Number of Rasas " p. 155, 1st ed. ( p. 183, 2nd ed. ).

Eṣā daśā refers to the act of creation, Kaumudī p. 160 : ślokaracanārūpe tyarthah. The point is that in pain we cannot create. Creation takes place later, when the experience has been assimilated and is then contemplated. This is another of Abhinava's seminal ideas taken over by the later tradition.

1. Reading samucchalana. On p. (160) ( 86 B.P. ), top of the page, the term has been used of water overflowing from a jug. Actually though this is an error, for it is not the karunarasa that overflows, but the original emotion. The word rasa is used loosely here to stand for both the final aesthetic result, rasa proper, and to mean " emotion " in general.

2. On p. 28 ( p. 10, B. P. ), Abhinava has used this same expression. B. ed. reads‘ śābda ” which is a better reading. This is also the earlier reading that we have accepted in our translation of the Locana.'Vailakṣaṇya here means " charm ", from the notion of its being something completely different. Śābda stands for śabdavyāpāra.

3. Is this famous line from Bhaṭṭanāyaka meant to show that the poet must be full of emotion, using rasa in the wider sense, before he can write? In other words, he is Bhaṭṭanāyaka saying that first one must be overwhelmed by an experience ? Or is he using rasa in the technical sense to mean that first the poet himself actually has an aesthetic experience, and then records it, so that others may share it ? Sanskrit poetic theory is not really clear on precisely what the experience of the poet is in relation to that of the reader. Abhinava seems, in his more rigorous moments ( " nātye eva rasāḥ na tu loke " ), to restrict the aesthetic experience to the reader, in which case the poet would be excluded. Bhaṭṭatauta, ( see Locana, p. 92 B. P. ) however, says that this experience ( anubhava ) is the same as that undergone by the reader, the poet and the nāyaka ! Note the Rasapradīpa ( quoting DR. IV. 42, p. 23 : काव्यार्थभावनास्वादो नर्त्तकेषडपि न वायते ।

4. On this form, see Renou's " Grammaire Sanskrite ", p. 414 and 439.

86

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

( chāndasena). SA EVA. The use of the word " alone " ( eva ) shows ( that it alone is ) the Ātman, not anything else. Therefore, what Bhaṭṭanāyaka has said, namely :

"Because of the overriding importance of the words used, people class the śāstra1 apart (from poetry and stories ). They give the name ākhyāna ( historical tale ) to compositions in which the sense conveyed by words is possessed of paramount importance. When both ( word and meaning) are subordinated, and ( all ) importance is given to the manner ( vyāpāra ), then it is called " poetry ",2"

is refuted. For if by " manner " he means that ( function ) whose essence consists in suggestiveness ( dhvanana ) and which is of the nature of aesthetic enjoyment ( rasanā ), he will have said nothing new. If, on the other hand, he means by " manner " abhidhā, we have already shown earlier3 how it cannot be of major importance in poetry.

He now explains the verse: VIVIDHĀ. That which is (made) beautiful because of the high degree of excellence4 in respect to the ideas ( vācya ), the words, and the structure ( racanā ), having been diversified ( vicitram kṛtvā) so as to be favourable to the various rasas to be suggested, i. e. that which is endowed with guṇas and alaṅkāras, both of words and meanings. There-

1. Śāstram here means the Veda. Bhaṭṭanāyaka's point is that in the Veda the " letter " is all-important. In stories, the meaning is important, and finally, in poetry, it is the manner in which something is told that counts the most. Cf. I. A. Richard's famous dictum : "It is never what a poem says which matters, but what it is".

2. It is impossible to know just how indebted to Bhaṭṭanāyaka Abhinava really is. We think, however, that the famous comparison of poetry to a loving wife, certainly was either taken directly from Bhaṭṭanāyaka, or was at least inspired by this passage. Both ideas are in fact synthesised by Śridhara in his commentary on the Kāvyaprakāśa and by Vidyādhara's Ekāvalī (K. P. Trivedi's edition. Bombay, 1903 ), p. 13 :

शब्दप्रधानं वेदाख्यं प्रुतुसंमितमुच्यते । इतिहासाख्याप्रबन्धे प्रुतनव्यापारमाश्रितम् ॥ इतिहासादिकं शास्त्रं मिश्रसंमितमुच्यते । अर्थव्यापारदृष्टप्रधानता काव्यतन्त्रिता ॥ ध्वनिप्रधानं काव्यं तु कान्तासंमितमीरितम् । शब्दार्थीं गुणतां नीत्वा व्यञ्जनप्रवणं यतः ॥

On this difference between śāstra and kāvya, there is an important passage ( from the lost Bhāmahaviṅaraṇa ?) of Udbhata in the Kāvyamīmāṅsā, p. 44 : असु नाम निस्सीमा अर्थसारः। किं तु रूप एवसौ, विचारितमुखः;, अविचारितरमणीयैक्श । तयोः पूर्वमाश्रितानि शास्त्राणि, तदुत्सरं काव्यनि, इत्येदृशा। ( T. S. S. ed. ) where Bhaṭṭanāyaka's idea is modified but generally accepted.

3. Page 63, ( B. P. ) Dhvanyālokalocana.

4. Prapañca here must be understood in the sense of utkarṣa.

fore, although “ suggestiveness ” exists everywhere ( even in such examples as “ the boy is a lion ” ), we don’t use the term “ poetry ” ( in all such cases ),

just as, in spite of the fact that the ātman exists ( in all things ) we only call certain things “ living ”. We have already explained this.1 This thus shows

that what ( Bhaṭṭanāyaka ) has said in the Hṛdayadarpana : “ In that case the word poetry would apply promiscuously everywhere ”2 is out of place. The

expression nihatasahacari3 (“ the killed female ” ) expresses the vibhāva. The word ākrandita (“cries ” ) expresses the anubhāva. JANITA.4 One must

supply : “ through attaining to the state of aesthetic enjoyment. ” Objection : if the verse arose from the aesthetic enjoyment of “ sorrow ”, how can one

say that the soul of poetry is that suggested thing ( viz. rasa )?5 ( i. e. only śoka has been mentioned in the stanza, and not rasa ). With this doubt in

mind he says: ŚOKO HI. Sorrow ( śoka ) is the sthāyibhāva of karuṇa which consists in the aesthetic enjoyment of sorrow.6 Since the state of

mind appropriate to the vibhāvas and anubhāvas in relation to the sthāyibhāva śoka, when aesthetically enjoyed, becomes rasa, it is but proper7 to say that

1. Page 59, Locana ( B. P. edition ).

2. The objection must have been that if one accepts the suggestive function ( dhvanavyāpāra ), which Bhaṭṭanāyaka does not, we will have to admit as examples

of poetry, cases which merely include suggestion, but no charm. Thus sarvatra means, as the K. says on p. 162 : simho vaṭuh ity ādāv api tatheti. See p. 57 (B.P. ed.)

of the text of the Locana.

3. Note that K. Sastri, on p. 164 of his Upalocana says that this is a pratīka that only gives the first words, but that it is meant to read : nihatasahacariviraha-

kātara, i.e. that it stands for the male krauñca ! But this is mere sophistry. Had Abhinava meant this, he would have said so.

4. Note that Abhinava has said ( on p. 79, 80, and 83 ) of the Locana that rasa is not janita, i. e. the function is not janana, “ production ”. Thus he is of course

bothered by the phrase krauñcākrandajanitah śoka eva. He therefore says here ( p. 89 ) that one must add the phrase : carvanāgocararatvena.

5. The objection is that in the kārikā only śoka is mentioned, not rasa. This is perfectly true, for the point of the Kārikā is to show the existance of a pratya-

mānārtha i. e. that śoka is here suggested, and not directly stated. However Abhinava and Ananda are probably correct to go further in their interpretations, for if this is all

the author of the Kārikā meant, it would be a very weak argument; for in the Rāmā-

yaṇa itself, we are directly told both before and after this verse that Vālmīki was in sorrow ! And of course there can be no doubt that the author of the Kārikā knew

very well that śoka is the sthāyibhāva of karuṇa.

6. The sthāyibhāvas, as soon as they are brought to the state of enjoyment ( carvanā ), become rasa. A rasa is after all only a latent sthāyibhāva that has be-

come manifest. Thus the K. says that śoka here stands for all the other sthāyibhāvas : śoka ity upalakṣaṇam ratyādeh, p. 167.

7. We have translated aucityāt to mean “ it is but proper ”. But it might mean upacāra. Thus the K. says : upayogitvānimittād upacārād iti yāvat. This may well be the correct interpretation, for in the Abhinavabhāratī, p. 285, we read :

kevalam aucityād evam ucyate sthāyī rusibhūtah.

XIV

the sthāyin itself attains the status of rasa. For ( yatah ) (the sthāyibhāva)

leads to aesthetic enjoyment in the following manner : the collection ( jāta )

of states of mind ( cittavṛtti ) is first experienced earlier in one's own life;1

then it is inferred (from outer symptoms ) to be existing in others; then

by the arousal of the latent impressions ( saṃskāra ) it creates a sympathetic

response ( in the spectator's ) heart2 (and then it leads to the identification

of the spectator with the situation ).3

Objection : the soul (of poetry ) has the form of the suggested sense

( in general ) and it has already been shown to have three varieties. It does

not consist exclusively of rasa. But this episode from the epic seems to

suggest that only rasa is the soul (of poetry ). ( Ānandavardhana ) replies to

this objection by accepting it ! PRATĪYAMĀNASYA CA. "Other varieties "

refers to vastu and alaṅkāra. The word bhāva (in rasabhāvamukhena )

shows that one can (in a loose manner of speaking ) refer to the vyabhicā-

ribhāvas as the essence (of poetry ), even though when they are aesthetically

enjoyed they do not come to rest only in themselves ( tāvanmātra i. e. svasmin-

aesthetic enjoyment does not terminate in bhāvadhavani ),4 and even though

they do not attain the pre-eminent position ( pratiṣṭhā ) of a rasa which

take place on culmination in the aesthetic enjoyment of the sthāyi (bhāva ).

" Rubbing one toe-nail with the tip of her other toe-nail, turning the

loose bracelet on her wrist, and slowly scratching the ground with her foot

whose anklet makes a deep sound "

In this stanza shyness (has been suggested as the essence of the verse ).

The word rasabhāva includes rasābhāsa, bhāvābhāsa and bhāvapraśāma, for in

spite of minor difference between, them in essence they are one and the same.

Prādhānyāt means because ( vastudhvani and alaṅkārādhvani ) terminate in

1. Note again that rasa is the cittavṛtti that is induced in the reader. It is

latent there all along, as a sthāyibhāva.

2. We must insert tanmayībhavana here to complete the series, as the K. does

3. Here is the K. on this sequence (p. 165) :

व्यवहारदशायां स्वस्मिन्नेवात्मनि संवेदितमिदानीं विलापादिकायंदर्शनात् परस्मिन्ननुमीयते, तदनन्तरं संस्कारोद्बोधः, तदनन्तरं निर्मलतया हृदयस्य संवेदः, तदनन्तरं तन्मयीभावः—इत्येवं स्थायिचित्तवृत्ते-

श्रवणोपायतया स्थायिभाव एव रस इत्युपचर्यते इत्यर्थः।

" That which was known in one's own self in day-to-day life is now, from

the cries etc. (of the bird ) and other effects, inferred to be existent elsewhere. After

that, one's own latent impressions are awakened; then there is a sympathy of one's

heart because it is pure (i. e. free from inhibitions ). After that, one identifies. Thus

in this manner, because the stable mental mood is the means to aesthetic enjoyment,

the sthāyibhāva itself is called rasa, metaphorically speaking "

Perhaps we should omit yatah, with three MSS (K. Sastri's edition,

p. 166, fn. 1).

4. Tāvanmātra is paraphrased by the K. as svarūpamātre.

rasa. Even though there is no full aesthetic repose in vastudhvani and alankāra-dhvani, nevertheless, because they give rise to an extraordinary charm that is beyond the rcach of other word-functions ( i. e. abhidhā and lakṣaṇā ), by extension ( aucitya =upacāra ) we can say that vastudhvani and alankāradhvani are the essence ( of poetry ).

We can thus see that all of Abhinava's efforts focus on one important need : to crack the hard shell of the “ I ” and allow to flow out the higher Self which automatically identifies with everyone and everything around. We can see this preoccupation in all of his work, and in many of the verses he quotes. He takes especial pleasure in a displacement of the “ I ”, as in the Vijñānabhairava passages he is so fond of, where the “ I ” is dissolved by staring long into empty space. Even the verse from the D. Āl. for which he evinces a particular liking, speaks of lovers reaching “ other shores ” of ecstasy.1

With this background we are now in a position to understand the importance for Abhinava of śāntarasa - how much support he derived from a theory which demanded the transcendence of personality, and which ends in a feeling of cosmic peace.

1. D. Āl. IV., p. 524-25.

PART II

ŚĀNTARASA

Our primary concern in this part of the book is to translate and annotate the notoriously difficult section of Abhinavagupta's Abhinavabhāratī that deals with śantarasa. This is the most extensive and the most important passage in Sanskrit literature on śantarasa. In order to permit the reader to see the background in some perspective, we have also translated all passages relating to śantarasa prior to Abhinavagupta. We have decided to let the passages speak for themselves in our translation, and to utilize the limited space available to us for textual notes.

The first passage is found in the Nāṭyaśāstra,1 but is most probably a later interpolation.

Natyaśāstra G. O. S. ed. vol. I, pp. 332–335 :

अथ शान्तो नाम रसः स्थायिभावो मोक्षपर्वतः। स तु तत्वज्ञानवैराग्य-

शुद्धादिभिरविभावैः समुपचते। तस्य यमनियमाद्यात्मध्यानधारणोपासनसर्वभूतदयालिङ्ग-

ग्रहणादिभिरनुभावैरभिनयः। प्रयोक्तव्यः। व्यभिचारिणः श्वास्य निर्वेदस्मृतिधृतिसर्वाश्रमशौच-

स्तम्भरोमाञ्चादयः। अत्रार्यः श्लोकाव् भवन्ति-

मोक्षाध्यात्मसमुत्सुकस्तव्चज्ञानार्थहेतुसंयुक्तः।

नैःश्रेयसोपदिष्टः शान्तरसो नाम सम्भवति ॥

बुद्धीन्द्रियकर्मेन्द्रियसंरोधाध्यात्मसंस्थितोपेतः।

सर्वप्राणिसुखहितः शान्तरसो नाम विज्ञेयः ॥

न यत्र दुःखं न सुखं न द्वेषो नापि मत्सरः।

समः सर्वेषु भूतेषु स शान्तः प्रतितो रसः ॥

भावा विकारा रत्याद्याः शान्तस्तु प्रकृतिमतः।

विकारः प्रकृतेःजातः पुनस्तत्रैव लीयते ॥

स्वं स्वं निमित्तमासाद्य शान्ताद्रावः प्रवर्त्तते।

पुनर्निमित्तापाये च शान्त एवोपलीयते ॥

एवं नव रसा दृष्टा नाट्ये वैशद्य लक्षणान्विता:।

1. NŚ. VI, after verse 82, p. 332 of the G. O. S. ed., Vol. I.

" Now1 śānta, which has śama for its sthāyibhāva, and which leads to mokṣa, arises from the vibhāvas such as knowledge of the truth,2 detachment ( vairāgya ), purity of mind etc. It should be acted out by means of the anubhāvas, such as yama3 and niyama,4 meditation on the Self, concentration of the mind on the Self ( dhāranā )5 devotion ( upāsanā ), compassion towards all creatures, and the wearing of religious paraphernalia ( lingagrahaṇa ).6 Its vyabhicāribhāvas are disgust with the world ( nirveda ) , remembrance, firmness of mind, purity in all the four stages of life ( āśrama ), rigidity ( of the body ) ( stambha ), horripilation, etc.7 The following Āryās8 and Slokas exist on this subject :

1. It is clear that this passage does not belong to the original NŚ. For one thing, it is found in only one of the many MSS. of the NŚ. For another, Abhinava does not comment on it directly. It is however obvious from what Abhinava says on p. 339, G. O. S., Vol. I ( p. 115, Raghavan's text, 2nd. edition ) namely : तथा च चिरन्तनपुस्तकेषु " स्थायिभावं रसत्वमुपनेष्याम: " ( which is actually found on p. 299 of the G.O.S., Vol. I) इसनन्तरं शान्तो नाम शमस्थायिभावात्मक इत्यादि शान्तलक्षणं पठ्यते, that he read some definition, of which the first few words correspond to what we have printed. He read this not at the end of the definition of the various rasas, but at the beginning. He might have been aware of the fact that this was an interpolation, for he says : " in ( some ) old manuscripts ". On the other hand, he was eager to attempt to show that Bharata in fact sanctioned śantarasa, even though he may not have said this in so many words. This comes out even in the adjective he applies to pustaka, cirantana, thereby attempting to give them some prestige and worth in the eyes of his readers.

2. If further proof is needed that Abhinava did not have this very same text before him, note that tattvajñāna is given here as one of the vibhāvas of śānta, whereas for Abhinava it is exclusively the sthāyibhāva of ŚR.

3. Yama means the five 'abstentions' given in the YS. II, 30 as ahimsa, satya, asteya, brahmacarya and aparigraha.

4. Niyama refers to the "observances" given in YS. II, 32 as : śauca, santosa, tapas, svādhyāya and īśvarapraṇidhāna.

5. Dhāranā refers to keeping the mind collected, cittasya ekāgratā ( See YS. II, 53 ).

6. Lingagrahaṇa refers to taking on the outer garments of an ascetic, as well as all the other paraphernalia of a religious mendicant. Surely these refer to the eight elements of Yoga. Cf. Yogasūtra, II. 29 : यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाध्यष्टावङ्गानि ।

7. Note that all these vyabhicāribhāvas are given by Bharata and apply to various other rasas. In fact, even tattvajñāna itself is given as one of the vibhāvas of nirveda ( VII. 28 )! For Bharata, the vyabhicāribhāvas can become sthāyibhāvas and vice-versa. Nirveda is mentioned as an anubhāva of śṛṅgāra and of karuṇa. At VII, 56, dhṛti is said to arise from vijñāna ! At VII, 108, thinking about the śāstras is given as a vibhāva of mati. Devaprasāda is a vibhāva of harṣa. Dhṛti, mati, smṛti and romāñca are vyabhicāribhāvas of vīra. Stambha is given as a vyabhicāribhāva of adhbuta ( p. 386 ) and of bhayānaka. The present passage is thus merely a pastiche from these various sources.

8. There is something wrong with this introduction : there are only two Āryās here, and thus the dual ( ārye ) should have been given.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

93

" Śantarasa has been taught as a means to the highest happiness ( naiḥśreyasa ). It arises from a desire to secure the liberation of the Self and leads to knowledge of the Truth. "1

" Śantarasa should be known as that which brings happiness and welfare to all beings and which is accompanied by the stabilization ( samsthita ) in the Self2 that results from the curbing of the organs of perception and the organs of physical activity. "3

" Śantarasa4 is that state wherein one feels the same towards all creatures, wherein there is no pain, no happiness, no hatred and no envy. "

" Śānta is one's natural state of mind ( prakrti ). Other emotions such as love, etc., are deformations ( of that original state ). The deformations arise out of this natural state of the mind and in the end again merge back into it. "

" The emotions arise out of śānta depending on their particular respective causes. And when the specific causes cease to function, they all merge back into śānta. "5

" Those who know dramaturgy see nine rasas along with their characteristics in this manner. "

Rudraṭa's Kāvyālankāra XV, 15-166

सम्यग्ज्ञानप्रकृतिः शान्तो विगतेच्छनायको भवति ।

सम्यग्ज्ञानं विषये तमसो रागस्य चापगमात् ॥

जन्मजरामरणादित्रासो वैरस्यवासना विषये ।

सुखदुःखयोरनिच्छाद्वेषाविवित्ति तत्र जायते ॥

1. Tattrajñānārthahetusamyuktāḥ is very clumsy, since artha and hetu mean exactly the same thing.

Mokṣādhyāitamasamutthah is equally clumsy. We think mokṣādhyātma should be understood as standing for adhyātmamokṣa, i. e. " liberation of the Self ".

Adhyātma would mean : ātmānam adhikṛtya, " with reference to the Self ".

This stanza is quoted, anomously, by Abhinava in the Abhinavabhāratī, p. 340 ( p. 115, Raghavan's, text 2nd ed. ). He introduces it as a Sangrahaśārikā, thus making it clear that it is not by Bharata.

2. We take adhyātma here to be used in the sense of the locative ātmani.

3. Buddhindriya means the same as jñānendriya, the eyes, the ears, the nose, the skin and the tongue. Karmendriya means the organs of physical activity, such as hands, feet, speech, etc.

4. Cf. Daśarūpāvaloka, under IV. 45, p. 135.

5. Abhinava quotes this verse ( saṃyam etc. ) in the A. Bh., p. 340. He also quotes it in the Locana, p. 391, with the remark : अन्ये तु........इति भरतावाक्यं दृश्यन्तः । thereby ascribing it to Bharata.

6. Rudraṭa's Kāvyālankāra, Adhyāya, 15, 15-16, p. 166 of the Kāryamālā edition by Durgaprasad and Pansikar, with Namisādhu's commentary, 3rd edition, N. S. P., 1928.

"Śānta ( rasa ) has for its cause ( i. e. as its sthāyibhāva ) right knowledge, and its hero is one whose passions are completely gone. Right knowledge arises from the disappearance of ignorance and of attachment to pleasure. Fear of birth, old age, death, etc., an attitude of disgust towards objects of enjoyment, and indifference to pleasure and pain arise ( as its anubhāvas )."1

Dhvanyāloka pp. 388-394:

एवमेकाधिकारण्यविरोधिनः प्रवन्धस्थेन स्थायिनि रसेनाझभावागमने निर्विरोधित्वं यथा तथा तदर्शितम् । द्वितीयस्य तु तप्रतिपादयितुमुख्यत्वे- एकार्थत्वे निर्दोषो नैरन्तर्ये विरोधवान् ।

रसान्तरव्यवधानिरसो व्यझझयः सुमेधसा ॥ २६ ॥

यः पुनरेकाधिकारत्वे निर्विरोधो नैरन्तर्ये तु विरोधी स रसान्तरव्यवधानेन प्रवन्धे निवेशायितव्यः । यथा शान्तप्रझ्ञारो नागानन्दे निवेशितौ ।

यश्च कामसुखं लोके यच्च दिव्यं महत्सुखम् ।

तृष्णाक्षयसुखस्यैते नाङहृतः पोडशी कलाम् ॥

यदिनाम सर्वजनानुभवगोचरता तस्य नास्ति नैतावतासात्रलोकसामान्यमहानुभाव-चित्रवृत्तिविशेषः प्रतिक्षयः शङ्क्यः । न च वीरे तस्यान्तभावः कतुं युक्तः । तस्याभिमान-

मयत्वेन व्यवस्थापनात् । अस्य चाशेकारप्रहसनैरुपतया स्थितेः । तयोश्चैत्रैर्विविधविशेषसद्वैदिप यदैक्यं परिलक्ष्यते तद्वीररोद्योरपि तथा प्रसङ्गः । दयावीरादीनां च चित्रवृत्तिविशेषाणां सर्वाकारसंहाररहितत्वेन शान्तरसप्रभेदत्वं, इतरथा तु वीरप्रभेदत्वमिति व्यवस्थाप्यमानं न कश्चिदिरोेधः । तदेवमस्ति शान्तो रसः ।

TRANSLATION OF Dhvanyāloka III. 26 :

So now it has been shown how one can avoid the opposition of a rasa that is opposed to the pervading rasa of the work because of their being in a single character, by assigning to it a subsidiary position. Now the following is said to show that one can avoid opposition in the case of the second variety as well :

1. Here is Namisādhu's commentary : sugamam na varam ( which should be read naramam, from Sanskrit na param - so this phrase will mean : “ The stanza is ( generally ) easy to understand, but ( the following explanations are necessary ) ”:

समर्यज्ञाने स्थायिभावः । विशावस्तु शब्दादिविषयरूपम् । अनुभवो जन्मादित्रासदयः ।

केशिच्छान्तस्य रसत्वं नेत्सम् । तदुक्तम् । भावादिकारणानां अपि विषमानत्वात् ।

This last sentence only begs the question of course,

Even when there is no opposition between two rasas, though they are found in one character,1 there might still be opposition because of ( the opposing rasa) occurring immediately after ( the major rasa ). (In such a case ) the intelligent (poet) will introduce2 a ( third ) rasa that will intervene (between the two opposed rasas ). (26).3

The rasa that is not opposed (to the principal rasa ), though occurring in the same character, but is opposed because of its immediate occurrence ( after it ), should be introduced into the work only after the intervention of a third rasa. As, for instance, śānta and śṛṅgāra have been introduced into the Nāgānanda4 (with the intervention of adbhuta ). Śānta, which is characterised by the full development of the happiness that comes from the destruction of desires,5 is indeed apprehended ( as one of the rasas by sensitive readers ).6 And so it has been said :

1. Insert rasasya after aikādhikaranyavirodhinah.

2. The K M edition records nyasyah as an alternative to vyangyyah.

3. By ekāśrayatve nirdoso, we think that the author of the Kārikās meant to convey the fact that two opposing rasas may reside in one person if a long time elapses. I. e. a man can be kāmin in one part of a poem and eventually become a virāgin in another. Bhartrhari's śatakatrayam ?

4. The idea in citing the Nāgānanda is that two opposing rasas, namely śṛṅgāra and śānta, are interrupted by a third rasa, adbhuta, that is not opposed to either of them. Abhinava has a long passage where he gives quotations from the drama exemplifying all the three rasas. The only noteworthy expression there is kramaprasarasambhāranābhiprayā, which means the orderly progression of the rasas. First comes śāntarasa, right at the very beginning of the drama (in fact in the Prastāvanā ), when Jīmūtavāhana goes off to the forest. Then the sthāyibhāva of adbhuta, namely vismaya ( over the beautiful singing ), is introduced, and this forms the transitional phase to śṛṅgāra. But note that this is a weak argument, for adbhuta hardly forms an important element in this drama. It is there, formally, only because of the one phrase : aho gitam, aho vādītram, which Jīmūtavāhana says when he first hears Malayavatī singing and playing on the lute. Moreover, all of these three rasas occur in the first act. The rest of the drama is exclusively concerned with the hero's efforts to give up his life for the sake of another.

5. This definition of śānta is needlessly complicated. A single long compound would have been more clear : trṣṇākṣayasukhparipopalaksanah: शान्तः ।

6. Ānanda is seriously concerned with showing that śāntarasa does exist ( pratiyata eva asti śānto rasah ). It is, therefore, likely that this was a controversial point in the ninth century (indeed it has remained controversial until the present day ). Since the Kārikās mention all of the eight rasas by name, at some point or another, there is absolutely no reason why they should not have mentioned śānta, had śānta been known to their author. The fact that śānta is never mentioned in a single Kārikā leads us to believe that their author was unaware of its existence (at least of its formal existence as a rasa, though there is no reason why he should not have known about śānta as an attitude ), and most probably, therefore, lived before the time of Udbhata, the first author to mention śānta as a rasa,

XV

96

सान्तरास

" The pleasures of love, as well as the great pleasures of heaven, do not equal even the sixteenth part of the happiness that succeeds the destruction of desire."1

Even should it be claimed that this is not within the range of experience of all men, still it is not possible simply on this account2 to reject what is the special state of mind of great men who are not like ordinary people. Nor is it correct to include śānta within vīrarasa, because vīra depends on egoism, whereas śānta consists exclusively in the destruction of any feeling of self.3 If, in spite of this distinction, one should still claim that śānta and vīra are one and the same, then the same absurd reasoning would apply to vīra and raudra. In the case of the states of mind in vīra which depend on compassion, etc., when there is a total absence of egoism, they can be considered as varieties of śāntarasa. If, however, egoism remains, then they should be considered varieties of vīra. If we understand things in this way, there will be no contradiction. And therefore there is śāntarasa. There is nothing wrong with including, in a work dealing with śāntarasa, a rasa (intrinsically) opposed to śānta, as long as a third and neutral (aviruddha) rasa intervenes.

Locana pp. 390–394 :

ननु नास्येव शान्तो रसः, तस्य तु स्थायिवै नोपदिष्टो मुनीनैः्याश्रयाश्शान्त- श्रेति । तृष्णानां विषयाभिलाषाणां यः क्षयः सर्वतो निवृत्तिरुपो निर्वेदः तदेव सुखं तस्य स्थायिभूतस्य यः परिपोषो रस्यमानाकृतस्तदेव च्छषणं यस्मात स शान्तो रसः । प्रतीत- एवति । स्वानुभवेनापि निवृत्तभोजनादिपरोविषयेच्छाप्रसक्तकाले सम्भाव्यत एव । अन्ये तु सर्वचिच्चित्तवृत्तिप्रशम एवास्य स्थायीति मन्यन्ते । तृष्णाड्‌द्रवास्य प्रसज्य- प्रतिषेधरुपाले चेतोद्रवृत्त्याभावेन भावव्ययोगात् । पर्युदासे तु सत्वपक्ष एवायम् । अन्य तु— खं खं निमित्तमासाद्य शान्ताद्रवः प्रवर्तते । पुनर्निमित्तापाये तु शान्त एव प्रलीयते ॥

इति भरतवाक्यं दृढवन्तः सर्वरससामान्यस्खभावं शान्तमाचक्षाणा अनुगजातविशेषान्तर- चिच्चित्तवृत्तिरुपं शान्तस्य स्थायिभावं मन्यन्ते । एतच्च नातीवास्मत्पक्षाद्दूरम् । प्रागभाव- प्रख्यंसाभावकतृत्व विशेषः । युक्तश्र प्रखंस एव तृष्णानाम् । यथोक्तम्—‘वीतरागजनमा- दर्शनात्’ इति । प्रतीत एवति । मुनीनाप्यझीकृत एव ‘कचिच्छमः’ इत्यादि वदता ।

1. Mahābhārata, XIII, 174, 46. The verse has become ( because of Ānanda's quotation ?) a subhāṣita, quoted even in elementary primers of Sanskrit in India.

2. etāvata—“ simply because of that ”.

3. Tasya and asya refer to vīrarasa and śāntarasa respectively.

न च तद्दीया पर्यन्तावस्था वर्णनीया येन सर्वचेष्टोपरमादनुभावाभावेनाप्रतीमामनता स्यात्! शृङ्गारादेरपि फलभूभावर्णनीयतैव, पूर्वभूमौ तु 'तस्य प्रशान्तवाहिता संस्कारात् । तच्छिद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्तराणि संस्कारेभ्य:' इति सूत्रदर्शनात्या चित्राकारा यमनियमादिचेष्टा राज्यधुरोद्वहनादिलक्षणा वा शान्तस्यापि जनकोद्रेकद्रवेयनुभावसद्रावाद्यमनियमादिमध्य-संभाव्यमानभूयोभ्यमिचारिसद्रावाच्च प्रतीत एव ।

ननु न प्रतीयंते नास्य विभावा: सन्तीति चेत्—न; प्रतीयते एव तावदसौ । तस्य च भवितव्यमेव प्राप्तनकुशलपरिपाकपरमेश्वप्रभृत्यहंकारहृदयशाब्दवीतरागपरिशीलनादिभिर्विभावैरित्यतैव विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसद्रावात्; स्थायी च दर्शित: । ननु तत्र हृदयसंवादा-भावाद्रस्यानमनतैव नोपपद्य । क एवमाह नास्तीति, यतः प्रतीत एव्ययुक्तम् ।

ननु प्रतीते सर्वस्य शृङ्गास्पदं न भवति । तहिं वीतरागाणां शृङ्गारो न शृङ्ग्य इति सोडपि रसवाच्यत्वामिति तदाह—यदि नामेति । ननु धर्मप्रधानोऽसौ वीर एवेति संभाव्यमान आह—न चेति । तस्येति वीरस्य । अभिमानमयच्वेनैति । उत्साहो ह्यहमेवविध इत्येवप्राण इत्यर्थ: । अस्य चेति शान्तस्य । तयोश्रेति । इहामयवदनिरीहलाव्यामयन्त-विरुद्धयोःपप्ति चशब्दार्थ:; वीरौदार्यवशवर्तिविरोधोऽपि नास्ति । समानं रूपं च धर्मार्थ-कोमलजनोपयोगित्वम् ।

नन्वेवं दयावीरो धर्मवीरो दानवीरो वा । नासौ कश्चित्, शान्तस्यैवेदं नामान्तरकरणम् । तथा हि मुनि:—

दानवीरं धर्मवीरं युद्धवीरं तथैव च ।

रस वीरमपि ग्राह्य ब्रह्म त्रिविधसंमितम् ॥

इत्यागमपुर:सरं त्रिविधमेवाभ्यधात् । तदाह—दयावीरादीनां चेष्टादिग्रहणेन । विषयजुगुप्सा-रुपकवादविमुखेऽन्तर्भाव:; शृङ्गार्यते । सा तस्य व्यभिचारिणी भवति न तु स्थायितामेति, पर्यन्तनिर्वाहे तस्या मूलत एव विच्छिद्यते । आधिकारिकत्वेन तु शान्तो रसो न निवद्रव्य इति चन्द्रिकार: । तच्चेहास्माभिर्न पर्यालोचितं, प्रसङ्गान्तरात् । मोक्षफलत्वेन चायं परमपुरुषार्थनिष्ठावश्यकर्मसेव: । प्रजावलतम्; मु चायमसम्प्रदायविरुद्धवैचित्र्यमहतेतत्काव्यकौतुक-, अस्माभिमिश्र तद्विवरणे बहुत्तरकृतनिरूपपूर्वपक्षसिद्धान्त इत्यलं बहुना ॥

TRANSLATION OF THE LOCANA ON DHVANYĀLOKA III, 26. :

Objection1 : “ There is no śantarasa at all, for Bharata has not taught its sthāyibhāva.” In order to answer this objection, ( Ānanda-

1. Note what Kane has to say on the date of the Avaloka : “ The dasarūpa and its commentary Avaloka were probably composed before Abhinavagupta wrote the Abhinavabhāratī. The earliest datable work of Abhinavagupta is the Kramaśotra composed in 990 A. D. It has been shown above that the Daśarūpa was composed between

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vardhana ) has said : " And śānta, etc. " The complete extinction of desires, that is, love for sense-objects, in the form of the withdrawal ( of the mind ) ( from every object of the sense ), ( also called ) detachment,1 that alone is happiness. The development of this, which arises from the aesthetic enjoyment of this detachment, when it turns into an abiding mental state, constitutes the definition of śāntarasa. " It is indeed apprehended. " It is possible ( for ordinary people ) to imagine what it is like from their own experience at the time when the course of their desires for all objects of the senses, such as food etc., has completely ceased (because of having eaten to satiation etc.).2 Others, however, believe that the sthāyibhāva of śāntarasa is the calming down of all mental activity. If the absence of desires (which is the meaning of tr̥ṣṇākṣaya) is understood in the sense of a complete negation of their existence, then it would amount to the absence of all mental activity and could not be regarded as a bhāva (i.e. a positive mental state). But if it is understood in the sense

Continued from previous page 974-996 A. D, and the commentary of Dhanika was composed not before 1000 A. D. Therefore, Dhanamjaya and Dhanika were contemporaries of Abhinavagupta. At all events the two works do not refer to each other, though ( sic ) they differ in sevral important respects." P. V. Kane, op. cit. p. 248. We think, though, that the Locana passage we are dealing with has in mind the criticisms of Dhanika, for in at least 5 places Abhinava refers to views that Dhanika has either mentioned or espoused. We think, for instance, that the passage on p. 390, ननु नाट्ये शान्तो रसः तस्य तु स्थायिभेनोपदिष्टो मुनिनेलयशाख्राह — इह शान्त-रसे प्रति वादिनामनेकविधा विप्रतिपत्तयः, तत्र केचिदाहुः — नाट्येऽपि शान्तो रसः विभावाद्यप्रतीतकरणात्।1 (p.147). The passage in tbe Locana on page 391, न च तदीया पृथकत्वावक्षा वर्णनीया येन सर्वचेष्टोपरमादनुभावेनाप्रतीयमानता स्यात् might well be a reference to Dhanika, p. 148, सर्वेऽथा नाटकादौ विनयात्मके शान्ते स्थायितवमसाधिः शमस्य निषिध्यते — तस्य समस्ततापारमलयरूपस्याभिनयायोगात्।( See also the more elaborate argument on this subject given in the Abhinavabhārati ). The passage on p. 393, नन्वै दयावीरौ धर्म-वीरो दानवीरो वा could well be a reference to the passage in Dhanika, p. 148, where be says :

अतो दयावीरौहासैनैव तत्र स्थायित्रम् The passage on p. 394 of the Locana, विषयडुप्संवादपाटीभटसेवन्तर्भावः शङ्कते, might be a reference to the reported view on p. 147 of the Avaloka : अन्ये तु वीरवीरमत्सरादावन्तर्भावं वर्णयन्ति. Finally, the remark in the Locana, on p. 392, ननु तत्र हृदयसंवादाभावाद्रसमानतैव नोपपन्ना सहृदया: स्वारचितारः सन्ति. Of course, there is no guarantee that these were not merely general views, held in common by a number of authors.

1. Note then that Abhinava is not saying that Ānanda's sthāyibhāva, tr̥ṣṇā-kṣayasukha, is different from nireeda.
2. Nivr̥tta goes with icchāprasara. We think the idea is that after one has taken a large meal, food is no longer attractive. From this we can infer that for the sage, worldly pleasures are no longer attractive, and thus we have a basis for understanding śāntarasa from our own experience.

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of exclusion ( of all desires ), then this view will fall within our position.1 Others, however, have taken their stand on the following verse of Bharata :2

" Various feelings, because of their particular respective causes, arise from śānta ( a state of mental calm ). But when these causes disappear, they melt back into śānta;3 and they then claim that śānta is common to all rasas and consider the sthāyibhāva of śānta to be that state of mind which has not been particularised into any other mood. This opinion is not very far removed from our position. The difference is one of prāgabhāva ("non-existence of something before its origination") and pradhvamsābhāva (non-existence of something when it is destroyed). And it is correct for desires to be destroyed. As has been said : "We can never find a man who is without desires from his birth." ( I. e. a person achieves this state at some later point in his life, and therefore desires can be destroyed.) Even Bharata has shown his agreement by saying : "Sometimes peace",4 etc. The culmination

1. The point is this : what kind of negative is tyāgakṣaya? Is it prasajyapratiṣedha, or paryudāsapratiṣedha? If it is the former, then there could be no question of a bhāva at all, and therefore this is unacceptable. Paryudāsa, which means "exclusion of something with the possibility of including its opposite", is however acceptable. The two kinds of negation are paralleled by the two forms of absence, prāgabhāva and pradhvamsābhāva which will be mentioned later.

2. This is from the NŚ VI. 106-8 and forms part of the interpolated ānta passage in that text.

3. Note that this verse does not necessarily mean that their author accepted śantarasa. Śānta is simply the absence of emotion, the tabula rasa of the emotional board. It has nothing to do, necessarily, with mokṣa or religious views in general.

The stanza is given under the heading of Āryā verses and was, therefore, most probably part of a floating tradition, and not part of a continuously argued passage. On p. 326 of the NŚ (Vol. I), several verses are introduced with these words : atrāryāḥ ( with a variant reading of atrānuvamśyā āryā bhavanti ) on which Abhinava has a most important remark : ता एता ध्वायिन एकप्रचछकतया (Abbinava is fond of this rather rarely used word ) पूर्वाचायैः लक्षणलक्षितैः पतिताः । सुहृनिसुखसंघहाय यथास्थानं निवेष्टिताः। It is, therefore, clear that these verses are not by Bharata himself. Some of them, however, might well be his own, and in this the situation resembles that of the Dhvanyāloka, where some of the Sangrahaślokas must be by Ānanda, and some must be by earlier or contemporary writers. Kane quotes Vanaparea 129, 8 : अत्रानुवंशो पठतः श्याणु मे कुरूनन्दन । परम्परागतमाल्येनानुमोकम् । (For more references, see Kane, op. cit., p. 17). Note that Abhinava explains this term ( anuvamśya ) as : अनुवंशो भवतोः शिष्याचार्यपरम्परागतं वतमानौ शोकाव्य इत्यादिषु मुग्यार्थसंकेतप्रकटीकरणेन कारिकाशब्दवाच्यो भवतः। Vol. I, p. 290 ( second paragraph ).

4. This is a reference to the NŚ, I. 106 :

कचिद्रमे: कचिक्रिडा कचिद्रः । दुःख्वातीनां शमातीनां शोकार्तीनां तपस्विनाम् ।। विश्रान्तिजननं काले नाट्यमेतद् द्विषां हविः । नानापर्णीनां च विझेयं नाट्यं ह्युतान्तदर्शनम् ।।

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ting stage of nirveda is not to be described ( in śānta ), so that one could say it cannot be perceived, because of the absence of any ( visible ) symptoms due to the cessation of all activity. This applies equally to śṛṅgāra,1 etc., where the culminating stage ( for example, actual sexual intercourse) cannot be described.2 But in earlier stages, according to the two Sūtras ( of Patañjali )3: “ This ( mind-stuff ) flows peacefully by reason of the subliminal-impression.”5 and “ In the intervals of this ( mind-stuff ) there are other presented-ideas ( coming ) from subliminal-impressions,” such diverse actions as yama, niyama, etc., or activities such as ruling the kingdom of the earth, etc., are perceived even in the case of Janaka and others who are nonetheless śānta (i. e. full of mental calm ). And so it must be admitted that śānta is apprehended because of the existence of such outwardly visible symptoms and because of the existence of many vyabhicāribhāvas which are imaginable-in the intervals of ( the accessories of yoga such as )4 yama, niyama, etc. Should one object that it is not perceived, as there are no vibhāvas belonging to it, we reply, no, it is perceived, and its vibhāvas such as acquaintance with people who are devoid of desire, fruition of one’s former good deeds, grace of the highest God, and acquaintance with the secret teaching relating to

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It is one of the key passages for those who believe that Bharata really did accept śānta as a rasa. But there is no reason to believe that these correspond exactly to any of the rasas. They refer rather to the puruṣārthas. One wonders, though, precisely what Bharata had in mind by including mokṣa ( corresponding to śama ) as suitable for the drama.

1. Delete the quotation mark before śṛṅgārāder api, in the B. P. ed.

2. This is an important distinction, but it is difficult to know exactly what Abhinava has in mind. He admits that it is impossible to show the anubhāvas of the last phases of śāntarasa, because at that point there is a complete absence of activity. ( This is an old Advaita problem, whether the Jīvanmukta engages in activity or not. The conundrum had passed into Zen, where it has formed the basis of elaborate discussions concerning the identity of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa ). But Abhinava says that the same is true of śṛṅgāra, etc. What does he mean? We suppose he is referring to actual sexual intercourse. Now, why, precisely, does he say that this cannot be portrayed? On the analogy of the earlier example of śānta, it would seem to be because there is no physical activity. But this, of course, is not true. Or does he mean, not only the act of penetration, but also the actual sexual intercourse in general, i. e. not only the act of ejaculation ? In this case, he might well mean that there is little or no activity. ( Which does not, however, imply that one cannot describe it, or even present it on the stage ). Perhaps Abhinava simply means that it would be a breach of good taste to portray actual sexual intercourse on the stage. But if this is what he means, it is hard to see how this is relevant to śantarasa and the absence of activity. Moreover, in the Abhinavabhāratī, Abhinava makes the same remark concerning karuṇarasa.

3. From the Yogasūtra, III, 10 and IV, 27. Our translation is taken directly from James Haughton Wood’s “ The Yoga System of Patañjali ”, Harvard Oriental Series, 17, Cambridge, 1914.

4. After vyabhicārisadbhāvāc ca add śāntarasah.

the Self, must be presumed. And so by all this we have shown that vibhāvas, anubhāvas, vyabhicāribhāvas, and a sthāyibhāva for śānta all exist. Objection1 : “ In 'śāntarasa no act of relishing can arise because of the lack of sympathetic response.” Who said that there is no sympathetic response ? For it has already been said that it is perceived. Objection : “ ( Though it may be ) perceived, it is not esteemed by everybody.'2 Yes,

but according to this reasoning, men devoid of desire will not find love very praiseworthy either, and so it will have to be removed from the annals of rasa history !3 And so Ānandavardhana says : “ Even if ”: Objection : “ It is possible to consider this ( śānta ) as identical with that variety of vīra which consists primarily of dharma ”. He answers this by saying : “ And not.” tasya refers to vīra. “ Is full of egoism, ” because the essence of utsāha ( energy, the sthāyibhāva of vīra ) is to feel and say that

“ I am such and such ”, etc. Asya ca refers to śānta. “ Between the two ”: ca here means ‘ although they are extremly opposed to each other because the one ( vīra ) is full of desire and the other ( śānta ) is devoid of desire. ’ But vīra and raudra are not even very much opposed, because their similarity consists in this, that in attaining dharma, artha or kāma, both are ( equally ) helpful ( upayogitva ). Objection : “ If this is so, then compassionate heroism ( dayāvīra ) is either religious heroism ( dharmavīra ) or generous heroism ( dānavīra ) ( but not śānta ).”4 No, it is neither of these two, because

1. The point of the objection is that śānta is never experienced by ordinary people in everyday life, and therefore they will have no rāvanās that will enable the acting to heighten the sthāyibhāva in them to the status of a rasa. Abhinava replies that śānta is, in fact, experienced by ordinary men. He refers, we believe, to the analogy of feeling sated after a full meal.

2. The opponent's argument, that śāntarasa appeals only to a select few, is very strong and deserves a serious reply. Abhinava's reply that for a vitarāga, a man with no passions, śṛngāra will also hold no appeal, is very weak. The point, surely, is that śṛngāra is, or has been, within the experience of all men, whereas śānta is not, ( There are after all philosophical schools in India which denied the very existence of śṛngāra !) This is presumably what the pūrvapakṣin means by śāghasyapadam. Moreover Abhinava has himself made fun of these very vitarāgas who are unable to appreciate love. Dry Mimāmsaka scholars he calls them. Of course, from a modern point of view, both objections can be simply met : it is not necessary to believe in somthing in order to enjoy it, for otherwise no atheist would find any pleasure in reading religious poetry, or even the Upaniṣads for that matter. Brigid Brophy has said that most of us “ have replaced belief in fairies by a Midsummer Night's Dream ”.

3. Abhinava must have in mind the passage in the N.S., 27, 59 : तुष्यन्ति तरुणाः कामे विद्रधा समयाश्रिते । अहंकारोपराश्रितं श्रिव मोक्षंव्रत विरागिणः ॥ on which he comments : हृदयसंवादोऽपि तथाविधस्तवज्ञानवैजर्स्कारभावितानां भवत्येव, यद्रक्ष्यति मोक्षे चापि विरागिणः । इति । ( Vol. I. p. 340 )

4. The punctuation of the Bālapriyā text is wrong. Place a danda after dānavīro vā. nāsau kaścit is a separate sentence, a reply to this objection.

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दान्तरস

( compassionate heroism ) is simply another name for śānta. For the sage has said :

" Brahmā has said that vīrarasa is of three kinds : generous heroism, religious heroism, and battle heroism ".1

And so, using the tradition ( āgama ) as authority, he ( i. e. the sage ), declared ( vīra ) to have only three varieties.2 And so Ānanda has said :

" compassionate heroism, etc., " where the word " etc. " ( refers to dānavīra and dharmavīra ).3 It might be ( wrongly ) suspected that ( śānta ) could be included under bībhatsa, because in both cases there is disgust with worldly objects. But while disgust4 can be a vyabhicāribhāva of śānta ( in the sense that it is transitory ), it cannot be its sthāyibhāva; because in the last phases of śānta, it is completely rooted out. The author of the Candrikā claims that śantarasa should not be employed as the major rasa ( in a work ). We have not examined this opinion here since that would lead to digression ( prasangāntarōt ).5 Because śānta is grounded on the highest goal of man,

1. Read rasam vīram and not rasavīram. It means vīrarasa.

2. The point of the verse is that Bharata does not even mention dayāvīra, and therefore it is not vīra at all, but śānta. ( NŚ. VI, 79. p. 331 ) The real question to ask Abhinava would have been how he intends to understand dharmavīra. How does this really differ from dayāvīra ?

3. Something has been dropped from the Locana passage dayāvirādinān cetyādigraharena. The Bālapriyā says that one must supply dharmavīradānavirayor grahanam. But this seems a contradiction, for Abhinava has just finished saying that dharmavīra and dānavīra are vīrarasa, not śāntarasa, whereas dayāvīra is śānta. However, this seems to be what Ānanda has in mind, for otherwise it is difficult to know what ādi will stand for. The view of Ānanda is that all the three, dayāvīra, dharmavīra and dānavīra, are to be regarded as varieties of śānta ( as far as one can judge from his Vrtti ), if they are free from all traces of egoism. If not, they should be regarded as varieties of vīrarasa. Thus, Ānanda does not appear to have shared Abhinava's view that any form of dayāvīra is necessarily śānta itself. Abhinava holds the view that dayāvīra is not to be identified either with dānavīra or with dharmavīra. He believes that dānavīra and dharmavīra are also to be regarded as varieties of śānta if they are divested of all traces of egoism. The difference between the positions of Ānanda and Abhinava seems to be this : that, whereas Ānanda regards dayāvīra as identical with śānta only in certain circumstances ( viz. when there is no egoism ), Abhinava regards dayāvīra as identical with śānta in all circumstances. This implies that there can be no egoism in dayāvīra for Abhinava. Cf. Locana, p. 514 : dayāvīra-śabdena vā śāntam vyapadiśati.

4. The idea is that jugupsā is not really a part of śānta, or rather, it is not an abiding element ( though it can be regarded as a vyabhicāribhāva of śānta ), since at the moment of realisation, nābhinandati न द्वेष्टि तस्य प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठिता।

5. Note Raghavan, " Number of Rasas ", p. 22, " Evidently, the Candrikākārā also held the view that Vira and Sr̥gāra are the Rasa-s in the Nāgānanda in accordance with the ending in the attainment of vidyādhara-cakravartitva, the overlordship of the kingdom of Vidyādhara-s, and the sustained love-theme, and that the śānta came in there as a subsidiary idea to give a new variety of Dayā-vīra,

( Continued on next page

i. e. because it gives rise to mokṣa, it is the most important of all the rasas.1 And this has been demonstrated at great length, stating both pro-and contra-positions, in the Kāvyakautuka of our teacher Bhaṭṭatāta and in our commentary on that work. So enough of further discussion here.

Dhvanyāloka pp. 529-533 :

तथा च रामायणमहाभारतादिषु संग्रामादयः पुनः पुनरमिहिता अपि नवनवः प्रकाशन्ते । प्रवन्धे चाझ्झी रस एक एनोऽपनिवध्यमानोऽनोरङ्गद्विप्रलम्भं छायातिशयं च पुष्णाति । कम्मति-वेति चेत्—यथा राम-यणे यथा वा महाभारते । रामायणे हि करुणो रसः शोक्यमादिक-विनासूत्रितः ‘शोकः शोक्तव्यमागतः’ इत्येवंवादिना । निर्बन्धदश स एव सीतातन्त्रियो ग-पर्यन्तमेव स्वप्रबन्धस्मुपरचयता । महाभारतेऽपि शांतरूपे काव्येऽध्यायान्वयिनी ऋषिप्रपाण्डव-विरसावसानवैमनस्यदायिनी समाधिसुपनिबद्धक्ता महासुनिना वैराग्यजननतत्पर्यं प्राधान्चेन स्वप्रबन्धस्य दर्शयता मोक्षलक्षणः पुरुषार्थः शान्तो रसस्थ मुख्यतया विवक्षाविषयत्वेन सूचितः । एतच्चाशेन विद्वत्प्रवर्यैरैय्यास्वादविधिभिः स्वयमेव चैतदुद्रीर्णं तेनादिर्ण-महामोहमपुंजिहीर्षता लोकमतिकुमझानालोकदायिना लोचनाथेन—

यथा यथा विपर्यैति लोकतन्त्रमसारवत् । तथा तथा विरागोऽत्र जायते नात्र संशयः ॥ इत्यादि बहुशः कथयता । तत्थ शान्तो रसो रसान्तरैर्मोक्षलक्षणः पुरुषार्थः पुरुषार्थान्त-रैस्तदुपसर्जनतयेनानुगम्यमानोडड्कितचेन विपक्षाविषय इति महाभारतात्पर्यं सुव्यक्तमेवाव-भासते । अज्ञद्विःभावश्र यथा रसानां तथा प्रतिपादितमेव । पारमार्थिकान्तस्तत्त्वानपेक्षया शरीरस्थेया ड भूतस्य रसस्य पुरुषायस्य च स्वप्राधान्येन चारुत्वमप्यविरुद्धम् । ननु महाभारते यावान्विवक्षाविषयः सोऽनुसुक्रमयां सर्व एवैकानुकार्नो न चैतत्तत्त्व दर्श्यते, प्रयुक्त सर्वपुरुपार्थप्रबोधहेतुत्वं सर्वरसगर्भत्वं च महाभारतस्य तस्मिन्नुद्देशे स्वाह्वनिवेदिततयेन प्रतीयेते । अत्रोच्यते — सत्यं शान्तस्यैव रसस्याङ्गित्वं महाभारते मोक्षस्य

Continued from previous page ) Abhinavagupta, however, rejects this view of the Candrikā in his Locana. Adhikāri-katvena tu śānto raso (raso na) nibaddharya iti candrikākārah, tac cehāsmābhir na paryālocitam." This does not seem justified by the passage Dr. Raghavan quotes Abhinava has not said that he rejects the views of the Candrikā, but only that a discussion of these views would involve digressing from his main theme. We have translated the whole passage on page 102. Cf. A. Bh., Vol. II, p. 451.

1. Note that what Abhinava says here : sarvarasebhyah pradhānatamah is directly contrary to what Ānanda will say on p. 397 of the D, Āl. : रस्नारारसः... सर्वरसेप्यः... प्रधानभूतः । Moreover he himself will admit in the Abhinavabhāratī that śānta is apradhāna : अत एव शान्तस्य स्थित्यङ्गड्यप्राधान्यम् । ( Vol. I, p. 339 ). And again in the A. Bh. IV, p. 78 : uktam hi - na śāntarasapradhānata prayogayogyo nānyatheti. (sann api ?) hi rasāntaroparakta eva prayogayogyo nānyatheti.

XVI

च सर्वपुरुषार्थेभ्यः प्राधान्यमित्येतन्न स्वशब्दाभिधेयेलानुक्रमण्यां दर्शितम्, दर्शितं तु व्यञ्जकलेन—

'भगवान्वासुदेवेशः कीर्त्यतेऽत्र सनातनः',

इत्यस्मिन्न वाक्ये । अननेन ह्यमर्यो व्यञ्जकलेन विवक्षितो यदत्र महाभारते पाण्डवादिचरितं यत्कीर्त्यते तत्रैवमसानविरसमविद्याप्रपञ्चरूपं च, परमार्थतस्त्वरूपतु भगवान् वासुदेवोऽत्र कीर्त्यते । तस्मात्स्मिनैव परमेश्वरे भगवति भवत् भावितचेतसो, मो भूत विभूतिषु निःसा-रासु रागिणो गुणेषु वा नयविनयपराक्रमादिष्विमेषु केवलेपु केशवचिस्स्त्राल्मना प्रतिनिविष्टधियः । तथा चात्रे-पश्यत् निःसारतां संसारस्यैवमेवार्थं वोदयत् स्फुटमेवावभासते व्यज्जकशक्येन-गृहीतश् चशब्दः । एवंविधमेवार्थं गर्भीकृतं संदर्शयन्नतोदरतच्छोका लक्ष्यन्ते—‘स हि सत्यम’ इत्यादयः ।

अयं च निगूढरमणीयोऽथी महाभारतावसाने हरिवंशवर्णनेन समाप्यते विधदता तेनैव कविवेधसा कृष्णद्वैपायनेन सम्यक्स्फुटीकृतः । अननेन चार्थन संसारातीते तच्चान्तरे भक्त्यतिशयं प्रवर्तयता सकल एव सांसारिको व्यवहारः पूर्वपक्षीकृतो न्यक्षरन् प्रकाशते । देवनातीर्यतपःप्रशस्तीनां च प्रभावातिशयवर्णनं तस्यैव परब्रह्मणः प्राधान्यायैवेन तद्भक्तिवेनैव देवनविशेषणमित्यपि । पाण्डवादिचरितवर्णननस्यापि वैय्यजननतत्प्रायोद्भरमित्यस्य च मोक्ष-मूलक्वान्मोक्षस्य च भगवत्प्राधान्यायैव मुल्यतया गीतादिषु प्रदर्शितत्वात्परब्रह्मप्राधान्य-त्वमेव । परम्परया वासुदेवादिसंबन्धाभिधेयेन चापरिमिताक्ष्यस्पदं परं ब्रह्म गीतादिप्रदेशन्तरेषु तदभिधानवेन लब्धप्रसिद्धि माथुरप्रादुर्भावानुकृतसकलसरूपं विवक्षितं न तु माथुर-प्रादुर्भावांश एव, सनातनशब्दविशेषितत्वात् । रामायणादिषु चानया संबया भगवान्मूर्त्यन्तरे व्यवहरणदर्शिनात् । निश्चितश्वर्यः शब्दतश्चित्रिद्रेव तदेवमक्रमणीविदर्शितेन वाक्येन भगवान्वरेकिणः सर्वस्यानस्यनियतां प्रकाश-यता मोक्षलक्षण एवैकः परः पुरुषार्थः श्राव्यत्नय, काव्यत्नय च तृणाक्षयसुवपरिपोषलक्षणः शान्तो रसो महाभारतस्याऽऽदौ विवक्षित इति सुप्रतिपादितम्।

अस्यान्तसारमूतवाच्यार्थ-मध्ये व्यज्जकलेन दर्शितं न तु वाच्यत्वेन । सारमूतो ह्यः स्वशब्दाभिधेयवचन प्रकाशितः सुतरमेव शोभामावहति । प्रसिद्धिश्रेयमस्यैव विदग्धवदित्परिपुष्टु यदभिमततरं वस्तु व्यज्ज्य-तेन प्रकाशते न साक्षाच्छब्दवाच्यत्वेन ।

Dhvanyāloka, Uddyota IV.1

Thus in the Rāmāyaṇa, in the Mahābhārata, and other works, though battles and the like are described again and again, they seem new each

1, D. Āl. pp. 529 ff.

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105

time.1 When one single rasa is presented as dominant in a large work,

this creates originality2 in the subject matter and ( gives rise to ) great

beauty as well. " Such as where ? " Well, for instance in the Rāmāyaṇa and

the Mahābhārata. For in the Rāmāyaṇa, karuṇarasa has been hinted at by

Vālmīki when he says : " Sorrow was transformed into poetry."3 It is

that very ( rasa ) that has been sustained till the very end, since Vālmīki ends

his work with ( Rāma's ) final separation from Sītā.4 ( The same applies to )

the Mahābhārata also, ( that work ) which has the form of a philosophical

( or didactic ) text5 and possesses the beauty of poetry. When the great

sage ( Vyāsa ) ends his work in such a way that it makes us feel melancholy

( vaimaṇasyadāyini ) by having the Vrṣṇis and the Pāṇḍavas all finish in a

pathetic way,6 and shows how his book puts emphasis on the creation of

world-weariness ( vairāgya ), he suggests by this emphasis that ( among the

rasas ) śāntarasa is meant to be predominant, and ( among the goals of life ),

mokṣa is primarily intended. Moreover this has been partially explained by

other commentators as well. The father of the world ( lokanātha ), who

wishes to lift people out of the morass of rampant ( udīrṇa ) ignorance in

which they have fallen, and provide them with the pure light of knowledge,

has himself asserted this very thing when he said the following and many

other things like it over and over :

1. What makes the battles seem original each time, is not, we think, the

use of dhvani in each particular description ( though vīra, bhayānaka, bībhatsa, and

raudra can all exist therein ), but their subordination to a more general aesthetic goal.

So in the case of the Rāmāyaṇa, the constant expressions involving pain, sorrow, sepa-

ration, etc., all conduce to the over-all end of the work, a feeling of karuṇa. In the

Mahābhārata, the more battles are described, the more distasteful war becomes and

the more firmly grounded our feeling of detachment, of world-weariness ( vairāgya ).

This theory, advanced as it is, would be appropriate to a work where the subject is a

unified one, but it can hardly be applied to a work as varied ( in authorship as well )

as the Mahābhārata, which contains several rasas, and cannot be viewed as a unity.

Ānanda of course could not have agreed.

2. Arthaviśeṣa here means arthanavatva.

3. See the passage translated from the Locana on the first Uddyota of the

Dhvanyāloka, p. 79. The passage here is Rāmāyaṇa I, 2, 40.

4. This refers to Sītā's being swallowed up by the earth. At the very end

of the Rāmāyaṇa, Rāma is promised a heavenly reunion. One wonders whether this

obvious interpolation existed at the time of the Dhvanyāloka. If it did, then Ānanda

in an unprecedented critical attitude seems to suggest that this cannot concern the

literary critic, which is a remarkably advanced view.

5. Read sāstrarūpe on p. 530.

6. Note what the Didhiti commentary ( p. 611 ) says on this : तेषामेव यदीदृशः

परिणामः तर्हि का कथा न्येषाम् ? " If even they ended up like this, what hope is there for

the rest of us ? " the mahāprasthāna episode, especially the svargārohaṇa, does indeed

convey an atmosphere of dejection. After all, the brothers undertook this suicidal

voyage because things looked so bleak. Yudhiṣṭhira especially strikes one as a tired

man, battle-weary and without illusions about man's perfectability.

"The more the course of the world ( l okatantra ) unfolds itself before us as vain and insubstantial, the more, surely, does ( our ) detachment grow."1

From this the ultimate meaning of the Mahābhārata appears most clearly: the two subjects intended as predominant are śāntarasa, with other rasas in a subordinated position, and mokṣa, with other aims of life likewise subordinated. The topic of the predominance and subordination of the different rasas has already been dealt with.2 It is no contradiction to say that if we do not take into consideration the ultimate ( pāramārthika ) inner truth ( of the Mahābhārata), other subsidiary goals of life ( besides mokṣa ) and other subsidiary rasas ( besides śāntarasa ) are beautiful in their own way ( svaprādhānyena, i. e. svaviṣaye ), just as the body, when we do not take the soul into consideration, is thought of as beautiful, though it is really only subsidiary ( to the soul ). "But", ( someone might argue ), " in the Mahābhārata all of the subjects to be presented have been given in the table of contents, and this one ( that you mention ) is not found there.3 On the contrary, we can understand, through the very words used ( svaśabdan-veditatva ) in that section ( uddeśa ), that the Mahābhārata teaches all the goals of man, and contains all the rasas." We reply : What you say is true. In the table of contents it has not been said in so many words that in the Mahābhārata, śāntarasa is the main ( rasa ) nor that mokṣa is more important than all other human preoccupations. But it has been shown through suggestion, as in the following phrase: "And the blessed eternal Vāsudeva is praised herein."4 The intended meaning, arrived at through suggestion, is that the deeds of the Pāṇḍavas, etc., which are recited in the Mahābhārata, all end pathetically and are only a manifestation of cosmic ignorance; and that the blessed Vāsudeva, whose form is the highest truth, is glorified there. "Therefore turn your minds devoutly to that revered, highest God alone. Do not set your hearts on the empty outward shapes of things, and do not exclusively fix your thoughts on mere worldly virtues like political sagacity, enforcement

1. We have not succeeded in tracing this stanza in the Mahābhārata.

The verse might appear to an impartial reader ( that is, outside of the context of the D. Āl. ) as a rather cynical comment : " only when things go badly do they appear unreal. " Without the context, we cannot say whether Ānanda's interpretation is the correct one.

2. D. Āl. III. 20 and following.

3. The passage the Pūrvapakṣin seems to have in mind is Mahābhārata I. 1. 48 :

वेदयोगं सर्विज्ञाने धर्ममर्थ: काम एव च ।

धर्मार्थकामशाखाणि शास्त्राणि विविधानि च ॥

4. Mahābhārata, I. 1. 256.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

107

of discipline, valour, etc." And further on, the word "and " (ca) helped by its suggestive power, is here clearly seen to suggest the following idea : "Take into account the hollowness of worldly existence." The verses immediately following, such as "He indeed is the Truth", etc., are (also) seen to contain implied in them similar ideas.

By completing his work at the end of the Mahābhārata with the description of Kṛṣṇa's genealogy (harivaṃśa), the poet-creator Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana has made this hidden beautiful sense wonderfully patent. And because this (hidden) meaning impels us to great devotion for another truth, beyond the phenomenal world, all worldly activities assume a preliminary1 and vincible position (pūrvapakṣa)2 as being fit to be ignored (nyakṣa).3 The description of the exceptional power of gods, holy places, penance, etc., is (only) a means to attaining the highest Brahman, because the various particular gods and other things (i.e. holy places, penance, etc.) are its manifestations (vibhūti).4 The description of the life of the Pāṇḍavas etc., gives rise to

1. Cf. Raghavan, "The Number of Rasas", p. 36 : "The author of the Bhāgavata in his criticism of the Bhārata, says that in the Great Epic, Vyāsa has described "Praṿṛtti" (as Pūrvapakṣa) so much and so well, that man who is by nature attached to it has mistaken the Pūrvapakṣa itself for the Siddhānta". Here is the verse, as quoted by Raghavan :

जुगुप्सतं धर्मकृतेऽनुशास्तः स्वभावरक्ष्यं महान् व्यक्तिक्रमः। यद्राच्यतो धर्म इति स्थितोऽर्थो मन्यते तस्य निवर्र्णे जनः॥ (Bhāgavata, I. 5. 15)

Note the important verse of Abhinavagupta in his Gītārtthasaṅgraha (edited by V. L. Shastri Pansikar in his edition of the Gītā, N. S. P., Bombay 1912 with 8 commentaries), p. 2 :

द्वैपायनेन मुनिना यदि चेद् व्यध्यावि शास्त्रं सहस्रशतसंमितमत्र मोक्षः। प्राथम्यतः फलतया प्रतितस्यदनं- धर्माम्भोधि तस्य परिशोषविषु प्रणीतम्॥

2. Professor Daniel H. H. Ingalls has kindly directed our attention to an interesting remark of Nilakaṇṭha on M. Bh., I. 1. 275 (Poona Ed. p. 24), where an adversary is made to remark : अग्रानर्थस्य युज्यादिम्रलापो भूतान इइयते to which the reply is :

एवं भारतेडपि धर्मेतरप्रतिपादनं एव परमतत्पर्यम्। अर्थवादजातमपि शुध्देरादिवतद्वहवहृद्य न दुर्योधन- दिवदिलाशयेनोक्तम् ................ तथा च सर्वसादृपि ग्रन्थारसरवेदेयमितरत् स्वाज्यमिति शुश्रुमे।

Note how similar this is to the last two verses of the Saundarananda of Aśvaghoṣa quoted above, p. 4.

3. Jacobi (p. 334, ZDMG. vol. 57, 1903) remarks that for adhyakṣyeṇa, ādhyakṣeṇa or adhyakṣeṇa should be read. He translates : "... erscheint das ganze weltliche Treiben ganz deutlich als überwundener Standpunkt." The Bālapriyā takes nyakṣeṇa to mean "entirely" (kārtsnyena), but we do not believe it has that meaning. Surely it means "despised" (Cf. nyakkṛta), literally "looked down upon" from ni and akṣa.

4. See Gītā X. 16 and 41, for this meaning of vibhūti.

vairāgya ; vairāgya is at the base of mokṣa; and mokṣa is a means to attain-

ing the blessed one, as has been principally shown in the Gītā, etc.; and thus

the description of the life of the Pāṇḍavas is indirectly1 a means of attaining

the highest Brahman. By designations such as Vāsudeva, etc., is meant

the highest Brahman, the abode of unlimited power, which is well-known

in the Gītā and other parts (of the Mahābhārata)2 under the name of

Vāsudeva (lit. "as denoted by such words as Vāsudeva — tadabhidhāna-

vatvena),3 the whole of whose essential nature was reflected in the incar-

nation at Mathurā.4 This is proved by the fact that the name Vāsudeva

is qualified (in the quotation from the Mahābhārata given above) by the

adjective " eternal " (which could not qualify an individual ); and ( further)

because this appellation is used of other manifestations of Viṣṇu in the Rāmā-

yaṇa etc.5 This matter has been decided ( nirṇīta ) by the grammarians

themselves.6 And so, through the sentence found in the table of contents,

it is revealed that everything different from the blessed one is ephemeral, and

thereby it is well-established that looking at the Mahābhārata as a śāstra, the

highest goal of man, namely mokṣa, is alone intended as the most important

( of the goals of life ), and looking at it as poetry, śāntarasa, which is charac-

terised by the nourishing of the happiness that succeeds the destruction of

desire,7 is intended as the most important ( of all the rasas ). Because it is

the very essence of the whole work, this meaning has been conveyed through

suggestion, and not directly. For an essential idea, if it is revealed without

directly stating it in so many words,8 carries a far greater beauty. It is

1. Paramparayā obviously goes with the preceding series, and thus the daṇḍa

should be removed and placed after paramparayā.

2. Gītādipraśaṃśeṣu can mean : “ in passages in the Gītā, etc. ”; or “ in places

( of the Mahābhārata ) like the Gītā, etc. ”

3. Read tadabhidhānāvatvena instead of tadabhidhānatvena.

4. Understand aṅgirūpam after māthuraprādurbhāvasaṃkalasvarūpam.

Māthuraprādurbhārdurbhāvas refers to Kṛṣṇa as an incarnation, being only a part

( amśa ) of the highest Brahman. Vāsudeva does not refer to this limited individual

( since qua avatāra he is not eternal ), but to the principle lying behind it. To limit

him to a specific place (Mathurā) obviously shows that this is only a part, not the

amśin or aṅgin, the whole.

5. Both Tripāṭhī (p. 1349 ) and the Dīdhiti ( p. 621 ) quote the following

verse from the Rāmāyaṇa to support Ānanda's statement :

यस्सैव वसुधा कृत्स्ना वासुदेवस्य धीमतः।

महती माधवस्यैव स एवं भगवान् प्रभुः॥

6. See Kāśikā on Pāṇini IV. 1. 114.

7. Trṣṇākṣayasukha is, according to Ānanda (see p. 390, D. Āl. third Uddyota),

the sthāyibhāva of śāntarasa.

8. Svaśabdanivedita is a key concept in Ānanda's system. See above, p. 7-8,

and also Locana, on p. 528 : śabdasprṣṭe 'rthe kā hrdyatā. See also the discussion in

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ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

109

well-known among the assemblies of the cultured and the learned that something which is highly prized should be revealed by suggestion and not in so many words ".

Locana pp. 530-533 :

अत्यन्तग्रहणेन निरपेक्षभावतया विप्रलम्भाश्रयां परिहरति । वृणीनां परस्परक्षयः,

पाण्डुतामुपि महापथिकश्रान्तानुचितां विपत्तिं:, कृष्णस्र्यापि व्याधादिद्वंष इति सत्वस्यापि विरसमेवावसानमिति । मुरुतयतेऽपि । यदपि " धर्मे चार्थे च कामे च मोक्षे च " युक्तं,

तथादि चत्वारश्वकारा एवमाहु:- यदपि धर्मार्थकामानां सर्वेषां तादृश्नारत यदन्यत्र न विद्यते,

तथापि पर्यन्तविरसत्वमात्रेवाsलोक्यताम् । मोक्षे तु यदृपं तस्य सारतात्वं विचार्यतामिति ।

यथायथेति । लोकेष्टन्र्यमाणं यत्नेन संपाद्यमानं धर्मार्थकामत्साधनलक्षणं वस्तुभूततयाsभिमततंपि । येन येनाज्ञरक्षणक्षयोदिना प्रकारण । असारवत्त्वच्चोद्भेदादिवत् ।

विप्रयंति । प्रत्युत विपरीतं संपद्यते । आस्तां तस्य स्वरूपपचितेरेरथः: तेन तेन प्रकारण

अत्र लोकतत्रे । विरागो जायते येनैनं तत्वज्ञानोदयेऽपि निर्वेदं शान्तरसस्थायिनं सूचयता

तस्यैव च संवेदनासारत्वप्रतिपादनेन प्राधान्यमुक्तं

नतु शृङ्गारादिव्यभिचारिमात्रकोटौ तन्न भातीयोहार्द्रताहेतु:, पारमार्थिकेति । भोगाभि-

निवेशिनां लोकवासनाविष्टानामभिलेतडपि रसे तथाभिमानः, यथा च शरीरे प्रमातृताभिमानः

प्रमातुर्योंगायतनमात्रेडपि । केवलेsधिवति । परमेश्वरभाक्तुपकरणेऽपि तु न द्वेष इत्यर्थः ।

विभूतिषु रागिष्णां गुणेषु च निवेशिष्यो मा भूतति संबन्धः । अग्र इति । अतुक्रमण्यनन्तरं

यो भारतग्रन्थः तत्रेत्यर्थः । ननु वासुदेवापयं वासुदेव इत्युच्यते, न परमेश्वरः परमात्मा

महादेव इत्याश्रइयाह — वासुदेवादिसंज्ञाभिधेयतयेनैति ।

बहूनां जन्मान्तरते ज्ञानवान् मां प्रपद्यते ।

वासुदेवः सर्वम्

इत्यादौ अंशिरूपमेतत्संज्ञामिधेयमिति निर्णयात्पर्यम् । निर्णीतत्वेति । शब्दा हि नित्या

एव सतोऽनन्तरं काकतालीयवशात्तथा सङ्केतिता इत्युक्तं — " ऋष्यशृङ्गकृष्णकुब्जेश्व" इत्यत्र ।

Continued from previous page )

the first Uddyota, pp. 78-83 ( Bālapriyā ed. ). Cf. also D. Āl. p. 78; 245; 248. Locana,

p. 525; 528. For a devastating criticism of Udbhata IV. 3, see Kuntaka's Vakrokti-

jīvita, III. 37 ( p. 159, De's ed. ). Contrary to the general view, Ānanda did not hold

that the vyabhicāribhāvas can be directly expressed. See M. V. Patwardhan and J. L.

Masson : "Solution to a Long-confused Issue in the Dhvanyāloka", soon to appear. in B.

S. O. A. S. For a fuller treatment of the issues involved in svasaṃvedanācya,see J. Masson,

" Svaṣabdaniveditatva - Telling, not Conveying ", to appear in J. O. I., Baroda,

110

शान्तरস

शास्त्रनय इति। तत्राखादयोगाभावे पुरुषेणार्थत इत्यमेव व्यपदेशः। साध्रः, चमस्कारयोगे तु रसव्यपदेश इति भावः। एतच्च ग्रन्थकारेण तत्त्वालोके वितत्योक्तमिह तस्य न मुख्योद्वसर इति नाम्नाभिस्तदर्शितम्। सुतरामेवति यदुक्तं तत्र हेतुमाह- प्रसिद्धिरेवेति। चशब्दो यस्मादर्थे। यत इयं लौकि की प्रसिद्धिरनादिष्टो भगवान्वासप्रभृतीनामप्ययमेवास्वादाभिधाने आश्रयः, अन्यथा हि क्रियाकारकसंवन्धादौ 'नारायणं नमस्कृत्य' इत्यादि शब्दार्थनिरूपण च तथाविध एतद् भगवत आश्रय इत्यत्र किं प्रमाणमिति भावः। विदग्धविदग्धमुखेन काव्यनये शास्त्रनये इति चानुसूत्तम्।

1. This is a fundamental distinction that goes back to the NŚ. VI, under verse 50, p. 310 G. O. S. (1st ed.). The point is that in vipralambha there is some hope of being reunited (sāpekṣābhāva), but in karuṇa there is none (nirapekṣa-bhāva). For the actual passage, see above, p. 82.

2. This verse has been omitted from the critical ed. of the M. Bh. One wonders whether Sukthankar had seen it. Will his critical principles permit him to omit from the text a verse vouchesafed by as old an authority as Abhinavagupta ?

3. Remove the daṇḍa after sampādyate on p. 530.

suggests the sthāyi (bhāva) of śāntarasa, i. e. nirveda ( “ world-weariness ” ),

which arises from knowledge of the truth (tattvajñāna).1 And its2 ( namely śānta-

rasa's) supreme importance is suggested ( ukta ) by demonstrating that all the

other goals of human life are insubstantial. Objection : “ In the Mahābhārata,

śṛṅgāra, vīra, etc., are charming as well . ” Anticipating this doubt he says :

PĀRAMĀRTHIKA. Although these other rasas are subsidiary ( aṅgabhūta ),

yet people who are exclusively interested in pleasures and who are overcome

by worldly desires think of them as predominant, just as ( foolish people )

think of this body as the cognising Self, although it is merely an instrument

(āyatana) for the enjoyment ( of pleasures ) by the conscious Self. KEVALESU.

There is no harm ( in fixing one’s thoughts on virtues ) helpful to one’s

devotion to the highest God. The construction is this : don’t have your minds

attached to worldly goods, and exclusively interested ( even ) in worldly

virtues. AGRE. In the text of the Mahābhārata, right after the Anukramaṇi,

Objection : “ Surely Vāsudeva is used in the sense of the son of Vasudeva,

and not in the sense of the highest Lord, the Ātman, the supereme

God.” Anticipating this doubt he says : VĀSUDEVĀDISAMJÑĀBHIDHE-

YATVENA.

“ At the end of many births, the wise man reaches me, ( thinking

that ) Vāsudeva is everything.”3

( In ) this and other ( passages like it ) the final meaning ( tātparya )

( of the word Vāsudeva ) has been established to be the whole ( truth, the

highest Brahman ), which is the content ( abhidheya ) of that designation ( i. e.

Vāsudeva ).

NIRNĪTAŚ CA. In discussing ( the Sūtra of Pāṇini ) : “ ṛṣandhakā-

vṛṣnikurubhyaś ca ”, it has been said that words ( i. e. names of individuals )

are really eternal, but are assigned conventional meanings ( in the form of

particular individuals ) only by accident.4 ŚĀSTRANAYE. The designation

of puruṣārtha ( in general ) is appropriate ( for the subjectmatter of the

1. According to what Abhinava says, tattvajñāna would have to be regard-

ed as a vibhāva ( i. e. an uddīpanavibhāva ) of śānta. This is precisely the opposite

of what he says in the Abhinavabhārati ( p. 106, Raghavan’s text ) : किं च निर्वेदो नाम

सत्त्वानुपोदयेत्प्रलयो वैराग्यलक्षणः, स च तत्त्वज्ञानस्य प्रत्युतोपयोगी,

must be regarded as an uddīpanavibhāva of śānta, with tattvajñāna as the sthāyibhāva.

It is a strange contradiction for which there seems to be no plausible explanation.

2. Tasya would seem to mean śāntarasasya ( which is how the Bālapriyā

takes it ).

3. Gītā, VII. 19. The rest of the verse is :

इति स महात्मा सुदुर्लभः।

4. See Kāśikāvṛtti on Pāṇini, IV. 1. 114.

XVII

112

शान्तरस

Mahābhārata ), in the sense of that which is sought after by men, there being no question of aesthetic pleasure.1 But the designation of rasa ( in general ) is appropriate ( for the subject matter of the Mahābhārata ) from the point of view of aesthetic delight. This is what is meant. This has been dealt with in detail by Ānandavardhana in his book the Tattvāloka.2 Since it is not the main subject here, we have not gone into the problem.

He now explains the reason for saying “ far greater beauty ” PRASIDDHIS CA. The word ca is used in the sense of “ since ”. As this matter is well-known in the world since beginningless time, therefore, in not saying directly ( that mokṣa and rasa are the subjects of supreme importance in the Mahābhārata ) the intention of the revered Vyāsa and others must have been just that ( i.e. they did not use direct words because this is not the practice in assemblies of the wise ). For3 otherwise in regard to the relations of actions and the senses conveyed by the various case-endings, etc., while explaining the meanings of the words in a stanza like “ Paying my homage to Nārāyaṇa etc.” ( the first verse of the Mahābhārata ), what evidence is there to show that Vyāsa had the same intention ( as the one which is in conformity with lokaprasiddhi )? This is what he means. The words “ cultured and learned ” correspond to the method of poetry ( kāvyanaya ) and the method of philosophy ( sāstranaya ) respectively.

1. Understand sati after āsvādayogābhyāse.

2. There are two references to the Tattvāloka of Ānandavardhana in the Locana : this one, and another on p. 67 in the first Uddyota. Unfortunately this work is lost to us. It would have been unique, for nowhere has the relationship between śāstra and kāvya been discussed in Indian philosophy. Obviously Ānanda ( like Abhinava ) with his interest in both fields would have been an ideal person to write about this question. One wonders whether his idea of the Mahābhārata as both a śāstra and a kāvya did not inspire the book and if this was not one of the most important works discussed. Note that here, elsewhere, Ānanda is interested in things that seem to have passed unnoticed before among his fellow Indians. If Abhinava really did comment on the Yogavāsiṣṭha, and if Ānanda is really quoted therein ( see above, p. 29 ), then it is possible that the Yogavāsiṣṭha was inspired by Ānanda's lost Tattvāloka.

3. This line anyathā hi kriyākārakasambandhādan, etc., involves a rather complex point. Here is the what Abhinava means : Vyāsa has made use of countless sentences in the M. Bh. in describing the main events in the story, the various episodes and incidents introduced from time to time, and in discourses on various worldly and philosophical topics. He has also commenced the M. Bh. with the verse nārāyaṇaṁ namaskṛtya, etc., which is a sentence. Now a sentence is nothing but a combination of an action ( kriyā ) with various efficient causal factors or relations ( kārakas ) ( such as kartṛ, karman, karaṇa, etc. ). A sentence is the relation between an action and its various contributory factors (kriyākārakasambandhādan vākye ); and this action and its various causal factors are displayed in a sentence according to well-known and generally accepted

( Continued on next page

Abhinavabhāratī

शान्तरसप्रकरणम् ।

ये पुनर्नव रसा इति पठन्ति, तन्मते शान्तस्वरूपमभिधीयते। तत्र केचिदाहः-शान्तः शमस्थायीभावात्मकः तपस्ययोगिसंप्रकर्षादिभिः विभावैरुपचयते । तस्य कामक्रोध-

भावकपुरनभावैः प्रभिनीयते। हरति चित्तं ध्वान्तमलिप्सरिरिति ॥

एतदपरे न सहन्ते, शमशान्त्योः पर्यायत्वात्, एकार्थप्रतिपादनाद्वाद्वा इति संल्ग्य-त्यागात्। किंच विभावा ऋतुमाल्यादयः तस्मन्नन्तरभाविनि श्रृङ्गारादावनुसन्धीयन्त इति युक्तम्। तपोडध्ययनादयस्तु न शान्तस्य समनन्तरहेतवः। तत्त्वज्ञानस्य अननन्तरहेतव इति चेत् पूर्वोदिततच्चाननडपि तहिं प्रयोज्यतेति तपोडध्ययनादीनां विभावता लयका स्यात्। कामादिभावोडपि नानुभावः, शान्तादिपक्षादव्यतिरेकात्;, अगमकत्वात्, प्रयोगासमग्रायित्याच ; न हि चेष्टालुपुरुषः प्रयोगयोग्यः । खड्गमोक्षादयोडपि हि निःश्वासोच्छ्वासप्तन भूषणादि-मिः चेष्टाभिरेवानुभाव्यन्ते । दृष्टप्रसृतिरपि प्राणाविष्योपरागः कथं शान्ते स्यात् । न चाक्षिचिलकरवमात्रेण तत्त्वज्ञानोपाये व्युत्पाद्यते विनेयाः। नैते परदुःखितमनसो दृश्यन्ते सम्प्रदर्शनसमावस्था प्राप्ताः;, आप्ते तु संसारेः। तन्न शान्तो रस इति ।

अत्रोच्यते---यथा इह तावत् धर्मोदितत्रितयम्, एवं मोक्षोऽपि पुरुवार्थः शास्त्रेषु स्मृतितिहासादिपु च प्राधान्येनोपायतो व्युपायचत इति सुप्रसिद्धम् । यथा च कामादिषु

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rules and conventions of syntax, which are as old as time (i. e. practically beginning-less ). And Vyāsa and other sages (like Vālmīki ) have strictly adhered to these well-known and generally accepted rules of sentence-structure ( or syntax ). In explaining the various syntactical relations in the sentences in the M. Bh. and other works and in explaining the meaning of the stanza nārāyanam namaskṛtya, etc., we take it for granted that in constructing these sentences, Vyāsa has strictly followed the generally accepted principles, and we proceed on this assumption at the time of reading the sentences in the M. Bh. and understanding their sense; and we have the satisfaction of having understood exactly what Vyāsa intended to convey. Thus, if we take it for granted that Vyāsa and others have followed the well-known and generally accepted (lokaprasiddha) laws of sentence-structure (as laid down by grammarians), we must also take it for granted that Vyāsa has also followed the well-known principle, generally accepted in circles of refined critics and scholars (vidagdhavidvatpariṣatsu ), namely that a matter close to the heart (i. e. a matter of primary importance) should be conveyed by suggestion and not by direct expression (and that comparatively unimportant matters should be expressed directly). If Vyāsa and others have followed laukikaprasiddhi in the matter of sentence-structure, then we can safely assume that they must have followed vidagdhavidvatpariṣat-prasiddhi in the matter of conveying abhimatatāravastu (i. e. a pradhānavastu) by suggestion (and an apradhānavastu by direct expression).

समुचिताश्रिततत्त्वतयो रत्यादिशब्दवर्याः: कविनटव्यापारेण आख्यादयोग्यताप्रापणद्वारेण तथाविधहृदयसंवादचत्: सामजिकान् प्रति रसत्वं यथारादितया नीयते, तथा मोक्षाभिधान-

परमपुरुषार्थोचिता चित्तवृत्ति: किमिति रसत्वं नानीयते इति वक्तव्यम्। या चासौ तथाभता चित्तवृत्ति: सैवात्र स्थायिभावः । एतच्च चिन्यं—किनामासौ ? तत्त्वज्ञान-

स्थितो निर्वेद इति केचित् । तथा हि—दारिद्र्यादिप्रभवां यो निर्वेद: ततोऽन्य एव, स्थितो निर्वेद इति केचित् । तथा हि—दारिद्र्यादिप्रभवां यो निर्वेद: ततोऽन्य एव,

हेतोरस्तत्त्वज्ञानस्य वैलक्षण्यात् । स्थायिसंचारिमध्ये चैतदर्थमेव्य पठितः, अन्यथा माझ्ळिकामुनिः तथा न पठेत् । जुगुप्सा च व्यभिचारिवेन शृङ्गारादि निषेधनं मुनिर्भाववान् सर्वेषामेव स्थायिल्वसंचारिवृत्तिचित्तजानुभावत्वानि योग्यतोपनिपतितानि शाब्दार्थविलाक्ष्यतनि अनु-

जानाति । तत्त्वज्ञानजश् निर्वेद: स्थायान्तरोपमर्दक: भाववैचित्र्यसहिष्णुबभ्यो रत्यादिभ्यो

य: परमः स्थायीश्लः; से एव किळ स्थायान्तरणामुपमर्दक: ।

इदंपी पर्यनुयुक्तं-ते तत्त्वज्ञानजो निर्वेदोडस्य स्थायीति वदता तत्त्वज्ञानमेवात्र

उक्तं स्यात्। वैराग्यसर्वीजादिषु कथं विभावत्वम्? तदुपायदिति चेत्‌ कारणकारणड्य

विमावताच्च वहवारः, से चात्रिप्रसङ्गवारः: किच निर्वेदो नाम सर्वत्रानुपादेयताप्रत्ययो वैराग्य-

लक्षणः, स च तत्त्वज्ञानस्य प्रख्युतोपयोगी । विरक्तो हि तथा प्रयतते, यथास्य तत्त्वज्ञान-

मुपपदते; तत्त्वज्ञानादि मोक्षः, न तु तस्माद् ज्ञात्वा निर्वेदो, निर्वेदादेव मोक्ष इति । 'वैराग्याद्

प्रकृतिलय: ' इति हि तत्रभवतः। ननु तत्त्वज्ञानिन: सर्वत्र हृदतरं वैराग्यं दृश्यम् । ततभव-

द्विरपयुक्तम्-'तथ्यं पुरुषव्यतिरेकेणैवैतत्स्यम् ' इति । भवत्प्रियम्; ' तादृशं तु वैराग्यं ज्ञानस्थैव

परा काष्ठा ' इति भुजङ्गविभुनेव भगवताभ्यधायि । ततश् तत्त्वज्ञानमेवेदं तत्त्वज्ञानमाल्य

परिपोष्यमाणमिति न निर्वेद: स्थायी; किंतु तत्त्वज्ञानमेव स्थायी भवेत् । यत्‌ु विभिचारि-

व्याख्यानावसेरे वक्ष्यते तदिरकालविभ्रमप्रलयस्योपादेयत्वनिबन्धनदृष्ट्ये यत्सम्यग्ज्ञानम्, यथा—

दृथा दु:खोण्डनदशन् स्तनभरता गौरिति परं

परिषक्त: पण्‌डो युक्ततिरिति क्षोण्यरहित: ।

कृता वैदूर्यांशा विकचकिरणे काचशकले

मया मूढेन त्वां कृपणमणिगुणे प्रणम्यते ॥

इति तत्निर्वेदस्य खेदरुपस्य विभावत्वेन; एतच्च तत्नैव वक्ष्याम: ।

ननु मिथ्याज्ञानमूळे विषयगण्य: तत्त्वज्ञानाद्, प्रशाम्यतीति दु:खजनमसूत्रेण अक्ष-

पादपादै: भगवद्‌दृा मिथ्याज्ञानापचयकरणं तत्त्वज्ञानं कैराग्यस्य दोपापायलक्षणस्य कारण-

मुक्तम् । ननु तत्‌ किं? ननु वैराग्यं निर्वेद: ? क एवमाह ? निर्वेदो हि शोकप्रवाह-

प्रसररुपश् चित्तदृतिविशेष: । वैराग्यं तु रागादीनां प्रच्‌छस: । भवतु वा वैराग्यमेव निर्वेद: ।

तथापि तस्य स्वकारणवशात् मव्यभाविनोडपि न मोक्षे साध्ये सूत्रस्थानীয়ता प्रत्यपादि आचार्येण। किंच तत्त्वज्ञानोलिथतो निर्वेद इति शमस्यैवेदं निर्वेदनाम कृतं स्वात। शमशान्त्योः पर्यायत्वं तु हासहास्याभ्यां व्याख्यातम्; सिद्धसाध्यतया, लौकिकलौकिकत्वेन, साधारणासाधारणतया च वैलक्षण्ये शमशान्त्योरपि सुलभमेव। तस्मात् निर्वेदः स्थायीरिति।

अन्ये मन्यन्ते रत्यादियैव तु चित्तवृत्तिविशेषा उत्ताः। तै एव कौतूहलादिवृत्तिश्रृङ्गारादिभावाविवेषसंस्र्रया: विचित्रा एव तावत्। ततश्च तन्मध्ये देव अन्यतमोऽत्र स्थायी। तत्र अनाहतानन्दमयस्वामिविषया रतिरेव मोक्षसाधनमिति, सैव शान्ते स्थायिनीति।

यथोक्तम्—

यश्वामरतिरेव स्वात् आत्मामरत्नक मानवः । आत्मन्येव च संतुष्टः तस्य कार्य न विद्यते ॥

इति। एवं समस्तविषयं वैकृतं पश्यत;, विश्वं च शोच्यं विलोकयत;, सांसारिकं च वृत्तान्तं अपकारितयैव पश्यत; सातिशयमसंमोहप्रधानं धैर्यम् आश्रितवत;, सर्वस्मात् विषयसार्थाद् विषयत;, सर्वलोकरुहणीयादपि प्रमादोः जुगुप्समानस्य, अपूर्वस्वाद्मातिशय-छामात् विषयमानस्य मोक्षसिद्धिरिति रतिहासादीनां विस्म्यान्तानाम् अन्यतमस्य स्थायित्वं निरूपणीयम्। न चैतन्मुनेर्नैव सम्प्रतम्। यदेव हि विशिष्टान् भावान् परिणयति रत्यादि-शब्देन चशब्देन च तत्रकारणैनेत्र अन्यान् संगृह्लीति, तावदेव तद्र्वचतिरिक्तालौकिकहेतूपनतानां रत्यादीनामतुजानालायेव अपरमेकिपयत्वम्। एवंवादिनां तु परस्परमेव विशारयताम् एकस्य स्थायित्वं विशीर्यत एव। तदुपायभेदात् तस्य तस्य स्थायित्वमिल्युच्यमानं प्रयुक्तमेव । स्थायिमेदेन प्रतिपुरुषं रसव्याप्यानन्यापत्तेः। मोक्षैकहेतुत्वाद् एको रस इति चेत्, क्षयैक-फलत्वे वीररौद्र्योरप्येकत्वं स्वात्।

अन्ये तु पानकरसदकविमाग्र प्रात्ता: सर्व एव रत्याद्योडत्र स्थायिन इत्याहुः। चित्तवृत्तीनामयुगपद्वावात् अन्योन्यं च विरोधार्थ एतदपि न मनोज्ञम् ।

कस्त्वत्र स्थायी ? उत्ते — इह तत्त्वज्ञानमेव तावन्मोक्षसाधनमिति तस्यैव मोक्षे स्थायिता युक्ता। तत्त्वज्ञानं च नामान्ज्ञानमेवात्र आत्मनश्च व्यतिरिक्तस्य विषयस्यैव ज्ञानम्; परो बोधमात्रे अनात्मैव स्वात्। विप्रकृष्ट चैतदस्मदुरुभिः अस्माभिर्मिश्रान्त्र वितन्यत इति इह नातिनिर्वचच्यः कृतः । तेन आत्मैव ज्ञानानन्दादिविशुद्धधर्मयोगी परिणतिपत्तविषयो-भोगरहितोदत्र स्थायी। न चास्य स्थायितया स्थायित्वं वचनोयम्। रत्यादयो हि तत्का-रणान्तरोदयप्रभयोद्यपममाननिरूप्यम आनृत्त्यः क्वचित् कालं आपेक्षितया स्थायिरूपात्-

मित्तिसंश्रया: सन्त: स्थायिन इति उच्यन्ते। तत्त्वज्ञानं तु सकलभावान्तरभित्तिस्थानीयं सर्वस्थायित्वं स्थायितमं सर्वा रत्यादिका: चित्तवृत्ती: व्यभिचारीभावयन् नि:सर्गत एव सिद्धस्थायिभावमिति तन्न वचनंयम्। अत एव पृथगस्य गणना न युक्ता। न हि खण्ड-मुण्डयोर्मध्ये तृतीयं गोलवमिति गण्यते। तेन एकात्रपदाश्रयद्वारा इत्यव्याहतमेव। अस्यापि कथम् न पृथगणनेति चेत् पृथग् आस्थादयोगादिति ब्रहमे। न हि रत्यादि इतरतासंप्रुक्षेन वपुषा तथाविधमारूपे लौकिकप्रतीतिगोचर: स्वगतमपि अविकलपरूपं व्युत्थानावसरेऽपि-संधीममानं चित्तवृत्त्यनतरकलुषं भावभावति

भासतां वा लोके तथा। तथापि न संशयन्नारस्थायिनां गणनम्, रसेपुतेक्षु अनुपयोगात्; अपि तु व्यभिचारिलिङ्गं लक्षणीयं विज्ञायते, नेतरथ। तथा होकात्रपद्-श्रद्धावैरिति एतत्प्रघट्टकोपपत्ति:। न चास्यास्मभभावस्य व्यभिचारिलिङ्गम्; असंभवात्, अवैचित्र्यावहत्वात्, अनौचित्याच्च। शम आत्मस्भभाव:;; स शमशब्देन मुनिना व्यपदिश:। यदि तु स एव शमशब्देन व्यपदिश्यते, निर्वेदशब्देन च, तन्न कश्चिद्राः। केवलं शमशक्तितत्त्वन्तरं निर्वेदोऽपि दारिद्र्यादिविभावान्तरोस्थितनिर्वेदतुल्यजातीय: स भवति।

तज्जातीय एव हेतुभेदोऽपि तत्त्रचपदर्शय रोतिभयादिरव तादृदृमात्सर्यरूपप्रमात्र तत्त्वज्ञान शम:; तथा च यस्काल्लध्योपरागविशेषा एवात्मनो रत्यादय:, तदृशुमेदोऽपि शुद्धस्मय रूपम् अव्यवधानसमाधिलभूत् अधिगम्य, व्युत्थानेsपि प्रशान्तता भवति। ययोक्तम् ‘प्रशान्तवा-हितासंस्कारात्’ इति। तत्त्वज्ञानलक्षणस्य च स्थायिन: समस्तोऽयं लौकिकालौकिक-चित्तवृत्तिकललापो व्यभिचारितामभ्येति। तदनुभावा एव च यमनियमाद्युपकृता अनुभावा: उपाझामिनयाद्यायतनये च ये शमादिभाविनया वक्ष्यन्ते। अत एते एतद्रिप्रया एव। अयमेव हि शमभाव:। विभावा अपि परमेश्वरादिमहर्षिप्रसृत:;, प्रकाशोनुमुखाश्र रत्यादयोऽत्राश्रया:। केवलं यथा विप्रलम्भे औत्सुक्यम्, संमोगेऽपि वा ‘प्रेमसमापत्तिस्वम्’ इति, यथा च रौद्रे औग्र्यम्, यथा च करुणवीरभयानकादिसंमुतु निर्झेदशृङ्गिताश्रया: व्यभिचा-

रिणोऽपि प्राधान्यान अवभासन्ते, तथा शान्ते जुगुप्साद्या: स्ववेधचव रामप्रतिपक्षत्वात्। तथा हि महात्रे नृकपालादिधारणम्, असुभादिसमुदायादिविस्तारसंक्षेपातिकर्मींकृतिहिं धर्मे (?)। जुगुप्साहेतुत्वेनैव निजाभ्यन्तं च देवरात् पुत्रजन्त्रनि उपदिश। स्वात्मनि च कृतकल्यस्य पर्यायघटनायामेवम् इति उत्साहोत्स्य परोपकारविषयेच्छाप्रयत्नरूपो दयापरपर्यायोऽ्यधिकोऽन्तरङ्क:। अत एव एतद्वयभिचारितालात् केचिद् दयावीरलवेन व्यपदिशान्ति, अन्ये धर्मवीरत्वेन।

ननु साहोदङ्कारप्राणः शान्तस्वहङ्कारौचिल्यप्रमकः । व्यभिचारित्वं हि विरुद्ध-

स्यपि न नोचितम्, रतादिव निवेदादौ। 'शक्या शाङ्कलम्' इत्यादौ हि परोपकार-

करणे भुत्साहस्यैव प्रकार्शी भयते । न तु उत्साहशून्या काचिदव्यवस्था; इच्छाप्रयत्नलव्य-

तिरेकेण पापाणतापच्चेः । यत् एव च परिहृष्यपरावरबेन स्वात्मोदेशनं कर्तव्यांतरं नाव-

शिष्यते । अत् एव शान्तहृदयानां परोपकाराय शरीररसरस्वादिदानं न शान्तविरोधि ।

'आत्मानं गोपसं' इत्यादिना बकृत्कृत्यविषयं शरीररक्षणमुपदिशेत्, संन्यासिनां

तदक्षादिताल्पर्याभावात् । तथा हि-

धर्मार्थकाममोक्षाणां प्राणा: संस्थि तिहेतवः ।

ताविध्नता किं न हन्त रक्षता किं न रक्षितम्॥

इति सुप्रसिद्धचरतुर्गेसाधकत्वमिव देहरक्षाया निदानं दर्शितम् । कृतकृत्यस्य जलेडम्नौ क्षत्रे

वा पतoditi संन्यासिने श्रवणात् । तथ्थायोचितं व्याख्यं शरीरम् । यदि़ परार्थं व्यज्यते

तत्, किमिव न संपादितं भवति ? जीमूतवाहनादीनां न यत्लिमिति चेत्, कि तेन नः ?

तत्त्वज्ञानिनं तावदश्यमास्ति । अन्यथा देहात्ममानेनिनां देह एव सर्वस्वमते धर्मानुदेशन

परार्थे व्यागस्य असंभव्यवात् । युधिष्ठिरो हि न वीरस्य देहत्यागयोभमः, परावजयोधनैव

प्रवृत्तः । श्रुतिपतनादाविप शुच्यतरदेहान्तरसंपादादिप्रेयोधिकं विजृम्भते । तत्, स्वार्थानुदर्शन

परार्थसंप्पचै यबच्चेष्टिं देहत्यागपर्यन्तमुपपेशदानादि तत्त्वदर्शनामतत्त्वज्ञानानामसंभाव्य-

मेवेति । तेडपि तत्त्वज्ञानिनः । ज्ञानिनां सर्वाश्रमेषु मुक्तिरिति स्मृतिषु च । यथोक्तम्-

'देवार्चनरतस्तत्त्वज्ञानिनिष्ठे ति तिथिप्रियः ।

श्राद्धे कृत्वा ददद् द्रव्यं गृहस्थोडपि हि मुख्यते ।'

इति । केवलं परार्थामिसंधिजात् धर्मात् परोपकारामकफललवेनैव अभिसंहितात्, पुनरपि

देहस्य तदुचितस्यैव प्रादुर्भावे बोधिसत्त्वादीनां तत्त्वज्ञानिननामपि ।

दष्टः अद्देश्यपि विश्रान्तिलाभः, खमावौचित्यात्, यथा रामस्य वीराङ्गे पितुराज्ञा

पाल्यत् । एवं श्रु᳀रायरेच्छेपि मन्तव्यम् । अत् एव शान्तस्य स्थायिलेडपि अप्राधान्यम् ।

जीमूतवाहने त्रिवर्गसंपत्तरेव परोपकृतिप्रधानाया: फलत्वात् । अनेनैवाशयेन नाटकलक्षण

वक्ष्यते— 'ऋद्धिविलासादिमिर्गुणः:' इति । अनेन हि ऋद्धिविलासप्रधानमर्थकामोत्तरं सर्वं

चरितं सकलड्येकहृदयसेवादसुंदरप्रयोजनं नाटके निवेशयितव्यमियुक्तम् । एतच्च तत्ैव

वर्णयिष्पामः । अननेनैव चाशये न शान्ते कचन् मुनिना जायंशको विनियोक्यते । तेन

जायंशावनियोगाभावात् तदसत्वमिति प्रयुक्तम् ।

अन्ये तु जीमूतवाहन: 'कस्ते पुत्र त्राता भविष्यति' इति शरणार्थिनीनां वृद्धामेव त्रातवान्। शक्किश्वास्य न काचित्। परहिंसा च न काचिदेयवमादः। तच्चानुमतेमव; न हि बोधिसत्त्वानां पुनः अभ्युत्थानात्मकजीवितमभिसंधानानुपविष्टं शक्तिश्वेदिति। न च काकतालीयदृत्या शस्त्रमुपदिशति। तद् सिद्धं दयालक्षणो हयुस्साहोदत्र प्रधानम्।

अन्ये तु व्यभिचारिणो यथायोगं भवन्तीति। यथोक्तम् 'तद्विदेवे प्रत्ययान्तराणि संस्कारेम्य:' इति। अत एव निश्शेषव्यतिरेकानुभावाभाव इति प्रयुक्तम्। यदा तु पर्यन्तभूमिकालामेउन भावाभाव:, तदास्य अप्रयोग्यत्वम्, रतिशोकादावपि पर्यन्तदशायाम् अप्रयोगस्य युक्तत्वात्॥

हृदयसंवादोदपि तथाविधतच्चज्ञानबीजसंस्कारभावितानां भवलेव; यदृदृश्यति 'मोक्षे चापि विरागिण:' इति। सर्वस्य न सर्वत्र हृदयसंवाद:, भयानके वीरप्रकृतेःरभावात्। ननु तादृशि प्रयोगे वीररस क आस्वाद:; उच्यते — यद्वायं निवृत्ते, तत्रावस्य पुरुषार्थोपयोगिग्नि श्रृङ्गारवीराद्यनतमतमस्स्येव। तचिष्यत्स्वेपामुखाद्: यत्नापि प्रहसनादौ हास्योदे: प्रधानता तत्रानुनिष्पादिरसांन्तरनिष्ठ एवास्वाद:। भिन्नाभिन्नविधिकार्यादोदेश एव रूपकभेदोचिन्तन निमित्तमात्र।

तस्मादस्ति शान्तो रस:। तथा च चिरंतनपुस्तकेऽपि 'स्थायिभावान् रसत्वमुपने-ष्याम:' इत्यनन्तरं शान्तो नाम शमस्थायिभावात्मक इत्यादि शान्तलक्षणं पठ्यते। तत्र सर्वरसां शान्तप्राय एवास्वाद:, विषयेभ्यो विपरीतस्य। तन्मुखयतांलाभ: केवलं वासनान्तरोपहित इति। अत्र सर्वप्रकृतित्वाभिधानाय पूर्वमभिधानम्। लोके च पृथक् पृथक् सामन्यमिति न गणनामिति स्थाय्यरसय पृथक् नोक्त:। सामान्यमपि तु विवेचकेन पृथगेव गणनायमिति विवेककामितसामाजिकस्वादकप्रतीतिविषयतया स पृथग्भूत एव। इतिहासपुराणाभिधानकोशादौ च नव रसा: श्रूयन्ते, श्रीमद्भिदान्तशास्त्रेष्वपि। तथा चोक्तम्—

'अष्टानामिह देवानां श्रृङ्गारादीन प्रदर्शयेत्। मध्ये च देवदेवस्य शान्तं रूपं प्रदर्शयेत्॥

तस्य च वैराग्यसंसारभीरुतादयो विभावा:। स हि तैरुपनिबद्धैरविभायते। मोक्षशास्त्राचिन्ता-दयोडनुभावा:। निर्बन्धमतिस्मृतितत्प्रसादादयो व्यभिचारिण:। अत एव ईश्वरप्रणिधानविषये भक्तिश्रद्धे स्मृतिमतिर्युस्साहानुप्रविष्टेऽन्यथैवाऽऽज्झमिति न तयो: पृथग्रसत्वेन गणनम्। अनत संग्रहकारिकाऽ——

मोक्षाध्याsमनिमित्ततस्तत्त्वज्ञानार्थहेतुसंयुक्तः ।

नि:श्रेयसधर्मयुक्तः शान्तरसो नाम विज्ञेयः ॥

विभावस्यानुभावयोग: क्रमात् विशेषणकथ्येन दर्शितः ।

स्त्रं स्वं निमित्तमादाय शान्तादुपपद्यते रसः ।

पुरुषनिमित्ततापोये तु शान्त एव प्रलीयते ॥

इत्यादिना सततारप्रकृतितन्मुखसहितं ।

यतु डिमे हास्यशृङ्गारपरिहारणं पद्यसर्वं च वक्ष्यते, तत्रायं भावः ।

'दीप्तरसकाव्ययोनी:' इति भाविना लक्षणेन रौद्रप्रधाने तावडिमे तदिरुद्रस्य शान्तस्य संभावनैव

न, किं निषेधेन । शान्तासम्भवे तु दीप्तरसकाव्ययोनीरित्यतेन किं व्यभिच्छेद्यं श्रृङ्गारहास्यवर्जं

पद्यसयुक्त इति बुक्के तत्र प्रसिद्धः । ननु करुणवीभत्ससंभयानकप्राधान्यमन्येन पादेन व्यवच्छेद्यते ।

नैतत्, साच्चव्यरभटीवृत्तिसंपन्न इत्यनेनैव तत्रिरासात् । शान्ते तु साच्चव्येव वृत्तिरिति न

तद्र्यवच्छेदकमेवैतत् । तेन डिमलक्षणं प्रत्युत शान्तरसस्य सद्भावे लिङ्गम् । श्रृङ्गारस्तु

प्रसभसेव्यमानः संभव्य एव । तदृशं च हास्य इति तयोरेव प्रतिषेधः; कृतः, प्राप्तत्वात् ।

सर्वसाम्याच्च विशेषतो वर्णदेवताभिधानमनुचितमयस्य तत्कथितमिति श्रेयम् ।

उपपत्तस्तु शान्तस्यापि दर्शितैव । सत्वभावो हि हास्यस्य (?) ।

विमावेन चास्य वीर-

वीभत्सौ (?) । अत एवं रसस्य यमनियमेश्वप्रणिधानाद्युपदेशः अभिनयोपयोगितया

महाफलत्वं सर्वप्राधान्यमित्यत्रव्यापकत्वं चोपपन्नमिति अभ्यमतप्रसङ्गः ।

तत्त्वस्वादोदस्य कीदृशः? उच्यते — उपरागादिभिः उत्साहल्यादिमिरुपरक्तं

यदात्मस्वरूपं तदेव विरलेभिमततलनान्तरालेन मांसमानसिततरसूत्रवद् यदाहृततत्स्वरूपं

सकलं रत्यादिषु उपरङ्ककु तथाभावेनापि सकृत्स्वभातोदयमात्रेण न्यायेन भासमानं

पराइमुक्तात्मकसकलैःवजलहीनैः परमानन्दलाभसंविदेकत्वेन काल्यप्रयोगप्रबन्धानां साधा-

रणतया निर्भासमानेऽन्तर्मुखावस्थामेदेन लोकोत्तरानन्दनायनं तथाविधहृदयं विधत्त इति ।

एते नैवै रसा:, पृथङ्गोपयोगित्वेन रक्षणाधिकार्येन वा इयतामेव उपदेश्यत्वात् ।

तेन रसान्तरसंमेवेऽपि पार्षदग्रप्रसिद्धया संख्याव्यतिक्रम इति यदन्यैरुक्तं तत्कृतकम् ।

भाव-

व्यये चेतद्रक्ष्यते । आद्रतात्मक: स्नेहो रस इति स्वसृत् ।

स च सर्वो रत्युत्साहादेव पर्यवस्यति ।

तथा हि बालस्य मातापित्रादौ स्नेह: भये विश्रान्त:,

यूथो मित्रजने रतौ, लक्षणोद: भातरि स्नेह: धर्मवीर एव ।

एवं गदस्थायिकस्य लौयरसस्य प्रयास्याने सराणिमन्ततया, हासे वा रतौ वा

अन्यत्र पर्यवसानात । एवं भक्तावपि वाच्यमिति ।

XVIII

120

शान्तरस

Translation :

The nature of śānta will now be explained according to those who follow the reading nava rasāḥ ( nine rasas ), ( instead of the reading aṣṭau rasāḥ ). In this connection some say that śama is the sthayibhāva of śānta and that it arises from vibhāvas such as ascetic practices with Yogins, etc. It can be represented on the stage by anubhāvas such as the absence of lust, anger, etc. Its vyabhicāribhāvas will be firmness, wisdom, etc. Others however do not accept this, because, they say, śama and śānta are synonyms. Nor do they wish to relinquish the figure of 49 bhāvas ( that was given by Bharata ). Moreover, they say that it is proper for the vibhāvas such as the seasons, flowers, etc., to be connected with love, etc., which arise immediately after these ( vibhāvas are apprehended ). But ascetic practices, Vedic recitation, etc., do not immediately give rise to śānta. Should

1. The text used here is that given by Dr. V. Raghavan in the revised edition of " The Number of Rasas ", published in 1967, p. 104 ff. All textual corrections will be found in the notes.

2. The three largest discussions in the Abhinavabhāratī are all in the sixth chapter of the NŚ. ( All of the seventh chapter of the Abhinavabhāratī but the very beginning has been lost, which is a great misfortune, since Abhinava refers to it frequently. It must have been a large and important section of the A. Bh. ). One deals with śṛṅgāra, the other ( ed. and tr. by Gnoli ) is on the arisal of rasa, and this is the third. But Abhinava was to some extent aware that there was something artificial about the śantarasa section, for he says : ye punar nava rasā iti paṭhanti, thereby clearly suggesting that this was a pāṭhāntara, and not an established part of the text. ( Note that on page 83 of the Locana, Abhinava quotes the text of the NŚ that reads : ity aṣṭau nātye rasāḥ smṛtāḥ, which shows that he must have regarded this as a more authoritative text ). He uses this same type of expression when discussing the god of śānta ( buddha ! ) and the colour ( svaccha ). ( See also A.Bh. p. 267 : तेन प्रथमं रसः । तै च नव । शान्तापलापिनस्तस्यादविति तत्र पठन्ति ! This on NŚ. VI 15, which gives the list as follows :

वृत्तिरहस्यकरुणा रौद्रवीरभयानकाः । वीभत्साद्भुतसंज्ञौ चैष्टी नाट्ये रसाः स्मृताः ॥

It is odd that it never occurred to Abhinava to say that the figure 8 only applied to the drama, and that Bharata might have sanctioned the ninth rasa for poetry. But of course Abhinava did not want to compromise even this much. ) Now does Abhinava mean that he too " read " nava rasāḥ ? He must, for otherwise we cannot understand the sentence : tanmate śāntasevārthāpam abhidhīyate. But it is clear that he was not the first to do so. ( Cf. NŚ. on I. 1, the A. Bh., p. 3, where Bhaṭṭanāyaka's view is quoted from the Hṛdayadarpaṇa : इति लोकान्तरपरोपपत्त्यर्थमुख्यननिगिरन्तरसोपकर्षपरोदयं भविप्यति । ) It is, however, doubtful that he had in front of him the text of the NŚ on śantarasa as we have it.

3. The forty-nine bhāvas are : eight sthāyibhāvas, eight sāttvikabhāvas and thirty-three vyabhicāribhāvas. This means that the exact number of vibhāvas ( which are really innumerable ), and of anubhāvas, is not given. Of course Bharata does mention, for each rasa, its anubhāvas as well as its vibhāvas, though he does not separately enumerate them in a Kārikā,

one argue1 that ascetic practices, Vedic recitation, etc., are the immediate causes of the knowledge of the truth, then, since the knowledge of the truth which precedes (śānta) is their ( immediate ) effect, they cease to be the vibhāvas of śānta. Even the absence of lust, etc., cannot be the anubhāva, because it is not conclusive evidence ( of śānta ), inasmuch as it is found to be present in rasas other than śānta as well3, and because it cannot be combined with a stage-representation ( prayoga ). After all, it is not possible to display a cessation of activity. For example, even the anubhāvas sleep, swoon, etc., can be shown by actions like breathing in and out, falling down, lying on the ground, etc. ( As for vyabhicārabhāvas ), how can firmness of mind, etc., which is accompanied by a desire for the attainment of objects,3 be appropriate to Śānta ? Those to be instructed cannot be taught how to attain the knowledge of the truth by means of a state of complete inactivity.4 Those people whose minds are pained by the sufferings of other people have not ( yet ) reached a state of tranquillity characterised by correct perception ( of the highest truth ), but rather they are ( still ) caught in the turmoil of worldly life.5 Therefore śāntarasa does not exist. The reply is

1. Vibhāva can be equated with kāraṇa, the immediate cause that arouse the sthāyibhāva of a rasa. The argument here then is that Vedic recitation, etc., do not immediately precede the sthāyibhāva ( śānta ) of śānta. The Pūrva pakṣin’s point is that if Vedic recitation, etc., are the immediate causes of tattvajñāna, then they cannot also be the vibhāvas of śānta, for they would be at one remove.

2. This line, śintād vipakṣād anyārtheḥ, is difficult. If we take vipakṣa to mean “ opposite ” which is its usual meaning, the passage will make no sense, for then it will be saying that even in the emotion which is the opposite of śānta ( i. e. “ love ” ) there will be kāmatyābhāva, i. e., there will be no “ love ” in “ love ” ! We will have to interpret vipakṣa to mean “ anything different from śānta, ” i. e., any other rasa besides śānta. In other words, there is no kāma, etc., in such rasas as raudra and bhayānaka.

3. Prāptariṣayoparga. Pandit Srinivasa Shastri of the Deccan College, who was kind enough to read over some of the more difficult passages with us, says that here means sambandhaḥ, so that the phrase will mean : यत्र विपयसंबन्धः प्रासो भवति । According to him, since śānta is a state of no mental activity at all, how can there be any contact with viṣayas therein ? But another interpretation is possible : dhrti is defined in the 7th ch. of the NŚ. ( Vol. I, p. 363, VII, 56 ) as arising from, among other things, manorathalābha. These are its vibhāvas ( note that for Bharata the vyabhicāribhāvas can become sthāyibhāvas and have their own vibhāvas, etc., as Abhinava will point out later in this passage ). Its anubhāvas are : तामभिनीयेतु प्राप्तान् विषयानुप-भोगात् etc. Therefore we think it is possible to take uparāgaḥ simply in the sense of upabhogaḥ, “ pleasure,” and interpret as : “ accompanied by a desire for the attainment of sense-objects ”.

4. We interpret akiñcitkaratvamātra here as the complete absence of any action, which is supposed to result from the state of tattvajñāna.

5. The point is that we can only sympathise with another person’s pain if we still identify with the body. For the Jīvanmukta ( i. e. the सम्यग्दर्शनसमास्थाप्राप्तपुरुष—

( Continued on next page

122

as follows :1 Just as in this world there is the trilogy dharma, etc., so also,

it is quite well-known that mokṣa too is one of the goals of life, and it is

found to be taught predominantly in the śāstras and in the smṛtis and itihāsas,

etc., by specifying the means leading to its attainment. Just as the states of

mind that are proper to love, etc. and expressed by such words as sexual love

( rati ) etc., by being made capable of being relished through the activity of

the poet and the actor, are brought to the status of rasas such as śṛṅgāra,

etc., in relation to the spectators who are possessed of the proper sympa-

thetic response ; in the same way, we ask you to tell us why the state of mind

which is appropriate to the highest goal of man known as mokṣa cannot be

Continued from previous page )

—note how this phrase samyagdarśana is often used in Buddhism in many

variations

samyagbodhi, etc.), such identifications are not possible. The main character of

śānta dramas is supposed to be paramakāruṇikatva. The Pūrvapakṣin objects that this

kind of sympathy is found in worldly life and not in transcendental mystic states.

1. We take atrocyate as Abhinava's own position. He is of course quite

right in pointing out that mokṣa was already a well-known puruṣārtha long before

the NŚ. But that mokṣa should be prevalent in the smṛtis and itihāsa does not, ipso

facto, establish any connection of it with literature. We must remember that for

people like Abhinavagupta, the smṛtis and itihāsas were not literature in the strict

sense of the word. Nobody, of course, would have argued that śānta in the sense of

mokṣapuruşārtha does not occur in such works. The point was whether it could occur

in the far more refined Nāṭakas and Kāvyas. It simply never occurred to these older

writers that one can apply the term literature to many of these works, as well

as to a large number of purely religious works, e. g. the Mahāparinibbānasutta in

Pāli, and several of the Sanskrit Mahāyāna Sūtras, e. g., the Vajracchedikā, or the

Vimalakīrtinirdeśa ( not available in Sanskrit, but recently so beautifully translated

into French by Professor Ét. Lamotte ). Even the Gītā, in spite of the fact that

Ānandavardhana ( p. 293 ) quotes the verse yā niśī sarvabhūtānām, etc., as an example

of dhvani, was not really considered "literature" in the strict, and restricted, sense

of the term that the Indians used it. This restriction was a great loss to the theory;

for dhvani would have been more faithfully served, in illustrations, by passages from

many of these religious or secular texts ( e. g. the Brhatkathāślokasaṅgraha ) than by

the Nāṭakas and the Kāvyas, many of which were artificially composed to conform to a

given rasa and its definition by Bharata. One has only to think of some of the literary

passages in the Upaniṣads ( e. g. Satyakāma Jābāla, or Raikva with the Cart ) to

realise how much the Indians lost by such a restriction. If later writers like Jagan-

nātha Panditarāja widened the definition of Kāvya ( remanīyārthapratipādakah śabdah

kāvyam ) it still does not mean that they went for their examples to this non-literary

literature. Viśvanātha comes closest when he says : vākyam rasātmakam kāvyam,

but even he never uses the vast literature that true obedience to such a phrase would

make available. It was only the Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism that opened itself to the

influence of religious literature, but its purpose was more religious than it was

aesthetic, and was confined, for the most part, to such works as the Bhāgavatapurāṇa.

( One thinks of some of the fine examples that Madhusūdana Sarasvati, a strict

Advaitin, chose from the Bhāgavatapurāṇa in his Bhagavadbhaktirasāyanam ).

raised to the status of a rasa ?1 That state of mind just described is indeed the sthāyibhāva of śānta. But one must consider what its name is. Some say that it is complete detachment ( nirveda—world-weariness )2 that is born from a knowledge of truth. For this detachment is quite different from the detachment that arises from poverty, etc., because its cause, viz. knowledge of the truth, is different. It was for this very reason ( i. e. because nirveda is the sthāyibhāva of śānta ) that it has been mentioned ( by Bharata ) midway between the sthayibhāvas and the sañcāribhāvas ( i. e. vyabhicāribhāvas ).3

1. There seems to us no doubt in reading through the objections made against śantarasa that the objectors had a real point. There is something about ŚR that forces it apart from all the other rasas. It is true, as the Pūrvapakṣin argues, that we find that all people are open to love, to fear, to terror etc. ( some more than others, and some only to certain emotions of course — as Abhinava points out in his commentary on the famous rasasūtra of the NŚ, we have, in the course of our many lives, experienced all of the primary emotions, the sthāyibhāvas ). But śānta is peculiar. Truly to be able to enjoy it, one must be religious ( at least this was the Indian view - today we are more sophisticated : it is perfectly possible to be moved by a religious spectacle without feeling primary “religious sentiments ”), and if the śantarasa experience truly takes place during a drama, it must change our lives. It is not like the other rasas, which simply enrich us, refine our sensibilities, in short do all the things that great literary experiences are supposed to do. It is not that it demands a suspension of judgment as do the other rasas, a momentary identification with different emotions. It means a complete reversal of our personality, what the Buddhists call parāvrtti ( see the controversial article on this word by A. Coomaraswamy, “ Transformation, Regeneration, Anagogy ”, in Festschrift Ernst Wintemitz, 1933 ). We believe that it was this difference, this sense of the “ completely other ” in ŚR that bothered so many literary critics in ancient India. While one sympathises with their hesitation, one can also understand the point of view of people like Abhinava, for whom these religious experiences were an integral part of their everyday life and especially of their literary life. Witness the great number of hymns attributed to people like Saṅkara, and the surviving ones of Abhinava and Ānanda. The conflict, the real conflict, which we see as one between the secular-minded literary critic and the religious-minded literary critic, never really came out into the open, except in this one argument over ŚR, for it was assumed, by all, that nearly everybody was religious. From our perspective, however, it is clear that some critics were more religious than others.

2. Nirveda can mean two things : it can have an ordinary, everyday sense of “ disgust ”, and it can have the more subtle and religious sense of “ total detachment ” from the world. Abhinava is here implicilty referring to this distinction.

3. This is a very curious, and we believe, a very weak argument : Bharata has begun his list of the vyabhicāribhāvas ( VII. 28, p. 356 ) with nirveda at the top ( tatra nirvedo nāma dāridryavyādhi, etc. ). Now, it is said by “ some people ” as reported by Abhinava, that Bharata had great respect for the idea of the maṅgala, that is, beginning a new topic with an auspicious word. Nirveda is not an auspicious word, therefore, Bharata ( since he cannot be presumed to be in error ), must have had some special intention in mind. According to these “ some people ” it is to show that nirveda is actually a sthyāyibhāva and also a vyabhicāribhāva. The view regarding the dual character of nirveda as both sthāyibhāva and vyabhicāribhāva is expressed by Mammata in the KP, IV ( p. 116, Jhalkikar's ed. BORI — see his comments, p. 116, last paragraph ).

124

शान्तरस

Otherwise ( i. e. if nirveda had not been intended by Bharata as the sthāyi-bhāva of śānta ), the sage who had great regard for uttering an auspicious word at the commencement of a section of his work ( māngalika ) would not have mentioned nirveda at that place ( i. e. he would not have put the inauspicious word nirveda at the head of the list of vyabhicāribhāvas ). When Bharata forbade the use of disgust ( jugupsā ) as a vyabhicāribhāva of śṛṅgāra, he sanctioned ( by implication )1 the interchangability of the characters of the sthāyibhāvas, the sañcāribhāvas, the sāttvikabhāvas, and the anubhāvas, in the case of all the 49 bhāvas as demanded by the requirements of a particular situation and as presented by the power of words and their senses.

Nirveda arises from knowledge of the truth and overwhelms the other sthāyins. For only that ( emotion ) which is more highly stable than any of the other sthāyins such as love etc. which can tolerate co-existence with a variety of emotions,2 that alone ( namely nirveda ), they say, can overwhelm other sthāyins.

They also raise the following objection : if nirveda which arises from knowledge of the truth, is said to be the sthāyibhāva of śānta, [ this amounts to saying that knowledge of the truth is the vibhāva ( i. e. cause ) of nirveda ], in which case how could vairāgya ( detachment ) and similar other things3 ( e. g. samādhi, which have been mentioned as vibhāvas of nirveda ) be the vibhāva of nirveda ? If one were to claim that detachment, etc., become the vibhāva of nirveda because they are the means of attaining to the knowledge of the truth, then it would mean that you are giving the name vibhāva to that which is the cause of another cause,4 and that would involve you in a great absurdity ( since vibhāva means the direct cause of a sthāyibhāva and not the distant or remote cause ). Moreover nirveda is an attitude of rejecting everything ( i. e. an attitude of not being attached to anything ), and it

1. The point is that normally jugupsā is the sthāyibhāva of bibhatsa, It is not given in the list of the thirty-three vyabhicāribhāvas, but the very fact that Bharata says that it should not be used in love shows that he felt that it could be a vyabhicāri-bhāva as well as a sthāyibhāva. He therefore, felt that under certain circumstances, ordinary vyabhicāribhāvas could become sthāyibhāvas, and sthāyibhāvas could become vyabhicāribhāvas. This is an important point. Abhinava has expressed a similar view in the Locana on the third Uddyota of the Dhvanyāloka, while commenting on bahūnām samavetānām, on p. 386 of the B. P. ed.

2. Bhāvaicitryasahisṇubhyah, " which can tolerate co-existence with a variety of emotions ". Does this mean that whereas rati, etc., can tolerate the presence of other sthāyibhāvas, nirveda the sthāyibhāva of śānta cannot ?

3. We take sabīja to mean sadrśa, just as sajātīya is taken to mean sadrśa.

Literally it means " coming from the same seed ", i. e. the same source. The word ādi in the compound vairāgyasabījādiṣu ( i. e. vairāgyasadrśeṣu ) is redundant. We have, therefore, ignored it in the translation.

4. Again, vibhāva cannot mean both " cause " and " cause of the cause ". See page 121, note 1.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

125

would on the contrary be helpful to the emergence of the knowledge of

the truth ( i. e. far from being the effect of the knowledge of the truth,

it would be a cause leading to it ), because a detached person will strive

in such a fashion that the knowledge of the truth arises in him. And mokṣa

comes from a knowledge of the truth. It is not that one knows the truth,

and then feels detached, and from that detachment mokṣa would arise. For

Īśvarakṛṣṇa says :

" From detachment comes ( only ) prakṛtilaya, ( i. e. dissolution into

the eight causes, pradhāna, buddhi, ahaṅkāra, and the pañcatanmātras, and

not mokṣa )."1 Objection : " Everywhere one sees a very great detachment

on the part of those who know the truth. Even Patañjali has said :

" Thereafter from that knowledge of the truth ( puruṣakhyāti ) arises

an extreme aversion to the guṇas ( i. e. detachment )".2 That is true ( bhavati

evam ). But Patañjali himself3 has said : " Such detachment is really the

highest state ( kāṣṭhā ) of knowledge." Thus4 then, knowledge of the truth

( leading to aversion according to Yogasūtra I. 16 ) means nothing but know-

ledge of the truth reinforcing itself from state to stage.5 And so nirveda is

not the sthāyibhāva of śānta. On the other hand, knowledge of the truth alone

would be the sthāyibhāva. As for right perception, which will be mentioned

( by Bharata ) while describing nirveda as a vyabhicārabhāva, as a vibhāva of

1. Sāṅkhyakārikā 45. This means that if a person has vairāgya only, but no

knowledge of the truth, he becomes, on his death, dissolved into the eight causes

( namely, pradhāna, buddhi, ahaṅkāra and the pañca-tanmātras ) but he does not

obtain mokṣa. Thus, it would seem that Īśvarakṛṣṇa holds the view that vairāgya

does not directly lead to mokṣa.

2. Yogasūtra, I. 16.

3. Vyāsa's Bhāṣya on the Yogasūtra, ( Ānandāśrama ed. p. 20 ). Patañjali,

the author of the Mahābhāṣya, is considered to be an incarnation of Śeṣa ( bhujangga-

vibhu ). Therefore it would seem that Abhinava thought Patañjali the author of the

Yogasūtras to be identical with the Patañjali of the Mahābhāṣya ( which of

course he is not ). Raghavan has pointed out ( p. 106 ) that the quotation is not

from Patañjali, but from Vyāsa. Did Abhinava simply make an error in the

ascription, or did he believe that Vyāsa and Patañjali were one and the same ? See

V. Raghavan, " Abhinavagupta and the Bhāṣya on the Yogasūtra "; A. O. R. Madras,

Vol. XII, Part II, 1938-39.

4. This passage : kī tu tatvajñānameva sthāyī bhavet is Abhinava's own position.

Bhavet here must be used ( according to Pāṇini III. 3. 161 ) in the sense of bhavitum

arhati.

5. Tattvajñānamālā means a series or succession of tattvajñānas. The idea

seems to be that the tattvajñāna referred to by the word puruṣakhyāti in Yogasūtra

I. 16 is a lower tattvajñāna which grows or develops into a higher stage of tattvajñāna

( referred to by the word gunavairāgyam in the Yogasūtra ). Idam tattvajñānam there-

fore would mean : गुनवैराग्याद्वाच्येन तत्वज्ञानम् । तत्ज्ञानमालया परिपोष्यमाणं, उत्तरोत्तरं प्रकर्षाप्रस्थं नीयमानत्वात् ।

nirveda, and which leads to the dissipation of the attitude of acceptance ( or attachment to unworthy objects ) on the part of a person who has been deceived by a delusion of long standing, as exemplified in the following stanza :

" In vain did I milk a bull mistaking it for a cow bending under the burden of her full udder; in vain 1 did I embrace an ugly eunuch thinking him to be a young girl; in vain did I cherish a longing for a piece of glittering glass thinking it to be beryl. All this I did when bemused as I was, I bowed to you, a miser unable to appreciate merit "—

well, that perception of truth has been mentioned as a vibhāva ( cause) of only the ordinary kind of nirveda 2 whose nature is sadness ( arising from a realisation of one's stupidity in wasting energy in a worthless cause ). 3 We will speak of this ( perception of truth ) there 4 ( i. e. in the seventh chapter whilst commenting on the section on nirveda ). Objection : " Attach ment to the sense-objects is rooted in false knowledge. It will cease when knowledge of the truth arises. 5 This is what the revered Akṣapāda has

1. The second comparison in this poor verse ( it is interesting that it is the only verse quoted by Abhinava in the whole Śantarasa section. It is strange that he should have chosen to give no effective examples of śāntarasa, considering that there was such a large variety to choose from, and it would have been very much to the point ) is somewhat odd, for if the " boy " was lāvanvarahitah, we can only assume that he was embraced due to inadequate lighting !

2. Samyagjñāna, therefore, means here only a worldly kind of " right knowledge " and is not used in the higher sense of the term.

3. This is a reference to NŚ VII, 28, pp. 356-357. Abhinava's point seems to be that nirveda as a vyabhicāribhāva is the ordinary kind of worldly nirveda (khedaru panirveda), while nirveda as a sthāyibhāva is a higher, philosophical nirveda. It is, however, interesting to note that among the vibhāvas of nirveda, Bharata mentions tattvajñāna. At NŚ VII, 30 ( G. O. S. Vol. I. p. 357 ) Bharata says :

योगीव ध्यानपरो भवति हि निर्वेदवान् पुरुषः ॥

The idea here seems to be that nirveda is to be acted out by means of, among other things, absorption in thought ( dhyānaparata ) similar to that of a Yogin. However, it does not follow that Bharata had any religious notion about nirveda while writing this stanza, although it is true that the term tattvajñāna will then be puzzling.

4. The promised discussion is not available. Unfortunately this section of the seventh chapter of the Abhinavabhārati has never been found. The editor ( Kavi) writes ( p. 347 ) :

एतस्मादप्रसृतिं नवमाध्यायपर्यन्तं व्याख्या नोपलब्धा । यदि लघुभागस्य ग्रन्थान्तं मुद्रणावस्थाया- मन्वर्हि प्रयतमानानामनस्माकं भूदितो व्यास्याभागो नोपलभ्येत तदा महामहत्यसदृविच्छेदेऽमू लपरिहरणाय सुकुमारजनमनःपरिबोधनाय चास्माभिरेव रचितां व्याख्यां सर्वथानुचिततमप्यसिद्धौ ग्रन्थान्ते योजयिष्यामः।

However, Kavi did not live to fulfill his promise.

5. This is a reference to Nyāyasūtra, I. I. 2 : दु खजन्त्रप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानाम्‌

मुक्तरोत्तरापादे तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः । The upshot of the preceding argument based on the ( Continued on next page

said in his Sūtra beginning with the words duḥkhajanma etc., when he says

that knowledge of the truth is caused by the removal of false knowledge and

that it is further the cause of vairāgya which is of the nature

of all faults ( doṣa ) ( such as attachment to worldly pleasures ). “So

what ?” “ Well, vairāgya and nirveda are the same thing1 ( and therefore,

nirveda is the sthāyin and tattvajñāna is a vibhāva ).” Who says so ? For nirveda

is a certain state of mind which is characterised by a flow of sadness, where-

as vairāgya is the complete destruction of rāga, etc. ( including śoka, i. e.

vairāgya is a higher form of detachment than is nirveda, for the latter is

often used non-technically to mean simply “weariness” or “disgust” ). Even

granting that vairāgya and nirveda are indentical, still Gautama placed it in

the midst of several ( other causes of mokṣa ) and did not mention it as the

immediate cause of mokṣa ( for it is only the remote cause ), ( and so it does

not follow that according to Akṣapāda nirveda, that is, vairāgya, is the

sthāyibhāva of śānta ). Moreover2 to say that nirveda arising from tattva-

Continued from previous page

sūtra of Akṣapāda is that mithyājñānāpacaya leads to tattvajñāna and tattvajñāna leads

to vairāgya. The opponent thinks that vairāgya is the same thing as nirveda. Hence

according to Akṣapāda the causal chain is : mithyājñānāpacaya gives rise to tattva-

jñāna which gives rise to nirveda. So, this means that according to Akṣapāda, nirveda

leads to mokṣa and hence, nirveda ( and not tattvajñāna ) must be regarded as the sthāyi-

bhāva of śānta. Now, the opponent challenges the position that vairāgya and nirveda

are identical, and then proceeds to point out the difference between nirveda and

vairāgya. He says that nirveda is a particular attitude of mind which is of the nature

of unbroken sadness ( śkapravarāprasara ), while vairāgya is the destruction of rāga,

dveṣa, moha, etc. The opponent of kecinmata ( this refers to the view mentioned on

p. 105 of Raghavan's text, that nirveda born of tattvajñāna is the sthāyibhāva of śānta,

see foot-note 2, p. 123, above) first challenges the position that vairāgya and nirveda are

identical. But then he concedes it for the sake of argument in the sentence bhāvatu

vā vairāgyam eva nirvedah. Even granting that nirveda and vairāgya are identical,

it does not follow that according to Akṣapāda nirveda ( i. e. vairāgya ) is the sthāyi-

bhāva of śānta. For although nirveda has a place in the causal sequence given above

[ the whole chain is : mithyājñānāpacaya ) ( i. e. tattvajñāna leads to doṣāpāya ( i. e.

nirveda or vairāgya ), which leads to pravrttyapāya, which leads to janmāpāya, which

leads to duḥkhāpāya, which leads to mokṣa ], still it is not actually stated in the Sūtra

to be the direct cause leading to mokṣa, but rather it is given as a remote cause

( mokṣe sādhye sūtrakathitiyatva na pratyapādi ācāryeṇa ). Thus according to the

opponent of kecinmata, the authority of Akṣapāda cannot be cited in support of the

view that nirveda is the sthāyibhāva of śānta. For if at all anything is to be the

sthāyibhāva of śānta, it must be the direct and immediate cause of mokṣa.

1. The question mark in Raghavan's text after nanu vairāgyam nirvedah

should be removed.

2. This is a complex passage. Kimca tattvajñānotthito etc. is the position of

the Siddhāntin, that is, of Abhinava. It is an objection against the kecinmata ( namely

that tattvajñānajanirniveda is the sthāyibhāva of śānta ). The essence of the

objection seems to be that the words denoting the sthāyibhāva and the rasa become

( Continued on next page

XIX

128

jñāna is the sthāyibhāva of śānta means that you are giving to śama the name nirveda1. (Reply : ) śama and śānta have been explained as synonyms like hāsa and hāsya ( i. e. sthāyibhāva and rasa ). ( But the synonymity in the case of śānta and śama is only apparent and not real ). There is a real difference between śānta ( the rasa ) and śama ( the sthāyibhāva ), for śama is siddha, an accomplished fact, while śānta is sādhya, something to be accomplished; śama is laukika, worldly, while śānta is alaukika, other-worldly; śama is sādhāraṇa, ordinary, while śānta is asādhāraṇa, extraordinary.2 Therefore, nirveda cannot be the sthāyibhāva of śānta.

Others believe that only eight mental states have been mentioned ( by Bharata ), such as love, etc. Those same3 mental states when depending on extraworldly vibhāvas such as śruta ( study of the scriptures and especially of the Upaniṣads ), which are different from the ordinary ( kathita ) vibhāvas, become indeed unusually lovely ( vicitra ). And from out of their midst one can become the sthāyin here ( i. e. in the case of śantarasa ). Out of them ( tatra ), rati alone, having for its object one’s own Self consisting of undisturbed bliss, is the means of attaining mokṣa. And so, that rati itself is the sthāyin in śānta. For it has been said :

Continued from previous page

synonymous, which is improper. The next sentence continues the view of the Siddhāntin : शमशान्तयोः पर्य्यायत्वं तु हासहास्याभ्यां ब्याख्यातम् । and contains within it the objection that the Pūrvapakṣin might make, namely that hāsa and hāsya are synonymous as well. Abhinava replies that this has already been explained. But now what follows does not make sense if it is explained as the view of the Siddhāntin, For Abhinava says : सिद्धसाध्यत्वे, लौकिकालौकिकत्वेन, साधारणासाधारणत्वा च वैलक्षण्यं शम-ज्ञान्त्योरपि सुलभमेव । Now these distinctions are well-known as being the major distinctions between the sthāyibhāva and rasa. The sthāyibhāva is always laukika, whereas rasa is always alaukika. The same thing would therefore apply to śama and śānta, namely one would be the laukikasthāyibhāva, and the other the alaukika-rasa. Now why does Abhinava say this ; for it only lends support to the Pūrvapakṣin ? Moreover tasmān na nirvedah sthāyīti does not follow from it. On the other hand, if we take the words śamaśāntoyoḥ, etc., as stating the view of the Pūrvapakṣin, the next sentence tasmān na nirvedah sthāyīti presents a real difficulty. For if the Pūrvapakṣin is speaking, and has just made a valid point, it makes no sense for the Siddhāntin to reply by saying : “ therefore our position is proved ”. Thus both solutions are unsatisfactory.

1. Note that on p. 268, Vol. III, NŚ, nirveda is given as the sthāyin of śānta !

2. We cannot ascertain any difference between laukika and alaukika on the one hand, and sādhāraṇa and asādhāraṇa on the other, such that Abhinava would be justified in using both terms. Surely sādhāraṇa and alaukika mean precisely the same thing.

3. Raghavan reads tata eva. But the Baroda ed. has ta eva ( i. e. te eva ) which seems to us a better reading.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

129

" That man whose love is centered in the Self, who is gratified in his Self, and who takes all delight in the Self - for such a man there is nothing any longer to be accomplished ".1

In the same way,2 any of the sthāyibhāvas beginning with rati and hāsa and ending with vismaya can be explained as the sthāyibhāva of śānta, because we find that a person attains to liberation if he realises the oddity of everything in the world ( hāsa ); if he sees that the whole world is lamentable ( śoka ); if he perceives the happenings in the world as harmful to his spiritual well-being ( and, angry with them, desires to conquer them ) ( kroda ); if he resorts to extraordinary energy dominated by the absence of delusion3 ( in order to overcome worldly temptations ) ( utsāha ); if he feels afraid of all the objects of the senses ( bhaya ); if he feels disgust for young women, etc., though they are desirable for all other people ( jugupsā ); if he feels astonished at his unprecedented realisation of his own self ( vismaya ). And Bharata agrees with this position. For while ( Bharata ) enumerates particular bhāvas by using words like rati, etc., and includes thereunder other varieties of the same by using the word ca,4 he does admit5 their ability to lead to liberation, provided that they are the result of extraordinary causes ( i. e. vibhāvas ) different from ordinary causes. But in the case of those people who hold this view ( namely that any one of the sthāyibhāvas such as rati, etc., can be the sthāyibhāva of Śānta ), the different sthāyibhāvas would cancel each other out and so not even one of them could be regarded as the sthāyibhāva of śānta. If it is said that the different sthāyibhāvas can be the sthāyibhāvas of śānta because of the different approaches leading to it, that is ( as good as ) already refuted. ( Further ), because of the different sthāyibhāvas of śānta depending on the approaches of the persons concerned, there would be an infinity of śāntarasas.

1. Gītā, III, 17.

2. All eight of the sthāyibhāvas can be accepted as the sthāyibhāva of śānta. For instance, hāsa can become the sthāyibhāva of śānta, if we look at everything around us as vaikalya, "odd " or "deformed" ( note that the Vidūṣaka, the main representative of hāsa, is described in the texts as being deformed and there-by amusing ), etc. Rati is considered in the sentence immediately preceding the quotation from the Gītā.

3. Asammohā is one of the uddīpanavibhāvas of vīrarasa. See NŚ., Vol. I. p. 378. Cf. Abhinava's explanation of Ānanda's mañgalāśloka of the Dhvanyāloka, p. 17, K. Sastri's ed.

4. Ca refer to NŚ., VI. 17, which enumerates the eight sthāyibhāvas and uses a ca after hāsa and śoka. According to Abhinava, the use of the particle ca is intended to convey the inclusion of other varieties of the eight sthāyibhāvas. It is not however clear what these varieties are.

5. Does etad ( in na caitan muner na sammatam ) refer to the interchangeability of vyabhicāribhāvas and sthāyibhāvas; or to the fact that the sthāyibhāvas of other rasas can induce an attitude leading to mokṣa ?

that there would be only one1 śantarasa ( and not countless śantarasas ) be-

cause of its being the cause of one single result, namely mokṣa, then even

vīra and raudra would have to be regarded as one rasa because both lead to

one single result, namely destruction ( of one's enemy ). Others say that all

the sthāyibhāvas, rati, etc., become merged together, just as ( different flavours

merge together ) in a beverage,2 and when so merged they become the

sthāyibhāvas ( of śānta ). But because different states of mind cannot co-

exist at one time, and because ( some ) are mutually antagonistic, even this is

not a very attractive thesis.

What then is the sthāyibhāva of śānta ? The reply is as follows :3

knowledge of the truth alone is the means of attaining mokṣa and so it would

be proper to regard that alone as the sthāyibhāva of mokṣa.4 Knowledge

of the truth is just another name for knowledge of the Self. The knowledge

of any object other than the Self is the knowledge of worldly objects.5 For

anything that is different from the Self is nothing but non-self. Our teacher

has dealt with this at great length. And we have gone into it in some detail

elsewhere, and so at this moment there is no point in dilating. Therefore,6

1. Eko rasah means śantarasa since the whole of the preceding discussion

is concerned with śāntarasa and is intended to show how all the sthāyibhāvas can be

connected with śāntarasa. To this it was replied, on p. 108, that (1) the different

sthāyibhāvas would cancel one another out, with the result that there would be not a

single sthāyibhāva for śānta, and (2) such a view would lead to not one rasa (called

śāntarasa ) but to an infinite number of śantarasas depending on the divergent atti-

tudes and approaches of different persons. The opponent replies to this by saying that

since all these sthāyibhāvas ( helping the emergence of śāntarasa ) would lead finally

to mokṣa, there would not be an infinity of śantarasas, but only one. To this the reply

is given on p. 109 : “ In that case since both vīra and raudra lead to a single result,

namely destruction of one's enemy, they too would have to be regarded as constituting

a single rasa ”. But we are not absolutely certain of this interpretation.

2. The comparison with pānakarasa is used again and again, both in the

Locana and in the Abhinavabhārati. Cf. A.Bh. p. 286 : पानकरसादौपि किं गुडमरिचादिपु

दृष्ट इति समानेतत्। See also the N.S. Vol. I, p. 287 ff.

3. After ucyate begins the siddhānta view.

4. The word mokṣa in the phrase : इति तस्माद् मोक्षे स्थायिता युक्ता is odd. One

expects śānta.

5. आत्मनः व्यतिरिक्तस्य विषयस्यैव ज्ञानम् is very clumsily worded. We think the

distinction is between knowledge of the Self and ordinary knowledge ( cf. the Gītā

distinction between vijñāna and jñāna ). Whatever knowledge is different from the

Self is simply worldly knowledge, jñānam. The next sentence, paro hy enam ātmā

anātmaina syāt is also very clumsy. How are we to understand paro ? We would

expect the noun governed by this adverb to be in the ablative : “ different from the

Self ”. Raghavan records the reading ātmana, instrumental singular, which would

also be irregular, but somewhat better than the nominative. Note that we read visaya-

syaiva instead of visayasyeva.

6. It is important to realise that at this point Abhinava abandons practical

considerations of drama, and gives the philosophic base underlying his views on śānta.

It is not different from the philosophical justification of an Advaitin — the additions

from his school of Kashmir Saivism are very slight.

the Ātman alone possessed of such pure qualities as knowledge, bliss, etc.,

and devoid of the enjoyment of imagined sense-objects, is the sthāyibhāva of

śānta. Its status as a sthāyibhāva should not be explained in the same terms

as the status, as a sthāyibhāva, in the case of other sthāyibhāvas ( i. e. there is

a great difference between the Atman's status as a sthāyibhāva and the other

sthāyibhāvas' status as sthāyibhāvas ). For rati, etc., which arise and dis-

appear due to the emergence and disappearance of their respective causes, are

called sthāyibhāvas in so far as they attach themselves for some time to the

canvas1 ( wall ) in the form of the ātman which is of an unchanging nature

relative to them. But knowledge of the truth is the canvas behind all emotions,

and so it is the most stable of all the sthāyibhāvas. It transforms all the

states of mind such as love, etc., into transitory feelings, and its status as a

sthāyibhāva, having been established by its very nature, need not be specifi-

cally mentioned. And therefore it is not proper to count ( knowledge of the

truth ) separately ( in addition to the eight sthāyibhāvas ). Between a lame

bull and a dehorned bull,3 bullness ( which is the generic property present in

both of the bulls ) is not considered as a third thing. And so the number, viz.

forty-nine, of the bhāvas is not disturbed. Should one demand to know why

then knowledge of the truth is separately considered ( as a sthāyibhāva )

( by me, Abhinavagupta ), we reply that it is so because it can be separately

enjoyed.3 For whereas rati, etc., can be the subject of ordinary perception

( in their pure form ), without being mingled with anything else, the nature

of the Self is ( of course ) not the subject of ordinary perception in its pure

form without being mingled with anything else, the way rati etc., are. ( But )

even though in its pure nature4 it is of an indeterminate form, still when

it is investigated at the time of the return from abstract meditation,5 it in-

variably appears as mingled with various mental states.

Or6 let it appear like that ( i. e. let the nature of the Self appear as

you say, soiled by the various mental states ). Still you cannot consider as

1. Is this comparison of the Ātman to the canvas of the painter found else-

where ? We know that it occurs several times in the Yogavāsiṣṭhamahārāmāyana.

2. Munda cannot of course mean shaven here. The practice is to cut the horns

of bulls so that they cannot harm anyone.

3. The reading as printed by Raghavan is : अस्यापि कृत्व न पृथग्गणनेति चेत्

पृथग्गणस्वादयोगादिति वयं । But he notes readings in M. & G. which have : अस्यापि कृत्व

पृथग्गणनेति चेत् पृथग्गणस्वादयोगादिति वयम् । which seems to us to give a more rational

sense. As for the next sentence, we think it means that the Ātman is not laukika-

pratītigocara as is rati, etc., because it is not mixed with any other form.

4. Svagatam means, according to Srinivasa Shastri, svasmin ātmani.

5. On vyutthāna, see Yogasūtras, III. 9, and III. 37.

6. It would appear from this concession, bhāsatām vā loke tathā, that this is

Abhinava speaking. This means that the last sentence in the preceding paragraph

must belong to the Pūrvapakṣin. But what precisely his point would be, we fail to see.

sthāyibhāvas all possible stable moods of the mind, for they are of no use so far as the (eight) rasas actually mentioned (by Bharata) are concerned. They rather deserve to be regarded as transitory feelings and not otherwise (i. e. not as sthāyibhāvas). And thus only can the statement (praghattaka) that there are in all forty-nine bhāvas be justified. This nature of the Self cannot be said to be transitory because it would be impossible, unimaginative (avaicitryāvahā) and improper. Śama is the nature of the Self. Bharata has designated it (i. e. the nature of the Self) by the word sama. If that same (nature of the Self) is called sama or nirveda, there is no objection. Only (note that) sama is a different (kind of) state of mind (altogether). And this (special) nirveda is (only apparently) similar to the nirveda that arises from other causes such as poverty, etc. Although their causes are different, (nonetheless, because) they are similar, they are both called nirveda. This is similar (to what takes place in) love, fear, etc. (?)1 Therefore the nature of the Self is itself the knowledge of the Truth, and it is also tranquillity. Further (tathā ca) rati, etc., (only) particular dark colorations (kālusyoparāgaviseṣāh) of the Self (or of śānta?). Having by means of continued concentration realised its form as being pure, though connected with them (i. e. rati, etc.), there is even at the time of withdrawing from meditation (vyutthāna), complete tranquillity (of the spiritual aspirant, the sādhaka). As has been said : praśantavāhitā sam-skārāt2. This entire collection of ordinary and extraordinary states of mind can become the helper of the major (emotion) known as knowledge of the Truth. Its anubhāvas are anubhāvas helped by yama, niyama, etc., and also the svabhāvābhinayas3 which will be described in the three chapters beginning with upāṅgābhinaya. And so they (i. e. these anubhāvas) are concerned with śāntarasa itself. This itself is its nature (i. e. the nature of śāntarasa).4 The vibhāvas are the grace of God, etc.5 And love etc., which are soon to be completely destroyed, can be aesthetically enjoyed in śānta (as subsidiary, momentary elements). Just as the vyabhicāri "eagerness" appears as important in love-during-separation or even in love-during-union, as said in the phrase: "love whose festivity never comes to an end";6 and just as augrya, a vyabhicārin, appears as prominent in raudra; and just as nirveda,

1. We simply cannot understand the simile ratibhayāditvādivṛtti.

2. Yogasūtra, III. 10. But we cannot understand what bearing this has on the word praśāntatā used by Abhinava in the preceding sentence.

3. We cannot make out what svabhāvābhinaya means. The phrase upāṅgā-bhinayādyadhyāyatraye refers to chaps. VIII, IX, and X of the NS

4. We are not sure we have understood ayam eva hi svabhāvah.

5. Drop the comma after parameśvarānugrahaprabhṛtayah and add a full stop.

6. Tāpasavatsarāja, I. 14.

so dhrti ( firmness of mind ), trāsa ( fear ) and harṣa ( joy ), though really vyabhicāribhāvas, appear as prominent in karuṇa, vīra, bhayānaka and adbhuta; so in śāntarasa, jugupsā ( disgust ), etc., appear predominantly, since they are completely opposed to love.1 For in the mahāvrata ( ceremony ) one carries about a human skull .......... ( obscure ).2 At the time of begetting a son ( by a widow ) from her brother-in-law, anointment of one's own body ( with oil ) has been recommended with a view to creating a sense of disgust.8 For the man who has done all that must be done with regard to his Self, ( i. e. who has realised the true nature of his Self ), his efforts are all for promoting the good of other people, and so his energy takes the form of an effort that is prompted by the wish to help others. This is a synonym for compassion, and it is very intimately connected with śānta. And so some people call śāntarasa dayāvīra ( compassionate heroism ) and some call it dharmavīra ( religious heroism ) because of the intensity of this energy ( utsāha ) which becomes its vyabhicāribhāva.

Objection : “ Energy is based on egoism as its essence, whereas śānta consists primarily in a loosening of egoism. ” ( Reply : ) It is not improper for an opposing mood to be a vyabhicāribhāva ( in Śānta ), for we find, for instance, nirveda ( as a vyabhicāribhāva ) in love. In the verse “ With the forest-ground overgrown with grass as my bed ” 4 and other similar stanzas, we find a high degree of utsāha in helping others. There is no state that is devoid of utsāha. For in the absence of desire and effort, one would be like a stone. And so because one has understood the higher ( Self ) and the lower ( Self ), there is nothing left to do with regard to one’s own Self, and therefore, for those whose hearts are tranquil, to give their all-in-all, i. e. to give their bodies, for the sake of helping another is not contrary to śānta. “ One should preserve one’s self”5, such and similar advice is meant in the sense of guarding one’s body and is meant for those who have not realised their Self, because ascetics are not concerned with guarding their bodies at all. For it has been said :

1. The main point of this argument escapes us.

2. As Raghavan has noted, this passage is extremely corrupt. ( We are unable to make any sense of the lines तथा हि महारत्रे नृकपालादिधारणमसुभावादिस्मृत्यादि-विस्तारस्तद्विपरीतसुखस्मृतिहृताहमिति )

3. This is a reference to the fact that when levirate takes place, it should be without any sexual desire, but only for the sake of procreation. Therefore, in order to create a sense of disgust for the body, both partners smear themselves with foul-smelling oil. Jayaratha quotes a verse on this subject in his commentary to the Tantrāloka, Vol. XI, p. 73. ( Part II ).

4. Nāgānanda IV. 2.

5. Gautamadharmasūtra, I. 9, 35.

134

ज्ञान्तरस्य

" The life-breaths ( prānāḥ ) are the cause of attaining dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. When they are destroyed what is not destroyed ? When they are guarded, what is not guarded ? ( i. e. all is guarded )".1

In this stanza the motive ( nidāna ) for the preservation of the body is shown to be its capacity to achieve the well-known four goals of life. In the case of the man who has realised his Self ( however ), it is ( often ) heard, in the context of samnyāsa that he should throw his body into water, fire or a pit.2 Thus the idea is that ( since ) somehow the body is to be renounced ( sometime or other ), if it be given up for the sake of another, what would not be achieved? ( i. e. so much is thereby gained ). Should one argue that Jimūtavāhana and others were not ascetics, we should ask how that matters to us ?3 Certainly they had attained to knowledge of the Truth. For it would be inconceivable that those who consider their body as their soul should abandon for the sake of others the very body which is ( to them ) their all-in-all, for ( in their case there would be no ) urge for dharma, etc. In a battle, a warrior has no intention of abandoning his body ( for a religious cause ), but rather he enters ( the battle ) only in order to conquer his enemy. ( In suicide ) by jumping off a cliff, etc., the main ( purpose ) is the desire to attain a more beautiful body in the life to come. Therefore whatsoever deeds, beginning with the imparting of ( spiritual ) advice and culminating in the renunciation of one’s body, are performed in order to achieve the benefit of others and without reference to one’s own benefit, are certainly inconceivable in the case of people who have not attained to a knowledge of the true nature of the Ātman. And they ( i. e. people who do these deeds ) are also knowers of the Truth. For those who know ( the Truth ), there is liberation in all the ( four ) stages ( āśrama ) of life. This is ( what is taught ) in the Smṛtis and in the Śrutis. As has been said :

" A man who is attached to worship of the gods, who is grounded in the knowledge of the Truth, who is gracious to guests, who, having performed the ceremonial rites to his ancestors ( śrāddha ), gives out wealth, even though he be ( only ) a house-holder, ( this man ) is freed ".4

However ( kevalam ) in the case of Bodhisattvas, etc., although they have known the truth, there is, because of their religious ( or righteous ) actions springing from a desire to do good to others and expected by them to

1. Not traced.

2. We should keep in mind the legend, still current in Kashmir, ( see Pandey, " Abhinavagupta ", p. 23 ) that " one day Abhinavagupta ......... along with twelve hundred disciples walked into the Bhairava cave and was never seen again. "

3. Jimūtavāhana was a Vidyādhara. Abhinava replies : so what ?

4. Not traced.

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result in the benefit of others, a reappearance of a body appropriate to that

(i. e. to those actions that they have performed ).1

Even in the case of rasas which occupy a subsidiary position ( in a

poetic work ), the attainment of “repose ”2 (i. e. aesthetic enjoyment ) is

met with, because that is only appropriate to their nature (as rasas ). For

instance, ( in the Rāmāyaṇa ), in the case of Rāma when he obeys

his father's orders (and goes into exile ), repose is met with in this,

though this aesthetic repose is only subsidiary. The same should be under-

stood in the case of śṛṅgāra and other rasas (when they occupy a subsi-

diary position in a poetic work ). Hence although śāntarasa3 has come

to stay4 (in the Nāgānanda ), it is not the major rasa, because (in that play )

the achievement of the three goals of human life (dharma, artha and kāma ),

with special emphasis on helping others, is the final result in the case of

1. We cannot decide whether this means that Bodhisattvas and others

who give up their bodies for the sake of others are reborn on earth, i. e.,

whether this contains a veiled reference to the famous apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa theory (on which see

8. Lévi's tr. of the Sātrilāṅkāra, III, 3, note 4 — in brief a Bodhisattva never enters

Nirvāṇa but is reborn again and again svātantryeṇa in order to benefit mankind ); or

whether Abhinava means that Bodhisattvas, etc., receive an appropriate body in

heaven. Or could he even mean (since heaven is a rather crude notion for Bodhi-

sattvas and Jīvanmuktas ) that the Bodhisattvas receive the dharmakāya ?

2. Viśrāntitilakah really means rasaṇapratiṣṭhā

3. A passage from the A. Bh., Vol. II, p. 451 (abhyāya 18) has an important

bearing on this issue. Here is the Sanskrit text :

एवं तावदीरोद्रादीनां रसाथास्वं (fिंत ) पुंष्वध्यात्मप्राणभूतवैन वर्त्मना, एवं प्रयोक्तु शान्त-

वीभत्सरसी चरमपुण्ययोगात्, तत्र न च सर्वस्य नाट्टिकारे, अपि कस्यचिद्विशिष्टमजननोदिकारात् ।

नाटकं यत्रापि तत्फलप्रधानतया प्राधानयमवलम्बतेतां, तथापि नासौ प्रचुरप्रयोग हति तत्रोः पुरुषार्थ-

प्रवरप्राणितयोरपि वीरादिरसान्तरभावनाप्रवणस्वभावानम् । एवं तावत्पुरुषार्थियो रुक्करसविषय एव परमार्थतः,

तथापि नित्यकृत्स्ववैतविलाससातत्येनाप्यनुयोगेप्टयोगिप तत्र भवति !

The passage has been translated by Professor Wright, BSOAS, Vol. 26, 1963,

p. 115 : “Thus vīra, raudra, śṛṅgāra (are used there ) respectively, occurring in

these works by being engendered by (the aims of the character portrayed ) dharma,

artha and kāma, while śānta and bībhatsa occur in connexion with mokṣa. But not

every character can carry the main role in this (latter ) case, only the occasional

saint. Although in the nāṭaka, śānta or bībhatsa may be the principal rasa when

mokṣa is the principal goal, this is not a common practice, so they, although en-

gendered by the best of human aims (the character's pursuit of mokṣa ) are consider-

ed subordinate to the other rasas — vīra, raudra, and śṛṅgāra. Thus the main rasa

of a drama is really governed by the puruṣārtha it portrays, but other rasas occur

in support of it as a result of the variety of subject matter included.

4. What does Abhinava mean by अत एवं शान्तस्य स्थायित्वेऽपि अप्राधान्यम् ?

How are we to take sthāyitva ? We can translate as “firmly entrenched ”, i. e.,

Abhinavagupta is simply insisting that śāntarasa is actually present in the Nāgā-

nanda.

XX

Jīmūtavāhana.1 With this thought in mind, Bharata will say ( NŚ, XVIII. 11 ) while defining a Nātaka, that “it is possessed of qualities such as wealth, flirtatious ways, etc.”2 This means that a dramatist should introduce into the Nātaka all kinds of actions in which opulence and flirtation are predominant and in which emphasis is placed on the two goals of life, artha and kāma, because such actions have the charming purpose of winning a sympathetic response from all people ( i. e. because such actions have a universal appeal ). We will describe this in that very section ( dealing with the definition of a Nātaka ). With this in mind, Bharata will not prescribe any jātyaṃśaka in śānta.3 Hence the view ( of some ) that śāntarasa does not exist in as much as Bharata has not prescribed any jātyaṃśaka in its case, is refuted.

Others however say : “ Jīmūtavāhana saved an old woman who needed protection, and who said : ‘Oh son, who will save you ?’4 He had no

1. By saying that śānta is apradhāna, Abhinava is not necessarily saying that śāntarasa can never be pradhāna, but only that it is not the pradhānarasa in this particular play. But it is an odd statement, since if any emotion is prominent in the Nāgānanda it is śānta. Śṛṅgāra is brief in its appearance, and vīra almost non-existent. Perhaps Abhinava was conceding a point belaboured by his critics. But if he does not allow śāntarasa as pradhāna in this play, where was it pradhāna ? For this is the only play Abhinava quotes in the context of śāntarasa, and indeed the only play that all the early writers quote. Therefore, by implication, it would seem that Abhinava concedes that śānta is never the pradhānarasa in drama. But then what does he mean by saying that it is the most important ( and he uses the very word pradhāna ), of all the rasas ? See Locana on the third Uddyota, p. 394 : मोक्षफलत्वेन चार्थं परमपुरुषार्थनिरीक्षित्वात् सर्वरसेम्यः प्रधानतमः ।

2. NŚ, XVIII. 11 ( G. O. S., Vol. II, p. 488 ) : नानाविभूतिभिरयुक्तमृद्धिविलासादिभिरिङ्गितं श्रेष्ठम् । अकुप्रवादकथाढ्यं भवति हि तन्नाटकं नाम ॥

3. The topic of the jātyaṃśakas is discussed in stanzas 1–13 of the NŚ XXIX ( Vol. IV of the G. O. S. ed. ). This same objection is raised in the A. Bh., Vol. IV, p. 78 : nanu śāntārase na kenacid aṃśakena gīyāmuktam. The reply that Abhinava gives is curious : vismaranaśīlo'si. smaryase(te) uktam hi - na śāntarasapradhānatā prayogasyā bhavati. sato'pi ( surely we must read sann api ) hi rasāntaroparaktā eva prayogāyogyo nānyatheti. But where has this been said ? Not in the NŚ itself. Nor do we find this actually quoted in the A. Bh. Perhaps Abhinava is in fact referring to this idea ( and not the actual words ) as explained in the A. Bh. in the śāntarasaprakaraṇa. The passage is puzzling.

4. Nāgānanda IV, 10. Saṅkhacūḍa's mother is speaking, asking who will save her son : हा पुत्रक, यदा नागलोकपरिरक्षणेन वासुकिना परित्यक्तोडसि तदा कर्त्तव्यपरः परित्राणं करिष्यति ? Just at that moment Jīmūtavāhana appears ( nane aham ) and offers to help ( amba, mā bhaiṣīḥ ). The mother had said she would end her own life as well ( IV, under v. 20 — tad ihaiva tvayā saha mariṣyāmi ), so Jīmūtavāhana saves her life by his action too.

power. He wanted to harm nobody." We agree with this. Should it be further argued that there is no power, . . . . . of Bodhisattvas (?). But the Sastra does not teach by means of käkatäliya(nyäya) (?).1 Therefore it is proved : utsäha is principally intended ( in this play and therefore vira is the major rasa ), and it is characterised by compassion.2 (In the Nägänanda ) other moods ( like love for Malayavati, detachment, etc.), become subsidiaries according to the circumstances (yathäyogam).3 As has been said :

तच्चिद्रेषु प्रयतान्तराणि संस्कारेभ्य: | 4

And so we have refuted the contention that anubhävas cannot exist because of a complete absence of action ( in the case of the man who is sänta ). When, however, one has reached the culminating state ( of Sänta ) and all anubhävas are absent, this (sänta) cannot be represented. In love and sorrow, etc.,also, in the culminating stages,5 it is correct that there is no possibility of representation.

Sympathetic indentification however is possible for those who have ( planted ) in them the samskäras that are the seeds of such knowledge of the Truth. As Bharata will say :

" People devoid of passion ( take delight ) in moksa " .6

1. Saktiś cäsya na käcid to sästram upadisati : we cannot, in spite of repeated attempts and devious explanations, make any sense of this passage.

2. This is very curious, for in the Locana ( p. 393 ) Abhinava has said that dayävira, is only another name for santarasa and that it is not to be regarded as a variety of virarasa, since Bharata has recognised only three varieties, dänavira, dharmavira and yuddhävira. Now he has just said that santarasa is not the pradhänarasa of the Nägänanda. But dayävira is. How are we to solve this contradiction ?

3. Does this passage, anye tu vyabhicärino, etc., mean that in the Nägänanda other emotions like love for Malayavati, detachment, etc., become subsidiary to dayävira according to circumstances ?

4. Yogasütra, IV. 27. We don't know what Abhinava means.

5. What is the culminating stage of karunarasa — death ?

6. This is NŚ., XXVII, 58. It is one of Abhinava's most important reasons for thinking that Bharata really did feel that there was such a thing as moksa that could be dramatically treated and displayed on the stage. Here is the verse :

युध्यन्ति तरुणा: कामे विदग्धा: समायांश्रिते । अर्थेऽर्थधर्मपराश्चैन मोक्षे चाथ विरामिण: ॥

" Young people are delighted with ( watching spectacles of ) love, the learned with ( watching spectacles concerned with ) doctrinal matters ( philosophy ), those interested in wealth are delighted with ( watching spectacles concerning ) material gain, and those without passion are interested in (spectacles dealing with ) moksa " .

This is certainly curious, for one wonders just where Bharata would include such spectacles, i. e. under what rassa ? It is odd that he should be silent on such an important point. Perhaps the verse is not by Bharata himself. Note verse 61 :

धर्मार्थ्यानुपराणे पु बृद्धालुध्यान्ति निल्स्या: ।

What would the rasa be of such dharmäkhyänas and puränas ?

(After all,) not everybody is always sympathetic to everything. For instance, a man whose nature is heroic (will not sympathetically identify with a character) in bhayānaka. Objection : "How can a heroic type of person take any delight in such a presentation ?"1 The reply is : in a work where this (śānta) is presented, surely there is one or other of the (other rasas) such as śṛṅgāra, vīra, etc. since the work is intended to be useful to the goals of life (other than liberation). Its aesthetic relish is grounded in śānta (however). In Prahasanas, etc. too, where hāsya, etc., are principal, the aesthetic relish is grounded in other rasas which arise in their wake (anuṣpādi). According to some, the justification for the exposition of the different drama-types is the intention to cater to aesthetic enjoyment in the case of different kinds of spectators (adhikārin). Therefore śantarasa does exist. And so in (certain) old manuscripts,2 after the passage3 "we will show how the sthāyibhāvas develop into the rasas", is read the definition of śānta in the phrase "What is called śānta has for its sthāyibhāvas śama," etc. In this connection, the aesthetic enjoyment of all rasas is similar to that of śānta, because it (i. e. this aesthetic enjoyment) is turned away from actual sense-object contact. [Because we are particularly concerned with one rasa, except that it is mixed

1. In the Locana Abhinava has simply replied to this important question with an arrogant response (p. 392-393). Here he considers it more seriously (the Locana was written before the Abhinavabhāratī, for we find that the A.Bh. refers to the Locana, e. g. p. 343, Vol. I : तच्च मदीयादेव तद्विर्णणात् सहदयालोचनादवधारणीयम्।)

But it is interesting that his reply makes bad sense. For he is saying that there are other rasas in every śānta play which will appeal to other people. This is of course true, but not a reply to the important objection that śānta is not an emotion that belongs to mankind universally, whereas the other rasas are. He fails to catch the point that it is qualitatively different from the example he counters with, namely that a vīra will take no pleasure in bhayānaka. He might not, but he could, since he must be aware of fear in himself though it may not be dominant. Cf. the curious remarks on p. 323 of the A. Bh., Vol. I, last 3 sentences of the first paragraph.

2. From this passage : तथा च विरंतनपुस्तकेष्विमावान् etc., it is clear that śantarasa was defined, in certain MSS before all the other rasas, and not after them. For these words, sthāyibhāvān, etc., are the last words before the description of the eight rasas. But note that in the A. Bh. Abhinava does not comment directly on whatever he read there. Why ? Is it because he did not believe it was part of the NŚ ? It is in fact quite possible that this section on śantarasa was a totally separate "book", not intended to fit it into the NŚ at all. In any case, it could not have come at the end of the rasa section, i. e. the end of the sixth adhyāya as it is printed in the G. O. S. edition.

3. Does he mean : (a) "I do not have śānta in my text"; or (b) "It is given in the beginning only in some books"? The implication is that most MSS did not contain a śantarasaprakaraṇa. Oddly enough Abhinava does not justify this ommission.

other latent mental impressions (vāsanā). ?]1 In order to indicate that

it (śānta) is at the root of all (rasas), it was named at the beginning.

In ordinary worldly dealings, one does not mention separately a thing

common to all, and so its sthāyin was not separately given. But even a thing

which is common to a number of other things deserves to be separately

reckoned by the discriminating man, and so it (śāntarasa) has become separate

as the object of cognition in the form of the aesthetic enjoyment of the

spectator who is admitted to be a discriminating reader. In the Itihāsas, the

Purāṇas, dictionaries, etc., we hear of nine rasas as well as in the revered

Siddhāntaśāstra. Thus it is said :

" He should display the eight rasas in the places alloted to the eight

gods. And in the centre he should display śāntarasa in the place of the

supreme God (Śiva)".2

Its vibhāvas are vairāgya, fear of saṃsāra, etc. Śānta is known through

the portrayal of these. Its anubhāvas are thinking about mokṣa-texts, etc.

Its vyabhicāribhāvas include world-weariness, wisdom, contentment (dhṛti),

etc. And as bhakti and śraddhā which are directed towards meditation on

God and which are reinforced by smṛti, mati, dhṛti and utsāha, are in any case

(anyathāiva) helpful (to śānta), neither of them should be counted as a

separate rasa. Here is a Saṅgrahakārikā on this matter :

" Śānta rasa is to be known as that which arises from a desire to

secure the liberation of the Self, which leads to a knowledge of the Truth,

and is connected with the property of highest happiness".3

1. We cannot arrive at a meaning for this sentence.

2. This refers, most likely, to the drawing of a mystic circle (cakra) as

practised in Tantric rituals. The eight gods are represented on the outside of the

circle. By pradarśayet probably "likhet" is meant. The point is that one draws the

gods, and then writes in underneath the rasa that accompanies them. There is one

difficulty however : devadeva must refer to Śiva. Now in the NŚ, VI. 44 (Vol. I,

p. 299) Śiva is given as the god of raudrarasa (raudro rudrādhidairvatāyah). More-

over, in the A. Bh. commentary on that stanza, Abhinava has associated śāntarasa

with the Buddha ! "बुद्धः शान्तेऽनुबोज्जोड्यत्नात्" इति शान्तवदिनः केचित् पठन्ति । But as this

is a quotation from a different (and untraced) source, it need not agree with the NŚ.

One can also take rūpa to refer to the actual pictorial representation. Pradarśayet

would, therefore, mean "draw". One should draw each of the gods according to the

rasa, i. e. such and such a god looking angry (raudra), another looking amorous

(śṛṅgāra), etc., and Śiva should be shown in samādhi. In the original, the genitive in

aṣṭānāṃ devānāṃ might also be taken as used in the sense of sambandha (aṣṭadeva-

sambaddhān rasān). The idea is that the eight rasas are to be pictorially represented

as symbolised by the eight presiding gods, i. e., by means of the characteristic forms of

the eight gods.

3. This is a verse actually found in the so-called śāntarasaprakaraṇa of the

NŚ (p. 333, Vol. I, A. Bh.), introduced with the words : atrāryāḥ ślokāś ca bhavanti

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140

By the three adjectives qualifying śānta in this verse, the vibhāvas, sthāyi-bhāva and anubhāvas are shown respectively.

" Various feelings, because of their particular respective causes arise from śānta ( a state of mental calm ). But when these causes disappear, they melt back into śānta ".1

In this verse and others it has been summarily shown that śānta is the source of ( all ) other rasas.

As for the statement that will be made by Bharata2 to the effect that in the Dima ( type of drama ) there are six rasas, excluding both hāsya and śṛṅgāra,3 here is what is meant : by giving the definition : " It is based on a composition with an exciting rasa ", there can be no question at all of śānta, as it is opposed to raudra which is predominant ( in the Dima ). So what is the point of ( separately ) excluding it ?

Continued from previous page

( which is really incorrect, since there are only two āryās and three ślokas. The dual ārye, therefore, should have been used ). The reading is slightly different. The last line reads : नो श्रृङ्गारोपदिष्टः शान्तरसौ नाम संश्रयति। It is clear from this quotation that Abhinava is not commenting on the actual passage of the NŚ.

The following remark of Abhinava does not seem to agree with the stanza. For how can nibhṛśayasa be said to represent an anubhāva ? The first two correspond, but not the third.

1. NŚ, VI, 87, p. 335.

2. See NŚ, Vol. III, p. 105.

3. This is NŚ. 18. 85, under the definition of Dima. Here is the passage from the NŚ, XVIII, 83 ff. ( Vol. II, p. 443 G. O. S. ed. ) :

डिमलक्षणं तु भूयोल्लक्षणयुक्तस्य प्रवक्ष्यामि।

प्रख्यातोदात्तरसंयुक्तः प्रख्यातविद्यादर्शनैः ॥

पौढालङ्कारयुक्तश्च नो डिमः कार्यः ।

नृत्तारहास्यवर्जः शोभे: सर्वे रसाः समाहृतः ॥

दीरसरकाव्योनिरनान्भावोपसंप्रतः ।

And verse 88 :

पौडनायकबहुलः सात्वत्यरमटिकृत्स्त्रि:सत्त्वः ।

Now Abhinava's argument is this : Dima deals mainly with raudrarasa. There can be no question of śānta at all, and so śānta was not specifically excluded by Bharata. We can also translate the sentence शान्तारसन्तवु तु दीरसरकाव्योनिरस्येतन, etc., as follows : " Since śānta is impossible, what else can be excluded but śṛṅgāra and hāsya, by the phrase ' viz. the Dima has as its source ( i. e. is based on ) an exciting theme '?

Had he said ( merely ) that it can be associated with six rasas ( and had he not said diptarasākāryayonih ), then there would be the undesirable contingency of that ( i. e. śānta ) being included. " As for the sentence शन्ते तु सात्वलेन भवत्तरित न तत्र-

वच्वेदकर्मीतद् ( p. 116 ), we think the na should be dropped ( Raghavan notes that MSS. M and G omit it ). If we do so, the translation of the sentence will be as follows : " But śānta uses only the sāttvati style, and therefore this ( qualification, namely sāttvatyārabhatīorttisampannah ) is quite sufficient to exclude it. "

( Continued on next page

is impossible and since the Dima has as its source (i. e. since it is based on ) an exciting rasa, what else can be excluded ( but śānta )? 1 Had he ( only ) said that it can be associated with six rasas, excluding śṛṅgāra and hāsya, ( without adding the qualifying phrase dīptarasakāvyayonih ), śānta would not have been excluded. Objection : “ This quarter stanza ( dīptarasa- kāvyayonih ) excludes karuṇa, bībhatsa and bhayānaka as predominant rasas. ” This is not true, because when ( he says ) that the ( Dima ) is associated with the styles called Sāttvatī and Arabhatī, 2 they are automatically excluded ( since they belong to the style Kaiśikī ). But śānta uses only the Sāttvatī style, and therefore this ( qualification ) alone would not be enough to exclude it. And therefore the definition of the Dima, far from arguing against the existence of śānta, is evidence for its existence. Śṛṅgāra however would be possible ( in a Dima ) because ( demons ) make love in a violent manner. 3 Hāsya is helpful to śṛṅgāra and therefore only their exclusion was specifically mentioned, because both are possible ( and only a possible thing can be excluded, but not an impossible thing such as śānta ).

Because ( śānta ) is common to all ( rasas ), it would be improper to name especially a colour 4 or god 5 ( that is appropriate to it, as one has

( Continued from previous page )

Abhinava's point is this : all the six rasas are dīptarasas, except for śānta. This word, therefore, excludes śānta, for otherwise there would be no point in saying dīptarasa, since that is just what the other six are ( though this is in fact wrong, since there is no reason to believe that Bharata uses each adjective to exclude something ). Surely this is tautologous in the sense that it is an explanation of śudrasa. Bharata is not so subtle as Abhinava wants him to be.

1. In an important article ( Vṛtti in Daśarūpakavidhānā dhyāya of Abhinava- bhārati, B. S. O. A. S. 1963, p. 113), Professor Wright translates Abhinava's comments on the Dima passage. Unfortunately, he has been misled by the use of the word syād into misunderstanding the passage. The passage in the A. Bh. reads ( Vol. II, p. 443, 1–3 ) : नाटकतुल्यं सर्वमन्यक्तिकैवल संधीनां चासमग्रता च गृहीतरहस्यैःवर्ज पद्धत्सु पर्यन्तेषु हान्तस्य प्रयोगः स्वादिल्याह द्विसरसेति । This Professor Wright translates as follows : “ All is as in the nāṭaka, the only difference is the incompleteness of sandhis and rasas. dīptarasa — enjoins the use of śanta since ( in its normal sense ) it would be ( tautological, being ) synonymous with the injunction that it should have six rasas to the exclusion of śṛṅgāra and hāsya ”. But śantasy a prayogah syād does not mean “ enjoins the use of śānta ” but precisely the opposite, namely that unless this adjective were there, śāntarasa would be precisely what is not wanted. Śāntarasa is excluded from the Dima, not included, as is clear from the śāntarasaprakaraṇa, Paryāyena in the above quotation is obscure, and we can make no sense of it.

2. Note that bhayānaka is associated with ārabhatī ( NŚ, III, p. 106. )

3. Abhinava has taken this notion of demons making love in a violent manner from the NŚ definition of Raudra, Vol. I, p. 322 : रक्तारक्तौ तौ । प्रायशः प्रसभं स्रियते ।

4. The colour of śānta is śvāccha ( Vol. I, p. 298—śvacchapītaṁ śamādbhutaṁ ).

5. The god of śānta is, note this, Buddha ! NŚ, Vol. 1. p. 299 : “ बुद्धः शान्तेऽद्भजोद्दृते ” इति शान्तवादिनः केचित्तु पठन्ति । बुद्धो जिनः परोपकारेकपरः प्रभुद्रो वा ।

done for the other rasas ), but they have been invented ( by some ). And so the reasonableness1 of śānta has been shown. Its true nature is hāsya. (? !)2 Vīra and bibhatsa tend to lead towards it.3 Therefore there is in the case of śānta the advice about the practice of yama, niyama, meditation on God, etc. It stands to reason that it leads to a great result ( of worldly objects ) ( anupabhogitā ),4 that it is more important than any other ( rasa ), and that it pervades the entire plot (?). And so enough of further elaboration.

What is the nature of its true relish ? It is the following : The nature of the soul is tinged by utsāha, rati, etc., which are capable of imparting their ( peculiar ) tinges to it. It is like a very white thread that shines through the interstices of sparsely threaded jewels. It assumes the forms of all the various feelings like love. etc., ( which are superimposed on it ), because all these feelings are capable of imparting their tinges to it. Even then ( tathā-bhāvenāpi ) it shines out ( through them ), according to the maxim that once this Ātman shines, ( it shines for ever ).5 It is devoid of the entire collection of miseries which consist in ( i. e. which result from ) turning away ( from the Ātman ). It is identical with the consciousness of the realisation of the highest bliss. It takes its effect through the process of generalisation6 in poetry and drama. It makes such a heart ( i. e. the heart of the sensitive spectator or reader ) the receptacle of an other-worldly bliss7 by inducing a peculiar kind of introspection ( antarmukhāvasthābheda ).

There are only these nine rasas, because only they deserve to be taught, as they are useful to the ( four ) goals of life or are exceptionally pleasant.

1. Following the reading upāpattiś ca in M. and G. ( Raghavan, p. 116 ).

2. Does sattrabhārah "mean sāttvikabhāvaḥ ? " Its sāttvikabhāva "is hāsya "?

But now can hāsya be regarded as a sāttvikabhāva "? Raghavan implies that this is corrupt. Perhaps we could emend as follows : Śānto hi hāso 'sya. Hāsa would stand for the smile of joy. Or one thinks of Śiva's attahāsa. Note the idea of the white colour associated with śānta.

3. Raghavan implies that this is corrupt.

But perhaps the meaning is this : vīra and bibhatsa tend to lead towards śānta, Bibhatsa, because after all it is the major rasa of the Nāgānanda.

4. We follow the reading anupabhogitayā ( as in Raghavan's 1940 ed. p. 105 ).

In the 1967 ed. ( p. 116 ), Raghavan has adopted the reading abhinayopayogitayā. Thus the phrase abhinayopayogitayā mahāphalatvam would mean : "It stands to reason that it leads to a great result ( namely mokṣa ) by reason of its being useful for acting." But we cannot see in what sense śānta can be said to be " useful for acting ", nor how its being useful for acting would lead to mokṣa.

5. This is only a partial analogy, and we cannot know exactly what Abhinava meant.

6. Is sādhāraṇatāyā a reference to sādhāraṇīkaraṇa ? I. e. do the vibhāvas etc., undergo the process of depersonalisation necessary in the theatre ?

7. Lokottarānandānayanam is a bahuvrihi compound : लोकोत्तरस्यानन्दस्यायनं यसिन् ।

Therefore, what others say,1 namely that this restriction on numbers is because only these nine are well-known to enlightened literary critics, though other rasas are possible, has been refuted. This will be explained in the chapter on the bhāvas. It is wrong to say that affection, with a sthāyibhāva of being moved (ārdratā) can be a rasa, because affection is (nothing other than) attachment, and all attachment culminates in rati, utsāha (or some other such accepted sthāyibhāva). For instance, the love of a child for its mother and father terminates in (i. e. can be included under) “fear”.2 The affection of a young man for his friends terminates in rati. The affection, as of Lakṣmaṇa, etc., for his brother terminates in (i. e. can be included under) dharmavīra. The same is true (of the affection) of an old man for his son, etc.3 The so-called rasa “cupidity” with the sthāyibhāva of “greed” can be refuted in the same manner, because it will terminate in some other (sthāyibhāva) such as hāsa or rati. The same holds true of bhakti.

Daśarūpaka, II, 4 and commentary thereon :

अथ धीरोदात्त :-

महासत्त्वोदिताम्भीर: क्षमावानविकत्थन: । स्थिरो निगूढहृदयोरा धीरोदात्तो हृदन्त्रतः ॥

Avaloka :

महासत्त्व: शोककोधाबिभूतसत्त्व:, अविकत्थन: अनात्मश्लाघान:, निगूढाहङ्कार: विनयच्छलनावलेप:,, हृदन्त्र: अज्झीक्तनिर्हाको धीरोदात्त:, यथा नागानन्दे जीमूतवाहन:-

शिरामुख: स्पन्दत एव रक्तमवापि देहे मम मांससमिति । तृत्ति न पश्यामि तवैव तावत्कि भक्षणास्वं विरलो गरुत्मन् ॥

यथा च रामं प्रति--

आहूतस्याभिपेकाय विशिष्टस्य वनाय च । न मया लक्षितस्तस्य कल्पोद्धाकारविभ्रम: ॥

1. Cf. the A. Bh. I, p. 298 :

एतावन्त एव रसा इत्युक्तं पूर्वम् । तेनानन्लेपि पारंप्रसिद्धैतावतां प्रयोज्यत्वमिति यकृत्लोल-हृदेन निपुणं तदवलेपेनापारमुद्रयेलम् ।

“We already said earlier that there are only these many rasas. So that when Bhaṭṭalollaṭa says that really there are an endless number of rasas, but that these (eight alone), since they are familiar to the audience (pārṣada), are fit to be portrayed, he says this without thinking, out of haughtiness.”

2. The point seems to be that a child is afraid of its mother and father, and its “love” can therefore be included under bhayānaka !

3. This is not a very good argument since surely these feelings are different in kind from śṛṅgāra,

XXI

यच्च केशावचित्र्यादीनां सामान्यगुणानामपि (नायक-) विशेषलक्षणे काचित्संकीर्तनं तत्तथां तत्राधिक्यप्रतिपादनार्थम्।

ननु च कयं जीमूतवाहनादिनङ्गानन्दादबुदाच्च इत्युच्यते? औदार्यं हि नाम सर्वोत्तर्षण वृत्ति:, तच्च त्रिजिगीषयैवोपपद्यते, जीमूतवाहनस्तु निर्जिगीषयैव कविना प्रतिपादितः। यथा—

तिष्ठन्भाति पितुः पुरो मुविथ या सिंहासने किं तथा यत्स्वनाहयतः सुखं हि चरणौौ तातस्य, किं राज्यतः।

किं मुक्तं मुवनत्रये धृतिरसौ मुक्तोज्झिते या गुरो— रायासः खतु राज्यमुझ्झितगुरोस्त्वास्ति कश्चिद्रुणः॥

इत्यनेन।

पित्रोर्विधातुं शुश्रूषां स्वकलत्र्य क्रमागतं।

वतं याम्यहमप्येष यथा जीमूतवाहनः॥

इत्यनेन च अतोडस्यैतन्नरश्रेष्ठमात्रप्रयुक्तं वीतरागवश्यतां। अन्यच्चात्रायुक्तं, यत्थाभूतं राज्यसुखदं निरभिलाषं नायकमुपादायान्तरा तथाभूतमलयकवचन्द्रात्रयुक्तं, यत्स्थाभूतं राज्यसुखदं निरभिलाषं नायकमुपादायान्तरा तथाभूतमलयकव्यनु— रागोपवर्णनम्। यच्चोक्तम्— ‘सामान्यगुणयोगी द्विजादिर्धीरशान्तः’ इति तदपि पारिभाषिकत्वादवस्तुस्वादवम्लेमेदकम्। अतो वस्तुस्वस्थिरिजींमूतवाहनादिव्यवहारः शान्ततामात्रिभावयति

अतद्रच्येत— यतावदुक्तं सर्वोत्तर्षण वृत्तिरौदार्यमिति न तज्जीमूतवाहनादौ परिहीयते। न हयेकरुपैव विजिगीषिता। यः केनापि शौर्यादियोगदयादिनाड्यानतिशेते स विजिगीषु:, न यः परापकारेरणार्थग्रहादिप्रवृत्तः। तथाहि च मार्गदूषणकादेरपि धीरोदात्तविजिगीषु:, न यः परापकारेणार्थग्रहादिप्रवृत्तः। रामोऽरपि जगत्पालनीयमिति दुष्टनिग्रहे प्रवृत्तस्य नान्तरीयकत्वेन भूम्यादिलाभः।

प्रसक्तिः। रामोऽरपि जगत्पालनीयमिति दुष्टनिग्रहे प्रवृत्तस्य नान्तरीयकत्वेन भूम्यादिलाभः इत्युदाहृतम्। यच्चोक्तं— जीमूतवाहनादस्तु प्राणिरूपं परिग्रहणमात्रभाज्जातमिति। इत्यदात्ततम्।

“तिष्ठन्भाति” इत्यादिना विषयसुखपराड्मुखतै, तत्सत्यम् — कार्पण्यहेतुत्वं स्वसुख- तृष्णासु निरभिलाष एव जिगीषुः। तदुक्तं—

स्वसुखनिरभिलाषः सविषसे लोकहेतेः प्रतिदिनमथवा ते इत्तिरेवविधैः ।

अनुभवति हि मुग्धां पादपस्तीकृतमुग्धं शमयति परितापं छादयोपहितानाम्॥ इत्यादिना।

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मळयवलनुरागोपरवर्णं तच्शान्तरसायं शान्तनायकतां प्रयुक्त निषेधति। शान्तवं चानहंकृतत्वं, तच्च विप्रादेरौचित्यप्रकर्षमिति वस्तुस्थित्या विप्रादेः शान्तता न स्वपरिभाषामात्रेण। बुद्धजीमूतवाहनयोरस्तु कारुणिकत्वाविशेषेऽपि सकामनिष्कामकरुणयावैधर्म्यादेवेदृशः। अतो जीमूतवाहनोद्धर्षीरोदात्तत्वमिति।

Daśarūpaka IV. 35 and commentary thereon :

रत्युत्साहजुगुप्सास्त्रः क्रोधो हासः स्मयो भयं शोकः।

शममपि केचित्व्राहुः पुष्टिनिबन्धपु नेऽतस्य ॥

इह शान्तरसं प्रति वादिनामनेकोपि विप्रतिपत्तिः: तत्र केचित्‌दुः - नास्त्येव शान्तो रसः, तस्याचायेण विभावादप्रतिपादनाल्लक्षणकरणात्। अन्ये तु वस्तुतस्तस्य भावं वर्णयन्ति, अनादिकालप्रवाहायातरागाद्दपयोरुच्छेदतुमशक्यत्वात्। अन्ये तु वीरवीभत्साद- वेन्तभावं वर्णयन्ति। एवं बदन्तः। शममपि नेच्छन्ति। यथा तत्रास्तु। सर्वत्र नाटकादि- वभिनयात्मनि स्थायिलवमसाभिः शमस्य निपिध्यते - तस्य समस्तव्यापारप्रविभयरूपस्य- भिनययोगात्।

यतु कैश्चिद्विभावादिदोषा शमस्य स्थायिलिङ्गुपवर्णितम्‌, तत्र मळयवलनुरागो- द्वप्रबन्धप्रबन्धतेन विभावाद्रचर्वर्तित्वप्राप्त्या विरुद्धं। न ह्येकान्तकार्यविमावालम्बनौ विषयानु- रागपरागवुपलच्यौ। अतो द्याविरोल्साहस्यैव तत्र स्थायित्वं, तत्रैव रङ्गरस्पाङ्गत्वेन चक्रवर्ति- त्वावतैश्व फलंवेनविरोधात्। ईप्सितमेव च सर्वत्र कर्तव्यमिति परोपकारप्रबन्धस्य विजिगी- षोर्नान्तरीयकत्वेन फलं संपघत इत्यवेदितमेव प्राक्। अतोडघ्येव स्थायिनः।

Daśarūpaka IV, 45 and commentary thereon :

शान्तरस्य चानभिनेयत्वाद् यदपि नाट्येऽनुप्रवेशो नास्ति तथापि सूक्ष्मातितादि- वस्तूनां सर्वेषामपि शब्दप्रतिपाद्यतया विद्यमानत्वात् काव्यप्रपञ्चयं न नियर्तते, अतस्त- दुच्यते।

शमप्रकरणनिर्वाह्यो मुदितादेशदातात्मा ।

शान्तो हि यदेतत्-

"न यत्र दुःखं न सुखं न चिन्ता न द्वेषरागौ न च काचिदिच्छा ।

रस्तु शान्तः क्थितो मुनिन्द्रैः सर्वेषु भावेषु शमप्रधानः ॥ "

इत्येवंलक्षणः, तदा तस्य मोक्षावस्थायोग्वामशरुपापत्तिलिङ्गायां प्रादुर्भावात् (प्रादुर्भावः), तस्य च शरुपेणानिर्वचनीयतां श्रुतिरिप - "स एप नेति नेति" - इत्यन्यापोहरूपे- णाह। न च तथाभूतस्य शान्तरस्य सहद्रया: खादयितारः सन्ति, अथापि तदुपायभूतो मुदितामैत्रीकरुणापेक्षादिलक्षणस्तस्य च विकासविस्तरक्षोभविशेषरुपपत्तेः तत्‌कुत्र्यैव शान्त- रसास्वादो निरुपितः।

Translation of the Daśarūpaka, II, 4 :1

Now the definition of the dhīrodātta ( nāyaka )2 is given.

"The dhīrodātta ( nāyaka ) is a great being, very profound, tolerant,

not boastful, steady; his sense of ego is kept in check and he is firm in his

commitments. "

Translation of the Daśarūpakāvaloka on II, 4 :

"Great being " means that his inner nature is such that he does not

experience sorrow, anger, etc. "Not boastful " means that he does not

praise himself. "His sense of ego is kept in check" means that his pride is

hidden by modesty. "Firm in his commitments "means that he carries out

till completion whatever he agrees to do. An example of this dhīrodātta

( nāyaka ) is Jīmūtavāhana in the Nāgānanda :3

"Blood is oozing from the openings in my veins, and on my body

there is still flesh. O Garuḍa, I see that you are not yet satisifed, so why

have you stopped devouring me ? "

Or as with regard to Rāma ( it was said ):4

"I did not perceive the slightest change in his appearance, neither

when he was called to be consecrated ( as king ), nor when he was banished

to the forest ".

When in the definition of a particular type ( of hero ) there is a

( special ) mention of some of the general qualities like firmness,5 etc.

( mentioned in II. 1-2 ), that ( special mention ) is intended to show that

those qualities are present in this particular ( hero ) in a very great degree.

Objection : How can you say that Jīmūtavāhana and other similar heroes,

in the Nāgānanda and other such plays, are exalted ( udātta )? Because

exaltedness means superiority to all others 6 and is possible only in the case of

1. We have used the edition by Pandit Sudarshanāchārya Shāstri, printed at

the Gujarati Printing Press, Bombay, 1914. This contains a brief commentary, mainly

on the Avaloka, by the editor.

2. It is somewhat odd that Dhananjaya should give, as one of the four types

of heroes, the śāntaraśānta ( p. 36 ), if he does not allow śantarasa in dramas.

Apparently he has in mind Cārudatta in the Mṛochakatika. At the very least, it is a

bad choice of words. Note the definition of the śāntanāyaka : सामन्यगुणयुक्तस्तु शूर-

शान्तो दृढादिृतः, which would rule out Jīmūtavāhana, who is a Vidyādhara.

3. Nāgānanda V, 16.

4. Mahānātaka III, 23.

5. The point seems to be that sthirah had already been mentioned in II. 1

among the general characteristics of all nāyakas. Keśāmcit construes with sthairyādi-

nām. It does not refer to people of a different persuasion ( i. e. keśāmcit matānām

sārena ). Before viśeṣalaksane we should understand the word nāyaka which makes the

sense clearer.

6. Vṛtti here does not mean " behaviour ". It means only " existence "

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147

a man who has worldly ambition ( vijigiṣutva ),1 whereas Jimūtavāhana has been described by the poet ( Harṣa ) as devoid of worldly ambition, as for example in the following stanza :

" Does a man shine as ( brilliantly ) when he is seated on a throne as he does when he stands on the bare ground before his father ? Can the happiness he receives from his kingdom be compared to the happiness he derives from massaging the feet of his father? Is the contentment he experiences from enjoying the whole universe comparable to what he feels when he eats the left-overs from his father's meal ? Kingship is indeed only a misery for the man who has abandoned his parents. Is there any virtue in such kingship ?"2

And also ( in the following verse ) :

" In order to dedicate myself to serving my parents, I am going to renounce my inherited fortune and go to the forest, just as did Jimūtavāhana ".3

Therfore, because Jimūtavāhana is predominantly peaceful and because he is very compassionate, he is a śānta hero,4 like a sage who has subdued his passions. Moreover ( ?)5 this is improper, that having introduced (upadāya) a hero who is without any desire for the pleasure of kingship, etc., the poet has indulged, in the course of the play (antarā), in a description of his intense ( tathābhūta ) love for Malayavatī. As for the statement : " The dhīraśānta is a twice-born, etc., who is endowed with general virtues" ( II, 4. ), ( this definition ) is not realistic, because it is meant to be technical (or formal)

1. Vijigiṣutva literally means " a desire to conquer " and is often used of kings and heroes. But here we think it has the larger sense of worldly ambition.

2. Nāgānanda, I. 6.

3. Nāgānanda, I, 4, in the prastāvanā, spoken by the Sūtradhāra to introduce Jimūtavāhana.

4. We take śāntalā to construe with asya. In this case the argument is for Jimūtavāhana's being a dhīraśāntanāyaka. But surely the whole point of the pūrvapakṣa is not only that he is such a type of hero, but that this should further imply that the rasa of the Nāgananda is śānta.

5. anyac ca means " and further, moreover". It cannot construe with ayuktam ( to give " there is something else that is improper " ), because there was no first thing given to which this would be the second. The construction is nonetheless peculiar. Understand idam between anyac ca and atra : anyac ca idam atrāyuktam. But it is odd that the Pūrvapakṣin should use an argument against himself. For he claims that Jimūtavāhana is a dhīraśānta hero should not be open to sexual passion. As Dhanika will point out, this must be used against him. Why then should the Pūrvapakṣin have provided such ammunition? However, since Dhanika accepts Cārudatta in the Mṛcchakatika as an example of dhīraśānta, though he is greatly interested in sexual love, it is consistent on his part to use this as an argument against the possibility of dhīraśānta in the case of Jimūtavāhana.

and thus it is not exclusive.1 Therefore, in reality, the behaviour of the Buddha, of Jīmūtavāhana and of Yudhiṣṭhira shows that they are śānta heroes. Here is our reply ( to all the above points ) : First of all ( tāvad ), the statement " Exaltedness means superiority to all others " is not inappropriate to the case of Jīmūtavāhana and others ( as you claim ), because worldly ambition takes many forms. If anyone exceeds others in heroism, or in liberality, or in compassion, he is said to be " possessed of worldly ambition ". This description is not used in the case of one who wishes to seize wealth by harming another person, otherwise we would find ourselves defending the ridiculous position that highwaymen are dhīrodātta(nāyakas) ! In the case of Rāma etc., they felt that they must protect the world and so they set out to punish the wicked ( and ) it was only incidentally ( nāntariyakatva ) that they obtained ( lordship over ) the earth. But Jīmūtavāhana and others like him were superior to all, because they were willing to give up even their own life to help others. And so they are to be regarded as the most exalted ( udāttatama ) ( and not merely exalted ). As for the verse that begins : "Does a man shine", etc., it is true that it shows (Jīmūtavāhana's) 'revulsion from sensual pleasures; but those who are ambitious are not concerned with their own personal pleasures that are the cause of misery. Thus it has been said :

" Indifferent to your own pleasure, you work hard for the sake of others. Or perhaps this is your natural disposition. For a tree carries on its head the most intense heat, and cools, through its shade, the heat of those who come to it for protection ( from the the sun )".2

On the contrary, the description of (Jīmūtavāhana's ) love for Malayavati which is not in keeping with śantarasa, (aśantarasaśraya ) rules out his being

1. The Pūrvapakṣin is objecting to Dhananjaya's definition of the dhīra-śāntanāyaka (II, 4). He says that this definition is not realistic, but only technical. For it says that the dhīraśāntanāyaka is endowed with the general qualities of a nāyaka. These include such qualities as vinitatva, madhuratva, dakṣatva, etc. Now these qualities are not all possible in the case of a dhīraśānta hero, because they are inconsistent with the state of being without desires which follows from his being a dhīraśānta hero. It is only technical or formal since it is a consequence of his being a hero (in general). Since the possession of the general qualities is thus unreal in the case of a dhīraśānta hero, it cannot be said to distinguish him from the other types of heroes (abhedakam). This means that according to the Pūrvapakṣin, the definition of the dhīraśānta hero as given by Dhananjaya is unscientific. One cannot help agreeing, for surely the differentiation that Dhananjaya makes (namely that he is a dvija and has the general characteristics of a hero ) is hardly consistent with śānta in any form. It is, therefore, most surprising that Dhanika, although he takes up and answers all the other objections, does not deal with this one ! It is almost as if he were admitting its justice. Could this possibly mean that he is himself criticising his brother under the guise of a Pūrvapakṣin ?

2. Śakuntalā, V, 7.

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149

a śānta (i. e. a dhīraśānta ) hero. The state of being tranquil involves the

absence of egoism, and this is naturally met with in the case of learned

Brahmins etc., and therefore learned Brahmins, etc., are really śānta heroes in

the real sense of the term and not simply in a technical or formal way. In

the case of the Buddha and Jīmūtavāhana, though it is true that there is no

distinction in terms of their compassion (i. e. though they are both equally

compassionate), still there is this difference : that the Buddha is compassionate

without any desire ( niṣkāma ) and Jīmūtavāhana is compassionate with desire

( sakāma ).1 Thus it is established that Jīmūtavāhana and others like him are

dhodātta ( nāyakas ).

TRANSLATION OF THE Daśarūpaka IV, 35 :

" (The sthāyibhāvas are ) love, energy, disgust, anger, mirth, amazement,

fear and sorrow. Some add peace ( śama ), but it cannot be developed in

plays."

TRANSLATION OF THE Avaloka on IV, 35 :

There are a great number of differing opinions among disputants in

the case of śantarasa. Some say there is no śāntarasa because Bharata did not

mention its vibhāvas, etc., and because he did not define it. Others, however

argue that ( regardless of whether Bharata mentioned it or not ) in actual

reality it cannot exist, because, ( they claim ), it is impossible to root out love

and hate which have been continously cultivated ( inside man ) from time

immemorial. Others claim that it can be included within vira, bībhatsa, etc.

Those who speak this way do not accept even śama ( as a sthāvibhāva ).

Accept whichever opinion you like ( yathā tathāstu ) ), in all events, however,

we cannot allow śama to be a sthāyibhāva in a Nāṭaka, etc., where acting is

essential, because, after all, sama consists in the complete cessation of all

activity and therefore cannot be acted out. As for what some have claimed,

namely that in the Nāgānanda, etc., śama is a sthāyibhāva, this is contrary to the

portrayal of Jīmūtavāhana's love for Malayavatī, which persists right through

the entire play and is also opposed to his ( finally ) obtaining the universal

sovereignty of the Vidyādharas.2 For we never come across both love for

1. We are not sure which of the two senses of sakāma and niṣkāma is

meant here. We have translated them in the Gītā sense of the terms. But Sylvain

Lévi has translated this line in a discussion concerning types of nāyakas as follows :

" En outre, Buddha et Jīmūtavāhana ne peuvent être classés ensemble; l'un et l'autre

sont des modèles de compassion, mais l'un est étranger à l'amour, l'autre y est sensi-

ble." ( " Théatre Indien ", p. 66, 2nd ed. ) We take it that Lévi refers to his love

for Malayavati.

2. This first criticism, that Jīmūtavāhana loves Malayavatī, is of course true.

It is a fault of the drama, for in actual fact the description of Jīmūtavāhana would

( Continued on next page

sense-objects and detachment from sense-objects subsisting in one single character.1 And so utsāha ( energy ) connected with dayāvīra ( as the major rasa ) is the sthāyibhāva ( of the Nāgānanda ). For ( in that play ) love being a subsidiary of that ( dayāvirotsāha ), there is no objection to the attainment of universal sovereignty as the final result ( of the dramatic action ). We have already said that even though an ambitious ( dhirodātta ) hero may set out with the primary object of doing good to others with a view to achieving that which is sought by them, worldly advancement may very well follow incidentally in his case.2 Therefore there are only eight sthāyins ”.

TRANSLATION OF Daśarūpaka, IV, 45 ALONG WITH DHANIKA'S COMMENTARY THEREON :

Commentary : “ Although sāntarasa cannot be introduced into a play, as it cannot be presented by means of acting, still because all things, though they be very subtle or long past, can be conveyed through words, its presentation is not forbidden in poetry.3 And so this is said :

Continued from previous page )

seem to preclude his falling in love. We are given absolutely no pyschological preparation for this. Quite the contrary, we would rather expect him to remain detached, if not actually repelled by sensual contact. It is only the Pūrvapakṣin who seems aware of this when he calls it ayuktam. As for his attaining lordship over the Vidyā-dharas, this is perhaps the weakest moment in an altogether weak play. He does absolutely nothing to achieve this. It is bestowed upon him by Gauri ( what is she doing in this supposedly Buddhist play in any case ? ) in a single verse at the end of the play, and this must strike any non-devotee of Gauri as highly inappropriate.

1. Ekanukāryavibhāvālambanau means “ as subsisting in one single character as their locus ” : ekanukāryarūpaḥ yah vibhavaḥ, tadālambanau tadāśrayau.

2. This refers to page 144, line 21 :

रामदेपी जगत्पावनिमिति पुष्टिनिद्राघे प्रभवस्य नान्तरीयक्त्वेन भण्यादिलामः ।

3. Note Raghavan ( “ The Number of Rasas ”, 2nd revised edition, p. 51 ) :

“ The critics who do not accept śānta are mainly writers on Dramaturgy proper. They think they are loyal to Bharata by denying it. This attitude begins, as far as extant works go, in the Daśarūpaka, the model and source for many a later work on Rūpaka, Dhanamjaya and Dhanika, both refute it and argue for its impossibility in drama.

ईशमपि केचित् प्राहुः पुष्टिनिद्राघ्ये नन्तस्य ।

From this it would appear that Dhanamjaya denies Śānta only in drama but accepts it in Kārya. But, as a matter of fact, Dhanamjaya, as interpreted by Dhanika, does not recognise it even in Kārya ( see p. 124 )”. S.K. De says more or less the same thing in his article “ The Śantarasa in the Nātya Śastra and the Daśa-Rūpaka ” :

“ Dhanamjaya himself would object to śānta only in the Nātya, which requires the delineation of the Rasa through its anubhāvas, etc. ; but he would permit it in the Kārya, because what cannot be acted can at least be described. But his commentator Dhanika would not allow śānta even in poetry. There can be, in his opinion, no such sthāyibhāva as śama or nirveda ”. Both De and Raghavan follow the reading in the NSP. ed.; see addendum for discussion.

( Kārikā ) : “ Śāntarasa ( śamaprakarṣa ) need not be mentioned ( separately 1 and specifically ), because the mental attitudes such as muditā, etc., out of which it is developed, are of the same nature ( as vikāsa, vistara, kṣobha and vikṣepa, which are at the root of the other eight sthāyibhāvas )”.

If śāntarasa is of the following nature, namely :

" Where there is no sorrow and no happiness, no anxiety, no hate or love and no desire at all, this is called śāntarasa by great sages, and it has śama as its sthāyibhāva "

then ( it must be noted that ) it appears only in the state of mokṣa, which is defined as the realisation of the true nature of the Self. Even the scriptures speak of this state as indescribable by saying " it is not thus, it is not thus ", thereby denying all positive attributes ( in its case ). Moreover, there are no sensitive readers who can be said to aesthetically enjoy śāntarasa as described above. Still 2 muditā, maitrī, karuṇā, and upekṣā, 3 which are means leading to it, are of the nature of vikāsa, vistara, kṣobha and vikṣepa, and since these latter ( four mental states ) have been mentioned earlier ( in connection with the eight sthāyibhāvas ) the aesthetic enjoyment of śāntarasa is as good as already described.

1. This is a difficult passage. Haas reads nirvācyah, whereas Shastri reads anirvācyah ( which he interprets, wrongly we feel, as vaktum aśakyah ) ; we accept the latter and translate it as : “ need not be ( separately ) mentioned ”. Śamaprakarṣa means the same as śāntarasa ( see bhāyotkarṣa in the sense of bhāyānaka used in the preceding verse ). For such a controversial subject this line is hardly sufficient. What are its implications? Apparently that śānta exists, but can be subsumed under the other rasas. However, Haas translates as follows : “ The Quietistic Sentiment, ( which arises ) from happiness and the like, is to be defined as a state having that ( i. e. happiness ) as its essential nature ”. This is in any case not how Dhanika understands the line. See addendum.

2. Athāpi would mean “ nonetheless ”. So, it would seem that we should understand the phrase : न च तथाभूतस्य ज्ञानरसस्य सह्हदयाः स्वादयितारः सन्ति, to mean that sahrdayas do not enjoy it.

3. Muditā etc.. are of course of great fame in Buddhism, forming a separate chapter of the Visuddhimagga. They are equally known to the Hindu tradition ( Yoga-sūtra, I, 33 ). Here Dhanika equates them with the four states of mind mentioned in IV, 52, where vikāsa ( expansion or dilation ) applies to śrīṅgāra and hāsya ; vistara ( exaltation or elevation ) to vīra and adbhuta ; kṣobha ( excitation ) to bībhatsa and śānta arises from upekṣā ( which is correct ), which would then be assimilated to vikṣepa (?). The construction of Dhanika's passage is somewhat complicated. Our translation best explains how we have understood it. ( Note that we have emended prādurbhāvāt to prādurbhārah ).

XXII

CONCLUSION

Abhinava's final view on the relation between brahmāsvāda and rasāsvāda seems to us best summarised by his commentary on a very unusual verse by Ānandavardhana. The verse is found in the third Uddyota of the Dhvanyāloka, in a long passage where Ānanda illustrates various combinations of dhvani with other types of poetry. The verse in question is meant to illustrate the conmingling (sañkirṇatva) of arthāntarasañkramitavācyadhvani with virodhālankāra, but the verse is interesting for completely different reasons.

Here is the verse along with Abhinava's remarkable commentary on it:

प्रबोधान्तराणामपि कदाचित् सङ्कीर्णत्वं भवत्येव । यथा तमेव-

या व्यापारवती रसां रसयितुं काचिच्चक्रीणां नवा दृष्टिरा परिनिष्ठितार्थविषयोन्मेषा च वैपस्थिती ।

ते हि अभिनवच्ये विश्वमानीश निर्विकल्पनन्ता वय श्रान्ता नैव च लयधर्मविधानन तद्रद्रक्तितुल्यं सुखम् ॥

इयत्र विरोधालङ्कारार्थान्तरसङ्क्रमितवाच्यस्य ध्वानप्रभेदस्य सङ्कीर्णत्वम् ।

Locana p. 508 :

व्यापारवतीति । निष्पादनग्रानो हि रस इत्युक्तम् । तत्र विभावादियोजनात्मिका वर्णना, ततः प्रमृति घटनापर्यन्ता क्रिया व्यापारः; तेन सततयुक्ता । रसाविति । रस्यमानतासारतया रसयितुं कर्तुम् । काचिदिति । क्षणे क्षणे नूतनेनूत्तनेनैवचित्रयेज्जनयत्यास्वादयन्ती । दृष्टिरिति । प्रतिबिम्बरूपा, तत्र दृष्टे: साक्षात्कृतत्वात् । न चानुप्रवेशनं भ्रान्तिमूलकमिव नवत्वं तद्गृहीतकृत्स्न-

एव । तदृशुगृहीतत्वं ध्वनेः, तथा हि चाक्षुषं ज्ञानं नाविवक्षितव्यतन्त्रमसम्भवाभावात् । न चान्यपरम् । अपि तु अर्थान्तर-

ऐन्द्रियकविज्ञानाभ्यासोऽलसति प्रतिबिम्बलक्षणेऽर्थे सङ्क्रान्तम् । सङ्क्रमणे च विरोधोऽनुप्राहक एव । तदृश्यति- ‘विरोधालङ्कार’ इत्यादिना । या चैवंविधा दृष्टिः परिनिष्ठितोऽचला: अर्थ-

विषये निश्चेतव्ये विषये उन्मेषो यस्या: तथा परिनिष्ठिते लोकप्रसिद्धेऽर्थे न तु कविवदपूर्व-

स्मन्वर्थे उन्मेषो यस्या: सा । विप्रक्षितामियं वैपस्थि-

तीति वचनेन नाहं कविर् न पण्डित इत्यादिनोद्घाट्यं ध्वन्यते । अनात्मीयमपि दरिद्रग्रृह-

इवोपकरणतया न्यात आहृतमेतन्मया दृष्टिद्वयमिलर्यर्थः; त इद अपीति । न ह्येकया दृष्ट्या-

सम्पृडनिर्‌वर्णनं निर्वहति। विश्वमिथ्येशम्‌ । आनिशमिति । पुनः पुनर्‌नवरतम्‌।

निर्वर्णीयन्तो वर्णनया, तथा निश्चिता‌र्थ वर्णयन्तः इदमिथ्य‌र्थमिते । परामर्शावुमानादिना निर्वध्य

निर्वर्णनं किंत्र सारं स्यादिति तिळ्हास्वलशो विचिन्त्यनम्‌ । यच्च निर्वर्ण्येन्ते तत्रखलु मध्ये

व्यापार्यमाणया मध्ये चार्थविशेषेऽपु निश्चिनो‌त्तमेऽपया निश्च‌ल्या ड‌च्छा सम्पृडनिर्‌वर्णितं भवति ।

श्रान्ताः इति । न केवलं सारं न ल‌ङ्घ्यं

व्याप्नोति । मध्ये‌त्यादि‌स्थेह‌र्थाहरण‌सङ्गतिन इ‌त्यर्थः । श्रान्ता इति । च्छन्द‌र्थशुश्रूष‌द्रव्ये‌ः । अभिधाश्र‌यन्ति । योग‌निद्रया

यावग्रलयु‌त खेदः प्राप्त इति भावः । च्छन्द‌र्थशुश्रूष‌द्रव्ये‌ः । अभिधाश्र‌यन्ति । योग‌निद्रया

स्वमत एव सारूप‌वेद‌वी स्वरूपाव‌स्थित इ‌त्यर्थः । श्रान्तस्य ध्यान‌स्थिते प्रति बहुमानो भवति ।

त्वदृ‌ृ‌दृ‌कीति त्वमेत्र परमात्म‌खरूपो विश्वासार‌स्तस्य भक्तिः श्र‌द्धादिपूर्वक उपासना‌क्रमज-

स्त‌दो‌वश‌स्तेन तुल्यमपि न ल‌ङ्घ्यमास्तां तावत्‌ज्ज‌जीयाम्‌ ।

एवं प्रयतमेत्र परमेश‌भक्तिजः कुल‌ह‌लमात्र‌व‌लि‌हतक‌विप्रामाणि को‌भय‌वृत्ते‌ः पुन-

रपि परमेश‌रविश्रान्तिरेव युक्तित मन्‌नान‌स्यैवुक्तिः । सक‌लग्र‌माण‌परिनि‌श्चित‌दृ‌ष्ट-

विषय‌विशेष‌ज्ञ य‌त्सुवं य‌दपि वा लोको‌त्तरं र‌सच‌र्व‌णात‌मकं तत् उ‌भय‌तो‌डपि परमेश‌रविश्रा-

न्यान‌न्‌दः प्रकृ‌ष्ट‌ने‌द‌न‌द्वि‌पु‌ण‌मात्राव‌मासो हि र‌साखा‌द इ‌त्यु‌क्तं प्राग‌स्माभिः । लो‌कि‌र्कं

तु सु‌वं त‌ते‌डपि निकृ‌ष्टप्रा‌यं बह‌र‌दुःख‌पु‌ञ्ज‌दि‌ति त‌त्प्र‌यम्‌ ।

TRANSLATION OF Dhvanyāloka, III : 1

"There is also a mixture of a figure of speech in varieties of dhvani ( other than rasadhvani) as well. For instance in the verse :

"The new and wondrous (kācit) vision (drṣṭi) of poets which concerns itself (vyāpāravati) with turning permanent emotional states (rasas; i. e. sthāyibhāvas) into aesthetic experiences, and that philosophic ( or analytic, vaipaścitī) vision that reveals the realm of already existing (i.e. not depending on the poet's creative imagination) objects — we have employed both of these constantly to examine and describe the world (we live in ). We have become weary in so doing, but have not found happiness therein, in any sense comparable to the joy we feel in our devotion to you, who sleep on the ocean ".

In this verse, there is a mixture of arthāntarasaṅkramitavācya and the figure of speech (known as ) (apparent) contradiction (virodha)."

TRANSLATION OF Locana III :

"VYĀPĀRAVATI : For we have (already) said that rasa is identical with the process of conveyance itself (nispādanaprāṇo hi rasaḥ).2 (Poetic

1. D. Āl. p. 507, 508. Abhinava quotes this verse in the A. Bh. Vol. I., p. 300.

2. This refers to Abhinava's doctrine, explained in the second Uddyota on p. 187, (B. P. ed.) that rasa is the process of perception itself (pratīyamāna eva hi rasaḥ ), i. e., it is not an object of cognition in much the same way that the sākṣin ( the subject ) in Advaita can never be the object of cognition. In this sense, rasa is purely subjective, and is not amenable to ordinary means of cognition.

vision is ) constantly engaged in that activity ( vyāpāra ), i. e., that action which begins with a description consisting in the combination ( i. e. presentation ) of the vibhāvas, etc., and ending with sentence-structure ( ghaṭanā ).1 Rasān refers to the sthāyibhāvas, the essence of which consists in the state of being enjoyed aesthetically ( rasamānatā ). Rasayitum means to make the sthāyibhāvas fit for attaining to this status of being aesthetically enjoyed. Kācid ( “ wondrous ” ) means revealing itself ( unmilanti ) by abandoning ( and becoming superior to ) the state of the cognition of ordinary worldly things. And so ( i. e. because they are endowed with such a vision ), they are poets by virtue of their power to describe2 ( things in an extraordinary way ). Navā means, it reveals ( āśutrayati ) worlds at every instant in ever new and variegated forms. DRSTIH. ( The vision ) is of the form of poetic imagination ( pratibhā ). Since “ vision ” refers ( primarily ) to knowledge we derive from our eyes and since it is here said to enable ( one ) to enjoy ( such beverages and edibles as ) sāḍava,3 etc., there is the figure of speech known as ( apparent ) contradiction ( virodha ).4 And so this vision is called “ new ” ( i. e. marvellous ).5 And the ( arthāntarasaṅkramitavācya ) dhvani ( in the word drṣṭi ) is helped by this figure of speech. For actually eyesight ( the literal sense of the word drṣṭi ) is not here altogether unintended,6 since it is not totally impossible ( to think of physical eyesight being of use to the poet in observing the world before describing it ). Nor is actual eyesight ( wholly intended ) ( and ) subservient to some other suggested sense ( anyapara = vivakṣitānyaparavācya ). Rather the literal meaning ( of sight ) passes over

1. This refers to those passages in the first Uddyota ( p. 88 and 104 ) that speak of guṇas and alaṅkāras as contributing to the beauty of poetry. In the second Uddyota ( p. 188 ) there is a passage in the Locana where the phrase samucitaguṇā- laṅkāra is actually used. See also Locana, p. 88.

2. Varnanāyogāt means lokottaravarṇanāyogāt. See KP I. p. 10 ( Jhalkikar's edition ).

3. Abhinava speaks of sāḍava in the A. Bh. Vol. I, ( p. 288 ).

4. Place a danda after virodhālaṅkāro on p. 508.

5. This expression, drṣṭih ( i.e. cākṣuṣaṃ jñānam ) rasān rasayitum vyāpara- vati involves a contradiction, something illogical and queer, and that is the reason for calling the vision navā ( novel, out of the ordinary ). Of course it is true that the contradiction is removed later on by taking drṣṭih to mean “ poetic vision ” and rasān rasayitum to mean “ to bring about aesthetic experience in the minds of the readers or spectators ”, but as soon as we understand the words metaphorically in this manner, the “ novelty ” or “ marvellousness ” also disappears. The words ata eva navā refer to the contradiction between the prima facie senses of drṣṭi and rasān rasayitum.

6. Atyantam can be taken both with avivakṣitam and with asamabhavābhāvāt. The idea is that this is not atyantatiraśkṛtanācya ( a subvariety of avivakṣitanācya ), because the literal meaning of “ sight ” is slightly retained in the sense that careful observation of the world around us is useful for the aspiring poet.

156

ध्वान्तरस

into the meaning of "poetic vision" that is the result of the repetition of the "sensual" (ocular) perception (of the world) (aindriyaka-vijñāna).1 This passing over (into another meaning) is helped by the figure of speech known as "contradiction".2 So, Ānanda will say : "(there is the combination of arthāntarasaṅkramitavācya) with virodhālaṅkāra".3 (The compound pariniṣṭhitārtha viṣayonneṣā can be explained as follows :) (First) yā ca means sight as just described, i. e. the functioning (unmeṣa) of which with respect to objects to be cognised is fixed (or stable) that is, immoveable (definite). Or else (we can analyse the componnd as follows :) That sight the functioning (unmeṣa) of which is with respect to objects that are firm (pariniṣṭhita), that is, well-known in worldly experience, and not with respect to completely unpredicted (new) objects as is the case with poets (i. e. poets create new worlds whereas philosophers analyse the one we live in). The word (vaipaścitī) is explained as vipaścitām iyam ("pertaining to philosophers"). When Ānanda says4 : "drawing on both sorts of vision", "that of poets" and "that of philosophers", his own modesty is suggested, for he means : "I am neither a poet nor a scholar." "I have borrowed this double vision (poetic and philosophic) which does not really belong to me, the way a poor man in an ill-equipped house will borrow provisions (and articles of furniture, etc.) from somebody else's house in order to entertain (a guest)."

TE DVE API : One sort of vision alone is not sufficient for accomplishing a proper scrutiny and interpretation (nirvarṇanam). Viśvam (in addition to the sense "world") means "all". Anīśam means again and again

1. The compound aindriyakavijñānābhyāsollasite (where ullasita must mean something like "being the result of") can also be understood in a totally different way : We can split the compound after aindriya, and read kavijñāna. This would then translate as : "The result of the repetition of the ocular perception (of the world) on the part of the poet".

2. How is the arthāntarasaṅkramitavācyadhvani helped by virodha? The point is this: the initial contradiction between dṛśi (eye-sight) and rasān rasayitum vyāpārayatiḥ (engaged in bringing about the experience of physical flavours or tastes) is responsible for giving rise to the arthāntarasaṅkramitavācyadhvani. The suggested prayojana in the ajahallakṣaṇā is pratibhānāsya atisphuṭatvam (extreme clarity of poetic vision). Had the virodha (i. e. failure of the literal sense of sight) not been there, there would have been no ajahallakṣaṇā, and consequently no suggestion of the prayojana. Thus the arthāntarasaṅkramitavācyadhvani is supported by (or based upon) virodha. So virodha is anu-grāhaka of the arthāntarasaṅkramitavācyadhvani (which is the anugrāhya). Virodha is the aṅga and arthāntarasaṅkramitavācyadhvani is the aṅgin. So this is a case of aṅgāṅgibhāvasaṅkara or anugrāhyānugrāhakabhāvasaṅkara.

3. P. 510.

4. Remove the daṇḍa after te avalambyeti on p. 509, since this is part of the series of three quotations that Abhinava enumerates.

without stopping. We have been describing (the world) through (poetic) descriptions (as explained above), and also describing in a definite (categorical) manner as follows : This is really like this1 (i. e. making careful analytic descriptions).2 A description (of this kind) involves analysis through direct perception (parāmarśa),3 inference, etc., so as to dissect things very minutely (tilaśas tilaśaḥ) (and carefully). It is well-known (khalu) that things to be described are well and properly (or completely) described when they are presented at times by means of the poetic vision (employed for bringing about aesthetic experience) and at times by means of the stable philosophic vision which definitely and categorically reveals their particular (i. e, true) nature. Vayam means "we who have been engaged in using both illusory4 (i. e, poetic) vision and analytic (i. e. philosophic) vision ". Śrāntāḥ means : "not only have we not discovered anything substantial, but quite the contrary, we have only found weariness". The word "and" is used in the sense of "but". Abhiṣayana. ("O you who are sleeping on the ocean"), because of your Yogic sleep, (having withdrawn the whole universe into yourself).5 And thus you know the true nature of the real essence, i. e, you remain in your true nature. A person*who is tired (naturally) feels respect (bordering on envy) for one who manages to be lying down ! TVADDBHAKTI. You alone are the true nature of the highest Self, the essence of every thing. "Devotion to you" means infusion with devotion preceded by faith (sraddhā), etc., which (infusion) arises in due order from upāsanā (adoration), etc. We have not obtained any (joy) (even remotely) com-

1. Abhinava uses this same expression on p. 97 of the Locana, in explaining how a poet, even though he be gifted with imagination (pratibhā) must nonetheless put in hard work in the form of revision, etc. : यद्यपि स्वयमक्षस्यतपरिस्कृतिः, तथापोदमित्य- मिति विशेषप्तो निरूप्यमाणं सहस्रशास्त्राभवति । Of course the two terms are slightly different in meaning.

2. Place a danda after idam itham iti in the B. P. edition.

3. We take parāmarśa to stand for pratyakṣa in general, rather than for lingaparāmarśa (i. e. as part of anumāna).

4. Mithyā refers to poetic knowledge, because, as Ānanda says in the fourth Uddyota (p. 527), quoting some unknown mahākavi : "The literary utterance of great poets is glorious. For it causes various ideas to enter the heart (of the reader) and appear (there) in a form which is different, as it were, from their real form". The Skt. chāyā for this is : अतथास्थितानपि तथास्थितानिव हृदये या निवेशयति । अर्थ- विशोपान्, स जयति विकटविगोचरावाणी ॥ See also the fine verses by Ānanda quoted in the third Uddyota, p. 498. See above, p. 12.

5. We propose placing a danda after yoganidrayā, which is the word added by Abhinava to bring out the implication of abdhiṣayana. "You are lying on the ocean in your Yogic repose." त्वमत एव सारसूपवेदो, स्वरूपावस्थितः इत्यर्थः, should be taken as a separate sentence. Cf., on the notion of Yoganidrā, Raghuvamśa, XIII. 6.

15.8

Śantarasa

parable to that arising from devotion to you, let alone an identical (joy).

This stanza is the utterance of the author (Ānanda), who began by first being

a devotee of God, and then, simply out of curiosity, adopted both the view-

points of the poet and the philosopher (but found them ultimately unsatisfy-

ing) and once again came to believe that rest in devotion to God was inevita-

ble (yuktā).1

For we have already explained2 that the happiness which

results from (conceptual understanding) of both seen and unseen

objects which are ascertained (pariniścita), by all the means of

valid cognition (i. e. philosophy) or even that transcendent joy

which consists in relishing an aesthetic experience - to both of these

the bliss that comes from finding rest in God is far superior

(prakṛṣṭa); and that aesthetic pleasure (rasāsvāda) is only the

reflection (āvabhāsa) of a drop (vipruṣ) of that mystic bliss.

But ordinary worldly happiness is for the most part (prāya) inferior

to even that aesthetic delight, because it is mixed with abundant (bahutara)

suffering as well. This is the essence of what he means. ”

This then, is Abhinava's final position. To have provided a coherent

philosophy of aesthetic experience is no small achievement. Clearly it was

owing to Abhinava's influence that so many later writers (primarily among

the ālaṅkārikas, and only very rarely among pure philosophers, for reasons

that still puzzle us) were able to draw upon this precious analogy of religious

experience and aesthetic experience, and to make their own contributions.

It is not our purpose to provide anything more than the briefest glance into

some of the more noteworthy passages in which interesting distinctions can

1. Is Abhinava just guessing that this is the case from the single poem here

given, or is he actually privy to some information about the life of Ānandavardhana

that has not come down to us? One might be inclined to believe that he is simply

saying what has become a cliché (cf. the popular notions about the life of Bhartrhari,

the author of the katakatrayam) namely that one is first inclined towards worldly

life, but eventually, in the wisdom of age, one comes to religion. But here Abhinava

says that Ānanda was first a devotee, then went through a middle period of interest

in poetry and philosophy, and finally came back to religion. This is too unusual to

be simply invented, and we think that the likelihood of Abhinava reporting an

actual detail of Ānanda's life is strong. Otherwise the expression prathamam would

be out of place, since there is nothing in the verse itself to warrant this assumption.

This is important, because it is the only detail that we know of his life, for no other

legends or reports have come down to us.

2. By ity uktam prāg asmābhiḥ, Abhinava must be referring to the Locana

itself (and not to an earlier work). But we have not come across any explanation in

our reading of the text of the Locana. A puzzle.

CONCLUSION

159

be found. One is found in the Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhaṭṭa.1 Mahima is objecting to the use of the word viśeṣa by Ānandavardhana in the expression kāvyaviśeṣa in Kārikā 13 of the first Uddyota : “It is also not possible to speak of excellence ( viśeṣa i. e. atiśaya ) in the case of poetry, for kāvya ( i. e. rasa ) consists in the relish of the highest happiness ”.2 Mahīma means that one cannot use the expression kāvyaviśeṣa, since all poetry is rasātmaka and is therefore in and by itself niratiśayasukhāsvādalakṣaṇa. ( He is thus not referring to the division of poetry into uttama, madhyama, etc.). In support of his contention he quotes the following very interesting verse :3

“ When, from the recitation4 and singing of the Dhruvā songs, rasa reaches its peak ( i. e. the spectator is filled with rasa ), he turns his attention inwards ( antarmukha ) for the moment, concentrated entirely on enjoying that profusion ( bhara ) ( of rasa ) and becomes delighted. At that moment ( tataḥ ) when ( he ) is immersed in his own true nature ( svarūpa ) and he is unaware of any outside object ( nirviṣaya ), his own deep flow ( nisyanda ) of joy becomes manifest, by which even Yogins are pleased ”.5

Madhusūdanasarasvatī in his Śrībhagavadbhaktirasāyanam, I. 12, differentiates between rāsasvāda and brahmāsvāda. He says that whereas brahman is sat ( existence ) and ajñāta ( unknown by ordinary people ), worldly objects like a beautiful woman, etc., are knowable ( jñeya ) by means of valid knowledge. But a beautiful woman, etc., as presented in literary works appears to the sahṛdaya in the form of pure consciousness ( caitanya ) as limited by the beautiful woman, etc., when the covering mantle disappears ( māyāvr̥titirodhāne, paraphrased in the commentary as as vyāvarana-

1. VV. p. 100 ( Kashi Skt. Series ed. 1964. )

2. VV. p. 100 : न च तस्य विशेषः संबभति निरतिशयसुखस्वादलक्षणत्वाच तस्य ।

3. VV. p. 100 : यदाडः-

पाठाद्रध ध्वनिगानाच्चः संपूयते रसे । तदास्वादम्रेकाग्रो हृद्यस्नन्मुखः क्षणम् ॥

ततो निविष्यस्य स्वरूपाच्चीतः निः । व्यक्तये ह्लादिनीनन्दो येन तुप्यन्ति योगिनः ॥

4. We take pāṭhya to mean : “ anything to be recited ”, and thus it can denote the recitation of the nāndī, the recitation of the speeches assigned to the different characters, and also to the recitation of non-dramatic poems. Dhruvāgāna applies not only to the songs sung in the pūrvaraṅga, but to all songs sung in the actual course of the play, such as that sung at the time of the entry of a character ( prāveśikī dhruvā ) and that sung at the exit of a character ( naiṣkramikī dhruvā ). Ruyyaka ( in his comm. on the VV., p. 99 ) takes pāṭhya to be a reference to Kāvya, and dhruvā to be a reference to the Nāṭya : पाठादिलयदिना, ध्वनाग्योगीतिसामध्यान्नुपयुज्यते नाट्यविपयरसम्वरूपवर्णनमू । काव्यविपयें तु गानवर्जमिति तदेव रसस्वरूपम्। Note that Ruyyaka, p. 100, takes asya as a reference to the reader or spectator : asya carvayituḥ.

5. Gnoli ( op. cit. first edition, Rome, p. 57 ), says that this verse is “...........certainly from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka.”

XXIII

160

tirodhāne), because the mind of the sahrdaya, stabilised in sattvaguṇa, becomes

for a moment identified with pure consciousness. But because it is after all

worldly objects (viṣaya) that are perceived under the form of the highest

bliss (paramānandarūpaviṣayopādānaṁ) and because there is the non-percep-

tion (abhāne) of the true nature of pure consciousness as it is limited by

worldly objects (tattadavacchinnacaitanyasvarūpa),1 there is neither immediate

release, nor any damage to the self-luminosity (of pure consciousness).2

What follows from this ?

" Therefore, when this (consciousness limited by worldly objects)

becomes manifest in the mind, it turns into rasa, although owing to its being

mixed with insentient objects it is somewhat less (than the joy of pure

consciousness )".3

Curiously enough, we have only come across one author who makes

the comparison in favour of rasāsvāda (with the possible exception, depending

on how it is interpreted, of the verse from Bhaṭṭanāyaka, quoted on p. 23 ),

and this is Jayadeva in his Prasannarāghava :

" Neither the knowledge of Brahman (i.e. spiritual bliss) nor the wealth

of a king can be compared to poetry. Like a daughter married to an un-

commonly worthy man, it creates joy in the heart when it is appreciated by an

exceptional person ".4

1. We propose reading tattadāvacchinna for caitanyāvacchinna, because this

latter makes no sense. If we read the former, tattad can refer to kāntādiviṣaya. The

expression tattadāvacchinnacaitanya actually occurs in the commentary, in the fourth

line from the beginning.

2. BR. I. 12 :

सदज्ञानध तद्रहा मेsयं कान्तादिमानतः ।

मायावृत्तितिरोधाने बृंख्या सत्वक्षया क्षणम् ॥

Note the commentary ( by M. himself ) :

वस्तुतः परमानन्दरुपविषयोपादानचैतन्यावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्वरुपाभानाच न सद्यो मुक्तिः स्व-

प्रकाशभङ्गी वा ।

3. BR.I. 13 : ततः कि अतः—

अतस्तदविमर्शवितं मनसि प्रतिपत्तहे ।

किचिन्न्यूनात्र रसता याति जात्यविमिश्रणात् ॥

Note the commentary : लौकिकरसे तु विशिष्टचिद्रसयैव चिदानन्दांशस्य स्कुरणात

आनन्दस्य न्यूनतेव ।

4. Prasannarāghava, ( ed. by V. L. S. Pansikar, NSP. 1922, p. 6 ). prastāvanā,

verse 23 (last stanza ) :

न ब्रह्मविद्या न च राजलक्ष्मीस्थथा यथीयं कविता कवीनाम् ।

लोकोत्तरं पुंसि निवेशयमाना पुत्रीव हृदये करोति ॥

Note the pun on the words lokottare puṃsi niveṣyamānā,

CONCLUSION

161

Looking back over the many passages quoted from Abhinava, what can we pick out as the main similarities and the main differences between rasāsvāda and brahmāsvāda ?

SIMILARITIES

(1) There is no pain in drama, for everything is blissful when we attain the state of rasa. This is equally true of any higher ecstatic experience.

(2) During an actual dramatic performance, we forget the self.

(3) We have no hope of material gain from art. The same is true on the religious level, since to become seriously religious in India generally means abandoning one’s acquired wealth.

(4) Both experiences are alaukika. We have seen how often Abhinava uses this term.

(5) Both experiences are ānandaikaghana.

(6) In both cases, the distance between the subject and the object is removed. Thus Abhinava stressed that rasa is not objective.

(7) Time and space disappear for the duration of the experience. We are not conscious of our surroundings during a drama, or at least we ought not to be, according to Abhinava.

(8) During both experiences there is total immersion. In the case of samādhi there is vyutthāna, which could correspond (perhaps forcibly, however ) to leaving the theatre and re-entering ordinary life. We have all certainly experienced the curious feeling of being let-down, even of depression, upon leaving a theatre.

(9) In both cases, special preparation is necessary : music and dance in the theatre, and perhaps one might include bhajans and other paraphernalia of bhakti in the case of religion.

(10) In both cases, what appears is not something that is “ created ” anew, but something that is “ manifested ”, or “ suggested ”. Rasa is not “ produced ”, it is “ suggested ”. So also, the identity of the ātman and

1. See also the Brahmāsiddhi of Maṇḍanamiśra, Ch. 1, p. 5, Kuppuswami Shastri’s edition : एवं च लोकोत्तरनन्द एवासौ ( ब्रह्मानन्दस्य ) मात्रेति युज्यते ।

2. Note what the Saṅgītaratnākara, III. 1266 says : ब्रह्मासंविद्विसदृशी संवित् । The Bhāvaprakāśana, II. ( p. 53 ) also deals with the distinction between rasāsvāda and brahmāsvāda and then ends by saying :

श्रवणमहोर्योंड्गमेवमुक्तः पुरातनैः !

Śāradātanaya, as is clear from Ch. I, p. 26-27, and Ch. II, p. 47, does not accept śānta. However, at II, p. 48, a certain Vāsuki is quoted who does accept śānta, On this problem, see Raghavan, “ The Number of Rasas,” p. 11.

162

शान्तरस

brahman is only a question of removing ignorance (i.e. nothing "new" is to be acquired). In Vedānta the term abhivyakti is often used for this process, just as both Ānanda and Abhinava use the same expression for rasa.

(11) In Vedānta, avidyā is removed by means of śravaṇa, manaṇa etc. In rasanispatti, Abhinava emphasises how the vighnas must be removed before rasa can manifest itself.

(12) In both cases there is a sense of rest (viśrānti), of having reached the goal (cf. the Vedāntic expression krtakrtya) beyond which there is nothing to be accomplished.

(13) In the aesthetic experience, Ānanda (and Abhinava) make light of the "means" that have brought it about, especially of the vācya sense, which is compared to a lamp (D. Āl. I. 9) which is useful for illuminating objects, but which is not the goal of our efforts. Similarly, in Vedānta, Śaṅkara speaks of the upāyas as being similar to a raft which we leave behind after our destination has been reached.

DIFFERENCES

The differences are no less striking, and certainly ought not to be lightly dismissed. Abhinava himself makes the distinction in a difficult passage in the Abhinavabhāratī :1

"Aesthetic experience (carvaṇā) is different from the perception of love, etc., that arises because of ordinary valid means of cognition such as direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), textual authority (āgama), simile (upamāna) and others. It is also (an experience) different from the indifferent (tataṣṭha) knowledge of another person's thoughts that arises from direct vision in a Yogin, and from the experience that consists of a single mass of the bliss (ānandaikaghana) of one's own Self that belongs to the highest Yogin and which, being pure (suddha), is devoid of contact (uparāga) with any object of the senses. The reason why aesthetic experience differs from all the above, is because of the absence of beauty caused respectively by the appearance of distractions such as the desire to acquire (arjñādi), the absence of active participation, the absence of clarity (asphuṭatva), and being at the mercy of the object (of contemplation)."

A. Bh. I, 285. Gnoli, p. 21 :

किं तल्लौलिकविभावादिसंयोगबलोन्मनस्तैक्ष्ण्यं चर्वणा। सा च प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमोपमानादिलौकिक- प्रमाणजनितरलाख्यबोधतस्तथा योगिप्रत्यक्षजतत्स्थपरसंविद्विज्ञानात्सकलवैषयिकोपरागशून्यस्यचुद्धपरयोगिगत- स्वास्मानन्दैकघनानुभवाच्च विदिष्यते, एतेषां यथायोगमजननादिविघ्नान्तरोदयततस्तद्स्थरक्तत्वविपर्ययैविशेषवैचित्र्य- कृतसौन्दर्यविरहात्।

Other differences are :

(1) The final state in Vedānta is almost always described (!) as ineffable,1 whereas Ānanda is clear that such an adjective can never be predicated of dhvani. Whether Abhinava agreed or not is not evident.

(2) The Adhikārin in the case of liberation is much more strictly defined that he is for literature. After all, children are perfectly capable of watching a drama, though they might not take away as much as a qualified adult. Sahṛdayatva is a much more worldly and concrete qualification than is mumukṣā.

(3) The drama is not expected (at least Abhinava never says anything about this) to change one’s life radically. To have a profound aesthetic experience is simply satisfying and does not imply that one will be in any sense profoundly altered. One cannot say the same for mystic experiences. Quite apart from the concept of sadyomukti, any deep religious experience is very likely to make a manifest, sometimes drastic, change in a person’s outward life.

(4) It is significant that most writers, (Abhinava is an exception), do not use the term ānanda to describe the purpose of poetry as often as they use the less ethereal term prīti and even more often vinoda, “entertainment”. It is perfectly legitimate to give curiosity as the reason for wishing to see any given drama. But to say the same of religious experience would be unthinkable, at least in ancient India.

(5) With the exception of Abhinava, (who has highly “spiritual” ideas about love, see p. 14) most writers regard the highest expression of drama to be sexual love, without any philosophical implications.

In spite of these differences, such sentiments in regard to aesthetic experience as Abhinava provided, became very common. For instance in the Alaṅkāramahodadhi of Narendraparbha Sūri we read :

1. E. g. Gaudapāda, III, 47 : स्वस्थं शान्तं सनिर्वाणमकृत्यं सुखमुत्तमम् । Ānandavardhana is quite clear that such an adjective can never be predicated of dhvani : येडपि सहदयहृदयसवेदनाख्येयमेव ध्वनिरामनाङ्गासुपुप्टेडपि न परीक्ष्यवादिनः । (D. Āl, p. 162-63). Sahṛdayahrdayasamevedyam is not ambiguous and cannot be Ānanda’s own position, for if it were, this would in no way prove that dhvani was “speakable” but only that it was “knowable” which is not the same thing at all. Moreover, this is confirmed by the passage in the D. Āl., p. 33, where this adjective is given as part of the anākhyeyavāda. We feel that it is quite possible that Abhinava himself, however, did not really agree with this position. It is interesting that he does not comment extensively on the anākhyeyavāda except to hint that it is a Buddhist position, with which Ānanda has dealt elsewhere (Locana, p. 519).

164

शान्तरस

" ( Aesthetic experience is that state ) wherein the mind sinks for a moment, where it bathes with ambrosia for a moment, where it gets drunk for a moment, where it melts away for a moment ".1

Even such a staunchly Vedānta work as the Pañcadaśī of Vidyāraṇya seems to have been influenced by aesthetic speculations in four lovely verses :

" The lamp which is in the theatre lights up equally the manager, the audience and the dancer. Even if they are not present, it shines ",2

" The manager is the ego. The audience are the sense-objects. The dancer is the mind. The keepers of time, etc., are the sense-organs. The illuminating lamp is the Witness ( i. e. the Self ) ".3

" Whatever forms can be imagined with the mind, illuminating all of these, he becomes the Witness of all of them. By himself however he is beyond the reach of words and mind ".4

" How can I experience such a Self ? If you feel this way, then do not ( try ) to experience it. When all experiences cease, then the Witness alone is left ".5

Here is a verse quoted by Jayaratha in the Tantrāloka which seems to sum everything up in a very fine analogy :

" Just as when various objects such as pieces of wood, leaves, stones, etc., fall into a salt-mine they turn into salt, so also emotions ( turn into bliss when they fall into ) the pure consciousness that is our very Self ".6

1. Alañkāramahodadhi of Nārendraprabha Sāri, ed. by L. B. G. J. Pandit, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1942 ( G. O. S. XCV ) :

मुक्त्वा तीव्रं क्षणं चेतः स्नात्वा सौख्याद् क्षणम् । माद्यत् क्षणं यत्र विलीयते इव क्षणम् ॥

The Agnipurāṇa too uses the same terminology as Abhinava :

आक्षरं परसं ब्रह्म सनातनं चिद्वयम् । वेदान्तेषु बदर्‌लक् चैतन्यं ज्योतिरेश्वरम् ॥

आनन्दः सहजस्तस्य व्यक्त्यते कदाचन । व्यक्तिः सा तस्य चैतन्यचमत्काररसादृशा ॥

Ch. 309, vv. 1-2 These verses seem to us clearly derived from Abhinava.

2. Pañcadaśī, X : 11 :

नटशालास्थितो दीपः प्रभुं सम्यङ् नर्तंकिम् । दीपविद्वेषण तदभावेऽपि दीप्यते ॥

3. P.D. X. 14 :

अहंकारः प्रभुः सम्यो विषयो नर्तंकरी मतिः । तालादिव्याप्रियक्षैषु दीपः साक्ष्यवभासकः ॥

4. P.D. X. 23 :

यच्चद्वपादि कल्पयेत् बुद्धया तत्साक्षराश्रयन् । यस्तु तस्य भवेत्साक्षी स्वतो वाङ्मनसोगचरः ॥

5. P.D. X. 24 :

वृं तादृश्यया ग्राह्य इति चेत् नैव गृह्यताम् । सर्वप्रत्युपशान्तौ तु स्वयमेवावशिष्यते ॥

6. T. Āl. Vol. I, p. 30, part two, second āhnika, under verse 35 :

यथा कमार्य पतिता काष्ठपाषाणोपलादवः । लवणत्वाय कल्पन्ते तथा भावाश्चिदात्मनि ॥

APPENDIX

LATER WRITERS ON Śantarasa AND Rasāsvāda :

It is not our main purpose to examine in any detail how the writers of the later tradition deal with the themes supplied by Abhinavagupta. Nonetheless there are certain passages which we feel deserve to be noticed. The three main texts that should be seen are the Kāvyaprakāśa, the Sāhityadarpana and the Rasagangādhara. There are two areas in which we are interested : śantarasa and rasāsvāda. The Kāvyaprakāśa is quite brief on śānta-rasa. At IV. 29 Mammaṭa says :

" Śṛṅgāra, hāsya, karuṇa, raudra, vīra, bhayānaka, bībhatsa and adbhuta—these are stated to be the eight rasas in drama."

Later, at IV. 35 he says :

" Śānta is the ninth rasa, of which nirveda is the sthāyibhāva " and then he gives the stanza ahau vā hāre vā kusumaśayane vā dṛṣadi vā as an example of śantarasa.1 It would seem therefore that according to Mammaṭa, śantarasa has no place in drama, but only in kāvya. But his statement is not unambiguous, and it is possible to interpret him to mean that generally only eight rasas are admitted, but that he would admit also śānta as a ninth.

Viśvanātha, in the Sāhityadarpana, III. 45 ff., has the following remarks on ŚR :

Sāhityadarpana III. 245-250 :

अथ शान्तः -

शान्तः शमस्थायिभाव उत्तमप्रकृतिमतः ।

कुन्देन्दुसुन्दरच्छायः श्रीनारायणदेवतः ।

अनित्यत्वादिनोऽपवस्तुनिःसारता तु या ।

परमात्मस्वरूपं वा तस्यालम्बनमिष्यते ।

पुण्याश्रमहरिक्षेत्रत्रतर्थर्म्यस्मृतादयः ।

महापुरुषसंज्ञास्तस्योद्दीपनरूषिणः ।

रोमाञ्चाद्याश्रुतुभावास्तथा सुवर्ग्यमविचारण ।

निर्वेदहर्षर्मणमतिर्भूतदयादयः ।

1. According to Kṣemendra, Aucityavicāracarcā 29 ( Minor works of Kṣemendra, Sanskrit Academy Series No.7, Hyderabad, 1961, edited by E. V. V. Rāghavācārya and D. G. Padhye ), this stanza was written by Utpalrāja. Kosambi ( " The Epigrams Attributed to Bhartrhari ", Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1948, p. 85 ) includes it among the Saṃśitaślokas, as no. 213.

यथा—

रथ्यान्तश्वरतस्थया धृतजरस्कथालव्याश्चगैः।

सत्रासं च सकौतुकं च सदयं दृश्यस्य तैरङ्गैः।।

निर्ज्जीकृतचित्सुधारसमुद्र निद्रायमानस्य मे।

नि:शङ्कः करटः कदा करपुटीकृतभिक्षां विलुठयिष्यति।।

पुष्टिस్తు महाभारतदै दृश्य्या।

निरहङ्काररूपत्वाद्वायवीरवादिरेष नो।।

दायवीरदै हि नागानन्ददौ जीमूतवाहनोऽन्तरा मल्लयवस्यादनुरागादिरन्ते च

विपाधरचक्रवर्तित्ववादर्शीनादहङ्कारोपशमो न दृश्यते। शान्तस्तु सर्वाङ्करणाहङ्कारप्रश-

मेकरुपपत्तान तत्रान्तर्भावमरहति। अतश्व नागानन्ददः शान्तरसप्रधानत्वमपासतम्।

ननु

“न यत्र दुःखं न सुखं न चिन्ता न द्वेषरागौ न च काञ्चिदिच्छा।

रसः स शान्तः कथितो मुनिन्द्रैः सर्वेषु भावेषु समप्रसारणः।।”

इत्येवरूपसप शान्तस्य मोक्षावस्थायामेवास्मास्वरुपापत्तिलक्षणयां प्रादुर्भावात्तत्र संचार्यादि-

नामभावान्वयेन रसत्वमियुच्यते—

युक्तव्युक्तदशायामवस्थितो यः शमः स एव यतः।

रसतातमेति तदस्मिन्संचार्यादः स्थितिश्व न विरुद्वा।।

यश्वासिन्सुखभावोऽयुक्तस्त्रर वैषयिकसुखपरवात्त विरोधः।

उक्तं हि—

“यच्च कामसुखं लोके यच्च दिव्यं महत्सुखम्।

तृष्णाक्षयसुखस्यैते नाहतत् श्रोत्रियं कलाम्।।”

सर्वाङ्कारमहङ्काररहितत्वं ब्रजन्ति चेत्।

आत्मान्तरङ्कमहति ह्यदयवीरादयस्तथा।।

आदिशब्दादधर्मवीरदानवीरदेवताविषयतिप्रहृतयः।

तत्र देवताविषया रतिर्यथा—

कदा वाराणस्यामिह सुरधुनिरोधसि वस-

न्वसान् कौपीं शिरसि निधानोड्डण्ठलिपुटम्।

अये गौरीनाथ त्रिपुरहर शम्भो त्रिनयन

प्रसीदति क्रोश्निमिषमिव नेष्यामि दिवसान्।।

"Śāntarasa has calmness (śama) as its basic mood. It belongs to the very best of men. It has the white complexion of the Kunda (jasmine) and the moon, and the revered Nārāyaṇa as its presiding deity. Its ālambanavibhāva is the emptiness (or vanity) of all things because of their transient nature, or it is the nature of the supreme Self. Its uddīpanavibhāvas are holy hermitages, sacred places (hāriketra), places of pligrimage, pleasant groves, etc., and the company of great men etc. Its anubhāvas are horripilation, etc. Its vyabhicāribhāvas are self-disparagement, joy, recollection, resolve, kindness towards all beings, etc. Here is an example :

"When will the crows fearlessly carry away the food placed as alms in my joined hands, as I move along the highway wearing an old, worn-out, tattered and inadequate garment, looked at by the citizens on the road with fear, curiosity and pity, sleeping in the unfeigned bliss of relishing the nectar of spirituality ?"

The full development (of śāntarasa) is to be seen in the Mahābhārata, etc.

"Dayāvīra (in which the sthāyibhāva utsāha is based on or is concerned with mercy or benevolence), etc., are not identical with this (śānta), as (śānta) is without even the slightest trace of egoism (while dayāvīra, etc., are marked by egoism)".

In dayāvīra, etc., such as for example in the case of Jimūtavāhana, etc., we do not find an extinction of egoism, in as much as we observe in the middle of the play, Jimūtavāhana's love for Malayavatī, and in the end his attainment of the status of sovereignty over the Vidyādharas. Śānta, however, cannot be included under dayāvīra, etc., because its exclusive nature is the extinction of egoism in every way. Hence the view that in the Nāgānanda, śānta is the dominant sentiment, is refuted.

It may be objected as follows :

"Where there is neither pain, nor pleasure, nor worry, nor hatred, nor affection, that is styled as Śāntarasa by the chief among the sages, that which consists in equality towards all objects".1

How can śāntarasa which is of the nature described above, and which manifests itself only in the state of emancipation (mokṣa), where there is the complete absence of the auxiliary feelings (and the abiding mental moods such as love, etc.) be regarded as a rasa ? We reply as follows :

"Since that tranquillity alone which exists in the state wherein the mind is joined to and also disjoined from the soul (i.e. wherein the soul is not

1. Reading sarvesu bhāvesu samapramāṇah, while in the Daśarūpa, under IV, 45, the reading is sarvesu bhāvesu samapradhānāh.

XXIV

completely absorbed into the absolute ) attains to the nature of rasa, the presence of the auxiliary feelings etc. ( i. e. of the abiding mental moods, the excitants and the ensuants ) is not ruled out ".

As for the statement that there is in śānta the absence even of pleasure, that refers only to worldly pleasure ( vaiṣayikasukha ), and hence, there is no contradiction. For it has been stated :

" The earthly pleasure arising from fulfilment of desires " as well as the great pleasure which is attained in heaven — these are not equal to even a sixteenth part of the happiness arising from the extinction of all desires ".

Dayāvīra, etc., deserve to be included under śānta, provided that they are completely divested of egoism in every way.

The word "etc.", stands for dharmavīra, dānavīra, love having a deity for its object, etc. Amongst these, love having a deity for its object is illustrated in the following stanza :

" When shall I pass my days as a moment, dwelling in Vārāṇasī, on the bank of the divine river ( Ganges ) wearing a loin-cloth, holding my hands joined on my head and crying out : " O lord of Gaurī, destroyer of Tripurā, three-eyed Śambhu, be merciful towards me ! "

The commentary of the Sāhityadarpaṇa on rasāsvāda, while interesting, is too long to include here ( see SD III. 1 and ff. ). This and the commentary of the Kāvyaprakāśa on rasāsvāda ( III. pp. 91-95, Jhalkikar ) are readily available, since there exist translations into English of both these texts ( see Bibliography ). The Rasagaṅgādhara, however, is a different matter, since it has never been translated before. We therefore thought it worthwhile to translate in full Jagannātha's remarks on śāntarasa, and to provide an explanatory translation of his remarks on Abhinava's views on rasāsvāda.

Here is the first text :

Rasagaṅgādhara

स च—

' शृङ्गारः करुणः शान्ता रौद्रो वीरोडुत्साहतथा । हास्यो भयानकश्चैव बीभत्सश्चेति ते नव ॥'

इत्युक्तेन्वयः । मुनिवचनं चात्र मानम् ।

केचित्—

' शान्तस्य शमसाध्यत्वाद्‌टे च तदसंभावात् । अष्टौवेव रसा नाट्ये न शान्तस्तत्र युज्यते ॥'

इत्यादः। तच्चापरे न क्षमन्ते। तथा हि नटे शमाभावादिति हेतुसद्भतेः, नटे रसाभिव्यक्ते-

स्वीकारात्। सामाजिकानां शमवच्चेन तत्र रसोद्रोधे बाधकाभावात्। न च नटस्य

शमाभावाच्चभिनयप्रकाशकत्वानुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम्। तस्य भयक्रोधादेरस्मभावेन तदभिनय-

प्रकाशकताया अभ्यासंगल्यापत्तेः। यदि च नटस्य क्रोधादिभावेन वास्तविककार्याणां वध-

बन्धपीडनाद्यमुपसंप्रेक्ष्येधी क्रोधादिकल्पनाभिः शृङ्गारादिषु नातश्चौ

निरेक्ष्यते, तदा प्रकृतेडपि तुल्यम्। अथ नाट्ये गीतवाद्यादीनां विरोधिनां सत्त्वात् सामा-

जिकेष्वपि विषयवैमुख्यासम्भनः शान्तस्य कयमुद्रेक इति चेत्, नाट्ये शान्तरससम्भ्युपगच्छेद्रिः

फलवळाच्चरीतिव्यावादेस्तस्मिन्निरोधिताया अकल्पनात्। विषयचिन्तासामान्यस्य तत्र विरोधित्व-

स्वीकारे तदीयाsलम्बनस्य संसारनिवृत्त्यस्य तदुद्दीपनस्य पुराणश्रवणसंस्कारपुष्टवनतीर्थावलोक-

नोदेरपि विषयल्वेन विरोधित्वाप्तेः। अत एव च चरमाध्वाये संगीतललकारे-

अष्टावेव रसा नाट्येऽभिति केचित् चूचुदुः।

तद्चारु, यतः कचित् रसं स्वदते नटः ॥

इत्यादिना नाट्येऽपि शान्तो रसोऽस्तीति व्यवस्थापितम्। तैरपि नाट्ये शान्तो रसो नारती-

त्युपगम्यते तदैव बाधकाभावेन महाभारतादिप्रबन्धानां शान्तरसप्रधानतया आख्येष्टलोका-

नुभवसिद्धत्वाच्च काव्ये सोडवस्यं स्वीकार्यः। अत एव 'अष्टौ नाट्ये रसाः स्मृताः' इत्युप-

क्रम्य 'शान्तोऽपि नवमो रसः' इति मम्मटभट्टोऽप्युपसमर्थः।

Rasagangādhara 1

Rasa is ninefold, because of the statement :

"Śṛṅgāra, karuṇa, śānta, raudra, vīra, adbhuta,

hāsya, bhayānaka, and bībhatsa — thus they are nine".2

And in this matter 3 the statement of the Sage ( Bharata ) is the final authority.

But there are some who say : 4

"Because śānta can be developed only from ( the sthāyibhāva ) śama, and because śama is impossible in an actor, there are only eight rasas in drama;

śānta has no place in it ". This is not, however, accepted by others. They say that the argument advanced ( by the advocates of eight rasas ) namely that

1. We have used the KM (12) Ed. 1939, p. 35 ff.

2. We do not know where this verse could come from. We take it that Jagannātha is saying that it is based on the Nāṭyaśāstra, not that it comes from the NS.

3. Atra means : aśmin viṣaye, namely rasasākkyāśraye.

4. Apare includes Jagannātha himself. He of course accepts the existence of śantarasa.

śama is not possible in an actor, does not stand to reason, because we do not accept that the revelation ( i.e. aesthetic enjoyment ) of rasa ( ever ) takes place in an actor.1 As the spectators (on the other hand) can experience tranquillity, there is no difficulty in the arousal of ( śānta ) rasa in them. It would not be proper to say that as the actor ( himself ) is devoid of śama, he cannot be capable of acting in a manner congenial to śama. For in that case, it will have to be accepted that, since an actor is devoid of ( genuine ) fear and ( genuine ) anger, etc., he would not be capable of acting in a manner congenial to fear, anger, etc. also. Now, if there is nothing objectionable in the actor's being able to manifest, through special training, repeated practice, etc., the artificial effects of anger, etc., although there is no possibility in his case of the real effects of anger, etc., i.e. although he cannot actually kill or imprison ( the object of his anger ), then the same should apply in the case of śama as well. It may now be asked : “ How can there be the emergence ( udreka ) of śānta in the minds of spectators (of a drama), since there is in a drama vocal and instrumental music, etc., all of which are opposed ( to the suggestion of the sthāyibhāva śama ), and since śānta is by its nature averse to the contemplation of worldly objects (e.g. music, dance, etc. )?” The reply is that those who admit the existence of śānta in drama, do not believe that the presence of vocal and instrumental music in a drama acts as a hindrance to the emergence of śānta, for the very reason that the result ( namely the emergence of śānta ) is actually experienced ( phalabalāt ). If now it is maintained ( by the opponent ) that the contemplation of any worldly object is detrimental to the emergence of śānta, then ( even in the case of non-dramatic poetry ), the ālambanavibhāva of śama such as the transitory nature of worldly existence, and its uddīpanavibhāvas such as listening to the recitation of the Purāṇas, association with saintly people, visiting sacred penance-groves and holy places ( tīrtha ), being worldly objects ( after all ), will have to be regarded as detrimental to the emergence of śānta ( in the minds of the readers of non-dramatic poetry ). It is for this very reason that in the last chapter of the Sangītaratnākara, it has been said :

“ Some have urged that in dramatic compositions ( nātyeṣu ) there are only eight rasas. But that is not ( at all ) correct ( acāru — unconvincing ), because no actor ever actually relishes any rasa whatsoever ”.2

1. Jagannātha does not accept the fact that the actor has rasa. Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, however, A. Bh., p. 264 ( Vol. I ) believed that he does : rasabhāvānām api rāsa-veśyaśama nate sambhavād anusamdhibalāc ca layādyanusaraṇāt ( for this phrase cf. Locāna, Uddyota, II, p. 184, last line ). Note too Daśarūpa, IV. 42 — kāvyārtha-bhāvanāsvādo nartakasyā na vāryate.

2. Sangītaratnākara, VII. 1360, p. 400 of the Ed. by G. S. Sastri, Vol. IV, Adyar Library, 1933, Madras.

APPENDIX

171

By means of this and similar arguments it has been established ( in that work ) that śāntarasa exists ( even in dramatic poetry ). Even those who hold the view that śāntarasa has no place in dramatic poetry ( nāṭya ) will have necessarily to accept its existence in non-dramatic poetry ( kāvya ), ( firstly ) because there are no such objections ( to its acceptance in non-dramatic poetry ) as given earlier, and ( secondly ) because it has been established on the strength of all people's actual experience that works like she Mahā-bhārata have śāntarasa as their dominant emotional mood. It is for this very reason that ( a great scholar like ) Mammata-bhaṭṭa first opened his discussion ( on the number of rasas ) with the words " eight are the rasas in drama " 1 and concluded his treatment of the subject with the remark : " śānta too has to be admitted as the ninth rasa ( in non-dramatic poetry )". 2

Of these -- love, sorrow, disaffection, anger, enthusiasm, wonder mirth, fear and disgust are the abiding mental moods respectively ". 3

ON THE sthāyibhāva OF śānta

(The sthāyibhāva of śānta, namely ) nirveda 4 ( " world-weariness " ) is a peculiar state-of-mind ( cittavrttiviśeṣa ) which is also called by the name viṣayavirāga ( " aversion to worldly objects of enjoyment " ) arising from contemplation on the eternal Reality ( nityavastu ) and the non-ternal phenomenal appearances in the world ( anityavastu ). If, however, nirveda is ( not the result of such contemplation, but is ) the result of domestic quarrels, etc., it is regarded as a vyabhicāribhāva ( a transient mood ) ( since it is of a transitory nature ). 5

Now here is a difficult passage from the Rasagangādhara on rasa : 6

समुचिततल्लक्षणसन्निवेशाचारुणा काव्येन समर्पितैः सहृदयहृदयप्रविष्टेरतदीय-सहृदयतासहकृतेन भावनाविशेषमहिम्ना त्रिगुणिततुण्यन्तर्मणीरिवादिभिरलौकिकविभावानु-भावव्यभिचारिशृङ्गारादिव्यपदेश्यैः, चन्द्रिकादिमिरुढीपितकरणैः, अश्रूपातादिमि: कांतादिमि:, चिन्तादिमि: सहकारिभिः, सम्भूय प्रादुर्भावितनेकोपिकेन व्यापारेण तत्त्कालनिरवर्तितानन्दाश्रणज्ञानजननात एव प्रमुख्यतमपरिमितप्रकृष्टप्रतीतिजधर्मेण प्रमात्रा स्वप्रकाशतया वास्त्वेन निजस्वरूपानन्दन सह गोचररीक्रियामः प्रागनिविष्ट्वासनारुपो रस्यादिरेव रसः !

1. KP., IV. p. 98 (Jhalkikar's edition ).

2. KP., IV. 35, p. 117.

3. रति: शोकश् निर्वेदरोत्साहाश्र हर्ष विस्मयः । हासो भयं जुगुप्सा च स्थायिभावा: कमादमी ॥

4. निलानिलस्वलुविचारजन्मा (चिच्चैत्तवविशेष:) विपयविरागाख्यो निर्वेद: शृङ्गालादिजसु व्यभिचारी !

5. On the two kinds of nirveda, see the A. Bh., ( Raghavan's ed. p. 105 ), surely the source of Jaganatha's remarks.

6. Pages 25-27 KM. edition 1939.

तथा चाहुः - ‘ व्यक्तः स तैर्विभावाद्यैः स्थायिभावो रसः स्मृतः ’ इति । व्यक्तो व्यक्तिविपयीकृतः । व्यक्तिकृत् भग्नावरणा चित् । यथा हि शरावादिना पिहितो दीपस्तज्ज्-वृत्तौ संनिहितान्तः प्रकाशते, स्वयं च प्रकाशते, एवमात्मचैतन्यं विभावादिसंवलितान् रत्यादीन् । अन्तःकरणधर्माणां साक्षिभास्यत्वाभ्युपगतः । विमावादीनामपि स्मृततुरगादीनामिव रज्जूभ्रमादीनामिव साक्षिभास्यत्वमविरुद्धम् । व्यज्जकस्य विभावादेच्चवणया आवरण-भञ्जस्य वोपचितिविनाशाभ्यामुत्पत्तिविनाशौ रसे उपचर्येते वर्णनिसततायामिव व्यज्जकताल्वादिव्यापारस्य गकारादौ । विभावादिचर्वणावधिवृत्तावधान्नस्य, निवृत्तायां तस्यां प्रकाश्याडवृत्ताविधिमानोडपि स्थायी न प्रकाशते ।

यदाह विमावादिचर्वणामहिम्ना सहृदयस्य निजसहृदयतावशोन्मथितेन तत्तत्स्थाय्युप-हितख्वरूपानन्दकारा समाधावित्र योगिनः स्वचित्तवृत्तिरुपजायते, तन्मयैभवनमिति यावत् । आनन्दो ह्ययं न लौकिकसुखान्तरसाधारणः अनन्तःकरणवृत्तिरुपपत्तः । इत्यं चाभिनव-गुरुम्मटभट्टादिप्रन्यखलरसयेन भग्नावरणचिदिदं शिष्टो रत्यादिः स्थायी भावो रस इति स्थितम् ।

वरतुतस्तु वक्ष्यमाणश्रुतिस्वारस्येन रत्यादिबाह्यत्ना भग्नावरणा चिदेव रसः । सर्वथैव चास्या विशिष्टात्मनो विशेषणं विशेष्यं वा निश्चयमादाय निलयं स्वप्रकाशत्वं च सिद्धम् । रत्यादिबञ्चमादाय तन्निष्ठयमितरभावस्यं च । चर्चणा चास्य चिद्वतावरणभञ्ज एव प्रागुक्ता, तदाकारान्तःकरणवृत्तिः । इयं च परमार्थस्वादात्मसादृश्येन, विभावादि-विषयसंवलितचिदालम्बनत्वात् । भोग्या च कार्यव्यापारमात्रात् । अयास्यां सुखांशभाने किं मानमिति चेत्समाधावापि तद्व्राने किं मानमिति पर्यनुयोगस्य तुल्यत्वात् । ‘ सुखमाल्य-त्तिकं यत्सद्बुद्धिग्राह्यमतीन्द्रियं ’ इत्यादिः शब्दोऽस्ति ततः मानमिति चेत्, अस्यत्रापि ‘ रसो वै सः, रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वानन्दी भवति ’ इति श्रुतिः, सकलसहृदयप्रत्यक्षं चेति प्रमाणद्वयम् । यद् द्वितीयपक्षं तदाकाराच्चिद्वृत्तिमात्रं रसत्वेन व्यस्तं स च शब्द-व्यापाराभ्यन्वाच्छाद्यते । अपरोक्षसुवालम्बनत्वाच्चापरोक्षाभिका । तच्च्वात्रैक्यबुद्धिद्वितत् । इत्याहुरभिनवगुप्ता वैय्याकरणाः ।

"Rasa—aesthetic enjoyment—is the sthāyibhāva rati, etc., which is of the form of a mental impression, already crystallised in the mind and implanted in the mind since the time of birth (or since time immemorial) and cognised (or perceived) by the cogniser (i. e. by the reader or spectator) along with the joy of self-realisation (nijasvarūpānandena saha) which is absolutely real (and not imaginary), as it is self-luminous (svaprakāśa)

(and does not require anything else to illuminate it). This cognition of a sthāyibhāva (such as rati, etc.,) is the result of an extraordinary function (of words and senses) (i. e. it is brought by the function called suggestion). (This suggestion) is produced (prādurbhāvita) by the appropriate ālambana-vibhāvas, uddīpanavibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas (described in the poem or represented on the stage) acting jointly and simultaneously (sambhūya). The extraordinary function (namely suggestion) which is thus brought into play as a result of the vibhāvas, etc., immediately removes the ignorance which acts as a screen (or veil) covering up (or obscuring) the blissful consciousness of the Self. And when the screen of ignorance is thus removed, the cogniser rises superior to and becomes divested of his peculiar properties such as being a limited cogniser (etc.).

The vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas are first presented by the poet or dramatist to the reader (or spectator) through the medium of the poem (or drama) which is charming because of the appropriate and beautiful literary style (adopted for conveying the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas). These vibhāvas, etc., enter (i. e., make an impression on) the mind of the appreciative, sympathetic reader (or spectator). Then by the power of the peculiar mental reflection (on the vibhāvas etc.), on the part of the reader and in cooperation with his appreciative attitude, the vibhāvas etc., become divested of their individualistic limitations and become universalised (or generalised), and vibhīvas like Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā lose their individualistic natures as Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā and stand out before us in the universal character of manhood and womanhood in general. In the realm of poetics, fundamental causal factors like Śakuntalā, exciting causal factors like moonlight, effect-factors like the shedding of tears and collateral, accessory effect-factors, like anxiety etc., are designated by the names ālambanavibhāva, uddīpanavibhīva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva respectively. They are extra-worldly (alaukika, i. e. they are idealised (and not presented as they exist in ordinary life) so as to serve the purpose of awakening and nourishing a particular mental mood (such as love etc.). In the ordinary world they are called ālambanakāraṇa, uddīpakāraṇa, kārya and sahakārin, but when idealised so as to suit the atmosphere of poetry and drama, they are known by the names vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāri-bhāvas.

"For it has been said that a sthāyibhāva revealed (or suggested) by the vibhāvas etc. is called by the name of rasa".1 Revealed (or suggested) means "made the object of revelation (or suggestion)". Now vyakti (revelation) (in the context of rasa-realisation) means consciousness (pure,

1. KP. IV. 28, p. 86, (Jhalkikar's edition).

blissful consciousness of the Self), from which the enveloping screen is (temporarily) removed (bhagnāvaranā cid). Just as a lamp covered by an earthen bowl (or wicker-basket) begins to shine by it self, and illumines nearby objects as soon as the cover is taken away, in the same way pure consciousness in the form of the ātman( i. e. the ātman who is pure consciousness and supreme bliss), which is covered by ignorance, desire etc. begins to shine on its own (svayam prakāśate) and illumines the sthāyibhāvas like rati, etc., along with (appropriate) vibhāvas, etc. For the sthāyibhāvas like rati are the properties (or attributes) of the mind (in as much as they are of the form of mental impressions or instincts embedded in the mind) and hence they are admitted (by rhetoricians and Vedāntins) to be capable of being illumined by the sākṣin (i. e. the ātman consisting of pure consciousness) (as soon as the enveloping veil in the form of ignorance, desire etc., is removed). There should be no difficulty in accepting that even the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas are illumined by the ātman (although they possess an objective character and are objective entitities like ghaṭa, paṭa, etc.), on the analogy of the horse etc. seen in a dream, or on the analogy of the silver (erroneously) perceived in a piece of tin (rangarājata). According to this view rasa is nothing but the subtle, latent instincts like love etc. As these instincts are permanent moods of the mind, rasa also is permanent in character. Now the question arises, how rasa is said to come into existence and cease to exist if it is permanent in its nature. The answer is that origination (utpatti) and cessation (vināśa) really belong to the aesthetic experience (carvanā) of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas which are the suggestors of the rasa. Or origination and cessation may be said to belong to the āvaranabhaṅga (removal of the screen in the form of ignorance, desire etc. which covers up the blissful consciousness). But the origination and cessation are metaphorically transferred to rasa by lakṣaṇā (rase upacaryate). For this an illústration is given from the sphoṭa doctrine of the grammarians. The letters in the form of sphoṭa are really eternal. But they are in ordinary language spoken of as subject to origination and cessation, only in a metaphorical sense. They are said to be subject to origination and cessation because of the origination and cessation of the contacts between the places of articulation (palate etc.) and the articulators (tip of the tongue etc.). The duration of the removal of the screen of ignorance, desire, worldly distractions etc., is conditioned by the enjoyment (carvanā) of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas (i. e. the removal of the screen of ignorance etc., lasts only so long as the enjoyment of the vibhāvas etc., last). The moment the enjoyment of the vibhāvas etc., comes to an end, the light of one's own blissful consciousness becomes veiled once again by the power of ignorance, desire, worldly distractions etc., and the light of consciousness that until now illumined the sthāyi-

bhāvas being itself enveloped, the sthāyibhāvas though permanent ( i.e. though present and exisiting all along ), do not shine any longer, and their enjoyment comes to an end. This is the reason why, and this is the sense in which, rasa is said to be subject to origination and cessation.

Or we may say as follows : because of the enjoyment of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas, which enjoyment is evoked ( or is called into play, unmiṣitā ) by the sympathetic attitude of the appreciative reader or spectator), the mind of the appreciative reader or spectator dwelling on the various sthāyibhāvas, becomes transformed into the blissful consciousness which is the nature of the ātman, just as in the case of a Yogin, his mind becomes transformed into blissful consciousness during deep meditation ( samādhi ). This transformation of the mind into the blissful consciousness ( which is the real nature of the ātman ) amounts to the identification of the mind with blissful consciousness ( tanmayībhavanā ). Now this bliss is not comparable with any of the ordinary worldly joys; because ordinary worldly joys are a property of the mind ( antahkarana ), ( while this bliss, kāvyānanda, is the essence of the ātman itself ). ( Really speaking kāvyānanda is not identical with brahmānanda or brahmāsvāda, because it is produced by the laukikasāmagrī, such as the contemplation of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhavas as described in a poem or exhibited in a drama, and so it is essentially laukika. But still it is alaukika in the sense that it is not comparable to any of the joys of this world. At the time of experiencing worldly joys, the ātman enters into contact with the mind so that laukikānanda is cittavṛttisamyuktacaitanyarūpa. But Kāvyānanda—or rasacarvanānyānanda—is śuddhacaitanyarūpa, i.e. at the time of experiencing rasāsvāda the cittavṛtti itself becomes transformed into the bliss of pure consciousness ). Jagannātha sums up the view of Abhinavagupta and his followers on rasa realisation as follows :

" Thus in the light of the real intention ( svārasya i.e. abhipraya ) of the works of Abhinavagupta and of Mammata and others, rasa is a sthāyibhāva such as rati, characterised by blissful consciousness ( i.e. becoming the object of pure, blissful consciousness which is the ātman's real nature ) from which the covering lid has been removed ( bhagnāvaraṇacidviṣayabhūtaḥ ). But, says Jagannātha, really speaking the view of Abhinavagupta and Mammata ought to be stated as follows : rasa is the blissful consciousness itself from which the covering lid ( of ignorance, desire and worldly distractions ) has been removed and of which the sthāyibhāvas like rati have become the object ( ratyādyavacchinnā bhagnāvaraṇā cid eva rasah ). This emended statement of the view of Abhinavagupta and Mammata is based on the śruti passage : raso vai saḥ. rasaṃ hy evāyaṃ labdhvā ānandī bhavati. The difference between the two statements of Abhinava-

xxv

gupta's and Mammata's view consists in the shifting of the viśeṣanaviśeṣya-

bhāva. According to the first statement bhagnāvaranā cid becomes the viśeṣaṇa

and ratyādisthāyibhāva becomes the viśeya. According to the second state-

ment, ratyādisthāyibhāva becomes the viśeṣaṇa and bhagnāvaranā cid becomes

the viśeya. But according to Jagannātha, the second statement is much more

in harmony with the śruti passage quoted above, although the first statement is

in keeping with what Abhinavagupta and Mammata have actually said in their

works. “But in any case, (i. e. under both the statements) the element of con-

sciousness (cidamśa) is either a viśeṣaṇa (in the first statement) or a viśeya

(in the second statement), and one thing is certain (or established) that rasa is

eternal (nitya) and self-luminous (svaprakāśa), because rasa is vitally con-

nected with the cidamśa (either as viśeṣaṇa or as viśeya) and the cidamśa is

eternal and self-luminous. Thus from the point of view of the cidamśa, rasa is

eternal and self-luminous, though from the point of view of the ratyādisthāyi-

bhāva it is non-eternal (anitya) and illumined by something else (para-

prakāśa or itarabhāsya).” (Hence both the remarks, namely rasah nityah

svaprakāśaś ca and rasah anityah itarabhāsyaś ca, are justifiable from their

respective viewpoints.)

Jagannātha then goes on to say that the relishing of rasa is nothing but

the breaking off (or withdrawal) of the screen (or mantle) (of ignorance,

etc.) covering the pure consciousness (cidgataivaraṇabhaṅgah) or the trans-

formation of the mind into the bliss of pure consciousness which is the

nature of the ātman (tadākāratā, i. e. svasarūpāndakārā, antaḥkaraṇavṛttih).

Now this aesthetic enjoyment (rasacarvanā) is different from (and is not

identical with) the meditational trance (samādhi or brahmāsvāda). For it

has for its object (ālambana) the bliss of pure consciousness blended with

the cognitions (or consciousness) of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāri-

bhāvas—which are worldly or mundane matters (viṣaya, i. e. sāṃsārikapadār-

tha). But brahmāsvāda or parabrahmasākṣātkāra is not mixed or blended

with the cognition (or consciousness) of worldly matters. (It is viśuddha-

brahmāsvādaka or ātmānandaviṣayaka). Further, aesthetic enjoyment (rasā-

svāda or rasacarvanā) is the outcome of the special function, namely

vyañjanā peculiar to poetry, while brahmāsvāda is the outcome of the process

laid down in the Upaniṣads, viz. śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana, etc. [Thus

there is a difference between rasāsvāda and brahmāsvāda with regard to the

viṣaya (object) and the means (karaṇa or sādhana).]

We translate the next section (beginning : athāsyāṃ sukhāṃśabhāne’pi,

etc.) :

“Objection : what evidence or authority (mānam) is there for holding

that in rasāsvāda (or rasacarvanā) there is the experience of an element of

happiness (joy or pleasure) (sukhāṃśa)?

Reply : A similar counter-question ( paryanuyoga ) could be raised in regard to samādhi ( or brahmāsvāda ). In other words it may be asked : what is the evidence ( or authority ) for saying that in meditational trance also there is the experience of happiness ( or bliss ) ?

Objection : Why, there is the following evidence ( in the form of a quotation from the Bhagavadgītā, to prove that in brahmāsvāda there is the experience of bliss ). The Gītā says ( VI. 21 ) : sukham ātyantikam vat tad buddhigrāhyam atīndriyam—which means that brahmāsvāda is full of happiness which is super-sensuous, which is perceptible directly by the intellect ( intuition ) and which is ātyantika, i. e. transcending every other kind of mundane joy.

Reply : we ( too ) have the authority of a scriptural ( upaniṣadic ) statement to prove that rasāsvāda is full of happiness. The scriptural statement is : raso vai saḥ. rasam hy evāyaṃ labdhvā ānandī bhavati.

[ Actually, however, this scriptural statement refers to the ātman and not to aesthetic experience. The proper meaning of the statement is : “ That ( ātman ) is surely ( vai ) rasa ( joy or bliss ). Having realised ( ātman which is ) rasa ( bliss ) he becomes happy or blissful.” ] In the first part of the quotation, the ātman is equated with rasa ( i. e. ānanda—supreme joy or bliss ). In the second part of the quotation it is said that having realised that ātman which is rasarūpa or ānandarūpa, he, i. e. the spiritual aspirant ( sādhaka ), becomes supremely happy ( ānandī bhavati ). But Jagannātha seems to have understood both parts of the quotation as referring to rasa in poetry or drama, i. e. as referring to aesthetic experience. He understood the second part to mean : “ having realised rasa, i. e. the emotional flavour, he ( i. e. the sahṛdaya or sāṃājika ) becomes supremely happy ”. But we doubt very much if the quotation from the Upaniṣad is capable of such an interpretation ]

“ In addition to this scriptural statement serving as evidence to show that rasāsvāda is ānandarūpa, the ānandarūpatva of rasāsvāda is borne out by a second authority, namely the direct experience of the sahṛdaya.” Jagannātha means that just as the ānandarūpatva of the brahmāsvāda is supported by the quotation from the Bhagavadgītā, and by actual experience of the Yogins, in the same way the ānandarūpat of rasāsvāda is supported by the scriptural passage given above ( namely : raso vai saḥ. rasam hy evāyaṃ labdhvā ānandī bhavati ) and by the direct experience of the sāhṛdaya.

Here is our translation of the next section : yeyam dviṭīyapakṣe, etc. : “ The rasacarvāṇa ( or rasāsvāda ) which has been described by us above in connection with the second statement of Abhinavagupta's view as consisting in a mental condition transformed into the bliss which is the ātman, well,

that rasacarvanā ( or rasāsvāda ) is both śabda ( verbal ) and aparokṣa ( i. e. of the nature of direct experience — pratyakṣarūpa ). Jagannātha means that it is śabda because it is induced by sabdavyāpāra, namely vyanjanā, and by abhidhā which always precedes vyanjanā. Rasacarvanā ( or rasāsvāda ) is aparokṣa ( i. e. pratyakṣarūpa ) because its object is ātmānanda ( aparokṣa-sukhālambanatvāt ). Thus rasāsvāda is both śabda ( i. e. śabdavya-pārabhāvya ) and aparokṣa, just as the knowledge of the identity between the jīvātman and the paramātman, arising out of the Upaniṣadic statement—tat tvam asi—, is śabda in so far as it is the outcome of the sentence tat tvam asi, and is also aparokṣa ( i. e. pratyakṣarūpa ) as it is a matter of direct, actual experience ( sākṣātkāra ) for the spiritual aspirant ( yogin ).

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ADDENDUM

P. IV, fn. 1. : See the article by M. V. Patwardhan and J. L. Masson :

"Jagannātha on the Definition of Poetry ", Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda ( to appear shortly ).

P. IX, line 12 : We must point out in all fairness, that this ascription is given only in the commentary of Rāvicandra ( see the Bhūmikā to the third edition of the Amaruśataka in the NSP, 1954) and not in the Vedānta tradition itself. Mādhavā (Vidyāranya) does not mention the legend in the Śankaradigvijaya even though he does tell the story of his seeking sexual knowledge in order to respond to the questions of Sāradā, Maṇḍanamiśra's wife. After having studied and put into practice Vātsyāyana's Kāmasūtra, he is also credited with a work on erotics :

svayaṃ vyadhattābhinavārthagarbhaṃ nibandhaṃ ekāṃ ṇpavesadhārī /

( from Narāyaṇa Rāmācārya's Bhūmikā, p. 1 to the Amaru ).

The most commonly held belief of the Vedāntasampradāya in relation to sexual love is expressed very graphically by Vidyāraṇya in his Śañkaradigvijaya, VIII. 25 ( p. 303, Ānandāśrama ed. ) :

yāsāṃ stanyaṃ tvayā pītaṃ yāsāṃ jāto 'si yonitaḥ / tāsu mūrkhatamaṃ striṣu paśuvad ramase katham //

But then, with the honorable exception of Kashmir Śaivism, what religious system has been fair to women ?

P. XIV, line 11 : Abhinava uses this same simile again in the Locana, p. 212 and adds : akaluṣodakadṛṣṭāntena, on the analogy of a clean piece of cloth that is dipped into clear water and absorbs all the water. In the same way the sensitive reader absorbs poetry.

P. 2, fn. 1 : On p. 223, Vol. II of the A. Bh., Abhinava disagrees with Bhaṭṭatauta. It should be noted that Ānanda too is not bound by tradition. Thus on p. 340 of the D. Āl. he says that it is a mistake to slavishly follow the doctrine of Bharata :

..........na tu kevalam śāstrathitisaṃpādanecchayā,

..........bharatamatusaraṇamātrecchayā ghaṭanāṃ.

P. 2, fn. 3, line 7 : There is no doubt that Ānandavardhana knew Vakpatirāja's poem, for on p. 173 ( B. P. ed. ) of the D. Āl. he quotes a Prākrit verse which is No. 406 of the Gauḍavaho. See J. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan : " The Dhvanyāloka and the Gauḍavaho ", to be published in the

190

commemoration volume for D. D. Kosambi (M. A. C. S. Research Institute, Popular Book Depot, Bombay).

P. 3. fn. 2 : In view of Abhinava’s elaborate commentary on the Nātyaśāstra, it is needless to stress the importance of this work for his own theories of aesthetics. See the present authors’ forthcoming book : “Nātyaśāstra VI, with Translated Excerpts from the Abhinavabhāratī”, Deccan College Monograph Series.

P. 3, fn. 1 : See J. Masson : “On the Authenticity of the so-called Bhāmahavivaraṇa of Udbhata” forthcoming in the Indo-Iranian Journal.

P. 4, line 10 : Cf. Bhāmaha, V. 3, quoted on p. 55.

P. 5, last line of the footnote : this verse is also found in the Rāmāyana, Ayodhyākānḍa, 105, 24.

P. 6, line 8 : Ānanda’s main contribution to literary criticism in India was that he asked, for the first time, the really serious and fundamental questions, e. g. : “What distinguishes great poetry from good poetry?” “Where does the essence of poetic experience really lie?” “What is the true purpose of figures of speech ?” “How important is style?” See J. Masson : “Philosophy and Literary Criticism in Ancient India”, in the forthcoming “International Journal of Indian Philosophy” Vol. I, No. 1, edited by B. K. Matilal.

P. 14, line 1 : In Vol. III. of the NS (G. O. S.), p. 185, Bharata says that love lies at the base of all emotions. प्रायेण सर्वभावानां कामः स्याद्विपत्तिरिष्यते ।

At XXII, 99 Bharata says that women are the source of all pleasure ! सुखस्य हि द्वयो मूलम् । Perhaps love was chosen as all-important by literary critics because in the drama, as in real life, it is its own reward. Cf. the lovely verse from Bhoja’s Sarasvatīkanṭhābharaṇa V. 74 :

yad eva rocate mahyaṃ tad eva kurute priyā / iti vetti, na jānāti tat priyaṃ yat karoti sā //

P. 16, fn. 2 : By oversight, we omitted the translation of the first three lines of the Skt. text from the A. Bh. Here they are: “Only those ( spectators ) whose hearts are like a clean mirror do not, at the time of watching a play (tātra), come under the influence of emotions like anger, infatuation, sexual desire, etc., which are (emotions only) appropriate to everyday life, (and not to the changes we undergo when watching a drama). For those (self-controlled people), when they listen to the ten types of drama, the collection of rasas (i. e. the various rasas) presented by means of dramatic representation (i. e. presented in a drama — nāṭyalakṣaṇaḥ) and

perceived through aesthetic experience consisting in generalised ( i. e. depersonalised ) imaginative delight ( rasanā ) is of course quite evident ( sphuṭa eva ). But for those who are not able to control their everyday emotions...

P. 18, line 13: Abhinava quotes the following definition of pratibhā in the Locana, p. 91 : pratibhä apūravastunirmänakṣamā prajñā. “ Imagination is that form of intelligence which is able to create new things. ”

P. 20, line 15: We wonder though, if it is not possible to interpret the words sämänyagunayagena in the line: yadi kävyärthasamśritair vibhävänubhävyañjitair ekonapañcäśadbhävaiḥ sämänyagunayogenäbhinispädyante rasäs tat katham sthäyina eva bhävä rasatvam äpnuvanti, found in the NS, VII. after verse 7 ( p. 349, Vol. I of the G. O. S. ed. ), as a reference to sädharanïkarana. It would be most interesting to see how Abhinava comments on this line. Unfortunately, his commentary on the 7th Adhyäya has not been found yet.

P. 22, line 1: Note Abhinava in Vol. III. p. 124 of the A. Bh. on the paramätman and drama.

P. 24, fn. 3, line 11 : Cf. A. Bh. Vol. III. p. 309: yat tu bhattanävakenoktam “ siddher api nātoder angatyam vrajantyäs tatpakse 'yam iti ” tena nätyängatä samarthitaphalañ ca purusärthatväd iti kevalam jaiminir anusṛta ity alam anena.

P. 29, line 16: This is an error on our part for which we apologise. What Professor Pandey actually wrote ( in a personal letter to Mr. Masson, May 1, 1969 ) is: “ Bhäskara Kantha, the author of the commentary Bhäskarï on the İsvara Pratyabhijñä Vimarsinï of Abhinavagupta wrote a long commentary on it, the fragment of which I saw in Srinagar which his descendants possess. ”

P. 34, fn. 1 : Änandavardhana, on p. 487 of the D. Äl. quotes a stanza which earlier writers claimed to be an example of vyajastuti ( which Änanda rejects, since there can be no gunibhütayngyatä in V. and Änanda regards this verse as an ex. of aprastutapraśamsä ). On page 489 he says that the stanza is commonly attributed to Dharmakirti: tathä cäyam dharmakirteḥ śloka iti prasiddhiḥ. He then goes on to say that that is perfectly possible in the light of another stanza ( which he quotes ) that is definitely ( Locana: nirvivädatadīyaśloka ) by Dharmakirti.

P. 34. fn. 1, line 10 : Tat tanmataparikṣäyäm granthäntare nirüpiyiṣyämaḥ means : “ We will deal with this in another work, in the examination of the Buddhist views ”. Now the most usual way of understanding this is to assume that Änanda wrote a general work of philosophy ( like the Sarvadarśanasangraha ), in which he examined critically several different philoso-

XXVII

phies. Abhinava's remarks, which are based on first-hand knowledge, are confusing. Dharmottara wrote a commentary on Dharmakirti's Pramāṇa-viniścaya called the Viniścayaṭīkā, that has been preserved in the Tibetan Tanjur, though not in Sanskrit ( see Dharmottarapradīpa, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. II, Patna, 1955 - We are indebted to Professor J. W. de Jong for this information). Vivṛti can either mean“ an explanation ”

in general, or it can be an actual commentary ( e. g. Nāṭyavedavivṛti, and Pratyabhijñāvivṛti ). We could translate Abhinava's remarks as follows : “ Another work ” refers to the commentary ( vivṛti ) called Dharmottarī on the Viniścayaṭīkā by the author of this work (i. e. the D. Āl., that is, Ānanda-vardhana ). This ( issue ) has been explained in that work. ” Or Dharmo-ttarī could be the name of the commentary on the Viniścaya ( i.e. Darmakirti's Pramāṇaviniścaya ). In this case the meaning would be : “ That issue has

been discussed in the gloss which was written by this author ( namely Ānanda ) on the Dharmottarī, a commentary on the Viniścaya. ” This would mean that Ānanda wrote an actual commentary on a Buddhist text. To our knowledge, there is no commentary by a Hindu writer on a Buddhist text. The work, therefore, would be unique. But we have seen that much of what Ānandavardhana did was unique, and this need not deter us from explaining

the lines in the manner we have. Jacobi ( ZDMG Vol. 57, p. 328 ) writes : Nach Abhinavagupta in Niścayaṭīkā, bei der Erklärung der Dharmottarā. Es scheint nämlich dharmottamāyā statt dharmottamāyām gelesen werden zu müssen." The reading dharmottamāyā is found in the KM ed. of the D. Āl. ( 1935 ed. )

P. 46, fn. 1 : Note that Viśvanātha speaks of this Nārāyaṇa as being his great-great grandfather ( vrddhaprapitāmaha i. e. prapitamahapitrā ) SD. III. 2–3.

P. 51, line 12 : cf. NŚ XIX. 146 ( Vol. III, p. 80 ) :

yasmāt svabhāvaṃ santyajya sāṃgopāṅgagatikramair / prayujyate jñāyate ca tasmād vai naṭakam smr̥tam //

P, 53, Note that Abhinava in the A. Bh. Vol. III, p. 124, remarks that the spectator does not think he is watching an actor, but feels it is the original character he is watching : prekṣakapakṣe na naṭābhimānas, tatra hi rāmābhimāna iti darśayati.

P. 99, last line of text : In the A. Bh. śāntarasaprakaraṇa, Abhinava twice ( once in the case of the jātyamśakas and again for the Dima ) justifies the fact that Bharata does not mention śāntarasa separately. But we find it curious that Abhinava is silent on the many passages where Bharata speaks of all eight rasas but omits śānta. For instance : in XX. 72, Vol. III. p. 105, Bharata mentions the different Vṛttis as they apply to each rasa. Śānta is

not mentioned, nor does Abhinava defend its omission. In chapter XVII

verses 128–129, the various forms of kāku are mentioned for each rasa,

excluding śānta, and again Abhinava (Vol. II. p. 396) has no explanation.

The same is true of XVII 103–104, where the svaras are mentioned for each

rasa, and Vol. II, p. 398, where the pāthas are given for each rasa, excluding

śānta.

P. 139, fn, 2 line : This might refer to a pāṭhāntara of the NŚ text

itself.

P. 145, line : We drop nanu as in the NSP ed. of the Daśarūpaka.

P. 150, note 3 : We cannot agree with Dr. Raghavan and the late

S. K. De when they hold that Dhanika did not allow śāntarasa even in

poetry. We think he did. Clearly both scholars have followed the NSP

edition, which reads, in the avataranikā to verse 45 (ch. VI) nanu before

śāntarasasya (as well as anabhidheyatvāt in place of anabhineyatvāt ), which

would turn this passage into the words of the Pūrvapakṣin. Thus the

final phrase : kāvyaviṣayatvaṃ na nivāryate is the position of the Pūrva-

pakṣin. Now comes the difficulty : who speaks the words atas tad ucyate?

If we suppose that this is the Pūrvapakṣin, who is seeking support in the

line of Dhanañjaya, then the pūrvapakṣa must continue with śanto hi yadi

tāvat up till svādayitāraḥ santi. But these two positions are contradictory :

in the first part, śānta is admitted in poetry, and in the second part it is

excluded. So the words atas tad ucyate must be the words of Dhanika.

But this also makes bad sense, because if Dhanika is responding to the pūrva-

pakṣa, he would be interpreting verse 45 to mean that there is no śāntarasa at

all. In that case, what would the words at the end of the paragraph: taduk-

tyaiva śāntarasāsvādo nirūpitaḥ mean? Obviously they are meant to esta-

blish some sort of existence for śāntarasa. In view of these arguments, we

feel that the reading nanu is not correct, since it seems to us clear, both from

our interpretation of VI. 45, and from the concluding lines of the Avaloka

thereon, that Dhanika did accept śāntarasa in poetry. Without nanu, the

avataranikā is by Dhanika himself, and is meant to introduce the notion of

śāntararasa in kāvya. Atas tad ucyate follows most logically : “Therefore,

the following is said:”.

Dhanika’s objections to the description of śāntarasa given in the verse na

yatra duḥkham etc. He ends his objection by saying: na ca tathābhūtasya

śāntarasasya sahrdayāḥ svādayitāraḥ santi, “There are no sensitive readers who

could enjoy such a śāntarasa.” In the Gujerati Press ed. the next words are

athāpi, namely, “nonetheless ”, i. e. in spite of this definition of śāntarasa,

we can admit its existence by understanding it to be, not an indescribable

state, but one in which there is muditā etc. In other words, Dhanika accepts

śāntarasa, but he refuses to characterise it as negative the way the definition he quotes does. The reading of the NSP ed., simply atha, makes bad sense, for this would have to be part of the pūrvapakṣa, which would, in that case, never be answered by the siddhānta. It is clear from IV. 45, that Dhananjaya accepted some form of śāntarasa. We accept the reading anirvācya, since nirvācya would mean simply: It can be defined, or explained. But if this is what Dhananjaya felt, why did he not mention it among the 8 sthāyibhāvas? The reason is that it follows automatically, since it consists of muditā etc., which are the same as vistara, vikāsa, etc. which were already mentioned in IV. 43, and so there is no need to mention it separately. This is what is meant by anirvācya. If Raghavan and De are correct, how would they explain the line in the Avaloka : taduktyaiva śāntarāsāsvado nirūpitah, which clearly indicates that śāntarasa can be aesthetically enjoyed ?

INDEX

References are to page numbers, with n after a number indicating that

it is found in the notes. All entries are according to the Roman alphabet.

Diacritical marks are ignored. Thus, s, s and ś will all be found under s.

A

abhidhā, 3, 7, 73, 85, 86, 177.

Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā, 7.

Abhinavagupta—

as a poet, XVI.

Abhinavabhāratī, I, II, VI, 2, 8, 21,

13, 13n, 14, 26n, 27n, 32n, 35, 35n,

43, 43h, 45, 46, 48, 48n, 51n, 52,

52n, 53n, 54n, 56, 56n, 57, 57n,

59n, 62n, 63n, 64n, 65n, 68n, 71n,

72n, 73n, 74n, 75n, 84n, 85n, 87n,

90, 92n, 93n, 97n, 98n, 100n, 103,

111n, 113, 120, 126n, 130, 135n,

136n, 138n, 143n. 153n, 154n. 161,

169, 170n, 189, 190.

abhinaya, 53.

abhinayana, 47.

abhivyakti, 65, 65n, 161.

abhivyakti kāraṇa, 28.

adbhutarasa, 95, 95n, 133.

Adhikārin, 162.

Advaita, 130n. 153n.

Agnipurāṇa, 12, 163n.

ākhyāna, 86.

Akṣapāda, 126, 127, 127n.

ajñāllakṣaṇā, 155n.

ālambanavibhāva, 169.

alaṅkāradhvanī, 6, 50, 81, 81n, 88, 89.

Alaṅkārakaustubha, 46n.

Alaṅkāramahodadhi, 162.

Alaṅkāraśekhara, 34.

alaukika, 128, 128n, 160, 172.

alaukikacamatkāra, 48.

Alvarez, A., XVI.

Amaruśataka, IX, 189,

anākhyeyavāda, 162n.

anākhyeyavādin. 6, 6n.

ānanda, XVII, 31, 42, 50,—

as goal of poetry, 67n, 162.

ānandaikaghana, VII, 160, 161.

ānandaghana, 25.

Ānandavardhana, 34, 67, 99. 101,

102n, 103n, 109n, 112, 112n, 122n,

152, 155, 156, 157, 157n, 189, 191.

ānandaviśrānti, 42.

anubhāvas, 48.

anugṛāhyaṇugṛāhakabhāvasaṅkara,

155n.

anuvāda, 9.

Anuyogadvārasūtra, 37n.

aṅgāṅgibhävasaṅkara, 155n.

apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa, 135n.

ārabhaṭī, 141.

ārdratā, 143.

Art ( autonomy of ), 51.

artha, 136.

arthāntarasaṅkramitavācyadhvani,

152, 154, 155.

Āryā, 99n, 139n.

asabhya, 19.

asammoha, 129n.

āśramas, 134.

āsvāda, 70.

Aśvaghoṣa, 3, 5.

Ātman, 131, 131n, 142, 173—

identity with Brahman, 160–61.

ātmananda, XIV, 31, 41, 177.

Atreya, B. L., 30n.

aṭṭahāsa, 142.

aucitya, 9, 10, 10n.

196

ध्वान्तरस

Auden, W. H., 14.

Avaloka ( Daśarūpakāvaloka ), 93n, 97n, 98n, 56, 143-151, 193, 194.

Avimāraka, 13.

avivaksitavācyadhvani, 8.

avyutpatti, 10.

Aucityavicāracarcā, 164n.

autsukya, 58, 58n.

B

Bālapriyā, V, XIVn, 66n, 68n, 71, 102n, 107n, 111n.

Balzac, 14.

Bengal Vaiṣṇavas XV, 122n.

Bhagavadbhaktirasāyanam, 122n, 83n, 158, 159.

Bhāgavatapurāṇa, 84n, 107. 122.

bhagnāvaranā cit, 173.

bhakti, 139, 143, 160.

Bhāmaha, 2, 3n, 19, 54, 55, 56n, 66, 71n, 190.

Bhāmahavivarana, 3, 86, 190.

Bharata, 47, 57, 93, 99, 100, 120, 123, 123n, 128, 129, 136, 137, 149, 168, 189, 190.

Bharati, A., 39n.

Bhartrhari, I, 157n.

Bhāskara, 46n.

Bhattacharya, S., II, 34n, 55n, 66, 67n.

Bhattanārāyaṇa, 44.

Bhatṭanāyaka, 15 ff., 23, 23n, 24n, 49, 62, 63n, 65n, 66n, 67, 67n, 72, 72n, 73, 73n, 74, 74n, 75, 75n, 77, 85, 85n, 86, 120, 158n, 159, 191.

Bhatṭatauta, 18, 18n, 63n, 70, 85n, 103, 189.

Bhattendurāja, 72n.

bhāva, 52, 53n, 78n, 79.

Bhavabhūti, 26, 79n.

bhāvadhvani, 88.

bhāvakatva, 75.

bhāvanā, 20, 64n, 72n, 75n, 76n, 76.

Bhāvaprakāśana, 160n.

bhaya, 67, 68n, 120.

bhayānakarasa, 37n, 133, 143, 143n.

bhogikaraṇa, 63n.

Bhoja, 190.

Bhojaprabandha, VIII, 3.

bhuñjana, 44.

bibhatsarasa, VII, 102, 142.

Blake, VIII.

bliss, 22, 142.

Boas, G., 5.

Bodhisattvas, 134, 135.

Brahman, 26, 67, 77, 107. 159.

brahmānanda, 26n. 174.

brahmāsvāda, 26n. 67, 67n, 151, 158, 160. 175.

Brahmasiddhi, 160n.

Brahmasūtrabhāsya, 25.

Br̥hādāraṇyakopaniṣad, 25, 25n.

Br̥hathathāślokasaṅgraha, 122n.

Brophy, B. 101n.

Brough, J., I, III.

Buddha, 120n. 139n. 141n. 148, 149.

Buddhism, 3, 34, 192.

Burrows, M., X.

C

cakra, 139n.

Candīdāsa, 63n.

Candrikā, 103n.

camatkāra, XIV, 30n. 45, 45n. 46, 69n,

69n, camatkṛti, 45.

Candrikākāra, 102.

Cārudatta, 146n. 147n.

Cārvāka, VIII.

carvanā, 42, 50, 73, 173.

Chāndogya, XII.

Childhood, XI.

Chintamani, T. R. V. 20.

cinmātra, 32n.

Coleridge, XVI., 2.

Coomaraswamy, A., 123n.

Creative writing ( courses in ), 18.

D

dancing and freedom, XI.

dānavīra, 101, 102n.

Dandin, 3, 3n. 71n.

Dante, V.

Daśarūpaka, II, 56n, 64n, 65n, 67n, 85n, 143-151, 166n, 193, 194.

Daśarūpāvaloka, see Avaloka.

Dasgupta, S., 30n.

dayāvīra, 101, 102n., 133, 167, 150.

De Jong, J. W., 192.

De, S. K., I., VI, 19n., 35n., 71n, 84n, 150n, 193, 194.

Delight ( as purpose of poetry ), 55.

Demons, 111.

Denotation, 65.

Devī, 32.

Dhanañjaya, 77n., 98n, 146, 148, 150n, 193, 194.

Dhanika, 56n., 98n., 147, 148, 150n, 151n, 193.

Dhanyaśloka, 38.

dharmakāvya, 135n.

Dharmakīrti, 34n, 191. 192,

Dharmavīra, 101, 102n, 133, 143.

Dharmottara, 192.

dhṛti, 121n., 133, 139.

Dhruvā, 158.

dhvavana, 75, 86.

dhvani, 6n, 17, 76n. 81, 152, 162.

Dhvanyāloka, I, II, VI, VII, IX, X, 6, 6n, 8n, 8, 9, 9n, 11, 11n, 13, 15, 32n, 35, 40n, 44, 46n, 53n, 66n, 67n, 75n, 76n, 78, 78n, 79, 89, 89n. 94, 99n, 103, 105n, 106n, 109n, 129, 152, 161.

Dhvanyālokalocana, see under Locana.

dhīrodātta, 146, 148, 150.

dhīraśānta, 146, 147, 148, 149.

Didhiti, 105n.

Dima, 140.

Dīpikā ( on the Kāvyaprakāśa ), 54n.

Donne, J., XV.

doṣa, 10.

Drama—

definition of, 51.

unreality of, 21, 52.

similarity with life, XI.

Dreams, XI.

druti, 67, 72n. 77n, 77, 82.

Duṣyanta, 172.

dūtī, 39, 40.

E

Ecstasy ( and aesthetic experience ) 21

exercises for inducing, 27.

Edgerton, III.

Egoism ( absence of, in śānta ), 96, 102n.

Ekāvalī, 63n.

Eliade, 39n.

Eliot, T. S., XV. XVI.

External world ( primacy of ), 13.

F

Figures of speech, 11.

Filliozat, P., II.

Freud, S., X. XI

G

Gādhi, 30n.

gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ, 7.

Gaudapāda, 162n.

Gaudapādakārikās, 25.

Gaudavaḥo, 2, 189.

Gautama, 127.

Gautamadharmaśāstra, 133n.

Generalisation, 142, 142n.

ghaṇṭyanuranana, 28.

Ghosh, M., I.

Gītā, 107., 108, 108n. 111n, 122n, 129, 130, 176.

Gītārthasaṅgraha, 24, 107n.

Gnoli, R., I, 3, 18, 20, 20n, 40n, 45n, 51, 57n, 62, 64n, 68, 69n, 78n, 120n, 158n.

Goblins ( unreality of ), 72, 72n.

God ( rest in ), 157.

Gods ( care in narrating their deeds ), 74n.

198

Goethe, XV.

Gūdhārthadīpikā, 25n.

guṇa, 14, 67, 71n, 72n.

guṇavṛtti, 3.

guṇībhūtavyaṅgya, 9.

Haas, G. O. II, 151n.

Harivamśa, 107.

harṣa, 133.

Harṣa, 147.

hāsa, 129.

hāsya, 141, 142.

Hemachandra, V, 16, 20n, 58n, 63n, 67n.

Hiriyana, M., I, 68n.

Hṛdayadarpaṇa, VII, 23, 23n., 55, 85, 87, 120n.

hṛdayānupravesa, XI.

hṛdayasamvāda, VII, 47, 49, 50, 73.

Huxley, A. VX, XXII.

I, 59n., displacing of, 89.

idam ittham, 156, 156n.

Ideas ( in poetry ), 5.

Imagination, 13.

Ingalls, D. H. H., I, III, 71n, 107n.

Ineffability, 162, 162n.

Ionesco, 10.

Īśvarapratyabhijñākarikā, 44.

Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī, 27n, 28n, 44, 59., 58n,

Īśvarakṛṣṇa, 125.

itihāsa, 54, 56n., 122n., 139.

Jacobi, H., II., 26n.. 107n, 192.

Jagannātha, 67n, 122n.

James, Henry, XVI.

Janaka, XII, XIV, 100.

Jayadeva, 159.

Jayantabhaṭṭa, VIII.

Jayaratha, 40, 41n, 42n, 49n, 50, 59n, 133n, 163.

jātyaśaka, 136, 136n.

Jīmūtavāhana, 136, 146, 148, 149, 166, 134.

jīvanmukta, 100, 135.

Johnston, E. H., 3.

Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism, II.

Joy ( transcedent ), 157.

Joyce, James, IX.

jugupsā, 102n, 124, 129, 133, 142n.

Kādamparīkathāsāra, 71n.

Kafka, IX.

kākatāliyanyāya, 137.

kāku, 193.

Kālidāsa, XVII, 3n, 10, 34, 74n.

kāma, 136.

Kāmasūtra, 189.

Kane, P. V., I, 21, 2, 21n, 34n, 40n, 97n, 99n.

Kārikākāra, 95n.

karuṇarasa, VII, 69n, 79, 82, 82n, 83n, 85n. 100n, 110, 105, 110n, 133, 137n, 151.

Kaśikāvṛtti, 108n, 111n.

Kaula, 39, 40.

Kaumudī ( on Locana ), V, XII, 17, 17n. 24n, 83, 85, 88n.

kaviśakti, 10.

kāvya, X, 122n, 170, ( śāntarasa in ), 193, 194.

Kāvyakautuka, 15, 17, 103.

Kāvyāloka, 8, 23n.

Kāvyamīmāṃsā, II, 19, 78n,'86n.

Kāvyānusāśana, 16, 58n.

kāvyanaya, 112.

Kāvyapradīpa, 67n. 77n,

Kāvyaprakāśa, II, 78n, 154n, 164, 172.

Keith, III.

Kosambi, 164n.

krauñca, 79, 82. 83.

Kṛṣṇa, 107, 110.

Krishnamoorthy, K., II.

krodha, 129.

kṛtakṛtya, 161.

Kṣemarāja, 30n, 39, 46.

Kṣemendra, 164n.

kṣobha, 151.

Kulārṇavatantram, 41n.

Kumārsambhava, 10, 11.

Kuntaka, V, 35n, 71n. 109n.

L

Lahiri, P. C., 72n.

lakṣaṇā, 7, 73, 85.

Lamotte, Ét., 122n.

laukika, 128, 128n.

Lawrence, D. H., IX.

laya, 68.

Lévi. S., I, 135n. 149n.

Lewis, C. S., XVI.

Literature—

autonomy of, 9.

and morality, 10.

Literary sensitivity, 11.

Locana ( Dhvanyālokalocaṇa ), I, IV, VI, VII, VIII, XII, XVI, 4, 7n, 8n, 8, 15, 21n, 22n, 23, 23n, 24n, 33, 33n, 34n, 40n, 43, 43n, 44n, 50, 50n, 51n, 54, 55, 55n, 56, 57, 59, 60n, 60, 66n, 67n, 69n, 71n, 72n, 73n, 75n, 77n, 78n, 79, 81, 82n, 86, 87n, 93n, 96, 97, 97n, 98n, 102n, 105, 108n, 109, 110, 120, 124n, 136n, 137n, 138n, 152–157, 157n, 169n, 189, 191.

lokadharmi, 47, 70, 70n, 71n.

lokaprasiddhi, 112.

Lollaṭa, 68, 72, 72n, 73n, 143n, 169n.

“ Lord of the Rings ”, 84n.

Love, 43, 101, 190,—

existing in consciousness not in body, 14.

even ascetics interested in, 15.

Abhinava on, 15.

various kinds of, 143.

XXVIII

as an aesthetic experience in śānta, 132.

Love-bites, 85n.

Love-making, ( no aesthetic pleasure in watching ), 64.

Lüders, H., 3.

M

Madhusūdanarasarasvatī, 25, 25n, 82n, 122n, 158.

mādhurya, 14.

Magic flower, XIV.

Mahābhārata, IX, X, XIII, XIV, 12, 30, 36n, 55n, 96n, 104, 105, 106, 106n, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113n, 166.

Mahābhāṣya, 125n.

Mahānāṭaka, 146.

Mahāparinibbānasutta, XIV, 122n.

Mahāvṛata, 133.

Mahāyānasūtras, 122n.

Mammabhaṭṭa, V, 19, 158.

maithuna, 42.

maitrī, 151.

Malayavaṭī, 147, 166.

Mallināṭha, VIII, 79.

Malreaux, A., XI.

Malvania, D., 37n.

Mammaṭa, 54n, 67n, 69n, 77n, 123n, 164, 170, 174, 175.

Maṇdanamiśra, 160n.

Mānikyacandra, 63.

Mann, Thomas, 8.

Masson, J. L., 82n, 109n, 189, 190.

Matilal, B. K., II, 30n, 190.

Mescalin, XV.

Methodology, I.

Mīmāṃsā, VIII, 76n.

Mirror ( analogy with ), 33n, 49n.

mokṣa, 4. 22, 48, 100n, 103, 105, 106, 108, 110, 122, 127, 129n, 130, 137, 151.

Moral instruction, 56n.

Mṛcchakaṭikā, 146, 147n.

muditā, 151.

200

शान्तरস

mumukṣā, 162.

Music, 16, 147.

O

Obscenity, 10.

Olson, E., 81n.

Osborne, H., XVn, XV.

N

Nāgānanda, XVI, 1, 34, 95, 102n, 133n, 135, 136, 137, 142, 146, 147, 149, 166.

Namisādhu, 94n.

Nandī, 158n.

Nārāyaṇa (as god of śantarasa), 16, (author), 192.

Narendraprabhasūri, 162.

Nāṭakas, 122n, 136.

Nāṭya, 170.

nātyadharmī, 47, 70, 70n, 71, 71n.

Nāṭyaśāstra, I, II, VI, XIV, 3, 14, 20, 21, 23, 26n, 34, 34n, 52, 56, 70n, 78n, 83n, 90, 92n, 99n, 101n, 102n, 110, 121, 126n, 129n, 130n, 132n, 137n, 138n, 190, 192.

Nemrov, H., 18.

New Critics, 11, 81n.

niyama, 100.

nijarasabhara, 51n.

Nīlakanṭha, 107n.

nirapekṣa, 110n.

nirveda, 48, 92, 92n, 98n, 100, 111, 123, 123n, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128n, 132, 170n.

nirvikalpasaṃādhi, 26n.

niṣkāma, 149, 149n.

Nyāyamañjarī, VIII.

P

pānakarasa, 130.

Pañcadaśī, 163.

Pandey, K. C., I, 23n, 24n, 29, 29n, 38, 45n, 66n, 40 40n, 134n, 191.

Pāṇini, 111.

Parabrahman, 42.

Paramārthasāra, XII.

Parā trimśikā, 33, 54n.

parā Vāk, 13.

parāvrtti, 123n.

Park, R., XVI.

paryudāsapratiṣedha, 99n.

Patañjali, 75n, 125, 125n.

pātha, 193.

pāṭhya, 158n.

Patwardhan, M. V., 109n, 189.

Philosophical vision, 153-157.

Plagiarism, V. 2.

Plato, VIII.

Pleasure (as major goal of poetry), 67.

poet—

importance of, 12.

as creator, 12.

technical equipment for, 11.

and Yogins, 23.

vs. rationalist, 24n.

vs. religious fanatic, 24n.

poetry —

same as drama, 16.

and madness, XII.

puropose of, XVII, 54, 77n.

and drama, 16.

and blindness, 19.

compared to a wife, 54.

Poetic vision, 153-157.

prādhānya, 15.

prakarana, 74n.

prahasanas, 138.

Pramāṇavārttikā, 34n.

Pramāṇaviścaya, 192.

prasajyapratiṣedha, 99n.

Prasannarāghava, 159.

Pratāparudrayaśobhūṣaṇa, 63n, 85n.

pratibhā, 13, 16 17, ff., 18n, 19n, 20, 191.

pravṛtti, 107n.

prayojana, 155n.

Primary world (and secondary world), 84n.

prīti, XVII, 54, 54n, 55, 67n, 77n, 162.

profession vs. description, 8.

Proust, IX.

purusārthas, 111, 122n, 135n.

Purāṇas, 137n, 139.

pūrvarañga, 52n.

pūtras te jātaḥ, 7.

R

Rāghavabhaṭṭa, 58n.

Raghavan, V., II, V, 10n, 15, 26, 29n, 45, 52n, 53n, 67n, 70, 71n, 72n, 85n, 102n, 103, 107n, 120n, 125n, 128n, 150n, 160n, 193, 194.

Raghuvamśa, 3, 79n, 156n.

Raikva, 122.

Raja, K. K., I, 7.

Rājataranginī, XIII.

Rājaśekhara, 2.

Rāma, 47n, 63, 64, 64n, 68n, 69, 74, 82n, 105, 135, 146.

Rāmāyaṇa, 2, 12, 35n, 74, 79n, 82n, 83n, 84n, 85, 104, 105, 108, 108n, 190.

rasa, VIII, XII, XVIII, ( surrender of self in ) 7, 12, 12n, 16, 23, 28, ( and the-I consciousness), 32n, 50, (definition of ), 51, ( analogy with tree), 52, 53n, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 65, 65n, 68, 69, 70, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 83, 85, 87, 87n, 88, 93n, ( number of ) 94, 96, 105 ( in the Rām. and M. Bh. ), 111, 112, 135, 138, 143n, ( number of ), 153n, 158, 159, 160, ( as suggested ), 171, 172. 173, 174, 175, 176.

rasadhvani, 6, 18, 51, 81, 153.

Rasagangādhara, II, IV, XIIIIn, 20, 63n, 67n, 85, 164, 167-177.

Rasapradīpa, 63n, 65n, 68n.

rasapratīti, 72, 135n.

rasasūtra, 43, 57. 62n, 123n.

rasāsvāda, 24n, 26, 151, 157, 158, 159, 160, 164, 175, 177.

raso vai saḥ, 176.

rati, 122, 128, 131.

raudrarasa, VII, 96, 130, 130n, 141, 170.

Ravicandra, 189.

Rawson, P., I.

Realism, 71n.

Religion and literature, XVI.

Religious belief, V.

Religious ecstasy and poetry, 21.

Religious preoccupations in poetics, VI-VII.

Renou, L., I, 11, 85n.

Repose, 135.

Richards, I. A., IV, XVI, 86.

Ritual and theatre, 43.

Rudrata, 93.

Ruyyaka, 158.

S

Śabda, 177,

ṣaḍava, 154, 154n.

sādhāraṇikaraṇa, 20, 49, 64n, 72n, 74n, 75n, 191.

sadyomukti, 162.

Sāhityadarpaṇa, II, 46n, 84n, 164-166.

sahrdaya, IV, VII, XI, XII, 6, 23, 47, 59, 78 ( defined ), 84n, 158, 159, 176.

sahrdayāhrdayasamvedya, 162n.

sahrdayatā, 45.

sahrdayatva, 162.

Sahrdayāloka, 8, 8n.

Śaivism, Kashmir, IX, 24, 27, 33, 130n, 189.

sakāma, 149n.

sākṣin, 26 ( and rasa ), 73n, 153n, 173.

śakti, 41, 42, 46n, 59n.

Śākuntala, 57, 58.

Śakuntalā, 148n.

śama, 5, 30n, 35, 128, 132, 149, 168, 169.

sāmagrī, 69, 73.

202

ज्ञानतरस

samādhi, 124, 139n, 160, 174, 175.

samnyāsa, 134.

Sampradayaprakāśinī, 18.

samsāra, 52, 52n.

samskāra, 137.

samyagbodhi, 122n.

samyagdarśana, 122n.

samyagijnāna, 126n.

saṅghatanā, 15.

Saṅgitaratnakara, 160n, 169, 169n.

Saṅgrahaśloka, 99n.

Saṅgrahakarikā, 139.

Śaṅkara, IX, XVI, 25, 25n, 30n, 62n, 123n, 161.

Śaṅkaradigvijaya, 189.

Śaṅkhacūda, 136n.

Saṅkhya, 67n.

Saṅkhyakarikā, 125n.

Śaṅkuka, 63n, 68, 68n, 69, 69n.

Śantarasa, III, V., VII, VIII, IX, X, XIII, XVII (its absence in early drama), 12, 32n, 92, 94, 96, 96n, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 111, 120, 123, 124, 125, 128, 129, 130, 133, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141. 142n, 149, 166, 150, 151, 167,168, 169. 170.

śantarāsāprakaraṇa, 139n.

sāpekṣa, 110n.

Śaradātanaya, 160n.

Sarasvatikaṇṭhābharaṇa, 190.

śāstra, 4, 17, 19, 30, 55n, 66n, 78, 86, 108.

śastranaya, 112.

sattva (guṇa), 77n.

sāttvati, 141.

sāttvikābhavas, 120n.

Satyakāma Jābāla, 122n.

Saundarananda, 3, 4n, 6, 107.

savikalpasamādhi, 26n.

screen (of ingorance ), 172.

sealing wax (compared to mind, du-ring literary experience ), 83n.

Self, 67, 131, 132, 133, 163.

Semen (ejaculation of), 42n.

Senses (enjoyment in ), 31.

Sexual analogies, 25, 27.

Sexual intercourse, 28, 41, 42, 43, 100.

Sexual pleasure, IX.

Shah, P. 36.

Shastri, P., 52n.

Shastri, Srinivasa, 121n, 131n.

Siddhāntaśāstra, 139.

Silburn, L., XII, 19n, 27n.

Sītā, 63n, 105, 105n.

Śiva, 41, 44, 49, 51, (dance of), 52, 139n.

Śivadrṣṭi, 33.

śivarasa, 39.

Śivasūtra, 46n.

Śivopādhyāya, 29, 30n.

śloka, 83.

Smrti, 122.

Soka, 82, 84n, 87, 87n, 129.

Somānanda, 33.

Sorrow in drama, 64.

spanda, 32n.

Spandakārikā, 19n.

speech (as a cow ), 23.

śraddhā, 139.

Sreekantiya, T. N., 17n.

Śridhara (commentator on KP ), 63n, 67n. 86n.

Śritantrājabhattāraka, 41.

śṛṅgārarasa, VII, 12, 14, 43, 45, 95, 100, 100n, 111, 120n, 122, 124, 141.

śruta, 128.

śrutiduṣṭa, 66.

Stallworthy. J. 60n.

Stavacintāmaṇi, 44n.

sthāyibhāva. 48, 88, 88n. 124, 150, 171.

Stchoupak, N. II.

Suggestion, 7, 8, 109.

Suggestiveness (see vyañjanā,), 77, 87,

Sukthankar, 110n.

Suicide, 134.

Soktimuktavali, 30n.

Sutralankara, 135n.

svabhavokti, 71, 71n.

svaccha, ( colour of santa ), 120n, 141n.

svara, 193.

svasabdanivedita, 5, 7, 108n, 109n.

svasamvedya, 56n.

svatmacamatkara, 43.

T

Taittiriya Upanisad, 25, 25n.

tanmayibhavana, VII, 49, 49n, 174.

Tandava, XI.

tantra, 66.

Tantraloka, XI, 20, 20n, 33, 40, 41, 42n, 49, 49n, 51n, 59n, 133, 163n, 163n, 59n.

Tantrasara, 45, 59n.

Tantric rituals, IX, XI.

Tapasavatsaraja, 132n.

tatastha, VII.

tatasthya, 63, 67.

tatparya, 7.

tattvajñana, 35n, 92n, 111, 111n, 125, 127, 127n.

Tattvaloka, 33, 55n, 112, 112n.

Tat tvam asi, 177.

Theatre & Tantric Ritual, XI.

Theory & practice ( disparity between) IX.

Tirtha, 169.

Tolkien, J. R. R., 84n.

Transcendence in literature, IX.

trasa, 133.

trivial vs. numinous, VIII.

trsnaksayasukha, 98n, 99n.

Truth and falsity ( inapplicability to literature ), 9.

Tynan, K., 10.

U

Ubhayabhisarikā, 35n.

Udbhata, 3, 35, 71n, 86n, 95n.

Universalisation, 72n, 74n.

unmatta, XII.

Upalocana, 87n.

upangabhinaya, 132n.

Upanisads, XII, XIII, 25, 122, 128,

upeksa, 151.

Utpaladeva, 2, 33n, 44, 164n.

utpatti ( as applied to rasa ), 75.

utsaha, 101, 129, 133.

Uttararamacarita, 26, 79n.

Uttungodaya, 2, 23n.

V

vacyartha, 8, 161.

vairagya, 36, 105, 127, 127n.

vaisayikasukha, 167.

Vajracchedika, 122.

Vakpatiraja, 2, 189.

vakroti, 71, 71n.

Vakroktijivita, 19n, 35n, 36n, 71n, 77n.

Valmiki, 16, 79n, 79, 82, 83, 105.

Vamana, 3, 66, 71n.

vasana, 48, 50, 58, 58n, 74, 139.

vastudhvani, 6, 50, 75n, 81, 81n, 88, 89.

Vasudeva, 111.

Vasuki, 160n.

Vatulanasutra, 19n.

Vedas, 54, 86n.

Vedanta, 73n, 161, 189.

Vedantasara, 26, 26n.

Venkatacharya, T., 35n.

Venugopalan, K., 51.

vibhavas, XII, 63n, 64, 84n, 172,

Vidusaka, 129n.

Vidyacakravartin, 18.

vidyadhara, 86.

Vidyaranaya, 163, 189.

vikasa, 67, 72n, 77, 77n, 151.

vighna, 46, 47.

vijigisutva, 147, 147n.

Vijñanabhairava, 25n, 27, 27n, 28n, 29, 59n, 89.

Vikramorvasiya, 74n.

viksepa, 151.

204

Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, 122n.

vinoda, XVII, 162.

vipralambha, 82, 110, 110n.

vīrarasa, 96, 101, 102, 111, 130, 130n, 133, 142.

virodhālaṅkāra, 153.

vismaya, 46n, 129.

Viṣṇu, 108.

Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa, 36, 37.

viśrānti, 161.

vistara, 67, 72n, 77, 77n, 151.

Viśvanātha, 122n, 164, 192.

Visuddhimagga, 151n.

Vṛttis, 192.

vyabhicāribhāvadhvani, 88.

vyabhicāribhāva, 109n, 121n, 124, 133.

Vyaktiviveka, II, 18, 19, 20, 86n, 158.

vyañgya, 8, 65n.

vyañjanā, IV, 7, 26, 65, 75, 75n, 76, 177.

vyāpāra, 86.

Vyāsa, 107n, 112.

vyutpādya, 55.

vyutpatti, 17, 54, 54n, 67, 69, 77n.

vyutthāna, 131n, 160.

W

Wain, J., IV.

Warder. A. K., 35n.

Wilson, E.. XII.

Wine, 42.

Witness, 163.

Woods, J. H., 100n.

Wright, E. G., 135n, 141n.

Y

yama, 100.

Yeats, 81n.

yoganidrā, 156n.

Yogasūtra, 19n, 74n, 92n, 100, 125n, 131n, 132n, 137n, 151n.

Yogasūtrabhāṣya, 125n.

Yogavāsiṣṭhamahārāmāyana, IX, 29, 31, 32, 40, 55n, 84n, 112n. 131n.

Yogesvara, 71n.

Yogin, 161, 174.

Yudiṣṭhira, 105n, 148.

Z

Zen, 100n.

Page Line For Read

I fn. 2, line 8 Sanskvit Sanskrit

I fn. 2, line 17 Philosohhy Philosophy

II 13 Vakrotkīivīta Vakroktījīvita

VI fn. 1, line 5 consgined consigned

X 9 dessicate desiccate

XI 30 hierachy hierarchy

XIV fn. 3, line 3 Locanu Locana

7 1 fulfill fulfil

11 2 love-makiug love-making.

15 30 perosn person

17 fn. 1, line 4 p. 1937 p. 57, 1937.

17 fn. 2, line 1 E. I. E. g.

18 fn. 4, line 4 Add a daṇḍa after kāvyam

21 8 was were

19 fn. 2, line 3 Sūtra Sūtra

27 25 fas far

29 1 Trantric Tantric

38 18 Dhanyaśloka Dhānyaśloka

40 21 bocomes becomes

46 32 सच्चाई सच्चाई

49 15 now not

49 28 सातिशये सातिशये

53 20 mūlabijasthānīyāḥ mūlabījasthānīyah

62 5 तासमनादितवं तासमनादितवम्

66 34 Should should

63 30 ब्रह्मस्वाद ब्रह्मास्वाद

68 16 Hiriyana Hiriyanna

72 26 रसनेति रसनेति

72 45 हृद्य हृद्यः

73 39 saccidānanda saccidānanda

73 43 मट्टोल्हटपक्षा- मट्टोल्हटपक्षा-

77 37 प्रतिपोषत प्रतिपाअते

83 23 the the

85 21 ślokaracanārūpe ślokaracanārūpe-

85 22 'tyarthah tyarthah

85 44-45 Drop the sentence "Note the Rasapradīpa etc."

88 19 take takes

206

शान्तरस

Page

Line

For

Read

88

24

bhāvapraśāma

bhāvapraśama

88

25

between, them

between them,

89

3

reach

reach

92

35

these

these

93

28

adhikṛtyo

adhikṛtya

94

14

तथा

तथा

98

32

°जुगुप्सारुपत्वाद्

°जुगुप्सारुपत्वाद

99

26

Āryā verses

Āryā verses and śloka verses

102

23

grahanam

grahanam

103

13

तेनादीर्णे

तेनोदीर्णे

109

18

सम्बन्धः

सम्बन्धः

110

33

p. 310

p. 309

111

10

enjoyment (of pleasures)

experience (of pleasures and sufferings)

115

6

तावत्

तावत्

115

14

विस्पष्यमानस्य

विषयमानस्य

116

5

पृथग्

पृथग्

116

15

रूपम

रूपम्

116

22

औद्गय्यम्

औद्गत्यम्

117

20

धर्मांत

धर्मांत

118

2

शक्ति श्रैति

शक्ति श्रैति

118

22

शृङ्गारादीन

शृङ्गारादीन्

121

18

arouse

arouses

121

45

सम्यग्दर्शनसमावस्था

सम्यग्दर्शनसमावस्था

124

21

vibhāva

vibhāvas

133

8

gust8

gust3

136

43

°परिरक्षकेन

°परिरक्षकेण

143

11

dharmāvīra

dharmavīra

163

6

that

than

165

28

संस्थितास्था

संस्थितास्था

169

23

who say4

who say

169

25

accepted by others.

accepted by others.4

170

16

are

is

171

Foot Note 5

Raghavan's ed,

Raghavan's "Number of Rasas "

173

3

brought

brought about

191

5

apūrva

apūrva

193

13

Ch. VI

Ch. IV

193

27

VI. 45,

IV. 45,

193

37

words are

word is

Śiva's cosmic dance has no purpose. It is the spontaneous expression of overflowing bliss; it is art.

Abhinavagupta ( 10th cen.)

Descriptions of love-making among the gods may offend some people's notions of propriety, but if the poet is gifted with imaginative genius, the sensitive reader will not find them obscene.

Ānandavardhana ( 9th cen. )

This whole universe is no less a figment of one's imagination than is the world created in drama. Nor is it less beautiful.

Bhatṭanāyaka ( 10th cen )

There are poets, blind from birth, who see more deeply than the rest of us. Their eye of imagination never closes.

Rājaśekhara ( 9th cen.)

To respond deeply to literature and to understand one's own Self are the same thing.

Abhinavagupta.

BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE.