1. Santarasa and Abhnivaguptas Theory of Aesthetics Masson J.L., Patwardhan M.V. BORI 1985

SĀNTARASA

AND

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

ŚĀNTARASA

AND

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL SERIES No. 9

ŚĀNTARASA

AND

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

BY

J. L. MASSON

M. V. PATWARDHAN

Reprint of 1969 edition

BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, POONA

1985

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY

R. N. DANDEKAR,

HON. SECRETARY,

BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE,

POONA-4.

For Jack and Diana

who made it possible

द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया

समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते ।

तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति

अनइन्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति ॥

"Two birds, deepest of friends,

live on the same tree.

One eats the sweet fruit.

The other, without eating, watches."

CONTENTS

Foreword

... ... ... ... ...

Preface

... ... ... ... ...

Abbreviations

-- ... ... ... --

Introduction

... ... ... ... ...

Part I : Abhinava's Philosophy of Aesthetics.

A. Influences :

(1) Literary Influences--

(a) Aśvaghoṣa ... ... -- -- 3

(b) Ānandavardhana ... ... ... 6

(c) Bhatṭatauta -- ... ... ... 15

(d) Bhatṭanāyaka ... -- ... -- 20

(2) Philosophical Influences--

(a) Vedānta ... ... ... ... 24

(b) Vijñānabhairava ... -- ... ... 27

(c) Yogavāsiṣṭha ... ... ... ... 29

(d) Kashmir Śaivism -- ... -- ... 33

(3) Influence from speculation on śāntarasa--

(a) Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa ... ... ... 36

(b) Anuyogadvārasūtra ... ... ... 37

(4) Tantric Influence--

Tantrāloka ... ... ... ... 40

B. Abhinava's Philosophy of Aesthetics.

(1) Translation of key passages from his philosophical

works and the Abhinavabhāratī ... -- -- 44

(2) Text and translation of the Locana on Dhvanyāloka,

Uddyota II ... ... ... -- ... 60

(3) Text and translation of the Locana on Dhvanyāloka,

Uddyota I ... ... ... ... ... 78

Part II : Śāntarasa.

( A ) Interpolated verses in the Nātyaśāstra ... ... 91

( B ) Rudraṭa ... ... 93

( C ) Dhvanyāloka, Uddyota III ... ... 94

( D ) Locana on same ... ... 96

( E ) Dhvanyāloka, Uddyota IV ... ... 103

( F ) Locana on same ... ... 109

( G ) Śāntarasaprakaraṇa from the Abhinavabhāratī ... 113

( H ) Daśarūpaka and Avaloka passages ... ... 143

Part III : Conclusion :

( A ) Verse from the Dhvanyāloka, Uddyota III, on devotion and poetry ... ... 153

( B ) Locana on same ... ... 153

( C ) Similarities between aesthetic experiences and mystic experiences ... ... 161

( D ) Differences ... ... ... 162

Appendix—Later writers on śāntarasa and rasāsvāda ... ... 165

( 1 ) Mammaṭa ... ... ... 165

( 2 ) Viśvanātha ... ... ... 165

( 3 ) Rasagaṅgādhara ... ... ... 168

Bibliography ... ... ... ... 179

Addendum ... ... ... ... 189

Index ... ... ... ... ... 195

FOREWORD

I have great pleasure in writing a Foreword to this book by Prof.

M. V. Patwardhan and Mr. J. L. Masson and in introducing the latter whom

I have known intimately for some time and who has struck me with his flair

for Sanskrit and its cultivation and for the literary study of Sanskrit lite-

rature, qualities which, undoubtedly, he has imbibed from his chief teachers

L. Renou of the Sorbonne and Prof. D. H. H. Ingalls of Harvard. His

association with these two scholars explains his association with me.

This monograph is on Śānta Rasa and Abhinavagupta's aesthetics as

it emerges out of the philosophy of Rasa as expounded by him. It stems out

of my Number of Rasas which at the time of its first appearance in the middle

of the forties, was the first detailed exposition of this important subject. In

that work, I had also offered a critical edition of the section relating to the

Śānta from Abhinavagupta's commentary on the Nāṭya Śāstra. Naturally,

while the material given in the present study has already been known, the

treatment of the authors has given it a freshness, illustrating the principles of

novelty elucidated by Ānandavardhana in Uddyota IV of Dhvanyāloka. As

Max Müller said, at every stage, a fresh study of a branch of knowledge is

required. In the introduction, as also in the main part of their work, the

authors have traversed a wide ground in respect of literature and response to

it, and on the background of the latest writers, critics and philosophers in

the West and the attempts of a few of them to interpret or understand the

contributions of the Sanskrit writers, they have highlighted some of the most

important ideas of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. The thought of

these two masters of Sanskrit literary criticism, particularly of the latter, is

examined on the background of their school of philosophy, Kashmir Śaivism.

But as they go, the authors take in their stride many other related concepts

which involve parenthetical treatment; added to these are the very large

number of references to works and authors, but the reader should be able to

follow the main theme of the authors namely the conception of Rasāsvāda as

elucidated by the two great aesthetes Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta.

It would not be possible to fall in line with the authors on some of

the literary judgements that they have passed on Sanskrit poems and plays,

e. g. those on p. ix of the Introduction. Also in some contexts of textual

interpretation, the authors have expressed their disagreement with earlier

writers and have given their own interpretation. However, this is not the

place to enter into discussion of details.

[ 2 ]

Not only does the study in the following pages show the extensive reading of the authors, but it also expressly mentions a chain of further studies, connected with the present one, which the authors have prepared.

As a member of the Indian Advisory Committee of the American Institute of Indian Studies, I am pleased that a Grantee of the Institute, one of the joint-authors of the Volume, has done remarkably well on his grant-programme in India.

Quite a few of the younger generation of American scholars are engaged in pure Sanskrit and Śāstraic studies, and by assisting them, the Institute is giving a fillip to Sanskrit studies.

Vijayādaśamī

20-10-1969

Madras.

V. RAGHAVAN

PREFACE

The present study grew out of a much larger work that the authors are presently completing. We have both been long interested in Sanskrit literary criticism. Professor Patwardhan has taught the Dhvanyāloka and the Rasagangādhara over a period of fifteen years to students in Fergusson College. Mr. Masson has translated and annotated the Dhvanyāloka and the first chapter of the Locana for his Ph. D. thesis at Harvard.

When we met we discovered a deep mutual interest in Abhinavagupta's Locana, the greatest Indian work on aesthetics, but a text so difficult that even the Pandits hesitate to teach it in the Pāṭhasālās. We began meeting twice a week for 3–4 hour sessions to read and discuss textual difficulties in the Locana. We soon found that we shared nearly identical views on the major problems in this work. Gradually most of the textual mysteries began to yield up their secrets, and we decided to translate the entire Locana as a joint work.

The section on śāntarasa was originally to have been an appendix to this three-volume annotated translation. But we found that so many issues in the Locana had a direct bearing on the problem of śāntarasa that it really required a more extensive and separate treatment. Especially in reading the śāntarasa passage in the Abhinavabhāratī, a text of notorious difficulty, we found that our readings in the Locana were a great help to its elucidation. It is primarily as an aid to understanding this śāntarasa passage of the Abhinavabhāratī that we are publishing the results of our research. We regard this as an introduction to our translation of the Dhvanyālokalocana which will be published along with the Dhvanyāloka in the Harvard Oriental Series.

It is a pleasant duty to thank those who have helped us : Mr. Masson first read the Dhvanyāloka with the late Professor L. Renou in Paris, who maintained a lively interest in Sanskrit

literary theory and urged on him the necessity of doing serious

work in this field. Professor V. Raghavan was kind enough to

read with him daily the fourth Uddyota with the Locana. His

pioneering work, “ The Number of Rasas,” and his magnum opus,

“ Bhoja’s Śṛṅgāprakāśa ” provided much of the stimulus for

writing the present volume. Professor D. H. H. Ingalls read Mr.

Masson’s translation of the first and fourth Uddyota of the

Dhvanyāloka and made many valuable suggestions on method

which we have followed here. Mr. Masson also wishes to thank

his old friends, Professor B. K. Matilal of the University of

Pennsylvania, and Professor K. Bhattacharya of the Centre

Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris, for stimulating

discussions over the past years on many of these very topics.

Several Pandits of the Deccan College have always been very

happy to discuss many of the issues with us. We wish to thank

especially Dr. V. W. Paranjpe and Pandit Srinivasashastri for

their help. Mr. R. P. Goldman from the Sanskrit department

of the University of Pennsylvania helped us to clarify many of

our ideas on Sanskrit and general literature while reading the

entire work in manuscript. We wish also to thank Mr. J. Losty

of the Sanskrit Department at Oxford University for reading

through the work and making numerous corrections in the

English text, and for his pointed questions. Mr. Masson wishes

to thank the A. I. I. S. for a fellowship from 1968–69 which

made this study possible by supporting his research, during

which time the present work was published. It is a great pleasure

to thank our good friend Dr. S. D. Joshi for his constant en-

couragement. Dr. R. N. Dandekar kindly accepted the work for

publication in the B. O. R. I. Oriental Series for which we are

grateful. We wish to thank Dr. V. Raghavan, whose work in

Sanskrit poetics is well-known to all scholars in the field, for

writing the foreword to this volume.

ABBREVIATIONS

(For details, see Bibliography)

A. Bh. Abhinavabhāratī, Abhinavagupta's commentary on the Nāṭyaśāstra.

Ānanda Ānandavardhana, author of the Dhvanyāloka.

Avaloka Dhanika's commentary on the Daśarūpaka of Dhanañjaya.

BN Bhattanāyaka, author of the lost Hṛdayadarpana, often quoted by Abhinava.

B. O. R. I. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

BP Bālapriyā commentary on the Dhvanyāloka.

Bharata Author of the Nāṭyaśāstra.

D. Āl. Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana.

DR Daśarūpaka of Dhanañjaya.

Daṇḍin Author of Kāvyādarśa.

Gnoli R. Gnoli, author of "The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta."

G. O. S. Gaekwad Oriental Series.

HC Hemacandra's Kāvyānuśāsana (with his own commentaries).

ĪPVV Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī of Abhinavagupta.

J. A. O. S. Journal of the American Oriental Society.

J. O. R. Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.

KM Kāvyamālā.

K. Mīm. Kāvyamīmāṃsā of Rājaśekhara.

KP Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa.

KSTS Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies.

Kane P. V. Kane, author of "History of Sanskrit Poetics."

Kaumudī The Kaumudī commentary by Uttungodaya on the Dhvanyāloka of Abhinavagupta.

Locana Abhinavagupta's commentary on the Dhvanyāloka.

M. Bh. Mahābhārata.

NŚ Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata.

NSP Nirṇayasāgara Press.

Pandey K. C. Pandey, "Abhinavagupta, an Historical and Philosophical Study."

RG Rasagangādhara of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja.

Raghavan V. Raghavan, author of "The Number of Rasas."

ŚR Śāntarasa.

Śridhara Śridhara's comm. on the Kāvyaprakāśa, ed. by Sivaprasad Bhattacharya.

T. Āl. Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta, in 12 vols.

VB Vijñānabhairava, with comm. partly by Kṣemarāja, and partly by Śivopādhyāya.

VJ Vakroktijīvita of Kuntaka.

VV Mahimabhaṭṭa's Vyaktiviveka.

Vāmana Vāmana's Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra.

YS Patañjali's Yogasūtra.

YV Yogavāsiṣṭhamahārāmāyaṇa.

INTRODUCTION1

A word on methodology :2 Philip Rawson in a recent article on Indian

aesthetics writes : “ In fact I believe that in the field of aesthetics ( as in the

field of logic ) a great series of thinkers who lived in India and wrote in

Sanskrit between the fourth century A. D. and the thirteenth have put many

ideas which must be brought into our present-day debates on art-ideas which

1. It might be asked why we use the term “ aesthetics ” in the title when surely

“ poetics ” would have been more correct, since aesthetics is a wider concept, including

reflections on the experience of the beautiful in all art forms, and not only in literature.

This would be true were we to confine our attention only to the Dhvanyālokalocana. But

the Abhinavabhāratī includes considerations of music and of dance as well as of litera-

ture, and it is clear, even if nowhere explicitly stated, that Abhinava intends his remarks

on the nature of imaginative experiences in drama and poetry to apply to other art

forms as well. If we were to sum up Abhinava's theory in one phrase as “ great art

demands the transcedence of self ” then we could surely apply this to music as well.

2. We presuppose on the part of our readers a certain familiarity with the

first time, we would recommend the following works :

For a general introduction to Sanskrit poetry the reader cannot do better

than read D. H. H. Ingalls' human study : An anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry,

Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge, 1965. The two standard works on Sanskrit literary

criticism are : S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya,

Calcutta, 1960, and P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, Motilal Banarsidass,

Delhi, 1961. Kane is better than De on textual problems, but less full on the actual

theories. A concise but intelligent overview of the theory of suggestion can be found

in an article by J. Brough, “ Some Indian Theories of meaning, ” Transactions of the

Philological Society, 1953, Oxford. An excellent book, which contains a very fine

chapter on the theory of dhvani is K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning,

Adyar Llbrary and Research Center, Madras, 1963. A clear account by a good

modern Indian philosopher of many of the issues will be found in M. Hiriyanna's Art

Experience, a collection of his essays on such questions as “ Art contemplation, ” “ Art

and Morality, ” “ The Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure ” and so on, Kavyalaya

Publishers, Mysore, 1954. For those who read French, we would recommend the pioneer

study of the Indian theatre by Sylvain Lévi, Le Théatre Indien, reprinted with

Renou's article, “ La Recherche sur le theatre Indien depuis 1890, ” Paris, 1963. The

Introduction to R. Gnoli's The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta, Rome,

1965 and now reprinted by Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1968, is excellent, though readers

might find the actual text difficult. K. C. Pandey's two works, Abhinavagupta, an

Historical and Philosophical Study, Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1966, and Comparative

Aesthetics, vol. I, Indian Aesthetics (both second editions), Chowkhamba, Banaras,

1959, are also likely to prove difficult, though both works contain much valuable

information. The reader would also be well advised to read one or two of the texts

in translation. The most important work on theatre and on dramatic theory is the

Nāṭyaśāstra (ca. 3rd century A. D.?) of which there is a new edition and trans-

lation by M. Ghosh, Manisha Granthalaya, Calcutta, 1957. Available translations are

(Continued on next page)

we can use on works of art as one uses a can-opener on a can, to get at the meat. Their writings could extend our conceptual armoury."1 While we agree with the sentiment, we disagree strongly with the method. In an article subtitled: “ A Study in Indian Aesthetics,” there is no mention of a single Indian critic ! One could contribute an entire negative bibliography on Sanskrit poetics which would illustrate the same fault: an insufficient acquaintance with the basic texts of Sanskrit literary criticism. Instead of vague generalisations ( or reinterpretations such as are found in the special issue of the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism on Oriental Aesthetics, Fall, 1965), we need detailed studies2 and especially translations into modern English of the major works of Sanskrit aesthetics. It is disturbing to think that there are no English translations at all of many of the most important works : the Vakroktijīvita, the Kāvyamīmāṁsā, the Abhinavabhāratī, the Dhvanyāloka-locana, the Vyaktiviveka or the Rasagaṅgādhara.3 There is no readily available translation of Daṇḍin, or Bhāmaha, or Vāmana, and Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka is sorely in need of a new and better translation. We know that the Indians have creative ideas on such important issues as “ the nature

( Continued from previous page)

rare : The Dhvanyāloka the most important text on poetics will soon be published with a complete translation of Abhinavagupta's commentary, the Locana, by the authors. Meanwhile there is Jacobi's excellent German translation, Z. D. M, G. no. 56, Leipzig, 1902 and the translation into English by K. Krishnamoorthy, Poona Oriental Series, Poona 1955. There is a French translation of Rājaśekhara's Kāvya-mīmāṁsā ( 9th century ), a fascinating and eccentric work by N. Stchoupak and L. Renou published by Société Asiatique in 1946 that is still in print. The second most important work on drama, though much later ( 10th century ) than the Nāṭya-śāstra, has been translated by G. O. Hass, The Daśarūpaka of Dhanamjaya : A Treatise of Hindu Dramaturgy, Motilal Banarsidass. Delhi, 1962. A good translation of Mammata's Kāvyaprakāśa ( 11th century ) has come out by G. Jha, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Banaras, 1967. Mammata follows Abhinava very closely, though he is more conventional in his opinions. It is by far the best of the “ text books ” that became so popular in the Sanskrit tradition. Similar to it, and even fuller in treatment, though less interesting, is the Sāhityadarpaṇa of Viśvanātha, translated by J. R. Ballantyne and P. Misra, Motilal Banarsidass. Delhi, 1965. An excellent and readable French translation of one of the later texts is Le Pratāparudrīya de Vidyānātha by Pierre Filliozat, Institut Français d'Indologie, Pondichery, 1963.

1. " An Exalted Theory of Ornament," published in Aesthetics in the Modern World, edited by H. Osborne, London, Thames and Hudson, 1968.

2. Such detailed studies are to be found pre-eminently in the works of two modern Indian scholars, V. Raghavan, and the late Sivaprasad Bhattacharya. For details, see Bibliography.

3. A four-volume work is soon to appear on readings from literary criticism throughout the world. One volume will be devoted to Indian Aesthetics. It is being edited by B. K. Matilal of the University of Pennsylvania and will contain translations of all the major texts ( excerpts only of course ) by B. K. Matilal, V. Raghavan, M. Ghosh, M. V. Patwardhan and J. Masson.

of poetic imagination," " the dichotomy between learning and inspiration,"

" linguistics and poetics," " the tension between pleasure and didacticism,"

" poetry and philosophy," " effort and spontaneity," and so on. But what

exactly did the Indian writers have to say on each of these issues ? We have

taken up one of these issues, śāntarasa, for detailed discussion in this volume.

Śāntarasa might be translated as "the imaginative experience of tranquil-

lity." It is an issue on which there exists some confusion. Edgerton was able

to write, astonishingly, of śāntarasa: " ...that it is forbidden to use it in the

drama ; it is inherently opposed to the very nature of the drama."1 This is a

simple misunderstanding of the texts. Such misunderstandings arise because

many modern writers are not taking the trouble to see just what the Sanskrit

writers on poetics have said. They are relying on secondary literature instead

of going directly to the original sources. In this way errors only compound

themselves. How will one be able to appreciate Sanskrit literature properly if

one is unaware of just what it is that a cultivated audience expected from its

literature ? And how can one know this, unless one reads Sanskrit literary criti-

cism ? Here we must take sides in what seems to us a major issue concerning

the proper method of understanding Sanskrit poetry : Professor D. H. H.

Ingalls has written of A. B. Keith, whose two works, " A History of Sanskrit

Literature " and " The Sanskrit Drama " are standard reading in the field,

" that for the most part he disliked Sanskrit literature." After illustrating this ,

Professor Ingalls remarks : "What is unjust in these judgements is that not once

does Keith apply the remarks of a Sanskrit critic to any of the Sanskrit works

he is judging."2 Professor J. Brough, a former student of Keith, responds

to this criticism by quoting a paragraph from Keith's " History of Sanskrit

Literature," after which he remarks: " I have re-read this paragraph with

close attention, but I have not been able to discover any hidden meaning in

it; and I do not understand how such words could be written by one who

'for the most part disliked Sanskrit literature.'"3 Professor Brough may

well be correct, for it is perfectly possible that Keith did in fact like much of

Sanskrit literature. But surely this is irrelevant. The point is not whether

Keith did or did not like Sanskrit poetry ( since one can certainly understand

something for which one does not have great admiration ), but whether he

understood it or not. Brough does not answer Ingalls' second charge, by far

the more important of the two. Did Keith judge Sanskrit literature accord-

ing to the highly developed canons of its own texts on literary criticism ?

1. F. Edgerton, " Indirect Suggestion in Poetry," Proc. of the American

Philosophical Society, vol. 76, 1936, p. 704.

2. An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry, p. 50.

3. J. Brough. Poems from the Sanskrit, Penguin, 1968, p. 21,

IV.

शान्तरस

Judging from his chapter on the theories of poetry in ancient India, one would guess not. He seems for the most part innocent of their more detailed doctrines.1 This is an important point of methodology. Before we can judge or even appreciate Sanskrit literature, we must understand it. As I. A. Richards often remarked to his students at Harvard : "We do not admire what we do not understand." No amount of theory on methodology will help one to understand Sanskrit literature. There is only one method that counts : exposure to, and familiarity with the texts. There is a perfectly straight-forward use of the word "understanding" which is too often ignored in the elaborate treatises now fashionable on "methodology" (often, it seems to us, merely excuses for not dealing with the texts themselves). The difficulties of interpreting a Sanskrit poem are considerably less in India than in the West. The meaning of a Sanskrit poem is rarely subjective. Either you have understood a verse or you haven't. In a traditional Sanskrit class, the Pandit will ask a student after he has read a verse : artho jñāto vā na vā, "Have you understood the meaning or not?" This makes it far more easy to reach a concensus about a poem's worth in Sanskrit than would be true in English literature.2 When we read a passage in one of these Sanskrit texts we know

1. For instance, on pp. 386-397 of A History of Sanskrit Literature (Oxford, 1928), Keith is supposed to be explaining the theories of Jagannātha's Rasagangā-dhara, but everything he quotes is actually taken by Jagannātha from Abhinavagupta's Locana, a fact of which Keith seems totally unaware. Thus, he writes : "The cause of this form of pleasure is a form of meditation (bhāvanā), consisting of continued application to the object characterized by the pleasure. It is quite different from the joy produced by the thought of the meaning of what is said to one, e.g. "A son is born to you." But this example actually occurs several times in the Dhvanyāloka-locana, (e.g. p. 80, Bālapriyā Edn.) 600 years earlier !

2. Not that the Indians ever made the fallacy of thinking that a poem was exhausted by what it meant. Far from it, they were likely to sin in the opposite direction, and suppose that a poem derived all its worth from how it was said (vyañjanā) rather than what it said. As I. A. Richards puts it : "It is never what a poem says which matters, but what it is." John Wain speaks of the difficulty of pointing the elements in a poem that make for its success : "But to illustrate these things in the concrete is to approach the vanishing center of literary criticism, which, not being an exact science, is bound sooner or later to reach a point at which demonstration breaks down and is replaced by a shared sensibility; though, of course, this point is very much more distant than the anti-critical writers on literature would have us think." Interpretations, edited by J. Wain, Routledge, London, 1955. For the Indians it was not only distant, but actually beyond the horizon. This is an important point to stress : the Indians simply cannot conceive of arguing over the final worth or even interpretation of a poem in quite the same way as can be done today in Western literary criticism. It is of course true that finally the sahrdaya, the intelligent and responsive reader, is the final criterion. But generally, sahrdayas tend to agree amongst themselves to an astonishing degree. One has only to look at the interpretations of poems advanced in Sanskrit commentaries. They are usually very

(Continued on next page)

immediately whether we understand it or not. If we do not, no amount of

" methodology " will give us instant and magic insight into the meaning. It

is only by reading further in the literature that understanding will be gained.

We feel that we have to speak of this because in a sense we are deal-

ing with religious material, and the familiar criticism comes to mind that in

order to understand Buddhism one must either be a Buddhist or at least be-

long to some religious tradition. Similarly, the argument goes, one must be

"personally" concerned with the problems raised by śāntarasa and by religious

ecstasy in general in order to understand the issues properly. To this belief we

cannot subscribe. We can sympathise intellectually with the problems raised

by śāntarasa without being personally moved by the issues in our everyday

life. Certainly to have a profound understanding of Dante it is not necessary

to be a believing Christian. We can respond to the power and grace of a

mind without necessarily agreeing with what is said. Were it necessary to

hold firmly to a set of immovable beliefs, then the whole of surrēalism,

in which our common expectations are constantly arrested, should possess

aesthetic significance. Literature does not depend for its power on a set of

beliefs. Is the ghost of Hamlet real? How can this matter for a proper

appreciation of a play? The important point is that it is real for the play.

Are the punishments that Dante describes " real "? They are real in the

poem. Whether we believe in their objective reality or not has nothing what-

ever to do with our appreciation of the poem itself. Similarly, śāntarasa

exists within the context in which we discuss it. We must judge these beliefs

in the context of the works of literature in which they appear, and not in the

light of our personal convictions, or we seriously restrict the possibilities of

our own literary appreciation. We have elucidated certain difficult texts

which describe ecstatic experiences. It should not be relevant what our own

belief is as to the objective nature of these experiences.

A more important dichotomy than that between belief and scepticism

has to do more directly with our method of work. This is the dichotomy

between modern Western methods and the more traditional method of under-

( Continued from previous page )

similar to one another. (This is surely why plagiarism in such matters was never

considered to be a serious matter. Witness Hemacandra, who uses Abhinava's expla-

nations of innumerable stanzas, He is not "cheating," he is "agreeing.") When a

modern commentary like the Bālapriyā follows Uttungodayā's Kaumudī on the Locana,

Rāmaśaraka is not being lazy or dishonest. This simply points to shared values in

Sanskrit literary criticism. We know, for example, that Mahimabhaṭṭa and Kuntaka

both disagree sharply with the views of the dhvani school, and with Ānandavardhana

in particular. But their disagreements concern principles, and do not really extend

to the interpretation of individual poems. When they explain the rasa of a poem there is

remarkable agreement.

vi

standing texts used by the Pandits. There need exist no opposition between

the two methods. In our cases, we have both profited greatly from our

study among the Śāstrins, and we both possess an unqualified admiration for

the depth of their knowledge into a given śāstra. On the other hand the

major part of our education has been along Western lines, and we see no

reason to abandon the critical principles it has instilled in us.

ABHINAVA'S ACHIEVEMENT

Abhinavagupta was without a doubt the greatest example in Indian

history of a literary critic who was also a philosopher of repute. Pandits will

often say of him that : alaṃkāraśāstram tenaiva śāstratvam prāpitam— “ He

alone turned poetics into a science.” There are virtually no important ideas

in later Sanskrit poetics that do not derive from him (or from his influ-

ences ).1 In his two famous commentaries, the Locana on the Dhvanyāloka,

and the Abhinavabhāratī on the Nātyaśāstra, he has dealt with almost every

important issue of Indian aesthetics. Neither work is meant to be primarily

philosophic - he deals rather with specific verses, and especially in the Locana

he performs brilliant feats of understanding and interpretation in discovering

the hidden “ suggested ” meaning in verses. ( There are numerous examples

of this; one thinks in particular of the enormous range of suggestion he is

able to derive from a single case of vastudhvani in the Dhvanyāloka ).2 His

linguistic acumen is no less astonishing, and he often points to the suggestive

use of a case-ending, or even a particle. But we are concerned in this volume

with those passages, by no means rare, where he deals more with theory

than with its practical application. In extracting Abhinava's philosophy of

aesthetics, we have discovered that he is deeply concerned with religious

values in literature. In this he marks a decided break with his predecessors.

There is nothing particular religious about the Nāṭyaśāstra. As for the

Dhvanyāloka, which we believe to be the work of two different authors,3 the

1. Many of the ideas of later writers ( especially Mammata ) which modern

writers mistakenly think to be original, derive ultimately and often literally from

Abhinavagupta. Thus S. K. De, “The theory of Rasa,” in Some Problems of Sanskrit

Poetics, Calcutta, 1959, p. 206, attributes to Viśvanātha the doctrine that “ those very

things which are called cause of pain in the world…….when consigned to poetry and

dramatic representation possess the right to be called, in consequence of their assuming

such a function, alaukika vibhāvas etc., and from them only pleasure ensues, as it does

from bites and the like in amorous dalliance.” But this doctrine is found first in the

Abhinavabhāratī, Vol. I, p. 292.

2. One thinks of his long explanations of the two last Prakrit verses quoted under

I, 4, on pp. 74–78 of the Locana ( B. edition ).

3. This is of course a very complex issue. Mr. Masson has written a long

article on the problem, arguing from internal evidence, that Ānandavardhana wrote

only the Vrtti, and that the Kārikās belong to an earlier author.

kārikās present absolutely no religious aspect at all. There are no religious terms used, and no analogies drawn from religious literature. Even the term śāntarasa is never used,1 Ānandavardhana is a different matter. In his vṛtti religious preoccupations are evident. Unfortunately, his Tattvāloka,2 a work that dealt with the relation between poetry and philosophy, is lost, so that we cannot know how great its influence upon Abhinava was. At least his concerns within the Dhvanyāloka never culminate in a philosophic theory. It is only with Abhinava himself ( preceded, in all likelihood, by Bhaṭṭanāyaka in his lost Hrdayadarpana ) that specific religious doctrines are applied to aesthetics ( we do not of course distinguish sharply between religion and philosophy, for in Abhinava's case, as in much Indian writing, the two are nearly coterminous ).

Abhinava is concerned with providing a stable philosophical foundation for his theories. We have tried to show in this volume how often Abhinava draws on śāntarasa for his major contribution to Sanskrit aesthetics, the theory of rasa. Reduced to its bare essentials the theory is as follows : watching a play or reading a poem for the sensitive reader (sahrdaya) entails a loss of the sense of present time and space. All worldly considerations for the time being cease. Since we are not indifferent (tataṡstha ) to what is taking place, our involvement must be of a purer variety than we normally experience. We are not directly and personally involved, so the usual medley of desires and anxieties dissolve. Our hearts respond sympathetically ( hṛdayasamvāda ) but not selfishly. Finally the response becomes total, all-engrossing, and we identify with the situation depicted (tanmayībhavana). The ego is transcended, and for the duration of the aesthetic experience, the normal waking "I" is suspended. Once this actually happens, we suddenly find that our responses are not like anything we have hitherto experienced, for now that all normal emotions are gone, now that the hard knot of "selfness" has been untied, we find ourselves in an unprecedented state of mental and emotional calm. The purity of our emotion and the intensity of it take us to a higher level of pleasure than we could know before - we experience sheer undifferentiated bliss ( ānandaikaghana ) for we have come into direct contact with the deepest recesses of our own unconscious where the memory

1. Those rasas with which the Kārikās of the Dhvanyāloka are concerned are actually mentioned at some point or another. Thus Karuṇarasa is mentioned at II, 8; Bībhatsa at III. 4; Roudra at II. 9; Śṛṅgāra time and again, e. g. II. 7, II. 15, etc. But nowhere is Śāntarasa mentioned by name in the Kārikās. Ānanda, however, does interpret III. 30 ( p. 397 ) to be a reference to Śāntarasa, but it is possible that he has misinterpreted the verse.

2. Abhinava refers to it on p. 67 of the Locana in the first Uddyota, and again in the fourth Uddyota, p. 533.

VIII

शान्तरसं

of a primeval unity between man and the universe is still strong. Inadvertently, says Abhinavagupta, we have arrived at the same inner terrain as that occupied by the mystic, though our aim was very different from his. Such an experience cannot but make us impatient with the ordinary turmoil of emotions that is our inner life, and though Abhinava never explicitly says so, one cannot help feeling that he expects the reader to search out now these experiences on a more permanent basis.

We would be justified in asking why Abhinava felt it necessary to provide such a unified theory of rasa ( when Ānandavardhana for instance never felt the need to philosophise about rasa ), and especially a theory that depended so heavily on notions involving śāntarasa. We think there is a good reason : as a religious man, Abhinava must have been under a certain amount of at least internal pressure to justify his deep interest in purely secular literature. There has always been among Indian philosophers ( and Western ones too; one thinks of Plato )1 a certain distrust of poetry. There is the attack of Jayantaḅṭa, the great logician, on Ānandavardhana's theory of suggestion : " There is no point in arguing with poets,"2 or the famous remark with which Mīmāṃsakas3 were known to rebuke those interested in poetry : " One should avoid the useless prattle that is poetry."4 Abhinava undermined such opposition by attempting to show that the states of mind during religious experiences and during literary experiences bore a basic affinity to one another. Literature, he wished to prove, at least the best literature, is just one more expression of an ineffable transcendent experience. This was a daring move and one which might legitimately have been expected earlier.5 It is rather odd when one considers it, that nobody before

1. As Blake puts it so well : "This was the fault of Plato. He knew of nothing but virtues and vices and good and evil."

2. यमन्यः पण्डितंन्यः प्रपेदे कञ्चन ध्वनिम् ।

अथवा नेदृशो चर्वा कविभिः सह शोभते । Nyāyamañjarī, p. 45.

3. Abhinava can use his wit very trenchantly when he desires. He has no liking for Mimāṃsakas and loses no opportunity to amuse himself at the expense of what he calls their dried-up minds. See for ex. Locana, p. 65, paśyata śrotrīyasyokti-kausalyam. One thinks of the very funny verse manufactured by the Mīmāṃsā pandits in the Bhojaprabandha, भोजनं देहि राजेन्द्र घृतसूपसमन्वितम्. " Give us, great king, food with butter and soup."

4. काव्यालापांश्र वर्जयेत् । See Mallinātha on RV. I. 1.

5. All large generalisations are dangerous, but we cannot refrain from mentioning what we consider to be a fundamental dichotomy that runs through Sanskrit literature. That which is trivial and which does not look beyond itself is contrasted with that which is significant and transcendental. Witness the hatred most philosophers have envinced for the Cārvākas who stress the absence of any numinous experience in life.

the Kashmir Śaivas thought of associating aesthetic experience with states of religious ecstasy, since the two have always been closely allied in India. Perhaps it was because the philosophical atmosphere of Kashmir Śaivism was so saturated with literature : we have only to glance at any single page of the Yogavāsiṣṭha to see how true this is. The most philosophic texts from this school bristle with terms taken from literature and literary criticism, just as conversely a work like the Dhvanyāloka is rich in philosophical implications and learning. For the Kashmir Śaivas generally, with their interest in Tantric ritual, sexual pleasure, indeed, aesthetic pleasure in general, was much less repugnant to them than it was to the Advaita tradition ( though we must not exaggerate this either, for did not the orthodox tradition itself ascribe to Śaṅkara the Amaruśataka ?).

What are the advantages that such a theory provides for Sanskrit literature ? They are many. (1) Such a philosophical justification must have helped to explain to Abhinava himself the nature of his interest in Sanskrit kāvya. If, as Kafka said, poetry should be a pick-axe to free the sea frozen within us, then most of Sanskrit poetry fails utterly. Most kāvya cannot reach us in our most primitive minds the way that Proust, or Lawrence, or Joyce can. In reading through the Dhvanyāloka, one is struck by the disparity between the theory and the literature to which it is applied. The poems themselves do not represent values more universal than their time. But the refined and subtle theories which Ānandavardhana employs, clearly do. For a modern scholar, it is easier to view these principles sub specie aeternitatis than to do so with the literature which illustrates them. The doctrine, oddly enough, is not significant merely as cultural anthropology, whereas many of the poems can only interest us for reasons other than their literary appeal.

Abhinava surprises us by ascribing the fault to us and not to the poetry. He could hardly have been unaware of this more or less unspoken complaint of sensitive critics, that a certain amount of Sanskrit poetry was mere trivial. This criticism would apply equally to Sanskrit plays. If we demand of our best literature transcendence, then these works seem to fail us. But Abhinava, in order to prove the lack of sensitivity in such a view, uses a very new argument : he brings in the example of śāntarasa. The one thing that śāntarasa does that no other rasa can, is that it disturbs us. If we really believe the message that any successful play dealing with śāntarasa tells us, we hear what Rilke said was the final lesson of all great literature : “ You must change your life.” By powerful arguments, Abhinava attempts to show that this quality of transcendence, which we must admit in śāntarasa (though his critics of course did not), applies equally well to good literature. The greatest example, which Ānanda was apparently the first critic in Sanskrit literature to notice, is the Mahābhārata. Before Ānanda nobody ever consider-

ed the possibility of looking at a piece of literature as a unified whole, with

a single dominant suggestive atmosphere, and certainly not something of such

gigantic proportions as the Mahābhārata. But both Ānanda and following

him, Abhinava, insist on the overwhelming experience that reading the Mahā-

bhārata provides. As unhappiness and doom succeed one another in seem-

ingly endless display of the vanity of this world; as we slowly become aware

of the folly of trusting to the external world to bring happiness; as one after

another the heroes of the epic whom we have come to know over volumes

and volumes fade from existence and everything seems to desiccate and near

its end, the reader is invaded by a sense of doom, a sense of the uselessness of

strife, and he is eventually instilled with a craving for tranquillity, for an end

to human suffering and misery. If our reading is extensive enough, concen-

trated enough, with no distractions from the outside world, then we can

induce in ourselves a profound imaginative experience of tranquillity, śāntarasa.

The Mahābhārata remains for Sanskrit literary critics the supreme example of

this mood, this imaginative creation. It is not surprising that Ānanda is at

his most eloquent when he describes this experience in great detail in the

fourth Uddyota of his Dhvanyāloka. The passage was clearly a powerful

influence in Abhinava's theories.

( 2 ) If Abhinava was struck by the poverty of much Indian kāvya

( which, through a reinterpretation of its purpose, he felt need no longer be

considered trivial ), he must have been equally disturbed by the lifeless quality

of much Indian philosophy. By eschewing the real world, it often found it-

self in the arid territory of the purely theoretic, with no tap-root leading into

the rich soil of real life as it is lived by men and women in a real world. An

English literary critic has recently berated this arid quality in surrealism :

" ...reading surrealistic books, as in talking to hermits, one is often struck

by the impoverishment of fantasy when not continually cross-pollinated by

the external world. Paradoxically, fantasy is not enriched, but etiolated by

resolute subjectivism."1 Abhinava, by importing literary issues into

philosophy, was able to provide philosophical thinking with a literary quality

it previously lacked. Aesthetics now becomes a legitimate concern for the

philosopher.

( 3 ) Abhinava discovered that great poems such as the Mahābhārata,

reach us beyond the conscious mind. One is reminded of Freud's great study

of Leonardo, when he speaks of the effeminate forms of Leonardo's " John

the Baptist " and " Bacchus " : " They are beautiful youths of feminine

delicacy and with effeminate forms; they do not cast their eyes down, but

1. Miles Burrows, reviewing Surrealism and the Novel, by J. H. Mathews in

the New Statesman, December, 22, 1967,

gaze in mysterious triumph, as if they knew of a great achievement of happiness, about which silence must be kept. The familiar smile of fascination leads one to guess that it is a secret of love."1

(4) Abhinava was not only a philosopher, he was also an authority on Tantric ritual. The rites he practised, probably even before he became interested in literary theory, must have provided him with his first contact with the kind of play-activity that he later found once again in the theatre. It seems to us no accident that Abhinava was more fond of the theatre than of any other form of literature. By establishing the intimate connection between theatre and ritual ( and thus by implication mythology as well ), Abhinava foreshadowed certain modern theories, even though he was not followed in this brilliant insight by any of his successors. The ramifications are many, and Abhinava often draws them in scattered places throughout his works. He is fond of the comparison of life with a drama and the resultant sense of unreality this gives. Dreams come up again and again in his works. In his Tantrāloka he speaks of man, the creator, as destroying the produce of his life, a dream. The external buildings, he says, are razed in the fire of his sudden awareness that he is Śiva, the great destroyer. Then follows the purely joy-filled dance of Śiva, the Tāṇḍava, that has no purpose other than to give expression to a sense of freedom and joy.2 On the other hand, one feels that Abhinava was not unaware of the enrichment that results from imaginative experiences. Even one's own childhood becomes an aesthetic object, something viewed with the dual detachment and involvement ( hṛdayānupravesa, or hṛdayasamvāda ) of the perfect spectator, the sahrdaya who is both moved and yet distanced from the object he contemplates. Has Abhinava in fact had an insight into the unconscious, and the value of imaginative understanding which Freud stressed as being essential to any true freedom from our own childhood traumas ?

(5) Abhinava is able to restore to poets an important place in the intellectual hierarchy by showing their underlying philosophical seriousness. One thinks he would have approved of Andre Malraux's comment : “ Les grands artistes ne sont pas les transcripteurs du monde; ils en sont les rivaux.” An advantage which might well pass unnoticed that Abhinava's system provides is the following : in Indian society, curiously enough, it was always the religious mystic who has been considered the maverick, who has been allowed the eccentric freedom that in the West we tend to associate with

1. S. Freud, Leonardo, pp. 162–163, Pelican Books, 1963.

2. See the very lovely verse from Vol. II of the Tantrāloka, p. 257, verse 286 :

अनन्तचित्रसद्र भैःसंसरस्वप्रसङ्गन ।

पोषकः शिव एवाहं इत्युञ्जासी हुताशनः ॥

For the dance image, see A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 21.

poets. Edmund Wilson, in "The Wound and the Bow," documents the neurotic elements in many of the great poets of the nineteenth and twentieth century. The striking phrase of the title refers to the myth of Philoctetes, the Greek warrior who possessed a magic bow, but was forced to live in isolation on an island because of the insufferable odour that emanated from a suppurating wound on his ankle. Eventually his countrymen had to call him back, in spite of their disgust, because of his unerring weapon. Art extracts its own price. Of course in India the mystic was never both loathed and venerated, he was simply venerated. Nonetheless already in the Upaniṣads we hear of the mystic as being similar to a child in his unrestrained behaviour.1 The adjective sometimes applied to him is unmatta, mad. One thinks of the extraordinary passage in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad dealing with Raikva of the cart, who dares to call King Janaka but a śūdra, and who finally agrees to teach him for the pretty face of his daughter. He received his name from where he lived, underneath a cart. This has not generally been true of the artist. The poet has always been far more integrated into Indian society. India has not developed the sense of the loneliness of the writer, shunned by, and shunning, society. But Abhinava, by restoring to him his more important functions, also enables him to preserve his independence. It is now not only the mystic who opens himself to numinous experience. Is it significant that the only description of the poet as a man out of his ordinary senses that immediately comes to mind is from Uttungolocana, the Kaumudī ? There he says of the poet: "...the poet wants to write poetry in order to instruct those of delicate minds, people who are for the most part similar to princes, in the means of attaining the four goals of life through aesthetic enjoyment. First, by the stream that is rasa, to be aesthetically enjoyed by the presentation of the vibhāvas etc. that are at the root of the poem he wishes to make, his own heart which is like a great and immeasurably deep lake (of rasa) becomes filled, then he becomes as if possessed by a planet, as if mad, and finally he pours out his poetry, and turns the listener, the sensitive reader (sahrdaya), into the same (sort of madman as he has become)."2 But of course the artist is never in Sanskrit

1. Cf. Abhinava's Paramārthasāra, verse 71 : जड़ इव विचरेदवादमतिः .

(Silburn, le Paramārthasāra, P. I. C. I., Paris, 1957, p. 60).

2. Kuppuswami Sastri's edition of the Dhvanyāloka, p. 170 :

इदमत्र वस्तुतस्वम्—कविविंहि सुकुमारमनसों राजकुमारप्रायाणाम् आस्वादपुरस्कारेण चतुर्वर्गोंपाय-व्युत्पत्तिसंपिपादयिष्या काव्यं चिकीर्षु:,; चिकीर्ष्यमाणकाव्यनिबन्धनीभूतविभावादियोजनास्वादनीयरसामृत-

प्रवाहेण प्रथमं स्वयमेव परिपूरितगभीरतरनिजहृदयमहाह्रदो भूत्वा ग्रहाविष्ट इवोन्मत्त इव काव्यं बहिः; प्रसार्य श्रोत्रणामपि सहृदयानामात्मसमयान्‌योगक्षेमतां संपादयति ।

society an alien figure. When we read of Abhinava (see below ) sitting in a

grape garden, a single golden earring hanging from his ear, surrounded by

magicians and women Yogins, playing on a lute with dūtīs by his side

with cups of wine and lemons in their hands, this in no way makes him

eccentric, at least to the Indian public. Even in the legend of his death,

how he entered a cave with twelve hundred disciples and never returned, there

is nothing “asocial” to shock the Indian.

( 6 ) One corollary of his theories, though again it does not seem to have

been realised either by Abhinava or by his successors, is that rasa becomes

available not only to poetry and the theatre but to all literature. Generally

rasa is only possible in kāvya or nātya. But the Mahābhārata is after all

already an exception since it cannot be considered kāvya in the strict defini-

tion of the term. Yet both Ānanda and Abhinava give it the careful literary

attention it deserves. The claim was made by Kalhaṇa at the beginning of

his Rājataranginī that his work on history contains śāntarasa :

“ Considering how the life of creatures cracks after a few moments,

one should understand ( why ) śāntarasa has been given the most impor-

tant position in this work ( atra ).”1

It is all the more surprising then that Abhinava never thought of

extending his theory to purely religious texts. After all the most obvious and

in a sense the best examples of śāntarasa are to be found in religious and

philosophical literature, and not in belles lettres. The Upaniṣads, for example,

would surely have provided Abhinava with his finest examples. Today we

can consider the Upaniṣads to be among the finest examples of world “litera-

ture,” though no text on literary criticism in ancient India ever thought of

quoting them or deriving support from any of their beautiful lines. As the

rhetoricians define literature, the Upaniṣads do not qualify. Abhinava's

brilliant insight that what makes for literature is the quality of the sentiment

and not adherence to formal rules, provided the opportunity for a re-definition

that was curiously never taken advantage of. Even Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja,

who gives a more liberal definition of literature,2 does not depart from

standard examples in his illustrations ( indeed he even regresses in including

only his own works, thus furthering the greatest single misfortune of Sanskrit

literary criticism, the divorce between what actually was written and what

was supposed to be written ). No better example of śāntarasa could be found

1. Rājataranginī, I. 23, 4 ( Viśva Bandhu's edition, Hoshiarpur, 1953 ) :

क्षणभङ्गे नु जन्नूनां स्फुरिते परिलक्षितते ।

मूर्धाभिषेकः शान्तस्य रसस्यात्र विचार्यताम् ॥

2. Rasagangādhara, KM edition of 1939, p. 4 :

रमणीयार्थप्रतिपादकः शब्दः काव्यम् ।

xiv

than the Pāli Mahāparinibbānasutta, the sober, moving account of the death of the Buddha. Or even such prosaic but haunting lines as that of King Janaka when his kingdom went up in flames : mithilāyām pradiptāyām na me kimcana dahyate—“ Nothing of mine is burned when Mithilā is in flames.”1

( 7 ) Abhinava insists on the epiphany that poetry provides, on the sense of camatkāra, of having our breath taken away. He compares it at one place2 to a wondrous flower that suddenly bursts into bloom. He is particularly fond of a fine image in the Nātyaśāstra :

" The externalisation ( bhāva ) of the emotion ( artha ) which makes an appeal to the heart is the source ( udbhava ) of rasa. The body is suffused by it, as dry wood is suffused by fire."3

( 8 ) An advantage that Abhinava's philosophy provides for Sanskrit literary criticism is that there need be no disagreements over significant literary experiences. Since the emotional experience in great literature is for Abhinava and later critics who follow him ( Mammata, Viśvanātha, Jagan­nātha, etc. ) always the same, namely ātmānanda, " the bliss of the self," an insoluble problem for Western literature has been solved. The problem is that there is no guarantee that two spectators feel the same thing when viewing a work of art. To say " it depresses me " or " it thrills me," or " it excites me," is often a comment on the viewer's own state of mind and not on the work of art itself. Usually it is discovered in later conversation that the work of art has acted as a catalyst, releasing some emotion long consciously forgotten, dislodging it from its undercover. One might object that Abhinava too is no longer speaking about the work of art on its own, but about certain universal states of mind. This is true, but at least, if all literary critics accept that this is the true function of literature, namely to induce such a state of euphoria, then they have a common ground on which to argue whether a particular piece of literature has been successful or not. And in fact it is astonishing to note how great a concensus of opinion there is in Sanskrit literature over what is good. The concensus lasts over the centuries. There are few poets who have been considered great in the tradition long ago, but now forgotten. If one looks through the names of poets that Abhinava constantly quotes, one is struck by how many of these are poets we still read and admire today, 1000 years later. We are all aware how

1. Mahābhārata, XII, 178. Quoted by Saṅkara in his bhāṣya on Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. I. 4. 15.

2. Locana, p. 160, ( B. P. edition ).

3. NS. VII, 7, Vol. I, p. 348. Quoted also in the Locana, p. 39. It is erroneously ascribed by the editors of the ed. with Bālapriyā to Bhaṭṭanāyaka,

योऽर्थः हृदयसंवादी तस्य भावो रसोद्भवः ।

शरीरे व्याप्तिते तेन शुष्कं काष्ठमिवाग्निना ॥

in the West even thirty years ago " great poets " are now not much more than footnotes in college textbooks. Goethe is reported to have said that he found " the Inferno abominable, the Purgatorio dubious and the Paradiso tiresome." One thinks too of Donne, eclipsed for three centuries and only restored to honour through the critical efforts of T. S. Eliot. Such ups and downs in Sanskrit literature are more or less impossible. ( There are of course other reasons for this as well ).

These are just some of the more general results of Abhinava's theories. The details will be found in the body of this work. We think it is clear that the way for later writers on poetics to expand on religious and philosophical themes was provided by Abhinava. ( Surely, for example, the Bengal Vaiṣṇavas, especially the two Gosvāmins, were inspired to their elaborate theories by the climate Abhinava created ). Abhinava's final theory bears a remarkable similarity to what Aldous Huxley developed in his work " The Doors of Perception." H. Osborne writes of this work as follows : " Finally it is sometimes asserted that works of art symbolize a metaphysical reality of which by our appreciative commerce with the work of art we become directly and immediately aware. This is a view which many modern artists have themselves alleged. In his essay " The Doors of Perception " Aldoux Huxley describes how under the influence of mescalin his ordinary perceptions were accompanied by an intense and inescapable feeling of revelation. He develops the theory that artistic vision in general has this revelatory character and that the works of art which artists create communicate to us imperfectly the revelation of ultimate reality which they have enjoyed. ' What the rest of us see only under the influence of mescalin,' he says, ' the artist is congenitally equipped to see all the time.... It is a knowledge of the intrinsic significance of every existent. For the artist as for the mescalin taker, draperies are living heroglyphs that stand in some peculiarly expressive way for the unfathomable mystery of pure being.' The statement that in the act of appreciating a beautiful work of art we have immediate intuitive awareness of ultimate or pure being, takes us outside the confines of aesthetics proper. As ' emotive ' descriptions of the artistic experience such affirmations are significant and must be treated with respect.'"1

We have seen some of the advantages that Abhinava's philosophy provided for literary criticism, all of which derive from his brilliant insights into what lay behind imaginative experiences in literature. Let us now look far more briefly ( for they are less important ) at some of the disadvantages. The chief danger, it seems to us, is the reductionism in his theories; how all

1. " Aesthetics as a Branch of Philosophy " by Ruth Saw and Harold Osborne, p. 31, in " Aesthetics in the Modern World, " London, 1968.

xvi

शान्तरसे

literature becomes reduced to a single experience. A similar criticism has been made of Coleridge : “Coleridge's demand for unification and harmony entailed the conversion of the poetic into something other than the poetic, its subordination to philosophy and ultimately to religion.”1 Perhaps the reason, in Abhinava's case, was that he was not himself a very good poet. He did of course write a good deal of poetry, but there are at the most three or four memorable verses in all of his work,2 and his poetry goes virtually unquoted in later critical literature. Perhaps he was prevented by his own intelligence from being direct and concrete.3 Had he been more of a poet, and more interested in the particular, would he have preached quite so reductionist a theory ? There are of course advantages to this ( a unified theory for one ) but it means forgetting what I. A. Richards has taught a generation of literary critics, namely that “ a poem does not stand for something else.”4 Abhinava's strength lay in ideas, in conceptual thinking. He was not himself an artist, and one cannot help being reminded of Eliot's famous remark à propos Henry James, that he had a mind so fine that no idea could violate it !

There is a sense in which Abhinava confuses art and life when he insists on the primacy of śāntarasa. It is of course true that dramatists can be concerned with anything they like, including the experience underlying śāntarasa; but the point is not one of theoretic possibilities, but of what actually succeeds in the theatre. Abhinava's weakest point was that he did not really have any example of a great play in which śāntarasa was dominant, to lend credence to his theories. The Nāgānanda is the sole exception, and this could hardly be considered great literature. By seeing beyond literature to the universal experience that lies behind it, Abhinava is undermining the autonomy, the uniqueness of literary experience. He is in danger of turning literature into an icon, a representational object, and aid to devotion rather than an experience unique and precious for its own sake. “Art”, in C. S. Lewis' fine phrase, “ must be received, not used.” Religion is not, after all, the same thing as literature, unless we dilute the definition of these two terms

1. Roy Park, “ Poetic Imagination in Coleridge and Kant,” British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 8, no. 4, Oct. 1968, p. 343.

2. The one really fine verse in the Locana is quoted under III, 30, p. 397 :

तां चन्द्रचूडं सहसा स्पृशन्ती

प्राणेश्वरीं गाढवियोगतप्ता ।

सा चन्द्रकान्ति आकृतिप्रतिकेव

संविद्रिलीयापि विलीयते मे ॥

in which he puns very effectively in comparing sexual love and śānta.

3. Cf. the verse he wrote on p. 127 of the Locana and the absurdly long and tortuous commentary he writes on it.

4. Quoted by A. Alvarez, “ The Phoenix and the Turtle ” p. 5, in the work ed. by J. Wain already cited.

into harmlessness. The descriptions that Huxley gives of what he felt under mescalin are interesting pyschologically, but to claim that they are essentially literary is to forget the fact that great literature can never be unconscious and ephemeral. The efforts and pains of creation are conceptual, concrete and external. Dreaming is not, after all, making. That literature could point nowhere except to itself, must have somehow proved disquieting to Abhinava. He was too religious to allow that literature might be somehow “ useless,” a goal in itself. (Though rasa does involve surrender to the work of art, and Abhinava insists that one's own self must be got out of the way before the work of art can truly be appreciated for its own sake ). It is significant in this respect that Abhinava shies away from the terms prīti “ pleasure ” and vinoda “ entertainment,” to express the purpose of poetry. He prefers the religious word ānanda “ bliss.” By insisting on putting such significance into poetry Abhinava is in danger of making much of Sanskrit literature top-heavy; one is wary that it simply cannot bear the philosophical burden he places on it. One's mind is irreverently invaded by an image of Kālidāsa sitting politely bored, listening to Abhinavagupta explain to him the deeper significance of his plays, his ears really attuned to the joyous shouts of the spring festival taking place outside.

ŚĀNTARASA

PART I

Abhinava's Philosophy of Aesthetics

INFLUENCES

Abhinava seems to us deeply concerned with four or five basic ideas :

the relation of poetry to philosophy; the nature of suggestion; religious

ecstasy ( and its bearing on literature ); drama and poetry, and ritual and

drama. The question that must have helped him to bring all these elements

together is one still asked today : how is it that we " enjoy" literary situa-

tions that are sad or tragic ? He sought the answer to this basic question in

extraordinary states of mind, in ecstatic experiences. Nobody denied these in

poetry or in religious literature generally,1 but in drama their existence was

still debated. Śāntarasa was not universally acknowledged as a legitimate

element in drama. For Abhinava the question was not merely academic, for

if he were not able to provide convincing arguments in its favour, he could

hardly justify his interest in drama. Moreover he had no examples of a play

in which śāntarasa played an important part, with the single exception of the

Nāgānanda, largely a Buddhist drama, and of questionable literary excellence.

By synthesising all of his pre-occupations into one system, a theoretical justi-

fication for śāntarasa could be made, with the ultimate result that the type of

otherworldly or transcendental experience which the spectator undergoes

during ŚR ( śāntarasa ) would be basic to all aesthetic experience. Such a

system was not to be found ready-made. But Abhinava was able to take

what he needed from different sources : from the Dhvanyāloka he took his

theory of suggestion; from Bharata he took the starting point of his ideas on

rasa and drama; from speculation on ŚR and from Kashmir Śaivism and

Tantric works he took ideas on the relation of religious ecstasy to literature.

The final end product was his theory of rasa in which he combines philo-

sophy and poetics. There are, therefore, four major influences in his

theories: poetics, philosophy, specuiation on ŚR and ritual.

Before examining these influences more closely, we must note that

while open to all of them, Abhinava had an extremely independent mind.

1. Since a great and undisputed literature already existed along these lines, one

has only to think of Bhartrhari's Vairāgyaśataka.

2

Not only is he not afraid to disagree with his own teachers,1 he is even able to disregard the great texts of the tradition : “We don’t care in the least if it is described in this way in the Rāmāyaṇa itself. In fact, it might be described in the Veda itself, and won’t be stifled by this fact”.2 There are very few ideas which did not “suffer a sea-change” when immersed into the depths of Abhinava’s mind. On the other hand, he belonged to a tradition in which a careful grounding in the past was de rigueur, and it is not surprising to find that he has been greatly influenced by a large number of writers. To consider this plagiarism3 is as absurd as demanding that Coleridge (like Lowell in “The Road to Xanadu”) footnote all his allusions and quotations ! Abhinava has a very fine verse in the Abhinavabhāratī, right after giving elaborate expositions of his predecessors’ views on rasa, in which he justifies his urge to proceed further :

“ When intellectual curiosity (dhīh) climbs higher and higher and sees the truth (arthatattva) without getting tired, this is because of the ladders of thought built by earlier writers.”4

Poetic Influences

Abhinava was of course familiar with all the works on poetics extant at the time of his writing (many of which are no longer available). He is particularly fond of Bhāmaha, whom he often quotes in the Locana.

1. On p. 314, A. Bh. Vol. I, Abhinava seems to disagree with Bharata concerning the definition of hāsya. Note Kane, H. S. P., p. 55. “On p. 436 (of the B. O. R. I. copy) Abhinava appears to differ from him (Utpaladeva, the author of the Pratyabhijñā, Abhinava’s teacher’s teacher) उत्पलदेवपादास्त्वस्मत्परमगुरवो व्याचचक्षते….. बयं तु मन्महे ।

2. A. Bh., Vol. III, p. 74 : रामायणेऽपि तथा वर्णितमिति चेत्किमत: । वेदेऽपि तथा वर्ण्यतां न वयमतो विभीष्म: ।

3. Ānanda has some very perceptive remarks on plagiarism in the fourth Uddyota of the D. Al., stanzas 11-17. It seems to us possible that he was influenced by Gauḍavaho. We think in particular of verse 66 of Vākpatirāja’s, which is identical in sentiment with the Prākrit verse that Ānanda quotes on p. 527. Verses 85 and 86 of the Gauḍavaho also prefigure several of the ideas in the fourth Uddyota. There seems no reason for questioning the date of 700 A. D. (Pandit, p. C of his ed. of the Gauḍavaho) and it is therefore perfectly possible that Ānanda knew the work. Rājaśekhara, who knew Ānanda by name (see p. 16 of the Kāvyamīmāṃsā) systematised Ānanda’s views on plagiary. See KM, p. 62.

4. A. Bh., I, p. 278. Also Gnoli, op. cit. p. 12 : ऊर्ध्वमारुह्य यदर्थतत्त्वं

धी: पश्यति शान्तिमवेदयन्ती ।

फलं तदैवैः परिकल्पितानां

विवेकसोपानपरम्पराणाम् ॥

The verse is quoted by Uttungodaya in his Kaumudī, p. 102 with some variation.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

3

Udbhata,1 Vāmana and Daṇḍin all of whom Abhinava quotes, do not seem to have provided him with any of his major doctrines. Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra was of course a major influence or rather stimulus, to his ideas on rasa.2 Much of his technical terminology derives directly from the NŚ, as well as several more advanced ideas. All this is well-known; so there is no need for us to provide illustrations. There is one "influence", however, which seems to us to have been overlooked. This is Aśvaghoṣa's Saundarananda. There is of course no way of knowing whether Abhinava knew this work or not.3 However, in the light of his pre-occupation with ŚR, and of his good knowledge of Buddhism generally, there seems no real reason why he should not. Moreover, there seems some evidence, in the form of certain striking similarities, which suggests that he did know this remarkable poet. The dominant rasa in both the Buddhacarita and the Saundarananda (and most probably the dramas4 as well, to judge from the meagre fragments pieced together by Lüders ) is

1. E. g. Udbhata's lost Bhāmahivarṇana (see p. 68, K. Sastri's ed.). Recently Professor Gnoli has published " Udbhaṭa's commentary on the Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha ", ISMEO, Rome, 1962, editing the fragments found at Kifirkotḥ which he identifies with the commentary on the Kāvyālaṅkāra. If Gnoli is correct, fragment number 10 (pp. 7-8), which deals with the Locana passage, should have been (without the pratīka) between abhidhānārthāh and śabdānām abhidhānam. But there is no room in the MS for such a reading. Therefore, if we are to retain Gnoli's theory, this will have to have occurred in the second half of line 2 of fragment 10. The only problem is that there does not seem, if we have correctly understood the accompanying photographs of the manuscripts, any room for this passage in the fragment in question. There seems to us no good reason why the pratīka, abhidhānārthāḥ should be repeated, nor can we see any justification for the second member of a compound being explained before the first member. It is true that the author of these fragments accepted abhidhāvṛtti and guṇavṛtti as śabdavyāpāras, but why must we assume that the person holding such a view is Udbhaṭa?

2 E. g. NŚ, vol. I, p. 272, G. O. S. ed. :

न हि रसाद्दते कश्चिदर्थः प्रवर्तते; the definition of rasa : p. 288, रस इति कः पदार्थः ? उच्यते - आस्वाद्यत्वात्; VI. 38 (p. 294 ); p. 299 : स्थायिभावोऽक्ष रसलवमुपनेतव्यामः .

3. There is no quotation from Aśvaghoṣa in any of Abhinava's works. The quotations from Aśvaghoṣa in the anthologies (see Kāviṇdarvacanasamuccaya, p. 29 ) are not found in any of his extant works. Rājaśekhara (KM, p. 18 ) quotes a verse from the Buddhacarita ( VIII. 25 ), but this is not ascribed by him to anybody. Similarly the Bhojaprabandha takes over BC IV. 59. Neither of these passages is sufficient evidence to say that the author actually knew Aśvaghoṣa's work, since the quotations could have come down though the work be lost. Note that BC VIII. 25 is similar to Raghuvaṁśa III. 15, but the whole problem of Kālidāsa's borrowing from A. is not settled. On the whole, we are inclined to think that Kālidāsa did know Aśvaghoṣa, and was influenced by him. Johnston (op. cit, Int. to the English Tr. of the BC, p. LXXII ) thinks that Daṇḍin, KD, II. 44 has BC IV. 33 in mind, and that Bhāmaha, in criticising ajihladat ( used in S. II. 30 ) may be referring to Aśvaghoṣa.

4. The fragments from the three dramas were edited by H. Lüders, " Bruchstücke Buddhistischer Dramen ", Berlin, 1911, and Philologica Indica, Göttingen, 1940.

4

śānta. The words śama and śānti occur constantly in both works.1 Further, at the end of Saundarananda2 there are two remarkable verses which might well have influenced Abhinava :

" And so this work, whose essence is liberation, ( was written ) so that people might obtain peace of mind, and not for amusement ( rataye ). I have written it in the form of a poem in order to engage the minds of readers interested ( primarily ) in other things ( and not in liberation ). The fact that I have dealt with things other than liberation is because of ( the book's ) poetic nature, and in order that it might appeal to the hearts of readers, just as a bitter medicine is mixed with honey in order to induce the patient to drink it. "3

Abhinava has used this very simile of medicine and honey in the Locana. Moreover, he insists, time and again, that poetry is more gentle than śāstra ( which can be loosely translated as "philosophy" ), but that it leads to similar results. The last verse of the work is no less important :

" Since men are, for the most part, engrossed in sensual pleasures, and totally disinterested in mokṣa, I have said in this work, under the ( sweet ) disguise of poetry, that mokṣa is the highest ( truth ). Knowing this, ( the reader ) should, with attentive mind ( avahitam ), accept from the poem that which leads to peace, and not ( only ) that which is pleasant. For gold is surely separated from mineral dust-particles. "4

If we suppose that Abhinava did know this poem, how do we explain the fact that he did not use Aśvaghoṣa's works, seeing that he could certainly

1. E. g. Saundarananda VII. 22; VIII. 56; XI. 5; XII. 33-34; XV. 49 a lovely verse that could be engraved on the tombstone of the twentieth century.

2. Note that in Saundarananda, XIV. 50, Aśvaghoṣa uses the expression śama-sukharasa ! But there is no evidence, aside from the dubious expression rasāntara at BC VII. 51, that he knew either the NS or the rasa theory.

3. Saundarananda, XVIII, 63 :

इत्येषा व्यूढशाल्लये न रतये मोक्षार्थमग्र्या कृति:

श्रोतॄणां ग्रहणार्थमन्न्यमनसां काव्योपचारात् कृतā ।

यन्मोक्षैकृतमन्सदत्न हि मया तत्त्वाव्यधर्मात्मकृतं

पातुं तिक्तमिवौषधं मदयुतं हृद्यं कथं स्यादिति ॥

4. S. XVIII. 64 :

प्रायेणालोक्य लोकं विषयरतिपरं मोक्षात्परिहतं

काव्यव्याजेन तस्मै क्थितमिह मया मोक्ष: परमिति ।

तद्बुद्धा शामिकं यत्तद्वहितमितो ग्राह्यं न ललितं

पांशुभ्यो धातुजे म्यो नित्यमुपकरं चामीकरमिति ॥

According to Johnston ( p. 164, notes ) the word upakāram is hapax since it occurs nowhere else in the literature. Perhaps like upakāra it means something like " useful ", " valuable ".

have argued with perfect justification that they are all good examples of ŚR? We think there is a plausible reason: although there are passages of real śānta poetry,1 nonetheless on the whole Aśvaghoṣa's position is directly opposed to the enjoyment of poetry for its own sake ( a position Abhinava defends, see below ). The whole of his work ( even the Saundarananda ) can be seen as a tract against just such frivolous activities as reading poetry and watching plays ! Śama is seen therein to be opposed to literary enjoyment, which after all implies a certain delight in the senses. Both Abhinava and Ānanda ( see below ), extol the great variety of this world. Two other, less probable reasons, suggest themselves : ( 1 ) Aśvaghoṣa was after all a Buddhist, and to quote him with approbation might have seemed odd. ( 2 ) In the verses quoted below there is real poetry. But there is a great difference between being told something, and actually experiencing it ( a problem which Abhinava and Ānanda are greatly concerned with, under the name of svasabdanivedi-tatva ). Preachers inform us; only poets invite us to experience. Aśva-ghoṣa is more often than not a preacher. Thus, the same ideas from the fine verses quoted in the notes are repeated time and again, especially in chapter XIV. But they make no impression, for they are merely bald statements — ideas rather than poems. As George Boas puts it, bluntly, in a lecture on philosophy and poetry : “….. the ideas in poetry are usually stale and often false, and no one older than sixteen would find it worth his

1. Saundarananda, XV, 32 :

अतीते डव्वनि संवृत्तः स्वजनो हि जनस्तव ।

अपापे चाङ्ननि जनेह स्वजनस्ते भविष्पति ॥

S. XV, 33 :

विहगानां यथा सार्य तत्र तत्र समागमः ।

जातौ जातौ तथा श्लेषो जनस्य स्वजनस्य च ॥

S. XV, 34 :

प्रतिश्रयं बहुविधं संश्रयन्ति यथाध्वगाः ।

प्रतियान्ति पुनः स्वक्वा तद्रज्ञातिसमागमः ॥

In the next verse such meetings are compared to a fistful of sand, held together only by the hand : vālukāmuṣṭivaj jagat. Cf. MBh. XII, 23. 36 :

यथा काठं च काठं च समेयातां महोदधौ ।

समेष्य च व्यपेयातां तद्रज्ञातसमागमः ॥

6

śāntarasa

while to read poetry merely for what it says".1 On the other hand, the real poetry of the Saundarananda becomes " part of the furniture of the mind ", and nobody who has read the fine verses from XV. 32-34 is likely to forget them. But such verses are rare, and Abhinava may well have classified the whole poem as "didactic", thus dismissing it from serious literary consideration, for the philosophical passages are of interest to the believer and to the scholar, but not to the sahrdaya. But this is mere speculation.

With Ānandavardhana, however, we pass into the realm of certainty. The influence of the Dhvanyāloka on Abhinava cannot be exaggerated. We can safely say that the two greatest works in Indian literary criticism are the Dhvanyāloka and Abhinava's commentary on it, the Locana. There are few ideas in the D.Al. which Abhinava has not assimilated, often by dealing with them in a more subtle manner. Those ideas, however, for which he owes less to Ānanda, will be dealt with in the section on Abhinava himself. Here we should like to call attention to certain key terms, which stand for important concepts, from the D. Al. which might escape the notice of a hurried reader. These are the terms which seem to us most important to Abhinava's theories. Before doing so, we should remember what dhvani is not. There is nothing imprecise, or vague about dhvani, as many Western writers have erroneously supposed, misled by the connotations of the word " suggestive ' in English. The concept is not a subjective one. There is nothing ineffable about dhvani. It is important to realise this. Ānanda, in fact, spends a good deal of energy in refuting the anākhyeyavādins, those who claim that, if suggestion exists at all, it is beyond the realm of speech.2 Both vastudhvani and alaṅkāradhvani can be paraphrased, without losing their status as poetry ( though of course they are no longer cases of dhvani by definition ), but rasadhvani cannot. In fact, if we were to state what is the single most important characteristic feature of rasadhvani, we would say that it is the inability to lend itself to paraphrase. The reason this is so has to do with

1. G. Boas, " Philosophy and Poetry ", Wheaton College, Mass. 1932, p. 9.

2. The position of the anākhyeyavādins is given at the beginning of the D. Al. p. 33 ( B. ed. ) : केषित्पुनलक्षणकरणशालीनबुद्धयो ध्वनेःस्तत्वं विरामगोचरं सहृदयहृदयसंवेशमेव समाश्रयातवन्तः । " Some whose minds shied away from attempting a definition declared that the truth of dhvani lay outside the realm of speech, and could only be internally realised by a sensitive reader. " Ānanda replies to this at the very end of the first Uddyota ( after K. 22 ). Again at the end of the third Uddyota, Ānanda comes back to their views, informing us that the Buddhists claim that all things are beyond definition ( p. 519, B. ed. ). Note that the kārikās themselves never reply to the anākhyeyavāda. In the third Uddyota ( p. 403, and also pp. 517-518 ) Ānanda, perhaps borrowing from Vākyapadīya I. 35, says that only a jeweller can recognise the true value of gems ( and whether they are genuine or synthetic ).

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

Ānanda's theory of the different functions that words fulfil in literature. We

will deal with this only briefly, for while it is essential to Abhinava, it is an

area about which the reader can find reliable information with no great diff-

culty.1 In essence it is this : Ānanda inherited from older works, two

functions of words, abhidhā and lakṣaṇā. Abhidhā is denotation, the literal

meaning of any utterance. Lakṣaṇā is more complex ( it has often been mis-

understood ), but can be translated as secondary usage, including metaphorical usage. The time-honoured example, unfortunately not so simple to under-

stand as has been thought, is : gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ, literally : " In the Ganges

is a village of cow-herders." If this sounds absurd in English so does it in

Sanskrit, for the locative is not normally used in the sense of proximity. By

" in the Ganges " is therefore meant " near the Ganges ", i.e. " on the banks

of the Ganges ". This meaning ( known as the lakṣyārtha, as opposed to the

abhidheyārtha ) is reached through lakṣaṇā. Until the time of Ānanda, these

were the only two functions ( apart from tāṭparya with which we are not

concerned here ) which writer, either on literature or philosophy, recognised.

Ānandavardhana revolutionised the field of poetics by adding a third func-

tion, hitherto completely unsuspected : vyañjanā or " suggestiveness ". This

sabdavyāpāra or " linguistic function " is active in all the three types of

suggestion mentioned above. Both Ānanda and Abhinava spend a great deal

of time justifying this function and defending it against detractors.2 They

did this so successfully that, after one or two major critics ( Kuntaka and

Mahimabhaṭṭa ), this function was universally acknowleged, and one finds

no major work written after the eleventh century in which the author does

not use it as an important element in his own theories on literature. To our

mind, Abhinava's major contribution to this doctrine was to show that rasa

is not niyata, i.e. " necessary ", thus differing from arthāpatti ( presumption,

which are logical processes. Direct statements "produce" results. Thus the

phrase putras te jātaḥ.3 " A son has been born to you ", "produces" delight.

This is not the case with aesthetic delight, which, according to Ānanda and

Abhinava, can only be " suggested ". But there are a great many other

ideas in the D. Al. not nearly so well-known, which must have exercised a

certain fascination for Abhinava, as they still do for us, one thousand years

later. The most important of these ( and certainly the least recognised by

modern writers ) goes by the name of svasaṃvedaniveditatva. It is closely related

1. See the excellent chapter on metaphor in K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of

Meaning, Madras, 1963.

2. Abhinava has a long defence in the Locana, pp. 55-70 ( B. ed. ). The very long

commentary ( pp. 401-457 ) in the D. Al., third Uddyota, also is concerned with this.

3. Locana, pp. 79, 80, 83.

8

शान्तरस

to the idea of vyañjanā. Can an emotion be conjured up by simply naming it ?1 When an author attempts to charge a situation with sensuality, for example, is it sufficient for a man to say to a woman : “ I want to sleep with you ”? If a character says to someone : “ I love you ”,2 this may or may not be the case, but as readers of literature we demand proof, and the only proof relevant to literature is the actual suggestion of the emotion in the work. Simple profession is not enough. Surely the great fault of Thomas Mann's “ Magic Mountain ” is that while the first half of the book successfully creates the atmosphere of a sanatorium removed from the preoccupations of ordinary existence, the second half, in which Mann deals with philosophical and political ideas, fails to come to life. It is too intellectualised, too explicit. Mann seems to be writing essays, not literature. Settembrini's long discourses only arouse impatience to get on to the real fictional elements of the work. Ānanda saw this clearly ( is he perhaps the first recorded literary critic to do so ? ) : “ In a poem in which there is no description of the vibhāvas, etc., but a simple use of the word “ love ”, etc., how can there possibly be the slightest imaginative experience ( on the part of the reader )? ”3 Abhinava was deeply impressed by this doctrine, as he tells us in the A. Bh. : “ It has been shown by the author of the dhvani ( -āloka ) and others, that rasas etc., are never conveyed by the mere naming of the emotion ( to be suggested ). This can be ascertained from my exposition called the Locana on the Sahṛdayāloka.”4 It is this doctrine that has led Ānanda to emphasise the extreme importance of the suggested element ( vyañgyārtha ) in literature, over and above the explicit element ( vācyārtha ). The whole first Uddyota of the D. Al. is devoted to establishing the existence of this suggested element, and to underlining its supreme place in poetry. At times, in fact, this seems excessive, for it often leads Ānanda to give critical acclaim to a poem that we should judge less satisfactory5 and to deride a poem that we should

1. Note what Abhinava says in the Locana, p. 51, that rasa is “ never even in a dream svaśabdavañcya,” स्वप्नेऽपि न स्वशब्दवाच्यः ।

2. There is a whole class of literature devoted to saying this same thing, on the part of women, by suggestion. They are always, as in D. Al. p. 71, cases of vastudhvani.

3. D. Al. p. 83 : न हि केवलरुकारादिरशब्दमात्रभाजि विभावादिप्रतिपादनरहिते काव्ये मनागपि रसवत्प्रतीतिरस्ति ।

4. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 343 : स्वशब्दानभिधेयत्वं हि रसादीनां ध्वनिकारादिभिरदर्शितम् । तच्च मदीयदेश तद्विवरणात् सहृदयालोकनादवधारणीयम् । The only names that Abhinava uses for D. Al. are kāvyāloka ( “ light on poetry ” ) and sahrdayāloka ( “ light for the sensitive reader ” ). The name dhvanyāloka is thus actually a misnomer.

5. We think of the verse : सुवर्णपुष्पां पृथिवीं चिन्वन्ति पुरुषाख्याः । etc. given on p. 137 of the D. Al. as an example of avivakṣitavācyadhvani, and which is surely

( Continued on next page )

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

9

prefer aesthetically, on the simple grounds that one contains suggestion and

the other lacks it. But as Ānanda was the very first critic in literary history

to have perceived the existence of the suggested sense, we must not complain

if he is carried away by enthusiasm at his discovery.1 There is however one

place in the D. Al. where Ānanda makes a very significant concession which

has been for the most part overlooked by the later tradition : in the first

Uddyota of the D. Al. he says that an emotional evocation can be “ directly

and explicitly stated ” if this statement is merely a recapitulation ( anuvāda )

of what has already been suggested.2

A doctrine which Ānanda never developed into a specific theory, but

which is nonetheless discernible from various passages and their underlying

assumptions in the D. Al. is the autonomy of literary experience. A poem

creates its own world, and must be consistent only with itself. It owes only

token allegiance to the outside world. The values of life are not necessarily

the values of literature. Ānanda says, very explicitly, in an important passage

in the third Uddyota, that questions of truth and falsity simply do not apply

to imaginative literature :

“ In the field of poetry where we perceive suggested elements, truth

( satya ) and falsity ( asatya ) are pointless. To examine ( literature ) through

( the usual ) valid means of cognition would simply lead to ridicule.”3

The criteria by which we judge literature, he explains, are not those

which we apply in our everyday life. This theory culminates in the famous

doctrine of aucitya, literally “ propriety ”. He develops this concept at very

great length in the third Uddyota, and culminates by saying :

“ Except for impropriety, there is no other source of harming rasa.

The highest secret ( upanisad ) of rasa is following well-known ( canons ) of

propriety.”4

( Continued from previous page )

inferior, as literature, to the verse quoted on p. 114 :

मनुरागवती संध्या दिवसस्तनपुरःसरः।

उहो दैवगतिः कीडृक् तथापि न समागमः॥

which is only an example of gunībhūtavyangya.

1. A criticism levelled by his detractors in an amusing line in the D. Al , p. 2 :

ध्वनिध्वंसनिरुक्ति यदेतदलोकसह्हृदयवभानामुकुलितलोचननैर्नृख्यते तत्र हेतुं न विद्मः।

2. D. Al. p. 81 : रसवद्बेन सा ( namely रसप्रतीति: ) केवलमनूष्यते, न तु तत्कृता।

3. D. Al. p. 455 : काव्यविषये च व्यङ्गच्यप्रतीतौ सत्यासत्यानुरूपस्थाप्यप्रयोजकत्वमेवात

प्रमाणान्तरव्यापारपरिक्षोपहासायैव सम्पद्यते।

4. D. Al. p. 330 : अनौचित्यादृते नान्यद् रसभङ्गस्य कारणम्।

प्रसिद्धौचित्यबन्धस्तु रसस्योपनिषत्परा॥

... 2

10

शान्तरस

What Ānanda means by aucitya is not however what we associate with the word "proper". Space does not permit us to go into the issue here,1 but at least one application of the theory, of great relevance to modern literature, should be briefly touched upon. This is the question of obscenity. The problem centres around the very beautiful eighth chapter of the Kumāra-sambhava in which Kālidāsa describes the love-making of Śiva and Pārvatī. Now Ānanda points out that this is tantamount to describing the love-making of one's own parents,2 since Śiva and Pārvatī are considered in mythology to be the father and mother of the world. Ānanda, from the same passage,3 leaves us in no doubt that the passage is "obscene" (asabhya). But this does not mean either that it should be censored (a question Ānanda never even considered, for it would be considered hubris to do more than make literary judgments; an actual "judge" deciding what people should or should not read, would be distasteful and indeed unthinkable in ancient India, as hopefully it is coming to seem to us today) or that it is not great literature. The description may be obscene (asabhya) but it is not vulgar (grāmya), i.e. it may offend some people's notion of propriety, but it is not on that account unrefined or without value. The reason, Ānanda tells us, is the literary skill with which the description is made. Kālidāsa was a consummate artist, and this is all that need concern the literary critic. Questions of morality are simply absurd. (Though one might sympathise, partially, with Kenneth Tynan when he pleads that he should be allowed to criticise a play' of Ionesco on moral grounds: "If a man tells me something which I believe to be an untruth, am I forbidden to do more than congratulate him on the brilliance of his lying?"4) Here is Ānanda's remarkable passage : "How is it that in such cases sensitive critics do not find the subject-matter utterly lacking in literary beauty (cārutva)? It is because (what would ordinarily be considered a blemish) is cancelled out (lit. concealed-tirohita) by artistic genius (kaviśakti). For there are two kinds of blemishes (doṣa): (1) that due to the lack of intellectual refinement (avyutpatti) on the part of the poet, and (2) that due to the absence of genius (śakti). Now the fault that is due to a lack of intellectual refinement can sometimes be passed over by grace of (the poet's inborn) genius. But a fault due to lack of genius will very quickly obtrude itself (on the attention of the reader) ... And so for example, great poets can describe the well-known sexual love, etc., among the very highest gods, and although they are improper, nonetheless, due to

1. See Raghavan, "Some Concepts of the Alaiṅkāra Śāstra" "Aucitya", pp. 194–257, Madras, 1942.

2. D. Al. p. 332 : तत् पित्रोः संभोगवर्णनमिव ।

3. D. Al. p. 332 : सुतरामसंभ्यम् ।

4. See the London Observer for the week of June 5, 1968;

ĀBHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

11

the saving power of their genius, such descriptions do not strike us as ( at all ) vulgar. An example is the description of the love-making of Pārvatī ( and Śiva ) in the Kumārasambhava."1

Another seminal idea of importance for Abhinava's later theories was the critical equipment necessary to appreciate this " suggested sense ". Kārikā 7 of the first Uddyota, has this remarkable verse :

" ( The suggested sense ) cannot be known merely through lexicography or through grammar. Only those concerned with the very essence of poetry have access to it."2

Here the author of the Kārikās is criticising what was until this time the very staple of the literary critic : technical knowledge. Reading through the works written before the D. Al., one is struck by the extraordinary perception of this remark. Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Udbhata and Bhāmaha are un-bending in their concern with the technicalities of the language, with metre, with grammar,3 and, especially, with figures of speech. One is reminded of the situation today, where the battle still continues between the " academics " who insist on the importance, for understanding a work, of peripheral knowledge, and the " new " critics ( a term Ānanda uses of his school ) who insist on the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the poem. The difference, of course, is that it could be taken for granted that anybody in ancient India who was interested in Sanskrit poetry automatically came armed with elaborate training in purely formal disciplines : grammar, prosody, logic. But Ānanda was the first to demand that another element be introduced : literary sensitivity. He was concerned with essentials, with the aesthetic impact of the work of art. This was revolutionary, but in a sense it never had the impact on later critical writers that one would expect it to have. The one great critic to assimilate this principle into his own literary criticism is Abhinava himself. For only Ānanda and Abhinava concerned themselves with wider issues of literary criticism. Thus, in the fourth Uddyota4 of the D. Al.

1. D. Al. pp. 316-317 :

कथमचारुस्तथादृशे विषये सहदयानां नावभातिति चेत्, कविशक्तिरोहितत्वात् । द्विविधो हि दोषः-कवेर्युपपत्तिकृतोऽशक्तिकृतश्च । तत्राऽशक्तिकृतो दोषः शक्तितरस्कृतत्वादाच्छिन्न लक्ष्यते । यस्तु शक्तिकृतो दोषः स झटिति प्रतীয়ते ............ तथा हि महाकवीनामप्युत्कृष्टदेवताविषयप्रसिद्धसंभोग-शृङ्गारनिबन्धनाध्यासनौचित्यं शक्तितरस्कृतत्वात् ग्राम्यत्वेन न प्रतिभासते । यथा कुमासंभवे देवीसंभोग-वर्णनम् ।

2. D. Al. p. 93 :

वेद्यते स तु काव्यार्थतत्त्वझरैरैव केवलम् ॥

3. See " Grammaire et Poétique en Sanskrit " by L. Renou, Études Vediques et Pāniniennes, Tome VIII, Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne Paris, 1961.

4. D. Al. p. 529.

12

Ānanda judges both the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata as whole works of literature.

Later authors were content to simply enumerate once again the various technical factors in a given poem. Abhinava, of course, carried on the tradition of Ānanda by focusing on fundamental questions of the philosophy of aesthetics. Though he was followed in this by all later writers, he was the last to make any contribution to the field. What he had to say was new and intellectually daring. Later writers simply repeat his ideas, usually in a simplified form. But it seems to us very likely that Abhinava was encouraged to take this wider view because of the example that Ānanda set for him.

Another idea which Abhinava must have first assimilated from Ānanda is the extraordinary importance ascribed to the poet. Not importance in the worldly sense of the term, but his autonomy, his ability to create new worlds. This too was an idea barely foreshadowed in earlier criticism. Ānanda states his position in two very exceptional verses, which have impressed themselves on the imagination of all later writers :

" In the shoreless world of poetry, the poet is the unique creator. Everything becomes transformed into the way he envisions it.

If the poet is emotionally moved ( lit. " in love " ) in his poems, then the whole world is infused with rasa. But if he be without an interest in the senses (vītarāga ), then everything will become dry ( nīrasa ) "

1. D. Al. p. 498 :

भपारे काव्यसंसारे कविरेकः प्रजापति: । यथास्मै रोचते विश्वं तथेदं परिवर्तते ॥

ऋजुकारि चेत्कवि: काव्ये जानंति रसमयं जगत् । स एव वीतरागश्वेत्कीरसां सर्वमेव तत् ॥

These verses are quoted in the Agnipurāṇa 339, 10-11, Ānandāśrama ed. Ahhinava explicitly states that these verses are by Ānanda in the A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 295 :

तत् एवोक्तम् — 'ऋजुकारि चेत्कवि:' इत्याभ्यानन्दवर्धनेनाच्यते॥

So there can be no doubt that the Agnipurāṇa has borrowed the verses from Ānanda and not vice versa.

Note also the fine verse quoted immediately after these two :

भावान्चेतनानपि चेतनवच्चेतनान्चेतनवत् ।

व्यवहारयति यथेष्टं सुकवि: काव्ये स्वातन्त्र्यतया ॥

Note that Abhinava (p. 499 ) takes Śṛṅgāra in the second stanza to be an upalakṣaṇa for all the other rasas.

We should not interpret vītarāga to mean vairāgyavat and take it to be a covert reference to śāntarasa. For if this were so, nīrasam would make no sense even in its punned meaning. Vītarāga here simply means a poet not interested in rasa, emotionally uninvolved. The second half of the verse, therefore, means that if the poet is not very good ( not alive to the external world ) he will not be able to invest his poetry with any real interest.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

13

Abhinava echoes this in his famous remark on poetic imagination ( pratibhā ) in the Abhinavabhāratī :

" The poet is like Prajāpati, from whose will this world arises. For the poet is endowed with a power to create wondrous and unheard of things.

This power arises from the grace of Parā Vāk ( " Highest Speech " ), which is just another name for poetic imagination ( pratibhā ), which has its seat in the poet's own heart, and which is eternally in creative motion ( ulita )."1

It follows from this that for both Ānanda and Abhinava, there could be no end to this creative imagination and to the actual poetic situations it could envisage.

This is the theme of a whole section at the beginning of the fourth Uddyota of the D. Al., where we are told that there is no end to the themes of poetry, as long as one is endowed with poetic imagination.2

He gives a beautiful simile :

" Even though subjects may have been already used, thanks to the fact that they are associated with imaginative experience ( rasa ) in literature, they all appear new, just as trees appear new during the honey-months ( spring )."3

There is no end to the novelty of poetic themes,4 no way of exhausting the subject-matter of poetry :

" Thousands upon thousands of poets as eminent as Vācaspati himself might use ( various ) subjects (in their poetry ), and yet, like primordial world-matter, they cannot be exhausted."5

This is a healthy emphasis on the primacy of the external world, and how it must always form the poet's major source of material.6

One is reminded of the passage from the Avimāraka : " How lovely is the great variety of this world ! "7

This agrees with the emphasis the kārikās

1. A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 4 :

चित्रापूर्वार्थनिर्माणकवेरपि स्वहृदयायतनससततोदितप्रतिभाभिधानपरवाग्देवतानुग्रहोस्थिततविचित्रार्थनिर्माणशक्तिशालिनः प्रजापतिरिव कामजनितजगत् ।

See also the Prākrit verse quoted by Ānanda in the fourth Uddyota, D. Al. p. 527.

2. D. Al. p. 537 :

न काव्यार्थेविरामोडस्ति यदि स्यात्प्रतिभागुणः । IV. 6.

3. D. Al. p. 528 :

दृष्टपूर्वा अपि ह्यार्थाः काव्ये रसपरिग्रहात् ।

सर्वे नवा इवाभान्ति मधुमास इव द्रुमाः ॥ IV. 4.

4. D. Al. IV, 6.

5. D. Al. IV, 10 :

वाचस्पतिसहस्राणां सहसैरपि यत्नतः ।

निबद्धा सा क्षयं नैति प्रकृतिर्जगतामिव ॥

6. See also NŚ, I. 119 (G.O.S. edition, p. 42).

7. Devadhar's edition of the Bhāsa plays, p. 132 : aho vicitrasvabhāvatā

( Continued on next page )

14

place upon love, of all the rasas ( note that ŚR is never mentioned specifically in any kārikā of the D. Al.). In the second Uddyota when the guṇas ( linguistic qualities ) are being discussed, mādhurya " delicacy " is emphasised: " love alone is very delicate, for it is the most pleasing among all the rasas."1 This is so, we are told, because " the mind, in love, becomes exceedingly sensitive ( is moved )."2 It is surely this emphasis3 that has led Abhinava, in the A. Bh., to make a profound philosophical definition of love. This occurs under NŚ. VI. 45, where Abhinava has a very long comment on Bharata's definition of śṛṅgārarasa. The section is, for the most part, very corrupt. However one passage can be translated :

" someone objected as follows: how can there be only one rasa ( śṛṅgāra ) when there are so many different kinds of love ( rati ) according to the literary character in whom ( love ) exists ? The person objecting thus is not ( really ) acquainted with love. For all love is only one. It ( exists ) where there is not the separation of the one (?-ekaviyoga ) ( from the other ), because there is a mutual ( commingling ) of consciousness. This is why ( Bharata ) said: uttamayuvaprakṛtiḥ ( this refers to p. 301, Vol. I of the NŚ: sā ca stripuṣahetukā uttamayuvaprakṛtiḥ ): " he is noble" and " she is noble " and so we get the dual compound uttamau. The same is true of yuvānau (i.e. " he is young and she is young " and so the dual compound ). Now the word uttamayuva in this context refers to their consciousness ( i.e. their minds ), and not to their bodies. For this concept ( viz. nobility ), from the highest point of view, applies only to consciousness..."4

( Continued from previous page )

jagataḥ. Cf. Auden, in the New Republic, Dec. 9, 1967 ; " If today, it seems to me the word "real " can be used at all, the only world which is real for us, as the world in which all of us, including scientists, are born, work, love, hate, and die, is the primary phenomenal world as it is and always has been presented to us through our senses, a world in which the sun moves across the sky from east to west, the stars are hung in the vault of heaven, the measure of magnitude is the human body, and objects are either in motion or at rest". It is clear that this love for the human, for the particular and the imperfect (cf. Balzac : " Blessed are the imperfect for theirs is the kingdom of love" ) is much closer to the hearts of Indian poets than of Indian philosophers.

1. शृङ्गार एव मधुर परः प्रह्लादनो रसः। D. Al., II. 7.

2. आद्रंता याति यतस्तत्राधि मनः। D. Al., II. 8.

3. See also III. 28 : विशेषोऽस्तु शृङ्गारे सकुमारतमो रसौ।

" Especially in Śṛṅgāra, for it is the most delicate of all the rasas ". See also D. Al. II. 11 and II. 15.

4. A. Bh. Vol. I, p 302 : अत एव यत्कैश्चिदचोद्यत - रतेराधारमेदेन भेदात् कथमेक रस इति। तदनभिज्ञतया। एकैव हि रतिः। यत्रान्योऽन्योः संविदा एकबयोगो न भवति। अत एवोत्तम-

( Continued on next page )

The above is meant only to give an idea of Ānanda's influence. The actual influence of the D. Al. has been far more extensive than we are able to indicate here. We have not, for instance, dealt with such important themes as prādhānya, " predominance ", and its importance for judging the status of a given poem, or of Ānanda's new ideas on figures of speech, or on sañghatanā ( linguistic structure ). But what we have said should suffice to give the reader an idea both of the remarkable profundity of some of the views of the Dhvanyāloka, and of their importance for Abhinava's philosophy of aesthetics.

BHAṬṬATAUTA

Bhaṭṭatautta, Abhinava's teacher1 of dramatic theory, wrote a work entitled the Kāvyakautuka,2 now lost. On this work Abhinava wrote a commentary, also lost. It is thus not possible to determine just how many of Abhinava's ideas come from Bhaṭṭatauta. He quotes him often in the A. Bh., but many of the passages are too corrupt to understand. However, it is clear that Bhaṭṭatauta emphasised the drama ( over and above lyric poetry ). Thus Abhinava says :

" ( Our ) teacher says that rasa arises in a poem when there arises an experience ( on the part of the reader ) that is similar to direct perception ( pratyakṣa ) ( of a drama ). Thus he says in the Kāvyakautuka :

( Continued from previous page )

युवप्रकृति: । उत्तमश्रोत्तमा चोत्तमौ । एवं युवानौ । तत्रोत्तमयुवशब्देन तत्तस्संविदुच्यते । न तु काय: । चैतन्यस्यैव हि परमार्थेत उत्तमयुवत्वं विशेष: ।

Cf. Abhinavagupta's remarks about love in the Locana, p. 205 :

रतौ हि समस्तदेहेन्द्रियैरपि तद्विपयतत्परत्वेनावच्छेदेऽपि न कामो हृदयसंवादमय: यतेरपि हि तच्चमत्कारोदस्यैव । अतो मधुर इत्युक्तम् । मधुरो हि शर्करादिरसो विवेकिनो-

विवेकिनो वा स्वस्थस्यातुरस्य वा इष्टिति रसानुप्रतिष्ठातवादभिलषणीय एव भवति ।

" For there is an unbroken propensity for love in all creatures, gods, animals, men etc. And so there is no creature who is not ( capable of ) responding sympathetically to love. Even an ascetic can find aesthetic delight in ( descriptions of ) love. And so it is called " delightful " ( madhura ). For a sweet dish such as sugar candy etc., when it falls on the tongue of a discriminating person or a non-discriminating person, a healthy man or a sick man, will immediately be pleasurable."

1. Generally whenever the term upādhyāya is used in the A. Bh. it refers to Bhaṭṭatauta.

2. अस्मदुपाध्यायोक्ते काव्यकौतुकेsङ्गीयमेवाभिप्रायो मन्तव्य: । A. Bh. Vol. 1, p. 37; this is in the context of what constitutes " imitation " in the drama. Abhinava also wrote a commentary on this work : स चायमसदुपाध्यायभट्टतौतेन काव्यकौतुके, अस्माभिरश तद्विवरणे बहु-

तरकतनिर्णय ( i. e. विचार )पूर्वपक्षसिद्धान्त इत्यलं बहुना, Locana, p. 394.

See V. Raghavan, " Authors Quoted in the Abhinavabhāratī ", J. O. R. Vol. 6, Madras, 1932.

16

शान्तरस

"In a poem that is not enacted, it is not possible to have a (true) aesthetic experience (āsvāda). When things (bhāva) such as gardens, one's beloved, the moon, etc., are well and elegantly described by a polished imagination, then they appear as if they are actually taking place before our very eyes (i.e. as if we saw them acted out)."

Abhinava improves on this:

".....the actions of the actor have been devised in order that the spectator might obtain an aesthetic experience that is appropriate to direct perception (as in the drama). This is why Bharata has sanctioned the use of music, etc., in order to break the knots of the heart that is filled with the anger and sorrow indigenous to it. For the text (the Nātyaśāstra ?) includes everything (or : is meant for all people). Therefore, rasas are only found in dramas, and not in the everyday world. This is what (Bharata) means (to say). And poetry is nothing other than drama."

But what is most significant for us, is the term pratibhā. It is clear from the quotations by later writers that Bhaṭṭatauta was greatly preoccupied with this term and the concepts that lay behind it. Hemacandra quotes three verses from Bhaṭṭatauta:

"It has been said that there can be no poet who is not (also) a seer. And a man (becomes) a seer because of his "vision" (darśana). Vision is the knowledge of the truth of the nature and properties of various things. A man is said in the śāstra to be a poet only because of vision. A man is said to be a poet in the world when he has both vision and (the power of) description. This is why, although the first poet (Vālmīki) was always gifted with a clear vision, as long as he did not actually describe (things) he was not known as a poet (but only as a sage)."

1. A. Bh. Vol. p. 290 :

काव्यार्थविषये हि प्रत्यक्षकरसंबेदनोदये रसोदय इत्युपाध्याया: । यदाहु: काव्यकौतुके—

'प्रयोगतन्मनापनत्रे काव्ये नाटवासंभव:' इति ।

'वर्णनोत्कलिता भोगप्रौढोक्यै सम्यगंपिता ।

उद्यानकान्ताचन्द्राचा भावा: प्रत्यक्षवत् स्कुटा: ॥' इति ।

2. A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 291 :

[ तत्र ये स्वभावतो निर्मीलमुकुरहृदयास्तैव संसारोचितक्रोधमोहाभिलाषपरवशामनसो न भवन्ति ।

तेषां तथाविधदशारूपकाकरणसमये साधारणरसनाविस्मकचर्वणग्राहो रससंचयो नाट्यलक्षण: स्कुट एव । ये त्वतथाभूतास्तेषां ] प्रत्यक्षचित्ततथाविधचर्वणालाभाय नटादिप्रक्रिया ।

स्वगतक्रोधशोकादिस्कूटहृदयग्रन्थि—

मोचनाय गीतादिप्रक्रिया च मुनिना विरचिता । सर्वानुग्राहक हि शास्त्रमिति न्यायात् । तेन नाट्य एव रसा न लोक इत्यर्थ: । काव्यं च नाट्यमेव । See Addenda.

3. Hemacandra, Kāvyānuśāsana, p. 432, Parikh and Kulkarni's second edition, (Bombay, 1964) :

(Continued on next page)

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

17

The Kaumudī on the Locana quotes a very important verse that might well come from the Kāvyakautuka :

" There are two paths of the goddess of speech : one is the śāstra, and the other is poetry ( kavikarma ). The first of these arises from intellectual ability ( prajñā ), and the second from genius ( pratibhā )."

This propels us to the heart of a great controversy, the tension between "inspiration" and "learning."2 For pratibhā not only means creative, or poetic imagination, it also means " genius", or " inspiration". The term to which it is generally opposed is vyutpatti, " learning", " intellectual refinement. " The dichotomy is very old in Sanskrit poetics. It held a particular fascination for Abhinava, for it involved him in one of his life-long preoccupations: the relation between philosophy and poetry. In a sense one can look at this dichotomy as finally touching the most famous dichotomy of all, that between the followers of the old school of poetics who believed in the paramount importance of alaṅkāras and guṇas, and the new dhvanī school. For the older school emphasises the hard work that must go into creation, the need for being properly schooled. The new school, on the other hand, emphasises imagination,3 inspiration, rasa and dhvani. This is expressed in the famous kārikā of the Dhvanyāloka where it is said that figures of

( Continued from previous page )

तथा चाह भट्टात: ( sic ) :

नानृदृश: कविरित्युक्तमृषिश्व किल दर्शीनात् ।

विचित्रभावधर्मांशतत्स्वप्रख्या च दर्शीनम् ॥

स तथ्वदर्शनादेव शाक्षेपु पठित: कविः।

दर्शनादर्शनाच्चाथ रूढो लोके कविश्चिति ॥

तथा हि दर्शने श्वैष्ठे नियेएड्यादिवैमुन्‍ने: ।

नेष्टिता कविता लोके यावज्जाता न वर्णना ॥

1. Kaumudī, K. Sastri's edition of the D. Āl. p. 170 :

दृश्यन्ते वल्मीकां गिरां देव्या: शास्रं च कविकर्म च ।

प्रज्ञोपेतं तयोराधं प्रतिभोद्रवमन्तिमम् ॥

This verse is quoted as the motto to a very fine article by T. N. Sreekantiya, " Imagination in Indian Poetics ", I. H. Q. Vol. XIII, No. 1, p. 57, 1937. There he says : "Quoted by Vidyādharacakravartin in his commentary on the Kāvyaprakāśa ( Trivandrum Edition Part I, p. 14 ). I am indebted to Dr. V. Raghavan of Madras for this reference. "

2. E. g. Daṇḍin KD, I. 103. Mahābhārata, XII. 260. I. We even find the dichotomy in the Pali texts, e. g. Aṅguttara Nikāya II. 230 where four types of poets are described ( cintakavi, sutakavi, atthakavi and paṭibhānakavi ) of which the last type, naturally superior, writes from " seizure " as it were.

3. The term pratibhā is often used in the D. Āl. e. g. I. 6 :

अलोकसामान्यमविच्यनक्ति परिस्कुरन्तं प्रतिभाविशेषम् ।

also, IV. 6 : यदि स्यात्प्रतिभागुण: ।

18

शान्तरस

speech will come without any effort to the poet concerned with rasadhvani.1 Of course Ānanda himself was not unaware of the importance of guṇas and alaṅkāras; it is only that for him and for Abhinava, they constitute the body, the externals of poetry. The argument is not confined to India. It is a matter of controversy whether a “ creative writing course ” is of any use to the young writer or not. There are those who argue that nobody ever learns anything from such artificial attempts to instil talent into students. Howard Nemrov once said in conversation that the only thing he really felt he should tell his class on creative writing was : “ Why don’t you write well ? Why aren’t you good ? ” On the other hand, there is general agreement that such classes do often manage to teach the already gifted student certain technical skills.

The most famous line on pratibhā, first quoted by Abhinava and later by a great many writers, belongs to Bhaṭṭatauta.2 It is :3 “ Poetic imagination is that ( form of ) intelligence which shines with ever new scintillation.”4 The whole verse is quoted as far as we known, only by Vidyācakravartin, in his Sampradāyaprakāśinī :

“ Remembrance is that which refers to an object of the past. Mati refers to something that is still in the future, buddhi deals with that which is present and prajñā belongs to all three times ( past, present and future ). But pratibhā is that intelligence which shines with ever new scintillation. The poet is he who is skilful in descriptions animated by that ( pratibhā ). Poetry is that which the poet does.”5

There is of course a long tradition behind this word. The most famous quotation is perhaps the verse from Bhāmaha that Abhinava quotes more than once :

1. II. 16 and vṛtti thereon.

2. Several stanzas on pratibhā have been ascribed by Gnoli to Bhaṭṭatauta : “ Three stanzas, quoted by Hemacandra and probably taken from Bhaṭṭa Tota ”, Gnoli, op. cit. p. XXX, Int. But this is incorrect, since the verses are from Mahimabhaṭṭa’s Vyaktiviveka, II. 117-119.

3. See also Locana, p. 92 :

प्रातिभा अपूर्ववस्तुनिर्माणक्षमा प्रज्ञा ।

4. Hemacandra, p. 3 quotes the whole passage :

प्रज्ञा नवनवोन्मेषशालिनी प्रतिभा मता ।

तदनुग्राहणाज्जीवद्गविर्णणानानिपुणा: कवि: ॥

तस्य कर्म स्मृतं काव्यं ।

5. Vidyācakravartin’s comm. on the KP, the Sampradāyaprakāśinī, TSS. nos. 88 and 100, part I, p. 13 :

स्मृतिरर्थततीतविषया मतिरागामिगोचरा ।

बुद्धिस्तात्कालिकी प्रोक्ता प्रज्ञा त्रैकालिकी मता ॥

The rest is as given in the preceding note,

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

19

"Even a stupid man can learn the śāstra from the teachings of his professor. But poetry is only given to the person who has imaginative genius ( pratibhā ) and that only once in a while."1

Abhinava and Bhaṭṭatuta must have known the fourth chapter of the Kāvyamīmāṃsā, most of which is given over to various views on pratibhā.2 Rājaśekhara defines it as : "That which causes to appear in the mind the collections of words, the technique of alaṅkāras, the caravans of meanings. the path of ( poetic ) expression, and other similar things as well."3 He divides pratibhā into two sorts : ( 1 ) that which applies to poets ( kārayitrī, or "creative" ), and that ( 2 ) which applies to critics or readers ( bhāvayitrī ). "Creative imagination is of three sorts: sahajā, "inborn", āhāryā, "acquired", and aupadeśikī, "learned". Poets too are divided into three classes, in accord with this scheme ( sārasvata, ābhyāsika and aupadeśika ). He has many interesting and unusual observations on critics and poets in the rest of the chapter as well. One thinks in particular of the two poets, blind from birth,4 who are nonetheless endowed with "vision" ( pratibhā ).

But it is really only Abhinavagupta who enables the various insights into the nature of imagination to be coordinated into a philosophical whole, as we shall see when dealing with his philosophy of aesthetics in the next section. The fine image of Mahimabhaṭṭa was surely inspired by Abhinava's philosophic views on imagination :

"Pratibhā is that intellectual function of the poet whose mind is concentrated ( stimita ) on thinking about words and meanings that are appropriate to rasas. It arises for a moment from the contact of the poet's mind with the essential nature ( of the Ātman )."

1. Bhāmaha, Kāvyālaṅkāra, I, 5 :

गुरूपदेशाद्ध्येतुं शास्त्रं जडधियोडप्यलम् ।

काव्यं तु जायते जातु कस्यचित्प्रतिभावतः ॥

2. On pratibhā see also : Vāmana, I, 3. 16; Yogasūtra, II, 36; also Kashmir Saiva literature, e. g. Somānanda's Śivadrṣṭi, II, 64 ( p. 78, KSTS, LIV, 1934 ); Vasugupta, Spandakārikā, IV, 7. See also L. Silburn, " Vātulanātha Sūtra " ( Paris, 1957 ) p. 14 and p. 38. See also Int. to De's ed. of the Vakroktijīvita, pp. XXIV ff. For the term in philosophy, see G. Kaviraj, "The Doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy ", Annals of the B. O. R. I., V ( 1923-24 ), p. 1 ff. and 113 ff. .

3. KM. ed. by C. D. Dalal and R. A. Sastry, revised ed. by Ramaswami Sastri Siromani, 3rd ed. Baroda, 1934, p. 11 :

या शब्दग्राममर्थसार्थमलंकृतिनिर्मितिमार्गमन्यदपि तथाविधमधिहृदयं प्रतिभासयति सा प्रतिभा ।

Uktimārga might also mean racanā, ṛiti, i. e. style.

4. op. cit. p. 12 यतो मेधाविन्द्रकुमारदासादयो जात्यन्धा: कवय: श्रूयन्ते ।

20

शान्तररस

" It is that which makes the things that exist in all the three worlds seem as if they were right before our very eyes, and ( hence ) it is known as the third eye of Śiva."1

It is clear that the striking image in this verse is borrowed from passages in the D. Āl.2 Abhinava is also greatly concerned with pratibhā as a philosophic concept. Thus we find it defined3 and very often referred to in his Tantrāloka.4

Bhatṭanāyaka

As we have noted under the passages quoted from Bhaṭṭanāyaka in the Locana passage from the second Uddyota,5 Abhinava has very obviously taken many of his key notions on poetry from BN. The most important of these is sādhāranīkaraṇa, the power which enables a situation in literature to abstract itself from its unique application to one individual, and to be universally applicable. This is not a concept found in Ānandavardhana, nor in the Nāṭyaśāstra. The word that BN uses for it is bhāvanā. Abhinava6 quotes the first line of a verse that Hemacandra7 and Jayaratha8 give in full :

"( There are three functions in poetry : ) abhidhā ( denotation, which, for BN, includes lakṣaṇā as well ), bhāvanā ( generalisation ), and the enjoyment that ensues. Both word and sense-figures belong to denotation. The whole collection of ( primary emotions such as ) love, etc., arises from bhāvanā.

1. Vyaktiviveka, II. 117-118, pp. 452-453 ( Kashi Sanskrit Series 121 ) :

रसानुगुणशब्दार्थचिन्तास्तिमितचेतसः ।

क्षणं स्वरूपस्पर्शोऽस्था प्रज्ञैव प्रतिभा कवे: ॥

सा हि चकुरुभगवतसृतृतीयमिति गीयते ।

चेन साक्षात्करोत्येष भावान्स्वैलेोक्यवर्तिन: ॥

2. D. Āl. p. 508 where the navā dṛṣṭi is referred to, and also D. Āl. p. 498, third verse.

3. T. Āl. XIII, 87.

4. Gnoli, quoting four very difficult stanzas from the T. Āl. ( XI, pp. 60-62 ), remarks . " Abhinava....stress ( es ) the fact that pratibhā does not exhaust itself in the poetical intuition,, but is, in a broader sense, the same consciousness, the same Self. In the majority of men it does not succeed in liberating itself from the chain of relationships and practical interests which condition and constrict it, but, in the poet, it burns with a purified light -to shine out finally in all its fullness in the intuition of the saints." Gnoli, op. cit. p. LI. Further references in the Tantrāloka are XIII. 90; 97; 101; 106; 112; 120 etc.

5. Below, we translate Abhinava's brief summary of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's views on rasa.

6. A. Bh. Vol. 1, p. 277.

7. See Hemacandra, op. cit. p. 96. See also Chintamani, "Fragments of Bhaṭṭanāyaka " J. O. R. vol. 1. p. 271. It is quoted in the Rasagangādhara p. 25 (with the variant reading tadbhogīkṛtir eva ca.)

8. Alankārasarvasva, p. 9.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

21

The accomplished man ( siddhimānnarah ) is permeated by the form of the enjoyment of that."1

Of course Bhaṭṭanāyaka2 was himself influenced by the D. Al. ( though he is supposed to have written his Hṛdayadarpaṇa to demolish the idea of dhvani ) in granting that there is an element in poetry beyond denotation and secondary usage. In one passage in the Locana,3 Abhinava even says that BN is simply giving suggestion another name. But far more important for Abhinava were BN's views on religious ecstasy and poetry.

It may well be that Bhaṭṭanāyaka was the first person to make the famous comparison of yogic ecstasy and aesthetic experience. Unfortunately his Hṛdayadarpaṇa has been lost, and only quotations survive in the later Alaṅkāra works. The Hṛdayadarpaṇa appears to have been either a commentary on the Nāṭyaśāstra or an independent work criticising the theory of dhvani in the course of which he had occasion often to quote from the Nś. Abhinava quotes Bhaṭṭanāyaka frequently in the Locana,4 not always to disagree with him. It is clear from many of his remarks that he had a high respect for him.

The passage we quote and translate is one of exceptional interest, that must certainly have been of great importance for Abhinava's own theories. It is found on p. 5 of the Abhinavabhāratī ( G. O. S. vol. I, 2nd ed. ) and is a commentary on the opening verse of the Nāṭyaśāstra :5

" Bhaṭṭanāyaka6 however ( explains the verse as follows ) :

अभिधा भावनां चान्यां तद्रोगीकृतिमेव च । अभिधाभावनां याते शब्दार्थालंकृतिं ततः ॥ भावनाभाव्य एषोडपि चरितारादिगुणे हि यतः । तद्रोगीकृतरूपेण व्याप्त्यते सिद्धिमान्नरः ॥

We are not certain about bhāvanābhāvyaḥ. Perhaps it should be translated as " to be reflected on in the mind by means of bhāvanā ", i. e, bhāvyaḥ would mean " to be reflected on ", bhāvanāya bhāvyah.

2. On Bhaṭṭanāyaka see Gnoli, op. cit., p. XX. Also Kane, H. S. P. pp. 221-225. The date Gnoli gives is around 900 A. D, In any case he certainly lived after Ānandavardhana in response to whose theory of dhvani his own work seems to have been written.

3. See Locana p. 188.

4. For all references in the Locana to BN, see Kane, op. cit. p. 223.

प्रणम्य शिरसा देवौ पितामहमहेश्वरौ । नाट्यशास्त्रं प्रवक्ष्यामि ब्रह्मणा यदुदाहृतम् ॥

6. Udāhṛtam, which simply means " spoken " is taken to be a pregnant use of the word by BN who interprets it as udāharaṇīkṛtam. The drama is like life. It is essentially unreal, and yet it affects us profoundly. Most important of all, it is

( Continued on next page )

22

शान्तरस

" I shall ( now ) expound that drama which was promulgated1 by Brahman - the highest Self - as an illustration such that people might understand that worldly objects are insubstantial ( nissārabheda ), fabricated ( as they are ) by ignorance ( of the identity between the Self and Brahman ). Just as the unreal actions of Rāma, Rāvaṇa and others, which are essentially a figment of one's imagination and hence do not possess a single fixed form, but in a moment assume hundreds and thousands of forms; which though different ( in their unreality ) from dreams, etc., are still the outcome of mental imagination ( hṛdayagrahanidāna ); which are enacted by actors who are almost like the creator of the world ( Brahmā ) and who have not relinquished their separate identity ( as persons in real life ) - those actions ( of Rāma and Rāvaṇa, etc. ) appear ( to us ) in a most unusually wondrous way; and though appearing like that, they become the means of attaining the (four) goals of life - in exactly the same way this universe consists of a display of unreal forms and names and yet through listening to and meditating on spiritual instruction, it leads to the realisation of the highest goal of human life ( namely mokṣa ).

Thus this stanza, by suggesting ( the attainment of ) the other-worldly highest goal of human life introduces śāntarasa.

' Depending on their respective causes the different rasas originate from śānta ( a state of mental calm ).'

Thus the present stanza ( NŚ, I. 1 ) conveys the higher purpose ( of drama ). " This is the explanation that Bhaṭṭanāyaka has given in his Sahṛdayadarpana. As he said :

( Continued from previous page )

the means whereby we may attain bliss, which is after all the same as the Self and therefore the same as mokṣa. A. Bh. Vol. 1, p. 5 :

भट्टनायकस्तु "ब्रह्मणा परमात्मना यदुदाहृतमविद्याविरचितिनिस्सारसंस्मेदग्रहे यदुदाहरणीकृतं तत्रादयं तद्रक्ष्यामी । यथा हि कल्पनामात्रसारं तत् एवंनवस्थितैकरूपं क्षणेन कल्पनाशतसहस्रसहं स्वप्रादिविलक्षण- मपि शुष्ठुतरं हृदयग्रहणिदानमलक्ष्यालम्बनब्रह्मकल्पनातोपरञ्चितं रामरावणादिचेष्टितमसत्यं कुतोडप्यधिकृत- वृत्या भाति । तथा भावसामनमपि च पुथर्थोपायातमेति । तथा तादृगेव विश्रिमिदमसत्येनामरूपप्रपञ्चात्मकमध्य च श्रवणमननादिविश्रेन परमपुरर्थप्रापकमिति लोकोत्तरपरमपुरुषार्थसूचनैन शान्तरसोपरक्षेपोड्यं भविष्यति ।

' सर्वे सर्वं निमित्तमदाय शान्तादुपपद्यते रसः ।' इति ।। तदनेन पारमार्थिकं प्रयोजनमुक्तं ।" इति व्याख्यानं सहृदयदर्पणे पर्यग्रहीत् ।

नम्रबैकौव्यनिर्माणकृतये शान्भवे यतः । प्रतिक्षणं जगन्नाट्यप्रयोगरसिको जनः ॥" इति

1. It is not clear whether Abhinava accepts this justification of ŚR or not. Most likely he does, at least in great part, for he also quotes this stanza ( NŚ. VI, p. 335, in the interpolated śantarasa section ) and also uses it in the third Uddyota of he Locana, p. 391. as a proof of the existence of Śantarasa.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

23

" I pay my homage to Śiva the poet ( also the omniscient one - kavi )

who has created all the three worlds and thanks to whom ( yatah ) ( sensitive )

people are able to attain aesthetic bliss by watching the spectacle ( prayoga )

of the play that is our life in this world."

We can see prefigured in this fascinating fragment ( from a commentary on the Nātyaśāstra1 itself ? ) many of the themes that were to occupy

Abhinava so closely2 : the world as a drama, the individual as the actor, the

illusion of drama and the illusion of existence, the acceptance of śāntarasa,

the importance of mokṣa, Śiva as the cosmic poet, etc. How many more

ideas would we find that Abhinava is indebted to BN for, if the Hṛdayadarpana were extant ?

The second passage from Bhaṭṭanāyaka is quoted in the Locana, under

I. 6 ( p. 91, Bālavriyā ed ) :

" The cow in the form of speech gives a unique drink ( rasa ) out of

love for her young.3 That ( rasa i. e. bliss ) which is ( laboriously ) milked

by the Yogins cannot be compared to it."4

Abhinava comments : " Without being possessed by rasa, the Yogins

laboriously milk out ( bliss )."5

1. Note that in the Locana, Abhinava speaks of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's Hṛdayadarpana, whereas here he refers to the Sahṛdayadarpana. Are these just variant names

for the same work ? K. C. Pandey ( Abhinavagupta, p. 200 ) suggests that the Hṛdaya-darpana refers to a book that refuted Ānanda's theories, whereas the Sahṛdaya-darpana would have been a commentary on the NŚ. It is true of course that hṛdaya

and sahṛdaya mean very different things, but Abhinava seems in the habit of calling a single work by different names. Thus he speaks of the Kāvyāloka ( i. e. the Dhvanyāloka ) of Ānandavardhana ( Locana, p. 2 and again Locana, p. 554 ) and later in

the Abhinavabhāratī, Vol. I, p. 343, he calls the same work the Sahṛdayāloka. This is the name he uses in the second vol. of the A. Bh. as well.

2. It is clear that Abhinava has used the ideas contained in this important

passage. But how did he feel consciously about it ? Did he accept the views or not ?

It would seem that he does, and yet on p. 3, Vol. I of the A. Bh. he quotes the interpretation of his teacher ( Bhaṭṭatāta ) on this verse from the NŚ !

3. Surely Uttuṅgodaya is wrong in saying that ignorance is suggested by the

word bāla .

The point is that the bāla ( child ) is like the sahṛdaya. There can be no

question of the sahṛdaya being ignorant.

बाले बालवदनभृङ्गे उपासके वत्से च ।

4. यदाह भट्टनायकवाग्धेनुरङ्गध एतद् हि रसं यद्वालतृष्णया ।

तेन नास्य समः स स्वादुद्रवते योगिभिरिह यः ॥

5. Locana, p. 91 :

तदावेशेन विना श्याक्रान्त्या हि यो योगिदुहे !

24

The point of the verse1 must be that rasa is superior to the bliss that Yogins achieve. The reason is that the Yogins must go through an elaborate process.2 But note that the verse could mean just the opposite, namely that the rasa the Sahrdaya enjoys is not equal to what•the Yogin enjoys. Tena nāasya samah does not specify whether it is superior or inferior. The verse is quoted in the context of poetry, and so the first interpretation ought to be the correct one. Furthermore, if it were not, Abhinava's quoting it here would be out of place.3

Philosophical Influences

Vedānta :

Not only was Abhinava, along with Ānandavardhana, assuredly the greatest thinker on aesthetic theory in India, he was also one of the greatest philosophical minds of medieval India. In Kashmir Saivism, to which school he belonged, his word is considered authoritative in all philosophical issues. It has been suggested4 that he wrote his works on poetics after his major works on philosophy. One would, therefore, expect his aesthetic theories to have been influenced by his readings in Kashmir Śaivism. But probably even prior to his writings on Kashmir Śaivism, Abhinava was exposed to earlier Advaita literature. There is of course his own commentary on the Gītā,5 and though

1. According to the K. the word vāg here means poetry : वाकू काव्यात्मतया परिणममाना धेतुः ।

K. Sastri's ed. pp. 168-169.

2. As the Kaumudī on the Locana says : आक्रान्त्या प्रत्याहारादिप्रयत्नपरम्परात्मकरप्रपीडनोपाया श्रयेणेत्यर्थः ।

3. However, there is no doubt that in the third Uddyota, Locana, p. 510, Abhinava speaks of rasasvāda as being only the reflection of a drop of the bliss that is parameśvaraviśrātyānanda. See our translation of this important passage below.

Note also the line that Abhinava quotes in the Locana ( p. 39 ) from Bhaṭṭa­nāyaka :

काव्ये रसयिता सर्वो न बोद्धा न नियोगभाकू ।

" In ( the realm of ) poetry anyone who feels aesthetic pleasure ( rasayitṛ ) ( is eligible for reading ), but not the cold rationalist ( boddhā ) nor the man willing to take orders ( from religious works - niyogabhāk )."

Abhinava makes this very charge against BN himself in the Locana ( p. 173 ), accusing him of being more a philosopher than a poet : न च……कल्पना युक्ता । जैमिनीयसूत्रे धैवं योज्यते न काव्येषु ।

4. See K. C. Pandey, Abhinavagupta, p. 30 for the chronological order of Abhinava's works.

5. The Gītārthasangraha, published in the NSP edition of the BG edited by Wasudeva Laxman Shastri Pansikar, with 8 commentaries, Bombay, 1912. It seems clear though that Abhinava was reluctant to comment on the Gītā. Not only is his

(Continued on next page)

he himself does not often quote the Upaniṣads, there is little likelihood that

he did not know them. He could not fail to have been deeply impressed with

certain remarkable passages that have a direct bearing on his own aesthetic

doctrines. We think of the beautiful simile in the Bṛhadāranyaka :

" Just as a man, when closely embraced by a woman he loves, knows

nothing of the outside world, nor even of the inner one, so also does the ego

( puruṣa ) know nothing of the outside or of the inner when it is closely

embraced by pure consciousness, the Self."1

Then there are the passages from the Taittirīya Upaniṣad2 which are

also quoted by Śaṅkara3 in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya.4

The phrase ānandaghana, used constantly in Vedānta works, obviously

made an impression on Abhinava, for he uses it several times. One also

thinks of such works as the Gauḍapādakārikās (Āgamaśāstra) which Abhinava

must have known ( in fact, the doctrines in Kashmir Śaivism take over most

of the major views of Advaita), for example III. 42-45,5 where the four

impediments in controlling the mind are mentioned. The four impediments

are : vikṣepa ( distraction ); laya ( which Madhusūdanasarasvatī takes to mean

suṣupti, in which he is supported by Gauḍapāda himself under III. 35); kaśāya

( Continued from previous page )

commentary unusually devoid of interest, but he himself hints that he did not really

feel any inward compulsion to write it :

तच्चरणकमलमधुपो भगवान्द्रीतार्थसंग्रहं व्यधात् ।

अभिनवगुप्तः सद्दृढिजलोककृत्तोदनाबर्हातः ॥

उत इदमवदायं यथार्थमपि सर्वथा नैव ।

वेदितुं शाम्भुहननीयं कृतयमिदं बाण्ववाथ हि ॥

In other words, he felt pressured to write it, and did it only for the sake of his

relatives. ( op. cit., pp. 775-776 ).

1. Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, IV, 3. 21 :

तद्यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया सम्परिष्वक्तो न बाहं किंचन वेद नान्तरमेवायं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना

संपरिष्वक्तो न बाहं किंचन वेद नान्तरम् ।

A somewhat amusing verse on this very passage is quoted in the commentary to

the Vijñānabhairava, under verse 69, p. 59 :

उदयया सम्परिष्वक्तो न बाहं वेद नान्तरम् ।

निर्दर्शनं शृणु: प्राह मूर्खस्तं मन्यते विधिम् ॥

2. रसो वै स: and रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वानन्दी भवति and विज्ञानं ब्रह्म.

Taittirīya, II, 7.

3. II. I. 12 : (आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात्)

4. Note though how Saṅkara understands rasa :

रसो नाम तृष्णिहेतुरानन्दकरो मदुराम्लादि: प्रसिद्धो लोके ।

5. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his Gūḍhārthadīpikā, N.S.P. Gītā with 8

comms., Bombay, 1912, quotes the verses and clearly explains them,

… 4

26

शान्तरस

( stiffening of the mind ); and sukha, which Sadānanda in the Vedāntasāra1

( 33 ) explains as rasāsvāda ! Here is the first half of kārikā 45 on sukham :

"In Yogic practices, one must not indulge in aesthetic pleasure

( sukham ). One should, through wisdom, remain unattached."

It would not be difficult, especially in a reductionist system ( where all,

from the highest level, is pure Brahman ), to see how Brahman and rasa, or

rasa and the sākṣin, the "witness" in the sense of pure consciousness were all

one, and identical with ānanda itself ( since Brahman is characterised as

saccidānanda ). This may of course have something of hindsight in it, but it

is doubtful whether Ānanda and thus Abhinava were not inspired to their

doctrine of vyañjanā, at least in certain aspects, by the Vedānta notion of

mukti,3 which is not produced, or created, but is made manifest ( abhivyakta )

through the removal of the āvaraṇas.

Already Bhavabhūti had used an important Vedānta simile in regard to

rasa. In the Uttararāmacarita III. 474 he speaks of karuṇa as the one rasa

of which all the others are simply vikāras, just as the bubbles and waves of

the ocean are all forms of water.5 Abhinava applies a very similar notion

to ŚR.6

1. Jacob's ed. p. 51, under number 33.

2. नास्त्वादयेत्सुखं तत्र निस्सङ्गः प्रज्ञया भवेत् ।

तत्र समाधौ परमसुखैक्यकोटिपि सुखं नास्त्वादयेत् । पततवन्तं कालमहं सुखोति सुखास्वादरूपा

वृत्ति न कुर्यांत ।

( under Gītā VI, 313, NSP ed. ) :

There is a very interesting variant, quoted in the Vedāntasāra ( Jacob's ed.,

p. 51, under 33 ) : नास्त्वादयेत्सं तत्र । Sadānanda says : अखण्डस्वानन्दावलम्बनेऽपि चित्तवृत्तेः

सविकल्पानन्दास्वादनं रसास्वादः । We can't help feeling that Sadānanda must have been

aware of the famous comparison, brahmānanda ( or even brahmāsvāda ), and rasāsvāda

and this is his way of answering it. His point then, as Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī notes, is that

the distinction is between nirvikalpasamādhi and savikalpasamādhi, two terms which

must have influenced Abhinava's own thinking on rasāsvāda. For in savikalpasamādhi,

the triputī ( subject, object, knowledge ) is present, as it must be in rasāsvāda, but

it is absent in brahmāsvāda, where there is only one sākṣin, with no object to

cognise, pure consciousness.

3. This similarity was already noted by Jacobi in his introduction to the

Dhvanyāloka translation, p. 398.

4. Raghavan, " The Number of Rasas, " p. 165 quotes this verse and ex-

plains it.

एको रसः करुण एव निमित्तभेदा-

द्वित्रःः प्रथक् पुथगिवाश्रयते विवर्तान् ।

आवर्तेबुद्बुदतरङ्गमयान् विकारा-

नम्भो यथा सलिलमेव हि तत्समस्तम् ॥

6. Cf. A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 335, basing himself on the famous verse in the NŚ,

Vol. I, G. O. S. p. 335 :

( Continued on next page)

ĀBHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

27

When we come to the influence of Kashmir Śaiva texts, we are on firmer ground. A work which seems to us to have had a decisive influence on Abhinava is the Vijñānabhairava, a work he often quotes.1 What is unusual about this work2 is its preoccupation with ecstatic experiences, and with exercises for inducing them. Here are some of the verses that undoubtedly captivated Abhinava :

" One should cast one's glance out into space, where there are no trees, no mountains, no walls ( to obstruct one's vision ), for when the nature of the mind ( which is to think about various objects presented to it) is suspended, all activities come to an end."3

" Meditating on the knowledge ( that exists on its own ) between two thoughts, one should fix (the mind) on that (empty) middle ( space). Suddenly abandoning both of them, truth will appear in the middle."4

In these verses, one finds a certain preoccupation with aesthetic themes — a feature that is lacking in Advaita works. It is carried even further, when sexual comparisons, for which Kashmir Śaivism has a definite sympathy, begin to appear :

" Wherever the mind finds pleasure, one should firmly fix it on that object. For there the true nature of absolute bliss will manifest itself."5

( Continued from previous page)

यत्र स्वं निमित्तमासाद्य शान्ताद्‌भाव: प्रवर्तते ।

आवा विकारा रसस्याः: शान्तस्तु प्रकृतिमेलनः ।

विकार: प्रकृतर्जात: पुनस्तत्रैव लीयते ॥

1. Only, as far as we are aware, in the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī ( edited in three volumes by Madhusūdan Kaul Sāstrī, NSP, Bombay, 1938, 1941 and 1943 respectively). The work is quoted in Vol. I, 77, 80 and 287 and in Vol. II on pp. 50, 179, 214, 262, 311, 427, and Vol. III, on pp. 30, 52, 169, 346 and 386.

2. There is an interesting French translation of this remarkable text by L. Silburn, Le Vijñānabhairava, Publications de l' Institut de Civilisation Indienne.

3. VB, 60 (p. 50) :

निरवकाशं गिरिभित्यादिदेशे दृष्टिं विनिक्षिपेत् ।

वेल्लने मानसे भावे वृत्तिक्षीण: प्रजायते ॥

In fact Abhinava quotes this very verse in the IPVV twice, once on p. 311 of Vol. II, and again in the same volume, p. 427.

4. VB, 61 (p. 50) :

उभयो:पि‌अन्तकोट्यो‌अन्तं ध्यात्वा मध्ये समाश्रयेत् ।

युगपद् द्वयं त्यक्त्वा मध्ये तत्त्वं प्रकाशते ॥

This verse too is quoted by Abhinava in the IPVV, Vol. III, p. 346.

5. VB, 74 (p. 62) :

यत्र यत्र मनस्तुष्टि‌िर्मनस्तत्रैव धारयेत् ।

तत्र तत्र परानन्दस्वरूपं संप्रवर्तते ॥

28

शान्तरास

The commentator explains this to mean that one can fix one's attention on any attractive object, such as the lotus-like face of a beautiful woman, and find bliss of a transcendental nature therein.1

" After the manifestation of the happiness resulting from the nourishing moisture produced in the body by eating a good meal and drinking, one should meditate on the state of fullness of the body (at that time). From this, absolute bliss will arise."2

The commentary explains rasa to mean the sense of "I-consciousness " and quotes the famous line from the Taittirīya already mentioned above.3

" The pleasure which terminates in the infusion of the power of bliss in a person on the achievement of sexual intercourse — that pleasure is one's own pleasure on the realisation of the essence of Brahman."4

Here the comparison that Abhinava will make between sexual experiences and ecstatic experiences, is explicitly stated. Note that the commentary speaks of pleasure of knowing Brahman as being of the form of the resonance of a bell (ghantyanuranaṇa), a term that Ānanda applies to dhvani. He also speaks of sexual intercourse as the abhivyaktikāraṇa (i.e. that which manifests or suggests) bliss,5 again a term that Abhinava uses of rasa. Verse seventy6 is another sexual verse where we are told that there is ānandasamplava, immersion in bliss, simply by remembering the various acts such as sucking (lehana), fondling etc., indulged in during love-play. The interesting thing is that the commentary gives a

1. यसिन् यसिन्वस्तुनि मनोहरे कामिनी वदनकमलादौ मनः सज्जते, तत्रैव धारयेत्स्वरं कषायोपहितम् ।

2. VB, 72 (p. 60) :

नानाविधपानकृतोच्छलासरसन्नदविजृम्भणात् ।

मावयेद्दररितावस्थां महानन्दस्ततो भवेत् ॥

This verse too is quoted by Abhinava, in the IPVV, Vol, II, p. 179.

3. VB, p. 61 :

अहं विमर्शे स चैतन्य रसरूपो व आनन्दः ।

4. VB, 69 (p. 58) :

शक्तिसंगमसंश्रुद्गशकल्यावेशावसानिकम् ।

मत्सुखं ब्रह्मतत्स्वयं तत्सुखं स्वाक्यमुच्यते ।

5. VB, p. 59 : the first passage is :

श्रीसञ्ज्ञानन्दावि भूतानन्दशक्तिसमावेशान्ते यत् घण्टानुरणनरूपं ब्रह्मतत्स्वयं सुखं परब्रह्मानन्दः ।

The second is : श्रीसृष्टु अभिव्यक्तिकारणमेव ।

6. The verse is : लेहनामन्थनाकोटैः श्रीसुखस्य भरात् स्मृतेः ।

शाक्त्यभावेऽपि देवेशि भवेदनन्दसंप्लवः ॥

complex Tantric explanation, which, it says, is Abhinava's !1 Could this mean that Abhinava had himself written a commentary on the Vijñāna-bhairava, now lost ? Reading through the commentary on these verses by Sivopādhyāya, one is struck by the fact that he too uses the terms of Abhinava from aesthetics. Clearly he also felt their relevance here. Surely it is the kind of speculation found in these remarkable mystic verses of the VB that is responsible, at least in part, for Abhinava's own philosophy, where worldly pleasures are not to be rejected.

Another work, of perhaps even greater importance, is the Yogavāsiṣṭha-mahārāmāyana.2 This is one of the most extraordinary texts of mediaeval India. To claim it for Kashmir Śaivism would be unjust, since the work itself stresses the fact that it belongs to no one school. The terminology is clearly heavily influenced by Kashmir Saivism, but it is just as deeply marked by Buddhism and by Advaita Vedānta. What we cannot know for certain is whether Abhinava knew this text or not. There is a tradition current in Kashmir that he commented on the YV.3 Dr. K. C. Pandey informs us that he has seen parts of this commentary in manuscript form in Kashmir.

There is some likelihood that the author of the YV knew the Dhvanyā-loka,4 and we already have quotations from the work by the thirteenth century, so that it appears reasonable to say that it was written in Kashmir,5 sometimes between the ninth century A. D. and the twelfth.6 The work is

1. VB, p. 60 :

आति अभिनवगुप्तपादा: ।

2. Yogavāsiṣṭhamahārāmāyana, edition with the commentary Vāsiṣṭhamahā-rāmāyanatātparyaprakāśa (a singularly uninteresting commentary of very little help in real difficulties), by Wāsudeva Laxmaṇa Śāstrī Paṇśīkar, NSP, Bombay, 1918, in two volumes.

3. See K. C. Pandey, Abhinavagupta, pp. 28-29 : " There is enough evidence to show that he wrote many other works besides the above..His commentary on the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha. We have no other source of information about it than a tradition current among Kashmiriian Pandits. '

4. This was first pointed out by V. Raghavan, " The Date of the Yogavāsiṣṭha ", J. O. R. Vol. XIII, Part II, 1939, pp. 121-123. The important verse of Ānanda that we quote and translate later is copied almost identically in Vol. II, p. 1521 (VIB, 190, verse 89 ). YV, VI B, 197, verses 15–17 are very similar to the D. Āl. I, 4. There can be little doubt that the YV is the borrower here.

5. See Raghavan, "The Yogavāsiṣṭha and the Bhagavad Gītā and the place of origin of the Yogavāsiṣṭha ", p. 73. J· O. R. Vol. XIII, Part I, January-March 1939. " Hence the suggestion that Kashmir was the place where the Yogavāsiṣṭha was produced deserves acceptance," op. cit., p. 82.

6. See Raghavan, op. cit., p. 128 : " What is the lower limit to the date of the Yogavāsiṣṭha is a question which I can answer here. Scholars have up till now pointed out Vidyāraṇya as the earliest to cite the Yogavāsiṣṭha. We can take up the (Continued on next page)

unique in many ways; one in particular interests us here : it is the only work

in Sanskrit ( apart from the Mahābhārata ) that illustrates one of Ānanda's

and Abhinava's pet doctrines : the relation between śāstra and kāvya. The

work itself1 says that it is meant as both, and all of its thirty-three thousand

verses bear out this boast. Not only does it contain remarkable philosophi-

cal doctrines, but many of the passages are as complex and literary as any of

the Mahākāvyaṣ. The philosophical stories are replete with lyric descriptions

of great beauty,2 and the very language itself gives evidence of a highly

literary mind.3 The author was clearly aware of all the terminology

from literary criticism,4 and makes use of it, thus illustrating Abhinava's

very philosophy. If he preceded Abhinava, then we can be certain that

( Continued from paevious page )

lower limit to the date of the Yogavāsiṣṭha by a century. The Sūktimuktāvalī ( G. O.

S. edn. ) was compiled by Vaidya Bhānu for Jalhaṇa in A. D. 1258. On pp. 412, 417,

439, 448 and 451 of this anthology, the Yogavāsiṣṭha is extracted. " Raghavan opts

for between the 11th and the middle of the 13th century as the date for the YV. This

is much closer to the truth than the unconvincing arguments of Atreya ( Philosophy of

the Yogavāsiṣṭha ) and Dasgupta's claim that it should be dated before Saṅkara.

Had Abhinava known the work, it seems odd that he would not have quoted it any-

where. It is intetesting to note that in the preserved portion of the commentary on

the VB by Kṣemarāja, the direct disciple of Abhinavagupta, there are no quotations

from the YV, whereas in the later commentary ( 18th cen. ) by Śivopādhyāya, there

are numerous quotations. This seems to us to point to the fact that Kṣemarāja did not

know the work.

1. YV, II, 18, 33 :

रूपं सुबोधमेवदं साल्कारविभूषितम् ।

काव्यं रसमयं चारुतिष्ठान्तैः प्रतिपादितम् ॥

2. On this aspect of the work, see J. Masson and B. K. Matilal " A love-

story from eighth-century India " in the Jadavpur Journal of Comparative Litera-

ture, 1966.

3. We think of such passages as III. 16. 1-17, with its descriptions of artistic

delights. Also VIA. 104, 15–21 for a fine discourse on the ill luck of a woman in spring

who is not able to make love with a man. The remarkable story of Gādhi ( V. 45–50 ),

who dreams, in one second, an entire life that turns out to have actually taken place in

another dimension, is replete with the most extraordinary literary passages. There is

no finer example in world literature of a profound philosophical mind with a genius for

artistic description, even though many of the verses betray a certain lack of tradi-

tional literary education ( odd syntax, unorthodox similes etc. ). There is a fullness and

an overflowing of the creative spirit in this work such as we have never come across

in any other Sanskrit text.

4. The word saṃta and its derivatives are to be found on virtually every page

of the YV ( e. g. VI. 68. 29; V. 25. 4 ); viśrānti also occurs constantly ( e. g. IV. 39.

20; VI. 42. 3 ); camatkāra is also very common ( e. g. III. 14. 45 ); tanmayī is not a

rare expression ( e. g. IV. 42. 11 ). Clearly the author is aware of the terms of literary

criticism, for we find at VIB. 83. 6 : वाच्यवाचकसंम्बन्धं विना बोधो न जायते । VIB. 65. 1-5

contains a number of puns on rasa and rastikajana.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

31

Abhinava derived a great deal of his inspiration from the YV, and if the author of the YV succeeded Abhinava, then it is just as clear that the YV derived its inspiration from Abhinava. In any case, both authors are closely related. One doctrine which is remarkably similar to passages from the VB and to passages in the Tantrāloka that we shall shortly examine, is the emphasis on being unfettered in one's enjoyment of life. Thus there is a passage where Vasiṣṭha tells Rāma that he, Rāma, is now a jīvanmukta, who knows that his consciousness is ever pure, and so he should : “ Drink, live, make love, for you have obtained the far-shore of worldly existence.”1

Such verses are not rare in the YV, e. g. :

“ It is all the same ( if the realised man ) be, with unbridled passion ( uddāmamanmatham ), given to heavy drink, or dance, or if, on the other hand, he abandon all society and go off alone to the mountains.”2

The number of verses in which ānanda is described in terms to which we are now used from Abhinava, are legion. Here are just a few examples :

“ That is genuine happiness wherein the mind ceases to function. Such happiness is not possible in heaven, just as it is not possible for a house of ice to exist in the desert.”3

And on a theme that Abhinava will develop himself :

“ Higher than a kingdom, than heaven, than the moon, than the status of Maghavan and even than the delight that arises in making love with one's beloved is the happiness proceeding from the extinction of desires.”4

The YV tells us that “all beings strive for bliss.”5 Speaking of ātmānanda, a term of which the book is very fond, it says :

1. पिब विहर रमस्व प्राप्तसंसारपारः । YV. V. 50, 75.

2. YV. V. 56, 53 :

उद्दाममनमर्थं पानतत्परो वापि नृत्यतु ।

सर्वैसङ्गपरित्यागी सममायातु वा गिरौ ॥

3. YV. VIA. 44, 26 :

यत्र नाम्युदितं चित्तं तत्सुखंकमक्रत्रिमम् ।

न स्वर्गादौ संभवति मरौ हिमगृहं यथा ॥

4. YV. V. 74, 44 :

अपि राज्यादपि स्वर्गादपीन्द्रादपि माधवात् ।

अपि कान्तासमासक्तान्तैराश्यं परमं सुखम् ॥

We suppose that indu here means something like candraloka.

5. आनन्दायैव भूतानि यतन्ते यानि कानिचित् । YV. VIA 108.20,

"That is the highest place, the peaceful way (i.e. state), the eternal good, happiness (śiva). Delusion no longer disturbs the man who has found rest (viśrānti) there."1

Such verses, many of them very lovely, could be multiplied indefinitely.2

1. YV. V 54, 70 :

तस्मिन् सा गतिः शान्ता तद्रूपं शान्तं च जायते । तत्र विश्रान्तिमासाद्य भूयो नो बाधते भ्रमः ॥

2. We have hardly done justice to the importance of this fascinating work. There are many more passages relevant to the issues we are considering here. We think of the extraordinary explanation at VI B 83, 18 of Siva at the end of time dancing and :

यन्नुज्यति हि तद्विद्रिद् चिच्चनस्पन्दनं निजम् ।

It is almost identical with the explanation is similarly explained and again linked up with the concept of spanda (one of the key terms in Kashmir Saivism), so often used in the YV (e.g. at III. 67.6 it is equated with cinmātra). Many other passages bring to mind Abhinavagupta and his ideas on Śāntarasa. Thus at VI B 39, 36 we are told : यथा नाहं न संसारः शान्तमेवावशिष्यते ।

"when the world and the "I" disappear, only tranquillity is left." A verse that occurs frequently (with minor variations) is : न तु:खशान्तौ न सुखे शान्तं शिवमेव जगत् ।

(VI B 37, 39) which we can compare with the NS, Vol. I, (G.O.S.), p. 334 and with the verse quoted below from the Viṣnudharmottarapurāṇa. Śānta is said to be the end of desire for which there is nothing comparable in the universe :

इच्छोदयो यथा दुःखमिच्छाशान्तिर्यथा सुखम् । तथा न नरके नापि ब्रह्मलोकेऽनुभूयते ॥

(VI B 36, 24) on which the commentary quotes the verse yac ca kāmasukham loke etc. (p. 1139), which Ānanda quotes in the Dhvanyāloka, p. 390. The tree that gives viśrānti is said (VI B 44, 20) to be vairāgyarasapuṣṭātmā. A passage very interesting in the context of rasa is VI B 41, 5-6 :

विच्चमत्कारमात्रात्मकरूपनारङ्क्षना: । रसान्तु केचित् शङ्कन्ते खे जगच्चित्रकारिकाः ॥ रसभावविकाराढ्यं नृत्यंस्यन्दिनैनैव च: । परमाणुप्रति प्रायः खे स्फुरन्त्यमृतात्मिकाः ॥

Note the commentary on this (p. 1150) : चिच्चमत्कारमात्रात्मनो ये जीववस्तुनो कल्पना-मात्रात्मकेऽङ्गे नृत्यमण्डपे शृङ्गारादिना नानारसज्ञा यासाम् । जगच्चित्रपुत्रिका: खे नृत्यनतीति परे-णान्वयः । रसस्य शृङ्गारादिभावैः स्थायिभावैवैकारः कम्पसवेगादिसंचारिभावैरादगं यथा स्याद्‌था ।

A similar verse, betraying the same knowledge of aesthetic theory is VI B 1, 18-19 :

रसभावनमनस्तस्थे माले भवति कर्मसु । दारुनृत्यमयस्येव परार्थमिव कुर्वतः ॥ नीरस एव ते सन्तु समस्तेन्द्रियसंविदः । आकारमात्रसंलक्ष्य हेमन्ततों लता इव ॥

on which the commentary (p. 1070) reads : यथा परेषां कौतुकार्थं नृत्यादि कुर्वत् इव स्थितस्य दारुप्रक्रियान्तस्य नटवच्छृङ्गारादिरसभावनं नास्ति तद्रततवापि कुबंवतो विषयसुखे मूढेसीयेव रसभावनं कौतुकबुद्धिरमा भवितव्यः ।

(Continued on next page)

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

33

There are many passages from Kashmir Saiva literature that helped to stamp Abhinava's philosophy. Here, for example, is a fine passage from the Parātrimśikā1 :

" He sees, without any doubt, through the śaktis of Śiva ( as if things were ) right in front of him. This is the attainment of immortality, the experience of the Self. This is the initiation into Nirvāna, and that which establishes the existence of the world."3

And here is an important verse from Somānanda's Śivadrṣṭi3 :

" When one attains great bliss or when one sees a friend after a long absence, meditating on the joy that arises, one merges into it, and one's mind becomes one with it."4

It is impossible to say how influential for Abhinava was the Tattvāloka of Ānandavardhana. The work has been lost, and unfortunately no quotations at all have been preserved. All we know of this work is what Abhinava tells us in the fourth Uddyota of his Locana5 : that it dealt, in great detail, with the relation between śāstra and kāvya, poetry and philosophy. Most

( Continued from previous page )

On trṣṇāsantyāgata ( cf. Ānanda's sthāyibhāva for 'sāntarasa, namely trṣṇā. kṣaya ), see V 24, 52. Note how dolls sing and talk with goddesses : VI B 6, 41. On the mirror image, cf. II 15, 6; II 13, 75. Note VI A 26-36 : नाहमसि न चान्योऽस्ति न मनो न च मानसम् which is a verse quoted in the Tantrāloka, Vol. 11, p. 44. Cf. Tantrāloka, II p. 173. The YV. stresses the relativity of time ( and how profound experiences escape from ordinary notions of duration ) : III ( 50, 22 : क्षणः स्वप्रे भवेत्कल्पः कल्पश्व भवति क्षणः. Finally one thinks of the awesome : naunam evāvaśiṣyate ( VI B 83, 29 ). " Only silence remains : "

1. Parātrimśikāvivṛti of Abhinavagupta, ed. by M. R. Shastri, KSTS No. XVIII, Bombay, 1918, pp. 258-259.

2. sākṣātparāmarśyasandhirbhavamākṛṣṭe rudraśaktibhiḥ .

... ... ... ... ...

इयमेवामृतप्रासिरमेवात्मनो ग्राहः .

इयं निर्वाणदीक्षा च विश्वसद्भावसाधिनी ॥

( इयं संवित्तिति यावत् )

We are not sure how to take ākrṣṭiḥ. Is it the subject of sākṣāt paśyati or its object ?

3. Utpaladeva's Śivadrṣṭivṛtti, ed. by M. K. Shastri, KSTS, LIV. Srinagar, 1934, p. 12. The verse is also number 71 of the Vijñānabhairava, p. 60. Abhinavagupta quotes the verse in the ĪPVV. Vol. II, p. 50.

4. आनन्दे महति प्राप्ते दृष्टे वा बान्धवे चिरात् ।
   

आनन्दमुद्रतं ध्यात्वा तल्लयस्तन्मयो भवेत् ॥

5. Locana, p. 533 : एतच्च ग्रन्थकारेण ( i. e. Ānandavardhana ) तत्त्वालोके वितत्योक्तमिह तस्य न मुख्योऽवसर इति नासाभिस्तद्र्धितम्. It is clear from the Vṛtti passage on p. 533 of the D. Āl. that the work dealt with what Ānanda calls the śāstranaya and the kāvyanaya. The Tattvāloka is also referred to by Abhinava in his Locana on Udd. I ( p. 67 ).

34

शान्तरस

likely Ānanda was inspired to this from his speculations on the nature of the Mahābhārata as both a work of philosophy and a work of poetry. We can justly presume that many of Abhinava's ideas come from this text.

Another question that must go unanswered, though it is rich in possibilities, is Abhinava's debt to Buddhism. We simply do not know anything definite on this problem at all, though it is very tempting to speculate.

INFLUENCES FROM SPECULATION ON Śāntarasa

It is clear that Abhinava did have access to certain old manuscripts of the Nāṭyaśāstra in which nine rasas were enumerated, including śāntarasa, and not the usual eight. Apart from the famous Kālidāsa passage which mentions only eight, there is reason to believe that Abhinava himself realised, with an extraordinary display of intellectual integrity, that eight was the older and more genuine reading. We say this because when he quotes the verse from the NŚ enumerating the rasas, in the Locana, he quotes the

1. Abhinava of course knew Dharmakirti whom he refers to with great respect in the ĪPVV, e.g. Vol. II, p. 111 : प्रमाणिकोडध्वायिर्धर्मकीर्तिराचार्यदिवलाग्रन्थानु-रोधात्तपक्षपातादेवमभिधत्ते, न पुनरसु स्वच्छन्दिरेप्सिति. He again refers to him by name at ĪPVV, I, 279; II, 46 and 174. He mentions the Pramāṇavārttika by name at several places in the ĪPVV. E.g. Vol. II, 220; 223; 228; 234; 400; Vol. III. p. 11; 72; 103; 127; 138; 140; 200; 389 and 397. In defending dhvani against those who claimed that it was ineffable, Ānanda has the following line : यस्त्वनिदेश्येयत्वं सर्वलक्षणविषयं बौद्धानां प्रसिद्धं तत्-त्मन्तपरिक्ष्यां अन्थान्तरे निरूपपिय्याम्. इह तु अन्थान्तरश्रवणालवप्रकाशनं सहदयहृचैमनस्यप्रदायीतिः न प्रक्रियते। Abhinava, commenting on this passage (Locana, p. 519) remarks : अन्थान्तर इति । विनिश्रयदीकायां धर्मोत्तर्यां या विवृतिरमुना यथाकृता तन्नैव तद्वाख्यातम्। It is really most unusual that Ānanda should write a commentary on a Buddhist text. This certainly shows that Buddhist doctrines must have exercised at least a fascination for Ānanda and thus for Abhinava as well. Under NŚ. VI. 45 (G.O. S. p. 299), there is Abhinava's odd remark that some who believe in Śāntarasa add the Buddha as the devatā : बुद्ध: शान्तेडज्जोडध्दुत इति शान्तवादिन: केचिद्रपथन्ति। He then goes to remark : बुद्धो जिन: परोपकारैकपर: प्रबुद्धो वा। Is it not significant that the only drama that Abhinava quotes from in support of 'sāntarasa is the Nāgānanda? Oddly enough, however, there exists at present no Buddhist text on alainkārasāstra. It seems rather unlikely that Dharmakirti wrote a work entitled simply "Alainkāra", as Kane has noted (H. S. P. p. 65). "So the Buddhist logician and philosopher Dharmakīrti may have been a poet, but there is nothing to substantiate the claim to regard him as a writer on Alaṅkāra." See Sivarāma Bhattacharya, "Studies in Indian Poetics", Calcutta 1964, which contains the reprint of an article entitled "The Neo-Buddhist Nucleus in Alankāraśāstra", though as Kane points out, the quotation from the Vāsavadattā is at the most ambiguous inspite of what Sivarāma says. There seems to us no likelihood that the kārikās of the Alankārasekhara could be by Dharmakīrti though we have no space to give our arguments. Note finally that Abhinava often quotes one Rāhula, a commentator on the Nāṭyaśāstra, and that this is a Buddhist name.

2. Vikramorvasīya, II. 18.

3. NŚ VI, 15, quoted in the Locana on p. 83.

ĀBHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

35

verse with only eight rasas. Moreover, throughout the A. Bh.1 he speaks,

whenever he mentions śānta, of those who " read " śānta. We cannot there-

fore know how old the doctrine of ŚR is. The first author of known date

to mention ŚR is Udbhata,2 who simply includes it in his enumeration

of all the rasas without further comment or explanation. The interpolated

śāntarasa passage in the Nātyaśāstra, whatever it was ( for it is clear that the

present passage is not likely to be precisely the one that Abhinava commented

on3 ), is nonetheless likely to have been the earliest reference to ŚR that

Abhinava knew. If we, purely tentatively, place the core of the NŚ around

the fourth century A. D., then all we can say is that ŚR must have been add-

ed to the text sometime before the time of Udbhata, i. e. the eighth century

A. D. ( unless we are to argue that it was Udbhata who first spoke of ŚR.,

which seems most unlikely in view of the fact that he has nothing whatever

to say about it, beyond naming it ). However, it is clear that for Ānanda,

ŚR was a matter of controversy. Had the passage from the NŚ already

existed, and had Ānanda felt that it was genuine, there would be no reason

for him not to have mentioned this fact in his D. Al., while discussing ŚR.

The fact that he did not, makes us suspicious of its existence in his time.

But if it was not existent, this means that it was added between the time of

Ānanda and Abhinava, i. e. only a space of about one hundred years. Is

this sufficient for Abhinava to speak of " old " manuscripts which contained

the ŚR additions ?

The influence on Abhinava of Ānanda's speculation on ŚR will become

clear from the passage we translate below. The importance of the NŚ passage

( and related verses, which though they do not specifically mention ŚR, yet

seem to Abhinava to imply it ) will also be clarified in part II of this volume.

But here we should say something of several passages4 which claim to be old,

but which can at best be described as suspect.

1. E. g. A. Bh. Vol. 1, p. 299 and 332.

2. Udbhata, Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṅgraha, IV. 4.

Note that Vararuci's Ubhayābhisārikā mentions a drama contest in which the

phrase aṣṭau rasāḥ occurs ( Caturbhānī, Madras, 1922, p. 13 ). See A. K. Warder and

T. Venkatacharya's recent translation, Madras, 1967.

3. For one thing he does not comment on all of the passage, and for another,

the terms used contradict his own. Thus the sthāyibhāva is śama (which Abhinava

attempts to interpret ), and tattvajñāna is given (p. 332, NŚ. Vol, 1, G. O. S. ) as a

vibhāva of 'śānta !

4. One should note too the passage from the VJ of Kuntaka. In his résumé

of the fourth unmeṣa, S. K. De quotes a line on this subject ( p. 239, second edition ) :

रामायणमहाभारतयोःश शान्तारसिंव पूर्वेसुरिभिरेव निरूपितम् ।

(Continued on next page)

३६

शान्तरस

In the twentieth chapter of the Viṣnudharmottarapurāṇa, we find the following stanzas :

" Śāntarasa is to be considered as independent and as standing separate."1

The point here is that four of the other rasas give rise to four others according to Bharata. Since Bharata does not mention śānta, and since there are only an èven number of eight rasas, there is nothing it could come from.

" O King, they say that śānta arises from vairāgya. It can be enacted by means of taking on religious paraphernalia and through such means as compassion for all beings, meditation, encouraging others towards the path of mokṣa etc."2

" Śāntarasa is that wherein one feels the same toward all creatures, where there is no pleasure, no sorrow, no hatred and no envy."3

It is clear that these lines are simply a pastiche of the various passages which the reader can see in Part II. It seems to us unlikely that this passage antedates Abhinava. The editor, Miss Priyabala Shah, thinks differently :

" Thus in the present stage of our knowledge, it would be safe to put Viṣnudharmottara somewhere between the first or rather the second half of the fifth century A. D., and the first half of the seventh century A. D., i. e. between circa 450 and 650 A. D."4 But in dating any Purāṇa text, to date more than single sections ( and indeed, perhaps more than single stanzas !), even very roughly, is a hazardous undertaking. It is perfectly possible that certain sections of the VDP are as old as Miss Shah claims the whole is, but

( Continued from previous page )

Mahābhārata ". This can only be a reference to Ānanda's fourth Uddyota (Kārikā 5, the vrtti on this ). The puzzling thing is that Ānanda describes karuṇa as the aṅgirasa of the Rāmāyaṇa, and not śānta ! ( Moreover, is it not a bit odd to refer to Ānanda as pūrvasūribhiḥ ? ) Note that the MS of the Vakroktijīvitam breaks off in the middle of a sentence discussing the Nāgānanda ( De. op. cit., p. 246 ) ( although Dr. Nagendra in his " Hindi Vakroktijīvita " claims that the work cannot be said to be incomplete since it deals with all the six topics it mentions at I. 18, although of course there is no colophon ) and we cannot know; therefore, what rasa Kuntaka held to be the major one in the Nāgānanda.

1. Viṣnudharmottarapurāṇa ( VDP ) p. 100, Vol. I, 9–11.

शान्तो रसः स्वतन्त्रोऽत्र पृथगेव व्यवस्थितः ।

2. शान्तस्य तु समुत्पत्तौ वैराग्यतः स्मृता ।

स चाभिनेयो भवति लिङ्गग्रहणतस्तथा ॥

सर्वभूतदयाध्यानमोक्षमार्गप्रवर्तने: ।

3. नास्ति यत्र सुखं दुःखं न द्वेषो नापि मत्सरः ।

समः सर्वेषु भूतेषु स शान्तः प्रथितो रसः ।

4. VDP, third Kānda, Vol. 1, O. I. Baroda, 1958, p. XXVI.

there is no likelihood that the same is true of the Alañkāra sections. It would 'be preposterous to hold that such a composite and clearly derivative work as the VDP ( indeed any Purāṇa ) actually originated an idea such as ŚR.

This same reasoning can apply to the Jain text, the Anuyogadvāra-sūtra.1 We cannot of course say for certain that the following passage is interpolated, and thus it could, in theory, be as old as the fifth century A. D. But the possibility of interpolation, especially in the case of a text that provides examples of numbered objects, is not unlikely. In any case, this could not possibly lie at the origin of ŚR, especially since it is the only reference to śāntarasa in Jain literature before the tenth century A. D.

णव कव्वरसां पण्णत्ता, तं जहा -

वीरो सिंगारो अद्भुओ अ रोदो अ होइ बोद्भव्वो । वेलणओ बीभच्छो हासो कलुणो पसंतो अ ॥

निद्दोससमणसमा हाणसंभव्रो जो पसंतभावेण । अव्विकारलक्खणो सो रसो पसंतो ति णायव्वो ॥

पसंतो रसो जहा -

सद्दभावणिविगारं उवसंतपसंतसोमादिट्ठीअं । ही जह मुणिणो सोहइ मुहकमलं पीवरसिरीअं ॥

"There are nine2 rasas in poetry. They are :

‘ The heroic, the sexual, the wondrous, the wrathful, as well as shyness, the disgusting, the comic, the pathetic and the calm ’.

śāntarasa is to be known as characterised by an absence of ( mental ) per-

1. We have used the Āgamodaya Samiti edition, Pothi form, Bombay 1924, with Maladhāri Hemacandrasūri's ( not Hemacandra, the author of Kāvyānuśāsana ) Sanskrit commentary. We have just received a very fine edition of the Nandi-suttam and the Anuogadārām, ed. by Muni Punyavijaya, Pt. Dalsukha Mālvania and Pt. Amritlāl Mobanāl Bhojak, Jain-Āgama Series No. 1, Shri Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay, 1968. See p. 121, St. 262. For the date of this text see the excellent introduction to this volume.

2. Note that bhayānaka is not included in this list. In its place is velanao ( vrīdanaka ), the sthāyibhāva of which is vrīḍā or lajjā (pp. 137-138 ). According to the commentator, bhayānaka is included under raudrarasa.

38

turbation; as arising from composure of the mind divested of all passions and as marked by tranquillity.1

Here is an example :2

‘ Oh, ( look ) how the lotus-like face of the sage shines ! It is full of the beauty ( of mental calm ) and genuinely devoid of any contortions ( due to the upsurge of passions), with its calm ( devoid of all urge to look at beautiful objects ) and gentle eyes unperturbed ( by anger, lust, etc. )’.

Even if both of these passages were older than Abhinava, there is little likelihood that he would have seen either.

TANTRIC INFLUENCE

The only contemporary description we have of Abhinavagupta is one of exceptional interest. Allowing of course for stylisation, the picture is nonetheless extremely vivid. Abhinava is presented as a mystic of a most unusual sort : he is surrounded by women, playing a musical instrument ( it is not unlikely that this was at the time of Abhinava’s life when he was expounding the text of the NŚ on music), drinking wine and yet engaged in the most intellectual of pursuits, commenting on a text. The work is called the Dhānyāśloka and consists of only four verses. According to Prof. Pandey,3 the man who wrote them was a direct disciple of Abhinava, and actually saw him as he describes him in the verses. Here is our translation of this important passage :

" May the glorious god Dakṣināmūrti ( Abhinavagupta ), who is an incarnation of Śiva, protect us ! Out of his deep compassion he has taken a new bodily form and come to Kashmir. He sits in the middle of a garden of grapes, inside a pavilion made of crystal and filled with beautiful paintings. The room smells wonderful because of flower garlands, incense-sticks and ( oil- ) lamps. Its walls are smeared with sandal-paste and other such things. The room is constantly resounding with musical instruments, with songs and

1. Hemacandra explains nirdoṣa as himsādidoṣarahita. Samādhāna is composure of the Mind : विषयाच्चित्तनिवृत्तिलक्षणं स्वास्थ्यम्. He takes prasāntabhāvena in the sense of krodhādiparityāgena jāyamānah, " arising from the renunciation of anger, etc.". But this involves repeating the idea conveyed by nirdoṣa. We, therefore, understand it as standing for prasāntabhāvena upalakṣitah (the instrumental of characterisation - upalakṣaṇe tritīyā), and take prasāntabhāva to mean prasānattva, i. e. the same thing as śama.

2. Our translation of this stanza follows the commentary, p. 139. There is one puzzling word there : on p. 140 the commentary writes : पश्य भो ! यथा मनेऽहं कमलं शोभते । कथम्भूतम् ? । सद्रावतो न मातृस्थानतः. Now what does this mātrsthānatah stand for ? Perhaps mātrsthāna is a wrong sanskritisation of māitṭhāna for māyāsthāna, i. e. " not with deceit, sincerely. "

3. K. C. Pandey, Abhinavagupta, p. 20.

with dancing. There are crowds of women Yogins and realised beings ( siddha ) with magic powers. It is equipped with a golden set from which pearls are hanging. It has a soft awning ( talima ) streched over it ( as a canopy ). Abhinava is attended by all his numerous students, with Kṣemarāja at their head, who are writing down everything he says. To his side stand two women, partners in Tantric rites ( dūtī ), who hold in one hand a jug of wine ( śivarasa ) and a box full of betel rolls, and in the other hand a lotus and a citron. Abhinava has his eyes trembling in ecstasy. In the middle of his forehead is a conspicuous tilaka made of ashes. He has a rudrākṣa bead hanging from his ear. His long loose hair is held by a garland of flowers. He has a long beard and golden ( reddish-brown ) skin; his neck is dark with shining yakṣapaṅka powder. His upavīta string is hanging down loose from his neck. He wears a silken cloth ( as a dhotī ) as white as moonbeams, and he sits in the Yogic position called vīrāsana. One hand is held on his knee holding a rosary with his fingers clearly making the sign ( mudrā ) that signifies his knowledge of the highest Śiva. He plays on his resonating lute with the tips of the quivering fingers of his lotus-like left hand."1

Clearly this is a picture of a Tantric rasika. It would be a grave error to suppose that Abhinavagupta accepted only a token form of Tantrism.2 The Kaula system on which he comments so elaborately in

1. The text has been edited by Pandey, op. cit. p. 738 from a single manucript preserved in Banaras :

द्राक्षारामस्य मध्ये स्फटिकमणिमये मण्डपे चित्ररम्ये पुष्पप्रकरूपेतैःद्विप्रवेष्टनपरिमले चर्चिते चन्दनाद्रेः । वातैर्यौतैः सन्तुष्टैः सततसुखरतौ योगिनी सिद्दसङ्घैः राक्षीर्णे स्वर्णपीठे शुद्धतलिमनले बद्धमुक्ताविताने ॥

आसीनः क्षेमराजप्रभृतिभिरलैः सेवितः शिष्यवर्यैः: पादोपान्ते निषण्णैरवहितहृदैः रक्तमुक्ता लिखद्भिः । द्राभ्यां पार्श्वस्थिताभ्यां शिवरसकरकं पूर्णाताम्बूलपेटीं दूतिभ्यां विग्रहाभ्यामपरकरलसन्मुक्तिकोपलाभ्याम् ॥

आनन्दर्रदोलिताक्षः स्फुटतिलकको भस्मना भालमध्ये रुद्राक्षोलासिकर्णं कलितकचभरो मालया लम्बकुण्डे: । रक्ताज्ञो यक्षपङ्कोल्लसदसितगले लम्बयुक्तोपवीत: क्षौमं वासो वसान: शशिकरधवलं वीरयोगासनस्थ: ॥

जान्वासक्तकरहस्त: स्फुटपरमशिवज्ञानमुद्रांकरस्थो वामश्रीहस्तपञ्चाक्षस्फुरितनखहैवैद्युताद्वीनाम । श्रीकर्णेशावतार: परमकरणया प्राप्तकाइमरीदेश: श्रीमात्र: पातु साक्षादभिनवपुषा दक्षिणामूर्तिदेव: ॥

2. For good bibliographies on Tantrism, see M. Eliade, " Yoga, Immortality and Freedom ", Bollingen Series, Pantheon Inc. N. Y. 1958, and A. Bharati, " The Tantric Tradition ", Rider & Co., London, 1965.

40

his Tantrāloka repelled all Westerners and most Indians who knew anything about it. This is a great pity, for it is surely one of the most interesting forms of practical mysticism ever invented. What concerns us here is the ādiyāga, the rahasya vidhi (secret ritual) belonging to the Kaula school. Abhinava devotes the whole of the 29th āhnika of the Tantrāloka1 to very elaborate explanations of this ritual. The text is extremely obscure on those passages that interest us the most, partly on purpose2 and partly because this subject has been rarely seriously studied, so that one is ignorant of most of the technical terms. In fact, apart from K. C. Pandey's use of the Tantrāloka in his work on Abhinavagupta, nobody else seems to have used, for any extensive purpose, this massive text.3 What is of interest to us is the similarity this process bears to a dramatic performance and the influence that this must have exercised on Abhinava's incipient theory of aesthetics.4 The ritual is in fact an elaborate play that takes the greater part of the day. The goal is the same as the goal in any ordinary drama, to reach a state of perfect equanimity, blissful repose, where the Dūti identifies herself with Śakti, and the male identifies himself with Śiva. As Abhinava puts it in an extraordinary verse in this section :

"I do not exist, nor does anyone else. Only as śaktis do I exist."5 "If one meditates, for even a moment, on one's real natural (Self) that is pure rest, then, one becomes (like) a great bird, and finds a woman to make spiritual

1. Tantrāloka, Vol. XI, part II, pp. 1-172.

2. Op. cit., p. 115, verse 169 :

न पश्यते रहस्यत्वात् स्पष्टैः शब्दैरमैया पुनः ।

See also p. 19, Jayaratha : स रहस्यत्वात् समयभङ्गभयाच्च नेहासाभिः प्रदर्शितः ।

3. Professor R. Gnoli writes to me (June 11, 1969) : "I have just completed the translation of the Tantrāloka by Abhinavagupta, which has kept me very busy for several years. The book will be shortly published by a Firm of Turin, in Italian".

4. Although Kane (H. S. P., p. 242) and K. C. Pandey (Abhinavagupta, p. 33) place the Tantrāloka earlier than the Locana, this is due to what must have been a wrong reading in the early editions of the Dhvanyāloka in the Kāvyamālā edition. There the reading was given as—

तदुक्तरीर्णत्वे तु सर्व परमेश्वरादृयं ब्रह्मोद्यसमुच्छलाख्यानुसारेण विदितं तन्नालोकग्रन्थं विचार्य ।

These readings do not fit the context as well as the reading given by Kuppuswami Sastri in his edition, p. 125 :

तदुक्तरीर्णत्वे तु सर्व परमेश्वरादृयं ब्रह्मोद्यसमुच्छलाखाकारेण न न विदितं तस्वालोकग्रन्थं विरचयतेऽ्यास्ताम् ।

This is also the reading given in the edition with Bālapriyā.

5. Verse 64, p. 44 :

नाहमसि न चान्योऽस्ति केवलाः शक्तयस्त्वहम् ।

(इत्येवं वासनां कुर्वन् सर्वदा स्मृतिमात्रतः ॥)

Note that the first part of this verse (nāham asmi na cānyo 'sti) is identical with a stanza in the Yogavāsiṣṭha, VI A, 26, 36, p. 828. It is found with variations, throughout the YV.

love to."1 Abhinava uses the same terms for both experiences.2 The whole ritual, according to Jayaratha, in his remarkable commentary on the Tantrāloka, is to "reveal" or "suggest" (abhivyaktı)3 ātmānanda. The strangest and the most disturbing element in the ritual involves the Dūti ( note the similarity to love-poetry, where every Nāyikā must have a Dūti ). The culmination of the rite is concerned with this Dūti, who identifies herself with Śiva's Śakti. Jayaratha quotes a text to the effect that this Dūti should be :

" One's own wife, one's sister, one's mother, one's daughter or one's beautiful friend."4

But Jayaratha points out that Abhinava (?) did not accept one's own wife as a Dūti, for one might conceive purely carnal lust in her case,5 which goes against the whole ritual6 where the goal is to enter a state of pure consciousness.7 The Dūti is very elaborately described in fourteen verses from the Śrītantrarājabhattāraka, with all the paraphernalia of a mahā-kāvya.8 Now follow the ordinarily9 forbidden acts,10 the three makāras :

1. The rest of the stanza is taken from Jayaratha, p. 45 :

क्षणमप्यत्र विश्रामं सहजं यदि भावयेत् । तदा स खेचरो भूत्वा योगिनीमेलनं लभेत् ॥

2. Thus on p. 118, verse 176, the words camatkṛti, rasa and ānanda are all found.

3. The same idea is found in the Kulārnavatantra, under V. 80 (Jīvananda Vidyasagara's ed.) :

आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो रूपं तच्च देहे व्यवस्थितम् । तस्याभियोगजं सुखं योगिभिस्तेन पीयते ॥

Cf. what Jayaratha says on p. 102 :

स्वानुभवमात्रैक्यरूपस्यार्थस्य प्रकाशकमभियोगकमित्यर्थः ।

4. Jayaratha, p. 72 :

स्वपत्नी भगिनी माता दुहिता वा शुभा सखी ।

5. Jayaratha, p. 73 :

स्वपत्न्यां हि रिरंसासंभावनाया अपि अवकाशः स्यात् । यदुक्तम् — दूतीं कुर्वीत कार्यार्थी न पुनः काममोहितः ।

6. Cf. p. 67, Jayaratha :

एवमेतत्कुलमार्गानुप्रविष्टेन सर्वथा स्वात्मानन्दव्युत्कतामात्रपरतया सेव्यं, न तु तद्रधीन् । (not out of greed).

7. Jayaratha, p. 72 : अनवच्छिन्नपरसंवित्स्वरूपापवेशः ।

8. Jayaratha, pp. 68-69.

9. Jayaratha often quotes verses in support of the seriousness of the aspirant, e.g. on p. 67 ( under verse 99 ) :

विना गुरूं विना देवं मूढवत्परमेश्वरि । मच्चरणाश्रितो नित्यं पशुवस्ते न संशयः ॥

10. Verse 10, p. 7 :

अत्र यागे च यदूद्रव्यं निषिद्धं शास्त्रसंततौ । तदेव योजयेद्वीरमान् वामामृतपरिप्लुतम् ॥

42

शान्तरस

wine ( madya also called Śivarasa at V. 17 ), meat ( māṃsam ) and love-making ( maithuna ). These three, when combined together, give the highest bliss ( ānanda ) and the highest bliss is none other than Parabrahman.1

Abhinava points out that this ritual expands ( vikāsa ) the heart, by inducing a state of complete freedom from desire ( nairākaṅkṣya ), since one's body ( through the use of perfume, incense and flowers, verse 108, p. 77 ) and mind are mutually satsified.

The actual sexual union,2 described in verse 50 is said to give rise to ānandaviśrānti, “ rest in bliss ”, on which Jayaratha has the significant gloss ( p. 36 ) of svātmacamatkāra. In his exposition, Abhinava uses the term śānta several times ( e. g. verse 133, p. 95 ) and many other words and concepts which were to form his theory of aesthetics. Finally, one of the major verses makes this comparison that we have been drawing inevitable :

" Because of the flow ( rasa ) of desire, through the force of the relish ( carvaṇā ) of outward things, which are filled with one's own flow (?), one attains the state of complete repose ( viśrāntidhāma ) and all phenomenal objects ( comm. bhāvajāta ) are merged into one's own Self."3

1. Verses 49–50. The verses actually dealing with intercourse ( e. g. 111–117 ) are deliberetely couched in obscure and symbolic terms, so that it is very difficult to understand precisely what is meant. There is no doubt that the sexual act is preceded by elaborate fore-play directly acted out, but symbolically interpreted. Thus Jaya-ratha on verse 114, p. 83 writes : अथ चात्र परस्परह्नननालिङ्गनपरिचुम्बनादिलक्षण: क्षोभ: ।

The passages concerning the actual ejaculation of semen are the most obscure of all. It is clear from p. 89 and elsewhere that the face of the śakti is the most important cakra of all, and it would seem, though we are not certain if we have understood the passages correctly ( e. g. p. 88 ), that the man ejaculates in the mouth of the woman. From the many quotations that Jayaratha cites, it is obvious that there existed a very elaborate and serious literature on this subject, unfortunately lost today. In explaining the difficult verse on p. 91, ( verse 123 ) Jayaratha explains that the semen should be passed back and forth from the mouth of the woman to the mouth of the man, and finally poured into a consecrated vessel. Several verses from " the āgamas " are quoted in support, e. g. p. 93 :

वक्त्राद्वक्त्रप्रयोगेण समाहृत्य महारसम् ।

तेन सन्तर्पयेच्चक्रं देवतावीरसंयुतम् ॥

Abbinava himself discusses various forms of ejaculation, all supported by ancient authorities. The subject, of enoromous interest to students of religion and of psychology, deserves a close and impartial investigation.

2. T. Āl. verse 97, p. 64 :

आनन्दो ब्रह्म परमं तच्च देहे त्रिया: स्थितम् ।

उपकारि द्वयं तत्र फलमन्यत्तदात्मकम् ॥

Dvayam in this verse is explained by Jayaratha as wine and meat. Anyad is sexual intercourse. Note that Abhinava himself, verse 99, and Jayaratha as well, are carefulto point out that the reason for engaging in such rituals must be transcendental, and not lust or greed, pp. 66–67.

3. T. Āl. 137, p. 97 :

रणणङ्करसात्रिजरसभरितबहिर्भावचर्वणवशोन ।

विश्रान्तिधाम कृञ्चिहुद्वा स्वात्मन्यथाप्येतु ॥

ĀBHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

43

Abhinava uses very similar terminology1 when speaking of śṛṅgārarasa in the Abhinavabhāratī :

" The joys of sex really apply to those who are in love with one an-other. Because it is only when one is in love that there is continual ( dhārā) repose in sheer happiness."2

Leaving aside the extremely curious sexual contacts with one's own family ( which require a very careful psychological, or psychoanalytic analysis if the significance is to be found ), there is nothing in the rest of the ritual that does not bear a close resemblance to the theatre. Surely such Tantric rituals affected Abhinava's views on the eventual goal of art, and led him to his transcendental theories on the aim of the aesthetic experience. The combination was unique in all of Indian history, and has produced one of the great monuments to the complexity and profundity of the human mind. If we sneer at the sexual elements, we reveal more about our own inadequacies and parochialism than about the ritual itself. It is only a lack of respect for the texts that will allow us to dispense with such passages under the excuse that they are “ indecent ”, for this they are surely not.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

It is of course impossible to give more than a brief sketch of Abhinava's amazingly rich range of thinking on aesthetic topics. What we wish to do here is to quote two long passages from the Locana with a translation. In the first, Abhinava gives a brief survey of his own philosophy of aesthetics, the earlier draft of his famous statement in the A. Bh. on the rasasūtra of Bharata. The second passage we chose because it serves to illustrate how these principles will apply to a concrete literary situation. Before giving the

1. Note how similar this is to XXVIII. 20, p. 10 vol. XI of the Tantrāloka where the actual comparison with the theatre is stated :

यथा प्रेक्षणके तत्तद्रष्ट्रुसंविद्भेदिताम् ।

क्रमयोगिता सघ एव लभते तत्प्रवेशनात् ।

योगाभ्यासक्रमोपात्तां, तथा पूर्णां स्वसंविदम् ॥

Note also the preceding verse, no. 18, where the participants in the mystic cakra must be pūraṇasamvid and capable of tanmayībhavana, again the very terms used by Abhinava in the Locana and the Abhinavabhāratī :

तच्चक्रचरणनिष्ठाता ये केचित्पूर्णसंविदः ।

तन्मेलकसमयुक्तास्ते तत्पूजार्हाः सदाः ॥

The next verse ( p. 10 ) speaks of tanmaya.

2. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 302 :

रतिक्रीडार्थं च (रतिः क्रीडा । सा च) परमार्थतः कामिनोरेव ।

तत्रैव सुखस्य धाराविश्रान्तेः ।

The next line, beginning aparasya tu and ending paramo bhogah is, we feel, Important, but unfortunately we are unable to make good sense of it.

44

passages, however, we thought it would be helpful if we indicated certain important ideas of Abhinava from his philosophical and literary works that will serve as an introduction to the two difficult passages to follow. ( As the reader has probably already recognised by now, all of Abhinava is more or less difficult. It is impossible, unfortunately, to read his works the way one reads the Dhvanyāloka, with immediate comprehension. Almost every sentence of Abhinava's is a puzzle which must be carefully pondered before it yields up its meaning, and even then we are not always certain to have understood correctly. )

In his philosophical works, we find Abhinava moving towards a synthesis of aesthetic pleasure and philosophy. The most important passage in this respect is from Abhinava's commentary on Utpala's vivṛti on the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā.1 Parts of it are corrupt, or at least we have not been able to make perfect sense of every sentence. Here is a tentative translation2 :

" And so it has been said by Śrī Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa :3 " Whatever bliss is to be found in all of the three worlds is only a drop from the ocean of bliss that is the god ( Śiva ) to whom I bow down." And so when a gourmet tastes drinks ( rasa ) such as a delicious beverage, he behaves very differently from a glutton, and distinguishes carefully : " Ah, this is like this."4 As he does so, since he takes rest in his Self as the knower, and takes into account predominantly only that element, namely the knowing subject, he is called bhuñjāna ( " one who enjoys" ). Whenever one completely passes beyond an ordinary state ( anyathābhāva ) and enjoys happiness, because such possible obstacles as ( the desire for ) material gain, etc., have been excluded, as for

1. ĪPVV. Vol. III, p. 178.

त्रैलोक्येक्षितपयत्र यो यावानानन्दः कश्चिदीक्ष्यते ।

स बिन्दुर्यः तं वन्दे देवमानन्दसागरम् ॥

इति श्रीभट्टनारायणेन । तथा च मधुरादौ रसे औदारिकाभ्यवहारवैलक्षण्येन प्रवृत्त इदमिस्थमिति प्रमातरि विश्रमयनप्रामातृभागमेव प्रधानतया विश्रान्तं मुñ्जान इत्युच्यते । यत्रायंव्याप्त्यन्तमन्यथाभावमतिक्रम्य सुखमास्वादते अर्जनादिसंभार्यमानविभागान्तरनिरासाद्रैक्यैकनिष्ठारादौ नाट्यकाव्यादिविषये, तत्र वीतरागतादेवासौ रसना चर्वणा निर्वृति: प्रतीति: प्रमातृताविश्रान्तिरेव, तत् एव हृदयेन परामर्शलक्षणेन प्राधान्याद्यदयदेवेदृश्यास्वस्थितस्यापि प्रकाशभागस्य वेधविश्रान्तस्यानादरणात्सहृदयताव्यपदेश इति निवृत्तावादरुपाश्रय रसानाद्रौचार्यकार्यविश्रितदृत्तयो रसा नवेत्यमर्थोऽभिनवभारत्यां नाट्यवेदविवृतौ वितत्य व्युत्पादितोऽस्माभिरिति । तकुन्तौली तामेवालोकयेत् । इह तु प्रकृतविवेकारितवान् विततः । तस्मादुपचरितस्य संवेेदनरूपतयानन्तरीयत्वेनावस्थितस्य स्वातन्त्र्यैव रसनेकननतया परामर्शी: प्रमाणानन्दो निर्वृति-

शमत्कार उच्यते । तस्मादुक्तमाह 'चमत्कुतेरभावात्' । मधुरादिरसाव्दे तु विषयस्पर्शानुबन्धानम् । ततोडपि काव्यनाट्यादौ तद्रव्यवधानसस्कारानुवेधरस्तु । तत्रापि तु तथोदितव्यवधानशतिरसक्रियासावधानहृदया लब्धवन्त एव परमानन्दम् ।

3. Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa's Stavacintāmaṇi, 61.

4. This phrase occurs often in the Locana, e. g. p. 97.

instance in the context of a play or a poem where śṛṅgāra, in which the pleasure experienced is different from the kind of pleasure we derive from objects in the world, ( is the subject matter ), because of the very disappearance of obstacles ( such as desire for material gain, etc., ) this is called rasanā, carvaṇā, nirṛti, pratīti and pramātṛtāviśrānti ( “ rest in the Self ” ). And then because of not caring for the established element of illumination which rests on the object to be known, there is said to be sensitivity — the aesthetic experience whose nature is undisturbed relish, and which is designated ( as sahrdayatā ) principally because of the hṛdaya ( heart ) consisting in consciousness ( parāmarśa ). And so aesthetic experience ( rasanā ) consists in tasting ( āsvāda ) without any obstacles. The idea that the states of mind which are the objects of this aesthetic experience are the nine rasas has been examined at great length in my commentary on the Nāṭyaveda, the Abhi.navabhāratī. Anyone interested in this question should, therefore, consult that book. Since it is not really germane to the present issue, I have not examined it at length ( here ). Therefore, parāmarśa ( consciousness ), paramānanda ( highest bliss ), nirṛti ( happiness ), are all called camatkāra, because of the completeness ( or compactness — ekaghanatā )1 of the aesthetic experience ( rasanā ). Therefore, he correctly said : “ Because of the absence of camatkṛti ”. In the tasting of a delicious beverage and other liquids, however, there intervenes a contact with an object of the senses, whereas in poetry and drama there is a far greater absence of such intervention, although even there, the latent impressions ( samskāra ) of such sensory contacts permeate the ( spectator ). Still, those whose hearts are careful to dispel the part of the customary intervention of sensory contacts will attain the highest bliss.,32

This passage3 is quoted in the context of camatkṛti,4 one of the

1. On ekaghanatā see Gnoli, op. cit. p. 58.

2. There are several difficulties in this text, and we are not certain of having understood the exact implication of some of the phrases. E. g. vyapadeśyāvavastita.syāpi prakāśabhāgāsya vedaviśrāntasya is not clear. In the expression tato'pi kāvyanāṭyādau tadvavadhanāśūnyatā, we take tato'pi to mean tato'pi adhikā and have translated accordingly. The words tasmād anupacaritasyā .. svatantrasyaiva rasanikaghanatayā are baffling.

3. After translating the above passage, we have found that Gnoli, in the second ed. of his " The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta " translates the very same text in his Introduction, pp. XLIII-XLV, but, oddly enough, he does not give the reference. We are afraid that we cannot follow his translation. See however his Essenza dei Tantra ( Torino, 1960 ) an Italian translation of Abhinava's Tantrasāra. Attention was first called to this important passage by K. C. Pandey in his Comparative Aesthetics, Vol. I, first ed. 1950, on p. 94. The reference he gives is Bṛhat Vimarśinī ( Ms. ) 407 ( I. 5. 11 ), to which he provides the text on pp. 421–422.

4. See in V. Raghavan, " Some Concepts of the Ālaṅkāra Śāstra ", the short essay on Camatkāra, pp. 268–271.

46

key terms for Abhinava.1 He gives, in the A. Bh. a very lovely example of its use :

" Viṣṇu is still in a state of wonder ( camatkāroti ), for, how strange, the thighs of Lakṣmī as white as a silver of the moon, were not broken by ( the churning of the ocean with ) Mt. Mandara."2

He then provides the definition of camatkāra :3 " It is defined as a seizure by joy ( bhogāveśa ), unbroken ( avicchinna ) and continuous satisfaction ( atrptivyatireka )."4

Another important concept found in this passage is the idea of vighnas, which Abhinava develops at some length in the A. Bh.5 In brief the theory is this : all the synonyms for aesthetic pleasure ( e. g. camatkāra, rasanā, āsvāda, etc. ) are just another name for consciousness that is devoid of any obstacle ( sakalavighnavinirmuktasamvittir eva ). It is only by removing these obstacles, seven in number, that we become totally receptive to a drama. These seven are : ( 1 ) lack of credibility ( ayogyatā ). One must be

1. Cf. Sāhitya-darpana III, 2-3 ( Vṛtti ), रसे सारशक्तिमत्कारः, ascribed to Nārāyaṇa, Cf. Bhāskara's versified commentary on the Śivasūtra, I, 12 :

( विस्मयो योगभूमिका: ) :

तद्वस्थितितमेवेदं जगत्समवलोकयन् ।

विस्मयाविष्ट इव यस्तिष्ठति प्रतिभाववान् ॥

There is no doubt that this notion of being filled with wonder, of surprise, had a great appeal for Abhinava. He himself never tires of using the expression camatkāra, though it occurs only once in the Dhvanyāloka itself. There is no doubt that the Śivasūtras śakti, I. 13 :

इच्छा शक्तिरुमा कुमारी, on which Kṣemarāja comments :

योगिन इच्‍छां परामेश्वरी स्वातन्त्र्यशक्तिः, कुमारी विशेषसंहारक्रीडापरा । ( p. 4 ). Kṣemarāja's commentary will be found at the back of the volume which contains Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara's commentary, KSTS, Vols. IV, and V, edited by J. C. Chatterji, Sringar, 1916.

2. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 279. The Prākrit text reads :

अज्ज वि हरी चमकअ कह कह वि ण मंदरेण दलिआइं ।

चंदकलादलसच्छभाइं लच्छीइं अंगाइं ॥

For which the Sanskrit translation is :

अद्यापि हरि:श्रृङ्गारोति कथमपि न मन्दरेण दलितानि ।

चन्द्रकलादलसच्छायानि लक्ष्म्या अङ्गानि ॥

3. Op. cit., p. 279 :

स चातृप्तिव्यतिरेकेणाविच्छिन्नो भोगावेश इत्युच्यते । मुग्धानस्यान्तर्भोगस्पन्दाविष्टस्य च मनःकरणं

चमत्कारमिति ।

4. See also the Alaṅkārakaustubha, Sivaprasad Bhattacharya's ed. p. 137 :

रसे सारशक्तिमत्कारो यं बिना न रसो रसः ।

which is quoted from another, untraced, source.

5. A. Bh., Vol. I, pp. 280-284.

able to sympathise ( hṛdayasaṃvāda ) with the events being portrayed. They

cannot be completely beyond our scope of knowledge, whether that

knowledge be acquired through our own past experiences or through our

acquaintance with literature.1 ( 2 ) Too personal an identification. One

must not feel that the drama is an actual event in the world. A certain

aesthetic distance is necessary. This is the purpose of the nāṭyadharmīs,

those conventions found only in the theatre, e. g. unusual speech habits,

dress etc. (3) An absorption with one’s own feelings ( nijasukhādivivaśībhāva).

One must overcome personal feelings in order to enter another person’s

feelings ( vastvantare samvidam viśrāmayet). Music, decoration in the

theatre, etc., all help to soften the spectator’s hard sense of ego. The setting

works on him and enables the spectator who is willing to respond to become

a sahrdaya, a man sensitive to literature. ( 4 ) Lack of proper means of per-

ception ( pratītyupāyavikalyam ). ( 5 ) Lack of clarity ( sphuṭatvābhāva). Just

as Abhinava insists on certain conventions in the theatre ( nāṭyadharmī ), so

also he insists on their opposite as well, a certain realism ( lokadharmī ).

Thus he says the acting ( abhinayana ) is in many senses very close to direct

perception (pratyakṣavyāpārakalpa). (6) Lack of pre-dominance (apradhānatā).

Abhinava feels that there are four major mental states, more important

( pradhāna ) than any others.2 He associates these four with the four goals

of life. Rati, love ( the sthāyibhāva of śṛṅgāra) corresponds to kāma. Krodha,

anger ( the sthāyibhāva of raudra) corresponds to artha. Utsāha, energy

( the sthāyibhāva of vīra ) corresponds to three ( kāma, dharma and artha ).

1. Cf. Abhinava, in the Locana, p. 331 :

एतदुक्तं भवति - यत्र विनेयानां प्रतीतिखण्डना न जायते तादृग्वर्णननियमम् । तत्र केवलमानुषस्य

एकपदे समार्णवलडननमसम्भाव्यमानतयाऽनुमिति हृदये स्फुरदुपदेश्यस्य चतुर्वर्गोपालभ्यलीकतां बुद्धौ

निवेशयति । रामादिषु तथाविधमपि चरितं पूर्वप्रसिद्धपरमपरोपचितसम्प्रत्योपारूढमसत्यतया न चकास्ति ।

अत एव तस्यापि यदा प्रभावान्तरमुद्रेक्ष्यते तदा तादृशमेव । न त्वसम्मभावनापदं वर्णननियमिति ।

"This comes to the following : one should only describe such incidents as do

not destroy the enjoyment of the audience. So that if (one should say that) a simple

man crosses the seven oceans in one step, because it is impossible, it will strike the

mind as untrue and so will cause even the teaching consisting in the means of attaining

the four aims of life to seem false as well. But in the case of Rāma etc., even such

(inherently unreal ) feats as the one just described (namely crossing the seven oceans )

do not seem false because such deeds are based on (our) trust that is generated by

a series of earlier well-known narrative events. And so even other extraordinary

feats of Rāma, when imaginatively described, will not seem false. But in any case

one should avoid describing unlikely events (unless they are vouchsafed by a narrative

tradition)."

2. Note that Bharata ( NŚ., VI. 39-40 ) too has this doctrine of four promi-

nent rasas which give rise to the other four in turn ( śṛṅgāra, raudra, vīra and

bībhatsa ). But he does not include śānta, a fact of which Abhinava could hardly have

been unaware, since in his commentary on the NŚ verses ( p. 295 ) he does not even

give a variant reading that would include śānta.

Finally nirveda, world-weariness ( given here, then, as the sthāyibhāva of śānta, as opposed to the Abhinavabhāratī, śāntarasaprakaraṇa passage !) corresponds to mokṣa. One of these must predominate in every drama. Abhinava explains that all of them contain a predominance of bliss ( sarve'mī sukhapradhānāh ), since in experiencing them, one is tasting one's own consciousness, which is a single compact mass of bliss ( svasamviccarvanārūpa-sai̇kaṣṭanasyā...ānandasāratvāt ). (7) The presence of doubt ( saṁśaya-yoga ). This refers to the fact that we cannot be certain what the anubhāvas are meant to represent. Tears, Abhinava tells us,1 might be due to joy or to sorrow, and anxiety ( cintā ) might refer to vīrarasa as well as to bhayānaka. But when properly combined ( samyoga ) such doubts will not arise.

We can see from this that Abhinava places emphasis (and not only here, but throughout both his major works on poetics ) upon the transcendental ( alaukika ) nature of our feelings during a drama. He has stressed over and over that there is not a direct correspondence between kāraṇa and vibhāva, or between kārya and anubhāva, for one refers to the world, and the other to art. Ordinary means of knowledge play no role in rasa :

" The enjoyment of an aesthetic experience consists of a transcendental wonder ( alaukikacamatkāra ) and is decidedly ( eva ) different from ordinary ( laukika ) knowledge such as ( is produced ) by memory and inference. "2

The sthāyibhāva that Abhinava speaks of is the same as vāsanā, an important word in his philosophy. It means the same as saṁskāra, latent impressions that we carry with us from birth to birth. In a sense it corresponds to the Freudian unconscious. The sthāyibhāva would correspond to the conscious, for the vāsanā is aroused, awakened, and we then call it a sthāyibhāva. Now this doctrine enables Abhinavagupta to answer one of the great puzzles of literary criticism in the West. How do we explain the fact that we can appreciate a drama which deals with emotions beyond the range of our experience ? E. g. how is it that incest dramas grip those of us who have no experience ( at least consciously ) of such emotions ? The answer that Abhinava gives is ingenious. He claims that in our beginningless ( for it is an axiom of Sanskrit philosophy that saṁsāra is anādi, though of course it has an end ) wanderings through the universe, we have had every conceivable experience, been open to every possible emotion. " Nothing human

1. A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 284.

2. A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 284.

तथा हि लौकिकचित्तवृत्त्यनुमाने का रसता। तेनालौकिकचमत्कारात्मा रसास्वादः स्मृत्यनुमानलौकिकसंवेदनविलक्षण एव।

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

49

is foreign to us." In a brilliant passage,1 Abhinava examines each of the

nine sthāyibhāvas, and shows how we all possess each and every one of them.

For example, we all seek pleasure, and avoid pain, and are thus open to rati

( sarvo riramsayā vyāptah ). He concludes: "There exists no living being

who is devoid of the latent impressions of these mental states."2 What

happens after this sthāyibhāva is activated is hrdayasamvāda, a word of which

Abhinava is very fond. It means "sympathetic response" and he uses it to

represent the state just before identification. It is made possible through the

existence of sādhāraṇīkaraṇa, the factor in literature that makes all events

impersonal and universal, an idea that Abhinava borrowed from Bhaṭṭa-

nāyaka as we have already seen. This identification which then takes place is

what Abhinava calls tanmayībhavana, another key term. The word is already

used in a difficult verse from the Tantrāloka :

" Those who do not identify ( with the object of contemplation ), who

do not know the merging of the body, etc., (in that object ) and whose

intellect as a means of cognition is not merged ( in that object ) — they are

known as insensitive."3

It is defined elsewhere in the Tantrāloka, where we are told that

"identification is the attainment of one's highest Self. It is the highest stage

of fulfilment, and there can be no further fruit after that."4 By "further

1. A. Bh., Vol, I, p. 282.

2. Op. cit., p. 282 :

न चेतच्चित्तवृत्तिवासनारूण्य: प्राणी भवति ।

3. T. Āl. (Vol. II ) III, 240, p. 228 :

येषां न तन्मयीभावस्ते देहादिनिमज्जनम् ।

अविवदन्तो मज्ञसंविन्मानास्वहृदया इति ॥

Note the commentary (Jayaratha) :

लोके हि सातिशये गीतादौ विषये तन्मयीभावेन सचमत्काराणां सहृदया इति अन्यथा परहृदयगा

( अहृदया:) इति प्रसिद्ध: ।

In order to overcome the difficulties in this obscure verse we construe : dehādi-

nimajjanam with avidanto as its object, and we dissolve the sandhi as avidanto

amagnasamvinnānāh. We understand samvit to mean intellect and māna to mean

" a means or instrument of cognition ''. But in spite of these interpretations, we are

not really certain that we have correctly understood the meaning of the stanza.

4. T. Āl., IV, 209, p. 237 (Vol. III) :

तन्मयीभावनं नाम प्राप्यि: सानुत्तरात्मनि ।

पूणत्वस्य परा काष्ठा सेतयत्र न फलान्तरम् ॥

Abhinava gives this definition in order to explain an exercise for inducing ecstasy

that he gives in the preceding verse, where we are told that just as one examines one's

own face again and again in a mirror and knows it to belong to oneself, so also examin-

ing oneself in the mirror of consciousness that consists in meditation, worship etc. one

sees Siva and then one merges with him :

... 7

( Continued on next page )

50

शान्तरस

fruit " (phalāntaṁaram), Jayaratha explains that Abhinava means the following :

generally when we obtain something, we are left with further expectations,

When we get what we want, we have further wants. Not so with this,

for we have attained ourselves, and there is nothing further to desire.1

Immediately after tannmayībhavana, the last stage in the process of aesthetic

experience, we come to the actual experience itself : rasa. Abhinava has

played down both alaṅkāradhvani and vastudhvani in his Locana commen-

tary, to give unique preference to rasa. Time and again he will say things

like the following :

" By the word ucita ( proper ), Ānandavardhana shows that the only

propriety ( relevant to poetry ) is the one with regard to rasa, and thereby he

suggests that rasadhvanī is the essence ( of all poetry )."2

His definition of rasa occurs in such a context :

" When the suggested sense does not take the form of an alaṅkāra,

then we say that it is plain vastu. The word plain ( mātra ) rules out its

being anything else ( i. e. alaṅkāradhvani or rasadhvani ). Now rasadhvani is

something else altogether. It belongs ( gocara ) only to the ( suggestive )

function in poetry. It is never included under worldly dealings ( vyavahāra )

and is never even to be dreamed of as being revealed directly through words.

No, quite the contrary, it is rasa, that is, it has a form which is capable of

being relished ( rasanīya ) through the function ( vyāpāra ) of personal

aesthetic relish ( carvaṇā ), which is bliss ( ānanda ) that arises in the sahrdaya's

delicate mind that has been coloured ( anurāga ) by the appropriate ( samucita )

latent impressions ( vāsanā ) that are deeply embedded from long before

( prāk ); appropriate that is, to the beautiful vibhāvas and anubhāvas, and

beautiful, again, because of their appeal to the heart ( samvāda ), and which

( Continued from previous page )

यथा पुरःस्थे मुकुरे निजं वक्त्रं विभावयन् ।

मुखो भियस्यदेकात्मवक्त्रं वेत्ति निजात्मनः ॥

तथा विकलपमुकुरे ध्यानपूजार्चनात्मनि ।

आत्मानं भैरवं पश्यत्यचिरात् तन्मयीभावतः ॥

1. In the commentary, p. 237, there seems to be some sort of misprint : anu-

ttarātmani prātithōpi kim bhavet ? This must stand for something like anuttarātmani

prāptyāpi kim bhavet ? The commentary on this verse is particularly fine ( though

we cannot make sense of the sākṅksatve' pi tāsya tathākalpanāt ). It ends thus :

अतश्र तत्रोत्पन्नेऽपि फले फलान्तरं संभाध्यम् — आकाङ्क्षान्तरस्यापि भावात्, यत्पुनः पारमार्थिक

पूर्णत्वं, तत्र न फलान्तरं संभवेत् — सर्वत्र एव साकाङ्क्षत्वस्य संक्ष्यात् ।

2. Locana, p. 45 :

उचितशब्देन रसविषयेवौचित्यं भवतीति दर्शयन् रसध्वनेर्जीवितत्वं सूचयति ।

ĀBHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

51

are conveyed by means of words. That alone is rasadhvani, and that alone,

in the strict sense of the word, is the soul ( of poetry ).''1

. His definition of drama is equally difficult and philosophic :

" A drama is a thing ( vastu ) whose essence, so far as the spectator is

concerned ( tadgrāhaka ), consists of rasa that can only be known by direct

experience ( samvedana ) in the form of aesthetic enjoyment which is altogether

different from correct knowledge ( samyagjñāna ), erroneous cognition

( bhrānti ), doubt, uncertainty, non-determination ( anadhyavasāya ) and ordi-

nary knowledge ( vijñāna ). It is distinct from worldly objects, and also

different from such things as their ( i. e. worldly objects' ) imitation, reflec-

tion and pictorial presentation ( ālekhya ), determination ( adhyavasāya ),

fancy, magic shows, etc.''2

Abhinava likes to insist on the autonomy of a work of art, on the fact

that it is sui generis and need have no object corresponding to it in the real

world. Thus he remarks of the dance that imitates nothing in real life,

but is pure creation, with no practical aim ( to be free of practical aims is

for Abhinava one of the defining characteristics of drama, as indeed it is of

all art ). Thus he remarks, à propos of Śiva's famous cosmic dance, that it

is the spontaneous expression of his overflowing bliss, in which no thought

other than sheer creative beauty exists.3 The poet is very much like Śiva ;

in fact, Abhinava often associates the poet, Śiva and rasa all together. For

1. Locana, p. 51 :

तदूपपाताभावेन तूपलक्ष्यतां वस्तुमात्रसुच्यते । मात्रग्रहणेन हि रूपान्तरं निराकृतम् । यस्तु स्वप्रेडपि न स्वशब्दवाच्यो न लौकिकव्यवहारपतितः, किंतु शब्दसमर्प्यमाणहृदयसङ्घवादसुन्दरवभावानुभावसमुचितप्रतिपादनविश्रान्तिसंवादनानुरागकुसुमस्वादैकनिष्ठश्चर्वणान्यपारसंविद्रसध्वनिरिति, स च ध्वनिरेवेति, स एव मुख्यतयात्मेति ।

2. A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 3 :

तत्र नाटयं नाम लौकिककपदाभिधेयतिरिक्तं तदनुकारप्रतिबिम्बालेख्यासड्इरारोपाध्यवसायोत्प्रेक्षास्वप्रमेयेन्द्रजालादिविलक्षणं तदग्राहकस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानभ्रान्तिसंशयानवधारणाध्यवसायविवेकान्तस्तादनस्त्वरूप-

संवेदनसंवेद्यं वस्तु रसस्वभावमिति वक्ष्यामः ।

For an elaboration of this passage ( and an explanation of how drama differs,

qua anukāra from other imitative objects ) see A. Bh. I. pp. 35-38, edited and translated

by Gnoli, op. cit. pp. 88-101, appendix I.

3. A. Bh. I, p. 21 :

शङ्करस्यैव भगवतः परिपूर्णानन्दनिर्भरेभूते देहेऽहचिदानन्दान्तर्निर्वृत्तौ ( ह् ) सुन्दराकारस्य अत एव नृत्यः इहिकामुत्रैक्याद्वैचित्र्यादनवच्छिन्नतया प्रकाश्यते ।

M. K. Venugopalan suggests to us that perhaps the reading should be

nirvāha.

Abhinava is very fond of the notion of overflowing ( see Locana, p. 86 ) with

one's own bliss. He uses it often in the Tantrāloka and in the very first verse of the

Locana he speaks of nījarasabharāt, the same expression.

52

instance in the Maṅgalaśloka to the fifth chapter of the A. Bh., he has a very fine verse with a remarkable simile :

" We bow down to that sky-form of Śiva which acts as a preliminary to the production of the play that is the creation of this world by providing the proper moment ( avakāśa ) ( for the play ) ( also : by providing the space in which creation is to be projected )."

1. A. Bh. I, p. 207 :

संसारनाट्यनिर्माणे याडवकाशविधानतः ।

पूर्वरङ्गायते व्योममूर्ति तां शाकरीं नुमः ॥

2. There are said to be eight forms of Siva, among which the last five are the pañca mahābhūtas, Vyoma is the fifth. It is the pūrvaraṅga, the preliminary to creation. The pūrvaraṅga forms a natural introduction to drama. Similarly Śiva's form, namely ākāśa ( sky ) forms a preliminary to creation, because it provides the space in which creation is projected.

3. E. g. A. Bh. I, p. 342 :

स्थायी प्रबन्धहृदये व्यभिचारिभूते:

कामाकुलासु जनतासु महानुभावः ।

अन्तर्विभावविषयो रसमात्रमूर्ति:

श्रीमान् प्रसन्नहृदयोडस्तु मम त्रिनेत्रः ॥

4. यथा बीजाद् भवेद् वृक्षो वृक्षात् पुष्पं फलं यथा ।

तथा मूलं रसाः सर्वे तन्तो भावाः व्यवस्थिताः ॥

5. A. Bh. I, p. 294 ( NŚ, V1. 38). The text has been edited by Raghavan in "Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa", Madras 1963, p. 532. The passage is extremely important, and warrants a full translation. The text, as given by Raghavan reads :

ननु यदि भावेष्यो रसास्तर्हि कथं मुक्तं ‘ न हि रसादृते कश्चिदर्थः प्रवर्तते ’ इति । तेन पूर्वं त एवादेरया इत्याशङ्क्याह—यथेयादिना । बीजं यथा वृक्षमूलवद् स्थितं तथा रसः, तन्मूला हि प्रीतिप्रविक

(Continued on next page)

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

53

( Continued from previous page )

काव्यम् । तत्र पुष्टपातनीयोडभिनयादिनटव्याख्यार: । तत्र फलस्थानीय: सामाजिकरसास्वाद: । तेन रसमय-मेव विश्रम् ।

Here is our translation :

"Objection: if the rasas arise from the bhāvas, how was it said, 'without rasa no (dramatic) matter can arise'? Hence they alone (i. e. the rasas) deserve to be mentioned first (and not the bhāvas)." Anticipating such an objection he says : "Just as the tree etc. Just as the seed stands as the root-cause of a tree, so the rasas (stand as the root cause of the bhāvas), for moral instruction and intellectual training, which are preceded by entertainment, arise from them (i. e. from the rasas). (The following words -tata eva ca vyākhyānārhāt are obscure, and we are not able to follow what Abhinava means). The functioning of the actor which is preceded by (i. e. which is based on) the (dramatic) poem, is (ultimately) based on the thought arising in the poet's mind-which thought is attuned in sympathy (to that of the original characters). It is that very thought (arising in the poet's mind) that is really speaking the rasa. The spectator who is carried away by the perception of vibhāvas etc. (only) on analysis (of the aesthetic experience - apoddharabuddhyā). (The following words : iti prayojane, nātye, kāvye, sāmäjikadhīyi ca, are obscure and we are not able to follow what Abhinava means by them). Thus the rasa existing in the poet (kavicato rasah) is like the seed which is the root (i. e. cause) (of a tree) (we propose reading mūlabījasthānīyah for the G. O. S. reading mūlabījasthānīyāt which makes no sense). For the poet is just like the spectator. For this very reason it has been said by Ānandavardhanācārya "If the poet is full of śrngārarasa" etc. (Dhvanyāloka III. p. 498). Therefore a (dramatic) poem is like a tree. The activity (functioning) of the actor such as gesticulation, is like the flowers etc. The aesthetic experience on the part of the spectator is like the fruit. Consequently everything is full of rasa," What follows is no less interesting.

अत्र च विज्ञानवादो, द्वैताभिधानं, स्कोटतत्त्वं, सत्कार्यवाद:, एकत्वदर्शनमित्यादि च द्रष्टव्यमिति केचित् । अयं तु प्रकृतानुपयोगिग्रूथलवसंदर्भणमध्यप्रायसंश्रयमशिक्षितप्रुविपण इत्यास्ताम् । अन्ये तु बीजादिव भावाद्रसकक्ष्यलतोडघ्यभिनयकुसुमसुनन्दरात्फलमिव भाव: प्रतीत्या सज्जयत हृदि । व्याचक्षते । तैः प्रकृतिविरुद्धं सर्व व्याख्यातम् । एवं हि भावस्यैवोपक्रमपर्यवसानवर्तित्त्वमुक्तं स्वादित्यास्यास्ति चैतत् ॥

Thus the idea is that all three views ( namely ) : ( रसेम्यो भावाः, भावेभ्यो रसः: and परस्परसंबन्धादेतेषामभिनिष्पत्तिः: ) are acceptable (upagatāh) according to the diversity of the intention (abhiprayavaicitryeṇa) : एवं त्रयेऽपि पक्षाः कथंचिदुपगता अभिप्रायवैचित्र्येणैति तात्पर्यम् ।

54

stand for such activitites of the actor as abhinaya, etc. Fruit stands for

the aesthetic enjoyment of the spectator. Thus everything ( or : the whole

world ) is made of rasa ! "1

For Abhinava, poetry and drama are essentially the same thing.2

Thus rasas are only to be found in drama, and not in the real world.3 And

what does Abhinava consider the purpose of drama and poetry to be? What

is his stance on the largely unspoken but constant controversy between

vyutpatti (in the sense of moral or intellectual instruction) and prīti (pleasure)

as the goal of literature? Basically Abhinava holds that the major purpose

of art is pleasure. Thus in the Locana4 he says :

" Although knowledge and pleasure for the reader are both present, as

Bhāmaha5 has said :

' Study of good poetry confers fame and pleasure, as well as skill in

dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa, and skill, too, in the fine arts,'

nevertheless pleasure is the main thing. Otherwise, how would poetry, a

source of knowledge, comparable to a ( loving ) wife, differ from the Vedas,

etc., which are also sources of instruction,6 comparable (in their manner of

instruction ) to a master, or from sources of instruction such as the itihāsas,

etc., which are comparable (in their manner of instruction ) to a friend ?7

1. Further on the tree analogy, of verse 24, p. 13 of the Parātrimsikā of

Abhinava edited by Pandit J. Z. Shastri, Srinagar, 1947, KSTS LXVIII :

यथा नयग्रोधबीजस्थः शक्तिरूपो महाद्रुमः ।

तथा हृदयबीजस्थं जगदेतच्चराचरम् ॥

2. काव्यं तावन्मुखत्वतो दर्शरूपकात्मकमेव । A. Bh., I, p. 291.

3. तेन नाटघ्रे ऽपि रसा न लोक इत्यर्थः; काव्यं च नाटघमेव ॥ A. Bh. I, p. 291.

4. Locana, p. 40 :

श्रोतॄणां च व्युत्पत्तिप्रीती यदपि स्तः, यथोक्कम् —

' धर्मार्थकाममोक्षेषु वैचक्षण्यं कलासु च ।

करोति कीर्ति प्रीतिं च साधुकाव्यानिशेवणम् । ' इति

तथापि तत्र प्रीतिरेव प्रधानम् । अन्यथा प्रसंसंमितेष्यो वेदादिष्यो मित्रमंमितेष्यश्रेतिहासादिष्यो

व्युत्पत्तिहेतुत्व्यः कोडस्य काव्यस्यत्वपत्तिहेतोर्जोष्यांसंमिततुल्यलक्षणो विशेष इति प्राधान्येनाननन्द एवोक्तः ।

चतुर्वर्गव्युत्पत्तिरपि चाननन्द एव प्रयान्तिकं मुख्यं फलम् ।

5. Bhāmaha. Kāvyālankāra, I, 2.

6. Vyutpatti most often means bahuśrutatā, learning. See Rudraṭa I. 18;

Mammaṭa. K.P. I, 2 (yavavahāravid, explained in the Vrtti as rājādigata-ucitācārapari-jñānam ) and I. 3 ( where the Vrtti explains the word nipunatā of the Kārikā by vyutpatti,

which is said to arise from महाकविसंबन्धिनां काव्यानामितिहासादीनां च विमर्शनम् ), and

Rasagangādhara pp. 9–11 ( 1939, KM ed. ).

7. Cf. p. 8 of the Dīpikā comm. on the Kāvyaprakāśa (ed. by Sivaprasad

Bhattacharya ) :

( Continued on next page)

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

55

And so delight has been mentioned ( here ) primarily (as the purpose of poetry ). Even of instruction in the four goals of life delight is the final and major result.'

Abhinava has an interesting passage in the third Uddyota of the Locana1 in which he repeats this fundamental distinction in method between history, philosophy and poetry. Since, he says, people, and especially people in important positions, must be made sensitive (lit. "instructed", vyutpādya ), the best way to provide them with this ethical and intellectual education ( vyutpatti ) is through poetry. The way to instruct people in the four goals of life is by entering their hearts ( hṛdayānupravesa ), which is just another name for imaginative experience in general ( hṛdayānupravesaś ca rasāsvādamaya eva ). Abhinava ends by saying that prīti, pleasure, is the cause of vyutpatti ( prītir eva vyutpatteḥ prayojikā ). His concluding phrase leaves us wondering whether this whole doctrine was not inherited from his teacher :

" Rasa consists of pleasure, and rasa alone is drama, and drama alone is the Veda. This is what our teacher says."2 Abhinava goes on to make this important remark : " Nor are pleasure and instruction really different things, for they both have the same object."3

( Continued from previous page )

स्वादुकाव्यरसोनिमिश्रं शास्त्रमप्युपयुज्यते ।

प्रथममौषधमधवः पिबन्ति कटु मेषजम् ॥

" ( Readers ) use ( i. e. read ) even the śāstras if they are mixed with sweet poetic rasas ( just as children will ) swallow bitter medicine if they first lick honey."

Curiously enough, according to Professor Bhattacharya, this is a quotation from the Hṛdayadarpaṇa ( see p. 8, fn. 1 : भट्टनायककृतहृदयदर्पणे इति बहुत्राकारनिर्देशः ). But this cannot be correct, since the stanza is found in Bhāmaha, V. 3. What are the works in Skt. that can be considered sāstras as well as kāvyas ? Really only two : the Yogavāsiṣṭha and the Mahābhārata. It is a great pity that Ānandavardhana's Tattvāloka is lost, for it very probably dealt with this fascinating topic in detail ( see Locana, p. 67 and p. 533 ).

1. Locana, p. 336.

2. Locana, p. 336 :

प्रेयार्थमा च रसस्तदेव नाटयं नाट्यमेव वेद इत्यस्मदुपाध्याया: ।

3. Locana, p. 336 :

न चैते प्रीतिव्युत्पत्ती भिन्नरूपे एव, द्वयोरेकविषयत्वात् ।

What Abhinava means by ekaviṣayatvāt is brought out in the next sentence :

विभावाद्यौचित्यमेव हि सत्वतः प्रीतेर्निदानमित्यसकृतदवोचाम ।

The aucitya of the vibhāvas etc. is the cause of the pleasure that we derive from poetry. Similarly the aucitya of the vibhāva etc. is the cause of the edification that we derive from poetry. This is stated by Abhinava in the next sentence ( p. 337 ) : विभावादीनां तद्रसोचितानां ( for which we should perhaps read तद्रसोचितानां ) यथावस्तुप्रवेदनं फलप्रयत्नीभूततया व्युत्पत्तिरिष्यते ।

Thus both prīti and vyutpatti depend on vibhāvādyaucitya. Both are the result of vibhāvādyaucitya. Abhinava's phrase dvayor api ekahetukatvāt, therefore, means dvayor api ekahetukatvāt. Since both are the outcome of a single cause, they are not different from one another.

56

शान्तरस

In this connection1 and in slightly more concrete terms ( the reader should not feel that the passages we translate in any sense exhaust the range of Abhinava's interest. For most of the Locana consists of very close textual remarks on specific verses. We have simply extrapolated the more abstract passages, since it is here that Abhinava deals with his philosophical views ), Abhinava has a very interesting passage in the A. Bh. on the NŚ. I. 108–110, on what drama does for the different kinds of spectators :2

"Drama thus described ‘creates mental repose’ ( viśrāntijanana, NŚ. I. 114 ), that is, it destroys the flow of pain for all spectators who are overcome either with pain such as comes from illness, who are afflicted with tiredness

1. One should compare the very interesting passage in the Daśarūpaka, and especially the commentary of Dhanika ( I. 6 ) :

आनन्दनिधान्द्रिपु रूपकेषु नृत्पत्तिमात्रं फलमल्पदृष्टि: ।

योडपीतिहासादिवदाह साधु तस्मै नमः स्वादुपरास्मुखाय ।।

Avaloka : तत्र कैश्चित्—

धर्मार्थकाममोक्षेषु वैचक्षण्यं कलासु च ।

करोति कीर्ति प्रीति च साधुकाव्यानुप्रेक्षणम् ।।

इत्यादिना त्रिवर्गादिन्युत्तर्प्तिं काव्यफलतवेनेच्छान्ति तत्रिरासेन स्वसंवेद: परमानन्दरूपो रसाख्वादो दशारूपाणां फलं न पुनरितिहासादिवत् त्रिवर्गादिन्युत्तप्तिमात्रमिति दर्शितम् । नम इति सोऽपि नतम् ।

" The silly man who says that as in the case of itihāsa, etc., so in the case of the different types of drama, which overflow with bliss, the only purpose is to impart moral and secular instruction — I bow low to him, who is averse to the pleasure arising from literature. "

( Note that the word sādhu can be construed with both namah and with tasmai; tasmai sādhu namah, " I bow low ( sādhu ) to him. and tasmai sādhu, tasmai namah." " May he fare well ( i. e. may god bless him ), I bow to him. " We think the correct reading is sādhu as an adverb and not sādhuh as an adjective going with alpabuddhiḥ ).

" In that connection some ( claim ) : " Reading ( and study— nisevana ) of good poetry bestows pleasure and fame and skill in the fine arts." ( Bhāmaha, I. 2 ).

By this and other verses they wish to show that the purpose of poetry is to give knowledge of the three goals of life etc. By refuting this, the author. shows that the purpose of the ten drama-types is aesthetic enjoyment, which is of the form of the highest bliss that is inwardly experienced ( svasamvedya ) and not merely knowledge of the three goals of life etc. as is the case in itihāsas etc. ' I bow low ' is of course meant sarcastically. "

2. A. Bh., Vol. I, p. 39 :

एवंभूतं यन्नाट्यं तत्रेप्सितां दु:खेन व्याध्यादिकृतेऽन, श्रमेणाध्वकेशादिजेन, शोकेन बन्धुमरणादि-कृतेनार्तानां पीडितानां तथा तपस्विनामनवरतरकृच्छ्रचānd्रāyaṇācharaṇaklitadauḥbalyā-tishayaparikhinna-हृदयानां विश्रान्तिजननं दु:खप्रसरणविवातक्रम् । प्रतिहतदु:खानां चाङ्गाद्मकधृत्यादिकारणं यथायोगम् ।

तथथा शोकातेसु धृतिव्यवध्यातेषु क्रोḍDA । श्रमातेसु सुखम् । आदिग्रहणin तपस्विनो मतिविरोधादय इति मन्तव्यम् । न चैतावदेव यावक्लान्तरेऽपि(रवि)परिपाकं सुखमुपदेशर्ज जनयतीत्येवं दु:खितानां तत्प्रशम-सुखवितरणकालान्तर सुखलाभ: प्रयोजनम् । ये पुनदु:खिता: सुखभूषितत्वितय एव राजपुत्रादास्तेषां लोकवृत्ते धर्मāyupayavargē उपदेशकार्येतन्नाट्यम् । लोकशब्देन लोकवृत्तम् । ननु कि गुरुवदुपदेशं करोति । नेत्याह । कि तु बुद्धिं विवर्धयति !

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

57

which comes from the inconveniences caused by a long journey etc., or are suffering from sorrow as when one's relations, etc., die, or for ascetics whose minds are distressed by excessive weakness resulting from constant ascetic practices and from the cāndrāyaṇa and other vows. When their sufferings are overcome, drama becomes the cause of dhṛti, etc., according to suitability (yathāyogam); thus dhṛti etc., (verse 113), having delight for their essence, apply in their proper order to the spectators afflicted with sorrows etc. For instance, (drama) gives courage to the person overcome with sorrow. For the man afflicted with illness it distracts his mind. For the weary man it creates happiness. The word “etc.” (in verse 113) stands for such things as awakening of the mind, etc., in the case of the man who practises tapas. Not only (does the drama achieve) this, but it also gives rise at a later date (kālāntare) to the result (paripāka) in the form of happiness that stems from instruction. In this manner the purpose (of the drama) for those who are unhappy (is threefold): it calms the pain of those who are grieved, it gives immediate pleasure, and it gives happiness later (through instruction, which if followed leads to happiness). As for those who are not in sorrow, but are almost always happy, such as princes, etc., even for them the drama provides instruction in the ways of the world and in the means leading to the (four) goals of life, such as dharma, etc. The word “world” means “ways of the world”. Question: does the drama instruct the way a teacher (or an elderly person) does? (Answer:) No. Rather it causes one's wisdom to grow.”1

In his commentary on the rasasūtra of Bharata, just before commencing a detailed statement of his own position, Abhinava quotes the first line of a very famous verse from the Śākuntala.2 Abhinava considered this verse to be the ideal introduction to his exposition of rasa. Since its exact significance has proved somewhat mysterious, we feel we are justified in introducing the two passages from the Locana with a short discussion on this passage. The verse reads:

“Seeing moving sights, and hearing soft sounds, even a man who is happy is filled with strange longing. Surely it is because he vaguely remembers, though he is not fully conscious, affections formed in an earlier life that are fixed inside him through the latent impressions they leave behind.”3

1. A good summation of this whole theory is Abhinava's account at the beginning of the A. Bh., of what takes place when we actually witness a drama, G. O. S., p. 36. The passage has been edited and translated by Gnoli, op. cit. (p. 96).

2. The verse is quoted in the A. Bh., pp. 279–280 (Vol. 1).

3. Śākuntala, V. 2 :

रम्याणि वीक्ष्य मधुरांश्च निशम्य शब्दान्

पर्थ्युत्सुको भवति यत्सुखितोऽपि जन्तुः ।

तच्चेतसा स्मरति नूनमबोधपूर्वं

भावस्थिराणि जननान्तरसौहृदानी ॥

3

58

शान्तरस

Why then does Abhinava quote this ?1 The reason we feel is this. Duṣyanta has an experience of rasa.2 But it is not like any other experience in the world. He is not directly experiencing any kind of sexual pleasure, but the vibhāvas ( music and perhaps paintings as well ) call up to him some vague memories. This in its turn produces longing ( autsukya ) in him. It is an aesthetic experience. The memory involved is not of course like any other kind of memory, for it has no object. The bhāvasthirāni in the verse are the actual vāsanās. These vāsanās (latent impressions) are brought to life by his hearing the music, and they then bring to his aesthetic attention ( i. e. his deeper unconscious) intimations of a pleasure he formerly had. But this pleasure is now no longer direct, it is purified, not directly statable. It is thus a higher kind of delight than the original.3 So Abhinava regards this verse as proof of rasa.4

1. Hemacandra, Kāvyānuśāsana, II. 1. p. 99 :

अत्र हि स्मरतीति या स्मृतिरुपदर्शिता सा न तार्किकप्रसिद्धा । अपि तु प्रतिभानापरपर्यायसाक्षात्कारस्वभावेयमिति । पूर्वमेतस्यार्थस्यानुभूतत्वात् ।

What Hemacandra means by saying that Duṣyanta has not experienced this love is that he is not now remembering something he has experienced. In other words, ordinary memory of happy experience does not constitute aesthetic experience. Thus a play does not bring up in our memories similar experiences. What is conjured up in us is the more general emotion, purified of any actual memory. This interpretation is confirmed by the passage from the ĪPVV. quoted in Note 3.

2. For Rāghavabhaṭṭa, the verse is a case of 'śṛṅgāra.'

3. On p. 252 of the third volume af the ĪPVV, Abhinava quotes the last lines of the same verse : bhāvasthitāni jananāntarasauhrdāni (this reading of bhāvasthitāni instead of bhāvasthirāni is confirmed by Rāghavabhaṭṭa, who says that it is a well-established reading). The context is extremely difficult to make out, since the text on which Abhinava is commenting is not extant, and none of the pratīkas make sense. But it is clear that he is quoting this as an example of an emotion (he seems to be discussing the distinction between various kinds of love; kāma, icchā, abhilāṣa, autsukya, etc. -क्वचिदु आत्मवविश्रान्तभवान्तरमनागूरितविशेषपेमपेक्ष्योस्थाप्यते यत्र सा इच्छा राग इत्युच्यते । आगूरितविशेषपतायां तु काम इति ।) that has no direct object, but is etherealized as it were, that is, in his terms, “generalised” : आदिमग्रहणादभिलाषमलो यत्र भावान्तरं सामान्यकारमपि वासनारोषमात्रेरणास्ते यथाह… … …भावस्थितानि जननान्तरसौहृदानी ।

Clearly then these vāsanās bring us to a state of generalised love, which is why it is called autsukya, for it would seem that autsukya is a longing with no particular object. This is in fact what takes place during a dramatic performance of the Śākuntala, for we do not wish to actually possess Śākuntalā herself.

4. Note that according to Rāghavabhaṭṭa, the verse is a case of aprastutapraśaṃsā, and this figure of speech further suggests the sthāyibhāva of uninterrupted love (aprastutapraśaṃsā, tena sthāyināḥ rater avicchedo dhvanitah). He also sees this as kōvyalinga, and hence as samśṛṣṭi. There are also three types of anuprāsa (cheka, vṛtti and śruti). He notes that the verse must be a case of rati (i.e. śṛṅgārarasa-dhvani) for otherwise there will be the doṣa of having the major rasa cut midway :

अन्यथा मध्ये विच्छेदान्महान् रसदोषः स्यात् ।

ĀBHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS 59

All of this culminates in what is lacking even in Ānandavardhana, a philosophical scaffolding on which to raise the structure of rasa. We are now ready to read the two important passages from the Locana.1

1. We have barely touched the surface of Abhinava's aesthetic philosophy. There are of course a great deal of interesting passages from his philosophical works which shed light on the issues discussed here. Lack of space prevents us from examining all of these passages here, but we cannot refrain from noting briefly at least some of them. The first verse of the last chapter of Utpalācārya's Īśvara-pratyabhijñā (Bhāskarī, vol. II, p. 280 ) reads :

स्वात्मैव सर्वजन्तूनामेक एव महेश्वरः ।

विश्वरूपोऽहमिदं मयि लिङ्खण्डितामर्शबन्धितः ॥

In his commentary to this Abhinava speaks of the consciousness that is not restricted by time and space, just as he speaks of the consciousness in a play that is not restricted by time and space (e. g. Abhinavabhāratī, p. 280 ) : यतः संवित्स्वभावोऽसौ संवेद्यक्ष न देशोन न कालेन न स्वरूपेण कोऽपि "मेदः । And later in his Vrtti : parānumu-khasvātmaviśrāntirūpāhamvimarśaparipūrṇaḥ. "Filled with the notion of 'I' ness which takes the form of rest in the self which is not directed towards anything else."

These are precisely the terms in which Abhinava speaks of the aesthetic experience.

See also Abhinava's Tantrasāra, p. 19, where two interesting verses sum up the third āhnika. The verses, oddly, are in Prākrit. Note that saim bhāti in the Prākrit should be translated into Skt. as svayaṃ bhāti and not as satyam bhāti as in the chāyā given in the footnote on p. 19. Also, sarahasa in the Prākrit should be translated as sarabhasa and not as sarahasya. Perhaps too one should emend vimṛṣṭarūpam into vimṛṣṭarūpe to agree with darpaṇe in the first line. The verse reads :

संवेऽणनिम्मलदप्पणम्मि सअलं फुरंतनिअसारं । आमरसणपरससरइसविमट्ठरूवं सइं भाइ ॥

One of the finest verses is found in the Tantrāloka, Vol. II, p. 200 :

तथा हि मज्झुरे गीते स्पर्शे वा चन्दनादिके ।

माध्यस्थ्यविगमे यासौ हृदये स्पन्दमानता ।

आनन्दशक्ति: सैवोक्ता यतः सहृदयो जनः ।

Note that Jayaratha quotes Vijñānabhairava, 73 (gītādiviṣayāsvāda etc. ).

When Abhinava speaks of the sense of the "I " changing, deepening, we are irresistibly reminded of a very moving and powerful poem :

" I have to tell

you….your son is mongol "

the doctor said.

How easily the word went in—

( Continued on next page )

60

शान्तरसे

The first passage is extracted from the Locana on the second Uddyota of the Dhvanyāloka.1 As far as we know this is Abhinava's first systematic exposition of his own and earlier views on the nature of aesthetic experience :

Locana pp. 180–190.

ननूक्तं भट्टनायकेन -

रसौ यद्यापि परगतया प्रतीये तदहि तादृश्यमेव स्यात्। न च स्वगतत्वेन रामादिचरितमयत्वादसौ प्रतीयेते। स्वात्मगतत्वेन च प्रतीतौ स्वात्मनि रसस्योत्पत्तिरेवभ्युपगता स्यात्। सा चायुक्ता सीताया:। सामजिकं प्रत्यविभावकत्वात्। कान्तावं साधारणं वासनाविकारहेतुविभावर्ततायां प्रयोजकमिति चेत्- देवतावर्णनादौ तदपि कथम्। न च स्वकान्तास्मरणं मध्ये संवेदते। अलोकसामान्यानां च रामादीनां ये समुद्रसेतुबन्धादयो विभावास्ते कथं साधारण्यं भजेयु:। न चोल्साहादिमान् राम: स्मर्यते, अननुभूतत्वात्। शब्दादपि तथात्विपत्तौ न रसोपजन:। प्रत्यक्षादिव नायकमिथुनप्रतिपत्तौ। उत्पत्तिपक्षे च करुणस्योत्पादाद्द:खिन्दे करुणप्रेक्षासु पुन:प्रवृत्ति: स्यात्। तन्न उत्पत्तिरपि, नाप्यभिव्यक्ति:, शक्तिरूपत्वात्। स हि रस: स्याद्विषयोजनतरितम्यप्रवृत्ति: स्यात्। तत्रापि किं स्वगतोऽभिव्यज्यते रस: परगतो वेति पूर्ववदेव दोष:। तेन न प्रतीये नोऽपचते नामि-

व्यज्यते काव्येन रस:। किं त्वन्यशब्दवैचित्र्यं काव्यात्मन्: शब्दस्य ऋजंशाताप्रसादात्। तत्राभिधायकत्वं वाच्यविषयम्, भावकत्वं रसादिविषयम्, भोगकृत्वं सहृदयविषयमिति त्रयोडश-भूता व्यापारा:। तत्राभिधाभागो यदि शुद्ध: स्यात्तत्नत्रादिम्य: शास्त्रन्याॅयेयभ्य: श्रेष्ठाद्य-

(Continued from previous page)

clean as a bullet

leaving no mark on the skin

stopping the heart within it.

This was my first death,

the “I” ascending on a slow

last thermal breath

studied the man below

as a pilot treading air might

the buckled shell of his plane.

The poem ends with the grave insight this new “I” bestows :

You have a sickness they cannot heal,

the doctors say : locked in

your body you will remain.

Well, I have been locked in mine.

We will tunnel each other out.

You seal the covenant with a grin.

(Jon Stallworthy, “Root and Branch”, Hogarth, London, 1968.),

which is the same kind of pure and beautiful reconciliation that Abhinavagupta achieves in his finest moments of philosophy, a wisdom we appreciate in literature, but hope for in vain in life.

1. Dhvanyālokalocana, p. 180, Banaras edition with Bālapriyā, under II. 4.

लङ्काराणां को भेद:? वृत्तिभेदवैचित्र्यं चाकिंचिकरम्। श्रुतिदुष्टादिवर्जनं च किमर्थम्? तेन रसभावनाल्लयो द्वितीयो व्यपार:, यद्वाश्रादमिधा विलक्षणैव। तच्चैतद्वावकत्वं नाम रसान् प्रति यत्काव्यस्य तद्विभावादीनां साधारणत्वापादनं नाम। भाविते च रसे तस्य भोग: योडनुभवस्मरणप्रतिपत्तिभ्यो विलक्षण एव दृष्टिविस्तरविकासात्मा रजस्तमोवैचित्र्यानुविद्धसत्त्वमयनिजचित्तस्वभावनिर्वृत्तिविश्रान्तिलक्षण: परब्रह्मास्वादसविध:। स एव च प्रधान-

भूतोदय: सिद्धरूप इत्थं व्युत्पत्तिनोऽपि प्रधाननिमित्तंवाति। अन्तरौचित्य-रसस्वरूप एव तावद्-व्यतिपत्त्य: प्रतिवादिनाम्। तथा हि- पूर्वावस्थायं य: स्थायी स एव व्यभिचारिसम्पातादिना प्राप्तपरिपोषोऽनुकार्यगत एव रस:। नाय्ये तु प्रयुज्यमानस्वानुभावचरस इति केचित्। प्रवाह-धर्मिण्यां चित्तवृत्तौ चित्तवृत्त्यन्तरेरण क: परिपोषार्थ:? विस्मयशोकक्रोधादिक्रमें तावन् परिपोष इति नानुकार्ये रस:। अनुकर्तरि च तद्वाव लेपादननुसरणं स्यात्। सामाजिगते वा कष्टमेवकार:? प्रत्युत करुणादौ दु:खप्राप्ति:। तस्माद्नायं पक्ष:। कस्ताहि? इहानन्वन्यनियतस्यानुकारो न शक्य:, निष्प्रयोजनश्व विशिष्टताप्रतीतौ ताटस्थ्येन व्युत्पत्यभावात्।

तस्मादनियतावस्थात्मकं स्थायिनमुद्दिश्य विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिभि: संयुज्यमानैरयं राम: सुखीति स्मृतिविलक्षणा स्थायिनी प्रतीतिगोचरतयास्वादरूपा प्रतिपत्तिरनुकर्तरोलम्ना नाटचैकगामिनी रस:। स च न व्यतिरिक्तमाधारमपेक्षते। किं त्वनुकार्याभिन्नाभिमते नर्तके आरबदयिता सामाजिक इत्येतावन्मात्रमद:। तेन नाटच एव रस:, नानुकार्यादिष्विति केचित्।

अन्ये तु — अनुकर्तरि य: स्थाय्यवभासोडभिनयादिसामग्र्यादिकृतो भित्ताविव हरितालादिना अश्वावभास:, स एव लोकातीततयास्वादापरसंज्ञया प्रतीया रस्यमाने रस इति नाट्यदृशा नाटचरसात्। अपरे पुनर्विभावानु भावमात्रमेव विशिष्टसामग्र्या समर्प्यमाणं तथैव भावनीयात् भावनारस्थायिरूपप्रचितवास्यचित्तवासनानुग्रकं स्वनिर्वृतिचर्वणविशिष्टमेव रस:। तन्नाटचमेव रसा:। अन्ये तु शुद्धं विभावम्, अपरे शुद्धमनुभावं, केचित्तु स्थायिमात्रम्, इतरे व्यभिचारिणम्, अन्ये तत्त्संयोगम्, एकेडनुकार्यं, केचन सकलमेव समुदायं रसमाहुरित्यलं बहुना।

काव्येडपि लोकनाटचधर्मिस्थानीयेन स्वभावोक्तिविकल्पप्रकारद्वयेनालौकिकप्रसन्न-मधुरौजस्विशब्दसमर्प्यमाणविभावादियोगादियेव रसवार्ता। अस्तु वात्र नाटचादिचित्ररूपा रसप्रतीति:; उपायवैलक्षण्यात्। इयमेव तावदत्र सरणि:। एवं स्थिते प्रथमपक्ष एवैतानि दूषणानि, प्रतीते: स्वपरगतत्वादिविकल्पनेन। सर्वपक्षेषु चं प्रतीतिरपरिहार्या रसस्य। अप्रतीतं हि पिशाचवदेऽप्यवहाय स्यात्। के तु यथाऽप्रतीतिमात्रख्यानेविशिष्टत्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्षको अनुमानिको आगमोल्या प्रतिभानकृता योगिप्रत्यक्षा च प्रतीतिरुपायकैवलक्षण्यादन्यैव, तद्वद्यमपि प्रतीतिश्वर्रणास्वादन भोगापरनामा भवतु। तन्निदानभूताया हृदयसंवादाद्युपकृताया विभावादि-सामग्र्या लोकोत्तररूपत्वात्। रसा: प्रतियन्त इति ओदनं पचतीतिवद् व्यवहार:, प्रतीममान

एव हि रसः। प्रतीतिरेव विशिष्टा रसना। सा च नाट्ये लौकिकानुमानप्रतीतिवैलक्ष्णya, तां च प्रमुखे उपायतया संदधान। एवं कार्ये अन्यशाब्दप्रतीतिवैलक्ष्णya, तां च प्रमुखे उपायतयापेक्षमाṇा।

तस्मादृजुध्यानोपहतः पूर्वपक्षः। रामादिचरितं तु न सर्वस्य हृदयसंवादीति महत्सा-

हसम्। चित्रवासनाविशिष्टवाचेतसः। यदाह — “ तासामनादिदivam आशिषो नियतवात्।

जातिदेशकालव्यवहितानामप्यानन्तर्य स्मृतिसंस्कार्योरेकरूपत्वात् ” इति। तेन प्रतीतिस्ता-

व्रत्सस्य सिद्धा। सा च रसनारूपा प्रतीतिरुपचयेते। वाच्यवाचकयोसत्त्राभिधादिविविक्तो

व्यञ्जनात्मा ध्वननङ्यापार एवं। भोगीकरणङ्यापारश्व काव्यस्य रसविषयो ध्वननात्मैव,

नान्प्रक्चित्त। भावकत्वमपि समुचितगुणाlंकारपरिग्रहात्कमसमाभिरेव वृत्तस्य वक्ष्यते।

किमेतदपूर्वम्? काव्यं च रसान् प्रति भावकत्वमिति यदुच्यते, तत् तु भवतैव भावनादुपप्तिपक्ष

एवं प्रत्युज्जीवितः। न च काव्यशब्दानां केवलानां भावकत्वम्, अर्थापरिज्ञाने तदभावात्।

न च केवलानामर्थानां, शब्दान्तरेणाष्येमाणत्वे तदयोगात्। द्वयोस्तु भावकत्वमस्माभिरेवोक्तम्।

' यत्रार्थः शब्दो वा तमर्थ गय्डः:' इत्यत्र। तस्मादृच्यङ्कत्वादिरen ठ्यापारेण गुणालङ्कार-

चित्र्यादिकयeitkृतङ्गयतया काव्यं भावकं रसान् भावयति, इति व्यंशायामपि भावनायां

करणांशे ध्वननमेव निपतति। भोगोडपि न काव्यशब्देन क्रियते, अपि तु ध्वननोध्य-

सङ्झृतानिvृतिद्द्वारेणास्वादानपरामिन् अलौकिके द्रुतिविस्तराविकासात्त्मनि भोगे कर्तव्ये

लोकोत्तरे ध्वननङ्यापार एवं मूर्धाभिषिक्तः। तच्चेदं भोगकृतं रसस्य ध्वननीयत्वे सिध्दे

दैवसिद्धम्। रस्यमानतोदितचमत्कारानतिरिक्तत्वाद्रोगस्येति। सत्यादीनां चाङ्झाङ्गिभाववैचित्र्य-

स्यानन्वाद्दूयादिवेहेनास्वादगणना न युक्ता। परब्रह्मास्वादसब्रह्मचारिरेवं चास्वस्य रसा-

स्वादस्य। व्युत्पादनं च शासनप्रतिपादनाभ्यां शास्त्रेतिहासकृताभ्यां विलक्षणम्। यथा

रामस्थाहमित्युपमानातिरिक्तां रसार्वादोपायस्वप्रतिभाविजृम्भमारुपां व्युत्पत्तिमन्ते करोति

कमुपलभामहे।

Here is our translation of this complex passage:

Objection :1 It has been said by Bhaṭṭanāyaka :2 ' Were rasa3 to

1. In the second edition of Gnoli's work, 'The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta', Chowkhamba, 1968, which has just appeared, he has added an appendix in which he translates the passage. However, our interpretations differ so often and so radically from his, that we felt we were not duplicating any labour by translating this important passage. It did not seem to us necessary to point out all the places where we differ.

2. This is an earlier version of what Abhinava later expands into the famous commentary on the rasasūtra in the Abhinavabhāratī, Vol. I, p. 277 ff. This passage forms the core of Gnoli's book. See also, for details on the views of Abhinava's predecessors, Sankaran, 'Some Theories of Rasa and Dhvani', and P. Shastri, 'The Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure'.

3. We have found the following texts useful, either because they reproduce, or because they expand these very arguments :

(Continued on next page)

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

63

be apprehended as belonging to someone else ( and not to the spectator ),

then ( the spectator ) would remain indifferent ( tātasthya ). Nor can rasa,

which stems from a poem dealing with a subject like the life and deeds of

Rāma, etc., be apprehended as belonging to oneself. For if it were appre-

hended as belonging to oneself, we would have to say that real emotions ( such

as sexual desire, etc. ) arise in one's own self ( while witnessing a dramatic

performance ). And that would be most improper in the case of ( somebody

like ) Sītā.1 For ( she ) cannot be the ( ālambana ) vibhāva2 with respect

to a spectator.3 Should it be argued that what causes ( prayojaka ) her

to become a vibhāva ( cause ) of arousing ( vikāsa ) latent emotions ( vāsanā̄)

( of love, etc. ) ( in the spectator ) is the fact that ( she stands as a symbol

for ) non-personalised ( sādhāraṇa ) womanhood ( kāntātva ), we reply : how

would such a process be possible in the case of the description of gods, etc. ?

Nor can it be said that during a dramatic performance ( madhye ) there is

( on the part of the spectator ) a recollection of his own wife.4 How can

( Continued from previous page )

the end of the volume ) : ( 1 ) Srīdhara's commentary on the Kāvyaprakāśa; ( 2 ) Mānikya-

candra's commentary on the KP.; ( 3 ) Caṇḍīdāsa's commentary on the KP.; ( 4 ) Hema-

candra's Kāvyānuśāsana; (5) Prabhākara's Rasapradīpa; ( 6 ) Vidyādhara's Ekāvalī;

(7) Vidyānātha's Pratāparudrayaśobhūṣaṇa, and finally ( 8 ) Jagannātha's Rasa-

gaṅgādhara.

1. Abhinava, following Bhattatatuta, uses this same argument against Saṅkuka,

A. Bh., p. 277 ( Gnoli, p. 7 ) :

न हि ममेयं सीता काचिदिति स्वात्मीयत्वेन प्रतीतिनोऽस्त्य ।

2. BN means that Sītā is only a vibhāva with regard to Rāma, not to the

spectator. But what can this mean? Vibhāvas are all in regard to rasa. After all, it

is not Rāma who experiences rasa in regard to Sītā, so how can she be his vibhāva?

We must take the word vibhāva to be a loose usage for kāraṇa of true rati in Rāma,

but this has to do with the real world and not with rasa.

3. Bhattanāyaka ( BN ) uses sophistry to prove that rasa is perceived neither

as located in the sāṃān̄ika ( ātmagata ) nor as located in someone else ( e.g. the

character portrayed or the actor who presents that character ). By ruling out both

the possibilities, ātmagatatva and paragatativa of rasapratīti, he comes to the conclu-

sion that rasah na pratīyate. " rasa is not perceived at all ''. According to BN we do

not have any perception ( pratīti ) of rasa, but only its enjoyment ( bhoga or bhogī-

karaṇa ). BN is not against admitting rasa in the sāṃān̄ika — he is against admitting

its pratyaya ( perception ) in the sāṃān̄ika. Instead of pratyaya, BN uses his own

terminology bhoga and bhogīkaraṇa. The difference between the two ideas seems to

us only one of terminology.

For the same arguments, see the A. Bh., p. 278, ( Gnoli, p. 10 ).

4. We have translated this sentence as if it were a serious observation,

namely that when the spectator sympathises he does not remember his own personal

life. However, it is possible that it is meant humorously as well : "for God's sake, you

do not want to have to remember your own wife when watching love scenes ! "

( uddīpana ) vibhāvas in the form of such deeds as building a bridge over the ocean, etc., by extraordinary heroes like Rāma ever become generalised, ( since nobody else could ever do them )? Nor can it be said that Rāma, etc., as full of energy,1 etc., is remembered,2 because he has never actually formed a part of our ( past ) experience ( such that now we could remember him ). To perceive ( Rāma's ) energy ( utsāha, the sthāyibhāva of vīrarasa ) from a verbal source of knowledge ( śābda ) is not to experience rasa,3 just as when we directly watch a couple making love there is no aesthetic pleasure.4 As for the theory that rasas arise ( utpatti ), ( the difficulty is that ) because of the ( spectator's ) ( real ) sorrow ( karuna, i. e. śoka ) he would be genuinely unhappy and would no longer return to watch such dramatic performances in which ( there was ) karuna ( rasa ) ever again. Therefore rasa does not “ arise ” ( utpatti ), nor is it induced by suggestion

1. The important word is Rāma, to which utsāhādimān is simply an adjective. The ādi stands for ratimān, etc., depending on the rasa. But none of these states form part of our own experience of Rāma, since we never knew him. Even though the spectator might apprehend the sthāyibhāvas like utsāha, etc., in Rāma, etc., from the words actually used in the poem, still it will be only śabdajanyajñāna of the utsāha in Rāma. This śabdajanyajñāna cannot lead to rasotpatti in the sahrdaya. The reason for this is given in the form of an analogy in the next sentence : “ Just as when a couple is actually observed ( pratyakṣa ) making love to each other, there is no rasotpatti in the observer ( rasopajana means ratibhāvāsvādana - an aesthetic experience of love ).” But we cannot quite see the point in the argument, in spite of the analogy. However, to have seen this “ generalised ” nature of drama was one of the great moments of literary criticism, and it appears that this view belongs to Bhaṭṭa­nāyaka, for Abhinava simply takes it over. Bhāvanā is the same as sādhōranīkarana. Ānanda does not use this term.

2. The reason we cannot remember Rāma is that the definition of memory in Sanskrit logic involves anubhava, direct experience.

3. The expanded version of this, A. Bh., p. 278 ( Gnoli, p. 10 ) reads : न च शब्दानुमानादिस्थ्यस्तत् — ( where तत् refers to उत्साहादिस्थायिभाव ) — प्रतीतो लोकस्य सरसतां युक्ता प्रत्यक्षादिव । What is BN's point? Does he mean simply that we cannot have rasapratīti through anumāna and śabda?

4. Abhinava ( A. Bh. Vol. I. p. 278, Gnoli, p.10 ) expands the analogy of watching a couple making love by adding : प्रत्युत रत्जाजुगुप्सासूत्रादिस्वचित्तवृत्त्यन्तरोदयेन व्यवग्रतथा का सरसत्वकृथापि स्यात् । “ On the contrary, because one becomes preoccupied ( vyagratayā ) with one's own mental moods that arise, such as embarassment, disgust, or even sexual desire, we cannot say that this is an aesthetic experience.” Cf. also Daśarūpaka IV. 39 and the Avaloka thereon. Abhinava makes the same point on p. 35 of the A. Bh., ( Vol. I ) : लौकिकमिश्रनदर्शीव सांसारिकहर्षकोधादिव्यितपत्तेरुभयदर्शनानुकुलतया (?) मुख्यदृष्टि प्रयुक्तदृष्टावनुसंधि (?) संप्रत्यभावात् । We take tatpratipattau in the last sentence of p. 181 to refer to utsāha of the preceding sentence : न च उत्साहादिमान् रामः सryंते, as opposed to Gnoli who takes it to refer to Rāmà.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

65

( abhivyakti ), for if ( such emotions as ) love, existing in a dormant form

( śaktirūpa ) ( in the spectator ), were to ( arise or ) be induced by suggestion,

then there would occur the difficulty that to a greater or lesser extent

( tāratamya ) the spectators would make actual physical attempts to possess

the object ( presented before them on the stage ).1 And if we held that

rasa was aroused ( i. e. induced )2 by suggestion, ( we could ask the same

question as before ;) is rasa existent in the spectator himself, or in someone

else ? The same difficulties would arise now as arose before. Therefore rasa

is not ( directly ) perceived ( pratīyate ),3 nor conjured up ( utpadyate ), nor

suggested ( abhivyaajyate ) by poetry. . But poetic words are of an altogether

different nature from ordinary words, thanks to the three functions ( tryamśatā )

possessed by them. Denotation ( abhidhāyakatva ) is concerned with the

literal meaning; universalisation ( bhāvakatva ) is concerned with rasa, etc.,4

and aesthetic enjoyment ( bhoktrtva ) is concerned with the sensitive reader

( sahrdaya ). These are three ( separate ) functions which are the constituents

of words used in poetry ( or literature ). If one were to claim that in

1. All later writers reproduce this phrase, viṣayārjanatāratamya but

without explaining it or paraphrasing it. It is thus clear that nobody really knew

what Abhinava meant. Gnoli takes it very differently from the way we have ( see op.

cit. p. 45, 108 ). We take it to mean that the spectator would actually feel the need

to acquire ( arjana ) the object ( viṣaya ) on the stage, i. e. he would want to get

up and take Sītā away. But the expression tāratamya is, we admit, inconvenient.

We suppose the idea is that some people will make a greater effort ( i. e. will be more

excited ) to attain the object, and others less. See Daśarūpaka IV. 39 and Avaloka on

the same : इतरेपामनुरागापकर्षेच्छादय: प्रसज्ज्येरन्‌ । Cf. the old story of the backwoodsman

in the gallery who shot the " villain " on the stage.

2. It is not clear to us just what Bhaṭṭanāyaka intends by the term abhivyakti-

He must of course have known the doctrine of vyañjanā as put forth by

Ānandavardhana. Abhinava uses the term abhivyakti as synonymous with " suggestion ".

Bhaṭṭanāyaka however understands " abhivyakti " to be a sort of production which he

places on the same level as utpatti, since his argument śṛṅgārasya abhivyaktaw, etc.,

really applies to utpattipakṣa. Abhinava points out that in a verse which he quotes from

BN, the expression vyaṅgya occurs. The verse is :

भावसंयोजनाव्यङ्ग्योपरसंवित्तिगोचरः ।

आसवदनासमानुभवो रस: काव्यार्थे उच्यते ॥

( Gnoli, p. 11, A. Bh. I, p. 279 ) on which Abhinava comments : इति तत्र व्यङ्यमानतया

व्यञ्ज्यो रक्ष्यते ( surely, though, the correct reading is lakṣyate ).

3. BN's stand that rasa is not perceived at all ( rasah na pratīyate ) is not

reasonable. It is the same sophistic argument used in svagatatva and paragatatva,

meant only to silence the opponent. Unless he could mean by pratīyate " direct

experience ", which is of course not what takes place in the theatre, since as BN

already pointed out, we do not know the people on the stage and are thus not

personally involved.

4. Rasādiviṣayam is problematic. We must understand ratyādiviṣayam, which is

confirmed by the Rasapradīpa, p. 26;

... 9

66

शान्तरस

literature ( tatra ) denotation alone held sway, then what would differentiate

śleṣa and other figures of speech from such devices as the use of words in two

senses ( tantra ),1 etc., in scientific works ?2 Moreover (if this were true)

then the different varieties of alliteration ( vṛtti ) would be virtually useless.

And what purpose would the avoidance of such faults as cacophony

( śrutiduṣṭa ),3 etc., serve ? Therefore there is a second function4 known as

generalisation ( bhāvanā ) ( responsible for bringing about the experience ) of

rasa (i.e. of the sthāyibhāvas ), thanks to which, denotation ( abhidhā )

assumes a new dimension ( vilakṣaṇā ), This function of universalisation

( bhāvakatva ) with respect to the rasas (i.e. sthāyibhāvas ) is in fact ( nāma )

what is, in poetry, responsible for making the vibhāvas, etc., universal. Once

a rasa (i.e. sthāyibhāva ) has been thus universalised,5 its realisation

( bhoga, ) i.e. sāksātkāra (is possible ), a realisation which is different from

the perceptions derived from memory or direct experience, which takes the

1. The Bālapriyā (p. 182) explains tantra as follows :

तन्त्रं नामानेकार्थबोधेच्छा पदस्यैकस्य सकृदुच्चारणम् । ……… शाखे “ हलन्त्य ”मिति

पाणिनीयसूत्राद्विव “ सर्वदो माधव ” इत्यादि“लेशपलेडपि तन्नादिनानेकार्थबोधसंभवादुभयोमेंदो न

स्यादित्यर्थः। The point is this : In the sūtra of Pāṇini (I.3.3 : halantyam ), " hal " stands

for two completely different things : it means (1) the śivasūtra (no. 14) hal, and (2)

any one of the consonants. There is of course no camatkāra in this. Cf. Udd. III,

Locana, p. 472. Cf. Vāmana's Kāvyālankārasūtra, IV. 3.7.

2. At this point in the exposition of BN's views, the Srīdhara commentary adds :

तत्रापि ( तत्रभिधा ) निरन्तरसान्तरार्धनिष्ठलेन मुख्यामुख्यमेदेन द्विविधः शब्दव्यापारः । स शाब्देतिहासयोरपि

यथाक्रमं शब्दार्थप्राधान्येन प्रभुमित्रसंमितयोः साधारणः । अन्यदेशीयस्तु काव्यनाटचयोरेव, उभयत्रापि

व्यापारप्राधान्याज्जायासंमितत्वेन व्यवस्थितेः। (S. Bhattacharya, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 68).

This makes it likely that this famous distinction of teaching like a master, and like

a wife, was first invented by BN and not by Abhinava. Abhinava first mentions

this on p. 40 of the Locana, and again on p. 336 and 399. The distinction between

śāstra, ākhyāna and kāvya has already been made by BN in a verse that Abhinava

quotes on p. 87 of the Locana :

शब्दप्राधान्यमाश्रित्य तत्र शास्त्रं पृथग्विदुः ।

अर्थे तत्प्रेन युक्ते तु वदन्त्याख्यानमेतयोः ॥

अभयोः गुणयोस्तु व्यापारे प्राधान्ये काव्यधीर्भवेत् ॥

[ We should read arthe tattvena as done by K. Sastri (p. 161) ]. This is surely the

inspiration for Abhinava's famous distinction, taken over by all later writers.

3. Śrutiduṣṭa is mentioned by Bhāmaha, I. 47, and by the Dhvanyāloka II. 14

and the Vṛtti thereon. Abhinava (pp. 214–215 of the Locana ) speaks of it as anitya

because there are cases in which harsh sounds are appropriate, e.g. in raudrarasa. See

also Uddyota III, parikaraśloka no. 1 on p. 302. Abhinava also refers to nityānityadoṣa

on p. 16 of the Locana.

4. Note that BN is arguing for a further power in poetry, beyond the literal sense.

Most probably he derives this doctrine from Ānandavardhana.

5. Bhāvite ca rase is really speaking an improper usage. Bhāvanayā samarpite

rase is what BN means.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

67

form of druti, vistara and vikāsa,1 and which approximates the bliss that comes from realising (one's identity) with the highest Brahman (para-brahamāsvādasavidhah),2 for it consists of repose in the bliss (nivṛtiviśrānti) which is the true nature of one's own Self, and which is permeated with sattva (guṇa) intermingled with the diversity of rajas and tamas. It is this aesthetic pleasure (bhoga) alone that is the major element (i. e. purpose of poetry),3 and it is an accomplished fact (siddharūpa) (since it consists in blissful repose in the pure consciousness of the Self which is an accomplished fact) (even though in relation to abhidhā and bhāvanā it is sādhya-rūpa, i. e. to be accomplished). (All forms of) intellectual and moral instruction (vyut-patti) (in literature) are in fact only subsidiary, (pleasure being the major goal of literature)."4 We reply (to these views of Bhaṭṭanāyaka) as follows:

1. Note the Rasagangādhara, p. 66 (KM ed. of 1939): गुणानां चैतेषां दृप्तिदीप्ति-विकासाद्यास्तिसृभिश्चित्तवृत्तय: क्रमेण प्रयोज्या:।

These terms are explained in the DR. IV. 43. Ānanda speaks of dīpti on p. 209. See also Kārikā II. 9 (p. 208). Abhinava speaks of dīpti as being vikāsasvabhāva-prajjvalanasvabhāvā (pp. 208-209, Locana). He also uses the verb dravati in connection with karuṇa. Ānanda says that the mind, in karuṇa, is exceedingly moved (ārdratām yāti, p. 46, and Raghavan, Śr. Pr. p. 436.

2. Note the importance of the term savidhah, which means literally "near". We don't think it can be taken to mean simply "similar" here, since surely the implication is that it is inferior. If this is the correct interpretation, then perhaps the passage about the Yogins milking the cow of mysticism (Locana, p. 91) should be reinterpreted, in spite of what Abhinava says. (Note that this agrees with the extraordinary passage in the third Uddyota, p. 510, where Abhinava unambiguously states that rasāsvāda is inferior to brahmāsvāda ...... परमेश्वरविश्रान्त्यानन्द: प्रकृत्यतदनन्दद्विप्रुणमात्रावभासो हि रसास्वाद:। See also Sridhara: भोगश्र परानन्दास्वादतां योगिगतो ब्रह्मास्वादसन्निकृष्ट:। But not everybody thought that BN meant "inferior". Mammaṭa, p. 60 (S. Bhattacharya's ed. from which the above quotation by Sridhara is taken), paraphrases as: brahmāsvādam iva. Note Hemacandra, p. 88: parabrahmāsvāda-sodaro nimilitanayanaiḥ, which reminds one of the humorous passage in the Dhvanyāloka p. 26: ध्वनिनिध्वैनिरतिं यदेतदारिकसहहृदयत्वभावनावमुकुलितलोचनैनैर्नृत्यते, which Abhinavagupta will later defend as being one of the signs of ecstasy.

3. This is very important, for Bhaṭṭanāyaka may have been the first to clearly say that vyutpatti is secondary to prīti. In this he is followed by Abhinava (p. 41 — ānanda eva pāryantikam bhalam; and third Uddyota, p. 336 where vyutpatti is said to be an incidental result of prīti, though the passage is somewhat ambiguous).

4. Govinda, in his Kāvyapradīpa, (p. 66) actually says that this view of BN is in accord with the Sāṅkhya doctrine: उद्रक्श्र स्वेतरावभि भूयावस्थानं इति साङ्ख्यसिद्धान्तानुसारेण विदुष्यते। Sattva, rajas and tamas are of course the three constituents of human nature; As Jagannātha says (p. 29, RG), during rasapratīti, rajas and tamas are suppressed by the preponderance of sattva, because of the power of the function called bhogakṛttva.

(Continued on next page)

68

शान्तरस्य

lows : the true nature of rasa is the subject of many different and controversial

views. For instance, some ( Lollata for example ) believe that that which is

known as a permanent emotion ( sthāyibhāva ) in its prior ( undeveloped ) form

( pūrvāvasthā ) becomes nourished ( i.e. developed, prāptaparipoṣa ) through

the introduction ( sampādita ) of the vyabhicārins, etc., and ( then becomes ) rasa

located in the character being portrayed ( anukārya ). Rasās are called nāṭyarasas

because they are used in drama. ( Objection to this view by Śaṅkuka : )1

what can it mean to say that one state of mind ( cittavrtti ) is “ nourished ”

by another state of mind, seeing that mental moods are in a constant state of

flux ( pravāhadharmin ) ?2 Wonder, grief and anger, etc., are not gradually

augmented ( paripoṣa ) ( on the contrary, they diminish with time ).3 There-

fore there is no rasa in the character being portrayed.4 If one were to say

that it is in the actor ( anukartr ), ( the difficulty is that ) the actor would

then be unable to follow the tempo ( laya ),5 etc., ( since he would be

==================================================================

( Continued from previous page )

An excellent account of BN's view and its similarity to the Sāṅkhya is to be found

in Hiriyanna, " Indian Aesthetics " Proceedings and Transactions of the first Oriental

Conference, Poona, 1922, pp. 246-247. “ The purpose of evolution in the Sāṅkhya is

bhoga and apavarga, and the use of this word bhoga in this passage constitutes a link

connecting the present theory with the Sāṅkhya.” ( op. cit. pp. 247-248 ).

1. Here is a one-sentence summary of Saṅkuka's position by Prabhākara,

Rasapradīpa, p. 22 ; विभावादिमिञ्चेटनुमीयमानोदकायं गो रत्यादि: स्थायिभावो रस:.

2. It is not clear what Saṅkuka intends by pravāhadharmin. What does he mean

when he says that one mental state cannot nourish another, since any mental state is in

constant flux ? The analogy of a river does not any hold good, for while it is in a constant

state of flux, it is nonetheless augmented by minor streams. Why should not a major

( or abiding, sthāyin ) mental state be intensified by subsidiary and fleeting mental

states? Does Saṅkuka mean that there is no question of any mental state being

strengthened by any other mental state, since all of them are after all in a state of

flux - always changing - diminishing in their intensity with the passage of time? But

this does not seem true. Does he mean that it is only in the theatre that one has a

concentrated mental mood, not in real life ? If so, would he argue that Rāma's love was

constantly changing ? Unlikely. What then could he mean ?

3. This passage has been expanded in the A. Bh. p. 274 : शोकस्य प्रथमं तीव्रत्वं

कालान्तु मान्यदर्शनम् । This is very true, and well observed, but what does it prove?

Perhaps the point is that a mental state becomes intensified or weakened because of

the external objective stimulants, and not because of other mental states ( like the

vyabhicāribhāvas ).

4. The sentence iti nānukārye rasah is elliptical. It should be explained as

follows : अनुकायैं ( रामादौ ) विभमान: रस: सामाजिकेनास्वाद्यत इति न युक्तम् । According to

Lollata, the spectator relishes the rasa ( i. e. ratyādisthāyibhāva ) which is located in the

character portrayed. Now Saṅkuka's view is that the spectator cannot be said to enjoy the

ratyādibhāva which is after all located in the character portrayed, who is removed both in

space and time from the spectator.

5. Note how the BP takes laya ( p. 184 ) : लयो नाम नृत्तगीतवाद्यानामेकतानतारूपं

साम्यम् । But we feel that Gnoli's interpretation, which we follow, is better ( see his

Int. p. XVIII ).

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

69

absorbed in an aesthetic experience and unable to concentrate on his duties as an actor). If one were to say (that rasa, i. e. ratyādbhāva exists) in the spectator, how could there be delight (camatkāra)? On the contrary, in karuṇa (rasa) (i.e. in tragic situations), etc., the spectator would experience (only) pain. Therefore this thesis is incorrect. What then is the correct view? It is not possible (precisely) to imitate any one particular mood because of the endless and ever-changing (anyata) degrees of intensity (of the mental moods). Moreover, it would be useless to do so, for if they were reproduced exactly (viśiṣṭatā), because (the spectator) would not be moved (tāṭasthya), there could result no edification (vyutpatti).

Therefore, (here is Śaṅkuka's view:)1 when this sthāyi(bhāva), whose nature is not definite (as regards its particular intensity), is combined with the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas, there results an experience (pratipatti) of the sthāyi(bhāva) (love, etc.) which is inferred as existing in the actor (because he is for the time being the locus of the rati, etc.) and is (therefore) confined only to the drama. The nature of this experience is the enjoyment of the sthāyibhāva (love, etc.) (thus inferred as existing in the actor) and it is different from memory, because it is the object of the apprehension that "this Rāma (standing before me, as represented by the actor) is happy2 (because he is with Sītā)." This rasa does not depend on any other thing beyond the actor who is apprehended (by the spectator) as non-relisher (of the ratibhāva, etc., inferred by him as existing in the actor). Only that much3 (and nothing more is required for the aesthetic experience of the rasa). Therefore, rasa exists only in the drama, and not in the characters to be portrayed, etc. This is the view of some (i. e. of Saṅkula).

Others4 say: the appearance (semblance, avabhāsa) of a sthāyi (bhāva) in the actor, which has been brought about by the dramatic accessories (sāmagri) such as abhinaya, etc., is like the appearance (semblance) of a

1. This is a difficult passage. We take viśiṣṭa to mean niyata (definite, particular, precise,): नटे निश्चितानुकार्थरामादिगतविशिष्ट (i. e. नियत) चित्तवृत्तिज्ञानं वर्तते। तेन च नटेन तज्ज्ञानानुसारेणाभिनयः क्रियते। इति स्वीकुते, सामाजिकोऽपि नासौ परमार्थिकः रत्यादिभावः किंतु तदनुकरणमात्रतम् इति जानीयुः। तेन चानुकरणमात्रत्वज्ञानेन सामाजिकानां ताटस्थ्यं स्यात्। ततश्च व्युत्पत्तिरसंभवा। Very different, however, is Gnoli, p. 110.

2. Ayam rāmaḥ sukhī is explained by the BP (p. 185) as rāmo' yaṃ sītāvisayaka-ratīmān.

3. Adaḥ means "idam". See Locana p. 160, where Abhinava uses the same expression. It occurs again on p. 239 and 258 of the Locana.

4. It is difficult to identify the person who held this opinion, number 4, given on p. 186. According to Mammaṭa (KP. IV, p. 88 of Jhalkikar's ed.) the painted horse analogy (citraturaga-nyāya) belongs to Saṅkuka, whereas here it is given after his views have already been expounded.

70

horse ( drawn ) on a canvas by means of yellow pigment, etc. Because it is

enjoyed by an act of cognition, which is otherwise called relish ( āsvāda ), and

since it is transcendental, it is called rasa. And so the expression nāṭyarasāḥ

is to be explained as nāṭyād rasāḥ, i.e. rasas arising from drama.

Others, however, say : the vibhāvas and anubhāvas alone, being present-

ed ( to the spectator ) with the help of special stage-equipment ( acting,

music, dialogue, etc. ) ( viśiṣṭasamagrī ) and being linked ( anuṣakta ) with the

instincts ( vāsanā ) appropriate to the mental state in the form of the sthāyi-

bhāva which is sought to be produced ( vibhāvanīya )1 by these vibhāvas and

which is intended to be brought within the purview of the experience of the

spectators by means of these anubhāvas, these ( vibhāvas and anubhāvas ) be-

coming the object of the relish in the form of the bliss of the Self ( svanirvṛti-

carvanāviśiṣṭa )2—well, these vibhāvas and anubhāvas themselves are rasa.

Therefore, rasas are nothing but drama. Others say that rasa is the

vibhāva alone, others that it is the anubhāva alone, and some that it is the

sthāyibhāva alone. Others say that rasa is the vyabhicāribhāva; still others

that the combination of these (four) is rasa. Some say that rasa is the

character being portrayed. Others say that rasa is the conglomeration of all

these ( five ) things. Anyway, this is enough now.

( Here then is my own, Abhinava's position ) : rasa applies to ( non-

dramatic) poetry as well, where in place of realism3 ( lokadharmī ) and

1. This is a difficult passage. Tadvibhāvanīya means vibhāvavibhāvanīya,

" The sthāyibhāva which is sought to be produced by those vibhāvas." Tadanubhāva-

nīya means anubhāva-anubhāvanīya, " The sthāyibhāva which is intended to be brought

within the purview of the experience of the spectators by means of those anubhāvas."

विशिष्टसामग्री समर्प्यमाणं means अभिनयादिसामग्रीकानां पुरुषतादुपस्थायि मननम् ।

2. Now how similar this is to Abhinava's view.

3. On nāṭyadharmī and lokadharmī, see the long article by Raghavan, J. O. R.,

Vol. VII, 1933, pp. 359-398, part I, and part II, Vol. VIII, 1934, pp. 57-75. Lokadharmī

refers to everything in the drama that is realistic (and applies thus primarily to the

prakaraṇa), whereas nāṭyadharmī refers to all the conventions used only in the

theatre: asides that nobody else can hear, monologues, talking animals, gods on the

stage, etc. Note that in the thirteenth chapter of the Nāṭyaśāstra ( Vol. II., G. O. S.

p. 214 ) when Bharata begins a long list of the lakṣaṇas of each, he speaks of loka-

dharmī as svabhāvabhäropagata ( XIII, 71 ). It is a very embracing topic with Bharata,

and includes such diverse elements as the pravṛttis, the prakṛtis, the dance, etc. Note

the very interesting verse that Abhinava quotes from his teacher (Bhaṭṭatauta?-he

only says : यथोक्तम् ) :

यद्वाच्याप्तिर्न तत्रास्ति कवेरर्थे न च संशयः ।

यत्रासंभवि तत् स्वासंसंभव्य तु धर्मतः ॥

The second half of the verse, unless one has na sambhavi, makes no sense. But the

first is all right : "Not everything that is in the world deserves to be described by

the poet in his plays." Abhinava more than once points out that not everything in

( Continued on next page )

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

71

convention (nāṭyadharmī) (that apply to the theatre) there are the two modes

of svabhāvokti1 and vakrokti which convey rasa by means of transcendental

(alaukika) vibhāvas2 etc, which are presented by words possessing such

qualities as clarity (prasanna), softness (madhura) and vigour (ojasvin).3

(Continued from previous page)

the drama need correspond to real life. As proof of this, he points out that many

dances do not have anything to correspond to them in real life. (What in the outside

world bears any resemblance whatsoever to Beethoven's last quarters?) Note too

what Abhinava says in the A. Bh. vol. I, p. 269 : लोके तु कदाचिन्न भवस्यपि गृहीतत्वात् ।

नाट्ये तु त एव जीवितम् । It may be that Abhinavagupta was the first writer ever to

have articulated this refutation of strict realism, which has now come to seem so

commonplace in modern literature that it needs no defence. This was not so, less than

fifty years ago.

1. These are parallel terms, svabhāvokti corresponding to lokadharmī and

vakrokti to nāṭyadharmī as applied to kāvya. Thus Abhinava is using the terms in

their widest sense. Bhāmaha too (V. 66 II. 85, I. 30) uses vakrokit to apply to all forms

of alaṅkāra. But he defines svabhāvokti (II.93) as a separate figure of speech.

(Thus De's remark, Vakroktijīvita, p. 23 : “Kuntaka follows Bhāmaha in rejecting

svabhāvokti as an alaṅkāra” is not true. It stems from the qualifying phrase in

Bhāmaha : iti kecit prakakṣate, which does indicate doubt on Bhāmaha's part, but not

complete rejection.) Daṇḍin (II.363) divides vāṅmaya into two realms : svabhāvokti

and vakrokti. See also Udbhata. III. 8-9. The most elaborate discussion on svabhā-

vokti is found in the first chapter of Kuntaka's Vakroktijīvita. Vakrokti of course for

Kuntaka is just what dhvani is for Ānanda, only it is even wider in its embrace.

Svabhāvokti is the alaṅkārya, the kāvyasarīra to which vakrokti is applied. See the

valuable article by V. Raghavan, "History of Svabbāvokti" in "Some Concepts, etc. ".

It is tempting to see the division in Skt. poetry as that of realism and romanticism.

Certainly verses that illustrate svabhāvokti tend to be more simple and direct,

and to deal with less exalted subjects. Moreover, the passage from the Locana supports

this conjecture. There are not a great many Skt. poets who excelled in realism. Profes-

sor Ingalls has written about one who did, Yogeśvara, in two remarkable articles : “A

Sanskrit Poetry of Village and Field : Yogeśvara and His Fellow Poets" J. A. O. S.

vol. 74 (1954) pp. 119-131; and "Yogeśvara and His Favourite Poets.", Dr. V.

Raghavan Felicitation Volume, Adyar Library Bulletin, Vols. 21-22, I967-68, Madras,

pp. 185 ff. A poem that deserves to be much better known in this respect is Abhinanda's

Kādambarīkathāsāra, quoted by Abhinava several times, which contains some remarkable

examples of well-observed minor moments in life.

2. Against Bālapriyā (p. 186), we take alaukika to construe with the

vibhūvas, etc. In other words, the vibhāvas are alaukika in so far as they are called

vibhāvas. It would not make much sense to associate the word with the guṇas them-

selves.

3. These are the śabdagunas mentioned by Bharata, Daṇḍin and Vāmana.

Ānandavardhana completely altered the older teaching of Daṇḍin (I. 41-42) and

Vāmana (I. 2.11) on guṇas, by bringing them under his system of rasa. For him,

the guṇas are the properties of rasa (as opposed to the alaṅkāras). See under II. 7

of the Dhvanyāloka. Instead of the usual ten guṇas accepted by Bharata, Daṇḍin

and Vāmana, Ānanda accepts only the three mentioned here. The concept is very

complex, and we have dealt with it at some length in our notes to the Locana

(Continued on next page)

72

Or we could even grant that aesthetic experience ( rasapratīti ) in poetry is distinct in nature from that experienced in drama, since there is a difference in the means whereby it is brought about ( in both cases ).1 Nonetheless ( tāvat ), the particular mode by which aesthetic experience is brought about is the only one that will be explained presently ( iyam eva ). This being the case, the criticism ( of Bhaṭṭanāyaka ) concerning the impossibility of rasa being found either in oneself or in someone else, applies only to the first view ( i. e. Bhaṭṭalollaṭa's ).2 But in all the views ( so far expounded ) the unavoidable fact remains that rasa is perceived ( pratīti ).3 For if it were unperceived ( as Bhaṭṭanāyaka claims ), then we could have no dealings with it, just as we can have no dealings with goblins4 ( since such creatures do not really

( Continued from previous page ) translation to be published shortly. Note that Abhinava, in his discussions on the guṇas, has occasion to develop a theory much like the one hinted at by the words druti, vistara and vikāsa as used by Bhaṭṭanāyaka. Ārdratā stands for druti. Dīpti would be the equivalent of vistara, and vyāpakatva ( or samarpakatva ) of vikāsa. They are of course associated with certain rasas. See the Locana on II. 7-10. The best treatment of the problem is to be found in P. C. Lahiri, " Concepts of Rīti and Guna in Sanskrit Poetics ", University of Dacca, 1937, and V. Raghavan, Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa, pp. 249-251.

1. There should be a daṇḍa after upāyavailakṣaṇyād. Iyam eva begins a new sentence.

2. I. e. Lollaṭa's views, which BN refutes so convincingly that Abhinava need not do the work again.

3. This is directed against BN. who had said earlier ( p. 182 ), tena na pratīyate. rasah. Abhinava expands this on p. 277 ( A. Bh. Vol. I, Gnoli, p. 11 ) : प्रतीत्यादि-व्यतिरिक्तक्ष संसारे को भोग इति न विद्मः । रसनेति चेत् साधु प्रतिपत्तिरेव । But this is perhaps to interpret BN too rigidly. By saying as pratīyate rasah, obviously he could not be claiming that rasa does not exist, only that pratīti is not an adequate word to express how it is experienced. Perhaps ( if he is not merely to be sophistic ) BN means that it is not " perceived " the way other things are in the world, i. e. it is not the result of the ordinary pramāṇas such as pratyakṣa etc. Moreover, Abhinava accepts what BN says about rasa being neither personal ( svagata ) in which case we would become physically involved, nor paragata, in which case we would be indifferent. Abhinava also accepts the reason for this statement : rasa is made universal, sādhāraṇīkaraṇa, which is one of the most important concepts of Skt. poetics, first met with ( under the name of bhāvanā ) in BN and universally accepted by later writers.

4. It would seem that Abhinava is saying that piśācas ( goblins ) are merely figments of the imagination. On p. 277, vol. I of the A. Bh. ( Gnoli, p. 11 ) Abhinava says the same thing : न चाप्रतीतेऽस्मन्निष्ठव्यवहारो योग्यम् । If Abhinava is indeed saying that such things as goblins and ghosts are merely products of our fancy, he would be one of the few early Indians to hold such an unorthodox opinion. We think it very likely that this is what he means ( how else could we interpret the line ? ) for he has made similar statements earlier : in the first Uddyota, commenting on a verse by his teacher Bhaṭṭendurāja, he says : न हि चेतनोपालम्भवदसांभाव्यमानोड्यमर्थो न च न ह्यः । ( p. 127 ).

exist outside of the imagination ). Moreover, though as cognition they are the same, nonetheless such forms of perception as direct perception ( pratyakṣikī ), inferential perception ( ānumāniki ), that which arises from verbal testimony ( āgamotthā ), that which is caused by intuition ( pratibhāna-kṛtā ), and that which stems from yogic sight ( yogipratyakṣajā i. e. telepathy, etc. ) are distinguished from one another by the means through which they are brought about. So also the perception ( pratīti ) of rasa, for which other names are carvaṇā ( relish ), āsvādana ( gustation ), bhoga ( enjoyment ), ( is a form of perception different from these other types of perception ), because the set of factors, namely the vibhāvas, etc., helped by sympathetic response ( hṛdayasamvāda ), etc., which lie at the base ( nidāna ) of the aesthetic experience are of a transcendental nature. When we say that “rasas are perceived” ( we are using language loosely ) like when we say that “ he is cooking the boiled rice ”1 ( odanaṃ pacati ) (where to be more precise we should really say tandulān pacati, since odana is the finished product ), for rasa is the process of perception ( pratīyamāna eva hi rasah)2 itself; and rasanā (aesthetic experience) is a particular kind of perception ( i. e. it is brought about by the sāmagri such as vibhāvas, etc., in literature ) ( pratītir eva viśiṣṭā rasanā ). This perception ( of rasa ) in drama is distinct from every-day cases of inference, though it depends on inference in the initial stages ( since one first infers from the vibhāvas, etc., the sthāyibhāva in the person being portrayed ). In poetry too this perception ( of rasa ) is different from other kinds of verbal cognition ( i. e. abhidhā, tātparya and lakṣaṇā ), but in the initial stages it depends on abhidhā as a means (of reaching the suggested sense). Therefore the pūrvapakṣa ( Lollaṭa's view )3 has been destroyed ( by Bhaṭṭanāyaka ) such that it can

1. This refers to the distinction between tandula, the raw rice, and odana, the finished product. Strictly speaking, we should say : tandulān pacati, " he cooks the rice " and not "odanaṃ pacati." But the words are used loosely. In the same way, rasah pratīyate is not strictly correct, for rasa is the finished product. What we should say is vibhāvādi pratīyate. Most probably this is what Bhaṭṭanāyaka meant as well.

2. Pratīyamāna eva hi rasah means pratīyamānatā eva hi rasah. Abhinava means that rasa is the actual process of aesthetic experience, and not the object ( viṣaya ) of that process. Just as rasa is described as rasyamānatā, in the same way it is here called pratīyamāna (i. e. pratīyamānatā, pratītih, rasanā, āsvādaḥ ). It is identical with experience-it is the aesthetic experience itself. In a similar fashion (and this may well have been the inspiration for Abhinava's view ), the sākṣin, in Vedānta, does not really see another object, or even experience happiness, for it is sarvāprkāśaka, and actual saccidānanda itself. To say ūtmānubhūyate is simply loose terminology, since this implies the tripuṭī, which is absent in true anubhava. Cf. A. Bh. p. 285 : सिद्धस्य रसचित्तप्रेमेयभूतस्य रसस्याभावात् ।

3. We take this as a reference to Bhaṭṭalollaṭa's views on the strength of the equivalent passage in the A. Bh., p. 277 ( Gnoli, p. 11 ) : तत्र पूर्वपक्षोऽयं भट्टलोल्लटपक्ष-नञ्युपगमादेव नाभ्युपगत इति तदूषणमनुस्थानोपहृतमेव ।

• 10

74

never rise again. ( When Bhaṭṭanāyaka ) on his part says that (extraordinary) deeds of Rāma ( such as building a bridge over the ocean, etc. ) do not win sympathetic response from everybody,1 he is being very rash ( sāhasa ) indeed.2 For minds are characterised as possessing a great variety of latent impressions ( vāsanā ). As has been said : “ Vāsanās are endless, because desire is eternal. ” “Though separated by species ( jāti ), place ( deśa ) and time ( kāla ), nonetheless there is a correspondence between memory and sāmskāras (i.e. though several lives intervene, vāsanās still give rise to instinctive reactions to external situations ).”3 Therefore it is now established

1. There is a very interesting passage in the A. Bh. Vol. II, p. 412, germane to this issue. Here is the text :

यदि तु मुख्यत्वेनैव देवचरितं वण्यंते तत्तावद्विप्रलम्भकरुणाकुलतभयानकरसोत्सितं चेतुविबध्यते तन्मात्रनुष्ठरितमेव संप्रधते, प्रत्युत देवानामधियाधनं प्रसिद्धिविधातकम् । तत्र चोक्तो दोषः, विप्रलम्भाद्भावं तु का तत्र विचित्रता रञ्जनाया एतत्प्रमाणत्वात् । अत एवं सहृदयसंबादोडपि देवचरिते दुलःखः, न च तेषां दुःखमस्ति, यत्प्रतीकारोपायैः क्युपपादनं स्यात् । नायिका तु दिव्याविरोधिनी यथोर्वशी नायकचरितेनैव तद्वृत्तस्याखेपात् ।

We are not certain of the phrase : pratyuta devānām adhiyādhānam prasiddhividhatakam. Also, we are not able to understand the exact sense of the last sentence : नायिका तु दिव्याविरोधिनी, यथा उर्वशी, नायकचरितेनैव तद्वृत्तस्याखेपात् ।

2. This must be a reference to p. 181 of the Locana, where BN said : समुद्रसेतुबन्धादयो विभावावास्ते कथम् साधारण्यं भजेयुः । But what could he mean by this ? The only logical inference would be that virarasa in such cases is not genuine, since it involves improbabilities. But this would be an odd position for anyone to take of the Rāmāyaṇa ( though Abhinava himself acknowledges the truth of this for all but the most famous of exploits, when he says that in the case of the prakaraṇa, outlandish events should not take place, since this will prove to be a viṅgha for the spectator - see p. 331 of the Locana ). Surely the whole point of the sōdhōranīkaraṇa doctrine is that it allows such events to become impersonalised, and so imaginatively possible. Could BN have actually said . रामादिचरितं न सर्वेषु हृदयसंबादि ?

3. Yogasūtra IV. 10, and IV. 9. On p. 282 of the A. Bh. Abhinava has a very

( Continued on next page )

ĀBHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

75

that there is the perception of rasa. Moreover ( Bhattanāyaka is wrong, because ) this perception in the form of aesthetic enjoyment (rasanā) does arise ( utpadyate ). And in bringing about this perception ( tatra ) the function is the suggestiveness ( dhvanana ), i. e. the vyañjanā of the literal sense and denotative words,1 which is a function different from abhidhā. ( What Bhattanāyaka calls ) the function of aesthetic relish (bhogīkaraṇa) with regard to rasa in poetry is nothing other than suggestiveness (dhvanana). As for bhāvakatva, which (for us ) consists in the use ( parigraha ) of proper guṇas and alaṅkāras,2 we will speak of this in some detail ( later in the second Uddyota ). What is new about it? When you (Bhattanāyaka) say that poetry is the producer (bhāvaka) of rasas, through bhāvanā, you have yourself revived the theory of utpatti ( which you supposedly destroyed ).3 One cannot say that in poetry words alone are productive (of rasa)4 for

( Continued from previous page )

interesting passage where he justifies the nine sthāyibhāvas in all human beings ( though some predominate in certain people and others in others ), and ends by saying : न ह्रेतचित्रवासनाशून्यः प्राणी भवति । In the course of our beginningless journey through this universe, we have experienced all emotions, Thus nobody fully aware of his own humanity can fail to be moved by another person's experiences. On p. 283 ( of the A. Bh.). Abhinava quotes a fascinating line from Patañjali II. 4 : न हि चेतन एकस्यां क्रियां रक्त इत्य- न्यासु विरक्तः । "The fact that Caitra is in love with one woman does not mean that he is out of love with others," This is not meant humorously, but only that when Caitra is in love with one woman, this means that his love for that particular woman is dominant in his mind. It does not mean that his mind is altogether devoid of love for any other woman. He of course has love in his mind for other women also, but this love is more feeble than the other, and hence overpowered by the love he feels for a particular woman at any given moment.

1. Suggestion applies to the vācya ( e. g. in vastudhvani, where the literal meaning suggests the vyaṅgyārtha ) and to the vācaka (since vācakas are vyañjakas ).

2. This is somewhat curious. Where has BN said that bhāvakatva is samu. citaguṇālaṅkāraparigraha? For BN bhāvanā is sādhāraṇīkaraṇa. How can this be associated with guṇas and alaṅkāras? However, Abhinava himself, in the A. Bh, p. 277, uses these very words to characterise BN's views. The wording in the A. Bh, is slightly different : दोषाभावगुणालङ्कारमयत्वलक्षणेन ...... ...... भवक्त्वव्यापारेण । The phrase nibidanijamohasainkaṭakārīṇā on p. 277 of the A. Bh, vol. I, is puzzling. Perhaps we must read saṁkaṭanivṛttikārīṇā.

3. This is well observed. It is true that BN must use some expression like utpadyate, regardless of what word he chooses, Thus when he says bhāvite ca rase ( Locana p. 183 ), one must paraphrase by bhāvanayā samarpite ca rase.

4. Abhinava's point seems to be that BN said (Locana, p. 182 ) that there are three functions of words : काव्यार्थमन् शब्दस्य शक्तिस्त्रिविधाप्रसाधिका । But this is unfair of Abhinava, since he too says over and over that vyañjanā is a śabdavyāpāra. Surely Bhattanāyaka must have meant the same thing? It is most unlikely that he would have restricted the function to words. On the other hand, Abhinava himself has argued for the importance of śabda. Cf. the interesting passage at the end of the first Uddyota, pp. 158-159.

76

शान्तरसे

if their meaning is not known, no rasa can arise. Nor can one say that it is meaning alone ( that gives rise to rasa in poetry ) for if the same meaning is expressed by other words ( śabdāntarenārpyamānatve ) rasa does not arise.1

We ( the Dhvanivādins ) have explained that both word and meaning ( are helpful in the presentation of rasa ) when we said : “ Whatever a meaning or a word manifests a suggested meaning.”2 etc. Therefore by means of the function known as suggestiveness ( as a means ), and through ( the use of ) guṇas, alaṅkāras and propriety ( aucitya ), etc., as a procedure ( itikartavyatā ) poetry which is possessed of the power of conveying ( bhāvaka ) ( rasas ) conveys ( bhāvayati ) rasas, and in this three-fold scheme of bhāvanā (as accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas )3 suggestiveness fits in as the means

1. Cf. what Ānanda says on p. 358 of the Dhvanyāloka, Uddyota III in the context of vayñjanā.

2. Dhvanyāloka I. 13. The whole verse reads :

यत्रार्थ: शब्दो वा तमर्थमुपसर्जनीकृतस्वार्थो।

व्यापारयति कविव्यापारशून्येऽपि स ध्वनिरिति कविभिः ॥

"When the (directly expressive) word and the literal meaning both first subordinate themselves (to the suggested sense), the word subordinating its meaning and the literal meaning subordinating itself, and then reveal that (suggested) sense, that kind of poetry has been called dhvani by the wise." This is in fact the major definition of dhvani in the D.Āl.

3. In brief, the Mīmāṃsā position is as follows : bhāvanā, creative force, or creative energy, is of two kinds : (1) śābdī, and (2) arthī. It is a particular kind of activity in an efficient or operative agent ( bhāvayitṛ ),which is conducive to the productions of the effect ( or conducive to the coming into being of that which is going to come into being ). Śābdī bhāvanā means verbal creativity, or word-efficient force. Arthī bhāvanā is purposive creativity, or end-efficient force. Śābdī bhōvanā is concerned with how the words in a scriptural or secular command operate in bringing about the fulfilment of that command. Arthī bhāvanā is concerned with how a particular action ordered by the scriptures or by a human master is carried out by the person ordered to do it, with a view to achieving the expected result. In this passage we are concerned with arthībhāvanā and not with śabdībhāvanā. Bhāvanā consists of three elements : (1) sādhya (objective aimed at by the action), (2) sādhana or karana (the means leading to that objective) and (3) itikartavyatā (procedure to be followed in reaching the objective ( kim bhūvayet, kena bhāvayet, katham bhōvayet ).

According to Abhinava, Bhaṭṭanāyaka has borrowed the word bhāvanā from the Mīmāṃsakas. In karmakāṇḍa, in the case of a sacrifice like jyotiṣṭoma ( jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta ), svarga is the sādhya. The jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice is the sādhana or karana, and the performance of the minor sacrifices prayāja, anuyāja, etc., is the itikartavyatā. In poetry and drama, rasa (or rasāsvāda ) is the sādhya, dhvanana or vyanjanāvyāpāra is the sādhana or karana, and guṇālaṅkāraucityādi (i.e. samuci-tagunālaṅkāraparigraha) is the itikartavyatā. Thus according to Abhinava dhvanana is the karana or sādhana by which rasāsvāda is brought about. This is what he means by the sentence इति रसाभासायापि भावनार्यां करणांशे ध्वननमेव निपतति ।

He means that kāvya is the bhāvaka of the rasāsvāda, just as the performer of a sacrifice is the bhāvayitṛ (i.e. bhāvaka) of the svargatipaphala.

ABHĪNAVĀ'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

77

( karaṇa ).1 Nor does bhoga ( aesthetic enjoyment ) come about through the words used in poetry ( alone ), but rather ( it comes about ) through the removal of the obscuration ( saṅkaṭa ) ( of the blissful nature of the Self ) caused by the blinding darkness which is itself the result of deep ignorance ( moha ). In the transcendental ( lokottara ) aesthetic enjoyment ( bhoga ) that is to be brought about ( in this manner ), for which another name is āsvāda ( enjoyment ), and which consists of druti, vistara and vikāsa,2 suggestiveness alone ( according to us, should be ) given the highest place of honour ( mūrdhābhiṣikta ). When suggestiveness ( of poetry in relation to rasa ) is admitted, this so-called bhogakṛttva ( of poetry ) inevitably follows. For bhoga is nothing other than the inexplicable thrill of delight ( camatkāra ) that arises from aesthetic enjoyment ( rasyaṃānatā ). But it is not correct to say that aesthetic pleasure ( āsvāda ) is divided ( only ) into three, druti, etc., ( because there are innumerable variations possible ) on account of the endless variety created by the principal-subordinate relation among the ( guṇas ) sattva, etc. We admit ( with Bhaṭṭanāyaka ) that aesthetic enjoyment is similar to the joy ( that comes from realising one's identity with ) Brahman.3 ( We also admit, with Bhaṭṭanāyaka4 that ) the intellectual

1. This is BN's own position. See A. Bh. p. 277 : चतुर्विधाभिनयरूपेण निविडनिजमोहसदृटकारिणा विभावादिसाधारणीकरणानमडभिधातो द्वितीयेनांशेन भावकत्वव्यापारेण भाव्यमाने रसः etc.

2. This could not be Abhinava's position, since on the next page ( 190 ) he will reject this three-fold classification ( even though in the Locana comm. on II. 7-10 he develops a similar scheme ). But if this is BN's position, and not Abhinava's, there should have been some indication to this effect. By ending it with dhvananavyāpāra eva mūrdhābhiṣiktaḥ, he has inextricably woven in his own views.

Further on druti, vistara and vikāsa, see Mammata, KP. p. 474, Jhalkikar's ed. Dīpti is vistara, mādhurya is druti. but for some reason vikāsa is not connected with prasāda, as one would expect. The scheme is accepted by Dhanamjaya.

3. Note how Mammata ( p. 59, Jhalkikar's edition ) puts this : परिस्फुरन् हृदयमिवप्रविशन् सर्वाङ्गीणमिवालिङ्गनमन्यत् सर्वमिव तिरोधत्तु बह्न्यस्वादमिवानुभावयन् अलौकिकचमत्कारकारी शृङ्गारादिको रसः । This is so well expressed that it has been copied by the Kāvyapradīpa, p. 69. Such language became, surely on account of both BN and Abhinava, very common in describing rasa ( whereas Ānanda does not use the word camatkāra in its technical sense ), so much so that we find Kuntaka, in describing an exquisite verse ( quoted in the Locana, p. 163 as well ), using similar terms ( De's ed. of the Vakroktijīvita, p. 35 ) : अत्र किमपीति ( as an explanation of the line in the verse that reads हृदये किमपि ध्वनन्ति ) तदाकर्णनविहितायाश्चित्तचमत्कृते रनुभवैकगोचरत्वलक्षणमव्यपदेश्यत् प्रतिपाद्यते ।

4. It would seem, as already noted, that for Abhinava, as for BN, prīti is the major goal of poetry. Cf. Locana p. 40 ( under I. 1 ), रसादपि तु प्रीतिरेव प्रधानम् । Thus for Abhinava, vyutpatti becomes easier to accept ( see p. 336 of the Locana ) and is the result of prīti, but still the major point of poetry is delight. Of course vyutpatti means instruction in all the four vargas, including mokṣa ( p. 41 : चतुर्वर्गव्युत्पत्तिरपि चानन्द एव पायेऽन्तिकं मुहुर् फलम् ) with the result that vyutpatti and prīti ( i. e. ānanda ) amount finally to the same thing; Cf. p. 336 : न चैते प्रीतिव्युत्पत्ती मिनरूपे एव, द्वयोरपि एकविषयत्वात् ।

refinement ( vyutpādana ) ( that results from poetry ) is different from that which comes from the śāstra through mandates ( śāsana ) and from the itihāsa through recommendation ( pratipādana ). In addition ( atirikta ) to the message that poetry provides for the readers in the form of the analogy that they must behave like Rāma,1 can we help it ( or : " who is to be blamed " - kam upālabhāmahe )2 if finally ( poetry ) creates an intellectual refinement in the form of the development ( vijṛmbhā ) of their critical receptivity ? Therefore the following is established : rasas are suggested ( abhivyajyante ). They are aesthetically enjoyed3 by their very perception ( pratītyā eva ca rasyante ) ( i. e. rasa is aesthetic enjoyment itself )."4

And here, finally, is the application of this theory to what has been traditionally regarded as the first actual literary experience. We include here the Kārikā and Ānandavardhana's Vṛtti on it as well :5

काव्यस्यात्मा, स एवार्थस्तथा चादिकवे: पुरा ।

कौशिद्रद्रवियोगोत्थ: शोक: श्लोकत्वमागत: ।।

विविधवृत्त्यवच্ছेदचमत्कृतिप्रपञ्चचारुण: ।

काव्यस्य स एवार्थ: सारभूतः ।

तथा चादिकवेराल्मीके: निहतसहचरीविरहकातरकौशिद्रजनित: शोक एव श्लोकतया परिणत: ।

प्रतीपमानस्य चान्यभेददर्शने डपि रसभावमुखेनैवोप-लक्षणं प्राधान्यात् ।

1. This must be the source of the later dictum, so frequently met with ( e. g. KP. under I. 2 ) : रामादिवद्वर्तितव्यं न रावणादिवत् ।

2. The idea is : this is the way things are, and nothing can be done about it, with the further implication that this is the way things ought to be as well. ( Ānanda uses this idea on p. 406 and Abhinava uses the expression kim kurmaḥ often ). Thus Gnoli's interpretation is incorrect.

3. Throughout the Locana, Abhinava has insisted on the importance of the sahṛdaya, the reader. Cf. his opening stanza : kavisaḥṛdayākhyaṁ. See also the Kāvyamīmāṁsā, IV, where Rājaśekhara divides pratibhā into two kinds : kārayitrī and bhāvayitrī, where bhāvayitrī corresponds to this type of " imagination " that belongs to the reader, and which is a faculty he brings to his appreciation of poetry.

4. Note what Abhinava says in the A. Bh. p. 279 : अधिकारी चात्र विमलप्रतिभान-शालिहृदय: ।

See the important definition of the sahṛdaya, the " sensitive reader ", in the Locana, p. 38 : येषां काव्यानुशीलनाभ्यासवशादविशदतदीभूतमनोभूमिके वर्णनीयनतन्मयोभवनयोग्यता तै: सहृदयै: ।

" Those people who are capable of identifying what the subject matter, as the mirror of their hearts has been polished through constant repetition and study of poetry, and who sympathetically respond in their own hearts- those ( people ) are what are known as sensitive readers." Abbinava then quotes a fine verse from the NŚ VII. 7, G. O. S. Vol. I, p. 348 :

योऽर्थो हृदयसंवादी तस्य भावो रसोद्रव: । शरीरं व्याप्तिमेतेन तेन कुष्कं काष्ठमिवाधिना ।।

Cf. Locana, p. 212.

5. D. Āl. 1, 5. ( pp. 84–90, B. ed. ).

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

79

KĀRIKĀ V:

It is the (suggested) meaning alone that is the soul of poetry. Thus long ago, the sorrow of the first poet that sprang from the permanent disruption of the sandpipers' love-making was transformed into verse.1

VRTTI:

That (suggested) sense alone is the essence of poetry - poetry which is beautiful because of a richness (prapañca) of structure (racanā) and of varied words and ideas. And thus the sorrow that was aroused (janita, i. e. uddīpita) by the cries of the Krauñca bird who was frightened (kātara) by the separation (viraha) from his murdered wife, in (Vālmīki) the first poet, was turned into a verse. For it has been stated (in the present Kārikā) that sorrow is the sthāyibhāva of karunarasa, (and that it is only suggested and not directly expressed). Although there are other varieties of the suggested sense, they are implicitly indicated through rasa and bhāva, because these are the most important.

Now here is the Locana passage, pp. 84–90 :

एवं ‘प्रतीममानं पुनर्‌न्यदेव' इत्यीयता ‘ध्वनिस्वरूपं व्याख्यातम् । अधुना काव्या-

स्यात्मेति । स एतेति प्रतीममानमात्रेडपि प्रकान्ते तृतीय एव रसध्वनिर्निरिति

मन्तव्यम् । इतिहासबळात् प्रकान्तवृत्तिग्रन्थ्यर्थबळाच्च । तेन रस एव वस्तुत आत्मा,

वस्त्वलङ्कारद्वनी तु सर्वथा रसं प्रति पर्यवस्यते इति वाच्यदुर्लक्घ्यै ताविल्याभिप्रायेण ‘ध्वनि:

काव्यस्यात्मे'ति सामान्येनोक्तम् । शोक इति । क्रौञ्चस्य द्वन्द्वविच्छेदेन सहचरीहननोद्वृतेन

साहचर्यध्वंसनेनोथितो यः शोकः स्थायिभावो निरपेक्षभावत्वादिप्रलम्भभृङ्गारोचितरतिस्थायी-

भावदन्य एव, स एव तथोक्तो भवति दु खैकप्रान्तदुःखैकचित्रया हृदयसंवादिनंभयानक-

क्रमादास्वाद्यमानतां प्रतिपद्यः करुणसरूपतां लौकिकशोकाद्‌तिरिक्तां स्वचित्तद्रुतिसमा-

स्वाध्यसारां प्रतिपद्यो रसपरिपूर्णकुम्भोच्चलनवच्चित्तवृत्तिभिः स्‍यानन्दस्‍वभावत्र्‌र्‌ङ्गिलापादिवच्च सम-

यानपेक्षत्वेऽपि चित्तवृत्त्य्‌अञ्जकत्वादिति नयेनाकृतकतयैवांशवशात्‌स्मरुच्‍चितशब्दच्छन्दो-

व्‌त्तादिनियतनित्‍श्‍लोकरूपतां प्राप्तः —

1. Cf. Raghuvamśa, XIV. 70 :

तामभ्‍यगच्छद्‌दुदितानुसारि कवि: कुशोद्‌ध्माहरणाय यत: ।

निषादविद्धान्‍डजरस्‍नयोन्‍थ: शोकत्‍वमापच्‍यत यस्‍य शोक: ॥

It is clear from the context that Kālidāsa means this verse to convey the compassion of Vālmīki, and thus the fact that he will accept the suffering Sītā, and take her into his āśrama. Thus Mallinātha remarks : तिरश्‍रामपि दुःखे न सेहे, किमुतान्ये-

षामिति भावः । Bhavabhūti (Uttararāmacarita II. 5) quotes the mā niṣāda verse from the Rāmāyaṇa, but he quotes it in the context of the first verse written in Skt., and not with regard to the compassion of Vālmīki,

मा निषाद प्रतिष्ठां त्वमगमः शाश्वतीः समा: ।

यत्क्रौञ्चमिथुनादेकमवधीः काममोहितम् ॥ इति ।

न तु मुनेः शोक इति मन्तव्यम् । एवं हि सति तद् दुःखेन सोडपि दुःखित इति कृत्वा रसस्यासमतेति निरवकाशं भवेत् ।

न च दुःखसन्ततस्यैषा दर्शनेति । एवं चर्वणोचित-

शोकस्थायिभावात्मककरुणरससमुच्चलनस्वभावव्वास्त एतद् काव्यस्यात्मा सारभूतस्वभावोऽपर-

शब्दवैलक्षण्यकारकः ।

एतदेवोक्तं हृदयदर्पणे - ‘ यात्रत्पूर्णो न चैतन तावतैव वमत्यमुम् ’ इति । अगम इति छान्दसेनाडागमेन । स एवैषेकारणेेदमाह - नान्य आस्तेति । तेन यदाह भट्टनायकः

शब्दप्राधान्यमाश्रित्य तत्र शास्त्रं पृथग्विदुः ।

अर्थतस्त्वेन युक्तं तु वद्न्याय्यानेमेतयोः ।

द्वयोरगुणत्वे व्यपारप्राधान्ये काव्यधीर्भवेत् ॥

इति तद्पास्तम् । व्यापरो हि यदि ध्वननात्मा रसनास्वभावस्तन्नापूर्वमुक्तम् ।

अथाभिधैव व्यापारस्तथाप्यसत्या: प्राधान्यं नेत्यात्रेदितं प्राक् ।

श्लोकं व्याचष्टे - विविधेति । विविधं तत्तदभियोग्यनुकार्यरसानुरुण्येन विचित्रं कृत्वा वाच्ये वाचके रचनाओं च प्रपञ्चेन यच्चारु शब्दार्थालङ्कारगुणयुक्तमिल्यर्थः ।

तेन सर्वत्रापि ध्वननसद्भावेऽपि न तथा व्यापारः । आत्मसद्भावेऽपि काचिदेव जीव्रव्यवहार इत्युक्तं प्रागेव ।

तेनैतद्निरवकाशम्, यदुक्तं हृदयदर्पणे-‘ सर्वत्र तर्हि काव्यव्यवहारः स्यात् ’ इति । निहत-

सहचरिति विभाव उत्कः । आक्रन्दितशब्देनानुभावः । जनित इति ! चर्वणागोचरत्वेनeti शेषः ।

ननु शोकचर्वणातो यदि श्लोक उद्भूतस्तकप्रतीममानं वस्तु काव्यस्यामिति कृत इत्याशङ्क्याह -शोको हीति । करुणस्य तच्चर्वणागोचरात्मनः स्थायिभावः ।

शोके हि स्थायी-

भावे ये त्रिभावानुभावास्तस्तमुचिता चित्तवृत्तिश्वर्य्यमाणात्मा रस इत्यौचिल्यात्स्थायिनो रस-

तापत्तिरियुच्यते । प्रकाशसंविदितं परत्रानुमितं च चित्तवृत्तिजातं संस्कारकमेण हृदयसंवाद-

मादधानं चर्वणायामुपयुज्यते यतः । ननु प्रतीममानरूपमात्मा तत्र त्रिभेदं प्रतिपादितं न

तु रसैकरूपं, अनेन चेतिहासेन रसस्यैवात्मभूतत्वमुक्तं भवतील्याशङ्क्याभ्युपगमेनैवोत्तरमाह-

प्रतीममानस्य चेति । अन्यो भेदो वस्त्वलङ्कारात्मा । भावप्रहणिन व्यभिचारिणोडपि चर्व्य-

माणस्य तावन्मात्राविश्रान्तावपि स्थापिचर्वणापर्यन्तरसनोचिततरमप्रतिष्ठामनवाप्यापि प्राणलं

भवतीयुक्तम् । यथा-

नखं नखाग्रेण विघट्टयन्ती विरर्तयन्ती वलयं विडोलम् ।

आमान्द्रमाशिक्षितनूपुरेण पादेन मन्दं भुवमालिखन्ती ॥

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

81

इस्यत्र लज्जाया: । रसभावशब्देन च तदाभासतद्रशामात्रपि संगृहीतावेव । अवान्तर-

वैचित्र्येडपि तदेकरूपत्वात् । प्राधान्यादिति । रसपर्यवसानादित्यर्थ: । तावन्मात्राविश्रान्ता-

वपि चान्यशब्दवैलक्षण्यकारितया वस्त्वलङ्कारच्वनेरपि जीहितस्वमौचित्यादुक्तमिति भाव: ॥

TRANSLATION :

Thus by the Kārikā : pratīyamānam punar anuvad eva, etc., he has

explained the nature of dhvani.1 Now he shows, under the cover (vyāja)2

of an incident from the epic (itihāsa), how it is the soul of poetry.

KĀVYASYĀTMĀ SA EVA. Although the suggested sense in general is the

point at issue, only the third (type of the suggested sense known as) rasa-

dhvani, should be considered as (the soul of poetry),3 because of the force

of the epic quotation, and because of the force of the meaning of the Vrtti

passages that immediately precede (and follow).4 Therefore really speak-

ing, rasa alone is the soul (of poetry). Vastudhvani and alaṅkāradhvani

(really) finally end up in rasa.5 And since they too are far more important

1. Abhinava means that Ānanda has so far explained the nature of dhvani (i.e. the suggested sense) by means of the Kārikā प्रतीयमानं पुनरन्वयदेव वस्त्वस्ति वाणीषु महाकवीनाम्

etc. Now he will begin to expound how the suggested sense is the actual soul of poetry.

2. Vyājena, literally "under the pretext of", "under the guise of", which amounts to "on the authority of", or "taking the help of".

3. After rasadhvaniḥ one must understand kāvyasyātmā.

4. We are not certain that we have understood prakrāntavrttigranthārtha-balāc ca, on p. 158 (84-85 B. P.). (References in this section are to the edition by Kuppuswami Sastri). We take it to mean : "because of the force of the Vrtti both preceding and following". This must be a reference to iti sthitam (p. 84 B. P.) which speaks of this kind of pratīyamānārtha (i.e. rasādi) as different from the vācya. The immediately following passage, vidvadha, etc., and in particular the words on p. 166,

(p. 90 B. P.) रसभावमुखेनैवोपलक्षणं प्राधान्यात् again speak of the third kind of pratīya-mānārtha (namely rasadhvani).

5. This is an important point that Abhinava comes back to again and again. He claims that Ānanda uses vastudhvani and alaṅkāradhvani only to show the difference between the abhidhāvayāpāra and the vyañjanāvyāpāra. He does not intend these as examples of true poetry, for that title is reserved for rasa alone. Earlier (pp. 50-51 B.P.) he had noted that one can often find vastu and alaṅkāra as svasabdavācya (i.e. as no longer cases of dhvani). What we think he means is that both of these are capable of paraphrase without any resulting decrease in the aesthetic experience (which is already slight in any case). But rasadhvani can never be paraphrased without destroying the poetry in it. In this Abhinava is in agreement with the "New Criticism".

Thus in a famous essay on Yeats' great poem "Sailing to Byzantium", Elder Olson said : "Although the argument as we have stated it clearly underlies the poem (note : he has just finished explaining the "argument", i.e. the vācyārtha of Yeats' poem), it would be erroneous to suppose that this in itself constitutes the poem, for in that case there would be no difference between our paraphrase and the poem itself". He then

... 11

(Continued on next page)

82

शान्तरस

( utkr̥ṣṭa ) ( or charming ) than the literal meaning, it was said ( in Kārikā 1)

in a general way that dhvani is the soul of poetry.

ŚOKA. That sorrow, the permanent emotion (belonging to karuṇarasa)

which arose because of the destruction of the coupling ( dvandva ),1 i. e.

because of the destruction of the intimate physical contact ( sāhacarya ) of the

Krauñca birds, owing to the killing of the female—2 this sorrow is different

from the sthāyibhāva rati (love) that is appropriate to vipralambhaśṛṅgāra,

because in it there is no hope of reunion ( nirapekṣabhāva ).3 The sorrow

has become capable of being aesthetically enjoyed ( āsvādyamānā ) through

the following stages : first come the vibhāvas (both ālambana and uddīpana),

and the anubhāvas (i. e. the wailing of the male bird etc. ) that arise from

them4 (i. e. the vibhāvas ). By feeling these deeply ( carvaṇā ), the heart

( of the sage Vālmīki ) sympathises ( with the plight of the male bird ), and

( finally ) he identifies ( with the situation ). (Once it is aesthetically enjoyable),

it becomes karuṇarasa, where the sorrow ( felt ) is different from the ordinary

sorrow we feel in everyday life. Its essence became capable of being enjoyed

once the mind ( of the sensitive sage ) had melted5 ( to the point of total

( Continued from previous page )

goes on to say, later in the same essay : “If the basic terms of a lyric poem do not

receive their meanings from the chance associations of the reader, neither do they have

their dictionary meanings : like terms in most discourse, they take their significance

from their context, through juxta-position to other terms with which they are equated,

contrasted, correlated or combined.” ( From “Five Approaches to Literary Criticism”

edited by W. Scott, N. Y. 1962).

1. Abhinava takes dvandva not to mean “pair” but to mean actual “sexual

intercourse ” ( sāhacarya ), a meaning the dictionaries do not seem to sanction.

2. For the slgnificance of the change that both Abhinava and Ānanda make

in the legend by having the female bird killed ratber than the male, see J. Masson :

“ Who Killed Cock Kraunca; Abhinavagupta's Reflections on the Origin of Aesthetic

Experience ”, Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, 1969.

3. This is a fundamental distinction that goes back to the NŚ VI, under verse

50 ( p. 309, G. O. S. Vol. I ) :

करुणस्तु शापद्‌गेशविनिपातितेष्टजनविभवनाशावधवन्धसमुत्थो निरपेक्षभावः। औत्सुक्यवचिन्तासमुत्थः

सापेक्षभावो विप्रलम्भभकृतः। एवम्‌न्यः करुणोद्‌नयश्र विप्रलम्भः इति।

The point is that in vipralambha there is some hope of being reunited. But in

karuṇa there is none. This makes it much closer to “ tragedy ” than has generally

been acknowledged. Thus in speaking of the Rāmāyaṇa, Abhinava will point out in

his Locana to the fourth Uddyota ( p. 580 ) that Rāma and Sītā are “permanently ” sepa-

rated, thus showing that the final verses of the epic which speak of their reunion in heaven,

have no impact on the reader in any aesthetic sense.

4. We take taduttakrunda to refer to both the cryings of the male and the

female. It will also include her ( or his, as described in the Rāmāyaṇa ) writing on the

ground in pain, one of the anubhāvas.

5. Druti refers to the “ melting ” of the mind, i. e. to a state when the

mịnd is exceedinly receptive. There is a very fine verse in Madhusūdanaṣarasvati's

( Continued on next page )

receptivity). (And this aesthetic experience) became transformed into a verse (śloka) regulated by (niyantrita) proper1 (words) and metre, etc., because of the unartificiality (akṛtakatā) (of the experience) and the complete possession (of Vālmīki). The emotional upheaval in the mind of the sage was like the overflowing of a jug filled to the brim with water, or like the cry of sorrow which is of the nature of the effusion of the mental mood (of grief). The words that the sage uttered (on that occasion) are suggestive of the state of his mind according to the maxim that exclamations (of joy, sorrow, etc.) are suggestive of (the relevant) natural moods, even in the absence of a fixed convention (between them and mental moods, unlike what is the case for words and their literal meanings).2

"Oh hunter, may you never, for eternal years, attain to stability (pratiṣṭhā) (in this world) since you killed, from a pair of Krauñca birds, the male (when) he was engrossed in love (-making)."3

But it should not be supposed that Vālmīki was (actually experiencing) sorrow (in the ordinary sense). For if he were, (that is,) if he were pained on account of the bird's pain, then the point of the Kārikā, that rasa is the soul of poetry, would be without any basis in the present stanza.4 Nor is

Śrībhagavadbhaktirasāyanam, p. 14 (verse 4), explaining the state of receptivity that the mind adopts during an aesthetic experience:

चित्तद्रव्यं हि जतुवत्स्वभावात्कठिनात्सकम् ।

तापकैष्यैष्यैंगे द्रवत्वं प्रतिपघते ॥

"The substance of which the mind is made is like red sealing wax. By nature it is hard. But when it comes in contact with the emotional states (during an aesthetic experience) which act as heating agents, it becomes soft to the point of flowing". He takes this fine anology a step further, and says that the mind is impressed with the emotions it contemplates. First the mind becomes soft and pliable, and then comes the hard substance like the drama or the play when the mind receives its impression the way sealing wax is impressed with a seal-ring.

1. In K. Sastri's edition we must understand śabda after samucita.

2. The point is that there is no fixed convention with regard to the meanings of exclamations that we utter spontaneously. Thus, a shriek can be due to either grief or joy, in the same way that tears can. Nonetheless these signs of joy or grief are "suggestive." This is of course not true in the case of words and their literal meanings; where there is a fixed convention.

3. Rāmāyaṇa, I. 2. 15.

4. As the Kaumudī says on p. 160 : 'sokamātrāsya rasatvāsambhavād: "If this verse simply illustrated sorrow there would be no possibiliiy of rasa''. Abhinava's point is that karuṇarasa arose in the sage, and not the primary emotion of sorrow. He has, therefore, interpreted the whole point of this example to be that the situation described in the Rāmāyaṇa is one of rasapratīti on the part of Vālmīki. For this to be the case, we must say that he was the audience, as it were, of his own verse! So, Abhinava envisages the situation something like this: Vālmīki sees

(Continued on next page)

84

it possible for somebody burdened with grief1 to utter a verse (at the very moment of his sorrow ).

( Continued from previous page )

the killing of the bird. He is deeply moved to the point of uttering a poem about it. But of course as long as he is simply in sorrow, that is, feeling one of the primary emotions that belong to real-life situations, he does not have the necessary “ artistic distance ” which would enable him to engage in poetic creation. So, at some magic point he stops feeling sorrow ( if in fact Abhinava ever felt that he did ), and it is as if he were witnessing a drama in a play-house. It is at this stage of some distance that he speaks his poem. Each time he contemplates what he uttered, he is the sahṛdaya, the rasika, the spectator ( which would explain why he says kim idam vyāhṛtam mayā at Rām. I. 2. 16 ). i. e. he is again in an alaukika state of aesthetic enjoyment. The śoka that he formerly felt has been transformed into art. While this is a pro-found interpretation of the famous incident, it should be carefully noted that this could hardly have been what the author of the episode in the Rāmāyaṇa had in mind. [ For the word śoka occurs again and again in the account : I. 2. 16 : śokārtena….mayā; I, 2. 18 : śokārtasya….me; I, 2. 29 : śocann eva punaḥ krauñcīm; I, 2, 30 : punaḥ…… śokaparāyaṇaḥ. In I, 2, 13 we read, kāruṇyam samapadyata. and in I, 2. 14 : karuṇa-veditvāt. ] Perhaps for the first time in any critical tradition, Abhinava has articulated the distinction between the “ primary world ” of actual events, and the “ secondary world ” of literature. These terms have been used by J. R. R. Tolkien in his essay “ On Fairy-Stories ”, published in “ Tree & Leaf ”, Unwin Books, London, 1964. See also “ Secondary Worlds ” by W. H. Auden, Faber & Faber, London, 1968. The world of the Rāmāyaṇa belongs to what Tolkien calls Faërie, “ the perilous realm, and the air that blows in that country ”. Mortal men only exist there when they are enchanted. In modern times, perhaps only Tolkien himself, in “ The Lord of the Rings ” has managed to create an entire “ secondary ” world. It is the greatness of Sanskrit literature that such autonomous worlds have been built — Kṛṣṇa's world in the Bhāga-vatapurāṇa, and the dream world of the Yogavāsiṣṭha. The sustained effort of imaginative creation evidenced in the latter work is to our mind unparalleled in any other literature.

1. Another point is that there can be no duḥkha in rasa, which is a synonym for ānanda, “ bliss, ” as Abhinava points out again and again. See De, H. S P. Vol. II, p. 132, and note the passage he quotes from the Abhinavabhāratī :

सामाजिकानां हृदयैकफलं नाट्यं न शोकादिफलम् ।

“ For the spectators, the whole point of the drama is to produce pleasure, not sorrow, etc. ” It is almost certain that Viśvanātha's remarks in the third pariccheda of the Sāhityadarpana were inspired by Abhinavagupta. There he says : ( p. 53, Vidyāsāgara's ed. ) ननु तहि करुणादीनां रसानां दुःखमयत्वाद्रसत्वं न स्यात् ( precisely the objection that Abhinava records ).

करुणाद्रवपि रसे जायते यत्परं सुखम् ।

सचेतसामतुभवः प्रमाणं तत्र केवलम् ॥

He then goes on to show that what in the world is a source of unhappiness is trans-formed in the drama into happiness, for the vibhāvas are alaukika ( an idea taken from Abhinava ) :

अलौकिकविभावत्वं प्राप्तेभ्यः काव्यसंश्रयात् ।

सुखं सज्जायते तेभ्यः सर्वेभ्योऽपीति का क्षतिः ॥

( Continued on next page )

ĀBHINAVĀ'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

85

Thus then, because the nature of the present stanza is the complete

overflow (samucchalana)1 of karunarasa the essence of which is the

sthāyibhāva sorrow, which is appropriate for aesthetic enjoyment, rasa alone

is the soul of poetry, its very essence, which produces a charm far beyond

the reach of other word-functions2 (i.e. abhidhā and lakṣaṇā). This is

confirmed by (Bhatṭanāyaka) in his Hṛdayadarpaṇa :

"The poet does not regurgitate rasa until he is completely filled

with it."3.

(In the stanza quoted from the Rāmāyaṇa) agamah4 (is used in the

sense of an augmentless Aorist) retaining the augment as a Vedic peculiarity

(Continued from previous page)

In the Vṛtti to this śloka he gives his famous comparison of love-bites, which

only produce, in their pain, pleasure :

तेष्यक्षरः श्वरते दन्ताघातादिदुःखमेव सुखमेव जायते।

But it must be pointed out that once again the source of this idea is Abhinava-

gupta. Thus in the Abhinavabhāratī, p. 285 (Vol. I, G.O.S.) we read : तथा हि शोकसंविचर्वनेsपि, लोके श्लोकस्य हृदयविश्रान्तिरन्तरतरतरायितव्यविश्रान्ततरर्यात्

precisely this. Cf. the Pratāparudrīya (Madras, 2nd Ed., 1931), comm. p. 209 :

संयोगसमये श्रीमद्गरदर्शनादिव कृतिमदृंखानुभवसिकारवदनात्राऽऽयुपपत्ति:।

See further the Rasa-gangādhara, pp. 30-31 (KM, 1939 ed.) and Raghavan, "Number of Rasas" p. 155,

1st ed. (p, 183, 2nd ed.).

Eṣā daśā refers to the act of creation, Kaumudī p. 160 : Ślokaracanārūpe-

tyarthah. The point is that in pain we cannot create. Creation takes place later, when

the experience has been assimilated and is then contemplated. This is another of

Abhinava's seminal ideas taken over by the later tradition.

1. Reading samucchalana. On p. (160) (87 B.P.), top of the page, the term

has been used of water overflowing from a jug. Actually though this is an error, for

it is not the karunarasa that overflows, but the original emotion. The word rasa is

used loosely here to stand for both the final aesthetic result, rasa proper, and to mean

"emotion" in general.

2. On p. 28 (p. 10, B.P.), Abhinava has used this same expression. B. ed.

reads "śābda" which is a better reading. This is also the earlier reading that we have

accepted in our translation of the Locana. Vailakṣaṇya here means "charm", from the

notion of its being something completely different. Śābda stands for śabdavyāpāra.

3. Is this famous line from Bhaṭṭanāyaka meant to show that the poet must be

full of emotion, using rasa in the wider sense, before he can write? In other words,

is Bhaṭṭanāyaka saying that first one must be overwhelmed by an experience? Or is

he using rasa in the technical sense to mean that first the poet himself actually has an

aesthetic experience, and then records it, so that others may share it? Sanskrit poetic

theory is not really clear on precisely what the experience of the poet is in relation to

that of the reader. Abhinava seems, in his more rigorous moments ("nātīye eva rasāḥ

na tu loke"), to restrict the aesthetic experience to the reader, in which case the poet

would be excluded. Bhaṭṭatauta, (see Locana, p. 92 B.P.) however, says that this ex-

perience (anubhava) is the same as that undergone by the reader, the poet and the

nāyaka !

4. On this form, see Renou's "Grammaire Sanskritite", p. 414 and 439.

86

(chāndasena). SA EVA. The use of the word "alone" (eva) shows (that it alone is) the Ātman, not anything else. Therefore, what Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka has said, namely :

"Because of the overriding importance of the words used, people class the śāstra1 apart (from poetry and stories). They give the name ākhyāna (historical tale) to compositions in which the sense conveyed by words is possessed of paramount importance. When both (word and meaning) are subordinated, and (all) importance is given to the manner (vyāpāra), then it is called "poetry",2"

is refuted. For if by "manner" he means that (function) whose essence consists in suggestiveness (dhvanana) and which is of the nature of aesthetic enjoyment (rasanā), he will have said nothing new, If, on the other hand, he means by "manner" abhidhā, we have already shown earlier3 how it cannot be of major importance in poetry.

He now explains the verse : VIVIDHA. That which is (made) beautiful because of the high degree of excellence4 in respect to the ideas (vācya), the words, and the structure (racanā), having been diversified (vicitram kṛtvā) so as to be favourable to the various rasas to be suggested, i. e. that which is endowed with guṇas and alaṅkāras, both of words and meanings. There-

1. Śāstram here means the Veda. Bhaṭṭanāyaka's point is that in the Veda the "letter" is all-important. In stories, the meaning is important, and finally, in poetry, it is the manner in which something is told that counts the most. Cf. I. A. Richard's famous dictum : "It is never what a poem says which matters, but what it is".

2. It is impossible to know just how indebted to Bhaṭṭanāyaka Abhinava really is. We think, however, that the famous comparison of poetry to a loving wife, certainly was either taken directly from Bhaṭṭanayāka or was at least inspired by this very passage. Both ideas are in fact synthesised by Sridhara in his commentary on the Kāvyaprakāśa and by Vidyādhara's Ekāvalī (K. P. Trivedi's edition. Bombay, 1903), p. 13 :

शब्दप्रधानं वेदाख्यं प्रसुसंमितमुच्यते । इष्टपाक्यान्यथापाठे प्रयवायस्थ दर्शनीत् ॥ इतिहासादिर्क शास्त्रे मित्रमंमितमुच्यते । अर्थेसार्थावदारुपत्वात् कथ्यतेरडर्थेप्रधानता ॥ स्वनिप्रधानं काव्यं तु कान्तासंमितमरीरतम् । शब्दार्थौौ गुणतां नीत्वा व्यङ्जकानप्रवणं यतः ॥

On this difference between śāstra and kāvya, there is an important passage (from the lost Bhāmahavivaraṇa?) of Udbhata in the Kāvyamīmāṃsā, p. 44 : वस्तु नाम निस्सीमा अर्थेसार्थः। किंतु द्विरूप एवासौ, विचारितसुखः, अविचारितरमणीयश्र । तयोः पूर्वमाश्रितानि शाखाणि, तदुद्रश्र काव्यानी, इत्यौद्भटः । Note also the Vyaktiviveka, III, p. 122 (T. S. S. ed.) where Bhaṭṭanāyaka's idea is modified but generally accepted.

3. Page 63 (B. P.) Dhvanyālokalocana.

4. Prapaṅca here must be understood in the sense of utkarṣa.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

87

fore, although " suggestiveness " exists everywhere (even in such examples

as "the boy is a lion" ), we don't use the term "poetry" (in all such cases ),

just as, in spite of the fact that the ātman exists (in all things ) we only call

certain things " living. " We have already explained this.1 This thus shows

that what ( Bhaṭṭanāyaka ) has said in the Hrdayadarpana : "In that case the

word poetry would apply promiscuously everywhere"2 is out of place. The

expression nihatasahacārī3 ("the killed female") expresses the vibhāva.

The word ākrandita ("cries" ) expresses the anubhāva. JANITA.4 One must

supply : " through attaining to the state of aesthetic enjoyment." Objection :

if the verse arose from the aesthetic enjoyment of " sorrow ", how can one

say that the soul of poetry is that suggested thing (viz. rasa )?5 (i. e. only

śoka has been mentioned in the stanza, and not rasa ). With this doubt

in mind he says : ŚOKO HI. Sorrow ( śoka ) is the sthāyibhāva of karuṇa

which consists in the aesthetic enjoyment of sorrow.6 Since the state of

mind appropriate to the vibhāvas and anubhāvas in relation to the sthāyibhāva

śoka, when aesthetically enjoyed, becomes rasa, it is but proper7 to say that

1. Page 49, Locana (B. P. edition ).

2. The objection must have been that if one accepts the suggestive function

( dhvanavyāpāra ), which Bhaṭṭanāyaka does not, we will have to admit as examples

of poetry, cases which merely include suggestion, but no charm. Thus sarvatra

means, as the K. says on p. 162 : simho vaṭuḥ ity ādāv api tatheti. See p. 57 (B. P. ed.)

of the text of the Locana.

3. Note that K. Sastri, on p. 164 of his Upalocana says that this is a pratīka

that only gives the first words, but that it is meant to read : nihatasahacarīviriha-

kātara, i. e. that it stands for the male krauñca ! But this is mere sophistry. Had

Abhinava meant this, he would have said so.

4. Note that Abhinava has said on (pp. 79, 90, and 83 ) of the Locana that

rasa is not janita, i. e. the function is not janana, " production ". Thus he is of course

bothered by the phrase krauñcākrandajanitaḥ śoka eva. He therefore says here (p. 89 )

that one must add the phrase : carvaṇāgocaratvena.

5. The objection is that in the kārikā only śoka is mentioned, not rasa. This

is perfectly true, for the point of the Kārikā is to show the existence of a pratīya-

mānārtha i. e. that śoka is here suggested, and not directly stated. However Abhinava

and Ānanda are probably correct to go further in their interpretations, for if this is all

the author of the Kārikā meant, it would be a very weak argument; for in the Rāmā-

yaṇa itself, we are directly told both before and after this verse that Vālmīki was in

sorrow ! And of course there can be no doubt that the author of the Kārikā knew

very well that śoka is the sthāyibhāva of karuṇa.

6. The sthāyibhāvas, as soon as they are brought to the state of enjoyment

( carvaṇā ), become rasa. A rasa is after all only a latent sthāyibhāva that has be-

come manifest. Thus the K. says that śoka here stands for all the other sthāyibhāvas :

śoka ity upalakṣaṇaṃ ratyādeḥ, p. 167.

7. We have translated aucityāt to mean "it is but proper ". But it might

mean upacāra. Thus the K. says : upayogitvanimittād upacārād iti yāvat. This may

well be the correct interpretation, for in the Abhinavabhāratī, p. 285, we read :

kevalam aucityād evam ucyate sthāyī rasībḥūtaḥ,

88

शान्तरस

the sthāyin itself attains the status of rasa. For ( yatah ) (the sthāyibhāva ) leads to aesthetic enjoyment in the follwwing manner : the collection ( jāta ) of states of mind ( cittavrtti ) is first experienced earlier in one's own life;1 then it is inferred (from outer symptoms) to be existing in others; then by the arousal of the latent impressions ( samskāra ) it creates a sympathetic response ( in the spectator's ) heart2 ( and then it leads to the identification of the spectator with the situation ).3

Objection : the soul (of poetry) has the form of the suggested sense ( in general ) and it has already been shown to have three varieties. It does not consist exclusively of rasa. But this episode from the epic seems to suggest that only rasa is the soul (of poetry). (Ānandavardhana ) replies to this objection by accepting it! PRATĪYAMĀNASYA CA. "Other varieties" refers to vastu and alaṅkāra. The word bhāva (in rasabhāvamukhena ) shows that one can (in a loose manner of speaking) refer to the vyabhicāri-bhāvas as the essence (of poetry), even though when they are aesthetically enjoyed they do not come to rest only in themselves ( tāvanmātra i.e. svasmin-aesthetic enjoyment does not terminate in bhavadbhāvi ),4 and even though they do not attain the pre-eminent position ( pratiṣṭhā ) of a rasa which takes place on culmination in the aesthetic enjoyment of the sthāyi (bhāva).

" Rubbing one toe-nail with the tip of her other toe-nail, turning the loose bracelet on her wrist, and slowly scratching the ground with her foot whose anklet makes a deep sound."

In this stanza shyness ( has been suggested as the essence of the verse ). The word rasabhāva includes rasābhāsa, bhāvābhāsa and bhāvapraśama, for in spite of minor difference between them, in essence they are one and the same. Prādhānyāt means because (vastudhvani and alaṅkāradhvani ) terminate in

=============================================================

1. Note again that rasa is the cittavrtti that is induced in the reader. It is latent there all along, as a sthāyibhāva.

2. We must insert tanmayībhavana here to complete the series, as the K. does.

3. Here is the K. on this sequence (p. 165) :

व्यवहारदशायां स्वस्मिन्मनः संवेदितमिदानों विलापादिकायेदृशानात् परसित्त्रनुभीयते, तदनन्तरं संस्कारोद्दोधः, तदनन्तरं निमीलतया हृदयस्य संवादः, तदनन्तरं तन्मयीभावः—इत्येवं स्थायिचित्तवृत्ते-श्रवणोपलत्वात् स्थायिभाव एव रस इत्युपचर्यंत इत्यर्थः।

" That which was known in one's own self in day-to-day life is now, from the cries etc. (of the bird) and other effects, inferred to be existent elsewhere. After that, one's own latent impressions are awakened; then there is a sympathy of one's heart because it is pure (i.e. free from inhibitions). After that one identifies. Thus in this manner, because the stable mental mood is the means to aesthetic enjoyment, the sthāyibhāva itself is called rasa, metaphorically speaking ".

Perhaps we should omit yatah, with three MSS (K. Sastri's edition, p. 166, fn. 1).

4. Tāvanmātra is paraphrased by the K. as svarūpanātre,

rasa. Even though there is no full aesthetic repose in vastudhvani and alankāra-dhvani, nevertheless, because they give rise to an extraordinary charm that

is beyond the reach of other word-functions (i. e. abhidhā and laksanā ), by extension (aucitya = upacāra) we can say that vastudhvani and alankāradhvani

are the essence ( of poetry ).

We can thus see that all of Abhinava's efforts focus on one important

need : to crack the hard shell of the “ I ” and allow to flow out the higher

Self which automatically identifies with everyone and everything around. We

can see this preoccupation in all of his work, and in many of the verses he

quotes. He takes especial pleasure in a displacement of the “ I ”, as in

the Vijñānabhairava passages he is so fond of, where the “ I ” is dissolved

by staring long into empty space. Even the verse from the D. Āl. for which he

evinces a particular liking, speaks of lovers reaching “ other shores ” of

ecstasy.1

With this background we are now in a position to understand the

importance for Abhinava of śāntarasa - how much support he derived from

a theory which demanded the transcendence of personality, and which ends in

a feeling of cosmic peace.

1. D. Āl. IV., pp. 524–25,

...12

PART II

ŚĀNTARASA

Our primary concern in this part of the book is to translate and annotate the notoriously difficult section of Abhinavagupta's Abhinavabhāratī that deals with śāntarasa. This is the most extensive and the most important passage in Sanskrit literature on śāntarasa. In order to permit the reader to see the background in some perspective, we have also translated all passages relating to śāntarasa prior to Abhinavagupta. We have decided to let the passages speak for themselves in our translation, and to utilize the limited space available to us for textual notes.

The first passage is found in the Nāṭyaśāstra,1 but is most probably a later interpolation.

Nāṭyaśāstra G. O. S. ed. vol. I, pp. 332-335 :

अथ शान्तो नाम शमस्थायिभावात्मको मोक्षप्रवर्तकः । स तु तत्त्वज्ञानवैराग्याश्रय-शुद्ध्यादिभिरविभावैः समुत्पद्यते । तस्य यमनियमाध्यात्मध्यानधारणोपासनसर्वभूतदयालिङ्ग-ग्रहणादिभिरनुभावैरभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः । व्यभिचारिणश्वास्य निवेंदस्मृतिधृतिसर्वाश्रमशौच-स्त्रीभरोमाञ्चादयः । अत्रार्याः श्लोकाश्र भवन्ति-

मोक्षाध्यात्मसमुत्थस्तत्वज्ञानार्थहेतुसंयुक्तः ।

हैःश्रयोपदिष्टः शान्तरसो नाम सम्भवति ॥

बुद्धीन्द्रियकर्मेन्द्रियसंरोधाध्यात्मसंस्थितोपेतः ।

सर्वप्राणिसुखहितः शान्तरसो नाम विज्ञेयः ॥

न यत्र दुःखं न सुखं न द्वेषो नापि मत्तसरः ।

समः सर्वेषु भूतेषु स शान्तः प्रथितो रसः ॥

भावा विकारा रत्याद्या: शान्तस्तु प्रकृतिरमृतः ।

विकारः प्रकृतेर्जातः पुनस्तत्रैव लीयते ॥

सं सं निमित्तमासाद्य शान्ताद्भावः प्रवर्तते ।

पुनर्निमित्तापाये च शान्त एवोपलीयते ॥

एवं नवर्सा दृष्टा नाट्येर्हेलक्षणान्विता: ।

1. NS. VI, after verse 82, p. 332 of the G. O. S. ed., Vol, I,

92

शान्तरस

" Now1 śānta, which has śama for its sthāyibhāva, and which leads to mokṣa, arises from the vibhāvas such as knowledge of the truth,2 detachment ( vairāgya ), purity of mind etc. It should be acted out by means of the anubhāvas, such as yama3 and niyama,4 meditation on the Self, concentration of the mind on the Self ( dhāranā )5 devotion ( upāsanā ), compassion towards all creatures, and the wearing of religious paraphernalia ( lingagrahaṇa ).6 Its vyabhicāribhāvas are disgust with the world ( nirveda ), remembrance, firmness of mind, purity in all the four stages of life ( āśrama ), rigidity ( of the body ) ( stambha ), horripilation, etc.7 The following Āryās8 and ślokas exist on this subject :

1. It is clear that this passage does not belong to the original NŚ. For one thing, it is found in only one of the many MSS. of the NŚ. For another, Abhinava does not comment on it directly. It is however obvious from what Abhinava says on p. 339, G. O. S., Vol. I (p. 115, Raghavan's text, 2nd edition) namely: तथा च निरन्तनुप्तकेषु " स्थायिभावान् रसत्वोपनेत्थ्याम: " (which is actually found on p. 299 of the G. O. S., Vol. I ) इत्यनन्तरं शान्तो नाम शमस्थायिभावात्मक इत्यादि शान्तलक्षणं पठ्यते that he read some definition, of which the first few words correspond to what we have printed. He read this not at the end of the definition of the various rasas, but at the beginning. He might well have been aware of the fact that this was an interpolation, for he says : " in (some ) old manuscripts. " On the other hand, he was eager to attempt to show that Bharata in fact sanctioned śantarasa, even though he may not have said this in so many words. This comes out even in the adjective he applies to pustaka, cirantana, thereby attempting to give them some prestige and worth in the eyes of his readers.

2. If further proof is needed that Abhinava did not have this very same text before him, note that tattvajñāna is given here as one of the vibhāvas of śānta, whereas for Abhinava it is exclusively the sthāyibhāva of ŚR.

3. Yama means the five " abstentions " given in the YS. II, 30 as ahimsā, satya, asteya, brahmacarya and aparigraha.

4. Niyama refers to the " observances " given in YS. II, 32 as : śauca, santosa, tapas, svādhyāya and īśvarapraṇidhāna.

5. Dhāranā refers to keeping the mind collected, cittasya ekāgrata (See YS. II, 53 ).

6. Lingagrahaṇa refers to taking on the outer garments of an ascetic, as well as all the other paraphernalia of a religious mendicant.

Surely these refer to the eight elements of Yoga. Cf. Yogasūtra, II, 29 : यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टावङ्गानि ।

7. Note that all these vyabhicāribhāvas are given by Bharata and apply to various other rasas. In fact, even tattvajñāna itself is given as one of the vibhāvas of nirveda (VII. 28 )! For Bharata, the vyabhicāribhāvas can become sthāyibhāvas and vice-versa. Nirveda is mentioned as an anubhāva of śṛṅgāra and of karuṇa. At VII, 56, dhṛti is said to arise from vijñāna ! At VII, 108, thinking about the śāstras is given as a vibhāva of mati. Devaprasāda is a vibhāva of hāsya. Dhṛti, mati, smṛti and romāṅca are vyabhicāribhāvas of vīra. Stambha is given as a vyabhicāribhāva of adbhuta (p. 386) and of bhayānaka. The present passage is thus merely a pastiche from these various sources.

8. There is something wrong with this Introduction : there are only two Āryās here, and thus the dual ( ārye ) should have been given,

ABHĪNAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

93

" Śāntarasa has been taught as a means to the highest happiness ( nihśreyasa ). It arises from a desire to secure the liberation of the Self and leads to knowledge of the Truth."

" Śāntarasa should be known as that which brings happiness and welfare to all beings and which is accompanied by the stabilization ( samsthita ) in the Self2 that results from the curbing of the organs of perception and the organs of physical activity. "3

" Śāntarasa4 is that state wherein one feels the same towards all creatures, wherein there is no pain, no happiness, no hatred and no envy."

" Śānta is one's natural state of mind ( prakṛti ). Other emotions such as love, etc., are deformations ( of that original state.). The deformations arise out of this natural state of the mind and in the end again merge back into it."

" The emotions arise out of śānta depending on their particular respective causes. And when the specific causes cease to function, they all merge back into śānta."5

" Those who know dramaturgy see nine rasas along with their characteristics in this manner."

RUDRAṬA'S Kāvyalankāra XV, 15–166

सम्यग्ज्ञानप्रकृतिः शान्तो निग्रेतेच्छानायको भवति ।

सम्यग्ज्ञानं विषये तमसो रागस्य चापगमात् ॥

जन्मजरामरणादित्रासो वैरस्यवासनां विषये ।

सुखवृदुःखैरनिच्छाद्रेषाविति तत्र जयन्ते ॥

1. Tattvajñānārthasamyuktah is very clumsy, since artha and hetu mean exactly the same thing.

Mokṣādhyātmamutthah is equally clumsy. We think mokṣādhyātma should be understood as standing for adhyātmamokṣa, i. e. "liberation of the Self." Adhyātma would mean : ātmānam adhikṛtya, " with reference to the Self."

This stanza is quoted, anonymously, by Abhinava in the Abhinavabhāratī, p. 340 ( p. 115, Raghavan's, text 2nd ed. ). He introduces it as a Sangrahakārikā, thus making it clear that it is not by Bharata.

2. We take adhyātma here to be used in the sense of the locative ātmani.

3. Buddhīndriya means the same as jñānendriya, the eyes, the ears, the nose, the skin and the tongue. Karmendriya means the organs of physical activity, such as hands, feet, speech, etc.

4. Cf. Daśarūpāvaloka, under IV. 45, p. 135.

5. Abhinava quotes this verse ( svam svam, etc. ) in the A. Bh., p. 340. He also quotes it in the Locana, p. 391, with the remark : अन्ये तु …………इति भरतवाक्यं दृष्टवन्तः । thereby ascribing it to Bharata.

6. Rudraṭa's Kāvyālankāra, Adhyāya, 15, 15–16, p. 166 of the Kāvyamālā edition by Durgaprasad and Pansikar, with Namisādhu's commentary, 3rd edition, N. S. P., 1928.

94

शान्तरस᳚

" Śānta ( rasa ) has for its cause ( i. e. as its sthāyibhāva ) right knowledge, and its hero is one whose passions are completely gone. Right knowledge arises from the disappearance of ignorance and of attachment to pleasure. Fear of birth, old age, death, etc., an attitude of disgust towards objects of enjoyment, and indifference to pleasure and pain arise ( as its anubhāvas )."1

Dhvanyāloka pp. 388-394 :

एवमैकाधिकारण्यविरोधिनः प्रबन्धस्थेन स्थायिना रसेऽज्ञभावगमने निरविरोधित्वं यथा तथा तद्दर्शितम् । द्वितीयस्य तु तत्प्रतिपादयितुमुच्यते –

एकाश्रयत्वे निर्दोषो नैरन्तर्ये विरोधवान् ।

रसान्तरव्यवधिना रसो व्यङ्ग्यः सुमेधसा ॥ २६ ॥

यः पुनरेकाधिकारत्वे निर्विरोधो नैरन्तर्यं तु विरोधी स रसान्तरव्यवधानेन प्रबन्धे निवेशयितव्यः । यथा शान्तशृङ्गारौ नागानन्दे निवेशितौ ।

यच्च कामसुखं लोके यच्च दिव्यं महत्सुखम् ।

तृष्णाक्षयसुखस्यैते नाङ्गह्रीः कोडशीं कलाम् ॥

यदि नाम सर्जनानुभवगोचरता तस्य नास्ति नैतावतासवलोकसामान्यमहानुभाव-

चित्तवृत्तिविशेषः प्रतिक्षणं भाक्यः । न च वीरे तस्यान्तर्भावः कतुं युक्तः । तस्याभिमान-

मयत्वेन व्यवस्थापनात् । अस्य चाहङ्कारप्रशमैकरूपतया स्थिते; तयोश्शृङ्गारविधिविशेषसदृशोऽपि

यदैक्यं परिकलप्यते तद्वीरौद्योरपि तथा प्रसङ्गः । दयावीरादीनां च चित्तवृत्तिविशेषाणां

सर्वाकारमहङ्कारहितत्वेन शान्तरसप्रभेदक्वमितरथा तु वीरप्रभेदक्वमिति व्यवस्थाप्यमाने न

कश्चिदिरोधः । तदेवमस्ति शान्तो रसः ।

TRANSLATION OF Dhvanyāloka III. 26 :

So now it has been shown how one can avoid the opposition of a rasa that is opposed to the pervading rasa of the work because of their being in a single character, by assigning to it a subsidiary position. Now the following is said to show that one can avoid opposition in the case of the second variety as well :

1. Here is Namisādhu's commentary : sugamam na varam ( which should be read navaram, from Sanskrit na param — so this phrase will mean : “The stanza is ( generally ) easy to understand, but ( the following explanations are necessary ) ” :

सम्यग्ज्ञानं स्थायिभावः । विभावस्तु शब्दादिविषयस्वरूपम् । अनभवो जन्मादित्रासादयः ।

कैश्चिच्छान्तस्य रसत्वं नेष्टम् । तदयुक्तम् । भावादिकारणानामत्रापि विधमानत्वात् ।

This last sentence only begs the question of course.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

95

Even when there is no opposition between two rasas,

though they are found in one character,1 there might still be

opposition because of (the opposing rasa) occurring immediately

after ( the major rasa ). (In such a case ) the intelligent ( poet )

will introduce2 a ( third ) rasa that will intervene ( between the

two opposed rasas ). (26).3

The rasa that is not opposed (to the principal rasa ), though occurring in the same character, but is opposed because of its immediate occur-

rence (after it ), should be introduced into the work only after the interven-

tion of a third rasa. As, for instance, śānta and śṛṅgāra have been introduced

into the Nāgānanda4 (with the intervention of adbhuta ). Śānta, which is

characterised by the full development of the happiness that comes from the

destruction of desires,5 is indeed apprehended (as one of the rasas by sensi-

tive readers ).6 And so it has been said :

1. Insert rasasya after aikādhikaranyavirodhinah.

2. The KM edition records nyasyah as an alternative to vyaingyah.

3. By ekāśrayatve nirdosa, we think that the author of the Kārikās meant to

convey the fact that two opposing rasas may reside in one person if a long time elapses.

I. e. a man can be a kāmin in one part of a poem and eventually become a vīragin in

another. Bhartṛhari's śatakatrayam ?

4. The idea in citing the Nāgānanda is that two opposing rasas, namely

śṛṅgāra and śānta, are interrupted by a third rasa, adbhuta, that is not opposed

to either of them. Abhinava has a long passage where he gives quotations from the

drama exemplifying all the three rasas. The only noteworthy expression there is

kramaprasarasambhāvanābhipraya, which means the orderly progression of the rasas.

First comes śāntarasa, right at the very beginning of the drama (in fact in the Prastā-

vanā), when Jīmūtavāhana goes off to the forest. Then the sthāyibhāva of adbhuta,

namely vismaya (over the beautiful singing ), is introduced, and this forms the tran-

sitional phase to śṛṅgāra. But note that this is a weak argument, for adbhuta hardly

forms an important element in this drama. It is there, formally, only because of the

one phrase : aho gītam, aho vāditram, which Jīmūtavāhana says when he first hears

Malayavatī singing and playing on the lute. Moreover, all of these three rasas occur in

the first act. The rest of the drama is exclusively concerned with the hero's efforts to

give up his life for the sake of another.

5. This definition of śānta is needlessly complicated. A single long compound

would have been more clear : तृष्णाक्षयसुखपरिपोषलक्षण: शान्तः.

6. Ānanda is seriously concerned with showing that śāntarasa does exist

( pratīyata eva and asti śānto rasah ). It is, therefore, likely that this was a controversial

point in the ninth century ( indeed it has remained controversial until the present day ).

Since the Kārikās mention all of the eight rasas by name, at some point or another,

there is absolutely no reason why they should not have mentioned śānta, had śānta been

known to their author. The fact that śānta is never mentioned in a single Kārikā leads us

to believe that their author was unaware of its existence ( at least of its formal existence

as a rasa, though there is no reason why he should not have known about śānta as an

attitude ), and most probably, therefore, lived before the time of Udbhata, the first author

to mention śānta as a rasa,

96

शान्तरस

" The pleasure of love, as well as the great pleasures of heaven, do not equal even the sixteenth part of the happiness that succeeds the destruction of desire."1

Even should it be claimed that this is not within the range of experience of all men, still it is not possible simply on this account2 to reject what is the special state of mind of great men who are not like ordinary people. Nor is it correct to include śānta within vīrarasa, because vīra depends on egoism, whereas śānta consists exclusively in the destruction of any feeling of self.3 If, in spite of this distinction, one should still claim that śānta and vīra are one and the same, then the same absurd reasoning would apply to vīra and raudra. In the case of the states of mind in vīra which depend on compassion etc., when there is a total absence of egoism, they can be considered as varieties of śāntarasa. If, however, egoism remains, then they should be considered varieties of vīra. If we understand things in this way, there will be no contradiction. And therefore there is śāntarasa. There is nothing wrong with including, in a work dealing with śāntarasa, a rasa ( intrinsically ) opposed to śānta, as long as a third and neutral ( aviruddha ) rasa intervenes.

Locana pp. 390-394 :

ननु नास्त्येव शान्तो रसः, तस्य तु स्थाय्येव नोपदिश्टो मुनिनेत्याशङ्क्याह-शान्तश्रेति । तृष्णानां विषयाभिलाषाणां यः क्षयः सर्वतो निःश्रित्तिरुपो निर्वेदः तदेव सुखं तस्य स्थायिभूतस्य यः परिपोषे रस्यमानताकृतस्तदेव लक्षणं यस्य स शान्तो रसः । प्रतीत एवति । शान्तुभवेनापि निर्वृतभोजनाद्यशेषविषयेच्छाप्रसतरवकाशे सम्भाव्यत एव ।

अन्ये तु सर्वचित्रवृत्तिप्रशम एवास्य स्थायीरिति मन्यन्ते । तृष्णाडSसद्रावस्य प्रसङ्गप्रतिषेधकाले चेतोः शान्तिरभावेन भासनायोगात् । पर्युदासेऽपि कामाद् भवायम् ।

अन्ये तु -

स्वं स्वं निमित्तमासाद्य शान्ताद्रावः प्रवर्तते । पुनर्निमित्तापाये तु शान्त एव प्रलीयते ॥

इति भरतवाक्यं दृश्वन्तः सर्वरससामान्यस्थ भावं शान्तमाचक्षाणा अनुपजातविशेषान्तरचित्रवृत्तिरुपं शान्तस्य स्थायिभावं मन्यन्ते । एतच्च नातिवास्मत्पक्षाद्दूरम् । प्राग्भावप्रध्वंसाभावकृतस्तु विशेषः । युक्तश्र प्रध्वंस एव तृष्णानाम् । यथोक्तम् - ‘वीतरागजन्म-दर्शनात्’ इति । प्रतीत एवति । मुनिनारायणझीक्रियात एव ‘कचिच्छमः’ इत्यादि वदता ।

1. Mahābhārata, XIII, 174, 46. The verse has become ( because of Ānanda's quotation ? ) a subhāṣita, quoted even in elementary primers of Sanskrit in India.

2. etāvatā — " simply because of that."

3. Tāsya and asya refer to vīrarasa and śāntarasa respectively.

न च तदीया पर्यन्तावस्था वर्णनीया येन सर्वचेष्टोपमादनुभावभावेनाप्रतीममानता स्यात् । झङ्झारादेरपि फलभूतेsववर्णनीयतैव, पूर्वभूमौ तु ‘तस्य प्रशान्तवाहिता संस्कारात् । तच्चित्रेsपु प्रत्ययान्तराणि संस्कारेभ्यः’ इति सूत्रद्रयन्तलीया चित्राकाराः यमनियमादिचेष्टा राज्यधुरोद्वहनादिलक्षणा वा शान्तस्यापि जनकादेर्दृष्टेस्त्वेनुभावसद्भावाद्वाध्यमनीयादिमध्य-

संभाव्यमानभूयोभ्यभिचारिसिद्धावाच्च प्रतीत एव ।

ननु न प्रतीयते नास्य विभावा: सन्तीति चेत्—न; प्रतीत एव तावदसौ । तस्य च भवतिsभ्यमेव प्राप्तकुसुमलपरिपाकपर्मेश्वतानुग्रहाद्यात्मरहस्याश्रवितरागपरिशीलनादिभिर्विभावैरित्यतैव विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसिद्धाव: स्थायी च दर्शितः । ननु तत्र हृदयसंवाद-

भावाद्रस्यमाननैव नोपपन्ना । क एवमाह नास्तीति, यतः प्रतीत एव्युक्तम्।

ननु प्रतीयते सर्वस्य शृङ्गारस्पदं न भवति । तांर्हि वीतरागाणां शृङ्गारो न शृङ्गार्य इति सोडपि रसत्वाच्च्यवतामिति तदाह—यदि नामेति । ननु धर्मप्रधानोsसौ वीर एवेति संभाव्यमान आह—न चति । तस्येति वीरस्य । अभिमानमयत्वेनैति । उत्साहो ब्राहमेवकिञ्चित्येवप्राण इत्यर्थः । अस्य चैति शान्तस्य । तयोश्चैति । ईहामयत्वनिर्हेत्वाभ्यामन्त-

विरुद्धयोरपीति चशब्दार्थः । वीररौद्रयोस्वस्ल्यन्तविरोधोऽपि नास्ति । समानं रूपं च धर्मार्थ-कामर्जिनोपयोगित्वम् ।

नन्वेवं दयावीरो धर्मवीरो दानवीरो वा । नासौ कश्चित्, शान्तस्यैवेदं नामान्तरकरणम् । तथा हि मुनि:-

दानवीरं धर्मवीरं युद्धवीरं तथैव च ।

रसें वीरमपि प्राह ब्रह्मा त्रिविधसंमितम् ॥

इत्यागमपुरःसरं त्रिविधमेवाभिधात् । तदाह—दयावीरादीनां चेष्टादिग्रहणेन । विषयजुगुप्सा-रूपत्वाद्दूभयन्तभावः शृङ्गार्यते । सो sत्रैव व्यभिचारिणा भवति न तु स्थायितामिति, पर्यन्तनिर्वाहे तस्या मूलत्व एव विच्छेदात् । आधिकारिकत्वेन तु शान्तो रसो न निवद्धोऽन्य इति चन्द्रिकाकारः । तचेदंस्माभिर्नै पर्यालोचितं, प्रसङ्गान्तरात् । मोक्षफलत्वेन चायं परम-पुरुषार्थान्निष्ठस्वात्मसर्वरसेव्यः प्रधानतमः । स चायमस्मदुपाध्यायभट्टतौतेन काव्यकौतुके,

अस्माभिश्व तद्विवरणे बहुत्रकृतनिर्णयपूर्वपक्षसिद्धान्त इत्यलं बहुना ॥

TRANSLATION OF THE Locana ON Dhvanyāloka III, 26.:

Objection1 : “There is no śāntarasa at all, for Bharata has not taught its sthāyibhāva.” In order to answer this objection, (Ānanda-

1. Note what Kane has to say on the date of the Avaloka : “The dasarūpa and its commentary Avaloka were probably composed before Abhinavagupta wrote the Abhinavabhāratī. The earliest work of Abhinavagupta is the Kramastotra composed in 990 A. D. It has been shown above that the Daśarūpa was composed between

(Continued on next page)

13

vardhana ) has said : " And śānta, etc." The complete extinction of desires,

that is, love for sense-objects, in the form of the withdrawal ( of the mind )

( from every object of the sense ), ( also called ) detachment,1 that alone is

happiness. The development of this, which arises from the aesthetic enjoy-

ment of this detachment, when it turns into an abiding mental state, constitutes

the definition of śāntarasa. " It is indeed apprehended." It is possible ( for

ordinary people ) to imagine what it is like from their own experience at the

time when the course of their desires for all objects of the senses, such as food

etc., has completely ceased ( because of having eaten to satiation etc.).2 Others,

however, believe that the sthāyibhāva of śāntarasa is the calming down of all

mental activity. If the absence of desires (which is the meaning of trṣṇākṣaya)

is understood in the sense of a complete negation of their existence, then it

would amount to the absence of all mental activity and could not be regarded

as a bhāva ( i. e. a positive mental state ). But if it is understood in the sense

( Continued from previous page )

974-996 A. D. and the commentary of Dhanika was composed not before 1000 A D

Therefore, Dhanamjaya and Dhanika were contemporaries of Abhinavagupta. At-

all events the two works do not refer to each other, though (sic) they differ

in several important respects." P. V. Kane, op. cit. p. 248. We think, though,

that the Locana passage we are dealing with has in mind the criticisms of Dhanika,

for in at least 5 places Abhinava refers to views that Dhanika has either mentioned or

espoused. We think, for instance, that the passage on p. 390, ननु नास्त्येव शान्तो रसः

तस्य तु स्थाय्येव नोपदिशो मुनिना श्राख्यात्‍वाह is a reference to Dhanika, under IV, 35, इह शान्त-

रस‌ं प्रति वादिनामनेकविधा विप्रतिपत्तयः, तत्र केचिदाहुः — नास्त्येव शान्तो रसः — तस्याचार्येण

विभावाद्‌भप्रतिपादनाल्लक्षणाकरणात्। (p. 147). The passage in the Locana on page 391,

न च तदीया पर्यन्तावस्थां वर्णनीयां येन सर्वचेष्टोपरमदनुभावेनाप्रतीममानता स्यात might well be a

reference to Dhanika, p. 148, सर्वथा नाटकाद्‌भिनयास्मिन्नि स्थायित्वमस्माभिः शमस्य निषिध्यते —

तस्य समस्तव्यापारप्रविलयारूपस्पष्‍टाभिनययोगात्। (See also the more elaborate argument on

this subject given in the Abhinavabhāratī ). The passage on p. 393, नन्वेवं दयावीरौ धर्म-

वीरो दानवीरो वा could well be a reference to the passage in Dhanika, p. 148, where

he says :

अतो दयावीरोत्साह्यैव तत्र स्थाप्यत्वम्‌।

The passage on p. 394 of the Locana, विषयजुगुप्सारूपत्‍वाधीभत्सेऽन्तर्भावः श्राख्यात्‌ते, might be a

reference to the reported view on p. 147 of the Avaloka : अन्ये तु वीरवीभत्साद्‌भावाद्‌वन्तर्भावं वर्णयन्ति.

Finally, the remark in the Locana, on p. 392, ननु तत्र हृदयसंवादाभावाद्‌वक्त्‍व्यमानेतैव नोपपन्ना

सहृदयाः स्वादयितारः सन्ति. Of course, there is no guarantee that these were not merely

general views, held in common by a number of authors.

1. Note then that Abhinava is not saying that Āmanda's sthīyibhāva, trṣṇā-

kṣayasukha, is defferent from nirveda.

2. Nivṛtta goes with icchāprasara. We think the idea is that after one has

taken a large meal, food is no longer attractive. From this we can infer that for the sage,

worldly pleasures are no longer attractive, and thus we have a basis for understanding

śāntarasa from our own experience.

of exclusion ( of all desires ), then this view will fall within our position.1 Others, however, have taken their stand on the following verse of Bharata :2

" Various feelings, because of their particular respective causes, arise from śānta ( a state of mental calm ). But when these causes disappear, they melt back into śānta;"3 and they then claim that śānta is common to all rasas and consider the sthāyibhāva of śānta to be that state of mind which has not been particularised into any other mood. This opinion is not very far removed from our position. The defference is one of prāgabhāva ("non-existence of something before its origination ") and pradhvamsābhāva ( non-existence of something when it is destroyed ). And it is correct for desires to be destroyed. As has been said : " We can never find a man who is without desires from his birth." ( i.e. a person achievès this state at some later point in his life, and therefore desires can be destroyed.) Even Bharata has hown his agreement by saying: "Sometimes peace",4 etc. The culminas

1. The point is this : what kind of negative is trṣṇākṣaya? Is it prasajyapratisedha, or paryudāsapratisedha? If it is the former, then there could be no question of a bhāva at all, and therefore this is unacceptable. Paryudāsa, which means " exclusion of something with the possibility of including its opposite," is however acceptable. The two kinds of negation are paralleled by the two forms of absence, prāgabhāva and pradhvamsābhāva which will be mentioned later.

2. This is from the NŚ VI, 106-8 and forms part of the interpolated śānta passage in the text.

3. Note that this verse does not necessarily mean that their author accepted śāntarasa. Śānta is simply the absence of emotion, the tabula rasa of the emotional board. It has nothing to do, necessarilly, with mokṣa or religious views in general.

The stanza is given under the heading of Āryā verses and śloka verses and was, therefore, most probably part of a floating tradition, and not part of a continuously argued passage. On p. 326 of the NŚ ( Vol. I ), several verses are introduced with these words : atrāryāh ( with a variant reading of atrāvamsyò aryā bhavanti ) on which Abhinava has a most important remark : ता पत्ता द्वार्यै एकप्रघट्टकतया ( Abhinava is fond of this rather rarely used word ) पूर्वावैश्लक्ष्यणवेन पठिता: । मुनिना सुखसंग्रहाय यथास्थानं निवेशिता: । It is, therefore, clear that these verses are not by Bharata himself. Some of them, however, might well be his own, and in this the situation resembles that of the Dhvanyāloka, where some of the Sangrahaślokas must be by Ānanda, and some must be by earlier or contem-porary writers. Kane quotes Vanaprava 129, 8 : अत्रानुवंशं पठतः शृणु मे कुरुनन्दन । on which Nīlakaṇṭha says : परम्परागतमाख्यानश्लोकम् । ( For more references, see Kane, op. cit., p. 17 ). Note that Abhinava explains this term ( anuvamśa ) as : अनुवंशे भवौ शिष्याचार्यपरम्परामु वर्त्तमानौ श्लोकाख्यौ वृत्तविशेषौ सूत्रार्थसंक्षेपपकटीकरणेन कारिकाशब्दवाच्यौ भवतः । Vol. I, p. 290 ( second paragraph ).

4. This is a reference to the NŚ, I, 106 :

काचिद्धमे: काचित्कीटा कचिद्दर्थ: कचिच्छहम् । दुःखातीनां श्रमार्तानां शोकार्तानां तपस्विनाम् ॥ विश्रान्तिजननं काले नाट्यमेतद् द्वविषयम् । ब्रह्मादीनां च विझ्रेयं नाटयं वृत्तान्तदर्शनम् ॥ ( Continued on next page )

100

ŚĀNTARASA

ting stage of nirveda is not to be described (in śānta), so that one could say it cannot be perceived, because of the absence of any (visible) symptoms due to the cessation of all activity. This applies equally to śṛṅgāra,1 etc., where the culminating stage (for example, actual sexual intercourse) cannot be described.2 But in earlier stages, according to the two Sūtras (of Patañjali)3; "This (mind-stuff) flows peacefully by reason of the subliminal-impression" and "In the intervals of this (mind-stuff) there are other presented-ideas (coming) from subliminal-impressions," such diverse actions as yama, niyama, etc., or activities such as ruling the kingdom of the earth, etc., are perceived even in the case of Janaka and others who are nonetheless śānta (i.e. full of mental calm). And so it must be admitted that śānta is apprehended because of the existence of such outwardly visible symptoms and because of the existence of many vyabhicāribhāvas which are imaginable in the intervals of (the accessories of yoga such as)4 yama, niyama, etc. Should one object that it is not perceived, as there are no vibhāvas belonging to it, we reply, no, it is perceived, and its vibhāvas such as acquaintance with people who are devoid of desire, fruition of one's former good deeds, grace of the highest God, and acquaintance with the secret teaching relating to

(Continued from previous page)

It is one of the key passages for those who believe that Bharata really did accept śānta as a rasa. But there is no reason to believe that these correspond exactly to any of the rasas. They refer rather to the puruṣārthas. One wonders, though, precisely what Bharata had in mind by including mokṣa (corresponding to śama) as suitable for the drama.

1. Delete the quotation mark before śṛṅgārāder api, in the B. P. ed.

2. This is an important distinction, but it is difficult to know exactly what Abhinava has in mind. He admits that it is impossible to show the anubhāvas of the last phases of śāntarasa, because at that point there is a complete absence of activity. (This is an old Advaita problem, whether the Jīvanmukta engages in activity or not. The conundrum had passed into Zen, where it has formed the basis of elaborate discussions concerning the identity of samsāra and nirvāna). But Abhinava says that the same is true of śṛṅāra, etc. What does he mean? We suppose he is referring to actual sexual intercourse. Now, why, precisely, does he say that this cannot be portrayed? On the analogy of the earlier example of śānta, it would seem to be because there is no physical activity. But this, of course, is not true. Or does he mean, not only sexual intercourse in general, i.e. not only the act of penetration, but also the actual moment of ejaculation? In this case, he might well mean that there is little or no activity. (Which does not, however, imply that one cannot describe it, or even present it on the stage). Perhaps Abhinava simply means that it would be a breach of good taste to portray actual sexual intercourse on the stage. But if this is what he means, it is hard to see how this is relevant to śāntarasa and the absence of activity. Moreover, in the Abhinavabhāratī, Abhinava makes the same remark concerning karunarasa.

3. From the Yogasūtra, III, 10 and IV, 27. Our translation is taken directly from James Haughton Wood's "The Yoga System of Patañjali," Harvard Oriental Series, 17, Cambridge, 1914.

4. After vyabhicārisadbhāvāc ca add śantarasaḥ.

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

101

the Self, must be presumed. And so by all this we have shown that vibhavas, anubhavas, vyabhicāribhavas, and a sthāyibhāva for śānta all exist. Objection1: "In śantarasa no act of relishing can arise because of the lack of sympathetic response." Who said that there is no sympathetic response? For it has already been said that it is perceived. Objection: "(Though it may be) perceived, it is not esteemed by everybody."2 Yes, but according to this reasoning, men devoid of desire will not find love very praiseworthy either, and so it will have to be removed from the annals of rasa history !3 And so Ānandavardhana says: "Even if." Objection: "It is possible to consider this (śānta) as identical with that variety of vīra which consists primarily of dharma." He answers this by saying: "And not." tasya refers to vīra. "Is full of egoism," because the essence of utsāha (energy, the sthāyibhāva of vīra) is to feel and say that "I am such and such," etc. Asya ca refers to śānta. "Between the two": ca here means 'although they are extremely opposed to each other because the one (vīra) is full of desire and the other (śānta) is devoid of desire." But vīra and raudra are not even very much opposed, because their similarity consists in this, that in attaining dharma, artha or kāma, both are (equally) helpful (upayogitva). Objection: "If this is so, then compassionate heroism (dayāvīra) is either religious heroism (dharmavīra) or generous heroism (dānavīra) (but not sāta)."4 No, it is neither of these two, because

1. The point of the objection is that śānta is never experienced by ordinary people in everyday life, and therefore they will have no vāsanās that will enable the śānta is, in fact, experienced by ordinary men. He refers, we believe, to the analogy of feeling sated after a full meal.

2. The opponent's argument, that śantarasa appeals only to a select few, is very strong and deserves a serious reply. Abhinava's reply that for a vitarāga, a man with no passions, śṛṅgāra will also hold no appeal, is very weak. The point, surely, is that śṛṅgāra is, or has been, within the experience of all men, whereas śānta is not, (There are after all philosophical schools in India which denied the very existence of mokṣa; but none that ever denied the existence of śṛṅgāra !) This is presumably what the pūrvapakṣin means by ślāghāspadam. Moreover Abhinava has himself made fun of these very vitarāgas who are unable to appreciate love. Dry Mīmāṃsaka scholars met: it is not necessary to believe in something in order to enjoy it, for otherwise no atheist would find any pleasure in reading religious poetry, or even the Upaniṣads for that matter. Brigid Brophy has said that most of us "have replaced belief in fairies by a Midsummer Night's Dream."

3. Abhinava must have in mind the passage in the NŚ. 27, 59 : तुष्यन्ति तरुणा: कामे विदग्धा: समयाश्रिते । अर्थेष्वरथपराश्श्रैक मोक्षेष्वथ विरागिण: ॥ on which he comments : हृदयसंवादोदपि तथाविधतरसवज्ञानबीजसंस्कारभावितानां भवत्येव, यदद्रक्ष्यति "मोक्षे चापि विरागिण: " इति । ( Vol. I, p. 340 )

4. The punctuation of the Bālapriyā text is wrong. Place a daṇḍa after dānavīro vā, nāsau kaścit is a separate sentence, a reply to this objection.

102

śāntarasā

( compassionate heroism ) is simply another name for śānta. For the sage has said :

" Brahmā has said that vīrarasa is of three kinds : generous heroism, religious heroism, and battle heroism."1

And so, using the tradition ( āgama ) as authority, he ( i.e. the sage ), declared ( vīra ) to have only three varieties.2 And so Ānanda has said: "compassionate heroism, etc.," where the word "etc." ( refers to dānavīra and dharmavīra ).3 It might be ( wrongly ) suspected that ( śānta ) could be included under bībhatsa, because in both cases there is disgust with worldly objects. But while disgust4 can be a vyabhicāribhāva of śānta ( in the sense that it is transitory ), it cannot be its sthāyibhāva; because in the last phases of śānta, it is completely rooted out. The author of the Candrikā claims that śāntarasa should not be employed as the major rasa ( in a work ). We have not examined this opinion here since that would lead to digression ( prasaṅgāntarāt ).5 Because śānta is grounded on the highest goal of man,

1. Read rasam vīram and not rasavīram. It means vīrarasa.

2. The point of the verse is that Bharata does not even mention dayāvīra, and therefore it is not vīra at all, but śānta. ( NŚ. VI, 79. p. 331 ). The real question to ask Abhinava would have been how he intends to understand dharmavīra. How does this really differ from dayāvīra ?

3. Something has been dropped from the Locana passage dayāvīrādīnāñ cetyādigrahanena. The Bālapriyā says that one must supply dharmavīradānavīrayor grahanam. But this seems a contradiction, for Abhinava has just finished saying that dharmavīra and dānavīra are vīrarasa, not śāntarasa, whereas dayāvīra is śānta, however, this seems to be what Ānanda has in mind, for otherwise it is difficult to know what ādi will stand for. The view of Ānanda is that all the three, dayāvīra, dharmavīra and dānavīra, are to be regarded as varieties of śānta ( as far as one can judge from his Vṛtti ), if they are free from all traces of egoism. If not, they should be regarded as varieties of vīrarasa. Thus, Ānanda does not appear to have shared Abhinava's view that any form of dayāvīra is necessarily śānta itself. Abhinava holds the view that dayāvīra is not to be identified either with dānavīra or with dharmavīra. He believes that dānavīra and dharmavīra are also to be regarded as varieties of śānta if they are divested of all traces of egoism. The difference between the positions of Ānanda and Abhinava seems to be this : that, whereas Ānanda regards dayāvīra as identical with śānta only in certain circumstances ( viz. when there is no egoism ), Abhinava regards dayāvīra as identical with śānta in all circumstances. This implies that there can be no egoism in dayāvīra for Abhinava. Cf. Locana, p. 514 : dayāvīraśabdena vā śāntam vyapadiśati.

4. The idea is that jugupsā is not really a part of śānta, or rather, it is not an abiding element ( though it can be regarded as a vyabhicāribhāva of śānta ), since at the moment of realisation, nāminanandati na dṛṣṭi tasyā prajñā pratidhṛttā |

5. Note Raghavan, " Number of Rasas ", p. 22, " Evidently, the Candrikākāra also held the view that Vīra and Śṛṅgāra are the Rasa-s in the Nāgānanda in accordance with the ending in the attainment of vidyādhara-cakravartitva, the overlordship of the kingdom of Vidyādhara-s, and the sustained love-theme, and that the śānta came in there as a subsidiary idea to give a new variety of Vīra called Dayā-vīra.

( Continued on next page )

i. e. because it gives rise to mokṣa, it is the most important of all the rasas.1

And this has been demonstrated at great length, stating both pro- and contra-

positions, in the Kāvyakautuka of our teacher Bhaṭṭatauta and in our com-

mentary on that work. So enough of further discussion here.

Dhvanyāloka pp. 529–533 :

तथा च रामायणमहाभारतादिषु संग्रामादय: पुनः पुनरभिहिता अपि नवनवाः प्रकाशन्ते ।

प्रबन्धे चाझ्जी रस एक एतदनिबन्धनोर्ध्वविशेषलाभं छायातिशयं च पुष्णाति ।

कास्मिश्चित्-

वेति चेत्—यथा रामायणे यथा वा महाभारते ।

रामायणे हि करुणो रसः स्वयमादिक-

विनासूत्रितः ‘शोकः श्लोकत्वमागतः’ इत्येवंवादिना ।

निर्जूढश्र स एैव सीतात्यन्तवियोग-

पर्यन्तमेव स्वप्रबन्धमुपरचयता ।

महाभारतेऽपि शाखारूपे काव्यच्छायान्वयिनी वृष्णिपाण्डव-

विरसासावनवैमनस्यदायिनीं समासिमुपनिबद्धता महामुनिना वैराग्यजननतत्पर्यैः

स्वप्रबन्धस्य दर्शयता मोक्षलक्षणः पुरुषार्थः शान्तो रसश्व सुरुचिरतया।

विवक्षाविषयत्वेन सूचितः ।

एतच्चांशेन त्रिविधतयैवैर्यासार्ल्याविधायिभिः

स्वयमेव चैतदुद्रीर्ण तेनोद्रीर्ण-

महामोहनग्रन्थिजिहीर्षितया लघिमतिविमलश्लाघनीयालोकितयैना लोकेऽथेन-

यथा यथा विपर्येति लोकतन्त्रमसारवत् ।

तथा तथा विरागोऽत्र जायते नात्र संशयः ॥

इत्यादि बहुशः कथयता ।

तत्क्ष शान्तो रसो रसान्तरैर्मौक्षलक्षणः पुरुषार्थः पुरुषार्थान्त-

रसतदुपर्जनलवेनानुगम्यमानोऽङ्गित्वेन विवक्षित इति महाभारतात्तपर्य्य सुव्यक्तमेव-

भासते ।

अज्ञाझिभावश्व यथा रसानां तथा प्रतिपादितमेव ।

पारमार्थिकान्तस्त च्वानपेक्षया शरीरस्येवाझ्भूतस्य रसस्य पुरुषार्थस्य च स्वप्राधान्येन

चारुत्वमण्यत्रिरुद्धम् ।

ननु महाभारते यावान्निवक्षाविषयः सोऽनुक्रमण्यां सर्व एवानुक्रान्तो न

चैतत्त्र दृश्यते, प्रत्युत सर्वपुरुषार्थप्रबोधहेतुत्वं सर्वरसगर्भत्वं च महाभारतस्य तस्मिन्नुद्देशे

स्वशब्दनिवेदितत्वेन प्रतीयते ।

अत्रोच्यते—सत्यं शान्तस्यैव रसस्याझ्झिवं महाभारते मोक्षस्य

( Continued from previous page )

Abhinavagupta, however, rejects this view of the Candrikā in his Locana. “Ādhikāri-

katvena tu śānto raso (raso na) nibaddhavya iti candrikākārḥ, tac cehāsmābhir na

paryālocitam.” This does not seem justified by the passage Dr. Raghavan quotes.

Abhinavs has not said that he rejects the views of the Candrikā, but only that a discussion

of these views would involve digressing from his main theme. We have translated the

whole passage on page 102. Cf. A. Bh., Vol. II, p. 451.

1. Note that what Abhinava says here : sarvarasebhyah pradhānatamah is directly

contrary to what Ānanda will say on p. 397 of the D. Āl. : रसतरसः...सर्वरसे ष्यः...प्रधानभूतः ।

Moreover he bimse'f will admit in the Abhinavabhāratī that śānta is apradhāna:

अत एव शान्तस्य स्थायित्वेऽपि प्रधान्यम् । (Vol. I, p. 339 ). And again in the A. Bh. IV,

p. 78 : uktam hi - na śāntarasapradhānatā prayogasya bhavati. sato'pt (sann api?) hi

rasāntaroparakta eva prayogayogyo nānyatheṭi.

च सर्वपुरुषार्थेष्य: प्राधान्यमित्येतत् स्वशब्दाभिधेयत्वेनानुक्रमण्यां दर्शितम्, दर्शितं तु व्यज्ज्यतवेन-

' भगवान्वासुदेवेशः क्रियते डत्र सनातन: '

इत्यस्मिन् वाक्ये । अनेन ह्यर्थो व्यज्ज्यतवेन विवक्षितो यदत्र महाभारते पाण्डवादिचरितं यत्कीर्त्यते तत्सर्वमवसानविमर्शनविधापापकृतां न, परमार्थमलयमकृत्वा भगवांन् वासुदेवो डत्र क्रियते । तर्मान्तरिमनेव परमेश्वरे भगवति भवत् भावितचेतसो, मा भूत् विभूतिषु नि:सा-रासु रागिणो गुणेषु वा नयत्रिनयपराक्रमादिष्वमीषु केवलेषु कुपुचिस्वर्‌वास्मना प्रतिनिविष्टधिय: । तथा चात्र-पश्यत् नि:सारतां संसारस्येयमुमेवार्थं ज्योतयन्त् स्कुटमेवाभासते व्यज्जकशाक्त्यनु-गृहीतश् चशब्द: । एवंत्रिधर्मार्थ गभीं कृतं संदर्शयन्‍तोडनन्तरश्लोका लक्ष्यन्ते-‘ स हि सत्यम्’ इत्यादय: ।

अयं च निगूढरमणीयोर्थो महाभारतावसाने हरिवंशार्वणनेन समाप्ति विधदता तेनैव कविवेधसा कृष्णद्वैपायनेन सम्यक्स्फुटीकृत: । अनेन चार्थेन संसारातीते तत्त्वान्तरे भक्त्यतिशयं प्रवर्तयता सकल एव सांसारिको व्यवहार: पूर्वपक्षीकृतो न्यकषण प्रकाशते । देवतातीर्थ-तप:प्रभृतीनां च प्रभावातिशयवर्णनं तस्यैव परब्रह्म: प्राप्त्युपायत्वेन तद्‌द्रि भूतित्वेनैव देवता-विशेषणामन्येषां च । पाण्डवादिचरितवर्णनस्यापि वैराग्यजननतत्पर्योद्वैराग्यस्य च मोक्ष-मूलत्वान्मोक्षस्य च भगवत्प्राप्त्युपायत्वेन मुल्यतया गीतादिषु प्रदर्शितत्वात्परब्रह्मप्राप्त्युपाय-त्वमेव । परम्परया वासुदेवादिसंज्ञाभिधेयत्वेन चापरिमितशाक्त्यार्पदं परं ब्रह्म गीतादिप्रदेशन्तरे षु तदभिधानत्वेन लड्‌धप्रसिद्धि माथुरप्रादुर्भावानु कृ तसकलस्वरूपं विवक्षितं न तु माथुर-प्रादुर्भावांश एव, सनातनशब्दविशेषितत्वात। रामायणादिषु चानया संज्ञया भगवन्मूर्त्यन्तरे व्यवहारदर्शनात् । निरीतश्शाब्दार्थ: शब्दतत्त्वविद्भिरेव

तदेवमनुक्रमणीनिदिष्टेन वाक्येन भगवद्वयतिरोकीण: सर्वस्यैव संस्यानियतां प्रकाशयता मोक्षलक्षण एवैक: पर: पुरुषार्थ: शास्त्रनये, काग्यनये च तृष्णाक्षयसुखपरिपोषलक्षण: शान्तो रसो महाभारतस्यादित्वेन विवक्षित इति सुप्रतिपादितम् । अत्यन्तसारभूतवाच्याय-मर्थो व्यज्जचवेनैव दर्शितो न तु वाच्यत्वेन । सारभूतो ह्यार्थ: स्वशब्दानभिधेयत्वेन प्रकाशित: सुतरामेव शोभामावहति । प्रसिद्धिश्रेयमस्ल्येव विदग्धविद्वत्परिषत्सु यदभिमततरं वस्तु व्यज्ज्य-त्वेन प्रकाश्यते न साक्षाच्छब्दवाच्यत्वेन ।

Dhvanyāloka, Uddyota IV.1:

Thus in the Rāmāyaṇa, in the Mahābhārata, and other works, though battles and the like are described again and again, they seem new each

1. D. Āl. pp. 529 ff.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

105

time.1 When one single rasa is presented as dominant in a large work,

this creates originality2 in the subject matter and ( gives rise to ) great

beauty as well, " Such as where ? " Well, for instance in the Rāmāyaṇa and

the Mahābhārata. For in the Rāmāyaṇa, karuṇarasa has been hinted at by

Vālmīki when he says : " Sorrow was transformed into poetry."3 It is

that very ( rasa ) that has been sustained till the very end, since Vālmīki ends

his work with ( Rāma's ) final separation from Sītā 4 ( The same applies to )

the Mahābhārata also, ( that work ) which has the form of a philosophical

( or didactic ) text5 and possesses the beauty of poetry. When the great

sage ( Vyāsa ) ends his work in such a way that it makes us feel melancholy

( vaimanasyadāyinī ) by having the Vṛṣṇis and the Pāṇḍavas all finish in a

pathetic way,6 and shows how his book puts emphasis on the creation of

world-weariness ( vairāgya ), he suggests by this emphasis that ( among the

rasas ) śāntarasa is meant to be predominant, and ( among the goals of life ),

mokṣa is primarily intended. Moreover this has been partially explained by

other commentators as well. The father of the world ( lokanātha ), who

wishes to lift people out of the morass of rampant ( udirṇa ) ignorance in

which they have fallen, and provide them with the pure light of knowledge,

has himself asserted this very thing when he said the following and many

other things like it over and over :

1. What makes the battles seem original each time, is not, we think, the

use of dhvani in each particular description ( though vira, bhayānaka, bībhatsa, and

raudra can all exist therein ), but their subordination to a more general aesthetic goal.

So in the case of the Rāmāyaṇa, the constant expressions involving pain, sorrow, separa-

ration, etc., all conduce to the over-all end of the work, a feeling of karuṇa. In the

Mahābhārata, the more battles are described, the more distasteful war becomes and

the more firmly grounded our feeling of detachment, of world-weariness ( vairāgya ).

This theory, advanced as it is, would be appropriate to a work where the subject is a

unified one, but it can hardly be applied to a work as varied ( in authorship as well ) as

the Mahābhārata, which contains several rasas, and cannot be viewed as a unity. Ānanda

of course could not have agreed.

2. Arthaviśeṣa here means arthanavatva.

3. See the passage translated from the Locana on the first Uddyota of the

Dhvanyāloka, p. 79. The passage here is Rāmāyaṇa I, 2. 40.

4. This refers to Sītā's being swallowed up by the earth. At the very end

of the Rāmāyaṇa, Rāma is promised a heavenly reunion. One wonders whether this

obvious interpolation existed at the time of the Dhvanyāloka. If it did, then Ānanda in

an unprecedented critical attitude seems to suggest that this cannot concern the literary

critic, which is a remarkably advanced view.

5. Read śāstrarūpe on p. 530.

6. Note what the Dīdhitī commentary ( p. 611 ) says on this : तेषामेव यदादर्शः

परिणामः तर्हि का कथान्येषाम् ? " If even they ended up like this, what hope is there for

the rest of us ? " The mahāprasthāna episode, especially the svargārohaṇa, does indeed

convey an atmosphere of dejection. After all, the brothers undertook this suicidal

voyage because things looked so bleak. Yudhiṣṭhira especially strikes one as a tired man,

battle-weary and without illusions about man's perfectability.

14

106

शान्तरस

" The more the course of the world ( lokatantra ) unfolds itself before us as vain and insubstantial, the more, surely, does ( our ) detachment grow."1

From this the ultimate meaning of the Mahābhārata appears most clearly : the two subjects intended as predominant are śāntarasa, with other rasas in a subordinated position, and mokṣa, with other aims of life likewise subordinated. The topic of the predominance and subordination of the different rasas has already been dealt with.2 It is no contradiction to say that if we do not take into consideration the ultimate ( pāramārthika ) inner truth ( of the Mahābhārata ), other subsidiary goals of life ( besides mokṣa ) and other subsidiary rasas ( besides śāntarasa ) are beautiful in their own way ( svaprādhānyena, i. e. svaviṣaye ) just as the body, when we do not take the soul into consideration, is thought of as beautiful, though it is really only subsidiary ( to the soul ). " But ", ( someone might argue ), " in the Mahābhārata all of the subjects to be presented have been given in the table of contents, and this one ( that you mention ) is not found there.3 On the contrary, we can understand, through the very words used ( svaśabdāniveditatva ) in that section ( uddeśa ), that the Mahābhārata teaches all the goals of man, and contains all the rasas. " We reply : What you say is true. In the table of contents it has not been said in so many words that in the Mahābhārata, śāntarasa is the main ( rasa ), nor that mokṣa is more important than all other human preoccupations. But it has been shown through suggestion, as in the following phrase : " And the blessed eternal Vāsudeva is praised herein."4 The intended meaning, arrived at through suggestion, is that the deeds of the Pāṇḍavas, etc., which are recited in the Mahābhārata, all end pathetically and are only a manifestation of cosmic ignorance; and that the blessed Vāsudeva, whose form is the highest truth, is glorified there. " Therefore turn your minds devoutly to that revered, highest God alone. Do not set your hearts on the empty outward shapes of things and do not exclusively fix your thoughts on mere worldly virtues like political sagacity, enforcement

1. We have not succeeded in tracing this stanza in the Mahābhārata.

The verse might appear to an impartial reader ( that is, outside of the context of the D. Āl. ) as a rather cynical comment : " only when things go badly do they appear unreal. " Without the context, we cannot say whether Ānanda's interpretation is the correct one.

2. D. Āl. III. 20 and following.

3. The passage the Pūrvapakṣin seems to have in mind is Mahābhārata I. 1. 48 :

वेदयोगं सविज्ञानं धर्ममोक्षर्थ: काम एव च ।

धर्मार्थकामशास्त्राणि शास्त्राणि विविधानि च ॥

4. Mahābhārata, I. 1. 256.

of discipline, valour, etc." And further on, the word " and " (ca) helped by its

suggestive power, is here clearly seen to suggest the following idea: " Take

into account the hollowness of worldly existence." The verses immediately

following, such as " He indeed is the Truth ", etc., are ( also ) seen to contain

implied in them similar ideas.

By completing his work at the end of the Mahābhārata with the des-

cription of Kṛṣṇa's genealogy (harivaṃśa), the poet-creator Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana

has made this hidden beautiful sense wonderfully patent. And because this

( hidden ) meaning impels us to great devotion for another truth, beyond the

phenomenal world, all worldly activities assume a preliminary1 and vincible

position (pūrvapakṣa)2 as being fit to be ignored (nyakṣa).3 The descrip-

tion of the exceptional power of gods, holy places, penance, etc., is ( only ) a

means to attaining the highest Brahman, because the various particular gods

and other things ( i.e. holy places, penance etc. ) are its manifestations

(vibhūti).4 The description of the life of the Pāṇḍavas etc., gives rise to

1. Cf. Raghavan, " The Number of Rasas ", pr. 30 : " The author of the

Bhāgavata in his criticism of the Bhārata, says that in the Great Epic, Vyāsa has

described " Pravṛtti " ( as Pūrvapakṣa ) so much and so well, that man who is by

nature attached to it has mistaken the Pūrvapakṣa itself for the Siddhānta." Here is the

verse, as quoted by Raghavan :

युगपत्सितं धर्मकृतेडनुशास्तः

स्वभावरक्तस्य महान् व्यतिक्रमः ।

यद्‌ब्रह्मण्यतो धर्म इतीतरः स्थितो

न मन्यते तस्य निवारणं जनः ॥

( Bhāgavata, I. 5. 15 )

Note the important verse of Abhinavagupta in his Gītārthasaṃgraha ( edition by

V. L. Shastri Pansikar in his edition of the Gītō, N. S. P., Bombay 1912 with 8

commentaries ), p. 2 :

द्वैपायनेन मुनिना यदूद्‌व्यधायि

शास्त्रं सहस्रशतसंमितमन्त्र मोक्षः ।

प्राहुस्तत् फलतया प्रशितस्तदन्य-

धर्मांदि तस्य परिपोषयितुं प्रणीतम् ॥

2. Professor Daniel H. H. Ingalls has kindly directed our attention to an

interesting remark of Nīlakaṇṭha on M. Bh., I. 1. 275 ( Poona Ed. p. 24 ), where an

adversary is made to remark : अत्रानार्थको युद्धादिप्रलापो भूयान् दृश्यते to which the reply is :

एवं भारतेऽपि धर्मेब्रह्मप्रतिपादन एवं परमार्थतस्त्वर्थवदजातमपि युधिष्ठिरादिवृत्तं वहततेग्यं न दुर्योंधना-

दिवदित्याशये नोक्कं... .................. तथा च सर्वेषामादपि ग्रन्थात्सारमिवादेयमितरत् स्वाज्यमिति श्रूयते ।

Note how similar this is to the last two verses of the Saundarananda of Aśvaghoṣa

quoted above, p. 4.

3. Jacobi ( p. 334, ZDMG. vol. 57, 1903 ) remarks that for adhyakṣyeṇa,

ādhyakṣyeṇa or adhyakṣeṇa should be read. He translates: "..erscheint das ganze

weltliche Treiben ganz deutlich als überwundener Standpunkt." The Bālapriyā takes

nyakṣeṇa to mean " entirely " (kārtsnyena ), but we do not believe it has that meaning.

Surely it means " despised " ( Cf. nyakkṛta ), literally " looked down upon " from ni

and akṣa.

4. See Gītā X. 16 and 41, for this meaning of vibhūti,

108

शान्तररस

vairāgya; vairāgya is at the base of mokṣa; and mokṣa is a means to attaining the blessed one, as has been principally shown in the Gītā, etc.; and thus the description of the life of the Pāṇḍavas is indirectly1 a means of attaining the highest Brahman. By designations such as Vāsudeva, etc., is meant the highest Brahman, the abode of unlimited power, which is well-known in the Gītā and other parts (of the Mahābhārata)2 under the name of Vāsudeva (lit. “as denoted by such words as Vāsudeva — tadabhidhānavatvena),3 the whole of whose essential nature was reflected in the incarnation at Mathura.4 This is proved by the fact that the name Vāsudeva is qualified (in the quotation from the Mahābhārata given above) by the adjective “eternal” (which could not qualify an individual); and (further) because this appellation is used of other manifestations of Viṣṇu in the Rāmāyana etc.5 This matter has been decided (nirṇita) by the grammarians themselves.6 And so, through the sentence found in the table of contents, it is revealed that everything different from the blessed one is ephemeral, and thereby it is well-established that looking at the Mahābhārata as a śāstra, the highest goal of man, namely mokṣa, is alone intended as the most important (of the goals of life), and looking at it as poetry, śāntarasa, which is characterised by the nourishing of the happiness that succeeds the destruction of desire,7 is intended as the most important (of all the rasas). Because it is the very essence of the whole work, this meaning has been conveyed through suggestion, and not directly. For an essential idea, if it is revealed without directly stating it in so many words,8 carries a far greater beauty. It is

1. Paramparayā obviously goes with the preceding series, and thus the danda should be removed and placed after paramparayā,

2. Gītādipraḍeṣu can mean: “in passages in the Gītā, etc.'', or “in places (of the Mahābhārata) like the Gītā, etc.''

3. Read tadabhidhānavattvena instead of tadabhidhīnatvena.

4. Understand angirūpam after माथुरप्रादुर्भवानुकृतसकलस्वरूपम्.

Māthuraprādurbhāva refers to Kṛṣṇa as an incarnation, being only a part (aṁśa) of the highest Brahman. Vāsudeva does not refer to this limited individual (since qua avatāra he is not eternal), but to the principle lying behind it. To limit him to a specific place (Mathurā), obviously shows that this is only a part, not the aṁśin or aṅgin, the whole.

5. Both Tripāṭhi (p. 1349) and the Dīdhitī (p. 621) quote the following verse from the Rāmāyāṇa to support Ānanda's statement: यस्येदं वसुधा कृत्स्ना वासुदेवस्य धीमतः । महती माधवस्यैषा स एन भगवान् प्रभुः ॥

6. See Kāśikā on Pāṇini IV. 1. 114.

7. Trṣṇākṣayasukha is, according to Ānanda (see p. 390, D. Āl. third Uddyota), the sthāyibhāva of śāntarasa.

8. Svaśabdanivedita is a key concept in Ānanda's system. See above, pp. 7–8, and also Locan, on p. 528: śabdasṛṣṭe'rthe kā hṛdyatā. See also the discussion in

(Continued on next page)

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

109

well-known among the assemblies of the cultured and the learned that something which is highly prized should be revealed by suggestion and not in so many words."

Locana pp. 530-533 :

अत्यन्तग्रहणेन निरपेक्षभावतया चिप्रलम्भाश्रितां परिहरति । वृण्णीनां परस्परक्षयः, पाण्डवानामपि महापथकृशेनान्तचित्ता विपन्नः, कृष्णस्यापि व्याधादिद्वंसम् इति सर्वेऽपि विरसमेवावसानमिति । मुख्यतयैति । यद्यपि "धर्मे चार्थे च कामे च मोक्षे च" इत्युक्तं, तथापि च्वाराश्क्कारा एवमाद्युः - यद्यपि धर्मर्थिकामानां सर्वस्वं तारडनास्ति यदन्यत्र न विद्यते, तथापि पर्यन्तविरसत्वमात्रैवावलोक्यताम् । मोक्षे तु यद्रूपं तस्य सारातैव विचार्यतामिति ।

यथायथेति । लोकैस्तन्र्यमाणं यत्नेन संपाद्यमानं धर्मर्थिकामत्साधनलक्ष्यं वस्तुभूततयाभिमतमपि । येन येनार्जनरक्षणादिक्षयादिना प्रकारेण । असारवत्त्वुच्छेदाज्जालादिवद् । विपर्येति । प्रत्युत विपरीतं संपद्यते । आस्तां तस्य स्वरूपचिन्तितव्यर्थः । तेन तेन प्रकारेण अत्र लोकतन्त्रे । विरागो जायते इत्यनेन तत्त्वज्ञानोत्थं निर्वेदं शान्तरसस्थायिनं सूचयति तस्मैव च सर्वेतरासारत्वप्रतिपादनेन प्राधान्यमुक्तम् ।

ननु रज्जुवीरादिचमत्कारोडपि तत्र भातीयाश्रित्याह - पारमार्थिकेति । भोगाभिनिवेशिनां लौकिकासनाविष्टानामड्भूतेडपि रसे तथाभिमानः, यथा शरीरें प्रमातृखाभिमानः प्रमतुर्भोगायतनमात्रेडपि । केवलोषिति । परमेश्वरमक्‌युपकरणेषु तु न दोष इत्यर्थः । विभूतिषु रागिणो गुणेषु चानिवृत्तधियो मा भूतेऽत्र सम्बन्धः । अग्र इति । अनुक्रमण्यनन्तरं यो भारतग्रन्थः ततत्रै्यर्थः । ननु वसुदेवापत्यं वासुदेव इत्युच्यते, न परमेश्वरः परमात्मा महादेव इत्याश्रित्याह — वासुदेवादिसंज्ञाभिधेयत्वेनैति ।

बहूनां जन्मनामन्ते ज्ञानवान् मां प्रपद्यते ।

वासुदेवः सर्वम्

इत्यादौ अंशिरूपमेतत्संज्ञाभिधेयमिति निश्चितं तात्पर्यम् । निश्चितश्रेति । शब्दा हि निल्या एव सन्तोडनन्तरं काकतालीयवशात्तथा संकेतिता इत्युक्तम् —— "ऋष्यन्धकवृष्णिकुरुभ्यश्व" इत्यत्र ।

(Continued from previous page)

the first Uddyota, pp. 78-83 (Bālabhāratī ed.). Cf. also D. Āl., p. 78; 245; 248. Locana p. 525; 528. For a devastating criticism of Udbhata IV, 3, see Kuntaka's Vakrokti-jīvita. III, 37 (p. 159, De's ed.). Contrary to the general view, Ānanda did not hold that the vyabhicāribhāvas can be directly expressed. See M. V. Patwardhan and J. L. Masson : "Solution to a Long-confused Issue in the Dhvanyāloka", soon to appear, in B. S. O. A. S. For a fuller treatment of the issues involved in svasabdavaniveditatva - Telling, not Conveying," to appear in J. O. I., Baroda,

110

शान्तरसं

शान्तनय इति । तत्रास्वादयोगाभावे पुरुषेणार्थ्येत इत्यमेव व्यपदेशः सादरः;, चमत्कारयोनेः तु रसव्यपदेश इति भावः । एतच्च ग्रन्थकारेण तत्स्थालोके वितयोक्कमिह त्वस्य न मुख्योद्वसर इति नास्माभिस्तदर्शितम् । सुतरामेवेति यदुक्तं तत्र हेतुमाह-प्रसिद्धौश्रिति । चशब्दो यस्मादर्थे । यत इयं लौकिकी प्रसिद्धिरनादिसत्ततो भगवद्व्यासप्रभृततीनामप्ययमेव-स्वशब्दाभिधाने आश्रयः;, अन्यथा हि क्रियाकारकसंबन्धादौ 'नारायणं नमस्कृत्ये'त्यादि-शब्दार्थानिरूपणे च तथाविध एव तस्य भगवत आश्रय इत्यत्र किं प्रमाणमिति भावः । विदगधविद्वद्‌ग्रहणेन काव्यनये शान्तनये इति चानुसृतम् ।

Translation of the Locana :

The word atyanta ( in the expression sītātyantaviyoga ), since it shows that they have no hope of meeting, indicates that this is ( karuṇa and ) not vipralambha ( śṛṅgāra ).1 The mutual destruction of the Vṛṣṇis, the end of the Pāṇḍavas by experiencing undeserved troubles on their great journey ( north, to death ), and Kṛṣṇa's destruction by a hunter show that everybody's end was pathetic. MUKHYATAYĀ. Although it has been said : “And in dharma, and in artha, and in kāma, and in mokṣa,”2 nonetheless the four “ ands ” amount to this, that although the essence of dharma, artha and kāma (as described in the Mahābhārata ) can be found elsewhere ( i. e. in works other than Mahābhārata ), nonetheless, the fact that they ultimately come to a pathetic end is to be found here only. But the paramount importance ( sāratā ) of the nature of mokṣa ( mokṣe yad rūpam tasya) can be seen only here ( in the Mahābhārata ). YATHĀ YATHĀ. (Tantryamāṇa means) that which people tend towards, i. e. what is sought by them (sampādyamāna) with effort. This refers to dharma, artha, and kāma, and the means leading to them, though people consider them to be real ( and essential ). YATHĀ YATHĀ means (the goals and their means) characterised by the working for their acquisition and for their protection (once they are obtained) and (finally) by ( their ) destruction. Asāravat means like an insubstantial magic show. Viparyeti means :3 on the contrary they turn out the opposite ( of what we has hoped for ), so there is no question of their being regarded as real and abiding. Tathā tathā means (the goals and their means) characterised by (acquisition, protection and eventual destruction). VIRĀGO JĀYATE. This

1. This is a fundamental distinction that goes back to the NŚ. VI, under verse 50, p. 309 G. O. S. (1st ed.). The point is that in vipralambha there is some hope of being reunited (saṅpekṣābhāva), but in karuṇa there is none (nirapekṣābhāva). For the actual passage, see above, p. 82.

2. This verse has been omitted from the critical ed. of the M. Bh. One wonders whether Sukthankar had seen it. Will his critical principles permit him to omit from the text a verse vouched by as old an authority as Abhinavagupta ?

3. Remove the danda after sampadyate on p. 530.

suggests the sthāyi ( bhāva ) of śāntarasa, i. e. nirveda ( “ world-weariness ” ).

which arises from knowledge of the truth (tattvajñāna).1 And its2 (namely śānta-rasa's ) supreme importance is suggested ( ukta ) by demonstrating that all the

other goals of human life are insubstantial. Objection : “In the Mahābhārata,

śṛṅgāra, vīra, etc., are charming as well.” Anticipating this doubt he says :

PARAMARTHIKA. Although these other rasas are subsidiary (aṅgabhūta),

yet people who are exclusively interested in pleasures and who are overcome

by worldly desires think of them as predominant, just as ( foolish people )

think of this body as the cognising Self, although it is merely an instrument

( āyatana ) for the experience ( of pleasures and sufferings ) by the conscious

Self. KEVALESU. There is no harm ( in fixing one's thoughts on virtues )

helpful to one's devotion to the highest God. The construction is this : don't

have your minds attached to worldly goods, and exclusively interested (even)

in worldly virtues. AGRE. In the text of the Mahābhārata, right after the

Anukramaṇī. Objection : “Surely Vāsudeva is used in the sense of the son

of Vasudeva, and not in the sense of the highest Lord, the Ātman, the

supreme God.” Anticipating this doubt he says: VĀSUDEVĀDI-

SAMJÑĀBHIDHEYATVENA.

“ At the end of many births, the wise man reaches me, ( thinking

that ) Vāsudeva is everything.”3

( In ) this and other ( passages like it ) the final meaning (tātparya )

( of the word Vāsudeva ) has been established to be the whole ( truth, the

highest Brahman ), which is the content (abhidheya ) of that designation

( i. e. Vāsudeva ).

NIRNITAŚ CA. In discussing ( the Sūtra of Pāṇini ): ṛṣyandhaka-

vṛṣṇikurubhyaś ca ”, it has been said that words ( i. e. names of individuals )

are really eternal, but are assigned conventional meanings ( in the form of

particular individuals ) only by accident.4 ŚĀSTRAṆAYE. The designation

of puruṣārtha ( in general ) is appropriate (for the subject-matter of the

1. According to what Abbinava says, tattvajñāna would have to be regarded

as a vibhāva (i. e. an uddīpanavibhāva) of 'śānta. This is precisely the opposite

of what he says in the Abhinavabhārati ( p. 106. Raghavan's text ): कि च निर्वेदो नाम

सर्वत्रानुपादेयताप्रत्ययो वैराग्यलक्षणः, स च न तत्वज्ञानस्य प्रत्युतोपयोगी,

where it is nirveda that must be regarded as an uddīpanavibhāva of 'śānta, with tattvajñāna as the sthāyibhōva. It

is a strange contradiction for which there seems to be no plausible explanation.

2. Tasya would seem to mean śāntarasasya (which is how the Bālapriyā

takes it ).

3. Gītā, VII. 19. The rest of the verse is :

इति स महात्मा सुदुर्लभः ।

4. See Kāśikāvṛtti on Pāṇini, IV. 1. 114;

112

शान्तरस

Mahābhārata ), in the sense of that which is sought after by men, there being no question of aesthetic pleasure.1 But the designation of rasa ( in general ) is appropriate ( for the subject-matter of the Mahābhārata ) from the point of view of aesthetic delight. This is what is meant. This has been dealt with in detail by Ānandavardhana in his book the Tattvāloka.2 Since it is not the main subject here, we have not gone into the problem.

He now explains the reason for saying " far greater beauty." PRASIDDHIŚ CA. The word ca is used in the sense of “ since ”. As this matter is well-known in the world since beginningless time, therefore, in not saying directly ( that mokṣa and rasa are the subjects of supreme importance in the Mahābhārata ) the intention of the revered Vyāsa and others must have been just that ( i. e. they did not use direct words because this is not the practice in assemblies of the wise ). For3 otherwise in regard to the relations of actions and the senses conveyed by the various case-endings, etc., while explaining the meanings of the words in a stanza like “ Paying my homage to Nārāyaṇa etc.” ( the first verse of the Mahābhārata ), what evidence is there to show that Vyāsa had the same intention ( as the one which is in conformity with lokaprasiddhi ) ? This is what he means. The words “ cultured and learned ” correspond to the method of poetry ( kāvyanaya ) and the method of philosophy ( śāstranaya ) respectively.

1. Understand sati after āsvādayogābhāve.

2. There are two references to the Tattvāloka of Ānandavardhana in the Locana : this one, and another on p. 67 in the first Uddyota. Unfortunately this work is lost to us. It would have been unique, for nowhere has the relationship between śāstra and kāvya been discussed in Indian philosophy. Obviously Ānanda ( like Abhinava ) with his interest in both fields would have been an ideal person to write about this question. One wonders whether his idea of the Mahābhārata as both a śāstra and a kāvya did not inspire the book and if this was not one of the most important works discussed. Note that here, as elsewhere, Ānanda is interested in things that seem to have passed unnoticed before among his fellow Indians. If Abhinava really did comment on the Yogavāsiṣṭha, and if Ānanda is really quoted therein ( see above, p. 29 ), then it is possible that the Yogavāsiṣṭha was inspired by Ānanda's lost Tattvāloka.

3. This line anyathā hi kriyākārakasambandhādau, etc., involves a rather complex point. This is what Abhinava means !

Vyāsa has made use of countless sentences in the M. Bh. in describing the main events in the story, the various episodes and incidents introduced from time to time, and in discourses on various worldly and philosophical topics. He has also commenced the M. Bh. with the verse nārāyaṇam namaskṛtya, etc., which is a sentence. Now a sentence is nothing but a combination of an action ( kriyā ) with various efficient causal factors or relations ( kārakas ) ( such as kartṛ, karma, karana, etc. ). A sentence is the relation between an action and its various contributory factors ( kriyākārakasambandhōdau vākye ); and this action and its various causal factors are displayed in a sentence according to well-known and generally accepted

( Continued on next page )

Abhinavabhāratī

शान्तरसप्रकरणम् ।

ये पुनर्नव रसा इति पठन्ति, तन्मते शान्तस्वरूपमभिधीयते । तत्र केचिदाहः -

शान्तः शमस्थायिभावात्मकः तपस्यायोगिसंपर्कादिभिः विभावैः पुष्टपद्यते । तस्य कामक्रोध-

व्यभिचारुरूपतभावैरभिनयः । क्यभिचारी धृतिमनित्रप्रभृतिरिति ॥

एतदपरे न सहन्ते, शमशान्त्योः पर्यायत्वात्, एकान्तपव्राश्रद्धावा इति संख्य-

त्यागात्। किंच विभावा ऋतुमाल्यादयः तस्ममनन्तरभाविनि श्रृद्धारादावनुसंधीयन्त इति युक्तम्। तपोडध्ययनादयरस्तु न शान्तस्य समनन्तरहेतवः । तच्चज्ञानस्य अननन्तरहेतव इति चेत् पूर्वोदिततत्कज्ञानेडपि तहि प्रयोज्यतेति तपोडध्ययनादीनां विभावत्वं युक्तं स्यात् ।

कामादिभावोडपि नानुभावः, शान्तादिपक्षादव्यावृत्ते;, अगमकत्वात्, प्रयोगासमवायिल्वाच;

न हि चेष्टाव्युपरमः प्रयोज्योऽपि । सुस्मोहाद्योडपि हि निःश्वासोच्छ्वासपतनभूषणादि-

दिम्: चेष्टामरेवाभिनयन्ते । दृष्टिप्रभृतिरपि प्राकृतविषयापरागः कथं शान्तं स्वाद् ।

न चांकिचित्करत्वमात्रेण तच्चज्ञानोपाये व्युत्पाद्यन्ते विनेयाः । नैते परदुःखदुःखितमनसो दृश्यन्ते सम्यग्दर्शनसमावस्थां प्राप्ताः, अपि तु संसारे । तत्र शान्तो रस इति ।

अत्रोच्यते - यथा इह तावत् धर्मादिद्वित्रितयम्, एवं मोक्षोडपि पुरुषार्थः शास्त्रेषु

स्मृतितिहासादिषु च प्राधान्येनोपायतो व्युत्पाद्यत इति सुप्रसिद्धम् । यथा च कामादिषु

( Continued from previous page )

rules and conventions of syntax, which are as old as time (i. e. practically beginning-

less ). And Vyāsa and other sages (like Vālmīki) have strictly adhered to these well-

known and generally accepted rules of sentence-structure (or syntax). In explaining

the various syntactical relations in the sentences in the M. Bh. and other works and

granted that in constructing these sentences, Vyāsa has strictly followed the

generally accepted principles, and we proceed on this assumption at the time of

reading the sentences in the M. Bh. and understanding their sense; and we have the

satisfaction of having understood exactly what Vyāsa intended to convey.

Thus, if we take it for granted that Vyāsa and others have followed the well-known

and generally accepted ( lokaprasiddha ) laws of sentence-structure (as laid down

by grammarians), we must also take it for granted that Vyāsa has also followed the

well-known principle, generally accepted in circles of refined critics and scholars

( vidagdhavidvatpariṣatsu ), namely that a matter close to the heart (i. e. matter of

primary importance) should be conveyed by suggestion and not by direct expression (and

that comparatively unimportant matters should be expressed directly). If Vyāsa and

others have followed laukikaprasiddhi in the matter of sentence-structure, then we can

safely assume that they must have followed vidagdhavidvatpariṣatprasiddhi in the matter

of conveying abhimatatattvastu (i. e. a pradhānavastu) by suggestion (and an apradhāna-

vastu by direct expression).

... 15

समुचिताश्रिततत्त्वयो रत्यादिशब्दवाच्याः कविनटव्यापारेण आख्लादयोग्यताप्रापणद्वारेण तथाविधहृदयसंवादवतः सामाजिका प्रति रसत्वं शृङ्गारादितया नीयन्ते, तथा मोक्षाभिधान-

परमपुरुषार्थौचित्यात्। चित्तवृत्तिः किमिति रसत्वं नानीयत इति वक्तव्यम्। या चासौ तथाभूता चित्तवृत्तिः सैवात्र स्थायिभावः। एतत्तु चिन्यम्- किंनामासौ? तत्त्वज्ञानो-

त्थितो निर्वेद इति केचित्। तथा हि—दारिद्र्यादिप्रभवो यो निर्वेदः ततोऽन्य एव, हेतोस्तत्त्वज्ञानस्य वैलक्षण्यात्। स्थायिसंचारिमध्ये चैतदर्थमेवायं पठितः, अन्यथा माझलिको मुनिः तथा न पठेत्। जुगुप्सा च व्यभिचारिणेव शृङ्गारे निषेधनं मुनिर्निर्भावानां सर्वेषामेव

स्थायित्वसंचारित्वचि तत्त्र्वानुभावत्वानि योग्यतोपनिपतितानि अनुझानाति। तत्त्वज्ञानजश् निर्वेदः स्थाय्यनंतरमपर्दकः। इ भाववैचित्र्यसहिष्णुम्यो रत्यादिम्यो यः परमः स्थायिशीलः, स एव किल स्थाय्यन्तराणामुपमर्दकः।

इदमपि पर्यनुयुक्तंते - तत्त्वज्ञानजो निर्वेदोऽस्य स्थायीति वदता तत्त्वज्ञानमेवात्र उक्तं स्यात्। वैराग्यसंबीजादिषु कुतो विभावत्वम्? तदुपायादिति चेत् कारणकारणस्य विभावताव्यवहारः, स चात्रिप्रसङ्गावहः। किंच निर्वेदो नाम सर्वत्रानुपादेयताप्रययो वैराग्य-

लक्षणः, स च तत्त्वज्ञानस्य प्रत्युतोपयोगी। विरक्तो हि तथा प्रयतते, यथास्य तत्त्वज्ञान-मुपजायते; तत्त्वज्ञानाद्धि मोक्षः, न तु तत्त्वं ज्ञात्वा निर्विच्चते, निर्वेदाच्च मोक्ष इति। 'वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः' इति हि तत्प्रभवतः। ननु तत्त्वज्ञानिनः सर्वत्र हृदयतरं वैराग्यं दृश्यम्। तत्प्रभव-द्विरप्युक्तम्- 'तत्परं पुरुषार्थेतरेगुणवैतृष्ण्यम्' इति। भवत्येवम्; 'तादृशं तु वैराग्यं ज्ञानस्यैव परा काष्ठा' इति भुजङ्गविभुनैव भगवताभ्यधायि। ततश्च तत्त्वज्ञानमेवेदं तत्त्वज्ञानमाल्यया

परिपोष्यमाणमिति न निर्वेदः स्थायी; किन्तु तत्त्वज्ञानमेव स्थायी भवेत्। यत्तु व्यभिचारी-व्याख्यानावसरे वक्ष्यते तच्चिकालविप्रलम्भप्रबन्धस्योपादेयत्वचनिवृत्तये यत्सम्यग्ज्ञानम्, यथा—

वृथा दुधोदनडवान् स्तनभरनता गौरिति परं परिष्वक्तः षण्ढो युवतिरिति लावण्यरहितः। कृतां वैदूर्याशा विकचकिरणे काचकले मया मूढेन त्वां कृपणमगुणं प्रणमता ॥

इति तन्निर्वेदस्य खेदरूपस्य विभावत्वेन; एतच्च तत्रैव वक्ष्यामः। ननु मिथ्याज्ञानमूले विषयगन्धः तत्त्वज्ञानात् प्रशाम्यतीति दुःखजनमसूत्रण अक्ष-पादपादैः भगवद्भिः मिथ्याज्ञानापचयकारणं तत्त्वज्ञानं वैराग्यस्य दोषापायवलक्षणस्य कारण-मुक्तम्। ननु ततः किं? ननु वैराग्यं निर्वेदः? क एवमाह? निर्वेदो हि शोकप्रवाह-

प्रसररूपश्वित तत्त्वृत्तिविशेषः। वैराग्यं तु रागादीनां प्रध्वंसः। भवतु वा वैराग्यमेव निर्वेदः।

तथापि तस्य स्वकारणवशात् मध्यभावविनोदपि न मोक्षे साध्ये सूत्रस्थानীয়ता प्रत्यपादि आचार्येण । किंच तत्वज्ञानोत्यितो निर्वेद इति शमस्यैवेदं निर्वेदनाम कृतं स्यात् । शमशान्तयोः पर्यायत्वं तु हास्यास्याभ्यां व्यावृत्त्यात्म्; सिद्धसाध्यतया, लौकिकालौकिकत्वेन, साधारणासाधारणतया च वैलक्षण्यं शमशान्तयोरपि सुलभमेव । तस्मात् निर्वेदः स्थायीति ।

अन्ये मन्यन्ते रत्यादय एवाष्टौ चित्तवृत्तिविशेषा उक्ताः । त एव कौतूहलविभावविविक्त-श्रुतावलौकिकविभावविशेषसंश्रया: विचित्रा एव तावत् । ततश्च तन्मध्ये एव अन्यतमोऽत्र स्थायी । तत्र अनाहतानन्दमयस्वात्मविषया रतिरेव मोक्षसाधनमिति, सैव शान्ते स्थायिनीति ।

यश्वात्मरतिरेव स्यात् आत्मतृप्तश्र मानवः । आत्मन्येव च संतुष्टः तस्य कायं न विद्यते ॥

इति । एवं समस्तविषयं वैकृतं पश्यतः;, विश्वं च शोच्यं विलोकयतः;, सांसारिकं च वृत्तान्तम् अपकारित्वेन पश्यतः;, सातिशयमसंमोहप्रधानं वीर्यम् आश्रितवतः;, सर्वस्मात् विषयसार्थाद् विभ्यतः;, सर्वलोकस्पृहणीयादपि प्रमदादेः जुगुप्समानस्य, अपूर्वस्वात्मातिशय-लाभात् विस्मयमानस्य मोक्षसिद्धिरिति रतिहासादीनां विस्मयान्तानां अन्यतमस्य स्थायित्वं निरूपणीयम् । न चैतन्मुनिना संमतम् । यावदेव हि विशिष्टान् भावान् परिणयति रत्यादि-शब्देन च अशब्देन च तत्प्रकारानेव अन्यान् संगृह्णीत:, तावदेव तद्व्यतिरिक्तालौकिकहेतूपनतानां रत्यादीनामन्तुजानात्यैव अपूर्वविषयत्वम् । एवंवादिनां तु परस्परमेव विशारदताम् एकस्य स्थायित्वं विशीर्यंत एव । तदुपायभेदात् तस्य तस्य स्थायित्वमित्युच्यमानं प्रयुक्तमेव ।

स्थायिभेदेन प्रतिपुरुषं रसस्याप्यनन्यापत्तेः । मोक्षैकहेतुत्वाद् एको रस इति चेत्, क्षयैक-फलत्वे वीररौद्रयोरप्येकत्वं स्यात् ।

अन्ये तु पानकरसदविभागं प्राप्ताः सर्वे एव रत्यादयोऽत्र स्थायिन इत्याहुः । चित्तवृत्तीनामयुगपद् द्वावात्, अन्योन्यं च विरोधाद् एतदपि न मनोज्ञम् ।

कस्मादन्तु स्थायी? उच्यते — इह तत्त्वज्ञानमेव तावन्मोक्षसाधनमिति तस्यैव मोक्षे स्थायिता युक्ता । तत्त्वज्ञानं च नामास्मज्ञानमेव । आत्मनश्र व्यक्तिरिक्तस्य विषयस्यैव ज्ञानम्; परो हि भावमात्र । विप्रकृष्टं चैतदस्मदृभिः । अस्माभिश्रावण्यात् वितन्यत इति इह नातिनिर्बन्धः कृतः । तेन आत्मैव ज्ञानानन्दादिविशुद्धधर्मयोगी परिकल्पितविषयोपभोगरहितोदत्र स्थायी । न चास्य स्थायितया स्थायित्वं वचनीयम् । रत्यादयो हि तत्क्षण-रणान्तरोदयप्रलयोत्यपद्यमाननिरुद्ध्यमानवृत्या: कंचित् कालम् आपेक्षितया स्थायिरूपात्म-

भित्तिसंश्रया: सन्तः स्थायिन इति उच्यन्ते। तत्ज्ञानं तु सकलभावान्तराभित्तिस्थानीयं सर्वस्थायिभ्यः स्थायितमं सर्वा रत्यादिकाः चित्तवृत्तयः व्यभिचारिभावयन्त् निसर्गत एव सिद्धस्थायिभावमिति तत्न वचनीयम्। अत एव पृथगस्य गणना न युक्ता। न हि खण्ड-मुण्डयोरमध्ये तृतीयं गोत्वमिति गण्यते। तेन एकान्तपन्नाश्रद्धाव इत्यभ्याहतमेव। अस्यापि कथम् न पृथग्गणनेति चेत् पृथग् आस्वादयोगादिति ब्रूमः। न हि रत्यादय इवेतरासंप्रक्तेन वपुषा तथाविधमात्ररूपं लौकिकप्रतीतिगोचरः। स्वगतमपि अविकलपरूपं न्युस्थानावसरेऽनु-संधीयमानं चित्तवृत्त्यन्तरकलुषमेवावभाति।

भासतां वा लोके तथा। तथापि न संशवन्मात्रस्थायिनां गणनम्, रसेष्वृकेषु अनुपयोगात्; अपि तु व्यभिचारित्वेन लक्षणीयत्वं विज्ञायते, नेतरथा। तथा ह्येकान्तपन्ना-श्रद्धावैरिति एतत्प्रघट्टकोपपत्तिः। न चास्यात्मस्वभावस्य व्यभिचारित्वम्; असंभवात्, अवैचित्यावहत्वात्, अनौचित्याच्च। शम आत्मस्वभावः; स शमशब्देन मुनिना व्यपदिष्टः। यदितु स च एवं शमशब्देन व्यपदेश्यते, निर्वेदशब्देन वा, तेन कैवल्यश्रित्त्वृत्त्यन्तरं निर्वेदोडपि दारिद्र्यादिविभावान्तरोऽस्थितिनिर्दयतुल्यजातीयः स भवति। तज्जातीय एव हेतुभेदेऽपि तद्वपदेश्यो रतिभ्यादिरिव। तदिदमात्मस्वरूपमेव तत्त्वज्ञानं शमः; तथा च यत्कालुष्योपरागविशेषा एवात्मनो रत्यादयः, तदनुगमेऽपि शुद्धमस्य रूपम् अज्यवधानसमाधिवलाद् अभिगम्य, न्युस्थानेsपि प्रशान्तता भवति। यथोक्तम् 'प्रशान्तवा-हितासंस्कारात्' इति। तत्त्वज्ञानलक्षणस्य च स्थायिनः समस्तोडयं लौकिकालौकिक-चित्तवृत्तिकलापो व्यभिचारितामभ्येति। तदनुभावा एव च यमनियमाद्युपकृता अनुभावा: उपात्ताभिनयाद्यध्यायतये च ये स्वभावाभिनया वक्ष्यन्ते। अत एव एतद्विषया एव। अयमेव हि स्वभावः। विभावा अपि परमेश्वरानुग्रहप्रसृतयः, प्रकाशयोनिमुखावकाश रत्यादयोऽत्राव्यासाद्या। केवलं यथा विप्रलम्भे औदास्यम्, संयोगेऽपि वा 'प्रेमसमाप्तोत्सवम्' इति, यथा च रौद्रे औग्र्यम्, यथा च करुणवीरभयानकाद्भुतेषु निर्वेदश्रुतित्रासहर्षः: व्यभिचा-

रिणोडपि प्राधान्येन अवभासन्ते, तथा शान्ते जुगुप्सा च: सर्वथैव रागप्रतिपक्षत्वात्। तथा हि महात्रते चुकपालादिधारणम्, अशुभार्योदिसमुदायादिविस्तारसंक्षेपातिकर्मीकृतिहि धर्मे (?)। जुगुप्साहेतुत्वेनैव निजाभ्यध्दानं च देवरात् पुत्रजन्मनि उपादिष्टम्। स्वात्मनि च कृतकृत्यस्य परार्थघटनायामेवोद्यम इति उत्साहोडस्य परोपकारविषयेच्छाप्रयत्नरूपो दयापरपर्यायोऽभ्यधिकोडनन्तरः। अत एव एतद्व्यभिचारिल्वात् केचित् दयावीरत्वेन व्यपदिशन्ति, अन्ये धर्मवीरत्वेन।

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

117

ननूंसाहोडहंकारप्राणा: शान्तस्वहंकारशौथिल्यात्मक: । व्यभिचारिलिं हि विरुद्ध-

स्यापि न नोचितम्, रतावित्र निर्वेदादे: । ‘शय्या शाद्वलम्’ इत्यादौ हि परोपकार-

करणे ह्युस्साहस्यैव प्रकाश्यते । न तु उत्साहशून्या कार्चिद्रव्यवस्था; इच्छाप्रयत्न-

व्यतिरेकेण पाषाणतापत्ते: । यत एव च परिदृष्टपरावारत्वेन स्वार्थमोदेशन कर्तव्यान्तरं नाव-

शिष्यते । अत एव शान्तहृदयानां परोपकाराय शरीरस्वस्वार्थदानं न शान्तिविरोधि ।

‘आत्मानं गोपायेत्’ इत्यादिना हृदयकृत्यविषयं शरीररक्षणमुपदिश्यते, संन्यासिनां

तद्रक्षादित्यतर्थ्याभावात् । तथा हि-

धर्मोऽर्थकाममोक्षाणां प्राणा: संस्थितिहेतव: ।

तान्त्रिक्नता किं न हतं रक्षता किं न रक्षितम् ॥

इति सुप्रसिद्धचरतुर्वर्गसाधकत्वेव देहरक्षाया निदानं दर्शितम् । कृतकृत्यस्य जलेडग्नौ शश्रे

वा पतेधिति संन्यासिले श्रवणात् । तथाथाकथंचित् त्याज्यं शरीरम् । यदिं परार्थे त्यज्यते

तत् किं तत्र न स्पृश्यते भवंति ? जीमूतवाहनादीनां न यतिव्रतोदित चरितं, कि तन न:?

तत्त्वज्ञानिन्तं तावदश्यमस्ति । अन्यथा देहात्ममानेनिनां देह एव सर्वस्वभूते धर्मोऽनुंदेशेन

परोर्थ त्यागस्य असंभव्यस्वात् । युद्धेडपि हि न वीरस्य देहत्यागायोद्यम:, परावजयोद्शेनैव

प्रवर्त्ते: । भृगुपतनादावपि शुश्रतरदेहान्तर्संपिपादयिषयैवाधिकं विजृम्भते । तत् स्वार्थानुद्देशेन

परोर्थसंंपच्यै यदच्चेष्टितं देहत्यागपर्यन्तमुपदेशदानादि तत् तद्ल्क्ष्यदात्मतत्त्वज्ञानानामसंभव्य-

मेवेति । तेडपि तत्त्वज्ञानिन: । ज्ञानिनां सर्वाश्रमेषु मुक्तिरिति स्मृतिषु श्रुतिषु च । यथोक्तम्-

‘देवाच्चनरतस्तत्त्वज्ञाननिष्ठोडतिथिप्रिय: ।

श्राद्धं कृत्वा ददद् द्रव्यं गृहस्थोऽपि हि मुच्यते ॥’

इति । केवलं परार्थोंमिसंधिजातं धर्मात् परोपकारात्मकफलल्वेनैव अभिसंहितात् पुनरपि

देहस्य तदुचितस्यैव प्रादुर्भवो बोधिसत्त्वादीनां तत्त्वज्ञानिनामपि ।

दष्ट: अज्ञेऽपि विश्रान्तिलाभ:, स्वभावौचिल्यात्, यथा रामस्य वीराद्धे पितुराज्ञां

पालयत: । एवं श्रृङारायज्ञेष्वपि मन्तव्यम् । अत एव शान्तस्य स्थायिल्वेडपि अप्राधान्यम् ।

जीमूतवाहने त्रिवर्गसंपत्तरेव परोप्कतिप्रधानाया: फलस्वात् । अनेनैवाश्रयेन नाटकलक्षणे

वक्ष्यते— ‘ऋद्धिविलासादिरिगैणै:’ इति । अननेन हि ऋद्धिविलासप्रधानान्मर्थकामोत्रं सर्वं

चरितं सकल्लोकहृदयसंग्रादसुन्दरप्रयोजनं नाटके निवेशयितव्यमियुक्तम् । एतच्च तत्ैव

वर्णयिष्याम: । अनेनैव चाश्रयेन न शान्ते कश्र्न मुनिना जाल्यंशको विनियोक्यते । तेन

जाल्यंशाविनियोगाभावात् तदस्वमिति प्रयुक्तम् ।

अन्ये तु जीमूतवाहनः 'कस्ते पुत्र त्राता भविष्यति' इति शरणार्थिनां वृद्धामेव त्रातवान्। शक्तिश्वास्य न काचिद्। परहिंसा च न काचिद्रेयमादृः । तच्चानुमतमेव ; न हि बोधिसत्त्वानां पुनः अभ्युत्थानात्मकजीवितमभिसंधानानुप्रविष्टं शक्तिश्वेति । न च काकतालीयवृत्त्या शास्त्रमुपादिशति । तत् सिद्धं दयालक्षणो हयुस्साहोदत्र प्रधानम्।

अन्ये तु व्यभिचारिणो यथायोगं भवन्तीति । यथोक्तम् 'तच्चिच्छेदशु प्रययान्तराणि संस्कारेभ्यः' इति । अत एवं निःश्वासत्वादनुभावभावः इति प्रयुक्तम्। यदा तु पर्यन्तभूमिकालाभेदानुभावभावः, तदास्य अप्रयोज्यत्वम्, रतिशोकादावपि पर्यन्तदशायाम् अप्रयोगस्य युक्तत्वात् ॥

हृदयसंवादोऽपि तथाविधतच्चज्ञानबीजसंस्कारभावितानां भवत्येव; यदृक्ष्यति 'मोक्षे चापि विरागिणः' इति । सर्वस्य न सर्वत्र हृदयसंवादः, भयानके वीरप्रकृतेःरभावात् । ननु तादृशि प्रयोक्ते वीरस्य क आस्वादः । उच्यते — यत्रायं निवध्यते, तत्रास्वयं पुरुषार्थोपयोगिनि, श्रृङ्गारवीरादन्यतममस्येव । तत्रिष्ठस्तेषामास्वादः । यत्नापि प्रहसनादौ हास्यादेः प्रधनता तत्राऽप्यनुनिष्पादिरसान्तरनिष्ठ एवास्वादः । भिन्नभिन्नाधिकार्याश्रयादोदेश एव रूपकभेदचिन्तने निमित्तमिति केचित् ।

तस्मादस्ति शान्तो रसः । तथा च चिरंतनपुस्तकेषु 'स्थायिभावान् रसत्वमुपने- ष्यामः' इत्यनन्तरं शान्तो नाम शमस्थायिभावात्मक इत्यादि शान्तलक्षणं पठ्यते । तत्र सर्वरसां शान्तप्राय एवास्वादः, विषयेभ्यो विपरीवृत्त्या । तन्मुच्यतांलाभः केवलं वासनान्तरोपहित इति । अत्र सर्वप्रकृतित्वाभिधानाय पूर्वभाविभावनं लोके च पृथक् पृथग् सामन्यास्य न गणनमिति स्थाय्यस्य पृथङ् नोक्तः । सामान्यमपि तु विवेचकेन पृथगेव गणनी- यमिति विवेचकाभिमतसामाजिकास्वादलक्षणप्रतीतिविषयतया स पृथग्भूत एव । इतिहासपुराणाभिधानकोशादौ च नव रसाः श्रूयन्ते, श्रीमत्तिद्धान्तशास्त्रेऽपि । तथा चोक्तम्—

'अष्टानामिह देवानां श्रृङ्गारादीन् प्रदर्शयेत् । मध्ये च देवदेवस्य शान्तं रूपं प्रदर्शयेत् ।।'

तस्य च वैराग्यसंसरभीरुतादयो विभावा: । सु हि तैरुपनिबद्धैरविभ्नायते । मोक्षशास्त्रचिन्तादयोऽनुभावा: । निर्वेदमतिसृष्टिधृत्यादयो व्यभिचारिणः । अत एव ईश्वरप्रणिधानविषये भक्तिश्रद्दे स्मृतिमतिधृत्युल्साहानुप्रविष्टेऽन्यथैवाऽऽनुभिति न तयोः पृथग्‌प्रस्त्वेन गणनम् । अत्र संग्रहकारिका—

मोक्षाध्यानिमित्ततत्चज्ञानार्थहेतुसंयुक्तः ।

नि:श्रेयसधर्मयुतः शान्तरसो नाम विज्ञेयः ॥

विभावस्थाय्यनुभावयोगः क्रमात् विशेषणत्रयेण दर्शितः ।

स्वं स्वं निमित्तमादाय शान्तादुत्पद्यते रसः ।

पुरनिमित्तापाये तु शान्त एव प्रलीयते ॥

इत्यादिना रसान्तरप्रकृतित्वमुपसंहतम् ।

यत्तु डिमे हास्यश्रृङ्गारपरिहारेण षड्रसत्वं च वक्ष्यते, तत्रायं भावः । 'द्वितरसरसकाव्योनी:' इति भाविना लक्षणेन रौद्रप्रधाने तावडिमे तद्विरुद्धस्य शान्तस्य संभावना नैव

न, किं निषेधेन । शान्तासंभवे तु द्वितरसकाव्योनीरित्येतें किं व्यवच्छेदम्? श्रृङ्गारहास्यवर्जं

षड्रसयुक्त इति हुक्के तत्र प्रसङ्गः । ननु करुणवीभत्समयनकप्राधान्यमन्यनैन पादेन व्यवच्छेद्यते ।

नैतत्, साच्चत्यारभटीवृत्तिसंपन्न इत्येनैन तत्रिरासात् । शान्ते तु साच्चत्येव वृत्तिरिति न

तदृश्यवच्छेदकमेवैतत् । तेन डिमलक्षणं प्रत्येत शान्तरसस्य सद्भावे लिङ्गम् । श्रृङ्गारस्तु

प्रसभसेव्यमानः संभावना एव । तदृश्यं च हास्य इति तयोरव प्रतिषेधः कृतः, प्राप्तत्वात् ।

सर्वसाम्याच्च विशेषतो वर्णदेवताभिधानमनुचितमप्यस्य तत्काल्पितमिति झ्रेयम् ।

उत्पत्तिस्तु शान्तस्यापि दर्शितैव । स विभावो हि हास्यरसः (?) । विभावत्वेन चास्य वीर-

वीभत्सौ (?) । अत एवं रसस्य यमनियमेश्वरप्राणिधानाद्युपदेशः अभिनयोपयोगितया

महाफलवं सर्वप्राधान्यमितिकृत्व्यापकत्वं चोपपन्नमिति अलंमिति प्रसङ्गेन ।

तत्त्वास्वादोडस्य कीदृशः? उच्यते — उपरागदायिभिः उत्साहादिभिरुपरक्तं

यदात्मस्वरूपं तदेव विमलोचितस्वात्मानिर्भासमानसत्तास्वाद् यदाह्नितत्त्वस्वरूपं

सकलेषु रत्यादिषु उपरज्येषु तथाभावेनापि सकृदिभातोड्यमात्रेति न्यायेन भासमानं

पराड्मुखतात्मकसकलदुःखजालहीनं परमानन्दलाभसंविदेकधनं काव्यप्रयोगप्रबन्धाभ्यां साधा-

रणतया निर्भासनानं अन्तर्मुखावस्थाभोदेन लोकोत्तरानन्दनायनं तथाविधहृदयं विधत्त इति ।

एते नैव रसाः, पुंरर्थोपयोगित्वेन रक्षणाधिक्येन वा इयतामेव उपदेश्यत्वात् ।

तेन रसान्तरसंभवेडपि पार्षदप्रसिद्धया संख्यानियम इति यदनैकृत्कं तत्प्रयुक्तकम् । भाव-

ध्याये चैतदृश्यते । आर्द्रतास्थायिकः स्नेहो रस इति त्वस्मत् । स्नेहो ह्याभिषङ्गः । स च

सर्वो रत्यतिशयादावेव पर्यवस्यति । तथा हि बालस्य मातापित्रो: स्नेहः भये विश्वानः

यूनो मित्रजने रतौ, लक्ष्मणादौ: भ्रातरि स्नेहः धर्मवीर एव । एवं वृद्धस्य पुत्रादावपि

द्रष्टव्यम् । एषैव गर्भस्थायिकस्य लौल्यरसस्य प्रत्यक्ष्याने सरसिन्मनन्तऽय्य, हसे वा रतौ वा

अन्यत्र पर्यवसानात् । एवं भक्तावपि वाच्यमिति ।

120

Translation :

The3 nature of śānta will now be explained according to those who follow the reading nava rasāh ( nine rasas ). ( instead of the reading aṣṭau rasāh ). In this connection some say that śama is the sthāyibhāva of śānta and that it arises from vibhāvas such as ascetic practices, association with Yogins, etc. It can be represented on the stage by anubhāvas such as the absence of lust, anger, etc. Its vyabhicāribhāvas will be firmness, wisdom, etc. Others however do not accept this, because, they say, śama and śānta are synonyms. Nor do they wish to relinquish the figure of 49 bhāvas3 ( that was given by Bharata ). Moreover, they say that it is proper for the vibhāvas such as the seasons, flowers, etc., to be connected with love, etc., which arise immediately after these ( vibhāvas are apprehended ). But ascetic practices, Vedic recitation, etc., do not immediately give rise to śānta.

1. The text used here is that given by Dr. V. Raghavan in the revised edition of " The Number of Rasas, " published in 1967, p. 104 ff. All textual corrections will be found in the notes.

2. The three largest discussions in the Abhinavabhāratī are all in the sixth chapter of the N Ś. ( All of the seventh chapter of the Abhinavabhāratī but the very beginning has been lost, which is a great misfortune, since Abhinava refers to it frequently. It must have been a large and important section of the A. Bh. ). One deals with śṛngāra, the other (ed. and tr. by Gnoli) is on the arisal of rasa, and this is the third. But Abhinava was to some extent aware that there was something artificial about the śantarasa section, for he says: ye punar nava rasā iti paṭhanti, thereby clearly suggesting that this was a pāṭhāntara, and not an established part of the text. ( Note that on page 83 of the Lócana, Abhinava quotes the text of the N Ś that reads: ity aṣṭau nātye rasāh smṛtāh, which shows that he must have regarded this as a more authoritative text ); He uses this same type of expression when discussing the god of śānta ( buddha ! ) and the colour ( svaccha ). (See also A. Bh. p. 267 : तेन प्रथमं रसः। रते: य नव । शान्ताप्राप्त्युपायनिरूपणस्थैव तत्पाठान्तम् ! This on N Ś. VII. 15, which gives the list as follows :

शृङ्गारहास्यकरुणा रौद्रवीरभयानकाः । वीभत्साद्भुतसंज्ञौ चेत्यष्टौ नाट्ये रसा: स्मृताः ॥

It is odd that it never occurred to Abhinava to say that the figure 8 only applied to the drama, and that Bharata might have sanctioned the 9th rasa for poetry. But of course Abhinava did not want to compromise even this much ). Now does Abhinava mean that he too " read " nava rasāh ? He must, for otherwise we cannot understand the sentence : tanmate śāntasvarūpam abhidhīyate. But it is clear that he was not the first to do so. ( Cf. N Ś. on I. 1, the A. Bh., p. 5, where Bhaṭṭanāyaka's view is quoted from the Hṛdayadarpaṇa : इति लोकोत्तरपरमपुरुषार्थसूचनेन शान्तरसोऽपक्षेपोड्यं भविष्यति ।)

It is, however, doubtful that he had in front of him the text of the N Ś. on śantarasa as we have it.

3. The forty-nine bhāvas are: eight sthāyibhāvas, eight sāttvikabhāvas and thirty-three vyabhicāribhāvas. This means that the exact number of vibhāvas ( which are really innumerable ), and of anubhāvas, is not given. Of course Bharata does mention, for each rasa, its anubhāvas as well as its vibhāvas, though he does not separately enumerate them in a Kārikā.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

121

one argue1 that ascetic practices, Vedic recitation, etc., are the immediate causes of the knowledge of the truth, then, since the knowledge of the truth which precedes ( śānta ) is their ( immediate ) effect, they cease to be the vibhāvas of śānta. Even the absence of lust, etc., cannot be the anubhāva, because it is not conclusive evidence ( of śānta ), inasmuch as it is found to be present in rasas other than śānta as well,2 and because it cannot be combined with a stage-representation ( pravoga ). After all, it is not possible to display a cessation of activity. For example, even the anubhāvas sleep, swoon, etc., can be shown by actions like breathing in and out, falling down, lying on the ground, etc. (As for vyabhicāribhāvas), how can firmness of mind, etc., which is accompanied by a desire for the attainment of objects,3 be appropriate to śānta? Those to be instructed cannot be taught how to attain the knowledge of the truth by means of a state of complete inactivity.4 Those people whose minds are pained by the sufferings of other people have not ( yet ) reached a state of tranquillity characterised by correct perception ( of the highest truth ), but rather they are ( still ) caught in the turmoil of worldly life.5 Therefore śāntarasa does not exist. The reply is

1. Vībhāva can be equated with kāraṇa, the immediate cause that arouses the sthāyibhāva of a rasa. The argument here then is that Vedic recitation, etc., do not immediately precede the sthāyibhāva (śama) of śānta. The Pūrvapakṣin's point is that if Vedic recitation, etc., are the immediate causes of tattvajñāna, then they cannot also be the vibhāvas of śānta, for they would be at one remove.

2. This line, śāntīd vipakṣād avyāvṛtteh, is difficult. If we take vipakṣa to mean "opposite" which is its usual meaning, the passage will make no sense, for, then it will be saying that even in the emotion which is the opposite of śānta (i.e. "love") there will be kāmaḍyabhāva, i.e., there will be no "love" in "love"! We will have to interpret vipakṣa to mean "anything different from śānta," i.e., any other rasa besides śānta. In other words, there is no kāma, etc., in such rasas as raudra and bhayānaka.

3. Prōptavisayoparāga. Pandit Srinivasa Shastri of the Deccan College, who was kind enough to read over some of the more difficult passages with us, says that uparāgah here means sambandhah, so that the phrase will mean : यत्र विषयस्य संबन्धः प्राप्नो भवति । According to him, since śānta is a state of no mental activity at all, how can there be any contact with viṣayas therein? But another interpretation is possible : dḥrti is defined in the 7th ch. of the NŚ. (Vol. I, p. 363, VII, 56) as arising from, among other things, manorathalābha. These are its vibhāvas (note that for Bharata the vyabhicāribhāvas can become sthāyibhāvas and have their own vibhāvas, etc., As Abhinava will point out later in this passage). Its anubhāvas are : तामिनयेत् प्राप्तानां विषयाणामुपभोगात् upabhogah, "pleasure," and interpret as : "accompanied by a desire for the attainment of sense-objects."

4. We interpret akiñcitatvamātra here as the complete absence of any action, which is supposed to result from the state of tattvajñāna.

5. The point is that we can only sympathise with another person's pain if we still identify with the body. For the Jīvanmukta (i.e. the सम्यग्दर्शनसमाव सथाप्राप्तपुरुष—

(Continued on next page)

... 16

122

as follows :1 Just as in this world there is the trilogy dharma, etc., so also,

it is quite well-known that mokṣa too is one of the goals of life, and it is

found to be taught predominantly in the śāstras and in the smr̥tis and itihāsas,

etc., by specifying the means leading to its attainment. Just as the states of

mind that are proper to love, etc. and expressed by such words as sexual love

( rati ) etc., by being made capable of being relished through the activity of

the poet and the actor, are brought to the status of rasas such as śṛṅgāra,

etc., in relation to the spectators who are possessed of the proper sympa-

thetic response; in the same way, we ask you to tell us why the state of mind

which is appropriate to the highest goal of man known as mokṣa cannot be

( Continued from previous page )

--note how this phrase samyagdarsana is often used in Buddhism in many variations

samyagbodhi, etc.), such identifications are not possible. The main character of śānta

dramas is supposed to be paramakārunikatva. The Pūrvapakṣin objects that this kind of

sympathy is found in worldly life and not in transcendental mystic states.

1. We take atrocylate as Abhinava's own position. He is of course quite

right in pointing out that mokṣa was already a well-known puruṣārtha long before

the NŚ. But that mokṣa should be prevalent in the smr̥tis and itihāsa does not, ipso facto,

establish any connection of it with literature. We must remember that for

people like Abhinavagupta, the smr̥tis and itihāsas were not literature in the strict

sense of the word. Nobody, of course, would have argued that śānta in the sense of

mokṣapuruşārtha does not occur in such works. The point was whether it could occur

in the far more refined Nāṭakas and Kāvyas. It simply never occurred to these older

writers that one can apply the term literature to many of these works, as well

as to a large number of purely religious works, e.g. the Mahāparinibbānasutta in

Pāli, and several of the Sanskrit Mahāyāna Sūtras, e.g., the Vajracchedikā, or the

Vimalakīrtinirdeśa ( not available in Sanskrit, but recently so beautifully translated

into French by Professor Ét. Lamotte ). Even the Gītā, in spite of the fact that

Ānandavardhana ( p. 293 ) quotes the verse yā niśā sarvabhūtānām, etc., as an example

of dhvani, was not really considered "literature" in the strict, and restricted, sense

of the term that the Indians used it. This restriction was a great loss to the theory,

for dhvani would have been more faithfully served, in illustration, by passages from

many of these religious or secular texts ( e.g. the Brhatkathāslokasaṅgraha ) than by

the Nāṭakas and the Kāvyas, many of which were artificially composed to conform to a

given rasa and its definition by Bharata. One has only to think of some of the literary

passages in the Upaniṣads ( e.g. Satyakāma Jābāla, or Raikva with the Cart ) to

realise how much the Indians lost by such a restriction. If later writers like Jagan-

nātha Paṇḍitarāja widened the definition of Kāvya (ramanīyārthapratipādakah śabdah

kāvyam ) it still does not mean that they went for their examples to this non-literary

literature. Viśvanātha comes closest when he says: vākyam rasātmakam kāvyam,

but even he never uses the vast literature that true obedience to such a phrase would

make available. It was only the Bengal school of Vaiṣṇavism that opened itself to the

influence of religious literature, but its purpose was more religious than it was aesthetic,

and was confined, for the most part, to such works as the Bhāgavatapurāṇa. ( One thinks

of some of the fine examples that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī a strict Advaitin, chose from

the Bhāgavatapurāṇa in his Bhagavadbhaktirasāyanam ).

ĀBHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

raised to the status of a rasa ?1 That state of mind just described is indeed

the sthāyibhāva of śānta. But one must consider what its name is. Some

say that it is complete detachment ( nirveda—world-weariness )2 that is born

from a knowledge of truth. For this detachment is quite different from the

detachment that arises from poverty, etc., because its cause, viz. knowledge

of the truth, is different. It was for this very reason (i. e. because nirveda is

the sthāyibhāva of śānta ) that it has been mentioned ( by Bharata ) midway

between the sthāyibhāvas and the sañcāribhāvas (i. e. vyabhicāribhāvas ).3

1. There seems to us no doubt in reading through the objections made against

śāntarasa that the objectors had a real point. There is something about ŚR that

forces it apart from all the other rasas. It is true, as the Pūrvapakṣin argues, that

we find that all people are open to love, to fear, to terror etc. ( some more than

others, and some only to certain emotions of course - as Abhinava points out in his

commentary on the famous rasasūtra of the NŚ, we have, in the course of our

many lives, experienced all of the primary emotions, the sthāyibhāvas ). But śānta is

peculiar. Truly to be able to enjoy it, one must be religious ( at least this was the

Indian view - today we are more sophisticated : it is perfectly possible to be moved

by a religious spectacle without feeling primary "religious sentiments " ), and if the

śāntarasa experience truly takes place during a drama, it must change our lives. It

is not like the other rasas, which simply enrich us, provide great scope for our imagi-

nation, refine our sensibilities, in short to all the things that great literary experi-

ences are supposed to do. It is not that it demands a suspension of judgment as do

the other rasas, a momentary identification with different emotions. It means a

complete reversal of our personality, what the Buddhists call parāvrtti ( see the con-

troversial article on this word by A. Coomaraswamy, "Transformation, Regeneration,

Anagogy," in Festschrift Ernst Winternitz, 1933 ). We believe that it was this

difference, this sense of the "completely other " in ŚR that bothered so many literary

critics in ancient India. While one sympathises with their hesitation, one can also

understand the point of view of people like Abhinava, for whom these religious ex-

periences were an integral part of their everyday life and especially of, their literary

life. Witness the great number of hymns attributed to people like Saṅkara, and the

surviving ones of Abhinava and Ānanda. The conflict, the real conflict, which we see

as one between the secular-minded literary critic and the religious-minded literary critic,

never really came out into the open, except in this one argument over ŚR, for it was

assumed, by all, that nearly everybody was religious. From our perspective, however, it

is clear that some critics were more religious than others.

2. Nirveda can mean two things : it can have an ordinary, everyday sense of

"disgust," and it can have the more subtle and religious sense of "total detachment "

from the world. Abhinava is here implicilty referring to this distinction.

3. This is a very curious, and we believe, a very weak argument : Bharata has

begun his list of the vyabhicāribhāvas ( VII. 28, p. 356 ) with nirveda at the top ( tatra

nirvedo nāma dāridryavyādhi, etc.). Now, it is said by "some people " as reported

by Abhinava, that Bharata had great respect for the idea of the maṅgala, that is, begin-

ning a new topic with an auspicious word. Nirveda is not an auspicious word,

therefore, Bharata ( since he cannot be presumed to be in error ), must have had some

special intention in mind. According to these "some people " it is to show that

nirveda is actually a sthyāyibhāva and also a vyabhicāribhāva. The view regarding

the dual character of nirveda as both sthyāyibhāva and vyabhicāribhāva is expressed

by Mammata in the KP, IV ( p. 116, Jhalkikar's ed. BORI - see his comments, p. 116,

last paragraph ).

124

Otherwise (i. e. if nirveda had not been intended by Bharata as the sthāyi-bhāva of śānta ), the sage who had great regard for uttering an auspicious word at the commencement of a section of his work ( māngalika ) would not have mentioned nirveda at that place ( i. e. he would not have put the inauspicious word nirveda at the head of the list of vyabhicāribhāvas ). When Bharata forbade the use of disgust ( jugupsā ) as a vyabhicāribhāva of śṛṅgāra, he sanctioned ( by implication )1 the interchangeability of the characters of the sthāyibhāvas, the sañcāribhāvas, the sāttvikabhāvas, and the anubhāvas, in the case of all the 49 bhāvas as demanded by the requirements of a particular situation and as presented by the power of words and their senses. Nirveda arises from knowledge of the truth and overwhelms the other sthāyins. For only that ( emotion ) which is more highly stable than any of the other sthāyins such as love etc. which can tolerate co-existence with a variety of emotions,2 that alone ( namely nirveda ), they say, can overwhelm other sthāyins.

They also raise the following objection : if nirveda which arises from knowledge of the truth, is said to be the sthāyibhāva of śānta, [ this amounts to saying that knowledge of the truth is the vibhāva (i.e. cause ) of nirveda ], in which case how could vairāgya ( detachment ) and similar other things3 ( e.g. samādhi, which have been mentioned as vibhāvas of nirveda ) be the vibhāvas of nirveda ? If one were to claim that detachment, etc., become the vibhāva of nirveda because they are the means of attaining to the knowledge of the truth, then it would mean that you are giving the name vibhāva to that which is the cause of another cause,4 and that would involve you in a great absurdity ( since vibhāva means the direct cause of a sthāyibhāva and not the distant or remote cause ). Moreover nirveda is an attitude of rejecting everything ( i. e. an attitude of not being attached to anything ), and it

1. The point is that normally jugupsā is the sthāyibhāva of bībhatsa. It is not given in the list of the thirty-three vyabhicāribhāvas, but the very fact that Bharata says that it should not be used in love shows that he felt that it could be a vyabhicāri-bhāva as well as a sthāyibhāva. He, therefore, felt that under certain circumstances, ordinary vyabhicāribhāvas could become sthāyibhāvas, and sthāyibhāvas could become vyabhicāribhāvas. This is an important point, Abhinava has expressed a similar view in the Locana on the third Uddyota of the Dhvanyāloka, while commenting on bahūnām samavetānām, on p. 386 of the B. P. ed.

2 Bhāvaicitryasahisnubyah, "which can tolerate co-existence with a variety of emotions." Does this mean that whereas rati, etc., can tolerate the presence of other sthāyibhāvas, nirveda the sthāyibhāva of śānta cannot ?

3. We take sabīja to mean sadrśa, just as sajātīya is taken to mean sadrśa. Literally it means "coming from the same seed," i. e. the same source. The word ādi in the compound vairāgyasabījādiṣu ( i. e. vairōgyasadṛśeṣu ) is redundant. We have, therefore, ignored it in the translation.

4. Again, vibhāva cannot mean both "cause" and "cause of the cause." See page 121, note 1.

ĀBHINAVĀ'S PHILOSOPHÝ OF AESTHETICS

125

would on the contrary be helpful to the emergence of the knowledge of

the truth ( i.e. far from being the effect of the knowledge of the truth,

it would be a cause leading to it ), because a detached person will strive

in such a fashion that the knowledge of the truth arises in him. And mokṣa

comes from a knowledge of the truth. It is not that one knows the truth,

and then feels detached, and from that detachment mokṣa would arise. For

Īśvarakṛṣṇa says :

" From detachment comes ( only ) prakṛtilaya, ( i.e. dissolution into

the eight causes, pradhāna, buddhi, ahaṅkāra, and the pañcatanmātras, and

not mokṣa ").1 Objection : " Everywhere one sees a very great detachment

on the part of those who know the truth. Even Patañjali has said :

" Thereafter from that knowledge of the truth ( puruṣakhyāti ) arises

an extreme aversion to the guṇas ( i.e. detachment )."2 That is true ( bhavaty

evam ). But Patañjali himself3 has said : " Such detachment is really the

highest state ( kāṣṭhā ) of knowledge." Thus4 then, knowledge of the truth

( leading to aversion according to Yogasūtra I. 16 ) means nothing but know-

ledge of the truth reinforcing itself from state to stage.5 And so nirveda is

not the sthāyibhāva of śānta. On the other hand, knowledge of the truth alone

would be the sthāyibhāva. As for right perception, which will be mentioned

( by Bharata ) while describing nirveda as a vyabhicārabhāva, as a vibhāva of

1. Sāṅkhyakārikā 45. This means that if a person has vairāgya only, but no

knowledge of the truth, he becomes, on his death, dissolved into the eight causes

( namely, pradhāna, buddhi, ahaṅkāra and the pañca-tanmātras ) but he does not obtain

mokṣa. Thus, it would seem that Īśvarakṛṣṇa holds the view that vairāgya does not

directly lead to mokṣa.

2. Yogasūtra, I. 16.

3. Vyāsa's Bhāṣya on the Yogasūtra, ( Ānandāśrama ed. p., 20 ). Patañjali,

the author of the Mahābhāṣya, is considered to be an incarnation of Seṣa ( bhujanga-

vibhu ). Therefore it would seem that Abhinava thought Patañjali the author of the

Yogasūtras to be identical with the Patañjali of the Mahābhāṣya ( which of

course he is not ). Raghavan has pointed out ( p. 106 ) that the quotation is not

from Patañjali, but from Vyāsa. Did Abhinava simply make an error in the

ascription, or did he believe that Vyāsa and Patañjali were one and the same? See

V. Raghavan, " Abhinavagupta and the Bhāṣya on the Yogasūtra," A. O. R. Madras,

Vol. XII, Part II, 1938-39.

4. This passage : कि तु तत्त्वज्ञानमेव स्थायी भवेत् is Abhinava's own position.

Bhavet here must be used ( according to Pāṇini III. 3. 161 ) in the sense of bhavitum

arhati.

5. Tattvajñānamālā means a series or succession of tattvajñānas. The idea

seems to be that the tattvajñāna referred to by the word puruṣakhyāti in Yogasūtra

I. 16 is a lower tattvajñāna which grows or develops into a higher stage of tattvajñāna

( referred to by the word gunavaitṛṣṇyan in the Yogasūtra ). Idam tattvajñānam there-

fore would mean : गुणैत्रैतृष्ण्यशब्दवाच्ये तत्त्वज्ञानम्। तत्त्वज्ञानमालया परिपोष्यमाणे would mean :

पुरुषख्यातिशब्दवाच्येन तत्त्वज्ञानेन परिपोष्यमाणम्, उत्तरौत्तरं प्रकर्षाप्रस्थानं नीमामानम्।

126

nirveda, and which leads to the dissipation of the attitude of acceptance ( or attachment to unworthy objects ) on the part of a person who has been deceived by a delusion of long standing, as exemplified in the following stanza :

" In vain did I milk a bull mistaking it for a cow bending under the burden of her full udder; in vain1 did I embrace an ugly eunuch thinking him to be a young girl; in vain did I cherish a longing for a piece of glittering glass thinking it to be beryl. All this I did when bemused as I was, I bowed to you, a miser unable to appreciate merit "—

well, that perception of truth has been mentioned as a vibhāva (cause) of only the ordinary kind of nirveda2 whose nature is sadness ( arising from a realisation of one's stupidity in wasting energy in a worthless (cause).3

We will speak of this ( perception of truth ) there4 ( i.e. in the seventh chapter while commenting on the section on nirveda ). Objection : " Attach-ment to the sense-objects is rooted in false knowledge. It will cease when knowledge of the truth arises.5 This is what the revered Akṣapāda has

1. The second comparison in this poor verse ( it is interesting that it is the only verse quoted by Abhinava in the whole śāntarasa section. It is strange that he should have chosen to give no effective examples of śāntarasa, considering that there was such a large variety to choose from, and it would have been very much to the point ) is somewhat odd, for if the " boy " was lāvanyarahitah, we can only assume that he was embraced due to inadequate lighting !

2. Samyagjñāna, therefore, means here only a worldly kind of "right knowledge" and is not used in the higher sense of the term.

3. This is a reference to NŚ VII, 28, pp. 356-357. Abhinava's point seems to be that nirveda as a vyabhicāribhāva is the ordinary kind of worldly nirveda ( khedarūpanirveda ), while nirveda as a sthāyibhāva is a higher, philosophical nirveda. It is, however, interesting to note that among the vibhāvas of nirveda, Bharata mentions tattvajñāna. At NŚ VII, 30 ( G. O. S. Vol. I. p. 357 ) Bharata says :

बाधपरिप्लुतनयनः पुनरश नि:श्वसदीनसुमुखनेत्र: ।

योगीव ध्यानपरो भवति हि निर्वेदवान् पुरुषः ॥

The idea here seems to be that nirveda is to be acted out by means of, among other things, absorption in thought ( dhyānaparattva ) similar to that of a Yogin. However, it does not follow that Bharata had any religious notion about nirveda while writing this stanza, although it is true that the term tattvajñāna will then be puzzling.

4. The promised discussion is not available. Unfortunately this section of the seventh chapter of the Abhinavabhāratī has never been found. The editor ( Kavi ) writes ( p. 347 ) :

एतस्मात्प्रभृति नवमाध्यायपर्यन्तं व्याख्या नोपलब्धा । यदि लघुभागस्य ग्रन्थान्तं मुद्रणावस्थाय-मन्वहं प्रयतमानानामसाकं दृष्ट्वा व्याख्याभागो नोपलभ्येत तदा महान्ग्रन्थसूत्रविच्छेदामङ्गलपरिहरणाय

शुकुमारजनमनःपरिबोधनाय चासाभिरेव रचितां व्याख्यां सर्वेऽथानुचितामप्यसिद्धैव ग्रन्थान्ते योजयिष्यामः ।

However, Kavi did not live to fulfil his promise.

5. This is a reference to Nyāyasūtra, I. I. 2: दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानाना-मूलरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः।

The upshot of the preceding argument based on the ( Continued on next page )

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

127

said in his Sūtra beginning with the words duḥkhajamma etc., when he says

that knowledge of the truth is caused by the removal of false knowlegde and

that it is further the cause of vairāgya which is of the nature of the removal

of all faults ( doṣa ) ( such as attachment to worldly pleasures ).” “ So

what ?” “ Well, vairāgya and nirveda are the same thing1 ( and therefore,

nirveda is the sthāyin and tattvajñāna is a vibhāva ).” Who says so? For nirveda

is a certain state of mind which is characterised by flow of sadness, where-

as vairāgya is the complete destruction of rāga, etc. ( including śoka, i. e.

vairāgya is a higher form of detachment than is nirveda, for the latter is

often used non-technically to mean simply “ weariness ” or “ disgust ”). Even

granting that vairāgya and nirveda are identical, still Gautama placed it in

the midst of several ( other causes of mokṣa ) and did not mention it as the

immediate cause of mokṣa ( for it is only the remote cause ), ( and so it does

not follow that according to Akṣapāda nirveda that is, vairāgya, is the

sthāyibhāva of śānta ). Moreover2 to say that nirveda arising from tattva-

( Continued from previous page )

sūtra of Akṣapāda is that mithyājñānāpacaya leads to tattvajñāna and tattvajñāna leads

to vairāgya. The opponent thinks that vairāgya is the same thing as nirveda. Hence

according to Akṣapāda the causal chain is : mithyājñānāpacaya gives rise to tattva-

jñāna which gives rise to nirveda. So, this means that according to Akṣapāda, nirveda

leads to mokṣa and hence, nirveda ( and not tattvajñāna ) must be regarded as the sthāyi-

bhāva of śānta. Now, the opponent challenges the position that vairāgya and nirveda

are identical, and then proceeds to point out the difference between nirveda and

vairāgya. He says that nirveda is a particular attitude of mind which is of the nature

of unbroken sadness ( śokapravāhaprasara ), while vairāgya is the destruction of rāga,

dveṣa, moha, etc. The opponent of kecinmata ( this refers to the view mentioned on

p. 105 of Raghavan's text, that nirveda born of tattvajñāna is the sthāyibhāva of śānta,

see foot-note 2, p. 123, above ) first challenges the position that vairāgya and nirveda are

identical. But then he concedes it for the sake of argument in the sentence bhāvatu

vā vairāgyam eva nirvedah. Even granting that nirveda and vairāgya are identical,

it does not follow that according to Akṣapāda nirveda (i. e. vairāgya ) is the sthāyi-

bhāva of śānta. For although nurveda has a place in the causal sequence given above

[ the whole chain is : mithyājñānāpacaya (i. e. tattvajñāna ) leads to doṣāpāya (i. e.

nirveda or vairāgya ), which leads to pravrttyapāya, which leads to janmāpāya, which

leads to duḥkhāpāya, which leads to mokṣa ], still it is not actually stated in the Sūtra

to be the direct cause leading to mokṣa, but rather it is given as a remote cause

( mokṣe sādhye sūtrastāniyatā na pratyapādi ōcāryeṇa ). Thus according to the opponent

of kecinmata, the authority of Akṣapāda cannot be cited in support of the view that nirveda

is the sthāyibhāva of śānta. For if at all anything is to be the sthāyibhāva of śānta, it

must be the direct and immediate cause of mokṣa.

1. The question mark in Raghavan's text after nanu vairāgyam nirvedah

should be removed.

2. This is a complex passage. Kimca tattvajñānothito etc. is the position of

the Siddhāntin, that is, of Abhinava. It is an objection against the kecinmata ( namely

that tattvajñānajanirveda is the sthāyibhāva of śānta ). The essence of the

objection seems to be that the words denoting the sthāyibhāva and the rasa become

( Continued on next page )

128

śāntarasa

jñāna is the sthāyibhāva of śānta means that you are giving to śama the name nirveda.1 ( Reply :) śama and śānta have been explained as synonyms like hāsa and hāsya ( i. e. sthāyibhāva and rasa ). ( But the synonymity in the case of śānta and śama is only apparent and not real ). There is a real difference between śānta ( the rasa ) and śama ( the sthāyibhāva ), for śama is siddha, an accomplished fact, while śānta is sādhya, something to be accomplished; śama is laukika, worldly, while śānta is alaukika, other-worldly; śama is sādhāraṇa, ordinary, while śānta is asādhāraṇa, extraordinary.2 Therefore, nirveda cannot be the sthāyibhāva of śānta.

Others believe that only eight mental states have been mentioned ( by Bharata ), such as love, etc. Those same3 mental states when depending on extra-worldly vibhāvas such as śruta ( study of the scriptures and especially of the Upaniṣads ), which are different from the ordinary ( kathita ) vibhāvas, become indeed unusually lovely ( vicitra ). And from out of their midst one can become the sthāyin here ( i. e. in the case of śāntarasa ). Out of them ( tatra ), rati alone, having for its object one’s own Self consisting of undisturbed bliss is the means of attaining mokṣa. And so, that rati itself is the sthāyin in śānta. For it has been said :

( Continued from previous page )

synonymous, which is improper. The next sentence continues the view of the Siddhāntin : शमशान्त्योः पर्यायत्वं तु हासहास्याभ्यां व्याख्यातसु । and contains within it the objection that the Pūrvapakṣin might make, namely that hāsa and hāsya are synonymous as well. Abhinava replies that this has already been explained. But now what follows does not make sense if it is explained as the view of the Siddhāntin. For Abhinava says : सिद्धसाध्यतया, लौकिकालौकिकत्वेन, साधारणासाधारणतया च वैलक्षण्यं शम-शान्त्योरपि सुलभमेव । Now these distinctions are well-known as being the major distinctions between the sthāyibhāva and rasa. The sthāyibhāva is always laukika, whereas rasa is always alaukika. The same thing would therefore apply to śama and śānta, namely one would be the laukikasthāyibhāva, and the other the alaukika-rasa. Now why does Abhinava say this; for it only lends support to the Pūrvapakṣin ? Moreover tasmān na nirvedah sihāyīti does not follow from it. On the other hand, if we take the words samaśontayoh, etc., as stating the view of the Pūrvapakṣin, the next sentence tasmān na nirvedah sthāyīti presents a real difficulty. For if the Pūrvapakṣin is speaking, and has just made a valid point, it makes no sense for the Siddhāntin to reply by saying : " therefore our position is proved." Thus both solutions are unsatisfactory.

1. Note that on p. 268, Vol. III, NŚ, nirveda is given as the sthāyin of śānta !

2. We cannot ascertain any difference between laukika and alaukika on the one hand, and sādhāraṇa and asādhāraṇa on the other, such that Abhinava would be justified in using both terms. Surely sādhāraṇa and laukika mean precisely the same thing.

3. Raghavan reads tata eva. But the Baroda ed. has ta eva ( i. e. te eva ) which seems to us a better reading.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

129

" That man whose love is centered in the Self, who is gratified in his Self, and who takes all delight in the Self - for such a man there is nothing any longer to be accomplished."1

In the same way,2 any of the sthāyibhāvas beginning with rati and hāsa and ending with vismaya can be explained as the sthāyibhāva of śānta, because we find that a person attains to liberation if he realises the oddity of everything in the world ( hāsa ); if he sees that the whole world is lamentable ( śoka ); if he perceives the happenings in the world as harmful to his spiritual well-being ( and, angrily with them, desires to conquer them ) ( krodha ); if he resorts to extraordinary energy dominated by the absence of delusion3 ( utsāha ); if he feels afraid of all the objects of the senses ( bhaya ); if he feels disgust for young women, etc., though they are desirable for all other people ( jugupsā ); if he feels astonished at his unprecedented realisation of his own self ( vismaya ). And Bharata agrees with this position. For while ( Bharata ) enumerates particular bhāvas by using words like rati, etc., and includes thereunder other varieties of the same by using the word ca,4 he does admit5 their ability to lead to liberation, provided that they are the result of extraordinary causes ( i.e. vibhāvas ) different from ordinary causes. But in the case of those people who hold this view ( namely that any one of the sthāyibhāvas such as rati, etc., can be the sthāyibhāva of śānta ), the different sthāyibhāvas would cancel each other out and so not even one of them could be regarded as the sthāyibhāva of śānta. If it is said that the different sthāyibhāvas can be the sthāyibhāvas of śānta because of the different approaches leading to it, that is ( as good as ) already refuted. ( Further ), because of the different sthāyibhāvas of śānta depending on the approaches of the persons concerned, there would be an infinity of śāntarasas. If it is said

1. Gītā, III, 17.

2. All eight of the sthāyibhāvas can be accepted as the sthāyibhāvas of śānta-rasa. For instance, hāsa can become the sthāyibhāva of śānta, if we look at everything around us as vairkta, "odd " or "deformed " ( note that the Vidūṣaka, the main representative of hāsa, is described in the texts as being deformed and thereby amusing ), etc. Rati is considered in the sentence immediately preceding the quotation from the Gītā.

3. Asammoha is one of the uddīpanavibhāvas of vīrarasa. See NŚ, Vol. I. p. 378. Cf. Abhinava's explanation of Ānanda's mangalaśloka of the Dhvanyāloka, p. 17, K. Sastri's ed.

4. Ca refers to NŚ., VI. 17, which enumerates the eight sthāyibhāvas and uses a ca after hāsa and śoka. According to Abhinava, the use of the particle ca is intended to convey the inclusion of other varieties of the eight sthāyibhāvas. It is not, however, clear what these varieties are.

5. Does etad ( in na caitan muner na sammatam ) refer to the interchangeability of vyabhicāribhāvas and sthāyibhāvas; or to the fact that the sthāyibhāvas of other rasas can induce an attitude leading to mokṣa ?

17

that there would be only one1 śantarasa ( and not countless śantarasas ) be-

cause of its being the cause of one single result, namely mokṣa, then even

vīra and raudra would have to be regarded as one rasa because both lead to

one single result, namely destruction ( of one’s enemy ). Others say that all

the sthāyibhāvas, rati, etc., become merged together, just as ( different flavours

merge together ) in a beverage,2 and when so merged they become the

• sthāyibhāvas ( of śānta ). But because different states of mind cannot co-

exist at one time, and because ( some ) are mutually antagonistic, even this is

not a very attractive thesis.

What then is the sthāyibhāva of śānta ? The reply is as follows :3

knowledge of the truth alone is the means of attaining mokṣa and so it would

be proper to regard that alone as the sthāyibhāva of mokṣa.4 Knowledge

of the truth is just another name for knowledge of the Self. The knowledge

of any object other than the Self is the knowledge of worldly objects.5 For

anything that is different from the Self is nothing but non-self. Our teacher

has dealt with this at great length. And we have gone into it in some detail

elsewhere, and so at this moment there is no point in dilating. Therefore,6

1. Eko rasaḥ means śantarasa since the whole of the preceding discussion

is concerned with śantarasa and is intended to show how all the sthāyibhāvas can be

connected with śāntarasa. To this it was replied, on p. 108, that ( 1 ) the different

sthāyibhūvas would cancel one another out, with the result that there would be not a

single sthāyibhāva for śānta, and ( 2 ) such a view would lead to not one rasa ( called

śantarasa ) but to an infinite number of śāntarasas depending on the divergent atti-

tudes and approaches of different persons. The opponent replies to this by saying that

since all these sthāyibhāvas ( helping the emergence of śantarasa ) would lead finally

to mokṣa, there would not be an infinity of śantarasas, but only one. To this the reply

is given on p. 109 : “ In that case since both vīra and raudra lead to a single result, namely

destruction of one’s enemy, they too would have to be regarded as constituting a single

rasa.” But we are not absolutely certain of this interpretation.

2. The comparison with pānakarasa is used again and again, both in the

Locana and in the Abhinavabhāratī. Cf. A. Bh. p. 286 : पानकरसावदोदपि किं गूढमरिचादिपु

दृष्ट इति समानमेतत् । See also the NŚ. Vol. I., p. 287 ff.

3. After ucyate begins the siddhānta view.

4. The word mokṣe in the phrase : इति तस्यैव मोक्षे स्थायिता युक्ता is odd. One expects śānte.

5. आत्मनः श्‍ न्यतिरिक्तस्य विषयस्यैव ज्ञानम् is very clumsily worded. We think the

distinction is between knowledge of the Self and ordinary knowledge ( cf. the Gītā

distinction between vijñāna and jñāna ). Whatever knowledge is different from the

Self is simply worldly knowledge, jñānam. The next sentence, paro hy evam ātmā

anātmaiva syāt is also very clumsy. How are we to understand paro ? We would

expect the noun governed by this adverb to be in the ablative : “ different from the

Self.” Raghavan records the reading ātmanā, instrumental singular, which would

also be irregular, but somewhat better than the nominative. Note that we read viṣayā-

syaiva instead of viṣayasyeva.

6. It is important to realise that at this point Abhinava abandons practical

considerations of drama, and gives the philosophic base underlying his views on śānta.

It is not different from the philosophical justification of an Advaitin — the additions from

his school of Kashmir Saivism are very slight.

ĀBHINĀVĀ'S PHILOSOPHÝ OF ÆSTHETICS

131

the Ātman alone possessed of such pure qualities as knowledge, bliss, etc., and devoid of the enjoyment of imagined sense-objects, is the sthāyibhāva of śānta. Its status as a sthāyibhāva should not be explained in the same terms as the status, as a sthāyibhāva, in the case of other sthāyibhāvas ( i. e. there is a great difference between the Ātman's status as a sthāyibhāva and the other sthāyibhāvas' status as sthāyibhāvas ). For rati, etc., which arise and disappear due to the emergence and disappearance of their respective causes, are called sthāyibhāvas in so far as they attach themselves for some time to the canvas1 ( wall ) in the form of the ātman which is of an unchanging nature relative to them. But knowledge of the truth is the canvas behind all emotions, and so it is the most stable of all the sthāyibhāvas. It transforms all the states of mind such as love, etc., into transitory feelings, and its status as a sthāyibhāva, having been established by its very nature, need not be specifically mentioned. And therefore it is not proper to count ( knowledge of the truth ) separately ( in addition to the eight sthāyibhāvas ). Between a lame bull and a dehorned bull,2 bullness ( which is the generic property present in both of the bulls ) is not considered as a third thing. And so the number, viz. forty-nine, of the bhāvas is not disturbed. Should one demand to know why then knowledge of the truth is separately considered (as a sthāyibhāva ) ( by me, Abhinavagupta ), we reply that it is so because it can be separately ejoyed.3 For whereas rati, etc., can be the subject of ordinary perception ( in their pure form ), without being mingled with anything else, the nature of the Self is ( of course ) not the subject of ordinary perception in its pure form without being mingled with anything else, the way rati etc., are. ( But ) even though in its pure nature4 it is of an indeterminate form, still when it is investigated at the time of the return from abstract meditation,5 it invariably appears as mingled with various mental states.

Or6 let it appear like that ( i. e. let the nature of the Self appear as you say, soiled by the various mental states ). Still you cannot consider as

1. Is this comparison of the Ātman to the canvas of the painter found elsewhere? We know that it occurs several times in the Yogavāsisṭhamahārāmāyana.

2. Muṇḍa cannot of course mean shaven here: The practice is to cut the horns of bulls so that they cannot harm anyone.

3. The reading as printed by Raghavan is : अस्यापि कथं न पृथग्मननति चेत् पृथगास्वादयोगादिति नून्महे । But he notes readings in M. & G. which have: अस्यापि कथं पृथग्गणनं चेत् पृथगास्वादयोगादिति नूनमहे । which seems to us to give a more rational sense. As for the next sentence, we think it means that the Ātman is not laukikapratiti-gocara as is rati, etc., because it is not mixed with any other form.

4. Svagatam means, according to Srinivasa Shastri, svasmin ātmani.

5. On vyutthāna, see Yogasūtras, III. 9, and III. 37.

6. It would appear from this concession, bhāsatām vā loke tathā, that this is Abhinava speaking. This means that the last sentence in the preceding paragraph must belong to the Pūrvapakṣin. But what precisely his point would be, we fail to see.

132

शान्तरसो

sthāyibhāvas all possible stable moods of the mind, for they are of no use so far as the ( eight ) rasas actually mentioned ( by Bharata ) are concerned. They rather deserve to be regarded as transitory feelings and not otherwise ( i. e. not as sthāyibhāvas ). And thus only can the statement ( praghaṭṭaka ) that there are in all forty-nine bhāvas be justified. This nature of the Self cannot be said to be transitory because it would be impossible, unimaginative ( avacitryāvaha ) and improper. Śama is the nature of the Self. Bharata has designated it ( i. e. the nature of the Self ) by the word śama. If that same ( nature of the Self ) is called śama or nirveda, there is no objection. Only ( note that ) śama is a different ( kind of ) state of mind ( altogether ). And this ( special ) nirveda is ( only apparently ) similar to the nirveda that arises from other causes such as poverty, etc. Although their causes are different, ( nonetheless, because ) they are similar, they are both called nirveda. This is similar ( to what takes place in ) love, fear, etc. (?)1 Therefore the nature of the Self is itself the knowledge of the Truth, and it is also tranquillity. Further ( tathā ca ) rati, etc., are ( only ) particular dark colorations ( kālusyoparāgaviśeṣāḥ ) of the Self ( or of śānta ? ). Having by means of continued concentration realised its form as being pure, though connected with them ( i. e. rati, etc. ), there is even at the time of withdrawing from meditation ( vyutthāna ), complete tranquillity ( of the spiritual aspirant, the sādhaka ). As has been said : praśāntavāhitā sam-skārāt.2 This entire collection of ordinary and extraordinary states of mind can become the helper of the major ( emotion ) known as knowledge of the Truth. Its anubhāvas are anubhāvas helped by yama, niyama, etc., and also the svabhāvābhinayas3 which will be described in the three chapters beginning with upāṅgābhinaya. And so they ( i. e. these anubhāvas ) are concerned with śāntarasa itself. This itself is its nature ( i. e. the nature of śāntarasa ).4 The vibhāvas are the grace of God, etc.5 And love etc., which are soon to be completely destroyed, can be aesthetically enjoyed in śānta ( as subsidiary, momentary elements ). Just as the vyabhicāri “eagerness” appears as important in love-during-separation or even in love-during-union, as said in the phrase: “ love whose festivity never comes to an end ”; and just as augry, a vyabhicārin, appears as prominent in raudra; and just as nirveda,

1. We simply cannot understand the simile ratibhayādiriva.

2. Yogasūtra, III. 10. But we cannot understand what bearing this has on the word praśāntatā used by Abhinava in the preceding sentence.

3. We cannot make out what svabhāvābhinaya means. The phrase upāṅgā-bhinayōdyadhyāyatraye refers to chaps. VIII, IX, and X of the NS.

4. We are not sure we have understood ayam eva hi svabhāvavaḥ.

5. Drop the comma after parameśvarānugrahaprabhṛtayaḥ and add a full stop.

6. Tāpasavatsarāja, I. 14

ĀBHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

133

dhr̥ti ( firmness of mind ), trāsa ( fear ) and harṣa ( joy ), though really vyabhi-cāribhāvas, appear as prominent in karuṇa, vīra, bhayānaka and adbhuta; so in śāntarasa, jugupsā ( disgust ), etc., appear predominantly, since they are completely opposed to love.1 For in the mahāvrata ( ceremony ) one carries about a human skull ……….. ( obscure ).2 At the time of begetting a son ( by a widow ) from her brother-in-law, anointment of one's own body ( with oil ) has been recommended with a view to creating a sense of disgust.3 For the man who has done all that must be done with regard to his Self, ( i.e. who has realised the true nature of his Self ), his efforts are all for promoting the good of other people, and so his energy takes the form of an effort that is prompted by the wish to help others. This is a synonym for compassion, and it is very intimately connected with śānta. And so some people call śāntarasa, dayāvīra ( compassionate heroism ) and some call it dharmavīra ( religious heroism ) because of the intensity of this energy ( utsāha ) which becomes its vyabhicāribhāva.

Objection : “ Energy is based on egoism as its essence, whereas śānta consists primarily in a loosening of egoism.” ( Reply : ) It is not improper for an opposing mood to be a vyabhicāribhāva ( in śānta ), for we find, for instance, nirveda ( as a vyabhicāribhāva ) in love. In the verse “ With the forest-ground overgrown with grass as my bed ”4 and other similar stanzas, we find a high degree of utsāha in helping others. There is no state that is devoid of utsāha. For in the absence of desire and effort, one would be like a stone. And so because one has understood the higher ( Self ) and the lower ( Self ), there is nothing left to do with regard to one's own Self, and therefore, for those whose hearts are tranquil, to give their all-in-all, i. e. to give their bodies, for the sake of helping another is not contrary to śānta. “One should preserve one's self,”5 such and similar advice is meant in the sense of guarding one's body and is meant for those who have not realised their Self, because ascetics are not concerned with guarding their bodies at all. For it has been said :

1. The mein point of this argument escapes us.

2. As Raghavan has noted, this passage is extremely corrupt. We are unable to make any sense of the lines तथा हि महान्ते नृकपालादिधारणमसुभावादिसमुदायादिविस्तर-सङ्क्षेपातिकर्मींकृतिहिं धर्में ।

3. This is a reference to the fact that when levirate takes place, it should be without any sexual desire, but only for the sake of procreation. Therefore, in order to create a sense of disgust for the body, both partners smear themselves with foul-smelling oil. Jayaratha quotes a verse on this subject in his commentary to the Tantrāloka. Vol. XI, p. 73. ( Part II ).

4. Nāgānanda IV. 2.

5. Gautamadharmasūtra, I. 9, 35,

134

शान्तरसे

"The life-breaths (prānāḥ) are the cause of attaining dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. When they are destroyed what is not destroyed? When they are guarded, what is not guarded? (i.e. all is guarded)."

In this stanza the motive (nidāna) for the preservation of the body is shown to be its capacity to achieve the well-known four goals of life. In the case of the man who has realised his Self (however), it is (often) heard, in the context of samnyāsa that he should throw his body into water, fire or a pit.3 Thus the idea is that (since) somehow the body is to be renounced (sometime or other), if it be given up for the sake of another, what would not be achieved? (i.e. so much is thereby gained). Should one argue that Jīmūtavāhana and others were not ascetics, we should ask how that matters to us*?3 Certainly they had attained to knowledge of the Truth. For it would be inconceivable that those who consider their body as their soul should abandon for the sake of others the very body which is (to them) their all-in-all, for (in their case there would be no) urge for dharma, etc. In a battle, a warrior has no intention of abandoning his body (for a religious cause), but rather he enters (the battle) only in order to conquer his enemy. (In suicide) by jumping off a cliff, etc., the main (purpose) is the desire to attain a more beautiful body in the life to come. Therefore what-ever deeds, beginning with the imparting of (spiritual) advice and culminating in the renunciation of one's body, are performed in order to achieve the benefit of others and without reference to one's own benefit, are certainly inconceivable in the case of people who have not attained to a knowledge of the true nature of the Ātman. And they (i.e. people who do these deeds) are also knowers of the Truth. For those who know (the Truth), there is liberation in all the (four) stages (āśrama) of life. This is (what is taught) in the Smṛtis and in the Śrutis. As has been said :

"A man who is attached to worship of the gods, who is grounded in the knowledge of the Truth, who is gracious to guests, who, having performed the ceremonial rites to his ancestors (śrāddha), gives out wealth, even though he be (only) a house-holder, (this man) is freed."

However (kevalam) in the case of Bodhisattvas, etc., although they have known the truth, there is, because of their religious (or righteous) actions springing from a desire to do good to others and expected by them to

1. Not traced.

2. We should keep in mind the legend, still current in Kashmir, (see Pandey, "Abhinavagupta," p. 23) that "one day Abhinavagupta ......... along with twelve hundred disciples walked into the Bhairava cave and was never seen again."

3. Jīmūtavāhana was a Vidyādhara. Abhinava replies: so what?

4. Not traced.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

135

result in the benefit of others, a reappearance of the body appropriate to that

( i. e. to those actions that they have performed ).1

Even in the case of rasas which occupy a subsidiary position ( in a

poetic work ), the attainment of " repose "2 ( i. e. aesthetic enjoyment ) is

met with, because that is only appropriate to their nature ( as rasas ). For

instance, ( in the Rāmāyaṇa ), in the case of Rāma when he obeys

his father's orders ( and goes into exile), repose is met with in this,

though this aesthetic repose is only subsidiary. The same should be under-

stood in the case of śṛṅgāra and other rasas ( when they occupy a subsi-

diary position in a poetic work ). Hence although śāntarasa3 has come

to stay4 ( in the Nāgānanda ), it is not the major rasa, because (in that play),

the achievement of the three goals of human life ( dharma, artha and kāma ),

with special emphasis on helping others, is the final result in the case of

1. We cannot decide whether this means that Bodhisattvas and others

who give up their bodies for the sake of others are reborn on earth, i. e. whether this

contains a veiled reference to the famous apratisthitaniṛvāṇa theory ( on which see

S. Lévi's tr. of the Sūtrālaṃkāra, III, 3, note 4 - in brief a Bodhisattva never enters

Nirvāṇa but is reborn again and again svōtantryeṇa in order to benefit mankind ); or

whether Abhinava means that Bodhisattvas, etc., receive an appropriate body in heaven.

Or could he even mean ( since heaven is a rather crude notion for Bodhisattvas and

Jīvanmuktas ) that the Bodhisattvas receive the dharmakāya?

2. Viśrāntilābhaḥ really means rasapratītiḥ.

3. A passage from the A. Bh., Vol. II, p. 451 ( adhyāya 18 ) has an important

bearing on this issue. Here is the Sanskrit text :

एवं तावद्रौद्ररसप्राधान्य यथास्थं ( किञ्च ) पुंप्रेयस्त्वप्राणभूतत्वेन वर्त्माना, पतेषु प्रयोदेशु शान्त-

वीभत्सरसौ तु चरमपुमर्थयोगात्, तत्र च सर्वस्य नाधिकारो, अपि कस्यचिदपश्चिमजनमनोरधिकारात् ।

नाटके यथापि तत्फलप्राधान्य तथा प्राधान्यमवलम्बनीयतां, तथापि नासौ प्रचरप्रयोग इति तयोः पुरुषार्थ-

प्रवरप्राणितयोरपि वीरादरसान्तराच्छावापेनावस्थानम् । एवं तावपुमर्थविषयो रूपकसविषय एव परमार्थतः;

तथापि त्वितिवृत्तवैचित्र्याद्रसान्तरप्रयोगोडपि तदृक्तया तत्र भवति ।

The passage has been translated by Professor Wright, BSOAS, Vol. 26, 1963,

p. 115 : " Thus vīra, raudra, śṛṅgāra ( are used there) respectively, occurring in

these works by being engendered by ( the aims of the character portrayed ) dharma,

artha and kāma, while śānta and bībhatsa occur in connexion with mokṣa. But not

every character can carry the main role in this ( latter ) case, only the occasional

saint. Although in the nātaka, śānta or bībhatsa may be the principal rasa when

mokṣa is the principal goal, this is not a common practice, so they, although en-

gendered by the best of human aims ( the character's pursuit of mokṣa ) are consider-

ed subordinate to the other rasas - vīra, raudra, and śṛṅgāra. Thus the main rasa of a

drama is really governed by the puruṣārtha it portrays, but other rasas occur in support of

it as a result of the varlety of subject matter included.

4. What does Abhinava mean by अत एव शान्तस्य स्थायित्वेऽपि अप्राधान्यम् ?

How are we to take sthāyitva? We can translate as " firmly entrenched, " i. e.,

Abhinavagupta is simply insisting that śāntarasa is actuaily present in the Nāgā-

nanda.

136

शान्तरस

Jīmūtavāhana.1 With this thought in mind, Bharata will say ( NŚ, XVIII. 11 ) while defining a Nāṭaka, that “it is possessed of qualities such as wealth, flirtatious ways, etc.”2 This means that a dramatist should introduce into the Nāṭaka all kinds of actions in which opulence and flirtation are predominant and in which emphasis is placed on the two goals of life, artha and kāma, because such actions have the charming purpose of winning a sympathetic response from all people ( i. e. because such actions have a universal appeal ). We will describe this in that very section ( dealing with the definition of a Nāṭaka ). With this in mind, Bharata will not prescribe any jātyaṃśaka in śānta.3 Hence the view ( of some ) that śāntarasa does not exist in as much as Bharata has not prescribed any jātyaṃśaka in its case, is refuted.

Others however say: “Jīmūtavāhana saved an old woman who needed protection, and who said : ‘Oh son, who will save you ?’4 He had no

1. By saying that śānta is apradhāna, Abhinava is not necessarily saying that śāntarasa can never be pradhāna, but only that it is not the pradhānarasa in this particular play. But it is an odd statement, since if any emotion is prominent in the Nāgānanda it is śānta. Śṛṅgāra is brief in its appearance, and vīra almost non-existent. Perhaps Abhinava was conceding a point belaboured by his critics. But if he does not allow śāntarasa as pradhāna in this play, where was it pradhāna? For this is the only play Abhinava quotes in the context of śāntarasa, and indeed the only play that all the early writers quote. Therefore, by implication, it would seem that Abhinava concedes that śānta is never the pradhānarasa in drama. But then what does he mean by saying that it is the most important ( and he uses the very word pradhāna ), of all the rasas? See Locana on the third Uddyota, p. 394 : मोक्षफलत्वेन चायं परमपुरुषार्थनिष्ठत्वात् सर्वरसेप्य: प्राधान्यतमः ।

2. NŚ., XVIII. 11 ( G. O. S., Vol. II, p. 488 ) :

नानाभिभूतिभिरियुक्तमृद्धिविलासादिभिरिगुणैरेश्रियम् । अङ्कप्रवेशकाद्यं च भवति हि तन्नाटकं नाम ॥

" That which is called nāṭaka is accompanied by diverse kinds of splendour ( i. e. according to Abhinava, by the magnificence of dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa ) ( in general ), and ( in particular ) it is possessed of such qualities as wealth, flirtatious ways, etc. It is rich in aṅkas ( acts ) and praveśakas ( minor scenes )."

3. The topic of the jātyaṃśakas is discussed in stanzas 1-13 of the NŚ XXIX ( Vol. IV of the G. O. S. ed. ). This same objection is raised in the A. Bh., Vol. IV, p. 78 : nanu śāntārase na kenacid aṁśakena gānam uktam. The reply that Abhinava gives is curious : viṁśanaṁśilo' sti. smaryase( te ) uktam hi - na śāntarasapradhānatā prayogasya bhavati, sato'pi ( surely we must read sann api ) hi rasāntaroparakta eva prayogayogyo nānpathet. But where has this been said ? Not in the NŚ itself. Nor do we find this actually quoted in the A. Bh. Perhaps Abhinava is in fact referring to this idea ( and not the actual words ) as explained in the A. Bh. in the śāntarasaprakaraṇa. The passage is puzzling.

4. Nāgānanda IV, 10. Saṅkhacūḍa's mother is speaking, asking who will save her son : हा पुत्रक, यद्ा नागलोकपरिरक्षणे वासुकिना परित्यक्कोडसि तदा कस्तेऽपरः परित्राणं करिष्यति ?

Just at that moment Jīmūtavāhana appears ( nanu aham ) and offers to help ( amba, mā bhaiṣīḥ ). The mother had said she would end her own life as well ( IV, under v. 20 — tad ihaiva tvayā saha mariṣyāmi ), so Jīmūtavāhana saves her life by his action too.

power. He wanted to harm nobody." We agree with this. Should it be

further argued that there is no power,......... ......of Bodhisattvas (?). But the

śāstra does not teach by means of kākatālīya( nyāya ) (?).1 Therefore it is

proved : utsāha is principally intended ( in this play and therefore vīra is the

major rasa ), and it is characterised by compassion.2 (In the Nāgānanda )

other moods (like love for Malayavatī, detachment, etc.,) become subsidiaries

according to the circumstances ( yathāyogam ).3 As has been said :

तच्च्छिद्रेषु प्रययान्तराणि संस्कारेभ्यः 4

And so we have refuted the contention that anubhāvas cannot exist because

of a complete absence of action (in the case of the man who is śāntu ). When,

however, one has reached the culminating state ( of śānta ) and all anubhāvas

are absent, this ( śānta ) cannot be represented. In love and sorrow, etc., also,

in the culminating stages,5 it is correct that there is no possibility of repre-

sentation.

Sympathetic identification, however, is possible for those who have

( planted ) in them the samskāras that are the seeds of such knowledge of

the Truth. As Bharata will say :

" People devoid of passion ( take delight ) in mokṣa."6

1. Śaktiś cāsya na kācid to śāstram upadisati : we cannot, in spite of repeated

attempts and devious explanations, make any sense of this passage.

2. This is very curious, for in the Locana ( p. 393) Abhinava has said that

dayāvīra is only another name for śāntarasa and that it is not to be regarded as a

variety of vīrarasa, since Bharata has recognised only three varieties, dānavīra,

dharmavīra and yuddhāvīra. Now he has just said that śāntarasa is not the

pradhānarasa of the Nāgānanda. But dayāvīra is. How are we to solve this con-

tradiction?

3. Does this passage, anye tu vyabhicārino, etc., mean that in the Nāgananda

other emotions like love for Malayavatī, detachment, etc., become subsidiary to dayāvīra

according to circumstances?

4. Yogasūtra, IV. 27. We don’t know what Abhinava means.

5. What is the culminating stage of karunarasa — death ?

6. This is NS., XVII, 58. It is one of Abhinava’s most important reasons

for thinking that Bharata really did feel that there was such a thing as mokṣa that could be

dramatically treated and displayed on the stage. Here is the verse :

तुष्यन्ति तरुणा: कामे विदगधा: समयाश्रिते । अर्थेध्वर्थैपराश्रैव मोक्षे चाथ विरागिण: ॥

" Young people are delighted with ( watching spectacles of ) love, the learned

with ( watching spectacles concerned with ) doctrinal matters ( philosophy ), those

interested in wealth are delighted with ( watching spectacles concerning ) material gain,

and those without passion are interested in ( spectacles dealing with ) mokṣa."

This is certainly curious, for one wonders just where Bharata would include such

spectacles, i. e. under what rasa ? It is odd that he should be silent on such an important

point. Perhaps the verse is not by Bharata himself. Note verse 61 :

धर्माख्यानपुराणेषु बृद्धास्तुष्यन्ति नित्यशः ।

What would the rasa be of such dharmākhyānas and purāṇas ?

.. 18

138

शान्तरस

( After all, ) not everybody is always sympathetic to everything. For instance, a man whose nature is heroic ( will not sympathetically identify with a character ) in bhayānaka. Objection : “ How can a heroic type of person take any delight in such a presentation ? ”1 The reply is : in a work where this ( śānta ) is presented, surely there is one or other of the ( other rasas ) such as śṛṅgāra, vīra, etc. since the work is intended to be useful to the goals of life ( other than liberation ). Its aesthetic relish is grounded in śānta ( however ). In Prahasanas, etc. too, where hāsya, etc., are principal, the aesthetic relish is grounded in other rasas which arise in their wake ( anuniṣpāti ). According to some, the justification for the exposition of the different drama-types is the intention to cater to aesthetic enjoyment in the case of different kinds of spectators ( adhikārin ). Therefore śantarasa does exist. And so in ( certain ) old manuscripts,2 after the passage3 “ we will show how the sthāyibhāvas develop in the rasas ”, is read the definition of śānta in the phrase “ What is called śānta has for its sthāyibhāvas śama,” etc. In this connection, the aesthetic enjoyment of all rasas is similar to that of śānta, because it ( i. e. this aesthetic enjoyment ) is turned away from actual sense-object contact. [ Because we are particularly concerned with one rasa, except that it is mixed with

1. In the Locana Abhinava has simply replied to this important question with an arrogant response ( pp. 392-393 ). Here he considers it more seriously ( the Locana was written before the Abhinavabhāratī, for we find that the A. Bh. refers to the Locana, e. g. p. 343, Vol. I : तच्च मद्रीयादेव तद्विर्णणात् सहृदयालोकलोचनादवधारणीयम् ).

But it is interesting that his reply makes bad sense. For he is saying that there are other rasas in every śānta play which will appeal to other people. This is of course true, but not a reply to the important objection that śānta is not an emotion that belongs to mankind universally, whereas the other rasas are. He fails to catch the point that it is qualitatively different from the example he counters with, namely that a vīra will take no pleasure in bhayānaka. He might not, but he could, since he must be aware of fear in himself though it may not be dominant. Cf. the curious remarks on p. 323 of the A. Bh., Vol. I, last 3 sentences of the first paragraph.

2. From this passage : तथा च चिरंतनपुस्तकेषु स्थायिभावान् etc., it is clear that śantarasa was defined, in certain MSS before all the other rasas, and not after them. For these words, sthāyibhāvān, etc., are the last words before the description of the eight rasas. But note that in the A. Bh. Abhinava does not comment directly on whatever he read there. Why? Is it because he did not believe it was part of the NŚ? It is in fact quite possible that this section on śāntarasa was a totally separate “ book ”, not intended to fit into the NŚ at all. In any case, it could not have come at the end of the rasa section, i. e. the end of the sixth adhyāya as it is printed in the G. O. S. edition.

3. Does he mean : (a) “ I do not have śānta in my text ”; or (b) “ It is given in the beginning only in some books ”? The implication is that most MSS. did not contain a śāntarasaprakaraṇa. Oddly enough Abhinaya does not justify this omission.

ĀBHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

139

other latent mental impressions (vāsanā).?1] In order to indicate that

it (śānta) is at the root of all (rasas), it was named at the beginning.

In ordinary worldly dealings, one does not mention separately a thing

common to all, and so its sthāyin was not separately given. But even a thing

which is common to a number of other things deserves to be separately

reckoned by the discriminating man, and so it (śāntarasa) has become separate

as the object of cognition in the form of the aesthetic enjoyment of the

spectator who is admitted to be a discriminating reader. In the Itihāsas, the

Purānas, dictionaries, etc., we hear of nine rasas as well as in the revered

Siddhāntaśāstra. Thus it is said :

"He should display the eight rasas in the places allotted to the eight

gods. And in the centre he should display śāntarasa in the place of the

supreme God (Śiva)."2

Its vibhāvas are vairāgya, fear of samsāra, etc. Śānta is known through

the portrayal of these. Its anubhāvas are thinking about mokṣa-texts, etc.

Its vyabhicāribhāvas include world-weariness, wisdom, contentment (dhṛti),

etc. And as bhakti and śraddhā which are directed towards meditation on

God and which are reinfored by smṛti, mati, dhṛti and utsāha, are in any

case (anyathaiva) helpful (to śānta), neither of them should be counted as

a separate rasa. Here is a Sangraha kārikā on this matter :

"Śānta rasa is to be known as that which arises from a desire to

secure the liberation of the Self, which leads to a knowledge of the Truth,

and is connected with the property of highest happiness."3

1. We cannot arrive at a meaning for this sentence.

2. This refers, most likely, to the drawing of a mystic circle (cakra) as

practised in Tantric rituals. The eight gods are represented on the outside of the

circle. By pradarśayet probably "likhet" is meant. The point is that one draws the

gods, and then writes in underneath the rasa that accompanies them. There is one

difficulty, however : devadeva must refer to Siva. Now in the NŚ, VI. 44 (Vol. I,

p. 299) Siva is given as the god of raudrarasa (raudro rudrādhidaivatayah). More-

over, in the A. Bh. commentary on that stanza, Abhinava has associated śantarasa

with the Buddha ! "बुद्धः शान्तेष्टदृजोऽनुचते" इति शान्तवादिनः केचित् पठन्ति । But as this

is a quotation from a different (and untraced) source, it need not agree with the NŚ.

One can also take rūpa to refer to the actual pictorial representation. Pradarśayet

would, therefore, mean "draw." One should draw each of the gods according to the

rasa, i. e. such and such a god looking angry (raudra), another looking amorous

(śṛṅgāra), etc., and Siva should be shown in samādhi. In the original, the genitive in

aṣṭānām devānām might also be taken as used in the sense of sambandha (aṣṭadeva-

sambaddhān rasān). The idea is that the eight rasas are to be pictorially represented

as symbolised by the eight presiding gods, i. e., by means of the characteristic forms of

the eight gods.

3. This is a verse actually found in the so-called Śantarasa prakaraṇa of the

NŚ (p. 333, Vol. I, A. Bh.), introduced with the words : atrāryāḥ ślokāś ca bhavanti

(Continued on next page)

140

शान्तरसे

By the three adjectives qualifying śānta in this verse, the vibhāvas, sthāyibhāva and anubhāvas are shown respectively.

" Various feelings, because of their particular respective causes, arise from śānta ( a state of mental calm ). But when these causes disappear, they melt back into śānta."1

In this verse and others it has been summarily shown that śānta is the source of ( all ) other rasas.

As for the statement that will be made by Bharata2 to the effect that in the Dima ( type of drama ) there are six rasas, excluding both hāsya and śṛṅgāra,3 here is what is meant : by giving the definition : " It is based on a composition with an exciting rasa," there can be no question at all of śānta, as it is opposed to raudra which is predominant ( in the Dima ). So what is the point of ( separately ) excluding it?

( Continued from previous page )

( which is really incorrect, since there are only two āryās and three ślokas. The dual ārye, therefore, should have been used ). The reading is slightly different. The last line reads : नैःश्रयसोंपदिष्टः शान्तरसो नाम संबभवति । It is clear from this quotation that Abhinava is not commenting on the actual passage of the NŚ.

The following remark of Abhinava does not seem to agree with the stanza. For how can nihśreyasa be said to represent an anubhāva? The first two correspond, but not the third.

1. NŚ, VI, 87, p. 335.

2. See NŚ, Vol. III, p. 105.

3. This is NŚ. 18. 85, under the definition of Dima. Here is the passage from the NŚ, XVIII, 83 ff. ( Vol. II, p. 443 G. O. S. ed. ) :

डिमलक्षणं तु भूयो लक्षणकृत्स्या प्रवक्ष्यामि ।

प्रख्यातवस्तुविप्र: प्रख्यातोदात्तनायकश्रेष्ठ ।

षड्सलक्षणयुक्तश्रुतरङ्कैर्है डिमः कार्यः ।

शृङ्गारहास्यवर्जः श्रेयः सर्वै रसैः समायुक्तः ।

दीरसरकाव्ययोर्निर्न्नानाभावोपसंपन्नः ।

And verse 88 : शोभानायकबहुलः सात्त्वत्यारभटीवृत्तिसंपन्नः ।

Now Abhinava's argument is this : Dima deals mainly with raudrarasa. There can be no question of śānta at all, and so śānta was not specifically excluded by Bharata. We can also translate the sent nce शान्तासंभावे तु दीरसरकाव्ययोर्निरिन्येतैव etc., as follows : " Since śānta is impossible, what else can be excluded but śṛṅgāra and hāsya, by the phrase ' viz. the Dima has its source ( i. e. is based on ) an exciting theme ' ? Had he said ( merely ) that it can be associated with six rasas ( and had he not said dīptarasakāvayayonirnin̄yetaih ), then there would be the undesirable contingency of that ( i. e. śānta ) being included." As for the sentence शान्ते तु सात्त्वत्येव वृत्तिरिति न तद्-

वच्छेदकमेवेतत् ( p. 116 ), we think the na should be dropped ( Raghavan notes that MSS. M. and G omit it ). If we do so, the translation of the sentence will be as follows : " But śānta uses only the sāttvatī style, and therefore this ( qualification, namely sāttvatyārabhaṭīvṛttisampannaḥ ) is quite sufficient to exclude it."

( Continued on next page )

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

141

is impossible and since the Dima has as its source (i. e. since it is based on ) an exciting rasa, what else can be excluded (but śānta )?1 Had he ( only ) said that it can be associated with six rasas, excluding śṛṅgāra and hāsya, ( without adding the qualifying phrase dīptarasakāvyayonih ) śānta would not have been excluded. Objection: " This quarter stanza ( dīptarasa-kāvyayonih ) excludes karuṇa, bībhatsa, and bhayānaka as predominant rasas."

This is not true, because when (he says) that the ( Dima ) is associated with the styles called Sāttvatī and Ārabhatī,2 they are automatically excluded ( since they belong to the style Kaiśikī ). But śānta uses only the Sāttvatī style, and therefore this ( qualification ) alone would not be enough to exclude it. And therefore the definition of the Dima, far from arguing against the existence of śānta, is evidence for its existence. Śṛṅgāra however would be possible (in a Dima ) because (demons) make love in a violent manner.3 Hāsya is helpful to śṛṅgāra and therefore only their exclusion was specifically mentioned, because both are possible (and only a possible thing can be excluded, but not an impossible thing such as śānta ).

Because (śānta ) is common to all ( rasas ), it would be improper to name especially a colour4 or god5 (that is appropriate to it, as one has

(Continued from previous page)

Abhinava's point is this: all the six rasas are dīptarasas, except for śānta. This word, therefore, excludes śānta, for otherwise there would be no point in saying dīptarasa, since that is just what the other six are (though this is in fact wrong, since there is no reason to believe that Bharata uses each adjective to exclude something ). Surely this is tautologous in the sense that it is an explanation of sadrasa. Bharata is not so subtle as Abhinava wants him to be.

1. In an important article ( Vṛtti in Daśarūpakavidhānādhyāya of Abhinava-bhāratī, B. S. O. A. S. 1963, p. 113 ), Professor Wright translates Abhinava's comments on the Dima passage. Unfortunately, he has been misled by the use of the word syāt into misunderstanding the passage. The passage in the A. Bh. reads ( Vol. II, p. 443, 1–3 ): नाटकतुऽ्यं सर्वेमन्यत्कैवलं संधीनां चासमग्रता च रञ्जारहास्यवर्जं पदात्तने पर्यायेण शान्तस्य प्रयोग: नाटक, the only difference is the incompleteness of sandhis and rasas, dīptarasa — enjoints the use of śānta since (in its normal sense ) it would be (tautological, being ) synonymous with the injunction that it should. have six rasas to the exclusion of śṛṅgāra and hāsya." But śāntasya prayogah syād does not mean " enjoints the use of śānta " but precisely the opposite, namely that unless this adjective were there, śānta-rasa would be included, which is precisely what is not wanted. Śāntarasa is excluded from the Dima, not included, as is clear from the śāntarasaprakaraṇa. Paryāyeṇa in the above quotation is obscure, and we can make no sense of it.

2. Note that bhayānaka is associated with ārabhatī ( NŚ, III, p. 106 ).

3. Abhinava has taken this notion of demons making love in a violent manner from the NŚ definition of Raudra, Vol. I, p. 322 : रज्जारश्व तैः प्रायशः प्रमदं सेवते ।

4. The colour of śānta is svaccha (Vol. I, p. 298 — svacchapiṭau samādbhūtai ).

5. The god of śānta is, note this, Buddha ! NŚ, Vol. 1. p. 299 : "बुद्धः शान्तेऽधिजोडध्दते" इति शा॑तेवादिनः केचित् पठन्ति । बुद्धो जिनः परोपकारैकपरः प्रबुद्धो वा ।

done for the other rasas ), but they have been invented ( by some ). And so the reasonableness1 of śānta has been shown. Its true nature is hāsya. ( ? ! )2 Vīra and bībhatsa tend to lead towards it.3 Therefore there is in the case of śānta the advice about the practice of yama, niyama, meditation on God, etc.

It stands to reason that it leads to a great result ( i. e. mokṣa ), as it eschews enjoyment ( of worldly objects ) ( anupabhogitayā ),4 that it is more important than any other ( rasa ), and that it pervades the entire plot ( ? ). And so enough of further elaboration.

What is the nature of its true relish ? It is the following : The nature of the soul is tinged by utsāha, rati, etc., which are capable of imparting their ( peculiar ) tinges to it. It is like a very white thread that shines through the interstices of sparsely threaded jewels. It assumes the forms of all the various feelings like love. etc., ( which are superimposed on it ), because all these feelings are capable of imparting their tinges to it. Even then ( tathā-bhāvenāpi ) it shines out ( through them ), according to the maxim that once this Ātman shines, ( it shines for ever ).5 It is devoid of the entire collection of miseries which consist in ( i. e: which result from ) turning away ( from the Ātman ). It is identical with the consciousness of the realisation of the highest bliss. It takes its effect through the process of generalisation6 in poetry and drama. It makes such a heart ( i. e. the heart of the sensitive spectator or reader ) the receptacle of an other-worldly bliss7 by inducing a peculiar kind of introspection ( antarmukhāvastābheda ).

There are only these nine rasas, because only they deserve to be taught, as they are useful to the ( four ) goals of life or are exceptionally pleasant.

1. Following the reading upapattiś ca in M. and G. ( Raghavan, p. 116 ).

2. Does sattvabhāvah mean sāttvikabhāvah ? " Its sāttvikabhāva is hāsya " ? But how can hāsya be regarded as a sāttvikabhāva ? Raghavan implies that this is corrupt. Perhaps we could emend as follows : ' śānto hi hāso 'sya. Hāsa would stand for the smile of joy. Or one thinks of Siva's aṭṭahāsa. Note the idea of the white colour associated with śānta.

3. Raghavan implies that this is corrupt. But perhaps the meaning is this : vīra and bībhatsa tend to lead towards śānta. Bībhatsa, because it creates jugupsā, vīra;

because after all it is the major rasa of the Nāgānanda.

4. We follow the reading anupabhogitayā (as in Raghavan's 1940 ed. p. 105 ). In the 1967 ed. ( p. 116 ), Raghavan has adopted the reading abhinayopayogitayā. Thus the phrase abhinayopayogitayā mahāphalatvam would mean : " It stands to reason that it leads to a great result ( namely mokṣa ) by reason of its being useful for acting." But we cannot see in what sense śānta can be said to be " useful for acting " , nor how its being useful for acting would lead to mokṣa.

5. This is only a partial analogy, and we cannot know exactly what Abhinava meant.

6. Is sādhāraṇatayā a reference to sādhāranīkaraṇa ? I. e. do the vibhāvas etc., undergo the process of depersonalisation necessary in the theatre ?

7. Lokottarānandānāyanam is a bahuvrīhi compound : लोकोत्तरस्यानन्दस्यानयनं येन तत्त् ।

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

143

Therefore, what others say,1 namely that this restriction on numbers is because only these nine are well-known to enlightened literary critics, though other rasas are possible, has been refuted. This will be explained in the chapter on the bhāvas. It is wrong to say that affection, with a sthāyibhāva of being moved ( ārdratā ) can be a rasa, because affection is ( nothing other than ) attachment, and all attachment culminates in rati, utsāha (or some other such accepted sthāyibhāva ). For instance, the love of a child for its mother and father terminates in (i.e. can be included under) "fear."2 The affection of a young man for his friends terminates in rati. The affection, as of Lakṣmaṇa, etc., for his brother terminates in (i.e. can be included under) dharmavīra. The same is true (of the affection) of an old man for his son, etc.3 The so-called rasa "cupidity" with the sthāyibhāva of "greed" can be refuted in the same manner, because it will terminate in some other ( sthāyibhāva ) such as hāsa or rati. The same holds true of bhakti.

Daśarūpaka, II, 4 and commentary thereon :

अथ धीरोदात्तः -

महासत्त्वोऽतिगम्भीरः क्षमावानविकत्थनः ।

स्थिरो निगूढाहङ्कारो धीरोदात्तो दृढव्रतः ॥

Avaloka :

महासत्त्वः शोकक्रोधाद्यनभिभूतान्तःसत्त्वः;, अविकत्थनः अनात्मश्लाघनः;, निगूढाहङ्कारः विनयच्छन्नावलेपः;, दृढव्रतः अज्ञातकुनिर्णाहको धीरोदात्तः, यथा नागानन्दे जीमूतवाहन-

शिरामुखैः स्रन्दत एव रक्तमचापि देहे मम मानसमस्ति ।

तृसिं न पश्यामि तवैव तावत्कि भक्षणाच्चं विरतो गरुडमनू ॥

यथा च रामं प्रति-

आहूतस्याभिषेकाय विसृष्टस्य वनाय च ।

न मया लक्षितस्तस्य स्वपोडण्याकारविग्रहः ॥

1. Cf. the A. Bh. I, p. 298 :

पतावन्त एव रसा इत्युक्तं पूर्वम् । तेनानन्त्येऽपि पार्षदप्रसिद्धयैतावतां प्रयोग्यत्वमिति यदृक्त-

लोल्लटेन निरूपितं तदवलेपेनापरामृष्टेयलम् ।

"We already said earlier that there are only these many rasas. So that when Bhaṭṭalollaṭa says that really there are an endless number of rasas, but that these (eight alone), since they are familiar to the audience ( pārṣada ), are fit to be portrayed. he says this without thinking, out of haughtiness."

2. The point seems to be that a child is afraid of its mother and father, and its "love" can therefore be included under bhayānaka !

3. This is not a very good argument since surely these feelings are different in kind from śṛṅgāra.

यच्च केषांचित्स्थैर्यादीनां सामन्यगुणानामपि ( नायक - ) विशेषलक्षणे कचित्संकर्तनं तत्तेषां तत्राधिक्यप्रतिपादनार्थम्।

ननु च कथं जीमूतवाहनादिरौदाद्युदात्त इष्यते? औदार्यं हि नाम सर्वोत्तर्षण वृत्ति:, तच्च विजिगीषित्व एवोपपद्यते, जीवमृतवाहनस्तु निर्जिगीषतयैव कविना प्रतिपादित:। यथा-

तिष्ठन्माति पिता: पुरो मुवि यथा सिंहासने किं तथा यत्संवाहयतः सुखं हि चरणौ तातस्य, किं राज्यत:?। किं मुक्ते सुवनत्रये धृतिरसौ मुक्तोज्ज्वलते या गुरो- रायास: खलु राज्यमुज्ज्वलतगुरोस्तलास्ति कश्चिदुण:॥

इत्यनेन।

पित्रोर्विधातुं शुश्रूषां यत्कवैश्वर्यं क्रमागतं। वनं याम्यहमप्येष यथा जीमूतवाहन:॥

इत्यनेन च। अतोडस्यात्यन्तशमप्रधानत्वात्परमकारुणिकत्वाच्च वीततागवच्छान्तता। अन्यच्चात्रायुक्तं, यत्तथाभूतं राज्यसुखादौ निरभिलाषं नायकमुपादायान्तरा तथा भूतमलयवस्तनुरागोपवर्णनम्। यच्चोक्तम्- 'सामन्यगुणयोगी द्विजादिदृशो: शान्त:' इति तदपि पारिभाषिकत्वाद्वाद्रास्तव्रमियभेदकम्।

अतो वस्तुस्थित्या बुद्धधिष्ठिरजीमूतवाहनादिव्यवहारा: शान्ततामाविभावयन्ति।

अत्रोच्यते- यत्तदुक्तं सर्वोत्तर्षण वृत्तिरौदार्यमिति न तज्जीमूतवाहनादौ परिहीयते। न ह्येकरूपैव विजिगीषा, न य: परापकरणार्थमग्रहादिप्रवृत्त:।

तथाहि च मार्गदूषकादेरपि धीरोदात्तत्वप्रसक्त:। रामादेरपि जगत्पालनायमिति दूषणिग्रहे प्रवृत्तस्य नान्तरीयकत्वेन भूम्यादिलाभ:।

जीमूतवाहनादिस्तु प्राणैरपि परार्थंसंपादनाद्दशमपयतिरेत इत्युदात्ततम:। यच्चोक्तं- 'तिष्ठन्माति' इत्यादिना विषयसुखपराड्मुखतेति, तत्स्यम्- कार्पण्यहेतुषु स्वसुखतृष्णासु निरभिलाषा एव जिगीषा:।

तदुक्तम्- स्वसुखनिरभिलाष: कविदृशे लोकेतो: प्रतिदिनमथवा ते वृत्तिरेवंविधैव। अनुभवन्ति हि मूर्खा: पादपलाश्तीमुष्णं शमयति परितापं छायोपाश्रितानाम्॥ इत्यादिना।

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

145

मलयवत्यनुरागो वर्णनं स्वशान्तर साश्रयं शान्तनायकतां प्रयुत निषेधति । शान्तवं चानहंकृतत्वं, तच्च विप्रादेरौचित्यप्राप्तमिति वस्तुस्थित्या विप्रादे: शान्तता न स्वपरिभाषामात्रेण ।

बुद्धजीमूतवाहनयोस्तु कारणिकत्वाविशेषेऽपि सकामनि ष्कामकृणस्वादि धर्मवैचित्र्याद् वेद: । अतो जीमूतवाहनाद् वर्धोदात्तत्वमिति ।

Daśarūpaka IV. 35 and commentary thereon :

रत्युत्साहजुगुप्सा: क्रोधो हास: स्मयो भयं शोक: ।

शममपि केचित्राहु: पुष्टिनिषेधेषु नैतस्य ॥

इह शान्तरसं प्रति वादिनामनेकधा विप्रतिपत्तय: ।

तत्र केचिदाहु: - नास्यैव शान्तो रस:, तस्याचायैण विभावादि प्रतिपादनाल्लक्षणकरणात् ।

अन्ये तु वस्तुतस्तस्य भावं वर्णयन्ति, अनादिकालप्रवाहायातरागद्वेषो रुच्छेदुमशक्यत्वात् ।

अन्ये तु वीरवीभत्सादि वन्त्रभावं वर्णयन्ति ।

एवं वन्त: शाममपि नेच्छन्ति ।

यथा तथास्तु । सर्वत्र नाटकादि वभिनयात्मनि स्थायित्वमस्माभि: शमस्य निषिध्यते - तस्य समस्तव्यापारप्रविलयरूपस्या भिनयायोगात् ।

यत्तु केचिन्नगानन्दादौ शमस्य स्थायित्वमुपवर्णनितम्, तत्तु मलयवत्यनुरागेणै SS- प्रबन्धप्रवृत्तेन विद्याधरचक्रवर्तित्वप्राप्त्या विरुद्धम् ।

न ह्येकानुकार्य विभावालं बनै विषयानुरागापरागावुपलब्धधौ ।

अतो दयावीरोत्साहस्यैव तत्र स्थायित्वं, तच्चैव रसत्वमादायतेन चक्रवर्ति त्वावाप्तेश्व फलवेनात्र विरोधात् ।

ईप्सितमेव च सर्वत्र कर्तव्यमिति परोपकारप्रवृत्तस्य त्रिजिगी षोर्नान्तरीयकत्वेन फलं संपादित इत्यावेदितमेव प्राक् ।

अतोऽष्टैव स्थायिन: ।

Daśarūpaka. IV. 45 and commentary thereon :

शान्तरस्य चानभिनेयत्वाद् यदपि नाट्येऽनुप्रवेशो नास्ति तथापि सूक्ष्माताति-वस्तूनां सङ्केतामपि शब्दप्रातिपदिकताया विद्मानत्वात् काव्यविषयत्वं न निवायते, अतस्त- दुच्यते ।

शमप्रकर्षे जनिर्वाच्यो मुदितादेस्तदात्मता ।

शान्तो हि यदि तावत्-

"न यत्र दुःखं न सुखं न चिन्ता न द्वेषरागौ न च काचिदिच्छा ।

रसस्तु शान्त: कथितो मुनिन्द्रै: सर्वेषु भावेषु शमप्रधान: ॥ "

इत्यै व लक्षण:, तदा तस्य मोक्षावस्थायामेवास्मस्वरूपापत्तिलक्षणां प्रादुर्भावात् ( प्रादुर्भाव: ),

तस्य च स्वरूपानिर्वचनीयता श्रु तिरूप - "स एष नो नो" - इत्यन्यापोहिरूप- णाह ।

न च तथाभूतस्य शान्तरस्य सहृदया: स्वादयितार: सन्ति, अथापि तदुपायभूतो मुदितामैत्रीकरुणोपेक्षादिलक्षणस्तस्य च विकासविस्तरक्षोभविक्षेपरूपतैवेत तदुक्यैव शान्त- रसास्वादो निरूपित: ।

... 19

146

शान्तरস

Translation of the Daśarūpaka, II, 4 :1

Now the definition of the dhīrodātta ( nāyaka )2 is given.

"The dhīrodātta ( nāyaka ) is a great being, very profound, tolerant, not boastful, steady; his sense of ego is kept in check and he is firm in his commitments."

Translation of the Daśarūpakāvaloka on II, 4 :

"Great being" means that his inner nature is such that he does not experience sorrow, anger, etc. "Not boastful" means that he does not praise himself. "His sense of ego is kept in check" means that his pride is hidden by modesty. "Firm in his commitments" means that he carries out till completion whatever he agrees to do. An example of this dhīrodātta ( nāyaka ) is Jīmūtavāhana in the Nāgānanda :3

"Blood is oozing from the openings in my veins, and on my body there is still flesh. O Garuḍa, I see that you are not yet satisfied, so why have you stopped devouring me?"

Or as with regard to Rāma ( it was said ) : 4

"I did not perceive the slightest change in his appearance, neither when he was called to be consecrated (as king), nor when he was banished to the forest."

When in the definition of a particular type (of hero) there is `a (special) mention of some of the general qualities like firmness,5 etc. (mentioned in II. 1-2), that (special mention) is intended to show that those qualities are present in this particular (hero) in a very great degree. Objection : How can you say that Jīmūtavāhana and other similar heroes, in the Nāgānanda and other such plays, are exalted ( udātta )? Because exaltedness means superiority to all others6 and is possible only in the case of

1. We have used the edition by Pandit Sudarshanāchārya Shāstri, printed at the Gujarati Printing Press, Bombay, 1914. This contains a brief commentary, mainly on the Avaloka, by the editor.

2. It is somewhat odd that Dhananjaya should give, as one of the four types of heroes, the dhīraśānta (p. 36), if he does not allow śantarasa in dramas. Apparently he has in mind Cārudatta in the Mṛcchakaṭikā. At the very least, it is a bad choice of words. Note the definition of the śāntanāyaka : सामान्यगुणयुक्तस्तु धीर-

शान्तो दृजादिकः , which would rule out Jīmūtavāhana, who is a Vidyādhara.

3. Nāgānanda V, 16.

4. Mahānātaka III, 23.

5. The point seems to be that sthirah had already been mentioned in II. 1 among the general characteristics of all nāyakas. Keśāmcit construes with sthairyādī-nām. It does not refer to people of a different persuasion. (i.e. keśāmcit matānusāreṇa ). Before viśeṣakṣane we should understand the word nāyaka which makes the sense clearer.

6. Vṛtti here does not mean "behaviour." It means only "existence."

ABHINAVĀ'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

147

a man who has worldly ambition ( vijigīṣutva ),1 whereas Jīmūtavāhana has

been described by the poet ( Harṣa ) as devoid of worldly ambition, as for

example in the following stanza :

" Does a man shine as ( brilliantly ) when he is seated on a throne as he

does when he stands on the bare ground before his father? Can the happi-

ness he receives from his kingdom be compared to the happiness he derives

from massaging the feet of his father? Is the contentment he experiences

from enjoying the whole universe comparable to what he feels when he eats

the left-overs from his father's meal? Kingship is indeed only a misery for

the man who has abandoned his parents. Is there any virtue in such

kingship? "2

And also ( in the following verse ) :

" In order to dedicate myself to serving my parents, I am going to

renounce my inherited fortune and go to the forest, just as did Jīmūta-

vāhana."3

Therefore, because Jīmūtavāhana is predominantly peaceful and because

he is very compassionate, he is a śānta hero,4 like a sage who has subdued

his passions. Moreover (?)5 this is improper, that having introduced

( upādāya ) a hero who is without any desire for the pleasure of kingship, etc.,

the poet has indulged, in the course of the play ( antarā ), in a description of his

intense ( tathābhūta ) love for Malayavatī. As for the statement : "The dhīra-

śānta is a twice-born, etc., who is endowed with general virtues " ( II, 4. ),

( this definition ) is not realistic, because it is meant to be technical (or formal)

1. Vijigīṣutva literally means " a desire to conquer " and is often used of

kings and heroes. But here we think it has the larger sense of worldly ambition.

2. Nāgānanda, I. 6.

3. Nāgānanda, I. 4, in the prastāvanā, spoken by the Sūtradhāra to intro-

duce Jīmūtavāhana.

4. . We take śāntatā to construe with asya. In this case the argument is for

Jīmūtavāhana's being a dhīraśāntanāyaka. But surely the whole point of the pūrva-

pakṣa is not only that he is such a type of hero, but that this should further imply that

the rasa of the Nāgānanda is śānta.

5. anyac ca means " and further, moreover." It cannot construe with ayuktam

( to give " there is something else that is improper " ), because there was no first thing

given to which this would be the second. The construction is nonetheless peculiar.

Understand idam between anyac ca and atra : anyac ca idam atrāyuktam. But it is

odd that the Pūrvapakṣin should use an argument against himself. For he claims that

Jīmūtavāhana as a dhīraśānta hero should not be open to sexual passion. As Dhanika

will point out, this must be used against him. Why then should the Pūrvapakṣin have

provided such ammunition? However, since Dhanika accepts Cārudatta in the Mṛccha-

kaṭikā as an example of dhīraśānta, though he is greatly interested in sexual love, it

is consistent on his part to use this as an argument against the possibility of dhīra-

śānta in the case of Jīmūtavāhana.

148

and thus it is not exclusive.1 Therefore, in reality, the behaviour of the Buddha, of Jīmūtavāhana and of Yudhiṣṭhira shows that they are śānta heroes, Here is our reply ( to all the above points ) : First of all ( tāvad ), the state-

ments " Exaltedness means superiority to all others " is not inappropriate to the case of Jīmūtavāhana and others ( as you claim ), because worldly ambition takes many forms. If anyone exceeds others in heroism, or in liberality, or in compassion, he is said to be " possessed of worldly ambition." This description is not used in the case of one who wishes to seize wealth by harm-

ing another person, otherwise we would find ourselves defending the ridiculous position that highwaymen are dhīrodātta(nāyakas) ! In the case of Rāma etc., they felt that they must protect the world and so they set out to punish the wicked ( and ) it was only incidentally ( nāntarīyakatva ) that they obtain-

ed ( lordship over ) the earth. But Jīmūtavāhana and others like him were superior to all, because they were willing to give up even their own life to help others. And so they are to be regarded as the most exalted (udāttatama) (and not merely exalted). As for the verse that begins : "Does a man shine," etc., it is true that it shows (Jīmūtavāhana's) revulsion from sensual pleasures ;

but those who are ambitious are not concerned with their own personal pleasures that are the cause of misery. Thus it has been said :

" Indifferent to your own pleasure, you work hard for the sake of others. Or perhaps this is your natural disposition. For a tree carries on its head the most intense heat, and cools, through its shade, the heat of those who come to it for protection ( from the sun )."2

On the contrary, the description of (Jīmūtavāhana's) love for Malayavati which is not in keeping with śāntarasa, (aśāntaraśāśraya ) rules out his being

1. The Pūrvapakṣin is objecting to Dhanañjaya's definition of the dhīra-śāntanāyaka ( II, 4 ). He says that this definition is not realistic, but only technical. For it says that the dhīraśāntanāyaka is endowed with the general qualities of a nāyaka. These include such qualities as vīnitatva, madhuratva, dakṣatva, etc. Now these qualities are not all possible in the case of a dhīraśānta hero, because they are inconsistent with the state of being without desires which follows from his being a dhīraśānta hero. It is only technical or formal since it is a consequence of his being a hero (in general ). Since the possession of the general qualities is thus unreal in the case of a dhīraśānta hero, it cannot be said to distinguish him from the other types of heroes ( abhedakam ). This means that according to the Pūrvapakṣin, the definition of the dhīraśānta hero as given by Dhanañjaya is unscientific. One cannot help agreeing, for surely the differentiation that Dhanañjaya makes ( namely that he is a dvija and has the general characteristics of a hero) is hardly consistent with śānta in any form. It is, therefore, most surprising that Dhanika, although he takes up and answers all the other objections, does not deal with this one ! It is almost as if he were admitting its justice. Could this possibly mean that he is himself criticising his brother under the guise of a Pūrvakakṣin ?

2. Śakuntalā, V, 7.

ĀBHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

149

a śānta ( i. e. a dhīraśānta ) hero. The state of being tranquil involves the

absence of egoism, and this is naturally met with in the case of learned

Brahmins etc., and therefore learned Brahmins, etc., are really śānta heroes in

the real sense of the term and not simply in a technical or formal way. In

the case of the Buddha and Jīmūtavāhana, though it is true that there is no

distinction in terms of their compassion ( i. e. though they are both equally

compassionate), still there is this difference: that the Buddha is compassionate

without any desire (niṣkāma) and Jīmūtavāhana is compassionate with desire

( sakāma ).1 Thus it is established that Jīmūtavāhana and others like him

are dhīrodātta ( nāyakas ).

TRANSLATION OF THE Daśarūpaka IV, 35 :

" (The sthāyibhāvas are ) love, energy, disgust, anger, mirth, amazement, fear and sorrow. Some add peace (śama), but it cannot be developed

in plays."

TRANSLATION OF THE Avaloka on IV, 35 :

There are a great number of differing opinions among disputants in

the case of śāntarasa. Some say there is no śāntarasa because Bharata did not

mention its vibhāvas, etc., and because he did not define it. Others, however,

argue that ( regardless of whether Bharata mentioned it or not ) in actual

reality it cannot exist, because, ( they claim ), it is impossible to root out love

and hate which have been continuously cultivated ( inside man ) from time

immemorial. Others claim that it can be included within vīra, bībhatsa, etc.

Those who speak this way do not accept even śama (as a sthāyibhāva).

Accept whichever opinion you like (yathā tathāstu), in all events, however,

we cannot allow śama to be a sthāyibhāva in a Nāṭaka, etc., where acting is

essential, because, after all, śama consists in the complete cessation of all

activity and therefore cannot be acted out. As for what some have claimed,

namely that in the Nāgānanda, etc., śama is a sthāyibhāva, this is contrary to the

portrayal of Jīmūtavāhana's love for Malayavatī, which persists right through

the entire play and is also opposed to his ( finally) obtaining the universal

sovereignty of the Vidyādharas.2 For we never come across both love for

1. We are not sure which of the two senses of sakāma and niṣkāma is

meant here. We have translated them in the Gītā sense of the terms. But Sylvain

Lévi has translated this line in a discussion concerning types of nāyakas as follows :

" En outre, Buddha et Jīmūtavāhana ne peuvent être classés ensemble; l'un et l'autre

sont des modèles de compassion, mais l'un est étranger à l'amour, l'autre y est sensi-

ble." ( "Théatre Indien," p. 66, 2nd ed. ) We take it that Lévi refers to his love

for Malayavatī.

2. This first criticism, that Jīmūtavāhana loves Malayavatī, is of course true.

It is a fault of the drama, for in actual fact the description of Jīmūtavāhana would

(Continued on next page)

150

शान्तरस

sense-objects and detachment from sense-objects subsisting in one single character.1 And so utsāha ( energy ) connected with dayāvīra (as the major rasa ) is the sthāyibhāva ( of the Nāgānanda ). For ( in that play ) love being a subsidiary of that ( dayāvirotsāha ), there is no objection to the attainment of universal sovereignty as the final result (for the dramatic action). We have already said that even though an ambitious ( dhīrodātta ) hero may set out with the primary object of doing good to others with a view to achieving that which is sought by them, worldly advancement may very well follow incidentally in his case.2 Therefore there are only eight sthāyins."

TRANSLATION OF Dasarūpaka, IV, 45 ALONG WITH DHANIKA'S COMMENTARY THEREON :

Commentary : " Although śāntarasa cannot be introduced into a play, as it cannot be presented by means of acting, still because all things, though they be very subtle or long past, can be conveyed through words, its presentation is not forbidden in poetry.3 And so this is said :

( Continued from previous page )

seem to preclude his falling in love. We are given absolutely no pyschological preparation for this. Quite the contrary, we would rather expect him to remain detached, if not actually repelled by sensual contact. It is only the Pūrvapakṣin who seems aware of this when he calls it ayuktam. As for his attaining lordship over the Vidyā-dharas, this is perhaps the weakest moment in an altogether weak play. He does absolutely nothing to achieve this. It is bestowed upon him by Gaurī ( what is she doing in this supposedly Buddhist play in any case ?) in a single verse at the end of the play, and this must strike any non-devotee of Gaurī as highly inappropriate.

1. Ekānukāryavibhavāvalambanau means " as subsisting in one single character as their locus " : ekānukāryarūpaḥ yah vibhavah, tadāvalambanau tadāśrayau.

2. This refers to page 144, line 21.

रामादेरपि जगत्पालननीत्यमिति दुष्टनिग्रहे प्रवृत्तस्य नान्तरीयकत्वेन भूम्यादिलाभः।

3. Note Raghavan ( "The Number of Rasas," 2nd revised edition, p. 51 ) : " The critics who do not accept śānta are mainly writers on Dramaturgy proper. They think they are loyal to Bharata by denying it. This attitude begins, as far as extant works go, in the Daśarūpaka, the model and source for many a later work on Rūpaka. Dhanam-jaya and Dhanika, both refute it and argue for its impossibility in drama.

शममपि केचित् प्राहुः पुष्टिनिर्वेदयेभु नितस्य ।

From this it would appear that Dhanamjaya denies Śānta only in drama but accepts it in Kāvya. But, as a matter of fact, Dhanamjaya, as interpreted by Dhanika, does not recognise it even in Kāvya ( see p. 124 ).'' S. K. De says more or less the same thing in his article " The Śāntarasa in the Nāṭya Śāstra and the Daśa-Rūpaka " : " Dhanamjaya himself would object to śānta only in the Nāṭya, which requires the delineation of the Rasa through its anubhāvas, etc. ; but he would permit it in the Kāvya, because what cannot be acted can at least be described. But his commentator Dhanika would not allow śānta even in poetry. There can be, in his opinion, no such sthāyibhāva as śama or nirveda." Both De and Raghavan follow the reading in the NSP. ed. ; see addendum for discussion.

ABHINAVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETICS

151

( Kārikā ): “Śantarasa ( samāprakarṣa ) need not be mentioned ( separately1 and specifically ), because the mental attitudes such as muditā, etc.,

out of which it is developed, are of the same nature ( as vikāsa, vistara,

ksobha and viksepa, which are at the root of the other eight sthāyibhāvas ).”

If śāntarasa is of the following nature, namely :

" Where there is no sorrow and no happiness, no anxiety, no hate or

love and no desire at all, this is called śāntarasa by great sages, and it has

śama as its sthāyibhāva."

then ( it must be noted that ) it appears only in the state of mokṣa,

which is defined as the realisation of the true nature of the Self. Even

the scriptures speak of this state as indescribable.by saying " it is not

thus, it is not thus," thereby denying all positive attributes ( in its case ).

Moreover, there are no sensitive readers who can be said to aesthetically

enjoy śāntarasa as described above. Still2 muditā, maitrī, karuṇā, and

upekṣā,3 which are means leading to it, are of the nature of vikāsa, vistara,

ksobha and viksepa, and since these latter ( four mental states ) have been

mentioned earlier ( in connection with the eight sthāyibhāvas ) the aesthetic

enjoyment of śāntarasa is as good as already described.

1. This is a difficult passage. Haas reads nirvācyah, whereas Shastri reads

anirvācyah ( which he interprets, wrongly we feel, as vaktum aśakyah ) : we accept the

latter and translate it as : " need not be ( separately ) mentioned." Samāprakarṣa

means the same as 'sāntarasa ( see bhayankarṣa in the sense of bhayānaka used in the

preceding verse ). For such a controversial subject this line is hardly sufficient.

What are its implications? Apparently that śānta exists, but can be subsumed under

the other rasas. However, Haas translates as follows : "The Quietistic Sentiment,

( which arises ) from happiness and the like, is to be defined as a state having that

( i. e. happiness ) as its essential nature." This is in any case not how Dhanika under-

stands the line. See addendum.

2. Athāpi would mean “nonetheless.” So, it would seem that we should

understand the phrase : न च तथाभूतस्य शान्तरस्य सहृदया: स्वादपितार: सन्ति, to mean

that sahṛdayas do not enjoy it.

3. Muditā etc.. are of course of great fame in Buddhism, forming a separate

chapter of the Visuddhimagga. They are equally known to the Hindu tradition ( Yoga-

sūtra, I, 33 ). Here Dhanika equates them with the four states of mind mentioned

in IV, 52, where vikāsa ( expansion or dilation ) applies to śṛṅgāra and hāsya; vistara

( exaltation or elevation ) to vīra and adbhuta; ksobha ( excitation ) to bībhatsa and

bhayānaka; and vikṣepa ( perturbation ) to raudra and karuna. It would seem that

śānta arises from upekṣā ( which is correct ), which would then be assimilated to

vikṣepa (?). The construction of Dhanika's passage is somewhat complicated. Our

translation best explains how we have understood it. ( Note that we have emended

prādurbhāvāt to prādurbhāvah ).

CONCLUSION

Abhinava's final view on the relation between brahmāsvāda and rasā-svāda seems to us best summarised by his commentary on a very unusual verse by Ānandavardhana. The verse is found in the third Uddyota of the Dhvanyāloka, in a long passage where Ānanda illustrates various combinations of dhvani with other types of poetry. The verse in question is meant to illustrate the cummingling (saṅkīrṇatva) of arthāntarasāṅkramitavācyadhvani with virodhālaṅkāra, but the verse is interesting for completely different reasons.

Here is the verse along with Abhinava's remarkable commentary on it :

प्रभेदान्तराणामपि कदाचित् सङ्कीर्णत्वं भवत्येव । यथा ममैव-या व्यापारवती रसान् रसयितुं काचिच्करीणां नवा-दृष्ट्या परिनिष्ठितार्थविषयोन्मेषा च वैपश्चिती ।

ते द्रे अप्यवलम्ब्य विश्वमनिशं निर्वर्णयन्तो वयं-श्रान्ता नैव च लब्धमब्धिशयन त्वद्र्कितुल्यं सुखम् ॥

इत्यत्र विरोधालङ्कारेणार्थान्तरसङ्क्रमितवाच्यस्य ध्वनिप्रभेदस्य सङ्कीर्णत्वम् ।

Locana p. 508 :

व्यापारवतीति । निष्पादनप्राणो हि रस इत्युक्तम् । तत्र विभावादियोजनाल्मिका वर्णना, ततः प्रभृति घटनापर्यन्ता क्रिया व्यापारः, तेन स तद्युक्ता । रसानीति । रस्य-मानतासारान् स्थायिभावान् रसयितुं रस्यमानतापत्तियोग्यान् कर्तुम् । काचिदिति । लोकवार्ताप्रतिभोद्धावस्थायामोन्मीलन्ती । अत एव ते कवयः वर्णनायोगात् तेषाम् । नवेति । क्षणे क्षणे नूतनैनूतनैश्चित्र्यैर्जग्न्यासूत्रयन्ती । दृष्टिरिति । प्रतिबिम्बरूपा, तत्र दृष्टिश्वाशुषुं ज्ञानं षाड्वादि रसयतीति विरोधालङ्कारोडत एव नवा । तदनुगृहीतक्ष द्ध्वनि:, तथा हि चाक्षुषं ज्ञानं नाविवक्षितमत्यान्तमसम्भवा भावात् । न चान्यपरम् । अपि तु अर्थान्तरे ऐन्द्रियकविज्ञाना्म्यासोल्लसिते प्रतिबिम्बलक्षणेऽर्थे सङ्क्रान्तम् । सङ्क्रमणे च विरोधोऽनुप्राहक एव । तद्रक्ष्यति-‘विरोधालङ्कारण’ इत्यादिना । या चैवंविधा दृष्टिः परिनिष्ठितोच्चलः अर्थ-विषये निःश्वेतव्ये विषये उन्मेषो यस्या: । तथा परिनिष्ठिते लोकप्रसिद्धेऽर्थे न तु कविवदपूर्व-सिद्धार्थ उन्मेषो यस्या: । विपश्चितामिति वैपश्चिती । ते अवलम्बयेतित । कवीनामिति वैपश्चि-तीति वचनेन नाहं कविरिति पण्डित इत्यात्मनोऽनौदात्र्यं ध्वन्यते । अनात्मीयमपि दरिद्रग्रृह-इवोपकरणतयान्वित आहृतमेतन्मया दृष्टिद्रयमिल्यर्थ: । ते द्रे अपीति । न होकया दृष्ट्या

... 20

154

शान्तरस

सम्पडनिर्वर्णनं निर्वहति । विश्वामित्यशेषम् । अनिशामिति । पुनः पुनरनवरतम् ।

निर्वर्णनयेन्तो वर्णनया, तथा निश्चितार्थ वर्णयन्तः इदमिथ्यमिति । परामर्शानुमानादिना निर्भय निर्वर्णनं किमत्र सारं स्यादिति तिलशस्तिलशो विचयनम् । यच्च निर्वर्ण्यते तत्रबहु मध्ये व्यापार्यमाणया मध्ये चार्थविशेषेषु निश्चितोन्नेषया निश्चितया दृष्ट्या सम्पडनिर्वर्णितं भवति ।

वयमिति । मिथ्यात्वच्वष्टशरणव्यसनिन इत्यर्थः । श्रान्ता इति । न केवलं सारं न लब्धं यावत्रप्रयुक्त खेदः प्राप्त इति भावः । चशब्दस्तुशब्दसार्थे । अभिधाश्रयनेति । योगनिद्रया स्वमत एव सारस्वरूपवेदि स्वरूपावस्थित इत्यर्थः । श्रान्तस्य शान्तिस्थितं प्रति बहुमानो भवति ।

स्वदृक्कीति । त्वमेव परमार्थस्वरूपो । विश्वसारसस्तस्य भक्तिः श्रद्धादिपूर्वक उपासनाक्रम-स्तदावेशस्तेन तुल्यमपि न लब्धमस्तां तावत्तज्जातीयम् ।

एवं प्रथममेव परमेश्वरभक्तिभाजः कुतूहहमात्रावलम्बितकविग्रामाणिकोभयवृत्तेः पुनरुपि परमेश्वरभक्तिविश्रान्तिरेक युक्तिः मन्वानस्ययमुक्तिः । सकलप्रपञ्चपरिनिश्चितदृष्टादृष्ट-

विषयविशेषजं यसुखं यदपि वा लौकोत्तरं रसचर्वणासमंकं तत् उभयतोऽपि परमेश्वरविश्रान्त्यनन्दः प्रकाश्यते तदनानन्दविप्राणमात्रावलम्बसो हि रसास्वाद इष्यते । लौकिकं तु सुखं ततोडपि निकृष्टप्रायं बहुतरदुःखानुषङ्गादिति तात्पर्यम् ।

TRANSLATION OF Dhvanyāloka, III :1

"There is also a mixture of a figure of speech in varieties of dhvani ( other than rasadhvani ) as well. For instance in the verse :

"The new and wondrous ( kācit ) vision ( dṛṣṭi ) of poets which concerns itself ( vyāpāravatī ) with turning permanent emotional states ( rasas; i. e. sthāyibhāvas ) into aesthetic experiences, and that philosophic ( or analytic, vaipaścitī ) vision that reveals the realm of already existing ( i. e. not depending on the poet's creative imagination ) objects—we have employed both of these constantly to examine and describe the world ( we live in ). We have become weary in so doing, but have not found happiness therein, in any sense comparable to the joy we feel in our devotion to you, who sleep on the ocean."

In this verse, there is a mixture of arthāntarasaṅkramitavācya and the figure of speech ( known as ) ( apparent ) contradiction ( virodha ).

TRANSLATION OF Locana III :

"VYĀPĀRAVATĪ : For we have ( already ) said that rasa is identical with the process of conveyance itself ( niṣpādanaprāno hi rasah ).2 ( Poetic

1. D. Al. pp. 507, 508. Abhinava quotes this verse in the A. Eh. Vol. I., p. 300.

2. This refers to Abhinava's doctrine, explained in the second Uddyota on p. 187, (B. P. ed.) that rasa is the process of perception itself ( pratīyamāna eva hi rasah ), i. e., it is not an object of cognition in much the same way that the sākṣin ( the subject ) in Advaita can never be the object of cognition. In this sense, rasa is purely subjective, and is not amenable to ordinary means of cognition.

CONCLUSION

vision is ) constantly engaged in that activity ( vyāpāra ), i. e., that action which begins with a description consisting in the combination ( i. e. presentation ) of the vibhāvas, etc., and ending with sentence-structure ( ghatanā ).1 Rasān refers to the sthāyibhāvas, the essence of which consists in the state of being enjoyed aesthetically ( rasyamānatā ). Rasayitum means to make the sthāyibhāvas fit for attaining to this status of being aesthetically enjoyed. Kācid (“ wondrous ”) means revealing itself ( unmīlantī ) by abandoning ( and becoming superior to) the state of the cognition of ordinary worldly things. And so ( i. e. because they are endowed with such a vision ), they are poets by virtue of their power to describe2 ( things in an extraordinary way ). Navā means, it reveals ( āsūtraayantī ) worlds at every instant in every new and variegated forms. DRSTIH. ( The vision ) is of the form of poetic imagination ( pratibhā ). Since “ vision ” refers ( primarily ) to knowledge we derive from our eyes and since it is here said to enable ( one ) to enjoy ( such beverages and edibles as ) sāḍava,3 etc., there is the figure of speech known as ( apparent ) contradiction ( virodha ).4 And so this vision is called “ new ” ( i. e. marvellous ).5 And the ( arthāntarasaṅkramitavācya ) dhvani ( in the word drṣṭi ) is helped by this figure of speech. For actually eyesight ( the literal sense of the word drṣṭi ) is not here altogether unintended,6 since it is not totally impossible ( to think of physical eyesight being of use to the poet in observing the world before describing it ). Nor is actual eyesight ( wholly intended ) ( and ) subservient to some other suggested sense ( anyapara = vivakṣitānyaparavācya ). Rather the literal meaning ( of sight ) passes over

1. This refers to those passages in the first Uddyota ( p. 88 and 104 ) that speak of guṇas and alañkāras as contributing to the beauty of poetry. In the second Uddyota ( p. 188 ) there is a passage in the Locana where the phrase samucitagunā laṅkāra is actually used. See also Locana, p. 88.

2. Varṇanāyogāt means lokottaravarnaanayogāt. See KP I. p. 10 ( Jhalikar's edition ).

3. Abhinava speaks of sāḍava in the A. Bh. Vol. I, ( p. 288 ).

4. Place a danda after virodhālaṅkāro on p. 508.

5. This expression, drṣṭih ( i. e. cākṣuṣam jñānam ) rasān rasayitum vyāpāra. vatī involves a contradiction, something illogical and queer, and that is the reason for calling the vision navā ( novel, out of the ordinary ). Of course it is true that the contradiction is removed later on by taking drṣṭih to mean “ poetic vision ” and rasān rasayitum to mean “ to bring about aesthetic experience in the minds of the readers or spectators, ” but as soon as we understand the words metaphorically in this manner, the “ novelty ” or “ marvellousness ” also disappears. The words ata eva navā refer to the contradiction between the pirrma facie senses of drṣṭi and rasān rasayitum.

6. Atyantam can be taken both with avivakṣitam and with asambhavābhāvāt. The idea is that this is not atyantatiraskṛtavācya ( a subvariety of avivakṣitavācya ), because the literal meaning of “ sight ” is slightly retained in the sense that careful observation of the world around us is useful for the aspiring poet.

156

into the meaning of " poetic vision " that is the result of the repetition of the. " sensual " ( ocular ) perception ( of the world ) ( aindriyaka-vijñāna ).1 This passing over (into another meaning ) is helped by the figure of speech known as " contradiction."2 So, Ānanda will say: " ( there is the combination of arthāntarasaṅkramitavācya ) with virodhā-laṅkāra."3 ( The compound pariniṣṭhitārtha viṣayonneṣā can be explained as follows : ) ( First ) yā cā means sight as just described, i. e. the functioning ( unmeṣa ) of which with respect to objects to be cognised is fixed ( or stable ) that is, immovable ( definite ). Or else ( we can analyse the compound as follows: ) That sight the functioning ( unmeṣa ) of which is with respect to objects that are firm ( pariniṣṭhita ), that is, well-known in worldly experience, and not with respect to completely unprecedented ( new ) objects as is the case with poets (i. e. poets create new worlds whereas philosophers analyse the one we live in ). The word ( vaipaścitī ) is explained as vipaścitām iyam (" pertaining to philosophers ). When Ānanda says4: " drawing on both sorts of vision," " that of poets " and " that of philosophers," his own modesty is suggested, for he means: " I am neither a poet nor a scholar." " I have borrowed this double vision ( poetic and philosophic ) which does not really belong to me, the way a poor man in an ill-equipped house will borrow provisions ( and articles of furniture, etc. ) from somebody else's house in order to entertain ( a guest )."

TE DVE API: One sort of vision alone is not sufficient for accomplishing a proper scrutiny and interpretation ( nirvarṇanam ). Viśvam ( in addition to the sense " world " ) means " all ". Aniśam means again and again

1. The compound aindriyakavijñānābhyāsollasite ( where ullasita must mean something like " being the result of " ) can also be understood in a totally different way : We can split the compound after aindriya, and read kavijñāna. This would then translate as : " The result of the repetition of the ocular perception ( of the world ) on the part of the poet. "

2. How is the arthāntarasaṅkramitavācyadhvani helped by virodha? The point is this: the initial contradiction between drṣṭi ( eye-sight ) and rasān rasayitum vyāpāravatī ( " engaged in bringing about the experience of physical flavours or tastes " ) is responsible for giving rise to the arthāntarasaṅkramitavācyadhvani. The suggested prayojana in the ajahallakṣaṇā is pratibhānāsya atisphuṭatvam ( extreme clarity of poetic vision ). Had the virodha ( i. e. failure of the literal sense of sight) not been there, there would have been no ajahallakṣaṇā, and consequently no suggestion of the prayojana. Thus the arthāntarasaṅkramitavācyadhvani is supported by ( or based upon ) virodha. So virodha is anugrāhaka of the arthāntarasaṅkramitavācyadhvani ( which is the anugrāhya ). Virodha is the aṅga and arthāntarasaṅkramitavācyadhvani is the aṅgin. So this is a case of aṅgāṅgibhāva-saṅkara or anugrāhyānugrāhakabhāvasaṅkara.

3. P. 510.

4. Remove the daṇḍa after te avalambyeti on p. 509, since this is part of the series of three quotations that Abhinava enumerates.

without stopping. We have been describing ( the world ) through ( poetic ) descriptions ( as explained above ), and also describing in a definite ( categorical ) manner as follows : This is really like this1 ( i. e. making careful analytic descriptions ).2 A description ( of this kind ) involves analysis through direct perception ( parāmarśa ),3 inference, etc., so as to discover wherein the essence might lie, i. e. dissecting things very minutely ( tilaśas tilaśah ) ( and carefully ). It is well-known ( khyāti ) that things to be described are well and properly ( or completely ) described when they are presented at times by means of the poetic vision ( employed for bringing about aesthetic experience ) and at times by means of the stable philosophic vision which definitely and categorically reveals their particular ( i. e. true ) nature. Vayam means “ we who have been engaged in using both

illusory4 ( i. e. poetic ) vision and analytic ( i. e. philosophic ) vision.” Śrāntāḥ means: “not only have we not discovered anything substantial, but quite the contrary, we have only found weariness.” The word “ and ” is used in the sense of “ but ”. Abhiśayana. (“ O you who are sleeping on the ocean ” ), because of your Yogic sleep, ( having withdrawn the whole universe into yourself ).5 And thus you know the true nature of the real essence, i. e. you remain in your true nature. A person who is tired ( naturally ) feels respect ( bordering on envy ) for one who manages to be lying down ! TVADBHAKTI. You alone are the true nature of the highest Self, the essence of every thing. “ Devotion to you ” means infusion with devotion preceded by faith ( śraddhā ), etc., which ( infusion ) arises in due order from upāsanā ( adoration ), etc. We have not obtained any ( joy ) ( even remotely ) com-

1. Abhinava uses this same expression on p. 97 of the Locana, in explaining how a poet, even though he be gifted with imagination ( pratibhā ) must nonetheless put in hard work in the form of revision, etc. : यद्यपि स्वयमेवतत्परिस्फुरति, तथापीदमित्थ-मिति विशेषतो निरूप्यमाणं सहृदयशाखीभवति । Of course the two terms are slightly different in meaning.

2. Place a danda after idam ittham iti in the B. P. edition.

3. We take parāmarśa to stand for pratyakṣa in general, rather than for lingaparamarśa ( i. e. as part of anumāna ).

4. Mithyā refers to poetic knowledge, because, as Ānanda says in the fourth Uddyota ( p. 527 ), quoting some unknown mahākavi : “ The literary utterance of great poets is glorious. For it causes various ideas to enter the heart ( of the reader ) and appear ( there ) in a form which is different, as it were, from their real form.” The Skt. chāyā for this is : अतथास्थितानपि तथासंस्थितानिव हृदये या निवेइयति । अथे-विशेषण, या ज्योत्काविकल्पनापरा वाणी ॥ See also the fine verses by Ānanda quoted in the third Uddyota, p. 498. See above, p. 12.

5. We propose placing a danda after yoganidrayā, which is the word added by Abhinava to bring out the implication of abdhiśayana. “ You are lying on the ocean in your Yogic repose.” त्वमत्र एव सारस्वरूपवेधी, स्वरूपावस्थितः इत्यर्थः, should be taken as a separate sentence. Cf., on the notion of Yoganidrā, Raghuvamśa, XIII. 6,

158

parable to that arising from devotion to you, let alone an identical ( joy ). This stanza is the utterance of the author ( Ānanda ), who began by first being a devotee of God, and then, simply out of curiosity, adopted both the viewpoints of the poet and the philosopher ( but found them ultimately unsatisfying ) and once again came to believe that rest in devotion to God was inevitable ( yuktā ).1

For we have already explained2 that the happiness which results from (conceptual understanding) of both seen and unseen objects which are ascertained ( pariniścita ), by all the means of valid cognition ( i. e. philosophy ) or even that transcendent joy which consists in relishing an aesthetic experience - to both of these the bliss that comes from finding rest in God is far superior ( prakṛṣyate ); and that aesthetic pleasure ( rasāsvāda ) is only the reflection ( avabhāsa ) of a drop ( vipruṣ ) of that mystic bliss.

But ordinary worldly happiness is for the most part ( prāya ) inferior to even that aesthetic delight, because it is mixed with abundant ( bahutara ) suffering as well. This is the essence of what he means.”

This then, is Abhinava's final position. To have provided a coherent philosophy of aesthetic experience is no small achievement. Clearly it was owing to Abhinava's influence that so many later writers ( primarily among the ālaṅkārikas, and only very rarely among pure philosophers, for reasons that still puzzle us ) were able to draw upon this precious analogy of religious experience and aesthetic experience, and to make their own contributions. It is not our purpose to provide anything more than the briefest glance into some of the more noteworthy passages in which interesting distinctions can

1. Is Abhinava just guessing that this is the case from the single poem here given, or is he actually privy to some information about the life of Ānandavardhana that has not come down to us? One might be inclined to believe that he is simply saying what has become a cliché ( cf. the popular notions about the life of Bhartrhari, the author of the śatakatrayam ) namely that one is first inclined towards worldly life, but eventually, in the wisdom of age, one comes to religion. But here Abhinava says that Ānanda was first a devotee, then went through a middle period of interest in poetry and philosophy, and finally came back to religion. This is too unusual to be simply invented, and we think that the likelihood of Abhinava reporting an actual detail of Ānanda's life is strong. Otherwise the expression prathamam would be out of place, since there is nothing in the verse itself to warrant this assumption. This is important, because it is the only detail that we know of his life, for no other legends or reports have come down to us.

2. By ity uktam prāg asmābhiḥ, Abhinava must be referring to the Locana itself ( and not to an earlier work ). But we have not come across any explanation in our reading of the text of the Locana. A puzzle.

be found. One is found in the Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhaṭṭa.1 Mahima is objecting to the use of the word viśeṣa by Ānandavardhana in the expression kāvyaviśeṣa in Kārikā 13 of the first Uddyota : “ It is also not possible to speak of excellence ( viśeṣa i. e. atiśaya ) in the case of poetry, for kāvya ( i. e. rasa ) consists in the relish of the highest happiness.”2 Mahima means that one cannot use the expression kāvyaviśeṣa, since all poetry is rasātmaka and is therefore in and by itself niratiśayasukhasvādalakṣaṇa. ( He is thus not referring to the division of poetry into uttama, madhyama, etc.). In support of his contention he quotes the following very interesting verse :3

" When, from the recitation4 and singing of the Dhruvā songs, rasa reaches its peak ( i. e. the spectator is filled with rasa ), he turns his attention inwards (antarmukha) for the moment, concentrated entirely on enjoying that profusion (bhara) ( of rasa ) and becomes delighted. At that moment (tatah) when ( he ) is immersed in his own true nature (svarūpa) and he is unaware of any outside object (nirviṣaya), his own deep flow (nisyanda) of joy becomes manifest, by which even Yogins are pleased."5

Madhusūdanasarasvatī in his Śrībhagavadbhaktirasāyanam, I. 12, differentiates between rasāsvāda and brahmāsvāda. He says that whereas brahman is sat ( existence ) and ajñāta ( unknown by ordinary people ), worldly objects like a beautiful woman, etc., are knowable ( meya ) by means of valid knowledge. But a beautiful woman, etc., as presented in literary works appears to the sahṛdaya in the form of pure consciousness (caitanya) as limited by the beautiful woman, etc., when the covering mantle disappears (māyāvṛtitirodhāne, paraphrased in the commentary as vyāvaraña-

1. VV. p. 100 ( Kashi Skt. Series ed. 1964 ).

2. VV. p. 100 : नच तस्य विशेषः संभवति निरतिशयसुखास्वादलक्षणत्वात्तस्य ।

3. VV. p. 100 : यदादौ ---

पाठ्यादथ ध्रुवागानान्ततः संपूरिते रसे। तदास्वादभरैकाग्रो हृद्यतन्मुखः क्षणम् ।।

तत्तो निर्विष्यस्य स्वरूपावस्थितौ निजः । निस्यन्दते ह्लादनिध्यान्दो येन तृप्यन्ति योगिनः ।।

4. We take pṛthya to mean: " anything to be recited," and thus it can denote the recitation of the nōndī, the recitation of the speeches assigned to the different characters, and also the recitation of non-dramatic poems. Dhruvāgāna applies not only to the songs sung in the pūrvaraṅga, but to all songs sung in the actual course of the play, such as that sung at the time of the entry of a character (prāveśikī dhruvā) and that sung at the exit of a character (naiṣkrāmikī dhruvā). Ruyyaka (in his comm. on the VV., p. 99) takes pāṭhya to be a reference to Kāvya,

and dhruvā to be a reference to the Nāṭya : पाठ्यादित्यादिना, ध्रुवाद्यगीतिसामध्यानुरूण्येन

नाट्यविषयरसस्वरूपवर्णनम् । काव्यविषये तु गानवज्ज्ञमिति तदेव रसस्वरूपम् । Note that Ruyyaka, p. 100, takes asya as a reference to the reader or spectator : asya carvayituh.

5. Gnoli ( op. cit. first edition, Rome, p. 57), says that this verse is "......certainly from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka."

शान्तरস

tiradhāne ), because the mind of the sahrdaya, stabilised in sattvaguna, becomes

for a moment identified with pure consciousness. But because it is after all

worldly objects ( viṣaya ) that are perceived under the form of the highest

bliss ( paramānandarūpaviṣayopādānāt ) and because there is the non-percep-

tion ( abhāne ) of the true nature of pure consciousness as it is limited by

worldly objects (tattadavacchinnacaitanyasvarūpa),1 there is neither immediate

release, nor any damage to the self-luminosity (of pure consciousness).2

What follows from this ?

" Therefore, when this ( consciousness limited by worldly objects )

becomes manifest in the mind, it turns into rasa, although owing to its being

mixed with insentient objects it is somewhat less ( than the joy of pure

consciousness )."3

Curiously enough, we have only come across one author who makes

the comparison in favour of rasāsvāda (with the possible exception, depending

on how it is interpreted, of the verse from Bhaṭṭanāyaka, quoted on p. 23 ),

and this is Jayadeva in his Prasannarāghava :

" Neither the knowledge of Brahman ( i. e. spiritual bliss ) nor the

wealth of a king can be compared to poetry. Like a daugher married to an

uncommonly worthy man, it creates joy in the heart when it is appreciated by

an exceptional person."4

1. We propose reading tattadavacchinna for caitanyāvacchinna, because this

latter makes no sense. If we read the former, tattad can refer to kāntādiviṣaya. The

expression tattadavacchinnacaitanya actually occurs in the commentary, in the fourth

line from the beginning.

2. BR. I, 12 :

सदज्ञानं तद्रूपं मेयं कान्तादिमानतः ।

मायावृतिरिरोधाने वृत्त्या सच्वस्थया क्षणम् ॥

Note the commentary ( by M. himself ) :

वस्तुतः परमानन्दरुपविषयोपादानचैतन्यावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्त्वरूपाभानाच्च न सद्यो मुक्तिः

स्वप्रकाशभङ्गो वा ।

3. BR. I. 13 : तथा किं

अतस्तदविभावितं मनसि प्रतिपद्यते ।

किञ्चिन्न्यूनाख्य रसतां याति जाड्यविमिश्रणात् ॥

Note the commentary: लौकिकरसे तु विषयावच्छिन्नसैव चिदानन्दांशस्य स्फुरणात्

आनन्दस्य न्यूनतैव ।

4. Prasannarāghava, ( ed. by V. L. S. Pansīkar, NSP. 1922, p. 6). prastāvanā,

verse 23 (last stanza) :

न ब्रह्मविद्या न च राजलक्ष्मीस्तथा यथेयं कविता कवीनाम् ।

लोकोत्तरे पुंसि निवेश्यमानां पुत्रीव हर्षं हृदये करोति ॥

Note the pun on the words lokottare pumsi niveśyamānā.

CONCLUSION

161

Looking back over the many passages quoted from Abhinava, what can we pick out as the main similarities and the main differences between rasāsvāda and brahmāsvāda?

SIMILARITIES

( 1 ) There is no pain in drama, for everything is blissful when we attain the state of rasa. This is equally true of any higher ecstatic experience.

( 2 ) During an actual dramatic performance, we forget the self.

( 3 ) We have no hope of material gain from art. The same is true on the religious level, since to become seriously religious in India generally means abandoning one's acquired wealth.

(4) Both experiences are alaukika. We have seen how often Abhinava uses this term.

( 5 ) Both experiences are ānandaikaghana.

( 6 ) In both cases, the distance between the subject and the object is removed. Thus Abhinava stressed that rasa is not objective.

( 7 ) Time and space disappear for the duration of the experience. We are not conscious of our surroundings during a drama, or at least we ought not to be, according to Abhinava.

( 8 ) During both experiences there is total immersion. In the case of samādhi there is vyutthāna, which could correspond ( perhaps forcibly, however ) to leaving the theatre and re-entering ordinary life. We have all certainly experienced the curious feeling of being let-down, even of depression, upon leaving a theatre.

( 9 ) In both cases, special preparation is necessary: music and dance in the theatre, and perhaps one might include bhajans and other paraphernalia of bhakti in the case of religion.

( 10 ) In both cases, what appears is not something that is “ created ” anew, but something that is “ manifested.” or “suggested.” Rasa is not “produced,” it is “suggested.” So also, the identity of the ātman and

1. See also the Brahmasiddhi of Mandanamiśra, Ch. 1, p. 5, Kuppuswami Shastri's edition : पूर्वं च लौकिकानन्द एवंास्य ( ब्रह्मानन्दस्य ) मात्रेः युज्यते ।

2. Note what the Saṅgītaratnākara, III. 1266 says : ब्रह्मासंविद्विसदृशो संवित्त् । The Bhāvaprakāśana, II ( p. 53 ) also deals with the distinction between rasāsvāda and brahmāsvāda and then ends by saying :

शिवागमैरथैर्ड्यमेवमुक्तः पुरातनैः ।

Śāradātanaya, as is clear from Ch. I, pp. 26-27, and Ch. II, pp. 47, does not accept śānta. However, at II, p. 48, a certain Vāsuki is quoted who does accept śānta. On this problem, see Raghavan, " The Number of Rasas," p. 11.

162

bráhman is only a question of removing ignorance (i.e. nothing “ new ” is to be acquired). In Vedānta the term abhivyakti is often used for this process, just as both Ānanda and Abhinava use the same expression for rasa.

(11) In Vedānta, avidyā is removed by means of śravaṇa, manana etc. In rasanispatti, Abhinava emphasises how the vighnas must be removed before rasa can manifest itself.

(12) In both cases there is a sense of rest (viśrānti), of having reached the goal (cf. the Vedāntic expression krtakrtya) beyond which there is nothing to be accomplished.

(13) In the aesthetic experience, Ānanda (and Abhinava) make light of the “ means ” that have brought it about, especially of the vācya sense, which is compared to a lamp (D. Āl. I. 9) which is useful for illuminating objects, but which is not the goal of our efforts. Similarly, in Vedānta, Śaṅkara speaks of the upāyas as being similar to a raft which we leave behind after our destination has been reached.

DIFFERENCES

The differences are no less striking, and certainly ought not to be lightly dismissed. Abhinava himself makes the distinction in a difficult passage in the Abhinavabhāratī :1

“ Aesthetic experience (carvaṇā) is different from the perception of love, etc., that arises because of ordinary valid means of cognition such as direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), textual authority (āgama), simile (upamāna) and others. It is also (an experience) different from the indifferent (tatastha) knowledge of another person's thoughts that arises from direct vision in a Yogin, and from the experience that consists of a single mass of the bliss (ānandaikaghana) of one’s own Self that belongs to the highest Yogin and which, being pure (śuddha), is devoid of contact (uparāga) with any object of the senses. The reason why aesthetic experience differs from all the above, is because of the absence of beauty caused respectively by the appearance of distractions such as the desire to aquire (arjanādi), the absence of active participation, the absence of clarity (asphuṭutva), and being at the mercy of the object (of contemplation).”

1. A. Bh. I, 285. Gnoli, p. 21 :

कि त्वल्लौलिकविभावादिसंयोगवलोपनतैवेयं चर्वणा । सा च प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमोपमानादिलौकिक-प्रमाणजनितरत्याद्यवबोधतस्तथा योगिप्रत्यक्षजतटस्थपरसंवित्तिज्ञानात्सकलवैषयिकोपरागरहून्यशुद्धपरयोगिगत-स्वात्मानन्दैकघनानुभवाच्च विशिष्यते, एतेषां यथायोगमर्जनादिविग्रहान्तरोदयताडस्थ्यास्फुटत्वविषयावेशवैवध्य-कृतसौन्दर्यविरहात् ।

CONCLUSION

163

Other differences are :

( 1 ) The final state in Vedānta is almost always described ( ! ) as ineffable,1 whereas Ānanda is clear that such an adjective can never be predicated of dhvani. Whether Abhinava agreed or not is not evident.

( 2 ) The Adhikārin in the case of liberation is much more strictly defined than he is for literature. After all, children are perfectly capable of watching a drama, though they might not take away as much as a qualified adult. Sahṛdayatva is a much more worldly and concrete qualification than is mumukṣā.

( 3 ) The drama is not expected ( at least Abhinava never says anything about this ) to change one’s life radically. To have a profound aesthetic experience is simply satisfying and does not imply that one will be in any sense profoundly altered. One cannot say the same for mystic experiences. Quite apart from the concept of sadyomukti, any deep religious experience is very likely to make a manifest, sometimes drastic, change in a person’s outward life.

( 4 ) It is significant that most writers, ( Abhinava is an exception ) , do not use the term ānanda to describe the purpose of poetry as often as they use the less ethereal term prīti and even more often vinoda, “entertainment.” It is perfectly legitimate to give curiosity as the reason for wishing to see any given drama. But to say the same of religious experience would be unthinkable, at least in ancient India.

( 5 ) With the exception of Abhinava ( who has highly “ spiritual ” ideas about love, see p. 14 ) , most writers regard the highest expression of drama to be sexual love, without any philosophical implications.

In spite of these differences, such sentiments in regard to aesthetic experience as Abhinava provided, became very common. For instance in the Alañkāramahodadhi of Narendraprabha Sūri we read :

1. E. g. Gauḍapāda, III, 47 : स्वस्थं शान्तं सनिर्माणमकथ्यं सुखमुत्तमम् । Ānanda-vardhana is quite clear that such an adjective can never be predicated of dhvani : येषpi सहृदयहृदयसंवेद्यमनाख्येयमेव ध्वनेरतात्पर्यमात्रानुसन्धि: स तेषpi न परीक्ष्यवादिन: । ( D. Āl. pp. 162-63 ), Sahṛdayahṛdayasamvedyam is not ambiguous and cannot be Ānanda’s own position, for if it were, this would in no way prove that dhvani was “ speakable ” but only that it was “ knowable ” which is not the same thing at all. Moreover, this is confirmed by the passage in the D. Āl., p. 33, where this adjective is given as part of the anākhyeyavāda. We feel that it is quite possible that Abhinava himself, however, did not really agree with this position. It is interesting that he does not comment extensively on the anākhyeyavāda except to hint that it is a Buddhist position, with which Ānanda has dealt elsewhere ( Locana, p. 519 ).

164

शान्तरस

" (Aesthetic experience is that state) wherein the mind sinks for a moment, where it bathes with ambrosia for a moment, where it gets drunk for a moment, where it melts away for a moment."1

Even such a staunchly Vedānta work as the Pañcadasī of Vidyāraṇya seems to have been influenced by aesthetic speculations in four lovely verses :

" The lamp which is in the theatre lights up equally the manager, the audience and the dancer. Even if they are not present, it shines."2

" The manager is the ego. The audience are the sense-objects. The dancer is the mind. The keepers of time, etc., are the sense-organs. The illuminating lamp is the Witness (i.e. the Self)."3

" Whatever forms can be imagined with the mind, illuminating all of these, he becomes the Witness of all of them. By himself however he is beyond the reach of words and mind."4

" How can I experience such a Self? If you feel this way, then do not (try) to experience it. When all experiences cease, then the Witness alone is left."5

Here is a verse quoted by Jayaratha in the Tantrāloka which seems to sum everything up in a very fine analogy :

" Just as when various objects such as pieces of wood, leaves, stones, etc., fall into a salt-mine they turn into salt, so also emotions (turn into bliss when they fall into ) the pure consciousness that is our very Self."6

1. Alañkāramahodadhi of Narendraprabha Sūri, ed. by L. B. G. J. Pandit, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1942 (G. O. S. XCV) :

मज्जतीव क्षणः सान्तीव शुभया क्षणम्। मादितीव क्षणं यत्व विलीयत इव क्षणम् ॥

The Agnipurāṇa too uses the same terminology as Abhinava :

अक्षरं परमं ब्रह्म सनातनमजं विभु । वेदान्तेषु वदन्त्येकं चैतन्यं ज्योतिरेश्वरम् ॥

आनन्दः सहजस्तस्य व्यक्त्यते स कथंचन् । व्यक्तिः सा तस्य चैतन्यचमत्काररसाह्लया ॥

Ch. 309, vv. 1-2. These verses seem to us clearly derived from Abhinava.

2. Pañcadasī, X. 11 :

नृत्यशालास्थितो दीपः प्रसं शभ्यांश नर्तकीम् । दीपयेदविशेषेण तदभावेऽपि दीप्यते ॥

3. PD. X. 14 :

अहंकारः प्रभुः सभ्या विषयाः नर्तकी मतिः । तालादिधाररीणाक्षाणि दीपः साक्ष्यवभासकः ॥

4. PD. X. 23 :

यथादृप्ति कल्पयेत् दृश्यां वेदनास्वादकारणम् । यस्तु तस्या भवेद्राक्षी साक्षी वाङ्मनसगोचरः ॥

5. PD. X. 24 :

कथं तादृक्ष्यया ग्राह्य इति चेत् नैव गृह्यताम् । सर्वग्रहोपसंशान्तौ स्यामेवावशिष्यते ॥

6. T. Āl. Vol, I, p. 30, part two, second āhnika, under verse 35 :

यथा लवणत्स्वादे कल्पनते तथ भावाश्रिदात्मनि ।

APPENDIX

Later Writers on Śantarasa and Rasāsvāda :

It is not our main purpose to examine in any detail how the writers of

the later tradition deal with the themes supplied by Abhinavagupta. None-

theless there are certain passages which we feel deserve to be noticed. The

three main texts that should be seen are the Kāvyaprakāśa, the Sāhitya-

darpana and the Rasagangādhara. There are two areas in which we are inte-

rested : śāntarasa and rasāsvāda. The Kāvyaprakāśa is quite brief on śānta-

rasa. At IV. 29 Mammaṭa says :

"Śṛṅgāra, hāsya, karuṇa, raudra, vīra, bhayānaka, bībhatsa and

adbhuta — these are stated to be the eight rasas in drama."

Later, at IV. 35 he says :

"Śānta is the ninth rasa, of which nirveda is the sthāyibhāva" and then

he gives the stanza ahau vā hāre vā kusumaśayane vā drṣadi vā as an example

of śāntarasa.1 It would seem therefore that according to Mammaṭa, śāntarasa

has no place in drama, but only in kāvya. But his statement is not un-

ambiguous, and it is possible to interpret him to mean that generally only

eight rasas are admitted, but that he would admit also śānta as a ninth.

Viśvanātha, in the Sāhityadarpana, III. 45 ff., has the following remarks

on ŚR :

Sāhityadarpana III. 245–250 :

अथ शान्तः -

शान्तः शमस्थायिभाव उत्तमप्रकृतिमतः ।

कुन्देन्दुसुन्दरच्छायः श्रीनारायणदैवतः ।

अनित्यत्वादिनाशोऽवस्तुनिःसारता तु या ।

परमात्मखरूपे वां तस्योल्लम्भनिमित्तये ॥

पुण्याश्रमहरिक्षेत्रतीर्थरम्यवनादयः ।

महापुरुषझ्ञाऽयास्तस्योद्दीपनरुपिणः ।

रोमाञ्चाद्याश्रानुभावास्तथा स्युर्ग्यभिचारिणः ॥

निर्वेदहर्षस्मरणमति भूतदयादयः ।

1. According to Kṣemendra, Aucityavicāracarcā 29 (Minor works of

Kṣemendra, Sanskrit Academy Series No. 7, Hyderabad, 1961, edited by E. V. V.

Rāghavācārya and D. G. Padhye ), this stanza was written by Utpalarāja. Kosambi

("The Epigrams Attributed to Bhartrhari", Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1948, p. 85 )

includes it among the Samśayitaślokas, as no. 213.

यथा-

रथ्यान्तश्वसस्तथा धृतजरत्कन्थालवस्याच्छगे:

सत्रासं च सकौतुकं च सदयं दृष्टस्य तैरङ्गरै: ।

निर्ज्यीकृतचित्तसुधारसमुदा निद्रायमानस्य मे

नि:शङ्क; करट; कदा करपटीमिक्षां विलोकिष्यति ॥

पुष्टिस्तु महाभारतादौ दृश्यतया ।

निरहङ्काररुपवैद्ययावीरादिरेष नो ॥

दायवीरादौ हि नागानन्दादौ जीमूतवाहनादेरन्तरा म्लयवत्यादनुरागादेरन्ते च

विद्याधरचक्रवर्तित्ववाक्यैर्दर्शनादहङ्कारोपशमो न दृश्यते ।

शान्तस्तु सर्वाकारेणाहङ्कारप्रशमैकरुपत्वान् तत्रान्तर्भावमहति ।

अतश्च नागानन्दाद: शान्तरसप्रधानत्वमपास्यम् ।

ननु

'न यत्र दुःखं न सुखं न चिन्ता न द्वेषरागौ न च काचिदिच्छा ।

रस: स शान्त: कथितो मुनिन्द्रै: सर्वेषु भावेषु समप्रमाण: ॥'

इत्येवंरुपस्य शान्तस्य मोक्षावस्थायामेवात्मस्वरुपापत्तिलक्षणां प्राप्तुर्भावात्तत्र संचार्यादि-

नामभावात्मकं रसत्वमियुच्यते—

युक्तियुक्तदशायामवस्थितो य: शम: स एव यत: ।

रसतामेति तदस्मिन्संचार्यादे: स्थितिश्व न विरुध्यते ॥

यश्रासिन्सुखभावोयुक्तस्तस्य वैषयिकसुखपरत्वान् विरोध: ।

उक्तं हि—

'यच्च कामसुखं लोके यच्च दिव्यं महत्सुखम् ।

तृष्णाक्षयसुखस्यैते नाहृत: षोडशीं कलाम् ॥'

सर्वाकारमहङ्काररहितत्वं ब्रजन्ति चेत् ।

अत्रान्तर्भावमहन्ति दयावीरादयस्थथा ॥

आदिशब्दादधर्मवीरदानवीरदेवताविषयरतिप्रभृतय: ।

तत्र देवताविषया रतिर्यथा—

कदा वाराणस्यामिह सुरधनिरोधे वस-

नसान: कौपीनं शिरसि निदधानोड्डालिपुटम् ।

अये गौरीनाथ त्रिपुरहर शम्भो त्रिनयन

प्रसीदति क्रोशन्निमिषमित्र नेष्यामि दिवसान् ॥

APPENDIX

167

" Śāntarasa has calmness (śama) as its basic mood. It belongs to the very best of men. It has the white complexion of the Kunda (jasmine) and the moon, and the revered Nārāyaṇa as its presiding deity. Its ālambana-vibhāva is the emptiness (or vanity) of all things because of their transient nature, or it is the nature of the supreme Self. Its uddīpanavibhāvas are holy hermitages, sacred places (harikṣetra), places of pilgrimage, pleasant groves, etc., and the company of great men etc. Its anubhāvas are horrification, etc. Its vyabhicāribhāvas are self-disparagement, joy, recollection, resolve, kindness towards all beings, etc. Here is an example :

" When will the crows fearlessly carry away the food placed as alms in my joined hands, as I move along the highway wearing an old, worn-out, tattered and inadequate garment, looked at by the citizens on the road with fear, curiosity and pity, sleeping in the unfeigned bliss of relishing the nectar of spirituality ?"

The full development (of śāntarasa) is to be seen in the Mahābhārata, etc.

" Dayāvīra (in which the sthāyibhāva utsāha is based on or is concerned with mercy or benevolence), etc., are not identical with this (śānta), as (śānta) is without even the slightest trace of egoism (while dayāvīra, etc., are marked by egoism)."

In dayāvīra, etc., such as for example in the case of Jimūtavāhana, etc., we do not find an extinction of egoism, in as much as we observe in the middle of the play, Jimūtavāhana's love for Malayavatī, and in the end his attainment of the status of sovereignty over the Vidyādharas. Śānta, however, cannot be included under dayāvīra, etc., because its exclusive nature is the extinction of egoism in every way. Hence the view that in the Nāgānanda, śānta is the dominant sentiment, is refuted.

It may be objected as follows :

" Where there is neither pain, nor pleasure, nor worry, nor hatred, nor affection, that is styled as śāntarasa by the chief among the sages, that which consists in equality towards all objects."

How can śāntarasa which is of the nature described above, and which manifests itself only in the state of emancipation (mokṣa), where there is the complete absence of the auxiliary feelings (and the abiding mental moods such as love, etc.) be regarded as a rasa ? We reply as follows :

" Since that tranquillity alone which exists in the state wherein the mind is joined to and also disjoined from the soul (i.e. wherein the soul is not

1. Reading sarveṣu bhāveṣu samapramāṇah, while in the Daśarūpa, under IV, 45, the reading is sarveṣu bhāveṣu samapradhānah.

168

completely absorbed into the absolute) attains to the nature of rasa, the presence of the auxiliary feelings etc. (i. e. of the abiding mental moods, the excitants and the ensuants ) is not ruled out."

As for the statements that there is in śānta the absence even of pleasure, that refers only to worldly pleasure ( vaiṣayikasukha ), and hence, there is no contradiction. For it has been stated :

" The earthly pleasure arising from fulfilment of desires as well as the great pleasure which is attained in heaven — these are not equal to even a sixteenth part of the happiness arising from the extinction of all desires."

Dayāvīra, etc., deserve to be included under śānta, provided that they are completely divested of egoism in every way.

The word " etc.'', stands for dharmavīra, dānavīra, love having a deity for its object, etc. Amongst these, love having a deity for its object is illustrated in the following stanza :

" When shall I pass my days as a moment, dwelling in Vārāṇasī, on the bank of the divine river (Ganges) wearing a loin-cloth, holding my hand joined on my head and crying out: "O lord of Gaurī, destroyer of Tripura, three-eyed Śambhu, be merciful towards me !"

The commentary of the Sāhityadarpana on rasāsvāda while interesting, is too long to include here ( see SD III. 1 and ff. ). This and the commentary of the Kāvyaprakāśa on rasāsvāda ( III. pp. 91-95, Jhalkikar ) are readily available, since there exist translations into English of both these texts ( see Bibliography ). The Rasagangādhara, however, is a different matter, since it has never been translated before. We therefore thought it worthwhile to translate in full Jagannātha's remarks on śantarasa, and to provide an explanatory translation of his remarks on Abhinava's views on rasāsvāda.

Here is the first text :

Rasagaṅgādhara

स च—

' शृङ्गार: करुण: शान्तो रौद्रो वीरोडद्भुतस्तथा । हास्यो भयानकश्चैव बीभत्सश्चेति ते नव ॥'

मुनिवचनं छात्र मानम्।

केचित्तु—

' शान्तस्य शमसाध्यत्वान्नैते च तदसंभवात्।

अष्टावेव रसा नाट्ये न शान्तस्तत्र युज्यते ॥'

APPENDIX

169

इत्याहुः। तच्चापरे न क्षमन्ते। तथा हि नटे शमाभावादिति हेतुरसङ्गतः, नटे रसाभिव्यक्तौ

स्वीकारात। सामाजिकानां शमवृत्तेन तत्र रसोद्रोधे बाधकाभावात। न च नटस्य

शमाभावात्तदभिनयप्रकाशकत्वानुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम्। तस्य भयक्रोधादेरप्यभावेन तदभिनय-

प्रकाशकताया अप्यसङ्गत्यापत्तेः। यदि च नटस्य क्रोधादिभावेन वास्तविकत्कार्याणां बन्ध-

बन्धादीनामुपप्लवस्यसंवेदनपि क्रतिमत्कार्याणां शिक्षाभ्यासादित उत्पत्तौ नास्ति बाधकत्वमिति

निरीक्ष्यते, तदा प्रकृतेऽपि तुल्यम्। अथ नाट्ये गीतवाद्यादीनां विरोधिनां सत्त्वात् सामा-

जिकेष्वपि विषयवैमुख्यात्मना शान्तस्य कथमुद्रेक इति चेत्, नाट्ये शान्तरससम्भुपगच्छद्धिः

फलवैचित्र्याद्वैरीतिवादादेस्मिन्विरोधित्वया अकलपनात्। विषयचित्तासामान्यस्य तत्र विरोधित्व-

स्वीकारे तदीयालम्बनस्य संसारानित्यत्वस्य तदुद्धपनस्य पुराणश्रवणससङ्ग्रपुण्यवनतीर्थावलोक-

नादेरपि विषयत्वेन विरोधित्वापत्तेः। अत एव च चरमाध्याये सङ्गीतरत्नाकरेऽष्टौैव रसा नाट्येऽभिति केचिदचूचुदन्।

तदचारु, यतः कश्चिन्न रसं स्वदते नटः॥

इत्यादिना नाट्येऽपि शान्तो रसो अस्तीति व्यवस्थापितम्। तैरपि नाट्ये शान्तो रसो नास्ती-

त्यभ्युपगम्यते तैरपि बाधकाभावान्महाभारतादिप्रबन्धानां शान्तरसप्रधानतया अखिललोका-

नुभवसिद्धत्वाच्च काव्ये सौदृश्यं स्वीकार्यः। अत एव ‘अष्टौ नाट्ये रसाः स्मृताः’ इत्युप-

क्रम्य ‘शान्तोडपि नवमो रसः’ इति मम्मटभट्टा अप्युपसमहार्षुः।

Rasagangādhara1

Rasa is ninefold, because of the statement :

“Śṛṅgāra, karuṇa, śānta. raudra, vīra, adbhuta,

hāsya, bhāyanaka, and bībhatsa — thus they are nine”.2

And in this matter3 the statement of the Sage (Bharata) is the final

authority.

But there are some who say :

“Because śānta can be developed only from (the sthāyibhāva) śama, and

because śama is impossible in an actor, there are only eight rasas in drama;

śānta has no place in it.” This is not, however, accepted by others.4 They say

that the argument advanced (by the advocates of eight rasas) namely that

1. We have used the KM (12) Ed. 1939, p. 35 ff.

2. We do not know where this verse could come from. We take it that

Jagannātha is saying that it is based on the Nāṭyaśāstra, not that it comes from the NŚ.

3. Atra means : asmin viṣaye, namely rasasaṅkhyāviṣaye.

4. Apare includes Jagannātha himself. He of course accepts the existence

of śāntarasa.

22

śama is not possible in an actor, does not stand to reason, because we do not accept that the revelation ( i. e. aesthetic enjoyment ) of rasa ( ever ) takes place in an actor.1 As the spectators ( on the other hand ) can experience tranquillity, there is no difficulty in the arousal of ( śānta ) rasa in them. It would not be proper to say that as the actor ( himself ) is devoid of śama, he cannot be capable of acting in a manner congenial to śama. For in that case, it will have to be accepted that, since an actor is devoid of ( genuine ) fear and ( genuine ) anger, etc., he would not be capable of acting in a manner congenial to fear, anger, etc. also. Now, if there is nothing objectionable in the actor’s being able to manifest, through special training, repeated practice, etc., the artificial effects of anger, etc., although there is no possibility in his case of the real effects of anger, etc., i. e. although he cannot actually kill or imprison ( the object of his anger ), then the same should apply in the case of śama as well. It may now be asked : “ How can there be the emergence ( udreka ) of śānta in the minds of spectators ( of a drama ), since there is in a drama vocal and instrumental music, etc., all of which is opposed ( to the suggestion of the sthāyibhāva śama ), and since śānta is by its nature averse to the contemplation of worldly objects ( e. g. music, dance, etc. )?” The reply is that those who admit the existence of śānta in drama, do not believe that the presence of vocal and instrumental music in a drama acts as a hindrance to the emergence of śānta, for the very reason that the result ( namely the emergence of śānta ) is actually experienced ( phalabalāt ). If now it is maintained ( by the opponent ) that the contemplation of any worldly object is detrimental to the emergence of śānta, then ( even in the case of non-dramatic poetry ), the ālambanavibhāva of śama such as the transitory nature of worldly existence, and its uddīpanavibhāvas such as listening to the recitation of the Purāṇas, association with saintly people, visiting sacred penance-groves and holy places ( tīrtha ), being worldly objects ( after all ), will have to be regarded as detrimental to the emergence of śānta ( in the minds of the readers of non-dramatic poetry ). It is for this very reason that in the last chapter of the Saṅgītaratnākara, it has been said :

" some have urged that in dramatic compositions ( nātyeṣu ) there are only eight rasas. But that is not ( at all ) correct ( acāru — unconvincing ), because no actor ever actually relishes any rasa whatsoever."2

1. Jagannātha does not accept the fact that the actor has rasa. Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, however, A. Bh., p. 264 ( Vol. I ) believed that he does : rasabhāvānvitām api vāsanā-vesavaśena nate sambhavād anusamdhibalāc ca layādyanusanarānāt ( for this phrase cf. Locana, Uddyota II, p. 184, last line ). Note too Daśarūpa, IV. 42. — kāvyārtha-bhāvanāsvādo nartakasya na vāryate.

2. Saṅgītaratnākara, VII. 1360, p. 400 of the Ed. by G. S. Sastri, Vol, IV, Adyar Library, 1933, Madras.

APPENDIX

By means of this and similar arguments it has been established (in that work ) that śāntarasa exists ( even in dramatic poetry ). Even those who hold the view that śāntarasa has no place in dramatic poetry ( nāṭya ) will have necessarily to accept its existence in non-dramatic poetry ( kāvya ), ( firstly ) because there are no such objections ( to its acceptance in non-dramatic poetry) as given earlier, and ( secondly ) because it has been established on the strength of all people's actual experience that works like the Mahā-bhārata have śāntarasa as their dominant emotional mood. It is for this very reason that ( a great scholar like) Mammatabhaṭṭa first opened his discussion ( on the number of rasas ) with the words " eight are the rasas in drama "1 and concluded his treatment of the subject with the remark: " śānta too has to be admitted as the ninth rasa ( in non-dramatic poetry )."2

Of these — love, sorrow, disaffection, anger, enthusiasm, wonder, mirth, fear and disgust are the abiding mental moods respectively."3

On the sthāyibhāva of śānta

(The sthāyibhāva of śānta, namely) nirveda4 ( " world-weariness " ) is a peculiar state-of-mind ( cittavṛttiviśeṣa ) which is also called by the name viṣayavirāga ( " aversion to worldly objects of enjoyment " ) arising from contemplation on the eternal Reality ( nityavasu ) and the non-eternal phenomenal appearances in the world ( anityavasu ). If, however, nirveda is ( not the result of such contemplation, but is ) the result of domestic quarrels, etc., it is regarded as a vyabhicāribhāva ( a transient mood ) (since it is of a transitory nature ).5

Now here is a difficult passage from the Rasagaṅgādhara on rasa :6

समुचितललितसन्निवेशचारुणा काव्येन समर्पितैः सहृदयहृदयं प्रविश्टैस्तदीय-सहृदयतासहकृतैने भावनात्रिशमोभद्रया नगिलतदुष्ट्यनंतरमपि वादिभिरेलोकिकविभावानु-भावव्यभिचारिशब्दघ्यपदेशैः शकुन्तलादिभिरालम्बनकारणैः, चन्द्रिकादिभिरुद्दीपनकारणैः, अश्रुपातादिभिः कार्यैः, चिन्तादिभिः सहकारिभिः, संश्रय प्रादुर्भावितेनालौकिकेन व्यापा-रेṇ तत्कालनिवर्तितानन्दांशावरणाज्ञाननेनात एव प्रमुष्टपरिमितप्रमातृवादिनिजधर्मेण प्रमाात्रा स्वप्रकाशतया वास्तविकस्वरूपानन्देन सह गोचरीक्रियामाणः प्राग्विनिविष्टस्वासनारूपो रत्यादिरेव रसः ।

1. KP., IV. p. 98 (Jhalkikar's edition ).

2. KP., IV. 35, p. 117.

3. रतिः शोकश्च निःक्रोधोत्साहहास्यो विस्मयः । हासो भयं जुगुप्सा च स्थायिभावाः क्रमादिमे ॥

4. निःश्रेयसवस्तुविविचारजनमा ( चित्तवृत्तिविशेषः ) विषयविरागाख्यो निर्वेदः गृहकलहादिजस्तु व्यभिचारी ।

5. On the two kinds of nirveda, see the A. Bh., ( Raghavan's " Number of Rasas " p. 10 5 ), surely the source of Jagannātha's remarks.

6. Pages 25–27 KM , edition 1939.

तथा चाहुः — ‘शप्तः स तैरविभावाद्यैः स्थायिभावो रसः स्मृतः’ इति । व्यक्तौ व्यक्तिविषयीकृतः । व्यक्तिश्व भग्नावरणं चित्तं । यथा हि श्रावादिना पिहितो दीपस्तद्वृत्तौ संनिहितानपदर्थान्प्रकाशयति, स्वयं च प्रकाशते, एवमात्मचैतन्यं विभावादिसंवलितं रत्यादीन् । अन्तःकरणधर्माणां साक्षिभास्यत्वाभ्युपगते: । विभावादीनामपि स्वप्रतुरगादिनामित्य रजरतातीनामिव साक्षिभास्यत्वमविरुद्धम् । व्यञ्जकविभावादिचर्वणाया आवरणभङस्य चोत्पत्तिविनाशाभ्यामुपपत्तिविनाशौ रसे उपचर्येते वर्णनिलयतायामिव व्यञ्जकताल्वादिव्यापारस्य गकारादौ । विभावादिचर्वणावधित्वादावरणभङस्य, निवृत्तायां तस्यां प्रकाश्याडवृतत्वादिच्चमात्रोडपि स्थायी न प्रकाशते ।

यद्वा विभावादिचर्वणामहिम्ना सहृदयस्य निजसहृदयतावशेनिमर्षितेन तत्तत्स्थाय्युपहितस्वरूपानन्दाकारः समाधाविव योगिनश्वित्तवृत्तिरुपजायते, तन्मयीभावमिति यावत् । आनन्दो ह्ययं न लौकिकसुखान्तरसाधारणः अनन्तःकरणवृत्तिरुपप्वात् । इत्यं चाभिनवगुप्तमम्मटभट्टादिग्रन्थसारसङ्रहेन भगवद्वाचिद्विशिष्टो रत्यादिः स्थायी भावो रस इति स्थितम् ।

वस्तुतस्तु वक्ष्यमाणश्रुतिस्त्रारस्पेन रत्यादिवच्छिन्ना भग्नावरणा चिदेव रसः । सर्वथैव चास्या विशिष्टात्मनो विशेषणं विशेष्यं वा चिदंशमादाय नित्यं स्वप्रकाशत्वं च सिद्धम् । रत्यादंशमादाय त्वनित्यत्वमितरभास्यत्वं च । चर्वणा चास्य चिद्वृतावारणभञ्ज एव प्रागयुक्ता, तदाकारान्तःकरणवृत्तित्वात् । इयं च परब्रह्मास्वादस्साधर्म्येवलक्षणा, विभावादिविषयसंवलितचित्तालम्बनत्वात् । भाग्या च काव्यस्यापरमाल्लात् । अथास्यां सुखांशाभाने कि मानमिति चेत्समाधाविपे तद्वान् कि मानमिति तुल्यतावात् । ‘सुखमार्गन्तिकं यत्तद्बुद्विग्राह्यमतिन्द्रियं’ इत्यादिः शब्दोऽरित तत् मानमिति चेत्, अस्यत्रापि ‘रसौ वै सः, रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वानन्दी भवति’ इति श्रुतिः, सकलसहृदयप्रल्यकं चेति प्रमाणद्वयम् । येयं द्वितीयपक्षे तदाकारचित्तवृत्त्यामिका रसचर्वणोपनयस्ता शब्दव्यापारभाव्यत्वाच्छाब्दीकापरोक्षसुखालम्बनत्वाच्चापरोक्षात्मिका । तत्त्वंवाक्यजलुद्धिवत् ।

"Rasa—aesthetic enjoyment—is the sthāyibhāva rati, etc., which is of the form of a mental impression, already crystallised in the mind and implanted in the mind since the time of birth (or since time immemorial) and cognised (or perceived) by the cogniser (i.e., by the reader or spectator) along with the joy of self-realisation (nijasvarūpānandena saha) which is absolutely real (and not imaginary), as it is self-luminous (svaprakāśa)

( and does not require anything else to illuminate it). This cognition of a sthāyibhāva (such as rati, etc., ) is the result of an extraordinary function ( of words and senses ) (i.e. it is brought about by the function called suggestion). (This suggestion ) is produced (prādurbhāvita) by the appropriate ālambanavibhāvas, uddīpanavibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas ( described in the poem or represented on the stage ) acting jointly and simultaneously (samabhūya ). The extraordinary function (namely suggestion) which is thus brought into play as a result of the vibhāvas, etc., immediately removes the ignorance which acts as a screen (or veil ) covering up (or obscuring ) the blissful consciousness of the Self. And when the screen of ignorance is thus removed, the cogniser rises superior to and becomes divested of his peculiar properties such as being a limited cogniser ( etc.).

The vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas are first presented by the poet or dramatist to the reader (or spectator) through the medium of the poem (or drama ) which is charming because of the appropriate and beautiful literary style ( adopted for conveying the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas ). These vibhāvas, etc., enter (i.e., make an impression on ) the mind of the appreciative, sympathetic reader (or spectator ). Then by the power of the peculiar mental reflection (on the vibhāvas etc. ), on the part of the reader and in cooperation with his appreciative attitude, the vibhāvas etc., become divested of their individualistic limitations and become universalised (or generalised ), and vibhāvas like Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā lose their individualistic natures as Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā and stand out before us in the universal character of manhood and womanhood in general. In the realm of poetics, fundamental causal factors like Śakuntalā, exciting causal factors like moonlight, effect-factors like the shedding of tears and collateral, accessory effect-factors, like anxiety etc., are designated by the names ālambanavibhāva, uddīpanavibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva respectively. They are extraworldly (alaukika, i.e. they are idealised (and not presented as they exist in ordinary life ) so as to serve the purpose of awakening and nourishing a particular mental mood (such as love etc. ). In the ordinary world they are called ālambanakāraṇa, uddīpakāraṇa, kārya and sahakārin, but when idealised so as to suit the atmosphere of poetry and drama, they are known by the names vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas.

" For it has been said that a sthāyibhāva revealed (or suggested ) by the vibhāvas etc. is called by the name of rasa."1 Revealed (or suggested ) means "made the object of revelation (or suggestion)." Now vyakti ( revelation ) (in the context of rasa-realisation ) means consciousness (pure,

1. KP. IV. 28, p. 86, (Jhalkikar's edition ).

174

blissful consciousness of the Self ), from which the enveloping screen is ( temporarily ) removed ( bhagnāvaranā cid ). Just as a lamp covered by an earthen bowl ( or wicker-basket ) begins to shine by it self, and illumines nearby objects as soon as the cover is taken away, in the same way pure consciousness in the form of the ātman ( i. e. the ātman who is pure consciousness and supreme bliss ), which is covered by ignorance, desire etc. begins to shine on its own ( svayaṃ prakāśate ) and illumines the sthāyibhāvas like rati, etc., along with ( appropriate ) vibhāvas, etc. For the sthāyibhāvas like rati are the properties ( or attributes ) of the mind ( in as much as they are of the form of mental impressions or instincts embedded in the mind ) and hence they are admitted ( by rhetoricians and Vedāntins) to be capable of being illumined by the sākṣin ( i. e. the ātman consisting of pure consciousness ) ( as soon as the enveloping veil in the form of ignorance, desire etc., is removed ). There should be no difficulty in accepting that even the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicaribhāvas are illumined by the ātman ( although they possess an objective character and are objective entities like ghaṭa, paṭa, etc. ), on the analogy of the horse etc. seen in a dream, or on the analogy of the silver ( erroneously ) perceived in a piece of tin ( rañgarajata ). According to this view rasa is nothing but the subtle, latent instincts like love etc. As these instincts are permanent moods of the mind, rasa also is permanent in character. Now the question arises, how rasa is said to come into existence and cease to exist if it is permanent in its nature. The answer is that origination ( utpatti ) and cessation ( vināśa ) really belong to the aesthetic experience ( carvanā ) of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicaribhāvas which are the suggestors of the rasa. Or origination and cessation may be said to belong to the āvaranabhaṅga ( removal of the screen in the form of ignorance, desire etc. which covers up the blissful consciousness ). But the origination and cessation are metaphorically transferred to rasa by lakṣaṇā ( rase upacaryate ). For this an illustration is given from the sphoṭa doctrine of the grammarians. The letters in the form of sphoṭa are really eternal. But they are in ordinary language spoken of as subject to origination and cessation, only in a metaphorical sense. They are said to be subject to origination and cessation because of the origination and cessation of the contacts between the places of articulation ( palate etc. ) and the articulators ( tip of the tongue etc. ). The duration of the removal of the screen of ignorance, desire, worldly distractions etc., is conditioned by the enjoyment ( carvanā ) of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas ( i. e. the removal of the screen of ignorance etc., lasts only so long as the enjoyment of the vibhāvas etc., last ). The moment the enjoyment of the vibhāvas etc., comes to an end, the light of one's own blissful consciousness becomes veiled once again by the power of ignorance, desire, worldly distractions etc., and the light of consciousness that until now illumined the sthāyi-

bhāvas being itself enveloped, the sthāyibhāvas though permanent (i. e. though present and existing all along ), do not shine any longer, and their enjoyment comes to an end. This is the reason why, and this is the sense in which, rasa is said to be subject to origination and cessation.

Or we may say as follows : because of the enjoyment of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas, which enjoyment is evoked (or is called into play, unmiṣita ) by the sympathetic attitude of the appreciative reader or spectator ), the mind of the appreciative reader or spectator dwelling on the various sthāyibhāvas, becomes transformed into the blissful consciousness which is the nature of the ātman, just as in the case of a Yogin, his mind ( samādhi ). This transformation of the mind into the blissful consciousness ( which is the real nature of the ātman ) amounts to the identification of the mind with blissful consciousness ( tanmayībhavana ). Now this bliss is not comparable with any of the ordinary worldly joys; because ordinary worldly joys are a property of the mind ( antahkarana ), ( while this bliss, kāvyānanda, is the essence of the ātman itself ). ( Really speaking kāvyānanda is not identical with brahmānanda or brahmāsvāda, because it is produced by the laukikasāmagrī, such as the contemplation of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas as described in a poem or exhibited in a drama, and so it is essentially laukika. But still it is alaukika in the sense that it is not comparable to any of the joys of this world. At the time of experiencing worldly joys, the ātman enters into contact with the mind so that laukikānanda is cittavrttisamyuktacaitanyasvarūpa. But Kāvyānanda- or rasacarvanājanyānanda - is śuddacaitanyasvarūpa, i. e. at the time of experiencing rasāsvāda the cittavrtti itself becomes transformed into the bliss of pure consciousness ).

Jagannātha sums up the view of Abhinavagupta and his followers on rasa realisation as follows :

" Thus in the light of the real intention ( svārasya i.e. abhipraya ) of the works of Abhinavagupta and of Mammata and others, rasa is a sthāyibhāva such as rati, characterised by blissful consciousness ( i. e. becoming the object of pure, blissful consciousness which is the ātman's real nature ) from which the covering lid has been removed ( bhagnāvaranacidviṣayabhūtaḥ ). But, says Jagannātha, really speaking the view of Abhinavagupta and Mammata ought to be stated as follows : rasa is the blissful consciousness itself from which the covering lid ( of ignorance, desire and worldly distractions ) has been removed and of which the sthāyibhāvas like rati have become the object ( ratyādyavacchinnā bhagnāvaranā cid eva rasaḥ ). This emended statement of the view of Abhinavagupta and Mammata is based on the śruti passage : raso vai saḥ. rasam hy evāyam labdhvā ānandī bhavati. The difference between the two statements of Abhinava-

176

gupta's and Mammata's view consists in the shifting of the viśeṣanaviśeṣya-bhāva. According to the first statement bhagnāvaranā cid becomes the viśeṣaṇa and ratyādisthāyibhāva becomes the viśeṣya. According to the second statement, ratyādisthāyibhāva becomes the viśeṣaṇa and bhagnāvaranā cid becomes the viśeṣya. But according to Jagannātha, the second statement is much more in harmony with the śruti passage quoted above, although the first statement is in keeping with what Abhinavagupta and Mammata have actually said in their works. " But in any case, (i.e. under both the statements ) the element of consciousness ( cidamśa ) is either a viśeṣaṇa (in the first statement ) or a viśeṣya (in the second statement), and one thing is certain (or established) that rasa is eternal ( nitya ) and self-luminous ( svaprakāśa ), because rasa is vitally connected with the cidamśa ( either as viśeṣaṇa or as viśeṣya ) and the cidamśa is eternal and self-luminous. Thus from the point of view of the cidamśa, rasa is eternal and self-luminous, though from the point of view of the ratyādisthāyi-bhāva it is non-eternal ( anitya ) and illumined by something else ( para-prakāśa or itarabhāsya )." ( Hence both the remarks, namely rasah nityah svaprakāśaś ca and rasah anityah itarabhāsyaś ca, are justifiable from their respective viewpoints ).

Jagannātha then goes on to say that the relishing of rasa is nothing but the breaking off ( or withdrawal ) of the screen ( or mantle ) ( of ignorance, etc. ) covering the pure consciousness ( cidgatāvaranabhaṅgah ) or the transformation of the mind into the bliss of pure consciousness which is the nature of the ātman ( tadākārā, i.e. svasarūpānandākārā, antaḥkaraṇavṛttiḥ ). Now this aesthetic enjoyment ( rasacarvanā ) is different from ( and is not identical with ) the meditational trance ( samādhi or brahmāsvāda ). For it has for its object ( ālambana ) the bliss of pure consciousness blended with the cognition ( or consciousness ) of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāri-bhāvas -which are worldly or mundane matters ( viṣaya, i.e. sāṃsārikapadārtha ). But brahmāsvāda or parabrahmasākṣātkāra is not mixed or blended with the cognition ( or consciousness ) of worldly matters. ( it is viśuddha-brahmaviṣayaka or ātmānandaviṣayaka ). Further, aesthetic enjoyment ( rasā-svāda or rasacarvanā ) is the outcome of the special function, namely vyañjanā peculiar to poetry, while brahmāsvāda is the outcome of the process laid down in the Upaniṣads, viz. śravaṇa, manana, nididhyāsana, etc. [ Thus there is a difference between rasāsvāda and brahmāsvāda with regard to the viṣaya ( object ) and the means ( karaṇa or sādhana )].

We translate the next section ( beginning : athāsyāṃ sukhāṃśabodhane, etc. ) :

" Objection : what evidence or authority ( mānam ) is there for holding that in rasāsvāda ( or rasacarvanā ) there is the experience of an element of happiness ( joy or pleasure ) ( sukhāṃśa )?

Reply : A similar counter-question ( paryanuyoga ) could be raised in regard to samādhi ( or brahmāsvāda ). In other words it may be asked : what is the evidence ( or authority ) for saying that in meditational trance also there is the experience of happiness ( or bliss )?

Objection : Why, there is the following evidence ( in the form of a quotation from the Bhagavadgītā, to prove that in brahmāsvāda there is the experience of bliss ). The Gītā says ( VI. 21 ) : sukham ātyantikam yat tad buddhigrāhyam atīndriyam—which means that brahmāsvāda is full of happiness which is super-sensuous, which is perceptible directly by the intellect ( intuition ) and which is ātyantika, i. e. transcending every other kind of mundane joy.

Reply : we ( too ) have the authority of a scriptural ( upaniṣadic ) statement to prove that rasāsvāda is full of happiness. The scriptural statement is : raso vai saḥ. rasaṃ hy evāyaṃ labdhvā ānandī bhavati."

[ Actually, however, this scriptural statement refers to the ātman and not to aesthetic experience. The proper meaning of the statement is : "That ( ātman ) is surely ( vai ) rasa ( joy or bliss ). Having realised the ( ātman which is ) rasa ( bliss ) he becomes happy or blissful." In the first part of the quotation, the ātman is equated with rasa ( i. e. ānanda—supreme joy or bliss ). In the second part of the quotation it is said that having realised that ātman which is rasarūpa or ānandarūpa, he, i. e. the spiritual aspirant ( sādhaka ), becomes supremely happy ( ānandī bhavati ). But Jagannātha seems to have understood both parts of the quotation as referring to rasa in poetry or drama, i. e. as referring to aesthetic experience. He understood the second part to mean : "having realised rasa, i. e. the emotional flavour, he ( i. e. the sahrdaya or sāṃājika ) becomes supremely happy." But we doubt very much if the quotation from the Upaniṣad is capable of such an interpretation ].

" In addition to this scriptural statement serving as evidence to show that rasāsvāda is ānandarūpa, the ānandarūpatva of rasāsvāda is borne out by a second authority, namely the direct experience of the sahrdaya." Jagannātha means that just as the ānandarūpatva of the brahmāsvāda is supported by the quotation from the Bhagavadgītā, and by actual experience of the Yogins, in the same way the ānandarūpatva of rasāsvāda is supported by the scriptural passage given above ( namely : raso vai saḥ. rasaṃ hy evāyaṃ labdhvā ānandī bhavati ) and by the direct experience of the sahrdaya.

Here is our translation of the next section: yeyaṃ dvitīyapakṣe, etc. : " The rasacarvanā ( or rasāsvāda ) which has been described by us above in connection with the second statement of Abhinavagupta's view as consisting in a mental condition transformed into the bliss which is the ātman, well,

that rasacarvanā (or rasāsvāda) is both śābda (verbal) and aparokṣa (i. e. of the nature of direct experience — pratyakṣarūpa).” Jagannātha means that it is śābda because it is induced by sabdavyāpāra, namely vyañjanā, and by abhidhā which always precedes vyañjanā. Rasacarvanā (or rasāsvāda) is aparokṣa (i. e. pratyakṣarūpa) because its object is ātmānanda (aparokṣasukhālambanatvāt). Thus rasāsvāda is both śābda (i. e. śabdavyāpārabhāvya) and aparokṣa, just as the knowledge of the identity between the jīvātman and the paramātman, arising out of the Upaniṣadic statement—tat tvam asi—, is śābda in so far as it is the outcome of the sentence tat tvam asi, and is also aparokṣa (i. e. pratyakṣarūpa) as it is a matter of direct, actual experience (sākṣātkāra) for the spiritual aspirant ( yogin).

BĪBLĪOGRÁPHY

Abhinavabhāratī : See Nāṭyaśāstra.

Agnipurāṇa : Ānandāśrama Edition, No. 41, Poona, 1900.

Alaṃkārakaustubha of Kavikarṇapūra : ed. with an old commentary and a gloss by Sivaprasada Bhattacharya, Varendra Research Society, Rajshahi, Bengal, December, 1926.

Alaṃkārasarvasva of Ruyyaka : edited with the commentary of Jayaratha, by G. Dvivedi, Kavyamala 35, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1939.

Alaṃkārasarvasva of Ruyyaka : edited with the Sāñjīvanī commentary of Vidyācakravartin by V. Raghavan and S. S. Janaki. Mehar Chand Lachmandas, Delhi, 1965.

Aśvaghoṣa, fragments of dramas of : See H. Luders.

B. L. Atreya : The Philosophy of the Yogavāsiṣṭha; Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, Madras, 1936.

Bhagavadgītā with eight commentaries : including the Gītārthasaṅgraha of Abhinavagupta, edited by W. L. S. Pansikar, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1912.

Bhāratīyanāṭyaśāstra; see Nāṭyaśāstra.

Bhāskarī : A commentary on the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī of Abhinavagupta, edited by K. A. Subramania Iyer and K. C. Pandey. Vol. I, Allahabad, 1938, Vol. II, 1950. Vol. II is Prince of Wales Sarasvasi Bhavan Texts No. 83.

Bhāskarī : Vol. III, an English translation of the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī in the light of the Bhāskarī by K. C. Pandey. Prince of Wales Sarasvati Bhavan Texts No. 84, Lucknow, 1954.

S. Bhattacharya : Cornerstone of Rasa-Ideology and the Śaivadarśana of Kāśmīr; Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference, Nagpur, 1945. Reprinted in Studies in Indian Poetics, Calcutta, 1964.

———Kāśmīr Śaivadarśana Impress on Alaṃkāras in Alaṃkāraśāstra ; Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference, Lucknow, 1950.

———Three Lost Masterpieces of the Alamkāraśāstra, Prācyavaṇī, Calcutta, 1944. Reprinted in " Studies in Indian Poetics." 1964.

———Studies in Indian Poetics; Calcutta, Indian Studies Past and Present, 1964.

Bhāvaprakāśana of Śāradātanaya : edited by K. S. Ramaswamy, G. O. S., No. XIV, Baroda, 1930.

180

Buddhacarita of Aśvaghoṣa : edited by H. Johnston, Calcutta, 1936.

T. R. Cintamani : Fragments of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, in Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, Vol. I, pp. 267–276.

Daśarūpaka of Dhananjaya : edited along with the Avaloka commentary of Dhanika, by Sudarshanacharya Shastri, Gujerati Printing Press, Bombay, 1914.

The Daśarūpaka of Dhananjaya : A Treatise on Hindu Dramaturgy : edited and translated by George C. O., Haas. First edition Columbia University Press, 1912. 2nd Indian edition, Motilal Badarsidass, Delhi, 1962.

S. K. De : Aspects of Sanskrit Literature : Reprints of nine essays, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta, 1959.

The Bhakti-rasa-śāstra of Bengal Vaiṣnavism : Indian Historical Quaterly, Vol. 8, 1932, pp. 543–88.

Early History of the Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement in Bengal : Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta, 1961.

History of Sanskrit Poetics : complete revised edition in one volume, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta, 1960.

Problems of Sanskrit Poetics : Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta, 1959. Contains many of his most important articles.

The Text of the Kāvyālokalocana IV : Journal of the Department of Letters, University of Calcutta, Vol. XI, 1923. Reprinted in “Problems of Sanskrit Poetics.”

The Theory of Rasa : Appendix to Vol. III of the Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volumes, Orientalia, Part II, pp. 240–253. Reprinted in “Problems of Sanskrit Poetics.”

Deviśatakam of Ānandavardhana : edited with the commentary of Kaiyaṭa by Shivadatta and W. L. S. Pansikar, Kāvyamālā IX, NSP, Bombay, 1916.

Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana : edited with the Locana of Abhinavagupta and the Bālapriyā of Rāmaṣāraka by Pattabhirama Shastri, Haridas Sanskrit Series, No. 135, Benaras, 1940.

edited with the Locana of Abhinavagupta, the Kaumudi of Uttungodaya and the Upalocana of Kuppuswani Sastri by S. Kuppuswami Sastri. Uddyota One. Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Madras, 1944.

edited with the Locana of Abhinavagupta by Durgaprasad Shastri, Kāvyamālā, NSP, Bombay, 1890.

——edited with the Locana of Abhinavagupta, a Hindi translation of both texts and the Tarawati Vyakhya by Ram Sagar Tripathi, Moti- lal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1963.

——edited with the Dīdhiti commentary of Badari Natha Sarma by Sobhita Misra, Haridas Sanskrit Series, No. 66, Varanasi, 1964.

——Translation of the First Uddyota by B. Bhattacharya, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, 1965.

——Translated into German by H. Jacobi, Z. D. M. G., Vols. 56, 57, Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, 1902, 1903.

——translated by K. Krishnamoorthy, Poona Oriental Series, No. 92, Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1955.

Ekāvalī of Vidyādhara : edited by K. P. Trivedi, Bombay Sanskrit Series No. 63, Bombay, 1903.

Gaudapādakārikā : edited with the commentaries of Ānandagiri and Śaṅkarā- cārya, Ānandāśrama, Poona, 1928.

Gītārthasaṅgraha of Abhinavagupta : See Bhagavadgītā.

R. Gnoli : The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies Vol. LXII, Varanasi, 1968. This is the second edition, revised and enlarged, of the original 1956, ISMEO edition.

——Further Observations on the Abhinavabhāratī : East and West. VIII, No. 1, April, 1957, pp. 100–103.

Haribhaktirasāmṛtasindhu of Rūpagosvāmin : edited with the commentary of Jīvagosvāmin by D. Shastri Gosvamin, Benares, Vikrama 1988.

M. Hiriyanna : Indian Aesthetics : Proceedings and Transactions of the first Oriental Conference, Poona, 1922, pp. 229–250. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1922.

D. H. H. Ingalls : An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry, H. O. S. No. 44 : a translation of the Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa, Cambridge, 1965.

——Yogeśvara and his Favourite Poets. ( Dr. V. Raghavan Felicitation Vol. ) Adyar Library Bulletin, Vols. 31–32, 1967–68.

Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī of Abhinavagupta : edited by M. Kaul Sastri, K. S. T. S., LXV, NSP, Bombay, 1943. In 3 vols.

Kalpalatāviveka ( anonymous ) : edited by M. H. Nagar and H. Shastri with an introduction by P. R. Vora. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series No. 17, Ahmedabad, 1968.

P. V. Kane : Gleanings from the Abhinavabhāratī : Pathak Commemoration Volume, pp. 385–401. BORI, Poona, 1934.

182

——History of Sanskrit Poetics : Third revised edition, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1961.

G. Kaviraj : The Doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy : ABORI, V, ( 1923-24 ).

Kāvyalakṣaṇam ( Kāvyādarśa ) of Daṇḍin : edited with a Sinhalese Buddhist commentary of Ratnaśrijñāna by A. Thakur and U. Jha. Mithilā Institute of Post-graduate studies and research in Sanskrit Learning.

Darbhanga, 1957.

Kāvyamīmāṃsā of Rājaśekhara : edited by C. D. Dalal and Pandit R. A. Sastry, third edition revised and enlarged by K. S. Ramaswami Sastri Siromani. Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1934.

——translated by N. Stchoupak and L. Renou, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1946. Cahiers de la Société Asiatique No. 8.

Kāvyānuśāsana of Hemacandra : edited by R. C. Parikh and V. M. Kulkarni. Second revised edition. Sri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, Bombay, 1964.

Kāvyānuśāsana of Vāgbhaṭa: edited by Pandit Sivadatta and K. P. Parab, NSP, Bombay, 1915.

Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha : edited with English translation and notes by P. W. Naganatha Shastri, Wallace Printing House, Tanjore, 1927.

Kāvyālaṅkāra of Rudraṭa : edited with the commentary of Namisādhu by Pandit Durgaprasad and W. L. S. Pansikar, Kāvyamālā 2, NSP, Bombay, 1928. Third edition.

Kāvyālaṅkārasūttrāṇi of Vāmana : edited by Narayana Rama Acharya, NSP, Bombay, 1953.

Kāvyālaṅkārasūtravṛtti of Vāmana : English translation by G. Jha, second edition, Indian Thought Series No. 2, Oriental Agency, Poona, 1928.

Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa : edited with the commentary ( hitherto unpublished ) of Śrīdhara, by S. Bhattacarya. Vol. I, Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series No. 7. 1959; Vol. II, Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series No. 15, 1961.

——edited and translated into English by G. Jha, two volumes, Bhāratīya Vidyā Prakāśan, Varanasi, 1967.

——edited with the Saṅketa of Māṇikyacandra by Vasudeva Shastri Abhyankar, Ānandāśrama Series, No. 66, Poona, 1921.

——edited with the commentaries of Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa and Govinda Thakkura, Āmandāśrama Series, No. 89, Poona, 1929.

——Ullāsas 1, 2, 3 and 10 only, edited with notes by A. B. Gajendra-gadkar, Bombay, 1939.

———edited with the Bālabodhini commentary of Vamanacharya Jhalki-

kar by R. D. Karmarkar, 7th edition, Bhandarkar Oriental Research

Institute, 1965.

———edited with the Dīpikā commentary of Caṇḍīdāsa by Sivaprasad

Bhattacharya, Part 1. Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavan Text,

No. 46, Banaras, 1933.

Kāvyaprakāśasaṅketa of Rucaka : edited by S. Bhattacharya, Calcutta

Oriental Journal, Vol. II, 7-8.

K. Krishnamoorthy : The Dhvanyāloka and its Critics. Kāvyālaya Publishers,

Mysore, 1968.

———Essays in Sanskrit Criticism. Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1964.

Sylvain Lévi : Le Théatre Indien. Pàris, 1891. New edition with introduc-

tion by Louis Renou, Paris, 1963.

Locana of Abhinavagupta : see Dhvanyāloka.

H. Lüders : ( Reprints of Monographs, ) Philologica Indica, Göttingen, 1940.

———Bruchstücke Buddhistischer Dramen, Berlin, 1911, Reprinted in

Philologica Indica, 1940.

Mahābhārata : Critically edited by V. S. Sukthankar and S. K. Belvalkar,

with the cooperation of other scholars, Bhandarkar Oriental

Research Institute, Poona, 1933-1966.

Mālinīviyogavārttikam of Abhinavagupta : edited by Madhusudhan Kaul

Shastri, K. S. T. S. XXXII, Srinagar, 1921.

Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra ( traditionally ascribed to Nāgārjuna ) : translated

by Étienne Lamotte, 2 volumes, Louvain, 1944.

Naiṣkarmyasiddhi of Sureśvarācārya : edited with the Candrikā of Jñānottama

by Col. E. G. A. Jacob, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series

XXXVIII. Revised by M. Hiriyanna. B. O. R. I., 1925.

J. L. Masson : “Who Killed Cock Krauñca ? — Some Reflections on

Aesthetic Experience,” Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda,

Vol. XVIII. No. 3, March 1969.

———“On the Authenticity of the Bhāmahavivarana,” in the Indo-

Iranian Journal, the Hague.

———(with B. K. Matilal) “A Love Story from the Yogavāsiṣṭha,”

Jadavpur Journal of Comparative Literature, Calcutta, 1966.

———(With D. D. Kosambi), “The Avimāraka of Bhāsa,” Motilal

Banarsidass, New Delhi, 1969.

184

शान्तरस

———Review of L. Silburn's “Le Vijñānabhairava” in Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 84, no. 4 Oct. 1964.

———Philosophy and Literary Criticism in Ancient India, in the "International Journal of Indian Philosophy," Ed. by B. K. Matilal, the Netherlands.

———Solution to a Long-confused Issue in the Dhvanyāloka ( with M. V. Patwardhan ). in the Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda, Vol. XXII, Nos. 1-2, 1972, pp. 48-56.

———The Dhvanyāloka and the Gaiḍavaho, ( with M. V. Patwardhan ) Science and Human Progress ( Prof. D. D. Kosambi Commemoration Volume ), Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1974, pp. 176-183.

———Svaśabdavācya, Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda.

———A Difficult Passage in the Dhvanyāloka ( with M. V. Patwardhan ), in the Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.

Nāṭakalakṣaṇaratnakośa of Sāgaranandin : translated by V. Raghavan and other scholars, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 50, part 9, 1960.

Nāṭyaśāstra : edited and translated by M. Ghosh — Text : Vol. I, 1-27, Manisha Granthalaya Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1967; Vol. II, 28-36, Calcutta, 1956. Translation : Vol. I. Manisha Granthalaya Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1967; Vol. II, Bibliotheca Indica, The Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1961.

———edited with the Abhinavabhāratī of Abhinavagupta : by M. Ramakrishna Kavi : Vol. I, 1-7, Second edition, revised and critically edited by K. S. Ramasvami Shastri, G. O. S. XXXVI, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1956; Vol. II, 8-18, G. O. S. LXVIII, 1934 ; Vol. III, 19-27, G. O. S. CXXIV, 1954; Vol. IV, 28-37, G. O. S. CXLV, 1964.

———Ch. 6, Rasādhyāya. On the Sentiments, with Abhinavabhāratī, edited by Subodhachandra Mukherjee, Calcutta, 1926.

J. Nobel : The Foundations of Indian Poetry and their Historical Development ( General Outline ). Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 16, Calcutta, 1925.

Pañcadaśī of Vidyāraṇya : edited with the commentary of Rāmakṛṣṇa by Narayana Ram Acarya, NSP, Fourth edition, 1949.

K. C. Pandey : Abhinavagupta, an historical and philosyphical study, Second edition, Chowkhamba, Varanasi, 1966.

Comparative Aesthetics, Vol. I. Indian Aesthetics. Chowkhamba, Varanasi, 1950. (Second revised edition, 1959).

Kāśmīr Śaiva Tendencies of Mahimabhaṭṭa : Bhāratīya Vidyā, XI, 1950, pp. 187-94.

Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta : texte sanskrit edité et traduit par Lilian Silburn. Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, No. 5, Éditions de Boccard, Paris, 1957.

Parātriṃśikāvivṛti of Abhinavagupta: edited by Mukunda Rama Shastri, K. S. T. S. No. XVIII, Bombay, 1918.

Prabodhacandrodaya of Kṛṣṇamiśrayati: edited with the Candrikā and Prakāśa commentaries by Vasudeva Sarma, NSP, Bombay, 1935.

Prasannarāghava of Jayadeva : edited by W. L. S. Pansikar, 3rd edition, NSP, Bombay, 1922.

Pratāparudrīya of Vidyānātha : edité avec traduction française, introduction et notes et le commentaire Ratnāpana de Kumārasvāmin par Pierre Filliozat, Pondichéry, 1963.

Pratāparudrayaśobhūṣaṇa of Vidyānātha : edited with Ratnāpana commentary of Kumārasvāmin by K. P. Trivedi, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, No. LXV, Bombay, 1909.

Pratyabhijñāhrdayam of Rājānaka Kṣemarāja : “The Secret of Recognition” edited by the staff of the Adyar Library under the supervision of C. Srinivasa Murti, with a translation into English by K. F. Leidecker from the German translation by E. Baer, Adyar Library, 1938, Madras.

S. Kunjunni Raja : Indian Theories of Meaning : Adyar Library Series, Vol. 91, Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1963.

V. Raghavan : Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa : Punarvasu, Madras, 1963.

The Date of the Yogavāsiṣṭha : Journal of Oriental Research Madras, Vol. XVII, 1944, pp. 228-231.

Nāṭyadharmī and Lokadharmī : J. O. R. Madras (Part I) Vol. VII, 1933, (Part II) Vol. VIII. 1934.

A Note on Abhinava's Polymathy : J. O. R., Madras, VIII, 1934, pp. 281-283.

The Number of Rasas: Second Edition, Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1967.

Some Concepts of the Alamkāraśāstra : Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1942.

... 24

186

The Works of Abhinavagupta : J. O. R., Madras, Vol. XIV, 1940, pp. 318-329.

Writers quoted in the Abhinavabhāratī : J. O. R., Madras, Vol. VI, 1932.

The Yogavāsiṣṭha and the Bhagavadgītā and the Place of Origin of the Yogavāsiṣṭha : J. O. R., Madras, Vol. XIII, part I, 1939, p. 73.

Rājataranginī : edited by Vishva Bandhu, Hoshiarpur, Viśveśvarānanda Vedic Research Institute, 1963, Part I (1-8).

Rāmāyaṇa : edited with three commentaries — Rāmāyaṇatilaka, Śiromaṇi and the Bhūṣaṇa of Govindarāja — by Srinivasa Sastri, Gujerati Printing Press, Bombay, 1912.

Rāmāyaṇa : critically edited by G. H. Bhatt and other scholars, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1958-1975.

Rasagangādhara of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja : edited with the commentary of Nāgeśa Bhatta by Pandit Durgaprasad and K. P. Parab, Kāvyamālā 12, NSP, Bombay, 1939.

Rasapradīpa of Prabhākarabhaṭṭa : edited by N. Shastri Khiste, Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavan Texts, Vol. 12, Benares, 1925.

P. Regnaud : La Rhétorique Sanskrite : Ernest Leroux, Paris, 1884.

Sāhityadarpana of Viśvanātha : Paricchedas I, II and X, edited by P. V. Kane Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, Fifth edition, 1965.

edited with his own commentary by Jivananda Vidyasagara Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1865.

Sangītaratnākara of Śārṅgadeva : edited with the Kalānidhi and the Sudhākara of Siṃhabhūpāla by Pandit S. Subrahmanya Shastri, Adyar Library and Research Institute, 1953. Four volumes.

S. Sankaran : Some Aspects of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit or the Theories of Rasa and Dhvani : University of Madras, 1929.

Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa of Bhoja : edited with the commentary of Ratneśvara on I-III and of Jagaddhara on IV, by Kedarnath Durgaprasad and W. L. S. Pansikar, Kāvyamālā 94, NSP, second edition, Bombay, 1934.

Saundarananda of Aśvaghoṣa : critically edited and translated by E. H. Johnston — vol. I text and notes, 1928, vol. II translation, 1932, Panjab University Oriental Publications, No. 14, published for the University of the Panjab by O. U. P., London.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hari Chand Shastri : Kālidāsa et l'Art Poétique de l'Inde : Libraire Ancienne Honoré Champion, Paris, 1871.

P. Pancapagesha Shastri : The Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure : Annamalai University Series No. 6, Annamalainagar, 1940.

J. Prabhakara Shastri : Lollaṭa's Theory of Rasa : J. O. I., Baroda, Vol. 15, 1965.

V. A. Ramaswami Shastri : Jagannātha Paṇḍita : Annamalai University Sanskrit Series, No. 8. 1942.

Pandit D. T. Tatacharya Siromani : Śānta-the ninth rasa. J. O. R. Madras, 1930 ( Vol. V, pp. 27-33 ).

Śivadrṣṭi of Somānanda : edited with the Vṛtti of Utpala by M. K. Shastri, K. S. T. S., LIV, Srinagar, 1934.

Śivasūtravārttikā of Bhāskara ed. by J. G. Chatterji, K. S. T. S. 4, Srinagar' 1916. Published with the Spandakārikās q. v.

Spandakārikās with the Vṛtti of Kallata : edited by J. G. Chatterji, K. S. T. S. 5, Srinagar, 1916.

T. N. Sreekantiya : Imagination in Indian Poetics. K. B. Pathak Commemoration Volume, B. O. R. I., 1934.

Śrībhagavadbhaktirasāyanam of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī : edited by Goswami Damodara Shastri, Varanasi, Vikram, 1984.

Śṛṅgāratilakam of Rudrabhaṭṭa : edited by Durgaprasad and Parab, Kāvyamālā III, p 111, Bombay.

Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa of Vidyākara : edited by D. D. Kosambi and V. V. Gokhale, H. O. S. 42, Cambridge, 1957.

Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta : edited with commentary of Rājānaka Jaya-ratha and notes by Pandit Madhusudhan Kaul, K. S. T. S., XXVIII, Shri Venkateshvar Steam Press, Bombay, 1918-38, Twelve volumes.

Tantrasāra of Abhinavagupta : edited by M. Rama Shastri, K. S. T. S. XVII, NSP, Bombay, 1918.

Uttararāmacarita of Bhavabhūti : edited by T. R. Ratnam Aiyar and W. L. S. Pansikar, 6th edition, NSP, Bombay, 1919.

Vajjālaggam ( A Prākrit Anthology ) : edited with the Sanskrit commentary of Ratnadeva by M. V. Patwardhan, Prakrit Text Society, Ahmedabad, 1969.

Vakroktijīvitam of Kuntaka : edited by S. K. De. 3rd edition, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta, 1961.

Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari : Kāṇḍa I, edited with the Vṛtti and Paddhati commentary of Vṛṣabhadeva by K. A. Subrahmanya Iyer, Deccan College Monograph Series, Poona, 1966.

K. M. Varma : Seven Words of Bharata — what do they signify? Orient Longmans, Bombay, 1958.

Vā́tulanāthasūtra : edited with the Vṛtti of Anantaśaktipāda and an English translation by Pandit M. K. Shastri, K. S. T. S. 39, N. S. I., 1923.

Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda : edited by M. Hiriyanna, Oriental Book Agency, 2nd edition, Poona, 1967.

Vijñānabhairava : edited with commentary partly by Kṣemarāja and partly by Sivopādhyāya, by M. Rama Shastri, Bombay, Tattvavivechaka Press, 1918, K. S. T. S. VIII.

Viṇāvāsavadattā : edited by K. V. Sharma, Kuppuswami Shastri Research Institute, Madras, 1962.

Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa, Kāṇḍa 3, Vol. I, critically edited with introduction, notes, etc., by Priyabala Shah, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1958.

Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhaṭṭa : edited with the commentary of Ruyyaka by T. Ganapati Shastri, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, Trivandrum, 1909.

——edited with the commentary of Ruyyaka and Hindi commentary by R. Dvivedi, Kasi Sanskrit Series, 121, Chowkhamba, Varanasi, 1964.

J. C. Wright : “ Vṛtti on the Daśarūpakavidhānādhāyāya of the Abhinavabhāratī, A Study of the History of the Text of the Nāṭyaśāstra : B. S. O. A. S., London, Vol. XXVI, Part I, 1963.

Yogadarśana of Patañjali : edited with commentaries of Bhāvagaṇeśīya and Nāgojībhaṭṭa by Mahadeva Gangadhar Bakre, N. S. P., Bombay, 1917.

Yogavāsiṣṭhamahārāmāyaṇa : edited with the commentary Vāsiṣṭhamahārāmāyaṇatātparyaprakāśa in two volumes by W. L. S. Pansikar, 2nd edition, N. S. P., Bombay, 1918.

ADDENDUM

P. IV, fn. 1. : See the article by M. V. Patwardhan and J. L. Masson :

"Jagannātha on the Definition of Poetry," Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda.

P. IX, line 12 : We must point out in all fairness, that this ascription is given only in the commentary of Ravicandra ( see the Bhūmikā to the third edition of the Amaruśataka in the NSP, 1954 ) and not in the Vedānta tradition itself. Mādhavā ( Vidyāraṇya ) does not mention the legend in the Śankaradigvijaya even though he does tell the story of his seeking sexual knowledge in order to respond to the questions of Śāradā, Maṇḍanamiśra's wife. After having studied and put into practice Vātsyāyana's Kāmasūtra, he is also credited with a work on erotics :

svayam vyādhattabhinnavarthāgarbham nibandham ekam nṛpaveṣadhāri /

(from Narāyaṇa Rāmācārya's Bhūmikā, p. 1 to the Amaru ).

The most commonly held belief of the Vedāntasampradāya in relation to sexual love is expressed very graphically by Vidyāraṇya in his Śaṅkara-digvijaya, VIII. 25 ( p. 303, Ānandāśrama ed. ) :

yāsām stanyam tvayā pītam yāsām jāto 'si yonitah /

tāsu mūrkhatama striṣu paśuvad ramase katham //

But then, with the honorable exception of Kashmir Śaivism, what religious system has been fair to women ?

P. XIV, line 11 : Abhinava uses this same simile again in the Locana, p. 212 and adds : akaluṣodakadṛṣṭāntena, on the analogy of a clean piece of cloth that is dipped into clear water and absorbs all the water. In the same way the sensitive reader absorbs poetry.

P. 2, fn. 1 : On p. 223, Vol. II of the A. Bh., Abhinava disagrees with Bhaṭṭatauta. It should be noted that Ānanda too is not bound by tradition. Thus on p. 340 of the D. Āl. he says that it is a mistake to slavishly follow the doctrine of Bharata :

…… …… …… na tu kevalam śāstrasthitisampādanecchayā, and again

…… …… bharatamatanusāraṇamātrecchayā ghaṇṭanām.

P. 2, fn. 3, line 7 : There is no doubt that Ānandavardhana knew Vākpatirāja's poem, for on p. 173 (B. P. ed.) of the D. Āl. he quotes a Prakrit verse which is No. 406 of the Gauḍavaho. See J. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan : "The Dhvanyāloka and the Gauḍavaho," published in the

190

शान्तरस

Science and Human Progress ( Prof. D. D. Kosambi Commemoration Volume ), Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1974, pp. 176-183.

P. 3. fn. 2 : In view of Abhinava's elaborate commentary on the Nāṭyaśāstra, it is needless to stress the importance of this work for his own theories of aesthetics. See the present authors' ' Aesthetic Rapture : The Rasādhyāya of the Nāṭyaśāstra ' in Two Volumes, Deccan College, Poona, 1970.

P. 3, fn. 1 : See J. Masson : ' On the Authenticity of the so-called Bhāmahavivarana of Udbhata ' in the Indo-Iranian Journal.

P. 4, line 10 : Cf. Bhāmaha, V. 3, quoted on p. 55.

P. 5, last line of the footnote : this verse is also found in the Rāmā-yana, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, 105, 24.

P. 6, line 8 , Ānanda's main contribution to literary criticism in India was that he asked, for the first time, the really serious and fundamental questions, e.g.: ' What distinguishes great poetry from good poetry ? ' ' Where does the essence of poetic experience really lie ? ' ' What is the true purpose of figures of speech ?' ' How important is style ? ' See J. Masson: ' Philosophy and Literary Criticism in Ancient India, ' in the ' International Journal of Indian Philosophy ' Vol. I, No. 1, edited by B. K. Matilal.

P. 14, line 1 : In Vol. III. of the NŚ.(G.O.S.), p. 185, Bharata says that love lies at the base of all emotions. प्रायेण सर्वेभावानां कामः श्रृङ्गारतिपतिरिष्यते । At XXII, 99 Bharata says that women are the source of all pleasures ! सुखस्य हि निधानं स्त्रियः । Perhaps love was chosen as all-important by literary critics because in the drama, as in real life, it is its own reward. Cf. the lovely verse from Bhoja's Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa V. 74 :

yad eva rocate mahyaṃ tad eva kurute priyā /

iti vetti, na jānāti tat priyaṃ yat karoti sā //

' He thinks : ' My beloved does whatever pleases me.' He does not know that whatever she does is ( automatically ) pleasant.'

P. 16, fn. 2 : By oversight, we omitted the translation of the first three lines of the Skt. text from the A. Bh. Here they are : ' Only those ( spectators ) whose hearts are like a clean mirror do not, at the time of watching a play (tатра), come under the influence of emotions like anger, infatuation, sexual desire, etc., which are (emotions only) appropriate to everyday life, ( and not to the changes we undergo when watching a drama ). For those (self-controlled people), when they listen to the ten types of drama, the collection of rasas (i.e. the various rasas) presented by means of dramatic representation (i.e. presented in a drama — nāṭyalakṣaṇaḥ) and

perceived through aesthetic experience consisting in generalised ( i. e. depersonalised ) imaginative delight ( rasanā ) is of course quite evident ( sphuṭa eva ). But for those who are not able to control their everyday emotions...

P. 18, line 13 : Abhinava quotes the following definition of pratibhā in the Locana, p. 91 : pratibhā apūrvavastunirmāṇakṣamā prajñā. “Imagination is that form of intelligence which is able to create new things.”

P. 20, line 15 : We wonder though, if it is not possible to interpret the words sāmānyagunayogena in the line : yadi kāvyārthasamśritair vibhāvānubhāvavyāñjitair ekonapañcāśadbhāvaih sāmānyagunayogenābhinispadyante rasās tat katham sthāyina eva bhāvā rasatvam āpnuvaṇti, found in the NŚ VII, after verse 7 ( p. 349, Vol. I of the G. O. S. ed. ), as a reference to sādhāraṇīkaraṇa. It would be most interesting to see how Abhinava comments on this line. Unfortunately, his commentary on the 7th Adhyāya has not been found yet.

P. 22, line 1 : Note Abhinava in Vol. III, p. 124 of the A. Bh. on the paramātman and drama.

P. 24, fn. 3, line 11 : Cf. A. Bh. Vol. III, p. 309 : yat tu bhatṭanāyakenoktam “ siddher api natāder aṅgatvam vrajantyās tatpakṣe ' yam iti ” tena nātyāṅgatā samarthitaphalāñ ca puruṣārthatvād iti kevalam jaiminir anuṣṭa ity alam anena.

P. 29, line 16 : This is an error on our part for which we apologise. What Professor Pandey actually wrote ( in a personal letter to Mr. Masson, May 1, 1969 ) is : “Bhāskara Kaṇṭha, the author of the commentary Bhāskarī on the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta, wrote a long commentary on it, the fragment of which I saw in Srinagar which his descendants possess.”

P. 34, fn. 1 : Ānandavardhana, on p. 487 of the D. Āl. quotes a stanza which earlier writers claimed to be an example of vyājastuti ( which Ānanda rejects, since there can be no guṇībhūtavaṅgyatā in V. and Ānanda regards this verse as an ex. of aprastutapraśaṃsā ). On page 489 he says that the stanza is commonly attributed to Dharmakīrti : tathā cāyam dharmakīrteḥ śloka iti prasiddhiḥ. He then goes on to say that that is perfectly possible in the light of another stanza ( which he quotes ) that is definitely ( Locana : nirvivādatadīyaśloka ) by Dharmakīrti.

P. 34. fn. 1, line 10: Tat tanmataparīkṣayāṃ granthāntare nirūpayiṣyāmaḥ means : “ We will deal with this in another work, in the examination of the Buddhist views.” Now the most usual way of understanding this is to assume that Ānanda wrote a general work of philosophy ( like the Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha ), in which he examined critically several different philoso-

192

phies. Abhinava's remarks, which are based on first-hand knowledge, are confusing. Dharmottara wrote a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇa-viniścaya called the Viniścayaṭīkā, that has been preserved in the Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. II, Patna, 1955 - We are indebted to Professor J. W. de Jong for this information ). Vivṛti can either mean "an explanation" in general, or it can be an actual commentary ( e. g. Nātyavedavivṛti, and Pratyabhijñāvivṛti ). We could translate Abhinava's remarks as follows : "Another work " refers to the commentary (vivṛti) called Dharmottarī on the Viniścayaṭīkā by the author of this work ( i. e. the D. Āl., that is, Ānandavardhana ). This ( issue ) has been explained in that work. " Or Dharmottarī could be the name of the commentary on the Viniścaya ( i.e. Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya ). In this case the meaning would be : " That issue has been discussed in the gloss which was written by this author ( namely Ānanda ) on the Dharmottarī, a commentary on the Viniścaya". This would mean that Ānanda wrote an actual commentary on a Buddhist text. To our knowledge, there is no commentary by a Hindu writer on a Buddhist text. The work, therefore, would be unique. But we have seen that much of what Ānandavardhana did was unique, and this need not deter us from explaining the lines in the manner we have. Jacobi ( ZDMG Vol. 57, p. 328 ) writes : Nach Abhinavagupta in Niścayaṭīkā, bei der Erklarung der Dharmottarā. Es scheint namlich dharmottamāyā statt dharmottamāyām gelesen werden zu müssen." The reading dharmottamāyā is found in the KM ed. of the D. Āl. ( 1935 ed. ).

P. 46, fn. 1 : Note that Viśvanātha speaks of this Nārāyaṇa as being his great-great grandfather ( vṛddhaprapitāmaha i. e. prapitamahapitä ) SD. III. 2-3.

P. 51, line 12 : cf. NŚ XIX. 146 ( Vol. III, p. 80 ) :

yasmāt svabhāvam santyajjya sāṅgopāṅgagatikramaih /

prayujyate jñāyate ca tasmād vai nāṭakam smṛtam //

P. 53, Note that Abhinava in the A. Bh. Vol. III. p. 124, remarks that the spectator does not think he is watching an actor, but feels it is the original character he is watching : prekṣakapakṣe na naṭābhimānas, tatra hi rāmābhimāna iti darśayati.

P. 99, last line of text : In the A. Bh. śāntarasaprakaraṇa, Abhinava twice ( once in the case of the jātyamśakas and again for the Dima ) justifies the fact that Bharata does not mention śāntarasa separately. But we find it curious that Abhinava is silent on many passages where Bharata speaks of all eight rasas but omits śānta. For instance : in XX. 72, Vol. III. p. 105, Bharata mentions the different Vṛttis as they apply to each rasa. Śānta is

not mentioned, nor does Abhinava defend its omission. In chapter XVII

verses 128-129, the various forms of kāku are mentioned for each rasa,

excluding śānta; and again Abhinava ( Vol. II. p. 396 ) has no explanation.

The same is true of XVII. 103-104, where the svaras are mentioned for each

rasa, and Vol. II, p. 398, where the pāṭhas are given for each rasa, excluding

śānta.

P. 139, fn. 2 line : This might refer to a pāṭhāntara of the NS text

itself.

P. 145, line : We drop nanu as in the NSP ed. of the Daśarūpaka.

P. 150, note 3 : We cannot agree with Dr. Raghavan and the late

S. K. De when they hold that Dhanika did not allow śāntarasa even in

poetry. We think he did. Clearly both scholars have followed the NSP

edition, which reads, in the avataranikā to verse 45 ( ch. IV ) nanu before

śāntarasasya ( as well as anabhidheyatvāt in place of anabhineyatvāt ), which

would turn this passage into the words of the Pūrvapakṣin. Thus the

final phrase : kāvyavisayatvam na nivāryate is the position of the Pūrva-

pakṣin. Now comes the difficulty: who speaks the words atas tad ucyate ?

If we suppose that this is the Pūrvapakṣin, who is seeking support in the

line of Dhananjaya, then the Pūrvapakṣa must continue with śānto hi yadi

tāvat up till svādayitāraḥ santi. But these two positions are contradictory :

in the first part, śānta is admitted in poetry, and in the second part it is

excluded. So the words atas tad ucyate must be the words of Dhanika.

But this also makes bad sense, because if Dhanika is responding to the Pūrva-

pakṣa, he would be interpreting verse 45 to mean that there is no śāntarasa at

all. In that case, what would the words at the end of the paragraph : taduk-

taiyva śāntarasasvado mūrkhitaḥ mean? Obviously they are meant to esta-

blish some sort of existence for śāntarasa. In view of these arguments, we

feel that the reading nanu is not correct, since it seems to us clear, both from

our interpretation of IV. 45, and from the concluding lines of the Avaloka

thereon, that Dhanika did accept śāntarasa in poetry. Without nanu, the

avataranikā is by Dhanika himself, and is meant to introduce the notion of

śāntarasa in Kāvya. Atas tad ucyate follows most logically : “ Therefore,

the following is said :”. Now the words śānto hi yadi tāvat represent

Dhanika’s objections to the description of śāntarasa given in the verse na

yatra duḥkham etc. He ends his objection by saying : na ca tathābhītasya

śāntarāsyasya saṃdayāḥ svādayitāraḥ santi, “ There are no sensitive readers

who could enjoy such a śāntarasa.” In the Gujerati Press ed. the next word is

athāpi, namely, “ nonetheless ”, i.e. in spite of this definition of śāntarasa,

we can admit its existence by understanding it to be, not an indescribable

state, but one in which there is muditā etc. In other words, Dhanika accepts

... 25

śāntarasa, but he refuses to characterise it as negative the way the definition he quotes does. The reading of the NSP ed., simply atha, makes bad sense, for this would have to be part of the Pūrvapakṣa, which would, in that case, never be answered by the Siddhānta. It is clear from IV. 45, that Dhananjaya accepted some form of śāntarasa. We accept the reading anirvācya, since nirvācya would mean simply : It can be defined, or explained. But if this is what Dhananjaya felt, why did he not mention it among the 8 sthāyibhāvas ? The reason is that it follows automatically, since it consists of muditā etc., which are the same as vistara, vikāsa, etc. which were already mentioned in IV. 43, and so there is no need to mention it separately. This is what is meant by anirvācya. If Raghavan and De are correct, how would they explain the line in the Avaloka : taduktyaiva śāntarasāsvādo nirūpitah, which clearly indicates that śāntarasa can be aesthetically enjoyed ?

INDEX

References are to page numbers, with n after a number indicating that it is found in the notes. All entries are according to the Roman alphabet. Diacritical marks are ignored. Thus, s, ṣ and ś will all be found under s.

A

abhidhā, 3, 7, 73, 85, 86, 177.

Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā, 7.

Abhinavagupta — as a poet, XVI.

Abhinavabhāratī, I, II, VI, 2, 8, 13, 13n, 14, 21, 26n, 27n, 32n, 35, 35n, 43, 43n, 45, 46, 48, 48n, 51n, 52, 52n, 53n, 54n, 56, 56n, 57, 57n, 59n, 62n, 63n, 64n, 65n, 68n, 71n, 72n, 73n, 74n, 75n, 84n, 85n, 87n, 90, 92n, 93n, 97n, 98n, 100n, 103, 111n, 113, 120, 126n, 130, 135n, 136n, 138n, 143n, 153n, 154n, 161, 169, 170n, 189, 190.

abhinaya, 53.

abhinayana, 47.

abhivyakti, 65, 65n, 161.

abhivyaktikāraṇa, 28.

adbhutarasa, 95, 95n, 133.

Adhikārin, 162.

Advaita, 130n 153n.

Agnipurāṇa, 12, 163n.

ākhyāna, 86.

Akṣapāda, 126, 127, 127n.

ajahallakṣaṇā, 155n.

ālambanavibhāva, 169.

alaṅkāradhvani, 6, 50, 81, 81n, 88, 89.

Alaṅkārakaustubha, 46n.

Alaṅkāramahodadhi, 162.

Alaṅkārasekhara, 34.

alaukika, 128, 128n, 160, 172.

alaukikacamatkāra, 48.

Alvarez, A., XVI.

Amaruśataka, IX, 189,

anākhyeyavāda, 162n.

anākhyeyavādin, 6, 6n.

ānanda, XVII, 31, 42, 50,— as goal of poetry, 67n, 162.

ānandaikaghana, VII, 160, 161.

ānandaghana, 25.

Ānandavardhana, 34, 67, 99. 101, 102n, 103n, 109n, 112, 112n, 122n, 152, 155, 156, 157, 157n, 189, 191.

ānandaviśrānti, 42.

anubhāvas, 48.

anugrāhyānugrāhakabhāvasaṅkara, 155n.

anuvāda, 9.

Anuyogadvārasūtra, 37n.

aṅgāṅgibhāvasaṅkara, 155n.

apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa, 135n.

ārabhaṭī, 141.

ārdratā, 143.

Art ( autonomy of ), 51.

artha, 136.

arthāntarasaṅkramitavācyadhvani, 152, 154, 155.

Āryā, 99n, 139n.

asabhya, 19.

asaṁmoha, 129n.

āśramas, 134.

āsvāda, 70.

Aśvaghoṣa, 3, 5.

Ātman, 131, 131n, 142, 173— identity with Brahman, 160-61.

ātmānanda, XIV, 31, 41, 177.

Atreya, B. L., 30n.

aṭṭahāsa, 142.

aucitya, 9, 10, 10n.

196

शान्तरस

Auden, W. H., 14.

Avaloka ( Daśarūpakāvaloka ), 56n, 93n, 97n, 98n, 143-151, 193, 194.

Avimāraka, 13.

avivakṣitavācyadhvani, 8.

avyutpatti, 10.

Āucityavicāracarcā, 164n.

autsukya, 58, 58n.

B

Bālapriyā, V, XIVn, 66n, 68n, 71, 102n, 107n, 111n.

Balzac, 14.

Bengal Vaiṣṇavas XV, 122n.

Bhagavadbhaktirasāyanam, 83n, 122n, 158, 159.

Bhāgavatapurāṇa, 84n, 107, 122.

bhagnāvaranā cit, 173.

bhakti, 139, 143, 160.

Bhāmaha, 2, 3n, 19, 54, 55, 56n, 66, 71n, 190.

Bhāmahavivarana, 3, 86, 190.

Bharata, 47, 57, 93, 99, 100, 120, 123, 123n, 128, 129, 136, 137, 149, 168, 189, 190.

Bharati, A., 39n.

Bartrhari, I, 157n.

Bhāskara, 46n.

Bhattacharya, S., II, 34n, 55n, 66n, 67n.

Bhattanārāyaṇa, 44.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka, 15 ff., 23, 23n, 24n, 49, 62, 63n, 65n, 66n, 67, 67n, 72, 72n, 73, 73n, 74, 74n, 75, 75n, 77, 85, 85n, 86, 120, 158n, 159, 191.

Bhaṭṭatauta, 18, 18n, 63n, 70, 85n, 103, 189.

Bhaṭṭendurāja, 72n.

bhāva, 52, 53n, 78n, 79.

Bhavabhūti, 26, 79n.

bhāvadhvani, 88.

bhāvakatva, 75.

bhāvanā, 20, 64n, 72n, 75n, 76n, 76.

Bhāvaprakāśana, 160n.

bhaya, 67, 68n, 120.

bhayānakarasa, 37n, 133, 143, 143n.

bhogīkaraṇa, 63n.

Bhoja, 190.

Bhojaprabandha, VIII, 3.

bhuñjāna, 44.

bībhatsarasa, VII, 102, 142.

Blake, VIII.

bliss, 22, 142.

Boas, G., 5.

Bodhisattvas, 134, 135.

Brahman, 26, 67, 77, 107, 159.

brahmānanda, 26n, 174.

brahmāsvāda, 26n, 67, 67n, 151, 158, 160, 175.

Brahmasiddhi, 160n.

Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, 25.

Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, 25, 25n.

Bṛhatkathāślokasaṅgraha, 122n.

Brophy, B. 101n.

Brough, J., I, III.

Buddha, 120n, 139n, 141n, 148, 149.

Buddhism, 3, 34, 192.

Burrows, M., X.

C

cakra, 139n.

Candīdāsa. 63n.

Candrikā, 103n.

camatkāra, XIV, 30n, 45, 45n, 46, 69n,

camatkṛti, 45.

Candrikākāra, 102.

Cārudatta, 146n, 147n.

Cārvāka, VIII.

carvaṇā, 42, 50, 73, 173.

Chāndogya, XII.

Childhood, XI.

Chintamani, T. R. V. 20.

cinmātra, 32n.

Coleridge, XVI, 2.

Coomaraswamy, A., 123n.

Creative writing ( courses in ), 18.

INDEX

D

dancing and freedom, XI.

dānavīra, 101, 102n.

Dandin, 3, 3n. 71n.

Dante, V.

Daśarūpaka, II, 56n, 64n, 65n, 67n, 85n, 143-151, 166n, 193, 194.

Daśarūpāvaloka, see Avaloka.

Dasgupta, S., 30n.

dayāvīra, 101, 102n., 133, 150, 167.

De Jong, J. W., 192.

De, S. K., I., VI, 19n., 35n., 71n, 84n, 150n, 193, 194.

Delight (as purpose of poetry), 55.

Demons, 111.

Denotation, 65.

Devī, 32.

Dhanañjaya, 77n., 98n, 146, 148, 150n, 193, 194.

Dhanika, 56n., 98n., 147, 148, 150n, 151n, 193.

Dhanyāśloka, 38.

dharmakāvya, 135n.

Dharmakīrti, 34n, 191, 192.

Dharmavīra, 101, 102n, 133, 143.

Dharmottara, 192.

dhrti, 121n., 133, 139.

Dhruvā, 158.

dhvanana, 75, 86.

dhvani, 6n, 17, 76n, 81, 152, 162.

Dhvanyāloka, I, II, VI, VII, IX, X, 6, 8, 8n, 9, 9n, 11, 11n, 13, 15, 32n, 35, 40n, 44, 46n, 53n, 66n, 67n, 75n, 76n, 78, 78n, 79, 89, 89n. 94, 99n, 103, 105n, 106n, 109n, 129, 152, 161.

Dhvanyālokalocana, see under Locana.

dhīrodātta, 146, 148, 150.

dhīrasānta, 146, 147, 148, 149.

Dīdhiti, 105n.

Dīma, 140.

Dīpikā (on the Kāvyaprakāśa), 54n.

Donne, J., XV.

doṣa, 10.

Drama—

definition of, 51.

unreality of, 21, 52.

similarity with life, XI.

Dreams, XI.

druti, 67, 72n, 77, 77n, 82.

Duṣyanta, 172.

dūtī, 39, 40.

E

Ecstasy (and aesthetic experience) 21 exercises for including, 27.

Edgerton, III.

Egoism (absence of, in śānta), 96, 102n.

Ekāvalī, 63n.

Eliade, 39n.

Eliot, T. S., XV, XVI.

External world (primacy of), 13.

F

Figures of speech, 11.

Filliozat, P., II.

Freud, S., X, XI.

G

Gādhi, 30n.

gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ, 7.

Gaudapāda, 162n.

Gaudapādakārikās, 25.

Gaudavaho, 2, 189.

Gautama, 127.

Gautamadharmasūtra, 133n.

Generalisation, 142, 142n.

ghanṭyanuranana, 28.

Ghosh, M., I.

Gītā, 107, 108, 108n, 111n, 122n, 129, 130, 176.

Gītārthasaṅgraha, 24, 107n.

Gnoli, R., I, 3, 18, 20, 20n, 40n, 45n, 51, 57n, 62, 64n, 68, 69n, 78n, 120n, 158n.

Goblins (unreality of), 72, 72n.

God (rest in), 157.

Gods (care in narrating their deeds), 74n.

198

Goethe, XV.

Gūdhārthadīpikā, 25n.

guṇa, 14, 67, 71n, 72n.

guṇavṛtti, 3.

guṇībhūtavyaṅgya, 9.

H

Haas, G. O. II, 151n.

Harivaṃśa, 107.

harṣa, 133.

Harṣa, 147.

hāsa, 129.

hāsya, 141, 142.

Hemacandra, V, 16, 20n, 58n, 63n, 67n.

Hiriyanna, M., I, 68n.

Hṛdayadarpaṇa, VII, 23, 23n., 55, 85, 87, 120n.

hṛdayānupraveśa, XI.

hṛdayasamvāda, VII, 47, 49, 50, 73.

Huxley, A. XV, XVII.

I

I, 59n.

displacing of, 89.

idam ittham, 156, 156n.

Ideas (in poetry), 5.

Imagination, 13.

Ingalls, D. H. H., I, III, 71n, 107n.

Ineffability, 162, 162n.

Ionesco, 10.

Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā, 44.

Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī, 27n, 28n, 44, 58n., 59n.

Īśvarakṛsna, 125.

itihāsa, 54, 56n., 122n., 139.

J

Jacobi, H., II, 26n., 107n, 192.

Jagannātha, 67n, 122n.

James, Henry, XVI.

Janaka, XII, XIV, 100.

Jayadeva, 159.

Jayantabhaṭṭa, VIII.

Jayaratha, 40, 41n, 42n, 49n, 50, 59n, 133n, 163.

jātyaṃśaka, 136, 136n.

Jīmūtavāhana, 134, 136, 146, 148, 149, 166.

jīvanmukta, 100, 135.

Johnston, E. H., 3.

Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism, II.

Joy (transcendent), 157.

Joyce, James, IX.

jugupsā, 102n, 124, 129, 133, 142n.

K

Kādambarīkathāsāra, 71n.

Kafka, IX.

kākatālīyayā, 137.

kāku, 193.

Kālidāsa, XVII, 3n, 10, 34, 74n.

kāma, 136.

Kāmasūtra, 189.

Kane, P. V., I, 2, 21, 21n, 34n, 40n, 97n, 99n.

Kārikākāra, 95n.

karuṇarasa, VII, 69n, 79, 82, 82n, 83n, 85n, 100n, 105, 110, 110n, 133, 137n, 151.

Kāśikāvṛtti, 108n, 111n.

Kaula, 39, 40.

Kaumudī (on Locana), V, XII, 17, 17n, 24n, 83, 85, 88n.

kaviśakti, 10.

kāvya, X, 122n, 170, (śāntarasa in), 193, 194.

Kāvyakautuka, 15, 17, 103.

Kāvyāloka, 8, 23n.

Kāvyamīmāṃsā, II, 19, 78n, 86n.

Kāvyānusaṃana, 16, 58n.

Kāvyānanda, 174.

kāvyanaya, 112.

Kāvyapradīpa, 67n, 77n.

Kāvyaprakāśa, II, 78n, 154n, 164, 172.

Keith, III.

Kosambi, 164n.

krauñca, 79, 82, 83.

Krṣṇa, 107, 110.

Krishnamoorthy, K., II.

krodha, 129.

kṛtakṛtya, 161.

Kṣemarāja, 30n, 39, 46.

Kṣemendra, 164n.

kṣobha, 151.

Kulārṇavatantra, 41n.

Kumārsambhāva, 10, 11.

Kuntaka, V, 35n, 71n. 109n.

L

Lahiri, P. C., 72n.

lakṣaṇā, 7, 73, 85.

Lamotte, Ét., 122n.

laukika, 128, 128n.

Lawrence, D. H., IX.

laya, 68.

Lévi, S., I, 135n, 149n.

Lewis, C. S., XVI.

Literature—

autonomy of, 9.

and morality, 10.

Literary sensitivity, 11.

Locana ( Dhvanyālokalocana ), I, IV, VI, VII, VIII, XII, XVI, 4, 7n, 8n, 8, 15, 21n, 22n, 23, 23n, 24n, 33, 33n, 34n, 40n, 43, 43n, 44n, 50, 50n, 51n, 54, 54n, 55, 55n, 56, 57, 59, 60, 60n, 66n, 67n, 69n, 71n, 72n, 73n, 74n, 75n, 77n, 78n, 79, 81, 82n, 86, 87n, 93n, 96, 97, 98, 98n, 102n, 105, 108n, 109, 110, 120, 124n, 136n, 137n, 138n, 152–157, 157n, 169n, 189, 191.

lokadharmī, 47, 70, 70n, 71n.

lokaprasiddhi, 112.

Lollaṭa, 68, 72, 72n, 73n, 143n, 169n.

" Lord of the Rings," 84n.

Love, 43, 101, 190,—

existing in consciousness not in body, 14.

even ascetics interested in, 15.

Abhinava on, 15.

various kinds of, 143.

as an aesthetic experience in śānta, 132.

Love-bites, 85n.

Love-making, ( no aesthetic pleasure in watching ), 64.

Lüders, H., 3.

M

Madhusūdanasarasvatī, 25, 25n, 82n, 122n, 158.

mādhurya, 14.

Magic flower, XIV.

Mahābhārata, IX, X, XIII, XIV, 12, 30, 36n, 55n, 96n, 104, 105, 106, 106n, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113n, 166.

Mahābhāṣya, 125n.

Mahānāṭaka, 146.

Mahāparinibbānasutta, XIV, 122n.

Mahāvṛata, 133.

Mahāyānasūtras, 122n.

Mahimabhaṭṭa, V, 19, 158.

maithuna, 42.

maitrī, 151.

Malayavatī, 147, 166.

Mallinātha, VIII, 79.

Malreaux, A., XI.

Malvania, D., 37n.

Mammaṭa, 54n, 67n, 69n, 77n, 123n, 164, 170, 174, 175.

Maṇḍanamiśra, 160n.

Māṇikyacandra, 63.

Mann, Thomas, 8.

Masson, J. L., 82n, 109n, 189, 190.

Matilal, B. K., II, 30n, 190.

Mescalin, XV.

Methodology, I.

Mīmāṃsā, VIII, 76n.

Mirror ( analogy with ), 33n, 49n.

mokṣa, 4, 22, 48, 100n, 103, 105, 106, 108, 110, 122, 127, 129n, 130, 137, 151.

Moral instruction, 56n.

Mṛcchakaṭika, 146, 147n.

muditā, 151.

200

mumukṣā, 162.

Music, 16, 47.

O

Obscenity, 10.

Olson, E., 81n.

Osborne, H., XVn, XV.

N

Nāgānanda, XVI, 1, 34, 95, 102n, 133n, 135, 136, 137, 142, 146, 147, 149, 166.

Namisādhu, 94n.

Nāndī, 158n.

Nārāyaṇa (as god of śāntarasa), 16, (author), 192.

Narendraṁaprabhasūri, 162.

Nāṭakas, 122n, 136.

Nāṭya, 170.

nāṭyadharmī, 47, 70, 70n, 71, 71n.

Nāṭyaśāstra, I, II, VI, XIV, 3, 14, 20, 21, 23, 23n, 26n, 34, 34n, 52, 56, 70n, 78n, 83n, 90, 92n, 99n, 101n, 102n, 110, 121, 126n, 129n, 130n, 132n, 137n, 138n, 190, 192.

Nemrov, H., 18.

New Critics. 11, 81n.

niyama, 100.

nijarasabhara, 51n.

Nīlakanṭha, 107n.

nirapekṣa, 110n.

nirveda, 48, 92, 92n, 98n, 100, 111, 123, 123n, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128n, 132, 170n.

nirvikalpasamādhi, 26n.

niṣkāma, 149, 149n.

Nyāyamañjarī, VIII.

P

pānakarasa, 130.

Pañcādaśī, 163.

Pandey, K. C., I, 23n, 24n, 29, 29n, 38, 40, 40n, 45n, 66n, 134n, 191.

Pāṇini, 111.

Parabrahman, 42.

Paramārthasāra, XII.

Parā triṃśikā, 33, 54n.

parā Vāk, 13.

parāvrtti, 123n.

Park, R., XVI.

paryudāsapratiṣedha, 99n.

Patañjali, 75n, 125, 125n.

pāṭha, 193.

pāṭhya, 158n.

Patwardhan, M. V., 109n, 189.

Philosophical vision, 153-157.

Plagiarism, Vn, 2, 2n.

Plato, VIII.

Pleasure (as major goal of poetry), 67.

poet—

importance of, 12.

as creator, 12.

technical equipment for, 11.

and Yogins, 23.

vs. rationalist, 24n.

vs. religious fanatic, 24.

poetry—

same as drama, 16.

and madness, XII.

purpose of, XVII, 54, 77n.

and drama, 16.

and blindness, 19.

compared to a wife, 54.

Poetic vision, 153-157

prādhānya, 15.

prakaraṇa, 74n.

prahasanas, 138.

Pramāṇavarttika, 34n.

Pramāṇaviṁśicaya, 192.

prasajyapratiṣedha, 99n.

Prasannarāghava, 159.

Pratāparudrayasobhūṣaṇa, 63n, 85n.

pratibhā, 13, 16, 17 ff., 18n, 19n, 20, 191.

pravṛtti, 107n.

prayojana, 155n.

Primary world (and secondary world), 84n.

prīti, XVII, 54, 54n, 55, 67n, 77n, 162.

profession vs. description, 8. Proust, IX.

purusārthas, 111, 122n, 135n.

Purāṇas, 137n, 139.

pūrvarāṅga, 52n.

putras te jataḥ, 7.

R

Rāghavabhaṭṭa, 58n.

Raghavan, V., II, V, 10n, 15, 26, 29n, 45, 52n, 53n, 67n, 70, 71n, 72n, 85n, 102n, 103, 107n, 120n, 125n, 128n, 150n, 160n, 193, 194.

Raghuvamśa, 3, 79n, 156n.

Raikva, 122.

Raja, K. K., I, 7.

Rājataranginī, XIII.

Rājaśekhara, 2.

Rāma, 47n, 63, 64, 64n, 68n, 69, 74, 82n, 105, 135, 146.

Rāmāyaṇa, 2, 12, 35n, 74, 79n, 82n, 83n, 84n, 85, 104, 105, 108, 108n, 190.

rasa, VIII, XII, XVIII, (surrender of self in ) 7, 12, 12n, 16, 23, 28, (and the I-consciousness ), 32n, 50, (definition of ), 51, (analogy with tree ), 52, 53n, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 65, 65n, 68, 69, 70, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 83, 85, 87, 87n, 88, 93n, (number of ), 94, 96, 105 (in the Rām. and M. Bh. ), 111, 112, 135, 138, 143n, (number of ), 153n, 158, 159, 160, (as suggested ), 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176.

rasadhvani, 6, 18, 51, 81, 153.

Rasagaṅgādhara, II, IV, XIIIn, 20, 63n, 67n, 85, 164, 167–177.

Rasapradīpa, 63n, 65n, 68n.

rasapratīti, 72, 135n.

rasasūtra, 43, 57. 62n, 123n.

rasāsvāda, 24n, 26, 151, 157, 158, 159, 160, 164, 175, 177.

raso vai saḥ, 176.

rati, 122, 128, 131.

raudrarasa, VII, 96, 130, 130n, 141, 170.

Ravicandra, 189.

Rawson, P., I.

Realism, 71n.

Religion and literature, XVI.

Religious belief, V.

Religious ecstasy and poetry, 21.

Religious preoccupations in poetics, VI-VII.

Renou, L., I, 11, 85n.

Repose, 135.

Richards, I. A., IV, XVI, 86.

Ritual and theatre, 43.

Rudraṭa, 93.

Ruyyaka, 158.

S

Śābda, 177.

sādava, 154, 154n.

sādhāraṇīkaraṇa, 20, 49, 64n, 72n, 74n, 75n, 191.

sadyomukti, 162.

Sāhityadarpana, II, 46n, 84n, 164–166.

sahrdaya, IV, VII, XI, XII, 6, 23, 47, 59, 78 (defined ), 84n, 158, 159, 176.

sahrdayahrdayasamvedya 162n.

sahrdayatā, 45.

sahrdayatva, 162.

Sahrdayāloka, 8, 8n.

Śaivism, Kashmir, IX, 24, 27, 33, 130n, 189.

sakāma, 149n.

sākṣin, 26 (and rasa ), 73n, 153n, 173.

śakti, 41, 42, 46n, 59n.

Sakuntala, 57, 58.

Sakuntalā, 148n.

śama, 5, 30n, 35, 128, 132, 149, 168, 169.

sāmagrī, 69, 73,

202

शास्त्ररस

samādhi, 124, 139n, 160, 174, 175.

samnyāsa, 134.

Sampradāyaprakāśinī, 18.

samsāra, 52, 52n.

samskāra, 137.

samyagbodhi, 122n.

samyagdarśana, 122n.

samyagjñāna, 126n.

sainghatanā, 15.

Sangitaratnākara, 160n, 169, 169n.

Sangrahaśloka, 99n.

Sangrahakārikā, 139.

Śankara, IX, XVI, 25, 25n, 30n, 62n, 123n, 161.

Śankardigvijaya, 189.

Śankhacūḍa, 136n.

Sāṅkhya, 67n,

Sāṅkhyakārikā, 125n.

Sankuka, 63n, 68, 68n, 69, 69n.

Śāntarasa, III, V, VII, VIII, IX, X, XIII, XVI (its absence in early drama). 12, 32n, 92, 94, 96, 96n, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 111, 120, 123, 124, 125, 128, 129, 130, 133, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141. 142n, 149, 166, 150, 151, 167, 168, 169. 170.

śantarāsaprakaraṇa, 139n.

sāpekṣa, 110n.

Śāradātanaya, 160n.

Sarasvatīkanṭhābharaṇa, 190.

śāstra, 4, 17, 19, 30, 55n, 66n, 78, 86, 108.

śastranaya, 112.

sattva (guṇa), 77n.

sāttvatī, 141.

sāttvikabhāvas, 120n.

Satyakāma Jābāla, 122n.

Saundarananda. 3, 4n, 6, 107.

savikalpasamādhi, 20n.

screen (of ignorance), 172.

sealing wax (compared to mind, during literary experience), 83n.

Self, 67, 131, 132, 133, 163.

Sūktimuktāvalī, 30n.

Sūtrālankāra, 135n.

svabhāvokti, 71, 71n.

svaccha, ( colour of śānta ), 120n, 141n.

svara, 193.

svasabdanivedita, 5, 7, 108n, 109n.

svasamvedya, 56n.

svātmacamatkāra, 43.

T

Taittirīya Upanisad, 25, 25n.

tanmayībhavana, VII, 49, 49n, 174.

Tāṇḍava, XI.

tantra, 66.

Tantrāloka, XI, 20, 20n, 33, 40, 41, 42n, 49, 49n, 51n, 59n, 133n, 163n.

Tantrasāra, 45, 59n.

Tantric rituals, IX, XI.

Tāpasāvat sarāja, 132n.

taṭastha, VII.

tāṭasthya, 63, 67.

tātparya, 7.

tattvajñāna, 35n, 92n, 111, 111n, 125, 127, 127n.

Tattvāloka, 33, 55n, 112, 112n.

Tat tvam asi, 177.

Theatre & Tantric Ritual, XI.

Theory & practice ( disparity between ) IX.

Tīrtha, 169.

Tolkien, J. R. R., 84n.

Transcendence in literature, IX.

trāsa, 133.

trivial vs. numinous, VIII.

trṣṇāl kṣayasukha, 98n, 99n.

Truth and falsity ( inapplicability to literature ), 9.

Tynan, K., 10.

U

Ubhayābhisārikā, 35n.

Udbhata, 3, 35, 71n, 86n, 95n.

Universalisation, 72n, 74n.

unmatta, XII.

Upalocana, 87n.

upāṅgābhinaya, 132n.

Upaniṣads, XII, XIII, 25, 122, 128.

upekṣā, 151.

Utpaladeva, 2, 33n, 44, 164n.

utpatti ( as applied to rasa ), 75.

utsāha, 101, 129, 133.

Uttararāmacarita, 26, 79n.

Uttuṅgodaya, 2, 23n.

V

vācyārtha, 8,. 161.

vairāgya, 36, 105, 127, 127n.

vaiṣayikasukha, 167.

Vajracchedikā, 122.

Vākpatirāja, 2, 189.

vakrokti, 71, 71n.

Vakroktijīvita, 19n, 35n, 36n, 71n, 77n.

Vālmīki, 16, 79, 79n, 82, 83, 105.

Vāmana, 3, 66, 71n.

vāsanā, 48, 50, 58, 58n, 74, 139.

vastudhvani, 6, 50, 75n, 81, 81n, 88, 89.

Vāsudeva, 111.

Vāsuki, 160n.

Vātulanāthasūtra, 19n.

Vedas, 54, 86n.

Vedānta, 73n, 161, 189.

Vedāntasāra, 26, 26n.

Venkatacharya, T., 35n.

Venugopalan, K., 51.

vibhāvas, XII, 63n, 64, 84n, 172.

Vidūsaka, 129n.

Vidyācakravartin, 18.

vidyādhara, 86.

Vidyāranya, 163, 189.

vikāsa, 67, 72n, 77, 77n, 151.

vighna, 46, 47.

vijigīṣutva, 147, 147n.

Vijñānabhairava, 25n, 27, 27n, 28n, 29, 59n, 89.

Vikramorvaśīya, 74n.

vikṣepa, 151.

204

VimalakĪrtinirdeśa, 122n.

vinoda, XVII, 162.

vipralambha, 82, 110, 110n.

vĪrarasa, 96, 101, 102, 111, 130, 130n, 133, 142.

virodhālankāra, 153.

vismaya, 46n, 129.

Viṣṇu, 108.

Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa, 36, 37.

viśrānti, 161.

vistara, 67, 72n, 77, 77n, 151.

Viśvanātha, 122n, 164, 192.

Visuddhimagga, 151n.

Vṛttis, 192.

vyabhicāribhāva, 109n, 121n, 124, 133.

vyabhicāribhāvadhvani, 88.

Vyaktiviveka, II, 18, 19, 20, 86n, 158.

vyañgya, 8, 65n.

vyañjanā, IV, 7, 26, 65, 75, 75n, 76, 177.

vyāpāra, 86.

Vyāsa, 107n, 112.

vyutpādya, 55.

vyutpatti, 17, 54, 54n, 67, 69, 77n.

vyutthāna, 131n, 160.

W

Wain, J., IV.

Warder, A. K., 35n.

Wilson, E., XII.

Wine, 42.

Witness, 163.

Woods, J. H., 100n.

Wright, E. G., 135n, 141n.

Y

yama, 100.

Yeats, 81n.

yoganidrā, 156n.

Yogasūtra, 19n, 74n, 92n, 100, 123n, 131n, 132n, 137n, 151n.

Yogasūtrabhāṣya, 125n.

Yogavāsiṣṭhamahārāmāyana, IX, 29, 31, 32, 40, 55n, 84n, 112n. 131n.

Yogeśvara, 71n.

Yogin, 161, 174.

Yudhiṣṭhira, 105n, 148.

Z

Zen, 100n.