20. CHAPTER XI VISIȘTĀDAVITA AND ITS THEORY OF BEAUTY

CHAPTER XI VISIȘTĀDAVITA AND ITS THEORY OF BEAUTY

As Surana is a Visistādvaitin, this theory of Art and his comcept of its complete emergence cannot be understood in the correct perspective without knowing the philosophy of Visistādavita. Threfore, it is necessary to examine the fundamen- tal tenets of this philosophy in so far as it throws light on the nature of Beauty and Art. Visistādvaita which is wrongly inter- preted as qualified monism is in fact, a philosophy of monistic pluralsm. If one is to present its epistemology in the language of the lay man without invloving oneself in its technicalities, it may run as follows :- I preceive a sheet of paper,white, soft and smooth. This per- ception of mine consists of three factors,the agent that is percev- ing, the object that is being perceived and the perception itself. 225

Now what are the relationships between these three factors? The sheet of paper which is the object in the present case can be said to be either a creation of my mind.or an object exsisting inde- pendently of my mind. If the former is valid, I can know only a universe which is filled with entities of my own mind. This means that objects as such do not exist independently of our minds, that all of them are produced by individual minds, that there are as many universes as there are minds without anything common between thåm, and that there connot be common values or inter- communication between the vanous minds. As these things are contradicted by expenence, and as this theory cuts at the very root of enquiry, this cannot be accepted. Moreover, this theory starts with the presupposition that our minds do not exist and this is a self-contradiction, simple and pure. The second theory that objects do exist independent of our minds may be once again divided into three classes :- The first maintains that the objects are not known as they are in them- selves but only as they are presented by our minds. The second G. V. Krshna Rao

only as they are presented by our minds. The second theory up- holds that the objects are essentially of one and the same nature,that they appear to be differnt and manifold due to the superimposition of Avidya and that their maniflodness and van- ety is neither is nor is not,nor both and thus indefinable. The third theory argues that the objects are real and manifold, and that they are revealed to us through the function or vrtt of the mnd. The first cannot be accepted because firstly,it presents two worlds,one knowable and the other unknowable,and secondly,the unknowable will be the cause of the knowable. The second theory that the objects are the result of superimposition of Avidya 1s refuted on seven grounds. They are firstly, āsrayanūpapattı, sec- ondly, tirodhananupapattı, thirdly, svarūpānupapatt, fourthly, anırvacanıyānupapattı, fifthly pramānānupapattı, sıxthly,

226 rurvartakanupapatti and lastly, nıvrttyanupapattı. The seat of Avidya should be either the Jiva or Brahman, neither of which is con- ceivable. It cannot be the jiva as jiva itself is the fictitious crea- tion of Avidya, nor can it be Brahman as Brahman is selfillumined and can never be enveloped by Avidya. To trace the locus of Avidya to the jiva and that of the jiva to Avidya is to commit the fallacy of mutal dependence. 2. Brahmasvarüpais mana and self-luminous. Either it is pure consciousness or not.If it is the former,it cannot be obscured, obstructed or destroyed by nescience. 7u dya> 3. Avidya is either real or unreal. If it is an entity or mulasvarupa,then it is inherent in Brahman as mūldudya and cannot be destroyed.If it is unreal there is no mulauidya or tulaudya as one or many. 4. Theonsing activity is the actual work of thought and to say that there is a theory which is ındefinable (sadasaduilaksana) is meaningless. 5. The theory of Avidya is not supported by sastraic authonty or any other pramana.

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6 Amnana cannot be sublated or dispelled by mana, as mana is itself the effect of amana But if it is something given,it can be removed only by spiritual discipline and not by the mere knowledge of self-ıdentity. If Brahman is ever existent and Avidya a non-existent, then the tern mumukastava Eonveys no mening at all. 7. Brahmajnana is not the jnana of Brahman, but it is jnana that is Brahman. It is said that jnāna stultifies ajnana and than stultifies itself;if so jnana is an act of spiritual sucide. With the vanishing of Avidya,jagat and Iśvara also persh. This theory of Avidya or Mäya, therefore, cannot be accepted. The third theory that the objects are manifested by the mind through its function or urtt makes souls and Isvara superfluous and the world process simply mechanical. Such a theory gives no assurance of the eternal bliss or complete release from the cycle of samsara And such a theory,Visistadvaita maintains, 227 cannot be accepted. It follows from the above examination that objects do exist in their own nght. Now what is the relationship between knowl- edge and its object? Since the object or prameya is relatively in- dependent and has its own existence, and since it presupposes knowledge, the latter cannot be either the cause or the effect of the former. The distinction of cause and effect in empircal life 1s due to mere having the particular anterior state and the particu- lar posteror state. The designation of a new categeory rght up to earth takes place when an element attains a different kind of state by abandoning its andteror state.2 Knowledge, therefore,1s as real as the agent who cogmses and the object that is cognised. It is neither materal nor spintual but immateral(ajada). By ım- matenality it is meant that knowledge illumines itself as well as the object for another but never for itself.278 It is self onginated, self-valıd279 and sui genens. That consciousness is self-luminous is inferred in the following manner :- "the consciousness, it is dis- puted, with reference to its own empincal usage, affects some- G. V. Knshna Rao

thing independently, because it is the case of empincal usage independent of anything in its own class, like an object, or a sense organ or a lght. Between sense of sight and light there is no similarity of generc character; for there is distinction between them because of the difference as that of ahamkara and of tejas "280 When it illumines itself, it is unconscious substance,and when it manifests objects,it is of the nature of substance-attribute or dravyaguna This statement naturally leads to the quesion: How can one and the same thing be both a substance and a quality at the same tume? A substance according to Visistadvaita, is the matenal cause and the matenal cause is the locus of states. It is the substratum of attributes.281 Whereas non-substance is that which is devoid of conjunction,282 consciousness is of the nature of attnbute, because it is dependent upon soul like the attnbutes of a substance. It is also a substance since it undergoes contra- diction and expansion. "It need not be doubted how conscious- 228 ness, an attnbute of the individual self, can become a substance because there is no contradiction between one and the same thing being both a substance and an attnbute like light. Sub- stance is the abode of states. The extension of consciousness beyond its substrate is possible in the case of light. A syllogism may be framed in the following manner .- Attributive consciousnes is a substance, because it possesses the attributes of diffusion etc. like a lumious substance. And moreover, consciousness is a substance, because it is the cause of cognition (bhavana), being different from the non-substance of conjunction and the unseen effect (adrsta) lıke an individual self."283 When such is the nature of knowledge it cannot be momen- tary or cannot be considered as existing for three moments as Buddhists advocate. Nor is it illusory in empircal life and in the phenomenal as maintained by the Advaitin; nor is it extrinsically valid as postulated by the followers of Nyaya and Vaisesika, nor consciousness itself is the self as asserted by the follwers of Sankhya and yoga. Thus jnāna, mati, prajna, samvit, dhisana, dhi, manışa, semuși, mēdha, buddhi' and such other terms are Studies in Kalapurnodayam

.synonyms of consciousness. Consciousness itself owing to the differnce of the limting adjunct, takes the form of happiness, sorrow, desire, hate, endeavour, etc. There is no evidence for the assumption of consciousness as distinct from and as a cause for generating happiness etc. The empirical usage I desire ', Thate', is accounted as an attrbute of consciousness like I remember' which is also a different form of consciousness. "when it is said that desire, resolve, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of firmness, modest, intelligence, fear and all these are but the mind, it is not really so. Because mind is the associate of consciousness, it is figuratively said that mind is all. "sımılarly, perception, inference, verbal testimony, recol- lection, doubt, misapprehension, error, discrimination, effort, infatuation, attachmet, hate, insobriety envy, courage, flckleness, arrogance, covetousness, anger, pride, stupefaction, treachery, persistence, disgust,joy, etc. and good state of mind, bad state of mind, affection, contentment, exaltation, peace, non-attachment, 229

enjoyment, friendship, compassion, desire, for liberation, mod- esty, forbearance, enquiry, desire for victory, delight, forgiveness, desire for art aversion, reminiseent forgiveness, desire for art, aversoion, reminiscent impression, hypocrisy, detraction of the qualities of others, desire to kill, inordinate hankerng, cupidity, past impression, dicussion, faith, devotion to God, self-surrender to God, etc. are the attributes of the individual self and they are innumerable, they are but particular modes of the attrbutive consciousness"284 Since objects are real and have independent existence,and since knowledge manifests or reveals itself as well as the object, our thoughts and experiences are trustworthy. The subject of cognition is as real as cognition and cognitive act. Real objeets independent of the mind and corresponding to their contents, are alone known. Therefore, reality of objects is reckoned as ab- solute. This view is known as satkhyätt, since what exists is cog- nized.285 If what exists alone is cognized, how can one explain illusion, error, opinion, dream etc. which are quite different from G V Knsnna Rao

valid knowldge? In the case of mistaking a rope for a snake,it 1s as real as the cognition of a rope itself. But the differnce between the two hes in this, the former consists in invalidating the workabilty of an object (axcsss:sdar) whereas the latter leads to successful activity. Now it may be questioned how one and the same subject can have two different cognitions when it comes into contact withe one and the same object? This is explaned by Vissitadvaita on the basis of quintuplication or pancikarana. "By the process of quintuplication, all the elements are present in all the elements like earth etc. Therefore, owing to the presence of a small portion of silver nacre, the object of that consciousness (1.e silver) is true. But as the portion of silver-content in the nacre is infinitesimal, it cannot serve the purpose of practical life; hence that cognition is bhrama. It disappears because of the knowledge of the preponderance of the nacre content in the object". "The cognition of dream etc. is also real. From the Srut we 230 understand that the Supreme person creates chariots etc. sub- sisting for a certain ume only,for the expencence of the particu- lar individual self mn accordance with its spiritual ment and de- merit."288 "In the case of the cognition, the conch is yellow, the expla- nation is as follows :- The visual rays of the eye which are in con- tact with the bile of the eye enter into conjunction with the conch; then the whiteness belonging to the conch is over-powered by the yellowness of the bile and hence not cognized. Therefore arises the cognition', the conch is yellow like a gold-gilt conch. The yellownesss issuing from his eye, owing to this extreme subtlety,is apprehended by him alone and not by others."289 From the above explanation it follows that knowledge is always of the real. But what differentiates valid knowledge (anyathajnäna,) and contrary knowledge (uiparta-jnāna)ıs this :- the former reveals or manifests the object as it really is and serves practical need whereas the latter do not.290 The sources of such valid knowledge according to Vsistadvaita are only three: per- cepton, inference and verbal or scriptural testimom Perception Studies ' Kalapumnodauam

or pratyaksa is the instrument of valid and immediate knowl- edge.291 It has for its object something always charactersed by difference, as it is impossible to perceive anything without any difference. Even if some one says that a state of consciousness without any differnence is possible, such a determination is al- ways marked by some attribute or other. Perception is of two kınds, determinate and indeterminate. Indeterminate perception does not mean the apprehension of an object bereft of all distinctions. For, whatever enters into human expenience under any circumstances appears with some elemnets of spatial and structural relations. Even the perception of an ob- ject for the first time involves thinking and discrimination as this'or 'that'. Visstadvaita, recognising the necessity of concep- tual factors in any expenence, defines indeterminate perception as the cognition of an indvidual for the first time with attributes, configuration etc. When the object of the same class is perceived for the second or the third time with the notion ofits gennc char- 231

acter, the perception is called determinate "The mode of perception is as follows :- Atman is joined with the mnd, mnd with the sense organ and the sense organ with the object of knowledge; as a rule,the sense organs do their func- tion by coming into contact with the object to be cognized ( s ed5 a). Therefore, when the visual sense is in contact with an object, in the form of a jar etc., ocular knowledge arises in the form 'this is a jar'.292 According to Visistadvaita yogic perception is not an inde- pendent source of knowledge. Smrt or recollection, pratyabhijna or recognition, abhava or non-existence, conjecture or uha, doubt or samsaya and genius or pratibha of holy personages are in- cluded in perception. The reason for this according to Srinıvasadasa, the author of Yatındra Matadipika, is as follows :- "Even if recollection is admitted as pramana, it has to depend on reminiscent impressions (samskära); since perception is the ori- gin of recollection, it is brought under perception, and so there is G V. Knshna Rao

no need to regard it as a separate pramana.293 Just as recollec- tıon is included ın pratyaksa, recognition (pratyabhijna) also in the form of 'this is that Devadatta' is included in perception. In our system since non-existence is nothing but another form of existence, the knowledge of non-existence of the jar is the floor itself. The antecedent non-existence of the jar is clay itself. The destruction of the jar means pot sherds."294 The scound source of knowledge which is inference pro- ceeds from the knowledge or pervasion (vyapti) between the per- vaded (vyapya)and the pervader(vyäpaka). In a case where fire pervades smoke, fire is called the pervader and smoke the per- vaded. When there is cognition that smoke is pervaded by fire, the knowledge of the pervader, namely,fire is obtained as in the inference,"wherever there is somke there is fire" To ascertain the relations of pervasion between two phenomena, a single observa-

232 tion is not sufficient. Therefore Visistadvaits emphasises the need for repeated observation to establish the universal pervasion be- yond doubt. The syllogism is not restricted to five menpers only. In som cases three-membered sysllogism serves the purpose,and in other cases even two-membered syllogism is recognised as suf- ficient.295 Visistdāvaita includes analogy (upamana) and presump- tion (arthäpatti) in inference. "Analogy is the knowledge of a fig- ure qualified by co-similarity which is accomplished by the recol- lection ofthe meanıng of an assımilatıve statement (atıdesavakya). A person though ignorant of the meaning of the word gavaya, hears from a forester that gavaya is similar to a cow; he goes to a forest and remembers the meaning conveyed by the assımilatıve statement. When he sees the figure qualified by co-similarty,then there arses in him the knowledge of the figure qualified by co- similatity, accompanied by the recollection of the meaning of the assimilative statement heard before. That knowledge is said to be anaolgy or upamana This is included in perception, since it is of the nature of recollection. It is brought under inference, as it depends upon the cognition of pervasion. And it is included in verbal testimony also, since it is generated by sentence.296 Studies in Kalapurnodayam

Visistadavita along with Nyäya,Sankhya and other Schools refuses to recognise presumption as a separate means of knowl- edge, since its purpose is served by inference. For instance,in the syllogism "Devadatta eats at night, because he is fat without eat- ing by day," "eating" is the pervasive concomitant of fatness," since whenever fatness is seen, there must be eating also. As it is known that Devadatta does not eat by day, the inference 1s that he must eat at night.

The third source of knowledge is sabda or verbal or scnp- tural testimony. The highest reality which is the sole cause of *he univere is Ramanuja maintains, not the object of perception or inference, but is known only through the sastras 297 Brahman is not an object of perception.298 No generalisation from expercnce can prove or disprove the reality of Brahman.299 Its reality,to which intelligenc points, lies in a region beyond that which intel- ligence points, lies in a region beyond that which can be actually 233 observed or understood by finite intelligence. Scripture, this theory maintains, is the only source regarding supersensuous matters, though reason may be employed in support of scripture. A state- ment is authontative when it is uttered by a trustworthy per- son, when it is free from errors due to defects of sense organs or when its menamg is not contradicted by any other cognition. The two sections of the vedas, namely, Karmakanda and jnanakanda, do not contradict each other. The earlier section or the Karmakanda treats of the vanous modes of upasana or wor- ship and the latter is devoted to Brahman, the object of worship. Hence both the Kandas of the Vedas constitute one homogene- ous subject. Unlike the Mimamsa school where validity of verbal statement is restricted to those Vedic texts which have for their scope what is yet to be accomplished (sadhya), in Visstadvaita the Vedic texts which denote Brahamn as existent realiity(siddha),are also of equal authority. The pancaratragama and the Vakhanasagama, which do not contradict the Vedas are authontative in toto according to this system.

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All statements, whetherfVedic or secular, are of two kinds, one having primary denotative funcion, and the other havng scondary denotative function (gaunavrtti). Primary denotation is abhidhavrtt, and it is manifold because of such differences as yoga. rudhi etc. When the meaning indicated by the primary de- notation is stultified the meaning nearest to it is denoted and that denotation is the secondary one . It is of two kınds, laksana and gauni Just as all words denoting "body" have their final mean- ing in the owner of the body, so also all words, whether they denote spirit such as Brahma, rudra, Agni, indra etc. Who con- stitute the body of Bhagavan, or matter such as praknt, kala, akasa, prana etc, which constiture His body, have their final mean- ing in the owner of the body, Sr Narayana, the Supreme self. All knowledge, whether perceptual or inferential, or of ver- bal testimony, manifests objects as having at least one quality

234 apart from the quality of pure being. When I perceive a leaf, I perceive its colour, shape, structure (samsthana) etc. but not its simple and pure being. It is the same in case of inference and verbal testmony also . Even scrptual testimony which says that Brahman is devoid of qualites means only that He is devoid of bad qualites. He is not pure consciousness bereft of all qualites. Since knowledge reveals what is existing and real, the qualities we apperhend must have a locus . If it is not the reality.the ob- jects manifested by our knowledge,what can be the substratum of these qualities? Therefore, there is not and there cannot be even a single object or thing without a quality. Everything tran- scendent or immanent must have some quality or other.

PRAMEYA

The object of valid knowledge is diveded into two main cat- egories as substance(dravya) and non-substance(adravya). Sub- stance is not only the meterial cause but also serves as the locus of changes. There are six substances - prakrti, kala, dharmabhuta- mana, nityvibhuti, jiva and Isvara. Non-substance which is an at- tribute, is always dependent on substance. While non-substance Studies in Kalapurnodayam

as an attribute is subject to change,the substance as the sub- stantive element does not undergo any change. A characteristic feature of Visistadvaita is that non-substance is sometimes viewed as both substance and attribute. For instance, though light (prabha) is an attribute of a effulgent object, it serves also as a substace, since it is subject to contraction and diffußion, and possesses colour as an attribute. From the absolute standpoint Isvara is the Substance,and the world of matter and selves are Hıs attributes. Isvara and jiva viewed as substantıve elements, are not subject to modifications, while prakrti, kala, dharmabuta- jnana and nityavibhut as attributwve elements undergo change. The non-substances are ten in number. Sattva, rajas and tamas are the qualites of prakrtı Sound, touch, colour, taste and smell are qualities of prakrti. Sound, touch,colour,taste and smell are the qualites of the five elements (bhūtās) like akasa etc. Conjuncion or samyöga is the external relation between sub- stances. Saktı or potency is the effecting agent of causation in all 235

causal substances.

PRAKRTI AND KĀĻA Prakrtı, characterised by the three gunas, constitutes the stuff out of which the universe evolves. It is the abode of indı- vidual self in mundane existence. It is called mulaprakrt sınce it is the primordial cause of the cosmos. It is known as "akaśa" as it is eternal in spite ofits manifold changes and modifications. It is termed as avyakata, as it is very subtle mn its causal state. It is called audya as it is opposed to the knowledge of Reality, and is known as mäya, as it is the cause of cosmic wonders. When matter is in an extremely latent state Without dis- tinction of name and form, it is known as pralaya. From prakrti, known as tamas in the begnning of evoluton, mahat appears with the three states of sattva, rajas and tamas Mahat evolves into ahamkara with the same three states called sattuikāhamkara (vaikarıka), rajasahamkāra (tajasa) and tamasāhamkāra, (Bhutadi) From sattvikahamkara, aded by rajasāhamkara, proceed the G. V. Knshna Rao

eleven senses, five conative senses, five congnitive senses and mind or manas. "Manas is that sense organ which is the cause of memoty etc. It resides in the region of the heart and is denoted by such terms as buddhi, ahamkara, citta etc., it is the cause of bondage as well as deliverance.300 It is not only the inner sense organ through which consciousness flows to the senses but also the sense commune which receives and co-ordinates sense knowl- edge. It is called buddhi when it is engaged in the function of decıdıng (adhyavasaya); ahamkara or abhumana when it conceives womgiy-for instance when the atman is identified with the body- and citta when it thinks. " These indnyas are subtle. They follow the individual self in its entry into other bodies and other worlds etc. In the state of liberation as they are unable to follow the individual self to the transcendental realm, they stay here till the time of dissolution. Or, they are taken by others who are devoid

236 of such organs. The view that the conative senses are destroyed along with the conative senses destroyed along with the destruc- tion of the body should be abandoned as it is opposed to the Sribhasya and other works."301 From tamasahamkara, aıded by rājasāhamkāra, arıse the five gross elements of akasa etc. through the media of the five tanmatras of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour.

The entire process of cosmic evolution is noting but change of states, The distinction between cause and effect is not real. A particular anterior state is called the cause and a particular pos- terior state is called the effect. Every effect connotes a pre-exist- ing cause. The doctrine of satkaryaväda affirms the non-differnece of cause and effect.

Kāla or tıme ıs eternal and all pervasıve. Unlıke prakrıtı, 1t is devoid of the three gunas of sattva, rajas and tamas Time as effect,which we expenience in our ordinary life,is changing and non-eternal. Months and years according to human and divine standards, the four yugas, the birth of Manus etc. and nitya, nauuttika and prakrta dissolutions are dependent on time. It serves

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as an instrument in the cosmic functions of Isvara. Though time has independence in the lilavibhuti (playmamfestation), it has no independent status in the ntyavibhuti(eternal-manifestation.)

NITYAVIBHUTI

Nityavibhuti is the immaterial, infinite domain beyond prakrti and its three gunas. It is selfluminous and is characterised by what is known as suddhatattva, different from the sattva of the three gunas. It is known by the differnet names of paramapada, tripadvibhuti, anandaloka etc. Vaikuntha, the city of God, is situ- ated within the realm of nityaubhuti. It is the stuff out of which the bodies of Isvara, the eternal, and the liberated selves are made. It is the means for the enjoyment of the liberated selves. The five saktis of sarva, nivrtti, visva, purusa and paramēsthin and the six attrıbutes of jnana, saktı, bala, aisvarya, virya, tejas manıfest themselves in this eternal domain of suddhasattva. Though it iS 237 beyond prakrtt it is capable of descending and permeating the consecrated images (arcavataras) in sacred pleaces.

DHARMABHUTAJNANA

The nature of Dharmabhutajnana or attrbutive knowledge has already been discussed. It is eternal and all -pervasive in respect of Isvara and jivas. It embraces the paths of karma, jnana and bhakti, and constitutes the root of religious expenence. Fi- nally, when the religious experience develops into firm medita- tion which is compared to the uninterrupted flow of oil, it be- comes the means of realising the beatific form of the Divine. Thus the religious consummation is absolutely dependent on the per- fect manifestation of dharmabhūtajnana. "Karmayoga, jnanayoga and other yogas, which are said to be the means for liberation, are the means to moksa through the medium of Bhakt alone What is called karmayoga is a special kind of activity which a person possessing true knowledge of the individual self and the Highest received from the instructions of G. V Knshna Rao

the preceptor, performs according to his capacity, it is non-pro- hibited action without any regard for the fruits, and is in the shape of kamya, nitya and nauittika actions. It is divided into worship of God penance, pilgrimage, charty, sacrifice, etc. this by destoying the impurites of the individual self, generetes jnana, and through it or directly becomes the producer of bhakti What is called manayoga is a special kind of meditation on the real nature of one's own self as distinct from praknt and as existing for the purpose of Isvara,after having attained purty of mind by the discipline of karmayoga This is useful for the direct realisa- tion of bhakti. Likewise the manner in which other means also are useful for generationg bhaktı may be understood. Bhaktiyoga is a continuous stream of remembrance, of God, uninterrupted like the fldw of oil,and is charactersed by the eightfold limits of yama, nıyama, asana, pranayama, pratyahara, dharma and 238 samadh It is generated by the sevenfold disciplıne of vwēka (dis- crimination), uimoka (detachment), abhyasa (constant practice), knya (good action), kalyana (virtuous conduct) anavasada (cheer- fulness and anuddharasa (non-exultaion) 302 Bhaktiyoga is the classical pathway to liberaton. But there is an alternative path to release for those who find it difficult to practise the austere dıscıplınes of sādhana-saptaka and astānga yoga, and who are not qualifed to receive instuction in the Vedas and the Upanisads. This may be follwed by anyone irrespective of his or her limitaitons, physical, mental or social. This is known as prapatt The heart of prapatti is absolute self-surrender with the firm faith in the saving grace of Isvara The main charactens- tics of prapatti are "to conceive what is in conformity with the will of God, to reject what is disagreeable to Him, to have firm faith that He will save, to seek Him alone as the protector and to sur- render one's self to Him in all meekness. A single act of self- surrender in all sincenty is sufficient to bring about release at once."

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