1. Studies In The Upanisads Govinda Gopal Mukhopadhyaya

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

DEPARTMENT OF ARCHAEOLOGY

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL

LIBRARY

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Call No. 181.41

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D.G.A. 79.

Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series, No. IX

Published under the auspices of the

Government of West Bengal

Studies No. 3

STUDIES IN THE UPANISADS

SANSKRIT COLLEGE

CALCUTTA

1960

Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series

BOARD OF EDITORS:

Dr Radha Govinda Basak, M.A., Ph. D., Chairman.

Dr Suniti Kumar Chatterji, M.A., D. Litt. (Lond.)

Professor Durgamohan Bhattacharyya, M.A.,

Kāvya-Sāñkhya-Purāṇatīrtha.

Professor Anantakumar Bhattacharyya,

Nyāya-Tarkatīrtha.

Dr Gaurinath Sastri, M A., D. Litt.,

Secretary and General Editor.

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

By

GOVINDAGOPAL MUKHOPADHYAYA, M.A., D. Phil,

Sāñkhyatīrtha.

Assistant Professor of Sanskrit,

Sanskrit College, Calcutta.

181.4

MUK

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STUDIES

IN

THE

UPANISADS

IN MEMORIAM

PRANGOPAL MUKHOPĀDHYĀYA

Father and Fount of Light

वक्ता चास्य त्वादृगन्यो न लभ्यः।

यत्ते मरीचीः प्रवतो मनो जगाम दूरकम्।

तत्त आ वर्तयामसि ह क्षयाय जीवसे॥

Rgveda.

It gives me great pleasure to present before the academic

world the results of research in the field of the Upaniṣads

done by Professor Govinda Gopal Mukhopadhyaya, a colleague

of mine at this College. It is admitted on all hands that

the Upaniṣads contain highly philosophical speculations and

when the Western world came to know about them through

translation they were not only deeply impressed by them but

there are definite indications also that in some cases these

speculations exercised considerable influence in moulding their

ways of thought. In India also there has been quite a good

number of works which have discussed different aspects of

this important branch of Vedic literature. In this context

one may reasonably enquire into the reasons why another

book should be written on the subject. To this our answer

would be that the writer of this book has chalked out a new

line of approach to the Upaniṣads and from one point of

view the line chalked out by him may be regarded as a most

correct way of understanding and appreciating the value of

the Upaniṣads. The main purpose of Upaniṣadic study should

be the realization of the Absolute and unless this realization

dawns upon the individual soul there is little justification for

entering into the polemics which often lures him away from

the pursuit of the ultimate end.

The author of the book must be congratulated specially

because he has taken adequate pains to focus his attention on

the way that ultimately leads to the realization of the Trans-

cendent Reality. When I say this I should not be misunder-

stood, for whenever occasion demanded, Dr. Mukhopadhyaya

did not fight shy to enter into such dialectics as could possi-

bly remove all obstacles in the way of proper appreciation of

the matter he proposes to discuss.

( xii )

One word more. It is encouraging to find the author

who has equally mastered both the Indian and Western

systems of thought engaging himself in a comparative study

of the views of some of the Western philosophers which, he

thinks, would be relevant to his study. This will enable

the modern mind to understand correctly and precisely the

value of the Upaniṣads. I would only wish in the end

that with the gift of original thinking and critical acumen,

Dr Mukhopadhyaya will continue in his endeavour at

unfolding the deeper implications of the Upaniṣadic liter-

ature and enable the world of scholars to realize the depth of

Indian Wisdom.

It is very much encouraging to the members of the Board

of Publications that the foreword to this volume has come

from the pen of that great savant of Indian Wisdom, Mahā-

mahopādhyāya Dr Gopinath Kaviraj. That he has kindly

agreed to associate himself with and bless the present research

activities of this institution will serve as a great stimulus to

our academic pursuits.

Gaurinath Sastri

PREFACE

The present work is the outcome of a prolonged intensive study in the sacred lore of the Upaniṣads. The study was mainly taken up with the object of finding out the unique nature of the Absolute or Brahman directly from the Upaniṣadic texts and also to investigate into the methods of approach to that Absolute as propounded in the Upaniṣads and finally to enquire into the characteristics of the final realization.

I was initiated into these studies by my late lamented father, who was to me the living embodiment of Upaniṣadic wisdom. I feel that I have been the most ineffective instrument for transmitting his luminous realizations.

I was singularly fortunate in having the privilege of studying the sacred texts at the feet of two eminent masters of Indian wisdom, Dr Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Mahāmaho-pādhyāya Dr Gopinath Kaviraj, while I was a research scholar in the Benares Hindu University.

I cannot adequately express my gratitude to them and especially to the latter for having graced my book with a foreword from his pen.

What I owe to Srimat Pratyagātmānanda Saraswati and Sri Krishna Prem is more than a matter for acknowledgement.

Sri Krishna Prem, though living the life of a recluse in the lonely heights of the Himalayas, took a brotherly interest in my work and made valuable suggestions and corrections.

I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to Dr Satkari Mookerjee, then 'Asutosh Professor of Sanskrit in the Calcutta University, Dr N. K. Brahma, then Head of the Department of Philosophy in the Presidency College, Calcutta, the late Dr Subodh Chandra Mukherjee, Mayurbhanj Professor of Sanskrit in the Benares Hindu University and Dr P. L. Vaidya,

( xiv )

who succeeded the latter-all of whom guided me in my

researches at different periods. My work would not have

seen the light of the day but for the personal interest shown

by my present Principal, Dr Gaurinath Sāstrī in its

publication. In spite of his various pre-occupations he devoted

considerable periods of his valuable time in thoroughly

revising my work and even in going through the proofs to

make the publication as perfect as possible and he has thus

laid myself under a deep debt of gratitude. I am grateful to

my esteemed friend, Prof Charuchandra Chattopadhyaya,

who, in spite of his advanced years, undertook to revise my

composition thoroughly, making valuable suggestions for

improvement in the language of the work. My friend and

colleague, Dr S. K. Mitra helped me in reading the proofs

and my thanks are due to him as also to Pandit Jagadish

Tarkatirtha for seeing my work through the press.

GOVINDA GOPAL MUKHOPADHYAYA

Sanskrit College

March 1960

CONTENTS

Preface

Abbreviations

Foreword

Prolegomena

Part I

The Goal

CHAPTER I

The Problem of Reality

The goal—the problem—two forms of Brahman—transcendence and immanence—their true significance—true meaning of ‘mithyā’—degrees of Reality—negative description—its real significance—view of Royce examined—the true picture of the goal—the false ideas pointed out—Immanence—Iśvara—Rāmānuja’s views—Bhartṛprapañca —Saṅkara—nature of Jīva—Is it eternal or evanescent—Māyā—the solution of the original problem—the true Vedāntic vision—Western views of Reality examined—Descartes—Leibniz—Spinoza—Kant—Hegel—Bergson—Alexander—Jeans and Eddington—the uniqueness of the Upaniṣadic view.

CHAPTER II

The Problem of Knowledge

The nature ot the Upaniṣadic knowledge—the problem—the Ātman not the object of knowledge—Perception—Inference—Intuition—Sākṣāt aparokṣāt—Vedāntic view of pramāṇas—the discourse of Yājñavalkya on Jyotis—the significance of vākya and śravaṇa—the nature of tattvajñāna—the relation of jñāna and karman—the value and utility of synthesis—the misrepresentation of transcendental knowledge—different views of Brahmadatta, Maṇḍana, Bhartṛprapañca —their reconciliation—the Western theories of truth examined—

( xvi )

Correspondence—Coherence—their inadequacy—the Upaniṣadic view of an unique type of knowledge.

Part II

The Way

CHAPTER III

The Preparation … … … 141-171

The three paths—primary necessity of a teacher—the method of approach to the teacher and its significance—Brahmacarya—Sattvaśuddhi—Ābāraśuddhi—Yajña—Śreyas and Preyas—Kratu—Satya—Dharma—Yajña, Adhyayana and Dāna—Śraddhā—Pitā, Ācārya and Atithi—Absence of stress on Ahimsa and Īśvarapranidhāna—the three ‘da’—condemnation of immoral acts—Summary—the Western critics’ imputation of disregard for morality in the Upaniṣads—reply to the charges.

CHAPTER IV

Contemplation … … … 172-197

The second step—its necessity—its distinction from the first step—the utility of the first step—the role of Mukhya Prāṇa—the meaning of upāsanā—its purposes—its constituents—the place of feeling or bhakti in it—the need of an ālambana—features of Upāsanā—grades of Upāsanā—Pratīka and Abamingraba—Sampat, Āropa, Samvarga, Adhyāsa—Saguṇa and Nirguṇa Upāsanā—the principle of classification—varieties of approach in the Upaniṣads—mystic elements—nāda—prāṇāyāma—jyotis—the two broad methods of yoga and viveka—synthesis and analysis.

CHAPTER V

The Synthetic Way … … … 198-222

The three centres of synthesis and the three Vidyās corresponding to them illustrated—the Dabara-vidyā—Udgītha-vidyā—Madhu-vidyā.

( xvii )

CHAPTER VI

The Analytic Way ... ... 223-249

The drawbacks of the synthetic way—Gārgya-Ajātaśatru episode—the sleeping man—the five sheaths of being—matter—life—mind—super-consciousness or vijñāna—ānanda—distinction between vijñānamaya and ānandamaya—whether the ānandamaya is the Ultimate Reality.

Part III

The Attainment

CHAPTER VII

The Problem of Attainment ... ... 253-297

The final problem—the significance of the conception of mokṣa—the problem—different conceptions of mokṣa—the Upaniṣadic conception—its true significance—the rationale of liberation—the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conceptions examined and distinguished from the Upaniṣadic one—other texts interpreted—the two aspects of attainment—Bhartrprapañca's view—rich and varied expression in the Upaniṣads—Kramamukti and Sadyomukti—Pītryāṇa and Devayāna—Brahmaloka—dying process—the Sūrya—the different bodies—problem of Jīvanmukti—Conclusion.

ABBREVIATIONS

SANSKRIT.

AU Aitareya Upaniṣad.

ARR Advaïtaratnarakṣaṇam. Bombay Edition.

AP Anubhūtiprakāśā.

ATU Atharvaśira Upaniṣad.

BH Bhāgavatam. (with Srīdhara's Commentary).

BU Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. (with Sāṅkara Bhāṣya).

BS Brahma-Siddhi. Madras Edition.

CU Chāndogya Upaniṣad (with Sāṅkara Bhāṣya).

DVP Daharavidyāprakāśikā.

DS Durgāptaśatí.

IU Íśa Upaniṣad.

JMV Jīvanmuktiviveka.

KTU Kaṭha Upaniṣad.

KSU Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad.

KU Kena Upaniṣad.

KH Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya. (Introduction by Saṅkara Bhārati).

PMB Mahābhāṣya of Patanjali. Keilhorn's Edition.

Mai. Maitrī Upaniṣad.

Ma. Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad.

MU Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.

NS Naiṣkarmya Siddhi.

NBS Nārada Bhakti Sūtra.

Nir. Nirukta (Yāska).

NSU Nyāya Sūtra.

PD Pañcadaśī.

PP Pañcāpadikā.

PGV Parapakṣagirivajra.

PPB Praśastapādabhāṣya (with Setuṭīkā and Vyomavatī vṛtti).

PRU Praśna Upaniṣad.

RV Ṛgveda.

( xx )

ŚB Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya (on Brahmasūtra, Bṛhadāraṇyaka & Chāndogya etc.).

SK Sāṅkhya-Kārikā.

SS Sāṅkhya Sūtra.

SA Samvidullāsa.

SDS Sarvadarśanasamingraha.

SD Śatadūṣaṇī. Conjeevaram Edition.

SLS Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha. Chowkhamba Edition.

SG Śivagītā.

SK Spandakārikā.

SBH Śrībhāṣya. Madras Edition.

ŚU Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.

TŪ Taittirīya Upaniṣad.

TL Tantrāloka.

TS Tantrasāra.

Vār. Vārttika.

VS Vārttikasāra.

VKL Vedāntakalpatikā.

VPB Vedāntaparibhāṣā. Edited by Sarat Chandra Ghosal Calcutta.

VAS Vedārthasaṅgraha.

YMD Yatīndramatadīpikā. Poona Edition.

YS Yoga-Sūtra.

ENGLISH.

STD Alexander—Space Time and Deity.

IU Aurobindo—(i) Isha Upanishad.

LD (ii) Life Divine.

CE Bergson —Creative Evolution.

SIV Bhattacharya K. C.—Studies in Vedantism.

VD Bosanquet—Value and Destiny of the Individual.

AR Bradley —Appearance and Reality.

PHS Brahma N.K.—Philosophy of Hindu Sadhana.

ER Caird, E. —Evolution of Religion.

PHR Caird, J. —Philosophy of Religion.

NAV Coomaraswamy, A.—A New Approach to the Vedas.

SWK Datta, D.M. —The Six Ways of Knowing.

( xxi )

PU Deussen —Philosophy of the Upaniṣads.

NPW Eddington —The Nature of the Physical World.

PR Edwards —Philosophy of Religion.

NRDR Falk, Maryla —Nāma-Rupa and Dharma-Rupa.

PU Gough —Philosophy of the Upaniṣads.

PTE Green, T. H. — Prolegomena to Ethics.

IHD Guenon, Rene — (i) Introduction to Hindu Doctrines.

MBV (ii) Man and his becoming according to the Vedanta.

TOP Hocking — Types of Philosophy.

TPU Hume — Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads.

EM Huxley, Aldous — Ends and Means.

PP Inge, W. —Philosophy of Plotinus.

Pr. James, W. —(i) Pragmatism.

VRE (ii) Varieties of Religious Experience.

PHP Jeans, J. —Physics and Philosophy.

NT Joachim, H.— (i) Nature of Truth.

SES (ii) A study of Ethics of Spinoza.

GP Joad, C.E.M. —Guide to Philosophy.

KM Keith, A.B. — (i) Karma-Mīmāṃsā.

PVU (ii) Philosophy of the Veda and the Upaniṣads.

STV Kirtikar — Studies in Vedanta.

YK Krishna Prem — The Yoga of the Kathopaniṣad.

IH Otto, R. — The Idea of the Holy.

IG Pringle-Pattison — The Idea of God.

EWT Radhakrishnan, S.— (i) Eastern Religions & Western Thought.

IVL (ii) An Idealist View of Life.

RPU (iii) Philosophy of the Upaniṣads.

CSU Ranade — A Constructive Survey of the Upaniṣads.

AG Roy, D.K. — Among the Great.

WI Royce — The World and the Individual.

HWP Russel, Bertrand —History of Western Philosophy

HPH Schwegler — History of Philosophy.

( xxii )

HM Sircar, M.N. — Hindu Mysticism.

TDI Spinoza — Tractatus de Intellectus.

CIL Underhill, Evelyn — Concerning the Inner Life.

UL Urquhart, W.S. — The Upaniṣads and Life.

HOP History of Pantheism.

CIP Contemporary Indian Philosophy.

JOURNALS.

CR Calcutta Review.

HG Hibbert Journal.

IA Indian Antiquary.

IHQ Indian Historical Quarterly.

FOREWORD

The Upaniṣads occupy a unique place in the history of spiritual and philosophical thought of India, nay of the whole world. Their value is to be assessed, not simply as a storehouse of wise sayings and parables which influenced the life of old people detached from the world, but as a living fountain of Divine Wisdom capable of quenching the thirst of ardent souls hankering after Peace and Blissful Existence. We all know that the different schools of orthodox philosophical thought in early medieval India had their origin in the Upaniṣads and most of the practical lines of approach towards the Goal of Life had their first inspiration from them. And in the cryptic utterances and obscure cult traditions found scattered in this literature we can easily detect traces of great mystic wisdom which do not easily lend themselves to the understanding of average and superficial intellect. A study of the Upaniṣads from every angle of vision is, therefore, essential for a proper appreciation of the spirit of Indian Culture.

I, therefore, heartily welcome the publication of the present Upaniṣadic studies of Dr. Govindagopal Mukhopādhyāya as a valuable contribution in the field of orthodox scholarship. The value of these studies consists mainly, I believe, in the way in which the writer has approached the subject. First of all, he has attempted to present the conception of the Supreme Reality and Knowledge which the Upaniṣads hold up as the highest ideal to our vision. Then he has described the path and has shown the pilgrim starting on this path under the guidance of the Master (Guru) (or

( xxiv )

of the Inner Monitor within, the Antaryāmī). But before

the actual journey commences there is, as he has shown, a

stage of preparation. Progress in the journey is evidently

marked by the degrees of clarity in contemplation reached by

the sādhaka. The Path is both synthetic and analytic.

When the Goal is reached—not certainly as a result of the

continued progress of the pilgrim's movement (which, of

course, is the expression of his personal effort) but as the

effect of the spontaneous outflow of Grace descending on the

soul out of the Supreme Height or from the Deepest Abyss,

as an act of super-abounding Freedom or Election (Varana),—

what happens is not simply the restoration of the soul's lost

freedom but its establishment in the self-aware unity of

Supreme Reality and Knowledge.

I commend the book, as coming from a young erudite

scholar who had the benefit of close association in his earlier

years with a man of singular spiritual insight in the person

of his illustrious father, to the reading public interested in

spiritual studies.

But I have one personal request to make to the writer

I should like to ask him to present us, if possible, with a

critical and comprehensive study of that aspect of ancient

Indian Wisdom which is reflected in the Upaniṣads. To be

thorough and penetrating it should have in its background

a living assimilation of the mystic traditions of the earlier

Vedic age represented by the mantras and brāhmaṇas as a

whole. There is no doubt that the so-called karmakāṇḍa

finds its true significance only when it is accepted as a sym-

bolical presentation to the uninitiated mind of the deeper

mysteries of the esoteric Vedic sādhana. It is also expected

that valuable light might be thrown on this study, with

( xxv )

special reference to several obscure issues involved, if it

included within its scope a careful consideration of the

contemporary religious thought-currents outside the Upaniṣa-

dic pale in the esoteric circles of Buddhism and Jainism, in

the earlier Pañcarātra and Ekāyana th ought and in the ancient

Āgamic traditions of various schools. In the last place, if

it is true that every school of subsequent religious thought

in India traces its descent, directly or incidentally, from the

Upaniṣads, we should be prepared to find in them the signs

of its first adumbration. A comprehensive study of this

kind, which should have an integral view-point and look

upon different cultural traditions with equal respect as being

divergent expressions of the same basic Indian pattern, has

long been a desideratum.

Dr Mukhopadhyaya has my best wishes for success in

this proposed literary enterprise.

GOPINATH KAVIRAJ

2A, Sigra,

Varanasi.

PROLEGOMENA

I

The need for a fresh approach and its aim

The propriety of a fresh enquiry into the ancient texts of the Upaniṣads may be easily questioned. For there is a general impression that they have been explored to the full, both historically and philosophically, from various aspects by eminent scholars of the East and the West and very little remains to be said or done about them any more. Yet we have been prompted to make an intensive study of them anew because we have felt that the true essence of the Upaniṣadic teaching has hardly been revealed so far and still requires to be grasped in all its bearings. That the real significance has been missed is evident from the lamentable confusions and deliberate distortions made about this sacred teaching by almost all of the Western scholars and philosophers even upto the present day. Though scholars like Radhakrishnan have tried their best to present the true spirit of the Upaniṣadic teaching and ably replied to the criticisms levelled against it by Western scholars like Gough, Deussen etc., yet Keith persists in maintaining that ‘Radhakrishnan ignores the fundamental moral indifference of the Upaniṣads by reinterpreting them in the light of absolute idealism¹. So we have felt the need of quoting Upaniṣadic texts freely and of presenting the views of the Upaniṣads through their texts alone to meet the charges levelled against them. The ‘moral indifference’ which Keith and others read into the text of the Upaniṣads is due to their total lack of apprehension of the transcendental nature of the Upaniṣadic knowledge. The failure to understand the true nature of this knowledge has led in the field of metaphysics to a colossal misconception about the nature of the Absolute or Brahman as presented in the Upaniṣads, which in its turn has produced in the sphere of ethics the idea of ‘moral in-

1. PVU, p. 587.

2

PROLĒGOMENA

difference'. Thus our aim in the following pages will be two-

fold: firstly, to clear the metaphysical confusion by presenting a

true picture of the Reality as depicted in the Upaniṣads and secondly,

to remove the illusion of 'moral indifference' or the misconception

about the absence of ethical content by bringing into light the true

method of the Upaniṣadic approach to that Reality and the consummation reached thereby.

It is not at all surprising that a true apprehension of this

ancient wisdom has not been possible at all in the West and has

ultimately led to such conclusions as 'contradictions in adjecto are

the normal characteristic of the Upaniṣads'2, for verily the Upaniṣads

contain a secret which is not easy to explore or unravel. The term

'Upaniṣad' essentially means 'the secret' or rahasyaṃ. As Deussen

puts it: "Certain mysterious words, expressions and formulas,

which are only intelligible to the initiated, are described as

Upaniṣad"3. The expressions or formulas look mysterious because of

their cryptic nature and they were put in such a form with a double

purpose: firstly, to conceal the supreme teaching from the uninitiated

and non-believers and secondly, by exciting the curiosity and wonder of

the true seeker to bring his mental faculties to their full stretch as

he contemplates over the symbol or expression. One who seeks

enlightenment or knowledge must exert himself to the utmost, and

apply himself to the finding of the solution of the puzzle with

unremitting labour. But a flat and explicit statement hardly stimulates

our intellectual faculties because its plainness is patent and needs no

further clarification. It is only a pithy saying, carrying a latent

import behind it, that forces the intellect to actively engage itself

in finding out the hidden and true significance or meaning. The

sacred texts of the Upaniṣads are thus full of such secret expressions

or formulas and this fact is borne out by the very basic meaning of

the term 'Upaniṣad.' Hence wonder is the first and the last word

about the Reality, the realiser of that Reality, as well as the method

of that realisation as contained in the Upaniṣads. It is wonderfully

2 PVU, p. 587.

3 PU, p. 16.

PROLEGOMENA

3

beheld, it is wonderfully spoken and it is wonderfully heard. There

is something amazing about it all.

A protest may be raised here by the rationalist mind that we

are being led to mysticism, to a sphere beyond all reason and logic

and so we must hasten to assure that nowhere does the Upaniṣadic

teaching flout the reason or run contrary to it but on the contrary

unequivocally affirm that the Reality is revealed only to the highest

reason, the subtlest one-pointed intellect.⁴ Hence to the surface mind

and the unrefined intellect the truth no doubt remains hidden and so,

if by the term ‘mysticism’ one understands that which is secret or

hidden, it can very well be said of the Upaniṣads that they

are full of mysticism, because they contain nothing but secret

teachings (guhya-ādeśāḥ) which is the very basic meaning of

the term ‘Upaniṣad’. And it must also be noted that the secret teach-

ings are not set forth in a haphazard fashion without any principle

of reason running behind them. They are the embodiments of the

highest reason, being the essence of the Veda, the repository of all

wisdom. If one devotes his thoughts in finding out the process of

reason which is at work behind all the teachings of the Upaniṣads,

he is sure to be struck by the amazing logical precision and

supreme harmony of thought running throughout the whole Upani-

ṣadic literature. It is Vidyā or Supreme Knowledge that is imparted

here and hence there is nothing irrational or illogical in these teachings.

It should not be mistakenly thought that the Upaniṣads contain

only idle intellectual speculations of primitive mankind about the

nature of the world and the soul, which are mostly crude and vague.

By thrusting mere intellectualism into the Upaniṣads and by reading

the texts in that light alone, the Western scholars have all been

deprived of the true wisdom they contain. By confusing Vidyā or

Jñāna with mere intellectual knowledge, even Deussen, the only ardent

and sympathetic student and interpreter of the Upaniṣads in the

West, makes a gross misrepresentation of the essential teachings

contained therein. As he puts it in his introduction to the Phi-

losophy of the Upaniṣads :¹ ‘Why then do we need a release from this

4 dṛśyate tvagrayā buddhyā sūkṣmayā. K.TUI, iii. 12,

4

PROLEGOMENA

existence? Because it is the realm of sin, is the reply of the Bible.

The Veda answers: Because it is the realm of ignorance. The

former sees depravity in the volitional, the latter in the intellectual

side of human nature. The Bible demands a change of the will, the

Veda of the understanding'.5 After thus pitting the intellect

against the will he gives his verdict in favour of the latter and then

suddenly comes to the conclusion that the will happens to be the

more fundamental of the two, as Schopenhauer views it and hence as

'the will and not the intellect is the centre of a man's nature, so

surely must the pre-eminence be assigned to Christianity, in that its

demand for a renewal of the will, is peculiarly vital and essential'.6

From this as a natural corollary or an easy deduction is made

patent the fact that the Upanisads are definitely anti-ethical,

inasmuch as they totally neglect the will which is the spring of all moral

actions. This view thus tries to represent the Upanisads as embodying a

one-sided approach to the Reality, viz. through the intellect alone.

The basis of all such misrepresentations lies in the failure to conceive

the transcendental nature of the knowledge that the Upanisads impart.

It is no mere intellectual acquaintance with the nature of the Ātman

or Brahman or a mere theoretical knowledge about it that is aimed at

anywhere in the Upanisads, but a living and concrete experience of

the Brahman or Ātman is sought everywhere. This is unmistakably

clear from the story of Nārada in the Chāndogya Upanisad,7 where

he gives a long list of the sciences he had mastered and thereafter

laments that he is merely a knower of hymns (i. e. sacred texts or

books) and not a knower yet of the Ātman. That he still lacked the

knowledge of the Ātman was evident to him from the fact of the

persistence of grief or sorrow in him. Only the knower of the Ātman

transcends all grief and hence he prays to the teacher to take him to

the other shore beyond all darkness. Had mere intellectual knowledge

been the aim of the Upanisads Nārada would not have begged

of his teacher to impart to him the knowledge of the Ātman, for he

was already well-versed in all the Vedas and Purānas, which contain

complete descriptions about the Ātman. It is thus for 'Vijñāna' or

5 PU, p. 48.

6 Ibid, p. 49.

7 CU, 7. 1,

PROLEGOMENA

5

thorough knowledge and living experience that the teacher is

approached and not for mere intellectual discipline.8

An approach to the teacher was considered indispensably necessary

to have the knowledge, and its significance lies in the fact that only an

experienced soul can generate the experience in another soul—only a

butning candle can light another. This also hints at the transcen-

dental nature of the Upanisadic knowledge, because it is not generated

through a process of intellectual reasoning but comes as a flash and

breaks upon the soul with the uniqueness of a revelation through the

ringing and revealing words of the teacher which penetrate into the very

core of being and rend the veil of ignorance. But we must add that

this revelation comes only after a most arduous intellectual discipline

and rigorous moral training. The light no doubt comes from above but

it must be received and retained below. This receptivity has to be

cultured and cultivated and it depends on one's own making. Givenness

is no doubt the essential mark of knowledge but the receptivity is

never given, it has to be achieved through intense self-effort. The

one is vastutantra, i. e., dependent on the object, the other is

kartrtantra i. e. dependent on the subject, devolving upon the

doer. We shall find throughout our study of the Upanisads how

they give equal scope to both in their respective spheres and thereby

achieve a wonderful harmony and reconciliation of a problem that has

proved baffling and insoluble to many.

That there was no lack of stress on the volitional aspect in the

Upanisadic approach to the Reality will be evident from the innumerable

passages in the Upanisads which we have collected together under a

section called 'The Preparation'. We have devoted a whole section

to it in order to show the utter hollowness of the charge of 'moral

indifference' which has been laid at the door of the Upanisads

times without number by all Western interpreters, without a single

exception. We have already pointed out that the fatal delusion has

been caused by the inability to grasp the true nature of the

transcendental knowledge that the Upanisads contain and teach. The

aim of the Upanisads is not merely to be freed from the taints of sin

8 tadvijñānārtham sa gurumevābhigachhet. MuU. I. 2. 12.

6

PROLEGOMENA

like that of the Bible, but to be freed from the fetters of finitude

which is the root cause of all sin. Release from the realm of sin is

only the first prayer of the Upaniṣads, merely the initial step in the

onward march—Asato mā sad gamaya. We have shown in the

delineation of the way how they move on and on till the final and

total freedom is gained. Merely the removal of anitality does not

bring perfection and complete freedom, for the seed of imperfection

still remains and the chain of bondage still clings to the feet. Not

even the attainment of divinity, in the sense of assimilation of one's

being to that of the luminous but still finite gods, brings the fullness

of freedom, the completeness of perfection. It is only on the

achievement of infinity that the utter release, the total freedom, the

absolute bliss is gained. Hence the Upaniṣads do not seek a relative

freedom or a partial autonomy and never rest content till the final

cause of all sin and suffering is removed root and branch and hence

their significant name, the ‘Upaniṣad’. Saṅkara while clarifying the

etymological meaning of the term ‘Upaniṣad’ points out: ‘This

Brahmavidyā is signified by the term ‘Upaniṣad’ because the whole

‘saṁsāra’ or creation along with its cause is absolutely uprooted and

removed by those who are engaged in it (i.e. this Brahmavidyā). The

root sad preceded by upa and ni carry this meaning’⁹. Again he

says: ‘Those who take recourse to this Brahmavidyā with faith and

devotion and in a spirit of identification, for them it removes all the

evils of birth, old age, illness etc., brings the realisation of the

Supreme Brahman and totally extinguishes ignorance which is the cause

of the ‘saṁsāra’. It is therefore termed ‘Upaniṣad’ because

the meaning of sad preceded by upa and ni is known to be

such’¹⁰.

Thus the very basic meaning of the term ‘Upaniṣad’ throws a

clear hint about the nature of the teaching which the scriptures known

by that name contain. The Upaniṣads strive after a complete

recasting of the whole man, a total transformation of his entire

personality. All the elements that constitute a human being—will,

intellect and feeling—are each and all involved in this process of

9 SB, IU. 1.

10 Ibid, TU. 1.

PROLEGOMENA

7

Upaniṣadic Brahmavidyā. We have traced the different phases through

which the Upaniṣads proceed step by step in purifying the will, the

intellect and the feeling—all the constituents of personality—without

neglecting the physical too and finally concern themselves with the

removal of the last film of finitude, thereby leading to the attainment of

the Infinite or Brahman. From the outcome of this attainment, too, it is

clear beyond doubt that the Upaniṣads did not seek a partial realisation

through the intellect alone. What happens when this supreme vision

dawns? The Upaniṣad replies: ‘The knots of the heart are unloosened,

all doubts are removed, the actions too are annihilated on the Supreme

being seen’.11 Desires vanish, doubts are banished and actions are

dissolved. In other words, with the removal of desire all feelings are

fulfilled, with the dispelling of doubt the intellect is at rest, and

with the dissolution of karman or action the will too becomes unfettered.

Thus the vision brings fulfilment in all the aspects of life. Hence it

is clear that Brahmavidyā does not signify a mere intellectual

apprehension of the Brahman. ‘By knowing the Brahman one becomes

the Brahman’—is the most emphatic assertion of the Upaniṣads. We

know of no other scripture in the world in which we may find a

statement of similar nature. But does mere intellectual knowledge

about a thing make one identical in being with the thing itself?

One must ponder deeply over the implications of such a knowledge,

which bears the promise of a total metamorphosis of the ordinary

creature of ignorance into the All-Knowing Brahman, immediately

as it dawns upon the individual soul. To skip over it as mere

intellectual knowledge is to miss the whole spirit and teaching of the

Upaniṣads.

That mere intellectualism was not meant by this knowledge is

clear from a categorical statement in the Upaniṣad:1 ‘This knowledge

can be achieved neither through reasoning nor by a shining intellect,

not even through repeated hearing’11. These methods are all discarded

summarily because they do not touch the core of being, as they

spring from a superficial curiosity of the surface self. The

Upaniṣads want to get to the very ground of the soul, to the

11. MuU, 2. 2. 8.

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foundational consciousness itself which underlies all the faculties of understanding,—thinking, feeling and willing, cognition, affection and conation. That foundation being touched, all others are transformed automatically. And so the only way of attaining this knowledge, the Upanisad states, is to get wedded unto it, to choose or court it (vr̥ṇute) as the sole pursuit of one’s whole being. Only then the Reality reveals its form to such a seeker.

We have dealt at length with the question of mere intellectualism in the Upanisadic teaching because not only in the West but unfortunately in this country too there has been a lamentable distortion and confusion of it with mere intellectual knowledge. This has led to an utter stagnation in the spiritual life and a total absence of true illumination. The degeneration has set in from as far back as the time of the great Vedāntist, Vidyāraṇya, who in his ‘Jīvanmuktiviveka’ frankly admits,12 rather laments that the modern seekers after knowledge (idānīntanāḥ) without going in for the primary purification and contemplation engage themselves through mere curiosity (autsukyamātrāt) in this quest for knowledge all at once. They only make a show of purification for the time being (tātkālika) and rush for the knowledge directly. Thus what was sought with the urge of the whole being in the Upanisadic times, henceforward became a matter for mere idle curiosity and speculation. This was responsible for the delusion which made the intellectual knowledge pass for tattvajñāna or metaphysical illumination. The key to realisation was thus lost and only arid abstraction filled the mind which sheds no light on the gloomy path of life nor takes the lamenting self to the other shore beyond all darkness, for which we saw Nārada prayed, and which is the true aim of the Upanisadic knowledge everywhere. So the inner man remained untouched, buried in the ignorance as before and subject to all the vicissitudes and distractions of life. Hence the necessity was felt to supplement this so-called tattvajñāna with yogic practices for controlling the mind and extinguishing the desires. But we have seen that the Upaniṣads promise immediate extinction of all desires and actions with the very dawning of this knowledge and this

12 JY, p. 234.

PROLEGOMENA

9

markedly points out the fatal misrepresentation of the true nature of

the tattvajñāna. The true tattvajñāna once generated stands in no need

of supplementation through other auxiliary methods or processes, be-

cause it is not a compartmental thing, not exclusively a mental or

intellectual product but springs from the very essence of being or the

core of the self. It is the ‘foundational consciousness’ as Haldane

calls it, and as such underlies all the phases of consciousness. Hence

the fulfilment which it brings is not partial but total and complete.

II

The basic teaching of the Upanisads & its uniformity

The misrepresentation of the true nature of the Upanisadic know-

ledge has been due to a total failure to grasp the essential

spirit of the entire Upanisadic teaching. The whole edifice of Brahma-

vidyā, we have tried to depict, rests on two fundamental concepts,

viz. that of the Agni and the Ātman, and hence the whole Brahma-

vidyā may be classed under two broad categories, one the Agnividya,

the other the Ātmavidyā. Almost all the Upaniṣads without a single

exception point out the two phases unfailingly. Agni is the principle

of change or transformation, the supreme Cosmic Energy which is at

work behind this whole world of manifestation. It is sometimes called

Āditya, sometimes Prāṇa and sometimes again Agni. That all the

different names signify the same thing is expressly stated by the

Upaniṣad itself : ‘This is Prāṇa, Agni, which is rising as

Sūrya or the Sun’.14 The same text calls it Viśvarūpa, of a universal

form, which rightly reveals its true nature, because it is the

universal principle underlying all the particular manifestations that is

signified by these terms. As Yama points out to Naciketas: ‘This Fire

is the Creative Power which brings about the manifestation of all

worlds, of which it is thus the root or basis’.15 The created things are

thus directly connected with this principle and only through it can lift

themselves to the sphere of the Uncreated. From the particular to the

Universal and thence to the Transcendent is always the method of

Upaniṣadic approach to the Reality.

14 PR, I. 7-8.

15 YK, p. 35

2

10

PROLEGOMENA

The Īśa Upaniṣad

Thus the Īśa, opening with the proposition of covering the whole existence by the Lord i. e. of seeing the Uncreated behind all created things, ends with a fervent prayer to Agni to lead forward towards the goal. Īśā vāsyam is no doubt the final goal but the initial movement towards it lies with Agni. Thus he who wants Īśā vāsyam must pray first of all, Agne naya.16 This is the unmistakeable teaching of all the Upaniṣads and not of the Īśa alone.

But where does Agni lead? It leads to its own home, its native abode which is 'the fulfilment of all desire, the foundation of the world, the infinity of creative will, the fearless other Shore, the Great One mantra-bodied (stomam), the Wide-extended, that in which all is established'.17 But to stop here will be fatal for the seeker because it will be delusive to mistake the attainment of some relatively lofty stage for the final Goal and to rest content with that. Hence though Agni leads forward, yet on reaching its final limit it covers the face of the Truth or the Reality in the form of the resplendent Sun. Therefore, the seeker has to pray to it again, not this time to lead him on but to leave the scene altogether, thereby allowing him to see the Reality in its utter nakedness or true nature.18 So the Sun is asked to retract its rays, withdraw its light because its lid, though golden, covers the Truth.19

The acceptance of Agni as the sole guide in the beginning and its abandonment in the final phase of the quest is the great secret and paradox of the whole Brahmavidyā. The failure to comprehend this secret has led to two forms of illusion. Some have clung to the Agni-vidyā which in the Īśa Upaniṣad is termed 'avidyā' because of its concern with the multiplicity, not realising that mere knowledge of the many however luminous, can never lead to that one 'Sun beyond the darkness'. Others have gone to the other extreme of not accepting its guidance at all, thinking that, since it is to be finally abandoned, it

16 ĪU, 18. 17 KTU, 1. 2. 11.

18 satyadharmāya dṛṣṭaye. ĪU, 15.

19 vyūha raśmīn samūha tejo. ĪU, 16.

PROLEGOMENA

11

is wiser to abandon it from the very beginning, or rather not to accept

it at all. It need hardly be mentioned that the latter go into a

deeper darkness than the former. Because the former though

falling short of the final vision, still obtain a relatively high sphere

of illumination while the latter indulge in mere speculation and

grope in darkness with a false pretension to the supreme knowledge,

presuming to have known the final truth. This is what has happened

with modern Vedāntists, who have totally ignored the Fire and have

made a haughty pretension to know the Reality directly without its

aid. But the secret of the Fire must be known if we would desire to

cross the dark and evil swamp. Without it, mere intellectual study,

whether dignified by the title Vedānta or by another such name, is

but the building of a mental tower of Babel, an aspiration to a Heaven

that no bricks of words or thought can ever reach, a thing whose use-

less ruins remain to view as one more ‘philosopher’s folly’. How

many are there not who spend their whole life in the study of

Vedānta and kindred philosophies and yet confess in the

end that nothing has happened. The world has remained the

same world, their senses have remained the same vicious and unruly

horses, the Light that was to have shone forth has remained hidden

and the Unitive Knowledge of which they have read and argued so

much has remained a metaphysical theory, something the experi-

ence of which must be postponed till after death. All this is through

the ignorance of the Fire’.

20

YK, pp, 128-129.

In our times there has set in a reaction to this neglect

of the Fire but this is also leading to a swing to the other

polar extreme. In the attempt to stress the importance of the

Fire, some modern exponents are almost placing it on the altar of the

Absolute and worshipping it as such, thereby exposing themselves

to the equally fatal danger of missing the supreme goal. The unerring

vision of the Upaniṣads steers clear of all such one-sided grasp of truth

and makes the right use of Agni in its own sphere yet with a full know-

ledge of its final limit. Agni, as we have pointed out, is the principle

of growth or transformation and this growth naturally has a limit. It

leads towards the supreme felicity (rāye)

21

, which has its end in the

20 YK, pp, 128-129.

21 IU, 18.

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PROLEGOMENA

state of Prajāpati, who is the source of all creation, but beyond is the

sphere of the Uncreated which can only be attained by the uncreated

principle in us, viz. the Ātman. Only the Ātman can realise the

Ātman or Brahman. The clear demarcation of the two spheres and

their mutual relation has been depicted all through the various Upani-

ṣads and it is only this outlook that has guided them everywhere

in solving all sorts of problems, metaphysical, epistemological,

ethical etc.

The Kena Upaniṣad

Like the Īśa Upaniṣad, the Kena, too, after indicating the true

nature of the Supreme Reality by such statements as 'That is other than

the known as well as beyond the unknown' and showing that neither

anyone of the senses nor the mind can comprehend it but rather, on the

contrary, they function only through it, goes on to make the paradoxi-

cal statement that it is known to the unknowing and is unknown to

the knowing!. In this way the Upaniṣad tries to impress upon the

seeker the incomprehensible and unfathomable nature of the Supreme

Reality. The Upaniṣad also knows full well that it is impossible to

attain to this dizzy height all at once and so immediately brings in

the myth of the gods' quest for the knowledge of the Brahman. Here

the failure of each of the gods, one after another, in their attempt to

comprehend the nature of the strange phenomenon or apparition

(yakṣam) standing before them, illustrates the inscrutable nature of it.

They all rushed towards it (abhyadravat) with proud pretensions but

had to return baffled and bewildered. Then finally to Indra, the lord

of gods, appeared the divine resplendent Mother Umā Haimavatī

who communicated to him the fact that the yakṣa was none else but

the Brahman. Thus through the medium of the Mother could gods

come to learn about the nature of the Brahman.22 Here the figure of

Umā or the Mother represents the Creative Principle, which we have

termed Agni and its importance as a medium for the supreme know-

ledge has been made all too clear to need further elucidation.

22 tato haiva vidāṅcakāra brahmeti. KU, 26,

PROLEGOMENA

13

The Kaṭhopaniṣad

In the Kaṭhopaniṣad Naciketas before enquiring about the

Ātman, seeks enlightenment about the true nature of the celestial

Fire (svargyam agnim) by his second boon and this explicitly makes

clear the order and sequence of the two knowledges. The effect of

this knowledge is also sung in glorious terms. 'He who has thrice

kindled the Naciketas Fire, has united with the Three and performed

the three Acts, crosses over beyond birth and death. Having known

and thoroughly realised that Shining Power, the Knower who is born

of the Brahman and (who is the one) Power deserving of worship,

one goes to the ever-lasting Peace'23. 'The wise man who having

kindled the triple Naciketas Fire and known this Triad, builds up

that Fire in meditation, he having already destroyed the bonds of death

and gone beyond sorrow enjoys the bliss of the Heavenly world'24.

But Naciketas, the true seeker, does not rest content with this

relatively high and glorious attainment. He next puts the supreme

question to Yama about the ultimate nature of the Self or Ātman and

Yama tries to dissuade him from making this final enquiry by offering

again and again the most alluring gifts for enjoyment. But Naciketas

spurns them all, seeking nothing else but the complete enlightenment or

the saving knowledge. This unerringly points out that only one with

the supremest detachment in him can press forward to the ultimate

goal, while others get involved in various relatively high states of

achievement. This is the true vairāgya, which views all else but

the Absolute as relative and perishable25 and therefore does not rest

content with anything less than the Supreme Reality. Even the

sublime attainment of the Universal Being, which is made possible

through the knowledge of the Fire, is cast aside as of relative value,

and Yama rightly praises Naciketas eloquently for his spirit of supreme

detachment.

But it must be remembered that this detachment or renunciation

or rather the casting off (atyasrākṣīḥ) of even the grand achievement

of the vastness of the Universal Being can come only after one has

23 KTU, I. I. 17.

24 Ibid, I. I. 18.

25 śvobhavā...sarvam jivitamalpameva. Ibid., I. I. 26.

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PROLEGOMENA

actually realised the state and seen it for himself. That is why the text

runs: ‘Thou hast with firmness cast aside after having seen it’26. The

‘atyasrākṣīḥ’ came after ‘drṣṭvā’, a point which should not be missed,

for otherwise the casting off or rejection has no meaning at all.

Rejection presupposes possession, but a false idea of vairāgya ignores

this fundamental fact and rushes for an empty rejection, which is

no rejection at all. The Upaniṣad everywhere prompts the seeker to

realise higher and higher states of being, and thereby first attain the

highest stature which again is to be finally surpassed by even

another forward movement. There is nothing unnatural or rash in the

Upaniṣadic conception of detachment. It is not through a violent

effort that a severance is effected here but it is achieved in as natural

a way as the youth outgrows the child. Hence it is nowhere the

teaching of the Upaniṣads that ‘it is not exertion, but inertion and a

perfect inertion, that is the path to liberation’ as Gough states27. On

the contrary, it is the path of extremest exertion, which leads to the

completest expansion that is indicated by the Upaniṣads. ‘Arise,

awake’ is always the soul-stirring call of the Upaniṣads which banishes

all ‘inertion’ whatsoever and infuses a spirit of enthusiasm which is

unequalled. The slightest ‘inertion’ or lack of alertness may bring

about a total ruin, a complete destruction, because the path is not a

rosy one but sharp as the edge of the sword, as the Upaniṣad warns,

adding that the seers call it a hazardous path28. The Reality is also

described as the Mighty Fear, the Upraised Thunderbolt29 to impress

upon the seeker the necessity of a supreme boldness and extreme

alertness in facing it. Thus ‘inertion’ is foreign to the very spirit of

the Upaniṣads, as will be shown from the actual statements in all

the Upaniṣadic texts.

The Praśna Upaniṣad

Again, in the Praśnopaniṣad, the first two praśnas or questions

are essentially about Prāṇa and only later in the subsequent four

26 KTU, I. 2. II.

28 KTU, I. 3. 14.

27 PU, p. 65.

29 Ibid. 2. 6. 2.

questions an enquiry is made about the nature of the Ātman. Prāṇa

is also expressly identified with Agni and its universal nature too is

asserted in a categorical statement we have already quoted30. The

Praśna Upaniṣad also incidentally throws interesting light on the

principle inherent in the creation of all beings. It says that when

Prajāpati desired to create he first took recourse to Tapas and there-

after generated a twin principle or mithuna. This twin principle is

comprised of what are termed here as Prāṇa and Rayi, the

Sun and the Moon and it is their commingling which leads to

the exuberance of creation. That this twin principle is at work

everywhere and in all phases of time is further shown and described

in detail. Thus the month is conceived as Prajāpati, of which the

dark fortnight is Rayi and the bright one Prāṇa. Similarly

of the day and the night the former is conceived as Prāṇa, the latter

as Rayi. This dark and the bright are the two movements which

signify the basic law of creation and pervade all through. Life and

death, waking and sleep, work and rest, youth and age, day and

night—everywhere we find this law in action. These two principles

take the form of Śiva and Śakti in the Tantras and there the symbol

of the Sun and the Moon has been worked out in greater detail with

which we need not concern ourselves here. We must only take note

of the fact that the Upaniṣads recognise a principle of unity-in-

difference at the basis of creation, of which Prāṇa happens to be one

chief component.

The importance of Prāṇa in sustaining the creation is

further stressed and elucidated in the second question through a

legend where it is shown that with the attempt on the part of Prāṇa

to depart, all other functions of different senses began to cease

automatically and only with its return their functions too were restored,

which proved beyond doubt the all-sustaining universal nature of

Prāṇa, that everything rested in Prāṇa31. Hence in order to have

a full knowledge of the workings of the universe, one must try first to

comprehend the true nature of Prāṇa, for the whole secret of creation

lies with it. So the Upaniṣad states: ‘All this and whatever is in the

30 PR, 1, 7. 31 prāṇe sarvam pratiṣṭhitam, Ibid, 2, 6.

16

PROLEGOMENA

heaven is under the control or dominion of Prāṇa32. As we found in

the Īśa that Agni was humbly approached for leading the seekers

towards felicity (rāye), so here too the second question closes with a

fervent prayer to Prāṇa to bestow on them prosperity and wisdom and

protect them like a mother protecting her sons33.

This remarkable similarity of thought proves beyond doubt that

the same strain runs throughout the whole texture of the Upaniṣadic

teaching. The aim is everywhere the attainment of the highest

stature, the achievement of the completest development through the

instrument or medium of Prāṇa and then to pass beyond to the

immeasurable and the unfathomable out of whose depth even this

glorious Prāṇa has its emergence. Thus there is nowhere a spirit of

escapism traceable in the Upaniṣads but instead there is a bold attempt

to grapple with all the pressing problems of life in order to find their

supreme solution. Existence is not shunned as a mere illusion or

phantasmagoria but its secret is sought to be unravelled and mastered

through a thorough knowledge of Prāṇa or Agni which is the one

active principle behind all existence.

The much misunderstood socalled māyāvāda or illusionism is contrary

to the very spirit of the Upaniṣads and also to the writings of its

original founder, the great Śaṅkarācārya, as we have tried to show in

our exposition of the goal. The common criticisms levelled against

Śaṅkara are absolutely beside the mark and betray a lamentable

ignorance on the part of the critics of his profound doctrine, which

tries to bring out the true spirit of the Upaniṣadic teaching in terms of

a strictly logical system. Gough, for example, has completely mis-

represented the Vedānta and the spirit of the Upaniṣadic teaching

through his all too superficial presentation of it. Speaking about the

Upaniṣadic period he says: ‘There were now virtually two religions,

the Karmamārga or path of rites for the people of the villages, living

as if life with its pleasures and pains were real and the Jñānamārga or

path of knowledge, for the sages that had quitted the world and

sought the quiet of the jungle, renouncing the false ends and empty

32 PR, 2. 13.

33 Ibid.

fictions of common life and intent upon reunion with the sole reality,

the Self that is one in all things living'.34 He also asserts that 'the

sum and substance, it may almost be said, of Indian philosophy, is

from first to last the misery of metempsychosis and the mode of

extrication from it,'35 and that 'in every state there is nothing to expect

but vanity, vexation and misery'.36 The absurdity of such statements

will be manifest from what we have already pointed out as the central

core of the Upaniṣadic teaching. Nowhere in the Upaniṣads is to be

found any spirit to 'quit the world' or 'seek the quiet of the jungle';

but on the contrary, all the great exponents of Brahmavidyā were

essentially men of the world and their supreme injunction too was

that 'one should wish to live a hundred years doing verily works in

this world'.37 Hence the Jñānamārga which they propounded was

not one which was set in opposition to the Karmamārga but it was

a path which transcended all oppositions and contradictions, giving

equal scope to all in their respective spheres, neither neglecting some

nor rejecting any. Neither is there any attempt in the Upaniṣads to

seek 'the mode of extrication from the misery of metempsychosis'

but rather they seek the mode of expansion from ānanda to ānanda,

through the development of Prāṇa, the Cosmic Energy, which makes

everything grow and expand.

But, again, they do not stop merely with this expansion; the

enquiry and the search is pursued further, as here, in the Praśnopa-

nisad, where immediately at the end of the second question, the third

question seeks enlightenment about the origin of this Prāṇa too. On

this question being put, the Ṛṣi is rightly struck by the genius of

the questioner and remarks: 'you are putting a question which is

beyond all questions' (atipraśnān pṛcchasi) and eulogises him as the

most proficient enquirer about Brahman (brahmiṣṭhosi) and as such

consents to tell him the secret of the origination of Prāṇa.38 'From

34 PU, p. 17.

35 Ibid., pp. 20-21.

36 Ibid., p. 23.

37 IU, 2.

38 PR, 3. 2.

3

18

PROLEGOMENA

the Ātman is the Prāṇa born’,39 and thus it is clear that Prāṇa is the

first emanation from the Ātman, out of which again emanates the

whole of existence. Hence in the return movement too, one has

first to resolve the existence in Prāṇa and thence resolve that too in

the Ātman.

To skip over this order is to run the risk of missing the

true goal. ‘One must not wish to leave out the steps between and

penetrate directly’. It is not easy to get back the true status of the

Ātman all at once and the sages of the Upaniṣads were very well

aware of this fact. Speculation about it from a distance only leads to

a deeper darknessss and will never generate the true illumination. With-

out the supreme refinement of the intellect, without the complete

growth of our personality in all its parts, this supreme majesty of the

Ātman or Brahman can never be apprehended or grasped. ‘If we

would transcend personality, we must first take the trouble to

to become persons.’40 After the completest development comes the

fulfilment and realisation and never before that. Nature is a cautious

and careful mother and will never allow us to get out of her

arms and walk our own way until she finds us completely mature and

developed. Unless we complete the cycle of development there is

no hope of getting out of it. To know the greatest thing that is the

Brahman, we too must grow great. This is the indisputable and

unequivocal teaching of the Upaniṣads. That is why the Praśna

Upaniṣad, while concluding its discourse, makes a reference to the

Puruṣa with sixteen parts or kālās, and says that ‘only after the

development of all kālās or parts of the being, one can hope to merge

in the Absolute, as the river merges in the ocean losing its name

and form and becomes partless and immortal.41 One must first grow

whole if he wants to reach the sole reality. The whole is in the

Prāṇa and beyond it is the Ātman, the sole reality. From the part

to the whole and thence to the sole reality is everywhere the eternal

order mapped out in the Upaniṣads.

39 PR, 3. 3.

40 EM, p. 325.

41 akalo amṛto bhavati. PR, 6. 5.

PROLEGOMENA

19

The Mundaka Upanisad

In the very opening of the Mundakopanisad, a clear distinction between two forms of knowledge is specifically made by the following statement: 'There are two vidyās to be learnt' thus say the knowers of the Brahman; one is Parā, the other Aparā' 42 In the category of Aparā is included all the Vedas as well as the Vedāngas and of the Parā it is simply stated that it is that through which the Immutable is attained or realised.43 This definition of Parā Vidyā makes it clear beyond doubt that it does not signify a method of mere intellectual apprehension but indicates the science of a direct realisation of the Supreme Reality. Another point to be noted here is that both the forms of knowledge viz. Parā as well as Aparā, are prescribed to be learnt and mastered (veditavye) and not the Parā alone. Without proficiency in the Aparā, which makes the intellectual development complete, it is impossible to gain an access to the realm of the Parā Vidyā, and this point is unfailingly stressed all through the Upanisads.

Next the Mundaka gives a picture of the Immutable which is to be apprehended through the Parā Vidyā. But, as we have pointed out, the Upanisad knows that it is impossible to grasp the Supreme all at once and so immediately the process of creation is described to make the Absolute seizable. The second part, as is usual with all the Upanisads, brings in the topic of the Fire.44 The kindling of the flame to the full (samiddhe havya vahane) and the offering or sacrifice of all unto it through faith (sraddhayā hutam) is enjoined and the Upanisad warns that he who fails in this duty of sacrifice loses all the seven spheres of existence,45 i.e. faces utter extinction. The seven tongues of the Fire are also described in detail and it is stated that he who makes the offerings at the right time with all these tongues of the flame ablaze is borne to the supreme sphere of the lord of the gods by the rays of the sun. The final limit of the expansion to which Agni

42 MU. I. I. 4,

43 yayā tadakṣaram adhigamyate. Ibid. I. I. 5.

44 MU, I. 2. 2.

45 ā saptamāṃstasyā lokān hinastī, Ibid. I. 2. 3.

20

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leads is also set forth very clearly here. It is the sacred Brahmaloka, the

highest of all spheres, to which the rays of the Sun carry the sacrificer.46

But immediately, in accordance with the true spirit of the Upaniṣads,

which have as their final goal only the Supreme Reality, the unstable

nature of even this grand achievement through the medium of Agni is

emphasised. These sacrifices or cults of fire are insecure boats47 and as

such cannot carry one beyond to the other shore. Hence those who

cling to the fire alone have to move round and round in the cycle of

birth and death because nothing but the supreme knowledge can get

one out of that cycle, and bring about the final deliverance. To gain

this supreme knowledge one must be filled with a spirit of total detach-

ment and self-abandonment and that is why the Upaniṣad says here that

those who reside in the forest with alms-begging as their vocation, the

utterly calm and enlightened souls, move through the door of the Sun

to the eternal sphere where is the Immortal Puruṣa, the Immutable

Ātman.

We have already spoken about the true ideal of detachment or

vairāgya and have tried to distinguish it from its other false and spuri-

ous forms. But here we must again sound a note of warning to those

who take this text here as an unmistakeable proof of the fact that the

Upaniṣads extol the ideal of sannyāsa or going to the forest and preach

the 'cult of beggars' as well as condemn loudly the way of karman.

The conflict and opposition between the ways of karman and jñāna or

sannyāsa is a creation of our ignorance. To the clear eye of the

Upaniṣadic sages no such conflict appears, for they definitely delimit

the spheres of the two, clearly mark out their respective boundaries.

They give full scope to karman, or to its presiding deity or source of

inspiration, Agni, in the sphere of creation but they equally know

that the Uncreated cannot be gained through anything created,48 and

hence they abandon it altogether when the time for approaching the

Uncreated comes. But this abandonment of karman is never taken

46 yajamānam vahanti MU. I. 2. 6.

47 plavā hyete adṛdhāḥ. Ibid., I. 2. 7.

48 nāstyakṛtah kṛtena, Ibid. I. 2. 12.

recourse to unless and until one has seen for himself the final limit of

development attainable through karman. Here lies the crux of the

whole Upaniṣadic wisdom, which is stated once more in the Muṇḍaka

most emphatically : ‘The Brāhmin should attain the spirit of renuncia-

tion only after having examined the spheres earned or achieved through

karman’.49

Thus this Upaniṣadic spirit of renunciation is not born out of any

spirit of disgust or annoyance nor is it prompted by the desire to get

away from the pressing cares of life to enjoy the bliss of solitude in the

forest. It is born of a unique vision before which all else, however

glorious, becomes dimmed into insignificance and hence is cast aside.

Though possessing the vastness of a Universal Being, though actually

enjoying the glories of the great Brahmaloka, one is seized yet with

a divine discontent, which does not allow him to rest there but goads

him on still. The promise of a still higher achievement dawns on

him and so he has to cast off all that he had earned or gained so far,

in order to move on. But one catches glimpse of the supreme height

of the vision only when he has reached the last summit of

Kārmic achievement. Hence as we found in the Kaṭhopaniṣad the

statement, drṣṭvā atyastrākṣib, so here too the same point is stressed

once more by the words parikṣya nirvedamāyāt, and thus the true

significance of sannyāsa is also brought out very clearly, which he

who cares may grasp easily if deliberate distortion is not his aim.

The Muṇḍaka also gives the direct lie to the charge of inaction or

‘inertion’ attributed to the Upaniṣadic teaching. It specifically states

that the best of the realised souls is he who has his play in the Ātman,

who has his love or attachment for the Ātman as well as he who is full

of action.50 It also enjoins that the Brahmavidyā is to be imparted only

to the active souls (kriyāvantah)51, which definitely shows that only the

virile souls could venture to take up the quest and were initiated in this

supreme vidyā and never the weaklings. ‘This Ātman can never be

realised by one who is devoid of strength’,52 is the most emphatic

49 MU, I. 2. 12.

50 Kriyāvān eṣa brahmavidām variṣṭhah. Ibid., 3. 1. 4.

51 Ibid, 3. 2. 10.

52 Ibid. 3. 2. 4.

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statement of the Upaniṣad here. Had ‘inertion, a perfect inertion’ been the path to liberation according to the Upaniṣad, as Gough takes it, then such statements would never have found any place in the Upaniṣadic texts. Only exertion demands strength and the Upaniṣadic demand for strength in the seeker is a demand for the utmost exertion which will be required to reach the final limit of the quest. We have shown in the section called ‘The Preparation’ how the whole period of Brahmacarya was essentially devoted to gather the required strength before the actual quest was undertaken.

The Muṇḍaka, like the Praśna, finally refers to the kalās or parts of being and their final mergence in the unity of the Immutable.53 But before speaking about this utter unity, where all name and form are lost as rivers in the ocean, the Upaniṣad speaks of the realisation of the All-pervading in all ways and also of the entering into the All.54 This proves once more our thesis that the Upaniṣadic approach to the Reality is always through the universal to the transcendent and never otherwise.

The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad

This is brought out clearly once again in the Māṇḍukyopaniṣad, which though the shortest treatise in the whole Upaniṣadic literature, contains the profoundest wisdom. It deals with the four states of the Self as well as the four measures of Oṅkāra and traces their correspondence. In a section exclusively devoted to Oṅkāra we have tried to probe into its mystery. Here we must only take note of the fact that though the Turīya or the Fourth is the supreme and final goal, yet it can be apprehended only after passing through the third. Of this third status the Upaniṣad says : ‘This is the Lord of all, this the Knower of all, this the Indweller, this the Source or Womb; out of which spring all created things and to which they return’.55 This sounds strikingly similar to the passage of the Muṇḍaka, we have just quoted above, which speaks of the realisation of the All-pervading

53 pare avyaye sarva ekībhāvanti. MU, 3, 2, 7.

54 Sarvagam sarvataḥ prāpya sarvamevāviśanti, Ibid., 3. 2. 5.

55 Mā, 6.

in all its facets or aspects. Hence one must trace back the whole

manifestation first to its source or cause, and only thereafter move to

the sphere, beyond all causality. Neither should one stop merely at

the source, and rest content with the discovery of the cause of all mani-

festation alone but must pass beyond. That is why even this over-

lordship, even this omniscience does not satisfy the Upaniṣadic sage,

for he feels that it is still a stage of sleep or utter inconscience

when compared with the true status, the transcendental majesty of the

Self. Nothing short of this final awakening which breaks even this

blissful cosmic sleep will satisfy him. But we must remind ourselves

once again that, according to the Upaniṣads, as it is imperative

to leave behind this state of the glorious majesty of the Universal in

order to reach the ultimate goal of the Transcendent, so it is

equally imperative to achieve the former state first, to actually

possess the overlordship before aspiring to reach the ultimate

end.

This truth is revealed again by the analysis of the three

measures of Oṅkāra, a, u and m. The first mora ‘a’ stands for āpti

or attainment. The attainment of higher and higher states of being and

fulfilment thereof is the basic note of OM, and hence the Upaniṣad

says that one attains all that he desires and also becomes the foremost

if he gains a knowledge of only this first mora.⁵⁶ Then the second,

‘u’, signifies the rising to the zenith of glory or supreme excellence

(utkarsāt) and as the Upaniṣad says, to the knower of this second

mora the stream of knowledge goes on moving higher and higher.⁵⁷

Lastly, in ‘m’ this movement towards higher and higher development

attains its culmination or end (apiti). But these three form only

one arc of the great circle of OM, the arc that is visible in manifesta-

tion. But in order to complete the circle a further movement is

necessary towards the other arc, the invisible arc which is beyond all

manifestations, the apparently dark arc of the Transcendent, which

is called the Immeasurable, the Fourth, the Unusable, the End of all

existence, the Good, the Non-Dual.⁵⁸ Thus only with the joining

of the two arcs is the circle completed and the movement which was

⁵⁶ Mā. 9.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 12.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 10,

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PROLEGOMENA

initiated with 'a' then finds its fulfilment again in 'a', the whole cycle having been completed. Hence 'a' is the 'ādi' or the starting point of the movement and again 'a' is the 'āpti' or the attainment or fulfilment of the movement.

Of this unique synthesis of the Upanisads, the Oṅkāra stands as the supreme symbol. It eternally signifies the great fact that in the Upaniṣadic wisdom or view of the Reality nothing was left out or rejected but everything was given its due place or scope and thereby an unique synthesis was evolved which is the fruit of a comprehensive and inherent unity. Of this final state of absolute harmony the Upaniṣad says: 'The Self alone enters into the Self through the Self'.⁵⁹ The mātrās or measures of OM lead step by step to this supreme end and this is everywhere the invariable method of the Upaniṣads.

The Taittirīya Upaniṣad

The Taittirīya Upaniṣad, through the very sub-division of its book, broadly indicates the relation of the Universal and the Transcendent, the need of the highest development and the subsequent surpassing of it. It therefore opens with the Śikṣāvallī, literally the section for training, which is exclusively devoted to the one supreme task of impressing upon the seeker the necessity of an all-round development, beginning from the physical right upto the intellectual. No other Upaniṣad can match the Taittirīya in this respect, viz. in its attempt to bring home the extreme importance of this development to the seeker through the use of the strongest imperatives as well as the most fervent prayers.

In the very opening it signifies that its first aim is the attainment of yaśah and brahmavarcasam,⁶⁰ glory and divine power. Then Indra, the master of rhythms⁶¹ is invoked to sprinkle or shower medhā or the power of apprehension and retention of the supreme wisdom. The seeker prays that he may be made fit for holding the immortal essence⁶²

59 Mā, 12.

60 Saha nau yaśah saha nau brahmavarcasam. TU. 1. 3. 1.

61 Chandasāṁ ṛṣabho, Ibid.

62 Amṛtāsya devadhāraṇo bhūyāsam, Ibid.

and hence he also prays that his body be made invulnerable or immaculate.63

He also prays: 'May my tongue be made the sweetest, my

ears fit for profuse hearing (of instructions)'.64

The next thing prayed for is śrī or prosperity all around.65

These two things must be combined, viz. śrī and medhā or prajñā, for an affluence without

the sobering effect of intelligence is likely to lead to degeneration and

an intelligence or wisdom shorn of plenitude or prosperity remains

barren and fruitless. So the ideal that the Upaniṣads uphold is not

of a beggar but of a king, full of all majesty and prosperity,

for śrī and medhā is strikingly akin to an almost identical prayer

found in the Praśnopaniṣad, where Prāṇa is propitiated and asked to

bestow śrī and prajñā.66 What was addressed to Prāṇa there is being repeated here to Indra who stands as the highest embodiment of

the Creative Energy or Prāṇa.

Even the physical necessities are not neglected. Śrī is conceived

as carrying to the seeker clothings as well as food and drink for all times.67

The Upaniṣads knew full well that want in the material

plane hampers the soul in its spiritual flight and so they first sought

all-round security in the material level before commencing the higher

quest. They sought all these provisions not for their own enjoyment

but for others only who may gather round them for getting the know-ledge or seeking enlightenment. That is why they immediately

send a call around, praying that Brahmacārins or seekers after know-ledge may flock to them from all quarters like the flowing waters

which rush downwards all round.68 Thus it is only for the dissemination of knowledge that the prosperity is sought and not for personal

enjoyment. The seeker plunges himself in prosperity which swells

in its thousand streams (sahastraśākhe), and prays: 'I enter into thee,

O Prosperity, do thou also enter into me'.69 The invocation of prosperity leads finally to the state of complete self-autonomy or

63 śarīraṁ me vicarṣaṇam. TU, 1.3.3.

64 Ibid.

65 tato me śriyam āvaha. Ibid, 1. 4. 2.

66 Śrīś ca prajñāñ ca vidhehi naḥ. PR. 2. 13.

67 annapāne ca sarvadā. TU. 1. 4. 2.

68 Ibid. 1. 4. 3.

69 Ibid.

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PROLEGOMENA

the attainment of the kingdom of the Self (svārājyam).70 In other

words, one then becomes the full man, the master of himself with the

complete flowering of his personality and the fulfilment of all his

desires.

It may be noted here that it passes our comprehension how in spite

of such specific statements strewn all over the Upaniṣads, statements

which fervently call upon the seeker to develop and grow through the

fulfilment of all his wants and desires, scholars like Keith could say

that 'the aim of the self turns out to be the annihilation of every

human desire and activity, an ideal which renders all active philan-

thropy idle and which has caused the chief virtues of India to

take the form of resignation, passive compassion and charity'.71

But we must again remind ourselves that the Upaniṣad does not

merely stop with the attainment of lordship or svārājyam. It still

moves on till it attains the Supreme. Hence after 'āpnoti svārājyam'

comes in the next section 'āpnoti param'.72 Even in the attainment of

this 'param' or Supreme, the Upaniṣad shows that the way is through

a gradual evolution of the personality beginning from the annamaya

and ending with the ānandamaya. Only then one reaches the ultimate

support, the tail end of the whole cosmos, the Brahman.73 The im-

plications of this method we have tried to make clear in a separate

section, called the 'Analytic Way' and we need not dwell on it any

further here.

The Aitareya Upaniṣad

The Aitareya Upaniṣad is exclusively devoted to the exposition of

the process of creation, which proves once again that creation was not

dismissed as a mere nothing or shunned as an inexplicable evil but its

mysterious nature was sought to be explored in order to find out the

truth that sustains it. Explaining the process of creation as far as

possible the Aitareya finally concludes that the whole creation,

beginning from Brahmā down to the solid earth, with all its infinite

70 āpnoti svārājyam, TU, 1. 6. 2.

72 TU, 2. 1.

71 PVU, p. 598.

73 brahma puccham pratiṣṭhā. Ibid, 2. 5.

PROLEGOMENA

27

varieties, is finally established or rooted in the Supreme Consciousness

or Prajñāna and this Prajñāna is verily the Brahman74.

The Chāndogya Upaniṣad

Next the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, the vast repository of all the vidyās

or various methods and techniques of knowledge, opens with the

worship of the Udgītha which literally means contemplation

through the uplifting music. Thus the call for upliftment or growth

is the very basic note of the Chāndogya. It says that one who worships

the Udgītha gets the fulfilment of all his desires as well as expands

or enriches the streams of desire.75 It also enjoins upon the seeker to

worship with knowledge and faith, which will infuse more vigour in

the act of contemplation and thereby make it really potent.76 Is this

all a call for inertion or inaction? In an analysis of the true nature

of contemplation, we have tried to show how all the elements of one's

personality are involved in it according to the Upaniṣadic view of it,

and so we need not go into the details of it here.

As the Chānālogya begins its series of vidyās with the Udgītha-

vidyā so it ends the series with the Daharavidyā. Its first call is for

an expansion towards the heights through the uplifting instrument of

rhythm and harmony and its final call is for a plunge into the depths

of the heart, into the very core of being to find out the supremely

subtle thing inherent therein. Hence after describing numerous

ways of contemplation or the innumerable vidyās, which lead to

expansion and illumination, the Chāndogya finally concludes with

the Indra-Virocana Samvāda,77 where the quest of the Ātman is des-

cribed as the sole aim. But here again, the true nature of the Self

is not revealed all at once but only by a gradual elimination of the

false notions of the lower selves, through a progressive growth

in consciousness. It also shows how an ignorant and unrefined

soul like Virocana sticks to a false or partial notion, taking it to be

the final truth and thus remains in eternal delusion. Indra, on the

74 prajñānam Brahma. AU. 3. 3.

75 apayita......sambardhaitā ha vai kāmanām CU. 1. 1. 7-8.

76 viryavattaram bhavati. Ibid. 1. 1. 10.

77 CU. 8. 7. ff.

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contrary, moved higher without remaining satisfied with a relative

truth because he went through long periods of more and more rigo-

rous tapas, which purified his vision and enabled him to perceive the

inadequacy of the knowledge which had been imparted to him pre-

viously. The clarification of vision comes only through tapas, other-

wise anyone with an average intelligence could have had the knowledge

of the Ātman. This stress on tapas proves once more that the nature

of the Upaniṣadic knowledge was not at all merely intellectual. Had

it been so, Prajāpati would not have deferred the imparting of the

instruction every time for such long periods of thirty-two years. An

adequate growth, an appropriate intellectual development in the seeker

was needed before true enlightenment could be generated in him.

Hence throughout the whole Upaniṣadic literature one finds the insis-

tent demand for tapas before the actual instruction is imparted.

Thus the Chāndogya lends complete support to our contention

that the knowledge of the Ātman cannot be had or rather the very

enquiry about it cannot commence unless one has explored the

Prāṇavidyā or Agnividyā to the full in all its numerous phases.

Through vidyā or upāsanā to jñāna was always the eternal order

indicated by the Upaniṣads. The breaking of this order has led to

the tendency to discredit upāsanā or vidyā as of relative and insigni-

ficant value and to the total misconception of the jñāna, which always

dawns only after the completion and perfection of the being through

the vidyās. In order to have grasp of the real bearing of the Upani-

ṣadic teaching, the true order of and relation between vidyā or

upāsanā and jñāna must always be kept in view and this is what we

have been tracing out through all the different Upaniṣads.

The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad

Finally, the great Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, great in bulk as well

as in profundity of thought, also unerringly points out the mutual

inter-relation of Prāṇavidyā and Ātmavidyā, though its main aim is

to give a correct exposition of the nature of the Ātman alone. It

opens with the topic of the Aśvamedha⁷⁸ or the highest sacrifice which

8 BU. I, I.

here symbolizes the sacrifice of the animal in us and a consequent achievement of purification of being. Thus yajña purifies one's being and it is, therefore, the first step in the approach to Reality which we have termed 'Preparation'. After the attainment of the culmination or the highest point of yajña there begins yoga or upāsanā. That is why the Brhadāraṇyaka after finishing the topic of Aśvamedha or the highest sacrifice, brings in the Udgītha upāsanā once again, which is depicted as the supreme science of Mukhya Prāṇa or the central Cosmic Energy. The final culmination of this upāsanā is in 'abhyā-roha'79 or higher and higher ascent, a progressive growth from the unreal to the real, from darkness to light and from death to immortality. The attainment of the highest development of being is the fruit of this Prāṇavidyā and its whole aim is voiced through that famous verse : 'Asato mā sad gamaya, tamaso mā jyotir gamaya, mrtyor mā amrtam gamaya'.80

But as usual even the attainment of this immortality does not satisfy the sages of the Upaniṣads, because it is a relative immortality, the immortality of Prāṇa or the universal principle. At every stage in the approach to Reality there is a taste of immortality, which follows as a consequence of the removal of certain limitations. This limitation is termed 'death' in different contexts. Thus at the end of the description of the Aśvamedha here it is said that one who performs this sacrifice conquers death; death never gets hold of him, rather it becomes his very self.81 Similarly we found in the Katha, statements about the attainment of Agnividyā, which also refer to the conquest of death, such as 'crosses over beyond birth and death,'82 'having already destroyed the bonds of death,'83 etc. Here also the effect of the Udgītha is described in similar terms with regard to all the senses, which were freed from death through the Mukhya Prāṇa. The refrain is : 'mrtyum atikrānto,'84 having crossed beyond death. Thus the term 'mrtyu' signifies different things at different levels and as such

79 BU. I. 3. 28.

80 Ibid.

81 apa punar mrtyum jayati nai 'nam mrtyur āpnoti mrtyur asyā 'tmā. BU, I. 2. 7.

82 tarati jannamrtyū. KTU, I. I. 17

83 mrtyupāśān puratah praṇodya. Ibid. I. I. 18. 84 BU, I. 3. 12-16.

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immortality, too, has its variations accordingly, and one must always

take note of this fact before assessing the value of any achievement

whatsoever.

The Bṛhadāraṇyaka here throws some light on the term ‘mrtyu’.

It says: ‘Hunger is Death’85 and this hunger is nothing but a synonym

of desire. It also says at the end of the Udgītha upāsanā, ‘pāpmānam

mrtyum apahatya’ i.e. having killed or conquered death which is sin.

This sin or pāpman has been clearly depicted in the Udgītha as the

sin of attachment, which makes the senses cling to what is attractive

to them i.e. pleasant and avoid what is unattractive or unpleasant. This

like and dislike born of attachment or desire is the sin and also the

death, which is conquered here through the instrument of Mukhya

Prāṇa, which is free from all such attachments for particular aspects,

being universal in its nature. Thus the immortality attained here is

the immortality of the Universal achieved through a release from the

sphere of the particular. As the Chāndogya spoke of the fulfilment

of all desires through the Udgītha, so here, too, it is said that a

singer of the Udgītha (udgātā) can bring for himself or for the yaja-

māna or the man for whom he sings, anything that is desired, as

it were, through a mere song (āgāyati).86 Hence one gains the fulfil-

ment of all desires on being freed from the clutches of death here,

and on attaining the immortality of the universal. This is the

‘kāmasya’ptim’87 referred to by Yama in the Kaṭha.

But even beyond this is the true and absolute freedom, the utter

freedom of the Transcendent. There the fetters of finitude are cast

off totally because one passes altogether beyond the category of the

finite to the supreme category of the Infinite. This supreme category

is that of the Ātman and hence the Bṛhadāraṇyaka immediately after

recounting the nature of the immortality of the universal brings in

the topic of the Ātman.88 The beauty of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and its

greatness lies in this that it does not leave any of the steps undescribed

but proceeds step by step in the proper sequence, leading the seeker

85 aśanāyā hi mrtyuh. BU, I,2.I.

86 Ibid. I. 3. 28.

87 KTU, I, 2. II.

88 BU, I. 4. ff

through a gradual refinement towards the final enlightenment. This

is everywhere the method adopted by the Upaniṣads and nowhere is

it more clearly presented than in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka. Those who take

the Bṛhadāraṇyaka as a mere treatise on the nature of the Ātman and

fail to take note of the other antecedent topics dealt with here, miss

the entire teaching and its deeper implications.

Thus our long analysis of all the ten principal Upaniṣads has

revealed the remarkable unity of thought running through them all

depicting the unique synthesis of the Universal and the Transcendent

through the two broad concepts of Prāṇa or Agni and Ātman. The

later Upaniṣads we need not explore here any further.

III

Upanisad & Brahmavidyā

The term ‘Upaniṣad’.

We have indicated that the basic meaning of the term ‘Upaniṣad’

is ‘rahasyaṃ’ or the supreme secret. As Deussen also concludes after

giving the numerous possible meanings of the term : ‘If the passages

collected in my index to the Upanishads under the word Upanishad

are examined, it will be at once evident that, taken together, they

involve the meaning, “secret sign, secret name, secret import, secret

word, secret formula, secret instruction,” and that therefore to all

the meanings the note of secrecy is attached. Hence we may conclude

that the explanation offered by the Indians of the word Upaniṣad

as rahasyaṃ, “secret,” is correct.’ In fact, this is the sole mean-

ing of the term indicated by the Upaniṣads themselves and it carries

this import all through the Upaniṣadic literature. Now the secrecy

of the doctrine embodied in the Upaniṣads consists in this that it

teaches something which is not taught or learnt anywhere else. Hence

it is distinguished from other secular sciences or branches of knowledge

in that it deals with something which does not come within the scope

of any other branch of knowledge. This something is the biggest

thing, the fundamental basis of all things, viz. Brahman.

89 PU, p. 15.

32

PROLEGOMENA

Brahmavidyā

The Upaniṣads thus contain or embody the science of the Ultimate Truth and that is why the doctrine of the Upaniṣads has come to be known as Brahmavidyā. In fact, the two terms ‘Upaniṣad’ and ‘Brahmavidyā’ have come to signify the same thing and are used as synonyms as Saṅkara explicitly says: ‘This Brahmavidyā connoted by the term Upaniṣad.’90 In fact, the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad itself in its very opening verse mentions this term, ‘Brahmavidyā’ and calls it as the basis of all vidyās or sciences.91 Thus there is no doubt about the fact that the literature passing by the name ‘Upaniṣad’ is concerned with nothing else but Brahman. Not only does it concern itself merely with the exposition of the true nature of Brahman but being a vidyā or spiritual science it also shows the way to its realization and also recounts the effects that follow from such realization i.e. the nature of the consummation attained.

Guru or the Teacher

Now, Brahmavidyā has a long tradition behind it. As traced by the Muṇdakopanisad, its first originator is Brahmā himself, the Prajā-pati or the Creator of the world, the sustainer of the universe, the first of the gods.92 It is thus as old as creation itself and hence its eternal nature. From Brahmā it was transmitted to his eldest son Atharvan, who in his turn gave it to Angirā and Angirā gave it to Bharadvāja Satyavaha and finally Bharadvāja narrated it to Angiras. To this Angiras came Śaunaka for enlightenment about Brahmavidyā.93 Brahmavidyā, being essentially a spiritual science, needed a transmission from the teacher, who had mastered it fully and it was not a thing which all could handle as they wished or master without the aid of a guide. Here lies the supreme importance of the approach to the Guru in the proper way, the ‘gurūpasadana’ with which Brahma-vidyā begins, for unless the teacher condescends to reveal the secret wisdom there is no other way of gaining it. That is why the Upaniṣad

90 se yām brahmavidyām upaniṣacchabdāvacyām. SB, Intr. to BU, p. 2.

91 sarvavidyāpratiṣṭhām. MU, 1. 1. 1.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

enjoins that one must approach the Guru or the Teacher for this knowledge.94

Another reason, as to why the knowledge could not be had without the aid of a Guru, was this that most of the varieties of Brahma-

vidyā were exclusive experiences of particular sages and as such absolutely under their custodianship. To learn that particular technique of

Brahmavidyā was impossible without the guidance of that particular teacher proficient in it. Hence one had to come in touch with the

particular line of tradition through which a particular vidyā was handed down. As the Mundaka traces a particular line, so the Chāndogya

mentions another in connexion with the Madhu-vidyā. This Madhu-vidyā was first revealed by Brahmā to Prajāpati and Prajāpati narrated it to

Manu, who in his turn gave it to the created beings and in the particular context, Uddālaka Āruṇi got it from his father.95 Similarly in connex-

ion with the Udgītha-vidyā it is mentioned that three persons became proficient, rather specialists in Udgītha, viz. Śilaka Śālāvatya, Caikitāyana

Dālvya and Pravāhaṇa Jaivali.96 In the case of the ethical virtues, too, we find one particular sage devoting himself exclusively to the cultivation of

one moral virtue, as Rāthitara, who was truthful in speech, took to truth as the one supreme virtue, a second, Pauruśiṣṭi, eternally engaged in

tapas, declared tapas to be the one primary thing, and a third Nāka Maudgalya holds that study and exposition, svādhyāyāpravacana, alone

constitute the whole ethical life.97 So in the matter of vidyās, different sages were experts in different lines and they exclusively possessed the

secret of their respective lines of approach. The Śāṇḍilya-vidyā, for instance, was a vidyā or technique exclusively evolved and perfected by

the sage Śāṇḍilya. Similar is the case with Upakosala-vidyā and others of a similar type. Hence we find frequently the picture in the

Upaniṣads of one sage going to another, or a group of them visiting another for further enlightenment about a particular method, or

vidyā.

94 tadvijnānārtham sa gurum evā 'bhigacchet. MU, 1. 2. 12,

95 CU, 3. 11. 4, 96 CU, 1. 8. 1. 97 TU, 1, 9.

34

PROLEGOMENA

The family tradition of Brahmavidyā.

The tradition of Brahmavidyā was also generally maintained

through the family line, i.e. as a general rule it was transmitted from

the father to the son. The Chāndogya specifically enjoins that the

father should communicate it only to the eldest son or to the most

devoted student residing with him.98 That this was the general custom

is also evident from numerous instances in the Upaniṣads. Thus in

the passage in the Mundaka already referred to, it is mentioned that

Brahmā gave the Brahmavidyā to his eldest son Atharva.99 So

Uddālaka Āruṇi got it from his father. Similarly, in the Taittirīya,

it is said that Bhrgu approached his father Varuṇa for being instructed

about Brahman.100 It is also mentioned in connexion with the

Udgītha-vidyā in the Chāndogya that the sage Kauṣītaki asked his son

to expand and develop the knowledge gained by the father.101 So

Śvetaketu also had his enlightenment from his father Gautama.102 It

is also recounted how the gods, the demons and men, all the

offsprings of Prajāpati, approached their father for enlightenment after

observing the period of brahmacarya with him.103 That it was every-

where expected as a general rule that the son should inherit the wisdom

from his father is also proved by the story of Śvetaketu, where the

father rather chides his son for going off the right track and reminds

him of the glory of his family, in which none is ever expected to

remain ignorant in the Vedas and thereby to turn out into a false

degenerate Brāhmaṇa. Hence he asks the son to observe brahmacarya

for gaining the supreme knowledge.104 In the recounting of the effects

of various vidyās too we find frequently mentioned that in the family

of one who gains this knowledge none is born who is not a knower of

Brahman and thus it is clear that it was earnestly desired and prayed

for that the knowledge should be preserved in unbroken continuity

through the line of the family.

98 jyeṣṭhāya putrāya pitā brahma prabruyāt prāṇāyyāya vā 'ntevāsine.

CU, 3. 11. 5.

99 atharvāya jyeṣṭhaputrāya prāha, MU, 1. 1. 1.

100 bhṛgur vai vāruṇir varuṇam pitaram upasasāra. TU 3. 1.

101 CU, 1. 5. 2.

102 Ibid, 6, 1. 1.

103 BU, 5. 2. 1.

104 CU, 6. 1. 1.

PROLEGOMENA

35

Features of the tradition.

Another interesting feature emerges from this importance of the

family tradition in Brahmavidyā as we have discussed it. It is clear

beyond doubt that the men who possessed and transmitted the

Brahmavidyā were men of the world, grhastbas and not world-renouncing

ascetics (sannyāsins). The term ‘mahāśāla’, too, is frequently used

as a qualifying adjective of the men who were engaged in Brahmavidyā,

which unmistakably proves that only those men who had achieved

eminence in the worldly life were thought fit to have the knowledge.

Only the full-statured, the completely developed men were entitled to

enter the arena of Brahmavidyā and this proves once again our thesis

that only after the highest development or growth could this trans-

cendental knowledge be grasped and retained and never otherwise.

Thus we hear that Śaunaka was a ‘mahāśāla’, a great householder,

who approached Āṅgirasa for getting the knowledge.105 Similarly it is

described that Pracināśāla, Satyayajña, Indradyumna, Jana and Buḍila,

all ‘mahāśāla’ and ‘mahāśrotriya’, great householders and great scholars

in Veda, gathered together to discuss about the nature of Ātman and

Brahman.106

That only men of the first rank, eminent and distinguished

in the world and full of prosperity as such, were the possessors of this

knowledge is also proved by the fact that many of the teachers in

Brahmavidyā are found to be kings, like Ajātaśatru, Aśvapati, Pravā-

hana Jāivalī etc. Even among the seekers of Brahmavidyā the name

of king Janaka shines in its own majesty. It is also clear from the

instance of Janaka how the kings used to encourage the study of

Brahmavidyā by offering great wealth and provision to a truly

enlightened man.

Thus Brahmavidyā was not confined to a class of ascetics alone

but had a wide range of adherents in which were included the people

and the kings alike, men as well as women, Brāhmins as well as

Kṣatriyas. Women were also not debarred from having any access to

Brahmavidyā, as is evident from the picture of Yājñavalkya instructing

his wife Maitreyī, as well as another woman of eminence, Gārgī.

105 MU, I. I. 3.

106 CU, 5. II. I,

36

PROLEGOMENA

We must here note in passing that we cannot agree with Deussen

when, from the fact that in some cases kings happened to be the

instructors in Brahmanvidyā, he draws the inference that 'the concep-

tions of the Upaniṣads, though they may have originated with the

Brāhmans, were fostered primarily among the Kṣatriyas and not

within Brāhman circles, engrossed as those were with the ritual',107

or again that 'the doctrine of the Ātman, standing as it did in such

sharp contrast to all the principles of the Vedic ritual, though the

original conception may have been due to Brāhmans, was taken up

and cultivated primarily not in Brāhman but in Kṣatriya circles, and

was first adopted by the former in later times'.108 He even goes so far

as to state that 'this teaching with regard to the Ātman was studiously

withheld from them, that it was transmitted in a narrow circle among

the Kṣatriyas to the exclusion of the Brāhmans'.109 All these wrong

inferences are drawn because of the confirmed prejudice and biased

view about the antagonism between the so-called Vedic ritual and the

Upaniṣadic Brahmanvidyā. We have already pointed out how Agni

and Ātman form the warp and woof of the whole texture of the

Upaniṣadic Brahmanvidyā, and this Agni is the central principle round

which grows up the elaborate Vedic ritual. The Upaniṣadic doctrine

never sets itself against the cult of the fire in a spirit of hostility and

opposition. On the contrary, it gives full and adequate scope to

Agni and only completes the movement initiated by it by moving

still further in the region of the Ātman. Yajña is no doubt described

as a leaky boat,110 but that is because it is not strong enough to lead

one to the sphere of the Ātman which is beyond its reach. The

doctrine of the Ātman or Ātmavidyā does not signify the rejection of

the doctrine of Agni or the Vedic ritual but only signifies the fulfil-

ment and transcendence of the latter by the former. Ātmavidyā

can never dispense with Agnividyā, for without the purification

through Agni or Yajña the enquiry about the Ātman can never come,

and hence it is impossible for the Ātmāvidyā to decry the latter but it

107 PU, p. 17. 108 Ibid, p. 19. 109 Ibid.

110 plavā hyete adṛḍhā yajnarūpāh. MU, I. 2. 7.

PROLEGOMENA

37

only points out the limitation of the Agni, having itself moved further on.

That Deussen's assertion about the fostering of Brahmavidyā among the Kṣattriyas alone and not within Brāhmin circles is absolutely unfounded is proved by a specific statement in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka which he too quotes incidentally while totally ignoring its real import. When Gāṅgya Bālāki after expounding the nature of Brahman to King Ajātaśatru remained silent, having exhausted the whole range of his experience, the latter made the historic statement that Brahman is not truly apprehended by this much knowledge. At this Gāṅgya prayed like a disciple to the King to enlighten him further, to which the King replied : 'that is a reversal of the rule, for a Brāhmaṇa to betake himself as a pupil to a Kṣattriya in order to have the Brahman expounded to him'.111 This proves beyond doubt that the general rule was that Brāhmaṇas used to impart Brahmavidyā to others and this was an exception to the general rule, so the King felt awkward, he being a Kṣatriya. at the request of Gāṅgya, a Brāhmaṇa, to teach him. Had Brahmavidyā been limited 'in a narrow circle among the Kṣattriyas to the exclusion of the Brāhmans', who were supposed to be 'engrossed with the ritual', how could such a statement be made that as a general rule the Brāhmaṇas transmitted it? Such narrowing down of the circle was absolutely unknown in the Upaniṣadic times.

On the contrary, the Brahmavidyā was freely exchanged among all the higher classes and sexes, without any restriction whatsoever. For the sake of gaining this supreme knowledge, even a haughty Brāhmaṇa never hesitated to bow down before a Kṣattriya as an humble seeker, as illustrated by the proud Gāṅgya Bālāki (dṛptabālāki), though that was contrary to the general law or custom. None was debarred from having this knowledge because it was verily universal in nature and in the Vārttikasāra it has rightly been said: 'All men are certainly entitled to have this knowledge'.112 What was true, however, as we have pointed out, is the fact that certain vidyās or methods of approach belonged to certain families or classes alone, were, in fact,

111 BU, 2. 1. 15.

112 manuṣyamātro vidyāyām adhikārī bhaved dhruvam. VS, 1. 884.

38

PROLEOMENA

their exclusive monopolies; hence we find the picture in the Upaniṣads

frequently of one particular man being approached for a particular

knowledge. As for instance, when Uddālaka Āruṇi was ap-

proached by the five Ṛṣis, viz. Prācīnaśāla, Satyayajña, Indra-

dyumna, Jana and Budila for enlightenment about the Vaiśvānara

vidyā or Agnividyā, he realized his incompetence to teach them about

it and hence directed them to King Aśvapati Kaikaya, who was

considered proficient in that particular vidyā.113 Similarly, Gautama

being asked by his son Śvetaketu to teach him about the

Pañcāgni-vidyā, failed to say anything and promptly admitted his

ignorance about it. 'Had I known it why should not have I told it

to you?', he said to his son. Then both the father and the son

went to King Pravāhaṇa Jaivali, who had originally put the question

about the five fires to Śvetaketu, and sought enlightenment from

him. Upon this the King told him that this particular vidyā had

never gone to any Brāhmaṇa before him i.e. he was the first

Brāhmaṇa who was going to have this knowledge, and because of it,

i.e. of the possession of this particular vidyā, the Kṣattriyas had

ruled all over the world114. We have already pointed out that the

'Agnividyā leads to unending prosperity and fulfilment of all desires,

to a state of overlordship, and as such it is no wonder that the

Kṣattriyas or the ruling classes possessed this knowledge to the exclusion

of other classes and thereby maintained their superior position

and glory of eminence. Thus it is plain that one particular class

sometimes used to have the exclusive monopoly of a certain form of

vidyā but there was no bar to a free exchange of the vidyā between

the different classes. Only one had to betake himself to the man,

particularly expert in that vidyā and approach him in the proper way,

and, if the teacher thought him fit for holding the knowledge, he

ungrudgingly gave it to him without any scruple or hesitation.

Adhikāra or Eligibility for Brahmavidyā

This fitness for holding the knowledge is known as adhikāra.

Of the true adhikārin of Brahmavidyā it is said that he must be of a

113 CU, 5. 11.

114 Ibid, 5. 3,

calm disposition and possess self-control115. To attain this calm disposition one had to go through a rigorous discipline of celibacy, brahmacarya before the actual vidyā was imparted to him. The details of this discipline and its implications we have discussed in the section called ‘The Preparation’. It is also strictly enjoined that one should not read about this Brahmavidyā who has not carried out the vow i.e. has not gone through the proper discipline.116 The Brahmavidyā is to be revealed only to those who are men of action, versed in the Vedas, devoted to Brahman, and who have propitiated with devotion the Fire as well, having carried out in the proper way the vow of carrying the Fire in the head117. This proves once again the close connection of the cult of Fire with Brahmavidyā. Only at the culmination of the worship of the Fire, only after the attainment of mastery in the cult of Fire, the Brahmavidyā used to be revealed. A spirit of absolute devotion to the Teacher is also demanded, as in the Śvetāśvatara: ‘The high-souled men reveal all these truths to one who has supreme devotion to God and an equal devotion to the Guru’118. As we have already indicated that the Brahmavidyā was generally revealed to the son or the most devoted pupil, so the Śvetāśvatara and Maitrī Upaniṣads strictly forbid its transmission to others: ‘Impart it to no one, who is not tranquil, who is not a son or a pupil’119. ‘This profoundest mystery of all is to be revealed to no one, who is not a son or a pupil and who has not yet become tranquil’ 120. Thus of all the conditions of a true adhikārin, tranquillity is one which is most insistently demanded. The Guru was also to be a man not only of great learning but a man of experience, whose sole devotion is in Brahman, who is literally ‘stationed’ in Brahman (śrotriyam brahmaniṣṭham)121.

115 praśāntacittāya śamānvitāya. MU, 1. 2. 13.

116 nai 'tad acirṇavrato adhīte. MU, 3. 2. 11.

117 MU, 3. 2. 10.

118 ŚU, 6. 23.

119 nā 'putrāya aśiṣyāya vā. ŚU, 6. 22,

120 nā 'putrāya nā 'śiṣyāya......nā 'śāntāya. Maitrī, 6. 29.

121 MU, 1. 1. 1.

40

PROLEGOMENA

The Value of Brahmavidyā.

The importance and value which was attached to Brahmavidyā

and how it was prized above everything else is also clear from a

passage in the Chāndogya, where it is said that 'though he (the

knower of Brahmavidyā) were to be offered in return for it all the

kingdoms of the ocean-girdled earth, yet should he bethink himself

'the other is of greater value'122. All earthly gains are insignificant

when compared to this priceless treasure. That is why Naciketas, the

true seeker, rejected all the tempting offers of earthly

enjoyments and even heavenly ones, held out before him by

Yama and sought nothing else but the supreme knowledge. This

also shows that it was not mere intellectual knowledge on which such

a high price was set that even all the earthly gains could not be

exchanged for it, but it was the saving wisdom, which completely

lifted one out of the realm of finitude. The failure to comprehend

the true nature of this knowledge has led to the bewilderment of

Keith, who says that 'it is simply inconceivable why on the ground of

such theoretic knowledge, men should abandon the desire for children,

ing a foolish asceticism'.123 The absurdity of such remarks will be

evident to any one who has had even a glimpse of the true Upani-

ṣadic wisdom.

Absence of Dogmatism & Varieties of Approach

Another marked characteristic in the culture of Brahmavidyā in

the Upaniṣadic times is the free spirit and open-mindedness with

which it was cultivated throughout. No bias or prejudice ever

dominated the mind of any seer nor did anyone cling to his own

realisation taking it to be final and supreme. On the other hand,

the general method was always a mutual discussion of respective

viewpoints and the correction and supplementation of one by the

other. The seers used to meet together, forming a council of friends,

as it were, to compare the notes of the journey, towards the Reality.

123 P.V.U, p. 594.

122 CU, 3.11.6.

PROLEGOMENA

41

Not vain argumentation was the method but the reporting of concrete realisation of each was always sought. So it is told that the three experts in Udgītha, viz. Śilaka Śālāvatya, Caikitāyana Dālbhya and Pravāhaṇa Jaivali all met together and said: ‘We are all specialists in Udgītha, so let us mutually discuss about the Udgītha.’124 Similarly, the five seers already referred to, Prācīnaśāla and others, met together for coming to a decision about the nature of Ātman and Brahman.125 Instances need not be multiplied, for this was the invariable method followed in the cultivation of Brahmavidyā. Sometimes, having failed to come to a final solution of their difficulties, they used to go in a body to a man of higher enlightenment, as in the above case the five seers later approached Uddālaka Āruṇi, who in his turn directed them to Aśvapati. Under the patronage of Kings too such councils of wise men used to meet from time to time as is evident from the story of Janaka.126

About the innumerable variety of methods through which Brahmavidyā used to be imparted, we need not concern ourselves here, for they have all been comprehensively traced and analyzed by Ranade in his ‘Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy’.127 We beg to close our introduction with an approximate list of the various vidyās found in the Upaniṣads, out of which we have tried to deal with three prominent ones, viz., the Dahara-vidyā, the Madhu-vidyā and the Udgītha-vidyā in details. The main principle behind all the vidyās is the same, though the techniques differ, and the approaches are diverse.

(1) Agnividyā —Kaṭha. 1.1.13-19.

(2) Ātmavidyā —BU. 1.4.7-8, 15, 2,4.5. Muṇḍ. 2.2.5 Māṇḍ. Kaṭha. 1.2. ff

(3) Udgīthavidyā —CU. 1.3-9. BU. 1.3.

(4) Upakosalavidyā —CU. 4.10-15.

(5) Omkāravidyā —CU. 1.1.1-7, Kaṭha 1.2.15.16. Māṇḍ. Tai. 1.8, Muṇḍ. 2.2.4-6. Praśna 5.

124 CU, 1. 8. 1. 125 sametya mimāṃsāṁcakruh. CU, 5. 11. 1.

126 Kurupāñcālānāṁ brāhmaṇā abhisametā babhūvuh. BU, 3. 1. 1.

127 pp. 34-40.

6

(6) Gāyatrividyā

—CU. 3.12.

(7) Dabaravidya

—CU. 8.1.1-2,

(8) Dirghāsyavidyā—CU. 3.16.

(9) Pancāgnividyā

—BU. 6.2.9-13. CU. 5.4.8.

(10) Prāṇavidyā

—BU. 5.13. 1-4.

(11) Bhūmavidyā

—CU. 7.23.1.

(12) Madbuvidyā

—CU. 3.1-5. BU. 2.5-6.

(13) Manthavidyā

—BU. 6.3.1-13. CU. 5.2.4.

(14) Sāndilyavidyā

—CU. 3.14.

(15) Samvargavidyā

—CU. 4.3.

(16) Satyakāmavidyā

—CU. 4.4-9.

(17) Sāmavidyā

—CU. 2.1-22. BU. 1.3.25-27.

Besides these we have reference to other secular vidyās like the following: Devavidyā, Brahmavidyā, Bhūtavidyā, Kṣatravidyā, Naksatravidyā, Sarpadevanavidyā128 etc.

128 CU, 7. 1. 2.

PART I

THE GOAL

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY

It has been the invariable custom with all the Indian systems of philosophy to enunciate the goal first, before exploring the way to attain it. They all feel that before the actual quest begins, the goal must be set forth as clearly as possible, because ignorance about the goal often leads to a half-way halt or an abrupt termination of the movement, originally initiated with a view to reaching the final truth of things. The danger of mistaking a relative truth for the final one is always there for one who makes the hazard of moving forward without a definite end or aim. The map must be drawn first of all, setting out the limit of the journey as well as marking off the boundaries. Of course, the map or picture differs one from another, according to the divergences of the minds that draw it. Thus the Sāñkhya picture presents in broad relief the twin principle of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, the true knowledge of which is the whole endand aim of its seeking. The Yoga picture while agreeing in essentials with the Sāñkhya one, adds the concept of an Īśvara who is, however, only the first of all puruṣas. The Nyāya prefers to draw the picture in a wealth of details and hence the ultimate things or padārthas, whose knowledge it seeks, are enumerated as sixteen. The Vaiśeṣika, though sharing an identical ideology with Nyāya, is a lover of brevity and so cuts down the figure from sixteen to six or seven. The whole picture of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā is devoted to the portrayal of the one essential thing that matters most according to it, viz., Dharma. Finally, the Uttara Mīmāṁsā or Vedānta tries to picture the unpicturable, to map the unmappable, through the help of the suggestions and symbols thrown out by the Upaniṣads about the nature of that supreme object, the Vast and the Infinite, viz. Brahman. Being the greatest thing, Brahman naturally includes within it all the innumerable fragments of the particular and so the conception of it too is, by its very nature, so comprehensive as to include all partial view-points in its all-embracing harmony. We must try to gather

44

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

from the Upaniṣads themselves the picture, which they present, about

the final goal and then judge its merits.

The Goal of the Upaniṣads

Now, what is the goal of the Upaniṣads? The Īśopaniṣad, one

of the oldest in verse, in its very opening line gives the

answer thus: ‘Īśā vāsyam idam sarvam’. On one side is Īśa or the

Lord, while on the other is ‘idam sarvam’, all this, and they are to

be joined together by the term ‘vāsyam’. But immediately a

problem arises in connexion with the meaning of the term ‘vāsyam’,

which plunges us straight into the heart of the hardest metaphysical

problem. As Sri Aurobindo in his book on the Īśopaniṣad points

out: ‘there are three possible senses of ‘vāsyam’, “to be clothed”,

“to be worn as a garment”, and “to be inhabited”1. Śaṅkara adopts

the first sense, while Sri Aurobindo prefers the last one. The adoption

of one sense or the other fundamentally determines the outlook of the

chooser in regard to the nature of the relation he thinks to be subsist-

ing between ‘Īśa’ and ‘idam’. In terms of modern philosophy, these

two entities may be termed as the subject and the object and the

whole aim and endeavour of philosophy, upto the present day, has

been to determine the exact relation between these two terms. And

the attempt to determine it has led to the division of the world of

philosophy into two warring camps, each of which tries to assign

superiority to one of the terms over the other. One denies the

independent existence of the object apart from the subject and turns

out an idealist, while the other vehemently denounces the reality of

the subject and pins its faith in the reality of the object alone,

calling itself a realist. Some of a compromising nature, have

thought it wise to stand in the middle and effect a synthesis by

giving scope to both, as well as admitting the reality of each of them.

The whole history of philosophy is the story of this swing of human

thought from one pole to the other and its occasional stop in the

middle to effect a compromise.

Thus, being caught up in the net of division, we are seeking to

bridge the gulf of the apparent division between ‘Īśa’ and ‘idam’.

1 IU, p. 1.

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY

45

Their mutual opposition is undeniable ; otherwise, there would

have been no need to seek a reconciliation between the two

through 'vāsyam'. Now, this reconciliation may be effected in various

ways, as the difference in the interpretation of the term 'vāsyam' itself

indicates. Firstly, a reconciliation may be effected by denying the

one and affirming the other ; secondly, by denying both ; thirdly, by

affirming both ; and, fourthly, by transcending both. Does the

Upaniṣad seek to obliterate or efface 'idam' altogether by enjoining

that it should be clothed or covered totally by Īśa or does it ask the

seeker to instal the Īśa in the bosom of 'idam' as the inhabitant

without covering its existence altogether? In other words, is the

world to be swallowed up by the Lord or inhabited by Him?

Before seeking the answer to this fundamental question it will be

wiser to determine, first of all, the connotations of the two terms,

whose reconciliation is to be sought, because the clearing up of the

concepts will go a long way in helping the final solution of the problem.

To determine the nature of the Īśa is the one main pre-occupation of

all the Upaniṣads. It is variously termed as Brahman, Ātman, Puruṣa,

Akṣara, Īśa etc., from different points of view. Of these the most

common appellations are Brahman and Ātman and their identity too is

specifically stated by the Upaniṣad itself: 'ayam ātmā brahma'2. The

Brahman or the Ātman is the sole pursuit of the whole Brahmavidyā

in the Upaniṣads. 'Brahman is called the goal'3, 'That Immutable is

the goal'4, 'That Ātman is to be seen'5, 'He is to be searched, He is

to be enquired about'6, thus the Upaniṣads speak again and again.

Definition of Brahman or Ātman

The next question that comes to the mind is: What is signified

by the term Brahman or the term Ātman? Here again we are

confronted with a difficulty, for various passages in the Upaniṣads

describe the Brahman or the Ātman in numerous ways, which seem

2 BU, 2. 5. 19; 4. 4. 5.

3 brahma tallaksyam ucyate. MU. 2. 2. 4.

4 laksyam tadeva kṣaram MU. 2. 2. 3.

5 ātmā vāre draṣṭavyah. BU, 4. 5. 6.

6 so 'nvestavyas sa vijijñāsitavyah. CU, 8. 7. 1.

46

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

conflicting and often inconsistent with one another. The two broad

features of the conflicting nature of the statements are: (i) affirma-

tion and (ii) denial, i.e. in some places it is described as identified

with all existence, while in other places it is pointed out solely by the

stripping off of all identifications whatsoever, by a drastic and relent-

less denial. 'All this is the Ātman,'7 'All this is verily Brahman'8 and

such other statements unequivocally affirm the identification of all this

with Brahman or Ātman, Again, 'He however, the Ātman, is not so,

not so (ne 'ti, ne 'ti). He is incomprehensible, for he is not compre-

hended; indestructible, for he is not destroyed; unaffected, for nothing

affects him; he is not fettered, he is not disturbed, he suffers no

harm'9, or 'That it is, O Gārgi, which the wise call the Imperishable

(aksaram); it is neither thick nor thin, neither short nor long, neither

red (like fire) nor fluid (like water), neither shadowy nor dark, neither

wind nor ether (space), not touched, without taste or smell, without eye

or ear, without speech, without understanding, without vital force and

without breath, without mouth or size, without inside or outside; never

consuming anything nor consumed by any'10 and such other statements

vehemently deny all identification, with any aspect of existence. Shall

we then say with Keith that "contradictions 'in adjecto' are the

normal characteristic of the Upaniṣads"11 or that "the hopeless

inconsistencies of the view of Yājñavalkya become painfully obvious"?12

Contradictions and inconsistencies no doubt confront us at every step

but that is no reason why one should leave things at that after

pronouncing a mere hasty condemnation. If one seeks the solution of

the contradictions patiently from the Upaniṣad itself, then there is no

reason why it should not be forthcoming with the clearness of the

morning light, dispelling all darkness whatsoever. It is our own bias

and prejudice that always deprive us from getting the true solution.

'Spiritual books are written in the language of the Spirit and must be

spiritually discerned. They yield a new sense at every reading and it

is only after many years that most of us begin to realize the colossal

7 idam sarvam yadayam atma. BU, 2. 4. 6.

8 sarvam khalvidam brahma. CU. 3. 14. 1.

9 BU, 4. 2. 4.

10 BU, 3. 8. 8.

11 PVU, p. 587.

12 Ibid. p. 594.

nature of our own initial mistakes'13. The real spirit can never be

taught, it must be caught through an attitude of sympathy with the

true essence of the Upaniṣadic teaching. And so let us try our best

to get in touch with it.

Two forms of Brahman

One Upaniṣad mentions that 'there are two forms of Brahman,

the manifest as well as the unmanifest'.14 Another Upaniṣad

speaks of the Para and the Apara-Brahman.15 The Maitrī

Upaniṣad says: 'There are two Para-Brahmans to be contemplated,

the Sabda as well as the Aśabda, the Śabdabraḥman and that

which is Para'.16 Thus the two descriptions which appeared mani-

festly contradictory point in reality to two distinct forms of the one

Brahman. The mūrta or the manifest is the form identified with

manifestation, the amūrta or the unmanifest form is by its nature

distinct from all manifestation, That form which is the active prin-

ciple in all manifestation is called the Śabdabraḥman or in the techni-

cal terminology of the later Vedānta, the Īśvara. The other which is

not so engaged or connected with manifestation is the Aśabda or the

Para Braḥman. In terms of Western philosophy, the one may be

called the God, the other the Absolute. But the problem of prob-

lems remains : what is the relation between the mūrta and the amūrta,

the Sabda and the Aśabda, the God and the Absolute? Are they

identical or distinct? 'We are thus face to face with the ultimate

problem which may be variously described as the problem of the

Absolute and God, of the One and the Many, of Transcendence

and Immanence, of Eternity and Time, of the Infinite and the Finite,

of the Universal and the Particular'.17 It is an ancient problem but

it still remains as acute as in the days of Plato and Śaṅkara.

Braḥman and Creation

The Upaniṣads are emphatic that at the root of the whole mani-

festation is Braḥman. 'That out of which all these things are born,

by which they live and unto which they return and merge, that is

13 CIL, p. 88.

14 BU, 2. 3. 1.

15 ARU, 5. 2.

16 Maitrī, 6. 22.

17 PR, p. 265.

Brahman'.,18 Nay, the very root meaning of the term 'Brahman'

signifies its creative nature. That which grows or swells is literally

Brahman, and hence, as Dr Maryla Falk rightly points out, originally

the term Brahman signified the female principle and did not convey

the neuter conception that is now assigned to it.19 'The vast Brahman

is my womb' says the Lord in the Gītā.20 But manifestation or

creation essentially implies a change or a movement and if Brahman

is the cause of it then that too must be changeful in its nature or at

least must be affected somehow or other by the changes in the effect.

If the immutability of Brahman is to be preserved, change must

be denied or Brahman must be conceived as itself changing or moving.

The Upaniṣads steer clear of this dilemma. We have pointed out in

the introduction that all the Upaniṣads unfailingly point out the two

broad features of Reality viz., Agni and Ātman. The whole struc-

ture of the Upaniṣadic wisdom rests on these two conceptions, and it

is through the instrument of these two principles that the Upaniṣads

solve all problems, however hard, with an ease that is striking and

remarkable. Now, as Agni or Prāṇa the Supreme Reality produces

and sustains the whole existence. 'Whatever is, all this world issues

forth from the moving Prāṇa1,21 'All that is here and in the heavens

are under the control of Prāṇa'.22 Agni is, therefore, significantly

called 'Jātavedas' the knower of all that is created and as the Nirukta

points out, in giving its various etymological meanings, it also

signifies that all created things know it23 because it is the source of

them all and as such in direct touch with them. It also exists eternally

in every cycle of creation, it is behind each and every manifestation24.

It is again the Śabda Brahman, the root of all creations, the Supreme

Logos, the Creative Word. It is also Sāvitrī, the Divine Mother,

who gives birth to the universe, and Gāyatrī, the redeeming Mother,

who guides all movements in the hearts of beings as well as in the

heavens. Its very nature is composed of two principles, Jñāna and Kriyā,

Reason and Action, as Śaṅkara rightly points out25 and hence creativity

18 TU, 3. 1. 19 NRDR, p. 8. 20 Gītā, 14. 3. 21 KTU, 2. 6. 2.

22 PRU, 2. 13. 23 jātāni vai 'nam viduh. Nir. 7. 5.

24 jāte jāte vidyate. Ibid.

25 vijñānākriyāśaktidvayasammūrchitah. ŚB, on CU, 3. 14. 2.

is its fundamental feature. Here, 'Reality is undoubtedly creative, i.e.

productive of effects in which it transcends and expands its own be-

ing',26 as Bergson states it. But this Prāṇa is a richer principle than

Bergson's elan vital, for it is not a blind urge or a pointless move-

ment alone like the latter, moving on and on without knowing an

end, but a luminous conscious force that knowingly creates and crea-

tively knows. Here knowledge and and movement go hand in hand

and what the vision directs the movement executes. Thus direction

and execution proceed from the same source here and therefore Prāṇa

is at once the 'anujñā'27 or the command, as well as the 'samvar-

dbaitā',28 the executor of the exuberant flow of creation. Hence,

'mithuna' or the mixture of two, i. e. unity-in-difference, is the very

basic nature of Prāṇa. The world with its differences and diversities

is here taken up within the unit of the single organism of Prāṇa, the

parts meet in the whole, the subject and the object are found to be

complementary parts of the same whole. Hegel's Absolute Idea thus

comes very near this conception of Prāṇa in the Upaniṣads. His

idea of the principle of differentiation within the unity of the

Absolute bears close resemblance to the similar Upaniṣadic conception

about Prāṇa. Hegel's view appears very fascinating to our

mind and still holds its sway over us because 'what our intellect really

aims at is neither variety nor unity taken singly but totality',29 as

James rightly points out. Our intellect is confronted with a bewilder-

ing variety and its sole effort is directed towards the construction of a

system or a coherent whole out of this chaotic mass. It endeavours

to create a perfect world in the sense of a rounded whole, 'a spherical

system with no loose ends hanging out for foreignness to get a hold

upon'. Hence our intellect conceives that the Absolute is the entire

system of internal discords transmuted into ever richer harmonies and

into the harmonious unity of the whole. Organic unity is the highest

unity that our intellect can comprehend or envisage.

But still there is a higher unity beyond it pointed out by the

Upaniṣads. We were confronted with the dilemma that if Brahman

26 CE, pp. 49-50.

27 CU, I. I. 8.

28 Ibid.

29 Pr, p. 130.

50

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

is the cause of the universe or the manifestation, it must be

conceived as itself changing, or change must be denied if

the immutability of Brahman is to be preserved. Through the

conception of Prāṇa, we have found, the Upaniṣads do not deny or

explain away change or manifestation, but rather exhibit that the whole

wealth of creativity is in the very heart of Reality. But how then is

the immutability of Brahman preserved if change or movement happens

to issue out of its very centre? It is preserved through the conception

of transcendence, which is the quintessence of the whole Upaniṣadic

wisdom. As Agni or Prāṇa Reality is immanent, as Ātman it is

transcendent. ‘Asaṅgo by ayam puruṣaḥ30 is the supreme truth

indicated about the nature of the the Ātman. The Ātman is absolutely

untouched ot untainted by all the colourful changes wrought over it

and retains its pure majesty unsullied all through.

Then, does transcendence imply that the Ātman or Brahman is out-

side the sphere of existence, far above the noise and tumult enjoying a

blessed solitude? We must warn readers here that the Upaniṣadic

conception of transcendence and immanence should never be confused

with the conceptions passing by those names in the West. In the

West, transcendence has always signified the exclusive aspect of Reality,

which is outside and above the process of creation and this has given

the inspiration to Deism or Theism which worships Reality from

a venerable distance, adoring its tremendous majesty and extolling its

utter unapproachability. Immanence stands for the opposite concep-

tion, which signifies a total identification of existence or creation with

Reality, which equates God and the world and as such leads to

Pantheism, which finds God as an intimate companion, no longer

above and beyond but close to the heart and here in the dust. Between

these two extremes stands the so-called Panentheism which tries to cut

a middle path by putting forth the view that the nature of Reality is

all immanence and some transcendence. It holds that the Supreme

Reality is completely immanent in the universe but this does not

exhaust its nature and so it is something more and hence partly trans-

cendent.

30 BU, 4. 3. 16.

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY

51

The Indian view or the Upaniṣadic conception of Reality is every-

where represented and condemned in the West as sheer pantheism,

which strikes at the root of all morality and obliterates the distinction

between good and evil, virtue and vice. Pantheism is defined as the

doctrine which ‘identifies God with the entire universe, which beholds

him in the movement of the tiniest insect or in the lustre of the

brilliant gem, in the mind of a Socrates or in the brain of a Newton.’31

But if this pantheism be the doctrine of the Hindus, how the

latter can be condemned in the same breath as a theory of illusion

passes our comprehension. In order to condemn the Indian theory of

so-called illusion, the Western scholars would represent it as sheer

transcendentalism and again just to represent the Indian doctrine as

the most obnoxious and abominable, in which there is ‘unbridled

license of a sensuous idolatry’, in which ‘the grossest impurities are

not only permitted, but perpetuated under the sanction of religion,’32

they would call it mere pantheism. All this is the result of a bias or

prejudice which is regrettable in every true scholar.

The Upaniṣadic Conception of Transcendence & Immanence

The Indian or Upaniṣadic conception of transcendence and

immanence is totally different and distinct from the Western view.

Here transcendence never signifies an aloofness or exclusion, because

the Brahman of the Upaniṣads is not a unitary principle which is

opposed to the multiplicity of creation. Not only has it created the

whole of existence, not only has it brought all this into being, but,

having created this all, has veritably entered into it as the Upaniṣad

expressly declares (tat srṣṭvā tadēvā ’nuprāviśat).33 Not only is it the

efficient cause, the nimitta-kāraṇa, of the creation but the material

cause, the upādāna-kāraṇa too. The anupraveśa, the entering into

creation, the very fact of immanence signifies its transcendence.

Here the entering or anupraveśa does not indicate something like the

entering of one thing into another but simply points to the fact that

by the act of creation the Supreme Reality has made itself accessible

to the intellect (buddhi). This access to the intellect is the true

31 HP, vol, I, p. 252.

32 PR, pp. 321-23.

33 TU, 2, 6.

52

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

meaning and significance of ‘anupravesa’. But the intellect is the subtlest

thing, being the very first and foremost principle in creation, and

naturally that which can enter even into this subtlest thing must

be subtler still. Only the subtle can enter into the gross and not

vice versa. Hence the Brahman surpasses even the intellect in subtle-

ness and thus easily enters into it; and being subtler than the intellect

it is not touched or tainted by any of the blemishes of the intellect.

By the very fact of its entering, it proves its transcending nature.

Transcendence thus, in our sense, always signifies the uniqueness, the

vilakṣaṇatā, the distinctness of Brahman, and never any exclusiveness

or apartness. ‘Other than the known, and more than the unknown

is That’34 declares the Upaniṣad, while signifying the transcendent

nature of Brahman. Here the two terms ‘anyat’ and ‘adhi’ peculiarly

suggest the uniqueness of the nature of Reality and signify its trans-

cendence of all categories of thought.

Similarly the ‘ne ’ti ne ’ti’ of Yājñavalkya simply signifies the dis-

tinctness of the Ātman from all this that is here and does not convey

any sense of excluding everything from it, as is ordinarily supposed.

The Brahman of the Upaniṣads has no opposition whatsoever to

anything and as such need not exclude anything in order to maintain

its reality or purity. Thus ‘ne ’ti ne ’ti’ does not deny the reality of

existence, it ‘denies all the empirical characterization of reality’.35 It

just signifies that Reality is something unique and distinct from the

empirical. If we keep this sense of denial in mind, then it will be

clear that ‘the denial of attributes and qualifications to Brahman does

not reduce it to a void’36 but on the contrary, points to its inexhaus-

tible fullness, which remains absolutely undiminished even after the

whole of creation streams out of it, because it is not touched by this

process of continuous ebb and flow at all, being absolutely distinct

from all this. Here by a strange mathematics even after the subtrac-

tion of the full from the full, the remainder still remains the full !37

34 anyad eva tad vidiṫād atho aviditād adhi, KU, 3.

35 HM, p. 59.

36 Ibid. p. 60.

37 pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya pūrṇam evā ’vaśiṣyate. Śāntipāṭha. IU.

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY

53

How does this miracle happen? It happens because Brahman creates not in the ordinary way of a cause and effect series, but in a unique non-causal way. This is the much misunderstood theory of

vivartavāda

in Vedānta. In all the creations we find in the world, the effect is produced through a transformation of the cause into something else. The cause dies in order to give birth to the effect. Whether we take the side of

ārabbhavāda

and say that the effect is something new and novel, which has just come into being and was previously non-existent, or concur with

parināmavāda

that it was already there in the cause in a latent form and has only been made patent through the process of so-called creation, a change in the cause, some form of alteration in it, has somehow or other to be admitted, in either case, in order to account for the emergence of the effect. Is it possible in any way to keep the cause absolutely unaltered, and yet have the effect produced? The

vivartavāda

makes a bold attempt in this line. It tries to show that even in this world where are illustrations of an effect being produced without any change or modification whatsoever in the cause. and here are brought in the classic examples of illusions, like the rope-snake etc. The examples or illustrations have been taken in the wrong way everywhere and their true significance has been missed. It is generally assumed that by these illustrations the Vedānta has sought to explain away the world as a mere illusion or phantasmagoria, whereas the illustrations have quite another bearing. They only seek to show the unsullied nature of the cause, which is not touched in any way by the effect imposed upon it. As

Śaṅkara

puts it: 'Not by the fact that a water-snake is taken to be a snake does it become full of poison nor a snake being taken for a water-snake becomes poisonless'.38 Similarly all the imperfections and limitations in creation do not touch Brahman at all, its eternal substratum, though Brahman is taken to be the world mistakenly. The illustration only goes upto this point and should not be pressed further.

38 Na hi ḍuṇḍubhas sarpa ity etāvatā saviṣo bhavati na vā sarpo ḍuṇḍubha ity etāvatā nirviṣo bhavati. ŚB, on VS, 2. 2. 10.

54

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

The Vedānta, being a system of philosophy, tries to bring home

the supra-rational truth in terms of rational concepts to the human

mind. Without twisting or flouting human logic, it attempts to

systematize the ineffable experience of the Absolute or Brahman.

Here it almost sets an impossible task before it, for how can the

supra-rational be presented through the methods of the rational

intellect ? Either the supra-rationality suffers or has to be sacrificed,

or rationality has to go. But the unique achievement of the Vedānta

lies in this that it never brings down the supra-rational even an inch

from its glorious height and yet presents a rational account of the

whole manifestation out of it. It keeps the cause absolutely unmodified

and yet accounts for the effect. It does not again say that a part of

the cause is modified and a part of it remains unmodified, for that

is contrary to all logic and will make the one indivisible reality a

mere combined product of different parts and as such destroy its true

unity. It keeps the whole cause unmodified and yet explains the

modification or effect. This is not an explaining away of things but

the only real attempt at explanation. The explaining away is, on the

contrary, resorted to by those who merely accept the contradictory

nature of Reality as presented to our intellect and experience and

pronounce that this contradiction is the fundamental nature of it.

To state that the Absolute or Brahman itself is modified as well as

unmodified i.e. contradictory in nature is to equate Reality with

the merely empirical.

It will not be out of point here to refer to the criticism of Hegel

by Herbart. 'Inherent contradiction, says Hegel, is the very nature

of these notions, as of all things in general; becoming, for example,

is essentially unity of being and non-being etc. That, rejoins

Herbart, is impossible so long as the principle of contradiction still

retains its authority. That the notions of experience present contradic-

tions is no fault of the objective world but of subjective perception,

which must redress its erroneous construction by a transformation of

these notions and an elimination of their contradictions. Herbart

accuses the philosophy of Hegel of empiricism, in that it accepts

from experience these contradictory notions unaltered ; and notwith-

standing discernment of their contradictory nature, regards them, just

because they are empirically given, as justified and even, on their

account, transforms the science of logic itself'.39 Hegel thus not

only accepts the contradiction and attributes the contradictory nature

to Reality, without attempting any solution but he also flouts the

ordinary logic by inventing a logic of the Absolute. In other words,

he frankly admits that to the ordinary logic the contradiction is

inexplicable, and insoluble. The Vedānta, on the contrary, boldly

accepts the fact of experience, acknowledges the contradiction and

finally solves it in a unique way. It brings in the classic examples

of illusion because on the intellectual plane there is no other analogy

through which the unmodified nature of the cause along with the

production of the effect can be illustrated, The plane of the intellect

is accustomed to 'parinama', i.e. creation through modification, it never

knows creation without modification save in the cases of illusion, and

that is why these illustrations are cited.

Unreality of Existence

But it may be objected here that this definitely takes away the

reality of the created things and reduces the world to a mere illusory

appearance, and though it may be the view of Sankara, yet it may

not be acceptable to us, concerned as we are here solely with the

Upanisads. The question then comes: Do the Upanisads pronounce

the world to be unreal? Certainly there are passages which definitely

state all existence to be of a fleeting nature,40 pronounce it to be of

very little worth41 and contrast the little with the Vast or Brahman and

condemn it as perishable42 and even go so far as to declare the many

to be non-existent.43 So the doctrine of illusoriness of created things

is not an invention of Sankara but has its roots in the Upanisads.

All these "are covered by falsehood" declares the Upanisad.44 But

the whole confusion arises from the use of the word 'anrta' or 'mithyā'

in connection with the existence of the world. Words always create

39 HPH, p. 280.

40 śvobhāvā martasya. KTU, 1. 1. 26.

41 sarvam jivitam alpam eva. Ibid. 42 yad alpam tan martyam. CU, 7.24. 1.

43 neha nānā 'sti kincana. KTU, 2. 4. 11.

44 Anrtena hī pratyūḍhāḥ. CU, 8. 3. 2.

56

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

a confusion because of their association with a certain definite import

beyond which we cannot go. ‘Mithyā’ has always come to mean,

in ordinary parlance, the unreal or non-existing. But the term mithyā

is never applied in this sense to the world, and one must therefore

carefully distinguish between the ‘asat’ and the ‘mithyā’, the non-

existent and the untrue. The world is not asat, non-existent because

it is verily a fact of experience, as the Vedānta-Sūtra expressly declares :

nābhāva upalabdheb.45 It is mithyā only in the sense that it has got

a spurious reality. Its reality is not genuine, because it does not

belong to it but is only delegated to it by something else. Hence its

reality is a dependent reality and not an independent one, which

can stand on its own grounds. Dependent reality, borrowed reality,

spurious reality is called mithyā, false, i.e. not genuine. The Upaniṣads

have no objection if any one feels satisfied by using the term

satyam with regard to the world or existence but then the Absolute

or Reality must be called Satyasya Satyam,48 the Truth of the Truth,

i.e. one must then distinguish between two orders of truth, in which

the lower truth is sustained by the higher.

Thus we find that it matters little whether we call the world satya

or mithyā, if we rightly understand the connotations of these two

terms. Even those who advocate the reality of the world can never

assert that the world is of the same order of reality as the Absolute,

but there are some who will raise a storm if it is called unreal or

mithyā. It is only strict logic which forces one to use the term

‘mithyā’, for Truth is one and undivided, and it is logically absurd

to speak of a more true or less true. If it is true, it is wholly true,

if it is not true then it is false, that is the imperative demand of

logic.

Degrees of Reality

The question immediately comes: Do the Upaniṣads not recognise

degrees of reality? Certainly they do but at the same time they

know its limitations. This less and more, or the degrees are essen-

tially a product of the intellect or the mind and do not apply to

45 VS, 2. 2. 28.

46 BU, 2. 1. 20.

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY

Reality itself. The intellect, while apprehending Reality, apprehends

less or more of it according to its power of apprehension and attributes

the degrees to Reality, while actually they belong to the intellect

itself. Thus there are no degrees in Reality, though the degrees are of

Reality. The Upanisads present Reality as a value from this point of

view and they draw a hierarchy of values too : 'Higher than the senses

are the (subtle) objects of sense; higher than those objects is the mind,

higher than the mind is the intellect or buddhi ; higher than the

intellect is the Great Self or Mahān Ātmā; higher than the Mahat

is the Unmanifest; higher than the Unmanifest is the Supreme Self

or the Puruṣa. That is the End, that the Ultimate Goal',47 or again,

'Higher than the senses is the mind; above the mind is the

intellect; beyond the intellect is the Great Self; above the Great Self

is the Unmanifest; higher than the Unmanifest is the Self or Puruṣa,

all-pervading and devoid of any characteristic mark, having known

which, every living being is liberated and goes to the immortal state'.48

Thus as we rise in the ladder of consciousness we get a clearer and

clearer view of Reality but that does not signify that Reality itself

is graded in nature. We have pointed out that it is only the power

of apprehension that creates the degrees, and power always signifies

a movement, and movement is essentially a function of Prāṇa. Thus

degrees of reality hold very true in the sphere of Prāṇa, which is

graded in its very nature but they do not apply to the Ātman,

which is single and simple in its being. Even the so-called

illusionist Sankara admits degrees of reality on the plane of the mind as

when he says in his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra that 'although

one and the same self is hidden in all beings, movable as well as im-

movable, yet owing to the gradual rise of excellence of the minds

which form the limiting conditions of the Self, Scripture declares that

the self, although eternally unchanging and uniform reveals itself in a

graduated series of beings and so appears in forms of various dignity

and power'.49 Thus the axiological and the logical views of Reality

are both placed side by side in the Upanisads and do not contradict

each other because they refer to two distinct spheres altogether. Axio-

47 KTU, 1. 3. 10-11. 48 KTU, 2. 6. 7-8. 49 VS, 1. 1. 12,

8

58

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

logically, Reality exhibits higher and higher values, appears

richer and richer in content and being, while logically it remains

the same one unchanging Reality. The Upaniṣads give equal scope

to both pariṇāmavāda and vivartavāda. What is pariṇāma on the

plane of the prāṇa and buddhi is vivarta on the plane of the Ātman

or Brahman.

Purpose and value of Creation

Still our intellect protests. Being accustomed to pariṇāma or evol-

ution, which is a fact of experience to it and hence very true, it

refuses to acknowledge any plane or sphere, where this law of evolu-

tion or pariṇāma does not hold good. It questions: ‘Even if this

experience of ourselves is illusory, the illusoriness itself is part and

parcel of the experience and cannot be conjured away. For, since we are

parts of the Reality, our experience—illusoriness and all—is in the end

a portion of God’s experience. But the God, who is timeless, complete

and positive Reality cannot be conceived as the ground of evil, error

or illusion. As we experience them they are in respect to such a God

‘mere negations’; and yet as we experience them they have a distinc-

tive character and are in some sense real’.50 But the Upaniṣads nowhere

conjure away the fact of experience. On the contrary, they show the

extreme importance and utility of the so-called illusory world. It is

this dual, this unreal, this finite which suggests the non-dual, the

Real, the Infinite. All these forms of diversity are assumed by the

Infinite itself in order to make its true nature revealed. ‘Indra assumes

these diverse forms through māyā in order to make known his own

form’.51 The ‘pururūpa’ or diverse forms are thus meant to point

towards the ‘svarūpa’ or the true form. As Saṅkara rightly points

out here: ‘Had this name and form not been manifested then the

unconditioned form of this Ātman, called the prajñānaghana, would

not have been revealed.’52 There is thus a deep purpose behind the

manifestation and hence it is not to be rejected or conjured away as

50 SES, p. 254.

51 Indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa īyate. BU, 2. 5. 19.

52 yadi hi nāmarūpe na vyākriyete tadā 'syā 'tmano nirupādhikaṁ rūpaṁ

prajñānaghanākhyāṁ na pratikhyāyeta. Ibid. ŚB.

a mere nothing. It is only by contrast with the unreality of the world

that the reality of Brahman is realized, and here lies its supreme value

and utility. That is why Reality creates this opposition between

knowledge and ignorance, good and evil, virtue and sin etc. In itself,

Reality does not stand in need of an opposite principle in order

to make itself real, but it is only to make its apprehension possible that

the creation of an opposite principle is needed. To make itself known

(praticakṣaṇāya) it has created the diversity and not to make itself real.

It is real by its own inherent nature and is not dependent on anything

else to make itself real.

Hegel and his followers make Reality itself composed of these

two opposite principles, unity and diversity, and they think that these

two constitute the very nature of Reality, which makes their Absolute

a spurious one, because, according to them, 'appearance without reality

would be impossible, for what then could appear? And reality with-

out appearance would be nothing, for there certainly is nothing out-

side appearances.'53 Such a relativity of the Absolute and the world

takes away the very absoluteness of the Absolute because it militates

against the intrinsic self-sufficiency of the Absolute. The Upaniṣads

never make this mistake of making the Absolute dependent on some-

thing else and thereby reducing it to a relative entity. They know that

'while a grin required a cat, a cat need not always have a grin',54 i. e.

though the world always stands in need of Brahman in order to

exist, yet Brahman never looks towards the world for its existence.

The mind in order to apprehend the existence of Brahman no

doubt needs the world, for, as we have pointed out, it is only through

the immanence that the transcendence is apprehended or realized, but

that is no reason for attributing to Reality itself the necessity that

is indispensable to the mind. The Upaniṣadic conception thus gives

full scope and value to the appearances and yet never makes them a

part and parcel of Reality. Reality is always established in its

own majesty, declare the Upaniṣads: 'In what is the Bhūman or the

Vast established? In its own majesty or not even in its own majesty.'55.

53 AR, p. 467.

54 RPU, p. 30.

55 sve mahimni 'ti yadi vā na mahimni 'ti; CU, 7. 24. 1,

60

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

It is so very self-sufficient that the Upaniṣads even feel diffident to state that it is established in its own majesty, and retracts its own statement, for that may give the impression that the Bbūman has to look to its own majesty in order to have its existence.

Utter freedom, complete self-sufficiency is the mark of the Absolute, and the Upaniṣads never compromise it for the sake of our inability to grasp it.

Contradictions Reconciled

The Upaniṣads thus feel no difficulty whatsoever in asserting the complete immanence of Brahman in the world, as well as, in the same breath, declaring its complete transcendence.

Everywhere they say that it is from the Akṣara or the Immutable that all the mutations proceed.

They even speak in the same line of a verse of the two aspects: 'It is without life, without mind, pure, higher than the supremely immutable.

From this is born life, mind, as well as all the senses; the sky, the wind, the fire, the waters, the earth, the sustainer of the universe.'

Similarly, the Īśa speaks of the two functions in the same verse, the 'paryagāt' and the 'vyadadbāt', the spreading all around and the making or ordering of things.

As Sri Aurobindo translates it: 'It is He that has gone abroad—That which is bright, bodiless, without scar of imperfection, without sinews, pure, unpierced by evil.

The Seer, the Thinker, the One who becomes everywhere, the Self-existent has ordered objects perfectly according to their natures from years sempiternal'.

As Rabindranath Tagore has pointed out in his brilliant exposition of this verse, that the first two lines describe Reality only in the neuter, while the concluding two lines use the masculine, which is very significant.

In the first part again, Reality is described simply through negatives, like akāya, avaraṇa, asnāvira, apāpaviddha etc., while in the second it is represented positively as the kavi, manīṣī, paribbū, svayambbū etc.

To the Upaniṣadic eye it is the same Reality

56 akṣarāt sambhavati 'ha viśvam. MU. 1. 1. 7,

57 MU, 2. 1. 3.

59 Cf. his 'Śāntiniketan' in Bengali.

58 IU, 8.

viewed from two aspects, now from within and now from without.

The two pictures do not make Reality dual but leave its unity unimpaired.

The difference is in the points of view and not in Reality itself.

Seen from within, the divine nature is Being resting in itself, centred in itself, and, viewed from without, it is the source from which streams out the exuberant flow of creation, and unto which it returns.

The absolute God thus becomes the creator God, when we look at it from the end of the world.

Here Reality streams down into the world it has created, and penetrates, sustains and controls it.

Here it is described as the ‘Lord of all, the knower of all, the Indweller, the Source, the (principle of) generation and dissolution of all created things.’60

But there it is all pure Being and nothing else.

"Neither inwardly conscious, nor outwardly conscious, nor in both ways conscious, nor conscious all through, neither knowing nor unknowing, invisible, intangible, incomprehensible, indescribable, unthinkable, inexpressible, founded solely on the certainty of its own self, the end of all existence, tranquil, blissful, timeless, that is the fourth, that is the Ātman, that is to be known."61

This description wholly through negative terms creates in our mind the idea that the Reality is going to be depleted of all contents, it is being deprived of all richness and we are being led towards an utter blank, a vain abstraction, a void, a zero.

This has led to the idea in the West that the Brahman of Indian philosophy is a characterless nothing, an empty abstraction, a purposeless empty power without wisdom and activity, a unity into which all existences pass as into a dark and eternal night.

That is why Caird describes the Indian Brahman as "an abyss of a negative infinitude….. a unity which has no principle of order in the manifold differences of things but merely a gulf in which all difference was lost."62

In the same strain, Pfleider describes Brahman as "an indeterminate abstract Being, which is hardly distinguished from nothing; an abyss which produces and maintains the finite; it is like the cave of the lion into which all the footsteps lead and none lead out again".63

Instances need not be

60 Māṇḍ, 6.

61 Māṇḍ, 7.

62 ER, vol. I, pp. 262-3.

63 "Lectures" I, 13-15.

62

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

multiplied, for they are all too common in each and every book of

the Western scholars and philosphers. But these writers and critics

do really deserve our sympathy, for it is not usually possible for

the human mind to conceive of this transcendent sphere of Advaita,

accustomed as it is to grow and know through a relation of duality.

The Upaniṣads are very well aware of this fact; they state clearly the

possibility of confusion in many of the discussions about Brahman.

Thus this fear seized the heart of Maitreyī, when Yājñavalkya,

describing to her the nature of Brahman, said that there was no con-

sciousness thereafter64 i.e. after the realization of Brahman. To this

Maitreyī protested, saying, that she was being utterly confused, because

she felt that she was being led to a state of utter unconsciousness, an

absolute void, and Yājñavalkya immediately reassured her, saying that,

he did not mean to confuse her, the Ātman is truly immortal, and its

nature or being is beyond annihilation.65 Similarly Indra, when in-

structed by Prajāpati that the nature of the Ātman was akin to the

state of sleep, felt disconcerted on thinking that then everything would

face utter extinction, and the state would not be an enjoyable one at

all.66 So he returned to Prajāpati, who appreciated his difficulty and

clearly distinguished the true nature of the Ātman from the state of

sleep or unconsciousness. He assured him that one did not lose every-

thing there but rather got back his own true form,67 became the

Supreme Puruṣa, full of all enjoyments. It is a state where all is lost,

yet all is found.

True Significance of Negative Descriptions

Hence, as we have already pointed out, the negative particle ne'ti

which is so frequently used in describing Brahman, does not signify

an annulment or rejection of all, as we commonly suppose, but every-

where suggests the uniqueness of Brahman or Ātman. The supreme

experience of the Ātman or Brahman has no parallel in our com-

mon world of experience; it is something of a 'wholly other' nature

64 na ca pretya saṃjñā’ sti. BU, 4. 5. 13.

65 avināśī vā are ayam ātmā anucchittidharmā. BU, 4. 5. 14.

66 vināśam evā 'pito bhavati nā’ ham atra bhogyaṃ paśyāmi. CU, 8. 11. 1.

67 svena rūpeṇa abhiniṣpadyate. CU, 8. 12. 3.

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY

63

and therefore those who refuse to move beyond the common experience

of thought or those who try to push the analogy of this our experience

to the sphere of the Absolute will certainly miss it.

Fortunately, there are some in the West who have lately realized

the true significance of the negative approach and seem to appreciate

it, finding its parallel in some of the Western mystics' approach to

Reality. Dr Otto, in his remarkable book, 'The Idea of the Holy'

rightly remarks: "This aspiration for the 'void' and for becoming

void and for becoming nothing, must seem a kind of lunacy to any one

who has no inner sympathy for the esoteric language and ideograms

of Mysticism and lacks the matrix from which these come necessarily

to birth. To such one, Buddhism will be simply a morbid sort of

pessimism. But, in fact, the 'void' of the Eastern, like the 'nothing'

of the Western mystic, is a numinous ideogram of the 'wholly

other'."68 James too in his 'Varieties of Religious Experience' gives

a correct appreciation of the Upaniṣadic approach through nega-

tives thus: 'Their very denial of every adjective you may propose

as applicable to the ultimate truth,—He, the Self, the Ātman, is to be

described by "No! no!" only, say the Upanishads—though it seems,

on the surface, to be a no-function, is a denial made on behalf of a

deeper Yes. Whoso calls the Absolute anything in particular, or

says that it is this, seems implicitly to shut it off from being that—it

is, as if, he lessened it. So we deny the 'this', negating the negation

which it seems to us to imply, in the interest of the higher affirma-

tive attitude, by which we are possessed".69 Coomaraswamy, the

great scholar and art-critic, hence rightly observes that "such a

negative manner of speaking is inevitable: for here negation, ne 'ti

ne 'ti, 'not so, not thus' is a denial of limiting conditions, a double

negative; not as with us who 'make innate denial' that we are other

than ourselves, an affirmation of limiting conditions. So Godhead

is 'void', light and darkness, it is rid of both, 'poised in itself in

sable stillness',it is 'idle', 'effects neither this nor that', is 'as poor,

as naked and as empty as though it were not; it has not, wills not,

wants not, 'motionless dark'."70

68 IH, p. 30.

69 VRE, p. 416.

70 NAV, p. 6.

64

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

Royce's view examined

There are, again, some eminent philosophers, who, while deeply appreciating the true significance of this negative approach, yet do not feel quite at home in this dizzy height of the transcendent and hence recoil back to the safe level of synthesis of the intellect. The case of Royce is an instance to the point. We believe that no other philosopher in the West has presented the view of the Upaniṣads more faithfully and sympathetically, yet ultimately, somehow or other, he fails to truly appreciate the supreme Upaniṣadic wisdom, and perhaps his Hegelianism proved stronger than his spirit of appreciation. He raises the problem very nicely: "Absolute immediacy of meaning by a simple and final presence—when do we finite beings come nearest to that? On the border-lands of unconsciousness, when we are closest to dreamless slumber. The Absolute, then, although the Knower, must be in truth Unconscious. But if this is so, wherein does the Absolute Being differ from pure Nothingness?"71 He himself states further that "the seers of the Upaniṣads are fully alive to this problem. It is a mistake to imagine that they ignore it. More than once they discuss it with the keenest dialectic."72 He then repeats the question: "Is the Absolute verily a mere nothing, "?73 and answers it as follows: "The Hindoo's answer to this last question is, in one sense, precise enough. The Absolute is the very opposite of a mere Nothing. For it is fulfilment, attainment, peace, the goal of life, the object of desire, the end of knowledge. Why then does it stubbornly appear as indistinguishable from mere nothing? The answer is: That is a part of our very illusion itself. The light above the light is, to our deluded vision, darkness. It is our finite realm that is the falsity, the mere nothing. The Absolute is All Truth."74 There can not be a more faithful and illuminating presentation of the Upaniṣadic view than this. But from this he goes to conclude that "this mystic Absolute gets, for the Hindoo, its very perfection from a Contrast-Effect,"75 and here he definitely errs, for as we have already pointed out the perfection or

71 WI, pp. 168-9.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid. p. 170.

74 WI, p. 171.

75 Ibid.

existence of the Absolute never depends on the contrast with the

illusory world but its apprehension by us, no doubt, does depend on

this contrast alone. So it is not true to state that "this contrast-

effect and this alone, gives the zero, that is the limit of the finite

process, its value, its truth, its absoluteness".76 Taking his stand on

this Contrast-Effect, Royce goes on to show the inherent inconsistency

of the Upaniṣadic view of the Absolute thus: "But a zero that is

contrasted with nothing at all, has so far not even any contrasting

character, and remains thus a genuine and absolute nothing. Hence, if

the Absolute of the Mystic is really different from nothing, it is so by

virtue of the fact that it stands in real contrast with our own real but

imperfect Being. We too then are. If our life behind the veil is,

as the mystic says, our goal, if already, even as we are, we are one

with the Knower, then the absolute meaning does not ignore, but so

far recognizes as real, even by virtue of the contrast, our present imper-

fect meaning.77 ....But to suppose, as the mystic does, that the

finite search has of itself no Being at all, is illusory, is māyā, is it-

self nothing, this is also to deprive the Absolute of even its poor

value as a contrasting goal. For a nothing that is merely other than

another nothing, a goal that is a goal of no real process, a zero that

merely differs from another zero, has as little value as it has content,

as little Being as it has finitude".78

The whole misapprehension arises from the failure on Royce's

part to appreciate truly the significance of the socalled unreality or

illusoriness or māyā, as he calls it. The Upaniṣads nowhere deny that

'we too then are', but we are, not in virtue of ourselves, but we exist

only through the existence of the Absolute or Brahman. Royce would

feel comforted and reassured if some reality is conceded to the finite,

if it is said that 'it is real in its own way'79, and the Upaniṣads never

object to conceding this sort of reality to the finite. The finite is

certainly real in its own way, but it is not real in the way the Absolute

is Real. The Reality of the Absolute is of a different category altoge-

ther, because It is Real on its own merit, while all else is real by

virtue of its reality and has no intrinsic reality of its own. Hence,

76 WI. p, 174. 77 Ibid. pp. 181-2. 78 Ibid. p. 193. 79 Ibid. p. 194.

9

66

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

as we have already pointed out, it is only strict logic which forces

Śaṅkara to call the finite unreal, when contrasted with the Absolute

Reality, while he himself admits degrees of reality within the realm of

the finite. Thus, it is not a contrast between two degrees of reality

here, between the less real and the more real, but between two

different orders of reality. The contrast is not between one nothing

and another nothing, between one zero and another zero, but between

the only true thing and the nothing, between the only one integer

and the infinite zeros. Remove the integer and all the zeros become

mere nothing, while attached to it, they acquire infinite value.

Royce wants to picture the Infinite as only a magnified finite,

because he thinks "it is not only the goal but the whole series of

stages on the way to this goal that is the Reality."80 But, as Joachim

puts it, "the Infinite cannot be regarded as merely a bigger or a more

lasting, or a numerically greater finite: its nature is in no sense made

up of finite parts. It must be conceived in a manner toto genere

different from that in which we conceive the finite."81 This is what

the Upaniṣads think about the nature of the Infinite. The Upaniṣads

never try to effect a hollow compromise between the finite and the

infinite. "The finite has not somehow to be retained in the Absolute.

The Vedānta does not pull up the finite to the level of the Absolute

nor does it bring down the Absolute to the level of the finite. It gives

us another solution of the problem. The Absolute is all in all of

the finite, it is its adbiṣṭhāna and āśraya, its ground and support. The

finite cannot and does not live for a moment without the Absolute.

But what from the standpoint of true knowledge is the Absolute

appears as the finite from the standpoint of ignorance or ordinary

empirical knowledge."82 Thus it is the finite which points towards

its ground or substratum by the very fact of its dependence on the

Infinite and the contrast-effect is enhanced and not diminished by the

so-called unreality or rather dependent reality of the finite.

Hocking's view examined

We have quoted Royce at length and have engaged ourselves so

long with him, just to show how a great mind, even on approaching

80 WI, p. 193. 81 SES, p. 34. 82 Brahma : YT, CR, Jan.' 42.

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY

67

the very border of the Supreme Reality ultimately recoils to its own

safe harbour of the intellect. Royce's is not the only case, but most

of the great thinkers and philosophers suffer from this 'last infirmity

of the noble mind. Being accustomed to move on the crutches of

the intellect, they get afraid finally to dispense with them and move

unaided straight into the heart of Reality to perceive the soul through

the soul. They timidly knock at the door of Reality but remain

wavering even when the door is ajar and miss the opportunity of enter-

ing into the sanctum sanctorum. Hocking's illuminating book, "Types

of Philosophy" is another illustration to the point. He nicely states the

difference between Realism, Idealism and Mysticism, thus : 'Realism

separates object and knower, idealism holds that all objects belong to

some knower; mysticism holds that the objects and the knowers belong to

each other - they are the same reality, they are one'.83 He deals exhaus-

tively with each of the three views, adding his own critical comments

at the end of each. He begins with Realism and finishes with Mysi-

cism and it apparently seems that he realizes that the true consumma-

tion or the final solution lies in Mysticism, but he really purports to show

that Realism and Mysticism are two extremes, the one favouring total

separation, the other total union, and the wisdom lies in the middle,

in the views of Idealism. He admits, while introducing the topic of

Mysticism that 'Idealism—even with the intuitions which lead to it—

leave us unsatisfied, suffering 'with the wound of Absence.' There

is, so to speak, another stage of intuition, in which the sense of

otherness drops away and the knower realises that he is identical with

the inner being of his object."84 But, he again gets alarmed

at this total dropping away of otherness, the entire identity of the

knower and the known. He apprehends that "pure unity, unless it

were understood to be the unity of something plural, would be a non-

descript unity indistinguishable from nothing".85 This apprehension

again and again haunts our mind and prevents us from viewing the

Reality in its utter truth and nakedness. It is again this bias which

represents the transcendence as an exclusion or aloofness, which is

never its real sense, as we have already pointed out. Hocking there-

83 TP, p. 381.

84 Ibid. p. 380.

85 Ibid. p. 414.

68

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

fore recoils back from the position of the mystic, refusing to proceed

to the farthest limit along with him and feels secure in the mid-

position, swinging or alternating between the one and the many. His

sense of the practical predominates over his sense of the real and hence

he concludes :

"The law of alternation is a practical principle,

perhaps the chief of practical principles. It declares that we cannot

make out a good life either by exclusive contemplation of the One or

by intelligent management of the Many; but we must have both, in

the form of a rhythm, like the rhythm of work and play, or of sleep

and waking."86

We have already pointed out how all these misapprehensions arise

due to the failure to comprehend the true nature of transcendence. We

have mentioned Hocking's case, because both he and Royce refer to the

Upaniṣadic view as belonging to the type of mysticism. But we must

here warn that the Upaniṣadic doctrine is too great to be contained in

any single 'ism'. If mysticism signifies an 'exclusive contemplation of

the One' then the Upaniṣadic teaching is most emphatically not mystic

in character. There is no spirit of exclusiveness in the Upaniṣadic

teaching; on the other hand, it exceeds even the supreme inclusiveness.

The Upaniṣadic or the Vedāntic doctrine is hence significantly termed

'advaita' or non-dualism. It does not exclusively seek the One, nor

lean towards the many, neither does it somehow work up a compromise

between the two but transcends both. "It is no 'nearer' 1 than 2 and

we may also note that the term advaita, usually loosely rendered as

monism, means actually non-dualism, which is not quite the same

thing."87 The Upaniṣads are very well aware of the synthesis, which

Hocking and Royce and thinkers of the same line put forward. They

know how to 'have both, in the form of a rhythm' and this rhythm is

the Prāṇa or Agni, as we shall try to show in dealing with the diffe-

rent vidyās. This law of rhythm is truly 'the chief of practical

principles', nay, the very basic principle behind all manifestation. But

that does not mean that this law is the final truth of things, though it

may be 'the chief of practical principles'. There is still behind it a

source from which even this supreme law emanates, and the Upaniṣads

86 IP, p. 415.

87 YK, p. 164.

never rest content till they reach that final source, the Light of all

lights (jyotiṣām jyotih),88 the Truth of all truths (satyasya satyam).89

They never deny the value of the practical principle, but rather give

the fullest scope to it and yet pass on to view things from the stand-

point of the Real. There is thus no conflict between the practical and

the real from the Upaniṣadic point of view, and the Upaniṣads never try

to bring down the real and completely identify it with the practical in

order to make it suit our taste and temperament.

The True Nature of Reality

What then is the picture of Reality or the Absolute as we can

finally draw it from the Upaniṣads? We have seen that the texts

speak of both forms, Para and Apara, the Transcendent as well as the

Immanent. Is it then a composite picture, of which the one half

represents transcendence and the other half immanence? The

Upaniṣads never try to join up somehow the two contradictory aspects

or get them placed together on the same canvas. They never try to

effect a ‘samuccaya’ or synthesis or getting together of the two, nor do

they cause a surrendering between them. A samuccaya or synthesis is

necessary where there is an opposition between two terms, which stand

in the relation of thesis and anti-thesis. But the transcendence

of Brahman, which we have tried to depict, has no opposition to

immanence, if we rightly comprehend its nature. The Western

conception, as we have pointed out, takes them in opposite senses and

hence, there are some who posit a third entity, which is represented as

neutral in its nature and of which both transcendence and immanence

are two equally real aspects, and in this way, they try to effect a

reconciliation between the two and yet keep the Absolute above the

conflict. But the Upaniṣads, we have found, speak of two Brahmans

and not of a third beyond both, because, according to them, there is no

relation of opposition between immanence and transcendence which

are to be reconciled in a third neutral entity. Here the transcendence

itself signifies the real nature of the Absolute or Brahman and the very

same transcendent Reality is viewed as immanent when looked at from

88 MU, 2. 2. 9.

89 BU, 2. 1. 20.

70

STUDIES

IN

THE

UPANIṢADS

the

end

of

the

world.

'Spirit-in-itself

is

transcendent,

Spirit

is

immanent

in

reference

to

the

order

of

expression'.90

'The

transcendent

alone

is

truth,

the

dynamic

divine

is

the

transcendent

presented

in

the

aspect

of

relation'.91

The

relation

or

the

absence

of

relation

leaves

the

transcendence

unimpaired.

The

transcendent

is

called

'para',

the

supreme

or

the

higher,

and

the

immanent

'apara'

or

the

'not-supreme'

or

the

lower,

not

to

depreciate

the

one

and

exalt

the

other,

but

the

immanent

is

'apara'

in

the

sense

that

it

is

the

view

of

Reality

through

a

medium

or

relation

and

hence

not

direct

and

intimate,

while

the

transcendent

is

the

view

of

Reality

in

and

through

itself,

and

hence

'para'.

But

one

must

pass

through

this

immanent

to

the

transcendent,

because

every

one

of

us

happens

to

be

a

denizen

of

the

world

of

relations

and,

as

such,

must

view

Reality

through

the

relation

first,

before

hoping

to

pass

beyond

all

relations.

The

attempt

to

view

the

transcendent

from

the

end

of

the

world

will

always

lead,

as

it

has

led

everywhere

up

till

now,

to

a

vague

abstraction.

The

Neo-Vedāntists,

in

their

zeal

to

extol

the

Nirguṇa

Brahman,

have

almost

reduced

it

to

a

mere

nothing,

an

empty

contentless

being.

Hence

Vidyāraṇya

Brahman

are

fit

to

know

the

Para

Brahman,

and

learn

this

supreme

Brahmavidyā.92

We

must

also

note

here

that

the

true

has

always

its

counterfeit

and

thus

there

is

a

false

transcendence,

as

well

as

a

false

immanence

which

imitate

the

originals

and

thereby

cause

a

deception.

The

false

transcendence

is

achieved

by

cutting

oneself

off

altogether

from

all

manifestation

and

through

the

ushering

in

of

a

blissful

silence.

This

is

the

path

of

Sāṅkhya,

which

seeks

an

aloneness

or

kaivalya,

away

from

the

diverse

mutations

of

prakṛti.

The

true

transcendence,

too,

is

a

state

above

all

manifestation,

but

not

aloof

or

away

from

manifestation.

Neither

is

it

in

all

manifestation

and

yet

somehow

above

it.

It

has

no

in

in

or

out,

within

or

beyond,

below

or

above.

It

is

'antaratra',

'avābhya.'

It

is,

what

it

is,

in

its

own

majesty,

preserving

its

uniqueness

amidst

all

contradictions.

It

is

also

the

silence,

but

not

the

silence

that

is

opposed

to

movement

or

change.

It

is

called

the

silence,

because

its

90

HM,

p.

91

Ibid.

p.

92

AP,

6,

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY

71

inherent nature or uniqueness is never disturbed or moved in any place

or time. There is always a risk of misunderstanding this supreme

silence as the silence of death, which benumbs all the creative flow

of life but in fact it is the silence of which both death and immortality

are equally shadows.93 The world is thus not cast off in this true

transcendence, as in Sāñkhya, for that would mean a lapse into dualism

and an abandonment of the true advaita position. The true advaita

never needs the excision of a second in order to achieve its non-duality,

for that very sundered or excised part will remain as an eternal chal-

lenge to its genuine non-duality, and falsify it. The Vārttīkasāra,

therefore, rightly points out that if the world is denied in Brahman and

is conceived as existing apart from it, then it will lead to the view of

the Sāñkhya and therefore the all-inclusiveness is being stated.94 To

know the transcendent, then, is not to lose the immanental richness but

to surpass it through a fullness that is over-flowing. To know it, is

to comprehend it in its own being or essence, as well as, in the details

of all relations, because having transcended all relations, it knows how

all relations work and arrange themselves. Having reached that Light

of all lights, one not only knows it in its pure white radiance, but also

comes to know how, through what curvatures and colours, it appears

manifold in the world of manifestations. It will not do merely to

know that all this is the play of that one Light but one must also

know the bow or the details of the process through which the Light

appears in diverse colours. To state in the terms of the classical ex-

ample of Vedānta, it will not do merely to know that the snake is

nothing but the rope, but one must fully know how, through what

process of misapprehension, the rope had appeared as the snake. Till

then the illusion will not be dispelled, the fear will not be removed,

the truth will not be revealed. True transcendence thus implies a

knowledge in details of the entire process of manifestation.

93 yasya chāyā amṛtā yasya mṛtyuḥ. RV, 10.121.2.

94 apoditam yadi jagad brahmaṇo'nyatayā sthitam.

tadā sāñkhyamataprāptir ataḥ sārvātmyam ucyate. VS, 2.4,2.

72

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

The Conception of Immanence or Īśvara

Having distinguished the spurious or pseudo-transcendence from

the true one, let us now proceed to have an acquaintance with the

aspect of immanence. Immanence, again, does not mean merely a per-

vasiveness through all space and time. Rather it signifies the principle

of sustenance, which makes things exist and appear. It is that aspect

of Reality which is in identification with existence. We have already

pointed out that the immanent is nothing but the transcendent

seen from the aspect of the world. It is thus Brahman itself

which becomes the Īśvara, when taken or viewed in reference to

the world or creation. As the Pañcadaśī expressly says: ‘It

is Brahman itself which appears as Īśvara, when in contact with the

upādhi of its Śakti.’95 This Śakti is termed as māyā or

prakṛti by the Śvetāśvatara, the nature of which we shall have

to discuss presently. He who is in touch with this māyā is the

Maheśvara or the Supreme Lord.96 ‘Īśvara then is the self as shining

on and in māyā which has the three guṇas (attributes or elements)

of sattva, rajas and tamas, and is, accordingly, both trigunāṭita

(transcending these guṇas) and śuddha-sattvopādhi (invested

with a transparent body of sattva)’97. ‘That one God covered

himself of his own nature by the net born of the pradhāna

or prakṛti, like the spider enveloping itself by the web’98. One

thing which is to be marked here is that he covered himself of his

own accord (svabhāvatāḥ), and not by any compulsion. This is what

makes him īśa or the Lord, while the jīva becomes anīśa, because his

covering is not conscious or self-willed, but rather imposed or thrust

upon him. Hence the jīvas cannot lift the veil or remove the net

whenever they wish, while Īśvara is always free to do so. Therefore

the jīvas look towards Īśvara for help in the matter of the removal of

this veil.

95 tac chaktyupādhisaṃyogād brahmai 've 'śvaratāṃ vrajet. PD, 3.40,

96 māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyān māyinantu maheśvaram. ŚU, 4. 10.

97 SIV, p. 33.

98 yastāṃ tanābhā iva tantubhiḥ pradhanajaiḥ svabhavato deva ekah

svam āvṛṇot. ŚU, 6, 10.

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY

73

Here the close connexion between the Īśvara and the Guru becomes patent. Not only is he the Creator but also the Redeemer. The Pātañjala Yoga-Sūtra, therefore, rightly calls him the eternal and most supreme Guru.99 Vyāsa, in his commentary, points out that though he has no personal benefit to gain yet his sole concern is to favour the created beings (bhūtānugrabah prayojanam).100 This function of ‘anugraha’ is something like a divine prerogative with him. The Katha Upaniṣad expressly mentions this latter function: ‘The Self-manifested has pierced the apertures of the senses outwards, therefore creatures look outwards and do not see the inner self’.101 The Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Kauṣītaki also state it more explicitly: ‘It is he who makes that man perform good deeds whom he wants to uplift, and again it is he who makes that man perform evil actions whom he wants to thrust downwards’.102 Thus the creatures or jīvas are absolutely at the mercy of Īśvara. This, however, does not make the Īśvara a mere despot, or reduce the jīvas into mere automata, for the jīvas are, in reality, his own images or reflections. He becomes the benefactor or oppressor, not of some entities which are apart from him, but he oppresses or molests himself by himself and again favours himself through himself. This is what is called his play or sport or līlā (lokavattu līlākaitalyam).103 The Tantras rightly lay stress on these functions of ‘nigraba’ and ‘anugraba’, and emphasize, that not even a thousand effort on the part of the paśu or the jīva can remove the original nescience, the limitation or ‘dirt of smallness’ or finitude, the āṇava mala. It is only Paśupati, the Lord, who has deliberately put on this veil, that can lift it once more through his act of grace. Here lies the significance of dīkṣā or initiation, which symbolises the removal of the original veil by an act of grace from above.

Thus the conception of Īśvara provides a great hope and affords a sustenance to all created beings, who are plunged in ignorance. Brahman does not sit aloof having plunged the world in ignorance but

99 Sa pūrveṣām api guruḥ kālenā 'navacchedāt. YS, 1. 26.

100 VBH, YS, 1. 25.

101 Parāñci khāni vyatṛṇat svayaṃbhū, KTU, 2. 1. 1.

102 Kauṣ. 3. 8.

103 VS, 2. 1, 23.

10

74

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

is eternally engaged as Īśvara in taking it once more out of the mire or darkness. Īśvara is actively interested in every bit of creation, though as Brahman he remains absolutely untouched and unconcerned. As Īśvara he is the vast refuge of all,104 the adorable beneficent Lord.105 He sits in the heart of all creatures as the Ruler,106 the Great Soul lords over all.107 He is the Controller of all, the Ruler of all, the Lord of all.108 He is the Overlord, the Sustainer of all creatures, the Lord of all creatures, the Bridge, which sustains and prevents the separation of all these spheres.109 He is the Mighty Fear, the Upraised Thunderbolt.110 'Out of its fear the wind blows, out of its fear rises the Sun as well as the Fire and the Moon, and the fifth, Death flies',111 or, as another Upaniṣad puts it, 'out of its fear the fire burns, out of its fear burns the Sun, out of its fear move or run Indra, Vāyu and the fifth Mrtyu or Death'.112 He is again called the Immutable, the 'Akṣara, and 'by the ruling or ordaining of this Akṣara, O Gārgī, the Sun and the Moon are sustained, by the ruling of this 'Akṣara the heaven and the earth are sustained, by the ruling of this Akṣara the seconds, moments, days, nights, fortnights, months, seasons and years are sustained, by the ruling of this Akṣara flow the rivers towards the east from the white mountains and similarly other rivers to their respective directions'113 and so on. Again, it is he who pervades everywhere: 'His eyes are all the world over, his mouth all around, his hands and feet everywhere'.114 He is also called the Antaryāmi or the Indweller : 'This is the Lord of all, the Knower of all, this the Indweller.'115 'This your Ātman, the Indweller is Immortal'116 and Yājñavalkya goes to point him out in details as the indwelling princi-

104 sarvasya śaraṇam bhat. SU, 3. 17.

105 varadaṁ devam idyam. Ibid. 4. 11.

106 śāstā janānām hrdaye sanniviṣṭaḥ. Ibid. 3. 13.

107 sarvādhipatyam kurute mahātmā. Ibid. 5. 3.

108 sarvasya vaśi sarvasya īśānaḥ sarvasyā'dhipatiḥ. BU, 4. 4. 22

109 eṣa sarveśvara eṣa bhūṭapāla eṣa bhūtā'dhipati eṣa setur bidharaṇe eṣāṁ lokānām asambhedāya. Ibid.

110 mahad bhayam vajram udyatat. KṬU, 2. 3. 2.

111 TU, 2. 8.

112 KṬU, 2. 3. 3.

113 BU, 3. 8, 9.

114 SU, 3. 3.

115 Māṇḍ, 6.

116 BU, 3. 7. 23.

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY

ple in all the elements, quarters, planets as well as in the crea

in their lives, minds and the senses.117 He is also represented

golden colour, the efulgent Puruṣa, the Creator, the Lord, the pro-

genitor of Brahmā.118 It is rare to find so rich and beautiful a des-

cription of God in any religious literature of the world. The whole

Upaniṣadic literature resounds with the glory of this personal God or

Īśvara, and his glowing description is strewn all over. Thus, this

Īśvara is not a 'myth', as Gough and other writers similarly disposed,

have ventured to describe, in their ignorance of the true bearing of

the Upaniṣadic teaching. And we must also here point out another

very erroneous conception which is too much current: "Brahman and

Īśvara have sometimes been called the higher god and the lower god.

The distinction is, to say the least, misleading, and probably the over-

definite language of some of the systematizing scholiasts is responsible

for it. No doubt there is a distinction between the conceptions. Yet

Īśvara is not in reality different from Brahman."119 Īśvara is nothing

but Brahman viewed with reference to the world, as we have already

pointed out, and hence they are the same Reality.

That this Īśvara is the same as Prāṇa is expressly stated in the

Kauṣītaki; 'It is this Prāṇa itself which is the Prajñātmā, or Conscious

Self, the Delight, the Undecaying, the Immortal', and the passage con-

cludes, 'this is the Sustainer of the spheres, the Lord of the spheres,

the Lord of all'.120 Thus this Prāṇa represents the Concrete Absolute,

of which Hegel and his followers are so staunch advocates. Hence, the

synthesis of which Hegel speaks was not unknown to the Upaniṣads,

but they passed on further in order to find a still higher solution,

of which Hegel had no idea. The Śvetāśvatara, evidently a later

Upaniṣad with a definite theistic note, almost anticipates the Hegelian

dialectic through the positing of three terms. We have previously

pointed out that the earlier Upaniṣads all speak of two Brahmans and

do not feel the need of positing a third, but here in the Śvetāśvatara

117 BU, 3. 7.

118 rukmavarṇaṁ kartāram iśaṁ puruṣaṁ brahmayonim. MU, 3. 1. 3.

119 SIV, p. 34.

120 sa eṣa prāṇa eva prajñātmā ānando 'jaro amṛtaḥ. Kauṣ. 3. 8.

76

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

we find a reference to three forms of Brahman (trividham brahmam etat)121, viz.. the Enjoyer, the Enjoyed and the Director.

It, again, says that vidyā and avidyā are concealed in the Supreme Infinite Brahman, of which avidyā is fleeting and vidyā is immortal

and He who controls both is another122. This reminds one of a similar solution given in the Gītā through the three concepts of

Kṣara, Akṣara and Puruṣottama. The earlier Upaniṣads, when they speak of the Īśvara as the third status, refer to the Supreme or Para

Brahman as the fourth or turīya, in order to distinguish it from the former.

Rāmānuja's view

The vast Upaniṣadic wisdom contains all forms of solutions and that is why it has been possible for different and divergent systems to

quote the Upaniṣadic texts in support of their respective views.

Śaṅkara's is not the only system which goes by the name of Vedanta,

but there are other schools like that of Rāmānuja, which are equally affiliated to the Vedāntic system of thought, i.e. spring from the

Upaniṣads. Rāmānuja is an advocate of the Concrete Absolute, and to him, the Ultimate Reality is the repository of all beneficent qualities,

one who sustains all by a fraction of his own power and is full of power, majesty, knowledge, great strength etc.123 The teachings of

the Vedānta, according to him, are, that there are three ultimate entities known to philosophy: the intelligent individual soul, the

non-intelligent matter and God; that God is the Supreme Brahman,

and is the cause of the universe, matter and soul constituting his body or modes, 'prakāra'; that the soul enters into matter and thereby

makes it live and similarly God enters into matter and soul and guides them from within;124 that Brahman is not devoid of attributes125

but endowed with all the imaginable auspicious qualities;126 that the

121 ŚU, I. 12.

122 Ibid. 5. 1.

123 Samastakalyāṇaguṇātmako'sau svaśaktileśād dhṛtabhūtavargah/

tejovalaiśvaryamahāvabodhasuvīryaśaktyādiguṇaikarāśih. Śrī Bh, VS,

3. 2. II.

124 Śrī Bh, Madras ed. p. 2.

125 Ibid. pp. 156; 344-5,

126 Ibid. p. 232.

world, as we see it, is not illusory but real, only its reality is not

independent of or apart from Brahman;127 that these three entities

are naturally distinct from each other;128 that there is no essential

oneness of the individual self with the supreme self;129 that salvation

means not that the individual soul becomes identical, in essence, with

the Supreme Self, but that it acquires most of the divine qualities of

that Self, and, in that sense, becomes one with Him.130 Brahman,

according to Rāmānuja, thus comprises within itself, distinct elements

of plurality, which all lay claim to reality. It is a Personal God, who

is all-powerful, all-knowing and all-merciful. Thus, to use the usual

terminology of Hegelian philosophers, we have in Rāmānuja's system,

God, man and nature, man transcending nature, and both man and

nature finding their ultimate reconciliation in God—a unity-in-

diversity.

Bhartṛprapañca's view

Even before Śaṅkara, a great Vedāntin thinker, named Bhartṛ-

pañca, was the upholder of the conception of the Concrete Universal.

Unfortunately, Bhartṛprapañca's original works are not available and

one has to collect his views only from other's references to him.

Śaṅkara refers to him again and again in his bhāṣya, and Sureśvara, in

his great Vārttika, presents the latter's views somewhat fully and clear-

ly. The credit goes to Professor Hiriyanna for collecting the views of

this old Vedāntin from the fragments and presenting them beautifully

in a nutshell131. Hiriyanna points out that, Brahman, according to

Bhartṛprapañca, is 'srapañca'—not robbed of its manifestations but

possessing all of them, and, he adds, that this conception resembles that

of the 'concrete universal' in modern philosophy. 'Bhartṛ maintained

like Śaṅkara that monism was the ultimate teaching of the Upaniṣads.

A conspicuous feature of the latter's doctrine is the distinction

between a 'para' or higher and an 'apara' or lower Brahman. Bhartṛ

also appears to have recognized this distinction; but while Śaṅkara

explains the lower Brahman as an appearance (vivarta) of the higher

127 Śri Bh, p. 233. 128 Ibid. p. 235. 129 Ibid. p. 146.

130 Ibid. p. 148. 131 IA, Vol. LIII—1924, pp. 77—86.

78

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

and therefore not of the same order of reality, Bhartr̥ regards them

both as real in the same sense. According to Śaṅkara, the two Brah-

mans form, as it is put, a non-duality (a-dvaita). The relation between

them (tādātmyā) is unreal, it being a relation between things of diffe-

rent orders of being. In Bhartr̥'s doctrine, on the other hand, the

two things related being equally real, the relation also is real. But

the things are not altogether disparate, so that the relation is not one

of entire distinction (bheda) as between a pot and a piece of cloth. It

is rather bhedābheda and the Ultimate Reality may, therefore, be des-

cribed as an identity-in-difference'132.

We have referred here to Rāmānuja and Bhartr̥prapañca to show

that the Indian philosophic thought is not unaware of the conception

of the Absolute as an identity-in-difference, as is generally supposed.

Śaṅkara, too, knows it full well and gives it an honoured place in his

scheme of things. He also sings the glory of the Īśvara and says that

this grand creation, which it is impossible even to conceive through

the mind, can be brought into being by the supreme Īśvara alone and

never even by all the great gods and angels or other divine powers.

The Advaita Vedāntin, too, has to look to this Īśvara for favour in

order to have the desire for advaita and so it has been rightly said that

it is only from the favour of Īśvara that men have the desire for the

non-duality.133 Śaṅkara unfailingly points out and emphatically states

that the knowledge of this Apara Brahman is the door to the know-

ledge of the Para Brahman,134 and so it cannot be skipped over or

dispensed with as a mere 'myth' or 'fiction'. The difference between

Bhartr̥ and Śaṅkara is, therefore, only a difference in emphasis and not

in essentials, and it is very curious and interesting to find that Sureś-

vara tries to explain Bhartr̥'s viewpoint as in effect the same as Śaṅ-

kara's and represents Bhartr̥ as a vivartāvādin instead of a pariṇāma-

vādin135.

132 IA. Vol. LIII—1924 p. 78.

133 Īśvarānugrahā eva puṁsām advaitavāsanā. AP, 6-85.

134 etāvad vijñānasya dvāratvāc ca parabrahma vijñānam prati. ŚB, on BU,

2.1.14.

135 Vār, śl. 1164, p. 666.

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY

79

As a matter of fact, if one judges the whole of Indian thought

impartially, remembering the true significance of transcendence as we

have put it, then it will be found that each and every system points

ultimately towards this unique state, though sometimes the emphasis

is put on one aspect and sometimes on the other. Thus, the Yoga

system, which is represented as an 'isolationist' school of thought, really

hints at this transcendent state because it does not speak of kaivalya

all at once but only after the vibhūtipāda, where one attains omni-

science and omnipotence.136 This great achievement, too, is cast off

ultimately in order to attain kaivalya.137 Here the stress is on

kaivalya, but the vibhūti is not ignored. Similarly, the Tāntric

thought, which is represented simply as evolutionary or dynamic in

character, has also this transcendental aspect everywhere. Contrary

to the Sāṅkhya, here the stress is no doubt on Śakti or Power, but

the final goal is the supreme Śiva, which is beautifully described

thus: "(Though) full of activity (it looks) idle, (though) light in

its sole nature (yet) dark, not a void (yet) like.the void, such is the

inscrutable nature of Sambhu or Śiva".138 Similarly of this final state

of realization the Tantras speak thus: "Then in that supreme sky

with the sun and moon having set, one remains, as it were,

unconscious as in the state of sleep, yet wide awake, (with his cons-

ciousness) uncovered".139 The Upaniṣads, we have pointed out, lay

equal stress on both the aspects through the two concepts of Prāṇa or

Agni and Ātman, and thereby work out an unique synthesis.

The Concept of Jīva or the Individual Soul

The conception of Iśvara has taken us too far. Closely allied to

this concept is the other one of jīva. In fact, the two are represen-

ted in the Upaniṣad as close friends, an eternal pair of birds occupy-

136 sarvabhāvādhiṣṭhātṛtvam sarvajñātṛtvam ca. YS, 3. 49.

137 tad vairāgyād api doṣavikṣaye kaivalyam. Ibid. 3. 50.

138 udyogamayam ālasyam prakāśaikatmakam tamah/

aśūnyam śūnyakalpam ca tattvam kim api śāmbhavam. SU, 3.9.

139 tadā tasmin mahāvyomni pralīnaśśibhāskare/

sauṣuptapadāvan mūḍhaḥ prabuddhaḥ syād anāvṛtaḥ, SK, 2.9.

80

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

ing the same tree.140 Of the two birds one eats the tasteful fruits,

while the other merely looks on, without eating anything.141 In

other words, the one is the enjoyer, the other is the seer. Now this

enjoyment is the enjoyment of the fruits of action, and it is the

jīva who becomes attached to or bound by the actions and hence comes

under bondage. Therefore it laments from the loss of its lordship

or freedom and is downcast, plunged in sorrow.142 Only when he

views the other, the Lord, and realizes his greatness, then alone is he

freed from all lamentations.143 The jīva is then a projected image

of Īśā, which is sent forth into the lower world of birth and death.

These images are our personal selves and hence the Kaṭha speaks

of the one as the light and the other as the shadow.144 These

shadows or images 'are thrown down into the sea of physical matter

like a fisher's net, and, when their 'catch' of experience is full, they

are withdrawn once more by the fisher'. Hence the Svetāśvatara

significantly calls the Īśvara 'jālavān', the netter or the fisher. He

himself does not descend into the sea but 'sits above in his boat

throughout the long ages of the Cosmic Day, knowing in himself

neither birth nor death nor sorrow'.

There is a lot of discussion and divergent opinions as to whether

the jīva is a projection or image of Īśvara, or whether both of them

are images of the one Supreme Brahman.145 We prefer to hold with

the author of Vivarana that the jīva is an image of Īśvara, for, this

explains more clearly the necessity of the dependance of the former

on the latter, as well as their close mutual connexion. This also

satisfactorily accounts for the svātantrya or the independence of the

Īśvara and dependence of jīva. The difference between jīva and

Īśvara is sometimes accounted for by saying that when the pure

consciousness becomes reflected in māyā it becomes Īśvara, while

when reflected in avidyā it becomes jīva. Māyā is represented as

made up of pure sattva, untainted by rajas and tamas, and avidyā

is said to be of darkened sattva, overpowered by rajas and tamas.

140 dvā suparṇā etc. MU, 3. 1.1.

141 Ibid.

142 MU, 3.1.2.

143 Ibid.

144 KTU, 1.3.1.

145 SL, p. 79 ff.

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY

81

There are, again, others who distinguish between the two by saying that in māyā, the vikṣepa or distraction element predominates, while in avidyā, the āvaraṇa or covering, or concealment is the main element.

Hence Īśvara being connected with the diffusive or distractive aspect goes on creating the diversity, without being covered or enveloped by nescience, while the jīva is completely in darkness being totally overpowered by the covering function.

This also explains why the one is all-knowing and the other absolutely ignorant.

Others again hold that Īśvara is the reflection of the consciousness in avidyā, while jīva is the reflection in the antahkarana or mind.

However divergent may be the views, it is clear that somehow or other, the one and the same light has been split into two, and the difference is only the difference of the medium which reflects the light and not of the light itself.

A very vexed question remains about the status of jīva.

Is it permanent and eternal or a mere fiction and evanescent?

There is a passage in the Katha and Svetāśvatara which seems to support the eternal nature of jīva.

It describes the Īśvara thus : 'He who is eternal among eternals, conscious among conscious entities, who, as one, distributes or allocates the desired things to many'.146

This passage asserts that Īśvara and jīva have these aspects in common, viz, that they are both eternal and conscious, while they differ in this that the one is singular, the other is plural and the one lacks the objects of desire, while the other supplies them to the other.

This last feature reveals that the jīvas lack ānanda, while they share the nature of sat and cit with Īśvara.

We shall have occasion to show that the ānanda-maya is verily Īśvara, as expressly stated in the Māṇḍukya147 and hence bliss is the marked feature of Īśvara which distinguishes him from jīvas.

This bliss signifies fullness, and as the Īśvara is not limited within the bounds of finitude, his fullness and bliss are inherent in his very nature, while the jīvas being essentially limited and imprisoned in finitude suffer from a lack of fullness and are deprived of bliss.

146 SU, 6.13., KTU, 2.5.13.

147 prajñānaghana eva ānandamayo…….esa sarveśvaraḥ etc. Māṇḍ, 5-6.

I I

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

But the crux of the question is: what happens when the bonds of

finitude are shaken off? Does the jīva still retain his entity or does

he become absorbed in the vastness of the infinitude? In Western

philosophical thought, even Bosanquet, who solely concerns himself

with the destiny of the individual, has to admit that in the Absolute

the content of the imperfect individual, has to be 'transmuted and

rearranged',148 and there is an 'expansion and absorption of the self'.149

Bradley also speaks of the perfection and harmony which the indivi-

dual attains in the Absolute as 'the complete gift and dissipation of

his personality', in which 'he, as such, must vanish'. 'The finite, as

such, disappears in being accomplished'.150

To the Upaniṣads the problem does not appear as a baffling one.

The Upaniṣads everywhere emphatically affirm the complete identity

of jīva and Brahman: 'As pure water dropped in another pure water

becomes absolutely like that, similar is the state of the self of the

knowing sage',.151 'As all these flowing rivers, moving towards the

ocean, on reaching the ocean lose themselves, removed are their name

and form, and they are called the ocean itself, similarly the sixteen

parts of this realiser or knower, on getting the Puruṣa are lost, gone

are their name and form and are called as Puruṣa itself'.152 The term

'astam gacchanti', literally 'sets' or 'gets lost', may cause an alarm to

many, who believe that the loss of individuality is a loss of all con-

sciousness. But one must remember that 'to be rid of the ego is not

to be rid of life'. Here, one rather 'loses' to find, dies to live. From

the point of view of the Supreme, the question of the persistence of

individuality is superfluous, and from the standpoint of Īśvara, the

question is readily taken up and it is.specifically stated that the indivi-

dual who gets this realisation, 'on rising from this body', i.e. casting

off the false or spurious individuality and on attaining the Supreme

Light, is endowed with his own true form (svena rūpeṇā' bhinispad-

yate),153 he becomes the Supreme Puruṣa (sa uttamah puruṣah).154

It is always our finite consciousness that gets alarmed at the very idea

148 Logic Vol. ii, p. 258.

149 VD, p. 263

150 AR, pp. 419-20.

151 KTU, 2.4.15.

152 PRU, 6.5.

153 CU, 8.12.3.

154 Ibid.

of its merging in the Infinite, but, in fact, the moment one sheds his

individuality, he is endowed with a super-individuality, which far

surpasses our comprehension.

The Upaniṣads, thus, do not make the Absolute a mere unity of

persons, or a system of selves, related to each other as parts of a sub-

stance like a college and its members, as conceived by Metaggart, but

keep the absolute unity of the Absolute or Brahman intact and yet

allow full scope and value to the individuals in the sphere of existence.

Jīva is, empirically, not a fiction but a reality, and though he cannot be

called jīva, as such, on attaining the Supreme, yet that does not in any

way signify that he vanishes into nothingness. On the other hand, he

attains a fullness, which was always his, on casting off the fetters of

finitude. He becomes the true Puruṣa on ceasing to be a jīva.

Hence it is not a loss but a regaining of the true personality.

The Concept of Māyā

But what really makes the one Supreme Consciousness split up

into two, the jīva and the Īśvara? We have already seen that it is

through the instrumentation of māyā that this division occurs. Not

only does it create the twin selves, the higher and the lower, the wise

and the ignorant, the happy and the miserable, the seer and the

eater but it also makes a deeper division, the division between the

subject and the object. As it brings forth the jīva, and the Īśvara,

so it immediately provides them with a jagat or world to be enjoyed

and ruled by each of them respectively. Thus the division between

the subject and the object is within the womb of māyā, and beyond

that is the undifferentiated unity.

Now, what is this supreme power called māyā, which is at the

root of creation and behind all manifestation? The usual translation

of the word as ‘illusion’ is entirely misleading, and has led to a

complete misunderstanding of the whole Vedānta. Māyā is essential-

ly that which measures (mīyate anayā). Hence it signifies that

function which measures the Immeasurable, sets a limit to the limit-

less. From this comes its secondary sense of the power of conceal-

ment, for unless the vastness of the Infinite is concealed, it becomes

impossible to represent it as small or finite. Its third sense of

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

conjuring trick or deception also follows from this, in as much as it deceives all by presenting the Infinite as the finite, the Vast as the small, the Eternal as the fleeting, and also vice versa. It is, therefore, represented as having two functions, viz. veiling and distraction, āvaraṇa and vikṣepa. It first puts a veil on the face of Reality and this is its covering function; thereafter, it goes on to make some other things pass for the Truth or Reality and this is its distracting function. This concealment of Truth or Reality is referred to, again and again, in the Upaniṣads,155 which evidently point to the āvaraṇa of māyā, and the second function is also referred to in the famous line: ‘Indro māyābhib pururūpa īyate,’156 where the assuming of many forms is attributed to māyā, and the term is used in the plural to make it tally with the plurality of forms assumed thereby.

There are some who are disposed to think that the doctrine of māyā is an invention of Saṅkara and that it does not find any place in the Upaniṣads, but this is an absolutely wrong idea, as has been ably pointed out by Ranade.157 Saṅkara may have worked it out in detail but the idea lies rooted in the Upaniṣads themselves. Gough rightly refutes Colebrooke, who is wrong in imagining that it is a later graft upon the old Vedāntic philosophy, and firmly asserts that "the tenet of māya is no modern invention; the thought, if not the word, is everywhere present in the Upaniṣads, as an inseparable element of the philosophy, and the word itself is of no infrequent occurrence;...... there has been no addition from without, but only a development from within; no graft but only a growth".158

All the problems of philosophy, of immanence and transcendence, unity and diversity, finite and infinite arise because of the presence of this principle of māyā. Māyā represents the principle of non-Being, it is the matrix of all becoming. The problem immediately arises: what is the relation between this non-Being and the Being? If this non-Being or becoming is in a relation of identity with

155 amṛtaṁ satyena channam. BU, 1.6.3., anṛtāpidhānā. CU, 8.3.2. etc.

156 BU, 2.5.19.

157 CSU, p. 223 ff.

158 PU, p. 248.

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY

85

Being, then the immutability of Being ceases, and again, if the relation

is a relation of difference, then there are two independent principles,

which destroy the doctrine of advaita. To get out of this dilemma,

the Vedāntins call it 'anirvacanīya' or inexplicable, but it must be

remembered that this inexplicability is only to the human conscious-

ness, from our point of view, because we, being a product of māyā,

cannot know, as such, the nature of our origin. As the Nāsadīya

Sūkta of the Rgveda points out: "Who knows and who shall say

whence has it come, whence this creation? Even the gods came

after it and hence who shall know whence did it come?"159. Only He

who is beyond the māyā and sits above it knows its nature, to all else

who are below it, i.e. under māyā, the knowledge is hidden and it's

nature remains inscrutable.

Those who complain that the Vedānta thus leaves things un-

explained, evidently forget that the very attempt to explain this

original mystery is self-stultifying, because it is something like an

attempt to ride on one's own shoulders. As Green puts it: "The old

question, why God made the world, has never been answered, nor

will be. We know not why the world should be; we only know that

there it is".160. Those who feel a satisfaction in attributing the

becoming to the very nature of Being, thereby, make the Being

or the Absolute lose its very character. The Vedānta, on the

contrary, accepts the mystery with veneration, acknowledges the

becoming as a fact, and yet holds on with equal firmness, to the other

great fact of the intrinsic self-sufficiency of the Absolute, its pure

non-dual nature. Thus, māyā is not a fiction or an unreality, not

'asat', to us, to our empirical consciousness, and again, it is not a

reality or 'sat' from the standpoint of the Absolute. Hence it is

called neither 'sat' nor 'asat'. neither something nor a pure nothing.

The Reality is one and indivisible, and yet that very Reality apparently

splits itself somehow into two. A mirror comes, as it were, in the

middle, and makes the one original face split in twain. The splitting

is only apparent, for when the mirror breaks or is removed it is again

the one single face. Hence māyā is not darkness, but shining and

159 RV, 10. 129.

160 PE, Sec. 100.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

resplendent like a clean mirror, and so the Upaniṣad calls it the golden

lid, which covers the face of Truth.161 Again, it is sometimes called

the truth and then the Reality is called the Immortal (amṛta),162 which

signifies that the one is the apparent truth and the other the abiding

or immortal truth (satyasya satyam).

Māyā, in one sense, is the repository of all knowledge, and again,

it is the very seat of ignorance, a bewildering paradox. The entire

knowledge of the whole manifestation is here, because she holds within

her womb the entire creation, and again it is here that the veil is cast

over the face of Truth or Reality, and the plunge into the ignorance

is taken. Īśvara, being the Creator, is in eternal union with māyā,

which "is properly speaking the 'means whereby' the Great Magician

(māyin) operates, viz. all the 'measure' (root mā, as in nirmā, 'to

create') that belongs to the divine nature, svabhāva, prakṛti etc."163.

Hence the Śvetāśvatara rightly calls this power as the own power of

the Lord (devātmśaktim).164 It is not something separate and undi-

vine in nature like the prakṛti of Sāṅkhya. In the words of Śaṅkara

it is "the divine power, in which names and forms lie unevolved and

which is the antecedent condition of names and forms."165 The Lord

is never separate from this power but in eternal conjunction with it.

'His supreme power is said to be of many kinds; knowledge, will

and action are natural to Him.'166 The Creator without his power

of creativity is inconceivable. It is through the medium of this mir-

ror of māyā that the supreme consciousness assumes self-consciousness,

comes to know itself, as it were, in all its richness.

Thus Īśvara and māyā are in a relation of identity-in-difference, the

power and the wielder of power being inseparable from each other, yet

different somehow from each other. The division is, in other words,

within the one and the same entity. "Hence comes the peculiarity

that the parā-prakṛti is both different from Brahman and an aspect

161 hiraṇmayeṇa pātreṇa satyasya pihitaṁ mukham. IU, 15.

162 BU, 1.6.3.

163 IHQ. Vol. XI, Sept. '35.

164 ŚU, 6.8.

165 daivī śaktiḥ avyākṛtanāmarūpā nāmarūpayoḥ prāgavasthā, ŚB, VS,

1.4.9.

166 svābhāviki jñānabalakriyā ca. ŚU. 1. 3.

of Brahman." From the standpoint of the Supreme or the Absolute,

the question of the relation between it and māyā does not arise at all,

because there it is one undivided homogeneous Reality (ekarasa).

Only when 'the pure Spirit becomes the subject' then immediately

comes confronting it 'the non-subject or object' and 'interaction be-

tween the two sets in.' 'The cosmic process is the gradual realisation

of values in its upward ascent from pure nothingness to the Kingdom

of God, under the influence and inspiration of the living God.'167 Thus

the whole evolution is in māyā, and, within her is the polarity of

subject and object. Īśvara or God is, no doubt, above māyā and so

is the Supreme or the Absolute, but the one is above it as a

controller or ruler, while the other is above it as its support and

substratum (adhiṣṭhāna). Hence the one is organically related with it,

while the other is eternally unrelated because of its uniqueness. "While

God is organically bound up with the universe, the Absolute is

not."168 So, "creation neither adds to nor takes away from the reality

of the Absolute. Evolution may be a part of our cosmic process, but

the Absolute is not subject to it. The Absolute is incapable of in-

crease."169 Thus this conception of māyā accounts for the evolution

and yet preserves the perfection of the Absolute. It takes its reality

from the Absolute, works out the diversity, and yet leaves the original

unity unimpaired.

Māyā has been identified with prakṛti in the Śvetāśvatara170 and the

famous verse 'ajām ekām' etc.171, evidently represents it as composed of

three guṇas, symbolised by the three colours, red, white and black. It

should also be noted that it is 'ajā' i.e. without birth or beginning be-

cause, as we have pointed out, nobody knows its origin. It is also some-

times identified with avidyā, but as we have pointed out, a distinction,

too, is drawn between them. Māyā is represented to be composed of

pure sattva, while avidyā is impure through the admixture of rajas and

tamas. Māyā is a more general term which includes both vidyā and

avidyā. It binds through avidyā and again releases through vidyā. So

167 HJ, Vol. XEIV, July, 46.

170 māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt. ŚU, 4. 10.

168 IVL, p. 343.

169 Ibid.

171 Ibid. 4.5.

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STUDIE IN THE UPANIṢADS

in the Tantras we find the propitiation of the Mother, for it is only

she who can effect the release, because the bondage, too, is purely due

to her. The Tantras have also, therefore, classified māyā from different

aspects, and named them differently as mohamāyā, māyā, mabāmāyā,

yogamāyā etc. The Upaniṣad, through its legend in the Kena about

the divine resplendent Mother Umā, evidently refers to this pure and

divine form of māyā,172 who alone, finally, reveals the nature of the

Supreme Reality to Indra. Those who neglect this vidyā or divine

aspect of māyā miss the whole significance of it. Again, "the term

avidyā, as applied to her, means primarily the dark abyss of non-being

(for 'vid' means both to be and to know), and secondarily the mysterious darkness of the unmanifest state."173 It is in this sense that the

term 'asat' is used to denote her in many places in the Upaniṣads, as

well as the term 'avyākṛta'. She has contraction and expansion in her

very nature and so sometimes she is the mere potentiality of all things

and sometimes the actuality.

Solution of the Problem

We now return to our original problem with which we started

our enquiry, viz. 'Īśa vāśyam idam் sarvam.' We have surveyed so

far the nature of īśa and have just seen the nature of 'idam' or non-

Being as presented by māyā. In our ordinary consciousness the 'idam'

predominates, the world of objects prevails over the subject. The

Īśa lies covered or concealed under the load of 'idam'. Instead of

the Īśa covering the 'idam', the 'idam' has come to cover the Īśa. Now

the process has to be reversed, the 'backward-flowing movement' has

to be initiated, the gaze has to be turned back (āvṛttacakṣub), the

'parāk' or the outward must turn 'pratyak' or inward. A return to

pure subjectivity is demanded. Does it mean an annulment or

negation of all objectivity ?

No; the Upaniṣad itself goes on to show the stages through which

this return to subjectivity is realized and points out its true nature.

When the hold of the 'idam' is first slackened, one begins to feel

172 bahuśobhamānām umām haimavatīm, KU, 24.

173 YK, p. 163.

dimly the presence of the other element, viz., Īśa or Ātman along with it. Gradually the ‘idam’ is integrated with the Īśa, the objects are found to inhere in the subject, like the beads strung together in a thread. As the vision grows, one comes to realize an organic unity between the two : there is no subject without the object, nor any object without the subject; all the bhūtas are in the Ātman and the Ātman is in all the bhūtas.174 Here, one feels ‘the existence of the one in the other and through the other’175, as Pringle-Pattison, puts it. But still there is a higher vision, where the objects (the ‘bhūtas’) are not seen in the Ātman but as the Ātman itself (ātmai ‘vā’ bbūt),176 i.e., the objects are found to exist only in and through the Ātman. Here the term ‘abbūt’ does not signify a ‘becoming’ of the Ātman, for that has already been indicated in the previous verse through the statement of the reciprocal relation of cause and effect subsisting between the bhūtas and the Ātman, and again between the Ātman and the bbūtas. Here what the Upaniṣad hints at is the transcendental relation subsisting between the objects and Ātman. In reality, the objects are the Ātman, and not mere products of the Ātman, for that would signify a relation of difference even in the midst of identity. It is to the deluded vision that the objects appear as independent entities. With the first dawning of knowledge and a partial removal of delusion, the objects appear as dependent on the Ātman and no longer separate and independent, but then the Ātman, too, has to be dependent on them. So in the final vision, the absolute freedom of the Ātman is once more realized; there is no relation of mutual dependence any more, for there are no two entities here, but the Ātman itself is all in all, all the objects or bhūtas have no separate existence. In the previous state, there was a ‘seeing’ (anupaśyati) as well as a seer (yas tu), but here it is a ‘becoming’ (abbūt) and there is, hence, no longer a seer, who observes through a relation of separation, but the observer or realizer becomes the very ground or substratum, the ‘adhiṣṭhāna’ of all (yasmin).

174 yas tu sarvāṇi bhūtāni ātmany evā’nupaśyati sarvabhūteṣu cā’rmānam, IU, 6.

175 IG, p. 254.

176 IU, 7.

• 90 STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

The Upaniṣads, thus, solve the problem of the subject and the

object not by a denial of the one and an affirmation of the other,

neither by a denial of both, nor by an affirmation of both, but

simply through a transcendence of both the terms. So, the ‘vāsyam’

in the sense of ‘inhabiting’ may be realized in the stage of ‘yas tu

sarcāni bbūtāni’, but in the next stage of ‘yasmin’, the ‘vāsyam’

assumes a different meaning. It is not a ‘clothing’ or ‘covering’ in

the sense that it makes the ‘idam’ non-existent or invisible, but it is

a ‘clothing’ through which the ‘idam’ is still seen, but no longer as

a separate reality but as the Ātman itself. The two senses will

also differ according as one interprets the term, ‘Īśa’. If by Īśa,

the Īśvara is taken, then he undoubtedly inhabits all the things

created, he being organically related to the universe; but if by Īśa,

one takes the Supreme or the Ātman, then the sense of inhabit-

ing no longer fits, because the Ātman is all in all, there is nothing

else to be inhabited by it. Thus the Upaniṣad itself beautifully

explains the process or stages of ‘vāsyam’ through the two successive

verses.

As Coomaraswamy rightly points out, "it is, then, a funda-

mental error to assume that either Veda or Vedānta regards the world

as a mistake ; what is asserted is that in so far as its parts or principles

are separately envisaged and not in their integrity, sub specie

aeternitatis as God sees them all together, the vision is a sorry one.

The unenlightened man has knowledge of (avidyā) each thing

independently and runs in vain pursuit of particular goods (prthak

paśyans tān evā’nubidhāvati. Katha 4. 14), for, as Ulvich Engelberti

expresses it, ignoratia divisiva est errantium. But whoever looks in

the eternal mirror and that is the same thing as ‘with eyes inverted’ or

‘thinking inversely’ (pratyakcetana - Yoga Sūtra 1. 29) or ‘upstream’

(pratikūla etc, passim) or with daivyacakṣus and not the māmsacakṣus

sees at once all things and God, as He sees Himself and so, far from

losing anything, possesses all things in their incorruptible perfection.

It is not the spectacle but the profane vision, that of the unrelated

sciences or humanism for example, that the Vedānta calls an ‘illusion’

(moha)......What Śaṅkara denies is the ultimate reality of things as

they are known ‘ignorantly’ i.e. objectively and as they are in them-

ves, not that of things "as they are in God."177 A modern Vedāntin

beautifully points out the uniqueness of the Vedāntic vision thus:

"The world as not separate from Cit or Consciousness is one vision.

The Cit as not one with the world is the second. Now with the

opening of the first (vision), the world is conceived as true or real;

with the dawning of the second, the sense of unreality (comes), but

with the opening of both comes the clear vision that the Cit alone is

really true and all else apart from it is untrue. Thus, though the

world is by its nature untrue, yet from the nature of the Ātman is

verily true".178 He also distinguishes clearly between the Buddhist,

Tāntrik and Vedāntist visions thus: The Vijñānavādin is predomi-

nantly of internal vision alone, the Śūnyavādin is predominantly of

both visions (because he denies both the inner and the outer), the

Svātantryavādin (Tāntrik) is predominantly of a divine vision alone,

but the Vedāntins have all their three eyes wide open, they

having plunged in that ocean of non-duality, without cancelling or

negating the inner and outer existences".179 Such is the uniqueness

of the Vedāntic vision, which the Upaniṣads embody. It does not

shut its eyes to existence but keeps them wide open looking simul-

taneously above and below. The final solution of things lies here

alone; all other solutions are only partial because they do not heal the

division but only cover it up.

Descartes

In Western philosophic thought it was Descartes, who first felt

acutely the existence of the division, or rather created it himself. So

177 IHQ vol. XI. Sept. '35.

178 viśvam cidabhinnam ity ekā dṛṣṭiḥ cin nā viśvābhinne 'ti dvitīya. Tatrā'-

dyonmilane jagati satyatvabuddhịḥ prarohati, dvitīyonmilane tu mithyātvamatir

dvayor evo 'nmilane tu cid evai 'kā paramārthasati tadanyad asatyam iti nirmalā

matic iti. Evan ca svarūpeṇa mithyābhūto 'pi prapañcaś cidātmanā satya eva,

KH, p. 39.

179 Kevalāntaradrṣṭipradhāno vijñānavādī.....ubhayadrṣṭipradhānas tu śūn-

yavādī, divyalocanātrapradhānas tu svātantryavādī, visphāritalocanatrayās tu

vedāntinah āntaravāhyaprapañcam anavadhiryai 'va tādṛśādvaītasarasi nimajjanāt,

Ibid. p. 30.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

he is rightly looked upon as the father or originator of modern Western

philosophy. He began with universal doubt and ultimately stumbled

upon the great truth that the doubter could not be doubted, which he

formulated in that famous proposition of his, ‘Cogito ergo sum’.

Descartes then discovered that in complete distinctness from this prin-

ciple of thought was the other principle of extension, and these two

formed the warp and woof of our whole existence. He also found

that ‘thought and extension are not only different from each other but

it is the very nature of these substances to negate each other; for

spirit is not only cognizable without the attributes of body, but it is in

itself the negation of the attributes of body’.180 Spirit and body are

essentially diverse and possess nothing in common. He understands

both of these as ‘substances’, i.e., elements which stand on their own

right, independently of each other. They stand opposed to each

other like centrifugal and centripetal forces. Having thus placed

mind and matter, consciousness and the world, in complete separation

from each other, Descartes fails to answer the question as to how they

happen to get mutually connected and affected by each other. For

every such act of connexion he has to bring in a third substance,

God, as a deus ex machina, who effects the unity of the ego with the

matter of extension.

Spinoza

The artificiality of this conception struck the thinkers that followed

Descartes. Spinoza, who came next, realized that the inner contradic-

tion of the philosophy of Descartes lies in his attribution of substanti-

lity to the two entities, viz., matter and mind, both of which he takes

as a substance. The remedy lies, Spinoza thought, in abandoning the

conception of both as substances and instead, taking them as forms of

the manifestation of a single substance. In the philosophy of Spinoza

this one substance is named God. He says, that “by Substance, I mean

that which is in itself and is conceived through itself: in other words,

that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other

conception”.181 This notion of substance being assumed, there can exist,

180 HP, p. 162.

181 Eth. Prop. VIII,

according to Spinoza, only a single substance. What is through its

own self alone is necessarily infinite, unconditioned and unlimited by

anything else. A plurality of infinites, is, therefore, impossible, and

hence the plurality of substances, as assumed by Descartes, is necessa-

rily a manifest contradiction. It is possible for only one substance,

and that an absolutely infinite substance, to exist. So, the two sub-

stances of Descartes, matter and mind, are taken by Spinoza as the

two 'attributes', in which the single substance reveals itself to us. It

is only the human understanding that invests substance with the two

attributes, substance itself being unexhausted by any such specialities

of form.

It is impossible to do justice to the sublime conception of Spinoza

within a short compass. He made one of the boldest attempts, in the

whole history of philosophic thought, to rise above the contradiction

in order to view things sub specie eternitatis. But yet the complaint

against him is that his substance is like the lion's den to which all

footprints lead, but nulla vestigia retrorsum. As James puts it: “You

cannot redescend into the world of particulars by the Absolute's aid or

deduce necessary consequences of detail, important for your life, from

your idea of his nature”.182 So Joachim feels that “there is an inner

contradiction in his conception of God, as at once excluding all deter-

mination and comprehending an infinite diversity of ultimate charac-

ters”.183 “There is nothing to explain why the unity should, even in

appearance, be broken up into multiplicity, why the Infinite should

appear in the guise of innumerable finites, why this world of illusion

should be here at all”.184 Thus Spinoza's lofty conception of sub-

stance failed to account for the dualism and contradiction here below,

for his substance was much too aloof and indifferent to concern itself

with these differences. Though he freed substance from all opposition

and contradiction by conceiving it as one and infinite, and not two

like Descartes, yet as attributes, thought remained only thought and

extension as only extension and this makes it inevitable that the one

will exclude the other. So the search for in inner principle of union

between them had still to be pursued. The reconciliation must be

182 PT, pp. 70-71. 183 SE, p. 106. 184 PR, p, 266.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

found through the very two terms of opposition and this could be

effected in two ways: either from the end of matter or from the

end of the spirit. Either mind was to be subordinated to

matter or matter was to be subsumed under mind. Descartes began

with dualism, Spinoza summarily resolved it through his neutralism,

but after him the philosophical world, abandoning his neutralism,

definitely divided itself into two hostile camps, viz, of Idealism and

Realism, the one taking the side of mind, the other that of matter.

The conflict has remained eternally acute ever since, though there have

been heroic attempts to effect a compromise every now and then.

Leibnitz

The first reaction to the views of Spinoza is noticed in Leibniz,

who set himself in sharp opposition to Spinoza's conception of sub-

stance. "Like Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz based his philosophy

on the notion of substance, but he differed radically from them as

regards the relation of mind and matter, and as regards the number of

substances. Descartes allowed three substances, God and mind and

matter; Spinoza admitted God alone. For Descartes, extension is the

essence of matter; for Spinoza, both extension and thought are attri-

butes of God. Leibniz held that extension cannot be an attribute

of a substance. His reason was that extension involves plurality

and can, therefore, only belong to an aggregate of substances; each

single substance must be unextended. He believed, consequently, in an

infinite number of substances, which he called "monads".185 Thus,

in antithesis to the philosophy of Spinoza, the fundamental thesis

of that of Liebniz is this: there is a plurality of monads which consti-

tute the element of all reality, the fundamental being of the whole

physical and spiritual universe. This is the Monadology of Leibniz

which was the reaction from Spinoza's monism. For Spinoza's One

Infinite Substance, Leibniz substituted a plurality of independent

finite substances, meaning by "substance" not (as in Descartes and

Spinoza) something static and inert, but that which is essentially

dynamic and active. But Leibniz, by his conception of plurality of

monads, created a fresh difficulty. As he expreses it: 'the

185 HWP, p. 6c6.

monads have no windows through which anything may come in or

go out', and thus, since each monad is independent and self-sufficient

the question as to how they come to interact, as in the case of per-

ception, remains unanswerable. To save the situation, Leibniz has

to take recourse to a 'pre-established harmony' between the monads,

which leads almost to a relapse to the position of Descartes, who had

also conceived of God as effecting the tie between matter and mind.

If the unity of the universe was to be saved, then the absolute

independence of the monads had to go, or if the absolute indepen-

dence of the monads was to be preserved, the unity was impossible

of achievement. So the problem remained where it was.

Kant

The next great figure in Western philosophy was Kant, who tried to

effect a compromise between the one-sided realistic and idealistic tenden-

cies that preceded him. Before him, while on the one hand, empiricists,

like Locke, Berkeley and Hume, assigned to the mind, in subordination

to the world of sense, a role of pure passivity; the rationalists, on the

other hand, like Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, assigned to it, in

superiority to the world of sense and in its sufficiency for its own self,

a role of pure activity. 'Kant, for his part, endeavoured to harmonize

the pretensions of both. He proclaimed the mind or the ego, as

practical ego, free and autonomous, the unconditioned arbiter of

itself, but again as theoretical ego, absolutely receptive and conditioned

by the world of sense.'186 Kant began his enquiry with a critical

scrutiny of the origin of human experience or cognition in man, and

hence his philosophy is critical and known as criticism. Kant's

famous 'Critique of Pure Reason' is devoted to this scrutiny and he

arrives at the following results. He finds, first of all, that all cognition

involves two factors, the subject and the object, the cognizer and the

cognized. Of them, the one factor, the external object, contributes

the material of knowledge, while the other factor, the subject contri-

186 HP, p. 210.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

butes the form,—those notions, viz., by virtue of which alone any

connected knowledge, any synthesis of individual perceptions into a

whole of experience, is possible. Both these factors are equally

indispensable for all knowledge whatsoever ; were there no external

world, there were no perceptions ; and were there no a priori notions,

these perceptions were merely an indefinite plurality and maniness, a

chaotic mass, without mutual combination, and without connexion in

the unity of a whole. In that case there would not be any such thing

as experience. Therefore, Kant concludes, that while perceptions

without notions are blind and notions without perceptions are empty,

cognition is a union of both, in this way that it fills up the frames

of notions with the matter of experience or rather disposes the matter

of experience into the net of notions.

Thus, though Kant discovered the unity of subject and object

in all human experience or knowledge, yet this healing of the division

proved absolutely deceptive and of no value whatsoever. For along

with the discovery of the fusion of the subject and the object, Kant

also came to discover that it is impossible to know things as they are

in themselves. The very unity of the subject and the object stood as a

stumbling block to the knowledge of the thing-in-itself, because, in all

cognitions the contribution of the subject produces some change in the

object. The innate forms or categories mould or modify the object

i.e., in other words, the object appears to us only as modified by

categories. Secondly, no perceptions reach us pure and uncoloured,

but only through the medium of time and space. Whatever is to be

perceived, must be perceived in time and space; without them percep-

tion is impossible, because they are the universal forms of all objects of

sense. Thus being an active contributor to the process of cognition,

the subject makes it impossible for the object to reveal itself in its true

being. The very fusion or unity of two elements destroys the purity

of the cognition and turns it into a spurious one. It follows, then,

that we only know appearances and not things themselves in their own

true nature. So, 'unknown and unknowable' was the last word of

Kant about the true nature of things, and the philosophical world

remained in utter darkness as before. The light was still to be

found.

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY

97

Hegel

A light was kindled in Hegel, which seemed almost to be the

final, that will dispel all darkness and provide a supreme solution to

all the problems. In fact, the nineteenth century was wholly dominated

by the philosophy of Hegel, and it still holds its sway over a large

section of philosophical thinkers. Hegel resolved the deadlock which

Kant's thing-in-itself had brought about. The unity of subject

and object, which Kant perceived as permeating all human cognitions,

was to Hegel the very soul of Reality. Thought itself was to him

the Absolute and the very impact and opposition of being and non-

being provided for him infinite richness to its conception. As he

states it: "Being, as being, is nothing fixed or definite; it yields to a

dialectic and sinks into its opposite, which also taken immediately is

nothing (saying that God is only the supreme Being and nothing more

is declaring Him to be so negatively also). The mere Being, as it is

mere abstraction, is, therefore, the absolutely negative. To prevent

one nullifying the other, man must first discover some field-predicate

for Being, to mark it off from Nothing; this of necessity leads to the

onward movement, and gives to Being a 'true or concrete significance'

(and this significance consists in the idea of Becoming). Becoming is

the unity of Being and Nothing. The unity has to be conceived in

the diversity, which is all the while present and explicit. To become

is the true expression for the resultant of 'to be' and 'not to be'.

Becoming is the first concrete thought and therefore the first notion,

whereas Being and Naught are empty abstractions".187

Thus to Hegel the very process of thought reveals the dynamic

self-evolution of the Absolute Idea. Hence he rejects his predecessor

Schelling's bare principle of identity, on the ground that it reduced

the Absolute into 'monotony and abstract universality', a kind of

'eternal night in which all cows are black'. Hegel, therefore, discards

static categories and lays great stress on the idea of development. But

yet the crux of the question remains: Is this development real or

purely formal and logical? A close scrutiny of Hegel's philosophy

reveals that he takes the development as purely logical. There is, at

187 LH, pp. 161-69.

13

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

the heart of things, no real flux but the movement is purely dialectical.

The Absolute has no history and from the point of view of the Eternal

Being, time and history are illusions. This is stated by Hegel himself

in a passage, which has become famous since Pringle-Pattison first

pointed it out, in which Hegel repeats the word Täuschung four times,

which literally means a ‘deception’. He states thus: “Within the

range of the finite we can never see or experience that the End has

been really secured. The consummation of the infinite End, there-

fore, consists merely in removing the illusion, which makes it seem

yet unaccomplished. The Good, the absolutely Good, is eternally

accomplishing itself in the world and the result is that it need not

wait upon us, but is already by implication, as well as in full actuality,

accomplished. This is the illusion under which we live………. In the

course of its process, the Idea creates that illusion by setting an anti-

thesis to confront itself, and its action consists in getting rid of the

illusion, which it has created”.188 Thus Hegel takes away with one

hand the reality he had conceded to the process or movement with

the other. His reconciliation is thus found to be far from satisfactory

and Pringle-Pattison rightly complains against this view thus: “But

can we hope to preserve the interest if we admit to ourselves—even

though it be only in our speculative moments—that it is all a cleverly

arranged deception? The view, as Hegel here presents it, seems to

me, I confess, to paralyze our energies at their source”.189

Hegel was thus forced to admit the illusory nature of the dynamic

movement and yet he tried desperately to give a reality to the history

through time. The contradiction between the timeless and the time

thus remained unsolved. Hegel left unanswered the question, why

should Absolute Perfection, to which there is nothing ‘unaccomplished’,

delight in creating the illusion of imperfection? How is Perfection

in general to be reconciled with even the appearance of many parti-

cular imperfections? Though the solution which Hegel offered was at

first hailed as unique and supreme, yet ultimately, on a close analysis,

it was found to have left the problem where it was, the chasm remain-

ing as wide as ever. The root of the problem is that if one tries to

188 LH, pp. 351-2.

189 IG, p. 412.

assign reality to the process of change or movement, then the Absolute

itself has to be conceived as changing and as yet imperfect, or if the

Absolute is to be conceived as perfect and eternally self-complete,

then the process or change becomes only apparent and turns out to be

illusory.

Hegel's solution having proved deceptive, the twentieth century

witnessed a reaction against the whole idealist mode of thought. It

was felt that so long philosophy had been much too engrossed with

the analysis of the mind, which in its turn had led to mere abstrac-

tions, without any touch with the concrete nature of life and the

world. So the natural demand was that 'the centre of gravity of

philosophy must, therefore, alter its place. The earth of things, long

thrown into shadow by the glories of the upper ether, must resume

its rights'.190 The need of the modern man was 'a philosophy that

will not only exercise the powers of intellectual abstraction but that

will make some positive connexion with this actual world of finite

human lives'.191 The tremendous progress and achievement of modern

science too contributed not a little to this orientation of outlook.

Philosophy which was so long under the domination of psychology,

henceforward came to be dominated by physics and biology. On the

one hand, the analysis of matter by the physicist has led almost to a

return to the views of Kant, because a principle of uncertainty, an

unknowable X is baffling all scientists, and on the other hand, the study

of life has revealed almost a bewildering richness, which is absolutely

beyond the grasp of the intellect. This has also led to a revolution

in the method of philosophy. Intellect has given place to intuition,

reason to feeling.

Bergson

The chief protagonist of this new type of philosophy is Bergson,

who raises the standard of revolt of the modern man of action

against the cool intellectualism of all philosophers beginning from

Plato. To Bergson, reality is a flux or change. The universe is

conceived as one continuous flow, and the vital urge has neither

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

beginning nor end, neither completeness nor finality. 'The world, then,

is the embodiment of an immanent principle of living change, which,

as it comes into existence, progressively creates the evolving universe.

This principle is Bergson's celebrated élan vital.'102 Bergson, thus, does

not show any regard for a finished and eternally complete Absolute

but even goes so far as to say that 'this idea of staticity is a mere

illusion of the intellect. He says that "we are at ease only in the

discontinuous, in the immobile, in the dead. The intellect is

characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life.103 So he sets

up intuition as the supreme method for grasping the living reality and

discards the intellect altogether. The novelty of Bergson's views is no

doubt striking but the drawback lies in the fact that there is no distant

end or aim to direct the course of his creative evolution, and the final

truth of things turns out to be cosmic pointlessness. Bergson has, no

doubt, rendered a great service to philosophy by releasing it from the

static prison-house of the intellect, but he has gone again to the other

extreme, by making that very unfettered state of release an end in it-

self, which has made his philosophy a merely aimless wanderer. He

has deeply felt the throb of creative impulse but has not been able to

follow it to its ultimate source or end. Hence he fails to comprehend

the 'whence' and 'whither' of the movement and so the riddle of ex-

istence remains unsolved.

Alexander

Closely following Bergson, Alexander sets up a creative and living

picture of his Absolute as Space-Time. His Absolute may be conceived

as an infinite and continuous whole, of which Space may be described

as the body and Time as the soul, and which is impregnated from

the beginning with a creative nisus. 'The real is Space-Time

as a whole and every complex or part within it. Our consciousness

of reality is the consciousness, that anything we apprehend

belongs to Space-Time…..Reality is, then, experienced whether

in enjoyment or contemplation as that which belongs to Space-Time

or the character of reality is the character of so belonging.'194 And

192 GP, p. 542.

193 CE, p. 174.

194 STD, pp. 247-8.

again, "within the all-embracing stuff of Space-Time, the universe

exhibits an emergence in Time of successive levels of finite existences,

each with its characteristic empirical quality".195

But the main difficulcy remains that it leaves unexplained how

the higher evolves out of the lower. If the Absolute be bare Space-

Time, shorn of all contents that belong to our experience, what is the

source of the qualities that we experience? Whence do the higher

qualities come, if they are not somehow or other latent in the Absolute

from the beginning? Hence, at every stage of evolution, one has to

admit a complete miracle, and so Alexander feels that all are absolutely

in the dark about the nature of the next higher quality that is to

evolve, viz. Deity. "Our human altars still are raised to the unknown

God. If we could know what deity is, how it feels to be divine, we

should first have to have become as gods. What we know of it is but

its relation to the other empirical qualitics which precede it in time.

Its nature we cannot penetrate."196 Here his agnosticism is complete.

Jeans, Eddington

Similar is the case with the scientist-philosophers, like Jeans and

Eddington. Through their approach to Reality with the aid of science

they find that "most of our common impressions of substance, world-

wide instants and so on, have turned out to be illusory, and the

externality of the world might be equally untrustworthy."197 The

reality escapes the scientist, he is only left with illusions and so he

frankly admits that "the supposed approach through the physical world

leads only into the cycle of physics, where we run round and round

like a kitten chasing its tail and never reach the world-stuff at all".198

Thus here, too, the unknowability looms large and the problem sits

heavy on the soul. By exhausting both the ends, viz. of mind as

well of matter, Western philosophy stands today perplexed, because

everywhere a deadlock confronts it and an inner contradiction wholly

falsifies all its solutions. One is forced ultimately to admit, like

Russel, that "empiricism and idealism alike are faced with a problem,

195 STD, p. 345.

197 NPW, p. 284.

196 Ibid. p. 347.

198 Ibid, p. 280.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

to which, so far, philosophy has found no satisfactory solution. This

is the problem of showing how we have knowledge of other things

than ourself and the operations of our own mind.'199 In other words,

the problem is the old problem of the subject and the object: how

they come to be connected if they are utterly disparate, and again, if

they are really one what creates the division? Their unity as well as

diversity is perplexing indeed. All solutions have been tried,—the

equal affirmation of both, the outright denial of both, the affirmation

of one and the denial of the other and so on—but all have been found

wanting. Is there, then, no way out of the problem?

The unique nature of the Upaniṣadic solution

The Upaniṣads show us the way out of this insuperable difficulty

by offering the supreme solution in the form of the unique conception

of the Ātman or Brahman. Western philosophy, we have seen,

through its long history is merely moving in a circle since the time of

Descartes, and this has been the case because there is a fundamental

error in the original conception of Descartes, which has escaped the

notice of all so far. Descartes gave the primary place to thought, and

it was thought which gave the clue to him to the existence of the 'I'

or the ego. The 'I', thus, had a secondary and derived existence, and

the original principle was taken to be thought, which, however, was

confronted by its opposite, viz. extension or matter. The opposition

between thought and matter has, therefore, continued to be funda-

mental, and though there have been heroic attempts to resolve the

opposition either by a violent denial of one of the terms or by a

worked-up compromise between the two, yet no attempt has been

made to transcend the opposition through the conception of a still

more fundamental thing than thought, which is the very pre-supposition

of both thought and extension. The Upaniṣads do not posit the

existence of the 'I' or the Self through thought, but the Ātman,

according to them, is the most fundamental of all things, and hence

self-revealed by nature. As Radhakrishnan aptly puts it: 'Descartes'

cogito ergo sum, "I think therefore I am" is not correctly expressed. I

199 HWP, p. 635.

am not because I think, I think because I am. Sum ergo cogito.

The self is primary and consciousness is inherent in it...........It is not

a necessity of thought or an object of faith as Kant affirms, but is

enjoyed as the content of spiritual consciousness. It is the felt aware-

ness of transcendent reality".200 Descartes' famous dictum has thus

to be reversed if the final solution of the problem is to be found.

The Upaniṣads give the clue to the reversal of the original wrong

position taken up by Western philosophy, for, to the Upaniṣads, it is

always the Ātman that is the most fundamental and primary of all

things, the eternal prius of everything in the world. The whole

enquiry of the Upaniṣads centres round this 'Ātman which is the

inmost of all things' (ya ātmā sarvāntarah),201 and as the true nature

of this Ātman is revealed nowhere else than in the texts of the

Upaniṣads, hence it is significantly called the Puruṣa of the Upaniṣads

(upanisadamin puruṣam).202 It is only by a true comprehension of

this 'upanisadam puruṣam' that the final solution of all problems can

be found.

We have seen that it is called the inmost of all things (sarvāntarah),

but does that mean that it is purely inward by nature? That it is

not so is proved by other statements of the Upaniṣads which assert

that all the outer manifestations, too, are this Ātman.203 Then is it

both inward and outward by nature? The famous statement of the

Māṇḍūkya about the true nature of the Ātman categorically states

that 'it is neither inwardly conscious, nor outwardly conscious nor

conscious both ways'.204 We are always accustomed to think in

terms of the outer and the inner. We only think of inclusion and

exclusion, but the Ātman transcends both. It does not include as

well as exclude all, but neither includes nor excludes anything. As

Sureśvara states, again and again, about the nature of the Ātman: 'It

is neither exclusive nor pervasive'.205 If it is not exclusive, we

immediately think that it must be all-pervasive, and if it is not all-

200 Hibb. Jl. vol. XLIV. July '49.

201 BU, 3. 4. 1.

202 BU, 3. 9. 26.

203 idam sarvam yad ayam ātmā. BU, 2. 4. 6.

204 nāntahprajñam na bahihprajñam no 'bhayatah prajñam, Māṇḍ. 7.

205 Vārt, 2. 7. 55.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

pervasive we take it to be exclusive by nature, and hence, by denying

both, the transcendental nature is sought to be indicated here. But

does not this total denial of both amount almost to a denial of the

very existence of the principle called Ātman? To guard against it

Sureśvara immediately adds that it is 'full and stationed in itself'

(pūrṇaḥ svātmany avasthitaḥ).206 It is not a 'śūnya' or a void that is

conveyed by this absolute denial, but it is a 'pūrṇa', an immeasurable

fulness which transcends all, that is sought to be grasped through this

negation. The Māṇḍūkya, too, after indulging in a relentless denial

or absolute negation finally says that it is 'the very essence of the sole

awareness of the Self' (ekātmapratyayasāram),207. and is utterly 'calm,

beneficent and non-dual' (śantam śivam advaitam).308

That there can be no question of exclusion in this conception of the

Ātman is proved by the very term 'turīya', which is used to describe

the supreme nature of the Ātman. 'Turīya' means the 'fourth', and hence

it does not exclude three, but not only includes but transcends it.

The three are not cast off, nor taken in, but simply transcended. Again,

we must remind that this transcendence merely means the uniqueness,

by virtue of which the Ātman, though in touch with all the three

states, remains untouched by them all. The ordinary dual conception

of immanence and transcendence has no meaning here. 'The question

of immanence and transcendence does not arise with reference to the

Absolute. For immanence implies the existence of an other in which

the Absolute is immanent. But the Absolute represents the totality

of being and there is nothing other than it.'209 The Turīya, therefore,

does not represent a single aspect of being but stands for that which

covers all, and because it covers all, it necessarily transcends all i.e.

stands unique from all else. It is the simultaneous awareness of all the

levels of existence or consciousness that is signified by the term Turīya.

Hence, as we have seen, Saṅkara Bhāṣya rightly represents the true

Vedāntin as one with his three eyes wide open (visphāritalocanatrayāstu

vedāntinaḥ). There is no sense of withdrawal in this conception of

transcendence, there is no shutting of one's gaze or a refusal to see all

existence. Through this vision, one comes to realize how the same

206 Vārt, 2.7.55. 207. Māṇḍ 7. 208 Ibid. 209 CIP, p. 285.

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY

105

Reality while remaining a non-dual pure unity or ‘abbeda’ in its true

nature, appears as a unity-in-difference or ‘bhedābheda’ in the plane of

Prāṇa or Buddhi, and again as complete difference or ‘bheda’ in the

still lower level of the ignorant mind. The Ātman or Brahman of the

Upanisads is, accordingly, no abyss which swallows up all finite be-

ings; it is ‘cave into which everything passes as into a kind of

eternal night’; it is no ‘lion’s den into which all the footsteps go and

none lead out again.’ The final solution of all problems lies in this

unique conception alone and it is by providing us with this solution

that the Upaniṣads prove their unerring wisdom and shine in a

singular blaze of glory.

14

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

The Upanisads do not merely furnish us with a perfect picture of Reality but also enjoin us to know it and it alone to the exclusion of all else. "Know that alone and discard all other talks,"1 is the injunction, the imperative command of the Upanisads. But why is this supreme stress on the necessity of knowing it? What is the value of knowing it? "This is the bridge of immortality,"2 "Only by knowing it one transcends death, and there is no other way of attaining (immortality)"3, answer the Upanisads. So it becomes imperative for us to enquire into the nature of this knowledge that promises immortality and carries one beyond the sphere of sorrow and suffering.

The Upanisads, in many places, signify this knowledge by the term 'seeing': "He who is free from desire sees or beholds it,"4 "It is seen by the keen and subtle intellect,"5 "This Ātman is to be seen"6 and so on. This specifically denotes that this knowledge is not mere idle speculation or intellectual theorising about the nature of the Ātman, but a direct vision, an immediate apprehension of it. As the ordinary man of ignorance sees the outer world of objects, so also the exceptionally gifted soul beholds the inner Ātman, having turned his gaze inwards.7 As there is an outer perception through the senses, so there is an inner perception through the soul and it is this perception or beholding that the Upanisadic knowledge denotes.

But a problem immediately confronts us. The Upanisad no doubt enjoins that the Ātman is to be seen (drastavyah). But how can it be seen? Is it an object of perception? The Upanisads categorically

1 tam evai 'kam jā̄natha anyā vaco vimuncatha. MU, 2. 2. 5.

2 amṛtasyai 'ṣa setuh. Ibid.

3 tam eva viditvā 'timṛtyum eti nā 'nyah panthā vidyate 'yanāya. SU, 3.8.

4 tam akratuḥ paśyati. KTU, I. 2. 20.

5 dṛśyate tv agrayā buddhyā. KTU, I. 3. 12.

6 ātmā vā 're drastavyah. BU, 2, 4. 5.

7 āvṛttacakṣuh. KTU, 2. I. I.

deny the possibility of its apprehension through the senses. "Not within the field of vision stands its form, nor with the eye can anyone see it."8 Perception being thus ruled out, inference, too, automatically becomes nullified. For inference is never possible without a basis of perception; nor has it any mark or linga to serve as the middle term of a syllogism. Then remains testimony. But testimony can never give us a direct knowledge about a thing, it only brings an indirect acquaintance with the existence of a thing. Neither is analogy of any help here, for the Ātman, as we have seen, is distinct from all else, and hence there is nothing in the universe which can be cited as analogous to it. Hence all the ordinary means of knowledge or pramāṇas that are at our disposal fail us in bringing the intimation of the Ātman.

The problem however is deeper. At the root of the failure of all the pramāṇas to comprehend the Ātman lies the supreme fact that the Ātman never becomes the object of knowledge, it is the eternal subject. It is, therefore, that the Upaniṣad asks: 'How shall ye know the knower?'9 It is impossible to make the knower the object of knowledge, for that will need another knower and so on, leading to a regressus ad infinitum. As the Ātman never becomes the object of knowledge, the Upaniṣad paradoxically states that it is unknown to the knowing and known to the unknowing.10 In other words, he who asserts that he has come to know the Ātman, signifies thereby that he has made the Ātmān the object of his knowledge, which is a manifest absurdity.9 For the object is always the not-self (anātman), the idam (it) as opposed to the Ātman (the self), the Īśa (the Lord) or the abām.

Therefore, 'so 'long as one knows 'another' as an object beside him, one does not know the self (Ātman), but only the not-self (anātman).

On the contrary, he who states that he has not known the Ātman rightly comprehends it, for he, thereby, asserts the great truth that the Ātman has not been the object of his knowledge.

But how then to distinguish between this not-knowing of the

8 na cakṣuṣā paśyati kaścanaim. KTU, 2. 3. 9.

9 BU, 2. 4. 14.

10 avijñātam vijānataṁ vijñātam avijānataṁ: K U. 1 1f.

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enlightened and the utter ignorance of the unenlightened? Does not

this not-knowing amount almost to an agnosticism? Is the Ātman

or Brahman of the Upaniṣads then similar to the Great Unknowable

of Herbert Spencer or the Thing-in-itself of Kant which is always

beyond the grasp of the human mind? In the very next verse the

Upaniṣad removes this apprehension: 'It is known in every act of

cognition and thus one attains immortality.'11 It remains unknown

(avijnātam) and yet is known in every act of cognition, pratibodhavidi-

tam, that is the paradox. In other words, it is never the object of know-

ledge, and hence unknown, and yet the very ground of all knowledge,

and hence is felt in each and every particular act of cognition. As in

the problem of Reality we pointed out that the negative statements

are made only for a deeper affirmation, so here in the problem of

knowledge, the Upaniṣads deny the knowability of the Ātman in

order to assert the foundational nature of its knowledge. As the

Reality is unique, so the method, too, of knowing it is unique. Our

ordinary consciousness fails to apprehend the nature of this knowledge,

as it fails to realize the true nature of the transcendent Reality. It is

necessary, therefore, to analyze the nature of our ordinary consciousness

or modes of knowledge and then contrast it with the transcendental

apprehension.

Perception

Our ordinary cognition always involves a dualism. It necessarily

pre-supposes a knower and a known and the function of the vṛtti or

the mode of the mind is to effect a union between the two. In fact,

our whole life is an unconscious endeavour to establish a link with the

outer world. In every act of our life we are trying to take in what

lies outside of us, to make the outer object a part and parcel of our

being. But yet we are never wholly successful. Though we can

take in a portion of the outer world into ourselves, the real essence

still lies outside us and so there is no complete fusion of our being

with the world, no absolute coalescence between the knower and the

known. It appears that our intellect merely touches the outer fringe

11 pratibodhaviditam matam amṛtatvam hi vindate, KU, 12.

of the object and never enters into the heart of it. This happens

because our intellect is unaccustomed to this act of identification and

it knows things only from a distance, through a relation of separation.

A second characteristic of our mode of perception is that in it the

object is never revealed in its true nature, because the subject always

makes an active contribution to the act of perception; and so, in the

very process of knowing an object, it modifies or colours the latter.

The subjective tinge always disfigures the pure original form of the

object. Thirdly, every act of perception is bound by space and time.

We only perceive a thing here and now. We cannot look before

and after, but our gaze is fixed on the immediate present. Similarly

a thing which is at a distance or covered by barriers does not come

within our view. These limitations are inherent in all perception.

Again, it knows only the particular and never comprehends the

general or the universal.

Inference

Inference goes ahead of perception in this that it frees the

mind from the limitation of the senses and thereby widens the

field of knowledge. Though the fire may not be within the ken of

one's perceptual knowledge, yet one may be quite sure of its exis-

tence, if smoke is perceived. The faculty of inference is, thus, not

vain imagination, but a method of knowledge, a pramāna, and, in fact,

it is this power of inference which distinguishes man from the animal.

Man, being essentially a thinking being, can never rest content merely

with what the senses present and report to him. He constructs, out

of that data or material supplied by the senses, a coherent system of

thought, extending, thereby, this knowledge to the future and to the

past. Man, therefore, can look before and after; he can apprehend

the future as well as bring back the past. The antecedents and the

consequents of an event are all before the gaze of the intellect that

indulges in inference. Inference also corrects perception and hence

stands superior to it. The senses often prove to be false reporters and

in many cases delude us by presenting the very opposite picture of

truth. The senses tell us that the Sun moves round the earth and it

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is only reasoning which comes to correct this total misrepresentation

of the actual fact, which is just the opposite of it.

Thus though reason or intellect helps greatly in the growth and

correction of knowledge, yet this help is rendered only at the expense

of the directness that the sense-perception contains. Inference or

reasoning always brings an indirect awareness of things, it cannot

make one see directly that the fire is there. Inference is always medi-

ate, that being its intrinsic character and it never becomes immediate,

for that will destroy its very nature. Bergson has beautifully pointed

out that the intellect is essentially a ‘tool-making faculty’, for, in other

words, it is a practical faculty evolved for the purpose of action in

the world. The ‘tool-making faculty’ has no doubt helped man

immensely in the management of the life in the world; but it has

taken him away, at the same time, from the soul or heart of life. “It

goes all round life, taking from outside the greatest possible number

of views of it, drawing it into itself instead of entering into it.”12

Hence the intellect presents us only with a snapshot view of things

or an infinite number of static pictures, which never brings us in

touch with the original living reality. Thus, so far as the heart of

the reality or life is concerned, the intellect has not helped man to

get near it, but, on the contrary, has taken him far away from the true

centre. The circumference has been widened no doubt but the touch

with the centre has been lost. The horizon of knowledge has been

extended at the cost of direct awareness.

Intuition

But there lies in man another faculty, far deeper and richer than

the intellect, through which he gains back the directness of apprehen-

sion lie had lost. The intellect has made him look outward, away

from the centre of life, but it is to the very inwardness of life that

intuition leads us.13 But what is this faculty called ‘intuition’? As

Bergson puts it: “By intuition, I mean, instinct that has become

disinterested, self-conscjous, capable of reflecting upon its object and

of enlarging it indefinitely”.14 In the terminology of Yoga philosophy

12. CE, p. 186.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

111

it is prajñā. It does not mean a hazy or indistinct knowledge of a

thing but signifies the clear light of reason, which views things directly

all at once.15 Prajñā or intuition is, thus, not a faculty which is incap-

able of giving us anything else than simple being', but it is a vision

direct as well as comprehensive (aśesavisésadarśanam). It is other

than inference or testimony, because it apprehends the unique or par-

ticular nature of a thing and does not stop with the knowledge of its

general nature alone like inference or testimony. It is an intimate

awareness; a 'knowledge by acquaintance', in the words of Russel. It

is the supreme perception (parim pratyaksam)16 and is the source of

testimony and inference, because they issue out of it.17

This prajñā is, thus, the true perception of the mind as distinguis-

hed from the false perception of the senses. We generally take the

pratyaksa or the sense-perception as the basis of all other pramāṇas but,

in fact, it is this prajñā or inner perception which is at the root of all

pramāṇas, as the Yoga system points out. Again, this prajñā is

not something which is opposed to the intellect, but, is the very

culmination or perfection of it. It is only after the highest develop-

ment of the intellectual faculty and its exploration to the full have

been achieved that the intuition suddenly flashes forth from the deeps.

When the mind becomes utterly limpid, clear like a crystal, being

freed from the memories or associations of words and images, then the

object is revealed in its true nature; the subject having ceased to con-

tribute anything to the act of cognition.18 This intuition has also

infinite ranges, beginning from the grossest right upto the subtlest.

The highest form of intuition is called tāraka i.e. which springs of

itself without any external cause or occasion. It covers all things of

all times in a single moment.19 The intellect knows only through a

process of succession but here a supercession of the process takes place.

The object is seized through a single act of intuition, the whole is

revealed in an instanteneity of moment.

Thus intuition gets us in touch with the flow of life or the actual

15 kramānamudhi spṛṣṭaṁ prajñālokah VB on YS, I. 47.

16 VB, on YS, I. 43. 17 Ibid. 18 YS, I. 43.

19 sarvaviṣayaṁ sarvathāviṣayaṁ akramamam. Ibid. 3.54.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

movement of the world. It brings an all-comprehensive knowledge

of the entire universe and of the principle that is active in all existence

or manifestation, which the Upaniṣads call Prāṇa. But the knowledge

of the Ātman is still to be gained. We have pointed out, in the previous

chapter, that the Ātman or Brahman is not opposed to the movement

or dynamis, and hence, is not a static being contrary to the dynamic

becoming. It is something unique transcending all these oppositions.

This is supported once again by the method of approach to the Ātman

delineated in the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣads never try to grasp the

Reality or Ātman through the intellect; and this proves that the

Reality they envisage is not a mere staticity of being, for, as Bergson

remarks about the method of the intellect, 'it always starts from

immobility, as if this were the ultimate reality'.20

Inadequacy of Intuition

Again, the Upaniṣads do not seek the Ātman through, what Bergson calls, 'intuition', or what the Yoga system calls samādbiprajñā.

The prajñā or intuition, though it brings a direct knowledge of things,

is still a process, and even in the highest state of nirodha when all

processes are apparently at an end, there still remains a touch of

process, which is traced or detected by the divergences in the periods

of time involved in nirodha. In other words, nirodha sometimes

continues for a longer period than another nirodha, and again, sometimes endures for a shorter period. And this is inevitable, since

intuition or samādhi or nirodha, after all, involves the mind and they

are only deeper movements of it, and wherever there is mind, there

must be a process. The process may be sometimes explicit, and sometimes all too implicit to be grasped at all, but still it is there all the

time so long as the mind exists. Hence intuition comes and goes,

it does not become an abiding vision. It, no doubt, gets to the centre

but is again thrown out of it. Consequently, vyutthāna or return to

the surface consciousness always haunts samādhi or the absorbed consciousness like a shadow, and is the eternal counterpart of the latter.

So a constant war goes on for mutual overpowering between the

20 nirodhasthitikālakramānubhavena. VB, on YS, I. 51.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

113

saṁskāras or potencies of vyutthāna and nirodha or samādhi.31 There remains, therefore, always an effort to keep the mind fixed in the level of samādhi or intuition. But even when the intuition becomes almost spontaneous, or the samādhi or nirodha almost a natural state, due to an overwhelming predominance of the inward movement towards the centre, there still remains an unconscious effort to retain or rather maintain that state or level of consciousness. Samādhi or intuition never becomes utterly spontaneous; there is always a trace of artificiality in it, because it is produced by the efforts of the subject or the mind.

Again, the object is not truly revealed in intuition in its utter purity. Though the mind is made absolutely clear as a crystal22 in samādhi, yet the object is known only as reflected in that clear mind and not as it is in itself. We still know only the image, though the image may, in this case, be very faithful, but not the original as yet. It is still a view of things through a medium, though the medium is seemingly non-existent due to its utter transparency and finest nature. Still there is a film though the film may be the finest. Hence, even in this deep union brought about by samādhi or intuition, the subject and the object are not totally identified. There is union no doubt but not unity as yet. It is only when this last and the finest film is pierced or lifted that we reach the utter unity, the absolute transcendence. The Upaniṣadic knowledge signifies the removal of this last veil that still separates the subject and the object, the finite and the infinite.

Hence the Upaniṣads discard the intuition of the mind or the prajñā of samādhi and seek a knowledge that is neither gained through a process nor lost after a time through vyutthāna or return to ordinary consciousness but which is spontaneous in its nature, depending not on the effort of the subject, but aroused or generated by the object alone; to be strictly precise, which is vastutantra and not kartrtantra. This knowledge, "by reason of the immediate character of its operation, may be called 'intuitive' but only on the strict condition that it

21. vyutthānanirodhasaṁskārayor abhibhavaprādurbhāvau. YS, 3. 9.

22 abhijātasye 'va maṇeḥ. YS, 1.41.

15

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

is not regarded as having anything in common with the faculty which

certain contemporary philosophers call intuition, a purely instinctive

and vital faculty that is really beneath reason and not above it."23 We

may call it the intuition of the soul in order to distinguish it from the

intuition of the mind, if we are keen to retain the term 'intuition'.

"This faculty can also be called the pure intellect, following the prac-

tice of Aristotle and his Scholastic successors, for to them the intellect

was in fact that faculty which possessed a direct knowledge of princi-

ples. Aristotle expressly declares that 'the intellect is truer than

science', which amounts to saying that it is more true than the reason

which constructs that science; he also says that 'nothing is more true

than the intellect', for it is necessarily infallible from the fact that its

operation is immediate, and because, not being really distinct from

its object, it is identified with the truth itself."24 Spinoza also hints

at such a kind of knowledge or perception when he says, at the end of

his classification of perception, that "lastly there is the perception

arising when a thing is perceived only through its essence."25 He

also points out later that "if the thing be self-existent, or as is com-

monly said, the cause of itself, it must be understood through its

essence only".26 The Ātman or Brahman of the Upaniṣads is essen-

tially such a self-existent thing and hence must be apprehended only

through its essence and not by any other means. In the words of

Eddington it may be called 'the intimate knowledge', which 'will not

submit to codification and analysis'.27

But the one term which truly expresses the nature of this know-

ledge is what the Upaniṣads use about it, viz., sākṣāt aparokṣāt. It is

not called pratyakṣa, because pratyakṣa or perception always involves,

as we have seen, the duality of the knower and the known, whereas in

this knowledge there is an absolute identity of both. But any know-

ledge, other than pratyakṣa is described as parokṣa or indirect. The

only source of direct knowledge is pratyakṣa, and all other modes of

cognition like inference, testimony etc. are indirect. Hence, to in-

dicate that though this knowledge is distinct from pratyakṣa yet it is

23 IHD, pp. 116-7; 24 Ibid. p. 117.

25 TDI, p. 8.

26 Ibid. p. 34.

27 NPW, p. 322.

not necessarily indirect, it is called not-indirect (na-parokṣa) i.e. aparokṣa. But this negative way of saying it merely as 'non-indirect' or immediate. Its immediacy surpasses even that of pratyakṣa or perception, for in perception the mediacy of the senses cannot be dispensed with and hence its immediacy is spurious. But here the soul perceives the soul without anything to intervene between the two. It surpasses even intellectual intuition in this that here the distinction between the subject and the object stands absolutely obliterated and hence the immediacy is complete. It is no doubt true that "intellectual intuition is even more immediate than sensory intuition for it is beyond the distinction between subject and object, which the latter allows to subsist; it is at once the means of knowledge and the knowledge itself and in it subject and object are identified. Indeed no knowledge is really worthy of the name except in so far as it has the effect of bringing about such an identification..... The only genuinely effective knowledge is that which permits us to penetrate into the very nature of things and if such a penetration may be effected upto a certain point in the inferior degrees of knowledge, it is only in metaphysical knowledge that it is fully and totally realizable".28 And here lies the superiority of this metaphysical or transcendental knowledge that intellectual intuitions and all other modes of knowledge find their final consummation in it, nay are verily rooted in it. It is the avasāna, the end or limit of all knowledge.

The Vedantic view of Knowledge

The Vedāntic view of pramāṇas is, therefore, absolutely distinct from all other views. According to the Vedānta, the root of all pramāṇas is the self-revealing mode of knowledge of the Ātman (svatabpramāṇa). All other modes of cognition are derived from this fundamental pramāṇa and are wholly dependent on it. Everywhere it is the one Cit that is revealed through the different modes of knowledge or pramāṇas. No cognition would have ben possible had there not been the self-shining Cit or Brahman at the background of both the subject and

28 IHD, p. 168.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

the object. What happens in every cognition is that the self in the

perceiving subject unites itself with the self in the object perceived.

In the degree that the knower has entered into the self or spirit of the

thing perceived, he is said to have known that thing. Hence,

'perception is Brahman itself, the immediate identity of knower and

known'.20 "All determinate knowledge is a self-abnegation, involving

as it does a stratification of the pure consciousness or caitanya into

three forms: pramātṛcaitanya or determinate self-consciousness, vṛtti-

caitanya or modes of consciousness, and viṣayacaitanya or empirical

object."30 So in all perception there is the coincidence of vṛtticaitanya

and viṣayacaitanya31 and it is only the unity of the apparently divided

consciousness that leads to knowledge in every case.

The Vedānta recognizes as many as six pramāṇas or modes of

knowledge, because according to it, it is the same single consciousness

that is apprehended through infinite ways of approach, and so there

is no need to restrict the modes of knowledge or curtail their number,

once the fundamental characteristic of all of them is recognized. In

every cognition the Cit or the Ātman is a necessary and invariable

element. In fact, the whole store of knowledge lies imbedded in us

and only that which is within us is revealed through the contact with

outer objects. 'All knowing is but remembrance' is a truth rightly

pointed out by Plato. Hence all perception is really acquired perce-

ption. What the vṛtti or the mode of mind does is simply the

removing or lifting of the veil that covers the object (āvaraṇābbhibhava)

and immediately with the removal of the veil the object flashes forth in

perception to our empirical consciousness. The covering of nescience

and its occasional lifting through vṛttis or mental modes makes it

appear that the knowledge is being generated at every moment anew,

but in fact, the knowledge is eternal and uncreated. "The self is aware

of all objects at all times; some being known positively and others nega-

tively. That the self knows objects directly presented to it is of course

obvious. But even in the cases of objects which are not positively so

29 SIV, p. 53.

30 Ibid.

31 Tattadindriyayogyavartamānaviṣayāvacchinnacaitanyābhinnatvam் tatta-

dākāravṛttyavacchinnajñānāsya tattadaṁśe pratyakṣatvam. JVP, p. 34.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

117

presented, the self can be said to know them, though not as present

but as absent. On being aware of an object for the first time the self

remembers that it was not aware of it before. This memory clearly im-

plies that even before the presentation of the object there was a cons-

ciousness of its absence or that it was known even then, though as

absent. Thus the self may be said to be always aware of all objects,

some as present and others as absent. Hence the Vedāntic dictum—

"Everything is lighted up by the self, either as known or as un-

known" (Sarvam jñātatayā ajñātatayā ca sākṣi-bhāsyam)."32

This presentation or non-presentation, jñātatā or ajñātatā is the

function of the intellect and hence we sometimes know and sometimes

do not know. Our knowledge has a rising and setting, a coming and

going, but to the eternal consciousness of the Sākṣin or the Seer it is

all one awareness, without any break or interruption, regardless of the

fact of presentation or non-presentation. It lights up equally both the

presence and the absence of things or objects. In other words,

nothing can be hid from the Sākṣin or the Ātman at any place or time.

It even knows the absence of knowing. This proves its fundamental

self-shining character. "It is in virtue of this fundamental

quality that an object appears and the subject knows. Appearance

and knowledge are but the two differentiated sides of the

same neutral fact of immediacy. In other words, the appearance of

caitanya as object to caitanya as subject or the knowledge on the part

of caitanya as subject of caitanya as object, has to be credited to the

fundamental self-manifesting characteristic of caitanya."33 Thus per-

ception does not bring knowledge merely from the contact of the sense

with the object but 'the fact of the self knowing the object is

somehow brought into connexion with the witnessing or self-shining

caitanya, of which the self is really constituted'34. Everywhere the

knowledge is produced through the contact of the Self or the Ātman.

Similar is the case with inference. Here, too, merely the steps of

syllogism or the modes of syllogistic reasoning do not supply the

knowledge, but an inner faculty of inference makes the knowledge

possible. He who does not possess it can never be made to infer,

32 SWK, pp. 77-8. 33 Ibid. p. 86. 34 Ibid. pp. 86-7.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

even when presented with the full form of a syllogism. The jump from the known to the unknown involves something else than the mere process of syllogistic reasoning ; in fact, the steps of syllogism merely serve as an occasion for the revelation of the inner flash of inferential faculty and do not produce the knowledge as such. As in perception the vrtti merely lifts the veil of nescience and effects a conjunction between the two caitanyas, so here, too, concomittance (vyāpti) and the particular sign or instance (hetu) merely serve to connect the particular with the universal, but it is only the self-luminous caitanya that gives rise to the knowledge spontaneously. This happens to be the fact in all forms of pramāṇas. In analogy, too, merely the similarity does not lead to the knowledge of one from the other ; but the joining of the two things i.e. the knowledge of the akinness is produced by an inner intuitive faculty. So with implication (arthāpatti) and other pramāṇas. It is the one consciousness that is apprehended differently at different levels of awareness and the different pramāṇas are nothing but the different methods devised for contacting the same caitanya in diverse ways as the occasion demands. The root of all knowledge, through whatever channel we may have it, is ultimately the Ātman. Hence the Upaniṣads call it prativodbaviditam, cognized in every act of knowledge. It is a basic fact from which there is no escape. It is a postulate of all knowledge. It makes experience possible.

The Self as the source of all Knowledge

Thus the Ātman or Brahman of the Upaniṣads is not unknowable, beyond all knowledge, but rather the very ground of all knowledge. All pramāṇas depend on this self-luminous light of consciousness and act only through it. As in our discussion on the problem of Reality, we found that nothing can exist apart from the Ātman, so from the analysis of knowledge too, it is revealed that nothing can be known except in and through the Ātman. That all cognition and means of knowledge or illumination depend on it is beautifully depicted in the famous discourse of Yājñavalkya and King Janaka.35 The King asked

35 BU, 4. 3.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

119

Yājñavalkya: 'Of what light is this Puruṣa'? In other words, what

is the source of illumination that makes it possible for man to work in

the world ? What is his guiding light ? Yājñavalkya first replies

that it is the light of the Sun (Āditya) through which a man stays,

moves and acts. The King then questions: 'With the setting of

the Sun of what light is the Puruṣa'? The Āditya or the Sun

cannot be the guiding light for all time, for it has its rising and

setting but the Puruṣa has still to be guided, and he still needs a light

and what then comes to his aid when the sun sets ? Yājñavalkya replies

that it is then the light of the moon which helps him to carry on his

work. Again the King questions: 'With the se'ting of the Sun and

with the setting of the moon of what light is the man'? Yājñavalkya

replies that it is of the light of the fire. The King persists in

his questioning and wants to know what happens after all these sources

of light viz. the sun, the moon and the fire have set, and Yājñavalkya

replies that then it is the light of vāc or word that guides. But, asks the

King finally: 'What is the source of light when vāc, too, is at rest' ?

Yājñavalkya then declares that it is the light of the Ātman. This points

out that the final source of all lights or illuminations is the Ātman.

While all other lights have their setting, this light of the Ātman

knows no rising or setting. It is the Eternal Uncreated Self-luminous

Light of lights.

Signifying this supreme source of light, another famous verse of

the Upaniṣads declares: 'There the Sun does not shine. nor the moon

nor the stars, nothing to say of this fire. Following that shining

(light) all others shine, by its light all these are lighted'.38 This, un-

equivocally, points out that all other sources of light or knowledge are

dependent on this light of the Ātman and act only through it. The

only light or knowledge which is absolutely independent and self-

shining is the light of the Ātman. All other lights being borrowed

lights fail to reveal the Ātman which is the very source of them all.

Hence in the attempt to reveal the Ātman they can do nothing but

set i.e. merge in that original light and allow it to reveal itself by its

own light. In all other cognitions, the mental mode encircles the

36 KTU, 2. 2. 15.

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object and the light of consciousness reflected in the mode reveals or

illumines the object. But in this case when the mind wants to com-

prehend the Ātman, what happens is that the reflected light becomes

merged in the original light, which is here sought to be made the

object of knowledge. In other cases, the object revealed is incons-

cient and material, and hence it is lighted by the reflected light of

the mental mode, but here what is sought as the object is the original

light itself and so instead of lighting it up, the reflected light simply

merges itself in the original. Hence it is said that the act of mental

mode applies to Ātman or Brahman, but the effect does not follow

from it. In the technical terms of Vedānta, there is vrttivyāpti in

this case, but no phalavyāpti. The mind moves towards the Ātman,

becomes modified in, or takes the form of the Ātman as in the case of

cognitions of other objects, but the result that follows in other cases,

viz. the revelation of the object in the light of consciousness does not

follow here, because what is grasped by the vrtti here is the revealing

light itself. Hence the knowledge of the Ātman is not an effect or

product of a process but signifies the termination of all processes.

From this point of view it is said that the mind never knows the

Ātman37 i.e. it can never make the Ātman an object of its knowledge,

like other finite objects of the world. But, again, from the other point

of view, it is only the mind that comprehends the Ātman,38 for the

mental mode about Brahman or Ātman must be generated, the mind

must be suffused wholly by it and only then will the original light

take up the reflected light within itself. The reflected light can

never reveal, it is true, the original light, but it can certainly

help a great deal in its revelation by putting itself face to face with

the original, tallying with it point to point and thereby ceasing to

exist separately. The mind or intellect in thus 'committing suicide',

in the words of Bradley, does not make the knowledge of the Ātman

an impossibility, but by this very act, by, moving, as it were, out of

the way allows the Ātman to reveal itself. The self-manifest (svayam-

prakāśa) Ātman then shines in its own light. "Self-manifestness of

knowledge means that knowledge can behave as being immediate

37 yan manasā na manute. KU, 5.

38 manasai 've dam āptavyam. KTU, 2.1,11.

without being an object of knowledge. This would be an exact rendering of the explanation of the term svaprakāśatva (self-manifestness) as given by the Advaitins :— avedyatve sati aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatvam svaprakāśatvam.'39

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

121

Realization of the Self-manifest

It may still be objected that, granted that the Ātman is selfmanifest, yet how is that self-manifestness to be realized? If the Ātman is self-shining, no amount of effort on the part of the mind or the intellect can ever make the Ātman known. Only if it is revealed of itself, then and then alone can it be known. But this self-revelation of the pure light of Cit or Consciousness can hardly be realized so long as the other false lights are shining. The false lights must be put out one by one so that the true light may shine. We must warn that by 'putting out' we do not mean or suggest a deliberate suppression of the ordinary means of knowledge, for that is never the Upaniṣadic method, but simply indicate the transcendence of the lower method or means by the higher. The development from sensation to perception and thence to conception is all an inner unfoldment of consciousness, and as the higher keys of consciousness become operative the lower ones automatically cease to play and become included in the higher. In order to reach the supreme state of the transcendental knowledge, our consciousness must be raised higher and higher by degrees. This is also indicated in the famous discourse of Yājñavalkya, we have just quoted.40 There the sun, the moon, the fire and the word all stand for different methods or levels of awareness or consciousness. The light of the sun evidently stands for the sense-knowlege, for the sun is generally connected with the eye, and it is the lowest form of knowledge with which all men generally carry on their work in the world. But higher than this light is the light of the moon, which shines even when the former has set. This is the light of the intellect or the mind, for the moon is definitely connected with the mind (cf. candramā manaso jātaḥ). From sense-perception we thus rise to the intellect. But even higher than this faculty of intellect is the light of

39 SWK, p. 137.

40 BU, 4. 3.

16

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

the fire, which evidently here symbolizes the power of intuition. It

penetrates even deeper and sheds its light in a sphere where the in-

tellect fails to enter. But even this intuitive faculty has its limit and

the light of the fire, too, has its end. The last light which comes

nearest to the supreme light of the Ātman is the light of Vāc or Word.

In a section on Oṅkāra, we shall have occasion to deal with the con-

ception of Vāc fully, but here we may only point out that this Vāc

signifies the supreme faculty of reason, which is at work behind all

manifestations. Just below the Ātman is the place of Vāc, and hence

it is nearest to the Ātman. Hence in lifting the consciousness towards

the pure self-shining awareness of the Ātman, one has finally to wait

here, in the plane of Vāc, before entering the domain of the Ātman.

It is Vāc which gives the clue to the Ātman being nearest to it and

after serving as a pointer, it, too, vanishes or goes to rest. Hence the

Vedāntins lay the supreme stress on vākya and assert that the know-

ledge of the Ātman or Brahman can only be gained with the help of

the vākyas or words of revelation contained in the Śruti and never by

any other means. "The consciousness of eternal freedom comes from

the Word and not from anything else"41 is the emphatic assertion of

the Vedāntins.

It is therefore that the Upaniṣad, after enjoining that the Ātman

is to be seen, further enjoins that it is to be heard (śrotavyah), for it is

this hearing that leads here to the seeing. We have pointed out that

the nature of the Ātman is self-shining (svayam-prakāśa) and it is the

pre-supposition of all forms of knowledge. Hence the knowing or

seeing of the Ātman simply means the recognition or realization of

the fact that it is the very ground of the knowledge that seeks to

apprehend it. In other words, it means simply the removal of the

illusion which makes the Ātman or Brahman appear as an 'other', as

an object which is to be realized or apprehended. The identity of

the knower and the known which is the aim of all knowledge is here

sought to be realized in its completeness. "Every form of knowledge

is different from every other in the degree of identification of the

object in itself with the object for consciousness, and the only resting

41 nityamuktatvavijñānaṁ vākyād bhavati nā'nyataḥ. NS, 4. 31.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

123

place for knowledge is where the agreement becomes absolute. Now,

if knowledge deals solely with the self which knows, it is entirely

self-constituted, self-determined, self-contained. To be completely

self-sufficient, however, is precisely what is meant by being Absolute.

Absolute knowledge is the presence to consciousness of its own Self-

Thought”.43 We have seen that the Vedantins view all modes of

knowledge or pramāṇas as nothing but the means of the contact of the

self with the self. The subject and the object are really not two

separate entities-they are one, and though the different modes of

knowledge effect an union between the two and seek to bridge the

gulf now and then, yet the identification is never complete. The

identification is only with a part and that, too, is partial. Complete

identity is not gained because all cognitions involve a process and a

process necessarily presupposes a relation of separation. The Vedānta,

therefore, seeks a method of processless cognition and it is only through

the medium of word or vākya that such a cognition is found to be

possible. The suggestive word, at the very instant of its utterance,

brings about the knowlege in a flash by removing the ignorance that

was preventing the apprehension of the fact that was already there, as

in the case of ‘daśamas tvam asi’. Instanteneity is its marked charac-

teristic. At the very moment of its birth it removes the ignorance all

at once (sakṛtpravṛttyā)43, as light dispels darkness the moment it is

kindled or brought. It does not require to be generated again and

again nor an effort is needed to retain it, for it is not concerned with

the production of what ‘should be’ but with the acknowledgement of

that which ‘is’. Its essential mark is givenness, and it does not depend

on the subject. It is always the outcome of the objective factor and

is the self-disclosing of the givenness. Hence the Upaniṣads symbolize

this instantaneous revelation by the image of the lightning in many

places.44 In the Veda, too, we find a passage which refers to it: “By

plural consciousness she brought down the mortal but by becoming

lightning she has torn off the veil.” And Dr Maryla Falk rightly

42 STV, p. 59.

43 Sakṛtpravṛttyā mṛdnāti kriyākārakarūpabhrd ajñānam āgamajñānam.

NS, 1. 67.

44 BU, 2.3.6, 5.4.7; CU, 1.4.2. KU, 29. 30. KTU, 6.2. SU, 4.4 etc.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

points out that "this is the earlicst instance of the image of 'lightning'

as applied to the event of instantaneous enlightenment produced by

the union with the transcendent principle of universal wisdom."45

Hence, the removal of the illusion of separation needs nothing but

the pointing out of the identity through a single suggestive word or

phrase, like 'tat tvam asi'. Consequent on the hearing of the word,

if the removal of the illusion takes place, it takes place all at once and

does not need to be repeated through a process. This direct and imme-

diate way of realization is, what is called in the Tantras, anupāya,

or literally 'methodless' way of approach. The Ātman or Śiva, as it is

called in the Tantras, being essentially self-luminous, it is felt that all

methods to reveal this self-revealing reality are superfluous and futile

and the self-luminous reality is hence sought to be grasped all at once

by a single effort of consciousness aroused by the word of the spiritual

guide (guru). As Abhinavagupta puts it: "The group of means

cannot reveal the Śiva. Does the thousand-rayed Sun shine by the

(help of the) jar? Having realized thus, the man with a wide vision

attains the self-luminous Śiva in an instant."46 Again it is said:

"The Śiva is not revealed by the methods, rather they are revealed

through its favour. I am that self-luminous (entity) appearing as the

world. Having thus heard the words of the teacher only once, some

being convinced, without any further cogitation are found to shine

full of knowledge".47

But it must be remembered that the Upaniṣads always point out

that this revealing word must be heard from an experienced teacher,

and it is only then that the word acts as the supreme means to an

instantaneous enlightenment and not otherwise. Only one who has

broken through the illusion and has realized his identity with the self-

luminous reality can generate in another soul the same knowledge

45 NRDR, pp. 10-11.

46 upāyajālam na śivam prakāśayed ghaṭena kim bhūti sahasradidhitih, /

vivecayann ittham udāradarśanas svayam prakāśam śivam āviśct kṣaṇāt.// IS, p.9,

47 upāyair na śivo bhāti bhāti te tatprasādataḥ

sa eva 'ham svaprakāśo bhase viśvasvarūpakaḥ/

ity ākarṇya guror vākyam sakṛt kecana niścitā

vinā bhūyo'nuṣandhānam bhānti samvinmayās sthitāḥ. TL, p. 3.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

125

through the suggestive words. His words become charged with a

significance which will be entirely missing when uttered by an inex-

perienced soul. That is why the Kaṭha Upaniṣad points out that "it

can not be understood properly when taught by an inferior type of

teacher, even if thought about in many ways".48 It must be 'taught

by an able teacher' (kuśalānuśiṣṭaḥ).49 For the attainment of this

transcendental knowledge, the Upaniṣads, therefore, nowhere ask the

seeker to go on meditating or contemplating over the nature of the

Ātman. They simply ask him to 'arise, awake and on attaining the

great ones or enlightened souls understand it'.50 Here the injunction

(vidhi) is not 'to contemplate' (upāsīta) but 'to know' (nivodhata).

This knowing is a single act, like the opening of the eyes and the

beholding of a thing in that very instant. Hence there is no process

involved in it. The very hearing of the Supreme Word (Mabāvākya)

brings back the lost consciousness and gets one established in the

highest status of self-luminosity. There is no effort on the part of

the recipient of this supreme knowledge, but it dawns of itself, spon-

taneously, and of its own accord, from the inmost depth of the soul.

The short and suggestive words of the teacher work a magic in him

by revealing the true nature, which was his and yet not his all this

time while he was steeped in ignorance. His innate purity, which

remains unsullied all through and even when he thinks that he is in

the iron grips of ignorance or saṃsāra, is gained back. It is only an

arousing or awakening of the latent consciousness that takes place in

this case, merely from the living contact with the teacher and his word.

Eddington gives the striking illustration of 'humour' in connexion

with what he calls 'intimate knowledge'. He points out that "humour

can be analyzed to some extent and the essential ingredients of the

different kinds of wit classified".51 But all this would not make us

laugh because "the classification concerns a symbolic knowledge of

humour which preserves all the characteristics of a joke except its

laughableness. The real appreciation must come spontaneously, not

48 KTU, I. 2. 8.

49 Ibid. I. 2. 7.

50 uttiṣṭhata jāgrata prāpya varān nivodhata. KTU, I. 3. 14.

51 NPW, p. 322.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

introspectively".52 And this spontaneous outburst of humour can

only come 'through contact with merry-minded companions',53 for

'probably in the recesses of his solemn mind there exists inhibited the

seed of humour, awaiting an awakening by such an impulse'.54

Exactly similar is the method prescribed and adopted by the Upaniṣads

concerning the spontaneous generation of the knowledge of the Ātman

or Brahman. Because of its spontaneous nature, this knowledge is

not gained by any process of inhibition or suppression of the mind

or the desires. The path of Yoga is samâdbi or nirodha, while the

method of Vedānta is bodha. The ignorance or nescience is removed

only by knowledge (bodha) and never by any other method or process.

And if this knowledge of identity between the individual self and

the Brahman, generated even for once, does not remove the ignorance

residing in the self when it is no knowledge at all.55 From this it

must be clear that the knowledge, which needs to be supplemented

after its birth by other processes like control of the mind or extinction

of desires (manonāśa vāsanākṣaya), is not the true Vedāntic knowledge

of which the Upaniṣads speak. It is not really tattvajñāna but is called

so merely by courtesy. The true Upaniṣadic knowledge is self-suffi-

cient and, as Śaṅkara points out, there is not even a trace of any

process or action in it.56 Once this knowledge dawns nothing else

remains to be done and herein lies its glory and uniqueness.57

Relation between Jñāna & Karman

The true nature of this transcendental knowledge has been

grasped by very few, and even among the followers of Śaṅkara, there

has been a divergence of opinion about its real character. The main

dispute arises on the question of the relation between jñāna and

karman. We have just seen that Śaṅkara denies all trace of karman

or kriyā in this knowledge, because karman stands for process, while

52 NPW, p. 322.

53 Ibid. p. 336.

54 Ibid. p. 337.

55 brahmātmaikatvavijñānam avidyāṁ ātmani sthitām./

sakṛjjñātam na ced dhanti jñānam eva na tad bhavet.// VS,

56 kriyāyā gandhamātrasyā'nuprayeśa iha po'padyate. ŚB, on VS, I. i, 4.

57 alaṅkāro hy ayam asmākaṁ yad brahmātmaāvagatau satyāṁ sarvakartā-

vyatāhāniḥ ṛtakṛtyatā ce'ti. ŚB, Ibid.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

127

this knowledge is beyond all process. Karman again signifies or pre-

supposes a relation of separation, while this knowledge aims at an

absolute identification or complete unity. Hence the two can hardly

be compatible and are fundamentally opposed to each other

like light and darkness. 'Far apart, contradictory and leading to

different ends are this pair, avidyā and what is known as Vidyā or

Knowledge', declares the Upaniṣad.58 This leads to two extremes:

Mīmāṁsakas and reject jñāna altogether; while there are some who

strictly adhere to pure jñāna to the utter exclusion of karman. There

are, again, some who stand in the middle, trying to effect a compro-

mise between the two. This attempt for compromise or synthesis

(samuccaya) also takes various forms. It may first be classified broad-

ly into two: samasamuccaya and visamasamuccaya. Samasamuccaya

means an 'even' compromise, which gives equal scope to both, without

assigning any superior status to any one of them. Viṣamasamuccaya

means an 'uneven' compromise and it takes two forms: there are

some who make jñāna the principal element and karman its auxiliary

part or limb, while others make karman supreme and jñāna subordinate

to it. Thus there are altogether five possible attitudes with regard to the

relation between jñāna and karman, viz., two extreme attitudes,

which exclude one or the other, and three compromising attitudes, of

which one gives an equal degree of emphasis on both, and the other

two vary in their emphasis on one or the other of the terms, though

keeping the two together all the same. The Upaniṣads give equal

scope to all these attitudes or viewpoints, appreciating fully the value

of each at its own level, and yet at the same time not jumbling them

up all together.

We have seen that the supreme knowledge is said to spring of

itself and spontaneously, but the question remains: why then does it

not manifest itself in every instance and at all times? The answer

must be found in the presence of obstacles which prevent its mani-

festation. And here in the removal of obstacles the value of karman

and its utility must be recognized. Karman never manifests the

58 dūram ete viparīte viṣūci avidyā yā ca vidye 'ti jñeyā, KTU, I. 2. 4.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

knowledge, for it is eternally self-manifest, but it only helps in making

the conditions suitable for the revelation of that self-manifested

nature of knowledge. In the level of the mind or the intellect

the synthesis of jñāna and karman is indispensably necessary. Here

theory and practice must join hands. We have to make the know-

ledge effective and enduring by acting it out; otherwise, it remains

all too, impotent. That is why the Upaniṣads condemn mere pursuit of

knowledge as an entering into deeper darkness and enjoin a combina-

tion of both action and knowledge (ubhayam் saba).59 The path of

contemplation, which we shall discuss later, is essentially composed

of these two elements, and upāsanā is a joint product of jñāna and

karman. But as there is a level of togetherness of both (ubhayam

saha), so there is a level of complete disparity and utter apartness

between the two (dūram ete viparīte visūucī).60 This apartness is not due

to a forced separation between the two, which always leads to a

darkness, because of its artificiality, but due to a natural

overtopping or transcendence of the lower by the higher term. Here

the self-luminous knowledge is so potent that it does not stand in

need of karman to make it effective. It dawns only when karman

utterly exhausts itself and leaves the jñāna to shine by itself. In

the level of utter ignorance, man is purely a creature of action, driven

blindly by its impulses. With the first glimmer of knowledge, action

assumes a new significance. It is the second level, where karman

still predominates, but jñāna, too, accompanies it, though in a lesser

degree. In the third level, with a further growth in knowledge, the

proportion of the two becomes equal and there is a parity between the

two (samasamuccaya). In the fourth level, the proportion of jñāna

still increases, throwing off the balance of equality once more and this

time in favour of jñāna. Karman is still there but only as secondary.

In the last level, jñāna completely rids itself of all trace of karman and

shines in its own majesty. Our whole history of thought is the history

of this gradual growth of knowledge through the overpowering of the

opposite force of karman or ignorance. The process that we see is a

creation of karman and the knowledge is not a product of this process.

59 IU, II.

60 KTU, 1. 2. 4.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

129

The process is concerned merely with the removal of the coverings of

karman. As the veils of ignorance are removed the knowledge seems

to be growing brighter and brighter, though in fact it is self-shining

and complete all through, and this is realized only when we

reach this final level of transcendental awareness.

As in the discussion of the problem of Reality we found the

difficulty in the true comprehension of transcendence, which leads to

its misrepresentation as a mere blank or utter abstraction, so here, too,

the transcendental nature of Knowledge is hardly grasped. Pure

jñāna is represented as dry intellectualism, while, in fact, it springs

from the very core of being, which is the source of all knowing, feeling

and willing. Again, being unaccustomed to a processless cognition

we reject the conception of pure jñāna and drag it down to the level

of the knowledge gained through a process. This is also evident

from the history of Vedāntic thought itself. Even before Sankara

there were many Vedāntins like Bhartṛprapañca, who, though agreeing

that jñāna is indispensable for self-realization, held the opinion that it

should be combined with karman, or in other words, they were in

favour of a samuccaya. The Naiṣkarmyasiddhi refers to some of

these views. There were some, like Brahmadatta, who held that the

knowledge which is generated by the vedānta-vākya does not remove

the ignorance all at once, but it is only after long meditation, day

after day, that the ignorance is dispelled through the accumulation of

thought about Brahman 61. The central teaching of the Upaniṣads

is, accordingly, to be found in injunctive statements like ‘ātme’ ty evo

‘pāsīta’, to which assertive propositions like Tat Tvam Asi are

subsidiary, for they only furnish the subject-matter for the upāsanā

enjoined therein. It is thus not the knowledge, which the latter

statements convey, that directly brings about final release but rather

its unremitting practice (abhyāsa or prasamkhyāna). There was again

another view, held by Maṇḍana, of a similar nature. ‘He also

61 kecit sampadāyabalāyastambhād āhur yad etad vedāntavākyād ahaṁ

brahme’ti vijñānam samutpadyate, tan nai ‘va svotpattimātreṇā ‘jñānam nira-

syati. kim tarhi? ahany ahani drāghīyasā kāleno’pāsinasya sato bhāvanopacayān

niśśeṣam ajñānam apagaccati. NS, 1. 67.

17

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

understands kriyā i.e., upāsanā here as the final import of the Upaniṣads

and construes the assertive propositions as depending upon it for their

eventual significance. Maṇḍana also, like Brahmadatta, thinks that

after knowing the nature of Brahman as taught in the Upaniṣads, one

should meditate upon it; but he differs from the latter in that he

makes not this meditation itself the means to liberation but a different

type of jñāna, distilled, so to speak, out of this meditation. That is

why the Upaniṣad says that one should attain the intuition after

knowing' (vijñāya prajñāṁ kurvīta)62. The great Bharṭṛprapañca,

whom we have already referred to, also holds a similar view. Bharṭṛ-

prapañca's conception of Ultimate Reality is that of a unity-in-diversity

and hence, according to him, the approach to that Reality must also be

of the nature of samuccaya. A mere adherence to karman means the

recognition of diversity alone and not also of the unity that underlies

it. For realizing the latter, jñāna is essential; so the Reality is

attained only by a combination of both. Hence karman is not to be

discarded but should be performed with a realization of its full signifi-

cance, i.e., with the enlightenment of jñāna, and not blindly. The

ignorant takes a limited vision of karman (paricchinnakarmātmadarśinah),

while the enlightened takes a broad view of it (apricchinnakarmāt-

madarśinah),63 and that is what distinguishes the two.

All these views draw their inspiration from the Upaniṣads and

hence cannot `be rejected as false or wrong. There is a kind of

knowledge, the knowledge of the intellect or the mind, which always

needs to be supplemented by karman and which never becomes potent

or fruitful except through a long process of meditation. And pertain-

ing to such a kind of knowledge of the intellectual level, the Upaniṣad

enjoins meditation after the gaining of the initial knowledge, in order

to make it permanent or abiding, or rather to transform the knowledge

into a vision, through such statements as vijñāya prajñāṁ kurvīta or

ātme 'ty evo 'pāsīta. In our discussion on upāsanā or contemplation

we shall have occasion to refer to this kind of knowledge. But it

would be wrong to make a sweeping generalization from this that all

knowledge is of this nature. There is another unique kind of

62 NS. 1.67.

63 ŚB on BU, I. 4. 15.

knowledge, which we may call the knowledge of the soul and hence processless and direct and immediate, that is quite distinct from the

previous one. The true Vedāntic wisdom, therefore, recognizes this samuccaya in its proper sphere, while at the same time pointing to

another level of knowledge where it shines in its own majesty. Sureśvara, therefore rightly says: “We do not reject samuccaya

everywhere”, because no power on earth can refuse to recognize it in its proper sphere.64

The need for meditation is, therefore, admitted practically by all Vedāntins, including the followers of Saṅkara, and even among the

latter a difference of opinion is found to prevail on the question, whe-

ther it precedes jñāna or succeeds it. In order to ‘see’ or realize the Ātman, so does Vācaspatī opine, one must first hear about it from a

teacher and get an initial knowledge about it thereby and thereafter strengthen it by reasoning and finally meditate over it. So, according

to him, it is nididhyāsana or meditation which leads to realization, preceded, of course, by jñāna or knowledge gained through śravaṇa.

But the author of Pañcapādikā holds the opposite view. According to him, meditation or nididhyāsana is only a contributory aid to the

right apprehension of the meaning of the mahāvākya. The pramāṇa itself needs no direct assistance whatsoever in revealing the prameya,

which it does, the moment conditions become favourable. Meditation or nididhyāsana is thus an indirect aid and precedes ātmajñāna instead

of succeeding it.65 It is clear, therefore, that while thinkers like Vācaspatī, Maṇḍana and Brahmadatta hold, in one form or another,

that the Upaniṣads by themselves cannot introduce ūs to the true nature of Brahman or Ātman but merely furnish a tentative conception

of it and persuade us to discover its actual nature for ourselves, there are others like the authors of Vivarana and Vārttika who take the

Āgama or the Upaniṣads as the only means for the direct apprehen-

sion of the true nature of the Ātman. In any case, the Vedāntic

64 na ca vayam jñānakarmaṇos sarvatrāi 'va samuccayaṁ pratyākakṣmahe. yaträ prayojyaprayojakabhāvo jñānakarmaṇos tatra nā’ pi śakyate

nivarayituṁ. NS, p. 58.

65 manananididhyāsanayor na brahmāvagatyuttarakālīnatā kintu śravaṇavad avagatyupāyatayā pūrvakālataī 'va. PP, p. 99.

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conception of knowledge, if it is to maintain its uniqueness, must not

be conceived as the product of any process, just as the Vedāntic Reality

should not be conceived as the final term of a series. If this know-

ledge becomes a product of meditation, there is nothing at all to

distinguish it from the prajñā that is gained through samādhi. That

is why Sureśvara rightly points out, and Ānandagiri in his commen-

tary thereon makes explicitly clear, that even nididhyāsana which is

prescribed by the Upaniṣads, is not a process like meditation (dhyāna)

and lest there should be a confusion with dhyāna, which is very

likely, the term vijñānena is added. It is an independent knowledge,

which only results in utter liberation that is called nididhyāsana.66

This is the final step of sākṣāt aparokṣāt as indicated by the

Upaniṣads.

Western theories of Truth

Human thought is still in search of a knowledge that will be

independent and self-sufficient, absolutely certain and uncontradicted

for all times. The different theories of truth in the West, like those

of correspondence and coherence, ultimately fail to account for the

real criterion of truth. ‘The correspondence theory asserts that a

judgment is true, if it corresponds with fact. Now the fact is either

known or not known. If it is not known, we cannot know that the

judgment corresponds with it. If it is known, it is to say the least

of it, unnecessary to make a judgment about it.’ In other words,

‘Either I know directly the fact with which my true judgment is to

correspond or I do not. If I know it directly, what need is there for

me to pass a true judgment about it, in order that the judgment

may correspond with it? If I do not know it directly, how am I to

know that my judgment does correspond with it?67’ Thus an inhe-

rent contradiction falsifies the theory of correspondence.

The coherence theory no doubt goes ahead of correspondence in

this that it tries to view the truth from a wider perspective with

66 dhyānāśiṅkānivrttyartham vijñānena ‘ti bhanyate. Vār, 2. 4. 234.

yan muktiṃātraphalāṁ svataḥtram jñānaṁ tad eva nididhyāsanaṁ smrtaṁ.

Ānandagiri on Ibid.

67 Joad : GP, p. 67.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

133

reference to different relations with the whole body of experience,

and not merely as an isolated fact. According to this theory, 'con-

ceivability is the essential nature of truth',68 and 'to be conceivable'

means to be a 'significant whole' or a 'whole possessed of meaning

for thought'. A 'significant whole' is such that all its constituent

elements reciprocally involve one another.'69 Thus, according to this

theory, 'until we know reality as a whole, we can never completely

know the truth of any particular judgment, but this applies inevitably

to the coherence theory of truth itself. On its own premises then

we can never know that the coherence theory of truth is true. Joachim,

therefore, feels that 'a theory of truth as coherence, if it is to be

adequate, must be an intelligible account of the ultimate coherence in

which the one significant whole is self-revealed'70, but, at the same

time, he frankly admits that 'every metaphysical theory, as the outcome

of experience which is partial and so far finite, is at best a partial

manifestation of the truth and not the whole truth self-revealed'.71

In other words, we always know only a part of truth and never the

whole of it, and if we do not know the whole of it, the coherence

theory can hardly stand. 'The coherence notion of truth may thus

be said to suffer shipwreck at the very entrance of the harbour', and

'the voyage ends in disaster, and a disaster which is inevitable'.72

Joachim, therefore, ends his illuminating book, 'The Nature of

Truth,' with a complete note of scepticism, and with the frank

acknowledgment 'that no theory of truth as coherence can be comple-

tely true; for as a system of judgments, as a piece of discursive know-

ledge, it must be 'other' than the truth 'about' which it is and thus

it must fail of that concrete coherence which is complete truth. And

again, as the knowledge of mind at a determinate level of appercipient

character, it must fall short of the complete self-revelation which is

absolute truth manifest to itself73 (italics mine).

Human knowledge thus essentially suffers from the limitation of

incompleteness and hence always remains dubious and uncertain. The

note of unknowability, which Kant sounded, still remains the basic

68 Joachim: NT, p. 66.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid. p. 170.

71 Ibid. p. 171.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid. p. 178.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

note, and rings through all our knowledge. We feel that the com-

plete knowledge of the whole always escapes us. We are knowing

more and more of the whole by bits, but cannot seize it all at one

stroke. Our knowledge, therefore, always remains uncertain; though

a present knowledge is working alright today it may be nullified to-

morrow through the discovery of its incoherence within a still greater

whole. Jeans makes a profound statement full of the deepest signi-

ficance in his illuminating book, "Physics and Philosophy". He

says: "Now these waves of knowledge exhibit complete determinism;

as they roll on, they show us knowledge growing out of knowledge

and uncertainty following uncertainty according to a strict causal law.

But this tells us nothing we do not already know. If we had found

new knowledge appearing, not out of previous knowledge but spon-

taneously and of its own accord, we should have come upon something

very startling and of profound philosophical significance" (italics

mine).74 Modern science even after having such a complete and

thorough knowledge of the workings of Nature finds that its know-

ledge is full of uncertainty and to its surprise, it also finds that what

it has learnt so far is nothing new or unique. Hence all are looking

forward to a new type of knowledge, which must be spontaneous in

its nature, as well as self-revealed and appearing of its own accord.

That only such a kind of knowledge can lift human thought from

the sphere of relativity and uncertainty is felt both by Joachim and

Jeans, and that is why the former uses the term 'self-revealed' again

and again, (which we have italicised in the quotations from him) and

speaks of 'absolute truth manifest to itself'. Otherwise, there is no

escape from a total scepticism or a complete denial of an absolute

truth as is done by pragmatists.

The Upaniṣadic View of Knowledge

It is just here that the Upaniṣads come to our aid to lift us out of

this hopeless position into which all our theories of knowledge or truth

ultimately land us. The Upaniṣadic or Vedāntic view of knowledge,

we have pointed out, is rooted in svataḥpramāṇa or svayaṁprakāśa,

i.e. self-revelation or self-luminosity. The 'self-revealed' knowledge,

74. PHP, p. 195.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

135

which Joachim vaguely apprehends as the only possible solution of the baffling problem, is recognized as the very fundamental fact of all experience in Vedānta. The very definition of pramā shows that, according to the Vedānta, the truth of knowledge consists in its non-contradictedness and novelty (abādbitatva and anadhigatata),75 and not in mere correspondence or coherence. A knowledge works as true only in so far as it is not contradicted. In the sphere of our relative knowledge there is no guarantee that the truth of a knowledge will not be contradicted in any place or time. Hence what we ordinarily call pramā or true knowledge is only pramā by courtesy. The really non-contradicted knowledge or pramā is the knowledge of the Absolute or the Ātman or Brahman. All other knowledge that goes by the name of pramā is so, in so far as it reveals this non-contradictedness of the self-manifest knowledge, or rather partakes of its nature. All else is true by virtue of this absolute truth, as all else is real by virtue of the supremely real. It is the same self-manifest truth, the svayamprakāśa, that is revealed at the level of the senses as correspondence between the knower and the known, pramātr and prameya and again at the level of the mind as coherence or harmony of experience or samvāda. But it shines in its completeness as absolute non-contradictedness only at the level of the spirit or the level of the sākṣāt aparokṣāt. The knowledge of the complete system of experience or the entire whole, which alone can make the theory of coherence plausible, can come only when one transcends the system. In order to know the whole one must pass beyond the whole. The whole cannot be known by a mere aggregation of the parts, for that only leads to an approximation, and never attains finality. Hence the Upaniṣads point to a unique processless type of knowledge which takes the cognizer at one bound beyond the sphere of the whole and gets him established in the transcendental sphere. It is only on reaching this sphere that one becomes assured of absolute non-contradictedness. Hence tattvajñāna or ‘metaphysical knowledge essentially implies permanent and changeless certitude’.76

75 pramātvam anadhigatābādhitārthaviṣayajñānatvam. VP, p. 5.

76 IHD, p. 114.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

Thus a bold leap is necessary in order to get the transcendental apprehension of Reality, and the supreme value of the Upaniṣads lies in this that they alone make this leap possible. The jump is taken only from the spring-board of the mahāvākyas of the Upaniṣads. No other pramāṇa is of any help here except the Word or Śabda because, as we have already pointed out in our exposition of Yājñavalkya's description of the different lights or sources of illumination, the light of Vāc or the Word comes nearest to the light of the Ātman. The function of the Word or Śabda is to point to this final light and then to go out, or retire. This pointing or suggesting is the peculiar virtue of the śabda or word and it is by this power of suggestion that the word transcends itself and carries one beyond its own bounds. But this suggestiveness of a word does not occur to all or is rather not caught by all, but is grasped only by one who has a keen mind, a refined intellect and who has dwelt over the problem long enough. The fall of an apple is a common event observed by all, but it was only to the mind of Newton that this all too common a fact of experience revealed the whole law of gravitation, and that was because his mind had been working all the time ceaselessly over the problem and the event just became an occasion for the final flash of revelation. Similarly the mahāvākyas of the Upaniṣads bring the revelation only to a mind that is seized wholly by this one passion for the supreme knowledge.

In this sense, therefore, nididhyāsana must precede the true revelation or knowledge, and should not succeed it. But if one, without the adequate passion for knowledge and refinement of intellect, happens to hear the mahāvākya, then he will certainly miss the true revelation and will be furnished merely with a tentative conception or knowledge of Reality, and in that case, nididhyāsana must follow jñāna. Thus the conceptions of the jñāna are different in the two cases, viz. in one case it is true revelation and in the other a mere tentative cognition, and the precedence or succession of meditation depends on the particular conception which one happens to hold about jñana. In any case, the mahāvākya is indispensably necessary for the supreme revelation, whether it dawns all at once from the mere hearing or after a long meditation. The manana or nididhyāsana which is done

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

137

independently of śravaṇa (i.e., without a basis of the mahāvākyas) is of no use whatsoever in the realization of the Ātman.

This is no dogmatism or a supercession of reason by authority to state that the words of the Śruti must be taken as the basis for all reasoning and meditation; a deeper reason lies behind the acceptance of Śruti as the starting-point of enquiry. As Prof Bhattacharya beautifully puts it: " Some provisional belief (śraddhā) is required to start the enquiry. A mere thought, even though necessary, can never induce belief, can never be mistaken for knowledge; for in knowledge there is an unmistakeable intuitive or 'given' character. This provisional belief can only be induced by authoritative statement (śabda or āgama) which may, for aught we know, be disproved afterwards. But the statement gains in reliability if on acting on it or after contemplation of it we attain a progressive satisfaction or realization. That is the only justification which we may expect to have of the truth of what is claimed to be revelation, from below, i.e., before we have finally realized its truth".77 That is why Saṅkara states that in the enquiry about Brahman, the Śrutis alone are not the pramāṇa as in dharmajijñāsā, but here Śrutis as well as the experiences or realizations are the pramāṇa, because the knowledge of Brahman ends in realization and pertains to a real object.78 Thus the culmination (avasāna) of all pramāṇas or means of knowledge is in experience (anubhava) and hence the Śrutis are not accepted blindly but verified by experience.

Solution of the problem

Thus experience being the very basis of brahmajñāna, the question of the unknowability of Brahman does not arise at all. But this experience is not an ordinary experience of the sense or the mind, it is the supreme and unique experience of the soul. As in the discussion of the problem of Reality we pointed out that the Upaniṣadic

77 SIV, p. 51.

78 na dharmajijñāsāyām iva śrutyādaya eva pramāṇaṁ brahmajijñāsāyām. kintu śrutyādayo 'nubhavādayaś ca yathāsambhavam iha pramāṇam anubhavā-natvād bhūtavastuviṣayatvāc ca brahmajñānasyā. SB on VS, 1. 1. 2.

18

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

conception of transcendence does not signify an exclusion or aloofness but only an uniqueness (vilakṣanatā), so here the conception of transcendental knowledge similarly signifies an unique type of knowledge, which flashes 'spontaneously and of its own accord' and is not exclusively an intellectual process, as is generally supposed. As the Reality or the prameya, so the means of knowledge or the pramāṇa. The transcendental or unique Reality needs a transcendental or unique mode of apprehension, and once this mode of apprehension is present, the object, that is Brahman, is automatically revealed, just as with the opening of the eyes the physical objects are bound to be perceived, and here also lies its spontaneity. Similarly in order to seize the immanent Reality that is Prāṇa, which is by its very nature an unity-in-difference ('mithuna') a method of apprehension is needed which also must be of a similar nature i.e., a combination of jñāna and karman. Lastly, when the Reality is viewed as utterly separate and distinct, as absolutely an 'other', then the method too becomes distinctly separative, like our ordinary perception. The Upaniṣads, therefore, in offering their solution to the problem of knowledge, do not exclude all the other modes of knowledge but recognize each at its own level, the āditya, the candra, the agni and the vāc and finally transcend them all through the conception of the self-luminous light of the Ātman, by which all others are lighted.

PART

II

THE

WAY

CHAPTER III

THE PREPARATION

We have found in our discussion of the problem of Knowledge that a transcendental mode of apprehension alone can seize the transcendental Reality. This mode is the mode of direct and immediate revelation, which is indicated by the famous dictum of the Upaniṣads: ātmā vā're draṣtavyah, śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyab1. This is the way of nivodbata as distinguished from the way of upāsita or dhyāyatha, as already pointed out. But about this way the Upaniṣad warns that 'it is sharp as a razor's edge, hard to cross and difficult to tread'.2 In other words, the straight and direct approach to the Supreme is full of great risk and open only to the exceptionally proficient seekers. 'Though there is in truth a door which leads from every house, even from the most ephemeral tenement, straight into It, yet it is a door which few can see and fewer open'.3 Hence the Upaniṣads, being fully aware of the difficulties involved in this straight way of soaring flight or 'the Way of the Eagle', go on to propound a less hazardous circular way or 'the Way of the Ant', where one can move slowly but steadily upwards through gradual stages. This circular or spiral way is symbolized by the great Oñkāra, which is furnished as the supreme support or ālambana, by holding on to which one may mount slowly higher and higher. Hence Vidyāraṇya rightly says that if that supreme consciousness does not become fixed or abiding, one must contemplate through the pranava or Oñkāra.4 The Upaniṣads, therefore, after pointing to the hazardous way, durgaṁ pathab show the other subtle way, anuḥ pantbāb,5 but even this subtle way cannot be treaded by all. Only he can move along this way, who has already journeyed through the preliminary path of good actions, panthās sukrtasya.6 We must, therefore, begin with the sukṛtasya

1 BU, 4. 5. 6.

2 KTU, 1. 3. 14.

3 YK, p. 79.

4 sā dhiś cen pā sthirā tarhi pranavena vicintayet. AP, 6. 58.

5 BU, 4. 4. 8.

6 MU., 1. 2. 1.

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panthāḥ before taking the subtle road, anuḥ panthāḥ. In the former

path or way we have a transformation of conduct and character, while

in the latter, that of consciousness. We have called, for our con-

venience, the former path or the preliminary path as ‘Preparation’,

and the latter as ‘Contemplation’.

The Need of a Teacher

The first necessity to get on the way is to have a guide, who can

lead and direct.⁷ So the Upaniṣad instructs the seeker to go to the

Guru for the special knowledge, first of all,⁸ for only he can take him

to the other shore beyond all darkness.⁹ ‘Only he who has an Ācārya

can have the knowledge,¹⁰ ‘Only the knowledge derived from the

Ācārya leads to the supreme goal’,¹¹ ‘Only the Ācārya can instruct

you about the way,¹² ‘Only he can know who has been taught or

enlightened by a proficient teacher¹³—thus the Upaniṣads speak again

and again. The enlightenment can be had from one who is himself

really enlightened and no knowledge is possible about this supreme

wonder of wonders if one is instructed by somebody else, who is an

inexperienced babbler.¹⁴

The seeker, on getting the true type of teacher, wants to have

all his problems solved by him, because he does not want to let go this

supreme opportunity of his life as he sits face to face with a pro-

foundly illuminating teacher. Thus we find in the Kaṭhopaniṣad

that Naciketas, who represents the true type of seeker, rejects all the

tempting offers made to him by Yama to prevent him from making

the supreme enquiry and adheres to his original enquiry about the ulti-

mate nature of things, because he knows that he would not have such a

teacher is conceived as one

part (purvarūpam) to whom the other part or counterpart (uttararūpam)

is the disciple and their union (sandhi) leads to the production of

Vidyā.¹⁶ So in the very śāntipāṭha of the Kaṭhopaniṣad, we find

7 KTU, I. 3. 14.

8 MU, I. 2. 12.

9 CU, 7. 16. 2.

10 CU. 6. 14, 211

11 CU., 4. 9. 1.

12 CU., 4. 14. 1.

13 KTU, I. 2. 7.

14 ananyaprokte gatir atra nā 'sti Ibid, I,2,8.

15 Ibid, I.I.22.

16 TU, I. 3. 2.

the prayer for the joint protection, and enjoyment of the teacher and

the taught, whereby they may both endeavour conjointly (saha vīryaṁ

karavāvahai) which will make their study really luminous or powerful

(tejasvin). To generate this tejas, light or power, one had to betake one-

self to the teacher, and in this matter the Upaniṣads do not enjoin a mere

casual visit to him for an occasional enlightenment but asks the seeker

to confine himself to the society of the teachers, rather to live in the

very family of the teacher absolutely for a long time.17. The student

or seeker also prays : 'Kindly get me to the family of the teachers'.18

It is only by living in close touch with the teacher for a long time, by

becoming an antevāsin, a co-inhabitant that the knowledge can be

expected to dawn. The teacher also instructs only that seeker, who

has taken refuge in him in the proper way.19

About the method of approaching the teacher there is one essential

feature which one finds depicted again and again in the Upaniṣads.

It is the time-old custom of becoming samitpāni20 or taking the fuel

in the hand while visiting a teacher for knowledge and enlightenment.

It is a very suggestive symbol, which reminds the seeker that he has

come to the teacher to really kindle the flame that burns all ignorance

and dispels all darkness. The aim should not be mere book-learning

or jñāna but a deep and comprehensive knowledge of the Supreme

Reality (tadvijñānārtham). This symbol of samitpāni also enjoins

upon the seeker the duty of collecting fuel or wood daily for the

teacher. It means that while he confines himself absolutely to the

home or family of the teacher, his sole occupation is the gathering or

collection of materials for lighting the fire. This period of collection

is the first stage in the Upaniṣadic way to the Supreme, which we

have termed as the stage of preparation.

The period of training or Brahmacarya

The general name for this period of collection in the Upaniṣadic

terminology is brahmacarya. This collection means a conservation or

17 atyantam ācāryakule avasādayan. CU, 2. 23. 2.

18 prāpaya na ācāryakulam. CU, 4. 5. 1,

19 upasannāya samyak. MU, 1. 2. 13,

20 MU, 1. 2. 12, PRU, 1. 2.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

gathering of forces which alone makes possible the supreme recollection, which leads ultimately to revelation. ‘This Ātman can never

be realized by one who is devoid of strength’, warns the Upaniṣad.21

To gain strength one must conserve, and that is why the term

brabmacarya has come to signify specifically continence or preservation

of the sex-energy. And so another Upaniṣad while delineating the

means of getting the realization of the Ātman mentions ‘dbātuprasāda’

or equilibrium of the humors as an essential requirement.22 Wherever

we look into the Upaniṣads we never miss this term when we find the

seers speaking about the means of realization: ‘Seeking that, one

takes recourse to brabmacarya.’23, ‘The Ātman is to be sought by

tapas, brabmacarya etc.’24, ‘This Ātman is attainable by eternal

brabmacarya’25 and so on. In all the anecdotes in the Upaniṣads we

find that whenever a seeker comes for enlightenment he is enjoined

to go through a period of brabmacarya first before he hopes to get

further instructions. Thus Upakosala, we hear, carried on brabma-

carya26 before he obtained the knowledge, Svetaketu was asked to go

on with brabmacarya,27 Indra and Virocana spent thirty-two years in

brabmacarya28 before they were initiated. And even the seers who

were brabmaparā brabmaniṣṭhāb, absolutely devoted to the supreme

quest, paramin brabma anveṣamānāb,29 had to wait for a whole year

observing brabmacarya before they were instructed by the great sage

Pippalāda.

This method was followed by the Upaniṣadic sages because they

knew that without proper conservation of energy no retention of the im-

parted knowledge is possible. To hold the supreme essence, the vehicle

must be made fit. Thus in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, in the very opening

of the Śikṣāvallī we find the prayer : ‘May my body be immaculate. May

I be fit to hold the immortal essence’.30 Indra, the master of rhythms,

is invoked to sprinkle or shower medhā or diligence on the seeker.31

In the opening (Śāntipāṭha) of the Kena Upaniṣad, before the actual

study. begins, a prayer is uttered to refresh all the limbs, all the

21 MU, 3. 2. 4.

24 PRU, 1. 10.

27 Ibid., 6. 1.

30 TU, 1. 4.

22 KTU, 1. 2. 20.

25 MU, 3. 1. 5

28 Ibid., 8. 7. 3.

31 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 1. 2. 15.

26 CU, 4. 10.

29 PRU, 1. 1.

different senses with divine strength.32 In the Praśna Upaniṣad,

Prāṇa is asked to give śrī and prajñā to the seeker.33 Only after one

is filled with supreme strength then alone the instruction begins, for

otherwise if the seeker lacks the capacity to hold the truth, he will

miss the entire teaching. The main thing which will lead to the

final release is a constant remembrance of the Supreme. This is what

is called dhruvā smṛti by the Upaniṣad.34 To constantly remember,

to maintain a continuous flow of the same consciousness is the very

basic meaning of Upāsanā. When one gets this continuity or straight

and unhampered flow of an identical consciousness then all the knots

are untied,35 for the continuous flow itself shows that the clogging

factors which give rise to the knots (granthi) have been removed.

The arresting of the continuous flow comes through dirt or impu-

rity. So the Upaniṣad prescribes ‘sattva-śuddhi’ for getting dhruvā

smṛti.36 This sattva-śuddhi means the purity of the whole being and

so all the parts which make up our personality must be rendered

pure. The purity or impurity of our psycho-physical make-up depends

on the nature of things we take in and assimilate. The quality of the

food we take determines the healthy or unhealthy nature of our body.

So to keep the body healthy we must consume the food that is pure.

Similarly to get the purity and health of our inner being, we must

first take note of the nature of food or nourishment that we are giving

to it. This is what is meant by ābāra-śuddhi37 in the Upaniṣad and

which is shown to be the only primary step that leads to the later

state of sattva-śuddhi. The term ābāra here has a wider connotation

than mere eating and signifies āharaṇa or gathering, i. e. taking in of

things.38 So the first duty of a seeker is to make his ābāra pure i. e.

he must first discriminate between what is good and bad and then

take a vow or resolve to take the good things alone and refuse the bad

ones that corrupt his system. This taking in of things or ābāra is

32 āpyāyantu mamā ’ngāni, etc.

33 PRU, 2. 13. 34 CU, 7. 26. 2,

35 sarvagranthīnām vipramokṣaḥ. Ibid. 36 Ibid.

37 āhāraśuddhau sattvaśuddhiḥ. CU, 7. 26. 2.

38 āhriyata ity ā’hāraḥ. SB, on Ibid.

19

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

done not by the mouth alone but by all the different senses. It is

through the door of the senses that the things of the world enter into

us. So all the senses are to be cleansed and thereby prepared to

welcome or take in the beneficial things alone, which will be condu-

cive to our spiritual health and well-being, and refuse to enjoy any

other thing that leads to a deterioration of the structure and is detri-

mental to it. In the prefatory prayer in the Praśnopaniṣad we find this

clearly stated: 'Let us hear by our ears only the good or the beneficial

(word), and by our eyes behold the good alone. Thus with an

equilibrium of all our limbs or parts we shall be pleasing the

gods with prayer'.39 By training our eyes, ears etc. to attend

to the good things alone, we get a calm disposition of our being.

An equilibrium in all the parts is established thereby and this equi-

librium of the senses is termed as yoga in the Upaniṣad,40 while the

training which leads to this equilibrium is called brahmacarya or yajña.

'What is called yajña is nothing but brahmacarya'41 runs the Upa-

niṣad. In another Upaniṣad, man himself is identified with yajña,42

and the different periods of a man's life are conceived as the different

oblations which are offered in the morning, the mid-day and the

evening.

Significance of Yajña

Yajña thus symbolizes the period of purification. The Chāndogya

Upanisad clearly states this significance of yajña in the following

line: 'Because it purifies all this, therefore this alone is yajña.'43 So

yajña cleanses or purifies the doors of our perception and thereby

brings an order and harmony in an otherwise aimless and disordered

life. It draws a boundary line in a hitherto unbounded field of life,

instils a purpose or aim in all our actions, to the fulfilment of which

we must strive and strain. It is yajña which distinguishes man from

the animal, for the animal is guided by impulses alone, while for man

39 bhadram karṇebhiḥ śṛṇuyāma etc.

40 tam yogam iti manyante sthirām indriyadhāraṇām. KTU, 2. 6. 11.

41 CU, 2, 23, 1.

42 puruṣo vāva yajñāḥ. Ibid., 3. 16. 1.

43 CU, 4. 16. 1.

yajña ushers in the reign of reason, which he may utilise for his

benefit or walk his own reckless way.

Śreyas and Preyas.

Here lies his freedom: in the choice between impulse and

reason, passion and prudence, preyas and śreyas. 'One is śreyas (the

good), the other is preyas (the pleasant); they both try to bind

man with different purposes. But of them, he who chooses the śreyas

is wise and he who courts preyas loses his purpose.'44 The criterion of

a true seeker is that he never falls a prey to the allurements of preyas

or the pleasant. Most people sink in this stream of the pleasant.45

Thus with the choice of the śreyas begins the life of the spirit and

that is why Yama opens his spiritual discourse with this topic of

śreyas and preyas and extols Naciketas as the true type of seeker be-

cause he has refused to be tempted by the offers of preyas and has

instead exihibited his steadfast attention to the śreyas alone. As one

should resolve to tread on the right path of śreyas, so must he pro-

mise to quit the evil way of preyas, for one cannot walk on both ways

together. The old track must be quitted first before the new road

can be taken. In similar and almost identical terms the great my-

stic Plotinus utters a warning: 'He, I say, will not behold this light,

who attempts to ascend to the vision of the Supreme while he is drawn

downwards by those things which are an impediment to the vision.'46

Hence as the Upaniṣads ask the seeker to observe brahmacarya, follow

the truth, perform tapas and so on in a positive manner, they similarly,

point out in a negative way the things to be desisted from or avoided,

'None can attain this (Ātman) unless he has ceased to revel in the

evil ways of life, unless he is calm and concentratced and his mind

tranquil',47. 'He who does not carry on a vow should not (be allowed

to) read this (brahmavidyā).'48 'One who is devoid of reason (avijñā-

navān) of uncontrolled mind and ever impure (amanaskas sadā aśucib)

can never attain this status (padam) but only goes down in saṃsāra'49,

44 KTU, 1. 2. 1.

45 majjanti bahavo manusyāḥ. KTU, 1. 2. 3.

46 EN, VI. 9, IV, Taylor's trans.

47 KTU, 1. 2. 23:

48 MU, 4, 2, 11.

49 KTU, 1. 3. 7.

148

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

Kratu or Resolution

Thus this period of preparation consists of two elements: the

acquirement or acceptance of the good and the rejection of the evil

ways and things. This must be taken as a vow or resolve. That is

why the term 'kratu' has an important bearing in the Upaniṣads.

'Kratu' primarily means firm resolve and secondarily sacrifice

or yajña. 'A man is made of kratu' says the Upaniṣad50, i.e. as his

resolution so is his evolution. A right resolve makes a right man.

To insert the right resolve, to instil the holy desire in the heart,

the Upaniṣads use the strongest imperatives, as we shall presently find

while discussing the premilinary virtues to be acquired. 'Therefore

he must do kratu'51, asks the Upaniṣad. Another Upaniṣad asks the

man; at the time of his last breath, to remember what he had resolved

and what he had done (krato smara)52, because only the thing he had

passionately desired and sought with his whole being in life will

determine his post-mortem state of existence, and future embodiment.

Thus we find that brahmacarya has been identified with yajña and

yajna or kratu is essentially composed of a right vow or resolve. This

vow has been called the śirovrata in one Upaniṣad53. It means the

carrying of the fire on the head. The fire symbolizes reason or

wisdom; and therefore to constantly carry the fire on the head means

to be constantly guided by reason alone. So it becomes clear now

that the approach to the teacher with which the brahmavidyā begins,

signifies the assent of the seeker to be guided by the superior reason

embodied in the teacher, and the preparatory period of brahmacarya

begins with a vow to abide by the instructions of the teacher who

represents the voice of reason and thereby reject the evil promptings of

impulse. In this way by strictly following the guidance of reason,

one gathers strength, vīrya or bala, without which the Ātman cannot be

realized. The impulses bring distraction and from distraction comes

diffusion of energy which gradually results in waste, draining away

of all strength. So conservation is the first essential condition to stop

this waste, and with conservation comes recollection. Patañjali in his

50 CU, 3. 14. 1.

51 Ibid.

52 IU, 17.

53 MU, 3. 2. 10.

system of Yoga rightly shows the gradual steps when he speaks of

smṛti or recollection following from vīrya or conservation of energy or

strength. The ultimate aim is prajñā or right knowledge. But right

knowledge can never dawn without samādhi or absorption, and

samādhi can hardly come without smṛti or constant recollection. For

this smṛti, vīrya or conservation is essential.54 This conservation must

be absolute and total. The waste has to be stopped all around. So

one must know in detail the virtues one has to cultivate in order

to gather strength. Let us try to find out what the Upaniṣads enjoin

in this respect, i.e. the necessary observances for the preparatory

period.

Satyam or Truth

In the Śikṣāvallī of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad we find some instructions

peremptorily given to the students or seekers. The very first instruc-

tion is: ‘Speak the truth’.55 Truth is the very basis or foun-

dation of the Upaniṣads and the Kena Upaniṣad expressly declares

it.56 By first becoming truthful in speech, we can gradually hope

to be truthful in spirit. The initiation in the life of the spirit begins

with the cultication of truth. ‘On what is initiation based? On truth,’

answers the Upaniṣad.57 ‘Therefore is the initiated asked to speak

the truth because in truth is the initiation based. On what is truth

based? On the heart, it was replied. By the heart is truth known,

therefore in the heart alone is truth based.’58 This passage is signifi-

cant as it makes clear the source or basis of truth. Hṛdaya and buddhi

have been identified in many places in the Upaniṣads, as we shall find

in our discussion about the dahara-vidyā; so, by saying that truth is

based on the heart, the seer is hinting that the buddhi or reason is the

true home or abode of truth. By adhering to truth in speech we

gradually get established in reason and consequently there remains

nothing irrational or impulsive in our nature. It is truth which is at

the root of creation and the world of unreality or falsehood is really

sustained by truth alone. ‘In the beginning were the waters; they,

54 YS, I. 20. 55 TU, I. II, I. 56 KU, 4. 33.

57 BU, 3. 9. 23. 58 Ibid.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

created truth, truth created Brahman, Brahman the Prajāpati, Prajā-

pati the Devas or Gods; those gods worship Truth alone—these three

letters—‘sa’, ‘ti’ and ‘yam.’ The first and the last letters are truth, in

the middle is the falsehood. Therefore this unreality or falsehood is

sustained on both sides by truth ’59

The supreme value that is attached to truth is also made clear

through the famous story of Satyakāma Jābāla. Satyakāma was

uncertain about his gotra or lineage and when he resolved to go in for

a period of brahmacarya he wanted to ascertain it correctly from his

mother Jabālā. She replied that she herself was ignorant about his

gotra because in her youth she was much too busy in serving many

people and as such had no opportunity to ascertain his gotra. ‘I do

not know what family or gotra you belong to. My name is Jabālā

and your name is Satyakāma. Therefore call yourself only as Satya-

kāma Jābāla.’ He went to Hāridrumata Gautama and said, ‘I

shall observe brahmacarya under you and so have approached you.’

Gautama asked, ‘What is your family, O gentle one?’ He replied,

‘I do not know it, I asked my mother about it but she replied that

she had got me while serving many men and hence she knew not

what was my gotra or family. I am simply Satyakāma Jābāla.’ Then

the Ṛṣi said, ‘Not a non-Brāhmin can speak like this (i.e. such fear-

less expression of truth is possible only for a Brāhmin). Bring wood,

I shall initiate you as you did not flinch from truth.’60 This clearly

depicts that truth and truth alone was counted as the supreme qualifi-

cation for discipleship.

Again we find a reference to a novel method of finding out a

real culprit by giving in his hand a heated axe. If he is a liar and

tries to conceal his guilt he will be burnt by it and later killed for his

crime. But if he has not perpetrated the act and is truthful (satyābbi-

sandbah) then even if he takes hold of the heated axe he will not be

burnt and then will be released.61 Thus whether in determining the

fitness of a disciple or in detecting the real culprit, the standard of

judgment always was fidelity to truth in the Upaniṣadic age. ‘One

is dried from the very roots if he tells a lie’ is the express opinion of

59 BU, 5. 5. 1. 60 CU, 4. 4. 61 Ibid., 6. 16. 2.

the seer in the Upaniṣad.62 So concealment and deception were things

unknown to seers of old. While instructing others, they never kept

anything concealed, and taught only that much about whose truth

there was no shadow of doubt in them. They never taught or talked

about a thing beyond their range of experience. Their whole conduct

is truth (ṛṣīṇām caritam satyam);63 because they knew that in order

to reach the supreme status of truth (satyasya paramaṁ nidhānam) one

must tread the celestial way (devayāna) and that way is made wide by

truth (satyena panthā vitato).64 The Praśna Upaniṣad declares: ‘They

alone attain this brahmaloka who have performed tapas and brahma-

carya, in whom is the truth established’; ‘Theirs is that pure brahma-

loka in whom there is no crookedness, falsehood or deception.’65

Thus truth is a standard of judgment, a rule of conduct and a means

for the attainment of the highest world.

Dharma or the true Law of Life

Along with the cultivation of truth in speech, one must also

tread the path of dharma.66 As satya is a quality of vacana or speech

(vada), so dharma is a matter for ācarana or conduct (cara). Dharma

is thus the actualization of truth. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad

says: ‘What is dharma is verily truth; therefore when one speaks the

truth he is said to be speaking dharma (i. e. rightly) or when one tells

dharma he is said to be telling the truth’.67 Thus these two are inter-

changeable terms. In the Vedic terminology it is ṛta or the right law

or norm of conduct. What the supreme vision reveals as satya is

sought to be expressed in action as ṛta or dharma. As one knows, so

must he act. If one knows the truth, he must act in the right man-

ner. If he acts wrongly, his knowledge of truth is merely a preten-

sion. Action and thought must be brought to a harmony, and then

dharma will be established. Dharma is not religion or virtue as it is

generally understood or translated. Dharma is the basic or inherent

nature of a thing which sustains it: To transgress dharma is to forfeit

one's own existence. According to our scriptures, dharma is comprised

62 PRU, 6. 1. 63 Ibid., 2. 8. 64 MU, 3. 1. 6.

65 PRU, 1. 15. 66 TU, 1. ii. 1. 67 BU, 1. 4. 14.

152

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

of two things: abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa. To grow and prosper and

and then to have complete freedom or release from the fetters of life

is the goal of dharma. So the essential meaning of dharma, i.e. its

definition is ‘codanā’ i. e. the incentive or inspiration to all actions.

The inspiration must come always from the highest centre. One

must be spurred to action by the command from above and not by the

promptings of the lower nature, which leads one to adharma. Every

action should thus be inspired by a noble purpose, and this is the

significance of the command to act according to dharma (dharman

cara).⁶⁸

Tapas or Force of Concentration

After discussing the general nature of dharma, let us try to find

out, if possible, some specific acts of dharma enjoined by the Upani-

ṣads. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad explicitly mentions three constituent

elements of dharma, viz, yajña, adhyayana and dāna.⁶⁹ Yajña generally

means sacrifice or the offering of the self. It is a very wide term

which generally applies to the whole stage of preparation or purifica-

tion. We have already seen from a passage in the Upaniṣad that yajña

has been identified with brahmacarya.⁷⁰ Here it is said : ‘The first

(i. e. yajña) is nothing but tapas.’ This term ‘tapas’ is met with

very frequently in the whole Upaniṣadic literature. Tapas primarily

means heat, that is why tapas plays an important part in the process

of creation, We hear that the Supreme, when He desired to create

(akāmáyata), found Himself tired and then performed tapas (tapo

atapyata), and from Him, tired and then heated through tapas (tapta-

sya), glory and energy sprang out.⁷¹ In the Vedic description of

creation, too, we find a similar reference to tapas. ‘From enkindled

tapas, ṛta and satya were born’.⁷² Thus tapas means the supreme

force or energy, the primal heat which produces the universe, or is

rather at the root of creation. So in going back to the source of

creation one has again to take recourse to tapas. ‘Enquire about

Brahman through tapas. Tapas is verily Brahman.’⁷³ The intenser

68 TU, 1, 11, 1. 69 CU, 2, 23, 1. 70 Ibid., 8, 5,

71 BU. 1. 2. 6. 72 RV, 10. 190. 1. 73 TU, 3. 2.

THE PREPARATION

153

the tapas grows, the brighter comes the revelation. Thus Bhṛgu, by higher and higher tapas, came to know by stages the different forms of Brahman, beginning from anna or matter right upto Ānanda or Bliss. Tapas with its primary meaning of force, thereafter came to mean forcible endurance of afflictions, i. e. penance. Such austerities of self-inflicted mortifications generate a heat of force, which ultimately purifies the soul. By denying to the self all forms of sense-enjoyment, one gathers the force which is generally frittered away in trivial enjoyments. This force or heat helps to slacken or soften the otherwise hardened encrustations lying heavily on the soul. Heat causes things to expand and so the heat of tapas expands the soul by releasing it from its small and narrow existence. Patañjali, too, while delineating kriyāyoga, which is the primary requisite of samādhi yoga, mentions tapas first, and Vyāsa, in opening his commentary thereon, says that success in yoga cannot come to one who has no tapas.74 Only by cleansing the cloth first, one should think of dyeing it. To dye an unclean cloth is to disfigure it and make it uglier still. This primary work of cleaning is done through tapas and that is called yajña here, which forms an integral part of dharma. Sri Aurobindo makes the conception of tapas clear in a remarkable note on that particular term, which we reproduce here: "Tapas means literally heat, afterwards any kind of energism, askesis, austerity of conscious-force acting upon itself or its object. The world was created by tapas in the form, says the ancient image, of an egg, which being broken, again by tapas, heat of incubation of conscious force, the Purusha emerged, soul in Nature, like a bird from the egg. It may be observed that the usual translation of the word 'tapasyā' in English books, 'penance', is quite misleading—the idea of penance entered rarely into the austerities practised by Indian ascetics. Nor was mortification of the body the essence even of the most severe and self-afflicting austerities; the aim was rather an overpassing of the hold of the bodily nature on the consciousness or else a supernormal energising of the consciousness and will to gain some spiritual or other object."75

74 nātapasyino yogas siddhyati, VB, on YS, 2. 1.

75 LD, p. 420.

20

154

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

Svādhyāya or Study

The next constituent of dharma is adhyayana or study. We have seen that the preparatory stage begins with the approach to the Guru or Ācārya. The approach is made in order to have knowledge, and to have knowledge, study must be prosecuted unremittingly. ‘Do not be unmindful to your studies’ warns the Upaniṣad.⁷⁶ Along with the cultivation of other virtues, svādhyāya and pravacana, study and teaching must go on without any interruption, because study is the sole occupation or pursuit of the student. So the Taittirīya Upaniṣad mentions all the different virtues, ṛta, satya, tapas, etc. separately and attaches to each of them the term svādhyāyapravacane ca, thereby showing that this is the common and indispensable factor in the list of virtues.⁷⁷ If one acquires other virtues to the neglect of studies, then all those virtues will be of no avail to him, because mere acquirement of virtues is not the goal but real illumination is the aim of all these preparations. This illumination can never be had without absolutely devoting oneself to studies to the exclusion of everything else. Therefore it cannot be dispensed within any case, even when one is acquiring other virtues. But mere study by oneself, or svādhyāya does not make the knowledge sure or secure, So pravacana also must be undertaken, adhyāpana must also be practised and not adhyayana alone. By pravacana or teaching, one not only enhances his own knowledge but by thus handing it down to another he helps in keeping the chain of tradition unbroken (jñānatantusamrakṣana), which also happens to be a supreme duty for him. Without distributing what he has acquired, one is not freed from the debt that he owes to his preceptor.

In the Mahābhāsya of Patañjali there is a memorable line which points out the conditions which make knowledge or vidyā really fruitful. There are four steps through which a vidyā becomes useful. First by the coming of it from the teacher, secondly by the studying of it, thirdly by the teaching of the same, lastly by its

76 svādhyāyān na pramādaḥ. TU, I. II. I.

77 TU, I. 9.

application.78 When these four things combine, real knowledge dawns,

and that is why the Upaniṣads lay so much stress on svādhyāya-prava-

cana. It must be noted in this connexion that the svādhyāya or study

must be confined to the Vedas alone. It is not the study of

secular literature, all and sundry, that is enjoined here but the reading

of the Śruti which is the very embodiment of Śabda-Brahman. Thus

by svādhyāya-pravacana one tries to maintain a constant contact with

the supreme Logos or Śabda-Brahman.

Dāna or Dedication

The third and last of the components of dharma is dāna or dedica-

tion. The Upaniṣad itself explains this last element thus : ‘The

third is to confine oneself absolutely to the family of the teachers.’79

This means that one who wholly gives himself up to this quest and

with that end in view resolves to spend his whole life in the home of

his teacher, is really the man who has made a gift (dāna) of himself.

In explaining the second factor of adhyayana the Upaniṣad had said:

‘The second is the brahmacārin residing in the family of the ācārya’.80

But here residence is absolute (atyantam) and not confined to the

period of brahmacarya alone. Hence it is a total dedication, a

complete consecration of one’s life that the term dāna here signifies.81

78 caturbhiś ca prakārair vidyo ‘payuktā bhavaty, āgamakālena svādhyaya-

kālena pravakanakālena vyavahārakālene’ti. PMB, p. 6, Keilhorn’s ed.

79 CU, 2. 23. 1.

80 Ibid.

81 In the interpretation of this text from Chāndogya 2. 23. 1, viz., ‘trayo

dharmaskandhāḥ etc., I have followed an independent line which differs widely

from the interpretation put to it by Śaṅkara. The difference arises from the

divergence in the method of splitting the actual text. I have put a stop after

‘dānam iti’, but Śaṅkara stops after ‘prathamah’ and so he has put all the three

viz. yajña, adhyayana and dāna together as the first of the three components of

dharma. Śaṅkara means to connect the dharmaskandhas with the three

āśramas, viz. brahmacarya, gārhasthya and vānaprastha and interprets the text

accorddingly, keeping the fourth āśrama of sannyāsa rightly beyond all dharmas,

and hence not included in the dharmaskandhas. But I beg to differ from

Śaṅkara here and think that after enumerating the three component

elements of dharma as yajña, adhyayana and dāna, the Upaniṣad itself goes

to explain them one by one. Śaṅkara has also been forced to twist the meaning

156

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

Its secondary meaning of charity naturally follows from this primary

sense of dedication. Through the cultivation of charity we are released

from our isolated existences or private universes and get connected

with the wider universe that lies around us. We feel indissolubly

bound by a tie of relation with our fellow beings and then endeavour

to our best capacities to fulfil all these relations.

Dāna thus connects us with the human world and this is made

clear in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, where we hear that the gods,

demons and men all had gone for enlightenment to their common

father Prajāpati, and he cryptically instructed them with only a single

syllable, 'da'. The gods understood it as dama or self-control, the

demons as dayā or compassion, and men as dāna or charity.82 Thus

dāna is essentially a human virtue, because man being a social being

must think of others around him and come to their aid by curtailing

or even sacrificing his own enjoyment. Hence man transgresses his

dharma or rather, goes against the inherent law of his nature if

he hoards everything for his own enjoyment and is not charitable

in his disposition. Not wealth alone but whatever treasure one

happens to possess must be distributed among and shared with his

fellow beings. That this ideal was always kept in view by the

Upaniṣadic sages is clear from the numerous illustrations of ungrudging

exposition of the nature of Reality to a true seeker. Nothing was kept

as a closely guarded secret or as one's own private experience. They

tried to disseminate the truths they had experienced as much as

possible. In a remarkable passage in the Taittirīya, we find the sage

inviting the brahmacārins to come to him from all quarters : 'As do

the waters flow downward, or the months move towards the year,

similarly O Lord, let the brahmacārins flock to me from all quarters'.83

He is sending a call all around and is praying and hoping that he will

of the term 'prathamab' into 'ekab' i.e. one, while in my interpretation its

natural import i.e. 'first' is preserved. The difference in the method of split-

ting is very interesting, though it must be borne in mind that Saṅkara's

interpretation is equally cogent and acceptable and the two interpretations do

not clash with each other nor are they in fundamental opposition. It is men-

tioned here only to point out the absolute flexibility of the Upaniṣadic texts,

82 BU, 5. 2.

83 TU, I. 4. 3.

have response to it from all quarters. This shows his anxiety to share

his experiences with others.

As in the case of spiritual treasure, so in the matter of earthly

treasures, too, there are ample illustrations of gift or dāna in the

Upaniṣads. The case of Janaka, who made a lavish gift to his precep-

tor Yājñavalkya at the end of his teaching, shines out in a singular

blaze of glory. The Kaṭhopaniṣad verily begins with this theme of

dāna. There it has been shown that the gift of bad and useless things

takes the donot to cheerless states of existence (anandā lokāḥ)84, and to

prevent the same thing happening to his father, Naciketas offers

himself as a gift and presses his father again and again to give him to

somebody, which ultimately so much enrages the father that he gives

over his son to Death or Yama. But from this supreme gift of the

son, though made in anger, there comes the great enlightenment to

Naciketas. Thereby the Upaniṣad teaches that no gift should be

made of useless things in a careless manner and the gift of a supremely

valuable thing, like a son, though heedlessly made brings its fruit.

So the Taittirīya Upaniṣad points out in detail the right manner of

making a gift. ‘One should give with reverence. Nothing should

be given with contempt. The gift must be made lavishly. With

humility should it be given and also with fear and right knowledge’85.

Thus by the three components of dharma a connexion is

established with the three spheres of existence. By yajña or sacrifice

one is linked with the world of gods, through study or adhyayana one

is joined with the supreme sphere of Śabda-Brahman and lastly through

dāna, self-giving or gift of things one gets connected with the human

world. Dharma thus covers all the spheres of life and is not an

isolated state of thing, as is clear from the Upaniṣadic conception of it.

Importance of Śraddhā or Faith

All these virtues are to be cultivated with adequate faith or

śraddhā. It is śraddhā which protects the seeker like a mother86.

It is nothing but the utter transparency of the mind (cetasas sam-

84 KTU, I. II. 3.

85 TU, I. II. 3.

86 VB, on YS, I. 20.

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STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

sādah), as Vyāsa defines it in his commentary on Patañjali's Yoga-

Sūtra87. Only a transparent mind can hold or retain the truth. The

truth gets stamped indelibly upon such a mind and thus the conviction

becomes unshakeable. That is why Āruṇi while imparting the

supreme instruction to Svetaketu asks him to have faith in his sayings

(śraddhatsva somya)88. Śaṅkara in his commentary thereon says :

'Though a thing established through reasoning and testimony is

known exactly to be so, yet the most subtle things are hardly

apprehended without a deep faith by one who is attached to outward

objects and follows his own nature. Therefore it is said 'Do have

faith'. With faith the mind becomes attentive to the thing desired

to be known and from that follows its knowledge'89. Elsewhere

in the Upaniṣad it has been pointed out that one begins to think

or contemplate over a thing only when he has faith in it and thus at

the root of manana or reasoning lies faith.90

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad it is stated that yajña or sacrifice

rests on dakṣiṇā or dedication and that dakṣiṇā is again based on

śraddhā. 'When one is full of faith then only he makes the gift'.

The Upaniṣad goes on to show the root of faith too. 'On what is

faith based? On the heart, it was replied. By the heart is the faith

recognized. Therefore in the heart alone is faith established or

founded'.91 Thus to have faith means to set one's heart upon the

thing, according to the Upaniṣads. Unless one takes a thing to heart

he cannot make it the sole pursuit of his life, and without this

singleness of purpose the supreme knowledge of Brahman cannot be

gained. So at the very root of the supreme enquiry lies faith. It is

śraddhā which got hold of Naciketas (śraddhā āviveśa)92 and prompted

him to think seriously about the acts of his father. So in his case too

reflection ensued (so amanyata)93 only after śraddhā had entered into

him (āviveśa). He also makes a demand on Yama to tell him about

the Supreme Secret because he is full of faith,94

Sraddhā is thus the essential pre-requisite of this supreme search

87 YS, 1. 20.

88 CU, 6. 12. 3.

89 Ibid. SB,

90 CU, 7, 19. 1.

91 BU, 3. 9. 21.

92 KTU, 1. 1,

93 Ibid.

94 prabruhi tāṁ śraddadhānāya manyam. KTU, 1.13.

because it makes one fit for holding the truth. Hence in this pre-

patory stage we find śraddhā repeatedly mentioned along with

the other virtues already discussed: ‘By tapas, brabmacarya and

śraddhā,95 ‘śraddhā, satya, brabmacarya and vidhi’,96 ‘offerings made

with śraddhā’,97. ‘Those who cultivate tapas and śraddhā in the

forest’98 and so on. The Taittirīya Upaniṣad while enjoining charity

warns the student that the gift must be made with faith and never

should anything be given without faith.99 Thus each and every act

enjoined herein must be done with absolute faith, without which

even a pious act becomes useless and even perverse (asat), as the Gītā

points out.100 The Taittirīya, while delineating the different forms

of the Ātman beginning from the annamaya, makes it explicitly clear

in the exposition of the Vijñānamaya Ātman that śraddhā is verily

the source of vijñāna or knowledge. ‘Its head is śraddhā alone’,

it declares.101 Echoing the Upaniṣads, Patañjali in his Yoga-Sūtras

places śraddhā at the very beginning of the evolution of the intellect

which culminates in prajñā.102 In the Vedāntic scheme, too, of the

acquirement of knowledge, it is śraddhā again which leads to samā-

dbāna. ‘The man with faith gets knowledge’, declares the Gītā.104

Thus everywhere it is made unmistakeably clear that to have

Knowledge, prajñā, vijñana or samādbāna nr jñāna, śraddhā is the

indispensable pre-requisite. ‘It is a living, responding of the soul to

God’ as Radhakrishnan puts it.105 Sri Krishna Prem in his illuminat-

ing book on the Kaṭhopaniṣad says that ‘the śraddhā which entered

Naciketas is the true faith, the Fair Faith as Hermes calls it, which

is a form of Knowledge that has been realized at deeper levels of be-

ing. In technical terms it is the reflection in the personal mind of

the Knowledge that results from the union of the higher manas with

the buddhi. For the personal mind it is not quite knowledge, be-

cause that personal or lower mind is not yet properly united to its

higher self and therefore the latter’s knowledge can only appear as

95 KTU, 1. 13. 96 PRU, 1. 2., 1, 10., 5.3.

97 MU, 2, 1. 7. 98 Ibid, 1. 2. 2. 99 Ibid, 1. 2. 11.

100 TU, 1. 11, 3. 101 Gitā, 17. 21. 102 TU, 2. 4. 1.

103 YS, 1, 20. 104 Gitā, 4. 40. 105 ERWT, p. 337.

160

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

the reflection which we term faith’.106 Thus with the dawning of

faith comes a glimpse of the light that lies beyond, which initiates the

quest or search as well as sustains the seeker to the very last limit

of his journey.

Sri Aurobindo analyzes the nature of faith in the following words:

‘First of all, faith does not depend upon experience; it is something

that is there before experience...........All men of action, discoverers,

inventors, creators of knowledge proceed by faith and until the proof

is made or the thing done, they go on inspite of disappointment,

failure, disproof, denial,—because of something in them that tells

them that this is the truth, the thing that must be followed and done..........Faith is the soul’s witness to something not yet mani-

fested or not yet realized but which yet the Knower within us, even

in the absence of all indications, feels to be true or supremely worth

following or achieving’ 107

Reverence for Parents

Another important teaching inculcated in Tāittirīya Upaniṣad is

the attribution of divinity to the parents and the guest as well.108

They are to be looked upon as emblems of divinity, for they are the

visible gods on earth who represent the Invisible Supreme. We have

already seen the supremely important place occupied by the ācārya in

the scheme of Brahmavidyā. The position of the parents, too, is no

less important. Not only do we owe our physical existence to them

but our whole spiritual make-up too. So the father is not only our

pitā but the pitṛdeva, the divine in the form of the father and the

mother is the mātrdeva, the divine incarnated as the mother.

The whole aim of Brahmavidyā is to find the divine in every form

and nowhere else it is more easily grasped and apprehended than in

the living and concrete form of the parents. Hence the Upaniṣad

enjoins the student to look upon the parents with supreme reverence.

The primary virtues are first imbibed from the parents. Thus

Satyakāma Jābāla who earned the Supreme Knowledge because of

his unswerving adherence to truth acquired this spirit of truthfulness

106 YK, p. 17.

107 AG, pp. 257-59.

108 TU, 1.11.2.

from his mother, Jabālā. He was absolutely in the dark about his

origin or caste, and had the mother chosen to deceive him by attribut-

ing a false origin, Satyakāma would have had no means to

correct it or even to know that it was false. But the mother gave

out the truth to her son in utter frankness and sincerity of spirit and

the son, too, repeated the same thing in an exactly similar and simple

way to his teacher when the latter questioned about his origin.109

On the contrary, the flouting of the authority or disregard for the

superiority of the parents debars one from getting the illumination

that he seeks, however much he may presume to know and pretend to

succeed. Thus we find in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad that the very first

boon that Naciketas sought from Yama was about the pacifying of

the angry and ruffled spirit of his father. The prayer was that the

father may be śāntasaṅkalpa, sumanāḥ and vītamanyuḥ, of a calm

disposition, happy mind and devoid of anger110. Naciketas, being

the ideal type of a seeker, knew that without the propitiation of the

father—though in his case the father was in the wrong, yet even then

—no knowledge can be gained, because the wrath of the parents blocks

the whole road to progress and makes further advancement impossible.

By mutual cooperation the son and the father should proceed on the

journey and so by adoration and surrender the son must propitiate

the father and identify himself with the spirit of his progenitor. The

son does not only inherit the material properties and earthly belong-

ings of his father after he passes away, but the whole spiritual inheri-

tance accrues to him. He must enrich the inheritance, so he has to

take the torch entrusted and handed over to him further in regions

left unexplored by his predecessor and continue the march from the

place where his father fell, who charges him to complete the journey

which he could not finish.

We find in the Upaniṣad the remarkable picture of this supreme

relation between the father and the son depicted in what is called

Sampratti111 i.e. sampradāna or entrusting. The dying father calls

the son to his bedside and gives him a report of the progress he had

made, of the summits he had gained in life. But still higher summits

109 CU, 4. 4. 1-4. 110 KTU, 1. 1. 10.

111 BU, 1. 5, 17,

162

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

remain to be scaled or conquered to make the journey complete. So he

entrusts his son with this work after leaving to him the whole wealth

of his experience gained during the journey. This is described as his

entering into the son, as it were, i.e. he identifies himself in spirit with

him112 at the time of his departure from this world113. Thus the duty

of the son, which is obtained from the very basic meaning of the term

'putra', is to liberate the father by completing the work left unfinished

by him114. This function of sampradāna is worked out in detail in

the Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad too.115 Similarly in the Chāndogya

Upaniṣad,116 we find the sage Kauṣītaki asking his son to enrich the

experience of his father by multiplying the rays i.e. by knowing the

reality in all its various aspects or numerous phases, of which he had

only a general and non-detailed knowledge. The father had only a

partial knowledge of truth and so he asks his son to have a com-

prehensive knowledge of the same and thereby complete his experience.

Such is the glorious and ideal relationship between the father and

the son which was envisaged by the seers of the Upaniṣads and that

is why in the very beginning of the spiritual discipline, the student

is trained to look upon his parents as gods. The tradition of the

Brahmavidyā was also generally handed down from the father to the

son, as we find from numerous instances in the Upaniṣads.

Respect for the Guest

Lastly, the atithi or the guest too, is to be looked upon as a god

and worshipped as such117. The act of hospitality should not be a

formal one but must be carried out in a spirit of worship, for when

the guest comes at our door he should not be looked upon as a

stranger or an outsider but as the very emblem of the Supreme

Spirit. In the Vedic imagery, Agni and Soma, too, are termed as

atithi, because they are like guests come from heaven to adorn the

112 ebhir eva prāṇais saha putram āviśati. BU, 1. 5. 17.

113 asmāl lokāt praiti, Ibid.

114 sa yady anena kiñcid akṣṇayā' kṛtam bhāvati tasmād enam sarvasmāt

putro muñcati, tasmāt putro nāma. BU, 1. 5. 17.

115 Kauṣi, 2. 15. 116 CU, 1. 5, 2- 117 TU, 1. 11. 2.

sacrifice. So in Kathopanisad118 it is expressly stated that when a

Brāhmin guest enters the house one must take it as an entry of

the Agni itself (vaiśvānaraḥ praviśati). Even the all-powerful Yama is

very much apprehensive of a calamity befalling him because of

his failure to attend to the guest who is namasya or adorable,

due to his absence from home; and so on his return, he immediately

goes to propitiate Naciketas by offering him the grant of three

boons for the three nights he had been left uncared for and

unattended. This shows what a great reverence was accorded

to a guest during the age of the Upaniṣads. This ideal of

service to the guest has permeated the whole fabric of Indian

life. Whether one reads the ancient Upaniṣads or the later epics

like Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata or the works of Kālidāsa like the

drama of Śakuntalā, everywhere is found this supreme importance of

atitbisevā stressed again and again. It is the nyajña, by performing

which we fulfil our obligation to the whole human race and feel that

none is a stranger to us in this world and the same divine spirit in-

habits all forms. The Mundakopanisad, while enumerating the

flaws that spoil the agnibotra sacrifice, mentions the absence of wor-

ship of the atithi (atithivarjitam) as one of the main defects.119 We

may note, in passing, that this scrupulous fulfilment of all duties

demanded here shows that the Upaniṣadic seers looked upon the tree

of life as an organic whole and hence tried to fulfil all the relations

scrupulously, not only of man to man but to all created things. The

vision of supreme unity is the final aim and the seeker is trained

from the initial stage to imbibe this spirit of unity in all spheres of

life.

After enjoining these duties the seer again warns the student

not to falter or fail in scrupulously carrying out each of the above

injunctions and so repeats them all over again with the warning ‘na

pramāditavyam’120 attached separately to each of them. This shows

how in this period of preparation one has to be constantly on

vigil and ever alert lest a slip should occur and spoil the whole work.

It also makes clear how exacting the sages were in this respect, viz. in

118 KTU, I. 7. 119 MU, I. 2. 3. 120 TU, I. II. I.

164

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

the scrupulous conformity to the moral law or dharma, though their ultimate aim was to transcend the sphere of morality, pass beyond all dharmas whatsoever.

No stress on Ahimssā or Īśvara Praṇidhāna

Of all the virtues enumerated so far, non-violence or ahimsā seems to occupy no privileged position in the Upaniṣads, which is a thing to be noted. It is mentioned just only once along with other virtues, in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad: ‘Now tapas, dāna, simplicity, ahimsā and truth in speech, these are his dakṣiṇās or fees.'121 It seems that the stress on ahimsā came with the later Buddhist tradition and so Patañjali, in his enumeration of yama, mentions ahimsā first of all.122 The stress varied between truth and non-violence in later schools. Some thought that satya or truth is the primary thing without which no ahimsā is possible. A really truthful man alone will never injure another. The opposite view is that one could hardly be established in truth without first cultivating the spirit of ahimsā. How can one flinch from truth whose vow is non-injury to others? The debate is interesting, though the ultimate issue is not so much a matter of dispute, as the final outcome is practically the same whichever way the stress is laid.

Another thing to be noted is that, though the Upaniṣads lay stress on tapas and svādhyāya, yet they nowhere mention in the preparatory stage any form of Īśvara-praṇidhāna, as we find it in the kriyāyoga of Patañjali's system, which has been defined by Vyāsa in his commentary as ‘the offering of the fruits of all actions to the Great Lord', (sarvakarmaphalānāṃ paramagurau arpaṇam),123 This teaching of ‘phalārpaṇa’ was made more popular by the Gītā as a preparatory purification. There is a theistic element involved in it, while the Upaniṣadic scheme of preparatory virtues has a more humanistic basis, as they are to be acquired and adhered to unflinchingly by man himself without bringing in a god at whose feet he may lay bare the burden of his soul. Here he must stand on his own strength

121 CU, 3. 17. 4.

122 YS, 2. 30.

123 Ibid., 2. 1.

(uddharēt ātmanā 'tmānam) and should not lean or depend upon any

external agency or factor—this seems to be the pointer.

Instruction through the syllable ‘Da’

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad124 there is a peculiar cryptic

formula of ‘da’, by which syllable three virtues are taught to the

three different species of beings, viz. the gods, the demons and the

human beings, all the offsprings of Prajāpati. All the three approached

their father for instruction and after having observed brahmacarya

prayed for the knowledge. To all the three he imparted the instruc-

tion through the same single syllable ‘da’, and each understood its

meaning according to his own peculiar disposition and character. The

gods took it as dama or self-control because they needed it more than

anything else as a check or corrective to their excess of power. With-

out dama they were liable to misuse the divine energy at their

disposal. The human beings understood it as dāna or offering because

being essentially social beings their foremost virtue lay in this gift or

offering of each to the other, which keeps the human society going.

The demons thought it to be dayā or kindness, for their fierce and cruel

nature needed to be softened by the benign influence of kindness all

around. Thus, at three levels, three forms of virtue are prescribed here:

the divine needs self-control, the human needs self-giving and the

demonic needs kindness.

Condemnation of immoral acts

The Upaniṣads also condemn many immoral acts and warn that

the perpetrators of such heinous crimes go down as well as those who

are the abettors. ‘By stealing gold, drinking wine, polluting the bed of

the teacher and killing a Brāhmin—these four go down as well as the

fifth who acts with them’.125

The Upaniṣads also discourage too much of learning as it

amounts to mere verbiage. ‘One should not absorb oneself in

many words, for that only tires the speech’.126 Mere scholar-

ship is not prized but the simplicity of a child is adored and

124 BU, 5. 2.

125 CU, 5. 10.

126 BU, 4. 4. 21.

166

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

prescribed. ‘After fully exploring knowledge one should desire to

remain as a child’.127 The Upaniṣadic seers were aware that too much of

learning only leads to arrogance and to distraction and entanglement

in a net of words. Instead of straightening and simplifying the issue

it only leads to an increasing complication and confusion of the same.

Only in a heart free from all bias and prejudices the truth is revealed.

That is why the innocence and simplicity of a child is sought to the

exclusion of all outward scholarship or learning. After a thorough

search through the intellectual mazes one must let everything go and

wait for the revelation through a simple intuition.

Summary of the teachings and their significance

The period of preparation which we have surveyed so far is

essentially a period of purification or purgation. It begins as we have

seen with the surrender of the charge of life to the teacher, who

henceforward sits at the helm, guiding the course of life of the

disciple. Under his exacting discipline the gathering of forces or the

conservation of energy begins, which is called brahmacarya. This

entails the rejection of many sweet and comfortable things which are

described as preya, and the deliberate endurance of many hardships

and rigours and restraints. Thus one goes in for tapas, which ‘only

means the development of soul-force, the freeing of the soul from

slavery to body, severe thinking or energising of mind’.128 For this

essential need. The seeker must know that ‘it is truth alone which

is (ultimately) victorious and not falsehood’.129 Without this basic

belief or faith in the ultimate success of truth it is not possible to

move forward in this hazardous path. That is why śraddhā or faith

has been found to be an indispensable requirement for the seeker. If

one follows with faith the way of truth, one’s power is sure to grow

imperceptibly and only the man with power can get hold of the

Ātman, because it can never be realized by one devoid of strength or

power as the Upaniṣad declares.130 The purpose of the gathering

127 BU, 3. 5. 1.

128 RPU, p. 91.

129 MU, 3. 1. 6.

130 Ibid, 3. 2. 4.

of strength is to kindle the fire, which alone can burn all impurities

whatsoever, free the soul from the crooked ties of sin and lead one

along the path of goodness (supathā) towards plenitude (rāye) and

fulfilment131. With the kindling of fire, life turns into a yajña or

sacrifice, and the seeker signifies his earnestness for kindling the fire

and turning his life into a yajña by carrying the ‘samidh’ or load of

wood in his hand while approaching the teacher. The seeker confines

himself to the home of the teacher and devotes himself absolutely

to the study of the scriptures. In order to test his assimilation of the

subject taught, he goes on to make an exposition of the subject to

others which makes his knowledge secure and sound.

Thus svādhyāya, or study and pravacana or exposition are the two

main occupations in the prepatory period. The sage Nāka Maudgalya

calls this svādhyāya and pravacana as the only form of meditation or

tapas132. That this happens to be the primary and essential thing

in this period is also clear from the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, where the

other virtues like ṛta, satya etc. are all seperately enumerated with the

clause ‘svādhyāya pravacane ca’ attached to each of them133. This

signifies that the other virtues should be cultivated along with the

study and exposition of scriptures and not to the exclusion of the

latter in any case. This period of studentship is thus solely meant

for the acquirement or gathering of knowledge along with the

conservation of energy or force which, as we have seen, is termed

brahmacarya. These two things viz. knowledge and strength or

force should be collected to the full and it is only the fullness of

knowledge as well as of strength that brings liberation. A complete

development of all the parts from the physical upto the intellectual

is, therefore, demanded.

This shows that the Upaniṣadic sādbanā or approach to Reality

is not a mere intellectual gymnastic; it is a growth, a development.

It is a growth from animality to humanity, from humanity to divinity,

and from divinity to infinity. Diffusion or dissipation of energy or

wastage of force must be checked at all costs and that is why so many

vows are to be taken and strictly adhered to. The injunctions about

131 IU, 18.

132 TU, I. 9.

133 Ibid.

168

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

right conduct can hardly be driven home with more emphasis or strength than as here in the Upaniṣads. With the strongest imperatives are they imparted to bring home to the novitiate the supreme importance of them. Scrupulous conformity to them is demanded by a repetition of the warning again and again : ‘mā pramada’, ‘do not fail or falter’.

We draw the attention of those scholars who find a complete disregard for morality in the Upaniṣadic teaching to this emphasis on right conduct repeated over and over again in the Upaniṣads. It is an astounding charge which Western scholars like Hume, Deussen, Gough and Keith have levelled again and again against the Upaniṣadic tradition.

Dr Hume observes: “There is a wide difference between the Upaniṣadic theory and the theory of the Greek sages, that the man who has knowledge should thereby become virtuous in character or that the result of teaching should be a virtuous life.

Here the possession of some metaphysical knowledge actually cancels all past sins and even permits the knower unblushingly to continue in ‘what seems to be much evil’ with perfect impunity, although such acts are heinous crimes and are disastrous in their effect for others who lack that kind of knowledge”134.

Evidently Dr Hume has completely misunderstood the nature of the ‘metaphysical knowledge’ to which he refers here. Does not the Upaniṣad declare unequivocally : ‘None can attain this Ātman unless he has ceased to revel in the evil ways of life’?135

To let the animal in us have its full play and yet to pretend to grow divine is a colossal self-deception of which the Upaniṣadic seers were very well aware.

So the seeker is warned again and again to be on his guard against the attacks of the enemy, the asura, who is the very incarnation of sin (pāpmā).

One must bid good-bye to the animal in him before he can hope to welcome and usher in the divine.

Not one Upaniṣad here and there mentions the necessity of moral discipline but all the Upaniṣads uniformly and unfailingly stress this point.

Thus the Kena Upaniṣad, which devotes itself exclusively to the exposition of the nature of Brahman, does not forget to remind its readers while concluding its discourse that tapas

134 TPU, p. 60.

135 KTU, 1, 2. 23.

dama and karman are the foundations of this supreme knowledge and

satya or truth is the very basis of it136. Again, in the Katha, while

expounding the nature of the Ātman, Yama gives the warning that one

who is devoid of reason (avijñānavān), of uncontrolled mind and ever

impure (amanaskaḥ sadā sucip) can never hope to attain this status

(padam) but only goes down in saṃsāra.137 If one wants to reach

the end of the way, Yama adds, one must have reason as his charioteer

and a composed mind as the bridle to check the senses, which are

like wild horses.138 Next, the Praśna Upaniṣad also sings to the

same strain, when it says that the stainless sphere of Brahman can

be attained only by those who have practised tapas and brahmacarya,

who are established in truth and free from all crookedness, falsehood

and deception.139 The Muṇḍaka is emphatic on this point that the

Ātman can be realized only through tapas, brahmacarya, satya and

right knowledge (samyag jñānena).140 The Taittirīya begins with

the Śikṣāvallī and devotes a whole section to this essential basic train-

ing in moral virtues before it goes on to expound the nature of

Brahman in later chapters. The Chāndogyā, in the very beginning,

brings in the topic of the classic struggle between the devas and

asuras and thereby reminds us that the way is not so smooth as we

think, because we must first free ourselves from the clutches of asura

or pāpmā who holds us in its iron grips.141 Lastly, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka,

though solely engaged in the exploration of the Ātman, opens with

the description of the Aśvamedha, the highest sacrifice, which literally

means the purification of the animal or the aśva.142 Thus we find

the same note ringing through all the Upaniṣads about the supreme

necessity of having a virtuous life in order to qualify for the supreme

knowledge of the Ātman or Brahman. Everywhere in the Upaniṣads

we find that the supreme knowledge is not imparted all at once

but the seeker is asked again and again to perform further tapas

and thereby purify himself before he can hope for the ultimate

enlightenment. Moreover, when one aspires to attain higher and

136 KU, 4. 33. 137 KTU, 1, 3, 7. 138 Ibid, 1. 3. 6.

139 PRU, 1. 15. 140 MU, 3. 15. 141 CU, 1. 2.

142 BU, 1, 1.

22

170

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

higher levels of perfection he has to pass through more rigorous

and stricter moral discipline as he rises in the scale of spiritual

advancement.

But it should be remembered that all this purification is not an

end in itself and the Upaniṣads are not mere codes of virtues or

morals. We have seen that purification or ābāraśuddhi, rather the

cleansing of the doors of perception is meant for sattvaśuddhi or

purity of the essence or being, which leads to a constant and uninter-

rupted remembrance of the supreme spiritual principle. With this

continuous flow of fixed remembrance, the knots of the heart are all

unloosened and then comes the utter freedom. This freedom, by its

very nature, implies a transcendence of all laws and regulations. The

liberated soul is neither bound to abide by any rule nor can he be

forced to flout any sacred law. There is no binding on him in either

way, for any form of limitation will frustrate the very freedom by

keeping him imprisoned in a particular realm of law. That is why the

Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, in a celebrated passage, describing the nature

of the liberated soul says: 'He is not tormented by doing or non-

doing.'143 Neither is there any feeling of depression in him on account

of brooding over past sins nor is there any elation in him at the

thought of virtuous acts previously performed. The 'ought' no longer

applies to him and so the thought of any unfinished duty does not

torment him.

The moral plane is the sphere of stress and torment, for it

is a battle-ground of two opposing and hostile forces, the devas

and the asuras, the forces of light and darkness. So here the injunc-

tion is to hold steadfastly to the forces of light, to abide strictly by

the dictates of reason. Every time one fails to be faithful to the

promptings of reason he is seized with a torment. There is no escape

from it. But with the birth of the spiritual element the story becomes

different. The strife ends, the struggle ceases, the torment disappears.

With the birth of the spirit comes a taste of freedom due to a trans-

cending of the sphere of conflict. Consequently he acts 'unblushingly',

as Hume calls it, in every way. 'Blushing' signifies a sense of guilt

143 BU, 4. 4. 22.

or sin, and one who has passed beyond the realm of sin can never have

any 'blushing' for any act whatsoever. But when Hume says that the

knower is allowed 'unblushingly to continue in what seems to be much

evil', he grossly misrepresents the thing. There can be no question

of the knower continuing in the ways of evil, because, as we have seen,

the Upaniṣad expressly declares that none can be a knower of the

Ātman if he does not desist from the evil ways of life. So one must

part company with 'what seems to be much evil', but ultimately he

must also part company with what seems to be much good. Good

and evil alike are transcended here because good also presupposes the

existence of evil, the notion of virtue calls up the opposite notion of

vice. To have real freedom one must pass beyond both of them.

Signifying this supreme state of liberation the Upaniṣad says: 'In that

highest state a thief is not a thief, a murderer not a murderer.

He is not followed by good nor followed by evil, for he then over-

comes all the sorrows of the heart'.144 Echoing this the Gītā says:

'Killing all these people he does not kill nor is himself killed.'145

All these extreme statements are made just to show that the realized

soul rises above the sphere of moral good and evil, and they are not

meant to indicate a deliberate continuance in the ways of evil or the

wilful perpetration of 'heinous crimes' as suggested by Hume. Neither

is there any suggestion that once 'the knowledge of the Ātman has

been gained, every action and therefore every moral action also has

been deprived of meaning,' as Deussen thinks.146 With the dawning

of the knowledge all actions assume a supreme meaning, to say nothing

of moral actions alone. The meaning attached to moral actions is

imposed from without and is hence contingent and artificial but here

in the state of knowledge the meaning springs from the soul of being

and spontaneously accompanies all actions whatsoever. Here 'law is

fulfilled in love.'

144 BU, 4. 3. 22.

145 Gītā, 18. 17.

146 PU, p. 362.

CHAPTER IV

CONTEMPLATION

We now move to the second stage in the Upaniṣadic approach to Reality. In the first stage of preparation we have found that, through a rigid discipline and strenuous endeavour, the attainment of purity of being (sattvaśuddhi)1 has been aimed at. This purity is not an end in itself but is sought to be achieved in order to qualify for the Brahma-vidyā proper, which is upāsanā or contemplation. Thus the Upaniṣad says: ‘To such a soul, who is free from the taint of impurity (mrdita-kaṣāyāya)2 the teacher shows the way to the other shore beyond darkness (tamasas pāram darśayati).3

Devas & Asuras

In the famous prayer in the Upaniṣad:

‘Lead me from the Unreal to the Real,

Lead me from Darkness to Light,

Lead me from Death to Immortality,’4

the first line seeks deliverance from unreality, i. e., emancipation from the false self, and thereby makes an affirmation of the true self. There is a ring of falsehood in all our actions while we remain mere creatures of impulse. With the guidance of reason there begins an assertion of truth and with this assertion ensues a struggle between the two forces, eternally hostile to each other, of truth and falsehood. This is the classic struggle between the devas and the asuras, with which opens the Chāndogya Upaniṣad,5 the repository of most of the vidyās or methods of contemplation, and thereon Saṅkara rightly comments: ‘this struggle for mutual overpowering and predominance is the struggle between the devas and the asuras, which is going on from all eternity among all creatures and in each body.’6 The term devas, derived from

1 CU, 7. 26. 2.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 BU, 1. 3. 28.

5 CU, 1. 2. 1.

6 anyonyābhibhavodbhavarūpas saṁgrāma iva sarvaprāṇiṣu pratidehaṁ devāsurasamigrāmo anādikālapravṛtta ity abhiprāyaḥ, ŚB, on CU, 1. 2. 1.

the verb ‘div,’ signifying illumination, stands for the functions of the senses illuminated by reason, while the term asuras signifies the exactly opposite thing, viz., the natural and impulsive actions of the senses, which are prompted by a pleasure in revelling in the objects of vital pleasure (āsu).7 In the stage of preparation the whole energy is devoted to the purification of the functions of the senses by a process which has been called ābāraśuddhi. Ābāraśudhi means the knowledge of the objects (viṣayavijñānam) freed from the taint of attachment and repulsion.8 But this attempt to free each of the senses separately from the taint of attachment or sin (pāpman)9 hardly becomes wholly successful. This is clearly brought out in the Upaniṣadic parable of the fight between the devas and the asuras and in the description of the methods adopted by the former in overcoming the latter. The devas tried first to overpower the asuras by enhancing or extending the powers of the different organs of sense, but every time they failed because the asuras intruded and struck them down by smiting them all, each of the particular faculties, with an attachment or liking. Attachment is sin (pāpman), for it causes a limitation, a narrowness, brings a fixed gaze on the particularities of a thing and thereby deprives one of the wide vision of the universal. Thus one gets absorbed in a world of particulars with their inherent duality of good and bad. Hence the nasal breath takes both the bad and the good smell, the organ of speech tells a lie as well as the truth, the eye beholds a beneficent form as also an ugly and reprehensible object, the ear hears good and beneficial words as well as lends itself to the reception of such talks as are not fit for hearing at all.10 In a word, all the senses are thus inherently stamped with this duality of good and evil. Therefore we find in an opening beneficial prayer (śānti-pāṭha) of one of the Upaniṣads: ‘May we hear by our ears only the beneficial (words or speech), may we behold through our eyes only the beneficial (form)11. To ensure the victory of good over evil, of sat

7 devā dīvyate dyotanārthasya śāstrodbhāsitā indriyavrttayah. asurās tadviparītās svesv viśvagviṣayāsā prāṇanakriyāsu ramaṇāt svābhāvikyas tama-ātmikā indriyavrttaya eva. ŚB on CU, I. 2. 1.

8 SB on CU, 7. 26. 2.

9 CU, I. 2. 1.

10 CU, I. 4. 2,

11 Ibid.

174

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

over asat is the aim of the preparatory level. That is why we find

the categorical imperative in force there. The seeker is asked to

tread the way of dharma and forsake the way of adharma, to speak the

truth, and avoid the telling of a lie and so on. Definite instructions

are thus given to choose the right and reject the wrong, and thereby

the right will is sought to be infused, the right resolution instilled.

Inadequacy of the first step

In this way through the preparation, though one finds himself

lifted from asat to sat, from the sphere of falsehood to that of truth,

yet darkness envelopes him. The fear of the asuras is not dispelled

as yet, as the devas do not feel completely immune from their attack.

The Chāndogya, while introducing the contemplation on Oṅkāra as

Udgītha, makes this point crystal clear by bringing in again the topic

of the devas. 'The devas, afraid of death, entered into the three

vidyās' i.e., the three Vedas or scriptures. In other words, they

first tried to flee from death by making their actions conform strictly

to the standards of truth and law as embodied in the scriptures. 'They

covered themselves with the rhythms (chandas); because they covered

themselves thereby (ācchādayan), therefore are the chandas termed as

such'. But there Death found them out as are fishes detected in the

waters. Knowing this (that they have again been spotted out by

Death) they lifted themselves above the ṛk, yajus and sāman and

entered into the Svāra or the Sound.12 Thus the covering provided

by the rhythm of reason proved inadequate, as Death pursued and

haunted them even there. It did not prove to be a shield thick

enough to make them invisible to Death, i.e., it did not lift them

altogether from the sphere of Death, did not free them absolutely from

its clutches. The aim was to transcend the sphere of Death but that

has not been achieved as yet. Fear persists, darkness is not yet

dispelled, death is yet to be transcended. Hence the second and

third line of the prayer run: 'Lift me from Darkness to Light, from

Death to Immortality'.

But it should be noted here that the first step of preparation did not

12 CU, I. 4. 3.

prove to be absolutely useless, only because it failed to free the gods

from Death. That they were still being pursued by Death and were

not yet free from its clutches could be apprehended by them only

because they were already in part purgerd and purified in being

(saṃskrtāś suddhātmānāb)13 by their pious deeds or their fight with

the powers of Darkness. This consciousness would not have dawned

on them but for this primary purification or struggle they had gone

through. The value of the first step is not minimised by proving

it to be inadequate but rather enhanced by this very fact. The

enquiry about the next step cannot come to one who has not explored

to the full the possibilities of the first approach. The limitations

thereof are apprehended, and the inadequacy realized only when the

method is given a complete trial. This is clearly brought out in this

parable in the Upaniṣad where it is shown that the devas tried to

overcome the asuras through the help of each of the senses, one after

another and only when all of them failed to overpower them that they

took recourse to the Mukhya Prāṇa, the central principle.

But why the senses, each and every one of them, failed to overcome

the asuras? Because the attempt to intensify the powers of the senses

or to magnify and stretch too far the particular functions always

leads to a stress and strain which, ultimately, is bound to end in

absolute failure and spell even disaster. There is no escape from it so

long as one remains confined to the sphere of particulars and is not

lifted towards the universal, which is the Mukhya Prāṇa. But there is

a utility of this attempt to expand the particular powers or faculties,

which cannot be denied anyhow, just as none can deny the utility

of modern science, though it has brought our civilization to

the very brink of total extinction. The search for the universal

begins only after the complete exploration of the particular

methods. And hence after exploring each of the particular means

to the full and finding each of them inadequate, the devas

thought of a different device.14 One must try the several methods

himself and find out their worth and then reject them all ultitmately

if they are found wanting. But to reject them on hearsay and

13 ŚB on CU, I. 4. 3. 14 CU, I. 2.

176

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

jump for the next higher step is to frustrate the whole aim of the

approach to the Supreme. Thus Yama tests Naciketas by offering

him a whole world of things of temptation and enjoyment and only

when he becomes sure that he is calm and unruffled (dhirra), and

has spurned (atinasrākṣit)15 all his offers, he begins his discourse on

the Ātman. The Mundaka also says that the Brahmavidyā is imparted

to one who is of a calm disposition (praśāntacittāya) and possesses self-

control (śamānvitāya).16 In order to have this calm disposition one

must have a feeling of complete detachment (nirveda). But this detach-

ment cannot come unless one has tried all the means in the different

spheres of action (parikṣya lokān karmacitān),17 and found them

wanting. ‘The Brāhmins wish to know (this Supreme Reality) by

yajña, dāna, tapas and anāśaka’,18 ‘One sees the Self in the Self by

becoming calm, self-controlled, detached, full of fortitude and concen-

tration’.19

The relation of the two steps

Thus the second step, with which we now propose to deal,

necessarily presupposes the first, as is evident from all the Upaniṣads.

We have stressed this point because the first step is generally skipped

over on the plea of its ultimate inadequacy and consequent futility,

but that only leads to an utter stagnation of the spirit because with-

out the necessary purification, no contemplation, in the true sense of

the term, is possible. Through the purification undergone in the

stage of preparation, one becomes dhirra, calm and collected, a term

very favourite with the Upaniṣads and strewn all over the Upaniṣadic

literature: Naciketas forsook everything else by his strong will

(dhrtyā) because he was dhīra.20 ‘Only the dhīra chooses the śreya, the

good, in preference to the preya or the pleasant’.21 ‘Exceptionally only

a dhīra with his eyes turned inwards sees the inner Ātman desiring

immortality’.22 ‘Only the dhīras look into the source of all creatures’,23

15 KTU, 1. 2. 3.

16 MU, 1. 2. 13.

17 KTU; 2. 11.

18 BU, 4. 4. 22.

19 BU, 4. 4. 23.

20 KTU, 2. 11.

21 Ibid, 2. 2.

22 Ibid, 4 1.

23 MU, 1. 1. 6.

‘the dhiras attaining the all-pervading reality all around’.24 Thus the

attainment of the state of dhirra is an indispensable necessity according

to the Upaniṣads and one can never become dhirra unless he is freed

from the taints of sin (mrditakaṣāya). This is attempted to be

achieved through the methods employed in the stage of preparation

we have gone through.

Thus, through the exhaustive methods of purification prescribed

in the state of preparation, one becomes partially freed from the

taints of sin (pāpman) and thereby realizes the hidden presence of the

asura still in his being. Aimless and impulsive actions are replaced

by a rhythmic regularity of functions, which is termed here as

chandas, through a conformity to the dictates of the scriptures or the

revealed Reason. But as this, too, proved an inadequate covering,

the devas took recourse to svara or the sound or the melody (indica-

ting a deeper harmony). And what happened then? ‘The devas

entering it became immortal and fearless’ (amṛtā abbayā abbavan).25

They were taken out of the sphere of Death by the uplifting power

of svara or nāda or the sound. They had drawn themselves inward

through chandas or rhythm, now they are raised upward through

sound or svara, far beyond the reach of the asuras. With this

upward movement begins the second stage of the Upaniṣadic

approach or way and that is why the Chāndogya Upaniṣad opens with

this Udgītha Upāsanā, which literally means the contemplation

through the uplifting power of music or rhythmic sound or

reason.

But this uplifting sound or energy can hardly be generated by

any of the organs of sense, because, being limited, there is a disturbing

element present in each of them which breaks up the sound into

fragments or disharmony and causes diffusion and dispersion and thus

prevents it from moving upward. This disturbing element is the

pāpmān28 or the sin of attachment, which inevitably brings in the

duality of likes and dislikes, good and bad. This causes a turning,

one way or the other and thus deflects the energy from the straight

path and makes the sound, too, quivering, unsteady and discordant.

24 MU, 3. 2. 5. 25 CU, 1. 4. 4. 26 CU, 1. 2. 2.

178

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

That is why the devas failed to raise the Udgītha again and again through each of the particular limited sense-organs. After repeated defeats at the hands of the asūras, they found out, at long last, the real centre which could generate the uplifting sound. It is the Mukhya Prāṇa,'27 the vital Energy or Caitanya Śakti, literally the life-principle residing in the mouth. As they resorted to the Mukhya Prāṇā, a miracle happened. Even the effort of taking an offensive against the asuras was not needed, it was not even required of them to strike at the enemy but as the enemy came to strike them, they themselves perished all at once like a clod of earth going to pieces on hitting a piece of stone.28

The Nature of the Mukhya Prāṇa

But what is the secret behind this miracle? How was it possible for the Mukhya Prāṇa to vanquish the asuras so easily without any effort whatsoever, while the sense-organs had failed even with the most strenuous endeavour? The secret is that the Mukhya Prāṇa is not attached to any particular organ and is thus free from self-regard and attachment can never be assailed by the asuras or death. It is thus immune from all attack by the hostile forces and is stationed in a sphere of natural freedom. By locating it in the mukha or the mouth it has been indicated that it is not stationed in any of the sense-organs but is situated in a neutral place, free from the taint of likes and dislikes, and is central too. 'Neither the good scent nor the bad is known by it, it has totally extinguished or exterminated all sin (apabatapāmpā by 'eṣa), and therefore whatever it eats or drinks, by that it protects or sustains all the other vital functions'.29 It is thus clearly an universal principle which sustains all the other particular functions which absolutely depend upon it. The sense-organs are all selfish, as they keep the best thing for themselves and give only the rest to others, as the Bṛhadāraṇyaka describes them.30 But the Mukhya Prāṇa, being universal in its very nature, has nothing to

27 CU, I. 2. 7.

28 CU, I. 2. 7.

29 CU, I. 2. 9-10.

30 BU, I. 3. 9.

keep for itself but its sole function is to sustain and nourish others

and lift them all from the sphere of death, attachment or limitation.

Hence it is termed aṅgirasa, the sustaining essence of all the limbs

(aṅgānām hi rasah).31 It is also called ‘dūr’32 or the ‘distant’ because

death keeps at a distance from it. Having exterminated (apahatya)

death in the form of sin, it carried (atyavat) or took each of the

senses and lifted them all beyond the sphere of death (mrtyum

aty amucyata)33 and thereby gave them all their divine forms which

shine gloriously, having transcended death (mrtyum atikrānto

dīpyate).34 Thus, through the awakening of the universal principle,

all the particular centres of consciousness, too, are released from their

imprisonment of selfishness and sin, and each gains a resplendent

divine form, free from death. The drawback of the methods adopted

in the preparatory stage was that they all tried to purify or divinise

each particular centre or organ separately and they failed to hit upon

a central principle which could sustain and nourish as well as divinise

them all. So was the prayer uttered for lifting the soul from dark-

ness and death to illumination and immortality. The Upaniṣad

enjoins that those who desire to make a higher and higher ascent

(abhyāroha)35 should make a japa of this particular prayer, i.e., repeat

these lines constantly, and thus become inured to the underlying idea.

Distinction of the two steps

The parable, with which we have been dealing so long, makes

two things clear: firstly, the shortcoming of the previous methods

and secondly, the unique importance and significance of the Mukhya

Prāṇa for the next step to be taken. This next step we have termed

contemplation, which the Upaniṣads call upāsanā. In the preparatory

stage the methods involved more or less those connected with the body

and the speech. There the main injunctions are signified by the terms

‘vada’36 and ‘cara’ which mean ‘speak’ and ‘act’. Here the injunction is

‘upāsita’37 i.e., ‘contemplate’, or literally ‘get near’, which involves the

31 BU, 1. 3. 9. 32 Ibid. 33 BU, 1. 3. 12.

34 Ibid. 35 BU, 1. 3. 28. 36 CU, 1. 11. 1.

37 CU, 1. 1. 1.

180

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

mind. Several virtues had to be culled from without or the outer

world in the preparatory stage, and so the seeker had to acquire them

by a severe effort of the body and the will. Here the inner being is

to grow from within, and so the only necessity or requirement is to

let the flow of consciousnessness move uninterruptedly towards that one

goal, which is to be achieved. This is called dhruvā smṛti38 or

constant remembrance by the Upaniṣad, and it is this process of

constant remembrance which is termed upāsanā.

The Nature of Upāsanā

Śaṅkara defines upāsanā as the steady maintenance of one-pointed

devotion of thought towards a particular object in the way sanctioned

by the scriptures, uninterrupted by any other consciousnessness apart from

it.39 Upāsanā thus involves three factors: (i) a subject who contem-

plates, the upāsaka; (ii) the object of contemplation, ālambana or the

upāsya; and (iii) the act of contemplation, or upāsanā. The act of

contemplation, thus, seeks to link the subject with the object and

ultimately to merge the one into the other through a gradual process

of identification. To make this identification possible, the subject

must be utterly passive and calm, and so the Upaniṣad enjoins: ‘Śānta

Upāsīta’40. The object, too, as Śaṅkara points out, should not be

something imaginary, i.e., which is conjured up through one’s sweet

fancy, but it must be ‘yathāśāstrasamarthitam’,41 sanctioned by the

scriptures; for, otherwise, one only moves in a world of imagination,

without getting anywhere near concrete realization. In order to give

a definite line to the process of thought, one must look into the

scriptures and direct his thoughts accordingly. Lastly the act of

contemplation, in order to be really potent, must have in it the combi-

nation of three factors: ‘vidyā’ or right knowledge, ‘śraddhā’ or faith

and ‘upanisad’ or mystic insight.42 These three things help to bring

in more force in the act (vīryavattaraṁ bhavati)43 than is usually found

when an act is performed mechanically. Upāsanā, is not, therefore, a

38 CU, 7. 26. 2.

40 CU, 3. 14. 1.

42 CU, 1. 1. 10.

39 ŚB on CU, 1. 1, 1.

41 ŚB, Ibid.

43 Ibid.

mechanical act but an act illumined by knowledge, sustained by faith

and crowned with a mystic faculty.

Upāsanā literally means to 'come near' a thing. Here the thing

to be approached is the very self of the seeker and not something

external to him. 'He is to be searched, he is to be enquired about',44

'Seeking the Atman through śraddhā vidyā' and all such lines signify

that the object of approach is the Ātman or Brahman. It is inherent

in us, yet we have to get near it because we have moved far away from

it by the outward-looking tendencies of mind, and have, thus, lost all

touch with it. It is the purpose of upāsanā to get in touch with it

again, to restore the lost contact. We are completely oblivious of the

treasure we possess, though we are always carrying it with us. The

Upanisad makes this clear with an apt simile. As men, ignorant about

the worth of a plot of land (aksetrajñāh), move about over it, again and

again, without knowing that a mass of gold lies buried under it, so are

all creatures ignorant about the supreme treasure that lies within them

(arttena hi pratyūḍhāḥ).45 There are thick layers of ignorance which

are to be removed one by one to make it possible for the self to reveal

itself in all its majesty. This probing through the coverings of

ignorance is the purpose of upāsanā and consequently, there are

different degrees of contemplation according to the depth of the

sinking or penetration.

The Purpose of Upāsanā

The purpose of upāsanā is thus twofold—a lifting of the veil of

ignorance and a consequent extension of vision and thereby narrowing

the division between the subject and the object and finally, reaching

the identification. To approach an object, to get to the very self of

it and lastly to identify oneself with it is the purpose of upāsanā.

The approach signifies a movement, and movement is life, and thus

upāsanā is essentially a function of life or Prāna. We have seen that

the upward movement, which is upāsanā, is possible only through

the help of the Mukhya Prāna. It is not the vital air that is meant by

Prāna but the Cosmic Energy which is at the root of creation. It is

44 CU, 8. 7. 1.

45 CU, 8. 3. 2.

182

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

thus not a blind force but a power informed with consciousness. It is

the joint product of jñāna and karman, illumination and action. There

is thus a samuccaya or fusion between jñāna and karman in upāsanā.

So the Īśa Upaniṣad rightly lays stress on this point of togetherness

or fusion (ubhayaṁ saha)46 between Vidyā aud Avidyā. Here jñāna

without karman leads to idle speculation and karman without jñāna

leads to mechanical repitition. They must join hands to make the

act of contemplation really fruitful and beneficial.

Distinction between Jñāna & Upāsanā

Upāsanā is thus neither pure jñāna nor pure karman but a

bi-une process comprising both. The distinction between jñāna and

upāsanā is thus an important one, which has been emphasized by the

later Vedāntins.47 In jñāna there is no process, nor does it admit

of any degree or hierarchy. It is a revelation which is immediate and

complete in itself. Neither does it depend upon the effort of the

seeker, because it is not a product, brought about by the endeavours of

an individual. It purely rests with the object itself, the subject has

no contribution to it. If the object reveals itself then it is revealed,

otherwise not even a thousand effort on the part of the subject

can make it reveal itself. In upāsanā, on the contrary, there is a process

and consequently a degree or hierarchy. It does not give birth to an

immediate and complete revelation but reveals the reality through

a mediate and incomplete manifestation, which gradually grows clearer

and more complete. It entirely depends upon the agent who contem-

plates because, here, things are moulded according to thought. As

he thinks so he becomes.48 This becoming or transformation signi-

fies the presence of the element of karman in upāsanā. As it is a

becoming or a process and involves effort on the part of the subject,

one has, therefore, to hold on to it steadfastly till the last breath of

life. 'Until one gets identified with the reality of the thing contem-

plated, one should go on thinking over it and later hold on to it till

46 ĪU, ii.

47 PD, 9.74.

48 taṁ yathā yathā upāsate tad eva bhavati. ŚBR, 10. 5. 2. 20.

death'.49 'Upāsanā may be done, undone or otherwise done according

to the individual and therefore he should (because it rests with him

alone) maintain always a continuous flow of consciousness.'50 It, thus,

requires uninterrupted effort for the whole span of life in order to

get established in the divine consciousness. The thing contemplated

becomes firmly established, the smooth flow (praśāntavābitā)51 becomes

ensured. as Patañjali says, only with long and continuous practice

carried on with supreme care.52 The smooth flow of consciousness

is interrupted primarily by the entry of a whole brood of aimless

thoughts or rajas and secondly, by the onset of inconscience or tamas.

Our consciousness, thus, has been broken up in different compartments,

the waking (jāgrat), the dream (svapna) and the sleep (suṣupti) states.

We pass from one state to another without being able to maintain a

link with the previous state. Thus the waking consciousness is cal-

led first and only then ensues the other state of dream. We

cannot enter into the other state unless the former is abandoned.

This causes a split or division in consciousness and the aim of upāsanā

is to remove this division. By constant thinking, the thing contem-

plated sinks into the subconscious and continues to be revealed even

in the dream state (svapnādāṽ api).53

Element of devotion in Upāsanā

But the subconscious or the dream state reveals only those

things which we desire most, and hold dearest to our heart.

Hence the object of contemplation must be a thing of supreme

adoration. Without devotion or sincere attachment, no contemplation

is possible. One must be passionately fond of the thing he contem-

plates upon, for otherwise his interest will slide back and take his

mind off from the object of contemplation. With deep attachment

the thing intrudes on the mind of itself, even when one is engaged in

other distracting activities. As a woman, intensely seeking the

company of her lover, thinks of him alone even while engaged in her

49 tathai' vā' mrti dhārayet. PD, 9. 7. 8. 50 Ibid. 9. 80.

51 YS, 1. 13. 52 Ibid. 1. 14. 53 PD, 9, 82.

184

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

household work, so does a contemplative soul meditate on his object of

contemplation even while engaged otherwise.54 Thus the element of

feeling plays an important part in the act of contemplation, and that

is why the leading exponents of the Bhakti school of thought, like

Rāmānuja, lay their whole emphasis on this dhruvā smṛti or

anudhyāna, constant remembrance as the supreme means of sādbanā.

The identification of dhruvā smṛti with upāsanā is very old and not a

new theory propounded by Rāmānuja, for one of the oldest Vedāntins,

Braḥma-Nandin is credited with a statement, quoted by Rāmānuja in

his Srī Bhāsya, in which he says definitely that upāsanā is nothing but

constant remembrance.55 Vedāntadeśika also quotes a verse which

very clearly shows the different steps through which upāsanā leads to

bbakti or absolute devotion for the object of contemplation. It says:

'Knowledge ends in meditation, meditation culminates in constant

remembrance, that leads to a seeing or realization i.e. an insight into

Reality, and this insight begets devotion'.56 Rāmānuja clearly points

this out while showing the way to realization. 'The means of the

realization of Brahman is only supreme devotion (parābbaktir eva),

which is of the nature of constant remembrance (anudbyānarūpā),

generated by the extreme loveability of the thing and which is

preceded by a knowledge of the Reality acquired from the scriptures

and brought into being by the pursuance of the path of devotion,

helped by his own actions or karman.'57 He also quotes Yāmunācārya

thus: 'The Supreme can be realized by the sole and absolute devotion

of a man whose mind has been purified by both (jñānayoga and

karmayoga)'.58 In this connexion he quotes the famous saying of the

Īśa Upaniṣad on Vidyā and Avidyā and explains Vidyā as contempla-

54 PD, 9. 83-84.

55 upāsanam syād dhruvānusmṛtir darśanān

nirvacanāc ca. Srī Bh. p. 34.

56 vedanāṁ dhyānaviśrāntāṁ dhyānāṁ śrāntāṁ dhruvā smṛtau/

sā ca dṛṣṭitvaṁ abhiyetī dṛṣṭir bhaktiṭtvam ṛcchati. SD, p. 136,

57 brahmaprāptyupāyaś ca śāstrādhīgatattvajñānapūrvakasvakarmānugṛhi-

tabhaktiniṣṭhasādhyānavadbhikātiśayapriyaviśadātāmapratyakṣatāpannānudhyāna-

rūpaparabhaktiṛ eva' ty uktam. VAS, pp. 248.

58 'ubhayaparikarmmitasvāntasayai' kāntikātyantikabhaktiyogālabhya iti. Ibid

p. 142.

tion which is of the nature of devotion (bhaktirūpāpannam dhyānam

ucyate).59 He also refers to the famous utterance in Katha that the

Ātman cannot be realized by teaching, nor by knowledge nor by

hearing profusely, but only he attains it who adores it most of all and to

him it reveals its own form; and he comments thereon that the Supreme

Puruṣa is realized by the seeker only when an extreme attachment

to that constant remembrance is generated in him.60 This devotion or

attachment, too, is not a mere blind feeling, but Rāmānuja calls it a

form of jñāna or knowledge (jñānaviśeṣa eva), in which the Supreme

is realized to be the most adorable thing to the exclusion of all other

things and which also gives rise to an utter dislike for everything

else.61 The Nārada-Bhakti-Sūtra says that bhakti requires absolute

devotion to the object of contemplation as well as an indifference to

all other things opposed to it.62

Integral nature of Upāsanā

Thus the Upaniṣadic Upāsanā is neither purely emotional nor

merely intellectual by nature but is an illumined act of the mind

suffused with adoration or love. This has been clearly indicated by the

three terms: vidyayā, śraddhayā and upaniṣadā.63 Other statements

in the Upaniṣads, such as, ‘This Ātman is perceived by those of

subtle perception through the refined and one-pointed intellect’,64

‘Pierce that goal, by drawing (the bow) with the mind suffused by that

feeling (tadbhāvagatena cetasā),65 ‘Those become immortal who

know it revealed through the heart, the clear intellect and the

mind’,66 ‘Those become immortal who know it residing in the

heart through the heart and the mind’,67 and so on, all equally point

out that each of the elements, which constitute our psychic being,

has its share in the act of upāsanā. It is not an one-sided approach

either through the heart or through the intellect but an integral

seeking of the whole being. The Upaniṣad shows that by realization

of the Ātman, not only is our knowledge completed because by

59 VAS, p. 143.

62 NBS, 9.

65 MU, 2. 2. 3.

24

60 Ibid p. 146.

61 Ibid p. 147.

63 CU, 1, 1, 10.

64 KTU, 1. 3. 12.

66 KTU, 2. 6. 9.

67 SU, 4. 20.

186

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

knowing it we know all, but our love, too, is fulfilled because it

happens to be 'dearer than the son, dearer than the wealth, dearer than

everything else, because this self is the inmost thing'.68 Hence love,

knowledge and action, feeling, knowing and willing, affection, cogni-

tion and conation, too, are all involved in this act of upāsanā.

In upāsanā we have first to get an ālambana, literally a 'support'

i.e., an object for contemplation and then hold on to it firmly through

an unflinching act of the will or concentration and thereafter direct the

thought-process along a definite channel; and this becomes smooth and

spontaneous with the growth of an insight into and consequent

attachment to the object. One must make it the central passion of

his life and steadily pursue that definite end, with his whole being.

By making the Mukhya Prāṇa the main instrument of upāsanā, the

Upaniṣads have sought to impress upon the seeker that the whole

man, the totality of all the parts that constitute him, should be engaged

or harnessed in this act of contemplation.

Characteristics of Upaniṣadic Contemplation

Having glanced through the general nature of the Upaniṣadic

upāsanā, let us now look into the characteristics of the methods by

means of which the upāsanā is carried on. Upāsanā being essentially a

movement, we find that, everywhere in the Upaniṣads, the movement

starts from the outer extremities and gradually penetrates into the

inmost recesses of the soul. This is a marked characteristic of all the

vidyās in the Upaniṣads, which we shall try to trace out clearly

later on. A second feature of the upāsanās or vidyās in the Upaniṣads

is that the whole investigation is conducted in two spheres, in the

subject as well as in the object, in the individual as well as in the

world, in the 'aham' as also in the 'idam', in the 'adbyātma' and also

in the 'adhideva' spheres. This method is repeated everywhere.

A third trait of the upāsanās is that the contemplation is carried

on in two ways: synthetically as well as analytically, through

'āpti' as well as 'saṃddbi', which the Giṭā calls yoga and vibhūti.

The vidyas do not rest content in knowing the reality simply as a

68 BU, I. 4. 8.

whole but proceed further to comprehend it in all its infinite

details too. That is why the Sage Kauṣitaki asks his son to recount

the rays of the Sun, all around,69 to sing repeatedly the Prāṇas in a

profuse manner70 and thereby to attain richer fruits of experience

than he. He had comprehended the reality in a common non-

detailed way, or got a general view of it and now requests his son to

know it in all its aspects and thus complete his partial realization.

The Chāndogya Upaniṣad opens with the Udgītha Upāsanā, which is

a part of Sāma Upāsanā and thereafter in the second chapter goes

on to expound the synthetic nature of Sāma Upāsanā (samastasya

khalu sāmna upāsanam).71 Thus the upāsanā is carried from the

parts to the whole, from the analytic to the synthetic aspect and vice

versa. There is also a graduated hierarchy in some of the upāsanās, as

we find in the Parovarīyān Udgītha and Parovarīyah Sāma Upāsanā72,

in which higher and higher grades are gradually unfolded and grasped.

This is also found in the famous Nārada-Sanatkumāra-samvāda,73

where the next is shown to be bhūyān i.e., higher than the former in

the exposition of the nature of the Ātman. But it should be remem-

bered that the higher includes the lower and adds something more

to it and never rejects it. The lower has its fulfilment in the higher

and finds its consummation there but never faces extinction.

The vidyās in the Upaniṣads also abound in so-called symbolism;

and some symbol is adopted in some form or other in all the spheres

of enquiry. But it must be remembered that the symbols of the

Upaniṣads are not so many fanciful constructions of the mind which

are provided as a support for contemplation. They all represent a

deep truth of spiritual experience and hence are not products of mere

wishful thinking. The truths of the symbols become revealed only

after one gets an insight into them. We shall try, while discussing

the vidyās, to account for the various symbols adopted in them, i.e.,

to find out why those very symbols like the heart-lotus, the cavity of

the heart etc, are adopted and why the imagery cannot be altered as

69 raśmīṁs tvam் paryāvartayāt. CU, 1, 5, 2.

70 prāṇans tvam் bhūmānām abhī gāyatāt. Ibid. 1, 5, 4.

71 CU, 1, 9, 2. 72 Ibid, 2, 7, 1. 73 Ibid. 7, 2-15.

188

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

we choose. We note this in order to guard against the common and

popular view of symbolism, which misses its true significance.

The divisions of Upāsanā

The grades of upāsanā are necessitated by the difference in the

levels of the intellect. Contemplation, being essentially a function of

the intellect, differs in nature according to the composition or quality

of the mind which contemplates. Our mind always functions in the

realm of relations, the most fundamental of the relations being that

subsisting beween the subject and the object. The aim of upāsanā

that separates the one from the other. It must be incidentally noted

here that the subject and the object are, in fact, two aspects

of the same Reality and unless the division is healed, truth cannot

be attained. This healing of the gap is effected in two ways:

sometimes, by making the subject predominant and sometimes, by

giving predominance to the object. This has led to the traditional

classification of upāsanā in two groups: the pratīka or the symbolic,

and the āhamgraba or the subjective. The first is, again, divided into

four classes and the second in two, thereby making the total number

of classification or varieties of upāsanā, six. The sub-divisions of the

first are: sampat, āropa. samvarga and adhyāsa. Sampat, literally

meaning ‘wealth’, signifies that form of symbolic meditation in which

a wealth of qualities is attributed to an otherwise small or insignifi-

cant thing.74 As for example, the mind has been called the infinite

and the seeker is asked to contemplate over it as such, though it is

well-known that the mind is a finite thing which engages itself with

only one thing at a time. The second, āropa, literally meaning ‘attri-

bution’, signifies that form of upāsanā in which the relation of the

whole with a particular thing is attributed to the parts as well .75 This

is illustrated in the Udgītha Upāsanā, where the Udgītha happens to

be a part of Sāman and because Sāman happens to be connected with

Oṅkāra, the Udgītha, too, is looked upon as closely related thereto, and

contemplated as such. In the third form, viz., samvarga, a particular

74 SG, 12, 10.

75 Ibid. 12. 11.

action or function is taken as an analogy and attributed as such to the

object of contemplation.76 The destructive wind called saṁvarga, literally

meaning ‘all-engrossing’, has the power of enveloping and thereby

destroying or controlling all creatures at the time of destruction of the

universe (pralaya). This great function of universal control is attributed

to the vital breath, prāṇa, which is supposed to bring under control all

the inner and outer senses and hence it is worshipped as such. The

last, called adhyāsa, is nothing but the attribution of a particular virtue

to a particular thing, only because it has been ordained by the scrip-

tures, in spite of the fact that such an attribution is manifestly absurd

and contradicts our normal experience.77 For example, in the Pañcāgni-

vidyā, the woman is conceived as fire and contemplated as such,

though it is well-known that a creature of dust can hardly be taken as

fire itself. To sum up, in sampat a quality is attributed, in āropa a

relation, in samvarga an action, and in adhyāsa anything found in

the scriptures. In all these, the object predominates and is made

to assume an importance through the attribution of some quality

or activity which distinguishes it from everything else and this

special feature grips the mind and makes it absorbed therein. Hence

all these forms of upāsanās are called outer (vāhya) because it is

the outer object which is predominant here.

The abamgraha upāsanā, however, is termed inner (āntara)

contemplation because, here, one turns inward towards his

own self and contemplates, accordingly, with a feeling of

identification of the object contemplated with the subject himself.

This upāsanā is divided in two classes: saguṇa and nirguṇa. When

some qualities are attached to the self and the contemplation goes on

in that manner then it is termed saguṇa, and when all qualities are

stripped of the self and the contemplation seeks an identification with

the very essence of being it is then termed nirguṇa. The upāsanā

of Oṅkāra has this double aspect, both saguṇa and nirguṇa, as the

Praśna Upaniṣad makes it clear that the Oṅkāra signifies both the

Para and Apara Brahman i. e., the Saguṇa as well as the Nirguṇa,

and the knower attains any one of the two phases by this contempla-

76 SG, 12. 13.

77 Ibid. 12. 12.

tion on Oṅkāra.78 Similarly the Bṛhadāraṇyaka enjoins the upāsanā

of the Self alone.79 When one concentrates on the Self in the nirguṇa

form it is only then that one seeks an identification with the basic

reality which is indicated both in a positive and a negative manner in

the Upaniṣads. 'Brahman is Bliss',80 'Brahman is the Supreme

Consciousness and Bliss',81 'Brahman is Truth, Consciousness and

Infinite',82 point to the reality in a positive way, and there are other

expressions like 'It is neither gross, nor subtle, neither short, nor long

etc.'83, 'That which is invisible, intangible, without sound, touch,

form, immutable',84 and so on, which indicate the reality in a negative

manner. So in the contemplation of the Self one should gather or

collect together all the different descriptions, both positive and nega-

tive, made about the Self or Brahman in different contexts and con-

template accordingly. The nirguṇa form of contemplation being

essentially of one type—because the basic reality cannot be of two

kinds—it is enjoined that all the attributes or adjectives should

be collected together, as they all signify the same essential reality and

the contemplation must proceed with this convergence of everything

upon the Self. This gathering together of attributes is technically

termed 'guṇopasaṁhāra'. In two different sūtras, Vyāsa has enjoined

the unity of these positive and negative characteristics attributed to

Brahman.85 In a word, the Ātman is sought to be realized as a

unity and hence the different characteristics are not meant for showing

the plurality of the Ātman but for pointing to the one and the same

thing from various aspects.

Grades of Contemplation

Thus from this traditional classification it is clear that the upāsanās

are graded according as they approach nearer and nearer the reality.

As it becomes difficult for the mind to contemplate without an object,

a concession is made to it by providing it with suitable symbols. But

as the contemplation grows deeper and deeper, it is felt that the object

78 PRU, 5. 2.

79 ātme'tyeva upāsīta. BU, 1, 4. 7

80 TU, 3. 6. 1.

81 BU, 3. 9. 28.

82 TU, 2. 1.

83 BU, 3. 8, 8.

84 MU, 1. 1. 6.

85 VS, 3.3. 11 & 3.3.33.

is nothing but a part of the subject and finally comes an identification

which takes the form of the feeling, ‘That is I’, So’ham asmi.86 This

identification with the Self is first made through the medium of

qualities or attributes, which is called saguna-upāsanā and finally comes

the identification with the very core of being of reality through

nirguṇa-upāsanā. The superior quality of an upāsanā is thus

recognized according to its proximity to the supreme realization of

identity. Hence the nirguṇa-upāsanā is taken to be the best form of

contemplation because it gradually leads to the highest knowledge.87

The Pañcadaśī shows the grade thus: ‘Better than the acts of the

devil is the performance of good acts, better than that is the saguṇa

contemplation and better than it is the nirguṇa one’.88 We have

already lifted ourselves from the sphere of the devil through the

performance of the good and virtuous acts prescribed in the state of

preparation. We shall next engage ourselves with the saguṇa form

of contemplation through the different vidyās and then go in for the

nirguṇa-upāsanā mainly through the help of the analytic methods

and finally find a synthesis of the two methods in Oṅkāra. All the

forms of contemplation have only one aim : to lead to the Supreme

Knowledge or Jyoti, and hence they are termed vidyās and through

vidyā, the Upaniṣad declares, one attains immortality, amṛtam aśnute89,

nay, rather vidyā itself is amṛta, amṛtaṁ tu vidyā.90

Varieties of approach

Before specifically dealing with the different vidyās we propose to

examine the characteristics which pertain to the Upaniṣadic approach to

Reality. We have already noticed some common features subsisting

among the different forms of approach and we must now turn to

the special features stamped on them. In other words, we must now

ascertain the varieties of approach as we have traced the unity of it.

The seeds of all the divergent approaches of later schools of philosophy

can be easily traced to the Upaniṣads.

86 ĪU, 16.

87 yavad vijnanasamipyam tavat sresthyam vivardhate/

brahmajnānāyate sāksāt nirgunopāsanaṁ śanaih. PD, 9 12. 2.

88 Ibid. 9. 12. 1. 89 ĪU, 11. 90 SU, 5. 1.

192

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

The Upaniṣad uses in many places the expression dhyāyatha91,

dhyāyan apramattah,92 dhyānayogānugatāh,93 which shows that the

method of dhyāna or yoga is implied in the upāsanā of the Upaniṣads.

In fact, the term Yoga, too, is found defined in the Kaṭha as the calm

holding of the senses,94 which reminds one of the calmness of the

limbs generated by āsana, with which the Yoga properly begins.

Again, in another place, one is asked to separate the Ātman from one's

own body very patiently (pravrhet svāt śarīrat)05.

This is clearly a method of viveka or discrimination, which is elaborated in the

Sāṅkhya system.

The famous instruction to surrender the speech to

the mind, the mind to the Jñānātmā or Conscious Self, the Conscious

Self to the Mahān Ātmā, the Vast Self and that Vast Self finally to

the Calm Self,98 is clearly a method of absorption (laya or nyāsa).

Tantra system is prescribed in some places, notably in connexion

with the famous prayer, ‘Asato mā sad gamaya’.97

Sometimes absorption through feeling, (bhāvagatena cetasā,98 tamayo bhavet,99)

is asked for, which clearly gives scope to bhakti.

Jānatha100 or Vijijñāsasva,101 ‘know’ or ‘enquire’, is very frequently enjoined all

over the Upaniṣads, which clearly has given birth to the famous

brahmajijñāsā of the Vedāntins.

Thus we find a rich variety in the

methods of approach, all of which, of course, press towards the

same goal.

Mystic practices

There are traces of mystic practices which later came to occupy a

prominent place in the scheme of sādhanā, especially in the Tāṅtric

system.

We have already seen that the Udgītha-vidyā is mainly

pursued by the help of the uplifting sound to be generated through

the Mukhya Prāṇa.

This function of sound or nāda as the connect-

ing link between the human and the divine is emphasized again and

91 MU, 2, 2. 6.

92 CU, 2. 22. 2,

93 SU, 1. 3.

94 KTU, 2, 6. 11.

95 Ibid 2. 6. 17.

96 Ibid, 1. 3. 13.

97 BU, 1. 3. 28.

98 MU, 2. 2. 3.

99 CU, 2. 2. 4.

100 MU, 2. 2. 5.

101 TU, 3. 1.

again in the Tantras. In fact only with the generation of nāda, the

upward flow or current is known to be active. The Chāndogya, while

showing the means of realizing the presence or existence of the

supreme luminosity of the self in the body (antah puruṣe jyotih),

refers to the hearing of the sound, similar to that generated by the

movement of the chariot (ninadam iva), or like that of the bellowing

of the bull (nadathur iva) or resembling the sound of the burning fire,

by closing or stopping the ears.102 The Brhadāranyaka also refers to

this hearing of the sound (ghoṣa) by stopping the ears and thereby

establishes the existence of the great fire Vaiśvānara within the human

body.103 This certainly came to be developed as an independent

line of sādhana later on, as we find many mystic schools of later

times taking to this practice of hearing the internal sound, which is

called nādānusandhāna and thereby stilling the mind to reach the

supreme goal.

Another important yogic practice, that of prānāyāma, though

not explicitly mentioned in the earlier Upaniṣads, is certainly hinted

at in a mystic way in many places. In the description of the Udgītha-

Upāsanā there is a mention of vyāna, which is said to be the

junction or meeting-point of the two breaths, prāna and apāna. It

must be remembered that by the term prāna is signified the exhalation

and by apāna, the inhalation, and vyāna signifies the cessation of both.

The term vyāna, in the Upaniṣads, carries a special sense and does not

signify that function of the vital air which pervades all through

the body or the skin, as described in the Sāṅkhya and other later

philosophical systems. Hence, by signifying that the vyāna is the

junction of prāna and apāna, recaka and pūraka, the Upaniṣad is

clearly hinting at kumbhaka, where both the outgoing and the ingoing

movements cease and meet. This is made all the more clear by the

mention of the various acts of valour (vīryavanti karmāṇi) which are

generally done by stopping the breath-movement, i.e., through vyāna;

such as the churning of the fire, the running of a race, the drawing of

a stiff bow.104 Thus all acts, which require supreme concentration

102 CU, 3. 13. 8. 103 BU, 5. 9. 104 CU, 1. 3. 4-5.

25

194

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

and energy, are done through vyāna and hence in contemplation,

which needs extreme attentiveness and alertness, vyāna is indis-

pensable and hence, in the Udgītha, it comes to play such an important

part. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad, too, refers to it in a more cryptic way,

where it is said that the prāṇa is moved up and the apāna is thrown

down and all the gods worship that little (literally 'dwarf') one, resting

in the middle.105 'This resting in the middle' is the same as the

'sandhi' or meeting point, which is vyāna. It is called 'vāmana', the

'dwarf' or 'little' one, because it is of so little a duration that it

almost escapes one's notice. In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, this 'vāmana' of

the Kaṭha is referred to as 'śiśu' or the child and there it is explicitly

stated that this 'śiśu' is nothing but the middle prāṇa.106 Hence it is

without doubt the middle state of equipoise, which in the Tāṇtric

terminology is called the suṣumnā, and which lies in the middle of

the two opposite currents of iḍā and piṅgalā; and the whole aim of

sādhanā is to get hold of this synthetic point and through it move

upward. The two opposite currents, one moving inward, the other

coming outward, always keep the mind moving and distracted.

In the middle comes the rest, a lull, a stop and in this moment of

equipoise, the doors of heaven are ajar and one catches a glimpse,

gets a flash, however fleeting, of the luminosity that lies beyond. But

it does not abide, because the coming and going movement ensues

once more immediately afterwards. But it leaves an indelible impress

on the mind, though its duration is so short. Hence the supreme

importance of sandhi in the Hindu view of contemplation. The

Taittirīya devotes a whole section to trace out the two opposite forces

as well as its sandhi in various spheres.107

As we find hints about nāda and prāṇa as instruments of contem-

plation, so jyoti, too, comes to play an important part, as is evident

from the Upaniṣads. The colours are given different ranks, and the

experience is tested and ranked according to the visualization of the

particular colour. Thus the white lustre (śuklaṁ bhāḥ)108 of the Sun

105 KTU, 2. 5. 3.

106 ayam vava śiśur yo' yaṁ madhyamah prāṇah. BU, 2 2. 1.

107 IU, 1. 3.

108 CU, 1. 6. 5.

is referred to, and deeper than that is the intense blue and dark hue (yan nīlaṁ parah krṣṇam).109 And Śaṅkara comments that this dark

hue is visible only to him, whose vision is intensely concentrated (atyantasamāhitadrṣṭadrśyate).110 One who pierces through this

dark hue beholds inside it the Golden Puruṣa, who is wholly golden in hue from the hairs down to the nails.111 The Madhu-vidyā

places the scheme of colours thus : first comes the red colour (rohitam rūpam)112 of the Sun; secondly, the white (śuklaṁ rūpam);113 thirdly,

the intensely dark hue (param krṣṇam rūpam);114 lastly comes the liquid lustre, which is found moving in the centre of the Sun (madbye

kṣobhata iva).115 Another verse runs thus: ‘They see the lustre of the eternal cause all around like the day (light) and this supreme

lustre shines in the luminous (Brahman).116 Śaṅkara comments :

‘Those who have realized Brahman, whose eyes are turned inwards, and hearts purified by the practice of brahmacarya etc. behold all

around the effulgence’ (ā samantato jyotih paśyanti).117 Another famous verse refers to moving towards the variegated from the dark

and again from the variegated to the dark, (śyāmāc chavalāṁ śavalāc chyāmāṁ prapadye).118 Colours are attributed even to the arteries or

nāḍis of the heart and their correspondence is shown to the different colours in the Sun. All these arteries of the heart are existing through

a subtle essence of a pink colour, as well as white, blue, yellow and red. This Sun, too, is pink, white, blue, yellow and red.119 Lastly,

in the famous Janaka-Yājñavalkya-samvāda, one is led ultimately, to the supreme Jyoti or lustre, through the different jyotis of

Āditya, Candramā, Agni, and Vāk.120 Thus jyoti or light and colour come to play a significant part in the Upaniṣadic approach to

Reality.

In later Upaniṣads, like the Śvetāśvatara, there are clear references to the Yogic practices of āsana, prāṇāyāma, dhāraṇā etc. as well as to

the vision of various lights as indicative of the revelation or experience

109 CU, 1. 6. 6. 110 ŚB on Ibid. 111 Ibid.

112 CU, 3. 1. 4. 113 Ibid. 3. 2. 5. 114 CU, 3. 3. 3.

115 Ibid, 3. 5. 3. 116 Ibid. 3. 17. 7. 117 SB, on Ibid,

118 CU, 8. 13. 1. 119 Ibid. 8. 6. 1. 120 BU, 4. 3. 2-6.

196

STUDIES IN THE UPANIṢADS

of Brahman.121 What are stated explicitly in the later Upaniṣads, are

expressed cryptically and in a very concealed manner in the earlier

ones. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Aitareya repeat an identical state-

ment which says that the gods are fond of indirectness (parokṣapriyāḥ)

and hate the direct or open method.122 This seems to apply truly to

the method of the earliest Upaniṣads, where they mostly speak as in

parables, whose mystery it is difficult to unravel.

Two broad features

From the survey of the characteristics found in the different

approaches to Reality in the Upaniṣads, two broad features come out

very prominently. The first is an approach through the methods of

yoga, more or less mystical and the second, through the methods of

viveka or vicāra, more or less the method of Sāṅkhya or jñāna. The

one proceeds in a synthetic way, seeking out correspondences or har-

monies between the outer and the inner self, and the other proceeds

through an analytic way searching after the supreme cause, penetrating

deeper and deeper by casting off, one by one, the outer wrappages

that hide that one reality. Of course, the two methods are found side

by side in many of the Upaniṣads, yet the stress varies. Thus the

Chāndogya begins with the Udgītha-upāsanā which, evidently, comes

under the synthetic approach, while the Bṛhadāraṇyaka's keynote is

to be found in 'Ātma ity eva upāsīta',123 in the contemplation of the

Ātman itself, which belongs to the second way. Thus, in these two

great Upanisads, though many things are found to be common and

even repeated in both places and though both the methods find place

in each of them, yet there is a predominance of the first method in the

Chāndogya and that of the second in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka. That is why

the Vedāntins find their supreme sustenance from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka,

while followers of the Bhakti school get invaluable guidance from

the Chāndogya. Similarly, the Īśa definitely favours the synthetic

approach (ubhayam saḥa),124 while the Kena leans towards the method

of discrimination (ne' dam yad idam).125 The Kaṭha steers a middle

121 SU, 2. 8. 11.

122 AU, 1. 3. 14.

123 BU, 1. 4. 7.

124 IU, 11.

125 KU, 1. 4-8.

course and tries to do justice to both the ways. The Praśna is mostly

synthetic, though there is a touch of the other approach towards the

end. The Munḍaka closely follows the Kaṭha in giving equal scope

to both. The Māṇḍukya gives scope to the method of synthesis

(pādā mātrā mātrāś ca pādā)126 while finally giving predominance to

the other way of analysis (nā’ntaḥprajñam etc.).127 The Taittirīya in

different sections allots definite places to both the methods. The

Aitareya, tracing out the source of creation, ultimately finds prajñā at

the root and its correspondence with all the functions of the mind,

nay with everything (sarvam prajñāne pratisthitam).128

126 Mā, 8.

127 Mā, 7.

128 AU, 3. 3.

CHAPTER V.

THE SYNTHETIC WAY

The way of synthesis essentially seeks a centre, a meeting-point where all the divergent lines converge and coalesce. Thereby the separation of the inner and outer spheres is sought to be removed, the sundered life is sought to be integrated. There are three principal centres where this synthesis is easily realized. These three points of synthesis are: the Heart (Hṛdaya), the Life (Prāṇa) and the Sun (Āditya). Even outwardly viewed, it is too well-known a fact that the heart is the central thing in the physical organism. The Prāṇa, too, is the most vital and central thing, rather the pivot round which moves the whole system of corporeal existence. This has been made clear, again and again, in the Upaniṣads through numerous parables and specific statements. The Sun, similarly, comes to occupy the same position in the solar system, and so what is inwardly Prāṇa or Prajñā is outwardly Āditya or the Sun. ‘Āditya is verily the outer Prāṇa’ declares the Upaniṣad.1 We shall try to get in touch with these three centres through the help of three principal vidyās in the Upaniṣads, viz., the Dahara-vidyā, the Udgītha-vidyā, and the Madhu-vidyā. The Dahara-vidyā tries to plumb the depths of the heart, the Udgītha -vidyā seeks to generate the reconciling rhythm of Prāṇa, and the Madhu-vidyā wants to explore the path of the immortal essence through the rays of the Sun.

(i) The Dahara Vidyā

The vidyās in the Upaniṣads form the rungs of the ladder of divine ascent, of which the Dahara-vidyā is the highest, and so we begin with it, first of all.

The text of the Upaniṣad runs:1 ‘Of all the vidyās the heart is the sole shelrer’ (ekāyanam).2 In other words, all the vidyās are rooted in the heart. ‘The supreme virtues like śraddhā, (faith) satya,

1 ādityo ha vai vāhyaḥ prāṇaḥ. PRU, 3.8.

2 BU, 2.4,11.

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(truth) etc., with which we dealt in the preparatory stage, are all ultimately referred to the heart. 'In what is faith rooted? In the heart, because through the heart is the faith 'known'.3 'In what is truth found? In the heart; through the heart is the truth recognized, therefore in the heart is the truth established.'4 Yājñavalkya teaches King Janaka about the heart in the following manner: 'What is stability? The heart is the stability. The heart is the shelter of all creatures, the heart is the root or the ground of all creatures, in the heart are all creatures sheltered. The heart is the Supreme Brahman'5. Thus the heart is here identified with the Supreme Brahman itself and it now becomes clear how everything in the universe—all the vidyās, all the creatures, all the meanings and values—is rooted there. Brahman being the supreme source of the universe, all things are naturally rooted in it and the heart being identified therewith gives shelter to everything. Unless one enters into the heart, there is no stability (sthitată) for him. He is in the grip of instability, a ceaseless flux or movement, so long as he does not get an entry into the heart. No contemplation (upāsanā) can really begin until the self enters into the heart, because he must first get a stable tranquil position and only then can he think of moving upwards and approaching the Supreme, which is contemplation. The constant whirl of the outer movement allows no fixity to the self and keeps it constantly on the move. To counteract the outer movement the inward movement is initiated and when it becomes complete it reaches the end, which is the heart. The self now gets a secure station or anchorage, rather gets his own self back, and now can begin his journey upwards.

3 BU, 3.9.21. 4 BU, 3.9.23. 5 BU, 4.1.7.

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of the self in numerous statements: ‘In the heart is the Ātman’⁶.

‘This my Ātman is inside the heart, subtler than a grain and this my

Ātman is inside the heart, bigger than the earth, the heaven and all the

worlds.’⁷ ‘The inner self, who is the Puruṣa of the size of a thumb, is

ever ensconced in the heart of all men.’⁸ Echoing the Upanisads the

Gītā says: ‘The Lord resides in the region of the heart of all crea-

tures’.⁹ The very etymological meaning of the word hrdaya signifies,

as the Upaniṣads show, that it is here that the Ātman resides. ‘This

Ātman is in the heart; therefore this is its etymology: ‘In the

heart is this (hrdi ayam), therefore (is it called) hṛdayam or the

heart’.¹⁰

Thus everything testifies to the importance of the hrdaya as the

place where the Ātman is to be found. Hence, the Dahara-vidyā

opens thus: ‘Now in this city of Brahman is the subtle abode of

lotus and inside it is the very subtle ākāśa or space. That which is

inside it that is to be searched after, that is to be enquired about.’¹¹

Here first comes the imagery of the city of Brahman, brahmapura.

As the city of a king contains his subjects and attendants who carry

out his behests, similarly this body is the city of Brahman containing

the several senses, the mind and the intellect, all serving the purpose

of the master.¹² The Kaṭha, similarly, refers to the city of eleven

gates of the Unborn Self.¹³ The Śvetāśvatara also speaks of the

nine-gated city of the bodily self (navadvāre pure dhiḥ).¹⁴ The Chān-

dogya, in another context, refers to the five luminous apertures of the

heart (pañca devasuṣayaḥ) which are the five vital breaths.¹⁵ They

are like the gate-keepers of the city of heaven (svargasya lokasya

dvārapāḥ).¹⁶ Śaṅkara comments: ‘By these, viz., the eye, the ear, the

tongue, the mind and the vital air or life, outwardly engaged, are the

doors of the realization of Brahman, residing in the heart, closed. It

is an experienced fact that the mind does not dwell on the Brahman

in the heart, being covered by ignorance due to the attachment to

6 PRU, 3.6.

8 KTU, 2.6.17.

10 CU, 8.3.3.

12 SB, Ibid.

14 ṢU, 3.18.

7 CU, 3.14.3.

9 Gītā, 18.61,

11 CU, 8,1.1.

13 KTU, 2.5.1.

15 CU, 3.13.1.

16 SB, Ibid.

outer objects because of the senses remaining uncontrolled.'17 Thus it

is clear that the outer senses, whether enumerated sometimes as

eleven or sometimes as nine or five, are the doors of perception

through which the self makes contact with the outer world. But to

enter into the inner sanctuary of the self, these must be closed. This

is sought to be conveyed by the imagery of the city of Brahman.

The inner abode of the self is the subtle lotus of the heart. 'Inside

one's body, above the navel, within a region of twelve fingers, of the

shape of a lotus-bud with its face downwards and slightly blooming,

covered all around by a network of nerves, is the abode of the Un-

iversal Self. Within that lotus is a subtle aperture which is the

ākāśa or supreme ether. In that ākāśa resides the Supreme Brahman

unmoved.'18 The imagery of the lotus (pundarīka) evidently

signifies that the heart is the centre of the buddhi, for the lotus

is the symbol of the intellect which blossoms forth, petal by petal, as

it gets in touch with the light of the Sun of the Spirit. That the

heart signifies the deepest centre of buddhi is clear from the use of

the term 'gubā', again and again, in the Upaniṣads, where the Ātman,

we are told, remains concealed: 'Of this creature, the Ātman is

concealed in the cave'19, 'Having entered the cave in the supreme

ether'20, 'Know this as hidden in the cave,'21 'He who knows it

hidden in the cave'22 and so on. The Taittirīya, after enunciating

the nature of Brahman, says: 'Who knows it as hidden in the cave,

founded in the supreme ether'23. The gubā or the cave and the heart

are identical, as is evident from the use of such terms as gubāgranthi24

and hrdayagranthi25 in the same sense. The knots that bind the

soul are all in the buddhi, for it is through the buddhi that the soul

gets connected or entangled with the outer world in infinite ways.

This is also physiologically signified by the description of the innu-

merable nerves which create a sort of network inside the heart (antar-

hrdaye jālakam iva).26 We also hear of the hundred and one nāḍīs

of the heart, of which only one leads upward and the others move in

17 SB, CU, 3.13.1. 18 DVP, p. 8. 19 KTU, 1.2.20.

20 SU, 3.20. 21 KTU, 1,1,14. 22 MU, 2.1.10.

23 TU, 2.1.1. 24 MU, 3.2.9. 25 MU, 2.2.8. 26 BU, 4.2.3.

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multifarious directions.27 Thus what is physiologically shown as the

heart, from which proceed the numerous channels of conscious move-

ment, i.e. the whole network of nāḍīs, is psychologically depicted as

the buddhi or the intellect, which is the centre from which radiates

the innumerable rays of impressions and experiences. That the

hrdaya is identical with the buddhi is further made clear by such

statements as 'the desires are all deposited in the heart',28 or 'one

crosses beyond all the sorrows of the heart';29 where the term 'hrdayam'

evidently signifies the 'buddhi', which is the store of all desires and

sorrows and other allied feelings. The Aitareya Upániṣad makes it

explicitly clear that the heart (hrdayam), the mind (manas) and all

different functions of the intellect. as samjñāna, ājñāna, vijñāna,

prajñāna etc. are only different names of prajñāna or the buddhi.30

Thus it is clear beyond doubt that the 'hrdaya', the 'gubā', the

'hrtpundarika' all signify the buddhi, which is the subtle abode of

Brahman (dharam veśma).31 Inside this is the subtle ākāśa or ether32.

The abode being subtle, the ākāśa is subtler still. This ākāśa is not

physical space but is only a name of Brahman and signifies that alone,

as Sankara makes it clear. Brahman is called ākāśa because of the

common features of bodilessness, subtleness, and all-pervasiveness.33

The very root meaning of the term ākāśa points to the all-pervasive

luminosity which is Brahman (ā samantāt kāśate prakāśate iti). Thus

by penetrating through the heart one must get hold of this extremely

subtle ākāśa and again piercing through it search for that which lies

inside it. From the outer ranges of the brahmapura or the city of

Brahman one first enters into the inner abode of the heart, from the

inner abode of the heart one proceeds further inside into the supremely

subtle ākāśa and finally dives into the bottomless depths to get at the

core of being, the foundation of all foundations. The Upaniṣadic

way everywhere leads the seeker thus from the outer to the inner

and then to the inmost realm step by step. All this points to the

fact that the ākāśa is the outer symbol of Brahman, buddhi the inner

27 KTU, 2.6.16, CU, 8.6,6,

28 kāmā ye 'sya hrdi śritāh. BU, 4.4.7.

29 BU, 4.3.22.

30 AU, 3.2.

31 CU, 8.1.1.

32 Ibid.

33 SB, on Ibid.

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203

and the Ātman which surpasses even these in subtleness is the real Brahman.

Now, the doubt naturally arises that when word 'dahara',

which signifies extreme smallness or subtleness, has been used as an adjective for both the lotus-abode (pundarīkaṁ veśma) and the ākāśa

or space therein, then the thing inside it, which is to be searched after, must be smaller still. Then what is the use of such a search

after the smallest thing ? Is it not an almost entirely fruitless exer-

tion that leads to nothing? The subtleness goes on to be finer and

finer as one penetrates farther and farther, till it almost seems to be

reaching the vanishing point. Hence a doubt naturally crops up

that makes one feel the utter uselessness of this search, because it

seems to be leading to a zero or a void. So the Upaniṣad itself

voices the doubt by raising the question thus : 'Now if he (the

teacher) is asked: "In the city of Brahman, the subtle lotus-abode and

inside it in the subtle space, what does exist, what is to be enquired

about"?34 Then he should reply : "The ākāśa inside the heart

is as much as this ākāśa. Both the heaven and the earth is truly

existent herein, both the fire and the wind, the sun and the moon,

whatever not, all are truly stored in it"'.35 The reply, thus, effectively

removes the misconception about the smallness of the space inside the

heart and the consequent nothingness attributed to the thing inside

it, by showing that the ākāśa inside the heart is of an identical

magnitude with the physical sky or space. Not only that ; it is of

an unlimited magnitude, as is made clear by the reference of every-

thing existing or non-existing to it. As Śaṅkara rightly points out,

the analogy of the physical space is taken,36 simply because there

is no other appropriate analogy to signify the infinitude of the inner

realm of the heart, and so it is not to be misunderstood that the inner

space is of an identical size or magnitude as the physical space.

Here the Upaniṣad also clearly points to the absolute correspon-

dence between the microcosm and the macrocosm. By stating that

34 CU, 8.1.2.

35 Ibid, 8.1.3.

36 ŚB, on Ibid.