1. Studies on Carvaka Lokayata Ramakrishna Bhattacharya

Cultural, Historical and Textual Studies of Religions

The volumes featured in the Anthem Cultural, Historical and Textual Studies of Religions series are the expression of an international community of scholars committed to the reshaping of the field of textual and historical studies of religions. Titles in this series examine practice, ritual, and other textual religious products, crossing different area studies and time frames. Featuring a vast range of interpretive perspectives, this innovative series aims to enhance the way we look at religious traditions. STUDIES ON THE CĀRVĀKA/LOKĀYATA

Series Editor

Federico Squarcini, University of Firenze, Italy Ramkrishna Bhattacharya

Editorial Board

Piero Capelli, University of Venezia, Italy Vincent Eltschinger, ICIHA, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Austria Christoph Emmrich, University of Toronto, Canada James Fitzgerald, Brown University, USA Jonardon Ganeri, University of Sussex, UK Barbara A. Holdrege, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA Sheldon Pollock, Columbia University, USA Karin Preisendanz, University of Vienna, Austria Alessandro Saggioro, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy Cristina Scherrer-Schaub, University of Lausanne and EPHE, France Biblioteka Inst. Filozofii Romila Thapar, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India Ananya Vajpeyi, University of Massachusetts Boston, USA Marco Ventura, University of Siena, Italy Vincenzo Vergiani, University of Cambridge, UK 1826023917

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Contents

Preface 9

Acknowledgements 11

Abbreviations 13

I. Origin of Materialism in India: Royal or Popular? 21

II. Jain Sources for the Study of Pre-Cārvaka Materialist Ideas in India 33

III. Ajita Kesakambala: Nihilist or Materialist? 45

IV. Perception and Inference in the Carvaka Philosophy 55

V. Commentators of the Cārvākasūtra 65

VI. Cārvāka Fragments: A New Collection 69

VII. On the Authenticity of an Alleged Cārvāka Aphorism 105

VIII. Paurandarasūtra Revisited 109

IX. What Did the Cārvāka-s Mean by sukham jīvet? 123

8 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

X. Sāmkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata in the Kauțilīya Arthaśāstra: A Re-View 131

XI. Yogācāra against the Cārvāka: A Critical Survey of Tattvasangraha, Chapter 22 137

XII. Jayantabhatta's Representation of the Carvāka: A Critique 147

XIII. What does Udayana Mean by lokavyavahārasiddha iti cārvākāḥ? 159

XIV Hemacandra on the Cārvāka: A Survey 163 Preface

XV. Haribhadra's Şaddarśanasamuccaya, Verses 81-84: A Study 175

XVI. The Significance of Lokāyata in Pali 187

XVII. On Lokāyata and Lokāyatana in Buddhist Sanskrit 193 I started writing on the Cārvaka, the most uncompromis- XVIII. Lokāyata and Lokāyatana ing materialist school of philosophy in ancient India, from in Sanskrit Dictionaries 197 1995 and have continued to work on its different aspects. My researches on this subject are now being offered in a XIX. rņam krtvā ghrtam pibet: Who Said This? 201 revised and enlarged form, thanks to the interest shown by Dr Federico Squarcini, Florence University. XX. jīvikā dhātrnirmitā or jīviketi brhaspatiḥ? 207 Each chapter is meant to be read separately, hence some repetitions have been retained. In some cases, references XXI. mṛtānāmapi jantūnām ... 213 have been made to other chapters. This makes every chap- ter self-complete and, at the same time, helps readers follow XXII. Cārvāka/Lokāyata Philosophy: my line of argument. Perso-Arabic Sources 219 Admittedly, there is paucity of material relating to the Cārvaka. Still, as in the case of the Presocratic philosophers XXIII. What is Meant by nāstika in the Nyāyasūtra of Greece, it is possible to reconstruct the basic tenets of this Commentary? 227 system on the basis of whatever little is found in the works of its opponents and the extracts quoted by them. Notwith- Bibliography 233 standing distortions, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata has emerged as the lone contender against the pro-Vedic Brahminical schools on the one hand, and the non-Vedic Buddhist and Jain schools on the other. Besides the orthodoxy prevailing around the Vedas, belief in after-life and after-world has been the bone of contention. This will be evident from the way I have arranged the Carvaka fragments in Chapter 6.

10 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

My endeavour has been to disprove certain notions about the Cārvāka/Lokāyata -two of which are generally admitted as being beyond doubt. They are as follows: (a) the Carvaka-s did not approve of any other instrument of cognition except perception, and (b) they advocated unal- loyed sensualism and hedonism. I have tried to show that both the charges are groundless calumnies. As to the first charge, there is enough evidence to show that the Cārvāka-s, in spite of their difference of opinion in other areas, did admit inference in so far as it was grounded on perception. As to the second charge, my contention is that no authentic Cärvāka aphorisms have been cited by the opponents of the Cārvāka to support their view, Moreover, the same charge Acknowledgements was brought also against Epicurus, despite the fact that he disapproved of sensual gratification as the end of life. The common belief that all materialists are nothing but sensual- ists is a misconception. It has also been my endeavour to establish the fact that there existed a pre-Carvaka school of materialism in India, although there is no way to prove that the Cārvaka system grew out of it. On the other hand, if the evidence provid- ed by the Manimekalai (and indirectly supported by the Needless to say, I am indebted to all scholars who have writ- Mahābhārata) is admitted, the two schools seem to have con- ten on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. However, special mention must tinued to exist side by side. The chief difference between be made of my friends, Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz. the two is that the earlier materialists took the number of elements to be five (earth, air, fire, water and space) while They have helped me in all possible ways and I do not know how to thank them enough. Even when I differ from their the Carvaka-s admitted only the first four. It is now for the readers to judge how far I have succeeded views (for example, whether Jayarāsi was a Cārvāka of some sort) my admiration for their scholarship is unbounded. in my attempts. Professor Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya and Dr Sanjitku- mar Sadhukhan always stood by me and helped me unravel the intricacies of some passages. Dr Sadhukhan was also kind enough to translate some verses and sentences from Tibetan, a language I do not know. Prof. M.S. Khan and Dr M. Firoze helped me with the Arabic and Persian texts. I shall fail in my duty if I do not thank them too. Without the assistance of my pupils and collaborators the task of editing, proof-reading and preparing the press copy could not have been possible. All of them did it as love's la- bour. I take this opportunity to thank Amitava Bhattacharya, Rinku Choudhuri, Prodyut Datta, Siddhartha Datta, Mala- yendu Dinda, Nabendu Roy and Subhendu Sarkar. Thanks are also due to the editors of the journals and commemoration volumes in which my articles and papers first appeared.

Abbreviations

ABORI Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (Poona) ABS Sadānanda Kāśmīraka. Advaitabrahmasiddhi AC Hemacandra. Abhidhānacintāmani

ĀLV Jayantabhatța. Āgamadambara Jñānaśrībhadra. Āryālankāvatāravrtti AS Vidyānandasvāmin. Aștasahasrī Așt Pāņini. Așļādhyāyī. See Katre. ĀSVr Śīlānka. Ācārāngasūtravrtti AYVD Hemacandra. Anyayogavyavaccheda-dvātrimśikā

BC AYVD (trans.) Thomas 1968 Aśvaghosa. Buddhacarita BC Sāntideva. Bodhicaryāvatāra Bhãm Vācaspatimiśra. Bhāmatī. See BS. BhI Nīlakaņțha. Bhāratabhāvadīpa (Comm. on the Mahābhārata). See Mbh. BI The Bibliotheca Indica (The Asiatic Society, Calcutta) BORI The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (Poona) BrS Br. Up Varāhamihirācārya. Brhat Samhitā

BS Brhadāranyaka Upanişad in EPU. The Brahma Sūtra with Sankara Bhāsya and Bhāmatī, Kalpataru and Parimala.

14 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Abbreviations 15

BSBh Bhāskarācārya. Brahmasūtrabhāsya LTN Haribhadra. Lokatattvanimņaya Ch. Up. Chāndogya Upanişad in EPU MA Candrakīrti. Madhyamakāvatāra C/L Cārvāka/Lokāyata MadVr Nāgārjuna. Madhyamakavrttih DA Divyāvadāna Mahap Mahapurāna (Tisatthimahāpurisagunālamkāra) DN Dīghanikāya Mān. Mānasollāsa Samgraha Dohā Abhayadeva. Sanskritcomm. on Sarahapāda's Manu Manusmrti Dohākosa MAP Kamalaśīla. Madhyamakālankāra-pañjikā EPU Eighteen Principal Upanisads MB Mugdhabodhinī (Nītivākyāmrtavyākhyā) ERE Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics Mbh The Mahābhārata FLPH Foreign Languages Publishing House MPu Matsya Purāņa (Moscow) MŚ Nāgārjuna. Madhyamakaśāstra GBhB Baladeva. Gītābhāşya. Śrīmadbhagavadgītā MV Māțhara. Māțharavrtti. See SK. 1845 Saka. NBh Bhāsarvajña. Nyāyabhūsaņa GBhM Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Gītābhāşya. 1978 NC Srīharsa. Naisadhacarita GBhN Nīlakaņțha. Gītābhāşya. 1978 NC (trans.) Handiqui 1956. Naisadhacarita of Śrīharșa GBhŚa Śankarācārya. Gītābhāşya Šrīmadbhagavadgīlā. ND Tarkavāgīśa. Nyāya Darśana (1981-89) 1978. NCC New Catalogus Catalogorum GBhŚr Śrīdharsvāmī. Gītābhāsya Śrīmadbhagavad-gītā. NK Udayana. Nyāyakusumāñjali 1978. NKC Parbhācandra. Nyāyakumudacandra GBhVi Viśvanātha. Gītābhāsya. Šrīmadbhagavadgītā. NM Jayantabhatta. Nyāyamañjari 1845 Saka. NP Tarkavāgīśa. Nyāya Paricaya GrBh Cakradhara. Granthibhanga. See NM. NP1 Nārāyaņa. Naişadhaprakāśa (Comm. on NC) GV NS Nyāyasūtra's (Ruben 1928) HV Jinabhadra. Ganadharavāda Harivamśa NSBh Vātsyāyana. Bhāsya (Tarkavāgīśa 1981-89) IHF The Indian Historical Review (New Delhi) NSi See PrPañ. ISPP Indian Studies Past and Present (Publica- NTD Jayasiņhasūri. Nyāyatātparyadīpikā tions). NVI Vādirājasūri. Nyāyaviniścayavivaraņa ISPP Indian Studies Past and Present (Calcutta). OEL Oxford English Dictionary JAS(B) Journal of the Asiatic Society (of Bengal) [Kolkata OUP Oxford University Press (formerly Calcutta)]. Pandeya See MS. The Jātaka Fausbøll 1891. PaPan Par Vāsudevasuri. Padapañcikā Jain Journal (Kolkata) Udayana. Nyāyavārtika-tātparya pariśuddhiḥ JM Āryaśura. Jātakamālā PC Krsņamiśra. Prabodhacandrodaya JñāNi Jñānaśrīmitra. Nibandhāvali PKM Prabhācandra. Prameyakamalamārtanda JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great PM Hemacandra. Pramānamīmāmsā Britain and Ireland (London) PPH People's Publishing House (New Delhi) KA Kauțilīya Arthašāstra PPr Padma Purāņa. Srsțikhaņda Kāśikā Vāmana-Jayaditya. See also Shastri, Shukla. PrPa Candrakīrti. Prasannapadā (on Nāgārjuna's KB Varadarājamiśra. Kusumāñjali-bodhanī Madhyamakaśāstra). See MŚ. KM Rājaśekhara. Kāvyamīmāmsā PrPañ Śālikanāthamiśra. Prakaraņapañcikā KS Vātsyāyana. Kāmasūtra PrPr Bhāvaviveka. Prajñāpradīpavrtti KS (trans.) Kāma-Sūtra of Vatsayana (sic), Mukherji 1945. (on Nāgārjuna's Madhyamakaśāstra). See MŚ. LS Lankāvatārasūtra (Nanjio 1923). Pr.Up. Praśna Upanişad in EPU LS (trans.) Suzuki 1956. PTS* Pali Text Society (London) LSDSam Anonymous. Laghuşaddarśana-samuccayasatīka PV Dharmakīrti. Pramānavārttikam

16 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Abbreviations 17

PVA Prajñākaragupta. Pramāņavārttikālankāra Śv. Up. PVSVT Karņakagomin. Pramānavārtlikasvopajña- TBV Śvetāśvatara Upanişad in EPU Abhayadevasūri. Tattvabodhavidhāyinī vrttițīkā Ten Suttas Ten Suttas from Dīgha Nikāya PVVr Manorathnandin's vrtti on PV TK Vācaspatimiśra. Tattvakaumudī in Rām The Vālmīki Rāmāyaņa Sāmkhyakārikā RKD Jagannāthamiśra (comp.). Rasakalpadruma TRD Guņaratna. Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā RNi Ratnakīrti. Ratnakīrti-Nibandhāvalih TS Sāntarakșita. Tattvasangraha RVP Śālikanātha. Rjuvimalapañcikā TSP Kamalaśīla. Tattvasangrahapañjikā. See TS. (on Prabhākara's Brhatī) TSPC Hemacandra. Trişaştisalākā-purușa-carita Șad-DS Rājaśekharasūri. Șaddarśanasamuccaya. TSPC (trans.) Johnson 1931 See ȘDSam (Varanasi ed.). TSV Vidyānandī. Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika SBE The Sacred Books of the East Tt.Up Taittirīya Upanişad in EPU ŚBh Šārīrakabhāsya by Sankara on BS TUS Jayarāśibhațța. Tattvopaplavasimha ŚD Pārthasārathimiśra. Šāstradīpikā TUS (Franco) Franco 1987 [1994] SDK Mādhava Sarasvatī. Sarvadaršanakaumudī UBhPK Siddharşi. Upamitibhavaprapañcākathā SDKa Damodara Mahapatrasastri. Up. Bhã. Upanişadbhāşyam Sarvadarśanakaumudī VāBh/SVr Saddharma-pundarıka Sūtram Jinabhadra. Višeşāvasyaka-bhāşya and SDPS Svopajñavrtti SDS Sāyaņa-Mādhava. Sarvadarśanasamgraha Vasu. SDS (trans.) Cowell, Gough, ed. Joshi 1981; G/L VDMP Sanghadāsagaņivācaka, Vasudevahimdī Vişnudharmottara Mahāpurāņa SDSam Haribhadra. Şaddarśanasamuccaya VK Amalānanda. Vedānta-Kalpataru. See BS. SDŚi Śrīkāmcī Rāmānujācārya. VMT Cirañjīvaśarman (Bhațțācāryya). Sarvadarśanaśiromanih Vidvanmodatarangiņī ŚHŚA Hemacandra. Śrīsiddha-hemacandra- VP Bhatrhari. Vākyapadīya śabdānuśāsanam VPS ŚHVP Vidyāraņya (Sāyaņa-Mādhava). Hemacandra. Śrīsiddha-haimavrhatprakriyā Vivaraņaprameyasamgraha (Mahāvyākaraņa) VPu Vişņu Purāņa SK Iśvarakrsņa. Sāmkhyakārikā VS Sadānanda Yati (Yogīndra). Vedānta-sāra ŚKA Šārdūlakarņāvadāna Vyo Vyomaśivācārya. Vyomavatī SKa Haribhadra. Samarāicca Kahā YS Hemacandra. Yogaśāstram SKSVr Sīlānka. Sūtrakrtānga-sūtravrtti YTC Somadevasūri. Yaśastilakacampū SMS Sarvamatasamgraha SPhS Samañña-phala-sutta in DN, Pt.1. SŚ Sarvajñātman Muni. Samkşepa-šārīraka SSam Suśruta Samhita with Nibandha-samgraha SSS Sarva[darśana]siddhāntasangraha ST Yāmuna. Siddhitraya STP Siddhasena. Sanmati-tarka-prakarana. See TBV. Svi Utpalabhatța (Bhațțotpala). Samhitā-vivrti. See BrS. SVM Mallişeņa. Syādvādamañjarī. See AYVD. SVR Vādidevasūri. Syādvādaratnākara ŚVS SVSS Haribhadra. Śāstravārtā-Samuccaya Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta-sārasamgraha INS

SVȚ Anantavīrya. Siddhiviniścayațīkā BIBLIOTEKA

Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

I Origin of Materialism in India: Royal or Popular?

Erich Frauwallner, the celebrated historian of Indian phi- losophy, held that materialism in India was created for the circle of Realpolitikers, practical politicians like Cāņakya. In it they found a doctrine which, by denying the existence of God, after-life, heaven and hell, etc., put out of their way all moral scruples that were hindrances to their actions. "It is, therefore, no accident," Frauwallner says, "that the first materialist whom tradition has handed down to us in living and vivid colours, is a King."1 The king he mentions is a legendary one: Paesi (Pāyāsi), whose views are recorded in Prakrit (Jain) and Pali (Buddhist) works. A.K. Warder also proposes that "another materialist school, besides Jayarāśi Bhațța's, seems to have appeared among the kings themselves and especially their ministers including perhaps the celebrated Vessakara of Magadha, who in the Anguttara Nikāya, Vol. II, expresses a realist view in conformity with Arthasāstra Lokāyata."8

' Frauwallner (trans.), II: 216. 2 See Rāyapasenaijjam, II = Rāyapaseniyasutta (Paesikahanayam) in Tripathi (ed.); Pāyasi Suttanta (DN, II: 23), trans. Rhys Davids (1910). 3 Warder (1956), 55. He also says that the KA"certainly draws inspiration from the Lokayata philosophy" (1971), 39.

22 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Royal or Popular? 23

Both Frauwallner and Warder arrived at the same conclu- had loved him, his grandson, tenderly, he certainly would sion on the basis of a supposed connection between material- have warned him, but he did not do so. Therefore, P. con- ism and Arthaśāstra, the science of polity. That the legendary cluded, his soul was no more in existence. Vijayasimha (V.) founder of the Lokāyata/Cārvāka system and that of a school replied that a soul cannot get out of hell, just as a criminal of Arthasāstra bear the same name, viz. Brhaspati, seems to shut up in a prison cannot get out of it and communicate have contributed to this notion. even with his best friends. All this speculation, I contend, is wide of the mark. Let us P. then said that his father had been a very good man and take up the issues one by one. had become a śramana; accordingly he should be in heaven now; why did he not come to teach him as he might have done, being a god? V. replied that as a very poor man of low

First, king Paesi. In both Jain and Buddhist versions of origin, who migrates to a distant country and acquires there riches and honours, forgets his former relations and friends, the story, only one negative idea is stated: there is no soul. By various observations and experiments the king came so a god, enjoying the delights of heaven, ceases to care for those with whom he lived on earth. to this conclusion. Much has been made of his "gruesome P. then related that a robber, who had been sentenced to experiments".4 The king is said to have thrown a thief alive death, was placed in an iron vessel hermetically sealed. The in a brazen pot, with a brass lid strongly soldered laid over it, man died, but no soul was observed to issue from the ves- in order to see how the soul could escape after his death. He claims to have put another thief in a jar to check whether the sel. V. replied that a famous conch-blower had similarly been

weight of the man varied before and after his death, etc. put in an iron vessel; then he blew his conch, the sound was

Frauwallner, it seems, took this story fabricated by the op- heard outside, though there was no opening at all. P. said that a robber once was strangled, but his weight was ponents of dehātmaväda (the view that there is no soul beyond found to be the same, before and after his death. V. replied the body) to be a record of real-life incidents. Hence, Paesi that a bladder, filled with air and without it, was ascertained was held up by Frauwallner as "the first materialist". But we not to differ in weight. have another version of the same story in a later Jain source, At last P. said that a robber who had been sentenced to Samarāicca Kahā (Samarāditya Kathā) by Haribhadra.5 There death, had been dissected into minute particles, but no soul is no mention of Paesi there, and though a king may be indi- rectly involved in this experiment, he is not the spokesman could be detected. V. replied that a man had cut up a piece of arani wood into the smallest particles but among them of dehātmavada. Since this work has seldom been mentioned no fire could be found which inheres the wood and comes in connection with Lokäyata,6 a summary of the debate be- forth by churning. tween Pingakesa (Pingakeśa), a follower of a minister, and Vijayasimha, a Jain monk, may be given here.' In all the versions of the story, the denier of soul is defeat-

Pingakesa (hereafter abbreviated as P.) said that his ed by some Jain or Buddhist monk (there is no uniformity in this part) and is reduced to submission. The tale is thus tailor- grandfather had been a very wicked man, his soul ought to have been in hell, if the opponent's views were right; as he made to denigrate a doctrine inimical to the Jain and Bud- dhist views (as well as the Brahminical). The Jains employed the story (based on examples and analogies, rather than ar- guments proper) to promote their doctrine, the Buddhists, 4 Jayatilleke, 105. theirs. There is no historical basis at all behind the story. Haribhadra in Jacobi, III: 1, 63-81. 6 Tucci refers to this work in passing (1925), reprinted in C/L, 389. He Another question may also be raised in this connection. If materialism originated in the royal circles, why do we not hear points out that "[t]he analogies which the Payasisuttanta shows to have of any follower or ideological successor of Paesi? Epigraphic with the Jaina Rayapaseniya and some passages of Samarāiccakahā cannot be explained as mutual borrowings, but rather as various derivations from records reveal the religious affiliations of the kings. Many real doctrines followed in ancient times" (ibid.). of them were adherents and/or patrons of the Brahminical 7 I have reproduced (with some minor alterations) the summary given sects (Saiva, Vaișnava, etc.), some were Buddhists and Jains as by Jacobi (ed.) in his introduction, li-liii. well. But, barring one mention in a much later Tibetan work,

24 Studies on the Carvāka/Lokāyata Royal or Popular? 25

History of Buddhism in India (1608) by Lama Taranatha,8 we share this view. They would not deny either artha or dharma do not find any king or prince professing Lokāyata. Surely we or kāma. But no materialist would accept dharma as a varga of could legitimately expect at least a few more materialists in life. Vätsyāyana in his KS quotes (rather paraphrases) a sūtra the rank of kings if the doctrine did originate among them. (aphorism) attributed to the Laukäyatika-s: "dharma is not The Dharmasāstras uniformly condemn the nāstika, the re- to be performed."12 Here lies the basic difference. The con- viler of the Vedäs.9 If there were Lokäyatikas among the kings, nection so naively made between Lokāyata and Arthaśāstra the Dharmasastras would have modified their attitude too. The fails to take note of this. Just because both deal with the kings and the law-givers used to live in symbiosis. There was no mundane world, it is not enough to link up the two; there Church vs. State confrontation in the Brahminical tradition. is a gulf of difference between the views of a trivargavädin So by applying both ponendo ponens (affirming the antecedent) and a lokāyatika. Vātsyāyana too belonged to the former cat- and tollendo tollens (denying the consequent) we come to the egory. He rejects the Laukāyatika view as well as that of the same conclusion: there was no Lokāyatika king in India. arthacintaka-s, who also rejected kāma.13The concept of the three varga-s (later four, with liberation, moksa, added as II a separate one) was the received view in the Brahminical tradition. Any school which preferred to serve only one or Second, the alleged connection between Lokāyata and even two varga-s was not acceptable.14 Arthaśāstra. But does Kauțilya not mention the Barhaspatya school As Kauțilya (or Kauțalya) tells us at the very beginning of his of Arthaśāstra which believed that economics (vārtā = agri- work, Arthasāstra is meant "for the acquisition and protection culture, cattle-rearing and trade) and the science of politics of the world" (prthivya labhe pālane ca),10 i.e., it teaches the king (dandanīti) to be the only sciences?15 They rejected the three how to acquire and protect a kingdom. It is so named because Vedas as a subject of learning (vidyā) for the Vedic lore is it deals exclusively with only one of the three divisions (varga-s) only a cloak for one conversant with the ways of the world of life, viz. material well-being (artha), the other two being spir- (samvaraņa-mātram hi trayī lokāyātrāvida iti).16 Does it not prove itual good (dharma) and pleasure (kāma). All the three varga-s that the followers of Brhaspati were covertly anti-religious? are to be attended to in equal measure, for all are mutually Covertly, yes. Unlike the Lokäyatika-s, however, they did not connected. Of these three, however, Kautilya considers artha to declare their view openly. And to Vatsyayana the Bārhaspatya be the supreme one (artha eva pradhāna iti kautilyah).11 Arthaśastra (now lost) is the only Arthasāstra, as the Manu. The authors of all Arthasastra texts (there were many is the only Dharmaśāstra.17 The Bārhaspatya Arthaśāstra then even before Kautilya, though we possess only his) would was as much orthodox as Kautilya's. Let not the name of Brhaspati deceive us. From time to time, we hear of several Brhaspati-s.18 The first is the pre- 8 "The king's (Nemita's) first son followed the 'secret doctrine of the ceptor of the gods (suraguru), second, the author of an Lokäyata', the second worshipped Mahādeva, the third Visnu, the fourth Arthaśastra, and third, that of a Dharmasāstra. All of them the secret [doctrine of the] Vedänta, the fifth the Digambara Kanaka and the sixth the brahmacāri brāhmana Kusa-putra [? Kauśika]. Each of them established his own centre." Taranatha, 53. What Taranatha means by "the secret doctrine of the Lokāyata" is 12 KS,1.2.25 (Chowkhambha ed., 19). Jayantabhatta mentions the apho- not clear. But the way he uses the word "secret" in relation to Vedänta rism in the following form: dharmo na kāryah (NM, Ch. 4, 1: 388). Peculiarly seems to suggest that he was thinking of "philosophy" in general. He enough, this aphorism as found in Jayantabhatta has gone unnoticed in the refers to Lokāyata in another passage (199), where it indubitably suggests collection of Barhaspatya-sūtra-s compiled by D.R. Shastri and Namai. dehātmavāda. (I would like to thank Dr Alaka Chattopadhyaya who explained the original Tibetan text to me, word for word.) with artha (1.7.3). 13 KS, 1.2.40. Kauțilīya, however, accepts both dharma and kāma along

9 Manu, 2.11, 4.30, 4.163, 8.22, etc. For a convenient compilation of 14 KS, 1.2.51. the views of the Brahminical law-givers in regard to freethinking, see 15 KA, 1.2.4. D. Chattopadhyaya (1976), 185-94. 16 KA, 1.2.5. 10 KA,1.1.1. 17 KS, 1.1.6-7. 11 Ibid.,1.7.4. 18 For the Brhaspati-s, see Aiyangar, 79.

26 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Royal or Popular? 27

cannot be the same person. It was the suraguru who is credit- Similarly, the word, lokäyata, in the KA does not stand for ed with deceiving the demons (asura-s, danava-s) by preach- materialism.25 If it were so, the Mānava school of Arthasāstra ing anti-Vedic doctrines in disguise. The Purana-s contain would not consider Ānvīkşikī (which comprises Sāmkhya, the story in slightly different versions.19 It is due to him that the Lokāyata/Cārvāka system is called Bārhaspatya-mata as Yoga and Lokāyata) to be a part of the Vedic lore.26 Lokāyata here stands for logic (as the Malayalam commentary clear- well. The Bārhaspatya Dharmaśāstra, like the Arthaśāstra ly states),27 or the science of disputation (as the Pali com- bearing the name of Brhaspati, is unfortunately lost. But the mentaries of the Tipitaka uniformly render the word, viz. fragments so far collected (as quoted or referred to in later vitandasattham).28 So, Warder's reference to "Arthaśāstra works on Smrti)20 do not evince anything radically different Lokāyata" has no bearing on realism or materialism. Since from other existing Dharmasastra-s. There is no indication his contention has been convincingly controverted by of anything anti-religious there (nor is it expected). The au- Jayatilleke,29 we need not go into it any further. thor of this work accepts Manu as the highest authority "be- cause he has embodied the essence of the Veda in his work". III This is surely a far cry from the Cärvaka which denounces the Vedas as hoax in no uncertain terms.21 Now I would like to demonstrate that materialism in In- Why does Kautilya then include Lokāyata as a branch dia has a popular origin as opposed to the alleged royal one. of study fit for the kings?22 Here too the identification of It is rather strange that this origin has so far been entirely Lokāyata with Bārhaspatya-mata has led many scholars astray. overlooked. I refer to Ajita Keśakambalin (Kesakambala), Jacobi, for instance, approaches the question thus: senior contemporary of the Buddha and Mahavira.30 Not

Now it is difficult to believe that Kautilya, who acknowledges that his name is never mentioned. It occurs in every book

the entire social order founded on the Vedas, meant this on Indian philosophy. He is accepted as "the forerunner

grossly materialistic system by that Lokāyata which he puts of the later Cārvākas" on all hands.31 But the most obvious on the same line together with Sānkhya and Yoga as a rep- conclusion has not yet been drawn. resentative of Anvīkșikī. And still there is no doubt about it, As with the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, the doctrine of Ajita is because the Lokäyata doctrine is ascribed to Brihaspati, the found exclusively in the works of his opponents, the Jains and teacher of the gods, and many of his verses handed down to Buddhists. They treated him as a rival, and so the accounts, us put in his mouth.23 as Goonasekere admits, cannot "be expected to be free from

The difficulty is created by taking all Brhaspati-s as one and prejudice."32 We are told that he was a renowned teacher who

the same person. Jacobi himself noticed, "The Niti-teachings of Brihaspati, which Draupadi expounds in Mahābhārata III. 32, are at any rate as orthodox as one can wish!"24 This itself 25 This issue has been elaborately discussed in Ch. 10 below.

is a conclusive evidence that there were many Brhaspati-s, 26 KA, 1.2.3: trayīviśeşo hy ānvīkșikī. 27 See Ch. 10 below. not one. 28 See Rhys Davids and Stede, s.v. "Lokāyata". See also Moggallāna (1981), 19, v. 112 ab. 29 Jayatilleke, 92-93. 19 See MPu, Chs. 24, 47; VPu, III: 17-18; PPu, Srstikhanda, 13. The story is most probably derived from Maitrī (Maitrayanī) Upanișad, 7.9. 30 See the article, "Ajita Kesakambalī" by B. Goonasekere in Malalasekera

20 See Jolly (1977) and Aiyangar. (ed.), I: 325-27. 31 See Barua, 288; Basham, 17. D. Chattopadhyaya, while not denying 21 Brhaspatismrti, 27.3 (Jolly, 387); SDS, 12-13. 22 KA, 1.2.10. A king is required to learn Sāmkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata, that Ajita was a materialist, chooses to emphasize the fact that he was "no

the three subjects which constitute Anvīksikī. less a philosopher of futility and moral collapse than the Buddha and

29 Jacobi (1911, 1970), 737; (1918), 104. Mahāvīra, Pūrana and Pakudha [ ... ]". He also brands Ajita's teachings as

24 Ibid. (1911), 737 nl and (1918), 104 n11, referring to the vulgate ed. "a philosophy of the graveyard" [(1959), 518]. He must have had in his

of the Mbh. In the crit. ed. of the Aranyakparvan, it occurs in 33.57: nītim mind the title of Roger Garaudy's book, Literature of the Graveyard (1948)

brhaspatiproktam). There are some other references to Brhaspati in the in which Jean-Paul Sartre, François Mauriac, Andre Malraux, and Arthur

Mbh. See Aiyangar, 79ff. Koestler had been adversely criticized. 32 Goonasekere in Malalasekera (ed.), I: 327.

28 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Royal or Popular? 29

lived the life of an ascetic, wearing a blanket made of hair Whatever be the right interpretation of this anomaly, it (hence the appellation, "of the hair-blanket", keśakambalin) is to be noted that Ajita's doctrines do not consist solely of which made him feel hot in summer and cold in winter (did he take it off then?). This surely is quite unlikely for a king like some negative propositions as Paesi's. Ajita had something

Paesi. Ajita is said to have preached the following doctrine. positive to preach, viz. not only that there is no soul, but also that this being is a compound of four great primary elements

There is no (consequence to) alms-giving, sacrifice or obla- (mahābhūta-s)-earth, air, fire, and water. This, as we know

tion. A good or bad action produces no result. This world from later sources, was the basic plank of the Lokāyata phi- does not exist, nor does the other world. There is no mother, losophy. The Barhaspatya-sūtra-s, quoted in the Brahminical no father (all good or evil done to them producing no re- and non-Brahminical works, uniformly speak of these four el- sult). There is no rebirth of beings after death. In this world, ements (not five) as tattva-s, basic things; everything else, in- there are no samanas or brähmanas established in the Noble cluding consciousness, comes out of them.35 Ajita is the earliest Path and accomplished in good practice, who through direct source of these aphorisms. Thus, his claim to be the originator knowledge (i.e., magga insight) acquired by their own efforts, of materialism in India is incontestible. The later development can expound on this world and other worlds. This being is but a compound of the four great primary elements; after shows a continuation of Ajita's ideas, not merely Paesi's. death, the earth-element (or element of extension) returns and goes back to the body of earth, the water-element (or ele- IV ment of cohesion) returns and goes back to the body of water, the fire-element (or element of thermal energy) returns and The popular origin of materialism in India also makes us goes back to the body of air, and the air-element (or element review another myth: its alleged hedonistic character. Work- of motion) returns and goes back to the body of air, while the ing under this prejudice, Goonasekere writes, "[Ajita's] mental faculties pass into space. The four pall-bearers and the bier (constituting the fifth) carry the corpse. The remains of choice of garments would indicate that he was a believer in

the dead can be seen up to the cemetery where bare bones lie austerity [ ... ] in spite of the fact that he was a materialist."36

greying like the colour of the pigeons. All alms-giving ends Is there any necessary connection between materialism in ashes. Fools prescribe alms-giving; and some assert that and hedonism? Very much like the alleged royal origin, the there is such a thing as merit in alms-giving but their words notion that a materialist must be a hedonist as well is wrong- are empty, false and nonsensical. Both the fool and the wise ly conceived against even the evidence of Ajita's way of life. are annihilated and destroyed after death and dissolution of In Greece too, Epicurus (341-271 BCE) had been a victim their bodies. Nothing exists after death.33 of this libel.37 Epicurus and the Epicureans had all along

It has been rightly pointed out that there is something preached a doctrine of self-sufficiency and plain living.

wrong in the clause, "this world does not exist" (natthi ayam But their opponents persistently branded them as heedless

loko). Jayatilleke thinks that the doctrines "attributed to [Aji- hedonists.38 It has been pointed out that the modern Eng-

ta] seem to be of a composite character," i.e., many a differ- ent idea has been lumped up and foisted on him.34 of this and another world (or simply, there is no 'other world', as heaven or a future life)" (1971), 33. 35 See D.R. Shastri (1982), 199, Aphorism Nos. 2-4; Namai (1976), 39,

33 Ten Suttas (1984, 1987), 83. Translation modified. Aphorism Nos. A2-4.

34 Jayatilleke, 95. He explains the anomaly in the following way: " ... the 36 Goonasekere in Malalasekera (ed.), I: 327. Emphasis added.

Buddhists identified all the known materialist views with Ajita, who sym- 37 Barua also refers to Epicurus in connection with Ajita and says that

bolizes the philosophy of Materialism, inconsistently putting together the both of them were misunderstood (289-90). Lovejoy and Boas are of the

tenets of mutually opposed schools since they both (or all) happened to be opinion that the charges brought against the epicurean ethical system

in some sense (metaphysical or pragmatic) materialists", 91. were libellous (152).

Without going into the question whether Jayarasibhatta can at all be 38 Epicurus did speak of pleasure as the aim of life, but he meant intellec-

taken as a materialist ("a pragmatic materialist" is what Jayatilleke calls tual pleasure, not sensual. As he said: "When we say that pleasure is the end

him), it is obvious that the account in the SPhS is not fully reliable. Warder and aim, we do not mean the pleasure of sensuality, as we are understood to

freely translates natthi ayam loko, natthi paro loko as "There is no distinction do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or wilful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and trouble in the soul.

30 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Royal or Popular? 31

lish sense of the word 'Epicurean', i.e., 'devoted to refined the example given below. Santaraksita mentions one and tasteful sensuous enjoyment' (OED), misrepresents the Kambalāsvatara whose opinion was apparently accepted teaching of Epicurus (as also does the Epicuri de grege porcum by the Lokäyatika-s.11 Benoytosh Bhattacharya proposes 'a swine from the sty of Epicurus' of Horace).39 to identify him first with his namesake who is regarded as Materialism as a philosophical doctrine definitely denies "one of the early authorities on the science of Music" along the concept of divine reward or retribution. It does not hesi- with such rsi-s as Tumburu, Vāyu, Nārada etc. "This shows tate to declare that there is no pleasure obtainable beyond that Kambaläsvatara flourished at a very remote age."42 But, this world. But it is not synonymous with hedonism. The OED other than the similarity of names, is there any justification clearly distinguishes between the technical (philosophical) for identifying the two? B. Bhattacharya writes, "It is not at sense of 'materialism' and the transferred senses that follow. all strange that a member of a materialist sect should devote One of these means: "Devotion to material needs or desires, himself to music; disbelieving in transmigration of soul or to the neglect of spiritual matters; a way of life, opinion, or in a future life, the cultivation of pleasure in this life would tendency based entirely upon material interests" (2c). A se- seem logical and entirely proper."43 mantic confusion around the word is still current in spite of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya objected to this weird identi- Engels's clear explication more than a century ago. He said: fication on two grounds: (a) It takes for granted that materi- alism equals hedonism, and (b) all ācarya-s of Music will then By the word materialism the philstine understands gluttony, have to be considered hedonists, which surely could not be drunkenness, lust of the eye, lust of the flesh, arrogance, cupidity, avarice, covetousness, profit-hunting and stock ex- the case.44 (Not satisfied with this identification, B. Bhattach-

change swindling -in short, all the filthy vices in which he arya was then "tempted to identify" Kambalāśvatara with Ajita himself indulges in private. By the word idealism he under- Keśakambalin as well!).45 stands the belief in virtue, universal philanthropy and in It was the Jains who made austerity (down to nakedness) a general way a "better world," of which he boasts before a doctrine of their own16 (quite different from the Middle others but in which he himself at the utmost believes only so Way, majjhima patipadā, enunciated by the Buddha). Their long as he is in the blues or is going through the bankruptcy opposition to materialism was as much on ontological consequent upon his customary "materialist" excesses.40 grounds as on that of hedonism. Failing to find fault with

Ajita, it seems, had made a cult of asceticism, rather than Ajita, they charged his disciples: "Thus undertaking various

of hedonism. It contradicts in no way his basic materialist posi- works they engage in various pleasure and amusements for

tion, because he was indifferent to both pleasure and pain. their own enjoyment."47

How deep-rooted is the misconception regarding the Even in the Common Era we find Jain scholars like Hema-

identity of materialism and hedonism can be seen from candra and Gunaratna attributing an eat-drink-and-be-merry philosophy of life to the Lokāyatika-s.48 Not that they were alone in this. Brahminical writers like Krsnamiśra, Śrīharșa

It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sen- sual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the 41 TS, 22: v. 1863: " ... consciousness proceeds from the body itself which grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through is equipped with the five life-breaths -Prāna, Apāna and the rest- as has which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul. Wherefore prudence been declared by Kambalāsvatara" (C/L, 164; the verse No. there is 1864 is a more precious thing even than philosophy; from it spring all the virtues, as in Ganganath Jha's translation and the Baroda ed. of the text). for it teaches that we cannot lead a life of pleasure which is not also a life of 42 B. Bhattacharya in Krishnamacharya (1926, 1984), xxxviii. prudence, honour and justice, and lead a life of prudence, honour and jus- 43 Ibid tice, which is not also a life of pleasure. For the virtues have grown into one 44 D. Chattopadhyaya (1969), 176 n258. with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them" ("Letter to 45 B. Bhattacharya in Krishnamacharya (1926, 1984), xxxix. Menoeceus" in Diogenes Laertius, 10.131-32). 6 See the Uttaradhyayana Sūtra, Lecture 16 in Jacobi, SBE 45: 73-77. 39 Harvey, 162. The phrase quoted from Horace occurs in his Epistle, 47 SKS, 2.1.17 in Jacobi, SBE 45: 341-45 and Goonasekere in Malalasek- 1.4.16. era (ed.), I: 325-26 40 Engels (1886) in Marx-Engels, n.d., 237. 48 TSPC, 12, vv. 325-45 and in TSPC (trans.), 36-38; TRD, 300.

32 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

and others had done the same thing.49 The Buddhists (e.g., Santarakșita and Kamalasīla), however, never raised the issue of hedonism in their opposition to the Lokāyatika-s, nor did Sankara or even the Jain scholar, Prabhacandra.50 Hedonism had no room in the doctrines of Ajita Keśakambalin, nor was it an invariable component of mate- rialism, whether in Greece or in India. The popular origin seems to survive in the name Lokāyata (lokeşu āyatam, wide- spread among the people) itself. Sankara too hints at the same thing when he brackets the common people (prākrtāh janah) and the lokayatika-s, for they thought that the soul was not different from the body.51 II Jain Sources for the Study of Pre-Cārvāka Materialist Ideas in India

Jain canonical texts and their commentaries often shed welcome light on the philosophical systems prevalent in an- cient and medieval India. For example, we come to know from the SKS that there were at least two materialist approaches in India before the seventh century CE.1 This view is corrobo- rated by some Buddhist and Brahminical sources as well. In what follows I propose to deal with some such evidence and then try to locate the points of difference between the two materialist theories mentioned by Jacobi. The SKS begins with an attack on the opponents of Jainism:

eë gamthe viukkamma, ege samanamāhaņā ayāņamtā viussittā, sattā kāmehi mānavā || [1.1.6]

Some men, Śramanas and Brähmanas, who ignore and deny

49 PC, 2.22; NC, 17. 50, 68, 72, 83; NC (trans.), 250-54. these true words [said in 1.1.2-5], adhere (to their own ten-

50 TSand TSP, Ch. 22; Śankarācārya on BS, 1.1.1, 2.2.2, 3.3.53,54; C/L, ets), and are given to pleasures.2 60-222, 234-40; Prabhäcandra in PKM, 341-49 and NKC, 110-20. All are translated in C/L, 160-239, 298-342. 31 Sankara on BS, 1.1.1: "Unlearned people, and the Lokāyatikas, are of the opinion that the mere body, endowed with the quality of intelligence See Jacobi in SBE 45, II: xiii.

is the self", C/L, 234. Buddhaghosa also writes (whatever he might have 2 I have used the text of the SKS and its commentary by Śīlānka as given in the MLBD ed. Jacobi's English translation has been cited with some meant by Lokāyata): "It is the ground of hoi polloi (bālaputhujjanālokassa minor changes, e.g. 'air' for äkāśa has been replaced by 'space', vāyu 'wind' ayatam)" in Woodward, 76. has been replaced by 'air'.

34 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Pre-Cārvāka Materialist Ideas 35

Śilanka in his commentary glosses on the word samana Instead of referring to the materialists Sīlanka glosses egesi as the Buddhists, etc. (sākyādayo) and the māhaņā as in this verse as the Vedists, Sāmkhyas and Saivas. those who follow the doctrines of Brhaspati (bārhaspatya- The verse that follows continues to speak in the same vein: matānusārinaśca brāhmanāh).3 He also mentions the fol- lowers of Samkhya, Nyaya, and Mīmāmsa and finally the duhao na vinassamti, no ya uppajjaye asam Cārvāka-s and Lokāyatika-s who do not believe in the soul savve 'vi savvahā bhāvā, niyattībhāvamāgayā || [1.1.16] that goes to the other world, but think that the soul is noth- ing more than the five elements. The Cārvaka-s, he says, do These (six substances) do not perish, neither (without nor

not believe in virtue and vice (punyapāpe). with a cause); the non-existent does not come into existence,

The next couple of verses in the SKS mention several oth- but all things are eternal by their very nature.4

er philosophical schools: The SKS then takes a fling at the Buddhists, who, as op posed to the eternalists, believe in the momentariness of eve- samti pamca mahābbhūyā ihamegesimāhiyā | rything, including the soul: pudhvī āu teu vā, vāu āgāsapamcamā || ee pamca mahabbhūyā tebbho egotti āhiyā aha tesim vināsenam, vināso hoi dehiņo || [1.1.7-8] pamca khamdhe vayamtege, vālā u khanajoino | anno ananno nevahu, heuyam ca aheuyam || [1.1.17] Some profess (the exclusive belief in) the five gross elements: Some fools say that there are five s k a n d h a s of momen- earth, water, fire, air and space. These five gross elements (are the original causes of things), from them arises another tary existence. They do not admit that (the soul) is different thing (viz., atman); for on the dissolution of the (five ele- from, not identical with (the elements).

ments) living beings cease to exist. In his interpretation of the term, ananno (Skt. ananya, Śīlānka explains the term egesi (ekeşām in Sanskrit) as identical), Sīlānka again refers to the ātma-sasthavādin-s, referring to the bhūtavadin-s (literally, elementalists) and Sāmkhya-s as well as the Carvaka-s, who consider the soul to identifies them as the followers of the doctrine of Brhaspati be a product of the elements. (bhūtavādibhir bārhaspatyamatānusāribhirākhyātāni). He takes The problem is that the elementalists mentioned in this doctrine to be identical with the Cārvāka/Lokāyata and SKS, 1.1.7 and 1.1.16 cannot be equated with the Cārvāka/ says that the Lokāyatika-s recognize these five elements as Lokāyatika-s. The reason is quite simple: the Cārvaka-s accept the basis of everything, even of the soul. only four elements, namely, earth, air, fire and water, but not This identification of the bhūtapañcakavadin-s with the the fifth, ether or space (ākāśa). An oft-quoted Cārvāka apho- Lokāyata, however, is open to question. I shall come back rism states: "Earth, water, fire and air are the (only) princi- to this issue soon. Let us now look at Silanka's commentary ples," prthivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni.5 This is why the Cārvāka-s on SKS, 1.1.15, the first line of which is almost identical with are often referred to as bhūtacatustayavādin-s. that of 1.1.7 (quoted above). The verse explains the differ- ences of these theories with regard to the number of ele ments: 4 The lines contain the seeds of materialism and atheism in particular. Lucretius (c. 99-55 BCE) takes this idea as his starting point: "Nothing can samti pamca mahabbhūyā ihamegesi āhiyā | ever be created by divine power out of nothing. The reason why all mortals are āyachattho puno āhu, āyā loge ya sāsae || so gripped by fear is that they see all sorts of things happening on the earth and in the sky with no discernible cause, and these they attribute Some say that there are five elements and that the soul is to the will of a god. Accordingly, when we have seen that nothing can be a sixth (substance), but they contend that the soul and the created out of nothing, we shall then have a clearer picture of the path world (i.e., the five elements) are eternal. ahead, the problem of how things are created and occasioned with the aid of the gods." (Book 1, 31) The proposition is said to have been advanced first by Melissus (fifth century BCE), a Greek philosopher. See Rosenthal and Yudin, 492. 3 SKSVr, 9. 3 Cārvāka Fragments, I.2. For sources etc. see Ch. 6 below.

36 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Pre-Cārvāka Materialist Ideas 37

SKS, 1.1.18 mentions them to be so: This being is but a compound of the four great primary ele- ments: after that, the earth-element (or element of extension) pudhavā au teu ya, tahā vāu ya egao returns and goes back to the body of the earth, the water- cattāri dhāuno rūvam evamāhamsu avare || element (or element of cohesion) returns and goes back to (for āvare some MSS have jānagā or jāņayā) the body of water, the fire-element (or element of thermal energy) returns and goes back to the fire, and the air-element The Janayas say that there are four elements: earth, water, (or element of motion) returns and goes back to the body of fire and air which combined form the body (or soul?).6 air, while the mental faculties pass on into space.7

Are the SKS and SKSVr all wrong then? Not quite. Here The number of elements ("great primary elements", is the first hint of a materialist theory which admitted four mahābhūta-s) is mentioned as four, but space too is admitted elements, rather than five, as the basis of its system. We hear in relation to the mental faculties, as opposed to the merely more of them in SKS, 2.1.15-17. It is necessary to quote the physical. The rest of the passage speaks of a materialist doc- whole passage: trine that denies the concepts of religious merits, need for offerings (dāna), etc .: Upwards from the soles of the feet, downwards from the tips of the hair on the head, within the skin's surface is (what [ ... ] The four pall-bearers and the bier (constituting the is called) soul, or what is the same, the Atman. The whole fifth) carry the corpse. The remains of the dead can be seen soul lives; when this (body) is dead, it does not live. It lasts as up to the cemetery, where bare bones lie greying like the long as the body lasts, it does not outlast the destruction (of colour of the pigeons. All alms-giving ends in ashes. Fools the body). With it (viz. the body) ends life. Other men carry prescribe alms-giving; and some assert that there is such a it (viz. the corpse) away to burn it. When it has been con- thing as merit in alms-giving; but their words are empty, sumed by fire, only dove-coloured bones remain, and the false and nonsensical. Both the fool and wise are annihi- four bearers return with the hearse to their village. There- lated and destroyed after death and dissolution of their bod- fore there is and exists no (soul different from the body). ies. Nothing exists after death. Those who believe that there is and exists no (such soul), speak the truth. SKS, 1.1.11-12 seem to echo Ajita's words: This murderer says: "Kill, dig, slay, burn, cook, cut or break to pieces, destroy: Life ends here; there is no world be- patteam kasine āyā, je bālā je a pamdiā yond." These (Nastikas) cannot inform you on the following points: samti piccā na te samti, natthi sattovavāiyā | natthi punne va pave va, natthi loe ito vare | whether an action is good or bad, meritorious or not, well sarīrassa vīņāseņam iņāso hoi dehiņo /| done or not well done, whether one reaches perfection or not, whether one goes to hell or not. Thus undertaking vari- Everybody, fool or sage, has an individual soul. These souls ous works they engage in various pleasures and amusements exist (as long as the body), but after death they are no more: for their own enjoyment. there are no souls which are born again There is neither virtue nor vice, there is no world beyond; on The first part is strikingly akin to what Ajita Kesakambala, the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to be. a senior contemporary of Mahävira and the Buddha, taught. The SPhS records his teachings as follows: Śilanka does not identify this doctrine with the Cārvāka/ Lokäyata. He uses a very different term for it, namely, tajjīvataccharīravāda, i.e., the body and the soul are not two 6 The word, jānayā, has been explained by the Dīpikā as jñānaka = different entities, but one.8 It is to be noted that the doc- panditammanya, one who considers himself to be a scholar (but is not). There is a variant reading: āvare for jānayā/jāņagā. Commentators take this to mean another sect of Buddhists, but the doctrine is more akin to 7 DN, I: 48, trans. Ten Suttas, 83. materialism than Buddhism. Silanka glosses on āvare, but refers also to the 8 SKSVr, 13-14. Śīlānka also refers to a passage from Br.Up. (2.4.12): reading jānagā and explains it as follows: tatrāpyayam artho 'jānakā' jñānino vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyah samutthyāya tānyevānu vinaśyati, na vayam kiletyabhimānāgnidagdhāh santa evam āhuriti samvandhanīyam (18). pretyasamjñāstī, "The pure Intellingence comes out of these elements and

38 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Pre-Cārvāka Materialist Ideas 39

trine of Ajita is called ucchedavada, 'annihilationism' in the English translation of the SKS, alludes to "two materialist Pali, Buddhist literature.9 Apparently Ajita's denial of almost theories" in SKS, 2.2.15 and 21f. respectively. He notes that everything under the sun, particularly of the concept of the both "have much in common" and compares the first with other-world and the transmigration of the soul, is responsible the views of Pūrana Kassapa and Ajita Kesakambala as found for the name given to this doctrine by the Buddhists. Sīlānka, in the SPhS. He further notices the image of the corpse be- on the other hand, picks up another aspect of the doctrine, ing carried away by four bearers for burning and the dove- namely, the denial of an immortal soul, which, he believes, coloured bones that remain. These are also mentioned in can and does exist without the mortal body. Not satisfied with mentioning two different materialist Ajita's exposition of this doctrine in the SPhS. The SPhS represents Ajita as a bhūtacatustayavādin where- thoughts, the bhūtavadin-s and the tajjīvataccharīravādin-s, as in the SKS the first school of materialists is said to be Sīlānka resorts to the doctrine of svabhava (lit. own being, bhūtapañcakavādin. Jacobi points out that ākāśa "is not reck- meaning 'inherent nature') and associates the doctrine enun- oned as a fifth element in the Buddhist literature but it is so in ciated in SKS, 1.1.11-12 with svabhāva.10 Utpalabhatta, too, preferred to identify the doctrine of svabhava with that of the that of the Jainas [ ... ]".13 He, however, summarily dismisses this discrepancy as "a verbal, rather than a material difference". Lokāyatika-s (whom Šīlānka calls bhūtavādin-s).11 By whatever The difference, I would humbly submit, is material, not name one may prefer to call them -Bārhaspatya, bhūtavādin, merely verbal. There are reasons to believe that before the Cārvāka or Lokāyatika- all the names refer to the followers seventh century CE there did exist two distinct materialist of the same materialist doctrine. In SKS, 2.2 we hear again of the materialist and three schools in India. We may cite a few instances from both Bud- dhist and Brahminical sources in support of this view. more persons who hold heretical views. "The second man" Manimekalai, the only extant Tamil Buddhist poem (writ- is a bhūtapañcakavadin, for he mentions five elements instead ten between the third and seventh centuries CE), men- of four (2.1.20). Silanka evidently does not know who this tions bhūtavāda as a philosophical system distinct from the "second man" is. He offers two alternatives: the Lokāyatika or Lokāyata. It says: the Sāmkhya. In SKS, 2.2.22 we again hear of some men who say: "There is a self besides the five elements. What is, does Passing on to the Sāmkhya and Vaisesika pandits, at last she not perish; from nothing nothing comes." Thus we have here (sc. Manimekalai) came to a Bhūta-Vādi. The Bhūta-Vādis hold a rehash of SKS, 1.2.7-8 and 16.12 that the world is formed out of the five elements alone, without The mention of more than one materialist school in the any divine intervention. We agree with the Lokäyata, the sage SKS was noted long ago. Jacobi in the introduction to his said, and believe that when the elements combine together, a material body and a spirit come into existence. That is all. We believe that perception alone is our means of knowledge and nothing else. We recognise only one birth, and we know that is destroyed with them, there is no awareness after death." The same pas- our joys and pains end on earth with this one life.14 sage has been quoted in NM, Ch. 3, I: 387-88 and in SDS, Ch.1, 4. See C/L, 157, 248. The basic philosophical position of the bhutavadin-s and 9 The Mahābodhi Jātaka (Jātaka 528), V: 228,239, 246. 10 SKSVr, 14. Silanka also quotes a verse attributed to the svabhāvavadin-s: the Lokāyatika-s indeed does not seem to differ in any ma-

kantakasya ca tīkşnatvam, mayūrasya vicitratā | varņāśca tāmracūdānām, jor respect. Echoes are heard of some well-known Cārvāka svabhavena bhavanti hi ||. "The sharpness of the thorn, the variety of the aphorisms, e.g., consciousness arises out of matter as does the peacock and the colour of the cocks are (due to) natural development.' intoxicating power of wine from non-toxic objects; it is all a For various readings of this verse and their sources see R. Bhattacharya matter of combination of a particular kind; perception is the (2002), 77-78. 11 See Svi on BrS, 1. 7. For further details see R. Bhattacharya (2002), 84. instrument of knowledge; and, there is no rebirth.15 Śīlānka defines the bhūtavādin-s as follows (on SKS, 1.1.1.11): bhūtavādino bhūtānyeva kāyākārapariņatāni dhāvanavalaganādikām kriyām kurvanti, asya tu kāyākārapariņatebhyo bhūtebhyaścaitanyākhya ātmotpadyate 'bhivyajyate vā, tebhyaścābhinna ityayam visesah (14). 13 See Jacobi (nl above), xxiv and nn1-2. 14 Adapted by Laksmi Holmstörm, Ch. 20, 170. 12 See n4 above. 15 See Ch. 6 below, aphorisms 1.3-5 and III.I.

40 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāata Pre-Cārvāka Materialist Ideas 41

That there was a school of materialist thinkers called school as "another section of the Cārvāka-s" as Guņaratna bhūtacintaka (he who thinks in terms of the elements), who does. In this respect he stands alone among the Jains. The recognized five elements instead of four, is attested, howev- fact is that the bhūtapañcakavädin-s belong to another materi- er obliquely, by the Mbh. The following verse (Santiparvan, alist school. They are not just cārvākaikadešīya-s. 267.4) may be cited as a case in point: The difference between the two schools of materialists is not confined to the difference in their views on the number yebhyah srjati bhūtāni kāle bhāvapracoditah | mahābhūtāni pañceti tānyāhur bhūtacintakāh || of elements (four of five?) admitted by them. There was an- other difference in their attitudes towards purusakāra (lit. These (elements) from which Time, moved by the desire of manliness), human endeavour vis-à-vis daiva or niyati, des- bringing forth physical forms, creates all beings, are called tiny or fate, yadrcchā (chance, accident), etc. "the five great elements" by those who think (in terms) of the The elementalists in the Mbh are shown to be accidental- elements.16 ists (non-believers in causality) and hence inactivists, since human efforts are futile: In another passage in the Mbh we read an account of cos- mogony, beginning and ending with five elements.17 The devā manusyā gandharavāh pišācāsurarākșasāh word bhūtacinta also occurs in the SSam.18 sarve svabhāvata srstā na kriyābhyo na kāraņāt ||21 Guņaratna most probably has this school of bhūtapañcakavadin-s in mind when he speaks of "some sections Elsewhere in the Mbh the word, svabhāva, is used to sug- of the Carvaka-s who consider space as the fifth element."19 The gest denial of causality, animittata.22 It is in this sense that nāstika-s in general are said to have believed in the existence svabhāva recurs in Buddhist Sanskrit literature, right from of four elements only. However, every other Jain writer, right Asvaghoșa's BC (first century CE).23 In the Nyāya tradition, from Haribhadra, Hemacandra and Prabhacandra, down to too, the pet example of the sharpness of the thorn used by Vidyānandin and Vādidevasūri mention the Lokāyatika-s as the svabhāvavādin-s is cited to suggest nirnimittatā (the ab- bhūtacatuştayavādin-s.20 But none of them refers to any other sence of any efficient cause), or even ahetu (absence of any cause, efficient or material whatsoever).24 Did the Carväka-s adhere to this view? Somadevasūri sug- 16 The same verse occurs in the vulgate edition, 274.4. The verse may gests just the opposite. A Cārväka minister in the YTC up- be related to the doctrine of time (kālavāda) which is first mentioned holds human endeavour over fate.25 in the Śv.Up., 1.2: kālah svabhāvo niyatir yadrcchā | bhūtāni yonih purusa iti In S-M's representation of the Cārvāka, too, the Lokāyatika cintyam [ ... ] ||. "Whether time, or inherent nature, or destiny, or accident, positively refuses to accept the concept of a lawless world. He or the elements, or the soul is the (first) cause is to be considered." The distinction between kālavāda and svabhāvavāda, as mentioned in several recognizes svabhäva as the cause behind all phenomena: chapters of the Mbh, Santiparvan, Moksadharmaparvādhyāya, is merely that Time is considered to be the Creator of all things instead of svabhāva. nanvadrstānistau jagad-vaicitryam ākasmikam syāditi cet na tad Both are atheistic and accidentalist (non-causationist, casualist). See Be- bhadram, svabhāvādeva tadutpatteh | dekar for further details. 17 Mbh, Āsvamedhikaparvan, crit. ed., 50.10 (vulgate 51.10). The bhūtacintaka-s are mentioned in Sānti., 224.50 (vul. 231.51) and Āśva., 21 Mbh, Āśva., 50.11 (vul. 49.11). 48.24 (vul. 49.12). 22 Mbh, Śānti., 172.10 ab (vul. 179.10). 18 Sūtrasthāna, 3.15; Sārīrasthana, 1.1. For further details see R. Bhat- 23 BC, 9.57-62; Śāntideva, BCA, 9. 117; TS, 4.110-12; Dharmakīrti, too, tacharya (2007), 275-281. 19 TRD, 300: kecittu cārvākaikadesīyā ākāśam pañcamam bhūtamabhimanyamānāh mentions this doctrine without using the word svabhava in PV, 162 cd-163 ab. Manorathanandin explains kecit as svabhāvavādinah (ibid., 64). pañcabhūtātmakam jagaditi nigadanti. 24 NS, 4.1. 22-24 and Tarkavāgīśa, IV: 183 -91. The position of the com- 20 Sometimes the position of some Jain authors is not clear. Jinabhadragaņi, speaking of tajjīva-taccharīra-vāda, merely mentions the mentators is not uniform. For details see Tarkavāgīśa, IV: 179. 25 YTC, 3.60-61, I: 382: daivam ca mānușam karma lokasyāsya phalāptișu | production of consciousness "from the collection of elements like the earth, kuto 'anyathā vicitrāņi phalāni samacestişu || apekşāpūrvikā yatra kāryasiddhih etc." (vasuhaha bhūyasamudaya sambhūya ceyaņa tti te samkā. GV, 3.102 (1650), 143), without specifying how many elements he has in mind, four or five. prajāyate | tatra daivam nrpānyatra pradhanam paurusam bhavet ||. See also Handiqui, 145-46.

42 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Pre-Cārvāka Materialist Ideas 43

But an opponent [of the Cārväka] will say, if you do not thus kalai is accepted). The proto-materialist trend presumably allow adrsta, the various phenomena of the world become withered away. It is also probable that it never developed destitute of any cause. But we (sc. the Cārvāka-s) cannot ac- cept this objection as valid, since phenomena can all be pro- into a full-fledged philosophical system with its own sūtra-

duced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.26 work, commentaries, etc. The deutro-materialist trend, on the other hand, evolved from the doctrine of bhūta men- Thus, in both the domains, cosmogony as well as attain- tioned in Sv.Up. 1.2., was preached by Ajita Kesakambala ment in human life, the Cārväka is represented as non-acci- and finally took the shape of the Cārvaka system. The earli- dentalist and activist -quite different from the elementalist est Jain reference to the doctrine of five elements is found mentioned in the Mbh in the Vasudevahimdi;31 the Mbh and the SKS, too, record the The existence of an elementalist-cum-inactivist/acciden- view of these proto-materialists.

talist school prior to the Cārvaka may also account for the identification of the Cārvāka and svabhāvavāda by quite a number of Vedāntins, Naiyäyikas and others.27 Such an identification may be traced back to the anonymous com- mentary on SK, v. 27 (available in a Chinese translation by Paramärtha) in the sixth century and more explicitly in Utpalabhatta's commentary on Br.S, 1.7.28 Other writers, such as Haribhadra and Sāntaraksita, however, treat the Cārvāka and svabhāvavāda as two independent doctrines, having no connection with each other.29 The confusion of terms, e.g., svabhäva as distinct from yadrccha (as in Sv.Up. 1.2 and as lucidly explained by Amalänanda in the thirteenth century)30 and svabhāva as a synonym for yadrccha (as in the BC etc.) is a stumbling block in the way of determining the significance of the word, svabhāva, in various contexts. Butthere we are con- cerned with the indirect evidence of the existence of two schools of materialists in India: one was the proto-materialist trend which seems to have been bhūtapañcakavādin as well as akriyavadin; the other was the deutro-materialist trend, which was both bhūtacatustayavādin and kriyāvādin. Both trends appear to have co-existed (if the evidence of Manime-

26 SDS, Ch. 1, 12-13. Trans. E.B. Cowell in C/L, 253. 27 Anandagiri on Sankara's commentary on Br.Up., 4.3.6., 554; Vidyāraņya, VPS, 201-11; Agnicit Purușottama, Rāmatīrtha and Nrsimha Āśrama on SS, 1.528; KB on NK, 1.5. 28 SKSV, 36; SVi, 9. 29 See Ch. 11 below and R. Bhattacharya (2001), 46-52. 30 Amalananda on Sankara's commentary on BS, 2.1.33: niyatinimittamanapeksa yadā kadācitpravrttyudayo yadrcchā, svabhāvastu sa 31 Vasu., 169, 275. See also Jamkhedkar, 184. The theory is called eva yāvadvastubhāvī, yathā śvāsādau, "Yadrcchā means random occurrence nāhiyavāda (natthiyavāda or nāstikavāda) (Vasu., ibid.). It is both without regard for the law of fixed causation; by contrast svabhāva is that bhūtapañcakavādin and accidentalist (jahicchā = yadrcchā). Haribhadra also which exists as long as the thing exists, for example, respiration, etc. (in calls the materialist Pingakesa a nāhiyavādin (SKa, III: 164). Pingakesa, the case of living beings)." Cf. TRD, 13-15. too, is a bhūtapañcakavādin (ibid.).

III Ajita Kesakambala: Nihilist or Materialist?

Ajita Kesakambala (Keśakambalin in Sanskrit), a senior contemporary of the Buddha, is generally recognised as an early (if not the earliest) materialist in India.1 As with the lat- er Cārvaka/Lokāyata-s, no authentic report of his teachings -not to speak of any work composed by him or his disciple- has come down to us. Whatever little we know of him is de- rived from Buddhist (Pali) and Jain (Prakrit) sources. Both the sects regarded him as a rival, so their accounts may not be accurate or without prejudice (as Goonasekere admits).2 One full statement of Ajita's views is found in the SPhS. He tells king Ajātasattu (Ajātaśatru) of Magadha:

natthi, mahārāja, dinnam, natthi yittham, natthi hutam, natthi sukaļadukkațānam kammānam phalam vipāko, natthi ayam loko, natthi paro loko [ ... ] |

Great king! There is no (consequence to) almsgiving, sacri- fice or oblation. A good or bad action produces no result. This world does not exist, nor does the other world [ ... ].3

1 See B. Barua, 289-90; H. Shastri, Lokāyata (1925) in C/L, 378; Ba- sham, 17; Frauwallner (trans.), II: 219-20; Kosambi, 104. 2 Goonasekere in Malalasekera (ed.), I: 327. 3 DN, I: 48. The translation is taken from Ten Suttas, 83. I have modified the rendering where necessary (for natthi paro loko, it has 'nor do other

46 Studies on the Carvāka/Lokāyata Ajita Kesakambala: Nihilist or Materialist? 47

Jayatilleke points out that the view expressed in the last part mūdhasya darpah sa punar moha eva of the passage does not square with the materialist position: mūdhasya nāyam ca paro 'sti lokaḥ | na hyeva duhkhāni sadā bhavanti This has always presented a problem for while it is well sukhasya vā nityaśo lābha eva || 8 known that the lokayata-materialists denied the existence of the next world, it appears strange that they should be spo- The pride of a stupid fellow is but delusion: he has neither ken of as denying the existence of this world as well, particu- this world nor the next. Nobody is ever in grief; nor can larly when they were elsewhere supposed to affirm positively pleasure be had always. the existence of this world.4 In the Gitā, the same doctrine is ascribed to a sceptic: The same view, however, is ascribed to a nastika in the Mbh Bhīşma tells Yudhișthira: ajñāś ca śraddadhānaś ca samśayātmā vinaśyati | nāyam loko 'sti na paro na sukham samsayātmanah || 9 nāyam loko 'sti na para iti vyavasito janah | nālam gantum ca viśvāsam nāstike bhayaśankini | The ignorant and unbelieving man who has a soul of doubt 5 is destroyed; neither this world nor the next exists, nor hap- piness for him who has a soul of doubt. There are men who have decided that this world does not exist, nor does the next. Such a terror-striken nāstika is not In the Katha Upanisad, however, the phrasing is different. to be trusted. Yama advises Naciketas:

Leaving aside the question why a nāstika is considered to ayam loko nāsti para iti mānī be terror-stricken,6 we may note another passage in the same punah punar vaśam āpadyate me | 10 text. Indrota warns Janamejaya: Believing, this world exists and not the other, he (= the stu- yad idam manyase rājan nāyam asti para kutah pid one deluded by wealth) is again and again subject to my pratismārayistaras tvām yamadutā yamakşaye || 7 sway.

If you think, O king, since this (world) does not exist, where Instead of the denial of both this world and the next, can be the next, the devils (lit. the messengers of Yama, the here we have a more meaningful formula:'this world exists, Indian counterpart of Hades/Pluto) will convince you (lit. there is no other' (to quote Radhakrishnan's translation).11 make you remember) in the infernal region (lit. the abode It should be remembered that Naciketas had a doubt of Yama). (vicikitsa) whether the soul existed after the death of man

In another verse in the Mbh we are told: and that is what he wished to learn from Yama.12 But the basic textual crux cannot be resolved by adopting the reading that occurs in the Katha as the right one. Where did the other version -which denies both this world and worlds', making the singular loko appear as plural, which is unwarranted). the next- come from? There is no room for emendation of T.W. Rhys Davids's translation of this passage ('there is no such thing as the passages (Pali and Sanskrit) in which it occurs. All MSS this world or the next') too is not literal enough. See Jayatilleke, 91. give the same reading without any variants. There is also 4 Jayatilleke, 95. the question of metre. We just cannot alter nāyam to ayam 5 Mbh, Santiparvan, crit. ed., 131.13 (133.14 in the vulgate edition). 6 There was every reason for a nāstika to be terror-stricken for, if detected, he could be banished with his arms bound, to the inaccessible regions, full of carnivorous beasts and elephants, and full of fear due to 8 Ibid., crit. ed., 275.12 (287.13 vulgate). snakes and thieves: vyālakuñjaradurgeșu sarpacorabhayeșu ca | hastāvāpanena 9 Gītā, 4.40. The translation is by Hopkins, 86. gacchanti nāstikāh kim atah param || said Bhīșma to Yudhișțhira, Śāntiparvan, 10 Katha Up., 1.2.6. The translation is by E. Röer, I: 64. crit. ed., 174.5 (181.5 vulgate). " Radhakrishnan (1953), 610. 7 Sāntiparvan, crit. ed., 146.18 (150.13 vulgate). 12 Katha Up., 1.1.20-21.

48 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Ajita Kesakambala: Nihilist or Materialist? 49

or ayam to nayam. And, in any case, as text-critics warn us, 5. Warder, taking the words of Ajita alone, cuts the Gord- explanation is preferable to emendation. ian knot in the following way: "There is no distinction of Let us look at the explanations offered so far. this and another world (or simply, there is no 'other world', 1. Buddhaghosa explains the Pali passage as follows: "This as heaven or a future life)".19 world is not there, if one is residing in the other world; the Instead of adopting any of these explanations (but not other world is not there, if one is residing in this world."13 rejecting any in toto), I would like to view the issue from (According to Basham, "Buddhaghosa seems to imply the a different angle. Even though in fragments, we possess a existence of a world beyond, but one which it was impossi- number of aphorisms attributed to Brhaspati, the epony- ble for mortals to enter; certainly he did not deny the exist- mous founder of the Cārvāka/Lokayata school.20 Taken to- ence of the material world.") 14 gether, they contain a more or less coherent doctrine, both 2. Hopkins refers to the Brahminical sources only but pays epistemological and ontological. Let us see if they can be no attention to the clear difference between ayam and nāyam. harnessed to the solution of this textual problem. He takes both to be the doctrine of the nāstika.15 There is no next world (or, after-life), is a well-known 3. Basham paraphrases the line thus: "there is no passing Lokäyatika position.21 The hedonistic pursuit ascribed to the from this world to the next."16 Cārvāka-s (wrongly, in our opinion) follows from this very 4. Jayatilleke, taking the SPhS and Katha in conjunction tenet. Similarly, "Religious duties are not to be performed", with Medhatithi's Commentary on Manu, 4.30, first suggests dharmo na kāryah, is another basic position held by them.22 that "there was a lokayata-materialist school which denied This too follows from the first. Combining these two, we the existence of this world as well" represented in the work may try to explain the formula containing two negatives as: of Jayarāsibhatta and asks, "Was Ajita also a pragmatic mate- No religious duties (such as sacrifices (yajña-s), alms-giving, rialist like Jayarasi?".17 Not being convinced of this dubious etc.) are to be performed either for the sake of this world identification, he writes: (since no earthly benefits can accrue from them) or for the next (such as, salvation, release from rebirth, etc. which do The more probable explanation seems to be that the Bud- not exist). Or, using the technical terms, one may say: sac- dhists identified all the known materialist views with Ajita, rifices guarantee neither abhyudaya (worldly pleasure) nor who symbolizes the philosophy of Materialism, inconsistent- ly putting the tenets together of mutually opposed schools nihśreyasa (summum bonum), as mentioned in Manu, 12.88. since they both (or all) happened to be in some sense (meta- If this explanation seems too fanciful or far-fetched, let physical or pragmatic) materialists.18 us look at Gitä, 4.40 again. It does not say that the man who has a soul of doubt declares, "This world does not exist, nor the other"; it only tells us that such a person enjoys no hap- piness either in this world or in the next. The verse is cryptic 13 Sumangalavilāsinī, ed. Mahesh Tiwary, I: 156. enough, but that is how it is to be understood.23 In Bengali, 14 Basham, 15 nl 15 Hopkins, 86. "According to epic interpretation," Hopkins points out, "one saying nästi, in refusing a gift to a priest, is a "negator" no less 19 Warder (1971), 33. than he who refuses assent to the orthodox belief. But ordinarily Nastika 20 See Ch. 6 below. is used in the latter sense and connotes a dissenter from received opinion 21 See Aphorism Nos. IV. 1-2 in Ch.6 below. in regard either to the existence of transcendental things or to the au- 22 Aphorism No. V.I. thority of hallowed tradition [such as the infallibility of the Vedas] ... Any 23 Mohini M. Chatterji translated this verse as follows: "The igno- number of these unbelievers is known who deny everything there is to rant man, the man devoid of faith, the doubt-souled, are destroyed. For deny" (ibid.). The two meanings of the word, nāstika, are significant, for the doubt-souled man there is happiness neither in this world, nor the they may account for the juxtaposition of the denial of both daksinā and next, nor in any other." 91. Cf. also Gitā, 6.40: partha naiveha nāmutra oblation along with the disbelief in the world beyond. See also Medhatithi vināśastasya vidyate | na hi kalyāņakrt kaścid durgatim tāta gacchati ||. O son on Manu, 4.30 (discussed below). of Prithã, neither here nor hereafter is there destruction for him; never, 16 Basham, 15 my son, does a worker of righteousness come to an evil end. M.M. Chatter- 7 Jayatilleke, 91. ji's trans. (115). Cf. also Ch. Up., 8.8.4: ātmānam eveha mahayannātmānam 18 Ibid. paricarannubhau lokāvavāpnotīmam cāmum ceti, "It is here that the Self is

50 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Ajita Kesakambala: Nihilist or Materialist? 51

the common proverb, ihakāl-parakāl khojāno or yāoyā (losing this passage, mostly with some alterations here and there,29 both this world (lit. time) and the next) means the same: we may safely conclude that the formula found in the Katha enjoying no benefit in this world or in the next.24 Up. (which, of course, comes earlier) is a variant of the same This interpretation is further corroborated by the way idea. But we need not reject or emend the latter formula Medhätithi explains the word haitukah (rationalists or soph- containing two negatives. Whether applied to a sceptic or ists, not just 'logicians', as Bühler renders it)25 in Manu, 4.30. to a denier of the world beyond (nāstika), it contains the Medhātithi glosses the word as nāstikāh and adds: "Those grains of the same contention in a more cryptic and some- who are firm in the knowledge that 'there is no next world, what puzzling form. no (virtue in) alms-giving (or paying sacrificial fees, daksinā The second passage quoted from the Mbh (Santi., 131.13) to the priests) and oblations', nāsti paralokah, nāsti dattam however, represents an extremely nihilist position. It certainly nāsti hutam ity evam sthitaprajnah".26 It is worth noting that goes well with the kind of the doctrine that some ultra-Sankarite Ajita too denied the efficacy of the last two items along with Vedāntins (Berkley-like solipsists called drstisrstivādin-s) and the existence of the next world.27 perhaps Jayarāsibhatta may have held. But it has no claim to Where did Medhätithi find this passage? So far the source be regarded as 'materialist'. If someone denies sense-percep- has remained unidentified. It actually occurs in the VDMP: tion as a valid means of knowledge, he can also deny the ex- istence of this world, not to speak of the next. This may very mugdhā evam pratāryante dhūrtair dhana-jihīrșayā | well be one among the many points of view, but it cannot be yāvaj jīvam sukham jīven nāsti mrtyor agocaram | called 'materialist' by any stretch of imagination. It is not on bhasmībhūtasya sāntasya punarāgamanam kutah || the basis of his views but on the strength of his references to nasti dattam hutam cestam na deva rsayo na ca | Suraguru (i.e., Brhaspati) that Jayarāsi has been branded as a The cunning ones thus cheat the deluded men, prompted Lokäyatika.30 However, nobody has denied that his approach by the desire to take away their riches. As long as life re- cannot be identified with, or even assimilated in, the doctrine mains, live happily; nothing is beyond death. From where of Cārvāka, which is uncompromisingly realist and pratyaksa- can be any return for that which has been reduced to ashes prāmānyavādin. Jayarāśi has been taken as a representative and ceased to exist? There are no such things as gifts (in of a supposedly second school of the Lokāyatika-s.31 But, by sacrifices), oblations, rites, nor gods nor sages. claiming so, his fundamental idealist (solipsist) position has been conveniently overlooked.32 A denier of pratyaksa may be King Vena is represented as a lokäyatika king here and called anything but a materialist. he is made to say this. Since this is the ultimate source of This interpretation does not contradict Jayatilleke's. The Medhätithi and a host of writers who have quoted parts of Buddhists might have lumped up many heretical (both non- Vedic and non-Buddhistic) views and foisted them on Ajita. to be adored, the Self is to be served, By doing so, one attains both the worlds, this one and the other." It is rather odd that Virocana the Asura should speak of the world beyond. This turn of the phrase, it seems, has 29 See Ch. 20 below. already become proverbial. 30 Sukhlalaji Sanghavi and Rasiklal Parikh, "Introduction", TUS, xi-xii. 24 E.g. Rabindranath Tagore, Red Oleanders, 32: "Are you bent on spoil- Franco endorses their view but brands Jayarāsi as both a Lokāyata and a ing your chances both in this world and the next, you wretched one?" Sim- sceptic. (1987), 4-8. But see K.K. Dixit's refutation of this view in ISPP, ilarly cf. the opening lines of Subhāsh Mukhopādhyaya's poem, "Lokțā IV.1 (1962), reprinted in C/L, 520-30. jānlai nā" (The man didn't even know): bđ diker buk-pakettā sāmlāte sāmlāte 31 Jayatilleke speaks of no fewer than seven materialist schools in an- Įhāyhāy | loktār ihakāl parakāl gela (Yata dūrei yāi), 15: "Alas! Pennywise, the cient India, Jayaräsi belonging to one of them. But he also admits that man forfeited (the bliss of) this world and of the world beyond" (The some of these may be hypothetical, concocted by the author of the credit for translating these highly idiomatic lines goes to my friend, Pra- Brahmajāla-sutta (DN), I: 106-07. In another place, Jayatilleke, however, bhas Kumar Sinha). declares that Jayarāsi "is not a materialist", but "shows a certain partiality 25 George Buhler, 133. for materialism [ ... ]." (82). 26 Medhatithi in Manu, II: 315. 82 Ruben (1958), K.K. Dixit (1962) and D. Chattopadhyaya (1964) have 27 SPhS, 48. tried to point out precisely this very aspect. See C/L, 505-30 and D. Chat- 28 I. 108. 18-19, 70a. topadhyaya (1964), 221-22.

52 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Ajita Kesakambala: Nihilist or Materialist? 53

It is, however, to be noted that his basic doctrine regard- Here too we have an echo of Ajita's view (specially the last ing religious duties (dharma) is faithfully reflected in the part of his exposition)39 but the statement stops at the de- passage from the VDMP excepting the natthi ayam loko part. nial of the world beyond, there is no denial of this world. Both represent the same doctrine, viz. uncompromising ma- Thus, the declaration natthi ayam loko is not to be taken terialism, not just scepticism. literally, but as a shorthand for "There is no happiness in this We may also note the views of king Pāyāsi (Paesi in Prakrit) world" as in the Gitā passage and the verse in Sāntiparvan who is held by some to be "the first materialist" in India.33 He (275.12) quoted above. is said to have declared: "Neither is there another world, nor At the same time, there is no denying the fact that there are there beings reborn not of parents, nor is there fruit or were arch-nihilists as well as all-out sceptics and agnostics result of deeds well done or ill done."34 There is no denial of in India from the days of the Rgveda.40 The LS records no this world, only of the paro loko. fewer than thirty one points of dispute (called lokāyata-s) The SKS, a Jain canonical work, also refers to many he- regarding soul, after-life, creation, etc.41 Ajita was inclined retical views, some of which are quite akin to Ajita's. One of to deny all that idealism and theism stood for. He too must them runs as follows: have meant, like the later Lokāyatika-s, atthi ayam loko, natthi

Upwards from the soles of the feet, downwards from the tips paro loko, but in the series of negations, the one affirmatory

of the hair on the head, within the skin's surface is (what is statement has become a part of universal denial.42 However, called) Soul (jiva), or what is the same, the Atman. The whole the subsequent statement attributed to Ajita, which speaks soul lives; when this (body) is dead, it (the soul) does not live. of the four great elements (mahābhūta-s)48 makes it abun- It lasts as long as the body lasts, it does not outlast the destruc- dantly clear that he believed only in their existence, not in tion (of the body). With it (viz. the body) ends life. Other men atthikavada (the doctrine that affirms the existence of the carry it (viz. the corpse) away to burn it. When it has been immutable soul). In this sense alone, he was a nātthikavādin consumed by fire, only dove-coloured bones remain, and the (though he is generally called ucchedavadin, for he believed four bearers return with the hearse to their village. Therefore in the dissolution of the soul with the death of the body).44 there is and exists no (soul different from the body).35 A nāstika does deny the efficacy of religious rituals and codes The similarity of the images -the pall-bearers and the of conduct, but not the existence of this world. Ajita, too, was dove-coloured bone -- is unmistakable. Ajita is made to em- a proto-materialist in his views, not a nihilist like Jayarāśi. ploy the same image in the SPhS.36 Here too there is no de- nial of the mortal world, only of the next. (Cf. the Lokāyata- sütra: "Since there is no dweller of the other world, the other 39 cāturmahābhūtiko ayam puriso ... bhassantā āhutiyo. dattupaññattam yadidam world does not exist," paralokino 'bhāvāt paralokābhāvah).37 dānam tesam tuccham musā vilāpo ye keci atthikavādam vadanti. vāle ca pandite ca

Earlier in the same Jain work, we are told: kāyassa bhedā ucchijjnati vinassanti, na honti param maranati. SPhS, 48. 40 See D.R. Shastri (1982), 82-93; Hemanta Gangopadhyaya, 69-86. 1 LS, 176-79. D.T. Suzuki in his translation of this passage (152-55) [Some fools say]: Everybody, fool or sage, has an individual "consistently mistranslated the term [lokāyata] as 'materialism' though it soul. These souls exist (as long as the body), but after death is obvious from the context that it could not mean this." Jayatilleke, 52 they are no more; there are no souls which are born again. 42 Cf. sarvatra paryanuyogaparāny eva sūtrāni brhaspateh, "The aphorisms There is neither virtue nor vice, there is no world beyond; of Brhaspati are everywhere prone to refuting only." TBV, 69. The author on the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to be.38 says that the Carvāka-s themselves declared so (cārvākair abhihitam), but it is more probable that this comes from the opponents of the Cārvāka, complaining against the long series of denials -of God, after-life, the authenticity of the Vedas, the efficacy of religious rites, of rebirth, heaven 33 Frauwallner (trans.), II: 216. and hell, etc. Anantavīrya calls this so-called aphorism a sūktam in SVT, 34 Pāyāsirājaññasuttam (DN), II: 236. 277. 23. See Ch.7 below. 5 SKS, 2.1.15. The translation is by Hermann Jacobi in SBE 45, II: 339-40. 43 See n39 above. 36 āsandipaññamā purisā matam ādāya gacchanti. yāvālahanā padāni 44 In the Mahābodhi Jātaka (Jātaka 528) king Brahmadatta of Kāsī paññayanti, kāpotakāni atthīni bhavanti. SPhS, 48. 37 See Ch. 6 below, Aphorism No. IV.2. (Kāsirațțha) is said to have five heretical councillors, one of whom is 38 SKS, 1.1.11-12: Jacobi, SBE 45, II: 237. called an ucchedavadin, who ultimately turns out to be a later incarnation of Ajita Kesakambala! The Jātaka. V: 228, 239, 246.

IV Perception and Inference in the Cārvāka Philosophy

Materialism, it has been said, is as old as philosophy.1 India too had her share of heretics, sceptics and proto-materialists right from the Vedic times.2 We read of them in the Upanisads and the epics. "Any number of these unbelievers is known, who deny everything there is to deny," said Hopkins.3 "Materi- alists and other heretics without special designation appear to fill the whole land." As the culmination to all these develop- ments we have the Cārvāka/Lokāyata system of philosophy. How and from when did materialism face a challenge? Ac- cording to Frauwallner,

Its situation becomes more difficult at the end of the classi- cal period of Indian philosophy, when logical and epistemo- logical questions moved to the forefront of interest and when every system was compelled to take them into consideration, on which their systems were founded. The adherents of the Lokayata also could not escape this demand.4 Originally they made light of the fact. In the sutras of Brhaspati it is said: "The

1 Both Radhakrishnan and Frauwallner have quoted this saying. See Rad- hakrishnan (1980) I: 277; Frauwallner, II: 296 (trans .: II: 216) respectively. 2 For a selection of such specimens, see Radhakrishnan-Moore (ed.), 34-36. 3 Hopkins, 86. The next sentence is quoted from ibid., 86-87

(1991), 154. 4 Franco takes the appearance of Dharmakirti to be the turning point.

56 Studies on the Carvāka/Lokāyata Perception and Inference 57

only means of right knowledge is sense perception," "The in- Aviddhakarņa, Bhāvivikta, and Udbhața in mind.8 Whatever ference is not the means of right knowledge." 5 One, there- little we know of them (and that is meagre indeed) from the fore, appealed only to sense-experience and simply dismissed works of Karņakagomin, Kamalasīla, Cakradhara, Anantavīrya, the further assertions of the opponent. One could do it so Vādidevasūri and Vādirājasūri is adequate to make us concur long as inferences which were arrived at by the antagonistic schools were simple inferences by analogy. It was enough to with Frauwallner's opinion that the philosophical literature show the fault of every conclusion, in order to decline every of the materialists did become richer in their hands. It is, inference as unreliable. Things, however, were different, as however, difficult to agree with his assertions that the later the opponent developed the firmly grounded scientific doc- Cārvāka-s deserted the original position vis-à-vis the inadmis- trines forming conclusions. One had to discuss these, nay, one sibility of inference as a means of right knowledge and that was compelled to establish one's own doctrine differently as they took up 'foreign thoughts'. In what follows I propose to from what one had done hitherto and to defend it.6 examine the issue in some detail. This is, of course, all conjecture, but this is how Frauwall- What induced Frauwallner to believe that the later Cārvāka-s had deserted the original position of their school? ner wished to reconstruct the course of development of the He must have had in his mind the following sentence written Cārvāka. by Purandara: "The Cārväka-s, too, admit of such an infer- As to the materialists, he said: ence as is well-known in the world, but that which is called Partly one tried to hold fast to the old line, as, for instance, inference [by some], transgressing the worldly way, is prohib- when one explained: "The aphorisms of Brhaspati have only ited [by them]."9 Franco says, "This is probably the most sig- this aim, viz. to refute the opponent".7 But in the majority of nificant contribution of Purandara to the Lokäyata school (at the cases one decided to discuss the doctrine of inference least it is the one for which he is remembered) [ ... ]".10 and to take it over at least in parts. Thus it is assumed that Purandara, by admitting at least one kind of inference, viz., "inference as is well-known in the world," Thus, according to Frauwallner, the later Cārvāka-s devi- deviated from the original, uncompromising position of the ated from their 'orthodoxy' regarding the inadmissibility of Cārvāka-s who allegedly refused to admit any other means of inference, etc. as a means of right knowledge. Paradoxically, right knowledge except sense-perception. This is how their po- however, sition has been represented in almost all philosophical digests This desertion of the original attitude led, in no way, to the and the works of its opponents in which the Cārvāka appears consequence of the decline of the system. The taking up of as the pūrvapaksin, one whose view is to be refuted. However, foreign thoughts and occupation with them led, on the con- I would like to submit that, first, Purandara, instead of being trary, to a regular activity and to a blossoming up of a litera- a 'revisionist', was only expatiating on the original Cārvāka ture richer than hitherto. view regarding the means of right knowledge, and, second, the Cārvaka-s after Purandara, too, held the same view, viz., Frauwallner did not elaborate on the blossoming of the barring one kind of inference mentioned above (i.e. laukika, later period but it may be presumed that he had Purandara, belonging to this world, and hence verifiable by the senses), no other kind of inference is valid, and sense-perception alone 5 Bedekar in his translation (225) omits the first aphorism (or it may be is the means of right knowledge, nothing else. a printing mistake). See the German text, S. 302. Aviddhakarna (to be distinguished from his namesake 6 Frauwallner, S. 307-08 (German text) and 225 (translation amended). who was a Naiyāyika, a Nyaya philosopher)11 holds the same The extracts that follow are from the same source. Franco-Preisendanz have followed Frauwallner in REP, VI: 180. In an earlier article (1991) Franco conjectured that the devastating arguments put forward by Dharmakīrti 8 For the few known Cārvāka philosophers from Kambalāśvatara to against the Carvaka "had to be urgently answered, or the Cārvaka would Udbhațabhatța, see Ch. 6, Bhā. 1-30. have been kicked out of the philosophical scene" (159). 9 Qtd. in TSP on TS, vv. 1481-82, 528. 7 Though this sentence has generally been accepted as an authentic 10 Franco (1991), 159. See also Franco and Preisendanz (1998) where Cärvaka aphorism, I have attempted to show that it really represents the Purandara is treated as a revisionist, a view which I do not share. view of the Carvaka's opponents. See Ch. 7 below. 11 See NCC, I: 426-27.

58 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Perception and Inference 59

view. Inference, he says, might be accepted from the em- It is also interesting to observe that Udayanācārya, intend- pirical point of view but adds: since the definition of probans ing to prove that every person worships God in one form (linga) is not possible, inference per se cannot be a means of or the other, says that the Cārvaka-s worship him as "what right knowledge.12 is proved by everyday practice".18 S-M also writes, "The only Thus the limited validity of inference is not doubted; what supreme being is the king, well established in the world".19 is denied is the claim that any kind of inference is as accept- Being materialists, the Cārvāka-s could not but accept "the able as sense-perception. Aviddhakarna further points out worldly way", i.e., what was open to all for verification. Ex- that any means of right knowledge consists in cognizing an cepting the extreme idealists (the Sankaraite Vedāntins, for object which has not been cognized before; hence, infer- example, who came in the wake of the nihilist Buddhists and ence cannot be regarded as a means of right knowledge, the other Buddhist school called Madhyamaka), all systems lacking as it is in this respect.18 of philosophy in India accept the validity of the worldly way.20 Aviddhakarna thus admits the validity of inference "as is That is why Jayaräsibhatta, the denier of all means of knowl- well known in the world", and, at the same time, denies the va- edge (and therefore of knowledge itself), says, lidity of inference as such by pointing out its disqualification. That the Carvaka-s always admitted what Purandara and And even those who know the supreme reality say: Aviddhakarna spelt out in so many words is also borne out by "The worldly path should be followed .. the anonymous author of a philosophical digest, SMS: similar."21 In respect to everyday practice the fool and the wise are

This rice, because of its riceness, satisfies hunger as it did yesterday -such an inference as this is included there (sc. in Hence it is idle to believe that the earlier Cärvaka-s did not the Lokāyata-sāstra) due to its being rooted in perception. have any faith even in the truth inferred and inferable from The fruits of worldly goods and summum bonum, the matter of daily life and experience.22 religion and brahman as well as the Veda, are devoted to the pretersensual, hence these are not (to be admitted as) means of light knowledge -this is the conclusion.14 kārikā 1.2) 18 lokavyavahāra-siddha iti cārvākāh, NK, 5 (the prose portion following While explaining the word, hi (indeed) in a verse repre- 19 lokasiddho rāja parameśvaraḥ, SDS, 6. senting the Carvaka view,15 Gunaratna, too, said: 20 Sankarācārya himself is said to have admitted that even a hundred Vedas cannot be authoritative against the evidence of sense-perception, The word 'indeed' (hi) has been used here to indicate a spe- na śrutiśatam api śīto 'gniraprakāso veti bruvan prāmānyam upaiti (quoted by ciality. The speciality, again, is that the Cārvakas admit the P.K. Gode (1939), 95. validity of inferences which tend to facilitate the daily activi- 21 Franco (1994), 69 and 279 n4. He offers an alternative translation of ties of ordinary people; such as the inference of fire from paramarthavid-s (299 n3), "those who know the supreme or ultimate aim in smoke, etc., but they never admit the validity of extraordi- life" (taking the word, artha to mean aim or purpose, as in purusärtha). The nary inferences which seek to establish the heaven, merit context, however, does not seem to warrant such an interpretation. On the and demerit, etc.16 other hand, the two conjunctions, ca and api, indicate that Jayarasi had the transcendentalists in mind who were more interested in paraloka than ihaloka. This, we should not fail to note, is spoken of the Cārvāka-s Nor do I think that Franco's interpretation of the view of the Lokāyatika-s is in general, not of a particular sect (cārvākaikadeśīya-s) whom correct. He thinks that the Lokāyatika-s "rejected dharma and moksa, and maintained that kama and artha are the only aims in life" (299 n3), quoting Gunaratna refers to elsewhere in the same work.17 SDS in support (arthakāmau purușārthau). There is every reason to doubt if the Lokäyatika-s at all used to think in terms of the so-called four aims in life. Second, in some other sources (equally antagonistic to the Lokāyata), 12 Qtd. in PVSVT, 19. they are said to have only aim; viz., kāma, pleasure (see ABS, 99; Nīlakaņtha 13 Qtd. in ibid., 25. on Gitā, 16.11). Apparently nobody knew what the Carvaka-s really thought 14 SMS, 15. in this regard. It was simply in order to stigmatize them that their opponents 15 SDSam, v. 83, 306. called them ekavargavādin-s; some others, dvivargavādin-s. 16 TRD on SDSam, v. 83, 306. Trans. C/L, 273. 22 One verse attributed to the Vedäntins (the Sankaraites in particular) 17 TRD, 300; C/L, 266. runs as follows: dehātmapratyayo yadvat pramāņatvena kalpitah | laukikam

60 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Perception and Inference 61

What then about the aphorisms that have been attributed Inference and others (i.e. all non-primary/secondary means to the Carvka-s, quoted presumably from the now lost sūtra- of knowledge such as analogy, verbal testimony, negation work or its commentaries? It is to be noted that the reading (abhäva), etc. -all the seven else mentioned in NS, 2.2.1) are of the aphorisms differs from text to text, and there is every not the means of right knowledge. possibility that most of the quotations are not verbatim. Thus The four sütra-s (or three, if we treat (c) and (d) to- I have the unenviable task of ascertaining the reading of the gether as one, as they are sometimes found quoted (e.g., relevant aphorisms and then interpreting them.23 "Since inference is secondary/non-primary, ascertaining Although we do not possess the original sütra-work of the the object through inference is rarely possible") may very Cärväka-s, we may try to form an idea of their original episte- well have formed a prakarana (sequence) in the original mological position from the following aphorisms found quot- sūtra-work. In his commentary on the concluding apho- ed in the works of their opponents. They are as follows: rism, Udbhatabhatta defends the original position of the a) "Sense-perception indeed is the means of right knowl- Cārvāka-s. The passage runs as follows: edge," because b) "The means of right knowledge is non-secondary/pri- In the grasping of the invariable relation of the hetu (probans) mary," and with its sadhya (probandum), three modes are recognised; c) "Inference is secondary/non-primary," therefore (i) by two unqualified perceptions, (ii) by perception along d) "Inference is not the means of right knowledge." with a qualified non-perception, and (iii) by the process of If we take the reading adopted by Silanka,24 we may re- repeated perception as found in worldly behaviour (bhūyo- write (d) as: darśanapravrttyā ca lokavyavahārapatitayā). This sūtra is aimed at those who recognise the hetu as gamaka (capable of yield- ing knowledge) according to the first mode of grasping. Fail- ure of concomitance (vyabhicara) is not seen even in the case tadvad evedam pramāņam tvātmaniścayāt. || "As the faith in the (identity of of hetus popularly known as such (lokaprasiddhahetus) (e.g. the) body and the soul is assumed to be the truth, similarly the mundane smoke, etc.); so also it is not noticed in the case of hetus adopt- things are to be admitted only so long as (the true nature of) the soul is ed in the special tantras or sāstras (tantrasiddha hetu-Sāstric not known" (qtd. by Bhūtanatha Saptatīrtha, I:[8]): hetus); so on the basis of the quality characterised by 'non- 29 Let us note a few variants of the three basic aphorisms referred to in perception of failure of concomitance' being common to the various works (the list is not exhaustive): them, the tantrasiddha hetus are established as being gamaka; 1. pratyaksam ekam pramānam (SVR, 265) it is because of this that anumana is gauna. Now, the knowl- 2. pratyaksam ekam ghatate pramāņam (SVR, 261) edge of non-failure of concomitance (avyabhicārāvagama) in 3. pratyakşam ekam (prāmāņam) nāparam (SVR, 277) respect of laukika (popular) hetus (like smoke, etc.) is instru- 4. pratyaksam ekam eva hi pramānam agaunatvāt pramāņasya (PKM, 177). mental in bringing about the knowledge of the probandum; 5. pratyakşam evaikam pramānam (VPS, 211; AYVD, v. 32, 130) but that is not there in the case of the tantra-siddha hetus 5A. (Jinabhadra quotes it as 'indriyapratyaksam evaikam pramanam' (sastric hetus), so it is not proper that non-perceptible things (VĀBh/SVr, II: 439) should be known with the help of these. Hence it is said 6. pratyaksam eva pramānam (PC, Act II, 40) that the ascertainment of things is difficult to attain on the 7. pratyakam eva pramāņam agauņatvāt (PKM, 178) 8. pratyakşam pramānam nānumānam (TSP, 945) strength of anumāna.25 b. 1. anumānam apramāņam (STP/TBV, 70) 2. anumānam na pramānam (NM, Ch. 7, II: 201) Vädidevasūri admits that the purpose of denying the va- 3. na khalu apratyakşam pramāņam asti (Bhām, 851) lidity of inference was not to deny inference as such, but 4. nānumānam pramāņam (TSP, 520; TK on kārikā 5, 32). only such inferences as the sāstric ones that purported to 5. nānumānādikam pramāņam gauņatvāt (SKSVr, 10, 12) (see also a. 8) establish heaven, etc. Udbhata was in favour of worldly prac- c. 1. nānumānam tāvat pramānam gaunatvāt (SVR, 261, 265) 2. pramāņasya gauņatvād anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhah (NM, Ch. 2, tice, and kept such well-established inference as fire from I: 183; Vyo, II: 161). smoke, etc. in view.26 Thus Udbhata was only adding some 3. pramānasyāgaunatvād anumānārathadurlabhah (NBh, 210) 4. pramānasyāgauņatvād anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhah (NM, Ch. 2, I: 177; STP/TBV, 70, 72, 354; PVSVT, 25; PKM, 180). 25 Trans. Solomon (1977-78), 986-87. For the text, see SVR, 256-66. 24 See n23 b 5. 26 Jayantabhatta, while elucidating the views of "the better learned

62 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Perception and Inference 63

new logical arguments against the extramundane use of home, viz., an inference based not on actual perception but inference to prove the existence of imperceptible objects, such as heaven and hell, etc. He was not against inference on an unverified major premise may very well be fallacious.29

as applied in everyday life, very much in the same spirit as Thus the later Cärvaka-s, in spite of other differences in

Purandara had explained. Similarly, Ubdhata is at one with their interpretation of some aphorisms,30 stuck to their origi-

Aviddhakarna in repudiating the claim of inference to be nal position regarding the primacy of perception and non- primacy of all other alleged means of right knowledge. If a as primary as perception (as most of the other schools of Paurandara aphorism denied the validity of inference (as philosophy claimed). There is thus no departure from the original position as Frauwallner believed. The distinction SVR says), it was Purandara himself who admitted the validity of inference in mundane matters. There is no contradiction made between the lokaprasiddha and tantrasiddha hetu-s is fundamental to the Cārvaka logic. between the two positions. Whenever the Cārvāka aphorisms

It will be rewarding to study the aphorism, "Inference speak of 'perception', "inference preceded by perception"

is not the means of right knowledge" in the context it oc- inheres in it, and 'inference' stands for "such inference as transgresses the worldly way in order to prove the existence curs. Here, too, we have to resort to conjecture since the or- der in which the aphorisms were originally arranged is not of the imperishable soul, its transmigration after the death of

known to us. However, a look at the STP and TBV suggests a person, God, heaven and hell, the omniscient being, etc."31

that the aphorism came in the wake of the following one, In this respect there is perfect continuity between the sūtra-

viz. "There is no other-world, because of the absence of any work and its commentaries.

other-worldly being."27 The major opponents of the Cārvaka -the Naiyayikas, Buddhists and Jains- in spite of their dif- ference of opinion among themselves, were all unanimous at one point: the existence of the other-world was an article of faith with them. The existence of God or gods might be denied, not that of the other-world. This was their trump- card. As Jayantabhatța said, "Once the other-world is estab- lished their (sc. the Cārvakas') objections are automatically refuted."28 The crux lies in the fact that the other-world cannot be visited by a man so long as he is alive; its existence has to be proved either by inference or by verbal testimony. In order to prove the existence of the other-world, the validity of in- ference and/or verbal testimony has to be established first. Hence the demand for the acceptance of inference, verbal testimony, and/or analogy (upamāna), etc. as valid means of 29 This is one of the earliest stories in support of the primacy and indis- right knowledge, on a par with sense-perception. pensability of perception. It is found in a number of Buddhist, Brahminical This is where the Carvaka-s put their foot down. They de- and Jain sources. See Ch. 15 below. nied the validity of any kind of inference whatsoever unless 30 Both Kamalasīla and Prabhācandra mention two different adhyāhāra-s and until it was preceded first by perception. The famous par- proposed by the commentators in connection with the aphorism, "From

able of the wolf's footprints was meant to drive this lesson that, consciousness," tebhyas caitanyam. See TSP, 633-34; PKM, 116-17 and NKC, 342. Udbhata interpreted the same sūtra in yet another manner (GrBh, II: 257) $1 "However, inferences that seek to prove a self, God, an omniscient be-

ones" also refers to the instance of smoke and fire (NM. Ch. 2, I: 184) as ing, the after-world, and so on, are not considered valid by those who know the real nature of things." (NM, Ch. 2, I: 184, C/L, 140). does SMS, 15 27 See Ch.6, IV. 2 below. Apparently the Cärvaka-s had to contend against both the Brahminical

28 NM, Ch. 2, I: 275; C/L, 156. āstika and the Buddhist-Jain nāstika schools, hence the reference to 'an omniscient being'.

V Commentators of the Carvakasūtra

In the history of classical Indian philosophy the Cārvāka school is the lone representative of the materialist system. Materialism in India, as we have shown before, had an ear- lier tradition. But the question is: Does the Cārvāka system represent a continuation of the materialism of the pre Christian era? In other words, is it just a change of name from Bärhaspatya (the doctrine of Brhaspati, the epony- mous founder of materialism in India)? At the present state of our knowledge, no definite answer is possible. However, one thing can be said: the philosophical system known at present as the Cārvaka, attained its final form before the eighth century CE and some continuity in its tradition can be observed at least upto the twelfth century. It can be safely asserted that there were a collection of Cārvaka aphorisms and more than one commentary on it. None of these works has been found to date. But a few extracts from the com- mentaries are scattered in various works and a few verses containing the basic doctrines of the Cārvāka have been quoted in other works. The names of five commentators of the Cārvākasūtra are known. All of them seem to have flourished before the eighth century or thereabouts. In what follows we propose to give an account of their works. The names are arranged alphabetically, not chronologically.

Commentators of the Cārvākasūtra 66 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata 67

1. Aviddhakarna. He wrote a commentary on the So there is little possibility of Kambalāśvatara to be identical Paurandarasūtra (which may be a namesake of the with them. Similarly another Kambalāsvatara is mentioned Cārvākasūtra or a new arrangement of the Cārvāka apho- along with such legendary sages as Tumburu, Vāyu, Nārada risms). Vādirājasūri distinctly refers to him as "a Cārvāka".1 and others.11 Prajñāraksita, a Buddhist philosopher, is called Karnakagomin too mentions his name.2 In the TSP two a follower of Kambalämbara.12 Cordier also refers to one Aviddhakarņas are mentioned: one, a Naiyāyika, and the Kambalakambalämbara.18 There is nothing common to all other, a follower of Carvaka. The name of the commentary those names excepting the word, kambala. B. Bhattacharya's by the second one is Tattvatika.3 In Anantavirya's work, the ambivalance -first identifying Kambalāśvatara with a musi- extracts from Aviddhakarna are most probably taken from cologist and then with Ajita Keśakambali- is prompted by a this commentary. Mahendra Kumar Nyayacarya assumes this strange argument: "It is not at all strange that a member of a Aviddhakarna to be the author of the Paurandarasutra itself. materialist sect should devote himself to music; disbelieving This is not acceptable, for Vâdirājasūri refers to Aviddhakarņa in transmigration of Soul or in a future life the cultivation of and Purandara separately and quotes from their works.5 pleasure in this life would seem logical and entirely proper."14 2. Bhāvivikta. Cakradhara mentions him as a "traditional As Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya has rightly pointed out, all the Cārvāka master" (cirantana cārvākācārya), i.e., one who be- acārya-s of musicology could then be dubbed as materialists.15 longed to the old Cārväka school (as opposed to the new 4. Purandara. His name is first found in the TSP.16 one represented by Udbhatabhatta).6 Bhavivikta may have Vādidevasūri quotes a 'paurandaram sūtram'that is cited in the written a commentary on the Cārvākasūtra. It also may be as- name of Cārvāka in the PKM. The same sūtra (with minor vari- sumed that he is one of the commentators whom Kamalaśīla ations) is found in three other works.17 Another Paurandara and Prabhācandra had in mind. A Naiyäyika bearing the aphorism has been quoted in the SVT.18 same name (Bhävivikta) is also encountered.7 Like the first While speaking of the Cārvāka system, Puspadanta men- Aviddhakarņa no work of this Bhavivikta has survived, Not a tions a 'paurandariya vitti' (paurandarīya urtti).19 It would ap- single line or even a phrase from his commentary has been pear that a philosopher called Purandara compiled the aph- quoted anywhere. orisms of the Carvaka and himself wrote a commentary on 3. Kambalāśvatara. His name occurs in the TS and TSP. them. Kamalasīla cites a sentence most probably from this Only a part of a sentence from his commentary is quoted: commentary. Vādirājasūri also mentions Purandara.20 "From the body (comes consciousness)."8 This extract seems It is not possible to say whether Purandara compiled the to have been taken from a passage explicating the Cārvāka aphorisms already known, or also added some of his own. But view on the primacy of the body over consciousness. Wild one point is clear: he tried to refute the common misconcep conjectures have been made about Kambalāśvatara's iden- tions around the number of pramāna-s. He did not deny the tity. He has been equated with a veteran preceptor of musi- validity of inference as such. cology as well as with Ajita Kesakambala, senior contempo- 5. Udbhațabhatta (or Bhatțodbhața). His name is rary of the Buddha.9 Kambala and Asvatara are said to have found more than once in the works of Cakradhara and composed Sangītaratnākara and similar works on music.10

as his source. 11 B. Bhattacharya, xxviii, referring to Bhuvanānanda Kavikaņțhāvaraņa

NVV, II: 101. 12 NCC, I: 169. 2 PVSVT, 19, 25. 13 Ibid. See NCC, I: 426-27. 14 B. Bhattacharya, xxxviii. 4 See Intro. to SVT, 77. 15 Chattopadhyaya (1969), 176 n258. 5 NVV, 101 16 TSP, 528, on TS, vv. 1481-82. 6 GrBh on NM, Ch. 7, II: 257. 17 SVR, 256; NM, NBh and PKM. See Franco (1991), 161 nl. See also Ch. 8 7 See Franco (1997), 99, 142. below. 8 TS, I: 225, v. 1863 18 SVT, 306. 9 B. Bhattacharya, Foreword to TS (1926), xxxviii-xxxix. 19 Mahāp, I: 328. 10 NCC, I: 169. 20 NVV, II: 101.

68 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

Vādidevasūri.21 His commentary was entitled Tattvavrtti.22 He was a very atypical commentator of the Cārvāka apho- risms; it may not be wrong to call him a 'revisionist'. There were already two distinct interpretations of the aphorism, tebhyaścaitanyam, "consciousness out of these". Some be- lieved that the missing verb should be 'arises', some others, 'is manifested'.23 Udbhata, however, says that "conscious- ness is for (the sake of) the elements; consciousness is in- dependent and aids the physical elements which constitute the body."24 Udbhata also gives a novel explanation of the aphorism attributed to Purandara. According to Cakrad- hara, by 'the cunning Carvaka' as well as 'the well-versed Cārvāka' Jayantabhațța means Udbhata.25 VI Vadidevasūri, on the other hand, refers to Udbhata rever- Cārvāka Fragments: A New Collection entially as "this respectable veteran twice-born".26 Both Aviddhakarna and Udbhatabhatta appear to blend the finesse of the Nyaya system with materialism. The avail- able fragments show a typically scholastic way of refating the opponents' views and profusion of technical terms. Udbhata the philosopher has been identified with the rhetorician who was also the minister of Kashmir during Jayapīda's reign (779-813 CE). Two other Udbhata-s are Introduction known to have existed.27 The upshot of this survey is that, like all other philosophi- cal systems in India, the Crvāka too had its own develop- A collection of all available Cārvaka fragments has been a desideratum since Henry Thomas Colebrooke first wrote on ment. The commentators were not always unanimous in their views but continued their polemic against the Buddhist, Jain the materialist tradition in India in 1827.1 For a pretty long time scholars relied almost exclusively on S-M's exposition and Naiyäyikas. It is a mystery why, along with the sūtra text, all in the SDS, Chapter 1.2 Slow but steady discovery of many a the commentaries too are lost and nothing except a few stray fragments survive. Frauwallner notices that in the writings of Cärvāka fragment, specially in the Buddhist and Jain works and other compendia of philosophical systems, made it clear the later commentators, the Cārvaka system became more enriched than before.28 It is a matter of regret that modern that there was more than meets the eye. Formerly only two

students and scholars of Indian philosophy do not seem to be legendary names were associated with the materialist system:

well-informed about the Cārvaka commentary tradition. Brhaspati and Cārvāka. Sāntarakșita's TS and Kamalasīla's TSP provide three historical names of Cārvāka authors: Aviddhakarņa, Kambalāśvatara and Purandara. Cakradhara mentions two more: Bhatta Udbhata and Bhāvivikta.3 Sev- eral aphorisms and extracts from the works of these com- 21 GrBh on NM, Ch. 1, I: 52-100; Ch. 7, II: 257, 263; SVR, 265, 269-70, 764-65, 1087. 22 SVR, 265. 23 TSP, I: 633-34 on TS, vv. 1857-58; NKC, 352. I H.T. Colebrooke (1837), 402-405. The essay was first read at a public 24 GrBh, II: 257-58 on NM, Ch. 7. 25 GrBh, I: 52-100. meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society on 3 February 1827. 2 The editio princeps of the SDS was first published by Ishwarachandra 26 SVR, 764. Vidyasagara in BI, 1853 (first fascicule) and completed in 1858. 27 NCC, II: 341 3 TSP on TS, v. 1484; TS, v. 1863; TSP on TS, v. 1481; GrBh/NM, Ch. 1, I: 28 Frauwallner (trans.), II: 225. 100; Ch. 7, 257; SVR, 265, 270, etc. also mention Udbhața.

70 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Cārvāka Fragments 71

mentators were welcome additions to the meagre number It is known that Frauwallner also collected the Cārvaka of Cārvāka fragments known before the 1920s. fragments for his own use but, to the best of my knowledge, D.R. Shastri (1894-1961) first attempted to compile the they have never been published.11 Cārvaka fragments in his English-Sanskrit work, Chārvāka In spite of the pioneering works of D.R. Shastri and Shashti (1928).4 Not satisfied with those attributed to Namai, there is still scope for yet another attempt to (a) Brhaspati or the Cārvaka-s in general, he sought to find ma- reconstruct the lost Cārvākasūtra and (b) compile the ex- terialist traits in other systems of philosophy. Thus he com- tracts from its commentaries, followed by (c) some verses piled one hundred aphorisms from various sources, some (called ābhāņaka-s and lokagāthā-s in the SDS) attributed to of which, however, are not of Cārvaka origin (he quoted the Cārvaka-s, and (d) other miscellaneous fragments most- from the Mīmāmsā-, Nyāya- and Sāmkhya-sūtra-s as well).5 He ly found in non-philosophical works. In what follows I pro- also reproduced sixty verses (hence the title of the work, pose to offer such a collection of the first three. Most of the Cārvāka-șasti). They are taken from the NC by Śrīharșa fragments already printed by D.R. Shastri and Namai will be (verses 1-47), SDS by Mādhavācārya (48-55, 57-59), VMT by found here, but unlike D.R. Shastri, all fragments will not Cirañjīva Bhațțācārya (56) and ȘDSam by Haribhadra (60). be treated as sūtra-s (aphorisms). I am unable to admit some He then published another collection of fifty fragments en- fragments considered genuine by D.R. Shastri and Namai titled "Cārvvāka-pañcāsikā" (in Bengali) in 1944.6 Later, in as emanating from authentic Carvaka sources.12 Therefore an appendix to his Bengali book, Cārvāka Darśana (1959) it will be necessary to explain why I have found it advisable he selected fifty-four aphorisms and verses out of all these to omit some fragments that were admitted by them. At the and printed them under the title, "Barhaspatyasūtram".7 He same time, I propose to add a few more aphorisms, verses was of the opinion that many more such sayings could be and other fragments. The justification for both exclusion collected and an authoritative work on the Bārhaspatya sys- and inclusion of some fragments is duly furnished. tem might be had if pains were taken to do so.8 „ The fundamental problem of collecting Cārväka frag- Sarvananda Pathak reproduced these fifty-four aphorisms ments is to separate the wheat from the chaff. Although very and verses verbatim (with Hindi translation) in his work on few fragments are available, each one has to be critically the Carvaka philosophy in 1965.9 tested before it may be accepted. Ancient authors, whether Namai has compiled and analysed the Bärhaspatya apho- in India or in Greece, were not very particular about quoting risms and verses in a long article (in English and Japanese) verbatim. The practice of modern editors of putting some in 1976.10 Of the fifty-four aphorisms and verses reproduced phrases and sentences within inverted commas or printing in Pathak's work he omitted nineteen and added nine new them in bold or italic types often facilitates locating the quo- ones from different sources, including Tibetan. There are tations. But sometimes, I feel, such quotation marks or spe- thus forty-five aphorisms and verses arranged under six cial types are unwarranted.13 heads (A-F) with the sources given in more detail. 11 Namai (1989, 1991), 229 n52 and Halbfass, ibid. 4 D.R. Shastri (1928), Sanskrit Section, 1-53. An unauthorized reprint 12 The basic reason is that such fragments are found only once in has been published by one Gagan Deo Giri, Ph.D., Ranchi University much later works or have been copied from the same source without any (Patna, Ranchi, Varanasi: Jyoti, 1980) with Hindi translation of certain evidence to support their authenticity. See e.g., Shastri (1959, 1982) Nos. parts. 9-14 = Namai (1976) A16-21 (taken from the KS) and Shastri, Nos. 26-34 3 Ibid., Appendix A, 1-8. Acarya Ananda Jha and Kewal Krishan Mittal (all taken from the PC) but not admitted by Namai. The question will be similarly utilized all orthodox and heterodox philosophical texts in their discussed below in more details. studies of materialism in India, as did Riepe in his work on naturalism. 13 A good example has been provided by L.V. Joshi: "[ ... ] Bhāsarvajña 6 See D.R. Shastri (1944). explains the application of anekanta following almost verbatim the 7 Shastri (1959), 173-176. text of Akalanka's Tattvārthavārtika. The editor, Svami Yogindrananda 8 Ibid. (1982), 203. seems to believe that Bhäsarvajña has verbatim quoted the passage from 9Pathak (1990), 136-146. Tattvārthavārtika and hence he puts the passage into inverted commas 10 Namai (1976), 29-44. Halbfass, 330 n13 refers to another article by which (marks) are not found in the Photostat of Nyāyabhūsaņa. As a matter Namai (published in 1981) which is not available to me. of fact, Bhasarvajña has paraphrased the TAVtext in his own way." 97.

72 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Cārvāka Fragments 73

The second problem lies in deciding whether the alleged view (pürvapaksa). In order to do justice to the exponent, quotation comes from the original source, or is merely re- the opponent would not only reproduce what the former quoted. had actually said, but would liberally add what he might or Last but not least, we have to reckon with some spurious should have said to strengthen his position further. Having statements attributed to the Carvaka-s. This is most apparent apparently made the exponent appear with the array of the in the case of poems and plays containing Cārvaka or Kali or a best possible arguments, the opponent would then set out follower of his doctrines as a character.14 A look at the Cārvāka to refute the former's views one by one. fragments collected to date reveals the fact that most of them However admirable the practice may be in other respects, are found in works written between the eighth and twelfth it is more a hindrance than an aid to the reconstruction of centuries CE. Although Cārvāka studies really began after the the actual views of the exponent. publication of the editio princeps of the SDS, it should be noted Another problem lies in choosing the right reading from that this digest rarely quotes any Carvaka aphorism that can be the number of variants available. In connection with the taken as genuine. It only purports to give, both in prose and stray verses attributed to Brhaspati in the SDS, I have cho- verse, the essence of the Carvaka philosophy, not in the words sen the reading that comes chronologically first. The sec- of any Crvka author, but as the learned fourteenth-century ond pāda in the well-known verse, yāvaj jīvam sukham jīven, Vedäntin understood it. Nor does he mention the name of etc. was originally nsti mrtyor agocarah as is found in the a single Carvaka work, text or commentary (which he does earliest source.15 The other reading, rnam krtva ghrtam pibet profusely while dealing with other philosophical systems in (found in the SDS alone) is spurious. It occurs only once in the same work). So it may be admitted that all Cārvāka works the fourteen instances in which the verse is wholly or partly had disappeared from India even before S-M's time. Hence, quoted or adapted.16 it may also be assumed that any author born after the twelfth Similarly, in the case of another verse, agnihotram, etc., the century had no access to the authentic Cārvāka works. Any fourth pāda as given in the SDS (jīvikā dhātrnirmitā) is spuri- reference to the "aphorisms of Brhaspati" or any statement ous. Everywhere else, in ten out of eleven instances, it reads: ending with "Thus said the Lokayatikas" should not be ac- jīviketi brhaspatih.17 cepted at its face-value. Paradoxically enough, we have to But what to do when we are confronted with such a slight adopt a very conservative attitude in dealing with the most variation as pratyaksam eva pramānam and pratyaksam evaikam radical philosophical system in ancient India. pramanam? The former reading occurs first in TSP (eighth At the same time, we cannot afford to throw away any scrap century) and is so quoted by Abhayadevasūri, Krsņamiśra of a fragment because of its dubious authenticity. Pending (both eleventh century) and others. The latter reading, how- the discovery of the lost Carvakasutra along with its commen- ever, is first found in VaBh/SVr (sixth/seventh century) which taries (yes, I am an invetarate optimist in this matter -as in is followed by Anantavīrya (tenth century), Vādidevasūri all other matters, too!), all we can do is to assiduously collect (eleventh century) and many others. Prabhäcandra first all statements which refer to the Cārvāka directly (i.e., men- chooses the former reading and a few lines after quotes the tioning the authority or authorities by name) or indirectly latter one.18 (attributing some idea to them rather vaguely). If we follow the same principle as adopted in the case of After all such direct or indirect references have been col- the verses, the former reading, viz., "perception is the one lected, we may start threshing. and only means of valid knowledge", has to be accepted. Such a collection, however, will pose further problems. But that would go flatly against what Purandara, himself a The Carvaka-s were criticized by the proponents of almost all philosophical systems, but mostly by the Naiyayika-s, Vedäntins, Jains and Buddhists. True to the Indian tradi- 15 The earliest source is presumably the VDMP followed by the TSP tion of polemics, they first propounded the exponent's and NM. 16 See Śl.7 below. The issue has been elaborately dealt with in Chs. 19, 20 below. 17 See Ch. 20 below. 14 See e.g., PC, NCand VMT. 18 For details, see Ch. 4 above. See also Sl.2 below.

74 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Cārvāka Fragments 75

Cārvāka, says: "The Cārvākas, too, admit of such an inference Another difficulty is to distinguish between a verbatim as is well known in the world, but that which is called infer- quotation from a Carvaka work (the collection of aphorisms ence [by some], transgressing the worldly way, is prohibited and its commentary) and a paraphrase. The SDS first sum- [by them]".19 The same idea is found in the SMS, too.20 There- marizes the Carvaka philosophy in prose and repeats the fore to brand the Carvaka-s as refusing to accept any other same in verse -both in the same chapter.28 This has led means of valid knowledge excepting perception (as Sureśvara Dasgupta to declare: "There was at least one metrical ver- (eighth century) does in his Män.)21 or, in other words, reject- sion of the main contents of this system from which extracts ing the validity of inference as such (as Jayantabhatta and are found quoted in Madhava's Sarva-darsana-samgraha and Vācaspatimiśra (both ninth century) represent them to be)22 in other places".29 will amount to a distortion of the true Cārvaka position. This is a mere conjecture that may not prove true in And the acceptance of the true position would also en- all cases. Versified versions of a philosophical system made tail the rejection of another so-called Cārvāka aphorism: by an opponent are not altogether unknown.30 Verbatim nānumānam pramānam (or its variants).23 Kamalasīla ascribes quotations, we may safely hypothesize, will be few and far this view to the grammarians as well as to the Carvaka-s on two between, and even those which appear to be so, should be different occasions.24 In fact, while attributing this view to the weighed more than once before accepting them as genuine. Cārvāka-s, the opponents invariably quote a verse (or verses) The last problem: from where to begin? Should we start from Bhartrhari (fifth century),25 not any aphorism from the from the hints and suggestions pointing to the existence sūtra-work. The Cārvāka-s were quite prepared to accept infer- of heretics, sceptics and free-thinkers in India as may be ence as a means of valid knowledge in so far as it was preced- culled from the Vedic literature?31 Uddālaka (Chāndogya ed or verifiable by perception. They, however, made a clear Upanişad, 6.1 ff) has been claimed to be the first material- distinction between the lokasiddha (commonly accepted) and ist-scientist in India.32 There are references to Asuramata tantrasiddha (following from scripture) hetu-s.26 Jayantabhatta in the Upanişads and the Gitā.33 There is every reason to used another set of terms to designate the same distinction: believe that Ajita Kesakambala, a senior contemporary of utpanna- and utpādya-pratīti-s.27 the Buddha, preached a proto-materialist doctrine.34 While Therefore, chronological priority cannot be the only cri- referring to the Lokāyatika-s, both Bhāvaviveka (sixth cen- terion in selecting the right reading of the so-called Cārvāka tury) and Candrakīrti (sixth/seventh century) quote a pas- aphorisms. The first one that reaches us may not be the origi- sage which resembles the words of Ajita as reproduced in nal reading. A late source, on the contrary, may retain it. We SPhS.35 The SKS also refers to some such proto-materialist have to take all the basic tenets of the doctrine into consider- doctrine which Silanka could not identify. He referred to ation and see whether a fragment conforms to them or not.

28 SDS, 6-7. 19 Quoted in the TSP, 528. See Bhã. 17 below. 29 Dasgupta, III: 532. 20 SMS, 15. It is also echoed in the TRD, 306 and the anonymous 30 Siddhasena Divākara presents in verse form the basic tenets of Vaiseșika Avacūrņi on ȘDSam, 508. and some other philosophical systems in his Dvātrimsad Dvātrimsikā. But 21 Mān., 2.17, 5.1; 20, 59. Varadarāja/Varadācārya quotes 2.17-18 in his they are all composed by him, not taken from any other source. Tärkikarakşā, as does the SMS on p. 14 (attributing the verses to the "logi- 31 See Radhakrishnan-Moore, 34-36. cians", nyāyavidām). 32 See D. Chattopadhyaya (1991), Ch. 7, 89-148. He first staked this 22 NM, Ch. 1, I: 43 (but see ibid., 52 where the well-educated Cārvaka-s claim in an earlier paper, later reprinted as "Materialism in Indian Phi- (presumably Udbhata and others) are made to say that the number of losophy" which forms Ch. 7 of his Knowledge and Intervention (1985), 196 pramana-s cannot be determined); Bhām. on BS, 3.3.54, 851-852. ff. He elaborated the theme in the Zakir Husain Memorial Lecture (New 23 See Ch. 4 above. Delhi, 1988), which was afterwards printed in IHR, XIII: 37-57 24 See Chs. 8, 11 below. 33 See Ch. Up., 8.7-9; Gita, 16.7, 9. See also Dasgupta, III: 529 and D. 25 VP, 1.52-54. See also n24 above. Chattopadhyaya (1959, 1973), Ch. 1, "Asura View", 1 ff. K.C. Chattopad- 26 Udbhata quoted in the SVR, 265-266. See Bhā. 12. hyaya has strongly objected to this (153-154 n42). 27 NM, Ch. 2, I: 184. Jayanta seems to have taken it from some commen- 34 See Chs. 1, 3 above. tary, most probably by Udhhata, on the Cārvākasūtra. 35 See MŚ, II: 60, 63-64 and 66 (on MS 18, 5-7) Cf. DN, I: 48.

76 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Cārvāka Fragments 77

both Sāmkhya and Lokāyata.36 The Mbh, Santiparvan, Ch the law-maker to be the same person.44 To make the confu- 211 contains a clear reference to materialism.37 sion worse confounded, a collection of rather odd aphorisms I would, however, like to start from the time when the called the Bārhaspatyasūtram arthāt Bārhaspatya Arthaśāstram, name, Cārvāka, is unequivocally mentioned in connection a piece of transparent forgery (as F.W. Thomas, the editor, with the materialist philosophy. The word, lokāyata, can be himself indirectly acknowledged) still haunts the scene.45 traced back to the KA;38 its Pali and Prakrit variants are also Rejecting both the names, Lokāyata and Bārhaspatya, I, found in Buddhist and Jain canonical works. But as I have therefore, prefer to call it Carvaka, which is at least not as tried to show elsewhere, lokāyata originally meant disputatio, dubious as the other two.46 And there is a special reason to the science of disputation, both in Pali and Sanskrit.39 Only do so. The first philosopher known to have used the name is from the sixth century CE do we find a verse attributed to Purandara, himself a materialist. He refers to his fellow-phi- the Lokāyatika-s.40 The verse in question presents the lesson losophers as "the Cārvaka-s".47 Kamalasīla and Haribhadra of a parable designed to establish the superiority of percep- (both eighth century) employ this name in their works,18 tion to mere inference that is not preceded or supported by and they are followed by a host of writers. (Interestingly perception.41 The word, barhaspatya, although favoured by enough, Sankara always uses the term, "Lokāyatika", never D.R. Shastri, Namai and some others, should, in my opin- "Cārvāka", when he refers to the materialists).49 ion, better be avoided. It encourages the identification of Materialism may very well be as old as philosophy (as both the author of the Carvakasutra with the preceptor of the gods Radhakrishnan and Frauwallner assert),50 but a methodical (suraguru). Why and how an uncompromisingly materialist presentation of any system in the ancient Indian context doctrine originated with a mythical sage associated with the requires, first, a book of aphorisms which would generate a gods is told in the Purāņa-s.12 Jayarāsibhațța names Bhagavān commentary to be followed by a series of sub-commentaries. Brhaspati and Suraguru when he refers to the eponymous I would, therefore, for the present purpose, leave behind all founder of materialism in India.43 As there was a lawbook references to asuramata, ucchedavāda, tajjīvataccharīravāda, (smrti) purportedly composed by a Brhaspati, some scholars dehatmavāda, etc.51 and start from such works as refer directly have tended to take the founder of a philosophical system and or indirectly to the sutra-work or its commentaries. First, the aphorisms and pseudo-aphorisms (i.e., those which look like aphorisms but may not be so -not merely on stylistic grounds but because each of them is found in 36 SKSVr, 10 (on SKS, 1.1.7). only one source). IV.1, IV.3-5 and V.1-2 (see below) may be 37 Mbh, 12.211. 26-27 (218.27-28 in vul.). See Ch. 8 below. 38 KA, 1.2.10. See Ch. 10 below. A more elaborate Bengali version was published in 1996 44 For the many Brhaspati-s, see, Aiyangar, 79. MŚ. Saraswati Bali's 39 See Chs. 16, 17. Eli Franco (2000) recently mentions that the Spitzwer Brihaspati in the Vedas and the Purānas (1978) is not available to me. MS fragment 143b (SHT - 810 of the Turfan MSS) contains references to 45 Thomas, 17; Kangle, II: 6 n4 and III: 43. The Brhaspati-niti teachings laukāyatā (sic) besides Sāmkhya and Vaišeșika (p. 548 [63] n23). He, too, that a learned Brahmin taught Draupadi's brother (Mbh, Aranyakaparvan, notes that the word is not used "in the sense of a materialistic philosophi- 33.57), "are at any rate as orthodox as one can wish" (Jacobi (1911), S. 737 cal school, but as a science whose nature is to criticize with reasons". = (1918), 104) See also Bhagavad Datta in Thomas 1916, 9 40 The anonymous commentary on the SK, v. 27 (translated into Chi- 46 The name, Carvaka is first found in the Mbh, Adiparvan, 2.63 (Vul., nese by Paramārtha) refers to a verse, yena śuklīkrtā hamsāh, etc. and iden- 2.74); Śānti., 39.23-47 (vul., Chs. 38-39). He is, however, a demon who got a tifies it as a Lokāyatika saying. See Bedekar, 10 n45 and S.S.S. Shastri, 36. boon from Brahma by satisfying Him in penance. To identify this Cārvāka For the etāvān eva verse, see Śl. 13 below and Ch. 15 below. with the founder of a philosophical school is downright absurd, although 41 See Ch. 15 below. some people tend to do so. As to the Brhaspati-s, see n44 above. 42 VPu, 3.18.1-29; PPu, Srsțikhaņda, 13.291-371. See also Hazra (1940, 47 See n19 above. 1987), p. 25 and his Introduction to VPu (1972), k-l. 48 See TSP, 639, 649, 657, 663, 665 and SDSam, 85d. 43 TUS, 45.11 and 125.13. See also 88.9. The very mention of Brhaspati 49 See ŚBh on BS, 1.1.1, 2.2.2, 3.3.53; on Gītā, 16.8, etc. as the preceptor of the gods and addressing him as bhagavan, I believe, 50 Radhakrishnan (1980), 277; Frauwallner (trans.), II: 216 (= S.296) are further evidence to prove that Jayarāsi was not a Cārvāka/Lokāyata, 51 Some other doctrines called prānatmavada, etc. found in the for no Cärvaka would deign to admit the existence of the gods and their Upanisads and in the works of later Vedantins are also left out because guru and refer to him as a god or demi-god. they are older than the Cārvaka doctrine. See n72 below.

78 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Cārvāka Fragments 79

taken as examples of pseudo-aphorisms. Variant readings I.3. tatsamudāye śarīrendriyavişayasamjñāh (Ś 2, N A3) are mostly of a negligible nature, excepting in the case of TSP, p. 634; LTN, f.24a; UBhPK, p. 668; TUS, p. 1 (Franco, III. 1.52 The sources in each case are arranged chronologi- p. 68); TSV (on 1.104), p. 28; BSBh (on BS 3.3.53), p. 196; cally as far as practicable (undated works like the SMS and ALVr (see, N, p. 38 n11 on A2-8); NKC, p. 341; PKM, p. the Purana-s have been placed at the end). 116; +PVA, p. 54; NVV, p. 93; TRD, p. 307. The Aphorisms and Pseudo-aphorisms section (marked I.4. tebhyaścaitanyam (Ś 3, N A4) A) is followed by the extracts from commentaries (B) and TSP, p. 633; +UBhPK, p. 668; +TSV (on 1.104), p. 28; ŚBh finally the verses attributed to the Cārvaka-s (C). Miscellane- (on BS 3.3.53), p. 851; BSBh (on BS, 3.3.53), p. 196; ALVY ous fragments mostly found in non-philosophical works will (see, N, p. 38 n11 on A2-8); +GrBh (on NM, Ch. 7), Part have to wait for some time to be collected and presented. 2, pp. 257-258; NKC, p. 342; +PKM, p. 116; +PVA, p. 54; The fragments are then rendered into English. Wherever +NVV, pp. 93,106; +ST, p. 13, 17; +SVR, pp. 1073, 1081; translations are extant, I have reproduced them with minor +TRD, p. 307. amendments (when absolutely necessary). I.5. kiņvādibhyo madaśaktivat (Ś 4, N A5) My views on the fragments are then given separately +LTN(on 2.31), f.24a; +UBhPK, p. 668; SBh (on BS, 3.3.53), Those fragments which have not been included by Shastri p.851 (with variants);+SKSVr, p. 11 (with variants); +PrPañ, and/or Namai are marked with + before the number of the p. 326; +NM, Ch. 7, Part 2, p. 217.23 (cf. p. 201.26); BSBh fragment. Additional sources too have been marked with +. (on BS3.3.53), p. 196; SVT, Part 1, pp. 283, 291; (cf. +YTC, Following abbreviations have been used (General Bhã/s = pp. 252-253); ALVr (see, N, p. 38 nll on A2-8); NKC, p. Bhāsya/s, Comm/s = Commentary/ries, N = Namai, Ś = D.R. 342; PKM, p. 115; +PVA, p. 54; ST, p. 13; +NVV, pp. 93, Shastri and Śl/s = Śloka/s). For others, see Abbreviations at 107; SVR, pp. 1073, 1086; KB p. 44; +VK, p. 854 (cf. PrPa, the beginning of the book. on MŚ, 18.6; p. 64; ȘDSam, v. 84, p. 306; TRD, p. 307). I.6. caitanyavisiştah kāyah purusah (Ś 7, N A10) TEXT +LTN, f.24a; ŚBh (on BS 3.3.53), p. 851; (cf. on 1.1.1, pp. 81-82); +PrPañ, Ch. 8, p. 320; [NM, Ch 7, Part 2, p. A. Aphorisms and pseudo-aphorisms 201.21]; +Vyo, Part 1, p. 137; +NVV, p. 93; TRD, p. 300; GBhŚr (on Gītā 16.11), p. 643; GBhM (on Gītā 16.11), p. I. bhūtavāda 642 (cf. dehamātram caitanyavisistam ātmā, GBhM (on Gītā 2.13), p. 48); ABS, Ch. 2, p. 99; GBhN (on Gītā 16.11-12), I.1. athātastattvam vyākhyāsyāmah (Ś 1, N Al) p. 642. TUS, p. 1 (Franco, 68); NM, Ch. 1, Part 1, p. 100.8; GrBh I.7. śarīrād eva (Ś 22, N A9) (on NM, Ch. 1), p. 100.20. TUS, p. 88 [cf. TS, p. 635: kāyād eva, which Ś quotes]. I.2. prthivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni (Ś 2, N A2) +I.8. śarīre bhāvāt TSP, p. 633; MAP, p. 99b (see N, p. 38 n11 on A2-3); +SBh (on BS 3.3.53), p. 851 (cf. Sankara on Pr. Up. 6.2. Up. LTN (on 2.3), f. 24a; +UBhPK, p. 668; +TSV (on 1.98 and Bhã., p. 195). 1.104), pp. 27-28; ŚBh (with some variants) (on 3.3.54), I.9. jalabudbudavajjīvāh (N A6) p. 854; +Bhäm (on BS 3.3.53.54), p. 854; BSBh (on BS +LTN, f.24a; [ UBhPK, p. 668]; [SKSVr, p. 11], [YTC, p. 253]; 3.3.53-54), p. 196; TUS, p. 1 (Franco, 68); +NKC, p. 341; SVȚ, pp. 283, 291; NKC, p. 342; SVR, p. 1074; TRD, p. 300. +PKM, p. 116; +PVA, 54; +GrBh (on NM, Ch. 1), Part 1, 100.20; PC, Act 2, p. 40; ST, p. 13, 17; ALVr (see, N, 38 n11 II. svabhävavāda on A2-8); +SVR, pp. 1075, 1086; VPS, p. 211; TRD, p. 307 (This and the following four aphorisms are also found in II.I. janmavaicitryabhedājjagadapi vicitram (N A7) other philosophical digests such as SDS, p. 2). ALVr (see, N, p. 38, nll on A2-8). II.2. mayūracandrakavat (N A8) ALVr (see, N, p. 38, n11 on A2-8) (cf. NVV, Part 2, p. 106: 52 See Ch. 4 above. svabhāvādeva mayūracitrādivat ... ).

80 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Cārvāka Fragments 81

III. pratyakşaprādhānyavāda +Bhā.3. tena yad ucyate 'viddhakarnnena -"satyam anumānam işyata evāsmābhi pramāņam lokapratītatvat kevalam III.1. pratyakşam (ekam) eva pramānam (Ś 20,25; N A13) limgalakşnamayuktam". GrBh, Part 1, p. 43; +VABh, Part 2, p. 439; +TSP, p. 945; PVSVȚ, p. 19. UBhPK, p. 668; SKSVr, pp. 10, 12; +AS, p. 36; +SVT, pp. +Bhā.4. tena yad ucyate 'viddhakarnnena - "anadhigatārthapari- 277, 293; TBV, Part 1, p. 73; NKC, p. 343; +PKM, pp. 177- cchittih pramāņam ato nānumānam pramānam arthaparicche 178; PC, Act 2, p. 40; +SVR, pp. 261, 265; +NSi (on Pr.Pañ., dakatvābhāvād" iti. Ch. 6, v.l), p. 112; +VPS, p. 211 (also found in Mān., Ch. PVSVȚ, p. 25. 5, v.l, p. 59; +AYVD, on v. 20, p. 130; +NTD, p. 88; SDS, Ch. +Bhā.5. itarasya acetanasya vā bhūmyādeh mūrtasya. anena 1, p. 3; SDK, pp. 4, 108; SMS, p. 15; SDSi, p. 1). Aviddhakarņasya samayo darśitah. III.2. pramānasyāgaunatvād anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhah SVȚ, p. 306. (Ś 21, N DI) +Bhā.6. kaścana cārvākaviśeso 'viddhakarnah. NM, Ch. 1, pp. 177, 183; AS, p. 36; NBh, p. 210; Vyo., Part NVV, Part 2, p. 101. 2, p. 161; TBV, pp. 70, 72, 354; PVSVȚ, p. 25; PKM, p. 178; +Bhā.7. susikşitacārvākāh Udbhațādayah. SVR, pp. 261, 265. GrBh, p. 52.26 (on NM, Ch. 1, Part 1, p. 52.18-19). See also Bhā.29. IV. punarjanma-paraloka-vilopavāda +Bhā.8. cārvākadhūrtastviti. Udbhatah. sahilokāyatasūtreșuvivrtim kurvan "athātastattvamvyākhyāsyāmah ""prthivyāpastejovayuriti' +IV.I. paralokāsiddhau pramāņābhāvāt sūtradvayam yathāśrutārthatyāgenānyathā varņayāmāsa SVR, p. 1109 (cf. UBhPK, p. 668; PC, Act 2, p.40; SDK, p. 4). prathamasūtre tattvapadena pramāņaprameya- IV.2. paralokino 'bhāvāt paralokābhāvah (Ś 17, N A II) sankhyālakşananiyamāśakyakaraņīyatām āha, dvitīyasūtram TSP, p. 633; TUS, p. 45 (Franco, p. 228); +AD, Act 3, p. api prameyāniyamapratipādakam tena vyākhyātam. tatra hi 65; YTC, p. 269; TBV, pp. 71, 91, 731; NKC, pp. 343, 345; "prthivyāpastejovāyur iti" ya "iti" śabdah sa evam +PKM, p. 116; SVR, p. 1109. prāyaprameyāntaropalaksanatvena tasyābhimatah. +IV.3. paralokicaitanyam niravayavatvāt GrBh, p. 100.19-24 (on NM, Ch. 1, Part 1, p. 100), Shah, p. 43. SVR, p. 1109. +Bhā.9. "cirantanacārvākair hi Bhaviviktaprabhrtibhiḥ bhūtebhyaścaitanyam" iti sūtram bhūtebhya iti V. vedaprāmānya-nişedhavāda pañcamyantapadayojanayā vyākhyātam, bhūtebhya utpadyate caitanyamiti. Udbhatenatu "bhūtebhyah "itipadamcaturthyantatayā +V.I. dharmo na kāryah vyākhyātam, bhūtebhyaścaitanyam bhūtārtham caitanyam NM, Ch. 4, Part 1, p. 388 (cf. KS, 1.2.25: $ 9, N A16). svatantram eva śarīrārambhakabhūtopakārakam ityarthah. +V.2. tad upadeśeşu na pratyetavyam GrBh, p. 257.24-26-258.21 (on NM, Ch. 7, Part 2, p. 257); NM, Ch. 4, Part 1, p. 388. Shah, p.197. +Bhā.10. yathā Udbhatena uktam - "sarīrārambhakakāraņānām eva B. Extracts from commentaries bhūtānam sa kaścit tādrso vicitrasukhaduhkhopabhogado dharmah svabhāvavišesa ityarthah". +Bhā.l. evamādis Tattvatīkāyām udāharaņaprapañco drastavyah GrBh, p. 262.25-27 (on NM, Ch. 7, Part 2, p. 262); Shah, TSP, p. 521 (on TS, Ch. 18, v. 1458). p. 198. +Bhā.2. Aviddhakarņas Tattvatīkāyāmāha - "nanu vā pramāņena +Bhā.11. Tattvavrttāvudbhatena - "lakaņakāriņa lāghvikatvenaiva kim iti parah pratipādyate, ubhayasiddham hi pratipādakam śabdaviracanavyavasthā, na caitāvatā 'numānasya gauņatā, bhavatīti? tad etad ayuktam; yasmād vacanātmakam yadi ca sādhyaikadeśadharmidharmatvam heto rūpam brūyuste, anumānam, na ca vaktuḥ pramāņam, atha ca vaktā tena param tadā na kācillaksane 'pi gaunīurttiḥ". pratipādayati, parapratipādanārthatvāt prayāsasya, nāvaśyam SVR, p. 265.16-19. ubhayasiddhena prayojanam" iti. +Bhā. 12. "hetoh svasādhyaniyamagrahane prakāratrayamistam TSP, p. 529 (on TS, Ch. 18, v. 1484). darśanābhyām avisistābhyāmdarśanena višistānupalabdhisahitena

82 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Cārvāka Fragments 83

bhūyodarśanapravrttyā ca lokavyavahārapatitayā, tatrādyena Mahāp, 20.18.9, p. 328. grahanopāyena yehetor gamakatvam icchanti tān pratīdam sūtram. +Bhā.20. [caitanyasya] mūrtasya prthivyādi-catustayasya jñānam lokaprasiddheşvapi hetuşu vyabhicārādarśanam asti anena pauram [paurandaram] matam darsitam. tantrasiddhevapi tena vyabhicārādarśana- SVT, p. 306. lakşaņaguņasādharmyatah tantrasiddhahetūnām tathābhāvo Mahendrakumāra Nyāyācārya offers an emendation of the vyavasthāpyata iti gauņatvam anumānasya avyabhicārāvagamo first word: caitanyavisistasya (p. 306 n16). hi laukikahetūnām anumeyāvagame nimittam sa nāsti +Bhā.21 ... na kevalam Purandarādeh ... tantrasiddheşviti na tebhyah parokşārthāvagamo nyāyyota NVV, Part 2, p. 101. idam uktam anumānād arthaniścayo durlabha iti". +Bhā.22. [Purandara] cārvākamate granthakartā. SVR, p. 265. 23-24, p. 266. 1-8. A marginal note on a passage found in a MS of Puspa- +Bhā. 13. uktam ca Tantravrttau Bhattodbhatena -“sarvaśca danta's Mahapurāna (most probably the passage cited dūşaņopanipāto-'prayojakahetum ākrāmatītyaprayojakavişayā above as Bhã.19), quoted in P.D. Gune's introduction to viruddhānumānavirodhaviruddhāvyabhicārinah". the edition of Dhanapala's Bhavisayatthakaha, p. 42. SVR, p. 270. 3-5. -Bhā.23. Bhāvivikta Tantravrtti may be misprint for Tattvavrtti (as noted by GrBh, p. 257.24 (on NM, Ch. 7 Part 2, p. 257); Shah, p. 197. Solomon, p. 990 n14). See, Bhā. 14 above. +Bhā. 14. yatratu Bhattodbhatah prācīkatat -“nahyatrakāraņameva +Bhā.24. ya garbhasthātītaloko 'stīti tadarthasiddhyartham kāryātmatāmupaiti yata ekasyākāraņātmana ekakāryarūpatopagame garbhasthātītabuddhiḥ samanantaraniruddhabuddhipūrvik, tadanyarūpābhāvāt tadanyakāryātmanopagatir na syāt. kim buddhitvāt, tadanantarabuddhivad iti sādhanam vadanti, tvapūrvameva kasyacidbhāve prāgavidyamānam bhavat tat kāryam. teşām drstānto nāsti. evam maranam yāvat sthitānām tatra vişayendriyamanaskārāņām itaretaropādānahitarūpabhedānām manusyāņām buddhyekamātratvanispannatvāt, tatastāvan na sannidhau viśiştasvetarakşanabhāve pratyekam pūrvaloka iti (N F2). tadbhāvābhavānuvidhānād anekakriyopayogo na virudhyate. PrPr, 204, a, 2-4 (on MS, 16.1) (For another restoration, see yata ekakriyāyām api tasya tadbhāvābhāvitaiva nibandhanam Pandeya, Part 2, p. 3). Cf. TUS, p. 57 sā cānekakriyāyām api samānā" iti. +Bhã.25. na hi devadattasya maranacittam cittāntareņa SVR, p. 764. 6-13. pratisandhīyate, maranacittatvāt, arhato maranacittavat (N F3). +Bhā. 15. tatrāyam jaraddvijanmā mahānubhavo 'bhinavam etam PrPr, 204, a, 4-5 (on MS, 16.1) (For two other restorations uttaramārgam asmān prati prakāśayati. see, Pandeya, Part 2, p. 3 and Franco, 1997, p. 116). Cf. SVR, p. 764, 24-25. TSP, p. 635 (on TS, vv. 1862-1863). +Bhā.16. yadācasta Bhattodbhatah - "itiśabdah pradarśanaparo +Bhā. 26. desāntaram kālāntaramavasthāntaram vā paraloka. na punah samāptivacanaś caitanyaśabdasukha-duhkhecchādveșa TSP, p. 637 (on TS, Ch. 22, wv. 1871-1876). - prayatnasamskārāņām tattvāntaratvāt +Bhā.27. ihalokaparalokaśarīrayor bhinnatvāt tadgatayorapi prthivyādiprākpradhavmsāpeksānyonyābhāvānām cittayornaikah santānah (Ś 18, N F4). cātyantaprakațatvād uktatvavilakșaņatvācceti". TSP, p. 663 (on TS, vv. 1938-1940). Cf. PVA, p. 105.21. SVR, p. 1087, 1-4. +Bhā.28. jātismaraņamasiddhamekagrāmāgatānām sarveşām +Bhā. 17. Kambalāśvataroditam smaraņāt. TS, Ch. 22, v. 1863, p. 635; TSP on TS (as above). See also TSP, p. 665 (on TS, Ch. 22, v. 1945). "Aphorisms and Pseudo-aphorisms", I.7 +Bhā.29. ašakya eva pramānasankhyāniyama iti Bhā. 18. Purandaras tvāha - "lokaprasiddham anumānam susikşitacārvākāh. cārvākair apīsyata eva, yattu kaiścil laukikam mārgam NM, Ch. 1, Part 1, p. 52. 18-19 (see, Bhas. 8 and 16). atikramyānumānam ucyate tannișidhyate" (Ś 35, N D2). +Bhā.30. susikşitatarāh prāhuḥ - dvividham anumānam, kiñcid TSP, p. 528 (on TS, Ch. 18, v. 1481). utpannapratīti, kiñcid utpādyapratīti, īśvarādyanumānantu +Bhā.19. emeya karivi appaniya utti | utpādyapratīti. kim jampasi paüramdariya vitti || NM, Ch. 2, Part 1, p. 184.6-7. See also Śls. 18-20 below.

84 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Cārvāka Fragments 85

C. Verses attributed to the Cārvāka-s Ś1.8. yadi gacchet param lokam dehad esa vinirgatah kasmād bhūyo na cāyāti bandhusnehasamākulaḥ || Ś1.1. na svargo nāpavargo vā naivātma pāralaukikah (Ś 46, N B12). naiva varnāśramādīnām kriyāśca phaladāyikāh || SDS, p. 14. 124-125. (Ś 39, N B4). Ś1.9. tataś ca jīvanopāyo brāhmanair vihitas tviha| PPu, Srsțikhaņda 13.323; SDS, p. 13, v. 1, lines 110-111; mrtānām pretakāryāņi na tvanyad vidyate kvacit || VMT, 3.2. (Ś 47, N B13). Ś1.2. agnihotram trayo vedās tridandam bhasmagunthanam| SDS, p. 14. 126-127. buddhipauruşahīnānām jīviketi brhaspatih || Ś1.10. trayo vedasya kartāro bhandadhūrtaniśācarāh | (Ś 40, N B7). jarbharīturpharītyādi panditānām vacah smrtam | RVP, p. 285; PC, 2.26, p. 44; GrBh, Part 2, p. 228 (on (Ś 48, N B14). NM, Ch. 7); NC, 17.39; NPr, p. 365 (on NC, 17.39); SDS SDS, p. 14. 128-129; +GBhŚr (on Gitā, 16.8); GBhVi (on pp. 5.50-51,13.112-113; BhD on the Mbh, Santiparvan, Gītā, 16.8); SMS, p. 15 (first line only-with variants). 218.25 (vulgate ed.), 211.24 (critical ed.); ABS, Ch. 2, Ś1.11. aśvasyātra hi siśnam tu patnīgrāhyam prakīrtitam | p. 100; SMS, p. 15; SSS, p.6. bhandais tadvat param caiva grāhyajātam prakīrtitam | Ś1.3. paśuścen nihatah svargam jyotistome gamişyati| māmsānām khādanam tadvan niśācarasamīritam svapitā yajamānena tatra kasmān na himsyate || (Ś 49, N B15-16). (Ś 41, N B8). SDS, p. 15. 130-132. VPu. 3.18.26; PC, 2.20, p. 40; SDS, p. 13.14-15; ABS, p. Ś1.12. nagna śramanaka durbuddhe kayakleśaparāyaņa 101 (quoting from VP). jīvikārthe 'pi cārambhe kena tvam asi śikșitah

Ś1.4. Cf. ŚKA, p. 19 (DA, p. 321, vv. 23-24). (Ś 51, N B6). mṛtānām api jantūnām śrāddham cet trptikāraņam TUS, p. 79. 17-18. nirvāņasya pradīpasya snehaḥ samvardhayec chikhām || Ś1.13. etāvān eva puruso yāvān indriyagocarah (Ś 42, N B9). bhadre vrkapadam hy etad yad vadanti bahuśrutah || PC, 2.21, p. 40; SDS, p. 13. 116-117; YS auto-commen- (Ś 19, N B2). tary, 2.47, f. 98b; SVM, 69. +PrPa, Vol. 2, p. 65 (on MŚ, 18.6); MA, p. 209; PrPr, Ś1.5. gacchatām iha jantūnām vyartham pātheyakalpanam | Vo1.2, p. 3 (on MŚ, 16.1), 64 (on MŚ, 18.6); VāBh/ gehasthakrtaśrāddhena pathi trptir avāritā || SVr, Part 1, p. 186; Part 2, pp. 344,439; TSP, p. 637. (Ś 43, N B10). 19-20; (SDSam., p. 301. 14-15; v. 81; LTN, v. 33, f. 24b; SDS, p. 14. 118-119. MVr, p. 129 (on SK, 17); SKSVr, p. 10 (on SKS, 1.1.6); Cf. VPu. 3.18.29, also quoted in ABS, Ch. 2, p. 101; (Sad - DS, p. 81, v. 160 .; Hemacandra Sūri on GV, Rām., Ayodhyā. 109.15 (vulgate). 1.5(1553), p. 10; LȘDSam., p. 256. Ś1.6. svargasthitā yadā trptim gaccheyus tatra dānatah | Cf. Mbh, Sānti., vulgate, 134.2; crit. ed. 132.1ef-2ab. prāsādasyoparisthānām atra kasmān na dīyate || +Ś1.14. piba khāda ca cārulocane yadatītam varagātri tanna te | (Ś 44, N BII). na hi bhīru idam kalevaram | gatam nivartate samudayamātram

Ś1.7. SDS, p. 14. 120-121. yāvaj jivam sukham jīven nāsti mrtyor agocaraḥ | PrPr, Vol. 2, pp. 3 (on MS, 16.1), 64 (on MŚ, 18.6); bhasmībhūtasya šāntasya punarāgamanam kutah || SDSam, p. 304. 14-17, v. 82; SKSVr, p. 10 (on SKS, (Ś 45, N B3). 1.1.6), p. 49 (on SKS, 2.3.11); p. 186.29-30; ĀSVr, p. +VDMP, 108. 18-19; +TSP, p. 17; +NM, Ch. 4, Part 1, 123 (on AS, 1.4.2); Sad-DS, p. 81, v. 161 (verbatim p. 388; Ch. 7, Part 2, p. 257; +TBV, p. 505 n6; +YTC, reproduction of SDSam., v. 82). Part 2, p. 253; MB, p. 14; +Pari., p. 113 (on NS, 1.1.2); Ś1.15. tapāmsi yātanāś citrā samyamo bhogavañcanā | TSPC, 1.345, p. 12; Doha., p. 86; NC, 17.69; SDS, p. 2. agnihotrādikam karma bālakrīdeva laksyate || 17-18; p. 14. 125-126; TRD, p. 202; SDK, 108. (N B5)

86 Studies on the Carvāka/Lokāyata Cārvāka Fragments 87

+VDMP, 1.108.14cd-15ab; +LTN, v. 34, f. 25a; AD, 3.9; I.4 Consciousness (arises or is manifested) out of these. TRD, p. 302. 18-19. 1.5 As the power of intoxication (arises or is manifested +Ś1.16. viśeşe 'nugamābhāvāt sāmānye siddhasādhanāt from the constituent parts of the wine (such as flour, water tadvato 'nupapannatvād anumānakathā kutah | and molasses). NM, Ch. 2, Part 1, p. 177. 12-13; PrPañ, p. 206 (first line I.6 The self is (nothing but) the body endowed with con- only: viśese 'nugamābhāvah sāmānya siddhasādhyatā); sciousness. AS, Ch. 1, p. 36 (first line only: sāmānye siddhasādhanād 1.7 From the body itself. viśeşe 'nugamābhāvāt); PVSVȚ, p. 26 (first line only: +I.8 Because of the existence (of consciousness) where viśeşenugamābhāvah sāmānye siddhasādhanam); Vyo., there is a body. Part 2, p. 161 (first line only: sāmānye siddhasādhanam I.9 Souls are like water bubbles. viśeşe 'nugamābhāvah); JñaNi, No.7, p. 268 (first line only, as in PrPañ); ibid., No.7, p. 274 (first hemistich II. The doctrine of inherent nature (lit. own being) only, as in above); ibid., No. 11, p. 379 (first line only, as in above excepting b: siddhasādhanam); ŚD, p. 63 II.1 The world is varied due to the variation of origin. (ab as in PrPañ, cd: anumābhangapanke 'smin nimagna II.2 As the eye in the peacock's tail. vādidantinah); ibid., p. 71 (first line only, as in PrPañ); PKM, p. 177.16 (first line only, as in PVSVT); RNi, III. The doctrine of the primacy of perception No.2, p. 54 (as in SD but line 1 becomes line2 and line 2 = line 1 with variants in 2d); SVR, p. 263. 12-13 (as in NM); PrPañ, p. 24 (the second line reads: tadvato knowledge. III.1 Perception indeed is the (only) means of right

'nupapannatvādi anumānakathā kutah). III.2 Since the means of right knowledge is to be non- +Ś1.17. anumānavirodho vā yadi cestavighātakrt | secondary, it is difficult to ascertain an object by means of viruddhāvyabhicāro vā sarvatra sulabhodayah || inference. NM, Ch. 2, Part 1, p. 179. 1-2; SVR, p. 263.14-15 (v. 2) (c. viruddhāvyabhicārastu). IV. The doctrine of the denial of rebirth and the other-world +Ś1.18. tatra dhūmānumānādeh prāmānyam kena nesyate ato hi sādhyam budhyante tārkikairakșala api || IV.I There is no means of knowledge for determining NM, Ch. 2, Part 1, p. 184. 8-9. (the existence of) the other-world. +Śl.19. yattvātmeśvara-sarvajña-paralokādigocaram | IV.2 There is no other-world because of the absence of anumānam na tasyestam prāmānyam tattvadarsibhiķ || any other-worldly being (i.e., the transmigrating self). NM, Ch. 2, Part 1, p. 184. 10-11. IV.3 Due to the insubstantiality of consciousness (resid- +Ś1.20. rjūnām jāyate tasmānna tāvad anumeyadhīh ing in the other-world. yāvat kuțilitam ceto na teşām vițatārkikaih || NM, Ch. 2, Part 1, p. 184. 12-13. V. The doctrine of the uselessness of performing religious acts

TRANSLATION V.1 Religious act is not to be performed. V.2 Its (religion's) instructions are not to be relied upon A. Translation of the aphorisms and pseudo-aphorisms (All trans. are mine).

I. Materialism B. Translation of the extracts from commentaries

I.1 We shall now explain the principle. Comm.1. See a number of such examples in Tattvatīkā I.2 Earth, water, fireandairare the principles, nothingelse. [the commentary on the Cārvākasūtra by Aviddhakarņa]. I.3 Their combination is called the "body", "sense" and Comm.2. Aviddhakarņa had said in Tattvatīkā: "By this "object". means of knowledge (sc. inference) what is conveyed to the

88 Studies on the Cārvaka/Lokāyata Cārvāka Fragments 89

other? What is conveyed has to be admitted by both (the nature of the elements that constitute the body, which brings speaker and the addressee). That is not right. As inference about the experience of diverse pleasures and miseries". is in the form of a verbal statement, not a means of knowl- Comm.11. Udbhata has said in Tattvavrtti: "The one who edge for the speaker, so he conveys (what he has to say) to the framed the definition aimed at brevity of expression, but not other. His effort is to convey, hence admitting (inference) by only because of this does inference become secondary. And if both is not necessary". they were to define the characteristics of probans as attributes Comm.3. Therefore, as has been said by Aviddhakarņa: "It of the thing which is a part of the probandum, there would is true that inference is admitted by us as a source of knowl- be no secondary significance even in the definition" edge, because it is found to be so in general practice; (what Comm.12. In the grasping of the invariable relation of the we only point out is that) the definition of an inferential probans with the probandum, three modes are recognized: mark is illogical". [1] by two unqualified perceptions, [2] by perception along Comm.4. Therefore, as has been said by Aviddhakarņa: "A with a qualified non-perception, and [3] by the process of re- source of knowledge means (an instrument) which produces peated perception as found in worldly behaviour. This apho- an awareness of an object not (already) cognized and there- rism is aimed at those who recognize the probans as gamaka fore, inference is not a source of knowledge, because it is not (capable of yielding knowledge) according to the first mode an instrument for producing a definite awareness ofan object". of grasping. Failure of concomitance is not seen even in the Comm.5. Of something else, i.e., of the unconscious ele- case of probanses well-established in the world; so also it is ments such as earth, etc. which have corporeal forms. By this not noticed in the case of the probanses established in the is shown the conclusion of Aviddhakarņa. scriptures; so, on the basis of the quality characterized by Comm.6. Thus (said) a certain Cārvāka (called) "non-perception of failure of concomitance" being common Aviddhakarņa. to them, the probanses established in the scriptures are admit- Comm.7. The well learned ones are Udbhata and others. ted as being gamaka. It is because of this that inference is sec- Comm.8. The cunning Cārvāka [is] Udbhața. While expli- ondary. Now the knowledge of non-failure of concomitance cating the two aphorisms in the Lokāyatasūtra-s, "We shall now in respect of worldly probanses is instrumental in bringing explain the principle" and "Earth, water, fire and air (are the about the knowledge of the probandum. But that is not there principles)" [see aphorisms I.1 and 2], he described it in an- in the concept of probanses established by the scriptures. So other way, forsaking the conventional interpretation. In the it is not proper that non-perceptible things should be known first aphorism, the term, tattva, tells the impossibility of laying with the help of these. Hence it is said that the ascertainment down any fixed number and essential characteristics of the of things is difficult to attain by dint of inference. sources of knowledge and objects of knowledge. The second Comm.13. Udbhata, too, has said in Tantravrtti [sic]: All aphorism, too, is explained by him as referring to the objects the objections (viz, Viruddha, Virodha-viruddha-vyabhicārin, of knowledge. The word, iti (in the aphorism), "the earth, wa- etc.) you raise against inference apply to the incapable rea- ter, fire and air iti" indicates also the possibility of similar ob- sons (hetu-s), they do not affect capable reasons. jects of knowledge other than the earth, etc. Such is his view. Comm.14. [Literal translation of this passage is beyond my Comm.9. The ancient Cārvāka-s like Bhävivikta and oth- power. I give below only a summary of what Bhatta Udbhata ers explained (the aphorism) "Consciousness (is produced) is alleged to have said]: It cannot be said that the cause at- from the elements", as in the word, bhūtevyah, the fifth declen- tains the nature of the effect, but the effect is something sion (in the ablative case) has been employed. But Udbhata new which appears in the presence of the cause. explains the word, bhūtevyah as having the fourth declension, Comm.15. This respectable veteran twice-born is revealing meaning "consciousness is for (the sake of) the elements; to us a novel way of answering criticism. consciousness is independent and aids the physical elements Comm.16. As said Bhatta Udbhata, "The word, iti, does which constitute the body". Such is the meaning. not denote the end, (but) it is illustrative. There are other Comm.10. As has been said by Udbhata, "It means that principles such as consciousness, sound, pleasure, pain, de- there is an unseen property of the elements, the particular sire, aversion, effort, impression and others. There are also

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prior non-existence of the earth, etc., posterior non-exist- body else's advice)" (utpadya-pratīti) [The former kind is valid, ence, the mutual difference which are quite apparent and but the latter kind is not]. distinct (from the principles, viz., earth, etc.)". [Translations of Bhās. 1,2,17,18,26,27 and 28 are quoted Comm.17. (As) said by Kambalāśvatara. (emended) from Ganganatha Jha's English rendering of the Comm.18. But Purandara said: "The Cārvākas, too, admit TSand TSP; of Bhās. 8,9 and 15 from E.O. Solomon's article; of such an inference as is well-known in the world, but that 19 was translated by C.R. Deshpande (see Bhattacharya Ch. which is called inference [by some], transgressing the worldly 8 n11 below). Bhās. 29, 30 and 31, as translated by Mrinal way, is prohibited [by them]". Kanti Gangopadhyaya, are taken from C/L, pp. 154, 140 and Comm.19. "Arranging your arguments in this way, why do 320 respectively. Bhäs. 24 and 25 were restored to Sanskrit you blurt out the commentary of Purandara"? from the Tibetan version by Sanjitkumar Sadhukhan. The Comm.20. Cognition belongs to the group of the four ele- rest are translated by me with the help of Gangopadhyaya ments, such as the earth, etc. which have assumed a corporeal form and Sadhukhan.] -by this is shown the conclusion of Pauram [Paurandaram]. Comm.21. Not only of Purandara and others. C. Translation of the verses attributed to the Cārvāka-s Comm.22. [Purandara] author of a work on the Cārvāka doctrine. 1. There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in Comm.23. Bhavivikta [The name of an ancient Cārvāka another world

philosopher] Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, etc., produce Comm.24. Those who want to prove that there is a previous any real effect. 2. Brhaspati says -The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ... ................ world of the embryonic state with the help of the argument that "the previous intelligence in the embryonic stage is always ascetic's three staves, and smearing one's self with ashes,- preceded by the cessation of an immediately preceding intel- (all these) are the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge ligence", since it is intelligence, like the intelligence coming af- and manliness. ter the embryonic state, cannot stand, as because the instance 3. If a beast slain in the Jyotistoma rite will itself go to given by them is not proper. Man, till he is dead, has only one heaven. stream of intelligence, therefore there is no previous world. Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own Comm.25. The dying consciousness of Devadatta is not father? recognized by another consciousness because the conscious- 4. If Śraddha (offering of rice balls to a dead person) produces ness is about to die, as the dying consciousness of the arhat. gratification to beings who are dead, then oil may rear the Comm.26. The other-world consists in another place, an- flame of an extinguished light. other time, or another state. 5. (If the Śraddha produces gratification to beings who are Comm.27. The body in this world and the body in the oth- dead), then here, too, in the case of the travellers when they er-world being entirely different, the chain of cognitions in start, it is needless to give provisions for the journey. those two bodies cannot be one and the same. 6. If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering (the Comm.28. Remembrance of previous birth cannot be ad- Śräddha) here, then why not give the food down below to mitted, because there is remembrance of all men coming those who are standing on the housetop? from the same village. 7. While life remains let a man live happily; nothing is Comm.29. The Carvaka-s, the well-versed ones, say that beyond death. it is really impossible to specifically state the number of the When once the body becomes ashes, how can it even re- sources of cognition. turn again? Comm.30. Now those who (think themselves to be) more 8. If he who departs from the body goes to another world, well-versed, say that (in fact) there are two kinds of infer- how is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of ence, "some in case of which the inferential cognition can be his kindred? acquired by oneself" (utpanna-pratiti), and "some in case of 9. Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans which the inferential cognition is to be acquired (on some- have established (it) here.

92 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Cārvāka Fragments 93

All these ceremonies for the dead, -there is no other (The translations of Śls. 1-11 are taken from Cowell's fruit anywhere. trans. of SDS (with some modification, particularly in case 10. The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, of Śls. 2 and 7); those of Śls. 13-20 from Mrinal Kanti Gango and demons padhyaya's trans. in C/L, pp. 258, 271, 269, 130, 132, 140 re- All the well-known formulae of the pandits, jarphari spectively (with some modification, particularly in the cases turphari, &c. of Śls. 13-14). Śl. 12 has been translated by me. As for the 11. And all the rites for the queen (e.g., holding the penis of reasons for choosing the readings I have adopted, see Chs. the horse) commanded in the Asvamedha (the Horsesacrifice). 20-22 below.) These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of presents to the priests. COMMENTS While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling demons. A. Comments on the aphorisms and pseudo-aphorisms 12. O, the naked one (Jain), ascetic (Buddhist), dimwit, given to practising physical hardship! Who has taught you D.R. Shastri and Namai include all kinds of fragments this way of leading life? -complete aphorisms and verses as well as extracts from 13. Man consists of only as much as is within the scope of the works of critics of the Carvaka (Shastri even accepts pas- the senses. What the vastly learned ones speak of (as true) is sages from poems and plays in which Cārvaka is ridiculed)- but similar to (the statement) "Oh! Dear! Look at the foot- purporting to represent the Cārvāka doctrine. I omit some print of the wolf!" of them as doubtful. Hence some explanation of why cer- 14. O! The one with beautiful eyes! Drink and eat (as you tain fragments are not admitted is only to be expected. In like). O! The one with a charming body! That which is past what follows I append the reasons. does not belong to you. O! The timid one! The past never Both Shastri and Namai adopt the following fragments: comes back. This body is nothing but a collectivity. kāma evaikah purusarthah, "pleasure is the only aim of life" (Ś5, 15. Penances are only various forms of torments, and ab- N A 15). It is found in a seventeenth-century work, ABS by stinence is only depriving oneself of consuming (the pleas- Sadānanda Kāśmīraka. Other writers such as Śrīdhara (before ures of life). The rituals of Agnihotra, etc., appear only to the fifteenth century), Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (sixteenth cen- be child's play. tury) and Nilakantha (seventeenth century) in their respective 16. No concomitance being possible in the case of the par- commentaries on the Gita, 13.11, mention it. However, Shastri ticular and there being the charge of "proving the proved" in himself includes another fragment, arthakāmau purusārthau, the case of the universal, the subject cannot be justified as a "Wealth and pleasure are the two aims of life" ($ 27) which is locus of the probandum. How can, therefore, one talk about found in two earlier sources, viz. the PCand SDS.53 inference (as a source of valid knowledge)? What are we to believe, then? Did the Cārvaka-s admit of 17. It is easily possible to find, in all cases, that one's infer- only one aim of life or two? The question itself needs to be ence is contradicted either by probans "which nullifies one's questioned. It is extremely doubtful whether the Cārvāka-s own thesis", or by a probans "which is an invariable opposite". at all used to speak or write in terms of purusartha, a typically 18. Indeed, who will deny the validity of inference when Brahminical concept. It seems the detractors of the Cārvāka one infers fire from smoke, and so on; for even ordinary peo- did not know what the Cārvaka view was in this regard. So ple ascertain the probandum by such inferences, though they they elected to foist on the Carvaka what they considered may not be pestered by the logicians. to be improper and/or despicable. Some chose 'pleasure' 19. However, inferences that seek to prove a self, God, an only, some others decided to add 'wealth' as well. Both are omniscient being, the other-world, and so on, are not consid- mere conjectures, not based on any statement found in any ered valid by those who know the real nature of things. authentic Carvaka source. So I reject Ś5 and Ś27. 20. Simple-minded people cannot derive the knowledge of probandum by such inferences, so long as their mind is not vitiated by cunning logicians. 53 PC, Act 2, 40; SDS, Ch. 1, 2.19-20.

94 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Cārvāka Fragments 95

For similar reasons I have desisted from accepting N A12: they will bear any fruit at all" (KS, 1.2.26-27; Ś 10-11, N A17- maranam evapavargah, "death indeed is emancipation" (also 18). Vatsyāyana then "cites" a few quotable quotes which taken from ABS). Apavarga, like purusārtha, is a concept rel- have been accepted by almost all modern scholars as genu- evant to the believer in rebirth, from the cycle of which a ine Cārvaka aphorisms, viz., pious man seeks to be released. But the Carvāka-s denied and ridiculed the very idea of rebirth and emancipation. So ko hy abāliśo hastagatam paragatam kuryat, "who but a fool would, the use of such a term is not to be expected of them. Some give away that which is in his own hands into the hands of an Cārväka might have once said something to this effect: "What other?" (KS, 1.2,28, S 12, N A19). do you people mean by emancipation? Death is the end of life. The cycle of birth, death and rebirth, and the possibil- varamadyakapotah śvo mayūrāt, "it is much better to have a pi- geon in hand today than a peacock tomorrow." (KS, 1.2.29; S ity of final emancipation are mere figments of the imagina- 13, N A20). tion". Hence some opponents of the Cārvaka might have framed this "aphorism". A variant of this (mrtyurevapavargah) varam sāmsayikānnişkādasāmsayikah kārșāpanah, "a genuine is found in the PC.54 Shastri includes it as a separate frag- copper coin is better than a dubious gold coin" (KS, 1.2.30; ment ($ 30). That, too, is therefore dispensed with. Ś 14, N A21). Now to a cluster of fragments from Vātsyāyana's KS. Al- most all scholars before and after Shastri and Namai have The commentator of the KS has shown that 1.2.29 is re- accepted them as authentic Cārvāka aphorisms. Let us look lated to 1.2.26. The Mīmamsakas, too, admitted that the at them one by one. fruit of religion is not always available immediately, it is to Speaking of the three aims of life, viz., virtue, pleasure and be expected in the future. KS, 1.2.26 seems to be an echo wealth, Vätsyayana mentions three groups of people: The of this declaration. Similarly KS, 1.2.30 is related to 1.2.27. Lokāyatika-s who say na dharmāmścaret, "religious acts are not And KS 1.2.29 and 1.2.30 are merely popular maxims, lauki- to be practised" (Ś 9, N A16), the followers of the doctrine ka nyaya-s.58 They cannot be regarded as aphorisms of any of wealth who prohibit pleasure, and those of the doctrine of philosophical school. KS, 1.2.28, too, is a mere rhetorical pleasure who say that searching for wealth is useless.55 Thus question. Vätsyāyana also represents the views of the artha- each group upholds only two aims of life, wealth and pleas- and käla-cintaka-s in the form of aphorisms. But there is no ure, virtue and wealth, and virtue and pleasure respectively. evidence that these two groups had any set of aphorisms of Vätsyāyana himself prefers to follow all the three aims of life their own. as does Kautilya.56 The only difference between them is that Then where does Vätsyayana get those so-called apho- Kauțilya considers wealth to be the foremost of the three risms? The only plausible answer is that he authored them aims,57 whereas Vātsyāyana apparently thinks pleasure to be himself. The same is true of the alleged aphorisms attributed so. However, as I have argued above, the Cārvāka-s presum- to the Lokäyatika-s. Even if the ideas contained in them tally ably did not think in terms of the so-called aims of life at all. with those of the Carvaka, they cannot have been composed Vātsyāyana simply conjures up three schools of thinkers who by any Cārvaka philosopher. If the word dharma is taken to were not trivargavādin-s, but dvivargavādin-s. mean yajña, "ritual sacrifice", KS, 1.2.26-27 might have also Vātsyāyana then makes all the three groups spell out their originated from the Jain and Buddhist circles, for they, too, doctrines. The Lokäyatika-s are made to say as follows: esyat were opposed to the Vedic sacrificial cult phalatvat, sāmśayikatvācca, "for they do not bear any fruit in Now to Ś 53-54. Namai takes them to be one (N Bl). The this world and (at the same time) it is also doubtful whether fragment/-s runs/run as follows:

laukiko mārgo 'nusartavyah. lokavyavahāram prati sadrśau bālapanditau. 54 PC, Act 2, 40. 55 KS, 1.2.32-47. 56 KS, 1.2.51; KA, 1.7.3-7. 57 KA, 1.7.6-7. 58 See Jacob, I: 44.

Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Cārvāka Fragments 97 96

The worldly way should be followed. In respect to worldly of objections" (Ś 23), is taken from the TBV. But in an ear- practice the child (i.e., the unwise) and the learned one are lier source, this sentence is called a sūkta, not a sūtra, as the TBV calls it.62 So it need not be accepted as a genuine similar. Cārvāka saying. On the other hand, it apparently reflects the Both are taken from the TUS. But, as Eli Franco has shown, view of the opponents of the Cārvaka, such as Jayantabhatta, both belong to the category of popular maxims and on the who similarly explained: "In the Lokāyata view, no precept two occasions the second sentence occurs in the Vyo, "the is indeed (positively) prescribed. It is only the assertions of context of the discussion has nothing to do with Lokāyata".59 a Vaitandika (representing merely, the destructive criticism Ś 15 runs as follows: śarīrendriyasanghāta eva cetanah of others). It is not really a body of precepts".63 So Ś 23 does ksetrajñah, "the union of the body and senses is conscious- not and cannot originate from any Cārvāka source. ness". Madhusūdana Sarasvatī quotes it in his commentary Ś 24-34 are taken from Krsnamiśra's allegorical play, PC. on the Gita, 13.6. In the same passage, while expounding They are all quoted from the speech of Cārväka, one of the the Nyaya view on consciousness, he refers to NS, 1.1.10. dramatis personae in the play, allied to a group of vicious side by side with the Lokāyatika view. But the term, ksetrajña characters. Even though some of the sayings of this Cārvāka is found exclusively in Sāmkhya; to be more exact, in the correspond to the Lokäyata view found in other sources epic Sāmkhya.60 It is highly improbable that a Cārvāka apho- (e.g., S 25~ our III.1, $ 26~ our I.2, Ś28~ our I.3, Ś 29 ~ our rism would contain such a term. IV.1, and Ś 34 ~ our Śls. 8-9), some others are manufactured kāma eva prāņinām kāranam, "pleasure is the cause of (the by Krsnamiśra himself to suit the context of the play. Thus birth of) animals" (Ś 16), is taken from Sankara's commen- Cārvāka teaches his disciple: lokāyatameva śāstram, "Lokāyata tary on the Gīta, 16.8. Sankara refers to it as "the view of the is indeed the science" ($ 24). There is no reason to regard ...................... Lokāyatikas". The view, however, is essentially Vedic. As the it as an aphorism. famous Nāsadīya hymn (Rgveda, 10.129.4) says: Ś 27 and Ś 30 have already been discussed above. Ś 31 and Ś 32 run as follows: dandanītireva vidyā and atraiva Desire in the beginning came upon that, (desire) that was the vartantarbhavati, "penal code (lit. the rule of the rod) is the first seed of mind. Sages seeking in their hearts with wisdom science (of polity)" and "agriculture, animal husbandry, found out the bond of the existent in the non-existent.61 trade and commerce, etc. are included in it". The bases of these two sentences lie in taking Brhaspati to be the author of So there is no reason why the sentence found in Sankara both the Bārhaspatyasūtra and the Bārhaspatya Arthaśāstra.64 should be taken as a Cārvāka aphorism. But the fragments of Brhaspati Smrti show that the author was etāvāneva puruso yāvān indriyagocarah, "man is as much as is a great admirer of Manu, and the lost Brhaspati Arthaśāstra admissible to the senses" (S 19), is the first line of a verse (SI. must have belonged to the same Brahminical tradition to 13 of ours). Namai has taken the whole verse (N B2). Shastri which the KA belongs.65 So the idea of vārtā and dandanīti as was apparently led by the TSP to adopt the first line only parts of the Carvaka doctrine is utterly misconceived. Similarly, kāyādevatatojñānamprāņāpanādyadhisthitādyuktam Moreover, one should be wary of accepting any view put jayate, "consciousness proceeds from the body equipped with in the mouth of a character in a play as a truthful represen- (the life breaths), Prana, Apana and the rest" ($ 22), is taken tation of a philosophical system. Just think of Socrates as from Kambalāśvatara's exposition of the Cārvākasūtra (Bhā. 7 presented in Aristophanes' Clouds. And think how the two of ours), and is not an aphorism by itself. Buddhist and Jain monks are represented in the AD and the sarvatra paryanuyogaparānyeva sūtrāņi brhaspateh, "the aphorisms of Brhaspati are everywhere merely for the sake 62 SVȚ, 277; Vidyānanda's Pramāņaparīkșā, accr. Franco (1987, 1999), 6 and 47; TSV, 70; PVSVT, 26. See also Ch. 15 below. II: 108, 172. 59 Franco (1987, 1994), Introduction, 43-44 and 299 n4. See also Vyo, 63 NM, Ch. 4, II: 388 (C/L, 157). 64 Cf. SMS, 15; D.R. Shastri (1982), 154. 60 Cf. Mbh, Śāntiparvan, crit. ed., 204.8, 211.12, 228.10, 308.105, etc. 65 Aiyangar, 27.3. See also Ch. 1 above. 61 Trans. A.A. Macdonell, 209.

98 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Cārvāka Fragments 99

PC.66 If one is to form one's opinion about the doctrines of Ś N RB Buddhism and Jainism solely on the basis of the AD and the A1 I.1 2355456 PC, the result would be, to say the least, ludicrous. No seri- 2 A2,3 I.2, 1.3 ous student of philosophy would do so. But when it comes A4 I.4 to the Cārvaka doctrine, Radhakrishnan, Moore and many N RB others have blindly accepted the PC to be a reliable source.67 4 A5 I.5 But such sources as the AD, PCand NCare always to be treat- A15 ed as dubious, and, unless confirmed by cross-reference, 6 A14

should better be left out of discussion. 7 A10 Ś 36-38 are taken from the ABS. They represent the 8 A12 9 views of those who believe "the senses", "mind" and "life" A16 10 to be the self.68 Sadānanda Kāśmīraka does not explic- A17 itly attribute them to the Cārvaka-s: he simply mentions 11 A18 "some", "others", etc. The fact is that all the three doc- 12 A19 trines have their origin in the Upanisads69 long before the 12 A19 Cārvāka-s appeared in the arena. The Vedāntins, right from 13 A20 14 A2 Śankara down to Sadānanda Yati or Yogīndra or Sarasvatī (c. fifteenth-sixteenth century), mention several views of 15 the self held by different schools.70 The Cārvāka-s have tradi- 16 17 A11 tionally been branded as dehatmavadin-s.71 Any other theory IV.2 18 F4 which takes "the senses" or "mind" or "life" or anything else Bhã.28 19 B2 Ś1.13 as the self is alien to the Cārvāka-s.72 Nor is there. any evi- 20 21 A13 dence that such theories were propounded by other Cārvāka 22 D1 see, III.1 schools.78 Thus Ś 36-38 cannot be accepted as Cārvaka frag- 23 A9, C1 III.2 1.7 ments proper. F5 I append below a concordance of the fragments: 24 25 See A13 II.1 26 27 66 AD, Acts 1 and 2; PC, Act 3. Cf. Mattavilasaprahasana by Mahendra 28

Vikramavarman. 29 67 Radhakrishnan(1980), 278n; Radhakrishnan-Moore, 247-249; D.R. 30 Shastri (1928), aphorisms 59, 70 and 86; Pathak (1990), 139-141. 31 68 ABS, Ch. 2, p. 101. 69 Cf. Tt. Up., 2.1.1, 2.2.1, 2.3.1 and Ch. Up., 5.1.7. 32 70 ŚBh on BS, 1.1.1; VS, Ch. 3.123-127, 69-72. 33 71 SDS, 6.53, see also ŚBh, 81, 850; Vyo, II: 126; PrPañ, Ch. 8, 320. 34 72 Vyo, II: 126, refers to the indriyacaitanyavadin-s and 35 D2 Bhã.17 manaścaitanyavādin-s; SVSS, vv. 523-576, to many others. ST, 5.19, 20- 36 24, too, mentions indriyātmavāda, mana-ātmavāda and prāņātmadvāda besides dehātmavāda. According to Subrahmanya Sastri, those who 37 say, deham eva ātmā are the Carvāka-s, but those who call the senses 38 - (indriya-s) to be so, are the Pauranika-s (see PrPañ, 315 nn5 and 7). 39 B4 Ś1.] 73 Opinions differed regarding the interpretation of some aphorisms 40 B7 Ś1.2 among the commentators of the Cārvākasūtra (see Bhās. 18 and 19 regard- 41 B8 Ś1.3 ing I.1, 2 and 4). But as regards I.6-8 no such difference is known to have 42 B9 existed. Ś1.4

Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Cārvāka Fragments 101 100

Ś N RB C. Comments on the verses attributed to the Cārvāka-s

43 B10 Ś1.5 B11 Ś1.6 As is evident from the verses printed above, they are mostly 44 taken from the SDS (eleven out of twenty). 45 B3 Ś1.7 I have first concentrated exclusively on such verses as have 46 B12 Ś1.8 47 B13 Ś1.9 been cited in well-known philosophical digests like the SDSand

48 B14 Ś1.10 independent philosophical works like the TUS. Some of these 49 B15-16 Ś1.11 verses are quoted directly from the Purānas and Upapurāņas. Now, there are also other verses attributed directly or indi- 50 51 B6 Ś1.12 rectly to the Carvaka-s in the same sources (some verses there

52 have been attributed to Brhaspati). There is no reason why 53 B1 they, too, should not be admitted as Cārvaka fragments. The 54 B1 only problem is that there is no evidence to prove that the verses are quoted from some authentic Cārvaka source. Hence B. Comments on the extracts from commentaries I have desisted from including such verses in this collection. It is rather strange that neither D.R. Shastri nor Namai has The extracts from the commentaries on the Cārvakasūtra included some other verses found in the VPu, PPu and VDMP. (in so far as they can be identified with some degree of certi- Similarly if the etāvān eva verse (our $1.13) is included, why tude) have been arranged alphabetically by the names of the should the verse that follows in Haribhadra's SDSam be left commentators (Bhas.1-23; rest are anonymous). So far five out? It neatly rounds off the parable of the wolf's footprint.78 names have been found mentioned in different philosophical One significant omission in all previous collections is works, viz., Aviddhakarņa, Udbhața Bhațța (Bhațțodbhața), another verse found in no fewer than twelve sources: visese Kambalāśvatara, Purandara and Bhāvivikta. All but Udbhața anugamābhāvāt, etc. (our $1.16). Similarly four verses in NM belonged to or before the eighth century CE; Udbhata, too, appear to be direct quotations (versified) from some Cārvāka must have flourished by or before the ninth.74 The names of source. I am inclined to adopt them as genuine Cārvāka frag- Aviddhakarna and Bhävivikta are also referred to in context ments (our Śls.17-20). of Nyāya. Whether they were Naiyāyika-s turned Cārvāka-s or Versified versions of the materialist doctrine are also vice versa or two different persons altogether cannot be as- found in the Mbh, Santiparvan, 2.11.22-30 and in the Ram., certained at the present stage of our knowledge.75 Ayodhyākāņda, 100.2-17. But, very much like the verses Of the five, Udbhata appears to have been an odd man found in the Puranas mentioned above, these passages can- out who sought to bring the Cārvāka doctrine closer to not be definitely attributed to any authentic Cārvāka source. Nyäya.76 He interpreted three fundamental aphorisms of As to the Puranas, the most detailed account of the nāstika the Cārvākasūtra (our I.1,1.2 and I.4) in a novel manner (see doctrines is found in the PPu, Srstikhanda, Ch. 13.79 This is Bhäs. 13 and 14). He may very well be regarded as a "revision- a part of a general denunciation of the Jains, Buddhists and ist" among the later Cārvākasūtra commentators. Cārvāka-s. The passage in the PPu is taken almost verbatim That there were several schools of interpretations of the from VPu, 3.18.24-29. As I have mentioned above, some of the Cārvāka aphorisms even before the eighth century is clear verses may very well be treated as ābhānaka-s and lokagāthā-s. from the TSP and other sources.77 But nothing definite is Māțhara has, in fact, quoted a verse from the PPu.80 The ABS, known about them. too, quotes from the VPu.81

74 See NCC, Vols. I, II and XII. 78 See Ch. 15 below. 75 See Franco (1997), 99 and 142, and Ch. 8 below. 79 Vangavasi ed., vv. 366-371; Anandashrama ed., vv. 370-376. 76 See Solomon, 990-991 and Franco, ibid. 80 PPu, Vangavasi ed., Srstikhaņda, 13.327. Quoted in MVr, on SK, v. 77 TSP on TS, vv. 1857-1858, 633-634; NKC, 342; PKM, 116-117; SVR, 2, 111

1081, 1086. 81 ABS, 100-101, quoting four verses from VPu, 3.18.24-27.

102 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Cārvāka Fragments 103

To the best of my knowledge nobody has referred to The basic issues raised in the verses are as follows: the chapters on the Carvaka in Sarvadarsanasiromanih by (a) Futility of animal sacrifice (with or without the doc- Śrīkāñci Rāmānujācārya and the two SDKaumudi-s, the first trine of non-violence and vegetarianism). by Mädhava Sarasvatī (sixteenth century) and the second by (b) Rejection of the irrational Paņdit Dāmodara Mahāpatraśāstrī (twentieth century) pub- (c) Refusal to believe in any verbal testimony which ap- lished as late as 1965.82 The latter is a mere rehash of the pears contrary to reason. prevalent (mostly wrong) views regarding the Cārvaka-s. He These three are all compatible with the Cārvāka doctrine quotes all the eleven verses from the SDS and one each from as we know it today. But the insistence on vegetarianism the Bhagavata-purana and Brhaspatismrti. (implied in our $1.11) along with (a) raises one pertinent Verses containing the Carvaka view also occur in Harib- Buddhists? question: does it emanate from the Carvaka-s or from the hadra's LTNand SVS, Jayantabhatta's AD, Siddharsi's UBhPK, Krsnamiśra's PC, Hemacandra's TSPC, and Śrīharșa's NC. In connection with some verses in the SDS, E.B. Cow- However, most of the verses attributed to Cārvaka or his fol- ell referred to Eugene Burnouf's Introduction à l'histoire du lowers are the authors' own composition. Therefore, they Buddhism Indien, p. 209.85 It contains a French translation are not fit to be included in the collection of Cārvaka frag- of a passage from the SKA. F. Max Müller (1878) also re- ments. The same remark applies to such philosophical di- marked: ........ ......: gests as the SSS and the SVSS. Although Santaraksita sometimes quotes from the works Some of these objections [in SDS] may be of later date, but most of them are clearly Buddhistic. The retort, why if a vic- of his opponents (e.g., from Kumārila and Bhartrhari), it tim slain at a sacrifice goes to heaven, does not a man sacri- is doubtful whether he has also done so in the TS, Ch. 22. fice his own father, is, as Professor Burnouf has shown, the Haribhadra and Rājasekhara have quoted two verses which very argument used by Buddhist controversialists.86 ........ ......... . are elsewhere attributed to the Lokāyatika-s (our Śls. 13- 14). There is nothing to show if any other verse in the two Müller also refers to guru Jābāli's speech in Rām., SDSam-s is of the same kind Ayodhyākāņda, 109.14ff (vul. ed.).87 Similar objections to There is an anthology of verses called RKD compiled ritual violence are found in the writings of the Jains. So, we by Jagannāthamiśra in which a number of verses have can never be sure whether SDS, vv. 3 and 11 (our Śls.3 and been quoted from a lost play called Bhaktivaibhava by Kavi 11) originated from the Buddhist or from Jain sources. In Dindima. The RKD is a very late work compiled between deriding the Brahmins, the DA says that the cruel Brahmins 1725 and 1775 CE somewhere in Orissa. Nothing is known devised animal sacrifice in order to partake of meat, a view about indima. So, not much credence is to be given to the which tallies with that of SDS, v. 11. authenticity of the verses attributed to Carvaka.83 The play We may close our discussion on the note that only some seems to have been influenced by the PC. twenty verses can be taken as belonging to the Cārvāka, Mention may also be made of the verses printed by Sarvanan- although there is no guarantee that even these were com- da Pathak in 1960.84 Unfortunately Pathak merely informs us posed by some Cārvāka philosophers. It is more probable that he got the verses from a manuscript (incomplete) but that the satirical verses were current in one or the other ....... does not furnish any details of its author, date, etc. It may very part of India and were orally transmitted. Hence they are well be a recent work. In any case, it does not warrant much called ābhāņaka-s and lokagāthā-s. Since many of them re- discussion since content-wise there is nothing new. flected the spirit of doubt and denunciation of Vedic re-

82 The second ed. was published by Odiśā Sāhitya Ekādemī (Academy), 85 SDS (trans.), 16 n20. Cowell refers to the first ed. of Burnouf's work Bhub(v)aneshwar in 1993. (1844). Burnouf translated long extracts from the Sārdūlakarņāvadāna 83 Vv. 106-109 (p. 507); vv. 384-385 (p. 605); vv. 516-550 (628-631). Vv. (in DA) on 205-210 521-532 are reproduced from SDS, 2.17-18, 5.50-51 and 13.110-115.132. 86 Müller (1901), 145. He, too, refers to Burnouf (1844), 209. 84 See Pathak (1960). 87 Ibid., 145 nl.

104 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

ligious rites, they were attributed to the Cārvāka-s at least from the sixth century CE. Together they constitute the counterpoint in Indian philosophy -the extreme left wing, so to say.88 Against this trend all other philosophical systems, Brahminical, Buddhist and Jain, rallied all their force, leav- ing no weapon unused (calumny not excluded).

VII On the Authenticity of an Alleged Cārvāka Aphorism

Erich Frauwallner's History of Indian Philosophy is regarded, particularly in the West, as an authentic and authoritative work on the subject. No doubt it deserves high praise for the meth- od employed by the learned author (though his political phi- losophy was, to say the least, reprehensible) and his thorough grip over the whole matter.1 In the last chapter of the work he deals with materialism in India. The situation, he says,

became more difficult at the end of the classical period of Indian philosophy, when logical and epistemological ques- tions moved to the forefront of interest and when every system was compelled to take into consideration, on which their sys- tems were founded [ ... ] Partly one tried to hold fast to the old line, as, for instance, when one explained: "The aphorisms of Brhaspati have only this aim, viz. to refute the opponent". But in the majority of cases one decided to discuss the doctrine of inference and to take it over at least in parts. This desertion of the original attitude led, in no way, to the consequence of the decline of the system. The taking up of foreign thoughts and occupation with them led, on the contrary, to a regular activity and to a blossoming up of a literature richer than hitherto.2 88 Cowell once (1862) noted: "We can only tell that at a very early period in Hindu speculation, the 'negative arm' was unusually vigorous; and it would not perhaps be impossible to reconstruct from still extant allusions a complete series (though not in chronological order), corre- 1 K.K. Dixit (1971) pays handsome tribute to this work. sponding in Greek philosophy to that from Xenophanes to Sextus Em- 2 Eng. trans. II: 225. Frauwallner quotes the alleged aphorism from piricus" (382). Abhayadeva's TBV, 70. It also occurs elsewhere. See nn 5, 6 and 7 below.

106 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata An Alleged Cārvāka Aphorism 107

Unfortunately Frauwallner did not have the time or the Now, as Franco notices, "[T]he ideological affinity be- scope to elaborate the 'blossoming' of the later period which tween this fragment and Jayarasi's interpretation of the is disregarded by other scholars. We may presume that he had Brhaspatisūtra is quite obvious."6 This is how the arch scep- Purandara, Aviddhakarņa and Udbhața in mind. Whatever lit- tic would deny the validity of inference along with all other tle we know of them from the works of Kamalasila, Cakradhara, means of knowledge acknowledged by the Naiyāyikas. Ananatavīrya, Vādidevasūri, Vādirājasūri and Karņakagomin What then about the charge of paryanuyoga, raising ques- is adequate to make us agree with Frauwallner's view that the tions about the doctrines of others without stating one's literature really became richer in their hands. own? This is precisely the objection to the Carvaka-s noted In spite of my overall agreement with Frauwallner's opin- by Jayantabhatta. If the Cārvāka-s themselves had admitted ion, I would like to point out that the later materialists in In- this, there would be no occasion for finding fault with them. dia did not give up the original attitude of the Cārvaka-s, and Let us see how Jayantabhatta attacks the Cārvāka-s: the sentence he quoted as epitomizing the 'old line', "The aphorisms of Brhaspati have only this aim, viz. to refute the In the Lokāyata view, no precept is indeed (positively) pre- opponent", is at best dubious, if not altogether wrong. scribed. It is only the assertions of a Vaitandika [disputer] The sentence referred to by Frauwallner is first en- (representing, merely, the destructive criticism of others). It countered in the TBV: sarvatra paryanuyogaparāni eva is not really a body of precepts.7 sutrāni brhaspateh.3 Although Abhayadevasūri writes that the Cārvāka-s themselves declared so (iti cārvākaih abhihi- What then about such aphorisms as "Live in pleasure tam), the sentence has the unmistakable ring of the voice of as long as you live?"8 Jayantabhatta dismisses the saying in Cārvākas' opponents. It is to be noted that Anantavirya, an- the following manner: "No. The fact being naturally estab- other Jain scholar, quoted the same sentence with one vari- lished, a prescription in this regard becomes useless." In ation (paraparyanuyogaparāni brhaspateh sūtrāņi) but called other words, this affirmative instruction too is no prescrip- it a sūkta, "a good or friendly speech, wise remark", not a tion. Jayanta further says: sūtra.4 Vidyānanda also quoted this sentence but clearly as- sociated it with the tattvopaplavavadin-s (whom he brackets As to the instructions "Religious act is not to be practised", with the Buddhist nihilists and Vedäntin brahmaists, most "Its (religion's) instructions are not to be relied upon", etc. (it is to be noted that) they are not really proper instruc- probably the Sankaraites). Similarly, Karņakagomin refers tions, for the Lokāyata doctrine is based only upon such to this sentence in connection with the validity of inference statements as representing the viewpoint of the opponent. and quotes the first line of a famous but unidentified verse Thus, there are subsequent Brähmana statements replying ( viśese 'nugamābhāvah sāmānye siddhasādhanam).5 (to the previous ones): "Well, I am not preaching ignorance. This self, indeed, is indestructible. It only has a connection with the senses, etc. (The self is not born; it can only have The saying has been accepted as an authentic Cārvaka aphorism by D.R. connection with newer senses, etc.)" (cf. Br.Up. 4.5. 14) Shastri, 1351 BS (1944), 15-16, later printed as an appendix in (1959), 173-76; (1982), 200-03 (the saying is numbered as Aphorism 23); Namai And there he rests his case: (1976), 39-44 (No. F5). 3 Abhayadevasūri, however, is not the first person to mention this Thus due to its being based upon statements representing sentence. See n4. 4 SVT, 277. The gloss on sukta is quoted from Monier-Williams' only the viewpoint of the opponent, the doctrine of the Dictionary. 3 Franco ((1994), 6 and 47 n9) refers to Vidyānanda's Pramānaparīkșā (Kashi, 1914, p.62); the passage from the TSV was quoted earlier in the Franco (1994), 6. I, however, do not share his view that there were editio princeps of the TUS, vii. -Karņakagomin writes: punaś tatrāpi sa eva two kinds of Lokāyatika-s -materialists and sceptics, and Jayarāsibhatța paryanuyoga ityevam sarvatra paryanuyogaparānyeva sūtraņi, tathā ca sūtra, belonged to the latter. 'viśeşe 'nugamābhavah sāmānye siddhasādhanam' (PVSVȚ, 26. Franco does NM, Ch. 4, II: 388; C/L, 157. not cite this). The last line quoted by Karnakagomin also occurs in many 8 For the continuously changing reading of this well-known verse, see other works. See Ch. 6, Sl. 16 above. Ch. 20 below.

108 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

Lokäyata is not an independent one; and because it is contra- dicted by later statements, it is not to be taken into account.

So the fragment quoted by Abhayadevasuri and so far ac- cepted by all scholars (D. Shastri, Frauwallner, Namai, Franco and others) cannot be taken as an authentic Cārvāka apho- rism. It represents the view of the opponents of the Cārvāka and is meant to mislead the students of Indian materialism. The lost collection of Carvaka aphorisms contained both positive and negative instructions (although Jayantabhatta tried to explain away the former set) and in spite of some differences in the interpretation of a few aphorisms, the po- sition of the materialists in ancient India (upto the twelfth VIII century) remained basically the same. Paurandarasūtra Revisited

The name of Purandara, a Cārvaka philosopher, was un- known to modern scholars before 1914. It was from the edi- tio princeps of Vadidevasuri's SVR that they came to know of a work called Paurandaram sūtram along with an apho- rism quoted from it: pramānasya gauņatvād (sic) anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhah.1 The SVR, however, does not seem to have attracted much attention. P.D. Gune in his intro- duction to the edition of Dhanapāla's Bhavisayatthakahā (1923) refers to a verse which mentions, among others, Akalanka and Purandara. He then quotes from the mar- ginal notes on a passage found in a MS of Pupphadanta's Tisatthimahāpurisagunālamkāra which identified Akalanka as nyāyakārakartā and Purandara as cārvākamate granthakartā.2 G. Tucci noticed this reference and mentioned it in a paper in 1925.3 None of them refers to the SVR.

1 SVR, 131 (as quoted by S.N. Dasgupta, III: 536). In a later edition of SVR (ed. M.L. Osval), the passage occurs on 265. The reading of this aphorism was later emended (e.g. by E.A. Solomon (1977-78), see n29) to pramānasyāgaunatvād, etc. See also nn 4, 5 below. 2 Dhanapāla, 42. Gune calls such marginal notes "sometimes so useful to editors of Jain-Prakrit works". 3 Tucci in C/L, 386.

110 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Paurandarasūtra Revisited 111

The aphorism quoted in the SVR was also found in Franco has rightly noted. "This is probably the most significant Abhayadevasüri's TBV, first published in 1924 with a vari- contribution of Purandara to the Lokäyata school (at least it is ant reading: pramānasyāgaunatvād, etc., though there is no the one for which he is remembered) [ ... ]".10 mention of Purandara in this work.4 P.L. Vaidya seems to have missed all this. In his edition The aphorism itself, however, was not a discovery. It (1937) of Puspadanta's Mahapurāna (Tisaļthimahāpurisaguņ was known from the first edition of the NM (1895) but it ālamkära), while explaining the term, pauramdariya vitti, he was not attributed to any work called Paurandaram sūtram.5 said, "The doctrine of Purandara, i.e. Indra, who along with Prabhacandra also cited this aphorism in the PKM but spoke Brhaspati is mentioned as founder of the Carvaka school".1 of the Cārvāka-s in general, not specifically of Purandara.6 The passage, however, leaves us in no doubt that this Later it was found that others too had quoted the same aph- Purandara can be no other than the "author belonging to orism without, however, naming Purandara.7 the Cārvāka doctrine" (mentioned above). What Puspadanta The publication of the TS and TSP (1926) was an epoch- adds to our knowledge is that Purandara was not only the making event in many respects. Here, for the first time, was author of a sutra-work, but that of a short commentary (or found a complete sentence attributed to Purandara: "The auto-commentary) as well (as might be deduced from the Cārvāka-s too admit of such an inference as is well-known in the sentence quoted by Kamalaśīla). world, but that which is called inference [by some], transgress- Another reference to Purandara was subsequently found ing the worldly way, is prohibited [by them]".8 Though D.R. in Vādirājasūri's NVV (1954).12 The work names not only Shastri, Mamoru Namai and others have taken this fragment Purandara but also Aviddhakarņa (whom Vādirājasūri iden- to be an aphorism from the now-lost Bārhaspatya/Cārvāka/ tifies as cārvakaviśesa while explaining the word, kaścana in Lokāyatasūtram9 it appears to be extracted from a commentary. Akalańka's text).13 With the publication of Anantavirya's SVT (1959) an- other aphorism from Purandara's sutra-work came to light: 4 TBV, I: 70. The editors referred to the variant reading as found in two caitanya[ viśişta]sya mūrtasya jñānam14 (the emendation other MSS as well as to SVR, 131 (in 70 n2). -within square brackets- was suggested by the editor, Ma- 5 (1895), 118, 123. See also NM, I: 177 (pramānasyā gauņatvād, etc.) and hendrakumara Nyayacarya). 183 (pramanasyāgaunatvād, etc.). G. Sastri here faithfully followed the ear- lier texts of the work (1936), 108, 112 and the commentary by Cakradhara (1972), 62. Subsequent references to the NM are to G. Sastri's (1982-84) edition D1). Namai refers only to Pathak's work, taking him to be the first com- à PKM (1941), 180. The text was first printed by the same publisher in piler of the Carvaka aphorisms (which he is not). 1912 but the copy of it is not available to me. 10 Franco (1991), 159. 7 Vyo (1930), 575; NM, II: 161; NBh, 210 (pramānasyāgauņatvād 11 Mahäp (1937), I: 643. The text reads: emeya karivi appaniya utti | kim arthaniścayo durlabha iti); PVSVȚ, 25. None of them, however, as- jampasi pauramdariya vitti ("Arranging your arguments in this way, why do cribes this aphorism to Purandara. Franco noted all this in his paper, you blurt out the commentry of Purandara?"), xx, 18.9ab, 328. Vaidya in a "Paurandarasūtra" (1991), 161 nl. gloss in Sanskrit explained pauramdariya vitti as cārvākamatam (idem). -I 8 TSP (1926), 421; TSP (1968), II: 528 (vv. 1481-82): Purandaras tvāha am grateful to Dr C.R. Deshpande, formerly of the University of Poona, lokaprasiddham anumānam cārvākair apīsyata eva, yat tu kaiścit laukikam for the translation of this difficult passage. He rendered the last phrase mārgam atikramyānumānam ucyate, tan nisedhate iti. It is to be noted that as 'the doctrine of Purandara, i.e. of Cārvāka' and wrote to me, "This is Purandara does not claim to have said anything new (as Udbhațabhatta literal translation. However, the sense is not clear" (personal communica- sometimes did (see GrBh on NM, ahnika 7, II: 257-58), but attributes the tion, 5.3.1997) .- Vaidya's interpretation of Purandara as Indra does not view to the Cārvāka-s in general, not even to any particular group or seem to be correct. Is Indra anywhere connected with the Cārvaka-s? subsect. -Since Purandara refers to the school he belongs to as 'the H.L. Jain referred to Purandara in an article (1925) in connection Cārvāka-s' (cārvākaih). I prefer to use this term rather than Bārhaspatya with Mahāp. See NCC, XII: 121. employed by Namai (see (1976), 29 n2) and Lokāyata (used almost as 12 NVV (1954), II: tasyāpyaviddhakarņasyāpi na kevalam purandarādeh a namesake, but the same word in the context of early Buddhist writ- dehad anutpattih, etc., on NV, v. 71a 101. ings-whether Hinayana or Mahayana- merely suggests logic, or rather 13 iti evam kaścana cārvākaviśeso 'viddhakarņah (ibid., on v. 70d, 101). sophistry, not materialism). 14 SVȚ, 306: caitanyaļvisista]sya mūrtasya prthivyādicatustayasya jñānam 9 D.R. Shastri, 1351 BS (1944), 15, aphorism No. 21 (taken from the anena pauram[daram]matam darsitam. Both emendations (within square TBV) in (1959), 173-76; Namai (1976), 42 and nn 27-28 (aphorism No. brackets) have been proposed by the editor.

112 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Paurandarasūtra Revisited 113

To the best of my knowledge that is all known so far about lemical writings19 and in almost all philosophical digests.20 Purandara. On the basis of what is available, meagre as it is, (f) Though the context of Purandara's exposition is not we may draw the following inferences: known, we may conjecture from Silanka's commentary on the (a) Purandara definitely flourished before (or in) the SKS, 1.1.8 that it concerns the proof of the existence of the al- eighth century CE (since Kamalasila, who belonged to the leged imperishable soul which is denied by the Cārvāka-s.21 same century, refers to him as a well-known authority along Similarly Abhayadevasüri quotes this very aphorism in con- with Aviddhakarņa the Lokāyatika,15 also flourishing in (or nection with the existence of the other world, rebirth, etc.22 before) the eighth century). -all presumed to be known through inference or testimony, (b) If Akalanka (eighth century) did refer to Purandara never through perception. and Aviddhakarna16 (as Anantavīrya says), then they might (g) A parallel to Purandara's exposition is found in the view have flourished even earlier. of 'the better learned ones' mentioned by Jayantabhatta.23 (c) Anantavīrya and Vādidevasūri (eleventh-twelfth They are said to have distinguished between two kinds of centuries) refer to the sutra-work compiled by Purandara, inference: utpanna pratīti (verifiable by perception) and whereas Kamalaśīla quotes from the Vrtti. utpādya pratīti (requiring indoctrination).They apparently (d) The aphorism, pramānasyāgaunatvād, etc. is closely shared the position taken by Purandara regarding the lim- modelled on Bhartrhari's VP, 1.42 cd: anumānapradhānena vinipato na durlabhah, "The fall of one who depends mainly on inference is not hard to find".17 19 E.g., ASVr and SKS with Niryukti and the commentary (vrtti) of (e) This should remind us what is often forgotten (too Śīlānkācārya, (1978), 12: yat tāvad uktam pratyakşam evaikam pramānam [ ... ], conveniently, I think): the grammarians (vaiyākarana-s) did on SKS, 1.1.8; SVM, 133: pratyaksam-evaikam pramāņam iti manyate cārvākah, not admit of any other means of knowledge excepting testi- commenting on AYVD, v. 20 (vinānumānena parābhisandhim, etc.). Cf. also mony, ägama. Both perception and inference to them were pratyaksaikapramāņavāditaya anumānādeh anangīkāreņa prāmānyābhāvāt, " ... [the existence of the soul cannot be proved] since this school holds but poor substitutes for testimony. Apart from Jayarāsibhațța that perception is the source of knowledge and does not allow inference, the tattvopaplavavādin and maybe Patrasvāmin,18 the school &c.". SDS (1981), 4. of grammarians also rejected inference -a position that is 20 The one notable exception to this is the anonymous SMS, 15. For generally attributed to the Cārvāka-s alone. They are branded further details, see below. 21 SKSVr, 10. as pratyakşaikapramānavadin-s by their opponents in their po- 22 TBV, 69-71. 23 śusikşitatarāh prāhuh. dvividham anumānam, kiñcid utpannapratīti kiñcid utpādyapratīti. īśvarādyanumānan tu utpādyapratīti. tatra dhūmānumanādeh prāmānayam kena nesyate | ato hi sādhyam budhyante tārkikairakșatā api || yattvalmeśvarasarvajñaparalokādigocaram | anumānam na tasyestam prāmānyam 15 For the two Aviddhakarņas, the Naiyāyika and the Lokāyatika, see tattvadarsibhih || (NM, Ch. 2, I: 184). "Now those who (think themselves Mahendrakumara Jain's Introduction to SVT, 73, 76-77, and NCC (1968), I: to be) more learned, say that (in fact) there are two kinds of inference; 426-27. See also Franco (1997), 142. 'some in case of which the inferential cognition can be acquired by one- 16 Mahendrakumara conjectured that "the author of Paurandarasūtra self', and 'some in case of which the inferential cognition is to be acquired was Aviddhakarņa" (SVT, 77). However, the separate mention of the two (on somebody else's advice)'. [The former kind is valid, but the latter kind authors by Vādirājasūri (NVV, 101) and Anantavīrya (SVȚ, 306: itarasya is not]. The inference of God and the like are ones in case of which the acetanasya va bhūmyādeh mūrtasya, anena aviddhakarnasya samaye darsitah) inferential cognition is to be acquired [on other's advice]. Indeed, who suggest otherwise. Both the Jain authors were commenting on Akalanka's will deny the validity of inference when one infers fire from smoke, and so works (Siddhiviniścayavrtti and Nyāyaviniścaya respectively). on; for even ordinary people ascertain the probandum by such inference, 17 VP ... with the Commentaries, Vrtti and Paddhati of Vrsabhadeva though they may not be pestered by the logicians. However, inferences (1966), 8; VP, with the Commentary by Puņyarāja (Prakāśa) (1887), 19. that seek to prove a self, God, an omniscient being, the after-world, and so Cf. VP, I. 32: avasthādeśakālānām bhedādbhinnāsu śaktişu | bhāvānumānena on, are not considered valid by those who know the real nature of things. prasiddhir ati [v. I. pratītirati] durlabhā ||. "Rarely are the natures of sub- Simple-minded people cannot derive the knowledge of the probandum stances known from inference, since their properties vary with variations by such inferences, so long as their mind is not vitiated by cunning logi- in (their) state, place or time" (trans. K. Raghavan Pillai, 6). cians." (trans. M.K. Gangopadhyaya in C/L, 140). The reference to the 18 For Patrasvamin, see TS and P, Ch. 18, vv. 1363-78 and 1379-1436 omniscient being shows that the polemics are directed as much against (presentation and refutation respectively), 494 ff. the Brahminical theists as the Buddhists.

Studies on the Carvāka/Lokāyata Paurandarasūtra Revisited 114 115

ited validity of inference in mundane matters (but never in for argument's sake, we tentatively accept the Cārvāka-s. as the so-called supramundane ones). pratyaksaikapramānavādin-s, then the grammarians too are (h) The word, durlabha, is also significant. It is not suggest- to be called āgamaikapramānavādin-s. In other words, both ed that inference is invariably wrong but that more often than of them were pramanaikavadin-s, both were anti-anumāna. not it is misleading. In other words, there is no avyabhicāritā Kamalasila in the TSP did not attribute the aphorism to between the antecedent and the consequent. the Bārhaspatyas alone; he spoke of bārhaspatyādayah, (i) This again reminds us of the famous Parable of the 'Bärhaspatyas and others'.28 Hence, even if we accept the Wolf's Footprints, found in Buddhist, Brahminical and view that the Carvaka-s denied the validity of inference in Jain sources.24 The parabola docet may be stated as follows: all cases, mundane or supramundane, the fact remains that apratyakşapūrvakam anumānam agrāhyam; if such inference they were not alone in holding such a view. Thus the apho- can deceive even the well-versed men in mundane matters, rism regarding the invalidity of inference cannot be applied what to speak of other cases which are not perceptible? exclusively to them. Can anything more be deduced from the three fragments Let us also see how Udbhațabhatta, a 'paramalokāya- of Purandara? I would venture to assert that by admitting the tikammanya' (as Vādidevasūri calls him) represents the Cārvāka limited validity of inference, and at the same time denying view regarding the non-primacy of inference: its non-primacy, Purandara was not deviating from the 'or- thodox' Carvaka position; on the other hand, he was only In the grasping of the invariable relation of the hetu (probans) with its sādhya (probandum), three modes are elucidating that which had suffered much obfuscation in the recognised -(i) by two unqualified perceptions, (ii) by hands of the opponents of materialism. perception along with a qualified non-perception, and (iii) Erich Frauwallner, who considered Purandara to be a by the process of repeated perception as found in worldly revisionist in this regard, refers to an aphorism, alleged behaviour (bhūyodarśanapravrttyā ca lokavyavahārapatitayā). to be of Cārvāka/Lokāyata origin: anumānam apramāņam The sutra is aimed at those who recognise the hetu as gamaka (along with another: pratyaksam evaika pramānam).25 The (capable of yielding knowledge) according to the first mode former (aphorism No. 6 in D.R. Shastri, A14 in Namai) is of grasping. Failure of concomitance (vyabhicāra) is not seen even in the case of hetus popularly known as such (lokaprasid- first found in Kamalasīla, then in Sīlānka, Vācaspatimiśra, dhahetus) (e.g. smoke, etc.); so also it is not noticed in the Jayantabhatta and Abhayadevasūri.26 It is rather interest- case of the hetus adopted in the special tantras or sāstras (tan- ing that Kamalasīla himself attributes the same aphorism to trasiddha hetu -Sastric hetus); so on the basis of the quality the grammarians in his Nyāyabindupūrvapaksasamksepa.27 If, characterised by 'non-perception of failure of concomitance' being common to them, the tantra-siddha hetus are estab- lished as being gamaka, it is because of this that anumāna is 24 For the parable itself, see SDSam (with TRD), ed. Luigi Suali, 303- gauna. Now, the knowledge of non-failure of concomitance 04. References to this parable are also found in Bhävaviveka (fifth/sixth (avyabhicārāvagama) in respect of laukika (popular) hetus (like century), Candrakīrti (sixth/seventh century), MS, (1989), II: 3, 64-65; smoke, etc.) is instrumental in bringing about the knowledge Haribhadra, LTN, MA (see Vallée-Poussin in ERE, VIII: 449 n), Śīlāńka of the probandum but this is not there in the case of the on SKS, 1.1.6, 10 and 2.3.11, 49; MVr on SK, v. 17. Manibhadra in his commentary on SDS, v. 81 gives a slightly different version of the story (See Laghuvrtti in SDSam, ed. K. Misra, 65-66). For a more detailed study See Ch. 15 below. f. 115 a 6. I would like to thank Dr Sanjitkumar Sadhukhan for drawing 25 Frauwallner, II: 308 (English trans. II: 225), quoting from TBV, 73. Be- my attention to this passage and permitting me to quote from his as-yet- dekar does not mention the second aphorism (first in the German text). unpublished restoration (MS, 17). 26 TSP on TS, v. 1455, 520; Sīlānka on SKS, 1.1.8, 12: nānumānam 28 TSP on TS, v. 1455, 520. See also below. pramāņam, visamvādakatvad [ ... ], Vacaspatimisra, Bhamatī on BS -SBh. Jñānaśrībhadra in his commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramānaviniścaya 3.3.53, and TK on SK, v. 5, 32; NM, Ch. 7, II: 201; anumānam tu na brackets the Bärhaspatya and Bhartrhari, urging both to accept the va- lidity of inference (and quotes an obscure line from the Vedas in his pramāņam eva cārvākānām); D.R. Shastri mentions TBV and TK only, Na- mai the first alone. support!) "evam eva sati anena krameņānumānaprāmānyam, yatah, vedo 'pi: 27 anumāne 'pi vipratipattir yathā- nānumanam pramānam bhrantisambhavād 'arthāvisamvādaka pramānam, visamvāde tatra bhavati' iti." Restored from iti vaiyākaraņaḥ. Kamalasīla, Nyāyabindupūrvapakşasamksepa (or -samkșipti), Tibetan by Sanjitkumar Sadhukhan (58). Sadhukhan could not trace the restored to Sanskrit from the Tibetan version, Peking Tanjur (Bstan-hgyur), source of the sentence quoted purportedly from the Vedas. Nor can I.

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tantra-siddha hetus (Sāstric hetus), so it is not proper that non- This rice, because of its riceness (annatva) satisfies hunger as it perceptible things should be known with the help of these. did yesterday - such an inference as this is included there (sc. Hence it is said that the ascertainment of things is difficult in the Lokāyataśāstra), due to its being rooted in perception. to attain on the strength of anumāna.29 The fruits of worldly goods (abhyudaya) and summum bonum (nihśreyasa), the matter of religion and brahman as well as the Udbhața's position thus is similar to Purandara's in all re- Veda are devoted to the pretersensual, hence are not (to be spects.30 He provides a more sophisticated argument, that is admitted as) means of knowledge -- this is the conclusion.33 all. This doubtless shows a continuity of approach, but does it prove that such was the original position of the Cārvāka-s? This view is further supported by the fact that while deni- For that, we should turn to Gunaratna. While explaining the grating (in the name of refuting) the Cārvaka-s, their op- word, hi (indeed) in SDSam. v. 83. ([ ... ] mānam tvakșameva ponents always make them quote Bhartrhari whose philo- hi), Guņaratna says: sophical position was diametrically opposite to materialism. Sāntarakșita quotes three verses verbatim from the VP (vv. 32- The word 'indeed' (hi) has been used here to indicate a 34) in the text of TS; so do Śīlānka (v. 42), Vācaspatimiśra speciality. The speciality, again, is that the Cārvakas admit the (v. 32), Jayantabhatta (vv. 32, 42 and 34, in this order, both validity of inference which tend to facilitate the daily activities of in the NM and AD) and Vādidevasūri (v. 32).34 If there were ordinary people (lokayātrānirvāhanapravanam), such as the in- ference of fire from smoke, etc., but they never admit the validity of any aphorism denying the validity of inference in the sūtra- extraordinary inferences which seek to establish the heaver, merit work of the Carvaka-s, why did they all quote Bhartrhari and and demerit, etc.31 (Emphasis added) then set out to refute his words -all the while referring to the Cārvāka-s as their purvapaksin-s instead of the true au- This, we presume, refers to the Cārvāka-s in general, not thor of the verse or verses? to a particular sect (cārvākaikadeśīya-s) of whom Guņaratna One has the impression that Jayantabhatta and others speaks elsewhere in his commentary.32 simply used the Cārvāka as their Sikhandin: the butt of their The SMS (anonymous and undated) too presents the attack was really Bhartrhari or the school of the grammar- Carvāka view in the following manner: ians, although they never declared it in so many words.35 Santarakșita, on the other hand, devotes a whole chapter to all those who had found fault with this or that aspect of inference and systematically sets out to refute them all. He 986-87. 29 Quoted in SVR, 256-66. I have used the translation by E.A. Solomon, starts with Pātrasvāmin (vv. 1363-1436)36 and moves on to 30 Solomon says, "Udbhața seems to be a progressive Cārvāka, a fol- lower of Purandara" (ibid., 990). What I would like to add is that both refute Uddyotakara and Aviddhakarņa the Naiyāyika (vv. Purandara and Udbhata were merely explicating the original and authen- 1438-39), Kumārila and others (v. 1442 et seq). Then he tic position of the Cārvaka-s in this regard. The use of plural, cārvākaih, refers to 'some' (kecana) in v. 1455b before quoting from may be honorific but more probably it refers to the Cārvaka philosophers Bhartrhari (vv. 1459-61= VP, I. 32-34). It is Kamalaśīla who in general. See also n8 above. identifies kecana as bārhaspatyādayah (TSP on TS, v. 1455). 31 SDSam, 306. English trans. in C/L, 273. Pandit Sukhlalji Sang- hvi explained the Carvaka view of the dominance of the sense-organs (indriyadhipatya) in the following way: "Note that the Carvāka repudiates the organs of knowledge like inference, verbal testimony, etc. which are 33 SMS, 15. Trans. mine. a matter of everyday practice, and yet he declares himself to be an advo- 34 TS, 521-52; Śīlānka on SKS, 1.1.8, 10; Bhām, 850; NM, Ch. 2, I: 177, 179, cate of perception - and sense-perception at that - being the sole organ 183; AD, Act 3, 59; and SVR, 262 (all in connection with the Cārvāka). of knowledge. This only means that according to the Cārvaka, an em- 35 Both Santarakșita and Jayantabhatta refute Bhartrhari's doctrine pirical organ of knowledge -be it inference, verbal testimony, or any of śabdabrahman (TS, Ch. 5, vv. 85-96, 128 ff and NM, Ch. 6, II: 107ff re- other- is not valid unless its findings are confirmed by sense-perception. spectively). In other words, the Cārvāka has no objection to a piece of knowledge be- 36 Since we know absolutely nothing about Pātrasvamin (Potter does ing regarded as valid in case it is not contradicted by sense-perception." not even name him in his Bibliography), we cannot be sure of his exact (Prastāvanā to his edition of Hemacandra's Pramāņamīmāmsā, 4; trans. in position regarding inference. But it is to be noted that Kamalasīla does his Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics, 4). not mention him as a Cārvāka, nor does anybody else. Sukhlalji considers 32 See SDSam, 300 and C/L, 266 respectively. See also n39 below. Pātrasvāmin as a Jain [TUS (1987), 30].

118 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Paurandarasūtra Revisited 119

The text then takes up Bhartrhari and Bhartrhari alone (w. We do read of the cārvākaikadesīya-s in connection with the 1457-61). Now, excepting Bhartrhari, none of the philoso- interpretation of some other aphorisms and alternative views phers whose views on inference have been examined in this regarding the number of elements to be admitted.39 But as chapter can be branded as anti-inference per se. regards the question of the means of valid knowledge we are Therefore, it cannot be concluded on the basis of told by all that the Carvaka-s (apparently without exception) Sāntarakșita's presentation that the Cārvāka-s were opposed depend on perception and perception alone. to inference as such. It is true of Bhartrhari alone. Purandara This, I contend, is a sheer misrepresentation of the origi- thus was simply stating the traditional position of the Cārvāka-s nal position of the materialists in India. In what may be taken in which inference preceded by perception was accepted as as the earliest record of the materialist view (found in the tantamount to perception and obviously such inferences Mbh) it is stated as follows: would be confined to everyday life and mundane matters. It may appear to be an exercise in futility if, even in the pratyakşam hyetayor mūlam krtāntaitihyayor api| face of overwhelming evidence of all non-materialist philoso- pratyakso hyagamo 'bhinnah krtānto vā na kimcana || yatratatrānumāne 'sti krtam bhāvayate 'pi vā phers and almost every digest-writer, I propose to establish anyo jīvah śarīrasya nāstikānām mate smrtaḥ ||10 the view. In fact, barring the statements found in the SMS and TRD (both quoted above), we do not have much of an The conclusion based on inference and tradition -both are evidence in support of the view that the Cārvaka-s, like the rooted in perception. Perception and testimony (what we are Vaiśeșikas (kāņāda-s), one particular school of the Naiyāyikas told to believe in) are identical; reasoned-out truth (= infer- and Buddhists (of the realist kind),37 admitted both percep- ence) too is nothing else (but perception). tion (absolutely) and inference (conditionally). However, we shall try to stake our claim on the basis of some conspicu- It is proved everywhere that the body exists. What the ous omission of reference to Purandara's view (as quoted by Kamalaśīla) in the works of the antagonists of the Cārvāka. (proven). ästika-s think -that there is a soul without the body- is not

When Vācaspatimiśra and Jayantabhațța ridicule the This is what the materialists in India meant by the prima- Cärväka-s for being inferior even to the animals (because cy of perception. They would have no objection to inference they would not rely on inference at all which even the beasts -or even to verbal testimony- if the conclusion had been do),38 they steer clear of stating that at least one school of the arrived at on the basis of actual observation and hence was Cārvāka-s, if not others too, held a different view. Are we to verifiable by perception. The priority (jyesthatā) of percep- assume that such prodigious scholars as Väcaspatimiśra and tion over all other means of knowledge is also admitted by Jayantabhatta did not know anything about Purandara while the Naiyäyika-s,41 though not by the Jains (who, however, ad- Kamalaśīla before them and Anantavīrya and Pușpadanta mit that perception alone is clear, visada and unambiguous, after, refer to this distinguished commentator? Nor does whereas inference, etc., not being immediate, are lacking in S-M refer to any deviant or revisionist school of the Cārvāka-s. clarity).42 This basic position is retained and explicated by Purandara against the misrepresentation by the opponents of materialism. He asserts that inference does not have an 37 Cf. pratyaksam ekam cārvākāh kaņādasugatau punah | anumānañca taccātha sāmkhyāḥ śabdaśca te ubhe || nyāyaikadeśinopyevam upamānañca ke- cana |, etc. This verse is found in Suresvara's Mān (Vārttika), v. 2. 17-18ab, 39 Guņaratna refers to 'some section of the Cārvākas' (kecit tu 20, also in Tārkikarakşā and the anonymous SMS, 14, attributing the verses cārvākaikadeśīya) who considered ākāśa (ether, space) to be the fifth form to a nyayavit. Suresvara might have flourished in the ninth century, but of matter in addition to the four stated by Haribhadra (v. 83), 300. Interest- apparently did not know anything about Purandara's exposition of per- ingly enough, this (or these) school/s is/are mentioned only by the Jains ception and inference (as Kamalasīla did). Hence he simply repeated the (See Śilańka on SKS, 1.1.6 and 2.3.11, 10, 49). See also n49 below. view of the detractors of the Cärvaka, who made no distinction between 10 Mbh, Śāntiparvan, crit. ed., 211. 26-27 (218.27-28 in the vulgate edi- inference preceded by perception (the only kind of inference admitted by tion). See also the notes by Belvalkar on this chapter. NS, 1 1.5) and that based on verbal testimony alone. 41 Cf. evam pramānajyesthe 'smin pratyakse lakșite sati ... (NM, Ch. 2, I: 164). 38 Bham on BS-ŚBh, 3.3.54, 852; NM, Ch. 2, I: 179; AD, Act 3. 42 avisadah paroksam. Hemachandra, Pramāņamīmāmsā, I. 2.1, 83.

120 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Paurandarasūtra Revisited 121

independent status as a means of knowledge (since it has ting limited validity of inference.48 This is not to deny to be preceded by perception), hence it is called anu-māna, that there were differences of opinion and interpretation not pra-māņa. among the later commentators of the Cārvākasūtra regard- The aphorism, pramanasyāgaunatvād, etc. has to be ex- plained in this light, rather than in the way the Jain antago- ing other issues. They held divergent views as to the appro- priate adhyāhara (supplementary word) in explaining the nists like Prabhācandra and Vādidevasūri did.43 Udbhața's aphorism, tebhyas caitanyam, 'out of those, consciousness': interpretation of the aphorism (quoted above) endorses the whether it should be 'is manifested' (abhivyajyate) or 'is pro- position of Aviddhakarna and adds new and subtle arguments duced' (prādurbhavati/upajāyate).49 But so far as the non-pri- in favour of the primacy of perception and non-primacy of macy of inference is concerned, there was perfect unanim- inference, etc.44 All the Cārvaka-s, earlier or later, stuck to ity of opinion among all the commentators, beginning from their original doctrinal position: inference in the affairs of Purandara down to Udbhata. Similarly, all of them accepted the world (lokavyavahāra) is acceptable; but perception alone a sort of limited validity of inference along with the primary is primary, inference is secondary.45 Where they differed from the Naiyayikas is that the latter admitted inference as a pri- importance of perception.

mary means, as much as perception. That is what the Cārvaka would not concede.46 The whole rigmarole regarding the sig- nificance of paksa and paksadharmata and the enumeration of the grounds for rejecting inference so elaborately amplified by the Jain savants are quite off the mark.47 Any interpretation of the aphorism under discussion would be faulty ab initio if one starts from the premise that the Cārvāka-s were originally pramāņaikavādin-s (perception alone), and only later, under the impact of Dharmakīrti, they were constrained to modify their position by admit-

43 For a survey of various interpretations (along with a new one sug- gested) see Franco (1991). 44 See Solomon, 987-88 45 PVSVT, 19, 25. It is after accepting inference as a valid means of knowl- edge from the empirical point of view (lokapratītvāt) that Aviddhakarņa raised objections to the validity of inference in connection with probans, linga. Cf. atha naiva pratyaksānumānāyoh pramānatvam pratișidhyate, etc. ibid., 26. 46 Dr Nagin J. Shah (personal communication, 15.4.1998) kindly point- ed out to me the difference between the Naiyāyikas and the Cārvaka-s in this regard. 47 Franco (1991) also notes that "Vadi's interpretation does not con- vey the original meaning of the sūtra" (pramāņasyāgauņatvād, etc.) "for it simply makes no sense" (155). When the Jain commentators deal with the Cārvāka-s as pūrvapaksin-s, they make them say not only what they had ac- tually said but also what they might have said (of course, the Jains are not 48 Frauwallner, II: 308; Eng. trans., II: 225. the only ones to do so). Hence, Prabhacandra rattles no less than nine al- 49 TSP on TS, vv. 1857-58, 633-34; NKC, 342; PKM, 116-17 (for ternative arguments against the validity of inference (NKC, I: 71) whereas translation, see C/L, 161-62, 304, 318). S-M, however, speaks of one Vädidevasuri is content with seven arguments only (SVR, 266). Apparently most of these were manufactured by the uttarapaksin-s. It was to this kind view only (viz. upajāyate, 'is produced') in SDS, 4, 6 as did Śīlānka (viz. of logic-chopping that the 'well learned ones' [as Jayantabhatta puts it (see abhivyajyate, SKSVr, 11). To this we may add PVA, 54 and SVR, 1073, 1081 (abhivyaktim upayāti), 1074 (vyañjayanti). See also Cakradhara in NM, Ch. n23 above)] objected. 7, II: 257-58. BIBLIOTEKA

IX What Did the Cārvaka-s Mean by sukham jīvet?

I

Opponents of the Crvaka-s were never wanting. Idealist and fideist philosophers and custodians of different religious groups rallied to refute the Cārvāka doctrine, not only on philosophical grounds with arguments but also by spreading false charges and calumnies in order to make the doctrine appear morally reprehensible. Two such oft-quoted charges will now be examined on the basis of original sources. The Cārvāka system of philosophy is generally known as one of hedonism. The following verse is supposed to epito- mize its basic position:

javaj jīvet sukham jīved rņam krtvā ghrtam pibet | bhasmībhūtasya dehasya punar āgamanam kutah. ||1 While life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs into debt; When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?

1 SDS (trans.), 11-12.

124 Studies on the Carvāka/Lokāyata sukham jīvet 125

It has been shown that the earlier sources of this verse The Sämkhya philosophers too have been abused in the read the second hemistich differently: nasti mrtyor agocarah same way. A verse attributed to them runs as follows: (no one is beyond death) in place of rnam krtvā ghrtam pi- bet.2 Apparently this slight but skilful alteration was made by hasa piba lala moda nityam vişayān upabhuñja kuru ca mā śankām | S-M in order to make the doctrine appear in an unfavour- yadi viditam te kapilamatam tat prāpsyase mokşasaukhyañ ca ||6 able light. However, the fact remains that the verse does urge people Laugh, drink, play, enjoy every day; have pleasure of the sens- to 'live happily', sukham jīvet. What could the Cārvāka-s mean es; don't be afraid; If you know the doctrine of Kapila, thereby you get both by it? Did they not advocate enjoyment of sensual pleasure as emancipation and happiness. the summum bonum of life? I shall attempt to answer this question. Needless to say, All this raises a counter-question: how much credence is where the Carvaka-s are concerned, there are very little posi- to be given to such canards against the doctrines that deny tive evidence to go by, for everything is culled from the po- God, after-life, etc .? lemical writings of their opponents. Hence the answer pro- A parallel case is found in Greece regarding the teachings posed by me cannot but be conjectural. of Epicurus. He was generally called a sensualist. Horace, the Latin poet, contemptuously refers to "the sty of Epicurus"7 II and the modern English word 'Epicurean' suggests one "de- voted to refined and tasteful sensuous enjoyment."8 It has On the basis of this floating verse, many a philosopher been pointed out that all this represents the anti-material- -both Brahminical and Jain- has branded the Cārvāka-s as istic views of the dominant philosophers.9 Epicurus in fact mere lotos-eaters, devoid of all morals, and having no faith abstained from taking rich food or drink. He ate only white in god, after-life, and the sense of good and evil.3 Interest- bread, supplemented by a little cheese on feast days.10 He did ingly enough, none of them quotes any sūtra, aphorism, in teach that pleasure was the aim of life. However, by 'pleasure' support of his contention. The verse indeed denies rebirth he meant something totally different from the 'eat, drink and and tells us that no happiness is to be expected in any future be merry' kind of attitude towards life. As F.A. Lange puts it: life. Hence happiness can be obtained in this life alone, and nowhere else. That is all that the verse says. The charge of hedonism has been brought against all be free from prejudice". Malalasekera (ed.), I: 327. materialist philosophers both in India and abroad. Ajita Ke- MVr on SK, v. 37, 149. Trans. mine. See also SDSam (Rājasekhara), 74 sakambala, a senior contemporary of the Buddha, lived the and TRD, 96 for variants life of an ascetic, wearing a blanket made of hair (so he was 7 "As for me, when you want a laugh, you will find me in fine fettle, fat called 'of the hair-blanket') which, as the Tipitaka says, made and sleek like a hog from Epicurus's herd (Epicuri de grege porcum)." Ho- race, Epistles, I: 4.16. him feel hot in summer and cold in winter (did he take it off 8 See OED, s.v. 'Epicurean' then?). He preached a proto-materialist doctrine, denying 9 "Epicurus taught that the highest good was pleasure, but because such things as good or bad action, rebirth etc.4 This made the every joy entailed some pain, he taught his disciples (Epicureans) to ex- members of his school the butt of attack by the Jains: "Thus ercise moderation in all things. Epicurus also taught that pleasure was undertaking various works they engage in various pleasures gained not through sensual enjoyment but by self-control and achieving tranquillity of mind. His teachings have been misunderstood at times, and amusements for their own enjoyment."5 however; some have seen them as defending the unashamed pursuit of bodily pleasure." Manser, 62. More forthright is Blackburn's comment: "The aim of all philosophy 2 For a detailed survey of various readings of this verse, see Ch. 20 below. is, however, to enable to live well, which is not to live in the hedonistic 3 To name a few: SDSam, vv. 80-82; PC, Act 2; TSPC, I: 340-45; NC, 17. trough the word Epicureanism now suggests, after centuries of propa- 50, 60, 69, 72; TRD on SDSam, v. 81. ganda against the system." s.v. Epicurus. 4 SPhS (DN), II: 48. 10 Russell, however, facetiously says that Epicurus' "method proved suc- 5 SKS, 2.1.17; SBE 45, II: 341. Goonasekere points out that such ac- cessful in his case, but he was a valetudinarian, and most people would counts as are found in Buddhist and Jain sources cannot "be expected to need something more vigorous"(199).

sukham jīvet 127 126 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

capacity)".14 If they really believed in sensual enjoyment Epikuros was opposed to Aristippos from whom he had learnt alone, they would not write on logic and epistemology with so much, in teaching that intellectual pleasure was higher and to be preferred to physical pleasure, for the mind is stimulated such finesse and acumen. not only by the present, but also by the past and the future. In fine, the charge brought against the Carvaka-s on the Yet Epikuros also was so far consistent that he explained that ground of unrestrained gratification of the senses is a mere the virtues must be chosen for pleasure's sake alone, just as calumny. To say that there is no pleasure beyond this world is we resort to medicine for the sake of health; but he added not to say that pleasure alone is the sole end of life. that virtue is the only permanent element of pleasure, all In any case, the clause, yāvajjīvet sukham jīvet, as Hiriya- besides may be separated from it as being perishable.11 nna observed, "seems to be parody of the Vedic injunction Lange further points out: -yāvajjīvam agnihotram juhoti."15 He also said, "Even if we ex- plain its extreme views as due to a reaction against the free So near logically stood Epikuros to his opponents Zeus and speculations and the austere asceticism that were widely cur- Chrysippus, who declared that virtue is the only good; and rent in ancient India, the system, we must admit, should once yet, in consequence of the difference in the points of depar- have inculcated less objectionable principles. The form in ture, we find the utmost difference in the system. which it is now presented has an air of unreality about it."16 There is another way to show how false is the charge of in- In a letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus clearly outlined what dulgence in excessive eating, etc., generally brought against he meant by pleasure: the Carvaka-s. The apocryphal Brhaspatisutra and the TRD say that the Cārvaka-s urged people to take meat and themselves When, therefore, we say that pleasure is a chief good, we practised what they preached.17 But in the account given in are not speaking of the pleasures of the debauched man, the PPu the Cärväka-s condemn the eaters of flesh and drink- or those which lie in sensual enjoyment, as some think who are ignorant, and who do not entertain our opinions, or else ers of liqueur. The Brahminical gods are rejected because interpret them perversely; but we mean the freedom of the they were married!18 The last half-verse quoted in the SDS body from pain and of the soul from confusion. For it is not .. (15. 132) also speaks against non-vegetarian diet: māmsānām continued drinkings and revels ... that makedlife pleasant but khādanam tadvan niśācarasamīritam, "the eating of flesh is sim- sober contemplations which examine into the reasons for ilarly commanded by the night-prowlers (i.e. demons)".19 all choice and avoidance, and which put to flight the vain What should we conclude from such contradictory reports: opinions from which the greater part of the confusion arises some Cārvāka-s were vegetarians and some were not; some which troubles the soul.12 were allied to the Kāpālika-s and some practised total sexual We know of a few Carvaka philosophers who commented on the Cārvākasūtra (now lost) and from the tantalizingly small fragments available to us we may concur with Frau- 14 SVR, 764. wallner's opinion that they produced a "a literature richer 15 Hiriyanna, 194 n2 than hitherto".13 Purandara, Kambalāśvatara, Aviddhakarņa 16 Ibid., 194-95. 17 The Bārhaspatya Sūtram arthāt Bārhaspatya Arthasāstram urges the king: and Udbhata -all were thinkers of high intellectual calibre. āsavāni sevayet ("Let him make use of fermented liquers", iii. 57), māmsāni Vādidevasūri, the diehard Jain opponent of materialism, re- ca ("also flesh food", 59), mattakaminyah sevyāh ("the printed text reads" fers respectfully to Udbhata as jarad-dvijanmā mahānubhāva, -- kasinyāh) ("Gay ladies are to be used," 63), etc. But the same text advises "the veteran twice-born and having great influence (or the king not to enjoy women (i.15), not to drink intoxicants (i. 16), etc. The book in fact is a poor piece of forgery and utterly undependable. Kangle declares that it is a very late work and does not represent the views of this (sc. Bärhaspatya) school as referred to in the works. II: 6n4. See also ................................... ibid., III: 43. For the TRD's view, see 300. 10-15. 11 Lange, 103. The quotation that follows is taken from the same page. 18 PPu, Srstikhanda, Vangavasi ed., Ch. 13. Some of these verses have 12 Diogenes Laertius, 10. 129 and 131-32. Trans. Copleston, s.j., I. ii: 352. v. 2, 111. also been quoted (without any reference to the source) in the MVr on SK, 13 Frauwallner (trans.), II: 225. However, I do not agree with his view that the later Cärväka-s took up 'foreign thoughts' and deserted the 'origi- 19 SDS (trans.), 12. nal attitude'. See Ch. 7 above.

128 Studies on the Carvāka/Lokāyata sukham jīvet 129

abstinence? I think it will be wiser not to give any credence to so-called sūtra-s are examples of poor attempts to put the any of these. The opponents of the Carvaka-s jumbled up the Cārvāka view in the Brahminical straitjacket. positions of all anti- or non-Vedic schools and made a nice In support of this contention I may again refer to S-M's mess of the nāstika views, imputing one's ideas to others. account of the Carvaka philosophy. He first says that the The two meanings of the word 'materialism' -one tech- Cārvaka-s consider wealth and pleasure the only ends of nical (as used in philosophy) and the other popular (found man (arthakāmau eva puruşārthamanyamānāh), but after a in short or pocket dictionaries)- have led to a ready accept- few lines he writes (in verse): "The pleasure arising out of ance of the misinterpretation that philosophical material- embracing a woman is the end of man" (anganālinganājjanya ists are addicted to the gratification of the senses, whereas sukhameva pumarthatā).24 all idealists are averse to it. (Here too the two meanings of It is also to be noted that unlike the Brahminical and Jain the word, 'idealism', provide room for misconception). As we controversialists, the Buddhists never refer to the Cārvaka have shown above, the philosophical idealists and the philo- view regarding purusārtha or apavarga (nor do such eminent sophical materialists are to be distinguished from 'idealists' writers as Sankara and Prabhācandra).25 (followers of some ideal) and 'materialists' (devoted to mate- rial needs, to the neglect of spiritual matters).20 As it is not IV done, sometimes even by the scholars, the confusion and ca- nard continue to grip the mind of laymen. Considering all things I would say that the Cārvaka doc- trine was basically a this-worldly philosophy with its own III systems of logic, epistemology, ontology and ethics. It had nothing to do with fideism, faith in karman, the ideas of di- What, then, about another fragment attributed to the vine or supernatural retribution and rebirth. But there is Cārvāka-s: kāma evaikah purusārthah, pleasure alone is the no incontrovertible evidence to suggest that the Cārvāka-s end of life?21 Some others speak of both kāma and artha as were akin to the pleasure-seekers mentioned in the Old the twin ends of the Carvaka-s.22 Warder has made a short Testament,26 who have been called 'Epicureans' by some shrift of the difference by commenting that the latter commentators, although, as has been shown above, the version"is from a different Lokäyata source, giving a slightly term is a misnomer.27 different view. Otherwise we must understand that wealth is necessary as a means of pleasure."23 I, however, would sug- gest that this 'slight difference' is a pointer to the fact that nobody knows what exactly the Cärväka-s thought of the ends of life (purusārtha). It is highly doubtful whether the Carvaka-s at all thought in terms of the Brahminical ideas regarding the four ends of life. On the other hand, both the 24 SDS (trans.), 3, 6. 25 See in particular the exposition and refutation of the Cārvāka in 20 See OED, s.v. 'idealism' and 'materialism'. None of these terms is en- TS, Ch. 22. See also Śankara on BS, 1.1.1, 2.2.2, 3.3.53-54; PKM and NKC countered before the seventeenth century. (relevant sections). All the passages will be found translated in C/L, 169- 21 D.R. Shastri, No. 5; Namai, A15. Shastri refers to Nilakantha's com- 240, 298-342. mentary on Gita, 16.11 as well as to ABS (1930), 99; Namai, to the ABSalone. 26 Isiah, 22:13, Wisdom, 2:6: "Let us eat and drink for tomorrow we die". Guņaratna says that the Cārvāka-s admit no virtue except pleasure, dharmam The sentence is also quoted in I Corinthians 15:32. Muir mentions it in kāmād aparam na manyate (TRD, 300. 13) connection with the yāvaj jīvet verse (C/L, 366 n5). 22 D.R. Shastri, No. 27. Namai has not included it in his collection of 27 Addison G. Wright points out that the wicked depicted by the author fragments, presumably because it would go against his A15 (= Shastri's 5). of the Book of Wisdom are not Epicureans or Sadducees. "Actually the The idea of the twin ends of life attributed to the Cārvaka-s is first found philosophy of life pictured here differs essentially from the doctrine of in PC, Act 2. all those mentioned and is really an eclectic assemblage of ideas." Brown 23 Warder (1971), 39. et al (eds.), 514.

X Sāmkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata in the Kauțilīya Arthaśāstra: A Re-View

Kauțilya (or Kauțalya) speaks of four kinds of vidyā: Ānvīkșikī, Trayī, Vārtā and Daņdanīti.1 Trayī refers to the three Vedas (Rk, Sāman, and Yajuh), i.e., theology; Vārtā means agriculture, animal husbandry, and commerce, i.e., economics; and Dandanīti stands for the management of the state, i.e., politics.2 What is Ānvīkșikī? Kauțilya himself explains that Ānvīkșikī comprises three studies: Sāmkhya, Yoga and Lokayata.3 Since he mentions the first two separately, it has been assumed that he refers to the earlier Sāmkhya (not the syncretic Sāmkhya-Yoga); the Yoga is obviously Patañjali's Yogasūtra, and the Lokāyata must be the materialist philosophy of the Cārvaka-s.4 Shamasastry in his English translation of the KA was not so sure about the identification of Lokāyata. He wrote with- in parentheses: 'Atheism?'5 The two earlier commentaries, Jayamangalā and Nītinirnīti, however, clearly identify Lokāyata with Nastika philosophy expounded by Brhaspati.6'

I KA, 1.2.1. Kangle (1969), I: 4. Cf. Kāmandaki, 35. 2 1.3. and 1.4. Kangle, I: 4-6. 1.2.10. Kangle, I: 4. 4 Jacobi (1970), 551; Kangle (1965), III: 100, 130. 5 Shamasastry, 6 6 G.H. Sastri, 10; Muni Jina Vijaya, 5.

132 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Sāmkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata 133

The only discordant note is heard in the Malayalam com- Pañcanana Tarkaratna believed that the word, laukāyatika, mentary (c. twelfth century). It explains Lokāyata as the had been derived from lokāyati, not lokāyata. Āyati means fu- Nyāyasāstra taught by Brahman, Gārgya et al.7 MM. T. Ganapati ture, uttarakala. Hence those who have no faith in the future Sastri preferred to follow this gloss in his new Sanskrit com- state or after-life (paraloka) or to whom this world itself is the mentary.8 MM. Phaņibhūşaņa Tarkavāgīśa was also of the opin- āyati, are called lokayatika-s.19 Phaņibhuşaņa Tarkavāgīśa also ion that in ancient times the Nyāyasāstra was called Lokāyata.9 noted this derivation as probable.20 So we have one problem here: What did Kauțilya mean One problem of accepting this derivation is that no ear- by Lokāyata -materialist philosophy or logic? lier authority or usage has been mentioned by them in sup- The word, Ānvīkșikī, too is open to various interpretations. port of this contention. On the other hand, Panini clearly Some have taken it to mean an esoteric doctrine (ātmavidyā), speaks of the thak Pratyaya to be applied in the sense of 'one who studies and understands'.21 The word, laukāyatika, is some others, logic (tarkavidya).10 Modern scholars have gen- thereby derived only from lokāyata, not from lokayati. In any erally opted for 'Philosophy' or 'Philosophical system'.1 Jol- case, such a derivation would not suit the context of the KA, ly provided a compromise solution: 'Logical philosophy' (by where it is reckoned as a branch or division of Anvīksiki. lokāyata, however, he meant 'materialist system').12 Sources from the Common Era do not help us much to Yet another problem lies in the interpretation of the word, comprehend the original meaning. Right from the Kāmasūtra, yoga. Phaņibhūșaņa Tarkavāgīśa proposed to take the word Kādambarī and Buddhist Sanskrit works we learn that the either in the sense of Nyaya or the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiseșika. Lokāyatika-s were antagonistic to religious duties (dharma) If, however in KA, 1.2, lokāyata referred to Nyāyaśāstra, yoga, and believed in sense-perception (pratyaksa) as the only valid he said, would mean only Vaisesika.13 MM. S. Kuppuswami means of knowledge.22 Their ideas were avidly controverted Sastri also held that yoga here refers to Vaisesika.14 Both of by the Jain, Buddhist and Brahminical philosophers from them mentioned Vatsyayana's commentary on NS, 1.1.29 as the eighth to the eleventh centuries.23 It is only from their well as other sources in support of their contention. writings that we know that the Lokayatika-s denied the au- We have then three problems to deal with: the meanings thority of the Vedas, the existence of after-life, rebirth, soul of ānvīksikī, yoga, and lokāyata in the context of the KA. and God. Haribhadra, S-M, and other authors of philosophi- In the Buddhist (Pali) tradition, Lokāyata is taken by all cal digests speak in the same vein.24 commentators and lexicographers to mean 'the science of But the question remains: did Lokayata mean this sort of disputation', vitandasattham.15 Rudolf Otto Franke, however, philosophical system in Kauțilya's times too? And we have to was of the opinion that it referred to a 'logically proven expla- solve two other cruxes as well, viz. the meanings of anvīksikī nation of nature' (logisch beweisende Naturerklaerung).16 Rhys and yoga in the KA. Davids also interpreted the word as 'Nature-lore'.17 Though I would propose the following interpretation on the basis K.C. Chattopadhyata agreed with this rendering to some ex- of two postulates: tent, both Tucci and Dasgupta were opposed to it.18 (1940, 1975), III: 514 n3 7 Kangle (1972), II: 6 n10. 19 Tarkaratna (1334 BS), 41, on KS, 1.2.30. 8 T.G. Sastri, 27. 20 Tarkavāgīśa (I: xv n2). N. Jha (9) takes Lokāyati to be the name of a 9 Tarkavāgīśa (1981), I: xiv; Gangopadhyaya (1990), 23-26. person who ramified the Bärhaspatya philosophy. He too does not men- 10 Kāmandaki, 39; so Manu, 7.43 and his commentators. Dave, II: 31-32; tion any authority in support of this contention. see also Böhtlingk and Roth, I: 649. 21 Aştādhyāyī, 4.2.60 and Ganapāțha, 23 in Katre, 416, 1271. See also 11 Jacobi, 549; Kangle, III: 99-100, 130; D. Chattopadhyaya (1976), 649. Kane (1968), I: 226n. 12 Jolly and Schmidt (1924), II: 3 (1923), I: 4. 22 KA, 1.2.25; Bāņabhațța (Kādambari, 513), but see his Harșacarita kavāgīśa, I: xvii. (Cowell and Thomas (trans.), 236) in which a Lokāyatika is found in a 14 S.K. Sastri, xvi. hermitage (tapovana); TS, Ch. 22, I: 523-29; II: 633-37. 15 Tayatilleke, 46-55. 23 Almost all the aphorisms and verses so far collected in D.R. Shastri (1959, 16 Cited in Rhys Davids and Stede (1975), s.v. Lokāyata. 1982), 200-201 and Namai (1976), 39-44 belong to these four centuries. 17 Rhys Davids (1899), 171 18 K.C. Chattopadhyaya, 139-40, 152-53; Tucci in C/L, 389-90; Dasgupta 5-6; SMS, 15-16. 24 ŞDSamin Suali (1905-14), 30; SDS (1978), 1-5; ȘDSamin K. Misra(1979),

134 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Sāmkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata 135

1. Meanings of words change in course of time, so we have That Lokäyata was cultivated among the learned Brah- to study the matter chronologically.25 2. The same name has been applied to different philo- mins is also proved by the references to its commentaries ( Varnikā and Vartikā), especially one called Bhāgurī in Patañ- sophical systems in India (Nyāya once meant Mīmāmsā as in Jaimini's famous work, Nyāyamālāvistara). jali's Mahābhāsya.31 The word cārvī (which means 'intelli-

The Buddhist (Pali) tradition uniformly takes lokāyata to gence') is applied to its ācarya-s as well.32

mean the science of disputation.26 This, I suggest, is the right Hence KA, 1.2.10 may better be understood in the follow-

meaning applicable to the KA context. This is the earliest ing way: "The logic-based philosophical system comprises

definition we have and it tallies with the explanation given in the Ur-Sāmkhya, Ur-Vaiseșika and the science of disputation

the Malayalam commentary. In the Buddhist (Sanskrit) tra- called Lokāyata, and nothing else."

dition too, the word seems to carry the same sense, though translators have been much influenced by the latter mean- ing of the word.27 A pronouncedly materialist system also called Lokāyata (or its many namesakes like dehātmavāda, bhūtacaitanyavāda, Cārvākamata, Bārhaspatyamata, etc.) must have been a later development. The proto-materialist doc- trine of Ajita Keśakambalin, a senior contemporary of the Buddha, was known as ucchedavāda, not lokāyata.28 Similarly, ānvīkşikī in the KA can only mean a 'logic- based philosophical system', as opposed to others based on the scriptures (e.g. Mīmamsa, and perhaps Vedānta). No clear-cut distinction had yet been made between logic and philosophy in Kauțilya's times. The same holds true for the NS as we have it to-day. Lokäyata too was both logic and phi- losophy. The Nyāyasāstra propounded by Brahman, Gārgya et al. (as the Malayalam commentary says) must have been a predecessor of Gautama's NS. The word, yoga, too can only mean the Ur-Vaisesika here. It too was originally a mere nature-philosophy like the Ur- Sāmkhya. The Vedantins considered both to be their chief enemy and branded them as outside the pale of the Vedas.29 In Kauțilya's days the battle-lines had not yet been drawn, and these three systems -Sāmkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata- were still considered to be secular (though the Mānava school of Arthasāstra did not consider Anvīkșikī to be essen- tially non-Vedic).30

25 Kane often (I: 225-26, III: 47-48, V: ii: 1205 n1956) speaks of the changes in meaning in relation to Lokāyata. 26 Rhys Davids (1899), 171. 27 SDPS, 70, 166, 266-67; Burnouf, 62,168, 280; Kern, 236, 97, 438. See also Rhys Davids (1899), 169-70 n4 and D. Chattopadhyaya (1969), 110. 28 Goonasekere in Malalasekera (ed.), I: 325-27. 31 7.3.45 (7 and 8) in Kielhorn III: 325-26; Dasgupta, III: 515-16; Kangle

29 BS, 2.1.1ff and 2.2.1-17 III: 130; Limaye in Thite ed., 18-19

30 KA, 1.2.3. Kangle, I: 4. 32 Vāmana-Jayāditya, Jinendrabuddhi and Haradatta Miśra on Așt 1.3.36; in Shastri and Shukla, I: 438-49.

XI Yogācāra against the Cārvāka: A Critical Survey of Tattvasangraha, Chapter 22

The publication of the TS along with its commentary, Pañjikā (TSP) in 1926 was an epoch-making event in the history of Indian philosophical studies.1 It is a voluminous work consisting of 3645 verses divided into twenty six chap- ter.2 Sāntaraksita, the author of the work, was the rector (upādhyāya) of the University of Nalanda (the remains of which are still to be seen in Bihar) in the second half of the eighth century CE. He then left for Tibet where he founded bSam-yas, modelled on the Buddhist monastery of Odantapurī. Tibetan scholars in this institute were trained to translate Buddhist texts from Sanskrit into Tibetan. After staying in Tibet for twenty five years or so, Sāntarakșita died in the first decade of the ninth century. The commentary on his work was written by his disciple, Kamalaśīla, who had accompanied his master to the land of snow. He is said to have been killed by some rivals whom he defeated in a public debate.

1 An English translation by Ganganatha Jha was published (1937 and 1939) from the Oriental Institute, Baroda. Another edition of the text has been brought out by Dwarikadas Shastri (1968, 1981). 2 The Varanasi edition has one verse less than the Baroda edition (see above). All subsequent references to the text are to the Varanasi edition.

Yogācāra against the Cārvāka 138 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata 139

Both Sāntarakşita and Kamalaśīla belonged to the etc; no object is apprehended (at this stage), as the sense-or- gans are yet to appear.(v. 1864) Yogacara school of Buddhist philosophy. The TS was written Cognition can have no other form than the apprehension with a view to refuting all other philosophical systems and of objects. This is why there is no cognition in such states as establishing the Yogācara view. The book has been called "a swoon. (v. 1865) veritable encyclopaedia for us of Indian philosophy current Nor does intelligence (cognition) reside in the form of poten- in his (sc. Sāntarakșita's) time."3 cy, because no potencies exist without a support. (v. 1866) One of the many philosophical systems that Sāntarakșita There being no soul that may be the support of cognition, the examines in the TS is the Lokāyata (Chapter 22). As usual body is the only support for it. So, at the end, when the body he first presents the exponent's view (pūrvapaksa) and then has ceased to exist, what will support cognition? (v. 1867) When the other body has not been seen, how can it be un- proceeds to refute it. He writes: derstood that the required support is the body that is subse- quently born? (v. 1868) If there is no entity that has continuity of existence, then How, too, could the cognition residing in different bodies, there can be no other world, because there is none belonging be related to the same chain of cognitions -it being like the to the other world. (v. 1856) consciousness of the elephant, the horse and other animals? The body, cognition, the sense-organs and the rest being (v. 1869) destroyed every moment, they cannot pertain to the other For these reasons, as the support of cognitions, you (sc. Bud- world. There is nothing else that is admitted (by you, Bud- dhists) have to seek a transmigrating personality without be- dhists). (v. 1857) ginning and end or accept disbelief (in the existence of the Hence, consciousness must be regarded as produced from other world.) (v. 1870).4 and/or manifested by, certain material substances, just like acids, the constituent elements of liquer and such things. After this, Säntarakșita begins his elaborate refutation of the The names, 'body', 'sense-organ', and so on are applied to (v. 1858) basic Lokāyata position which, as he understands, is as follows: special combinations of earth and other material substances; (a) Denial of the existence of the other-world (paraloka) there is nothing other than these. (v. 1859) and the resident of the other-world (paralokin), i.e., the soul There can be no cause-effect relation between the two minds or spirit, (consciousnesses) under dispute, because they subsist in dif- (b) Denial of the existence of consciousness independent ferent bodies, just like the cognition of the cow and that of of and not dwelling in the body, the horse. (v. 1860) (c) Denial of rebirth (both of previous and prospective Cognitions (consciousnesses) cannot be the effects of the cogni- lives), tion (consciousness) in question, because they are intelligence, like intelligence connected with another series. (v. 1861) (d) Denial of the possibility of the transference of con- The dying consciousness of the man beset with affections sciousness from one body to another, and cannot bring about the contiguity of another mind (con- (e) Denial of the Buddhist notion of 'the chain of con- sciousness), because it is dying consciousness -just like that sciousness'. of the persons free from afflictions (passions and impuri- Apparently, Santaraksita elected to deal with only such ties). (v. 1862) issues as were relevant to establishing and defending the sys- It follows that consciousness proceeds from the body indeed tem of philosophy he championed, an idealist system called in which are seated Präna, Apana and the rest of the five life- breathes, as it is said by Kambalāśvatara. (v. 1863) Yogācara. Thus the pronounced atheism of the Lokāyata It is audacious to assert that there is cognition in the foetus, did not affect him, for he, too, was an atheist (In TS. Ch.2

3 D. Chattopadhyaya, Editorial note on Śāntarakșita and Kamalaśīla in 4 I have translated the passage myself but have also taken help from Jha's C/L, 160. Ganganatha Jha, however. said: "The work [TS] is rather disap- translation (see nl) which has been reproduced in C/L, 161-66. It should be noted that the terms, cetas, citta, jnāna, vijñapti and vijñāna used in this pas- pointing; it is purely and almost entirely polemical, its avowed aim being the demolition of all views contrary to the texts of orthodox Buddhism sage (as elsewhere) by the Buddhist philosophers all mean 'consciousness'. A rather free translation of the verses will be found in B. Bhattacarya's -the doctrinaire part of which is neatly- though not at all clearly -set forth Foreword, Baroda ed., xv ff. in the six opening verses of the Text" (nl above, Introduction, x).

140 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Yogācāra against the Cārvāka 141

he refutes the existence of God). Similarly, Buddhists of all The fact is that Sāntarakșita often quotes from Kumärila sorts deny the existence of the imperishable and eternal self and the present case may not be an exception. The other (atman). They, however, firmly believe in the doctrine of re- possibility is that both of them have taken the said verses birth and the passage of consciousness from one person to from the same source. Whatever the case may be, the fact another. This forced them to believe in the existence of the remains that Sāntarakşita, like Dharmakīrti before him, had momentary consciousness without any human body to sup- to reckon with opposition from all sides, orthodox Vedists port it. This, in its turn, made them the butt of attack not and anti-Vedists. only of the Lokāyata-s but also of the adherents of Mīmāmsā The choice that the Lokayata offers to the Buddhist at and Nyaya. It is intriguing that in representing the Lokāyata the end of his argument (v. 1870) is rather intriguing. Did view, Sāntarakșita quotes three verses from Kumārilabhațța's the Lokāyata-s call their doctrine nāstikata, or was it an ap- Ślokavärtika. Satkari Mookerjee was the first to note this fact. pellation devised by the astika-s themselves? Originally the He said: two terms, āstika and nāstika, were coined to designate those who affirmed the existence of the other-world (paraloka) The entire argument put in the mouth of the materialist is and those who denied it.9 Later on they came to suggest bodily taken mutatis mutandis from Kumārila's Śloka-vārtika. many things, including 'theist' and 'atheist'.10 In the given The Ślokas from 1865 to 1868 [Varanasi ed. 1864-67] are re- context, nāstikatā cannot mean atheism. The issue of debate produced verbatim and Śls. 1869 to 1871 [Varanasi ed., 1868- is belief in rebirth and transmigration of cognition. So the 70] are but a summarized version of Kumarila's Ślokas 59-64 and 69 to 73, Atmavāda, Ś.V., pp. 703-07.5 word here can only mean: denial of the existence of cogni- tion after one's death. More recently Franco has noted that the Mimāmsaka-s The Lokāyata asserts the basic materialist tenets as they and Nyāya-Vaiseșika-s are found to criticize the Buddhist developed in ancient India, viz. (a) the primacy of body over doctrine of rebirth "with arguments that bear a baffling re- cognition, (b) everything in the world, including the body, semblance to those of the Cārvakas".6 He further says: "It consists of four material substances, earth, air, fire and water, seems that the most orthodox and most heterodox schools (c) consciousness is produced from or manifested by certain (sc. the Mīmāmsā and the Lokāyata) have joined forces to material substances. As to the last item Kamalasīla tells us that criticize the Buddhists [ ... ] Yet the question arises whether there were two different approaches to the aphorism, "From these are Mīmāmsa arguments adopted by the Cārvāka or them (the material substances), consciousness". Two sets of vice versa."7 Franco thinks that "the latter is the case, be- commentators supplied two different verbs to complete the cause these arguments are disjointed from their surround- sentence. "Some said 'Consciousness is produced' and oth- ings in the SV, whereas they form a coherent whole with ers, 'Consciousness is manifested'."" This is important inas- their immediate context in TS 1863."8 much as the existence of at least two commentaries on the Cārvākasūtra (now lost) is thereby attested. (Prabhācandra, an eleventh-century Jain writer, also corroborates this view).12 Mookerjee, 204 n2. He further notes: "It is strange that the editor Before examining the Lokāyata as a doctrine Sāntarakșita of the Tattvasangraha has failed to enumerate the Ślokas 1865 to 1868 in has controverted the Cārvaka view on inference in Ch.18. that work in the list of quotations from Kumārila, given as an appendix. This chapter is devoted to the refutation of the views of many Perhaps the omission to mention Kumärila as the author of the same by known (and a few unknown) philosophers whose concepts Kamalaśīla is responsible for this overt omission on the part of the editor. of inference differ from that of the Yogācāra Buddhists. It is absolutely necessary that these ślokas should be noticed in the appen- dix of the Tattvasangraha" (ibid). Nothing of the sort has been done in the 1984 edition (which is but a reprint of the 1926 ed.). 6 Franco (1997), 99. 9 See Vāmana-Jayāditya, Kāśikā on Aștādhyāyī, 4.4.60. Ibid., 100. 10 Manu describes a nāstika as the reviler of the Veda (2. 11). See also the 8 Ibid. Franco tends to assume that "Kumārila put the Cārvāka argu- views of his commentators on 3. 150; 4. 30; 4.163; 8.22 and 11.67, which most- ments into verse and that it was simply easier for Santaraksita, who knew ly agree with those of the grammarians. For other views see Hopkins, 86. that they were Carvaka arguments, to quote them in an already versified 11 Comments on v. 1858 (Varanasi ed., 633-34). form" (101). 12 PKM, 116-17; NKC, 342.

142 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Yogācāra against the Cārvāka 143

Śāntarakșita first takes up the concept of one Pātrasvāmin13 Purandara, he obliquely refers to 'the better learned ones'17 (vv.1363-18) and refutes it at length (vv. 1379-1436). He then (susiksitatarāh). He writes as follows: proceeds to deal with Uddyotakara (v. 1438), Aviddhakarņa the Naiyayika (different from his namesake, the Lokāyatika) Indeed, who will deny the validity of inference when one in- (v. 1439), Kumārila (vv. 1442-44) -the verses are directly fers fire from smoke, and so on; for even ordinary people quoted from Ślokavartika, Inference, Section 5, wv. 141-43- ascertain the probandum by such inferences, though they and 'some others' (kecana, Kamalasila explains that they refer may not be pestered by the logicians. However, inferences to 'the Barhaspatya and others') (vv. 1455-58). Sāntarakșita that seek to prove a self, God, an omniscient being, the after then controverts Bhartrhari (vv.1459-61), quoting VP, I. 32- world, and so on, are not considered valid by those who know the real nature of things. Simple-minded people cannot de- 34. Next comes the issue of 'Inference for the sake of others' rive the knowledge of the probandum by such inferences, so (parārthānumāna) (wv. 1462-66, refuted in v. 1467) and the ref- long as their mind is not vitiated by cunning logicians. utation of corroborative inference (cited by the opposition in v. 1456) and of the view expressed in v. 1458 (vv. 1468-70 and The same interpretation of the Carvaka view regarding in- 1471-73 respectively). Then he sets out to refute the views of ference is found in a philosophical digest, SMS, and TRD.18In Bhartrhariandothers (1474-80).Suddenlyhe goes back to tack- our own times, no less a scholar than Pandit Sukhlaji Sanghvi le Purandara (vv. 1481-83) and finally presents and refutes the has also explained the Carvaka position in the same way.19 view of Aviddhakarņa the Lokäyatika in a couple of verses (vv. In spite of all this, some opponents of materialism have 1484-85). There ends the chapter. consistently and persistently distorted the Cārvāka view. The name of Purandara, a Carvaka philosopher, is found Frauwallner could not deny what Purandara had said. How- elsewhere as an author of a sutra-work and its commentary.14 ever, he claimed that the later Cārvaka-s had deserted their Kamalaśīla quotes a line presumably from the commentary original position by admitting inference.20 He did not men- (vrtti) which gives a lie to the calumny that the Cārvaka-s re- tion that even Purandara did not admit inference in all mat- ject all inference as a means of right knowledge. Purandara ters (e.g. the extrasensory) and the primacy of perception says: "The Carvaka-s, too, admit of such an inference as is continued to be the basic position of all later Cārvāka-s like well-known in the world, but that which is called inference Aviddhakarņa and Udbhața. [by some], transgressing the worldly way, is prohibited [by It is in connection with Purandara's views that Kamalasīla them]."15 In other words, the Carvaka-s are prepared to accept refers to a work called Tattvatīkā by Aviddhakarņa. Kamalaśīla inference in so far as it relates to mundane matters, verified or also mentions the arguments that the Carvaka-s employ to verifiable by perception.16 But when the limit is extended to prove why inference cannot be regarded as a means of right include such unseen and invisible 'objects' as the ephemeral cognition.21 It should also be noted that Sāntarakșita crosses or imperishable soul, God, the other-world (paraloka), etc., swords with a number of philosophers who accept the validity the Cārvaka-s refuse to admit the validity of such inferences of inference but are also conscious of its shortcomings. Ud- based on scripture or logical jugglery. Jayantabhatta, too, re- dyotakara and Kumārila are the most prominent among his fers to this distinction, although instead of attributing it to opponents. Purandara and Aviddhakarna, too, did not deny the validity of inference in common usage (lokavyvahāra). So it is unfair to represent them as belonging to a school of phi-

13 Nothing is known about this philosopher. H. Potter does not even mention his name in his monumental Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy (Vol. 17 NM, Ch. 2, I: 184; C/L, 140. I). Sanghvi considers Pātrasvāmin to be a Jain philosopher (1941), reprint- (508) 18 SMS, 15; TRD, 306. The Avacūrni on the same text echoes Gunaratna ed in the Varanasi ed. of TUS, Appendix, 30. 14 See Pupphadanta, Mahapurāna, 20. 18. 9 ab, I: 328 (refers to a 19 Prastāvana to his edition of Hemacandra's PM (1961) 4. See also his Pauramdariya vitti); SVR, 265 (refers to a Paurandaram sūtram). article mentioned in n13 above, 23-24. 15 TSP, II: 528 (on TS, vv. 1481-82). 20 1956, Band II: S. 296: Trans. 225. More recently Franco and Preisend- 6 This is how the NS defines inference in 1.1.5. After defining percep- anz have also treated Purandara and others as revisionists in REP (VI: 180). tion in 1.1.4, it says: inference is preceded by it [i.e., perception]. 21 Comments on TS, vv. 1458 and 1484 (521, 529).

Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Yogācāra against the Cārvāka 145 144

losophy which accepted only one means of right knowledge came to mean two diametrically opposite views: (a) one that (viz. perception) as the Vaiyākaraņa-s believed in āgama, the denied the existence of any creator-God but affirmed the Vedas, and in nothing else, not even perception. In fact the laws of nature as the first cause (jagatkārana) and the only de- grammarians alone can be labelled unconditionally as 'anti- termining factor in the universe (thereby admitting causality inference', for they state in so many words why inference of a sort) and (b) the other denied the existence of both is not acceptable to them.22 Jayantabhatta, Vācaspatimiśra, creator-God and causality; the universe, according to it, was Sīlānka, and Vādidevasūri quoted Bhartrhari and glibly at- ruled by chance-accident.29 Amalānanda and Guņaratna treat tributed the idea (rejection of inference as such) to the the doctrines of svabhāva and yadrccha as two opposite views Cārvāka-s.23 Apparently they could not locate any Cārvāka whereas the Buddhists and Naiyāyika-s represent svabhāva as aphorism or even a floating verse (ābhānaka or lokagāthā) in one of the many forms of accidentalism.30 support of their attribution. In view of all this, we may safely disregard TS, Ch.4 in our It is also of interest to note that Kamalaśīla himself writes analysis of the Carvaka as represented in the TS. elsewhere that the grammarians are of the opinion that in- To sum up, then: we are indebted to both Śāntarakșita ference cannot be accepted as a means of valid knowledge and Kamalaśīla for providing us with (a) the names of three since there is a possibility of error.24 In his Pañjikā, however, Cārvāka philosophers, Aviddhakarņa, Kambalāśvatara and Purandara,31 (b) some extracts from their works,32 (c) the he attributes the same statement, nānumānam pramāņam, to "the Barhaspatya and others."25 name of Aviddhakarna's commentary,33 and (d) no fewer The fourth chapter of the TS, dealing with svabhava (own than eleven fragments from the Cārvāka- or Paurandara-sūtra being) is taken by some to refer to the Cārvāka philosophy.26 (although two of them denying the validity of inference as This, I contend, is based on sheer misunderstanding. One such are of dubious authenticity).34 Of these eleven frag- cannot fail to notice that there is no reference to any Lokā- ments two are not encountered anywhere else.35 It is from yata work or author either in the text or in the commen- the TS and TSP that we come to know that the contradic- tary on this chapter. Nor do the TS and TSP refer to the tion between the Cārvāka-s and the Yogācāra Buddhists lay doctrine of svabhava in Chs. 18 and 22. As a matter of fact, mainly in the issue of rebirth, and hence in admitting the although svabhavavada is a very ancient doctrine, mentioned separable existence of the cognition apart from the body. It side by side with those of Time (kāla), Destiny (niyati). Acci- dent (yadrcchä), etc.,27 it is never identified with the Lokāyata before the sixth century when svabhāvavāda was already a 29 Kamalasīla in his comment on TS, v. 110 refers to these two schools or 'lost philosophy'.28 Even by the eighth century, svabhāvavāda svabhāvavādin-s. V.M. Bedekar says, "The distinction tends to be metaphysi- cal and abstract" (11 n46). Not quite, for by denying even svabhāva as the cause the distinction between svabhāvavāda and yadrcchāvāda (accidental- ism) was blurred by the second school. See Ch. 2, n30 above. 22 VP, Brahmakhaņda, vv. 32ff. 30 See Kalpataru on BS, 2.1.33; SDS, Ch. 1:13 ff. The identification of svabhāvavāda with the Lokāyata is not encountered before the tenth cen- 23 For further details see Ch. 8 above. tury (Utpalabhatta in his commentary on Varahamihira's Brhatsamhitā, 24 Nyāyabindu-pūrvapakşa-samksepa. Peking Tanjur, f. 115 a 6, restored 1.7), although such a view is implied in a sixth-century commentary on SK to Sanskrit from the Tibetan version by Dr Sanjitkumar Sadhukhan. I am v. 61 (translated into Chinese by Paramärtha). See Bedekar, 10 n45. See .. ........ ........ indebted to Dr Sadhukhan for drawing my attention to this passage and also NS, 4.1.22-24. permitting me to refer to his as-yet-unpublished restoration of the work 31 See TS, v. 1863 (Kambalāśvatara), TSP on v. 1481 (Purandara), TSP (MS 17). 25 Comments on v. 1455. Cf. comments on v. 2968: "The Lokāyatika on v. 1484 (Aviddhakarņa). 32 See above and TSP on vv. 1456-58. says, 'Perception is the (only) means of knowledge, not inference'." 33 TSP on v. 1458. 26 D. Chattopadhyaya has included both Chs. 4 and 22 in his anthol- 34 See TSP on vv. 1857-58, 1859, 1868-70, 1871-73, 1938-40, 1945 and ogy, C/L. 27 Śv. Up., 1.2. vv. 1455, 2968. 35 The one concerning the other-world (quoted in TSP on vv. 1871-73) 28 Randle says: "Some of these 'lost philosophies' (so to speak) were probably fathered by Brahmanical tradition on the Lokāyata or Cārvāka and the other on remembrance of previous birth (TSP on v. 1945). The school and some of them are possibly to be found in the strange assort- fragments may have been taken from some commentary (or commentar- ies) of the Cārvākasūtra. ment of doctrine reviewed in [NS 4.1]". 16 n3.

146 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

also highlights the unique position of the Cārvaka in Indian thought. This was the only school that refused to accept the dogma of the transmigration of the soul which the two other heterodox schools, viz. Jains and Buddhists, did not deny.

Postscript It may be rewarding to compare TS, v. 1862 with what Bhavaviveka presumably quotes (or paraphrases) from a Cārvāka work in his commentary on Nāgarjuna's Madhyamakaśastra, 16.1: "The dying consciousness of De- vadatta is not recognized by another consciousness because the consciousness is about to die, as the dying consciousness of the arhat."36 Namai has included the passage as a Cārvāka XII

saying in his compilation of Cārvāka fragments.37 Franco Jayantabhatta's Representation

notes: "This Cārväka syllogism has been repeatedly referred of the Carvāka: A Critique to and criticized by Buddhist authors upto Ratnakīrti [fl. 1070] and Mokşakaragupta [fl. 1100]. Until now the frag- ment [quoted above] has been considered anonymous, but I would like to attribute it, at least as a working hypothesis, to Kambalāśvatara."38 I have no objection to this hypothesis but would only The NM of Jayantabhatta is a seminal work of the Nyaya- like to point out that besides Kambalāśvatara, several com- Vaiśeșika system of philosophy. The author was a staunch mentators on the Cārvākasūtra were already there when opponent of the Cārväka/Lokāyata and missed no opportu- Kamalaśīla wrote his TSP (See his comments on TS, v. 1864: nity of reviling it in the strongest possible terms. One of his kecid vrttikārāh [ ... ] anye). Anyone of them might have been favourite abuses employed against his adversaries is varāka, the author of this fragment. 'wretched'. On one occasion he remarks: "But in such kind of assemblies (discussing philosophical questions), who would indeed care to remember the (name of the) wretched Cārvākas?"1 He always mentions the Cārvaka-s in a tone of de- rision and his attempts are directed to the refutation of the materialist tenets as they developed in India, viz. a. bhūtacaitanyavāda (the doctrine of consciousness arising out of matter). b. śarīrātmavāda or dehātmavāda (the doctrine of the self as something inseparable from the body, i.e., there can be no self independent of the body).2 The Carvaka-s are made to appear as an opponent 36 Bhavaviveka, PrPr, in MŚ, II: 3. (pūrvapaksin) in relation to a third question, viz. 37 Namai (1976), 44, marked F3. Dr Sanjitkumar Sadhukhan, to whom I am indebted for the English translation from the Tibetan passage quoted in this postscript, points out that the Tibetan word ñin mstams as printed in Namai's article should be ñin mtshams. Franco (1997), 116 also suggests the same (although instead of nin mstams as found in Namai he quotes ñin 1 GrBh, Ch. 3, I: 299; C/L, 157. Hemacandra also employs the same adjective: varam varākaścārvāko yo 'sau prakațanāstikah, YŚ, 2.38, f. 96b. See mtsams, which may very well be a printing mistake). also Ch. 14 nn25-26 below. 38 Franco (1997), 116. 2 See NM, Ch. 7. II: 201-02, 214-17; C/L, 110-25.

Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Jayantabhatta's Representation 148 149

c. whether or not inference (anumana) is to be admitted as body (the self being neither imperishable nor perennial) suf- a means of valid knowledge (pramāna).3 fers from oversimplification. It is one thing to say that the self Here, too, Jayanta ridicules the Carvaka-s who allegedly cannot be separated from the body and another to say that the do not recognize any other means of valid knowledge ex- body and the self are one. Jayanta writes: "[T]he Laukāyatikas cept perception (pratyaksa). It is in this connection that he who deny that there is any 'other world' (paraloka) think that refers to the well-learned (susikita) and cunning (dhūrta) there is no self other than the body itself as 'endowed with Cārvaka-s.4 These two adjectives gave rise to the idea that consciousness' (caitanyakhacita)."10 there were at least two schools of the Carvaka-s. This view The Carvaka-s always insist on (a) the primacy of four has been accepted uncritically by almost all historians and natural elements, earth, air, fire and water, (b) a particu- analysts of Indian philosophy.5 lar combination of these elements constituting the animal There are reasons to believe that in many respects Jayanta body, and (c) consciousness being produced or manifested has misrepresented the Cārvaka and misled generations of from the living organism.11 Jayanta, however, blurs all this scholars in their comprehension of materialisim. and equates the self with the body. Before going into a detailed critique of Jayanta's polem- It is interesting to note that the Laukāyatika-s are brand- ics against the Carvaka-s a few more facts may be mentioned. ed as those who deny the existence of the other-world. Jay- First, he was also the author of a philosophical play in five anta is keen to refute them because he needs to establish acts called A.6 Admittedly a closet play, it contains (in Act the existence of the other-world. Not only Nyāya-Vaisesika, 3) the same sort of misrepresentation and refutation of the all other systems of Indian philosophy (except the Cārvāka, Cärväka as is found in the NM. He did not add anything new of course), whether orthodox (pro-Vedic) or heterodox in the play. It is a mere rehash. (anti-Vedic), including the Buddhists and the Jains, hold Second, Jayanta refers to a number of aphorisms purport- the other-world and whatever that entails (rebirth, etc.) to edly of Carvaka origin. Most of them are mentioned else- be their chief article of faith. We shall see afterwards that where, both before and after his work was composed. How- Jayanta has a stake in establishing the existence of the im- ever, there are two aphorisms that are found in the NM alone. perishable self and its transmigration from one body to an- They are as follows: other. The Cārvaka-s' refusal to accept this constitutes the 1. Religious act is not to be performed (dharmo na kāryah). chief obstacle without overcoming which he cannot reach 2. Its (religion's) instructions are not to be relied upon the more important issue, viz. the validity of inference as an (tad upadeśeşu na pratyetavyam). independent means of knowledge. When he comes to deal It is rather strange that these two fragments, existing in print with the issue of inference he falls prey to confusion and since 1895,8 escaped the notice of D.R. Shastri and Namai.9 makes contradictory statements. For example, at first he Now to the critique of Jayanta. His representation of the declares that according to the Cārvaka-s "there is only one two basic tenets of materialism, viz. the primacy of matter kind of pramana which is perception (pratyaksa)."12 A few over consciousness and non-existence of the self without the pages after he writes: "The Carvakas, the well-learned ones (suśikșita) say that it is really impossible to specifically state the number of pramana(s)."13 Elsewhere he says: "According 8 NM, Ch. 2, I: 175-84; C/L, 128-41. to the Cārvaka-s, inference is not a pramana at all."14 But then 4 NM, Ch. 1, I: 52,100; C/L 154-55. again he refers to 'the better learned ones' (susikşitatarāh, 5 One of the few execptions to this trend has been D. Chattopadhyaya presumably the Cārvaka-s again) who say that there are two (1989), 55-56. He refers to M.K. Gangopadhyaya (1984), 31-32. More re- cently Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz have accepted Cakradhara's identification of susikşitacārvāka and cārvākadhūrta as Udbhața. See "Mate- rialism, Indian School of", REP, VI: 179. 10 NM, Ch. 7, II: 201; C/L, 110. 6 See AD, Act 3 7 NM, Ch. 4, I: 388; C/L, 157. Ch. 8 n49 above l1 Regarding the diversity of views, viz., 'produced' or 'manifested', see 8 The Vizianagram Sanskrit Series No. 10, is the editio princeps of the 12 NM, Ch. 1, II: 43; C/L, 154. 13 NM, Ch. 1, II: 52, 100; C/L, 154-55. work. 9 For details see Ch. 8 n9 above. 14 NM, Ch. 7, II: 201; C/L, 111.

Jayantabhatta's Representation 151 150 Studies on the Carvāka/Lokāyata

perception alone, and hence, the world would have been as kinds of inference, "some in case of which the inferential motionless as a figure drawn in a picture.18 cognition can be acquired by oneself" (utpannapratīti) and "some in case of which the inferential cognition is to be ac- Then he adds (in prose): quired (on somebody else's advice) (utpādyapratīti)".15 Apparently Jayanta means to suggest that, according to Even in the case of objects which are being perceived, common them, the former kind is valid but the latter kind is not. He people apply the probans 'it is of the same nature' (as previously then explains which inferences are admitted by them and produced pleasure or pain) in respect of them, and thus deter- mine them (by inference) to be either a cause of pleasure or a which are not. He writes: cause of pain, and accordingly, take them up or avoid them.19 The inferences of God and the like are ones in case of which the inferential cognition is to be acquired (on others' advice). Thus Jayanta criticizes and refutes the Cārvāka-s by mak- Indeed, who will deny the validity of inference when one infers ing them deny what they never denied! Lokavyavahära fire from smoke, and so on; for even ordinary people ascer- (common usage) is as much important to them as percep- tain the probandum by such inferences, though they may not tion and perhaps it is in this sense that Udayana speaks of be pestered by the logicians. However, inferences that seek to lokavyavahārasiddha (established by common usage) as the prove a self, God, an omniscient being, the after-world, and God (bhagavān) of the Cārvāka-s.20 In fact, besides actual so on, are not considered valid by those who know the real perception, the Cārvāka-s believe in nothing else except nature of things. Simple-minded people cannot derive the lokavyavahārasiddha and the worldly way (laukikamārga). knowledge of the probandum by such inferences, so long as Jayarasibhatta asserts the unavoidability of the worldly way their mind is not vitiated by cunning logicians.16 by quoting two apophthegms: "The worldly way is to be fol- That 'the better learned ones' cannot but be the Carvaka-s lowed [ ... ]" and "As regards common usage the ignorant is borne out by what Purandara says regarding inference: (lit. child) and the scholar are alike."21 As to the Cārvāka-s who, according to Jayanta, refused to The Carväka-s too admit of such an inference as is well-known accept any definite number of pramāna-s, we have only his in the world, but that which is called inference (by some) words to go by. No other writer known to us has spoken of transgressing the worldly way is prohibited (by them).17 such a view and attributed it to the Cārvāka-s. At this juncture a question automatically arises: if the Instead of declaring a blanket ban on inference as such, Cārvāka-s were not averse to inference as such but only to the Cārvaka-s, it appears, have no objection to inference in such inferences as are employed to justify the existence of the the affairs of daily life. Their opponents like Jayanta, how- self, God, an omniscient being, the other-world and so on, ever, make them deny even this limited validity of inference. who exactly is Jayanta's adversary? Whom is he controverting In two consecutive verses Jayanta writes: in defence of inference? Even ordinary people like a woman, a child, a cowherd or a ploughman determine, beyond doubt, the presence of one 18 NM, Ch. 2, I: 179. Cf. AD, Act 3. 22, 62. object from the presence of another object which has an in- 19 Ibid, Cf. Vācaspatimiśra, Bhāmatī (on BS, 3.3.53-54), Varanasi ed., variable relation with the former. 852, in which he satirizes the Carvaka as being 'more beastly than a beast'. If the validity of inference is denied, (perception would he See C/L, 243. the only source of valid knowledge). But the everyday life 20 NK, 1.2, 5. The word, lokavyavahara, has been interpreted by others of people in general cannot be carried on with the help of to suggest (a) idols of gods and goddesses, and (b) king. But in my opinion, 'common usage' suits the context better. See Ch. 13 below. Udbhatabhatta, contrasts lokaprasiddhahetu (probans well-established in the world) with tantrasiddhahetu (probans established by scripture). Udbhata also uses the 15 NM, Ch. 2, I: 184; C/L, 140. term lokavyavahāra along with bhūyodarsana (repeated observation) in his novel commentary on a Carvaka aphorism. See SVR, 266. 17 Qtd. in TSP, II: 528 (on TS, Ch. 18, vv. 1481-82). For others confirm- 16 Ibid. 21 TUS, 1. For a detailed discussion of these two apophthegms see Fran- ing this view see Ch. 8 above. See also Sanghavi's Hindi article (1941) re- co (1994), 43-44, 68-69. printed as an appendix in TUS (1987), particularly pp. 23-24.

152 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Jayantabhatta's Representation 153

The answer is obvious. The true opponent is Bhartrhari, same time, they do not believe that any invariable relation the founder of the philosophical system of the grammarians. can be established between two events on the basis of mere There is no other system in the history of Indian philosophy observation. They affirm that the means of valid knowledge that denies the validity of all means of knowledge excepting must be primary (agauna). Since inference is to be preceded verbal testimony, more particularly, the authority of the Ve- by perception as NS, 1.1.5 states categorically, it is at best a das. It is, therefore, not surprising that Jayanta, while present- secondary (gauna) means of knowing things. ing the alleged view of the Cārvaka-s on inference, quotes Now the problem with the Nyäya-Vaisesika-s is that the exist- three verses from the VP in both NM and AD without, how- ence of God, the other-world, etc. cannot be proved by means ever, mentioning their source. They run as follows: of perception; scriptural authority and inference drawn from authoritative statements have to be resorted to. The existence It has, thus, been said that since various things differ in their of God is established by the following inference: Everything powers (sakti) due to the change of circumstances, time, that is an effect has a maker, so the earth, etc., too, must have space, and the like, it is hardly possible to determine the things (in their true nature) by inference. When a blind per- a maker. But the existence of the other-world is more impor- son hurries on in an uneven path, mainly depending upon tant to them. As Jayanta says: "The reply to (the objections to inferences by the touch of hands, etc., he stumbles down, not the admission of God raised by) the Barhaspatyas would sim- infrequently, on the ground. An object may be determined ply be the establishment of paraloka." And Cakradhara eluci- (to be of a particular nature) with an inference carefully for- dates: "When paraloka is established, their (sc. the Cārvākas') mulated, by persons who are quite adept in the art of infer- objections are automatically rejected."24 ence; still the same may be described to be of a quite differ- ent nature by others who are more learned." How to establish the other-world? Agama (scripture) is the sole resort. This is why Vātsyāyana defines anvīksā in this All this makes it abundantly clear that there was no authen- peculiar way: tic Cārvāka aphorism or even any verse (ābhānaka/lokagāthā) The inference (anumäna) which is not contradicted by per- that could be cited in support of the deliberate misrepresen- ception and scripture is called anvīksā, that is knowing over tation of the Carvaka view on inference. Hence this unjust again (anu, literally 'after') of that which is already known resort to the VP. I have deliberately used the word'deliberate' (īkșita) by perception and scripture ... The inference which for Jayanta was doubtless aware of the true Cārvaka view re- is contradicted by either perception or scripture is pseudo- garding perception and inference. Perhaps this is why, while nyāya.25 (Emphasis added) representing it in another section of the work, he does not re- fer to the Carvaka-s by their true name but resorts to the iron- This is flying in the face of what NS, 1.1.5 says: "Next [is ical appellation, susiksitatarāh, 'the better learned ones'.23 discussed] inference (anumana) which is preceded by it (tat- Why does Jayanta try so hard to establish the status of in- pūrvaka) (i.e. by perception) [ ... ]".26 There is not the slightest ference as an independent means of knowledge on a par with hint of scripture here. Jayanta, too, has to uphold the view of perception? Why does he consider it necessary to prove that anvīkā as proposed by Vātsyāyana in order to establish the inference is as much a primary means of knowledge as per- existence of the other-world. ception? The Cārvaka-s, we have shown, have no objection to I may now attempt to clarify what Jayanta means by susiksita- admitting inference in so far as it concerns perceptible mat- cārvāka and cārvāka-dhūrta, the well-learned and the cunning ters, like fire from smoke. But they draw the line there. At the Cārväka-s. On the basis of these references some have con- ceived two schools of the Cärväka-s. It should be remembered that no scholium on the NM was available to them. Now that 22 NM, Ch. 2, I: 177, 179 quoting VP, 1.31, 42, 34 (in this order). See VP (1966), 88-89, 98; AD, Act 3. 15-17, 59. For others who have quoted Bhartrhari while refuting the Cārvāka-s, see Ch. 8 n33 above. M.K. Gan- 24 NM, Ch. 3, I: 275; C/L, 156. gopadhyaya (1984) noted some of these earlier. 25 Vātsyāyana on NS, 1.1.1. I quote from the translation by M.K. Gango- 23 NM, Ch. 2, I: 184; C/L, 140. See also NM, Ch.7, II: 256-57. In the last padhyaya (1982), 4. instance Jayanta indirectly refers to Udbhața. 26 Ibid., 17.

154 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Jayantabhatta's Representation 155

the GrBh by Cakradhara has been published.27 we are in a bet- As to the instructions "Religious act is not to be performed", ter position to judge whether Jayanta could mean anything "Its (religion's) instructions are not to be relied upon," etc., of that sort. Cakradhara identifies both the 'well-learned (it is to be noted that) they are not really proper instructions, Cārvaka-s' and the 'cunning Cārvaka' as referring to Udbhata for the Lokayata doctrine is based only upon such statements and others.28 This, I believe, may very well be true. Jayanta as represent the viewpoint of the opponent (pūrvapaksa- was prone to ridicule his opponents by using such ironical vacana). Thus there are subsequent Brāhmana statements replying (to the previous ones): "Well, I am not preaching appellations. For example, he employed the term, susiksita to ignorance. This self is indeed indestructible. It only has a designate the Prābhākara Mīmāmsaka-s twice in NM.29 connection with the senses, etc. (The self is not born; it can The name of Udbhata is well attested. Vādidevasūri also only have connection with newer senses, etc.)".34 quotes from his work and refers to him quite respectfully.30 There was another Udbhata, a rhetorician (some have iden- On the basis of all this Jayanta dismisses the Lokayata out tified the two as the same person although there is no evi- of hand: dence to support it). Kahlana refers to one Udbhața who was a minister of Jayāpīda, king of Kashmir in the eighth centu- Thus due to its being based upon statements representing only ry.31 In any case, there is no reason to doubt the historicity of the viewpoint of the opponent, the doctrine of the Lokāyata Udbhața (as Chattopadhyaya does).92 is also not an independent one; and because it is contradicted by later statements, it is not to be taken into account.

ground: Jayanta further criticizes the Carväka-s on the following It is very odd that Jayanta who most probably possessed the book of Cārvāka aphorisms (now lost) as well as at least In the Lokāyata view, no precept is indeed (positively) pre- scribed. It is only the assertions of a vaitandika (representing one commentary on it (composed by Udbhata) would deny merely the destructive criticism of others). It is not really a the existence of anything positive in the Cārvaka philosophy. body of precepts.33 The Cārvāka-s, of course, abide by the materialist conception of nature and man. Hence, they have nothing to do with any This is a rather strange assessment. Jayanta himself notes a religious duty to ensure their passage to heaven or attaining probable objection to this assertion and refutes it as follows: final liberation from the cycle of rebirth. Quite naturally they forbid people to follow the instructions of priests and gurus. But then, there it has been (positively) prescribed: "live in But this should not make one blind to the fact that these ap- pleasure as long as you live". No. The fact being naturally parently negative instructions were firmly rooted in certain established, a prescription in this regard becomes useless. positive views of nature and man, e.g., the four elements are (It is not a prescription at all). the fundamental principles; from these alone, when trans- formed into the body, intelligence is produced, and when 27 N.J. Shah (ed.), is the editio princeps. It has been reprinted in NM these are destroyed intelligence at once perishes also.35 (1982-84). Second, it is highly doubtful whether the Cārvāka-s ever 28 See: NM, Ch.1, I: 52, 100. See also n23 above. 29 NM, Ch. 3, I: 249; Ch. 5, II: 4. quoted any passage from the Vedas and the Upanisads or ever drew sustenance from those texts.36 On the other hand, there 985-92. 30 SVR, 764. For all references to Udbhata, see E.A. Solomon (1977-78), are reasons to believe that the authors of the Upanisads were 8 See V. Raghavan (ed.), NCC, II: 341, referring to Rājatarangiņī, IV. controverting the views of some pre-Cārvaka materialists.37 495; NM, I: Introduction, (8); C/L, 155. Interestingly enough, the rhetori- cian Udbhata along with Bhamaha has often been called cirantana (S.N Dasgupta and S.K. De, I: 534 nl) whereas Cakardhara distinguishes 34 Jayanta here quotes from Br.Up., 4.5.13. Ubdhața from the cirantana-cārvākācārya-s such as Bhāvivikta (NM, Ch. 35 These are the basic tenets of the Cārvaka quoted by many oppo- 7, II: 257). nents in their works as well as in all digests of philosophy. See e.g., SDS, 32 D. Chattopadhyaya (1993), 70 (misprinted as 86). He doubts whether Ch. 1 (C/L, 247-57). Jayanta knew of any Udbhata at all. 36 S-M, too, says that the Carvāka-s quote the śruti in support of their 33 NM, Ch. 4, II: 388; C/L, 157. The two extracts that follow are quoted contentions and cites Br.Up., 2.4.12. See C/L, 248. from the same source. 37 The asura view found in the Mai.Up. and the Gita as well as in the

156 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Jayantabhatta's Representation 157

Third, the Carväka-s never claim to have anything to do the Cārvāka view, Jayanta's polemical zeal and fideistic bias with the Vedas. They refuse to believe in the veracity of scrip- make his exposition of the Cārvaka even less reliable than tural precepts unless they are verifiable by sense-perception. Sankara's. Sankara does not distort the Carvaka view while They are not at all eager to be counted as 'the sheep'. crossing swords with it. He, too, has a very low opinion of the In order to understand Jayanta's refusal to admit the Cārvaka-s whom he brackets with 'the unlearned people'.41 Carvaka-s, we have to look at the context of these remarks. A But he does not go to the extent of misrepresenting the doc- question has been raised (presumably by some fellow Nyāya- trine. This is precisely what Jayanta does. Vaiseșika) whether or not the precepts of the Lokāyata and others should be considered valid in view of the fact that Postscript they, too, are based on Vedic statements.38 Earlier Jayanta has shown catholicity by declaring that all precepts based Jayanta writes: "The Cārvaka-s, the well-learned ones, say on the Vedas are to be considered valid. He, however, is not that it is really impossible to specifically state the number of prepared to be so catholic as to entertain the view of the pramāna-s" (Ch. 1, I: 52). more liberal ones. It is, therefore, necessary for him to prove The same statement is attributed 'to the cunning Cārvaka' that the Carvaka-s are basically anti-Vedic -a fact that the who cites certain forms of valid knowledge which cannot be Cārvāka-s never deny! What Jayanta is doing here is merely said to be produced by the accepted pramāna-s like percep- disabusing some liberals of the notion that the precepts of tion, etc. Jayanta then sets out to refute such a view by refer- the Carvaka-s, too, have their roots in the Vedas. Ift order to ring to "the ascetic (tapasvi), though he is adept in inventing do so, he has to go to the extent of denying the existence of such instances of awareness, does not really know the nature anything positive in the Cārvāka view. of either perception or inference." Jayanta concludes his I have intentionally ignored all passages in which Jayanta refutation with the following observation: "Therefore, the simply takes a fling at the Cārvāka-s who, according to him, nästika-s, not having enough intelligence to determine the 'are only to be thrown away' (i.e. refuted).39 He also adds a power of the pramana-s have been clamouring in vain that rhetorical question: "Therefore, where is the scope for enu- in the case of pramana-s there is no specific rule as to the merating their very insignificant logic (ksudra tarka) in this number." (ibid., 100ff) list of vidyasthana?"40 Yet the fact remains that he has to spend No Cārvāka aphorism known to us speaks of the indeter- much ink in defence of the disembodied self and the validity minability of the number of pramana-s. On the contrary, the of inference independent of perception. Cārvāka-s have been accused of being pramānaikavādin-s, To sum up then: Jayanta in his polemics against the i.e., they professed only one sort of pramāna, viz. percep- Cārvāka-s does not help us to reconstruct the basic tenets of tion. Wherefrom did Jayanta learn about the Carvaka-s pro- ancient Indian materialism. On the contrary, he has misrepre- pounding indeterminability of pramāna-s? sented the Carvaka view on inference. Being a staunch theist, The answer, I believe, is to be found in the mysterious he had no alternative but to controvert the Cārvāka-s. Howev- identity of the 'ascetic' (apparently used satirically). Cakrad- er, the way he has done it makes him appear as a debator who hara tells us that Jayanta meant Udbhatabhatta and others is not loath to resort to jalpa and chala, manoeuvre and inten- (udbhatādayah) when he applied such ironical and insult- tional distortion. Although the NM since its first publication ing adjectives as susikşita and dhūrta respectively. Udbhața is has been treated as a major source for the reconstruction of known to have denied the traditional Cārvaka view that the number of elements is four and four only (see Comm. 16 in Ch. 6 above). It is possible, but by no means certain, that Ch. and the BrUp .- s. may very well be related to some ancient material- Udbhata was also the progenitor of the view that the number ist thinkers. See D. Chattopadhyaya (1973), 42-48. See also his study of Uddālaka in (1991), II: 98-148. For a bird's-eye view of the freethinkers and definition of pramana cannot be specifically stated. mentioned in the Mbh, see Hopkins, 86-90. 38 NM, Ch. 4, I: 387-388; C/L, 175. 39 NM, Ch. 1, I: 9; C/L, 154. 40 Ibid. 41 ŚBh. on BS, 1.1.1, 82; C/L, 234.

158 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

The source, I presume, was Udbhata's commentary on the Cārvākasūtra. In any case Udbhața was a 'revisionist' among the later Carvaka-s and his odd interpretation of some Cārvākasūtra-s is not to be accepted as representative of the original Cārvāka view.

XIII What Does Udayana Mean by lokavyavahārasiddha iti cārvākāḥ?

At the beginning of the Nyāyakusumāñjali Udayana, the Nyāya-Vaisesika philosopher, in his endeavour to prove the existence of God, declares all men to be theists at heart. Eve- ry school of philosophers and even non-philosophers like the craftsmen, he says, believe in Him in some form or the other, notwithstanding the difference in calling Him by various ap- pellations. By way of example he refers to the Carvaka-s who, according to him, consider 'What is established in the worldly practice' to be their God (lokavyavahārasiddha iti cārvākāh).1 Commentators have tended to explain the term, lokavyavahāra in two ways. Varadarajamiśra, the earliest known scholiast, offers two alternatives: (i) the visible king and the like, or (ii) idols of gods in the form of having four arms.2 He is followed by Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgīśa and T. Vīrarāghavācārya Siromaņi.3 Four other commentators,

: Prose section following kārikā 1.2. Varadarāja, 4. 2 lokavyavahārasiddhah rājādidrśyamānascaturbhujādirūpā pratimā vā. 3 lokavyavahāreti, yathā loke vyavahriyate caturbhujādyupeta dehavān īśvara na tvadrśya iti tathā. athavā lokavyavahārasiddhah rājā 'lokasiddho rājā parameśvara 'ityukteh. Kāmākhyānātha, 8; prajāpālakamahārājarūpeņa vā ālayādişvabhi-manyamānapratimādirūpena vā vilaksanaprabhāvaśāliśrīrāma krsnādirūpeņa vā. Vīrarāghavācārya, 5

160 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata What Does Udayana Mean 161

viz., Vardhamāna Upādhyāya, Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma, God out of their insistence on perception: whatever is not Śankaramiśra and Guņānanda Vidyāsāgara, mention only the and cannot be perceived in this world is rejected by them. second interpretation.4 The point they wish to make is that Two maxims (nyāya) found in some philosophical works one needs a visible entity for one's god, not an invisible one. also uphold the importance of 'the worldly way' and 'world- When does a commentator offer two or more alterna- ly practice'. They run as follow: laukiko mārgo 'nusartavyah tives in interpreting a word or a passage in the text? Instead and lokavyavahāram prati sadrsau bālapanditau.6 "The worldly of digressing into a long excursus, the question may be way should be followed. As regards worldly practice, the ig- answered briefly as follows: If a commentator finds several norant (lit. child) and the scholar are similar." interpretations equally appropriate to the context and/or It is well-known that even a world-denying philosophy equally logical but is not sure which of them corresponds like the Advaita Vedänta, with all its disavowals of the objec- to the author's intention, he records all the possible ones. tivity of the material world, has to speak of vyāvahārikasattā In short, alternatives betray uncertainty in the mind of the (practical existence) as the idealist Buddhists had thought commentator himself. of samurti satya.7 As to everyday practice, no amount of phi- In this case, why some later commentators opted for one losophizing and logic-chopping can make one deny that interpretation only is not clear. Perhaps they found the other food is required to satisfy hunger, water to quench thirst. alternative inappropriate or redundant or both. This kind of everyday practice is followed by all, whether he Whatever the case may be, I propose that both the in- is an ignorant man or a scholar.8 terpretations are wide of the mark. Lokavyāvahārasiddha is S-M in his presentation of the Cārvāka system refers to a a term used to distinguish between two kinds of probanses saying, "The king, established in the world, is the supreme -the first actually seen and verifiable in everyday life, such lord" (lokasiddho rājā parameśvaraḥ [ ... ] lokasiddho bhaved as smoke from which one can and does infer the existence of rājā pareso nāparah smrtah).9 What S-M has in mind is that, fire, and the second which concerns unseen and unverifiable according to the Carvaka-s, there is no invisible overlord: inferences regarding God, the other-world (paraloka), heaven the king on earth is the only visible lord one can think of. and hell, etc. which have to be established with the authority The key-word is lokasiddha, as in the other two maxims men- of the scriptures. This is how Udbhatabhatta elucidates the tioned above. difference between lokaprasiddha and tantrasiddha hetu-s.5 Ap- I therefore suggest that lokavyavahārasiddha in Udayana parently, Udayana intends to suggest that the Cārvāka-s make should be taken to mean "what is established in worldly practice, i.e., perceptible and hence followed by all in ac- tual life". 4 yatha loke vyavahriyate caturbhujādyupetadehavān, natvadrśya ityarthah. Vardhamāna, 6; lokavyavahārasiddhah pratimādyākārah, Rāmabhadra, 7; lokavyavahārasiddhaitipratimākāraityarthah, Sankara, 8; lokavyavahārasiddhah caturbhujādiśarīram tādršī pratimeti kecit. Guņānanda, 8. 5 yat tu tenaiva paramalokāyatammanyena (sc. Udbhațena) loka- vyavahāraikapakşapātinā lokaprasiddhadhūmādyanumānāni puraskrtya sāstrīyasvargādisādhakānumānāni nirācikīrșata [ ... ] lokaprasiddheșvapi 6 Jayarāsibhațța, TUS, 1 [68 in Franco (1994)], quotes both; Vyomaśiva hetuşu vyabhicārādarśanamasti tantrasiddheșvapi tena vyabhicārādarśana- quotes only the second, twice (II: 108, 172). On both occasions Vyomasiva lakşanagunasādharmyataḥ tantrasiddhahetunām tathābhāvo vyavasthapyata. calls it a nyaya. D.R. Shastri and Mamoru Namai have accepted the second Quoted in Vadidevasuri, SVR, 256-66. Even before Udbhața, Purandara re- one as a Bärhaspatya aphorism (No. 54 and 41, Bl respectively). But see ferred to the 'worldly way': lokaprasiddham anumānam cārvākair apīşyata Franco (1994), 299 n4 and Intro., 43-44. eva, yat tu kaiścit laukikam mārgam atikramyānumānam ucyate tan nişidhyate. 7 See D. Chattopadhyaya (1964), 98-100. Quoted by Kamalaśīla, TSP, II: 528. Other works by non-Cārvāka authors 8 Franco, however, interprets the maxim in a quite different way in con- also refer to such 'inferences as tend to facilitate worldly activities' ad- formity with his thesis regarding Jayarasi as a sceptic Lokayatika. Matilal's mitted by the Carvāka-s. For example, visesah punaścārvākair lokayātrā- reference to Sextus [quoted by Franco (1994), 43] is, in my opinion, mis- nirvāhaņapravaņam dhūmādyanumānamişyate kvacana na punah svargā leading. The question is not of being active or inactive, but of accepting re- drstādiprasādhakamalaukikamanumānamiti. Guņaratna, TRD on ȘDSam, v. ality as reality, not as illusion, whatever one's philosophical view might be. 83, 306. The anonymous Avacurni on the same text also contains the same 9 SDS (1978), 6. The second extract is taken from the versified version sentence (508). (All emphases mine). following the prose statement.

XIV Hemacandra on the Cārvāka: A Survey

Hemacandra, respectfully called kalikālasarvajña (the omniscient one of the Kali era), was not the first Jain au- thor to write about the Cārvaka/Lokāyata. Long before him Haribhadra had dealt with this system of philosophy in his SDSam, SVS and LTN. So had Siddharsi in his UBhPK. How- ever, some passages in Hemacandra's works contain some- thing of special interest in connection with the Cārvāka. A passage in the AC runs as follows:

syādvādavādyā"rhatah syāt šūnyavādī tu saugatah | naiyāyikastvākşapādo yaugah sāmkhyastu kāpilah | vaiseşikah syādaulūkyo bārhaspatyastu nāstikah || cārvāko laukāyatikaścaite sadapi tārkikā |1 Hemacandra mentions six systems of philosophy: 1. Syādvādavādin or Arhata (i.e. the Jain), 2. Sūnyavādin or Saugata (i.e. the Buddhist), 3. Naiyāyika or Ākșapāda or Yauga,2 4. Sāmkhya or Kāpila, 5. Vaiseşika or Aulūkya, and 6. Bārhaspatya or Nāstika or Cārvāka or Laukāyatika.3

1 AC, 3.525-527. 2 The use of the word, yauga (one who studies or knows Yoga), in this sense (instead of referring to the Pātañjala system of philosophy) is not unknown or unprecedented. See Tarkavāgīśa, I: xvii, 278-80. 3 Not having access to Hemacandra's auto-commentary on AC, Colebrooke

164 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Hemacandra on the Cārvāka 165

Why Hemacandra excludes Mīmāmsā, Vedānta and Yoga Bhadanta (Buddhist) and Lokāyata; Sāmkhya, Nyāya and is rather puzzling. Haribhadra in his SDSam begins with a Vaiseșika constitute the uttarapaksa (opponent's view).6 short exposition of the Buddhist system and proceeds to deal Hemacandra takes Ānvīkșikī and Tarkavidyā to be with Nyaya, Sāmkhya, Jain, Vaiśeşika, Mīmāmsā, and Cārvāka. synonymous,7 but he does not mention Carvaka along with He too excludes Vedanta. But his inclusion of the Cārvāka the Jain and Buddhist systems as distinguished from the seems to have been an afterthought. Having concluded the pro-Vedic ones (Nyāya, Sāmkhya and Vaiseșika). Tradition- section on the doctrine of Jaimini (i.e. Mīmāmsā), Hari- ally 'the six systems' mean the six pro-Vedic (astika) systems bhadra suddenly remembers that some scholars preferred only, the Buddhist, Jain and Cārvaka systems are called to treat Nyāya and Vaiseșika as a single system and, accord- nāstika (negativist) for they do not accept the inerrancy of ing to them, the number of the āstikavādin-s is five, not six the Vedas. But the two terms, āstika and nāstika, have been (v. 78). So in order to maintain the magic number, six, he de- explained variously from different points of view. As F.W. cided to fill in the gap with the Cārvaka (v. 79). Apparently, Thomas notes in another context: "The negative term, by the term, āstikavādin (affirmativist), Haribhadra means nāstika sometimes denotes those who reject the Veda and its those systems of philosophy which believe in the existence dharma, in which case it includes the Buddhists: more gen- of the other-world (paraloka).4 Hence he includes the Bud- erally it is those who deny moral responsibility and a future dhist and Jain systems in his list. Hemacandra seems to have life: which seems to be the sense here (sc. AYVD, v. 20), as followed Haribhadra in maintaining the number, six, and the Buddhists, and the Jains themselves, escape."8 in excluding both Vedänta and Yoga. But his choice of six However, the omission of Mīmāmsā, Yoga and Vedānta in systems is markedly different. He speaks of six tarka-s (dialec- AC is intriguing. Hemacandra in his AYVD refutes Mīmāmsa tical systems). The term is also found earlier in NM although and Vedānta (vv. 11-14) along with Vaiśeșika, Nyāya, they are not enumerated.5 We are indebted to Rajasekhara Sāmkhya, Buddhist and Lokāyata (vv. 4-9, 10, 15, 16-19 and (fourteenth century CE) for the exposition of the six tarka-s. 20 respectively).9 In his YS he condemns animal sacrifice and Rājasekhara divides Ānvīkșikī into two paksa-s (views, lit. brands Jaimini as a monster (2.38). What induced Hemacan- sides). The pūrvapaksa (exponent's view) comprises Arhat, dra to make a new list of six tarka-s, quite distinct from all other lists, seems inexplicable. As to Yoga, he perhaps did not consider it as a system distinct from Samkhya, or he may not was mistaken in his interpretation of this passage. He said: "HEMACH- have accepted it as a philosophical system at all. ANDRA ... mentions and discriminates the various sects: viz. 1st, Ārhatas, Hemacandra gives four synonyms for the materialist or Jainas, 2dly, Saugatas, or Bauddhas, and, 3dly: six philosophical schools, philosophy in the AC. In his auto-commentary he explains viz. 1st. Naiyāyica; 2d. Yoga; 3d. CAPILAS [sic] Sānchya; 4th. Vaiseshica; 5th. Vārhaspatya or Nāstica; and 6th. Charvāca or Locāyata." [(1837), II: 219. The Bärhaspatya as the sāstra made by Brhaspati. Such is the tra-

article was first published in The Asiatic Researches, Vol. IX, 1807]. ditional view found in the Purana-s.10 A nastika, according Hemacandra, however, specifically explains that the schools, right to Hemacandra, is one who thinks that there is no virtue from the Arhata, are called tārkika (ete ārhatādyah, tarkah prayojanameșā- and vice, nāsti punyam pāpam iti matirasya nāstikah. The word, tārkikāh). AC, 344. Colebrooke was presumably wrong in treating Yoga as cārvāka, is derived from the root carva, "to chew". A Cārvāka a separate system and taking Barhaspatya and Carvaka as two distinct chews the self (carvatyātmānam cārvākah). He refers to his 'sects'. On this basis he concluded: "The two last (sc. his 5th and 6th) are reputed atheistical, as denying a future state and a providence. If those own grammatical work, Unadisutra 37, which runs as follows: be omitted and the Mimansas (sic) inserted, we have the six schemes of philosophy familiar to the Indian circle of the sciences" (Ibid., 219). Ap- parently he had only the ästika (affirmativist) systems in mind. Hemacan- 6 KM, Ch. 2, 191: dvidhā ānvīkșikī pūrvottarapaksābhyām | arhadbhadantadarśane dra, on the other hand, never mentions the Patanjala Yoga, and although lokāyatam ca pūrvah paksah. sānkhyam | nyāyavaiseşikau cottarah ta ime sat tarkāh || he mentions Mīmāmsā and Vedānta elsewhere (e.g., AYVD, vv. 11-14), he 1 AC, 2.165 cd, 107: anvīksikī tarkavidyā mīmāmsā tu vicāranā. does not do so in AC. 8 Thomas, 124 n3 on AYVD, v. 20. For different meanings of ästika and nastika, see, besides the standard 9 Hemacandra in fact devotes two separate verses, one to Jaimini (v. 11) dictionaries, Hopkins, 86-87. and the other to Kumārila (v. 12). NM, Ch. 1, I: 9: vaisesikāh punarasmadanuyayina evetyevamasyām janatāsu 10 See PPu, Srşțikhaņda, Ch. 13. Cf. HV, Harivamsaparvan (vulgate ed.), prasiddhāyamapi şattarkyāmidameva tarkanyāyavistarasabdābhyām āstramuktam. Ch. 28. The passage has been omitted in the critical edition (21:327, 148).

166 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Hemacandra on the Cārvāka 167

mavāka-śyāmāka-vārtāka-jyontāka-gūvāka-bhadrākādayah.11 In the AYVD Hemacandra makes the Cārvāka appear as Each of these words ends with the aka suffix and is formed ir- one who believes perception to be the sole instrument of regularly (ete ākapratyayāntā nipātyante).12 Although the word, knowledge: cārvāka, does not occur in the sūtra itself, the auto-com- mentary mentions it along with some other words of which vinānumānena parābhisandhimasamvidānasya tu nāstikasya cārvāka is one ( ... svonāka-cārvāka parākādayo bhavanti). na sāmpratam vaktumapi kva ceștā kva drstamātram ca hahā Hemacandra's derivation of cārvāka has not been univer- pramadah ||19 sally accepted. Other authorities speak of another irregular formation: cāru + vāc > cārvāc, cārvāka.13 In this case too it is not But of (for) the Nastika, who without inference is not aware definitely known whether the word cäru is to be taken as an ad- of the intent of others, it is not apposite even to speak: what of a movement, what of a mere look! Alas! error!20 jective (meaning agreeable, pleasant, etc.) or as a noun (which is another name of Brhaspati).14 All the derivations proposed Mallișeņa in his commentary, SVM, explains the Cārvāka are plausible in so far as the formation of the word is admit- view as follows: ted to be irregular. As to the ka suffix, even though the word, śyāmāka is cited by Rāyamukuța as an instance of ākah ending, That perception alone is Demonstrant is the view of the he refers to another suffix, makan and mentions Halāyudha Cārvāka (pratyaksamevaikam pramāņam iti manyate cārvākah). as his authority.15 Gunaratna, another Jain writer, however, fol- For that he girds himself: anu-, 'after', following upon, apre- lows Hemacandra but instead of carvayätmänam he opts for the hension and memory of the mark and the connection; -mi- following explanation: carvanti bhaksayanti tattvato na manyante yate, 'is measured', 'is outlined', a thing remote in place, time punyapāpādikam parokşajātam iti cārvākāh, "The Cārvāka-s chew and own-nature by this species of cognition, accordingly anu- mäna. From the context it is inference for self. That, infer- up, eat up, i.e. do not consider as realities a host of entities ence, proof with a Middle Term; without lacking; intent of such as virtue, vice, etc. which are imperceptible."16 others, view of others; is not aware of, not correctly cognizing. Hemacandra explains lokāyata as lokeşvāyatam lokāyatam The word but is for the purpose of pointing out the difference brhaspatipranītaśāstram; one who knows or studies such a from the previous disputants; of those previous disputants, as śāstra (science) is a laukāyatika. The problem is that the they are affirmativist (ästika), he has made discussion on the meaning of ayatam is uncertain and Hemacandra does not points of disagreement. But of (for) the Negativist it is not throw any light on it.17 even proper to speak; how is discussion with him possible?21 It is to be noted that the word, nāstika is used to mean ex- clusively the Cärväka. The word, as we have noted above, has We have shown that Hemacandra uses the term, nāstika, been interpreted in various ways. Hemacandra himself uses either as a general term for abuse or to mean the Cārvāka. Mallișena offers further explanation: the word as a term of abuse. In the YS (2.37) he condemns Manu and other Brahminical law-givers who prescribe ani- Or else, his (sc. Carvāka's) view being that there is no future mal sacrifice. Hemacandra calls them nāstikebhyo 'pi nāstikah, world, merit and sin, (because of the exception noted in the worst of the nastika-s.18 In the AYVD, however, the word, the grammatical rule [ŚHSA, 6.4.66] concerning the forma- nāstika, is reserved for the Cārvāka alone (v. 20). tion of the three words "nāstika-āstika-daistika," he is called Nästika), for that Negativist, the Laukäyatika, to speak even is not apposite, even to utter a word is not proper; hence

11 ŚHVP, 740. only to remain silent is preferable for him; to say nothing of 12 Hemacandra's auto-commentary (Brhadvrtti) on ŚHŚA, 740. entering into a company of authorities on logic and debat- 13 Whitney, Rule 233a, 80. Cf. Tarkavācaspati, s.v. cārvāka. ing on propounding a means of proof.22

4 See Monier-Williams, s.v. cāru. 15 Rāyamukuța, 2: 269 (on Vanaușadhivargaḥ, 211) and n. 6 TRD, 300. Trans. C/L, 267. 19 AYVD, v. 20. 17 See Ch. 6 above. 20 Trans. Thomas, 126. 18 In his auto-commentary Hemacandra writes: paramanāstika ityarthah 21 Ibid. (on YŚ, 2.37, f. 96b). 22 Ibid., 126-27. As to the grammatical rule, cf. Panini, Ast, 4.4.60. How- .................. . .......

Hemacandra on the Cārvāka 169 168 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

righteousness. Sambhinnamati's speech runs as follows: It is rather strange that Hemacandra in his polemical zeal tends to misrepresent the Carvaka position regarding Well said! Svayambuddha. You desire the Master's welfare, for inference as an instrument of knowledge. The Cārvāka-s intention is inferred from speech like food from vomiting. never denied the validity of inference in mundane matters.23 Only hereditary ministers like you, no others, speak thus for Among the Jains, Ratnaprabha and Gunaratna, too, explain the pleasure of the Master who is always sincere and gracious. the Cärvaka view concerning inference in the same way, as What teacher, harsh by nature, taught you, that you spoke thus does Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi in our own times.24 to the king, like an untimely stroke of lightning? The Master That there was no love lost between Hemacandra and the is served here by attendants seeking pleasure themselves. Why should they say, "Do not enjoy pleasures"? Abandoning plea- Cārvaka-s is also illustrated by his use of the word, varāka, sures of this world and striving for them in the next world which means 'wretched, low miserable, pitiable'. However, is like licking the elbow, leaving what is to be licked in the he reserves his uttermost hatred for the Mīmamsaka. In the hand. Dharma is said to have its fruit in the next world. That YS he writes: is very improbable. There is no next world from the very fact of the non-existence of people for the next world. Conscious- varam varākaścārvāko yo 'sau prakațanāstikah | ness arises from earth, water, fire, and air, like the power of vedokti-tāpasacchadmacchannam rakso na jaiminih ||25 wine itself from sugar, flour, water, etc. Certainly there is no soul apart from the body which will go to another world after Rather Carväka who is worthy of pity and an open negativ- it has left the body. Therefore, pleasure of the senses is to be ist than Jaimini, a demon, hidden under the disguise of an constantly enjoyed without fear. One's own soul must not be ascetic, mouthing the words of the Vedas.26 deceived. Destruction of one's desires is foolishness. Dharma and non-dharma, obstacles to pleasure are not to be feared; Last but not least, in his TSPC (Lives of Sixty three Divine since they indeed do not exist at all, like donkey's horns. What Personages), Hemacandra takes a fling at the materialists, merit has been acquired by one stone that it is worshipped presumably the Cārvaka-s.27 Following the traditional mode by bathing, ointment, wreaths, clothes, and ornaments? What of narrative found in some Buddhist and Jain tales,28 Hema- evil has been acquired by another stone that it is polluted? If candra also introduces a king whom his ministers, belong- people are born and die according to karma, as a result of what karma do bubbles appear and disappear? Therefore, so ing to different philosophical persuasions, try to persuade long as consciousness exists, it acts, as it desires. Of conscious- according to their philosophical inclinations. Sambhin- ness that has perished, there is no further birth. 'Whoever namati, a minister speaking in favour of materialism, accus- dies is born again,' that is mere talk with entirely inconclusive es his fellow minister, Svayambuddha for upholding dharma, argument. Therefore, our Master should unhesitatingly enjoy himself with young women charming with beauty of form on a couch like śirīsa petals. He should eat at will nectar-like food and drink. He is an enemy who hinders. Day and night, remain ever, Manu 2.11: nāstiko vedanindakah. Hemacandra explains the words, anointed with camphor, aloe, musk, sandal, etc., as if made of nāstika, āstika and daistika as follows: ete tadasyetyarthe ikaņantā nipātyante fragrance alone. O king, constantly look at whatever abounds (Laghuvrtti on SHSA, 6.4. 66). in gardens, vehicles, people, picture galleries, etc., for the 23 See Ch. 8 above. pleasure of the eyes. Day and night, O Master, have nectar for 24 Ratnaprabhā on PNTA, 540; TRD, 306 (on SDSam, v. 83), C/L, 273; Sanghvi, ASILM, 4. your ears with sounds of songs echoing with flutes, lutes and 25 YS, 2. 38, f. 96b. Cf. YS, 3.10: najanati param svam va madyaccalitacetanah drums. So long as one lives, let him live happily with pleasures svāmīyati varākah svam svāminam kinkarīyati || (f. 257b). of the senses. He should not trouble himself by religious ac- Jayantabhatța, too, employs the same derogatory adjective, varāka, to tions. Where is the fruit of dharma and non-dharma?29 the Carvaka-s. See NM, Ch. 3, I: 299. 26 In his auto-commentary, Hemacandra explains varaka as one who is What is to be noted in this passage is the juxtaposition of to be pitied because of his lack of pride (dambharahitatvād anukampyah), f. crude hedonism and materialism. Some of the philosophi- 97a. Elsewhere, too (e.g., on YS, 3.10), he says, a varäka is one who is wor- thy of pity because of his lack of consciousness (varākaścaitanyahīnatvād- anukampanīyah, f. 258a). 27 TSPC, I. 325-45. 29 Trans. Helen M. Johnson, I: 37-38. 28 Cf. SKa, JM, UBhPK, YTC.

170 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Hemacandra on the Cārvāka 171

cal doctrines attributed to the Carvaka-s are also encoun- tual pleasure that one derived from prudence. In a letter to tered here, e.g., Menoeceus, Epicurus wrote: 1. There is no other-world. 2. Consciousness arises from four forms of matter. When we say, then pleasure is the end and aim, we do not 3. There is no soul apart from the body. mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensu- 4. There is no rebirth. ality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, 5. Religious duties are not to be performed.30 prejudice or wilful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean Opponents of the Cārvaka doctrine, whether a Vedāntin the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. It like Šankarācārya, Buddhists like Šāntarakșita and Kamalaśīla, is not an unbroken succession of drinking bouts and of rev-

or aJain like Prabhäcandra have controverted all this and quot- elry, not sexual love, not the enjoyments of the fish and oth- er delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant ed the relevant aphorisms from the now-lost Cārvākasūtra.31 life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every However, none of them has called the Crvaka a hedonist or a choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through eudaemonianist - not at least in the same vein as Hemacandra which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul.36 does.32 In the Brahminical tradition, writers like Krsnamiśra and Śrīharșa have echoed Hemacandra.33 Jayantabhatța in his Simon Blackburn has rightly noted: allegorical play, D, has tarred the Jain and Buddhist mendi- cants as well as a kāpālika with the same brush. The Cārvāka The aim of all philosophy is, however, to enable us to live well, view represented by Brddhämbhi, however, is not branded as which is not to live in the hedonistic trough the word Epicu- reanism now suggests, after centuries of propaganda against hedonistic there.34 The Carvaka-s' opposition to all religious the system. Rather, practical wisdom, attained through phi- rites, it seems, has been misconstrued deliberately to suggest losophy, is needed to attain the pleasant life, which consists in (as a reductio ad absurdum) that they preached a kind of 'eat a preponderence of katastematic pleasures, capable of indefi- drink and be merry' approach to life. nite prolongation, over merely kinematic or volatile sensory The same kind of baseless charge has been brought against pleasures.37 Epicurus (341-270 BCE).35 He did preach that pleasure was the aim of life. But it was not sensual pleåsure, but intellec- Hemacandra in his work was merely lampooning the Cārvāka. Svayambuddha, in his turn, sets out to refute the Cārvāka system and speaks against sensual pleasures. His pu- ritanism, however, is typical of the Jain attitude to life. 30 For the Carvăka fragments, see IV. 2, I. 4, I. 6-8, IV. 1, V. 1 in Ch. 6 above 31 See ŚBh on BS 1.1.1, 2.2.2, 3.3.53-54; TS, Ch. 22 and TSP; PKM, 48-49, Sambhinnamati's discourse ends with a rewritten version 110-21, 177-80; NKC, 3.7, 341 ff. of a popular verse attributed to the Lokāyatikas: 32 As against the widely prevalent notion that the Carväka-s were gross hedonists, Richard Garbe (ERE, 8: 138) and M. Hiriyanna (195) expressed yavajjīvet sukham jīvet tāvat vaişaikaih sukhaiḥ | their doubts, but writers of modern college textbooks and handbooks of na tāmyed dharma-kāryāya dharmādharmaphalam kva tat ||38 Indian philosophy prefer to perpetuate the unsupported notion propa- gated by the opponents of the Carvaka, mostly through poems and plays In its earliest known form the verse runs as follows: like PC, Act 2; NC, 17. 58-59, 69, 70. $3 See Chs. 9 and 15 for further details. 34 In AD, Act 1, both a Buddhist and a Jain monk are portrayed as despi- yāvaj jīvam sukham jīven nāsti mrtyor agocarah | bhasmībhūtasya śāntasya punarāgamanam kutah ||39 cable sensualists, but Carvaka is spared. In Act 3 he is represented as a sober philosopher with whom the ästika-s are engaged in a prolonged debate. 35 Epicurus has been maligned as a gross sensualist as early as the first While life is yours, live joyously; century BCE in a poem by Horace (Epistles, 1.4.14-16). Horace invites Tibul- None can escape Death's searching eye: lus, his melancholic friend, to visit him at his farm: "As for me, when you want to laugh you will find me in fine fettle, fat and slick, a hog from Epicu- rus' herd (epicuri de grege porcum)" (276-77). Cf. modern English words, 'epi- 36 In Diogenes Laertius, 10.131-32, 2: 657. cure' and 'epicurean' used to suggest "person with refined taste in food and 37 Blackburn, 122. drink" and "person fond of pleasure and luxury" respectively (as glossed in 38 TSPC, 1.245, 12. the Little Oxford Dictionary). 89 VDMP, I. 108, 18cd-19ad, f. 70a; TSP, 17; NM, Ch. 7, II: 257 and SDS, 3.

172 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Hemacandra on the Cārvāka 173

When once this frame of ours they burn. SDS (śrāddham cet trpti kāranam), the second line, however, is How shall it ever again return?40 identical with what is found in the SDS.45 But the SDS is not The verse evidently relates to the denial of the concept of the only source of this verse. It first occurs in the PC.46 S-M might have taken the verse from this source inasmuch as the rebirth. Some other writers, however, have made it appear as readings in both the PC and SDS are identical. an encouragement to unrestrained hedonism. Hemacandra, too, shifts the emphasis from the issue of rebirth to that of From whichever source Krsnamiśra, Hemacandra and dharma and non-dharma Mallișena might have got the verse, only Krsnamiśra attributes To sum up: Hemacandra's stray remarks and comments it to the Cärväka whereas the Jain writers simply utilize it in order to assail Jaimini. Given Hemacandra's antipathy to the on the Cärväka do not help us much in reconstructing the Cārväka system of philosophy which is known to us only Cārvaka-s it is difficult to believe that he did not know that the verse had been attributed to the Cārvāka-s. through a few fragments. Some of these fragments, however, Krsņamiśra's attribution of the verse to the Cārvāka-s in appear to be spurious. What is transparent is Hemacandra's the PCis then open to doubt. In fact, the verses at the end of all-out antipathy to the materialist system. SDS, Ch. 1, might have been gathered from various sources, Here, too, there is a paradox. In his polemics against the Mīmāmsaka, Hemacandra cites an anonymous verse, which is including the Buddhist and Jain ones, and then attributed to Brhaspati.47 But that is a different issue. generally attributed to the Carvaka. The verse runs as follows: Postscript mrtānāmapi jantūnām yadi trptirbhavediha | nirvāņasya pradīpasya snehah samvardhayecchikhām ļ|41 In certain editions of AC (e.g., Kālīvara Vedāntavāgiśa ed., If (the śraddha ceremony) satisfies the dead beings here, then Kalikata, 1284 BS and Nārāyāņacandra Bhațțacāryya ed., Ka- oil might increase the flame of an extinguished lamp. likata, 1314 BS) there is an additional (seventh) Kāņda named Śiloñcha (residue). A verse in this Kāņda runs as follows: Mallişena also quotes this verse (with some variants) in his commentary on AYVD, v. 11, which is devoted to controverting vaiśeşike kanādo 'pi jaino naikāntavādyapi | the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā doctrine enjoining himsā (ritual killing): cārvāke(a) laukāyatikah krșiprasrtamityapi |1

mrtānāmapi jantūnām śrāddham cet trptikāraņam | In all probability the whole seventh Kānda is a later addi- tannirvāņapradīpasya snehah samvardhayecchikhām ||12 tion. The verse quoted above, in any case, adds nothing new If even to dead beings the Śräddha is the cause of satisfaction. to what has been said in AC, 3. 525-27. Then oil might increase the flame of an extinguished lamp.43

Thomas notes that the verse "is clearly in the style of Cārvāka comments; but in the Sarva-darsana-samgraha, where the first line is given as such, the second line differs."44 The variant is insignificant: nirvānasya pradīpasya for tannirvāņapradīpasya. But what is more significant is that while the second hemis- 45 SDS (BORI ed.), 13, v. 4. It is, however, possible that Thomas used the BI ed. or the Anandasrama ed. of the SDS (or any of their verbatim re- tich of the first line as quoted in the YS-urtti differs from the prints) in which the second line of the verse runs as follows: gacchatāmiha jantūnām vyartham pātheyakakalpanam. In later editions (e.g. BORI ed.), this is the first line of another addi- 40 Trans. E.B. Cowell. For a detailed discussion of the many variants of tional verse (v. 5). (Joshi prints the text of SDS, Ch 1, from the BORI ed. this notorious verse, see Ch. 20 below. but retains the trans. by Cowell who followed the BI ed. and so had no 41 YŚ, f 98b (on 2.47). access to this verse). Hemacandra and Mallisena, however, seem to have 42 SVM, 69. got the verse in question from the same source. 43 Trans. Thomas, 69. 46 PC, Act 2, v. 21, 40. 44 Thomas, 69 n36. 47 See Ch. 6 above.

XV Haribhadra's Şaddarśanasamuccaya, Verses 81-84: A Study

Humour is not a strong point of ancient Indian philoso- phers, or philosophers in general. Besides some sharp repar- tees, ingenious ironies and downright abuses, humour proper is seldom to be met with in philosophical works. One notable exception is the parable of the wolf's footprint. In what fol- lows I propose to discuss the parable in some detail. The para- ble most probably originated with the Cārvaka-s and was quite well known in the Jain, Buddhist and Brahminical circles. The first allusion to the parable occurs in the MBh Sāntiparvan, Mokşadharma-parvādhyāya.1 Bhīșma tells Yudhisthira that the acquisition of righteousness (dharma) and wealth is the direct object of a Ksatriya (one born in the warrior caste) and one should not get involved in deciding what is righteousness and what is not, for no one has seen their results. So it is as useless as the discussion about the wolf's footprint:

adharmo dharma ityetad yathā vrkapadam tathā Nilakanțha in his commentary left the word, vrkapadam, unexplained, presumably because he did not know the par-

1 Mbh, crit. ed., 132. 1 ef-2ab; vulgate ed., 134.2.

176 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Șaddarśanasamuccaya, Verses 81-84 177

able behind the simile. He wrote, "As the judgment regarding G (Gunaratna) narrates the parable in greater detail: the footprint on the ground -whether it belongs to a wolf or a dog or a leopard- is futile, so is the judgment whether Here is a traditional story. Once there was a man, his mind something contributes to righteousness or to its opposite."2 deeply inculcated with ideas advocated by the nāstika (het- An earlier scribe fared no better. Baffled by the word, erodox) doctrine. But his own wife had her mind deeply rooted in the ästika (orthodox) doctrine. Very diligently, ev- vrkapadam, he 'emended' it to read vrksaphalam, 'fruit of ery day, he tried to convince her with arguments set forth in a tree'. Vādirāja (fourteenth century) in his commentary his own system. But as she was not convinced, (he hit upon on the Santiparvan, explicated it accordingly: etad anayoh a plan) and thought to himself, 'She will be convinced by phalam vrksaphalam yathā tathā kālāntare drsyate. "The fruit this process.' So thinking, in the later part of the night, he (result) of these (righteousness and its opposite) is seen, went out of the city along with her, and said to her: "Oh! like the fruit of a tree, at a different time."3 Blessed one! In this city there live some people who main- Although the parable was known right from the first cen- tain that inference has validity in respect of imperceptible turies of the Common Era and attributed to the Lokāyatika-s things, and they are held as men of great wisdom by ordi- by the sixth century, we have to wait for Somatilakasūri (four- nary people. But just mark their dexterity in the matter of critical judgement." teenth century) and Gunaratna to learn the parable itself.4 Then starting from the city-gate up to the junction of the Both were commenting on a verse in Haribhadra's SDSam. S four roads, on the main thoroughfare where the mass of dust (Somatilaka) takes the following reading: had been made even by the breeze blowing gently, he made footprints of the wolf on the mass of dust, on both sides of his etāvān eva loko 'yam yāvān indriyagocarah own body, by pressing upon the three fingers joined together bhadre vrkapadam paśya yad vadanti bahuśrutah ||5 of both his hands. Then in the morning. finding those foot- prints, a large crowd gathered on the main thoroughfare. This world consists of only as much as is within the scope of The men of great wisdom who also arrived there said to the the senses. What the vastly learned ones speak of (as-true) is people: "As the footprints of the wolf cannot be explained but similar to (the statement) 'Oh, Blessed one! Look at the otherwise (it is to be concluded that) at night some wolf must footprint of the wolf!' have come here from the forest." So the man finding them speaking in such terms, said to his S then explains it as follows: wife: "Oh! Blessed one! My beloved one! Look at, consider, the case of these footprints of the wolf!" For those chatter-boxes who accept the validity of inference, verbal testimony, etc. and seek to establish pleasure and pain This explains the verse satisfactorily in all respects. It in the forms of heaven and hell, etc. to be achieved through should be noted that S speaks of one footprint only (as the ..... the agencies of virtue and vice, and never cease in their ef- verse employs the singular form, vrkapadam), but G refers forts, an illustration is cited: 'Oh ! Blessed one! Look at the to the footprints (vrkapadāni) made by the husband. But the footprint of the wolf!' Thus, for example, a certain person, after drawing with the movement of his own fingers, the reading that G adopted contained abahuśrutah, 'not vastly learned'. However, he also knew of the variant reading, shape of a wolf's footprint on the layer of dust made even by a very gently blowing breeze, said to his wife, who had become bahuśrutah. Thus he wrote: eager to see the footprint of a wolf, 'Oh! Blessed one! Look at the footprint of the wolf!'6 If the reading accepted is 'what the vastly learned ones say' etc. then the implication is to be explained as 'they are vastly learned only according to popular belief' (and not in reality). 2 Mbh, vulgate ed., 1505. 3 Quoted in the crit. ed., 696n. S explained the significance of the verse as follows: 4 SDSam (H) on v. 81. 452-53.

6 C/L, 258ff with minor changes. S's commentary appears there in the Ibid name of Manibhadra's, presumably following Damodar Lal Goswami's Preface (prastāvanā) to M.K. Jain's ed. of ȘDSam (H) has shown that the edition of SDSam (H) (Benares,1905). However, Dalsukh Malvania in his author of the Laghuvrtti was Somatilakasūri, not Manibhadra (21).

178 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Şaddarśanasamuccaya, Verses 81-84 179

What is the implication? Just as her skilled lover fulfilled her Man consists only of as much as is within the scope of the desire for seeing the footprint of a wolf-she, being an artless senses. Oh! Blessed one! what the vastly learned ones say is lady, was unaware of the real fact- by deceiving her only with like the footprint of the wolf. the mark made by his fingers, so also these people -knaves in the garb of the pious, and bent upon only cheating oth- Fortunately enough, we have the original Sanskrit verse in ers- and ordinary people, by somehow convincing them of Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā (sixth century CE): the infallibility of certain inferences and verbal testimonies, into the dilemma of what is to be eaten and what is not, who is fit for copulation and who is unfit, what is desirable and what etāvāneva purușo yāvān indriyagocarah | is to be avoided, etc., by enticing them away with the hope of bhadre vrkapadam hyetad yadvadanti bahuśrutā |/8 enjoying pleasures to be attained after reaching heaven, etc. and produce blind faith in pious acts. Man consists of only as much as is within the scope of the senses. What the vastly learned ones speak of (as true) is but The two versions (S's and G's) differ on a number of similar to (the statement), 'Oh! Blessed one! This is the foot- print of the wolf.' points, viz. (a) S refers to the parable as 'an illustration'(drstānta), G This is most probably the original reading of the first line calls it 'a traditional story' (sampradāya) as well as 'an intro- which is found in the works of later authors such as Jinab- duction' (upadarsana) to a drstanta. hadra Gaņi, Kamalasīla, Sīlānka and Māțhara.9 They all have (b) S does not refer to the man as a nstika as G does, he puruso instead loko 'yam which is found in the works of Har- calls him 'a skilled lover' (vidagdha ballabhah). ibhadra, Maladhārī Hemacandrasūri, Rājaśekharasūri and (c) S does not mention any occasion for drawing the wolf's the anonymous author of LSDSam.10 (For a table of the vari- footprint other than the wife's interest in seeing it. ants, see Appendix B). (d) In S's version only one footprint drawn on dust suf- There can be no doubt that the verse as found in the earli- fices whereas G mentions several est sources contains the correct reading. The difference be- (e) The fourth päda of the verse is left unexplained by S. tween the readings adopted by Haribhadra and some other (f) S refers to the woman as 'an artless lady who was de- Jain writers on the one hand and all others on the other, lies ceived by her lover': G describes her as an astika (erthodox) mostly in the choice between puruso and loko 'yam, paśya and who had to be convinced by her husband with the help of a abahuśrutāh being of little consequence. Since purușo appears suitable demonstration. to be the right reading, we intend to proceed on its basis. (g) S does not explicitly relate v. 81 to the next verse Yet the other reading, viz. loko 'yam, is not altogether in- which G does. appropriate. If purusa leads to the doctrine of dehātmavāda, Let us now look at the verse in the chronological order of loka (which G explains as 'this perceptible world, the human its appearance (with variants, as usual). world')11 leads to another seminal doctrine of the Cārvāka-s, Bhävaviveka (fifth/sixth century CE) was the first to quote viz. paralokavilopavāda as well as pratyakşaprādhānyavāda: no this verse in his commentary on the Madhyamakaśāstra. Re- inference or verbal testimony unless preceded by percep- stored to Sanskrit it reads: tion is to be considered valid. Thus no credence is to be given to the existence of paraloka since there can be no par- yāvān indriyagocarah purusah etāvān eva | bhadre bahuśrutāh yad vadanti te vrka-(pada)-cihnavat ||7 8 PrPa on MŚ, 18.6 (II: 65). 9 VABh/SVr, I: 186 (first line only), II: 344 (full verse) and II: 439 (first line 7 PrPr, ff. 203b8 and 232b6-7. I am indebted to Dr Sanjitkumar Sadhukhan only). On the first and third occasions there is etāvān esa instead of etāvān for restoring the verse from its Tibetan translation which is printed at the eva; TSP on TS, v. 1871, 637; SKSVr (on SKS, 1.1.6, 10.6 and also on 2.3.10, end of MS. -It is to be regretted that Pandeya in his Sanskrit restoration 49.18) and MVr (on SK, v. 17), 129 (my copy has yāvad instead of yāvān). of PrPrwrites: etāvāneva loko 'yam (on MS, 16. 1. II: 3) and bhadre vrkapadam 10 Commentary on GV, 1.5 (1553),10; LDSam, 2, 5, 6; LTN. v. 33, f. 24b; brūhi [ ... ] (on MS, 18.6. II: 64). On both occasions, the Tibetan version has ŞDSam (H), v. 81: ŞDSam (R), v. 160, 81. skyes-bu (purusah). The word, bruhi is not there in the Tibetan translation at 11 ayam pratyakşo loko manusyalokah. Unfortunately this sentence is miss- all. (It has neither hyetad nor pasya, but only 'like the wolf's print'). ing in the translation in C/L, 268

180 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Şaddarśanasamuccaya, Verses 81-84 181

alokin (i.e. in the absence of any disembodied self, there sufficient knowledge) did not care to think that a man, too, cannot be any abode for it).12 could have made such a mark with his fingers. Through the Now we shall see whether the parable as narrated by S and demonstration of the folly of such learned people, blindly G (based on the reading found in Haribhadra) tallies with relying on inference unpreceded by perception, the hus- the original reading of the verse. band convinced his wife that the sastric injunctions relating It is of interest to note that Bhävaviveka cites another verse to the edible and inedible, etc. are all bogus. G concludes in his glosses on MS, 16.1 and 18.6. Restored to Sanskrit it his elaborate exposition of the parable with the following would run as follows: remark:

sundari cārulocanabhūtvā khāda varagātri te atītam yat tat na || Now, these persons who do not know well the actual fact bhīru gatam na nivartate kalevaram idam samudayamātram (iti) ||13 regarding the footprints of the wolf, speaking, though many in number like a single person, may create confusion in the Evidently this is a translation of the following verse as it oc- minds of ignorant men; but still, their words would never be curs in Haribhadra's ȘDSam (as also in Rājaśekharasūri's): acceptable to those who are well-aware of the truth. So also, there are many preachers (vadin) who are really cunning fel- piva khāda ca cārulocane yadatītam varagātri tan na te| lows disguised as pious ones and who have the sole aim only na hi bhīru gatam nivartate samudayamātram idam kalevaram ||14 of cheating others.

Oh! The one who possesses beautiful eyes! Drink and eat. G then introduces his comments on the next verse ($DSam, Oh! The one with a charming body! That which is past does v. 82) as follows: "To show what her husband advised her to not belong to you. Oh! The timid one! The past never comes do after that the author says." back. This body is only a collectivity. S offers an alternative (slightly different) interpretation of 'drink and eat': The verse is also found in Silanka's commentaries on the AS and SKS.15 In the SKSVr the verse occurs immediately after the Or, 'drink' means 'drink the lips, etc. (of the beloved)' (i.e. etāvān eva verse with one variant in the first line: sadhusobhane engage in the act of kissing) and 'eat' means 'enjoy the ob- in place of carulocane as found in the ASVr. Silanka quotes the jects of pleasure.' And all this is the advice coming from an verse again with the same reading, but accompanied only by impassioned man. That is, crown your youth with success. the pratīka (first part) of the etāvān eva verse. I hope most readers would agree that this second verse, This is an Indian parallel to the carpe diem (enjoy the day) too, forms a part of the parable of the wolf's footprint. The theme well known in European poetry.17 It also follows from parable, it may be remembered, was originally concerned the Cārvaka doctrine that opposed senseless asceticism, the with the existence of imperceptible things which are de- followers of which fondly hoped that some virtue would ac- duced solely on the basis of inference from a major premise crue from all kinds of abstinence and self-torture (a concept which is itself faulty. The premise is something like this: so dear to the Jains).18 'If there is a mark on the dust that looks like a wolf's foot- The oldest reading of the second verse (SDSam, v. 82) print, it must have been made by a wolf.' People who said also shows its link with the first verse: 'This body is only a so (whom the nāstika husband considered to be lacking in 17 See Baldick, 31 18 Dharmakīrti in his auto-commentary on PV, 1.342 said: 12 paralokino 'bhāvāt paralokābhāvah is a well-known Cārvāka aphorism vedaprāmānyam kasyacit kartrvādaḥ snāne dharmecchā jātivādāvalepah found in a number of sources. See Ch. 6, IV. 2 above samtapārambhah pāpahānāya ceti dhvastaprajñānām pañca limgāni jādye || 13 PrPr, ff. 203b8-204al and 232b7-8 (on MŚ, 16.1 and 18.6); II: 3, 64. "(Belief in) the authority of the Vedas, and in some creator (of the world), 14 SDSam(H), v. 82; SDSam (R), v. 161, 81. desiring merit from bathing, pride in (high) caste and practising self- denial for the eradication of sins -these five are the marks of the stu- 17-18). 15 ASVr (on ÄS, 1.4.2, 123); SKSVr (on SKS, 1.1.6, 10. 6-7 and 2.3.10, 49, pidity of one whose intelligence has been destroyed." Quoted in: Rahula 16 SKSVr on SKS, 2.1.47, 186. 29-30. Sāņkrtyāyana, 806 nl.

182 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Şaddarsanasamuccaya, Verses 81-84 183

collectivity' refers back to 'man' (purusah) in v. 81a; vv. 83-84 follows: "The one of pure knowledge, appearing out of these continue the theme of the elements and their collectivity: forms of matter, gets dissolved again only into them; there is no awareness after death."24 Whether or not Jayantabhatta, kim ca prthvī jalam tejo vāyurbhūtacatustayam Maladhärī Hemacandrasūri and S-M were conversant with caitanyabhūmiretesām mānam tvaksajameva hi | Jinabhadra's work and took the cue from him, the fact re- prthyādibhūtasamhatyām tathā dehadisambhavah | mains that all of them have cited the same Br.Up. passage in madasaktih surāngebhyo yadvattadvatsthitātmatā |19 their exposition of the Carvaka view.25 S-M even says that the Moreover, earth, water, fire and air are the four forms of Lokāyatika-s quote the śruti for this (sc. intelligence is pro- matter. According to them, these four are the basis (bhūmi) duced from the four elements only when they are transformed of consciousness, and the only valid form of knowledge is into the body) and then cites the passage from the Br.Up. (In the one produced by the senses. this connection E.B. Cowell noted: "Of course Sankara, in his When there is a collectivity (samhati) of the forms of matter, commentary, gives a very different interpretation applying it the earth, etc., there is production of the body and others. Just as the power of intoxication (is produced) from the to the cessation of individual existence once the knowledge ingredients of a spirituous drink, so is determined (in the of the Supreme is attained".26 He also proposed a comparison body) the presence of the self's essential mark (ātmatā, i.e. of this passage with the commentary on Jaimini-sūtra. 1.1.5) consciousness). In course of presenting the exponent's view (TS, v. 1871) Sāntarakșita said: "As regards 'the other world', there is no The emphasis is on what is elsewhere called 'a special com- such other world apart from the 'chain of causes and effects, bination' (parinamavisesah) of the four elements which gives in the form of cognition and the rest'."27 Kamalasīla in his rise to consciousness just as non-intoxicating objects (water, commentary then contradicts it by saying: "This is exactly as sugar, molasses, etc.) combine to give rise to the power of in- you (Cārvakas) who are addicted to merely perceptible pleas- toxication.20 In both cases, it is not just any combination, but ures apply the name 'other- world' to some other part of this a special kind of it that matters.21 same visible world; as is declared in such assertions as: 'Man The parable was certainly meant for disabusing people of consists of only as much as is within the scope of the senses' the notion of the existence of an imperishable self distinct and again: 'The other world consists in another place, an- from the body and all that such a notion entails, e.g., the other time or another state'."28 other- world, rebirth and release.22 Bhāvaviveka quotes the Slānka, too, describes the Cārvāka-s as saying that there couple of verses in connection with the idea that there is no is no such thing as the self (jwva) which is extramaterial and other world to which one can go from this world. On the capable of visiting the other-world.29 Māthara quotes the three occasions that Jinabhadra quotes the etāvān eva verse first line of the first verse (v. 81) in connection with his com- (or its first line only) in VBh/SVr, his emphasis is on the ments on the existence of the self independent of the body, Lokāyatika's denial of the existence of the other world since senses, intelligence, etc.30 it is not apprehensible by the senses.23 He also refers to a line from Br.Up., 2.4.12 (also found in ibid., 4.5.13) which runs as 24 Instead of following Sankara's commentary (which gives an idealis- tic twist to this passage) I have given a literal translation from C/L, 157. 25 See NM, Ch. 4, II: 114; GV Comm. 10 [on 1. v. 5 (1553)], and SDS, 19 I have quoted from the text followed by Somatilakasūri. The text Ch. 1. 3. followed by Gunaratna in his commentary contains some variants which 26 C/L, 255 n4. do not concern us here. 27 TS, v. 1871, 637. 20 For pariņāmaviśeșa, see PV, 3.40; PVSVT, 21; PVA, 54-55; NM, Ch. 28 TS, 637 (Instead of 'Materialists'. I have opted for 'Cārvāka-s'). 1, 201; NVV, I: 56; NKC, 343; SVR, 1074. 'From those, consciousness' While the first sentence quoted by Kamalasila has long been recognized (tebhyaścaitanyam) is a well-known Cārvāka aphorism. See Ch. 6, I.4 above. as a genuine Bārhaspatya (Cārvāka) fragment, the second one quoted by 2ı samudayamātram idam kalevaram. SDSam (H), v. 82d. him escaped the attention of both D.R. Shastri and Mamoru Namai. See 22 Jayantabhatta quotes some verses to this effect presumably from a Ch. 6, Bhã. 26 above. Cărvāka source. See NM, Ch. 2, I: 184; C/L, 140. 29 See SKSVr, 10. 4-5; 49. 16-17. 23 For details see n9 above. 30 MVron SK, v. 17, 124. ....::

184 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Șaddarsanasamuccaya, Verses 81-84 185

Thus the point of controversy in all cases where the two source, viz. TSP. Namai (1976, 40 n 21) refers to PrPr, PrPa, verses (or a part of them) are quoted has been the existence TSP and SDSam (H) (G). I have located six more sources of the imperishable self and its abode called the other-world, (see Ch. 6, Śl. 13 above). However, the census of sources is paralokin and paraloka. The Cārvāka-s' insistence on percep- not claimed to be exhaustive. tion as the primary means of knowledge makes them deny D.R. Shastri includes the first line of the etāvān eva verse both. It is against this heretical idea that the Jain, Buddhist in his "Barhaspatyasutram" (200, No. 19 - misprinted as No. and Brahminical philosophers have always been up in arms. 16 in Namai, 41) while Namai quotes the whole verse (on The parable, particularly the second verse that is attached 41, B2). Namai also quotes the piva khāda verse on 41 n23 to it as a part of the parabola docet, 'the parable teaches', is but does not include it in his collection of fragments (nor double-edged: it emphasizes the importance of perception does D.R. Shastri). without the support of which any conclusion arrived on the The piva khada verse is found in PrPr (twice), ASVr (reads basis of inference or verbal testimony remains suspect. Such sādhusobhane for cārulocane) and SKSVr (thrice), ȘDSam (H) conclusions include the whole world of unverifiable no- (S reads jātaśobhane for cārulocane), ȘDSam (R). A Tibetan tions, such as the imperishable soul, the other world, God, version occurs in MA, after v. 100 (see Warder(1971), 35). the omniscient being, etc.31 At the same time, the moral of the story exposes the futility of following sastric injunctions APPENDIX B regarding what is potable and what is not, what is edible and what is not. The second verse is not an exortation to Variants of the etāvan eva Verse heedless hedonism (as some readers take it to be): it merely exposes the unreliability of the sastric injunctions regarding food and drink. By implication, the verse also advises peo- (a) The full verse is quoted in MA, PrPr (twice), PrPa. VBh/ ple not to be burdened with any sense of guilt for not being SVr, LTN: ȘDSam (H), SKSVr (twice), GV Comm, SDSam able to observe such injunctions. (R) and LŞDSam. S's alternative interpretation of the second verse is there- VBh/SVr (twice), TSP and MVr refer to the first line fore improbable. But by following G's interpretation of the only; SKSVr quotes the pratika only on 186. couple of verses we can better comprehend the intention of the author of these verses. (b) There are three variants: (i) puruso loko 'yam APPENDIX A PrPr(twice) PrPa ŞDSam (H) Sources For The Verses LTN MA VBh/SVr (twice) GV Comm. L. de la Vallée Poussin ("Materialism (Indian)" in ERE, TSP ŞDSam (R) VIII: 499n) refers to LTN, SDSam (H), PrPa and MA as the SKSVr (twice) LŞDSam sources for the etavan eva verse. His translation reads as fol- lows: "There is nothing in man except what is visible to the (ii) hyetad senses. Look, dear friend, at what these so-called scholars call paśya the traces of the wolf" (Italics mine). Apparently he pre- MA fers puruso to loko 'yam, paśya to hyetad and bahuśrutā to SDSam (H) PrPr abahuśrutāh -a composite reading of PrPa and ȘDSam (H) VBh/SVr SKSVr (twice) (G). See Appendix B for details. GVComm D.R. Shastri (1959/1982, p. 202) mentions only one LTN LŞDSam

The Tibetan translation of PrPr has neither hyetad nor 31 See NM, Ch. 2, I: 184; C/L, 140. paśya but reads vrkacihnavat.

186 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

(iii) bahuśrutāḥ (nty)abahuśrutāh

MA ŞDSam (H) (G) PrPr (twice) SKSVr (twice) PrPa ȘDSam (R) VBh/Vr

SDSam (H) (S) LTN GVComm LŞDSam

Vallée Poussin in the editio princeps of MadVr with PrPa XVI writes: "In the Lokatattvanirnaya of Haribhadra (Giornale The Significance of Lokäyata in Pali della Societa Asiatica Italiana, 1905, p. 290) the 'Bhūtavadin' (=Cārvāka) also expresses himself: etāvān eva loko 'yam yāvān indriyagocaraḥ, bhadre vrkapadam hy etad yad vadan- ty abahuśrutah. But the editor, M.L. Suali notes the wariant Şaddarsanasamgraha (sic), verse 81: bhadre vrkapadam paçya yad vadanti bahusrutāh; and he refers to the commentary in course of being edited in the Bibliotheca Indica." (360 n5, translated from the French). In the edition of SDSam Lokäyata (substantive) along with its derivative lo(lau) with TRD Suali, however, printed: vadantyabahuśrutāh (301). kāyatika (adjective) is often encountered both in Pali and (G noted the variant, bahusrutah in his commentary (304) Sanskrit, and as logāyata, logayaya or loyāyata in Prakrit.1 The which has been quoted above). word does not seem to be Vedic. In Sanskrit it first occurs (indirectly) in the Pāninīya Ganapātha 23; in Pali in the Tipițaka itself.2 The word, both in Prakrit and Sanskrit, has generally been taken to mean the materialist system of phi- losophy, later known as the Cärvaka and that is how it is generally rendered in English. T.W. Rhys Davids, however, noticed that on many occa- sions in the Pali Sutta-s, the rendering, viz. "materialism", does not suit the context. Accordingly the PTS Pali Eng- lish Dictionary decided to omit this meaning altogether. It glossed lokāyata as

what pertains to the ordinary view (of the world), common or popular philosophy, or as Rhys Davids (Dial. i. 171) puts it: 'name of a branch of Brahmin learning, probably Nature lore" later worked into a quasi system of "casuistry, sophistry."3

1 See Böhtlingk and Roth, Monier-Williams, Rhys Davids and Stede, and Vijaya Rājendrasūri, s.v. lokāyata. 2 Ast, 1271. See also Kane, 1. 226n. Rhys Davids (1899), 22, n4; Rhys Davids and Stede, s.v. lokāyata.

188 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Lokāyata in Pali 189

The Dictionary also refers to Rudolf Otto Franke's Ger- This is an excellent example of cutting the Gordian knot-by man translation of the DNin which lokayatam is rendered as denying the very existence of a school of philosophy! "logically proven explanation of nature" (logisch beweisende After the discovery of the KA (and its subsequent pub- Naturerklärung). lication in 1909) and of a considerable number of digests Thus the chief meaning in Pali and Sanskrit seems to and polemical works, it is idle to doubt the existence of the have diverged into two altogether different ways, having no Lokāyata/Cārvāka.10 Since the KA stands chronologically apparent relation to each other. It is not that such a case is nearer the Tipitaka, it will help us comprehend the mean- unprecedented. What is interesting to note is that the gloss ing of lokäyata in Pali if we can make out its meaning in the provided in the PTS Dictionary never found favour with any Arthasāstra context. I propose to proceed on the basis of two Pali scholar excepting Rhys Davids himself.4 Even the trans- postulates, viz. (a) meanings of words change in course of lators of the Samyutta- and Anguttaranikāya-s (Books of Kin- time; so we have to study the matter in proper chronological dred Sayings and Gradual Sayings) in the PTS rendered the sequence, and (b) the same name has been applied to differ- term lokāyatika as "skilled in metaphysics" and "world-wise" ent systems of philosophy in ancient India.11 respectively. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya pointed out that In the earliest times, the word, lokāyata, both in Sanskrit such renderings merely proved the translators' uncertainty and Pali, it appears, stood for logic, or rather, disputatio, regarding the proper meaning of the word.5 the art of disputation. Kautilya wanted the princes to learn Rhys Davids, again, was the only scholar who refused to Ānvīkşikī along with Trayī (the three Vedas), Vārtā (agri- believe that once there was a system of philosophy in India culture, animal husbandry and commerce) and Dandanīti called Lokäyata. He challenged the lexicographers who had (management of the state).12 Lokāyata (which belongs to taken lokāyata to mean so. He even thought that Sankarācārya Ånvīkşikī) then was not considered to be something irreli- had controverted "a curious opinion which he ascribes to the gious or anti-Vedic. At the same time, it was studied as a secu- Lokāyatikas -possibly wrongly as the very same opinion was lar subject, on a par with two other systems of philosophy, controverted ages before in the Pitakas, and not there called viz. Sāmkhya and Yoga (most probably Vaiśeşika).18 As Paul Lokāyata, though the word was in use in Pițaka times."6 Hacker points out cogently: Apparently Rhys Davids had in his mind the proto-material- ist doctrine of Ajita Kesakambala which is called ucchedavāda, It is misleading to translate the word änvīksikī by philosophy not Lokāyata in the SPhS (DN).7 The same doctrine (or a as H. Jacobi had done ... Anvīkşikī consists in examining by rea- son, i.e. in reasoning and reflexion (hetubhir anvīksamānā) variant of it) is known as tajjīva-taccharīrvāda in the Jain tradi- and is practised in all sciences ... the future king requires in- tion.8 Rhys Davids also believed that S-M's exposition of the struction in logical thinking and he can find it principally Lokāyata view in SDS, Chapter I, was "very able" but had "all in each of the three systems.14 the appearance of being drawn from his own imagination".9

ed out that Rhys Davids was wrong: traces of the real existence of a school of 4 Jacobi in 1911 had taken lokāyata in the sense of 'infidel philoso- philosophy that called itself Lokāyata were numerous. See ERE, 8: 493 n4. phy' or materialism (1970: 551) but in 1919 sought "to make out that the 10 Special mention may be made of Santaraksita's TSand Haribhadra's school (sc. Lokāyata) was in origin merely the popular natural philoso- SDSam. Both of them have persented and controverted Lokāyata in some phy." Keith dismissed this idea rather perfunctorily (32 nl). K.C. Chatto- details. padhyaya endorsed the view of Rhys Davids in 1975 without adducing any " Kane (I: 225) admitted that the meaning of Lokayata had changed with new instance or argument. time (see also III: 47-48). As to the second postulate, it may be mentioned 5 The Book of Gradual Sayings, trans. E. M Hare, IV: 287; The Book of that Mīmāmsā was also called Nyāya (as in Jaimini's Nyāyamālāvistara) Kindred Sayings, trans. Mrs. C.F. Rhys Davids, II: 53. D. Chattopadhyaya and Yoga represented Vaiseșika (as in NS, 1.1.29, as Vātsyāyana explains) (1969), 99 n162. or Nyāya or even Nyāya-Vaiśeșika. See Phaņibhūşaņa Tarkavāgīśa. I: xvi, 6 T.W. Rhys Davids (1899), 171-72 270-80; Kuppuswami Sastri, xvi: K. Chattopadhyaya, 855. 7 DN, I. 48-49. PTS Dictionary, however, does not refer to Ajita in con- 12 Kangle (ed.), 1.2.1, 10. nection with uccheda. 13 See Ch. 10 above for a detailed discussion of this issue. 8 SKSVr, 185. 14 Hacker, 164 (italics in the original). He refers to Jacobi (1911), 1970, 9 T.W. Rhys Davids (1899), 172. C. Bendall (Athenaeum, 30.6.1900) point- 547-58.

190 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Lokāyata in Pali 191

Even though some translators and scholars still take in the earlier sources, before the Common Era, Lokāyata has Lokāyata in the sense of atheism/materialism in the one and only one meaning: disputatio. Both in earlier Pali Arthaśāstra context, the parallel systems mentioned along and Sanskrit usage, a lokāyatika brāhmana is one who is fond with it make it amply clear that Ānvīksikī and hence Lokāyata of disputation, hence criticized as one engaged in sophistry can only mean 'philosophical system based on logic',15 as or casuistry. This however, is not the gaunīvrtti (secondary opposed to those others based on scripture (e.g., Mīmāmsā, meaning) as Rhys Davids suggested, but the primary one.21 and perhaps also Vedānta) Let us take an example from the Rāmāyana (Ayodhyā- It is also to be noted that one Malayalam commentary of kāņda). Rāma asks Bharata: the KA explains Lokāyata as a Nyāyaśāstra taught by Brha- man, Gargya and others.16 T. Ganapati Sastri preferred to fol- kaścinna lokāyatikān brāhmaņāmstāta sevase | low this gloss in his Sanskrit commentary (all other commen- anarthakuśalā hyete bālā panditamāninah || taries, however, take lokāyata to mean Bārhaspatyamatam or dharmaśāstresu mukhyesu vidyamāneșu durbudhāh Nāstikaśāstra). Phaņibhūșaņa Tarkavāgīśa was also of the buddhim ānvīkşikīm prāpya nirartham pravadanti te ||22 opinion that in ancient times Nyāyasāstra was called Lokāyata, and in the context of the KA it could mean the same.17 My dear son, don't serve any Lokāyatika brāhmins. They are experts in doing harm, are puerile and consider themselves This, we contend, is also the original meaning of the word, to be learned. Even though there are principal religious law- lokāyata, in Pali and Sanskrit. Both Saddanīti by Aggavamsa books, these dimwits, having recourse to sophistical intel- and Abhidhānappadīpika by Moggallāna retain the meaning of ligence, talk rot. (Trans. mine) Vitanda-(Vāda)-sattham, the art of disputation.18 It was much later that Lokāyata and Cārvāka came to designate materi- The connection between anvīksikī buddhi and lokāyatika alism (dehātmavāda, bhūtacaitanyavāda, etc.). It has been ob- brāhmana is a definite pointer to the true and first meaning served that the word, cārvāka, is conspicuous by its absence in of lokāyata.23 the Tipitaka.19 It is also to be noted that the word laukāyatika How could the word become synonymous with Cārvāka in the sense of an anti-religious hedonist is not encountered materialism? We presume that disputatiousness and challeng- before the Kāmasūtra, and the word, cārvāka, though found ing the veracity of the sacred texts were common to the older as a proper name of a demon in the Mbh, does not appear to Lokāyatika-s and the new Cārvaka-s. It is interesting to note designate 'materialism' before the eighth century CE.20 But that Medhätithi in his commentary on Manu, 4.30, glosses haitukāh as nāstikāh, and other commentators agree with this view. The verse is also quoted in the Mitāksarā (on Yājñavalkya- 15 Kangle, II: 6 n10. Smrti, I. 130) which explained the word haituka as "one who 16 Ganapati Sastri (1924), 27. See also G. Haridas Sastri, 10; Jina Vijaya by argumentation, raises doubts about everything."24 Muni, 5. 17 Tarkavāgīśa, I: xiv. See also Gangopadhyaya (1990), 124-26. Thus we may once and for all dispense with the first mean- 8 Smith, I: 361 (section 396). The reading in this edition differs con- ing of lokayata provided in the PTS Dictionary (viz. common siderably from what Rhys Davids had cited (1899: 168). Dasgupta thought or popular philosophy, Nature lore) and take the word to that Rhys Davids's translation of the passage was 'inexact' since the latter mean, both in Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit, a text-book of had taken gandham to mean 'book'. Dasgupta preferred to take it in the disputation: sense of 'smell' (III: 313n). But the reading printed by Smith is gantham. Rhys Davids and not Dasgupta was right. In Saddanīti, Aggavamsa refers vitandasattham/vitandā(vāda)śāstra. not only to vidtandasattham but also to vitandasatthasippam, 'the art of dis- putatio.'-Moggallāna says: vitandasattham viñneyam yam tam lokāyatam iti (ed. D.D. Shastri, v. 112ab,19). 19 Nanayakkara in Malalasekera (ed.), III: 686. 21 See Rhys Davids and Stede, s.v. lokāyata. 20 'iti laukayatikāh', KS, after 1.2.30 (Tarkaratna, 41). For the first ap- 22 Crit. ed., 94.32 (Vaidya, 537), 100.28 in the vulgate. pearance of Lokayata/Lokayatika in philosophical literature, see TS, 23 This is perhaps the only instance in which anvīksiki has been used as Chapter 22 passim and SDSam, v. 80 (Suali, 301). The word, cārvāka, in an adjective. See Schmidt, s.v. ānvīkșikī. this sense is first found in Kamalasīla (on Sāntarakșita, Ch. 22 passim) and 24 Jha (ed.), 342. Acarya (ed.), 44 (yuktivalena sarvatra samśayakārī). See ȘDSam, v. 85 (Suali, 307). also T.G. Sastri (1982), 105 (Bālakrīdā commentary).

XVII On Lokāyata and Lokāyatana in Buddhist Sanskrit

In what follows I propose to discuss the validity of the read- ing lokayata (with or without inflections) and a doubtful word (I would call it a ghost word), lokāyatana occurring in the Śārdūla. (between 200 and 350 CE, included in the Buddhist Sanskrit work, the Divyāvadāna). The readings in the availa- ble MSS, Chinese and Tibetan translations, and hence in the three printed editions,1 are not always the same. The mean- ing of the word too will depend on the reading adopted. Let us look at the first two instances:

(1) padako (padaśo) vaiyākaraņo lokāyate yajñamantre mahāpuruşalakşaņe nişņāto niskānkşah (Vaidya, 318)

319. (2) lokāyatayajñamantramahāpuruşalakşaneşū pāragah (Vaidya,

In (1), Cowell-Neil (C-N) read lokāyatikayajñamantre (619) and in (2), lokāyatayajñatantre (620). Mukhopadhyaya (Mukho.), in both cases, emended the reading to lokāyata yajñamantre and lokayata yajñamantra (12, 13). He was ap- parently influenced by the second occurrence of lokāyata along with yajñamantra and mahāpuruşalaksana. Although

i Edited by Cowell-Neil (1886), Mukhopadhyaya (1954), and Vaidya (1959).

194 Studies on the Cārvaka/Lokāyata Lokāyata and Lokāyatana in Buddhist Sanskrit 195

the MSS consulted by him had the word lokāyatana in (2), for lokāyata, presumably because he did not think that the he preferred to follow C-N, who had emended the reading, word could have any special meaning other than what it had as they themselves confessed, ex conjectura, since their MSS in standard Sanskrit,3 viz. materialism (as Böhtlingk and Roth had such mislections as lokāyamayajña and laukāyayajña-(620 have it). Edgerton, however, records the word, lokāyatana, n5). In the first instance, Mukho.'s MSS have lokāyatika and which he says, "=Skt. lokāyata" (465).4 The only instance of the Tibetan translation has lokāyataśastra; so he chose to re- its occurrence he mentions is, of course, the Divyāvadāna, tain parity of expression by reading lokāyata and yajñaman- 635.25. i.e. our (5), which is rejected by Mukho. and Vaidya tra (not tantra as in C-N) in both (1) and (2). but, in our opinion, should be retained in a suitably emended Vaidya printed the text mostly in accordance with Mukho.'s, form. In any case, lokāyata does not mean materialism or the butin (1), he split up the compound, thereby making lokāyata, Cārvāka system of philosophy (also known as Bārhaspatya- yajnamantra and mahāpurusalaksana three different branches mata or Lokayata-mata) in Buddhist Sanskrit. It stands for, as of study. In (2), he retained Mukho.'s reading. Dasgupta says, "a technical logical science." The next two instances show remarkable conformity: A comparison with Pali will prove the validity of this ren- (3) athavā lokāyatam bhavatā bhāsyapravacanam paksādhyāyo dering. In all Pali commentaries, dictionaries, etc., lokāyatam vā nyāyo vā tvayādhitah. (Vaidya, 328; Mukho., 31; C-N, 630). is always glossed as vitandasattham or vitandavādasattham, the (4) chandasi vā vyākarane vā lokāyate vā ... prajnāyate (Vai- science of disputation.5 This was the original meaning of the dya, 330; Mukho., 37; C-N. 633). word. In KA, 1.2.10, too, it means the same. Both (3) and (4) show that lokāyata is to be taken as a sepa- Only later, but not much earlier than the fourth centu- rate subject of study along with vyākarana, bhāsyapravacana, etc. ry CE, lokāyata came to mean materialism (as it is used in One particular passage, however, poses a problem. In C-N, it Vātsyāyana's KS (1.2.25-30). What was common to the older runs as follows: Lokāyatika-s and the new Cārvāka materialists was perhaps (5) brāhmanaih paurānaih samyag drstāni chandasi vyākarane disputatiousness: nothing was sacred to them. It is interesting padamīmāmsāyām vā lokāyatane vā, anyāni ca gotrāņi na caişām to note that Medhatithi, in his commentary on Manu, 4.30, ūhāpohah prajñāyate (635). glosses haitukāh as nāstikāh and quotes the following words, Mukho. omitted vā lokāyatane vā as the Tibetan translator "nāsti paralokāh, nāsti hutam", which originally occur in VDMP, had done so (40 and n).Vaidya too followed Mukho. inthis I. 108. 19ab and are attributed to Vena, a lokāyatika king.6 instance (331). Since, however, all available MSS contain these We should also remember that the word, cārvāka, does three words, such omission is unwarranted. We may emend not occur in the Tipitaka even once.7 The only materialist the word, lokāyatane, to read lokāyate, as Mukho. did in (2). known in the Buddha's times is Ajita Kesakambala, who is From the above discussion it may be concluded that in called an ucchedavādin, not a lokāyatika or cārvāka; lokāyatika all the five cases, lokāyata (or lokāyate) is used as substantive, is reserved for the disputants, vaitamdika-s. Cārvāka as whether occurring as an independent word or as a part of the name of a materialist system-bulider (or follower of a compound. Dasgupta proposed to make an exception in Brhaspati) is first encountered in the TSP of Kamalasīla and case of (1). "It is true, however," he said, "that Lokāyata is not always used in the sense of a technical logical science but 3 Edgerton, I: xxi. sometimes in its etymological sense (i.e. what is prevalent 'It may be noted that Bohtlingk and Roth, Monier-Williams, and Edger- among the people, lokesu āyato lokāyatah) as in Divyāvadāna, ton -all considered lokāyatana a doubtful word, but included it in their dic- p. 619 ... "2 On the basis of (3), (4), and (5), however, we may tionaries simply because Colebrooke had quoted it. See Colebrooke [(1837), say that both in (1) and (2) lokāyata is to be taken as a proper I: 444], and Cowell's note (in Colebrooke (1873) I: 428 n1). name denoting a branch of study, yajñamantra as another. 5 Jayatilleke (1980), 45-57 offers a detailed survey of lokāyata in Sanskrit This leads us to the meaning of the word, lokāyata, particu- and Pali. He points out that Suzuki's rendering of lokāyata as 'materialism' in his translation of the Lankāvatāra Sūtra is wrong. larly in Buddhist Sanskrit. Edgerton's Dictionary has no entry 6 'nāsti paralokah, nāsti dattam, nāsti hutam' ity eva sthitaprajñāh. The source of this quotation, so far as I know, has not yet been identified by the learned editors of Medhätithi's commentary. 2 Dasgupta, III: 514 n3. ' Nanayakkara, in Malasekera (ed.), III: 686.

196 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

the SDSam of Haribhadra. Sāntaraksita and Sankarācārya, however, employ lokāyata and laukāyatika, not Cārvāka, to mean meterialism and a materialist respectively. So, in the Sārdūla., too, lokāyata has only one meaning: a text-book of disputation, vitandaśastra. Patañjali must have meant the same when he said, by way of example, varnikā Bhāgurī lokāyatasya, vartikā Bhāgurī lokāyatasya,8 i.e. "Bhāgurī is the commentary on (a work of) disputatio".

XVIII Lokāyata and Lokāyatana in Sanskrit Dictionaries

In what follows I propose to point out (a) an erroneous meaning of lokāyata, and (b) a redundant entry, lokāyatana, in the Sanskrit-Wörterbuch (abbreviated later as S-W) and to ac- count for the mistakes.

(a) Lokāyata

S-Winter alia says: "In Pali (it) is said to mean an imaginary story, romance, cf. Burnouf in Lot(us), de la b(onne) 1(oi), 409 and lokāyatika." Under lokāyatika it refers to "perhaps an- other meaning of the word" (other than "a materialist") and cites Burnouf, ibid., 168 and 409.1 Burnouf in his French translation of the Saddharma- pundarīka-sūtra (Ch. 13) writes, "[A Boddhisattva Mahāsattva] does not court the Lokāyatikas" (ne recherche pas les Lokāyatikas) and explains in a note:

There is no reason to believe that the term indicates any- thing other than the sect among the Buddhists as among the Brahmanas to be attached to the atheistic doctrines of the Cärvakas. Pali might suggest here another interpreta- 8 On Aştādhyāyī, 7.3. 45 (Kielhorn, III: 320-26). Cf. nayate cārvī lokāyate in Kāśikāurtti (on Aștā. 1.3.36), Nyāsa, and Padamañjarī (Shastri and Shuk- 1 "In Pali soll lokāyata eine erfundene Geschichte, Roman bedeuten", la, I: 438-49). s.v. lokāyata. "Eine andere: Bed. wird vielleicht das Wort." s.v. lokāyatika.

198 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Lokāyata and Lokāyatana in Sanskrit Dictionaries 199

tion; as Lokāyata there signifies "fabulous story, romance" In any case, the meaning recorded in S-Wfollowing Burn- it will be permissible to suppose that the Lokāyatikas of our ouf is totally unwarranted. Lotus indicate the authors or the readers of similar works in which the passions and the affairs of the world form the (b) Lokāyatana principal subject.2 He refers to Moggallāna's Abhidhānappadīpikā as printed S-W adopted this word following Colebrooke and added: in Clough (1824) as his source. "probably mistaken for lokayata."4 Monier-Williams also enlists T.W. Rhys Davids strongly objected to this interpretation: the word in the following way (apparently disapproving):

Burnouf ... has a curious blunder in his note on the passage Lokayatana (!), m.a. materialist, Col. (p. 409). He says Lokāyata means in Pali 'fabulous history, romance'; and quotes as his authority, the passage ... from Colebrooke wrote as follows: the Abhidhana Padipika [vitandā-sattham viññeyyam yam tam lokāyatah] in which Lokāyatam is simply explained as In the second of these instances, SADANANDA'S scholiast, vitandasattham. This last expression cannot possibly mean RĀMA TĪRTHA, names the Locayatanas, a branch of the anything of that sort. ([1899]169-70 n4) Charvaca, as particularly intended. (1837, I: 404)5

Rhys Davids is right. Abhidhānappadīpika simply states that The text of Ramatirtha's commentary on the Vedāntasāra, "What is known as the science of disputation is the Lokayatam." however, reads: There is nothing to suggest histoire fabuleuse or roman here. Munīnāñca matibhramah. Burnouf did make a blunder, lokāyatānām cārvāka-vieşāņām matabhedān āha ... (187). misled by Clough who, in his marginal gloss on lokayatah (13, v. 8cd) writes "Fabulous story".3 Such a meaning of lokāyata The word, lokāyatānām, is the inflected form of lokāyatam is not found anywhere else. S-W by literally translating the in the sixth declension, plural number. So lokāyatana was words of Burnouf has helped perpetuate the error. either a mislection in Colebrooke's MS or an instance of But what is more striking is that Rhys Davids could not de- misreading on his part. However, the word, lokāyatana, has tect the source of this blunder. It is also rather curious that, never been encountered in any Sanskrit text to mean "ma- while Böhtlingk and Roth rendered histoire as Geshichte (re- terialism" or "a materialist" taining thereby the ambiguity of the original), Rhys Davids There is an entry of lokāyatana in Edgerton's Buddhist took it to mean "history" though Burnouf surely employed Sanskrit dictionary on the basis of a single occurrence of the

the word to mean "story". word in the Sārdūlakarnāvadāna (in Divyāvadāna). The entry and gloss run as follows:

2 "Il n'y a pas de raison de croire que ce terme désigne chez les Bud- Lokāyatana (nt .? ) = Skt. Lokāyata, the system so named: °-ne dhistes autre chose que la secte comme chez les Brâhmanes pour rattacher Divy 635.25; in BR cited from Colebrooke, Essays 1.404 as à la doctrine atheiste des Tchârvâkas. La pali prurrait suggéter ici une au- personal, meaning a follower of the lokāyata (the usual Skt. And tre interprétation: comme lokayâta y signifie «histoire fabuleuse, roman,» HIS lokayata); it is cited from Ramatīrtha on Sadānanda; BR il serait permis de supposer que les Lokāyatikas de notre Lotus désignent les suggest that it is an error, and indeed a note to the 2n ed., auteurs ou les lacteurs de pareils ouvrages, dans lasquels les passions et les 1.428, states that lokayatah is read 'in the printed edition.' affaires des monde forment le sujet principal." Burnouf, 409. Note to 168. 3 vitandasattham vinneyyam yam tam lol n lokāyatam iti | kețubham tu kriyākappavikappo kavinam hito | ākhyāyikopaladdhatthā pabandhakappanā kathā | dandanītyatthasattasmi buttanto tu pavatti ca |, Abhidhānappadīpikā, 4 "lokāyatana m. nach COLEBR. Sc. V.a. lokāyatika COLB. Misc. Ess.1. Clough (1824), Section 2, vv. 8 cd-9 af, 13; Shastri (1981), pathamo 404, wohl fehlerhaft für lokayata." saggakāņdo, 6. Girabaggo, vv. 112-13, 19. Clough (13) took ketubham to 3 In the second edition of Colebrooke's Misc. Essays (1873), E.B. Cowell mean "Invention", ākhyayikā, "A tale", and kathā "A feigned story", and re- added a cryptic note on locāyatanas. "In the printed ed. Lokāyatāh" (428 ferred to lokāyatam as "Fabulous story". V. 113ab is taken from Amarakoşa, nl). Apparently this note failed to draw the attention of Monier-Williams vv. 321ab and 322ab. (see above and also below).

200 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

Edgerton could consult only the Cowell-Neil editio prin- ceps of the Sardula. But a later edition (1954) based on new MSS as well as Chinese and Tibetan translations omits the words, vā lokāyatane vā, as they are not found in the Tibetan version (40 and n21).6 So, even in Buddhist Sanskrit, lokāyatana is a mere mislec- tion. Guiseppe Tucci, however, "quotes a passage from Bud- dhaghoso's Sāratthapakāsinī [Bangkok ed.] where the word āyato is taken in the sense of āyatana (basis), and lokāyata ac- cording to this interpretation means 'the basis of the fool- ish and profane people'." (Dasgupta, III: 514-15).7 But the same text edited by Woodward adopts a different reading: XIX Lokāyatam, lokass'eva āyatam (76); āyatanam is given as a vari- ant reading found in the Colombo ed. and a very late MS rņam krtvā ghrtam pibet: Who Said This?

(copied in 1914). Buddhaghosa further writes:

Bāla-puthujjana-lokassa āyatam 'mahantam gambhīran' ti upadittham, parittam chavam ditthi-gatam. (76). It is the äyatah (ground) of hoi polloi, (and though) put forth as something great and serious, it is a low, wretched (false) doctrine. At the end of the first chapter of the SDS, S-M quotes a number of verses and ascribes them to Brhaspati. One of Apparently the word äyatah is used here as a noun though them runs as follows: the PTS Pali-English dictionary provides no second meaning of äyatam as noun excepting "a bow" yāvaj jīvet sukham jīved rnam krtvā ghrtam pibet | Besides, Trenckner's A Critical Pali Dictionary has no entry bhasmībhūtasya dehasya punarāgamanam kutah ||1 of the compound lokāyatana (s.v. "-ayatana"). To sum up then: the word lokäyatana is found neither in While life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed on Sanskrit nor in Pali. Hence it should be omitted from the ghee even though he runs in debt;

dictionaries. When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again? (E.B. Cowell's translation)

To many this has become the epitome of the Cārvāka phi- losophy, which is thus reduced to hedonism par excellence -a doctrine that urges man to seek happiness at any cost and, at the same time, makes happiness a matter of sensu- Personally I am of opinion that Mukhopadhyaya could retain the ous gratification alone. word in the emended form lokäyata as he did in 13 where his MSS had Where did S-M get this verse? No authority is cited in lokāyatana (see 13 n19). Cowell-Neil too emended the reading here, as his work though some other verses or parts thereof can be they said, ex conject. They had to deal with mislections as lokayama-, lau- kaya-, but not lokāyatana (see 620 fn). P.L. Vaidya in his edition of the traced back to earlier Purānas, plays and poems.2 The au- Divyāvadāna (1959) reproduced Mukhopadhyaya's constituted text of thenticity of such passages is therefore doubtful. It is also Śārdūla; hence no significant emendation was made here. He too omits vā lokāyatane vā (331). See Ch. 17 above. 7 Dasgupta refers to Tucci's Linee di una storia del Materialismo Indiano, 1 SDS (BORI ed.), Ch. I, 14. v. 7, lines 125-26. 17. As the book is not available to me, I have to quote from Dasgupta. 2 See Ch. 6 above.

202 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata rņam krtvā ghrtam pibet 203

probable that S-M as well as his predecessors borrowed them and ceased to exist? There are no such things as given (in from a common source -perhaps purely oral. That is why sacrifices), oblations, rites, nor gods nor sages. T.W. Rhys Davids suggested that S-M's description of the Lokāyata "is chiefly based on certain infidel doggerel verses This (Upa-) Purāna, composed some time between 400 which cannot possibly have formed a part of the Lokyata and 500 CE,6 seems to be the primary source from which studied by the Brahmins of old."3 all later authors have quoted or adapted the verse under There are, however, reasons to believe that at least in case discussion. of the verse cited above, S-M reproduced a distorted version Kamalaśīla quoted one line -bhasmībhūtasya sāntasya of the original. Let us follow the successive alterations of etc .- in his TSP7 but it was Jayantabhatta who first quoted this verse. the two consecutive lines from the VDMP as a verse-unit8 In the earlier part of the same chapter S-M himself quotes and thus, we presume, became the immediate source of all what he calls a lokagāthā: subsequent authors. Somadeva Sūri in his YTC quoted the verse as it occurs in the VDMP with some variants in the yāvaj jīvam sukham jīven nāsti mrtyor agocaraḥ | first line only: yāvaj jīvet sukham jīvet nāsti mrtyor agocaraḥ.9 bhasmībhūtasya dehasya punarāgamanam kutah ||1 Udayana in his Pari. quotes the first line only which has nāsti mrtyor agocarah.10 Abhayadeva Sūri most probably refers to While life is yours, live joyously; this very reading of the verse.11 (I say 'most probably' be- None can escape Death's searching eye: When once this frame of ours they burn, cause he quotes the first hemistich only. The editors of his How shall it ever again return? (E.B. Cowell's translation) work, I think rightly, refer to the NM). In the twelfth century we find the first line rewritten by The main difference between the two verses lies in the another Jain scholar, Hemacandra, as: second hemistich (no reference is made to Brhaspati as au- thor either). Now, this verse occurs first in the VDMP almost yāvaj jīvet sukham jīvet tāvad vaişayikaih sukhaiḥ exactly in the same form as the last and first lines of two and the second line altogether altered: consecutive verses with one variant -sāntasyå in place of dehasya: na tāmyed dharma-kāryāya dharmādharma-phalam kva tat.12

mugdhā evam pratāryante dhūrtair dhana-jihīrşayā So long as one lives, let him live happily with the pleasures yāvaj jīvam sukham jīven nāsti mrtyor agocaram | of the senses. He should not trouble himself by religious ac- bhasmībhūtasya sāntasya punarāgamanam kutah | tions. Where is the fruit of dharma and non-dharma? (Helen nāsti dattam hutam cestam na devā rsayo na ca ||5 M. Johnson's translation)

The cunning ones thus cheat the deluded men, prompted by the desire to take away (their) riches. As long as life re- mains, live happily; nothing is beyond death. From where 6 Hazra (1958), I: 143. can be any return for that which has been reduced to ashes Baroda ed., 14; Varanasi ed., 17. Trans., 21. Neither of the editors could locate this quotation. 8 Ch. 7. Ed. G. Sastri, II: 257; the Mysore edition has dehasya for śāntasya (which along with jivet for jivam is noted as a variant reading in the foot- 3 Dialogues (1899), 172. By 'doggerel verses' Rhys Davids apparently re- note. See II: 348). Jayanta did not refer to any source for this verse. He sim- fers to the abhānaka-s and lokagāthā-s quoted. The first word has been taken ply stated, 'As they say' / 'As the saying goes' (yathaha). The learned edi- to mean "a saying, proverb" (Monier-Williams, 145, col 2) and the second, tors of this work have not been able to trace the source of this quotation. "a verse or song (handed down orally) among men" (ibid., 906, col 2) which 9 YTC, II: 253 is how Böhtlingk-Roth rendered it. ("Ein in munds des volkes lebender Vers", 0 Pari (on NS, 1.1.2), 113. VI: 582). There is no entry of äbhanaka in Böhtlingk-Roth, nor in Schmidt. l1 TBV, 505 n6. Jayanta, too, in his work, once refers to the verse by None of these two words is recorded in Sabdakalpadruma either. quoting the first hemistich only (Ch. 4. Ed. G. Sastri, I: 388: nanu ca yāvaj SDS, 2, lines 17-18. jīvam sukham jīved iti tatropadiśyate ... ) 5 VDMP, I. 108. 18-19, 70a (Translation mine). 12 TSPC, I: 345, 12.

204 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata rņam krtvă ghrtam pibet 205

This is the first alteration made in the first line of the from the Carvaka-s themselves. The story of king Vena in original verse. the VDMP is hostile to materialism and, even in its origi- Gunaratna, a co-religionist of Hemacandra, cites the first nal form, the verse is imputed to the irreligious king by the line with a minor variation: author/s of the Purana.

yāvaj jīvet sukham jīvet tāvad vaişayikam sukham As long as a man lives, let him live happily; so long are the pleasures of the senses. But in the second line he reverts to the original reading with one variation: dehasya for śāntasya.13 Śrīharsa, on the other hand, preferred to rewrite the verse in the following way: kah śamah kriyatām prājñāh priyāprītau pariśramah | bhasmībhūtasya bhūtasya punarāgamanam kutah ||14 Ye arrant fools, of what use is quietude? Try to gratify your mistresses. Will a creature, once he is reduced to ashes, ever return? (K.K. Handiqui's translation) It is interesting to note that Mädhava-Sarasvatī, in spite of S-M and Guņaratna and Srīharșa, goes back to the Purāņic reading as quoted by Jayantabhatta but replaces sāntasya with dehasya.15 Similarly an undated commentary on So- madeva Süri's Nītivākyāmrta called Mugdhabodhinī and Ad- vayavajra's commentary on Sarahapāda's Dohākoșa quote the verse which reads nästi mrtyor agocarah and tāvat mrtyor agocarah respectively.16 On the basis of available evidence we may conclude that the verse in question was first distorted by the Jains (who were very much anti-Lokayata) and then by the Brahmiņical opponents of the Carvaka. What was meant to be a simple denial of the concept of after-life was transformed into a preaching of heedless hedonism as well. S-M got this verse from some unknown source or rewrote the second hemis- tich himself, apparently forgetting that he had quoted an- other version of the same only a few pages earlier. Second, if the VDMP is the source of this verse, it is also to be noted that this is not an authentic version coming

13 TRD, 202. 14 NC, 17.69, 646. 15 SDK, 108. 16 MB, 14; Dohā., 86.

XX jīvikā dhātrnirmitā or jīviketi brhaspatiḥ?

At the end of the first chapter of the SDS, S-M quotes a number of verses and ascribes them to Brhaspati. One of them runs as follows:

agnihotram trayovedas tridandam bhasmagunthanam buddhipauruşahīnānām jīvika dhatunirmita (sic)

J. Muir, the first English translator of this passage from the SDS, renders it thus:

The agnihotra sacrifice, the three Vedas, the mendicant's tri- ple staff, and the practice of smearing oneself with ashes, are only a means of livelihood ordained by the Creator for men who have neither understanding nor energy.2

The verse seems to strike an odd note. It is well known that Brhaspati, the eponymous founder of the Lokāyata doctrine, denied the existence of God, after-life, etc. Why should he speak of the Creator, dhātr?

1 SDS (BORI ed.), Ch. 1, 13, v. 2, lines 112-13. In the editio princeps the last word was dhātrnirmitā. 2 Muir (1861), 352. The anonymous German translation (ZDMG, 1860) has 'von den Vätern angeordnet' (ordained by the Father) for dhātrnirmitā (525).

208 Studies on the Carvāka/Lokāyata jīvikā dhātrnirmitā or jīviketi brhaspatiḥ? 209

Cowell indeed felt that there was something wrong here. Sālikanātha was apparently the first to quote this verse.7 He therefore translated dhatrnirmita as "made by Nature". It has jīviketi brhaspatih. Krsnamiśra cited this verse in his In a note he added, "I take Dhātri as God, or nature, speak- ing by common parlance. Dr Hall (Catalogue, p. 162) would brhaspatih.8 allegorical play, PC (2.26). The last pāda here too is jīviketi

seem to take Dhātri as the name of an author. -'Dhātri may In the GrBh commentary on Jayantabhatta's NM, Cakrad- sometimes stand for Brihaspati'."4 hara quotes the same reading with one variation in the There is no evidence elsewhere or in the lexicons that second pāda - bhasmamundanam (ashes and shaving of the Brhaspati was also called Dhātr. In any case, even accepting head) for bhasmagunthanam.9 that would be of no avail in the given context. How could Śrīharșa, however, decided to rewrite the verse in his NC Brhaspati or a mere author (as Hall would have it) make or (17.39) in the following way: ordain the livelihood of the ascetics? Max Müller modified the last line of Cowell's translation agnihotram trayītantram tridandam bhasmapundrakam | of this verse as follows: prajnāpauruşanihsvānām jīvo jalpati jīvikā ||10

They are the mode of life made by the creator for those who Brhaspati [= Jīva] says, "Oblation in the fire, morning and are devoid of sense and manliness. evening, the system of rules built up by the three Vedas, the carrying of three sticks tied into one, and the bearing of In a note he pointed out: "Dhātri, creator, can here be browmarks of ashes are the means of livelihood of those used ironically only, instead of Svabhāva or nature."5 who are devoid of wisdom and manhood." (K.K. Handiqui's The reading of the verse seems to be suspect. translation)

Fortunately enough, S-M himself quotes another reading of the verse in the earlier part of the same chapter. Nārāyaņa, in his commentary (NPr) on this verse, quotes the verse as it occurs in the RVP and PC but retains agnihotram trayovedās tridandam bhasmagunthanam | bhasmapundrakam in the second pāda.

buddhipauruşahīnānām jīviketi brhaspatih ||6 Nīlakantha goes back to the original version but writes trayīdharmāh (ordinance according to the three Vedas) in The fourth pada here is quite different. Cowell translates the first pāda.11 the last line as: "Brihaspati says, these are but means of live- Sadānanda Kāśmīraka, a contemporary of Nīlakaņțha, in hood for those who have no manliness nor sense." his ABS provides yet another reading: The difference lies only in the last pāda, which, however, makes all the difference in meaning. Evidently the reading agnihotram pītañca tripundram bhasmadhāraņam | just quoted is more appropriate. Why then did S-M alter it prajñāpaurusahīnānām jīvo jalpati jīvikām ||12

when he cited the verse for the second time? The question The Agnihotra, wearing ochre robes, bearing of three brow- will lead us to the source of the verse itself. marks of ashes are the means of livelihood of those who are destitute of wisdom and manhood, says Brhaspati.

3 JASB (1862), 381. Cowell's translation also appeared in Appendix C to The second line is taken almost verbatim from Śrīharsa's Colebrooke's Miscellaneous Essays [second edition, edited by Cowell (1873)] version (only in the third pāda it has hīnānām and in the and in The Pundit (1874) before the publication of Cowell-Gough (1882). 4 JASB (1862), 381 n. The note was omitted in Cowell-Gough (1882). By fourth, jīvikam). The first line is largely rewritten. 'Catalogue' Cowell refers to Hall (1859) who said, "A complete list of the numerous authors and treatises cited or referred to in the Sarva-darsana- sangraha will, therefore, have value in affording a notion as what philo- 7 RVP, 285 sophical and cognate works were held, five hundred years ago, to be au- PC, 44. thoritative, or, at least, representative" (161-62). He then cites the names of 9 GrBh, I: 228. Brihaspati and Dhātri as authorities in relation to Chārvāka-darśana. 10 NC, 635. 5 Max Müller (1971), 101 and n2. I1 On Mbh, Sāntiparvan, 218.25 (vulgate ed.), 211.24 (critical ed.). SDS, 5, lines 50-51. 12 ABS, Ch. 2 ('dvitīya mudgaraprahārah'), 100. Translation mine.

210 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata jīvikā dhātrnirmitā or jīviketi brhaspatiḥ? 211

Two philosophical digests of uncertain date, the SMS and So it may be concluded that the reading of the verse in SSS, quote the second line as it is found in PC without a sin- question as found in the RVP, PC, GrBh and in the earlier gle variant.13 part of SDS, Chapter I is the original one, other readings are In an anonymous commentary on Somadeva Sūri's variations or distortions. Nītivākyāmrta, the same verse is quoted in a corrupt form: agnihotram trayovedah prabrjyā lprabrajyā] nagnamundatā buddhipauruşa hīnānām jīvite 'do [?] matam guruh [guroh] ||14 Following the occurrence of the verse (twelve in eleven sources) chronologically, can we come to any conclusion re- garding its true reading? The variants in the first line are minor and of little consequence. The crux lies in the last pāda: should it be jīviketi brhaspatih or jīvikā dhātrnirmitā? The third alternative -jīvo jalpati jīvikā(m)- may be safely ignored. It was Srīharsa's fabrication and none but Sadānanda Kāśmīraka adopted it. All other readings have jīviketi brhaspatih. This seems to be the correct reading. Why did S-M substitute it by jīvikā dhātrnirmitā? The rea- son is apparently as follows. While quoting the verse for the first time, S-M himself calls in an ābhānaka, a popular say- ing.15 Salikanātha might not have been the author of the verse. He too perhaps got it from a purely oral source. Most of those who have quoted this verse (including S-M) retain the original reading of the last pāda. When S-M quotes the verse for the second time (along with ten others), he intro- duces them with the remark: "And all this has been also said by Brhaspati." the verse in question comes as the second one. So, instead of naming Brhaspati twice in so close a suc- cession, S-M omits his name and thereby alters the last pāda. This saves the metre but kills the sense. Dhātr is introduced for nothing in an uncompromisingly atheistic system of phi- losophy and unnecessarily creates some confusion. It should be remembered that this is not the only in- stance of S-M tampering the reading of what was known as Bärhaspatya sayings. He had done the same thing with an- other verse (yāvaj jīvam, etc.) by providing two readings: the first, original; the second, his own.16

13 SSS, 6; SMS, 15. 14 MB, 76, v. 33 on sūtra 32. 15 SDS, 5, line 49. Nos. 40 and 45, and B7 and B3 respectively. Shastri adopted the second 16 For a detailed discussion of the variants of this verse, see Ch. 19 above. reading for B3. Leaving aside, for the present, the question whether such D.R. Shastri and Namai have included both yāvaj jīvam, etc. and agniho- popular sayings can be taken as authentic sutra-s, we may note that the tram, etc. in their reconstruction of the lost Barhaspatyasutra as aphorism first readings in both cases would be more appropriate.

XXI mṛtānāmapi jantūnām ...

A verse in the editio princeps of the SDS, Ch. 1 runs as follows:

mrtānāmapi jantūnām śrāddham cet trptikāraņam | gacchatāmiha jantūnām vyartham pātheyakalpanam ||1

If the śraddha produces gratification to beings who are dead. Then here too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is needless to give provisions for the journey.2

Iśwarachandra Vidyāsāgara, the first editor of the SDS, could procure only five MSS for collation. Apparently all the five contained the same reading. Two large Sanskrit dictionaries, the Sabdakalpadruma and the Vacaspatyam, quote this reading along with other verses from the SDS.3 Subsequent editions (reprints) of the SDS published by Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati (1871), Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara (1889) and Mahesacandra Pāl (1894) adopted the same reading.4

1 SDS (BI ed.), 6. SDS (Parimal ed.), 12. The translation first appeared in JAS(B), 1862, 381. For the meaning of sraddha. see Appendix A. 3 S.v. Cārvāka. It may be mentioned in this connection that Karl H. Potter wrongly at- tributes the editio princeps to Tarkaväcaspati (T) and gives the year of pub- lication as 1851 (809.17.1, 510). T's edition appeared first in 1871. A copy

214 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata mṛtānāmapi jantūnām 215

Hari Narāyana Apțe brought out a new edition of the SDS Fortunately, the verse (PC, 2.21) also occurs in the works of in 1906. It supplied the last chapter not found in the MSS two Jain savants, Hemacandra and Mallisena. In Hemacandra's available to Iśwarachandra Vidyāsāgara. However, as regards auto-commentary on his YS, the verse runs as follows: the verse under discussion (v. 4 of the last section), Apte's edition does not differ in any respect from the editio princeps.5 mṛtānāmapi jantūnām yadi trptirbhavediha | It is in Vāsudeva Shāstrī Abhyankar's edition of the SDS nirvāņasya pradīpasya snehah samvardhayecchikhām||9 (1924) that two additional lines are first found. The second line of the earlier reading (4 cd) becomes the first line of the This varies a little from the reading found in the PC and SDS (yadi trptirbhavediha, 'if it causes gratification here' in next verse (5 ab) and two new lines, 4 cd and 5 cd are added. The two verses now read as follows: place of śrāddha cet trptikāranam in b), but otherwise the readings are all alike. mrtānāmapi jantūnām śrāddham cet trptikāraņam | Mallisena quotes this verse in his commentary on nirvānasya pradīpasya snehah samvardhayecchikhām || Hemacandra's AYVD. The reading cited by him is different gacchatāmiha jantūnām vyartham pātheyakalpanam | from Hemacandra's but it is much closer to that of the PC. gehasthakrtaśrāddhena pathi trptiravāritā ||6 There is only one minor variant in c: tannirvānapradīpasya for If the śraddha produces gratification even to the dead beings, nirvānasya pradīpasya.10 oil would then increase the flame of an extinguished lamp. In spite of these variations, it cannot be claimed for certain It is futile to provide for the travellers when they start. Their that Hemacandra and Mallisena got the verse from two different gratification on the way would be boundless by the offering sources. Most probably they were quoting from memory which of śrāddha at home. (Trans. mine) may account for the differences in their readings. There is another point to be noted. Krsnamiśra attributed The addition of two new lines (4 cd and 5 cd) makes more this verse to Cārvaka who makes a brief appearance in his cogent reading and much better sense. In place of nine verses allegorical play. Krsnamiśra has nothing but contempt for of two lines each and a verse having three lines (twenty-one his views. Hemacandra and Mallisena, on the other hand, lines in all), we now have ten verses of two lines each and a quote the verse under discussion with approval and use it verse having three lines (twenty-three lines in all). as a stick to beat the Mimamsakas with. Both of them were Unfortunately Abhyankar does not specify from which adherents of the doctrine of non-violence (ahimsa) while the new MS or MSS he got these two additional lines. In his Mīmāmsakas, as staunch Vedists, accepted and recommended short exposition he refers to a couple of verses from the VPu slaughter of animals in śraddha and other rituals. There (3.18.25-26). The second one is a variant of SDS, Ch. 1, lines is nothing to prove that Krsnamisra was the author of this 114-15 (=v. 3 in the last set of verses). However, Abhyankar verse. It is more probable that the verse was already current failed to notice that the first additional line, viz. nirvānasya as an ābhānaka or lokagāthā (popular saying), a floating pradipasya, etc. (line 117 in his ed. = 4 cd) also occurs in PC, verse circulating orally. S-M might very well have taken the 2.21.7 In fact the reading given in the SDS tallies with that of verse from the PC and believed that it had its origin in the the PC. Most probably S-M got this verse from the PC, as he Carvāka tradition. But the question is: did Hemacandra and might have got vv. 2 and 3 from other sources.8 Mallișena, too, think that the verse "is clearly in the style of Cārvāka comments"?11 Would they use a verse attributable to the Carvaka-s in their polemics against the arch-Vedists? Or, of this edition is available in the Government Sanskrit College Library, Kolkata. Similarly the name of Mahesacandra Pal has been misprinted in Potter as C.M.Pal (809.17.19, 510). 9 On YŚ, 2.47, f. 98b. 5 SDS (Ānandāśrama ed.), 5. 10 SVM, 69 on AYVD, v. 11. 6 SDS (BORI ed.), 13-14, lines 116-19. I1 F.W. Thomas, 69 n36. He must have had some edition of SDS prior to 7 The speech is attributed to Cārvāka. Cf. PC, 2.20 = VPu, 3.18.26 = SDS, the BORI ed. Hence his comment: "The first line is given [in SDS] as such, Ch. 1, last section, v. 3 the second line differs" (ibid.). But, as we have shown above, the difference 8 For details see Ch. 6 above. in reading is merely due to the absence of 4 cd.

216 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata mṛtānāmapi jantūnām 217

did they know that the verse had emanated from Jain circles Mallisena mentions the source. In the PPu, too, the verse and it could be employed with immunity? is not attributed to the Cārvaka. The basic theme of the The verse makes fun of offering oblations to the departed section in which this verse occurs is the condemnation of soul in the śrāddha ceremony. The Cārvāka-s did not believe Vedic sacrifices that require violence.16 in the existence of the soul without the body. So the banter It is probable that S-M merely compiled the last eleven against the śräddha ceremony is quite fitting. But that is not verses from disparate sources. He did not compose any of the only point. Sraddha also involves slaughter of animals as these verses (although he made some alterations in the food for the ancestors. As Manu prescribes: readings)17 and attributed all the verses to Brhaspati.18 S-M concentrates on the practice of slaughtering animals in vv. 3-6, dvau māsau matsya-māmsena trin māsān hāriņena | 9 and 11ef; vv. 1 and 7-8 deny the existence of the incorporeal aurabhreņātha caturah śākunenātha pañca vai || (3.268) soul (and consequently the futility of śraddha), and vv. 9-11 Two months with fish-flesh, three months with that of deer, ridicule the text of the Vedas, as well as Vedic sacrifices, and Four months with that of sheep, five months with that of birds. blame the Brahmins for inventing obscene rituals. (Trans. F.W. Thomas) The first three verses can be traced back to the PC, VPu, NC and other texts. The context of vv. 4-6 can be related to similar Both Hemacandra and Mallisena quote this verse in the same sources, such as Jabāli's speech in the Rām., Ayodhyākāņda sections in which they quote the mrtānāmapi jantūnām, etc.12 and VPu; v. 7 is taken from the VDMP while vv. 10-11 could Similarly, in order to deprecate himsã in the performance have been taken from some Buddhist and/or Jain sources.19 of Vedic rituals, Mallisena quotes a verse that is also found S-M does not always quote verbatim and his choice of the last in the PPu: eleven verses is rather eclectic. It is impossible to accept his declaration that Brhaspati is the author of all these verses. It yūpam chitvā pašum hatvā kṛtvā rudhirakardamam | is more probable that the verse, mrtānāmapi jantūnām, etc., yadyeva gamyate svarge narake kene gamyate |13 was taken from a Jain source although Krsnamiśra attributed it to Cārvāka. Hemacandra and Mallișeņa most probably If having cut a sacrificial post, having slain animals, and knew the verse to be of Jain origin and unhesitatingly used it made a puddle of blood, Thus one gets to heaven, whereby does one go to hell?1 against the Vedic ritualists in general. (Trans. F.W. Thomas) APPENDIX A Māțhara, too, quotes this verse (with some variants) in his commentary on the SK,15 although neither he nor The word, śrāddha, is generally taken to mean funeral ceremony. But Monier-Williams has rightly observed:

12 On YŚ, 2.43, f 98b; SVM, 62 on AYVD, v. 11. [ ... ] Śrāddha is not a funeral ceremony [antyeshți] but a 13 SVM, 65 on AYVD, v. 11. See PPu, Srsțikhanda, 13.323 (there are supplement to such a ceremony: it is an act of reverential some minor variants) homage to a deceased person performed by relatives, and is 14 Trans. F.W. Thomas, 66. moreover supposed to supply the dead with strengthening 5 Mathara on SK, v. 2, 111. The verse as quoted reads: vrksamśchitva nutriment after the performance of the previous funeral paśum hatvā krtvā rudhirakarddamam | yajñaiśced gamyate svarge narakah ceremonies has endowed them to ethereal bodies; indeed kena gamyate ||. Editors and translators of the MVrand SVM have not iden- until those antyeshti or 'funeral rites' have been performed, tified the source of this verse. Mäthara vaguely refers to anyacca (another) while Mallisena attributes the verse to the followers of a great sage (tathā ca pathanti pāramarșāh). There was no love lost between Hemacandra (or, for the matter of that, Mallisena) and the Cārvāka-s. So the "great rsi" 16 See Appendix B. can never refer to a Carvaka. It is also to be noted that Hemacandra de- 17 See Chs. 19 and 20 above. votes no fewer than thirteen verses in his YS (2.37-49) to denounce himsā 18 tadetatsarvam brhaspatināpyuktam. SDS (BORI ed.), 13, line 109. enjoined in the Vedas and Smrtis and denounces Manu and other law- 19 For details see Ch. 6 above. Jābāli, however, does not object to himsā. makers as the worst of the nāstika-s (nāstikebhyo 'pi nāstika, 2.37). He is content to point out the futility of offering food to the dead.

218 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata

and until the succeeding first śräddha has been celebrated the deceased relative is a preta or restless, wandering ghost and has no real body [only a lingaśarīra, q.v.], it is not until the first śräddha has taken place that he attains a position among the Pitris or Divine Fathers in their blissful abode called Pitri-loka, and the śr. is most desirable and efficacious when performed by a son. (A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, s.v. śrāddha.)

APPENDIX B

The episode in PPu, Srstikhanda, Ch. 13, first tells how Brhaspati (disguised as Sukra) misled the demons (danava-s) who wished to learn the way to liberation. Brhaspati advised XXII them to renounce all yajña and śrāddha (v. 316), and remain Cārvāka/Lokāyata Philosophy: celibate (vv. 327-33). He also spoke vehemently against himsā (319-26). Perso-Arabic Sources

In another section of the same chapter Māyāmoha (as producedby Keśava) advises thedemonsfurther. Hefirstassumes the guise of a Jain ascetic (yogī digambara mundo varhipatradhara, v. 346) and then of a Buddhist monk (raktāmbaradhrk, v. 360). In both forms Māyāmoha denounces the evil religion of slaughtering animals, etc. (pasughātādidustadharma, v. 361) The demons then began to indulge in reviling the Vedas, gods, The whole literature of the Cārvaka system is lost. Scholars have ransacked all Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit works to glean yajña and Brahmins. This is an amplified version of a tale found in the VPu. For whatever little that can be salvaged. However, the Arabic and Persian sources have not been tapped yet. Here I propose to a detailed study, see Hazra (1963), 343-45. Hazra, however, discuss three such works doubts the authenticity of the episode in VPu 3.18. (1940), 25. See also his "Introduction" to H.H. Wilson's translation of VPu, (k) - (1). For a survey of the heretical doctrines in the Purāna-s, see The first source is, of course, India by al-Bīrūnī (1031). Dandekar, 737-53. The passage runs as follows:

[ ... ] the book Laukâyata [Lokāyata], composed by Brihaspati, treating of the subjects that in all investigations we must ex- clusively rely upon the appreciations of the senses; the book Agastyamata, composed by Agastya, treating of the subject that in all investigations we must use the appreciation of the senses as well as tradition [ ... ]1

Birūnī apparently had no access to the first work he refers to. That is why he could mention only one aspect of this sys- tem, viz. sense-perception (pratyaksa) as the only valid means

1 Alberuni's India, I: 132. For the Arabic Text, see Fi Tahqiq ma li'l-Hind.

220 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Perso-Arabic Sources 221

of knowledge (pramana). From earlier sources we know that selves affirm, which are not founded on perception, or on the Laukäyatika-s denied everything that the theists believed proof drawn from testimony."5 in: God, the infallibility of the Vedas, the efficacy of the ob- The position of the Jains vis-à-vis the valid means of servance of religious duties either for this world or for the knowledge, however, has not been uniform. It was Umasvāti next, etc. The Buddhists and Jains too had no faith in God (c.400 CE) who first referred to five jñana-s: mati (sensory and the Vedas but they believed in after-life or the other- and non-sensory perception) and śruta (scriptural writing), world (though, unlike the Jains, the Buddhists did not ac- belonging to the indirect kind, and avadhi, manahparyāya cept the idea of the imperishable soul). The Laukāyatika-s and kevala, three types of extra-sensory perceptions, belong- had gone several steps ahead: they were rooted in this world ing to the direct kind. Akalanka (c. 720-780) spoke first of and had nothing to do with anything beyond the senses. three, then of six pramāna-s: pratyaksa, smrti, pratyabhijñā, Bīrūnī does not mention the most characteristic features of tarka, anumāna and āgama (perception, memory, recogni- this school. tion, knowledge of invariable concomitance, inference and The reference to a work called Agastyamata (the doctrine verbal testimony). Hemacandra and Vādidevasūri ( both of of Agastya) is highly intriguing. Like the text of Brhaspati, the eleventh century) divided these six into two categories: this book, too, is lost. But it seems to refer to a modified view direct (pratyaksa) and the rest into indirect (paroksa).6 S-M, of the materialist school. What Birūni exactly meant by al- on the other hand, quotes the view of a Jain philosopher, khabar (translated as 'tradition') is not clear. Surely it cannot Jinadatta, who spoke of perception and inference as the two refer to the Sanskrit word aitihya (generally rendered into valid means of knowledge admitted by syādvada (the Jain English as 'tradition') which was accepted as a valid means philosophy).7 of knowledge by the Pauranika-s, i.e., those who accepted the In any case, the doctrine of Agastya seems to be quite dis- books of legends (purāna-s) as authoritative.2 We are told that tinct from that of the Jains. they believed in eight means of knowledge, not just two (as Bīrūnī says). On the other hand, if al-khabar stands for 'com- TT mon knowledge' which need not be verified by sense-percep- tion anymore, we may conjecture that Biruni was speaking of The second source is al-Shahrastanī's Ara'ahl al-Hind. Purandara who declared that the Cārvaka-s accepted infer- Unlike Bīrūnī, Shahrastānī (d. 549 AH/ 1153 CE) did not ence in so far as it related to mundane matters verifiable by know Sanskrit, and what he writes about Indian philosophy sense-perception.3 is rather vague. He speaks of two schools of Brāhmanas: Sachau in his notes on India speculated: "Is it (sc. the doc- naturalist and dualist.8 By 'naturalism' he might have meant trine of Agastya) identical with that of the Jainas?" He re- svabhāvavāda which, though an older doctrine, had, by ferred to Colebrooke's view in this regard.4 the tenth century (if not earlier), become identified with Colebrooke indeed said, "But the Jainas are distinguished Lokäyata,9 or he might have referred to Sāmkhya. Since he from the rest by their admission of no opinion, as they them- does not expressly state which doctrine he had in mind, we cannot be sure whether he means Lokāyata or not.

2 NS, 2.2, 1-2. The relevant verses referring to the views of different schools, including the Pauranika-s, are quoted in SMS, 14 and elsewhere 5 Colebrooke (1807, 1873), II: 173. (e.g. Mān. and Tārkikarakșā). 6 See Sanghvi (1961), 50-54 and Dixit (1971), 7, 22, 146. We read of as many as eight valid means of knowledge accepted by dif- SDS (BORI ed.), 87, v. 4ab. Cowell, in his edition of Colebrooke's Misc. ferent schools: pratyaksa (perception), anumāna (inference), śabda (verbal Essays (1873) also notes this view, but instead of mentioning Jinadatta, he testimony), upamāna (analogy), arthāpatti (postulation), abhāva (absence), refers to Mādhava (173 n2) sambhava (inclusion) and aitihya (traditional hearsay). The Paurnika-s ac- 8 See Bruce B. Lawrence (1976). For a survey of Shahrastani's views, see cepted all eight as valid. M.S. Khan (1984), 199-208. The Arabic text has been edited by Md. Syed 3 TSP on TS, vv. 1479-81. Kilani, Beirut, 1395 AH/1975 CE (second ed.) Sachau, 300 (note on 132). He, however, frankly confesses, "His (sc. 9 So far as I know, Bhattotpala (or Utpala Bhatta) was the first to iden- Agastya's) doctrine is not known to me." tify svabhāvavāda with Lokāyata in his SVi on BrS, 1.7

222 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Perso-Arabic Sources 223

III Some comments are in order: (a) Although the informants of Abu'l Fadl speak of The third source, and the most important one, is Abu'l 'many works' written by the Carvaka-s (instead of only one Fadl-i-Allāmi's Āin-i Ākbarī. Again, unlike Bīrūnī, Abul Fadl mentioned by Bīrūnī), they do not seem to have read even (1551-1602) did not know Sanskrit but he had gathered one of them. This is understandable, for no authoritative around him the best available scholars of his time and pre- text or commentary of the Cārvāka school was available in pared a digest of all the major systems of Indian philosophy. the sixteenth century (or, for that matter, after the twelfth). The two chapters (IV-V) can vie with any digest compiled Whatever little was known to them seems to have been trans- before or after him.10 mitted orally from preceptors to disciples. Hence their ac- Historians of Indian philosophy, however, have paid lit- count cannot be expected to be accurate in all respects. tle attention to this important Persian source. The exposi- (b) The informants must have been extremely pious tion of some of the systems is more ample, though some and God-fearing. Their attitude is best reflected in the way others (like Carvaka and Buddhist) are treated rather cur- Cārvaka is introduced in the very first sentence. sorily.11 It is definitely a pointer to the fact that his inform- (c) 'The whole end of man' mentioned in the passage ants knew little about the non-Vedic schools. Interestingly obviously refers to what is known as purusārtha in the Brah- enough, the Jain philosophy is represented in greater detail minical tradition, and the enumeration of the four constitu- than others. ent parts or elements is meant to suggest the four varga-s Let us now look at the section on the Nāstika: (departments) of life: artha (wealth), kāma (pleasure), moksa (release) and dharma (religious merit). This is not the right Charvaka, after whom this school is named, was an unenlight- order in which they are represented by the Brahminical au- ened Brahmin. Its followers are called by Brahmins, Nāstikas thors. Originally only three such varga-s were formulated, or Nihilists. They recognise no existence apart from the four mokșa came to be added later. Dharma comes first, followed elements, nor any source of perception save through the five by artha and kāma; moksa is the summum bonum. All pious men organs of sense. They do not believe in a God nor in immate- rial substances, and affirm faculty of thought to result from and women are required to pay attention to all three, but the equilibrium of the aggregate elements. Paradise they re- there were differences of opinion as to the priority of artha gard as a state in which man lives as he chooses, free from and dharma. Kauțilya, for example, admits all three to be the control of another, and hell the state in which he lives the end of life, but to him artha comes first. Without wealth, subject to another's rule. The whole end of man, they say, is there can be no pleasure or religious merit.13 Vatsyayana, comprised in four things: the amassing of wealth, women, the author of Kāmasütra (fourth century CE), upholds dhar- fame and good deeds. They admit only such sciences as tend ma above all (second comes artha and last, kāma) but prefers to the promotion of external order, that is, knowledge of just to treat all the three varga-s as equally important; no varga administration and benevolent government. They are some- what analogous to the sophists in their views and have writ- is to be left out of life.14 The writers of Dharmasästra, on the ten many works in reproach of others, which rather serve as other hand, place dharma over everything else.15 lasting memorials of their own ignorance.12 (d) We should also note that, in this context, kāma does not mean zan (woman) as Abu'l Fadl writes: it means pleasure as such.16 Only in a narrow sense it means sexual enjoyment. 10 K. Miśra writes of no fewer than twenty-three digests of philosophy (darsana-samgraha-s) right from the eighth century CE in his preface to ȘDSam (Varanasi ed.), xvii-xxi. 13 KA, 1.7.3-7. 11 A look at the space provided for the different philosophical systems 14 KS, 1.2, see the English trans., 36-43. Vātsyāyana himself defines kāma in the English translation (A'in-i Akbari, Vol III, trans. Jarrett) will bear as "the desire for the enjoyment of objects through the five senses -of this out: Nyaya (Ch. IV: 143-66), Vaiseşika (166-67), Mīmāmsā (167-72), hearing, touch, sight, and smell under the guidance of the mind which is Vedānta (172-79), Sāmkhya (179-87), Pātañjala (187-98), Jaina (Ch. V, connected with the soul. The object of this desire is pleasure." (1.2.11). 199-222), Bauddha (233-27) and Cārvāka (227-28). 15 For a survey of the relationship between artha and kāma, see Kane, 12 For the Persian text, see Acin-i Akbari (1297 AH/1880 CE), 89. The II: 1:8-9. English translation is quoted from Jarrett, 227-28. 16 See kāma in Monier-Williams (1899).

224 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Perso-Arabic Sources 225

(e) Similarly, nik-nāmī and niku-kārī are poor equivalents all religious practices.21 Such a connection is therefore ill for dharma and moksa. Abu'l Fadl, it appears, misunderstood warranted. his informants. The Cārvāka-s, uncompromising material- (g) The reference to sufista'i is rather interesting. The ists as they were, had nothing to do with religious merit or word, lokāyata, as I have said before, originally meant dispu- release (from the cycle of rebirth). Nor is there any definite tation, often it would appear, for disputation's sake. Com- evidence that they used to think in such Brahminical terms mentators on Pali canonical works also explain the word in as puruşartha and varga-s of life. Some of their opponents this way (vitandasattham). Only much later it came to mean have said that they recognized both wealth and pleasure as 'materialist philosophy'. In fact, the word, cārvāka, as a syn- the end of life, but some speak of pleasure alone as their onym is found even later.22 Abu'l Fadl uses this word, not creed.17 In any case, the Cārvaka-s, like their fellow-nāstika-s, lokāyata, to designate 'materialism'. But the two meanings the Buddhists and Jains, were under no obligation to oper- -disputatio and materialism- have already got mixed up.23 ate under such Brahminical schemes as these. The Cārvaka-s are therefore, represented as argumentative (f) 'The sciences [tending] to the promotion of external and denying every tenet of their opponents, particularly the order,' etc. obviously refer to Arthasastra, the science of pol- concept of after-life and the infallibility of the Vedas. ity. The connection between Lokāyata and Arthasāstra has To sum up, we may say that though the account of the been suggested by some other writers too, both medieval Cārvaka philosophy as given in the Acin-i Ākbarī does not and modern.18 However, it is not proven that the Lokāyata philosophy was closely allied to the princes or even to court provide any reliable piece of information (other than con- firming one view attested in other sources, viz., conscious- circles. Unfortunately, we possess only one Arthaśāstra text ness is the product of four-fold matter, i.e. earth, air, fire -that by Kauțilya. He does mention Lokayata as a constitu- and water), it is negatively important inasmuch as it shows ent of Ānvīksikī (logical philosophy) but the word, lokāyatam, that this system had definitely become a 'lost philosophy'24 there may very well mean the art of argumentation or dispu- by the sixteenth century and even the best pundits of north tation, as in Pali.19 Moreover, the KA is anything but unor- India had little idea of its tenets. thodox; it accepts the Vedic lore as the subject of learning (vidyā) to be mastered by a prince.20 The Carvaka-s, on the Postscript other hand, openly defied the authority of the Vedas and No available source so far consulted or referred to by the scholars of ancient Indian philosophy mentions (as Abu'l

17 PC, Act 2 and SDS, 2, speak of both artha and kama as the two varga s accepted by the Lokäyatika-s whereas Nilakantha (commentary on the 21 See SDS, vv. 10-11, 14-15. Gītā, 16.11) and Sadānanda Kāśmīraka (ABS, 99) mention kāma alone as 22 Cārvāka the rāksasa (demon) in the Mbh is not projected as a mate- their puruşārtha. Warder (1971) does not consider this difference to be of rialist; he worshipped Brahma and earned a boon from him. He is burnt any importance. Referring to S-M's view (which is earlier) he says, "Perhaps alive by the Brahmins for the sin of reviling the latter (Santiparvan, this is from a different Lokayata source giving a slightly different view. Oth- 39.22. 48 in the crit. ed.). The name, Cärvaka, however, became a syn- erwise we must understand that wealth is necessary as a means to pleasure" onym for Lokäyata in course of time. It is first encountered in the works of (39). But this very difference in representation points to the fact that none Kamalasīla and Haribhadra although Sāntarakșita and Šankarācārya still of the opponents of the Cärvka/Lokäyata knew for certain what the latter used the word, lokāyata, only. It appears that the Lokayatika-s too called had actually said. They were simply trying to place the doctrine within the themselves Cārvaka-s (see TSP, II: 528). For the technical and popular framework of Brahminical thought regarding the end of life. It is hardly senses of materialism, see the OED, s.v. conceivable that such diehard atheists and deniers of after-life, etc. would 23 Śabda-kalpa-drumah, the famous Sanskrit lexicon compiled by the think in these terms. pundits of Radhakanta Deva (1822-52, Supplement, 1859), records two 18 See. for example, SDS, 2, Frauwallner (trans.), II: 216; Warder (1971), 39. different meanings of lokāyatam, viz. tarkabhedah (a kind of logic) and 19 See Ch. 16 above. cārvāka-sāstram (the doctrinal work of the Cārvāka). 20 KA, 1.2.8. Kautilya staunchly upholds the social and religious order 24 Randle used this term in relation to svabhāvavāda, etc .: "Some of (varna and aśrama) promulgated by the Brahminical orthodoxy and fosters these 'lost philosophies' (so to speak) were probably fathered on the all kinds of superstitions. See 1.19.31, 3.18.7, 3.20.22, 4.10.13, 5.2.5, 37-45, Lokāyata or Cārvāka school and some of them are possibly to be found in etc. See also Kangle, III: 150-60. the doctrines reviewed in [NS 4.1].", 16 n3.

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Fadl does) that the Cārvaka-s conceived of paradise and hell as the earthly conditions of freedom and bondage re- spectively. Such a reference, however, is found in a small, obscure and undated philosophical digest, Sarva-darsana- śiromaņi written by Śrī-Kāmci-Rāmānujācārya II (different from the author of Sri-bhäsya and other works, as the editor mentions on 19n). The passage runs as follows:

Dependence (on another's will) is bondage, self-depen- dence is freedom, passing away of the body is super-free- dom (paratantratā bandhah svatantratā muktih, dehanivrttiḥ parāmuktih, 2). XXIII What is Meant by nastika in the Nyayasutra Commentary?

Vātsyāyana in his commentary (Bhāsya) on the NS em- ploys the word, nāstika and its derivatives, nāstikatva, and nāstikya, thrice (on NS, 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 3.2.61, IIIb60 in Ru- ben). The meaning of nästika (lit. negativist) in the last two instances is conventional and readily comprehensible. But it is not so evident in the case of the first. I propose to deal with this problem in detail and consider the views of other explicators of the NS. Let us begin with NS, 1.1.2. In course of explaining what is meant by false knowledge (mithyājñāna), Vātsyāyana enu- merates how evils produced under the influence of attrac- tion and repulsion lead to moral lapses: "Driven by the evils and through the agency of the body one commits violence, theft and incest. Through words (one is led to) plotting against others, covetousness and nāstikya."1 Vātsyāyana adds that motivations like these are sinful, resulting in adharma, lack of merit. Apparently nāstikya is here associated with irreligiosity. The Manu very succinctly explains nāstika as 'a defiler of the Veda',

1 All references to the NS and its commentaries are to the texts edited ............ by Anantalal Thakur and the English translation by Mrinal Kanti Gango- padhyaya (with some minor modifications).

228 Studies on the Carvāka/Lokāyata What is Meant by nāstika? 229

nāstiko vedanindakah (2.11).2 Defiling the Veda is one of the ments") opens with the following statement, atra nāstika āha, worst sins in the eye of Brahminical orthodoxy. By including "To this (conclusion) the nāstika says". The sūtra purports to nāstikya in the enumeration of vices, Vātsyāyana records his un- refute the view that the body is produced due to connection flinching devotion to the Veda as well as his own orthodoxy. with the results of actions previously performed (pūrvakrta- It is, however, well known that the term, nāstika, is also phalānuvandhat tad utpattih, 3.2.60, IIIb59 in Ruben). Eleven employed by the Buddhists and Jains to designate those who, sūtra-s (3.2.62-72, IlIb 61-71 in Ruben) are devoted to this instead of denying the validity of the Veda, used to deny issue. Denial of anything beyond the four elements (viz., the existence of the other-world or after-life (paraloka) and earth, air, fire and water) is the basic stand of the Indian ma- hence the concept of virtue and vice. See, e.g., Vämana and terialists.4 There is a Carvaka aphorism which affirms that the Jayāditya on Ast, 4.4.60 and Hemacandra in his auto-com- body is merely a combination of four elements (tatsamudāye mentary on AC, 3.526.3 We may note in passing how differ- śarīrendriya-vişayasamjñāh).5 NS, 3.2.61 reiterates this view. ence in religious views leads to divergent interpretations of Nastika in this instance obviously refers to the materialist. the same word. Since the Buddhists and Jains had nothing to The Buddhists and the Jains also call the materialist nāstika do with the Veda and hence had no concern in upholding it or nāhiyavādī,6 because he does not believe in rebirth and as a sacred text, they had to put forward their own meaning the notion that the meritorious and sinful acts of previous of nästikya in order to brand the common enemy of all reli- birth would influence the course of future life. Denial of re- gions, namely, the materialists (grammar is not as objective a birth and hence of after-life (paraloka) is another character- science as some people believe it to be). istic position of the Indian materialists. A Cārvāka aphorism In whichever sense we take nastikya in the NSBh on NS, runs as follows: paralokino 'bhāvāt paralokābhāvah, "There is 1.1.2, there is no room for doubt regarding the moral disap- no other world because of the absence of any other-worldly proval that goes with the word. being" (i.e. the transmigrating self).7 Hence nastika in the The NSBh on NS, 3.2.61 (bhūtebhyo mūrtyupādānavat context of NS, 3.2.61 means the materialist. tadupādānam, "The production of the body is just like the The NSBh on NS, 1.1.2 and 3.2.61 may then very well be production of certain composite objects out of material ele- taken to refer to the same doctrine. So far so good. However, nästika in the NSBh on NS, 1.1.1 does not and cannot mean the same. Let us look at the con- 2 Not all commentators and translators of the Manu, however, take text. Speaking of the importance of corroborative evidence nāstika and vedanindaka as synonymous. G. Bühler, for instance, trans- (drstānta), Vātsyāyana writes: lated the verse (2.11) as follows: "Every twice-born man, who, relying on the Institutes of dialectics, treats with contempt those two sources (of It (drstānta) being there, inference and testimony are pos- the laws [Veda and Dharmasästra]) must be cast out by the virtuous, as sible; without it these are not possible. It is also the basis an atheist and scorner of the Vedas" (31). Dasgupta, on the other hand, proposes to take vedanindaka as 'the definition of nāstika'(3: 518-19). See also n3 below. 3 asti matirasya āstikah. nāsti matirasya nāstikah ... na ca matisattāmatre 4 There was also another (and presumably earlier) school of material- pratyaya işyate, kim tarhi paraloka'stīti yasya matirasti sa āstikah. tadviparīto ists in India, which spoke of a fifth element (ākāśa, space) in addition to nāstikaḥ. Kāśikā, 396; nāsti punyam pāpam iti matirasya nāstikah. AC auto- the four, as attested by the Mbh, Santiparvan, 267.4; SKS, 1.1.7-8, etc. See commentary, 334. Commenting on the word, nāstika, in Hemacandra's Ch. 2 above. The Carvaka-s seem to have appeared after the redaction of AYVD, v. 20, as explained by Mallişeņasūri, F.W. Thomas writes: "The neg- the NS. But the history of materialism in India goes back to a much ear- ative term nāstika sometimes denotes those who reject the Veda and its lier period, even earlier than the Buddha. Cf. Ajita Kesakambala's views dharma, in which case it includes the Buddhists: more generally it is those found in the SPhS (DN). See Ch. 3 above. Unfortunately no materialist who deny moral responsibility and future life: which seems to be the sense text of the earlier period has survived; the Cārvākasūtra (now lost) too is here, as the Buddhists and the Jains themselves, escape" (126 n3). available only in fragments. But there are enough fragments to evince the Not only the Buddhists and the Jains but some Brahminical writers continuity of the old materialist tradition. Hence I have referred to the too follow this meaning. Medhätithi (on Manu, 8.22) calls the nāstika-s Cārvāka aphorisms to represent the materialist view. paralokāpavādin-s, but his gloss on nāstika in Manu, 4.163, runs as follows: 5 Cārvāka fragment, I.3. For sources see Ch. 6 above. vedapramānākānām arthānām mithyātvādhyavasāyah, "the view that the 6 See Äryaśūra, JM, 23.57, 151; Haribhadra, SKa,164. Vedic doctrines are not true". 7 Cārvāka fragment, IV. 2. See Ch. 6.

230 Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata What is Meant by nastika? 231

of the application of nyāya (nyāya-pravrtti). By (showing) the contradiction of the drstanta the position of the oppo- of the anupalambhika, according to Tarkavāgīśa, is therefore

nent can be declared as refuted. By the substantiation of quite distinct from the Madhyamaka view. It may be called the drstanta, one's own position is well established. If the sarvvābhāvavāda (Elucidation of NS, 4.2.18).11 nāstika admits a corroborative instance, he has to surrender In the absence of any other opinion offered by the sub- his nastikatva. If he does not admit any, how can he silence commentators of the NS it is well nigh impossible to identify his opponents? (5) the anupalambhika for certain. However, one thing is evident. The context is epistemological and metaphysical, not ethical Who is this nästika? Surely he cannot be the irreligious per- or religious. son caring neither for the Vedas nor for after-life (as in the Vātsyāyana thus uses the term nāstika in two different, and NSBh on NS, 1.1.2). Nor can nāstika here mean the material- even contradictory, senses: (a) an absolute idealist who de ist philosopher (as in the NSBh on NS, 3.2.61). A materialist is nies the very existence of all things, and (b) a materialist who only too keen on perceptible evidence. A Cārvāka aphorism accepts nothing that is not perceptible and, therefore, he is asserts: pratyaksam (ekam) eva pramāņam, "Perception indeed considered irreligious. is the (only) means of right knowledge".8 And drstānta, as Vātsyāyana explains, "is an object of perception (pratyaksa- vişayo 'rthah), an object about which the notions (darsanam) of the layman (i.e. one who learns) as well as of the expert (i.e. one who expounds) are not in conflict (i.e. are unani- mous)." (5). (NSBh on NS 1.1.1. See also NS, 1.1.25). Why should then a materialist deny the existence of cor- roborative instance, as Vātsyāyana's nāstika is supposed to do? In this case, nästika then must mean someone else. Jha, how- ever, translated nästika and its derivatives in all the three in- stances uniformly as 'Atheism' and 'Atheist' (177, 365, 1404); Gangopadhyaya prefers 'sceptic', 'scepticism', 'heterodoxy' and 'Nāstika' (5, 9, 268 respectively). The sub-commentators of the NS do not bother to ex- plain what Vātsyāyana here means by nāstika. Phaņibhūșaņa Tarkavāgīsā in his comments on NS, 4.2.18,9 proposes to equate this nāstika to the anupalambhika, who is the exponent of the view that 'all is non-existent' (athedanim anupalambhikah sarvam nāstīti manyamāna āha). Vācaspati, however, identifies this ānupalambhika with the sūnyavādin. Tarkavāgīśa, on the other hand, proposes to take him as an asatkhyātivādin, which a Buddhist śūnyavādin is not.10 Sūnyavāda, as expounded by Nāgārjuna, refuses to commit whether the world is existent (sat) or non-existent (asat) or anything else. The doctrine

8 Cārvāka fragment, III.1. See Ch. 6. 9 Tarkavāgīśa, V:109. See also 1: 42 (on NS, 1.1.1). Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya offer a summarized version of Tarkavāgīśa's Elucidation (tippanī) in English 10 Tarkavāgīśa, IV:233 (on NS, 4.1.37) and V:212-14. In NP (32) " Tarkavāgīśa, V:108-09. He apparently has NS, 4.1.37 (IVa34 in Ruben)

Tarkavāgīśa calls the doctrine of the ānupalambhika 'sarvvanāstitvavāda', in mind: sarvamabhāvo bhāveşvitaretarābhāvasiddheh, "All is non-existent

the doctrine of the non-existence of all objects. See also nll below. (abhāva - asat), because, among the positive entities, the mutual absence of one in the other is proved."

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