1. Taittiriya Upanisad Bhashya Vartika of Suresvara - R Balasubramanian 1984

THE

TAITTIRĪYOPANIṢAD

BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

OF

SUREŚVARA

R.Balasubramanian

THE

TAITTIRĪYOPANIṢAD

BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

OF

SUREŚVARA

EDITED

WITH

INTRODUCTION,

ENGLISH

TRANSLATION,

ANNOTATION,

AND

INDICES

BY

R.

BALASUBRAMANIAN

M.A.,

Ph.D.,

D.Litt.

Director,

Radhakrishnan

Institute

for

Advanced

Study

in

Philosophy

RADHAKRISHNAN

INSTITUTE

FOR

ADVANCED

STUDY

IN

PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY

OF

MADRAS

1984

First published, 1974

Revised Edition, 1984

© University of Madras, 1984

PRICE 100/-

PRINTED IN INDIA

AT AVVAI ACHUKKOODAM, 17, P. V. KOIL STREET, MADRAS-600013

FOREWORD

Sures'vara, one of the chief disciples of Śaṅkara, is known as the Vārtika-kāra because of the Vārtika-s he wrote on the Master's commentaries on two of the Upaniṣad-s, the Brhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya. Vārtika is a commentarial work in verse whose aim, as defined by Rājas'ekhara in his Kāvya-mīmāṁsā, is to examine what is said, what is not said, and what is ill-said in the original text. So far as Sures'vara's Vārtika-s are concerned, it is obvious that they expound what the Master says in his commentaries and also supplement by stating explicitly what is left unsaid. But, in the view of Sures'vara, there could be nothing ill-said in Śaṅkara's writings. Sures'vara was such a devout and ardent disciple that there was no question of his being critical of the Master's expositions. Defining the scope of his Vārtika on the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya, Sures'vara says that his exposition, in brief, of the meaning of the bhāṣya is commenced "through words supported by reason for the purpose of removing the objections raised by pseudo-logicians." In an invocatory verse at the commencement of his Vārtika on the Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya, Sures'vara offers obeisance to the most worshipful Teacher whom he compares to the full moon, and says that by the rays of his glory the entire world is pervaded, that by his grace those that are affected by the misery of bondage find great relief in the final good, and that by his utterance which is like the thunderbolt the false arguments of the logicians are shattered. And, in this Vārtika, says Sures'vara, he but endeavours to explain the Master's bhāṣya, by his grace (ācārya-prasādatah). It is evident, therefore, that in his Vārtika-s Sures'vara cannot be critical

vi

of his Master's interpretations. He does offer, it is true,

alternative meanings for certain terms and phrases. But

this does not amount to 'examination of what is ill-said'

(durukta-cintā). Rājacchara's definition must have had as

its models Vārtika-s which are critical of the original texts

to which they relate. There is no need to take this definition

as absolute; and a Vārtika need not conform to all the

features mentioned in the definition. Mightly as Sures'vara's

intellect was, he feels as if nothing before the splendour of

his Master. His humility and submission to the Master's

will are complete. In the Naiṣkarmya-siddhi, which is an

independent work on Advaita, 'Sures'vara pays the highest

tribute to his Guru. He says that all excellences in their

superlative degree are centred in the Master and that he is

the destroyer of the knot of ignorance. Sures'vara goes on

to say that he has undertaken to write this manual at the

explicit command of the Master, and that, the weak crea-

ture that he is, he has nothing new to say. How can a fire-

fly illumine the sky, he observes, when it is already filled

with the rays of the noon-day sun?

In view of the important place occupied by Sures'vara

in post-Śaṅkara Advaita, the Department of Philosophy of

this University and the Centre for Advanced Study affiliated

with it have been engaged in a study of his works. The

introductory part of his Vārtika on the Brhadāraṇyakopani-

ṣad-bhāṣya is known as the Sambandha-vārtika because what

it seeks to determine is the precise relationship between the

ritual sections of the Veda-s and the Upaniṣad-s which cons-

titute Vedānta. Although it is the introductory part of the

larger Vārtika, it may well serve also as an independent

work on Advaita. The Sambandha-vārtika was published

in 1958 (republished in 1972): the text in Devanāgarī, with

an English translation, introduction, notes, and translite-

rated extracts from three unpublished commentaries. One

of the present projects of the Centre is to complete the

vii

publication of the entire Vārtika on the Brhadāraṇyakopaṇi-

ṣad-bhāṣya. The Naiṣkarmya-siddhi has been one of the

texts taught at this Centre for the post-graduate classes. A

translation of this text with annotations, etc., which is

under preparation will be published eventially. The

present publication is of the Vārtika on the Taittirīyopa-

niṣad-bhāṣya. Dr R. Balasubramanian, Reader in Philosophy, has translated this work into English and provided annotations, where necessary, following the gloss of Ānandagiri. In 1903, the late A. Mahadeva Sastri

published a work which bears the title, The Tattirīya Upaniṣad, with the commentaries of Śaṅkarācārya, Sureśvarā-cārya, and Sāyaṇa (Vidyāraṇya). This work, however,

does not contain a complete translation of Sureśvara's Vārtika. As the translator explains in his Preface, "it is

only where the Vārtika explains the bhāṣya or adds to it something new, that the Vārtika has been translated." Dr Balasubramanian's translation is of the whole text; its

value is enhanced because it accompanies the text in Devanāgarī. There is also a long introduction in which

Sureśvara's exposition of Advaita is clearly presented, as gathered from his works. It is hoped that the world of

scholarship will receive this publication as a useful addition to the literature in English on post-Śaṅkara Advaita.

T. M. P. Mahadevan

Director

Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy

University of Madras

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

Sures'vara's Taittirīyopanisad-bhāsya-vārtika is one of

the valuable basic works on Advaita. It is a verse com-

mentary on Śaṅkara's Bhāsya on the Taittirīyopanisad. It

consists of one thousand and twentyseven verses — one

hundred and eightysix verses in Chapter I, seven hundred

and fifty verses in Chapter II, and ninetyone verses in

Chapter III. For students of Advaita, this work is as

important as Śaṅkara's Bhāsya on the Taittirīyopanisad.

The text of the Taittirīyopanisad-bhāsya-vārtika that is

printed here in Part II is based on the Ānandās'rama

Sanskrit Series No. 13, which also contains Ānandagiri's

gloss (ṭīkā) thereon. The text of the Taittirīya-vārtika

edited by Śrī R. L. Somayaji with the Taittirīyopanisad,

Śaṅkara's Bhāsya, and his own commentary on the Vārtika

is the same as the one published in the Ānandās'rama

Series, excepting for the changes in the order of the verses

here and there. Though the readings adopted in the

Ānandās'rama edition have been mainly followed, I have

on the basis of Ānandagiri's gloss, preferred in certain

places other readings which have been given in the Ānand-

ās'rama edition itself or which are justified by the context.

The readings in this edition which differ from those adopt-

ed in the Ānandās'rama edition have been listed separate-

ly in Part III, Index II of this book.

Sures'vara's style is terse as well as difficult with many

ellipses with the result that the translation of his verses has

not always been an easy task. Ānandagiri's gloss, which

is both elaborate and lucid, has been closely followed in

construing the meaning of the verses. The English translation of the text is faithful to the original. In spite of Ānandagiri's gloss, there has been considerable difficulty in translating the verses; and in the absence of Ānandagiri's gloss, the understanding of Suresvara's position itself at every stage would have been difficult, and the work of translation would have been an unlucky venture. The annotation that follows the translation of each verse states the Taittirīya text which is taken up for explanation in the verse, brings out the central idea intended to be conveyed by it, considers the objection that may be raised against it, and defends the Advaita standpoint on the basis of other Scriptural texts and reasoning.

In Part I of the book which contains a critical Introduction, I have discussed the philosophy of Advaita as expounded by Suresvara drawing materials not only from the Taittirīya-vārtika, but also from the Sambandha-vārtika, the Brhadāranyaka-vārtika, the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, and the Mānasollāsa. Here also in presenting Suresvara's position I have taken full advantage of Ānandagiri's gloss on both the Sambandha-vārtika and the Brhadāranyaka-vārtika and of Jñānottama's brilliant and lucid commentary called Candrikā on the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi. I have shown that Suresvara's views are in perfect agreement with those of Saṅkara, though in a few places there are minor disagreements between them in textual interpretation, which have nothing to do with the central thesis of Advaita. The important objections of the critics in respect of (i) Brahman as nirguṇa, (ii) the nature of jīva, (iii) the ontological status of the world, (iv) the nature and function of avidyā, and (v) the validity of Scripture as the source of knowledge of the trans-empirical Brahman have been considered and met. I have cited appropriate passages from the writings of Suresvara in support of the position.

xi

I take this opportunity to express my thanks and deep sense of gratitude to Dr T. M. P. Mahadeven, Director of the Centre for his suggestions, help, and encouragement in completing this work and also for his valuable Foreword commending this book to the world of scholars.

Dr V. A. Devasenapathi, Professor of Philosophy in the Centre, read part of the Introduction, and his suggestions were helpful to me. I am grateful to him for his help and guidance in completing this work. I express my thanks and gratitude to Dr N. Veezhinathan, Lecturer in Sanskrit at the Centre, who not only suggested improvements and modifications in the translation of the text as well as in the Introduction, but also helped me a great deal in all aspects of the press work.

I will be failing in my duty if I do not record here the deep debt of gratitude that I owe to my teacher Brahmas'rī Bhāsyabhāvajña Varahoor Kalyāṇasundara Sastri, Professor of Vedānta at Vivekananda College, Madras. I had the good fortune of studying the Taittirīya-vārtika and other related texts on Advaita sitting at his feet for several years. To him I owe my knowledge of Advaita.

I am thankful to Mr M. Venugopal for the meticulous care and readiness with which he prepared the typescript for the press. I express my gratitude to the divinely gifted artist Śilpi who not only prepared a picture of the image of Śrī Sures'varācārya installed inside the matha of Kāma-koṭi-pīṭha at Kāñcī, but also gave me and my colleagues the pleasure of his company in our trip to Kāñcīpuram.

I am thankful to the University Grants Commission and the authorities of the University of Madras for the financial grant towards the publication of this book.

xii

As a reverential offering, I dedicate this book to His Holiness Śrī Candras'ekharendra Sarasvatī-pūjyapāda of Kāmakoti-piṭha, the Sage of Kāñcī, in whose name we reiceice, by whose light we see, and inder whose protection we thrive.

Madras

January 14, 1974

R. BALASUBRAMANIAN

PREFACE TO THE REVISED EDITION

Since the Taittirīyopanisad is the basic text on which Śankara wrote his Bhāsya and Suresvara his Vārtika, it has been included in this revised edition for the benefit of the readers.

I am grateful to my colleague, Dr V.K.S.N. Raghavan, for attending to all aspects of the press work.

I am thankful to the authorities of the University of Madras for providing funds for the publication of this revised edition of my book and to Messrs Avvai Achuk-koodam for the neat and timely printing of the book.

Madras

April 13, 1984

R. BALASUBRAMANIAN

xvi

4. The subject matter of karma-kāṇḍa (4)

213

5. The subject matter of the Vedānta (5)

213

6. The cause of bondage (6)

214

7. Ignorance is the cause of all action (7)

214

8. Brahman-knowledge puts an end to all activities (8)

215

9. The Mīmāṃsā view that karma is the means to liberation (9-10)

215

10. Its refutation (11-22)

216

11. The view that attainment of heaven through karma is liberation (23)

221

12. Its refutation (24)

221

13. Refutation of the view that action and meditation give rise to a permanent result (25-26)

222

14. If release is accomplished by action, it will not be eternal (27-32)

222

15. Brahman-knowledge alone destroys ignorance (33)

225

16. The scope of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (34)

225

17. The meaning of Upaniṣad (35-36)

226

18. Prayer to the various gods for the removal of the obstacles on the path of Brahman-knowledge (37-49)

226

19. The purpose of the science of phonetics (50)

231

20. Explanation of the science of phonetics (51-53)

231

21. Meditation on the Saṃhitā (54-67)

232

22. Japa and homa for obtaining intelligence and wealth (68-91)

237

23. Meditation on the Vyāhrtis (92-109)

245

24. The location of Brahman and the way to its realization (110-126)

251

25. Meditation on Brahman in the form of Pāṅkta (127-134)

256

26. Meditation on Pranava (135-142)

260

xvii

27. The usefulness of rites (143-150)

263

28. The utility of recitation (151-160)

265

29. Obligatory and occasional rites have to be performed prior to the origination of Brahman-knowledge (161-183)

269

30. The reason for the invocation at the commencement of the Brahmavallī (184-186)

276

CHAPTER II

1. The knowledge of the supreme Brahman which removes ignorance and its effects is the subject matter of this and the next chapter (1)

279

2. Salutation to the non-dual Brahman (2)

279

3. Meditation which is not opposed to rites cannot lead to liberation (3)

280

4. The combination of meditation and Scriptural rites cannot lead to liberation (4)

280

5. Brahman-knowledge alone can destroy the root cause of bondage (5)

280

6. Eligibility for Brahman-knowledge (6)

281

7. The attainment of non-attachment (7)

281

8. Liberation appears to be unattained due to ignorance (8)

282

9. Since action is not opposed to ignorance, only a person who has renounced all works is eligible for Brahman-knowledge (9)

282

10. Renunciation is the best of all the means to liberation (10-11)

282

11. The futility of karma in respect of liberation (12-17)

283

12. The means of knowing Brahman (18)

286

13. The significance of the means-end declaration by the text “The knower of Brahman attains the highest” (19-29)

286

xviii

14. The meaning of the text "The knower of Brahman attains the highest" (30-33)

291

15. The attainment of Brahman is not real, but only figurative (34-43)

292

16. The explanation of the text "Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite" (44-62)

297

17. The text "Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite" does not have its purport in a non-entity, or momentary existence, but only in Brahman (63-79)

305

18. The non-difference between Brahman and the Self (80-101)

313

19. The meaning of the text "He who knows Brahman as existing in the intellect" (102-109)

323

20. The meaning of "the supreme ether" (parame vyoman) (110-115)

327

21. The knower of Brahman enjoys all desires as Brahman (116-129)

330

22. Brahman is infinite in the real sense of the term (130-136)

336

23. The meaning of the text "From that Brahman, from this Self, was produced ether" (137-139)

340

24. Creation is not real (140-151)

342

25. The nature of the five elements (152-157)

351

26. The Sūtrātman and the Virāj must have preceded the creation of the world (158-162)

354

27. The origination of herbs, food, and man (163-175)

359

28. The nature of avidyā (176-180)

365

29. The birth of man and the stages of his development from the embryonic condition to old age (181-223)

368

30. Only the subtle and gross bodies are subject to modifications, but not the Self (224-229)

382

xix

31. Man alone is qualified for rites and knowledge (230-231)

383

32. Understanding the nature of the five sheaths is the means to the knowledge of the Self (232-241)

387

33. Explanation of the sheath of food through the imagery of head, two wings, etc. (242-256)

396

34. All beings are born from food (257)

405

35. Food is the Virāj (258)

405

36. Food is medicine for all (259-260)

405

37. Meditation on food as Brahman (261-263)

406

38. The meaning of anna (264)

407

39. The sheath of vital force (265-277)

408

40. Gods, human beings, and animals depend on prana (278-281)

416

41. Meditation on prāna as Brahman (282)

417

42. The sheath of vital force is the self of the sheath of food (283)

418

43. Brahman alone is the Self, in the real sense of the term, of all the sheaths (284-287)

419

44. The sheath of mind (288-302)

422

45. The meaning of yato vāco nivartante which occurs in the context of the sheath of mind (303-306)

431

46. The sheath of intellect (307-319)

433

47. The sheath of bliss (320-322)

440

48. The opponent's view that the sheath of bliss is the supreme Brahman (323-324)

441

49. Its refutation (325-343)

442

50. The limbs of the sheath of bliss (344-345)

454

51. Brahman is the tail, the support (346)

455

52. The gradations of happiness (347-350)

455

53. The question about the existence and non-existence of Brahman (351-359)

457

54. Who attains Brahman - the wise or the ignorant? (360-366)

460

55. Arguments for the existence of Brahman (367-434)

464

56. Only the wise man attains Brahman, but not the ignorant (435-442)

500

57. Brahman is adrśya, etc. (443-457)

505

58. An ignorant man does not attain Brahman (458-468)

513

59. The power of avidyā (469-470)

517

60. Brahman is the source of fear (471-482)

518

61. Inquiry into the gradations of happiness (483-526)

524

62. One and the same consciousness exists in the human person and in the sun (527-538)

545

63. Difference between Śaṅkara and Sureśvara in the textual interpretation (539-542)

551

64. Absence of desire and enjoyment of bliss (543)

553

65. Attainment of Brahman through giving up attachment (544-549)

554

66. Is the attainer different or non-different from the supreme Brahman? (550-594)

557

67. Brahman cannot be grasped by the mind and speech (595-604)

585

68. Brahman-realization through the cognition produced by Scripture (605-607)

589

69. No need of meditation or injunction or another pramāṇa for attaining the knowledge of Brahman (608)

591

70. Brahman cannot be known through pramāṇas like perception (609-614)

592

71. The futility of injunction with regard to the Self (615-616)

595

72. No scope for meditation with regard to the Self (617)

597

xxi

73. Brahman is not the content of the sentence-sense (618)

598

74. Brahman reveals both pramāṇa and apramāṇa (619)

598

75. The validity of the assertive Upaniṣadic texts independently of injunction (620-638)

599

76. The argument of the Niyogavādin (639-647)

609

77. Its refutation (648-686)

614

78. The validity of anuvādas (637-702)

636

79. Difference is not known through any pramāṇa (703-705)

644

80. The independent validity of the assertive Upaniṣadic texts and the futility of injunction in respect of the Self (706-720)

646

81. Bliss is not different from Brahman (721)

653

82. The knower of Brahman has no fear (722-731)

653

83. The knower of Brahman has no remorse (732-746)

657

84. The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman (747)

661

85. Why the Brahmavallī is spoken of as the Upaniṣad? (748-750)

661

CHAPTER III

1. The relation between the previous chapter and the present one (1-2)

663

2, The dialogue between Bhrgu and his father (3-11)

664

3. The definition of Brahman (12-13)

668

4. Bhrgu resorted to tapas for knowing Brahman (14-21)

669

5. Food, vital force, mind and intellect are not Brahman (22-29)

673

6. Bliss is Brahman (30)

677

7. Tapas as the means to Brahman-knowledge (31)

678

xxii

8. The purport of the dialogue between Bhrgu and Varuna (32-33)

678

9. Bhrgu's realization of the non-dual Brahman (34)

679

10. The non-verbal knowledge arising from the verbal testimony (35)

679

11. Like Bhrgu, anyone else can attain Brahman (36-37)

680

12. Meditation on food (38-39)

680

13. The vows enjoined on the contemplators (40-48)

682

16. Meditations on Brahman (49-70)

686

15. The meaning of saha brahmanā (71-73)

696

16. Everything is Brahman (74)

697

17. The sublation of the universe by Brahman-knowledge (75-76)

698

18. Description of a jīvanmukta (77-88)

699

19. Concluding invocation (89)

705

20. Conclusion (90-91)

706

Part III : Indices

Index I : Alphabetical index of verses of the Taittirīyopanisad-bhāsya-vārtika

707

Index II : List of readings followed in this text which differ from those given in the Ānandāśrama Edition

749

Index III : Index of words and topics in part I : Introduction

753

Bibliography

759

तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद्

शाङ्करभाष्यवृत्तिका

हरिः ॐँ । शं नो मित्रः वरुणः । शं नो भवत्वर्यमा ! शं न इन्द्र्रो बृहस्पतिः ! शं नो विष्णुरुरुक्रमः ॥ नमो ब्रह्मणे । नमस्ते वायो । त्वमेव प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मासि । त्वामेव प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्म वदिष्यामि । ऋतं वदिष्यामि । सत्यं वदिष्यामि । तन्मामवतु । तद्वक्तारमवतु । अवतु माम् । अवतु वक्तारम् ॥ ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥ इति प्रथमोऽनुवाकः ॥

श्रीगुरुभ्यो नमः । वर्णः स्वरः । मात्रा बलम् ! साम सन्तानः । इत्युक्तः शाङ्करभाष्यः !! इति द्वितीयोऽनुवाकः ॥

सह नौ यशः । सह नौ ब्रह्मवर्चनंसम् । अथातः संहिताया उपनिषदं व्याख्यास्यामः । पत्वस्वाधिकरणेषु । अधिलो कमधिज्योतिषमधिनिधनमध्यिप्रज-मध्यात्तमम् । ता महासंहिता इत्याचक्षते । अथाधिलो कम् । पृथिवी पूर्वरूपम् । चौरुत्तररूपम् । आकाशः सन्धिः । वायुः सन्धानम् । इत्यधिलोकम् । अग्निः पूर्वरूपम् । आदित्य उत्तररूपम् । आपः सन्धिः । वैद्युतः सन्धानम् । इत्यधिज्योतिषम् । आचार्यः पूर्वरूपम् । अन्तेवास्युरुत्तररूपम् । विद्या सन्धिः । प्रवचन सन्धानम् । इत्यधिविध्यम् । माता पूर्वरूपम् । पितोत्तररूपम् । प्रजा सन्धिः । प्रजननं सन्धानम् । इत्यधिप्रजम् । अथाध्यात्मम् । अधरा हनुः पूर्वरूपम् । उत्तरा हनुरुत्तररूपम् । वाक् सन्धिः । जिह्वा सन्धानम् । इत्यध्यात्मम् । इत्थं महासंहिता । य एवमेता महासंहिता व्याख्यात वेद । सन्धीयते प्रजा पशुभिः । ब्रह्मवर्चसेनान्नादायेन सुवर्ग्येण लोकेन ॥ इति तृतीयोऽनुवाकः ॥

यः छन्दसामृषभो विश्वरूपः । छन्दोभ्योऽध्योमृतात्सम्भूव । स मेन्द्रो मेधया स्पृणोतु । अमृतस्य देव धारणो भूयासम् । शरीरं मे विचर्षणम् । जिह्वा मे मधुमत्तमा । कर्णाभ्यांं भूरिविश्रुवम् । ब्रह्मणः कोशोऽसि मेधया पिहितः । आवहन्ती वितन्वाना । कुर्वाणा चीरमात्मनः । वासांसि मम गावश्र्च । अन्नपाने न मे सवँदा । ततो मे त्रिपमावृतम् । लोमशं पशुभिः सह

xxiv

स्वाहा। आमायन्तु ब्रह्मचारिणः स्वाहा। विमायन्तु ब्रह्मचारिणः स्वाहा। प्रमायन्तु ब्रह्मचारिणः स्वाहा। दमायन्तु ब्रह्मचारिणः स्वाहा। शमायन्तु ब्रह्मचारिणः स्वाहा। यशो जनेऽसानी स्वाहा। श्रेयान् वस्यसोऽसानी स्वाहा! तं त्वा भग प्रविषानि स्वाहा। स मा भग प्रविष स्वाहा। तस्मै सहरारावे। नि भगवान् त्वयि मूजे स्वाहा! यथापः प्रवता यन्ति ! यथा मासा अहर्जरम् । एवं मां ब्रह्मचारिणि ! धातरायन्तु सर्वतः स्वाहा । प्रतिचेशोऽसि । प्र मा पादि ! प्र मा पद्यस्व ॥ इति चतुर्थेऽनुवाकः॥

भूर्भुवः सुवरिति वा पताक्तिलसो व्याहृतयः! तासामु ह स्मैतां चतुर्थीम्। माहाचमस्य प्रवेदयते! मह इति । तद् ब्रह्म । स आत्मा । अज्ञान्यान्या देघताः । भूरिति वा अयं लोकः । भुव इत्यन्तरिक्षम्। सुवरित्यसौ लोकः । मह इत्यादिरियः । आदित्येने वाव सर्वे लोका महीयान्ते । भूरिति वा अग्निः । भुव इति वायुः । सुव- रित्यादित्यः । मह इति चन्द्रमाः । चन्द्रमसा वाव सर्वाणि ज्योतींषि महीयान्ते । भूरिति वा ऋचः । भुव इति सामानि । सुवरिति यजूंषि । मह इति ब्रह्म । ब्रह्मणा वाव सर्वे वेदा महीयान्ते । भूरिति है प्राणः । भुव इत्यपानः । सुवरिति व्यानः । मह इत्यनम् । अन्नेन वाव सर्वे प्राणा महीयान्ते । ता वा एताश्चतस्र- श्चतसृष्चतसो व्याहृतयः । ता यो वेद । स वेद ब्रह्म । सर्वेऽस्मै देवा बलिमावहन्ति ॥ इति पञ्चमोऽनुवाकः ॥

स य एवंदर्शी आकाशः । तस्मिन्नय पुरुषो मनोमयः । अमृतो हिरणमयः । अन्तरेṇ तालुके । य एष स्तन इवावलम्बते । सेन्द्रयोनिः । यत्रासौ केशान्तो विरवर्तते । विपर्यस्ता शीर्षकपाले ! भूरित्यग्रे प्रतितिष्ठति । भुव इति वायौ । सुवरित्यादित्ये । मह इति ब्रह्माणि । आत्मनि स्वाराज्यम् । आत्मनि मनसस्पतिम् । वाक्पतिं विश्वकुषपतिः । श्रोत्रपतिर्विज्ञानपतिः । एतत्ततो भवति । आकाशशरीरं ब्रह्म । सत्यात्मप्राणारामं मन आनन्दम् । शान्ति- समृद्धममृतम् । इति प्राचीनयोग्योपास्व ॥ इति षष्ठोऽनुवाकः ॥

पृथिव्यन्तरिक्षं द्यौर्दिशोऽवान्तरदिशः । अग्निर्वायुयुरादित्यश्चन्द्रमाः नक्षत्राणि । आप ओषधयो वनस्पतय आकाश आत्मा । इत्यधिभूतम् । अथाध्यात्मम् । प्राणो व्यानोदानः समानः । चक्षुः श्रोत्रं मनो वाक् त्वक् । चर्म मांसं स्नावास्थि मज्जा । एतदधिविधाय ऋषिरिरोचत । पादुकं वा इदँ सर्वम् । पादुतेनैव पादृणोतेति ॥ इति सप्तमोऽनुवाकः ॥

ओमिति ब्रह्म । ओमितीदँ सर्वम् । ओमित्येतदनुकृतिर्ह स्म या अप्योश्रावयेत्याश्रावयति । ओमिति सामानि गायन्ति ! ओं शोभति शस्त्राणि शँसन्ति । ओमित्यध्वर्युः प्रतिगरं प्रतिगृणाति । ओमिति ब्रह्मा प्रसौति । ओमित्यध्वरमनुजानाति । ओमिति ब्राह्मणः प्रवक्ष्यन्नाह ब्रह्मोपास्नवानोति । ब्रह्मैवोपास्नोति ॥ इति अष्टमोऽनुवाकः ॥

ऋतञ्च स्वाध्यायप्रवचने च । सत्यञ्च स्वाध्यायप्रवचने च । तपश्च स्वाध्यायप्रवचने च । दमश्च स्वाध्यायप्रवचने च । शमश्च स्वाध्यायप्रवचने च । अग्नयश्च स्वाध्यायप्रवचने च । अग्निहोत्रञ्च स्वाध्यायप्रवचने च । अतिथयश्च स्वाध्यायप्रवचने च । मानुषञ्च स्वाध्यायप्रवचने च । प्रजा च स्वाध्यायप्रवचने च । प्रजनश्च स्वाध्यायप्रवचने च । प्रजातिश्च स्वाध्यायप्रवचने च । सत्यमिति सत्यवचा राथीतरः । तप इति तपोनित्यः । पौत्रशिष्टिः । स्वाध्यायप्रवचने एवति नाको मौद्गल्यः । तद्धि तपस्तद्धि तपः ॥ इति नवमोऽनुवाकः ॥

अहं वृक्षस्य रेरिवा । कीर्तिः पृष्ठं गिरेरिव । ऊर्ध्वपवित्रो वाजिनीव स्वमृतमस्मि । द्रविणं सवर्चसम् । सुमेधा अमृतोक्षितः । इति त्रिशङ्को-वेदानुवचनम् ॥ इति दशमोऽनुवाकः ॥

वेदमनूच्याचार्योऽन्तेवासिनमनुशास्ति । सत्यं वद । धर्मं चर । स्वाध्यायान्मा प्रमदः । आचार्याय प्रियं धनमाहृत्य प्रजातन्तुं मा व्यवच्छेत्सीः । सत्यान्न प्रमदितव्यम् । धर्मान्न प्रमदितव्यम् । कुशलान्न प्रमदितव्यम् । भूत्यै न प्रमदितव्यम् । स्वाध्यायप्रवचनाभ्यां न प्रमदितव्यम् । देवपितृकार्याभ्यां न प्रमदितव्यम् । मातृदेवो भव । पितृदेवो भव । आचार्यदेवो भव । अतिथिदेवो भव । यान्यनवद्यानि कर्माणि । तानि सेवितव्यानि । नो इतराणि । यान्यस्माकं सुचरितानि । तानि त्वयोपास्यानि । नो इतराणि । ये के चास्मच्छ्रेयांसो ब्राह्मणाः । तेषां त्वयासनेन प्रश्वसितव्यम् । श्रद्धया देयम् । अश्रद्धया अदेयम् । श्रिया देयम् । ह्रिया देयम् । भिया देयम् । संविदा देयम् । अथ यदि ते कर्मविचिकित्सा वा वृत्तविचिकित्सा वा स्यात् । ये तत्र ब्राह्मणाः सम्मर्शिनः । युक्ता आयुक्ताः । अलुक्शा धर्मकामाः स्युः । यथा ते तत्र वर्तेरन् । तथा तत्र वर्तेथाः । अथाभ्याख्यातेषु । ये तत्र ब्राह्मणाः सम्मर्शिनः । युक्ता आयुक्ताः । अलुक्शा धर्मकामाः स्युः । यथा तेषु वर्तेरन् । तथा तेषु वर्तेथाः । एष आदेशः । एष उपदेशः । एषा वेदोपनिषत् ।

xxvi

प्तदनुशासनम्। एतदभुपासितव्यम् । एतदु चैतदुपास्यम् ॥ इति एकादशोड-

-नुवाकः ॥

शं नो मित्रः शं वरुणः। शं नो भवत्वर्यमा । शं न इन्द्रः बृहस्पति:। शं नो विष्णुरुरुक्रमः । अमो ब्रह्मणो । नमस्ते वायो। त्वमेव प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मासि। त्वामेव प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मावादिग्म् । ऋतमवादिषम् । सत्यमवादिषम् । तन्माम-

-वीत् । तद्वक्तारमावीत् । आवी᳞मम् । आवीद्वक्तारम् । ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥ इति द्वादशोडनुवाकः॥

ब्रह्मवल्ली

हरिः ॐ । सह नाववतु । सह नौ भुनक्तु । सह वीर्यं करवावहै । तेजस्विनावधीतमस्तु । मा विद्विषावहै । ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥

ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम् । तदेषाभ्युक्ता । कुर्वन् शान्तिमनन्तं ब्रह्म । यो वेद निहितं गुहायां परमे व्योमन् । सोऽश्नुते सर्वान् कामान् सह । ब्रह्मणा विपश्चितेति । तस्माद् एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः । आकाशाद्वायुः । वायोरग्निः । अग्नेरापः । अद्भ्यः पृथिवी । पृथिव्या ओषधयः । ओष-

-ध्योदन्नम् । अन्नात्पुरुषः । स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमयः । तस्येदमेव शिरः । अयं दक्षिणः पक्षः । आयमुत्तरः पक्षः । अयमात्मा । इदं पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा । तदप्येष श्लोको भवति ॥ इति प्रथमोडनुवाकः ॥

अन्नाद् हि प्रजा: प्रजायन्ते । या: काश्च पृथिवीं श्रिता: । अथो अन्नेनैव जीवन्ति । अथैनदपियन्त्यन्ततः । अन्नं हि भूतानां ज्येष्ठम् । तस्मात्सर्वौष-

-धमुच्यते । सर्वं व एतद्ब्रह्मोपासते । अन्नं हि भूतानां ज्येष्ठम् । तस्मात्सर्वौषधमुच्यते । अन्नाद्भूतानि जायन्ते । जातानि᳞येन वर्धन्ते । अद्भतेᳶत्ति च भूतानि । तस्मा दत्तं तदुच्यत इति । तस्माद् एतस्मा-

-दन्योऽन्तर आत्मा प्राणमयः । तेनैष पूर्णः । स वा एष पुरुषविध एव । तस्य पुरुषविधताम् । अन्वयं पुरुषविधः । तस्य प्राण एव शिरः । व्यानो दक्षिणः पक्षः । अपान उत्तरः पक्षः । आकाश आत्मा । पृथिवी पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा । तदप्येष श्लोको भवति ॥ इति द्वितीयोडनुवाकः ॥

प्राणं देवा अनु प्राणन्ति । मनुष्याः पशवश्च ये । प्राणो हि भूतानामयुः । तस्मात्सर्वायुषमुच्यते । सर्वमेव त आयुर्यन्ति । ये प्राणं ब्रह्मोपासते । प्राणो ह्य-

xxvii

हि भूतानामयुः ! तस्मात्सर्वायुयुष्मुच्यत इति । तस्यैष एव शरीर आत्मा । यः पूर्वस्य । तस्माद्वा एतस्माद्राणमयात् । अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोमयः । तेनैष पूर्णः । स वा एष पुरुषविधः पुम् । तस्य पुरुषविधताम् । अन्यं पुरुषविधः । तस्य यजुरेद शिरः । ऋग् दक्षिणः पक्षः । सामोत्तरः पक्षः । आदर्श आत्मा । अधरोऽधिरसः पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा । तदन्येष श्लोको भवति ॥ इति तृतीयोऽनुवाकः ॥

यतो वाचो निवर्त्तन्ते । अप्राप्य मनसा सह । आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् । न विभेति कदाचनैति । तस्यैष एव शरीर आत्मा । यः पूर्वस्य ! तस्माद्वा एतस्मान्मनोमयात् । अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः । तेनैष पूर्णः । स वा एष पुरुषविधः पुम् । तस्य पुरुषविधताम् । अन्यं पुरुषविधः । तस्य श्रद्धैव शिरः । ऋतम् दक्षिणः पक्षः । सत्यमुत्तरः पक्षः । योग आत्मा । महः पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा । तदन्येष श्लोको भवति ॥ इति चतुर्थोऽनुवाकः ॥

विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते । कर्माणि तनुतेऽपि च । विज्ञानं देवाः सर्वे । ब्रह्म ज्येष्ठमुपासते । विज्ञानं ब्रह्म चेद्वेद । तस्माच्चेन्न प्रमादति । शरीरेऽपाप्मनो हित्वा । सर्वान् कामान् समश्नुते इति । तस्यैष एव शरीर आत्मा । यः पूर्वस्य । तस्माद्वा एतस्माद्विज्ञानमयात् । अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमयः । तेनैष पूर्णः । स वा एष पुरुषविधः पुम् । तस्य पुरुषविधताम् । अन्यं पुरुषविधः । तस्य प्रियमेव शिरः । मोदो दक्षिणः पक्षः । प्रमोद उत्तरः पक्षः । आनन्द आत्मा । ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा । तदन्येष श्लोको भवति ॥ इति पञ्चमोऽनुवाकः ॥

असन्नेव स भवति । असद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत् । आस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद । सन्तमेनं ततो विदुरिति । अथातोऽनुप्रश्नाः । उताविद्वानमुं लोकं प्रेत्य । कश्चन गच्छती ३ । आहो विद्वानमुं लोकं प्रेत्य । कश्चित्समशृणुते उ । सोऽकामायते । बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति । स तपोऽतप्यत । इदँ सर्वमसृजत । यदिदं किं च । तत्सृष्ट्वा । तदेवानुप्राविशत् । तदनुप्रविश्य । सच् तत्यच्चाभवत् । निरुक्तं चानिरुक्तञ्च ।

xxviii

निलयनञ्चानिलयनं च । विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानञ्च । सत्यं चानृतं च सत्यमभवत् । यदिदं किञ्च । तत्त्वयमित्याचक्षते । तदप्येष श्लोको भवति ॥ इति षष्ठोऽनुवाकः ॥

असद् वा इदमग्र आसीत् । ततो वै सदजायत । तदात्मानँ स्वयमकुरुत ! तस्मात्तत्सुकृतमुच्यत इति ॥ यद्वै तत्सुकृतम् । रसो वै सः । रसँ ह्येवायँ लब्ध्वानन्दी भवति । को ह्येवान्यात्कः प्राण्यात् । यदेष आकाश आनन्दो न स्यात् । एष ह्येवानन्द्याथि । यद्ह्येवैष एतस्मिन्नष्टशये न तम्येऽनिह्हेऽनिलयनेऽभयं प्रतिष्ठाँ विन्दते । अथ सोऽभयं गतो भवति । यदा ह्येवैष एतस्मिन्नुदरमन्तरं कुरुते । अथ तस्य भयं भवति । तत्प्येव भयं विदुषोऽमन्वानस्य । तदप्येष श्लोको भवति ॥ इति सप्तमोऽनुवाकः ॥

भोषासाद्वादात्पवते । भोषोदेति सूर्यः । भोषासादेवन्द्रश्च । मृत्युर्धावति पञ्चम इति ॥ सैषानन्दस्य मीमाँसा भवति । युवा स्यात्साधुयुवाध्यायकः । आशिष्ठो दृढिष्ठो बलिष्ठः । तस्येयँ पृथिवी सर्वा वित्तस्य पूर्णा स्यात् । स एको मानुष आनन्दः । ते ये शतं मानुषा आनन्दाः । स एको मनुष्यगन्धर्वाणामानन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य । ते ये शतं मनुष्यगन्धर्वाणामानन्दाः । स एको देवगन्धर्वाणामानन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य । ते ये शतं देवगन्धर्वाणामानन्दाः । स एकः पितॄणाँ चिरलोकलोकानामानन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य । ते ये शतं पितॄणाँ चिरलोकलोकानामानन्दः । स एक आजानजानां देवानामानन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य । ते ये शतमाजानजानां देवानामानन्दाः । स एकः कर्मदेवानाँ देवानामानन्दः । ये कर्मणा देवानपियन्ति । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य । ते ये शतं कर्मदेवानाँ देवानामानन्दाः । स एको देवानामानन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य । ते ये शतं देवानामानन्दाः । स एक इन्द्रस्यानन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य । ते ये शत इन्द्रस्यानन्दाः । स एको बृहस्पतेरानन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य । ते ये शतं बृहस्पतेरानन्दाः । स एकः प्रजापतेरानन्दः । स एको ब्रह्मण आनन्दः । श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य । स यश्वायँ पुरुषे । यश्चासावादित्ये । स एकः ।

xxix

स य एवंवित् । अस्माल्लोकात् प्रेत्य । एतमन्नमयमात्मानमुपसङ्क्रामति । एतं प्राणमयमात्मानमुपसङ्क्रामति । एतं मनोमयमात्मानमुपसङ्क्रामति । एतं विज्ञानमयमात्मानमुपसङ्क्रामति । एतमानन्दमयमात्मानमुपसङ्क्रामति । तदप्येष श्लोको भवति ॥ इति अष्टमोऽनुवाकः ॥

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते । अप्राप्य मनसा सह । आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् । न विभेति कुतश्चनेति ॥ एतं ह वाव न तपति । किमहं साधु नाकरवम् । किमहं पापमकरवमिति । स य एवं विद्वानात्मानं स्पृणुते । उभे ह्येवैष एते आत्मानं स्पृणुते । य एवं वेद । इत्युपनिषत् ॥ इति नवमोऽनुवाकः ॥

भृगुवल्ली

ॐ सह नाववतु । सह नौ भुनक्तु । सह वीर्यं करवावहै । तेजस्वि नावधीतमस्तु । मा विद्विषावहै ॥ ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥

भृगुर्वै वारुणिः । वरुणं पितरमुपससार । अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति । तस्मा एतत् प्रोवाच । अन्नं प्राणं चक्षुः श्रोत्रं मनो वाचमिति । तं होवाच । यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । येन जातानि जीवन्ति । यत् प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति । तद्विजिज्ञासस्व । तद् ब्रह्मेति । स तपोऽतप्यत । स तपस्तप्त्वा ॥ इति प्रथमोऽनुवाकः ॥

अन्नं ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात् । अन्नाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । अन्नेन जातानि जीवन्ति । अन्नं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति । तद्विज्ञाय । पुनरेव वरुणं पितरमुपससार । अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति । तं होवाच । तपसा ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व । तपो ब्रह्मेति । स तपोऽतप्यत । स तपस्तप्त्वा ॥ इति द्वितीयोऽनुवाकः ॥

प्राणो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात् । प्राणाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । प्राणेन जातानि जीवन्ति । प्राणं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्तीति । तद्विज्ञाय । पुनरेव वरुणं पितरमुपससार । अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति । तं होवाच । तपसा ब्रह्म

XXX

विजिज्ञासस्व इ तपो ब्रह्मेति । स तपोडतप्यत । स तपस्तप्त्वा ॥ इति तृतीयोऽनुवाकः ॥

मनो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात् । मनसो ह्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । मनसा जातानि जीवन्ति । मनः प्रयत्न्यभिसंविशन्तीति । तद्विजिज्ञाय । पुनरेव वरुणं पितरमुपससार । अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति । तं होवाच । तपसा ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व । तपो ब्रह्मेति । स तपोडतप्यत । स तपस्तप्त्वा ॥ इति चतुर्थोऽनुवाकः ॥

विज्ञानं ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात् । विज्ञानाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । विज्ञानेन जातानि जीवन्ति । विज्ञानं प्रयत्न्यभिसंविशन्तीति । तद्विजिज्ञाय । पुनरेव वरुणं पितरमुपससार । अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति । तं होवाच । तपसा ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व । तपो ब्रह्मेति । स तपोडतप्यत । स तपस्तप्त्वा ॥ इति पञ्चमोऽनुवाकः ॥

आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात् । आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति । आनन्दं प्रयत्न्यभिसंविशन्तीति । सैषा भार्गवी विद्या । परमे व्योमन्प्रतिष्ठिता । स य एवं वेद प्रतितिष्ठति । अन्रवान्नादो भवति । महान् भवति प्रजया पशुभिर्ब्रह्मवर्चसेन । महान् कीर्त्या ॥ इति षष्ठोऽनुवाकः ॥

अन्नं न निन्य्यात् । तद् व्रतम् । प्राणो वा अन्नम् । शरीरमन्नादम् । प्राणे शरीरं प्रतिष्ठितम् । शरीरे प्राणः प्रतिष्ठितः । तदेतदन्नन्ने प्रतिष्ठितम् । स य एतदन्नन्ने प्रतिष्ठितं वेद प्रतितिष्ठति । अन्नवानन्नादो भवति । महान् भवति प्रजया पशुभिर्ब्रह्मवर्चसेन । महान् कीर्त्या ॥ इति सप्तमोऽनुवाकः ॥

अन्नं न परिचक्षीत । तद् व्रतम् । आपो वा अन्नम् । ज्योतिरन्नादम् । अप्सु ज्योति: प्रतिष्ठितम् । ज्योतिष्यप: प्रतिष्ठिता: । तदेतदन्नन्नन्ने प्रतिष्ठितम् । स य एतदन्नन्नन्ने प्रतिष्ठितं वेद प्रतितिष्ठति । अन्नवानन्नादो भवति ।

xxxi

महान् भवति प्रजया पशुभिर्ब्रह्मवर्चसेन । महान् कीर्त्या ॥ इति अष्टमोऽनु-

वाकः ॥

अन्नं रडु कुर्तीत । तद् व्रतम् । पृथिवी वा अन्नम् । आकाशोऽन्नादः । पृथिव्यामाकाशः प्रतिष्ठितः । आकाशे पृथिवो प्रतिष्ठिता । तदेतदन्नमनने प्रतिष्ठितम् । स य एतदन्नमनने प्रतिष्ठितं वेद प्रतिष्ठिति । अन्नवानन्नादो भवति । महान् भवति प्रजया पशुभिर्ब्रह्मवर्चसेन । महान् कीर्त्या ॥ इति नवमोऽनुवाकः ॥

न कञ्चन वसतौ प्रत्याचक्षीत । तद् ऋतम् । तस्माद् यया कया च विधया बहन्नं प्राज्ञुयात् । अराडयस्मा अन्नमित्याचक्षते । एतद् वै मुखतो-

डन्नं राधम् । मुखतोऽस्मा अन्नं राध्यते । पतद् वै मध्यतोऽन्नं राधम् । मध्यतोऽस्मा अन्नं राध्यते । एतद् वा अन्ततोऽन्नं राधम् । अन्ततोऽस्मा अन्नं राध्यते ॥ य एतं वेद । क्षेम इति वाचि । योगक्षेम इति प्राणापानयोः । कर्मेति हस्तयोः । गतिरिति पादयोः । विमुक्तिरिति पायौ । इति मानुषीः समाख्या ॥

अथ दैवीः । ऋतिरिति वृष्टौ । बलमिति विद्युत् । यश इति पशुषु । ज्योतिरिति नक्षत्रेषु । प्रजातिरमृतम् आनन्द इत्युपस्थे ॥ सर्वमित्या-

कारे ॥ तत्प्रतिष्ठेत्युपासीत । प्रतिष्ठावान् भवति । तन्मह इत्युपासीत । महान् भवति । तन्मन इत्युपासीत । मानवान् भवति । तन्नम इत्युपासीत । नम्यन्ते-

डस्मै कामाः । तद् ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत । ब्रह्मवान् भवति । तद् ब्रह्मणः परिमर इत्युपासीत । पर्येणं ध्रियते द्विषन््तः स्पत्नाः । परि येड्रिया आर्तघ्याः ॥

स यश्वायं पुरुषे । यश्वासावादित्ये । स एकः । स य एतं वेद । अस्माल्लोकात् प्रेत्य । एतमन्नमयमात्मानमुपसङ्क्रम्य । एतं प्राणमयमात्मानमुपसङ्क्रम्य । एतं मनोमयमात्मानमुपसङ्क्रम्य । एतं विज्ञानमयमात्मानमुपसङ्क्रम्य । एतमानन्दमयमात्मानमुपसङ्क्रम्य । इमाँल्लोकान् कामान् कामरूप्यनुसञ्चरन् ।

एतत् साम गायत्रास्ते । हा अ्रवु हा अ्रवु हा अ्रवु । अहमन्नादोरडहन्नादोऽहन्नादः । अहं श्लोककृदहं श्लोककृदहं श्लोककृत् । अहमादोऽडहमादोऽह-

xxxii

श्लोककृत्। अहहमस्मि प्रथमजा ऋतऽस्य । पूवर्ं देवेभ्यो अमृतस्य नाऽऋभाय । यो मा ददाति स इदेव मा ऽआवा: । अहहमन्नमन्नमदन्तमा ऽअदि i अहं

विश्वं भवनमध्यमभवा ऽअम् । सुवर्नं ज्योतीः। य पचं वेद । इत्यपनिषत्॥ इति

दर्शनोऽनुवाकः ॥

ॐ सह नाववतु । सह नौ भुनक्तु । सह वीर्यं करवावहै । तेजस्वि

नावधीतमस्तु । मा विद्विषावहै ॥ ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः !!

CORRELATION OF CONTENTS BETWEEN

THE TAITTIRĪYAVĀRTIKA AND

THE TAITTIRĪYOPANIṢAD

Chapter I: Śīkṣāvallī

Taittirīyavartika

Taittirīyopanisad

Verses 1-36

(preliminary

discussion)

Verses 37-49 ... Anuvāka I

Verses 50-53 ... Anuvāka II

Verses 54-67 ... Anuvāka III

Verses 68-91 ... Anuvāka IV

Verses 92-109 ... Anuvāka V

Verses 110-126 ... Anuvāka VI

Verses 127-134 ... Anuvāka VII

Verses 135-142 ... Anuvāka VIII

Verses 143-150 ... Anuvāka IX

Verses 151-160 ... Anuvāka X

Verses 161-183 ... Anuvāka XI

Verses 184-186 ... Anuvāka XII

Chapter II: Brahmavallī

Verses 1-18

(preliminary

discussion)

Verses 19-256 ... Anuvāka I

Verses 257-277 ... Anuvāka II

Verses 278-302 ... Anuvāka III

Verses 303-312 ... Anuvāka IV

xxxiv

Verses 313-351 ... Anuvāka V

Verses 352-414 ... Anuvāka VI

Verses 415-479 ... Anuvāka VII

Verses 480-594 ... Anuvāka VIII

Verses 595-750 ... Anuvāka IX

Chapter III: Bhṛguvallī

Verses 1-21 ... Anuvāka I

Verses 22-29 ... Anuvākas II-V

Verses 30-39 ... Anuvāka VI

Verses 40-41 ... Anuvāka VII

Verse 42 ... Anuvākas VIII-IX

Verses 43-88 ... Anuvāka X

Verses 89-91

(Conclusion)

Part

I

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

I

SUREŚVARA AND HIS WORKS

Sures´varācārya's rank in the history of Advaita is

not to be determined by comparing him with others who

came after him. Like Vyāsa and Śankara, Sures´vara

stands apart in unique and solitary eminence. There

is none like him. In the prefatory remarks to the Vedānta-

kalpalatikā Madhusūdanasarasvatī says that he is going to

set forth in measured words the true scnse indicated by

Srī Vyāsa, Śankara and Sures´vara, after refuting the

views of Jaimini, Patañjali, Gautama, Kanāda, Kapila,

and others.' The fact that Madhusūdanasarasvatī places

Sures´vara in the galaxy of Vyāsa and Śankara is, indeed,

a just and splendid tribute to Sures´vara whose authority

is invoked by many an Advaitin.

Sures´vara who was one of the direct disciples of

Śankara is important in the school of Advaita for two

reasons. Before he became a sannyāsin and a devoted dis-

ciple of Śankara, he was a householder and a doughty

champion of Mīmāṁsā. As a follower of Śankara his

spirited defence of Advaita and his trenchant criticism

of Mīmāṁsā as well as other schools assume a decisive

i. Vedāntakalpalatikā, ed., by R. D. Karmarkar (Bhandarkar

Oriental Research Institute, Post-graduate and Research Department

Series, No. 3, Poona, 1962), p. 2, verse 4:

nirdhūya jaimini-patañjali-gautamoktiḥ

kānāda-kāpila-śivādimatāni cāham

śrīvyāsa-śankara-sures´vara-sūcitārtha-

śuddhim vyanajmi viśadaṁ mitabhāṣitena.

2

INTRODUCTION

importance inasmuch as they come from one who was

previously a Mīmāṁsaka. He did not go over to Advaita

in a fit of emotion. Before he became a sannyāsin-disciple

of Śaṅkara, he was known as Maṇḍanamiśra. As a hard-

baked Mīmāṁsaka, he tried to defend the Mīmāṁsā inter-

pretation of the Veda in a prolonged debate with Śaṅkara,

which lasted for several days. At last, he admitted defeat,

accepted without any reservation the standpoint of

Advaita, and requested Śaṅkara to initiate him into sann-

yāsa. His donning ochre robes meant a great deal more than

mere change in external appearance. It was the external

symbol of fire-baptism which made him emerge as a

spirituaily regenerate person. It brought a new awakening

in him. His defence of Advaita and his criticism of

Mīmāṁsā and other schools arise from his new enlighten-

ment. Secondly, Suresvara is respecfed and honoured by

the later Advaitins as one of the foremost teachers of

Advaita. In the school of Advaita he is popularly known

as the Vārtikakāra, the author of the Vārtikā, in the same

way as Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is known as the Vārtikakāra in

the Pūrvamīmāṁsā school. For example, whenever

Appayya Dīkṣitā in his Siddhāntalesasaṅgraha cites some

passage or view from the writings of Suresvara, he says

that it has been stated in the Vārtika, or that it is the view

of ihe Vārtikakāra. Nowhere does he say that it has been

stated by, or that it is the view of, Suresvara.9 This is a

clear indication of the fact that Suresvara is well-known

in the Advaita school as the Vārtikakāra, and that his

Vārtikas are considered to be as authoritative as the

writings of Śaṅkara. His Vārtikas are great because they

constitute great philosophical literature in Advaita, com-

posed by a person of great character and force of

intellect.

2. There are as many as eight references to the Vārtika in the

Siddhāntalesasaṅgraha.

SUREŚVARA AND HIS WORKS

3

According to tradition, Sures'vara was known in his

pūrvāśrama as Maṇḍana and also as Vis'varūpa before he

became a sannyāsin-disciple of Śaṅkara. In the course of

his tours of victory (digvijaya), Śaṅkara met Kumārila

Bhaṭṭa, the celebrated teacher of Mīmāṁsā, who was

about to burn himself for expiating his sin of betraying

his teachers. Śaṅkara vainly tried to dissuade him from

self-destruction. Kumārila directed Śaṅkara to meet and

hold discussions with Maṇḍanamiśra, a great Mīmāṁsaka

and Kumāriia's sister's husband.

The earliest life history of Śaṅkara that is available

to us now is Anantānandagiri's Śaṅkaravijaya. In Canto

55 of this work, Kumārila, so the narration goes, tells

Śaṅkara of Maṇḍana as his sister's husband and advises

him to hold discussions with Maṇḍana.3 This work men-

tions Vidyālaya near Hastināpura locally known as Bijila-

bindu as the place where Maṇḍana lived.4 It is also stated

that Maṇḍana, being convinced of the greatness of Śaṅ-

kara, becomes a sannyāsin.5 He then comes to be known

as Sures'vara.

Vyāsācala's Śaṅkaravijaya does not identify Vis'va-

rūpa with Maṇḍana. Vyāsācala narrates the meeting of

Śaṅkara with one Maṇḍana, who is a householder, on his

way to meet Vis'varūpa on the advice of Kumārila. After

blessing this Maṇḍana, Śaṅkara leaves him and goes to

the house of Vis'varūpa.6

3. Śrī Śaṅkaravijaya of Anantānandagiri, ed., N. Veezhinathan

(University of Madras, 1971), p. 174.

4. Ibid., p. 174:

"...hastināpurādagneya bhāgasthalami vidyālayamiti prasiddhaṁ [taddeśa

vāsinastu bijilabinduriti vadanti]

5. Ibid., p. 177.

6. Vyāsācala, Śaṅkaravijaya, ed., T. Chandrasekharan (Madras

Government Oriental Manuscripts Series, No. 24, 1954), pp. 57-58.

4

INTRODUCTION

Cidvilāsa in his Saṅkaravijayaviḷāsa identifies Maṇḍana with Suresvara. According to Cidvilāsa, Maṇḍana is the name of the same person in his earlier āśrama who on becoming a saṃnyāsin assumed the name of Suresvara.7

In the Guruvaṃśukāvya it is narrated that Saṅkara was directed by Kumārila to meet Viśvarūpa who, after becoming a saṃnyāsin, was known as Suresvara.8

One more work to which reference must be made is the Saṅkaradigvijaya attributed to Vidyāraṇya. In this work the name Viśvarūpa occurs in many places as the name of Maṇḍana. Vidyāraṇya narrates the meeting of Śaṅkara and Kumārila. The latter instructs Śaṅkara to defeat Maṇḍana whom he describes as a reputed householder (mahāgrhī), as one who believes in the path of karma (karmatathah), as one who is opposed to the path of renunciation, and as a great scholar in the different branches of learning. This is stated in verses (111) to (117) of the seventh Canto of this work.9 Vidyāraṇya also tells us that, according to the promise made to Śaṅkara, Maṇḍana became a saṃnyāsin when he was defeated, and that thereafter he came to be known as Suresvara. This is described in verses (74) and (75) and verses (104) to (106) of the tenth Canto of this work.10

It is quite evident from what has been stated above that, according to the tradition known to Vidyāraṇya and others, Maṇḍana is identical with Viśvarūpa and Suresvara, and that, when defeated by Śaṅkara, he renounced the world, was initiated into saṃnyāsāśrama, and became a saṃnyāsin.

7. Vide Introduction to the Slokavārtika (Madras University Sanskrit Series, No. 13), p. x.

8. Guruvamśakāvya (Sri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam), Canto II, 48-50.

9. Saṅkaradigvijaya (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series), pp. 292-293.

10. Ibid., pp. 399-400 and p. 410.

SUREŚVARA AND HIS WORKS

5

devoted disciple of Śaṅkara under the new name of

Sures'vara. Sures'vara's association with the Kāmakoṭi-piṭha

at Kāñcī is stated in the Śaṅkaravijaya of Anantānandagiri.

According to the narration given by Anantānandagiri,

after consecrating the Śrīcakra in the temple of Kāmākṣī,

Śaṅkara cstablished the Kāmakoṭi-piṭha and directed Sures'-

vara to be in charge of it by worshipping ihe Yoga-liṅga

there.11

It is difficult to fix the exact date of Sures'vara. Rely-

ing on the tradition as embodied in the works which give

an account of the life history of Śaṅkara, one can defi-

nitely say that Sures'vara was a contemporary of Kumārila

and Śaṅkara. According to tradition as stațed earlier,

Sures'vara was known while he was a householder as

Vis'varūpa and also as Maṇdana, and that following the

defeat he suffered in the debate with Śaṅkara he became

the sannȳāsin-disciple of Śaṅkara. Though M. Hiriyanna

and S. Kuppuswami Sastri challenge the view that

Maṇdana, the author of the Brahmasiddhi, is identical with

Sures'vara, the author of the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi and the

Vārtika, they do not call in question the traditional account

that Sures'vara is identical with Vis'varūpa and that Vis'-

varūpa came to be known as Sures'vara, when he became

a sannȳāsin-disciple of Śaṅkara.12 It may be suggested

that by fixing the date of Śaṅkara one may be in a posi-

tion to determine the date of Sures'vara. Though scho-

lars have endeavoured in various ways to determine the

date of Śaṅkara, there is still no certainty about his date.

The traditional school, relying on the records of the

11. Śrī Śaṅkaravijaya of Anantānandagiri, pp. 188-189.

12. M. Hiriyanna, "Sureśvara and Maṇḍanamiśra", Journal of

the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, April 1923 and

January 1924; also see S. Kuppuswami Sastri's Introduction to the

Brahmasiddhi (Madras Government Oriental Manuscript Series, No. 4,

1937).

6

INTRODUCTION

maṭhas established by Śaṅkara, assigns him to the fifth

century B.C. The date of Śaṅkara, which has found

favour with the modern school led by the Western ori-

entalists is 788-820 A.D. But there is no finality about

the latter date. While T. R. Chintamani fixes the date

of Śaṅkara as 655-687 A.D.,13 Kuppuswami Sastri argues

on the basis of the data provided by Chintamani that it

would be reasonable to fix the date as 632-564 A.D.14

Neither of these dates can be accepted as final consid-

ering the fact that there are difficulties even in determining

the century in which Śaṅkara might have lived. So it

will not be possible to fix the date of Suresvara by rely-

ing upon the date of Śaṅkara. However, we may fix the

upper and the lower limits of the period when Suresvara

should have flourished.

There is a commentary called the Bālakrīḍā on the

Yājñavalkya-smṛti, and this commentary is ascribed to

Viśvarūpa.15 The latter quotes a verse from Kumārila

Bhaṭṭa's Ślokavārtika in the introductory portion of this

work. Tradition has it that Suresvara was known as

Viśvarūpa in his pūrvāśrama, and that he was also a dis-

ciple of Kumārila. If so, Suresvara cannot be earlier

than Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Vimuktātman quotes in his Iṣṭa-

siddhi from the works of Suresvara.16 There is evidence

to show that Sarvajñātman, the author of the Samkṣepa-

śārīraka, is acquainted with Vimuktātman's Iṣṭasiddhi.17

13. See his article “The Date of Srī Saṅkarācārya and Some of

His Predecessors’’, Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, Volume III,

1929, pp. 39-56.

14. See Introduction to the Brahmasiddhi.

15. See Introduction to the Ślokavārtika, p. xvi.

16. See the Iṣṭasiddhi, ed., M. Hiriyanna (Oriental Institute,

Baroda, 1933), p. 355 and p. 375.

17. The Samkṣepaśārīraka of Sarvajñātman, ed., N. Veezhinathan

(Madras University Philosophical Series, No. 18, 1972), IV. 14, p. 524.

SURŠEVARĀ AND HIS WORKS

7

Sarvajñātman is equally acquainted with Suresvara's Naiṣkarmyasiddhi and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika.18 Madhusūdanasarasvatī and Rāmatīrtha in their commentaries on the Saṁkṣepasārīraka identify Sarvajñātman's preceptor as Sureśvara.19 There is a view that Sarvajñātman adorned the Kāmakōṭi-pīṭha with Suresvara as his protectur.20 If so, Sarvajñātman was probably a younger contemporary of Suresvara (as well as Vimuktātman?). Whatever be the position of Sarvajñātman, it is evident from these internal evidences that Suresvara could not have lived after Vimuktātman and Sarvajñātman. So we may safely assign Suresvara to the period between Kumārila Bhatta as the upper limit, and Vimuktātman and Sarvajñātman as the lower limit.

The Naiṣkarmyasiddhi is one of the valuable works of Suresvara. There are four works of great importance in what is known as the siddhi-literature of Advaita Vedānta. Suresvara's Naiṣkarmyasiddhi is one of them, the other three being the Brahmasiddhi by Maṇḍana,21 the Iṣṭasiddhi

18. Ibid., I, 170, p. 81; I, 190, p. 92; III, 346, p. 510.

19. Ibid., see Introduction, p. 3.

Commenting on the scope of the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi as a compendium of Advaita philosophy, Hiriyanna observes that Sureśvara's Naiṣkarmya-siddhi may be compared to two other works — one by his teacher and the other by his pupil — the Upadeśasāhasrī of Saṅkara and the Saṁkṣepasārīraka of Sarvajñātman. See Hiriyanna's Introduction to the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, No. XXXVIII, 1925), p. xxx.

20. Śrī Jagadgururatnamālāstava (Śrī Kāmakōṭi Kōsasthānam, Francis Joseph Street, Madras, 1962), p. 47.

21. According to Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Maṇḍana-miśra, the author of the Brahmasiddhi, is different from Maṇḍana alias Viśvarupa who, after becoming a sannyāsin-disciple of Saṅkara, was called Sureśvara. See my article "Identity of Maṇdanamiśra", Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 82, October-December 1962, pp. 522-532, for my critical review of the identity theory accepted by tradition, and the arguments against it put forward by Kuppuswami Sastri.

8

INTRODUCTION

by Vimuktātman, and the Advaitasiddhi by Madhusūdana-

sarasvatī. There is a traditional story connected with

the writing of the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi. It is said that Śrī

Śaṅkara wanted Sureśvara to write a Vārtika on his

commentary on the Brahmasūtra. This was not to the

liking of the other disciples who thought that Sureśvara

might not have been sincere in his conversion, and that

if he was entrusted with the writing of a Vārtika on the

Sūtra-bhāṣya of Śaṅkara he might misinterpret it. Śaṅkara,

therefore, directed Sureśvara to write an independent

work on Advaita. Accordingly, Sureśvara wrote the

Naiṣkarmyasiddhi as an independent work. He says in this

work that he expounds the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman

which is contained in the heart of the Vedānta and which

puts an end to the life of saṃsāra in obedience to his

preceptor's commandment (gurvanuśikṣayā), though it has

been explained by others also.22 The Naiṣkarmyasiddhi,

written partly in prose and partly in verse, consists of

four chapters. It is not a commentary on any other work,

but is an independent treatise on Advaita. It is a com-

pendium of the entire philosophy of the Vedānta (aśeṣa-

vedānta-sāra-saṅgraha-prakaraṇam), for it deals with all the

essential features of Advaita Vedānta.23

The Mānasollāsa, which is another work of Sureśvara,

is a running metrical explanation of Śaṅkara's Dakṣiṇā-

mūrti-stotra. One of the striking features of this small

work is the reference it contains, in the course of the ex-

planation of the second stanza of the hymn, to the

Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Paurāṇika, and Śaivāgama categories,

the theories of causality, and the sources of knowledge

accepted by the different systems, for the purpose of vin-

dicating the Vedānta doctrine of māyā by refuting all of

22. NS, I, 3.

23. NS, see the sambandhokti to I, 1.

SUREŚVARA AND HIS WORKS

them. "All the principles thus assumed," says Sures'-

vara, "existed in the Self before, as the plant in the seed.

By māyā, acting in the form of will, intelligence, and

activity, have they been displayed."24

Yet another minor work written by Sures'vara is the

Pañcīkaraṇa-vārtika consisting of sixty-four verses, which is

a commentary on a prose work of Śaṅkara's by name

Pañcīkaraṇa.

Sures'vara wrote elaborate verse commentaries (Vārti-

kas) on the Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya and the Bṛhadāraṇyako-

paniṣad-bhāṣya of Śaṅkara. There is an explanation for

Sures'vara's choice of these two among the Upaniṣad-

bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara. In honour of his teacher, Śaṅkara,

who belonged to the Taittirīya recension (śākhā) of the

Yajurveda, Sures'vara took up the Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya

for explanation; and as his own sākhā was the Kāṇva of

the Yajur-veda, it was but appropriate that he took up the

Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya for his Vārtika thereon.25 In fact,

Śaṅkara has followed the Kāṇva recension of the Bṛhad-

āraṇyakopaniṣad in his commentary.

24. A. Mahadeva Sastri, The Vedānta Doctrine of Sri Saṅkarācārya

(V. Ramaswamy Sastrulu & Sons, Madras, 1920), vv. 43-44, p. 45:

sarve vikālpāḥ prāgāsan bīje'ṅkura ivātmani

icchā jñāna-kriyā-rūpamāyayā te vijṛmbhitāḥ.

25. See Vidyāraṇya, Saṅkaradigvijaya, Canto 13, vv. 65-66, p. 481:

satyam yadāttha vinayinmamā yājuṣī yā

sākhā tadantagatabhāṣyanibhandha iṣṭaḥ

tadvārtikam mama kṛte bhavatā praneyam

sacceṣṭitam parahitaikaphalam prasiddham. (65)

tadvattadiyā khalu kāṇvasākhā

mamāpi tatrāsti tadantabhāṣyam

tadvārtikam cāpi vidheyamiṣṭam

paropakārāya satām pravṛttiḥ. (66)

I owe this reference to Professor S.S. Raghavachar of the Univer-

sity of Mysore.

10

INTRODUCTION

Though the whole of the Taittirīya-yajur-veda is studi-

ed with proper accent and employed in ceremonial wor-

ship, the Taittirīyopanisad is more popular than the ear-

lier portions of this branch of the Veda. The fact that

Śaṅkara has quoted from this Upanisad one hundred and

fortyseven times in his Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya speaks volumes

for its authoritativeness. Sureśvara's Taittirīyopuniṣad-

bhāṣya-vārtika consisting of one thousand and twenty-seven

verses is an explanation of Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on the

Taittirīyopanisad.

The Brhadāraṇyaka is the greatest of the Upaniṣads,

and Śaṅkara's commentary on this Upaniṣad is the grea-

test of his Upaniṣad-bhāṣyas. Sureśvara wrote a Vārtika

on Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on this Upaniṣad. Sureśvara's Brha-

dāraṇyakopanisad-bhāṣya-vārtika, which is a very volumi-

nous one, is great not only in size, but also in substance

and theme. Śaṅkara has written a brief introduction to

the Brhadāraṇyakopanisad before commencing his bhāṣya

thereon. Sureśvara's Vārtika on this introduction is known

as Sambandha-vārtika. It contains more than one thousand

and one hundred verses, and the entire Brhadāraṇyaka-

vārtika is approximately ten times the size of the Samban-

dha-vārtika. The Brhadāraṇyaka-vārtika may be characte-

rized as a source book of Advaita, and Sureśvara is at

his best in his exposition and vindication of Advaita as

well as in his criticism of other schools.

II

SUREŚVARA'S ROLE AS A VĀRTIKAKĀRA

Let us now consider the part played by Sureśvara as

the author of the Vārtika. A Vārtika has been defined as

a work which examines what is said (ukta), what is not said

(anukta), and what is not well-said (durukta) in the original.

A Vārtika, that is to say, has to do the threefold work of

SUREŚVARA'S ROLE AS A VĀRTIKAKĀRA

11

explaining the original text, supplementing it, and offering, where necessary, alternative interpretations not mentioned in the original. The author of a Vārtika has, therefore, an important work to discharge in writing the verse commentary. In his Vārtikas on the Br̥hadāranyaka-paniṣad-bhāṣya and the Taittirīyopanisad-bhāsya, Sures'vara vindicates the standpoint of Śaṅkara by offering elaborate explanations to the original. Sometimes he has to amplify the explanations given in the bhāsya by supplementing further details which might have been provided by the author of the bhāsya himself elsewhere. There is no difficulty in understanding the work of elucidation and amplification which Sures'vara does as the author of the Vārtika. But what is intriguing is the third work which he has to do. As a Vārtikakāra he has to examine what is not well-said (durukta) in the original, and offer a different explanation. We must look into this aspect bearing in mind Sures'vara's relation to Śaṅkara.

Sures'vara is a devoted disciple of Śaṅkara. He says in the Naiṣkarmya-siddhi that, even as King Bhagīratha worshipped Śiva, he worshipped Śrī Śaṅkara, who was established in Brahman, who was omniscient, and who was surrounded by sages always. It is from that great Śaṅkara, he declares, that he obtained as a boon the Gaṅgā of the liberating knowledge.26 If so, how is it possible for Sures'vara, the devoted disciple, to think of any explanation given by Śaṅkara, his divine master, as what is not well-stated or wrongly stated (duruktam)? It is, therefore, necessary to clarify the meaning of duruktam.

One explanation that may be offered is that Sures'vara sets forth a certain interpretation as an alternative to the one given by Śaṅkara considering the competence of the spiritual aspirant to understand the teaching. There

26. NS. IV, 76.

12

INTRODUCTION

is neither confusion nor lack of clarity in the teachings of

the Upaniṣad One who is not properly equipped may

have difficulties in understanding its teachings. A com-

mentary (bhāṣya) is intended to help the spiritual aspirant

in understanding the teachings of the original correctly.

There is no room for the accusation that Śaṅkara is con-

fused or wanting in clarity in his commentaries. Every-

one of his commentaries is a master-piece well-known for

clarity of thought and consistency of ideas. If, in spite

of ail these, one fails to understand the standpoint of

Śaṅkara, it is only a reflection on the poor intellectual

equipment on the part of the reader. Assuming that a

certain explanation given by Śaṅkara has not been well-

stated to suit the spiritual aspirant who may be dull-

witted, Sures'vara, it may be said, offers an alternative

interpretation, which can be justified from the standpoint

of a particular category of eligible persons. Playing the

role of a Vārtikakāra, Sures'vara has to assume that a

certain explanation has not been properly stated to suit

the needs of some, and offer on that assumption an alter-

native interpretation. This is how Ānandagiri explains

the position of Sures'vara in respect of the work of durukta-

cintā, examining what is not well-stated, which he has to

do as the author of the Vārtika.27

Another explanation is also possible. It may be said

that Sures'vara profers to interpret some texts of the

Upaniṣad in his own way differing from Śaṅkara, where

such an interpretation is equally justified by the context.

Though a follower and interpreter of Śaṅkara, Sures'vara

can claim the freedom to have his own interpretation of

the Upaniṣadic passages in certain cases. This is perfectly

justified, and is true to the spirit of inquiry.

27. See Ānandagiri's explanatory note to the opening verse of

TUBV (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series).

SUREŚVARA'S ROLE AS A VĀRTIKAKĀRA

13

It is to be borne in mind that, though Sures'vara may differ from Śaṅkara in the interpretation of śruti passages in certain places, there is absolutely no difference between them in the basic philosophical standpoint.

The difference, wherever it arises, is purely exegetical in nature in respect of certain Upaniṣadic texts, and is not detrimental to their agreement on the central thesis of non-dualism as taught by the principal texts (mahāvākya) of the Upaniṣads.

Surcs'vara readily acknowledges his indebtedness to his teacher whenever he gets the occasion before he sets forth his own interpretation.

In the Taittirīyopanisad-bhāsya-vārtika, for example, before giving an alternative interpretation, Sures'vara says by way of expressing his gratitude to his teacher that his dense ignorance has been consumed in the fire of his master's speech.

In the Brhadāraṇyakopanisad-bhāsya-vārtika Sures'vara in a particular context not only disagrees with Śaṅkara's interpretation, but also declares emphatically that his own interpretation should be accepted and not that of Śaṅkara.

His rejection of Śaṅkara's interpretation must be viewed in the proper spirit in the light of the foregoing explanation.

It is intended neither as a discredit, nor as a disavowal of his allegiance, to Śaṅkara.

Mention may be made in this connection of one such difference in interpretation between Śaṅkara and Sures'vara taken from the Taittirīyopanisad-bhāsya-vārtika.

The Bhṛguvallī gives an account of Bhṛgu approaching his father Varuṇa for instruction about Brahman.

Varuṇa defines Brahman as that from which all beings are born, that by which they live, and that in which they finally merge.

Knowing this definition of Brahman, Bhṛgu, it is said, practised tapas (sah tapah atapyata.) What is this

28. TUBV, II, 541, p. 342.

29. BUBV, I, V, verse 281, p. 848.

14

INTRODUCTION

tapas which Bhrgu practised? Sankara explains the term

tapas as concentration of the outer and inner organs, for

that forms the door to the knowledge of Brahman in

accordance with the sruti text, "The concentration of the

mind and the senses is the highest tapas."

But Suresvara interprets tapas in a different way.

According to him, tapas in this context must be interpret-

ed as critical reflection on the subject through the method

of agreement in presence and in absence (anvaya-vyatire-

ka), since this alone is competent to make us under-

stand the knowledge conveyed by the principal texts of

the Upanisad such as "I am Brahman." Bhrgu, according

to this interpretation, applied the method of anvaya and

vyatireka to the five sheaths and realized that they are

not-Self. That alone which is uniformly present (anvaya) in

all states and at all times is the real which is Brahman;

and what is present in a certain state at a particular time

and absent in other states and at other times (vyatireka) is

not real. Brahman alone is uniformly present in all states

and at all times; but matter (anna), vital force (prana),

etc., which are effects having a beginning and an end are

sometimes present and sometimes absent. So the mode of

inquiry which Bhrgu adopted for knowing Brahman in-

volved the application of the method of anvaya and

vyatireka. Some may have difficulties in understanding how

concentration (tapas) enabled Bhrgu to know Brahman.

In the absence of any indication as to how it functions in

respect of enlightening us about something, the term

"concentration" may be quite mystifying to quite a few.

It is in the context of this difficulty likely to be felt by

many that Suresvara's interpretation of the term tapas

has to be understood.

30. TUB, Bhrguvalli, first anuvaka:

"tacca tapah bahyantahkaranasamadhanam, taddvarakatvadbrahmapratipatteh, 'manascendriyanam ca hyaikagryam paramam tapah'."

31. TUBV, III, 19, p. 462.

TAITTIRĪYOPANIṢAD : AN ANALYSIS

15

There are many instances of such difference between

Sures'vara and Śaṅkara in the Brhadāranyakopaniṣad

bhāsya-vārtika. Sures'vara, for example, differs from

Śaṅkara in the interpretation of the Brhadāranyaka text

which reads: "Yājñavalkya went to Janaka, the Emperor

of Videha. He thought he would not say anything."32

in the course of his commentary on this text Śaṅkara

observes that the object of Yājñavalkya's visit was to get

more wealth and maintain that already possessed, and

that "while going, he thought he would not say anything

to the Emperor." Sures'vara interprets the text differently

by reading the text 'sa mene na vadisye' as 'sam enena

vadisye.' Following this reading Sures'vara interprets

the text to mean that Yājñavalkya went to the king think-

ing that he would speak well (samvadisye).33 Sures'vara's

interpretation seems to be appropriate in the context,

because there is actually a good deal of discussion bet-

ween Janaka and Yājñavalkya.34

III

TAITTIRĪYOPANIṢAD: AN ANALYSIS

The Yajur-veda consists of two recensions, the

Taittirīya and the Vājaṣaneyī. The Taittirīyopaniṣad

belongs to the former recension, while the Īśāvāsya and

the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣads belong to the latter.

The Taittirīyopaniṣad which forms part of the

Taittirīya āraṇyaka consists of three chapters called Śikṣā-

vallī, Brahmavallī (also known as Ānandavallī or Brahmā-

nandavallī) and Bhṛguvallī. The Śikṣāvallī is also referred

to as the Sāṃhitī Upaniṣad, since the study of the saṃhitā

32. BU, IV, iii, 1.

33. BUBV, VI, iii, verse 10, p. 1378.

34. See my article, "Identity of Maṇḍanamiśra", Journal of

American Oriental Society, October-December 1962 for some other diffe-

rences in interpretation between Śaṅkara and Sures'vara in BUBV.

16

INTRODUCTION

forms part of it. The remaining two chapters are

together called the Vāruṇī Upaniṣad, because they deal

with the knowledge of the highest Brahman (Brahmanvidyā)

as taught by Varuṇa. Each of these chapters is divided

into sections (anuvāka). There are twelve sections in the

Śikṣāvallī, nine in the Brahmanvallī, and ten in the Bhrgu-

vallī.

The Śikṣāvallī is mainly concerned with saguṇa-vidyā,

the knowledge of the conditioned Brahman. It gives an

account of the various meditations (upāsanā) to be practis-

ed by the spiritual aspirant for attaining concentration or

one-pointedness of mind which is necessary for Brahman-

realization. While the performance of karma disinterested-

ly in a spirit of dedication to God purifies the mind and

creates a desire for knowledge (vividiṣā), the practice of

meditation is conducive to the concentration of the mind

or the development of the one-pointed intellect.35 It is with

a view to help the spiritual aspirant qualify for the nirguṇa-

vidyā, the knowledge of the unconditioned Brahman, that

the Śikṣāvallī proceeds to explain the different medita-

tions.

Of the twelve sections of the first chapter, the first

one contains a prayer to the gods for the removal of

obstacles in the way of saguna-vidyā. The second section,

which deals with the science of pronunciation (śikṣā),

stresses that there should not be any slackness or indiffer-

ence in the recital of the text. Meditation on the samhitā,

which is taught in the third section, will secure fruits of

this and the future world. If a person meditates on the

samhitā without any desire for fruits such as cattle and

heaven, he will attain purification of the mind, which is

necessary for the attainment of Brahman-knowledge. The

fourth section gives an account of the mantras which are

35. KU (I, iii, 12) says: “By the seers of subtle things, He is seen

through a pointed and fine intellect.”

TAITTIRĪYOPANIṢAD : AN ANALYSIS

17

to be recited and also of the oblations to be offered for

attaining good memory, sound health, intelligence and

wealth. The fifth section teaches meditation on the vyā-

hṛtis, which is conducive to the attainment of indepen-

dent sovereignty. The sixth section gives instruction on

the meditation of Brahman as located in the cavity of the

heart (hṛdayākāśa) and as possessed of such attributes as

"formed of mind", etc., for mediocre students. Medi-

tation on Brahman as endowed with perceptible qualities

with a view to help aspirants who are inferior is taught in

the seventh section. The eighth section teaches medita-

tion on Om which is a means for attaining the supreme

Brahman or the Hiranyagarbha in accordance with the

manner in which it is meditated upon. This meditation is

for the benefit of superior students. The ninth section

stresses the importance of the duties enjoined by śruti and

smṛti such as the study of Scripture, the performance of

rites, the practice of ethical virtues, and the fulfilment of

social obligations, along with the practice of upāsanā. The

entire mantra of the tenth section is to be recited by the

spiritual aspirant, as such a recital is conducive to the

attainment of the purification of the mind and thereby

of Brahman-knowledge. Triśaṅku gives expression in

this mantra to his experience of Brahman-realization. The

eleventh section contains the post-instruction of the tea-

cher to the students returning home after the completion

of their studies. It is intended to show that the perfor-

mance of rites is conducive to the rise of knowledge. In

the last section of the first chapter the disciple expresses

his gratitude in the form of thanks-giving to the gods for

protecting him and his teacher.

The Brahmavallī consists of nine sections. It teaches

the knowledge of the unconditioned Brahman (nirguṇa-

vidyā), which alone can destroy ignorance, the root cause

of bondage. The lapidary opening sentence of the first

18

INTRODUCTION

section, "The knower of Brahman attains the highest,"

lays down that the knowledge of Brahman is the means to

liberation. After defining Brahman as the real, knowledge,

and infinite, the Upanisad proceeds to show in this section

that Brahman is identical with the inward Self, which is

concealed by the five sheaths (pañca-kośa) arranged in a

telescopic manner, one inside another, the outer deriving

its being from the inner. An account of the outermost

sheath, the annamaya-kośa, which is a product of food, is

also given in this section. The sheath of vitality (prāṇa-

maya-kośa), the sheath of the mind (manomaya-kośa), the

sheath of the intellect (vijñānamaya-kośa), and the sheath

of bliss (ānandamaya-kośa) are described respectively in the

second, third, fourth, and fifth sections. These sheaths

constitute the gross, subtle, and causal bodies of the indi-

vidual and the cosmic being. The fifth section teaches

that, as distinguished from these sheaths, there is Brah-

man-Ātman, which is the support of all these sheaths.

The sixth section raises an important question whether

Brahman, which is devoid of all distinctions, which is be-

yond all empirical relationships, exists or not. It also raises

the further question whether the knower of Brahman or an

ignorant man attains Brahman. The Upaniṣad proceeds to

set forth in this section the existence of Brahman as the

cause of the universe consisting of things with and without

form. Further reasons for the existence of Brahman are

given in the seventh section. Brahman, it is said, must

exist as the source of joy enjoyed by all creatures, as the

cause of all vital and organic functions of the jīva, and as

the cause of fear and fearlessness of the men of ignorance

and knowledge respectively. The eighth section, which

contains a calculus of pleasure, describes Brahman as

bliss par excellence of which worldly happiness enjoy-

ed by all creatures is a particle. Worldly happiness

increases a hundredfold as one ascends to the different

classes of celestial beings mentioned in this section. A

TAITTIRĪYOPANIṢAD : AN ANALYSIS

19

person well-versed in the Veda and also free from desire and sin enjoys the highest bliss which is Brahman. It is also stated in this section that one who knows Brahman, the highest bliss, as non-dual, i.e. as the same both in the human person and in the sun, attains it by differentiating it from the not-Self.The concluding section of the Brahma-vallī states that he who has realized Brahman, which is beyond the grasp of speech and mind, is not afraid of anything whatsoever. The knower of Brahman, who remains as Brahman, is not tormented by good and evil which are relevant only in the relative sphere of ignorance.

There are ten sections in the Bhṛguvallī. Narrating the story of the dialogue between Bhṛgu, the disciple, and Varuṇa, his father, the opening section of this chapter defines Brahman as that from which the universe comes into being, that by which it lives, and that into which it is finally merged. How Bhṛgu was able to arrive at Brah-man-Ātman as the cause of the creation, continuance, and dissolution of the universe as a result of his systematic inquiry into anna, prāṇa, manas, vijñāna, and ānanda, is stated in sections two to six. The Upaniṣad declares in the sixth section that any one who knows Brahman in the manner in which Bhṛgu did becomes firmly established in Brah-man, i.e. he becomes Brahman itself. Sections seven to ten explain certain meditations on food, which have not been dealt with earlier in the Upaniṣad. The tenth section concludes with an account of a jīvanmukta. The knower of Brahman who remains as Brahman, who has realized the oneness of all things, proclaims his non-dual experience for the benefit of spiritual aspirants.

As one reads this Upaniṣad, one will be struck by the remarkable sequence, both chronological and logical, in the presentation of the subject matter. The Śikṣāvallī explains Scriptural rites and meditations which are remote

20

INTRODUCTION

aids (bahirañga-sādhana) to the attainment of Brahman-

knowledge. While the performance of rites in a spirit of

dedication to God leads to the purification of the mind,

the practice of meditation in the manner in which they

are prescribed by Scripture without any desire for the

fruits thereof helps one to have concentration of the mind.

Only a person whose mind is purified and who is capable

of concentration is eligible for the study of the Vedānta.

Guided study (śravaṇa), rational reflection (manana), and

repeated contemplation (nididhyāsana) are the principal

proximate aids (mukhyantaranga-sādhana) to the attainment

of knowledge. One should resort to the study (śravaṇa)

of the Vedānta only after fulfilling the requirements of

eligibility as stated above; for, otherwise, the study of the

Vedānta will not be fruitful. To the eligible person the

nature of Brahman-Ātman has been set forth through the

study of the various Śruti texts in the Brahmavallī. The

transition from the Śikṣāvallī to the Brahmavallī is, there-

fore, both chronological and logical. The Bhṛguvallī

purports to teach the method of reflection (manana) on the

teaching of Śruti texts. The discipline of manana should

follow that of śravaṇa. Varuṇa did not tell Bhṛgu directly

what Brahman is. On the contrary, he formulated a

definition of Brahman and made Bhṛgu inquire in a syste-

matic way into that definition with a view to find out

Brahman by himself. The method of anvaya-vyatireka, which

Bhṛgu followed, enabled him to discriminate Brahman-

Ātman from anna, prāṇa, etc., and finally attain the direct

knowledge of Brahman-Ātman. So there is both chrono-

logical and logical sequence between the Brahmavallī and

the Bhṛguvallī.

The Taittirīyopaniṣad is one of the important principal

Upaniṣads. Śaṅkara's commentary on this Upaniṣad and

Sures'vara's verse commentary, which seeks to explain both

the Upanisad and Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya thereon, enhance its

ŚAṄKARA ON THE TAITTIRIYOPANIṢAD

21

importance. This Upaniṣad has become a classic for three

of its outstanding teachings: (1) for the definition of Brah-

man in terms of its essential nature (svarūpa-lakṣaṇa) as

real, knowledge, and infinite (satyam jñānam anantam

brahma) and also for the definition per accidens (tatastha-

lakṣaṇa) of Brahman as the cause, etc., of the universe,

(2) for the method of discrimination between the Self and

the not-Self through an inquiry into the fivefold sheath

(kośa-pañcaka-viveka), and (3) for the calculus of pleasure

(ānandāsya mīmāṃsā) which points to Brahman as bliss par

excellence.

IV

ŚAṄKARA'S COMMENTARY ON THE

TAITTIRĪYOPANIṢAD

A commentary (bhāṣya) is expected to bring out the

meaning of the cryptic or aphoristic statements of the origi-

nal and also the meanings of the words contained therein.

Śaṅkara's commentaries on the Brahmasūtra and the Upa-

niṣads are marvellous masterpieces serving as models of

exegetical art, philosophical reasoning, and argumentative

skill. Padmapāda speaks of his teacher, Śaṅkara, as

bhāṣyavittakaguru, as one who attained great celebrity by

36. TU, II, 1.

37. TU, III, 1.

38. TU, II, 1-5.

39. TU, II, 8.

40. "sūtrārtho varnyate yatra vākyaih sūtrānukāribhih,

svapadāni ca varnyante bhāṣyaṁ bhāṣyavido viduh."

41. Pañcapādikā, invocatory verses :

"yadvaktrāmānasasarah pratilabdhajanma-

bhāṣyarāvinda-makarandarasaṁ pibanti,

pratyāśamumkhavinītavineya bhrṅgāstān-

bhāṣyavittakagurūn-pranato'smi mūrdhnā."

22

INTRODUCTION

his commentary, and also as the bestower of happiness. As

in his other commentaries, Śaṅkara in his bhāṣya on the

Taittirīyopaniṣad,too, explains the meanings of the words of

the Upaniṣad, brings out the purport of the śruti passage,

refers to the grammatical pec:liarities and Vedic usages,

introduces, where necessary, the sections (anuvāka) with a

short expianation, explains the sequence of the sections and

also of the chapters, and discusses at great length in certain

places some of the important issues connected with the main

problem. What Śaṅkara says of those teachers in the past

who have explained the Upaniṣads is equally true of him.

Before commencing his comnientary on the Taittirīya,

Śaṅkara writes: “I bow down ever before those teachers by

whom all these Upaniṣads have been explained in the past,

taking into consideration the words, the sentence, and the

means of proof (pada-vākya-pramāṇataḥ).”42 A commentary

must pay attention to the words (padāni) used in the origi-

nal, the sentences (vākyāni) which occur, and also the

means of proof (pramāṇāni) such as inference suggested

by the śruti itself in support of the view.43 Or, it may

be said that a commentary must explain the original

by taking into consideration the science of grammar

(vyākaraṇa), the Mīmāṁsā system, and the principles of

The term bhāṣyavittakaguru may be explained as bhāṣyeṇa vittah

bhāṣyavittah, kaṁ sukhaṁ tatpradah guruḥ ka guruh bhāṣyavittah kaguruh

bhāṣyavitta-kaguruh.

42. TUB, I, 1 :

'yairime gurubhiḥ pūrvaṁ pada-vākya-pramāṇataḥ

vyākhyātaḥ sarvavedāntāstannityam praṇato'smyaham.'

43. See TU, II, 6, for the reasoning contained in the śruti itself

when it says so'kāmayatā, etc., with a view to establish the existence of

Brahman.

See Acyutakṛṣṇānandatīrtha's Vanamālā, a commentary on

TUB (Srirangam: Sri Vani Vilas Press, 1913), p. 2: “so'kāmayatā ityādau

brahmasattva-sādhakatvā-vivaksitānyanumāni pramāṇam.”

logic (nyāya-śāstra).44 In his commentary on the Taittirīya

Śaṅkara pays due attention to these disciplines.

What remains prominent in Śaṅkara's commentary on

the Śikṣāvallī is his repeated emphasis on the importance

of karma as a remote aid to the attainment of knowledge.

Liberation, according to Śaṅkara, is nothing else than

remaining in one's own Self on the cessation of the mate-

rial cause, viz avidya, ctc., on account of which one resorts

to karma.45 Liberation by its very nature is eternal.

What is eternal can never be produced, and what is pro-

duced is impermanent. Śaṅkara, therefore, concludes

that liberation can never be accomplished by karma.46

But this does not mean that Śaṅkara has ignored the

importance of karma in the scheme of practical discipline

leading to the attainment of Brahman-knowledge, which

is liberation. In his commentary on the ninth section of

the Śikṣāvallī, Śaṅkara says: 'From the statement that

knowledge alone leads to the attainment of independent

sovereignty it may follow that the duties enjoined by Vedas

and Smṛtis are useless. In order to avoid such a contin-

gency, the duties are being presented here, so that they

may be shown as contributory to the attainment of the end

of man.' The disinterested performance of karma in a

spirit of dedication to God purifies the mind, and the

44. See Vanamālā, p. 2 :

"yadvā padam vyākaraṇam tatsādhutva-vicārarāpatvāt, vākyam

mīmāṁsā vedavācya-vicārarāpatvāt, pramāṇam nyāyaśāstram prādhānyena

pratyakṣādi-pramāṇa-vicārātmakatvāt."

45. TUB, I, 1 :

"tasmādavidyādi-karmopādāna-hetunivṛttau svātmanyavasthānam

mokṣaḥ."

46. TUB, I, 1 :

"na hi nityam kiñcidārabhyate loke, yadārabdhaṁ tadanityamiti,

ato na karmābhyo mokṣaḥ"

24

INTRODUCTION

knowiedge of Brahman will dawn only on one whose mind is purified.47 While one should pursue karma before the rise of knowiedge, one must abstain from the same after the rise of knowledge. Sañkara observes: "Rites are to be undertaken so that knowiedge may emerge... The absence of rites after the rise of knowledge will be shown in such passages as '(Whenever the aspirant) gets fearlessly established (in Brahman),'...'"

In his commentary on the tenth section of the Śīkṣāvalī, Sañkara lays stress on the utility of the recitation (japa) of mantra as an aid to the rise of knowledge. It is accepted, says Sañkara, that knowledge arises in one whose mind is purified by recitation (svādhyāya) of the sacred text.

Sañkara states that intelligence and prosperity, too, are indirectly helpful to knowledge.50 Commenting on the significance of the prayer for prosperity in the context of knowledge, he says that such a prayer is "for the sake of wealth, which is needed for rites, and rites are

47. TUB, I, 11:

"sariskrtasya hi viśuddha-sattvasya ātmavijñānamañjasaivotpadyate."

48. TUB, I, 11:

"ato vidyotpatt-yarthamanuṣṭheyāni karmānīti...uditāyām ca brahmavidyāyām 'abhayam் pratiṣṭhām vindate' ... ityādinā karmanaiṣkiñcanyam் darśayiṣyati."

49. TUB, I, 10:

"svādhyāyena ca viśuddha-sattvasya vidyotpatt-iravakalpate."

See also Sañkara's commentary on BS, III, iv, 38.

50. TUB, I, 5:

"tadanu medhākāmasya śrīkāmasya cānukrāntā mantrāḥ, te ca pāramparyeṇa vidyopayogārthā eva."

ŚAṄKARA ON THE TAITTIRĪYOPANIṢAD

25

calculated to diminish accumulated sins, on the exhaus-

tion of which knowledge becomes revealed. :

Śaṅkara emphasizes in an equal measure the impor-

tance of the grace of God (Īśvara-prasāda), through which

alone one can resort to the study of the Upaniṣad, the

practice of austerity (tapas) and meditation (dhyāna) as well

as non-injury (ahiṃsā) and celibacy (brahmacarya), as aids

to knowledge; but the guided study of the texts (śravaṇa),

rational reflection (manaṇa), and repeated contemplation

(nididhyāsana) are the immediate cause of knowledge. ²

The highest good can be attained through knowledge

alone.

Advaita teaches that Brahman, the ultimate reality, is

non-dual, and is identical with the inward Self, and that

the phenomenal world is illusory. This, according to

Śaṅkara, is the central teaching of the Brahmavallī, the se-

cond chapter of the Taittirīyopaniṣad. He observes that the

lapidary opening sentence, “The knower of Brahman

attains the highest,” brings out the purport of the entire

Brahmavallī. ³ The mantra-portion which follows this apho-

ristic declaration is of the nature of a short commentary

thereon. It seeks, according to Śaṅkara, (1) to set forth

the nature of Brahman as real, knowledge, and infinite,

(2) to show that Brahman has to be realized as non-diffe-

rent from one’s own inward Self, and (3) to demonstrate

51. TUB, I, 4:

"śrīkāmo'smin-vidyāprakaraṇe abhidhīyamāno dhanārthah, dhanam

ca karmārtham, karma ca upāitadurītakṣayārtham, tatkṣaye hi vidyā prakā-

śate."

52. Ibid., I, 11:

"na hī 'pratibandha-kṣayādeva vidhyotpadyate, na tvīśvaraprasāda-

tapo-dhyānādyanusṭhānāt iti niyamo'sti; ahiṃsā-brahmacaryādīnām ca vid-

yāṁ pratyupakārakatvāt, sākṣādeva ca kāraṇatvācchravaṇa-manaṇa-nidi-

dhyāsanādhīnām."

53. Ibid., II, 1:

"brahmavidāpnoti paramiti vākyam sūtrabhūtam sarvasya vallyar-

thasya."

26

INTRODUCTION

that the realization of Brahman consists in attaining to the

state of being the Self of all (sarvātmabhāva), i.e. in being

Brahman which transcends the characteristics of transmi-

gratory existence. Since Brahman has been defined as real,

knowledge, and infinite, it must necessarily be non-dual.

That Brahman is identical with the Self is clearly brought

out, says Śaṅkara, by the text, “From that (Brahman),

verily, i.e. fron this Self, is ether born,”54 where the

word “Self” is used with regard to Brahman itself. Śaṅkara

argues that the entire universe comprising ether, time,

etc., is illusory because it is an effect.

Brahman is the cause of the universe. The latter, which is

an effect and therefore illusory, has no being of its own

apart from Brahman, which is the transfigurative material

cause, on which it is superimposed. Apart from the cause,

there is really no such thing as effect,55 as stated in the

well-known vīcārabhaṇa text of the Chāndogya, “The

modification is only a name arising from speech, while the

truth is that it is just clay.”56

Śaṅkara does not explain the manifestation of the

world of name and form through the transformation of

Brahman. He rejects, that is to say, brahma-pariṇāma-vāda.

Brahman, which is immutable, illusorily appears as the

phenomenal world, in the same way as a rope illusorily

appears as a serpent. In the course of his commentary on

the passage, “He desired, ‘May I become many’…57

54. TUB, II, 1:

"tasmādvā etasmādātmanah iti brahmanyeva ātmaśabda-prayogāt

vediturātmaiva brahma.

55. Ibid., II, 1:

"sarveṣāṁ hi vastūnāṁ kālākās̄ādināṁ kāraṇaṁ brahma.

kāryāpekṣayā vastuto'ntavatvamiti cet, na, anṛtatvāt kāryavastunah, na hi

kāraṇavyatirekeṇa kāryaṁ nāma vastuto'sti…"

56. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI, i, 4.

57. TU, II, 6.

ŚAÑKARA ON THE TAITTIRĪYOPANIṢAD

27

Śaṅkara says that the differentiation of name and form is the appearance of Brahman as many. In no other way, so he argues, can the partless Brahman become manifold and finite. The finitude and plurality of Brahman must be understood as similiar to the delimitation and diversification of ether caused by extraneous factors. It is through name and form, which serve as limiting adjuncts, that Brahman becomes many. It is through them alone that it enters as a factor in all our empirical dealings - as a knower (jñātā), as knowledge (jñānām), as object known (jñeyam), etc.

It is impossible, according to Saṅkara, to state directly what Brahman is. Since Brahman is one and non-dual, free from difference of every kind, it can only be conveyed by the well-known method of superimposition (adhyāropa) and subsequent denial (apavāda). Śaṅkara says that this is the traditional method of teaching Brahman, which is trans-phenomenal (niṣprapañca). Brahman is first spoken of as the cause of creation, maintenance, and dissolution of the world, as endowed with attributes, etc. Since the ultimate reality is one and non-dual, without parts, immutable, and tranquil, the categories of understanding such as cause-effect relation, substance-attribute relation, whole-part relation, etc., cannot be applied to it. It can only be stated indirectly by eliminating the superimposed attributes through a process of "not this", "not this."

58. TUB, II, 6: "tad-etannāmarūpavyākaraṇam brahmaṇo bahubhavanam; na anyathā niravayavasya brahmaṇo bahutvāpattirupapadyate, alpatvam vā, yathā ākāśasya alpatvam bahutvam ca vastvantarakṛtameva...tābhyām ca upā-dhibhyām jñātr-jñāna-jñeya-śabdārthādi-sarvavyavahārabhāg-brahma."

59. See Saṅkara's commentary on the Bhagavadgītā, XIII, 13: "tathā hi sampradāyavidām vacanam adhyāropāpavādābhyām niṣprapañcaṁ prapañcyate."

60. Sec BUB, IV, iv, 5.

28

INTRODUCTION

wish to describe its true nature, free from all differences due to limiting adjuncts, then it is an utter impossibility.

Then there is only one way left, viz to describe it as 'not this', 'not this', by eliminating all possible specifications of it that one may know of.'61 Even the definition of Brahman as "real, knowledge, and infinite" should not be understood as expressing the nature of Brahman directly.

It seeks to convey indirectly that Brahman is other than the unreal, the insentient, and the finite.62 Because of the inherent limitation of words to denote Brahman, śruti says that words along with the mind return without comprehending Brahman.63

Considering the built-in limitation of words to express what is inexpressible, we could now specify the sense in which Scripture must be understood as the means of knowing Brahman.

When it is said that Brahman can be known only through the Upaniṣad, it does not mean that the Upaniṣad will intimate Brahman as such-and-such.

This is an utter impossibility even for śruti.

For one thing, Brahman is not an object of knowledge like a table or a tree to be made known by a means of knowledge (pramāṇa).

There is yet another difficulty.

Brahman-Ātman which is of the nature of consciousness is presupposed by all means of knowledge in the discharge of their work.

A pramāṇa can do its work only because of the help it receives from the Self, the intelligent principle.

What is presupposed by a means of knowledge can never be established by it.

Further, as stated earlier, Brahman cannot be expressed by any word, not even by the word "Being" (sat).64

A word can denote a thing if that object is associated with a genus or an act or a quality or a relation.

61. See BUB, II, iii 6.

62. TUB, II, 1.

63. Ibid., II, 9.

64. BG, XIII, 12.

ŚAṄKARA ON THE TAITTIRIYOPĀNIṢAD

29

Brahman does not belong to any genus, and so it cannot be denoted by such words as sat. Since it is immutable, it cannot be expressed by a word implying an act. Being devoid of attributes, it cannot be indicated by a word implying a quality. Since it is one and non-dual, it is not related to anything; and so it cannot be denoted by a word expressing a relation. In short, Brahman cannot be expressed by śabda. Why is it, then, that Scripture is accepted as the means of knowing Brahman? The aim of Scripture, says Śaṅkara, is to help us discard all distinctions illusorily superimposed on Brahman due to avidyā. Scripture does not purport to present Brahman as this or that object; its purport is rather to show that Brahman as the eternal subject is never an object, and thereby to remove the distinctions such as the object known, the knower, etc., fictitiously created by avidyā.⁶⁵ Since Brahman-Ātman is mistaken for the not-Self, Scripture reveals it by eliminating the five sheaths, which are not-Self, set up by avidyā.⁶⁶

The non-dualism of Śaṅkara is based on the authority of the Upaniṣads. Śaṅkara does not hesitate to reject any view that is opposed to the central teaching of the Upaniṣads. That Brahman is identical with the Self, that the Self being trans-phenomenal is free from the attributes of transmigratory existence such as sorrow and fear, and that these attributes are ascribed to the Self due to avidyā, constitute the central teaching of the Upaniṣads. It may be

65. SBSB, I, i, 4:

"avidyākalpita-bheda-nivṛttiparatvāt śāstrasya. nahi śastramidaṁ-tayā viṣayabhūtam brahma pratipipādayiṣati. kim tarhi. pratya-gātmatvena avi-ṣayatayā pratīpādayadavidyā-kalpitam vedya-veditr-vedanādibhedamapanayati"

66. TUB, II, 2:

"annamayādibhya ānandamayāntebhya ātmabhyah abhyantarataratamam brahma-vidyayā pratyagātmatvena didarśayiṣu śāstram avidyākṛtapañcakośa apanayana"

objected that the teaching of the Upaniṣads as expounded

by Śaṅkara goes against the Vaiśeṣika of Kañāda, the

Sāṅkhya of Kapila, and other schools. Śaṅkara holds that

the teachings of these schools have to be rejected as erro-

neous for two important reasons. Not only are they not

based on the Upaniṣad, but they are also opposed to its

teaching.⁶ Taking his stand on śruti, Śaṅkara makes use

of reasoning (upapatti) in order to show that the teaching

of Scripture also meets the demands of reason. That is

why he says that the trans-phenomenal nature of the Self

is established by Scripture as well as by reasoning.⁶⁸ Rea-

soning (tarka) which is not opposed to śruti must be press-

ed into service as a supplement thereto, according to

Śaṅkara, for ascertaining its purport.⁶⁹ Since Brahman-

inquiry must finally result in Brahman-intuition, intuition

or experience (anubhava) is the consummation of the study

of, and the inquiry into, the Vedānta. Only when Brah-

man-knowledge culminates in experience, it removes ignor-

ance and thereby is the means to release.⁷⁰ Śaṅkara’s

commentary on the tenth section of the Śikṣāvallī, which

refers to Brahman-intuition attained by the sage Trisanku,

is relevant in this context. The entire mantra of this

section, according to Śaṅkara, is the statement of

Trisanku after his realization of the unity of the Self

for expressing the fact that he had reached, just like

Vāmadeva, the goal of all desires.

67. TUB, III, 10:

"kāpila-kānādādi-tarkasāstrā-virodha iti cet, na; teṣāṁ mūlābhāve

vedavirodhe ca bhrāntatvopapatteḥ."

68. Ibid., III, 10:

"srutyupapattibhyāṁ ca siddham ātmano'saṁsāritvam."

69. SBSB, I, i, 2:

"srutyaiva ca sahāyatvena tarkasya abhyupetatvāt."

70. Ibid., II, i, 4:

"anubhavāvasānam ca brahmavijñānam āvidyāyā nivartakam,

mokṣasādhanam ca, drṣṭabalatayā iṣyate."

SAÑKARA ON THE TAITTIRIYOPANIṢAD

31

If the non-dual Brahman-Ātman appears as the world of name and form, it is due to the principle called avidyā, which is referred to by different names such as avyakta, māyā, prakṛti, etc.

Avidyā is beginningless (anādi), indeterminable (anirvacanīya), and of the nature of an existent (bhāvarūpa). It has two powers - the power of concealment (āvaraṇa) and the power of projection (vikṣepa). It not only suppresses the true, but also suggests the false.

Śaṅkara brings out the twofold work of avidyā in several places in his commentary on the Taittirīyopaniṣad. It is the very nature of avidyā to conceal Brahman-Ātman which is of the nature of knowledge, and so he speaks of knowledge being screened by ignorance (avidyayā-tiraskṛiyamañe vijñāne).

Concealing the nature of the Self, avidyā, says Śaṅkara, sets up the fivefold sheath (avidyākṛta-paṅca-kośa).

If the ultimate reality is one and non-dual, duality is what is conjured up by ignorance (avidyā-parikalpitasya dvaitasya).

In another place Śaṅkara says that the elements beginning with ether are the creations of ignorance (ākāśādibhūtārabdhairavidyākṛtam).

The subject-object distinction is also caused by ignorance (avidyākṛte-viṣaya-viṣayi vibhāge).

Dream and waking states, Śaṅkara says, are also creations of ignorance (avidyākṛtatvāt jāgrat-svapnayoh).

It will be obvious from the way in which

71. SBSB, I, iv, 3. See also SBGB, V, 14.

72. TUB, II, 8. See BG, V, 15: "ajñānenāvṛtam jñānam tena muhyanti jantavaḥ."

73. TUB, II, 2.

74. Ibid., II, 5.

75. Ibid., II, 3.

76. Ibid., II, 8.

77. Ibid., II, 8.

32

INTRODUCTION

Śaṅkara describes the work of avidyā that he takes it, not as a negative entity (abhāvarūpa) in the sense of absence or non-existence of knowledge (jñānābhāva), but as an existent, something positive (bāvarūpa). Though it is an existent, it is not real, according to Śaṅkara. Brahman alone is real. Since there is nothing different from Brahman, avidyā is not real to be reckoned as a second entity in addition to, and thereby to delimit, Brahman. The truth is that, inough from the relative, empirical standpoint we are compelled to speak of avidyā-māyā, from the standpoint of Brahman, there is no such thing as avidyā-māyā. That is why Śāṅkara says that “māyā is that which does not exist,” and ‘that “it is the name of the non-existent.”78

Śaṅkara reconciles the truth of non-duality as taught by the Upaniṣads with the appearance of duality involved in all our business of life by assigning them to two different spheres - the absolute (pāramārthika) and the relative (vyāvahārika). Though the truth is that the non-dual Brahman alone is, we have to admit the knower-known, the teacher taught and other distinctions, the Scriptural texts which speak about them, different sources of knowledge such as perception, the fact of bondage, and the Scriptural injunctions and prohibitions, so long as the non-dual Brahman is not realized; and the entire duality vanishes into thin air the moment one attains the saving knowledge of the non-dual reality. On the basis of the distinction between the two standpoints mentioned above, it is very often said that Śaṅkara advocates the “double decker theory of reality”79 — reality as absolute and

78. See Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, IV, 58: “sā ca māyā na vidyate, māyetyavidyāmānasyākhyā.”

79. See Ninian Smart, The Yogi And The Devotee (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968), p. 37 for the use of the expression “double-decker theory”

ŚAṄKARA ON THE TAITTIRĪYOPANIṢAD

33

reality as empirical. The expression "double-decker" is

misleading as it suggests that both the deckers or the

standpoints are true to the same person simultaneously.

Śaṅkara's position is quite different from this. He does

not maintain that there is no conflict between non-duality

and duality by admitting simultaneously the equal validity

of both from the standpoint of one and the same person.

A person who is involved in duality is assuredly under

the spell of ignorance, and such a person has no Brahman-

intuition. To one who has attained Brahman-intuition,

there is no duality. That is why Śaṅkara says: "The

highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts, viz

the body, the senses, and the mind, is, by the ignorant,

spoken of as if it were embodied. With regard to this

(unreal limitation of the one Self) the distinction of

objects of activity and of agents may be practically

assumed, as long as we have not realized that the Self is

one only from the text, 'That art thou.' As soon, however,

as we realize the truth that there is only one universal

Self, there is an end to the whole practical view of the

world with its distinction of bondage, final release, and

the like."80 Commenting on Gauḍapāda's statement, "This

explanation is for the purpose of teaching. Duality ceases

to exist when the highest truth is known," Śaṅkara

observes: "The ideas of teacher, taught, and Scripture

are for the purpose of teaching, and these are true till

one realizes the highest truth. But duality does not exist

when one, as a result of the teaching, attains knowledge,

i.e. realizes the highest reality."81 Śaṅkara employs here

the logic of disjunction. It is a case of either or and not

of both and. Either one is involved at the relative level of

duality based on ignorance, or one realizes the non-dual

reality as the absolute truth.

80. SBSB, I, ii, 6.

81. Śaṅkara's commentary on the Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, I, 18.

34

INTRODUCTION

Śaṅkara adopts the same point of view in his commentary on the Taittirīyopaniṣad. Reference may be made to two passages here. Speaking of the spiritual aspirant who gets fearless stability in Brahman, he writes: “Since he does not see diversity that is the creation of ignorance and is the cause of fear, he becomes established in fearlessness. When he becomes established in his true nature, then he does not see anything else, does not hear anything else, does not know anything else.”82 This passage refers to the state of knowledge, which is the standpoint of the Absolute. Referring to the state of ignorance where there is duality, he says: “In the state of ignorance, the ignorant man sees in this Self something, presented by ignorance, like the vision of a second moon seen by a man suffering from the eye disease called timira,”83 and perceiving difference due to ignorance, he is overcome by fear.

To Śaṅkara, the strength of Advaita is the strength of its non-dualism based on the authority of the Vedas. Śaṅkara makes this point clear in the course of a discussion initiated by him on the problem: “Who is he that knows thus, and how does he attain (Brahman)? Is the attainer different from, or the same as, the supreme Self?” The opponent puts it to Śaṅkara that the discussion of this problem is useless, and that the latter cannot establish his point by ascertaining the meaning of Scripture.84 The discussion at this stage proceeds as follows.

82. TUB, II, 7:

“atha tadā saḥ tasmin-nānātvasya bhayāhetoravidyākṛtasyādarśanāt abhayam gato bhavati. svarūpapratiṣṭho hyasau yadā bhavati, tadā nānyat paśyati, nānyacchrṇoti, nānyadvijānāti.”

83. Ibid., II, 7:

“yadā punaravidyāvasthāyām hi yasmād eṣah avidyāvān avidyayā pratyupasthāpitam vastu taimirika-dvitīyacandravat paśyati, ātmani ca eta-smin brahmaṇi…bhedadarśanạṃ kurute; bhedadarśanameva hi bhayakā-ranam.”

84. Ibid., II, 8.

SAÑKARA ON THE TAIT IRIYOPANIṢAD

35

Śaṅkara: What! Is there a Vedic commandment that the point shall not be established?

Opponent: No.

Śaṅkara: Why then (do you say that I cannot establish the point)?

Opponent: Because there are many opponents. You are a monist, since you follow the Vedic teaching. But many, indeed, are the pluralists who are outside the Vedic pale and who are opposed to your point.

Śaṅkara: This itself is a benediction to me that you brand me a monist surrounded by many who are pluralists. Therefore I shall conquer all; and I shall now commence the discussion.

Three points emerge from this discussion: (1) Non-dualism is the central teaching of the Vedas. (2) Those who advocate pluralism in any form go outside the authority of the Vedas. (3) A philosophical position cannot be considered to be sound just because the number of its votaries is legion. While Advaita is based on the secure and solid foundations of the Vedas, pluralism, in whatever way it is formulated, is untenable, since it is not based on, and supported by, the Vedas.

Śaṅkara at times introduces in his commentary, either at the beginning, or at the end, or in the middle of a section, as the occasion demands, lengthy discussions on problems raised by the Scriptural text for the sake of the clarification of the issues. There are such lengthy discussions in five places in his commentary on the Taittirīyopaniṣad, and in three of them he begins the discussion in his own characteristic style with a stress on inquiry (cintana).85

85. TUB, I, 11 :

"atraitaccintayate vidyākarmanor-vivekārtham "

36

INTRODUCTION

In the first of these, which occurs as an introduction

to the first section of the Śīkṣāvallī, Śaṅkara says

that release (mokṣa) cannot be attained by means of ritual

action (karma). His argument is that whatever is produced

is impermanent and that, since release which is of the

nature of the Self is eternal, ritual action is not a means

thereto.86 Release is positive, and so it is no argument

to say that, though produced by karma, it can be eternal

like pradhvaṁsābhāva which is said to have a beginning,

but no end.87 Śaṅkara says: “Release consists in remain-

ing in one's own Self on the cessation of the material

cause, viz ignorance (and desire) on account of which one

resorts to karma. The Self, as such, is Brahman, and the

knowledge of Brahman leads to the removal of ignor-

ance.”88

The main aim of the discussion which occurs at the

end of the eleventh section of the Śīkṣāvallī is to ascertain

whether release can be attained by karma alone, or by

karma aided by knowledge, or by karma and knowledge in

combination, or by knowledge aided by karma, or by know-

ledge alone. By showing the untenability of the first four

alternatives, Śaṅkara maintains that release can be

attained by knowledge alone. What is produced by

karma is perishable; and since release, as stated earlier,

Ibid., II, 6:

"tattraitaccintyam — katham anuprāviśaditi."

Ibid., II, 8:

"tattraitaccintyam — ko'yamevamvit, katham vā saṁkrāmatīti..."

86. Ibid., I, 1:

"na hi nityam kiñcidārabhyate loke, yadārabdham tadanityamiti;

ato na karmārabhyo mokṣaḥ."

87. Ibid., I, 1:

"pradhvaṁsābhāvavannityo'pi mokṣa ārabhyata eveti cet, na,

mokṣasya bhāvarūpatvāt."

88. Ibid., I, 1:

SAṄKARA ON THE TAITTIRĪYOPANIṢAD

37

is eternal, karma cannot be a means thereto. The futi-

lity of karma cannot be overcome by bringing in know-

ledge as an aid to it. Saṅkara declares that what is eter-

nal cannot be produced even if there are one hundred

Scriptural texts to the contrary.⁸⁹ Nor can it be said that

release can be attained by the combination of knowledge

and ritual action. Saṅkara rules out this possibility firstly

on the ground that the result of karma is different from

that of knowledge. Karma is required for the origination,

purification, transformation, or attainment of something.

But release is not any of these to be accomplished by

karma. Further, the combination of knowledge and karma

is not possible because of their mutual opposition.

"Knowledge which relates to the reality wherein agency

and other factors are absent is opposed to karma which

can only be brought about by accessories which are oppo-

be ruled out in view of the mutual opposition between

karma and knowledge. Saṅkara, therefore, concludes that

release can be attained by knowledge alone.

The discussion which occurs in the sixth section of

the Brahmavallī is concerned about the meaning of the

entry text (praveśa-śruti), "Having created that, into that

very world He (Brahman) entered." After considering

the various possibilities by which one may try to under-

stand the meaning of this text, the opponent concludes

that this text has to be ignored as it does not convey any

meaning. Saṅkara argues that this text purports to convey

the knowledge of Brahman, which is the central theme of

89. TUB, I, 11.

"na hi vacanaśatenāpi nityamārabhyate, ārabdham vā avināśi

bhavet."

90. Ibid., I, 11 :

"pravilina-kartrādi-kāraka-viśeṣa-tattvaviṣayā hi vidyātadvipari-

ta-kārakasādhyena karmaṇā virudhyate."

38

INTRODUCTION

the chapter, through an account of the creation of ether,

etc. The entry of the Self into the cavity of the intellect

has been stated with a view to show that the association

of the Self with the internal organ causes the knowledge

of Brahman, because the internal organ which is proxi-

mate to the Self has the power of illumination.91

Advaita which maintains that Brahman, the ultimate

reality, is non-dual and that one attains release by Brah-

man-knowledge has to clarify certain issues such as "Who

is the knower of Brahman? How does he attain Brahman?

Is the attainer different from or the same as the supreme

Brahman?" There are critics who urge that, since the

attainer is different from the attained, the thesis of non-

dualism is untenable. They also urge that, in order to

make the term "attainment" meaningful in the literal

sense, the Advaitin must accept duality between the attai-

ner and the attained. The discussion which occurs in the

eighth section of the Brahmavallī focusses its attention on

these issues. The substance of Śaṅkara's argument may

be stated as follows. It is the jīva that is the knower of

Brahman. On the authority of the aphoristic statement,

"The knower of Brahman attains the highest," it has to

be said that one attains the highest Brahman through

knowledge. Since the jīva in its essential nature is identi-

cal with Brahman, the attainer and the attained are not

different, and so there is no danger to the thesis of non-

dualism. It is well-known that knowledge removes igno-

rance. Since knowledge alone is prescribed as the means

of attaining Brahman,92 it follows that the non-attainment

91. TUB, II, 6:

"evamantahkarana-guhatma-sambandho brahmaṇa upalabdhihetuh,

sannikarṣāt, avabhāsātmokatvācca antaḥkaraṇasya."

92. Ibid., II, 8:

"vidyāmātropadeśāt; vidyāyāśca dṛṣṭam kāryam-avidyānivṛttiḥ;

tacceha vidyāmātram ātmaprāptau sādhanaṁupadiśyate '

SAṄKARA ON THE TAITTIRIYOPANIṢAD

39

of Brahman is because of ignorance and that its attain-

ment is through knowledge. In short, the jīva duc to

ignorance identifies itself with the body, the vital force,

the mind, etc., which are not-Self, and through know-

ledge it distinguishes the Self from the not-Self, and re-

mains as Brahman. If the jīva were really different

from Brahman, it cannot become or remain as Brahman

through knowledge. Under the circumstances, the attain-

ment of Brahman by the jīva should not be understood

in the literal sense of the acquisition of something new not

already attained. The word “attainment” here means,

according to Śaṅkara, knowledge or realization alone."

The last of the discussions occurs in the concluding

section of the Bhrguvaḷḷī. Śaṅkara emphasizes here that,

though the Self is free from worldly existence involving

the relation of enjoyment and enjoyership, it is nevertheless

ascribed to the Self through ignorance and that, since the

jīva in its essential nature is identical with Brahman,

sorrow, fear, and other characteristics of transmigratory

existence do not really belong to it.

Like his other commentaries, Śaṅkara’s Taittirīyopa-

niṣad-bhāṣya is both lucid and profound (prasanna-gambhīra).

Śaṅkara sets forth the central teaching of Advaita within

the framework of Scripture, supporting Scripture by

reasoning. While reasoning is guided by Scripture, Scrip-

93. TUB, II, 8 :

"yā hi brahmavidyayā svātmaprāpti-rupadiśyate sā avidyākṛtasyā

nnādiviseṣātmanā ātmatvenādhyāropitasyā anātmanāḥ apohārthā."

94. Ibid., II, 8 :

"tasmāt na prāptịḥ saṅkramanāṃ...jñānaṃātraṃ ca saṅkra-

manam-upapadyate."

95. Ibid., III, 10 :

"kāryaviṣayā eva bhogyabhoktrtvakṛtaḥ saṃsāraḥ, na tvātmanīti."

96. Ibid., III, 10 :

"trāsāderduḥkhasya ca upalabhyamānatvāt nopalabdṛdḥarmatvam."

40

INTRODUCTION

ture in its turn is ably supported by reasoning. Śaṅkara

makes full use of flawless reasoning in support of his exe-

gesis of Scripture and thereby shows that the teaching of

Scripture meets the demands of reason. He is neithez

dogmatic in his exposition of Scripture nor does he in-

dulge in dry reasoning. He shows that the teaching of crea-

ti3n, the principle of cause-effect relation, the inquiry into

the five sheaths, the analysis of waking, dream, and deep

sleep experience, the study of the calculus of pleasure ar.d

the analysis of the subject-object epistemology reinforce the

truth of non-duality, which constitutes the centra! teaching

of Scripture. Citing passages from smrti and itihāsa,⁷

which are considered to be secondary Scripture, Śaṅkara

shows that his teaching is not unly based on śruti, but is

also in harmony with other Scriptural authorities such as

smrti and itihāsa. To Śaṅkara, the truth known from Scrip-

ture and corroborated by reasoning must finally consummate

in plenary experience (anubhava). The joy that

results from such experience as evidenced in the case of

Vāmadeva and Triśaṅku knows no bounds; the effulgence

which a realized person radiates is ever-shining like that

of the sun;⁸ and to attain the plenary experience through

the grace of the teacher and the teaching of Scripture is,

indeed, the greatest wonder. Śaṅkara sets forth the teach-

ing of Advaita with devotion to Scripture, respect for

reasoning, and the finality of plenary experience. He is

unsurpassed in facility of style and magnificence of dic-

tion, profundity of thought and richness of imagery; and

97. Śaṅkara quotes from the Manusmrti in three places in his

TUB — once in his commentary on I, 1 and twice in his commentary

on I, 11. He quotes from the Mahābhārata twice — once in his com-

mentary on I, 4 and again on III, 1. He also quotes from the Āpastamba-

dharmasūtra in his commentary on I, 11.

98. Commenting on the text "suvarnajyotīḥ", Śaṅkara says:

"āditya iva sakrt-vibhātam asmadīyam jyotīr-jyotīḥ, prakāśa

itvarthah." (TUB III, 10)

THE BHĀṢYA AND THE VĀRTIKA

41

his writings, which are quite numerous, exhibit a remarkable consistency throughout. There is nothing in Śaṅkara

of the ephemeral and the parochial; the midrib of his

philosophy is eternal and universal.

V

THE BHĀṢYA AND THE VĀRTIKA

Though Sures'vara follows Śaṅkara closely like a shadow its original, it does not mean that he is no more than

an unvarying facsimile of his master. Playing the role of

the author of the Vārtika, Sures'vara not only interprets

Śaṅkara by restating what has been said by him, but also

supplements him, wherever necessary, by clarifying the

issues and providing further arguments in support of

Advaita. His work does not stop with this. Absorbing

the thought and spirit of his teacher so completely as to

inspire his own soaring genius, Sures'vara offers in certain

places his own interpretation of Scriptural passages differing from Śaṅkara, without prejudice to the central thesis

of Advaita. Nor do these differences in interpretation

suggest any disrespect and disavowal of allegiance to

Śaṅkara.

Consider, for example, Śaṅkara's discussion of the

nature of release and the means thereto, which occurs in

the first and eleventh sections of the Śikṣāvallī, and Sures'-

vara's Vārtika thereon.

Or, consider Śaṅkara's discussion

of the meaning of the Scriptural text which speaks

about the entry of Brahman into the world (pravesa-śruti)

as it occurs in the sixth section of the Brahmavallī

and Sures'vara's Vārtika thereon.

The turns of express-

99. TUBV, I, verses 4-34, pp. 3–15; II, verses 1-18, pp. 69-76.

100. TU, II, 6:

"tatsṛṣṭvā, tadeva anuprāviśat."

101. TUBV, II, verses 378–401, pp. 261–275.

42

INTRODUCTION

ions, the sequence of arguments, and the mode of reasoning are almost the same in Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya and Sures'vara's Vārtika. But even here one cannot fail to notice the brilliance of Sures'vara's dialectical skill which sparks off, when, for example, he brings out the futility of karma in respect of liberation in verses (13) to (15) of the Brahmavallī.

In many places Sures'vara, as the author of the Vārtika, amplifies Saṅkara's Bhāṣya with a view to clarify the problem from the standpoint of Advaita. And his amplification is not only necessary, but also valuable in the context. In the first section of the Brahmavallī, Brahman-Ātman is said to be the cause of the world. The Upaniṣad says: "From that (Brahman), verily, from this Self, is ether born; from ether, the air..." Commenting on this passage Śaṅkara says: "From that Brahman, that is identical with the Self, ether (ākāśa) was created. Ether means that which is possessed of the attribute of sound and provides space for all things that have forms. From that ether, air (vāyuh) - which has two attributes, being possessed of its own quality, touch, and the quality, sound, of its cause (ākāśa). The verb, 'was created,' is understood." He then proceeds to explain the creation of fire, water, and earth, and also of herbs, food, and man, following the same sequence as given in the Upaniṣad.

There are two questions to be answered here in order to vindicate the non-dual nature of the ultimate reality. Is the creation of the world real? The same question may be rephrased differently as follows: Is Brahman the real or the apparent cause of the world? Brahman is said to be one and non-dual, immutable and partless, neither an effect nor a cause. Nevertheless, the Upaniṣad speaks of Brahman as the cause of the world. If so, what is the sense in which Brahman is said to be the cause of

THE BHĀṢYA AND THE VĀRTIKA

43

the world according to Advaita? Śaṅkara does not discuss this question in this context. Suresvara argues on

various grounds that the creation of the world is not real and that Brahman is not the real, but only the apparent

cause of the world through avidyā.102

The other question is whether Brahman itself is the cause of everything from ether on wards or whether

Brahman is the cause of ether alone. This question arises because śruti says that from the Self ether came into existence, and from ether air was created, and from air fire

was produced, etc. Śaṅkara does not take up this issue here, though he has answered this question in his commentary on the Brahmasūtra.103 Suresvara explains the

standpoint of Advaita in unambiguous terms. He says that Brahman itself is the cause of everything. Brahman through avidyā is the cause of ether, and the same Brahman, which has assumed the form of ether or which

remains conditioned as ether through avidyā, is the cause of air. In the same way Brahman alone, which has assumed the form of air through avidyā, is the cause of fire.

The same explanation holds good in other cases too.104 According to Advaita, no element by itself independently

of Brahman can be the cause of another element.

While Śaṅkara does not give elaborate explanation of the birth, growth, and the different states of man in

his commentary on the Scriptural text, “From the herb was produced food; and from food was born man,”105 Suresvara goes into the details covering the entire life-history

of man — the misery of his pre-natal condition, the pangs of birth, the helplessness of infancy, the despair of youth,

102. TUBV, II, verses 140–165, pp. 132–149.

103. SBSB, II, iii, 10; II, iii, 13.

104. TUBV, II, verse 153, p. 142.

105. TU, II, 1.

44

INTRODUCTION

the suffering of old age, and the inevitability of death —

not only to show that the Self, which is without a beginning

and an end, and which is free from all changes, must be

discriminated from the not-Self, but also to generate a

fecling of disgust against iransmigratory existence.106

Suresvara's explanation of the śruti text, "Than that

verily, than this one which is formed of the essence of

food," (tasmādvā etasmādannarasamayīt) which occurs in

the second section of the Brahmavallī, is, indeed, a valu-

able supplement to Saṅkara's commentary on this text.

Suresvara brings out the meaning of this text in the con-

text very explicitly.107 The word tasmāt refers to the

Virāj, the cosmic being in its gross or physical aspect; and

the word etasmāt refers to the individual physical being.

Since the two words are in co-ordinate relation, the text

conveys the idea that the human being, a product of food

at the individual level, is identical with the Virāj, the

cosmic being in its gross aspect.

The Taittirīyopaniṣad enumerates five sheaths — the

sheath of food, the sheath of vitality, the sheath of mind,

the sheath of intellect, and the sheath of bliss — which are

arranged one inside the other, with the sheath of food

(annamaya-kośa) as the outermost. When superficially

viewed, it appears as though the Upaniṣad speaks of each

inward sheath as the self of its outward sheath, i. e. the

sheath of vitality as the self of the sheath of food, the

sheath of mind as the self of the sheath of vitality, and

so on, and finally it speaks of the sheath of bliss as the

self of the sheath of intellect. The text, "tasyaisa eva

śarīra ātmā, yah pūrvvasya," occurs in the third,108 fourth,

106. TUBV, II. verses 166-224, pp. 150-172.

107. Ibid., II, verses 266-267, p. 199.

108. Saṅkara explains this text in the third section as follows:"tasya

pūrvvasya annamayasyā esa eva śarīre annamaye bhavah śarīrah ātmā, kah ?

THE BHĀṢYA AND THE VĀR'TIKA

45

and fifth sections of the Brahmavallī. Śaṅkara explains

this text, as it occurs in each of these sections from the

standpoint of the Vṛttikāra, who holds that the self consis-

ting of bliss (ānandamaya), the fifth in the series, is the

real Self or the highest Brahman;109 and finally in the

fifth section he rejects it as it is untenable. He maintains

on various grounds that the self consisting of bliss cannot

be the highest Brahman, but only the conditioned self.

The procedure adopted by Śaṅkara when he discusses this

issue both in the Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya and the Taittirīyopani-

ṣad-bhāṣya is the same: to state first of all the view of the

Vṛttikāra as the prima facie view and then to explain his

final view (siddhānta) according to Advaita. The issue

whether the self consisting of bliss is the real Self or the

conditioned self is discussed in the ānandamayādhikarana of

the Brahmasūtra. Śaṅkara to start with explains sūtras

12-19, which constitute the ānandamayādhikarana, from the

standpoint of the Vṛttikāra, then criticizes it and states his

final view in the course of his commentary on the nine-

teenth sūtra; and before concluding his commentary on

this adhikarana he shows how these sūtras have to be inter-

preted.110 Similarly, Śaṅkara explains the text, "tasyaisa

eva śārira ātmā, yaḥ pūrvvasya," in the third, fourth, and fifth

sections of the Brahmavallī in accordance with the view of

ya eṣa praṇamayaḥ." This text is explained in the same way in the

sequel making suitable changes in respect of the sheaths involved.

109. Acyutakṛṣṇānandatīrtha explains Saṅkara's position as follows:

"tasyaisa iti vakyamānandamayo brahmeti vadatām vṛttikārānāṁ matena

vyācaṣṭe-tasya pūrvasyeti. ata eva ānandamayādhikarane vṛttikāramate

sthitvā ānandamaya-paryāyāsthamidam vākyam tasyaiṣa pūrvasyeti padayo-

ritthameva vyavahitānwaya-pradarśanena vyākhyātamācāryaiḥ." See Vana-

mālā, pp. 136-137.

110. Radhakrishnan holds the view that Saṅkara gives a twofold

explanation of the ānandamayādhikarana. In the first explanation

Saṅkara accepts, says Radhakrishnan, that Brahman is ānandamaya.

Since this interpretation goes against the unqualified character of Brah-

man, Saṅkara offers, so Radhakrishnan maintains, a strained expla-

40

INTRODUCTION

the

Vṛttikāra

and

finally

rejects

it

in

his

commentary

on

the

fifth

section.

But

he

gives

us

no

indication

in

the

third

and

fourth

sections

as

to

whether

his

explanation

of

the

text,

"tasya

eva

śarīra

ātmā…"

is

from

the

standpoint

of

the

Vṛttikāra

or

from

his

own

standpoint.

We

have

to

wait

for

this

till

we

come

to

his

commentary

on

the

fifth

section.

Sures'vara

in

his

Vārtika

does

not

hold

us

in

suspense.

Following

Śaṅkara,

he

first

of

all

explains

the

text,

"tas-

ya

eva

śarīra

ātmā…,"

which

occurs

for

the

first

time

in

the

third

section,

from

the

standpoint

of

the

Vṛtti-

kāra,'

smelis

out

the

danger

of

such

an

interpretation

as

it

will

oblige

us

to

accept

the

self

consisting

of

bliss

(ānandamaya)

as

the

real

Self,

and

with

a

view

to

forestall

this

difficulty

interprets

this

text

in

the

very

next

verse

from

the

standpoint

of

Advaita.

112

Inasmuch

as

he

prepares

the

ground

in

this

way

for

a

discussion

in

the

fifth

section

whether

the

ānandamaya

refers

to

the

highest

Brahman

or

the

conditioned

self,

his

role

as

the

author

of

the

Vārtika

is

very

effective.

After

presenting

the

view

of

the

Vṛtti-

kāra

as

the

prima

facie

view

in

two

verses

113

in

the

sequel,

he

criticizes

it

at

great

length

devoting

as

many

as

seven-

teen

verses.

114

nation

that

ānandamaya

is

a

vesture

of

Brahman.

See

S.

Radhakrishnan,

The

Brahma

Sūtra

(London:

George

Allen

&

Unwin,

1960),

p.

257

and

p.

Saṅkara's

Bhāṣya

does

not

warrant

this

interpretation

of

Radhakrishnan.

It

is

wrong

to

say

that

Śaṅkara

gives

a

twofold

explanation

of

this

adhikaraṇa.

The

explanation

that

is

given

to

start

with

from

the

standpoint

of

the

Vṛttikāra

is

the

prima

facie

view

which

Saṅkara

rejects

by

giving

in

the

sequel

his

own

explanation

in

his

commentary

"idam

tviha

vaktavyam…"

TUBV,

II,

verse

283,

p.

Ibid.,

II,

verse

284,

p.

Ibid.,

II,

verses

323-341,

pp.

231-232.

Ibid.,

II,

verses

335-341,

pp.

232-243.

THE BHĀṢYA AND THE VĀR TIKA

47

Suresvara in his Vārtika pays special attention to an

important argument given in justification of the view that

the ānandamaya is the highest Brahman and not the condi-

tioned self.115 Śaṅkara does not refer to this argument,

which focusses its attention on the parity of reasoning

between the Bhrguvallī and the Brahmavallī. Bhrgu first

thought of food as brahman, then he thought one after

another of prāṇa, manas, and vijñāna as Brahman; and

finally realizing bliss (ānanda) as Brahman, he stopped his

investigation. Bhrgu's goal was Brahman. The fact that

he stopped his investigation with ānandu, the fifth in the

series, shows that it is the supreme Brahman and not the

conditioned self. In the same way, the ānandamaya, which

is the fifth in the series as discussed in the Brahmavallī,

must also be, according to this argument, the highest

Brahman and not the conditioned self.

Suresvara argues that ānanda, where Bhrgu stopped

his inquiry, may be viewed as the conditioned self (kār-

yātmā). His reasoning is as follows. While the Brahma-

vallī gives instruction on the nature of Brahman to be

attained, the Bhrguvallī teaches the means thereto. The

five sheaths, from the anna to the ānanda, constitute the

means for realizing Brahman. When Bhrgu realized that

the five sheaths are not-Self and that Brahman is the

support of the ānandamaya, he stopped his investigation

with ānanda. Nothing more was required by him. When

he was able to discriminate the Self from the not-Self,

the knowledge of the highest Brahman flashed to him from

the śruti text itself. So according to this line of reason-

ing, the ānanda with which Bhrgu stopped must be under-

stood as the ānandamaya-kośa.

Even if it is maintained that the ānanda, as taught in

the Bhrguvallī, is the supreme Brahman, it does not follow,

115. TUBV, II, verse 323, p. 231.

48

INTRODUCTION

says Sures'vara, that the ānandamaya as taught in the Brah-

mavallī is the supreme Brahman. Ānanda is free from

spccifications and distinctive forms. It is nirviśeṣa. And

so it is identical with the highest Brahman. But the

ānandamaya in the Brahmavallī is described as a differentia-

ted entity with joy, enjoyment, and the like, as its limbs.

So it cannot be the supreme Brahman.

To Sures'vara the analogy between ihe ānandamayā

and the ānanda in terms of ihe position (sthāna) in the

series is rather superficial. It is true that, like the ānanda-

maya, the ānanda also is the fifth in the series. But this

similarity between the two in respect of the position

(sthāna) in the series is no argument to say that, like

ānanda, the ānandamaya also must be understood as the

highest Brahman. We are justified in considering the

ānanda as the highest Brahman because of the authority

of Śruti which declares that Bhṛgu knew bliss as Brahman.

Of Śruti and sthāna, the former is more authoritative than

the latter.

If one is bent upon the similarity in the series present-

ed in the Brahmavallī and the Bhṛguvallī, even this does

not prevent us from considering the ānandamaya as the

conditioned self. In the Brahmavallī the emphasis of

the fifth section is on Brahman, which is the central

topic of discussion, and not on the ānandamaya. But the

sixth section of the Bhṛguvallī straight-away mentions

ānanda, which is Brahman, immediately after vijñānamaya;

and the ānandamaya, the fifth sheath, though not explicitly

mentioned, is implied in the context.116

In several places after stating Śaṅkara's explanation

of a term contained in the Upaniṣad, Sures'vara gives his

own. For example, in the passage, "In the beginning all

this was but the unmanifest (Brahman). From that emer-

116. TUBV, II, verses 332-340, pp. 237-242.

ged the manifcsted. That Brahman created itself by itseif. Therefore it is called the self-creator,"117 there is the word sukṛta. By virtue of being the cause of everything, Brahman, according to Śaṅkara, is the self-creator (svayam kartṛ). After explaining the meaning of the word sukṛta as stated above, Sures'vara explains it in the sense of well-done (suṣṭhu-kṛtam). According to this explanation, the word sukṛtam does not refer to the Lord, but to the act of the Lord, which has been well-done."18

The Taittirīyopanisad speaks of Brahman as adrśya, anātmya, etc. An effect or a modification (vikāra) is perceptible, and so Śaṅkara explains the word adrśya to mean "what is changeless" (avikāra) or "what is not an object of cognition" (aviṣayabhūta). The word anātmya, according to Śaṅkara, means the unembodied, the incorporeal (aśarīra).119 These words, according to Sures'vara, may be explained in a different way also. The word drśya means what is gross, and the word ātmya, what is universal or what is subtle. Brahman is said to be adrśya since it is free from the gross forms; and it is said to be anātmya, because there is no universal or class characteristic in it or because it is free from the subtle forms.120

In the eighth section of the Brahmavallī which speaks about the different grades of happiness, there is the expression "pitṛṇām cirakalokānām." Śaṅkara explains this to mean "of the manes whose world is ever-lasting;" the world of the manes, that is to say, lasts (relatively) for

117. TU, II, 7.

118. TUBV, II, verse 419, p. 284.

119. TUB, II. 7: "adrśye, drśyam nāma draṣṭavyam vikārah, darśanārthatvād-vikārasya; na drśyam adrśyam, avikāra ityarthah. etasmin adrśye avikāre aviṣayabhūte, anātmye aśarīre, yasmādadrśyam tasmādanātmyam, yasmācca anātmyaṁ tasmādanātmyaṁ tasmādanātmyaṁ tasmādanātmyaṁ tasmādanātmyam."

120. TUBV, II, verses 445, 446, and 449, pp. 296-298.

50

INTRODUCTION

ever.121 But Suresvara argues that since long stay in

the world of the manes is the result of the performance

of Scripture-ordained ceremonies to the manes, the expres-

sion refers to those who stay long in the world of the

manes.122

The sruti text, "yato vāco nivartante..." occurs in the

ninth section as well as in the fourth section of the Brah-

mavalli. But the context in the two sections is different.

Śankara does not explain the meaning of this text in the

fourth section, where it occurs in the context of the mano-

maya-kośa, though he brings out the difference in the

meaning of the text while commenting on it in the ninth

section, where the context is the non-dual Brahman. But

Suresvara, playing the role of the Vartikakāra, specifically

states that this text, occurring as it does in the context of

the manomaya-kośa in the fourth section, does not refer to

the supreme Brahman, and thereby prepares us for noti-

cing the difference in meaning when the same text, with

an important variation in the second line, occurs in the

ninth section.123

Deviating from Śankara's commentary Suresvara dis-

cusses independently at great length in the ninth section

of the Brahmavalli the question whether Brahman-know-

ledge falls within the scope of pramāṇas like perception,

or meditation (bhāvanā), or injunction (niyoga). He utilizes

this occasion to discuss the validity of words (pada) and

corroborative statements (arthavāda) which are treated as

re-statements (anuvāda).124 Suresvara's main aim in this

121. TUB, II, 8:

"ciralokālokānāmiti pitṛṇām viśeṣaṇam. cirakālasthāyī loko

yeṣāṁ pitṛṇām te ciralokalokāḥ."

122. TUBV, II, verse 512, p. 328.

123. Ibid., II, verse 306, p. 222.

124. Ibid., II, verses 608-720, pp. 381-442.

THE BHĀṢYA AND THE VĀRTIKA 51

lengthy discussion running to more than one hundred verses is to vindicate the independent validity of the assertive texts like tat tvam asi, which convey the knowledge of the non-dual Brahman-Ātman.

A Vārtika is expected to explain the original text, amplify it, and offer, where necessary, alternative interpretations by way of examining "what is not well-said" (durukta) in the original. In the course of the explanation of Sures'vara's role as the Vārtikakāra reference was made to the difference between Śaṅkara and Sures'vara in the interpretation of the meaning of the word tapas.125 Let us now refer to other differences in interpretation between Śaṅkara and Sures'vara.

The sixth section of the Brahmavallī contains certain questions raised by the disciple for the purpose of clarifying his doubts after listening to the instruction given by the teacher. The first question is whether Brahman exists or not. The second one is whether an ignorant man, after departing from here, attains Brahman or not. And the last question is whether a man of knowledge does or does not attain Brahman. According to Śaṅkara, the Upaniṣad beginning from the text, "so'kāmayata, bahusyāmprajāyeyeti," (II, 6) till "sa yaścāyam puruṣe, yaścāsāvāditye, sa ekaḥ" (II, 8) answers the first question by giving various reasons such as the phenomena of creation, acquisition of joy, functioning of life, etc., which prove the existence of Brahman. The third question whether a man of knowledge attains Brahman or not is answered, according to Śaṅkara, by the Upaniṣad in the passage beginning from "sa ya evam vit" (II, 8). Śaṅkara is of the view that the Upaniṣad does not answer separately the question whether an ignorant man attains Brahman or not as the answer

125. See above, p. 14.

52

INTRODUCTION

to the third question also contains the answer to the

second one.126

Sures'vara does not agree with Saṅkara's explanation.

According to him the first question, which relates to the

existence of Brahman, is answered by the Upanisad begin-

ing from "so'kāmāyata, bahu syām prajāyeyeti" (II, 6) till

"esa hyeva ānandayāti" (II, 7). The question whether a

man of knowledge attains Brahman or not, says Sures'-

vara, is answered by the Upanisad in the text "yadā hyevaiṣa

etasminnadrṣye...abhavam gato bhavati" (II, 7). The remain-

ing question relating to the ignorant man is answered,

according to Suresvara, in the text, "yadā hyevaiṣa etasmin

udaramantaram kurute," etc. (II, 7). Suresvara holds that

all the three questions raised by the disciple are answered

by the Upanisad in the sixth and seventh sections of the

Brahmavallī.127 It may be mentioned here that Sures'vara's

interpretation has a decided advantage over that of Saṅ-

kara. According to the latter, of the three questions only

two of them, the one relating to the existence of Brahman

and the other about the man of knowledge, are directly

answered by the Upanisad, and the answer to the question

about the ignorant man is implied in the answer to the

question about the enlightened man. But according to

Sures'vara's explanation, even the question about the

ignorant man is directiy answered by the śruti text (śabdāt)

and not by implication (arthāt).

In the sixth section of the Bhṛguvallī, the Upanisad tells

us that any person who realizes bliss as Brahman in the

same way as Bhṛgu did becomes firmly established in

126. TUB, II, 8:

"tatra vidvān-samaśnute na samaśnuta iti anupraśno'tyah; tad-

apākaranaāyocyate. madhyamo'nupraśnah antyāpākaranaādeva apākṛta iti tad-

apākaranaāya na yatyate."

127. TUBV, II, verses 539-542, pp. 341-343.

ELIGIBILITY FOR BRAHMAN-KNOWLEDGE

53

Brahman, i.e. becomes Brahman itself. It goes on to say: "He becomes the possessor of food and the eater of

food; and he becomes great by progeny, by cattle, by spiritual lustre and by fame." While Śaṅkara says that

these texts speak about the visible result (drṣṭa-phala) that accrues to the knower of Brahman, Sures'vara is of the

view that the Upaniṣad here narrates the fruit which results from meditation on the conditioned Brahman(saguṇa-vidyā-

phalam) with a view to praise the knowledge of nirguṇa-Brahman. Since the knower of Brahman, who remains as

Brahman, has fulfilled all his desires, it is not proper to say, according to Sures'vara, that these results accrue to

such a person.128 Again, at the beginning of the seventh section of the Bhṛgu-vallī the Upaniṣad says: "His vow is

that he should not deprecate food." Whose vow is this? Śaṅkara says that the vow spoken of here is enjoined on

the knower of Brahman (brahmavido vratam). But, according to Sures'vara, it is enjoined on one who meditates on

food (annopāsaka).129

VI

ELIGIBILITY FOR BRAHMAN-KNOWLEDGE

The question of eligibility for the study of the Vedānta involves a basic issue about the relation between the two

sections of the Veda. The ritual-section (karma-kāṇḍa) of the Veda deals with karma, its nature, the procedure to be

followed when performing it, and its fruit such as heaven (svarga). The knowledge-section (jñāna-kāṇḍa), on the con-

trary, is concerned with Brahman which is ever-existent, the means of attaining it, and the fruit, viz liberation which

accrues to one who attains Brahman-knowledge. Thus the two sections of the Veda are different, as also the two

Mīmāṁsās of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa which are

128. TUBV, III, verse 38, p. 470.

129. Ibid., III, verse 39, p. 471.

54

INTRODUCTION

expositions of the Veda. The difference between the two

sections of the Veda and the two Mīmāṁsās in respect of

subject matter (viṣaya) and fruit (phala) leads to a third

difference between them. The person who is eligible

(adhikārin) for the study of the one is different from the

one eligible for the study of the other. Thus the threefold

difference between the two sections of the Veda indicates

clearly that they are two different branches which have

to be kept apart for all purposes. They do not constitute

one body of doctrine, one Scriptural authority (ekaśāstra).

Though they are parts of the Veda, the ritual-section is

spoken of as Veda and the knowledge-section as Vedānta

with a view to emphasize the radical difference between

them.

Sures'vara says that the term āmnāya refers only to the

karma-kāṇḍa and not to the entire Veda.130 He criticizes the

Mīmāṁsā view which holds that the entire Veda is one

unit having its purport in action. The Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtra,

I, ii, 1, for instance, says that Scripture (amnāya) has its

purport in action. Sures'vara contends that the term

āmnāya here must refer only to a part of Scripture (āmnā-

yāṁśa), viz the ritual-section, and not to the entire Veda.

It is but proper to say that the purport of the injunctive

texts is in action. But the Vedānta texts, which are also Scrip-

tural texts and which are not injunctive, but existential,

do not have their purport in action. Nor are they subsi-

diary to the injunctive texts (vidhi-śeṣa).131 It should not

be said that the Vedānta texts which do not have their

purport in action are futile. The Taittirīyopaniṣad says,

"The knower of Brahman attains the highest."132 The

Vedānta texts have not only fruit (phala) of their own,

but a fruit which is perceptible (drṣṭa-phala), which can

130. SV, Ed., T.M.P. Mahadevan (University of Madras, 1958),

verse 271.

131. Ibid., verse 273.

132. TU, II, 1.

ELIGIBILITY FOR BRAHMAN - KNOWLEDGE

55

be attained here and now.133 The Vedānta, Sures'vara declares, is the means to the attainment of Self-knowledge, which is release.134 So each part of the Veda is authoritative in its own sphere — the ritual-section in respect of karma and the knowledge-section in respect of Brahman.

If the two parts of the Veda along with the two Mīmāṁsās, which are expositions thereof, are different, the persons eligible for their study are also different. It is laid down that a person who is to undertake the study of the Vedānta should fulfil the fourfold means of eligibility (sādhana-catuṣtaya), viz discrimination between what is eternal and what is transitory, non-attachment to the enjoyment of fruit here and hereafter, possession of virtues like control of the mind, control of the senses, indifference to objects, etc., and an intense desire for liberation.135 According to Śaṅkara, the fourfold means of eligibility is the condition antecedent for the study of the Vedānta, for the desire to know Brahman arises only when these conditions are fulfilled. There is restriction at both ends — with regard to the candidate on the one hand and the subject of inquiry on the other. Only a person who fulfils these conditions should resort to the study of the Vedānta, and a person who fulfils these conditions should study the Vedānta alone. If a person undertakes the study of the Vedānta without fulfilling the requirements, the fruit aimed at, viz Brahman-realization, cannot be attained. Since the desire to know Brahman, which arises when one fulfills the fourfold means to eligibility, is intense, it ceases to exist only when Brahman, the object of desire, is realized. So the intense desire to know Brahman (brahma-jijñāsā), which is the motivatory force, implies the eligible candi-

133. SV, verse 275.

134. Ibid., verse 280.

135. See SBSB, I, i, 1.

56

INTRODUCTION

date not only to undertake the inquiry into the Vedānta,

but also to pursue it till the goal is reached.¹³⁶

Sures'vara sets forth these conditions of eligibility for

the study of the Vedānta in different places in his writings.

A sannyāsin who has a pure mind, who is free from attach-

ment, and who has renounced all rites is eligible for

Brahman-knowledge. He says: "A person who has be-

come pure in mind by the performance of obligatory rites,

etc., and who is free from attachment to the fruits which

have accrued in the waking experience, in the same way

as one is free from attachment to the son, etc., seen in

dream (is eligible for knowledge)."¹³⁷ In another place

he says: "He alone is eligible to study the Vedānta who

has renounced all actions without residue, who desires to

shake off transmigration, and also to know the unity of

the Self."¹³⁸ "The discipline (necessary for the attain-

ment of knowledge) is of the nature of the quiescence of

all activity, of speech, mind, and body."¹³⁹ Knowing

the perishable nature of the things of the world through

perception, inference, and Scripture, one can discrimi-

nate the permanent from the transitory and be non-

attached to the latter comprising the choir of heaven and

the furniture of earth.¹⁴⁰ With faith and devotion as well

as a pure mind turned away from all pleasures lower than

mokṣa, one who is desirous of knowing Brahman should

approach, says Sures'vara, a competent teacher.¹⁴¹

It may be argued that it is impossible for one to be

in possession of the fourfold means of eligibility without

136. See Rāmarāyakavi, Śrī Śaṅkarāśaṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśah

(Guntur, 1953): "icchāyā drdhatvaṁ nāma nesyamāna-viṣaya-pra-

vartakatvam, kintu isyamāna-viṣaya-prāpti-paryantatvam." p. 11.

137. TUBV, II, verse 6, p. 7.

138. SV, verse, 12.

139. Ibid, verse 281; BUBV, IV, iv, verses 1203-1270.

140. TUBV, II, verse 7.

141. Ibid, III, verses 5-6, p. 455.

ELIGIBILITY FOR BRAHMAN-KNOWLEDGE

57

the study of the Vedānta. It is only after studying the

Vedānta and realizing the nature of Brahman that it will

be possible for one to discriminate the eternal from the

transitory and develop non-attachment towards transitory

things. The problem which has to be solved may be

stated in the form of a dilemma. If Brahman is not

known, eligibility for knowledge is not possible; and if

it is known, eligibility is not necessary.

Suresvara contends that there is a way out of this

dilemma as the alternatives are not collectively exhaustive.

It is not a case of Brahman-Ātman being either known or

not known; but it is a case of Brahman-Ātman being both

known and not known. And so there is a third alternative

which has not been taken into consideration by the critic.

Even before one begins to inquire into the Vedānta with a

view to know Brahman-Ātman, one has a general know-

ledge (āpāta-jñāna) of it through the formal study (adhyayana) of the Veda. There is the injunction that every per-

son shall study his own section of the Veda. One should

not only study the Veda, but understand its meaning as

well. In the course of the formal study one comes across

various Scriptural texts which declare that Brahman is

eternal, that whatever is got through action is perishable,

that everything other than Brahman is perishable, etc.

Though one has this knowledge in a general way even

before the commencement of the inquiry into Brahman,

such a knowledge is not free from doubt, and is not firmly

established, because it has not been systematically inquired

into. It means that Brahman-Ātman is known and also

not known. Though to start with one has only a general

knowledge as a result of the formal study of the Veda

along with the auxiliary disciplines, it has kindled an

intense desire for attaining a firm knowledge of Brahman.

Such a person is, indeed, eligible for the study of the

Vedānta. Suresvara observes: “Eligibility results even for

58

INTRODUCTION

him who, although ignorant, possesses a general knowledge about the truth of Brahman-Ātman and who desires knowledge and release.'"142

As a result of the study of the Veda and its auxiliary disciplines, one must have the urge towards release, which presupposes the preliminary discipline in the form of the discrimination between the eternal and the transitory, renunciation of the enjoyment of happiness, and so on, comprised in the fourfold means of eligibility. Sureśvara explains how in the absence of the urge towards release it will not be possible for one to attain the highest end, viz liberation, as follows: "One who has no urge towards release will not approach a preceptor. In the absence of a preceptor there is no hearing of the sacred text. Without hearing the sacred text, there are no words and meanings to be inquired into. In the absence of words and their meanings on what should rational inquiry rest ? Without such an inquiry there is no comprehension of the significance of the sacred sentence. Without that comprehension, ignorance cannot be destroyed. Without the destruction of ignorance the attainment of the supreme goal is impossible."141 So a person who has an intense urge towards release and who has renounced all karma is eligible for the study of the Vedānta.

Renunciation is not an affair of a moment which one can resort to in a fit of momentary disgust. Nor does Advaita recommend it indiscriminately to each and every one with a view to become eligible for the study of the Vedānta. One has to climb a steep and arduous path from the stage in which one accepts the world in all its reality to that in which one rejects it as non-real. This will be obvious if we consider the stages that precede the act of

142. SV, verse 283.

143. NS, II, 7-10.

ELIGIBILITY FOR BRAHMAN-KNOWLEDGE 59

renunciation and the stages that follow it till one attains Brahman-realization, as worked out by Suresvara.144

The act of renunciation for the purpose of knowing Brahman (vividisā-sannyāsa) must be preceded by (1) the performance of obligatory and occasional rites (nitya-naimittika-karmānusthāna), (2) purification of the mind (cittasuddhi), (3) the conviction about the utter uselessness of the things of the world (saṁsārāsāratā-drṣṭi), (4) the desire to renounce the world (saṁsārajihāsā), (5) the giving up of desire for son, etc. (eṣanātraya-tyāga), and (6) an intense desire to know Brahman (vividiṣā).

It is only when a spiritual aspirant has come to the stage of vividisā-sannyāsa, i.e. renunciation of karma as well as the things of the world for the purpose of knowing Brahman, that he is called upon to undertake the enquiry into Brahman by means of guided study (śravaṇa), rational reflection (manana), and repeated contemplation (nididhyāsana).

When the threefold discipline of śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana leads to Brahman-intuition, the wise man who has realized Brahman, who remains as Brahman, has, indeed, renounced everything.

Steeped as he is in Brahman, his is the life of total renunciation; and this renunciation which follows his spiritual awakening is termed vidvat-sannyāsa as distinguished from vividisā-sannyāsa, which is prescribed as a preparation for Brahman-realization.

The requirements for the study of the Vedānta are undoubtedly stiff and the stage as well as the importance of renunciation as formulated in Advaita is not to be trifled with.

144. BUBV, II, iv, verses 2-5.

VII

THE SELF AND THE NOT-SELF

According to Advaita, Brahman-Ātman which is the ultimate reality is one and non-dual. The pluralistic universe of our day-to-day experience which appears to be real is non-real, illusory. It is rooted in avidyā which conceals the real and projects the false. Suresvara says, "Thus this world of duality, falsely presenting itself, phenomenal in nature, rooted in error, and eluding rational scrutiny, must be clearly distinguished from the Self through reason."145

The elucidation of the nature of the Self as distinguished from the not-Self, which is of great importance in the metaphysics of Advaita, constitutes the central theme of the entire second chapter of the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi. Suresvara explains the distinction between the Self and the not-Self not only on the basis of Scriptural authority, but by means of reasoning as well. But it is only through Scripture that one can know that the jīva in its essential nature is no other than Brahman. Suresvara says: "Distinguishing the Self from what is known and (the resulting) cognition and also from the knower, and again distinguishing the Self from their opposites, which are all set up by avidyā, one should know, 'I am Brahman,' from the śruti text."146

Brahman-Ātman, says Suresvara, is self-luminous (svayamjyotih).147 It is eternal consciousness (sadāvagatirūpah).148 It cannot be revealed by any other thing (ananyānubhavam).149 It is the absolute which is unconditioned.

145. NS, II, 44.

146. TUBV, II, verse 479, p. 312.

147. Ibid., II, verse 682, p. 423.

148. Ibid.

149. Ibid., II, verse 157, p. 144.

tioned (kevalam).150 It is the supreme bliss that cannot

be specified (niḥsambodham parānandam).151 It is non-dual

bliss (advaitānanda-lakṣaṇam).152 It it independent of all

means (sādhanaisvyrham).153 It transcends means-end

relation (asādhanam-asādhyam).154 It is not what is con-

veyed by the sentence sense (avākyārthātmakam).155 It

is free from attributes (nirguṇa),156 free from perceptible

and other qualities (drśyatvādi-vivarjitah);157 free from

differentiation (nirvikalpah).158 It is not touched by

duality (dvaitāspṛk).159 It is neither an effect nor a cause

(akāryakāraṇam).160 It is ever-existent and free from

action (nityah, karmavimuktah).161 It is neither an object

nor the subject of knowledge (adrśyam, nāpi dṛśikṛt).162

It is trans-empirical (alaukika).163 It is beyond the five

sheaths such as the sheath of food (rasādeḥ pañcakāt-

param).164 It is immutable consciousness (kūṭasthavijñā-

nam).165 It is constant by its very nature (svato dh-

ruvah).166 It is the innermost being which is one and

150. Ibid., II, verse 657, p. 409.

151. Ibid., II, verse 427, p. 286.

152. Ibid., II. verse 521, p. 332.

153. Ibid.

154. Ibid., II, verse 490, p. 317.

155. Ibid., II, verse 618, p. 388.

156. Ibid., II, verse 721, p. 443.

157. Ibid., II, verse 461, p. 304.

158. Ibid., II, verse 397, p. 272.

159. Ibid., II, verse 234, p. 179.

160. Ibid., II, verse 140, p. 132.

161. Ibid., II, verse 717, p. 441.

162. Ibid., II, verse 684, p. 424.

163. Ibid., II, verse 609, p. 382.

164. Ibid., II, verse 129, p. 125.

165. Ibid., II, verse 720, p. 442.

166. Ibid., II, verse 651, p. 406.

62

INTRODUCTION

immutable (pratyagekam avikriyam).167 It is free from changes (nirvikāram).168

The not-Self, on the contrary, is what is perceived. Having name and form, it is endowed with attributes. It is finite and composite. It is involved in action as a factor therein. It is subject to change.

According to Suresvara, the Self can be distinguished from the not-Self on the basis of the following three criteria. (1) The Self being of the nature of consciousness is self-established. (2) Being immutable, it has no changes like origination, destruction, etc. Let us consider one by one these three criteria.

VIII

THE SELF IS SVATASSIDDHA

There are Scriptural texts which declare that Brahman is of the nature of consciousness and that the Self is identical with Brahman.169 The Self is, therefore, of the nature of consciousness. It is through consciousness that everything, whether it is an object in the external world, or one's own body, whether it is a mental state like pleasure or mind itself, is known. By itself the internal organ (antahkarana) which is material cannot cognize or reveal anything. If it gets the status of a knower (jñātā), it is because of the fact that consciousness, which is the Self, is reflected therein. The internal organ, carrying

167. Ibid., II, verse 2, p. 69.

168. Ibid., II, verse 356, p. 248.

169. TU, II, 1: "satyam jñānam anantam brahma;" Māndūkya Upanisad, II: "ayamātmā brahma."

THE SELF IS SVATASSIDDHA

63

the reflection of consciousness, knows itself as "I" (aham).

In the same way it knows other objects which are present-

ed to it as "this" (idam). Starting from the internal

organ which is material and which is other than the Self,

every object is known only through consciousness. Even

the mental mode is known through the Witness-conscious-

ness. The internal organ is never constant. It is subject

to modifications. The mental modes, i.e. the changes of

the internal organ, which appear and disappear one after

another, are known only through the Witness-conscious-

ness which alone is eternal and self-luminous. A series

can never be aware of itself as a series. It can be known

only through another factor which is both permanent and

a witness to it. That the mental modes are in a state of

flux can be known only through the Witness-consciousness.170

It is usual to say that we gain our knowledge of things

through some pramāṇa. But a pramāṇa can function as a

pramāṇa only through the help of consciousness. We can

go even one step further. The very distinction between

pramāṇa and apramāṇa presupposes the work of conscious-

ness.171 If we say that something is a pramāṇa and that

something else is not a pramāṇa, it is because of the Witness-

consciousness. In the same way it is only through the

Witness-consciousness, says Sures'vara, that we are able to

distinguish a valid cognition (pramā) from an erroneous

one (ābhāsa-jñāna).172 Consciousness which is presupposed

in all acts of knowing is the basis of all knowledge. While

other objects are established through consciousness, the

latter is self-established (svatassiddha), for it is self-luminous

170. TUBV, II, verse 94, p. 110; II, verse 123, p, 123; II,

verse 411, p. 280; II, verse 666, p. 414.

171. Ibid., II, verse 619, p. 388.

172. Ibid.

64

INTRODUCTION

by its very nature. The Self which is consciousness is

said to be self-luminous in the sense that, while it is not

revealed by any other means or agency, it reveals other

objects.173

The argument that the Self can be known through

some other factor cannot stand examination. What is that

other factor, it has to be asked, that knows the Self? The

not-Self which is insentient and which is dependent on the

Self for its own illumination cannot be the knower of the

Self. Nor can it be said that the Self knows itself. One

and the same Self cannot be both the knower and the

known, the subject and the object of knowledge, at the

same time. It is no argument to say that it is known

through another Self or consciousness, for the Self is one

and non-dual. Since everything other than the Self is

insentient, it is absurd to suggest that some other factor

than the Self knows the Self. So it has to be admitted

that the Self is self-established,174 and that what is pre-

supposed in all means of knowledge cannot be established

through them.175

In fact, Scripture itself teaches that the Self which is

consciousness is self-luminous and that it cannot be known

through any other factor. The Katha Upanisad, for

instance, says: "Everything shines only after that shining

light."176 The Mundaka Upanisad declares: "The wise

realize everywhere that which cannot be perceived and

grasped."177 If the Self were to be an object of knowledge,

it can never be a knower in the same way as a pot which

173. "ananyābāsyatu'e sati svetara-sarvāvabhāsakatvam svayamprkā-

satvam."

174. NS, II, 36 and 57.

175. TUBV, II, verses 525-526, pp. 334-335.

176. II, ii, 15.

177. I, i, 6.

THE SELF IS SVATASSIDDHA

65

is an object of knowledge is not a knower. But Scripture

says that the Self is a knower.178 It follows, therefore,

that the Self is not an object of knowledge. That is why

Suresvara says: “The knowability (of Brahman) is denied

by śruti texts themselves such as ‘By what should one

know the knower?’ ‘Thou shalt not see the seer of seeing,’

which are in the injunctive form.”179 So Advaita holds

the view that the Self which is consciousness is self-

established.

If Brahman-Ātman is not an object which is known,

it must be treated, the critic argues, as unknown (aviditam).

This, however, is not desirable, so the critic maintains,

as it rules out the possibility of attaining the knowledge of

Brahman, which is the means to release. It will also

render Scripture, which purports to teach Brahman,

useless.

This argument is untenable. Brahman, according to

Advaita, is neither the known nor the unknown.180 It

was stated earlier that Brahman is no other than the

inward Self of the individual. The latter which is of the

nature of consciousness is always immediate. That is why

Scripture speaks of Brahman as what is immediate and

direct.181 Since Brahman being identical with the inward

Self is immediate (aparokṣa), the attainment of the know-

178. BU, IV, iii, 32: “It becomes (transparent) like water, one,

the witness, and without a second.”

179. TUBV, II, verse 681, p. 423.

There are Scriptural texts, e.g., Kaṭha Upaniṣad, I, iii, 12,

which say that Brahman-Ātman is seen through a pointed and fine

intellect. It should not be concluded from these texts that the Self is an

object of knowledge. The idea sought to be conveyed by these texts is

that the Self is vrtti-vyāpya and not phala-vyāpya.

180. See the Kena Upaniṣad, I, 4:

"anyadeva tadviditādatho aviditādadhi."

181. BU, III, iv, 1.

56

INTRODUCTION

ledge of Brahman necessary for release is assuredly within the reach of spiritual aspirants. But this should not be construed to mean that Brahman is known in the sense that stocks and stones are known. It is only through Scripture that one gets the knowledge that Brahman being identical with the inward Self is immediate, and so Scripture is not useless.

We may lay bare the difficulty involved in viewing Brahman as either known or unknown as follows. Is Brahman-Ātman known or unknown? If the former, is it the case that it knows itself or that it is known by some other object? It cannot be said that it knows itself, because one and the same entity cannot at the same time be both the subject and the object of knowledge. Since everything other than the Self is insentient, it cannot be known by anything else. Nor can it be said that it is unknown. While it is intelligible to say that an object which is mediate (parokṣa) is not known, it makes no sense to say that Brahman-Ātman which is always immediate is not known. Sures'vara argues that only an insentient object can be said to be either known or unknown.32 When we have the cognition of an object like tree, we treat that object as known. When we do not have the cognition of an object, that object is said to be unknown. So the characteristic of being known or unknown belongs to an insentient object. Since Brahman-Ātman cannot be said to be either known or unknown, Scripture declares that it is different from the known and the unknown.183

It is necessary at this stage to clarify the sense in which the Self is said to be the knower (draṣṭā or jñātā) and also as knowledge (jñānam). There are Scriptural texts like "It becomes (transparent) like water, one, the

182. TUBV, II, verse 478, p. 311.

183. Kena Upaniṣad, I, 4.

THE SELF IS SVATASSIDDHA

67

witness, and without a second,"184 "He is never known,

but is the kncwer; there is no other knower but Him,"185

etc., which speak of the Self as the knower. Since

Brahman-Ātman reveals everything, it is spoken of as the

knower and also as knowledge.186 'This characterization of

Brahman as the knower or the witness holds good only

from the relative standpoint of avidyā. The uitimate

reality is one and non-dual. Since in reality there are no

objects to be known or revealed, Brahman cannot be the

knower. So long as there is vyavahāra, by presupposing

objects which are known, we speak of Brahman-Ātman as

the knower or the witness. Our mode of speech which

involves the distinction between the Seif as the knower

and the not-Self as the known is meaningful only in the

context of avidyā, which is presupposed in all our discourse

and business of life.187 While Brahman-in-itself is not

the knower, Brahman-in-relation-to-the-world is said to be

the knower. In the words of Sures'vara: "The instruction

of śruti is that Brahman is surely different from what is

known, that it is different from what is not known, and

that it is different from both the known and the

knower."188

The same explanation holds good for the Scriptural

text which speaks of Brahman as of the naure of know-

ledge or consciousness. It is the nature of knowledge to

reveal objects which are presented to it. It means that

Brahman is defined as of the nature of knowledge by pre-

supposing objects which are revealed by it. From the

184. BU, IV, iii, 32.

185. Ibid., III, vii, 23.

186. See Srī Sankarāsañkara-bhāsya-vimarśah, p. 172:

"jñāyate bhāsyate sarvamaneneti sarvāvabhāsakaṁ brahma jñāna-

śabdasya mukhyārthah."

187. TUBV, II, verse 651, p. 406.

188. Ibid., II, verse 477, p. 311.

68

INTRODUCTION

absolute standpoint, Brahman is nirviśeṣa. Brahman-itself cannot be expressed by words. Scripture itself says that words along with the mind turn back without reaching Brahman. That is why the ‘affirmative’ Upaniṣadic text, “Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite,’189 is interpreted in a secondary sense as stating that Brahman is other than the real, the insentient, and the finite.

When superficially viewed, it may appear that Scripture which speaks about Brahman as (1) the knower (jñātā), (2) as knowledge (jñānam), and (3) as that which eludes the grasp of both speech and mind (vāṅmanasā aviṣaya) is a veritable babel of confusion. But on a careful examination it will be seen that Scripture resorts to these modes of speech with a view to help the spiritual aspirant understand Brahman step by step. First of all, Brahman-Ātman is characterized as the knower with a view to distinguish it from the insentient objects which are known. In the next stage, it is spoken of as knowledge which constitutes the essence of the knower. Finally, since Brahman is free from all attributes and specifications, Scripture says that Brahman-Ātman is beyond the reach of both speech and mind. The first two stages hold good in the relative sphere of vyavahāra, while the last is true of Brahman from the absolute standpoint. There is, however, an important difference between the first two stages. The Self is a knower because of its erroneous identification with the internal organ.190 But when there is no such identification with the internal organ, it is spoken of not as a

189. TU, II, 1.

190. See Śrī Śaṅkarāśaṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśah, p. 97: “ahamkūara-tādātmyā-adhyāsena hi bhavati jñātā pratyagātmā... vyavahāradaśāyāmeva ātmano vāstavam rūpam jñānam. ahamkāra-tādātmyā-adhyāsa-prayuktatvena avāstavam aupādhikam tu jñātrtvam... paramārtha-daśāyām ātmā jñānasvarūpopi na bhavati, viṣayaprakāśakatva-lakṣaṇa-jñānatvābhāvāt.”

knower, but as knowlerige. While the first one involves

adhyāsa, the second does not. It means that whiie the Self

is a knower because of its association with the upādhi, viz

the interna! organ, it is knowledge by its essential nature

when it is free from the upādhi.191

IX

THE SELF IS NIRGUNA

We shail now consider the second criterion auccording

to which the Self is devoid of attributes (nirguna). Accord-

ing to Advaita; Brahman-Ātinan is pure, undifferentiated

consciousness (nirviṣeṣa-cinmātram). 'Though the Self, in

rcality, is free from attributes, the attributes of the bcdy,

the senses, and the mind are superimposed on it due to

ignorance. The characteristics of the body (śarīra) such

as its birth and death, its colour and other features are

superimposed on the Self because of the false identification

of the Self with the body. When a person says, "I am burnt,"

"I am black," and so on, he superimposes the attributes of

the body on the Self or the "I". Blindness which is an attri-

bute of the sense-organ (indriya) is superimposed on the

Self when one says, "I am blind." In the same way, when

a person says, "I am the knower," he superimposes the

attribute of the intellect (buddhi) on the Self. The attri-

bute of the mind (manas) is superimposed on the Self when

one says, "I perform the various mental operations such

as upāsanā." In all these cases there is the erroneous

identification of the Self with the body, the senses, the

intellect, and the mind as the case may be leading to the

superimposition of the attributes of the not-Self on the

Self.192 We have to explain the locutions such as "I am

191. Ibid., p. 98:

"ātmano jñātṛtvameva aupādhikam, jñanatvam tu svābhāvika-

meva."

192. See TUBV, II, verses 225-229, pp. 173-176.

70

INTRODUCTION

black," "I am blind," "I am happy," which seem to lend

support to the view that the Self or the "I" is endowed

with attributes, only on the basis of the erroneous identifi-

cation of the Self with the not-Self. Suresvara says: "The

ego-consciousness, the feeling of mineness, will, and desire

are not the attributes of the Self just as leanness, for

example, is not the attribute of the Self, for they are

experienced as objective and they are subject to cessation.

In the latter respect they are like the garment one may

wear."193 Since the characteristics of the subtle and

gross bodies, which are not-Self, are erroneously ascribed

to the Self which is really free from all of them, the Self

must be discriminated from the not-Self and shown to be

nirviśeṣa in itself."194

Critics of Advaita do not accept the view that Brahman-

Ātman is devoid of attributes. The Scriptural text which

says that "Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite" is

interpreted by them to mean that Brahman has reality,

knowledge, and infinitude as its attributes. They argue

that there is no object which is devoid of attributes. Every

object is known as such-and-such, i.e. as possessing certain

attributes. This, the critics urge, is as much true of

Brahman as it is of any other object. In determining the

nature of any object we are guided by the evidence of

pramāṇa. Neither perception (pratyakṣa) nor inference

(anumāna) nor verbal testimony (śabda) lends support to

the existence of an object which is devoid of attributes."195

If so, how could it be said that Brahman is devoid of attri-

butes? The truth is, according to the critics, that Brahman

193. NS, II, 22.

194. TUBV, II, verses 224, p. 172.

195. See Rāmānuja, Śrībhāṣyam, Ed., Sri Uttamur Vira-raghava-

charya (Madras, 1963), I, i, 1, p. 48; "nirviśeṣa vastunīdam pramāṇamiti na śakyate vaktum; saviśeṣavastuviṣayatvāt sarva-

pramāṇānām."

is not pure, undifferentiated Being. On the contrary,

Brahman possesses attributes like reality, knowledge,

bliss, and so on.

It is necessary to examine at some length this argu-

ment of the critics as it is directed against the central

thesis of Advaita. According to Advaita, Brahman-Ātman,

the ultimate reality, is one and non-dual and is devoid of

attributes. It is free not only from sajātīya- and vijātīya-

bheda, but also from svagata-bheda. It is pure undifferen-

tiated Being. There are Scriptural texts which say that

Brahman-Ātman is nirguṇa. It means that the ultimate

reality is free from attributes of every kind - sacred as

well as profane, auspicious as well as evil. There is no

justification for the view that the Scriptural texts which

say that Brahman is nirguṇa purport to deny Brahman of

only evil qualities depending on prakṛti. The negation of

attributes by these texts is not partial, but total. Since the

distinction between the sacred and the profane is mean-

ingful only in the context of the relative standpoint of the

vyāvahārika, the Upaniṣadic texts which declare that

Brahman is without qualities should not be interpreted in

a compromising way to mean that Brahman is free from

all evil qualities alone, but not from auspicious qualities

as well. Brahman-in-itself is nirguṇa — free from all quali-

ties, good as well as evil. It is through reasoning (yukti),

according to Sureśvara, that we must discriminate the

Self from the gross and subtle bodies.196 Here also we

may resort to reasoning for the purpose of vindicating

that the Self is devoid of all attributes.

The distinction between substance and attribute is not

possible in the case of the Self, which is partless (niravayava),

one (ekarasam), and non-dual (abhinnam). Sureśvara says

196. NS. II, 21.

72

INTRODUCTION

that the Self does not admit of internal distinction in any way.197 Just as the Self is not touched by duality objectively, so also it is not touched by duality subjectively: the Self, that is to say, is one in the real sense of the term.198 So we cannot treat it as a substance and consciousness, bliss, etc., as its attributes. Such a distinction is possible in the case of the mind which being known is an object of knowledge. The mind by its very nature is insentient. It gets the power of illumination because of its proximity to the Self which is unchanging consciousness. It is subject to modification inasmuch as it assumes the form of the object that is presented to it. The mind must, therefore, be dissociated from consciousness, the power of illumination with which it is falsely credited. But the position is quite different in the case of the Self. Consciousness is not an attribute of the Self; on the contrary, it constitutes the essence of the Self. In the same way, reality and bliss are not attributes of the Self, but they constitute the essence of the Self. The Self by its very nature is real, consciousness, and bliss. It is, therefore, wrong to say that consciousness, bliss, etc. are the attributes of the Self. In the words of Sures'vara:"The distinction between substance and attribute falls within the mind. It does not belong to the Self. Thus the Self is immediate awareness without any internal distinction, for there could be no ground for differentiation within it."199 In short, while the mind has consciousness and other attributes such as agency, the Self is consciousness, and has no attribute whatsoever, because it is one undifferentiated Being.

Further, an object which is perceived alone, says Sures'vara, possesses certain qualities, for only such an

197. TUBV, II, verse 583, p. 369.

198. Ibid., II, verse 234, p. 179.

199. NS, III, 13.

object is fit to be seen.200 The Self, as stated earlier, is adrśya,

i.e. it is not an object of perception. Perceptible qualities

are absent in it, because it is pure, undifferentiated cons-

ciousness. Commenting on the Upanisadic text, "adrśye

unātmye,"201 Suresvara argues that the Self is free

from generic as well as specific characteristics, gross as

well as subtle forms.202 He drives home the point by

inviting our attention in his connection to a parallel

treatment of this problem in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the

Taittirīya Upaniṣads.

The Bṛhadāraṇyaka first describes Brahman as having

two forms - the gross (mūrta) consisting of earth, water,

and fire, and the subtle (amūrta) consisting of air and

ether.203 After explaining the two forms of Brahman, it

proceeds to describe it as "not this, not this" with a view

to show that Brahman is really free from these two

forms.204 The two negative particles are used by Scrip-

ture in an all-inclusive sense to deny every possible specifi-

cation or attribute that one may think of with regard to

Brahman. The procedure that is adopted here is based

on the well-known technique of superimposition (adhyāropa)

and subsequent denial (apavāda). The Taittirīya, too,

follows the same procedure. It first of all says that

Brahman became the gross (sat) and the subtle (tyat).205

But subsequently it denies Brahman of these two forms

when it describes it as adrśya, anātmya, etc.206 What is

given or affirmed alone, says Suresvara, can be negated.

Negation presupposes affirmation. From the statement

200. TUBV, II, verse 444, p. 295.

201. TU, II, vii.

202. TUBV, II, verses 445-446, p. 296.

203. BU, II, iii, 1-3.

204. Ibid., II, iii, 6.

205. TU, II, vi.

206. Ibid., II, vii.

74

INTRODUCTION

that Brahman became the gross and the subtle, one may think that these two forms really exist in Brahman and that the latter is, therefore, saviśeṣa. It is with a view to remove this wrong notion that Scripture declares in the sequel that Brahman is adrśya, anātmya, etc., i.e. it says that Brahman is free from specifications and attributes that one may think of, and that one cannot, therefore, think of these forms and attributes as inherent in it.207

It is necessary in this connection to examine the view that the Upaniṣadic text, “Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite,” which is meant as a definition of Brahman, intimates it as qualified by attributes and not as one, undifferentiated Being devoid of attributes. Two arguments are adduced in support of this view. The first argument lays stress on the significance of the co-ordinate relation that obtains among the words ‘real,’ “knowledge,” etc., with a view to show that Brahman is qualified by attributes. Words which are in co-ordinate relation denote one thing as qualified by several attributes208 as when we say, “a blue, big, fragrant lily;” here we refer to the flower “lily” as qualified by the three attributes, viz its blue colour, its big size, and its fragrant smell. These words are not synonyms, and each word is used for a specific reason. In the same way, the Scriptural text, “Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite,” denotes Brahman as qualified by three attributes, viz reality, knowledge, and infinitude. Just as blueness, bigness, and fragrance inhere in the lily as its qualities, so also reality, knowledge, and infinitude, according to this argument, inhere in Brahman as its qualities.

207. TUBV, II, verses 449-450, pp. 298-299.

208. See Śribhāṣyam, I, i, 1, p. 90: “ekasyaiva vastuno’neka-viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭatā-pratipādanaparatvāt sā-mānādhikaraṇyasya.’

THE SELF IS NIRGUNA

75

There is yet another argument in support of the view that Brahman is not devoid of attributes. In the Upaniṣadic text the words "real," etc., are not used to state the essential nature of Brahman. If the text purports to set forth the essential nature of Brahman, it can do so by any one word, and this would render the employment of the other two words useless.209 But different words which are in co-ordinate relation have been used for different reasons. It follows, therefore, that this text states the defining attributes of Brahman and that the latter which is qualified by several attributes is saguṇa.

Both the arguments are untenable. According to Advaita, the Upaniṣadic text, "Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite," conveys the knowledge of Brahman only indirectly through the secondary meaning and not directly through the primary sense. The very fact that the words in this text are in co-ordinate relation is the reason for interpreting this text through implication. There is difficulty in construing the meaning of these words, which are in co-ordinate relation, in the primary sense. The three words—real, knowledge, and infinite—which are used as a definition of Brahman do not go together. Let us first consider the definition of Brahman in terms of knowledge. In our ordinary discourse we understand "knowledge" or cognition as something which has a beginning and an end, because one cognition is followed by another cognition. We also understand it as finite or limited, because it is different from both the knower and the known. If Brahman is defined in terms of knowledge, and if knowledge, as ordinarily understood, is both temporary and finite, it makes no sense to apply the words "real" and "infinite" to Brahman. The same difficulty arises when

209. Ibid., p. 89 :

"ekenaiva padena svarūpam pratipannamiti padāntara-prayogavaiyarthyvāt."

76

INTRODUCTION

we examine the other two words. An entity, e.g. ether as understood in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, may be both real and infinite. But it is not of the nature of knowledge. In other words, even if Brahman is understood as both real and infinite, it cannot at the same time be defined in terms of knowledge. Again, knowledge may be real in the sense that it leads to the accomplishment of some end; but there is, so far as our ordinary experience goes, no instance of knowledge which is infinite. It means that even if Brahman is knowledge and real, it cannot be defined in terms of infinitude. In short, we cannot construe the meanings of the words "real", etc., in the primary sense by placing them in co-ordinate relation. So the Scriptural text, "Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite," which is intended as a definition of Brahman, intimates it only through the secondary sense. The similarity between this text and the sentence about lily cited earlier is superficial. In the example of the lily, the co-ordinate relation holds good among the several words whose meanings can be construed in the primary sense. But this does not hold good in the case of the Scriptural text that we are considering. So while the sentence, "It is a big, blue, fragrant lily," conveys the knowledge of an object as qualified by several attributes, the Scriptural text in question does not do so.

The Advaitin readily admits that the words "real," etc., contained in the text are not synonyms and that they serve to distinguish Brahman from everything else. By the word "real" Brahman is distinguished from what is unreal, by the word "knowledge," from what is insentient, and by the word "infinite," from what is finite. Since this Scriptural text intimates Brahman only indirectly by negating the unreal, the insentient, and the finite from it, it does not lend support to the view that Brahman is endowed with attributes such as reality, knowledge, and so on.210

TUBV, II, verse 98, p. 112.

THE SELF IS NIRGUNA

77

If the word "knowledge" does not denote Brahman

directly, but indicates it only through the secondary sense,

Brahman, the critic argues, is not of the nature of know-

ledge. By the same reasoning it has to be said, according

to the critic, that Brahman is not of the nature of bliss.

This conclusion is not unwelcome to Advaita.211 It has

already been stated that Brahman-Ātman is spoken of as of

the nature of knowledge, etc., from the relative standpoint

of the vyāvahārika. Brahman which is beyond the reach of

both speech and mind cannot be referred to as of this

nature or that. Brahman-in-itself is nirguṇa. That is why

Scriptural texts like "Brahman is real, knowledge, and

infinite" are explained in the secondary sense. Advaita

maintains that though Scripture does not directly express

the nature of Brahman, it nevertheless reveals its nature

indirectly, and so the utility of Scripture cannot be denied.

In the words of Suresvara: "All the words which are

used to convey the knowledge (of Brahman) return with-

out expressing their sense directly. But they return only

after revealing it (indirectly)."212

Let us consider another argument adduced by the

critics to show that Brahman is not free from attributes.

The critics argue that Brahman is not mere bliss, but a

subject enjoying bliss.213 It means that Brahman has

bliss as its attribute, and that it is, therefore, saguṇa. The

Taittirīya texts, "That is one bliss of Brahman,"214 and

211. See Śrī Śaṅkarāśaṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśah, p. 176:

"yāvadvyavahāraṁ brahma saviśeṣameva iti uktatvāt. paramārthato

hi sarva avabhāsakatvādayo brahmaṇi na santīti brahma nirviśeṣam ityuktam.

tasmād-ñānamānandam vā na brahmaṇaḥ svarūpam."

212. TUBV, II veres 600, p. 377.

213. See Rāmānuja, Śrībhāṣyam, I, i, 1, p. 94:

"na ānandamātram brahma apitvānandi."

214. TU, II, viii.

78

INTRODUCTION

"He knowing the bliss of Brahman,"215 are cited in sup-

port of this view. Since these texts speak about the bliss

of Brahman, it follows, according to the critics, that

Brahman is different from bliss and that the two are re-

lated as substance and attribute.

This argument is untenable. Of the two Scriptural

texts cited above, the first one refers to the bliss enjoyed

by the Hiraṇyagarbha who pervades the entire universe in

the cosmic and individual forms.216 It does not refer to

the supreme Brahman. The bliss which is Brahman is

infinite, immeasurable. But here the Scriptural text speaks

about the bliss that is measurable, because it says that if

the bliss of the Virāj be multiplied a hundred times, it is

one bliss of Brahmā, i.e. the Hiraṇyagarbha or the Sūtrāt-

man. Further, Brahman is bliss, and bliss is Brahman;

and it is wrong to think of any difference between

bliss and that which has bliss, for Scripture itself says that

if a spiritual aspirant creates even a little difference in

Brahman, he is tormented by fear. In the words of

Sures'vara: "Here (in Brahman) there cannot be even the

slightest difference between bliss and that which has

bliss, since it has been stated by śruti itself that one who

makes a little difference (in Brahman is struck with

fear)."217

In the light of the foregoing explanation it follows

that there is no justification for interpreting the other

Taittirīya text, "He knowing the bliss of Brahman," in

terms of difference between Brahman and bliss. Sures'vara

argues that Brahman and bliss are not two different enti-

ties related in terms of substance and attribute. Just as

there is no Rāhu apart from his head, even so there is no

215. Ibid., II, ix.

216. TUBV, II, verse 515, p. 329.

217. Ibid., II, verse 518, p. 331.

THE SELF IS NIRGUNA

79

Brahman apart from bliss. The duality signified by the expression "brahmaṇo ānandam" is figurative as in "rāhoḥ śiraḥ." To quote Suresvara: "Here the duality signified by the expression 'of Brahman' is figurative as in the case of the 'head of Rahu.' There is no duality in the real sense, since Brahman is without attributes."218 This view that bliss is not an attribute but the very essence of Brahman is supported by another Scriptural text, "He knew bliss as Brahman."219

The critics argue in a different way to show that Brahman is qualified by attributes. They maintain that every object is saviśeṣa as it has some attribute or other. This, according to them, is as much true of Brahman as it is of any other object. If so, Brahman, like any other object, is saviśeṣa. This argument cannot stand examination. The difficulty here is that the critics cannot explain the inherence of an attribute in an object whatever it is. An object-with-attribute is saviśeṣa; and an object-devoid-of-attribute is nirviśeṣa. Does an attribute inhere in an object-with-attribute or in an object-devoid-of attribute? It cannot be the latter. If an object by its very nature is such that it is devoid of attribute, it is absurd to say that an attribute inheres in it. To speak of an object-devoid-of-attribute and also to say that an attribute inheres in it is a contradiction in terms. In order to avoid this absurdity it may be argued that an attribute inheres in an object-with-attribute. A little analysis is enough to show that even this alternative is untenable. The notion of an object-with-attribute is complex as it refers to two entities viz an object and an attribute. When it is said that an attribute (say A) inheres in an object-with-attribute, is the latter attribute (B) different from the former attribute (A)

218. Ibid., II, verse 721, p. 443.

219. TU, III, vi.

80

INTRODUCTION

or not? If it is said that it (B) is not different, it involves

the fallacy of self-dependence (ātmāśraya) as it amounts

to saying that the attribute A even before its inherence in

the object is already there. If it is said that it (B) is

different, then does it exist in an object-with-attribute or

in an object-devoid-of-attribute? It cannot be said that it

(B) exists in an object-devoid-of-attribute because of the

absurdity that arises, viz an attribute existing in an object-

devoid-of-attribute. If it is said that it (B) exists in an

object-with-attribute, is the latter attribute (say C) diffe-

rent from the first one (A) or not? If it is not different, there

arises the fallacy of mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya).

If it is different, then does it (C) inhere in an object-with-

attribute or in an object-devoid-of-attribute? It cannot be

the latter because of the absurdity, viz an attribute inhering

in an object-devoid-of-attribute. If it is said that it (C) in-

heres in an object-with-attribute, then is the latter attribute

(say D) different from the first attribute (A) or not? If it is

not different, there arises the fallacy of circle in reasoning

(cakraka). If it is different, does it (D) exist is an object-

with-attribute or in an object-devoid-of-attribute? It can-

not be the latter because of the absurdity of an attribute

inhering in an object-devoid-of-attribute. If the former,

it leads to infinite regress (anavasthā).220 It is, therefore,

impossible to give an intelligible account of the existence

of an attribute in an object. If so, the very concept of

saviśeṣa is unintelligible. The notion of an object with

attribute appears to be intelligible, but it does not bear

scrutiny. If so, how is it possible to say that knowledge,

bliss, and so on are the attributes of Brahman?

According to Advaita, Brahman-Ātman is nirdharmaka.

The critics who are bent upon proving that Brahman-

220. See Srī Saṅkarāsaṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśah, p. 28, for the

pattern of argument developed here.

THE SELF IS NIRGUṆA

81

Ātman is not pure undifferentiated Being criticize the

Advaita standpoint in a different way. Does nirdhar-

makatva as an attribute exist in Brahman or not? If the

former, how could it be said, the critics argue, that

Brahman is nirdharmaka; and if the latter, Brahman

cannot be nirdharmaka.

This argument is fallacious. It is absurd to say that

there it the attribute, viz nirdharmakatva, in an object

which is said to be devoid of attribute (nirdharmaka). This

point may be made clear by citing an analogous case. It

is absurd to say that there is the attribute, viz gunatva, in

a guna which is said to be nirguna. A quality (guna) is

devoid of qualities. We do not predicate qualities of

qualities. If it be said that in a guna there is another guna,

then by the same logic the latter, too, must be said to have

another guna, which, again, must be said to have another

guna and so on. Such an argument is vitiated by the

fallacy of infinite regress. When Brahman-Ātman is said

to be devoid of attributes (nirdharmaka), it is absurd to say

that, if not anything else, at least nirdharmakatva must be

the attribute of Brahman-Ātman.

According to Advaita, the Self is pure, non-relational,

undifferentiated consciousness (nirviśesa-cinmātram). The

critics object to this on the ground that when we examine

our consciousness we always find it relational in two ways.

When, for example, I say, “I saw this object,” my

consciousness is undoubtedly relational and is, therefore,

differentiated inasmuch as it is my consciousness which has

a certain object for its content. This argument first of

all focusses its attention on the intentionality of conscious-

ness. Consciousness is always consciousness of something—

consciousness of a tree, consciousness of a table, and so

on. It means that consciousness is always related to some

object which is transcendent to it. There is no such

82

INTRODUCTION

thing as contentless consciousness. In the second place, this argument emphasizes that consciousness is always consciousness of some one. Consciousness cannot hang in the mid-air; it must have its anchorage in a conscious Self Just as consciousness involves a content, even so it involves a person to whom it belongs. It is always a case of my consciousness, or your consciousness, or his consciousness. In short, consciousness is two-way relational as it points to a content (viṣaya) on the one hand and as it requires a locus (āśraya) on the other. On the basis of this analysis it is argued that consciousness is an attribute belonging to a conscious Self and that it is also related to an object which is transcendent to it. The critics also claim that neither perception nor inference nor Scripture lends support to the Advaita view that there is pure, undifferentiated, non-relational consciousness.

Advaita does not deny the relational nature of consciousness in the states of waking and dream. Consciousness is undoubtedly intentional in these states as there are objects which are presented to it.221 Though consciousness in itself is undifferentiated and non-relational, it becomes intentional due to the work of avidyā. The Self which is pure consciousness is conditioned by the mind in the state of dream. The person who dreams creates a world of his own from his impressions of waking experience stored up in the mind. Out of the memory of past experience he creates chariots and horses, spans and roads,

221. In the Mānasollāsa, Sureśvara explains the waking and dream states as follows:

"yadā buddhigataih punyaiḥ preritendriyamārgataḥ sābdādīn viṣayān bhunkte tadā jāgaritaṃ bhavet."

"saṃhrteṣv indriyeṣveṣu jāgrat saṃskārajāmpumān manasāanviṣayān bhunkte svapnāvastathā tadā bhavet."

See The Vedānta Doctrine, ed., A. Mahadeva Sastri (Madras: V. Ramaswamy Sastrulu & Sons., 1920), pp. 87-88.

pools and streams, though none of them are there.222 In

the state of waking experience the Self which is condi-

tioned by the mind and the sense-organs experiences the

objects of the external world. The things created in the

mind within and those seen in the world without are non-

real or illusory as they are conjured up by avidyā.

Consciousness in itself is not intentional; but it becomes so

due to the limiting adjuncts, viz the mind and the senses,

which are all products of avidyā.

Consciousness per se is neither a knower nor an

attribute of a knowing subject. But it assumes the status

of a knower due to a false identification with the internal

organ. This may be stated in a different way also. The

internal organ is insentient. But on account of the reflec-

tion or semblance of consciousness therein it plays the role

of a knowing subject characterized by consciousness. So the

Self which is pure consciousness is not the knowing subject.

The internal organ characterized by consciousness alone

is the knowing subject. It means that consciousness,

though in itself non-relational, becomes relational due to

the upādhi of the internal organ. In short, in waking and

dream states, consciousness is relational in the double

sense - as pointing to an object which is its content and as

requiring a knowing subject for its locus - because of the

upādhi with which it gets related due to avidyā. The

relational nature of consciousness is adventitious

(aupādhika) and not natural (svābhāvika) to it.

Advaita cites the case of deep sleep with a view to

show that there is the evidence of perception for the

existence of the non-relational, undifferentiated conscious-

ness. Before we examine the case of deep sleep it is

necessary to make a brief reference to the Advaita

222. See BU, IV, iii, 10.

84

INTRODUCTION

analysis of the triple stream of experience — the states of

waking, dream, and sleep.

Advaita may be characterized as radical empiricism

as it examines our experience at all levels — waking, dream

and sleep - for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of

consciousness. The three states differ from one another.

In the waking state the mind and the sense-organs func-

tion. The Self in this state experiences the objects of

sense which are external, and is involved in them through

the body and senses; and its enjoyments are gross. In

the state of dream where the mind alone functions, the

Self impelled by desire experiences the objects created by

the mind; and its enjoyments are subtle. In the state of

deep sleep the mind becomes quiescent by relapsing into

its causal condition of avidyā. The Self in this state remains

serene and unattached, without desires and dreams,

without the distinction of seer and seen. A person may

pass from one state to another — from waking to dream,

from dream to deep sleep, and from deep sleep back again

to the waking state. Nevertheless, he has the intuition of

identity of the person involved in the three states; he

knows that the same person who was asleep and dreamt

is now awake recollecting his experience. Though one

and the same Self is involved in all the three states, it is

designated differently as Viśva in the waking state, as

Taijasa in dream, and as Prājña in the state of deep sleep

for the purpose of bringing out the difference between

one state and another and also the difference in the

upādhi with which the Self is associated — with the mind

and the senses in the waking state, with the mind alone in

dream, and with avidyā in deep sleep.223 While the mind

and the senses are not uniformly present in all the three

states, the Self which is consciousness is uniformly present

223. BUBV, IV, ii, 82-84; IV, iii, 979.

in all of them. It is that which reveals the presence as well as the absence of all of them. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka explains how the Self as the Witness-consciousness remains unaffected in the states of waking and dream though it moves as it were from one state to another, by giving the example of a great fish which swims alternately to both the banks of a river without touching them and without being overpowered by the current.224 The Self is not really involved in these states; the mind, the senses, and the body alone are involved. Attachment and work, desire and grief, which are their characteristics, are, due to ignorance, superimposed on the Self which is beyond desires, free from evils, and fearless. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka also gives the example of a tired hawk returning to its nest, with a view to explain the nature of the Self in the state of deep sleep.225 The bird in the illustration goes to its nest to remove the fatigue of its flight. In the same way the Self enters its abode, i.e. remains in its own form without desires and dreams, in the state of deep sleep for overcoming the fatigue caused by its contact with the mind and the senses in the other two states. While it is difficult to know the real nature of the Self in waking and dream states, we gain an insight into its real nature as pure, undifferentiated,non-relational, indeterminate consciousness in the state of deep sleep, where it remains in its natural state of non-duality. That is why Sures´vara says that “the state of deep sleep is not like the dream state, because the Self (therein) is non-dual by its very nature.”226

224. BU, IV, iii, 18. BUBV, IV, iii, 1148-1151.

225. BU, IV, iii, 19. BUBV, IV, iii, 1158.

226. TUBV, II, verse 568, p. 359.

86

INTRODUCTION

A person who wakes up from deep sleep recollects his experience by saying, "I did not know anything." Recollection presupposes, and is based on, previous experience. On the basis of his recollection we can say that in deep sleep he was not conscious of anything within or without. If we question him whether he was not conscious of this or that object, he would reply that he did not cognize anything and that he was also not conscious of himself then. So the recollection here proves that in the state of deep sleep there is nothing but consciousness which is self-luminous. Consciousness here is undifferentiated and non-relational. It is not intentional because it is not a case of consciousness of. Referring to this consciousness in deep sleep, the Upanisad says that "although seeing then, it does not see, i.e. is not conscious of anything, because there is no second object separate from it which it can see."

When we ask the person who recalls his experience of deep sleep whether he was conscious of himself then, he says, "I did not know even myself then."228 It is necessary to ascertain the meaning of the term "myself" (mām). In the context the term can only refer to the "I" or the knowing subject (ahamartha). Prājña, which is the name given to the Self of the deep sleep state, is different from the "I" or the knowing subject. If Prājña itself is the knowing subject, it cannot be unaware of itself at that time. One can be conscious of the absence of something else different from oneself; but one cannot experience one's own absence. Just as Prājña is not conscious of any object transcendent to it, even so it is not conscious of the knowing "I". So the term "myself" in the statement cannot refer to anything but the knowing "I" (ahamartha),

227. BU, IV, iii, 23.

228. "māṁ api ahaṁ na jñātavān."

and the statement as a whole intimates the absence of the

knowing "I" in deep sleep. Prājña, the Self of deep sleep,

is not conscious of anything, not even of the "I" or the

knowing subject. The same Self, assuming a different name

viz Viśva, in the waking state recollects its experience of

deep sleep to the effect, "I did not know anything; I was

not conscious of even myself then." In short, in deep sleep

the Self which is consciousness is undifferentiated and

non-relational.

It is no argument to say that the knowing "I" persists

in deep sleep, even though its presence is not noticed.

Who has not noticed its presence? It cannot be the "I".

If the "I" were present there, it would be impossible for

it to be unaware of itself. It must, therefore, be said that

someone other than the "I" or the knowing subject is not

conscious of it at that time, and that someone is Prājña.

Let us consider another possible interpretation of the

term "myself". According to this explanation, the term

"myself" refers to the "I" as distinguished by several

characteristics such as caste, sex, stage of life, and so on,

with which it is associated in the waking state. So the

statement, "I did not know even myself then," means that

even though the knowing "I" persists in deep sleep it is

not conscious of itself as one who sleeps in a particular

place, as so-and-so, as a man, as old and dumb, and so on.

This explanation also is not satisfactory. Let us concede

for the sake of argument that during sleep there is no

consciousness of the "I" as qualified by the various charac-

teristics which are familiar to us in the waking state. If

the "I" still persists there shorn of all these characteristics,

how is it experienced then? What is the form in which

it persists at that time? Is it as the knowing subject? Or

is it in some other form? The only reply that can be given

is that it is not experienced in any of these forms. To say

88

INTRODUCTION

that the "I" persists, but the form in which it persists is not known, is absurd. It amounts to saying that even though one does not know the "I" in any way one knows that it exists at that time, which is untenable. So it must be said that the knowing "I" does not persist in deep sleep and that the Self at that time is not aware of anything, not even of the "I". The perceptual experience of deep sleep, according to Advaita, proves the existence of consciousness which is undifferentiated and non-relational.

The foregoing analysis of our experience of deep sleep and of its subsequent recollection when we wake up from sleep is based upon what Sureśvara characterizes as the outward view (parāgṛṣṭi) of the problem as distinguished from the inward view (pratyagṛṣṭi).229 While the outward view refers to the relative standpoint, the inward view refers to the absolute standpoint. Sureśvara discusses the problem of deep sleep from both the standpoints. From the standpoint of the outward view he argues for the existence of avidyā and the experience of the non-relational, undifferentiated consciousness in deep sleep as evidenced by the memory or recollection (smṛti) of its experience in the waking state.230 There is also explain our normal waking consciousness of the things of the world in terms of antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti, even so we explain our experience of the indeterminate, non-relational consciousness in deep sleep in terms of avidyā-vṛtti.231 From the standpoint of the inward view,

229. BUBV, I, iv, 298-299.

230. TUBV, II, verse 582, p. 368.

NS, sambandhokti to III, 58: "tasmādavaśyaṁ suṣupte'jñānaṁ abhyupagantavyam."

231. See Srī Saṅkarāsaṅkara-bhāṣya-vīmarśah, p. 37: "avidyāssattvena tadā brahmākāravidyāvṛttisattvāt na nirvikal-pajñānasya kāścit.

THE SELF IS NIRGUNA

89

Brahman alone is, and avidyā does not at all exist at any time in any state — waking, dream, and deep sleep.232 In the absence of avidyā in deep sleep, there cannot be avidyā-vṛtti. If so, the statement, "I did not know anything then," cannot be treated as a case of memory. Sures'vara argues that the cognition as embodied in this statement is vikalpa-jñāna.233 It is a case where we use words denoting an object and claim to have the cognition of that object, though there is really no object corresponding to our cognition. Our cognition of avidyā is similar to our cognition of the illusory snake. Just as the illusory snake does not really exist and has no being of its own apart from the rope on which it is superimposed, even so avidyā does not really exist and has no being of its own apart from the Self on which it is superimposed.234 Though avidyā never exists, nevertheless we posit it from our standpoint and look upon the Self as its locus. In fact, the main aim of the analysis of the triple stream of experience is to set forth the nature of the Self as the non-dual reality free from avidyā and its products. When we view the Self from the standpoint of the outward view, we think of it as what is involved in the triple stream, as moving from one state to another, and also as associated with avidyā and its products. We superimpose all these on the Self only to deny it of all of them in accordance with the well-known technique of adhyāropa and apavāda. If the distinction between the outward view and the inward view is borne in mind, it will be apparent that there is no inconsistency in Sures'vara's position. His insistence on the existence of avidyā in deep sleep as in other

232. BUBV, I, iv, 299.

233. Ibid., I, iv, 300-301.

Following the Yoga system, Ānandagiri explains the term vikalpa which occurs in BUBV, I, iv, 301, as "sabdajñānānupūti vastu-śūnyo vikalpaḥ."

234. BUBV, I, iv, 303.

90

INTRODUCTION

states is from the standpoint of the outward view, and his denial of it with all that it involves is from the standpoint of the inward view.

By means of inference, too, it can be shown that the Self is devoid of attributes. Consider, for example, the following inference, “The Self is devoid of attributes, because unlike pot and other objects it is not perceived as endowed with attributes in deep steep,” which is quite valid.

It may be argued that the conclusion of inference cannot be at variance with what is perceived in the waking state. The Self is perceived as qualified by attributes in the waking state; it means that duality is perceived here. Though these attributes persist in deep sleep, they are not perceived, it may be argued, because of the absence of the internal organ or because of the preoccupation of the mind with something else at that time.

This argument is untenable. We say that something is the case or that something is not the case only on the basis of pramāṇa. But here there is no pramāṇa to show that the Self has attributes even though these attributes are not perceived at that time. If what is never perceived is admitted to exist, one may as well argue that the sky-flower which is never perceived also exists, which is absurd.

Further, the above argument proceeds on the wrong assumption that what holds good in the waking state must also hold good in deep sleep. Duality no doubt is perceived in the waking state; here we look upon the Self as qualified by various attributes. But it does not follow that duality is also perceived in deep sleep. Being a creation of avidyā, what is called waking experience is, indeed, a wondrous illusion on a par with our dream experience. So long as there is avidyā one perceives duality, one perceives the Self as endowed with attributes in the waking state.

But when avidyā is removed, duality ceases to exist in the same way as the illusory serpent ceases to exist at the termination of the illusion. It is true that even in deep sleep there is the persistence of avidyā. But this is no reason to say that the experience of deep sleep is also an illusion, like the experience of the waking state. Though there is avidyā in deep sleep, its projective power (vikṣepa-śakti) is absent with the result that one does not experience anything else than the non-dual Self at that time. Nor is it possible to say that the non-perception of the qualities of the Self or of duality is due to the preoccupation of the mind with something else. The untenable assumption here is that something is perceived in deep sleep and that the mental preoccupation with that object accounts for the non-perception of the qualities of ihe Self or of duality. There is no perception of anything at all in deep sleep. The Self remains at that time in its natural state of non-perception.235 That is why Scripture says that "seeing then, it does not see."236 It must be borne in mind that Advaita does not rely exclusively on the evidence of inference to prove that the Self is devoid of attributes. Reasoning is made use of only as a supplement to Scripture (śruti). The final court of appeal is experience (anubhava).

Advaita holds the view that the Self is one and non-dual, and that it is free from attributes on the basis of Scripture as well. Before we cite śruti texts in support of this view, it is necessary to dispose of a basic objection that Scripture, which is verbal testimony, does not and cannot convey a non-relational sense. According to this view, a sentence, whether it is Scriptural or secular, can convey only a relational sense. A sentence consists of a group of words. The meaning of a sentence is construed by combining the meanings of the different words with each other. Even an individual word which occurs in a sentence

235. TUBV, II, verses 565-566, p. 357.

236. BU, IV, iii, 23.

92

INTRODUCTION

conveys a relational sense. This is because of the fact

that it consists of a stem (prakrti) and a suffix (pratyaya),

which have different meanings. It is, therefore, argued

that a Scriptural sentence cannot convey a non-relational

meaning. If Scripture conveys anything, it must be a

relational sense. If so, how can it be said that the non-

dual, non-relational Self is the import of a Scriptural

sentence ?

Advaita does not deny that most sentences express a

relational meaning. For example, a sentence like “That

rose is red” conveys substantive-adjective relation. Or, a

sentence like “A is greater than B” expresses a relation

between two substantives. Sentences like these are un-

doubtedly relational. But it should not be said as a general

rule that every sentence conveys a relational sense. The

meaning intended to be conveyed by a sentence alone

constitutes the import of a sentence. The same thing is

true of a word in a given context.

It may be that in

some cases the meaning intended to be conveyed is rela-

tional, and in other cases non-relational. In other words,

sentences may be classified into two groups — sentences

which signify a relational meaning (samisargāvagāhi) and

sentences which signify a non-relational meaning (samisar-

gānavagāhi or akhaṇḍārthaka). A sentence like “Bring a

cow” belongs to the former group, while a sentence like

“This is that Devadatta” belongs to the latter. The

Upaniṣads purport to teach the truth of non-duality, and

their purport is ascertained by the application of the six

marks (ṣaḍliṅga) like the harmony between the beginning

and the conclusion of a passage (upakrama-upasaṁhāra),

repetition (abhyāsa), etc.

237. See Rāmānuja, Śribhāṣyam, I, i, 1, p. 50.

238. “padam padasamudāyarūpam vākyam vā tatparyaviṣayamevārtham

pratipādayati iti niyamah.”

239. The six marks (ṣaḍliṅga) are: (1) the harmony of the initial

and concluding passages (upakrama-upasaṁhārā), (2) repetition (abhyāsa),

THE SELF IS NIRGUṆA

93

The negative as well as the affirmative texts of the Upaniṣad bring out the indeterminate, non-relational, non-dual nature of the Self. The Bṛhadāranyaka says that the Self is "neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long,240 and so on. The Taittirīya describes it as "changeless, incorporeal, inexpressible."241 The Śvetāśvatara declares that it is "without parts, without activity, tranquil, irreproachable, without blemish."242 The underlying idea here is that the Self is devoid of ali attributes. The reason for this is that it is "one only, without a second."243 The affirmative text of the Taittirīya, "Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite,"244 does not set forth the nature of the Self positively as such-and-such. It seeks to convey, as stated earlier, that the Self is other than the unreal, the insentient, and the finite. If it were possible to state the nature of the Self positively, Scripture would not have said that "words along with the mind return without reaching it."245 Sures'vara says: "How can we ignore Scripture which repeatedly asserts the attributeless Brahman and denies everything other than the seeing consciousness as insubstantial, by saying, 'not this, not this?'"246 If any description of the indeterminate, non-relational, non-dual Self is possible at all, it can only be a negative description as "not this, not this", as stated in the Bṛhadāranyaka.247 A spiritual aspirant who fulfils the requisite conditions attains directly the non-relational knowledge from the

(3) novelty (apūrvatā), (4) fruitfulness (phala), (5) glorification by eulogistic passages or condemnation by deprecatory passages (arthavāda), and (6) intelligibility in the light of reasoning (upapatti).

240. BU, III, viii, 8.

241. TU, II, vii.

242. VI, 19.

243. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI, ii, 1.

244. TU, II, 1.

245. Ibid., II, ix.

246. NS, II, 42.

247. BU, II, iii, 6; TUBV, II, verse 100, p. 112.

94

INTRODUCTION

Śruti text "tai tvam asi." In the words of Sures'vara: "As

in the case of the ether in a pot and the ether outside it,

so also because of the co-ordinate reiatiation of the words

'That' and 'Thou' (in the Śruti text 'That Thou art'), by the

removal (of the incompatible factors denoted by them)

the direct non-relaticnai sense takes place to us (from the

text).248

X

THE SELF IS KŪTASTHA

Immutability is the third criterion by which the Self

can be distinguished from the not-Self. In several places

Sures'vara refers to the nature of the Self as immutable

(kūṭastha), as what is free from changes like origination,

existence, growth, etc. He says: "Existence and other

(mutable) states do not exist (for the Self) since these

states would be possible only if there is origination (for

the Self)."249 Again, "He who remains through the

origin, continuance, and cessation of the world in the

form of unchanging awareness must be understood as the

Self, as 'I am He'. Do not think of yourself as any of

these transient factors."250 Jn another place he says:

"When once the sixfold forms of change are negated of

the Self, no deficiency or evil can be demonstrated in it by

the dog-like logicians."251

While the Self is immutable, everything other than

the Self is subject to change. It is not difficult for us to

understand how the things of the world are subject to

changes like birth and existence, growth and transforma-

tion, decline and death. Sures'vara explains at great

length the changes that take place in the gross and subtle

248. TUBV, II, verse 658, p. 410.

249. TUBV, II, verse 187, p. 161.

250. NS, II, 111.

251. Ibid, II, 85.

bodies, which are not-Self, tracing the career of the jīva

from its pre-natal condition in the womb through its birth,

growth, and decline till its death. The Self has no birth

at all. But on account of the erroueous identification of

the Self with the body, it is thought of as having birth.

"The Self is said to be originated (as it were) following

the origination of the body, in the same way as ether is

said to be originated following the origination of a

pot."252 "All the transformations from the beginning (of

life in the womb stated above) belong to the subtle and

gross bodies. Though they are not of the Self, it is thought

due to ignorance that they are of the self."253

What applies to an external object and the body

(śarīra) also holds good for the mind. The mind is subject

to constant changes. When we claim to know anything,

whether it is an external object like a tree or a subjective

state like pleasure, it is through the modifications of the

mind. The manifold modifications of the mind, says

Sures'vara, are superimposed on the Self due to ignorance

though in truth "the Self is the unchanging witness of the

thousand modifications of the mind."254 Sures'vara esta-

blishes this at great length by arguing that the Self which

is eternal consciousness pervades as it were all the perishing

functions of the mind, that it is the witness of the mental

states like pleasure and pain, that it is the constant factor

in all mental modifications like memory, dream, and

awakening, and also in the different states of experience —

waking, dream, and deep sleep.

According to Advaita, while the Self is pure conscious-

ness, the internal organ which carries the reflection or the

semblance of consciousness is the knower (jñātā). Though

252. TUBV, II, verse 187, p. 161.

253. Ibid., II, verse 224, p. 172.

254. NS. II, 77.

96

INTRODUCTION

insentient, on account of the association of consciousness,

it knows itself as "I" (aham) and other objects as "this" (idam). It is through the modifications of the internal

organ that we are able to have the cognition of anything as such-and-such. In accordance with the modification it

undergoes it is spoken of as being in a state of knowledge or ignorance. In short, knowing something and not

knowing something are the characteristics of the internal organ according to the changes it undergoes; they have

nothing to do with the Self which is free from characteristics. Again, the work of memory and recognition

belongs to the internal organ and not to the Self. In the words of Sureśvara: "The intellect assumes these forms:

'I know this, and I do not know this.' It is the seat of recognition. The knower alone has the two forms

(mentioned earlier)."255 The Self is not affected by the different mental modes which appear and disappear one

after another, for all of them are external to it. "Just as earlier (i.e. prior to the rise of the mind) consciousness re-

mains unaffected by the mental state, so also even after the rise of the mind it is in the same condition. Indeed, the

immutability (of consciousness) is known through experience."256 We have already stated that the one factor which

remains constant and unaffected amidst the fluctuating modes of the mind and the alternating states of waking,

dream, and deep sleep is consciousness, and we speak of it as the witness to all these. Sureśvara argues that this mode

of speech is tenable only from the standpoint of avidyā A witness implies something which is witnessed. The Self can

be the witness to something — the knower, a mental state, the triple stream of experience only if something else, a

second entity, exists. But in reality there is nothing else than the Self. So when we say that the Self is the witness,

255. TUBV, II, verse 652, p. 407.

256. Ibid., II, verse 94, p. 110.

it is by presupposing avidyā which is responsible for the perception of duality.257 If we do not know the nature

of the Self as immutable consciousness, it is because of the illusion caused by avidyā. To quote Suresvara: “The Self

which is the witness of all cognitions cannot have a nature other than that of pure consciousness. It is not known to

be such because of illusion.”258

It is necessary here to explain a text from the Taitti-

rīya, which seems to suggest that the Self is subject to modification. The text as it is reads: “He, verily, is this

man formed of the essence of food.”259 It means that the supreme Self is this man, the jīva, who is a modification of

food. If so, one may argue that the Self which is identi-

fied with the jīva is subject to modification. But this inter-

pretation is wrong. The Self which is beyond the sheaths

appears in the form of the jīva constituted by the five

sheaths only due to avidyā. The body of the jīva is a

modification of food. Since it serves as the adjunct of the

Self, the latter which is really free from modification is

thought of, due to a wrong identification with the body, as

subject to modification. One object can never become

another object. Though a rope can never actually become

a serpent, it may appear to be a serpent due to avidyā. In

the same way the Self which is free from modification may

nevertheless appear to be a man who is a modification of

food. “Just as a rope attains the form of a serpent

through avidyā, though it is not really competent to be-

come that, so also the Self attains, indeed, the form of the

jīva consisting of the five sheaths and suffers as it were in

that form.”260

257. Ibid., II, verse 651, p. 406.

258. Ibid., II, verse 650, p. 406.

259. TU, II, 1:

"sa vā eṣa puruṣo'nnarāsamayayah."

260. TUBV, II, verse 250, p. 191.

93

INTRODUCTION

Sures'vara argues that both Scripture and reasoning lend support to the view that the Self is free from changes such as birth and death. The Katha Upaniṣad says: "The intelligent Self is neither born nor does it die. It did not originate from anything, nor did anything originate from it. It is birthless, eternal, undecaying, and ancient."261 A thing which has a beginning undergoes a series of changes culminating in destruction. But if it has no beginning, other changes cannot take place in it. With a view to deny all modifications in the Self, birth and death, i.e. beginning and end, are denied of it. The Self which is of the nature of consciousness has neither a cause nor an effect.262 It did not originate from anything. There is nothing else besides the Self, for the Self is free from sājātiya-, vijātiya-, and svagata-bheda. In the absence of a second entity, one cannot say that it is an effect or a modification of some other thing. Nor has anything come out of the Self. Advaita holds the view that the Self is not the real, but only the apparent cause of the world through avidyā. Further, only a composite entity suffers modification. Since the Self is partless (niravayava), it is free from change.263 There is yet another point to be emphasized here. The Self has nothing in it which is to be abandoned. Nor does it require anything which is to be acquired.264 It means that the Self cannot suffer any change either through accretion or loss. The notion of giving up or acquiring anything presupposes duality. But the Self is one and non-dual.

The really important question to be considered here is whether the non-dual, non-relational consciousness, which

261. Kaṭha Upaniṣad, I, ii, 18.

262. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, VI, 8: "na tasyā kāryaṁ karanam ca vidyate."

263. SV, 144-146.

264. TUBV, II, verse 651, p. 406.

THE SELF IS KŪTASTHA

99

is identical with Brahman-Ātman, is without a beginning and an end. While the critics are bent upon proving that it has both, the Advaitin argues that it has neither. This question is of utmost importance, because if it is proved that consciousness has a beginning it will follow that it is subject to other changes. Suresvara maintains that it is not possible to show that consciousness has a beginning or origination (utpatti). If it be said that it has a beginning, it would mean that it was non-existent before its origination. The problem that is involved here is whether one can admit the prior non-existence of consciousness (jñāna-prāgabhāva).265 If one were to admit the prior not-existence of consciousness, it must be solely on the ground that it happens to be an object of knowledge. If so, the crucial question is: What is it that knows the prior non-existence of consciousness ? Is it consciousness itself or something other than consciousness? The latter alternative has to be ruled out, because everything other than consciousness is insentient, and what is insentient can never be credited with the knowing function. The former alternative is equally untenable. If consciousness exists at the time of such apprehension, ex hypothesi it is not non-existent then. To say that something which exists apprehends at the very same time its own non-existence is absurd. If it does not exist at the time of its prior non-existence, then it cannot directly apprehend its non-existence.

It is no argument to say that consciousness, after coming into existence, can infer its own prior non-existence. A person, for example, infers that he was non-existent before his birth on the basis of what he has himself seen in the case of a pot which was non-existent before its origination. But it is not possible to think of such inference in the

265. Rāmānuja in his Śrībhāṣya, I, i, 1, argues at great length the tenability of jñāna-prāgabhāva.

100

INTRODUCTION

present case.266 If it is admitted that it is the very nature

of consciousness to reveal an object by its own being (sva-

sattayaiva), it is wrong to say that consciousness knows its

prior non-existence through inference. where it has to

depend upon something else outside its being. The point

at issue is not whether the past can or cannot be known by

consciousness. We do admit that the things of the past

as well as things yet to come can be the objects of

consciousness. But what we deny is that consciousness

can directiy apprehend its own prior non-existence.

The prior non-existence of consciousness cannot be

known through perception, for the latter is a source of

knowiedge only with regard to something that is present.

Nor can it be known through inference, for it is not

possible to have any vyāpti here to prove the case. Nor is

there any Scriptural text which speaks about the prior

non-existence of concsciousness. It cannot be argued that

the prior non-existence of consciousness, which is abhāva,

is known through the pramāna called anupalabdhi. The

term anupalabdhi means absence of cognition or con-

sciousness. To say that the prior non-existence or absence

of consciousness is known through anupalabdhi means that

the prior absence of consciousness is known through the

absence of consciousness. The curious thing here is that

what is known (i.e. the prior absence of consciousness)

involves "absence" as well as "consciousnes", and the

means through which it is known (i.e. anupalabdhi) also

involves "absence" as well as "consciousness". If the

two cases of consciousness and also the two cases of

absence or non-existence are identical, there arises the

fallacy of ātmāśraya. If they are different, how is the

absence of consciousness (anupalabdhi or upalabdhyabhāvah),

266. See Srī Saṅkarāsaṅkara-bhāṣya-vīmarśah, p. 71:

"svaprāgabhāvavasya svapratyakṣaviṣayatvam na ityeva asmābhi-

rucyate...anubhava-prāgabhāvārkatvam tu anubhave viṣayo na bhavatīti bruṃah."

THE SELF IS KŪṬASTHA

101

which is said to be the means of knowing the prior absence

of consciousness, known? If it be said that, since it is

negative, it is known through another absence of know-

ledge, it will lead to infinite regress.267 So in view of

these difficulties it cannot be said that the prior non-

existence of consciousness is known through anupalabdhi.

It is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between

vrtti-jñāna and svarūpa-jñāna insisted on in Advaita. The

former is cognition through the mental mode, e.g. the

cognition of a tree. It has a beginning and an end as one

cognition is followed by another. The cognition of a pot

is followed by the cognition of a tree, which again is

followed by the cognition of a building. What witnesses the

series of cognitions which follow one another is the Self,

which is eternal consciousness, which does not form part

of the series, and which has neither a beginning nor an

end. The present discussion is about svarūpa-jñāna and

not about vrtti-jñāna which is admitted to be momentary,

or to last till it is replaced by another vrtti-jñāna which

is opposed to it. Referring to svarūpa-jñāna Suresvara

says that "transformation is not possible (for the Self),

as for wind and fire, because there is no possibility of

prior non-existence."268

Whatever has a beginning comes to an end, and

whatever is without a beginning has no end. Since cons-

ciousness has no beginning, it has no end. It may appear

that the general principle formulated here in support of

the view that consciousness which is without a beginning

267. Ibid., p. 72:

"anupalabdhirupalabdhyabhāvah, upalabdhiśca anubhavah. tathā

ca anubhavābhāvena anubhavapragabhāvo grhyata iti prāptam-tatra

ubhayoranubhavayoh ubhayorabhavāyavośca abhāde ātmāśrayah. bhede sa ca

anubhavābhāvah kena grhyate? anubhavāntareṇa cet anyonyāśrayādayah."

268. SV, 144-145.

102

INTRODUCTION

is also without an end is untenable as there are exceptions

to it. One may argue that there are at least two exceptions

to this principle. The first is prāgabhāva which has an end,

though it has no beginning. The other exception is avidyā

which, as admitted by Advaita itself, is without a beginning

(anādi), though it comes to an end at the rise of know-

ledge. If so, it may be argued that consciousness also,

though without a beginning, has an end.

This argument cannot be accepted. A little examina-

tion is enough to show that the general principle remains

inviolate as the two cases cited above are thoroughly mis-

leading. First of all it is wrong to cite prāgabhāva which

is a negative category as a counter-instance. The discuss-

ion here is not about negative categories. What is main-

tained is that a positive entity which has no beginning has

no end; and consciousness which is the subject of the pre-

sent discussion is something positive. There is also another

objection. The six changes such as origination, existence,

etc. can be predicated only of a positive entity (bhāva-vastu).

They cannot be affirmed of a negative entity such as

prāgabhāva. It, therefore, makes no sense to say that

prāgabhāva, though without a beginning, has an end.

The case of avidyā, however, is quite different from

that of prāgabhāva. For one thing, Advaita does not

consider avidyā as a negative entity. Further, avidyā has

a beginning, and for this there is the support of śruti

which declares that avidyā comes into existence of its

own accord.269 It may appear that Advaita is not

consistent in its position, because it maintains that avidyā

is beginningless (anādi) and also that it has a beginning.

But the inconsistency here is only apparent and not real.

An explanation of the sense in which avidyā is said to be

269. Nṛsiṁhapūrvatāpinyupaniṣad, IX, 3:

"māyā ca avidyā ca svayaṁeva bhavati "

THE SELF IS KŪṬASTHĀ

103

beginningless will straighten out the difficulty. Avidyā is

said to be anādi not in the sense that it has no beginning,

but in the sense that its beginning or origination is

not caused by anything else.270 We can drive home

the point by considering the case of the world. Whereas

the world owes its existence to avidyā, the latter does

not owe its existence to anything else. It is no doubt

true that avidyā, like the world, is dependent on Brahman

which is the locus (adhisṭhāna). But there is this important

difference. The world is related to, and has, Brahman

as its locus only through avidyā. But avidyā's relation

with, and its location in, Brahman are not due to any-

thing else. They are caused by avidyā itself. So it means

that avidyā has a beginning, though its beginning is not

caused by any other factor, and that, because it has a

beginning, it has also an end. The general principle, viz

that which has no beginning has no end, and that whatever

has a beginning has an end, holds good. The standpoint of

Advaita is that the Self which is consciousness has no end,

because it has no beginning. This is clearly brought out

by the Bhagavad-gītā when it says that the supreme Self

has no end, because it is without origination and without

qualities.271 In his commentary on this passage Śaṅkara

observes that an object which has a cause perishes by itself.

But since the Self has no beginning or cause, it does not

perish. That the Self is without qualities is an additional

reason for saying that it is imperishable, for an object

which has qualities, Śaṅkara says, perishes by loss of

qualities.

270. See Śrī Śaṅkarāśaṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśah, p. 77:

"avidyāyāstu janma astyeva, 'māyā ca avidyā ca svayameva

bhavati' iti sruteḥ. tasyā anāditva-prasiddhitsu parato janmābhāva-prayuktā."

271. Bhagavad-gītā, XIII, 31:

"anāditvān nirguṇatvāt paramātmāyam avyayah."

XI

SUPERIMPOSITION

Our entire business of life involving differentiation like, "I do this action." "This is the fruit of my action,"

"I am old," "I am blind," and so on, is based on the superimposition of one thing on another or the attribute

of one thing on another due to ignorance (avidyā). We cannot carry on our business of life without relating the

Self with the not-Self, though in truth the Self is non-attached. Suresvara observes that "the relation of the

Self with what is different from it is the result of ignorance."272 What is called superimposition (adhyāsa) which

involves mistaking one thing for another or ascribing the attribute of one thing to another does not take place of its

own accord. It is caused by ignorance. To quote Suresvara: "One being either the attribute or the nature of

another is not out of itself. Without ignorance it is not seen in the world. It is everywhere seen due to delusion.

It is the ignorant man that superimposes the attribute of being a thief on a post thus, 'This thief comes against me.'

Without darkness this is not seen."273

Generally speaking an ignorant man suffers from two kinds of erroneous notion called ahamabhimāna and mamā-

bhimāna. In the former there is the erroneous identification of the Self with the intellect, or the mind, or the vital

air, or the senses, or the body, which are not-Self.274 In the other variety of erroneous notion, one looks upon the

external things as one's own and says, "This is my cow," "This property belongs to me," "These are my kinsmen,"

and so on. Just as the Self cannot be identified with the

272. SV, 109.

273. Ibid., 114-116.

274. TUBV, II, verses 225-227, pp. 173-174.

intellect, mind, etc., so also it cannot be related to any of

the external things of the world. The Self has no rela-

tion whatsoever with anything, subjective as well as

objective. Nor it is possible to think of any purificatory

rite with regard to the Self. There are acts of purifica-

tion (saṁskāra) for the gross and subtle bodies, and as a

result of the purificatory acts a person considers himself in

terms of various statuses such as a celebate student, a

householder, etc. Neither the purificatory acts nor the

different statuses have anything to do with the Self. If

we associate any purificatory act or a status with the Self

it is only by superimposing distinctions such as caste, stage

of life, age, etc., on the Self, though they are not possible

in the Self.275

Though avidyā is the root cause of superimposition

and thereby of evil, it is the ego that plays the chief role

in the mechanism of superimposition, and so the ego may

be characterized as the villain of the piece. Sures'vara

says that the ego is the cause of misery to the Self in its

embodied condition.276 He explains this as follows: “The

root cause of all evil in the world, hated by creatures, is

the ego, for it brings together in itself the Self and the

not-Self. In reality, the Self transcends all connection

with nescience and its effects, in the past, present, and

future, for the Self has as its essential nature pure consci-

ousness that is eternal and inextinguishable.”277 Being

the primary adjunct (mukhyopādhi) of the Self, it serves as

the meeting place of the inner Self and the outer world.

It is the knot (granthi) which unites as it were the Self and

the not-Self.

It is necessary to explain the mechanism of super-

imposition at different levels in order to understand the

275. Ibid., II, verse 228, p. 175.

276. Ibid., II, verse 452, p. 300.

277. NS, sambandhokti to II, 53.

106

INTRODUCTION

part played by the ego (ahamkāra). The internal organ,

the senses, and the body are the adjuncts of the Self. All

of them are insentient (jaḍa). When we say that man

is a sentient being, we superimpose sentience, which

constitutes the nature of the Self, on the body. By super-

imposing the characteristic of the body on the Self, we

say, "I am a man." As stated earlier, our entire

business of life is carried on by superimposing one thing

on another. If we discriminate the Self from the not-Self,

we will understand that the body is insentient like a stone,

even though it is treated as sentient when compared with

a stone. In the absence of the functioning of the senses,

the body is insentient, and so it looks as if the senses are

sentient, though in turn they are also insentient. In the

same way, in the absence of the co-operation of the inter-

nal organ the sense-organ is not able to do its function,

and becomes inert like a stone. The manifold modifica-

cations of the internal organ may be brought under two

categories, viz the modification as "I" (ahamvṛtti) and

the modification as "this" (idamvṛtti). When the internal

organ undergoes the former modification, it is known as

mind (manas).

ego, will be seen to be insentient. Just as we say "my

table" so also we say "my mind," and like any other

insentient object, the mind also is dependent on what is

sentient. The ego, too, must be discriminated from the

Self. In the absence of discrimination, it appears to be

sentient, though it is really insentient, and assumes

the status of a knower (jñātā) due to the reflection of

consciousness therein (cipratibimbagrāhitayā). In the

same way, owing to the superimposition of the ego on

the Self, the latter appears to be what is denoted by the

ego (ahampratyayaviṣayatvam). The mutual superimposi-

tion that is involved here is of great importance. The

Self by its very nature is neither a seer nor a hearer. But

it is said to have these features due to its association as it were with the ego.

Similarly, the ego which is material is neither a seer nor a hearer by itself.

Nevertheless it comes to be looked upon as a seer and hearer only due to the reflection or semblance of consciousness therein.

So the reciprocal superimposition of the one on the other - the nature of the sentient Self on the ego and the sense of the ego on the Self - is at the basis of our claim "I know."

That is to say, when the Self is conditioned by the ego, we say "I know."

With the addition of the mind as the adjunct to the Self-ego complex, we have the experience to the effect "I am happy."

By bringing in the body as the conditioning factor to the Self-ego complex, we say "I am a man."

It means that the ego is the first to be superimposed on the Self; and the other adjuncts starting from the mind are superimposed on the Self-ego complex.

This accounts for the fact that while the mind, the senses, and the body are easily discriminated from the Self, there is much difficulty in discriminating the ego from the Self.

Since the ego, by virtue of its being the primary adjunct of the Self, is at the basis of all that we claim to know and of all that we do in our day-to-day experience, Suresvara maintains that the ego is the root cause of all the evil in the world and that its elimination will amount to the realization of the non-dual Self.

To quote Suresvara: "That seer is conjoined to the seen and the seen is conjoined to the seer.

Both of them are conjoined in and through the functioning of the ego.

On the elimination of the ego, the Self abides in perfect non-duality."

In another place he says: "All this is the fault of the intellect - that it assumes the forms of external objects, that it appears as the inward Self, and as consciousness."

278. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin, for example, maintains that the ahamartha is the Self.

279. MS, II, 53.

280. TUBV, II, verse 655, p. 408.

XII

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL

If Brahman-Ātman which is the ultimate reality is one and non-dual, what is the nature as well as the ontological status of the world? According to Advaita, the phenomenal world is non-real, illusory, like the rope-snake, and its ontological status is no better than that of the rope-snake. Suresvara argues that an illusion cannot take place in the absence of a substratum.281 In the case of the rope-snake illusion, the rope which is in front is the substratum for the illusion to arise. In the same way, Brahman is the substratum on which the pluralistic universe is superimposed. Just as a person on account of avidyā cognizes the illusory silver in a piece of shell, even so we perceive due to avidyā the pluralistic universe in the non-dual Brahman.282 “All the things which we perceive exist here within (the Self). Within is the whole of this universe. By māyā it appears as external like one’s own body in a mirror.”283

But this explanation is not satisfactory to the critics. Is the world, the critics argue, different from Brahman or not? If it is different from Brahman, there arises dualism, for there are at least two entities, viz Brahman and the world; and this would disprove the thesis of non-dualism. The other alternative fares no better. If it be said that there is identity or non-difference between the two, how are we to understand this non-difference? Is the world non-different from Brahman, or is Brahman non-different from the world? If it is said that the world is non-different from Brahman, there is no need for Brahman-knowledge,

281. TUBV, II, verse 64, p. 95.

282. BUBV, I, iv, 1280.

283. Mānasollāsa; see A. Mahadeva Sastri, The Vedānta Doctrine, verse 8, p. 5.

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL 109

for there is no world of bondage to be negated by the saving knowledge of Brahman. If Brahman is non-different from the world, then Brahman wiil cease to be Brahman, and will be composite in nature. Suresvara answers these questions by saying that the world has no being of its own (asvīmakatam), that it is wrongly imagined to exist due to illusion (mithyāsiddham, mahamūlam), and that it defies rational inquiry (sudurbodham).284

The snake which is cognized in a rope has no being of its own apart from the rope, the substratum, on which it is superimposed. By itself it is non-existent. But it is wrongly imagined to exist due to ignorance which not only conceals the nature of the rope, but also projects the appearance of a snake which is false. The same thing is true of the world. The latter does not exist, and has no being or status of its own, apart from Brahman which is its substratum. But on account of avidyā which plays the dual role of suppressing the truth and suggesting the false there is the appearance of the pluralistic universe. In the words of Suresvara: “Nothing that is other than the Self is found apart from the Self, nor in the Self. Therefore, objects like the ego are fictitious constructions wrongly imagined to be the Self.”285 The world no doubt is actual or existent to an ignorant man who does not inquire into its ontological status. To an inquiring mind, however, the world is a puzzle defying rational inquiry. Owing its existence to avidyā which is itself indeterminable, the world, too, does not admit of a rational explanation as either real or unreal. That alone which exists for ever is real. The world is not real, because it exists only so long as there is avidyā. With the termination of avidyā at the onset of Brahman-knowledge, the world as such ceases to exist. Nor can it be treated as unreal. What

284. NS, II, 44.

285. Ibid., II, 45.

110

INTRODUCTION

is unreal like a sky-flower can never be cognized. The

world, however, is cognized, and so it cannot be dismissed

as unreal. It cannot be both real and unreal at the same

time as it would violate the law of contradiction. Since

its ontological status cannot be determined to be such-and-

such in terms of the categories known to us, it is said to

be durnirūpa. For want of a better term, the Advaitin

characterizes it as indetermiiable (anirvacanīya).

Suresvara maintains that the world does not really

exist even in the present. "The non-existent in the past

and in the future cannot exist by themselves even in the

present."286 The rope remains a rope all the time -

before it is mistaken for a snake, at the time when it is

mistaken for a snake, and subsequent to the removal of

the erroneous cognition of a snake. If the snake is non-

existent in the rope both in the past and in the future, it

cannot also exist in the present. When it is said that the

rope-snake exists at the time of its perception, it only

means that even though it does not really exist even in

the present time of its perception, it nevertheless appears

to exist at that time due to avidyā, and it ceases to exist

when there arises the right knowledge of the given object.

And it is this idea that is conveyed when we characterize

the rope-snake as mithyā. Illusoriness consists, according

to Suresvara, in being sublated by right knowledge.287

The same explanation holds good for the world. Brahman

alone exists all the time. The world, however, exists as

it were in the present due to the work of avidyā. With

the removal of avidyā through right knowledge, the world,

too, gets removed. Like the rope-snake, the world of

plurality also, which has the semblance of existence in the

286. Mānasollāsa; see A. Mahadeva Sastri, The Vedānta Doctrine,

verse 3, p. 77.

287. Ibid., verse 10, p. 153: "mithyātvaṁ nāma bhādhyatvaṁ

samvagjñānodaye sati."

present, is mithyā. Like avidyā, the world of plurality is,

to use a significant expression of Sureśvara, avicārita-

siddha;288 it appears to exist so long as it is not scru-

tinized. It is an object of our experience, though there is

no evidence of pramāṇa to prove its existence. It is prasiddha,

but not pramāṇa-siddha. It has the appearance of an

established entity as long as we do not inquire into and

ascertain the difference between the Self and the not-Self.

The world cannot be identified with the Self for the simple

reason that, while the former is insentient, the latter is sen-

tient. Nor does it exist as something different from the Self.

What, then, is the relation between the two? The phenome-

nal world can never be related to the trans-phenomenal

Self either as its attribute or as its essential nature. There

is also another difficulty here. If it is admitted to be an

entity different from the Self, one must specify what it is

in itself. Since it has no being of its own apart from the

Self which is its substratum, we cannot state its nature.

Being insentient, it cannot reveal itself. Nor can it be

said that it is revealed by the Self, the sentient principle,

because there can be no relation between what is sentient

and what is insentient. Notwithstanding these difficulties

we take it for granted that the world exists. The existence

of the world is, therefore, avicārita-siddha.

It may be argued that the world which is insentient

must be admitted to be different from Brahman which is

sentient, and that the difference between Brahman and

the world is real. This argument aims at scoring two points

at one stroke: its aim is not only to show that the world

exists as a real entity different from Brahman, but also to

prove that Brahman has vijātīya-bheda. This argument is

untenable as it proceeds on the wrong assumption that the

world is real. Since the world itself is non-real or illusory,

288. BṛUṁV, iv, 444.

112

INTRODUCTION

one cannot work out the theory of difference between

Brahman and the world with a view to show that Brah-

man has vijātiya-bheda. What is eternal alone is real; and

since the world has a beginning and an end, it is not

eternal and therefore not real.

The world, it may be argued, is eternal hecause it

exists even before creation and after dissolution. It exists,

that is to say, in a subtle, unmanifest condition before

creation and after dissolution. The Gītā refers to the

manifestation of the world from the avyakta, the Unmani-

fested.289 It only means that the world which is an effect

remains in a subtle condition in the avyakta, which is the

cause. When the subtle world manifests as the gross one,

we speak of the creation of the world. When there is a

change from the gross to the subtle, it is referred to as

disssolution. There is only change of state. There is

neither creation for the first time, nor destruction for

ever. If so, the world is eternal; and since it is eternal,

it is real.

This argument cannot stand examination. When the

world is said to be eternal, it is necessary to know whether

the subtle, unmanifest world is eternal or whether the

gross, manifest world is eternal. Neither alternative is

tenable, because the subtle, unmanifest world does not

exist after creation, and the gross, manifest world does not

exist in the state of dissolution. It is no argument to say

that the subtle and gross conditions are different states of

one and the same world, and that the same entity which

persists through the changes is in a subtle, unmanifest con-

dition at one time and in a gross, manifest condition at

another time. The contention here is that the world is not

both subtle and gross at the same time, and so there is no

violation of the law of contradiction. Inasmuch as one and

289. VIII, 18.

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL

113

the same world endures through the changes of states, it is,

according to this argument, eternal. This argument is

fallacious. It proceeds on the wrong assumption that a

substance remains intact while the modes or the states

which qualify it change. A change of quality does involve

a change in the qualified substance. What is subject to

modification cannot be eternal. If so, how can it be said

that the world which is subject to modification is eternal ?

And if it is not eternal, it cannot be real.

Objections have been raised questioning the tenability

of the superimposition of the world on Brahman. A rope

which is mistaken for a snake is a composite entity

(sāvayava). But Brahman is partless (niravayava) and so

it cannot serve as the substratum for the world to be

superimposed thereon. Further, there is similarity bet-

ween rope and snake, or between nacre and silver. But

one cannot suggest any similarity between Brahman which

is sentient and the world which is insentient. In the

absence of similarity between the two the possibility of

mistaking Brahman for the world has to be ruled out.

Again, a rope which is mistaken for a snake, or a nacre

which is mistaken for silver, is saviśeṣa, because

each of them has two features - a general feature

(sāmānyāmśa) and a specific feature (viśeṣāmśa). Error

arises only when the general feature of the object is

cognized, while its specific feature remains unnoticed. The

rope which is in front is cognized in a general way as

"this" (idam) and not as possessing the special feature of

ropeness. The position, however, is quite different in the

case of Brahman which is, according to Advaita, nirviśeṣa.

The distinction between general and specific features is

not possible in an object which is nirviśeṣa. In the

absence of such a distinction it cannot be said that, while

the general feature of Brahman is cognized, its specific

114

INTRODUCTION

feature is not cognized. If so, there is no possibility of

Brahman being mistaken for something else.

None of these objections are tenable. It is usual to

say that (1) the residual impression of the previous

cognition of a real object (satyavastvanubhava-janya-

samskāra), (2) defect in the object of knowledge

(prameya-doṣa), (3) defect in the cognizer (pramātṛ-

doṣa), (4) defect in the instrument of valid cognition

(pramāṇa-doṣa), and (5) cognition of the general nature of

the substratum without the cognition of its specific feature

(adhiṣṭhāna-viṣeṣājñānam, tatsāmānyajñānam), are the

causal aggregate of superimposition. A little reflection is

enough to show that excepting the last all the other

conditions are not uniformly present in every case of

erroneous cognition, and so they are not the necessary

conditions of erroneous cognition. Superimposition does

take place even if the given substratum is partless; for

example, we superimpose characteristics of the gross body

such as caste on the Self which is partless, as when we

say, 'I am a brāhmaṇa.' All of us see the ākāśa as blue,

which is a case of erroneous cognition, though none of

us suffer from any defect in the visual sense, and so there

is no pramāṇa-doṣa. Nor is there prameya-doṣa, because

there is no similarity between ākāśa and the blue colour.

This, again, is not a case where by any stretch of imagina-

tion can we say that there is pramātṛ-doṣa. Further, the

residual impression of the prior cognition of the thing

which is superimposed is necessary. But the thing cognized

earlier need not be real. The residual impression of an

illusory object may as well serve the purpose. According to

Advaita, two conditions which are necessary and sufficient

for superimposition are: (1) the substratum whose general

feature alone must be cognized, but not its specific feature

and (2) avidyā which suppresses the true and suggests the

false.

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL

115

It is necessary at this stage to show how the two conditions stated above are fulfilled in the superimposition of the world on Brahman. Brahman-in-itself is nirviśeṣa. But Brahman which is in association with, or delimited by, avidyā is saviśeṣa. Advaita maintains that the world of plurality is superimposed on Brahman which is saviśeṣa. If so, we can speak of the general and specific features of Brahman. While existence (sadrūpam) is the general feature of Brahman, knowledge and bliss (cidānandarūpam) are its specific features. The general feature, viz existence, must persist and be cognized even at the time of error, while the specific features, viz knowledge and bliss, are not cognized at the time of error.290 In the example of the rope which is mistaken for a snake, the “this” aspect is cognized, but not its specific feature, viz ropeness, at the time of error. A person suffering from illusion does not say, “The rope is snake,” but only “This is a snake.” In the same way, although we are under the spell of ignorance, we do not say, “The world is knowledge and bliss,” but we say “The world is existent.” Just as the illusion of snake disappears when the specific feature, viz ropeness, of the object is cognized, even so the erroneous perception of the pluralistic universe would disappear when one realizes Brahman as knowledge and bliss. It is necessary to bear in mind that Brahman is saviśeṣa so long as there is vyavahāra based on avidyā. and that the world is superimposed only on Brahman which is saviśeṣa. While the superimposition of the world on Brahman is due to avidyā, the superimposition of avidyā on Brahman is not due to anything else, nor to a second avidyā as it would lead to infinite regress. It is caused by avidyā itself which is capable of accounting for itself as well as for others coccyate.”

290. “yo bhrāntidaśayāmapỉ pratibhāti, yadabhāve bhrāntireva na syāt, sa eva sāmānyāṃśaḥ ādhāra iti coccyate. yo bhrāntidaśayāṁ na bhāti, yadbhāne bhrāntirniśśeṣam naśyet, sa eva viśeṣāṁso’dhiṣṭhānamiti coccyate.”

116

INTRODUCTION

after having come into existence. That is why Scripture says that avidyā comes into existence of its own accord.291

The world is both real and non-real — real as Brahman and non-real by itself. When Scripture says that “All this, indeed, is Brahman,”292 it may appear that the world which is sought to be identified with Brahman is real. This, however, is not the meaning of this text.

When we say, “The silver (that is cognized) is nacre alone,” (yadrajatam sā suktih), we convey the idea that the silver which suffers sublation when the nacre is cognized has no being of its own, and that it does not exist apart from the nacre which is the substratum.

The co-ordinate relation in which the two words “silver” and “nacre” are placed conveys the sense of oneness in respect of nacre only through the sublation of silver (bādhāyām sāmānādhi-karanyam).

In short, this kind of co-ordinate relation which involves sublation brings out the non-reality of silver and the reality of nacre.

It may be said as a general principle that the words which are in co-ordinate relation, as in the case of “The pot is clay” (mrd-ghatah), “This post is a man” (ayam sthānuh purusah), refer to what is real and what is non-real.

We do not say, “The clay is thread,” but we do say, “The pot is clay.”

In the former case both clay and thread are real, but in the latter the clay is real, but not the pot.293

The same explanation holds good in the case of the Scriptural text which says that the entire world is Brahman.

The text here conveys the idea that the world which suffers contradiction consequent on the realization of Brahman is non-real and does not exist apart from Brahman.

Since

291. Nrsimhapūrvatapinyupanisad, IX, 3 : “māyā ca avidyā ca svayameva bhavati.”

292. Chāndogya Upanisad, III, xiv, 1.

293. See Śrī Śan̉karāśan̉kara-bhāsya-vimarśah, p. 230: “sarvatrāpi satyāsatyayoreva sāmānādhikaranyam, na tu satyavoriti.”

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL

117

it has no being of its own apart from Brahman which is its substratum, we say that the world as world is non-real, though as Brahman it is real. That is why Sures'vara says that all duality terminates in Brahman-Ātman like the serpent in the rope.294 Again, "The world which is an effect composcd of names and forms is in itself non-existent, because it is not-Self. It is from the one supreme Brahman wliich is existence that the manifested world was, indeed, born."295

What is the càuse of the world? Is Brahman itself-the cause of the world? Or is somcthing other than Brahman the cause of the world? When śruti says that from the Self which is Brahman ether came into existence,296 it may be thought that Brahman is the cause of the world, and that the creation of the world by Brahman is real. Sures'vara argues that the nature of Brahman is such that it cannot be the cause of the world for three important reasons. First of all, Brahman being all-pervasive is non-different from all, and so there is nothing different from it to be thought of as its effect. Second, Brahman is one and non-dual, and there is no second entity to be related with Brahman in terms of cause-effect relation. Third, being immutable, Brahman cannot be the cause of the world. The supreme Brahman is neither an effect nor a cause of something. Nor is there anything other than Brahman which is fit enough to be the root cause of the world. All objects other than Brahman are effects, and none of them is the ultimate cause of the world.297

It is no argument to say that Brahman, though immutable, can be the cause of the world in the same way as a

294. TUBV, II, verse 730, p. 446.

295. Ibid., II, verse 416, p. 282.

296. TU, II, 1.

297. TUBV, II, verses 140-141, pp. 132-133.

118

INTRODUCTION

magnet, remaining where it is and without undergoing any

change, is the cause of the movement of iron filings just

by its proximity to them. Since Brahman is ever-existent,

its proximity to the world is also ever-existent, and this

would mean the creation or the existence of the world all

the time. The idea of eternal creation is unacceptable,

for creation (srsṭi) and dissolution (pralaya) alternate like

day and night.298

There is also another difficulty here when we speak

of the creation of the world. Every object which is created

comes into existence at a particular time and space. Then

what about the creation of both time and space? While

the occurrence of a thing is explained in a particular space-

time context, the occurrence of both space and time

cannot be explained by presupposing another space and

time, for strictly speaking there is neither plurality of

space nor plurality of time. It means that the explana-

tion of the creation of a thing in the space-time context

breaks down when we attempt to explain the creation of

both space and time. Any attempt to explain the occur-

rence of both space and time at one level by presuppo-

sing "another space" and "another time" will lead to the

fallacy of infinite regress.299

Sures'vara exposes the untenability of the creation of

the world by Brahman in another way. If Brahman is the

cause of the creation of the world, then one must specify

the occurrence of creation in respect of time — whether the

creation of the world by Brahman took place in the past,

or whether it will take place in the future, or whether it

takes place now. None of these alternatives is tenable.

Without assuming Brahman's relation with time it can-

not be said that Brahman either created, or creates, or will

create the world. The truth is that Brahman is unrelated

298. Ibid., II, verse 142, p. 133.

299. Ibid.

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL

119

(asaṅga) to anything whatsoever. It means that Brahman as well as its creation is not of the past, nor of the present, nor of the future. Further, to specify the creation of the world by Brahman in terms of time is to limit Brahman by temporal dimension, past, present, or future. Since Brahman is the cause of time, it cannot be limited by time.300 It may be stated here to avoid any possible confusion that Brahman by itself is neither a cause nor an effect. But it is nevertheless said to be the apparent cause of, and thereby to have relation with, time due to its association with avidyā. Generally speaking, Advaita holds the view that Brahman associated with avidyā is the apparent and not the real cause of the world.

There is yet another reason to show why the creation of the world is not real. The very notion of the creation of the world is unintelligible. The world must have been either existent or non-existent before its creation. It cannot be said that the world which is non-existent (asat) comes into being. The non-existent, just because it is non-existent, cannot have any relation with a cause. In the absence of its relation with a cause, the non-existent cannot come into existence. Nor is it possible to say that what is existent (sat) comes into being. What is already existent cannot be produced by a cause. If neither the existent nor the non-existent comes into being, to speak of the creation of the world does not make any sense.301

Sures'vara refers to yet another difficulty involved here. To say that the world is created is to admit that it is subject to the sixfold change such as origination (janma), destruction (nāśa), etc. Is there origination for origination? Is there destruction for destruction? If there were origination for origination and destruction for destruction, it would lead to infinite regress. If, on the contrary, there

300. Ibid., II, verses 143-144, pp. 135-136.

301. Ibid., II, verse 146, p. 137.

120

INTRODUCTION

is no origination for origination and destruction for destruction, it must be said, says Suresvara, that they are immutable. And if they are immutable, to say that one state such as origination is followed by other states such as existence, growth, etc. is wrong. But all the time we proceed on the assumption that there is the sixfold change though in truth it is illusory.302 It means that the creation of the world is not real, but only illusory due to māyā. In the words of Suresvara: "From Brahman-Ātman which has neither a beginning nor a middle nor an end, and which is concealed by avidyā, ether comes into existence like the (double) moon arising from the eye-disease."303 Again, "What comes into being is not competent to stay even for a moment; then how is permanency for that? To the deluded vision it appears permanent like the serpent caused by avidyā out of the rope."304

It is necessary in this connection to explain the meaning of the pravesa-śruti, the text which speaks of the entry of Brahman into the universe. The Upanisad says: "Having deliberated, he created all this that exists. That (Brahman) having created (that), entered into that very thing."305 On a superficial reading of this passage one may argue that the creation of the world by Brahman is real. But at the same time the entry of Brahman into the world, it may be argued, is utterly meaningless as every possible explanation of it bristles with difficulties and contradictions. Clay and pot are related as cause and effect. Once the pot has been produced from the clay, the latter cannot enter into the former once again as a separate entity. Likewise Brahman, the cause, cannot in the form of the cause once again enter

302. Ibid.

303. Ibid., II, verse 149, p. 140.

304. Ibid., II, verse 150, p. 140.

305. TU, II, 6.

into the world after having created it. But it is this impossible thing that has been spoken of by Scripture. Nor can it be said that Brahman entered into the universe in some other form. Brahman is one and non-dual, and one cannot think of any other form for Brahman. It cannot be said that Brahman entered into the universe in the form of the jīva, for the latter in its essential nature is not different from Brahman. Further, since Brahman is all-pervasive, there is no place anywhere in the universe which it has to enter into anew. There is yet another difficulty. It makes sense to say that an object which has form enters into another object which has also form. But since Brahman is devoid of form, it is absurd to speak of the entry of Brahman into the universe. In view of all these difficulties one may draw the conclusion that the entry-text has to be set aside as nonsensical.306

Following Śaṅkara, Sureśvara argues that the purport of the entry-text is to teach the non-difference between Brahman and Ātman, which is the central thesis of the Upaniṣads. The account of creation and of the entry of Brahman into the universe must be understood in the context of the central teaching. We have already said that the creation of the world by Brahman is not real; Brahman, that is to say, is not the real, but only the apparent cause of the world. If so, the entry of Brahman into the world is also not real. The entry that is spoken of in II, 6 of the Taittirīya is but the "entry" of Brahman into the intellect mentioned earlier in the same Upaniṣad in II, 1. With a view to remove the wrong notion that Brahman is something remote and mediate, the Upaniṣad, immediately after defining Brahman as real, knowledge, and infinite, says that Brahman is seated in the cave of the intellect, and suggests thereby that Brahman is identical with Ātman, the

306. TUBV, II, verses 379-390, pp. 261-269.

122

INTRODUCTION

inward Self of the individual. Brahman-Ātman can be

known only through the intellect. We have already said

that the intellect which carries the sembiance of conscious-

ness is the source of all our cognitions of the various

objects. It is through the same intellect which reflects

Brahman-consciousness that one must attain the knowledge

of Brahman. When the intellect is rid of all differentia-

tions, when it remains one and unitary (akhaṇḍākāra),

there arises the knowledge of Brahman. Since Brahman

is known through the intellect which carries the reflection

of Brahman-consciousness, it is said, in a figurative way, to

have entered into the intellect. In the words of Sures'vara:

"Brahman which is without differentiation is cognized in

this (intellect) which is the source of all differentiation.

Hence, the entry of Brahman into the intellect is an

imaginary representation. It is not conveyed in the literal

sense."307 Sruti resorts to this mode of speech with a

view to impart the knowledge of non-difference between

Brahman and Ātman.

Sures'vara is an advocate of sattaikyavāda. Reality

is one and non-dual, and that is Brahman-Ātman. Every-

thing other than Brahman-Ātman is non-real, illusory.

The world of waking experience is as illusory as the dream

world. Suresvara observes : "Just as in dream the

universe existing in one's own Self is seen as if it were

external, so be it known that even in the waking state

this universe exists within, and yet appears to be exter-

nal."308 He further explains the similarity between the

waking and dream worlds as follows : "It is certain that

the existence of objects seen in dream is not independent

of the existence of one's own Self. What difference is

307. Ibid., II, verse 397, p. 272.

308. Mānasollāsa; see A. Mahadeva Sastri, The Vedānta Doctrine,

verse 9, p. 6.

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL 123

there in the objects of waking consciousness, impermanent and insentient as they always are?'309 "Just as when awake, a man sees not the things which are presented to his view during sleep, so, subsequent to the rise of right knowledge, he sees not the universe.'310 There are undoubtedly certain differences between the contents of dream and the objects of waking experience.311 Notwithstanding these differences, the world of our waking experience is as illusory, non-real, as the dream world. Like Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara, Sures'vara maintains that the waking and dream world are on the same footing. The status of the world does not become superior to that of a dream-lion or a rope-snake just because we say that the world has empirical reality (vyāvahārika-sattā) while a dream-lion or a rope-snake has phenomenal reality (prātibhāsika-sattā).312 The world is empirically real; it is nevertheless illusory. If it is admitted from the strict metaphysical point of view that Brahman alone exists, that everything other than Brahman is non-real, and that in Brahman alone all the world takes its rise, persists, and perishes, it follows that the the world of waking experience, like a dream object, is illusory. The world is phenomenal and also illusory. One can argue, as Radhakrishnan does,

309. Ibid., verse 10, p. 6.

310. Ibid., verse 12, p. 7.

311. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, II, 4; also, SBSB, III, ii, 3.

312. The real difference between the empirical world and an object like a rope-serpent may be stated in this way. While the former is due to mūlāvidyā, the latter to tūlāvidyā, otherwise called avasthājñāna. We can state the difference in another way also. The appearance of the world is due to avidyā. But the appearance of a rope-serpent is due to avidyā and other defects. Hence the difference between the empirical world which is said to be vyāvahārika and the rope-serpent which is said to be prātibhāsika. Notwithstanding this difference, both of them are illusory, because in both the cases there is the work of the basic defect called avidyā.

124

INTRODUCTION

that the world is phenomenai but not illusory313 oniy if

the phenomenality of the world and its illusoriness are

opposed to each other. But they aie not. And so there is

no justification for the coniention that "unreal the world

is, illuscry it is not,"314 that "there is nothing to support

the view that the entire manifold universe is illusory in

character,"315 and that the world "is not to be compared

with illusory appearances."316 Advaita has not donc any

damage to the world. The iliusory status of the world

does not jeopardize the practical reality of thc world.

From the relative standpoint of avidyā, the world exists,

and is real and meaningful; it is not a wasteland. And

this is what Suresvara characterizes as the "outward

view." Froni the standpoint of Brahman, there is neither

avidyā nor the world. This is, acccording to Suresvara, the

standpoint uf the "inward view."

According to Advaita, the individual self (jīva) in its

essential nature is no other than Brahman, but it appears

to be different due to the limitation it suffers through its

association with avidyā and its products. Suresvara says:

"Just as a rope attains the form of a serpent through

avidyā, though it is not really competent to become that,

so also the Self attains, indeed, the form of the jīva consis-

ting of the five sheaths and suffers as it were in that

form."317 Again, "Just as a rope makes itself a serpent

through avidyā, even so the jīva, separating, then, from the

non-dual consciousness (which is Brahman) through avidyā

313. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (London: George

Allen & Unwin, 1966), Vol. II, p. 581.

314. Ibid., p. 583.

315. S. Radhakrishnan, The Brahma Sutra (London: George

Allen & Unwin, 1960), pp. 137-138.

316. Ibid., p. 140.

317. TUBV, II, verse 250, p, 191.

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL

125

makes itself an agent and an enjoyer."318 It means that

there is no real difference between Brahman, the supreme

Self, and the jīva, the individual self. The difference

between them is not natural, but adventitious caused by

avidyā and its products. Brahman does not become the

jīva by undergoing transformation; but Brahman in the

empirical dress is the jīva. The individual self in its

empirical condition has not only the experience of avidyā,

but also knows itself as the subject of knowledge, the agent

of action, and the enjoyer of the fruits of action associated as it is with the five sheaths (kośa-pañcaka) and the three

bodies (sarira-traya), which are not-Self.

Reality is one and non-dual, whether we view it from

the standpoint of the individual, which is the subjective

approach, or from that of the world, which is the objective

approach. Suresvara says that neither the individual self

nor the empirical world endangers the non-dual status of

Brahman-Ātman, the ultimate reality. "The inward Self,

which is not touched by duality even objectively, in the

same way as it is not touched by duality subjectively, is

one. Owing to avidyā, the Self is illusorily divided into

two categories of ‘Thou’ and ‘I’."319 Suresvara substantiates his position by providing an analysis of the nature of

both the empirical self and the objective world. In the

course of his analysis he works out a parallelism between

the two by showing that each is constituted by five sheaths

which are not-Self, and therefore not real.

On may wonder why Scripture should give us a

detailed analysis of the nature of the five sheaths, as we

find in the Taittirīya, though instruction on the nature of

Brahman is what is required for attaining liberation.

Though these five sheaths are not-Self, they have been

318. Ibid., II, verse 463, p. 305.

319. Ibid., II, verse 234, p. 179.

126

INTRODUCTION

looked upon ali along as the Self due to ignorance. Through

an explanation of the nature of these sheaths, Scripture

seeks to impart the knowledge of the Self which is beyond

the five sheaths. Understanding the real nature of the

sheaths is the means to the attainment of the knowledge

of the Self. What is not known must be known through

what is known. What cannot be comprehended easily

must be taught through something more tangible and easiiy

understood. "Just as a person is made to see the moon

through seeing the edge of a branch of a tree alone, so

also he is made to see Brahman which is identical with the

inward Self and which is devoid of sheaths through the

knowledge of the sheaths alone."320

Suresvara says that the non-dual Seif is divided as

it were into two divisions - the subject or the "I" divi-

sion (asmadvibhāga) and the object or the "Thou" divi-

sion (yusmadvibhāga). The two words "I" (asmat) and

"Thou" (yuṣmat) are used to bring out the absc lute

opposition between the subject and the object. The

pronouns of the first and the third person can be placed

in a co-ordinate relation in a sentence as when we say,

"It is I," "I am he whom you speak about." Again, the

pronouns of the second and the third person can be

placed in a co-ordinate relation in a sentence as when we

say, "You are he whom I wanted to see." But language

does not allow of any such co-ordination between the

pronouns of the first and the second person. The subject

or the "I" division has for its content the notion of "I",

while the object or the "Thou" division has for its con-

tent any object which can be referred to as "this".

The empirical self has an outfit of five sheaths arrang-

ed in a telescopic manner, one inside another, the outer

320. Ibid., II, verse 232, p. 178.

deriving its being from the inner. The sheath of food (annamaya-kośa) is the outermost one. It is a product of matter. Inward to the sheath of food are the sheath of vital force (prāṇamaya-kośa), the sheath of mind (manomaya-kośa), the sheath of intellect (vijñānamaya-kośa); and the sheath of bliss (ānandamaya-kośa). Employing the imagery of a bird, the Taittirīya describes each sheath as consisting of a head, two wings, the trunk and a tail for the purpose of meditation. The practice of meditation on these sheaths as indicated by śruti leads to the purification of the mind and thereby helps the spiritual aspirant to uncover the non-dual Self by one the different sheaths which conceal it.321 The sheath which is inward is subtler than, and pervades, the one which is outward to it. The inward sheath is, therefore, the cause of its outward sheath. In the language of the Taittirīya, the inward sheath "fills" the outward one. Suresvara explains the relation between the sheath of food and the sheath of vital force which is inward to it as follows: "By the sheath of vital force, this (sheath of food) is filled in the same way as the serpent is filled by the rope. The sheath of food which is an effect is illusory, as known from the vācāramḅhana text."322 The same explanation holds good for the remaining sheaths. With regard to the sheath of bliss, the Upaniṣad says that it is Brahman which is its support.323 It means that every sheath, from the annamaya to the ānandamaya, is non-real, because all of them are effects. Being an effect is what makes a thing illusory; and being a cause is what makes a thing real. This is the central teaching of the vācārambhaṇa text of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad which says

321. Ibid., II, verse 244, p. 187.

322. Ibid., II, verse 272, p. 202.

323. TU, II, 5: "brahma puccham pratiṣṭhā."

128

INTRODUCTION

that an effect or a modification is only a name arising from speech.

When superficially viewed, it may be thought that each inward sheath is the self of its outward sheath, because it appears as though the Upaniṣad speaks of the sheath of vital force as the self of the sheath of food, the sheath of mind as the self of the sheath of vital force, and so on.

In fact, the Vṛttikāra follows this line of interpretation which enables him to maintain that the sheath of bliss, the fifth in the series, is the supreme Brahman.

But this interpretation is not acceptable to both Śaṅkara and Sureśvara, who hold that the sheath of bliss is only the conditioned self and not the highest Brahman.

Sureśvara first of all objects to considering any sheath which is illusory as the self of another sheath.

For example, the sheath of vital force can be the śarīra-ātmā, the self dwelling in the body made of food, only in a secondary sense.

Being insentient, the sheath of vital force can never be the self of the sheath of food in the real or primary sense of the term.

The same thing is true of the remaining sheaths including the sheath of bliss.

Sureśvara says: "All (the five sheaths) being illusory, we consider that which has been defined as real, etc., and which is free from all transmigratory existence as the Self."

Further, what is itself non-real or illusory can never be the real basis or substratum of another illusory object.

Consider the case where a rope is first of all mistaken for a stick and then for a snake.

The illusory stick which is itself a false appearance, which owes its existence to something else, cannot really account for the illusory snake.

324. VI, i, 4.

325. TUBV, III, verse 285, p. 210.

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL

129

Here it is the rope, and not the illusory stick, which is the substratum for the illusory snake; it alone constitutes the nature of the self of the illusory snake. The sheath of vital force, whose status is similar to the illusory stick mentioned above, cannot be the real basis, i.e. cannot constitute the nature of the self, of the sheath of food. What is true of the sheath of vital force is equally true of the other sheaths. So Sures´vara maintains that Brahman alone on which all the sheaths are superimposed is the Self of ail.325

Sures´vara adduces several reasons to show why the sheath of bliss is not the highest, but only the conditioned self. According to Advaita, when the intellect carrying the semblance of the inward Self is in the form of joy, etc., it is the ānandamaya-jīva, which is the enjoyer. Three points are important in the Advaita conception of the sheath of bliss. First of all, the sheath of bliss is the conditioned self with the intellect as its adjunct. Second, the intellect carries the semblance of Brahman which is bliss. Third, the manifestation of the different forms such as joy in the intellect is due to the upāsanā and karma performed by the jīva in its previous life. Like the other sheaths, the sheath of bliss is an evolved principle. And this is confirmed by the suffix “maya” which occurs uniformly in all these terms, from the annamaya to the ānandamaya. So every one of these sheaths is a conditioned self - the self in the upādhi of the physical body, or the vital force, or the mind, or the intellect, as the case may be. Since the ānandamaya occurs in the context of evolved principles (vikāra-prakaraṇa), it cannot be the highest principle.327

It is no argument to say that the suffix ''mayat'' in the ānandamaya is used in the sense of abundance (prācuryārtha)

326. Ibid., II, verse 286, p. 211.

327. Ibid., II, verse 325, p. 232.

120

INTRODUCTION

and not in the sense of modification (vikārārtha), and that

the ānandamaya, therefore, refers to the supreme Brahman

which is full of bliss. Suresvara argues that if the suffix

"mayat" has been understood in the sense of modification

in the sheath of food, etc., it must be construed in the

same sense in the sheath of bliss also as there is no justi-

fication for the change of meaning all on a sudden in the

same context from "modification" to "abundance".328

There is also another reason to show why the ānanda-

maya is not the highest Self. The Taittirīya says that a

person who knows Brahman transcends all the sheaths

including the sheath of bliss.329 This transcending

(saṅkramana) is possible only if the sheath of bliss is an

effect or a modification. And there is also something

different from the sheath of bliss which is its cause,

support, or resting place. It is not the sheath of bliss that

is Brahman, but its support is Brahman. Suresvara clinches

the issue in this way. If the sheath of bliss were the

highest Brahman, the word "saṅkrānti" which occurs in the

Taittirīya, II, viii, 5, with regard to the sheath of bliss

cannot be given an intelligible meaning. It must mean

either transcending or attaining Brahman. But neither of

these meanings is tenable here. Let us first consider the

first of these two meanings. There are two reasons to

show why Brahman cannot be transcended by the jīva.

First of all, Brahman is all-pervasive, and so it can never

be transcended by the jīva. Second, the jīva is non-diffe-

rent from Brahman. One cannot transcend oneself. It

means that the jīva cannot transcend Brahman which is

its inward Self. The other meaning also does not hold

good. It cannot be said that the jīva attains Brahman.

Since Brahman is non-different from the jīva, there is no

attainment of it by the jīva. So, saṅkrānti, whether it is

328. Ibid., II, verse 326, p. 233.

329. TU, II, viii, 5.

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL

131

understood in the sense of transcending or in the sense of attaining, is not possible with regard to the highest Brahman. Inasmuch as śruti specifically speaks about the transcending of the sheath of bliss, the latter must be only a conditioned self and not the supreme Brahman.330

The Taittirīya describes the sheath of bliss as possessing head and other limbs. It says that joy is the head, enjoyment is the right wing, exhilaration is the left wing, bliss is the trunk, and Brahman is the tail or the support of the sheath of bliss. It means that the sheath of bliss is saviśesa, a differentiated entity. But Brahman is nirviśesa, the pure, undifferentiated Being. So the sheath of bliss cannot be the highest Brahman. One cannot argue that Brahman is differentiated for the purpose of identifying it with the sheath of bliss as it would be inconsistent with the Scriptural declaration that Brahman is imperceptible, incorporeal, and inexpressible.331 Since Brahman is imperceptible, incorporeal, etc., it cannot be identified with the sheath of bliss possessing head and other limbs.332

There is one more point to be stressed here. The description of the sheath of bliss occurs in the fifth section of the Brahmavallī. The sixth section which follows it refers to the possibility of doubt with regard to the existence of Brahman. Every one has direct experience of the sheath of bliss. If Brahman were identical with the sheath of bliss, there cannot be any room for doubt whether it exists or not. In so far as such a doubt is raised, it means that the sheath of bliss cannot be identified with the highest Brahman.333

330. TUBV, II, verses 327-329, pp. 234-235.

331. TU, II, 7.

332. Ibid., II, verse 331, p. 236.

333. Ibid.

132

INTRODUCTION

The five sheaths are apportioned to the three bodies—the gross, the subtle, and the causal — of the jīva. The sheath of food is identified with the gross body (sthūla-śarīra) which is subject to birth and death. The sheaths of vitality, mind, and intellect constitute the subtle body (sūkṣma-śarīra) which is the nucleus for the rise of another gross body and which is associated with the jīva throughout its transmigratory existence. The subtle body consists of seventeen factors—buddhi, manas, the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, and the five vital airs.334 The sheath of bliss is identified with the causal body (kāraṇa-śarīra). In the waking state the jīva with the physical body as its adjunct is called Viśva. It is called Taijasa in the dream state where the subtle body is its adjunct. Prājña is the name given to it in the state of deep sleep, with the causal body as its adjunct. The point to be stressed here is that one and the same Self is given different names in its empirical condition taking into consideration the state of experience and the limiting adjunct with which it is associated. Corresponding to Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājña which are the individual forms (vyasṭi) of the Self, there are Virāj, Hiranyagarbha, and Īśvara, which are the cosmic forms (samaṣṭi) of the Self. The Virāj is the cosmic being in its gross physical aspect covered by the sheath of food. The Hiranyagarbha, otherwise known as the Sūtrātman, is the cosmic being in its subtle aspect, enveloved by the sheaths of vitality, mind, and intellect. The cosmic being, equipped with the sheath of bliss and remaining unmanifest, is called Īśvara.

Sures'vara says that the purpose of the teaching of the correlation between the five sheaths at the individual level and those at the cosmic level is to help the spiritual aspirant realize the non-dual Brahman-Ātman which transcends the

334. Ibid., II, verse 174, p. 153.

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL

133

five kośas. Each sheath at the cosmic level is the material

cause of its corresponding sheath at the individual level.

That is to say, the five sheaths of the subject division are

the modifications of the corresponding sheaths of the

object division.335 The annamayakośa of the individual

is a modification of the anna-kośa of the cosmic level. In

the same way, the prāṇamayakośa of the individual is a

modification of the prāṇa-kośa of the cosmic level. The

same explanation holds good for the remaining sheaths.

Suresvara argues that by making use of the principle that

the effect is non-different from its material cause all these

sheaths could be merged in one another in such a way

that ultimately the non-dual Self alone will remain.

The process of merging or resolution is done at two

stages. First of all, the five sheaths of the subject division

must be resolved in thought into the five sheaths of the

object division. It means that one must realize that the

annamaya is not different from the anna, that the prāṇa-

maya is not different from the prāṇa, and so on. When

we are thus left with the five sheaths of the object division,

the process of merging must once again be resorted to.

Since anna has evolved from prāṇa, prāṇa from manas,

manas from vijñāna, and vijñāna from ānanda, the first

cause, one must resolve anna in prāṇa, prāṇa in manas,

and so on till one comes to ānanda, the first cause. Finally,

one must transcend ānanda by resolving it in Brahman

from which it is non-different.336

By the application of the anvaya-vyatireka principle it

can be shown, according to Suresvara, that while the

sheaths are not real, the Self alone is real. That alone is

real which is uniformly present in all things. What is pre-

sent in some object and absent in others is not real. It has

335. Ibid., II, verse 235, p. 180.

336. Ibid., II, verses 236-237, pp. 181-182.

134

INTRODUCTION

already been stated that the five sheaths are related as

cause and effect, and that what is considered to be an

effect is not different, and does not exist apart from its

cause. While the cause is present in its effect, we cannot

reverse this relation and say that the effect is present in

its cause. Though the sheath of vitality is the cause of

the sheath of food, it is in its turn the effect of the sheath

of mind. Though the sheath of intellect is the cause of the

sheath of mind, it is in its turn the effect of the sheath of

bliss which again has Brahman as its cause or support. It

means that none of these sheaths which are evolved princi-

ples are uniformly present in all things; and so they are

not real. But Brahman which is the ultimate support or

cause of everything is real. So by the application of the

anvaya-vyatireka principle one must discriminate, as Bhṛgu

did, the five sheaths which are not real from the Self

which is real. A person who is able to discriminate in this

way the Self from the not-Self realizes Brahman as his

inward Self directly from the Śruti text itself independently

of injunction and meditation. That is why Sures'vara says:

"Since the realization of the Self is, indeed, brought about

by the sheaths through the method of agreement and diffe-

rence, they are regarded as the means thereto."337 Again,

"So the five sheaths were taught to him (by Varuṇa) as

the means of comprehending Brahman-knowledge con-

veyed by the śruti text. Thereafter, Bhṛgu stopped his

investigation (with ānanda), since the remainder, viz

Brahman-knowledge, takes place of its own accord (from

the text itself)."338

Sures'vara holds the view that the jīva, like Īśvara, is

an ābhāsa, a semblance of Brahman, the pure conscious-

ness. It means that both jīva and Īśvara are cidābhāsas.

337. Ibid., II, verse 335, p. 238.

338. Ibid., II, verse 337, p. 241.

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL

135

An ābhāsa is what resembles the original, though essentially different from it.339 So both jīva and Īśvara resemble the pure consciousness, though they are different from

it. The semblance theory (ābhāsa-vāda) of Suresvara is different both from the reflection theory (pratibimba-vāda)

of the Vivarana school and the limitation theory (avac-

cheda-vāda) of the Bhāmatī school.

Avidyā and its product are responsible for the appearance of both Īśvara and jīva. Brahman-in-itself, accord-

ing to Suresvara, is neither the cause, nor the inner controller, nor the witness, of the universe, all of which are

the characteristics of Īśvara, who is the semblance of consciousness in avidyā. In the same way, Brahman-in-itself

is neither a cognizer, nor an agent, nor an enjoyer; but these are true of the jīva which is a semblance of consciousness in the intellect (buddhi), which is a product of

avidyā. So the non-dual Brahman appears through its association with avidyā and the intellect in the dual forms

of Īśvara and jīva respectively.

The association of the Self, which is pure consciousness, with avidyā results in a false identification of the one

with the other. Further, there is non-discrimination between the pure consciousness which is the Self and its sem-

blance reflected in avidyā. So what is called Īśvara is the

semblance of pure consciousness in avidyā, wrongly identified with its original. The jīva, too, is explained in a

similar way. The association of the intellect with the Self

leads to a wrong identification of the one with the other.

Following this, there is non-discrimination between the

339. Cidābhāsa is explained in this way: cidvilakṣaṇatve sati

cidvad-bhāsamānatvam cidābhāsatvam.

BUBV, IV, iii, 1320, explains how the pure consciousness, which

serves as the original, transcends its semblance reflected in ajñāna and

its product.

136

INTRODUCTION

pure consciousness and its semblance reflected in the intellect. The semblance of the pure consciousness in the intellect wrongly identified with its original is jīva.340 From the foregoing account it is obvious first of all that both jīva and Īśvara are conditioned selves. Secondly, as ābhāsas, both of them are mithyā; their ontological status is indeterminable as either real or unreal, as either jāda or ajada. Thirdly, in each there is a wrong identification of Brahman, the pure consciousness, which is the original, with the semblance thereof in avidyā or the intellect as the case may be, starting from the initial wrong identification with avidyā or the intellect. It is on account of this wrong identification that Īśvara, though only a semblance and therefore mithyā, is viewed as the cause, the inner controller, and the witness of the entire universe. Similarly the jīva also, though only a semblance and therefore mithyā, is looked upon as an agent, an enjoyer, and a cognizer. So Sureśvara's conception of both jīva and Īśvara involves four factors, viz (1) avidyā or the intellect as the case may be, (2) the semblance of the pure consciousness therein, (3) pure consciousness which is the original, and (4) a false identification of the original with its semblance due to non-discrimination.

The foregoing explanation of the nature of the jīva as an ābhāsa is different both from the reflection theory of the Vivaraṇa school and the limitation theory of the Bhāmatī school. The jīva, according to the Vivaraṇa school, is a reflection of consciousness in the intellect, which is a mode of avidyā. Since there is no difference between the reflection and its original, the jīva is non-different from Brahman-consciousness. The reflected image in a mirror is identical with its original, but it nevertheless appears to be different because of the mirror which reflects

340. See Madhusudanasarasvatī, Siddhāntabindu, Ed., Trayambakam Sastri (Kasi Sanskṛit Series, No. 65, 1928), pp. 219-220.

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL

137

it. In the same way, the intellect in which Brahman-consciousness is reflected is responsible for the apparent difference between the original and its reflection. From what has been said above, it will be obvious that there is a basic difference between the reflection theory and the semblance theory. While the former maintains that the reflection, being identical with its original, is real, the latter holds that the semblance which is not identical with its original is mithyā. The limitation theory of the Bhāmatī school seeks to explain the jīva, not in terms of either reflection or semblance of Brahman-consciousness in the intellect, but in terms of limitation. According to this theory, Brahman, the pure consciousness, delimited by avidyā is the jīva. The difference between Brahman and the jīva arises because of the limiting adjunct, viz avidyā, in the same way as the difference between the ether enclosed in a pot and the ether outside it arises because of the pot. If so, the difference between Brahman and the jīva is only adventitious and not natural.

Suresvara's explanation of the jīva as an ābhāsa of Brahman is based on Saṅkara's commentary on the Brha-dāraṇyaka.341 Saṅkara says that through avidyā Brahman attains the status of the jīva, becomes an agent and an enjoyer, and is caught up in transmigratory existence. And it attains release when it realizes through knowledge its real nature. Consider the case of a prince who, brought up by a hunter, considers himself a hunter, though in truth he is a prince. All that is required for regaining his real status is the awakening through some one that he is a prince and not a hunter. Similarly nothing else than the knowledge of its real nature is needed for Brahman to give up its illusory status of jīva and remain in its own form as Brahman. Appayya Dīkṣita quotes the following verse which he says is taken from the Vārtika: “Just as for the

341. BU, I iv, 10.

138

INTRODUCTION

king's son on regaining his memory, the condition of being a hunter ceases, even so for the ignorant (there is release) because of such texts as 'That thou art'."342

Sures'vara says: "The supreme Self, though it is infinite, attains the status of the Kṣetrajña, the knower of the body, by means of avidyā. Only thus, the declaraion (of Krṣṇa), 'Know me also as the Kṣetrajña,' is tenable."343

Though both Īśvara and jīva are conditioned selves, they are different inasmuch as their adjuncts are different. Avidyā or māyā which is the adjunct of Īśvara is pure; but the intellect which is the adjunct of the jīva is impure.

According to Sures'vara, Īśvara is the Witness-consciousness (sākṣin) as He knows everything. He is the material cause (upādānakāraṇa) as well as the inner controller (antar-yāmin) of the entire universe.

But the jīva can claim none of these. Associated as it is with the limited intellect, a product of avidyā, it is the subject of knowledge, the agent of action, and the enjoyer of the fruits of action.

Further, there is only one primal avidyā. Since Īśvara is the semblance of the pure consciousness reflected in avidyā, there is only one Īśvara.

But there is a plurality of jīvas. Being a mode or an evolute of avidyā, the intellect is manifold. Since the jīva is a semblance of the pure consciousness in the intellect and since the intellect is manifold, there are many jīvas.344

There is one more important distinction between Īśvara and the jīva. It has already been stated that Īśvara is the witness to everything. It means that though He is associated with avidyā neither His nature nor that of others is concealed from Him by avidyā. He is the witness not only to avidyā, but also to everything that takes

342. See Sidhāntalesasañgraha, Ed., S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (University of Madras, 1937), Vol. II, Sanskrit text, p. 20. Professor Sastri says that this verse is not found in the Vārtika.

343. TUBV, II, verse 175, p. 154.

344. See Siddhāntabindu, p. 220.

place in the universe. In other words, He is not over-whelmed by the power of concealment (āvaraṇa-śakti) of avidyā, though He witnesses the world-process due to the power of projection (vikṣepa-śakti) of avidyā. It follows from this that there is no bondage for Īśvara. Being a victim of both the powers of avidyā, the jīva does not know its real nature, but considers itself as an agent and an enjoyer; and so it is in bondage. It is on account of the adjuncts that both Īśvara and jīva are different from Brahman and also different from each other. "Since the non-dual reality appears, through avidyā, in the different forms of Kṣetrajña and Īśvara, by removing it (we must realize their) oneness like the oneness of the ether enclosed in a pot and the ether outside it."345

XIII

AVIDYĀ

Since the existence of both the pluralistic universe and the empirical self is sought to be solved in terms of the primal principle called avidyā, it is necessary to shift our attention to the latter problem. Sureśvara follows in the footsteps of Śaṅkara in the treatment of this problem. Like Śaṅkara, Sureśvara does not make any distinction between māyā and avidyā, He uses these two words as synonyms. The primal principle which is responsible for the appearance of the world of diversity and finite individuals, though in truth the non-dual Brahman alone is, has been designated differently as illusion (māyā), as the primary germ (pradhāna), as the unmanifested (avyakta), as ignorance (avidyā), as nescience (ajñāna), as the imperishable (akṣara) till the rise of knowledge, as the undifferentiated (avyākṛta), as the material cause (prakṛti),

345. TURV, II, verse 530, p. 337.

140

INTRODUCTION

and as darkness (tamas).346 It is beginningless (anādi).

Since its nature cannot be determined in any way, it is

said to be illusory appearance (mithyā). It is positive,

i.e. of the nature of an existent (bhāvarūpa). It has two

functions - concealment and projection: that is, it suppre-

sses the truth and suggests the false. It has Brahman-

Ātman as its locus (āśraya). It is not eternal as it can be

terminated by the right knowledge (jñāna-nivṛtya).

According to Suresvara, avidyā is entitatively one,

though functionally it is diverse, and so he speaks of it,

stressing its functional diversity, as non-apprehension

(ajñāna) when it obscures the nature of the given object,

as mis-apprehension or erroneous cognition (anyathā-

jñāna or viparyaya-jñāna) when it presents the given object

differently, as dubitative cognition (saṁsaya-jñāna) when

there is the cognition of the given object as either this or

that in terms of alternative predications.347 Not knowing

the given object, a person mistakes it for something else.

But when the object is cognized as it is, there is no mis-

apprehension. It means that mis-apprehension is a conse-

quence of non-apprehension. When by right knowledge

non-apprehension of an object is removed, its mis-appre-

hension, too, gets removed at the same time. So non-

apprehension and mis-apprehension, Suresvara says, are

related as cause and effect.348 Doubt also presupposes

non-apprehension of the real nature of the given object.

Not knowing the object in front, one says that it is either

a lamp-post or a man. So Suresvara says that non-appre-

346. Mānasollāsa; see A. Mahadeva Sastri, The Vedānta Doctrine,

verse 31, pp. 38.

347. TUBV, verse 660, p. 411.

348. BUBV, I, iv, 386:

"yadeva nityamajñānam mithyā-jñānam tadevatu

kāranetararūpeṇa tayoravyabhicārataḥ."

The word nityam in the first line of the verse means anāditvam.

hension (ajñāna) is the basis for both doubt and error.349

But non-apprehension itself would be possible only if there

is concealment of the nature of the given object.350 One

and the same principle called avidyā obscures the truth

from us and thereby holds us in suspension or misleads

us to wrong cognitions. Avidyā is one, but it appears to

be many because of its functional manifestations.

The primal ignorance is described as beginningless

(anādi) as it has no cause to account for its beginning or

origination. We know that the things of the world are

related as cause and effect. The origination of a thing,

e.g. a pot, is explained in terms of its cause, viz clay. In

fact, the entire universe, according to Advaita, is caused

by avidyā. If avidyā is the cause of the universe, what,

then, is the cause of avidyā? Advaita says that, unlike

the world, the primal ignorance has no cause, and there-

fore has no beginning. If it would, like other things, require

a cause, there must be a cause of its cause, and the cause

of its cause must also have a cause, and so on; and this

349. BUBV, I, iv, 438-440.

Commenting on verse 440,

"ajñānaṁ saṁśayavānno mithyājñānāt-tathaiva ca

tayostattva-vivakṣāyāṁ ajñānaṁ tattvamucyate,"

Ānandagiri says: "mithyā-saṁśaya-dhīyoḥ ayathārthātmaṁ cet ajñānatvameva

syāt, tathā hyasmin-viṣaye'smākam saṁśayasya sattvāt ajñānamasti, tathaiva

viṣayāntare mithyā-jñānasyā sattvāt ajñānaṁ vartate. evaṁ lokavyavahārāt

tayor ajñānameva tattvaṁ niścitaṁ, ataḥ tatsvarūpapivaḳṣāyāṁ ajñānameva

tadvivekibhirucyate."

350. What Śaṅkara says in his commentary on the BG, XIII, 2,

is relevant in this context. According to Saṅkara, "As partaking of

the nature of a veil, avidyā — whether causing erroneous cognition, or

doubt, or non-cognition — is a tāmasic notion, i.e. a notion born of

tamas: for, on the dawn of the light of discrimination, it disappears:

and (for instance) we find the same three modes of avidyā—such as non-

cognition, etc. — arising also from timira (an eye disease causing dimness

of sight), which is tāmasic, as partaking of the nature of a veil."

142

INTRODUCTION

would lead to infinite regress. Further, it is only by presupposing time that we can speak of the beginning of

avidyā in time. But time itself is a product of the primal ignorance, and so it is wrong to speak of the beginning of

the primal ignorance in time. Avidyā, however, is not beginningless in the sense in which Brahman is. If it

were really beginningless like Brahman, there would be no end to it. But it has an end. Suresvara observes: "The

beginningless ignorance is seen to be destroyed in a moment by knowledge which has a beginning."351 Since

the primal ignorance has an end, it must have a beginning. Scripture, in fact, testifies to this when it says that avidyā-

māyā comes into existence of its own accord.352 The primal principle accounts for its own being, and having

come into existence it accounts for other things. It may appear that Advaita is blowing hot and cold as it says

that avidyā has a beginning, and is also beginningless. That there is no inconsistency here will be obvious if the

sense in which avidyā is said to have a beginning and the sense in which it is said to be beginningless is understood.

The position of Advaita on this issue comes to this: the primal ignorance has a beginning though its beginning

is neither in time, nor caused by another object which is its cause.

It is not possible to determine the nature of the primal ignorance as either real or unreal. What is unreal (asat),

e.g. the sky-flower, is never experienced. But since avidyā is an object of our experience, it is not unreal. According

to Advaita, what is real (sat) never suffers sublation. But since avidyā is removable by knowledge, it is not real. Nor

can it be both real and unreal because of contradiction. So

351. SV, 190-191.

352. Nrsimhapūrvatāpinyupaniṣad, IX, 3:

"māyā ca avidyā ca svayaṃeva bhavati".

the primal ignorance has a unique ontological status as it is different from both real and unreal (sadasadvilakṣaṇa).³⁵³

The critic argues that, instead of saying that avidyā is different from both real and unreal, it may be characterized as both real and unreal by formulating the criteria of real and unreal in a different way. The criteria as formulated by the critic are: (1) What is experienced is real, and (2) what suffers contradiction is unreal.³⁵⁴ Since avidyā is experienced, it is real; and since it is sublated, it is unreal. So in terms of these criteria, avidyā, the critic argues, may he characterized as of the nature of both real and unreal (sad-asadākaram).

This argument is untenable. First of all, there is no proving instance in support of the criterion that what is experienced or cognized is real.³⁵⁵ It cannot be said that the criterion holds good in the case of Brahman. Brahman is knowledge by its very nature, and so it is not what is cognized or experienced. Knowledge is different from the object of knowledge. What is knowledge by nature can never become an object of knowledge. Nor is it possible to cite objects like pot as proving instances of the criterion. Far from accepting the reality of these objects, Advaita maintains that, since these objects are cognized, they are non-real or illusory. According to Advaita, pot and other objects are illusory, because they are cognized, and what is cognized is illusory, e.g. the rope-serpent. Inasmuch as avidyā is cognized, it is non-real or illusory. Secondly, the criterion that what is unreal (asat) suffers contradiction is wrong. What is unreal, e.g. the sky-flower, is never experienced, and it is absurd to speak of

353. Mānasollāsa; see A. Mahadeva Sastri, The Vedānta Doctrine, verse 13, p. 153.

354. "pratīyamānatvāt sat, bādhyamānatvāt asat."

355. See Śrī Śaṅkarasaṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśah, p. 287.

"yat sat pratīyate ityatra-drṣṭāntābhānāt."

144

INTRODUCTION

contradiction or sublation of what is never cognized or

experienced. What is presented or given alone can be

negated. There is no negation in the case of sky-flower,

for there is no prior cognition of it, which is necessary for

its subsequent denial. Since the rope-snake is first cog-

nized, it admits of subsequent denial. So it is wrong to

say that what suffers contradiction is unreal; rather one

should say that what is never experienced or cognized is

unreal, e.g. the sky-flower.

The critic joins issue with Advaita in a different way.

He maintains that, though avidya is different from the un-

real, it is not so from the real. Just as we cognize the

world and other objects as real, even so, the critic urges,

we cognize avidya as real. What is vouched for by our

day-to-day experience can neither be ignored nor denied.

If so, it is wrong to say that avidya is different from both

real and unreal. The truth is, according to the critic, that

avidya, though different from the unreal, is not different

from the real (asad-vailakṣanye satyapi na sadvailakṣanyam).

In order to answer this objection it is necessary to

bear in mind the distinction between the absolutely real

and the empirically real. Brahman, according to Advaita,

is absolutely real; it does not suffer contradiction at any

time. On the contrary, any object which exists at one

time and ceases to exist later on is not absolutely real.

What is not absolutely real may nevertheless be empirically

real. When Advaita says that avidya is different from the

real, it means that it is different from the absolutely real

which is Brahman. Advaita does admit that avidya and

the objects of the world which are experienced in our

day-to-day experience are empirically real.356 So the

356. Ibid., p. 288:

"ajñānīdeḥ pāramārthika-sattvābhāvāt asmābhiḥ sadvailakṣaṇ-

yamucyate, na tu vyāvahārika-sattvābhāvāt."

objection of the critic is beside the point as it does not touch the criterion of the real as formulated by Advaita.

The objection can be answered in another way also.

Being illusory, avidyā has no being or reality of its own. Brahman alone is; Brahman alone is real. By erroneously ascribing reality to avidyā we speak of it as if it is real in our day-to-day experience.357 It means that avidyā is different not only from the unreal, but from the real as well. Since it can be designated neither as real nor as unreal, it is characterized as indeterminable; and since it is indeterminable, it is non-real or illusory.

The primal ignorance cannot be different from Brahman, for in that case, there would arise dualism which is flatly denied by Scripture. Nor can it be identical with Brahman; no identity is possible between Brahman which is sentient and avidyā which is insentient. It cannot be both different and non-different from Brahman, because of contradiction. Further, since it is not caused by another object, it is not a composite entity made up of parts. As the cause of composite things, it cannot be devoid of parts.358 It means that the nature of the primal ignorance cannot be determined in terms of the categories known to us. It is, therefore, said to be indeterminable (anirvacanīya) and also illusory (mithyā).

Though Suresvara has not used the neat expression "anirvacanīya" in describing the nature of the primal ignorance, he docs bring out its full significance in his writings.

357. Ibid., p. 288:

"kāraṇa-brahma-sattāyāḥ kārye ajñānādu anugamādeva ajñānaṁ sadityādi-vyavahāraḥ, svatas tu ajñānādeḥ sattvaṁ neti kṛtvā ajñānādeḥ sadvailakṣaṇyamuktam."

358. Mānasollāsa; See A. Mahadeva Sastri, The Vedānta Doctrine, verses 13-15, pp. 153-154.

146

INTRODUCTION

He characterizes it very frequently as avicāritasiddha359

with a view to show that it exists only so long as it is not scrutinized. Avidyā is well-known to us in our experience;

and no one is beyond its reach.360 It cannot, however, be proved by any source of valid cognition. Though

it is prasiddha, it is not pramāṇa-siddha. A brief explanation of this point is necessary. According to Advaita,

Brahman-Ātman which is knowledge by its very nature (svarūpa-caitunya) is not opposed to the primal ignorance,

for it not only accommodates avidyā in its bosom by being its locus, but also reveals it.- On the contrary, the knowledge which arises through the mental mode (vṛtti-jñāna)

is opposed to it. So we cannot know it through the knowledge generated by a pramāṇa. Such an attempt, Sures'-

vara declares, is as futile as the attempt to see the darkness of a mountain-cave by means of a lamp. The light

of a lamp will remove darkness. In the same way, the knowledge obtained through a pramāṇa, instead of revealing ignorance, will remove it. It is for this reason that

Advaita says that ignorance, which is prasiddha, is not pramāṇa-siddha. The following observations of Suresvara

are relevant here. “The name māyā,” Suresvara says, “is given to an appearance which cannot be accounted

for.”361 Again, “This harlot which is māyā, appearing only so long as not scrutinized, does deceive the Ātman by

her false affectations of coquetry.”362 In another place he says: “He who desires to see avidyā through the knowledge generated by a pramāṇa could as well certainly

359. Ibid., verse 16, p. 155; see also BUBV, I, iv, verses 332 and 444; BUBV, II, iii, 224; NS, sambandhokti to I, 1.

360. TUBV, II, verse 470, p. 308.

361. Mānasollāsa; see A. Mahadeva Sastri, The Vedānta Doctrine, verse 13, p. 153.

362. Ibid., verse 16, p. 155.

see the darkness in the interior of a cave lamp.'363

AVIDYĀ

147

Though avidyā is not knowable through any pramāna,

it is nevertheless directly experienced being illumined by

the Witness-self.364 It is impossible for us to explain in

any intelligible way the relation between Brahman-knowledge and avidyā. It is only at the empirical level, which is

itself a state of avidyā, that we speak of avidyā and its

location in Brahman. When Brahman is known, there is

no avidyā; and when Brahman which is the locus is not

known, how can one know avidyā which is said to be

located in it? In the words of Suresvara: "When Brah-

man is not known through valid cognition, that there is

nescience is unintelligible; and more so, when it is known;

there is no unsublated false cognition. He who is endowed

with nescience cannot establish it; in consideration of

the nature of reality it is established that there is no

nescience."365 "Therefore it is impossible," concludes

Suresvara, "to demonstrate through means of valid cogni-

tion that nescience is (in Brahman), or as of what form it

is, or whence, for there is only experience (of it)."366

Avidyā "which does not stand the scrutiny of pramāna"367

is unintelligible, mysterious. Suresvara remarks: "Look

at the audacity of nescience. No one is beyond it. It

disregards truth and reality and settles itself in existence

as if it were the ultimate reality."368

Suresvara emphasizes the pervasive character of avidyā

by drawing pointed attention to its manifold functions at

363. TUBV, II, verse 177, p. 155.

364. Ibid., II, verse 438, p. 292; also see Siddhāntabindu, p. 189;

"na jānāmi iti sākṣipratītisiddham anirvācyam ajñānam."

365. SV, 178-180.

366. Ibid., 184-185.

367. Ibid., 181-182.

368. NS, III, 111.

148

INTRODUCTION

the empirical level. He characterizes it as "the seed of all

evil"369 and "the root cause of bondage."370 Working

out the causal nexus leading to bondage, he says that

desires, which are caused by ignorance, lead to actions,

which is the seat of evil.371 In another place he says that

time with its threefold dimensions comes into being from

avidyā.372 Brahman-in-itself is not the cause of ether and

other elements which constitute the world, but Brahman in

association with avidyā is the cause.373 Stressing the

work of projection played by avidyā, he says that "the

objects of the world, which are related as causes and

effects and which are projected by avidyā, exist as it

were"374 by depending on the supreme Brahman. The

attainment of Brahman, Sures'vara declares, is "obstructed

only by the darkness of ignorance."375 "Though the

inward Self whose light ever shines and never sets is the

witness of avidyā, it is nevertheless obstructed by avidyā.

And we speak about that (obstruction) only on the strength

of avidyā."376 Duality, Sures'vara holds, is due to avidyā,

and through duality avidyā is the cause of fear.377

The manifold functions of avidyā may be brought

under two categories — the work of concealment (āvaraṇa)

and that of illusory projection (vikṣepa). Avidyā conceals

or veils the non-dual Brahman-Ātman and projects the

non-real or illusory world of plurality. In view of its being

the cause of concealment and illusory projection, it is

369. TUBV, II, verse 4, p. 70.

370. Ibid., II, verse 5, p. 70.

371. Ibid., II, verses 125-126, p. 124.

372. Ibid., II, verse 147, p. 138.

373. Ibid., II, verse 371, p. 257 and verse 417, p. 282.

374. Ibid., II, verse 412, p. 280.

375. Ibid., II verses 436-437, pp. 291-292.

376. Ibid., II, verse 438, p. 292.

377. Ibid., II, verse 572, p. 362, and verse 576, p. 364.

treated as bhāvarūpa — an expression which should not be construed to mean that avidyā is real, but only to mean that it is something existent and not negative. It has already been stated that, according to Suresvara, one and the same avidyā may be viewed as non-cognition, or as erroneous cognition, or as dubitative cognition depending upon the stress we lay on a certain function which it does. When in certain places Suresvara speaks of avidyā in terms of agrahana, it may appear that he views it as something negative. He says, for example, that the nature of avidyā "does not consist in anything other than the non-perception of the Self."78 For the deluded mind, he says, there is 'non-perception (which is avidyā) in the form 'I do not know.' "379 It is wrong to conclude from these that Suresvara views avidyā negatively as absence of knowledge (jñānābhāva) or as the prior non-existence of knowledge (jñāna-prāgabhāva). There is non-perception of the Self because of the concealing work of avidyā. The work of concealment which is positive cannot be done by a negative entity, which is non-existent. Suresvara argues that one cannot, contrary to all evidences, hold the view that a positive something comes out of what is negative or non-existent.380 If avidyā is explained negatively as absence or non-existence of knowledge, it cannot do the work of concealing or veiling the Self. Even the Logicians who are adepts in determining the nature of non-existence do not, as Sarvajñātman remarks, assert that what is non-existent veils an object.381 In so far as avidyā does this work, it has to be viewed as something positive or existent. That is why Suresvara says that the term "avidyā" must

378. Ibid., II, verse 179, p. 156.

379. Ibid., II, verse 180, p. 157.

380. Ibid., I, verse 22, p. 11.

381. See Saṅkṣepaśārīraka, I, 320: "nābhāvamāvaranamāhuraḥrabhāvaṣaundāḥ"

150

INTRODUCTION

be explained in the same way as the word "amitra" is

explained.232 When we speak of a person as amitra, we

mean that he is other than, or opposed to, a friend. Simi-

larly, the entity denoted by the word "avidyā" must be

explained as something other than, or opposed to, know-

ledge. The word does not convey the sense of absence of

knowledge.

In the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi there is a discussion whether

avidyā can be the cause of transmigratory existence. The

critic who initiates the discussion argues that ignorance is

absence of knowledge. Since it is not something positive,

it cannot be, he concludes, the cause of transmigratory

existence.383 Suresvara rejects this argument by holding

that avidyā is not absence of knowledge, but something

positive. He works out his position on the general

principle that concealment of the nature of an object

is the condition antecedent for non-apprehension; or

mis-apprehension, or doubt in respect of it 384 It is not

enough if we cognize an object generally, but we must

cognize it determining its nature as such-and-such, if any-

thing that is said of it is to be both significant and useful

in our day-to-day business of life. Consider the case of an

object which is first of all not known at all. It means,

according to Suresvara, that the object is concealed totally

by avidyā. A little later it is known in a general way, but

not with its specific quality; i.e. the thatness of the object

is known, but not its whatness. It means that in spite of

some knowledge of it we cannot claim to have known it

because we are still ignorant of its nature as the veil of

382. TUBV, II, verse 179, p. 156.

383. NS, sambandhokti to III, 7.

384. See Sankara's commentary on the BG, XIII, 2:

"tāmase ca āvaraṇātmake timirādidoṣe sati agrahaṇādeḥ

avidyātrayasya upalabdheḥ."

avidyā wich conceals it has not been removed. If ignorance is nothing but absence of knowledge, when there is knowledge of an object in a general way, it should forthwith bring about the disappearance of ignorance. Ignorance, however, still persists even after knowing an object in a general way. And this proves, according to Suresvara, that ignorance is something different from mere absence of knowledge, and it is this ignorance called avidyā or ajñāna which, concealing the nature of an object, is the cause of its non-cognition, or erroneous cognition, or doubt in respect of it as the case may be.385

The experience of deep sleep also proves that avidyā is not prior absence or non-existence of knowledge, but something positive. A person recollects his experience of deep sleep by saying: "I did not know anything then." Recollection presupposes prior experience. When the person claims that he was ignorant then, it means that he had at that time the experience or knowledge of ajñāna. The question to be considered is whether this ajñāna experienced by him in deep sleep can be treated negatively as prior absence of knowledge (jñānābhāva or jñāna-prāgabhāva). Suresvara's answer is in the negative. Generally speaking, knowledge of abhāva requires the knowledge of both the locus (dharmin) and the correlate (pratiyogi). One cannot speak of mere absence or non-existence, for it would convey no sense at all. Rather one must say what is absent (say, a pot) and where it is absent (say, on the ground). Having the knowledge of both the pot (the correlate) and the ground (the locus), one can speak of the absence of the pot on the ground. Similarly if one were to speak of "absence of knowledge" in deep sleep, it requires the knowledge of both the locus and the correlate at that time. Since the mind is wholly quiescent then, the person in the state of deep sleep

385. See NS. III, 7, Jñānottama's commentary thereon.

152

INTRODUCTION

cannot have the knowledge of both the locus and the correlate which is necessary for the knowledge of "absence of knowledge". If the mind as such were to function then and if the person were credited with the knowledge of both the locus and the correlate, it would not be a state of deep sleep. Deep sleep being what it is, we have, therefore, to conclude on the strength of the subsequent recollection in the waking state that the person concerned had the knowledge or experience of avidyā which is quite different from absence or non-existence of knowledge.386

If, according to Advaita, there is knowledge of avidyā in the state of deep sleep, it amounts to saying that knowledge and ignorance co-exist at that time. But this, the critic argues, is untenable, since the two are mutually opposed. This argument of the critic is without force. The word "knowledge" here may be understood in two senses. It may be understood either in the sense of knowledge which constitutes the essential nature of Brahman-Ātman (svarūpa-jñāna) or knowledge which arises through avidyā-vṛtti. We have already stated that svarūpa-jñāna which reveals avidyā is not opposed to it. In deep sleep there is avidyā as well as avidyā-vṛtti. Avidyā, which is the adjunct of the Self of deep sleep, is the causal condition of the mind. It is through avidyā-vṛtti that Prājña, which is the name given to the Self of deep sleep, experiences both ignorance and happiness.387 When deep sleep is followed by the waking state, the Self associated with the mind, which is only avidyā in the effect-form, recollects its previous experience of both ignorance and happiness.

386. Ibid.

387. See Śrī Śaṅkarāśaṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśah, p. 313: "suptau ca antahkaraṇa-vṛttirnāsty eva. avidyāvṛttireva asti, tasyāśca ajñāne satyeva sthitiryukteti. "suṣuptau jīvasya api avidyāvṛttirūpa-jñāna aṅgīkāācca antah-karaṇasyeva ajñānasyāpi vṛttirijñānābhāśyeva." (p. 301)

AVIDYĀ

153

There is, therefore, no inconsistency in the co-existence of knowledge and ignorance in deep sleep.

There is yet another reason to show why avidyā which is something positive is different from the prior absence of knowledge. Knowledge destroys ignorance. If avidyā is nothing but the prior non-existence of knowledge, then knowledge cannot destroy the prior non-existence of knowledge, for it can arise only after the termination of its prior non-existence. When there is knowledge, there is no prior non-existence of knowledge; and when there is prior non-existence of knowledge, there is no knowledge. And so the two cannot be related as the destroyer and the destroyed. However, since knowledge destroys ignorance, the latter should not be viewed negatively as prior non-existence of knowledge.388

Further, the prior absence of knowledge is never an object of direct perceptual experience. It is what we have to infer from the knowledge that takes place subsequently.389 If knowledge takes place now, it implies that prior to its origination it was non-existent. Since the prior absence of knowledge has to be inferred from the subsequent rise of knowledge, it cannot be directly experienced. Inasmuch as avidyā is directly experienced, it must be different from the prior absence of knowledge. Let us consider this issue in another way to show why avidyā should not be understood as jñāna-prāgabhāva. The latter expression means prior absence of knowledge. What is the nature of the knowledge whose prior non-existence is meant here? Is it knowledge-in-general (jñāna-sāmānya)? Or is it some

388. See Saṃkṣepaśārīraka, III, 111: "na jñānāt prāgabhāvakṣaya iti ghaṭate tatkṣaye tatprasūteḥ."

389. Śrī Śaṅkarāsaṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśah, p. 293: "jñānarīpakāryakalpyasya jñānaprāgabhāvāsya anubhava-viṣa-yatvāyogāt."

154

INTRODUCTION

specific knowledge (jñāna-viśeṣa)? Knowledge-in-general

is knowledge which is undifferentiated, indeterminate, and

non-relational, and so it is no other than Brahman which

is eternal. What is eternal can never be absent at any

time. If so, jñāna-prāgabhāva in the sense of the prior non-

existence of knowledge-in-general is untenable.390 The

other alternative fares no better. When knowledge arises,

it is specific and relational — specific because we are able to

differentiate it as such-and-such from other cases of know-

ledge, and relational because it has a transcendent object

to which it is related. But one does not have direct access

to what is called the prior non-existence of specific know-

ledge; i.e. one does not directly experience it as such.391

One does not, for instance, directly experience the prior

non-existence of a pot or a table. Differentiation is possible

at the level, and in respect, of knowledge. One cognition

can be differentiated from another cognition. But such

differentiation is not possible at the level, and in respect,

of prāgabhāva. Considering that, while avidyā is directly

experienced, jñāna-prāgabhāva does not admit of such

direct experience, it is wrong to treat avidyā negatively as

prior absence of knowledge.

Further, since the primal ignorance is removable by

Brahman-knowledge, it has an end, and that which has an

end must also have a beginning. Scripture, as already

stated, speaks of the beginning of the primal ignorance

when it says that māyā-avidyā comes into existence without

390. Ibid., p. 293:

"jñānasāmānyasya caitanya-rūpatvena tatprāgabhāvāyogāt."

Also see Siddhāntabindu: "na ca idam abhāvarūpam. jñānasya nityatvena

tadabhāvānupapatteh..."

391. Srī Sarikarāsankara-bhāsya-vimarśah, p. 293:

"jñānaviśeṣa-prāgabhāvānām ca jñānaviśeṣotpatterh prāguvicya

anubhavāyogāt."

being caused by anything eise.392 What is positive or existent alone has a beginning and an end. It is absurd, according to Suresvara, to speak of either a beginning or an end of a negative entity. Suresvara rejects the Nyāya view that prāgabhāva, though without a beginning, has an end, and that pradhvamisābhāva which has a beginning has no end. He objects to associating these alleged negative entities with a certain act (kriyā) and a quality (guna) — the act of destruction and the quality of impermanence in the case of prāgabhāva, and the act of origination and the quality of permanence in the case of pradhvamisābhāva. One can speak not only of the origination or destruction, but also of a certain quality of a pot, which is positive or existent. But it is absurd to speak of origination or destruction of non-existence (abhāva). Nor can any quality be associated with it. In the words of Suresvara: “Non-existence has no relation either with action or quality. Since it has no existence, it cannot be related to anything in any place.”393 Since the primal ignorance has both a beginning and an end and also is of the nature of the three gunas (trigunātmaka), it is not negative, but something positive or existent. Suresvara does not admit the existence of negative entities at all. What is called abhāva, Suresvara says, is only in imagination (kalpanāmātram).394 “It is unreal like a stone-son.”395 It has no existence. If so, it is wrong to treat avidyā which is directly experienced as a negative entity.

It may be mentioned here that the real position, according to Advaita, is that avidyā cannot be characterized even as something positive or existent (bhāvarūpa).

392. Nrsiṁhapūrvatāpinyupaniṣad, IX, 3: “māyā ca avidyā ca svayameva bhavati.”

393. TUBV, I, verse 31, p. 14.

394. Ibid., I, verse 29, p. 13.

395. Ibid., I, verse 32, p. 15.

156

INTRODUCTION

Strictly speaking, avidyā is neither existent nor non-existent, but an illusory appearance (mithyārūpa). If it is positive or existent like Brahman, it cannot be negated; and if it is non-existent like a sky-flower, it cannot be cognized or experienced. But since it is both cognized and negated like a rope-serpent, it is an illusory appearance. If, from the relative standpoint of vyavahāra, we characterize it as bhāvarūpa, it is to suggest that what causes the appearance of the world of diversity cannot be negative. So long as our business of life continues, avidyā exists, and consequently we speak of it as existent, though it is different from both the existent and the non-existent.396

According to Suresvara, Brahman or the Self is the locus (āśraya) of avidyā. It may appear that, since the Self is of the nature of knowledge, it cannot be the locus of avidyā. Knowledge and ignorance are mutually exclusive. If so, how could avidyā, it may be thought, be located in the Self? Suresvara argues that the Self alone is the locus of avidyā and not anything else, which is not-Self. First of all, since the not-Self is of the nature of ignorance, it does not make sense to say that ignorance is located in what is of the nature of ignorance. Ignorance has no scope for its work of concealment in respect of the not-Self. Secondly, both knowledge and ignorance must have the same locus (ekādhikarana). What is capable of acquiring knowledge can be invested with ignorance. Since there is no possibility of the not-Self acquiring knowledge, ignorance can never be located in the not-Self. Thirdly, what

396. Śrī Saṅkarāsaṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśaḥ, p. 319:

"vastutastu na bhāvarūpamajñānam, nāpi abhāvarūpam, kim tu mithyārūpameva — bhāvātve brahmaṇa iva nivrttyayogāt; abhāvattve śasasaṅgasyeva pratītyayogāt; pratīyate nivartyate ceti rajjusarpavanmithyābhūtameva ajñānam. vastuto mithyātvepi yāvadyavavahāram sattvād-bhāvarūpam ajñānamīti mayocyate."

owes its very existence to avidya cannot be its support.

The not-Self is a product of ignorance.

It is wrong to say that ignorance, which is earlier by virtue of its being the cause, is dependent on its own effect which comes later.

And lastly, a locus must have a nature of its own independently of what is located in it.

Since the not-Self has no nature or being of its own independently of avidya, it is wrong to say that the not-Self is the locus of avidya.

There are only two categories, the Self and the not-Self.

If the not-Self cannot be the locus of avidya, it follows that the Self alone is its locus.397

The objection that the Self which is of the nature of knowledge cannot be the locus of ignorance is not tenable.

For the purpose of answering this objection it is necessary to clarify the sense in which the Self is said to be of the nature of knowledge.

By knowledge which constitutes the nature of the Self, we do not mean pramana-jñana, but saksi-caitanya.

The former involves the triple epistemological factors, viz the knower, the known, and the resulting knowledge involving distinction, which is the work of avidya, and so being illusory, it cannot constitute the nature of the Self which is real.

Saksi-caitanya, on the contrary, is not opposed to avidya for the two are related as the revealer and the revealed.

From the standpoint of Brahman, Suresvara says, there is no avidya at all.398

And so when we explain the relation between the Self, which is the Witness-consciousness, and avidya in terms of the revealer and the revealed, or in terms of the locus and the contained, we presuppose avidya.

That is why Suresvara says that these relations are meaningful only in

397. NS, see the sambandhokti at the beginning of Chapter III; see also BUBV, I, iv, 1215-1227.

398. SV, 175-177.

158

INTRODUCTION

the context of avidyā, while the truth is that the Self in itself is neither the revealer nor the locus of avidyā.399

What, then, is the content of avidyā? It is Brahman-Ātman, says Sureśvara. Being-the-object-of-valid-cognition (meyatva) is for the Self alone, for that alone is unknown.400 It is the Self whose real nature remains concealed that is to be known. Further, since the not-Self is insentient by its very nature, there is no need for avidyā to conceal its nature. So the not-Self does not fall within the scope of avidyā.

It may be argued that the non-dual Self cannot be both the locus and the content of ignorance. The case of knowledge, it may be said, is worth considering here. The subject of knowledge is different from the object of knowledge; knowledge, that is to say, is in some one, and it is about something else. So the locus of knowledge is different from the content of knowledge. One may argue that what is true of knowledge is equally true of ignorance. Ignorance is in some one; and it is about something else. If so, the locus of ignorance must be different from its content. It means that one and the same entity, viz the Self cannot be both the locus and the content of ignorance. Since the Self is one and non-dual, homogeneous and partless, it is not possible, the critic argues, to suggest that ignorance is located in one part of the Self which is

399. Sureśvara's answer to the objection is very terse. Jñānottama's illuminating commentary on Sureśvara's one-sentence answer, "ajñānamātranimittatvāt-tadvibhāgāsya sarpātmateva rajjvāḥ," is of great help here. See NS, with the Candrikā of Jñānottama, ed. by M. Hiriyanna (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, No. XXXVIII, 1925), pp. 106-107.

400. SV, 173.

known, and that its content in the other part of the Self,

which is not known. So the Self which is admitted to be

the locus of avidyā cannot, according to the critic, be the

content of avidyā as well.

The Advaitin answers this objection by taking his

stand on the undeniable fact of experience. It is a matter

of common experience for us to say: “I know myself,”

and also “I don't know myself.” When a person says,

“I know myself,” it is a case where one and the same

object is both the locus and the content of knowledge.

The person who knows, i.e. the person who has knowledge,

is myself; and the content of knowledge is also myself.

In the same way, the locution, “I don't know myself,”

shows that one and the same entity is both the locus and

the content of ignorance. The person who is ignorant is

myself, and the object of ignorance is also myself. The

same line of explanation may be adopted to show that the

Self is both the locus and the content of ignorance.401

So long as there is vyavahāra, the Self is saviśeṣa; and so,

as stated earlier,402 we speak of its general and specific

features. Further, the Self is both known and unknown.

While existence (sadrūpam) which is its general feature is

known, knowledge and bliss (cidānandarūpam) which are

its specific features are not known. That aspect of the

Self which is known is not concealed by avidyā; and that

aspect which is not known is concealed by it. So the

Advaita view that avidyā is not only located in, but also

has, the Self as its content by concealing it is quite sound.

The primal ignorance which is the cause of bondage

is destroyed by the unitary, non-relational knowledge

through the mental mode (akhaṇḍākāra-vṛtti-jñāna) which

401. See Jñānottama's commentary on the sambandhokti, p. 106.

402. See supra p. 115.

160

INTRODUCTION

is generated by the principal texts (mahāvākyas) like

tat tvam asi. No sooner does this knowledge arise than it

destroys the primal ignorance. There is no time interval

between the rise of knowledge and the disappearance of

ignorance. Even as it arises it is non-relational and

immediate, and so it removes ignorance straight away

without any need of repeated contemplation on its con-

tent. That is why Sures'vara says: "The beginningless

ignorance is seen to be destroyed in a moment by know-

ledge which has a beginning; and of this (knowledge) re-

petition is not required."403 There are Scriptural passages

which affirm that the primal ignorance can be removed

by the knowledge of the Self. The Chāndogya, for instance,

says: "One who knows the Self crosses over sorrow."404 The

Gītā also refers to the destruction of ignorance by know-

ledge.405 In support of Scripture there is the following

inference: "Ignorance is removable by knowledge, because

it is an illusory appearance like the rope-serpent."406

The final vrtti-jñāna does not persist after removing

the primal ignorance. After doing its work it dis-

appears of its own accord in the same way as a medicinal

drug gets itself removed after destroying the disease. To

quote Sures'vara: "From the (Scriptural) utterance there

arises the cognition, 'I am Brahman,' which destroys

ignorance. This cognition disappears along with ignor-

ance after destroying it, in the same way as the medicine

disappears after destroying the disease."407

403. SV, 1090-1091; also see TUBV, II, verse 606, p. 380.

404. VII, i, 3.

405. V, 16.

406. "ajñānam jñānān nivartate, adhyastatvāt, rajjusarpavat."

407. TUBV, II, verse 607, p. 380.

XIV

SCRIPTURE AND REASON

Sures'vara emphatically declares that the saving know-

ledge can be obtained only through Scripture and not

through other means of knowledge. He says: "Concern-

ing the inmost Self, knowledge arises firmly from the text,

'Thou art that Being', which extinguishes all further

enquiry. This knowledge cannot come from other sources

of knowledge."408 Brahman is trans-empirical. Percep-

tion and other means of knowledge can convey the know-

ledge of empirical objects, but not that of the trans-empi-

rical Brahman. Through perception we gain knowledge

of the objects of the external world. Since Brahman-

Ātman is the inner reality and not an object of the exter-

nal world, it cannot be known through perception. Nor

can it be known through inference. Since the Self is

imperceptible, it is not possible to have the knowledge of

the invariable relation (vyāpti-jñāna) between the Self and

anything else; and in the absence of such a knowledge

inference has to be ruled out.409 Knowledge, as it is

ordinarily understood, involves three factors, viz the

knower, the means of knowledge, and the object of know-

ledge (pramātṛ-pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāra), which relate

to the objects of the external world. Consequently the

inward Self does not fall within the scope of knowledge as

other objects do. In the words of Sures'vara: "As this

entire mechanism of knowledge relates to the external

world, however far we may examine, the ordinary modes

of knowledge are only for gaining knowledge of external

objects."410 Adducing several reasons to show why the

Self cannot be known through perception and other means

408. NS, III, 67.

409. Ibid., III, 51.

410. Ibid., III, 52.

21

162

INTRODUCTION

of knowledge. Sures'vara sums up the position as follows:

"As the Self is of the nature of eternal awareness, as it

stands in need of no other proof, as it is without physical

qualities like sound, as it is that about whose existence

doubts can never arise, as it is the inmost Self, as it is an

end to itself in itself, as it is not an object of knowledge, it

is not cognized through ways of knowing like perception,

by persons governed by worldly desires."411

It should not be thought that Sures'vara denies or

underestimates the value of reason. He says in several

places that reasoning must be made use of for discriminat-

ing the Self from the not-Self. To quote Sures'vara: "A

wise man, having determined the distinctive characteristics

of the Self and the not-Self, must know through inference,

as he knows fire through smoke, that all the factors upto

the intellect are of the nature of the not-Self."412 There

are different forms of reasoning like inference (anumana),

analogy (upamana), argument based on anvaya-vyatireka,

etc. Sures'vara makes use of these forms of reasoning in

his writings.413 Though reason is ancillary to Scripture,

it is nevertheless important as it helps to clarify the issues

raised by Scripture and make the teaching of Scripture

intelligible. In fact Scripture itself emphasizes the impor-

tance of reasoning as a valuble supplement to it. The

Br̥hadāranyaka, for instance, says: "The Self should be

realized — should be heard of, reflected on, and medi-

tated upon."414 Śravana is guided study of Scripture

through listening to the instructions from a teacher.

Manana, which is to follow śravana, is reflection through

reasoning on the teaching of Scripture. The Taittirīya,

411. Ibid., III, 47-48.

412. Ibid., IV, 5.

413. TUBV, II, verse 368, p. 255; II, verse 413, p. 281; II,

verse 674, p. 418; II, verse 658, p. 409; II, verses 656-657, p. 409.

414. BU, II, IV, 5.

too, lays emphasis on the importance of rational reflection

on the part of the spiritual aspirant after listening to the

teacher. The teacher, for instance, instructs the disciple

as follows: "If anyone knows Brahman as non-existing,

he himself becomes non-existent. If anyone knows that

Brahman exists, then the wise think of him as existing."415

After receiving this instruction from the teacher, the

disciple, who is expected to be critical, asks questions

with a view to clarifying certain difficulties involved in the

teaching. Scripture refers to the questions raised by the

disciple with the prefatory note, "Then, therefore," follow

these questions."416 Commenting on this text, Suresvara

says that "in the text athāta the questions of one who

wishes to determine the final view will be stated."417 It

may be stated here that reflection consists not only in the

employment of arguments such as anumāna, upamāna, and

arthāpatti, which will prove the thesis that the jīva in its

essential nature is non-different from Brahman, but also in

the use of arguments which will refute the standpoint of

duality.418 As a supplement to Scripture, reasoning will

help the spiritual aspirant to ascertain whether the thesis

of non-difference between the jīva and Brahman is tenable

or not.

Reason, however, has its own limitations. For one

thing, it can give us only mediate knowledge which has to

be validated through some other knowledge as it lacks

certitude. If this other knowledge is also mediate, we

will require some other knowledge for its validation, and

so on; and this will lead to infinite regress. Secondly,

415. TU, II, vi.

416. "athāto'nupraśnāḥ."

417. TUBV, II, verse, 363, p. 252.

418. "mananam nāma pratyagbrahmaikyasādaka, tadbhedabādhaka-yuktibhiḥ sadā'dvaitīya-brahmaikya-anusandhānam."

164

INTRODUCTION

there cannot be any finality in respect of the findings of

reason. What is reasonable when viewed from one point

of view may be shown to be untenable from another point

of view through the help of reason. Thirdly, reason gives

us only relational knowledge involving subject-object,

substance-attribute, cause-effect, and other distinctions.

The Self which is inward and non-relational cannot be

known through reason. Finally, reason may help us to

discriminate the Self from the not-Self, but it cannot tell

us what the Self is. It is only through Scripture that we

can gain the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman. In the words

of Sures´vara: “To the inquirer who, after rejecting every

phenomenon upto the vital breath as not-Self through the

method of anvaya-vyatireka, asks, ‘Who am I?’ Scripture

furnishes the answer, ‘You are That.’ ”419

It is not enough to know that the not-Self is. The

inquiry comes to an end only when the nature of the Self

is known positively. The body, the senses, and the mind

have all along been mistaken for the Self because of avidyā.

As a result of discrimination, a person who undertakes the

inquiry is able to realize that what he was seeing all along

is not really the Self.420 It is quite probable that he

entertains the doubt that he, too, has been eliminated, for

he has not known the Self, and what was thought of as the

Self has turned out to be the not-Self. Being accustomed

to know things through perception and other means of

knowledge, he may endeavour to know the Self in the

same way as he knows other things. Such an attempt is

bound to result in disappointment. The Self which is

trans-empirical cannot be known through the physical eye

which is competent only in respect of empirical things.

That is why Scripture declares that the Self is “not seen

419. NS, III, 53.

420. Ibid., IV, 11.

by the eyes,"421 and that "the Seer of the seeing cannot be seen."422 So, reason which plays a vital part in the initial stages by helping us to discriminate the Self from the not-Self must be followed by Scripture. While reason prepares the way, Scripture accomplishes the goal. The two are, therefore, related as what helps and what is helped. It only means that Scripture which is the source of the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman cannot be disregarded. Citing the case of the Buddhists who, without accepting the authority of śruti, depend on mere reason, Suresvara sounds a note of warning by saying that those who do not accept the authority of śruti in respect of the trans-empirical reality will not only fail to reach the goal, but will also run into the danger of accepting what is false.423

It is necessary at this stage to consider the validity of the Vedic testimony (śruti) as a source of knowledge. If there are reasons to show that the Vedic testimony cannot be accepted as a source of knowledge, we have to reject it. That which makes known what is otherwise unknown is a pramāṇa. In the words of Suresvara: "If a pramāṇa makes known an object, without being dependent on another pramāṇa, then that is truly a pramāṇa; there is no other definition of pramāṇa."424 Perception, inference, etc. are sources of knowledge in matters empirical.425 But in respect of Brahman which is trans-empirical, the Vedic testimony is our only source of knowledge. Suresvara argues that the Vedic testimony will cease to be a source of knowledge (1) if what it conveys is otherwise known and is, therefore, not new, or (2) if what it

421. Kena Upaniṣad, I, 7.

422. BU, III, iv, 2.

423. NS, III, 34.

424. SV, 683.

425. TUBV, II, verse 70, p. 99.

66

INTRODUCTION

says is opposed to the evidence of another pramāṇa, or (3) if what it says is doubtful, or (4) if it does not make known anything at all.426 Let us consider whether the validity of śruti as a source of knowledge can be questioned on any or all of the conditions stated above.

The first condition does not hold good. The knowledge of the non-dual Brahman conveyed by the Vedānta texts is otherwise unobtained. The trans-empirical reality does not fall within the scope of pramāṇas like perception. So the Vedānta texts which convey the knowledge of Brahman cannot be dismissed as restatements (anuvāda).

A basic difference between a Scriptural statement and the statement of a trustworthy person may be noted here. The information conveyed by the statement, “There are fruits on the bank of the river,” uttered by a trustworthy person can also be known through perception. One who hears this statement can verify the truth of the statement by means of perception. The knowledge conveyed by a Scriptural text like tat tvam asi, however, cannot be confirmed by pramāṇas, like perception, for what is taught by the Upaniṣads does not fall within the scope of perception and other pramāṇas.427 As Suresvara puts it, “On what grounds can śruti, which reveals the real Self, free from misery and inaccessible to other sources of knowledge, be judged as not being a source of knowledge?”428

It may be stated here that Suresvara, disagreeing with the Niyogavadin who argues that anuvādas which restate what is already known do not have validity independently of injunctive texts, maintains that even anuvādas have validity on their own.429 Suresvara says: “As in the case of (assertive) śruti texts which have the power to convey (the

426. NS, sambandhokti to III, 35.

427. TUBV, II, verse 610, p. 382.

428. NS, III, 35.

429. TUBV, II, verses 687-701, pp. 426-433.

SCRIPTURE AND REASON

167

knowledge of Brahman), the validity of anuvādas, too,

cannot be snatched away by the crows (of Mīmāṁsakas),

by connecting them with injunction.'”480

We shall now consider the second condition. Is it the

case that the evidence of śruti goes against that of percep-

tion and other pramāṇas? Critics of Advaita answer this

question in the affirmative. They try to substantiate their

view in several ways which deserve careful examination.

While Scripture affirms the truth of non-duality, percep-

tion and other sources of knowledge lend support to the

existence of a plurality of things which are different from

one another. That we experience a world of diversity in

our day-to-day experience, is a matter which dues not

require philosophical defence through dialectics. How can

śruti be a valid source of knowledge when what it affirms

is patently opposed to the unquestionable evidence of

pramāṇas like perception? Further, while śruti declares

that the Self is free from sorrow and suffering, perception

testifies to the contrary. There is yet another point for

consideration. Everyone from infancy onwards depends

upon perception, but śruti is thought of only subsequent

to perception. It means that perception comes first, and

śruti comes later. If so, when the evidence of śruti comes

into conflict with that of perception, either śruti, the

critics urge, must be declared invalid or its meaning must

be construed in accordance with the evidence of percep-

tion. In other words, when the Vedic testimony is at

variance with that of perception, it becomes weaker.

According to Sures'vara, the basic assumption involved

in the several points raised above is wrong. The argument

as a whole proceeds on the assumption that there is conflict

between śruti and other sources of knowledge. There is,

however, no justification for this assumption. The scope

430. Ibid., II, verse 693, p. 430.

168

INTRODUCTION

of śruti is entirely different from that of perception and

other sources of knowledge. It means that the nature of

validity claimed for the Vedic testimony is different from

that claimed for perception and other sources. Perception

is a source of knowledge in empirical matters. It gives us

a knowledge which accords with our experience of things.

if the knowledge it gives does not stand the test of practi-

cal efficiency, if its evidence runs counter to our experience,

then it has no validity at all. Perception has, therefore,

only empirical validity (vyāvahārikaprāmāṇya). What

is true of perception is also true of inference and other

pramāṇas. The Vedic testimony, on the contrary, is the

means of our knowledge of the ultimate reality. Its claim

to validity centres round the trans-empirical. Just as

perception does not have any validity in respect of the

trans-empirical, even so śruti does not claim any empiri-

cal validity. There is thus a clear demarcation of the

spheres of application and authority of śruti and percep-

tion. Consequently, the possibility of any conflict between

them is ruled out. In the words of Sures'vara: "A pramāṇa

is that which makes known what is new. If it does not do

this function, it ceases to be a pramāṇa. So no conflict is

conceivable (between śruti and other sources of know-

ledge) as they relate to mutually distinct spheres.431

Sures'vara drives home his point by an illustration. We

perceive colour through the visual sense, and we hear

sound through the auditory sense. Since the scope of each

sense-organ is restricted to its own sphere, the validity of

the one cannot be denied by means of the other. There is

no discord at all between them. Generally speaking, to

say that two pramāṇas are mutually contradictory is self-

discrepant. The absurdity of the argument, "This is no

sound, because I see colour through the visual sense,"432

431. NS, III, 83.

432. Ibid., III, 84.

is so patent that it calls for no comment. So the testimony

of Śruti cannot be set aside on the ground that perception

proves something else as there is no conflict between them.

Scripture, it was argued, is at variance with percep-

tion, because while the former affirms the truth cf non-

duality, the latter that of duality. Here again the argu-

ment proceeds on the untenable assumption that percep-

tion proves the existence of a plurality of things. Sures´vara

argues that perception does not reveal difference. Only

if it is proved that we get the knowledge of difference or

plurality through perception can we say that the evidence

of perception goes against the ieaching of Śruti. Percep-

tion, according to Sures´vara, can only reveal an object.

It cannot distinguish one object from another.433 The

visual sense, for example, can reveal a pot; but it cannot

distinguish a pot from another object, say a table. The

work of perception consists only in the manifestation of an

object and not in revealing or proving the reality of

difference. So long as the reality of difference is not

proved, it is not possible to maintain that there is a

plurality of things which are different from one another.

In order to show that the work of perception is no

more than the manifestation of an object, let us consider

the different possibilities regarding the function of percep-

tion. There are three possibilities here. One can argue

that (1) perception reveals an object, or that (2) it

reveals difference, or that (3) it manifests an object and

also reveals difference. Of these, only the first alternative

is tenable.

It cannot be said that perception reveals difference,

that is to say, distinguishes or excludes one object from

another, because difference, Sures´vara argues, cannot be

433. SV. 920.

170

INTRODUCTION

a content of perception. What is real alone can be the

content of pramāṇa. Difference, being illusory like the

rope-serpent, cannot be the content of a pramāṇa, and so

does not fall within the scope of perception.434

Difference, it is said, is anyonyābhāva. When we say

that a cow is different from a horse, there is mutual non-

existence (anyonyābhāva) of the one in the other, i.e. there

is the non-existence of the horse in the cow as well as the

non-existence of the cow in the horse. So difference in the

sense of mutual non-existence is abhāva. If so, perception,

Suresvara argues, has nothing to do with what is non-exis-

tent. There can be relation between an existent object

and perception, and not between what is non-existent and

perception, since the non-existent which is devoid of being

cannot serve as the basis of any relation.435 The point

here is that abhāva cannot be known through perception

which requires sense-object contact. Since difference is

viewed as abhāva, it cannot have any relation with

the sense-organ. If it cannot be known through percep-

tion, it cannot also be known through anumāna and other

pramāṇas which are all dependent on perception. Sures-

vara argues that difference, which is said to be negative,

cannot also be known through non-cognition (anupalabdhi).

The term anupalabdhi may mean either the absence of

pramāṇa or the absence of knowledge. It is absurd to say

that the absence of pramāṇa is the pramāṇa by which abhāva

is known. Nor is it possible to say that the absence of know-

ledge is the means for knowing abhāva. Knowledge alone

reveals an object, but not the absence of knowledge.436

Since it cannot be shown that difference falls within

the scope of perception, the third alternative according to

434. Ibid., 921.

435. SV, 923.

436. TUBV, II, verses 703-704, pp. 434-435.

which perception not only reveals an object, but also differentiates it from others is equally unenable. All that perception can do is just to manifest an object. If so, there is no justification for the contention that the evidence of perception goes against the teaching of śruti.

Sures'vara observes that there is no conflict between the teaching of śruti and the evidence of perception. If it appears that there is conflict between the two in a particular instance, it is necessary for us to show that the alleged conflict is not genuine. For example, while śruti teaches that the Self is intrinsically free from sorrow and suffering, the evidence of perception is to the contrary. This seems to be a clear case of conflict between Scripture and perception. However, the conflict here is only apparent and not real. Pleasure and pain belong to the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) which is subject to modifications. On account of non-discrimination between the Self and the internal organ, what is true of the latter is erroneously ascribed to the former. So if one says that the jīva is subject to misery as evidenced by perceptual experience, it should not be taken in the primary sense, but only in the secondary sense.437 In other words, what śruti says is true of the Self from the absolute standpoint, while the evidence of perception in respect of it is from the relative standpoint. In view of the difference in the standpoints, there is no conflict at all between śruti and perception.

Let us assume for the sake of argument that there is conflict between śruti and perception. The question, then, arises whether the testimony of śruti should be accepted as valid or that of perception. Sures'vara maintains that Scripture alone should be accepted as final for two reasons. First, Scripture being impersonal (apauruṣeya) is free from

437. NS, III, 96.

172

INTRODUCTION

defect and distortion, and so the teaching of Scripture can

never be doubted.438 But the same thing cannot be said of

perception and other sources of knowledge. Every one of

these sources of knowledge is dependent on the mind and

the senses of the person, which are liable to defect and

distortion. Cases of error in perception are not wanting.

If it is found that the evidence of perception goes wrong

in one particular instance, one may be sceptical about the

reliability of perceptual evidence as a whole. Second, the

experience of deep sleep corroborates the Scriptural testi-

mony that the Self is intrinsically of the nature of bliss. It

follows that what is bliss by its very nature is wrongly

imagined as subject to suffering due to its association with

the mind; and so perception must yield to Scripture in this

regard.439

The argument which seeks to prove the supremacy of

perception on the ground that everyone from the beginning

depends upon perception,and that the knowledge conveyed

by śruti which comes later cannot, therefore, sublate the

knowledge conveyed by perception, is suicidal. Far from

strengthening the case of perception, it really undermines

its position in relation to śruti. The very admission that

perceptual knowledge is prior, while the Scriptural know-

ledge is subsequent, weakens the former and strengthens

the latter. It is well-known that the subsequent knowledge

of shell becomes stronger by sublating the earlier cognition

of silver. In the same manner, the knowledge conveyed

by Scripture which is subsequent cannot help sublating the

earlier cognition obtained through perception. Since

perception and Scripture are independent of each other,

and since the Scriptural knowledge is subsequent to the

perceptual knowledge, we must, by adopting the principle

438. TUBV, II, verse 245, p. 187.

439. NS. III. 94.

of the subsequent sublating the earlier (apaccheda-nyāya),

declare the earlier cognition through perception invalid.

Kumāрила explains the upaccheda-nyāya as follows: “Where

two (sourсes), being related as prior and posterior, convey

their knowledge independently of each other, the posterior

is stronger of the two.”440 In fact, one need not resort to

the apaccheda-nyāya for the purpose of vindicating the

final authority of Scripture if the issue as stated here

involves the problem of Scripture versus perception. The

issue has to be decided in favour of Scripture simply on

the ground that Scripture, being impersonal and therefore

being completely free from any possible defect, will always

supersede perception, which is liable to defect, when their

evidences on any problem are conflicting. The superio-

rity of Scripture rests on its impersonal character.”

The third condition also does not hold good. The

authority of Scripture cannot be set aside on the ground

that what it conveys is open to doubt (saṁśaya). Sures'vara

says that there is no scope at all for doubt with regard to

Scripture. There are two points to be considered here.

First of all, we must consider the nature of the pramāṇa

at issue. There is room for doubt in respect of a pramāṇa

like perception which is dependent on the human agency.

But since śruti is impersonal (apauruṣeya), one cannot

raise doubts about it as a source of knowledge. When the

not-Self which is the root cause of all possible doubt is

removed through reasoning, there cannot be any room for

doubt about the teaching of śruti.442 Secondly, we must

also consider the nature of the object to be known. Here

440. Tantravārtika (Benares Sanskrit Series, 1903), p. 819.

441. See Srī Sankarāsańkara-bhāśya-vimarśah, p. 124:

"tasmāccchāstrasya-cakśurādeśca avidyādi-sādhāraṇudośa taulyepi

bhrama-pramādādi pumdośa-taulyābhāvāt na tulyadoṣatvam. evam asādhā-

raṇadoṣavattvāt cakśurādipramāṇānām pramāṇābhāsatvena durbalatvam;

tadrahitvātvācca śāstrasya prābalyam."

442. NS. III, 36.

174

INTRODUCTION

it is the Self that is to be known through Scripture. That about which doubts may arise, Sures'vara remarks, is not the Self according to the wise. "With regard to the Self there could be no doubt, for it is of the nature of awareness itself."443 Sures'vara argues that with regard to objects like pot there may be ignorance, error, and doubt, but "not in respect of the cognizer, the cognition, and the Witness-consciousness."444 As a cognition takes place, the knower knows it directly. So one cannot entertain any doubt about it; nor can one be ignorant or mistaken about it. Since the cognizer (jñātā) is directly illumined by the Witness-consciousness, neither ignorance, nor doubt, nor error is possible with regard to the cognizer. If none of these is possible even with regard to both the cognition and the cognizer, one can argue a fortiori that they are not possible with regard to the Witness-consciousness, which reveals both the cognition and the cognizer.445

Is it possible to say that Scripture does not convey any knowledge whatever and that it is not, therefore, a source of knowledge? Sures'vara says that one who is incapable of comprehending the Scriptural instruction about the selfluminous Self deserves to be treated contemptuously as a figure of clay in the human form.446

A basic objection is very often raised against Scripture being a source of knowledge on an entirely different ground. If everything other than Brahman is non-real or illusory as argued by Advaita, Scripture, too, which is different from Brahman is illusory (mithyā). According to Advaita, it is the non-real Scripture that intimates the real which is Brahman. Sures'vara, for instance, says:

443. Ibid., III, 37.

444. TUBV, II, verse 660, p. 411.

445. Ibid., II, verses 660-663, pp. 411-412.

446. NS. III, 38.

SCRIPTURE AND REASON

175

"The Vedānta, though in itself mithyā, may enable one to know the real, like the idol of a God, or like a drawing, or like a reflection."447 The critic argues that since Scripture, according to Advaita, is mithyā, it cannot be the source of knowledge of Brahman.

This objection is wrong. If Advaita holds the view that the illusory character of Scripture is not prejudicial to its being a source of valid cognition, it is because of the fact that the criteriou of illusoriness is different from that of a valid cognition. What suffers contradiction is illusory.448 Judged by this critericn everything other than Brahman — Īśvara, the jīva, Scripture, and the cognition produced by Scripture — is illusory, for all of them cease to exist as soon as there is Brahman-realization. The paradox here is that it is through Scripture which is itself mithyā that we come to know not only of the illusoriness of everything other than Brahman, but also of the reality of Brahman.449 There is, for example, the Śruti text which says that "everything else but this (Self) is perishable"450 and therefore mithyā. Though Scripture is mithyā, it is nevertheless a pramāṇa. What gives rise to a valid cognition is a pramāṇa. Non-sublatability of the content is the criterion of a valid cognition: a valid cognition, that is to say, is one whose content does not suffer contradiction

447. Mānasollāsa; See A. Mahadeva Sastri, The Vedānta Doctrine, verse 11, p. 153.

448. "mithyātvam nāma bādhyatvam samyagjñānodaye sati." See Mahadeva Sastri, The Vedānta Doctrine, v. 10, p. 153.

449. Rāmānuja restates the standpoint of Advaita in this regard as follows: "The teacher who imparts knowledge is mithyā. The knower is also mithyā. Scripture also is mithyā. The knowledge arising out of Scripture is also mithyā. All this is known from Scripture itself which is mithyā." See The Vedārtha-saṅgraha of Rāmānuja, Ed., S. S. Raghavachar (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1956), p. 5.

450. BU. III, iv, 2.

176

INTRODUCTION

at any time.451 The cognition of a rope-serpent is not

valid, because its content, viz the rope-serpent, suffers

contradiction by the subsequent cognition. On the cont-

rary, the non-rational cognition which reveals Brahman is

a valid cognition, because its content, viz Brahman, is ever-

existent and does not suffer contradiction at any time.

Scripture which gives rise to this valid cognition is, there-

fore, a pramāṇa. It means that Scripture, though non-real

or illusory, is at the same time a pramāṇa as there is no in-

compatibility between its illusory character and its being a

source of knowledge. It may be stated here that percep-

tion and other alleged sources of knowledge are strictly

speaking not pramāṇas at all as the cognitions produced by

them do not fulfil the criterion of a valid cognition. What

is known through them gets sublated when the non-dual

Brahman is realized. However, for all practical purposes

they are accorded the status of pramāṇas as the cognitions

produced by them remain uncontradicted till the rise of

Brahman-knowledge. Though the cognition produced by

Scripture is pramā, it is aparamārtha, i.e. it is not real.

The reason for this is obvious. Whatever is produced is

not real, and since this knowledge is produced by Scripture

it is also not real. The non-dual knowledge which is Brah-

man is the only thing which is eternal and which is not

produced.

Though the knowledge produced by Scripture is not

real, it nevertheless removes the cognition of diversity,

which is also not real, in the same way as the cognition of

a stick, which is not real, removes the earlier cognition

451. See Śrī Śaṅkarāśaṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśah, pp. 123-124:

"abādhitārthavisayam jñānam hi pramā...evam pramā-janakat-

vādeva śastram mithyābhūtamapi pramāṇamityucyate...evam paramārthabhūta-

brahmapratipādakatvena param pramāṇamapi śastram, vyāvahārikatvena

aparamārtha-bhūtameveti."

of a snake which is also not real.452 In fact, Scripture does not purport to tcach Braḥman; its purport is only in the removal of the erroneous cognition of difference caused by avidyā. The view that the Scripture-produced cognition which is not real (ayathārtha) removes the cognition of diversity which is equally not real is both intelligible and sound. So according to Advaita, though Scripture is mithyā, it is undoubtedly a pramāṇa. The ontological status of the cognition produced by Scripture is no doubt mithyā; nevertheless, the cognition which Scripture produces is pramā, for Brahman which is made known by this cognition through the removal of the cognition of diversity is real.

According to Suresvara, the knowledge that we get from śruti texts like tat tvam asi is immediate (aparokṣa) as well as non-relational (asamsrṣṭa). To construe the meaning of the text, "That thou art," we must take into consideration (1) the co-ordinate relation (sāmānādhi- karṇya) between the two terms "That" and "thou", (2) the substantive-attribute relation (viśeṣaṇa-viśesya- sambandha) in which the two terms are placed, and (3) the implied meaning of the terms (laksyārtha).453 The connotations of the two terms "That" and "thou" are different. The word "That" refers to Brahman which is infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and so on. The word "thou" signifies the individual self which is finite, parvis- cient, etc. Since the connotations of the two words are different, one may be inclined to think that they refer to two different objects. But this is not possible because of the

452. Ibid., "mithyābhūtam sāstram mithyābhūtameva pramājñānam janayati na kaściddoṣaḥ." (p. 123) "na caivaṁ doṣamūlatvāt ayathārtha- bhūtena brahmajñānena katham dvaitajñānāsya bādha iti vācyam, dandabhra- meṇa sarpabhramāsya bādhadarśanāt." (p. 129).

Also see SBSB, II, i, 14 for a discussion on this issue.

453. NS. III, 3.

178

INTRODUCTION

co-ordinate relation (sāmānādhikaraṇya) between the two

words "That" and "thou". Words which are placed in

co-ordinate relation as in the expression "the blue lily"

(nīlamutpalaṁ) refer to one and the same object. Though

the connotations of the two words "blue" and lily" are

different, they nevertheless refer to one and the same

object because of the co-ordinate relation between therı.

At this stage we construe the meaning of the expression

"the blue lily" in terms of the substantive-attribute rela-

tion as this will help us to do justice to the different

connotations of, and the co-ordinate relation between,

the two terms. The expression "the blue lily" denotes

an object which, while being a lily, has aiso the attri-

bute of blue colour. We have construed the mean-

ing in such a way that though the two terms have diffe-

rent connotations they have the same denotation. This

way of construing the meaning of words is known as

abheda-saṁsarga, i.e. identity which involves relation.

There is, however, difficulty in adopting this mode of

explanation through substantive-attribute relation in the

case of the text tat tvam asi. When we consider the

mutual qualification of the two terms, i.e. the qualification

of the meaning of the word "That" by "thou", and the

qualification of the meaning of the word "thou" by

"That", we find that a simple and direct identification of

the one with the other as outwardly conveyed by the

sentence is logically untenable. As stated earlier, the

explicit meaning of the word "That" is Brahman as

determined by infinitude, omniscience, remoteness, etc.,

and that of "thou" is the individual self as determined by

finitude, parviscience, immediacy, etc. It is absurd to

identify "That" with "thou" in view of the fact that the

determinants of the two terms are mutually incompatible.

In other words, this text cannot be treated as an attribu-

tive judgement. The import of the text as indicated by

the co-ordinate relation between the words therein is in

identity (abheda). But it is not relational identity, i.e. identity which involves the relation of substance and attribute; rather it is non-relational identity. The non-relational unitary sense (akhandārtha) of the text is brought out by recourse to the implied sense (laksyārtha). By removing the determinants of each term, which are incompatible with those of the other term, i.e. by removing the characteristics such as omniscience and parviscience, omipotence and helplessness, and so on which arise because of the limiting adjuncts, and by retaining the common element, viz. consciousness, it is shown that the text tat tvam asi conveys the sense of identity, i.e. a unitary, non-relational content. To quote Suresvara: "According to us, the relations such as samānādhikaraṇya (connecting words and their meanings) bring out directly the non-verbal import of ‘That thou art’ like the identity of ether through the cancellation of the different adjuncts."454 The point to be emphasized here is that according to Suresvara (a) the immediate knowledge of Brahman-Ātman is obtained from the Upaniṣadic text, “tat tvam asi,” and that (b) this knowledge is non-relational.

The non-dual Brahman is made known by Scripture only through implication (laksanā). Words can signify a class characteristic, or a quality, or an action, or a relation.455 Since none of these factors which occasion the usage of words are present in Brahman, the latter cannot be known by the express meanings (vācyārtha) of words. It is for this reason that śruti says that words along with the mind return without reaching Brahman.456 Since the ultimate reality cannot be stated to be such-and-such, the

454. NS, III, 9.

455. NS, III, 103.

456. TUBV, III, verses 595-596, p. 375.

180

INTRODUCTION

Upaniṣadic texts like “neti neti”457 seek to teach Brahman negatively by stating what it is not, by negating what is gross as well as what is subtle from it. Even the affirmative Upaniṣadic texts like “Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite” do not set forth the nature of Brahman positively. As in the case of the text, “That thou art,” the text which says that Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite has to be interpreted in the secondary sense as stating that Brahman is other than the unreal, the inser-tient, and the finite. Since the things to be eliminated are unreal, inserient, and finite, there is the need for the use of three different words; viz real, knowledge, and infinite. Even this text, according to Suresvara, conveys a non-relational, non-verbal content.458 What cannot be designated by words must necessarily be undifferentiated and non-relational.

The meaning intended to be conveyed (tātparya-viṣaya) by a sentence in a given context is its import. Though a sentence is a group of words which are related to each other according to certain conditions like expectancy, fitness, etc., it does not mean that the meaning of every sentence is relational (saṃsṛṣṭārtha). There are sentences which signify a relational content. There are also sentences which convey a non-relational sense. To find out whether a sentence conveys a relational or non-relational sense, we have to ascertain the meaning intended to be conveyed by it. For example, the sentence, “This is that Devadatta,” conveys the sense of identity of the person concerned. We do not include the different sets of occa-sions, times, and places in which Devadatta was seen as constituting the import of the sentence. Excluding all these factors which are not intended to be conveyed by the speaker, we lay stress on the identity of the person as

457. BU, III, ix, 26.

458. SV, 705; TUBV, verses 99-100, p. 112.

constituting the import of the sentence. Let us consider

another example. A person, let us say, does not know the

moon, though he has been told that it is a heavenly body

to be seen at night. When he asks another person, 'Which

is the moon?' he is told, 'The most resplendent one is the

moon.' It is obvious that this sentence does not intend to

convey any relational conient, but only to convey which

the moon is by identifying it to the inquirer who put the

question. Since only the meaning intended to be con-

veyed must be taken as the import of a sentence, it is

wrong to say that every sentence, whether scriptural or

secular, conveys a relational sense through the construc-

tion (anvaya) of the different meanings of words.

According to the Niyogavādin, the knowledge which

arises from the Upaniṣadic text is mediate (parokṣa) and

involves relation (samsrṣṭa). Brahman which is immediate

and non-relational cannot be the content of the verbal

cognition (śābda-jñāna) which arises from the assertive

Vedānta text, for the latter can convey only a relational

sense. When the indirect, relational knowledge conveyed

by the Vedānta text is constantly meditated upon, there

arises therefrom the immediate, non-relational knowledge.

There is, therefore, the need for meditation (upāsanā or

prasankhyāna) on the content of the verbal cognition for

obtaining 'another cognition' which has the immediate,

non-relational Brahman as its content. Making out a case

for meditation in this way, the Niyogavādin argues that

the assertive Upaniṣadic text must be construed along with

the injunctive text which enjoins meditation.459

Suresvara rejects the argument of the Niyogavādin on

several grounds. When, following the hearing of the

Vedānta texts, there is rational reflection (manana) through

the method of anvaya-vyatireka on the teaching of the

459. TUBV, II, verses 639-647, pp. 399-404.

182

INTRODUCTION

Vedānta texts, there arises the unitary, non-relational,

mental cognition (akhaṇḍākāra-vṛttijñāna) from the texts

like "That thou art."460 Sureśvara says: "As in the case

of the ether in a pot and the ether outside it, so also

because of the co-ordinate relation of the words 'That' and

'thou' (in the śruti text 'That thou art'), by the removal (of

the incompatible factors denoted by them) the direct

non-relational sense takes place to us (from the text)."461

Since the verbal cognition even as it arises from the text

is both immediate and non-relational, there is no need for

meditation on the content of the verbal cognition for

obtaining "another cognition" as argued by the Niyoga-

vādin. Further, a cognition is required for the purpose of

knowing something. Since the non-dual Brahman is made

known by the verbal cognition even as it arises from śruti,

there is no need of "another cognition" to be obtained

from meditation for the purpose of knowing Brahman-

Ātman. What is known once through a pramāṇa does not

require to be known again by some other source. What

the other cognition is expected to do has already been

done by śruti.462 It cannot be said that the other cogni-

tion is required for knowing Brahman in a clear and

definite way free from doubt. The knowledge that we

get from śruti which is a pramāṇa is clear, definite, and

free from doubt, and so there is no need for the other

cognition. If the verbal cognition that arises from śruti

is not clear, definite, and free from doubt, śruti will

cease to be a pramāṇa. Moreover, if the right knowledge

of the desired type, i.e. knowledge which is both immediate

and non-relational, is not obtained from the śruti text in the

first instance itself, it can never be obtained by means of

meditation practised for any length of time. In the words

460. Ibid., II, verses 656-657, p. 409.

461. Ibid., II, verse 658, p. 409.

462. SV. 792.

of Suresvara, "If reasoning and śruti do not give rise to

direct 'apprehension of reality previously, how can this

unprecedented result issue from their mere repetition?"463

Nor can it be said that the other cognition, which medita-

tion is supposed to give rise to, is required for the sake of

overcoming the mediateness of the Self. The Self is the

most direct and immediate reality, and so the question of

removing the mediateness of the Self does not arise.464

It is no argument to say that the other cognition different

from the one which arises from śruti is required for des-

troying the primal ignorance. Suresvara maintains that

to an eligible person the comprehension of the meaning

of the Scriptural texts destroys the primal ignorance at

once without any need of repetition.465

It should not be thought that Suresvara does not

provide any place for meditation in the scheme of spiritual

discipline. Suresvara admits that there is scope for medi-

tation with regard to the hearing of the texts and rational

reflection. Since śravaṇa and manana are actions which

can be enjoined, he is prepared to admit that there is scope

for injunction thereto; but neither the Self which is ever-

existent nor the knowledge of the Self which takes place

from śruti independently of injunction can be enjoined.466

By meditation, hearing is perfected.467 Repeated inquiry

into the meanings of the words "tat" and "tvam" through

anvaya-vyatireka and other methods of reasoning facilitates

a clear understanding of the teaching of śruti.468 An

eligible person, as a result of śravaṇa and manana, obtains

Brahman-knowledge which is non-verbal, non-relational,

and immediate straightaway from Scripture.

463. NS, III, 124.

464. SV, 793.

465. NS, I, 67.

466. TUBV, II, verse 667, p. 414.

467. NS, III, 125.

468. TUBV, II, verses 714-715, pp. 439-440.

XV

THE MEANS AND THE END

Liberation, according to Advaita, is the realization of Brahman-Ātman which is real, knowledge, and infinite, which is ever-free, non-dual, and eternal bliss. Ignorance (avidyā) which conceals the real nature of Brahman-Ātman is the cause of bondage, and the attainment of knowledge (vidyā) which destroys the foundational ignorance is liberation. Suresvara explains the causal chain of avidyā and its products, which binds the individual, as follows:

"Erroneous cognition arises on account of the ignorance of Brahman which is always of the nature of the Self and which is devoid of duality. From that (ignorance) arises desire, and from desire arises action."469 Involvement in action for the fulfilment of desires is bondage. It is true that Scripture in certain places speaks of desire as the cause of bondage. The Brhadāranyaka, for example, says, "As is his desire, so is his resolve; as is his resolve, so is his work,"470 emphasizing that desire leads to bondage. It also says that "He who does not desire, who has no desires..."471 attains liberation. But since desire itself is due to ignorance of the real nature of the Self, Advaita holds the view that ignorance is the root cause of bondage.

Knowledge, through the eradication of ignorance, ensures the condition called liberation where all desires are at rest, where all desires are fulfilled, where the Self alone is, and nothing else separate from it that can be desired.

It is a matter of common knowledge that when we are ignorant of something we endeavour to remove that ignorance by gaining the true knowledge of that object.

469. TUBV, I, verse 7, p. 4.

470. BU, IV, iv, 5.

471. Ibid., IV, iv, 6.

THE MEANS AND THE END

185

Take the familiar case of mistaking a rope which is in front for a snake. Not knowing the real nature of the object in front, a person thinks that it is a snake and begins to run away in fear. His ignorance of the real nature of the object in front is the cause of his erroneous cognition of it as a snake and the subsequent reactions in him like sweating, running away in fear, and so on. It is not enough if he is told that the object in front is not a snake. The statement that it is not a snake does not serve to remove his ignorance of the object in front. It may help him to some extent to know what it is not. But this does not mean that his ignorance of the object in front has been removed. The very fact that he still entertains doubts about it and is keenly desirous of knowing what it is shows that he is still ignorant of it; and his ignorance can be removed only by attaining the knowledge of the object in front, viz the rope. In short, it is knowledge alone that removes ignorance in the same way as light removes darkness. The Advaita view that knowledge is the direct means to Brahman-realization which is release is thus based upon what we experience in our day-to-day life. That knowledge is the antidote to ignorance holds good not only with regard to removing our ordinary ignorance as exemplified in our mistaking a rope for a snake, but also in overcoming the foundational ignorance from which we suffer. Sureśvara, therefore, maintains that Brahman-knowledge alone is the means to the attainment of the highest good, viz liberation.

Being eternal, liberation cannot be accomplished or produced by any means. Whatever is produced is perishable, and so liberation which is eternal cannot be produced by any means. The attainment of Brahman-knowledge itself, according to Advaita, is liberation. Strictly speaking,

472. TUBV, II, verse 15, p. 74.

186

INTRODUCTION

even knowledge is not the means to liberation, for the

means-end relation is not applicable to liberation which is

ever-existent. When Scripture says that knowledge is the

means to liberation, it is as a methodological device for

the purpose of initiating the spiritual aspirant into Brah-

man-knowledge. "By way of leading (the aspirant) to-

wards the inward Self, Scripture utters the means-end

statement, 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest,'

with a view to the attainment of what is quite the

contrary."473 The role of the compassionate Scripture

may be compared to that of a benevolent mother.

"Just as a mother prompts a child by saying, 'Dear child, drink

the medicine with faith; your hair will grow,' so also

Scripture prompts a person with a view to the attainment

of liberation, not attainable through any means (other than

knowledge)."474 The category of means-end relation holds

good only from the standpoint of ignorance. Though

Brahman whose attainment is said to be liberation is

eternal and is ever-attained, it appears as what is to be

attained due to ignorance. When at the onset of knowledge

ignorance, which conceals the eternal and the ever-attained

Brahman, gets removed, we speak as if liberation is

attained through knowledge. Since the removal of ignor-

ance alone is required for attaining liberation, Sureœvara

says that the destruction of avidyā may as well be

characterized as liberation.475 This, however, should not

be understood to mean that liberation is something

negative. Liberation is the realization of what is ever-

existent and not the accomplishment of anything new.

That is why the Chāndogya speaks of it as remaining in

473. Ibid., II, verse 22, p. 77.

474. Ibid., II, verse 23, p. 78.

475. BUBV, III, iii, 23:

"avidyānāśamātraśca mokṣa ātmanā iṣyate

yatatato'tirekena mokṣo'nityo bhaveddhruvam."

Also see, BUBV, III, iii, 28; III, iii, 37; and IV, iv, 559.

one's own form.476 If liberation consists in attaining anything new, if the jīva attains a new form which it did not have already, the Chāndogya view, as stated above, will not hold good. One's own form cannot be attained; and what is attained will not be one's own form.

Not knowing its real nature due to avidyā, the jīva thinks that it is different from Brahman and suffers from its finitude and individuality in the state of bondage. When avidyā is removed, the jīva realizes that it is no other than Brahman, i.e. it remains as Brahman in the state of liberation. It is, therefore, wrong to think of duality between Brahman and the liberated jīva in the state of release. Liberation is freedom from fear, and fear arises because of duality. Only when the jīva does not perceive anything else and does not make any difference whatsoever does it attain fearlessness which is release.477 Since the individuality of the jīva which is caused by avidyā cannot persist in the state of liberation, the latter should not be thought of in terms of co-existence (sālokya), proximity (sāmīpya), similarity (sārūpya), and intimate union (sāyujya) between the jīva and Brahman by presupposing duality.

The loss of personal existence of the jīva as the jīva in the state of release is not something to be deplored.478

476. VIII, iii, 4.

477. TU, II, 7 : "etasmin...abhayam pratiṣṭhām vindate...etasmin udaramantarim kurute, atha tasyā bhayam bhavati."

478. Rāmānuja does not distinguish the Self from the "I" or the ego (ahamartha). His failure to distinguish the one from the other is responsible for his misrepresentation of the Advaita view of release as the annihilation of the Self. The "I" or the ahamartha which he has mistaken for the Self does not persist in the state of release; and from this he concludes that the Self gets annihilated in the state of release. Since release involves the loss of personal existence, a person would "turn away as soon as somebody began to tell him about release. And

188

INTRODUCTION

On the contrary, it is the consummation devoutly to be wished by the jīva. Though the jīva in its essential nature is ihe ever-free Brahman itself, on account of avidyā it erroneously identifies itself with the ego (ahamārihu), entertains the sense of individuality, and experiences misery in its personal existence. What binds it is its erroneous identification with the rgc; and when it overcomes this erroneous identification, it remains once again in its essential nature as the ever-free Brahman. The evil to be removed is its status as the jīva (jīvabhāva) marked by such characteristics as the sense of “I”, personal existence, and the experience of pleasure and pain. Freedom from bondage does not mean the total destruction of the jīva; it only means the removal of the adventitious jīvabhāva.479 The jīva, as stated earlier, is a complex entity consisting of the pure consciousness and the ego with the mutual identification of the one with the other. Taking advantage of the scriptural instruction, the jīva endeavours to be free from the adventitious feature in its being and remain as Brahman. Liberation is at once a loss and a gain—the shedding of the ego and its personal existence, and the regaining of its original status of Brahman.

Liberation is freedom from the limiting conditions of individual human existence. It is freedom from subjection to time and space, freedom from transmigratory existence. It is not mere cessation of sorrow and suffering. It must be understood positively as the state of supreme bliss.

the result of this would be that in the absence of willing and qualified pupils, the whole scriptural teaching as to final release would lose its authoritative character.” See Śrībhāṣya, Ed., by Sri Uttamur Vira-raghavacharya, p. 82.

479. See Śrī Śaṅkarāśaṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśah, p. 116:

“jīvasya ahaṅkāra-tādātmyādhyāsa-prayukto'haṁbhāvo bandhaḥ. vidyayā samīḷasya tasya nivṛttyā svābhāvika-brahma-bhāva eva mokṣaḥ.”

THE MEANS AND THE END 189

Brahman is bliss, and since the attainment of Brahman is liberation, it is something positive. A negative description of it in terms of absence of misery is quite inadequate. Brahman-bliss is incomparable. It is that which has "neither a higher nor a lower."480 It is with a view to help us understand its nature that the Upanisad, speaking in terms of the calculus of pleasure, says that Brahman-bliss is the culmination of the ever-increasing happiness arranged in a graduated scale from the lower to the higher. It is an attempt to indicate the unsurpassable and infinite bliss through the limited and surpassable happiness that all beings enjoy.481

It is very often urged by the critics that the Advaita conception of liberation as the attainment of Brahman-realization is untenable. They allege that, though Advaita speaks of liberation as an attainment, it is not attainment in the literal sense of the term. It is only attainment as it were, for the Advaita view of liberation comes to no more than spiritual awakening. So, if liberation is the goal, it is not what is accomplished or attained in the real sense. Bondage also, the critics allege, is not real according to Advaita. What is real can never cease to be. If bondage is real, it will never cease to exist, and any effort to remove it is futile; and so there is no real bondage according to Advaita, but only bondage as it were. The critics seem to think that bondage which is genuinely experienced cannot and should not be dismissed in a cavalier manner as not real.

It is first of all necessary to bear in mind in this connection that the Advaita view of liberation is integrally connected with the Advaita theory of reality. Secondly, the objections raised against both liberation and bondage

480. TUBV, II, verse 483, p. 314.

481. Ibid., II, verse 486, p. 316.

190

INTRODUCTION

are not objections against two different and independent

problems. If it is admitted that the Advaita conception

of reality is sound, one cannot but accept the Advaita view

of liberation and bondage, which are two sides of the same

coin. Thirdly, one should be clear about the standpoint

that is assumed in any statement about bondage and

liberation.

Let us first consider the sense in which the word

"attainment" is understood by Advaita. Attainment,

according to Suresvara, may be understood in two senses.

A person, let us say, has to go to a certain village. The

attainment of the village is what is yet to be accomplished.

This "attainment" is different from the attainment of a

necklace which a person wrongly thinks to have been lost,

though in truth it is in his own body.482 In the one case

there is the attainment of what is not attained, whereas

in the other there is the attainment of what is already

attained. Since Brahman is ever-existent and since it is no

other than the inward Self of the individual, it is always

attained, though due to ignorance a person thinks that it

is what is yet to be attained. Though the jīva in its essen-

tial nature is Brahman itself, it does not realize itself to be

so only due to ignorance. As in the case of attaining what

is already attained, to know Brahman is to know what

is already known. The idea of the attainment of the

"Being Brahman, he goes to Brahman."483 The Aitareya

text. "Consciousness is Brahman,"484 conveys the idea

that Brahman which is of the nature of consciousness is

already known. The reason for this is obvious. Brahman-

consciousness is the basis of every act of cognition.

482. SV, 886.

483. BU, IV, iv, 6.

484. Aitareya Upanisad, III, i, 3.

THE MEANS AND THE END

191

What is presupposed in every act of cognition is already known.

What is to be removed is of two kinds. It may be a factual source of pain like a thorn or a needle that has gone into the flesh. Or, it may be an imaginary source of pain like an illusory serpent.485 Since Brahman is ever-free and since the inward Self of the individual is non-different from it, the bondage of the jīva, which has to be removed, is like removing the serpent in the rope. The serpent is not in the rope; it is only imagined to be there. Likewise, the condition of bondage can never be a characteristic of the ever-free Self; but it is imagined to be so, the real nature of the Self being concealed by avidyā. In both the cases, the knowledge of the truth — the knowledge of the rope which is in front in the one case and the knowledge of the Self in the other — is the means for removing what is not really there, what is already avoided. It means that what is ever-free gets liberated, and that bondage which is not really there gets removed. The Katha Upaniṣad says, “Being already free, one is liberated.”486 The idea of removing what is already removed is supported by the Chāndogya text which says that Brahman “is one only, without a second.”487 Only if there is a second to Brahman, the question of removing what is other than Brahman will arise. But Brahman is free from difference of every kind — sajātīya-, vijātīya-, and svagata-bheda. So the jīva which in its essential nature is no other than Brahman is not really subject to bondage. What is really free from bondage appears to be bound due to avidyā. And so removing bondage is a case of removing what is already removed.488

485. SV, 887; also see NS, 1, verses 31 32.

486. II, ii, 1.

487. VI, ii, 1.

488. TUBV, II, verse 104, p. 114.

192

INTRODUCTION

Since Brahman is infinite, the attainment of Brahman cannot be analogous to attaining or reaching a village by a person.

In the latter case the village which is located at a particular place is different from the person.

The latter must move from his place towards his destination if he wants to reach it.

He literally reaches the village covering the entire distance through walking or other means.

Here the attainment is real.

This, however, does not hold in the other case.

There is no need for the jīva to go by a certain path to reach Brahman, for the latter is all-pervasive;

and if it is all-pervasive it is always attained.

Arrival and departure have no meaning in the context of the attainment of Brahman (brahmaprāpti).

Mukti is not a spiritual pilgrimage to Brahman.

Only if Brahman is away from the jīva, it makes sense to say that the jīva has to reach it by going through a particular path.

So the attainment here is not real, for it is the attainment of the already attained.

Let us consider another argument which has been adduced to show that the attainment of Brahman is real.

The critic tries to work out an analogy between attaining Brahman and reaching a village.

Śruti texts which say that “Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite” give information about Brahman.

This information, the critic argues, is like the information about the way to a village.

Just as a person by getting the information about the way to a village is able to reach it, so also a person by getting the knowledge of Brahman is able to attain it through the process of repeated contemplation on that knowledge.

In this argument, the knowledge of Brahman is analogous to the knowledge of the way to the village;

and the act of contemplation on that knowledge is similar to the act of walking on the road.

The critic, therefore, concludes that the attainment of Brahman is real like the attainment of a village.

THE MEANS AND THE END

193

This argument, says Sures´vara, is untenable as it overlooks a basic difference between the two cases.

It is true that from sruti texts we get the knowledge of Brahman which is to be realized.

But in the example cited no information about the village to be reached is given.

On the contrary, information about the way to the village alone is given.

Further, the argument proceeds on the wrong assumption that there is the need for repeated contemplation on the verbal cognition (s´abda-jñāna) for the purpose of attaining Brahman.

It has already been stated that, since the verbal cognition even as it arises from sruti is immediate and non-relational, there is no need for contemplation thereon.

So the analogy suggested by the critic breaks down.489

If liberation is the attainment of Brahman by the jīva, the latter, the critic argues, must be different from the former.

The critic cites the Mundaka text, “He, verily, who knows Brahman becomes Brahman himself,”490 in support of his view.

This text means, according to the critic, that the jīva who is different from Brahman attains it through knowledge.

Sures´vara rejects this argument as untenable.

What does it mean to say that the jīva who is said to be different from Brahman becomes Brahman?

Two alternatives may be thought of here, and both of them are untenable.

It may mean that the jīva becomes Brahman by ceasing to be what it is, i.e. by undergoing destruction.

Or, it may mean that the jīva, remaining what it is, becomes Brahman.

Neither of these meanings will hold good here.

A pot which continues to be what it is cannot become a cloth.

Nor can it become a cloth when it ceases to be.

In the same way, remaining what it is, a jīva cannot become Brahman.

Nor can it be said that it becomes Brahman when it ceases to be.

489. Ibid., II, verses 557-558, p. 352.

490. III. ii, 9.

194

INTRODUCTION

that it becomes Brahman when it ceases to be. The truth is that the jīva is always Brahman and not different from it. If it were really different from Brahman, it can never become Brahman by any means, much less by knowledge. That is why Suresvara says, "Since one object cannot become another, whether it gets destroyed or not, the wise man must know the jīva as non-different from the supreme Brahman."491

It may appear that, if the thesis of non-difference between the jīva and Brahman is accepted, the Munḍaka text cited above has to be declared invalid. If the jīva is identical with Brahman even prior to its realization of this identity through knowledge. then the Muṇḍaka text which speaks of the jīva attaining Brahman through knowledge is untenable. The difficulty here is only apparent, as there is no conflict between the standpoint of Advaita and the Munḍaka text. If the jīva is not already Brahman, it cannot become Brahman through knowledge. Though it is already Brahman, it does not know the truth due to ignorance; and when ignorance is removed through knowledge, it attains Brahman in the sense that it realizes that it is no other than Brahman. Here the attainment of Brahman is like the attainment of the tenth man in the parable. In both the cases, the non-attainment is through ignorance and the attainment is through knowledge.492 It means that in both the cases there is the attainment of the already attained. If so, the attainment of Brahman is not real in the sense in which the attainment of a village by a person is real. And also the Advaita view that the jiva is non-different from Brahman is consistent with the Munḍaka text cited above. It will be obvious from the foregoing account that the Advaita view that liberation

491. TUBV, II, verse 554, p. 350.

492. Ibid., II, verse 556, p. 351.

THE MEANS AND THE END

195

consists in the attainment of Brahman through knowledge

is based cn, and integrally connected with, the theory of

reality which it formulates.

Advaita does not deny the fact of bondage at the

empirical level. Bondage is an evil that has to he ove:-

come. It is as much a fact as stocks and stones are

admitted to be facts at the empirical level. it is a hard

reality which man has to reckon with so long as he is what

he is carrying on the business of life in the worid. It is

real empirically, though there is no such thing as bondage

from the transcendental point of view, from the standpoint

of Brahman which alone is. In the same way, at the

empirical level our endeavour to attain Brahman-Ātman

is real and genuine, though from the transcendental stand-

point the problem does not arise. When Gaudapāda says,

"There is no dissolution, no origination, none in bondage,

none aspiring for wisdom, no seeker of liberation, and

none liberated. This is the absolute truth,"493 he is

speaking from the transcendental point of view, from the

"inward view", as Suresvara would put it, which is to be

distinguished from the "outward view". Without specify-

ing the standpoint which is adopted, to criticize the

Advaita view of bondage as an as-it-were-bondage and the

Advaita conception of the attainment of liberation as an

as-it-were-attainment is a gross misrepresentation of

Advaita.

The discovery of one's essential nature is liberation,

and it is achieved through the unitary, non-relational

knowledge produced by Scripture. There is no time-lag

between the rise of knowledge and the attainment of

liberation. While the result of an action accrues at a

later time, the fruit of knowledge takes place immediately

493. Māndūkya-kārikā, II, 32.

196

INTRODUCTION

as soon as the saving knowledge arises. Both the nature

of liberation and the means thereto are such that in prin-

ciple there is nothing which prevents the attainment of

liberation in the present life. It is for this reason that

Advaita maintains that liberation is “an experience of the

present, not a prophecy of the future.”494

At the onset of the right knowledge, not only the

primal ignorance but also the different forms of karma —

sañcita which is karma-in-store, āgāmi which is karma-yet-

to-come, and prārabdha which is karma-in-action — which

are caused by the primal ignorance, cease to exist. The

physical body is the result of the work of prārabdha.

Since all karmas including prārabdha cease to exist follow-

ing the removal of avidyā, the body of the knower of

Brahman also falls off. So when a person attains Brahman-

realization, he becomes disembodied too; and the libera-

tion he has attained is called sadyomukti. The doctrine of

sadyomukti is acceptable to Suresvara.495 The Munḍaka

text which says, “The knot of the heart is cut, all doubts

are dispelled, and his karmas terminate when He is seen,

the higher and the lower,”496 lends support to sadyo-

mukti. When there is no impediment, the immediate and

non-relational knowledge which arises from Scripture re-

moves ignorance in toto. Consequently the knower of

Brahman attains deliverance from the physical body forth-

with. That is why Suresvara says: “By merely coming

into being once, knowledge removes the whole of bondage.

494. S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads (London: George

Allen & Unwin, 1953), p. 118.

495. NS, IV, 54-59. After explaining sadyomukti which is one

traditional view, Suresvara sets forth jīvanmukti, which is another

traditional view, in IV, 60-69 with the remark, athāparassāmpra-

dāyikaḥ in his sambandhokti to verse (60). Jñānottama in his commen-

tary on this sambandhokti writes: “evam sadyomukti-pakṣam aṅgīkrtya

ṣeṣaṣeṣibhavah parihrtaḥ, sāmprataṁ jīvan-mukti-pakṣe’pi ṣeṣaṣeṣibhāva

ityuttaragranthasya tātparyamāha…”

496. II, ii, 9.

THE MEANS AND THE END

197

When ignorance is removed, misconception arising from that ignorance does not abide apart."497 Again, "... when the Self is known, there is no knowledge yet to be acquired, and there is no ignorance yet to be destroyed."498

The doctrine of jīvanmukti which is also a traditional view is equally acceptable to Suresvara. A person who has attained liberation may continue in the embodied condition due to the persistence of prārabdha, and his state of liberation is called liberation-in-life (jīvanmukti). The Chāndogya text, "For him there is delay only so long as he is not delivered (from the body), then he will become one with Brahman,"499 supports the doctrine of jīvanmukti.

Earlier, reference was made to the Mundaka text which speaks of the extinction of all karmas at the onset of Brahman-knowledge. In view of the Chāndogya text which admits the continuance of prārabdha for some more time till its momentum gets exhausted in the case of the knower of Brahman, it has to be said that the Mundaka text does not refer to the extinction of all karmas, but only to that of sañcita and āgāmi. While the Mundaka text states the general rule, the Chāndogya states the exception. Both the texts are valid, and the conflict between them is only apparent.

Since liberation is not inconsistent with embodiment, the conception of jīvanmukti does not involve the paradox of the co-existence of bondage and release.500 The

497. NS, IV, 57.

498. Ibid., IV, 58.

499. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI, xiv, 2; see BUBV, I, iv, 1549-1550.

500. Professor Suryanarayana Sastry speaks of "the unsolved contradiction" of the co-existence of bondage and release in a jīvan-mukta. See his Introduction to The Bhāmatī of Vācaspatī (Madras: Theosophical Publishing House), p. xliii. This is the view of the earlier Sastry. The later Sastry, however, maintains that there is no "problem" of jīvanmukta. See his essay on "Jīvanmukta" in Collected Papers of Professor S. Suryanarayana Sastry, Ed., T. M. P. Mahadevan (University of Madras, 1961).

198

INTRODUCTION

persistence of the body is of no consequence to the liberated

person, for he knows it to be illusory. Though he bears

the body, he has, indeed, sloughed it off. The body has

the same relation to him as the cast-off slough to the snake

to which it once belonged. It does not, therefore, bind

him though it contributes to the semblance of enjoyment

on his part. Both the physical body and the phenomenal

world are “night” (nisā) to him, for he does not see them

at all in the same manner as others do.501 To quote

Sures'vara: “Fixed in the Self with all his being, he never,

indeed, sees the universe. No doubt, he becomes aware

of the world of diversity occasionally when he is awake to

the world around; but then he sees it not as something

different from the Self which is consciousness, inasmuch as

consciousness runs through all. On the contrary, he sees

this universe as illusory like the delusion in respect of

direction or the appearance of the double moon.”502

If at the onset of the right knowledge a person attains

liberation, why then does a liberated person witness the

world-show at all? The appearance of the world, which

the liberated person knows to be mithyā, is because of the

persistence of the projective power (viksepa-sakti) of

avidyā in his case. It is true that when knowledge arises

ignorance gets removed. There is, however, an important

condition to be fulfilled if this is to be true. Knowledge

removes ignorance in toto only if there is no impediment

to it.503 Of the two powers of avidyā, the power of

concealment (āvarana-sakti) is removed as soon as the

immediate and non-relational knowledge of the Self takes

501. BG, II, 69.

502. Pranava-vārtika; see A. Mahadeva Sastri, The Vedānta

Doctrine, verses 56-58, p. 206.

503. See Srī Sankarasanikara-bhāsya-vimarsah, p. 301.

"pratibandharahītameva pramānajñānam sarvātmanā ajñānam

nivartayati, sati tu pratibandhe pramāna-jñānāt ajñānāsya ekadeśenaiva

nivṛttih"

place. The projective power of avidyā, however, persists in the case of the liberated person as long as the impediment in the form of prārabdha continues. No special effort is needed on the part of the liberated person to remove the prārabdha. When its force is exhausted, it comes to an end of its own accord. Since he knows the truth, it does not bind him in any way through its functioning. That is why Suresvara says that the prārabdha which continues in the case of a jīvanmukta exists only as a semblance (ābhāsa), and having realized the truth, he is free not only from sañcita and āgāmi, but also from prārabdha. The prārabdha of a liberated person is like a tree that has been uprooted. Just as the uprooted tree perishes by withering away and drying up, so also the prārabdha of a jīvanmukta perishes through exhaustion. Such being the case, a jīvanmukta who witnesses both the semblance of the physical body and the phantom world is not deceived by them. When the prārabdha which has been the impediment ceases to exist, the projective power of avidyā, too, gets removed. He, then, attains deliverance from the physical body; and to him there is no more the appearance of the world.

Since liberation can be attained by one while being alive, Advaita speaks of liberation-in-life (jīvanmukti) which is usually contrasted with liberation from embodied existence (videhamukti). This should not be understood to mean that Advaita formulates the theory of twofold liberation - one kind of liberation called jīvanmukti and the other known as videhamukti. Just as there is only one Brahman, even so there is only one liberation. The suggestion

504. Pranava-vārtika; see A. Mahadeva Sastri, The Vedānta Doctrine, p. 206: "prārabhasya anuvrttistu muktasyaabhāsamātratatah." See BUBV, I, iv, 1529-1530.

505. NS. IV, 61.

200

INTRODUCTION

that Advaita accepts two kinds of mukti is as naive and absurd as the suggestion that Advaita subscribes to the theory of two Brahmanas. One may attain liberation and yet be embodied. The physical body of the liberated person which continues for some more time even after liberation falls off when prārabdha ceases to exist. The presence or absence of the body has nothing to do with liberation. For release the cessation of the body is not necessary. Nor does release take place as a matter of necessity when the present physical body ceases to exist.506 From the standpoint of the liberated person, the body, whether present or absent, does not bring about any change in his experience of liberation. From the standpoint of others, the presence of the body in the case of a liberated person confers a great benefit to mankind; for when the knower of Brahman is in the state of vyutthāna he plays the role of a teacher, is engaged in selfless activity for the good of others, and guides them in respect of what is right and wrong. Indeed, he alone can be a true friend, philosopher, and guide. He is not subject to any injunction and prohibition, temporal restrictions and territorial barriers. He is a personality without frontiers. Though he is a law unto himself, he will not violate moral norms and social conventions. His life is a paradigm of right action. As he is firmly established in Brahman-bliss, the effulgence which he radiates is ever-shining like that of a sun. To show that the bliss in which a jīvan-mukta is rooted knows no bounds, the Upaniṣad says that a jīvanmukta, who is the knower of Brahman, having become Brahman, "enjoys all desires simultaneously."507 Suresvara says: "Being devoid of superior and inferior forms, getting the food according to his wish, and assuming the forms according to his wish, the knower of Brahman

506. See S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Collected Papers, p. 247.

507. TU, II, 1; TUBV, II, verse 116, p. 120.

THE MEANS AND THE END

201

remains (one with Brahman) traversing these worlds which are upādhis created by acts."508 A liberated person like the sage Triśaṅku may proclaim to the spiritual aspirants the greatest wonder that has taken place in him: as a result of the attainment of Brahman-knowledge. Triśaṅku, for example, says: "I am the invigorator of the tree (of the world). My fame is high like the ridge of a mountain... I am immortal and undecaying."509 With a view to create confidence in the minds of the spiritual aspirants, a jīvanmukta may sing the song of the oneness (samatva) of Brahman: "I am food, I am the eater of food... I am the navel of immortality."510 Apart from indicating whether the liberated person is in the embodied condition or not, the two expressions, jīvanmukti and videhamukti, do not suggest any difference in the nature of liberation. Liberation during life is as complete, perfect, and final as liberation after the falling off of the body.

According to Suresvara, knowledge alone is the means to liberation. It should not be thought that Suresvara either ignores or minimizes the importance of action (karma). The performance of obligatory and occasional rites enjoined by Scripture leads to the purification of the mind, and the knowledge of Brahman is manifested only in a pure mind.511 The vividisiā text of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka which says, "The Brāhmaṇas seek to know it through the study of the Vedas, sacrifices, charity, tapas...,"512 brings out the utility of the Scripture-ordained rites. Two points must be emphasized about the performance of rites which are enjoined by Scripture. The first one is that obligatory and occasional rites have to be performed. The

508. TUBV, III, verse 77, p. 489.

509. TU, I, 10.

510. TUBV, III, verse 83, p. 492.

511. NS, I, 50.

512. IV, iv, 22.

202

INTRODUCTION

second point is that they should be performed only prior

to the origination of Brahman-knowledge.513 For the

origination of knowledge through the purification of the

mind, karma is necessary; but once knowledge has sprung

up, it requires no help from karma or from anything else

for accomplishing the final goal. Suresvara insists that

karma which is necessary in the initial stages of the disci-

pline must be dropped out after it has discharged its func-

tion. He says: "Actions, having generated in the mind

through its purification the inclination towards the Self,

and having thus fulfilled their purpose, disappear like the

clouds after the rainy season."514 In support of this

he quotes the well-known text from the Bhagavad-gītā: "For

one to ascend to yoga, action is said to be the means.

To the same person when he has ascended to yoga,

sama is said to be the means."515 Suresvara argues that

even optional rites, when performed without any attach-

ment to their fruits, is conducive to the origination of

knowledge through the purification of the mind.516 Even

the meditations that are taught in the knowledge-section

are indirectly useful to the attainment of the knowledge of

the Self.517 While karma as enjoined by Scripture is the

remote means, control of the mind (sama), control of the

senses (dama), etc. are the proximate means to the origina-

tion of knowledge. The threefold discipline comprising

śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana constitutes the principal

proximate means (mukhyāntaraṅga-sādhana) to the origina-

tion of knowledge in so far as it is helpful to the rise of

knowledge from Scripture by removing the obstacles such

as doubt and erroneous cognition.

513. TUBV, I, verse 161, p. 59.

514. NS, I, 49.

515. VI, 3.

516. SV, 328.

517. Ibid., 329.

THE MEANS AND THE END

203

Sures'vara refutes at greai length the Mīmāṁsā view that karma is the means to iiberation. He first of all disposes of the Mīnāṁsā view according to which a person who, abstaining from optionai rites and forbidden acts, performs obligatory and occasional rites as enjoined by Scripiure will, without any furtner effort, attain liberation at the termination of his present iife.518 The first objection against this view is that it proceeds on the wrong assumption that the fruits of the accumulated deeds which are in store can be cnjoyed and thereby exhausted without any residue in one birth. The karma-in-store (sañcita) may comprise many kinds of good deeds as well as many kinds of bad deeds. For example, since the fruit of jyotiṣṭoma is different from that of a cold-blooded murder, one who has performed these deeds cannot enjoy their fruits in one and the same life. It may even be the case that the nature of a particular deed may be such that its consequences have to be enjoyed in more than one life.519 So the assumption that the entire sañcita-karma will bear fruit in one life, and that it can be exhausted through enjoyment in that span of life itself is wrong. We shall now consider the nature of the discipline suggested by this view. The discipline is twofold: (1) abstinence from optional rites (kāmya-karma) and forbidden deeds (pratiṣiddha-karma) and (2) adherence to obligatory and occasional rites (nitya-naimittika-karma). The former aspect of the discipline is not so easy as the Mīmāṁsaka takes it to be. Because of desire a person gets involved in activity of both kāmya and pratiṣiddha type. Desire in its turn is caused by avidyā. So the discipline which calls for abstinence from such activities ultimately requires the removal of avidyā; and avidyā can be removed only by attaining the knowledge of the Self.520 The Mīmāṁsaka, however,

518. TUBV, I, verses 9-10, p. 5; NS, I, 9-21.

519. TUBV, I, verses 11-14, pp. 6-7.

520. Ibid, I, verse 17, p. 9.

204

INTRODUCTION

rights shy of the knowledge of the Self. The negative aspect of the discipline which he formulates will be effective only if what he deliberately wants to avoid is admitted as the sine qua non of liberation. The positive aspect of the discipline fares no better. The Mīmāṃsaka holds the view that the performance of obligatory and occasional rites destroys the good as well as the bad deeds which have not yet borne fruit, and so as a complement to the negative side of the discipline he recommends adherence to nitya-naimittika-karmas. There is a basic inconsistency in the Mīmāṃsā position on this issue. According to Mīmāṃsā, the performance of obligatory and occasional rites removes sin which one will incur as a result of the non-performance of these rites. If this is true, it is wrong to say that the performance of these rites causes the destruction of sañcita-karma.521 Even if it be assumed that obligatory and occasional rites, when performed, can destroy the accumulated deeds of the past, they must be capable of destroying only the evil deeds and not the good ones, since they are not opposed to the latter.522 Strictly speaking, even sin which is something positive cannot arise from the non-performance of obligatory and occasional rites, which is negative.523 The non-performance of these rites is only an indication of the existing sin on the part of the person concerned.524 Since the performance of these deeds requires belief in duality, it cannot be the means to liberation which is free from duality.525

The following are the main arguments to show that karma is not the means to liberation. (1) The attainment of heaven (svarga) is not the same thing as the attainment

521. Ibid., I, verse 15, p. 8.

522. Ibid., I, verse 16, p. 8.

523. Ibid., I, verse 19, p. 9.

524. Ibid., I, verse 21, p. 10.

525. NS, I, 96.

of liberation. Heaven no doubt inay be attained through

karma. Since whatever is attained through karma is

perishable, heaven, too, is perishable. Liberation, how-

ever, is eternal; and so it can never be attained through

karma.526 (2) What is required for release is the destruc-

tion of ignorance. Karma which is a product of ignorance

is not opposed to it, and so it cannot destroy it. "As

release is nothing but the elimination of ignorance, action

cannot be the means thereto. Just as the error engendered

in darkness cannot put an end to darkness, even so action

cannot eradicate ignorance."527 (3) Whenever we do

any action, it is for the sake of production (utpatti), or

purification (samskāra), or transformation (vikāra), or

attainment (āpti) of suinething; karma, that is to say, can

produce, or purify, or transform, or bring within reach,

something. Apart from these four, a fifth use of karma

cannot be thought of. Release is not something to be

produced, because it is eternal (nityatvāt). It is not

something to be purified, for it is bereft of all qualities

and impurities (nirgunatvāt, nirdosatvāt). Further, only

a thing that serves as a means like a sacrificial vessel or

clarified butter can be purificd by sprinkling of water

and so on. Since release is not a means to anything

(asādhana-dravyātmakatvāt), it cannot be purified. It is not

something to be transformed, because it is immutable

(kūṭasthatvāt). It is not something to be attained, for it is

already attained as the Self of everyone (ātmatvena

nityāptavāt).528

It may be argued that, though karma by itself cannot

be the means to liberation, it can, in combination with

meditation (upāsanā), lead to liberation. Sures'vara does

526. TUBV, I, verses 23-24, p. 11.

527. NS, I, 24.

528. NS, I, 53; TUBV, I, verse 18, p. 9; II, verses 13-15, pp. 73-74;

II, verse 560, p. 354; II, verse 585, p. 370.

206

INTRODUCTION

not object to the combination of karman and upāsanā.

Such a combination, however, cannot give rise to the

desired result. Liberation, as stated earlier, is eternal

and it is a contradiction in terms to say that what is eternal

is produced. Further, when meditation is not able to

alter the impermanent nature of its own result, it cannot

make the impermanent result of karma permanent.⁵²⁹

Could it be said that the combination of action

(karma) and knowledge (jñāna) is conducive to the desired

result? Sures'vara rejects this type of combination theory

as equally untenable, in whatever manner the combination

of action and knowledge is thought of — (1) whether both

action and knowledge are given the equal status as the

means, or (2) whether action is made the principal means

with knowledge as subsidiary to it, or (3) whether know-

ledge is made the principal means with action as subsidiary

to it. Reference has already been made to the utility of

karma to the origination of knowledge through the purifi-

cation of the mind. It means that action and knowledge

are related as means and end. If karma is the means,

though a distant one, to the rise of knowledge, it is chrono-

logically earlier than the end to which it is conducive.

If so, knowledge which is to be accomplished through

karma and other aids and which is, therefore, posterior to

them cannot be subsidiary (aṅga) to karma.⁵³⁰ Nor can

action be subsidiary to knowledge. There is no need of

the assistance of karma to knowledge in the matter of

attaining liberation. It cannot be said that karma assists

knowledge by removing the hindrance that stands in the

way of attaining release. The only hindrance to the attain-

ment of liberation is ignorance. Knowledge, Sures'vara

says, does not arise at all without removing ignorance.⁵³¹

529. TUBV, I, verses 25-26, p. 12.

530. NS, I, 54.

531. Ibid., I, 65.

CONCLUSION

207

If so, knowledge does not require help from any source whatsoever, much less from karma, in doing its work.

The only alternative which remains to be examined is whether knowledge and action can co-exist and function as partners of equal status.

This, too, is not possible as they are mutually opposed to each other.

Just as a lion and a sheep cannot work together in partnership, just as the sun and darkness cannot co-exist, even so knowledge and ignorance can neither co-work nor co-exist.

532 Suresvara draws pointed attention to the fact that knowledge and action so radically differ in respect of their (i) source, (ii) nature, and (iii) effect that they cannot be united at all.

Pramāna is the source of knowledge; but ignorance and desire are the source of action.

The nature of knowledge is such that it reveals reality; but action which involves duality in the form of means and end, doer and deed, conceals the real.

The destruction of ignorance is the effect of knowledge; but production or attainment or transformation or purification is the effect of karma.

533 So any attempt to place knowledge and action together for the purpose of attaining liberation will be in vain.

XVI

CONCLUSION

Many hallowed names are associated with Advaita.

It would be unfair to mention one above the rest.

Each has contributed to the building of the stupendous structure of Advaita with many facets and vast dimensions — by clarifying the concepts, by defining the categories and principles, by interpreting scriptural texts, by reconciling

532. Ibid., I, 55-56.

533. Ibid., I, 66.

208

INTRODUCTION

the apparent conflicts, by bringing to the fore some of the implications in the writings of Śaṅkara, by forging the two-pronged dialectics which on one side moves forward on the offensive by exposing the untenability of the categories and principles of other systems and on the other side holds on to its position by meeting the objections of the critics. However, the spade work of raising the structure of Advaita on the foundations of the Upaniṣads was done by Bādarāyaṇa, Śaṅkara, and Suresvara. It is for this reason that great dialecticians like Madhusūdanasarasvatī and Gauḍabrahmānanda associate Suresvara with Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara and consider Advaita which has been taught by this triumvirate to be final and authoritative.

Being a direct disciple of Śaṅkara, Suresvara has thoroughly imbibed the spirit of his master. As the author of the Vārtika, he has played the distinguished role of an accredited spokesman of Śaṅkara. His role was more than that of a commentator of Śaṅkara. By his massive writings which touch every aspect of Advaita, he has enriched the literature of Advaita. He is an inexhaustible fount of inspiration and ideas for later Advaitins who have drawn heavily from him. His authority has been invoked by Vimuktātman, Sarvajñātman, Prakāśātman, Vidyāraṇya, Ānandabodha, Citsukha, Madhusūdanasarasvatī,Brahmānandasarasvatī, and Appayyadīkṣita in support of some view or other. Just as the important features of the Bhāmatī school can be traced to the Brāhmasiddhi, so also the important features of the Vivarana school can be traced to the writings of Suresvara. As he was a doughty Mīmāṁsaka before he became a sannyāsin-disciple of Śaṅkara, Suresvara was fully acquainted with Mīmāṁsā; and his vehement and thoroughgoing criticism of Mīmāṁsā from the standpoint of Advaita is a tough morsel for the Mīmāṁsakas to chew. His criticism of

other schools is equally sharp. The range and depth of

his thought, his exegetical ability and penetrative analysis,

his dialectical skill and argumentative finesse, his sugges-

tive similes and biting sarcasms — all these testify to the

fact that he is one of the great master-minds of the school

of Advaita.

Though Suresvara is not prepared to compromise on

the basic non-dualistic standpoint of Advaita, he stresses

the need for conciliation towards the different modes of

interpretation,which converge upon the central teaching of

Advaita. He says: "Whatevcr be the mode of explanation

through which people attain the firm knowledge of the

inward Self must be treated as valid. But it is (in itself)

not valid."534 One may, for example, adopt the limitation

theory (avacchedavāda) or the reflection theory (pratibimba-

vāda) or the semblance theory (ābhāsa-vāda) in order to

bring out the non-difference between Brahman and the

jīva. Each of them, according to Suresvara, is valid in so

far as it serves the purpose for which it is intended. How-

ever, in itself, when taken out of the context of the central

teaching, it has no validity. One mode of explanation

which is intelligible and appealing to one person may not

appear to be so to another. But all these different modes

of explanation, which converge on the same point, are

equally valid, though none of them can claim any privi-

leged position over the others. Keeping in view the final

perspective, we have to explain the differences between

the Bhāmatī school and the Vivarana school, or between

any two Advaitins. Suresvara wants us to understand

that Advaita, far from being a house divided against

itself, is the Rock of ages.

534. BUBV, I, iv, 402:

"yayā yayā bhavetpumsāṁ vyutpattiḥ pratya­gātmāni

sā saivā prakriyeyha svāt sādhvī sā cānavast­hitā."

INVOCATION

ॐ शं नो मित्रः शं वरुणः । शं नो भवत्वर्यमा । शं न इन्द्रो बृहस्पतिः । शं नो विष्णुरुरुक्रमः । नमो ब्रह्मणे । नमस्ते वायो । त्वमेव प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मासि । त्वमेव प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्म वदिष्यामि । ऋतं वदिष्यामि । सत्यं वदिष्यामि । तन्मामवतु । तद्वक्तारमवतु । अवतु माम् । अवतु वक्तारम् । ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥

ॐ सह नाववतु । सह नौ भुनक्तु । सह वीर्यं करवावहै । तेजस्वि नावधीतमस्तु मा विद्विषावहै । ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥

Part

II

TEXT,

TRANSLATION

AND

ANNOTATION

CHAPTER

I

ŚĪKṢĀVALLĪ

[

1

]

सत्यं

ज्ञानमनन्तमेकममलं

ध्वस्तान्धकारं

परं

निर्धूतं

हदि

पद्मामध्यनिलयं

निःशेषधीसाक्षिणम्

!

वेदान्तोपनिविष्टबोधविषयं

प्रत्यक्त्या

योगिनां

भक्त्या

तं

प्रणिपत्य

वेदशिरसो

वक्ष्यामि

सद्वातिकम्

॥

Saluting

with

devotion

the

supreme

Braḥman

which

is

existence,

knowledge,

infinite,

and

one,

which

is

free

from

impurity,

which

destroys

ignorance,

which

is

free

from

difference,

which,

being

seated

at

the

centre

of

the

lotus-heart,

is

the

Witness

of

all

cognitions,

which

is

the

purport

of

the

Vedānta,

and

which

is

realized

as

the

innermost

Self

by

those

who

are

steady

in

knowledge,

I

begin

this

verse

commentary

on

the

Taittirīya

Upaniṣad

which

strings

together

valid

arguments.

Sureśvara's

verse

commentary

on

Śaṅkara's

bhāṣya

on

the

Taittirīya

Upaniṣad

is

known

as

Vārtika.

A

Vārtika

is

defined

as

a

work

which

examines

what

is

said

(ukta),

what

is

not

said

(anukta),

and

what

is

not

well-said

(durukta)

in

the

original.

It

elucidates

what

is

stated

in

the

original

text,

supplements

it,

and

offers

wherever

necessary

alternative

interpretations.

Sureśvara

seeks

to

bring

out

the

nature

of

the

existent

Brahman

by

stringing

together

valid

arguments

in

his

Vārtika.

The

Upaniṣads

have

their

purport

in

the

non-difference

of

Brahman

and

Ātman

as

stated

in

the

principal

text

(mahāvākya),

tat

tvam

asi.

The

word

tat

signifies

through

secondary

sense

(lakṣyārtha)

Brahman.

The

secondary

significance

of

the

word

tvam

is

Ātman.

Brahman

is

of

212

TAITTIRĪYOPANIṢAD-BHĀṢYA-VĀRTIKA

the nature of existence (satyam). It is consciousness (jñānam) which is

self-luminous. It is infinite (anantam) and eternal (nityam), for it is not

limited by time and space. It is not limited by any object, for there is

nothing like it or unlike it; and so it is one (ekam). It is also free from

internal difference. It is free from impurity (amalam). It is the

Supreme or the Highest (param) which transcends cause-effect-relation.

By realizing Brahman, ignorance (avidyā) is destroyed. It is free from

all distinctions superimposed on it (nirdvaitam). The Self (Ātman)

located in the centre of the heart is the Witness to all the cognitions

which take place through mental modes (āśrayāśrayibhāvena). Since the two words tat and tvam are in grammatical

apposition, they refer to one and the same entity. So the principal text

tattvamasi teaches the non-difference of Brahman and Ātman.

[ 2 ]

यस्येदं सकलामलेन्दुकिरणप्रभैर्यशोरशिमभि-

व्याप्तं यश्र कृपालुतापरवरशश्रके हितं दुःखिनाम् ।

यद्‍द्राणीकुलिशावरुणमत्यः: पेतुर्दिशस्तार्किकाः

भक्त्या पूज्यतमं प्रणम्य तमहं तद्‍भाष्यनীতौ यते ॥

Saluting with devotion the most revered teacher by

whose rays of glory, similar to those of the impeccable

full moon, this world is pervaded, who by his grace has done good to the afflicted caught up in bondage, by whose

utterance, similar to the thunder-bolt, the Logicians (and

others) being struck ran to different directions, I endeavour

to write this explanation on his bhāṣya (on the Taittirīya

Upaniṣad).

In this verse Sureśvara offers his salutation to his teacher, Srī

Saṅkara, who has written a commentary on the Taittirīya Upaniṣad.

[ 3 ]

तैत्तिरीयकसारस्य मयाड्‌डचार्यप्रसादतः ।

विस्पष्टार्थेरुचीनां हि व्याख्येयं सम्प्रणीयते ॥

ŚIKṢĀVALLĪ

213

By the grace of my teacher and for the benefit of those who wish to have a clear exposition, this verse commentary on the essence of the Taittirīyaka has been written by me.

Sureśvara's Vārtika is an explanation of both the Taittirīyopaniṣad and Saṅkara's bhāṣya thereon.

This verse occurs also in Saṅkara's bhāṣya.

[ 1 ]

दुरितक्षयहेतूनि नित्यानि बाह्यणे यजुः ।

काम्यानि नेह कर्माणि दृष्टादृष्टफलानि तु ॥

In the previous section called Brāhmaṇa the obligatory (and occasional) rites which cause the removal of sin, as well as the optional rites which give rise to fruits to be attained here and hereafter, have been told.

The Upaniṣad does not form part of the ritual section (karma-kāṇḍa) of the Veda, and so there is the need to explain it separately.

The ritual section of the Veda deals with obligatory, occasional, and optional rites. The different rites enjoined in the ritual section of the Veda are not intended to secure liberation. Since the theme of the Upaniṣad is different from that of the ritual section, there is the need to explain it separately.

[ 5 ]

विद्या प्रस्तूयतेऽथोघ्रं यथाभूतार्थचोधिनी ।

कर्मोपादानहेतूंस्तान् सैवोच्छेत्तुमलं यतः ॥

In the subsequent part, viz., the Vedānta, the knowledge of the existent Brahman is commenced, for that alone can destroy action and its causes.

The Upaniṣad imparts the knowledge of the existent Brahman which one wants to attain after fulfilling the preliminary requisites prescribed therefor. The performance of good deeds here in this life or in the earlier life leads to the purity of mind (antaḥkaraṇaśuddhi)