1. Tarkasangraha_English_Translation_-_Jivananda_Vidyasagara_1872

Tarkasangra...

Annam Bhaṭṭa

J. Vidyasagara

Tarkasangra... ed. with an Engl. tr. by J. Vidyasagara

TARKASANGRAHA

ANNA BHATTA

PANDIT JIBANANDA VIDYASAGARA B. A.

Calcutta: PRINTED AT THE SARASUDHANIDHI PRESS. 1872.

To be had from Pandit Jibananda Vidyasagara B. A. Govt. Sanskrit College of Calcutta.

अवतररिणका

प्रथाम्य परमाचार्यं श्रीजीवानन्द शङ्करम् ।

एकैकभाष्यया तर्कसंग्रहोऽयं निरूप्यते ॥ १ ॥

प्रायो वृत्तिप्रियतयैवषिह भाषितेषु

लोके समादृतिरतिप्रथिता समन्तात् ।

इंलङ्कभाषितमतः सुमतं जनानां

तत्पाटवेन महिमानुपैति लोकः ॥ २ ॥

तदादरेणापरभाषितेषु

श्रद्धा परं भवत एव दृश्याम् ।

तेषां प्रचारेण च सर्वदेशे

प्रायो विवादेऽरम्याख्यर्चर्चा ॥ ३ ॥

संस्कारयुक्तां विदुषां गिरं मनाक्

इंलङ्कभाषासु क्रतश्रमाणाम् ।

यथा प्रचार्यैंत सुतकोविद्या

तथावबोधाय मनैष यत्नः ॥ ४ ॥

तेषां विवोधनकृते निजभाषयैव

डाक्तरविबलषिनविदा विदिता पुरा यत् ।

रोयेरङ्कतरवरेऽपि च भिन्नशाखत्वे:

सवादनेन विदुषा विपुलोकृता सा ॥ ४ ॥

तयोः काचित् पदवीं काचिदपी च तत्त्वचर्चां

गृहीत्वा सारांशं समातम अनुसृत्यापि च मया ।

अनूद्यैषां श्रपयै विरचितमिदं लक्ष्मणगिरा

हृदि स्थानं दत्वा सफलयतु विद्वान् श्रममिमम् ॥ ६ ॥

श्रीदामोदरगोविन्द-समाख्यस्य विजन्मनः ।

प्रौढ्याकृष्टेन च मया सन्दर्भोऽयं विनिर्मितः ॥ ७ ॥

यदि प्रमादादच ममास्ति कश्चित्

विद्वद्भिरेष विमार्जनीयः ।

दोषानुसन्धानपरा न सन्तो

गुषैैकपक्षा: प्रतितात्ति लोके ॥ ५ ॥

येषां हितार्थीय कृता मचेष्टा

तेषां मुदे साादि सा समर्था ।

तदैव मे सफलचयः फलप्रदो

न चान्यथैव विचिन्तनीयम् ॥ ९ ॥

याके वेदाद्वाहेनुमिते शास्त्रेऽच मया ।

निर्माय मुद्रिता यत्नात् तर्कसंग्रहदीपिका ॥ ९० ॥

TRANSLATION OF THE TARKA SANGRAHA.

1. "Having treasured in my mind the Lord of the universe, and having taken the dust of the feet of my preceptor, this collection of the Philosophical Discussions, is made by me, to make the subject easy to the understanding of those who are not well off in the subject."

2. "There are seven categories (padarthas);—I. Substance (dravya), II. Quality (guna), III. Action (karma), IV. Generality (samanya), V. Particularity (vishesha), VI. Intimate Relation (samavaya), VII. negation (abhava).

Padartha is not exactly what Aristotle meant by category; but as most of Aristotle's categories refer to classes of existence or to what is most nearly related to them, and as in modern philosophy the term category expresses almost universally this meaning, we may safely adopt it here, viz. as refering to the notions, which express the general forms of knowledge or what is the same, the general modes of existence.

There are different sets of Categories according to different schools of philosophy. Those of Aristotle are as folloivs :—

1. Substance. 2. Quantity. 3. Quality. 4. Relation

2. Place. 6. Time. 7. Condition. 8. Possession .

3. Action. 10. Passion.

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Those of Zoroaster are as follows :—

I. Sensation. II. Intelligence. III. Judgment. IV. Conscience. V. Life.

Those of Locke are as follows :—

I. Extension. II. Solidity. III. Mobility. IV. Perceptibility. V. Motivity. VI. Perceptibility. VII. Motivity. VIII. Existence. IX. Duration. X. Number.

The number of seven catagories is adopted by the-Veiseshikas, and also acknowledged by the followers of the Nyaya, as established in the Bhashya.

Kanada acknowledged only the six Categories, excluding negation. Gautama, the founder of the Nyaya, enumerates under the head of objects of proof (categories.)

1. Soul, 2. body, 3. sense, 4. object of sense, 5. intellect, 6. mind, 7. activity, 8. fault, 9. condition of the soul after death (transmigration), 10, retribution, 11. pain

2. deleverance from pain.

The enumeration of the Subdivisions of Categories.

3. “The Substances are nine in number : 1. earth (prithivi), 2. Water (ab), 3. light (tejas), 4. air (vayu), 5. ether (akasa), 6. time (kala), 7. space (dik), 8. soul (atman), 9. mind (manas).”

Time and space are here classed as substances, because the word substance is employed to signify that to which qualities can be attributed. To explain this more fully, it is the substratum of qualities either in the relation of intimate union (samavaya sambandha) or in the relation af antecedent negation (pragabhava) that is of future existance.

4. “The qualities are twenty-four in number.,

1. Color (rupa), 2. taste (rasa), 3. smell (gandhā), 4. touch (sparsa), 5. number (sankhya), 6. quantity (parimana), 7. individuality (prithaktwa), 8. conjunction (sanyoga), 9. disjunction (vibhaga), 10. priority (paratwa), 11. posteriority (aparatwa), 12. gravity (gurutwa), fluidity (dravatwa), 14. viscidity (sneha), 15 sound (sabda), 16. intellect (buddhi), 17. pleasure (Sukha), 18. pain (dukha), 10 desire (ichhā), 20. aversion (dwesha), 21. volition (prayatna), 22. virtue, (dharma), 23. vice (adharma), 24. faculty (sanskara).

2. "There are five actions.

3. Throwing upwards (utkshepana), 2. throwing downwards (abakshepana), 3. contracting (akunchana) 4. expanding (prasarana), 5. going on (gamana)."

The last of these, viz gamana or "motion in general, inludes all sorts of motion not mentioned before.

6. "Generality is considered two fold, extensive (para) and non-extensive (apara)."

These correspond to genus and species. Existence, referring substances, qualities and actions is called extensive. The class which differs from this is called non-extensive ; substantiality and similar notions are extensive and non-extensive. It is called extensive by its including many things ; by its being included in a more extensive class it is non-extensive.

6, 'But the ultimate conditions of eternal Substances such as mind, Soul, time, place and the atoms of which the earth, water &c. are composed) are called particularities which are endless.'

Such is the relation of a substance with its component parts, as of a jar, &c. with its two halves, &c. ; further the relation of substances with qualities and actions,

and lastly the relation of substances, qualities and actions with their respective classes is called intimate relation. Intimate relation means constant relation.

7. "But the Intimate relation is of only one kind."

"Negation or non-existence (abhāva) is of four kinds ;—antecedent negation (pragabhava, or the state of a thing before it began to be), destruction (pradhansabhava), absolute negation (atyantabhava), reciprocal negation (anyonnyabhava.)"

Negation is the reciprocal negation of the six categories, that is to say negation arises from the six categories being denied of each other. Negation is two-fold, universal negation and mutual negation. Universal negation is negation, different from mutual negation. Mutual negation is the negation of identity. Universal negation is of three kinds, antecedent, emergent, and absolute negation. In this half a jar is to be produced; in this half a jar is to be destroyed; there is no jar; these are respectively the three negations, mentioned above.

Having thus classified the categories, the author proceeds to consider in detail each of the subdivisions.

8. "Earth has the peculiar quality of smell. It is of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal. It is eternal in the form of atoms; non-eternal in the form of aggregates or products viz. if consisting of two three &c. atoms."

The non-eternity of earth in the form of products indicates the want of permanence in the forms, such as jars, &c, which it may take. The jar, when broken to pieces as atoms, is no longer a jar, but the earth, of which it is composed, still remains. The existence of eternal atoms has been a favorite theory of several schools

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of philosophy. Among the Greeks, Epicurus is one of

the most renowned of the maintainers of the atomie

theory. The doctrine has been resumed by some modern

chemists, not as an established fact but as a hypothesis

which supplies terms very advantageous in enunciating

the chemical laws of Definite Proportions.

" It (earth composed of parts) again is of three

kinds, through the division of organized body (sharira

organ of sense (indriga), object or inorganic matter

(vishaya). We the mortals possess the organized

body of the earth; the smell is the organ of sense

of the earth, which receives odour, residing in the

ore part of the nose; the inorganic matter of the

earth is clay, stone and the like."

9. " Water is cool to the feel. And this (water

is of two kinds-eternal and non-eternal, eternal,

in the shape of atoms and non-eternal in the shape

of products from the by-atomical to the highest

compound.

" These compounds are again of three kinds;-the

organized body; the organ of sense, and the inorga-

nic matter.

Its organized body is to be met with in the realms

of Varuna (or Neptune); its organ of sense is tongue

(rasana) which relishes taste, residing in the fore-

part of the tongue; its inorganic matters or objects

(visayas) are rivers, seas, &c."

10. " Light is hot to the feel. It is of two

sorts-eternal in the form of atoms and non-eternal

or transient in the form of compounds. These pro-

ducts or compounds are again of three kinds:-the

organized body, the organ of sense and the inorganic

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matter. It is well known that the organized body

of light abides in the solar realm; the organ of

sense of light is sight (chakhas) the recipient of colour,

residing in the forepart of the black pupil of the eye;

inorganic light is of four sorts, according to the

division of earthy (bhauma), celestial (divya), intesti-

nal (audarya) and mineral (akaryya). Earthy light,

is that of fire, &c. celestial light is such as lightening

&c. is without fuel. Intestinal is the cause of the

digestion of what is eaten and drunk. Mineral light

is found in mines, as gold, &c."

The Nyaya philosophy considers light and heat as one

and the same thing. Modern chemists have found out

curious resemblances not only between light and heat

but also between these and electricity and magnetism;

but whether they are materially the same or different has

not yet been ascertained by experiment and examination.

In the Nyaya the organ of seeing is supposed to be a ray

of light emitted forth by the centre of the eye towards

the external object that is seen. The Buddhists suppose

that the organ of seeing is the pupil of the eye itself.

The optists of the present day affirm that we see an object

not because a ray emanates from the pupil of the eye

towards the object viewed and ellumines it, but because

the object reflects light on the retina of the eye.

The theory of the intestinal heat appears to be a

prediction of Leibig's doctrine of digestion which as-

cribes to the body the function of a furnace having the

food as fuel.

As the strongest heat of a furnace is nnequal to

calcine gold or turn it into an earthly looking oxide,

it is supposed by the Naiyayikas as a lucid substance

and not an earthly matter like the other metals.

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In the Mimansa, gold is considered as a different substance altogether. This theory is adopted by the modern chemists of Europe.

11. "The feel in the air is considered peculiar to itself. The air is also supposed to have no colour. It is of two kinds, eternal and non-eternal:-eternal in the form of atoms—and non-eternal in the form of compounds or products. These compounds again are of three kind:-I. The organized dody; II. the organ of sense and III. the inorganic matter. The organized bodies of air are in the aerial region (evil spirits, such as the pisachas) ; its organ of sense the percipient of touch, is the skin (twak) which extends over the whole body. Its inorganic matters are those which cause the trembling of the trees and the like."

12. "The air that circulates within the body is called the vital air (prana) and this, though single, receives the defferent denomimations of breathing, flatulence &c. through the distinction of modifying circumstances.

13. "The distinguishing quality of the ether is sound. It ts one, all pervading, and eternal. Time (kala ),though one is the cause of the employment of the terms past and the like. It is all pervading and eternal."

The element of ether is inferred in order to account ior sound. As pure air and water are destitute of smell, ft has been concluded by the Naiyayikas that the smell is the distinctive proof of earth :-the perception of savour depending on the presence of moisture in the mouth, it was concluded that the sense of taste must be aqueous in its nature :-the relation between light and vision was plain enough :-and the air having been

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appropriated to the sense of touch, which surrounds the whole body just as the air usually surrounds it, there remains nothing else to support the uniformity of the system than to infer a fifth ' elementary essence for the substratum of sound which elementary essence is designated as ether. A fifth element, under the denomination of Quintissence, was acknowledged by the ancient philos o phers of Europe, though with a different signification from that of the Nyaya system.

The doctrine that the organs of sense must resemble in their nature the objects which they were to apprehend is equivalent to the doctrine of a long predominance in Europe :—“that a cause must resemble its effect.” It is in some points, the converse of the theory of ideas or sensible forms. In that theory outward bodies were supposed to emit forth refined images of themselves to the mind through the organs of sense. Here, on the other hand, the mind is supposed to send forth an organ of sense towards its object in the external world, resembling the object itself.

Thus bright bodies are represented as being viewed by means of a ray of light that emanates from the eye, and which constitutes the sense of sight.

Time, the producer of all productions, is the substrate of the world. This is proved by the perception of the " now ". If for instance the perception : "here is now a jar," is given there exists a union between the motion of the sun and the jar. This is not conjunction or any other relation (for conjunction is between the parts of two or more things,) but it is a relation of a different kind, which is produced by time. That time is to be thought under the notion of a substratum, is evident from its being the cause of priority and posteriority. Time is the special (non-general) cause of the perception

f priority and posteriority. Or if both definitions are combined. Time is the substrate of the special union, which is the non-intimate cause of priority and posteriority.

Although one, it has many names, viz moment, hour day &c., past, future and present time. Past is the time, whose destruction is the present, as yesterday; future is the time, whose future existence is present, as to-morrow, and present is the time, whose future existence is destroyed and whose destruction is (to come to pass) future, as to-day. There will, after every future moment, be another moment, because there will be always another action (the junction of which with other things produces the relation of time); this will be cause at the general conflagration, where also the terms of “ moment, ” “ day, ” &c. are applied.

14. “ Space (dik) is the cause of the use of the terms eastern and the like. It is one, eternal, and all-pervading (or infinite.)”

15. “The repository of knowledge is the Soul (atman). It is of two kinds—the human Soul, and the divine Soul. The divine Soul is God who is Omniscient and one only—devoid of happiness and misery. The human Soul is different in each human body and is infinite and eternal.”

The reason ascribed for the theory that the human soul is infinite is this, that, wherever the body goes, there the soul too is present. The human soul is the intimate cause of happiness and unhappiness &c., and the substantiality of it is proved by its being the substratum of the qualities: happiness and unhappiness. Since such causes as merit and demerit do not exist with regard to God or the devine Soul, he is not subject to either happiness and unhappiness.

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The human Soul governs the organs of sense, &c because it successively, produces the conscience of the senses and of the body. Although there is in the soul the perception: I know, I am happy, &c., yet it cannot at first be proved against one who holds the contrary opinion, that the soul is something different from the body, &c. To prove this, it is said that "an instrument must possess its agent." As an instrument, has no effect without an agent, so also the eye and the other senses, which are the instruments for knowledge, have no effect without an agent. For this reason an independent agent is assumed.

To show, that the body is not the agent, it is urged that "there is no consciousness in the body, as is proved by the disappearance of consciousness after death," and also "if consciousness belonged to the body, there could in old age be no recollection of things, perceived in childhood, the body being subject to increase and decrease by acquiring and losing its particles," consciousness can neither belong to the senses; for if such were the case, how could recollection remain, when the senses are destroyed?

Let then consciousness not belong to the senses (external) but be maintained for the eternal mind To which the answer is :-the mind cannot be the Site of consciousness ;-for then knowledge and other internal qualities would remain imperceptible. Because as the mind is an atom, and as the cause of every perception is a certain greatness, no perception could take place, if knowledge, happiness, &c. were placed in the eternal mind. How mind is an atom, is explained afterwards. Consciousness then must belong to the soul.

Having finished the account of substance, the author goes on to treat of quality.

16. "Mind (manas) is that organ of sense which is instrumental to the apprehension of happiness and misery &c. It is endless, as each soul possesses one mind. It is in the form of an atom and is eternal."

The Naiyayikas are of opinion that the mind is small, as an atom, because if it were infinite, as the Mimamsakas uphold, it might be in union with all substances simultaneously, and all sensations might be contemporaneous. Various sensations, the Naiyayikas maintain, do not arise at once to the same soul. They only appear to do so when passing in rapid succession ; as a firebrand, whirled with velocity, looks like a ring of fire.

Of Qualities.

17. "The quality, that is apprehended by the eye only, is colour. Through the division of white, blue yellow, red, green, orange, and variegated, it is of seven kinds. All these seven colours are to be found in earth. The colour that is to be found in water is non-resplendant white. In light it is to be found both white and bright,"

The great Newtom has discovered that the colour is in light only, and that a ray of light can be analysed into all the seven primary colours by means of a glass-prism. He has also proved by experiment that the variety of colours that is visible in the universe is owing to the variety of powers which different objects possess to absorb some primary colours and to emit forth the residue of the ray.

18. "The quality that is apprehended by the tongue is taste. And that is of six kinds through

the division of sweet, acid, saline, bitter, astringent, and pungent. All these six qualities of taste can be had in earth but in water the sweet taste can only be found."

19. "The quality that is apprehended by the nose is smell. And it is of two kinds, fragrance and non-fragrance which exist in earth only."

(20) "The quality that is apprehensive only by the organ of touch is feel. It is three-fold, cold, hot, and temperate (ie neither cold nor hot). It exists in earth, water, light, and air. The feel that is in water is cold, the feel that is in light is hot, and the feel that is in both the earth and air is neither cold nor hot."

Feel is perceived by the skin, it is the cause of perception through the skin. {t is three-fold, tepid, cold, and warm. Hardness and similar qualities are in the earth. It is eternal in the atoms of water, light, and air, non-eternal in the atoms of earth.

The qualities of colour, taste, smell, and feel, as abiding in earth, they are produced by a cause, because by the union with fire, the colour, taste, and smell and feel of earth are changed ; not so as abiding in water, &c. be a hundred times boiled, yet no change of its colour, &c. akes place. The smell and heat of water, on the other thand, are artificial, because they are present or absent by the presence or absence of artificial means, like the ocld feel of air and earth.

The Vaisesikas affirm, that as to earth the change by the process of cooking takes place in the atoms. Their view is, as follows:—as long as the parts are retained in the compound, no change by the process of cooking is possible ; but when by the union of fire the compound

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substances have been destroyed, that change takes place

in the atoms whic h have beccme independent of ea

other. And again by the union of the atoms which,

have been changed by the process of cooking, a produc-

tion is effected from the compound of two, three, &c.

atoms again to a componnd of many parts; for by the

extraordinary velocity of heat the transition from the

destruction of one compound to the production of

another is sudden. Then from the destruction of a

compound of two atoms, by a new production, a compound

possessed of shape, &c., is formed in a few moments.

The Naiyayikas on the other hand affirm, that in com-

pounds also, viz, in compounds of two, three &c., atoms,

change by the process of cooking takes place. Their

opinion is as follows:-The compound substances have

pores, the minute parts of fire enter into the inside, and

therefore change by the process of cooking is possible

although the parts be retained in the compound.

(21) "The four qualities, colour &c., which are pro-

duced by the application of heat, are transient ; but

when they are not produced by the application of heat,

they are either eternal or non-eternal or transient:-

they are eternal in the eternal matters (atoms) and

non-eternal or transient in the non-eternal or tran-

sient matters (objects produced, such as com-

pounds.)"

(22)" The non-general or special cause of the appli-

cation of the terms one, &c., is Number. It pervades

all the nine substances. Beginning from one, it

reaches to the highest numerical figure (pararddha.)

Unity is either eternal or non-eternal ; eternal when

apertains to objects eternal, and non-eternal or tran-

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sient when appertains to objects non-eternal or trans

sient. But duality, &c., are every where non

oternal or transient."

The highest numerical figure "parardha" is "many

lacks of karors." The transient unity means this:-

that when an object is broken into two pieces, it leaves

on the moment, its character of unity and assumes the

haracter of duality.

(23) "The non-general or special cause of the use of

measure, is Quantity. It abides in all the nine

substances ; and it is of four kinds, minute and great,

longe and short."

(24) "The non-general or special cause of the appli-

cation of the term separate, is Individuality, which

quality abides in all the substances."

(25) "The special or non-general cause of the

use of the term "connected," is conjunction. It

pervades all the substances."

(26)"Disjunction is that quality which causes the

destruction of conjunction. All the substances are

to site."

"Distance and proximity or priority and pos-

teriority are the two special or non-general causes

of the application of the terms far and near, ancient

and recent. Having been incident to four substances

beginning with the earth and to the mind, they are

of two kinds what is made by space and what is

made by time. With reference to an object placed

far off, there is the distance made by space. With

reference to an object placed near, there is proximity

made by space. When an object is old there is priority

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with reference to time. When an object is young,

there is posteriority with reference to time."

(27) "The instrumental cause of a body's beginning

to fall is weight or gravity which abides in earth

and water."

(28) "The instrumental cause of the first

commencement of tickling is Fluidity which abides

in earth, water and light. It is of two kinds:-

natural (or primary) and adscititious (or secondary).

It is natural (or primary, in water and adscititious

(or secondary i e produced by somethiny else) in

earth and light. In earthly substances such as

clarified butter, &c,fluidity is caused by the appli-

cation of heat".

(29) "The quality that causes infinitesimal

particles to assume the shape of a mass is Viscidity:

It exists in water alone".

The Naiyaikas maintain that oily Substances are

viscid, only because they contain water. This phenomenon

according to modern Chemists falls under the category

of attraction of cohesion.

(30) "The quality that is apprended by the organ

of hearing (Sotra) is sound (Sabda). It is two-fold,

inarticulate and articulate. Inarticulate sound is

that of a bugle, &c. Articulate Sound is in the form

of the Sanscrit and other languages."

(31)"The quality that is the cause of the application

of all terms is intellect or knowldge (buddhi). It is of

two kinds, Memory and Apprehension. Knowledge

(or a state of consciousness), which is caused by the

internal reflexion of previous impressions (Sanskara

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is called memory (smṛiti). Knowledge different from that, is called apprehension (anuvaba). That is of two kinds, true-apprehension and false apprehension.

(32) "Apprehension of an object in its real nature, is true apprehension. Thus the knowledge that ‘it is silver’ which we arrive at after, seeing true silver is called true apprehension. That is truly called the pramā i e knowledge unmistakeable. False apprehension is that which indicates a nature that does not belong to the object of which the apprehension is formed. For instance, the apprehension ‘This is silver’ in a pearl-shell is a false apprehension."

(33) "True apprehension is of four kinds:— preceptions, inferences, comparisons and testimonies. Their causes are also four-fold, viz. perception inference, comparison, and testimony."

True apprehension is an apprehension without error. It is not perceived but by itself, by the concurrence of doubts. The Mimansakas say, that true apprehension is comprehended by itself. According to the Gurus a knowledge is a true aprehension by its own manifestation.

According to the opinion af the Murarimisras knowledge is obtained by reflection.

(34)" An efficient cause, that is not general to many effects, is called a special cause. That antecedent which invariably and unconditionally precedes an effect is called a cause. That is called an effect, of which, there was a previous non-existence."

(35) "Cause is three-fold, through the divisions of intimate, non-intimate, and instrumental. That from which in its intimate relation an effect is

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produced is called an intimate cause, as threads are of cloth, and the cloth itself of its own colour, &c.

Where the cause and effect are associated in one and the same object, that cause is called non-intimate ; such as the conjunction of the threads is the nonintimate cause of cloth, and the colour of the threads is that of the cloth itself; and the third, that is, the instrumental cause must be considered, what is different from either, such as the weaver's brush, the loom, &c., are of cloth. Among these three kinds of causes, that cause which is not general, is called the instrumental cause."

(36) "The instrumental cause of preception is sensation ; sensation is the knowledge that is produced by the union of an organ of sense with an external object. This knowledge, which is called sensation, is two-fold ; what admits of an alternative and what does not. The knowledge that admits of an alternative is indefinite, such as in the simple notion that "this is some-thing." The knowledge that does not admit of an alternatlive is definite such as, in the positive cognitions of 'this is Dittha' & 'This is a Brahman,' 'This is black.'

(37) "The Intercourse (Sannikarsa) of an organ of sense with anexternal object,which is the instrumental cause of preception, is of six kinds as follows:-

I. Conjunction, II. intimate union with that which is in conjunction, III. intimate union with what is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, IV. intimate union, V. intimate union with that which is intimately united, and VI. the union which arises from the relation between the

thing qualified and the thing that qualifies. For instance, when the preception of a jar takes place by the intercourse of an organ of sight, there the intercourse is conjunction. In the preception of the colour of the jar, there the intercourse is the intimate union whith that which is in conjuction, for the colour is intimately united with the jar which is in conjunction with the organ of sight. In the perception of the presence of the generality of colour, there the intercourse is the intimate nnion with what is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, for in the colour that is intimately united with the jar which is in cojuction with the organ of sight, is inherent in the generic property of being coloured. In the perception of Sound by the organ of hearing, there the intercorse is intimate union, for the ether pervading the cavity of the ear, is the organ of hearing, and sound being the specific quality of ether, and there being an intimate relation between a quality and a thing possessing that quality. In the preception of the generic property of sound, the intercourse is the intimate union with that which is intimately united. In the preception of negation, the intercourse is the nnion which arises from the relation between the thing qualified and the thing that qualifies, for in the preception that 'this ground is possesed with the negation of a jar' there the ground that is in conjunction with the organ of sense is distinguished by the specific quality of the negation of a jar. Thus the knowledge that is prodneed by these intercourses of six kinds is called perception. The instrumental cause of that perception are the organs

of sense. Therefore the organs of sense are ack-

nowledged to be the authority of perception. Thus

ends the chapter on Sensation and Perception."

The author then goes on to the chapter on Infe-

rence.

(38.) "The act of inferring (something unknown

from the known data ) is called inference."

"An inference is knowledge arrived at from

a logical deduction. This consists in the knowledge

of a general principle combined with the knowledge

that the case in question is one to which it is

applicable. For instance, the knowledge that 'this

hill is possessed with smoke, which is invariably

attended by fire' is a logical primise, the knowledge

deduced from which, viz. that 'this hill is fiery 'is a

logical inference. The genrality of a principle

(Vyapti) consists in the inseparable connection of

one given thing with some other as in the

instance that 'wherever there is smoke there is

fire.'The existence of the thing which forms the

middle term (Vyapya) of a Syllogism, in the thing

which forms the subject of the conclusion or the

minor term (Pakṣha) is called the generality of

principle of being in the minor term."

The special cause ( instrumental cause ) of an in-

ference is the knowledge of the invariable connection

of the subject with the predicate in a general proposi-

tion (Vyapti-jnana)

For instance, let a man who from the smoke on a

hearth, &c. has become aware of the invariable

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connection of smoke with fire, see afterwards any

where on a mountain uninterrupted line of smoke.

He will then recollect the general proposition that

'smoke is invariably connected with fire.' Hence

arises the knowledge, that 'this mountain is possessed

with smoke which is invariably connected with fire'

thence arises the knowledge that 'this mountain is fiery'

which is an inference.

The ancients held, that smoke, when actually perceived,

together with the notion, that it is invariably connected

with fire, is the special cause of a conclusion. The

modern philosophers deny this; for they say, if the

reason (Linga, sign) were the special cause of the

conclusion, then inference could not take place, if the

reason (sign) had not yet arrived, or had been destroyed;

because then the reason, the pretended special cause

of a conclusion, was not present.

It is difficult to find an adequate word for the term

(Vyapti) in English. It means literally, pervading

inherence, the inherent and essential presence of any one

thing or property in another, but it is used in the Nyaya

and other philosophical systems to denote the logical rela-

tion of one notion to another in a proposition of such a

kind, that under circumstances an inference may be drawn

from it; or it is the relation of the subject to the predicate

and vice versa, as the major proposition of a syllogism.

The subject of such a proposition is the (Vyapya) the

notion, which is pervaded by another (by the predi-

cate) that is to say, which is only a part of the predi-

cate, which is less extensive than the latter, or includ-

ed in it. The subject is therefore invariably connec-

ted with the predicate and if the former is thought,

the latter also is thought. The predicate is the

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( Vyapaka, ) the pervading notion; it has a greater extent than the subject, and the latter is only a part of it. It is, therefore, not invariably connected with it, and if the predicate is thought, the subject is not necessaily thought with it. The Vyapti is, accordingly, only understood, if the relation of the two notions, to be connected together, on either part is understood. Further, the Vyapti is a proposition, from which an inference can be derived, that is to say, it must be a general proposition, fit to form the major proposition of a Syllogism. The names of Vyapya and Vyapaka are only used with reference to the general proposition ; if a third term (the minor term) is connected with them, they obtain other names, Viz; the Vyapya (middle term) the name of Hetu, reason, argument, or linga, sign, and the Vyapaka ( major term ) the name of Sadhya, conclusion. The minor term (the subject of the conclusion) is calied Paksha : place (minor term, subject of the conclusion) viz the place, to be connected by means of the middle term with the major term, or predicate of the conclusion.

The knowledge of the determination of the reason (middle term) which is determined by a general predicate, (major term) in connection with the place (minor term) is the special cause of a conclusion. This can be comprehended in a double manner, either, it is the knowledge, that the subject of the general proposition (the middle term,) is connected with the place (subject of conclusion, minor term) or, it is the knowledge, that the place (subject of conclusion) is possessed of thesubject of the general proposition (middle term.) Accordingly the conclusion takes place either from the knowledge, that the subject of the general proposition (middle term) is connected with the place (subject, minor term) from

which follows that the conclusion (predicate of the

conclusion, major term) is connected with the place

(minor term) or it takes place from the knowledge, that

the place (minor term) is possessed of the subject of

the general proposition (middle term) from which follows,

that the place (minor term) is possessed of the

conclusion (major term.)

The knowledge of the attribute (middle term) of the

subject (of conclusion) as determined by the predicate

(major term) with which it is invariably connected

takes place through intimate relation, and produces the

conclusion by the same relation.

This is on the whole an excellent exposition of

the logical relation of the conclusion. It is here lucidly

explained in what manner the three notions of a

syllogism are in relation to each other, and also that

the cause of the conclusion is not the middle term, as

separated from the major term, but only in its connec-

tion with it. As this is sometimes not attended to, it

is not superfluous to attach importance to it. At the

same time it is true, that the logical form of a syl-

logism does not consist of one premise, and the conclusion

but of two premises whith one conclusion; for if one

reflects as to the form, viz.. the minor term in con-

nection with the middle term, which is itself determined

by the major term, it is evident, that there are two

connections viz. of the minor term with the middle, and

of this with the major. That is to say, there are two

propositions or two premises.

(39) "The process of Inference is of two kinds, for

one's own self, and for the sake of others. That

which is for one's own self, is the cause of de-

duction of a logical inference in one's own mind;

for instance, having made repeated and personal observations, in the case of culinary hearths and the like, that wherever there is smoke there is fire, having come to the conclusion, that this an invariable sequence, having reached a mountain, and having entertained a doubt about the existence of fire in it, and having observed smoke on the mountain, a man recollects the invariable and unconditional antecedence of fire, where there is smoke. Afterwards this knowledge arises in his mind that this mountain is distinguished by smoke which is invariably and unconditionally attended by fire. This is called Linga-paramarsa which means such recognition of linga or sign as leads to a logical inference Thence is produced the knowledge, that the 'mountain is fiery.' This is ealled a logical inference for one's own self.

(40) "But, when any one, after having for the satisfaction of his own mind inferred fire from smoke, makes the application of the five-membered syllogistic form for the edification of the understanding of others, that inference is called the inference for the sake of others. As for instance

I. This hill is fiery.

II Because it smokes.

III. Whatever is possessed of smoke is fiery, as a culinary hearth.

1V. And that it does so.

V. Therefore it is fiery. Thus from a sign already established, the other man also is convinced of the existance of fire."

(41) 'The five-membered (Avayavas or propositions) of the syllogistic form are as follows :-

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1. The proposition (pratijñā that which is to

be proved by argument)

2. The reason, argument or hetu;

3. The instance (udāharana, drishtānta).

4. The application (upanaya).

5. The conclusion (nigamana).

For instance;

1. 'This hill is fiery'; is the proposition.

2. 'For it smokes' is the reason or hetu.

3. 'Whatever smokes is fiery'; is the instance

or udāharana.

4. 'This hill smokes'; is the application or upanaya

5. 'Therefore it is fiery'; is the conclusion

or nigamana.

The modern school of the Nyāya has reduced the

syllogism to three and even to two members, and this

last reduction appears to have been most generally adop-

ted. In this form the two premises, viz. major and

minor propositions are condensed into one premise, of

which we shall now give a description.

That a syllogism be correct, two things are required. 1,

a general proposition, in which the subject (reason) is

invariably connected with a predicate (conclusion), more

comprehensive than the subject, and 2, a minor term

with which the subject of the general proposition is con-

nected. That there is this double connexion of the minor

term with the reason, and of the reason with the conclu-

sion, is to be decided by consideration, which is the

intercourse between the minor term and the reason, as

connected with the general predicate or the predicate of

the conclusion. This consideration is only one, and therefore the form of the antecedent of the conclusion can only be one, or: there is only one premise, by which the minor term is expressed as determined by the reason in its invariable connexion with the conclusion.

For instance: let a man from former obseravtion know, that smoke is invariably connected with fire, as for instance on a culinary hearth; let him see afterwards an uninterrupted column of smoke rising from a hill, he will recollect the general proposition that smoke is invariably connected with fire. Hence the knowledge arises: This hill is possessed of smoke, which is invariably connected with fire. This knowledge, to a third by a second, is consideration, from which the conclusion arises: This hill is fiery.

This is in its principal points the theory of the Nyaya of the form of the syllogism. It is essentially the same with that of Aristotle. The differences are two. The first is a difference in the form, or rather in expression, viz. that the two permises are combined into one. The exposition is certainly not simple, for the different combination of the ideas, forming a syllogism, ought to be represented in their natural form, which is the connexion of two in a proposition, and the same principle ought to have been applied to the conclusion; for if it is true that two premises must be combined into one, the conclusion also should not be stated in a separate sentence, but the whole syllogism should form one sentence, for instance, in the example: This hill, determined by smoke, which is determined by fire, is determinied by fire. Yet the difference is only apparent;

for the Nyaya, as Aristotle, connects, one notion with the other through a third with which the latter is connected, or excludes it by a third, from which the second is excluded.

The second difference is, that the Nyaya wanted not only to give rules for the correctness of the logical operation in arguing, but to guard against false premises, and for this purpose the consideration was also to establish the truth of the major proposition by a reference to an instance, in which the truth of the proposition was exemplified. Their consideration was therefore, not only directed to the logical operation of arguing, but also to the truth which may result from it, and both the truth of the conclusion, and the correctness of the argument should be the result of one and the same operation, which of course is impossible.

With the exposition of the form of syllogism, the logical theory of the Nayaya is nearly completed. Gautama divided inference into three kinds ; 1, inference of an effect from a cause, as if rain is inferred from a collection of clouds ; 2, inference of a cause from an effect, as if rain is concluded from an increase of the water in a river ; and 3, inference from general notions, as if earth is inferred to be a substance from its having the quality of smell. This division, is not logical, as cause and effect are metaphysical notions and have no relation whatever to the different forms of syllogism. The modern school of the Nayaya has therefore not adopted this division, but acknowledges three kinds of syllogisms; which are only affirmative inference, only negative inference, and inference, at the same time affirmative and negative. From the examples, given

in illustration, it appears, that the latter includes two moods of the first and second figures, Barbara and Camestres; Barbara being the type for all general affirmative conclusions, and Camestres for all gener negative ones. Here, however, is their theory finished and we find no trace of the different moods the syllogistical forms can enter into.

(42) "The(linga-paramarsa) or the recognition of a sign is alone the instrumental cause of an inference (anumiti), both of that for one's own self and of that for another; therefore the linga-paramarsa or the recognition of a sign is an act of inference (anumanam)."

(43) "A Sign (linga) is of three kinds, (1) that which has reference to an invariable union and separation (anwaya-vyatireki) ; (2) that which has reference to union alone,(kewalanwayi)and (3)that which has reference to separation alone (kewalavyatireki);. Where the sign has reference to the pervading inherence (Vyapti) both by union and separation, there the sign is called that which has reference to an inseparable union and separation; as for instance, the state of being smoky, when fire is to be proved. ' Wherever there is smoke, there is fire as a culinary hearth'; this an universal affirmative. 'Where there is no fire, there can also be no smoke, as for instance in the case of a great 'lake'; this an universal negative. The sign which has reference to union alone is that which has no negative dristanta or example, as for instance, 'this jar is nameable, because it is cognizable by prama or true

apprehension, as cloth is'. For there is no instance where a thing is unnameable when it is cognizable by true apprehension and vice versa. The sign that has a reference to separation alone, is that in regard to which we argue from an invariable absence.

As an example we institute the following syllogism :-

' (1) Earth differs from these (other elements) :

' (2) Because it possesses smell :

' (3) Whatever is not different from these (other elements) is not possessed of smell, as for instance water, (ie it is not possessed of smell) :

' (4) But this (earth) is not so (ie is not unpossessed of smell) :

(5) Therefore it is not like the other elements.

But if (in the the third proposition) we argued (affirmatively) that 'whatever is possessed of smell is different from the other elements,' we would have been in want of an instance to cite the earth being the singular instance of that.'

Without undergoing the needless necessity of citing an example in an argument, it can be simplified by stating a universal affirmative premise thus:-

" 1. Whatever is possessed of smell, differs from the other elements. :

(2) Earth is possessed of smell :

(3) Therefore Earth differs from other elements"

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The connexion of the subject with the predicate is two-fold. Namely, there are three kinds of inference, viz; only affirmative, only negative, and affirmative and negative at the same time.

1. The only affirmative kind takes place, when there are no dissimilar instances with regard to the conclusion (major term, that is to say, when the major term is not excluded from any other notion) for instance, if it is argued, that something is an object of knowledge, because it can be named; for here is a dissimilar instance impossible as every thing is an object of knowledge.

If it is said, 'that the only affirmative kind is impossible, because it is separated from all other notions' (that is to say, such a notion is separated from all other notions, and cannot therefore be connected with all.) We deny this; for what is separated, is common to all, and this is merely affirmative. Moreover, the mere affirmation is the notion of a thing which is no object of actual absolute negation, and this is proved in the negation of the ether, &c. (that is to say, as it cannot be proved, that ether, space, &c. are not found any where, so it cannot be proved with regard to such notions as knowledge, &c.).

2. Merely negative inference takes place, when there exist no similar subjects of conclusion, for instance, in the inference : Earth is distinguished from all the other elements, because it is possessed of smell. Here is earth the minor term, the conclusion the distinction from what is different from earth, and reason the smell; for in this case there is no similar instance, viz. no instance with which the conclusion is connected, because it was before excluded from the other elements.

3. Affirmative and negative inferences take place, when there exist similar and dissimilar instances of the conclusion or major term; for instance : This is fiery, because it smokes. In this case there are similar instances, as a hearth, &c., and dissimilar instances, as a lake, &c.

The cause of the negative conclusion is the knowledge of a general negative proposition, Vyatirekavyapti Hence the true definition of a general negative proposition is this :—A general negative is the necessity of the absence of the reason, where there is an absence of the conclusion or the major term ; that is to say, a general negative is the absence of the reason, which absence is included in the absence of the conclusion or major term.

Here it must be understood, by what connexion, at what place, and by what notion, the more extensive notion is comprehended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be determined. From this knowledge it follows : by what connexion and notion, the more comprehensive notion is comprehended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be determined. Accordingly, where the absence of smell expresses the notion of the other elements by distinctive relation, there follows the absolute negation of the notion of the other elements by the negation of the negation of smell ; but where the more extensive notion of the other elements is comprehended by the relation af identy; this is reciprocal negation. And lastly, when by the relation of conjunction, for instance, the more extensive notion of fire with regard to smoke is comprehended, there the negation of smoke, determined by the relation of conjunction, in a tank

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also follows from the negation of fire, determined by the relation of conjunction. Here is the cause of the apprehension of the general negative proposition, the knowledge of what agrees with a general negative.

Another opinion on the subject is that: By means of the negative, the general affirmative is understood, but the knowledge of the general negative proposition, is not the cause. Where by means of the general negative, the general proposition is understood, there it is called a negative inference. The necessity of the conclusion (major term, here the difference from the other elements) is first evident from single things, as a jar, &c. and afterwards it is established for the notion of earth, &c.

(44) "That, where the existence of the property to be proved is doubtful, is called the subject of the conclusion (paksha) ; as the mountain, when the fact of its having possessed of smoke is the reason (argument or hetu). That, where the existence of the property to be proved is undoubted, is called the subject on the same side or Sapaksha ; as the culinary hearth, in the same argument. That which is undoubtedly possessed of the negation of the property to be proved, is called the subject in opposition or vipaksha ; as a great lake in the same argument"

OF FALLACIES.

(45) "There are five semblances of reason or fallacies or hetvabhasas, which are as follows :--

I. Going astray.

II. Contradiction.

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III. Equalization.

IV. Inconclusiveness.

V. Absurdity.''

(46) "The fallacy of going astray or savyabhichara

is that which may have a conclusion different from

that which is wanted.

It is of three kinds.

1. That which is too general or Sadharana.

2. that which is not general enough or asadharana.

3. And that which is non-exclusive or anupa-

sanhari.

The fallacy of going astray, which is too general,

is that where the reason or hetu may be present,

when the property to be proved is absent; as for

example, if one would say, 'The mountain is fiery,

because it is cognizable by prama or true ap-

prehension but cognizability by prama or true

apprehension can as well be ascribed to a lake which

is possessed of the negation of fire.'

(47) "The fallacy of going astray that is not

general enough, is excluded from the subject of

conclusion and from an oposite onpe. As for exam-

ple, 'sound is eternal, because it is possessed of the

generic property of souud.' This is a fallacy of

going astray that is not general enough, for the

generic property of sound exists in sound alone

and excluded from all, either eternal or non-eternal.''

(47) "The fallacy of going astray that is non-.

exclusive or anupasanhari, where no example can

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be brought either in support or in opposition. As for instance, if it is said, that ' Every thing is non-eternal, beeause it is cognizable by prama knowledge without error,'—here there is no examplo to cite, because 'every thing' is the subject of the conclusion.'

(48) "The fallacy of contradiction or viruddha is that, where the reason is invariably attended with the negation of what is to be proved. As for example, when it is said that,—'sound is eternal because it is created.' This argument should be rejected as fallacious, because the state of having been created is attended with non-eternity :— the negation of eternety."

(49) "It is called the fallacy of equalization or satpratipaksha when the reason is counterbalanced by another reason which proves the negation of what is to be proved. As for example, when one would say that, ' The sound is eternal, because it is cognizable by the organ of hearing, as the generic property of sound is acknowledged by both parties,' it might be said with equal force on the other side, that, ' sound is non-eternal, because it is a creation, as a jar is '

(50) "The fallacy of inconclusiveness, is of three kinds :—

1. inconclusiveness on the part of the subject asrayasiddha;

2. inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason svarupasidha;

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3. inconclusive-ness from limitation." (vyapya- twasiddha)

(51) "As an example of the inconclusiveness on the part of the subject it is cited, 'The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is possessed of the generic property of lotuses, as in the lotuses of the lake,'here the sky-lotus is the locality of the generic property of a lotus, which sky-lotus is in reality non-existent."

(52) "Inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason takes place, for instance, when it is inferred 'that sound is a quality, because it is cognizable by the organ of sight.' But this cognizability by the organ of sight is not existent in the sound; sound being cognizable by the organ of hearing. Inconclusiveness from limitation would take place, for instance, when the reason is attended with an indispensable condition. Such an indispensable condition or upādhi is what always attends the property to be proved, but does not always attend what is brought forward as a proof."

(53) "Invariable attendance on the object to be proved (sādhya-vyāpakatva) consists in the not being the counterpart (apratiyogitva) of the absolute negation (atyantabhāva) attendant on (sama- nadhikarana) that which is to be proved. Non-invariable attendance on that which is cited as a proof (sādhana-vyāpakatva) consists in the being the counterpart (pratiyogitva) of the negation which exists in the proof."

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(54) "In the argument that, 'The mountain is possessed of smoke, because it has fire,' here the contact of wet fuel is an indispensable condition. As for instance, 'wherever there is smoke there is the union with wet fuel,' is an invariable attendance on what is to be proved (sadhyavyapakata). But such an inference is not true, 'That wherever there is fire, there is the union with wet fuel' for there is no union with wet fuel in the case of an ignited iron ball—this is what is called the non-invariable attendance on the proof or sadhanavyapakata. Thus the invariable attendance on what is [to be proved being coexistent with the non-invariable attendace on the proof, the indispensable condition there is the union with wet fuel. As this additional condition is indispensable here, to prove the absolute presence of smoke, fieriness in this argument is fallacious as regards its conclusiveness."

Such an argument as expressed in the form, 'The mountain is fiery: —therefore it mnst have smoke,' is called an Enthymeme, because here of the two premises of a regular syllogism only one is expressed and the other is suppressed in the mind (en thymō) of the speaker. When a fallacy occurs in an Enthymeme, it is very difficult to detect whether the fallacy is in the reasoning or it is a fallacy extra dictionem.

(55) "The fallacy of absurdity or badhita, is that where the negation of what is to be proved is established without doubt by another proof. If for example, one would say that, 'Fire is cold,

because it is a substance.9 Here the predicate of the conclusion, what is to be proved, is coldness, the negation of which, warmth, is apprehended by the organ of touch by one's own self. Hence the argument is called absurd.

"Thus ends the chapter on Inference."

Too general is a reason, which abides as well in the subject of the concusion as in an opposite one; subject of the conclusion (sapaksha) is, where the major term abides, for instance, if fire is the major, smoke the middle, a mountain or a hearth is the subject or the minor &c. A subject opposite to the conclusion (Vipaksha) is , where it does not abide;

for instance, in the example given above, a tank is a subject, opposite to the ccnclusion or the major term,

That is to say, the reason is too general, when it abides also in a subject, where the major term is not found. For instance, let a hearth be the subject or minor term; smoke the major term, and fire the reason, the conclusion would be: the hearth smokes, because it is fiery, which would be false, because it is too general; for fire, the reason, is also connected with other subjects, where there is no smoke, for instance, with an ignited iron ball.

This is not a logical fallacy, which takes place, when the conclusion does not follow from the premises but as a fallacey extra dictionem, where the matter of the permises is wrong; for the conclusion follows here from the premisses. In this instance the major proposition is wrong, which is : wherever there is fire there is smoke. The conclusion, however, is quite

right as well in form as in matter, and the example is therefore not judiciously selected. The fault would, however be apparent, if iron ball for instance had been taken for the minor term.

Non-general is the reason, which has no similar subjects of conclusion for the major term, that is where the major term has only one subject, or where no similar instances can be adduced for the reason.

Non-exclusive, is a reason, where the major term is the negation of absolute negation ie where the major term may be predicated of any other notion. Hereby a general negative is impossible and a conclusion therefore cannot take place.

A contradictory reason is one which does dot abide in the subject of conclusion or minor term, that is to say, a reason, whose negation is the major term or reason which is the contrary notion of the major term. Be cow the subject, the notion (class) of cow the major, and the notion of horse the middle term. Here the reason, the notion of the horse, excludes the major, the notion of cow, and therefore does not admit of an inference. Here the fault is in the reasoning, but the major premise is wrong; it is therefore a fallacy extra dictionem.

1. Inconclusiveness on the part of the subject is there, where the notion of the subject or the minor term, is impossible

For instance, if it should be inferred, that a golden-hill is fiery, the conclusion could not take place, because there is no such thing as a golden hill.

Here also the conclusion is not wrong, the fault lies in the minor premise, where the subject is a notion, not

D

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given by experience; and the fallacy is therefore one extra dictionem.

2. Ineonclusiveness from the nature of the reason or the middle term, takes place, if the reason is not found in the subject, with which a connexion was supposed if the reason and the subject exclude each other. Let it for instance be argued that a tank is a thing, because, it smokes. Tank or water in the tank, and smoke are contrary notions, and smoke therefore cannot be predicated of a tank.

Here also lies the fallacy in the minor premise. We observe, that the second kind of inconclusiveness does not correspond to the first. In the first the minor term, was contradictory, and we should therefore have expected, that in the second the reason would have been contradictory.

3. Inconclusiveness from limitation on the part of the invariable connexion with the predicate. This can be two-fold, on the part of the suject, and on the part of the predicate.

a. On the part of the predicate. This takes place if the predicate is a contradictory notion. For instance, if the inference were made, that the mountain has a golden fire, the notion of a golden fire, major term is contradictory.

Here the major premise is wrong,

b. Secondly on the part of the reason. This takes place, if the reason is contradictory, for instance, if the argument were 'the mountain is fiery from golden smoke.' The fault is here again in the major premise.

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Some say, that this kind takes place, if the terms are too narrow, as if it should be inferred that the mountain is fiery, because it has blue smoke.

IV. An equalised reason is the consideration of opposite reasons. An equalised reason takes place, if at the time of the consideration of a reason, invariably connected with the absence of the conclusion or the major term the consideration of a reason occurs with which the conclusion is invariably connected; as for instance, if at the time of consideration of water, &c. which is invariably connected with the absence of fire,there is a consideration of smoke invariably connected with fire.

V. Absurdity is, if a subject is without the conclusion, which is assigned to it.

Absurdity takes place, if the conclusion does not abide in the subject or minor term ; for instance, if at the time of the production of a jar, the jar is taken as the subject or minor term, and smell as the conclusion, there is an absurdity, because at the time of production there is no smell in a jar, &c. for all things are at that time without smell.

COMPARISON.

(56) " Comparison (upamāna) is the instrumental cause of the act of comparing (two or more things with one another from similarity). The act of comparing is the knowledge of the relation which exists between a name and a thing named. The cause of this is a knowledge of similarity. The recollection of the extension of the signification of a word by analogy is a step involved in the operation. As for instance a man not knowing what is signified by

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the word gavaya (Bos gavaeus), and having heard

from a forest-man that 'a gavaya is like a cow'

resorts to a forest, where having recollected the

meaning of the sentence told to him, he sees a body

like that of a cow. Then arises this act of compari-

son in his mind, that, 'this is what is meant by the

word gavaya.'

"Thus has comparison been explained."

The author then goes on to the chapter on Testi-

mony.

TESTIMONY.

(57) "A word is an assertion by one worthy of

trust. 'He is but called worthy of trust, who speaks

the truth. A sentence is a collection of significant

sounds; as for instance, 'Bring the cow.' A signi-

ficant sound or pada is that which has the power

to convey a certain meaning. 'This meaning is to

be understood from this significant sound' is the

will of God, which is called the convention or the

power."

(58) "Mutual correspondence, compatibilty, and

juxtaposition of the words are (unitedly) the cause

of the knowledge of the significance of a sentence."

These three requisites are elucidated below.

(59) "The reverse of a tendency to convey any

other than the intended connexion of one word with

another, is what is called the mutual correspondence

(akanksha). Compatability (yogyata) is nothing more

than the non-futility of the signification of a sen-

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tence. Juxtaposition (sannidhi) is the pronunciation

of words without long pause (between each)."

The want of the three requisites enumerated above

are examplified below.

(60) "A sentence or a collection af words wanting

in mutual correspondence, &c., is no valid sentence—

for instance, 'cow, horse, man, elephant,' gives no

proof, there being no mutual reference between

the words."

Akanksha literally means desiring for, or looking

after something. In the sentence : 'Dittha chandram

pasyati,' or 'Dittha (an individual) sees the moon,' here

the word 'Dittha' being in the nominative case, wants

a verb to regulate, which it finds in the word 'pasyati.'

Again the verb 'pasyati' requires an action to govern

which it finds in the word 'chandram,' similarly the

word 'chandram' requires a nominative and a verb

which it finds in 'Dittha' and 'pasyati.' Thus there is

a mutual correspondence between the three words,

'Dittha' 'chandram' and 'pasyati.' The author then

goes on to show 'that mutual correspondence alone is

not sufficient to make a sentence valid.

As for instance :-

(61) "The sentence 'He should irrigate with fire'

is not valid, as it is in want of compatibility (there

being no such thing between fire and irrigation,

water alone being compatible with irrigation.)"

This is an instance where though there is no want of

mutual correspondence or akanksha, yet the sentence is

not valid as there is no compatibility or yogyata between

fire and irrigation. The Author then shows how a sen-

ence may not be valid, though it may be complete as

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regards mutual correspondence and compatibility, if it

is in want of the juxtaposition of the words in it.

(62) "Words pronounced not close together but

at intervals of praharas (or two and half hours of

the solar day), such as 'Bring-the-cow' &c. form

no valid sentences, as there is a want of the juxtapo-

sition of the words."

This is an instance of the invalidity of a sentence

owing to the absence of juxtaposition of the words con-

stituting it, though it is valid as regards its mutual cor-

respondence and compatability.

(63) "Speech is of two kinds, divine (vaidika),

and human (laukika). What is called vaidika or

divine is authoritative as it is uttered by God. But

human or laukika speech, that is uttered by one

who deserves confidence, is alone authoritative;

other is not so."

(64) "The knowledge of the meaning of a sentence

is verbal knowledge (sabdabodha). Its special cause

is (the knowledge of) words. Thus is ascertained

what is called True Apprehension."

FALSE APPREHENSION.

(65) False apprehension is of three kinds, through

the division of doubt, mistake, and the fault of reductio

ad absurdum."

(66) "The recognition, in a thing possessing a

certain quality, of many contradictory qualities

as characterising it, is doubt or Sansaya. For

instance 'whether a post or a man.'"

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Darkness or insufficient light is the cause of this doubt.. When we do not come to a resolution, whether this is not a post, or this is not a man, and we confound the qualities of both in it, it is then called doubt.

(67) "False knowledge is mistake or viparyaya. For instance, the knowledge of silver in a pearl-shell."

(68) "Reductio ad absurdum or tarka is that which consists in founding the pervader (here supposed to be denied) through the allegation of the pervaded (here supposed to be taken for granted). As for instance, 'If there were not fire (which you do not grant), then there would not be smoke (which you admit there is).'"

(69) "Memory is also two-fold, true and false. True memory is that which arises from true apprehension. False memory is that which arises from false apprehension."

The author having exhausted the subject of Intellect, hurries on to the remaining qualities of pleasure pain, &c.

(70) "That is called pleasure or sukham which is agreeable to the perception of all ; likewise that is called pain or dukham which is disagreeable (to the preception of all)."

(71) "Desire or ichchha means wishing. Aversion or dwesha means wishing-ill-of. Effort (prayatna) means action."

(72) "Virtue or merit (dharma) arises from the performance of what is enjoined ; but what is called vice or demerit (adharma) is that which arises from the perpetration of what is prohibited."

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(73) "The eight qualities, commencing from intellect, are the specific qualities of soul alone."

(74) "Intellect, desire, and effort, are of two kinds eternal and non-eternal or transient. These are eternal when they belong to God, and non-eternal or transient when they appertain to mortals."

(75) "Faculty is of three kinds, velocity, thought, and elasticity. Velocity or vega abides in the four substances beginning with Earth and in mind. Thought or bhavana which arises from perception and is the cause of memory, exists in soul alone. Elasticity or sthitisthapaka is the restorer to former position, of a thing whose position has been changed, and is a quality that abides in mats and such other substances formed of earthly elements."

"Thus ends the chapter on the Qualities."

The author then goes on to the category of Action.

ACTION.

(76) "Action consists in motion."

Casting upward or utksepana is the cause of a contact with the higher region. Casting downwards or apakshepana is the cause of contact with a lower region. Contraction or akunchana is the cause of the close contact with what is near to the body. Dilation or prasarana is the cause of the close contact with what is distant. Every thing else is called going or gamana. Action exists in the four substances beginning from the earth and in the mind."

The author then proceeds to the category of genus or generality.

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GENUS OR GENERALITY.

GENUS OR GENERALITY.

(77) "Genus or Genrality (samanya) is eternal, one and belonging to many, and abiding in Substance, Quality, and Action. It is two-fold, higher and lower. The highest degree of genus or generality or the Summum genus is existence. The lower degree is called the species or jati, such as is substantiality or the common nature of what are called substances."

Of the two para and apara, para is that which is more extensive and therefore is called the Genus; and apara is less extensive and therefore is called the species

The author then goes on to the category of Particularity.

PARTICULARITY.

PARTICULARITY.

(78) "Particularities or viseshas are existent in, eternal substances and are such that they exclude (the eternal substances) from each other."

Eternal substances are 1. mind, 2 soul, 3 time, 4 space 5 ether ; and 6 the atoms of earth, water, and air. Then comes the category of Intimate Relation.

INTIMATE RELATION.

INTIMATE RELATION.

(79) "Intimate relation or samavaya is eternal connexion. It abides in things which can not exist separately. Two things which can not exist separately are those, of which two, one exists as absorbed in the other. Such pairs are, parts and whole composed of those parts, qualities and the thing qualified, action and actor, species and individual, particularity and eternal substances."

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At last the author comes to the last of the categories ie negation or non-existence.

NEGATION.

(80) "It is of various sorts. Antecedent negation or pragabhāva is without beginning, but has a termination. Such is the negation of an action before it is produced. Destruction or pradhwansa has a beginning, but no termination. Such is the negation of an action subsequent to its production. Absolute negation or atyantabhāva is the counterpart of what is distinguished by union during the three times past, present and future. As for example, 'There is no jar on the ground.' Mutial negation or anyonyabhava is the counterpart of what is distinguished by union with identy. As for instance. 'A jar cannot be cloth.'

(81) "Since every thing is included under the categories enumerated, categories are therefore ascertained to be seven alone."

The author concludes with the following couplet:-

(82) "These logical and philosophical aphorisoms were composed by the learned Anna Bhatta, in order to clear the understanding of juvinile students as regards the opinions of Kanada and of Nayaya."

Gotama is the founder of nyaya or logic ; and kanada is the founder of the system of philosophy called vaishika.

"Thus is the Tarka Sangraha finished."

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तर्कसंग्रहः

२। निःश्रेयसिद्धि विशेषं विधाय गुरुवन्दनम् । वाचां तु खलुनीघाय क्रियते तर्कसंग्रहः ॥

९ । द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावा सप्तपदार्थाः ।

३ । तत्र द्रव्याणि पृथिव्यप्तेजो वाय्वाकाशा- शदिगात्ममनांसि नवैव ।

४ । रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वैकत्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहसंस्कार- शब्दः पक्चदशधा:शब्दो नित्योऽनित्यश्चेति धर्मीधर्मिसंकरात् ।

५ । उत्क्षेपणावक्षेपणाकुचनप्रसारणागमनानि पश्चैव कर्माणि ।

६ । परमपरसाम्यं सामान्यम् । नित्यत्वाविशेषेऽपि विशेषसत्त्वेन सामान्यसत्त्वं विरुध्यते इति ।

२

तर्कसंग्रहः।

७। षभावाय स्वीक एव।

sभावस्वरूपविविधः प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावौड्य-

त्तभावोऽन्योन्याभावश्चेति।

८। तत्र गगनवती पृथिवी वा द्विविधा नित्या

sनित्याचैति नित्या परमाणुरूपा। sनित्या कार्य

रूपा। sा पुनस्त्रिविधा शरीरेंद्रियविषयभेदात्।

शरीरमसदादीनां द्रव्यं गंधवदकं शरार्ति

तच्चनाशापवर्गी विषयेऽत्यपाणादिः।

९। प्रीतिसुखवत्य् ऽापः।

तास्स द्विविधा नित्या sनित्याश्च। नित्याः पर-

माणुरूपाः। sनित्याः कार्यरूपाः। ताः पुन-

त्रिविधाः शरीरेंद्रियविषयभेदात्। शरीरं

वरुणलोके। इंद्रियं रसग्राहकं रसं तच्च-

जिह्वायवच्चे। विषयः शरित्समुद्रादिः॥

१०। उष्णातेजस्तज्जः।

तदूिविधं नित्यमनित्यं वा। नित्यं परमाणुरूपम् sनित्यं कार्यरूपम्

पुनस्त्रिविधं शरीरेंद्रियविषयभेदात्। शरीर-मादित्यबोक्र प्रस्थितम्। इंद्रियं रूपग्राहकं चक्षु-

स्तच्च रूपात्ताराग्रवर्ति। विषयस्तुरूपे बौम-दिगादिदिग्व्यापारमेदात्। ममि चक्षुरादिकम्।

तर्कसंग्रहः

प्रविष्टं दिव्यं विशिष्टादि। भुक्तात्मे पञ्चामरादेतुरादयम्। आकारजं तुवर्यादि।

११। उपरचितसर्पवात्वायुः। स द्विविधे नित्यनियतस्व। नित्यः परमपुरुषप्रेरितनियतस्व कार्यरूपः। पुनःस्विविधः शरीरेंद्रियविषयभेदात्। शरीरं वायुलोके। इन्द्रियं स्पर्शप्रपञ्चकं त्वक्‍‌ सर्वशरीरवर्ति। विषयो बुद्धादिकल्पनभेतुः ॥

१२। शरीरान्तः सचारी वायुः प्राणः स चैकादशप्रकारभेदात्त्रयः प्राणादिसंश्र्चा जभते ॥

१३। बहिर्गुणसमवायां नचैकं विभु नित्यञ्च। अनित्यादिकञ्चार्चतेतुः कालः स चैकः विभुर्नित्यस्व।

१४। प्राच्यादिदिग्व्यवहारचेतुर्दिक् वाचिका नित्या विभो च ।

१५। ज्ञानाधिकारस्थात्मा। स द्विविधे जीवात्मा परमात्मान्त। तत्रेश्वरः सर्वज्ञः परमात्मैक एव सुखदुःखादिरचितः। जीवात्मा प्रतिबिम्बो विभुनित्यस्व ।

१६। महदःखाद्यपर्यन्तविश्वाभासप्रतिनियं मनः।

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तत्र प्रत्यात्मनियतत्वादनित्यं परमाणुद्रव्य नित्यञ्च।

१७। ग्रय गुणः।

चतुर्मान्चतुर्ग्राण्वो गुणो द्वपरम् । तच्च घ्रकनीयरक्तचित्रकपिशाचित्रभेदात् षड्विधं पृथिवी-

बीजतेजोरुक्तिः। तच्च पृथिव्यां सर्वविधम्।

चपाङ्करं एकं जले। पाकजरं एककञ्च ने-

द्बि।

१८। रसनयाश्रयो गुणो रसः। स च मधुराद्यष्ट-

कटुकषायत्वन्तभेदात् षड्विधः पृथिवीज-

वृत्तिः । पृथिव्यां षड्विधो जले मधुर एव ।

१९। ग्राघ्रयाश्रयो गुणो गन्धः। स च द्विविधः

घ्ररभिरसुराभिस् पृथिवीमात्रवृत्तिः ।

२०। त्वगिन्द्रियमानयाश्रयो गुणः स्पर्शः। स च

त्रिविधः शीतोष्णानुष्णाशीतभेदात् । पृथिव्यज-

लवायुवृत्तिः । तत्र शीते जले। उभयत्तेऽपि ।

मनुष्याधीनः पृथिवीवायोः।

२१। द्विपादिचतुष्पदं पृथिव्यां पाकजनित्यञ्च ।

अन्यच्चापाकजं नित्यमनित्यञ्च। नित्यगतं नि-

त्यम् । अनित्यगतमानित्यम्।

२२ । एकादिव्यवहाराधारश्चेतुःसंख्या । सा नवद्रव्यवृत्तिः। एकादिपरार्द्धपर्यन्ता । एकत्वनित्यमनित्यञ्च नित्यगतविल्यमनित्य- गतमनित्यम् । द्रव्यादिकञ्च सर्वञ्च नित्यमेव ।

२३। मानव्यवहाराधारं कारणं परिमाणं नवद्रव्यवृत्तिः । तच्च चतुर्विधं न्रशु मष्टदू- द्वर्ष दृख्यते ।

२४ । पृथग्व्यवहाराधारं कारणं पृथक्त्वं सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ।

२५ । संयुक्तव्यवहाराधारश्चेतुः संयोगः सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ।

२६ । संयोगनाशकेषु गुणो विभागः सर्वद्रव्य- वृत्तिः । परापरव्यवहाराधारकारकञ्च परत्वाप- रत्वे । प्रथियादिषु चतुर्ष्वमनोऽप्रत्यक्षिणी ते द्विविधे दिकूले कालकते च । दुरस्थे दिकृतमपरत्वं समीपस्थे दिकृतमपरत्वम् । ज्येष्ठे कालकृतम् परत्वं कनिष्ठे कालकृतमपरत्वम् ।

२७ । श्राचपतनादनमवायिकारणं गुरुत्वं पृथि- वीजलवृत्तिः ।

तर्कसंग्रह:

२८। आद्यन्वयादन्यमवायिकारणं द्रव्यं पृथिव्यप्तेजोवृत्ति:। तद्विविधं सांभविकं नैमित्तिकं च। सांभविकं जले। नैमित्तिकं पृथिवीतेजसो:। पृथिव्यां घृताढ़ते: स्रग्रिसंयोगजं द्रव्यम्।

२९। चूर्णादिपिण्डीभावश्चेतुर्गुण: द्रेशो जल-मानवृत्ति:।

३०। श्रोनयोराच्चेो गुण:शब्द आकाशमात्रवृत्ति:। स द्विविधोध्वनात्मको वर्णात्मकश्चेति। ध्वन्यात्मक: सैर्यादि:। वर्णात्मक:सङ्क्ष्षत भाषादिरूप:।

३१। सर्वव्यवहारचेतुरुड्‌डि‌ज्ञ्जानम्। ता द्विविधा स्मृतिरनुभवश्च। संस्कारमात्रजन्यं ज्ञानं स्मृति:। लक्‍डि‌लं ज्ञानमनुभव:। स द्विधे यथार्थाऽयथार्थश्च।

३२। तदति तत्मकारकानुभवे यथार्थ: यथा रजते रदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम्। सैव प्रमेत्यच्यते। तदभाववति तत्मकारको ऽनुभवो ऽयथार्थ:। यथा शुक्तिकादि‌ं रजतमित्यादि ज्ञानिम्।

तर्कसंग्रहः।

३३। यथार्थानुभवस्तुर्विधः प्रत्यक्षानुमित्यप-मितिप्राब्दभेदात्। तत्करणमपि चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दभेदात्।

३४। व्यापारवदसाधारणं कारणं करणम्। अन्यथासिद्धिकार्यनियतपूर्ववृत्तिः कारणम्। कार्ये प्रागभावप्रतियोगी।

३५। कारणं त्रिविधं समवायिसमवायिनिमित्त-भेदात्। यस्मिन्वेते कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत्समवायि कारणं यथा तन्तवः पटस्य, पटस्य स्वगतपादे:। कार्येण कारणेन वा सदैकरूपत्वे सति कारणं असमवायि कारणं यथा तन्तुसंयोगःपटस्य, तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्य। तदुभयभिन्नं कारणं निमित्तकारणं यथा तुरीयादीतकं पटस्य। तदेतत्त्रिविधकारणमध्ये यद्व्यापारवदसाधारणं कारणं तदेव करणम्।

३६। तत्र प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणं प्रत्यक्षम्। इन्द्रियार्थ-सन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्। नतु दिव्यं निर्विकल्पकं सविकल्पकम्। नत् निष्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं निर्विकल्पकम्। यथा इदं किंचित्तु द्रव्यम्

तर्कसंग्रहः

प्रकारकं चानं सविकल्पकम्। यथा डिट्ठे-डयम्। ज्ञाख्खो डयम्। घ्यामो डयमिति।

१७। प्रत्यक्षज्ञानषेतुरिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षः षट्त्विधः संयोगः, संयुक्तसमवायः, संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः, समवायः, समवेतसमवायः, विशेषणविशेष्यभावः इति। चक्षुषा घटप्रत्यक्ष-

जने संयोगः सन्निकर्षः;, घटरूपप्रत्यक्षजने संयुक्तसमवायः सन्निकर्षः;, चक्षुःसंयुक्त घटे रूपस्य समवायात्। रूपत्वसामान्यप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः सन्निकर्षः;, चक्षुःसंयुक्ते

घटे रूपं समवेतं तत्र रूपत्वस्य समवायात्। श्रोत्रे ऽपि शब्दप्रत्यक्षे समवायः सन्निकर्षः;, कर्णविवरद्रव्याकाम्रस्य श्रोत्रत्वात् शब्द खा-

काशगुणत्वात् गुङ्गुणानां च समवायात्। शब्दत्वसामान्यप्रत्यक्षे समवेतसमवायः सन्निकर्षः;, श्रोत्रसमवेत षब्दे शब्दत्वस्य समवायात्। ऽप्रत्यक्षे विशेषणविशेष्यभावः सन्निकर्षः;, घट-

भाववृत्तित्वादित्यत्र चक्षुःसंयुक्ते घटत्वे घट-त्वाभाववृत्तित्वादित्यत्र चक्षुःसंयुक्त घटाभावत्वे विशेष्यविशेषभावात्। एवं षड्विधः सन्निकर्षः।

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तर्कसंग्रहः

मानं प्रत्यक्षम् । तत्करणं इन्द्रियं तत्रादि इन्द्रियं प्रत्यक्षप्रमा णमिति सिद्धम् ।

३५ । अनुमितिकर णमनुमानम् । परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः । व्याप्यविशिष्टपक्षधर्मता न्वयव्याप्ति स्मरणं परामर्शः । यथा वन्हिव्याप्तधूमवान् य पर्वतो धूमवानिति ज्ञानं परामर्शः । तज्जन्यं पर्वते वह्निमानिति ज्ञानमनुमितिः । यत्र यत्र धूमस्त तत्र तत्र वह्निरिति व्याप्तिः । व्यापकस

३६ । अनुमानं द्विविधं स्वार्थं परार्थं च । स्वार्थानुमितिहेतुः । तयादि । स्वयमेव भवेदर्शनेन यत्न धूमस्तद्व्याप्ति स्मरणादेः व्याप्यो गृहीलो पर्वतस्तद्वान् इति स्वदिच्छानः पर्वते धूमं पश्यन् व्याप्तिं स्मरति यश्च धूमस्तद्व्याप्तवह्नि वानिति मत्वा

४७ । लिङ्गं लिङ्गिप्रामिदर्शनं परामर्श इष्यते ।

तर्कसंग्रहः

९०

यितुं पश्चाद्वयववाक्यं प्रयुज्य तत्रारथानुमानम्। यथा पर्वतो वन्हिमान् धूमवत्त्वात्। ये ये धूमवान् स वन्हिमान् यथा महानसः। तथात्वात्प्रत्येतি। अन्येन प्रतिपादिताऽर्थे जीयं प्रतिपत्तुते।

४१। प्रत्यक्षाद् द्वादशरपौपन निगमनानि पश्चावयवा:। पर्वतो वन्हिमानिति प्रतिज्ञा। धूमवत्त्वादिति हेतुः। ये ये धूमवन्तोऽपैर्-

पाम्। तथात्वाचायमित्युपनयः। तथासत्येतिनिगमनम्॥

४२। स्वार्थानुमितिपरार्थानुमितौ चाऽर्थज्ञप्तपरामर्श-

एत्र करणं महासाङ्ख्यैः।

४३। विशिष्टं ज्ञानमनुमितिरेकि, केवलान्विकेवलव्यतिरेकि चेति। अन्ययेन व्याप्तिरिकोऽपि, व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिरिकोऽपि, यत्र वाक् साध्यो धूम-

वत्त्वादिति तत्र धूमस्ताचाप्रियेथा महानस इव्यतिरे-

कव्याप्तिः। यत्र वन्हिनैकति तत्र धूमो नास्ति यथा कुड्यादिति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः। अन्वय-

व्याप्तिकं केवलान्वयि यथा कटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात् परवत्। यत्र प्रमेयत्वाभिसेवन-

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सर्षपंचपः।

तिरेकव्याप्तिनैक्‍त सर्वस्य प्रमेयत्वादिघेयत्‍वाच्‍च। व्यतिरेकमाचव्याप्तिर् केवलव्यतिरेकि। यथा पृथिवीतिरेकव्यो भिद्यते गच्‍छवत्‍त्। यद्‌-

तरेभ्यो न भिद्यते न तद्‌गतस्‍वत् यथा जडम्। न चायं तथाऽ। तस्‍मान्नतर्थेति। यत्र यज्ञ न्वषत्-

द्रराभिन्नमित्यये हेताव्‍तो नाद्‌ति पृथिवी मानस्य पच्‍छत्‍वात्।

४४। सन्‍दिग्धसाध्‍यानपच्‍छः। यथा भूमवत् स्‍तेतै पच्‍छत। निश्‍चितसाध्‍यवान् सपच्‍छः। यथा

तदेव मच्‍छानसः। निश्‍चितसाध्‍याभाववान् विपच्‍छः। यथा तदेव मच्‍छाच्‍छुदः।

४५। सव्यभिचारविरुढोऽसत्‍पतिपच्‍छाविच्छबाधितः पच्‍छ चेत्‍नाभासः।

४६। सव्यभिचारी डनैकान्तिकः। सत्रिविधःवासाधारणप्‍वाधारभावानुपपच्‍चारमदात। तच्‍च सा-

ध्याभाववृत्तिः साधारणे डनैकान्तिकः। यथा पच्‍वते वन्हिमान् प्रमेयत्‍वादिमि प्रमेयतच्‍छ

वह्यभाववति दृढे विद्यमानत्‍वात।

४७। सर्वेसपचविपचव्यावृत्तोडसाधारणे। यथा ग्राद्‌धे। नित्यः स्‍वप्रकाशि भास्‍कत्‍वात् स्‍वच्‍छो

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१२

तर्कसंग्रहः ।

नित्येभ्योऽनित्येभ्यो व्यावृत्तं सद्धर्मान्वितः ।

अन्यव्यतिरेकदष्टान्तराऽस्तेऽनुपपत्तिरो यथा

सर्वेऽनित्यः ' प्रमेयत्वादिति । यच्च सर्वेऽपि

पक्षत्वात् दृष्टान्तो नाक्ति ।

४४। साध्याभावव्याप्यो हेतुर्विरुद्धः । यथा'पद्ये

नित्यः कृतकत्वादिति । कृतकत्वं चि नित्यत्वा-

भावेनानित्येन व्याप्तम् ।

४५। साध्याभावसाधकं हेतुर्न्तरं यस्याःसन्नि-

पक्षः । यथा शब्दे नित्यः श्रावणत्वात् सद्‌त्व-

दिति । सद्देऽनित्यः कार्यत्वात् घटवदिति ।

५० । प्रकृतिहेत्वविघः । यत्प्रकृत्यसिद्धः

स्वरूपव्याप्तत्वाऽसिद्धःवेति ।

५१ । अप्रसिद्धो यथा गगनारविन्दं सुरभि

पारविन्दत्वात् । शरोजारविन्दवत् । यच्च

गगनारविन्दमाश्रयः स च नास्त्येव ।

५२ । स्वरूपासिद्धो यथा शब्दो गुङस्साधुषत्वात् ।

यच्च चाक्षुषत्वंशब्दे नाक्ति शब्दस्य श्रावणत्वात् ।

तोपाधिको हेतुर्याऽप्यलाऽसिद्धः । साध्यव्याप-

कत्वे सति साधनाऽव्यापक उपाधिः ।

५३ । साध्यसमानाधिकरणतया

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वृक्षसंघ्रहः

गत्वं साध्यव्यापकम् । साधनत्रयसिद्धावन्या-

भावप्रतिबोधित्त्वं साधनान्याप्यकतुम् ।

५४। पर्वते धूमवान् वह्निमत्त्वादिकार्य-

देशनसंयोगे साध्याभि। तथासति तत्र धूम-

संसर्गे हेतुसाध्यसापकता । यत्र वृक्षत्वादेर्नसंयोगे नास्ति प्रयोजकत्वे

वृक्षत्वादेर्नसंयोगे भावादिति साधनाव्यापकता॥

एवं साध्यव्यापकत्वं सति साधनाव्यापकत्वाद्-

देशनसंयोग उपाधिः। सोपाधिकत्वादिहिमत्व-

व्याप्तत्वाभिधानम् ।

५५। यत्र साध्याभावः प्रमाणान्तरेपि निष्-

तेः सः वाधितः। यथा वन्हिरनुष्णो ह्रव्य-

लादिति। प्रत्यक्षानुष्णत्वं साध्यं तदभाव उ-

ष्ण्यस्पर्शेन प्रत्यक्षेण युक्त्या नेति वाधितत्वं

व्याख्यातमनुमानम् ॥

५६। उपमितिकरणमुपमानम् । संज्ञासंज्ञि-

सम्बन्धज्ञानमुपमितिः । तत्करणं साध्यसम-

नम् । ज्ञातदेशवाक्यार्थकथनरव्यानरव्य-

पारः । तथाहि गवयशब्दवाच्यसज्ञानं कुम-

विदारण्यकपुरुषाद्देशे गवयत्वानि

१४

तर्कसंग्रहः

श्रुत्वा वचं गते वाक्यार्थे सरणगोचरत्वापि नात् । पर्याति तदनन्तरं श्रद्धा गवयसदृशकार्यतुप्रतिसन्धाने ।। व्याप्त्याद्युपमानम् ।।

४९। श्राप्तिश्च यथार्थवत्ता । वाक्यं पदसमूहः । यथा गामानयेतिसामर्थ्यम् । शक्तं पदम् । श्राप्तिश्रदाद्वयं बोध्यं र्ति ईश्वरेच्छा संकेतः । शक्तिः ।

५०। श्राकाङ्क्षा योग्यता सन्निधिश्च वाक्यार्थ-श्रवणात् ।

पदस्य पदान्तरव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तोऽर्थ-मनुभावकत्वमाकाङ्क्षा । यथोभाषो योग्यता । पदाना मविच्छेदेनोच्चारणं सन्निधिः ।

६०। श्राकाङ्क्षादिरक्षितं वाक्यमप्रमाणं यथा गैतमुख्यगच्छोति न प्रमाणमाकाङ्क्षाविर-धात् ।।

६१। श्रद्धिना शिष्यदिति न प्रमाणं योग्यता-विरध्दात् ।

६२। प्रश्टरे प्रश्टरे श्रुतिसंप्रतिपत्तान्न गामा-नयेत्यादिपदानि न प्रमाणं सान्निध्याभावात् ।

६३। वाक्यं विधिधं वैदिकं लौकिकं च । वैदि-

तर्कसंग्रहः

१४

कामोऽरेकान्तानैकान्तिकं प्रमाणम् । ऐकान्तिकत्वेऽनैकान्तिकत्वमनैकान्तिकम् ।

६४ । वाक्यार्थज्ञानं नाम्नज्ञानं तर्कार्पणं न तःः ।

इति न्यायामृताभ्यो निकषोपलः ।

६५ । वाक्यार्थोऽनुमितेर्विषयः । संप्रतिपत्त्यर्थ-

वाक्यं श्रवणम् ।

६६ । रकाजन्यन्यायेन विवादनागाममेवैष्य-

द्वादिक्रियानं व्यत्यक् । यद्यस्य साधर्मा पुष्टो

वेष्टि ।

६७ । मिथ्याज्ञानं विपरीतक् । यथा घृताविदं

रजतमिति ।

६८ । वाक्यार्थसेषे व्यापकत्वारोपकः । यथा

यद् वाक्ये रसासिद्धिं भूम्नोडपि न साधिति ।

६९ । कृतिरपि द्विधा शास्त्रायां कद्यायामेव ।

प्रामाण्या यथार्या । शामज्ञानाड्यसमया ।

७० । सर्वेषामनुकूलवेदतुरीयं चासम् । प्रति-

कूलवेदतुरीयं दुःखम् ।

७१ । इच्छा कामः । क्रोधो रोषः । इति मदनः ।

७२ । विधिनाज्ञेयो धर्मः + । निषिद्धकर्मज-

न्यस्स धर्मः ।

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३६

तर्कसंग्रहः

०३। बुद्धिराद्योऽष्टाविधस्तु प्रमाणविभागः।

०४। बुद्धीष्टविषयकत्वाद् द्विविधा निःश्रेयसपरा-

प्सिद्धिः। सक्रिया असक्रिया इति जीवधर्मः॥

३५। संस्कारादिस्वसिद्धौ तत्रैव भावनाख्यो-

त्प्रत्यक्षादिरूपत्वेनैव तु प्रत्ययम-

नुभवजन्या स्मृतिर् धर्माधर्माख्या-

त्मानवधारणात्। श्रेयोऽशेयोभयाख्य-

दुःखापात्त्वादृष्टिरूपत्वाच् चतुर्धा तद्-

वृत्तिः। इतिक गुणाः॥

३६। चक्षुरादीनि चक्षुः।

जडत्वे सति संयोगे सति चाक्षुषत्वात्।

प्रधाने प्र-

संयोगादेतु स चैकेषाम्।

समस्तस्संयोग-

देहैककर्म्मन्।

विप्रकृष्टसंयोगे तुःप्रच-

रसं प्रत्यन कर्तृ गमनं मनसो न-

त्वष्टमनोव्यापृतत्वात्॥

३७। नित्येषु कर्म्मणेकर्म्मुगतं सामान्यं द्रव्य-

गुणकर्म्मवृत्ति। तद् द्विविधं प्रथमा-

परत्वभेदात्। परं सत्ता।

अपपरं जातिर् द्रव्यादिः॥

३८। नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तिसंयोगे सति कार्य्यते-

क् विशेषः॥

३९। नित्यसम्बन्धः समवायः

तर्कसंग्रहः

वृत्तिः। ययोदयोरमध्ये एकमपराश्रितनिवावतिष्ठते तावायुतसिद्धौ। ज्ञवयवावयविनौ गुणगुणिनौ क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ जातिव्यक्ती विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये च वृत्तिः॥

८०। ज्ञानादिः स्वान्तः प्रागभावः उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं कार्यस्य सदिरनन्तः प्रध्वंसः उत्पत्न्यनन्तरं कार्यस्य। वैकालिकसंयोगावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिकोडत्यन्ताभावः। या भूतले घटो नास्तीति। तादात्म्यसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगितावच्छिन्नाभावः। यथा घटः पटो न भवतीति॥

८१। सर्वेषां पदार्थानां यथायथमुक्तेष्वन्तर्भावात्त्वप्येव पदार्था इति सिद्धम्॥

८२। कपादनन्यायमन्यावालव्युत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गौ। अन्नभट्टेन विदुषा रचितस्तर्कसंग्रहः॥

इति श्रीतर्कसंग्रहः समाप्तः॥

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