10. CHAPTER FIVE.

CHAPTER FIVE.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF RASA. 1. Rasa-Its Nature and Process of Realization. The literary Rasa is generally asserted to be of relishable or delectable nature. The reference to Rasa in the Upanisad runs, 'Verily it is Rasa ; he becomes all bliss on getting it.'1 Its attainment making one all bliss suggests its being of blissful nature. Bharata's description gives it as pleasure- giving and the analogy of relish is to be found in the pleasure experienced on tasting food dressed with various spices.2 He, thus, implicitly accepts on the basis of the above analogy the relishable nature of Rasas as the Karuna etc. as his word, 'Nānāvyañjanasamskrta' expressly means the various kinds of edibles as the sweet, the sour, the bitter etc. The Nātyaśāstra unlike later authorities does not dilate on the blissful nature of Rasa, yet the author furnishes only in hints and suggestions what later on was given a clear exposition by Abhinava. Bhāmaha recognized in hints the relishable nature of Rasa (Svādukāvyarasonmiśra).3 Daņdin admitted the relishable nature of Rasa4 and allied himself with Bhatta Lollata in the realization of Rasa5 but gave this process only in suggestions.6 Vämana accepted that Rasa had a sort of brilliance,7 thus hinting at the delectable nature of Rasa. The Agnipurana derives the Rati from the Ānanda of

1. T. Up. II. 71. 2. N. S. (K. S. S. ) VI. p. 71. 3. K. L. V. 3. 4. K. D. I. 51. 5. Ibid. II. 281-283. 6. Ibid. 7. K. L. S. III. 2. 15.

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Brahman,1 thus expressing Rasa as all bliss. It is, however, Rudrabhatta's Rasakalikā quoted by Raghavan2 that recogni- zes the division of Rasas into pleasurable and painful. Bhatța Lollața explains the realization of Rasa as a matter of superimposition ; how far this knwoledge is pleasure- giving has been seen before. Śrī Śankuka explained it as a matter of inference which could hardly satisfy the aesthetic standpoint. It is in Bhatta Nāyaka that the pleasurable nature of Rasa can be seen in its process of realization. The function called the Bhävakatva is according to him res- ponsible for only presenting things in their universalized aspects devoid of their particular characteristics. He, there- fore, postulates one more function called the Bhojakatva. Through this function Rasa which is different from memory etc. is enjoyed in the mind when it expands and blooms due to the predominance of the Sattva over the Rajas and the Tamas which, therefore, get suppressed. The mind is in equipoise and the self-consciousness is here all light and bliss. The bliss of Rasa is of the nature of the bliss called the Brahmänanada but the two are not the same.3 This theory is obviously influenced by the doctrines of the Sānkhya philosophy, though the influence is not traceable in all respects as the theory is an attempt to explain pleasure in the field of Aesthetics. In the Sankhya system the evolution from the Prakrti takes place for Bhoga of the Prakrti and through it for the attainment of Kaivalya by means of dis- criminatory knwoledge of the Purusa. The three Gunas in a state of equilibrium constitute the Prakrti and evolution starts when this equilibrium is disturbed due to Karma by

1. A. P. 338. 1-5. 2. R. N. R. p. 155. 3. N. S. (G. O. S.) VI. pp. 278-279.

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the proximity of the Purusa. The whole creation comes into being as a result of this evolution. It exists only so long as the Purusa considers himself identified with the Prakrti. When discriminatory knowledge ( Tattvajñāna ) is attained the creation dissolves. And the Purusa ( soul) attains libera- tion ( Kaivalya ). The true knower ( Tattvajñānī) at that time is in a state where there is complete detachment from pleasure and pain. His egoistic impulses are got rid of from the Buddhi which is transcended. All this is brought about through the predominance of the Sattva Guna which also disappears in the end. According to the interpretation of Bhatta Nāyaka put on the Rasasūtra of Bharata the mind of the spectator is dissociated from all personal and particular interests as the Bhävakatva presents things in their generalized forms. The result is the Viśrānti consequent on the pre- dominance of the Sattva, but this detachment is not com- plete and lasting as it is only a temporary relief from personal troubles. The Buddhi here is not transcended for good and the person does not become Jīvanmukta. Therefore he is led to Bhoga. The condition at this time though obviously of pleasure is not one detached from either pleasure or pain as in the Sānkhya system. This interpretation of the aesthetic pleasure unnecessarily postulates two functions, the Bhävakatva and the Bhojakatva, as shown previously. Explained in the light of the principles of the Sänkhya system the Väsanās of the true knower either get purged or become useless and hence cannot be realized as Rasa. Again it is difficult according to the fundamental principles of this system to explain Rasa as experienced in the Nātya. This will become clear when the consideration of Rasa is made in connection with the Nātya. The Yogamālāsamhitā view which has already been described in connection with the

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origin of different Rasas isakin in some respects to the Sānkhya view. It is, therefore, in the interpretation of Abhinava that the delectable nature of Rasa and its realization in its satisfac- tory aspect is to be seen. Abhinava was a Kāśmīrian Śaivaite belonging to the Pratyabhijñā school of the Śaiva philosophy. This system believes in the existence of one Supreme Being who is Parameśvara, the Great Lord. His mere will is sufficient for the creation of this universe as no sooner does He wish to create than the Sakti appears. Then follow other elements. He does not need any material to work with.1 He has two aspects : the Viśvottīrna and the Viśvātmaka. The latter aspect is permeating every object in this creation. Siva binds Himself with various bonds, restrictions and limitations though all these are His forms and comes to be called the Pasu otherwise called the Purușa. It is due to this fact that Siva in His Viśvottīrņa aspect is called the Pasupati. He is the consciousness itself other- wise known as the bliss in which no sequence is perceptible (Akramānandachidrūpaḥ Pramātā Sa Maheśvara).2 He is the illuminator of all the objects in this world which are the manifestations of His own intrinsic power. These objects appear diverse due to diversity of tints in them as the words run, 'Vivrtam Chabhinavavaguptacharyaih. Tameva Bhāntamanubhāti Sarvam Tasya Bhāsā Sarvamidam Vibhāti (Ka 2/2) Iti Srutyā Prakāśachidrūpamahimnā Sarvasya Bhāvajātasya Bhāsakatvamabhyupeyate. Tataścha Vișaya- prakāśasya Nīlaprakāśaḥ Pītaprakāśa Iti Vișayoparāga- bhedad Bhedah.'3 According to the Pratyabhijna system, therefore, the Purusa is only in need of recognition of his

1. S. D. S. Lines. 1-2. p. 199 2. Ibid. Line. 72. p. 195. 3. S. D. S. Lines. 80-83. p. 196.

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former self having the perfection of Maheśvara in omniscience, omnipotence etc. He transcends such limitations as the Kalā, the Vidyā, the Rāga, the Kāla and the Niyati-the five sheaths (Kañchukas) as they are called as they cover the true nature of Parameśvara ( though by His own will ). When he has recognized his true self he is at one with Parameśvara ( Samarasa ), and it is at this stage that perfect bliss is experienced. Abhinava's affinities towards the Pratyabhijñā system were sure to be reflected in his ex- planation of the Rasasutra of Bharata. That Rasa is the highest bliss in literature without its sequence being realized in poetry or dramatic performance after the representation of the Vibhavas etc. has unequivocal reference to Parameś- vara who is Akramānandachidrūpa. When the Purușa has realized his identity with Parameśvara, the question of one Purușa being friend, another enemy and the third indifferent does not arise. It is due to this that in the Samarasa stage the particularities and special characteristics lose their particular references and exclusive restrictions and appear in general and universal aspects. At that time the all blissful aspect of Parameśvara is realized in full by the Purușa who feels himself as one with Him. At this stage he feels I am Parameśvara' and therefore does not become Bhāvātīta, above the different powers, as the attributes of Parameśvara as the Chit, the Ananada, the Ichchha, the Jñana and the Kriyā are realized as his own attributes. Any other cogni- tion, therefore, gets suppressed by this bliss. This blissful aspect of the Purusa is not something produced as it already exists in a concealed state. These Purușas appear diverse because of their individual diversities. The earthly counter- part of this pleasure is to be realized at the recital of the poetic piece or the dramatic representation where the Vibhāvas

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etc. become generalized and universalized. The reader or the spectator has his latent emotions ( Bhavas ) aroused and he is transported to the all blissful state wherein personal differences and peculiarities are lost. This state, however, is not permanent but exists so long as the Vibhāvas etc. are cherished ( Charvyamāņataikaprāņa ),1 all the factors being realized not separately but together on the analogy of the beverage. The pleasurable state is, therefore, equated with Rasa. Rasa is fundamentally one but is enjoyed as different due to the difference of the Sthāyibhavas which in their turn have got their psychological basis. The com- parison of this experience to that of the Brahmāsvāda is only to give an idea of the highest stage of the realization of Rasa and not to estimate its nature. As the commentator in the com. points out2 in the realization of Brahman it is only Brahman which is experienced whereas in the realization of Rasa the Vibhāvas etc. are also experienced. It is due to this fact that such a word as Brahmāsvādamivānubhāvayan3 and not Brahmāsvādamanubhāvayan is used. This position evidently proves that the interpretation of the Rasasūtra of Bharata in terms of the popular Advaita Vedānta philosophy does not go the whole way. Viśvanātha, therefore, has also a similar expression in this connection, though his theory is a Vedantic approach to Rasa. He uses the word, Brahma- svādasahodara,4 calling Rasa the brother of, that is, having a family affinity to the bliss of the realization of Brahman and not Brahman itself. Jagannatha propounds the theory of Abhinava in terms of the Advaita Vedānta. He explains that the removal of the sheath of ignorance from over the Ānandāmśa of the self is due to the transcendental power

1. K. P. IV. p. 93. 2. Ibid (Com.). 3. Ibid. IV. p. 93. 4. S. D. III. 2.

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born of the functioning of the Vibhavas etc. in the literary piece ; the result is that the latent impressions deeply seated inside assume a corporeal shape and are realized as Rasa with the self's illumination, rather with the self's blissful aspect. This is an approach from the standpoint of the Advaita Vedanta. He established Rasa as the Chit itself delimited by the Sthayibhavas as the Rati etc. from over which the cover has been laid aside. Because of Rasa being dependent on the literary composition he was constrained to recognize the limiting factors as the Rati etc. and had also to accept Rasa as a temporary realization. The relish ( Charvanā ) con- sisted in either the removal of the screen from over the Chit or the particular state of the Antahkarana having assumed that form. He fully knew the difference of Rasa from the Brahmasamādhi as the former depended on the Chidānanda delimited by the Vibhāvas etc, and was to be brought about by the functioning ( of objects ) of the literary composition. In support of his view he quotes the Śruti.1 According to the Advaita Vedānta when Brahman has been realized, the realized and the realizer ( Brahman and the Yuktayogin) become one, as perfect identity between them is established. Hence the Vasanas get effaced or completely eradicated and no enjoyment whatsoever can take place. It is only the Ānanda aspect of Brahman, its bliss so to say, which is the sole pleasurable experience. The realizer, therefore, becomes Bhavatīta and cannot experience the aesthetic Rasa which is nothing but the conjoint experience of the Sthāyibhāva, Vibhävas etc. Hence it is that at the highest stage according to the principles of the Advaita Vedānta no realization of Rasa can take place. It has been explained to take place

1. R. G. p. 23.

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on a level much lower than the highest. The Advaita Vedäntic interpretation like the Sānkhya one can hardly account for the enjoyment of the Madhura Rasa of the Chaitanya school to which Rūpa Goswāmī belonged, or of the Bahkti Rasa of the Vaisnava school as advocated by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. According to the Chaitanya school the Madhura Rasa at its highest stage, the Mahābhāva, is experienced by the Gokula Devīs as Rādhā fully enamoured of Lord Krsna. An idea of it can be had from the harmo- nious living of a husband with his wife amidst all pleasures in the world, but this instance, after all, remains earthly as the Madhura Rasa not only far excels it but becomes trans- cendental ; at its highest stage, though apparently the feeling of duality comes to view, in reality such feeling of duality completely disappears and is out of question. Accor- ding to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī the Bhakti is of two kinds. One is the Sādhanarūpā (means) and the other the Sādhyarūpā (end). In the latter the duality of the devotee and God remains only in name, as the devotee feels himself as one with God. In other words, the devotee is Samarasa with God. This Bhakti is different from Jñāna due to difference in the Anubandhachatustaya.1 It is not on a lower stage than that of Jñāna but in some respects stands even higher, for even those who have no doubts to be cleared off and who delight in Self, have devotion which has no ulterior purpose behind- such is their devotion towards Hari of great prowess.2 At the Sämarasya stage the apparent duality leads to the highest bliss. The Bhakti Rasa and the Madhura Rasa,therefore, have no place in the economy of the Advaita Vedantic interpretation. It is only the Jñana which has the exclusive

1. S. B. B. R. p. 11. 2. Ibid. p. 13.

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and emphatic significance. In the Pratyabhijna school, however, the Paśu when it realizes its inherent status as Parameśvara is in a state of Sāmarasya akin to that enjoyed by the devotee and God ; hence the Bhakti Rasa can be explained according to the Iśvarādvayavāda of the Pratya- bhijña school. That it is difficult to explain Rasa in the Nātya according to the principles of the Advaita Vedānta will become clear later on. Rasa is not Kārya, a product of any cause (Karana ) as it should survive the disappearance of the Vibhāvas etc. ( Nimitta Kāraņas ). That it disappears with the Vibhavas is a well recognized fact. It can yet be called a product because of the production of relish ( Char- vanā) with which it is generally identified. It is not some- thing already existent and hence something to be indicated, and yet it is something capable of being realized by self only as it is different from the worldly knowledge received through such means as perception etc., the knowledge of the Yogin who is on way to realization though it might have been received independent of worldly means and the knowledge of the Yogin who has completely realized. It cannot be said that Rasa is an indeterminate knowledge as the Vibhāvas etc. are realized in it and yet it cannot be called a determinate knowledge as only the relish of the transcendental pleasure is to be had. The theory of Bhatta Lollata, Śrī Śankuka etc. can thus be beautifully and convincingly explained from the standpoint of Abhinava's interpretation which also takes into consideration BhattaNāyaka's interpretation as it includes its universalizing factor, the Sādhāraņīkaraņa as it is called, the absence of which had given BhattaNāyaka license of criticism against the theories of inference and generation. Rasa, thus, brings about a transcendental strikingness.

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( Alaukikachamatkārātmā )1 and stands above all cognitions as its causes are all transcendental (Alaukika). The delectable nature of Rasa in one way or another was recognized by almost all later writers though some of them included Rasa in Vakrokti, others in Auchitya and still others in Anumiti, while a few placed it under Tātparya Śakti. Bhoja expresses the dual nature of Rasa as Raghavan says.2 King Haripāladeva, the writer of the Sangītasudhā- kara,3 accepts the Vipralambha, which is recognized as altogether a different Rasa, as painful. There were, of course, a few others who not only did not agree in full in according recognition to all Rasas as pleasurable and suggested the dual nature of Rasas in mere hints but also pointed out on the basis of reasoning that of all Rasas some were pleasurable while others painful. Such, for instance, is the position of Ramachandra and Gunachandra, the joint authors of the Nātyadarpana.4 They classified the Srngāra, the Hāsya, the Vira, the Adbhuta and the Santa as pleasurable while the Karuna, the Raudra, the Bībhatsa and the Bhayānaka as painful on the basis of the Vibhāvas etc. which according to them were the Ista (desired-for ) in case of the first set and the Anista (undesired-for ) in the second set. In reply to the argument that as regards the pleasurable nature of Rasas as the Karuna etc. the experience of the sympathetic critics is the sole test, they say that this experience as pleasurable is totally barred by the experience itself. The Bhayānaka, the Bībhatsa, the Karuna and the Raudra even when shown as consummated in poetry or in dramatic re- presentation produce in readers or spectators some indescriba-

1. N. S. (G. O. S. ). VI. p. 286. 2. R. N. R. p. 155. 3. Ibid. p. 145. 4. N. D. p. 159.

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ble painful experience ; and it is due to this that the society gets afflicted. Had this experience been pleasurable there ought to have been no affliction. This reply is not quite convincing. People in general take pleasure in the recital or the dramatic representation of Rasas as the Karuna etc. without being in any way agitated. There are, no doubt, a few people who so completely identify themselves with the particular characters imitated by the actors that they get perturbed, as then they do not keep at the same time their individuality separate, which is the position of the spectator. To generalize on the basis of a few cases as the above is not sound. Moreover, in cases of identification as shown above, the particular characteristics of the original characters are not universalized, that is to say the Sādhāraņī- karaņa does not take place ; therefore, the question of literary Rasa does not arise. Besides, the all blissful aspect of the individual Ātman seems to be quite ignored here. Again to the argument that if it is so, no body should feel eagar to read such portions or witness such representations the reply is that this eagerness can be accounted for in three ways: firstly, it is due to the demonstration of the proper dis- position of objects by the dexterity of the poet and the efficiency of the actor even after the realization of Rasa is over on the boards, for even wonder is experienced when the dexterous stroke of the enemy beheads one proud of one's valour. Deceived, thus, by the all pleasurable strikingness born of the efficient powers of the poet and the actor wise persons experience a great pleasure even in such painful Rasas as the Karuna etc. The spectators also desirous of realizing it become eager for it ; secondly, the poets and the playwrights compose works in imitation of the world which is both pleasurable and painful, hence when

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composing works dealing with the life-incidents of such great persons as Rāma etc. painful and pleasurable elements do come in. Like the sweetness of the beverage the sharp and the bitter tastes are relished as pleasurable. In incidents as the kidnapping of Sītā, the dragging of the hair and the pulling of the dress of Draupadi etc. how can pleasure be experienced by symapthetic persons ? The pathos etc. of the original character is after all painful. If it is turned into pleasure in imitation, the imitation will be false as in it the pleasure would be felt as perverted ; thirdly, the pleasure experienced by those afflicted with the destruction of their desired objects at the recital or the representation of the pathetic is, really speaking, the experience of pain. The afflicted derive pleasure from the painful news but feel agitated with the pleasurable news, hence the Karuna etc. are painful.The three ways in which the authors accounted for the eagerness of the audience are open to criticism. In the first the authors have already assumed the cessation of the realization of Rasa, and then advanced that the proper arrangement and disposition of words etc. make the audience eager for it. The ancillaries only bring the audience in a fit mood to witness the representation, they thus bring about only the preparatory stage pointed out by Abhinava and it is afterwards only that Rasa is realized. The authors, however, have reversed the order of the two functions in order to maintain their ground. This is evidently absurd as it goes totally against the facts of experience because verbal arrangement through the Abhidha functions before the Rasadhvani can be had. In the second the authors have accepted the pleasurable nature of Rasa on the analogy of the beverage wherein the sweet, the bitter etc. are tasted as sweet, but the confusion has come due to the wrong sense

321 attached to the word, imitation, in literature. That every- thing in literature becomes transcendental and the objects do not have earthly touch in all respects seem to have received no consideration. Pains, sorrows etc. of the original characters are their own pains and sorrows. Why should they be felt as such by the readers or the spectators also ? When presented in a literary piece and experienced by the audience do they not appear universalized, for how can the audience identify with the original characters who are separated in certain cases by centuries of times ? Be- sides, in literary pieces the life-incidents of original charac- ters are not slavishly imitated as shown previously, there- fore the question of the falsity of imitation in literature does not arise. In the third the authors have taken into con- sideration only those persons who are in any way in trouble, Do these people really feel troubled at the recital or the representation of the pathetic ? Speaking on the material plane are not their sympathies widened and do they not feel solace ? Then is it the work of painful experience ? The universalized presentation or representation and the realization of the blissful nature of the Atman fully solve this problem. The authors themselves admit that painful news give pleasure to the afflicted, then the representation of the pathetic should also give them pleasure. On the other hand, they say that pleasurable news agitates them. Do all kinds of pleasurable news agitate them or only those which remind them of their own troubles ? The authors have taken into consideration only the afflicted ; what about those who are not afflicted ? Do these also feel pain at the recital or the representation of the pathetic ? Such are some of the queries which have evidently not attracted the attention of the authors. Their condition before 21

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establishing some Rasas as pleasurable and others as painful would have been a sort of dilemma when it becomes difficult to decide the exact nature of sensation. 'Sometimes one is baffled as to the pleasurable or the painful nature of a sensat- ion', as Bhavabhūti puts it.1 This condition has been well got cleared off by Vidyanātha who says that the worldly sorrow or pleasure might have been experienced as such by the original characters but in the Sahrdaya they all convert into pleasure which is intense.2 The mention of the name of Bhavabhūti here rouses the curiosity if the poet-dramatists and the poets have also expressed their views in connection with the nature and the process of the realization of Rasa. Vālmīki comes first whose experience of the tragic Krauñcha incident automati- cally found spontaneous expression in the Śloka metre. It furnishes hints on the conception of Rasa. In the state- ment, 'Let my utterance, I who am deeply touched with pathos, become Śloka metre and nothing else,'3 Ānanda sees the critic in Välmīki and finds in him the germs of the Rasa theory.4 Vālmīki was a great poet as his genius was creative and he could vividly visualize situations etc. But he was a critic also as he realized that it was his intense emotion finding outlet in rhythmic expression. That the Vibhāvas, the Anubhāvas and the Vyabhichāribhāvas con- vert the Sthayibhavas along with themselves into Rasas- the stage in which the personality is lost and which consists of nothing but indescribable joy, though not expressed explicitly by the poet, seems to have received his implicit attention and recognition. And herein lay the germs for

1. U. R. I. 25. 2. P. R. 88. p. 292. 3. V. R. I. II. 18. 4. D. L. I. 5.

323 later scholars for their various conceptions of Rasa. Kālidāsa is the next great writer deserving full attention. When witnessing the dramatic performance the spectators lose themselves in it completely.1 The poet-dramatist thereby tacitly recognizes Rasa as pleasurable. He is the master of the Śrngāra Rasa indulging in special depiction of the Vipralambha.2 He is also adept in the delineation of the Vīra and the Karuņa Rasas. He follows Vālmīki in ex- pressing poetry as the rhythmic expression3; but whereas Vālmīki throws only vague hints Kālidāsa gives obviously suggestions as to the presence of the Sthayibhavas, though implanted in previous births, in the persons and recognizes the functions of the Uddīpana Vibhāvas.4 Bhavabhūti seems to be an adherent of Vālmīki as he gives prominence to the Karuna Rasa and evolves the Karuna-synthesis to be considered later on, though in his dramas he makes the Vīra and the Śrngāra Rasas also as principal. Murāri is called Bālavālmīki.5 He considers the Vipralambha and the Sambhoga 6 as different. Bharavi regards the Vipralambha as delectable .? Māgha fully knew that it was the Sthāyi- bhava when nourished by the Sañcharibhavas that matured into Rasa.8 When various characters develop various Bhāvas, the spectators realize Rasa and are delighted.9 The delectable nature of Rasa is thus expressed and its transcendental nature admitted.10 These poet-dramatists and poets are representa- tive, therefore the expansion of list seems unnecessary. They 1. M. A. (in K. G.) II. 8 .; V. V. (Pelava's speech on p. 134) in K. G. 2. Meghadūta. 3. R. V. (XIV. 70) in K. G. 4. A. S. (V. 2) in K. G. 5. A. R. p. 19. 6. Ibid. VII. 37. 7. Kirāt. XI. 27. 8. Siśupāla. II. 87. 9. Ibid. XIV. 50. 10. Ibid. XIII. 69.

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show how Rasa had a strong hold over them and how they felt delighted in the delineation of different Rasas and thus delighted the spectators and the readers. The majority of these scholors do not accept Rasas as the Karuna etc. as painful. Rasa is recognized by them as all bliss, transcendental and indescribable. But the point that comes up for consideration is if all Rasas are equally pleasurable, that is, if the pleasure is of the same nature. Madhusudana Sarasvatī points out the difference in the pleasurable nature of Rasas. He says that it is the Sattva which makes the Sthayibhava. The Sattva is of pleasurable nature hence all Rasas are, no doubt, pleasurable but as this Sattva gets mixed with the Rajas and the Tamas in various proportions in different Rasas, the pleasure differs in extent. Hence the experiences of different Rasas are not equally pleasurable.1 This fact has been only hinted by Śrīmada- chyutarāya in the Sāhityasāra in pointing out in the com. the constituents in reference to Gunas in different Rasas.2 Madhusūdana's contention is obviously based on the Sāņkhya doctrine as Raghavan says3 whereas Śrīmadachyutarāya's view is Vedantic, follower of Jagannātha as he was. But then the true solution is to be sought in the Pratyabhijñā system. There the difference is not based on the Gunas as the Sattva, the Rajas and the Tamas as in the above two views. The Gunas in this system function on a very lower plane. As has already been pointed out before, the difference comes in due to the difference of objects. Hence the cogni- tion of one object must differ from the cognition of another object, though the cognition in its abstract form is one

1. S. B. B. R. I. p. 22 ; II. 79. 2. A. S. S. V. p. 103 (Com.) 3. R. N. R. p. 156.

325 and the same. In the same way the bliss also must differ. One bliss delimited by one object must be different ( Vilak-' sana) from the bliss delimited by another object. There- fore one Rasa must also differ from another Rasa in the nature of pleasure due to difference in the delimiting factors as the Sthayibhavas, the Vibhavas, the Anubhavas etc. Even in the case of one individual Rasa, for instance, the Śrngāra the experience of pleasure will be different according to the Alambana Vibhāvas, that is, the Āśraya and the Vișaya, the Uddīpana Vibhāvas etc. as also in reference to the different spectators. The experiences in all these cases will, therefore, be different and of particular nature ( Vilak- șana ). The different mental conditions involved as relish in different Rasas or equated with Rasas themselves and the difference in the Vibhāvas etc. particular in cases of different Rasas explain the pleasures as different in different Rasas. A few recent scholars have also tried to account for the pleasure experienced at the recital or the dramatic representa- tion of a literary composition. These views have been given with due criticism in S. S. A. B. and V. R. V. which are in Marāțhī language. N. C. Kelkar has attempted to expalin it on the basis of the Savikalpaka Samādhi ( deter- minate concentration ). The mind with the help of imagina- tion gives the objects literary forms and this imagination expresses itself either through Rasa or through the Alankāra which are the indispensable constituents of literary com- position. The pleasure that ensues from the study of litera- ture is due to many causes. The individual self longs to encompass, and assume the form of, the world at one moment. This task of the self is restricted by sense organs delimited in time, place and action ; the self, therefore, spreads itself

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all round with the help of the transcendental imagination. In this state it not only retains its individuality but also assumes that of others. The bliss of the realization of Rasa takes place when this assumption (identification with the characters represented etc. ) is effected by the self. The intensity of this pleasure, however, depends upon the pro- portion of the success achieved. When there are many kinds of Rasas to be realized, the pleasure will proportionately be enhanced.1 As regards the poetic figures also the juxta- position of the Upameya ( object to be compared) and the Upamāna (object of comparison) in the simile, for instance, gives rise to pleasure. Such pleasure leads to absorption and further on to Samädhi. The word, Samädhi according to him is generally understood in the sense of the Nirvikalpaka Samādhi of the Yogaśāstra. It is, however, used by him in the sense just the opposite to the above. In the Samādhi caused by the contemplation of literature the knwoledge of one's own self as well as others' exists ; and if that literature is of high order, its study and contemplation will give rise to many kinds of imagniation within and many objects, therefore, will be experienced by the mind.2 This, there- fore, is the true function of literature. The view as expressed above has certain defects. Rasa and the Alankāra are kept on a par ; the case, however, is not so. Experiencing other's emotions without losing one's own consciousness can only be done on the basis of mutual sympathy, respect and love, which cannot be felt for characters like Rāvana etc. Hence in such cases no pleasure will be experienced. Rasas depicted and poetic figures used in a large number at one time can only lead to pleasure in a few well managed cases, because

1. V. R. V. pp. 178-179. 2. S. S. A. B. p. 181.

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the greater the number, the better the arrangement should be. Deficiency in it will surely lead to confusion. This view ignores other poetic constituents as the Rīti etc. The attribution of the self's longing for expansion can equally hold good in other branches of learning. Many other objections have also been brought forward. D. K. Kelkar, another scholar, advances his theory of the Svāyatta Tādātmya (self-controlled identification ). The identification which is established by the spectator with the original character is under the control of the spectator. All kinds of pleasure from literary com- position are the workings of imagination. Through it identity with the desired object can be established. The extent and the duration of the identity remain under the control of the self. In everyday affairs of the world that control is lost, but it remains in hold in the enjoyment of Rasa. That is how the difference can be shown between the practical and the literary worlds.1 The view is open to criticism for many objections can be preferred against it. For instance, when a good work is read or its representation on the boards seen, the control is gradually lost and anything standing in the way at that time is felt as utterly disturbing. The scholar himself attests to the effect that there ought to be some corresponding qualities for identity ; it, therefore, seems that it is difficult to establish it with all the characters. Further on it is expressed that it is not necessary to establish identity with low and vile characters. Such statements evidently go against the view.2 R. S. Joga gives his view of the Sahānubhūtipūrvaka Tātasthya (indifference with sympathy ).3 This view has been worded by him in order

1. S. S. A. B. p. 187. 2. V. R. V. p. 181. 3. Ibid. p. 182.

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to do away with a little of the excess from the identity ( Tādātmya ) established between thespectator and the original character, the restriction and the effort from the Svāyatta ( self controlled) and the depth of concentration from the Samādhi ( absorption). The question that remains unans- wered is as to the way the identity can be established between the spectator and the low character. On a par with the above view is one advanced by V. R. Joshi which is the Ātmaupamya- buddhīnem Parakāyāpraveśa (entering into other's body through the knowledge of comparison with self). N. C. Phadake and K. P. Kulkarni have both tried to explain the aesthetic pleasure in literature on the basis of the Punah- pratyaya and the Pratyabhijñā which practically mean one and the same thing and aim at the same object. R. S. Joga, however, distinguishes them by pointing out rhat the Punahpratyaya has more of Anubhava ( experience ) whereas in the Pratyabhijñā Jñāna ( knowledge ) has a greater share.1 K. N. Vatve calls the two as practically the same and says that on the study of literature or at the sight of the characters the experiences mixed with pain, pleasure etc. described therein or represented on the boards lead to the remembrance of such previous experiences by the self.2 The views, no doubt, have wider scope than that of the previous theory yet many things seem to have been left out of consideration. What about the experiences which are described in the literary composition but which have not at all been ex- perienced before ? Literature does not take stock of past experiences only. Novelty in matter is also one of its quali- ties. New ideas, new characters, new technique etc. are ever welcomed and liked by readers or spectators. Phadake

1. S. S. A. B. p. 197. 2. V. R. V. p. 183.

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accounts for the literary pleasure by giving another view to the effect that literature pacifies the unsatisfied longing.1 This view will fully meet the above objection, yet the pacified longing also has to be consoled sometimes. D. N. Apte advances his theory which in other words is the same as the Punahpratyaya or the Prathyabhijñā view. The pleasure that ensues even in cases where there is no correspondence of emotions between the reader or the spectator and the original character is so felt because the keen longing of the experiences to find expressions is satisfied in literature.2 Late Dr. M. R. Patavardhan has also tried to account for literary pleasure. He says that literature gives knowledge of new things and curiosity is satisfied. According to him man has a natural curiosity to have knowledge of the ex- periences of mankind. The satisfaction of this curiosity results in pleasure. In such cases the absence of identity or mutual sympathy is not felt and concentration results.3 This theory takes account, of the past experiences as well as of new things, but it postulates inquisitive indifference ( Jijñāsu Tätasthya ) for the reader or the spectator. Y. R. Agashe calls literary pleasure the Lalitānanda.4 Man has got curiosity as a natural instinct. This inner urge indicates his keen longing for self-expression. The whole life, therefore, is the expression of the ego which is constantly seen busy in expressing itself, in bringing about its full development and realizing its inherent knowledge. This longing for knowledge is pacified with new experiences. It is also satisfied through imagnination as with the perceptual ex- perience. It is in fine arts that this longing for knowledge is

1. V. R. V. p. 184. 2. Ibid. pp. 184-185. 3. Ibid. p. 185. 4. V. R. V. p. 186.

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satisfied with the help of imagination. P. K. Guha accounts for the relief from tragedy in two ways: one affirmative, the other negative. The first aspect ' consists in the exaltation tragedy brings to the mind of the audience by its artistic presentation, in different plays, of different phases of the tragedy of life,'1 whereas the second aspect 'consists in the palliation, which we meet with in all tragic drama of the inherent painfulness of its theme, by the employment of various devices of art'.2 The first aspect concerns itself with the human appeal differing in different arts according to the nature of subject-matter etc. The second, however, depends upon the use of various devices which suggest that what is visible to the eye is merely an appearance and that there is an inner world wherein the intangible forces are seen operating before which this outward appearance is nothing. Lascelles Abercrombie calls this inner world 'the poetic world',3 the function of which 'is not to advance the action of the play but to iterpret or rather to illumine it.'4 It is this duality of impression which takes away from the painful effect of tragedy which on analysis will be found to be 'a double-chambered drama.'5 This duality of impression is kept in view by the writer in heroes, plots etc. in order to mitigate the painful effect in as greater a measure as possible. It serves the purpose of producing illusion in the minds of the spectators who take fictitious representation as true. This illusion in tragedy discharges the complex function of suggesting that behind the outer world, there is a world of mind and soul which is no less true than the outer world.

1. G. T. R. p. 34. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. pp. 36-37. 4. Ibid. p. 37. 5. Ibid. p. 42.

331 Guha's view takes into consideration the nature of the sub- ject matter of the tragedy and the artistic devices of dramatic compositions. It calls the dramtic effect an illusion. It hardly takes into consideration the subjective factor present in the spectator which is, as it were, the pivot of the whole superstructure. The view is more guided by the views of European theorists who paid more importance to the piece of art itself. Most of the scholars whose views have been described have obviously borrowed the wordings from, and formulated their peculiar views on, the theories of Sanskrit scholars ; and as such those views can easily be read, understood and criticized in the light of the original theories of Sanskrit scholars. Some of these views also seem to have taken into consideration a few points from the theories of European scholars. This kind of influence they reflect in the use of curiosity as the prime cause of the pleasure experienced on witnessing a dramatic representation etc. It is meet, there- fore, to pass over the views of European scholars only summarily. Unlike Indian scholars, they have tried to explain pleasure resulting from tragic scenes mostly. In this field of criticism Aristotle, the Greek savant, comes first for consideration. Aristotle has emphasized two emotions, pity and fear, and thus the pathetic and the fearful sentiments have been considered by him in connecticn with his theory. According to him 'tragedy effects a " Katharsis " ( purga- tion ) of these and kindred emotions.'1 Many and varied are the interpretations put on this view. Robertelli said that the tragic representation made people accustomed to the terrible, hence life, a bed of thorns as it is, became tolerable. Giraldi

1. T. D. p. 122.

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interpreted 'purgation' as applying not only to pity and fear but to similar emotions. Lessing said that ' Katharsis' stood for purification. In worldly life people lack balance. Some have too much of pity and fear whereas others little. In order to strike a balance or to bring about the golden mean the tragedy has come into existence. As others have said, the pity and the fear are purified at the representation of the tragedy, as they lose personal touch and become impersonal. It is because of this that pity etc. for others are experienced. This is the sublimation of the emotions ; in other words it is their purification. Some recent scholars have tried to interpret the word, Katharsis, as applied to the medical science. According to them it means purgation whereby 'it is not the passions that are purged of their impurities; it is the human soul that is purged of its excessive passions.'1 It is also to be understood as a reply to the stricutres passed by Plato on the art of poetry. Plato attributed a very bad effect to poetry whereas Aristotle stood for the defence of poetry. This, however, was something topical as it depended on the views of life the Greeks conceived. For instance, at one end stood such persons as Plato, the great philosopher, who advocated complete subjugation of passions whereas at the other stood Aristotle who allowed them reasonable indulgence. The first became so vehement for righteousness every- where that in the end he denounced even art as wicked because he gave such arguments as the art was twice removed from reality and 'Poetry feeds and waters the passions, weeds that ought rather to be killed by drought.' The second, on the contrary, said that art like fiction, 'is more philosophic than the history of actual events,' and he

1. L. T. p. 24.

333 remarked concerning poetry that 'it makes them less, not more, emotional, by giving a periodic and healthy outlet to their feelings.'1 The theory of purgation sounds like the modern psychological theory according to which the repressed emotions have to be given a safety valve, otherwise having remained long in pent-up condition they might give rise to complexes. But the above view of purgation deals mainly with the effect whch is moralistic. Moreover, no body goes to the theatre for a mental dose. Butcher, there- fore, tries to see 'a further meaning. It expresses not only a fact of psychology or of pathology, but a principle of art. The original metaphor is in itself a guide to the full aesthetic significance of the term.'2 He accepts that the Katharsis 'denotes the removal of a painful or disturbing element from the organism, and hence the purifying of what remains, by the elimination of alien matter,'3 and applies it to tragedy. He establishes that the medium of art gives distinctly an aesthetic satisfaction. He also tries to arrive at the nature of the process of purgation on the basis of hints etc. supplied by Aristotle. Pity and fear in everyday life have each pain or disturbance due to imminent evil, destructive or painful. Each may have reference to self or to someone very near to self. But in the dramatic representation both these emotions as they are experienced in actual life undergo sufficient modification in that pity is therein appealed to for a character 'not a wholly innocent sufferer, but rather a man who meets with sufferings beyond his deserts,'4 and fear instead of remaining ' the direct apprehension of misfortune impending over our own life,' turns into ' the sympathetic shudder we

1. L. T. pp. 32-33. 2. T. A. p. 253. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. p. 258.

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feel for a hero whose character in its essentials resembles our own.'1 He must be an ordinary man but at the same time standing above in external status and dignity and also placed at an ideal distance in order that the spectators may not be reminded of their own troubles, cares and personal affairs. It is under such conditions that identification takes place, the characters being presented in universalized aspects. The feeling experienced at this time is immediate. Because of the identification, the spectators feel that they are con- cerned with the incidents and yet their personal safety is not threatened, because union here is through imagination as the spectator 'becomes one with the tragic sufferer, and through him with humanity at large.'2 'The sting of the pain, the disquiet and unrest, arise from the selfish element which in the world of reality clings to these emotions. The pain is expelled when the taint of egoism is removed.'3 Butcher, when questioned if the above explanation is not reading modern conceptions into old theories, replies, 'that if this is not what Aristotle meant, it is at least the natural outcome of his doctrine ; to this conclusion his general theory of poetry points.'4 Butcher says it is, thus, that art is made a source of joy to the people in general and redounds to the credit of the poets. 'The poets found out how the transport of human pity and human fear might, under the excitation of art, be dissolved in joy, and the pain escape in the purified tide of human sympathy.'5 Abercrombie calls the attempts of Aristotle at defining the tragic pleasure 'as an attempt in the right direction.'6 He says that 'tragedy

1. T. A. pp. 258-259. 2. Ibid. p. 266. 3. Ibid. p. 268. 4. Ibid. pp. 268-269. 5. Ibid. p. 273. 6. A. P. C. pp. 109-110.

335 certainly does produce an enjoyable and wholesome effect, by rousing in us emotions which in real life would be un- pleasantly and perhaps dangerously disturbing ....... '1 He is not prepared to accept that the meaning attached to the word, Katharsis, in the medical science or other religious sense, that is, purification, stands quite admissible. He, however, accepts that something like 'purification ' may be alleged as tragedy presents evil things deprived of their evil effect.2 R. S. Joga quotes the interpretation of B. Croce put on the word, Katharsis. 'By elaborating his impressions, man frees himself from them. By objectifying them, he removes them from him and makes himself their superior. The liberating and purifying function of art is another aspect and another formula of its character of activity. Activity is the deliverer just because it drives away passivity.'3 That the above interpretation in one way or another accepts the unburdening of emotions and their purification as the function of art is quite obvious. The great poet Milton interpreted ' purgation ' thus. 'Tragedy, as it was anciently composed, hath been ever held the gravest, moralest, and most profitable of all other poems : therefore said by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of those and suchlike passions ; that is to temper and reduce them to just measure with a kind of delight, stirred up by reading or seeing those passions well imitated.'4 Herein emotions like but not identical are estimated to produce delight. These interpretations are only efforts to explain the effect of tragedy. It has, however, to be kept in mind here that with the Greeks only two

1. & 2. A. P. C. p. 110. 3. S. S. A. B. pp. 233-234 (Footnote). 4. M. S. A. (Preface).

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sentiments, the pathetic and the fearful, counted in the drama. Their aim was to depict mainly the tragic incidents, the working of Nemesis over the doomed families etc., hence their canvas was not so wide as that of Oriental theorists. Still the Greeks considered the above two sentiments as principal in the drama. The Greek dramatists also realized great pleasure in writing out tragedies. For Aeschylus the tragedy was, 'A means of uttering his exultation in human greatness and heroism, his troubled groping to find the gods behind the gods, the hidden springs of the justice of the world.'1 Sophocles believed that the tragedy demonstrated the marvellousness of man-the theme which also found favour with Shakespeare. These dramatists, therefore, con- sidered the human qualities the principal things in the tragedy. With Euripides the tragedy concerned itself with truth and thus grew moralistic. Racine treated the tragedy more as a school mistress. In the above two dramatists, however, the moral did not find favour at the total expense of the delightful. With Ibsen the delightful finds favour as he declares his aim to be an artist above all. Coleridge says that the spectator comes to have a particular state of mind when witnessing a dramatic representation. Even impossible things are taken up as real, and disbelief in their not being real is thus suspended. That state of mind is, therefore, called the 'suspension of disbelief.' This position, how- ever, stands open to criticism as suspension of diebelief requires effort on the part of the spectator. No spectator seated in a theatre-hall ever thinks, while enjoying pleasure, that this pleasure of his is being enjoyed because he has already considered the characters before him as real, though

1. L. T. p. 35.

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in fact they are not really the original characters but actors impersonating them. The list of the dramatists and the poets can be enlarged but disagreement in their theories will be the most marked feature, though in practice the same hearty interest will come to view. The opinions of the philosophers and the critics also do not agree. Pleasure as the result, however, has received the general approval and sanction. It is, therefore, in the mode of explanation that disagreement is seen. Rousseau said that the pleasure accruing from witnessing the tragic representation was largely sadistic, that is, it pleased man to hear related the torments of others. Segni also explained this as the func- tion of the tragedy during the Renaissance. This theory may contain a grain of truth as human nature is a complex problem ; it cannot, however, be given much weight. It might account for the pleasure of the primitives but that stage of humanity has long passed away. Malicious persons may feel satisfied to a certain extent. The theory, viewed thus, is a crude one. Others say that instead of watching other persons undergoing torments, it gives pleasure to watch one's own self troubled and tormented. This is how the pleasure explained as sadistic in the above theory be- comes masochistic here. This masochistic theory is as crude as the sadistic one just considered. That pleasure accrues to one from self-torture is rather strange. It may accrue to a few persons who are stoics or stoically-minded. Moreover, pains less intense might give pleasure but what about those which are disastrous ? From such pains, painful experience will ensue. Abbe Dubos says that people ' go to tragedies because it is pleasanter to be grieved than bored; '1

1. L. T. p. 38. 22

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Fontenelle ( with whom Shelley also concurred ) believes that in a painful and a pleasurable emotion the difference is only of degree, and the knowledge of unreality in the theatri- cal representation makes even a painful object pleasant. Abbe Dubos' position that people go to the representation of a tragedy to be grieved does not stand as no body is willing to court pain. Fontenelle's postulation that the effect of the tragedy is weakened because the spectator has the sense of the unreality is rather weak by itself. In the emotional stage, the sense of either unreality or reality does not intervene. Moreover, the question of pain and pleasure being a matter of degree does not mean that the two are equally liked. No body wants to experience pain instead of pleasure. Hume accepts in parts the explanations of both the above theorists but supplements them as he says that there also exists here the pleasure felt ' in the activity of the imagination as it mirrors life.'1 The emphasis is put by Hume on the activity of the imagination but the imagination may not be seen active at all places. According to Guha, Hume gave credit to eloquence which Guha criticizes as reflecting indiscrimination between different forms of art.2 Hegel was a pure idealist. His theory of the tragic fact was surely influenced by his idealism. 'The essentially tragic fact is the self-division and intestinal warfare of the ethical substance, not so much the war of good with evil as the war of good with good. Two of these isolated powers face each other, making incompatible demands. The family claims what the state refuses, love requires what honour forbids. The competing forces are both in themselves rightful, and so far the claim of each is equally justified ; but

1. L. T. p. 39. 2. G. T. R. p. 24.

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the right of each is pushed into a wrong, because it ignores the right of the other, and demands that absolute sway which belongs to neither alone, but to the whole of which each is but a part.'1 Pleasure accrues from seeing characters per- fectly indentify themselves with their isolated causes and compete vehemently and violently for asserting their indivi- dual and several claims, as also from witnessing the final re- conciliation wherein the exclusive claim is generally denied self-assertion, the conflict seldom ending peacefully and the tragedy thus closing with a solution. Hegel was an idealist. Hence his theory, too, has much of idealism. As Lucas puts it, ' In a Utopia peopled by Hegels tragedy might perhaps be what he describes, but that is no concern of ours.'2 Modern theorists concentrate too much on the individual character and do not show the final merging of discords into a high harmony. They cannot, therefore, explain things on the basis of this theory. Schopenhauer has his gospel of life in the phrase, Vanity of vanities. He considers life full of miseries. Joys here on this side of the globe are of impermanent nature, fleeting at every moment. The tragedy emphasizes this miserable and serious side of life. It, thus, represents worthlessness of life. Wise men come to feel a sort of resignation and renuncia- tion for all the things here. 'We should go home from a play, he thought, having realised more clearly than ever the worthlessness of life, freer than ever from that will to live which comedy on the contrary encourages.'3 And in this consists the tragic pleasure. Schlegel concurs with Scho- penhauer in his view.4 Minturno also emphasizes the same

1. O. L. P. pp. 71-72 2. L. T. p. 43. 3. Ibid. p. 44. 4. T. D. p. 134.

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point when he expresses his disbelief in worldly prosperity and in the duration and stability of worldly things, faith in their perishable nature and in the fact that every happiness changes into misery.1 Schopenhauer's view has too much of pessimism. Life may often seem sad but is it really worthless ? The theorist seems to teach a sort of resigna- tion towards, and contempt for, life. Is it not plainly an utterly moralistic approach to a piece of art ? This view has affinities with Bhavabhuti's which advocates the Karuņa as the only Rasa. P. K. Guha brings 1 forward some objections on the basis of the tragedy being a piece of art having wide appeal and arousing zeal in activity. Moreover, he says that if tragedies taught complete pessimism and comedies gave enjoyment according to Schopenhauer, the two species could not flourish side by side.2 In Nietzsche this complete disillusion of Schopenhauer gets mixed with illusion ; 'the essence of tragedy is not simple disillusion, but alternate illusion and disillusion, ' as Lucas puts it.3 The visions of the grandeur and littleness of life here alternate : in other words, here is visible a struggle of opposite feelings. This theory recognizes truth to a certain extent but it is again a theory which comes from a philosopher. The tragic experience cannot be called alternating. It is not only the struggle of opposite feelings that interests the spectator. Many other factors as imaginative presentation of objects also interest him ; he thus gets pleasure from the dramatic art as such. Nietzsche's view seems to make no distinction between the dramatic and other forms of art in point of effect. I. A. Richards believes that in the tragedies is to be

1. T. D. P. 134 (Footnote). 2. G. T. R. pp. 14-15. 3. L. T. pp. 46-47.

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found reconciliation of opposite and discordant qualities. He instances the two emotions, pity and fear. Pity makes the people approach the object towards which it is felt whereas fear takes them away far from it. The tragedy depicts the two and shows in a way their reconciliation as to be satisfying to the spectator. He also 'suggests that many other such discordant impulses might perhaps also be finding themselves reconciled in the tragedy. The word, Katharsis, used by Aristotle means according to Richards this re- conciliation for he says, "Their union in an ordered single response is the Catharsis by which tragedy is recognised, whether Aristotle meant anything of this kind or not."1 That Aristotle never used Katharsis in the sense of anything of the kind expressed in the above theory is fully shown by Lucas. Moreover, does tragedy represent a tug of war between emotions as pity and fear ? Do these emotions never come in separately ? That it cannot account for all the tragedies has been admitted by the theorist himself by dismissing the Greek tragedies as 'pseudo-tragedy' and 'almost all Elizabethan tragedy outside Shakespeare's six masterpieces. '2 Lucas calls curiosity the basis of tragedy and says that because of it man has a longing to have different and various experiences from life which tragedy depicts in its opposite phases. A sort of pleasure is thus given by the tragedy as the love of beauty and truth and of truth to life and about it is satisfied. The satisfaction comes through many ways. 'It may be the thought that the hero, like Samson, has at least got cleanly off the stage.' Or 'it may be simply the consolation of perfect language, as when Antigone passes with that last great cry down to her living

1. L. T. p. 49. 2. Ibid. p. 51.

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tomb.' 'Or it may be simply the consolation of the sheer integrity which faces life as it is.'1 At times the characters may lack tragic splendour, and yet the play may remain a tragedy ; the tragedy in such cases even though depicting human unhappiness pleases due to the truth with which it is described and its skilful communication to the audience. The universe seems quite disordered, it affords great miseries to man. It sometimes even crushes him under its feet very mercilessly. Man, therefore, gets satisfaction by painting this cruel working of the inexorable destiny. The instinct of curiosity in man works on a lower level. Its satisfaction, therefore, cannot be equated with the Rasāsvāda which becomes transcendental. Moreover, curiosity can be res- ponsible for the desire to know and study sciences and arts, to see performances other than dramatic also, hence it can hardly account for the pleasure ensuing from witnessing a dramatic representation. In the case of spectators who witness the same tragic representation twice or thrice, this theory cannot be satisfactory. Allardyce Nicoll says that in the tragedy there are many factors which give pleasure. Some of the characters possess heroic grandeur. When such characters move in action, the mind of the audience soars into very high regions. This nobility of characteriza- tion, therefore, serves as a relief from tragedy. The feeling of nobility involving moral problems is another source of this relief, though the conception of morality differs in different contexts. Pleasure also ensues from the sense of universality which is 'some form of contact with infinity.'2 To the religious persons it means a contact with divine forces whereas in case of the atheists the contact takes place

1. L. T. p. 57. 2. T. D. p. 131.

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with illimitable forces of the universe staggering and bewilde- ring understanding. These two aspects are fully reflected in the old and the new dramas depicting the religious and the scientific tendencies and forces. Poetical effect also caters to this pleasure, by taking away much from the gloom of the tragic plot. This poetical effect is the result of ' the creative artistic power of the dramatist himself',1 and it serves ' to reave away our minds for a moment from the gloomy depths of the tragedy.'2 The view takes into con- sideration the moralistic as well as the artistic factors. But it is more moralistic as the qualities of the characters are more to be seen coming into prominence and engaging atten- tion whereas the artistic finish is simply to throw into tempo- rary oblivion the gloomy depths of the tragedy. C. T. Winchester says that in a tragic representation the character in suffering demonstrates his virtues and merits. For some time the hero appears to get the better of the elementary forces acting against him. The hero comes to command respect from the audience which results in their pleasure, even though he meets the tragic end. If in the dramatic representation murders in cold blood without the expression of virtues are enacted, no pleasure will accrue.3 That this view is moralistic is quite obvious. K. N. Vatve records one view under the name of some scholars. When the characters are seen in troubles, sympathy, compassion etc. are felt for them. It is a sort of help rendered to them, for instances, the dramatic representation or the recital of the life-incidents of a poor starving beggar fallen into the clutches of cruel oppressors brings tears into the eyes of the spectators or the readers. These tears give the readers or

1. T. D. p. 132. 2. Ibid. 3. V. R. V. p. 200.

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the spectators some consolation and lead to their pleasure.1 The view contemplates cases as they happen in actual life. The spectacle of poor beggars starving and oppressed in everyday life, no doubt, brings tears but those tears do not indicate pleasure. Therefore tears here will give one some relief on the expression of sorrow for others, but no pleasure will ensue. John Dennis says that provocation to virtues and restraint over evils are shown in the representation of a tragedy. This spectacle, therefore, gives pleasure to the spectators.2 This view is also moralistic because it con- templates encouragement to virtues and control over the evils as the subject of the tragedy. The spectators do not always expect to see virtue triumphant and vice punished, as sometimes the reverse is to be seen in drama as in actual life. These views of European scholars on a reflection seem to arrange themselves into some definite categories. Some reflect a moralistic approach to the subject whereas others deal with the enumeration of the various factors as merits and virtues of characters responsible for the pleasure ensuing from the representation of a tragedy. Some of these views take into consideration the pacification of the instinct of curiosity, the activity of imagination, the suspension of ' disbelief, life as a banquet to be seen etc. etc. But no theory makes any approach taking into consideration the inherent goodness, beauty and truth of the human soul as the Orienta- lists did. Aristotle has considered the subject in a way which fairly resembles the Indian standpoint. He took into consideration the emotions of pity and fear and gave the verdict that tragedy effected the Katharsis, which was interpreted by some to the effect that the human soul it was

1. V. R. V. pp. 200-201. 2. Ibid. p. 199.

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which was purged of these emotions, thus implying the purification of the soul of its impurities.1 Butcher's interpretation makes the characters universalized where objects have no reference to self. Personal cares, troubles etc. also do not find any scope as all these are completely removed. Complete identification with characters, therefore, takes place. In all these points there is resemblance with the Indian standpoint. But then the insufficiency of the Western standpoint stares in. Firstly, Aristotle does not furnish any such warranted interpretation as Butcher's. Secondly, Butcher himself says that this interpretation has been reached from the hints furnished in Aristotle's work. Hence the objection to this interpretation can arise. Taking then the interpretation as such, it is clear that it does not reach the satisfactory solution. The inherent blissful state of the Purusa as recognized in the economy of the Indian philosophy seems to have received no consideration by Western philosophers. Their thinking had not dived deep into the very core of the subject though some of them tried to make the best approach possible in the circumstances. Some of their solutions were akin to those mentioned by Sāradātanaya. Just as the sweet, the sour, the bitter etc. become delicious to persons according to place, time etc. so do the Śrngāra Rasa etc. to the spectators in various and different circumstances. And as such they are called Rasas. They are also called Rasas because they are in- dividually relished by individuals due to difference in their nature, in circumstances and transitoriness and fickleness of mind.2 The Pratyabhijñā school of the Kāśmīrian Śaiva philosophy propounded the Rasa system in a way which

1. L. T. p. 24. 2. B. P. Lines 5-16. p. 40.

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satisfied the different standpoints. That the tenets of this system found reflection in the exposition of Rasa stands as an un- doubted fact, as the life-principles of personalities stand as whole and not demarcated into different sections. Satisfac- tory solution is, therefore, to be found in it. 2. RASA ONLY ONE Rasa in literature is the pleasure which is born of the recital of a poem or the spectacle of a dramatic representa- tion. It is the pleasure of the self as the Sthāyibhāvas implanted inside with the conjoint operation of the Vibhāvas etc. mature into Rasa. It is all bliss wherein the difference in reference to self and non-self sinks. Rasa, thus, as an ineffable bliss, is fundamentally one. It is called one but appears different due to delimiting factors. It is to express this one Rasa that Bharata uses the word Rasa in singular number in the expression, 'Na Hi Rasad Rte Kaśchidarthaḥ Pravartate.' It is called the Mahārasa by Abhinava who says that, viewed from the standpoint of the Sphota, the Mahārasa may be likened to the Sphota which is permanent whereas other Rasas are only unrealities.1 It is also likened to Brahman from the standpoint of which the different many Rasas appear as unrealities. It receives different names due to its constituents as the Sthāyibhāvas, the Vibhāvas etc.2 Abhinava explains that God ( Parameśvara ) is without plura- lity, that is, He has no kinds as He transcends all limitations of space, time and form.3 Just before this has been described the apparent plurality. One com. in manuscript form on Sarasvatīkanthābharana of Bhoja says that Rasa as relish is one.4 Kavi Karņapūra Gosvāmī establishes one funda-

1. N. S. (G. O. S.) II p. 269 (Com.). 2. Ibid. VI p. 273 (Com). 3. S. D. S. p. 196. 4. R. N. R. p. 177.

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mental Rasa of which he postulates one Sthāyibhāva. He calls the latter the Āsvādānkurakanda which is an attribute of mind wherein pure Sattva completely devoid of the Rajas and the Tamas predominates. It becomes separately and diversely named due to the different Vibhavas.1 The com. to the above gives the analogy of the crystal which though white appears different in colours when placed in the vicinity of different flowers having different hues. The author again describes Rasa as fundamentally one and says that the limiting factors as the Rati etc. make it look as many.2 The last view postulates one definite Sthāyibhāva for the one fundamental Rasa and accounts for the different Rasas on the basis of the different Vibhavas. Abhinava did not postulate any such Sthayibhava. He called the mental function, however, the Rasana, another name for Rasa, which was variously called the Svāda ( relish ) by some and the Charvanā by others. 3. RASA-ITS CLASSIFICATION. Bharata, the father of Sanskrit dramaturgy, has at the very outset of the description of Rasa in the sixth chapter of the N. S. (K. S. S. ) raised the question as to why Rasa is so called and what it is.3 The question is answered forthwith that it is an entity and is so called because of being Āsvādya ( of a relishable nature ). The subsequent writers as Mammata, Viśvanātha etc. have also equated it with the Charvaņā ( relish ); it is, therefore, a particular relish. Any classification of Rasa must have reference to the relish and its nature. Bharata has counted the four Rasas, viz. the Srngāra, the Raudra, the Vira and the Bībhatsa as the primary ones and the Hāsya,

1. K. A. K. V. 63. 2. Ibid. V. 71. 3. N. S. (K. S. S.) VI. p. 71.

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the Karuna, the Adbhuta and the Bhayānaka as their respec- tive derivatives.1 The raison d'être of the above position is, however, to be found in the Daśarūpaka where the dra- ·maturgist Dhanañjaya takes the very word from Bharata and calls Rasa the Svāda ( relish ). In the Śrngāra, the Vīra, the Bibhatsa and the Raudra this Svada is of four kinds involving as it does four mental conditions : the Vikāsa (blooming or unfolding), the Vistāra (expansion), the Ksobha ( agitation ) and the Viksepa ( distraction ) respectively. The other four Rasas, viz. the Hasya, the Adbhuta, the Bhayānaka and the Karuna, have been described as products not in the exact sense of being generated from them but coming out of them in various relation.2 The examples quoted in support are from Bharata and, thus, the author and the commentator both based themselves on Bharata's Nātya- śāstra. This position has been so tenaciously adhered to that the Santa as a dramatic Rasa has been completely refuted, without paying attention to the fact that Bharata has accepted it in hints as will be seen later on. That he has also described it in the line, Bībhatsādbhutasāntānām Traividhyam Nātra Kathyate,3 and given it a separate treatment4 as in the case of other eight Rasas is borne testimony to by the N. S. (G. O. S.). The closing stanza of the sixth chapter counts Rasas as nine ; the com. makes it more clear. The Agni- purana also gives the list of the primary and the derivative Rasas in conformity with Bharata. In this respect it may be said to occupy the same position as Dhanañjaya. The departure, however, comes in the mode of explanation. The Śrngāra comes out of the Rāga ( attachment ), the Raudra

1. N.S. (K.S. S.) VI. 39-41. 2. D. R. IV. 43-44 (and Com. pp. 162-163). 3. N. S. (G. O. S.) VI. p. 386. 4. Ibid. VI. pp. 333-342.

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from the Tīkşna ( Taikşnya) (intensity and vehemence ), the Vīra is the Avastambhaja (born of stupefaction ) and the Bībhatsa is the Sankochabhūḥ (produced from contraction ).1 Śinga Bhūpāla mentions2 the four mental conditions put forward by Dhanañjaya and accepts the four primary and the four derivative Rasas. 3 Rupa Gosvāmī accepts the above mental conditions with one addition. In the Sänta Rasa he accepts the Pürti ( the feeling of complete- ness or surfeit) whereas he admits the Vikāsa in the Prīti, the Preyan, the Vatsala, the Madhura and the Hasya ; the Vistāra in the Vīra and the Adbhuta ; the Viksepa in the Karuna and the Raudra ; and the Ksobha in the Bhayānaka and the Bibhatsa.4 The above two authors do not equate the different kinds of Rasas with these mental conditions, for they say that these mental conditions are involved as relish in different Rasas. The different kinds of relish are brought about by different Vibhävas etc. which are particular in different Rasas. Bharata's statement5 that the Anukrti ( imita- tion) of the Śrngära is the Häsya, the action of the Raudra is the Karuna, that of the Vira is the Adbhuta and the spectacle of the Bibhatsa is the Bhayānaka is not a conclusive one. For instance, love poses and love passages between the lovers. become, no doubt, an object of laughter for the spectator but often they are felt as disgusting by them. No body while witnessing a spectacle of the Häsya Rasa thinks first that it is the imitation of the Śrngära Rasa and hence a case of the Hāsya Rasa. Moreover, the Hāsya Rasa can be relished without the Śrngara Rasa. A well-dressed strong and cautious person suddenly slipping on the road furnishes the instance. 1. A. P. 338-6-8. 2. R. S. II. p. 175. 3. Ibid. II. 166-167. 4. R. H. S. p. 310. 5. N. S. (K. S. S.) VI. 40-41.

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The last argument applies to the Raudra and the Karuna Rasas also as they have been regarded by Bharata as the cause and its effect. The Karuna can exist without the Raudra. The difference in the standpoint can also account for them separately. Viewed from the standpoint of the sufferer the whole sight appears pathetic whereas the whole position will appear terrific when looked at from the point of view of the oppressor. It, therefore, becomes clear that in a drama both the oppressor and the sufferer must be present in order to remind that the Karuna is the effect of the Raudra. In the Uttararamacharita Rāma and Sītā are the sufferers. Who is the oppressor of Rāma ? Is it the situa- tion ? But the situation is not a person incarnate. More- over, a person may be an object of pity without in any way being connected with anger. The Vira may sometimes result in something marvellous but the marvellous may be brought about without the agency of the Vira. The coming of Menakā in the form of light to take away Sakuntalā in her distress in the Abhijñānaśākuntala is an instance of the Adbhuta brought about by the Karuna. The spectacle of the Bibhatsa may result in the Bhayanaka but the latter does not invariably depend on the former. The deer being pursued by Duyanta in the Abhijñānaśākuntala furnishes an instance of the Bhayānaka brought about by the Vīra in the king. Such are some of the arguments against the conclusiveness of the statement. That is why Sarngadeva says that all Rasas can mutually stand as the producer and the produced. He says that the Raudra is the cause in the Bhayānaka, from the Vipralambha Śrngāra the Karuņa is produced, the Vira serves as the cause in the Bhayānaka and the Adbhuta, and the laughter of the Vidūșaka is the cause

351 of the hero's Hasya.1 Later on Bhanudatta is seen testifying to the above position. He quotes at first Bharata but gives the opinion of some old authority as the Pūrvagranthakāra- sammatih in accounting for some other relations of the producer and the produced not mentioned in Bharata. He gives illustrations also wherein the Karuna and the Bībhatsa serve as cause to the Vīra, the Śrngāra to the Bhayānaka and the Vira to the Śrngära.2 The statement of Bharata, how- ever, bears testimony to the keen insight of the Sanskrit dramaturgist into human nature. This knowledge becomes more clear in the hands of other Sanskrit scholars. Abhinava mentions Bhatta Nāyaka as postulating the third function, the Bhoga, which is of the nature of the Vistara and the Vikāsa as explained in the com. to the N. S. (G. O. S. ),3 and of the nature of the Vistāra, the Vikāsa and the Druti (melting) as set forth in the Dhvanyālokalochana.4 Bhatta- Nāyaka does not give any particular technical names to these mental states. Abhinava, however, calls these mental states or conditions as the Gunas (Dīptih Pratipattur Hrdaye Vikāsavistāraprajvalanasvabhāvā. Sācha Mukhyatayā Ojaśśabdavāchyā).5 The Guņas, viz. the Ojas, the Prasāda and the Madhurya exist respectively as the Dīpti ( illumination of and unfolding ), the Samarpakatva or the Vyāpakatva (pervasion ) and the Ardratä or the Druti -- the three mental conditions evoked only in the process of the realization of Rasa. Hence Rasas and the Gunas are invariably connected as the effects and their causes. The statement, therefore, that the Dipti is the character of Rasas like the Raudra has been well explained by Lahiri as showing the superimposition of 1. S. D. S. R. VII. 1384-1385. 2. B.R. T. p . 168-169. 3. N. S. (G. O. S.) VI. p. 279 (com.) 4. D. L. II. pp. 183 & 189 (Com.) 5. Ibid. II. p. 208 (Com.)

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the effect (Karya) on the Kārana (cause ).1 If this is the position of the Guna, why has it been accepted as a separate element ? The answer is that, though the above position has fully been accepted, in the economy of the Dhvani the Guna was to receive recognition as a separate factor, as long before it had become the pivot of one of the schools in Sanskrit poetics. Here if it is said that 'a peculiar associ- ation with the vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva rouses the sthayin to a stage of relish,'2 the question will again crop up if this relish is had only as one of the above mental conditions. Hence is the Guna realized as essential as the Sthayibhava. 'If it is true that the Guna comes into existence on account of the Rasa, it is equally true that the Guna ( in the form of the Cittavrtti) constitutes a part and parcel in the actual realisation of Rasa. Nay, in the ultimate stage of relish Srngāra has no other existence except a supreme delight in the form of the melting of the heart which is the character of the Guna Mädhurya; Raudra has no other ex- istence except in the form of a brilliant expansion of the heart which is the character of the Guna Ojas. Similarly, Prasāda in the form of a pervasion of the heart is an essential character of all the Rasas. Thus, although in theory the Guna is swallowed up in the Rasa, in practice it makes the Rasa what it is.'3 Ananda, thus, accepts the Guna as a separate element in his Dhvani theory and says that in the Sambhoga Śrngāra ( as Abhinava points out), the Vipralambha and the Karuna there is a proportionately advancing degree of the Mädhurya as the mind melts in them; the Ojas, involving an expansion, resides in the Raudra ( as also in the Vira and the Adbhuta, as pointed out by

1. C. R. G. p. 206. 2. Ibid. p. 207. 3. Ibid.

353 Abhinava) ; and the Prasāda is common to all.1 Lahiri explains well the presence of the Prasāda in all Rasas. He says, "It has been seen that the perception of Rasa depends on understanding the composition in which some of the accessories of Rasa find their expression, and thus the quality of pervading is the character of this Guna in the sense that in every Rasa the mind must be prepared to grasp at once the situation depicted in the conception."2 The Śrngāra, the Karuna, the Raudra, the Vira and the Adbhuta have been expressed by Ananda as involving different mental conditions. What about others ? Abhinava says that Ānanda has already referred to a peculiar association of more than one mental condition in each of the rest. He elucidates Ananda's hints as he lays down that in the Hāsya the Mādhurya and the Ojas are present in equal degree, for the Hāsya is subordinate to the Śngāra ( Abhinava is seen here still adhering to Bharata whose influence he is unable to shake off comple- tely ) and it involves an expansion of the heart. Similarly in the Bhayanaka and the Bībhatsa the Madhurya and the Ojas are both present but the former is present in a lesser degree than the latter, for though the mental function is of absorption and hence melting yet the expansion predominates due to the Vibhavas being of this nature. In the Śanta sometimes the Ojas predominates whereas at others the Mädhurya according to the variety and peculiar nature of the Vibhava.3 Mammata says in the definition of the poetry that it should be endowed with the Guna, implying thereby the Gunas as the essential attribute (Nitya) and thus also making one think that the Gunas can exist without bearing any relation to Rasa. But later on this relation becomes quite 1.D.L. II. 8-10. 2. C. R. G. p. 210. 3. D. L. II. p. 212. (Com.) 23

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clear when they are described as causes of bringing about the various mental conditions in different Rasas. Mammata at first gives a general definition1 and then the particular characteristics of each of the three. The Madhurya, which gladdens the heart by bringing about a melting thereof, resides in increasing degree in the Sambhoga, the Karuna, the Vipralambha and the Santa (in admitting this nature of the Santa Mammata differs from Abhinava). The Ojas which is a glow in the form of an expansion of heart is present in increasing degree in the Vira, the Bībhatsa and the Raudra ( again a departure from Abhinava in putting the Bībhatsa here). The Prasāda exists in all Rasas.2 Hemachandra follows Mammata closely but differs from him slightly in that he accepts the presence of the Mādhurya Gūna in increasing degree in the Sambhoga, the Sānta, the Karuna and the Vipralambha.3 Viśvanātha adheres to the position of Mammata to a certain extent but wisely differs from him inasmuch as he says that the Guna does not bring about the mental condition but is identical with it.4 He disposes of in the com. under the second stanza of the eighth chapter of S. D. the argument by saying that the mental condition melting the heart cannot be regarded as an effect of the Mādhu- rya as it is the same as the literary bliss in the form of a mental relish. Panditarāja Jagannātha follows the previous writers with but one difference. Unlike them who say that the Gunas belong to Rasa primarily and to the word and its sense only secondarily he appears to hold that the Gunas belong primarily and not secondarily to the word and its sense both.5 The

1. K. P. VIII. 66. 2. Ibid. VIII. 68-71. 3. H. K. S. IV. p. 201. 4. S. D. VIII. 2, 4, 7 & 8. 5. R. G. p. 55.

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psychological approach which has been seen above at the hands of the different writers assumes quite a new form in the treatment of Sāradātanaya. He accounts for the difference in Rasas in point of origin on the basis of the function of the ego with the ten sense organs coming in contact with the external objects and the different kinds of the Vibhāvas fixed for different Rasas.1 The mind, at that time, in different relations with the three Gunas, viz. the Sattva, the Rajas and the Tamas, combined with different sense organs under- goes different transformations otherwise called Rasas. The author elucidates his point as follows. When the Lalita Vibhävas finding representation suitable to them in con- junction with the Sāttvikabhāvas, the Anubhāvas and the Vyabhichāribhāvas excite the Sthāyibhāvas, at that time the mind of the spectators is permeated with the Rajas and the Sattva. The mind then undergoes a transformation which is blissful. It is called the Srngara and is relishable. The process is as above in all other Rasas with the difference in the Vibhavas, in the function of the Gunas and of the sense organs. The Sthāyibhāvas undoubtedly differ in all Rasas -- a fact which hardly requires any special notice. In the Häsya, the Vīra, the Adbhuta, the Raudra, the Karuna, the Bībhatsa and the Bhayānaka the Vibhāvas respectively are the Lalitā- bhasas, the Sthiras, the Chittras, the Kharas, the Rūksas, the Ninditas and the Vikrtas. The mind is touched with the Rajas, has a trace of the Tamas and rests in the Chaitanya in the Hasya; it is permeated with the Sattva, has a trace of the Rajas and is combined with the Abhimāna in the Vira ; it is resplendent with the Rajas and the Sattva and is combined with the Buddhi in the Adbhuta ; it has traces

1. B. P. Lines. 12-18. p. 4.

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of the Rajas and the Tamas and is combined with the Ahankāra in the Raudra; it is predominated by the Tamas, assumes the form of the Chitta, is of insentient nature and has traces of the Sat in the Karuna ; it assumes the form of the Buddhi, is devoid of the Sattva and has traces of the Chit in the Bibhatsa ; and it assumes the form of the Chitta and has traces of the Tamas and the Sattva in the Bhayanaka. This explanation of the origin of Rasa is as described in the Yogamālāsamhitā.1 On the basis of the above explanation only eight Rasas are recognized. According to some scholars there is a ninth transformation of mind which is the Santa Rasa; whereas according to others there can be no such transformation, for austerities etc. cannot be represented. The latter view is given under the name of Padmabhu who accepts only eight Rasas.2 This opinion has undoubted reference to Bharata's mention of only eight Rasas under the name of Druhina as has been pointed out by Raghavan.3 The author then gives another view under the name of Närada where the mental transforma- tions are akin to those in the previous views. The difference that exists here is that the helping factors are the three Gunas, viz. the Sattva, the Rajas and the Tamas, and the Ahankāra. When the mind comes into contact with external objects and has the Rajas in predominance, it along with the Ahankāra is transformed into the Srngāra Rasa. The above transforma- tion with the replacement of the Rajas by the Sattva is called the Hasya Rasa. The Vira is the mental transformation wherein are to be found the Ahankara, the Rajas and the Sattva functioning as also the contact of the mind with external objects. The above transformation devoid of the

1. B. P. II. pp. 43-45. 2. Ibid. II. p. 47. 3. R N. R. p. 4.

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Ahankara and the Rajas is the Adbhuta Rasa. The Raudra Rasa is the transformation of the mind wherein the Rajas, the Tamas and the Ahankara function and which has come into contact with external objects. The Karuna Rasa is the above transformation devoid of the Rajas and the Ahankāra. The Bibhatsa Rasa is the transformation of the mind which has assumed the form of the Chitta, has the Tamas and the Sattva functioning, and has come into contact with external objects. From the mind which is devoid of the Sattva, the Buddhi and has distinct traces of the Tamas comes into origin exclusively from outside the Bhayānaka Rasa. The Śānta Rasa is the transformation of the mind when it is very slightly touched with external objects, which is devoid of the Rajas and the Tamas and when it has assumed the form of the Sattva in the pure form of the Chitta.1 In the above view has been expressed some justification for the classification of Rasas as primary and their derivatives, as can be illustrated from the fact that the descriptions of the Hasya, the Adbhuta, and the Karuna have been given as produced from the Śrngāra, the Vīra and the Raudra. It is, however, quite plain that in the above two theories the mental transforma- tions are said to be Rasas themselves. Śāradātanaya gives some other views also on the classification of Rasa. He says that from the Sāmaveda the Śrngāra came out, from the Rg the Vira, from the Atharva the Raudra and from the Yajus the Bībhatsa. Lord Paramātmā remembering the Sāmans and desirous of creating the world cherished the wish of manifesting His form by Himself. This wish addicted to sens ualobjects is called the Rati which is the Śrngāra. His consciousnesss in the form of desire and action, when He

1. B. P. II. p. 47-48.

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remembers the Rks, comes into contact with external objects. It is then of the nature of the Utsāha ( enthusiasm ) and is called the Vira. When remembering the Atharvamantras His intellect bent on doing harm is put into action by anger. It is called the Raudra. When remembering the Yajus His tendency in the form of action actually terminating in some result is called the Bibhatsa. The author then counts the above four sentiments as principal and primary, the other four as their derivatives.1 That the author here is to a certain extent following Bharata is clear. He gives another view on the origin of different Rasas. Vyāsa is said to be its propounder. When in the assembly of the god Brahmā the Bharatas gave the dramatic representation of the Tripura- dha, out of the four mouths of the god, who was witnessing the show very attentively, came the four Rasas with the four Vrttis. When the Bharatas acted the enjoyment in union of Śiva and Śivā, the Śrngāra came forth from the Kaiśikī Vrtti from the mouth facing the East. When they acted well the destruction of Tripura the Vira came out of the Sattvatī Vrtti from the mouth facing the South. On the representation of the destruction of the sacrifice of Daksa, the Raudra came forth out of the Arabhati Vrtti from the mouth facing the West. And when the actors represented Maheśvara's activities at the destruction of the whole universe, the Bibhatsa came forth out of the Bharati Vrtti from the mouth facing the North. Here the author puts forth a suggestion that according to Sankara etc. Rasas got mani- fested and were not produced from the respective mouths, thereby probably hinting that Rasa is suggested and not produced. He then shows that other four Rasas have

1. B. P. III. pp. 54 55.

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come out of the previous four. When Lord Parameśvara putting on matted locks and deer skin, ornaments in the form of serpents, with one eye emitting fire and with His body smeared with ashes, desired amoruous sports with the goddess Śivā, the goddess and Her companions burst into uproarious laughter. Hence is the Hāsya Rasa said to have originated from the Śrngāra Rasa. When Tripurāsura built the three Puras ( cities or fotresses ) of iron, silver and gold and posted hundreds of thousands of crores of active demons around them for their defence, Lord Parameśvara, all alone bearing their violent showers of arrows, looked with the corner of His eye at Ambikā who, too, was seeing Śiva in the same way ; and laughing, He, the destroyer of love, reduced to ashes all of them with one arrow. At that time all living beings were struck with wonder. Hence is the Adbhuta said to come out of the Vira. When Rudra Vīra- bhadra destroyed the sacrifice of Daksa and inflicted punish- ment on the gods with various instruments, at that time the goddess and Her companions, seeing the sufferers with their ears, eyes and noses cut off, felt a great pity for them. It is due to this that the Karuna Rasa is said to be produced from the Raudra. On the destruction of the Adidevas when Bhairava took up their bones and besmeared up His body with their ashes and danced on their cremation ground, the demons etc. got frightened with these activities and resorted to Him for shelter struck dumb with violent fear as they were. It is because of this that the Bhayanaka is said to have originated from the Bībhatsa.1 Thus does Śāradā- tanaya fancifully records the origin and classification of different Rasas. In certain respects he follows Bharata

1. B. P. III. pp. 56-58.

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whereas in others he shows his affinities with later writers as Bhoja etc. who as seen before exploited the Abhimāna Vrtti to the utmost. Sāradātanaya accepts as also rejects the Śanta Rasa in conformity with the two views quoted by him under the names of Nārada and Padmabhū. The Santa Rasa, therefore, became the battle-ground for writers and scholars of Sanskrit poetics, some of whom rejected it wholly, whereas others accepted it in literary works other than dramas. There were still others who gave it recognition even in dramas.1 It may be conceded here as a ground for contention as to how far it can be represented directly on the stage through the performance of various activities, just as heroic activities dramatically represented directly suggest the Vira. The Santa Rasa, however, may be said to represent a stage which is the result of the activities depicted through other Rasas, and perhaps it was with this reason that individual Sthayibhava or all combined together were put forward as its Sthāyibhāva. This will receive treatment in the chapter following. Abhinava postulated the Ātman as its Sthayibhava and hence all other Sthāyibhāvas became its Vyabhichāribhāvas. It, therefore, appears cogent to say that the representation of the Vira etc., where any of them is not intended to be the principal Rasa, finally leads to the enjoyment of the Santa in the spectators. This position represents the Santa as a Rasa suggested through other Rasas and not as a mental state in the audience before the dramatic representation -- which perhaps is intended to be understood by Wilson when he says, "The advocates for its exclusion2 suggest a compromise, and transfer it from

1. R. N. R. p. 44. 2. 'Exclusion' here means 'exclusion from dramatic composition. '

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the persons of the play to the audience, who are thus fitted for the impressions to be made upon them. It is highly proper, it is urged, that they should exhibit the Santa Rasa, and sit in silent attention, their tempers perfectly passive, and their hearts free from every external influence."1 Wilson here not only goes against several authorities in Sanskrit poetics but virtually ignores some very weighty considera- tions. For example, some of the dramas themselves aim at the representation of the Santa Rasa, the activities of the Yatamāna Yogin (Yogin putting in efforts to achieve the highest stage of truth and reality) etc. Moreover, the psychological explanation of the different Rasas makes provision for the Santa also inasmuch as the mental con- dition in, or equated with, the Santa Rasa has been expressly pointed out. Tranquillity comes only after struggle, there- fore in the representation of the Santa Rasa all other Rasas are contributory factors. The recognition of the Sānta as a dramatic Rasa was responsible for the advocacy of an other Rasa called the Māyā Rasa. Bhānudatta mentions it and advances psychological grounds for its acceptance. In the Nivrtti is to be accepted the Santa Rasa whereas on the basis of the Pravrtti is to be recognized the Māyā Rasa. This Rasa cannot be included in, or be identical with, the eight orthodox Rasas. The eight Sthāyibhāvas become its Vyabhichāribhāvas. The Mithyājñāna is postulated as it Sthāyibhāva.2 Chirañjīva Bhatțāchārya in the Kāvya- vilasa buotes the above view and criticizes it. He gives no recognition to the Māyā Rasa but accepts only nine Rasas including the Santa.3 The Rasachandrikā also cri- sicizes and refutes it completely.4 Raghavan, too, rejects 1. W. D. pp. 90-91. 2. B. R. T. pp. 161-162. 3. C. K. V. p. 10. 4. V. R. C. pp. 68-69.

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it.1 It was the advent and admission of the Śanta which became responsible for the consideration if the established number of Rasas is sufficient or other Rasas should also be recognized and the number increased. The names of such Rasas as the Preyas, the Vätsalya, the Prīti, the Sneha, the Bhakti, the Śraddhā, the Laulya, the Kārpaņya, the Udātta, the Uddhata, the Vyasana, the Duhkha, the Sukha, the Vrīdanaka etc. have been mentioned. Many of these have been seen engaging the attention of very early scholars. Bhämaha, for example, has considered the Preyas as the Bhakti etc. Many of them as the Preyas, the Vātsalya, the Priti, the Sneha, and the Bhakti have also been con- sidered by some scholars, as Mammata and Hemachandra, under the Bhäva which in its turn is, in one aspect, only another form of the Rati converting into the Śrngāra Rasa. Even if separately cognized the mental condition involved is only the Druti, hence they do not need separate mental conditions. The Mandaramarandachampu postulating the Karuņā as the Sthāyibhāva of the Vātsalya Rasa2 is an instance in point. The Karuņā here is different from the Karuna Rasa as the former is a mixture of affection with other emotions for the child. But the Druti is assuredly the mental con- dition involved. Out of the above the Bhakti Rasa assumed two different aspects later on at the hands of the Bengal Vaisnavaite of the Chaitanya school and the Advaitī as Madhusudana Sarasvatī. The effort made was to include other Rasas in its whole economy as will be seen later on. The Laulya has been put forward byAbhinava and its inclu- sion in the Hasya shown by him3-a fact which is testified to

1. R. N. R. p. 139. 2.M.M. C. p. 100. 3. N. S. (G. O. S.) VI. p. 342 (Com.).

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by Bhoja also. Bhānudatta discusses the Kārpanya along with the Laulya and shows their inclusion in the Hāsya Rasa.1 The Udatta and the Uddhata Rasas put forward by Bhoja have been so advanced to fix one Rasa for each of the four types of heroes. For instance, the Dhīrasānta hero has the Santa Rasa, the Dhīralalita the Preyas, the Dhīrodātta the Udātta or the Ūrjasvin, and the Dhīroddhata the Uddhata Rasa.2 That the Vyasana, the Duhkha and the Sukha Rasas come under one or another of the recognized Rasas is shown by Rämachandra and Gunachandra when advancing them for consideration.3 Lastlty comes the Vrīdanaka which has replaced the Bhayānaka which in its turn is recognized as included in the Raudra in the Anuyoga- dvarasutra of the Jains.4 The illustration brings out the emotion of modesty and is, therefore, rightly considered by Raghavan as a Vyabhichāribhāva.5 It, therefore, attains the stage of the Bhava according to its conception by Mammata etc. These different Rasas put forward for discussion indicate the efforts of the writers who wanted to suggest that there should be Rasas other than the re- cognized ones. This attitude was not a sudden growth as hints in as early writers as Bhatta lollata are to be found as mentioned by Abhinava,6 though the number nine is re- cognized because of the established nine Rasas having the capacity to be useful for the four great objects-the Pumarthas as they are called -- and give much greater delight to people. Rudrata also hints at the same point,7 which is made clear by his commentator, Namisādhu. Pratihārendurāja limits

1. B. R. T. p. 125. 2. R. N. R. p. 122. 3. N. D. p. 163. 4. R. N. R. pp. 140-141. 5. Ibid. p. 143. 6. N. S. (G. O. S.) VI. pp. 299 & 341 (Com.). 7. R. K. L. XII. 3.

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the number to nine only technically.1 Bhoja hints at other Rasas by saying that all the Bhavas can also be relished as Rasas.2 Bhoja goes to such a length as to recognize as Rasas even the Sāttvikabhāvas which are physical manifesta- tions mostly as will be seen later on. He, however, does not recognize that the Vibhāvas etc. can mature into Rasas- a position which is referred to in the Lochana3 and made explicit by Panditarāja in the Rasagangādhara.4 This position is, no doubt, found in practice when Dhanañjaya advances for consideration Rasas as the Mrgaya and the Aksa, though at the same time he points out their inclusion.5 That this state of affairs subsided of itself can be seen very clearly in the work of the latest great authority on Sanskrit poetics, Panditarāja Jagannātha. He accepts the orthodox eight Rasas in conformity with the standpoint of all the ancient authorities. He also accepts the Santa even in dramaturgy thus recognizing the number of Rasas as nine. Other views recognizing Rasas other than the established nine have received summary disposal at his hands. Herein stands the authority of Bharata and Abhinava unchallenged who gave the number as nine only, even though the ninth may be recognized as suggested in hints according to some, inspite of the fact that in some edition of the Nātyasastra ( as in the G. O. S. ) the text on the Śānta is available.6 4. Rasa-Synthesis. (i) Karuņa. The first great poet of India is Valmīki whose very first verse is the expression of deep pathos for the separation of

1. K. S. pp. 52-53. 2. B. S. P. I. 11. 3. D. L. p. 186 (Com.). 4. R. G. p. 28. 5. D. R. IV. 83. 6. N. S. (G. O. S.) VI. pp. 333-336 & VII. 386.

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the Krauñcha pair. The poet was so deeply touched to the core with the wailings of the bird that the vehement passion found outlet in the Śloka metre. No other passion had ever before so much agitated within him and so much brought about the melting of his mind as to make the poet lose himself in total absorption. The rhythmic expression of pathos leads one to think that it was so vehement, so absorbing and at the same time so beautiful that it sponta- neously chose its fitting medium. Various other incidents in the life of other living beings would have been witnessed by the first poet, but the vehemence of the Karuna Rasa was experienced by him very keenly. This automatic and natural preference for the Karuna Rasa to others proves it to be of the most primary importance. Bhavabhūti, the poet-dramatist, had the same vehement and all-engrossing experience of the Karuna Rasa. Speaking of the Karuņa Rasa he says that it is the only one Rasa which undergoes various tranformations like water which variously assumes the forms of whirlpools, bubbles, ripples and waves.1 The com. to the above makes the position quite clear. It runs, 'though fundamentally one it looks different like the different relations of companion, husband and wife. It assumes different conditions in Vāsantī, Sītā, Rāma etc.' Here the commentator bases his interpretation as regards other Rasas as transformation on the ground that the author has himself used the word, Vikāra. The commentator clearly points out that the different forms are the Śrngāra Rasa etc. And finally he says that though the author of the Śņngāra-prakāśa maintains the Śrngāra Rasa as the only Rasa, yet he establi- shes the Karuna as the only Rasa as it is to be experienced

1. U. R. III. 47.

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in plenty and is common to those fond of this world as well as to those who have renounced it completely, and other Rasas are merely its transformations. Later on is to be found Ananda who bears testimony to the fact that the Karuna Rasa it is which has been depicted by the first poet as the principal Rasa, thoroughly sustained as it is till the separation of Sīta.1 Ananda has here pointed out that the first Rasa is only the Karuna Rasa. He did not mean to say like Bhavabhūti that is was the only Rasa. It is, there- fore, the view of Bhavabhūti which advocates this synthesis. The poet-dramatist experienced to the full the vehemence and the intensity of the Karuna Rasa. He was keenly sensitive to every external influence, so much so that in the Mālatīmādhava he expresses his condemnation for his contemporaries who did not give him his due praise and credit.2 To a mind so sensitive, naturally pessimism appeared rampant and it is obviously this fact which is expressed by the commentator in the word, Prāchuryad.3 Life thus becomes a burden to the sensitive man, but the question that arises here is if life is an incessant misery or it is not inters- persed with the oases of happiness. Even the dramatist had to go against his grain in bringing about the final meeting between Rama and Sīta and not letting the play end with their separation. Then as opposed to the all prominence of the Karuna stands the predominance of the Śrngāra Rasa which finds much more favour with not only human beings but with living beings in general. Bhavabhūti perhaps got the idea of this synthesis in Bharata who advocated the origin of one set of sentiments from the

1. D. L. pp. 529-530. 2. M. M. I. (Prastāvanā). 8. 3. U. R. III. 47 (Com.).

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other ; but he changed the order. The mental condition involved in, or equated with, the Karuna Rasa is the melting of the heart. It is one of the mental conditions and as such how can it include others ? The insufficiency of the view, therefore, appears quite evident. It is an other consideration that in a literary piece the Karuna Rasa may predominate, others being subsidiary to it, but to establish the Prakrti-Vikrti-Bhāva is really not sound as it ignores other mental conditions. Raghavan in support of the Karuņa-synthesis says, "In English, the word ' Symapthy' meaning 'response to another's feeling of sorrow,' has come to be used in an enlarged sense to mean all forms of aesthetic response and attunement of heart, Cittasamvāda ; and here is a linguistic argument in favour of a Karuņa- synthsis. For it seems, the model and the supreme example of a complete attunement of heart, which poetry and drama effects, is certainly the attunement of hearts in Karuna".1 His acceptance of the word 'sympathy' in its modern extended sense certainly covers every case and places it high above all ; but whether Bhavabhūti used it in this com- prehensive sense is doubtful. He did not mean to cover all the cases but advocated the origin of other Rasas from the Karuna-a position which seems hardly contemplated in the above quotation.

(ii) Śānta.

The Śānta Rasa synthesis is to be found in Bharata's Nātyasāstra itself. The Bhāvas as the Rati etc. are the transformations (Vikāras) whereas the Sānta is the original

1. R. N. R. p. 165.

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nature (Prakrti). The transformations have come out of this original nature and they finally merge into it. The particular Bhäva with its cause comes out of it on the destruc- tion of which it sinks back into it. Abhinava builds his own opinion on the above statement. He calls the Santa the greatest Rasa due to its being connected with the Moksa, the greatest Puruşārtha. It is transcedental also as it has not got so much of earthly touch as other Rasas have and further that the Atman, the Sthāyibhāva here as recognized by Abhinava ( this marks a departure from Bharata ), is the substratum of all the activities as it is this factor which assu- mes different Vrttis in other Rasas as the Srngāra etc. It is, thus, the Sthayibhava even of other Sthayibhavas as the latter rather become the Vyabhichāribhāvas in it.1 The Śānta Rasa has been recognized as a dramatic Rasa by Bharata and after him even by Udbhata. It is not on the same level with other Rasas, as like them it cannot be directly represen- ted. That the Prabodhachandrodaya furnishes an instance in point will be seen later on. Other Rasas finally merge into it just as in a work like the Mahābhārata, as Ānanda points out, other Rasas finally merge into, and suggest, it ultimately.2 The advocates of the Santa as that stage of Rasa which is devoid of any Vrtti better establish the Santa-synthesis than those who recognize it as any of the Vrttis or as an individual Rasa involving any of them. In the absence of any mental condition, obviously it is the original nature and other Rasas will only be its modifications. In case any one Vrtti is admitted the synthesis is sure to ignore other mental conditions. The theory, thus, will appear inadequate.

1. N. S. (G. O. S.) VI. pp. 336-337 (Com.). 2. D. L. pp. 530-531.

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(iii) Śrngāra. A-RATI ŚRNGĀRA. The Agnipurana puts forth the synthesis of the Rati Śrngāra according to which various Rasas are modifications of the Rati. The inherent bliss of the Ultimate Reality called Parabrahma which is indestructible, eternal, unborn, all pervading etc. sometimes becomes manifested. That manifestation is called Rasa of the nature of wonder of ( at the apprehension of transcendental) consciousness. Its first transformation is the Ahankara from which proceeds the Abhimana which is pervading the three worlds. Out of this Abhimana proceeds the Rati of which Rasas as the Śrngāra, the Hāsya etc. are modifications.1 B-AHAŃKĀRA ŚRNGĀRA Bhoja has given another synthesis called the Ahankāra Śrngāra synthesis which establishes the function of the Ahankāra everywhere. This Ahankāra is also otherwise called by him the Abhimāna and the Śrngāra. It is a Guņa of the Atman and Rasa has Rasatva because of the relishable power of the Atman. It is, therefore, this Ahankāra, that is, self-love which is the one Rasa. The Śrngara, other name for the Ahankāra, is, therefore, the only Rasa. This basic Śrngāra is different from its derivatives as the Śṛngāra, the Häsya etc. It is to be marked here that this synthesis is not akin to those advocated previously, as here the Śrngāra is not one of the recognized nine Rasas but altogehter a different element serving as the basic principle. In cons- sistency with this attitude Bhoja does not accept the nine recognized Rasas as Rasas but recognizes them only as the

1. A. P. 338. 1-5. 24

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Bhävas. Rasa in his theory can be called only an experience of absolute and unconditioned bliss. If this experience becomes in any way conditioned by the Śrngāra, the Hāsya etc, it means that it has not reached the highest stage. Hence the Śrngara, the Hāsya etc. are only the Bhāvas. Keeping this principle in view, Bhoja even advocated the relishable nature of the Vyabhichāribhāvas etc. on the same level with the Śrngāra, the Hāsya etc.1 That Bhoja got suggestions from the Agnipurāna synthesis is quite evident. As pointed out previously in the last chapter, he did not follow it in toto but equated the Ahankāra with the Abhimana and the Śrngāra. In the Agnipurāna theory itself as the Rati comes out of the Abhi- māna, the Śānta Rasa is not properly contemplated. Its mention is, no doubt, to be found2 but it seems that the underlying mental condition is not considered. Besides, it is not clear how the Śrngara can transform itself into the Raudra etc. where there is fundamental difference in the Vrttis (mental conditions ). It is apparently a Vedāntic approach to the synthesis as the terminology shows. With Bhoja it becomes the Sänkhya approach utilizing the Sānkhya and the Nyāya phraseology. Bhoja's Abhimāna or Ahankāra was something gross and not pure' I' as advocated in the Trika system, hence the theory can hardly be said to be in conformity with the Trika system. The acceptance of the nine recognized Rasas as only Bhävas and of the delectable- ness of even the Vyabhichāribhāvas is, no doubt, novel, striking and original in the light of the particular theory, but this is surely either in ignornace or in non-acceptance of the fundamentals of psychology. That these Rasas are

1. B. S. P. I. 3-12. 2. A. P. 338. 9.

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relished as such has already been shown. Vatve has pointed out that this synthesis of the Ahankāra Srngāra has its support in the Gita.1 It seems to be ignored here as to how the Häsya in one of the aspects wherein it is Parastha ( where the other man is laughed at and his Abhimāna is wounded) can be accounted for. Had other Rasas been recognized as Rasas the point would not have arisen as the experience in every case would have been unconditioned bliss. This bliss according to Bhoja is disturbed by the knowledge of the Śrngära, the Häsya etc., hence the latter are only the Bhävas. Further Bhoja gets inconsistent with his own theory when he says that the Santa attains the stage of the Bhava on this Abhimana. The Santa means a stage of total disappearance of the Abhimāna according to scholars. Vatve gives here a view propounded by Prof. Chaphekar which advocates the Rati or the expression of the vehement emotion as the origin of Rasa. Various Rasas get their names in accordance with the forms of the objects which give outlet for this Rati. The view gives three kinds of the Rati, viz. the Śrngāra, the Vīra and the Karuna,and out of the Vira comes the Radura, the Bībhatsa and the Bhayānaka. The Häsya and the Adbhuta have not been accepted as Rasas.2 That the theory is partial is quite clear.

(iv) Preman.

Bhoja suggests another synthesis in Preman. The Rati lies at the root of all the Bhavas. It reaches the culminating stage when it leaves the Bhäva stage and attains the Rasa stage. At that point it becomes the Preman. Other Bhāvas

1. V. R. V. p. 230. 2. Ibid. p. 231.

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also at this stage become Rasas. Hence all Rasas merge in the Preman.1 Bhoja recognizes three stages of his Rasa, viz. the Parākoți, the Madhyama Avasthā and the Uttarākoți. In the first it is the one Ahankara otherwise called the Śrngāra, in the second the Śrngāra becomes manifest in various ways in the forms of the Rati etc. each growing to its climax through the Vibhavas etc., and in the last all these become aspects of the Preman which is the transformation of the Rati.2 He has, however, suggested this synthesis under the Preyas Alankāra. He says in the Srngāraprakāśa that the Preman is the only Rasa.3 It is later on in Kavi Karnapūra that the synthesis finds advocacy. The Kavi does not dilate upon this synthesis but disposes it of very summarily as he is afraid it will fatten the bulk of his work, the Alankārakaustu bha.4 He says that in the Preman all other Rasas get merged. As the Preman is one indivisible Rasa, all other Rasas and the Bhävas emerge from, and submerge into, it like the waves and currents in the ocean.5 The melting of the heart has been recognized as the Sthāyibhava of this Rasa. The synthesis, therefore, is partial as all other mental conditions have been ignored. The Kavi had religious proclivities as pointed out before. Hence is this special favour towards Chittadrava which is the menatl condition in the Bhakti Rasa. The tendency is quite obvious even though the Bhakti has been recognized as a separate Rasa. The Kavi is influenced in this synthesis by Rūpa Gosvāmī etc. who establish Premā as the stage which turns into different kinds of Sthāyibhāvas which, therefore, may be said to emerge from, and sub- merge into, it.

1. B. S. K. V. p. 760. 2. Ibid. pp. 759-760. 3. R. N. R. p. 170. 4. K. A. K. p. 148. 5. Ibid. pp. 148-149.

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(v) Adbhuta. The Adbhuta-synthesis, though not regularly expounded as early as Bharata, seems to be present in hints even so early in that the pervasiveness of this Rasa is to be found enjoined even in the Nātyasāstra. 'The plot is to be full of wonder,'1 bears witness to it. 'Those expert in the depiction of the Adbhuta Rasa should invariably depict it in the Nir- vaha na Sandhi'2 is another instance wherein Bharata attaches importance to this Rasa. Later writers took up this thread. Bhämaha even propounded the Atisayokti3 which Dandin accepted.4 Änanda and Abhinava also recognized it.5 It is in Kuntaka, however, that Bhämaha's doctrine of the Atiśayokti found all possible scope. The Chamatkāra with him counted most. This Chamatkāra with him is nothing but 'strikingness and novelty.' The poet-dramatist Bhav- abhuti who had expounded the Karuna-synthesis accepted the importance of the Adbhuta Rasa as it is suggested many times in the seventh act of the Uttararamacharita, but the regular Adbhuta-synthesis is to be found in the Sāhityadarpana mentioned by Viśvanātha under the name of his great grandfather, Nārāyana, quoted in the writings of one Dharmadatta. Viśvanātha gives this view in course of the explanation of the word, Chamatkāra. He says that the Chamatkāra consists in the expansion of the Chitta ; it is otherwise called the Vismaya ( wonder). That this is the life of Rasa has been said by the revered Nārāyana. Dharmadatta in his work says, "The essence in Rasa is the Chamatkāra experienced at every

1. N. S. (K. S. S.) XXI. 54. 2. Ibid. XX. 47. 3. K. L. II. 85. 4. K. D. II. 214 & 220. 5. D. L. pp. 467-468. 6. V. J. I. 2 & 10 (With com.).

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step. In that Chamatkara which is the essence, it is the Adbhuta experienced every where. It is due to this that the great Nārayana called the Adbhuta the only Rasa."1 That is how the Adbhuta-synthesis is held. That this Chamatkära had a firm hold on most of the writers in this field can be shown by the fact that even Panditarāja Jagan- nātha, always averse to take anything on trust because of its antiquity, tradition or advocacy by former great scholars, accepts it and builds on it his definition of poetry ; for what does his Ramanīyatā consist in but the Lokottaratva of which the equivalent is the Chamatkara.2 Bhanudatta has shown that the Chamatkara is present in every Rasa as its ancillary, becoming the predominant Rasa ( Adbhuta) where others become subordinate to it.3 This is a position recognizing the all pervasiveness of the Adbhuta Rasa. Kavi Karņapūra quotes the very verse given in the Sähityadarpana with some modification which though slight comes to place the utmost importance on the Chamatkāra, as it is said that without it no realization of Rasa can take place.4 The Kavi, however, does not intend to expound the Adbhuta-synthesis but merely points out the presence of the element of wonder which in the susceptible spectators produces a delectableness. This intention of his has been made quite clear in the footnote.5 Thus the Adbhuta Rasa has been holding ground in Sanskrit poetics and dramaturgy. It is not something unexpectd as the soul itself of which the art is the expression of perfec- tion towards the true, the good and the beautiful has itself been always regarded as something mysteriously wonderful as in the Gita.6 But it has to be remembered here that the

1. S. D. III. p. 1. 2. R. G. p. 4. 3. B. R. T. p. 28. 4. Κ. Α. K. p. 137. 5. Ibid (Footnote). 6. Śrī. Bhag. Gī. II. 29.

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wonder element does not last long ; on the satisfaction of the longing for novelty it vanishes. Prabhākara rightly points out that as human natures differ the wonder may not appeal to all. Moreover, it is not present in the Vyabhichā- ribhavas as well as in all the Sthayibhavas. For instance, there is no tinge of wonder in the Soka.1 It may further be pointed out here that recognition of the Adbhuta synthesis means the ignoring of the importance of other mental conditions. (vi) Bhakti. The hints of the Bhakti Rasa are to be found as early as Bhämaha in the Preyas Alankāra2 which Dandin also accepts.3 But the Bhakti as a separate Rasa received no recognition as it was included in the Bhäva, the immature Rasa stage of the Rati. There were some efforts at its implicit acceptance as Rasa and not merely as the Bhäva, but the attitude of strict adherence to the traditional position rendered the above efforts useless. All this is finally illustrated in the Rasagangā- dhara wherein Panditarāja raises the problem by pointing out the Bhakti as Rasa and giving his verdict to the effect that all kinds of the Rati except the Rati between man and woman are to be included in the Bhäva. With the staunch advocates of the Bhakti, however, it held its supremacy. It was regarded not only as one of the recognized Rasas but the only Rasa ; all other Rasas were to be included in it. The Bhakti-synthesis received its advocacy in two schools, viz. the Chaitanya school of the Bengal Vaisnavism and the Advaitavādin as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. A-Bhakti according to the Bengal Vaişnavism.

1. R. P. p. 40. 2. K. L. III. 5. 3. K. D. II. 276-277.

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the Vyabhichāribhāvas and the Sthāyibhāvas will not hold1. The Māya Rasa should not be accepted as the arguments above point out. This synthesis is really speaking not akin to other syn- theses as here altogether a separate Rasa is postulated. Other Rasas excepting the Santa are not its derivatives but simply its Vyabhichāribhāvas. This Rasa, therefore, is never relished at all. On the other hand, the above so- called Vyabhichāribhāvas are separately relished as Rasas hence no such Māyā Rasa is ever realized. 5. Rasas-Their Interrelation, Contradiction etc. Bharata's remark about the four primary Rasas and their four derivatives shows its validity here as each primary with its derivative can never be opposed but always mutually help- ing. In Bharata no mention of the contradiction between Rasa and Rasa is to be found. Bhänudatta, however, men- tions Bharata in this connection in the 8th stanza of the eighth chapter of his Rasatarangini. In case of other Rasas there are mental conditions which according to their nature are sometimes contradictory and sometimes not ; in such cases the transference from one mental condition to another is worth consideration. For instance, the Vīra and the Srngära are not opposed but friendly as the Dhvanyā- loka points out2, but the Srngära may not be friendly to the Vīra as the Sāhityadarpana puts it3. Only one Rasa depic- ted to the exclusion of others in the whole literary piece becomes monotonous and if many Rasas are depicted with- out any relation, there is a chaos and the unitary effect of the literary piece is marred, as no Rasa appears predominating.

1. V. R. C. pp. 68-69. 2. D. L. p. 381. 3. S. D. III. 254.

392 The depiction of one Rasa as principal should, therefore, be the aim of the author. Ananda says that according to the aim of the author one Rasa should be kept as the prin- cipal Rasa.1 The question of compatibility or opposition comes only when the author has put before him the aim of depicting one Rasa as principal and others subsidiary to it. The opposition between Rasa and Rasa is to be experienced when the one intended to be kept as principal has its full scope not attained due to interference by another. Hence it is that different ways of removing this opposition have to be adopted. When, therefore, one Rasa has been kept up as principal and others subordinate to it, this opposition ought to disappear ; but there are cases when simply making one Rasa as principal with others subordinate to it does not solve the problem. For instance, the Srngāra and the Bī- bhatsa are never compatible, the latter totally marks the effect of the former. In such cases the subordinate Rasa, whether compatible or not with the principal Rasa, should never be brought to its full stage of maturity. Sometimes in case of the Srngära and the Vīra, even when both have attained equal maturity, the opposition is removed2. Mammata notes that sometimes the subordinate Rasa, even though opposed to the principal one, does not mar the full enjoy- ment of the principal Rasa when remembered with it3. In case of the two opposed Rasas instanced above, though Ānanda has not marked it, there is a deciding factor dis- tinguishing the principal from the subordinate as the word, 'Bhatasya' used here is pointed out in the Daśarūpaka4. Panditarāja Jagannātha also points out the same thing when 1. D. L. III. 21. 2. Ibid. pp. 382-383. 3. K. P. VII. 65. p. 453. 4. D. R. IV. pp. 144-145.

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he says that in such cases the special signification of ordinary adjectives serves as the deciding factor1. The Vyabhi- chāribhavas opposed to the principal Rasa should not be brightly depicted. This is obviously to show that the subordinate Rasa opposed to the principal Rasa has not matured to its final stage. · If, however, the above Vyabhi- chäribhāvas have been depicted too brightly, those of the principal Rasa should be repeated. In cases when the subordinate Rasa has been brought to its full maturity, it should be repeatedly suggested as the subordinate Rasa. In the above three cases the subordinate Rasa serves the purpose of bringing the principal Rasa to its full stage of maturity as Ānanda points out. He also points out that in the opinion of those who use through the Upachara the word Rasa for the Sthayibhava, such relation of the prin- cipal and the subordinate is accepted without any hitch.2 When two Rasas are mutually opposed their opposition may be set aside by making them both subordinate to a third which in such cases becomes the principal Rasa ; for instance, the Srngära and the Karuna are both mutually- opposed but when they become parts of the Bhāva (devo- tion to the king ) the opposition is not experienced.3 When two Rasas are mutually opposed and have the same Āśraya (substratum), one of them is to be made to have some other substratum. Under such circumstances the latter even if fully matured will not have any destructive effect. If, however, two Rasas, directly opposed, are to be depicted in the same Āśraya, some other Rasa should be interposed to avoid this direct opposition. No case of opposition arises when a Rasa opposed to the principal Rasa is made

1. R. G. p. 49. 2. D. L. p. 387. 3. R. G. pp. 48-49. :

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subordinate to a Rasa which is already subordinate to the principal one Rājñi ( Senāpatitadbhrtyavat ).1 When there are many Rasas in a literary work they are, thus, interrelated and the opposition and contradiction reconciled. Any dereliction is sure to bring in defect in the realization and enjoyment of the principal Rasa. There may, however, arise some other defects in every Rasa as pointed by Ananda and Mammata. The mention of the Vibhāvas, the Anubhāvas etc. of the opposite Rasa, ex- pressing Rasa meant to be suggested through the general word as Rasa or the particular word as the Srngara etc., naming the Vyabhichāribhāvas or the Sthāyibhāvas directly and the suggestion of the Anubhava and the Vibhava with a great deal of difficulty, untimely elaboration and breaking up of a Rasa, giving a wide canvas to an ancillary, negligence of the important and the main factor as the hero etc., des- cribing different characters as performing activities and works quite incompatible with their nature,status etc., describing an element which does not function as a part and hence is not helping to Rasa, harnessing the Vrttis in a manner unsuitable to their nature-such and like are the causes which bring about defects in Rasa. Some of these defects may be removed. Sometimes the Sañchāribhāva even if expressed may not bring about the defect ; it may also not bring about the defect in Rasa when it is expressed as suppressed by other ones. The defects based on the external factors may also be brought about by inappropriate use of such elements as the Gunas, the Ragas, the metres etc. In the previous section the Gunas have primarily been equated with the Chitta-

1. K. P. VII. p. 456 (Com.).

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vrttis ( mental conditions ) themselves. In their opinion, therefore, the Gunas in the sense of factors bringing about these mental conditions are so called only secondarily whereas according to others these Gunas are so called not secondarily but primarily also. There are some letters prescribed for bringing about these mental conditions in different Rasas. The Madhurya and the Ojas Gunas have different letters, their conjunction and combination regulated in cases of different Rasas. Departures from them bring about defects in the suggestion of Rasas concenrned. In cases when these departures are in conformity with certain rules enjoined upon in connection with the propriety of the speaker etc., they do not turn into defects.1 In the same way the Alankära where used to help the enjoyment of Rasa would bring about a defect in it if it is used inappropriately2. Bharata notes particular Alankāras appropriate to particular Rasas3. Certain metres have been prescribed as appropriate to certain Rasas. Bharata, Ksemendra etc. have all noted these metres4. Ksemendra has mentioned metres in con- nection with the description of the Srngāra Alambana Vibhāvas etc5. Mammața has noted cases where inappropriate use of metres has marred the enjoyment of Rasas6. Certain Rägas have also been prescribed in connection with certain Rasas. In connection with them tunes also have been prescribed. Bharata, Sārngadeva etc. note it.7 Inappro- priate use of them will surely bring in defects. Some writers were very particular in maintaining the delicacy of Rasa. It is said that as Rasa is the main thing in a literary piece all

1. K. P. VIII. 77. p. 487. 2. A. V. C. 15. 3. N. S. (K. S. S.) XVII. 109-111. 4. Ibid. XVII. 111-114. 5. K. S. T. III. 17-19 & 21-22. 6. K. P. VII. p. 338. 7. N. S. (K. S. S.) XIX. 38-39; XXIX. 1-18; S. D. S. R. II. pp. 157-226.

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things, the word with its sense etc., should be so appropriately used as not to interfere in any way with the enjoyment of Rasa.1 Ananda maintains the delicacy of the Śrngāra above all others. He says that any defect, howsoever slight and insignificant, mars the enjoyment of the Śrngāra rasa; therefore, the writer should be very careful, otherwise the slightest inattention will at once become obvious.2 In the above cases it is clear that the defects in the enjoy- ment of Rasa come from external factors, hence reconcilia- tion and removal of defect are possible by the study of the prescribed rules and codes in connection with those factors. But the enjoyment of Rasa may again become defective when its different constituents become defective. Almost all Sanskrit poeticians and dramaturgists admit that such a defect comes in mainly due to lapse in the rules of propriety. Cases of this lapse can be multiplied. Love centering on one's own wife or an unmarried girl receives sanction of the rules which, of course, differ according to the tenets of the particular school, country, conventions, traditions etc.3 Even in the case of one's own wife it becomes defective ( Abhāsa) if one's love to her is described when she is immersed in sorrow; here the propriety is not maintained4. If love is with respect to another's wife, maybe with re- ference to the teacher's wife, the enjoyment is defective, This is a case where the Visaya is defective. A heroine loving many persons is another such instance. In the Prakarana etc. where the courtezan acts as the heroine, love is depicted centred on the hero to the exclusion of other

1. D. L. III. 32 ; K. P. VII. 49. 2. D. L. III. 28-29. 3. Love of the Gopis is to be considered as an exception. 4. K. P. IV. p. 121 (Com.).

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characters. When love is depicted as existing in the Upanā- yaka or in the Pratināyaka it is a case of Rasābhāsa. In the same way the defect may be in the Āsraya. The love of a man for a lady if proceeding from him before she is des- cribed as love-smitten for him is also defective1. Another case of defect arises when on either side love remains un- responded. The description of the love of a lady for a man whose love has not been described or even hinted at is also a case of Rasābhäsa ( though the variant reading here describes it as Anābhāsa). Here love is possible to arise by sight etc. Śrī Śinga Bhūpāla calls it a case of Prāgabhāva. He also gives other kinds as Atyantābhāva and Pradhvamsā- bhäva, where even in the presence of the causes, love does not arise.2 Love depicted in respect of very low persons as the Mlechchhas and love sports of the birds are also regarded as defective Rasas. The latter point, however, is con- troversial in which many scholars have arranged themselves on one side and many on the other. Bhoja recognizes it as Rasābhāsa3. Hemachandra recognizes love among things devoid of sense organs and birds as Rasābhāsa and Bhāvā- bhāsa4. Vidyādhara recognizes Rasa in birds etc. He calls love in them Rasa. Among them also are the Vibhavas. The objection that the birds have no knowledge of the Vibhāvas etc. is equally applicable in case of some uncultivated persons; and further it is not the knowledge of the Vibhāvas but the latter themselves which lead to the enjoyment of Rasa. Hence is the enjoyment of Rasa recognized in birds5. Vidyānātha accepts love in birds as Rasābhāsa

1. K. P. IV. p. 123 (Com.). 2. R. S. II. p. 203. 3. B. S. K. V. p. 667. 4. H. K. S. II. p. 201. 5. E. V. III. p. 106.

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but Kumāraswāmī in the Ratnāpana com. notes the view of Vidyādhara.1 Viśvanātha recognizes it as Rasābhāsa.2 Śinga Bhūpāla notes the view of Vidyādhara and passes it under his critical eye. He brings forward his objection that among the birds there cannot be the Vibhavas as the Muni has enjoined a Śuchi and Ujjvala object as the Vibhava. The brids cannot be Suchi etc. Towards the female elephant the elephants are causes of love and not the Vibhävas. In such cases the mind of the Sahrdaya cannot experience Rasa. In the case of the low people also Rasa will be experienced as Rasābhāsa.3 The author recognizes in connection with the Bhāvas certain lapses in the rules of propriety. They are of two kinds, viz. the Asatyatva and the Ayogyatva.4 Rājachūdāmaņī Dīkșita recognizes love of birds as Rasa5 and instances Mammata's description® of the frightened deer under the Bhayānaka Rasa as a correct example of the Bhayānaka Rasa. Viśvanātha gives the defects which turn other Rasas into Rasābhāsas. Anger directed towards the Gurus etc. turns into the Raudrā- bhäsa. When the Santa is depicted in low characters it becomes the Sāntābhāsa. When in the Hāsya the Gurus are the Alambanas it is the Hasyabhasa. When in the Vira the character is low and the Utsaha is directed towards the murder of Brähmanas etc. it is a case of the Vīrābhāsa. In the Bhayānaka when the characters are high it is a case of the Bhayānakābhāsa7. The Vāmanī com. to the Kāvyaprakāśa notes such factors in cases of all Rasas

1. P. R. p. 281. 2. S. D. III. 264. 3. R. S. II. pp. 206-207. 4. Ibid. II. p. 142. 5. R. K. D. IV. pp. 211-212. 6. K. P. IV. p. 109 (Com.). 7. S. D. III. 264-266.

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turned into respective Rasābhāsas.1 The Bhāvaprakāśana records how Rasas as the Śrngāra etc. turn into the Śrngārā- bhäsa etc. When the Śrngāra is suppressed by the Hāsya, the Hasya is mixed with the Bibhatsa, the Vira is permeated with the Bhayanaka, the Adbhuta is touched by the Bībhatsa and the Karuna, the Raudra is permeated with the Śoka and the Bhaya, the Karuna is mixed with the Häsya and the Śrngāra, the Bībhatsa is mixed with the Adbhuta and the Śrgāra and the Bhayānaka is mixed with the Raudra and the Vira, they all turn into respective Rasābhāsas. The author explains all these elaborately.2 Śinga Bhūpāla gives the above opinion with slight changes.3 Bharata's statement that the Hasya is the imitation of the Śrngāra4 gives scope for inference that the Srngārābhāsa may be a case of the Hāsya Rasa for the word Anukrti may mean Ābhāsa as Abhinava puts it.5 The instance quoted describes the love of Ravana for Sītā. Abhinava himself says that, though here Rasa is of the same form as the Hāsya, the Sāmājikas experience here the Śrngārābhāsa first ; the Hāsya is ex- perienced only afterwards when discrimination works ; it, therefore, is a case of the Śrngārābhāsa.6 Hence the Śṛńgārābhāsa is different from the Hāsya. Love in respect of a god ( ascetic, preceptor, teacher, king, son etc. included ) is called the Bhāva by most rheto- ricians, though the Vaisnavas call it the highest Rasa. That it was so regarded by the rhetoricians does not appear to be unjustified when it is considered that in the melted heart of worldly persons love for a lady makes a more lasting

1. K. P. IV. p. 121 (Com.). 2. B. P. pp. 132-133. 3. R. S. II. pp. 202-203. 4. N. S. (K. S. S.) VI. 40. 5. D. L. p. 179 (Com.). 6. D. L. pp. 78-89 (Com.).

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impression than love for gods as MM. Pandita Khiste puts it.1 Exceptions may occur but in this world the above type of persons consititutes the majority. According to the rhetoricians, breach of the rules of propriety will result in Rasa being defective. With the Vaisnavas, however, Rasa of God in case of other's wife does not become Rasābhāsa.2 Rasābhāsa is described by Rūpa Gosvāmī as based on the consitituents of Rasa being either insufficient (Anga-hīnatva) or improperly developed (Anga-vairūpya). It is accordingly of three kinds, viz. Uparasa, Anurasa and Aparasa.3 The first includes cases where the twelve Rasas, that is, the Santa etc. with their forms distorted by the Vibhavas etc. turn into Uparasas. In this case the Vibhāvas etc. become impro- per. Each and every detail has been elaborately described by the author.4 Rasas, that is, the seven Gaunas with one Mukhya, viz. the Śānta, become Anurasas when the Vibhāvas etc. have connection with Krsna.5 Rasas as the Hasya etc. become Aparasas when Krsna remains the Vişaya and his opponents become the Asrayas, that is to say when it is developed in hostile persons.6 The feeling of the Rati or the Bhava ( the two taken in the same sense as will be pointed out later on ) may be present in Ābhāsa (semblance ) only and not in reality. It may take the form of either the Pratibimba ( reflection ) where the thirst for the Bhoga or the Moksa remains ; or the Chhāyā ( shadow ) where a little of curiosity ramains.7 Kavi Karņapūra Gosvāmī recognizes the Ābhāsa to be of three kinds, viz,, the Prasiddha, the Krtrima and the Siddha. The first is only known ( Prasiddha) not really

1. Sāras. Su. p. 37. 2. K. A. K. V. p. 133. 3. R. H. S. 2. p. 494. 4. Ibid. 3-19. pp. 494-500. 5. Ibid. 20. p. 500. 6. Ibid. 22-23. p. 501. 7. R. H. S. pp. 110-112.

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happened as in cases of ordinary persons ( Prākrta ); Mālatī's love for Nandana became only proclaimed ( Prasiddha ) but in reality she loved Mädhava ; in case of persons of higher status (Aprākrta) the instance is Rukmini's love which was for Krsna though at first it was announced for Śisupāla. The instance of the Krtrima is available in Makaranda who in the robes of Malatī expressed his love for Nandana. The Siddha is, no doubt, that which has violated the rules of propriety. The case of the want of propriety occurs when love in a lady is directed towards many lovers. Love of many ladies for Krsņa is not to be regarded as Rasābhāsa, for it is a case of the best form of love.1 The above is one aspect of the Bhava connected as it is with god etc. as recognized by many of the Ālankārikas ; its other aspect comes in when the Vyabhichāribhāva, instead of maturing along with the Sthāyibhāva into Rasa, becomes suggested by itself. Rūpa Gosvāmī recognizes this aspect of the Bhava as that when the Rati of friends either attains a level of equality with, or is a little lower than, the Krsna- Rati but is being profusely nourished. Here the Krsna-Rati is the main thing ; therefore, in a way this case is nothing but the coming into prominence of the Sañchāribhāva as pointed out in the com2. Viśvanātha mentions one case also as the Bhava where the Sthāyibhāva is simply excited (Udbuddha )3-which is also confirmed inthe Vāmanī com.4 to the Kāvyaprakāśa. The above two cases of the Bhāva as also the Rati etc. connected with god etc. which is the third kind of the Bhava have all been described in the above com. as cases where Rasa cannot be realized for its

1. K. A. K. V. pp. 131-133. 2. R. H. S. 110. p. 312 (With Com.). 3. S. D. III. 260-261. 4. K. P. IV. p. 118 (Com.). 26

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constituents become separately suggested instead. When considered from their own standpoint these are the lower stages of enjoyment, the highest stage being Rasa. When considered from the standpoint of Rasa they are lower stages as defect in one form or another has interfered in their attaining to the highest stage of Rasa. The Bhāva has four kinds where the Vyabhichāribhāvas have become relishable due to Śānti ( allayment ), Udaya ( manifestation ), Sandhi ( conjunction ) and Śabalatā ( admixture ) of or with other Bhāvas. Rūpa Gosvāmī recognizes these four in connec- tion with the Vyabhicharibhavas.1 He also recognizes the Ābhāsa of the Vyabhichāribhāvas firstly in two ways, viz. the Prātikūlya (presence in the opponents, that is, the Vipakse Vrtti) and the Anauchitya ( impropriety ). The latter is then divided into the Asatyatva ( falsity ) and the Ayogyatva. These two cases occur when the Vyabhichāribhāva is attributed to the lifeless things and the birds respectively.2 It has, however, to be noted here that in the devotee there may be a longing to become a lifeless object as the Venu etc. closely and intimately connected with Krsna. This is not a stage of the Abhasa as Krsna here is the principal Vișaya.3 In case of the Rati connected with gods which becomes the Bhäva and the Sthāyibhāva when it is simply excited ( Ud- buddha), the above four kinds of the Bhāva are not possible, as the Sthayibhavas stand by themselves and cannot suffer allayment etc. by others. Anandavardhana, however, mentions the Praśama etc. of Rasa4. Abhinava instances in the Lochana the Praśama of the Irsyā Vipralambha Rasa5. As Rasa turns into Rasābhāsa when it is inappropriately directed

1. R. H. S. pp. 274-277. 2. Ibid. pp. 272-273. 3. R. U. M. p. 375. 4. D. L. II. 3. 5. D. L. p. 176 (Com.).

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or used, the Bhāva also becomes the Bhāvābhāsa when it is inappropriately depicted as the Lajjā ( shame ) in the courtezan.1 Leaving aside the Bhäva in its different aspects as shown above the Bhavas in general include, according to the authorities in Sanskrit poetics, the Sthāyibhāvas, the Vyabhi- chāribhāvas and the Sāttvikabhāvas as will be seen in the chapter following. The Abhasas of the Sthāyibhavas and the Vyabhicharibhavas have already been explained and illustrated. Rūpa Gosvāmī gives the Ābhāsas of the Sāttvikabhāvas as of four kinds, viz. the Ratyābhāsabhava ( arising from the semblance of the Rati), the Sattvābhāsa- bhava (arising in feeble hearts as old Mīmāmsakas ), the Nihsattva (arising from habit in people extremely soft- hearted but hard-hearted internally ) and the Pratīpa ( arising in people inimical to Krsņa ).2 In the above discussion such terms as the Sthāyibhāva, the Vyabhicāribhāva etc. as the constituents of Rasa have occurred. Their clarification as to their nature etc. and other problems connected with them is necessary. It is but pertinent, therefore, to turn to them next.

1. S. D. III. 266. 2. R. H. S. 38-44. pp. 223-226.