1. vedanta prakriya pratyabhina The Method of the Vedanta by Sachidanandendra Sarasvati - AJ Alston 1997

The Method of the Vedanta

A Critical Account of the Advaita Tradition

Sri Swami Satchidånandendra

Translated by A. J. Alston

The Method of the Vedanta Swami Satchidanandendra's major work represents the first large-scale critical history of Advaita Vedanta ever attempted. It seeks to establish a clear view of the traditional Advaita Vedanta based on the Upanishads, Brahma Sutras and Bhagavad Gita as systematised by Shankara and his close associates, unencumbered by the mass of conflicting theories developed by later writers of the school. Stripping back these layers of later interpretation, Swami Satchidanandendra calls the reader back to Shankara, who never forgot that the ultimate purpose of all study and reflection is the attainment of immediate experience of one's own true nature as the 'Self of All'

THE METHOD

OF THE VEDANTA

A Critical Account of the Advaita Tradition

SRI SWAMI SATCHIDANANDENDRA SARASVATI

Translated from the Sanskrit by: A.J. ALSTON

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED . DELHI

First Indian Edition: Delhi, 1997 First published in 1989 by Kegan Paul International Limited, London

A.J. Alston 1989 No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except for the quotation of brief passages in criticism.

ISBN: 81-208-1358-8

Also available at: MOTILAL BANARSIDASS 41 U.A. Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007 8 Mahalaxmi Chamber, Warden Road, Mumbai 400 026 120 Royapettah High Road, Mylapore, Chennai 600 004 Sanas Piaza, Subhash Nagar, Pune 411 002 16 St. Mark's Road, Bangalore 560 001 8 Camac Street, Calcutta 700 017 Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004 Chowk, Varanasi 221 001

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FOREWORD

There is a saying of those that know the tradition: 'That which cannot be expressed is expressed through false attribution and subsequent recantation.'*

Every argument has its origin in certain lifc-contexts, certain cultural situations. No argument starts in a vacuum because human beings are born in an already interpreted world. That world assumes a certain form of life, a form of life in which man is born and lives. Yet there is something amiss in every interpretation, some lack, some lapse, something missed and not grasped. Hence the urge to improve upon every received world view, every cultural disposition. We, sons and daughters of man are children of ontological disin- heritance, we who live as perpetual displacements. This original penury we would undo through replacing one interpretation with another interpretation, one discourse with another discourse, one reality principle with another reality principle. The history of cultures is replete with such pathetic attempts. Myths gave place to theology, theology to philosophy, philosophy to science and, within each of these discourses, the less sophisticated interpretations to the more sophisticated ones. There is, as I said, something pathetic,

Śańkara on the Bhagavadgītā (13.13) *

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even, I would say, tragic, about these attempts. For discov- eries often turn into closures, triumphs into disastcrs, progress into decline. New world views often demand a heavy price in terms of practice and its decadence, even in terms of holocausts and suicidal wars. Our new world view may, sometimes one fears, end up in an unprecedented tragedy. To repose faith in new interpretations and new discourses is to be insensitive to the enormity of our loss, to the impov- erishment of our souls and the staleness of our world. It is to be asleep to the truth that we know neither ourselves, nor our world, nor the awesome majesty of the word that we so heedlessly reify into a mere utensil. Three fourths of man, say the Vedas, is lost to man and three fourths of the word. To find what he has lost of himself and of his speech, he has to give up the arrogant privilege he has appropriated for himself, the privilege of giving meaning to what is, of inter- preting it in terms of concepts, received or fabricated. This, says the Vedantic tradition, is avidya, this what he would call a privilege. For all that he deems to be tragic and cursed flows from it, from this interpretive passion which resides in man as something more primordial than himself. This act of deprivileging himself he cannot accomplish through that of a leaping will, itself a child of avidya but through a sustained and careful analysis of his interpretations and, more impor- tantly, through living the dispositions they imply. For we cannot, warns the true tradition of Vednta, conclusively refute an interpretation in purely theoretical terms. Some- thing in it survives all criticism, all refutation. One has to live the disposition implicit in a given interpretation to find it disown itself. Every interpretation is, to recant a little of what has been said above, redemptive, redemptive to the extent it can disown itself, find itself false. This it can but

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only if it is analysed in depth and lived in depth. We have to live the otherness of rcalism, the otherness that informs man's relationship with the world, the essential oneness that ideal- ism has found in that relationship and the uncertainty that ambiguists reveal in it with an almost uncanny ruthlessness. One has to live this otherness, this oneness, this ambiguity to find its truth and the limitation of that truth. One has also to live as pure consciousness of Vedanta, consciousness unre- lated to any object, to (see) it transform itself into what we mortals can only call reality or the ultimate truth of things. There is no interpretation that does not command our re- spect, and, equally, there is no interpretation that can de- mand our allegiance. For our allegiance is with Being and not with how man or his speech can grasp it. There is a tendency in the scholastic and commentatorial tradition of Advaita Vedānta to confuse interpretation with truth, symbol with reality. This tradition often dogmatised the redemptive untruths of the Upanisads into truths abso- lute and tried to retain what it was supposed to discard or recant. The Method of the Vedanta highlights this tendency of this tradition with a remarkable depth and clarity. With the exception of the great masters of this tradition, masters like Gaudapāda, Śankara and Sureśvara, our commentators have all but forgotten the true tradition, the tradition of false attribution and subscquent recantation, of adhyāropāpavāda. They did not know how to de-think their thoughts and unsay their theories. The composition of the Vedānta-Prakriyā-Pratyabhijnā is indeed an important event in the long history of advaita scholarship and interpretation. The work succeeds, to a great extent, in dispelling so many misconceptions which the ingenuity of scholars, traditional as well as modern, has woven around the teachings of the Upanisads. Thinkers and

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jijñāsus, unequipped with knowledge of Sanskrit, would ever remain indebted to Professor A.J. Alston for giving them such a beautiful translation of this masterpiece. Even scholars of Sanskrit would find the translation helpful, such is its lucidity, accuracy and readability. Many of the obscure passages in the original turn remarkably transparent in this translation. Lovers of Indian culture would, I am sure, join me in expressing our deep sense of gratitude to the transla- tor. We have also the emotion to say, 'Thank you!' to the soul of his late wife, who typed out the entire manuscript even when she knew she was dying. Professor Alston chose to express his pain and her heroism through an understate- ment. Let me not profane his feelings through voiubility. There can be no doubt that this translation has won, and will win, for the Vedānta-Prakriyā-Pratyabhijñā the attention that it so richly deserves but could not receive earlier be- cause of the deplorable state into which Sanskrit studies have fallen in our land. One could only wish that the Svämin had also highlighted the lived dispositions implied in the various interpretations that we are called upon to recant. For the great teachers of the Upanisads demanded of their disciples to outlive views, not to discard them. Only this way, they knew, could man open out to truth, only this way could truth obey his call. This way of innocence we badly need in these our clever but unhappy times. The Method of the Vedanta should prove, to an extent, a curative for this malady of our civilisation.

SOM RAJ GUPTA

CONTENTS

FOREWORD V

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE xi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xiv ABBREVIATIONS XV SECTION HEADINGS xix

THE METHOD OF THE VEDANTA 1

SELECT INDEX OF CONCEPTS 945 BIBLIOGRAPHY 971

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

The present large-scale work is not exactly a history or a reference book or a reader, but it has something of the char- acter of all three. Its purpose is to establish a clear view of the traditional Advaita Vedanta based on the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gita and Brauma Sutras as systematized by Gauda- pāda, Saakara and Suresvara, unencumbered by the mass of con- flicting thecries developed by later authors of the school. Instead of crediting Śankara with an ontology, a cosmology, an epistemology and the other paraphernalia of traditional western metaphysics, the author concentrates on his theologi- cal method, and shows how he interpreted the texts that com- municate to the student a direct awareness of his true nature as the Self of all by the process of 'false attribution fol- lowed by later retraction'. The characteristic views of the later authors are examined, in varying degrees of detail, to see where they throw light on this teaching which leads to direct awareness of the Self, and where, more frequently, they misunderstand and obscure it. Attention is paid to Bhartr- prapañca and other pre-Sankara Vedanta theorists, and a chap- ter is accorded to Bhäskara as a characteristic representa- tive of conscious opposition to Sankara within the Vedanta fold. The leading western authority on Śankara's Advaita in post- war years, the late Professor Paul Hacker of Munster, remarked on the 'sharp-sighted' way in which the author of The Method of the Vedanta drew attention, in his earlier work called The Mūlāvidyā Nirāsah, to a number of characteristics of Śan- kara's doctrine that stand in pointed contrast to the re- ceived dogmas of the Advaita school. It is hoped that this free translation of the more detailed VEDANTA PRAKRIYĀ PRATYABHIJNA may help to stimulate scholars in India and the West to go back to the Sanskrit original and ponder again the real significance of Sankara's Vedanta doctrine in the light of it. It should also provide helpful pointers for the

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guidance cf the ordinary student who wishes to pick out what Śankara actually said from the confused mass of teaching com- ing from the later theorists. The work should be of parti- cular interest to the spiritual enquirer because it concen- trates strictly on the correct interpretation of the central teachings of the Upanishads: no space is accorded to the detailed refutation of secular systems. The main argument is carried forward by the author him- self, in passages which are given in thicker type. These passages are backed by extensive quotations from the writers he is discussing, given in lighter type. In places the author adds explanatory notes which are here given in italics, the whole scheme corresponding to the three different forms of Devanagari type used in the Sanskrit original. A few itali- cized translator's notes are inserted, and in fact all pas- sages enclosed within brackets are explanatory material by the translatcr. The system of numbering in the quoted ex- tracts within the various sections has been simplified and slightly altered. As the result of a small correction, the cection-numbers in the translation exceed those of the ori- ginal by one from 183 to 191 and by two from 193 to 305. In a very few cases, where the translator failed to trace a bib- liographical reference given in the original, he supplied a reference to a different text which had the same words in the belief that it would be more accessible to the western reader (e.g. the reference to the White Yajur Veda on p. 2). He has also supplied nearly all the cross-references marked 'M.V.', which should not be considered part of the original work, and is responsible for all translations of quoted texts, though ample references have been given to existing translations where available. In the case of some of the texts quoted, the translator has used more recent and accessi- ble editions than those used in the original work. References to Sanskrit texts used are invariably given, except in the case of Sankara, where the translator unfortunately did not have full access to the editions used by the author. One point deserves special mention. The words 'Ignorance' and 'Consciousness' are given with a capital when they are used (as they most frequently are) in a technical sense pecu- liar to the school, though they may occasionally appear with- out capitals when they are used in their ordinary English sense (there are the inevitable border-line cases). But one should note carefully that the terms 'Ignorance' and 'meta- physical Ignorance', which are used synonymously, did not have the same meaning for Sankara as they came to have for his followers. For Sankara, metaphysical Ignorance was the crucial superimposition of Self and not-self that makes empir- ical experience possible (M.V. pp. 45 ff .; 112); for the author of the post-Sankara work called the Pañcapadika, metaphysical Ignorance was that (assumed) 'power of Ignorance' that brought superimposition into being (M.V. p.387). It was this latter

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conception that prevailed in the school, and it is a large part of the purpose of the present work to demonstrate its falli- bility. Established scholars of the calibre of M. Hiriyanna and S.S. Suryanārayana Sastri have confessed to doubt and uncer- tainty in handling some of the passages here encountered. There must be many cases where the present translator has failed to grasp the true meaning. Nevertheless, it is hoped that even an imperfect translation of such a penetrating enquiry into the fundamental principles of Advaita Vedanta may serve as a useful stimulus to further study.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My thanks and acknowledgments, as translator, are due in the first place to the Adhyātma Prakāsa Kāryālaya, Holenarsipur, South India, for granting me permission to translate the work and for supplying supplementary materials. They are also due, and in very great measure, to my late wife Ann, who typed the entire body of the work with selfless devotion in the last stages of the cancer from which she died. They are also due to Miss Mary Alcock and Mrs M. Andralojc for help in checking the final text and references; to Mrs Patsy Clasen for completing the typing and corrections; and also to Mr P. Hopkins, Chairman of K.P.I., for taking up the publication of the book and making some very helpful arrange- ments.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A. D.S. Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra A.S.S. Ānandāsrama Sanskrit Series

B.B. V. Brhadāranyaka Bhāşya Vārtika, see Suresvara

B.I. Bibliotheca Indica B.S. Brahma Sūtra, see Bādarāyana B.S.Bh. Brahma Sūtra Bhāşya, see Śankara Bh.B.S.Bh Bhaskara's B.S.Bh., see Bhaskare

Bh.G. Bhagavad Gītā

Bh.G.Bh. Bhagavad Gītā Bhāşya, see Śankara Bhã Bhāmati, see Vācaspati Miśra c.S.S. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series

G.O.S. Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda G.P. Gita Press, Gorakhpur I.P. Indian Philosophy, Vol.II, see Radhakrishnan

I.S. Işta Siddhi, see Vimuktātman Kh . Khandana-Khanda-Khādya, see Śri Harsa M.Bh. Mahabhārata, see Vyasa and Mahābhārata

M.R. V. Māndukya Rahasya Vivtih, see Sac M. V. Method of the Vedanta (the present work) N.C. Naisadiya (or Naișada) Caritra, see Śrī Harsa

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N.Sid. Naişkarmya Siddhi, see Suresvara P.M. Pūrva Mīmāmsaka (ritualist) P.M. R. Pūrve Mīmāmsā Bhāsya, see Śabara P.M.S. Pūrva Mīmamsā Sutra, see under Sabara p.p. Pañcapādikā, q.v. in Bibliography S.B. Śatapatha Branmaņa S.B.E. Sacred Books of the East, Oxford, reprinted Delhi S.L.S. Siddhanta Lesa Sangraha, see Appaya Dīkşita ś.s. Sankşepa Śārīraka, see Sarvajñātman s.v. Sambandha Vartika, sce Suresvara ś.v. Śloka Vārtika, see Kumārila Sạc Saccidānandendra Svāmin = Sri Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati, author of the present work T.B.V. Taittiriya Bhāşya Vārtika, see Suresvara T.B.Vi. Taittiriya Bhāşyārtha Vimarsinī, see Sac

T.D. Tattva Dipana (comm. on V.), see Akhandananda T.N. Translator's Note

T.P. Tattva Pradīpikā, see Citsukha T.S. Taittirīya Saņhitā Tai. Br. Taittiriya Brāhmaņa Taitt. Ar. Taittiriya Aranyaka u.s. Upadesa Sāhasrī, see Mayeda v. Vivaraņa, see Prakāsātman V.P.P. Vedānta Prakriyā Pratyabhijñā V.P.S. Vivaraņa Prameya Sangraha, see Bhāratitīrtha

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LATIN TERMS

ad fin. towards the end ad init. towards the beginning ad loc. at the place cited ibid. at the same place idem the same (work) loc. cit. at the place cited above

per se in itself

q.v. which see

sic left as it stands in the original

supra above

viz. that is to say

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SECTION HEADINGS

INTRODUCTION

The Method of Communicating the Supreme Reality 1 in the Upanishads

2 The Sense in which the Upanishads are an Authoritative Means of Knowledge

Superimposition and its Removal do not affect the Absolute 3

This is the only Method of interpreting the Upanishads 4 sanctioned by Tradition

Reasons for the Compcsition of the present Work

The Special Features of the Present Work 5 5

Conclusion 8

CHAPTER I THE NEED FOR ESTABLISHING THE TRUE METHOD

1. The Traditional Method of the Vedanta that has been handed 9 down by an unbroken Succession of Gurus, beginning with Brahmā

2. Though the Method has been clearly proclaimed in the Three 9 Starting-Points of the Vedanta Tradition (prasthāna-traya), Confusion has been introduced by various Teachers

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3. Difficulty of recognizing the tiue Method caused by the 10 Rise of New Schools

4. An Objection raised by modern Students 11

5. One attemipted Solution to the problem: the View that the 12 various Formulations of the Method are due to varying Degrees of Ability in different Students

6. Examination of this attempted Solution 14

7. Ancther ill-informed Attempt to show that the different Theories 15 do not conflict

8. Examination of this Solution 16

9. The Need for an Attempt to explain the Recognition of the 22 true Method

10. Rules to be followed in determining the Method 23

CHAPTER II SURVEY OF THE MATERIAL COMPRISING THE THREE STARTING-POINTS OF THE VEDANTA (THE UPANISHADS, THE GĪTÃ AND THE BRAHMA SŪTRAS)

11. Why the Work begins with a Survey of the Starting-Points 28

12. The Subjects covered in the Upanishads 28

13. The Difficulty for those of dull Inteilect in arriving at the true 33 Method of the Vedanta from a mere Consideration of the Upanishads alone

14. The Subjects treated in the Gītā 33

15. One cannot determine the Method just through the Gita either 36

16. A Topical Analysis of the Brahma Sūtras as a fundamental 36 Starting-Point of the Vedanta

17. The true Method of the Vedanta is not easily discoverable from 37 an Examination of the Brahma Sutras either

CHAPTER III

EXAMINATION OF THE COMMENTARIES OF ŚRĪ ŚAŃKARA BHAGAVATPĀDA

18 .. How the Teacher Sankara Bhagavatpāda belongs to the 39 true Tradition

19. The traditional Method accepted by Sankara Bhagavatpāda 40

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20. The Method of False Attribution followed by Retraction 41 underlies other forms of Vedanta Teaching

21. The Absolute can only be revealed through False Attribution 43 followed by Retraction

22. The Root of all False Attribution, known as Metaphysical Ignorance 45

23. The Causes, Nature and Results of Ignorance 47

24. The Causes, Nature and Result.of Enlightenment 50

25. How being capable of Experience through valid Means of 51 Empirical Knowledge and being Capable of Action are states arising through Ignorance

26. The Texts dealing with Injunctions and Prohibitions proceed 55 on the Basis of Ignorance

27. The Texts concerned with Liberation apply to those afflicted 58 with Igncrance - but with a Difference

28. How the Veda is the Final Means of Knowledge 60

29. The Notions of Knowledge and Ignorance pertain to the 64 Sphere of Ignorance only

30. The Cancellation of the Three Kinds of Ignorance. 67 through Knowledge

31 How Vedic Tradition and Inference lead on to Direct Experience 69

32. Methods of Teaching the Absolute through Doctrines of Cause 74 and Effect, etc., are Variants that are subsidiary to the main Method

33. The Distinction between Cause and Effect 74

34. Creation is accepted as Real from a Practical Standpoint to 78 help one Class of Students

35. Two Doctrines: the Effect is real before Production: 80 Origination is illusory

36 Vedic Support for the last two Points 83

37. The Method of Communicating the true Nature of the Absolute 86 indirectly through Attributing to it the false Notions of Universal and Particular

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38. The Method of Communicating the true Nature of the Absolute 88 indirectly through Recourse to the Notions of Seer and Seen

39. Communicating the Absolute through Discriminating it 93 from the Five Sheaths

40. Communicating the true Nature of the Self through a '95 Discrimination of the Three (apparent) States of Waking, Dream and Dreamless Slcep

41. How the true Nature of the Individual Soul is Being or the Absolute 96

42. How the Self is of the Nature of Consciousness 98

43. The Self is ever void of the States 100

44. How the Self's Appearance of having Three Forms is Illusory 104

45. Distinction between the Individual Soul and the Lord negated 107 through a Consideration of the Thuee States

46. How the Self is in no way touched by Practical Experience 110

47. What does it mean to speak of the Falsity of Duality? 116

48. How in the State of Empirical Experience a Distinction among 119 Means of Knowledge is observed

49. Texts on the Absolute without Adjuncts affirm its Existence: Texts 122 on the Absolute with Adjuncts prescribe Themes for Meditation

50. Certain Vedic Texts proclaim the Existence and true Nature 126 of the Absolute

51. The Higher and Lower Absolute 130

52. The Difference between Knowledge and Prescribed Meditations 132

53. The Means to Knowledge 136

54. Alternative Combinations of the means to Knowledge 140

55. The Limits of Spiritual Practice 142

56. The Difference between prescribed Symbolic Meditations 146 (upāsana) and Sustained Contemplation of the Absolute (nididhyāsana)

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57. The Learning and other Virtues to be pursued by the Renunciate 150 seeking Liberation fall within Ignorance

58. After the Rise of Metaphysical Knowledge there is only Absorption 154 in the Self and no Action

59. Liberation is nothing other than that firm Establishment in the Self 156 that prevails when ignorance has been cancelled

60. The Two Forms of Liberation, and how Liberation in Life is Superior 161

61. No Distinctions of Kind are found in Liberation as the result 164 of Metaphysical Knowledge

CHAPTER IV EXAMINATION OF SOME PRE-SANKARA SCHOOLS

62. How the present Chapter relates to what precedes and follows 168

63. The View that the entire Veda teaches that Action alone is the 168 Means to Liberation

64. View that the Upanishads relate to Ritual by explaining the Nature 170 of the Soul and so on

65. The View that Liberation comes through the Avoidance of 174 optional Ritual and Forbidden Acts

66. The Doctrine that Liberation is achieved by a Combination of 176 Knowledge and Action

67. Knowledge identified with Meditation: the Absolute made 180 subordinate to Injunctions to Meditate

68. The View of those who accept an Injunction in the Context of 184 Metaphysical Knowledge

69. Knowledge of the Self only comes through the practice of 187 repeated Affirmation (Prasankhyāna Vāda)

70. The Doctrine of the Elimination of the Universe 191

71. The Doctrine of Liberation through Elimination of Pleasure-desire 199

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72. The View that Liberation comes from halting the Impressions 200 of the Three States of Waking, Dream and Dreamless Sleep

73. The View that Liberation results from Obedience to an Injunction 205 to sustain Rcmembrance of Knowledge

74. The View that Liberation arises from an Injunction to suppress a !! 207 Movement of the Mind

75. The Doctrine of the Bhagavatas 208

CHAPTER V BHARTRPRAPANCA

76. The Nced for Examining the System of Bhartrprapanca 213

77. Cause and Effect in the School of Difference in Identity 215

78. The Eight Conditions of the Absolute 219

79. The Conscious Individual as Modification of the Absolute 221

80. The Distinction between the Seer and his Seeing 225

81. Explanation of the Class of Texts like 'Though seeing, yet He 227 does not see'

82. The Qualifications for Knowledge of the Absolute 231

83. Examination of the Three States 235

84. Discussion of Liberation 245

85. The Intermediate Stage 246

86. Hearing, Pondering and Sustained Meditation 251

87. The Doctrine of Liberation through a Combination of Knowledge 254 and Ritual

88. Rising above the Divine Wealth 256

CHAPTER VI MAŅDANA

89. The Need for examining the Positions of the various Interpreters 260

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90. The Pre-eminence of Sureśvara among the Interpreters 260

91. Why the Position of Mandana has to be examined first 261

92. The Nature of Metaphysical Ignorance in Mandana's System 262

93. The Indeterminability of Metaphysical Ignorance 263

94 The Scat of ignorance 265

95 The Cessation of Natural Ignorance 266

96. Doctrine ot the Cancellation of Illusion 259

97 Experience through the Means of Valid Knowledge 271

98. Objections and Answers regarding the Authority of the Veda 275

99 Objections and Answers to the Possibility of the Words of the Veda 278 communicating the Absolute

100. The Combination of Repeated Meditation and Ritualistic Action 282 as the Means to Liberation

101. The Method for obtaining Liberation 287

102. Sympathy with other Advaita Theories 292

103. Summary of Mandana 296

CHAPTER VII SUREŚVARA

104. The Works of the Author of the Vartika 297

105. The close Connection between the Brahma Siddhi and the 297 Sambandha Vārtika

106. The rival Doctrines examined in the Sainbandha Vārtika 299

107. Refutation of Mandana's Positions in the Vartika 299

108. The Treatment of the Doctrine of Bhartrprapanca in the Vārtika 302

109. Because the Unity and Sole Reality of the Self expresses itself 304 by Nature as Awareness it is Self-evident

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110. Metaphysicai Ignorance in Sureśvara 305

111. Objections and Answers on the Subject of Metaphysical Ignorance 307

112. The Treatment of Ignorance by Śri Śankara and Sureśvara compared 311

113. Enquiry into the Seat of Ignorance and the Object which it conceals 313

114. The Operation of the Means of Knowledge 316

115. The Cancellation of Illusior 320

116. Authority cf the Veda: Role of Negative Texts 323

117. Perception, etc., cannot contradict the Veda 330

118. Treatment of the Topic of Cause and Effect 330

119. The Treatment of Universal and Particular 337

120. The Treatment of the Discrimination of the Five Sheaths 340

121. The Distinction between Subject and Object 343

122. Teaching by Examination of the Three States of Waking, 348 Dream and Dreamless Sleep

123. Can there be an Injunction for Knowledge? 360

124. Can there be Injunctions for Hcaring, Pondering and 364 Sustained Meditation?

125. Comparison of Śri Sankara and Sureśvara on the Topic of 367 Hearing and the Rest

126. The Injunction for Inner and Outer Control and the 373 other Disciplines

127. How Action and Meditation relate 377

128. There is no other Liberation except Eradication of Ignorance 379

129. All Duality is imagined through Ignorance 380

130. The Form of Non-duality approved in the Vārtika 382

CHAPTER VIII THE PAÑCAPĀDIKĀ

131. The Need for an Examination of the System of the Pancapadika 385

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132. The Nature of Ignorance according to the Pañcapādikā 386

133. What is the Proof of Ignorance? 389

134. The Fffect of Ignorance 390

135. Did the Doctrine of Ignorance as Material Cause of the World 392 originate with the Pañcapādikā?

136. The Definition of Superimposition in the System of the Pancapādika 393

137. Why are Difterent Theories of Superimposition Mentioned? 396

138. The two Examples adduced in Śri Sankara's Commentary to 398 illustrate Superimposition

139. The Defect of Ignorance as the Cause of the Distinctions 402 amongst the Individual Souls

140. Superimposition and Empirical Experience are One and 407 the same Thing

141. The Ego-Superimposition 412

142. The Seif as the Object of the Notion 'I' 417

143. The Ego-Notion 419

144. The Examples of Superimposition given in the Pañcapādikā 428

145. The Identity of Superimposition and Ignorance 433

146. Empirical Experience through the Means of Valid Knowledge 435

147. The Immediately Evident Character of the Object of Knowledge 438

148. Answers to Objections about the Authenticity of the 441 Upanishadic Teaching

149. Direct Experience of the Self 447

150. Refutation of the Doctrine that the Absolute is taught as an 450 Appendage to the Injunction to Meditate

151. How can Beginningless Ignorance have an End? 454

152. The Treatment of Cause and Effect 458

153. The Treatment of the Three States 461

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154. Examination of the Means to Metaphysical Knowledge 464

155. Summary of the Pancapadika 469

CHAPTER IX ·BHĀSKARA

156. The Place of the Doctrine of Bhaskara in the History of 470 Vedantic Thought

157. The Tradition followed by Bhāskara 471

158. The Author of the 'Vrtti' and the Author of the 'Vakya' referred 474 to by Bhāskarācārya

159. The Divisions of Subject-Matter in the Brahma Sūtras 475 according to Bhāskara

160. Treatment of the Topic of Ignorance 476

161. The Authority of Perception, etc., and the Authority of the Veda 481

162. The Relation of Vedic Revelation and Reason 486

163. The Prime Importance of the Cause-Effect Relation in the 488 System of Bhāskara

164. The Treatment of Cause and Effect 490

165. Refutation of the Doctrine of the Unreality of the Effect 493

166. The Doctrine that the Self undergoes real Transformation 498

167. Refutation of the Doctrine of Māya 503

168. The Doctrine of the Reality of the Effect before Production 507

169. The Relation between the Individual Soul and the Lord 514

170. The Empirical Experience of the Individual Soul 519

171. The Method of Discrimination of the Five Sheaths 524

172. Bhäskara on the Discrimination of the Three States 528

173. Reflection over the Means to Liberation 534

174. The Rewards of Knowledge and Action 539

xxix

175. Repeated Practice of Hearing, Pondering and Sustained Meditation 541

176. The Relation of Knowledge and Yoga 542

177. The Description of Liberation 543

178. Summary of the Examination of Bhaskara's System 545

CHAPTER X THE BHĀMATĪ

179. Padmapāda, Sureśvara and Vācaspati as Sub-Commentaters on 546 the Commentaries of Śrī Śankara

180. The Works of Vācaspati Miśra 547

181. The Place of the Bhamati School in Vedanta 548

182. The Two 'Ignorances' in the System of the Bhamati 549

183. The Definition of Superimposition 552

184. Consideration of Superimposition as Superimposition of an Object 554

185. How far does the Definition of Ignorance agree with the 554 Characteristics that have to be Defined?

186. The Begininglessness of Ignorance 557

187. The Seat of Ignorance 561

188. The Plurality of Ignorance .562

189. The Cause of Ignorance 564

190. How the Interplay of the Means of Knowledge and their Objects 565 is based on Ignorance

191. The Validity of the Veda 567

192. The Relation between Revelation and Reason 574

193. The True Subject-Matter of Vedic Teaching 577

194. The Treatment of Cause and Effect 580

195. The Unmanifest 584

196. The Superimposition of the Notion that one is an Individual Soul - 589

197. The Relation between the Absolute and the Individual Soul 591

xxx

198. Refutation of the Doctrine of Difference in identity 597

199. The Discrimination of the Five Sheaths 601

200. Dream in the Context of the Discrimination of the Thrce States 605

201. Dreamless Sleep in the Context of the Discrimination of the 611 Three States

202. Liberation is Eternal as it is one's State when one has realized 615 one's own True Nature

203. Liberation in Life 616

204. The Means to Liberation 621

205. Hearing, Pondering and Sustained Meditation 628

206. Refutation of the Notion of an Injunction for Knowledge: The 632 Doctrine of Immediate Intuition

207. The School which holds that Immediate Intuition cannot arise 641 merely from hearing the Supreme Texts

208. Concluding Summary 646

CHAPTER XI THE ISTA SIDDHI

209. Refutation of the Bhamati School along with Revival of the 647 Doctrine of Root-Ignorance

210. High Reputation of Vimuktatman, Author of the Ista Siddhi 647

211. The Main Point in the Book is the Establishment of 648 Indeterminable Ignorance

212. The Division of Subject-Matter in the Book 649

213. The Opening Verse condensing the Teaching of the whole Work 649

214. Predominance of Dialectical Argumentation 650

215. Refutation of the Distinction between Subject and Object 651

216. The Author's Dialectical Method 654

217. Because the World is Indeterminable, Non-Duality is Safeguarded 656

218. Proof that the Universe is the Effect of the Indeterminable 657 Illusory Power of Ignorance

xxxi

219. The Relation between the Absolute, Maya and the World 659

220. The Treatment of Cause and Effect 660

221. Ignorance as the Cause of Purely Phenomenal Objects 666 (Prātibhāsika Artha)

222. Ignorance (Ajñāna) is Different from Error, Doubt and 670 Absence of Knowiedge

223. Theories of Error 676

224. The Nature of Ignorance of the Shell 682

225. Ignorance of the Shell does not truly exist 692

226. How do the Means of Valid Cognition operate? 701

227. The Termination of Ignorance 706

228. What is the Cessation of Indeterminable Ignorance? 711

229. Ignorance of the Absolute terminated by Stages 715

230. Knowledge of the Absolute causes Immediate Intuition 724 through removing Ignorance of the Absolute

231. A Modicum of Ignorance accompanies even the one who has 729 attained Direct and Immediate Knowledge

232. Refutation of the Systems of Mandana and others 734

233. Refutation of Non-Dualism as conceived in the Theory of the Absolute as Word 743

234. Acceptance of the Doctrine of Positive Non-Duality 746

235. Defence against Opponents' Objections 749

236. Summary 750

CHAPTER XII THE VIVARAŅA

237. The Context of the Work 752

238. Superimposition has False Ignorance (Mithyā Ajñāna) for its 753 Material Cause

xxxii

239. Demonstration of the Nature of Metaphysical Igncrance 755

240. Threefold Cause of the Superimposition of the Nct-Self 761 onto the Self

241. The Seat of Ignorance and the Object it conceals 764

242. The Distinction between the Soul and the Absolute 769

243. The Ego-Superimposition 773

244. The Soul as a Reflection of the Absolute 775

245. Refutation of the Theory of Delimitation (Avaccheda Vada) 778

246. Ignorance in Dreamless Sleep 781

247. Ignorance is not a Material Cause introducing a Distinction 787 between the Soul and the Absolute

248. Explanation of Knower, Knowing and Known 790

249. Proof of Superimposition 795

250. Shell-Siiver and so on as the Examples for Superimposition 798

251. Study of the Cancellation of Error 804

252. The Identity of Avidyā and Māyā 810

253. The Cessation of Ignorance 813

254. The Doctrine of the Impression of Ignorance (Avidyā-Samskāra) 817

255. The Absolute as the Cause of Vedic Tradition 820

256. The Absolute is known through Vedic Revelation even though 822 it is an Already-Existent Entity

257. Reflection and Dialectic 830

258. Immediate Knowledge and the Means which lead to it 832

259. Hearing, Pondering and Sustained Meditation 835

260. How Action is an Aid to Knowledge 844

261. The Absolute is the Cause of the World 848

262. Summary of the Vivarana 855

xxxiii

CHAPTER XIII THE NYĀYA MAKARANDA

263. The Nyaya Makaranda 857

264. The Order of Topics in the Nyāya Makaranda 858

265. Refutation of Difference 858

266. Error is the Manifestation of an Object of Indeterminabie 861 Reality-Grade

267. Beginingless Indeterminable Ignorance 866

268. The Falsity of the Universe and the Self- 868 Luminosity of the Self

269. Perception and the Rest have Practical Validity: the Veda 870 has Validity because it communicates Truth

270. How the Upanishads can be an Authoritative Source of Kncwledge 872

271. How the Upanishadic Texts refer to a Partless Entity 874

272. Examination of the Nature of Liberation 878

273. The Seat of Ignorance 879

274. The Means to Liberation 882

275. The Cessation of Ignorance 883

276. Summary of the Nyāya Makaranda 885

CHAPTER XIV THE KHAŅDANA OF ŚRĪ HARSA

277. Links with New Methods 886

278. Introduction to Śrī Harşa 886

279. Division of Topics in the Book 887

280. No Rule that both must agree on the Reality of the Means of 888 Knowledge, etc., for a Debate

281. Even the Nihilist has a Right to enter into Debate 891

282. Idealism based on Self-Luminous Cognition 893

283. The Indeterminability of the Universe of Plurality 899

xxxiV

284. What is the Proof of Non-Duality? 904

285. Summary 906

CHAPTER XV CITSUKHĀCĀRYA

286. The Philosophy of Citsukhācārya 908

287. Citsukhācarya's Literary Output 908

288. The Contents of the Tattva Pradīpika 909

289. Citsukha's Manner of Expounding a Topic 910

290. Some Definitions and Proofs accepted by Citsukhācārya 914

291. Citsukhācarya's Place in the History of Vedanta 916

CHAPTER XVI SARVAJNĀTMAN

292. Who was Sarvajñātman? 918

293. The Importance of his Work 920

294. Ignorance alone is the Cause of Superimposition 920

295. The Purpose of the Vedanta and of this particular Work 922

296. Points about the Supreme Texts 923

297. The Veda is the Source of Knowledge of the Absolute 925

298. Miscellaneous Teachings from the Section on the Harmony 927 of the Texts

299. The Absolute as Cause of the World 929

300. Examination of the Three States of Waking, Dream and 932 Dreamless Sleep

301. Bare Consciousness is both the Seat of Ignorance and the Object 935 concealed by it

302. Accounting for the Distinction between Bound and Liberated Souis 938

303. Metaphysical Knowledge and Liberation arise from Application 938 to the Means of Knowledge

304. Liberation in Life 939

305. The Place of Sarvajnatman in the History of Vedanta 940

INTRODUCTION

THE METHOD OF COMMUNICATING THE SUPREME REALITY IN THE UPANISHADS

There is one pcint of which careful and acute students of the Māņdūkya Kārikas of Śri Gaudapada and the commentaries of Śri Śankara on the Brahma Sutras, Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita are well aware. They know that the concern of the Upanishads is to communicate to sincere enquirers direct experience of the supreme reality as their own Self - that supreme reality which is non-dual, has no particular features, and is beyond the range of speech and mind. They know that, to this end, the texts begin by falsely ascribing to this entity various attrib- utes that it does not really possess. They know that the texts refer to it by such terms as 'Being', 'the Absolute', 'the Self' and so on, and speak of it as knowable, as being of the nature of Consciousness and Bliss, as being accessible through the teachings of the Veda and the Teacher, as undergoing a real transformation (parinama) to manifest as the world, and as entering, in the form of the individual soul, into the universe it has projected, and enjoying it as an object of experience. Thus we find such texts as, 'In the beginning, my dear one, this (world) was Being alone' (Chand.VI.ii.1), 'Verily, in the beginning this (world) was the Absolute' (Brhad. I.iv.10), 'In the beginning this (world) was verily the Self, one only' (Ait. I.1.1), 'This is what has to be known, the eternal, the self- existent' (Śvet.I.12), 'The Absolute is Consciousness and Bliss' (Brhad. III.ix.28,7), 'That goal which all the Vedas proclaim' (Katha I.1i.15), 'He who has a Teacher can know' (Chand. VI.xiv.2), 'He became both the solid and the impalpable' (Taitt. II.6), and 'Let me enter as the living soul and unfold name and form' (Chand.VI.iii.2). But these attributes are only imagined in this way for pur- poses of instruction. These same upanishadic texts mean to ward off any suspicion that the superimposed attributes belong

2 Introduction

to the supreme reality. So at the end of various passages of teaching they clearly retract what they had said earlier. Thus we have such texts as The Self must be apprehended simply as "It is", this being the truth of both its two forms (with and without apparent conditioning adjuncts). When it has been apprehended simply as "It is", its true nature beccmes clear' (Katha II.iii.13), 'He knows, and there is no knower of Him' (Śvet. III.19), 'You cannot know the knower of knowing' (Brhad. III.iv.2), 'That from which words fall back without attaining access, together with the mind' (Taitt. II.9), 'It is not born, neither does it die' (Katha I.ii.18), 'Though reaily unborn,

xxxi .19), it appears as if born in many different forms' (White Yajurveda 'All this universe is but the Absclute (brahmar) alone' (Mund. II.ii.11), '(We find that, under analysis), the firehood of fire has vanished: a modificatjon is a mere name, a suggestion of speech' (Chand. VI.iv.1), and 'That is the real. That is the Self. That thou art' (Chand. VI.viii.7). And there are certain passages which specifically deny all knowable characteristics of the principle of reality called the Indestructible, such as the characteristic of being a substance or an attribute. For example, we have 'O Cargi, this the knowers of the Absclute call the Indestructible. It is not gross, not subtle, not short, not long, neither red (like fire) nor fluid (like water), neither shadow nor darkness, neither wind nor ether, not adhesive, not taste, not odour, without eyes, without ears, without voice, without mind, without bril- liance, without the vital principle, without an orifice, with- out a measure, having nothing within and nothing without. It consumes nothing, nor does anything consume it' (Brhad. III. viii.8), 'Imperceptible, inapprehensible, having no source from which it proceeds and having no colours or features, without eyes, ears, hands or feet' (Mund. I.i.6), and 'Without sound, impalpable, without form, beyond decay, without taste, con- stant, without odour, without beginning or end, fixed, beyond Mahat (the cosmic mind)' (Katha I.iii.15).

THE SENSE IN WHICH THE UPANISHADS ARE AN AUTHORITATIVE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

This principle of reality called the Absolute (brahman), since it is that which manifests in the guise of the knower, is that on which all right empirical cognition and so on depend. Its existence is therefore established as logically prior to all empirical experience, including valid empirical knowledge. For, as the Self of all, it is immediately evident; and because it is self-luminous experience, it is self-evident, and does not, like pots and other objects, require anything else apart from itself to make itself known. For all these reasons it does not require any special positive teaching. So the Upanishads do not fulfil their function as authoritative means of knowledge,

3 Introduction

in this context, through revealing a hitherto unknown object, in the manner of perception and the other means cf empirical knowledge. How, then, do they fulfil this function? The com- petent authorities in this field quote the text 'But when all has become his own Self, then what could a person see and with what?'. (Brhad. IV.v.15). And they say that it is only by a figure of speech that the Upanishads are spoken of as an authoritative means of knowledge. For their function is to communicate that reality in ite true nature, beyond the play cf the means of knowledge and their objects, merely by putting an end to the superimposition omto it of attributes it does aot possess.

SUPERIMPOSITION AND ITS REMOVAL DO NOT AFFECT THE ABSOLUTE

The Absolute is not affected in any way either by the super- impositions made upon it in worldly experience or by the false attributions deliberately madc by the Veda and the Teacher for purposes of instructics, or by their subsequent retraction. It gains no superior quality, nor does it suffer any defect. For the Absolute is pure Being, ever void of all plurality. It is imagined as associated with plurality and as subject to trans- migratory experience by the metaphysically ignorant people of the world. The Upanishads and the Teachers deliberately con- form their teaching to this erroneous view and say, 'All this is in truth the Absolute, homogeneous and void of all plural- ity. There is no universe of plurality apart from the Abso- lute. The individual soul is not anything different from it either'. For there are such upanishadic texts as, 'All this universe is (in truth) nothing but the Absolute' (Mund.II.ii. 11), 'All this is but the Self alone' (Chand.VII.xxv.2), and 'There is no other seer, no other hearer, no other thinker, no other knower but He' (Brhad. III.vii.23). Nor should one suppose that the Upanishads and the Teachers conjure away a real universe by their teaching. The Upanishads never admit that any real distinctions exist which would jus- tify us in speaking of a traditional science and a pupil learn- ing it, or of a real metaphysical Ignorance that truly afflic- ted the pupil and was really brought to an end by the tradi- tional teaching. When they speak of 'all this', it is but a device adopted for purposes of teaching. But no 'all this' exists at the time of teaching, or has existed before or will exist afterwards. This is the final truth. And thus one of the great authorities (Sri Gaudapada) has said: 'If the world of plurality really existed, it would no doubt really come to an end. But this duality is a mere illusion. Non-duality is the final truth. False imagination might come to an end if it were anything that anyone had really imagined. This doctrine (that the world of plurality is imagined) is (itself only) for

4 Introduction

the sake of teaching (those in metephysical Ignorance). When the truth is known, there is no duality' (G.K.I.17,18).

THIS IS THE ONLY METHOD OF INTERPRETING THE UPANISHADS SANCTIONED BY TRADITION

This method of teaching is met with throughout the Upanishads. We know from the text 'That which has no plurality is communi- cated through false attributior followed by retraction', quoted in Śrī Bhagavatpāda Śankara's Gītā Commentary (XIII.13), that thoee who knew the true upcnishadic tradition practised this method of teaching before the time of Sri Bhagavatpada himself. And we know also from the words of Gaugapada that he taught this traditional method. For he says; 'The text denies all that it had previcusly taught, by saying "He (the Self) is neither this nor that" (Brhad. II.111.6), and by showing that the Self is beyond all perception and conception. Through this the Unborn is able to manifest' (G.K.III.26). The meaning is that, simply for purposes of instruction, the Veda first attributes to the Self, as principle of reality, features that it does not in fact possess. And it does this even though the Self is that which alone exists, within and without (Mund. II. i.2), and is also unborn and without differentiation. Then, when the Self has been thus taught, and the work of positive instruction is complcte, the Veda itself retracts whatever it had previously taught, to show that none of it was the final truth.

REASONS FOR THE COMPOSITION OF THE PRESENT WORK

This method employed throughout all the classical Upanishads, though one in essence, assumes many different forms. Included among the sub-varieties to be examined below are forms of teaching in which the Absolute is associated with cause and effect, with creation, with the distinction between the indivi- dual soul and the Lord, with universals and particulars, with the distinction between the five 'sheaths' (kosa) and with the three 'states' (of waking, dream and dreamless sleep). I have written this book to bring this method home to the hearts of spiritual enquirers by presenting it in an exact exposition. Then, after showing how it has become obscured, I have re- stated this pure traditional method of upanishadic teaching, to enable modern enquirers to recognize it, and thereby to put them on the right path, free from all thorns, to a correct appreciation of the meaning of the Upanishads. In regard to the teaching being obscured, I have shown in the course of the work how the teachers of Bhagavatpada

5 Introduction

Śankara's time, and other earlier ones who belonged to dif- ferent schoois, were not able to recognize the paramount im- portance of this method of teaching found in the upanishadic texts. I have shown how they supposed that bondage and igno- rance were realities, and that the seeker of liberation achieved nis goal through bringing them to an eud through re- sort to various practical disciplines alone. And I have ex- plained how, in the light of thesc opinions, they devised a number of different and conflicting techniques for explaining the upanishadic texts. Further, I have shown that there have been cther expositors of a later period who, calling themselves followers of Bhaga- vatpāda, bave not properlv studied this true iechnique, and, while affirming that their views were in agreement with his, havc set un theories that conflict both with his teaching and mutually with each other. I have also pcinted out how there have been Vedantic commentators of other schools, later than Bhagavatpada, who have been unwilling tc acknowledge the importance of this true technique, and who have supposed that Bhagavatpada's whole position has been refuted when a mere detail in his explanatiom of his pocition has been refuted, thereby deluding both themselves and others. I have also shown how there are Vedantic scholars of a later day who suppose that the Advaita propounded by Bhagavatpada can be preserved merely by refuting the objections raised by the commentators of other schools, who do not belong to the true tradition. And I have shown, finally, that such scholars are often engaged in the defence of positions that are in fact in contradiction with those of Bhagavatpada, without their even being aware of the fact.

THE SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE PRESENT WORK

The work is not limited to the exposition of the pure upani- shadic spiritual technique and the exposure of many of the deviations found in other techniques. It is the writer's view that the belief that all that is required is an explanation of the Vedic texts according to one's own opinions, arrived at by mere reason, has been the chief cause of Vedantins' falling a prey to disputation and mutual contradiction. For this reason he has supplied an outline of the history of Vedantic thought as a means to examine the various techniques of interpretation of the upanishadic texts that it offers. In this connection, it has been shown how the early Vedanta Teachers who came before Śri Śankara, though admitting in general that the message of the Upanishads was non-dualism, were not able to avoid points of mutual disagreement. The main positions of Bhartrprapañca, who may have been approxi- mately a contemporary of Bhagavatpāda Sankara, have received

6 Introduction

as complete an exposition as wes possible from the commentaries of the latter and the Vartikas of Suresvara and their sub- commentaries by Anandagiri. And they have been briefly refuted in accordance with the commentaries and Vartikas. Amongst the schools appearing after Śri Bhagavatpada, that of the author of the Vartikas (Suresvara) has been set out in some detail. For it was the venerable Suresvara who expourded and supported in his own inimitable way the technique fcllowed by Bhagavatpada. Amongst those who adopted a standpoint of opposition to it, special attention has been given to the doc- trines cf Mandama Misra and Bhaskaracarya. For we shall show afterwards that almost ail the later Vedantins were influenced by these two in working out their own line of thought. Amongst the schools of those who wrote explanatory works as followers of Bhagavatpada, those of the Pañcapadika and the Vivarana sub-commentary composed upon it, as well as that of the Bhamati, have been set out and accorded special prominence. The aim is to bring out how the arguments are tainted with the defects both of mutual contradiction and of contradiction with the commentaries of Śri Bhagavatpada. Other schools, up to and including that of Sarvajñatma Muni, have also been dealt with, to show how they are entangled in mere dialectics, a kind of vice indulged in to show off the author's skills as an interpreter. Efforts have also been made, within the limits of the author's capacity, to bring out how the Veda and reason and immediate intuition co-operate together, and how the earnest seeker of liberation can acquire a correct conviction about the truths taught in the Upanishads by following the traditional methods of enquiry approved by Bhagavatpada, and thus attain their end. A number of special points have been made clear in the course of the survey. For example, it has been pointed out how the Upanishads do not derive their authority as a means of knowledge solely from the fact of their being included among the texts of the Veda. They derive it from their power to lead ultimately to a direct experience of the Self, arising from the cancellation of all play of the empirical means of knowledge with their objects. This power is associated with their demonstration of the fact that the state of being an individual knowing subject, which is the prior condition for all empirical experience, is itself based on metaphysical Ignorance. (M.V.28) Among further special points are the fol- lowing. The method observed in the Upanishads for communi- cating the metaphysical truth should be called Āgama (tradi- tional instruction). That form of argument which follows the Veda and is a subordinate discipline practised for the sake of direct experience, as well as the secular reasoning used in its support, should be called 'reason'. The terms 'traditional instruction' and 'reason' are thus used by the true experts in Vedanta in a very precise technical sense. Empty dialectic based on perception and inference alone (suşka-tarka) amounts

7 Introduction

to nothing more than personal opinion, and has uo place in this discipline (M.V.31). Here, the term 'authoritative means of knowledge' (pramana) is applied (not to the reasoning itself but) to that direct experience in which reasoning must invari- ahly culminate if it is to be called upanishadic in the proper sense of the term (M.V.31). And the particular nature of direct experience as acknowledged in Vedanta has been explained as direct experience of the Self. This is what follows when the Self has been realized in its omn true nature after all superimposition has been abolished through metaphysical knowl- edge (vidya) (M.V.31). The purpose of this explanation is to rule out the teachings about 'trance' (samadhi) and sc forth found in other schools. No doubt the upanishadic doctrine maintains that all play of the empirical mears of knowledge with their objects is based on Ignorance. But in this doctrine it is not the case that the visible realm is merely reasoned away by negative dialectic, as in the case of the teaching of the Buddhist Nihilists. For recourse is had to two standpoints in regard both to action and knowledge - the worldly standpoint and the Vedic standpoint. Until the worldly standpoint has been con- tradicted and cancelled on the strength of direct realization of the truth of the higher Vedic standpoint, the secular means of knowledge, such as perception, inference and the rest, all have validity in their respective fields, as do the Vedic pas- sages dealing, for instance, with meditators and themes for meditation, or with injunctions and prohibitions and also the portions of the Veda doaling with liberation. The object of explaining all this is to rule out the incursion of the views of other schools (M.V.48 and 49). Again, it is true that in the upanishadic doctrine the Abso- lute (brahman) must be the Self of all, without differentiation, without a second, ever pure, conscious and liberated by nature. And hance we have the verse, 'There is no dissolution and no creation. There is no one bound and there is no one undergoing spiritual discipline. There is no one seeking liberation and no one who has attained liberation. This is the highest truth' (G.K.II.32). Nevertheless, it has been explained how, when things are viewed from the standpoint of our experience in meta- physical Ignorance, learning and other helpful acquisitions have to be pursued by those earnestly desirous of liberation, and there must be firm adherence to knowledge (jñana-nistha) once it has arisen (M.V.58). Liberation, when it consists in establishment in one's own true Self accompanied by the renun- ciation of all activity after the cessation of Ignorance, may be referred to by the term 'immediate release' (sadyo-mukti) (M.V.59 and 60). And from the standpoint of empirical experi- ence we may speak of 'final release' (atyantika-mukti) when the body falls (on death) at the end of the experience of the portion of merit and demerit that initiated the life in which liberation was obtained (M.V.60). And although from the

8 Introduction

atandpoint of empirical experience we can think of liberation in three different forms as 'release by stages' (krama-mukti), 'immediate release' (sadyo-mukti) and 'release after death' (videha-mukti), yet in release in its true nature there are no distirctions, since it is by naure our own Self, ever in our possession (M.V.61). From this empirical standpoint, there- fore, the distinction between means and ends is intelligible - all thic we have explained.

CONCLUS TON

How far this effort has been successful must he left to the judgment of the acknowiedged experts in the study of upani- shadic doctrine. Whatever inkling I have been able to obtain of the true power of the traditional method has come through sustained remembrance of the holy feet of Bhagavatpada. I offer this book to that World-Teacher in the true sease of the words, quite content with this alone, and indeed rcgarding myself as highly fortunate. As with my other works before, I offer this first part of the work called 'Rccognition of the true Method of the Vedanta' to the Working Committee of the Adhyātra Prakāsa Kēryālaya at Holenarsipur to print and pub- lish. They have enthusiastically accepted the work of dissemi- nating my particular views on the Vedanta through the publica- tion of my writings. It is my heart-felt prayer that the Lord Nārāyaņa may bless this Committee so that, having earned the grace of Sri Bhagavatpada through their efforts in printing, publishing and distributing this first volume, they may be able to take up the publication of the second volume at a later time.

Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī Bhikşu, whose support is the remembrance of Śrī Śankara's holy feet.

Adhyātma Prakāsa Kāryālaya, Thursday, 30th January 1964.

CHAPTER I THE NEED FOR ESTABLISHING THE TRUE METHOD

OM! Reverence to the line of Seers, beginning with Brahma, who have established the tradition of the knowledge of the Absolute! Reverence to the Great Ones! Reverence to the Gurus!

1 THE TRADITIONAL METHOD OF THE VEDANTA THAT HAS BEEN HANDED DOWN BY AN UNBROKEN SUCCESSION OF GURUS, BEGINNING WITH BRAHMĀ

It is well known to those who follow the Veda that the phrase 'the method of the Vedanta' refers to the method for teaching knowledge of the Absolute observed in the Upanishads. Knowl- edge of the Absolute first ranifeste at the beginning of a world-period in the mind of Hiranyagarbha or Brahma, who has received the Veda from the supreme Lord. The method, carried on continuously by a succession of Teachers beginning with Brahmā, has even come down to certain Teachers of modern times. And earnest seekers of release can still today achieve their goal by. acquiring an unshakable conviction about the truths in the science of the Upanishads, taught by a true Guru. For we have the upanishadic text, 'In search of release, I take refuge in that deity, the light of my intellect, who projects Brahmā at the beginning of a world-period and delivers to him the Vedas' (Śvet.VI.18).

2 THOUGH THE METHOD HAS BEEN CLEARLY PROCLAIMED IN THE THREE STARTING-POINTS OF THE VEDANTA TRADITION (PRASTHĀNATRAYA), CONFUSION HAS BEEN INTRODUCED BY VARIOUS TEACHERS

This method of the Vedanta has received the support of the Bhagavad Gita and other works, according to the principle 'The

10 Chapter 1

Veda engenders knowledge in him who is fit to receive it'. The true distinction and true relation between the way of action and the way of renunciaiion has been established, and the character of those fit to tread them properly determined. The method has also been established through rational argu- ments by the revered Bādarayana Acarya, who composed an ex- egetical work (the Brahma Sutras) explaining the upanishadic texts. However, in the course of long time the traditional path has occasionally fallen almost into oblivion. In these cir- cumstances it has sometimes happened that certain Teachers, unable to discern the true nature of this method on account of their own mental imperfections, their minds deranged by im- pressions received from the teachings of other schools, inter- preted the upanishadic teaching to their pupils in all sorts of different ways according to their personal understanding. On account of this, they occasionally gave out the teaching of other schools as if they were the traditional doctrine, ard in this way it has come about that certain extraneous teachings have gained currency as orthodox Vedanta. Ccnfusion about the true upanshadic doctrine was thus introduced by authors representing various schools of Vedanta, who made free use of quotation of texts, allied both to genuine reasoning and to sophistry: Then it was that Śri Gaudapāda Ācārya, actuated solely by a desire to serve the people, composed his Kārikās and stated the true traditional method in its proper form, through the medium of an explanation of the meaning of the Māņdūkya Upanishad. And Śrī Śankara Bhagavatpāda, as well as his pupils and followers, propagated his commentaries on the three starting-points of the Vedanta (the Prasthanatraya, viz. the classical Upanishads, Brahma Sūtras and Gita), thoroughly clarifying the true method, and purging away the mud of all the different spurious methods of interpretation. For their conviction was that if anyone heedlessly embraced any random method of interpretation he would be prevented from attaining the supreme good, and would fall into adversity.

3 DIFFICULTY OF RECOGNIZING THE TRUE METHOD CAUSED BY THE RISE OF NEW SCHOOLS

Even so, with the passage of time, the commentaries of Bhaga- vatpada, too, fell into obscurity through the weak understand- ing of their students. Works had been written by Bhagavat- pada's direct pupil Suresvara Acārya to explain further the meaning of these commentaries, but, being themselves in places difficult to understand, they were not enough to prevent those whose minds had become affected by other traditions from enter- ing onto wrong paths. Further, various expository works were written by people who could not shake off the influence of the theories of other schools, and gradually more and more con-

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fusion about the true method of the Vedanta was introduced by people indulging in all sorts of different theories. To add to our misfortunes, certain dualist Vedantins arose, natural enemies of Advaita, who composed new commentaries in which they took hold of whatever explanations and theories of Advaita were current in their day, and refuted them as if they were the views of the revered Commentator himself. There are also hundreds of independent treatises by autbors of cur own school which proclaim themselves, without warrant, to have been written by Śri Bhagavatpada. And thus it has come about that the teachings of the revered Commentator can nc longer promote recognition of the true method of the Vedanta even when they are heard, as the minds of the hearers are confused by the din of the quarreiling disputants. Formidable indeed is the power of Kali Yuga!

4 AN OBJECTION RAISED BY MODERN STUDENTS

Students whose minds have been driven this way and that by the various dissentient theorists are apt to raise the following objection. Amidst all this confusion, how can we distinguish the pure method of the Vedanta from those different theories which merely masquerade as such? For a long time now, all manner of different theories have been advanced by latter-day commentators who say that they follow the upanishadic doctrine, each of them producing arguments to refute the others. Those, too, who have written sub-commentaries explaining Śri Bhaga- vatpāda's commentaries continually display differences in their formulation of the method. In the same way, the authors of subsidiary works of explanation base their work om differing conceptions of the true method. Now, the Upanishads are still universally accepted as au- thoritative by all competent students. Everyone studying them follows the same texts. And it is agreed in Vedanta that that method alone should be recognized which is found to agree with the teaching of the Gpanishads taken as a whole, when the mean- ing of the texts has been properly ascertained in accordance with the six exegetical criteria for determining purport. (These are: (1) a commentator should safeguard the unity of theme found in the opening and closing passages of a topic (upakramopasamhāraikya); (2) he should take account of the emphasis implied by repetitions (abhyasa); (3) in judging what is significant and what is subordinate, he should observe the principle that all significant teaching has the character- istic of not being available elsewhere (apurvata); (4) he should observe the principle that all significant teaching has utility (phala); (5) there need not be a literal interpreta- tion of passages of eulogy or condemation (arthavada); (6) interpretations should have logical consistency (upapatti). T.N. )

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Nevertheless, while various commentators interpret the Upanishads, as supported by the Epics and Puranas and other traditional texts, according to these criteria, they all do so arbitrarily, according to their own particular school. And it is well known that those whc come in the wake of the founders of systems do not measure up to their great predecessors. All, however, are attached to their wn theories and passionately concerned to refute these of their adversaries. The authors of all these latter-day commentaries and sub- commentaries become involved, in the course of their discus- sions, in disputes based either on speciel pleading or cn pure- ly destructive dialectics, without ever satisfying their zeal fcr pouring or't innumerable books. And yet ncne of them is seer to be universaily eccepted by all Vedantins as the best authority on the =ethod. As it was the same with the encients as it is with the moderas, how could we know that any one par- ticular method was flawless? We cannot mow collect together all the largc number of ancient commentators in ome place in company with the Vedantins of modern times. Nor do we now possess all the commentaries that have been written. It wili therefore not be possible to consider all the schools compara- tively and decide that any particular one is alone correct. And though innumerable books are available in the form of com- mentaries, expositions and independent treatises composed to bring out the meaning of the Upanishads from the standpoint of this or that school, it is hard to know which we should accept as authoritative, and by what qualities they should be judged- and equally difficult to know what should be rejecied as standing in contradiction with what was authoritative. So, all in all, it seems to us that the recognition of the right method of the Vedanta is no easy matter.

5 ONE ATTEMPTED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM: THE VIEW THAT THE VARIOUS FORMULATIONS OF THE METHOD ARE DUE TO VARYING DEGREES OF ABILITY IN DIFFERENT STUDENTS

Some say that this objection is not right. For Śri Bhagavat- pada, they claim, saw that the Vedas, the Smrti and the Puranas formed one united whole, and showed, through his commentaries on the classical Upanishads, the Brahma Sutras and the Bhagavad Gita, that non-duality was the sole final message of the Upani- shads. This he did by refuting all theories involving duality. Since it is only failure to understand Bhagavatpada's meaning that has occasioned the composition of new commentaries on the Upanishads from a dualistic standpoint, it remains true (the argument runs) that the study of the theories they contain is unnecessary for the more acute students who have faith in the authoritative commentary. But certain expositions exist which are of help to students of average or poor ability, in that they refute objections raised by other commentators and explain

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how vision of non-duality is the means to unsurpassable beati- tude. Similarly, there exist many carefully composed independent works by Bhagavatpada and his followers which aim to make the meaning of the Upanishads clear and to remove all thorns from the path of Vedantic hearing and reflection, even for the most tenderfoot students. As for what was said about the many dif- ferences of opinion that are found amongst the different methods of explanation, the reply has beon given by an expert on the topic (quoted at Appaya Diksita, 1916, Comm. p.4): 'Contradiction amongst imaginary suggestions made to help a person understand a reality that is not imaginary are not & de- fect. For it is not thought to be a defect if there is mutual contradiction between the various falsc versions of the minute star Arundhati (Alcor) amid the neighbouring constellations to the north and east that different people suggest initially to enable others tc identify the true Arundhati'.

(Arundhati is a minute star near the Plough, on which the bridal couple have to gaze at a certain point in the wedding ceremony. T.N. )

This (these theorists claim) is enough to resoive the dif- ferences of view that occur in the independent works on Vedanta. For the final aim in all the texts is to convey the unity and sole reality of the Self, and little value is attached to objects that are merely established by empirical experience. Thus even the mutual refutations found in the various different independent works do not imply a defect. For what was the object thet the authors of these refutations had in mind? They saw that different enquirers stood at different intellectual leveis. Therefore, with a view to promoting firm- ness on the path leading to knowledge of the identity of one's true Self with the Absolute, they applied themselves to teach a method which took proper account of the various different levels of understanding. There is no rule saying 'A person attains to the knowledge of the unity and sole reality of the Self through this method and this alone'. And the author of the Vartika (Suresvara) has said, 'By whatever method of in- struction men are brought to a realization of the inmost Self, that method is good here. There is no fixed rule about it' (B.B.V. I.iv.402). Hence the whole view that one of the various methods is the right one, and the rest are to be rejected, is wrong. And this investigation aimed at recognition of the right method of the Vedanta is like the arbitrary pastime of picking out one parti- cular constellation when tie sky offers the whole infinite abundance of its twinkling stars to choose from.

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6 EXAMINATION OF THIS ATTEMPTED SOLUTION

But our own view is that this solution will not be enough to satisfy the doubts of enquirers. For consider. Not only be- fore the revered Commentator Sankara, but even before Gauda- pada, there had been not a few Vedaniins of the Advaita (non- dual) persuasion who had adopted quite different methods of interpretation. Indeed it is clear that there had already been resort to different methods of interpretation amongst Advaitins even before ihe time of the composition of the Brahma Sutras. Fer the commentary on the Vakyanvaya Adhikarana (Brahma Sūtra I.iv.19-22) shows that the Teachers Asmarathya, Audulomi and Kasakrtsna, considered in that passage, taught the doctrine of the identity of the Self with the Absolute, but that each fol- lowed quite different methods of explaining that identity. Nor was it at all the case that the commentator on the Sutras (Śankara). and the author of the Vartika (Suresvara) merely set their minds at rest with the reflection 'All those theorists had Advaita as their final message' and then remained silent. On the contrary, they stated their own method, supporting it with Vedic quotations and dialectical reasoning, and refuted the methods adopted by others as not being the right way to establish Non-Duality. For even Vedic texts are not adjudged to be an authoritative means of knowledge when they appear to be mutually contradictory and have not been brought into har- mony, what to say of mere arguments. Of the various mutually contradictory theories, only one could constitute the right path. For, just as paths going in contrary directions cannot lead to the same spot, so there cannot be alternative correct views about a reality. Vyasa has said: 'The path that goes to the eastern sea does not lead to the western sea. There is only one path leading to liberation. Listen while I explain it in detail' (M.Bh. Mokşa Dharma 274.4). Nor does the maxim about the approximate versions of Arun- dhati apply here. For in that procedure one first points out a number of stars that are not in fact Arundhati, and it is only the last to be pointed out that is really Arundhati, and, when that is known, it is clear that the others were only provisional and brought in as a device to point out the real one. And the one who finally observes Arundhati is quite clear about this. In this situation there are no contradictions. For it is always perfectly clear, in the way we have indicated, that the stars pointed out in the constellations to the east and north and so on were not the real Arundhati. And though the stars pointed out by different people are different, some to the east and others elsewhere, there is no disagreement amongst the various people pointing to them that they are all just a device for pointing out the real Arundhati, which is otherwise hard to see. But in the present context the case is far otherwise. The propagators of one method insist vehe- mently on the incorrectness of the other methods.

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Nor can one maintain that there cannot be any contradicticn between the commentaries of Śri Sankara and the later works purporting to explain them, if one merely alleges that differ- ent passages are designed to cater for the needs of students of different grades. For, unlike harmonious convictions, con- tradictory convictions cannot lead to the highest good. Nor was it relevant to quote the text of Suresvara, 'By whatever metnod of instruction men are brought tc a realization of their inmost Self ... '. For tnat was not intended to lay down the general method of Vedantic interpretation. The context shows that the subject was theories of creation, as is clear from the succeeding verse. It runs, 'The rise, maintenance and destruction (of the worid) are nowhere really possible. This will also bc explained later, using words in their plain meaning' (B.V.V. I.iv.403). There is no suggestion here that, because the doctrines of all cther theorists of the school have Non-Duality for their final message, there can be no contra- diction with them. On the contrary, the author displays great zeal in bringing out the defects cf thcse who do not follow the same method of interpretation as himself. But we desist from showing this in detail for reascas of space. Similarly, there are clear contradictions between the com- mentaries of Sri Sankara and the independent works attributed to his name. Therefore, until we have found some means of showing the harmony among the different schools, it is clear that there is little hope of establishing the true method of the Vedanta on an impeccable basis.

7 ANOTHER ILL-INFORMED ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT THE DIFFERENT THEORIES DO NOT CONFLICT

Others try to establish absence of conflict between Śri Bhaga- vatpada's commentaries and the sub-commentaries in a different way. They hold that conflicts can be resolved in the same way as they are in another science. In the science of grammar the maxim holds, 'One must rely on exegetical works for the parti- cular meaning. For the presence of doubt is not a proof that there is no definite rule' (Nagesa, 1868, p.l). Similarly in Vedanta, they say, one must rely on later exegetical works for the particular meaning of what has been stated in a general way in the commentary. Or they refer to the new distinctions re- quired to settle apparent contradictions between ideas urged at different places in the commentaries. Some things, too, are left unsaid in the commentaries. Hence various points are elaborated in the later works, as occasion arises, in order to amplify knowledge of the true Vedantic position. And on this basis these prattlers try to produce quotations in defence of the authority of the later exegetical works. Others argue that some grammarians accept the principle 'Authority belongs to whichever sage came later' (Bhattoji,

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1949, sectica 222, p.192). The idea is that if the author of the Värtika (katyayana) manifests dissent of any kind from what is said in the Stra of Panini, or if he adds anything in the way of a private gloss of his own, then it is his word that must always be accepted and not that of the author of the Sutras. And when the author of the Commentary (Fatanjali, who came after Kātyāyana, ) refutes the statements of the author of the Vartika (Kātyayana) in order to establish some rule, then it is his opimion only about which rule was correct that should he accepted. On this basis the view is put forward that wherever a con- flict is found between the revered Commeutator (Sankara) and the later expository works, it is the view of Suresvara or Padmapada that must always be accepted (against that of Śri Śankara). Only thus, they maintain, can the objections of the dualists be fully refuted and the doctrine of the Commentator properly preserved. Others argue as follows. It is known on the basis of tra- dition that Padmapada (the alleged author of the Pañcapādikā) and Suresvara wele direct pupils of Bhagavatpada. How could these two expositors of their master's work possibly have had the impertinence to adopt different traditions on their own account, in conflict with those of the Commentator? Would it not be more sensible to conclude that these two learned their master's doctrine from his own lips, and that they later clarified it so as to give an unanswerable reply to the objec- tions brought forward by opponents after the commentaries had been written, thereby protecting them from criticism? The common point in all these views is that the method pro- pounded by the Commentator must be defended on the basis of accepting as authoritative the positions advocaled in the sub- commentaries, positions which have now become universally cur- rent. And it is never right to attribute contradictions to the venerable authors of the sub-commentaries.

8 EXAMINATION OF THIS SOLUTION

This does not appear to us to be a correct solution either. To begin with, there is no reason why we should accept every principle belonging to another science, in this case grammar. True, Bhagavatpada himself has enunciated the principle 'Where the view of another school is not refuted it is allowed to stand' (B.S.Bh. II.iv.12). So you might ask why we should not accept the principle of another science in the present context on his own authority. But in the present context, maxims can only be accepted if they are really applicable, not otherwise. And the part of the above-quoted maxim saying 'for the presence of doubt is not a proof that there is no definite rule' does not apply here at all. For that text refers to a particular context in the Mahabhasya of Patañjali in the following way.

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Commenting on the Sutra 'a, ai and au are called vrddhi' (Pāņini Sūtra I.i.l), the Mahābhāsya makes a theorist who only knows one side of the matter say, 'Let us suppose that the "t" (appearing as the "d" in vrddhiradaic) was inserted to remove a doubt. If the author of the Sutras had just said "aic" without preceding it by "t", thore would have been room for the doubt whether only the two vowels "ai" and "au" had been meant, or whether "a" also had been included. So the "t" was inserted to eliminate this doubt'. But the exponent of the settled conclusion is made to reply, 'This would have been a mere doubt. And in all doubt the maxim applies thai one must rely on commentaries for the particular meaning. For the presence of doubt is not a proof thai there is no definite rule. Hence I (as commentator) will explain that the reference is to the three vowels a, ai and au (while the insertion of the "t" has a different function). There are other places also (e.g. Paņini VI.1.93) where doubts of this kind arise and where the author of the Sutras makes no attempi to elucidate them (leav- ing this task to the commentators)' (Patañjali, 1962, p.42). Now, if this maxim is to bc accepted in the Vedanta, too, we are agreeable. But it should only be applied when a doubt has been left unresolved in the material under commont. And we must make it clear that the explanatory texts that actually contradict the work on which they are commenting can never be rendered authoritative by appeal to this maxim. Perhaps you will remind me that you have said that, when- ever there is a conflict between an original text and a later commentary, we should accept the maxim of certain grammarians 'Authority belongs to whichever sage came later'. True, you said it. But if you accept that maxim wholesale you will in- cur a very unwelcome rcsuit. For you do not yourself hold the opinion that whatever is shown to be earlier is already by that mere fact subject to being contradicted and cancelled, so that whatever is later is authoritative. For if that were the case, then whenever there was any conflict between the commentary and a gloss on the commentary, or between a gloss and a sub- gloss, the later gloss or sub-gloss would invariably be authori- tative. In fact the glosses and sub-glosses would rank highest, and supreme authority would lie in them, and they would refute the commentary which they were supposed to be explaining. But even those who accept the theories of the later glosses do not accept that. For it is very well known that all the authors of glosses and sub-glosses themselves affirm with a single voice that Bhagavatpada is an infallible authority. And so it would be incumbent on the one who held that each later author was authoritative against his predecessors to explain how it was that the author of the original commentary was regarded as alone supremely authoritative. For otherwise the conflict between the Commentator and the authors of later glosses would remain unresolved. Nor do we find in our own science the same number of later authors deliberately contradicting the text on

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which they were commonting that is found amongst the grammari- ans, so that we are not forced to pick out one and say 'He alone stands supreme'. And there is another point. The maxim 'Authority belongs to whichever sage came later' was not univorsally accepted by all the ancients of every school. For in discussing whether or not the negative particle 'na' (not) when associated with an inflected ending invariably formcd a compound, Śri Śabara Svamin wrote as follows: 'Katyayana, the revered author of the Vartika, expressed the opinion that when the word "nct" was associated with an inflected word it invariably formed a com- pound, affirming that citing an opticn would be useless, as the case was self-evident. But the veuerable Panini did not take this view. In the Sutra "Option" (Panini sutra II.i.11) he said that there was option in such cases. And the word of Pāņini is to be taken as authoritative because he was a posi- tive teacher (sadvadin). The word of Katyayana is not authoritative, because he was a mere corrector who dealt in negations (asadvadin). Those who deal in negations may be ignorant of something which really exists' (P.M.B. X.viii.4, cp. Devasthali, 1959, r.134). It is true that Kumārila Bhatta defends the authoritativeness of Kātyāyana on this point, in his commentary on this passage in the Tuptika. He writes: 'Here, an expression like "king-man", where the first word is not inflected, should invariably be taken as a compound. For if the inflections were included, we would have the expression "the king's man" in full. Hence he (i.e. Kātyāyana) has said, "And the citing of an option would be useless"'. Still, it has been well shown that the maxim 'Authority belongs to whichever sage came later' is not respected by everyone in all schools. And as the present argument does not really gainsay this, it would be irrelevant to pursue it further. So the view that in Vedanta conflicts can be resolved in the same way as they are in another science (viz. grammar) is uot correct. It was also said that 'Padmapada' and Suresvara were known to be pupils of Bhagavatpāda, and that it was therefore impos- sible that they should have failed to have understood their own Teacher's meaning or composed explanatory works in con- flict with it. To this we would reply as follows. It is true that there is a tradition that a certain person called Padmapāda Ācārya was a cherished pupil of Bhagavatpāda and was the author of the Pancapadika. But that tradition can only be accepted as resting on the authority of. biographical romances such as the Sankara Vijaya of Madhava. There is no evidence for it anywhere else. There is nothing, either in the text of the Pañcapadika as we now have it, or in the Vivaraņa composed (by Prakasātman) to explain it, to show that any person called 'Padmapada' was its author. None of the manuscripts of the work contain a colophon saying it was com- posed by Padmapada, nor is it anywhere stated that the author was a pupil of Bhagavatpada. Hence there is still doubt even

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today as to who the actual author was. There can, however, be no doubt either about the contra- dictions that subsist between the Pañcapādika and the commen- tary it is explaining, or about those between the Pañcapādikā and the Vivarana sub-commentary composed to explain it. Here we will cite only one example. We find in Śri Śankara's Brahma Sutra Commentary the expressions 'This very superim- positicn, thus defined, the wise call "Ignorance"' (I.i.1, introduction) and 'Name and form, imagined through Ignorance as if they were the true form of the Lord, ... are spoken of in the Veda and Smrti as "Maya", "Sakti" and "Prakrti"' (II.i.14). But in the Pañcapadika we find it said that Igno- rance 'is spoken of in many different ways in the Vedas, Smrtis, Epics and Puranas, such as Name and Form (nāma-rūpa), the Unevolved (avyakrta), Ignorance (avidya), Divine Power of Illusion (māyā), Nature (prakrti), Non-perception (agrahaņa), the Unmanifest (avyakta), Darkness (tamas), the Cause (kārana), Dissolution (laya), Power (sakti), the Great Sleep (mahāsupti), Sleep (nidra), the Indestructible (aksara) and the Shining Ether (akasa). (See M.V. 132, 4; 143, 4.) Here there is a clear contradiction between the commentary of Bhagavatpada and the Pañcapadika. For, in the commentary, name and form are said to be imagined through Ignorance and to be spoken of as Māyā. But in the Pañcapādika they are said to be Ignorance and Māyā. Later in the Pañcapādika (M.V.154,7) it is first laid down, with the help of such upanishadic quotations as 'Not indeed for the sake of the husband (is the husband dear)' (Brhad. II.iv.5), that the Self is the most desirable entity. The Pañcapadika theu goes on: 'If the Self is already known ir advance to be the dearest thing, then to say "it should be seen" or "it should be heard about" (Brhad. II.iv.5) consti- tutes (not an injunction but) a mere eulogy'. And having thus affirmed that hearing and the rest belong to the realm of mere eulogy, the Pañcapādikā goes on to strengthen the argument by saying: 'The gerundive is not here used in the sense of an injunction. It is used to express the idea of fitness, according to the Sutra, "The optative, the gerundive and the noun of agency may be used to express the idea of fitness"' (Panini III.iii.169). But the sub-gloss on the Pañcapādikā called the Vivarana, in explaining this very pas- sage, contradicts it, saying; 'He means that the first Brahma Sutra was laid down on the basis of accepting that hearing, supported by pondering and sustained meditation, were enjoined for the sake of right knowledge. And he now says tha:, al- though those texts are injunctions, they carry the additional sense of eulogy'.

(The author of the Vivarana here twists the words of the Pañcapādikā to imply that knowledge can be enjoined, contra- dicting the author's evident intention. note at M.V.259,6. T.N.) See below, author's

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How, then, could anyone maintain that contradictione such as this could all be parts of one theory? So the view that there could not be any contradiction between Śankara Bhagavat- pāda and Padmapāda Ācārya because they were supposed to be Guru and pupil is not right. Nor can the vicw be sustained that there is no contradiction between the Paacapādika gloss on Śri Śankara's commentary attributed to 'Padmepāda' and the sub-gloss called the Vivarana that purports to explain that gloss. In regard to Śri Suresvara Ācārya, there can be no dispute that he was a pupil of Bhagavatpada, as we have his own clear statem nt in the words, 'Having served the lctus feet of Śri Śankara I received (this pure knowledge ... ) and have now set it forth' (N.S.IV.74). And he spoke, indeed, of having com- posed a Vartika on Śri Śankara's Taittiriya Commentary in the following words: 'Suresvara, knower of the great truth and pupil of that mighty mendicant bearing the name of Siva (i.e. Śankara) who is the inspiration of a whole band of seekers of enlightenment, has composed this noble nectar-like Vārtika in devotion to him, to explain his commentary on the Taittiriya Upanishad, the heart of the teachings of the Taittiriya school' (T.B.V. III.90-1). Nevertheless, there would always be the possibility of his expressing his own views even where they contradicted the commentary on which he was writing a Värtika; for we find this practice in the Vārtikas of Kātyāyana and Kumārila Bhațța. We might also gather this from reflecting on the definition of a Vārtika given by Vyāsa in an untraced text in one of the minor Puranas, 'The wise, who know what.a Vartika is, bestow that title on those works which open up reflection about what has been said, left un- said or wrongly said'. And this possibility is clearly actuated in certain verses of Suresvara's Vartikas in which he refutes the commentary. For example, we find in the Brhadāranyaka Commentary an explanation of the following passage from the Upanishad, namely, 'This human world is to be won through begetting a son and not through any other act. The world of the ances- tors is to be won through ritualistic activity. And the world of the gods is to be won through symbolic meditations' (Brhad. I.v.16). The explanation given in Śri Sankara's com- mentary says, 'This human world is to be won with the son as the only means, "won" here meaning "attained by some means" ... One has to understand "not won through anything else, that is, not through ritualistic activity or through symbolic medita- tions". The world of the ancestors is to be won only through ritualistic action such as the performance of the Agnihotra, not through a son or through symbolic meditations. The world of the gods is to be won only through symbolic meditations, not through a son or through ritualistic activity'. In his Vartika here, Suresvara maintains that the worlds of the ancestors and the gods can be attained by other means,

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and that the explanation in the commentary unwarrantably in- serts the word 'only' and is not correct. He writes: 'The word "only" in the Upanishad anplies in the case of the son alone, for we know from the Veda that the world of the ances- tors and the world of the gods can be attained by resurt to more than one means. This is the only correct explanation of the upanishadic text, and the other explanation (i.e. that given in Śri Sankara's commentary) is faulty. Only this ex- planation, therefore, should be accepted, and not the one that is seen to be faulty' (B.V.V. I.v.280-1). This constitutes a claim by Suresvara that it is his own explanation that is correct and should be accepted, and not that of the revered Commentator. Similarly, there is a text in the Taittirīya Upanishad, 'This is the self-within-the-body of the former (of the "food- sclf", the physical body or annamaya kosa)' (Taitt. II.3). This is explained in Śri Sahkara's commentary as follows: 'This is the self-within-the-body of that previously mentioned food- self. What is? This vital-energy-self'. Suresvara, the au- thor of the Vartika, expresses his disagreement with this. He says: 'Or rather, the "self" referred to is that (metaphysical Self) defined earlier as Reality, Knowledge and Infinity. For the word "self" is only used in a secondary sense to mean any- thing else. Because that is the inmost principle of all, the present text should be seen to be referring to that (and not to the vital-energy-self) as the "self" of the food-self'. (T.B.V. II.284) And having thus set forth his own explanation, he goes on to explain the reason for his dissatisfaction with that of the Commentator in the words, 'The "self" from which an illusory snake (imagined in a rope) derives its existence does not consist in any mere illusory self such as a stick or other imaginary superimposition. The "self" of the snake is the rope'. (T.B.V. II.286) So it is not right to say that Bhagavatpada's pupils would be incapable of saying anything that contradicted him. All we are saying here, and this should not be forgotten, is that one should only accept that there was no contradiction between ihe commentaries of Śri Sankara and the glosses of his fol- lowers if such contradictions could somehow be shown never to have occurred. But since tbis is not possible, one should no longer try to insist on the idea that in all the different sub-schools it is one single method that is observed. If the case with the theories of expositors who are regrded as direct pupils is what we have shown it to be, it will obvious- ly be far worse with the theories of such later writers as Vacaspati Misra, who are universally agreed to have come later. So we shall not take the trouble to mention their contradic- tory statements here. Further, there are over a hundred independent works on Vedanta attributed to Bhagavatpāda and probably written by other authors, the contents of which have been examined by

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expert philologists without their yet being able to attain unanimity about who wrote what. Amongst works attributed to Bhagavatpada we ofien find details of doctrine characteristic of later schools and even mention of points from mutually in- consistent systems. It is clear that such works are of no use fur determining the true method of the Vedanta. So, we must take it that the second way suggested above (M.V.7) will no more suffice to overcome the doubts of enquirers than the first did.

Here I would like to bring before the reader, by way of example, the wel ?- known work called Viveka Cudamani. It has acquired permanent currency (reading niscala-pracalatām) as a work of Śri Sankara. But it foilows a different poetical style from that of the revered Commentator. It frequently uses technical expressions not found in the Upanishads, Brahma Sutras and Cita, expressions which only became common in post- Sankara works. It quotes as authoritative works such as the Yoga Vasistha and Sutu Samhita, which are nowhere quoted by the revered Commentator. All this snows that it was not a work of Bhagavatpada. I have shown in the notes and appendix to my edition of the Viveka Cūdamani with Kannada translation that it follows the Gita Tatparyabodhini in style and all other points, and is a work of Śri Sankarananda. Naive in- deed is the conviction that Sri Sankara himself was the author of all the independent works attributed to his name!

9 THE NFED FOR AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN RECOGNITION OF THE TRUE METHOD

Our enquiries so far, then, have shown the following. The true method handed down traditionally from beginningless time is still evident in the Upanishads, as can be seen from hints contained in the upanishadic and Smrti texts. 'Brahma taught this to Prajapati, Prajapati to Manu, Manu to the people' (Chand. VIII.xvi.1), 'Now the lines of Vedic Teachers' (Brhad. III.v.1), 'Naciketas, having attained this knowledge taught to him by Death (Yama) ... realized the Absolute and passed beyond passion and death. And anyone else who, like Naciketas, knows the inmost Self (adnyatma), will do the same' (Katha II.iii. 18), 'He, Brahma taught that knowledge of the Absolute which is the foundation of all the sciences, to Atharvan, his eldest son ... both the higher and the lower knowledge' (Mund. I.i.1-2), and 'I taught this yoga to Vivasvat' (Bh.G.IV.1). But the method has been taught in many different ways by ancient and modern Acaryas and their followers. And the en- quirer is faced with the following doubt. Are there many different methods taught in different Upanishads and in the language peculiar to different Vedic schools, and variously explained by different commentators? Or is it that there is

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just one single method, and that when minor variations within it are found in the Upanishads and Gita these are differently interpreted by immature minds? Cr is it that all the different and obviously cenflicting theories taught by contending theo- rists are all good, because they set forth the one true human end, like paths that start from different directions but all lead finally to the same city? Or is it that only one of these methods is the right one, and that earnest seekers of libera- tion should reject the rest as definitely leading one astray? Hence, because the texts of the Upanishads and the texts of the Smrti also seem confuged, and because there is disagree- ment among wany of the expositors of the Vedanta even though they are learned, and because enquirers of little understand- ing cannot make a right decision about the truth - for all these reasons it is clear that those who know the Vedanta must certainly make efforts to promote recognition of the true method, bringing out the truth by analysing what is right and wrong in all these views.

10 RULES TO BE FOLLOWED IN DETERMINING THE METHOD .

Now let us consider how and under what conditions one should proceed in recognition of the true method. Unless some rules and order are introduced into the investigation, any method introduced by anybody could be accepted as correct, or else all could be rejected as untrue for lack of proof. And this result would not be right in itself, and would not be what anyone would want either. So we shall set out the criteria to decide which method is the true cne.

(I) FIRST OF ALL, THAT METHOD SHOULD BE ACCEPTED WHICH CAN DETERMINE THE OVERALL TEACHING OF THE UPANISHADS IN LINE WITH THE TRADITIONAL RULES OF EXEGESIS. The meaning of the texts must be settled according to the criteria of 'opening' and 'conclusion' of a topic, etc., observed by the established experts in that field (the Mimamsakas). The latter recognize also six Forms of Evidence (for deciding which passages are fundamental and which subordinate). They are direct relation (śruti), indirect implication (linga), syntactical connection in a sentence (vākya), context (prakaraņa), position (sthāna) and etymology of names (sabda). (See Laugākşi Bhāskara, 1974, pp.9-20.) These forms of Evidence (srutyadi) should be regarded as authoritative, decreasing in power as the series progresses. If a single Vedic text stands in contradiction with many others it should be abandoned. As between texts dealing directly with the subject under discussion in the context in which they occur and those not doing so, the for- mer must be accounted more authoritative. If there is nothing to contradict it, a word must be understood in its literal sense. As between the Veda and the Smrti, the Veda is always

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more authoritative (in case of conflict). Smrti texts based on the Veda are more authoritative than those based on nothing more than Smrti. It nas to be accepted that only that method can be right which never transgresses these and other such rules of interpretation.

(II) AMONGST THE VARIOUS COMMENTARIES, ONLY THOSE OF ŚRI SANKARA BHAGAVATPADA SHOULD BE FOLLOWED FOR DETERMINING THE METHOD. Though all agree that in the first instance the method has to be determiued through close acquaintance with the whole body of upanishadic tcxts themselves, still, a per- son might well feel that ordincry people like us are not capable of understanding the meaning of the Veda through our own independent efforts, and that we depend on the expcsitions of others. We must therefore pin our faith on commentaries composed by some famous author and hope to understand the Vcda through his help. It is for the sake of an enquirer who thinks thus, and who wonders, further, why the method of some particular famous author of his own choosing should not be accepted, that we say that the maxim ('Amongst the various commentaries ... ') formulated above as the heading of the present paragraph holds. But why should one follow Śri Śankara's commentaries only? For this we give two reasons:

(1) Because they are the oldest surviving commentaries. It is inherently probable that early commentators will have adopted the Vedantic method that agrees with tradition. For they stand in closer proximity to it, while later authors are by definition more remote. The latter could well be suspected of addiction to the exposition of other methods of their own devising, arising through lack of contact with true Advaitins, and resulting in the surrender of their thinking powers to the influence of the philosophies of the dualists, and in impreg- nation with their tendencies. Observe, also, that there are reasons for supposing that in Śrī Śankara's time no dualistic Vedantins yet existed. For instance, it is only the Sankhyas and other non-Vedantic philosophers whom Sankara examines and refutes in his commen- taries. He does not examine and refute any dualistic Vedan- tins. And he says in his commentary on the Brhadāranyaka, 'For all exponents of the Upanishads agree that all the upani- shadic texts teach the notion of the identity of the individu- al self with the supreme Self' (Brhad.Bh.II.i.20). And we find in his Brahma Sutra commentary the sentence, 'All those who preach liberation agree that liberation arises through right knowledge' (B.S.Bh. II.i.11). So we conclude that in his day no dualistic Vedantins yet existed who regarded the individual soul and the supreme Self as totally distinct, or who relied for liberation solely on other means apart from knowledge, such as devotion. Therefore, until some compelling

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historical evidence is produced for the existence of dualistic Vedantins in or before Śri Śankara's day, the principle must hold good that the Vcdantic method is only concerned with Non- dualism. So we can omit here any examination of the views of other later commentaries. Admittedly there were a number of commentators cefore Śri Śażkara Bhagavatpāda. But it remains true that the first need is to acquaint curselves with Śri Śankara's commentaries, since today we can only ascertain the views of these earlier authors, and see tne way in which their merits and defects werc assessed, through the references in Sankara's commentaries and the Vartikas of Suresvara. Since we only know the methods practised earlier through the assessment in these works. we must wait to examine the earlier writings until we have first studied Śankara's commentaries.

(2) Because they are held in greater esteem than the subsidiary explanations. All the authors of the subsidiary explanations agree that the Commentator Sankara is to be held in supreme reverence. Nowhere do we find it said, either in the Pañcapadika and its sub-commentaries or in the Bhāmati and its sub-commentaries, that one should accept any starting- point other than the revered Commentator. On the contrary, the authors of these works clearly state that they are only going to explain what the revered Commentator meant. So when what is given out as an explanation of the commentaries stands in direct contradiction with the very words of those commen- taries, we hardly need labour the point that the meaning of the commentaries, and consequently the method they imply, must be sought directly from the commentaries themselves (and not from the later explanatory works).

(III) WHERE THE COMMENTARY AND THE SUBSIDIARY EXPLANATION CONFLICT, ONE MUST RESORT TO THE VERDICT OF THE VEDA AND REASONING. Suresvara and the other post-Sankara Advaita au- thors wrote their expository works, as we know from their own words, accepting the Commentator as a revered authority. Suresvara, for instance, says at the end of his Vartika on Śankara's Brhadāraņyaka Commentary: 'This Vārtika has been composed in a spirit of devotion to give a succinct explana- tion of the commentary written on the Kanva recension of the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad by my Guru, which expounded the upani- shadic doctrine of the unity and sole reality of the Self. That commentary is free from all impurity of motive, has power to destroy all the evil effects of false reasoning, is illu- mined by countless brilliant arguments and is an unfailing source of supreme peace to every good student' (B.V.V. VI.v. 24). And the author of the Pancapadika says: 'I apply myself with devotion to the task of explaining the clear but deep commentary with its weighty harvest of words and sentences' (P.P. p.6/1) and 'Therefore the view of the revered Commentator

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must be accepted as the true tradition - of the revered Com- mentator who was the finest flower of all those who realized the Absolute, and who took birth solely out of compassion for the people and with a view to propagate true knowledge' (P.P. p.97/20). The author of the Bhamati also wrote: 'Having offered reverencc to Sankara, who possessed a clear intelli- gence and was a mine of compassion, I proceod to analyse nis clear but decp commentary' and 'Precccupation with the works of the Ānārya (Śankara) sanctifies the impure speech even of a weak creature like me, just as the water from a puddle is purified if it enters the Ganges' (Bha. I.i.l). Nevertheless, we find in the Värtika passages which de- clare, on the authority of Veda and reason, that some other explanation of the text is the correct cne, and not that adopted by Śri Śankara. In such passages it is undeniable that the Acarya's explanation is being explicitly contradic- ted, as we have already had occasion to show. (See M.V.8.) Even in those cases where there is a clear contradiction with- out any explicit avowal of the fact, we must conclude that the author of the Vartika considered his own opinion as su- perior, and adopted a different path. We have no other choice. In such places, the goal of both authors is still the same, the determination of the meaning of the Vedic text. All ad- herents of truth must agree that one should accept that which- ever system is supported by solid arguments, whether it be ŚrI Śankara's or that of a later expositor, must be accepted. And the revered Commentator himself spoke in this vein in his Brhadaranyaka Commentary (II.iii.6) when he said: 'Therefore all those who are clever at thinking up different interpreta- tions of the Veda explain the meaning of the upanishadic texts differently. Even so, I would accept anything that represen- ted the true meaning of the Veda. I have nothing against them perscnally'.

The expression is meant sarcastically, with the idea that the true meaning of the Veda is not found in this way. Neverthe- less, one should understand that if it had been the meaning of the Veda it would have had to have been accepted.

(IV) IN CASES WHERE SPECIAL STEPS HAVE TO BE TAKEN TO ESTABLISH WHAT ŚRI ŚANKARA'S VIEW WAS, THE COMMENTATOR'S OWN WORDS ARE TO BE ACCEPTED AS A BETTER AUTHORITY THAN ANY RESUME ON THE PART OF A TEACHER BELONGING TO ANOTHER SCHOOL, OR THAN AN EXPLANATORY WORK BY A MEMBER OF HIS OWN SCHOOL. There is no need for further argumentation to support this. If one does not have the explicit word of the Commentator on a particular point, his view has to be inferred from what he has said on other points.

(V) WHEREVER THERE SEEMS TO BE A MUTUAL CONTRADICTION BETWEEN DIFFERENT COMMENTARIES ON THE THREE STARTING-POINTS

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(UPANISHADS, GITA AND BRAHMA SUTRAS), ONE SHOULD CHCOSE AS AUTHORITATIVE THE TEXT WHICH BEST SUPPORTS THE MAIN SYSTEM, AFTER AN ANALYSIS TO SEE WHICH TEXTS ARE AND WHICH ARE NOT DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH EXPOUNDING IT.

In the remainder of the work the author will be doing what he cam, within the limits of his ability, to determine the true method of the Vedanta in the light of the above principles.

CHAPTER II THE THREE STARTING-POINTS OF THE VEDANTA

11 WHY THE WORK BEGINS WITH A SURVEY OF THE STARTING-POINTS

It has been established, therefore, that there is an absolute need for a precise determination of the true method of the Vedanta. To this end, the first texts to be examined, accord- ing to accepted custom, should be the Upanishads, as they are the basic authority from which all else derives. And we must also trest of the Gita and the Sāriraka Mimamsa (i.e. the Brahma Sutras), the two other starting-points (prasthana) which are universally regarded as supporting them. We there- fore proceed now to an examination of the three starting- points, to see how much help they will afford for our present enquiry. First we shall treat of the ten Upanishads over whose classical status there is no disagreement. Then we shall proceed to the Gita and finally to the Brahma Sutras.

12 THE SUBJECTS COVERED IN THE UPANISHADS

The Isa Upanishad, embedded right in the texts of the White Yajur Veda as handed down by the Vajasaneya school, treats of various spiritual disciplines, such as renunciation of ritual, performance of the obligatory ritual, the combination of knowledge with Ignorance, the combination of meditation on Nature in its manifest form (sambhūti) with meditation on its unmanifest form (asambhuti). And it teaches how the one who performs these disciplines passes (after death) through the disc of the sun (to the realm of immortality). The subjects dealt with in the Kena Upanishad are the fol- lowing. First there is mention of the function of all the various bodily and mental organs. Then there is the state- ment that the organs are dependent for their powers on prompt- ing received from the metaphysical principle of reality. Next

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it is taught how that principle is beyond the range of any of the organs of knowledge, and that it is other than the known and also other than the unknown. It is also said that, be- cause this principle is that whereby speech and other organs arc enabled to bear on objects, it cannot itself be an object of meditation or worship. The text thei goes on to show in more detail how this principle is not properly knowable as an object, but is known through an awakening, and how this awakening has to occur here in this life here below. Next it relates how Agni and Vayu were unable to fathom this principle. Then it teils how Indra manifested in his true nature as the Absclute through the grace of Uma Devi. Finally, it explains how austerity (tapas) and other such disciplines are auxi- liaries for enlightenment. In the Katha Upanishad it is taught how meditation on Agni according to a prescribed method leads to heaven as its re- ward, and how realization of the Absolute (brahma-vidya) is associated with the Yoga of Self-Knowledge (adhyatma-yoga) and results in immediate immortality. The Mundaka Upanishad of the Atharva Veda speaks of a two- fold knowledge, divided as higher and lower, presenting the teaching in the form of an answer to the question, 'What is that by knowing which one knows all this?' It sums up the results of the lower knowledge by saying, 'One attains the world of heaven (svarga) through Vedic ritual, and the World of Brahma through prescribed Vedic meditations associated with ritual'. Then it declares that the Absolute in its high- est form, the undifferentiated metaphysical principle, known through the higher knowledge and designated by such names as the Indestructible (aksara) and the Spirit (purusa) is, as cause of the wcrld, one-without-a-second. He who knows it is omniscient and verily the Absolute itself. The Presna Upanishad of the Atharva Veda describes how the sage Pippalada taught knowledge of the Absolute in its highest form to Lukesa and other pupils. It also teaches how the Ab- solute (brahman) is to be distinguished even from Prajāpati and from the vital energy (prana), and how it is the seat of the origin and dissolution of the Sixteen Fractions (kalā) beginning with the vital energy. Only through this knowledge can people cross beyond Ignorance. The Mandukya Upanishad just examines the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep and then declares that the Self is void of them. It teaches how the syllable OM and the Self are identical. The Taittiriya Upanishad begins with various themes for meditation. Having first taught that one can attain sovereign spiritual independence (svārājya) through meditation on (the conditional form of) the Absolute through the mystic words 'Bhur, Bhuvah, Svah', it teaches that one can reach the realm of Prajäpati (brahma-loka) through meditating on that same (conditioned) Absolute as five-fold (Taitt.1.6-7). It affirms

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tne necessity of performing ritual, and lays down the instruc- tions that should be given by a Teacher in the case of a pupil who has learned his Veda by heart. In the second Valli it proceeds to teach (the different topic of) Knowledge of the Absolute (brahma-vidyā). It de- scribes how the Absolute (brahman) is the cause of the world. The text mentions how the Absolute enters into the world it has projected and becomes all, as the solid and the impalpable, and so forth (Taitt.II.6). And it rclates how it passes over into the 'sheaths' (kosa) made up of food, vital energy, mind, knowledge and bliss, and finally realizes all its desires. In the third Valli there is a story about a convcrsation between Bhrgu and Varuna. Bhrgu attained to that which is the support of all by coming to a knowledge of the Absolute as Bliss; this he did through dwelling on food, the vital energy and other objects of contemplation. Afterwards a few further symbolic meditations are mentioned. The Aitareya Upanishad starts from a description of the powers of the cosmic vital energy- and of the mode of its wor- ship (taught in the Aitareya Aranyaka). It teaches how the supreme Self created all the worlds, how it enters the body through the skull, how transmigration proceeds, and how all will attain immortality through awakening to the Absolute, present as Consciousness in all bodies from that of Brahmā down, and knowing it to be their own Self. The Chandogya Upanishad begins by teaching various symbolic meditations. In the sixth Book the teaching whereby all that has so far been unheard is heard, all that has so far been unthought of is thought, all that has so far beon unknown is known, is brought out through the story of a conversation between Śvetaketu and Uddalaka. Further points taught are that Being (sat) as the Absolute (brahman) is the cause of all the universe, that it enters the universe as the individual soul, and that the three elements projected by the Absolute become intermingled three-fold. 'This whole world has this (which is the subtle essence) for its Self. That, is the real. That is the Self. That thou art' (Chand. VI.viii.7). This teaching is repeated several times, along with an examination of the nature of sleep and death, and with the help of dir- ferent examples. Then it is demonstrated how the whole uni- verse and all the souls within it are identical as Being, as the Absolute. Then further teaching is given in the seventh Book through the story of a conversation between Nārada and Sanatkumāra. There is mention of a hierarchy of principles, beginning with Name and ending with the cosmic vital energy, each of which, as the series progresses, is greater than the last. Beyond them stands a transcendent principle called the Infinite (bhuman). It is joy, the supreme Self in its true nature. Here one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else. The text sums this up by affirming that it is the

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non-dual reality. In the eighth Book we find the teaching that the Absolute is present as the small body of ether within the lotus of the heart. He who performs meditation upon it, it is taught, at- tains all his desires in the World of Brahma (brahma-loka). And then in the next section Prajapati spcaks to Indra and, after considering the three states of waking, dream and dream- less sieep, establishcs that it is verily the Absolute that is the true Self of all, immortal, beyond fear or danger, free from all defects. As for the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad, the first Book begins with injunctions to meditation on Prajāpati (I.i.l ff.) and on the vital energy (I.iii.l ff), after first showing how Prajāpati, as tne universe, can be identified with the horse of the Horse Sacrifice. Other topics covercd include a recom- mendation to meditate on the Self (I.iv.l ff.), the teaching that one realizes one's nature as the Self of all through knowledge of the Absolute (brahman) (I.iv.10), the docirinc of the projection of seven forms cf food (I.v.1), and instruction in meditation on Vāyu (I.v.22) and on the cosmic vital energy (I.v.21,23) . The second Book brings the story of a conversation between Gargya and Ajatasatru. Here it is taugut that the whole uni- verse is dissolved in the supreme Self in dreamless sleep and projected anew on awakening, as is shown by the example of awaken'ng a sleeping man. An explanation is given of the mys- tic formula 'the reality of the real', which conveys the true hiddcn nature of the cosmic vital energy (II.i.20). An account is given of the two aspects of the Absolute as 'the solid and the impalpable' (II.iii.1). The same two forms of the Abso- lute are then described in various new ways, such as 'definite being' (sat) and 'indefinite being' (tyat), while the Absolute in its true nature is indicated ultimately by the formula 'neither this nor that' (II.iii.1-6). There follows the story of a conversation between Maitreyi and Yajmavalkya (II.iv.1 ff.). The points covered are the following. The means to knowledge of the Self are. hearing, pondering over what one has heard and subjecting it to sus- tained meditation. Through knowledge of the Self all is known, and through no other way. The earth and other compo- nents that go to make up the world and the creatures that live in the world subsist in mutual interdependence, as is illus- trated by saying that each is like honey to the other (II.v.l ff.). All creatures, all gods and all worlds are held togeth- er (in the Self), as is illustrated by the example of the spokes of a wheel held together in the hub. In the third Book the argument is carried forward in the form of a dispute between Brahmins assembled at a sacrifice held by King Janaka. The main topics are the following. What are the fruits of ritual and of symbolic meditation on various factors in the ritual? What becomes of those who perform the

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Horse Sacrifice (III.iii.2)? What is the nature of the Abso- lute, present as the inmost Self of all? Those who know the Absolute give up desire. Metaphysical knowledge is extolled by saying that only he is a Brahmin in the true sense who knows the Absolute (bramman). Various principles beginning with earth and ending with Brahma-loka are said to form a hierarchy in which each successive plane is interwcven in (pervaded and sustained by) that which follows. The nature of Sutre and Antaryamin is explained. All is said to be inter- woven in the ether, and the ether is said to be interwoven in the Absolute in its form called the Indestructible (akşara), vold of all distinctions. All (apparent) distinctions in the Absolute must be overcome. The Absolute is the support of all. As 'Neither this nor that' it is the true Self. As cause of the universe, it is 'Consciousness and Bliss'. The fourth Book covers the following topics. Meditations on the Absolute with form are enjoined, for example conceiving it as Speech (vac). Ther there is the section on vision of the Self - a vision that is achieved by stages, through ider- tifying oneself in meditation first with the Self as associ- ated with the gross body, then with the Seif as associated with the subtle body, then with the Self as associated with the cosmic vital energy, and finally through realizing the identity of the latter with the supreme Self, according to the principle 'Neither this nor that'. The meditations on the Seif in different forms are associated with different names, such as Indha and others. (See Sankara, Brhad.Bh. IV.ii.1-4.) Later there is again a demonstration that the Self is other than the complex of its bodies and organs, through an exami- nation of the phenomena of waking, dream and dreamless sleep. And the Self is further conveyed as pure, as self-luminous, as the power of unbroken conscicusness, as non-dual and as of the flavour of unsurpassable bliss. It is only the blind individual soul who experiences birth and death and the like. The vital energies of the enlightened and liberated person do not ascend from his body at death. Having already realized his true nature as the Absolute, he merely dissolves in the Absolute. The text goes on to explain how all the rituals enjoined in the Veda are useful for enlightenment, and there is an eulogy of the enlightened person as one who has done all that has to be done. The Book closes with an account of knowledge of the Self through a repetition of the conversa- tior between Yajmavalkya and MaitreyI (Brhad.V.iv.2 ff. cp. Brhad. II.iv.1). Thus the fourth Book takes up a large number of topics. The fifth Book is merely an appendix, containing the in- junctions for certain meditations not previously mentioned. The Śvetāsvatara and Kauşītaki Brāhmaņa Upanishad are of- ten quoted in the commentaries of Śri Śankara and also in the Gītā and Brahma Sūtras. But as we do not have a commentary on them by the Ācārya, no individual analysis of their

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contents will be given here

13 THE DIFFICULTY FOR THOSE OF DULL INTELLECT IN ARRIVING AT THE TRUE METHOD OF THE VEDANTA FROM A MERE CONSIDERATION OF THE UPANICHADS ALONE

Those of dull intellect are not able to discern any one single .

method of teaching present everywhere throughout the Upani- ehads even after careful study of a statement of their subject- matter of the kind set out above. On the contrary, it appears at first sight that a whole variety of different methods are observed, each valid for its owa subject-matter alone. In the Kena Upanishad we find the strict metaphysical distinction of the Seer from the seen. In the Taittiriya Upanishad we find elaboration of the doctrine of the five sheaths, and the de- scripiion of the Absolute and the world as cause and effect. In the Prasna Upanishad there is a description of a regreg- sive series of causes; here eacn cause as the series goes back is more subtle than the one before, and each cause dis- solves into its more subtle successor in the regressive series. In the Mandukya, Chāndogya and Brhadāraųyaka Upani- shads the topic of the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep is occasionally introduced. Initially, there- fore, it appears as if an independent examination of the Uprnishads will not disclose any single method of teaching that occurs throughout.

14 THE SUBJECTS TREATED OF IN THE GITA

At this point in our deliberations it will be well to include an account of the Gita, which is one of the fundamental starting-points of the Vedanta. For it was composed in order to lay down the truth about both the theoretical and the prac- tical aspects of Vedanta. As a summary of the whole Vedic teaching, it is a useful auxiliary to the Upanishads. We therefore indicate here the subject-matter of the various chapters in order. The first chapter describes the dejection of Arjuna, in order to set the work in its context in the Mahābhārata nar- rative. The second chapter first mentions how one can adopt either of two alternative standpoints, the 'Sankhya' stand- point and the 'Yoga' standpoint. The existence of the action- less Self as the final reality is taught from the Sankhya standpoint. Resori to action associated with renunciation of all individual purposes is taught from the Yoga standpoint, while dissolution in the Absolute (brahma-nirvāna) is taught as the end attained by those who attain to the Sankhya stand- point. In the third chapter it is explained how choice in resort

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to ihese two paths depends on the qualifications cf the stu- dent, also how resort to action is itself the means to acquire fixity in the actionless state. The fourth chapter teaches how the highest Lord, though unborn, changeless and indestruc- tible, is able to take apparent birth, through Maya, in order to preserve the Spiritual Law (dharma). It also explains how enlightenment is obtained through aitendance on persons who are themselves enlightened, and how the actions of the en- lightened man do not involve him in bondage. In the fifth chapter it is explained how, though both engagement in (proper) action and renunciation of action lead to the highest goal, still, engagement in action is the easier path for the seeker. It is also declared that for renunciates in the highest sense there is dissolution in the Absolute (brahma-nirvāna) in this very life as well as after death. In the sixth chapter it is taught how action and meditation both contribute to Yoga, though there is a difference in the way they do so. It is also taught how the Yoga of Meditation (dhyana-yoga) should be performed, and how its result is vision of the Self, and how that result follows regularly. The topics cf the seventh chapter are as follows. First there is the teaching about the two forms assumed by the Lord, his higher and lower Nature (prakrti). Then it is taught that the world is interwoven in the Lord, and that He is invested with its various attributes. Finally there is the teaching that, amongst those who take refuge in the Lord, it is the devotee who has also gained metaphysical enlightenment that is the best - and that our natural attachment for the pairs of opposites is an obstacle to enlightenment. The eighth chapter describes how those who meditate on the holy syllable OM apply themselves to Dharana Yoga and proceed (after death) by the path characterized by such names as 'the Path of Fire', how they reach the Absolute in its (unmanifest) form as the Indestructible by stages, and how others follow 'the Path of the Dark Lunar Fortnight' and return for rebirth on earth. The ninth. chapter describes the nature of the supreme Self and states the method for attaining vision of the Self, which re- sults in direct intuition. Various forms of worship of the Lord are also mentioned, as well as some of his special forms of divine manifestation; it is explained how it is only those who give exclusive devotion to the Lord who attain to Him. The tenth chapter gives a detailed description of the special divine manifestations of the Lord, as an aid to worship and meditation. The chapter closes with the admonition, 'One should know that the whole universe is but a fragment of the Lord'. In the eleventh chapter Arjuna begs the Lord to mani- fest before Him in his form as the universe, which He does. Then we have the hymn in praise of the Lord uttered by Arjuna. Further teaching is given to say that the Lord in his form as the universe is only attainable through devotion, and that such attainment is consequently only open to a disciple who

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devotes himself exclusively to the Lord. In the twelfth chap- ter a comparison is made between those who worship the Lord in his form as the universe and those who worship Him in his (un- manifest) form as the Indestructible. Those who worship Him in his form as the universe are said to be wiser, as the dis- cipline they follow is less troublesome. The following methods of worship of the Lord in his form as the universe are said to be progressively easier, namely Abhyasa Yoga in the form of dwelling solely on the form of the Lord as the universe, dedi- cation to performance of work for the Lord, and lastly renun- ciation of the fruits of all action. Mention is also made of the absence of hatred and other saintly characteristics that mark a worshipper of the Lord in his form as the Indestruc- tible. The thlrteenth chapter shows how to uistinguish between the Field (the physical and subtle bodies of the individual) and the Knower of the Field (the unchanging witness-Consciousness that illumines those bodies), and affirms that the Knower cf the Field in all Fields is none other than the Lord. Once again the topic of right knowledge is discussed, including such diverse subordinate themes as the moral prerequisites for knowledge such as absence of pride, the metaphysical nature of the Absolute that has to be realized, the discrimination of Nature (prakrti) and Spirit (puruga), and an account of the various alternative approaches to vision of the Self. Finally there is reversion to a further description of what right vision of the Self is. Chapter fourteen deals with the ways in which sattva, rajas and tamas, the three 'constituents' (guna) of Nature, cause bondage. It mentions certain charac- teristics which enable us to recognize that this or that par- ticular constituent is predominating. It points out the re- sults caused by the rise to predominance of this or that con- stituent, and indicates the nature of him who has passed beyond the sway of the constituents. The fifteenth chapter describes the process of transmigration. It teaches non- attachment as the means to bring it to an end. It describes how he who attains the supreme abode (of Lord Visnu) does not again return for rebirth. It declares that realization of the Self can only be achieved by one already engaged in transmigratory life. It gives a brief account of some special powers and glories of the supreme Self. It shows that the Lord is called the supreme Spirit (purușottama) because He transcends both the perishable and imperishable aspects of his Maya. It commends knowledge of the supreme Spirit. The themes of the sixteenth chapter are the distinction between godly and demoniac dispositions, and the explanation of how the revealed traditions are the only authoritative source for knowing what should and what should not be done. In the seventeenth chapter there is a description of the differences in food, sacrifice, ascetic practices and charity according to whether the constituent sattva, rajas or tamas predominates,

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The point here is to inculcate higher stapdards in these acti- vities. There is also teaching to explain the function of the formula OM TAT SAT. The topics in the eighteenth chapter are as follows. Sacrifice, charity and ascetic practices should be performed withoui desire for personal reward. Those who abandon ritual do not recessarily invite suffering as a conse- quence. The Self does not do any act. An account is given of the differences of quality which occur according to whether sattva, rajes or tamas predominates in knowledge, action, man- ner in which one performs action, attitude, firmness of mind, jey and su forth. Mention is meie of the specific duties for the verious castes, beginning with the Brahming. One attains competence (siddhi) for realizing the Absolute through wor- shipping the Lord by means of performance of one's duty. There is an account of the further discipline required by those who have attained to 'competence' if they wish to realize the Absclute. The one who has realized the Absolute also sees the Lord. Finally there is teaching about taking refuge in the Lord.

15 ONE CANNOT DETERMINE THE METHOD JUST THROUGH THE GITA EITHER

If one simply rcflects over the topics taught in the Gita, one gains some iusight into the mutual relation of knowledge and action and other elements in the discipline. But ordinary people like ourselves will not easily be able to discover the method for determining the nature of knowledge cf the meta- physical truth, or of the series of stages through which it is attained. For the Gita is throughout more concerned with spiritual teaching than with argument. Here again, therefore, it is clear that the recognition of the right method of ep- proach is a difficult matter if we rely on our individual thinking. In the Upanishads, indeed, passages of argument supported by examples are occasionally introduced. But we have seen that even there anyone who would investigate the method finds himself on a thorny path. And where, as in the Gita, argumentation is hardly found at all, investigation into method will be more difficult still.

16 A TOPICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BRAHMA SŪTRAS AS A FUNDAMENTAL STARTING-POINT OF THE VEDANTA

Our next task must be to analyse and understand the structure of the Sutras which stand as the official exegesis of the Upanishads (vedānta-mīmamsa). From the mere fact that it is called 'Mimamsa', we know that argument must predominate in this work. The disposition of its topics is as follows. The first Sutra in the first Quarter (pada) of the first

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Book (adhyava) says, 'Then therefore the enquiry into the Ab- solute (brahman)'. It ieaches that this is an enquiry that has to be made. The second Sūtra gives a definition of the Absolute in the form 'That from which proceed the origination, maintenance and dissolution of this world'. The third Sūtra says 'Eecause the Veda is its womb', dec)aring thereby that the Veda is the only authoritative source of knowledge for it. The fourth Sutra emphasizes even further how the Veda is the scurce of knowledge of the Absolute by advancing a reason and saying 'But that, (the Absolute, is the main topic of the Veda) on account of the harmony of the texts'. In the tifth topic (adhikarana, i.e. at B.S.I.1.5) the notion that any non- conscious principle could be the cause of the world is re- futed by the words ' (The cause of the werld is) nct (the non- conscious principle "Nature" advocated by the Sankhya philoso- phers), for that would be against the revealed teaching, (which speaks of the Creator) "taking thought"'. From then on the first Book is concerned, right up to the end of the third Quarter, with showing that the texts of the Upanishads co- operate harmoniously throughout to teach the existence of the Absolute. The fourth Quarter of the first Book of the Brahma Sutras starts from the idea that certain of the texts of the Upani- shads might have the misleading appearance of referring to the 'Pradhana' (Nature) of the Sankhyas. And the argument is to show that they refer to something else, and thus to vindicate the view that the upanishadic texts co-operate harmoniously to teach the existence of the Absolute throughout. The second Book demonstrates how the doctrine earlier attributed to the Upanishads is not in conflict with the Smrti (the traditional literature of the Hindus other than the Veda) or with reason, and refutes rival views. The third Book describes the way in which the soul undergoes transmigration, and examines at length the nature and function of symbolic meditations and other disciplines. The fourth Bock is chiefly concerned with a description of the results accruing from metaphysical knowl- edge. All Vedantins agree broadly that this is the order of topics in the Brahma Sūtras.

17 THE TRUE METHOD OF THE VEDANTA IS NOT EASILY DISCOVERABLE FROM EXAMINATION OF THE BRAHMA SŪTRAS EITHER

Now, it is agreed by all that the Sūtras of Bādarāyana were composed to establish the true import of the Upanishads through logical argument. And it is true that we have an un- traced maxim, 'The experts in the field know that Sutras state the essence of a subject all round in a compact form, free from doubt, free from unjustified interpolations, free from error'. But although these characteristics no doubt

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hold of the Brahma Sutras, nevertheless - we cannot explain why - in their case the freedom from doubt has not been so ccmplete as to preclude the rise and circulation of a number of mutually contradictory explanations. For we find that, even before Śri Śankara Bhagavatpāda, Bhartrprapañca and other early authors, who claimed to be followers of the Vedanta standpoint, composed short commentaries (vrtti) on the Sūtras that explained them in different and mutually inconsistent ways. Although these various short commentaries no longer exist, we find them examined in the commentaries of Sankara and the Vartikas cf Suresvara. And it is well known that these same Sutras have been interpreted often in many differ- ent ways by writers coming after Sankara, such as Bhaskara, Rāmānuja, Śrīkaņtha, Vijmāna Bhiksu, Madhva, Vallabha; Bala Deva and others. Each of the different commentators supposes that his own particular method was that followed by the author of the Sutras. It is also well known that their followers still dispute with one another about the method of interpre- tation today. Thus it is already ciear that there is even less hope of discovering the true method of the Vedanta through a mere examination of ihe Sutras than there would have been from the mere study of the Upanishads and Gītā.

CHAPTER III ŚRĪ ŚAŃKARA BHAGAVATPĀDA

18 HOW THE TEACHER SANKARA BHAGAVATPADA BELONGS TO THE TRUE TRADITION

From a mere examination of the subject-catter of the three starting-points of the Vedanta (Upanishads, Gita and Brahma Sūtras) it is thus difficult to determine the correct method of the Vedanta. And this shows, as we have pointed out, that the first task, if we are to determine that correct method, is to examine the commentaries of Śri Śankara. The opinions of the commentators of his own period and earlier can only be inferred indirectly from passages referring to them either in the commentaries of Śri Sankara or the Vartikas of Suresvara. The early commentaries no longer exist anywhere today, 30 at the moment we have no other resource but to go to the commen- taries of Śri Buagavatpāda. We now take up the question of whether the method laid down by Śri Bhagavatpada was his own invention, or whether it was handed down by tradition. For if this method was the personal invention of the revered Commen- tator, that will give rise to a doubt as to whether it really was or was not the method accepted in the Upanishads them- selves. It is well known thet Śri Gaudapāda has the universal reputation in the Vedantic world of having been the Teacher of Bhagavatpada's Teacher. The Karikas he composed on the Māņdukya Upanishad are even today still treated with the deepest respect by all Advaitins in the course of their for- mal study. Again, he is mentioned with honour in Śri Sankara's commentary on the Brahma Sutras as a knower of the true tradi- tion (sampradaya), in the passages, 'And so a great knower of the tradition says' (B.S.Bh. II.1.14) and 'In this connection a great Teacher who know the true tradition about the meaning of the Upanishads has said ... ' (B.S.Bh.II.1.9). Now, Gaudapada himself has referred with marks of respect to earlier knowers of the tradition, in the words, 'By experts

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in the Upanishads' (G.K.II.31) and 'By sages thoroughly con- versant with the Veda' (G.K. JI.35). And the Commentator (viz. Śankara Bhagavatpada) has himself expressed his profound ven- eration for the true tradition at various places. For example, in his Gita Commentary he quotes the view cf those who have but an imperfect insight into the truth as foilcws: 'Bringing transmigratory experience to an end is a task that I have to achieve. I shall achieve it by acquiring knowledge of the Field (the individual physical body and subtle transmigratory body) and the Knower of the Field (the Lord presont within those two bodies as Witness), and by becoming established in the nature of the Lord, the Knower of the Field, after having acquired direct knowledge of Him through the practice of meditation first'. And having quoted this incorrect doctrine (which implies that the ignorant individual soul is initially different from the Knower of the Field and has to become identical with the latter through its exerticns) he comments: 'The contemptible "sage" who holds such a view thinks he is bringing out the true meaning of transmigratory experience and of liberation from it, and also the true meaning of the Veda as a whole. Dut iu fact he is a "slayer of the Self", cou- fused himgelf and leading others into confusion. Because he is bereft of the true tradition for interpreting the Veda, he rejects what it teaches and reads into it what it does not teach. One who does not know the true tradition for inter- preting the Veda is therefore to be ignored as an ignoramus, even if he be learned in all the sciences' (Bh.G.Bh.XIII.2). Elsewhere in the same work he writes: 'But some persons, be- lieving themselves to be very wise, say that the intellect cannot attain to the Self because the latter is formless, so that it is hard to become established in right metaphysical knowledge. True, indeed, it is hard for those who have no Teacher and belong to no tradition, who have not heard the upanishadic texts in the traditionally prescribed way, whose minds are wholly attached to external objects and who have not pursued the right path with diligence ... ' (Bh.G.Bh.XVIII.50). We also find the following sentence in the Brhadāranyaka Com- mentary: 'And in this connection one (i.e. Dravidācārya) who knew the true tradition used to recount a little story' (Brhad.Bh. II.i.20). Thus Bhagavatpada showed his profound respect for the true tradition. For these reasons, and also because he was the pupil of a pupil of Gaudapāda, himself widely famous as a knower of the true tradition, there can be no serious reason to doubt that Bhagavatpada belonged to the true tradition.

19 THE TRADITIONAL METHOD ACCEPTED BY ŚAŃKARA BHAGAVATPĀDA

If we now look for an answer to the question, 'What, then, was

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this Vedantic method that the Ācarya accepted as the one handed down in the true tradition?', we find the sentence: 'For there is the saying of those who know the true tradition, "That which cannot be expressed (in its true form directly) is expressed (indirectly) through false attribution and subse- quent retraction"' (Bh.G.Bh.XIII. 13) And the meaning of this saying of the true experta is ex- pounded in the commentary on the Brhadāranyaka as follows:

(1) Wuoso knows the Self, thus described, as the fearless Absolute (brahman), himself becomes the Absolute, beyond fear. This is a brief statement of the meaning of the entire Upani- shad. And in order to convey this meaning rightly, the fanci- ful alternatives of producticn, maintenance and withdrawal, and the false notion of action, its factors and results, are deliberately attributed to the Self as a first step. And then later the final metaphysical truth is inculcated by negating these characteristics through a comprehensive denial of all particular superimpositions on the Absolute, exprcssed in the phrase 'neither this nor that'. Just as a man, wishing to explein numbers from one to a hundred thousand billion (points to figures that he has drawn and) says, 'This figure is one, this figure is ten, this figure is a hundred, this figure is a thousand', and all the time his only purpose is to explain numbers, and not to affirm that the figures are numbers; or just as one wishing to explain the sounds of speech as repre- sented by the written letters of the alphabet resorts to a device in the form of a palm-leaf on which he makes incisions which he later fills with ink to form letters, and all the while, (even though he point to a letter and say 'This' is the sound "so and so"') his only purpose is to explain the nature of the sounds referred to by each letter, and not to affirm that the leaf, incisions and ink are sounds; in just the same way, the one real metaphysical principle, the Absolute, is taught by resort to many devices, such as attributing to it production (of the world) and other powers. And then after- wards the nature of the Absolute is restated, through the concluding formula 'neither this nor that', so as to purify it of all particular notions accruing to it from the various devices used to explain its nature in the first place'. (Brhad. Bh.IV.iv.25)

20 THE METHOD OF FALSE ATTRIBUTION FOLLOWED BY RETRACTION UNDERLIES OTHER FORMS OF VEDANTA TEACHING

This one sole method, applied in different forms at different places, is found throughout the Upanishads, Gita and Brahma Sutras. It can therefore be recognized when examined in its different contexts, as long as the rules already referred to

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(M.V. p.23, rule I) for determining context are kept firmly in mind. Here we will merely broach the subject in outline, so as to enable the student to preserve consistency and avoid confusion in following the wide variety of passages from the commentaries and basic texts of the Vedanta to be introduced below. Although there are no distinctions in the Absolute, and it is already attained inasmuch as it is the Self of all, it is sometimes falsely spoken of in the Upanishads as something that has to be attained. The purpose of such texts is to counter the suspicion that it might be attainable through any other means apart from knowledge. In the same way the Abso- lute is in certain places falsely referred to as something that has to be known. The purpose of such text& is to deny that anything apart from the Absolute is worthy of knowledge. Somctimes the Absolute is falsely spoken of as a 'knower' (in the sense of being an individual capable of performing the act of knowing). The purpose of such texts is to deny that it can be an cbject of knowledge. Sometimes it is falsely spoken of as a Witness. The purpose of such texts is to deny that it is a knower (in the sense of an individual capable of performing an act of knowing). On the other hand in some texts the reference is solely to the Absolute in its true nature, and here even Witnesshood is denied, through the formula 'neither this nor that'. In some places, it is falsely claimed that the Absolute can be known through the texts of revelation, the real pur- pose of such a claim being to deny that it is capable of be- ing known through perception and the other secular means of knowledge. But in other places it is declared to be inacces- sible even through revelation, and to be beyond the range of the mind. Here the reference is to the Absolute in its true nature, and it is denied that it can be known through texts (speech) or through the mind. In the same way it is falsely affirmed that the Absolute is the cause of the world. The purpose is to deny that the Absolute can be an effect, and then afterwards its true nature is conveyed by denying that it can be a cause either. Five sheaths (kosa) are enumerated and predicated of the Absolute one by one. Then these predi- cations are successively denied, and the Self is thereby revealed as beyond the five sheaths and beyond all duality. In the same way, the role of epistemological subject is some- times attributed to it in order to show that it is not an object. And then it is revealed as bereft of all duality, showing that it is not in truth a subject either. Again, first the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep are falsely attributed to the Self, then subjection to each of them is denied one by one. Finally, through the teaching that the Self is 'the Fourth' (turiya), there is an outright denial that it undergoes any changes of state at all, Why waste words? Whatever is attributed to the Absolute in the

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course of communicating its true nature is eventually denied, so that the mind may be brought to a halt. And this has been declared by Śri Gaudapāda Ācārya, one 'who knew the true tra- dition for interpreting the meaning of the Upanishads', as follows: 'The text denies all that it had previously taught by saying "He (the Self) is neither this nor that". Thus the Unborn, the only reality within and without, only manifests when it is realized that it is not anything that is conceived by the mind' (G.K.III.26). Whatever is taught positively as a means of communicating ihe supreme metaphysical reality is all merc false aitribution. Hence the Upanishad denies t by repeating the phrase 'This Self is neither this nor that' at intervals (Brhad. II.iii.6, III.ix.26, IV.ii.8, IV.iv.22, IV.v.15). And the meaning of the Karika is that the Self in its true nature, bereft of all distinctions, manifests of its own accord when ali (else) has been negated.

21 THE ABSOLUTE CAN ONLY BE REVEALED THROUGH FALSE ATTRIBUTION FOLLOWED BY RETRACTION

'Well', you may ask, 'how can you say that this (basically negative) method that has been described is present throughout the commentaries on the three starting-points of the Vedanta (Upanishads, Gita and Brahma Sutras), when parts of these are concerned with describing (positive) philosophical doctrines and with the means to attain particular (positive) ends?' To this we reply as follows. The essence of the method of false attribution is that imaginary characteristics are first at- tributed to the Absolute, and this serves as a negation of whatever is incompatible with those characteristics; then later even the falsely attributed characteristics are negated. Efforts to abolish falsely attributed characteristics have to be continued till all are removed. In this way the true nature of the Absolute can become known through the mere ne- gation of all false attributions. And it is clearly declared in the commentaries on the three starting-points of the Vedanta that there is no other way in which one can come to know it. To show this, one may quote the following passages.

(1) But how can the mere phrase 'neither this nor that' be of service in communicating the true nature of the principle called 'the reality of the real'? It does so, we reply, by negating all varieties of apparent conditioning adjunct (upadhi). The Absolute is that in which there is no particu- larity. There is no name, no form, no action, no distinc- tion, no universal, no attribute. It is through these deter- minations alone that speech proceeds, and not one of them belongs to the Absolute. So the latter cannot be taught by sentences of the pattern 'This is so-and-so'. In such upani- shadic phrases and words as 'The Absolute is Consciousness-

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Bliss' (Brhad. III.ix.28.7). 'A mere mass of Consciousness' (Brhad. II.iv.12), 'Brahman', 'Atman', the Absolute is arti- ficially referred to with the help of superimposed name, form and action, and spoken of exactly in ihe way we refer to ob- jects of perception, as when we say 'That white cow wiih horns is twitching'. But if the desire is to express the true nature of the Absolute, void of all conditioning adjuncts and particularity, then it cannot be described by any positive means whatever. The only possible method then is to refer to it through a comprehensive denial of whatever positive charac- teristics have been attributed to it in previous teachings, and to say 'neither this nor that'. (Brhad.Bh.II.iii.6)

(2) Nor can the Absolute be properly referred to by any such terms as Being or non-being. For all words are used to convey a meaning, and when heard by their hearers convey the meaning the speaker had in mind. Bui communicable meaning is restric- ted without exception to universal, action, attribute and relation .... The Absolute, however, does not belong to any universal (genus), so it cannot be expressed by a noun such as 'Being' or 'non-being'. Being without attributes, it cannot be described by any adjective denoting an attribute. And be- ing actionless, it cannot be expressed by any verb denoting activity. For the Upanishad speaks of it as 'Without parts, without activity, at rest' (Svet.VI.19). Nor has it any rela- tion with anything. For it is 'One', 'without a second', 'not an object' and 'the Self'. Hence it cannot be expressed by any word. And the upanishadic texts themselves confirm this when they say 'That from which words fall back' (Taitt. II.9), and in other passages. (Bh.G.Bh.XIII.12)

(3) And because the Absolute has no particular characteristics, the Veda indicates its nature by denying of it the forms of all other things, as is shown, for instance, in the following pas- sages: 'And so, therefore, the teaching is "neither this nor that"' (Brhad. II.iii.6), 'It is other than what is known, and above the unknown' (Kena I.4), 'That from which words fall back without obtaining access, together with the mind' (Taitt.II.9). And the Vedic texts also relate how when Badhva was questioned by Baskalin he gave his answer merely by not speaking. 'Sir, teach me in words', Baskalin said. But the Teacher remained silent. Finally, at the second or third time of asking, Badhva replied, 'I am telling you, but you do not understand. This Self is utter silence' (B.S.Bh. III.ii.17). Similarly, in the Smrti, too, the Absolute is taught by mere negation of what it is not, as for example in such passages as, 'I will tell you what you have to know, knowing which you will attain immortality. The beginningless Absolute (brahman) in its highest form is not said to be either Being or non-being' (Bh.G.XIII.12). And in the same way we have a further text from the Smrti in which Narayana, putting on the form of the

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entire universe, spoke to Nārada and said, 'O Nārada, this is a mere illusion (maya) projected by Myself, whereby you see Mie associated with the attributes of all creatures. Do not sup- pose that this is My true nature' (M.Bh.Moksha Dharma 339.45). (B.S.Bh. III.ii.17)

(4) (The Absolute is that which ultimately has to be known). So, in order to show that it exists, it is first spoken of in its false form set up by apparent conditioning adjuncts, and fancifully referred to as if it had knowable attributes, in the words 'with hands and feet everywhere'. For there is the ancient maxim of those who know the tradition, 'That which can- not be cxpressed in its true form (directly) is expressed (indirectly) through false attribution followed by retrac- tion'. And then the next verse of the Gita is composed to make sure that it could not be supposed that the Absolute which is the object of our search truly had organs such as hands and feet, mere adjuncts falsely attributed to it. (Bh. G.Bh.XIII.14, intro.)

22 THE ROOT OF ALL FALSE ATTRIBUTION, KNOWN AS METAPHYSICAL IGNORANCE

Let us take it, then, that the Absolute can only be communi- cated by the method of denying of the Absolute all that has been falsely attributed to it. But if you start pointing out false attributicns, when will you be sure you have got to the end of all of them? For wrong ideas are limitless, being sub- ject to no rule. How then could the Upanishads achieve a de- finitive negation cf all false attributions? To this objection we reply as follows. There is one false attribution that is the root cause of all others. It is due to its presence that the other erroneous ideas come into being and work mischief during the time of their existence. So the Upanishads single out this error and call it metaphysical Ig- norance (avidya). And the knowledge whereby one establishes the true nature of metaphysical reality through negating that error is called enlightenment (vidyā). Thus in this connection we have: (1) Widely apart and leading to divergent ends are these, Ignorance and what is known as enlightenment. I know you, Naciketas, to be eager for enlightenment, for even many desires did not distract you. (Katha I.ii.4)

(2) You, indeed, are our father. You take us beyond Ignorance. (Praśna VI.8)

(3) He, Brahma, taught that knowledge of the Absolute which is the foundation of all the sciences to Atharvan, his eldest

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son. (Muņdaka I.i.1)

And we find this Ignorance explained in the Commentaries as follows:

(4) When it is clear thai the object and the subject, which pertain to the notion 'you' and 'I' respectively, and whirh are contradictory in nature like darkness and light, cannot each be of the nature of the other, it is evidently even more incorrect to identity their attributes. From which it follows that the superimposition of the object and its attributes, pertaining to the notion 'you', onto the subject, which per -. tains to the notion 'I' and is of the nature of pure Conscious- ness, must be erroneous. And the opposite superimposition of the subject and its attributcs onto the object must be erro- neous too. And yet, though these two principles are utterly distinct in nature, there is a failure to distinguish one from the other, and each, together with its attributes, is super- imposed on and identified with the other. And from that there results this natural worldly experience, based on wrong knowl- edge (mithya-jñana) and involving a synthesis of the real with the false, which expresses itself as 'I am this' and 'This is mine' call Ignorance. .. This very superimposition, thus defined, the wise And ascertainment of the ultimately real principle through discrimination between the confused elements (in this mutual superimposition of the Self and the not .- self) they call enlightenment (vidya). (B.S.Bh.I.i.1, intro.)

(5) And hence it is that everyone superimposes every kind of activity, which really belongs to the realm of name and form, onto the Self, and superimposes the property of light (which really belongs to the Self alone) onto name and form. And since people superimpose name and form onto the Self-of-the- nature-of-Light, they become utterly confused by alternative fancies such as 'This is my Self', 'No, it is not of that nature', 'It is capable of action', 'No, it is not capable of action', 'It is pure', 'It is not pure', 'It is in bondage', 'It is free', 'It is motionless', 'It goes', 'It comes', 'It exists', 'It does not exist'. (Brhad.Bh.IV.iii.7)

(6) The 'conjunction' (mentioned in the Gita verse under com- ment ) between the Knower of the Field and the Field (cp. M.V. p.35), which are respectively subject and object and of utter- ly distinct nature, is in fact (no real conjunction at all but) a (mere mutual) superimposition of their attributes, arising from a failure to discriminate two utterly distinct entities one from another. It is comparable to the process (in the stock examples of perceptual error) by which 'conjunc- tion' with a snake is superimposed on a rope, or'conjunction' with silver is superimposed on shell (i.e. a piece of mother- of-pearl), through failure to discriminate the two.

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This 'conjunction' of the Knower of the Field and the Field is essentially superimposition, of the nature of wrong knowl- edge (mithya-jñana). It is, however, possible to ceparate out the Knower of the Field, as the inner fibres of a piecc of munja grass may be separated from its outer stalk. It can then be known as we have defined it., through a discriminative knowledge of the Knower of the Field, acquired in the manner already described. It is then possible to be aware of the Absolute, that which we are here to know, void of all epparent conditioning adjuncts, as expressed in the formula 'It is not said to be either real or unreal' (Bh.G.XIII.12). Whoever does this acquires the clear conviction that (in ordinary ex- perience) the non-existent is appearing as if existent, like elephants conjured forth by magic (maya = mass hypnotism) or like dream-visions or cloud-palaces. And, in the case of one in whom this clear vision has arisen, wrong knowledge disap- pears, because it is in contradiction with right knowledge, and because its origin (non-discrimination) has been removed. (Bh.G.Bh.XIII.26)

23 THE CAUSES, NATURE AND RESULTS OF IGNORANCE

We now know the nature of metaphysical Ignorance. It consists in the mutual superimposition of the Self onto the not-self, and of the not-self onto the Self, and also of their attri- butes. Various synonyms are found for it in the commentaries which are familiar from general usage, such as adhyāsa, adhya- ropa, viparyaya, viparyāsa, mithyā-jmāna, mithyā-pratyaya, anyatha-grahana, tamas, bhranti and moha. Thus we have such passages as 'Ignorance is the supposition that what is tran- sieut, impure, of the nature of pain and not-self is eternal, pure, of the nature of joy and is one's Self' (Patajali, Y.S. II.5) and 'When wrong knowledge (mithya-jmana), psychological defects, self-interested action, birth ard pain have been successively removed, then, because each removes the next in the series, what results is liberation' (Gautama, Nyaya Sutra I.i.2). There is, however, a special point in the Vedantic teaching. In no other system do we find the doctrine that when we make a mutual identification of the Self and the not- self and their attributes we are identifying the real and the unreal: (the other systems speak, rather, of the false identifi- cation of two reals). We have seen that failure to discriminate the Self from the not-self is the cause of this Ignorance. This has been clear from texts quoted from the commentaries. We admit that a mere absence (such as absence of discrimination) cannot of itself cause anything. For non-existence has no distinctions, from the mere fact of being non-existence, or otherwise you might be able to produce oil as an effect resulting from the mere absence (non-existence) of sand. But there is nothing odd

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about the present case. For it is a clear fact of experiencc that =hen the true nature of anything is not discerned, vari- ous false notions about it arise. So it is the Self, the real motapnysical principle, that is imagined under various names and forms when its true nature is not discerned. On this a grcat authority has said: 'As a rope imperfectly perceived in the dark is variously imagined as a snake or a stream of water ur in other ways, so is the Seif wrongly imagined as this and that' (G.K. TI.17). Thus we observe in worldly experience that superimpositicn as false imagination has absence cf discrimination of the true nature of some reality as its prior conditicn. So we may say that the mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-self has absencc of discrimination of the true nature of the Self and the not-self as its sole prior cause. And this absence of discrimination is taught in Śri Śankara's commentaries by a variety of synonymous werds implying want of knowledge, such as absence of knowledge (ajñāna), failure to perceive (agra- hana), not being aware of (anavagama), not being awake to (amavabodha, apratibodha). Becausc it is the cause of wrong knowledge, it is sometimes also called cause (kārana), seed or sleep (nidra, supti). Wrong knowledge is referred to in the authoritative texts as the 'effect' of absence of knowl- edge, or as its 'result' or as 'dream'. For example, we find in the First Book of the Kārikās of Gaudapada: 'Visva (Consciousness associated with the waking state) and Taijasa (Consciousness associated with the dream- state) are both accepted as being conditioned as cause (non- perception of the Self) and as effect (wrong perception of the Self). Prajña (Consciousness associated with dreamless sleep) is conditioned solely as cause. Neither cause nor effect (neither non-perception of the Self nor wreng perception of the Self) are round in Turiya (pure Consciousness as such, transcending all states) .... Neither Prajma nor Turiya are aware of duality. In this respect they are equal. But Prajña is associated with the seed called sleep. Sleep does not exist in Turiya. Visva and Taijasa are associated with both sleep and dream (where the word 'dream' is used in a broad sense to include waking experience as well as dream, each being regarded as a species of wrong knowledge). Prajña has sleep, but is free from dream (in the above broad sense). But the enlightened ones see neither sleep nor dream in Turiya. Dream is the state of one who perceives wrongly (anyatha-grahana); sleep (nidrā) is the state of one who does not know the truth. When the delusion of these two states no longer occurs, one reaches the plane of Turiya (G.K. I.11,13-15)'. Now we take up the explanation of the effects of Ignorance. Ignorance and enlightenment are described in the Brhadāranyaka Upanishad as follows. 'When he feels (in dream) as if he were being struck, as if he were being overpowered, as if he were pursued by an elephant, as if he were falling into a pit, he

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imagines through Ignorance whatever dangers he has experienced in the waking state. But when he thinks, like a god or king, "Verily, I am all this", that is his highest state' (Brhad. IV.111.20). Here, by citing the examplo of dream, the text indicates how universal experience shows that all this worldly life is the result of Ignorance. For in dream there is no real dis- tinction between knower, knowledge and knows, or between actions, their factors and results. The whole world knows that it is all a mere illusion, conditioned by false impres- sious (vasana). But at the time the dreamer thinks, 'People are really striking we. They are overpowering me. An ele- phant is chasing me. Help! I've fallen down a pit. Alas, what troubies have come upon me'. And we all know that, when the feeling of enlightenment supervenes, people have the idea, 'I have become a god, I have been anointed a king, I have realized my nature as the Self of all'. And the Veda shows that the results of superimnosition are the same in waking as they are in dream. We also conclude from the commentary on this passage that this is so. For it says:

(1) A false notion arises, called Ignorance, based on the im- pressions of past experience. That is what the text is teach- ing. 'Appears to strike him' means 'appears to strike the dreamer' .... This, therefore, is the essence of Ignorance. It causes one to conceive what is the Self of all as not the Self of all. It sets up (the appearance of) other things over against the Self, though they do not reaily exist. It makes the Self finite. Hence desire arises for that from which one is cut off. Because one is cut off and feels desire, one re- sorts to action. From action foliow consequences. (Brhad.Bh. IV,iii.20)

And in the commentary on the Brahma Sutras we find the fol- lowing:

(2) All commerce between the attested means of knowledge (perception, inference, revelation, etc.) and their objects, whether in the Vedic or secular sphere, proceeds on the basis of this same mutual superimposition of the Self and not-self called Ignorance, as does all Vedic tradition, whether con- cerned with injunctions and prohibitions or with liberation. (B.S.Bh.I.i.l, intro.)

(3) This 'natural' (i.e. uncaused) beginningless and endless superimposition, which is of the nature of false supposition and which is the origin of the sense that one is an individual capable of action and experience, is directly familiar to everybody. (ibid. )

(4) And the entire upanishadic teaching is begun to

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commonicate knowledge of the sole reality of the one Self and thus to put an end to this superimposition, the cause of all evil. (ibid. )

24 THE CAUSE, NATURE AND RESULT OF ENLIGHTENMENT

The cause, nature and result of enlightenment have been com- pactly epitomized in the last quotation from the Brahma Sūtra Commentary, beginning 'And the entire upanishadic teaching ... ' (M.V.23,4). For Ignorance is the cause cf all evil, in that it is what gives rise to the sense of being an individual capable of action and experierce, and also to the instruments and cbjects of knowledge. Unless the instruments of knowledge are in play there cannot be any notion of an object set over against oneself and existent. And, if there is no knowledge of any second thing standing over against oneself, there is no scope for the rise of desire or fear relating to it. Without the rise of desire and fear and other passions there cannot be action or withdrawal to acquire the desirable and avoid the undesirable, or experience of the results of such action or withdrawal. Hence we conclude that it is Ignorance alone that is the cause of all evil, because it is what gives rise to empirical experience through instruments of knowledge. When things are viewed from this standpoint, even worldly advan- tages are seen to be a disaster. This superimposition was called the cause of all evil because even things that are to one's worldly advantage are perishable and will bring pain through undergoing destruction, and because they will plunge a person again and again into labour and trouble as he tries to realize his individual ends. The Veda itself shows that whatever is attained through action is perishable, and sup- ports the idea with such texts as, 'For just as a state in the present world attained through previous action comes to an end, even so do the states in the next world gained through meritorious action come to an end' (Chand.VIII.1.6). The fact that enlightenment causes the destruction of Ig- norance is already clear when we see that knowledge of the shell (mother-of-pearl) or the rope destroys the error of mis- taking a piece of shell for silver or a rope for a snake. So it follows that, in the present context also, direct knowl- edge of the sole reality of the one Self has the result of putting an end to ignorance of the Self. The phrase 'to com- municate knowledge of the sole reality of the one Self and thus to put an end to this superimposition, the cause of all evil' (M.V.23,4), expresses this result, which is the cessation of Ignorance. As for the nature of enlightenment, it is the direct conviction 'The final truth is that only the Self exists'. If we turn, finally, to the cause of enlightenment, we find that this is indicated by the phrase 'And the entire upani-

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shadic teaching is begun' (M.V.23,4). The fact that all forms oi imagination have the Self for their sole underlying sub- stratum, and the fact that the enquirer is himself identical with the supreme Self - these points are clearly taught in such upanishadic passages as, 'All this universe has that subtle principle for its essence. That is the real. That is the Self. That thou art, O Śvetaketu!' (Chand. VI.viii.7).

25 HOW BEING CAPABLE OF EXPERIENCE THROUGH VALID MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE AND BEING CAPAHLE OF ACTION ARE STATES ARISING THROUGH IGNORANCE

A passage from the Brahma Sutra Commentary quoted in an ear- lier section (M.V.23,2) promised that it would later be shown how ail our experience of the means and objects of valid em- pirical knowledge, and the operation of all the Vedic and other traditional texts, depended on superimposition, called Ignorance. This fact that all our experiences originate from Ignorance, which implies that they are based on wrong knowl- edge (mithya-jmana), which is but a syncnym for Ignorance, is clearly stated in the Brahma Sutra Commentary, in the passage running: '(And from that there results) this natural worldly experience, based on wrong knowledge and involving a synthesis of the real with the false, which expresses itself as "I am this" and "This is mine"'. And the revered Commentator makes it clear that he means by 'superimposition' a 'wrong notion' (mithya-buddhi) when he says, 'Superimposition, we have al- ready said, is one thing being wrongly taken for another'. Ncw, nobody could even contemplate the idea that Ignorance in the form of wrong notions or experience fabricated through mere words and ideas could imply a real relation like contact, such as the contact between a hand and a book, or a real relation like the relation of cause and effect subsisting between clay and pots. So we have to conclude that tha com- mentary is affirming that the whole play of the means and ob- jects of empirical knowledge is based on false conception. And in this connection the Veda hints that the complex of the soul and its bodies and organs is not in any (real and) con- stant relation with the Self by saying: 'The Spirit, remaining the same, appears to conform successively to the conditions of the two worlds (the present life and the next future one). It only seems to think. It only seems to move. It has entered on a dream, but transcends this world, the forms of death' (Brhad. IV.iii.7). Although the Spirit has no contact with the body or its organs of knowledge and action, it appears to be the one acting when they act, and appears to move. In truth, however, it does nothing whatever in the course. cf dream (i.e. the dream of empirical experience in general, cp. Suresvara, B.B.V. IV.iii.447 ff.). This appears to be what the upani- shadic text means. As for the phrase, 'It transcends the

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forms of death', that is explained in Śri Bhagavatpada's com- mentary: '"Death" here means desire, action, Igncrance and the rest. Death has no other nature. Its forms are the forms of the complex of the soul and its bodies and organs. So the Spirit transcends the forms of death, which dcpend on action and its consequences' (Brhad.Bh. IV.1ii.7). With this teaching of the Veda in mind, the revered Commen- tator raisee the quesiion, 'But in what sense do we mean that perception and the other secular means of knowledgc, together with Vedic tradition, belong to those in the realm of Igno- rance?' Aad he replies: 'What we say here is this. Without seif-identification with the body and senses expressed in the feelings "I" and "mine" there can be no empirical knower, and so the processes of empirical knowledge canmot begin' (B.S.Bh. I.1.1, intro.). Here it is clear that the revered Commentator quotes no authority to prove that the play cf the means of em- pirical knowledge belongs only to those in the realm of Igno- rance. So if he is able to state flatly that ihe power of making use of the means of knowledge does not arise without self-identification with the body and its organs, such a state- ment must rest on universal experience. And the revered Com- mentator speaks in various places of the relation between the Self and the body and cther factors of the empirical person- ality as set up by false identification:

(1) Therefore, since being embodied is the result of false notions, it stands proved that the enlightened person is not embodied even when still alive. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

(2) The question of whether the soul 'has' or 'has not' a body depends simply on whether metaphysical discrimination has or has not arisen. For the Vedic text says, 'Dwelling in all bodies, not Himself embodied' (Katha I.ii.22). (B.S.Bh.I.iii19)

(3) 'Relation with a body' includes relation with various bodies. What does 'relation with a body' in fact imply? It means the rise of the wrong idea that this body and so on, that is, the complex formed by the soul and its bodies and organs, is my very Self. (B.S.Bh.II.iii.48)

(4) The word 'body' is understood here to include the organs and the mind. That body (so understood) is the seat of ex- perience for the Self. The Self is by nature pure and tran- quil. It is visited, however, (in the course of Ignorance) by the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep. But in itself it is immortal, in the sense of being free from death and the other characteristics of change that beset the body, sense-organs and mind, the latter being the product of the merit and demerit of previous births .... The body, then, is of this kind, always in the jaws of death, beset by the pleasant and the unpleasant. It is the seat of the Self for empirical

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experience, and in this sense occupied by it. The one who has such a body is declared to be 'embodied'. 'Being embodied' is the state, arising through lack of metaphysical discrimination, in which the Self, which is by nature without a body, feels 'I am verily that body and that body is myself'. In this state, the Self is in the grip of the plcasant and the unpleasant. (Chand.Bh. VIII.xii.1)

And this also explains the superimposition that results in the feeling that one is an individual capable of action and experience. For here also one only engages in activity of this kind if one identifies oneself with the complex of soul, body and orgams. And indeed, the Veda and the Smrti texts speak of varicus 'activities' of the Self only on account of the activi- ties of the complex of the soul and its bodies and organs. And they speak of the Self (in its true form) isolated (from the complex) as void of activity. The commentary of Śri Bhagavat- pada follows this practice in several places.

(5) When He breathes, He is called Vital Energy. When He speaks He is called Speech (vac). When He sees, He is called the Eye, when He hears, the Ear. When He thinks, He is called the Mind (manas). These are but the names of His activities. He who meditates on these aspects of Him singly, does not come to know Him. For, as conceived under one or other of these aspects, He is incomplete. One should meditate on Him merely as 'the Self'. (Brhad. I.iv.7)

Śankara's Commentary: The vital energy and the rest, as the text says, are but names denoting the apparent activities of the Self. They are only names deriving from and denoting the activities of the Self; they are not names referring to the Self in its true nature as pure Consciousness .... As long as a person thinks 'I see, I hear, I touch', and imagines that his Self is characterized by the human activities that belong to the illusory realm of Nature, he does not rightly know the Self in its cntirety. If a person should ask, 'How should one view the Self if one is to know it rightly?', the text replies, 'One should meditate on Him merely as the Self'. The Self (atman) which possesses the vital energy and other particular aspects of himself that we have just mentioned, also pervades them. Because the Self (atman) pervades them (apnoti), they are said (because the word ätman is etymologically cognate with apnoti) to be the Self. Because the Self includes all these particulars, it is the whole of which they are illusory aspects .... Therefore one should meditate on Him merely as 'the Self' (cp. M.V.38,6).

(6) When this Spirit is 'born' it accepts a body and becomes associated with impurities. When it leaves the body at the time of death, it leaves its impurities behind. (Brhad. IV.iii. 8)

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Sankara's Commentary: By 'impurities' is meant the body and its organs, inseparably associated with impurity, the seats of action, meritorious and otherwise .... Thus it is established that this Light of the Self is different from the body and its organs, the 'impurities'. For it is first joined with them and later separated from them. Tf they were its properties, it could not become joined to them or separated from them (as they would always accompany it by nature).

(7) It is the Self as associatcd with the bouy, the senses and the mind that the wise call 'the experiencer'. (Katha I.iii.4)

Sankara's Commentary: Rightly do the wise, the discrimi- nating ones, speak of the Self associated with body, senses and mind as the experiencer, the one undergoing transmigration. For the Self alone is not an experiencer. It only appears to become an experiencer through association with such apparent conditioning adjuncts (upadhi) as the intellect (buddhi), etc.

tion, his various organs and instruments, the physical effort (8) There is the person acting, the body as his seat of ac-

of various kinds put in by his body and organs, along with assistance from the gods as the fifth component. Whatever ac- tion of body, speech or mind a person initiates, whether proper or improper, these five factors are the conditions for it. (Bh.G. XVIII.14-5)

Sankara's Commentary: The seat of action is the body, which is the place where desire and aversion, pleasure, pain and knowledge have their play. Then therc is the person act- ing, who is also the experiencer, himself marked by condition- ing adjuncts. There are the various organs, such as the sense of hearing, etc., for perceiving sound and other objects, these organs being twelve in number (the five senses of per- ception, the five powers of bodily action, and the two forms of the mind, manas when it is wavering and buddhi when it is fixed). There are the various activities of the vital energy, such as the out-breath and the in-breath and the rest. And these four factors are completed by a fifth, the force of the gods, such as Aditya (the sun-god) who presides over the sense of sight, and other deities.

(9) This being so, that wrong-headed person who thinks that the Self is verily the one who acts cannot see the truth, through lack of a trained understanding. (Bh.G.XVIII.16)

Sankara's Commentary: Thus action has to be performed. through these five factors. The phrase 'This being so' indi- cates that the teaching of the previous two verses shows why the person spoken of in the present verse is wrong-headed. The

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reference is to the one without metaphysical knowledge who thinks that the one who performs action is his true Self, though the latter is pure and transcendent. Such a person thinks 'It is verily I who act' in the case of an act which is in fact performed by these component factors, which he only identifies with his true Self through Ignorance. Why does he think in this way? Through lack of a trained understanding, an understanding trained through the teaching of the Vedic texts and the words of the Teacher .... And so, for lack of a trained understanding, he does not see the true nature either of the Self or of action. Thus he is wrong-headed, that is, his mind is bad, perverted and defective, and a sure cause of further birth and death.

(10) The supreme Self, the Indestructible, being beginning- less and without attributes, 0 son of Kunti, though present in the body, does not act and is not tainted. (Bh.G.XIII.31)

Śankara's Commentary: Though present in the body: this means that we are aware of the presence of the Self in our bodies. Still, it does not act. And because it does not act, it is not tainted by the results of any act .. Who is it, then, who does act and become tainted in our - bodies ?... The Lord has already answered this, saying 'But it is Nature (implying Ignorance) that acts'. (Gita V.14) For the notion that the Self acts or is tainted is itself of the nature of mere Ignorance. There is no action or taint in the highest Self from the standpoint of the highest truth.

26 THE TEXTS DEALING WITH INJUNCTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF IGNORANCE

We must now examine the meaning of the statement in ŚrI Bhaga- vatpada's Commentary that all texts concerned with injunctions and prohibitions and with liberation proceed only on the basis of accepting superimposition as a fact (M.V.23,2). There is a difference here between secular experience and experience as dealt with in the Veda. In secular activity, no allowance is made for knowledge of a Self beyond the body. Materialists think only of obtaining the desirable and avoiding the un- desirable insofar as these affect the body solely in this one life. Only those who desire to know particulars about obtain- ing the desirable and avoiding the undesirable in regard to other lives and other worlds are fit for the duties and ex- periences dealt with in the Veda. Here knowledge of the existence of a Self (beyond the body) is a necessary require- ment. And thus it has been said by Śri Bhagavatpada, 'Without knowledge of the existence of a Self connected with other lives, there cannot be any desire to obtain the desirable or

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avoid the undesirable in guch lives. We see this in the case of the Naturaiists (svabhava-vadins). Therefore the Veda sets forth teaching about the existence cf a Self connected with other lives, and explains the particulars of how to obtain the desirable and avoid the undesirable in other lives' (Brhad. Bh.I.i.l). Hence the doubt might arise: 'Are the experiences (of the desirable and the undesirablc) thus dealt with in the Veda the work of Ignorance or not?' For we owe any knowledge we may have of a Self over and above the body to the Veda. For if, in our attempts tc safeguard the teaching of the commentaries, we were to suppose that these duties and experiences were not the work of Ignorance, that would contradict the point made at the end of the introduction to the Branma Sutra Commentary, 'Superimposition, of the nature of wrong knowledge (Ignorance), is what gives rise to the idea that we are individuals capable of action and experience. For this would be to accept that the sense of being an individual capable of action and experi- ence, referred to in the Veda, was not the result of metaphys- ical Ignorance. But if, on the other hand, we accepted that capability of individual action and experience was based or Igncrance, that would undermine the authority of the Veda. For it would show that what it taught (when speaking about duties and the rewards flowing from the performance of them) was not true. On this question, the Veda itself accepts the view that capability for individual action and experience are based on Ignorance. it says: 'Frail are these barques, consisting of the sacrifice, the sixteen officiating priests, the sacrificer and his wife, pertaining to ritual in its lower form. Those deluded people who praise this as "the best" go again to old age and death. Plunged in Ignorance, supposing themselves to be scholars and very wise, they wander about, struck hither and thither and bemused, like blind men led by one who is him- self blind' (Murd. I.i1.7-8). Nor is the authority of the Veda in any way undermined. For the only purpose of the Veda is to teach people how to at- tain their various ends. With this in mind, the revered Com- mentator has written:

(1) No one but a person who acts in an intelligent, thinking way, and knows of the connection of his soul with other worlds, is qualified to perform the ritualistic activity laid down in the Veda. But such a person does not depend for his qualification on a knowledge of the true Self that can only be known from the Upanishads - the Self which is beyond hunger and thirst and other such infirmities, which does not admit of distinction into different castes such as Brahmins and Kshatriyas, and which does not undergo the experience of transmigration. For knowledge of the true metaphysical Self would be useless in regard to ritualistic duties, and would

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in fact disqualify one for them by contradicting the sense that one is an individual capable of action. But until knowl- edge of the Self in this true form arises, the Veda continues its teaching without overstepping the bounds of the experience of those afflicted with Ignorance. For example, such texts as, 'A Brahmin should offer sacrifices' proceed on the basis of superimposing onto the Self distinctions of caste, stage of life, age and so forth. (B.S.Bh.I.i.l, intro.)

(2) Although the obligatory daily ritual is to be learned from the Veda alone, still, it only applies to one afflicted by Ignorance. And in the same way, prohibitions against acts, such as the slaughter of a Brahmin, which bring evil on the one who does them, can only be learned from the Veda. Yet such acts are only performed by those afflicted with Ignorance and lust and other such defects. Otherwise their performance would be inexplicable. And the daily, occasional and optional ritual are the same (that is, they are learned from the Veda, but only performed by those afflicted with Ignorance). (Bh.G. Bh.XVIII.67, intro. )

(3) Even the one who affirms the existence of a Self over and above the body is to be accounted of untrained mind if he sees the Self alone as the one who acts. So, being thus untrained, he does not see the truth, either about the Self or about action. (Bh.G.Bh.XVIII.16)

(4) An opponent may raise the following difficulty. It is taught, he may say, that one should acquire knowledge of the unity and sole reality of the Self, thereby abolishing the distinctions which make up the factors of action, such as the person doing it, his instruments and so on. It is like knowl- edge of the rope, for instance, which destroys the illusory notion of a snake for which the rope had been mistaken. But this teaching stands in contradiction with the injunctions to perform ritual, for it would rob them of all scope. Yet we find that injunctions to perform ritual are in fact laid down. Such a contradiction cannot stand, as the Vedas are an author- ity for right knowledge. But we reply that there is no difficulty. For the Vedas simply accept the factors of action as they are presented in ordinary experience. And on this basis they lay down ritual for those who desire liberation, as a means to do away with the accumulated effects of their sins. And they lay down rit- ual for attaining particular ends in the case of those who desire them. They are not concerned with affirming that the factors of action actually exist. (Tait.Bh.I.1l)

(5) Wrong, also, was the opponent's view that, if the Veda taught the non-duality of the Absolute, this would render the part of the Veda that dealt with action inauthoritative. For

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avoid the undesirable in such lives. We see this in the case of the Naturaiists (svabhava-vadins). Therefore the Veda sets forth teaching about the existence cf a Self connected with other lives, and explains the particulars of how to obtain the desirable and avoid the undesirable in other lives' (Brhad. Bh. I.i.1). Hence the doubt might erise: 'Are the experiences (of the desirable and the undesirablc) thus dealt with in the Veda the work of Ignorance or not?' For we owe any knowledge we may have of a Self over and above the body to the Veda. For if, in our attempts tc safeguard the teaching of the commentaries, we were to suppose that these duties and experiences were not the work of Ignorance, that would contradict the point made at the end of the introduction to the Branma Sutra Commentary, 'Superimposition, of the nature of wrong knowledge (Ignorance), is what gives rise to the idea that we are individuals capable of action and experience. For this would be to accept that the sense of being an individual capable of action and experi- ence, referred to in the Veda, was not the result of metaphys- ical Ignorance. But if, on the other hand, we accepted that capability of individual action and experience was based or Igncrance, that would undermine the authority of the Veda. For it would show that what it taught (when speaking about duties and the rewards flowing from the performance of them) was not true. On this question, the Veda itself accepts the view that capability for individual action and experience are based on Ignorance. It says: 'Frail are these barques, consisting of the sacrifice, the sixteen officiating priests, the sacrificer and his wife,pertaining to ritual in its lower form. Those deluded people who praise this as "the best" go again to old age and death. Plunged in Ignorance, supposing themselves to be scholars and very wise, they wander about, struck hither and thither and bemused, like blind men led by one who is him- self blind' (Mund.I.i1.7-8). Nor is the authority of the Veda in any way undermined. For the only purpose of the Veda is to teach people how to at- tain their various ends. With this in mind, the revered Com- mentator has written:

(1) No one but a person who acts in an intelligent, thinking way, and knows of the connection of his soul with other worlds, is qualified to perform the ritualistic activity laid down in the Veda. But such a person does not depend for his qualification on a knowledge of the true Self that can only be known from the Upanishads - the Self which is beyond hunger and thirst and other such infirmities, which does not admit of distinction into different castes such as Brahmins and Kshatriyas, and which does not undergo the experience of transmigration. For knowledge of the true metaphysical Self would be useless in regard to ritualistic duties, and would

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in fart disqualify one for them by contradicting the sense that one is an individual capable of action. But until knowl- edge of the Self in this true form arises, the Veda continues its teaching without overstepping the bounds of the experience of those afflicted with Ignorance. For example, such texts as, 'A Brahmin should offer sacrifices' proceed on the basis of superimposing onto the Self distinctions of caste, stage of life, age and so forth. (B.S.Bh.I.i.1, intro.)

(2) Although the obligatory daily ritual is to be learned from the Veda alone, still, it only applies to one afflicted by Ignorance. And in the same way, prohibitions against acts, such as the slaughter of a Brahmin, which bring evil on the one who does them, can only be learned from the Veda. Yet such acts are only performed by those afflicted with Ignorance and lust and other such defects. Otherwise their performance would be inexplicable. And the daily, occasional and optional ritual are the same (that is, they are learned from the Veda, but only performed by those afflicted with Ignorance). (Bh.G. Bh.XVIII.67, intro. )

(3) Even the one who affirms the existence of a Self over and above the body is to be accounted of untrained mind if he sees the Self alone as the one who acts. So, being thus untrained, he does not see the truth, either about the Self or about action. (Bh.G.Bh.XVIII.16)

(4) An opponent may raise the following difficulty. It is taught, he may say, that one should acquire knowledge of the unity and sole reality of the Self, thereby abolishing the distinctions which make up the factors of action, such as the person doing it, his instruments and so on. It is like knowl- edge of the rope, for instance, which destroys the illusory notion of a snake for which the rope had been mistaken. But this teaching stands in contradiction with the injunctions to perform ritual, for it would rob them of all scope. Yet we find that injunctions to perform ritual are in fact laid down. Such a contradiction cannot stand, as the Vedas are an author- ity for right knowledge. But we reply that there is no difficulty. For the Vedas simply accept the factors of action as they are presented in ordinary experience. And on this basis they lay down ritual for those who desire liberation, as a means to do away with the accumulated effects of their sins. And they lay down rit- ual for attaining particular ends in the case of those who desire them. They are not concerned with affirming that the factors of action actually exist. (Tait.Bh. I.11)

(5) Wrong, also, was the opponent's view that, if the Veda taught the non-duality of the Absolute, this would render the part of the Veda that dealt with action inauthoritative. For

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Vedic teaching is given to deal with conditions as actually perceived .... At first it accepts natural duality based on metaphysical Ignorance just as we perceive it. On this basis, it teaches ritualistic action to the one who is afflicted with natural Ignorance, and hence with such defects as desire and aversion, for the sake of whatever ends he may conceive .... Then, later, when he has come to see the defects inherent in action, its factors and results, and wishes to rest serene in his own true nature, which is opposed to all action, the Veda teaches him the means to this also, which is 'Knowledge of the Absolute' (brahma-vidya), that is to say vision of the sole reality of the Self. (Brhad.Bh.V.i.l)

Even the meditations prescribed by the Veda fall within the province of mental activity. They therefore represent teach- ing given to people still afflicted with Ignorance, and teach- ing which accepts duality in the form of action, its factors and results, just as they are perceived by such people. About this there is little to he said. So the revered Commeniator expressed himself as follows:

(6) All practical experience of the Absolute as an object of meditation, or as the one performing meditation, takes place in the state of Ignorance. (B.S.Bh.I.i.12)

27 THE TEXTS CONCERNED WITH LIBERATION APPLY TO THOSE AFFLICTED WITH IGNORANCE - BUT WITH A DIFFERENCE

We should now consider the texts dealing with liberation in their proper setting in the teaching a3 a whole. Even here, knowledge of the Absolute is taught on the basis of accepting the duality implied in such distinctions as Teacher, texts, pupil, knower, knowing, knows and so on, just as ordinarily perceived. Such texts apply to those in Ignorance just as much as the texts enjoining and prohibiting action. But there is this difference. The texts dealing with in- junction and prohibition reveal a means to the accomplishment of some human end, and do no more. They do not say anything as to the reality or unreality of the distinction into action, its factors and results. But the texts dealing with libera- tion bless with liberation the one who really desires to know the true nature of his own Self, devoid of action, its factors and its results. Liberation means permanent establishment in that Self. Hence there is no contradiction between the texts conveying injunctions and prohibitions and the texts teaching liberation. For the texts conveying injunctions and prohibitions have their scope earlier in the state of Ignorance; when the truth has been known, however, duality no longer exists. And in fact

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there is never any contradiction between duality and non- duality. For no duality whatever exists from the standpoint of upanishadic revelation or of the Teacher who follows it, and the notion cf the existence of texts, Teacher and pupil is only assumed for the sake of teaching pupils. It was with this in mind that the words were given, 'And the entire upanishadic teaching is begur to communicate knowledge of the sole reality of the one Self ... ' (M.V.23,4). So there are no difficulties here. For the Commentator follows the different texts on which he is commenting at different places. In some he throws light on the practical experience of duality for those in the state of Ignorance. In others he explains how there is no such experience when non-duality has been realized.

(1) The supreme Self is loosely spoken of by immature souls as the embodied individual soul, taken to be limited by its apparent conditioning adjuncts, the body, sense-organs, mind and intellect. It is like the ether of space, which appears to be cnclcued by conditioning adjuncts such as pots of vary- ing shapes and sizes, when it is in fact not so enclosed .* The limitations undergone by the Self are of that kind (i.e. merely apparent). Relative to such adjuncts, experience of such distinctions as that between the performer and the object of an act does not imply any contradiction. This remains true as long as the teaching of the existence and sole reality of the Self in the text 'That thou art' has not been properly assimilated. But when the existence and sole reality of the Self is directly apprehended, all individual experience, in- cluding bondage and liberation, comes to an end. (B.S.Bh. I.ii.6)

*(For example, if you move a pot you will move the air in the pot, but the space that appeared to be 'in the pot' when it was in its original position cannot be moved: in fact there is no real enclosure of space in the pot, only apparent enclosure. T.N.)

(2) The continuous empirical experience of the individual soul proceeds solely through its being afflicted with Igno- rance. (B.S.Bh.I.iv.3)

(3) All empirical experiences that occur before one has real- ized that one's Self is the Absolute are taken as real, like the experiences of a dream before awakening. (B.S.Bh.II.i.14)

(4) The inmost Self is one. There cannot be two inmost Selves. Where there is only one, practical experience of such a unity as if it were multiple, and reference to it as such, arise through apparent conditioning adjuncts. It is as when we speak figuratively of the ether of space in the pot and the ether of space in general (as if the pot really circumscribed

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a volume of the ether of space and effectively cut it off from the rest of ihe ether, which it does not, as the ether is a continuum and too subtle to be effectively circumscribed by gross objects). Once this is understood, the Vedic texts speaking of distinctions such as subject and object, means of empirical knowledge such as perception, etc., transmigratory experience of the world, and the Vedic texts conveying injunc- tions and prohibitions, all become intelligible (even when non-duality is accepted as the final truth). And the Veda it- self confirms this. For it shows that all empirical experi- ence belongs to the reaim of Ignorance in such texts as, 'For where there is an appearance of duality, there (a subject who is) one sees (an object which is) another'. (Brhad.IV.v.15) But this text goes on to deny any empirical experience in the realm of enlightenment in the words, 'But where everything has become the Self, what could one see, and with what?' (B.S.Bh. I.ii.20, cp. M.V.49,6)

(5) 'This doctrine (of the existence of pupil, texts and Teacher) is accepted only for purposes of teaching. When the truth is known, duality no longer exisis'. (G.K.I.18)

Sankara's Commentary: How, then, can the notion of Teacher, texts and pupil come to an end? The reply is as follows. An imagination could come to an end if anything had actually been imagined by anybody. Just as this world-appearance is an il- lusion like a rope-snake, so is this imaginary distinction between a pupil and his Teacher and so on. It is accepted as a means for teaching, but only before the rise of enlighten- ment. So it is for purposes of instruction (and not as a statement of metaphysical truth) that we have this teaching that there is a pupil and a Teacher and a subject taught. But when the object of the teaching is attained, when the supreme principle is known, duality does not exist. (G.K.Bh.I.18)

28 HOW THE VEDA IS THE FINAL MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

The method of false attribution foilowed by subsequent retrac- tion has been partially described. From the description so far given it has been established that the function of the upani- shadic texts as authoritative means of knowledge is to promote knowledge of the unity and sole existence of the Self by eli- minating Ignorance. They do not affect the Self or contribute to it in any way. For the Self is not the object of any means of knowledge, since in its true nature it is non-dual. And since it is by nature ever immediately evident and self- evident, it does not need anything else to establish itself. An appearance of duality is established through Ignorance. But it is the self-luminous principle, the witness of the

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activity of all the organs such as speech and mind, which stands illumining all else with its Consciousness. For we have the upanishadic text, 'There is one shining deity present hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the inner Self of all be- ings, the regulator of action and its results, dwelling within all beings, ihe Witness, the Illuminator, transcendent, void of all empiricel attributes' (Śvet.VI.11). Perception and the other means of empirical knowledge are associated with this principle only through Igmorance. For it is by nature ever pure, conscious and liberated. And it is only through their association with this principle as converted through Ignorance into a knowing subject that perception and the other means of knowiedge have any life at all; and they shine through its llght alone. For we have such upanishadic texts as: 'You cannot see the seer of seeing, you cannot hear the hearer of hearing, you cannot think the thinker of think- ing, you cannot know the knower of knowing' (Brhad. III.iv.2), 'The unseen Seer ... ' (Brhad. Iii. vii. 23), 'Which cannot be thought by the mind, through which, they say, the mind thinks' (Kena I.6) and 'All this manifests through its light' (Mund. !I.11.11). Even when there is the error of supposing the body, senses and organs to be the Self, this self-luminous principle re- mains the inmost principle of all, superior to all through be- ing immediately self-evident. For we have the upanishadic text, 'That which is immediately evident is the Absolute, that is the Self, interior to all' (Brhad. III.iv.1). When we say 'The Upanishads are the means to attainment of that principle', we should be clear that this 'attainment' only occurs through the elimination cf our wrong supposition that this principle falls within the field of our ego-notion. The statement that the Upanishads are the means to its attainment is also used merely to indicate that the self-luminous prin- ciple is not known by any of the other means of knowledge, such as perception and the rest. There is also a further point. Perception and the other empirical means of knowledge, along with the Vedic texts con- veying injunctions and prohibitions - even along with the upanishadic texts themselves - are valid only as long as the Absclute has not been kncwn in its true nature through the Veda, for then the wrong notion of 'knower through means of knowledge' is eliminated. After true metaphysical knowledge has been attained, only the non-dual Absolute remains. There cannot then be the notion that the Self is the object of a means of cognition, or that any means of cognition exists to know it. Hence the experts in the interpretation of the Upani- shads have taught that the Upanishads are the 'final means of knowledge'.

(1) This principle is not within the scope of perception, as it does not have form or colour or any other perceptible

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attribute. And ii cannot te the object of inference or the other means of empirical knowledge either, as it does not have any property o serve as an inferential sign or to provide any of the other prerequisites of an inference. (B.S.Bh.II.i.6)

(2) If you object that, if the Absolute is not an object of knowledge, it cannot be known through the Veda, we reply that this is not so. For the aim of the Veda here is to put an end to distinctions imagined through Ignorance. The Veda does not aim to expound the Absolute as if it were an object character- izable as this or that. What, then, does it. do? What, it does is to eliminate distinctions such as those of krower, knowl- edge and known, which are imagined through Ignorance. And it does so by teaching that the Absolute, because it is the in- most Self, is not an object of knowledge. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

(3) For the Self is not anything brought in to anyone as some- thing new, for it is self-established and self-manifest from the start. The Self does not depend on any means of knowledge to be known, since the means of knowledge depend for their existence and power to operate on it. They belong to it, and are only brought into play to establish objects of knowledge which (unlike the Self) are not yet established. (B.S.Bh. II.iii.7)

(4) The Self of all is other than the performer of action, the object of the ego-notion, and conceived through that as 'I'. It is the witness of the cgo-notion, present, the same, in all beings, one, constant and eternal, the Spirit (purusa). It is not attainable by anyone merely through following the Vedic texts concerned with injunction and prohibition, or merely through studying one of the various systems based on logical reasoning conducted independently of the metaphysical teaching of the Veda. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

(5) And the text 'But I am asking you about that Spirit taught in the Upanishads' (Brhad. III.ix.26) affirms that the .Spirit in question is specifically the Spirit taught in the Upanishads. This would only have been possible if it had been the primary topic that the Upanishads taught. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

(6) And again, this (the metaphysical part of the Upanishads) is the final means of knowledge proclaiming the unity and sole reality of the Self. After that nothing further could be required. (B.S.Bh.II.i.14)

(7) For once the true nature of the Self is known, there can no longer be any more experience of the means and objects of empirical cognition. For the final means of knowledge puts an end to the condition of the Self as a knower whose knowledge comes through the empirical means of knowledge. And in putting

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an end to this condition, the final means of knowledge itself ceases any longer to be a means of knowledge, just as the means of knowledge present in a dream cease to be such on waking. (Bh.G.Bh.II.69)

(8) Realization of the Absolute is not arywhere found either to destroy or create any reality. What it.is invariahly found to do is to put an end to Ignorance. So here also, the sense of not being the Absolute and the sense of not being the total- ity of all that exists, which are induced by Ignorance alone, should be put to an end by realization of the Absolute. (Brhad. Bh.I.iv.10)

(9) We admit that the soul is cubject to the evils of trans- migration before enlightenment, and that perception and other means of empirical knowledge pertain only to this realm. For there are texts such as 'But where everything has become the Self, what could one see and with what?' (Brhad. II.iv.14) which show that, on enlightenment, perception and the other empirical means of knowledge cease. Nor can you object against us that if perception and the other empirical means of knowl- edge fall away, the Veda, as an authoritative means of knowl- edge, falls away with them. For this is precisely our own doctrine. We base our doctrine that the Veda itself dis- appears at enlightenment on the authority of the passage (Brhad. IV.iii.22) which begins 'Here the father is no father' and goes on to say, 'And the Vedas are no Vedas'. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.3)

(10) Therefore, all injunctions and all other valid means of knowledge come to an end with the realization of 'I am the Absolute'. For when direct knowledge of the non-dual Self that is not subject either to destruction or production has been attained, then there can no longer be any means of knowl- edge, for they would have no objects and no individual knowing subject to resort to them. And it has been said: 'The Self is only an individual knowing subject before the attainment of direct knowledge of that Self which the Upanishads say has to be investigated. When the true nature of the individual know- ing subject has been thoroughly investigated, then it is found to be (the supreme Self) free from sin and other defects. Just as the notion of the identity of the Self with the body is imagined at first to hold as valid, so are all the means of knowledge found in worldiy experience (including the Veda) imagined to hold as valid until the Self has been realized'. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

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29 THE NOTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE AND TGNORANCE PERTAIN TO THE SPHERE OF IGNORANCE ONLY

It has already been stated (M.V.22) that the mutual superim- position of the not-self onto the Self and the Self onto the not-self, called Ignorance, is the root and origin of all other superimpositions onto the Self. And it has also been explained how the Upanishads, since they fall within the sphere of the play of the empirical means of knowledge, cease to be a means of knowledge after direct insight into the unity and sole real- ity of the Self has been attained. It has also been explained how the notions of knowledge and Ignorance themselves pertain to the sphere of Ignorance only. And it has been explained how the notion that Ignorance causes the Self to undergo bond- age, and that knowledge removes that bondage and accords re- lease, are also notions pertaining solely to the sphere of Ignorance. Thus the means of knowledge called the Veda is (ultimately seen to be) an illusion. And its power to effect release through destroying Ignorance is also an illusion. And on this basis one might wonder whether direct knowledge of the supreme Self was itself also an illusion, or whether it was real. If it were an illusicn, then the liberation it effected would also be illusory, and in that case what would be the point in the upanishadic discipline? If, on the other hand, we say that direct knowledge of the Self is real, then how could real direct knowledge arise from illusory upanishadic texts? If this objection is raised, we must draw attention to two different ways in which it can be answered. If we take the phrase 'direct knowledge arises through the holy texts' to mean that such direct knowledge consists in the mere mental idea to which the texts give rise, then such knowledge would be illusory. It would be as illusory as a dream-sword used to slay a dream-tiger. Still, it will be enough to destroy illu- sory Ignorance. And being itself inseparable from Ignorance, it will be destroyed with the latter. Liberation, which will mean becoming established in one's own naturc, will be attrib- uted figuratively to one who was never involved in erroneous knowledge and its destruction, just as waking up is attributed to a dreamer who was never really involved with sword or tiger. But is it not the case that, on this view, bondage will be an illusion and liberation, therefore, also an illusion? Let it be even so. No harm will result to the supreme reality But how (when the Upanishads are unreal) can the supreme reality be established as real? There is no occasion to raise such a doubt. Know that the supreme reality is self-evident and self-established. For superimposed fancies could not sus- tain themselves for an instant without the supreme reality as their substratum. So let it be enough, when considering the objection this way, to say that knowledge of the supreme reality will supersede automatically when wrong ideas are

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removed. In considering the other way of answering the objection, we begin by noting that when perception and the other empirical means of knuwledge are put into operation to secure direct knowledge of their various objects, the final result is the emergence of a mental idea (vrtti). The subsequent result of this mental idea is the manifestation of the Consciousness of the Self, which is in fact eternally self-established. The cognition resulting from an (in itself admittedly illusory) means of knowledge is thus in reality nothing other than the eternal self-established principle called Consciousness. In the same way, in the coutext of enlightenmcnt also, there is a manifestation of Conscicusness as e result of the mental idea that arises from a rccognized means of knowledge, namely the upanishadic text. This, toc, may be spoken of figuratively as the 'result' of the operatiom of (an in itseif admittedly illasory) means of knowlodge. There is thus ne occasion to raise baseless objections.

(1) 'There is no destruction and no creation. There is no one bound and no one undergoing spiritual discipline. There is no one seeking liberation and no one who has attained liberation. This is the highest truth'. (G.K.II.32)

Sankara's Commentary: If duality is spread forth, while in truth only the Self exists, then the conclusion is that all experience, secular and Vedic, belongs to the realm of Igno- rance alone.

(2) But how can the Veda put an end to the notion of duality if the Absolute in its true nature remains bcyond the scope of its activity? We reply that there is nothing wrong here, (since its function is to negate duality). For duality is superimposed on the Self through Ignorance, just as the snake is on the rope .... The Self is invariably present amidst all these (superimpositions of contradictory false notions such as 'I am happy', 'I am unhappy' and so forth) .... Therefore 'happiness' and the other mental experiences are distinctions that are merely imagined in the Self, which in fact has no distinctions. And thus it follows that the purpose of the Vedic texts when they predicate 'non-happiness' and other negative attributes of the Self is merely to terminate such ideas as 'I am happy' and so on. And there is the maxim of one (Dravidacarya) who knew the true tradition for interpreting the texts, 'Its validity stems from the fact that its function is to negate'. (G.K.Bh.II.32, cp. M.V.138,12; 229,2)

(3) If you say that knowledge and ignorance as experienced by the mind (cp. Suresvara, T.B.V.II.578) are attributes of the Self, that is wrong. For we are directly aware of them as ob- jects. Discrimination and non-discrimination lie in the mind

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and are objects of perception, like a patch of colour. A patch of colour, being an object of perception, cannot be an attribute of the perceiver. And Ignorance is formulated in one's own experience as 'I am confused, my understanding is not clear'. In the samc way, the clear discrimination arising from knowledge is also a matter of experience .* Men of knowl- edge communicate their knowledge to others, and others receive ii. Thereforc, knowledge and ignorance belong to the realm of name and form. Name and form are not attributes of the Self. For there is that other upanishadic text, 'The ether, verily, is that which determines name and form. That within which they lie is the Absolutei. (Chand. VIII.xiv.l) And this name and form are merely imagined in the Absolute, like day and night in the sun. From the standpoint of the highest truth, they do not exist. (Taitt.Bh.II.8)

*(Some interpret. 'The fact that mental knowledge is distinct from one's own Self is also a matter of experience'. The Sanskrit would bear either interpretution. T.N. )

(4) But how can the fact that the Self is the Absolute, which is true, be conveyed by the Upanishads, when the latter are by nature illusory ?... There is nothing wrong here. For we find practical results such as death occurring from the mere sus- picion that one has been poisoned. And we also see that a dream snake-bite and bathing in water in a dream exert their due effects in the context of the dream. If it were to be claimed that such experiences were illu- sory, our reply would be as follows. The snake-bite and the bathing in the water on the part of the dreamer are illusory. But the knowledge whereby he is aware of having the dream, known technically as the 'resultant cognition' (phala), is real. For it is not contradicted on waking. (B.S.Bh.II.i .. 14)

(5) Here an opponent objects: To say that knowledge is the resultant cognition (phala) arising from the application of a means of knowledge (pramana), and also that it is of the nature of the light of the Self, eternal, constant and raised above all change, is a contradiction. To such an objector the Teacher replies, 'There is no con- tradiction. Why not? Well, that which is eternal and raised above all change is perceived at the end of cognitions coming through the recognized means of knowledge, as this is what such means of knowledge are for. Because the ideas arising from acts of perception and the rest are transient, the eter- nal and constant knowledge (that is the natural essence of the Self) appears (in them) to be transient. Hence it is spoken of figuratively as the 'result' (phala) of the application of such means of knowledge. (U.S. prose, para 108)

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3C THE CANCELLATION OF THE THREE KINDS OF IGNCRANCE THROUGH KNOWLEDGE

Absence of knowledge, doubt and wrong knowledge form a triad, all thrce of which are different irom knowledge. They share the common character of obscuring the true nature of the real. They ail disappear on the rise of knowledge. In this sense it is right that they should all be called Igncrance (avidya). And they are, indeed, sometimes referred to collectively by such terms as 'ajãāna' and 'avidyā'. Novertheless, here in the Vedanta system, it is 'wrong knowledge' (mithya-jmana) for which the technicel term 'avidya' is specially reserved. And the reason for this is that which has alrcady been given. Ignorance in this sense is the cause of all evil, because it is that which sets in motion the means of knowledge in all empirical experience. For as long as e person thinks that his Self is associated with the body and its orgass he can be designated as 'the embodied one', 'the indi- vidual soul', 'the conscious individual' (vijmanatman), 'the knower', 'the seer', 'the hearer', 'the one who acts', 'the expericacer' or by other words which refer to the various apparent conditioning adjuncts (upadhi) he assumes. And as long as the superimposed notion that one is an empirical knower lasts, one will have such notions as 'I do not know', 'I am in doubt', 'I have had a wrong idea' and 'Now such and such a matter has been correctly appraised through such and such a means of knowledge'. He will be the one to whom the experience of knowledge and ignorance occurs. And thus through natural Ignorance he will feel, even in regard to his own Self, 'I am ignorant, I do not know my true Self', 'On this point I have a great doubt, namoly, "Which of these selves is my true Self?"' and 'Sometimes I wrongly identify myself with such ex- ternal objects as my physical body and my sons and other family members'. But what about the time when one gets rid of Ignorance through the upanishadic texts and the words of the Teacher, and knows one's own Self in its true form? Then the two forms of Ignorance consisting of absence of discrimination and doubt depart of their own accord: there is no need to make any fur- ther effort to dismiss them. Ignorance with its root (absence of discrimination) and its consequences is not swept away by knowledge like dust by an act of sweeping. Knowledge dispels Ignorance by its mere rise, as darkness disappears automati- cally with the rise of the sun. As for the rise of knowledge, that depends on nothing more than the upanishadic texts and the words of the Teacher. This it is, as we have already ex- plained, that communicates knowledge of the ever self- established Self, which is itself indifferent to knowledge and Ignorance.

(1) The knot of the heart is cut. All doubts are dispelled.

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All & person's merit and demerit (the cause of his rebirth) is destroyed, when the Absolute has been known, who is both the transcendent and the manifest. (Mund.II.ii.9)

(2) Whether Ignorance be understood as absence of knowledge, as doubt, or as positive wrong knowledge, in any case it can only be eliminated through knowledge, and not through action. For action is not contradictory to any of them. (Brhad.Bh. III.iii.1, intro: )

(3) An obscure (tamasa) idea ic Ignorance (avidya) because it conceals. It may be a positive wrong apprehension, or it may instil doubt, or it may be simply failure to apprehend. It is rightly said to conceal because, when the light of discernment shines, it disappears. And the triad of non-apprehension, doubt and misapprehension are only found in the presence of some obscuring factor such as the disease of double-vision in the eyes. (Bh.G.Bh.XIII.2)

(4) For when knowledge in the form 'Fire is hot and luminous' supervenes, it is no longer possible to have such wrong notions in regard to fire as 'Fire is cold and non-luminous', or to have doubt, or to have failure to anprehend. (Isa Bh.18)

(5) All commerce between the attested means of knowledge (per- ception, inference, revelation, etc.) and their objects, whether in the Vedic or secular sphere, proceeds on the basis of this same mutual superimposition of the Self and the not- self called Ignorance. (B.S.Bh.I.i.1, M.V.23,2)

(6) And until Ignorance ceases, the individual soul remains caught in experience of the results of actions bringing merit

Bh.I.iv.6) and demerit and in the state of individuality (jivatva). (B.S.

(7) And as long as the connection with the intellect as con- ditioning adjunct lasts, so long does the individuality and transmigration of the soul last. (B.S.Bh.II.iii.30)

(8) The Self is always evident by its very nature, the sole obstacle to this being Ignorance. We have the example of a piece of shell which is actually being perceived (as a 'this'), and yet, since it is misapprehended as silver, it is not (properly) perceived. The sole obstacle here is misapprehen- sion. The (indeterminate) perception of the shell (as a mere 'this') can only be knowledge, since it is only knowledge that is obscured by wrong knowledge. In the same way, Ignorance in the form of misapprehension is the sole obstacle in the case of the perception of the Self. (True) perception of the Self, therefore, arises from the removal of Ignorance through meta- physical knowledge and in no other way. (Brhad.Bh.I.iv.7)

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(9) In worldly experience we find that colour manifests as soon as there is contact between the visual organ and light. In the same way, Ignorancc of the Absolute disappears the moment that direct knowledge of it arises. (Brhad.Bh.I.iv.1O)

(10) All experience, whether secular or bascd on Vedic teach- ing, comes to an end in the case of the man of steady wisdom, in whom metaphysical discrimination has arisen. For his Igno- rance has come to an end, and that experience was based on Ignorance .... For when there is knowledge, Ignorance dis- appears. It is like the abolition of the darkness of night when the sun rises. (Bh.G.Bh.II.69)

(il) Immediately knowledge of the Self has been obtained, it puts an end to Ignorance. No process occupying time is admitted here. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.2)

(12) If you say that there must be a distinction in the Self according to whether Ignorance has or has not been put to an end, we reply 'No'. For we hold that the notion that the Self is afflicted by Ignorance itself belongs to the realm of the false imagination of Ignorance. As we have already explained, (Brhad. Bh. III.v.1), the Self is not affected by Ignorance, any more than the rope, desert, shell and sky are affected by the imputed snake, mirage, silver and impurities of dust or cloud. If you say that there must be a distinction in the Self accord- ing to whether it is or is not a producer of Ignorance, just as there is a difference in sight according to whether it is or is not afflicted by double-vision -again we say 'No'. For the Upanishads deny that the Self, in its true nature, is an individual capable of any form of action, by saying (Brhad. IV.iii.7) 'It only seems to think, it only seems to move'. (Brhad.Bh. IV.iv.6, cp. M.V.206,7 for continuation of the pas- sage)

31 HOW VEDIC TRADITION AND INFERENCE LEAD ON TO DIRECT EXPERIENCE

The line of reflection so far presented has made it clear that Ignorance alone is the root-cause of all the evils of trans- migration, and that its essential nature consists in the super- imposition of the notion of being an individual knowing subject onto the Self. In the realm of empirical experience, this Ignorance appears to be cancelled and brought to an end by knowledge arising from the texts of the Upanishads. From the standpoint of ultimate truth, however, the Self, as the final reality, transcends the experience of knowledge and Ignorance. In this context, there is a particular method of instruc- tion approved of by the Veda. Its function is to communicate the true nature of the Self by negating the notion that the

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supreme Self, ever pure, conscious and liberated by nature, is the individual knowing subject set up by Ignoracce. This method is given the technical name 'Agama' (traditional in- struction) by the experts on the Upanishads. It is true that the term 'Agama' is widely used in a broader sense as a name for the whcle body of the traditional texts of the Vedanta school. And in the Bhagavata and other Puranas the basic texts of the Pañcaratra and other schools are given the name of 'Agama', on the ground that they have come from (agata) the teaching of competent authorities. But this particular method of teaching that we are here expounding, in which the true nature of the supreme reaiity, beyond the range of speech and mind, can be communicated in its true form through the subse- quent retraction of all that had previously been attributed to it - this method also, we must take note, is referred to specifically by the term 'Agama' by those who know the true tradition. Of this the following texts from Śri Śankara's com- mentaries provide examples.

(1) Because this entity has no attributes like colour, it is not an object of perception. And because it has no signs which can be used as a basis for inference (since these, too, depend on perception), or any other features that could lead to in- direct forms of knowledge, it is not within the realm of in- ference or other forms of indirect knowledge either. This en- tity can only be known through the traditional texts (agama), like the results in future lives of our ritualistic and righ- teous acts. (B.S.Bh.II.i.6)

Here, because the phrase 'traditional instruction' is associ- ated with denial of perception and inference, etc., it means the whole body of the traditional texts of the Vedanta school.

(2) Do you say that the opponent (the expounder of the Saiva Āgamas) has a traditional body of teaching (agama) of equal authority with that of the traditional texts (agama) of the Advaitin, since his texts come down from the omniscient Lord Śiva? (B.S.Bh.II.ii.38)

Here the word Agama is used to refer to the authoritative texts of the Mahesvara (Saiva) school.

(3) The nature of the Absolute has been laid down in the first two Books of the Brhadāranyaka Upanishad, the Madhu Kanda, in which tradition predominates. Then, in the Yajnavalkya Kanda, concerned with the rational justification of that traditional teaching, it has been reflected on through disputation, with resort to thesis and counter-thesis. And in the fourth Book the teaching has been subjected to further detailed reflection in the style of questions and answers, by pupil and Teacher, and summarized in a concluding passage. (Brhad.Bh.IV.v.l,

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intro.)

Here we have to understand that the phrase 'traditional in- struction' (agama) refers (not simply to the texts of the Vedanta but) to a special method of teaching. For the dis- tinction between 'with traditional instruction predominant' and 'with rational justification predominant' was made in regard to the content of two different sections of the Vedic text itself, the Madhu Kānda und the Yājnavalkya Kānda.

In this connection, it is clear that a person of very bright intellect, who is able to realize his own true nature, lying beyond all empirical experiencc, merely through listening to the texts of the Upanishads, has no need tc look for any fur- ther means of knowledge or to pursue any other discipline in this field. For he has put away all supcrimpositicn, and is established in his own true nature. Of course, even when he was engaged in superimposition, he was (in a scnse) established in his true nature. For one can never lose ore's own true nature; and even in the state of superimposition there is not the slightest counection between one's true nature and the various ideas superimposed on it. Nevertheless, through failure of apprehension, it appears as if the person had at that time falien from his true nature. And from that stand- point, we speak of him throwing off superimposition through knowledge and beccming established in his true Self. This is how the matter must be understood. This 'being-established-in-one's-own-true-nature' is called immediate experience of the Self (atmanubhava). We have al- ready pointed out the reason for this, which is that the Con- sciousness which constitutes the Self manifests as direct experience at the conclusion of a mental cognition (M.V.29,5). So in this matter we are not obliged, as we are in the case of the teachings of the ritualistic section of the Veda, to con- fine our appeai to the authority of the word of the Veda. For we can appeal to that which produces a form of knowledge which regularly culminates in direct experience. But those of middling or inferior intellectual powers are not able to understand the meaning of the texts correctly and bring it into their immediate consciousness merely from hear- ing the texts once. In their case, reasoning in support of the Veda is a proper step. And reasoning in the secular style, as long as it is constructive and in conformity with the texts, is also permissible. For we have the upanishadic text, 'It should be heard about, it should be pondered over' (Brhad. II.iv.5). But reasoning, even when it is in. support of the Veda, should only be accepted as a preliminary discipline undertaken for the sake of direct experience. In this con- text, direct experience only is the authoritative means of knowledge, whatever the sources that lead to it. This direct experience, regarded as a means of knowledge,

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is not (intermittent and limited) like the knowledge resulting from sense-perception. Nor is it a mere mental phenomenon, like a pain originating from the chest or from head-ache (all pain being transmitted to the mind, according to classical Indian psychology). It illumines all knowledga of the exter- nal and internal worlds. It is in reality nothing other tham the true form of Consciousness that is the very nature of the Self. But it is spoken of as 'direct e=perience' relative to the objects which it illumines with its light. The sun, for instance, is mere light. But it is spoken of as 'an illumi- nator' relative to the various cbjects which it illumines. And the light of the Self ie referrred to as 'direct experience' in the same way. As for that reasoning which is hot based on the traditional texts, which does not issue in valid knowledge in the form of airect experience, and which consists in mere human specu- lation - that is called 'bare lcgic' or 'dry logic' (suşka- tarka), and it has no place in reflection as practised in Vedanta.

(4) And so it is true that the supreme principle cannot be conveyed by perception or the other recognized means of em- pirical knowledge. But it can be conveyed by the traditional method (agama). To teach this the text says, 'It is other than what is known and above the unknown'. (Kena Bh.I.4)

(5) Known technically as 'the Absolute' (brahman), it is of the nature of immediate experience, void of all the attributes of transmigratory life. This is the meaning of the word 'that' (in the phrase 'That thou art'), familiar to the experts in the Upanishads. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.2)

(6) For logical reasoning is accepted only as an auxiliary to Vedic revelation. (B.S.Bh.I.i.2)

(7) In the case of enquiry into the Vedic ritual, the Vedic and other traditional texts alone are the criterion. But this is not so in the case of the enquiry into the Absolute. Here it is the same texts that are the authority, but with immediate experience (and firm remembrance, etc.) added in the case of the purely metaphysical texts. For knowledge of the Absolute requires io culminate in immediate experience (anubhava), and (unlike the part of the Veda dealing with commands and prohi-

Bh.I.i.2) bitions) has an already-existent reality for its object. (B.S.

(8) Therefore an investigation is opened, by means of a philo- sophical enquiry into the nature of the Absolute, into the meaning of the texts of the Upanishads. This enquiry is sup- ported by dialectical reasoning not in conflict with the upani- shadic texts, and its purpose is the attainment of supreme

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beatitude. (B.S.Bh.I.i.1)

(9) Repeated resort to the appropriate means of knowledge is indeed useless in the case of the person who can attain im- mediate experience of the fact that his true Self is the Ab- solute merely from hearing the text 'That thou art' spoken once. But for him who is not able to do sc, repetition is the proper means. (B.S.Bh. IV.i.2)

(10) The Self that has to be known has no parts. But the nature of having many parts, such as body, sense-organs, lower mind, higher intellect, experience of objects and so forth is superimposed onto it through Igmorance. A person may elimi- nate one part through one conviction, another through ancther. In this sense, knowledge of the Absolute is a progressive pro- cess. But this process is only the preliminary form of knowi- edge of the Self. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.2)

Knowledge of the Self here meuns direct experience of the Self.

(11) True, it has been said that the Veda itself proclaims that reason must be respected, as it enjoins pondering as well as hearing. But this should not be used as a pretext for allowing empty hypothetical reasoning to gain entry. For in the present context only those arguments that are sanc- tioned by the Veda may be resorted to, and that only as an auxiliary to the attainment of direct experience. (B.S.Bh. II.i.6)

(12) Moreover, objections based on mere empty dialectic should not be raised on topics which can only be known through Vedic revelation. Trains of reasoning on these top- ics where the premises are not based on Vedic revelation, but on mere human speculation, are without any firm foundation. For human fancy is unbounded. (B.S.Bh.II.i.1l)

The Ācarya (Sankara) speaks on the one hand of 'topics which can only be known through Vedic revelation', and on the other of 'trains of reasoning on these topics that are not based on Vedic revelation, but on mere human speculation'. What he wishes to point out is that there is no harm in re- lying on the processes of empty dialectic when one is en- gaged in refuting the views of an opponent who himself relies solely on dialectic, if the refutation deliberately follows the opponent's method. For here Vedic revelation is of no avail, since it is not accepted as authoritative by the opponent. The idea is that true believers will not be able to see the hollowness of any philosophy unless its reasoning has been refuted following its own methods. That is why we see both Gaudapada and the revered Commentator (Sankara)

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following the methods of empty dialectic when they are en- gaged in refuting the doctrines of the Buddhists and others.

32 METHODS OF TEACHING THE ABSOLUTE THROUGH DOCTRINES OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, ETC., ARE VARIANTS THAT ARE SUBSIDIARY TO THE MAIN METHOD

Various subsidiary methods fer teaching the Absolute are ac- cepted in the Vedanta school, for the sake of dull and mid- dling intellects, as part of the logical thecrizing leading eventually to direct experience. For example, there is teach- ing about the distinction between cause and effect, the dis- tinction between universal and particular, the distinction between eubject and object, the distinction between the five 'sheaths' and the three 'states' and other such tcpics. But in every case there is one basic method at work. The aim throughout is to reveal urity by negating superimpositions and so to enlighten the studcat as to the unity and sole reality of the cne Self and se to effect his realization of that Self. This will become clear through examining the various different methods one by one.

33 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CAUSE AND EFFECT

First, we consider the distinction between cause and effect. The Chandogya Upanishad speaks of the non-dual Absolute as 'Being' (sat). It teaches that 'Fire', 'Water' and 'Earth' (lit. 'food' ) were projected from it. It teaches that Being, as the supreme deity, entered Fire, Water and Earth as a living soul and unfolded name and form. It teaches through examples such as that of clay and iron (and the effects of which they are the material cause) that the effect is non- different from its material cause, and that through a knowl- edge of the material cause there is a knowledge of all the effects. It supports this with arguments. And then it de- clares that the true Self of the whole world and of Śveta- ketu, the hearer of the teaching, is the Absolute. It does this in the words, 'All this world has this for its Self. That is the real. That is the Self. That thou art'. (Chand. VI.vii.7) Again, in the Mundaka Upanishad the whole world of the moving and the fixed is said to proceed from the non-dual Absolute, known as the Indestructible Principle, as the Real, as the Spirit and by other names. And then it is said, 'This immortal principle is the Absolute. The Absolute is in front, the Absolute behind, the Absolute to the right, the Absolute to the left. This whole universe is nothing but the Absolute. It is the object of supreme love' (Mund. II.1i.12).

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Thus the Mundake, also, teaches that the world is one with the Absolute or Self. In the Taittiriya Upanishad, it is first said that the projection of the world consisting of the ether and other elements proceeds from the Absolute. And in the end it is declared that one finds perfect stability, bringing freedom from all fear, in identifying oneself with the Absolute, be- reft of all relation with the perceptible and imperceptible aspects of the world (Taitt. II.7) In all cases of this tind, a doctrine of cause and effect is accented as a preliminary device to help induce the mind to understand the unity and sole reality of the Self. The Veda does not teach that the effect 12 real. For instarce, in the example given in the Chandogya, it is first said that all effects are mere names, just a suggestion through spesch. Then it is laid down that, relative to them, the cause alone is real. In the same way, it is laid down that the supreme cause alone is real, it being taught that all its modifica- tions are mere names. It is therefore laid down clearly and with utmost emphasis that the doctrine that there exists a universe of effects is only admitted at all in order to teach the existence of a cause as its ultimate ground. Thus we have:

(1) Just as, my dear one, all that is made of clay is known from one lump of clay, so it follows that a modification is a name, a suggestion of speech. The truth is, 'It is only clay'. (Chand. VI.i.4)

(2) Behold! The firehood of fire has disappeared. A modi- fication is a name, a suggestiou of speech. The truth is 'There are (only) three subtle elements (lit. colours) ... '. (Chand. VI.iv.1-4)

(Here M.V.33, 2 (the present section) refers back to the three deities that are said to form the subtle elements of fire, water and earth, and are also said to have been three- folded or interwoven by the supreme deity called Being to develop 'name and form', the apparent objects of the world (Chand. VI.iii.3, VI.iv.5-7). The whole scheme of the world presented here by the Chandogya is to be viewed only as a device for leading the mind on towards unity. M.V. 33, 2 shows how the gross element fire is composed of the three subtle elements of fire, water and earth. The references given at M.V.33,2 to Chand.VI.iv.1-4 show that, according to the tenta- tive scheme, all the manifestations of fire in the world are composed from the three subtle elements. But Chand. VI.ii. 3 shows that the two other subtle elements or deities, water and earth, spring from the fire deity, which in turn springs from the deity called Being. M.V.33.3 teaches that this implies that they can all be reduced to Being. M.V. 33,4

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harking back to M.V. 33, 1, re-affirms the broad principle that if y proceeds from and abides in x, with x for its material cause, it can be reduced to w. Thus the whole world of ap- parent distinctions can be reduced to pure Being, and this teaching of Śri Sankara is rooted in the Chandogya Upanishad, See also M.V. 36 introduction; 36, 2;47, 1; 164; 168, 16; 233, 8. T. N. )

Śankara's Commentary on Chand. VI.iv.l: Before discrimina- tive knowledge of the three subtle elements (coloured red, white and black) that go to make up fire, you had the notion of fire. That notion or fire has now (after discrimination of the three component subtle elements) disappeared, and the word 'fire' also .... Fire was but a notion based on a word. As the text says, 'A modification is a name, a suggestion of speech'. By 'name' it means 'a mere namc'. Consequently the idea of fire, too, as well as the name, is false. What, then, is real in this rase? The answer is that it is only the three subtle elements that are real. The idea is to lay it down that nothing whatever exists here except the three subtle elements. (Chand.Bh.VI.iv.l)

(3) With food (= the subtle earth element) as the sprout, seek for water as the root. With water as the sprout, my dear one, seek for fire as the root. With fire as the sprout, my dear one, seek for Being as the root. All these beings, my dear one, have Being for their root, have Being as their abode, Being as their support. (Chand. VI.viii.4)

(4) And from the giving of such examples as clay, etc., we see that the purpose of teaching the creation of the world- appearance was really to expound the non-difference of the effect from the material cause. And thus a great authority on the tradition has declared: 'When creation is mentioned in the Veda, and taught in various ways, through such examples as clay, iron and sparks, this is only a device for introduc- tion (of the doctrine of the sole metaphysical reality of the Self)'. (See G.K.III.15) In truth there is no differentiation of any kind. (B.S.Bh.I.iv.14, cp. M.V.168,14-16)

Also, in the teaching coming from the Gita, it is said that the Lord is the cause of the production and dissolution of the world at the beginning and end of each world-period through his two 'Natures(prakrti, Bh.G.VII.3-7). The idea here is to show that the universe is not self-caused, and to indicate that the effect is non-different from the material cause. And to prevent the suspicion that there must be another cause to bring forth the Lord Himself, it is said that there is no principle higher than He and beyond Him, and this is to emphasize, also, that He is the supreme reality.

(5) Know that all beings have this for their womb. I am the

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origin and the dissolution of the whole universe. 0 Dhanañ- jaya, there is nothing higher than I. (Bh.G.VI.6-7)

Thus it is declared that the Lord pervades the whole uni- versc, and that it derives its stability from dependence on Him. The purpose is to bring home to the heart of the lis- tener that even when the universe is ir manifestation thore is no second reality over against the Lord, and that the uni- verse has no independent existence.

(6) This whole universe is spread forth by Me in My unmani- fest form. All beings abide in Me but I do noi abide in them. Indeed, they do not in truth stand in Me! Behcld My Divine Power! (Bh.G.IX.4-5)

And in the teaching coming from the Brahma Sūtras it is clearly stated that the effect is non-different from the cause, and that an exposition of the distinction bctween cause and effect is undertaken only as part of the method of communicating their non-difference.

(7) From which proceed the origination, maintenance and dis- solution of this (world). (B.S.I.i.2)

(8) And the Absolute must be understond as the material cause of the world, or otherwise there would be a contradic- tion between the thesis and the example offered to illustrate it. (B.S.I.iv.23)

(9) The world as effect is non-different from the Absolute as cause, as is shown by such texts as 'a suggestion of speech' and others. (B.S.II.i.14)

Śankara's Commentary: When the text says 'and others' (i.e. and other texts like 'a suggestion of speech'), one can quote a whole number of examples of texts teaching that he Self is one and is the only reality. For instance, 'All this universe has that subtle principle for its essence. That is the real. That is the Self. That thou art' (Chand. VI.viii.7). 'All this is the Self' (Brhad.II.iv.6). 'All this is the Absolute' (untraced). 'All this is the Self alone' (Chand.VII.ii.12). 'There is no plurality whatever here' (Brhad. IV.iv.19). And unless the Self were one and the only reality, one could not explain how everything could be known from one thing (as implied at Chand. VI.i.4-6). Thus this whole universe of experiencers and objects of experience must be seen as nothing other than the Absolute. It is like the non-difference of the ether of space, as apparently en- closed in the big pot and the small pot, from the ether of space in general. (M.V.27,4) And it is like the case of such illusions as a mirage, which are non-different from the

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substratum on which they appear, such as the desert soil, since their nature is to appear and vanish, and their nature is inexplicable. (B.S.Bh.I.i.14)

34 CREATION IS ACCEPTED AS REAL FROM A PRACTICAL STANDPOINT TO HELP ONE CLASS OF STUDENTS

Thus, under the traditional Vedic method of instruction, whereby cause and effect are initially taught as distinct, the notion of creation is at first accepted, but not in or- der to teach creation as a fact. Why then? In order to teach the non-duality of the supreme principle, by showing thet the world, as effect, is non-different from the Abso- lute, as cause. Let us take this as granted. But a person of dull intel- lect might reason as follows. Is the creation spoken of in the Veda altogether unreal from the highest standpoint? Or is there some eiement of reality in it even from that stand- point? For it does not seem possible that there could be no grain of reality at all in creation, when the Veda, which is the special authority on such a matter (which transcends the powers of perception and inference) describes it at such length. And again, the world is experienced by everyone through perception and the other means of knowledge as a co- hereut realm in which a person engaged in action can accom- plish his acts. How could any thinking person dismiss it as unreal? Here the experts give a reply and say that this is a point that must be understood in the light of a distinction. Ef- fects may be said to exist as long as the factors of action denoted by words seem capable of co-operation for use in the performance of ritual or of prescribed meditations, and when the Absolute has not yet been discriminated from the condi- tioning adjuncts of name and form. But this existence is only accepted from the standpoint of practical worldly ex- perience. All creation is admitted to enjoy its illusory existence before the illusory play of name and form set up by Ignorance (avidya) has been cancelled. But when the aim is to identify the Absolute in its true nature, then it is declared that it is the Absolute alone that is referred to by every word and comprehended in every idea. For even when they are manifest, it is impossible to explain name and form either as identical with or as different from the Absolute. And if they are spoken of from the standpoint of vision of the Absolute, they do not in truth exist. Thus it stands proved that the Absolute has no second, is beyond all em- pirical experience and is eternally and constantly self- established. So there is no contradiction.

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(1) The enlightened ones have always taught that objects really come into being to those who hold to the reality of objects and are afraid of the teaching that they do not come into being; for this (doctrine of real origination) accords with perception and practical dealing (especially with the performance of. caste and other duties). (G.K.IV.42)

Sankara's Commentary: The teaching that things really come into being is given by the enlightoned ones, by those who teach non-duality ... because this is what is perceived, and also to make it possible to follow the rules of caste and stage of life. For these two reasons, it is taught that things really come into being. But this teaching is only given to those who are habituated to speaking of objects as real, who have weak powers of discrimination, who have simple faith in the ritualistic teaching and a firm and persistent belief in the reality of objects. And it is taught as a means to a different idea. The idea is, 'Let them think of it like that for the moment. But there will come a time when discrimination of the unborn, non-dual Self will arise of its own accord in the hearts of earnest students of the Upani- shads'. The teaching is given in that spirit, and not with the idea that it is the final truth.

(2) We give the name of an elephant to what is conjured forth by the mass-hypnotist because we perceive it and be- cause it figures in practical dealings (is tied up, mounted, etc.); and it is in just the same way that we say (of a thing in the world) 'It is an existent reality' because we perceive it and because it figures in praetical dealings. (G.K. IV. 44)

(3) Those entities that are 'born' do not really come into being. Their 'birth' is like a hypnotist's magic display. And that magic display (maya) itself is a thing that does not exist. (G.K.IV.58)

Śankara's Commentary: And those other souls (read atmano) and other entities that (appear to) come into being - they also are imagined. This is, in the same way as at Karika IV.57, called 'concealment'. The entities that come into be- ing only through 'concealment' do not come into being at all from the standpoint of the highest truth. If the entities come into being, as described, through 'concealment' they do so through illusory appearance (maya), and should be seen to be like a hypnotist's magic display. Is the hypnotist's magic display a reality? No. 'That magic display is itself a thing that does not exist'. The idea is that the term 'Maya' is a name for something that does not exist.

(4) And the author of the Sutras, too, speaking from the

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standpoint of the highest truth, said 'Non-different from that', (i.e. the world as effect is non-different from the Absolute as cause). Speaking from the standpoint of empirical experience, however, he says 'Let it be, as in the world' (B.S.II.i.13), and descries how the Absolute can be repre- sented as a great ocean. Here he accepts the world of effects aud the doctrine of real transformation (parinama) because it will be of use for the prescribed meditations on the Absolute associated with various finite forms. (B.S.Bh.II.i.14)

(5) If you say that, if the conditioning adjunct 'name and form' existed, such upanishadic texts as 'One only without a second' and 'There is no plurality here' would be contradic- ted, we reply 'No'. For this idea has been refuted by the example of water and foam, and by the examples of clay and the like as material causes. From the standpoint of uitimate truth, however, no namc and form really exist for the fol- lowers of the Upanishads, such as truly could be discerned as separate principles, distinct from the principle of supreme reality, eny more than the modifications of clay and other such substances are distinct principles apart from those sub- stances. For name and form are but modifications of the supreme reality, as foam is of water and pots are of clay. And from this standpoint it is seen that texts like 'One only without a second' (Chand. VI.ii.1) and 'There is no plurality whatever here' (Brhad. IV.iv.19) do in fact refer to the su- preme reality. The case is different, however, as long as the Absolute remains, under the influence of natural (uncaused) Ignorance, unperceived in its true transcendent nature, in clear dis- crimination from the conditioning adjuncts of body and organs consisting of name and form. This true nature, indeed, stands untouched by the imputed adjuncts, just as the shell is untouched by the silver for which it is mistaken, and the colourless ether of the sky is unaffected by the colour and shape falsely attributed to it when it is seen as blue and concave (tent-formed). But here the natural (unregenerate) vision conditioned by the organs consisting of name and form continues, and it is under this condition that all this world is presented to us as a reality separate from our own Self. (Brhad.Bh. III.v.l)

35 TWO DOCTRINES: THE EFFECT IS REAL BEFORE PRODUCTION: ORIGINATION IS ILLUSORY

Because the world of name and form, being no more than an apprehension, is only a piece of false imagination, it no more undergoes origination, maintenance and dissolution than a rope-snake does. Nor can origination, maintenance and

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dissolution apply to what is real in the highest sensc, as that is by nature constant, eternal and raised above all change. But in the case of a rope not properly recognized as such there can be false notions, such as a rope-snake and others. And in the same way, when the Absolute is not prop- erly recognized as such, it is quite intelligible that there should be such false notions as that of the rise of the world of name and form. For this is what is found to be the case; and when the mistaken ontity is known in ite true nature, in the case of the Absolute as weil as the rope, the false notion is found to be cancelled. In the Vedanta school this fact is accepted, and inter- preted according to the doctrine called Sat-kārya Vēda. Though the effect is utterly non-existent as effect, it is eternally real as the Absolute, the substratum on which it is projected. This is the claim of Sat-kārya Vada. The Abso- lute has no origin (lit. is 'unborn') and non-dual. Talk of its 'hirth through Maya' refers to its coming into manifesta- tiom as the illusory world of name and form - an appearance of which it is itself the reality.

(1) There is no destruction and no creation. There is no one bound and there is no one undergoing spiritual discipline. There is no one seeking liberation and no one who has attained liberation. This is the highest truth. (G.K.II.32)

Śankara's Commentary: A piece of mental imagination like a rope-snake does not actually either rise up from or dis- solve back into the rope. Nor does any real snake actually rise up in or become dissolved in the mind. Nor do both these things happen. The same is true of duality in generai, which is not different from the rope-snake in point of being a mere mental phenomenon.

(2) Considered in its true nature as the Self, this (world of) plurality does not exist as anything separate from the latter (the Self).Nor is it anything different from the Self when considered in its intrinsic plurality (because it is illusory). The various appearances within it are not dis- tinct either from each other or from the Self, neither are they non-distinct. Such is the view of the wise. (G.K.II.34; for Sankara's Comm., cp. M.V:283,6)

(3) As a rope imperfectly perceived in the dark is variously imagined as a snake or a stream of water or in other ways, so is the Self wrongly imagined as this and that. And as the imaginations cease when the rope is known for what it is, without the addition of any second thing, with the conviction 'This is verily a rope', so imaginations cease when the Self is known for what it is. (G.K.II.17-8)

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(4) But will it not follow (from the denial of empirical at- tributes in the Absclute in such texts as 'void of sound' etc., that the effect is) unreal (before its manifestation)? No. For this would be a bare negation. (B.S.II.i.7)

Śankara's Commentary: Objection: You maintain that the Absolute is pure and void of all the great elements beginning with sound. But you also claim that it is the material cause or the world; and you claim that the world is opposite in nature to the Absolute, since it is essentially impure, and is possessed of all the elements, beginning with sound. Now, if all this were true it would imply the non-existence of che (impure world as) effect (in its material cause, the Abso- lute) before production. And this is not acceptable to an exponent of the doctrine of the existence of the effect be- fore production (sat-kārya vāda) like you.

(as the Sutra here says), the opponent's position proceeds Answer: There is nothing wrong in our position here. For

'from a bare negation' For this is a bare negation, without anything to be negated .... The effect does not cxist inde- pendently with a nature other than that of the cause, even now. On this we have such texts as, 'All things extrude him whc sees them as other than the Self' (Brhad. II.iv.6). The existence of the effect as the cause, however, is in no way different before or after its production. Well, but is not the cause of the world the Absolute void of sound and the other elements? Yes. But the effect, the world consisting of sound and the other elements, cannot exist except as the cause, either before creation or now. (B.S.Bh.II.i.7)

(5) The Self is unborn, but appears to undergo birth in various forms through Maya, as we know from such texts as 'There is no plurality whatever here' (Brhad. IV.iv.19) and 'Indra (goes about in many forms) through his magic powers' (Brhad. II.v.19). (G.K.III.24)

Śankara's Commentary: The phrase 'through his magic powers' in fact means 'through our sense-perceptions'* which are of the nature of Ignorance. And this also follows from the text, 'though really unborn, He appears as if born in many different forms' (White Yajurveda XXXI.19). Therefore He only 'undergoes birth' by way of illusion. The word 'but' is inserted for emphasis, to secure the meaning 'only through illusion'. One and the same being cannot be both unborn and born in many ways, any more than fire could be cold and at the same time hot.

*(Indra = indriya = sense-organs; māyā in plural = prajñā in plural (by Yāska XII. 27) = cognitions. See M.V.220,8

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and 9. T.N. )

(6) But the Absolute becomes subject to transformation and to all empirical experience through apparent distinctions, con- sisting of name and form, manifest and unmanifest, which are imaginea through Ignorance and are indeterminable either as being the metaphysical reality itself or as being anything different. In its ultimately true form, however, il remains beyond all empirical experience and not subject to transfor- mation. (B.S.Bh.II.i.27. For mcre detail, see also M.V.47,6; 138,8;220,7.)

36 VEDIC SUPPORT FOR THE LAST TWO POINTS

Some people may think that the way in which we have just described the doctrine cf the reality of the effect before production and the doctrine that all coming into being is il- lusory does not literally agree with the Veda. For (they will say) the origination of the universe from the Absolute, as well as its maintenance through and dissolution in the Ab- solute, are always taught as real fects in the Upanishads. We have such texts as 'The ether was born from the Self' (Taitt. II.1), 'He projected the cosmic vital energy' (Prasna VI.4), 'The universe is born here from the Indestructible Principle' (Mund. I.1.7), 'That from which these creatures are born' (Taitt. III.1), 'He projected these worlds' (Ait.I.2) and 'Then He projected fire' (Chand.VI.ii.3). We find the same teaching in the Gita, in such texts as 'I am the origin of all' (Bh.G.X.8). And there is the Sütra in the Brahma Sutras which gives the definition of the Absolute as 'That from which proceed the origination, maintenance and dissolu- tion of this world' (B.S.I.i.2). So how can one set all this aside and deny the reality of the world and embrace the doc- trine that coming into being is an illusion? We would prefer to say that the Absolute, being omniscient and omnipotent, is verily the cause of the world in the literal sense. And we have such Vedic texts as 'He who is omniscient, all-knowing' (Mund. I.i.9) and 'His supreme power is taught to be abundant and varied' (Svet. VI.8). But this doubt is unjustified. For the true form of the Absolute is invariably indicated through the very negation of the other forms that do not really belong to it, in such texts as 'And so there is the teaching "neither this nor that"' (Brhad. II.1i1.6) and 'It is not said to be either real or unreal' (Bh.G.XIII.12). And when the Absolute is known in its true form one does not desire to know anything further. As for the texts proclaiming the origination, maintenance and dissolution of the universe, the Veda itself declares in the text 'With fire as the shoot my dear one, seek Being as the root' (Chand.VI.viii.4) that their real purpose is to

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proclaim the unity and sole reality of the Self. Therefore, since we have such Vedic texte as 'Indra through his magic powers (maya)' (Brhad. II.v.19) it must be understood that the origination, maistenance and dissolution of the universe are illusory, and that the texts apparently proclaiming them really have another meaning. For one must accept that the texts which convey that form of knowledge after obtaining which one does not desire to know anything further must be of greater autnority than any other texts. And the stetement that the Absolute is omnipotent is made from the standpoint of empirical experience oniy, not from that of the highest truth. For a power, also, is (ultimately) nothing but its material cause, even as ar effect is nothing but its material cause. And as guarantee of this we have such empbatic pas- sages in the Veda as 'This whole universe is in truth (noth- ing but) the Absolute' (Mund. II.ii.12) and 'All this is but the Self alome' (Chand. VII.xxv. 2).

(1) The text denies all that it had previously taught by saying 'He (the Self) is neither this nor that'. Thus the Unborn, the only reality within or without, only manifests when it is realized that it is not anything that is conceived by the mind. (G.K.III.26)

(2) But why should the texts proclaiming the origination, maintenance and dissolution of the world be regarded as sub- ordinate to those denying the existence of any distinctions within the Absolute, and not the other way about? Our reply is that the texts denying distinctions yield a form of knowl- edge after obtaining which nothing further remains to be known. For when once the unity, sole existence, eternality, purity and so forth of the Self are directly known, no further need or desire to know anything else arises. One feels, and with justification, that one has attained the fi- nal goal of human life. And there are Vedic texts which support this, such as 'What delusion, what grief, can there then be for one who sees the unity of all?' (Isa 7), '0 Janaka, you have attained the fearless state' (Brhad.IV.ii.4) and 'He who knows the bliss of the Absolute experiences fear from no quarter'. (Taitt.II.9) ... It is seen, also, that the enlightened ones experience profound inner contentment and other such glorious states; and the Veda denounces all the claims to reality of the de- lusive modifications in the text 'He goes from death to death who sees the appearance of plurality here' (Brhad. IV.iv.19). So the texts which deny all distinctions of the Absolute cannot be subordinate to any of the others. Nor is it the case that the texts proclaiming the origination, maintenance and dissolution of the world are able to commu- nicate a truth leaving no further knowledge to be desired. On the contrary, we are forced to conclude that they are

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inserted for the sake of some other teaching. For the text first says, 'Know, my dear one, that this (body) is a shoot that has grown up. It cannot be without a root' (Chand. VI. iii.3). And then at the end it goes on to show how (not any modification of matter but) Being alone must be known as the one root of the whole universe. (B.S.Bh.IV.iii.14)

(3) And because the texts dealing with the origination, maintenanre and dissolution of the world are really concerned with communicating the unity and sole reality of the Self, it follows that the Absolute does not (in truth) possess a plu- rality of creative powers (sokti). (B.S.Bh.IV.iii.14)

(4) Therefore the power (sakti) must be identical with the material cause (in which it resides), and the effect of the power must be identical with the power. (B.S.Bh.II.i.18)

This asserts that the power and its effect are both identi- cal, in their nature, with the material cause, this being directly evident in the case of the power, while in the case of the effect the identity is evident mediately through its identity with the power.

(5) The Vedic texts on creation would be valid equally whether creation was or was not a fact (in which latter case they would have the purpose of drawing attention to the sole reality of the Self, as already explained at G.K.III.15, cp: M.V.33,4). That interpretation of the texts which agrees with reason must be accepted, and no other. (G.K.III.23)

Sankara's Commentary: All creation belongs to the (illu- sory ) realm of projection through Ignorance. It is not a fact from the standpoint of ultimate truth. For we have the text 'He (alone) exists within and without, the Unborn' (Muņd.II.i.2).

(6) And we hear from the Veda 'There is no plurality what- ever here' (Brhad. IV.iv.19), 'Indra goes about in many forms through his magic powers (maya)' and 'That which is really unborn appears to undergo birth in various forms' (White Yajurveda XXXI.19). But that 'birth' is through illusion. (G.K.III.24)

(7) The real can only be born through illusion, not truly. He who holds that the real is truly born (cannot say that the Unborn is born, for that would be a contradiction. He) will have to say that the already born is born (which in- volves infinite regress). (G.K.III.27)

Śankara's Commentary: Just as a real object like a rope can undergo 'birth' as a snake through illusion but not truly,

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so can the Self, which, even though not subject to perception, is real, undergo 'birth' as the world through illusion but not truly, in the manner of the 'birth' of the rope as a snake .. But from the standpoint of ultimate truth the Unborn does not undergo any birth whatever. As for the thinker who tries to say that the Self as Unborn, the supreme principle of reality, truly undergoes birth - well, if he tries to say that the Unborn undergoes birth, it will be a contradiction. Hence the implication of his doctrine is that it is the already born that undergoes birth. But to say that it is the alread born (only) that undergoes birth im- plies infinite:regress. (For, in order for a thing to be born at all, on such a view, it would have to have been born previously, and that birth would imply a previous birth and so to infinity.)

37 THE METHOD OF COMMUNICATING THE TRUE NATURE OF THE ABSOLUTE INDIRECTLY THROUGH ATTRIBUTING TO IT THE FALSE NOTIONS OF UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR

Such, then, was the method of communicating the true nature of the Absolute indirectly by setting up a hypothetical dis- tinction between cause and effect. It included the device of explaining the nature of the effect, accompanied by the denial of the existence of cause or effect. And all this was for the sake of establishing the true nature.of reality. This we have explained. Now we go on to consider the method of communi- cating the true nature of the Absolute through the device of attributing to it the false notions of universal and particu- lar. On this subject we have the Vedic text: 'One cannot hear the individual sounds when a tattoo is beaten on a drum. One can only hear the sound of the drum, or of the beating of the drum' (Brhad. II. iv. 7). This is the meaning. One can only hear the sounds that come forth from a drum that is being beaten as 'the sounds of the drum' - that is, one can only hear them as the universal 'sound' in particularized form, particularized here by the blows cn the drum. The particular sounds cannot be perceived (reading na ... grahitum sakyante) separate from the universal 'sound', as they do not exist in- dependently of it. This principle must be applied in evalu- ating particulars everywhere. And from this we conclude that no particulars exist independently of the universals to which they belong. The text goes on to give further examples of the way in which we have to understand the nature of univer- sals and particulars in the case of sound, saying 'as when a conch is blown ... ' (Brhad. II.iv.8) and 'As when a lute is played ... ' (Brhad. II. iv.9). Thus none of the particular sounds of any class of sound exist except as particulars of

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that class. And the various classes of sound do not exist apart from the great universal 'sound' itself. Aud, in the same way, the particulars and classes of touch, colour, taste, and odour do not exist apart from the great universals to which they respectively belong. And we see by analogy that none of the particulars and classes found in the world during its period cf manifestation exist independently of the (great- est and all-inclusive) universal called Being. But how should we understand this term 'universal' (if it is to mean 'Being' in the profoundest sense)? It cannot be the universal called'Being' as conceived by the Logicians, which (is merely the objective universal that) accompanies all particular objects. For that objective universal is in- variably accompanied by (and deperdent on) the Witness- consciousness which is its own true Self. We know from our own direct experience that the universal called 'Being' in this sense has no existence apart from that Consciousness which is its invariable support. But if we argue that the Self as Conscicusness lies out- side the Logicians' objective universal called 'Being', will this not imply that the Seli is non-being? And it is neither possible nor desirable to suppose that the Self is non- existent. .So will one not have to accept that the Self is the objective universal called 'Being' whether one wants to or not? No. For in such cases as dreamless sleep and world- dissolution at the end of the wcrld-period the Self remains, but the objective universal called 'Being' does not accompany it. The Logicians, indeed, do not admit the existence of substances and other particulars (in the period of world- dissolution) before the beginning of a new world-period, as it would contradict their doctrine of the non-existence of the effect before its production. And there cannot be a uni- versal without particulars. Therefore, we conclude that that which everywhere accompanies all universals and particulars in the period of world-manifestation is the manifestation of the Self alone, of the nature of Being. And that is the Self as Consciousness, which is the Self in its true form. No other universal called 'Being' (such as the universal of objective Being imagined by the Logicians) exists. Thus when the texts speak of the existence of universals and particulars, using the examples of the drum and the rest, they do not intend to inculcate the idea that the Self is a supreme objective universal. Their purpose, rather, is to direct the mind towards the Self as Consciousness, which is itself neither a universal nor a particular, by teaching that neither universals nor particulars exist independently of Consciousness. Hence it is clear that the reference to uni- versals and particulars is only a phase of the method of teaching by false attribution followed by denial.

(1) The purpose of producing a number of different examples

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here is to show that universals are many. There are many dif- ferent kinds of universal, some conscious, some non-conscious. The problem is to show how they all form a hierarchy falling within one (cpecial kind of) superior universal, massed Con- sciousness. (Brhad.Bh.II.iv.9)

(2) It is only through the perception of the universal 'Sound' itself that the particulars belonging to that universal can be perceived. The latter cannot be perccived independently, for they have no existence as independent particulars. And in the same way no particular reality is perceived in waking or dream independently of Consciousness (prajñana). There- fore it is correct to say that particulars have no existence as anything other than (massed) Consciousness. (Brhad.Bh. II.iv.7)

(3) But is it not a fact that, even on the thesis of the Vaisesikas, everything is correlated with Being, for the word and notion of Being accompanies all categories such as sub- stance and attribute, as when we speak of an 'existent sub- stance', an 'existent attribute' or an 'existent act'? No. This might conceivably be true in regard to the present. But in regard to the past the Vaisesikas do not admit that any effect was existent before its production; for they explic- itly maintain the opposite view, namely that the effect was non-existent before production. And they are not reconciled to the (upanishadic) doctrine that Being, one only without a second, existed before the production of the universe. Thus this supreme cause called Being of which the Chandogya Upani- shad speaks is different from the universal called 'Being' as conceived by thc Vaisesikas. And this is clear from the examples (cited by the Chandogya Upanichad to illustrate its doctrine of Being), such as that of clay (where the pot pre- exists before production). (Chand.Bh.VI.ii.1)

38 THE METHOD OF COMMUNICATING THE TRUE NATURE OF THE ABSOLUTE INDIRECTLY THROUGH RECOURSE TO THE NOTIONS OF SEER AND SEEN

Considered from the natural standpoint of common experience, this universe seems to consist of the three categories of seer, seeing and seen, as expressed in the formula 'Through this I see that'. From this standpoint, the seer is the one who experiences objects by permeating them with the activity of his instruments of cognition. Seeing means the activity of the various organs of knowledge, such as the powers of sight and hearing and others. The seen is the object in the form of sound, touch, colour and so forth. The word 'seeing! is also used to mean the result of the activity of the organ

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of cogrition, that which enables us to say 'He sees, he hears, he thinks, he knows'. In this context, discrimination of the seer from the seer means determining the true nature cf the seer by distinguishing it totally from the seen. The seer (subject) is known through the I-notion, the seen (object) through the this-notion. The distinction between subject and object depends on the distinction betweer the notions 'I' and 'this'. What is known solely as 'I' cannot in any way be known as 'this'. It is the seer in the true sense. All other seers are cither 'seers' in a secondary sense, or else illusory. When we say in worldly parlance 'The king sees through the eye of his spy', we are speaking of seership in a secondary sense. Since everycno knows that the king and his spy are different, the 'scership' of the spy is attributed to the king in e secondary or figurative sense. But, when we think and speak of the body and its crgans as if they were seers, this is not figurative usage; it is illu- sion. For we regularly think and say 'Isee' in regard to the activities of the organ of sight and the rest, which are not seers, without any sense of figurative usage. And in this connection we have a Vedic text which points out that the distinction between the seer and the seen belongs to the realm of duality based on Ignorance: 'For where there is an appearance of duality, there (a subject who is) one sees (an object which is) another, (a subject who is) one smells (an object which is) another, (a subject who is) one tastes (an object which is) another, (a speaker who is) one addresses (a person who is) another, (a hearer who is) one hears (a person who is) another, (a thinker who is) one thinks of something which is) another, (a subject who is) one touches (an object which is) another, (a subject who is) ose knows (an object which is) another' (Brhad. IV.v.15). This worldly vision, based on Ignorance, consists in modi- fications of the mind, and is hence traneient. The modifica- tions of the mand which arise are permeated by Consciousness and reflect Consciousness, and the people of the world think that it is these modifications alone which deserve the name of knowledge. But there is another vision which alone de- serves to be called vision from the standpoint of the highest truth, which is eternal and constant Consciousness, the very nature of the Self. There seer and seen are one, like the sun and its light. The supreme Self is called 'the Seer' on account of this vision, but this is only affirmed relative to objects, such as the modifications of the mind, because it illumines them. It is in fact only a seer, and is never seen, and hence it is 'the Seer' from the standpoint of the highest truth. On this we have the Vedic text, 'You cannot see the seer of seeing, you cannot hear the hearer of hear- ing, you cannot think the thinker of thinking, you cannot know the knower of knowing. He is your Self, present within all' (Brhad.III.iv.2).

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This Seer becomes a seer in the worldly sense only through having the modifications of the mind attributed to it falsely. We have already pointed out (M.V.25,5-10) that the Self be- comes an individual knowing subject through a (misplaced) sense of 'I' and 'mine' held with regard to the body, sense- organs, mind and so ferth. And the Self only becomes subject to the popular notions 'He sees' and 'He thinks' through the operations of this trensient vision, falsely projected through Ignorance as if it really belonged to the Self. For it is only when conceived as asscciated with this worldly vision that He who is the support of the cosmic vital eaergy is spo- ken of as 'the seer, the one who touches, the one who smells, the taster, the thinker, the knower, the one who acts, the individual soul wielding the instruments of knowledge. From the standpoint of the final truth the Veda maintains that there is no seer apart from the supreme Self, possessed of constant and eterral vision, the Witness of all, and pro- claims 'There is no break in the seeing of the seer' (Brhad. IV.iii.23) and 'There is no other seer, no other hearer, no other thinker, no other knower but He' (Brhad. III.vii. 23). But if one examines this worldly vision one sees that it is characterized by the coming and going of dreamless sleep, waking and dream, and is inherently unstable. Then the Veda shows that the Self is void of the triad of seer, seeing and seen, and beyond all empirical experience and conception. And it communicates it by denying what had been falsely at- tributed to it previously, saying 'But where all has become his own Self, what can he see and with what? What can he smell and with what? What can he taste and with what? Whom can he address and with what? Whom can he hear and with what? What can he know and with what? With what can he know that whereby he knows all this? This Self is "neither this nor that": (Brhad. IV. v.15).

(1) 'Where' (in the upanishadic text saying 'For where there is an appearance of duality') means 'In that particularized form of the Self, arising from the apparent limitations im- posed by the complex of the soul and its bodies and organs, set up by Ignorance and only admitted by the text on a hypo- thetical basis'. The text goes on 'For where there is an appearance of duality ... ' It means that there is an appear- ance of duality, an appearance of something different, some object other than the Self, in the Absolute, although the latter, from the standpoint of the highest truth, is without duality .... 'Where' in the text is followed by 'there'. 'There', be- cause there is an appearance of duality, and only because of this appearance, one who is different from the supreme Self, who is only admitted to exist hypothetically, a self that is not the Self in the true sense, a self that is different from 'the true Self only in the sense that the reflection of the

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moon in water is different from the moon, that different self is the one who smells. As for the one who smells, he smells an objcct of smell, which is different from him, with an act of smell, which is different again. The words 'one' and 'an- other', in the upanishadic text quoted above, '(A subject who is) one smells (an object which is) another', refer (not . simply to nominative and accusative but) to all case rela- tions in general. The word 'smells' refers to both act and result, as in the case of 'he cuts' (which refers both to the act or raising and lowering the knife and to the resulting severance, so that 'smells' refers both to the physiological process and to the resultant awareness). (Brhad. Bh. II.iv.14)

(2) You cannot see the seer of seeing, you cannot hear the hearer of hearing, you cannot think the thinker of thinking, you cannot know the knower of knowing. He is your Selr, present within all. (Brhad.III.iv.2)

Śankara's Commentary: Seeing is of two kinds, that which passes for such in the world, and that which is really such. That which passes for such in the world is a function of the inner organ (mind) associated with the sense-organ of sight. It is an act, and hence it begins and ends. But the seeing of the Self is (not an act but) the very nature of the Seer, as heat and light are the very nature of fire, and hence it has no beginning or end. Because it appears to be fused with the seeing that is an act, and which is only its condi- tioning adjunct, the Self is spoken of as 'the seer', and is assumed to include the distinction between 'the seer' and 'his seeing'. As for that worldly form of seeing, tinted with colours through the sense of sight, it is (not in itself eternal but) something that comes intc being apparently fused with the constant and eternal vision of the Self, and carrying a re- flection of the latter. It comes into being and passes away, permeated by that constant and eternal vision. That is why, although the vision of the Self is always seeing, one speaks of it figuratively and says either 'It is seeing' or 'It is not seeing', though in fact the seer of seeing undergoes no change. And the text will say later, 'It seems to think, it seems to move' (Brhad.IV.iii.7) and 'There is no break in the seeing of the Seer' (Brhad.IV.iii.23). (Brhad.Bh.III. iv.2)

(3) There is no break in the seeing of the Seer (Brhad.IV. iii.23). There is no break in the smelling of the one who smells (Brhad.IV.iii.24). There is no break in the knowing of the knower. (Brhad.IV.iii.30)

Śankara's Commentary: In waking and dream, the Self as the principle of pure light becomes known as enjoying

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experience in various forms such as 'seeing' (hearing, smell- ing) and so forth, through various apparent conditioning ad- juncts, such as the eye as organ of sight. In dreamless sleep the activity or the various conditioning adjuncts breaks off, and they are no longer illumined by Consciousness, and Con- .sciousness is no longer apprehended as ir differentiated by them. And yet Consciousness is spoken of as present in dream- less sleep in accordance with experience, just as it is present when differentiated ly the apparent conditioning ad- juncts (in waking and dream). (Brhad.Bh.IV.iii.30)

(4) He who has the feeling 'Let me smell this' is the Self. The nose is for smelling. He who has the feeling 'Let me say this' is the Self. The voice is for speaking. He who has the feeling 'Let me hear this' is the Self. The ear is for hearing. He who has the feeling 'Let me think this' is the Self. The mind is his divine eye. (Chand. VIII.xii.4-5)

Sankara's Commentary: As the phrase 'He who has the feel- ing ... is the Seif' is used in each case, we conclude that the nature of the Self is Consciousness. It is as if one were to say What shines in front is the sun, what shines to the right, what shines behind, what shines to the left, what shines above

light. is the sun', which would mean that the nature of the sun was

(5) The Self effects knowledge by its mere presence (lit. existence), not by any active effort. It is the same with the Self as with the sun, which also illumines by its mere pres- ence, and without any active effort. (Chand.Bh.VIII.xii.5)

(6) When He breathes, He is incomplete and is called Vital Energy. When He speaks, He is called Speech (vac). When He sees, He is called the Eye, when He hears, the Ear. When He thinks, He is called the Mind (manas). These are but the names of His activities. He who meditates on these aspects of Him singly, does not come to know Him. For, as conceived under one or other of these aspects, He is incomplete. One should medi- tate on Him merely as 'the Self'. (Brhad.I.iv.7,M.V.25,1)

Śankara's Commentary: The vital energy and the rest, as the text says, are but names denoting the apparent activities of the Self. They are only names deriving from and denoting the activities of the Self; they are not names referring to the Self in its true nature as pure Consciousness. And so they do not refer to the Self in its entirety. As long as a person thinks 'I see, I hear, I touch', and imagines that his Self is characterized by the human activities that belong to the illusory realm of Nature, he does not rightly know the Self in its entirety. If a person should ask, 'How should one view the Self if

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one is to know it rightly?' the text replies, 'One should meditate on Him merely as the Self'. The Self (atman) which possesses the vital energy and other particular aspects of himself that we have just mentioned, also pervades them. Be- cause the Self (atman) pervades them (apnoti), they are said (because the word atman is etymologically cognate with apnoti) to be the Self. Because the Self includes all these particu- lars, it is the whole of which they are illusory aspects.

Here, the teaching is as follows. 'Being the seer' and other such states (of the Self in worldly experience) are based on apparent conditioring adjuncts and do not represent the Self in its entirety. They are finite versions of the Self. The Self in its entirety is what permeates 'being the seer' and all other particular states sei up by conditioning adjuncts like the organ of sight. As illumining all these, the Self has its true nature as Consciousness. Here it is the knower by nature, the seer in the irue sense of the word.

39 COMMUNICATING THE ABSOLUTE THROUGH DISCRIMINATING IT FROM THE FIVE SHEATHS

We now take up for consideration the method of discriminating the five sheaths. A passage in the Taittiriya Upanishad be- gins 'The Absolute is Reality, Knowledge, the Infinite' and goes on to say 'He who knows it hidden in the subtlest ether in the cave of the intellect obtains all joys at once'. This is to show that it has to be known in the cave of the intel- lect. The text then goes on to explain the method of that knowledge by teaching the projection of the five elements in order, beginning with the emergence of the ether immediately from the Self or Absolute, and how the human body is composed of the essence of food derived from the elements, a fact which it refers to at the same place in the phrase 'Man arises from food'. Accepting provisionally that ordinary people wrongly identify themselves with the gross body compcsed of food, the text goes on to speak of the false sense of identity with the vital energy, and says, 'There is another self within that, made up of the vital energy'. And after that it says, 'There is another self within that, made up of mind', 'There is an- other self within that, made up of knowledge', 'There is an- other self within that, made up of bliss'. It teaches that each new self successively is the inner self of the previous one. And, at the last, it mentions the Absolute (brahman) as the 'tail' or 'prop' of the self made up of bliss. From this we conclude that from the standpoint of the final truth it is verily the Absolute that is considered to be the inmost Self of all. Man in his true form as the one Spirit (purusa) can- not have five different selves. 'Whoso knows this goes beyond this self made up of food when he leaves the body at death'

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(Taitt.II.8). And in the end he will have to go beyond the self made up cf the vital energy, beyond the self made up of mind, beyond the self made up of knowledge and beyond the self made up of bliss in the same way. We conclude this from the fact that the five selves (or 'sheaths') ending with the bliss self are spoken of at the end of the passage as having to be transcended. So here again we see that we have another method for strengthening one's sensc of identity with the Absolute, the final reality. One does so through falsely identifying oueself successively with one 'self' or 'sheath' (kosa) after another, and ther negating the previous one successively at each stage (including negation of the bliss self through iden- tificatior with the Absolute at the end).

(1) The supreme Self is the very life of the 'sheaths' de- scribed in the Taittiriya Upanishad, beginning with the sheath formed of food. We have already explained (G.K.III.3,M.V.46,1) how this Self resembles the ether of space. (G.K.III.11)

(2) The text goes on, 'There is another self within this self made up of food'. The idea is to reveal the Absolute finally as the inmcst Seif standing within the series of the five selves, beginning with the food-self and ending with the bliss- self, by rejecting these five illusory 'sheaths' set up by Ignorance, as one reveals the inner grain of kodrava rice by removing successively its various husks. (Taitt.Bh.II.2)

(3) Thus it is not just as circumscribed by the self formed of food (the physical body) that living beings feel themselves to have a self. All living creatures also feel themselves to have a self on account of the 'self of vital energy', which exists within the body of food, and pervades it throughout. And in the same way all living beings feel themselves to have a self through the self made up of mind, through the self made up of knowledge and through the self made up of bliss, each of which is more subtle than its predecessor in the series and pervades it, and each of which is formed from the material elements such as the ether, and is set up by metaphysical Ig- norance. Over and above these they also have a true Self, which is by its very nature the cause of the ether and the other physi- cal elements. It is eternal, not subject to modification, all-pervading, defined as 'Reality, Knowledge, the Infinite', beyond the five sheaths, the Self of all. For this is the Self of all in the true sense. This last idea is included by im- plication. (Taitt.Bh.II.3, cp. M.V.171;199)

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40 COMMUNICATING THE TRUE NATURE OF THE SELF THROUGH A DISCRIMINATION OF THE THREE (APPARENT) STATES OF WAKING, DREAM AND DREAMLESS SLEEP

Now we begin the study of the method of communicating the true nature of the Absclute by discriminating the three states. We are familiar with three states of the soul, those of waking, dream and drcamless sleep. Waking and dream are the states of awareness, dreamless sleep the state of non-awareness. It is impossible to imagire any other staie apart from awareness and non-awareness. So when these three states have been consid- ered, we have considered all scates and the nature of the ob- jects belonging to them. These states can only exist supported in the universal Self as Consciousness. They exclude one another mutually, but Con- sciousness always accompanies them, without being affected by their attributes. Waking and dream, and the worlds of waking and dream, are never perceived in the absence of the Self as Consciousness. From this it follows that the states are un- real, and that the Self is real and of sovereign omnipotence. From the fact that in dreamiess sleep we attain to Being or the Self, we conclude that in its true nature the Self is pure Being, void of all plurality.

(1) These three states alone constitute the realm of the know- able. For anything knowable outside them is inconceivable. (G.K.Bh.IV.88)

(2) The sage, having known the Self, the great, the all- pervading, that through which one experiences both dream and waking, no longer experiences grief. (Katha II.i.4)

(3) Having enjoyed himself in this dream-state, and roamed about and seen auspicious and inauspicious sights, this Spirit goes back by the route he came and returns to the waking state. He is not accompanied in waking by what he saw in dream. For this Spirit is relationless ... Then, verily, this Spirit, having enjoyed himself in the waking state, and roamed about and seen auspicious and inaus- picious sights, goes back by the route he came and returns to the dream state. (Brhad.IV.iii.16-7)

(4) No objects are seen in waking and dream in the absence of consciousness. Therefore it is logical to say that without consciousness such objects would not exist. (Brhad.Bh.II.iv.7)

(5) When this Spirit sleeps (svapiti), then, my dear one, he is merged (sampanna) in pure Being, he has become one with his own Self (svam apita). That is why they say of him 'he sleeps' (svapiti), for he has become one with his true Self

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(svam ... apīta). (Chand.VI.viii.1)

(6) But states such as the internal state of consciousness (called dream) are actually perceived in the Self. How are we to know that they are unreal like the illusory snake misper- ceived in a rope on the mere (unsupported) authority of a ne- gation? To this question we reply as follows. Consciousness persists throughout all the states, ever unchanged, whereas the states exclude one another mutually like the imagined dis- tinctions such as snake, stream of water, stick and the rest misperceived in the rope. Consciousness, on the other hand, is real, as it persists everywhere without exception. (Mānd. Bh.7)

41 HOW THE TRUE NATURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS BEING OR THE ABSOLUTE

In the waking state there is self-identification with body and organs and hence the appearance of being an individual knowing subject, having the recognized means of knowledge. In dream- less sleep, however, this sclf-identification breaks off, and there is the appearance of a lapse of one's condition as indi- vidual knowing subject. Hence the Veda describes the state of dreamless sleep as the attainment of Being, and of entering one's own true nature. However, nothing can ever truly depart from its own true nature. So we conclude that the state of being an individual knowing subject in the waking state was a mere illuscry appearance. This will become clear from a consideration of the state of being an individual knowing subject in dream. Nobody thinks that there is then any connection with e real body and real organs. And yet it is well known that the Self appears in that state to be an individual knowing subject - it appears to have the power to hear, think and know. And from this we can see that, in the waking state too, being an individual knowing subject is only a false appearance caused by conditioning ad- juncts. Both waking and dream appear as waking when they are taking place, so that it is impossible to find any special sign whereby we could recognize definitively 'This is waking'. This being so, and because the Veda teaches that in dream- less sleep the soul attains its true state, its sole natural state, we can see through comparison that the apparent indi- vidual subjecthood in waking and dream, imagined through Ig- norance, is only the apparent assumption (by the Self) of a form that is not its true nature.

(1) The Spirit (purusa) is the seer, the toucher, the hearer, the smeller, the taster, the thinker, the knower, the active one, the cognizer in all empirical knowledge. His support is the supreme, immutable Self. (Praśna IV.9)

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Sankura's Commentary: He is called the Spirit (purusa) inasmuch as he fills (pūrana) the apparent conditioning ad- junct (upadhi) consisting of the complex of the bodies and or- gans, which has already been mentioned. And just as the re- flection of the sun in water or cther medium returns back into the sun (on the destruction of the reflecting medium), so does the Spirit (after appearing as the seer and toucher and so forth) rest finally in the supreme Self, the Immutable, that which remains over as the ultimate support of the universe.

(2) In the same way the soul, in the states of waking and dream, becomes intcrpenetrated with duality set up by Igno- rance, and becomes active and suffers pain. And then after- wards, to get rid of its weariness, it enters into its own Self (in dreamless sleep), into the Absolute, the transcen- dent. It takes leave of the complex of bodies and organs, and becomes non-active, and feels happy in the state of highest serenity. (B.S.Bh.II.iii.40)

(3) Of course, it is also true that the individual soul is never anything but united with the Absolute, as it can never lose its own nature. But in waking and dream it appears to acquire a foreign nature on account of its contact with appar- ent conditioning adjuncts, and it is relative to this appear- ance that it is said to 'attain' its true nature in dreamless sleep, because the apparent foreign nature is then lost. (B.S. Bh.III.ii.7, cp. M.V.226,10;246,13)

(4) In dream there are no proper organs either for knowledge or action. For the sense-organs are withdrawn, and there are no eyes or cther organs with which to perceive chariots. And how could the chariots of dream really be created in the twin- kling of an eye as they appear to be? be timber for it? (B.S.Bh.TII.ii.3) And where would there

(5) The Veda speaks of dream activities using the phrase 'as if'. 'Either he appeared as if enjoying himself in the com- pany of women, or else as if laughing, or else as if seeing terrible sights' (Brhad. IV.iii.13). Even people in the world speak of dreams in this way, 'It seemed as if I had climbed a mountain peak' or 'It seemed as if I was beholding a forest range'. (B.S.Bh.II.iii.40)

(6) The wise say that dream and waking are one. For distinc- tions of subject and object are the same in each, as has been shown (at G.K.II.4) in previous reasoning. (G.K.II.5)

(7) The appearance of particular cognition on the part of an individual knowing subject arises through the association of the Self with such apparent conditioning adjuncts as location in a particular intellect. When such cognition ceases (in

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dreamless sleep), we speak of the individual as being in con- tact with the supreme Self. But this is a figurative way of speaking, which holds true relative to the apparent condition- ing adjunct, but which does not imply that any real limitation

246,7) (or separation) ever occurred. (B.S.Bh. III.ii.34, cp. M.V.

(8) And it is only this kind of relation (i.e. of identity with one's own Self) that is possible in dreamless sleep, and not another. For the Veda speaks of one's being connected with one's own true nature in the words 'He has become one with his true Self' (Chand. VI.viii.1). And one cannot depart from one's own true nature. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.35)

42 HOW THE SELF IS OF THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Well, let that be so. And we must also note that the con- sciousness of the individual kno:ing subject certainly lapses, as, for instance, in dreamless sleep. Consciousness in waking is external. Consciousness in dream is internal. These two states are mutually exclusive, as are the two different worids that belong to them and the two different ways in which the objects of those worlds are known. And the individual knowing subject lapses completely in dreamless sleep. It is common knowledge that everyone in the world remembers his dreamless- sleep experience as 'I knew nothing'. And there is a Vedic text on the point which runs: 'He (Indra) said, "A person (in dreamless sleep) does not then know himself as 'I am such and such', nor does he know these objects of the world. Verily, he goes to destruction"' (Chand. VIII.xi.2). Indeed, it is the very essence of dreamless sleep that a person should not then know anything. For if he knew anything, then his mode of vision would be like that of dream and waking, and he would not be in any special state, different from them. And it would follow that when we examined the state of dream- less sleep we woul not find any awareness of the true nature of the Self, and the knower in his true form would verily lapse. Or else we should have to conclude that reality was a void, on the ground that we then perceived nothing. But this is not so. For it is impossible to deny the fact of experience. The memory 'In sleep I knew nothing' could only occur to one who had had the experience. And no one can deny that the true form of the Self as knower is, precisely, experience. So there is no place here for the doctrine of the Void. It is true that we have the Vedic text: He said, 'A person (in dreamless sleep) does not then know himself as "I am such and such"'. If this only means that in dreamless sleep there is no particularized cognition, let it be so, it does our

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argument nc harm. We ourselves affirm that there is no parti- cularized cognition in dreamless sleep, in the form of seeing or hearing and so on. And we hold that dreamless sleep is, precisely, the cessation of all that. But the cause of. the absence of particularized cognition is not separation from the Self as the knower in his true form. The cause is the absence in that state of any knowable object. It is to convey this that the Veda says, 'When he does not know anything then (in dreamless sleep), he is knowing when he does not then know anything. There is no break in the knowing of the knower, for it is indestructible. But there is not then (in dreamless sleep) any other thing over against him which he could know' (Brhad. IV.iii.30). Therefore consciousness is the very nature of the Self, as light is the nature of the sun. But its lack of particularized cognition in dreamless sleep is due to the fact that im that state everything is identical with Con- sciousness. Thus Consciousness is no more absent in dreamless sleep than it is in the other two states (of waking and dream). And hence the Veda says. 'When they have attained Being (in dreamless sleep), they have no (particularized) knowledge' (Chand. VI.ix.2) and 'Embraced by the Self as Consciousness, he has no knowledge of anything, within or without' (Brhad. IV.iii.21).

(1) If it be objected that consciousness lapses in dreamless sleep, we reply that it does not. For dreamless sleep is actually experienced. (Mand.Bh.7)

(2) It is true that the text says 'He goes there (in dream- less sleep) to destruction'. But the reference is to the de- struction of all particularized cognition, not to the destruc- tion of the knower. (B.S.Bh.I.iii.19)

(3) The point is that the appearance of not being conscious that characterizes the state of dreamless sleep arises from the absence of any objects to be conscious of, not from the absence of consciousness. It is like the case of light per- vading the ether between solid objects. Here the light is im- perceptible, not because it is not present, but because there is nothing for it to illumine. (B.S.Bh.II.iii.18)

(4) Dreamless sleep is the state of cessation of particular- ized cognition. It admits of no distinctions. There one has attained Being. And because Being is one (and without inter- nal distinctions) the text was only right to say 'There he has no particularized cognition'. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.7)

(5) And this same soul, embraced by its own Self in the form of consciousness in its true natural state as transcendent light, becomes a perfect unity, the Self of all, with no in- ternal differentiation, and knows no other object outside

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itself and no distinction within itself, such as 'Here I am, happy or unhappy'. In this connection you asked, 'Why does he know nothing in this state of dreamless sleep if his natural state is the light of consciousness?' I have now stated the reason, which is that he is a perfect unity, like that of a man and his wife in embrace. (Brhad.Bh.IV.iii.21)

43 THE SELF IS EVER VOID OF THE STATES

We have spoken of attaining unity with the Self as 'the con- scious one' (prajma) in dreamless sleep. (M.V.23) And it has been explained how this is a person's crue mature. It is not that in dreamless sleep a person has to reach auy new condition that did not belong to him before. Being 'the tonscious one' (prajñatva) means, indeed, being possessed of 'prajña', defined as constant and eternal Conscioushess. From this we conclude that it permeates dream and waking also. And so it follows that (in one's true nature) one is the supreme Lord (parame- svara) in dream and waking no less than in dreamless sleep. In dream and waking, however, there is an appearance of be- ing an individual experiencing subject, based on self- identification with an individual's complex of bodies and or- gans. The fact that one is revealed as the supreme Lord when this self-identification is given up is stated elsewhere in various passages of the Veda, such as: 'The individual soul stands on the same tree (as the Lord), bewildered, grieving and helplessly drowned in sorrows. But when he sees that other one, the adored Lord, he knows "His glory is mine", and all his grief departs' (Mund. III.i.2). In this way one may reject the sense of being an individual knowing subject that is falsely superimposed on the Self in the three states, and then one realizes that one was always the supreme Lord. And from this we conclude that the sole purpose of the method of teaching the three states was to bring out how, in one's true nature, one is void of all states. For the further teaching that one is 'the Fourth' is only intelligible on this basis.

(1) The one in dreamless sleep is called 'the conscious one' (prajña) in relation to his earlier condition (in dream and waking). Or else he is called 'the conscious one' to show that he has a peculiar nature as bare (undifferentiated) con- sciousness. That is, in the other two states (of dream and waking) there is also particularized cognition in addition. (Mand.Bh. 5)

'Particularized cognition' refers to that additional form of consciousness based on the sense of being an individual know ing subject. The word 'also' shows that even when there is particularized cognition there is also Consciousness in its true nature in addition.

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(2) 'The conscious one' (prajna) is the supreme Lord. For He is ever associated with Consciousness (prajña) in the sense of 'omniscience'. (B.S.Bh.I.iii.42)

(3) Ignorance, which assumes the form of duality, is a wrong idea like the wrong idea of a man that we may have when we mis- perceived a post. Until one puts an end to Ignorance through realizing the true nature of one's own Self as the constant and eternal Witness, raised above all change, in the conviction 'I am the Absolute', the individual soul will remain an indi- vidual soul. But it is possible to emerge from the sense of identity with the complex of body, sense-organs, mind and in- tellect. This occurs when one is enlighiened through Vedic teaching which says: 'You are not that complex of body, sense- organs, mind and intellect. You are not the one subject to transmigration. What then is the truth? The truth is that the sole reality is the Self, of the nature of pure Conscious- ness. That thou art'. When this cnlightenment occurs, one then becomes awcke to the true nature of one's own Self as the comstant and eternal Witness, raised above all change. One rises above the sense of identity with this body and its or- gans. Verily, one who succeeds in this realizes his own true Seli as the constant and eternal Witness, raised above all change. (B.S.Bh.I.iii.19)

(4) Two birds, together, companions, occupy the same tree (the body). One eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on. (Muņd.III.i.1)

Sankara's Commentary: Of these two occupying the tree, one is the Knower of the Field (M.V.p.35) as associated with the apparent conditioning adjunct of the subtle body. Failing to discriminate the true Self from the subtle body, he resorts to the tree and eats the berries in the form of experience of the pleasures and pains arising as the 'fruit' of his previous deeds. It is called 'sweet' (not in the sense of being in- variably pleasurable but) in the sense of being rich with a variety of gradations of feeling. The other does not eat. He who does not eat is the Lord, ever pure, conscious and liber- ated by nature, omniscient, having all creatures for his ap- parent conditioning adjunct. For he is the prompter both of the experiencer and the experienced, simply by existing as the eternal Witness. He is the other who looks on, not eating. He only observes.

(5) 'When', says the Upanishad. That is, when he sees through meditation that other one, that one who is different in nature and who does not have the tree for his adjunct, who is the Lord of the whole world, not subject to transmigration, beyond hunger, thirst, grief, delusion, decrepitude and death. Then he (identifies himself with that other one and) acquires the

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conviction 'I am the Self of ali. I am the same to all. I abide in all beings. I am not that other illusory self, lim- ited by adjuncts springing from Tgnorance'. When he has the feeling in regard to the glory and grandeur of the whole world 'All this belongs to Me, the supreme Lord - when he is finally ablc to see this, then he passes beyond sorrow'. (Mund. Bh.III.i.2)

(6) The first quarter of the Self is Vaisvanara. His sphere is the realm of waking experience. His consciousness is of ihe external realm. He has seven organs and nineteen mouths. He experiences the gross perceptible objects of the waking world. (Mand.3)

(According to Śri Sankara, the seven organs of Vaisvanara are those mentioned at Chand. Up. V. xviii. 2, where the Self is pre- sented for meditation as. Vaisvanara, a giant human figure, having head, eye, breath, body, bladder and two feet repre- sented by parts of the cosmos, such as the world of heaven, the sun, the wind, the earth and so on. The 'ninetcen mouths' refer not to the cosmos but to the organs of the individual experiencer - the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, the five forms of the vital energy and the four forms of the mind (manas, buddhi, ahamkara, citta = doubt, decision, ego-feeling and imagination). Vaisvanara is thus the Self as witnessing Conscicusness, but also Consciousness in the illusory form of all experiencers and all objects of experience in the waking state. As the objects of such experi- ence le is called Virat. T.N. )

Śankara's Commentary: It is accepted that the final mes- sage of all the Upanishads is the identity of all as the Self. So it was right for the text to speak of the Self with the adjuncts of the gross perceptible body (pinda) on the plane of individual existence (adhyatmika) as having seven organs, be- ginning with the world of heaven. For the intention was to indicate the identity of the Self having the adjunct 'Pinda' (the individual body in the waking state) with the Self having the adjunct 'Virat', the latter constituting the whole world of gross objects perceived in the waking state, existing on the plane of the divine (adhidaivika) cosmic forces .... Teaching the identity of the Self that has Pinda for ad- junct with the Self that has Virat for adjunct was also meant to indicate the identity of the Self having the individual dreamer (taijasa) for adjunct with the Self having Hiranya- garbha for adjunct, (Hiranyagarbha being the creator-god, first-born at the beginning of a world-period, the cosmic in- tellect in which lie the subtle impressions (vāsana) from which the gross world of Virat will emerge, cp. Brhad. Bh. V.v.1), and who also (cp.Prasna Bh.V.5) constitutes the total- ity of subtle bodies, likewise composed of impressions, of all

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creatures). There was also the intention to indicate the iden- tily of the Self of the individual in dreamless sleep with the Self having the adjunct called the Avyakta (the Unmanifest Principle, namely the undifferentiated seed-state or 'causal' state of name and form before manifestation at the beginning of a world-period, not determinable as either identical with or different from the Self, from which first Hiranyagarbha and then Virat will spring, cp.Brhad. Bh. V.v.1).

Here it is taughi that the Self apparently bound down in wak- ing experience must arise from self-identification with the individual gross body, take leave of the notion that he is an individual knowing subject, and realrze his nature as Vaisva nara. Likewise it is taughi that Hiranyugarbha is the true nature of Taijasa, the individual enjoying dream experience.

(7) Visva, the Self in subjection to the illusion of waking experience, is faced by external objects. In his case, therc- fore, Consciousness is experienced in the gross form of exter- nal objects. Here, however, in the case of laijasa, the Self in subjection to the illusion of dream-experience, Conscious- ness is experienced merely in the form of subtle impressions. That is why thcre is reference to 'rarified experience'. (Mānd. Bh. 4)

Here the revered Commentator speaks of a gross form of Con- sciousness and a subtle form of Consciousness that are objects of experience for the Self. From this we infer that he is denying that the Self is a knowing subject in the commonly accepted sense, and affirming that the Self is the Lord, the Witness illumining the knowing subject as ordinarily con- ceived.

(8) He is the Lord of all, He is omniscient, He is the Inner Ruler, He is the womb of all, the source of all beings and that into which they will finally dissolve back. (Mand.6)

(9) At the time of the dissolution of the vital energy at death, the vital energy of those who formerly identified them- selves with limitations persists in unmanifest form. And, just in the same way, when dreamless sleep, as a state of non- particularity, comes over one who (in the waking state) has been identifying himself with the vital energy, the vital energy persists in unmanifest form and as seed for the fructi- fication of future experience. The Witness, also, is the same in both cases, the Witness of the Unmanifest. And this Wit- ness is identical with the (apparently multiple) 'Witnesses' of those who identify themselves with the finite (in the waking and dream states). So that the author of the Kārikas was right to classify consciousness in dreamless sleep as 'having become one' and as 'a single mass !. (G.K.Bh.I.2)

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Here Prajna (the conscious one) and Prana (the cosmic vital energy) are treated as synonyms. Each is regarded as a seed that gives birth to the individual soul. And it is taught that when Prajna is conditioned by the adjunct of dreamless sleep it is non-differeni from Consciousness supporting the world of name and form in its unmanifest state on the cosmic plare (avyakrta). Prajna is also the seed of the individual soul in the sense of being (as Consciousness) the substratum of the illusory projection of the appearance of an individual subject, having the experience of waking and dream.

44 HOW THE SELF'S APPEAKANCE OF HAVING THREE FORMS IS ILLUSORY

The revered Commentator remarked, following universal experi- ence, 'The one in droamless sleep is one with the cosmic Un- manifest principle, there being no distinctions in cither of them'. (Mand.Bh. 3, ad fin. ) This statement requires careful attenticn. There are Vedic texts which say that, when the world is in the stage of dissclution between wcrld-periods, name and form, in their unmanifest state, are one with the Self and can be referred to as 'the one Self'. Thus we have In the beginning this (world) was verily the Self, one only' (Ait. I.1) and others. And there are texts in the same spirit which say that in dreamless sleep, also, name and form are in unmanifest state and one with the Self. For instance, we have such texts as 'In the state of dreamless sleep, the sleeper has become all one, massed Consciousness, consisting of bliss, experiencing bliss' (Mānd.5) and 'Yājñavalkya taught him "(In dreamless sleep) the seer is one, transparent like water, without a second. This is the realm of the Abso- lute, O Emperor. This is his highest state. This is his greatest attainment. This is his supreme realm (loka). This is his highest bliss"'(Brhad. IV.iii.32). The texts also speak of all manifestations of the vital energy, of the worlds, the gods and all creatures proceeding from the Self as associated with dreamless sleep. 'As a spider climbs up- wards on the web that has proceeded from its own spittle, as small sparks fly out from a fire, even so do all the mani- festations of the vital energy, all the worlds, all the gods presiding over them and all the creatures in them proceed forth (from this Self when the individual soul awakens from sleep)' (Brhad. II.i.20). The Māndūkya Upanishad, too, speaks of 'the source of all beings and that to which they finally dissolve back' (Mand. 6). Thus the method of communicating the Absolute by teaching that the Absolute undergoes the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep and that of teaching that it is the cause of the world belong together. In both cases it is taught that the origin, maintenance and dissolution of the world

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proceed from the highest Lord, and this teaching is given to indicate that the world is non-different from Nim. The name and form found in dream and waking exclude one another mutu- ally, and each lapses when the other is in play. Both lapse by nature in dreamless sleep. Hence we conclude that they are only superimposed on the Self through Ignorance. So our final conviction must bo that the whole notion that the Self under- goes the three siates cf waking, dream and dreamless sicep is itself a mere illusion (māyā).

(1) The Veda teaches that there is a dissolution of the world (pralaya) and a re-projection in dreamless sleep and waking when it says: 'When one is in dreamless sleep and nees no dream, then he becomes one with this cosmic vital energy. Then speech, together with all names, enters back into him, as also the power of sight, together with all forms, the power of hearing, together with all sounds, and the mind together with all thoughts. Then, when he awakens, just as sparks fly out in all directions from a blazing fire, co all the vital ener. gies (subtle organs cf perception and action) spring forth from this Self to their respective stations, and from them come forth the gods, and from the gods the worlds' (Kausitaki III.3). (B.S.Bh.I.iii.30)

(2) For in the present context only those arguments that are sanctioned by the Veda may be resorted to, and that only as an auxiliary to the attainment of direct experience. For example, one may argue that since dream-experience and waking experi- ence are mutually exclusive they (are transient and so unreal and therefore) do not affect the Self; and because in dream- less sleep the world-appearance is lost and one unites with the Self, the real, it follows that one is the Self, the real, free from the world-appearance; because the world-appearance rises from the Absolute, it follows, from the law that ef- fects are non-different from their material causes, that it is nothing other than the Absolute. It is reasoning of this kind that is legitimate. (B.S.Bh.II.i.6)

(3) The upanishadic doctrine is that in dreamless sleep the individual soul unites (in pure identity) with the Absolute in its highest form, and that it is from the Absolute in its highest form that the world, beginning with the vital ener- gies (senses), springs forth (when the soul awakens). (B.S. Bh. I.iv.18, cp.M.V.246,12)

(4) There are Vedic texts which teach that the world, as ef- fect, is non-different from the Absolute, its material cause, without exception in past, present and future. For example we have, 'All this (world) is but the Self' (Brhad. II.iv.6), 'All this is but the Self alone' (Chand. VII.xxv.2), 'All this in front is verily but the Absolute, the immortal' (Mund.

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II.ii.12) and 'Verily, all this is the Absolute' (Chand. ITI. xiv.l). Here, the refutation of the charge that, if the effect were non-different from the material cause, the cause would be tainted by the defects of the effect, is as follows. The cause has no real connection with the effect or with its at- tributes, since the effect is superimposed through Ignorance. The same argument holds against the view that the effect would taint the material rause with its defects when it dissolved back into it. And in this connection there is another illustration. The magician is himself in no way affected in past, present or future by the magic display he has spread forth by his hyp- notic power (maya), as it is nothing real. And, in just the same way, the Self is unaffected by the illusory appearance of the world of transmigratory experience. Similarly, the one who sees a dream remains one and the same, and is not touched in his real nature by the dream-illusion, as it does not per- sist with him when he is awake or when he has attained iden- tity with all in dreamless sleep. Likewise, the Witness of the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep is one. It never lapses, and is untouched by the three states, which themselves come and go. This ap- pearance of the supreme Self as characterized by the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep is a mere illusion, like the appearance (through misperception) of a rope as a snake. In this connection, a great Teacher who knew the true tradition about the meaning of the Upanishads has said, 'When the individual soul, asleep under a beginningless illusion, finally awakens, he awakens to a knowledge of the unborn, sleepless, dreamless, non-dual roality' (G.K.I.16). (B.S.Bh. II.i:9)

(5) But if anyone thinks that, because (between the two af- firmations of the existence of the Absolute at Brhad. IV.iii.7 and IV.iv.22) there is an intervening exposition of the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep, it follows that the text means to teach that the Absolute is by nature subject to transmigratory experience in any form, then he might as well set off for the east and find himself in the west. For the purpose of the texts in expounding the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep is not to declare that the Absolute is subject to these states or to transmigratory ex- perience in any form, but to show, on the contrary, that it is entirely bereft of the three states and that it. is not sub-

42. ject to transmigratory experience in any form. (B.S.Bh.I.iii.

This was written in response to the passage in the Brhad- aranyaka Upanishad (IV. iii. 7) 'Which is the Self? It is the Spirit (viewed under adjuncts) with intellect predominating (vijñana-maya) lying within the heart, within the vital

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energies (subtle organs of perception and action), the inner light'. (See M.V. 79, 3.) On the other hand in the Mandukya we find that the Self is first identified with forms such as Vaiśvānara (M. V.43,6) found in the waking state, and other forms (Taijara, Prajña, M.V. 23) found in the other states, each as the case may be. But then afterwards there is a text beginning 'Not with consciousness of the internal (mental) realm, not with consciousness of the external realm ... ' which declares that the Self is not touched by any of the states. From this we conclude with certainty that mention of the three states was only made here in order to deny that the Self was subjeet to any state.

45 DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL AND THE LORD NEGATED THROUGH A CONSIDERATION OF THE THREE STATES

There is another point that emcrges through the teaching by the method of attributing the three states to the Self. To begin with, it comes out that the name and form of the waking state, and the bodies and organs composed of them, are imag- ined through Ignorance and are therefore illusory. Equally illusory is the alternation between consciousness and non- consciousness on the part of the individual souls that appear in that state, as also the notion that they enjoy the power to have knowledge as individual subjects and the power to act as individuals and to experience the results of their actions. Indeed, the whole notion of the distinction between an expe- riencer and his experience is illusory, along with all that goes with it. Also illusory, in that context, are the notions that the Lord is a 'lord' in the literal sense, that He is the cause of the world, or that the individual souls are subject to His rule. Equally illusory is the notion that name and form persist as a remnant in the form of a seed-power in dreamless sleep and cosmic dissolution. For the seed-power there inferred falls within the realm of what is imagined through Ignorance. Hence the Veda declares that the soul in its true nature is none other than the Absolute, unborn and without a second. It also makes various specific denials, including the denial that the Self has internal or external consciousness relative to the internal (mental) or external (extra-mental) realms imagined through Ignorance. And it affirms the true nature of the Self as Turiya, void of any touch of the three states or the realms belonging to. them.

(1) Name and form, imagined through Ignorance as if they were the very nature of the Self, the omniscient Lord, inde- terminable either as the real principle or as anything (independent and) different from it, the seed of transmigra-

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tory experiencc and the differentiated world, are spoken of in the Veda and Smrti as 'The Power of Maya belonging to the omniscient Lord' and as 'Nature' (prakrti). The omniscient Lord is different from them. For the Veda says 'The shining ether, verily, draws forth name and form. That in which they exist is the Absolute' (Chand. VIII.xiv.l). (B.S.Bh. TI.i.14)

It is from the empirical standnoint ihat name and form are spoken of as indetemminable either as the real principle or as anything different, relative to their illusory form as it ap- pears. But it should not be forgotten that it has already been shown at M.V. 35 that from the standpoint of the highest truth they are the Seif.

(2) Thus the Lord conforms to the conditioning adjuncts, wrought of name and form and set up by Ignorance, in the same sense that the ether conforms to the conditioning adjuncts such as the clay poi and the coconut water-vessel, etc. And within the realm of human experience He rules over the con- scious beings called individual souls, who are in truth noth- ing but his own Self, but who assume the limitations of the body, mind and senses in the same way that the ether of space assumes the limitations of the pots of different shapes and sizes in which it is apparently enclosed. But the body, mind and senses are wrought of name and form, which are set up by Ignorance. Hence the 'lordship' of the Lord, as well as His omni- science and omnipotence, exist in relation to conditioning adjuncts which are of the nature of Ignorance. From the standpoint of ultimate truth, there can be no talk of any op- position between a Lord and His subjects, or of omniscience, etc., in the Self, in which all apparent conditioning adjuncts are by nature annulled through knowledge. And this has been declared in such Vedic passages as, 'Where he sees nothing clse and hears nothing else and knows nothing else, that is the infinite' (Chand.VII.xxiv.1) and 'But when all has become his own Self, then what could a person see and with what?' (Brhad. IV.v.15) In this way, the Upanishads as a whole teach that there is no empirical experience in the state of knowl- edge of the final truth. (B.S.Bh.II.i.14)

(3) And the author of the Sutras, too, speaking from the standpoint of the highest truth, said 'Non-different from that', (i.e. the world as effect is non-different from the Absolute as cause). Speaking from the standpoint of empirical experience, however, he says 'Let it be, as in the world' (B.S.II.i.13), and describes how the Absolute can be repre- sented as a great ocean. Here he accepts the world of effects and the doctrine of real transformation (pariņama) because it will be of use for the prescribed meditations on the Absolute associated with various finite forms. (B.S.Bh.II.i.14, cp.

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M.V.34,4)

(4) Ignorance, which assumes the form of duality, is a wrong idea, like the wrong idea of a man that we may have when we misperceive a tree-stump. Until one puts an end to Ignorance through realizing the true nature of one's own Self as the constant and eternal Witness, raised above all change, in the conviction 'I am the Absolute', the individual soul will re- main an individual soul. But it is possible to emerge from the sense of identity with the complex of body, sense-organs, mind and intellect. This cccurs when one is enlightcned through Vedie teaching .. One then becomcs awake to the true nature of one's own Self as the constant and eternal Witness, raised above all change. One rises above the sense of identity with this body and its organs. Verily, one who succeeds in this realizes his own true Self as the constant and eternal Witness, raised above all change. (B.S.Bh.I.iii.19, cp. M.V.43,3)

(5) Moreovei, when one becomes awake to the non-difference of the soul and the Absolute through such texts teaching their non-difference as 'That thou art', this puts an end to the no- tion that the individual soul is suffering transmigration and also to the notion that the Absolute is a world-creator. (B.S. Bh.II.i.22)

(6) We see in the world that, in childhood and other early states of life, virility and other such attributes are present in rudimentary form, but are taken as not present because they are not actually perceived, while in youth and other later states they become manifest. And it cannot be that in youth they suddenly emerge from non-existence, or we would find them suddenly emerging in eunuchs, for example. In the same way, this connection of the soul with the in- tellect that we are discussing exists in potential form during dreamless sleep and periods of world-dissolution, and then manifests again at the time of awakening or of creation. (B.S. Bh.II.iii.31)

(7) And when this world dissolves at the end of a world- period it is not completely dissolved, for a potentiality (sakti) remains over. When it rises up again (at the begin- ning of the next world-period) it does so on the basis of this potentiality. (B.S.Bh.I.iii.30)

(8) Thus, although there are no distinctions in the Self in its true nature, we see that this dream-like empirical ex- perience of distinctions continues regularly during the period of world manifestation, based on wrong knowledge (even though punctuated by intervals of dreamless sleep when wrong knowl- edge is in abeyance). Therefore we should infer by analogy

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that a potentiality (sakti) for future distinctions remains in the period of world-dissolution, too, this potentiality itself

Bh.II.i.9) being a mere appearance, conditioned by wrong knowledge. (B.S.

What is being affirmed here is that potentialities (sakti) like that for contact with or separation from the intellect, in- ferred to cxist in dreamless sleep and cosmie dissolution, are themselves only imagined through Ignorance.

(9) Indeed, if the word 'Being' were here understood as pure Being without seed, those dissolved in dreamless sleep or in the dissolution at the end of a world-period could not emerge again. Or, alternatively, those who had been liberated would be reborn, as there would be no difference between them and the ones in bondage in point of having no seeds of future rebirth (after death). Moreover, such a doctrine would render the upanishadic teachings on spiritual knowledge pointless, as there would be no seeds to be burnt up by knowledge. Hence, throughout the wholc range of the Veda, Being is only called 'vital energy' or referred to as the cause of the world when it is assumed to be associated with seeds. And that is why (in order to bring out the final truth) there has to be expli- cit denial of association with seeds in certain other texts, such as 'the transcendent, beyond the Indestructible principle' (Muņa. II.i.2), 'He alone exists within and without, Unborn' (Mund. II.i.2), 'from which words fall back' (Taitt.II.9) and '"neither this nor that"' (Brhad.II.iii.6). (G.K.Bh.I.2)

(10) The production of all entities, whether they belong in the realm of Visva, Taijasa or Prajña (M.V.23), is a 'produc- tion' through the illusion of name and form set up by Igno- rance, of things that (in their true nature as the Absolute) are already real. (G.K.Bh.I.6)

(11) Not with consciousness of the internal realm, not with consciousness of the external realm, not with consciousness of both, not a mass of (undifferentiated) consciousness, not intu- itively omniscient, not non-conscious, not visible, not within the scope of practical experience, intangible, indefinable, unthinkable, indescribable, whose proof lies solely in the no- tion 'the Self', being the dissolution of all plurality, per- fectly peaceful, auspicious (siva), without duality. This is how they conceive 'the Fourth'. This is the Self. This is what has to be known. (Mānd.7)

46 HOW THE SELF IS IN NO WAY TOUCHED BY PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE

Here we have only expounded five of the ways used for

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communicating the Absolute, such as the teaching that it is the cause of the world and so on, and that only in the most general terms. But it should be enough to show that other less impor- tant applications of the method of false attribution followed by subsequent denial are also valid. In this way, students should be able to deduce the pattern of the other methods used. Whatover characteristics are attributed to the Self as a means to awaken the student to ultimate reality are always finally denied. This is the heart of the method. It is in this spirit that the Veda attributes to the Self that existence as an indi- vidual soul that is familiar from worldly experience. And to this soul it atiributes possession of a body and its appendages, also birth and the other changes of the life-cycle, power to act and umdergo experience in the world, rebirth and transition to other worlds, followed by re-embodiment on this carth on the cxpiry of the karmic merii and demerit that carried it away. And it teaches also how one who has lcst all love for the werld comes to the feet of a Guru, listens to his teaching, ponders over the meaning of what he has heard and acquires release from transmigration through understanding it. We have already ex- plained (M.V.27) how even this contact with revealed teaching only takes place within the realm of Ignorance. And though the Self is thus associated with practical experience at all levels, it undergoes no change as a result, any more than the shell, the rope and the pure and infinite ether of the sky are affec- ted by the silver, the snake and the roof-like shape and im- purities (of clouds and dust) falsely attributed to them in the course of worldly experience. The Self is ever identical with the Absolute, eternal, pure, conscious and free. In worldly experience it appears both tc support and be concealed by Ignorance. Yet this does not in- troduce any change into its nature. The Vedic texts proclaim- ing the identity of the Self with the Absolute, such as 'That thou art' (Chand. VI.viii. 7) and 'I am the Absolute' (Brhad. I.iv.10) affirm just this. Even at the time when the rope and the shell are appearing as snake and silver, there is in fact no snake or silver. In the same way, even at the time when one appears to be undergoing transmigratory experience, there is no real transmigratory experience occurring in the Self, which is why the competent authorities bring forward these examples of the rope-snake and the rest. There is, however, this difference between the examples and the thing they illustrate. In the examples, the snake and the rest do not really exist in the rope and the rest. It is simply that the perceiver erroneously supposes the snake and the rest to be there, and thinks and speaks accordingly. The case with the thing these examples illustrate, namely illu- sions in regard to the Self or Absolute is somewhat different. Here we have a case of practical experience of relation with the Self set up by erroneous knowledge. The difference is that here even the notion that the erroneous knowledge ever

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belonged to the Self, as well as its cancellation, are both seen to belong to the realm of Ignorance. In the case of such superimpositions as the rope-snake, each superimposition is experienced as a wrong notion. Similarly, the superimposition of the not-self onto the Self is also experienced as a wrong notion. But occasional wrong notions such as the rope-snake arise and suffer cancellation while the individual knowing subject remains in being as such. This, however, is not the case with the superimposition of the not-salf onto the Self. For the superimposition onto the Self of the notion that it is au individual knowing subject is part of that general super- imposition of the not-self onto the Self. And when that lat- ter superimposition is cancelled, the whole notion of an em- pirical experiencer ie cancelled wit it. One cannot conceive this root-superimposition of the not- self onto the Self as having either a beginning or an end in time. For time itself only comes into existence with this superimpositior. And the authorities speak of it as begin- ningless and endless (M.V.46,12). And it must not be forgot- ten that we have already shown that the whole notion of Igno- rance and emlightenment itself belongs to the realm of Igno- rance (M.V.27,1, etc.) .

(1) The Self appears to undergo birth through the multipli- city of souls, just as the ether of space appears to undergo birth through the multiplicity of new forms into which it ap- pears to be enclosed through the production of pots (cp. M.V. 27,4). The ether is also the example to explain the apparent rise of new objects like pots through the compounding of the elements (since the elements are taught to proceed from the ether and the effect is nothing over and above the material cause). (G.K.III.3, cp. M.V.75,9)

(2) The Self stands within all bodies, motionless and unaf- fected, like the ether of space, whether they die or are born, whether they go, come or stand still. All bodies and organs are appearances projected like dreams by the power of illusion inherent in the Self. Their existence cannot be established logically, whether they are taken as varying in eminence or as all the same. (G.K.III.9-10; for Śri Sankara's comm., see M.V.242,6-7)

(3) Nor does (the appearance of) being affected by Ignorance or (the appearance of) its removal make the slightest differ- ence to the real. Imagine the case of a person in thick darkness, mistaking a rope lying on the ground for a snake. He feels afraid, trembles and runs away. But suppose another person says to him, 'Do not be afraid. That is not a snake. It is a rope'. And suppose that on hearing this he gets rid of his fear and trembling and stops running away. In such a case, it will make no difference to the reality (the rope)

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whether the snake-idea is present or has been removed. It is the same in the case of the Self. (B.S.Bh.I.iv.6)

There is no difference in the reality, the rope, either when the snake-idea comes or when it is removed. In the same way, there is no difference in the Self when the notion that it is affected by Ignorance is present, or when it is removed. That is the point being made.

(4) Perhaps you will object that it is inconceivable that the Absolute should be concealed by Ignorance. But such an objec- tion would be wrong. wor knowledge of the Absolute is recom- mended in the Veda. When a piece of shell is lying within the field of vision, one does not inform anyone that that is what it is, and say 'This is a piece of shell, not a piece of sil- ver', unless it has been erroneously perceived as silver. In the same way, unless there had been false superimpositions made onto the Absolute through Ignorance, there would not have to be exhortations to rise to a knowledge of the unity and sole reality of the Absolute in such texts as, 'All this is the Absolute' (Chand. VI.ii.1), 'All this is the Self' (Mund. II.ii.ll) and 'This duality is not anything other than the Absolute' (Brhad. IV.iv.19). (Brhad.Bh. I.iv.10)

One has to accept that the Absolute is concealed by Ignorance, as the teachings in the Veda about knowledge are inexplicable otherwise. That is the point being made.

(5) We do not say, the opponent claims, that there is no superimposition onto the Absolute of attributes it does not possess, superimposition parallel with the false superimpcsi- tion of the attributes of silver onto a shell. What we say is that the Absolute is not the cause of superimposition onto itself of attributes that it does not possess, and that it is not the author of Ignorance. Very well, replies the Advaitin. We agree that the Abso- lute is not the author of Ignorance and that it is not de- luded by it either. Even so, there is nothing other than the Absolute which is the author of Ignorance, and no other con- scious being apart from the Absolute that is deluded by it, as we know from such texts as, 'There is no other knower but He' (Brhad.III.vii.23), 'There is no other knowing principle apart from that' (Brhad. III.viii.1l), 'That thou art' (Chand. VI.viii.7), 'The Absolute knew itself alone' (Brhad.I.iv.10), 'I am the Absolute' (Brhad.I.iv.10) and 'He who thinks "I am one and He another does not know"' (Brhad. I.iv.10) (Brhad.Bh. I.iv.10)

Here it is taught, on the authority of the Veda, that from the standpoint of Ignorance the Absolute is afflicted with Ignorance, while from the standpoint of the final truth it is

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free from it.

(6) But it would not be right to say that this absence of in- dividual experience (in enlightenment) is conditional on the attainment of any particular state. For the text 'That thou art' (Chand VI.viii.7) shows that the fact of one's true Self being the Absolute is not conditional upon any particular state. (B.S.Bh.II.i.14, cp. M.V.169,15)

What this means is that the Self is not really an individual transmigrant soul even in the state where the appearance of being one is being superimposed onto it.

(7) Verily, this is that great unborn Self, beyond decay, death and fear. The Absolute, indeed, is fearless. He who knows the Absolute as fearless verily becomes the Absolute. (Brhad.IV.iv.25)

Śankara's Commentary: Here the whole message of the Upani- shad is condensed in brief. It was to convey this inea prop- erly that the false hotions of origination, maintenance and withdrawal of action, its factors and results, were first at- tributed to the Self. And then finally the truth was communi- cated by denying all that, and negating all distinctions that had been falsely attributed to the Self, through the formula 'neither this nor that'.

(8) The Self is imagined as different unreal beings and is also conceived as 'non-dual'. Even the unreal beings only manifest through the Self in its non-dual aspect. Therefore it is non-duality that is truly propitious. (G.K.II.33)

Śankara's Commentary: And so the Self, although in truth it is only the Self and ever uniform in nature, is imagined as different unreal beings, such as the cosmic vital energy, and also conceived in its finally true form, comparable to the rope as substratum of the imaginary snake. And these unreal beings, such as the cosmic vital energy, can only be imagined on account of the non-dual principle - pure Being, the Self. For there cannot be a piece of imagination without a substra- tum on which it is imagined. And thus it is non-duality that is alone truly propitious, even when false imagination is in play. For the non-dual never lapses, being itself the sole. substratum of all imaginations. But the illusions of imagina- tion are unpropitious.

(9) Perhaps you will object that there is a difference bet- ween the Self when it is the victim of Ignorance and the Self when it is not, just as there is a difference between sight that is and sight that is not afflicted by the disease of double-vision. But the objection would be wrong. For the

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text 'It only seems to think, it only seems to move' (Brhad. IV.iii.7) denies that the Self could be, on its own, the victim of Ignorance. And the error called Ignorance arises from the collaboration of several different processes (and not from the Self alcne). And this (our denial that the Self is the victim of Ignorance) agrees with the fact that Ignorance stands cver against the Self as an object which it witnesses. (Brhad.Bh. IV.iv.6, cp. M.V.101,7)

(10) Similarly, in the sentence 'He sees the piece of shell as silver', the word 'shell' means the actual shell, whereas the word 'silver' imnlies the imaginary idea of silver. One merely imagines silver, although there is in fact no silver there. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.5)

(11) For the final means of knowledge (the highest texts of the Veda, which yield knowledge of the Self), brings to an end the notion that the Self is an individual knowing subject em- ploying means of knowledge. And this final means of knowledge (the Veda) itself ceases to be a means of knowledge the moment it brings that notion to an end, just as the (apparent) means of knowledge that prevailed in dream (dream-perception, dream- inference, etc.) cease to be authoritative on waking. And we see in the world that a means of knowledge does not promote any further activity once the object in view has been known. (Bh.G.Bh.II.69, cp. M.V.190,5)

After the shell has once been known, means of knowledge are no longer employed to discover it. In the same way, once one's ou Self has been known in its true state free from the idea that it is an individual knowing cubject, the Self is no long- er a 'knower' in the empirical sense, nor is there any further employment of means of knowledge to obtain knowledge of that supreme metaphysical principle. That is the point being made.

This natural (uncaused) beginningless and endless super- imposition, which is of the nature of false supposition and is (12)

the origin of the notion that one is an individual capable of action and experience, is directly familiar to everybody. (B.S. Bh.I.i.l, intro.)

Here superimposition is said to be beginningless and endless and directly familiar in common experience. This affirmation is made on the assumption that there is an individual subject employing means of knowledge, as it is presented in empirical experience. The next sentence brings out how knowledge of the unity and sole reality of the Self cancels the sense that one is an individual knowing subject (and cancels time with it). So there is no contradiction between what was said first and what is said later.

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47 WHAT DCES IT MEAN TO SPEAK OF THE FALSITY OF DUALITY?

There is a further point that can be seen to emerge from our discussior so far. It is that duality is false and subject to canceliation through knowledge. But it should be clearly un- derstood that duality is not accepted as any second real thing standing over against the Absolute, but rather as something ul- timetely non-different from it. From a phrase like 'Superim- position is a synthesis of the real with the false, and ali practical experience is based on it', one should nct draw the wrong conclusion that superimposition is ever really performed or that it really exists and has to be cancelled by knowledge. For false attribution and subsequent negation themselves have sigmificance only within the realm of Ignorence. For this reason, from the standpoint of the highest truth Advaitins shouid not be considered and spoken of as people who proclaim the falsity ci the world. They should be considered, rather, as people who proclaim the sole existence and (undifferentia- ted) reality of the Self. A false notion cannot be real while it lasts and then undergo obliieration at the time of correc- tion. We find in the world that a rope, for example, will re- main exactly what it is, even if it be falsely imagined as a snake or the like. And in the same way, the Absolute remains what it is, even when it is falsely imagined as the world and the soul and so forth. This is the finally accepted truth.

(1) Does it then follow that everything that is perceived is non-being, like a rope misperceived as a snake? No. That is not our position. For we hold that it is invariably real Being that is perceived, only it is perceived under the distinctions of duality and hence as different from what it really is. Thus we do not maintain that anything anywhere is non-being. The rationalist philosophers (Naiyayikas and Vaiseşikas) believe in the existence of entities other than pure Being. Hence they speak of the non-existence of these entities before their rise and after their final destruction. But we do not believe that any entity other than pure Being exists anywhere or at any time, whether a name or a named object. On the con- trary, it is invariably Being to which some other name is given through the notion of it as something else. It is parallel with the case of the snake-illusion, where it is in fact the rope that is called a snake under the impression that it is a snake. And it is parallel with the normal worldly practice of thinking of the lump of clay or the clay pot as different from the clay and calling them 'the lump' and 'the pot'. But for those who discern the rope in its true nature, the name and notion of the snake cease, as do the name and notion of the pot and the rest in the case of those who dis- tinctly perceive the true nature of the clay. And in just the same way the name and notion of all modifications of Being

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into other forms cease for those who discern the true nature of pure Being. For, as the texts say, the latter is 'that from which words fall back without attaining it, together with the mind' (Taitt.II.4) and 'He who is beyond all definitions and without support' (Taitt. II .? ). (Chand.Bh.VI.ii.3, cp. M.V. 138, 12)

The teat is saying thai, just as in the case of those commit- ting a perceptual error in the world, the name and idea of a snake are wrongly referred to the reality, the rope, so, in the case of those who do not have true knowledge of the Abco- lute, the name and idea of the world are wrongly referred to the reality, the Absolute.

(2) It will be like the application of the name and notion 'man' to a tree-stump not clearly recognized as such in the twilight, or like the application of the name and notion of silver to a piece of shell unwittingly mistaken for silver. How, then, can one say that the word and notion 'I', when ap plied to the complex of the individual soul and its bodies and organs, are a case of figurative usage, when they arise from failure to distinguish the Self from the non-self? Profound scholars, who know the distinction between Self and not-self in theory, apply the name and notion of 'I' to the body through confusion, just like shepherds and goatherds. Hence those who maintain that an eternal Self exists as something quite sepa- rate from the body and its organs apply the notion of 'I' to the body and organs not figuratively but erroneously. There- fore, because possession of a body is conditioned by erroneous ideas, it stands proved that the enlightened one is dis- embodied while still alive. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4, cp. M.V.141,6)

The point being made is that the name and notion 'I' that urise falsely in relation to the complex of bodies and organs in the case of the individual soul, like the false names and notions that may arise in regard to a tree-stump or a piece of shell, have for their sole real object the Self, the substra- tum of the false body-idea. In all such cases one should avoid the error of supposing that anything exists over and above the substratum. We have already (M.V. 35) refuted the notion of crude minds that imaginary entities like the rope- snake undergo any real production.

(3) If the world of plurality really existed, it would no doubt really come to an end. But this duality is a mere illu- sion. Non-duality is the final truth. (G.K.I.17)

Śankara's Commentary: But the world of plurality no more exists than a snake imagined in a rope. A snake imagined in a rope through an erroneous idea is not something that actu- ally exists and is then later brought to an end through

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discriminatory knowledge. The case with a mass hypnotist's display is similar. When the spell is removed from the spec- tators' eyes, we cannot say that any existent reality has ceased to be. And similar again is the case with this mere illusion of duality called the world. All that really exists is the non-dual Self, comparable to the rope in the rope-snake illusion, or to the mass hypnotist in the case of the magi- cian's display. Hence the meaning is that no world of plural- ity either comes into being or comes to an end (cp. M.V.227,3, notc).

Here again we have a denial that the imagined world of plural- ity either exists or passes away, any more than the rope-snake either exists cr passes away.

(4) The form of the soul in which it appears to be an indivi- dual capable of action and experience, tainted by attachment and aversion and other defccts, and subject to various cvils, is set up by Ignorance and is not real in the highest sense. Its true form as the highest Lord, having the opposite charac- teristics, such as freedom from all evil, is realized in knowl- edge through the dissolution of the false form set up by Igno- rance, as the rope is known through the dissolution of the rope-snake. (B.S.Bh.I.iii.19)

Here also it is said that the erroneously imagined state of being an individual soul, though not a real fact, is dissolved through knowledge, like the rope-snake and the rest.

(5) The water and other features of a mirage are nothing over and above the stretch of desert on which they appear, since their existence is exhausted in their being seen and their na- ture is inexplicable. In the same way, it should be seen that this world of experiencers and experienced objects is nothing over and above the Absolute. (B.S.Bh.II.i.14)

(6) Differences of form are accepted as being imagined through Ignorance. If the real shows distinctions of form that are only imagined through Ignorance it is not thereby invested with real parts. The moon does not in fact become many when seen as if many by an eye afflicted with double- vision. The Absolute becomes apparently. subject to transfor- mation (pariņāma) and to all empirical experience through ap- parent distinctions consisting of name and form, manifest and unmanifest, which are imagined through Ignorance and are in- determinable either as being the metaphysical reality itself or as being anything different. In its ultimately true form, however, it remains beyond all empirical experience and not subject to transformation. (B.S.Bh.II.i.27)

The point being made here is as follows. There is no real

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plurality in the moon seen by one afflicted with double- vision. Similarly, there are no real distinctions in the Ab- solute. It undergoes no distinction on account of name and form (reading nama-rupa), either in their manifest or their unmanifest state. For such distinetions are only imagined through Ignorance. Nor is the Absolute the actual substratum of any real experiences of transformations and so on intro- ducea by name and form.

48 HOW IN THE STATE OF EMPIRICAL EXPERIENCE A DISTINCTION AMONG MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE IS UBSERVED

We know from many texts that, in the manner already explained, the Upanishads do not admit any reality over and above the Ab- solute or Self. For instance, we have 'All this world is the Absolute; the Absolute is the greatest' (Mund. II.ii.12), 'Where he sees nothing else and hears nothing else and knows nothing else, that is the infinite' (Chand. YII.xxiv.l), 'All this is but the Self alone' (Chand. VII.xxv.2), 'All this (world) is but the Self' (Brhad. II.iv.6), 'All this has this (Being) for its Self, that is the real, that thou art' (Chand. VI.viii.7) and 'There is no plurality here' (Brhad. IV.iv.19). Nevertheless, it is affirmed that before the Absclute is known in this way, all experience arising from authoritative means of knowledge in the worldly and Vedic spheres holds good as perceived. The Vedanta does not admit that one can argue away what is actually perceived, in the manner of the total Nihilists. Within this state of empirical experience, there is resort to a distinction between different criteria for valid knowledge according to whether one adopts the standpoint of worldly experience or the standpoint of Vedic teaching. The worldly standpoint is the natural one, associated with attachment and aversion and so forth. Action performed from this standpoint and arising from motives based on natural knowledge does one harm. But a person may acquire control of his senses and act only according to Vedic teaching. He is then said to be following the Vedic standpoint, and this is the difference between the worldly and Vedic standpoints in regard to action. But a distinction also has to be drawn between the worldly and the Vedic standpoint in knowledge. Here the worldly standpoint is that where the individual, through natural ways of thinking, or, as we might say, on the mere basis of per- ception and the other empirical means of knowledge, identi- fies himself with the complex of his bodies and organs, hav- ing the feelings 'I' and 'mine' in regard to them. The Vedic standpoint arises when he follows the Veda and identifies himself with the pure Self, which is untouched by the bodies

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and orgens and is mot an individual capable of action and ex- perience. The terms 'Vedic standpoint', 'standpoint of the Rgis' and 'standpoint of the final truth' are used as synonyms, as elso are 'worldly standpoint', 'natural standpoint' and 'standpoint of empirical experience'. And the Vedic standpoint, in which the final truth is seer, is that of the Acārya who has seen that truth, and may also be called the 'Acarya's stand- point'. Sometimes we have the experience 'vision in line with', as when a person may iollow the teachings of the Veda and Ācārya and may suppose his our experience to be in line with theirs. Thus, when commenting on the text 'Those wise ones who see Him eituated within their owa bodies' (Katha II.11.12), the re- vered Commentator explains it as saying 'Those whose minds are restrained from all internal and external idestion and enjoy direct experience of the Lord, following the teachings of the Ācarya and the Veda': We have already seen that the Veda teaches that, while a person is still in the roalm of Igno- rance, his first step is to reject the natural worldly stand- point through the Vedic standpoint and to set forth on that highest path which brings both worldiy welfare aud final beati- tude (M.V.26 and 27). And we have also mentioned (M.V.28) that after kncwledge of the Self, perception and the other empiri-

ply. cai means of knowledge, as also Vedic teachirg, no longer ap-

(1) This ordinary empirical experience of the world, solidly established as it is through all the various means of knowl- edge, cannot be argued away without prior knowledge of some other reality. For where no exception can be shown, an estab- lished rule holds. (B.S.Bh.II.ii.3l, cp. M.V.172,5)

(2) He who acts according to his whim, rejecting the rules for conduct laid down in the Veda, does not attain happiness in this life or in heaven after it, and fails to realize the true goal of life. Therefore it is the Veda that is your au- thority for what you should and should not do. One should perform one's actions here below with full knowledge of what the Veda prescribes and prohibits. (Bh.G.XVI.23,24)

(3) A person's nature, associated with desire and aversion, will impel him to act according to its dictates, and this will lead him to abandon his own proper duty and assume that of another. But desire and aversion can be controlled by their enemy, discriminative knowledge. And when a person follows this course he comes to see the world from the Vedic stand- point and is no longer at the mercy of his natural disposi- tion. (Bh.G.Bh.III.34)

(4) No doubt Brahma Sutra II.i.24 said: 'If you say that the Vedic Absolute cannot be the cause of the world because in the

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case of a conscious efficient cause we regularly find resort to instruments, whereas it is not admitted that the Absolute resorts to instruments, we reply that you are wrong, for the process is conccivable on the analogy of the flow of milk from the udders of a cow'. But this was only advanced from the standpoint of secular reasoning to show that an effect can take place of its cwn accord without the need for an external instrument. From thr standpoint of Vedic revelation, however. all things depend on the Lord, and this doctrine we in no way abandon. (B.S.Bh.II.ii.3)

(5) But the teaching is given from the Vedic standpoint, as in the case of Vamadeva. (B.S.I.i.30)

Sankara's Commentary: The god Indra, through attaining the standpoint of the Rsis, became aware of himself as the supreme Self. He had the conviction, in agreement with the Veda, 'Verily, I am the Absolute'. So he taught '(Since I am the Absolute), know me alone' (Kausitaki III.1).

(6) Perheps you will say that the statement 'Even though he were to kill all these creatures he would not kill them' is only an eulogy, but, even so, a contradiction. But in fact there is no difficulty here. The problem is solved when we take into account the two standpoints from which things may be seen, the worldly (or empirical) standpoint and the standpoint of absolute truth. The Lord is saying, 'Even though he may appear to have killed them from the standpoint of empirical experience, from which standpoint he would take body, senses and mind as the Self and think 'I am the killer', from the standpoint of ultimate truth, as just explained, he is not the killer, and is not bound (to further transmigratory experience) by any act of killing. (Bh.G.Bh.XVIII.17)

(7) Perhaps you will object that if one claims perfect unity for the Absolute there will be a total absence of any plural- ity or variety. And then perception and the other secular means of knowledge would be contradicted. They would just be erroneous cognitions, like the false notions of a man and the like that may arise in regard to a tree-stump seen in the dark. The Vedic texts which deal with prescribed and pro- hibited actions, too, depend on difference. If that were ab- sent, they would stand contradicted. Even that part of the Veda which deals with liberation depends on such distinctions as that between pupil and Teacher, and would be impossible without them .... To this we reply as follows. There is nothing wrong. All empirical experiences that occur before one has realized that one's Self is the Absolute are taken as real, like the ex- periences of a dream before awakening. Until the realization of the unity and sole reality of the Self, no one has the

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idea that such phenomena as the means cf empirical knowledge, the objects of such knowledge and the resultant cognitions are false. On the contrary, before realizing that their Self in its true nature is the Absolute, all living beings identify themselves with those very phenomena, feeling 'I' and 'mine' in relation to them through Ignorance. Thus all worldly ex- perience and Vedic teaching hold good before one realizes thet one's true Self is the Absolute. Ordinary people, when asleep, see beings of high and low degree in dreams. And this knowl- edge is felt to be genuine perception until awakening, and there is no notion during the dream that only an appearance of perception is in play. It is the same with waking perception

165,4, note) before realization of the Self. (B.S.Bh.II.i.J4, cp.M.V.146,5;

19 TEXTS ON THE ABSOLUTE WITHCUT ADJUNCTS AFFIRM ITS EXISTENCE: TEXTS ON THE ABSOLUTE WITH ADJUNCTS PRESCRIBE THEMES FOR MEDITATION

The Absolute is taught in two ways in the Upanishads, with and without conditioning adjuncts. Its form with adjuncts is also called 'with form' and 'with attributes'. We have exam- ples of its being taught in this way in such texts as 'With a golden beard and golden hair, golden right up to the tips of his nails' (Chand. I.vi.6) and 'He is the one acting in all activity, He is the one desiring in all good desires, He in- cludes all odours and tastes' (Chand. III.xiv.2). And the Ab- solute is taught as being without conditioning adjuncts in such texts as 'Partless, actionless, motionless, faultless, untainted' (Svet. VI.19) and 'Neither this nor that' (Brhad. II.iii.6). Here, one might well accept that the Absolute without ad- juncts was communicated through the method of false attribu- tion followed by subsequent retraction, already described. But the studcnt might also wonder what role the texts speak- ing of the Absolute associated with adjuncts played in this process. And again, one might suppose that the Absolute with adjuncts and the Absolute without them could not really be the same entity. For having adjuncts and not having them are contradictory states. If this were the case, the teaching would be inauthoritative, as it would imply contradictions in upanishadic doctrine. And so one would have to ask, 'Should we take it that texts speaking of the Absolute without ad- juncts are auxiliaries to those speaking of it with adjuncts, and should therefore be treated as subordinate? Or is it rather that the texts speaking of the Absolute with adjuncts are auxiliaries to those speaking of it as without adjuncts, so that the texts on the Absolute with adjuncts should be treated as subordinate? And there is another point. There are texts which declare

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a reward for knowledge of the Absolute with adjuncts gained through particular meditations. For instance, 'He who knows thus rises above all evil' (Chand. I.vi.7), 'Through this he ob- taius the worlds beyond the sur and also the degires of the gods' (Chand. I.vii. 7) and 'And so through this he obtains the worlds below the sun and also the desires of men' (Chaud. i.vii.8). There are also texts mentioning the reward for knowledge of the Absolute withcut adjuncts, such as 'What de- lusion, what grief, can ihere be for ons who sees the unity of all?' (Isa 7) ard 'All are liberated, immortal in the highest sense' (Mund. III.ii.6). Some therefore hold that one cannot believe that all the Upanishads combine to teach the Absolute according to a single method, since there is no criterion to show why one should reject some texts and accept others. Ou this point revered Badarayana has said, 'The Absolute is certainly without form, as the texts speaking of it thus are concerned primarily with affirming its existence as such' (B.S. III.ii.14). The Absolute has to be understood as being verily without conditioning adjuncts, not as confined within adjuncts and having internal distinctions cf form such as colour and so forth. Why? Because the texts speaking of the Absolute with- out adjuncts are primarily concerned with affirming its exist- ence and indicating its true nature. And Bādarāyana has also explained the place of the texts speaking of the Absolute associated with apparent conditioning adjuncts in the words 'And because they may be interpreted on the analogy of light, they are not useless' (B.S.III.i1.15). The texts affirming that the Absolute has form are not use- less, for they are concerned with teaching about prescribed meditations. It does not follow from the mere fact that there are texts speaking of the Absclute as conditioned by form that the Absolute has form in reality. When light is viewed through apparent conditicning adjuncts, for example as passing between the fingers and so on, it may appear to be curved, but it does not follow that it is curved in its true nature. The same is true in the case of the Absolute. For it was shown earlier (B.S.Bh. III.ii.ll) that the conditioning adjuncts ap- parently affecting the Absolute are aspects of name and form, which, in turn, are imagined through Ignorance. Further, we have the upanishadic text: 'That which cannot be uttered by speech and through which speech makes utterance - know that that only is the Absolute, and not that which people (here) worship. That which cannot be thought by the mind, through which, they say, the mind thinks - know that that only is the Absolute, and not that which people here worship' (Kena I.5-6). This text maintains that the Absolute, in its true nature, is beyond the range of speech and thought and without conditioning adjuncts. It is also beyond the scope of all meditation and worship associated with form. And so the Veda declares openly that the form of the Absolute where it appears to be conditioned by adjuncts is not the

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highest truth. Thus our thesis that the Absolute has to be understood as being verily without adjuncts has been proved. It was objected, bowever, that rewards were declared in the Veda for kuowledge of the Absolute with and without adjuncts alike. To this we reply that tho rewards of varying degree that are promised in the texts speaking of the Absolute as as- sociated with apparent adjuncte pertain to the realm of Igno- rance. In the texts speaking of the Absolute without adjuncts, however, only one rewerd is declared, that of immediate libera- tion. So there is a significant difference between the two classes of texts, and the objection has no force.

(1) Where there is a conflict, texts primarily concerned with the particular subjoct matter of the topic in hand have more authority than those primarily concerned with some other topic (cp. M.V.10, rule I, p.23). This is the rule which enables one to make a decision and say that, although there are Vedic texts speaking of the Absolute as associated with conditioning adjuncts as well as those speaking of it as not so associated, the Absolute is in fact without form. And it follows that the opposite view is demonstrably wrong. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.14)

(2) But does not this mean the contradiction of what was said earlier (B.S.Bh.III.ii.11) about the Absolute not having two different sets of characteristics even in association with conditioning adjuncts? We say that it does not. For no real attribute can be introduced into a substance by a mere ap- parent adjunct. In any case, the adjuncts are set up by Igno- rance. And we have already explained at various places how worldly experience and Vedic revelation apply while natural Ignorance is in play. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.15)

The point being made here is that because the Absolute is only taught to be associated with adjuncts for purposes of meditation, there is no contradiction with the traditional method of interpreting the Upanishads, since all meditations (performed in obedience to Vedic rules) belong to the realm of Ignorance.

(3) The purpose (of the text in using the word 'eva') is to exclude the apparent conditioning adjuncts through which the Absolute can be referred to as the speech of speech, the see -. ing of sight, the hearing of hearing, the mind of mind, the one engaged in action, the experiencer, the controller, the ruler and as 'the Absolute consisting of Knowledge and Bliss'. For the Absolute is transcendent, without distinctions, per- fectly homogeneous. The force of the word 'eva' ('alone') is to show that the Absolute is without distinctions and is the Self alone. The text then adds that the Absolute here treated of is not the Absolute associated with distinctions arising from adjuncts. It is not the Absolute on which people

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meditate, considering it to be other than their own Self, and endowing it with such characterictics as 'being the Lord' and the like. (Kena Bh.I.5)

(4) When aspects of the world-appearance are taught in the course of the exposition of meditation for specific fruits .(upasana), as in such texts as 'Consisting of mind, with the vital energy for body, luminous in nature' (Chand.III.xiv.2), they should not be regarded as having been mentioned for the sake of some dissolution. For meditations of this kind are connected by context with such injunctions to meditate for

III.xiv.1). specific rewards as 'He should have a definite purpose' (Chand. And since the Vedic passage itself shows that such attributes are mentioned for the sake of meditation for specific rewards, it is not right to interpret them figura- tively as having been mentioned to bring about disso- lution. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.21)

The point being made is that the texts giving meditations for specific rewards are primarily concerned with prescribing ac- tion. Hence they do not fall within the scope of the method of interpreting Vedic texts as false attribution followed by subsequent retraction.

(5) It is (only) in the state of Ignorance that there can be practical experience of or verbal reference to the Absolute as either the object of meditation or the one performing medita- tion. (B.S.Bh.I.i.12)

(6) This idea that the individual soul and the Inner Ruler are different is a result of the apparent conditioning ad- juncts of bodies and organs set np by Ignorance. It does not represent the final truth. The inmost Self is one. There cannot be two inmost Selves. Where there is only one, practi- cal experience of such a unity as if it were multiple, and reference to it as such, arise through apparent conditioning adjuncts. It is as when we speak figuratively of the ether of space in the pot and the ether of space in general (as if the pot really circumscribed a volume of the ether of space and effectively cut it off from the rest of the ether). Once this is understood, the Vedic texts speaking of distinctions such as subject and object, means of empirical knowledge such as perception, etc., transmigratory experience of the world, and the Vedic texts conveying injunctions and prohibitions, all become intelligible (even when non-duality is accepted as the final truth). (B.S.Bh.I.ii.20, cp. M.V.27,4)

The teaching here consists of the following points. The no- tion that the individual soul is different from the highest Lord arises through self-identification with the conditioning adjuncts of the bodies and organs. The notion that the

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individual soul and the Lord are respectively meditator and object of meditation (under limited forms) springs from this earlier distinction. The authoritativeness of the texts pre- scribing meditation on the Absolute conceived under condition- ing adjuncts, and of mention of the soul's enjoyment of the promised rewarde for such meditations, applies to the empirical mode of vision only.

(7) Moreover, the rewards promised in passages teaching medi- tation for a specific end are different on different occasions. Sometimes the reward promised is the remission of the effects of past sinful deeds, sometimes the attainment. of an cxalted status (such as that of a deity), sometimes liberation by stages. Thus the texts teaching meditation for a specific end are distinct even among themselves, and should not be inter- preted as forming a single topic in company with the texts teaching the existence and true nature of the Absolute. (B.S. Bh.III.ii.21)

50 CERTAIN VEDIC TEXTS PROCLAIM THE EXISTENCE AND TRUE NATURE OF THE ABSOLUTE

There are vedic texts, quite different from those primarily concerned with prescribing courses of action, which are pri- marily concerned with proclaiming the true nature of reality. We have already explained how the method of interpretation as false attribution followed by subsequent retraction applies to them alone. And we have also seen how the Absolute as ex- pounded in the texts dealing with meditations prescribed for specific ends is associated with apparent conditioning ad- juncts of name and form imagined through Ignorance. And we have further seen that the method of interpretation as false attribution followed by subsequent ratraction is not appli- cable to those texts, because they depend on injunctions to perform meditations for specific ends. However, some have expressed a different opinicn. Their conviction was that when a text is not concerned with pre- scribing action, when it merely states the nature of things as they are, it is not unquestionably authoritative. They say that it may then be a mere piece of 'eulogy', designed to pro- mote or discourage a certain course of action. Or else it may be an auxiliary to an injunction to act, indicating the true nature of the one performing a ritual and of the deity to whom it should be offered. Or else (despite its appearance as a factual statement) it may represent an injunction to meditate on the Absolute conceived under conditioning adjuncts, or an injunction to perform scme other action. Or again, it might be accepted as factually authoritative in communicating the nature of the Absolute, but only if taken as an auxiliary to a categorical command (niyoga) to know the latter, so that

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authority lies in the command. These views will be examined critically in a later section (M.V.64). In the present section we shall examine the view of those who hold that there are not and cannot be texts in the Veda confined to the mere communication of facts about already- existent reality, since this is the province of other means of knowledge. There are texts like 'This Absolute is without a before (cause) or an after (effect), without anything inside it or cutside it in space. This Self, the Witness of all from with- in, is the Absolute' (Brhad. II.v.19) which proclaim the existence and true nature of the Absolute. It cannct be imag- ined that these texts are either injunctions to act for a given end (vidhi) or catogorical commands (niyoga). For the words composing them can be seen to co-operate to proclaim the existence and true nature of the Absolute, and to do that alone. And irom this it fcllows that they are not concerned with other topics such as indicating who shculd perform e particular act. Nor are they proclaiming the nature of any already-existent reaiity which is within the scope of other authoritative means of knowledge. For in the Absolute all distinctions are cancelled, and all means of knowledge with them. Nor is it correct to say that there is no reality sub- ject to communication. For everything can be communicated as being the true Self of the hearer, and no one can deny the existence of his own Self. Nor should it be objected that the knowledye derived from such texts is useless. For there is immediate evidence that it produces the result of the destruc- tion of Ignorance and its attendant evils. Therefore it stands proved that the Absolute is an already-existent reality, that it is the Self, that it is subject to communicatior through the method of false attribution followed by subzequent retraction, and that this knowledge is of utility to man.

(1) There are some (Mimamsakas who follow Prabhakara) who claim that there is no section of the Veda that simply ex- pounds the true nature of reality. They hold that the Veda consists entirely of injunctions and prohibitions and materi- al subordinate to these. But this view is wrong, for the Spirit proclaimed in the Upanishads is not subordinate to anything. The Spirit proclaimed in the, Upanishads, and only in the Upanishads, is the Absolute. It is not the being that undergoes transmigration. It is different from the substances of the world, which are claimed by the Mimamsakas to be open to the four typical kinds of action for purposes of Vedic ritual, namely (1) producing (of a new substance, such as a cake, by kneading the dough), (2) obtaining (of an already- existent substance, such as the milk of a cow, by milking it), (3) transformation (in which one state of an already- existent substance is dissolved, to be supplanted by another, as in melting the sacred butter by heating it) and

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(4) purification (where an already-existent. substance is al- tered without its present state being effaced, as in ceremoni- al purification by sprinkling water) .* The Spirit is taught in sections where it is itself the primary topic, and is not introduced as a theme subordinate to some other topic. Nor can you say, 'The Self does not exist, it is not known'. For the Veda affirms the existence of the Self in the text 'This Self is neither this nor that' (Brhad. III.ix.26). This shows that the Spirit taught in the Upani- shads is our own Self. And no one can deny the existence of their own Self, for it would be the Self of the one performing the act of denial ... And iu the text 'But I am asking you about that Spirit taught in the Upanishads: (Brhad. III.ix.26), the specification 'taught in the Upanishads' only makes sense if that Spirit is taken to be found proclaimed only in the Upanishads, and pro- claimed as their primary topic. The statement that there is no section of the Veda concerned with proclaiming an already- existent reality was therefore a mere rash assertion. (B.S.Bh. I.i.4), cp. M.V.282,2, note)

*(See Keith, 1921, p.85 f .; Śalikanātha, 1961, p.457 f. Śri Sankara himself interprets the four basic kinds of action in a different way, not bound doum to the ritual as in the Mimam- sakas. See M.V. 59,12. T.N. )

(2) Nor can it be made out (with the Ritualists) that the texts in the Upanishads proclaiming the existence and true nature of the Absolute are really concerned with explaining the true nature of the one performing an act. For there are texts such as 'What should he then see and with what?' (Brhad. II.iv.14) which deny the existence of action and its factors and results. And while it is true that the Absolute is an already-existent entity, it is not true that it is an object of perception and the other empirical means of knowledge. For the Absolute cannot be known as the Self without the help of Vedic texts like 'That thou art'. Nor was our position in any way harmed by what was said about the teaching of the existence of the Absolute being of no practical value to man, on the ground that, as an already- existent entity, the Absolute was not subject to rejection or acquisition. For it is only through the knowledge that the Absolute, not subject either to rejection or acquisition, is his own true Self that man can overcome all his misery and achieve the goal of life. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

Here we have a refutation of the view that the texts pro- claiming the true nature of the real are concerned with the nature of the one doing an act, and of the view that what they teach is either within the scope of other authoritative means of knowledge or else useless.

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(3) Once it has been determined that the words of the sentence co-operate systematically to teach the existence and true na- ture of the Absolute, it is not right to suppose that they mean anything else. It would imply contradiction with Vedic teach- ing and baseless conjecture, unsupported by revealed doctrine. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

(4) Knowledge of the Absolute arises from the texts which ex- pound the nature of reality and are not primarily concerned with prescribing action. Such was the view of the Acarya Badarayana, who said, 'But that, (the Absolute, is the main topic of the Veda), on account of the harmony (systematic or- dering) of the texts' (B.S.I.i.4). (B.S.Bh.III.iii.1)

(5) We have set out in detail, in commenting on the Sūtra 'But that, (the Absolute, is the main topic of the Veda), on account of the harmony of the texts' (B.S.I.i.4), how the texts con- cerned with expounding the Absolute state the nature of reality

21. only, and do not lay down categorical commands. (B.S.Bh.III.1i.

(6) We ask you, therefore, 'Do the texts which proclaim the true nature of the Self produce certain and fruitful knowledge or do they not?' If they do, how can they help being authori- tative? Have you not seen examples of the fact that metaphy- sical knowledge of the Self results in the benefits of the cessation of Ignorance, grief, delusion and fear and all the other defects which cause continuation of transmigratory life? There are hundreds of upanishadic texts proclaiming that this is the case, such as 'What delusion, what grief, can there be for one who sees the unity of all?' (Isa 7) and 'I am only a knower of the texts, my lord, not a knower of the Self .... Hence I am subject to grief. Take me beyond grief, my lord' (Chand. VII.i.3). Have you not heard them? Now, we ask of you, do we find the same certain and fruitful knowledge in texts like 'He wept'* (T.S. I.v.l)? (Brhad. Bh.I.iv.7, cp. M.V. 64,5)

Here the point being made is that the texts concerned with the existence and true nature of the Absolute are an authori- tative means of knowledge and not mere explanatory passages (like 'He wept', which may be fanciful), because they give rise to certain and beneficial knowledge.

*(Attacked by the other gods, Agni 'wept' or 'howled' 'arodit' from the Sanskrit root 'rud'. Therefore Agni is called Rudra. His tears became silver. Therefore silver must not be given on the sacrificial altar, i.e. if a gift is made to a priest in the form of silver, this should be done away from the sacrificial altar. T.S. I.v.1. Śrī Śańkara dismissed such myths as 'little stories' - akhyāyikā -

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iwvented to promote some practical aspect of the teaching. TNv.)

51 THE HIGHER AND LOWER ABSOLUTE

Thus the Absolute without conditioning adjuncts is communicated in the texts primarily concerned with proclaiming the existence of the Absolute as the true Self. The texts primarily con- cerned with prescribing meditations on the Absolute conceived under conditioning adjuncts teach it as limited by such ad- juucts. Thus two forms of the Absolute are taught in the Upa- nishads. In this connectior, we have learned that the texts concerned specifically with expounding the existence and na- ture of the Absolute have authority on that theme because they are primarily concerned with that topic, and that they teach that the Absolute must be accepted, frcm the standpoint of the highest truth, as being free from conditioning adjuncts. 'With- out adjuncts', 'without plurality', 'without distinctions', 'without attributes', 'the cause', 'the chief' and 'the supreme (para)' are in this context synonymous terms. Also synonymous are 'having conditioning adjuncts', 'having plurality', 'naving distinctions', 'having attributes', 'the effect', 'the subordi- 'nate' and 'the lower (apara) ' .. This distinction in the Absolute between a supreme aspect and a lower aspect rests on the authority of such Vedic texts as 'This Absolute, O Satyakama, in its supreme and lower as- pects is Om' (Prasna V.2). The non-duality of the Absolute is not contradicted, since the conditioning adjuncts are set up by Ignorance. Forms and attributes and so forth that are mereiy set up by Ignorance keep their reality from the standpoint of empirical experience, in the way explained above (M.V.48). And the Absolute, since it is the cause of all name and form and so the power (sakti) behind all, stands as the Self of all, since an effect is non-different from the power from which it springs (B,S.Bh.II.i.14, cp. M.V.36,4, with note). And there are other parts of the Vedic doctrine that are all explicable on this basis, such as the teaching that those who practise meditation on the Absolute under conditioning ad- juncts reach the Absolute by the Path of the Flame and other routes, as also the teaching about the attainment of exalted positions and about the attainment of parity with the Lord in enjoyment of the rewards of merit.

(1) Are there two Absolutes, a supreme Absolute and a lower Absolute? Yes, there are two, as is shown by such texts as 'This Absolute, O Satyakama, in its supreme and lower aspects, is Om' (Praśna V.2). What, then, is the supreme Absolute, and what the lower? To this we reply as follows. Where particularities arising from name and form set up by Ignorance are denied, and the Absolute is spoken of in negative terms such as 'not gross, etc.', there

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we have the supreme Absclute. When that same Absolute is re- ferred to as qualified by some particular aspect of name and form for purposes of meditation, in such words as 'Consisting of mind, having the vital energy for its body, luminous in na- ture' (Chand. III.xiv.2), there we have the lower Absolute. But would not this contradict the texts affirming the non-duality of the Absolute? No. This objection stands refuted because the conditioning adjuncts are name and form set up by Igncrance. (B.S.Bh.IV.iii.14)

(2) For it is the supreme Absolute itself which is taught, ir some places only and for the sake of meditation, to be associ- ated with conditioning adjuncts of a pure and elevating kind, and to have charecteristics implying modification, such as 'being composed of mind' (Chand.III.xiv.2) and so on; in this context the Absolute is referred to as being 'in its lower forn (apara)'. (B.S.Bh.IV.iii.9)

It should not be supposed that this text is in conflict with the text 'This Absolute, in its supreme and lower aspects, is Om' (Praśna V.2). For that latter text (was not a metaphysical statement but only) taught a meditation on Om conceiving it as the Absolute in its supreme form (the reward for which was liberation by stages). Consult B.S.Bh.I.iii.13.

(3) As for the difficulty that the Vedic texts also attribute to the Spirit a golden beard and the like, which is not com- patible with his being the highest Lord, we reply to that as follows. The golden-bearded form could very well be one of those illusory forms deliberately assumed by the highest Lord for the sake of His devotees. For we have such a text from Smrti as: 'O Narada, this that you behold is an illusion that I have projected. Do not suppose that in my true nature I am associated with the attributes of all creatures in this way' (Vyāsa, M.Bh.XII. 339.45). Again, when the very highest form of the Lord is taught, with all particularities denied, we have such texts as 'without sound, without touch, without form or colour, undecaying ... ' (Katha I.iii.15). But sometimes the highest Lord, since He is the cause of all, is taught, for purposes of meditation, as having certain mutable characteristics. We have such texts on this subject as 'He is the one acting in all activity, He is the one desiring in all good desires, He includes all odours and tastes' (Chand. III.xiv.2). On this basis, texts teaching that He has a golden beard and the like are intelligible. (B.S.Bh.I.ii.20)

. (4) The teacher Badari holds that the superhuman being con- veys his charges to the Absolute in its lower form, associated with finite attributes. (See Chand.IV.xv.5.) This is because the Absolute in its (lower) form as effect has a particular

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position and so can be 'reached'. But one cannot conceive 'goerhood' or 'being gone to' or 'the act of going' in relation to the Absolute in its highest form, for in this form it is

IV.iii.7) all-pervasive and also the inmost Self of all 'goers'. (B.S.Bh.

(5) We have already explained, in commenting on the Sūtra 'The soul is spoken of in this way (i.e. as atcmic) when it is considered predominantly under the attributes of the intellect' (B.S.II.iji.29), that although the Self is all-pervasive, it has the appearance of movement when the intellect and other apparent conditioning adjuncts move, just as the ether of space appears to move with the movement, of pots (cp. M.V.27.1 and 4). (B.S.Dh.IV.iii.14)

(6) Liberated souls have all supernatural powers such as re- ducing their bodies to minute size, except that of producing; maintaining and withdrawing the universe. Those latter powers belong solely to the Lord, whose existence is eternal and self-evident. (B.S.Bh. IV.iv.17)

(7) And so the identity with the Lord enjoyed by those liber- ated ones who still take their stand on the Absolute as modi- fied into the world of effects (the Absolute in lower form) is not total. For the Veda (Kauşītaki I.7, Brhad.I.v.20,23) teaches that souls who are liberated in this way have parity with the Lord, whose existence is beginningless and self- evident, only in point of enjoyment (not in respect of ruler- ship of the universe). (B.S.Bh.IV.iv.21)

52 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND PRESCRIBED MEDITATIONS

In the realm of Ignorance, there is no contradiction if medi- tations on the Absolute as associated with conditioning ad- juncts, along with injunctions to perform them, are found in the section of the Veda devoted to metaphysical knowledge. For both meditation and knowledge, as the latter occurs at this preliminary stage, are denoted by the technical term 'Vidya', and both are modifications of the mind. It is true that meditations on the Absolute conceived under conditioning adjuncts have points in common with action. They are performed to intensify the merit arising from ritual and for the sake of well-being in this life and lives to come. And yet they also qualify as knowledge, since they are mental and promote introspection and have liberation by stages as their reward. And it is because they are in this last res- pect altogether different from action that they are dealt with in the context of knowledge of the non-dual reality. Thus, insofar as they are both mental, knowledge of the

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non-dual reality and meditation or the Absolute as associated with conditioning adjuncts are both equally referred to in the Veda and Smrti by such terms as 'jñāna', 'vidyā' and 'upāsanā'. Yet there is an essential difference betwees them. Upāsana (alternative form of upāsana) is a synonym for dhyāna (medita- tion). It is a mental activity, dependent on the efforts of a person acting, and, like ritualistic action, can only be known about through the iujunctive texts of the Veda. But knowledge properly so called is the result of the application of a means of valid coguition. It is sometimes defined as a mental idea that arises in true correspondence with the thing known. Thus mcditation on the Absclute as associated with conditioning ad- juncts is L kind of action, and so depends on the factors and results of action, ail of which are false superimpositions. But knowledge (in the deepest sense of the word) is that intu- itive awareness of reality in which all superimposition is abolished.

(1) Meditation is dwelling on something mentally. Though mental, it depends on human will, and can either be done or not done or done in a different way. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the result of the application of a means of valid cognition, and bears on the true nature of an already-existent object. Knowledge, therefore, does not fall within the pro- vince of what can be done, not done or done differently. It is conditioned neither by a command nor by the human will, but by the nature of an already-existent entity. Thus, even when knowledge is mental, there is a very great difference between knowledge and a deliberate mental act like meditation. In the text prescribing a symbolic meditation, 'Man, O Cautama, is verily the sacrificial fire .... Woman, O Gautama, is verily the sacrificial fire!' (Chand.V.vii.l and viii.l) the conception of man and woman as the sacrificial fire is purely mental. As it comes into being by the mere force of obedience to an injunction, it is a mental action and subject to human will. But the idea of fire, when one is in the pres- ence of that well known object, is not dependent on an injunc- tion, nor is it a mere creation cf the human mind. It is in fact a piece of knowledge, conditioned by the nature of the object perceived. It is not an act. And one should realize that it is the same with all objects of the various means of knowledge (such as perception, inference, etc.). (B.S.Bh. I.i.4, cp. M.V.68,2)

(2) Meditation (upasana) means approaching the deity mentally in the form in which it is described in the explanatory texts of the Veda which present deities as objects of meditation. It implies meditation on the deity in that form to the exclu- sion of all worldly thoughts until there arises a conviction of one's identity with the true form of that deity which is as powerful as one's previous conviction of identity with

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one's body in worldly experience. (Brhad.Bh.I.iii.9)

(3) And in this scction, devoted overall to knowledge of the non-dual reality, some meditations that lead to a higher worldly station are introduced. Those here included, however, are of the kind that leads to very high results approximating to liberation. They have for their subject-matter the Absolute in a form only miidly distorted from its true non-dual nature, as in such texts as 'Consisting of mind, having the vital energy for its body' (Chand. III.xiv.2) and so on. They are related to aspects of the ritual, and their reward is enhance- ment of the merit arising from performance of certain items of ritual. On the other hand they have their similarity with the metaphysical parts of the Upanishads in that they are concerned with mental ideas. (Chand.Bh.I.i.l, intro. )

(4) What, then, is the difference between knowledge of non- duality and these meditations? The answer is that knowledge of non-duality puts a final end to that notion of a distinc- tion between the factors of an action, such as the person do- ing it, its object, instruments and results, which we have the natural tendency to superimpose onto the actionless Self. It is like the dissolution of the superimposed snake or the like which occurs through right knowledge of the true nature of the rope .. Meditation, on the other hand, consists in taking some conception laid down by the Vedic texts and making the stream of ideas in one's mind conform to it continuously over a peri- od, without admitting the intrusion of ideas of anything else. That is the difference between knowledge and meditation. (Chand.Bh.I.i.1, intro.)

(5) Such męditations contribute to the final understanding of the metaphysical truth by purifying the mind, and are in this sense auxiliaries to knowledge of non-duality; and, because. they offer a definite conception to hold on to, they are easy to practise, and are hence placed here at the beginning of the Upanishad, before the transition to the metaphysical teaching. proper. (Chand.Bh.I.i.1, intro. )

(6) One should only meditate on those attributes of the Self that are taught in the Veda - not on those not taught in the Veda, even if they be known empirically to exist. (Chand.Bh. II.ii.1)

(7) Nor can anyone acquire new and different knowledge of anything under the force of an injunction if he has already known it as different through a valid means of cognition. Even if he thinks of it differently (e.g. thinks of woman as the sacrificial fire, cp. Chand. V.viii.1) under the conviction that he is enjoined to do so, this does not amount to knowl- edge, but only to imaginative mental activity. And if a thing

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that had been properly known through a valid means of cognition suddenly began to appear different of its own accord, that would simply be error. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.21)

Let us suppose that a person, who has knoum something in one way through a valid means of cognition, meditates upon it as something different in obedience to a Vedic injunction. The point here made is that genuine knowledge will remain unchanged by this, even though the person is obeying a Vedic injunction. For instance, if one is enjoined to see Visnu in a stone image, that does not abolish the notion that it is a stone image. The notion of Vienu is the product of subjective human endeavour. It is only a piece of meditation, and so a piece of mental activity. If, however, there were only the stone image, and through darkness or some other obscuring factor there arose other ideas of it, such as the notion that it was a man, that should be considered simply as error.

(8) And in consonance with this we find the words 'knowleage' and 'meditation' used interchangeably in the Upanishads, as, for example, in the text 'And I say this of anyone who knows what Raikva knows' (Chand.IV.i.4) followed closely by 'O Raikva, teach me, venerable master, that deity on which you meditate' (Chand. IV.ii.2). Sometimes we find the text using the word 'meditation' at the beginning and 'knowledge' at the end, as in 'He should meditate on mind as the Absolute' (Chand. III.xviii.1) followed by 'He who knows thus shines and burns bright with an aura of good name and fame and the lustre of spiritual knowledge' (Chand.III.xviii.3). (B.S.Bh.IV.i.1)

(9) That which is within this (ether of the heart), that one should investigate, that one should seek to know in immediate intuition. (Chand. VIII.i.1)

Here we have the idea: 'That which is within this Brahman, called the ether of the heart, that should be sought, that should be investigated'. It is a meditation that is being en- joined (though a word like 'investigation' would seem at first sight to imply knowledge). For a reward for the performance of the meditation is stated later, 'Those who die having known the Self ... (all their desires are fulfilled and they are able to wander at will in all the worlds) ' (Chand. VIII.i.6).

(10) Because this meditation (vidya) was never received by any Brahmin before you, therefore the teaching of it was en- trusted to the Kshatriyas alone in all the worlds. (Chand. V.iii.7)

Here the word 'knowledge' (vidya) is used to refer to a medi- tation, to the Meditation on the Five Fires (Pancagni-Vidya detailed at Chand. V.iii.1 - V.x.2).

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(11) He who meditates on Name as the Absolute is able to travel at will as far as the range of Name extends. (Chand. VII. i.5)

Superimposing deliberately the idea of the Absolute on Name is an enjnined act, dependent on the will of man. evidently a meditation. So this is

(12) Verily, through vision of the Self, through hearing of the Self, through thinking over the Self, through knowing the Self, all is known. (Brhad. II.iv.5)

Here, vision of the Self is (not a matter of meditation but of) knowledge in accordance with reality, as there is mention of knowledge of the one resulting in knowledge of all.

(13) Those who meditate on (it. know) Me as Lord of the Crea- tures, as Lord of the Gods, as Lord of the Sacrifices, know Me even at the time of death, their minds under control .... But how are You to be meditated on (lit. known) at the time of death by those of controlled minds ... Those who, intent on Myself, abandon all their actions to Me and meditate on Me with unwavering concentration ... are rescued by Me from the ocean of death and rebirth. (Bh.G.VII.30, VIII.3, XII.6-7)

Here the reference throughout is to meditation to be performed deliberately at the will of man.

(14) Thus the fire of knowledge burns all action (and the resulting merit and demerit ) to ashes .... This is the sover- eign knowledge, the sovereign secret, purifying, excellent, immediately evident, in conformity with the spiritual law, ex- tremely simple to achieve, inalterable ... But those who meditate on the unmanifest principle, indestructible, inde- scribable, all-pervading, unthinkable, raised above change and motion, eternally fixed ... (Bh.G.IV.37, IX.2, XII.3)

Here the reference is to knowledge of the undifferentiated Absolute in its true form throughout (so that the word 'medi- tate on' (paryupasate) is here used in the sense of 'know') .

53 THE MEANS TO KNOWLEDGE

The Absolute is the Self of all. Because it is immediately evident by nature, it follows that it is only hidden by Igno- rance. The only thing that will avail here is the metaphysi- cal knowledge that comes from the texts of the Upanishads, as that removes superimposition of every kind. The Absolute is spoken of specifically as 'the Spirit taught in the Upanishads' (Brhad. III.ix.26). And another text, 'He who has a Teacher

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can know' (Chand. VI.xiv.2), shows that the Absolute has to be attained through the teachings of an Acarya who knows the true upanishadic tradition. However, those whose minds are attracted by external ob- jects find that their thinking is clouded by latent desires. For them, neither the texts of the Upanishads nor the words of the Teacher are alone enough to grant knowledge that the Abso- lute is their own true Self. The Veda and the Smrti therefore give instructions on rituals aud meditations to purify the mind and promote the longing for introspective contemplaticn. Even here, rituals and good works will only purify those who are averse from evil conduct. The Smrti says 'The Vedas do not purify him who acts ignobly'. Thus it is clear that only he can engage in meditation as a prescribed duty whose mind has been purified by rituals and good works, so that he has become introspective and contemplative. For meditation is essenti- ally a mental practice. And there are inner means prescribed for knowledge for the person inclined to introspection and contemplation. The Veda speaks of inmer and outer control (sama and dama) and the rest, while the Smrti speaks of 'absence of pride' and the rest (Bh.G.XIII.7 if.). We know that these are means to meta- physical knowledge of the Self, because the Veda says so. The most direct means, however, are hearing the texts, pon- dering over them, and subjecting them to sustained meditation .* For it is universally recognized that they bear immediately on what requires above all to be known, and illumine it by their very nature. Thus it stands proved that rituals and the rest are indirect means to metaphysical knowledge through removing external obstacles, while hearing of the texts and so forth are the direct means, because they bear on the subject and il- lumine it immediately and directly.

*(One can hardly avoid translating 'nididhyasana' as 'sus- tained meditation'. But the author shows that for Sri Sankara and Suresvara the term had other meanings. See M.V. 56; 100,2, note; 124, 1, note; 125,2, note; 259,17, note. See also the author's English works, Salient Features, pp. 43-53; Clarifica- tion, p.98-9; Vision, pp.71-9, 115. T.N.)

(1) And the text 'But I am asking you about that Spirit taught in the Upanishads' (Brhad.III.ix.26) affirms that the Spirit in question is specifically the Spirit taught in the Upanishads. This would only have been possible if it had been the primary topic that the Upanishads taught. (B.S.Bh. I.i.4, cp. M.V.26,5)

(2)- If it had been simply a matter of an injunction to medi- tate on 'I am pure Being' as a mere idea, if the hearer was not being told that his true nature was Being when addressed as 'thou' (in the text 'That thou art'), then there would have

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becn no occasion to teach a specific means to knowledge in the additional text 'He who has a Teacher can know' (Chand. VI.xiv. 2). For the need for a Teacher from whom to hear the text and receive the injunction to meditate would have been obvious, as in the case of the texts of the ritualistic section of the Veda such as 'he should offer the Agnihotra'. (Chand.Bh.VI. xvi.3)

(3) And so this doctrine, which proceeds from upanishadic tradition, only leads to proper knowledge when it is given out by a Teacher fully conversant with that tradition, who is not a mere logician. (Katha Dh.I.ii.9)

(4) The text specifies 'those Teachers who have correct knowledge'. The Lord means that only the knowledge taught by them is effective, and not any other kind of knowledge. This granted, the point made in the next verse will follow natu-

knowledge as taught by them, 'you will not again be afflicted rally. 'Having known which', that is, heving acquired this

with confusion as you are now, 0 Son of Pandu'.(Bh.G.Bh.IV. 34-5)

(5) It is true that the obligatory ritual, such as the Agni- hotra, if performed to the accompaniment of prescribed medi- tations on its symbolic significance, is superior to the same ritual performed without such meditations, just as a learned Brahmin is superior to one who is not learned. But the Agni- hotra and other rituals are not quite without significance for knowledge even if performed without such meditations. For we have the Vedic text 'Him the true Brahmins seek to know ... through sacrifice ... ' (Brhad. IV.iv.22, M.V.55,1), which re- fers to the Agnihotra and other ritual as a means to knowl- edge without specifying whether it has to be accompanied by the prescribed meditations on its symbolic significance or not .... It is, however, correct to assume that, as a means to knowledge of the Self, ritual such as the Agnihotra has more power and produces more significant results when per- formed to the accompaniment of prescribed meditation .... For there is the text, 'What one does with knowledge, faith and meditation is more potent' (Chand.I.i.10). But this text, by saying that the Agnihotra and other rituals as accompanied by meditation are more potent in their special result, neverthe- less implies that these same rituals have some efficacy and significance for that result even when they are not accompa-

54,2) nied by meditation. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.18, continued below, M.V.

Here it is explained how both ritual alone and ritual accom- panied by meditation are each a means to knowledge.

(6) Yogis perform action without attachment or egoism, with

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body, mind, intellect and sense organs, for purification of the mind. (Bh.G.V.ll)

Śankara's Commentary: The term 'atma-suddhi' here means 'purification of the mind' (sattva-uddhi).

(7) Against such a position the author of the Sūtras says, 'Nevertheless, the secker of knowledge chould be equipped with inner and outer control and the cther preliminary disciplines'. For these disciplines have been enjoined in the passage, 'Therefore, possessed of inner and outer control, abandoning all action for personal ends, strengthening himself by volun- tary resistance to discomfort, and concenirating his mind, he should see the Self here in the midst of this life in the present body' (Brhad. IV.iv.23). What has been enjoined by the Veda, the author of the Sutras continues, must necessarily be carried out ... , Rituals such as sacrifices are also required for knowledge, as the Vedic text c the subjcct shows (cp. just above, M.V.53,5) .... Smrti texts, too, such as the Gita, explain how ritual sacrifices and the like, if performed with- out desire for individual gain, are a means to knowledge of the Self for those who desire liberation (Bh.G.XVII.25) .... A distinction, however, vetween the two kinds of means to knowl- edge should be drawn. Inner and outer control and the rest are more proximate means, because they are directly connected with knowledge of the Self through the phrase 'he who knows thus' (Brhad. IV.iv.23). Ritual sacrifices, on the other hand, are only connected with promoting the desire to know, and hence are to be regarded as more remote aids. (B.S.Bh.III.iv. 27)

(8) No one can attain Him through knowledge who is not averse from evil conduct, who is not tranquil, concentrated and of peaceful mind. (Katha I.ii.24)

Śankara's Commentary: He who is averse from evil conduct, whose mind is concentrated and withdrawn from the passionate inclinations of the senses, who is of peaceful mind and cares not even for the rewards promised for concentration, and who has a Teacher - such an one attains the Self, as earlier described, through knowledge.

(9) The instrument for vision of the Self is the mind, puri- fied and educated by inner and outer control, etc., and by the Veda and the teachings of the Teacher. (Bh.G.Bh.II.21)

(10) What it means is this. The highest form of 'establish- ment in knowledge' is the state of knowledge of one's own true Self in immediate experience. Such knowledge depends for its rise and maturation on the Vedic texts and the instruc- tions of the Teacher, along with auxiliaries such as

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purification of the mind and the cultivation of absence of pride and other qualities mentioned at Bhagavad Gita XIII .? ff. It consists essentially in knowledge of the identity of the Knower of the Field (see above, M.V. p.40). with the supreme Self. And it is associated with the abandonment of all action. Action is caused by the false notion of a distinction between the various factors that go to make it up, such as the one do- ing it, the instrument, the object, the result and so forth. (Bh.G.Bh.XVIII.55)

(11) One who has faith, whose senses are under control and who is intent on service of the Teacher attsins knowledge. (Bh.G.iV.39)

(12) Faith and the rest (including service of the Teacher) remove the (natural) incitements to transgress the spiritual law. Listening to, pondering over, and subjecting the upani- shadic texts to sustained meditation, on the other hand, are directly concerned with what has to be known. When sin and other obstacles pertaining to the body and mind have been re- moved, hearing, pondering and sustained meditation are by their very nature the means to knowledge of reality in its true form. (Brhad.Bh.I.iv.2)

(13) 0 Maitreyi! The Self has to be seen! It has to be heard about, pondered over and subjected to sustained medita- tion. Verily, through vision of the Self, which comes through pondering and meditation, all this is known. (Brhad.II.iv.5)

54 ALTERNATIVE COMBINATIONS OF THE MEANS TO KNOWLEDGE

But if ritual and ali the rest are to be regarded as means to knowledge, there is a point which requires consideration. Are they all to be resorted to indiscriminately? Or can we find any rule according to which some people should resort to only some of them? On this point, we can accept the rule that members of the three higher castes, who are qualified to perform the ritual laid down in the Veda, may perform that ritual with or with- out the accompanying meditations on its symbolic significance. In either case they will derive purity of mind and the incli- nation towards introspective contemplation. They will then be able to attain knowledge through hearing, pondering and sustained meditation. Inner and outer control and so on, of which restraint (yama, see Yoga Sutra II.29 ff.) is the most important element, are easy to obtain for those who have al- ready acquired purity of mind. For this reason the disin- terested performance of rituals, too, since it leads to purity of mind, is an auxiliary cause of the rise of knowledge. But

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there is no rule to say that rituals must necessarily be per- formed by everyone, even by those whose minds have been puri- fied by performance of rituals in previous lives. For them, the means to knowledge are hearing and the rest, associated with the inner disciplines of faith, devotion and so forth. Those who are not qualified to have knowledge of the con- tents of the Veda or to practise the rituals which it lays down may apply themselves to the restraints and observances appropriate for their caste, and acquire knowledge through hearing and reflecting over the teachings of the Epics and Puranas ard through other such practices. Exalted beings like the goas, to whom the Vedas are by nature ever manifest, have the right to practise hearing and the rest without application to the preliminary discipline of learning the texts by heart. And we learn from the Veda that in the case of Prajāpati, whose mind was perfectly pure, knowledge arose without his even having to practise hearing and the other disciplines (M.V.54,5). Iu the same way we have to understand that combi- nations of, or choices between, the various remaining parts of the discipline, such as faith, dedication, service of the Teacher and the resi, are required in different ways, either severally or collectively, for different grades of pupil, in order to qualify them for hearing and so on and for the rise of knowledge.

(1) Action is a means to liberation indirectly, through pro- moting knowledge. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.16)

(2) Hence regular performance of the Agnihotra and other ritual, with or without prescribed meditations, whether per- formed by the seeker of liberation in this life or a previous one, is instrumental, so far as it goes in any given case, in extinguishing that demerit arising from past sins which ob- structs knowledge of the Absolute. In this sense, such action is a means to knowledge of the Absolute. Depending in turn on the inner discipline of hearing, pondering, faith, dedica- tion and service of the Teacher, it co-operates with knowledge of the Absolute towards the one end of liberation. (B.S.Bh. IV.i.18, continuing on from M.V.53,5)

(3) But in the case of those Sudras like Vidura and Dharma- vyadha, in whom knowledge of the Absolute arises through the power of the impressions of good deeds performed in previous births, nothing can prevent such knowledge from bringing its due result. For knowledge brings its results inevitably and without exception. Moreover, the text from Smrti, 'One should read it out to all four castes' (Vyasa, M.Bh.XII.327.49) de- clares that all four castes have the right to instruction in the Epics and Puranas. But the principle that the Sudra has no rights in regard to the Veda stands. (B.S.Bh.I.iii.38)

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(4) In this connection, it is certain that there can be de- sire for liberation amongst the gods. It arises, for instance, from their noticing that their special powers belong to the realm of change and are not eternal. They are also in a posi- tion to achieve it, as we know from both verse and prose pas- sages of the Veda, as well as from the Enics, Puranas and worldly tradition (reading purana-lokebhyo), that they enjoy embodied existence. Nor are there any texts prohibiting the gods from the pursuit of liberation. It is truc that there are texts saying that a student must undergo an initiation (upanayana) before he can study the Veda. But the fact that the gods do not undergo this initiation does not disqualify them from Vedic practice. For this initiation is for the pur- pose of study and learning by heart, but the Veda is by nature manifest to the gods. And the Veda also exhibits them (as at Chandogya VIII.xi.3) assuming roles like that of a celibate

I.iii.26) student (brahmacarya) in order to acquire knowledge. (B.S.Bh.

(5) The fact that Prajapati was able to obtain vision of the unity of all is intelligible. For he had burnt all the sins that subvert merit, knowledge, dispassion and majesty, and transmute them into their opposites. Thereby he undcrwent a special birth with a pure body and organs. His vision of unity arose (without the need of instruction) from that. (Brhad.Bh.I.iv.2)

(6) There may be differences of choice or combination of ex- cellence or deficiency in the means used to attain an end .... Thus, in attainment of knowledge of the unity and sole reality of the Self, the origin is sometimes actions performed in a previous life, as in the case of Prajapati. Sometimes the means is mental concentration, for we have the text 'You should strive for knowledge of the Absolute through mental concentration' (Taitt.III.2-3, etc.). Sometimes faith and other factors are spoken of as the cause of knowledge of the Absolute in such texts from the Veda and Smrti as 'He who has a Teacher can know' (Chand. VI.xiv.2), 'He who has faith ac- quires knowledge' (Bh.G.IV.39), 'Know that through prostra- tion ... ' (Bh.G.IV.34), 'From the Teacher only' (Chand. IV.ix. 3) and 'It should be seen, it should be heard about' (Brhad. II.iv.5). (Brhad.Bh.I.iv.2)

55 THE LIMITS OF SPIRITUAL PRACTICE

One should also consider the question of how long, up to what point, the spiritual practices are to be continued. Are the ends of the Vedic teaching fulfilled when the spiritual prac- tices have been performed once? Or does one have to go fur- ther and carry out spiritual practices repeatedly? If

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repeated practice is necessary, how long should it be conti- nued? The Smrti text, 'A person qualifies himself for becoming established in knowledge by worshipping Him (from whom the world proceeds) through the performance of his particular re- ligious duties' (Bh.G.XVIII.46) shows that, since spiritual practices lead to a visible result, religious duties have to be carried out without desire for reward until purity and dis- passion have arisen in the mind. But those who have acquired dispassion should adopt the life of a wandering monk (parama- hamsa), as we know from the Vedic text 'He should wander forth as a monk the very cay that dispassion arises' (Jabala Up.4). But he shouid carry on with his religious duties until dis- passion dawns, for we have the Smrti text, 'Of the two, Karma Yoga is better than abandonment of karma' (Bh.G.V.2). The Smrti text 'But renunciation, O mighty-armed onc, is hard to achieve without the previous practice of Karma Yoga' (Bh.G. V.3) shows that Karma Yoga is the special means to renuncia- tion in the true sense of the word, namely direct intuition of the supreme 'reality. As for the immediate means to knowledge, such as hearing the upanishadic texts and so on, the decision between choice of one of them, or combination of some or all of them, depends on the qualifications of the person practising them. For ex- ample, the highest kind of candidate is able to acquire im- mediate intuitive vision that his Self is the Absolute from merely hearing the relevant upanishadic texts once. These people who realize the goal by merely hearing the texts once have nothing further to do. When once the sun has risen, no further acticn is needed to remove darkness. But those who are not able to acquire intuitive knowledge of the meaning of the texts in their own direct experience have to go on hearing the texts and reflecting over them to remove the doubts that prevent their meaning being understood, and they have to con- tinue with this until intuitive knowledge arises. For we see that those of dull understanding acquire knowledge through diligent repetition. 'Reflection' here implies resort to reasoning under the guidance of the Vedic texts, in the manner already explained (M.V.31,7-12), and to secular reasoning in conformity with that. In this way, notions that have been wrongly superimposed on the Self are removed one by one. But those who cannot acquire intuitive knowledge of reality by hearing and reflection alone have to resort to sustained meditation also. In any case, the general rule is that hear- ing and the rest have to be continued until there is intuitive knowledge of reality. For attainment of intuitive knowledge of reality is their purpose. The fact that they are mere means to this is shown by the Vedic text, which first says 'The Self has to be seen'. This shows that seeing the Self is the goal. And the text then goes on to teach that hearing and the rest are the means to that goal, in the words 'It must be

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heard about, pondered over, subjected to sustained meditation' (Brhad. II.iv.5). On the other hand inner and outer control and the rest, along with absence of pride and other qualities (prescribed at Gītā XIII.7 ff.), are mere auxiliaries, and there is no set limit to their observation. They ars intended for carrying knowledge to perfection, and whatever has that for its purpose is itself an aspect of being established in knowledge (jñana- niştha). Hence, when we speak of resort to the means of knowledge cowing to an end when knowledge is acquired, it does not mean that these auxiliaries alsc come tc an end.

(1) Him the true Brahmins seek to Fnow through repetition of the Veda, through sacrifice, through charity, through auster- ity and through extreme moderation in the enjoyment of sense- objects. (Brhad.IV.iv.22)

(2) Good works such as sacrifice, charity and austerity should not be given up. Verily, they must be continued. Verily, sacrifice, charity and austerity purify the hearts of the wise. O descendant of Prtha, it is My fixed and final view that these good works, too, should continue to be performed,

XVIII.5-6) without feelings of attachment or thought of reward. (Bh.G.

Śankara's Commentary: The word 'too' (in the phrase 'these good works, too', ) is used to show that such works should be continued by the seeker of liberation even though, when per- formed by a man of attachment hoping for rewards, they are a source of bondage.

(3) Monks wander forth from home desiring Him (the Self) alone as their realm (loka). (Brhad.IV.iv.22)

(4) Repeated resort to hearing, pondering and sustained medi- tation would indeed be useless in the case of the person who gained immediate experience of the fact that his true Self was the Absolute merely from hearing the text 'That thou art' spoken once. But it is appropriate in the case of the person who cannot do so. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.2)

(5) We find it to be the case that those who have but a vague idea of the meaning of a text on hearing it once do come to shed their various misconceptions and understand it rightly after repeated hearings. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.2)

(6) There are some for whom the meanings of the words 'that' and 'thou' are obscured by ignorance, doubt or misunderstand- ing. In their case, merely hearing the text 'That thou art' will not yield knowledge of its true meaning. For one can only understand the meaning of a sentence if one first under-

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stands the meanings of the words composing it. In the case of such people, repeated hearing of the texts and reasoning over them is appropriate in order to discern the true meanings of the words. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.2, cp. M.V.207,3-4)

(7) It is true that the Self which is being communicated has no parts. But many parts are erroneously attributed to it, such as body. mind, senses, intellect and sensation. Here, one act of attention can dispose of one erroneously attrivuted part, another can dispose of ancther. In this sense, communi- cation of the Absolute may be by stages. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.2)

(8) For all yogis of weak or medium calibre, restraint of the mind is the means to pass beyond all fear, also to the eradi- cation of misery, to awakening to the Self and to unbroken peace. (G.K.III.40)

Sankara's Commentary: There are some people who take the mind and the senses, and all else that is other than the Abso- lute in its true form, as non-existent from the highest stand- point, like a rope-snake. They have 'become' the Absolute, and feel no fear, and have perfect natural certitude as to the indestructible peace called liberation, which depends on noth- ing external. As we have already explained (G.K.Bh.III.36), there are then no further spiritual practices for such a per- son to do. But there are other yogis on the spiritual path of weak or middling powers of vision. They regard the mind as something other than the Self, but related to the Self, and are not awake to the sole reality of the transcendent Self. In their case, passing beyond fear depends on restraint of the mind. So also does eradication of misery. For those who lack dis- crimination, and regard the Self as related to the mind, can- not escape misery as long as the mind is active. In their case, awakening to the Self, also, depends on rigid control of the mind. So does that indestructible peace which is called liberation (cp. M.V.259,17, note).

Here !rigid control of the mind' (mano-nigraha) means sus- tained meditation (nididhyasana, cp. M.V.53).

(9) For hearing and the rest have to be carried on until there is direct vision of the Self, but then they end. For their goal is one that is realizable in this very life. (B.S. Bh.I.i.1)

(10) But the wandering monk gives up all ritualistic duties, and there can be no obstacles for him arising from the omis- sion of acts. As for inner and outer control and the rest, which are his peculiar duty, these strengthen his steadfast- ness in the Absolute, and are not opposed to it. The duty

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laid down for his order is in fact establishment in (firm ad- herence to) a steadfast absorption in the Absolute, fortified by inner and outer contrcl and other such disciplines. Sacri- ficial ritual and the like, however, which are the duty of other orders, do prove an obstacle to the monk if he strays from his path to perform them. (B.S.Bh.III.iv.20)

(11) The Lord is Himself going to explain in detail the na- ture of that Knower of the Field (M.V. p.40) in all his majesty, the knowledge of whom leads to immortality. This win come at the point beginning 'I will teach you what you have to know' (Bh.G.XIII.12 ff.). But now He is going to teach the group of virtues, such as absence uf pride and the rest, which lead to knowledge. When they are present, a person becomes qualified to know what has to be known. One intent on these is said to be a renunciate, a person established in his ab- sorption in knowledge. Because this group of virtues is the means to metaphysical knowledge, the Lord lays down that they may be referred to as knowledge. (Bh.G.Bh.XIII.7)

(12) And another reason why the order of wandering mendi- cancy cannot be merely for those who are physically or other- wise unfit to perform ritual (as the Mimamsakas claim it to be) is the fact that entering this order is part of the dis- cipline for bringing metaphysical knowledge to its full matur- ity as realization of the Absolute. (B.S.Bh.III.iv.20)

56 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRESCRIBED SYMBOLIC MEDITATIONS (UPĀSANA) AND SUSTAINED MEDITATION ON THE ABSOLUTE (NIDIDHYĀSANA)

It has been explained how the monk who has attained through dispassion to genuine adoption of the life of wandering mendi- cancy must necessarily carry out the discipline of hearing the texts and pondering over them regularly and continually until he gains immediate vision of the Self. He who does not attain this immediate vision merely from hearing, must carry out further regular hearing, supported by pondering over the meaning. Weak and mediocre candidates, however, must also perform sustained meditation (nididhyasana, cp. T.N. at M.V. 53, intro.). Sustained meditation, like the unbroken meditation implied in the prescribed symbolic meditations, is a piece of action. Hence it is sometimes called meditation (upāsana). Yet such symbolic meditations as 'Woman is the sacrificial fire' (Chand. V.viii.1) are differently defined. Upāsana (as con- trasted with nididhyasana) means maintaining a stream of identical images of which the form is (not dictated by one's knowledge of any reality but) prescribed in the Veda.

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Nididhyasana, on the other hand, means fixing the mental gaze on the principle of reality to determine its true nature, like one examining a jewel. A candidate practising meditation in the form of upasana must select one of the meditations laid down for attaining to the Lord as associated with attributes, and maintain the same image in his mind, according to the dictates of the Veda, un- til he has obtained immediate vision of the object of his meditation. For meditation realizes its true end when it is used as a means to direct vision. But its reward is attain- ment of the Absolute in its lower form at a later time (i.e. after death) in the World of Brahma. Here there is enjoyment of the same cxperience as the Lord. And at the end of the world-period the final metaphysical knowledge will arise, and there will be deferred release in company with Brahma. Such is the teaching of the Veda. The aim of the one practising sustained meditation (nidi- dhyasana) is different. He tries to attain direct vision of reality (here in this very world) by turning his mind away from all else. And there is the difference - as against upā- sana - that after the rise of knowledge nothing further re- mains to be done. It is this sustained meditation that is referred to at Katba Upanishad I.ii.12 by the name 'Adhyatma Yoga'. In the Gita it is sometimes called 'Dhyana Yoga' (e.g. XVIII.52). In the Māndūkya Kārikās it is called 'restraint of the mind' (G.K.III.41, etc.). Its nature is described there in that latter work. Everywhere its result is described in the same way as right metaphysical knowledge, and from this comes immediate liberation (sadyo-mukti).

(1) If immediate vision of the Lord or other object of medi- tation had been secured through one form of meditation, it would be purposeless to start another. As for the theory of a combination of different meditations, this would render it impossible to attain direct vision of any deity, as the mind would be thrown into distraction. And the Vedic texts show that meditation should culminate in immediate vision of (= self-identification with) the being on whom the meditation is performed. For example, there are such texts from the Veda as 'He who has direct vision of this does not fall into doubt' (Chand. III.xiv.4) and 'Having already identified himself with the deity of his meditation while still alive, he merges with him completely at death (Brhad.IV.i.2, cp. Suresvara, B.B.V. IV.i.23 ff.). And there are Smrti texts teaching the same point, such as '(Whatever being one remembers at death), on whom one has meditated constantly, (to him one goes, 0 son of Kuntī)' (Bh.G.VIII.6). Therefore one should choose only one of the various meditations which bring the same reward, and adhere to that until the reward is attained, in the form of realization of one's identity with the object of meditation'. (B.S.Bh.III.iii.59)

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(2) When the World of Brahma, which belongs to the Absolute in its ('lower' cr) 'effect' form, is about to dissolve at the end of a world-period, the souls whe have attained to perfect metaphysical knowledge in that world proceed, together with Hiranygarbha (Brahma), the presiding deity of that world, to what the author of the Sutras calls 'the supreme'. 'The su- preme' is the perfectly pure highest abode of Visnu. Thus a release by stages (krama-mukti) has to be assumed, on account of the mention of 'non-return' and other such circumstances in certain Vedic texts. (B.S.Bh.IV.iii.10)

(3) The wise men comes to know God through mastering Adhyatma Yoga, and gives up joy and sorrow. (Katha I.ii.12)

Śankara's Commentary: Mastering Adhyātma Yoga: Adhyātma Yoga means withdrawing the mind from objects and concentrating it on the Self. Having meditated on the deity, the Self, through attainment of Adhyatma Yoga, the wise man gives up joy and sorrow because there are no gradations of value in the Self.

(4) 'He is seen by those of subtle vision through their sub- tle minds' says the Veda (Katha I.iii.12), pointing out that the highest state of Visnu is difficult to attain. Then the same text goes on to teach yoga as the means to attain it, in the words 'The wise man should dissolve the senses into the mind and should dissolve the mind into the intellect. He should dissolve the soul into the great self and he should

13). dissolve that into the Self that is pure peace' (Katha I.iii.

That is, he should first give up the use of speech and the other organs of action and perception and should remain iden- tified with the lower aspect of the mind alone. He should then note that the lower aspect of the mind, too, has defects such as an inclination towards the sense objects and unsteadi- ness in its decisions, and he should dissolve it into that higher aspect of mind (buddhi) which has fixed determination for its nature and is sometimes known by the technical term 'intellect' (vijmana). He should refine the intellect and resolve it into 'the great self', the experiencer or apex of the intellect. The 'great self', however, must be dissolved in the 'Self that is pure peace', the supreme Spirit that is the subject of the section, the summit of human experience. (B.S.Bh.I.iv.1)

(5) Resorting to dispassion, always intent on the Yoga of Meditation (Dhyana Yoga). (Bh.G.XVIII.52)

Sankara's Commentary: Meditation means dwelling on the true nature of the Self. Yoga means one-pointed concentration on the Self. He who is intent on 'Dhyana' and 'Yoga' thus

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defined is the one 'intent on the Yoga of Meditation'. The use of the word 'always' is to show that he has no other du- ties, such as daily repetition of the Vedic verses.

The Lord wishes to explain what is implied in establishment in absorption in knowledge. He first staies the inner discipline in the passage beginning 'associated with a pure intellect' (Bh. G. XVIIr. 51) and ending 'becomes fit for reclization of the Abeolute' (Bh.G.XVIII.53). Then He describes the result, namely immmediate liberation, in the two verses beginning 'Having become the Absolute, pure in mind ... ' (Bh.G.XVIII. 54-5).

(6) That yoga should certainly be practised with resclute mind. Giving up without exception all desires that come from individual will, restraining the sense-organs on every side through the mind, one should gradually withdraw from all activity, with will and intellect firmly controlled; keeping the mind fixed on the Self, one should not think of anything. Wherever the fickle mind wanders, one should bring it back and fix it on the Self alone, under firm control. Supreme joy comes to such a yogi, whose mind is at perfect peace, whose lusts have subsided, who is sinless and who has become the Ab- solute. Such a yogi, free from all sin, always controlling his mind in this way, easily attains the supreme joy of con- tact with the Absolute. With his mind contro'led through yoga, he sees himself in all beings and all beings in his own Self, seeing the same everywhere. (Bh.G.VI.23-9)

Śankara's Commentary: 'Seeing the same everywhere' is said of one who has the same undifferentiated vision or knowledge of unity and identity with the Absolute and the Self in regard to all things of different grades, from Brahma to the beings of the vegetable and mineral realms. (Bh.G.Bh.VI.29)

Here, having explained the method of the Yoga of Meditation (dhyana), the Lord shows in the last verse that its result is knowledge.

(7) The mind must be restrained tirelessly, as if one were emptying the sea with the tip of a blade of grass. One must resort to special means to restrain the mind when it is dis- persed amid desires and enjoyments. The mind must also be awakened and held in restraint even when it is perfectly calm in the dissolution of dreamless sleep. Mere dissolution in dreamless sleep is no better than desire (since it is also the seed of future worldly experience). One restrains the mind from desires and enjoyments by remembering 'All is pain'. When one remembers 'All is the Unborn (the Absolute)', one does not even see what is born. When the mind is drowsy in its practice of yoga one should arouse it, and when it is

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distracted one should again calm it down. One should know that the mind is soiled with latent impressions, and should not allow it to move when it has attained the state of equi- librium, free from the tendency either to dissolution or dis- traction. Even there, one should not savour the joy. One should acquire non-attachment through the discriminative wis- dom that sees all joy as born of Ignorance. When the mind, although at first motionless, moves out once more, one should again carefully bring it back to unity. When the mind no longer either undergoes dissolution in dreamless sleep or dis- traction amidst desires and enjoyments, and it is motionless and without manifestation, then it has reached its state of perfection. It (has reached the state of 'no-mind', G.K.III. 32, and) is the Absolute. (G.K.III.41-6)

Here there is first a detailed description of the method of restraining the mind, and afterwards an ewplanation of the result in the form of the mind's attainment of the Absolute.

(8) It has already been established in the first, topic of the present Book (i.e. at B.S.Bh. IV.i.l, cp. M.V.125, intro .; 206,6, note 3; 259,8) that all meditations (upasana) imply re- peated activity. Amongst meditations in general, those which aim at leading to right intuitive knowledge have to be per- formed until the end is achieved, like pounding the paddy to extract the rice. In their case, the extent of the repetition required is clear. For after their final goal of right in- tuitive knowledge has been achieved, no further action could be prescribed. Intuitive knowledge of the identity of one's true Self with the Absolute cannot be prescribed. It takes one beyond the realm of the Veda. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.12, cp. M.V. 206,6, note 1)

Here, repetition of the practice of hearing, pondering and sustained meditation (nididhyasana) is implied by the fact of their being linked with the word (prescribed) 'meditation' (upasanā). Sustained meditation (nididhyasana), in particular, has to be practised as a form of meditation (upāsana). For it must be realized that this has already been established in Śri Sankara's Brahma Sutra Commmentary in the words, 'When we speak of meditation (upāsana) or sustained meditation (nidi- dhyasana) we are referring to activities which imply repeti- tion as an essential feature' (B.S.Bh.IV.i.1).

57 THE LEARNING AND OTHER VIRTUES TO BE PURSUED BY THE RENUNCIATE SEEKING LIBERATION FALL WITHIN IGNORANCE

The seeker of liberation, the one endued with metaphysical discrimination, should rise above the three basic desires for

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a son, for wealth and for advantages in the after-life, and should master his 'learning', here understood as knowledge of the Self. Then he should 'desire to stand based on strength'. That is, he should noi revcal himself as possessed of knowledge and other accomplishments, but rather should strive to stand based on the strength of the Self alone. Then he should strive to become a sagc, and shouid acquire supreme eminence in knowl edge through exclusive pursuit of the Self. Otherwise, one should suppose, his mind might be drawn towards external ob- jects by the overpowering force of natural extraversiom. And the Vedic doctrine is that he should acquire total contenpt for all ideas other than that of the Self, and should become utterly absorbed in the vision of the Absclute, and then he will be a Brahmin in the true sense. Even this discipline is carried out, like rituals and pre- scribed meditations, on the basis of the erroneous idea that cme is an individual capable of action. Hence it belongs em- phatically to the realm of Jgnorance. In the same way, the notions that the individual soul is an individual scul, that it has attained dispassion, that it desires liberation and that it has obtained liberation are all appearances that hold good from the standpoint of practical experience only. The final truth is that the Self alone exists, and that it is the Absolute, unborn and without a second.

(1) Therefore the Brahmin, having mastered his 'learning', here conceived as knowledge of the Self, should strive to stand based on the strength of the Self. And having mastered both learning and strength, he becomes a silent contemplative sage (muni). When he has mastered both the preparations for sagehood and sagehood itseif, then he becomes a Brahmin in the true sense of the word, a knower of the Absolute. (Brhad. III.v.1)

Śankara's Commentary: The Brahmins of ancient times knew that this Self was beyond the scope of means and ends in the domain of action. They rose above all ends and means, charac- terized here as 'desires', and lived as mendicants. And they abandoned all action as a means either for ends in this life or lives to come. Therefore, even today, a Brahmin, that is, one who is to get knowledge of the Absolute (brahman), first masters this indirect knowledge of the Self called 'learning' - that is, completes his indirect knowledge of the Self. Then, through the help of the Teacher and the traditional teaching, he rises above desires. Indeed, this 'learning' in its true form consists in rising above desires .... Therefore, having risen above desires, he should strive to stand based on the strength of direct knowledge of the Self .. 'Strength' here refers to the total elimination of vision of objects, an elimination which is achieved through knowledge of the Self. The phrase 'He should strive to stand based on the

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strength of the Self' means that he should strive to remain in the state where vision of objects is eliminated .... Then he becomes a silent contemplative sage (muni), that is to say a yogi, through pondering (manana) .... The phrase 'the prepara- tions for contemplative sagehocd' means the perfection of wis- dom and strength, understood respectively as knowledge of the Self and elimination of all notion of the not-self. Sagehood is the culminating point and final result of elimination of all notion of the not-self. When this has been achieved, t.he Brahmin has done all that needs to be done. The idea 'All is the Absolute' arises.

(2) Sagehood is a third stage, laid down after those of 'the state of a child' (balya, see M.V.57,3, notc) and 'learning', implying knowledge of a deeper form .... But if it be assumed that knowledge has already been achieved, how can it be af- firmed that there is an injunction to resort to the life of a sage, an affirmation made on the ground that sagehood repre- sents a special degree of knowledge that has not yet been men- tioned? This is explained by the words 'where there is a special case' occurring in the Sutra. It means that in the special case where knowledge of the high degree implied by contemplative sagehood has not been attained, on account of the continued overpowering force of the vision of difference,

III.iv.47) there we have an injunction to resort to sagehood. (B.S.Bh.

In Śri Śankara's Brahma Sutra Commentary it is said that even the enlightened person, insofar as he conforms in life to the empirical standpoint, may appear to be overpowered by vision of difference, and that the life of contemplative sagehood is prescribed to counteract this. The quotation in the previous sentence (omitted above) 'having known the Self' shows that it is the truly enlightened person who is in question. For that reason, it also follows that the one who merely desires en- lightenment should also practise the life of contemplative sagehood, so there is no contradiction.

(3) He should avoid all hypocrisy and pride and the like, not revealing his knowledge, learning and spirituality. He should be like a small child, who does not try to show himself off to others, because his sensibilities are not yet devel- oped. (B.S.Bh.III.iv.50)

In the Brhadaranyaka Commentary, 'balya' is explained as the strength (bala) derived from knowledge. In the Brahma Sutra Commentary, it is eaplained as a small child's (bala) nature, free from hypocrisy and show. The two ideas should be taken as complementary.

(4) The monk should know from the beginning what has to be

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rejected, what has to be realized in immediate intuition, what disciplines have to be adopted and what has to be neutrai- ized. It is traditionally held that, apart from the Self that has to be realized, the other three categories (what has to be rejected, adopted and neutralized) are illusory. (G.K.IV.90)

Śankara's Commentary: The three worlds of waking, dream and dreamless sleep have lo be rejected as non-existent in the Self, as an imaginary snake has to be rejected as non-existent in the rope in which it has been imagined. What has to be realized in immediate intuition is the supreme reality beyond the four modes of judgment .* The true discipline is to become a monk and give up the three desires for a son, wealth and advantages in the life to come. And then one has to cultivatc the qualities of wisdom, strength (or childlike simplicity) and sagehood. Psychologi- cal defects like attachment, aversion, infatuation and the like have to be rooted out. The monk must know that his dis- cipline lies in all these things that have to be rejected, realized in immediate intuition, auopted or neutralized. And he must know all this right from the start. Apart from what has to be realized in immediate intuition - apart from the One, the Absolute, the supreme reality - the other three classes of things which have to be rejected, adop- ted or neutralized are illusion, mere figments of Ignorance. This is the traditional teaching of the knowers of the Abso- lute. It means that these threc classes of things are not ultimately real.

*(The four modes of judgment are given at G.K.IV.83. The author translates the verse as follows at M.R.V., English intro. p.46: ""It is; it is not; is and is not; neither is nor is not" - he who has seen that Glorious One untouched by these four one-sided viewpoints by which He seems to be for ever obscured, he verily is the all-seer'. T.N.)

(5) No soul is ever born. The Self undergoes no birth. That is the highest reality where nothing is born. (G.K.III.48)

Sankara's Commentary: All these disciplines such as re- straint of the mind are mere projections of the imagination, like the objects of clay or iron imagined as real entities distinct from their material cause. So also are the various prescribed meditations. The idea is that they are mere means to apprehension of the supreme reality, not that they are themselves the final truth. The final truth is that no soul was ever born, no individual capable of action and experi- ence .... This reality is something superior to the 'realities previously treated of as mere means to ends. In this reality, which is the Absolute, nothing is born, not an atom.

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58 AFTER THE RISE OF METAPHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE THERE IS ONLY ABSORPTION IN THE SELF AND NO ACTION

Though the Veda and Smrti lay down what are the disciplines for metaphysical knowledge, yet one cannot predict which of those who carry them out will attain it or when they will do so. If there is no impediment, one who carries out the means to metaphysical knowledge will find that it matures in that very life. But if there is an impediment, then it will still mature, but in a later life. For this reason we find that metaphysical knowledge sometimes matures during life as a celibate student, or in the householder's state, or in the state of retired forest life as the case may be, whenever one of these states may happen to favour the fruition of dis- cipiines carried out in earlier lives. Whenever anyone gains metaphysical knowledge, it implies automatically that he re- nounces all action. Metaphysical knowledge and action cannot exist in any way whatever. Thus the Veda permits a person to retire from any stage of life, from that of a celibate student on, and take up the life of a wandering monk. For wc have the text, 'Let a person renounce after completing the life of a forest-dweller; or, if conditions be otherwise and favourable, let him renounce even in the midst of life as a celibate stu- dent or in the midst of life as a forest-dweller' (Jabāla 4). Where, however, a person is for some reason unable to become a renunciate in the formal sense (i.e. to adopt the life and insignia of a monk) on the rise of metaphysical knowledge, here, though it may appear from the empirical standpoint that he is carrying on with the active life, from the standpoint of true vision he has no connection with action. In his case there is no egoism or desire for reward for his actions, so that they do not count as action. From his own standpoint all action was abolished on the rise of metaphysical knowledge. And there can only be metaphysical knowledge where there is total absence of any sense that one is personally engaged in action.

(1) If a person comes to know the Self immediately as 'This am I', in desire for what and for the sake of whom would he continue to identify himself with the miseries of the body? (Brhad. IV.iv.12)

(2) But he whose joy is in the Self alone, who is fully sat- isfied by the Self and content with the Self alone - there is nothing that such a person has to do. (Bh.G.III.17)

(3) When there is no obstruction arising from the maturation of the merit and demerit from previous deeds, then the means to metaphysical knowledge, if put into operation, produce metaphysical knowledge here in this life. But if there is

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such an obstruction, they only give rise to enlightenment after the present life .... (The laws governing the fruition of merit and demerit are inviolable.) For the conditions of time, place and occasion that call forth the maturation of the karmic results of one deed cannot call forth that of another. For deeds (e.g. extremely good and extremely bad ones) have contradictory karmic results. (B.S.Bh.III.iv.51)

(4) But one who sees inaction in action and action in in- action becomes actionless and a renunciate through that very insight. Though he may have been engaged in action before at- taining metaphysical discrimination, afterwards he does not engage in any action any longer, but allows just enough acti- vity to his body to sustain life. He who begins his life in action due to merit and demerit from previous lives, and then at some later point acquires right metaphysical knowledge, from then on secs no purpose in any action, and renounces ac- tion together with its accessories. Should it, for any reason, be impossible for him to give up the life of action, he may remain engaged in action as before, for the good of the world, yet because he has no purposes of his own to serve, and is without attachment either for action or its rewards, he does nothing. The action of such a person is verily inaction, as it has been burnt in the fire of knowledge. (Bh.G.Bh.IV.20)

(5) When a person has in this way lost the idea that he is either a Brahmin or a Kshatriya, the renunciation of that idea automatically implies the renunciation of the actions appro- priate to that caste, together with the accessories required for the performance of its duties (e.g. household fire, sacred thread, etc.). (Brhad.Bh.II.iv.1)

(6) In worldly experience we find that colour manifests as soon as there is contact between the visual organ and light. In the same way, Ignorance of the Absolute disappears the moment that direct knowledge of it arises. (Brhad.Bh.I.iv.1O)

(7) For the conviction of the one who knows the Absolute is: 'I am the Absolute, by nature incapable of individual action or experience eternally throughout past, present and future time, quite contradictory to the notion which prevailed be- fore, namely that I was an individual, capable of action and experience. In truth, I was not ever capable of action and experience before, I am not capable of them now, and I never shall be in the future'. Only on this basis is liberation intelligible. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.13, cp. M.V.203,7, note)

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59 LIBERATION IS NOTHING CTHER THAN THAT FIRM ESTABLISHMENT IN THE SELF THAT PREVAILS WHEN IGNORANCE HAS BEEN CANCELLED

The argument so far has shown that the nctions cf bondage and liberation fall within the realm of empirical experience, it- scif based on ihe mutual supcrimposition of the Self and not. self. Liberation may accordingly be seen as the establishment in the non-dual Self that occurs when metaphysical Ignorance and the other typical characteristics of transmigratory life are brought to an end. This occurs through the intuitive metaphysical knowledge that arises from the Vedic texts and the teachings of the Ācarya. But liberation so conceived only makes sense from the standpoint of Ignorance. Various phreses are used in Śri Śankara's text to refer to such a state of transcendence of all plurality (kaivalya). For example, we find 'being esteblished in one's true nature' (Mand.Bh. intro., M. V.50,1), 'being established in one's own Self', 'being established in one's true essential nature', 'being established in one'e true nature which is the inmost Self', 'having one's own Self as one's (sole) support', 'real- ization of one's own true nature', 'the state of realization

60,2; 67,4). of the Absolute' (M.V.59,8) and 'freedom from the body' (M.V.

This state of liberation implies identity with the Abso- lute. And, since the Absolute is nothing other than the true nature of the enquirer, it is not a state that has to be ac- quired through any form of action, either through production, transformation, purification or obtainment (cp. M.V.59,12). It is simply a matter of knowing one's own true nature through removal of the metaphysical Ignorance that obscures it. Even the doctrine that liberation has to be effected through knowl- edge is only a figurative way of speaking. Attainment of the Absolute is 'attainment' in the same figurative sense as the 'attaining himself as the tenth' achieved by the tenth man through coming to see that he was the tenth. (A simple villager, deputed to count ten people, could only reach nine because he forgot to count himself, and was reminded by a bystander 'You are the tenth'.) There is no break in the knowledge of the Self of such a knower, even though he conforms to the erroneous vision of the world, for he is merely conforming to what he knows to be an error. Such a person's actions do not involve him in merit and demerit and consequent further transmigratory ex- perience, as they are performed only for the welfare of the people. And if he gives spiritual teaching, it is only to help seekers of liberation. Even here, he does not feel that, in the final analysis, he is an individual person performing an action.

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(1) What, then, is that purpose? We reply as follows. When anyone is suffering from a disease and the disease ends, the patient is then established in his true nature (as healthy). Similarly, when the dualistic world of plurality comes to an end, the soul, previously in pain, becomes established in its true nature. 'Attaining' this state of non-duality is the purpose. (Mand.Bh.l, intro.)

(2) And so, when metaphycical Ignorance ceascu, one becomes established in one's own true Self. This is (figuratively called) 'attainment' of the supreme. (Taitt.Bh.I.1, intro. )

(3) If the Self is eternal and so uot produced by knowledge, does not this mean that mere knowledge is useless? No. For metaphysical knowledge leads on to the immediately evident re- sult of revealing one's own trne intrinsic nature, transcend- ing all plurality, through putting an end to metaphysical Ignorance. Knowledge which puts an end to the darkness of metaphysical Ignorance culminates in this immediately evident result of transcendence. The light of a lamp has the immedi- ate result of dispelling Ignorance, darkness and illusory no- tions like that of a rope-snake. The result of such a light will be the conviction that the rope (alone exists and) tran- scends all false notions like that cf a snake, which now no longer exist. Similarly, the result of metaphysical knowledge is that the Self manifests free from all false imagination and transcendent. (Bh.G.Bh.XVIII.67, intro. )

(4) On the death of this body there will be no occasion for another to come into being, for attachment and the other bind- ing psychological defects will not have been in play. Tran- scendence of all plurality will have been realized without ef- fort, since transcendence is no more than being established in one's own true nature. (Bh.G.Bh.XVIII.67, intro. )

This sentence was written in the context of conforming for argument's sake to the basic assumptions of those who hold that total freedom is to be achieved solely by performance of the obligatory ritual. Similarly, in the Brahma Sutra Commen- tary (IV.iii. l4) there is a phrase conforming to the assump- tions of the same doctrine. It runs: 'Transcendence of all plurality, meaning establishment in one's own true nature, en- sues because there is no longer anything to cause one to join with another body'. All the passage will be given in context at M.V.65, 3 below.

(5) The so-called immortality of the gods and other beings is transient. But this immortality, which means establishment in one's own true nature as the inmost Self, is permanent. (Katha Bh.II.i.2)

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(6) Since this beginningless and endless transmigration is painful by nature, and is connected with all continuousiy, like the unbroken flow of a river, all Jiving beings ought to desire to be rid of it. The cessation of transmigration is liberation, the province of the higher (metaphysical) knowl- edge. Liberation is beginningjess and endless, not subject to decay and death, immortal, beyond danger, pure, clear, con- sisting in establishment in one's own Self, supreme bliss, non-dual. (Muņd.Bh.I.ii.1)

(7) When the true nature of the soul is not yet discriminated from the body and other apparent conditioning adjuncts, the cognition arising from the Veda that effects this discrimina- tion constitutes 'transcending the body'. And the 'attainment of the soul's true nature' is nothing other than the direct intuition of the true nature of the Self resulting from the discriminating cognition. (B.S.Bh.I.iii.19)

(8) This is the state of realization of the Absolute, O descendant of Prthu. No one who attains this state falls into error again. (Bh.G.II.72)

Sankara's Commentary: This is the state of realization of the Absolute. It means renunciation of all action and remain- ing established as the Absolute.

(9) Just as the slough of a snake lies dead, cast off on the top of an ant-hill, so lies this body. (Brhad. IV.iv.7)

Śankara's Commentary: In the case of the liberatcd person, illustrated by the snake which sheds its slough, the body may be said to lie as if dead, because it has been rejected as not-self. Though the case of the liberated person is parallel with that of the snake that has cast off its skin, it is not completely parallel. He has become the Self of all. He is like the snake in point of being at present without a body. But, unlike the snake, he does not later re-assume a body. Previously he identified himself with a body brought on by desire and action, and so was embodied and mortal. But now he has lost desire and action and is therefore verily bodiless and immortal.

(10) Therefore, since being embodied is the result of false notions, it is proved that the enlightened person is not em- bodied even when still alive. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4, M.V.25,1)

(11) The state of liberation is verily identity with the Absolute. (B.S.Bh.III.iv.52, cp. M.V.61,4)

(12) He who thinks that liberation is something that has to be literally 'produced' has in mind a 'liberation' that would

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depend on action of body, speech or mind. The same is true of those who think that the soul has to undergo transformation to become the Absolute. Liberation as conceived in both these views would inevitably be impermanent. For we find in the world that nothing is permanent which can only come into being through a transformation, like curds (which are a transforma- tion of milk), or which has to be produced, like a pot. Nor can it be said that liberation is dependent on action in the sense of needing to be obtained. For, as being the truc na- turc of one's own Self, it is not subject to being 'ob- iained' .... Nor does liberation depend on action in the form of purification (samckara). Purification is brought ahout either through conferring some new attribute on the thing to be purified, or else removing a defect. But in the case of liberation it is not possible to confer a new attribute. For liberation is the Absolute in its true nature, to which noth- ing can be superadded. Nor can there be purification through removal of defects. For liberation is the Absolute in its true nature, eternally pure and free from defects. (B.S.Bh. I.i.4, cp. M.V.50,1)

(13) Liberation is said figuratively to be a result produced by knowledge because knowledge puts an end to the obstruction caused by Ignorance. But Ignorance cannot be brought to an end by any form of action. Nor can one conceive of any other obstruction to liberation apart from Ignorance, of a kind that might be removed by action. For liberation is eternal, and is nothing other than the true nature of the seeker himself. (Brhad.Bh.III.iii.1, intro.)

(14) The villager we are considering, who was counting the numbers of the party, failed, through his own Ignorance, to 'attain to' himself (to include himself in the number, cp. M.V.59, intro.). But when he was afterwards reminded by someone 'You are the tenth' he 'attained to himself' through his own knowledge. In the same way, one who fails, through metaphysical Ignorance, to attain to his own true nature as the Absolute may very well attain to it later when instructed by the Vedic texts, through enlightenment in the form of direct intuition that he is the Absolute, the Self of all. (Taitt.Bh.II.1, cp. M.V.206,8)

(15) Awakening, through cancellation of wrong knowledge, to the fact that one is not an individual able to perform action, puts an end to action. But wrong knowledge, though cancelled, may continue for a time through the force of impressions (samskara), as in the case of double vision of the moon (where the patient, even after he has been cured, may occa- sionally be haunted by recurring double vision of the moon, which he does not take seriously). (B.S.Bh.IV.i.15; cp. M.V. 203,7, note; 254,2, note)

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(16) No wrong notion arises for the enlightened person. For in his case there is no reason for it. An erroneous notion arises and becomes manifest on the basis of the general form of an object when its particular nature has not been deter- mined. As, for example, there may be the notion of silver where there is in fact a piece of chell, when the shell has been perceived in a general way (as a 'this') but not deter- minately perceived as a piece of shell. In the case of one who has determinate knowledge of an object, the basis of er- roneous cognition has been destroyed and it cannot occur. When a correct idea abcut the chell has once arisen, erroneous no- tions about it are no longer found. Sometimes, however, memories which appear like erroneous cognitions may arise from latent impressions left by erroneous notions that had arisen previously, and may occasionally produce the appearance of erroneous cognition. It is the same as when one who has cor- rectly learned the directions of the quarters is (even after- wards) occasionally visitcd by a wrong notion of them (which aves not seriously affect his correct conviction). (Brhad, Bh. I.iv.10, cp. M.V.231,7, note)

(17) (Even the liberated person, says the objector, has to act, and his actions will involve merit and demerit and re- birth.) If you try to avoid this consequence, he continues, by saying that the acts of him who acquires enlightenment through mere knowledge are forthwith destroyed, then it would follow that, because knowledge of the Absolute is the cause of attainment of pure Being at the very moment of its rise, to say 'There is liberation' would imply immediate death. From this it would follow that there could never be a (person lib- erated while alive and so there could never be a) Teacher. And this would contradict the text 'One who has a Teacher ac- quires knowledge', and would imply that liberation could not arise from knowledge. Or else it would imply that knowledge did not invariably produce its expected result, as, for in- stance, when a person knows the way to another country but does not put his knowledge into practice by actually going there. All this objection, however, is wrong, because it neglects the distinction between works which have and works which have not actually begun to work out their fruits in the life in which liberation is attained. (Chand.Bh.VI.xiv.2)

There cannot be action in conformity to what has been can- celled and known to be false (hence the reference to 'rest' in the nine-gated city of the body at M.V.59,18, immediately below). This also refutes the criticism that, on the Ad- vaitin's doctrine, there cannot be an enlightened Teacher.

(18) For actions pertain to the body, and it is through Igno- rance that they are falsely superimposed onto the Self, which

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is other than the body. And they can be 'renounced' through discriminative knowledge that the Self is different. from the body and its actions. He in whom this discriminative knowl- edge has arisen, who has renounced all action, continues never- theless to rest in the body as if in a house, to rest in the nine-gated city of the body, undergoing experiences couforming to the unexhausted remainder of the impressions of that frac- tion of his total merit and demerit which initiated his present birth. For it is only in the body that particular cognition is possible. The text therefore introduced a mcaningful qual- ification when it said 'rests in the body'. For the meaning is 'only rests in the body', (and does not suppose that he is acting when it acts), and this implies a distinction between the experience of the enlightened person and the unenlightened one. (Bh.G.Bh.V.13)

Here it is caid that when all a person's action has ceased he may rest in the body, conforming to what has been cancelled and knoun to be false. From this we see that it is quite in- telligible that such a person should continue to feel 'I am not doing anything' even in the act of giving teaching.

60 THE TWO FORMS OF LIBERATION, AND HOW LIBERATION IN LIFE IS SUPERIOR

The liberation that is brought by enlightenment is called by the experts 'immediate liberation' (sadyo-mukti), because it comes simultaneously with metaphysical knowledge. It is also called 'liberation while yet alive' (jivan-mukti) because, from the empirical standpoint, it appears to be acquired by someone still living, aud to last as long as his life does. His remaining in the Absolute as the Absolute on the death of the bcdy is referred to by various figurative expressions such as final release (vimukti), dissolution in the Absolute (brahmany-apyaya, brahma-nirvana), realization of the Absolute (brahma-bhuya), attainment of the Absolute (brahma-sampatti), final peace (kgema) and the state of non-return (apunar- avrtti). These terms draw attention to the absence of any remnant of merit or demerit which might occasion another body. But liberation in the strict sense is 'immediate liberation' only.

(1) For there is no going or returning on the part of those who enjoy immediate liberation and are established in right metaphysical knowledge. For we have the Vedic text 'His vital energies do not depart' (Brhad. IV.iv.6). Their vital energies are dissolved in the Absolute. Verily, they have become the Absolute, they are the Absolute. (Bh.G.Bh. VIII.24, cp. M.V. 61,2)

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(2) Being nothing but the Absolute, he dissolves in the Abso- lute. (Brhad. IV.iv.6)

Śankara's Commentary: In fact, the enlightened onc is al- ready the Absolute here on earth. Thongh he appears to have a body, yet (as the text puts it) 'being nothing but the Abso- lute, he dissolves in the Absolute'. It is bocause he has no desires to cause the limitation of feeling that he is not the Absolute that one can say of him 'being nothing but the Abso- lute, he dissolves in the Absolute', while he is still in this world, not after the death of the body. For when the enlight- ened person passes away he does not enter any new state dif- ferent from the one he had while alive. The phrase 'he dis- solves in the Absolute' only means that he does not pass to any other body.

(3) Having done spiritual practice, he no longer grieves. Though already liberated, he acquires final liberation. (Katha II.ii.1)

Sankara's Commentary: 'Having done spiritual practice' means 'having practised meditation'. His spiritual practice is meditation associated with the metaphysical insight that goes with immediate experience of the real Even here in this world he is finally released from the bondage of desire and action, which are figments of Ignorance. 'Though already released, he acquires final release' means that he does not acquire a body again.

(4) Such a yogi becomes the Absolute and attains dissolution in the Absolute. (Bh.C.V.24)

Śankara's Commentary: He who is such a person, he is a yogi. He attains dissolution in the Absolute, which is liber- ation, while still alive here below, being himself already the Absolute.

(5) Those who know the Self attain total dissolution in the Absolute. (Bh.G.V.26)

Śankara's Commentary: Liberation is dissolution in the Ab- solute, both when it occurs to the living and when it occurs to the dead.

(6) Supreme joy falls to this yogi whose mind is utterly at peace, whose passionate tendencies (rajas) have subsided, who has become the Absolute, stainless. (Bh.G.VI.27)

Śankara's Commentary: 'Who has become the Absolute' means 'liberated while alive' (jivan-mukta). It means one who has the conviction 'All is verily the Absolute'.

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(7) One who has relinquished egoism, strength, pride, desire, anger and acquisitiveness, who is peaceful and without sense of possession - he becomes fit for absorption in the Abso- lute. (Bh. G.XVIII.53)

Śankara's Commentary: Absorption in the Absolute means be- coming the Absolute. He becomes fit for that, capable of it.

(8) When a percon sees the creatures in all their variety as standing in the One and as an evclution from that alone, then he attains to the Absolute. (Bh.G.XIII.30)

Sankara's Commentary: 'A person sees' means 'Having pon- dered on the Vedic texts and the teachings of the Acarya, he sees (the creatures, etc., ) with the direct perception that they are his own Self, as proclaimed in the text "All this is the Self alone"' (Chand. VII.xxv.2). When a person sees (them as) an outgrowth from or expansion of the Self in such ways as proclaimed in the text 'The vital energy is from the Self, hope is from the Self, memory is from the Self, the ether is from the Self, fire is from the Self, water is from the Self, appearance and disappearance are from the Self, food is from the Self ... ' (Chand. VII.xxvi.1), then a person attains the Absolute, that is, verily he becomes the Absolute.

(9) With their minds on that, identified with that, absorbed in that, intent on that, they go to the state of non-return, their sins dispelled by knowledge. (Ph.G.V.17)

Śankara's Commentary: Those whose minds have attained to the Absolute, who accept the Absolute as their own Self, who are absorbed in the Absolute, that is, who are established in the Self alone, having abandoned all action - that is the meaning of 'absorption'. 'Intent on that' means regarding that as their highest goal, that is, having their joy in the Self alone. Those whose Ignorance of the Self has thus been removed by knowledge are never again linked with a body. Their sins are dispelled or removed by the knowledge just men- tioned. The reference is to those whose sins and other de- fects which lead to further transmigration have been dispelled by knowledge; that is to say, to ascetics(yati).

Here the phrase 'absorbed in that' refers to liberation in life; however, a reference to liberation after the death of the body (videha-mukti) is also included, through the phrase 'the state of non-return'.

(10) Good and bad deeds are extinguished on the rise of metaphysical knowledge if they were committed in previous births and their results have not begun to mature in the pres- ent one, or if they were committed in the present life before

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enlightenment. But the good and bad dceds that initiated the present life as the vehicle for knowledge of the Absolute, and whose results have only been partly experienced, are not ex- tinguished. How do we know this? Because of the text 'The delay will only last till he is free from the body, then he will attain union' (Chand. VI.xiv.2). This text shows that final peace comes at the time of the fall of the body. If it were not for the distinction between action of which the effects have begun to fructify and action of which the effects have not yet begun to fructify, all action without exception would be destroyed by knowledge of the Absolute .. And in that case there would be nothing further that could sustain the empirical existence of the enlightened percon, and he would enter the final peace forthwith. But then the Veda would not have spoken of the need to wait for the death of the body. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.15)

Here it is accepted that, from the empirical standpoint, the enlightened one has a body. From this standpoint, it is ac- cepted that he must experience the remnanis of that portion of his total merit and demerit that occasioned the body in which he obtained enlightenment. And because 'attainment of the final peace' is mentioned as occurring after the death of the body, it is clear that the phrase 'final peace' refers to the final transcendence that comes with absolute freedom from the body at death (videha-kaivalya).

61 NO DISTINCTIONS OF KIND ARE FOUND IN LIBERATION AS THE RESULT OF METAPHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE

It is true that works on Vedanta speak of three different kinds of liberation. They speak of 'liberation by stages' (krama-mukti), where those who have practise prescribed sym- bolic meditations go to the World of Brahma, and attain right intuitive knowledge of the Absolute there, in company with Brahma, when that world dissclves at the end of the cosmic period (M.V. 49, 7; 56,2). They speak of 'immediate liberation' (sadyo-mukti), which is obtained here below in the course of the present life on earth or a later one, and which is simul- taneous with the enlightenment that comes when the practice of the means to enlightenment reaches full maturity (M.V.60, intro.). And they speak of 'liberation after death' (videha- mukti), which will occur on the death of the body, when the portion of merit and demerit that brought into existence the body in which enlightenment is attained has been experienced and thereby exhausted (M.V.60, 10). Nevertheless, no distinctions can possibly apply to liber- ation in its true nature. For liberation in its true nature is ever already attained, and there is no difference in the

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kncwleuge whereby it is attained.' Liberation is not anything that arises through production, transformaticn, cbtainment cr purification (M.V.59, 12). So it is not anything which could be attained and which could therefore vary in kind according to the means by which it was attained. It is cf the nature of the Self, which is always already attained. And the Self is partless, and eternally raised above change, and is incapable of receiving any further increase, and cannot be the object of amy action. The notion 'Liberation occurs at the death of the body' merely refers to the fact that there will not be assump- tion of another body (cp. M.V.60,2). So it should not be sup- posed that the results of metaphysical knowiedge of the Abso- lute vary in different cases. For liberation, being nothing other than the true nature of tne Seif, is ever uniform. That is the sole truth.

(1) When (towards the beginning of a new world-period) the dissolution of thai effect called the World of Brahma is at hand, the souls who have attained to right knowledge in that world, proceed, together with Hiranyagarbha (Brahma), its overseer, to 'something higher'. And that 'something higher' is the supremely pure highest abode of Visnu. Thus a 'liberation by stages' has to be assumed, on account of the mention of non-return and other circumstances in cer- tain Vedic texts. For we have already explained how attain- ment of the Absolute in its supreme form is not strictly pos- sible by a method that involves a journey. (B.S.Bh.IV.iii.1O)

(2) Those who approach the Absolute by the route of pre- scribed meditations, meditators on the Absolute (as associ- ated with form), go to the Absolute on this path after t.hey are dead. The phrase (go) 'by stages' has to be supplied. For there is no going or returning on the part of those who enjoy immediate liberation and are established in right meta- physical knowledge. (Bh.G.Bh.VIII.24, cp. M.V.60,1)

(3) Merit and demerit are the causes of bondage. And it has been shown (at B.S.IV.i.13-4) that, in the case of one libera- ted in life, metaphysical knowledge severs the connection both with merit and demerit and destroys them, so that the en- lightened one is of necessity liberated at the death of his body. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.14)

(4) We have seen, then, that there is a law in the case of the one desiring liberation, and pursuing the discipline which leads to it, which states that the question whether his en- lightenment occurs in the present life or a future one is de- cided by the intensity of his effort and the aptness of the means to which he resorts. This might suggest that there could be laws about distinctions of better or worse in regard to liberation itself.

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To dispel this idea, the author of the Sutras says, 'Thus there are no rules about different results in the case of liberation'. Why nct? Because there is no variation in the account of liberation in any of the upanishadic texts. For the state of liberation is verily identity with the Absolute, and the Absolute cannot assume different forms, as it has been

III.iv.52) shown that its essential nature is always the same. (B.S.Bh.

(5) (Now, therc can be no such thing as a special high degree of liberation.) This is also true because righi metaphysical knowledge is always and everywhere identical, so that there can be no rules about its different results in different cases, as there ran be in regard to rituals, which differ among them- selves. For the one and only means to liberation is right metaphysical knowledge, and there are no differences in that as there are in rituals. With meditations on the Absolute as- sociated with attributes, such as 'Made up of mind, having the vital energy as its body' (Chand. III.xiv.2), the case is dif- ferent. Here there can be rules about different results in different individual cases, just as there are in regard to different rituals. This is rendered possible through the ad- dition or subtraction of attributes in the meditation .... But this is not possible in the case of attributeless knowledge, as no attributes are present. (B.S.Bh.III.iv.52)

(6) You will perhaps object that the bodiless state comes as a result of meritorious acts. But this is wrong. For it is the natural state. On this there are such Vedic texts as, 'Having known the Self, the great one, all-pervading, Him who, dwelling in all bodies, is not Himself embodied, the stable within the unstable - the wise person does not grieve' (Katha I.ii.22). (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

This passage states that liberation, which means not being embodied, is the natural state.

(7) Therefore, since being embodied is the result of false notions, it is proved that the enlightened person is not em- bodied even while alive. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4, cp. M.V.25,1; 59,10)

The remark that being embodied is the result of false notions shows that statements about having to wait for the death of the body for liberation are only made in the context of em- pirical experience as set up by Ignorance.

(8) But this state of not being embodied called liberation is true from the highest standpoint, it is constant and eter- nal and raised above change, it is all-pervading like the ether, it is void of any modification, ever overflowing with contentment, partless and of the nature of self-luminous

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light. Neither merit and demerit and their results, nor time, past, present and future, can approach it. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

(9) He who thinks that liberation is something that has to be literally 'produced' has in mind a 'liberation' that would depend on action of body, speech or mind. The same is true of those who think that the soul has to undergo transformation to become the Absolute. Liberation as conceived in both these views would inevitably be impermanent. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

(10) Nor does liberation depend on action in the form of purification (samskara). Purification is brought about either through conferring some new attribute on the thing to be puri- fied, or else removing a defect. But in the case of libera- tion it is not possible to confer a new attribute. For liber- ation is the Absolute in its true nature, to which nothing can be superadded. Nor can there be purification through removal of defects. For liberation is the Absolute in its true nature, eternally pure and free from defects. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

CHAPTER IV PRE-ŚAŃKARA SCHOOLS

62 HOW THE PRESENT CHAPTER RELATES WITH WHAT PRECEDES AND FOLLOWS

We now take up the study of some schools which existed before the time of Śri Śańkara Bhagavatpāda. These theories are con- sidered and refuted at various places in Śri Gaudapāda's Kārikās, in Śrī Śankara's Commentaries and in the Vārtika of Śri Suresvara. Here they will be quoted and examined relying on these sources, no other source being available. The result of the examination will be to confirm our opinion that the method of interpretation of the Upanishads foliowed by the holy Commentator is the best.

63 THE VIEW THAT THE ENTIRE VEDA TEACHES THAT ACTION ALONE IS THE MEANS TO LIBERATION

The early (pre-Sankara) founders of schools can be divided in- to two classes. There are those who cling to the ritualistic section of the Veda and are opponents of the Upanishads; and there are those who accept the Upanishads as authoritative, but are over-attached to the view that authority depends on command. Amongst those who specialized in the ritualistic section of the Veda, some thought that only actions could be the means to human welfare. They said, 'Since the Veda exists only to pro- mote action, the texts which do not deal with that are use- less' (Jaimini, P.M.S. I.ii.1), and meant it literally. On this basis, they dismissed the Upanishads as useless, because those texts are not concerned with action. They held that they would have a purifying effect if recited, but that was all. Since they took the notion of 'heaven', conceived as un- surpassable joy, to be but a synonym for liberation, they held

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that liberation arcse from the performance of ritual. Behind their view was the idea that only he who knew the meaning of the whole Veda was qualified to perform rituais, that the whole Veda was concerned with rituals, and that if one did not accept that liberation arose from the performance of rituals, one would be condemning the Veda as useless. This view is not tenable. Against it, the Teachers have maintained that all who propound a doctrine of liberation ac- cept that liberation is eternal, while any result that is brought about by action is bound to be transient. It is true that knowledge of the Veda is necessary for the performance of ritual. But the meditations taught in the Veda (which come under the rules for ritual), though referred to as 'knowledge', are not the same thing as the metaphysical knowledge thai arises directly from hearing. In reality, knowledge of the Self is mot required as a qualification for performing ritual, since ritual can be performed by one who merely has knowledge of the texts. The knowledge of the Self taught in the Upani- shads actually blots out all duality, and after that there cannot be qualification for the performance of ritual.

(1) The doctrine that, because the unsurpassable joy called heaven comes from the performance of ritual, liberation comes from ritual alone, is wrong. For liberation is eternal. Noth- ing in the world that has a beginning is eternal. We have the maxim, 'Whatever has a beginning is transient'. (Taitt.Bh. I.1, intro.)

(2) The statement, 'If a man knows the whole Veda, that only qualifies him to perform rituals', was nc better. For en- joined meditations cannot just be dismissed as mere knowledge of the Vedic texts by heart. A person qualifies to perform rituals through mere knowledge of the texts by heart, and rit- uals do not depend on prescribed meditations. The latter, therefore, must be prescribed for some other purpose, and that purpose is well known to be liberation. This is confirmed by the Veda itself. For after saying that the Self has to be heard about, the text goes on to enjoin two further different activities, in the words, 'It must be pondered over, it must be subjected to sustained meditation'. And it is well known that pondering and sustained meditation are quite different from mere knowledge derived simply from hearing the texts from the Teacher when learning them by heart. (Taitt.Bh. I.1l)

In this passage there is mention of the fact that a person qualifies to perform rituals through mere knowledge of the texts by heart. From this we conclude that the 'hearing' spo- ken of later in the passage only means hearing of the texts from the Teacher for purposes of learning them by heart.

(3) We have the text 'Having studied the Veda, he should

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leave his Teacher's house ... ' (Chand. VIIT.xv.l). From this we conclude that the ritualistic injunctions apply to one who has merely studied the Vedic texts and learned them by heart, without necessarily having knowledge of their meaning. But, if this were so, would it, nct follow that, because he was still ignorant, he would not be qualified to perform ritual? No, there is no such defect in the argument here. For we do not. in any way deny that knowledge about the rituals may arise as a result of learning the texts by heart and that this knowl- edge may quality one to perform the rituals. All we say is that the metaphysical knowledge of the Self taught in the Upanishads, which is seen to have a different independent pur- pose of its own, cannot also be for the purpose of qualifying anyone to perform ritual. A person's knowledge of cne ritual has nothing to do with his qualification to perform another one, and the same principle (that knowledge of one matter does not proauce qualifications for another) holds good here too. (B.S.Bh.III.iv.12)

(4) Furthermore, there are texts like 'But when all has be- come his own Self, then what could a person see and with what, what could a person smell and with what?' (Brhad. II.iv.14) which speak of the destruction of this whole phenomenal world of plurality through knowledge - this phenomenal world, which is set up by Ignorance, which is of the nature of action, its factors and results, and which is the necessary condition for action. But anyone who hoped to couple qualification for ritualistic action with that direct knowledge of the Self which arises from the upanishadic discipline would find, in- stead, that his qualification for ritualistic action had in fact been undermined. (B.S.Bh.III.iv.16)

This was said to refute the view that would concede that the texts of the Upanishads were meaningful, while claiming that the knowledge arising from them qualified one for ritual.

64 VIEW THAT THE UPANISHADS RELATE TO RITUAL BY EXPLAINING THE NATURE OF THE SOUL AND SO ON

It is claimed by the ritualists that knowledge derived from the Upanishads relates to ritual only, and does so by giving teaching about the Self, conceived by them as the one per- forming the ritual, and also by giving information about the nature of the deity presiding over the ritual, in this case the Absolute (brahman). They say that the rewards promised in the Veda for knowing the Self are no more than fanciful eulogies, as is the case with such texts as 'He who performs sacrifices using a ladle made of palasa-wood will hear no evil. sound' (T.S.III.v.7.2). Or else, according to another

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view, the upanishadic texts exist simply to teach the pre- scribed meditations found in their texts. They cannot be con- cerned with communicating information about anything truly existent. For an already complete and existent reality would have to be the object of some other means of knowledge, (and not of the Veda, which, according to the ritualists, is exclu- sively concerned with things at present incomplete which have to be done). The Veda is not an authoritative source of knowl- edge except in relation to commands, and commands are con- cerned exclusively with action. It cannot be concerned with proclaiming the maturc of what is already existent, as there would be no reason for it to do sc (since perception and in- ference are available for the practical affairs of the world, while no good comes out of the mere satisfaction of idle specu- lative curiosity). This view of the Mimamsaka ritualists is refuted by the Teachers of our school as follows. The sole purpose of the Upanishads is to teach the existence of the Absolute as the chief thing which has to be known, and which is bereft of ac- tion and of all its factors such as the performer of the act, his instruments and so forth. Neither the Absolute itself nor knowledge of the Absolute can be conceived as subsidiaries of action. The uitimate aim of the Upanishads is to proclaim that the true nature of one's Self is the Absolute. This be- ing so, the mention of deities and so forth which comes in their texts refers to the latter for subordinate purposes, and in a particular context only, and should not be supposed to be the ultimate purport of the upanishadic teaching (M.V.52, 2). But the fact, taught in the Upanishads, that the true nature of one's Self is the Absolute, (is the chief topic being taught, since it) is not to be known from any other source. It cannot be objected that the Upanishads are useless, since metaphysi- cal knowledge yields (in the permanent removal of suffering) an incontestable gain. Nor can it be argued that the Upani- shads constitute mere eulogies, or that they are inauthorita- tive because not connected with commands. The doctrine that they must really be injunctions to act, whether for liberation or worldly well-being, is refuted in the Commentaries of Śri Śankara and the Vartika of Suresvara on these lines.

(1) If, indeed, all that was taught in the Upanishads was the existence of the Self as the transmigrating soul, the embodied one, the one performing acts and undergoing experiences, 'transcendent' only in the sense of being distinct from the body, then the texts specifying some reward for knowledge of the Self might well be mere eulogies in the way that the op- ponent has described. But, as the author of the Sutras here points out, the Self is taught in the Upanishads as being 'something more' than the embodied self. It is the Lord, not the transmigrant soul. The Self taught in the Upanishads does not have the illusion that it is a performer of action or that

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it has the other typical characteristics of the transmigrant soul. It is the supreme Self. It has superhuman attributes such as freedom from sin. This is the Self which the Upani- shads teach, and they teach it (not as anything which has to be done but) as 'what has to be known'. Nor does such knowl- edge have anything to do with inspiring one to perform rituals (in the manner suggested by the opponent). On the contrary, il destroys actions once and for all. (B.S.Bh.III.iv.8)

(2) There is no contradiction if accounts of the deities and so forth occur (in the Upanishads ) for the sake of the medi- tations which their texts teach. But it does not follow from this that the Absclute could possibly be cubsidiary to injunc- tions to meditate. For when all has become one and there is no longer anything to reject or acquire, all knowledge of duality in the form of action, its factors and results is ef- faced. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

(3) For the texts in all the Upanishads co-operate to teach this subject (the Absolute) as their ultimate topic .... And when it is known to have been established that their words co-operate to teach the true nature of the Absolute, it is not right to suppose that they have any other purpose. For that would be to contradict what the Veda does teach and introduce what it does not teach. Nor can it be made out (with the Ritualists) that the texts in the Upanishads proclaiming the existence and true nature of the Absolute are really concerned with explaining the nature of one performing an act. For there are texts such as 'What should he then see and with what?' (Brhad. II.iv.14) which deny the existence of action, its factors and results. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4, M.V.50,2)

(4) And though the Absolute is an already-existent reality, it is nevertheless not a possible object of perception and the other means of empirical knowledge. For one cannot come to know that the Absolute is one's own true Self as proclaimed by the text 'That thou art' (Chand. VI.viii. 7) without the Vedic teaching. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

(5) We ask you, therefore, 'Do the texts which proclaim the true nature of the Self produce certain and fruitful knowledge or do they not? If they do, how can they help being authori- tative? Have you not seen examples of the fact that metaphy- sical knowledge of the Self results in the benefits of the cessation of Ignorance, grief, delusion and fear and all the other defects which cause continuation of transmigratory life? There are hundreds of upanishadic texts proclaiming that this is the case, such as 'What delusion, what grief, can there be for one who sees the unity of all?' (Isa 7) and 'I am only a knower of the texts, my lord, not. a knower of the Self .... Hence I am subject to grief. Take me beyond grief, my lord'

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(Chand. VII.i.3). Have you not heard them? Now, we ask of you, do we find the same certain and fruitful knowledge in texts like 'He wept' (T.S. I.v.l)? If we do not, then let them be inauthoritative. But how could the fact of their be- ing inauthoritative render texts which produce certain and fruitful knowledge inauthoritative? (Brhad.Bh.I.iv.7,M.V.50,6)

(6) Even if other Vedic texts are inauthoritative as means of knowledge if they are unconnected with commands, it cannot be denied that the Vedic texts which cuiminate in metaphysical knowledge of the Self are authoritative. And the authenticity of the Veda does not require to be proved by inference, and so does not require (to be established indirectly by a universal rule derived from) evidence perceived elsewhere. (B.S,Bh.I.i.4)

(7) Knowledge of the ritualistic section of the Veda has for its aim temporary welfare in the after-life and in lives to come, and that depends on carrying out its instructions. Meta- physical knowledge of the Absolute has for its aim supreme (and eternal) beatitude, and does not depend on carrying out any later course of action for the achievement, of this. when one has to enquire into the karmic merit, that would follow upon a particular action, that merit lies in the future. At the time one comes to hear of it from the Vedic text, it does not yet exist. For it depends for its existence on human ac- tivity. The prompting provided by the text is also different in the two cases. A text prompting to meritorious action 'enlightens' a person in the sense of urging him to carry out its content. A text prompting a person to acquire metaphysi- cal knowledge of the Absolute itself grants him metaphysical enlighienment, without the need of anything further to be done. Since the enlightenment arises from the prompting itself, the person is not prompted to do anything for enlightenment. Such enlightenment arises automatically and without action, as in the case of perception of an object which comes within the range of the senses. (B.S.Bh.I.i.1)

(8) But is not liberation, just like welfare in the after- life, something that has to be sought through active pursuit of means, since it is something one does not already have in one's possession? Not so. It has to be sought, indeed, but not in the same way that welfare in the after-life has to be Just as one stricken by illness 'becomes himself' through medical treatment, so is transcendence of all plural- sought ....

ity (which constitutes one's own true nature) 'reached' (not through activity of any kind) but through the destruction of metaphysical Ignorance of the Self through enlightenment .... What would be the use of an injunction here, since the exist- ence of that which is sought does not depend on human acti- vity? Even if an injunction on this subject were to occur in the Veda it would be meaningless, for injunction has no scope

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in the context. (Suresvara, S.V. 26,28,30)

65 THE VIEW THAT LIBERATION COMES THROUGH THE AVOIDANCE OF OPTIONAL RITUAL AND FORBIDDEN ACTS

Others held that liberation does ivt depend on knowledge. It depends on not performing any optional ritual or committing any forbidden acts, on exhausting the merit and demerit al- ready in force by experiencing it and on performing the daily obligatory ritual to avoid the harmful consequences of omitting it. And while holding all this, they also held that liberation was to be sought through giving up action, in the sense that the very nature of liberation consisted in resting in the Self. This doctrine is just a piece of empty hypothetical reason- ing. It takes no account of the Vedic maxim 'Transcendence of all plurality comes from knowledge'. The Acaryas of our schcol have therefore refuted it on its own chosen ground, by logical argumentation duly supported by Vedic quotation. It is impos- sible to exhaust all werit and demerit, because our actions (from beginningless time) are infinite in number. The perfor- mance of the obligatory rituals must bring some future karmic merit that will have to be experienced. The idea that harmful consequences will be incurred by its omission is untenable (cp. M.V.65,6). Thus the whole description of this path for attaining liberation is incorrect. The path as described would always imply a remnant of merit and demerit, and it would be impossible to prevent further embodiment in transmi- gratory life to experience it. The whole doctrine is set out and refuted in the Taittiriya Upanishad Commentary, in the Gita Commentary and in the Brahma Sutra Commentary. The matter is also explained in the Sambandha Vartika of Suresvara.

(1) No, for actions are many and of different kinds. There may be many deeds of merit and demerit that have been committed in previous lives which will have mutually contradictory kar- mic results. Of these deeds, some will have begun their kar- mic fructification in the present life, others not. It is im- possible that those which have not begun to fructify in a given life should be exhausted through having their karmic consequences experienced in that yery life. It follows that a further body will have to be brought into being so that the remaining unexhausted merit and demerit can be duly experi- enced. And the existence of a remnant of unexhausted merit and demerit is proved by such texts from the Veda and Smrti as, 'Those whose conduct in this life has been good (will soon obtain a favourable rebirth)' (Chand. V.x. 7) and 'Through the remnant (of its deeds the soul will acquire a future body)' (A.D.S. II.ii.2.3). (Taitt.Bh.I.1, intro.)

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(2) No. For we have the Vedic text. 'Only through knowing Him does one pass beyond death. There is no other path for reaching the highest state' (Svet.III.8). And we have the further Vedic text saying that liberation is as impossible for one who does not have enlighienment as folding up the sky like a piece of leather (Svet.VI.20), and the text from the Purana, 'One reaches transcendence of all plurality through know.ledge'. Also, it is impossible for the meritorious (as well as the sinful) deeds of previous lives that have not begun to fructify in the present life to be exhausted (in the present life) through experience. (Bh.G.Bh.XVIII.67, intro. )

(3) Where is not a single Vedic text that says 'The one who desires liberation should proceed like this' (see abovc, M.V. 59,4, note). Our opponents have just thought it up through their own private conjecture, on the principle 'Because merit and demerit are the cause of further transmigration, if merit and demerit are removed transmigration will cease'. But it will not hold even on the basis of reason, as it is impossible to show logically that the occasion for rebirth would not re- main. (B.S.Bh.IV.iii.14)

(4) And there is no proof that the performance of the obliga- tory daily and occasional ritual will only have the effect of removing the harmful consequences of their omission, and, that they will not produce any karmic merit (that will have to be experienced in a new life). That new merit, too, would be likely to produce further merit (from actions in the new life, which would have to be experienced in further lives to come). For the Smrti says, 'Just as, when a mango tree has been planted for the sake of its fruit, shade and pleasant odour follow of their own accord, so advantageous results accrue automatically to him who performs meritorious acts' (A.D.S. I.vii.20.3). Nor can anyone who does not have right intuitive knowledge of himself as the Self of all claim to be able to avoid all optional ritual and forbidden acts from birth to the funeral pyre. For even the cleverest people make slips oc- casionally. And since there will thus always have to be a doubt, it is, as we said, impossible to show how. (on this method) merit and demerit could be totally eradicated. (B.S. Bh.IV.iii.m)

(5) The non-performance of the obligatory ritual is not in itself anything positively existent. This being so, it can- not be the cause of positive harmful consequences. But the phrase 'Not carrying out the prescribed ritual' (Manu XI.44) is intelligible if it is taken to imply non-performance of the obligatory ritual, and this in turn is taken as a sign point- ing to the evil consequences of previous sins that should have been warded off by the performance of the obligatory ritual but were not. (Taitt.Bh.I.1, intro.)

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(6) Nor is it right to object that the daily obligatory rituals must always be fulfilled to avoid the harmful conse- quences of their omission. For omission of the obligatory rituals only has harmful consequences for one who is not a renunciate. A renunciate cannot incur a penalty for not tend- ing the sacrificial fires, which is the duty of celibate stu- dents, who are not renunciates and who have the duty of per- forming rituals. Nor can any positive result, such as a harm- ful consequence, arise from the mere non-performance of obliga- tory rituals, as we know from the Vedic text 'How conld being arise from non-being?' (Chand. VI.ii.2), which teaches that be- ing cannot arise from non-being. (Bh.G.Bh.III.1, intro.)

(7) The natural reward for the proper performance of these. enjcined caste duties is attainment of heaven. For there are such texts from the Smrti as 'The members of the various castes and stages of life who have applied themselves to their special duties enjoy the rewards of their deeds after death, and then, through the remnant of their merit and demerit, are reborn in favourable circumstances from the point of view of place of birth, caste, family, spiritual life, length of days, learning, career, happiness and intellect' (A.D.S. II.ii.2.3). And in the Puranas, too, we find that different 'worlds' and different other rewards are specified for the members of dif- ferent castes and stages of life (whose duties have been well performed). (Bh.G.Bh.XVIII. 45)

The idea of what is meant by 'through the remnant' here is explained at B.S.Bh. III.i. 8. When the merit to be experi- enced in heaven, derived from the actions of the previous life, has been exhausted through enjoyment, there remains a remant of merit and demerit derived from other actions which leads to rebirth in this world and which is known by the term 'what clings' (anusaya). A full statement and refutation of the doctrine of libera- tion here under review in the present section is given in Suresvara's Sambandha Vartika, verses 47-101.

66 THE DOCTRINE THAT LIBERATION IS ACHIEVED BY A COMBINATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION

There are some who hold that performance of rituals cannot bring liberation on its own, but it can if combined with knowledge.For we see that poison leads to death, and curds to fever, if they are taken on their own, but that the re- sults are different if they are taken combined with recita- tion of mantras and an accompanying dose of sugar respective- ly. And the people who think thus quote as their proof the Vedic text 'Whatever one does with knowledge, faith and

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meditation is more potent' (Chand. I.i.10, cp. M.V.53,5). Some argue that knowledge and action have this extra power when they are combined on a basis of equality, taking their stand on the Vedic text 'His knowledge and his actions take hoid cf him' (Brhad. IV, iv.2). And they point out that the Veda con- tains examples of householders founding traditions in which metaphysical knowledge is taught, and regard this as a sign in favour of their view. But both these peints are wrong. Action only produces re- sults in the realm of manifest name and form, as experience teaches and the Veda proclaims. It cannot be supposed to have any effect on liberation, which is the very negation of name and form. For whatever is the result of action is inevitably impermanent. And if liberatior were the result of action, it would naturally be one of those impermanent results. So texts like 'Whatever he does with knowledge, faith and meditation' and the examples of householders founding traditions in which metaphysical knowledge is taught will have to be understood in another wsy. Otherwise there will be a contradiction with basic upanishadic teaching, as explained. In any case, liber- ation cannot be regarded as a possible result of action, as it is something (already existent and) merely hidden by Ignorance. Only knowledge can put an end to Ignorance, since anything else is, precisely, the result of metaphysical Ignorance! Darkness does not put an end te darkness. There is an argument that runs as follows. No special re- ward is mentioned in the Veda for the performance of the obli- gatory daily ritual. But, since it has been prescribed, it must be assumed to bring a reward of some sort, and that re- ward must be liberation. But this argument is wrong. For the only results of action in the context of ritual are production, obtaining, transformation and purification (M.V.50,1). Only that can be enjoined which could be conceived as producing these results. Nor can metaphysical knowledge and action co-exist, that one could imagine their being combined. For they are contra- dictory by very nature. And one also deduces that a combina- tion of knowledge and action cannot be the means to liberation from the fact that the seeker of liberation is enjoined to give up all action. There can, of course, be a combination of knowledge with action in the case of meditations on the Abso- lute as associated with finite forms. For when one is carry- ing out meditations of this kind one still has the idea of oneself as an individual capable of action. Action is an auxiliary even for knowledge of the Absolute in its attribute- less form, but only an indirect one; so that if there is a combination of action and knowledge at all, it must be in successive stages. The doctrine that liberation comes through a combination of knowledge and action is combated in Śankara's commentaries and in the Sambandha Vartika of Suresvara (verses 357-77) on these lines.

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(1) Ritualistic action as enhanced by 'knowledge' (i.e. by prescribed meditations on the symbolic significance of some factor in the ritual) can only take one up to a certain point (i.e. to identity with the creator-deity, Hiranyagarbha). For both action and its results depend on the world of manifest name and form. But action cannot affect the Absolute. For the Absolute is not an effect. It is constant, changeless and eternal. It has no manifest attribntes. It does not consist of name and form. It is by nature free from action, its fac- tors and results. (Bihad.Bh.III.iii.1, intro. )

(2) Scrutinizing the worlds (realms of experience in the after-life) won through action, the Brahmin should come to view them with indifference. Everything here is the result of action and is impermanent. Why indulge in action any more? (Muņa. I.ii.12)

Sankara's Commentary: All such worlds are won through ac- tion, and since they are produced by action they are imperma- nent. It means that nothing (in the empirical realm) is eternal. All action results in the impermaneni.

(3) The Vedic text 'Whatever he does with knowledge ... ' (vidya, Chand.I.i.10) does not refer to knowledge in all senses. It only refers to the 'knowledge' (meditation) which is the subject of the topic, which is expressed in the text 'He should meditate on the Udgitha, which is this syllable Om' (Chand. I.i.1). (B.S.Bh.III.iv.10)

Here, meditation on the Udgitha is a mere auxiliary to the ritual. We have already seen that knowledge (meditation) is combined with ritualistic action in order to enhance the ef- fect of the latter. The revered Commentator is saying that metaphysical knowledge of reality is not the subject under discussion.

(4) The opponent also claimed (B.S.Bh.III.iv.5) that the text 'His knowledge and his action accompany him' (Brhad. IV. iv.2) was an indication that knowledge produced no results on its own (without the help of action). Against this we reply that it is necessary here to make a distinction. What the text means is that knowledge follows one man, action another man. The phrase 'his knowledge and his action' has to be taken distributively, like the words 'a hundred' in 'give a hundred between them both', which means fifty to one and fifty to the other. (B.S.Bh.III.iv.1l)

The ensuing part of the commentary shows that this is hypo- thetical teaching, based on a voluntary concession to the opponent's standpoint. For the passage continues:

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Nor could the text about the 'accompanying' on the part of knowledge and action have reference to the one desirous of liberation. For the passage ends by saying 'This is for the man who desires' (Brhad. IV.iv.6), and thereby reveals that it is for the benefit of the one concerned with further transmi- gratory existence, while the separate appearance of the phrase 'as for the one who has no desires' shows that the intention is to deal with one who desires liberation separately. In the case of teaching for the sake of the one concerned with fur- ther transmigratory experience, one may understand by 'knowl- edge' both prescribed knowledge (here = merit from prescribed Vedic meditations) and forbidden knowledge (improper medita- tions in Tantrika cults, etc.), there being no difference between the two in that context. The text refers equally to both prescribed and prohibited actions wherever found. If it is taken in this way (i.e. as pertaining to transmigratory life), the texi about 'accompanying' on the part of knowledge and action need not be understood distributively in the sense mentioned above (and the merit from knowledge and action, meditation and ritual, will belong to the same person). (B.S. Bh.III.iv.11)

(5) (Liberation is said figuratively to be the 'result' of knowledge, because metaphysical knowledge puts an end to the obstruction wrought by Ignorance, while Ignorance cannot be destroyed by action.) Nor can one conceive of any other ob- struction to liberation apart from Ignorance, of a kind that might be removed by action. For liberation is eternal, and is nothing other than the true nature of the seeker himself. (Brhad.Bh. III.iii.1, intro.)

(6) Nor does metaphysical knowledge require the support of action to yield its result of transcendence of all plurality (kaivalya). For the presence of action would actually be con- tradictory to the cessation of Ignorance. Darkness does not remove darkness. (Bh.G.Bh.XVIII.67, intro.)

(7) (One cannot accept the contention of some Ritualists that the reward for the performance of the obligatory ritual must be liberation - since no other reward is mentioned.) For such ritual (cp. M.V.50,1) could only effect production, transformation, obtaining or purification (none of which would encompass liberation). And that is as far as reasoning on the

intro.) data of Vedic revelation allows us to go. (Brhad.Bh.III.iii.1,

(8) The notions of difference and non-difference being mutu- ally contradictory, the notion 'All this is but the Self' can- not arise without destroying the natural notion of Ignorance that the various factors. of an action and its results are all mutually distinct. But it is only when one is conscious of

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mutual differences between the various factors of an action, and between the action and its results, that an injunction to perform an action (for an end) is intelligible. For when the disease of double-vision has been cured, the representation of the moon as one oniy cannot arise without effacing the notion based on the disease that there were two moons - and it is the same with other illusions of the same kind. For knowledge and Ignorance are contradictories. (Chand.Bh. II.xxiii.1)

(9) Have we not proved, then, that knowledge and action shouid be combined for liberation by members of all stages of life? No, you have not proved it. For the seeker of libera-

intro. ) tion is ordered to abstain from all action. (Bh.G.Bh.III.1,

(10) And knowledge (without action) is available to the celi- bate orders. For so it stands in the Vedic texts. (B.S.III. iv.17)

Sankara's Commentary: The Vedic texts speak of metaphysi- cal knowledge for the celibate orders. And knowledge cannot in their case be subordinate to action. For they do not have to perform any Vedic ritual like the daily Agnihotra at all.

(11) It is only knowledge that actually brings liberation, but action is an indirect aid and is spoken of as a cause figuratively. And when it is said that action co-operates with knowledge, the reference is to past (preparatory) actions performed before metaphysical knowledge arose. For once the knower of the Absolute has obtained enlightenment he is no longer able to perform the Agnihotra or any other ritual. For when there is knowledge that one's own Self is that Absolute which is beyond the reach of injunctions, one passes beyond the realm of Vedic commands. But in the case of knowledge arising from meditations on themes involving form and attri- butes, the sense of being an individual performing an action is not brought to an end. In such a case, therefore, the Agnihotra and other ritualistic action can still follow. For when such ritualistic action is performed by one who is with- out desire for any personal advantages it can contribute to knowledge (by purification of the mind), as it has no other function to perform. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.16)

67 KNOWLEDGE IDENTIFIED WITH MEDITATION: THE ABSOLUTE MADE SUBORDINATE TO INJUNCTIONS TO MEDITATE

There were other theorists who identified knowledge of the Absolute with a form of meditation. They quoted texts which they deemed to prescribe meditations, such as 'It is the Self

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that should be seen' (Brhad. II.iv.5), 'He (the Self) it is who should be investigated' (Chand. VIII.vii.1) and 'One should meditate only on "It is the Self"' (Brhad. I.iv.7). And they held that the texts of the Upanishads, too, only gave infor- mation about already-existent entities through mentioning par- ticulars of the forms under which they had to be conceived in meditation. They treated them on the same footing as texts giving information about sacred objects needed as auxiliaries for the ritualistic injunctions, like the sacrificial post and the ahavaniya fire and so forth (objects in regard to which action is prescribed). And they treated liberation as a dis- tant future reward of the after-life, arising from the merit of practising prescribed meditations, like heaven and other occult rewards (which flow mysteriously from the practice of the ritual and supervene after the death of the bouy). Or, according to another theory, it may be accepted that the re- ward for practising prescribed meditation is iiself the ces- sation of Ignorance. The Teachers of our line combat this theory as follows. Vision of the Self can be shown to arise from mercly hearing the Vedic texts which communicate the Absolute as the true Self and as reality. This being so, nothing further remains to be done in response to such commands as 'It should be seen' and so on. The Vedic texts teach that liberation supervenes immediately on metaphysical knowledge. They do not leave any room for anything else to be done afterwards. It must be taken that liberation is the state of being without a body, and is not attainable through meritorious action. For we have texts denying that there is any contact either with the pleas- ant or the unpleasant in liberation (e.g. Chand. VIII.xii.1), and others proclaiming that liberation is our true natural state. Another reason why liberation is not attainable through action is that it is eternal and raised above all change, and not subject to any of the four characteristic modes of action dealt with in the Veda (M.V.50,1). In this respect liberation differs radically from the sacrificial post and other material objects which, unlike liberation, are not identical with the Absolute, and so depend on action for their existence. Nor is it correct to identify knowledge with meditation. It has already been shown (M.V.52, 1) that, on the Vedic view, the function of knowledge is merely to illumine the real. Its only role (in the present context) is to put to an end that metaphysical Ignorance which is the impediment to liberation. Nor is this knowledge of which we are speaking, namely the metaphysical knowledge of the identity of one's true Self with the Absolute, a meditation like the prescribed symbolic meditations (sampat, meditations in which the attributes of a higher entity are superimposed onto a lower entity, so that the higher entity is seen in the lower entity, its symbol). For the texts proclaiming the identity of one's true Self

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with the Absolute fulfil their entire function in expounding it alone (and are not also concerned with enjoining an action of any kind). Nor is it right to say that metaphysical Igno- rance can be brought to an end through prescribed meditations. For meditations performed in obedience to injunctions are ac- tions, and, being thus themselves effects of metaphysical Ignorance, are unable to bring it to an end.

(1) But do not these supreme metaphysical texts of the Upani- shads supply the subject-matter for obedience io injunctions such as The Self should be known'? No. For we have already explained that these supreme metaphysical texts leave nothing over that has to be done. Texts like 'That thon art', which communicate the true nature of the Self, cause vision of the Self at the very time they are heard. So one does not have to go on afterwards to obey an injunction to see the Self, as if this were a separate duty. We have already given this answer before. (Brhad.Bh.I.iv.7)

(2) Nor is the text 'One should meditate only on "It is the Self": an originating injunction (utpatti-vidhi, from active obedience to which a reward would follow). Why not? Because, apart from acquiring metaphysical knowledge from the texts that state the true nature of the Self and negate the not- self, there is nothing further that has to be done, either mentally or physically. But the Ritualists hold that an in- junction has only performed its office when there is the idea of some human activity that has to be performed over and above the mere reception of knowledge from hearing the text containing the injunction. (Brhad.Bh.I.iv.7)

(3) There are many Vedic texts which exhibit liberation as following immediately upon metaphysical knowledge of the Ab- solute and thereby deny that anything further has to be done. Consider, for instance, 'He who knows the Absolute, that supreme principle, verily becomes the Absolute' (Mund. IIT. ii.9), All a person's merit and demerit (the cause of his rebirth) is destroyed, when the Absolute has been known, the Absolute that is both the transcendent and the manifest' (Mund. II.ii.8), 'He who knows the bliss of the Absolute ex- periences fear from no quarter' (Taitt.II.9), 'O Janaka, you have attained the fearless state' (Brhad.IV.ii.4), 'Then the Absolute knew itself alone as "I am the Absolute". Therefore it became the all' (Brhad.I.iv.l) and 'What delusion, what grief, can there be for him who sees the unity of all?' (Isa 7). (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

(4) The Vedic text describes transmigratory experience in the same way as we have done when it says, 'Verily, there can be no end to pleasure and pain for the one who remains associated with a body' (Chand. VIII.xii.1). However, it

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continues later, 'Him who is without a body, pleasure and pain verily do not touch'. Because it says that pleasure and pain do not touch such a person, we conclude that it denies that any acts of merit have to be performed in obedience to Vedic injunctions when there is the state of freedom from the body called liberation .... If you say that the state of being free from the body itself has to be gained through acts of merit, we reply that it is not so, since freedom from the body is the natural state. For we have such Vedic texts as, '(Having known) ... Him who, dwelling in all bodies, is not Himselr em- bodied, the stable within the ustable' (Katha I.ii.22). (B.S.Bh.I.i.4, cp. M.V.60,2)

(5) For we find in the world that nothing is permanent which can only come into being through a transformation, like curds (which are a transformation of milk), or which has to be pro- duced, like a pot. Nor can it be said that liberation is dependent on action in the sense of needing to be obtained. For, as being the true nature of one's own Self, it is not subject to being 'obtained' .... Nor does liberation depend upon action in the form of purification. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4, cp. M.V.50,1; 59,12)

(6) The Vedic text 'He carves the sacrificial post' can stand as a subordinate injunction which brings the sacrificial post into being, as the latter is something which has to be brought into being or it would not exist at all. But there cannot be any such injunction to bring into being the unity of all as the Self, since this is already a self-established fact. (S.V. 657)

(7) Meditation is dwelling on something mentally. Though mental, it depends on human will, and can either be done or not done or done in a different way. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the result of the application of a means of valid cognition, and bears on the true nature of an already-existent object. Knowledge, therefore, does not fall within the prov- ince of what can be done, not done or done differently. It is conditioned neither by a command nor by the human will, but by the nature of an already-existent entity. (B.S.Bh. I.i.4, cp. M.V.52,1)

(8) There are Vedic texts which show that the sole result of metaphysical knowledge that the true nature of one's Self is the Absolute is to put an end to the impediment that prevents liberation. For instance we have, 'You, indeed, are our father. You take us beyond Ignorance' (Prasna VI.8), 'Master, I have heard from people like yourself that he who knows the Self crosses beyond grief. My lord, I am in grief. Take me, my lord, beyond grief' (Chand. VII.i.3) and 'To him whose sins had been obliterated, the venerable Sanatkumara showed what

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lies beyond Ignorance' (Chand.VII.xxvi.2). (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

(9) If knowicdge of the identity of one's true Self with the Absolute were taken as resting on an injunction to perform meditation on the attributes of a higher entity as present in a lower one (sampat), this would do violence to the grammar of the texts in which it is taught (which are in the indicative, not the imperative mood). (B.S.Bh.I.1.4)

(10) Whether Ignorance be understood as absence of knowledge, as doubt, or as positive wrong knowledge, in any case it can only be eliminated through knowledge and not, through action. For action is not contradictory to any of them. (Brhad.Bh. III.iii.1)

(il) All practical experience of the Absolute as an object of meditation, or as the one performing meditation, takes place in the state of Ignorance. (B.S.Bh.I.i.12)

68 THE VIEW OF THOSE WHO ACCEPT AN INJUNCTION IN THE CONTEXT OF METAPHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE

Some held that there must be an injunction even for metaphysi- cal knowledge. Otherwise, they said, if it were not duly en- joined, it could not be part of what the Veda intended to teach. But this view will not stand examination. For knowledge derived from words does not depend on the presence of an in- junction in the sentence heard. A Vedic text affirming the existence cf the Absolute only informs the person hearing it. It does not at the same time order him to understand its own content. For knowledge arises at the very moment the text is heard. If the text is a means of knowledge at all, it cannot depend on an injunction to perform its function of communica- ting information. For other means of knowledge (perception, inference, etc.) do not depend on an injunction in any such way. What then of the expressions in imperative form found in the Veda, such as 'You should seek to know that' (Taitt.III.1) and 'It should be seen' (Brhad. II.iv.5)? They have to be understood in some different sense, either positively, as pro- moting knowledge of the Self by turning the hearer's mind to- wards the inmost Self, or else negatively, as turning his mind away from the not-self. For knowledge cannot be the subject of an injunction. And the true Self, as the Absolute, the object of right knowledge, is not anything that can be either rejected or acquired (that one would try to act on it). Nor is there any evidence that anything can act on its own Self. And again, to accept that there should be an injunction even

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for verbal knowleuge about matters of fact would take us alto- gether tco far, as it would make ell knowledge derived from words dependent on an injunction (which would lead to infinite regress, M.V. 68,6). On these grounds the revered Commentator refuted the view in question.

(1) An injunction which gives information about the nature and results of an act of merit only gives a person this infor- mation incidentally in the course of enjoining him to do the aci. A text affirming the existence of the Absclute, on the other hand, only gives a person information. As immediate apprehension (of the Absolute) arises direcily from (hearing) the (affirmation contained in the) text, the person hearing it cannot be enjoined to carry the immediate apprehension out (as if it were the result of some subsequent act). On the con- trary, the knowledge just springs up automatically, as in the case of an object standing before one's eyes. (B.S.Bh.I.i.1)

(2) The idea of fire, when one is in the presence of that well known object, is not dependent on an injunction, nor is it a mere creation of the human mind. It is in fact a piece of knowledge, conditioned by the nature of the object per- ceived. It is not an act. And it is the same with all ob- jects of the various means of knowledge (such as perception, inference, etc.). This being so, knowledge of the Self in its true form as the Absolute cannot be dependent on an injunction to act. Imperative and similar forms applied to it, even in Vedic texts, lose their imperative force and become blunted, as razors become blunted if used against hard objects like stones. For here the object to which they are applied is some- thing not subject to rejection or acquisition. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4, cp. M.V.125,1)

(3) But what do these apparent injunctions mean - texts like 'The Self, verily, should be seen, heard about ... ' (Brhad. II.iv.5), which have the appearance of injunctions? Their pur- pose, we say, is to turn the hearer away from the objects of his natural instinctive activity. The extraverted person, who thinks 'Let me have what is desirable and avoid what is not desirable', does not achieve life's highest goal. But when such a person comes to desire the supreme human goal, texts like 'The Self, verily, should be seen' and so on turn him away from the natural concern with the psycho-physical organism and its interests, and engage him in continuous remembrance of the inmost Self. Then finally the true principle, the Self, not subject to rejection or acquisition, is taught to such a person, when he is sincerely engaged in investigating the true nature of the Self. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4, cp. M.V.125, intro .; 125,1, note)

(4) Texts in the form of a command such as 'The Self should be

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scen', which are found in the sections dealing with the high- est knowledge, are fundamentally for the purpose of turning the hearer in the direction of the knowledge of the Self, and are not primarily to be regarded as injunctions to become aware of the real. Even in the world, when people give a com- mand and say 'Look here' or 'Listen to this', the meaning of such phrases really is 'Pay attention', and not 'Acquire a piece of direct knowledge'. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.21, cp. M.V.125,2)

(5) When one speaks of the individual soul, the individual able to act and undergo experiences, one is in fact referring to the Absolute, but associating the latter with particulers brought into being by apparent conditioning adjuncts such as the intellect. There is no contradiction with such texts as 'He should not aim to know speech, he should know the speaker' (Kauşitaki 1II.8), which give teaching designed to turn the hearer towards his inmost Self so as to exhibit the Absolute in its true state, free from the particulars brought in by apparent limiting adjuncts. (B.S.Bh.I.i.31)

(6) Perhaps you will object that confronted by a mere state- ment of the true nature of the Self, a person would not actu- ally go on to know the Self without some injunction. But this would not be right. For knowledge of the true nature of the Self arises simply from hearing the words of the person declaring it. What would be the good of repeating what had already been done? Do you object that he would not even hear the text without an injunction? But this objection is wrong, as it would lead to infinite regress. If he would not proceed to hear the content of the words spoken by the one declaring the true nature of the Self without an injunction, he would not pro- ceed to hear the content of the text containing the injunc- tion without a previous injunction. And he would not proceed to hear that injunction without a previous one, and so to infinity. (Brhad.Bh.I.iv.7)

(7) The Self does not require to be prompted by one of the means of knowledge (perception, inference, etc.,) to know itself, because here the object is nothing but its own Self. Moreover, when the Self is known, the authoritativeness of all authoritative means of knowledge comes to an end. Once the Self is intuitively known in its true nature, the inter- play of means of knowledge and objects of knowledge can no longer continue. (Bh.G.Bh.II.69, cp. M.V.46,11)

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69 KNOWLEDGE OF THE SELF ONLY COMES THROUGH THL PRACTICE OF REPEATED AFFIRMATION (PRASAŃKHYĀNA VĀDA)

The doctrine of the Prasankhyana Vadins was as follcws. It is true (they said) that there car be no injunction bearing directly cn knowledge. But injunctions are needed in the Upa- mishads for the practice of repeated affirmation. For there cannot be knowlecge of the Self simply from hearing the rele- vant texts once. Again, there cannot be knowledge of the Self simply through the texts without reasoning over them, so there must be repeated practice at that too. Or again, since hear- ing the texts and reasoning over them will oly yield general (abstract) knowledge of the Seif, the practice of repeated affirmation (abhyasa) is needed for particular concrete experi- ence. Or again, we may admit that metaphysical Ignorance is removed when metaphysical knowledge once arises. Nevertheless, metaphysical Ignorance persists spontaneously, without regard to cause and effect. It cannot be definitively eliminated, any more than the ordinary ignorance that keeps on cropping up with regard to new objects (in ordinary life) can be elimina- ted. On the contrary, it is certain to arise again, on ac- count of the impressions accumulated during many previous lives. So there has to be the practice of repeated affirma- tions of the truth (throughout life) to keep metaphysical Ignorance at bay. For we have the upanishadic text, 'Once the wise Brahmin has acquired knowledge, he should practise re- peated affirmation' (Brhad. IV.iv.21). .Or the theory may take another form. It may argue that the knowledge derived from a sentence must consist in a synthesis of the meanings of the separate words, and cannot itself fail to be syuthetic. And so repeated spiritual practice must fol- low in order to obtain a simple spiritual intuition (elimina- ting the element of synthesis of a manifold). Thus a fourfold means of knowledge is required to know that all is one as the Self, consisting of revelation, reason, repeated affirmation of the results so attained and realization of the Self, as expressed in the verse, 'Seekers of liberation come to see their own Self as liberated through the fourfold means of knowledge, consisting of revelation, reason, repeated practice and "the Self"' (quoted by Anandagiri at S.V. 810). But all this is wrong. If metaphysical knowledge did not arise directly from the texts, the latter would stand exposed as inauthoritative. For independent reason has no authority in this sphere. It would be absurd to expect that, if knowl- edge did not arise after revelation and reason had been re- sorted to once, it would arise through repeated affirmation of the inadequate knowledge so far obtained. No formal in- junction for repeated affirmation, called Prasankhyāna, is found anywhere in the Veda. Repeated affirmation of what had been heard and reflected over once could not give rise to any

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new concrete metaphysical intuition that had not arisen in the first place. The theory results in the further difficulty that, if it were followed, the meaning of the Vedic texts in view wculd in fact never be ascertained; for a series of de- liberately repeated affirmations would be limitless. The op- ponent's notion that even after metaphysical Ignorance had been destroyed by metaphysical knowledge it could return again later is unfounded. Equally unfounded is the expectation that, ir it was capable of returning, it could be finally eradicaied by repeated affirmation. Śri Śaikara and Sureśvara refuted the doctrine of tuose whe believed in the necessity of repested affirmation througcut life or other counts too. For instance, if the texts are en authoritative source of knowledge (as they are), then if they only gave rise to abstrect and synthetic knowledge (which is nct in fact the case, cp. M.V.67,3), such knowledge would have to be accepted as the final truth. Authoritative means of knowledge are not like the factors of a piece of action; they cannot be ictensified through repetition to produce different degrees of knowledge. Whether the Assolute had or had not been knows through some other means of knowledge, it would not in fact be susceptible to any form of synthesis, and in any case there could be no injunction to know it. And finally, repeated affirmation of wrong knowledge would not produce right knowledge, but would confirm and strengthen the wrong knowledge.

(1) If the Veda were to depend on reasoning and other factors even in a matter for which it was the sole authority, it would lose its status as an independent authority all round, and be- come dependent on external confirmation (like cacual human speech). (s.v. 809)

(2) If each of the four means of knowledge (alleged on your theory to be) involvcd (cp. M.V. p.187) produced a single resultant-cognition only through co-operating together (as you now claim), that would stand in contradiction with your origi- nal doctrine that each of them separately brought some knowl- edge, which was enhanced by the next means mentioned in the series. (So the 'co-operation' theory must be rejected. ) (S.V. 812, ed. Mahadevan 813)

According to these theorists, knowledge of the Self was gradu- ally improved successively by each of the four faetors of the means of knowledge.

(3) If the means for knowledge of the Absolute were purely secular reasoning, such as a critical examination of the im- plications of dream and the other states of consciousness, then reality would be accessible to the empirical means of knowledge, and so not the content of Vedic teaching. And the

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Vedic teaching on this head would be rendered inauthoritative by being reduced to a mere reproduction of what was already known through reason. But if the arguments were taken (not as secular but) as based on the Veda, on the ground that they exist merely to explain Vedic tradition, then thcy themselves would be mere reproductions of what was already known from another source. Consequently they would have no independent authority and would not be a separate means of knowledge dis- tinct from Vedic revelation (and this would undermine the cp- ponent's doctrine of four separate means of knowledge). (s.v. 816-7)

And so reason couid not support Vedio revelation either.

(4) If texts like 'That thou art' do not give rise to the idea of one's identity with the Absolute when heard once, what hope is there that they will do so if they are heard repeat- edly? To this it might be replied that no text can promote immediate intuitive knowledge of anything on its own. The text is dependent on reasoning to promcte a concrete intuition of one's identity with the Absolute. But even so repelition would still be useless (as the reasoning would do its work, if it did it at all, when performed once). (B.S.Bh.IV.i.2)

(5) Prasankhyana is repetition. How can that enhance knowl- edge? Nothing new is added to the object to be known by re- peated application to the means of knowledge. (s.V. 818)

(6). If the Self is understood in the empirical sense as the knower in ordinary experience, it cannot at the same time be part of the means of knowledge (as the Prasankhyana Vadins claim, cp. M.V. p.187). Nor could it be part of the means of knowledge if it were understood as the supreme Self, as then it would be the object to be known. And if the whole theory of a fourfold means of knowledge is wrong, how could direct experience of the Self be the result of resort to these means? (s.v. 824)

So on either theory the Self cannot be one of the means of knowledge (as the Prasankhyāna Vādins claim it to be).

(7) Suppose one objects that text and reasoning would yield only general (abstract) knowledge, not particular (concrete) knowledge .... And concrete experience is needed to put an end to metaphysical Ignorance (which is itself evident in concrete experience). So repetition is needed to gain that. But this is wrong. For if hearing a text and reasoning over it do not give rise to concrete experience the first time, it is impos- sible that they should do so merely through being repeated. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.2, cp. M.V.206,6, note, section 3)

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(8) Perhaps you will object that there is no such thing as a constant stream of ideas communicating knowledge cf the Self, as in fact we (invariably) find wrong ideas about the Self and their results. Hence it is only the last cognition of the Self before death that ends metaphysical Ignorance, and not an earlier one. But this idea, too, is wrong. For if the first cognition of the Self proved erroneous (as the theory demands), this would undermine the authority of all the others. If the first idea of the Self did not remove metanhysicel Ignorance, the last would not either, as its content would be the same. To this you might reply that it is the whole series of cog- nitions of the Self that removes metaphysical Ignorance, not any single cognition in isolation. But this also is wrong. For there cannot be a continuous scries of cognitions of the Self if one has to carry on with the business of living. For a continuous stream of cognitions of the Self and ideas to do with the business of living are contredictory. Perhaps you will say that there can be a continuous stream of cognitions of the Self right up to the dcath of the body,. obtained by ignoring ideas connected with the business of liv- ing. But this again is wrong. For it is impossible to deter- mine in advance how many cognitions there will be, and the theory will have the fault of attributing uncertainty to the Vedic teaching. (Brhad.Bh.I.iv.10)

(9) If metaphysical Ignorance could return as before during the life-time of the liberated person, even after the metaphy- sical reality had been rightly known, what proof is there that it would not return again after his death? Knowledge and Igno- rance, therefore, can have no other relation but that of con- tradictories (i.e. can only be knowledge and absence of knowl- edge), like fire and what it burns. Ignorance is subject to cancellation. How could it cancel knowledge, which is what cancels it? Fire, the burner, cannot be burnt by what it burns. Metaphysical Ignorance, though it still existed at the time, could not (in the case of the enlightened person) pre- vail against metaphysical knowledge when the latter arose. How can you possibly show that, even after it has itself already been destroyed, Ignorance could cancel metaphysical knowledge? (B.B.V. IV.iv.914-7)

(10) That which has been known through an authoritative means of knowledge cannot be questioned. This statement applies to the Absolute as known through the Veda, whether it is known as a synthesis of diverse elements or otherwise .... Because means of knowledge relate to their object as illuminator (and therefore do not create or modify it but conform passively to its nature), they cannot supply variable degrees of knowledge according to the intensity with which they are applied; in this they differ from the factors of creative action, which produce more or less of their effect according to the amount

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of energy and perseverance put into the act. No man of true learning could say that the abstract and synthetic knowledge of the Absolute derived from merely hearing the words of the Vedic texts was inexact (and therefore required to be cor- rected through Prasaikhyana) unless he already knew the Absolute through other means of knowledge: for he would not have any evidence for the claim, He could not even make such a claim if he did have knowlenge of the Absolute through other means, knowledge which contradicted the Vedic revelation. For his own preferred means of knowledge and the Vedic revelation would both equally be authoritative means or knowledge, and there would be no evidence for accepting one rather than the other. Indeed, if the Absolute could be known in its simple (true) form through some means of knowledge other than thc Veda (which is not in fact the case), there would be no need for upanishadic meditation, and the anparent injunction invoked in favour of it ('Once the wise man has acquired knowledge, he should practise repeated affirmation', Brhad. IV.iv.21) would be useless .... Morever, the opponent lays claim to a strange kind of omi- science when he says that knowledge derived from the Veda, which is a certified means of knowledge, is incorrect and has to be corrected by something that is not even a means of knowledge .... And again, the impression that arises from meditating on a wrong idea (which is the discipline that the opponent recommends ) would in fact impede the dawn of right knowledge and not give rise to it .... Even in the world it is seen that repetition is a strengthening force. One should see that here also, in the context of the metaphysical teaching of the Veda, repetition of a wrong idea will only strengthen it. (B.B.V. IV.iv.813,15-18,20,23,30)

70 THE DOCTRINE OF THE ELIMINATION OF THE UNIVERSE

There were some who thought that the heart of the teaching of the Veda was the elimination of the universe. The purpose of every text was to enjoin on the hearer the elimination of one or other of the distinctions or other elements that make up his world of experience. A text like 'He who desires heaven should offer sacrifices' (T.S. II.v.5) is meant for elimination of the identification of the body with the soul. A text like 'He should fetch water in the milk-pail for the one who desires cattle' (Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra I.xvi.3) is for the elimination of personal desire for pleasures like food. The negative texts are for the elimination of action arising from passions like attachment. Texts enjoining the obligatory ritual, daily and occasional, are for the elimination of action based on the ord- inary natural instincts. And so they held that the texts of the ritualistic portion of the Veda had the function of

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preparing a person for true knowledge of the Self through eli- minating distinctions. In the same way, texts attributing form to the Absolute were held to have no different purpose, and to have been introduced to demonstrate that the Absolute was without form, through gradual elimination of the universe. That the texts affirming the reality of the Absolute were for the purpose of eliminating the universe of plurality was re- garded as obvious. And thus the whole Veda was seen as con- cerned with eliminating the universe of plurality. But there are many reasons why this theory is wrong and why there cannot be an injunction to eliminate the universe. To begin with, in the texts affirming the existence of the Abso- lute, (there is only affirmation and) no genuine injunctions are found. Then again, the universe of plurality, superimposed through Ignorance, is eliminated automatically (and without meed of an injunction) simply by the texts that communicate the true nature of the Absolute. And if the true naturc of the Absolute has not been communicated, it is impossible to climinate the universe of plurality through a mere act of obe- dience to an injunction. The theory also involves the diffi- culty that, since the soul falls within the universe of plural- ity, the soul, too, would be eliminated with the latter. Or again, if the individual soul were considered to be in truth the Absolute, it would be known from the texts communicating the true nature of the Absolute that the soul, in its true nature, was not subject to commands. Nor should anyone suppose that when forms involving plural- ity are attributed to the Absolute for purposes of meditation, in such texts as 'made up of mind' (Chand. III.xiv.2), there is any purpose of eliminating distinctions. For these forms are only connected with the relevant injunction to meditate. No injunctions to eliminate them are found. Nor is there any in- dication that the texts concerned with the Absolute, either with or without form, are included under any injunction to eliminate the universe on the ground of being a subordinate element in it, as the injunctions to perform the fore- sacrifices are a subordinate element in the latter (cp. M.V.70,1). As for the texts of the ritualistic section of the Veda, there is no place whatever amongst them for an injunction to destroy the universe. One cannot suppose that texts like 'He who desires the possession of villages should offer sacrifices' are given for the sake of release through elimination of the universe of plurality. For such rewards as villages and the like are clearly perceived to belong to the universe. And texts concerned with ritual could not be for the sake of the elimination of the world of plurality; for, if they were, the whole world of transmigratory experience would by now have been obliterated. And if the purpose of rituals really had been liberation, then the whole conception (found in the Veda) that they lead to the possession of villages and other worldly

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ends would have been without warrant. Nor can it be supposed that the rituals exist for the sake of a form of liberation that one reaches gradually by passing through heaven and other stages, as one climbs gradually up the stairs te the roof of a house. For the example cited is not a true parallel. The stairs are but instruments, whereas heaven and other such re- wards are themselves geruine human goals pursued for their own sake. Ncr can it be said that the texts have both purposes, as actions like digging a canal may serve different purposes at the same time, (such as irrigation and hygiene). For there is nothing to support this, while actien and cessation from action (implied by liberation) are contradictory. Again, the texts expressing metaphysical negaticns ('neither this nor that', etc.) admittedly help in the suppression of attachment and other passions. But there is nothing to show that the positive injunctions have a similar role. For ecti- vity of any kind is naturally directed towards the world of plurality. And the negative texts like 'nct gross ... ' and so on effect the elimination of the body directly (in liberation, without need of the help of ritualistic injunctions). And ritualistic acts do not depend on each other mutually; each is exhausted in producing its own result. As for the fact that they can gradually fit a person to become a candidate for metaphysical knowledge (by purifying his mind to an ever greater degree) that is acceptable. There is the additional difficulty that, if the Veda were exclusively concerned with injunction, this would make it dif- ficult to accept the identity of the individual soul with the Absolute, as the Absolute is beyond the sphere of injunctions, and this would render the metaphysical texts of the Veda in- authoritative. And other faults would follow, such as making liberation the occult result of the performance of ritual and hence rendering it impermanent. Or such grounds as these the doctrine is refuted at length in Śankara's Brahma Sūtra Com- mentary III.ii.21 and in Suresvara's Sambandha Vārtika 384-423.

(1) The texts promising rewards for meditations on presribed themes have aims that are different from those of the texts concerned with affirmation of the existence and sole reality of the Absolute. The two classes of texts cannot be treated as parts of one and the same topic. How, indeed, can you sup- pose them to form one topic? If you say that they all depend on one injunction, like the injunctions to perform the fore- sacrifices, which depend on the main injunction to perform the Full Moon Sacrifice which the fore-sacrifices precede, that is wrong. For the texts proclaiming the existence and sole reality of the Absolutc are not associated with any injunction at all. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.21)

(2) Let us suppose we receive the reply that this world- appearance, comprehending the microcosm such as the body and

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its organs, and the macrocosm such as the five great cosmic elements like earth, and the objects into which they are trans- formed, is real and has to be eliminated. In that case, since the universe cannot be eliminated by an individual through his own activity, the tenching that it had to be eliminated would be a command to perform the impossible. And as the great ele- ments like earth and the rest would all have been eliminated by the first single person who obtained liberation, the uni- verse would now be without them (which is absuru). Perhaps the opponent will contend that the Absolute is one, and that this universe of plurality is a false appearance superimposed on it which has to be eliminated through metaphy- sical knowledge. But in that case the correct course would be that knowledge of the Absolute shouid be conveyed by the ne- gation of the illusory universe of plurality that had been superimpcsed on it through Ignorance. (This, however, could not occur through injunctions, but only) through (purely meta- physical) texts like 'One only, without a second' (Chand. VI.ii.1) and 'That is the real, that is the Selr, that thou art' (Chand. VI.viii.7). When knowledge of the Absolute has been thus conveyed, enlightenment will arise automatically, and metaphysical Ignorance will stand abolished. Then this whole universe of name and form superimposed through Ignorance will be dissolved like a dream. Unless metaphysical knowledge of the Absolute has been attained in this way, injunctive texts saying 'Realize the Absolute' and 'Eliminate the universe' will not effect those ends even if repeated hundreds of times cver. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.21)

(3) And in regard to the individual soul, to whom the injunc- tion is supposed to be addressed, we would ask whether he is to be considered as part of the world-appearance, or whether he is to be considered in his true nature as the Absolute. If he is to be considered as part of the world-appearance, then, since the doctrine teaches that the Absolute in its true nature is void of all plurality, the individual soul will have been reduced to nothing along with earth and the other great ele- ments. To whom, then, will the injunction have been addressed? And who will there be to obtain liberation by obeying it? On the alternative view, the soul would be considered in its true nature as the Absolute. But the Absolute is by nature incapable of receiving an injunction. As soon as the Absolute was known, the conviction would arise that the notion of indi- viduality had been due to Ignorance. Since there would then no longer be anyone capable of receiving an injunction, there could not be an injunction. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.21)

(4) On the other hand, when forms implying plurality are men- tioned as themes for prescribed meditations in sections devoted to that subject, in such texts as 'Made up of mind, having the vital energy as its body, luminous in nature' (Chand.III.xiv.2),

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such texts chould not be regarded as having been introduced for the sake of effecting eliminations. For they are connected with positive injunctions to perform the meditations concerned, such as 'He should frame somc purpose' (Chand. III.xiv.l). (B.S.Bh.III.ii .? L)

(5) It is intelligible that attributes of this kind should have been imputed to the Absolute for purposes of those pre- scribed meditations that are to be followed by speciric future rewards. But it is evidenily incorrect to interpret them in a figurative sensc and say that they are introduced for pur- poses of elimination of the universe of plurality. (B.S.Eh. III.ii.21)

(6) In regard to the fore-sacrifices (prayaja) and the New and Full Moon Sacrifices, unity of topic is defensible, as here the qualification of the sacrificer for both, arising from the fact that they co-operate to produce the same reward, which he desires, furnishes an element of unity. But in the present context, as between texts dealing with the Absolute associated with attributes, texts dealing with the Absolute unassociated with attributes and texts conveying commands, no element of unity is yielded by the qualifications of the people addressed (as they are all quite different). Attributes like 'luminous in nature' do not promote elimination of the world- appearance. Nor would elimination of the world-appearance pro- mote attributes such as 'luminous in nature', as the two are mutually contradictory. For it is not right to burden one and the same text with the aim of total elimination of the world-

III.ii.21) appearance and continued respect for part of it. (B.S.Bh.

(7) Perhaps you (who hold that all the texts of the Veda are concerned with liberation) will ask whether attaining identity with all is not liberation, quoting 'Therefore it became the all' (Brhad. I.iv.10). Yes, it is liberation. But Vedic texts like 'He who desires villages should offer sacrifices, he who desires cattle should offer sacrificcs' do not have the goal of liberation in view. If the purpose of such injunctions had been realization of the non-dual Absolute it would not have been attainment of villages, cattle, heaven and the like - and then villages, cattle, heaven and the like would never have been mentioned. But they are mentioned, as particular rewards for different kinds of rituals. And if the purpose of Vedic rituals really was realization of the Absolute in its true non-dual form, the world of transmigration would not now exist. (Brhad.Bh.III.ii.1, intro. )

(8) Perhaps you will say that the injunctions to perform rituals for rewards, though their main aim is the elimination of the universe, do also have the secondary function of

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promoting further transmigration (for those who want rewards in that realm). A light may be brought for the purpose of ascertaining the colour of a particular object, and yet, it may also illumine everything else that stands within its rays. But this view is wrong, as it cannot be supported by any evi- dence. If the rituals and meditations enjoined by the Veda are intended to promote realization of the Absolute in its true non-dual form. it cannct be shown that they have the secondary function of effecting something completely different (namely, further experience in the realm of bondage). There is no evi- dence for it, either through perception, inference or revela- tion. (Brhad.Bh.lII.ii.1, intro.)

(9) Perhaps you will claim that one becomes gradually fitted for knowledge of the Self through the performance of all the rituals which lead to heaven and other desirable goals, start- ing with the simplest and going on to the most elaborate. The process would be like one climbing up to the top of a house, passing up the stairs one by one .... But this is wrong. For heaven and the rest are not steps on the path to anything else. They are genuine human goals, pursued for their own sake. (s.v. 400,402)

(10) Perhaps you will say that one text can have both func- tions at the same time, just as a canal or a light can be use- ful in different ways at the same time. But this is not cor- rect, for, according to the rules of Vedic exegesis, a text cannot mean more than one thing at the same time in this way .* Nor can one and the same text mean action and non-action at the same time. Canals and a light may be useful in different. ways at the same time because they are perceived to be so in worldly experience; so in their case there is no difriculty. (Brhad.Bh.III.ii.1, intro.)

*(See Jaimini, P.M.S. II.i.46, quoted and discussed at Devasthali, 1959, p.186 ff. T.N.)

(11) Ritualistic action, with its five factors comprising the sacrificer's wife, son, wealth, merit from meditation and merit from previous ritual, along with the sacrificer himself, belongs to the realm of metaphysical Ignorance. Hence it is not a means to attainment of the Self. If a person pursues one goal with the means appropriate to another the results are adverse. Running and walking about are not the right way to appease hunger and thirst. (Brhad.Bh.II.iv.l, intro. )

(12) It is only reasonable to hold that what is a cause of action cannot at the same time be a cause of non-action. (Brhad.Bh.III.ii.l, intro. )

(13) We grant that the prohibitions contained in the Veda

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are auxiliaries to cessation from action, inasmuch as they pro- hibit action for the sake of objects brought to mind by attach- ment and other passions. But how can the 'original' injunc- tions inhibit attachment? They do not even have the negative force of the 'excluding' or the 'restricting' injunctions *.... There is no difference between action for visible ends in the world and action for the sake of unseen ends to be enjoyed after death Both are means to desired pleasures, motivated by attachment and other passions. Both promote attachment to the world equally. What is the difference between the two kinds of action that enables you to say that one promotes liberation while the other does not? (s.v. 411-2,418-9)

*(Vedic injunctions, as opposed to prohibitions, have positive grammatical form. They may be divided into three classes, however, where the last two classes, despite their positive grammatical form, imply negation, either through 'restriction' or 'exclusion'. The first class, original injunctions (apūrva- vidhi), enjoin actions to which one would not have been prompted without that particular injunction (vidhi). The term 'original injunction' (apurva-vidhi) must be distinguished from the term 'originating injunction' (utpatti-vidhi, M.V. 67,2); the originating injunctions, small in number, form the most important sub-class within the ritualistic injunctions as a whole; they are the fundamental injunctions which direct one to perform a sacrifice for an end, and are contrasted with 'injunctions of application' (viniyoga-vidhi), most of which are themselves original injunctions (apurva-vidhi), which tell you how to do it. In the threefold classification of injunctions as original, restrictive and exclusive, restrictive injunctions (niyama- vidhi) complete the specification of what has to be done. When it is known that rice must be husked, a niyama-vidhi specify- ing pounding the paddy restricts the sacrificer to that method of husking, so that he will not, for instance, gouge it out with his nails. This is not an original injunction, because he already knows that he has to husk the rice. Though its grammatical form is positive, its force is restrictive (nega- tive). Here there is no explicit injunction to gouge that has to be excluded. But where there is an injunction to seize a bridle, and the ritual includes both a horse and a donkey, the injunction might, so far, refer explicitly to the bridle of either animal. If a further injunction is added to seize the reins of the horse, this excludes not just the sacrificer's idea to seize the Lridle of the donkey, but the explicit in- junction to do so too. This is called an excluding injunction (parisankhya-vidhi). For more precise information, see Mahadevan on S.V. 412-3 and Keith 1921, p.86. T.N.)

(14) Perhaps you will suggest that where the Vedic texts

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appear, at face value, to be concerned with heaven, we must infer that they are really concerned with elimination. But this is wong. For their concern with the elimination of the body and the rest is openly established by their direct teach- ing at some points (i.e. in the metaphysical as opposed to the ritualistic texts: hence elimination of the body and so on need not and should not be indirectly inferred from texts speaking of other matters). When the whole of an elephant is perceived standing in front of you, you cannot infer its pres- ence from perception of its leg, Negative texts like 'not gross' and so on directly negate the body and cther features of the universe, (so there is no justification for an infer- ence that positive texts must be artificially interpreted to perform this negative function). (s.v. 425-6)

(15) The injunctions to perform rituals and the texts affirm- ing the existence of the (actionless) Absolute are each limited to their own task. How could they both apply to the same per- son at the same time when (unlike the chief and auxiliary in- junctions for a ritual) they are not mutually dependent? (S.V. 398)

(16) And there is another point. Tf the Veda were really limited to injunction (as the opponent believes), then the teaching that the true Self of the individual soul was the Ab- solute, beyond the sphere of injunction, would be rendered in- authoritative. So the opponent is driven to say that the Veda teaches that one's true Self is the Absolute and also enjoins this knowledge on the hearer. But this would mean that the body of Vedic texts dealing with the Absolute, though forming a single science, would be teaching two different and mutually contradictory subjects (namcly, realization of the actionless Absolute and performance of a duty). In short, no one can save the doctrine that the Veda is con- cerned solely with injunction from a great many defects - such as contradiction of what the Veda actually teaches, affirmation of points that it does not teach, making liberation into a distant occult result of action like the occult results of ritual and thereby rendering it impermanent, and other faults besides. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.21)

It is true that in our own doctrine we maintain that the world-appearance consisting of action, its factors and results, set up by metaphysical Ignorance, is eliminated through knowl- edge. Nevertheless, these criticisms which we have levelled at those who believe that the whole Veda consists of injunc- tions designed to eliminate the world-appearance have their purpose. We wish to show that, as pointed out by Śri Sankara in his commentary to Brahma Sutra I.i. 4 (M.V.52,1), the sec- tion of the Veda devoted to metaphysical knowledge merely pro- claims reality to be what it is (without any injunction being .

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implied), while the texts concerned with rituals and the texts concerned with prescribed meditations give their various in- junctions to perform actions of various kinds.

71 THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERATION THROUGH ELIMINATION OF PLEASURE-DESIRE

There were others who held that those whose minds were sullied by pieasure-desire did not have the right to be candidates for knowledge of the supreme non-dual principle. Such people, they maintained, could attain to the state of Prajapati through performance of ritual combined with meditation on unity in duality. One who had done this, they held, might then later attain the state of supreme non-duality, when all his desires had been eliminated. But this doctrine also is without foundation. Pleasure- desire cannot be assuaged by the enjoyment of pleasures. If pleasure-desire is not killed out, then, even if one comes tc hear the Vedic teacning about the bliss of the Absolute, it will not blunt the desire for sense-objects. And in these circumstances it will not be possible to attain the highest human end by meditation on unity in duality combined with per- formance of ritual. For rituals (ultimately yield pleasure and thereby) increase desire. Nor is attainment of the realm of Prajāpati necessarily a means to liberation. Indeed, the supreme bliss of the Absolute is present equally in everything. It is not any different under the apparent conditioning adjunct called 'Prajapati' from what it is anywhere else. Nor is there any Vedic text that says that only he who has attained to the realm of Prajapati first can attain liberation. Suresvara's Vārtika rerutes the doctrine on these lines. Śankara Bhagavetpāda points out in his Brhadāraņyaka Commentary that the means employed to attain the realm of Prajāpati can- not be the same as those required for the attainment of the virtue of non-attachment.

(1) Not so. For pleasure-desire is not eliminated through enjoyment of pleasures even for hundreds of years. By indul- ging one's pleasure-desire one greatly increases it. It is brought to an end by perception of the defects inherent in ob- jects of pleasure .... If the bliss of the Absolute is merely heard about from the Vedic texts and not made the object of direct experience, this will not be enough to blunt the edge of the desire for joy from sense-objects. The way to end pleasure desire, therefore, is to meditate on the pain-giving and imper- manent character of sense-objects. Obeying injunctions to per- form rituals for rewards results, not in the suppression of pleasure-desire, but in the opposite. Attaining the state of Prajapati is not a guaranteed means to liberation. From the standpoint of the highest truth, there

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is no difference of rank between any of the apparent condition- ing adjuncts of the real .... The reality is the same in Praja- pati and the meanest insect. This is clear both from reason and from such texts as 'And whichever of the gods awakened to his true nature as the Self became the Absolute. It is the same in the case of the Rsis, it is the same in the case of men' (Brhad. I. iv.10). (s.V. 345,348-50,354)

(2) The course of discipline that leads to attainment of iden- tity with Hiranyagarbha (= Prajapati) cannot be the samc as the ccurse of discipline that leads to withdrawel from all empiri- cal experience. Nejther can the course of discipline that leads the one intent on the supreme Self to withdraw from all empirical experience be the same as that which leads to the state of identity with Hiranyagarbha. For you cannot derive the power to reach a particular state from a discipline which puts an end to reaching any state. Perhaps you (Bhartrprapanca) will claim that a person may attain the state of Hiranyagarbha after death, and then, with his organs dissolved, with only his name rumaining, become fit, to attain knowledge of the supreme Self. But that (would be self-condemned as an explanation of Vedic texts since it) would render useless the Vedic teachings about knowledge of the supreme Self given for ordinary people living in the world like ourselves. For texts like 'And whichever of the gods .... It is the same in the case of the Rsis, it is the same in the case of men' (Brhad.I.iv.10) show that knowledge of the Abso- lute is taught as a goal available to everyone. (Brhad.Bh. III.ii.13)

72 THE VIEW THAT LIBERATION COMES FROM HALTING THE IMPRESSIONS OF THE THREE STATES OF WAKING, DREAM AND DREAMLESS SLEEP

There were some who thought that the Self was an object capable of being signified by a word and that it must therefore be knowable through one or other of the recognized means of em- pirical knowledge. And they maintained that, as the Self could be recognized through discriminating it from waking, dream and dreamless sleep through the method of agreement and differ- ence,* there was no need to resort to the Veda as a means of knowledge in this context. The function of the Veda, rather, was to enjoin as a command the halting of the impressions of waking and the other states. Since the Self was self-luminous, it would naturally manifest of its own accord when the impres- sions had been halted. So they held that the upanishadic texts, like the texts laying down the ritual, were authorita- tive because they promoted action, not because, like perception and the other means of valid cognition, they revealed reality.

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They therefore maintained that liberation would only come frcm the halting of impressions, whether other measures were taken or not. This is wrong. It is self-contradictory to say that our Self is self-manifest, and also that, because it is an object capable of being signified by a word, it is knowable through the reccgnized means of knowledge. Awakening to this reality in fact results from negating distinetions like the notion that it is an object capable of being signified by a word. It is neither the meaning of a word nor of a sentence. and if means of knowledge other than the Veda were admitted in this context, and if it were through them that one knew about evil, and about the impressions as cause of evil, and abeut putting an end to evil through their destruction, then the texts of the Veda would certainly be rendered useless. For the final goal of lifc would be obtained without Vedic injunctions. Again, it is imnossible to believe that impressions accumu- lated over many lives could be breught tc a halt in one single life. And if an impression cannot be destroyed by immediate knowledge that is antagonistic to it, how could it he shown to be subject to destruction merely through dwelling on the idea of such knowledge? So their doctrine that man is enjoined to dwell upon the idea of knowledge is also incorrect. Morecver, in dreamless sleep and kindred states (swoon, coma, trance) there are no impressions, and yet liberation does not super- vene. Nor is there immediate intuition of the Self in those states, as there is no opportunity in them for the operation of the Veda as an authoritative means of knowledge. So the view that liberation follows merely from the halting of impres- sions is incorrect. Further, the Self is the Witness both of Ignorance and of the means of knowledge. When it is already their Witness, the question of whether it is established or not established by the means of knowledge simply does not arise. And the idea that it requires an injunction and other further conditions before the existence of the Self can be established is merely ridiculous. Nor is it correct to think that if the Self is self-established, the texts which give knowledge of it are inauthoritative because they only repeat what is already known from some other source. For we know from experience that things that are at first not known become known only when some definite increment in knowledge has been sought and ob- tained, and what is a matter of common experience cannot be questioned. As for what was said about the texts of the Upanishads only being authoritative when they laid down injunctions, like the ritualistic texts, that was simply wrong. Injunctions are appropriate when one has to learn that, for a given end, some- thing has to be done which one will then go on to do. But here the highest end open to man is realized simply from knowledge. There is nothing remaining to be done, so the case

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is quite differemt. And there is another poirt. It is said that the Veda pro- motes action when it apprises one of ihe previously unknown means to some desired end. And the Veda does not promote ac- tion in any other way except this. So even in this context the authoritativeness of the Veda lies in the fact that it con- veys true information about reality, not in the fact that it promotes action. This is further confirmed by the fact that the authority and validity of percepticn and the other means of knowleuge also lie in their power to give infcrmation about the real. Again, it is caly Ignorance that renders the impressions evil. Our true Self, which is relationless, could not be con- nected with impressions but for metaphysical Ignorance. Fur- ther, if the Self is only known indirectly through inference arising from the sign 'different from the three states', it will not be known as identical with the Absolute. And so that is another reason why one needs to remove Ignorance. It is only Ignorance that obstructs the abolition of transmigratory life, although the non-existence of the latter is an eternally established truth. Only Ignorance obstructs realization of the Absolute, which is in truth eternally realized. This be- ing so, it follows that Ignorance is abolished by knowledge arising from 'That thou art' and other Vedic texts and not by the halting of impressions. And one should not raise the objection, 'How can one know that the Witness of the three states is the Absolute even from the Veda?' For the Witness of all means of knowledge (such as perception), and of the presence or absence of all states (such as waking, dream and dreamless sleep), is the Self in its true nature, Consciousness bereft of all plurality, not exist- ing for the sake of another. It is only called a Witness (figuratively) relative to what it witnesses (which are but empty illusions). The only veil hiding it is Ignorance. Hence it can be communicated as the Absolute only by the removal of this veil through texts like 'That thou art'. The doctrine of liberation through the halting of impressions is refuted by Suresvara on these lines in his Vārtika.

*(If one reviews one's experience reflectively, one sees that an identical Self is present constantly, while the states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep pass away and give way to one another. One's Self, therefore, must be different from those three states. T.N.)

(1) This Self is not, in truth, the meaning either of a word or of a sentence. It is known in its true nature, therefore, only through the negative texts. (s.v. 462)

(2) Therefore, since the reason for being caught in transmi- gration is supposed to be known through mere inference (to be

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the psychie impressions), evil (on this theory) ceases for the soul when those impressions are destroyed. Liberation, the true goal of man, would thus be secured without recourse to the Veda, as in the view of the Buddhists and other anti-Vedic theorists. The Veda would thus be rendered useless. (s.v. 457-8)

(3) Because the impressions have arisen from many past lives, they are infinite in number. Man cannot bring all of them to an end in the same place in one life. (s.v. )59)

(4) If direct concrete knowledge of the Self, which destroys Ignorance, does not destroy those impressions of suffering, how will mere dwelling on such knowledge do so, when the lat- ter will inevitably be broken by contradictory thoughts of pain and the like? (s.v. 460)

(5) Though there are no impressions in dreamless sleep, swoon and trance, yet there is no liberation either. Nor is the Self as ultimate knower manifest in these states, because of the absence of the operation of any means of knowledge. (s.v. 463)

(6) The Self is the principle of immediate experience. Igno- rance (distorts but) does not obscure it; no means of knowl- edge reveals it (as if it were totally unknown before). How could it depend on anything (such as an injunction) to be known? (s.v. 467)

(7) Perhaps you will object that the Self must be self- established because none of the ordinary means of knowledge can reveal it, and that this renders the Vedic texts proclaim- ing it inauthoritative, as they are only informing one of what is already known. But this is wrong. For it is a matter of ex- perience that metaphysical reality is not fully known without the discipline of hearing, pondering and sustained meditation. There is no direct awakening to truth without resort to this discipline. (s.v. 546-7)

Ignorance is immediately evident in experience. Knowledge arising from the authoritative means (the Veda) reveals the Self in its true nature as self-manifest by removal of meta- physical Ignorance. So the Veda does not here merely repeat what was known before from another source.

(8) Knowledge and Ignorance are both directly perceived in experience. What conceivable authority could one have for de-

(s.V.548) claring impossible that which had actually been perceived?

We have beginningless Ignorance and also knowledge that super venes at a certain time - this is asserted on the basis of

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experience. The uppeal is to the rule 'Nothing that is per- ceived can be impossible'.

(9) An injunction is appropriate when a person first learns that something has to be done to attain a particular end, and then has io do something to accomplish it. But here, in the case of the texts proclaiming the true nature of the Self, the highest human end is gained immediately, simply by becoming awake to the reality prcclaimed. We do not see the accomplish- ment of any end through action here. (s.V.586-7)

(10) And so, even when the Veda incites one to action, it only aoes so by giving information about previously unknown mauters which would be the means to e desirable end. Its power to incite action only consists in its power to communi- cate knowledge. Thus the authoritativeness of the Veda lies in its power to convey true knowledge, not in its power to in- cite action. In this respect it is the same as the other authoritative means of knowledge, such as perception, where power to incite action is not found. (S.V. 637-8)

(11) Metaphysical Ignorance is the sole cause of connection with any evil. Even connection with the impressions depends solely on metaphysical Ignorance .. were to show that the Self was distinct from the states of .. Even if logical analysis

waking, dream and dreamless sleep, as the genus 'cowhood' is distinct from the individuals in which it resides, how would that show (without the help of the Veda) that it was identical with the Absolute? (s.v. 464,856)

(12) In this special case, where the difference betwcen having or losing depends on metaphysical Ignorance, nothing but cor- rect metaphysical knowledge can secure this highest interest of man. He who desires the destruction of all evil from the Veda, overcomes all suffering when he hears from the Vedic texts 'Thou art the Absolute'. For his Ignorance is then des- troyed. (s.v. 888-9)

(13) From hearing the texts one may acquire the following conviction, namely: I am the Absolute, from which proceed all the means of right knowledge, the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep and the distinction between being and non-being. The Absolute is that whereby all things not yet established become established, that on which being and non-being depend, that which does not exist for the sake of anything else and for the sake of which all else exists, and which never (in truth) has anything but itself to illumine. The triad of knower, knowledge and known, each mutually dis- tinct, proceed from it. It is the real, and must be accepted as the Witness. The lotus of Consciousness must be seen as expanded (i.e. present) in dreamless sleep as well as in

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waking, for the Veda says that there is no break in the seeing of the seer (Brhad.IV.iii.23). But, in its true nature, the lotus of Consciousness is not expanded (i.e. differentiated) in dream and waking any more than it is in dreamless sleep (as the Veda denies that there is true contact between the Self and the organs of empirical knowledge, Brhad. IV.iii.15). The Self is not a Witness in itsclf; it is a Witness only in re- lation to the (illusory objects that come before its light to be) witnessed. Being nothing but the'inmost vision, it is not accessible to thought or speech ... Even though this inmost Self is thus immediately knowable, because it is self-luminous, and though it is the Witness of all metaphysical Ignorance and its effects, neverthelcss it remains unknown until the advent of some definite increment in knowledge has been sought and obtained. Therefore it is only from hearing Vedic texts like 'That thou art', and not from any other source (such as obe- dience to injunctions or halting of impressions) that, unshak- able knowledge of reality as the one Self results. (S.V. 1082-6,1090-1)

73 THE VIEW THAT LIBERATION RESULTS FROM OBEDIENCE TO AN INJUNCTION TO SUSTAIN REMEMBRANCE OF KNOWLEDGE

Others held the following doctrine. The highest goal of human life cannot be fulfilled merely through hearing the kind of knowledge that one obtains through hearing. One has to sus- tain remembrance of that knowledge in addition. And from this one attains the highest goal of human life. The revered Commentator refuted this doctrine on the ground that, once genuine knowledge of the Self had arisen, remem- brance of it would be sustained automatically, and would not have to be enjoined as a duty. But he also offered an alter- native view, purely as a concession to the ways of thinking of other people, through which an injunction could be accepted. If so, it must be accepted as a 'restrictive' injunction (cp. M.V. p.197) applicable on the assumption (made only as a con- cession) that knowledge had weakened with time, under the force of the merit and demerit that had initiated the life in which enlightenment was obtained. The revered Commentator altogether rejected and refuted the possibility of an 'origi- nal' injunction (cp. M.V. p.197) in this context.

(1) Perhaps you will say that something else to be done is implied after the mere knowledge arising from hearing the text, namely sustained remembrance of the knowledge of the Self that arose from the text. But this is wrong, as sustained remem- brance is already implied as an automatic consequence. The moment that knowledge of the Self arises from the texts that proclaim the Self, it necessarily puts an end to all wrong

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notions about the Self. When wrong notions of the Self have ceased, the natural memories that arise from them and bear on various aspects of the not-self no longer arise. Moreover, everything other than the Self is then seen to be an evil. For when the Self has once been known, everything else is seen as evil. For all this realm of the not-self ic transient and painful and impure, and has many other defects, while the Self, the reality, is the opposite. Hence memories based on experience of the not-self cease when the Self is known. Sustained remembrance of the knowledge of one's iden- tity with the Self of all must follow automatically as (when all other memories have been obliterated) this is the only alternative left. And because such remembrance follows implic- itly, it cannot be the subject of an injunction. Further, it is on account of this sustained automatic remem- brance of the knowledge of the Self that the defect of pain arising from grief, delnsion, fear and fatigue ccases in the case of the enlightened person. Defects like grief and delu- sion proceed from wrong knowledge. And in support of this we have such Vedic texts as 'What delusion?' (Isa 7), 'He who knows the bliss of the Absolute experiences fear from no quar- ter' (Taitt.II.9), 'O Janaka, verily you have attained the fearless state' (Brhad. IV.ii.4) and 'The knot of the heart is broken' (Muņd. II.ii.9). (Brhad.Bh.I.iv.7)

(2) As for the opponent's earlier statement that texts like 'Once the wise man has acquired knowledge of the Self alone, he should practise repeated affirmation' (Brhad. IV.iv.21) referred to acts of meditation over and above the mere under- standing of the meaning of the words of the text, we agree that it is true. But such texts do not constitute original injunctions (cp. M.V. p.197). They only constitute restrictive injunctions, as they merely specify one already-known alter- native. Perhaps you will now ask how we can say that meditation is already known as one possible alternative among others, seeing that we have said earlier that sustained remembrance of the knowledge of the Self was regular, as it was the only alterna- tive left. Quite right. But the merit and demerit that brought into being the body in which enlightenment was attained must nevertheless be fully worked out. Even after enlighten- ment has been attained, thought, word and deed inevitably con- tinue. For merit and demerit that are already under way are more powerful (than knowledge), like an arrow that is already in flight and must run its course. Therefore the stream of remembrance of knowledge of the Self is liable to be overpowered by the merit and demerit that occasioned the present life, and hence activity to strengthen it is already known as a possible alternative. Sustained remembrance of the knowledge of the Self gained from the upani- shadic texts, therefore, has to be supported by renunciation

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and dispassion and other characteristic disciplines of the spiritual life. But this duty is nct to be taken as resting on an original injunction, because it can be seen to be a duty without one. Therefore texts like 'Once the wise man has acquired knowledge of the Self alone, he should practise repeated affirmation' must be taken as restrictive injunctions, prompting one to ad- here strictly to sustained remembrance of the knowledge of the Self which one has already gained. For no other way of inter- preting the text is possible. (Brhad.Bh.I.iv .? )

The same point is made in the Commentary on Brahma Sutra III.iv.47.

74 THE VIEW THAT LIBERATION ARISES FROM AN INJUNCTION TO SUPPRESS ALL MOVEMENT OF THE MIND

There were some who held that it was something else that the Upanishads enjoined over and above the mere knowledge derived from hearing the texts, namely suppression of all movement of the mind. For yoga is found enjoined in the Upanishads. Other schools also accept suppression of all movement of the mind as a method for attaining vision of truth. And the evidence for the claim that yogic vision is a part of Vedic doctrine finds indirect support in the upanishadic text, 'Having known this deity, the cause of all, through the disciplines of Sankhya and Yoga, one is liberated from all bonds' (Śvet.VI.13). This doctrine also is refuted by the revered Teacher ŚrI Śankara. For we do not find any other means to liberation ex- cept knowledge that one's true Self is the Absolute. The phrase 'having known ... through the disciplines of Sankhya and Yoga' really refers to the disciplines of knowledge and meditation as conceived in the Vcdic tradition. And total ces- sation of all movement of the mind cannot be achieved through sustaining remembrance of knowledge.

(1) For the Veda denies that there is any other means to final beatitude apart from the knowledge of the unity and sole real- ity of the Self derived from the Veda. This it does in the text, 'Only through knowing Him does one pass beyond death. There is no other path for reaching the highest state' (Svet. III.8). (B.S.Bh.II.i.3)

(2) (The Yoga discipline of Patañjali is not a means to liber- ation.) For we do not find any means recognized in the Upani- shads for obtaining the highest goal of life apart from knowl- edge that one's true Self is the Absolute. This is illustrated by such texts as, 'Then the Absolute knew itself alone (as "I am the Absolute"). Through that it became the all' (Brhad.

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I.iv.10), 'He who knows the Absolute attains the supreme. Being' (Taitt. II.1) and 'He who knows the Absolute, that supreme prin- ciple, verily becomes the Absolute' (Mund.III.ii.9). (Brhad. Bh.I.iv.7)

(3) It is true that the passage quoted from the Svetāsvatara Upanishad spoke of metaphysical vision coming through Sankhya and Yoga when it said, 'This ... (the) cause of all, which is known through the disciplines of Sankhya and Yoga' (Svet.VI.13). But we have to understand here that it is only the knowledgc and meditation taught in the Veda that is meant in this con- text, and that they are referred to by the words 'Sankhya' and 'Yoga' because the latter are convenient approximate terms. (B.S.Ph.II.i.3)

(4) And (we also deny that the discipline of the Yoga School can lead to liberation), because there is no other way (except that of the Vedic discipline) to suppress the movements of the mind, For there is no way to stop the movements of the mind excopt through knowledge of the Self. There is, in fact, no discipline that will suppress all movements of the mind: there is only the automatic stream of remembrance that follows after metaphysical knowledge of the Self has arisen. I.iv.7) (Brhad.Bh.

75 THE DOCTRINE OF THE BHAGAVATAS

The followers of the Bhagavata tradition held the following views. The Absolute is the cause of the world. It is by na- ture eternally pure, conscious and liberated. Because it is taught that the individual soul is created by the Absolute, and that, as subject to transmigration, its nature is the opposite of that of the Absolute, the individual soul cannot have the conviction 'I am the Absolute'. If it did, it would mean that the Absolute would be sullied with the defects of the soul. So no one should suppose that the Absolute can be identified with the individual soul undergoing transmigration. The Absolute has to be worshipped through offering of flowers, water cupped in the hands, hymns, inclinations of the head, oblations, reci- tation of appointed texts, yoga practices and so forth. When he has come to know it through worship, the disciple will become the Absolute, the controller of all. This view is characterized by Gaudapada as 'the doctrine that the Absolute undergoes birth', and he refutes it. It is denounced as being in contradiction with Vedic tradition in Śri Śankara's Gita Commentary. The texts found in the verses and prose passages of the Veda exhibit the Creator Himself entering into the bodies He has created. Throughout all the Vedic texts the word 'Self' is used to mean the Absolute, and the individual soul is taught to be identical (in its true

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nature) with the non-dual Absolute. And the identity of the true Self of the hearer with the Absolute is taught as being ar established fact in the text 'That thou art'. The notion of a (real) distinction between the individual soul and the Lord is also decried. If there are texts which speak of the creation of the individual souls, they are introduced only as part of the process of bringing home the unity or all. It is a figurative notion introduced with a view to suggest some- thing else, like the equally figurative notion that separate parcels of the ether of space arc created within separate pots. As ior worship, the revered Acarya accepts this, following the injunctions for meditation and worship that apply tc students of low or medium powers of vision.

(1) The soul that resorts to worship remains within that form of the Absolute which (apparently) undergoes birth as the world. Before the (apparent) creation of the world, all was (one as) the unborn supreme principle. Therefore a worshipper of this kind is deemed pitiable. (G.K.III.1)

(2) But T am the one subject to transmigratory experience, the one who enjoys pleasure and suffers pain. The halting of transmigratory experience is a task that I have to achieve. I shall do so by knowledge of the Field and the Knower of the Field (M.V. p.40), by meditation, and by becoming established in the very nature of the Lord, the Knower of the Field, after having acquired direct knowledge of Him first. He who thinks or teaches thus cannot himself be the Knower of the Field. And the miserable 'sage' who holds such a view thinks that he is bringing out the true meaning of transmigra- tory experience and of liberation from it, and also the true meaning of the Vedic teaching as a whole. But in fact he is a 'slayer of the Self', confused himself and leading others into confusion. Because he is bereft of the true tradition for interpreting the meaning of the Veda, he contradicts what the Veda does teach and reads into it what it does not teach. One' who does not know the true tradition for interpreting the Veda is therefore to be ignored as an ignoramus, be he learned in all the sciences. (Bh.G.Bh.XIII.2)

(3) No. For both the verse and prose texts of the Veda teach that it was verily the Self who entered the bodies He had ' created. The text which begins 'He made the bodies (lit. "cities", pur)' goes on 'The Spirit (purusa) entered those "cities" (pur)' (Brhad. II.v.18), 'He assumed a form corres- ponding to each form; that "assuming a form" was to make Him- self known' (Brhad. II.v.19) and 'The Wise One, who, after pro- jecting all forms, names them, and goes on uttering those names' (Taitt.Ar.III.xii.7). There are many verses in all the different Vedic schools which proclaim that it was the tran- scendent Self and not the transmigrating individual squl who

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projected the world and entered into the body. And there are many prose passages, such as, 'Having created it, verily, He entered into it' (Taitt.II.6), 'Having slit the suture of the skull, He entered through that gate' (Ait.I.iii.12), 'This deity thought, "Let me enter into these three deities (great elements) as the living soul"' (Chand. VI.iii.2), 'Hidden in all these beings, He is not manifest' (Katha I.iii.12) and many others. (Brhad. Bh.II.i.20)

(4) Throughout the Veda, the term 'the Self' is found used to mean the Absolute. And this term also means 'the inmost Self'. Hence it is only right to conclude 'I am the Absolute', as we know from the text 'He is the ihner Self of all beings' (Mund. II.i.4), and also from the fact that there is no transmigrating soul other than the supreme Self, as is shown by such texts as 'One only, without a second' (Chand.VI.ii.1), 'All this is verily but the Absolute alone' (Mund.II.ii.12), 'All this is but the Self alone' (Chand. VII.xxv.2) and others. (Brhad.Bh. II.i.20)

(5) Verily, this is that great unborn Self, beyond decay, death and fear. Verily, the Absolute is fearless. He who knows the Absolute as fearless verily becomes the Absolute. (Brhad.IV.iv.25, cp. M.V.46,7)

Śankara's Commentary: Verily, the Absolute is fearless. It is well known in the world that the Absolute is fearless. Therefore it is but true to say that the Self, which has the same constitution, is the Absolute.

(6) But it would not be right to say that this absence of in- dividual empirical experience (in enlightenment) is conditional on the attainmeni of any particular state. For the text 'That thou art' (Chand. VI.viii. 7) shows that the fact of one's true Self being the Absolute is not conditional upon any state. (B.S.Bh.II.i.14, cp. M.V.46,6; 169,15)

(7) But the reward of knowledge of the Absolute is immediately evident, for the Veda speaks of 'the Absolute which is immedi- ately and directly evident' (Brhad.III.iv.l) and teaches 'That thou art' as an already accomplished fact. (B.S.Bh.III.iii.32)

(8) The non-difference of the individual soul and the supreme Self is celebrated in the Vedas, Puranas and Epics, while the notion of their difference is decried. And (despite the way things appear to crude common-sense and despite the elaborate theories of the realist Logicians) this view turns out to be correct in the end. (G.K.III.13)

(9) The Self appears to undergo birth through the multipli- city of souls, just as the ether of space appears to undergo

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birth through the multiplicity of new forms into which it ap- pears to be enclosed through the production of pots (cp. M.V. 27,4). The ether is also. the example to explain the apparent rise of new objects like pots through the compounding of the elements (since the elements are taught to proceed from the ether and the effect is nothing over and above the material cause). (G.K.III.3)

Śankara's Commentary: When the Veda occasionally speaks of the birth of the individual souls (e.g. Mund. lI.i.2) in order to help instruct the dull pupils, then, if birth is to be ad- mitted at all, this is the example according to which it should be understood, namely the example of the 'production' of ap- parently isolatcd units of the ether of space through the pro- duction of pots.

(10) When creation is mentioned in the Veda, and taught in various ways, through such examples as clay, gold and sparks, this is only a device for introduction (of the doctrine of the sole metaphysical reality of the Self). In truth, there is no differentiation of any kind. (G.K.IIT.15)

Sankara's Commentary: Therefore the Vedic texts speaking of creation and so on are only intended to introduce the idea of the unity and sole reality of the Self. It is not right to imagine that they have any other purpose. So no differentia- tion introduced by production and so on exists in any way.

(11) In this connection (j.e. following on from the passage at M.V.169,6) it must be observed that the words 'You have come out of the Absolute like a spark from fire' serve to strengthen the soul's conviction that it is the Absolute, like (the parallel phrases such as 'You were cast forth at birth from the palace' serving to strengthen) the conviction of the prince that he was a king .* For, until it flies out, a spark is one with the fire from which it proceeds. Hence the refer- ences to examples like gold, iron and sparks of fire are not concerned with teaching the creation, maintenance and dissolu- tion of a differentiated universe, but rather with strengthen- ing the conviction that all is one. (Brhad.Bh.II.i.20)

*(Dravidācārya cited the example of a prince cast out from the palace as an infant and brought up by foresters, believing himself to be a forester. Later, on the king's death, a minis- ter found him and told him, 'You are not a forester but the king'. As the prince then recognized himself to be the king, so the soul can recognize itself to be the Absolute when told 'That thou art'. T.N.)

(12) The individual soul under the name of Sankarsana cannot emanate from the supreme Self called Vasudeva, or it would

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suffor from impermanence and other defects. In that case, too, its attainment of Bhagavan would not constitute liberation. It would merely be a case of the destruction of an effect through dissolving back into its material cause. (B.S.Ph.II.ii.42)

(13) Nor do we see anything wrong if anyone is inclined to worship Bhagavan vehemently and one-pointedly by visits to his temple and the rest. For adoration of the Lord is well known to be prescribed in the Veda and Smrti. (B.S.Bh.II.ii.42)

(14) Students on the path are of three grades, those, namely, of weak, medium and excellent visicn. This meditation is taught to them for their benefii in a spirit of compassion. (G.K.III.16)

Sankara's Commentary: Meditations of this kind are taught for their benefit - that is, prescribed meditations and ritu- als are taught for the benefit of those of weak and medium vision. They are not taught for the benefit of those of excel- lent vision who have the settled conviction 'The Self is one only, without a second'. They are taught by the Veda in a spirit of compassion - that is, with the idea, 'They arc on

unity?' the right path. How can they come to the supreme vision of

C

CHAPTER V BHARTRPRAPAÑCA

76 THE NEED FOR EXAMINING THE SYSTEM OF BHARTRPRAPAÑCA

The various schools of Vedanta teaching that were current in Śrī Bhagavatpāda Śankara's day can be grouped for consideration under three headings, according to the way in which they ex- plained the relation of the individual soul to the Absolute. They can then be labelled as doctrines of difference, of non- difference and of difference in identity. The doctrine of difference was attributed by Bādarayāna Ācārya to Audulomi, in the words 'Because it (the individual soul) will become so (i.e. will become one with the Absolute) when it departs (from the body at death', B.S.I .. iv.21). In general, those who mairtain this doctrine hold that the indivi- dual soul is literally sullied by contact with the complex of conditioning adjuncts consisting of the body, the senses and the mind in its lower and higher forms. But they say it can purify itself through spiritual learning and meditation and other disciplines, and that it will then emerge from the com- plex of the body and the rest (at the time of death) and attain identity with the supreme Self. On this criterion, the doctrine of the Bhägavatas is also clearly a doctrine of difference: for they hold that through a hundred years of worship of the su- preme Lord Bhagavan by visits to the temple and so on, the soul may rid itself of its passions and attain to Him (on the death of the body). Some of the other doctrines reviewed above support a theory of difference, since they make liberation a result to be achieved in the after-life as a reward for recourse to enjoined action. To this group belong those who hold that liberation is achieved by a combination of knowledge and action (M.V.66), those who maintain that enjoined meditations are the path to liberation (M.V.67) and those who teach that liberation comes through elimination of pleasure-desire (M.V.71).

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Other theorists reviewed above hold that libereticn occurs in life, but they also make attainment of the highest goal of life dependent on carrying out injunctions laid down in the Veda, just like those who say that final beatitude only comes in the after-life. In the end their doctrines, too, only af- firm in a different way the same teaching, namely, that before liberation the individual soul and the Lord are different. To this group belong those who accept an injunction in the context of metaphysical kncwledge (M.V.68), those who preach the prac- tice of affirmation (M.V.69), those who preach the elimination of the universe (M.V.70), those who preach halting the impres- sions (M.V.72), those who preach sustained remembrance of knowiedge (M.V.73) and those who preach the suppression of all movement of the mind (M.V.74). On the other hand a doctrine of identity is attributed to Kasakrtsna in Brahma Sūtra I.iv.22 in the words 'Kasakrtsna (held that the individual soul and the Absolute were identical) on the ground that it was the Absolute itself that assumed the form of the soul'. The teaching of this school was that, as viewed from the empirical standpoint, the supreme Self assumes the illusory appearance of being the iudividual soul. This was the doctrine followed by Gaudapada and other early Acaryas. The revered Bhagavatpada says that it is this doctrine alone that follows the true Vedantic method, and this is in fact the doc- trine that we have expounded in detail in Chapter III above. Then there is the third doctrine, that of difference in identity, attributed to Āsmarathya at Brahma Sūtra I.iv.20 in the words 'We have a sign (that the supreme Self is non- different from, as well as different from, the individual soul), as is shown by the promise (that when the supreme Self is known, all is known) - such was the view of Asmarathya'. As a representative cf this doctrine one might cite Bhartrprapanca, who was probably a near-contemporary of Śankara Bhagavatpada. Nobody has yet discovered any earlier exponent of the doctrine of difference in identity than these two Teachers. Bhartrprapañca's commentaries have not survived in complete form. However, fortunately for all serious enquirers into the true method of interpretation in Vedanta, his views are exam- ined in Śri Śankara's Commentary on the Brhadāranvaka Upani- shad, in Suresvara's Vartika on that, and in the glosses on these two works by Anandagiri. In these works, phrases from the commentaries of Bhartrprapanca are quoted, and from a con- sideration of these it is possible to get some light on the philosophy of difference in identity in its oldest form. I have accordingly reconstructed the doctrine of this school as far as was necessary, by collecting the relevant texts and filling out the commentaries of ŚrI Sankara and Suresvara here and there with my own reasoning. When this school has been examined, we will have been over almost all the available ancient examples of Vedantic method. And this will enable us to say without fear of contradiction, 'The method followed in

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the Vedanta is what we have described it io be'.

77 CAUSE AND EFFECT IN THE SCHOOL OF DIFFERENCE IN IDENTITY

We now proceed to describe briefly the method cf teaching about cause and effect used by Bhartrprapanca. According to bim, the first section of the fifth Book of the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad has to be understood as teaching that the Absclute is both dualistic and non-dualistic; it is not either.purely dualistic or purely non-dualistic. If the truth had been that it was purely ron-dualistic, then duality would be urreal like the water in a mirage, and then the ritualistic section of the Veda would be useless. The descriptions of the originatios, main- tenance and dissolution of the universe would be vain, as would the practical injunctior to hear about the Self, ponder over it and subject it to sustained meditation. On the other hand if duality were real exactly as it stands, the philosophy of non- duality (taught at places in the Upanishads) would prove false. Starting from this dilemma, the topic is taken up in the sub-section beginning 'That is infinite' (Brhad.V.v.1), with a view to dispel the doubt. The upanishadic phrase 'That is infinite' is explained as saying that the (Absolute as) cause is the supreme reality, while the phrase 'This is infinite' affirms that the (Absolute as) effect (in the form of the world) is the supreme reality. The effect is infinite because, even when produced, it is non-different from its material .cause, and at the time of the Cosmic Dissolution, it will again remain infinite as the cause. Thus cause and effect should both be seen to be ever infinite, in past, present and future. It is this one infinity that is taught as undergoing distinc- tion as cause and effect. In the same way, the Absolute is both dualistic and non- dualistic. The sea consists of water, waves, foam, bubbles and so forth. And the waves, foam, bubbles and the rest, that arise from the water, are just as much the nature of the sea as the water is. True, they come and go; but they are per- fectly real for all that. And all this world of duality is perfectly real too, comparable to the water and the waves in the illustration. The Absolute in its supreme form is com- parable to the water of the sea. Since duality is thus real, they say, the texts of the ritu- alistic section of the Veda are authoritative. And this method of teaching the metaphysics of cause and effect is summarized and reproduced by Śri Sankara and Suresvara in the Commentary and the Vartika on the sub-section of the Brhadāranyaka Upani- shad beginning 'That is infinite' (Brhad.V.i.1). It is also summarized by Śrī Śankara in his Commentary to Brahma Sūtra II.1.14, in the words: 'Perhaps you will disagree, and argue that the Absolute is pluralistic by nature. Just as

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a tree has many different tranches: you will say, so the Abso- lute has many powers and performs many functions. The tree is oue as a tree, but many as to its branches. What is one as the sca is many as waves and foam .... Since the Absolute has a unitary sapect, the teachings about liberation arising from knowledge are perfectly intelligible. And the practical teach- iags of the ritualistic section of the Veda about worldly life and ritual are equally intelligible, since the Absolute hag its aspect as & real plurality'. But this theory is not right. When it comes to metaphysical knowledge of reality, there is no room, as there is is teaching about religious duty, for general rules qualiried by exceptions and alternatives. Duality and nor-duality are contradictories. The theory would therefore be im danger of undermining the Vedic texts which speak of Consciousness as a single homogeneous mass. If the Absolute were of both dualistic and non-dualistic nature, like the sea or the tree, it would have parts, and so would inevitably be impermanent. A being that was supposed to be dualistic and non-dualistic at the same time would rot be a possible object of meditation. And the theory would destroy the authority both of the texts which decry vision of differ- ence and also of those which affirm the reality of the cause alone. The notion that one is the body can be cancelled once and for all by direct knowledge that one's true Self is the ever self-established Absolute taught in the Veda. When this knowledge is acquired there is then no longer any scope or need for the idea that the Absolute has ar aspect under which it is many. And yet before knowledge that the Absolute is one's true Self has arisen, all practical experience can be accepted as real, and plurality must be assumed to be real to accommodate it. Thus pure Advaita can aumit duality and non- duality for the Absolute (though duality is only admitted from the standpoint of metaphysical Ignorance), and the doctrine, when understood in this sense, does not contradict the Vedic teaching. But the teaching of Bhartrprapanca that the Absolute is both dualistic and non-dualistic on the same real footing is refuted by Śri Śankara and Sureśvara.

(1) Exceptions apply in the domain of ritualistic activity. When a general rule would have prescribed such and such an action, the force of exceptions is to rescind part of the gen- eral rule. Take, for example, the formula 'Not harming any creature except (for sacrificial purposes) on consecrated ground' (Chand. VIII.xv.1). Here we have a general law prohib- iting injury to any living creature, but with a restriction permitting it on consecrated ground on the occasion of a large sacrifice. In the present context, however, no general propo- sition affirming the existence of the non-dual Absolute can be rescinded in any particular area, because the Absolute, being non-dual, cannot have particular areas. Alternatives, too, are inapplicable in the case of the

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Absolute, for the same reason. For example, the ritualistic section of the Vedas covers the two alternatives 'He grasps' and, 'He does not grasp the sodasin cup in the course of the Atiratra ceremony'. It is a conceivable alternative, because grasping and not grasping are merely potential processes, de- pendent for their actualization on the will of man. But in the case of the affirmation of the existence of the 4bsolute, there cannot be any such alternative as 'either dual or non-dual'. For the Self is an existont reality, and hence not dependent on the will of man; and it is moreover contradictory to say that

Bh.V.v.l) one and the same thing can be both dual and non-dual. (Brhad.

(2) The theory also conflicts with Vedic teaching and with

beyona doubt or suspicion of error, which would all have to be reason: There are Vedic texts of clearly established truth,

jettisoned as useless on the present theory. We should lose, for examplc, those which speak of the Absolute as a single mass of Consciousness, homogeneous like a lump ef salt (Brhad. IV.v. 13), 'with no gaps or interstices, without a before (cause) or an after (effect), without anything inside it or outside it in space' (Brhad. II.v.19); and we should also lose the text which speaks of the Spirit as 'He alone exists, within and without, unborn' (Mund.II.i.12), and those which say 'neither this nor that' (Brhad. II.iii.6), and such negative texts as 'Not gross, not subtle, not short' (Brhad.III.viii.8) and 'Unborn, beyond decay, death and fear' (Brhad. IV.iv.25). Similarly, there would also be a contradiction with reason. For that which is many and has parts and activity cannot be eternal and constantly self-identical, whereas the fact of memory, etc., shows that the Self is eternal and constantly self-identical, so that contradiction results from a theory that would imply that it was not such. (Brhad.Bh.V.i.1)

(3) Moreover, the opponent's theory would render the Veda senseless. So far from safeguarding the ritualistic portion of the Veda, it would clearly undermine its validity, for it would imply both experience of the fruits of deeds that one had not performed, and also annihilation of the fruits of deeds one had performed. (Brhad.Bh.V.i.1)

(4) Perhaps the opponent will reply that there are perfectly. good examples of things, such as the sea, that are both dual and non-dual, and ask how, in the face of these, we can say that it is contradictory to claim that one thing can be both dual and non-dual. But this defence is of no avail, as the exemple cited is not relevant to the case in hand. It was in regard to the eternal, partless, existent reality that we said that duality-cum-non-duality was contradictory. We do not maintain that it is contradictory in the realm of effects, where everything has parts. Hence this whole theory is to be

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rejected on the ground that it is contradictory to the Veda, Smrti and reason alike. (Brhad.Bh.V.i.l)

(5) And there is another reason why it cannot be the doctrine intended by the Veda. It does not yield any conception of the Absolute that would be fit to meditate on. The Veda never presents, either as an object of meditation or of knowledge, an Absolute that is variegated in the manner of (cuch earthly objects as) the sea or a forest, and which brims over with hun- dreds and thousands of distinctions implying birth, death and evil. On the contrary, it expressly speaks of the Absolute as a homogeneous mass of Consciousness, saying "erily it is to be seen everywhere as one and homogeneous' (Brhad. IV.iv.20). And it actually condemns vision of the Absolute as anything but homogeneous in the words 'He goes from death to death who sees the appearance of plurality here' (Brhad.IV.iv.19). And it is

Bh.V.i.i) agreed that one should not do what the Veda condemns. (Brhad.

(6) For even supposing that we admitted for argument's sake that the Absolute could remain one and the same thing and yet be both dual and non-dual at the same time, like the sea, we still would not escape from that conflict with the Veda to which you yourselves have drawn attention. You ask how? Well, there would be one supreme Absolute, both dual and non-dual in nature. Being beyond grief and delusion and other defects, it would not seek spiritual teaching. Nor could there be any Teacher for it, as no Teacher could exist other than itself, the dual-cum-non-dual Absolute being recognized as the sole existent .... And if the Absolute were taken as one mass of Consciousness, as the sea is one mass of water, then the whole conception of anyone other than the Absolute either receiving or imparting instruction would become impossible. One may take the indivi- dual, Devadatta, as consisting of duality and non-duality and as constituted by his various organs and limbs. But it is in- conceivable that his voice and ears, considered as parts of him, should function respectively as Teacher and receiver of teaching, while he himself was neither Teacher nor taught. For Devadatta is but one consciousness, as the sea is but one mass of water. Hence it follows that the opponent's theory involves conflict with the Veda and reason, and fails to establish what it aims to establish. (Brhad.Bh.V.i.1)

(7) And so when the identity of one's own true Self with the Absolute has been apprehended through the Veda, it contradicts and cancels the previous natural conviction of one's identity with the body, as the ideas of the rope and the like contra- dict and cancel the (illusory) notions of the snake and the like. But when the notion of one's identity with the body has been contradicted and cancelled, all empirical experience based

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on it stands contradicted and cancelled too, so that there is no longer any need to assume a lower aspect of the Absolute, characterized by plurality and variety, in order to explain it. (B.S.Bh.II.i.14)

(8) Nor would the teaching 'Liberation comes through knowledge' be explicable on this theory (of Bhartrprapanca). For those who uphold it do noi admit erroneous knowledge, removable through right knowledge, to be the cause of transmigratory lire. If both knowledge of the Absolute as one and knowledge of the Absolute as many were true, how could one then say that the knowledge of unity removed the knowledge of plurality? (B.S. Bh.1I.i.14)

(9) Hence the word 'that' (in 'That is infinite') refers to the infinite Absolute. And that same infinite Absolute is also this infinite Absolute present in the (universe as its) effect, brought into manifestation by Ignorance and having the apparent limiting adjuncts of name and form, thus appearing to be dif- ferent from its own true nature. But when (at the time of liberaticn) one has known that supreme infinite Absolute to be one's own true Self through the conviction 'I am that infinite Absolute', one thus 'takes the infinite' through this knowledge of the Absolute, and rejects the notion that one is not infi- nite, a notion arising from metaphysical Ignorance and from association with the apparent conditioning adjuncts of name and form. Then only the infinite remains. (Brhad.Bh.V.i.1)

78 THE EIGHT CONDITIONS OF THE ABSOLUTE

If the Absolute in its highest form is considered as a great ocean, then its motionless condition is called (by Bhartr- prapañca) the Indestructible (aksara), its condition when first fractionally beginning to move is called the Inner Ruler (antaryamin), and its condition when totally in motion is called (in this system) 'the Knower of the Field' (ksetrajña). These are the first three states, and there are five others, given by Ânandagiri as the individual bodies (pinda), types (jati), the Cosmic Body (virat), the Cosmic Soul (sūtra) and the Divine Cosmic Powers (daiva). (Anandagiri on B.B.V. I.iii.314) Thus the Absolute has eight conditions (avastha) .. Some spoke of them as powers (sakti), others as modifications (vikāra). This doctrine is refuted in Śri Sankara's Brhad- āraņyaka Commentary.

(1) Well, we can say at once that neither conditions nor powers are intelligible in the case of the Indestructible. For there is the text saying that it is beyond all worldly charac- teristics like hunger, etc., (Brhad. III.v.l). And one and the same thing cannot both have conditions like hunger, etc., and

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at. the same time stand above them and not have them. The same difficulty applies if we say that the Absolute has powers. And the errors in supposing it could have modifications and parts have already been pointed out in our commentary on Brhad- āraņyaka II.i.20 (trans. Madhavananda p.300). So all these as- sumptions are quite false. (Brhad.Bh.JII.viii.12)

Aud the dcctrine of the Eigbt Conditions has been refuted at various places by the author of the Vartika (Śri Suresvara).

(2) (It is not the case that the Absolute really assumes eight conditions to make up the universe. On the contrary, it is merely that) a false notjon arises from the darkness of meta- physical Ignorance of the real, like the appearance of a snake arising through Ignorance of the rope, and this false notion assumes the form of being (the universe) differentiated into eight conditions. (B.B.V. I.iii.314)

(3) The Lord, the Undeveloped Cosmic Prineiple (avyakrta), the Cosmic Vital Energy, the Cosmic Body, the Elements, the Divine Cosmic Powers and so forth - none of these would be possible in the inmost Self except on the basis of metaphysical lgno- rance. (B.B.V. I.iv. 487)

(4) Bhartrprapañca wishes, likewise, to claim that being 'innermost' is common to all the eight conditions of the Self (said in the Upanishad to be the dearest thing of all). But he cannot explain the term 'innermost' (Brhad. I.iv.8) on the prin- ciples of his system (for he lacks a transcendent principle on which all else would depend while it was dependent on nothing else). (B.B.V. I.iv.1043)

This is a piece of reflection over the upanishadic text 'That Self is innermost' (Brhad. I. iv.8). Anandagiri's gloss runs: 'Having shown that the term "innermost" is explicable on his own system, he (Suresvara) goec on to show that it would not be explicable on the theory of Bhartrprapanca. The individual body, the type, the Cosmic Body, the Cosmic Soul, the Divine Cosmic Powers, the Undeveloped Cosmic Principle, the Inner Ruler and the Knower of the Field - these eight conditions of the Absolute do not exist one within the other on Bhartr- prapanca's theory. His view is that, just as, amongst pots and dishes made of clay, the clay alone is the reality, so in the eight conditions, "being the Self" is a comon feature (like the clay), and in this sense "being the innermost" is common to all of them. But this is not enough to prove 'that the Self is the innermost thing (for which the not-self would have to have non-reciprocal dependence on the innermost Self, as the Vartika's preceding verses show)'.

(5) (If the real modifications assumed by Bhartrprapañca are

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rejected), how then do we explain the differentiation that they occasion in ordinary experience? It is all due to apparent conditioning adjuncts, we say. Neither distinction nor non- distinction pertains to them in themselves, for in their true nature they are massed Consciousness, homcgeneous like a. lump of sait. For we have the texts, 'Without 9 before (cause) or an after (effect), without anything inside it or outside it in space' (Brhad. II.v.15) and 'This Self, in its true nature, is the Absolute' (ibid.). And it is said in the Atharva Veda 'He alone exists, within aud without, unborn' (Mund. II.i.2). Hence the Self without adjuncts, being indescribable, void of all distinctions, one and unique, can only be taught by say- ing 'neither this nor that'. When the Self has the adjunct of the complex of bodies and organs characterized by Ignorance, desire and action, it is called 'the transmigrant' and 'the individual soul'. When the Self has the adjunct of eternal and infinite knowledge and power it is called 'the Inner Ruler' and 'the Lord'. That same Self, when void of all adjuncts, solitary, pure, standing in its own true nature, is called 'the Indestructible' and 'the Supreme'. And then as qualified by such adjuncts as the Cosmic Soul, the Cosmic Undeveloped Principle, the Divine Cosmic Powers, types, individual bodies, and the bodies and organs of men, animals and departed spirits, He assumes their name and form .... Hence the distinction between the Indestruc- tible Principle, the Inner Ruler and all beings is due to ap- parent conditioning adjuncts and nothing else. (Brhad.Bh. III.viii.12)

79 THE CONSCIOUS INDIVIDUAL AS MODIFICATION OF THE ABSOLUTE

Bhartrprapanca held the view that the supreme Self did not en- ter the objects of His creation directly in His own true form. (Contrast Śri Śankara, M.V.75,3.) He assumed a modification called 'the conscious individual' (cp. M.V.30, intro.). This conscious individual was regarded as both different frem and non-different from the supreme Self. Since, in Bhartr- prapañca's system it was different, it could be, and was, con- nected with transmigration; since it was also non-different, it was. capable of the conviction 'I am the Absolute'. And Bhartrprapanca thought this would eliminate all contradictions (Śrī Sankara's Brhad.Bh. II.i.20). The name of Bhartrprapañca is admittedly not connected with this teaching in Suresvara's Vartika on this passage, or in Anandagiri's gloss. Yet it must be his teaching, because there are other points which go with the doctrines attributed to him by name elsewhere. For instance, there is the doctrine that the cause and effect are both real, enforced through the example of the sea, and the description of the Absolute as

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having eight conditions. Similarly. Bhartrprapamca's explanstion of the two aspects of the Absolute, perceptible and imperceptible (Brhad. II.iii.I). are summarized in Śrī Sankara's Brhadāraņyaka Commentary with the sarcastic introduction 'Some who regard themselves as great experts on the Upanishads devise a theory ... '.

(1) The objective realm of gross and subtle elements, * they say, makes one category (rasi), the lowest. The supreme Self forms another category, the highest. And between these two extremes, they claim, there lies a third or middle category, different from either, consisting in the entire mass of a per- son's merit and demerit, arising from prescribed meditation, ritual and skills acquired in previous lives, together with the 'self with intellect predominating', the one awoken by Ajatasatru (Brhad. II.i.15), who is the one able to act and undergo experience. The category of merit and demerit prompts action. The category of the gross and subtle elements is the result of action, and includes also the bodies and organs that are the means to it. Here they try to reconcile their views with those of the Logicians. Having first boldly affirmed that the whole cate- gory of merit and demerit resides in the subtle body, afraid that (with their teaching about a permanent subtle body) they will seem to fall into the doctrine of the Sankhyas, they draw back. They now say that the whole category of merit and de- merit can become displaced from the subtle body and lodged in a particular part of the supreme Self, where it can exist even in the absence of the subtle body, just as the scent of flowers can be extracted from its, seat in the flowers and transferred to a cup in a distilled essence (i.e. as scent) and preserved even in the absence of the flowers. This alleged 'portion' of the supreme Seif, though in itself without attributes, receives attributes from outside, which come to it through the category of merit and demerit. This portion of the supreme Self is the conscious individual, the one who acts and has experiences, who is bound and (eventually) liberated. Here they take after the view of the Vaisesikas (who likewise regard merit and de- merit as being stored not in the subtle body but in the Self itself, regarded as individual). And this category of merit and demerit accrues to the Self (in their view) from the side of the objective realm of the elements; for even the indivi- dual self is regarded by them as per se without attributes, since it is but a portion of the supreme Self. (Brhad.Bh. II.iîi.6)

*(On this classification, ether and wind (air) count as subtle elements; fire, water and earth count as gross elements. T.N.)

Then again we have the text '"Which is the Self?" asked King Janaka. Śri Yajmavalkya replied, "This self with intellect

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predominating, lying within the sense-organs ... "' (Brhad. IV.iii.7). Bhartrprapañca, as reported by Anandagiri, here expiains the phrase 'vijmana-maya' confidently (but wrongly, cp. M.V.79,3,4) in the words 'The Absolute in its highest form is Consciousness (vijñana), and the individual soul (jiva) is called "the one made up of Consciousness" (vijñana-maya) be- cause he is of the nature of Consciousness' (tika on Brhad.Bh. IV.iii.7, ad init.). Śrī Śankara also alludes to the same point in Bhartrprapamca's teaching in the words, 'Those who explain the soul to be a modification of the supreme Self as Conscicusness ... ' (Brhad.Bh. IV.1i1.7, see Madhavananda p.611). The assumntion that the supreme Self undergoes modification to assumc the form of the individual soul may be represented in three different ways. It may be regarded as similar to the transformation of one part of a whcle to produce a number of new objects of the same class, as pots and the like are modifi- cations of clay. Or it may be taken that the whcle, in this case the supreme Self, remains essentialiy unchanged, through changes that occur in a few parts, as when hair springs up in a few parts of the body or certain portions of the earth's surface turn to desert (cp. M.V.110, intro.). Or, thirdly, it. may be taken that the whole undergoes total transformation, as when milk is transformed into curds. On the first alternative, the identity of the individual with the whole would only amount to that similarity possessed by separate members of the same class; it would only be a figurative identity and not a real one, and that would contra- dict bcth the Veda and Bhartrprapañca's own system. On the second alternative, the virtues or defects of the part would infallibly affect the whole (since the whole pervades the parts - and this, too, would contradict the Veda). The third alternative would contradict the Vedic texts that declare that the Absolute has no parts (since transformation is inconceivable without parts). And on these lines Śri Sankara argues thet the soul as the conscious individual (vijñāna-ātman) cannot be a modification of the supreme Self (Brhad.Bh.II.1.20). The theory of the three categories, of which the whole realm of the perceptible and the imperceptible forms the first, he refutes as follows.

(2) We have already explained the defects of the theory (e.g. at Brhad.Bh.II.i.20, just quoted). If parts are attributed to the supreme Self, then it will have to be regarded as under- going transformation. It will have to be regarded as being 'rent' (contradicting Isa 8). And there are other insuperable difficulties, such as that of explaining how there could be translation to various realms after death in accordance with one's deeds (as taught in the Veda). Moreover, the theory takes the individual soul as (in one sense) ever distinct from the supreme Self; and, in that case, how could it also be one with it (as the theory requires)?

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Suppose it be contended that the subtle body is figuratively attributed to the supreme Self, as one figuratively attributes to the ether of space the shapes of the pots and jars and cavi- ties in the earth in which it appears to be enclosed? Even so, all this will resuit in the unacceptable consequence of affirm- ing that the subtle impressions reside in the supreme Gelf when the subtle body is absent (as in dreamless sleep). And the theory would involve the untenable assumption that metaphysicel Ignorance could arise of its own accord, like a desert appear- ing on the surface cf the earth. The notion that an impression could be transferred from its seat to some other receptacle, without there being any inter- mediary capable of carrying the impressions, is in any case quite inconceivable. Nor is it countenanced by the Vedic texts themselves. The latter (deny that the impressions lie anywhere but in the heart and mind and) say, for instance, 'Desire, de- termination, doubi ... (are all mind)' (Brhad. I. v.3), 'It is through the heart (mind) that one knows all forms' (Brhad. III.ix.20), 'It only seems to think, it only seems to move' (Brhad. IV.iii.7), 'Those desires of his which lie in the heart' (Brhad. IV.iv.7) and 'Then (in dreamless sleep) he has passed beyond all sorrows of the heart' (Brhad. IV.iii.22) .. Perhaps it will be claimed that there could be an analysis into the perceptible and the imperceptible as the only two manifestations of the supreme Self, while the impressions be- long solely to the individual soul. But that would undermine the maxim of the school, 'The supreme Self undergoes modifica- tion into the individual soul'. For this latter maxim implies that the supreme Self, too, is affected by the impressions through the medium of the individual soul. In any case, one cannot even conceive how one thing could undergo modification into another, if the expression were taken literally (ie. to mean that what is actually one thing really becomes a differ- ent thing). Nor can the individual soul be taken as a separate entity distinct from the supreme Self without doing violence to the principles of the system. (Brhad:Bh.II.iii.6)

The idea that the suffix '-maya' in the phrase 'vijmana-maya' implies a modification is refuted as follows.

(3) Some hold that there are modifications of the supreme Self as Consciousness. But in thus interpreting the phrase '(viewed under adjuncts) with intellect predominating (vijñana-maya), with mind predominating (mano-maya)' (Brhad.IV.iv.5), they mis- conceive the term 'with intellect predominating' and end up with a doctrine other than that intended by the Veda .... And it is clear from the reading later on in the other (Madhyandina) school 'sa-dhi', meaning 'within the heart (or intellect)', that what is meant by the phrase 'vijñana-maya' is (not 'a modification of Consciousness' but) only 'with intellect (vijmana) predominating'. (Brhad.Bh. IV.iii. 7)

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And we find the following in Suresvara's Vartika.

(4) But that great intellect (Bhartrprapanca), who explains the suffix '-maya' of 'vijñana-maya' here as meaning a modifi- cation, contradicts the explanation he gives elsewhere (Brhad. IV.iv.5) of 'vijñana-maya' as 'consisting of intellect', and he also attributes to the Absolute the evils that in fact only belong to the soul. Indeed, all modificationc have been speci- fically denied of the Self in the Vedic verse 'The eternal conscious principle is never born and never dies ... ' (Katha I.ii.18). The truth is that if the individual soul were a modification of the Self it would have a beginning and there- fore an end and so would not be eternal: it would therefore be incapable of liberation. And so the correct interpretation of the suffix '-maya' here is not 'modification', but 'pre- dominating' (so that the compound 'vijnana-maya' means 'with intellect predominating') .. (B.B.V. IV.iii.318-20)

These quotations show that for Bhartrprapanca the individual soul was a modificatica ci the Absolute as Consciousness.

80 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SEER AND HIS SEEING

When asked by Usasta 'O Yajnavalkya, which self is the Self within all?', Yājñavalkya replied 'You cannot see the seer of seeing, you cannot hear the heerer of hearing, you cannot think the thinker of thinking, you cannot know the knower of knowing' (Brhad. III.iv.2). According to Anandagiri, Bhartrprapanca explained this idea as follows: Seeing is an action. The colour it perceives is its object, as that is the goal of the act. Eye, lower (waver- ing) mind and higher (decisive) mind are the instruments of the action. The conscious individual is the one that does the action. The result of the action of seeing on the part of the individual soul is perception of the colour. The person who does the act is prompted to do it because it will be the means to something else; after the action has been completed, a result will accrue to someone at some later time. In evalu- ating, an action, one should keep one's eye on this result rather than on the person doing the action (Anandagiri on B.B.V. III.iv. 171-4). This view of Bhartrprapanca is refuted in the Brhadaranyaka Commentary as follows.

(1) (If, as Bhartrprapanca supposed, the 'seer of seeing' mentioned in the upanishadic text was the seer conceived as one acting), then, since the participial suffix '-er' (in 'seer' ) vould already imply someone doing the act of seeing, the subsequent phrase 'of seeing' would be redundant. 'You

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cannot see the seer' is all that would have been needed to have beon said. For the suffix '-er' is added to the verbal root 'see' in that text. And the suffix '-er' is said to refer to the one performing the act denoted by the verbal root to which it is auded as a suffix. We can only say, for instance, 'He conducts the one who is going', or 'The one who is cutting ... '. We cannot speak of the goer of going or the cutter of cutting, whon (because the going already implies a goer and the cutting a cutter) there is no distinction of meaning between the two verbal forms. Nor should anyone be allowed to dismiss the words 'of seeing' as mere embroidery if there is a way of taking them literally and making them significant - and we have shown in our own explanation that there is a way, cp. M.V.38,2). Nor is it a mere wrong reading, for both schools (Kaņva and Madhyandina) have it. (Brhad.Bh.III.iv.2)

And Suresvara says in his Vārtika:

(2) Nor does Bhartrprapanca's explanation agree with the question (raised by Uşasta at Brhadāranyaka III.iv.2). The whole question has specifications which are incompatible with a reply referring to a person performing the act of seeing. For Usasta said 'Explain to me that Absolute which is immedi- ately and directly evident'. The specification that he went on to add ('the Self within all') is not in any way compatible with an answer pointing to the one performing an act of seeing. (B.B.V. III.iv.177-8)

Bhartrprapamca held the view that Usasta's question concerned the nature of the individual soul, while Kahola's question con- cerned the supreme Self. For, according to Anandagiri, he wrote in the following terms explaining the Madhyandina version of the Brhadāranyaka text: 'The previous question referred to the supreme Self, this one refers to the individual soul. For the dissolution of the individual soul in the supreme Self has to be explained. When the supreme Self and the individual soul are both the principal subjects of the same section, then, if the supreme Self is said to be the inmost principle, that will hold good for the individual soul too .... And since the individual soul, as bare Consciousness, is beyond grief and delusion, this will hold good of the supreme Self too. In the remainder of Brhad- āranyaka III.v. there will be a description of the supreme Self; in Brhadāranyaka IV.iii.l ff. there will be a descrip- tion of the individual soul. The second question, we must as- sume, deals with a subject not touched on before'. (Anandagiri on 3.B.V. III.v.5-15, explaining Bhartrprapañca's wrong view.) We have already explained above at M.V.38,2 the meaning accepted for 'the seer of seeing' in Śri Sankara's Commentary. He refuted Bhartrprapañca's theory that the questions of Usasta and Kahola referred to different subjects as follows:

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(3) No, (the two questions are not about two different 'selves' ). For the reply to each of them contains the asser- tion 'your'. The reply to each of them contains the same asser- tion, 'This is your Self, the Self within all'. No individual perscnality can have two selves. The individual as the complex of the soul and its bodies and organs, dorives his existence from having one Self. Nor (in the context of the metaphysical teaching of the text) can there be one separate Self for Usasta and an essentially different one for Kahola. For what is re- ferred to as 'the Self' in the primary sense of the words, and spoken of as 'within all', cannot be two. If one of the two wore the Self in the primary sense of the word as 'the Abso- lute', then the other (since it was different) could only be the Self in a figurative sense, and its 'selfhood' and 'being within all' would also be figurative. If the words were all taken in their primary senses, their meanings would be contra- dictory. If one of the two 'selves' was the Absolute, present within all, then the other would have to be not-self, not 'present within all' and not referred to by the word 'self' in its primary meaning. Therefore, what we have in the text is two references to the same Self, given with a view to convey some particular point about it .. (Brhad.Bh. III.v.1)

The charge of unnecessary repetition is rebutted as follows:

(4) In the first question there was mention of a Self differ- ent from the complex of bodies and organs, to whom this bond- age, together with its cause (metaphysical Ignorance), was said to pertain. In the second question a new particular is men- tioned. It is declared that (in its true nature) the Self is beyond hunger and other characteristics of transmigratory life. From knowledge of this particular, together with renunciation, there is release from the previously mentioned bondage. There- fore the two questions and answers, which both end with the idea 'This is your Self', refer to the same entity (in the first case associated with metaphysical Ignorance, in the second not). (Brhad.Bh. III.v.1)

81 EXPLANATION OF THE CLASS CF TEXTS LIKE 'THOUGH SEEING, YET HE DOES NOT SEE'

There is a passage in the Veda on dreamless sleep which begins: 'Verily, when there (in the state of dreamless sleep) he does not see, he is, verily, seeing,, though he does not see. For there is no break in thc seeing of the seer, which is indestruc- tible' (Brhad. IV.iii.23). It ends, 'He does not then know any- thing ... ' (Brhad. IV.iii.30). Bhartrprapañca replies to the objection 'If the Self is self-luminous by nature, why does it not see in the state of dreamless sleep?' in the following way.

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(1) The sleeper is seeing at that time. But no determinate knowledge arises. This Spirit (purusa) is the seer. It per- forms the act of seeing. It performs the act of knowing . colours and shapes manifested through the power of sight and brought before it by the mind. Here again, it acts as the seer in that final act of apperception that occurs after the mental idea and the pot, or whatever else is being represented, have become related as subject and object. And this power of seeing colour and form, which belongs to the soul, pertains to a being that acts. For attributes exist where their substances do, as heat exists where there is fire. Therefore, as long as the seer is present there is no break in the seeing. And the seer is constant and eternal. He cannot undergo destruction because He is the Self of all, and because no second thing exists over against Him. There could be no other second thing that could work his destruction, as there can be nothing separate from Him .: Nor does He destroy Himself. Being indestructible, He is eternal and coustant. Secing is a constant and eternal attribute of the constant and eternal seer. So the seer remains seeing (even in dream- less sleep) with his unbroken sight." But if He remains seeing, in what sense is it that He does not see? Listen to how He sees and also does not see. There is not then (in dreamless sleep) any second thing whereby any determinate cognition could arise. Perhaps you will say that, if the object of vision is difference in identity, there must be something separate to be seen. Yes, there must be something separate, but not separate in the sense of being other. If there were anything separate and other than Himself, He would see it; but there is no second thing other than He. Therefore, since in dreamless sleep the power of sight persists and yet does not find any- thing to see, it cannot be said to perceive. It is like the case of fire which may be burning, but will not burn anything that is not close to it. (Anandagiri on B.B.V. IV.iii:1540-65)

Here it is clear that Bhartrprapanca interpreted the upani- shadic texts on seeing, hearing and the other faculties as implying that the individual soul consisted of a substance separate from its attributes. On this theme, the revered Teacher Sankara summarizes the doctrine of separate attributes as follows.

(2) Is. it, then, that seeing, smelling, tasting and so on are different attributes of the soul, as heat, illumining and 'burn- ing up are different attributes of fire? Or is it that there is only one 'attribute' (consciousness), itself not different from the Self but appearing to have different attributes of its own on account of different conditioning adjuncts that do not really belong to it? On this, some say as follows. The Self, which is reality, has identity and difference by very nature, just as a cow is

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one as a substance, but has mutually different characteristics, such as having a dewlap and so on. We must infer by analogy that subtle, partless substances are characterized by identity and difference just as gross perceptible ones are. (Brhad.Bh. IV.iii.30)

The refutation runs as fcllows.

(3) Such an interpretation is wrong, as the text is concerned with something else. For this text (beginning 'There where He is in dreamless sleep', Brhad.IV.iii.24) is not concerned with affirming that attributes of the Self such as seeing, smelling, tasting and so on are different from one another. It is con- cerned with answering the question why it is that the Self does not have any knowledge in dreamless sleep, if it is the light of Consciousness by nature. The passage 'There where (He is in dreamless sleep)' is begun to rebut the objection that the Self cannot be the light of Consciousness by nature (if it does not shine in dreamless sleep) .... The assumption that seeing and the rest aie different attri- butes of the Self is made through ignorance of the meaning of the text. And it contradicts the texts saying that the Self is a mass of Consciousness, homogeneous like a lump of salt (Brhad. IV.v.13). Nor can heterogeneous nature be attributed to partless enti- ties, for there are no examples of such a thing. It is true that certain people attribute different characteristics such as all-pervasiveness and power to relay sound to the partless ether of space, and also attribute taste and odour to partiess atoms. But it must be seen that this, too, is a case of attri- buting to things adjuncts that do not really belong to them. (For the ether of space is subtle and transcends perception: it is not limited by or touched by illusory adjuncts, and there- fore does not pervade them. And the atoms, if they were truly partless, would have no dimensions, and so would not be able to enter into contact or relation with sensible attributes of any kina. ) ... There is therefore no instance of any partless thing having attributes. This is also enough to refute the notion that the supreme Self undergoes distinctions and trans- formation through the different powers of perception that it has in the eyes and so on (since only that which has parts is capable of transformation). (Brhad.Bh.IV.iii.30)

The revered Commentator's views on this topic have already been developed at M.V. 38 above, to which the reader is referred.

In Suresvara's Vārtika, too, this doctrine of Bhartrprapañca is refuted at length. The gist of the refutation given there is as follows. If the word 'seeing' (in the phrase 'seeing, He does not see') had referred to 'seeing' understood (not as a participle but) as (a noun meaning) the seer in his true

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nature, then the text could not have gone on afterwards to .speak of his act of seeing, (in the phrase 'there is no break in the seeing of the scer'). And if seeing were taken as an action, there would come a break in it, from the mere fact of its being an action. To say that seeing is an action performed by a seer and that it has no break is a contradiction, and such an interpretation of the Veda would bring its authority into disrepute. It would also contradict inierence, which tells us that whatever is performed is impermanent. The phrase 'He does not see' (following after 'although see- ing' in the Brhadāranyaka text) is a mere recapitulation of (and cencession to) human experience, and does not imply an assertion of the existence of any new attribute in the Self. And that which is eternal and raised above all change cannot be regardeu as performing the act of seeing or of knowing a colour or form. Nor is there any rule that attributes (in this case that of seeing) persist as long as the substances in which they inhere, as is shown by such examples as that of black hair turning white. But if we did admit this principle, the act of seeing would still not persist as long as the Self, as it is not an attribute of the Seif! The argument, 'Because the seer has no internal distinctions, there is no break in its attribute' is also wrong. For if the seer were in any sense active it could not be constant and eternal. It is also wrong to argue that (we only know that) there is no action of seeing in dreamless sleep because there is no object to see. For in dreamless sleep we directly appre- hend the absence both of the individual seer and his sight. If they really existed, they would be experienced in that state. It is also wrong to say that in dreamless eleep an object is present but that one does not see it because it does not come from anything totally other than one's Self. This is wrong be- cause, if difference in identity were true, the object of per- ception would not be totally different from the Self even in the waking state. In fact, on this theory there is nothing totally other, nothing totally separate, nothing that is purely objective, and the expressions 'other', 'separate' and 'objec- tive' are tautologous. But on our view these expressions have clear and distinct meanings. The objective is whatever is illumined by the Wit- ness (including the individual perceiver and his body and or- gans). The complex of seer, seeing and soen (as it appears from the empirical standpoint) is other than the Self in the sense that the complex is imagined while the Self is not. And seer, seeing and seen are mutually separate. So the defect of tautology does not arise. It is on these lines that the doc- trine of difference in identity is refuted in Suresvara's Vārtika (B.B.V. IV.iii.1566-1620).

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82 THE QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ABSOLUTE

There is a passage in the Veda where the text epitomizes knowl- edge or the Absolute by saying 'One shouid meditete only on "It is the Self": (Brhad. I.iv.7). Later the text raises the ques- tion 'What was it that that Absolute knew whercby it became all?' (Brhad. I. iv.9) and says finally ' In the beginning, verily, this (the world) was (only) the Absolute. Then it knew itseli alone as "I am the Ahsolute". Through that it became all' (Brhad. I.iv.10). Here Bhartrprapanca explaius the word 'Brahman' (the Absclute) as referrirg to the Brahmana, the man who attains (i.e. who will in future become) the Absolute. Śri Sankara's Commentary summarizes Bhartrprapanca's position as follows. 'First one performs meditation associated with ritual bearing on the Absolute in its lower form as difference in identity, and thereby attains to the Absolute in that form, having turned away from all objects of enjcyment. In this state one attains the great Whole, and the bonds of desire and self-interested action are cut. One then attains the Arsolute in its supreme form through knowledge of it in that form, and in this sense one is referred to in the text as 'the Absolute'. This view is then refuted in the following words. 'That is wrong. For attaining unity with the 'Whole' would imply the defect of impermanence (since it was an act). We do not find any true example in the world of anything that attains the na- ture of something else through some cause and itself (despite undergoing change) remains eternal. So to maintain that one attained the great 'Whole', the change being caused by knowl- edge of the Absolute, and that this result was permaneut, would be a contradiction'. The notion that one is not the Absoluie, and that one is not the Whole, arises through metaphysical Ignorance, and ceases through knowledge of the Absolute. It is not that one ever really has the characteristic of not being the Absolute. It emerges later that this is the revered Commentator's own posi- tion. Here again, therefore, we find that there has to be resort to the method of false attribution followed by subse- quent denial. In Suresvara's Vartika, Bhartrprapañca's introductory com- mentary is described as follows.

(1) When people have experienced the reward of ritual and meditation (through attaining the Absolute in its form) as difference in identity, they want to know about a yet higher form of discipline, and ask 'What did the Absolute know where- by it became all?' The Absolute in its supreme form as the unity of all is the supreme Self, and that is our true Self. It is through and as this Self that the creatures have their existence. Hiranyagarbha, product of metaphysical Ignorance, is the common Self of all who have fallen from their nature

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as the Absolute. It is through this (lower manifestation of the) Self that all creatures have their existence. Whatever else there may be, such as the Cosmic Body (virat, cp. M.V. p.102) or the Divine Cosmic Powers (devata), is the product of metaphysical Ignorance. The various conditions of the Self are experienced at different times in different ways by the various ignorant individual souls, each according to its lights. These states are the results of their merit and demerit accumulated from the past, and those results themselves proceed from acts committed in those states. One who identifies himself with thc individual body will retain this sense of identity after death. He who meditates on the Divine Cosmic Powers will find unity with them after death, and the same result will follow in the case of meditation on the Cosmic Body or the Cosmic Mind (Hiranyagarbha, M.V.43,6). In the same way, a sense of identity with the supreme Self is achieved through meditation on that. The Self is constant and eternal. But individual conscious- ness is not constant and eternal. Sometimes it is obscured by Ignorance. Ignorance is not being awake to the truth 'All this universe is nothing but my own Self'. This conviction is con- stant and eternal in the supreme Self, but it is not constant and eternal in the individual soul undergoing transmigration, whose knowledge has been obscured. One who becomes less than the 'all' through Ignorance may regain his status as the 'all' through knowledge in the form of the conviction that he is the Self of all. Such an one was never anything but the Absolute formerly, so it is through an awakening (and not through any change of state) that he 'attains to' the Absolute. (From Ānandagiri on B.B.V. I.iv.1124-62)

Here Bhartrprapanca's words as quoted by Anandagiri have been reproduced almost as they stoou, occasionaily eked out from Suresvara's verses. The question arises whether Bhartrprapañca holds with Śri Bhagavatpada that duality is superimposed through Ignorance and removed through knowledge, as Suresvara says he does, or whether he holds that the one who falls to the state of an individual soul through Ignorance first brings that state to an end through meditation on the Absolute and then attains to the Absolute. Suresvara says, 'The term "knowledge of the Absolute" (Brahma-vidya) implies an awaken- ing to the identity of all. For the truth of duality is non- duality, even as the rope is the truth of the imagined snake' (B.B.V. I.iv.1138). If this were taken to make Bhartrprapañca agree that everything is superimposed on the Absolute through Ignorance, it would conflict with the explanations of Bhartr- prapañca's doctrine given elsewhere, where he is said to have explained the text 'That is infinite' as implying the reality (of the Absolute) both as cause and as efiect, and it would also conflict with the description of the Absolute as duality in identity given throughout. Hence we think it probable that it is only by Suresvara that Bhartrprapanca's commentary is

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explained in this way. This would agree with another verse in Suresvara's Vartika, Bhartrprapanca'e position was (illusion- ist) as we have explained; his commertary makes the same, point at other places' (B.B.V. I.iv.1164). On this =e have Ānanda- giri's gloss: 'An opponent might ask, "Why do you explain Bhartrprapamca's commentary on this introductcry passage (Brhad. I.iv.9) as if he were an illusionist, when elsewhere his com -. mentary speaks of a real transformation of the Absolute?" The argument "His commentary makes the same point (affirming that the world is illusory) at other places" is a roply to this pos- sible cbjection'. But is it not the case that in another verse Suresvara openly says that Śri Sankara is here refuting, not Bhartr- prapañca's doctrine, but only those who misunderstood it, in the words: 'The revered Guru (Sankara) clearly introduced this reasoning to correct those who heard the words (of Phartr- prapañca) "will become the Absolute" and interpreted them wrongly'? (B.B.V. i. iv. 1135) Anandagiri adds in his gloss: 'The revered Commentator introduced the reasoning to ccrrect the errors of those who wrongly supposed that he (Bhartr- prapanca) did not support a doctrine of illusion'. If you ask how a doctrine of illusion can be made to harmo- nize with Bhartrprapanca's teaching, we have to reply by in- troducing a distinction. Here he is saying, 'Metaphysical Ignorance is not being awake to the conviction "All this uni- verse is in truth nothing but my own Self"'. Again, explaining 'In the beginning, all this was the Absolute' (Brhad.I.iv.10), he wrote, 'By "this" is meant the world, manifested as name and form. He (Prajapati) identified himself with tuis world through Ignorance. Having transcended it, he knew his own Self' (Anandagiri on B.B.V. I.iv.1176). So Bhartrprapanca's commentary could be intrepreted to mean: 'He appeared to iden- tify himself with the universe of name and form. And then he became all, through realizing that his Self was the Absolute'. On this basis, our case would stand. Consider, however, the passage which runs as follows. 'These states are the results of merit and demerit accumulated from the past, and those results themselves proceed from acts committed in those states .... As with identification with the individual body, or with the Divine Cosmic Powers or with the Cosmic Body or the Cosmic Mind ... in the same way, a sense of identity with the supreme Self is achieved through meditation on that'. Here it is clear from the language of his commen- tary that he accepts that the state of being the supreme Self is something that has to be achieved through 'knowledge', un- derstood in the sense of the act of meditation (upāsana). Here the criticism made by the revered Commentator (Śankara) applies, namely that the attainment of any state (through activity of any kind, including meditation), always implies the defect of impermanence. So the meaning of Suresvara's Vārtika quoted above was, 'When Bhartrprapañca's doctrine is

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thus understood, it agrees with the Veda and reason'. That is why he wrote later, 'This version of Bhartrprapanca's commen- tary has been set forth to make it agree with the words of the Veda and with direct experience of truth' (B.B.V. I.iv.1188). Anandagiri's gloss says, '"Version" means "mode of interpreta- tion following the doctrine that the world is an illusion". If you ask Surefvara why he did that with Bhartrprapanca's com- mentary, he replies "To make it agree with the words of the Veda and with direct experience of truth"'. In explaining the topic of the twe forms of the Absolute as gross and subtle, Śri Sankara and Suresvara are at one in re- futing Bhartrpraranca's conception, expressed by Śri Śankara in the words 'Ignorance is not (suppcsed on this theory to be) a property of the Self. It manifests spontaneously and is beginningless (in the manner of the Nature of the Sankhyas; it does not afflict the Self as a whole, but only the individual mind), like desert places (which cover only a part of the earth's surface)' (Brhad. Bh. II. iii.6). In this context, Śri Śankara also has the following to say:

(2) And if (attaining the Absolute is something for the future and so implies that) there is impermanence, then there results the fault of your contradicting your own doctrine, as we have already explained. For such a result (being impermanent) is the same as that which could be obtained through action (so that your theory that a combination of knowledge and action was required for liberation would be contradicted). And if you reply that the effect of knowledge of the Absolute is the cessation of the notion, produced by Ignorance, 'I am not the all', and consequent attainment of the state of being all, then your theory of a person 'about to become the Absolute' would be contradicted (since everyone would already be the Ab- solute) .... On this basis it is only right to suppose that, from the standpoint of the final truth, in the text 'Verily, this (world) was the Absolute in the beginning' (Brhad. I.iv.10), the term 'the Absolute' was used in its primary sense (and not in a secondary sense, as imagined by Bhartrprapañca, to mean 'the Brahmana or one about to become the Absolute'). For the Veda reports things as they are. The notion that the term 'the Absolute' means 'a person about to become the Absolute' is a total distortion of the meaning of the term. It is not right to abandon what the Veda does teach and invent things that it does not teach. (Brhad.Bh.I.iv.10)

And one could quote more to show that there was nothing wrong in our claim (that Śri Śankara and Suresvara both refuted the doctrine of Bhartrprapañca as diverging from the true tradi- tion, although Suresvara sometimes deliberately interpreted it to accord with that tradition).

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83 EXAMINATION OF THE THREE STATES

In the present section a few of the scattered texts quoted in Anandagiri's gloss on Suresvara's Vartika will be collected to- gether for the sake of those who wish to know the place held by the practice of examining the states of waking and dream, etc., in the syster of Bhartrprapamca. Bhartrprapanca's connecting-commentary to the conversation between Gargya and Ajatasatru, which includes a discussion of the state of a person in dreamless sleep, makes the following points.

(1) There is a short account of the 'conscious individual' (the soul) in the text on the entry of the Absolute into His creation. Here the concept is explained with the help of a story, (the story of the conversation between Gargya and Ajātasatru, Brhad. II.i.l ff.). The question is raised, 'If the gods are the real experiencers and the controllers of the or- ganc of knowledge and action, why assume a conscious individual over and above them, seeing that it would have nothing to do?' In Bhartrprapanca's system, Gargya is represented as the expo- nent of the tentative view, while the Veda states the finally accepted conclusion through the person of Ajatasatru, King of Kāśī. (Ānandagiri on B.B.V. II.i.21-4)

According to Suresvara, this connecting-commentary introduced by Bhartrprapanca is wrong. For it does not accord with the context, which is the doctrine that liberation arises from knowledge of the Self. There was no point in troubling to re- fute the presence of the gods. And even when their presence is admitted, the existence and utility of a conscious indivi- dual over and above the bcdy is accepted doctrine anyway (B.B.V. II.i.24-5) .

Ajatasatru asks the following question about the person awoken from sleep. 'This soul, the conscious individual, who was asleep - where was he when he was asleep? From whence has he come?' (Brhad. II.1.16) Bhartrprapañca answers this question as follows.

(2) Asking this question implies raising an objection. If the experiencer was of the very nature of knowledge and his organs were continuously present, how could he suddenly awaken at some particular moment? If, on the other hand, the soul left the body in sleep and went far away, or was destroyed, how could it ever return? (Anandagiri on B.B.V. II.i.196-7)

Suresvara refutes this explanation as follows. It is wrong to explain the question as asking how there could be an awakening at some particular point in time if the experiencer were knowl- edge by nature. For it would contradict the answer given

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later: 'He was in the inmost Self and nowhere else, and came back from there'. Nor would the question have made any sense if it hed asked how the soul could return if it left the body and went far away. For the means of movement belong exclusively to the physical body. How could the experiencer himself move to another place? And it is wrong to suppose that in dreamless sleep he could be destroyed. For he is of the very nature of kncwledga, and (even if things are viewed from the empirical standpoint he cannot be destroyed since) he goes on to wake up (B.B.V. II.1.203-4).

(3) When he has gone to sleep, the Self viewed under adjuncts with intellect predominating (vijñana-maya, M.V.79,3) absorbs into himself, through the intellect, the consciousness pertain- ing to the sense-organs, and lies within the ether of the heart. When this Self thus holds back the sense-crgans in his grasp, it is said of him 'He sleeps (svapiti = svam apiti = he dissolves into himself)'. (Brhad.II.i.17)

This upanishadic pessage and its implications were explained by Bhartrprapanca as follows.

(4) Withdrawing consciousness in the form of speech and other faculties through consciousness in the form of intellect, he lies in the ether of the heart. Having emerged (a little) from the heart along the subtle canals (nadi), he sees dreams. When the text says 'withdrawing consciousness' and 'through con- sciousness', the word 'consciousness' means the organ or facul- ty itself in each case .... The self-luminous consciousness of this conscions individual undergoes modification (as dream). Its special home is the heart, because it is through the heart that it passes out (into the subtle canals for dream). Because it is especially there in the heart that the consciousness of latent mental impressions manifests, it is said that he lies there (even in dream). (From Anandagiri on B.B.V. II.i.248-54)

In considering these views of Bhartrprapañca Suresvara ex- presses himself as follows. When the text in summing up after- wards says 'The mind is restrained' (Brhad. II.1.17), the impli- cation is that the mind and its latent impressions are with- drawn. So Bhartrprapamca's idea that consciousness in the form of speech, etc., is withdrawn through consciousness in the form of the intellect is wrong. The correct explanation is that this Spirit Himself absorbs speech and the rest, and then it is said of Him 'He goes to sleep (svapiti)'. 'He goes to sleep' (svapiti) means that he has become one with his own Self (svam apito, Chand.VI.vili.l, cp. M.V.39,5), as the ety- mology of the word shows. And the upanishadic text gives further reasons for viewing the matter in this way when it says that the sense of smell (prāna = ghrana, B.B.V. II.1.259) and so on are absorbed .* (B.B.V. II.1.256-9)

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*(Anandagiri explains: In dreamless sleep ail the faculties are withdrawn and there is no adjunct to produce any distinction. The soul then stands as the Self or Absolute, and is not the transmigrating individual. (Anandagiri on B.B.V. II.i. 259). T.N. )

And Śri Śankara speaks in his Commeniary as follows. 'And if you accept that etymology (i.e. the etymolcgy 'svapiti = svam apiti') suggests that in sleep the soul has a form that tran- scends ine attributes of the world of transmigration, but ask for a proof, the text goes on to suppiy one. conclnde that, when speech and ail the other organg are with- .. From this we

drawn, the Self remains establishec in its own true nature, free from all division into action and the factors and results of action'. (Brhad.Bh. II.1.17)

We have already recounted and considered (M.V.81) how Bhartr- prapanca dealt with the quesiion 'How is it that the Self does not see anything cer against itself as a second thing in dreamless sleep?' That passage is relevant here alsc, and should be borne in mind.

In the section of the Brhadaranyaka where Janaka rose from his seat of honour to greet Yajmavalkya (IV.ii.l ff.), Yājavalkya asked Janaka 'Where will you go when you are released?' Janaka replied, 'Revered sir, I do not know where I shall go'. Bhartrprapañca explains this passage as follows.

(5) Janaka knew the truth (abstractly), but he did not know the path for realizing i. He had to be educated by having this shown to him. Although knowing the supreme Self, he said 'My lord, I do not know', because he did not know the path of direct vision. (Anandagiri on B.B.V. IV.ii.16)

The refutation of this is found in Suresvare's Vartika. Nothing was said in the earlier sections of the Upanishad about Janaka knowing the Self, so we do not have any proof that the king yet had knowledge of the Absolute. Nor is the question 'Where will you go?' a question about a path - it is a question about a destination. When one has become convinced of one's identity with that Self which is 'immediately evident as the Absolute' (Brhad. III.iv.1), there is no possibility of going anywhere on a path. And Bhartrprapanca's whole conception is in conflict with such texts as 'Being nothing but the Absolute, he dis- solves in the Absolute' (Brhad. IV.iv.6), 'There is no going thither' (Katha I.i1.8), 'All this is but the Self alone' (Chand. VII.xxv.2) and 'All this is verily but the Absolute' (Mund.II.ii.12). The idea of attaining liberation through go- ing on a path is also wrong because the only obstacle prevent- ing liberation is metaphysical Ignorance (B.B.V. IV.11.20-9). From this we infer that Bhartrprapanca thought that all that

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is taught, beginning with Vaisvanara (Brhad, I.i.1) and euding with 'Salutations to Thee, the Fourth' (turiya, Brhad. V.xiv.7), is taught for the sake of meditation (as a result of which one will go to some desirable state after death). But Suresvara wrote: 'Metaphysical knowledge is the only meang to attain the Self, as Yajnavalkya said to King Janaka "You have attained". If the means had been anything other than metaphysical knowl- edge, he would have said "You will attain"' (B.B.v. IV.ii.95). He was commenting here on the upanishadic text '"0 Janaka, you have attaineu the fearless state" said Yajmavalkya' (Brhad. IV.ii.4).

In a later section of the Upanishad an examination of waking, dream and dreamless sleep is set out. Here there is a text which says 'The Spirit, being similar (to the intellect), ap- pears to conform to the conditions of the two worlds of waking and dream' (Brhad. IV.iii.7). Bhartrprapañca explains this as follows:

(6) The various sense-faculties, such as sight and the rest, are mutually different and yet also similar, since they belong to the same body. In the same way, there is similarity between the intellect and the Self (which produces a false sense of identity), while the power to have individual experience is distinct from the Self and is a property of the intellect alone Why do we argue that the Self must be separate? Well, the two worlds of waking and dream are both compounded of the ele- ments. If the Self were not different from them (and from the intellect which belongs to them) they would both manifest simul- taneously. But this is not found to be the case. We must as- sume, therefore, that the Self is some separate being who en- ters the waking world and the dream-world successively, and, when it is present in one of those worlds, that world appears, and when it is absent that world disappears. (From Anandagiri on B.B.V. IV.iii.424-9)

This teaching is approved by Suresvara.

(7) There are only two dwelling-places of this Spirit, this world and the next. (Brhad.IV.iii.9)

Bhartrprapanca explains the context of this passage and its continuation as follows.

(8) Three topics have been raised in the immediately preceding 'Which is the Self? It is this Spirit (viewed under adjuncts) with intellect predominating, present within the passages.

sense-organs, the inner light illumining the heart ... ' (Brhad. IV.iii.7), 'The Spirit, being similar to the intellect, appears to conform ... ' (Brhad. IV.iii.7), 'This Spirit ... discards those evils at death' (Brhad.IV.iii.8). Their explanation has to be

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given through the example of dream. (B.B.V. IV.iii.831-2)

Suresvara does not criticize this, and the gloss says 'He ap- proves Bhartrprapanca's introducticn to the context' (Ananda- giri on B.B.V. IV.iii.833).

We find at Brhadāranyaka IV.iii.16 a text, 'Whatever he sees there (i.e. in the dream-state), he is unaffected. For this Spirit is unattached'. What do 'unarfected' amd 'unattached' mean here? On this topic Bhartrprapañca expresses himself as follows.

(9) 'Unaffected' implies freedom from merit and demerit; 'unattached' implies release from desire. And here you might raise an objection. Even in the waking world, you might say, action is not the true cause of accumulating merit and demerit (and consequent rebirth). The true causc is desire. And in dream this root cause of the accumulation of merit and demerit is not itself uprooted! So merit and demerit are bound to be accumulated in dream. Not so. The purpose of this upanishadic text in saying 'This Spirit is unattached' is to show that, at the time of dream, the Spirit is free from that mode of the mind, called desire or attachment, which causes the accumulation of merit and demerit. In fact the mind itself (together with desire) is under eclipse in dream, and only the play of subtle impressions from the past is left. All desires, which are forms of death (Brhad. IV.iii.7), are related directly to the body. And in dream the Spirit is separated from the body (Brhad. IV.iii.12). Just as the dream-creation of chariots and other external ob- jects is unreal, so equally is the creation of the dream-body and its organs. All creations in a dream, and everything seen in it, are unreal. The experience in dream of attachment for a body and its organs is also experience of the unreal. Hence it is said that this Spirit is without attachment and pure. Longing prompts the soul to act. But it is itself a subor- dinate element in action. When the scent of flowers perfumes the basket in which they are placed, the scent is that of the flowers, not that of the basket. In the same way, longing is an element in the activity of the mind and other factors of action; it does not pertain to the Self. When the conscious- ness of the individual is coloured by longing, we speak figura- tively of the soul as 'acting'. Action needs the prompting force of that colouring of longing, both in order to arise and to bring its karmic reward later. All action depends on motive. It is therefore connected with mind, body and organs, but never with the Self. Even in the absence of mind, body and organs after death, action remains in being, dependent for re- alizing itself on motive in the mind, surviving in subtle form. It does not depend on the Self. The latter, therefore, is the Witness of attachment in dream, attachment being a subordinate

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phase of action. As witness, the Celf is separate from attach-

54. ment and free from it. (From Anandagiri on B.B.V. IV.iii.1015-

Since Suresvara states this explanation of Bhartrprapañca's without refuting it, it appears that he accepted it. Elsewhere, however, he refutes as follows the view that the attribute of one thing can be passed to anothcr like the scent of flowers perfuming a basket, when the two things are of different nature.

(10) The scent of flowers, and so forth, can only be passed to a thing of like character, such as a cloth with which it may come into contact. This cannot happen in the case of unlike substances. On account of its subtlety, the ether cannct be affected by impressions, even though it is a substance. All the less can impressions affect pure Consciousness, which is different in kind, and which is not even a substance. If Con- sciousness were taken to assume the form of the impressions, as clay assumes the form of cups, then the impressions would be nseless. They would never be anything other than Consciousness (and so would add nothing new). Hearing is not coloured by sight, even though both are objects. Even less can pure Con- sciousness be coloured by impressions, as it is relationless and unattached. (B.B.V. II.iii.105-8)

There is an upanishadic text as follows: 'As a great fish now follows the eastern and now the western bank of a river, so does this Spirit now enjoy dream, now waking experience .... That (dreamless sleep) is his form beyond desire, evil or fear. When a men is embraced by his beloved wife he is not aware of anything, within or without. In the same way, when (in dream- less sleep) this Spirit is embraced by the Self as massed Con- scicusness, he is not aware of anything, within or without. This is the form in which he has realized ail his desires, in which his desires are only for his own Self, in which he has no desires, in which he is not afflicted by grief' (Brhad. IV. 111.18 and 21). Here is Bhartrprapanca's explanation of the context of this passage.

(11) The external activity of this Spirit depends on the acti- vity of the intellect and other instruments .... Desire arises from action and infects the Spirit, but desire and the Spirit are explained as being separate .... On the other hand metaphy- sical Ignorance has the Self's Consciousness for its seat .... It distorts that Consciousness and conditions it for erroneous perception .... Consciousness in this form passes successively through the intellect and other organs, assuming progressively grosser forms, and finally becomes apt for empirical experi- ence .... Insofar as the relationship between action and the Spirit is caused by attachment, the fact that they are really distinct has already been explained; insofar as the relation is

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caused by Ignorance, the fact that they are really distinct. stili remains to be explained .... Attachment enters the Self from the outside, coming from the objects and the sense-organs. Under the pull of attachment, Consciousness seeps out from the Self and operates in the realm of the external .... The connection of the Self with action rests on metaphysical Ignorance, and hence brings harm .... Therefore only he who is free from attachment and Ignorance attains liberation. Liberation is like regaining one's true state (of health) when there is no longer any connection with illness. So it is worth disowning Ignorance. In dreamless sleep one is free from Ignorance, desire and action, and hence healthy in one's own true nature. (From Anandagiri on B.B.V. IV.iii.1089-1100)

This doetrine is refuted by Suresvara in the Vartika as fol- lows. When once it is admitted that nothing exists over and above the Self, then no objects or sense-organs can exist apart from Ignorance. The theory that attachment comes in from the objects through the sense-organs then becomes untenable. Nor could it be summoned by Ignorance. For Ignorance produces wrong knowledge and does nothing else. Nor is it correct to say that Ignorance has the Self for its seat. For the whole notion that Ignorance rests in the Self itself depends on Igno- rance! Ignorance cannot be conceived as resting in the Self either by its own power or by the power of another. The doc- trine that Ignorance disturbs the Consciousness of the Self and makes it apt for erroneous perception is no better, because there are Vedic texts which deny all modification of the Abso- lute. So we have to accept in the end that the whcle notion of Ignorance permeated by a reflection of Consciousness rests on arguments devoid of critical reflection (B.B.V. IV.iii. 1105-11).

Bhartrprapañca interprets the example of the great fish as follows.

(12) The materialists say that, just as in the external sphere, particularized consciousness (sensation) arises from the inter-relation of the eye with light and the object of vision, even so mental knowledge arises from the inter-relation of the intellect with the sense-organs. This accounts for mental knowledge, and we do not need to assume a knower over and above it. But this is wrong. If there were no separate knower, then consciousness in dream would be material light just like waking consciousness (according to the terms of the materialist's theory). The onset of dream would not then in- troduce any change; the stuff of which the waking world and the dream-world was composed would be the same; and the two worlds would be perceived simultaneously. But in practice this does not occur. That is why (the Upanishad speaks of a

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great fish and) says that there is an observer of these two 'nests' of waking and dream who (perceives them successively and) is (therefore) different from them (as the fish is differ- ent from the two river-banks which it visits alternately). It will be objected by some that, since the soul is all- pervading, it would always be in contact with the worlds of waking and dream and would perceive them cimultaneously. The cause of the fact that they arc perceived in alternation is not the presence of a separate knower, but the presence of presid- ing deities. The latter can well enter into operation succes- sively .... But this theory is also wrong. Since the deities are all-pervading, their activity, also, ought (on this theory) to be simultancous. But the cognitions of the soul (as knower separate from his knowledge) are successive. And it is in any case impossible that the deities who preside over the sense- organs should be present in dream (as the sense-organs are then in abeyance). But the soul may be present as the witness of dreams brought on by merit and demerit and by other causes. The existence of a knower different from the act of knowing is thus proved by the evidence of activity in two successive spheres (waking and dream), which must be the work of a single per- ceiver (himself different from the cognitions in both states). The same perceiver is present throughout both waking and dream. But his work as perceiver of them cannot be simultaneous (as they are successive). The fact that he acts to perceive them successively is thus well explained .... And the fact that they are not perceived simultaneously is a sign of the existence of a soul (separate from and additional to the stream of cogni- tions, for the latter do not overlap one another successively in time) .. As for the deities, they do not perform thcir normal func- tion in dream. For in the case of one dying or going to sleep, they leave their work in the individual body (at the time of death or sleep) and go to their own proper stations, as we know from such Vedic texts as 'Speech enters Agni' (Brhad. III.ii. 13). The deities leave one about to enter on dream in the same way .... It is true that the deities do not leave Hiranya- garbha. But as Hiranyagarbha is not manifest to perception, their presence in Hiranyagarbha is not enough to produce any effects in dream .... The perceiver transcends both waking-time and dream-time. Hence knowledge cannot be categorized as material, and is not brought about by the deities. (From Ānandagiri on B.B.V. IV.iii.1120-46)

Here, Suresvara does not go on to criticize Bhartrprapañca's refutation of the materiality of knowledge. But he does re- mark that the whole argument for refuting the presence of the deities was pointless, whether the deities be taken as differ- ent from or non-different from the elements (B.B.V. IV.iii. 1147) .* Ānandagiri, too, in his gloss, says 'Bhartrprapañca's interpretation of the illustration of the great fish has been

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explained. Suresvara accepts that Bhartrprapanca's procedure is a method of refuting the materialist. But he says that the whole procedure of raising the possibility that the deities might be responsible for alternations of states of conscious- ness from waking to dream and back io waking was wrongly con- ceived (Anandagiri on B.B.V. IV.iii.1147).

*(It is useless to anpeal to deities rather than to a separate knower to account for the alternation of waking and dream, whether the deities be conceived as different or non-different from what they control. If they are conceived as different, it would be better to accept the simpler hupothesis of a knower separate from the cognitions he knows. If the deities are taken as non-different from what they control they will be non-different from the hody, and the need for a knower separate from the cognitions he knows in order to account for the alter- nation between waking and dream will already have been estab- lished in the course of refuting the materialist. If the whole appeal to deities was meaningless, the mention and refutation of the theory was also meaningless. See Anandagiri on B.B.V. IV.iii.1147. T.N.)

The Veda gives an example to illustrate the soul's entry into the state of dreamless sleep. 'As a hawk or an eagle after flying about in the sky becomes tired, folds its wings and is borne down to the nest, so does this Spirit hasten to that state where He has no desires and sees no dreams' (Brhad. IV.iii.19). Bhartrprapanca introduces this passage as follows.

(13) The Self's determinate knowledge in the realm of duality sheds light in all directions in the waking state, like the sun's rays beaming .... Desire springs from action, and the subtle impressions of future tendencies (vasana), too, arise from action alone .... The soul acts according to its impres- sions and receives rewards according to its action .... The impression becomes one with the reward it promotes. Coloured by the impressions, the soul conceives desires. .. Desire manifests the creations of dream, with their joys and sor- rows .... Determinate knowledge modifies desire, for the devel- opment and course of action are governed by knowledge .... De- terminate knowledge here is equivalent to wrong knowledge (viparīta-darsana) or Ignorance (avidya) .... Even when there is something to apprehend, empirical knowledge apprehends it wrongly .... Desire is external to the soul. Desire prompts the soul to action, and action causes modifications (of plea- sure and pain in the soul) .... Desire, action, impressions and empirical consciousness, being mutually dependent, are all one complex .... The soul desires on account of the impressions and sees the objects of duality through empirical conscious- ness .... But in dreamless sleep, the realm of non-duality, action breaks off, as there is nothing external to prompt it

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into movement, and desire also, now coalescing with the soul. lies at peace for lack of anything to do .... Even Conscious- ness cannot assume the form of determinate empirical knowledge, since there is nothing different from it in nature or separate from it for it io perceive .... It is like a fire when all its fuel is burnt . .. It is with this in mind that the Veda says 'He desires no desires and sees no dream', thereby declaring that the true nature of the soul is free from desire, action and so forth. (From Anandagiri on B.B.V. IV.iii.1188-1201)

Suresvara does not explicitly condemn this teachiug. All he says is, 'The question whether or where this interpretation is right or wrong must be examined by scholars with an open mind' (B.B.V. IV.iii.1203-4). But Anandegiri makes the following observation. 'It is wrong to make a distinction between waking and dream on the one hand, conceived as the realm cf duality, and dreamless sleep on the other, conceived as the realm of non-duality. It is wrong, whether the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep are taken as real or as unreal. If they were real, duality would be real. If they were unreal, non-duality would be the truth, and all distinctions would have been refuted (Anandagiri on B.B.V. IV.iii.1204).

There is a Vedic text which explains the absence of empirical seeing, seer and seen in dreamless sleep. 'Verily, when there (in dreamless sleep) he does not see, he is, verily, seeing, though he does not see. For there is no break in the seeing of the seer' (Brhad. IV.iii.23). Suresvara's exposition and refutation of Bhartrprapanca's interpretation of this passage and its continuation has already been given above at M.V.81,1, and should be consulted there. The introduction to the passage, explaining the context, runs . as follows in Bhartrprapañca's words, summarized:

(14) It has been said that in dreamless sleep there is no pain within. At that time the soul remains in its own true nature as pure spiritual light .... It means its own light, as the sun and other external luminaries are absent .... But have we not said that all determinate knowledge falls under the heading of Ignorance? And will it not follow that there will be a feeling 'I am all this' in dreamless sleep which will fall into the category of Ignorance? No. Though the conviction 'I am all' is determinate knowledge, it does not come under the category of Ignorance. For we have explained that metaphysi- cal Ignorance is the fear that arises from vision of plurality. 'I am all this' is the contrary conviction, betokening meta- physical knowledge. When this vision of unity is kindled it is always pure and clear. But because no empirical knowledge arises, the soul does not feel it knows anything. Yet it is shining brightly with its own Consciousness. It is not right to raise the objection, 'If there is

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Consciousness, how can there be the feeling of not knowing any- thing?' This has been answered by the example of the man em- braced by his beloved wife and not aware of anything, within or without. Perhaps it will be objected that the example is not parallel with the thing it is used to illustrate. The man em- braced by his wife has his sense-organs intact and capable of particular empirical knowledge, yet he has no sense of distinc- tions, because his organs, though present, are closed. This is not the case in dreamless sleep. So there shouid be an expla- nation of how there can be the feeling of not knowing anything, even though knowledge is present. Should we, perhaps, say that it is darkness that is present and not light? Not so. For much effort has been expended in establishing that the nature of the soul is spiritual light. And the theory propounded by our own school will stand. For when a person awakens from sleep he recognizes himself as 'I am that same'. Therefore in dreamiess sleep the soul persists through its own true nature

1400. as spiritual light. (From Anandagiri on B.B.V. IV.iii.1387-

Suresvara does not criticize this doctrine here. So we can only infer what part of it he did not accept from his later examination of Bhartrprapanca's interpretation of the passage as a whole, already cited above at M.V.81,1. Ānandagiri also says in his gloss, 'The context as viewed by the other party has been stated. Suresvara will refute the part with which he disagrees later on' (Anandagiri on B.B.V. IV.iii.1408).

84 DISCUSSION OF LIBERATION

Taking Visva, Taijasa, Prajma and Turiya (M.V.43), and dissolv- ing each in its successor, Yajmavalkya taught Turiya by saying 'This Self is "neither this nor that"'. Then he said, 'O Janaka, you have attained the fearless state' (Brhad.IV.11.4). And Janaka replied, 'May the fearless state come to you, O Yājñavalkya'. Here the objection would occur, 'The Guru has evidently him- self attained the fearless state. Why is his blessing re- turned?' Bhartrprapañca replies to this objection as follows.

(1) Yajñavalkya had attained the fearless state. It was not that he had not attained it. But he did not have immediate experience of it. Still he was, after all, liberated. Or again, we might put it otherwise and say that there are two forms of liberation. The one who has immediate intuition (sākşāt-kāra) of the Absolute while still alive in the body is said to be liberated, even though he is not dissolved in the Absolute. He will have a second liberation in the form of dis- solution in the Absolute on the death of the body. Even while enjoying the first kind of liberation he can be given a

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blessing for the second. (Anandagiri on B.B.V. IV.ii.101-2)

This view is refuted by Suresvara as follows. Yajmavalkya simply referred to knowledge of the Self when he said 'You have attained the fearless state'. So we conclude that nothing further was needed, in the way either of any new intuition of the Absolute or of dissolution in it. Nor is there any such thing as a competent Guru who has nct himself realized the Ab- solute. Nor would the king have uttered the words 'May the fearlrss state come to you, O Yajnavalkya, to you, O revered one, who have enabled us to kmow the fearless state' if the Guru's knowledge were supposed to be no more than verbal. Nor would there be any need or desire for dissolution in the Abso- lute on the part of one who had aitained immediate knowledge, that a 'blessing' of this kind would have been appropriate (if taken literally). So the explanation of King Janaka's words given by Bhartrprapañca is noi correct. (B.B.V. IV.ii.95-109) From this it is clear that Suresvara did not express agree- ment in his Vartika with Bhartrprapanca's doctrine of two kinds of liberation, liberation while yet alive (jivanmukti), and liberation as release after death (videha-mukti). Suresvara held that only liberation while alive was liberation in the true sense. This was also the view of Ācārya Bhagavatpāda, as has already been shown at M.V.60.

85 THE INTERMEDIATE STAGE

The following text occurs in the Veda on the occasion of a question asked by Ārtabhāga. '"0 Yājnavalkya", he said, "when a man dies, what is it that does not leave him?" "Name", re- plied Yājnavalkya. "Infinite is name, infinite are the Visva- devas. He who knows this verily wins thereby an infinite realm (loka)"' (Brhad. III.ii.12). '"0 Yājñavalkya", he said, "when a man has died and his voice has dissolved in fire, his vital energies in wind, his power of sight in the sun, his mind in the moon, his power of hearing into the quarters of space, his body into earth, his soul into the ether, the hairs of his body into the plants, the hairs on his head into the trees, his blood and seed into water - where then is that man?" "Artabhaga, my dear one", said Yājmavalkya, "take my hand. We will find out about this on our own. This is not something we can discuss in public". Then the two of them went out and discussed it together. Action was what they spoke of, action was what they praised. Verily, a man becomes virtuous by vir- tuous action, vicious by vicious action. Thereupon Artabhaga of the line of Jaratkāru became silent' (Brhad. III.1i.13). This is how the revered Commentator explains the context of this passage introducing Brhadāraņyaka III.ii.13.

(1) The bondage of the sense-organs and objects, of the nature

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of death, has already been described at the passage ending at Brahāraņyaka III.ii.9. Liberation is possible because there can be the death (end) of this form of death, as was mentioned at Brhadaranyaka III.ii.10. This liberation means the dissolu- tion of the sense-organs and objects here in this life, like the extinction of a lamp (Brhad.IlI.ii.ll). It was to teach the true nature of the deathlike bondage of the sense-organs and objects, and to uncover its true cause that this new sec- tion is started beginming '0 Yajñavalkya ... '. (Brhad.Bh. III.ii.13)

Bow Bhartrprapaca viewed the context is summarized by the holy Commertator (Śankara) himself.

(2) Here some (i.e. Bhartrprapanca) propound the following theory. They say that even when the organs and objects of ex- perience and their causes such as desire, merit and demerit, have all disappeared, even then a person is not liberated. He remains with only his name left, cut off from the supreme Self by that Ignorance which arises from the Self and yet does not conceal all of it, in the manner of desert places arising spon- taneously and spoiling parts only of the earth's surface. In this state such a person remains quite turned away from the world as an object of enjoyment. Desire and action are at an end. He. occupies an intermediate stage. His task is to put an end to vision of duality once and for all through vision of his identity with the supreme Self. Hence (thinks Bhartr- prapanca) the next stage in the teaching must be the introduc- tion of the subject of the supreme Self. In this way the thinkers of this school excogitate an 'intermediate stage' called 'apavarga' or 'exemption' (from further transmigration). And they establish their transition to the next portion of the

M.V.71,2) text in the light of this fancy. (Brhad.Bh.III.ii.13, cp.

Here are Bhartrprapanca's words on this subject, extracted from Anandagiri's gloss on Suresvara's Vartika.

(3) The following objection to our (Bhartrprapanca's) position may be raised. Simply through a combination of ritual and meditation, practised in the context of vision of duality, (attachment along with) the whole of duality will have been uprooted. No seed will remain that might produce the material elements that could constitute a future body. Through this, a person will have achieved his end, and will have no more use for the Veda. He will have no motive for proceeding on to a vision of non-duality. How do you explain the further teach- ing? We (i.e. Bhartrprapañca) reply as follows. Ritual and meditation practised in combination in the context of vision of duality destroy the effect of attachment. Attachment is

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what produces the materials for further existence in the world. This desire-element is uprooted. And if desire is uprooted, the whole element of action, to which it belongs, is uprooted with it. What then is left of the soul? Determinate knowledgc in the form of Ignorance is left. As to what is initiated by Ignorance and action respectively, action is only effective in modification when changes of form or state occur. It is Igno- rance that imposes apparent limits on Consciousness. It is this Ignorance that constitutes empirical cognition imposing limits. The soul (in the state of 'exemption' - apavarga), being (still) subject to the limiting force of Ignorance, remains separated from the supreme Self. It still belongs to the realm of transmigration and partakes of duality. Its dissolu- tion in the Absolute is a goal that has yet to be achieved. The phrase 'its dissolution has to be achieved' is a referencc to something that has not yet been achieved, and the injunction will remain in force until the dissolution takes place. This shows how the Vedic teachings on duality and non-duality inter- relate. For, when Ignorance is uprooted, empirical cognition, imposing limits, comes to an end; but attachment, and the power of action to produce modifications, do not. As attach- ment and action are not yet at an end, they bring further em- pirical cognition imposing limits. For the forces of attach- ment, action and Ignorance are inseparable. And there cannot be vision of non-duality as long as impure duality is present. (From Anandagiri on B.B.V. III.ii.47-61)

The teaching about the uprooting of duality here is in contra- diction with the Veda and with Bhartrprapañca's own explana- tions of it. There are Vedic texts teaching the indestructi- bility of the world of duality, such as 'The Spirit is inde- structible .... If He did not (continually produce new food througu His thought and action) this world would collapse' (Brhad. I.v.2) and 'Through the power of the Seif alone, the meditator on the Self creates whatever he desires' (Brhad. I.iv.15). 'This world was then unmanifest' (Brhad. I.iv.7) teaches that this world of duality is indestructible by predi- cating of it an unmanifest and a manifest state. So one can- not uproot desire and action through attaining the state of Hiranyagarbha (as Bhartrprapanca's theory demands). As for attaining the Absolute in its unmanifest state, that occurs even in dreamless sleep; but it is not enough for the realiza- tion of the final goal of life. Ignorance may be considered either as absence of knowledge or as erroneous knowledge. In either case it has no power to impose limits. If it is absence of knowledge, it is merely a concealing force (and not a limiting one). And erroneous knowledge, such as the erroneous notion that the ether of the sky is blue, imposes no limitation on the ether. Again,

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Bhartrprapanca himself said, 'Ignorance springs up spontaneous- ly here and there in the Self, like desert places appearing on the surface of the earth. On the other hand desire and action, together with their subtle impressions, are repeatedly produced in the inmost Self by previous desire and action, and do not arise from Ignorance'. So Ignorance is not the material cause of the world. Nor was it right to claim that, even after Ignorance had been destroyed, desire and action could bring it back in the form of empirical cognition imposing limits. For they are not its cause. And even if they were, they could not bring it back from non-ezistence once it had been destroyed, In the absence of earth to grow from, even the most refreshing showers will not bring forth a lotus-bed from the empty sky. Nor can the Absolute be the cause of Ignorance. For if it were, Ignorance would be ineradicable. Or, if Ignorance were caused by the Absolute and nevertheless underwent destruction, (it would do so because it was its inalienable nature to undergo destruc- tion, and) there would be no need to have recourse to special means to destroy it (which is absurd, as it would rcnder the supreme texts of the Veda useless). And again, if desire and action did not even have the power to keep Ignorance in being, how could they have the power to recreate if from nothing once it had been destroyed? Bhartrprapanca's doctrine that, when desire and action have been destroyed through a combination of meditation and ritual, Ignorance remains, contradicts his own explanation of the text 'neither this nor that'. He declared that 'neither this' ne- gated the whole realm of the gross and subtle objects, while 'nor that' negated the desires that brought it into being. Whea desire and all particularities are at an end, what is left is the partless Absolute - such was his explanation of the phrase 'neither this nor that'. How could the statement 'Even when there is knowledge through the text "neither this not that" Ignorance does not dissolve in the Absolute' fail to be contradictory? And what about the statement 'there cannot be knowledge of non-duality till duality has been purified?' What kind of purification of duality is here meant? Does it mean separating it from non-duality? Or does it imply its total destruction? As, in Bhartrprapanca's doctrine, reality is one, being a whole arti- culated into parts, duality cannot be separated from non- duality. And if duality were destroyed there could not be a whole articulated into parts, and that would contradict the specific teaching of the school. In fact, the entire notion of a whole articulated into parts is unintelligible, since the whole and the parts would be mutually contradictory, like cold and hot. (Nothing can be one and at the same time non-one or many.) And it is a no- tion which contradicts the negative upanishadic texts like 'Without a before (cause) or an after (effect)' (Brhad. II.v.19).

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And if knowledge of the Absolute as a whole did mot include knowledge of it articulated into parts, the texts saying that, when the Absolute is known, all is known, would stand contra- dicted. Nor would anything further remain to be known (as the doctrine of 'exemption' implies it would) when the whole was known. When the rope is known, no snake or other imagined form remaias over. Nor can anyone perceive all the different forms of duality. And if (we were to grant for argumest's sake that) all the distinctions were perceived, the Absolute could not be accounted infinite. Moreover, vision of the Self (which is infinite) and vision of the not-self (which is finite) are mu- tually contradictory. That is why the Veda said, 'The sense- organs are turned outwards, ... (a certain wise person turned his gaze inwards and beheld the Self within)' (Katha II.i.l). On these lines Suresvara refuted the doctrine of Bhartr- prapañca at length in his Brhadāranyaka Vartika (B.B.V. III.ii. 63-12C). And there is a further refutation by Śri Śakara himself in his commentary on Brhadāranyaka IIi.ii.13, which runs as follows.

(4) What they do not tell us, however, is how there can be attention to, hearing of, pondering over and sustained medita- tion on the supreme Self on the part of a bodiless being who has lost all his organs and vital energy. They tell us that his sense-organs have dissolved, and that only his name is left. And they connect this state with the words 'lies dead' which occurred earlier in the text (Brhad.III.ii.ll). They cannot support this idea with even the dream of an argument. If, to avoid these absurdities, they were to say that, even while still alive, the student came to the point where he was associated with Ignorance alone, completely withdrawn from all objects of enjoyment, then they would have to explain how that state arose. If they were to say that it arose through his attaining identity with the whole realm of duality (through meditating on Hiranyagarbha), then this has already been re- futed (at Brhad.Bh.I.v.2). One might, as one alternative, suppose that the enlightened one, endowed with his karmic merit and demerit and with his vision of the Self as duality in unity, might become dead, with his organs and vital energy dissolved, and might in this condition attain identity with the universe as Hiranyagarbha. Alternatively one might suppose that he remained alive, with his organs and vital energy, not dissolved, withdrawn from experience of objects, intent on meditation on the supreme Self. But these two (alternative) states could not both be produced by the same course of discipline. If there were the course of discipline that leads to attainment of identity with Hiranyagarbha, it would not be the course of discipline that leads to withdrawal from all experience of objects. And if there were the course of discipline that leads the one intent on the supreme Self to withdrawal from all empirical experience,

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then it would not be what leads to identity with Hiranyagarbha. For that which promotes the attainment of an end cannot also promote withdrawal from all attainment. Perhaps it will be said that the enlightened man attains Hiranyagarbha after death, and then, with his organs and vital energy dissolved, with only his name remaining, becomes a candidate for knowlege of the supreme Self. But in that case the instruction (found in the Veda) for the knowledge of the supreme Self, which is addressed to living beings like ovr- selves, would be useless (which is absurd). For knowledge of the Absolute is taught as an attainable end for everyone, as texts like 'And whichever of the gods ... ' (Brhad. I.iv.10) show, So this is all an utterly contemptible theory, foreign to the Vedic teaching. (Bhad.Bh.III.ii.13)

S6 HEARING, PONDERING AND SUSTATNED MEDITATION

Thus Bhartrprapañca espoused a doctrine of duality in non- duality in regard to the nature of the Absolute. And he also followed a different line from that of Sankara Bhagavatpada in his teaching on the subject of the means to liberation. For consider. At Brhadaranyaka II.iv.5 there is a text, 'O Maitreyi! The Self, verily, is to be seen, heard about, pon- dered over, subjected to sustained meditation', which mentions various ways through which the Absolute is apprehended. As Śri Śankara remarks in his Commentary to Brhadāraryaka II.v.l, 'to be heard about' implies listening to the Teacher and the tra- ditional texts. 'To be pondered over' implies logical reflec- tion. The kind of reasoning there mentioned might have 'All this is the Self' as the proposition to be proved, and the proof might be that the Self was the sole universal principle present in all this, the sole source from which it arose, and the sole reality into which it will finally dissolve. The doubt might arise that the proposition advanced as proof was itself unfounded, and it is to settle this doubt that the sec- tion of the Brhadāranyaka Upanishad called the Madhu Brāhmana (Brhad. II.v.l ff.) was composed. Or else we might say (he adds) that the reason for the initial proposition has been stated, and the Upanishad is now going on to draw the final conclusion. Bhartrprapañca's explanation, however, is different. He says:

(1) Brhadāraņyaka Upanishad II.iv.5-6 explains what is tradi- tionally meant by 'hearing' in 'it should be heard about' (Brhad.II.iv.5). Brhadāraņyaka Upanishad II.iv.7-14 explains what is meant by 'pondering' in 'it should be pondered over' (Brhad. II.iv.5). The function of the Madhu Brahmana beginning at II.v.l is to enjoin sustained meditation. (Brhad.Bh.II.v.l,

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intro.)

On this the revered Commentator observes:

(2) In any case, logical reasoning must follow the lines laid down by the Veda. And there can be no need for a separate in- junction to say that sustained meditation must be brought to bear on what had been thought out logically and established through Vedic revelation and reason. Therefore we reject as wrongly conceived Bhartrprapanca's idea that hearing, ponder- ing and sustained meditation are expounded in separate portions of the Upanishad. (Brhad.Bh.II.v.l, intro.)

Here it seems that the revered Commentator is only concerned to deny that there is a separate injunction to perform sustained meditation, not to deny that the teachings about hearing, pon- dering and sustained meditation are separate in themselves. Otherwise one might conclude that Śri Gaudapāda Ācārya's divi- sion of the teaching was wrong. For in the first Book of his Karikas he explains the revealed Vedic teaching (i.e. explains bearing). In the second he explains the unreality of the world through rational argument (i.e. explains pondering). In the third he first teaches the attainment of the state in which the mind becomes virtually 'no-mind', a state attained by the highest class of enquirers through realization of the sole reality of the Self (G.K.III.32, cp. M.V.265,4). Then he goes on to speak of the restraint of the mind that has to be practised by students of weak or medium powers of vision for

259, 17). the attainment of that state (G.K.III.40-6, cp. M.V.55,8; 56,7;

Here in the 3rhadaranyaka, too, there are similar divisions. What is taught in the Madhu Kanda (interpreted broadly as Brhad. I.1.1-II.vi.3) primarily as revealed doctrine is ex- pounded over again in the Muni Kanda (Brhad. III.1.1-IV.vi.3) primarily through logical argumentation, and is afterwards set forth yet again (in the Khila Kanda, Brhad.V. i.l-VI.v.4) pri- marily from the point of view of meditation, as being the highest reward of meditative practice. All this, too, would be wrong if the teachings about hearing, pondering and sus- tained meditation (cp. M.V.56) were in in no way separate. So it is only Bhartrprapañca's mention of a separate injunction to sustained meditation that is condemned here by the revered Commentator. One also has to infer that the author of the Vrtti on the Brhadaranyaka must have insisted that the present short section of the Upanishad (II.v.l ff.) contained a sepa- rate injunction to sustained meditation.

(3) This Self is the overseer of all, the king ruling over all beings. As all the spokes of a wheel are affixed both to the hub and the felly, so are all beings, all gods, all worlds, all organs and all these individual souls affixed to this Self.

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(Brhad. II.v.15)

Bhartrprapañca's explanation of this section is reported as follows in Suresvara's Vārtika.

(4) The student should identify himself with the Indesiruc- tible, the supreme Self, and he should imagine the body as the hub of a wheel, and the whole world beginning with the deities as the spokes centred there, and should become penetrated with this conviction, and should subject it to sustained meditation. One who continually meditates thus attains an identity with the Self from which there is no turning back, as a molten ball of iron becomes one with the fire pervading ii. The meditator disappears as such, and becomes one with the object of his meditation. This 'Wheel of the Absolute' (brahma-cakra) is present in all beings, but because they are not awake to it they are not aware of it. (B.B.V. II.v.68-73)

This explanation is not correct. It contradicts the maxim 'What is a statement of fact should mot be taker as a command'. The whcle theory is constructed on the basis of an example. But the image of the wheel as set forth by Bhartyprapañca can- not be derived from the literal meaning of the upanishadic text, nor is there any injunction in that section of the Upani shad saying 'He should subject it to sustained meditation'. All that the upanishadic text actually says is that everything must be referred to the Self according to the example of hub and felly. Anyone who imagined that there was an injunction here would be guilty of putting forward what the Veda does not teach and contradicting what it does teach. Even in the course of this very topic in the Upanishad any distinction of inner and outer, or cause and effect, is denied in the words, 'This Absolute is without a "before" (cause) or an "after" (effect), without anything inside it or outside it in space. This Self, the Witness of all from within, is the Absolute' (Brhad. II.v.19). Vision of any kind of distinction has already been denounced in the text 'He who meditates on a deity as "I am one and he is another" does not have true knowledgc' (Brhad. I.iv.10). And the view that the Absolute can be the object of an act of meditation is denied in the text 'Not this which people here worship' (Kena I.5). The text 'It is seen by those of subtle vision through the sharpest tip of their minds' (Katha I.iii.12) inculcates vision of the Self, not meditation on it. Its meaning is that the Absolute can only be known by a purified mind. Or this text may also be taken to mean that there was awareness of the Self before connection with the not-self arose. So the notion of a wheel, introduced by Bhartrprapañca here to substantiate his metaphysical views about a whole articulated into parts, is unwarranted. It was therefore refuted on these lines by Suresvara in his Vārtika (B.B.V. II.v.74-89).

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From this we conclude thut for Bhartrprapanca 'sustained medi- tation' (nididhyasana) was a certain form of meditation (laid down in a Vedic injunction). We have seen at M.V.56 what it was for the revered Commentator. What it meant for Suresvara will be shown below at its proper place, M. V. 125.

87 THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERATION THROUGH A COMBINATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND RITUAL

Like other proponents of the doctrine that knowledge of the Absolute rested on an injunction, Bhartrprapanca identified the word 'knowledge' in this context with meditation, and held that a combination of meditation and ritual was the means to libera- tion. Accordingly we find his doctrine that ritualistic acti- vity was included in the means to liberation refuted here and there by Śri Śankara and Suresvara. Thus at Brhadāraņyaka Upanishad I.iv.15 we find the following.

(1) This very principle is Brahminhood, Kshatriyahood, Vaishya- hood and Shudrahood. He became a Brahmin as Agni (fire) amongst the gods. He is (especially) the Brahmin amongst men. He becomes the Kshatriya through the divine power of Kshatriya- hood, the Vaishya through the divine power of Vaishyahood,the Shudra through the divine power of Shudrahood. Therefore people desire a place amongst the gods as Agni and a place amongst men as a Brahmin. For the Absolute was pre-eminently present in these two forms. If anyone departs from this world without having seen his destination, the Self, then the Self, being unknown, does not protect him, even as the Vedas do not protect one who does not recile and know them, any more than unperformed ritual protects the one who does not perform it. Even if one who does not know the Self performs many holy deeds, that merit is finally exhausted. One should meditate on the Self alone as one's true realm (loka). He who meditates on the Self alone as his true realm finds that his merit is not exhausted. What he desires he is able to create, through the power of this Self. (Brhad.I.iv.15)

Bhartrprapanca introduces this passage as follows.

(2) Well, action, at any rate, cannot be the cause of libera- tion. For if it were, liberation would be impermanent. Nor can the gods. For they are in charge of action, and restrict a person to that realm. Self if he abandon the gods. Nor can a person attain vision of the Nor can one realize the Self without actually seeing the Self. Obedience to the commands of the gods, implying action and sacrifice, would actually be in contradiction with knowledge of the Absolute. So libera- tion cannot come either from a combination of knowledge and action or from either of them taken separately. Nor can one

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abandon action before. one has fulfilled the three debts (to men, gods and the ancestors). And so, to repeat, one ends up at the position that liberation is unattainable either by ac- tion alone, or by knowledge alone, or by a combination of the two. It is to combat this conclusion that the next section of the Upanishad is introduced. Realization of identity in difference is attainable through a combination of knowledge and action in the form of meditation on Hiranyagarbha allied to pcrformance of the obligatory daily ritual. That state is impermanent from the very fact of its including duality. But the state beyond distinctions, which is unmanifest, and which is in fact the state of realization of the supreme Self, is indestructible. This being so, one who meditates on Hiranyagarbha reaches an impermanent realm (loka). But if anyone attains that (supe- rior) unmanifest state and meditates upon it, then his very Self becomes action and his action is never exhausted. Thus in his case action (all ritualistic duty) is fulfilled, and there is knowledge in the form of meditation on the Absolute. The first stage of the discipline is a combination of meditation on Hiranyagarbha with meritorious action. The second is a combi- nation of meditation on the Absolute in its manifest form as Hiranyagarbha with meditation on the Absolute in its unmanifest form. (B.B.V. I.iv.1692-1709)

Here the doctrine of Bhartrprapañca is refuted by the revered Commontator as follows.

(3) Here some (i.e. Bhartrprapañca) say that people make ob- lations into the sacred fire and offerings of charity to Brah- mins hoping to realize the supreme Self as their world. But this is wrong. We know this for two reasons. First, the dis- tinction into four castes is mentioned (not in any direct con- nection with the goal of realizing one's own Self but) to establish rights and duties in relation to ritual within the realm of Ignorance. And secondly, a specification is intro- duced a little later in the texts which shows that Bhartr- prapanca's view that those offering oblations did so for a world that was their own Self must be wrong. (For if in the context of the present teaching the term 'world' had meant 'the supreme Self', the specification 'his own Self' in the later phrase 'If anyone depart without having realized his own Self as his world' would have been meaningless. But if it be taken that the world for the sake of which one makes oblations and offers prayers is a world other than one's own Self and dependent on Agni, then the introduction of the specification 'his own Self' in the later part of the text will be meaning- ful; its purpose will be to specify that the world now being spoken of in the later part of the text is not any world other than one's own Self) .. Then there is the view (cp. M.V.87,2) that the action of ..

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the enlightened man is never exhausted because it is always accompanied by meditation (on the Absolute) .... This is a charming conception, but not that of the Veda. For it is the supreme Self, the main subject of the section, that the text refers to under the phrase 'His own realm'. (There is no ref- erence to any form of the realm of action.) The text first refers to the Self as 'one's own realm'; then it drops the words 'one's own' and introduces the term 'the Self', and again refers to 'the Self alone' in the sentence 'One shouid meditate on the realm of the Self' ... In that context, there is no occasion for introducing the idea of a reaim permeated by action. Moreover, a later text specifically points out that the topic is the supreme Self, pertaining solely to knowledge and not to action, in the words 'What have we to do with progeny, we whose realm (loka) is the Self?' (Brhad. IV.iv.22) The phrase (that follows) 'this Self is our realm' shows that their realm is different from the realm attained through sons, rituals and symbolic meditations. Witness also such texts as 'His realm (loka) is not diminished by action' (Kauşitaki III.1) and 'This is his highest realm (loka)' (Brhad. IV.iii.32). These texts should be taken as constituting one single affirmation, along with their various specifications. Here we have the specification 'his own realm, the Self' .. The use of the term 'Self' in the phrase 'From his very Self he (who meditates on the Self alone as his realm) creates whatever he desires' (Brhad.I.iv.15) is only appropriate where the meditator has realized his identity with the supreme Self. The meaning is, 'He procures it from himself, from the realm of the Self that is the topic under discussion'. Otherwise, the text would have made a specification and said that he ob- tained it from the (as yet) unmanifest world constituted by the future rewards for ritual, showing that the source from which he obtained his desires was neither the realm of the highest Self, the topic under discussion, nor any manifest source. Indeed, the Self has been made the topic of the pres- ent teaching (in the phrase 'If anyone depart without having realized the Self as his realm', ibid.). And it has been fur- ther specified (in the phrase 'He should meditate on the Self alone as his realm', ibid.). In these circumstances, the reference cannot be to an 'intermediary realm, neither the higher Self nor the lower Self' (as Bhartrprapañca supposes). For this is not taught (here or anywhere else) in the Veda. (Brhad.Bh. I.iv.15)

88 RISING ABOVE THE DIVINE WEALTH

It is clear that Bhartrprapañca would not accept total renun- ciation of action as a means to liberation, .simply because he accepted a combination of action with knowledge as the means.

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Accordingly we find the following in Śri Śankara's Brhad- āraņyaka Commentary.

(1) But there are some who would connect even the enlightened person with desire. (Brhad.Bh.II.iv.1)

(2) Some say it is impossible to rise above the divine wealth! For they say that one could only rise above it in dependence on it. (Brhad. Bh.III.v.l)

*(The Divine Wealth (daiva vitta), in this context, is the ct- tainment of the realm of the gods, especially the realm of iliraryagarbha, through rituals associated with prescribed Vedic meditations on elements in the ritual. Cp. Brhad. Bh. III. v. 1, intro., trans. Madhavananda p.481. T.N.)

(3) Perhaps the opponent will say that, because the present Upanishad is concerned with knowledge of the Self, this text apparently implying withdrawal from action is not an injunction but a mere explanatory passage (artha-vada, not authoritative because it might be rhetorical) .... There are rules in the Veda and Smrti for houseless monks about attending upon the Guru, daily repetition of prescribed Vedic texts, regulations about eating, rinsing the mouth and so forth. And since the wearing of the sacred thread is laid down as part of such cere- monies as honouring the Guru, one cannot suppose that there is any intention to teach the abandonment of the sacred thread. It is true that rising above desires is apparently ordained in the present passage. But it is only rising above the three desires for a son, for wealth and for a high realm (loka) in the after-life. It does not imply rising above all action and above all resort to the instruments of action. If all action and ritual were to be abandoned, then one would be imagining something never taught in the Veda and failing to perform what is laid down in the Veda, such as the wearing of the sacred thread and so on. Thus one would be causing the non-performance of what is laid down and the performance of what is forbidden, which would be a great sin. So the abandonment of the sacred thread and other emblems is a false tradition, a case of the blind leading the blind. (Brhad.Bh.III.v.1)

And we may surmise that it is the same commentator whose views against renunciation are being examined in other passages, too, such as the one beginning:

(4) But those who (wrongly) imagine that the knower of the Ab- solute has to perform action to guard against obstacles arising from the sin of omission ... (Brhad.Bh.IV.iv.6)

These are the people who only accept that (limited) form of renunciation found in the 'three-staff' tradition. Of them the

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revered Commentetor wrote:

(5) That (supreme) form of houseless mendicancy which is characterized by rising above all desires is an auxiliary to knowledge cf the Self, as it consists in giving up desire, and desire is opposed to knowledge of the Self and pertains to the realm of metaphysical Ignorance. But there is another (lower) form of houseless mendicancy which consists in the adoption of a certain regulated mode of life, and is a means to the attain- ment of the World of Erahma and other spiritually desirable ends. In this sphere, there are Vedic injunctions about wear- ing the sacred thread and carrying other emblems. (Brhad.Bh. III.v.l)

(6) Verily, there are three realms - the realm of men, the realm of the ancestors and the realm of the gods. This realm of men is won by begetting a son alone and by no other act. The realm of the ancestors is won by ritual, the realm of the gods by meditation. The realm of the gods is the best realm. Therefore they praise meditation. (Brhad. Up.I.v.16)

Introducing this passage, Bhartrprapafica said:

(7) It has been said earlier, 'That, verily, which is the year is Prajapati, having sixteen equal parts. He who knows Prajapati thus becomes Prajapati'. It might be claimed that one reaches the state of Prajapati by this knowledge alone, and not by begetting a son and performing ritual, or by the sacrifice with its five factors (wife, son, meditation, wealth, physical performance of the ritual). It is to refute this idea and to state the true view, which is that a combination of begetting a son, creation of wealth and performance of medi- tation is required for realization that one is the Self of all, that the Upanishad goes on to say 'Verily, there are three realms .. Here one might raise a doubt. There cannot be a combination for a single end between things that effect their own ends in- dependently. One does not combine cotton threads with fra- grant grasses to produce a cloth. And if the three activities of begetting a son and the rest were mutually dependent, they would really constitute facets of one activity, namely ritual, and would not be a genuine combination of. three different activities. Since a combination is thus impossible, should we not conclude that all three realms are obtained by meditation alone, as through this one obtains a sense of one's identity with all? But this is not right, as the mode of causation is differ- ent in the three cases. Begetting a son and so on are each mentioned as having a different result. When the text says 'This realm of men is won by getting a son alone' it denies that there can be resort to any other means for this end.

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Perhaps you will say that this is contradicted by such a text as 'One conquers this realm (of men) through performance of the Jyotistoma sacrifice'. But this is wrong, as that text is concerned with something different. One cannot conquer (attain to) the realm of men in any other way except by beget- ting a son. But is this not contradicted by the words 'One conquers this realm of men by means of the Jyotistoma sacri . fice'? No. The text about begetting a son speaks of conquer- ing this realm in the sense of attaining to it. The text about ihe Jyotistoma sacrifice speaks about conquering this realm (this world) in the sense of rising above it. (B.B.V. I.v.218- 38)

Thus Phartrprapamca here expounds a discipline for rising abrve the three realms of men, the ancestors and the gods, through successively combining knowledge with begetting a son, ritual and meditation. It is perhaps worth drawing attention to two other doctrines, me a combination of action with knowledge, that are mentioned and refuted in Śri Śankara's Brhadāranyaks Commentary, ard which appear to have been maintained by some other commentator, as they do not agree with Bhartrprapañca's version of the doc- trine. He describes the first view as follows. 'Some hold that all ritual leads to the cessation of bondage. As one is liberated successively from each 'death', meaning from each new body, so one attains a new one, not for the sake of attaining it but for the sake of getting rid of it. Thus until duality is finally destroyed, all (as the Upanishad says) is death. But when duality is finally destroyed, then one is truly re- leased from the prospect of undergoing further death. Before that, one can caly speak of liberation in a relative or second- ary sense (Brhad.Bh. III.ii.1, intro.). In describing the second, he refers to what is said by 'Some who teach how disinterested ritual perforwed to the accompani- ment of prescribed meditations has different effects (from ritual not accompanied by meditation), as poison and curds have different effects when taken to the accompaniment of mantras and sugar respectively ... ' (Brhad.Bh. III.iii.1, intro.). The final truth about whose views are represented in these texts must be left to the further investigations of experts in his- torical criticism and textual analysis.

CHAPTER VI MAŅDANA

89 THE NEED FOR EXAMINING THE POSITIONS OF THE VARIOUS INTERPRETERS

We now take up the study of the different positions adopted by the interpreters of Śri Sankara's commentaries. A very generai indication has already been given at the beginning of the book of the way in which the positions of the interpreters conflict with one another and also with Śri Sankara's Brahma Sutra Com- mentary. The idea was to show that everywhere there were clear differences of method to be found. It should not be supposed that my aim is to show that the various interpretations are of no help whatever for understanding the meaning of Śri Sankara's Commentary. The interpreters have brought out many points in the Commentary that are there only hinted at and would not easily havc been understood by the less gifted students. The introduction by the interpretative works of topics not con- sidered in the Commentary alsc helps to clarify the mind of the student, as is generally admitted. Nevertheless, the interpretations do here and there appear to depart from the path accepted in the Commentary as the right method. Sometimes they even seem to espouse a contradictory method, and sometimes the different schools accept assumptions which put them at odds one with another. Where this appears , to be so, one has to examine the context in each case, to see clearly whether the works are really at one or not. In this respect, there are many border-line cases. Hence the need for a detailed examination of the position of each of the main interpretative works.

90 THE PRE-EMINENCE OF SURESVARA AMONG THE INTERPRETERS

The first position that should be examined is that of Śri

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Suresvara Ācārya, definitely known to have been a direct pupil of Bhagavatpada Sankara. It was he who, with a view to protect the tradition of Śri Bhagavatpada, refuted all the previous methods of interpretation of the Vedanta in the introductory Sambandha Vārtika portion of his Brhadāraņyaka Bhāşya Vārtika, on the basis of Vedic revelation, reason and his own direct experience. On this account. all students are greatly in his debt. And then he went on to complete the Vartika on Śri Sankara's actual Brhadaranyake Commentary, a work that is equal in rank with the famous Vartika written by Kumārila Bhatta on the Purva Mimamsa Commentary of Sabara.

91 WHY THE POSITION OF MANDANA HAS TO BE EXAMINED FIRST

Before entering on an examination of the system expounded in Suresvara's Vartika, it is necessary to begin first with an examination of the system of the Brahma Siddhi (of Mandana),* to heip the reader in his approach. Sometimes the lines of argumest found in the Brahma Siddhi are followed in Suresvara's Värtika just as they stand; sometimes the actual words, phrases and arguments are reproduced. Two questions, in particuiar, arise here. Do the two authors follow one method of interpre- tation, or are their methods different? If the two methods are different, then which of them is it that borrows the words and arguments of the other to support his own method, and why does he do so? Some say that Mandana Misra, pupil of Bhatta Kumarila and author of the Brabma Siddhi, was defeated in a public debate by Śri Śankara Bhegavatpada and became the latter's pupil, taking the order of a renunciate under the name of Suresvara- carya. Others say that it was another person called Visvarūpa who was defeated by the revered Äcārya in debate and later be- came Suresvarācarya. We shall leave this contentious problem alone here, as it is the province of historians. But we may observe that it does not appear easy to accept the identity of Mandana and Suresvara, given the differences in literary style and philocophic method in the books attributed to them. The style of the Brahma Siddhi, which is in mixed prose and verse, appears to be more literary than that' of the Naişkarmya Siddhi of Suresvara, also in mixed prose and verse. In regard to philosophic method, an examination of the means that they ad- vocate for the realization of the non-dual Self will strongly suggest difference. Whether it should finally be ascertained that Suresvarācārya originally was Mandana after all, or whether it should turn out that they were different people and it had to be assumed that the Naişkarmya Siddhi and the Vartika were composed by the same person, who came after the author of the Brahma Siddhi in time, in either case the main points in Mandana's doctrine

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that were in contradiction with that of Bhagavaipada ought to have been refuted by Suresvaracarya. But they are nct. If, to explain this, we assume that the Brahma Siddhi must have been composed after the Vartika of Suresvara, then, in turn, it be- comes difficult to explain why Mandana does not bestcw even a glance on the peculiar doctrines of the Vartika, and the whoie problem is complicated, from whichever side it is approached, and we must turn it over to the hands of the philologists and experts in literary history. Here we shall accept the tradi- tiomal view that Mandana wrote before Suresvaracarva, and pro- ceed to examine his position now. A symnathetic student will surely understand that this ig the right course for the pur- poses of the present work.

*(References to the Brahma Siddhi are given here by pages to Kuppuswami's edition, the only one extant. Besides the com- plete French translation by M. Biardeau, there is also an able and fairly full summary in English in Potter, 1981, made as a special instalment of the work, by Allen W. Thrasher. Both these works have page-references to the Sanskrit text. See Bibliography under Biardeau and Potter. T.N.)

92 THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICAL IGNORANCE IN MANDANA'S SYSTEM

It appears that the Brahma Siddhi was composed in order to show that the Absolute could only be known through the Upani- shads. But Mandanacarya's view was that knowledge of the Ab- solute consisted in immediate vision arising from meditation on the (merely abstract) knowledge arising from the uparishadic texts. This will be examined further below (at M.V.100). The nature of the Absolute is defined in the opening bene- dictory verse of the Brahma Siddhi. It runs: 'We offer rever- ence to Prajapati, who is bliss, one, deathless, birthless, immuteble, who is all and yet who transcends all, beyond fear'. An examination of the nature of metaphysical Ignorance is undertaken to show that it is through metaphysical Ignorance that the Absolute, which is really of the nature described above, appears to assume the form of an individual soul. Mandana nowhere gives a clear definition of Ignorance as such. He does, however, in several places (B.Sid. p.9,20,32,33, 122) speak of two forms of metaphysical Ignorance, respectively non-perception and wrong perception. But for Mandana Igncrance more particularly means positive error. This emerges, for in- stance, from the passage: 'Non-apprehension, being a non- entity, cannot be the cause of anything. It cannot be the cause of erroneous vision, or it would cause it in coma and dreamless sleep. What then is the cause of erroneous vision? Not non-perception, but, as we have already said, beginning- less, purposeless Ignorance. It is useless to ask for a cause

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of beginningless Ignorance. Because erroneous vision and the impressions it leaves act on each other mutually as cause and effect our theory cen stand' (B.Sid. p.33). (That is to say; erroneous vision leaves impressions which in turn beget new erroneous visions which in turn beget new impressions and so

lessly.) on: one mey imagine the series of causes stretching back end-

Bhagavatpada Śankara declared in the introduction to his Brahma Sutre Commentary that metaphysical Ignorance was of the nature of a superimposition of Self on not-seif, the real on the unreal, and vice versa. And he explained the matter fur- ther in his Gita and Brhadareryaka commentaries. Why the euthor of the Brahza Siddhi did not even bestow a glance on these passages is not clear. It seems impossible that Ācārya Mandana had never heard of the view that Ignorance is essen- tially superimpositicn. For elsewhere he himself wrote, 'It is only scmething existent that, when not manifesting in its true form, can manifest in a superimposed form that does not truly exist. How could there be superimpostion on the empty Void (thet total non-existence of anything declared by the Madhyam- ika Buddhists to be the final truth)? What could there be to manifest? There would be nothing to be a cause of anything' (B.Sid. p.20).

93 THE INDETERMINABILITY OF METAPHYSICAL IGNORANCE

On the question 'Is metaphysical Ignorance real or unreal?' The author of the Brahma Siddhi expresses himself as follows:

(1) Ignorance is not the true nature of the Absolute, nor is it anything different. It is not totally unreal, nor yet real. That is precisely why it is spoken of as 'Ignorance', 'the power of illusion' (maya) and 'wrong knowledge'. If it had been the true nature of anything, then, whether it had been different or non-different from that thing, it would have been perfectly real and so would not have been Ignorance. If it had been totally unreal, it would have been like a flower ap- pearing to bloom in the sky, and could not have entered into experience. So it is indeterminable (as either real or un- real) .... Very well, says the objector, let us admit that the form that manifests is not real. But the fact of manifestation is certainly real, and that is what is called Ignorance. But the objector's argument is unsound. If the form that manifests is not real, the manifestation cannot be made out to be real either. It would be a mere false appearance. Even the notion that the unreal entity was undergoing manifestation would it- self be an error. So Ignorance is not real, although it is not unreal either. It is for this very reason that it can

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come to an end, for its nature is unstable. It is a mere illu- sory appearance. Otherwise, if it had a fixed nature, how could anything so firmly established suffer any change? What has a fixed nature cannot be destroyed. And if its true nature were to be an empty void, it would automatically be non- existent. And so (on our theory of the nature of Ignorance) there is nothing to infringe non-duality, nor are we left with- out anything requiring to be brought to a halt (which would have rendered the highest teachings of the Upanishads redun- dant). (B.Sid. p.9 f.)

On this we would comment as follows. If the Absolute is taken as real, it is not clear how anyone could arrive at the con- viction that there was something else outside it labelled un- rcal. All reference to real and unreal occurs within the realm of Ignorance only. Of the ultimate reality in itself, cae cannot say either that it is real or that it is unreal. This is the settled conclusion, pointed out at Gita XIII.12. That is why, since the final metaphysical principle is without distinctions, it is communicated in the Upanishads only by ne- gating what is foreign to it. So the teaching 'This wetaphy- sical Ignorance is indeterminable either as real or as unreal' is not correct. Nor does the teaching 'This Ignorance is also called "the power of illusior" (maya) and "false appearance"' agree with the right method of interpretation in the Vedanta. The author himself says, 'Ignorance is superimposition, it is erroneous vision'. But the cosmic power of illusion (māya) is Nature (prakti), the seed of name and form, superimposed through Ignorance. The Veda says, 'One should know that Nature (pra- krti) is Māyā' (Śvet. IV.10). In its manifest form, Maya is, to speak from the standpoint of empirical experience, indeter- minable as identical with or different from the supreme Self (B.S.Bh. II.1.14). If it were identical with the Self, it would be indestructible by nature and couid never be brought to a halt. If it were different, it would be an independent reality and could not have been imagined through Ignorance. From the standpoint of the highest truth, however, name and form are non-different from the supreme Self, so non-duality is not infringed. Śankara here. One must accept the view of Bhagavatpada He wrote: 'But when name and form are examined from the highest standpoint by the followers of the Upani- shads to see whether they are or are not anything other than the supreme Self, then it is found that they do not truly exist as separate entities, any more than modifications of clay and other substances exist as entities separate from the substances from which they are made, as is the case with all modifications like foam arising from water or pots coming from clay. And it is on this basis that one can see how texts like 'One only, without a second' (Chand.VI.ii.1) and 'There is no plurality here' (Katha II.1.11) apply to vision of the highest

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reality (Brhad.Bh. III.v.l)

94 THE SEAT OF IGNORANCE

You may ask, 'What is the seat of Ignorance?' To this the Brahma Siddhi replies as follows:

(1) As for the question, 'To whom does Ignorance belong? - we reply, 'It belongs to the individual souls'. You will say: But are not the individual souls identical with the Absolute? That is why it says in the Veda, 'This deity thought "Let me enter into these three deities (great elements) as this living soul" ... ' (Chand.VI.iii.2). We reply: Yes, this is so from the standpoint of the highest truth. But the souls are falsely imagined as different. You may say: But whose false imagination is it that intro- duces differences? It cannot be the false imagination of the Absolute. For the Absolute is of the nature of knowledge, and hence free from false imagination. Nor can it be the false imagination of the individual souls. For they depend on false imagination for their existence. The argument would be circu- lar. The distinction required to form an individual soul would depend on false imagination, while false imagination would be supposed to have its seat in the individual soul! In answer to this difficulty some say: This would only be a problem in the case of a demonstrable reality. What cannot be established as a reality cannot produce something else that is a reality. But it is not a problem for what is merely an illusion (maya). Nothing is impossible for the power of illu- sion. An illusion (maya) is something inexplicable. If it had been something explicable, there would have been a reality and not an illusion. Others explain the matter differently. They say, 'Ignorance and the individual soul are both beginningless like the seed" and sprout. So the question of circular argument does not arise'. And those who claim that Ignorance is (a power, sakti, and) the material cause of all distinctions say, 'Ignorance is beginningless and purposeless'. On this latter view, the fault of circular argument does not arise, as Ignorance is described as beginningless. And as it is described as purposeless, there is no occasion to raise difficulties about the purpose of the creation of the universe with its distinctions. (B.Sid. p.l0)

When it is here said that Ignorance belongs to the individual souls, that is correct, as it agrees with experience. However, Mandana goes on to raise the objection 'To whom does the false imagination which produces difference belong?', and to object further that if the answer 'It belongs to the individual souls' were given this would imply circular argument. Both these ob- jections, and also the attempted answer, should be ignored

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as mere logic-chopping based on unproved hypotheses. For the real existence either of false imagination itcolf er of the distinction of the Absolute into individual souls has not been proved. yence it is impossible to accept sequence in time and say either that distinction into souls, itself based on false imaginaticn, occurs first, while the false imaginations occur- ring to the souls come afterwards, or that the false imagina- tions occurring to the souls come first. In the absence of ary proof of the real existence of imagination or of distinc- tion into souls or of time, the whole objection can never be raised. For metaphysical Ignorance is the prior condition for all empirical =xperience. And all empiricel experience occurs through Ignorance alone, including experience of Ignorance (M.V.29)! Sc what objection is there to be raised, and on hat grounds? This also refutes the suggestion that metaphysical Ignorance and the individual soul should both be regarded as beginning- less in the same sense that the succession of seed and sprout is beginningless. For it is not admitted that the soul and its Ignorance are under the jurisdiction of time, as the seed and sprout are. So one should uot raise an objection of this kind about the seat of Ignorance. If one admits the non-dual prin- ciple as the final reality there is no place for any objecticns. One cannot impute even a trace of Ignorance or of any other defect to the non-dual reality. For the Veda says, 'What could a person see then, and with what?' (Brhad. II.iv.14) In empiri- cal experience, on the other hand, wherever and in whatever way Ignorance is experienced, it must be accepted there in that way. There are no objections to be raised or answered. This is illustrated in the following way in ŚrI Sankara's Brahme Sutra Commentary. '"To whom does this Ignorance belong?" we reply, "To you who ask this question". If you then ask, "But does not the Veda say that I am the Lord?" we reply, "If you are awake to this (you will see that) there is no Ignorance for anybody"' (B.S.Bh. IV.i.3). A aimilar idea is found in the Gita Commentary (XIII.2). 'Here the question is raised, "Whose is this Ignorance?" We reply, "It beiongs to him to whom it ap- pears to belong" .... "But does not Ignorance belong to me?" "If you really know that, then you know both Ignorance and the Self to whom it belongs"'. And there are other similar pas- sages.

95 THE CESSATION OF NATURAL IGNORANCE

One might raise an objection in the following form. Ignorance though natural, could be brought to an end by the advent of some differeni (and contradictory) idea. But he who holds that all is one as the Self cannot admit the advent of any new factor. So how could Ignorance, on his theory, come to an end? The Brahma Siddhi raises this question (quoting Kumārila,

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Ś.V. Sambandnākșepa Parihāra 85-6) and then continues:

(1) It is the individual sculs, as we have said, who are af- flicted by the impurity of Ignorance, not the Absolute. The Absolute is eternal, pure and constant light. It cannot accept any new adventitious factor. If it could, then not even the Ignorance of one who had attained to the Absolute would come to an end. This would render liberation impossible. Or if you maintsined that it was the Absolute which underwent transmigra- tion and the Absolute which was liberated, then, when one per- son was libcrated, all would be liberated - which is absurd .... Therefore it is the individual souls who undergo transmi.gration through Ignorance, and the individual souls who are liberated. And, though afflicted by the impurity of natural Ignorance, their Ignorance can very well be brought to an end through the advent of some contradictory factor called knowledge. For metaphysical knowledge is not natural to the individual soul; it is metaphysical Ignorance that is natural. And the metaphy- sical Ignorance of the individual soul can be dissolved by metaphysical knowledge, the latter being adventitious (from the standpoint of the ignorant soul). And though the individual souls are not anything other than the Absolute, the fact that some are bound and others liberated is explained on the analogy of the reflection and its original ... (where reflections may come and go with the coming or going of the reflecting media, without the fate of one reflection affecting any of the others or the original, B.Sid. p.12). Knowledge, verily, is the cessation of Ignorance, if Igno- rance be taken as non-apprehension. For it is the existence of something (i.e. of knowledge) which is, precisely, the cessa- tion of its non-existence (i.e. the cessation of non- apprehension). But what if ignorance be taken as positive er- roneous cognition? Even so, it would be the rise of the knowl- edge of truth that would bring Ignorance to an end, as it would contradict and cancel it. The cessation of the idea of silver erroneously perceived in a shell simply consists in the rise of the knowledge of the shell. The cessation of the silver-idea is not a goal that has to be achieved through the rise of the knowledge of the shell or through further effort of any kind. For the rise of knowledge of the shell and the cessation of the idea of silver are simultaneous and do not depend on any fur- ther activity. (B.Sid. p.121-2)

Here Mandana says that it is only the individual souls who are afflicted with the impurity of Ignorance, not the Absolute. If by this he mears that in ordinary experience the individual soul is only a false appearance of the supreme Self, and that the Ignorance and other defects of the imaginary individual soul can no more be found in the supreme Self, which is eter- nal, pure, conscious and liberated by nature, than the impuri- ties of the reflected images of the sun can be found in the

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true sun - then we say 'Yes'. For it agrees with the words of Śri Sankara's Brabma Sutre Commentary, as in the following cases. 'One should understand that the individual soul stands to the supreme Self as the little image of the sun reflected in water stards tc the real sun. The individual soul (as such) is not identical with the Self. Yet it is not a separate en- tity either: (B.S.Bh. II.1ii.50, cp. M.V.144, 7; 244,6) and 'The reflection of the sun in water expands and contracts with the motion of the water, mcves when the water moves, muliiplies when the water is divided. Thus it conforms to the condition of the water. But these chenges do not affect the real sun' (B.S.Bh.III.ii.20, cp. M.V.244, 8, note). But when Mandana goes on to insist that whereas the Absolute is evcr free from transmigration, Igncrance and transmigration beiong to the individual soul alone - that is not correct. For evem in the state of transmigration the individual soul is nct anything other than the Absolute. The false notion of being an individual soul is superimpossd on nothing other than the Absolute. For it is impossible to suppose that any experience, including that of Igmorance, could occur anywhere else except in the Absolute. Thus we have the following text in the Brhad- aranyaka Commentary. 'If the supreme Self is without suffering and there is no sufferer other than it, would not that mean that the whole initiative of the Veda to remove pain was use- less? No, for its purpose is to remove the erroneous notion, superimposed through Ignorance, that one is a sufferer. It is like removing the error of the rustic who forgot to count him- self when counting up the number (cp. M.V.59, intro .; 59,14). And we admit the existence of an imaginary seif undergoing suffering' (Brhad.Bh. I.iv.7). Mandana alsc says, 'If it were the Absolute alone that un- derwent transmigration and achieved liberation, then, when one persor was liberated, all would be liberated' (B.Sid. p.12). That is not sound either. For in truth reither the Absolute nor the individual soul undergoes either transmigration or liberation. Mandana himself admits the point when he says, 'Transmigration and liberation from it belong to the realm of the imaginary only. They do not exist in the supreme principle from the standpoint of the highest truth' (B.Sid. p.15). Per- haps it will be said, 'Well, transmigration and liberation do pertain to me as imaginary individual soul, just as dark hue and the like may pertain to the reflected image (without af- fecting the original). Our opponent is trying to make out that they pertain to the Absolute, and that is a very different position'. Oh, what a short memory! Is not the whole notion of being an individual soul just a way of imagining the Abso- lute? No other reality except the Absolute exists that could stand as the substratum of the false imagination that one was an individual soul and so on. It follows inexorably that, while a thing can only be imagined to be the substratum of Ignorance, it is only the Absolute that can be so imagined.

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Thus we find in Śri Sankara's Brhadāranyaka Commentary: 'We have the text "Then the Absolute knew itself alone (as "I am the Absolute"): through that it became the all" (Brhad. I.iv.10). It is wrcng to suppose that this text shows that the Absolute could not be a spiritual enquirer like us. For (there is noth- ing wrong in supposing that the Absolute could appear to be such from the standpoint of Ignorance, and) this is what we hear irom the Veda. It is not my personal fancy. It is the Vedic teaching' (Brhad.Bh. I.iv.10, cp. M.V.232, 10). Nor would this teaching imply that if one person were liber- ated all would be liberated. For we find at the level of prac- tical experience that only he whose Ignorance comes to an erd is liberated, not anyone else. From the standpoint of the final truth, the Absolute is neither bound nor liberated. How couid cne speak of everyone being literated when there is no plurality in the Absolute? As an expert has put it, 'There is no one bound and there is uo one undergoing spiritual disci- pline. There is no one seeking liberation and no one who has attained liberation' (G.K.II.32). And we have the remark of Śri Śankara in his Brhadāranyaka Commentary (I.iv.10), 'It is true that the Absolute is neither the author of Ignorance nor the one deluded by it. And yet there is no one (no real being) other than the Absolute who is the author of Ignorance, and there is no conscious being other than the Absolute who is de- luded by it' (cp. M.V.46,5). So we must conclude that when Mandana denied that either Ignorance or bondage and liberation were to be found in the Absolute he was donying an assertion that had not actually been made.

96 DOCTRINE OF THE CANCELLATION OF ILLUSION

In the Section on Command (Niyoga-Kanda) of Mandana's Brahma Siddhi we find the following: 'The proper apprehension of a cognition determined by an object does not guarantee the real- ity of that object. For it is always possible that something may be determined as such-and-such through false superimposi- tion when its nature is really different, as when a sacrificial fire is visualized in heaven, in accordance with the text "O Gautama, that world is verily the sacrificial fire" (Chand. V.iv.10), whereas the sacrificial fire is not really found (read anagni-drsteh) in heaven or in rain or in woman or in the other places mentioned in this text' (B.Sid. p.136). In this context, the exponent of the doctrine that the au- thority of the Veda lies solely in its commands (the Mimāmsaka Prabhäkara) rejects the doctrine that a thing can be misper- ceived as other than it is. In the case of the error whereby shell is taken as silver, he does not accept that the shell is perceived as silver; he holds that there is just a memory of silver (not recognized as a memory). When those who are unable

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to distinguish between a perception and a memory fail to do so, there is failure to perceive a distinction accompanied by the conviction that one is perceiving non-difference. This theory is wrong, because it fails to explain uow the one who desires silver may (under illusion) direct his activity towards shell (since error, on this analysis, is a non- apprehension, a mere negaticn, incapable of causing or explain- ing anything - B.Sid. p.137, cp. M.V.115, 1 and 2). It is also wrong because it would prevent expianatiou of the canceilation and correction of an erroneous cognition (in that it is only a positive misapprehension that can be caucelled and corrected - B.Sid. p.142). Further, if the failure-to-perceive-a-distinc- tion theory of error (the akbyati-vada attributed to Prabhakara) were applied universaily, it would also be impossible to ac- count for the two aspects of Ignorance, the dissclution of dreamlcss sleep and the false projection of dream and waking (B.Sid. p.149-50). And so, ssys the author of the Brahma Sid - dhi, we have to accept the theory that error is positive mis- conception (viparita-khyati). On this we may make the following observations. The same author, Mandana Misra, also refutes three thecries of error in his Vibhrama Viveka. (They are, the theory that what appears as external to consciousness is really immanent within it (atmakhyati), the theory that the error is a sheer appearance having no objective basis (asat-khyati), and the theory that error arises from failure to perceive a distinction between a memory and a perception - akhyati.) He then establishes the theory that error consists in positive misconception (viparita- khyāti). Bhagavatpāda Śankara, too, when referring to super- imposition as wrong knowledge says, 'But in all these views the common point is that one thing appears with the attributes of another', thereby establishing that uperimposition as he defined it is accepted in all schools. Thus both Acāryas (Mandana and Sankara) appear at first sight to agree that error consists in positive misconception. But Ācārya Mandana does not bring out how the exponent of the theory that error arises from the failure to perceive a dis- tinction accepts positive misconception against his own will when he speaks of the failure to perceive a distinction accom- panied by the conviction (positive!) that one is perceiving non-difference (read abheda-grahanabhimana), so that the op- ponent contradicts his own position; the revered Ācārya Śankara, on the other hand, does bring out this contradiction (as he says that the common point in all the theories of error is that one thing appears with the attributes of another). And again, Mandana did not attain to that direct experience of the Self in the light of which ŚrI Śankara was able to affirm the total absence of transmigratory experience in the Self. Śri Śankara draws attention to the total absence of silver in the shell in the words, 'One merely imagines silver, although no silver is present in fact' (B.S.Bh.IV.1.5, cp. M.V.46, 10). This

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being the case with the example, he describes the thing to be illustrated by it, the total absence of the universe of plural- ity in the Self, in many passages - witness, for instance, 'As there are no distinctions in natural states like dreamless sleep and samadhi ... ' (B.S.Bh. II.1.9) - and also describas clearly the absence of transmigration in the Seif in such texta as 'That form which is directly perceived in dreamless sleep, free from Ignorance, desire and action' (Brhad.Bh. IV.111.22). As for Mandana, he quotes Gaugapada's Karika I.ll correctly when he says, 'Visva (Consciousness associated with the waking state) and Taijase (Consciousness associated with the dream- state) are both accepted as being conditioned as cause (non- perception of the Self) ard as effect (rong perception of the Self). Prajña (Consciousness associated with dreamless sieep) is condiiioned solely as cause. Neither cause nor effect (neither non-perception of the Self nor wrong perception of the Self) are found in Turiya (pure Consciousness as such, tran- scending all states' (B.Sid. p.150, quoting G.K.I.ll, cp. M.V. 23). But his remarks on dreamless sleep contradict the Veda, experience and reason alike in other parts of his work. He says, for instance: 'In dreamiess sleep, only the power of projection ceases. The impressions left from previous projec- tion do not come to an end, and neither does non-perception. Otherwise there would be no difference between dreamless sleep and Turiya. Dreamless sleep is referred to (figuratively) as attainment of the Absolute just because there is no projection' (B.Sid. p.22). This is wrong, because Turiys is simply the Self in its true nature, free from the alternation of states like waking and the rest; it is not an extra state over and above them. Mandana forgot this point in the traditional teaching. Nor did he take into account the following profound point made by Gaudapāda: 'Dream (svapna) is the state of one who perceives wrongly; sleep (nidra) is our word for the state of one who does not know the truth. When the delusion of these two states no longer occurs, one reaches the plane of Turiya' (G.K.I.15, cp. M.V.23).

97 EXPERIENCE THROUGH THE MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

By what means of knowledge do we come to know the Self? The Brahma Siddhi presents an objector's arguments as follows. Not through perception, for perception has for its object distinc- tions, which are the very opposite of the Self. Nct through inference, as inference depends on perception. Not through. comparison, since comparison observes similarity (read sādrsya- vişayatvāt), and similarity depends on difference. Not through common-sense presumption, as this would lead us to difference, the very opposite of the Self, as no experience is possible except on the basis of difference. Indeed, absence of

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difference could not itseif be known without the distinction of knower, knowing and known, which implies difference! Nor could anything that did not exist (here, the non-existence of dif- ference,) be enough to establish a non-existence (such as the non-existence of difference; as a metaphysical truth, (for that would require some positive means of proof). Nor could the various means of knowledge taken together establish the non-existence of the world of plurality, for their own very existence would be incompatibie with the non-existence of plu- rality. Tradition, if cf human origin, could not take us to the Self, as its content could only be what could be known through other means of knowledge. Nor could the superhuman revelation of the Veda do so, as it is confined to injunctions and prohibitions (concerning future duties and sc on) which could not apply to an already existent reality. Nor could revelation be ar independent authority if it bore on existent entities instead of conveyicg injunctions and prohibitions. For it would require to conform to reality, ard this would im- ply dependence on cther means of knowledge. And the passage adds further arguments of this kind (B.Sid. p.22-3). In reply, there is the verse, 'Sages say that the Self is to be known from the Veda, and that it is communicated through the elimi- nation of all distinctions' (B.Sid. verse I.2, p.23). Again, the Section on Dialectic (Tarka Kānda) in the Brahma Siddhi begins by raising the following objection. 'Perception and the other empirical means of cognition yield knowledge of objects that are mutually distinct in nature. Verbal revela- tion, therefore, cannot be an authority for the sole existence of one non-dual principle. For this would conflict with per- ception and the other means of valid empirical knowledge, like the statement "Stones float": (B.Sid. p.39). The answer is given on the basis of two possible suppositions - first on the supposition that if Vedic revelation conflicts with per- ception and the reet of the empirical means of knowledge it is a weaker authority, and secondly on the supposition that the Veda is of equal authority with perception and the rest.

(1) Where there is a contradiction between revelation and the empirical means of knowledge, it is revelation which is more authoritative. 'When contradictory instructions come, one earlier, one later, the earlier one is superseded by the later, just as the instructions for the derivative form of a ritual supersede those of the original form' (P.M.S.VI.v.54), and 'A later contradictory thesis cannot be established without can- celling the earlier (but now contradicted) thesis' (S.V., Codana Sutra 57). Determination of distinct entities arises for everyone through the natural means of empirical knowledge such as perception and the rest. Knowledge of the non-dual principle is something (not natural but) adventitious that oc- curs in the case of a few people only. It is not natural, and depends upon and presupposes the natural means of knowledge

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like perception and the rest. When it arises it cancels em- pirical knowledge, as it cannot arise without doing so. We may be sure of this for the further reason that percention and the other means of empirical knowledge are lialle to various forms of error, whereas Vedic revelation is beyond any possible re- proach. The fallihility that characterizes humans is absent from the Veda precisely because it is not of human origin. For example, it is only through Vedic revelation that it is possible first to suspect and later to become convinced of the begin- ningless impressions of Ignorance that are the cause of error in perception and the other means of empirical knowledge, er- rors like the conviction that one is identical with the body. But Vedic revelation is not of human origin, and is not marked by any defects of this kind. And if it were, it would not be a valid means of knowledge. Ferception and the other means of empirical knowledge are authoritative on the plane of empiri- cal experience. Empirical experience does not contradict it- self because of the fixed and regular character of the impres- sions of Ignorance. Nothing that contradicts experience is authoritative .. But as long as perception and the other means of empirical knowledge agree with experience one cannot accuse them of the fault of contradicting it. They could only be charged with that if they did contradict it. And yet they are in contra- diction with the vision of metaphysical reality that comes from the texts of the Upanishads. We must therefore take them to be under the sway of that beginningless metaphysical Igno- rance that militates against knowledge of reality. In the case of perception and the other means of empirical knowledge, therefore, authoritativeness (within their own sphere) is com- patible with being under the sway of a defect. (B.Sid. p.40)

Here we have an objection, attributed to the opponent as a provisional view, that the Absolute is not an object of per- ception or of any other means of empirical knowledge. And we have a doctrine, proclaimed by Ācārya Mandana as the estab- lished teaching of the school, that the Acsolute can only be realized through Vedic revelation. Both the objection and the view given as the established teaching of the school are cor- rect. For we have a statement in Śri Sankara's Brahma Sūtra Commentary, fully supported by reasoning, which runs as fol- lows. 'All empirical experiences that occur before one has real- ized that one's Self is the Absolute are taken as real, like the experiences of a dream before awakening. .. Ordinary people, when asleep, see beings of high and low degree in dreams. And this knowledge is felt to be genuine perception until awakening, and there is no notion during the dream that only an appearance of perception is in play. It is the same with waking perception before realization of the Self' (B.S. Bh.II.i.14).

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But when Mandana went on to say that, in case uf confiict between the empirical means of knowledge and Vedic revelation, Vedic revelation was the stronger authority because it was not of (fallible) human origin - that was wrong. For the various meens of krowledge (including Vedic revelation) have different spheres of operation, and cannot conflict. Śri Sankars says, 'The various means of knowlcdge, like hearing, each have tbeir separate sphere' (Brhad.Bh. II.1.20). We car admit that if there had been any contradiction between Vedic revelation and the empirical means of knowledge, then Vedic revelation would have bcer a stronger authority, because it is not of fallible human origin. And the knowledge that Vedic revelation produces, be- cause it does not spring from natural (human and failible) sources, can be without defects, while we know from that very revelation that perception and the other empirical means of knowledge may be infected with errors deriving from beginning- less Ignorancc. But this is not the right way to explain the matter, as it is only playing with hypotheses that will never be verified. Indulgence iu such hypotheses may inspire faith in the hearts of Vedic believers: but it cannot demonstrate the necessary superiority of Vedic revelation as an authority in every case. Bhagavatpāda Śakara has shown in the intro- duction to his Brahma Sutra Commentary that all the play of authoritative knowledge and its objects depends on, and is in- variably accompanied by, metaphysical Ignorance, a point which he supports by appeal to universal experience. He says there: 'But in what sense do we mean that perception and the other means of knowledge, together with Vedic tradi- tion, belong to those in the realm of Ignorance? What we say here is this. Without self-identificatior with the body and senses expressed in fcelings of "I" and "mine" there can be no empirical knower and so the processes of empirical knowledge cannot begin' (B.S.Bh. I.i.1, intro.). We have already explained this point above (M.V.24 and 25). It is not clear why Mandana paid no attention to it. The tra- ditional texts dealing with liberation, though associated with Ignorance, are a special case because they are 'the final

28 and 29) .. means of knowledge'. This also has been explained above (M.V.

And when knowledge of non-duality has once arisen from the Veda, the play of perception and the other empirical means of knowledge. They no longer remain at all, so that one cannot then speculate on whether they are a stronger or a weaker authority. For the Veda says, 'When there is an appearance of duality, a subject who is one sees an object which is another ... but when all has become his own Self, then what could a person. see and with what?' (Brhad.IV.v.15)

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98 OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING THE AUTHORITY OF THE VEDA

Ācārya Maņdana summarizes various objections to the authority of the Veda as a means for kuowing the Absolute and then an- swers them. Most of them are also referred to by Suresvara in his Vartika and collectec together for refutation. So we shall only take a few of them up for discussicn here.

(1) (The objection is: The Veda depends on percention and the other means of empirical knowledge to make itself known. Awak- ening to the nou-dual Absolute, by cancelling perception and the other means of empirical knowledge, renders the Veda in- authoritative - Mandana answers: ) Vedic revelation does not depend on perception and the cther means of empirical knowl- edge in order to be an authoritative source of knowledge; it only depends on them to make itself known. Otherwise it would not be a means of knowledge. As it does not depend on any other factor in the performance of its own function, it cannot be undermined by perception and the rest. (B.Sid. p.40)

(2) (Objection:) 'Non-difference cannot be known without the help of difference. Knowledge of it depends on the authorita- tive means of knowlcdge, and the existence of such means of knowledge implies the existence of difference. To say that non-difference can only be known through the medium of differ- ences is a contradiction'. To this Mandana replies, ' ... Knowl- edge implies a means, but not the reality of that means. A reality is sometimes known through an error'. (B.Sid. p.41)

(Mandana supplies an "example to show what he means. A person may mistake a clump of trees, standing in the distance, for an elephant, and then, through surprise at the elephant, be stim -. ulated to gaze harder, so that he perceives the trees, which would otherwise have escaped his attention. T.N.)

(3) (The objection is: The ritualistic injunctions in the Veda imply the existence of difference, the highest teachings of the Upanishads imply non-difference, so these two parts of the Veda contradict one another. Mandana replies:) There would have been a contradiction if the purpose of the ritual- istic injunctions of the Veda had been to teach the existence of difference as a metaphysical fact. But their main purpose is to give help to man by taking difference for granted (ac- cording to common-sense experience based on metaphysical Igno- rance) and then saying 'One may effect such-an-such an end by such-an-such means'. (B.Sid. p.43)

(4) (The opponent's objection (B.Sid. p.74) runs:) The whole Veda is authoritative only in regard to things that have to be done. Its injunctions only inform one about existent entities,

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past, present or future, incidentally in the course of explain- ing what has to be done :... For, as an expert on the ritual- istic section of the Veda has said, 'Injunctions may refer to past, present, future, hidden, remote or remarkable matters' (Sabara's Commentary on P.M.S. I.i.2). But they are not neces- sarily an authoritative means of knowledge for the already- existent, as on that topic they may be no more than restate- ments of what is primarily known from another source. (Mandana replies:) That knowledge which can only come from revelation cannot be enjoined. It arises without an injunc- tion, just like knowledge from the Veda about merii and de- merit (where there may be injunctions to perform certain acts for certain ends, but where there is no injunction to acquire knowledge about them - B.Sid. p.74). Nor need all Vedic statements of fact be dismissed as mere restatements of what is primarily known from another source. For the Absolute can only be known from the texts of the Veda, which are not of human origin, so that it cannot have been previously known through any other means of knowledge (B.Sid. p.79) .... Nor does there have to be an injunction for the acquisition of immediate knowledge of the Absolute. For such knowledge is an end in itself. There is no scope for a scriptural injunction to work for a known human end; one strives for it sponta- neously (B.Sid. p.116) ... (Objection:) But could there not be an injunction to sus- tain through protracted meditation knowledge that had already arisen from the texts? To this objection Mandana replies: Very well, if you wish; there would be no contradiction ... Or, alternatively, it could be maintained that an injunction would be useless here, as the desirable end which it promised would already be attained. Prolonged brooding on something in one's mind may give rise to immediate apprehension of it, and that is a result already attainable in this very life. It is the final goal of life, which implies no further goal beyond. We have already explained how immortality is nothing other than the emergence of one's own true nature. However, it is seen in the world that constant re-affirmation leads to the further clarification of right knowledge. Even a non-existent entity can give rise to an experience if one meditates on it with sufficient intensity, what to say of an entity that ac- tually exists (B.Sid. p.154).

'Here, it was correct to say that the dependence of the text on being perceived was not a defect, as apprehension of reality can arise from erroneous knowledge. And it was correct to say that the texts enjoining rituals do not have the function of proclaiming the reality of difference, but are concerned with teaching the means to desired human ends. For both these points are corroborated by experience. We may also agree with the contention that knowledge of the real, knowledge of the Absolute as our own true Self, can arise from an upanishadic.

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text, even though the latter, in the last analysis, will not be a reality. The revered Commentator has said: 'For we see that results such as death do in fact flow from merely mental causes, such as grief and despair. And we also see that a dream srake-bite and a dream bath in water produce their due results in the dream'(B.S.Bh.II.i.14). And Mandana himself says: 'There is no rule that the unreal can produce no effects. A mere illusion can evoke joy or fear. And (in symbolism) what is not the reality can give knowledge of the reaisty, as in the case of the drawing of a wild ox (to give scmeone a first idea of whar the animal is like), or in the case of the writing of letters (to represent sounds, B.Sid. p.13-4) .* Here the empirical reality of both the symbol and the symbolized is assumed, though, from the standpoint of the ultimate truth, both would be the non-dual reality and nothing else. Mandana himself says: 'Even the means to the vision of non-duality (hearing, pondering, etc .. ) are not unreal in their true na- ture, for their true nature is the Absolute. The means for attaining the Absolute is the Absclute itself, associated with certain forms of Ignorance' (B.Sid. p.14). And the further poirt that Mandara made in this passage, saying that knowledge cannot be enjoined, was also correct. For we see this to be the case in worldly experience.

*(A school-teacher might trace in the dust the figure of the rare wild ox and of the letter 'k', and might say 'This is a wild ox and that is the sound "ka"'. The statements would not be true and would imply erronsous knowledge if taken literal- ly - but they would lead to right knowledge. T.N.)

But the view that there could be an injunction to practise repeated affirmation of the metaphysical knowledge acquired from the texts, in order to convert it into direct vision, is not acceptable. We have already refuted the view that there should be repeated affirmation of the knowledge derived from the texts in order to convert it into concrete experience (M.V.69, 7), And there is the further reason that the error of not realizing that the Absolute is immediately evident is re- moved by verbal knowledge on its own, as in the case of.the rustic's coming to know that he himself was the tenth person (cp. M.V.59,14). As for the idea, 'Prolonged brooding gives rise to immediate knowledge of its various objects; and we see in the world that repeated affirmation is a cause of the ad- vantage of right knowledge' - that may be correct for knowl- edge of the not-self in the world. For we see this phenomenon in such matters as the understanding of the musical scale, where perception arises from traditional instruction (allied to subsequent practice). But this is not so in the present case. Here, the Absolute is not different from the Self of the hearer, nor is it capable of being made an object, nor is it unknown. The Veda speaks of 'the Absolute that is imme-

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diately evident' (Brhad. ITI.iv.l). Since the Absolute is con- stantly and eternally evident, examples of learning taken from worldiy experience are not relevant. It may be that it is found in the world that a certain kind of meditation can lead to immediate experience even of some- thing that does not exist. But that is not a relevant example either, as it would be a mere private hallucination, and nct knowledge corresponding to reality. Perhaps you will say that immediate acquaintance is some- times attained through practice based on injunctions. We can admit this. But the practice here involved is not affirmation of right knowledge derived frem an authoritative means of knowledge; it is only the mental activity of repeated medita- tiom. Ner can we admit an injunction for knowledge correspond- ing to reality. Nor is repeated resort to a means cf correct knowledge ever found to have any effect on the object to be known. This should suffice to dispose of the incorrect theory that repeated affirmation leads to immedlate knowledge of the Absolute.

99 OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS TO THE POSSIBIL.TTY OF THE WORDS OF THE VEDA COMMUNICATING THE ABSOLUTE

Mandana Misra considers the question of whether or not the words of the Voda can communicate the Absolute, and does so through an examination of the rature of a sentence. He raises and answers three objections.

(1) Verbs denoting activity are not found in Vedic texts dealing with the existence and nature of the Absolute. The meanings of nouns cannot be brought into connection with one another without the help of a verb denoting something to be done. Without this connection, the Veda will not be able to establish any meaning for words like 'the Absolute' which stand.for already-existent realities - for the mention of an already-existent reality is not significant on its own, but requires completion by the further mention of something that has to be done (B.Sid. p.85) .... A verb, however, may easily be assumed anywhere, even when it is not openly expressed, as in the case of supplying (the unexpressed verb) 'is' and so on. We know this from the rule, 'The third person singular of the root "as", meaning "it is", may be assumed even when it is not expressed' (Patañjali on Paņini II.iii.1.4). In the same way, a phrase defining the nature of the Absolute is really intent on proclaiming 'It is', and it is this implicit reference to the act of existing that makes possible the association of the various word-meanings in such a phrase to form a meaningful sentence. And since, when existence is communicated at all, it is by nature the main

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thing being communicated (and so the predicate and most impor- tant element in the sentence), its presence (explicit or im- plicit) in a Vedic text is enough to establish a real entity qualified by existence (visişța = tad-visişta = sattā-visişta, Citsukha comm. ad loc. ): (B.Sid. p.85) .... Some object that the meanings of the separate words of a phrase cannot be brought into association without a verb imply- ing action. But this is not correct. For we have phrases like 'this, the king's representative' or 'these, the fruit-laden trees' where the meanings of the different words are appre- hended in association without a verb implying action (B.sia. p.99) .... Even if you insist on maintaining that there can be no sentences without a verb denoting action, and that revealed texts having 'to be' as their verb are not an authoritative means of knowledge, since they depend on other means of knowl- edge for an understanding of their content - even then, the existence of the Absolute as cause of the world can be known from Vedic texts proclaiming the act of creation (B.Sid. p.99 f .; cp. M.V.148,8). Here the following cbjection could be raised. Verbal reve- lation cannot be an authority communicating knowledge of the Absolute. To begin with, mere single words like 'Brahman' (the Absolute) or 'Antaryamin' (the Inner Ruler) cannot be such an authority. For they can only convey an idea when there is knowledge of their connection with something already estab- lished as existent by other means of knowledge. And if there can be no authoritative comunication of the Absolute through single words, there can be no such communication through sen- tences either. For the meaning of a sentence is simply the meaning of its component words qualifying one another .... Now, in sentences supposed to convey authoritative knowledge of the Absolute and other entities quite beyond the range of percep- tion, individual words which denote the entity in question either will or will not occur. If they do not occur, then (being absent) they cannot relate to other words in the sen- tence either by way of association or of exclusion of meaning (on association and exclusion, see Kunjunni Raja, p.191 ff.). But even if they do occur, they cannot be apprehended in rela- tion with a known meaning (since the meanings, being beyond perception, cannot be known: read adhigata). And if not them- selves so known, they cannot help to provide a properly quali- fied sentence-meaning (B.Sid. p.156, summarized). To this objection Mandana replies as follows. The concepts. of 'cause' and of 'being' are known to all in a general way. Through texts like 'That from which these creatures are born' (Taitt.III.1) and 'Not gross, not subtle, not short ... ' (Brhad. III.viii.8) these general concepts assume a particular form not knowable through any other means cf knowledge, and then stand as the meaning communicated by the sentence. The condi- tioning force is formed by the meanings of the individual. words in the texts, modifying one another either by way of

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association or exclusion. Thus the texts use word-meanings well known to the world at large, and by using these in con- junction are able to communicate knowledge not previously known. So they do not fail to convey information, neither do they merely repeat what is already known from other sources. Or else one may argue differently as follows. The Absolute, one may say, is not altogether unknown in worldly experience. It is in fact what is known in all cognitions, as there is nothing else apart from it that can be known, and all' particu- lar cognitions have (as Consciousness) one common form. Alsc it is known that, when all distinctions are withdrawn, the Absolute remains left over as the real, as is illustrated by the example given in the text, 'A modification is a name, a

VI.i.4). suggesticu of speech; the truth is, "it is only clay"' (Chand.

But if the Absolute is known in ordinary worldly experience, what is it that is communicated by Vedic revelation? It is the non-existence of the universe of plurality. The meaning of the term 'universe of plurality' is already known. And the meaning of 'non-existence' is also known. The non-existence of the universe is the new truth communicated by the association of these two word-meanings. The claim is that the Veda is the only possible source of this knowledge. For perception and the other empirical means of knowledge are inseparably linked with metaphysical Ignorance. They are not able to apprehend the Absolute, void of all distinctions. The non-existence of dif- ference is known only through the Veda. (B.Sid. p.156-7)

Here, it was correct to reply that the word 'is' has to be supplied, where absent, to associate word-meanings with each other to form a meaningful sentence. For we find it said by Śri Śaikara, 'What is there to prevent the texts proclaiming the existence of the supreme Self and the Lord from being proper sentences with subject and predicate if they are asso- ciated with the verb "to be"? There are other obvious exam- ples of subject-predicate usage in the Upanishads, such as "I am the Absolute" and "That thou art"' (Brhad.Bh.I.iii.1). And Mandana's statement that we find words interconnected without the overt expression of a verb was also correct, as we see from such examples as 'This Self (is) the Absolute' (Brhad. II.v.19). Nor should one raise the objection attributed to the opponent who said that all such interconnections were per- formed by supplying a verb with a meaning implying that some- thing had to be done. For this view has been contradicted by Śri Śankara in his Brahma Sutra Commentary as follows. 'If knowledge of the identity of one's true Self with the Absolute were taken as resting on an injunction to perform a symbolic meditation based on resemblance (sampat, cp. M.V.67, intro.), this would do violence to the grammar of the texts in which it is taught, which (are in the indicative, not the imperative, mood and) say 'That thou art', 'I am the Absolute' and 'This

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Self is the Absolute' (B.S.Bh.I.i.1, cp. M.V.67,9). But the statement that the existence cf the Absolute can be known from the texts defining it as that which does the act of creating the world will not carry weight with those who really understand the Upanishads. For texts like 'That from which these creatures are born ... ' do not refer to an act of crea- tion. They are concerned with explaining the nature of the Absolute, as is shown in this case by the connection with the words 'That is the Absolute'. Assuciation and exclusion of word-meanings, which apply only within the realm of Ignorance, are not possible in the case of the Absolutc, the Self, the non-dual principle beyond Ignorance and its effects, whose existence is known from such texts as 'In the beginning, my dear one, this was Being, alone, one only, without a second' (Chand. VI.ii.1). The Absolute canuot be directly denoted either by a word or a sentence. It is neither a universal nor a particular, neither a cause nor an effect. It has no parti- cular characteristics. it is that 'from which words fall back, together with the mind, without obtaining access' (Taitt. II.9). Since mind and speech cannot attain to it, it is incon- ceivable as the meaning either of a word or of a sentence. Nor would it be right to argue (with Mandana) that the Vedic texts confer a particular form on such universals as 'Cause' or 'Being' through the association and exclusion of word-meanings. Nor was it right to say that by association of the (already- known) meanings of 'universe of plurality' and 'non-existence' the Veda communicated (the new and not yet known idea of) the non-existence of the universe. And when Mandana made the claim 'The Absolutists (Vedantins) teach the Absolute as a universal figuratively by denying all particulars of it' (B. Sid. p.38), then the Absolute so taught is not the meaning of any sentence. Nor was it right to say 'The non-existence of the universe of plurality is found in the Absolute' (cp. B.Sid. p.15). For neither the non-existence of the universe, conceived as differ- ent from the latter, nor the character of being the seat of such a non-existence can exist in the Absolute. And this is enough to refute another passage in Mandana, namely: 'In the Sutra "But it is such through association of the meanings of words" (B.S.I.i.4, as interpreted by Mandana), the Absolute is separated from the topic of merit and demerit as found in the injunctions 'and prohibitions of the Veda, and it is declared that the Absolute can be known from the meanings of the words in the Veda when associated so as to build sentence-meanings. Association here means association of the meanings of the words, their inter-relation. From this the Absolute is known' (B.Sid. p.155). For association of word-meanings makes no sense in the case of the Absolute. The Vedic texts do not de- note the Absolute through a sentence where the meaning is formed by the mutual qualification of the meanings of the words, either by way of association or exclusion. They only

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indicate it, and this by negating all the directly expressed meaning. As the revered Commentator put it: 'In this way the terms "Reality", "Kncwledge", and "Infinity", placed next to one another, condition each other mutually and deny their own direct meaninga of the Absolute, while at the same time serving to indicate it indiroctly. Thus it is shown that the Absolute is nct open to direct verbal desiguation, in agreement with such textc as "That from which words fall back, together with the mind' and "Undefined, without eupport" (Taitt: II.9 and 11.7). Nor ic the Absolute the meaning of any phrase (of subject-predicate type) like "The lotus (is) blue"' (Taitt.Bh.

Thus, although the Absolute is not accessible to words, it can only be approached thrcugh the Veda. It is not an object of the other means of knowledge as it is their own inmost Self. And it is communicated by the Veda as the Self through romoving all notions of difference which have been falaely imagined in it, one of which is the notion that it is something that can and should be kmown as an object. Ag it is said in ŚrI Śankara's Brahma Sutra Commentary: 'It should not be ob- jected that if the Absolute were not an object it could not be revealed by the Vedic texts. For the purpose of the Veda is to zegate distinctions that have been imagined through Igno- rance. It does not purport to expcund the Absolute as an ob- ject kmowable as a "this". On the contrary, in revealing the Absolute as a non-object and as the inmoet Self, it abolishes all distinctions including those between subject, object and act of knowledge' (B.S.Bh.I.1.4).

100 THE COMBINATION OF REPEATED MEDITATION AND RITUALISTIC ACTION AS THE MEANS TO LIBERATION

Acarya Mandana holds that (after attainment of metaphysical knowledge of the Self) the last impressions of erroneous knowledge are brought to an end by a discipline consisting in repeated meditation combined with ritualistic activity.

(1) This repeated practice, following on after hearing and pondering over the highest texts, of meditation on the Self in its form where differentiation has been negated through the text. 'This Self is neither this nor that', is evidently what contradicts vision of difference and brings it to an end. This discipline, after first dissolving vision of difference in general, later dissolves itself also ... as a medical potion first causes digestion of other liquids and then digests it- self, or as a poison (used as a drug) first destroys other poisons and then destroys itself (B.Sid. p.12-3). After something has been determined in its true nature by an authoritative means of knowledge, all false appearances of

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it cease in principle, and yet they may continue if there is a special cause. For example, erroneous double-vision of the moon or a false sense of the direction of the quarters of the compass may persist even in those who know the truth about the moon or the direction of the quarters from a trustworthy per- son. In the same way, one who has known the true nature of the Self with the help of that indubitable authority, the Veda, may find that false appearances remain. through the power of the impressions of Ignorance strengthened by the accumulated force of a beginningless series of carlier erroneous cognitions. To put an end to these new false appearances, there has to be re- sort to a new measure. Experience shows that that new measure must be repeated meditation on the truth. And it must be ac- companied by sacrifices and the other duties (charity and aus- terity, etc.) which the Veda teaches to be necessary on this path (Brhad.IV.iv.22). Meditation deepens the impression of truth already received. It inhibits the previous impressions of wrong knowledge and prolongs its own effects. There are others who hold that the point of the sacrificec is to remove in some occult way the demerit thai is the obstacle to our at- taining the highest goal, since the obligatory daily ritual is well known to destroy sin .... Even when vision of reality has arisen, it may not carry a powerful impression. In this case, if there is a strong im- pression arising from erroneous vision, what should be correct cognitions may turn out to have wrong objects. For example, we may see someone who has lost his sense of direction failing to remember the correction he had received from a trustworthy person and continuing on in the wrong direction. Similarly, we see the continuation of fear arising from the erroneous no- tion of a snake even in the casc of a rope that has been cor- rectly known as such, when that correct knowledge is forgot- ten .... Therefore even after vision of reality has arisen from the right authority, the Veda, the sages recommend repeated affirmation of the metaphysical truth to overcome or root out entirely that more powerful impression acquired naturally from the beginningless repetition of erroneous vision.That is why the Upanishads say, 'It should be pondered over, it should be subjected to sustained meditation',and they also lay down a series of practical measures such as inner and outer control, chastity, sacrifice and other disciplines. What did they give that teaching for if they did not mean it? (B.Sid. p.35) ... But the Absolute, you might object, is of the very nature of knowledge. Knowledge is not anything other than the Abso- lute. And the Absolute is eternal and not anything that can be produced through action. So how could anything need to be done? We answer that it is like the case of a transparent piece of crystal, the colour of which is concealed when it lies next to a brilliantly coloured object. One may need to remove the object before one can see the crystal in its true form. It is the same in the case of the Absolute; (one does

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not and cannot act upon it in order to see it, but one has to act to remove what obscures it and prevents it from being seen in its true nature). (B.Sid. p.37)

The claim is made above that vision of difference and its im- pressions can be dissolved like medicinal liquids or poisons functioning as antidotes and so forth, through repeated medi- caticn. What is here overlooked is that meditation is an acti- vity, and that its results are therefore inevitably temporary. The Veda also supplies a maxim well grounded in reason, 'There is nothing in the world that is not the result of action (and therefore impermanent). What is the good of action?' (mund. I.ii.12). Again, there was a reference to the continuation of false appearances after the truth had been ascertained in the case of such illusions as wrong sense of direction and the double- vision of the moon, and to the persisience of the snake- illusion, due to the strength of past impressions, even fcr those who had ascertained that the rope was in fact only a rope. But these visions are samples of the not-self, associ- ated with conditioning defects (such as darkness, eye-disease, etc.) and with a continued sense of being an individual ex- periencer. In the Ignorance of transmigratory life such dan- gers are possible. But Mandana does not perceive that they are absolutely impossible once vision of the constant and eter nal and immediately evident Self has arisen from such texts as 'This Self can only be expressed as "neither this nor that"'. 'That thou art' and 'The Absolute that is immediately evident and directly known'. All duality ceases immediately when every act of ideation is negated by 'neither this ncr that'. But Mandana did not ask himself what could be the need for re- sort to other means of knowledge after that. Cn this point the following passage from Śri Sankara is worthy of considera- tion.

(2) The Self is and remains one and identical. But it is imagined as having the three successive forms of internal con- sciousness (dream), external consciousness (waking) and massed consciousness (dreamless sleep), even as a rope may be falsely imagined in different ways as snake, stick or stream of water. But when, with the rise of correct knowledge negating the no- tion that the Self undergoes any of these states, one simul- taneously achieves the cessation of the notion of plurality in the Self - which notion is the only source of suffering - then 'the Fourth' (turiya) is known once and for all, and no further proof or discipline is required. (Mand.Bh.7)

When it was said that metaphysical revelation through the Veda was instantaneous, that was correct. Once duality has ceased, the duality of knower, knowledge and known can no longer con- tinue. For the revered Commentator says, 'Subject-object

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kncwledge cannot remain an instant after the cessation of For to suppcse that it could would entail a new sup- pression of duality and so lead to infinite regress, which duality.

would mean that dual:ty could never cease' (Mand. Bh. 7). In the case, however, of the person who is not able to realize in concrete experience that his true Self is the Absolute from merely hearing it stated once, we curselves admit that for such a person reflection over the metaphysical teachings of the Veda and repeated meditation on them is required so that he may come to discern the true meaning of the words. It is possille that Mandana would have claimed that he him- self had said this. He could say that he himself had advocated a course of spiritual discipline coasisting of hearing, pon- dering and repeated meditatiom. Is it not the case, he could ask, that I have simply restated his own position in different words and with different arguments? But this would be wrong. The discipline advocated by Mandana consists in the prolongation of verbal knowledge in the form of meditation dependent on the activity of the medi- tator. irect concrete experience could never arise from this mere prolongation of abstract verbal knowledge. And it would be impermanent even if it could, as it would be the result of an action. And Mandana's doctrine that the re-affirmation of abstract knowledge somehow produces concrete knowledge contra- dicts ordinary worldly experience. The metaphysical knowledge that we (in Śri Sankara's school) teach, however, is condi- tioned by reality (and not by the will of a person meditating). Reflection over and repeated meditation on the knowledge gained from the Vedic texts is prescribed for the purpose of genera- ting concrete knowledge through the removal of superimposed elements from our knowledge. We have already explained above (M.V.73) how, once metaphysical knowledge is attained, remem- brance of that knowledge is implicitly guaranteed, and how it would be mere waste of effort to go into the question of fur- ther measures to overcome surviving wrong impressions. So it follows that once metaphysical knowledge has been attained, repeated meditation is no longer relevant. Why, then, are sustained meditation, inner and outer control and so forth taught at all? We have earlier mentioned that hearing and repeated reflection are for the purpose of under- standing the meaning of the words of the texts. Sustained meditation, however, is, according to the Vedic teaching, a special discipline for realization of one's own true Self. It is synonymous with Adhyatma Yoga and other kindred terms. This also has been explained above (M.V.56). As for inner and outer control, in which the 'yama' of Patanjali's Yoga Sutra II.29 f. is the chief element, they contribute indirectly to the rise of metaphysical knowledge by promoting an attitude of introversion. For we have the upanishadic text, 'Therefore, possessed of inner and outer control, leaving off all action for personal ends, strengthening himself by voluntary resist-

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tance to discomfort and concentrating his mind, he sees the Self in the Self within' (Brhad. IV.iv.23, cp. M. V.53, 7). Perhaps you will suggest that the Veda must be able to com- municata and convey information before its hearers have been through any special forms of discipline, and ask if the latter really have any purpcse. In answer, we say that they do. In the case of an extraverted person, whe idertifies himself with his body, sense-organs and mind with the feeling 'me' and 'mine', knowledge of the meaning of the metaphysical texts of the Upamishads can never arise because such a person cannot understand the meaning of the word 'inmost'. But it is clear enough that one whose minu has been disciplined by inmer and outer control and the rest, and kas become introvertive can understand the meaning of that word (and its synonyms) and thereby can have immediate experience of the tranecendent prin- ciple that those texts proclaim. On this, we find in Śri Śankara's Gita Commentary, 'The instrument ror vision of the Self is the mind, purified and educated by inner and cuter con- trol, etc., and the Veda and the teechings of the Teacher' (Bh.G.Bh.II.21, cp. M.V.53,9) . As for the claim that sacrifices and the other duties taught by the Veda were necessary to uproot persistent false impressions even after metaphysical knowledge had been ac- quired, that was simply ridiculous. Performance of sacrifices and so on will merely strengthen the false idea that one is an individual able to carry out action. How could you hope to uproot all false notions through that? One does not abolish darkness with yet thicker darkness. This is also enough to dispose of Mandana's contention that, because of the text ' ... by sacrifice, by charity' (Brhad. IV.iv.22, M.V.55,1), even if metaphysical knowledge is regarded as accessible through repeated meditation it is still dependent on the performance of rituals, just as, although it is possible to get to a village without a horse, one gets to it quicker and with less trouble with one (B.Sid. p.37, cp. B.S.III.iv. 26). Putting fetters on the legs of a man already lame does not. help him to move faster. Eves the contention that sacri- fice and the rest contributed in some occult way to the re- moval of persistent false impressions was unjustified and wrong. What brings metaphysical Ignorance to an end is meta- physical knowledge. But the impressicns of Ignorance which persist. after metaphysical knowledge, and the effects of such impressions, cannot be brought to an end by (sacrifice and the 'rest, which, as actions, are also) impressions of Ignorance. For impressions of Ignorance cannot contradict and cancel im- pressions of Ignorance. As it is said in ŚrI Śankara's.Com- mentary on the Brhadaranyaka, 'When it is clear that Ignorance is brought to an end through knowledge, it is wrong to make a hypothesis that the occult power of ritual brings it to an end. When it is clear that the husks of the rice are destroyed by the act of pounding them, it is not right to make a hypothesis

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that the husks are destroyed by an occult power emanating from the ritual. in the same way, there is no room for any hypo- thesis that Ignorance is brought to an end through the occult results of the obligatory ritual' (Brhad.Bh. III.iii.l, intro.). Why, then, are rituals taught? The Veda itself answers this questicn in the words, 'Him the true Brahmins seek to know through repetition of the Veda, through sacrifice, through charity, through avsterity and through extreme moderation in the enjoyment uf sense- objects' (Brhad. IV.iv. 22, M. V. 55, 1). The function of ritual is io prepare for the rise of knowledge. Śri Sankara says in his Brahma Sutra Commentary, 'Herce the rise of knowledge of the Self depends on sacrifice, charity and austerity and the rest, also on ianer and outer control and the performance of the duties of one's caste and stage of life. A distinction, however, between the two kinds of means of knowledge should be drawn. Inner and outer control and the rest are more proximate means, because they are directly con- nected with knowledge of the Self through the phrase 'He who knows thus' (Brhad. IV.iv.23). Ritual sacrifices, on the other hand, are only connected with promoting the desire to know, and hence are to be regarded as more remote aids (B.S.Bh. III.iv.27, M.V.53,7).

101 THE METHOD FOR OBTAINING LIBERATION

The author of the Brahma Siddhi clearly says that Ignorance is the only bondage and that its disappearance is liberation. And yet, in contradiction with this, he appears to accept that de- struction cf Ignorance and actions is itself a peculiar kind of reality. Let us look at some texts on the subject.

(1) Liberation is nothing but the disappearance of metaphysi- cal Ignorance, for transmigration is nothing but Ignorance. But the disappearance of metaphysical Ignorance is nothing other than the rise of metaphysical knowledge (B.Sid. p.119) ... Realization of the Absolute means manifestation in one's own true form, like the manifestation of the transparent crystal in its true form on the removal of the brilliantly coloured object close by that had been colouring it. For the Absolute is the true nature of the individual soul .... We say of a cloth that has always been white, 'It has become white' when, after having become dirty, it has been washed. In the same way, when. the veil of Ignorance has been removed and the soul's true form manifests, the text says 'It has manifested in its own true form' (Chand. VIII.iii.4). Thus we have the further text 'Being nothing but the Absolute, hè dissolves in the Ab- solute' (Brhad.IV.iv.6) .... The cessation of metaphysical Ignorance is (and can be) nothing but metaphysical knowledge. It is the same, even if

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metaphysical Ignorance is conceived as non-apprehension. For the cessation of the non-existence of anything is simply the positive existence of that thing. And if metaphysical Igno- rance is taken as positive erroneous apprehension, then the rise of corrcct knowledge of the truth which contradicts it is its cessation. Cessation of the silver-illusion is nothing but, the rise of knowledge of the shell, and no further effort after knowledge of the shell is required to procure it. For the knowiedge of the shell and the cessation of the silver- illusion are simultaneous. (B.Sid. p.121-2)

(2) One might raise the following objection. Action with its merit and demerit (leading to further birth) is uprooted along with the uprooting of metaphysical Ignorance, and not other- wise. Action is therefore included along with doubt and error when we speak of the uprooting of Ignorance, as implied in the upanishadic text 'All a person's merit and demerit is des- troyed ... ' (Mund.II.ii.9). But it is not the case that liber- ation and the destruction of action occur immediately on vision of reality, otherwise there would be contradiction with the Vedic text 'The delay will only last till he is freed from the body' (Chand. VI.xiv.2). But this objection would not be correct. For the Chandogya text should be taken as a figurative expression meaning that liberation will follow quickly, not as a literal statement meaning that liberation will be delayed till the death of the body. Or let us suppose that the text was saying, 'If the de- lay for one person was short, "shortness" would mean "until he was released (at death) from the body"'. This would imply that one person might be liberated immediately on attaining metaphysical knowledge, because the death of the body would occur then and there, while another person might have to wait a certain interval for final liberation. The second person would have to wait till the portion of merit and demerit that had initiated the current body had been exhausted through ex- perience. The first alternative would not undermine the concept of 'man of steady wisdom' (found at Gita II.54). For that term refers to one who is still undergoing discipline and has reached a certain (advanced) stage. On the second alternative, the enlightened person sees himself as a mere 'apparent' ex- periencer, due to the impressions arising from the maturation of the merit and demerit that gave rise to his current life. He does not feel personal engagement in the manner of one who has not acquired metaphysical knowledge (B.Sid. p.130 f., sum- marized) ... These impressions of Ignorance are comparatively short- lived, and nothing else is needed to bring them to an end. They end through vision of reality, or else simply of their own accord. This state is called 'liberation in life' (jivan- mukti) .... Even when the cause has gone, the effect may

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remain through the force or impressions. It is through the force cf impressions of merit and demerit that are already under way in the present life, or through further impressions arising as a consequence of these, that even an enlightened person who has attained metaphysical knowledge can continue to live in the body. (B.Sid. p.132, summarized)

Here, there is nothing to contradict in the statement that the rise of metaphysical knowledge and nothing else, constiiutes the cossation of metaphysical Ignorance. This is known from such authoritative Vedic texts as 'He who knows the bliss of the Absolute has no fear' (Taitt. II.4) and 'What delusion, what grief, can there be for cne who sees the unity of all?' (Isa 7) And the revered Commentator has said: 'In worldly ex- perience we find that colour manifests as soon as there is contact between the visual organ and light. In the same way, Ignorance of the Absolute disappears the moment that knowledge of it arises' (Brhad.Bh.I.iv.10, cp. M.V.30,9). There was also the statement that realization of the Abso- lute meant the manifestation of cme's true nature that occurs when obstacles are removed, on the analogy of the transparent crystal manifesting its true nature after the colourful object lying near it, and seeming to colour it, had been removed. This, too, is correct, as long as the word for 'removal' in the illustraiion is understood to stand for 'cessation'. But if Ignorance and its effects are taken to be physically removed, like the colourful object metioned in the example, then the conception is wrong. Knowledge of the shell, Mandana claimed, constitutes removal of the silver-error. This is correct, since it is found to be the case in experience. But if it is said that Self-knowledge perceives the Self, as knowledge of the shell perceives the shell, then that, we say, is wrong. For in the case of the crystal, it is not really removal of the colourful object that is required in order to be aware of its transparency. What is really required is a discriminative knowledge of the difference between the crystal and the colourful object. On this point we have the following passage in Śri Śankara's Brahma Sūtra Commentary.

(3) Compare the case of a piece of transparent crystal, where before the introduction of a discriminating cognition the true nature of the crystal, which is really light and transparent, does not seem to be different from such external adjuncts as the red or blue colour of objects near which it is placed. But after the rise of a discriminating cognition, the crystal be- comes distinct, and it is said to have 'attained' its true nature as light and transparent, although it was really exactly the same all along. In the same way, when the true nature of the soul does not yet appear to be discriminated from the body and external adjuncts, the knowledge arising from the Veda

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that does effect this discrimination is what constitutes 'transcending the body'. And the 'attainment' of the soul's true nature is nothing other than direct knowledge of the true nature of the Self, the result of the discriminating cognition. The question whether the soul 'has' or 'has not' a body de- pends simply on whether uiscrimination has or has not arisen. For the Vedic text says, 'Dwelling in all bodies, not Himself embodied' (Katha I.ii.22). And the Smrti, too, teaches that there is no real distinction between having a body and not having one, in the text, 'Though existing in the body, O son of Kunti, He dues not act and is in no way tainted' (Bh.G. XIII.31). (B.S.Bh.I.iii.19)

As for the state of being a person of steady wisdom, that was guararteed by the Lord Himself, when he said 'O son of Kunti, this is the state of fixity in the Absolute' (GIta II.72). So the whole doctrine that the body dies immediately on the ex- haustion of merit and demerit is wrong. It is the other doc- trine that is to be preferred, namely, that the one liberated in life is the 'man of steady wisdom'. For there are Vedic texts to prove this, such as 'Having an eye, though appearing to bc without an eye, etc.' (quoted at B.S.Bh.I.1.4 from an untraced text) and 'Verily, pleasure and pain do not touch one who is bodiless' (Chand. VIII.xii.1). And if you claim that, from the standpoint of empirical experience, there appears to be retention of a body and persistence of impressions, we can accept that too. For it is admitted by the revered Commen- tatcr.

(4) And one should not raisc the objection that the knower of the Absolute must either have a body for a certain time after his enlightenment or else not have one. For if anyone, even though he be only one person, nevertheless has the conviction in his own heart that he has immediate knowledge of the Abso- lute and is also possessed of a physical body at the same time, how can anyone else shake him from this conviction? And this very point is made by the Veda and the Smrti when they des- cribe the state of one of steady wisdom. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.15)

(5) But the negated erroneous knowledge continues on for a certain time owing to the force of latent impressions, as in the case of (a person cured of the eye-disease through which he saw) two moons. (ibid. )

We have already explained above (M.V.100) that, once the ap- pearance of the world of plurality has been contradicted and cancelled by knowledge of the Self, it in no way touches the Self and does not constitute bondage. At the same time, we also said that this knowledge comes from Vedic revelation only, and that the whole conception that it had to be followed by repeated affirmation and meditation was wrong.

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At another point in the Brahma Siddhi we find the following. 'Verbal knowledge is abstract, the world-appearance ie concrete experience; therefore, because these two kinds of knowledge do nct contradict one another, it is not true to say that (after knowledge of the Self derived from Vedic revelation) the faise eppearance of the world of plurality no longer touches the Self .. ... But when, through meditation and other such prac- tices, immediate corcrete experience of the Absolute is intro- duced, then the world-appearance is contradicted, and, though it remsins in being, it does not touch the Self' (B.Sid. p.134). The cure for the sad malady of insisting on this totally un- founded doctrine has been mentioned above at M.V.iOc, so noth- ing remains tc be added here. The revered Commentator observes:

(5) When the subject-matter of a Vedic passage is an injunc- tion to act, such injunctions treat of something like the Agnihotra or other ritual, that has to be performed at a dif- ferent time, after the meaning of the text has becn understood, and with the help of various factors, such as the person doing the act along with his various materials and instruments. But when the subject of the texts is knowledge of the supreme principle, the case is different. The aim of the text is then fulfilled as soon as its meaning is properly understood. For there is nothing left over to do apart from merely understand- ing what is being conveyed by the text. (Mund.Bh.I.i.6, intro. )

Thus, from the empirical standpoint, the Veda can speak of the destruction of metaphysical Ignorance and its effects, in such texts as 'The knot of the heart is cut' (Mund. II.11.9). It is assumed that the connection of the Self with Ignorance, desire and action itself holds only from the standpoint of Ignorance, just like the notion that the Self has a body, sense-organs and mind. From the standpoint of an enlightened person him- self, however, his Self is, ever was, and ever will be free from Ignorance, desire and action. Sc, from the standpoint of the highest truth, the whole idea that Ignorance is only ex- hausted on the death of the body of the enlightened one, and that liberation after disembodiment (videha-mukti) then super- venes, is seen to be false. On this subject we find the fol- lowing.

(7) If you suppose that there is any change in the Self af- flicted with Ignorance according to whether Ignorance has or has not been brought to an end, the answer is that it is not so. We have already explained (cp. M.V.34,5 ad fin. ) that the snake, mirage-water, silver, and appearance of contamination through dust or clouds that are erroneously perceived in the rope, desert, shell and the ether of the sky do not affect the latter, as they belong to the realm of imagination set up by Ignorance. Perhaps you will object that there is a difference between

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the Self when it is the author of Ignorance and the Sclf when it is not, just as there is a diffcrence between sight that is and sight that is not afflicted by the disease of double- vision. But the objection would be wrong. For the text 'It only seems to think, it only seems to move' (Brhad. IV.iii.7) denies that the Self could be, on its own, the victim of Igno- rance. And the error called Ignorance arises from the collab- oration of several different processes (and not from the Self alone - that is, when we speak of errors such as empirical experience which are products of Ignorance, though ihemselves also termed 'Ignorance'). And this (our denial that the Self is the victim of Ignorance) agrees with the fact that Ignorance stands over against the Selr as an object which it witnesses. (Brhad.Bh.IV.iv.6, cp. M.V.46,9)

And so these also are points to be reckoned with.

102 SYMPATHY WITH OTHER ADVAITA THEORIES

The basic theory accepted in the Brahma Siddhi is that knowl- edge of the non-dual reality consists in immediate apprehension of the Absolute arising from repeated meditation on the verbal knowledge acquired from the Veda, combined with the continued performance of ritualistic and cther duties. Connected with this, there is, on the question of giving the texts in all parts of the Veda their due weight, a partial adoption of the tenets of the school teaching that all Vedic texts combine to eliminate the universe. The method of false attribution fol- lowed by subsequent retraction (adhyaropa-apavada) is also acceptcd. On this we have the following texts.

(1) A thing can be described in words even when it is not known through any other means of knowledge apart from speech, and when there is no prior knowledge of its connection with its name. This description is done through the negation of other particulars. For the meanings of the words for the vari- ous negated particulars and the meaning of the word 'not' are already known. Thus the Absolute is taught in this way through the negation of all particulars in the text 'Not gross ... ' (Brhad. III.viii.8). That is what the verse above (B.Sid. verse I.2, M.V.97, intro. ) meant when it said 'Through elimination of all distinctions'. (B.Sid. p.26)

(2) What is without particulars can be known through revela- tion. It is implanted in the mind verbally through the very negation of particulars. It is like the essence of gold. The essence of gold is never perceived unconcealed by some parti- cular form, whether it be a natural lump or a fashioned arte- fact like a necklace. And these latter are not the essence of

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gold. For when any of thesc forms are lost, the gold persists in another. But an entity that cannot be distinguished in perception from the particular forms concealing it can be known mentally through the negation of particulars and communicated to others. This method of communication is exemplified in the Veda in the text 'This Self is expressed as "neither this nor that"'. And it has been said by one of another school, 'When all universals have been eliminated, what remains over is the real' (Bhartrhari, Vakya Padiya III.ii.21). Others again have said, 'That which has no plurality is communicated through at- tribution followed by retraction'. (B.Sid. p.26)

Tt shouid be noted that there is here a certain difference from the doctrine of false attribution followed by later re- traction taught by Bhagavatpada Sankara in that it is not taught that the attributions are false.

Again, in the course of expounding the true nature of the Absc- lute, certain deviations are here and there accepted from other traditions, the doctrines, namely, of Non-dualism of Word, Non- dualism of Being as a Universal, Non-dualism of Positive Being. In explaining these we shall give the texts of the Brahma Siddhi not literally but in summarized form. We begin with the doctrine of Non-dualism of Word.

(3) There are texts like 'The Absolute in its supreme and lower form (Purusa and Hiranyagarbha) is Om' in which no in- junction to meditate is given. Instead of giving an injunc- tion to meditate, such texts simply teach that the syllable Om is the Self of all. This information, since it is given only by the Veda, is inaccessible to perception and the other means of empirical knowledge, and so cannot be in contradiction with them. The forms that constitute the world-appearance are all entirely dependent on speech. It is revealed in the Rg Veda in the hymn to Speech (R.V.X.125) that Speech (as the deity Vac) is the Self of all and the Lord of all. The world is only known through knowledge that is coloured by speech, since it is invariably known under the form of speech. And we find that, even when an object (like a blade of grass lying on the road) has been vaguely apprehended without verbal formulation, our awareness is intensified when linked with words, for when that link is not present, what has been noticed becomes as good as unnoticed. For all these reasons, consciousness, in order to be consciousness, depends on assuming the form of a word. Or, to express it differently, consciousness is the power called 'Speech'. In any case, every object that is known is known in association with speech, since it depends upon speech to be known. The object, therefore, has been shown to be either a modification or an illusory manifestation (vivarta) of speech. (B.Sid. p.17-9)

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On the Non-dualism of Being as a Universel, we have:

(4) Because the Absolute is described in the Veda by negating all distinctions, it is said by some to be the universal called 'Being'. As for the Mimamsakas who say that a universal without particulars would be a monstrosity that would no more exist than a hare's horn (Kumarila, S.V., Ākrtivāda 10), to them one must point out that they have no universal law that what hac no particulars does not exict, since particulars them- selves (on which their argument depends) are indivisible into further particulars. (B.Sid. p.37)

On the subject of the Non-dualism of Positive Being we have the following:

(5) Some hold that attributes are of two kinds, positive and negative. Negative attributes do not undermine Non-duality. The Upanishads, however, speak of the Absolute as Consciousness and Bliss (Brhad. III.ix.28,7). If Bliss be taken here as a positive entity, then either it would be a substance with Con- sciousness for its attribute, or else Consciousness would be a substance with Bliss for its attribute. In that way there would be a distinction between substance and attribute, and this would undermine non-duality .... He who thinks that Con- sciousness and Bliss are two different forms possessed by a substance likewise contradicts the text, 'One only, without a second', (Chand. VI.ii.1). This being so, the Absolute must in fact be taken to be of the nature of Consciousness, while the word 'Bliss' (according to the prima facie view) merely refers to ihe accidental circumstance of absence of pain. (B.Sid. p.4, cp. M.V.130,4, note)

Now, it is clear that the texts quoted by the exponent of Non- dualism of Word, and the arguments he advanced, may be accepted as not contradicting Advaita. For we find such texts in the Veda as. 'Let me unfold name and form' (Chand. VI.iii.2), 'All this world is but the syllable Om' (Mand.1) and 'All this is but the Absolute' (Mand. 2) in which Om is taken as constituting name, and which identify name and the named, while alternately emphasizing one or the other. And if we include the text sum- ming up the teaching (Mand.7), the Self as Turiya is seen to be identified with the syllable Om, both being the non-dual reality that remains over when the apparent universe of plural- ity has come to an end. So we conclude that the essence of both word and meaning is the Absolute. And this is experienced in dreamless sleep and other states (such as meditative trance). If we turn to the theory of Non-dualism of Being as a Uni- versal, we can say that there is nothing wrong if we speak of Being as a universal on the ground that the Absolute, as bare Being, is present in all distinctions. For we find Being present in all our representations - existent pot, existent

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cloth, existent elephant, ete. Ācārya Mandana himself said at one point 'The Absolute is spoker of figuratively as a univer- sal by the Absolutists (brahma-vadir) because they describe it by denying particulars' (B.Sid. p.38). But if what is peing here spoken of is also regarded as identical with the universal called Being ae propounded by the Vaiseşikas, then we cannot agree. Being as conceived by the followers of Kanada is not connected through inherence with its effects before the latter are produced. As Śrī Śankare has said, 'The Vaiseșikas do not admit that this world, as an effect, was verily Being before its production at the begin- ning of the world-period. For they uold that the effect is non-existent before being prouuced. And they do not admit that Being was one only without a second before the production of the world (Chand.Bh. VI. ii.1). We have given more of this passage at M.V.37,3 above. In the last Section of the Brahma Siddhi (p.157) we find the words: 'What then is propounded by Vedic revelation? It is the non-existence of the world of plurality that is pro- pounded'. Seeing this, scme have affirmed (e.g. S.Kuppuswami, B.Sid., Eng.intro. p.xliii) that the author supported the doc- trine of the Non-duality uf Positive Being. But this does not appear to be correct. For after summarizing the doctrine of the Non-duality of Positive Being in the first Section of the work, Acarya Mandana goes on to state his own view as follows. ' (You ask how that which is expressed in the text "The Ab- solute is Consciousness and Bliss" by two terms which are not synonyms could be one thing - and suggest that "Bliss" means only "absence of suffering".) To this we reply that there is nothing wrong (if the two terms retained their positive mean- ing). The two words refer to a special light (Consciousness) of the nature of Bliss, just as one speaks of the light of the moon (as "the greatest" and also as "luminous", although only one special light is referred to). And he sums up, 'In the. text "The Absolute is Consciousness and Bliss" the two words proclaim that the nature of the Absolute is a special form of Consciousness or (i.e. which is the same as) a special form of Bliss' (B.Sid. p.5). As for the sentence in the last Section of the Brahma Siddhi saying that the Veda only taught the non-existence of the world of plurality (M.V.99,1, ad fin.), it must be remembered that the Section teaches that words united in sentences in- variably convey a meaning that is a synthesis of a manifold. The highest end of man, the author thinks, can therefore only be attained through immediate vision arising from repeated meditation on verbal knowledge derived from the supreme Vedic texts (B.Sid. p.35-6;154). And Mandana accepted that the ap- pearance of a world of plurality remained even for one who had acquired immediate vision of the Self (B.Sid. p.134). So the question of whether or not the author of the Brahma Siddhi was a partisan of the doctrine of the Non-duality of Positive Being

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still requires further investigation by scholars.

103 SUMMARY OF MAŅDANA

Broadly speaking, there is hardly one of the schoola of post- Śankara Vedanta that is not affected by the thinking of Ācarya Mandana, so erudite in matters of Vedic exegesis. Theory of illusion and of the correction of illusion, analysis of the means of knowledge, selection of the more trustworthy in cases where perception and revelaticn conflict, the truth about word-meanings and sentence-meamings, showing how the Veda could be an authority for the existence of the Absolute, exam- inatioa of the methods whereby knewledge is gained, determina- tion of the relation betweem knowledge and action, settling the question whether hearing and the rest were or were not the subjects of an injuncticn, consideration of the nature of meta- physical Ignorance, of its seat and of the object which it concealed, estimate of the role of dialectic in Vedanta, refu- tation of the possibility of differences existing anywhere, observations about meditation on knowledge aurally received, probing the nature of immediate knowledge of the Absolute, establishing a distinction between liberation in life and lib- eration after the death of the body - it would be no exagger- ation to say that on all these topics of investigation the modes of enquiry adopted by Mandana Misra have found favour with the connoisseurs of Vedanta doctrine to this day. Students who are mindful of the balance and length of the present work, and about the clarity of the subsequent exposi- tion, will nct take it amiss if I have dwelt at some length on the system of the Brahma Siddhi, since it furnishes the entry into all the later systems that followed.

CHAPTER VII SUREŚVARA

104 THE WORKS OF THE AUTHOR OF THE VĀRTIKA

We now begin the examimation of the Vartika school. All crit- ics agree that the Vartikas on Śri Sankara's Taittiriya and Brhadāraņyaka Commentaries were composed by Śri Suresvara, as well as the Naişkarmya Siddhi. Our study here will therefore be confined to these works. The commentary on the Dakşiņāmūrti Stotra called the Manasollasa and the Bālakrida Commentary on Yājñavalkya Smrti, which are said to have been composed by a person called Visvarūpa Ācārya, cannot be accepted as belonging to the Vartika school, not only because scholars are divided about their authenticity, but also because they advance views in contradiction with the teaching of the Vartikas. The Pañcīkarava Vārtika is also left out of account for the same reasons. Therefore we shall try to determine the nature of the Värtika teaching with the help of the eerliest mentioned three works only. (For translations of Suresvara, see M.V. p. 386)

105 THE CLOSE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE BRAHMA SIDDHI AND THE SAMBANDHA VĀRTIKA

We have already mentioned at the beginning of the chapter on Mandana (M.V.91) how, in the matter of the refutation of op- ponents' views, there is much similarity in the line of thought of the Brahma Siddhi and Suresvara's Vartika. This is espe- cially true in the case of the Brahma Siddhi and the introduc- tory portion of Suresvara's Brhadāranyaka Vārtika, called the Sambandha Vartika. This theme will be developed a little fur- ther here to help those who would like to make a comparison of the two schools. The first Section (Brahma Kanda) of the Brahma Siddhi, in

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the course cf trying tc explain how the Absolute can only be known through the Veda, sketchas in various theories of the relation between the ritual-section and the knowledge-section of the Veda and refutes them. Those same theories are also summarized for refutation in the same way in the Vartike, mostly in the same words. For example:

(1) The Doctrine of the Elimination of the Universe of Dis- tinctions: Everywhere in the Veda there is taught the elimina- tion of some distinction somewhere. Thus the ritualistic in- junctions are held to be auxiliaries towards aptitude for knowledge of the Self through the visible result of eliminating differences. B.Sid. p.27; S.V. (verses) 378-83. The refutation: B.Sid. pp.28-30; S.V.384, 398,424-6.

(2) The Doctrine that Pleasure-desire is eliminated through Indulgence: It is held that the ritualistic section of the Veda promotes aptitude ror knowledge of the Self by making every pleasure-desire available. B.Sid. p.27; S.V.343-4. The refutation: B.Sid. p.30; S.V.345-54.

(3) The Doctrine of the Discharge of the Three Debts: It is held that ritualistic injunctions prepare one for knowledge of the Self through securing discharge of the three debts, begin- ning with that to the gods. Statement and refutation: B.Sid. p.36; S.V.436.

(4) View that Knowledge of the Self enters the Sphere of Ritual through purifying the Performer of Ritual: B.Sid. p.28. The refutation: B.Sid. p.31; S.V.427-35.

(5) The Doctrine that the Whole Veda is concerned with Acts to be Done: B.Sid. p.23 and the whole of Section Three (Niyoga Kaņda); S.V.477-541. The refutation: B.Sid. pp.25-6; S.V. 542-760.

(6) Doctrine that Ritual may help the Rise of Knowledge be- cause its Results differ according to the Motive with which it is Performed: B.Sid. p.27. Accepted S.V.322. Accepted with a qualification, B.Sid. p.36.

(7) Two Views according to which Rituals are either for Puri- fication or else Parts of the Discipline of Knowledge: Accep- ted at B.Sid. pp.27-8,36. Doctrine that rituals are for awak- ening the desire for knowledge, but that they must be given up for the actual attainment of the Absolute: S.V.14,322. Accep- tance of the doctrine that rituals are for purification: S.V. 87,192,301.

(8) Refutation of Difference: Two (Tarka Kāņda): S.V.917-86. B.Sid. The whole of Section

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In these, and in other places where rival schools are examined, the two works show a striking similarity, not only of meaning but even of words.

106 THE RIVAL DOCTRINES EXAMINED IN THE SAMBANDHA VĀRTIKA

The following is a list of some other views described for pur- poses of refutation in the Sambandha Vartika which are not noticed in the Brahma Siddhi.

(1) The doctrine that symbolic meditations are enjoined for the sake of liberation. S.V.20. (2) The doctrine that liber- atin, understood as abiding in one's nature as individual soul, arises from ritualistic action. S.V.32. (3) Various forms of the doctrine that knowledge and action are to be combined in three ways for liberation. S.V.357. (4) Doctrine that there is an injunction to perform repeated meditation (prasankhyana). S.V.761. (5) The doctrine that knowledge is for the sake of meditation which will in turn lead to liberation. S.V.438. (6) Doctrine that knowledge that all is the one Self is only a piece of symbolic meditation. S.V.439. (7) Doctrine of suppression of the impressions of the waking and other states. S.V.441-2. (8) Doctrine of the suppression of the mind. S.V.443.

And there are other doctrines of the same kind. Why Mandana does not refer to them while Suresvara does is not clear.

107 REFUTATION OF MANDANA'S POSITIONS IN THE VĀRTIKA

The question of whether Mandana and Suresvara were the same person is much discussed today. Even if they were different, it cannot be disputed that they were both Advaitins and that they each quoted for their own work the same arguments against the dualists that are to be found in the work of the other. It is also noticeable that in Mandana's book one occasionally finds the arguments and even the words of the revered Commen- tator Śankara. From this one may conjecture that the Advaitins had been using these same arguments with slight changes for a long time. Then came Suresvara Acarya, who accepted and bor- rowed the arguments used by Mandana and other forerunners against other schools where such arguments did not contradict his own system. But he refuted the constructions even of mem- bers of his own school if they did contradict his own system. And it appears likely that he did so at the command of his Guru. This can be substantiated by a glance at his Naişkarmya Siddhi.

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(1) It is in obedience to the command of my Guru that I ex- pound the secret doctrine hidden in the heart of the Upani- shads, which ends transmigration and takes one to immortality. I am aware that it has also been explained by others. (N.Sid. I.3) This book is written neither to gain fame, nor wealth, nor deferential treatment, but in order to test the metal of my cwn knowledge at the touch-stone of the God-realized sages. (N.Sia. I.6)

From a consideration of these two verses one might conjecture that when Acarya Mandana's fame had spread wide Suresvara Ācarya composed an independent treatiee called the Naişkarmya Siddhi. Its name was a faithful reflection of its contents, since it was written to help people to establish themselves in the actionless Self through knowledge alone. it was composed also with a view to refute Mardana, who counselled the one desirous of liberation to practise a combination of knowledge and action (in the form of repeated affirmation of knowledge through meditation, M.V.98,4, ad fin. ). The refutation was accomplished by showing that knowledge and action were in total contradiction. Typical of the teachings that Suresvara combated in this context were the following two points. Knowledge derived from words is inevitably indirect, and only he attains liberation who has risen to immediate awareness of the Self through medi- tation and other active measures (M.V.101,5,note); the false appearances that persist even after knowledge of the Self can only be brought to an end by repeated meditation on one's vision of the reality allied to performance of sacrifices and other caste duties (B.Sid. p.35, M.V.100,1). This had already been contradicted by ŚrI Sankara, as the following text shows.

(2) The knowledge that one is (in truth) ever liberated comes from the holy texts and from no other source. And knowledge of the meaning of a text is not possible without first calling to mind the meaning of its component words. It is certain that the meaning of a word is called to mind on the basis of agreements and differences (in the way one has heard the word used and in the meanings for which it is made to stand). In this way one comes to know oneself as the pure transcendent Self, beyond pain and action. The clearest form of authorita- tive knowledge of the inmost Self (i.e. immediate awareness based on identity-feeling) arises from such texts as 'That thou art', just as it did from 'Thou art the tenth' (cp. M.V. 59,14). (U.S.(verse) XVIII.190-2)

It was by quoting these words of his Guru as his authority that Suresvara refuted the doctrine of repeated meditation (Prasankhyana Vada; N.Sid. IV.31-3; S.V.206-8) and also that of liberation through a combination of action and knowledge

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in his Vārtika and Naişkarmya Siddhi. To refute this doctrine of combination he wrote some verses in his Brhadāraşyaka Vār- tika, beginning with one saying that only he who was without aitachment for the enjoyment of anything in this world or the next was a fit candidate for liberation.

(3) 'Children run after external pleasures ... ' (Katha II.i.2) and again 'He who desires pleasures and dwells on them is re- born' (Mund. III.ii.2) and again 'He who has no desires ... (be- ing nothing but the Absolute, he dissolves in the Absolute' Brhad. IV.iv.6). (Having thus declared that caly he who is in- different to the enjoyment of objects in this world and the next qualifies for metaphysical knowledge, Śri Suresvara con- tinues:) To remove metaphysical Ignorance, nothing is re- quired but metaphysical knowledge. And to give rise to such knowledge, nothing else is required except the virtues begin- ning with inner and outer control. In order to acquire these virtues, nothing is required but purification of the mind, and for purification of the mind nothing is required but the per- formance of the obligatory daily ritual as a duty. Since thought, word and bodily deed arise solely from ignorance of the Self (read atma-ajmana), when that has been cancelled by knowledge of the Self, how could there be dependence on action afterwards? (B.B.V. I.iii.97-100)

One may note two further doctrines of the Brahma Siddhi that were refuted by Suresvara. Mandana argues as follows. Every meaningful sentence communicates a particular not previously known to the hearer. In the Vedic texts proclaiming the Abso- lute, we find the universal notion 'cause' and the universal notion 'being' conveyed by phrases such as 'That from which (these creatures are born)' (Taitt. III.1) and 'Not gross ... These ideas (in themselves universals) acquire a particular meaning not known through other means of knowledge when their universal meaning is narrowed down by the meaning of other words in the sentence, either by way of association or of ex- clusion; and this particular meaning is the burden of the text (B.Sid. p.157, cp. M.V.99,1). Or again the elimination of plurality may be effected through revelation. The meaning of the term 'plurality' (read prapañca-padartha) is already known. And the meaning of 'non-existence' is also known. The non-existence of plurality is the new truth communicated as a sentence-meaning by the association of these two word-meanings (B.Sid. p.157, cp. M.V.99,1). These two theories are refuted by Suresvara. He remarks again and again that there is no association or exclusion of word-meanings in texts teaching the identity of the true Self with the Absolute, because the inmost non-dual Self cannot be the meaning expressed by any sentence (N.Sid. III.25, 26;76. S.V.902, 909-10; B.B.V. I.iv.1406-8,1431; III.iv.29,33,46; III.v.100, 184, 190). In explaining the text 'The Infinite,

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verily, remains' (Brhad. V.i.1) he expresses himself thus:

(4) Reality, which does not admit of any distinction between God and the individual soul, appears through Ignorance to in- clude this distinction. When Ignorance is abolished through the knowledge that says 'neither this nor that', only the Self remains. There is seen to be no association cr exclusion of word-meanings to form a scntence-meaning, not even a negation - when Ignorance, the root of all these false notions, is abol- ished through authcritative knowledge derived from the Veda in the manner explained. (B.B.V. V.i.21-2)

108 THE TREATMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF BHARTRPRAPANCA IN THE VĀRTIKA

we have spoken so far as if the principle doctrine to be re- futed in the Naiskarmya Siddhi and the two Vartikas was that of Mandana Misra. But it should be remembered that what has been described above could equally well have been intended to re- fute Bhartrprapanca. And there are some strong reasons for supposing this to have actually been the case. Because Bhartr- prapañca was an exponent of the doctrine of Duality in Non- duality, he accepted the doctrine that the meaning even of the supreme texts of the Veda was based on the mutual association and exclusion of the word-meanings to form a sentence-meaning. When, in the passage just quoted above, the Vartika said 'There is seen to be no association or exclusion of word-meanings to form a sentence-meaning, not even a negation' (B.B.V. V.i.22) - that occurred in the course of a refutation that followed a summary of Bhartrprapasca's interpretation of the text 'That is infinite ... ' (Brhad.V.i.1). Like Mandana, Bhartrprapañca advocated a combination of knowledge and action for liberation (M.V.87). Also like Mandana, he accepted that for liberation there had to be a new form of immediate knowledge, different from that conveyed orally by the texts (M.V.84). Again, it is true that Suresvara refers (as if speaking of Mandana) to the doctrine of those who say 'The knowledge "I am the Absolute" arising from the upanishadic texts depends on the association of the meanings of its differ- ent component words and hence does not penetrate to the real (non-dual) nature of the Self' (N.Sid. I.67, prose intro.). Nevertheless, he attributes this teaching to those who set store on the injunction 'Once the wise man has acquired knowl- edge of the Self alone, he should practise repeated affirmation' (Brhad. IV.iv.21). And he does not anywhere take notice of the alternative to obedience tc this text advocated by Mandana in the words: 'Or alternatively it could be maintained that an in- junction would be useless here, as the desirable end which it promised would already be attained. Prolonged brooding on something in one's mind may give rise to immediate apprehension

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of it, and that is a result already attainable in this very life' (B.Sid. p.154, M.V.98,4). And there is another point. The whole tenor of Śri Śankara's commentary on the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad is for him to estab- lish his own method of interpretation while refuting that of Bhartrorapaca. There is every reason to suspect that accom- plishing this was the main reason for the composition both cf the commentary and of Suresvara's Vartika explaining it. And we have described at length in Chapter V above on Bhartr- prapañca how both the commentary and the Vartika establish their own view of the meaning of the text of the Brhadāranyaka after refuting that of Bhartrprapañca at every step. But we find no elabcrate refutation of Mandana of this kind either in the commentary or the Vartika. And we find the foliowing remark in the commentary, referring to Bhartrprapanca: 'There- fore, all those whe are clever at thinking up different inter- pretaticns of the Veda explain the meaning of the upanishadic text differently. Even so, I would accept anything that re- presented the true meaning of the Veda. I have nothing against them personally' (Brhad.Bh. II.iii.6, cp. M.V.10, III, note. p.26).

(1) They say (that is, Bhartrprapañca says, ) 'One should al- ways meditate intensely on the Absolute, the real, in its supreme form as the whole, both as a collective whole and as a system of inter-related parts'. Sometimes he speaks of the Absolute's constituting a whole as implying a series of states, along with a certain being assuming those states; sometimes he describes the Absolute in terms of a cause associated with its 'effects. Sometimes the great thinker describes it as a whole divided into different parts, as a wheel is divided into hub, felly and spokes. Did he learn that, I wonder, from the true tradition? (B.B.V. I.iv.948-50) ... There is a (so-called) great expert in the tradition who holds, forsooth, that plurality and unity are one and the same. He said that name, form and action are both different and non- different from the Absolute. (B.B.V. I.vi.46) ... And there are more passages in this vein, such as: 'There is another of these great luminaries (Bhartrprapañca) who ex- plained the relation as follows ... ' (B.B.V. II.i.21). 'Stu- dents must examine these two views (those of Sankara and Bhartrprapanca) and accept whichever seems to them best' (B.B.V. II.i.255). 'A certain person who regarded himself as a great expert in the Upanishads invented an interpretation of his own, with great ingenuity, and spoke as follows, quite without any understanding of what the Upanishads actually mean' (B.B.V. II.ii.90). 'There is another Absolutist (brahma-vadin) who explains the example (of the spokes, hub and felly of a wheel given at Brhadāranyaka II.v.15) differ- ently in order to suit his own dogmas about the Self consti- tuting a whole and so forth' (B.B.V. II.v.67, cp. M.V.86,4). 'Here, a certain great genius taught, as a special piece of

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wisdom supplied free by Vaisvanara, that a person is not final- ly liberated even when he has been liberated from his two bodies' (B.B.V. III.ii.41). 'Therefore the whole doctrine that the Absolute is both one as a collective unity and many as the differentiated parts is a mere superstition. It may be a spe- cial piece of wisdom supplied free by Vaiśvanara, but it does not obey the rules of reason' (B.B.V. IV.iii.1187). 'Depend- ing (not on reason but) on a free donation of wisdom from Vaisvanara ... ' (B.B.V. IV.iv. 391). 'This was the explanation given by that august sage, the great Bhartrprapañca, supported neither by the Veda nor by reason' (B.B.V. IV.iv.412). 'He explained it otherwise with marvellous ingenuity ... ' (B.B.V. V.i.28).

In these and other passages, the doctrine of Absolutism as infected with plurality, and the doctrine of liberation through a combinaticn of knowledge and activity were tirelessly mocked and criticized in hundreds of ways. When Suresvara repeatediy specified the true nature of the Self or Abcolute as 'neither transcendent nor immanent' he probably had Bhartrprapañca in mind - Bhartrprapañca who held that the Absolute was a unity as a coliective whole and a plurality as a system of inter- related parts (B.B.V. I.iv.529,656,1445; II.i.88,361; II.iii. 12; II.iv.14; II.iv.411,473; III.ix.156; IV.iii.368; IV.iv.569, 846-7,1298; V.1.10). Putting all this together, it seems more reasonable to sup- pose that Bhartrprapañca was singled out as the chief opponent to be refuted. And there is another related point that re- quires investigation. If Bhartrprapañca's Vrtti on the Brhad- araņyaka was so well known in Mandana's day, why is it that that mcticulous philosopher did not su much as vouchsafe it a glance? As I am not myself able to settle this doubtful ques- tion, I just raise it and offer it to philologists and his- torians, while we ourselves will carry on with the matter in hand.

109 BECAUSE THE UNITY AND SOLE REALITY CF THE SELF EXPRESSES ITSELF BY NATURE AS AWARENESS, IT IS SELF-EVIDENT

The revered Commentator pointed out that the Self was self- evident. He said, 'The Self is not a thing that supersedes anything else; for it is self-established and self-manifest. The means of knowledge belong to it. It does not depend on them to establish its existence' (B.S.Bh.II.iii.7, M.V.28,3). 'We do not base our doctrine of the unity and sole reality of the Self on the authoritative means of knowledge, since the Self is bare immediate awareness by very nature .. So we shall show later that no means of knowledge apply to it. The means of knowledge themselves rest in and depend on awareness' -

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this text of Suresvara (N.Sid. 1.89) shows that his teaching fully agreed with Śri Śankara on this point. In many places in the Vartika it is pointed out that the presencc and also the absence of means of knowledge can only be established by the Self as awareness, and that the Self is self-evident. For instance there is the verse 'Knower, knowledge, knowr and cer- titude all depend for their establishmest on the presence of the Self. On what, then, could the Self depend for its own establishment?' (B.B.V. I.iv.870), and there are many other similar texts (e.g. B.B.V. II.1.552, III. iv.91, IV. 1ii.191-6, IV.111.891 ... ).

110 METAPHYSICAL IGNORANCE IN SUREŚVARA

The revered Commentator, it is well known, said: 'Superimposi- tion thus defined the wise call Ignorance' (B.S.Bh.I.i.1, intro., cp. M.V.p.19) .Mandana, for his part, spoke of 'natural (beginningless) metaphysical Ignorance' in the individual souls (B.Sid. p.12). But he posed the alternative, 'either non- apprehension or false apprehension' (B.Sid. p.9), and then ex- pressed a prefercuce by saying 'Ignorance is positive error' (B.Sid. p.ll, cp. M.V.92). He also said, 'Because both Igno- rance and the individual soul are beginningless, .like the cycle of seed and sprout, it follows that the question of cir- cular argument does not arise' (B.Sid. p.l0, cp. M.V.94, 1). Bhartrprapañca said, 'Ignorance is failure to realize "I am all"' (M.V.82). It arises of its own accord, like desert places on parts of the surface of the earth (M.V.79,1,note).

The sentences referred to in Śri Sankara's Commentary when he was considering Bhartrprapanca's doctrine have been given in very summary form here. But they are clearly reported in Suresvara's Vartika and quoted in the sub-commentury there. 'Ignorance is a power of the Lord, even though "natural (un- caused)". Therefore, when it is manifest, it affects only a part of the Lord and has its seat in this individual soul' (Anandagiri on B.B.V. II.iii. 122). 'As deserts and the like occupy some places on the carth only, and are not universal attributes characterizing the whole surface of the earth everywhere, so Ignorance is not an attribute of the supreme Principle' (Ānandagiri on B.B.V.II.iii.124).

Suresvara, however, says that metaphysical Ignorance is ab- sence of knowledge and the effects of that. It is established through one's own direct experience, not through means of knowledge or proof. Since it is established through immediate experience alone, it escapes the grip of the various means of knowledge. For it is 'established only through lack of re- flection'. Suresvara says this repeatedly. 'Failure to

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realize that one's own Self is the sole reality is called Ignorance. Its seat is the Self, as immediate experience. It is the seed of transmigration. Its destruction constitutes the liberation of the soul' (N.Sid. I.7). 'The effects of Igno- rance are "established only through lack of reflection" even like Ignerance itself. Thererore, when Ignorance is destroyed, the whole world is destroyed and is turned into pure Conscious- ness' (B.E.V. 1.iv.1329). 'As metaphysical Ignorance is estab- lished through immediate experience only, just like the imme- diate experience "I am the Absolute", so, when dastroyed through the rise of an authoritative cognitiou, it dissolves and turns into the Self' (S.V.177). These texts show that Igmorance is occasionally declarcd by Suresvara te be subject to cancellation through the authoritative means of knowledge. We shall hore quote come further verses from the Vartikas to throw light on this.

(1) The sole cause here is impermanent Ignorance, which means 'I do not know'. It is established (not by any authoritative means of knowledge but) only through one's own experience of it, like the owl's experience of night by day. (T.B.V. II.176)

The phrase 'cause here' means the cause of apparent delimita- tions superimposed on the Self.

(2) He who would wish to see Ignorance with the sight pro- duced by the authoritative means of knowledge is like one hoping to see the darkness in the depths of a cave with a lamp. Whatever appears here in the world as 'not-self' is a result of Ignorance. Hence it is also called Ignorance. But knowledge has only one form, that of the Self. Ignorance has no other nature but failure to apprehend the Self. Ignorance is non- knowledge' in the sense of 'the opposite of knowledge', as a 'non-friend' is the opposite of a friend. The conception will always be intelligible in this sense. (T.B.V. II.177-9)

The nature of Ignorance as not-self is simply non-perception of the Self. Non-perception of the Self is called Ignorance (avidyā, literally non-knowledge) because it is the contradic- tory of knowledge (as 'non-cat', in logic, is the contradictory of 'cat').

(3) Nor can the theory that Ignorance arises spontaneously from the supreme Self, like desert places appearing here and there on the surface of the earth, be correct. If Ignorance arose from the supreme Self, it would mean that liberation would be impossible. Or if Ignorance were destroyed, then on this theory it would imply the destruction of the Self, the erroneous doctrine of the Buddhists. (B.B.V. II.iii.130-1)

These two verses were composed to refute Bhartrprapanca.

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i11 OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS CN THE SUSJECT GF METAPHYSICAL IGNORANCE

In the course of reflecting on the topic of the cessation of Ignorance, the following hypothetical cbjection was raised in the Brehma Siddhi.

(1) Since the Absolute is eternal, its essence is indestruc- tible. Ignorance, therefore, (which requires t.o be destroyed) cannot be of the nature of the Absolute. Ignorance must either be or not be different from the Alsolute. If it is not dif- ferent, what could there be in it that could be destroyed? So let us say that Ignorance is mere non-apprehension. It could not then be arything different from the Absolute .... But knowledge which puts an end to Ignorance, is eternally present in the Absolute. And nothing else apart from the Absolute exists .... If, on the other hand, metaphysical Ignorance were positive wrong apprehension, then how could it be brought to an end? For we have now pointed out how such a theory has de- fects, whether Ignorance be taken as being of the nature of the Absolute or not of its nature. (B.Sid. pp.8-9, summarized)

The answer given to this objection was as follows.

(2) Ignorance is not part of the nature of the Absolute, nor is it a second thing over against it, nor is it altogether un- real, nor is it real. That is why this Ignorance is called Maya and a false appearance. If it were the nature of any- thing, then, whether different from that thing or not, it would be perfectly real and so would not be Ignorance. But if it were totally unreal, like a flower supposed to be growing in the sky, it would not enter inio experience. So it is inde- terminable (either as real or unreal, B.Sid. p.9) .... If the matter is conceived thus, Ignorance may be taken as belonging to the individual souls, regarded as different from the Abso- lute, without the defects complained of by the opponent. (B.Sid. p.l0, summarized)

On the same topic, an objection is quoted from the Śloka Vārtika cf Kumārila.

(3) If Ignorance were the true nature of anything, it could not be extirpated ever. For what exists naturally can only be destroyed by the advent of some different external factor. But those who claim that all is the one Self cannot admit the ad- vent of any different external factor. (S.V. Sambandhākşepa Parihāra 85-6; cp. M.V.95, intro.)

The refutation of the objection by Mandana is through appeal to the indeterminability of Ignorance. But Ignorance is never found referred to as indeterminable anywhere in Suresvara's

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Värtika. It is there accepted as being of the nature of uon- apprehension, expressed as the feeling 'I do not know'. So we must think how this objection would have been met by Suresvara. In this conrection, the following verses are worthy of con- sideratiom.

(4) Though this metaphysical Ignorance is natural, it is mani- fest only on account of the Seif as immediate experience. It is ousted and destroyed by knowledge, as darkness is destroyed by the rise of the sun. Beginningless Ignorance is seeu to be destroyed in an instant by metaphysical knowledge, which has a beginning in time. We do not cecept that such knowledge re- quires re-affirmation. Though this our inmost Self is thus self-luminons and is the Witness of all Iguorance and its ef- fects, yet it is not properly known before metaphysical knowl- edge has arisen through the upanishadic discipline, as our own immediate experience (of 'I do not know') indicates. (S.V. 1088-90)

Here is what the passage.means. Ignorance is natural, for we have the immediate experience 'I do not know'. And we ses everywhere in experience how prior absence of knowledge is re- moved once and for all through adventitious knowledge, without there being any question of the need for re-affirmation of such knowledge. Nor should one raise the objection 'How could there be Ignorance in the Absolute, which is knowledge by nature?' For before the rise of metaphysical knowledge through the upa- nishadic texts as administered by a Teacher, the Self can ap- pear (through Ignorarce) both as the ignorant one and as un- known, though itself the Witness of all knowledge and Ignor- ance. And so in this way our metaphysical Ignorance, even though natural (and so beginningless), is brought to an end by the adventitious metaphysical knowledge arising from the Vedic texts. Nor should one raise the objection, 'How can this be so, if nothing apart from the Absolute exists?' For we accept all experience as it comes before the rise of metaphysical knowledge. Very well. But how do we explain how Ignorance could be established by immediate experience? And if it can be shown that it is so established, Low could it be that defects are not introduced into the Absolute through contact with Ignor- rance and its effects? And how could it, if established by immediate experience, be brought to an end? On this subject we have the following verses.

(5) Everyone, even children, will express their natural Igno- rance based on experience when asked about something of which they have no knowledge. They will say, 'I do not know any- thing about it' .... In regard to things that are entirely be- yond the range of experience, like things on the roof of the Himalayas, waking experience is thus no different from

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dreamless sleep. There is no break here in experience itself, as we have the expcrience 'I do not know'. And when we see some- thing that formerly we did not see, (there must have been ex- perience of not secing sincc) we know afterwards 'Formerly I did not kuow it'. (S.V.993,995-6)

In things that are totally beyond the range of experience, one knows from one's oum emerience of 'I do not know' that they ure not known. This is estublished first, and then Suresvara goes on to show how a person may say of something he now sees, 'Up to now, I did not know it'. The idea is to show that all Ignorance is establiched by experience.

(6) Ignorance is established by one's own experience, even though the Self is free from Ignorance. Before the rise of thc knowledge that all is the one Self, we have the experience 'I do not know'. (B.B.V. I.iv.216)

In that in which,because it is of the very nature of imediaie awareness, there can be no Ignorance, there is nevertheless, before the rise of metaphysical knowledge of the Self, the notion established through immediate awareness 'I do not know myself'.

(7) That principle (the Self) is self-revealed. Therefore it is ever free from Ignorance. That which is ever free from Ignorance is free also from he impurities that spring from the latter. (B.B.V. I.iv.213)

The meaning is that the Absolute is not touched by Ignorance or its effects because it is ever self-evident to itself.

(8) He who has known the Self in its true nature knows that its connection with Ignorance is impossible in past, present or future. It is then seen that the notion that the pure Self was connected with anything else was only established through lack of reflection. (B.B.V. I.iv.217)

The enlightened one who knows the Self in immediate experience has the conviction 'Ignorance is impossible in me in past, present or future'. The notion of connection with Ignorance was established only through lack of reflection - that is the meaning. The fact that Ignorance and its effects are estab- lished only through lack of reflection is often mentioned in the Vartika, for example in such places as: B.B.V. I. iv. 1170,

IV.iv.307. 1329, 1341; II.iii.192, 224; III.iv.131; III.v.42; III.viii.31;

(9) Merely from the rise of the correct idea from the text 'That thou art', one finds that Ignorance, together with its effects, never existed in the past, does not exist now, and will

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never exist in the future. And so it is not possible to show by authoritative means of knowledge that Ignorance belongs to the Self, or to explain its nature or indicatc its source. For its sole existence is our experience of it. He who is afflic- ted with Ignorance cannot determine the truth about that Igno- rance. It is oniy onc who has experienced the final reality who can make the discovery, by reference to that, 'Ignorance does not exist': (s.V.183-4,179)

The cessation of Ignorance is only intelligible if Ignorance is seen to be established only through lack of reflection. It is onty through the vision of one who has known the Self that one can say, 'It docs not exist', because only after such vision will one have scen that, unlike the Self, Ignorance is not self-established. And sc, from the standpoint of vision of the final truith, questions such as 'what is the nature of Ignorance?' or 'Where did it come from?' are simply not raised (as it is known that Ignorance had no existence).

In the view of Suresvara, lack of metaphysical knowledge is the cause of transmigratory experience. Therefore he lays it down: 'Failure to realize that one's own Self is the sole reality is called metaphysical Ignorance. Its seat is the Self as immediate experience. It is the seed of transmigra- tion. Its destruction constitutes the liberation of the soul' (N.Sid. I.7) . On this point, the Mimamsakas and others raise an objection. Absence of authoritative knowledge may assume one of three forms - wrong knowledge, absence of knowledge or doubt. Two of these, (wrong knowledge and doubt), being positive reali- ties, are explicable as due to some defect in the factors of knowledge' (Kumārila, Ś.V. Codanā Sūtra 54). Basing them- selves on this text from an acknowledged authority, they hold that erroneous knowledge, being a positive reality, can func- tion as a cause, but that mere lack of knowledge cannot be regarded as the cause of transmigratory experience, because it is not a.positive reality. This. was probably the reason why Ācārya Mandana laid the main emphasis on positive erroneous knowledge as the nature of Ignorance, remarking, 'Non- apprehension, being a non-entity (abhava), cannot be the cause of anything' (M.V.92, intro.). Against this, Suresvara argued as follows:

(10) Are you saying that, in the case of error, what is ne- gated by an authoritative means of knowledge is reality? If reality were negated thus, what would be left for an authori- tative means of knowledge to know ?... How could false knowl- edge be reality? The false is not the real. To speak of knowledge being false and yet being reality - that could only come from a great genius like Kumarila. Even if the erroneous notion of a snake or the like in regard to a rope were taken

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as a reality in itself, it would still be unreal appearance when identified with the rope, and, as such, would be contra- dicted and cancelled by knowledge of the latter. If erroneous knowledge had a cause, as it does in Kumarila's theory, then he ought to be able to state that cause. If he were to say it was a real effect but had no cause, that would be laughed out of court even by children .... The fact is that in the triad 'absence of knowledge', 'wrong knowledge' and 'doubt', 'absence of knowledge' is the cause and the other two are its effects. (B.B.V. I.iv.423,425-7,1368)

What is argued here is that erroneous knowledge is an unreality juut like (that non-entity) absence of knowledge. That is why it can be contradicted and cancelled by authoritative knowl- edge. Since erroneous knowledge can only arise as a result of absence of knowledge, the Mimamsakas' objection was incorrect.

112 THE TREATMENT OF IGNORANCE BY ŚRI ŚAŃKARA AND SUREŚVARA. COMPARED

In the introduction to his Brahma Sūtra Commentary, Śrī Śańkara declares that erroneous cognition is superimposition. He says: 'And yet, though these two principles (Self and not-self, pure subject and object) are utterly distinct in nature, there is a failure to distinguish one from the other, and each, togethcr with its attributes, is superimposed on and identified with the other. And from that there results this natural worldly ex- perience, based on erroneous knowledge and involving a syn- thesis of the real with the false, which expresses itself as "I am this" and "This is mine"' (M.V.22,4). He also says, 'Superimposition is of the nature of a false idea' (B.S.Bh. I.i.1, intro. ad fin.). And he declares metaphysical Ignorance to be that very erroneous cognition, synonymous with superim- position. In Suresvara's Vārtika, however, metaphysical Ignorance is said to be non-discrimination, of the nature of lack of or absence of knowledge. For example, we have: 'The relation between the Self and Ignorance of the Self is held to be that between 'the Self' and 'being constituted by the Self without being aware of the fact'. This fundamental failure of discri- rination, called Ignorance of one's true Self, is said to be. the cause of (the apparent existence of all) the creatures of the world' (B.B.V. I.iv.381). A further verse was added to indicate that absence of knowledge was the one core of errone- ous knowledge. 'Absence of knowledge, constantly present as it is, is identical with erroneous knowledge; as cause and effect, they are constant concomitants' (B.B.V. I.iv.386). And he makes his view clear with the verse, 'From doubt we deduce absence of knowledge. From wrong knowledge we deduce the same. If we are asked, 'What is the essence of doubt and wrong

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knowledge?' we reply 'Their essence is absence of knowledge' (B.B.V. I.iv.440). The revered Commentator Sankara had declared openly that the sole purpose of the Upanishads was to put an end to superimpo- sition, saying 'And the entire upanishadic teaching is begun to communicate knowledge of the sole reality of the one Self, and thus to put an end to ihis superimposition, the cause of all evil' (B.S.Bh.I.i.1, intro. ad fin. ). But Suresvara re- versed this view and atated his own view very clearly as fol- lows: 'When right knowledge arises it cancels and contradicts absencc of knowledge. When that has been cancelled, there is no need for further efforts to cancel positive erroneous cog- nitica. The fact that a false cognition can be cancelled is only so because it implies absence of Encwledge. How can false cognition harm us when its root has been destroyeu?' (B.B.V. I.iv.437-8) So the question arises which view is bet- ter, and I shall explain what anpears to me to be the truth in this matter. The revered Commentator said that failure to discriminate the Self and the not-self was the cause of their mutual super- imposition. But in saying this he was only concerned with the mind functioning as the basis of empirical experience. For he says, 'Through the failure to distinguish one from the other (Self and not-self) ... there results this worldly experience based on wrong knowledge' (B.S.Bh.I.i.l, intro.). In his Gītā Commentary, too, we find the words, 'a "conjunction" which is in fact (not a real conjunction but) a mere mutual superimpo- sition of the Field and the Knower of the Field (M.V. p.35) together with their attributes, a superimpostion that is con- ditioned by a failure to discriminate two utterly distinct entities one from the other' (Bh.G.Bh.XIII.26, cp. M.V.251,6). In crdinary worldly experience, superimposition of silver onto a piece of shell occurs when there is failure to discriminate between the two phenomena, shell and silver. When the revered Commentator said that our mutual superimposition of Self and not-self was conditioned by a failure to distinguish between the two, he was assuming for purposes of exposition that the same thing that happens in the case of the shell-silver error happens also in the case of that superimposition of Self and not-self that conditions all empirical experience. But the two cases are not the same. In the case of the worldly ex- ample, the one who saw the silver was already established as an individual empirical experiencer before he saw it. In the case of the mutual superimposition of the Self and not-self, however, the Self is not already established as an individual experiencer before that superimposition is made. The Self, at that stage, is not (yet an individual experiencer and so not) yet in a position to 'fail to discriminate Self and not- self'. So we cannot speak of any such failure to discriminate as the cause of the mutual superimposition of Self and not- self. For the teaching is that becoming an individual

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experiencer can only occur through the said superimposition. It fcllows that (in the case of this initial superimposition that makes all cthers possible) it was not intended te assert real temporal sequence between non-discrimination and superim- position, but only logical sequence according to the concep- tions of the human mind - the conception of superimpositica implies the conception of non-discrimination as its logically prior condition. As for the objection that there are no exceptions to the rule that absence of knowledge is the cause of ali empirical phencmena, because wrong knowledge is its effect - this objec- tion may be answered on similar lines as follows. The whole notion of cause and effect, we may say. falls within superim- positicm. For until superimposition had itself already come into being, it could not set up temporal or causal sequence, which depend on superimpcsition. Hence our own view is that, in relation to the Self, all appearance of con-apprehension, doubt and wrong-apprenension is itself superimposition, and that in this context there is no occasica to enquire into the nature or its material or effi- cient cause, as there might be in the case of the incidental superimpositions that occur in the course of empirical experi- ence. For the revered Commentator says, 'Thus this natural (i.e. uncaused) beginningless and endless superimposition, which is of the nature of false supposition ...! (B.S.Bh.I.1.1, intro. ad fin.) And Suresvara accepts this same view, but expresses it in a different way by saying 'Absence of knowledge, constantly pres- ent as it is, is identical with erroneous krowledge' (B.B.V. I.iv.386, cp. M.V. p.311). So one should not suppose that there is any fundamental difference between the two systems on this head. When the matter is examined in this light, it is fair to see Suresvara's treatment of non-apprehension sad false apprehension as directed only to refuting a particular form of the theory that metaphysical Ignorance was erroneous cognition - the form in which that doctrine was advanced by another school (that of Mandana). But wrong apprehension, non-apprehension and doubt can only occur in the case of an individual experiencer (i.e. within the realm of superimposi- tion). Such is our own view of the matter.

113 ENQUIRY INTO THE SEAT OF IGNORANCE AND THE OBJECT WHICH IT CONCEALS

The Brahma Siddhi raises the question 'To whom does metaphysi- cal Ignorance belong?' and answers 'We say "It belongs to the individual souls"' (B.Sid. p.10). We have already examined this view (M.V.94;95). Bhartrprapañca held that metaphysical Ignorance springs spontaneously from the Absolute, and, modi- fying a portion of the latter, has its seat in the individual

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soul. it is, however, a characteristic of the not-self. Listen now to the words of Suresvara.

(1) Now, Ignorance cannot exist in the void. It must always be Ignorance of someone about something. Further, we have al- ready established that two categcries exist, and only two, the Self and the not-self. From this it follows that the seat of Ignorance (the conscious being which Ignorance affects) cannot be the not-self. For the very nature uf the not-self is Igno- rance, and Ignorance cannot affect Ignorance. Even if it could, what difference would the rise of Ignorance in Ignorance bring about (that we could say that it was an event at all)? Nor is the attainment of knowledge possible in the not-self, that one could argue that there must have been some contradic- tory Ignorance in the not-self (for it to negate). Further, the not-self is born of Ignorance. It is absurd to suppose that that which is logically and causally prior can only exist supportea by and dependent on its own effect. Nor, again, has the not-seif any form independent of and different from Igno- rance, whereby it could serve as its seat and support. These arguments (which refute the possibility of the not- self serving as the seat of Ignorance) also show that it can- not be the object concealed by Ignorance either. Therefore the not-self is neither the seat of Ignorance nor the object con- cealed by Ignorance. Hence we conclude, as the only remaining alternative, that it is the Self alone which is both the seat of and the object concealed by Ignorance. All of us have the experience 'I do not know', and in the Veda we hear 'I am only a knower of the mantras, my lord; I do not know the Self' (Chand.VII.i.3). (Nor do the arguments which tell against the not-self as seat of Ignorance apply to the Self.) The Self, indeed, is not identical with Ignorance, since its nature is pure Con- sciousness. Moreover, (the rise of) Ignorance in the Self produces a difference in the form of an obscuration of knowl- edge. And attainment of knowledge is possible because the Self is the source of knowledge. Nor has the Self the charac- teristic of being an effect of Ignorance, (which, as we have seen, prevented the not-self from functioning as its seat); for it is rock-firm and raised high above all change by nature. And finally, the conscious Self has a form and existence inde- pendent of those of Ignorance, whereby it can serve as a seat for the latter. Hence we conclude that it is the Self alone that is affected by Ignorance. What, then, is the object concealed by this Ignorance per- taining to the Self? The Self is that object. But is it not a fact thet Ignorance is incompatible with the Self, since the latter is of the very nature of knowledge, and is without differentiation (so that it cannot serve as a seat for Ignor- ance, which would imply a distinction between the seat and the thing seated)? And is it not the case that the Self gives

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rise to knowledge, and is contradictory to Ignorance in other ways too? To this cbjection we reply that Ignorance is compatible with the Self. For in reality the Self remains undifferenti- ated. It appears to become differentiated into knower, knowl- edge and known through mere Ignorance alone, just as it is through mere Ignorance that the rope appears to become a snake - the Self and the rope remaining in reality quite un- affected. Hence when Ignorance is shaken off there is complete absence of all the evils of duality. (N.Sid. III.1, intro. )

Aud Suresvara's view is that from the standpoint of the highest truth there is no Igmorance for anyone.

(2) No. The notion that Ignorance has its seat in the Abso- lute and belongs to it is itself only imagined in Ignorance. From the standpoint of the Absolute, Ignorance can in no way exist. (s.V.176)

What is here said is that there is no other metaphysical Igno- rance, with its seat in the not-self, over and above the Igno- rance seated in the Self that obscures the Self. But this does not mean that one can interpret Suresvara to be saying that there is no other Ignorance at the empirical level, such as Ignorance of sheil in the shell-silver error. That would disagree with his arguments mentioned several times in the previous section (M.V.112) and supported with the usual exam- ples like the rope-snake, about absence of knowledge being a factor (and the fundamental factor) in error, over and above the erroneous cognition itself. But from the standpoint cf the highest truth, there is only one Ignorance, which has the Self for its seat and also for the object which it conceals. There are not really two different kinds of Ignorance. And that is all he wished to say. This will be made clear at M. V.115 (where he denies all reality to the silver-error). We have already referred at M.V.69,9 to his refutation of the doctrine of two kinds of Igncrance. That was said in the course of introducing a refutation of the Prasankhyana Vadins (exponents of the doctrine that liberation comes through re- peated meditation on the texts), whose doctrine was as follows:

(3) They (the Prasankhyana Vadins) hold that there are two kinds of Ignorance, natural and adventitious. The adventitious kind applies to worldly objects, the natural kind to the Self. Adventitious Ignorance disappears through the rise of knowl- edge cccurring once, as in the case of the prince brought up as a forest-dweller and thinking himself to be such, and who remembered he was a prince when a minister came to tell him, 'You are not a forester, you are a prince'. Natural Ignorance, though it may be removed through the rise of knowledge occur- ring once, nevertheless returns, as we see from examples of

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attachment and other defects arising from Ignorance once more, even in the case of those who have known the metaphysical truth. (B.B.V. IV.iv.861-3)

This confirms our thesis, as it shows that Suresvara was aware of the doctrine of two kiuda of Ignorance and rejected it. In the same way, in the system of the rovered Commentator himsel!, by whom Ignorance is identiried with superimposition, the Self is the seat of Ignorance just as it is felt to be in practical experience (in the form 'i do not know'). But there is no occasion for subtle theories about it. For the whole notion of knowledge and Ignorance itself belongs to the sphere of Ignorance. On this we might quote the following.

(4) If you ask 'To whom does this Ignorance belong?' we reply 'To you who ask this question'. If you then ask, 'But does not the Veda say that I am the Lord?' we reply, 'If you are awake to this (you will see that) there is no Ignorance for anybudy'. (B.S.Bh. IV. i. 3)

(5) It may be asked, 'Whose is this Ignorance?' The reply is, 'It belongs to him to whom it appears to belong'. (Bh.G.Bh. XIII.2)

(6) The Teacher says: You take that which is the supreme Self and which is not subject to transmigration wrongly, and have the conviction 'I am subject to transmigration'. You take that which does not perform action as a performer of action, you take one who does not enjoy empirical experience as the empirical experiencer, you take that which alone really exists as if it were non-existent .. That is metaphysical Ignorance. (U.S.(prose) section 50)

Here also we see that the teachings of Śri Sankara and Suresvara are essentially the same. Both take absence of knowledge and erroneous superimpostion as fundamentally one.

114 THE OPERATION OF THE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

The fact of objects being unknown is not established by the means of knowledge (perception, inference, revelation, etc., ), because it is the invariable pre-condition before a means of knowledge can be applied. If it could be established by a valid means of knowledge that an object was unknown, this would imply the absurd result that the state of a thing as un- known would persist for ever (whereas we know that things previously unknown sometimes come to be known, cp. M.V.114,2 and 3). For the same reason, it cannot be established by the valid means of knowledge that things are in doubt or

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erroneously represented (since valid knowledge removes the doubt and misrepresentation, S.V.688). Indeed, the means of knowledge only apply to what is totally unknown (B.B.V. I.iv. 258). Perception and the rest are means of knowledge precisely because they put an end to ignorance of pots and other objects, which latter are themselves revealed as unknown only in and through (the Self as) immediate experience. Therefore the means of knowledge never bear on the not-self without also bcaring on the supreme Self (S.V.1002). Pots and other worldly cbjects are known only through an authoritative means of knowledge, and do not lose their conditicn of being unknown without one. The Self, however, being the self-established reality, may be understood to lose its condition of being un- known directly through the means of valid knowledge (the Vedic text) and without an act of cognition producing a resultant- cognition. (S.V.1004)

Anandagiri explains this verse of Suresvara differently. He saus: 'The Self cannot be known withoul the help of a cognition through the means of valid knowledge (i.e. the Veda), on ac- count of its very nature as inmost Self and reality. For it is only consciousness in the form of a cognition through a means of valid knowledge (as opposed to the Self as pure Con- sciousness) that contradicts Ignorance. Consciousness in its pure form does not do so (since it co-exists with it as its Witness)'. This is not in contradiction with the true teaching of the system. Nevertheless, I submit that what Suresvara is really saying in the present verse is as follows. Pots and other worldly objects established by the empirical means of knowl- edge depend on the self-luminous cognition resulting from the means of valid knowledge to lose their state of being unknown. The Self, however, loses it directly through the Vedic text (M.V.116). It does not depend on a self-luminous 'resultant- cognition' from the application of one of the means of knowl- edge to lose its state of being unknown. For it is non- different from right-knowledge by nature.

In truth, however, what was really not-self could not even reach the stage of being unknown. The great philosophers of all schools hold that in practical experience objects like Lots are unknown before the rise of the cognition through which they come to be known (B.B.V. IV.iii.158). However, there are no distinctions in reality. Hence the word 'being' can refer to only one entity, and it is that and that alone which is unknown. The individual experiencer and the means of knowledge at his disposal are both experienced as appearances of a self-luminous entity. And it is that entity which is Being, and (because it is the only reality) it is that and that alone which is unknown (N.Sid. III.7-8). Again, a means of knowledge establishes an object, like a

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piece of shell that is already existent before that means of knowledge is applied. It dces not establish the existence of anything totally non-existent. But it would have been wrong to have said that the illusory silver for which the shell was mistaken was existent but unkmowa, like the shell was. And it would have been wrong to have said that the silver was eter- nally existent bui unknown, like thc Self. Therefore it is wrong, in the case of illusory silver, to say that a means of knowledge is applied to remove a special increment of Ignorance concealing the silver, over and above the Iguerance that con- ceals the Self (B.B.V. IV.iii. 166-7). It is the unknown shell that is wrongly interpreted as silver. In the same way, the Self is wrongly interpreted as the not-self by those who have not gained metaphysical knowledge. in the example, knowledge of the illusory silver is not knowledge through a valid means of knowledge, as here the existence of silver independent of the illusory cognition is never established. Nor is the silver-iilusion based on the application of a valid means of knowledge to the shell, as Ignorance of the shell is not re- moved (B.B.V. IV.iv.904). In the case of erroneous knowledge of the Self, the pheuom- enon that the silver-illusion example was intended to illus- trate, no cognitions bearing on the nct-self are examples of the application of valid cognition. The not-self can neither be known nor unknown, any more than the illusory silver can (because it does not exist). Nor can the Self be known through a valid cognition bearing on the not-self; for a cog- nition bearing on the not-self will not destroy the Ignorance relating to the Self. From the empirical standpoint, however, the various means of knowledge give rise to valid knowledge in their respective spheres. The application of a valid means of knowledge results in cognition (prama), which, because it is of the nature of immediate experience, is itself identical with the Self. Hence (from the empirical standpoint in which they have their play) all the means of valid cognition (appear to) communicate knowledge of that Self which is revealed in the Upanishads. But that, being self-established, neither comes nor goes. It does not stand in need of a valid means of knowledge to reveal it (T.B.V. II.526). We are familiar, however, in practical experience with the feeling 'I do not know' in relation to it. In this sense we are ignorant of it, and the valid means of cognition called the Veda liberates us from this Ignorance. Thus when the Ignorance that causes practical experience of an individual experiencer and his means of knowledge has been destroyed by the knowledge arising from the Veda, all the means of valid cognition cease to be such any longer. And this means the realization of man's true end (S.V.162,1007). Here we subjoin a few verses from the Vartikas illustrating Suresvara's way of examining the valid means of knowledge.

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(1) The means cf valid knowledge do not produce 'unknownness' for the very reason that they produce 'knownness'. If they produced 'unknownness', what function would valid knowledge fulfil? (B.B.V. I.iv.295)

(2) Our ignorance of anything is a matter of immediate aware- ness, and invariably precedes valid cognition and ceases with it. It cannot, therefore, be established by the means of valid cognition. (s.V.686)

(3) If ignorance of a thing were accessible to the means of knowledge, like objects such as a pot, it would be rcal, and what was at any time unknown would be unknown for ever. (s.v.687)

(4) We have already stated the rule which shows that erroneous cognition and doubt can no more be known through valid cogni- tion than ignorance can. (The rule, namely, that what is brought to an end by a valid cognition cannot be an object re- vealed by that valid cognition). (B.B.V, T.iv.257)

(5) Pots and other objects in the world are known only through the valid means of empirical knowledgc such as perception, ete. Until they are so known, they remain unknown. But the Self, because it is a self-evident reality, must become known with- out the help of an act of cognition. (S.V.1004)

(6) That (the Self) without taking cognisance of which even the empirical means of knowledge could not rightly determine the not-self - how can the ritualists deny that the Upanishads can communicate knowledge of it? (s.V.551)

(7) Since every object is unknown before the idca of it first arises in our minds, and since (even as unknown), it exists by the power of the one reality (sat), it is that reality which is (ultimately) the thing that is unknown. The Self, which is the reality manifesting itself in both the knower and the means of knowledge when an empirical cognition is being sought, and which is revealed by its own power - that is (always) the entity concealed by Ignorance. (N.S.III.7,8)

(8) In the case of the illusory cognition of silver in what is really a piece of shell, the valid means of knowledge ex- presses its validity by revealing the shell and showing that the latter existed before the means of cognition was applied. But no valid means of knowledge bears on the silver, which is not shown to have existed at all. When illusory silver is erroneously perceived in a piece of shell, there is no silver being revealed by valid cognition to exist in the same way that the shell does. There is no silver as a reality at all, either previously unknown, like the shell, or previously known

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(though imperfectly) like the Self, the real. (B.B.V. IV.iii. 166-7)

(9) The illusory silver is only known when the shell is not known. In the same way. the not-self can only be known when the Self, as immediate experience, is not known (in its true nature). Illusory cilver cannot be the object of a valid cog- nition, as its existence, unlike that of the shcll, cannot be established apart from the cognition by which it is known, since it is never -stablished as known in other circumstances. Since the illusory silver-cognition does not reveal the shell as an object of valid cognition, it cannot be a means of valid cognition at all, for lack of an object. The illusory silver- cognition cannot be a means of valid cognition for the shell any more than it can for silver, as it does not cancel Igno- rance of the chell or assume its form. And it shoulu be under- stood that, as in the case of the illusory silver-cognition, all apparent means of valid cognition that bear on the not- self are not valid means of cognition at all (from the stand- point of the highest truth). The only exception is that (i.e. the supreme metaphysical texts of the Veda) which bears on the inmost Self. A person's inmost Consciousness is experienced here in the world as unknown until he is enlightened by the (appropriate) means of knowledge (the supreme Vedic texts). (B.B.V. IV.iv.901-6)

(10) But where the cognition is (not of the not-self but) of the form and nature of the Self, being pure Consciousness ex- cluding all else, there is no dependence on any further means of cognition. Once this knowledge rises, it, never sets. (T.B.II.526)

(11) It is not the case (that if the Upanishads taught the sole reality of the transcendent Self the Vedic texts enjoin- ing rituals would be contradicted). All valid means of knowl- edge retain their validity till knowledge of, the Self. For all culminate in, but end with, that. (S.V.162)

(12) The Ignorance that gives rise to the whole play of knower, knowledge and known is cancelled by enlightenment, which is of the nature of identity with the one infinite Self, arising from upanishadic texts like 'That thou art'. (S.V.1006)

(13) Therefore the Veda is a valid means of knowledge in that it destroys Ignorance of the Self. And this is man's highest goal. Such is the view of the wise. (S.V.1007)

115 CANCELLATION OF ILLUSION

In the course of refuting the (Mimamsaka) theory that

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perceptual errors arise from failure to perceive a distinction (akhyati-vāda), Ācārya Mancana goes on to state bis own doc- trine as follows:

(1) There could not be the correcting-cognition 'this is not silver' if error had been mere non-apprehension, since nothing positive can result from a non-apprehension; a non-apprehension cannot give rise to any idea, as it is a non-existence. On the other hand a positive erroneous cognition 'rcvealing' silver, that did not in fact exist, in a nearby perceptible object, cr a cognition 'revealing' (distant) silver as if it were close, would give a positive result (in the form of an idea subject to cancellation) .... We do not hold that the correcting- cognition 'this is not silver' merely negates the existence of silver or of an cbjeci in contact with the sense of sight. We hold that it either denies that the thing in contact with the sense of sight is silver, or eise denies that it is silver that is in contact with the sense of sight. A non-apprehension cannot stand as the object of either of these negations, irom the mere fact of being no more than a failure io apprehend. One must therefore necessarily resort to the theory of positive erroneous cognition (viparita-khyati) if one is to account for the fact that there is anything positive to negate. (B.Sid. p.143)

And Mandana clearly says that the shell is the object of the erioneous silver-cognition.

(2) In erroneous cognition, it is not in its true form as shell that the shell stands as object of the silver-cognition, for the shell would prompt no activity in its true form. It stands in the form of silver, as there is an activity of pick- ing up founded on that. (B.Sid. p.147)

In Suresvara's Vartika Ignorance is taken as a non-entity (abhava). Nevertheless, the doctrine of erroneous perception as positive erroneous cognition is clearly approved under a different form, as is shown at the beginning of the verse quoted above, 'The illusory silver is only known when the shell is not known ... ' (B.B.V. IV.iv. 901, M. V. 114, 9). No clear statement is forthcoming from Mandana on the ques- tion whether or not the illusory silver actually exists. But there are verses in the Vartika clearly showing that the sil- ver is a mere apparition which has no real existence anywhere.

(3) The hotion 'this silver' does not refer to any real entity anywhere. It turns out that there was no genuine knowledge of silver existing in the shell and that the silver was not a genuine 'this' (not a genuine object existing in front of us). Some say that, in the silver-illusion, because neither 'silver' nor 'this' (as associated with silver) can be shown to exist

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anywhcre else they must exist in the Witness or in the mind. But this also we deny. There is no knowledge of any object at all here. There is a mere apparition caused by false knowl- edge. (B.B.V. I.iv.275-6)

The existence anywhere of a false notion or object cannot be proved by valid cognitiou. The illusory object, the illusory cognitiom, Ignorance itself, the individual experiencer and so on - all these are established not by valid means of cogni- tion but by the immcdiate experience of changeless Conscious- ness.

(4) Therefore an appearance like a memory arises in the mind that bears the impressions of previous experiences of silvcr. But it manifests only through the eternal, changeless and unitary light of the supreme Self. In Ignorance there is only the individual experiencer and his experience - there is no real object of valid cognition beyond them. Hence Ignorance and its individual experiencer are objects of the immediate apprehension of the Witness. There could not even be an in- dividual experiencer and his empirical experience without the support of pure Consciousness (samvit). For, in their true nature, the individual knower and his knowledge and its ob- jects, which together constitute the not-self, are nothing but pure Consciousness. (B.B.V. I.iv.279-82)

Thus for Suresvara the point of introducing the example of perceptual illusions like illusory silver was to show that the whole vision of the world was a mere illusion. The illusory appearance of the world rises up in the Self when the latter remains unknown. Even Ignorance cannot manifest except through the support of self-evident pure Consciousness. Such manifestation occurs in the absence of deep metaphysical re- flection. On this point there are the following verses in the Vārtika.

(5) Therefore all our familiarity with valid empirical knowl- edge, with apparently valid empirical knowledge and with in- valid knowledge (error) - as also with metaphysical Igno- rance - is made possible by that special means of knowledge (the Self) which requires nothing else to illumine its object. This whole universe of objects that come into being and pass away can only be known through this special internal verifi- able principle, which is self-evident and independent of any other means of knowledge. (B.B.V. I.iv.272-3)

The internal verifiable principle is the 'Self-not-yet-known'. 'Ananyamam' means 'self-established and independent of any other means of knowledge'.

(6) This erroneous cognition cannot be correct knowledge

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corresponding to any object, as it does not relate to any ob- ject of valid cognition. Because it is known, it cannot be said not to cxist at ail. Because it is directly perceived as something actually present, it is not admitted to be a memory. (B.B.V. I.iv.274)

The erroneous cognition is not an idea corresponding to a real object, nor is it absence of knowledge, nor is it a memory. The teaching of this verse is like Sri Sankara's phrase 'the false appearance at one place of what had previously been seen at another place, of the nature of (but not identical with) memory' (B.S.Bh.I.i.1, intro.).

116 AUTHORITY OF THE VEDA: ROLE OF NEGATIVE TEXTS

In this way, hecause the Self has thus been shown to be the only entity that is unknown, it must undeniably be accepted as being the one thing that has to be kuown. Thus the Vedanta philosophy has a settled and well-demonstrated object of en- quiry, while other philosophies do not. The fact that the Self as immediate experience is a verifiable reality is demon- strated by all the means of cognition. That very Conscious- ness which is accepted as the resultant-cognition following upon perception and the other valid means of knowledge being applied to external objects - that very Consciousness is ac- cepted as the subject-matter of the Upanishads, which they communicate to the hearer with the authority of a valid means of knowledge. It is for this reason that we do not accept the Vedic texts to be authoritative just because they are Vedic texts. They are accepted as authoritative because doubt and wrong knowl- edge and so forth are impossible in the Self as immediate ex- perience, knowledge of which they effectively communicate. Since metaphysical Ignorance and its effects are only estab- lished 'through lack of deep metaphysical reflection', it can be removed solely by knowledge arising from the texts. Nor should one raise the objection, 'Because the Self is of the nature of knowledge it can eliminate Ignorance on its own. What is the need of any further factor such as Vedic texts?' For what removes Ignorance? It is always a valid means of cognition, which provides a resultant-cognition which in turn removes the 'unknownness' of its object. But the Self is not contradictory to metaphysical Ignorance, for as constant and eternal awareness it remains in permanent co-existence with Ignorance. So what destroys metaphysical Ignorance - and it is the only thing that destroys it - is the Self when it has been immediately experienced in its true form through the Veda as means of cognition. Nor should one think, 'The true nature of the Self has to

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be settled through logicai argumentation, employing the method of agreement and difference. Why appeal to the Veda?' For it is only in relation to Ignorance that the Self appears to mani- fest as cause and effect. Its true nature cannot be discovered in its manifestation either as effect or cause. So logical enquiry by the method of agreement and difference, which treats of effects and causes, will not awaken us to a knowledge of the true nature or the Self. Again, the Self is the Absolute and the Abselute is the Self, their identity is the special theme of the upanishadic texts. That is not a subject that can ta approached by any other means of knowledge apart from those texts. Nor should one raise the objection: 'If the meanings of the words "Absolute" and "Self" are within normal human comprehensicn it means that they must be known through some other weans of knowledge apart from ver- bal revelation, and then verbal revelation could not be an authoritative means of knowledge - or eise the meanings of the words must be beyond ncrmal human comprehension, in which case the words "Absolute" and "Self" would be ineffective for lack of any acquain+ance with their meaning. In eithor case their meaning cannot constitute the theme of the upanishadic teaching'. Such an objection is not right. For in fact the meaning of the word 'Self' is familiar as referring to the es- sence or true nature of anything, while the term Brahman (the Absolute) is familiar as expressing magnitude. A Vedic text can therefore very well employ those words to communicate a meaning that transcends normal human comprehension, namely the identity of the Absolute and the Self. We have knowledge of the deities and heaven and other supernatural matters through the texts of the Veda in just the same way In this connection we find texts like 'That thou art' and 'I am the Absolute' having pairs of words in subject-predicate relation. From this we conclude that the meanings of the words in each such pair stand as qualified and qualifier. By the process of qualification the element 'the sufferer' (the individual experiencer) is eliminated from the meaning of the word 'thou', and the element 'not directly known' is eliminated from the meaning of the word 'that'. Hence the properly pre- pared student acquires through these texts knowledge of the identity of the Self, indirectly indicated as the meaning of the word 'thou' through knowership and egohood (which point to the Consciousness of the hearer), with the Absolute, the in -. directly indicated meaning of the word 'that'. This knowledge is immediate experience of that (transcendent principle) which is not the meaning of (i.e. which cannot be directly denoted by) any sentence; it is not communicated either by the exclu- sion or association of word-meanings to form a sentence- meaning. Here there is no need of the application of any fur- ther means of knowledge (once the text has been properly un- derstood), since the reference is to Consciousness as the Real, and Consciousness in its true nature is super-terrestrial

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(alaukika), and Reality is of the nature of absolute awareness. There can only be dependence on knowledge from some other quarter or on something other than the Vedic text in a case where the thing to be known is within the scope of some other means of knowledge. In this connection, the following verses from the Brhadāranyaka Vārtika are relevant.

(1) That which has ultimately to be known, which is initially unknown and which transcends the individual knower and his knowledge and its objects - that can be known in this world from the Veda and from no other source. (B.B.V. I.iv.339)

(2) That which has to be known here, and known through the Upanishads as the means of valid cognition, is pure Conscious- ness, which manifests also as the resultant-cognition when the empirical means of cognition are applied to external objects. (S.V.159)

(3) Nor do we maintain that the reason for faith in the Veda is its own statement that it is of superhuman origin (at Brhad. l1.iv.10); the reason is the impossibility of the usual causes of invalidity of statements (human origin, which implies falli- bility, being accessible to other means of knowledge, etc.) in the statements of the Veda. (B.B.V. II.iv.325)

(4) Metaphysical Ignorance and its effects cannot be proved to exist, either if taken as identical with the Absolute or as different. Hence we say that it is only established at all 'for lack of reflection'. The notion that the ether of the sky is blue like a lotus-petal by day and then changes to become black like the belly of a bumble-bee at night is only accepted for lack of reflection. One should see that the whole notion of the existence of metaphysical Ignorance and its effects is an illusion of the same kind. (B.B.V. I.iv.332-3)

So we see that metaphysical Ignorance and its effects are inde- terminable either as the real or as anything different, and they are established (accepted) only for lack of deep critical reflection.

(5) Though enlightened by nature, the Self accepts and toler- ates not being known, being the only entity able to do so, since it is the only entity that is real. It does not destroy Ignorance without the aid of a valid cognition. The Self de- stroys its own Ignorance only when mounted on the pedestal of a means of valid knowledge, and not otherwise. The means of valid knowledge destroys Ignorance, in alliance with the Selr, when it bears on reality. (B.B.V. IV.iii.181-2)

The Self as immediate experience is not of itself in contradic- tion with metaphysical Ignorance. Nor is a mere means of valid

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cognition on its own able to contradict Ignorance, unless it is applied to its object and issues in a resultant-cognition (cp. M.V.29,5). That is the meaning.

(6) Because cause and effect owe their origin to mere rela- tive cognition, one cannot find reality in either of them. Hence reasoning by agreement and difference, which operates in the realm of cause and effect, cannot throw light on the real- icy taught in the Upanishads. The final reality can be known only through the upanishadic texts, the sole means for knowing it. (B.B.V. IV.iii.400-1)

The Self is non-dual, so cause and effent are not real. Hence there cannot be knowledge of the Self through reasoning by the method of agreement and difference.

(7) The fact that the true Self is identical with the Absolute and the Absolute identical with the true Self is the special topic of the metaphysical texts in the Upanishads like 'That thou art'; and it cannot be known through any other means of knowledge .... The use of the word 'self' is current in the world and not restricted to that of the metaphysical term 'Self'. Equally, the idea of 'magnitude', conveyed by the term used for the Absolute (Brahman, from root brh, to swell), is familiar from current use. Thus the meanings of the indi- vidual words of the text 'I am the Absolute' are known from worldly experience. What, then, is the obstacle to the forma- tion of a sentence-meaning that transcends sense-experience from these words as juxtaposed in a sentence in the Veda? Even the meanings of such technical terms used by the ritualists as 'unprecedented' (i.e. the occult, power of the ritual), 'deity' and 'heaven' are known from worldly experience. But in their case, too, a special meaning that transcends sense-experience is learned from the Vedic texts. (B.B.V. IV.iii.1115, followed by S.V.861-3)

(8) On our view, that which is not the direct meaning of any sentence (viz. the Self or Absolute, which cannot be directly denoted by any sentence), is known through immediate apprehen- sion as the meaning of 'that' and 'thou' through the exclusion (of the mutually contradictory parts of the word-meanings) that arises through the words being placed in subject-predicate relation. It is the same process as that which occurs in the sentence 'Verily, the ether in the pot is the same as the ether in the sky'. (N.Sid. III.9)

'The ether in the pot is the same as the ether in the sky'. In this sentence the words 'pot-ether' and 'sky-ether' are placed in subject-predicate relation, so that their meanings qualify one another and the mutually contradictory elements are elimi- nated. The sentence-meaning that results is a reference by

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indirect indication to bare ether (not limited either as pot- ether or sky-ether). The text 'That thou art' should be understood in the same way. 'Not the direct meuning of any sentence' means that what the sentence indirectly indicates is (something infinite and) not a sentence-meaning that arises from exclusion or association and so on (among the word- meanings in the manner of normal speech dealing with finite objects).

(8) The fact that the meaning of the word 'thou' is not the individual soul (lit. 'the suffercr') is conveyed by its being qualified as the Absolute, which is the meaning of the word 'that'; and the fact that the (transcendent ) Absclute, the meaning of the word 'that', is intimately known as one's in- most Self is conveyed by the presence of the word 'thou' next to it. (N.Sid. III.10)

Because of the mutual qualification of the meanings, the con- tradictory elements are eliminated.

(9) The Consciousness and interiority of the Self, raised high above all change like a fixed mountain peak, are not ac- cidental characteristics introduced from without. They are whai enables the soul to feel itself as an individual experien- cer and an ego. Therefore the Self is indirectly indicated by appeal (through the use of the word 'thou') to the soul's sense of being an individual experiencer and an ego. (N.Sid. III.11)

EXPLANATION OF THE MECHANISM OF THE NEGATIVE TEXTS GIVEN IN THE VĀRTIKA

Here we may take up the explanation given in the Vartika of the meaning of the words in the negative metaphysical texts of the Veda. Initially we have an account of a theme found in Śri Śankara's commentaries, the theme, namely, that all this realm of name, form and action will have to be negated. And this is foliowed by its actual negation through the word 'not'. In this context, we should not suppose that once form, etc., have been negated of the Self they might persist elsewhere, as 'existence', for instance, when negated of 'pot' may persist in relation to 'cloth'. This agrees with worldly experience, too, where no form is found to subsist in separation from that of which it is a form. And when metaphysical Ignorance of the supreme Self has been negated, none of its effects are found to persist anywhere. Again, the things that have to be negated are not invariably present together with one another, whereas the presence of the inmost Self never fails. Hence it is first taught that all this world of name, form and action is errone- ously superimposed on the Self, and then its existence in the Absolute is denied, the Absolute itself being (undeniable

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because) self-established as immediate experience. The word 'mot' can only negate what has to be negated on the basis of accepting the existence of the Self. For the Self as pure Consciousness is inseparable from any negation. All that has to be negated is dependent for its (apparent) existence on the Self, which cannoi be negated. Negation, therefore, does not imply total non-existence of anything, as non-existence itself falls within the realm of that which has to be negated. The upanishadic ncgation 'neither this nor that', however, extends universally; it negates whatever is found, except the Absolute or Self, the Witness of all, which latter persists untouched (B.B.V. II.ii1.183 .207) . But the text 'neither this nor that' is also explalned by Suresvara in another way. On the second view, although this text has the form of a negation, it is not actually a negation. For beforc the occurrence of the text 'And so there is the teaching "neither this nor that"' (Brhad. Ii.iii.6), the Abso- lute had already been established as transcending the gross and subtle elcments (the entire realm of the empirically know- able, cp. T.N. at M.V.79, 1). And in the text 'There are two forms of the Absolute' (Brhad. II.iii.l), the word 'of' implies that the Absolute is different from (transcends) the two forms. From the mere fact that the not-self is not regularly present together with the Self (e.g. in dreamless sleep), its non- existence in the Self has already been proved (so that the pur- pose of the text 'neither this nor that' cannot be to repeat that proof, which would amount to a mere tautology). And there are other considerations which show that the text 'neither this nor that' need not and should not be taken as a negation. There is a sensc in which the not-self, since it is established by perception and other means of valid cognition, cannot be ne- gated. Even if we accept that in some sense it could be ne- gated, a mere negation is in itself fruitless. If the text (Brhad. II.iii.6) were taken thus, it would not fulfil its promise of positive teaching (adesa), affirmation of the Abso- lute. So the correct way to analyse the meaning of 'neti' (= na + iti) is to take 'na' (not) as an indirect reference to the self-established Self (as that in which the empirical knower, knowledge and known are not present, B.B.V. II.iii. 229), and to take 'iti' as having the force of identifying the inmost Self with the Absolute (thereby bringing the Absolute within the scope of the possible experience of the hearer in the same way as 'That thou art', B.B.V. II.iii.233). This is Suresvara's teaching at Brhadāraņyaka Vartika II. iii. 214-34. Here we quote a few more verses illustrating other points made in the Vārtika.

(10) That the Absolute is different from the gross and subtle aspects of the world (the 'two forms') has already been estab- lished before the promise of positive teaching (adesa, Brhad. II.iii.6). Therefore this teaching is given to enable the

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hearer to have direct apprehension that he is the Absolute (B.B.V. II.iii.214). The negative text 'neither this nor that' is not primarily concerned with negating what has to be negated (such as the gross and subtle aspects of the universe) but with an indirect method of communicating the true nature of the hearer. If the text merely negated the universc in its gross and subtle aspects, and the Absolute were not established by some other positive cognition, the result would be a void ... (B.B.V. II.iii.215). The element 'na' (not) in 'na iti = neti' indicates indircctly that principle of Consciousness which is self- established without need of a separate means of cognition, in which the individual knower, his knowledge and its ob.jects do not exist, and which is known through awakening to one's own true nature ... (B.B.V. II.iii.229). The word 'na' (not) indicates that that which has ultimately to be known (the Self) is self-established by its own power (it is that which is not known through the empirical processes). The word 'na' (not) is augmented by 'iti' (this) to form 'neti' to show that the Self is the Absolute. The Absclute is here indicated by the term 'iti' (because the term 'this' allied to 'not' negates the gross and subtle aspects of the world which appear to characterize the Absolute, leaving the Absolute in its pure form identical with the Witness - so Ānandagiri). (B.B.V. II.iii.233)

Here it might appear that an objection could be raised. If the two forms of the Absolute, the subtle. and the gross aspects of the universe, are denied, why should that be thought to leave the Absolute a void? Thc mere fact that it is beyond the scope of all other means of knowledge would not render it a void, since it is self-revealed. Even though it is self- revealed, might we not wonder if the Vedic texts would not be needed to cancel metaphysical Ignorance? But the Vedic text 'neither this nor that', which negates all that is superim- posed, exists precisely for this purpose. But has not Ignorance been proved to be a distinct prin- ciple, the cause of what has been superimposed, so that it cannot be thus negated? No, we do not accept this. The method for expounding the Absolute is that of negating everything that has been imagined in regard to it. It is like communicating the true nature of the rope by negating the snake and all else that has been imagined in it. Knowledge of the true nature of the Absolute arises simultaneously with the understanding of the negations, so we cannot admit that anything further re- quires to be done for knowledge of the Absolute once the ne- gations are understood. To us, therefore, it seems to be mere obstinacy to claim that there requires to be a special further negation of Ignorance over and above negation of wrong knowl- edge.

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Or again, we could happily concur with Anandagiri's gloss on Brhadāranyaka Vārtika II.iii.233, when he says, 'The expres- sion "neti" is the proof to show that the Witness, indicated by the word "not" (i.e. not the individual knower or any fac- tor in the empirical personality), is the Absolute'. But enough of all these subtleties! All the various ways here discussed fer accounting for the validity of the supreme nega- tive texts follcw the method of false attribution followed by subsequent retraction, and hence are acceptable.

117 PERCEPTICN, ETC., CANNOT CONTRADICT THE VEDA

We have alrcady menticned above (M.V.105) that, like Mandana, Suresvara refuted the notion of difference in order to answer the objection that the metaphysical texts of the Veda cculd not be an authoritative means of knowledge since they stood in contradiction wiih other valid means of cognition that con- veyed a knowledge of duality. Our own view is that Suresvara only raised this objection when arguing his position on the basis of deliberate concessions to the views of othcrs. For elsewhere he refutes in clear terms the doctrine that the dif- ferent means of knowledge could contradict one another (S.V. 1076-81; N.Sid. III.86). He 'also refutes the doctrine that the various means of knowledge could contradict one another on the topic of the unity and sole reality of the Self in the course of explaining Śri Śankara's Brhadāraņyaka Commentary (B.B.V. II.i.588-94; cp. N.Sid. III.96) . * Such an author could not seriously admit that the metaphysical texts of the Upani- shads could stand in contradiction with the deliverances of other means of knowledge. He also held that even the Veda was an authoritative means of knowledge of the Self only through negating Ignorance, not that it could communicate it directly. For, as he explained at Sambandha Vartika 999, his view was that the existence of the individual experiencer and his knowl- edge and its objects, along with time and other conditions, de- pended entirely on the immediate experience supplied by the Self. How could any of them affect the Self in any way?

*(Cp. N.Sid. III.96, intro .: 'We speak thus (of the possibility of a conflict between Vedic revelation and perception) on the basis of a deliberate concession. Otherwise, we have more than once remarked that one means of cognition cannot be contradic- ted by another'. T.N.)

118 TREATMENT OF THE TOPIC OF CAUSE AND EFFECT

As in Śri Sankara's Brahma Sūtra Commentary, so in Suresvara's

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Brhaāranyaka Vartika, the subject of cause and effect is in- troduced only in order to refute the whole nction of cause and effect. There are places in the Vartika where Suresvara appears to take Ignorance as the material cause of the world, but this is only a superficial view that might cccur at first sight to one unable to give due consideration to what the Vārtikas and Naişkarmya Siddhi really intended to say. No real existence of cause and effect is in fact admitted, as a study of certain parts of Suresvara's works would show. Indeed, he states it openly, and also refutes the whole conception of cause and effect.

(1) And the whole uncritically accepted world of duality is per se endless, in that it rests on bare Ignorance of the non- dual Self, as the fancied silver rests on Ignorance of the shell. Hence it is Ignorance of the Self which is ultimately the cause of all evil, (N.Sid. I.1, intro. )

Here it might appear at first glance as though Ignorance of the Self were being taken as the material cause of duality. In reality, however, it is clear from an examination of such texts as 'Ignorance, which means "I do not know"' (T.B.V. II.176, ep. M.V.110,1; 222,1, note) that Ignorance is a non- entity (abhava) and could not possibly be a material cause.

(2) Further, the not-self is born of Ignorance. (N.Sid. III.1, intro., cp. M.V.113,1)

Here again, one might make the mistake of supposing that it was being said thai Ignorance was the material cause of the not-self. But in fact the preceding sentence has clearly de- nied the existence of any Ignorance contradicting knowledge in the words, 'Nor is the attainment of knowledge possible in the not-self that one could argue that there must have been some contradictory Ignorance (in the not-self for such knowledge to negate', cp. M.V.113,1).

(3) For Ignorance is nothing but absence of knowledge, and, since the latter is a non-entity by nature, it cannot stand as the cause of transmigratory experience. The existent cannot spring from the non-existent. (N.Sid. III.7, intro. )

Here an objector suggests that Ignorance cannot be the cause of transmigration.

(4) Since every object is unknown before the idea of it arises in our minds, and since (even as unknown) it exists by the power of the one reality (sat), it is that reality which is ultimately the thing that is unknown. (N.Sid. III.7, cp. M.V. 114,7, ad init. )

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This verse is composed to explain, against the previous objec- tion, in what sense Ignorance is a cause, although it is a non-entity. The essence of the reply is that the objection is beside the point, because the actual cause is reality, the Ab- solute, as unknown. One should ignore the alternative expla- nation saying 'The Self is concealed by Ignorance as a positive force different from mere absence of knowledge' offered by the commiientator Jñanottama because it contradicts Suresvara's mean- ing.

(5) Ignorance of the Self is the precondition for the appear- ance of this magic show of duality, and the Absolute is called the cause mediately through that. (B.B.V. I.iv.371)

Duality is here taken as a magic show in the sense of being an erroneous superimposition. Ignorance is its cause only in the manner above explained. The Absolute alone is the cause, through the medium of Ignorance; that is the meaning. One should recall here what has been said earlier about the sense in which Ignorance is the cause of erroneous knowledge (M.V. 111,10; 112; 113,2,note; 113,3). It is clear that the expla- nation of this verse given by Anandagiri in his sub-commentary on this verse goes against the original meaning when he says, 'Duality, which, like a mass-hynotist's magic show, is accep- ted as real only for lack of reflection, must have for its cause something which is not a non-entity (as a non-entity cannot function as a cause). It requires a material cause corresponding to itself (in reality-grade, i.e. indeterminable reality-grade) and has one in metaphysical Ignorance. The Ab- solute stands as the cause (only) through resorting to that'.

(6) Thus cause and other such notions are set out only for the sake of proving the existence of the transcendent Self. They are a device to make the Self available, as one who knew the truth proclaimed (G.K.III.15, cp. M.V.33,4; 75,10). The negation of all notions such as cause does not suffice to establish non-duality. The negation itself requires to be ne- gated by the awakening to the homogeneous unity and sole reality of the Self. First there is a thorough demonstration that all this appearance of plurality has Being for its true nature. Then it is taught how Being itself melts into infinity as pure Consciousness. (B.B.V. I.ii.27-9)

Cause and effect and so forth are only established provision- ally with a view to establish the unborn non-dual Self, which is neither cause nor effect nor absence of cause and effect. It is not intended to establish cause and effect as real from the highest point of view. Nor is it intended to say that non-duality is simply the absence of cause and effect. For one becomes awake to the self-revealed principle which is dif- ferent from any non-entity through negating negation itself,

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by awakening to the self-established reality that is its oppo- site. First it is shown, by resorting to the hypothesis cf causution, that the real (sat) is the cause of all. Then even the notion of reality (sattva) is eliminated in the non-dual homogeneous principle. So the teaching about cause and effect is not for the purpose of affirming the existence of cause and effect.

(7) Ignorance, merit and demerit and the impressions of past actions lying unevolved in the elements fire, water, earth and wind, and dissolved in ether, remaining as existent but not manifest - these, together with the Self, form "The Undevel- oped Principle' .. It is Ignorance that manifests in the fcrm OI the objective universe of material objects (visva), as it is the nature of Ignorance to do so. Hence the Upanishad says, 'This universe was then (before the projection of the world) undifferentiated' (Brhad. I.iv.7). (B.B.V. I.iv.205-7)

First the nature of 'the Undeveloped' is explained. Then it is declared that it is Ignorance only that appears as the manifest and the unmanifest. Hence it is that the Undeveloped Principle is sometimes called Ignorance in the ancient texts and, when the word Ignorance is used in this special sense, material causality can be found attributed to 'Ignorance'. The not- self, too, is another form assumed by Ignorance. But here the clue is given by the phrase 'Hence it (the not-self) is also called Ignorance (T.B.V. II.178, M.V.110,2). This also is only a metaphorical use of the term Igncrance.

(8) If viewed from the standpoint of the final truth, Igno- rance and its effects cannot be established as existing either through its own power or through that of another. From the standpoint of Ignorance it is sometimes referred to by the term 'the Undeveloped'. When we reflect on our experience on waking from dreamless sleep we say 'I knew nothing', which shows that Consciousness is reflected in Ignorance. The ori- gin, maintenance and dissolution of the world take place in the Self as reflected in Ignorance. The Seif, as associated with Ignorance, is the cause of bodies where Ignorance pre- dominates, and of conscious beings where Consciousness pre- dominates. All such distinctions are conditioned by past thought, meditation and activity. (B.B.V. I.iv.340-2)

(9) Ignorance is confusion and unconsciousness appearing in the reality, the Self, which is in truth ever enlightened. As confusion and unconsciousness are found in the not-self, this whole world is called 'death'. (B.B.V. IV.iii.457)

The text (at Brhad. IV.iii.7) has spoken of 'the forms of death', where 'death' means "Ignorance'. Earlier it had said, 'Darkness (Ignorance) is death' (Brhad. I.iii.28). Suresvara's

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present verse follows on from that. Confusion and unconscious- ness are the nature of Ignorance. And the fact that both of these appear even in the not-self is an expression of 'death'. The verse explains how the term 'Ignorance' comes to be ap- plied to the not-self.

(10) The term 'Ignorance' does not mean anything but 'non- consciousness'. This is confirmed by the Veda (at Brhad. IV. iv.3 and 4) where the text runs 'having sent this body to 'Avidya' (= unconsciousness)'. (B.B.V. I.iv.256)

In this verse Suresvara declares that non-consciousness is the essenticl nature of Ignorance in order to bring out how en- lightenment and Ignorance are contradictories as Consciousness and non-consciousness. His idea is that the Veda intended to teach that Ignorance was non-consciousness when it said, 'Having .struck down its previous body and sent it to uncon- sciousness, the soul proceeds (after death) to a new body'. Here again, Ignorance is clearly identified with the not-self.

(11) Texts like 'Darkness (Ignorance) is death (light is im- mortal)' (Brhad.I.iii.28) and 'In the beginning, this univerce was water' (Brhad. V.v.l) show that metaphysical Ignorance is continually at work, either in manifest or unmanifest form. (B.B.V. I.ii.136)

The text 'Darkness is death, light is immortal' (Brhad. I.iii. 28) refers to Ignorance, evolved and manifest as natural knowl- edge and action. In the text 'In the beginning, this universe was water' (Brhad. V. v. 1), the word 'water' also refers to Ignorance, but this time the reference is to Ignorance in its unmanifest form. That is the meaning of the verse. One cannot here accept the statement of Anandagiri, 'It is Root Ignorance only that is referred to by the word "darkness" used to explain the term "death"'. For it is said that Igno- rance displays itself either in manifest or in unmanifest form. This implies that Root Ignorance, identified with the Unmanifest Principle, is itself a creation of Ignorance. And the doctrine of Root Ignorance as accepted by other schools of Advaita is nowhere found in the Vartika. The word 'Root' in the phrase 'Root Ignorance displays it- self' must have entered the received text through a mishearing on the part of someone in error, who was evidently introducing his own peculiar theory, paying no attention to the loud and clear statements elsewhere that Root Ignorance was but a par- ticular form assumed by Ignorance, namely the Unmanifest Prin- ciple. Neither was any attention paid to the description of Ignorance given in the words 'Ignorance is the feeling "I do not know"' (cp. T.B.V. II.176). We may pass this by as incidental. But the following should here be noted. Wherever in the Värtika there is a reference to

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Ignorance as a materiul cause, this is predicated of Ignorance considered as having assumed its form as the non-conscious Un- manifest Principle. It is not a reference to ii in its own characteristic nature as confusion. For the whole conception of cause and effect is only mentioned in ihe vartika at all to show that it is created by Ignorance. From the standpoint of practical experience, on the other hand, causality can be ac- ccpted wherever it is found.

(12) This illusion (maya) which, though utterly unreal, mani- fests as name, form and action - its subtlest form is called 'Death'. (B.B.V.I.iii.135)

Ignorance displays itself here in the world as name, form and action. Its subtlest form, which may also be called Maya, is called 'Death'. It had been said earlier in the Vedic passage under comment, 'This was covered over by Death' (Brhad. I. ii. 1). Here again, it is only Ignorance in its form as seea-state of the not-self consisting of name, form and action that is re- ferred to by the word 'Maya'. And this agrees with numerous texts in Śri Sankara's commentaries, such as 'Name and form, imagined through Ignorance as if they were the very nature of the omiscient Lord, indeterminable either as the real prin- ciple or as anything different from it, the seed of transmigra- tory experience and the differentiated world, are spoken of in the Veda and Smrti as "The Power of Maya belonging to the Omiscient Lord"' (B.S.Bh. II.i. 14, cp. M.V. 45, 1). Anandagiri's remark in his sub-commentary here, 'The word Maya is introduced to refute those who distinguish between Ignorance and Maya', was made without a proper understanding of the meaning of the verse on which he was commenting.

(13) In this context (of teaching that the world-appearance arises from absence of knowledge of the Absolute) we find the clear verse of Gaudapada, which begins, well supported by analogies, 'As a rope imperfectly perceived ... (in the dark is variously imagined as a snake or a stream of water or in other ways, so is the Self wrongly imagined as this and that' (G.K. II.17, cp. M.V.23). That which has no name or form manifested (at the beginning of the world-period) through bare Ignorance. (B.B.V. I.iv. 389-90)

What the author is saying is: 'On the topic of manifestation proceeding from the Undeveloped Principle, one should see from the explanation of creation given by Gaudapada, with examples, that the notion of the world and the Absolute as effect and cause must be interpreted as agreeing in every way with the analogy of the illusory snake misperceived in the rope'. In the same way, the author later (B.B.V. I.iv.443) quotes Bhagavatpada Śarkara's Upadesa Sahasrī XVIII.46: 'Just as the rope-snake, (though unreal), possesses being by virtue of the rope until

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discriminated from it, so also does the complex of the Self, the reflecting medium and the reflection possess being by vir- tue of the changeless Self, (until it is discriminuted from it', cp. M.V. 144, 10).

(14) Transmigratory experience is taught to ve an erroneous superimposition on the Self. And, according to the general worldly view, there cannot be erroneous superimposition with- out a cause. Therefore, to explain what is the cause, Sri Sankara says in his Brhadaranyaka Commentary :That (Self) which is the cause of the whole universe ... '. But has not, the cause already been declared to have been the superimposition on the Self, through natural Jgnorance, or the notions of be- ing one who acts, aiong with action and its results? Yes. But the teaching is repeated in a special form intended to refute the Sankhya doctrine that Nature (non-conscious and independent of Spirit) is the material cause of the world. The cause of the world is the Self, unknown through Ignorance. It is not the three 'constituents' (guna) making up Nature spoken of by the Sankhyas. (B.B.V. I.iv.478-80)

This is an explanation of the passage in Sri Sankara's Commen- tary on the Brhadaranyaka (I. iv .? ad init.) which begins, 'This Self, for the sake of which all the traditional texts came in- to being, on which the notion of being one who acts, along with that of action and its results, are superimposed through natural Ignorance, that which is the cause of the whole world, that which is the true nature of name and form ... '. There is mention here of transmigration, consisting of the feeling that one is acting, and associated with action and its results, as being 'superimposition'. The word 'superimposition' is used here to mean the result of superimposition, not the act, ac- cording to the interpretation 'A superimposition is what is superimposed'. The reference (in Suresvara's verses) to (the worldly view that there must be) a cause of superimposition refers to the real substratum on which an imagined entity must rest. Suresvara takes the phrase 'through Ignorance' from Sri Sankara's Commentary, interprets it according to his own system as meaning absence of knowledge, and then refers to the objec- tion that might be raised, 'There cannot be superimposition without a (positive) cause'. On his own view, the statement 'Absence of knowledge is the cause of all the world' does not refer to absence of knowledge alone as the independent cause. The cause is the Self as unknown. This, at least, is my own understanding of the verses. And then the reply comes, saying that there was no occasion for the objection that was raised. On the system of the revered Commentator himself, there is no problem about the falsity of transmigration, consisting in the feeling that one is acting, associated with action and its results. For he says, 'Transmigration is set up through

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natural Ignorance in the form of erroneous knowledge'. Where he said, 'That Self which is the cause of all the universe', that was only to show that, because ihe whole universe is merely imagined, the Absolute can only be the cause in the sense of being the reai substratum on which the imaginations are made. There is to this extent a difference between the emplanations of Ignorance offered by Śri Sankara and Suresvara. The two explanations agree basically, however, as we have al- ready euplained at M.V. 112.

(15) If the effect were taken as different from the cause, how could they be cause and effect? They would be known as separate, unconnected entities, like the Himalayas and the Vindhya mountains. But if the effect were taken as non- different, then, since there would be identity, there could not be cause and effect. What is actionless cannot function as a cause. That which is not the object of action should not be calleu an effect. And that which is void of action cannot be a factor of action. Time and aciion couid not be causes, as they themselves only exist through that (the Self) in which they are due to dissolve. It is evident that what cannot even bring itself into being could not bring anything else into be- ing, whatever its efforts. (B.B.V. II.i.399-402)

Here the whole conception of causality is rejected as ratio- nally indefensible. A few verses later Suresvara sums up. 'And so the creations and withdrawals of the universe down the ages are imagined, just as the distinctions of time and space are. When you have seen reality, you know that the creation, maintenance and withdrawal of the universe are impossible' (B.B.V. II.1.411, M.V.129,8). And so Suresvara keeps to the tradition of the true experts in Vedanta, which says that the causality supposed to produce the world is illusory.

119 9 THE TREATMENT OF UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR

Thus the treatment of cause and effect in Suresvara's works is not introduced to show that the Absolute is the cause of the world. Its purpose is actually to refute the whole conception of causality by first superimposing the notion of causality onto the Self in order to teach the existence of the latter (the Self, read atmano 'stitvam), and then refuting causality in the light of the Self in its true nature. The case with the teaching of universal and particular is similar. The first step is to teach the existence of the Self by superimposing onto it the notion that it is a universal, in order, in the end, to be able to deny that it is characterizable either as a' universal or as a particular. Here too, Suresvara follows the method of the revered Commentator. Indeed, in the preliminary

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false attribution of the notions of universal and particular, he follows the method of the Upanishad itself, as we can ncw see. As the particular beats in a drum-roll cannot be heard sep- arately from the drum-roll itself, even sc the things whose existence depends on the Self carnot be perceived separately from the Self (B.B.V. II.iv.267-8, condensed). First one has the general perception, 'Those are the sounds of a drum', or one may hear them in a more specific, but still general, form as 'Those sounds arise from the striking of a drum in a special way'. But any relatively specific sounds, or particular sounds, are only heard as part of their universal, the general drum-roll (cp. B.B.V. II.jv.275-80). Again, first one has the general indeterminate perception 'pot', after that the speci- fication 'is', yielding 'existent pot'. And so the original gezeral perceptiom is further specified in experience by sub- sequent particularization (having a long spout, existing at such and such a place and time, etc .: B.B.V. II.iv.281). Again, each further specification in our knowledge of a universal genus is known only as a specification of the universal and to the accompaniment of it. And, in the same way, every genus or particular is itself known as accompanied by Consciousness (cit) imperfectly known. It is superimposed on the Self through absence of knowiedge of the latter. But the inmost Self does not require any external support to establish its own existence. The Self beholds the not-self only when it puts on the livery of being an individual experiencer. But it ex- periences itself as independent Consciousness in its true state only. Examples such as the sounds of the conch and lute are also given to illustrate the dissolution of all particulars everywhere into the one great universal, 'Being'. And yet one must remember that in reality no distinction into universal and particular exists. For though the univer- sal. is invariably found in the particulars, the particulars are not invariably found in the universal. But the universal cannot be perceived separately and without being in some way related to the particulars. Even if one admitted that univer- sals somehow existed in isolation from particulars, they would then become particulars themselves, like 'that particular short-horned cow' within the general species cow. And if one cannot establish the existence of universals one cannot estab- lish the existence of particulars either. When one cannot establish the existence of either universals or particulars, it is vain to talk about a particular falling within a univer- sal. For the relation of container and contained implies two terms. And no relation of distinction or of any other kind can be established as holding between universal and particular. This is the line taken by Suresvara in his retraction. In this connection the following verses are worthy of note.

(1) The sound of the drum in general is mentioned

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to exemplify the broad universal as such. The 'drum-roll' refers to the particulars conceived as the universal in its other (i.e. particularized) form. And the reference to 'ex- ternal sounds' (Brhad.II.iv.7) refers to the (impossibility of hearing the) particulars alone (conceived as somehow separate from the universal). These are the three examples that the Upanishad gives (to show that sound in a particular form is dependent on sound in a more general form both to exist and to be knowr, so that particular Being, also, depends on mors general Being both to exist and to be known). (B.B.V. II.iv. 288-9)

(2) Nothing whatever can be established by the means of valid cognition independently of the notion of Being, whether regarded as the same as Being through invariable concomitance, or as different from it through independence, or as of the nature of non-being. Because there cannot be anything sepa- rate from Being, there cannot be anything in relation with de- ing. And one should understand that, whatever is the case with Being, exactly the same is the case with the inmost Self, the reality of which is self-revealed, and does not have to be

290-1) established by any separate means of cognition. (B.B.V. II.iv.

No reality separate from Being conceived as a universal can be established either as in constant concomitance with Being or as independent of Being, or as non-being. This is what, the example of Being conceived as the highest universal shows. So the point is proved by the example of Being conceived as the highest universal that there cannot be any relation of Being with anything else taken as separate. The meaning is that the same non-duality obtains in the case of the self-revealed Self (which is not, from the highest standpoint, a universal).

(3) The pot is perceived as existent, as having a long spout, as situated at a certain place, as existing at a certain time. No new object is perceived each time there is a further deter- mination. (B.B.V. II.iv.281)

This is an example to show how all the later determinations are contained implicitly in the first indeterminate perception.

(4) In the same way, everything that is perceived is super- imposed on pure Consciousness, as it is invariably perceived accompanied by that. Everything in the world, whether a uni- versal or a particular, has Ignorance of pure Consciousness as its cause. (B.B.V. II.iv.282)

(5) There is no other source for the establishment of the inmost Self apart from the (self-revealed) inmost Self itself. In the case of the not-self, means of valid cognition are

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required. Even then, the not-self is only known through the individual knower, who depends for his own cxistence on the Self. (B.B.V. II.iv.283, with gloss)

The inmost Self is its own means of valid cognition. The not- self is only established at all through the Self as means of cognition.

(5) The Self can only behold the not-self when it dons the livery of an individual able to act and experience. As pure Vision raised above change, it does not behold itself in the same way. The not-self, being complex, is known through per- ceplion. The Self, being simple, is known through itself in the form of knowledge bearing inwards. (B.B.V. II.iv.284-5)

The Self as an individual capable of action knows the not-self through applying one of the means of valid cognition. The Self in its true transcendence knows itself in imnediate ex- perience without recourse to any external means. Moreover, the not-self as known by the individual knower through his means of knowledge is a complex entity. But the Self does not enter into composition with any other being. It is known througn its own Self in the form of knowledge bearing inwards.

(6) (The whole conception of universal and particulars is unintelligible.) The universal can no more be identical with the particulars than they can with it. But if the universal be taken as distinct from the particulars there can be no universal (and hence no particulars either). If a universal were taken per impossibile as not being in constant concomi- tance with its particulars (and so as not being identical with them), the umiversal and its particulars would be distinct, like an elephant and a rat. But then what we call a universal would be a particular among particulars, like a short-horned cow in a herd of others. (B.B.V. II.iv.269-70, cp. M.V.130,3)

'Among particulars' - that is, it would either be a particu- lar sub-species among species, or a particular among particu- lars.

120 THE TREATMENT OF THE DISCRIMINATION OF THE FIVE SHEATHS

The view of Suresvara expressed in his Vartika is that the teaching about the Five Sheaths (cp. M.V.39), too, is intro- duced in the Upanishads in order to bring out the nature of the Self as the Absolute by first attributing to it posses- sion of the Five Sheaths, but only with a view to denying them afterwards. This method of teaching may be briefly summarized as follows.

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The notion that we are identical with the sheaths is im- planted in us by an impression arising from beginningless Ignorance. In Vedanta, the sheaths are initially accepted as a device through which to introduce the idea of the inmost Self existing within them (T.B.V. II.232-3). The inmost Self, though only one, appears through Ignorance as if limited by the Five Sheaths in two ways, that is, on the individual plane and on the cosmic plane (T.B.V. II.234-5). The sheaths, begin- ning with the sheath made up of food (the physical body) are effects. They each have to be first dissolved into their material causes, food and so on. Then each earlier one in turn has to be dissolved into the next in the series, until the Self is left as the supreme cause, and then ever the notion that it is a cause is cancelled by the knowledge arising from the upanishadic texts, and it finally remains over as the Absolute in its true form (T.B.V. 236-7) .

(First one must meditate on one's own individual body as being nothing over and above 'food', the matter of the cosmos, until it is finally felt to be so (T.B.V. II. 253). Then one must meditate on one's own vital energy till it is felt to be one with the cosmic vital energy (T.B.V. II. 254), on one's mind (manas, M.V. 25, 8) as the cosmic mind (expressed as the Veda, T.B.V. II. 306), on one's intellect (buddhi, M.V. 25, 8) as the cosmic intellect (Hiranyagarbha, the one who 'has' and real- izes the ideas in the cosmic mind, T.B.V. II. 306 ff.), and on the joy arising from the merit of one's rituals and prescribed meditations (T.B.V. II. 320-22; 342-5) as constituting a sheath of the Absolute (the anandamaya-kośa) which is a false appear- ance of the Absolute (T.B.V. II. 340-2), though its true nature is nothing other than the Absolute (T.B.V. II. 341). T.N.)

If (no account were taken of the cosmic plane and) only the sheaths of the individual plane were dissolved, the regult would be the knowledge of a 'self' individualized by its own body and mind, ip the manner of the Sankhya teaching (T.B.V. II.268). Each later sheath that is mentioned in the series is spoken of as something separate from the earlier ones. It is regarded as 'another internal self' according to the for- mula 'it (the preceding self) is filled by that (the later one)'. As the series progresses, each sheath is said to be filled by the next one following it, which constitutes its true 'self'. So we see that the sheath made up of food is accompanied by the remaining four, beginning with the sheath made up of the vital energy. The sheath made up of the vital energy is accompanied by the remaining three, beginning with the sheath made up of mind (i.e. the sheaths made up of mind, intellect and bliss). On this basis, all effects have to be dissolved in the supreme cause by noting that the later sheaths are in constant concomitance with the earlier ones of the series, while the earlier ones are not in constant

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concomitance with the later ones (T.B.V. II.269). The reality that has to be communicated by this device is the Absolute. It is taught in the second Section of the Taittiriye Upanishad (the Ananda or Brahmanarda Valli). And the third Section (Bhrgu Valli) explains how the existence and nature of the Absolute has earlier been taught by pointing to the mutual ccncomitance and non-concomitance amongst the vari- ous sheaths, so that the two Sections agree. There is only this small difference that in the third Section the Absolute is taught as being pure Bliss in its true nature through the ne- gation of the Five Sheaths which are effects cf Ignorance, as is implicit in the text 'Ho had the knowledge "The Absolute is bliss"' (Taitt. III.6). (See T.B.V. II.332-5.) And, in the same way, the meaning of the text 'A person be- comes non-existence (if he thinks the Absolute to be non- existence)' (Taitt. II.6) is found to be the same. For it says that if a man thinks of the Absolute, which is in fact real as his own Self, as being one of the sheaths and therefore un- real, he becomes himself unreal. The knowers of the Absolute hold that he alone is real who knows himself as the real Abso- lute, beyond the sheaths. Therefore one should negate all the sheaths, which have been imagined through Ignorance and realize that one is the supreme Self, not subject tc change (T.B.V. II.353-6). In this context, these are the verses of the Taittiriya Vartika most worthy of consideration.

(1) The mind has become deeply impregnated with impressions in this beginningless realm of transmigration. It can, how- ever, be turned towards the inmost Self by a device, and so this device is now set forth. In truth, the one inmost Self has no contact with duality. It only undergoes bifurcation into inner and outer, subject and object, by way of illusion through Ignorance. On the subjective side, there are the five sheaths beginning with the sheath made up of food (the physi- cal body), along with the inmost Self; on the objective side, there are food and the remaining material causes of the five sheaths (i.e. earth, water, fire, air and ether). Having dissolved the five individual sheaths into their cosmic counterparts by meditation, one should meditate on the five cosmic counterparts of the five sheaths, taking each suc- ceeding one as the inner 'self' of its predecessor. Having thus dissolved the whole notion that one is in any sense an effect, one should rest in the notion that one is the cause. And then finally one should dissolve that notion through the supreme Vedic texts, and attain to the Absolute as one's real Self. (T.B.V. II.233-7)

(2) Though the Self cannot be identical with the Five Sheaths, it appears to be so through Ignoranae, as the rope-snake ap- pears to be identical with the rope. And it appears to suffer

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in tune with the sheaths. (T.B.V. II.250)

(3) As each effect in turn is of the nature of its material cause, the Absclute is infinite, and the Sankhya dualism bet- ween Nature and Spirit is avoided. Each material cause in the series exists independently of its effect, which precedes it in the series (as the cosmic vital energy exists independently of food and is the source from which food proceeds). And yet it invariably accompanies its effect. Hence our thesis that the effect is nothing over and above the material cause can be supported by arguing from independent existence and invariable concomitunce (vyatireka and anvaya) .... All four of the other (and higher) sheaths are present in the sheath made up of food. The three other higher cnes are present in the vital energy, two in the mind (intellect and bliss), one (bliss) in the intellect. (T.B.V. II.268-9,271)

(4) The Absolute was taught in the second Section of the Taittiriya Upanishad. To explain the method how it has to be learned, the third Section of the Upanishad recounts (Taitt. III.1, etc.) how Bhrgu said to Varuna, 'Holy one! Teach me Brahman!' When the goal has first been explained, it then remains to explain the means. The means are the Five Sheaths, for one reaches the Absolute through (meditating on) them (as taught). It is clear that they are the means, because the Self is seen through them when they are analysed and meditated on according to the laws of universal concomitance (anvaya) and independent existence (vyatireka). (T.B.V. II.333-5)

After explaining Śri Sankara's interpretation of the word 'tapas' (austerity) given in his commentary or Taittiriya III.1, Suresvara adds his own, which runs: 'Tapas is pondering according to the laws of constant concomitance and independent existence' (T.B.V. III.19). The present passage should be understood in the light of that.

(5) If a person identifying himself with the sheaths, thinks that the Absolute is unreal, although in fact it is real as his own Self, he himself becomes unreal in this world .... This being so, one should rise above the sheaths that have been imagined through Ignorance. One should take refuge in the supreme Self, beginningless, endless and not subject to modi- fication. (T.B.V. II.353,356)

121 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUBJECT AND OBJECT

The Self in its true nature as seen from the standpoint of the highest truth is also taught by the method of first falsely attributing to it the character of an individual experiencing

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subject and then retracting the teaching. For example, we find the pure Consciousness that constitutes the true nature of the Self figuratively referred to at various places in the Upanishads as the perception of the individual and as the individual perceiver. This Consciousness, which in its true nature is one, appears as many through Ignorance. And then Conscicusness in its true form as one is contrasted with the empirical conscicusuess arising in the course of the activity of the individual experiencer; and in this form it is referred to as Consciousness 'in its true nature' to ensure the con- trast. Empirical consciousress comes into being and suifers the six chaages of state (coming irto being, existence, growth, development, decline, destruction) undergone by everything in the temporal reaim. But it is pervaded at every stage by un- changing pure Consciousness in its true form. We have the upanishadic text, too, 'The Absolute which is directly and im- mediately evident is the Self, present within all' (Brhad. III.iv.2). The word 'direcily' (evident) might suggest that it was the individual subject which was being referred to. So the words 'amd immediately' are added to set at rest any sus- picion that the reference was to perceptual knowledge arising from the division into knower, knowledge and known. The de- tails are given at Brhadāranyaka Vartika III.iv.15-18 (see M.V.121,5 below). Consciousness in its true nature only exists where the di- vision into knower, knowledge and known has been transcended. The sequel to the passage 'You cannot see the seer of seeing' (Brhad. III.iv.2) shows that the Self is the Witness of the complex formed by the individual knower with his knowledge and its objects. It is not itself an object of cognition, as we know from the very fact of its being the real in its true mature (which transcends all distinctions, including that into subject and object). Thus it is said that the Self cannot be an object of empirical perception. There exists a Witness in the light of which alone the experience 'I see' and 'I do not see' is possible. That Witness must be identified with pure Consciousness, It can only be known through its own light. It cannot become the object of empirical perception. The in- dividual knower and his knowledge and its objects are non- conscious by nature. Being a complex, they exist for the sake of another (cp. U.S. (prose) section 56). They cannot provide knowledge of the vision of the inmost Witness. They cannot even know each other unaided. They depend on the conscious- ness of the Witness to establish themselves at all. How could they possibly see the seer of all? On this subject, one should consider the following verses.

(1) That Seer (the Witness) is itself the sight. It is not one of a complex of factors in an action. For sight is here claimed as a characteristic of the Seer. (B.B.V. IV.iii.1435)

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On account of the attribution of seeing to the Seer as an es- sential property (not as a mere temporary activity) in the upanishadic phrase '(There is no break in) the seeing of the Seer' we understand that seeing is to be taken as the essential nature of the Seer. So the Self is not an agent carrying out an act of seeing.

(2) Consriousness is one only everywhere. It is different from all the not-self. This one Consciousness undergocs illu- sory manifestation in many different forms through causes arising from Ignorance of it. (B.B.V. III.vii.60)

(3) Consciousness, which is actionless, assumes this familiar form of empirical knowledge, divided into individual subject, act of knowing and object. But Consciousness itself is with- out this division. Because it is one and the sole reality, the familiar empirical form only arises as an appearance, ever pervaded by Conscicusness in its true form. It is only when pervader and pervaded are exhausted in that relation that we have pervasion in the true sense, as in the case of the per- vasion of the rope-snake by the rope. There cannot be perva- sion in the full sense between things that are differentiated by space or time, like the Himalayan and Vindhya ranges. (B.B.V. III.iv.96-8)

Because vision, as an action explicable through the factors of action, is invariably accompanied by Consciousness in the true sense, which is not a factor in any action, we say that empiri- cal vision arises 'pervaded by' pure Consciousness, and this implies that it is pervaded by it in the same sense that a rope-snake is pervaded by the rope. This alone is pervasion in the strict sense. When we say, for instance, that the pot is 'pervaded' (encompassed) by the light of a lamp, that is loose usage.

(4) This empirical vision on the part of the Self depends on the individual experiencer and other illusory factors. But know that the Consciousness of the inmost Self is real in the highest sense. It is only through the presence of real Con- sciousness, and pervaded by it, that the empirical vision en- joyed by the Self comes and goes and suffers the six stages of development typical of all temporal being (coming into being, etc., cp. above, M.V. p.344). The limitations thereby imposed on the universal Consciousness are but apparent limitations, like the apparent limitations in space introduced by the pro- duction of a pot (cp. M.V.27,1). (B.B.V. III.iv.99-100)

(5) And in case the characterization 'directly evident' sug- gests an active seer, the phrase 'immediately evident' is added to prevent this supposition (Brhad. III.iv.1) .... The phrase 'immediately evident' (aparokşād) is used to negate the

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distinction into individual subject, known object, and knowl- edge, and to convey a reality that is without distinctions. When the distinction into subject, object and knowledge is ne- gated, thc self-revealed Witness alone remains over as estab- lished, revealed by the characterization 'immediately evident.'. (B.B.V. III.iv.15,17-8)

(6) It is saia (by the revcrcd Commentator) that, since the individual subject and his knowledge and its object only exist relatively to one another, it is the true and eternal nature of the Self to be the Witness .... If, with that vision where- by you are able to say 'I know' and 'I do not know' you are able to turn round and see that vory vision itself (as if it were an object) - then please speak out (and good luck to .. Those whc say that, when the Witness of all the modifications of the mind is established as self-revealed ex- you!) ..

perience, there still remains something to be brought about by action, will have the difficulty of explaining with what instru- ments the Witness could perform an action. (B.B.V. III.iv.82; 80; 1.iv.320.

The operation of the valid means of cognition depends on the prior establishment of the Consciousness that is Witness of all. This, being self-revealed, does not depend on anything else. No contribution to that which is the Witness by nature can be given for activities appropriate to that which is merely the known. As the power of a lamp to shed light cannot be in- creased by any other lamp, so the lamp of immediate experience is incapable of being increased by any other immediate experi- ence. This being the case, those who say that immediate ex- perience is something that has to be brought about by action will have the difficult task of explaining how, with what in- struments, and for what end, immediate experience could be produced. That is the meaning.

What has been said so far has been said from the standpoint of false attribution. Now we begin the corresponding retraction. The Self's unconditioned Vision stands prior to all activity either of seeing or of any other kind. It is not subject to increase or diminution. It is not a factor in any action. It is the Self in its true form. It becomes a Witness only through association with metaphysical Ignorance. And the very notion of association with Ignorance is itself a creation of Ignorance. In its true nature, the unconditioned Vision raised above all change can no more be a Witness than the non- conscious can. Pure Consciousness cannot be a Witness for lack of a connection with any object capable of being wit- nessed, while the non-conscious cannot be a Witness even when a connection with such objects exists. The supreme Self as Consciousness is therefore only a Witness through the medium of its reflection in Ignorance. On this view, all difficulties

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can be solved.

(7) The inmost Consciousness has stood eternally without ever rising or setting, the prior condition for the possibility of the activity of an individual experiencer, itself not a factor in any action, transcendent (relationless). This is the true form of the Self, not of the nature either of a cause or of an effcct, eternally manifest, homogeneous, void of all darkness and all distinctions. It assumes the rorm of a Witness only through connection with metaphysical Ignorance. And the notion of connection with Ignorance is itseif due only to Ignorance. (B.B.V. III.iv.83-5)

(8) The unconditioned Vision raised above all change can no more be a Witness than what is non-conscious can. The uncon- ditioned Vision has no connection with any object capable of being witnessed: the non-conscious is not capable of being a Witness even when such an object is at hand. Therefore the supreme becomes a Witness of its own reflection in Ignorance (in the form of the individual knower, knowledge and known). For the reflection of Consciousness in Ignorance (is an object capable of being witnessed, since it) is a compound implying relationship between effect and cause. (B.B.V. III.iv.89-90)

'Effect' here means the intellect and so on. 'Cause' means Consciousness as unknown.

(Whatever is compounded (samhata) has been brought into being by another and exists for the sake of another and is therefore an object capable of being witnessed. On 'compounded' in this sense, cp. U.S. (prose) section 56. T.N.)

(9) The Self has no second thing over against it, as it is raised above all change and has only Ignorance for its apparent conditioning adjunct. Nevertheless, the false idea that it is a Witness is superimposed upon it by dense souls whose minds have been blinded by Ignorance. (B.B.V. I.iv.372)

The notion that it is a Witness is a false superimposition, conditioned by the limiting adjunct of bare Ignorance.

(10) The individual knower, stationed in the intellect and identified with it, convinces himself of the presence of Ignorance and its effects in the Self, though in truth it is not present, through his own extraverted gaze - as simple souls attribute blue colour to the colourless ether of the sky. (B.B.V. I.iv.298)

The only source of our conviction as to Ignorance is our own immediate experience 'I do not know'. Even that experience occurs only through an extraverted gaze. But if we look

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with a purely introverted gaze, Ignorance dnes not exist. It is like the cuse of the blue colour experienced when looking at the ether of the sky. Even at the time it is being experi- enced it does not actually exist. It is the same with Igno- rance.

122 TEACHING BY EXAMINATION OF THE THREE STATES OF WAKING, DREAM AND DREAMLESS SLEEP

The exposition of the three states of waking, dream and dream- less sleep is not aimed at teaching that those three states really exist. The purpose of the author of the Vartika is omly to communicate the true nature of the Self by first teach- ing it through superimposing on it the three states, and then, by a critical examination of the latter, to reveal in immediate experience the eternal Self free from ail changing states. Briefly, the practical method followed for realizing the 'Fcurth' (M.V.23, intro.) or final reality is this. While still in the state where he is subject to false superimposi- tion, the student must identify his physical body with the body of the universe (Vaisvanara) through meditation. Having achieved this sense of identity, he must then realize the iden- tity of the body of the universe with the cosmic mind (Hiranya- garbha). He must then dissolve that in the Self as cause, called Prajma. And finally, he must emerge in his own true nature, beyond cause and effect, as 'neither this nor that'. The details of this process are explained in the Vārtika on the section of the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad dealing with light (jyotib, Brhad. IV.iii.l ff.). The individual soul as the Spirit viewed under adjuncts with intellect predominating (M.V.44,5, note) is of the nature of light. Through Ignorance he enjoys waking experience when the intellect is awake, and when it is asleep he sees dreams (B.B.V. IV.ii1.448). This individual soul, a false appearance composed of impressions and consisting of an individual subject and his means of cog- nition, is said to pass into the dream-state when the mind be- comes its own object as light, and in that dream-state also the soul is self-luminous light only. But in dreamless sleep the only conditioning adjunct is metaphysical Ignorance. The Self here is the cause which will later produce waking and dream as its effects (B.B.V. IV.iii.979). In the waking state the soul performs actions through its body and organs and ex- periences pleasure and pain. In the dream-state, with the intellect for conditioning adjunct, it sees dreams under the impulse of desire. In dreamless sleep its adjunct is Igno- rance alone, and it there stands as the cause of the mind and other factors of the individual organism; that is the differ- ence between the states of dream and dreamless sleep (B.B.V. IV.iii.1528).

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In this connection, Suresvara follows the method of the Upanishad and the revered Commentator in using the example of a great fish. The fish stands, in his exposition, for the Self, different both frcm the body and the organs of the waking state, known as 'death', and from the desire and activity that prompt the further existence of the physical body. And so it can be shown that the notion that the Sclf undergoes transmi- gratory experience is due to metaphysical Ignorance (B.B.V. IV.iii.1148-51). In dreamless sleep the soul stands as 'the Self unknown', the cause of waking and dream experience, and, being vold of name and form, is verily the Absolute. For, as remarked at Brhadāraņyaka Vārtika II. i.451-2, we have the upanishadic texts, 'All these creatures go daily to the realm of the Abso- lute but are carried away by delusiou and do not know it' (Chand. VIII. iii.2) and 'Thus all things here return to the supreme Self' (Prasna IV.7). The upamichadic text giving the example of the hawk, too, (Brhad. IV.iii.19, cp. M.V.83,12, note) is intended to expound the true nature of the Self as eternally pure, conscious and liberated (B.B.V. iv.iii.1158). The phrase .foids its wings' refers to its remaining in Igno- rance. The phrase '(is borne down) to the nest' refers to the fact that in dreamless sleep even the reflection of Conscious- ness rests in the form of pure Spirit (B.B.V. IV.iii.1172-3). That, therefore, which, in the two states of waking and dream, was associated with Ignorance in the sense of having apparent conditioning adjuncts that were effects of Ignorance, now in dreamless sleep stands separated from Ignorance (B.B.V. IV.iii. 1174-5). This is the true form of the soul, free from Igno- rance, desire and action. But in waking and dream there is an extraneous conditioning adjunct, caused by Ignorance (B.B.V. IV.iii.1205-6). One must, however, remember the other point that although, as explained, desires cease when waking and dream cease, nevertheless they do remain in dreamless sleep in the form of a latent impression, and they manifest again in the case of one who has awoken from sleep. They are never com- pletely eliminated till metaphysical knowledge of the Self dawns (B.B.V. IV.iv.378). In dream, the Self is defiled by desire and merit and de- merit. Yet it is partly luminous, because unrelated to the external world, and it conforms to and illumines the objects created by mental impressions under the impulse of desire. On the other hand, in dreamless sleep the Self stands alone, con- ditioned only as the cause, and assumes perfect tranquillity. Hence dreamless sleep is called perfect peace (samprasāda, B.B.V. IV.iii.976-8). We admit absence of knowledge in dream- less sleep in a certain sense. There is absence of internal knowledge of the form 'This am I', and also absence of exter- nal knowledge of the form 'these creatures'. But this absence of knowledge comes from being in identity with the supreme Self as the 'Conscious One' (prajma). It is quite different

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from the absence of knowledge that occurs in dream and waking. which is due to apparent conditioning adjuncts. And this is taught in the Upanishad with the help of the example of the man embracing his wife (B.B.V. IV. iii. 1309-10). But how do we kncw that this absence of knowledge in dream- less sleep is due to attaining identity, and not to a natural absence of consciousness? Absence of knowledge is, after all, the typical characteristic of non-conscious beings (B.B.V V.iti.1384). It is to answer this objection that the Upani- shad says, 'Verily, when there (in the state of dreamless sleep) he does not see, he is, verily, seeing, though he does not see. For there is no break in the seeing of the seer' (Brhad. IV.iii.23). Desire, action, ignorance aud the like are not the nature of the Self, as Consciousness is. And the Upanishad tells us that the soul is unattached and is not followed in waking by the effects of its experiences when dreaming (Brhad. IV.iii. 15-6, cp. M.V.40,3). The relation of the Self with metaphysi- cal Ignorance is beginningless, (in the sense of timeless), nc doubt. But it is accepted that its relation with such effects of Ignorance as positive acts of erroneous cognition, desires and so forth nas a beginning (B.B.V. IV.iii.1408-9). But what is the connection of one who is the victim of ab- sence of knowledge and erroneous knowledge with the metaphysi- cal teaching (B.B.V. IV.iii.1410)? To answer this question, dreamless sleep is expounded as a state frce from ignorance, desire and action. Even in the dream-state the sense-organs dissolve into the vehicle of the impressions, as we know from the text, 'Himself not sleeping, he looks down on the sleeping sense-organs' (Brhad. IV.iii.11). How could the organs be present in dreamless sleep when not even their impressions are present (B.B.V. IV.iii. 1416)? So, since the action of seeing and its factors and results are alike impossible, a person does not see in dreamless sleep. And (in another sense) he does see, since he is Consciousness by nature (B.B.V. IV.ii1. 1417). ' From the feeling 'I did not see (anything)' on the part of one who has woken up, we know that, in dreamless sleep, the absence of the individual subject and his knowledge and its objects has been directly experienced in that state by Con- sciousness in its true nature (B.B.V. IV.iii.1420). If there had been any break in the vision of Consciousness one would not be aware of dreamless sleep, as it would not have been ex- perienced (B.B.V. IV.iii.1438). The present participle 'see- ing' in the phrase, ' ... although seeing, He does not see. For there is no break in the seeing of the seer ... ' (Brhad. IV.iii. 23) does not mean that there is an individual subject enjoying experience. For that is impossible in dreamless sleep. You have to be content with the explanation that the I-notion of dreamless sleep ('remembered' retrospectively in subsequent waking experience) represents the Self in its true nature. It

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is the subject of the participle 'seeing' in the same sort of (metaphorical) sense (not implying action) that we speak of space as 'giving' room (B.B.V. IV.iii.1442). Ome should not raise the objection, 'How can the Self see at all if it has no factors of action at its digrosal?' For oven in the world =e do not see the factors of action at work before an action. Whether there is action to be done or not, factors of action as a pre-condition can be ruled out in either case (M.V.122, 15). Moreover, in the case where seeing is con- stant, it is impossible to establish a relation of temporel sequence between an action and its result, so that it is im- possiblo to establish the existence of an end and means (and hence impossible to think of the seeing cf the Witness as an action, B.B.V. IV.ii1.i449). The distinctions that set up the appearance of an individual seer, his seeing and its results are shown to arise through ignorance (B.B.V. IV.1ii.1450). There is dependence on Ignorance for relation with knowledge of the not-self; but there is no such dependence on Ignorance, or the factors of acticn which are a mere appearance derlving from it, when it is known that only the Self exists (B.B.V. IV.iii.1451-2). Thus in dream and waking the Self appears through Ignorance to undergo distinction according to the distinctions of name and form. But this is not the case in dreamless sleep, so that in that state one does not see duality, as one does in waking. In dreamless sleep, everything has assumed the form of the changeless Self. There is then neither Ignorance, nor its effects, nor absence of Ignorance, for there is then noth- ing apart from the Self for the Self to witness as its object (B.B.V. IV. i1i. 1518-23) . Therefore, in dreamless sleep the Self knows nothing, without thereby giving up its nature as Consciousness. Thus all difficulties can be explained. The Upanishad sums up the final truth about dreamless sleep in the passage beginning '(In dreamless sleep) the seer is one, transparent like water' (Brhad. IV.iii.32, cp. M.V.44, intro.). Here is the meaning. Water is pure. In the state of dreamless sleep there is no awareness of cause and effect, because Ignorance and its effects cannot penetrate that which is eternally conscious by nature. It is one, without internal distinctions, and not itself standing as an individual within a class. That is, it is one only, without a second. It is not a seer (in the empirical sense of one performing the act of seeing). For it is by nature void of the factors of action, and there is nothing for it to see. It is also non-dual be- cause it. transcends Ignorance and its effects (B.B.V. IV.ii. 1798-1806). It is ever immediately evident. The realm of the Absolute is not, properly speaking, either transcendent or immanent. It is that 'state' (loka) which is the Absolute. The implication is that the true nature of the Self is the Absolute. This is known from the highest texts of the Upani- shads, where the subject-predicate relation of the words,

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and the mutual qualification of the word-meanings gives rise to a sentence which can only express an indication (and not denote a definite meaning, B.B.V. IV.iii. 1819-21). This is the highest state of the soul, which puts an end to all other states (B.B.V. IV.iii.1828). It is his supreme possession, his unsurpassable state of glory. It is the highest realm to which he can attain, for it is indestructible. It is his supreme bliss. For it exceeds all cther bliss, and 'all other creatures subsist on a fraction of this bliss' (B.B.V. IV.iii. 1828, -32, -36, -40). Thus irom an examination of the states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep we can establish that the Self is real, that it transcends all the not-self, that it is unalloyed, that it is seli-luminous, that it is comstant and eternal, that its nature is unsurpassable blise, that it is a pure unity, that it is Consciousness and ncthing else and that it is without a second. The most important verses to consider in this regard are the follewing.

(1) The secker of liberation (having identified himself with Vaiśvanara, the Self as associated with the cosmos in its ob- jective form, cp. M.V.43,6), proceeds on from Vaisvanara and identifies himself in his heart with its inner self, Taijasa or Hiranyagarbha (M.V.23; 43,6). Then he dissolves this into its inner self, the Cosmic Vital Energy. The term 'Vital Energy' as used in this context means the Self as cause (viz. the Self qua unknown). It is the seed of every effect and is also known as 'the Conscious One' (prajna, M.V.23 and 43). Effects cannot dissolve anywhere except into their material cause. Therefore, when the seeker of liberation has reached the cause of all, he should proceed on to the Absolute in its true nature, which is not a cause, by thinking 'neither this nor that'. (B.B.V. IV.ii.82-4)

(2) Just as, when the mind is awake, one identifies oneself with it falsely and feels 'I am awake', so, when the mind is dreaming and one is witnessing the dream, there is the false

IV.iii.448) idea whereby one identifies oneself with the dream. (B.B.V.

(3) The Self as cause is indeed the inmost principle, but viewed under the adjunct of bare Ignorance. The effects which,

IV.iii.979) as such, it produces are called waking and dream. (B.B.V.

(4) Ignorance is the cause of the mind. The mind is the con- dition of the individual experiencer. It is only in the realm of the body that one experiences pleasure and pain. All is caused by Ignorance of the inmost Self. (B.B.V. IV.iii.1528)

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(5) Tne true form of the Self as pure and conscious and so on is set forth with an example (at Brhad.IV.iii.19) by the use of the words 'as a hawk'. (B.B.V. IV.iii.1158)

(6) Dy the image of the folding of the wings the upanishadic text teaches that, even here in this world, the creature that has sprung from Ignorance of the Self rests in it (i.e. in the Self in dreamless sleep). By the words 'is borne down to the nest' it refers to the pure form of the inmost Self assumed by the reflection of the inmost Consciousness in Ignorance when the soul comes to the inmost Self (in dreamless sleep). (B.B.V. IV.iii.1172-3)

(7) When all the effects of Ignorance, including the mind, are withdrawn, the reflection of Consciousness is also with- drawn, as the reflection of the sun in water disappears with the disappearance of the reflecting medium. Before dreamless sleep, the Consciousness associated with Ignorance was identi- fied with the effects of the latter (in waking and dream). The distinction between Consciousness and its supposed reflection arises from Ignorance. (B.B.V. IV.iii.1174-5)

The true nature of the reflection of Consciousness in the mind is the inmost Consciousness itself. In the states other than dreamless sleep, it appears to be distinct from the inmost Consciousness, but only through Ignorance. In dreamless sleep, however, the case is otherwise. Here it rests in its own true nature as pure Consciousness, as the reflection of the sun in water returns to its original, the sun, when the reflecting medium is removed.

(8) This is the true form of the soul that is here described, free from Ignorance, desire and action in dreamless sleep. One should know that the other form of the soul, undergoing waking and dream, is due to an extraneous cause, that sole cause be- ing Ignorance of the Self. (B.B.V. IV.iii.1205-6)

(9) In dreamless sleep, when waking and dream have disap- peared, all men's desires disappear with them. They just re- main in the form of latent impressions. The upanishadic text (Brhad. IV.iv.7) specifies all desires, to show that, for im- mortality, even the latent impressions of desire have to be neutralized. When Ignorance, the cause of desire, has been eradicated, no latent impression remains over, or anything else either, as Ignorance is the root of every phenomenon in the empirical world. (B.B.V. IV.iv.378-9)

It is only from the standpoint of empirical experience, accord- ing to Suresvara, that Ignorance and its effects are said to leave impressions (reading samskāra-seşatva).

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(10) The nature of the Self is pure Consciousness: it is not desire, action, (psychological) ignorance and the rest. For we know from the texts 'unattached' and 'not followed (in waking by its experiences that it had when dreaming)' (Brhad. IV.iii.15) that desire and the rest are illusory. Pure Con-

Self. sciousness, raised above all change, is the true nature of the Its association with metaphysical Ignorance is begin- ningless, while its association with desire and other effects of Ignorance is regarded as having a beginning. When the soul is afflicted by Ignorance of the Self and consequent positive misconception, what is the teaching to which it has to turn for knowledge of the truth? This the Upanishad explains when it says, 'Verily, when there (in the state of dreamless sleep) he does not see, he is, verily, see- ing, though he does not see (for there is no break in the see- ing of the seer' (Brhad.IV.iii.23). (B.B.V. IV.iii.1408-10)

(11) The text (Brhad. JV.iii.23) says 'He does not see' because there cannot be the factors of action in dreamless sleep. It says 'although seeing' in relation to the true state of af- fairs (namely the presence of the universal Consciousness). (B.B.V. IV.iii.1417)

(12) (The Self can be known without dependence on one's indi- vidual subject-object cognition yielding empirical knowledge.) For it is after first beholding reality (in dreamless sleep), unattained by the triad of knower, knowledge and known, that one afterwards (is aware of that absence of the triad and) says 'I did not (then) see (in dreamless sleep)'. This ab- sence of seeing is witnessed by the Self in its pure form as Consciousness, just as what is seen is also so witnessed (so that the Self as Consciousness is established as constant and eternal). (B.B.V. IV.iii.1420)

(13) If there were any break in the seeing of the seer in dreamless sleep one would not have the feeling of knowing one had been to sleep. Therefore the vision of the supreme Self is void either of origin or dissolution. (B.B.V. IV.iii.1438)

(14) As one may use the participle of a verb and refer meta- phorically to the actionless ether of space as 'giving space', so may one refer metaphorically to the actionless Self as 'seeing'. (B.B.V. IV.iii.1442)

(15) Because no factor of action is found at work before an act is begun, factors of actions must be deemed universally inoperative at this stage .... If there is no action to be done, there can be no factors of action. And even if there is an action to be done, the notion of factors of action leads to infinite regress (as one would have to assume new factors of action to set the original ones in motion and so to infinity).

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It is thus hard to show how factors of action operate at all. Moreover, in a case (like that of the constant 'seeing' of the Self), where it is impossible to establish a temporal sequence between an act and its result, it is impossible to establish the existence of an end and means either. But if Ignorance is accepted as the cause, all these difficulties become explic- able. Everything is a mere appearance resulting from Ignorance. There is nothing incorrect. (B.B.V. IV.iii. 1444,1448-50)

The asserticn that, even accepting factors of action from the empirical standpoint, there is nothing wrong, appears to be no more than an artificial argument based on an unnecessary con- cession to the opponent's case (because Suresvara has shown at length that there cannot be factors of action at work in the case of the 'sceing' of the Seer). Hence one need not examine this argument too closely. But students may find a passage at the end of the introductory part of Śri Sankara's Commentary to Bhagavad Gita XVIII.67 of interest. It begins, 'No, for that would make what did not act into a performer of action ... '. (See Bh.G.Bh. XVIII.67, trans. A. Manadeva Sāstrī p. 515.)

(16) Where a connection of the Self with the not-self is taught, there the reference is to a connection based on Igno- rance, forming the notion, based equally on Ignorance, of an individual able to act, and of factors of action at his dis- posal, etc. But when for the man of wisdom the notion 'All is the (actionless) Self'arises, this idea is based on reality. It does not, like the notion of a not-self, depend on Igno- rance and its effects. (B.B.V. IV.iii.1451-2)

(17) Where there are distinctions (as in waking and dream) there is the appearance of Ignorance (in the form of 'I do not know' ). But there are no distinctions whatever in dreamless sleep (and consequently no feeling 'I do not know' and no Ignorance, cp. M.V.122,19). Ignorance belongs to the mind, as that is where it is consistently found. It does not belong to Consciousness in the state of dreamless sleep (prajña). In the one undivided Consciousness raised above all change an (apparent) distinction arises through vision based on Igno- rance, a distinction which comprises thousands of further dis- tinctions through name, form and action. But in dreamless sleep that duality is not found. Ignorance, the cause of evil, is not present. There is then no duality for the soul to per- ceive through distinction into individual subject, empirical knowledge and objects, as there is in the waking and dream states. To speak of the absence of Ignorance and its effects is to affirm the sole existence of the Self, eternal and raised above all change, as the only reality. To affirm the sole existence of the Self, the cause, in dreamless sleep is to deny the existence of the effect as a reality. (B.B.V.

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IV.iii.1517-20).

We now show the method of the negation of the three states. Ignorance of the Self is nothing real. Our certitude as to its existence rests only on the feeling 'I do not know' that arises in the course of empirical experience (T.B.V. II.176). The soul, centred in the mind aad looking not inwards but out- wards, convinces itself of its ignorance of the Self, as one .convinces onsself of the blue colour of the (colourless) ether of the sky. But if it turns its gaze inwards, it finds noithor ignorance nor doubt nor wrong knowledge in waking, dream or draamless sleep (B.B.V. I.iv.298-9). And one should not raise the objectios that one has to accept that Igmorance was pres- ent in dreamless sleep om account of the memory 'I knew noth- ing' that is supposed to occur to one who has awoken from it. For in dreamless sleep one does rot in fact have the experience 'I do not know'. And it is not right to say that the feeling 'i did not know' (that comes to one after he has woken up) represents a memory. When Devadatta remembers 'I knew that then', he remombers what he had previously experienced accord- isg to its proper details of time and place. But one cannot say that this Self looks back over what it had previously ex- perienced in this way. For, since the Self is the Witness of time, space and causation, it cannot undergo determination by time, space and causation (since it witnesses these as objects and therefore as distinct from itself). Ignorance, again, does not exist for its owr sake. (That which exists for the sake of another is non-conscious, cp. U.S. (prose) section 71. That for which it exists muist be conscious and self-existent, in short the one Seif taught in the Upani- shads. What exists for the Self has no existence independent of the Self and is reducible to a temporary illusion arising on the substratum of the Self, cp. Anandagiri on B.B.V. I.iv. 301, IV.ii.25. T.N.) Ignorance is an illusion arising in the Self and appearing before it, like the illusion of a rope- snake and so on. It is thus correct to dismiss it as mere false imagination. As the rope-snake is falsely imagined in the rope and is nothing other than the rope, so Ignorance is imagined in Consciousness, and, being in its true nature Con- sciousness, manifests there. And when the eternal Conscious- ness raised above all change is known, Ignorance and its ef- fects are cancelled. (B.B.V. I.iv.300-6). It is true that at Naişkarmya Siddhi III.58 (prose intro- duction) Suresvara makes a case for the existence of Ignorance in dreamless sleep, saying, 'In dreamless sleep there is pres- ent that very Ignorance of the Self that is the cause of all evil'. But there is nothing wrong here. For this was said on the assumption that everyone accepts Ignorance at its face value until it is finally cancelled through metaphysical knowl- edge derived from the holy texts. Nor should one think that this implies that there is no experience of the Self in

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dreamless sleep, which might imply, in turn, that it did not then exist. For we have to accept that the Consciousness which was infallibiy present to enable us to say 'I knew noth- ing (in dreamless sleep)' is in fact the Self, of the nature of immediate expcrience (B.B.V. III.iv.103). In its true nature the Seli is totally devoid of Ignorance, not enly in dreamless sleep but in waking and dream as well. It is not active. It is intericr to ail. It comstitutes all. It is the true nature both of itself and of anything else. Sc the Upanishad was correct to say that when it does not see, in dreamless sleep, yet it is seeing when it does not see (Brhad. IV.i11.23). It no more sees (in the sense of an activity) in waking and dream than it does in dreamless sleep. And there is no more any break in its real Consciousness in dreamless sleep than there is in waking and dream (B.B.V. IV.1i1.1493-5, 1907-8). It can be proved by reason that the states of the Self are false appearances. The state of waking is a false appearance simply because of its form as waking experience, and because it has a beginning and an end, like the (admittedly illusory) appearance (to the dreamer) of being awake in dream. The ef- fects of Ignorance that lie before us are apprehended as non- conscious, and they have no independent existence of their own, like the water seen in a mirage (B.B.V. IV.ii1.1072-3). Again, waking and dream do not pertain to the true Self. For they are only found belonging to the individual soul, as ap- parently delimited by the mind, itself associated with psycho- logical ignorance and desire. They do not in any way belong to the inner Witness of the individual soul. For the Witness, from the very fact of being the Witness, cannot be organically connected with what it witnesses (since the subject can never be the object nor the object subject, B.B.V. IV.ii1.905). And again, all the not-selves are false appearances, as they ex- clude one another mutually, like the snake, stick, trickle of water, etc., falsely imagined in the rope (B.B.V. I.iv.1496-7). And in dreamless sleep and coma they (not merely exclude them- selves mutually but) all completely disappear from view (B.B.V. II.iii.222). But the Self as Consciousness is never lost (B.B.V. II.iv.126), as it is the Witness both of the feeling 'I know' and 'I do not know' (B.B.V. II.iv.129). Thus from the standpoint of the final truth, neither waking nor dream nor dreamless sleep belong to the relationless Self. These states are only illusory experiences arising from meta- physical Ignorance, like the experience of the rope-snake and the rest (B.B.V. II.1.264-6). Thus in all circumstances the Self is pure Consciousness. It is non-dual, and does not undergo different states. The whole doctrine that the Self passes through different states is taught (and then later denied) only to bring out how the supreme reality is free from such states. It is only from the texts of the Upanishads that one can know that the supreme

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reality is free from such states. It is only from the texts of the Upamishads that one can know that the supreme reality is the Absclute, not from lcgical investigation of the impli- cations of the three states and from that alonc (B.B.V. IV.iii. 1112-5). That is the teaching of the Vartika. Here are the chief verses worthy of coneideration on these topics.

(18) Ignorance of one's own Self is a false appearance, alike in waking, dream and dreamless sleep, that comes into the field of practical experience, witnessed by the Self that is self- rcvealed .... It is only when the Conscious One, seated in the mind and identified with Ignorance, turns its gaze outwards that it fails to apprehend its own true Self and accepts Igno- rance and its effects as real, like a child accepting as real the blue colour of the sky. It does not do so through its own true nature. But when its gaze is turned inwards, it finds neither ignorance, nor doubt nor wrong knowledge in waking, dream or dreamless sleep. (B.B.V. IV.iii.1293, I.iv.298-9)

(19) One who awakens from dreamless sleep has the memory 'I did not know anything'. But that is not a genuine cognition bearing on the state of dreamless sleep. For nothing that be- longs to the Self can pertain to the past, since the Self is

I.iv.300) undifferentiated by time, space or other factors. (B.B.V.

For the whole notion 'Ignorance residing in the Self was ex- perienced in the past' makes no sense (since neither the Self nor metaphysical Ignorance falls within time. )

(20) The innermost Self is not accepted as being touched either by past time or by future time. Whatever exists for another exists as an illusion appearing on the substratum of that which is self-existent. Hence it is traditionally taught to be false imagination. The fact that a thing belongs to the past cannot be known through perception, and the fact that a thing lies in the future cannot be known through any means of valid knowledge. Hence all notions of past and future are false knowledge .... Ignorance manifests in the Self, but in truth it is only pure Consciousness. Since it is dependent on the inmost Self raised above all change, this imagined cause can be cancelled, together with its effects, (through a realization of one's true nature as the inmost Self). (B.B.V. I.iv.301-3,6)

(21) If Consciousness as immediate experience was not invari- ably present in dreamless sleep, how do you explain how the one who awakens from it can have the idea 'I knew nothing in areamless sleep'? (B.B.V. III.iv.103)

(22) The Self in dreamless sleep 'is seeing though it does

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not see' because it has none of the factors of action, because it is interior to all, because it is all, and because it is the true nature of all else. It does not see in dreamless sleep for the reason mentioned (namely that it has none of the factors of action, so that it is present shining but does not perform any act of seeing); but one should understand that it does not see in waking and dream either, for the same reason. And just as Consciousness is unbroken throughout dream and waking, so is it also in dreamless sleep, for the reasons given. (B.B.V. IV.iii.1493-5)

(23) This Self has unbroken vision. This has already been de- clared to be the case in dream and waking. But it is true in the case of dreamless sleep also, as the text 'When there in the state of dreamless sleep ... ' (Brhad. IV.iii.23) shows. And just as the Self transcends the factors of action in dreamless sleep as bare eternal Consciousness raised above all change, so does it also transcend the factors of action in dream and waking. (B.B.V. IV.iii.1907-8)

(24) This state of waking is unreal, simply on account of the fact that it is a state of waking. For it has a beginning and comes to an end, like the state of waking that appears (to the dreamer) to occur in dream. The waking state is a mere ap- pearance arising from Ignorance. Its objects (since they ap- pear before the Witness) are invariably non-conscious, and have no independent existence of their own, like the water seen in a mirage. (B.B.V. IV.iii.1072-3)

(25) It is the mind thet acts, afflicted by ignorance and desire. Sleeping and waking belong to the mind; they do not

-IV.iii.905) belong to the Witness of the mind, pure Consciousness. (B.B.V.

(26) When a garland is misperceived as a snake, it cannot be misperceived as a stick or in other ways at the same time. Similarly, when the inmost Self is misperceived as undergoing one of the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep, it cannot be misperceived as undergoing one of the others at the same time. Even under metaphysical Ignorance, the various not-selves (are seen to be unreal because they) exclude each other mutually. How much more clearly will their unreality be revealed when all Ignorance is dissolved without remainder in the inmost Self! (B.B.V. I.iv.1496-7)

(27) The various manifestations of the not-self (are known to be unreal because they) exclude one another mutually. And in dreamless sleep, swoon, trance and other such states the Self as Witness reveals the complete disappearance of the not-self. (B.B.V. II.iii.222)

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(28) In dreamless sleep the individual subject and his knowl- edge and its objects disappear, but pure Consciousness does not disappear. However, all other things in the world apart from Consciousness exclude one another mutually and disappear altogether in dreamless sleep .... Whenever there arises the notion 'I do not know', this is witnessed by the Self. How much more evidently is this the case with the feeling 'I know!' Fure Consciousness, therefore, never disappears. (B.B.V. II.iv.126,129)

(29) The relationless Self does not undergo either dreamless sleep or waking. How could it then undergo the state of dream? Waking, dream and dreamless sleep are but natural (uncaused, beginningless) Ignorance of the Self. The imagin- ary idea that the Self is asleep or awake or is dreaming be- longs only to creatures asleep in the night of Ignorance. This whole universe consisting of the moving and the fixeu is a mere illusion. The Supreme is its true nature, as the rope is the true nature of the illusory snake. (B.B.V. II.i.264-6)

(30) The nction that the Self passes through the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep arises from other (secular) means of knowledge. The Vedic teaching appearing to confirm the existence of the three states (does not constitute valid authoritative teaching but) is only given to conform with (false) knowledge derived from other sources (secular experi- ence). But the fact that the one who appears to be passing through (repeated cycles of) waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep is really the Absolute can only be known from the upani- shadic texts. Hence it is that which they are concerned to communicate as valid knowledge. The purport of 'That thou art' and other metaphysical texts of the Veda is to teach that the true nature of one's own Self is the Absolute, and the

1113-5) true nature of the Absolute one's own Self. (B.B.V. IV.iii.

123 CAN THERE BE AN INJUNCTION FOR KNOWLEDGE?

There is a text in the section of the Brhadāranyaka Upanishad containing the teaching given to MaitreyI which runs: 'The Self, indeed, should be seen, heard about, pondered over and subjected to sustained meditation, Maitreyi. Verily, through seeing the Self, through hearing about it, through thinking of it and through knowing it, all this (world) becomes known' (Brhad. II.iv.5). In this connection, the question whether or not the seeing and so on were enjoined has been a subject for dispute among philosophers. For example, Ācarya Mandana wrote: 'The phrase "should be subjected to sustained meditation" is part of one

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long conmected passage that begins "For the sake of the Self" and onds "All this is but the Self" (Brhad. II.iv.5-6). The purpose of this passage is to expound the true nature of the Self. The phrases occurring within it, "should be seer", "should be heard about" and "should be subjected to sustained meditaticn", though expressed (in imperative form) as gerun- dives, are not scparate injunctions, but (belong to the main passage expounding the Absolute ard) are intended for eulogy. For the gerundive termination is said to have other meanings spart from command, such as ascribing worth or value (cp. Pāņini III.iii.169, quoted above, M.V. p.19). The text there- fore oniy means "The Self is worthy of being seen, etc."). We have such examples of th's as "Visnu is worthy of being of- fered (lit. "should be offered", gerundive) the Upamsu Sacri- fice" (T.S. II.vi.6), which occurs amongst the texts about offering the Upamsu' (B.Sid. p.155; see also Śabara, P.M. Bhāgya II.1i.10). Suresvara, however, makes three distinctions in treating this prohlem. He says that 'should be seea' cannot be an in- junction, as it refers to knowledge conditioned by reality. 'Shouid be heard about' and 'should be pondered over' are in- junctions, since they refer to actions dependent on the humar will. 'Should be subjected to sustained meditation' is not an injunction. For sustained meditation (nididhyasana) is. (not an action but) that immediate experience of one's own true Self that constitutes the goal of the Vedantic spiritual dis- cipline. 'It should be seen', then, is not an injunction. Why not? In the phrase 'The Self should be seen' the word 'Self' refers to one's inmost Self, and knowledge of one's Self is already ome's own by nature. Again, the knowledge expressed here by the verb 'seen' cannot be enjoined, as it is conditioned by reality. When the word 'knowledge' is used to refer to sym- bolic meditations (such as 'Woman, O Gautama, is the sacrifi- cial fire', Chand. V.viii.1) it stands for something that can be enjoined, but symbolic meditation is not the topic of the present passage. Again, there is no other seer apart from the inmost Self. And where the seer and that which has to be seen are the same there can be no injunction of the form 'It should be seen'. For there canhot be an injunction to an act of see- ing where the seer, acting on himself, is performer and object of the same act. Therefore the teaching 'All this (world) is but the Self' (Brhad. II.iv.6) is given by the Veda after it had first used the formula 'neither this nor that' (Brhad. II.iii.6) to negate the notion that the Self had assumed the form of the not-self. And so the real force of the apparent injunction 'the Self should be seen' is to give some informa- tion about something the hearer did not previously know. This is the gist of Suresvara's refutation of the possibility of there being an injunction for seeing. Objections raised by opponents are disposed of as follows.

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One should not object that the Vedic texts making metaphysical statemerts are no more authoritative than cagual worldly re- merks like 'There are five fruits on the river bank'. Nor shouid one object that the words cannot be properly intercon- nected to form a sentence for lack of a verb. For the Veda will be an authoritative means of knowledge if it can awaken anyone to the truth of the sole reality of the one Self, a truth inaccessible to any other means of knowledge. And the Vedic text can perform this functics even when the connections of the words with their meanings are not apprebended, as in the case of sentences that awaken sleepers. Nor do the meta- physical texts ever isck verbs, as forms of the verb 'to be' can always be understood and supplied. The remark about there being fruits on the river bank concerns a matter which can be known from sources cther than the spoken word. It does nct concern a matter that can only be known through verbal revela- tion, so it was an irrelcvant example. Here are the chief verses to consider.

(1) In the phrase 'The Self that should be seen' (Brhad. II.iv.5) the word 'Self' refers to the inmost Self, as the Self is invariably experienced as that which is inmost. The words 'should be seen' refer to a correct knowledge of that through the Veda. It is true that everyone is naturally aware of their own Self. But what they do not know is that it is the Self of all. It is that idea that is affirmed by the Veda as something new that has to be known. This text, however, could only be an injunction to act if the knower and the thing to be known were different. In the present context there can be no injunction to act, for lack of any difference between what was enjoined and the one on whom the injunction was laid. (B.B.V. II.iv.95-7)

The idea is that, because one does not know that all this is one's own Self, it is correct to suppose that this is what the text affirms. But there is no command to perform any act here, since, although the text assumes the grammatical form of an injunction, there is no distinction between what is en- joined and the one on whom the injunction is laid. What we have, rather, is the commmication of a piece of hitherto un- known information.

(2) The idea 'All this is the Self' is valid knowledge condi- tioned by the object known. Only if it had been the idea of something already familiar from worldly experience, like fire, could it have arisen in dependence on the arbitrary will of the individual knowing subject (and only in such a case could it have been the object of an injunction, for instance an in- junction to meditate, as is implicitly the case in the text 'Woman, O Gautama, is the sacrificial fire', (Chand.V.viii.1, cp. M.V. p.361). So there cannot be an injunction for

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metaphysical knowledge of the Self, as it is not an idea that arises in dcpendence on the will of man. But actions like reasoning over the meaning of the words of the texts by the method of agreement and difference are enjoined, since they are dependent on the will of man. (B.B.V. II.iv.120-1)

(3) When subject and object are different, there is pervasion of the object by the subject in order to know it, as in the case of perception of a pot. But the Self cannot actively per- vade itself to have knowledge of itself in this way. There cannot be pervasion where there is non-difference, for the very reason that pervader and pervaded would already be iden- tical. (B.B.V. II.iv.135)

Unlike a material object like a pot, the Self is not capable of being pervaded through the activity of the individual know- ing subject in the form of seeing. Nor can the Self's own vision (act on and) pervade itself.

(4) Nor is there any other subject who could see the Self as an object, for this is specifically denied in the text 'There is no other seer ... but He' (Brhad. III.vii.23). And, indeed, we do not find in the world two subjects playing between them the role of subject and object. (B.B.V. II.iv.136)

When the Vedic text says 'There is no other seer ... but He', it means that, from the standpoint of the highest truth, the Self is not an object that can be seen. Even from the stand- point of worldly experience, one subject is never the object of the vision of another subject.

(5) If the seer were able to see itself, that would be a con- tradiction of the laws of action. And if (by some strange chance) it could do so, it would always be doing so, so that the injunction to do so would be rendered useless. (B.B.V. ll.iv.137)

The contradiction of the laws of action would consist in the fact of the one doing an action being himself the object of that action. The implication of the verse is that there can- not be an injunction to see one's own Self, whether such vision be of the very nature of the seer or whether it be as- sociated with an individual knowing subject.

(6) Here, too, in the Brhadaranyaka as well as in the Chandogya, the text accepts on the basis of common experience all that it has negated as not being of the nature of the in- most Self in the words 'neither this nor that' (Brhad.II.iii. 6) and affirms 'All this(world) is the Self' (Brhad.II.iv. 6) .... The injunction here 'The Self should be seen' (Brhad. II.iv.5,6) is therefore no more than the communication of

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hitherto unknown information (i.e. 'The Self should be seen' = 'See that, namely, I am telling you that, the Self is as here taught', cp. M.V.125,2). The text 'the Self should be seen' could not be intended as an injunction to act addressed to one not yet acting, as action is impossible in the case of the Self. (B.B.V. II.iv.104 and 115)

(7) It is not correct to say that all the texts of the Upani- shads have to be interpreted as injunctions, on the ground that statements of fact are never authoritative, since they depend for their validity on knowledge gained from other sources. For the metaphysical statements of the Upanishads are an authoritative means of knowledge, since they awaken one to the sole reality of the Self, not knowable from any other source, as words are used to awaken a sleeper. (B.B.V. II.iv. 148)

(8) There is no rule that a verb must appear overtly in a sentence before the words can be connected. In the metaphysi- cal texts, verbs like 'art' and 'am' can very well be under- stood and supplied even when not overtly expressed. It is true that there is dependence on other sources of knowledge in the case of the casual remark 'There are fruits on the river bank', because there the things denoted by the words 'fruits' and 'river bank' are accessible to another means of knowledge, namely perception. (B.B.V. IV.ii.161-2)

124 CAN THERE BE. INJUNCTIONS FOR HEARING, PONDERING AND SUSTAINED MEDITATION?

It is correct to hold that hearing, pondering, inner and outer control and other such parts of the spiritual discipline can be enjoined, as they fall within the scope of the human will, and are indispensible auxiliaries to that rational examination of the meaning of the words of the metaphysical texts of the Upanishads which is necessary for a comprehension of their meaning. As Śri Śańkara said in his Upadesa Sāhasrī:

(1) The knowledge that one is (in truth) ever liberated comes from the Vedic texts and from no other source. And knowledge of the meaning of a text is not possible without. first calling to mind the meanings of its component words. It is certain that the meaning of a word is called to mind on the basis of agreements and differences (in the way one has heerd the word used and the meanings for which it is made to stand). In this way one comes to know oneself as the pure transcendent Self, beyond pain or action. (U.S. (verse) XVIII.190-1, cp. M.V.107,2)

Let us examine this further in the context. In the

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Brhadaranyaka, the words 'it should be heard about' are added to show that the earlier words ' (The Self) should be seen' do not impiy that one should resort to all the valid means of cognition, but only to the texts of the Upanishads. As for the further phrase 'it should be pondered over', this includes resort to the various methods for determining the meaning of the Vedic texts, such as testing by the Six Forms of Evidence (M.V. p.23), as well as reasoning in consonance with the Veda. On the other hand the phrase 'it should be subjected to sustained meditation' is declared to refer to the immediate experience in which hearing and pondering ought to culminate. When there arises that immediate intuition of one's owr true nature which dopends on no external factor, then there is nothing left that one has to do. When the non-dual Self hag beer perceived as a result of hearing and pondering cne has the conviction 'There is no further knowledge left to arise, there is no Ignorance left that has not been burnt up'. One should not raise the objection that the word 'nididhyasana' must mean meditation. For the meazing of the term 'nidi- dhyasaua' has been expressed by the term 'immediate intuition' (vijmana) in the passage, 'Verily, through seeing the Self, through hearing about it, through thinking of it and through knowing it (in immediate intuition, vijñana), all this (world) becomes known' (Brhad. II.iv.5). That meditation (dhyana) is a prerequisite of immediate intuitica is not denied. But it is immediate intuition, and not meditation and the rest of the discipline, that is ultimately required to realize the goal of liberation. Nor should one object that liberation must be impermanent if it is the result of immediate intuition. For liberation in the sense of being the one universal Self is always, and for everyone, a fact. All that has to be effected by immediate intuition is the practical negation of our Igno- rance that we are the one universal Self. Liberation is in no way distinct from immediate intuition of the Self. One should understand that, if liberation is spoken of as the result of immediate intuition, this is only a figure of speech. On this topic, the following verses should be noted.

(2) So there cannot be an injunction for metaphysical knowl- edge of the Self, as it is not an idea that arises in depend- ence on the will of man. But actions like reasoning over the meaning of the words of the texts by the method of agreement and difference are enjoined, since they are dependent on the will of man. In the same way, a person can decide whether to carry out hearing and pondering as well as inner and outer control and the other parts of the spiritual discipline - so all these practices are enjoined. (B.B.V. II.iv.121-2)

(3) One might suppose that all the means of valid cognition revealed the Self in that the cognitions resulting from them depended on it intimately for their light. But the Brhad-

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arauyaka Upanishad says 'It must be heard about', pointing thereby to the upanishadic texts. (B.B.V. II.iv.212)

One might suppose that the Self should be seen through all the valid means of cognition, because the Seif as Consciousness constitutes the resultant-cognition of each. But the force of the words 'It must be heard about' is to ehow that it is the upanishadic texts thut are the authoritative source of knowl- edge of the Seif, since it is only through them that metaphy- sinal Ignorance of the Self (reading atma-ajnana) can be brought to an end.

(4) It is the application of the Six Forms of Evidence (M.V. p.23) that brings out the true force of the words. Then the text says 'It (the Self) must be pondered over' to determine the true meaning of the traditional texts communicating it. It is clear from the command 'Tt must be pondered over' that what is being taught here is reality in its true nature. In the case of mere symbolic meditations prescribed for merit, such as 'Woman is the sacrificial fire' (Brhad.VI.ii.13), we

II.iv.214-5) do not find any injunction to ponder over the meaning. (B,B.V.

He just remarks in passing that the injunction saying that there has to be pondering shows that the text here is con- cerned with final vision, not with preliminary meditation.

(5) Reasoning in conformity with the words of the Vedic texts is also enjoined, for this is what enables one to deter- mine accurately what the words mean. (B.B.V. II.iv.216)

Reasoning is of help, for instance, to find out how the mean- ing of the word 'Thou' in 'That thou art' must be the Witness and cannot be anything else.

(6) .Awakening to immediate knowledge of the supreme Self de- pending on no external factor is called Nididhyasana. It is mentioned after seeing and hearing to show that they culminate in that .... One's first knowledge of the Self is through hearing, and then one ponders over what one has heard. When hearing and pondering are complete, one comes to have immedi- ate knowledge of the Self .... Because the use of the word 'Nididhyasana' (lit. 'sustained meditation' ) might lead the hearer to suppose that meditation was meant, the Upanishad deliberately uses the term 'immediate intuition' (vijñana) as a synonym for it at Brhadāranyaka II.iv.5, to show that medi- tation is not here meant. I already mentioned earlier how meditation and other practices are a means to immediate ex- perience. But immediate experience does not exist for the sake of anything else. It is taught to be just liberation,

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attainment of the final goal of all. (B.B.V. II.iv.217,220, 233-1:)

(7) Hearing and the rest are the means to that immediate in- tuition which depends on nothing apart from itself. When this has arisen, nothing more is required apart from that immediate experience of the Self already attained, ... There is no other resuit of knowledge that our Self is the sole reslity except the eradication of our ignorance of that fact. For this is ever by nature our true state The one inmost Self is the reality of which cause and effect are mere false appearances. When that Self is known, how could Ignorance fail to be de- stroyed? Tell me, pray, how there could ever be Ignorance of the Self again. (B.B.V. II.iv.221,235,231)

I have given the form 'ajnana' ('Ignorance') at the end of the last verse ('Ignorance of the Self') following Anandagiri. But if (as would also be legitimate) the word were read as 'jñana' ('knowledge'). then we would have 'On account of knowledge of the inmost Self, no other knowledge needs to be acquired'. The passage would then agree with the end of the preceding verse (B.B.V. II.iv. 230), which says 'There is (then) no knowledge that has not been acquired; there is no Ignorance that has not been destroyed'.

125 COMPARISON OF ŚRI ŚAŃKARA AND SUREŚVARA ON THE TOPIC OF HEARING AND THE REST

At first sight there appears to be a certain disagreement bet- ween Śri Śankara and Sureśvara on the question of whether hearing and the rest can be the subjects of an injunction. Śri Śankara makes an opponent ask 'What do these apparent injunc- tions mean, texts like "The Self, verily, should be seen, heard about ... " and so forth?' (B.S.Bh.I.1.4, cp. M.V.68,3). On account of his use of the phrase cpparent injunctions, it might seem that he did not admit that hearing and the rest could be subjects of injunctions. But at another place he seems to ad- mit that hearing and the rest can be enjoined. He says: 'Rep- etition of the affirmation must be carried out. Why? Because it is taught repeatedly. The repeated teachings like "The Self must be heard about, pondered over and subjected to sus- tained meditation" point to a repetition of the affirmation' (B.S.Bh. IV.i.1). For he would not say that anything had to be done unless there were an injunction on the subject in the Veda. In Suresvara's Vartika, on the other hand, there is no ref- erence to injunctions for hearing and the rest as 'apparent' injunctions. On the contrary, he says openly and emphatically that these practices are enjoined, in the words 'A person can decide whether to carry out hearing and pondering ... so all

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these practices are enjoined' (B.B.V. II.iv.122, M. V. 124, 2). And there is anuther apparent point of difference. In Śri Sankara's Brahma Sutra Commentary, the text 'the Self should be subjected to sustained meditation' (Brhad. II.iv.5) is ac- ccpted as referring to a duty that has to be performed. For it is treated as an act, as is shown by the passage 'And medi- tation (upasana) and sustained mcditation (nididhyāsana) are said to comstitute one act that entails repetition (B.S.Bh. IV.i.l, cp. M.V.56,2, note). There are grounds for supposing that he regarded sustained meditstion (nididhyasana) as a species of meditation (upasana) because in the next passage he gives as examples of it 'He assiduously meditates on (or at- tends on) his Guru' and 'She whose husband is abroad dwells on him fixedly' (B.S.Bh.IV.i.1). On the other hand, in the Vartika of Suresvara 'awakening to immediate kuowledge of the supreme Self depending on no ex- ternal factor' is clearly said to be the meaning of the term 'nididhyasana' (B.B,V. II.iv.217, M.V.124,6). And having said this, Suresvara goes on in the sequel to deny that the term 'nididhyasana' refers to an act that has to be performcd. He aims to demonstrate that the term 'nididhyasana' did not refer' to meditation (dhyana) because the text uses the term 'immedi- ate intuition' (vijñana) as a synonym for it (B.B.V. II.iv.233, M.V.124,6 ). Do the two systems, those of Sri Śankara and Suresvara, agree - or do they contradict one another on these points? If they do in fact contradict one another, which is the better? It is a point worth considering. My own view is the following. Śri Sankara spoke of the appearance of an injunction in a particular context. His pur- pose was to refute the contention of the authors of the earlier commentaries (vrtti) on the Brahma Sutras that the metaphysical texts of the Upanishads were authoritative only if regarded as subordinate to an injunction to acquire meta- physical knowledge. He did this by asserting that metaphysical knowledge is something conditioned by reality, and different from meditation. Here is his text as he himself set it out.

(1) The idea of fire, when one is in the presence of that well known object, is not dependent on an injunction, nor is it a mere creation of the human mind. It is in fact a piece of knowledge, conditioned by the nature of the object per- ceived. It is not an act. And it is the same with all ob- jects of the various means of knowledge (such as perception, inference, etc.). This being so, knowledge of the Self in its true form as the Absolute cannot be dependent on an injunction to act. Imperative and similar forms applied to it, even in Vedic texts, lose their imperative force and become blunted, as razors become blunted if used against hard objects like stones. For here the object to which they are applied is some- thing not subject to rejection or acquisition. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4,

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cp. M.V.68,2)

Thus a view is tentatively advanced by an opponent (and refuted by Śri Śankara). According to this view the Absolute can only be taught through injunctions involving some duty to be done. But the whole theory is wrong. For there is also such a thing as knowledge of the Absolute conditioned by its true nature - that is the gist of this passage in the commentary. And it goes on to ask, 'But what do these apparent iujunctions mean?' (where the reference is to passages which say that the Self should be 'seen' or 'heard about' and so on). The very fact that this question is raised also implies that knowledge cannot be the subject of an injunction. Consider, too, the refutation of the opponent. It ruus: 'But when such a person comes to desire the supreme human goal, texts likc "The Self, verily, is to be seen" and so on turn him away from the natural concern with the psycho-physical orgasism and its affairs, and engage him in continuous remembrance of the inmcst Self' (cp. M.V. 68,3). It does not say anything about whether hearing and the rest are or are not able to be enjoined, as that is not the question at issue (which is the refutation of the view that knowledge can be enjoined). No doubt there is the implication that there is also a certain element of enjoining a duty in places where gerundive expressions like 'should be seen' or ' should be heard about' are used; for only so wiil the gerun- dive ending in the suffixes -ya, -tavya and -aniya, which denote a duty to act, have meaning. But this does not mean that one has the right to insist that knowledge also can be the subject of an injunction, as the passage is only intended to strengthen the argument in hand (namely the refutation of the opponent's view that knowledge can be enjoined). There is another passage in Śri Sankara's Commentary that expresses the same idea.

(2) Texts in the form of a command such as 'The Self should be seen', which are found in the sections dealing with the highest knowledge, are fundamentally for the purpose of turn- ing the hearer in the direction of the knowledge of the Self, and are not primarily to be regarded as injunctions to become aware of the real. Even in the world, when people give a com- mand and say 'Look here' or 'Listen to this', the meaning of such phrases really is 'Pay attention', and not 'Acquire a piece of direct knowledge'. When anyohe is in proximity with a knowable object, knowledge of it sometimes arises and some- times does not. Therefore, anyone who wishes to acquaint someone with an object should show it to him. When it has been shown to him, knowledge will arise according to the nature of the object and the means of cognition applied. (B.S.Bh. III.ii.21, cp. M.V.68,4)

Thus the force of the 'injunctions' apparently enjoining

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hearing and so on is not actually to enjoin imwediate knowlodge through these disciplines. Their force, as the revered Commen- tator concludes by saying, is to inculcate attention to the Self. There is no contradiction with what is said at Brahma Sutra Commentary IV.i.1, as it is taught there that it ie just this attention to the Self thai has to be repeatedly practised. Suresvara aiso maintains in his Brhadāraņyaka Vārtika that only that which is within the scope of froe human will cau be enjoined. He does not insist on denying that knowledge can arise from one act of hearing and so cr. His words are 'The acticn of hearing and so on must be continued here diligently untii the immediate intuition we have spoken of arises in all its glory' (B.B.V. II.iv.218). So there is no difference bet- ween the two systems in regard tc the teaching that hearing and pendering are open to injunction. Suresvara does give the aprearance of saying that no one could attain direct and immediate intuition of the Self merely from hearing. For ome of the verses of the Vartika begins 'Acquaintance with the Self is first through hearing, and then one ponders over what one has heard' (B.B.V. II.iv.220, M.V. 124,6 ). On the other nand Śri Sankara says in his Brahma Sūtra Commentary, 'Repeated resort to hearing, pondering and sus- tained meditation would indeed be useless in the case of the person who gained immediate experience of the fact that his true Self was the Absolute merely from hearing the text "That thou art" spoken once' (B.S.Bh. IV.i.2). How could there be such a contradiction? In this case, too, we reply, there is nothing more than a superficial appearance of disagreement. For Suresvara wrote in the Naişkarmya Siddhi: 'Of these (four dif- ferent kinds of hearers of the text "That thou art"), there is one who knows "that which is not the meaning of any sentence" in his inmost Self. For him, all the not-self has comc to an end. As all his impediments have been destroyed, there is in his case nothing more to be said. Nor is there anything further to be said about the one who acquired realization merely from hearing the text (that is, without having to reason over it at all). He, also, is in possession of some super- natural power' (N.Sid. III.64, prose intro.). Thus when it was said in the Brhadaranyaka Vartika 'One's first knowledge of the Self is through hearing' and so forth, this was only said with reference to those who are unable to apprehend the meaning of the text and realize that their own true Self is the Absolute merely through hearing it once. So there is agreement between the system of Śri Sankara and Suresvara in maintaining that immediate knowledge can arise through mere hearing. Let us therefore turn our attention to the apparent contra- diction on the subject of 'sustained meditation' (nididhyāsana). In Śri Śankara's Brahma Sūtra Commentary, 'sustained medita- tion' (nididhyāsana) is seen to be a kind of spiritual practice and to be enjoined. Speaking of the term 'sustained medita- tion', for instance, he says clearly that when we are using it

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'we are talking of an act that entails repetition' (B.S.Bh. IV.i.1, cp. M.V.56, 8, note). And he says also, 'Pondering and sustained meditation too, like hearing, are for the sake of direct experience' (B.S.Bh. I.i.4). Thus he refers to 'sus- tained meditation' as something different from immediate in- tuition, as something to which one has to apply oneself for the seke of immediate istuition. So we conclude that for him sustained meditation was a kind of practice that could be enjoined. He aiso held that 'sustained meditation' (midi- dhyasaua) was not different in kind from meditation in generel (upāsana). Fcr at some places he uses the term 'upāsana' to stand for it, as when he says 'Meditations (upāsanā) aimed at right intuitive knowledge have to be performed until the final end is achieved, like pounding the paddy to extract the rice' (B.S.Bh.IV.i.12, M.V.56,8). And vet there is a certain difference between 'sustained meditation' (nididhyasana) and meditation as described by Śri Śankara in the following passage: 'Consider the texts, "Man, O Gautama, is the sacrificial fire" and "Woman, O Gautama, is the sacrificial firc" (Chand.V.vii.1, V.viii.l). Here the iden- tification of man or woman with the sacrificial fire is a men- tal idea. It is an act owing its origin solely to the injunc- tion to meditate thus. It is therefore an action, and one that is freely determined by the human will' (B.S.Bh.I.1.4). Sus- tained meditation (nididhyāsana) as conceived by Śri Śańkara differs from meditation as described above in that it does not owe its origin solely to the injunction to meditate. For hear- ing about the Self, pondering over it and subjecting it to sustained meditation are for the sake of something which can be experienced here in this world, and for realizing one's iden- tity with the Self. This is shcwn in such a passage as 'The Self comes to be seen through the disciplines of hearing, pon- dering and sustained meditation resolutely pursued. Right knowledge of the Absolute as the sole reality only dawns when these three disciplines of hearing, pondering and sustained meditation are fused into one, and not otherwise, for example through hearing alone' (Brhad.Bh. II.iv.5). It follows also from the passage: 'But in any case, pondering must be carried out by reasoning in accordance with what is laid down in the Veda. And sustained meditation must be performed on what has been pon- dered rationally, on what has been ascertained through revela- tion and reason' (Brhad.Bh. II.v.l, intro.). Even though this discipline is referred to by the term 'upāsana' it is evidently different from such meditations as those prescribed in the texts speaking of woman as the sacrificial fire, which are for the sake of a result not to be perceived in the present life, namely the accumulation of spiritual merit through meditation. For the notion that woman is the sacrificial fire is not a notion based on the true nature of reality. It is formed only through obeying the injunction to meditate on this theme, and it brings its results not here in this life but in other worlds

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(to be attained after death). But the case with sustained meditation is different. That which one subjects to sustained meditation one perceives here ir this very life. It is a case of susteined attention and nothing else. That is the differ- ence between meditation (upasana) and sustained meditation (nididhyāsana) in the system of Śri Śankara. It is well known that words like 'vision', 'knowledge' and so on may be found used by Śri Sankara quite appropriately either to designate knowledge of the real or else to designate a certain form of deliberate arbitrary mental activity; for they may be used in different senses according to whether they are addressed to fit candidates for the higher or for the lower form of knowledge of the Absolute (the latter being not so much knowledge of the Absolute as meditation on it under prescribed forms). And we should understand that, in the same way, phrases such as 'one should meditate' or 'one should practise sustained meditation' may either refer to the mere cherishing of a mental idea (bhāvanā) or else to sustained attention to previously attained right knowledge - according to the con- text. That is how we explain the use of the term 'sustained meditation' in Śri Śankara's system. Now let us consider Suresvara's Vartika. He says, 'Awaken- ing tc immediate knowledge of the supreme Self depending on no external factor is called Nididhyasana' (B.B.V. II.iv.217, M.V.124,6). From this clear statement one deduces that fcr him the term Nididhyasana cannot refer to any activity of the form of cherishing a mental idea (bhavana), although he does not deny that meditation is required as a preliminary disci- pline for right metaphysical knowledge. We learn this from the sequel, when he says 'I already mentioned earlier how meditation and other practices are a means to immediate experi- erce. But immediate experience does not exist for the sake of auything else. It is taught to be just liberstion, attainment of the final goal of all' (B.B.V. II.iv.234, M.V.124,6). This shows that though Śri Sankara and Suresvara understood the term 'nididhyasana' in a different sense, their systems agree in maintaining that meditation is an activity and a preliminary discipline for knowledge. However, Suresvara does insist on the point that because the Upanishad uses the term 'immediate intuition' (vijñana) in the sequel (Brhad. II.iv.5) as a synonym for the 'nididhyasana' referred to just .before, one should not suppose that it had meant 'meditation' by 'nididhyasana' (B.B.V. II.iv.233, M.V.124,6). 'Nididhyasana' is placed here in the Upanishad in apposition with hearing and pondering, so it is proper to suppose that it represents an activity. And we find the equivalent of 'vijnana' in the form of a verb used elsewhere to denote action for the sake of immediate intuition, as in 'That one should investigate, that is what one should desire to know in immediate intuition' (Chand. VIII.i.1, vii.1; cp. M.V.52,9 and note). In the present text (Brhad. II.iv.5) too, we can very well accept that the

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ierm 'nididhyasana' means meditation for the sake of direct vision. For Suresvara himself accepts such meditation as the cause of direct vision. And if one takes 'The Self should be seen' (Brhad. II.iv.5) to refer to immediate experience con- ceived as the result of seeing, then there would be nothing wrong in taking hearing, pondering and sustained meditation (nididbyasana) as being a threefold activity enjoined for the sake of that result. It seems, therefore, that the revered Commentator's explanation of the term 'nididhyasana' is the better one. Otherwise (i.e. on Suresvara's view) it appears that useless repetition would be attributed to the Upanishad when it says 'drastavya' (should be seen) follcwed later by 'nididhyāsitavya' (interpreted by Suresvara as 'should be seen in immediate intuition'). In any case, there is no disagree- ment between the two authors on the question of what are the means to metaphysical knowledge, so that no serious difficulty arises.

126 THE INJUNCTION FOR INNER AND OUTER CONTROL AND THE OTHER DISCIPLINES

The text 'This is the eternal glory of the one who has realized the Absolute' (Brhad. IV.iv.23, cp. M.V.53,7) means that the person who has gained enlightenment has the eternal glory of realizing the undifferentiated reality expressed as 'neither this nor that'. A verse quoted in that text expresses the nature of the glory of the enlightened person by saying 'He is not tainted by action, which is evil' - meaning that the re- sult of his exalted state is to place him beyond the 'taint' cf karmic merit or demerit. Suresvara first explains the term 'one who knows this state' (pada-vit) according to Śri Śankara's Commentary, and then goes on to suggest an alternative meaning of the term as 'one who knows the meaning of the words' (padartha-vit, B.B.V. IV.iv. 1190). On this view, there would be an injunction to discover the meaning of the individual words of the metaphysical texts, and the reward for obeying it would be a knowledge of the meaning of the sentences which they composed. The upanishadic text continues, 'Therefore, possessed of inner and outer control, abandoning all action for personal ends, strengthening himself by voluntary resistance to discom- fort, and concentrating his mind, he sees the Self here in the midst of this life in the present body' (Brhad. IV.iv.23). Suresvara explains that this passage, as connected with what went before, implies the idea 'Because knowledge has this re- sult, therefore he who knows thus becomes possessed of the disciplines of inner and outer control and the rest, and comes to know the meaning of the word "glory"' (B.B.V. IV. iv. 1192-3). It is said that such an one, possessed of the fourfold means to liberation (discrimination, dispassion, the sixfold

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spiritual equipment - (see the qualities mentioned at Madhav- ananda, p.766) - and desire for liberation), that is, having inner and outer control and the other spiritual prereqvisites, having distinguished the Self from the not-self through reason- ing by the method of agreement and difference, finally comes to see 'All is the Self' (B.B.V. IV.iv.1201-2). In the modern printed editions of Śri Śankara's Commentary at this point we read (Brhad. Bh. IV.iv. 23) '"Posscssed of inner control" (santa) means "desisting from the activities of the extornal sense-organs" and "possessed of outer control" (danta) means "free from mental thirst"'. One must presume. that these terms (santa and danta) have been written the wrong way round due to the carelessness cf some copyist. For elsewhere we find an explanation running '"Inner control" means "the coming to rest of the mind"' and '"outer control" means "the coming to rest of the external seases"' (Bh.G.Bh.XVI.1). Ard in line with this we find Suresvara saying in the present passage of the Vartika, 'First he becomes pcssessed of outer control, then possessed of inner control, and afterwards he withdraws from all activity for personal ends. For in interpreting the sequence the rational order in which the qualities would have to be developed must take precedence over the literal order in which they happen to be mentioned in the text under comment' (B.B.V. IV.iv. 1203-4). Suresvara next addresses himself to the question, 'Why should there be an injunction for inner and outer control and the rect, when the desire to pursue them arises naturally?' He says that human acticns are of four kinds, based respectively on transgression of the law, personal desire, unthinking in- stinct and duty (B.B.V. IV.iv.1208). It is clear that the seeker of liberation cannot indulge in the first three. But how could a man of understanding want to pursue even duty when he sees that it leads to the same evil (namely rebirth) as non-performance of it? (B.B.V. IV.iv.1213) Therefore, when a person is acting for duty's sake his mind naturally becomes purified, and he comes to feel that he must give up even this form of action, so that the desire for inner and outer control leading on to the capacity for withdrawal from all action for personal ends arises naturally. We find teaching to the same effect in the Smrti: 'The wise person should apply himself continuously to the broad moral principles (yama, cp. Yoga Sutra II.29 f.), but he should not apply himself to the parti- cular daily duties'(niyama, Manu Smrti IV.204). If you argue in this manner and ask why inner control and the rest are enjoined, the reply is that, even though these practices might be prompted naturally, the function of the upanishadic text is to enjoin them specifically as means to knowledge of reality. Or again, it might be that the mere idea of withdrawal from activity for personal ends might arise naturally, without the idea of duty, expressed in the feeling 'I must actually carry that withdrawal out'. That duty of

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carrying out the practices is what is enjoined here (B.B.V. IV.iv.1220). Nor would it be correct to raise the objection 'The mention of inner and outer contrcl would have been quite enough, since all action is given up through them. What was the need for specifying withdrawal as well?' For in sound exegesis, the positive injunction to perform daily duty will prevail over a mere general negation, which is always open to exceptions, so that the upamishadic text enjoining withdrawal has to be supplied to bring about the definitive abandonment of the daily duties (B.B.V. IV. iv. 1223-6). One should not raise the objection 'Hearing and cogitation and sc on involve disturbance of the mind just as much as performance of the dailv duties. Why is no effort made to discourage them?' For it would be wrong to give them up, since they are predominantly helpful to the attainment of witharawal (B.B.V. IV.iv.1238), The discipline of strengthesing oneself through vcluntary resistance to discomfort implies acquiring the pcwer to endure the pairs of opposites (heat and cold, pleasure and pain and so forth). The upanishadic text adds 'concentrating his mind'. This is to enjoin the remunciatiom even cf those activities, such as casual fantasies, in regard to which man is not natu- rally free. 'With faith for his (sole) wealth' (Brhad. IV.iv. 23, Madhyandina recension) enjoins the total renunciation of all action (B.B.V. IV.iv.1269). Thus with the help of these auxiliary disciplines a person should come to see the Self even while alive in the present body, through reasoning by agreement and difference. Then he comes to see all as his own Self (B.B.V. IV.iv.1278). That is the meaning of Brhadaranyaka Upanishad IV.iv.23. One should observe the following verses of Suresvara.

(1) First one should acquire outer control, then inner con- trol, and finally the capacity for withdrawal from all activity for personal ends. For the logical order in which the quali- ties have to be developed takes precedence (in interpretation) over the order in which they happen to be mentioned in the text under comment. (B.B.V. IV.iv.1203)

(2) Yes, it is true that there can be no injunction for inner control and the rest, since they are prompted in the natural course. They are prompted naturally, it is true. But what the Vedic text does is to lay down authoritatively that they are the specific means leading to correct knowledge of the inmost Self. (B.B.V. IV.iv.1218)

(3) Or else we may say that the idea of abandonment of action comes naturally, as explained, but that the notion that it is a duty that one has to carry out (if one wishes to attain en- lightenment) does not arise naturally. Hence it is enjoined. (B.B.V. IV.iv.1220)

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(4) The injunction to perform the daily obligatory ritual all one's life will certainly be a more powerful authority and prevail over any general injunction to give up action (as the particular injunctions to kill at a sacrifice prevail over the general prohibition 'One should not harm any living being' ). For the injunction to do the daily obligatory ritual all one's life is only concerned with keeping one's body alive (and not with ministering to and encouraging the egoistic passions). Since the general injunction to inner and outer control and so on will not suffice to annul the injunction to do the daily ritual all one's life, the text takes the further step of specifically enjoining the abandonment of all actions for per- sonal ends (uparati). (B.B.V. JV.iv.1225-6)

(5) If the performance of the obligatory daily ritual is pro- hibited because it creates disturbance, wandering about to beg for one's food and other activities of the monk also create a great deal of disturbance. Why are they not prohibited too? Hearing and pondering over the upanichadic texts, too, cause a good deal of disturbance. Wny are not these activities also prohibited by the Veda, as well as the rituais? But this ob- jection is wrong. For these activities contribute to the chief goal. Wandering about to beg for alms and the rest are not prohibited as they are engaged in for the sake of that goal. (B.B.V. IV.iv.1235 -? )

(6) And now, by saying 'concentrating his mind', the upani- shadic text enjoins continual reduction to a minimum of those actions which one is not free to abandon entirely. (B.B.V. IV.iv.1246)

There must be the strictest control over those activities of the mnind and the senses which we are not free to abandon en- tirely, such as seeing, hearing, mental fantasy and so forth. Where concentration is enjoined, it means that one should absorb. the senses in the mind and the mind in the Self (through meditation).

(7) One should not suppose that the reading (of the Madhyan- dina recension) 'With faith for his (sole) wealth' is otiose, on the ground that total renunciation has already been pre- scribed. For the enlightened person still has some action to perform in the realm of perceptible objects (in the form of maintaining the body and so on). The purpose of the phrase is to enjoin the relinquishment of any feeling of 'mine' in regard to the instruments or materials of these acts. (B.B.V. IV.iv.1267-8)

The purpose of the text 'With faith for his (sole) wealth' is to enjoin the abandonment of feelings of possession even to- wards objects like the begging bowl.

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(8) Faith is his only possession. Because he has nothing else, the one who has abandoned all actions is called 'One who has faith for his (sole) wealth'. (B.B.V. IV.iv.1269)

(9) He should see the Self while he is yet in the body, sepa- rating it from the whole mass of the not-self through reason- ing by agreement and difference supported by the spiritual disciplines mentioned above. sees ... '. (B.B.V. IV.iv. 1272-3) Or the reading may be just 'He

To read 'He should see ... ' would be to follow the reading of the Madhyandina tradition.

127 HOW ACTION AND MEDITATION RELATE

There is a passage in the Vartika which explaing the order in which the various disciplines leading to the rise of meta- physical knowledge have to be practised and describes the method of these practices.

(1) Only metaphysical knowledge is required for the eradica- tion of metaphysical Ignorance. Only inner control and the othe: spiritual disciplines are required for metaphysical knowledge. Only purification of the mind is required for the acquisition of inner control and the other spiritual disci- plines.Only the performance of the daily obligatory ritual is required for the purification of the mind. Metaphysical Igncrance of the Self is the sole cause of action, mental, vo- cal or. physical. When that (metaphysical Ignorance) has been cancelled by knowleuge of the Self, how could there be any further dependence on action? (B.B.V. I.iii.98-100)

It is also said in the Naişkarmya Siddhi:

(2) From performance of the obligatcry daily rituals comes merit; from merit comes destruction of (the karmic effects of) sin; from this comes purity of mind; from this comes a correct evaluation of transmigratory life; from this comes indifference to it; from this comes desire for liberation; from this comes the search for the means to liberation; from this comes renunciation of all ritualistic action and its accessories (the sacred thread, etc.); from this comes prac- tice of yoga; from this the focusing of the mind within; from this a knowledge of the meaning of the metaphysical texts like 'That thou art'; from this the eradication of metaphysi- cal Ignorance; from this establishment in one's own Self alone, according to the texts, 'Verily, being nothing but the Absolute, he dissolves in the Absolute' (Brhad.IV.iv.6) and 'Though already released, he acquires final release' (Katha II.ii.1). (N.Sid. I.52, prose intro., cp. M.V.60,2 and 3)

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Meditations, it is clear, each have their stated reward, like rituals. And just as the performance of the cbligatory daily ritual is enjoined as a preliminary contributing to the rise of knowledge, or even as all ritual is laid down as a means to the awakening of the desire for kaowledge, so in the section of the Veda devoted to knowledge and meditation, the medita- tions are laid down as a means to preparing one to become fit for knowledge. For we have texts like, 'When you are released from here, where will you gc?' (Brhad. IV.ii.l) And we know that meditations are userul on the path of gradual release, because they are taught in connection with the Path of tbe Flame and elsewhere. (On the Path of the Flame, see Deussen, 1912, Chapter XXX. T.N.)

(3) Whatever is taught on the subject of meditations in the Knowledge-Section of the Veda is only for the sake of pre- paring oneself for the knowledge that all is the one Self. We know from the text 'When you are released from here, where will you go ?: (Bhad. IV.ii.1) and from references to the Path of the Flame that meditations are not limited in their results to the rewards promised for them (but may also lcad to gradual release). This shows correctly the relation between the Rituals-Section and the Knowledge-Section of the Veda, and there are no grounds for asserting any different relation. (s.V.329-31)

Meditations: The reference is to those meditations taught in the Knowledge-Section of the Veda and associated with the Path of the Flame and other teachings about release by stages. The reference is not to all meditations throughout the Veda in general. Not limited in their results to the rewards promised for them: It means that they are not merely concerned with medi- tation and worship, but are also a means to knowledge. No attention should be paid to the claim of Anandagiri that the purpose of the meditations is liberation and that this purpose cannot be achieved except through a succession of stages. There are no grounds for it.

(4) What Śri Yajñavalkya asked King Janaka was (not about entry into the world of a deity at death through meditation, about which the king knew, but) 'When you leave the first plane of existence, what is the second to which you will go?' This was to show that meditation on deities and purification of the mind through similar practices are also a means to the (gradual) attainment of knowledge. Sri Yajnavalkya's question, 'When you are released from here, where will you go?' really meant 'Do you believe that, in the case of one fit for the highest knowledge, all the meditations prescribed in the Upani- shads lead to liberation by stages?' (B.B.V. IV.ii.12-13, cp. M.V.83,5)

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All such meditutions may result in release by stages: the incidental implication here is that they retain their lower purpose for those who are not fit for immediate liberation. For it is only here and there in the Upanishads that the teuching of the Absolute in its nighest form is exhibited as indicated, for instance, by certain phrases in the conver- sation between Gargya and Ajatasatru, or in that between King Janaka and Śri Yajnavalkya, such as: "It cannot be known if there is no more knowledge than that" said Ajatasatru. "Then let me come to you as a pupil", said Gargya' (Brhad. II. i. 14) and '"Very well", said Sri Yajnavaikya, "I will tell you where you wili go (i.e. nowhere, because the king had already reached the state beyond fear)"' (Brhad. IV.ii.1; see B.B.V. IV.ii.31 ff.).

128 THERE IS NO OTHER LIBERATION EXCEPT ERADICATION OF IGNORANCE

There is a text in the Brhadaranyaka which runs: 'I am in touch with the subtle, far-reaching ancient path, having fi- nally discovered it. By this path the wise who have known the Absolute go to the shining realm after leaving here, re- leased' (Brhad. IV.iv.8). Here the knower is not different from the known, the Absolute, so the phrase 'I am in touch with' is used (B.B.V. IV.iv.549). 'Discovered it' means 'have found it through the teachings of the Veda and the Ācārya' (B.B.V. IV.iv.550). Having turned their backs on Ignorance by following this path, and having attained to the Absolute, they go. Those who have known the Absolute 'dissolve in the Abso- lute', this is the meaning of 'go to the shining realm after leaving here' (B.B.V. IV.iv.552). 'After leaving here' does not imply that they have to wait for the death of the body before they attain the Absolute. For the eradication of meta- physical Ignorance, the cause of illusory empirical experience, they have to wait for metaphysical knowledge only, and for nothing else (B.B.V. IV.iv.554). The passage agrees with and confirms the other text which runs 'Verily, being nothing but the Absolute, he dissolves in the Absolute' (Brhad. IV.iv.6), says Suresvara, commenting on a later part of the text (B.B.V. IV.iv.560). The following verses should be noted.

(1) Because it would be impossible for the Absolute not to include me, therefore it is said 'I am in touch with the path'. This path, as described, has come to me. Later, I discovered it myself, following the teachings of the Veda and the Acarya. In knowledge of the inmost Self, the subject is not different from the object. (B.B.V. IV.iv.550)

(2) This 'shining realm' (the Absolute, not 'heaven') was

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what was really meant before by the word 'svarga', even in the phrase 'He who wants svarga should offer sacrifices'. For that which is established by the knowledge arising from the upanishadic texts cannot be reached through rituals, (B.B.V. IV.iv.555)

Even in the earlier remark, 'He who wants svarga should offer sacrifices', the reai reference was to the 'Absolute as a shining realm', not to 'heaven' as a happy abode. In any case, it is only the Absolute (appearing as heaven) under a con- ditioning adjunct that can be reached through rituals.

(3) The word 'svarga' is used here only to mean 'the highest bliss'. Because it occurs in the context of teaching libera- tion, it is something eternal. Hence it cannot here mean what comes as the result of performing rituals. (B.B.V. IV.iv.556)

(4) On the (false) theory that liberation depended on the death of the body, it would depend on dissolution in the cause. But after the eradication of the cause of all, enlightenment supersedes automatically, and nothing else is needed. (B.B.V. IV.iv.558)

It would depend on dissolution in the cause: It means disso- lution in the Absolute as yet unknown, assuming some such other apparent form as the cosmic vital energy. After the eradication of the cause of all: This means after the eradication of metaphysical Ignorance.

(5) No other obstacle to liberation is admitted except Igno- rance. Accordingly, when Ignorance has been destroyed, then, a person (nr) is liberated already in this life even before he is finally liberated from rebirth at the death of the body. The Upanishad has already taught this earlier in the text 'Being nothing but the Absolute, he dissolves in the Absolute' (Brhad. IV.iv.6). No later upanishadic passage, therefore, could make us believe that liberation depended on the death of the body. (B.B.V. IV.iv.559-60)

Liberated already ... before one is ... liberated from rebirth: This is a reminiscence of Katha Upanishad II.ii.1.

129 ALL DUALITY IS IMAGINED THROUGH IGNORANCE

In the system of Suresvara, all duality is an effect of Igno- rance. There is therefore nothing else to be done once Igno- rance has been eradicated. The distinction between the Self and the not-self, the distinction between known and unknown, the distinction between real and unreal, the distinction

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between being and not being an individual knowing subject - all these distinctions arise through Ignorance. Five 'sheaths' encasing the individual and five corresponding cosmic sheaths standing as their causes are distinguished only through Igno- rance. Other distinctions like that between manifest and un- manifest, effect and cause, whole and parts, action and its component factors and results are also set up by Ignorance alone. The Witness, the Lord, creation, maintonance and with- drawal of the universe, the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep, and, in a word, the very relationship of the Self with Ignorance iiself, is all the work of Ignorance alone. Therefore when vision of the inmost principle is attained and Ignorance brought to an end, all bondage to transmigratory experience ceases immediately. The manifestation of ignorance and its later eradication have no effect whatever on the Self, the principle of reality, any more than the imagination of a snake in a rope and the later cessation of that imagination have any effect on the rope. Here also, as in the system of the revered Commentator, the method of false ottribution fol- lowed by subsequent retraction is consistently followed every- where. This we have to accept.

(1) Clothed in the livery of being an individual knowing subject, the Self beholds the not-self; but it cannot behold the Self as an object in this way, as the Self is the pure light of Consciousness and nothing else. (B.B.V. I.iv.734)

(2) The distinction between known and unknown, the distinction between appearing as knowledge and as Ignorance, and the dis- tinction between being and not being an individual subject enjoying knowledge - none of these distinctions belong to the Self. For they are not self-established. They depend on the Witness. (T.B.V. II.666)

(3) Texts like 'Darkness (Ignorance) is death, (lig :. is immortal)' (Brhad. I.iii.28) and 'In the beginning, this uni- verse was water' (Brhad. V.v.l) show that metaphysical Ignorance is continually at work, either in manifest or unmanifest form. 'Emerging from these elements' (Brhad. II.iv.12), the Lord, though raised above all change, appears through Ignorance as the Knower of the Field (M.V. p.35), through the rise of an illusory appearance of Himself as the not-self. (B.B.V. I.ii.136-7, cp. M.V.118,1l and note)

(4) That which is neither a cause nor an effect assumes the appearance of cause and effect through Ignorance. Hence the Veda works for the eradication of the latter. Ignorance of the Self manifests everywhere as cause and effect, though it has for its true nature that (the Self) which is not either a cause or an effect. It is witnessed as an object by its own true Self. (B.B.V. I.ii.130,I.iv.309)

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(5) The notion which we have here in the world of whole and parts belongs to the plane of Ignorance of the inmost Self. It does not belong to the supreme Self, in which all Ignorance

I.iii.269) (lit. blindness) is negated by 'neither this nor that'. (B.B.V.

(6) True Being does not undergo birth and is not a cause. It appears as a cause through Ignorance, and also as action and all its component factors and results. (B.B.V. I.ii.128)

(7) That supreme principle of reality, which is indicated by the negative texts such as 'Not. gross ... ' (Brhad. III.viii.8), which in its true nature lies divested of Ignorance and its effects, appears as 'the Witness' and 'the Inner Ruler' when apparently limited by the adjunct of Ignorance, its own illu- sory manifestation. (B.B.V. I.iv.151)

(8) And so the creations and withdrawals of the universe down the ages are imagined, just as the distinctions of time and space are. When you have seen reality, you know that the creation, maintenance and withdrawal of the universe are impos- sible. (B.B.V. II.i.4ll, cp. M.V.118,15 and note)

(9) The imaginary idea that the Self is asleep or awake or is dreaming belongs only to creatures asleep in the night of Igno- rance. (B.B.V. II.i.265, M.V.122,29)

(10) The individual knower, stationed in the intellect and identified with it, convinces himself of the presence of Igno- rance and its effects in the Self, though in truth it is not present, through his own extraverted gaze - as simple souls attribute blue colour to the colourless ether of the sky. (B.B.V. I.iv.298, M.V.121,10)

It should be understood that certain verses that have already been quoted above in different contexts have been re-introduced in the present section to show that Suresvara approved the method of teaching through false attribution followed by sub- sequent retraction.

130 THE FORM OF NON-DUALITY APPROVED IN THE VĀRTIKA

The Vartika of Suresvara accepts that the true Self, as the Absolute, is non-dual. It is accessible when metaphysical Ignorance, the source of the whole imaginary network of dual- ity, has been eradicated through the texts of the Upanishads. This is what one learns from the study of the Vartika. Suresvarācarya refuted all the existing systems of Advaita opposed to his own. He did so on the authority of Vedic

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revelation, backed by reason and his own direct intuition, as we have had occasion to note at the point where we examined the different varieties of the early period of the teaching (cp. M.V.90, intro.). We havc also explained here and there in the presert chapter some of the differences between the system of Acarya Mandana and that of the Vartika. Various theories of Advsita accepted or tolerated by Mandana are re- futed by Suresvara: we might refer to the theories cf Non- Dualism of the Word (sabdadvaita, cp. M.V.102,3), Non-Dualism of Being, where Being is conceived as a universal (sattādvaita, cp. M.V.102,4) and Non-Dualism of Positive Being (bhavādvaita, cp. M.V.102,5). We shall close this chapter with a few verses on these topics.

(1) That which has in truth no name or form manifested as name and form, depending solely on Ignorance (i.e. manifested at the beginning of the world period). Statement, in general, is called 'name' (nama); the stated, in general, is called 'form' (rupa). Through these two categories the Lord is able to manifest Himself for all creatures born in the realm of manifestation; if He had stayed in his unmanifest form this would not have been possible. (B.B.V. I.iv.390-2)

For the Non-Dualism of the Word adopted by Mandana, one should consult Brahma Siddhi pp. 17-19 (cp. Potter, 1981, pp. 356-8).

(2) Therefore (i.e. because mental repetition is traditionally rated higher than oral repetition of the texts) the true nature of the Yajur Veda (and of all Vedic texts) is to be divine knowledge implanted in the mind. In this way the eternality of the Vedas can be rightly explained (since eternal Conscious- ness pervades the mind). Their power to communicate can be established if they are not taken as physically spoken words (but as ideas); it cannot be established if their essence is supposed to be the (assumed) eternal principle (sphota) latent in the spoken word. (T.B.V. II.297-8)

For Mandana's views on 'Sphota', one should consult his work the Sphota Siddhi (see Bibliography, under Biardeau).

(3) Here in the upanishadic text the term 'the Absolutei is used in its direct meaning as the reality that is neither transcendent nor immanent, neither a universal nor a particu- lar. (B.B.V. IV.iii.1815)

The Absolute is deseribed in these terms throughout the Vārtika, as at B.B.V. I. iv.656,745, 1073, 1272, 1446; II.i.371; II.iii.12,240; II.iv.14; III.iv.38 and so forth (cp. also M.V. 119,6). But Mandana understood the Absolute to be the universal called Being (satta), see Brahma Siddhi p. 37 (M.V.102,4).

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(4) The inmost principle, raiced abcve all change, remains contemplating itself as the light (lit. result) in every cog- nition, witnessing all knowledge cf being and non-being. It is itself that immediate experience that is not experienced by another. And so when the individual knowing subject and his knowledge and its objects cease, then the inmost Self estab- lishes itself as the sole existent by its own inherent power. When the fact that the individual subject and his knowledge and its objects do not exist is established through awakening to one's true Self, then the notion of 'not' indicates that which is eternally luminous and not knowable by any. extericr means of knowledge. (B.B.V. II.iii.227-9)

The implication of this is that the notion of 'not' does not apprise one of non-existence. And this refutes the Non- Dualism of positive Being (bhavadvaita). But Mandana accepts it. See Brahma Siddhi p.4. *

*(At B.Sid. p.4, cp. M.V. 102, 5, Mandana makes an opponent remark that the Absolute can be associated with positive at- tributes (e.g. bliss) and negative attributes (e.g. absence of the world or of Ignorance). As Mandana does not contradict this, he was taken by later authors as having accepted the view that the Absolute could have the negative attribute of 'absence of the universe' or 'cessation of Ignorance' (cp. B.Sid., ed. Kuppuswami, English intro. pp. xl-xlv). It is non-dual in its positive aspect (bhavadvaita), but tolerates a kind of duality in that it has negations of various kinds for its 'negative attributes'. Bhavadvaita, which rests on the error of reifying negations and setting them up as a strange kind of reality, reappears in such later Advaita authors as Vimuktatman (cp. M.V. 234) and Anandabodha (cp. M.V. 275). No such reification is found in Suresvara. For him the word 'not' merely indicated the Absolute in its true form. T.N.)

CHAPTER VIII THE PAÑCAPĀDIKĀ

131 TKE NEED FOR AN EXAMINATION OF THE SYSTEM OF THE PAÑCAPĀDIKĀ

We now take up the examination of the Pañcapādika, wiihin the limits of the scale and purpose of the work in.hand. It has been mentioned above (M.V. p.16) that this sub-commentary on Śri Śankara's Brahma Sūtra Commentary is supposed to have been the work of a certain Padmapādācārya, a direct pupil of Bhaga- vatpāda Sankara. But the name Padmapada is not found in the colophons of the work, nor is any name of the author mentioned in the gloss on the work called the Vivarana (cp. M.V. p.18). From the title 'Pamcapadika' we might deduce that it covered five Pādas ci the Brahma Sūtras (i.e. up to B.S. I.i.31.). But the work is at present only available as far as the first four Sutras, to the great regret of the historians of Vedantic ideas. The story that the work was once completed and then for some reason destroyed by fire seems to be a mere invention put forward to explain its unfinished state.

There is some indication in the body of the surviving portion that the author intended to write a complete commentary. For instance, there is a sentence 'We shall explain how this is so at the Sutra "Some say that the soul is mortal because it is confined to the present body"' (B.S.III.iii.53) at the begin- ning of the section on the theme that all is the one Self (P.P. p. 148/33)* This shows that the author intended to com- plete his work at least as far as that section (i.e. that adhikarana of the Brahma Sūtra).

*(Page-references to the Pañcapādikā are given here first ac- cording to the Madras edition, followed after an oblique stroke by the page in the older 'Vizianagram' edition, page-references to which are given in Venkataramiyah's English translation. For a summarized English translation with page-references to these

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editions, see Potter, 1981, pp. 563-97. For translations of Suresvara, see Bibliography under Alston, Balasubramanian, Mahadevan, Potter (1981), Raghavachar. All three works quoted in the M.V. are sumarized in Potter's work with page-references. T.N.)

Be all that as it may, ihe treatice must in any case be oue of the oldest of the Advaita works that have survived, as it quotes texts from the old commentaries on the Brahma Sutras that have not come down (P.P. p.180/42; 201/48). No oldcr gloss on Śri Sankara's Brahma Sutra Commontary is available today. The Pancapadika, then, even in its truncated form, represents a particular theory of the meaning of Śri Sankara's Brahma Sutra Commentary that has been curremt amongst the in- terpreters or that commentary for a long time and has conse- quently acquired very great authority. For this reason, also, this system deserves a close examination.

132 THE NATURE OF IGNORANCE ACCORDING TO THE PAÑCAPĀDIKĀ

The nature of Ignorance is set forth in the Pañcapādika in a highly individual way. For example, we find in Śri Sankara's Brahma Sutra Commentary (cp. M.V.22,4), 'And yet, though these two principles are utterly distinct in nature, there is a failure to distinguish one from the other, and each, together with its attributes, is superimposed on and identified with the other. And from that there results this natural worldly ex- perience, based on wrong knowledge (mithya-jmana) and involving a synthesis of the real with the false, which expresses itself as "I am this" and "This is mine"'. To get straight to the literal meaning, one has to assume that the construction the revered Commentator intended was, 'There is superimposition of Self and not-self, subject and object, through a failure to discriminate them one from the other'. And we find in the Gita Commentary, 'The "conjunction" between the Knower of the Field (cp. M.V. p.35) and the Field, which are respectively subject and object and of utterly dis- tinct nature, is in fact (no real conjunction at all but) a (mere mutual) superimposition of their attributes, conditioned by a failure to discriminate them one from another' (Bh.G.Bh. XIII.26). This has been explained above (M.V.22,6). Mandana, too, accepted the technical terms of Śri Gaudapāda, and spoke of non-perception (agrahana) and wrong perception (anyathagrahana) as together constituting Ignorance (B.Sid. p.9). This has also been referred to above when dealing with Mandana (M.V.92, intro .; 110, intro.). Suresvarācārya, also accepted that only the Ignorance encountered in the feeling I do not know' deserved to be referred to by the term 'Igno- rance' (M. V. 110, l and 2; 111, 4-6). It has been explained above,

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in the course of examining his system, how he cawe also to speak of Ignorance as wrong knowledge and as the appearance of a not-seif set up by that wrong knowledgc (B.B.V. I.iv.386, M.V.112, intro.). Bhartrprapanca, also, described Ignorance as 'non-perception' (as :not being awake to thc Self', M.V. 82,1). In the Pañcapadika, however. we find scmething very dif- ferent. The author does not offer any explanation at all of Śri Śakara's phrase 'there is a failure to distinguish one from the other ... ' (cp. M. V.22, 4;112, intro.). And he explains the phrase from the Commentary 'this ... world'y experience based on wrong knowledge ... ' (ibid.) in a sense quite differ- ent from tnat in which it was meant. Thus we have:

(1) The indeclinable past participles used to express the ideas 'is superimpoced' and 'involving a synthesis' (ibid. ) are not used to denote priority in time, or with the idca that they refer to anything other than the worlaly experience it- self. For there are not here two separate actions involved, as there would be for instance, in the sentence 'He's going away now, having had his meal'. 'Superimposing' and 'this natural worldly experience' amount in fact to the same thing. And in the concluding summary the phrase 'And so this "natural" (uncaused) beginningless and endless superimposition ... ' (M.V.23,3) mentions superimposition as the only activity. Hence the use of the indeclinable past participle should be seen as a mere figurative way of speaking, as when we say 'Consciousness is the nature of the Spirit' (as if the nature of the Spirit were something different from the Spirit, that somehow belonged to it). (P.P. p.25 f./4)

(2) Objection: When stating what the topic was to be, there was mention of 'this natural worldly experience'. How is it that now at the conclusion of the topic you can refer to this same worldly experience as 'superimposition' and throw in the extra characteristic 'beginningless'? To this objection we reply as follows. At the time of stating the topic, too, the reference was to natural worldly experience conceived as super- imposition of the ego-sense onto the inmost Self. And the inmost Self is established as beginningless. Anything which is 'natural' to that is implicitly beginningless too. So the conclusion of the passage does agree with the beginning after all, and beginningless was not just 'thrown in'. (P.P. p.159 f,/36)

This shows that the words 'superimposition' (adhyasa), 'making a synthesis' (mithunīkarana) and 'worldly experience' (vyava- hara) are used as synonyms. We shall have to examine this later when we are looking at superimposition (M.V. 140).

(3) The Commentary says 'mithyajñāna-nimittah'. 'Mithyājñāna'

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means 'that which is false (mithya) and which is Ignorance (ajñana)'. By 'false' is meant 'indeterminability'. And 'Ignorance (ajñana)' means the non-conscious power of Igno- rance (avidya-sakti), the negation of knowledge. 'Tan- nimittah', 'having that for its cause' means 'having thai for its material cause'. (P.P. p.26/4)

Here it is claimed that the 'power of Ignorance' is the material cause of superimposition. It will become clear at every step that by 'the power of Ignorance' the author of the Pañcapadika does not mean 'the power belonging to Ignorance' but 'the power that is Ignorance'. The doctrine that super- imposition requires a material cause, the doctrine that Igno- rance is a non-conscious power (sakti.), and the doctrine that the word 'false' (mithya) means 'indeterminable' - none of these doctrines is found anywhere in Sri Sankara's Commentary. The term 'false knowledge (mithyajnana)' is occasionally found there to mean a false idea as opposed to right knowledge as at B.S.Bh.I.i.4, I.iii.19, II.i.14, II.i.22 and so on. It is true, again, that we find 'indeterminability either as the real or as anything different' ascribed in the Commentary to the seed of name and form, which is imagined through Ignorance to be the supreme Lord (B.S.Bh. II.i.14). Nevertheless we do not find anywhere in Sri Sankara's commentaries on the Brahma Sutras, Upanishads or Gita the attribution to Ignorance, as the seed of name and form, of bare 'indeterminability' con- ceived in the manner of Mandana as 'not altogether unreal, nor ... real ... so indeterminable' (cp. M.V. 111,2).

(4) This beginningless Ignorance is referred to in the Vedas, Smrtis, Epics and Puranas as Name and Form, the Undeveloped, Ignorance, Maya, Nature (prakrti), Non-perception, the Unmani- fest, Darkness (tamas), the.Cause, Dissolution, Power, the Great Sleep (mahasupti), Sleep (nidra), the Indestructible, the Shining Ether. In different places it is spoken of in many different ways. It is spoken of as preventing the mani- festation of Consciousness in its true form as the Absolute and then producing the appearance of the individual soul. It is spoken of as the wall on which are painted the pictures of the impressions resulting from our meditations, rituals and acquired skills in previous lives. It is spoken of as that which remains in dreamless sleep as the mere latent impression of its power of projection, concealing the light of Conscious- ness. (P.P. p.98 f./20)

Here 'Ignorance' (avidya) and 'Power' (sakti) are not used as separate words, each meaning Ignorance. Ignorance has already been designated by the compound word 'power-of-Ignorance! (avidya-sakti) in the phrase 'And the power of (i.e. the power called) Ignorance must be admitted' (P.P. p.27/4). And Igno- rance, being referred to by the terms 'the Undeveloped'

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(avyakrta) and so on is clearly affirmed to be the state of the world prior to cosmic projection. It is also referred to as the obstacle which prevents the Absolute from manifesting as the Absolute. The author regards Ignorance in the form of superimposition, which was the form in which it was explained by Bhagavatpada Sankara in the introduction to his Brahma Sutra Commentary, as an effect, and clings to the idea that 'the power of Ignoranee' is its material cause. The auihor of the Pañcapadika does not use the word Ignorance io desig- nate that phenomenon of superimposition or erroneous cognition, which is well known as being subject to correction and cancel- lation through knowledge. Why, instead of doing that, he applies the term Ignorance to the Undeveloped Principle, which belongs to the realm of knowable objects, is a mystery.

133 WHAT IS THE PROOF OF IGNORANCE?

It is clear that in the systems of Bhagavatpāda Sankara and Suresvara it is accopted that Ignorance is established through immediate experience. Thus the introduction to Śri Sankara's Brahma Sūtra Commentary declares ' (Superimposition, which is) the origin of the sense that one can act and have experiences as an individual, is directly familiar to everybody' (M.V.23, 3). And Suresvara says, 'On my view only one assumption has to be made - Ignorance. And that is based on immediate experience' (S.V. 182). And the same thing is stated at other places in clear terms. In the Pancapadika, however, Ignorance is established (not by immediate experience but) by resort to argumentation and proof through the recognized means of knowl- edge (pramāņa).

(1) In the case of (all) external objects and mental experi- ences, this power of Ignorance must necessarily be admitted to exist invariably in association with their real nature as bare Being. Otherwise the manifestation of false objects would be inexplicable. (P.P. p.27/4)

Here the appeal is to the recognized means of knowledge called presumption (arthapatti) in its empirical (not exegetical) use as applied to perceived objects.

(2) We reply that here, too, (in the case of the Self) there exists a defect of non-perception, of the nature of Ignorance, which conceals the light of Consciousness. How is that known? From the Veda and from the exegetical presumptions we have to make in interpreting its texts (śrutārthapatti). Examples of Vedic texts would be 'Enveloped in falsity (all these creatures go daily to the realm of the Absolute but are carried away by delusion and do not know it)' (Chand. VIII.iii, 2, M.V. p. 348) and '(The individual soul) bewildered, grieving and helplessly

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drowned in sorrows' (Mund. III.i.2, M.V. p.100). Presumption as applied to the Vedic texts also establishes metaphysical Tgnorance. Everywhere in the Upanishads knowledge is taught to be the means to liberation. From this we conclude by pre- sumption (arthapatti) that a natural bondage exists, of the nature of Ignorance, the failure of the soul to be aware that in its true nature it is the Absolute. (P.P. D.73/14)

Here an appeal is made to the Veda and to the exegetical use of the means of valid knowledge called presumption to deter- mrine the meaning of Vedic texts, with a view to establish the existence of Ignorance. The function of a means of valid knowlecye (pramana) is to put an end to ignorance of its ob- ject. This is generally admitted. But, if so, it is not cicar why appeal was made to the. Veda and other means of knowledge to prove the existence of Ignorance, which is already by defi- nition proved to exist (as motive) before one can decide to auply a means of knowledge. There was also an appeal to pre- sumption (arthapatti). But no euplanation was uffered why presumption should establish a (cosmic) power of Ignorance, rather than the individual Ignorance, (guaranteed by our per- sonal experience and) accepted by the other systems of Advaita (such as those of Śri Sankara and Suresvara).

134 THE EFFECT OF IGNORANCE

Because the power of Ignorance consists in Name and Form, it follows by implication that the whole world is its effect. At a particular point, however, the author of the Pañcapādikā speaks of it spccifically, in the course of his discussion of superimposition, as a cause of the superimposition of the ego- sense. Thus we have:

(1) But this (Ignorance) is not an obstacle to the manifesta- tion of non-conscious objects in their true nature as they exist in the objective world. For failure to perceive them is already accounted for by the defects and insufficiencies of our instruments of knowledge. And we see in the case of the illusory appearance of silver, the true (i.e. empirically real) nature of the silver as shell is apprehended before and after the illusion, even though Ignorance is uniformly present. In such cases, therefore, Ignorance is only the cause of the shell appearing in a different form. The inmost Self, however, being of the nature of pure Consciousness, is self-luminous. The non-manifestation of the Self, since it can have no other cause, must be traced to the obstacle of the power of Igno- rance, established as inhering in it naturally. The power of Ignorance, therefore, prevents the inmost Consciousness from manifesting in its true form, and is also the cause of its appearing as the ego-sense and in other guises that are not its

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true nature. In dreamless sleep, however, and other states in which subject-object consciousness is suspended, the ego-sense, with its appurtenances, remains as a mere latent impression of the creative activity of Ignorance, and afterwards re-awakens. And so worldly experience, consisting in identifying oneself as a human being and so on, through the egc-sense of 'I' and 'mine', though in one sense natural (and so beginningless), is nevertheless (rightly) declared (by the Commentator Sri Śankara) to be 'caused' by Ignorance, but (caused ar something 'natural' and so beginningless, and) not as anything arriving adventitiously. (P.P. p.29 f./4-5)

here it is taught that Ignorance has its seat in Consciousness. that it is the obstacle which prevents Consciousness manifest- ing in its true nature, and that it is the cause of its mani- festing in what is not its true form (i.c. as the ego-sense and so on). From this it would follow that a non-conscious appearance, too, would be a manifestation of Consciousness in what was not its true form. (But the author says, 'Ignorance is taken by presumption (arthad) io rest in the individual soul, obscuring its true nature as the light of the Absolute', cp. M. V. 134, 2; 139, 4; 241, 4 and note; V.P.P. English Intro. p. 110.) It is quite unintelligible how he could claim that Ignorance has its seat in an effect of Ignorance, given that the effects of Ignorance are non-conscious (cp. M.V. 113, 1) . But we desist from further examination of this here, as we shall have to examine the explanations of Prakasatman on this point below (M.V. 241, 4). The statement that this power of Ignorance is the cause of an appearance of the inmost Self in forms, such as the ego- sense and the feeling of possession, which it does not reaily have, appears to be in conflict with the passage in Sri Sankara's Commentary which states that the ordinary worldly experience of 'I' and 'mine' is 'natural' and therefore un- caused. There is, however, the special point that the author of the Pañcapadika also holds that in dreamless sleep and similar states, where subject-object consciousness lapses, superimposition remains as a mere impression and then rises up again in manifest form on waking. To this extent superimposi- tion is not natural but the effect of a cause. We shall have to consider this when we are examining the topic of superimpo- sition (M.V.140).

(2) But have we not said that the soul is nothing other than the Absolute? Yes we have. That is why Ignorance is taken by presumption (arthad) to rest in the individual soul, obscuring its true nature as the light of the Absolute. Otherwise, if there were constant awareness of the fact that, from the stand- point of the highest truth, the individual soul was identical with the Absolute, the teaching about their identity in the Veda would be useless. So those who truly understand the Veda,

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the Smrti and reasoning have to accept that the Absolute, it- self one and homogeneous, is the substratum of innumerable individual souls only as delimited by beginningless Ignorance. (P.P. p.73 f./14-15)

Here (in the last part of the extract) it is said that this Ignorance has its seat in the Absolute, and that it is the cuuse of the uppearance in the latter of innumerable indivi- dual souls. The proof of this offered is the impossibility of the teachings about the identity of the individual soul with the Absolute on anu other hypothesis. It is clear that this system differs from that of Mandana here, who taught that Ignorance had its scat in the indivillual soul (M. V. 94, 1).

(The author holds that the P.P. had no consistent and clearly thought out view about where Ignorance has its seat. See Pañcapādikā-Prasthānam, p. 55. T.N.)

135 DID THE DOCTRINE OF IGNORANCE AS MATERIAL CAUSE OF THE WORLD ORIGINATE WITH THE PANCAPĀDIKĀ?

Of the books that maintain that the power of Ignorance is the material cause of all distinctions, the Pañcapādika is the oldest that still survives today. But there is external proof that the author of the Pancapadika was not the author of the doctrine. For we find in the Brahma Siddhi the words 'And those who claim that Ignorance is (a kind of substance or power and) the material cause of all distinctions say, "Ignorance is beginningless and purposeless"' (B.Sid. p.l0, M.V.94,1). We do rot find a phrase exactly like this ('Ignorance is begin- ningless and purposeless') in the Pañcapādika. So we infer that the doctrine that Ignorance was a power (sakti) and a material cause must have originated earlier. This view of those who accept the power of Ignorance implies a different method of interpreting the Veda from the method of false attribution followed by subsequent retraction accepted by Bhagavatpāda Śankara. We may assume that, as there was no competent authority known to have originated it, it must have been first introduced under the guise of an explanation of Śri Śankara's Brahma Sūtra Commentary, and then, with the passage of time, it came to be accepted as constituting a small cur- rent within that mighty river itself. The Brahma Sutra Com- mentary of Śri Śankara and the Brhadāranyaka Vārtika of Suresvara do not anywhere make the slightest mention of any doctrine treating Ignorance as a material cause, though they examine a considerable number of the earlier systems. So one might, as an alternative, surmise that this system was evolved by someone after the time of the composition of the Vērtika. As this is really a subject for professional philologists, I

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do not propose to write more about it here.

136 THE DEFINITION OF SUPERIMPOSITION IN THE SYSTEM OF THE PANCAPĀDIKĀ

Śri Śankara raises the question in the introduction to his Brahma Sutra Commentary 'What then is this thing called super- imposition?' And he gives the answer in the form of a defini- tion: 'We reply: "It is the manifestation at one place cf what had previously been seen at another place, of the nature of a memory"'. The Pancapadika explains that passage as foilows.

(1) Here the words 'at another place' imply that it is some- thing else that is manifesting, other than the actual object in front. The manifestation is like a memory (smrti-rupa). The term 'memory' (smrti) means (here not the act of remember- ing but) the memory-image. For the 'ghan' and other suffixes (including the 'ktin' which forms the final 'ti' in 'smr + ti = smrti' ), though they cannot be used to denote the performer of an act, are found applied to the root to form derivatives in senses other than that of the verbal noun expressing activity. ('Smrti' may therefore mean 'the memory-image' as well as 'the act of remembering', cp. Patanjali, Mahabhasya, Vol. I, p.146, commenting on Panini IIT.iii.19). A superimposition is like a memory, but is not literally a memory. For (unlike a memory) it is something that manifests clearly in froni of one as if it were an object of perception. It is, however, rightly called 'like a memory' (by Śri Śańkara) because it is a manifestation of something that has been seen previously. There is no illusory manifestation of silver in a piece of shell when a person is in sense-contact with the lat- ter unless he has previously seen silver. And the definition of superimposition extends by implication to the erroneous cognition that has the superimposed thing for its object. Do you ask how this is so? A superimposition, we reply, is like a memory, but superimposition is not memory. For the cognition in a superimposition does not manifest the object of a past cognition as such (i.e. as a memory recognized to be a memory of something previously perceived). How, then, can we say that a superimposition is of the nature of a memory? Be- cause its rise depends on a previous cognition. A cognition which manifests something (like illusory silver) with which there is no present sense-contact necessarily depends on a previous cognition of that object (silver) through the valid means of knowledge. (P.P. pp.39-42/6-7)

On this subject, the words of the revered Commentator, when he explains superimposition as a cognition that synthesizes the real with the false, agree well with his general doctrine. He says, ' ... and each, together with its attributes, is super-

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imposed on and identified with the other ... involving a syn- thesis of the real with the false ... (from which there results) this natural worldly experience' (M.V.22,4). And he confirms this in the sequel by saying 'Everyone superimposes (the notion of) another object onto the object standing in tront of him'. And, as is well known, he gives a yet clearer definition in different words in the concluding summary to his introduction to his Brahma Sutra Commentary when he says, 'And we have already said that superimpcsition is the notion of one thing mistakenly applied to another thing', thereby showing that superimposition was superimposition of an idea only. The author of the Pancapadiki ignores all this. He takes refuge in mere established usage. He says that established usage applies the '-ti' suffix to the root even when the mean- ing intended is not a noun expressing activity (i.e. when 'smrti' is used to mean 'a memory-image' and not 'remembering'), though the traditions of the early Grammarians restrict such a formation to nouns expressing activity, as is shown by the Sutra, 'The "gham" suffixes (including "-ti") may be added to the root to form verbal nouns expressing activity, though not to denote the performer of an act' (Panini I:I.iii.19). On the fragile basis of a claim about usage, he takes the word memory (smrti) to mean the mcmory-image, although it could perfectly well have meant the act of remembering (so that there was no justification for appealing to established usage to assert a new meaning in defiance of Panini's rules). It appears to us that the author of the Pañcapādika resorted to this procedure to safeguard his own private theory that the term 'mithyajmana' meant the power of Ignorance conceived as the material cause cf superimposition. For if he had followed the usage of the Brahma Sutras as explained by Śri Sankara's Commentary and had taken Ignorance primarily as superimposi- tion, a form of wrong knowledge subject to cancellation through right knowledge, he would never have relegated this meaning to a secondary position by saying 'And the definition extends by implication to the erroneous cognition that has the superim- position for its object' (cp. supra). For superimposition is explicitly defined in the commentary (not as an illusory object but) as a form of false knowledge - in the words, 'And we have already said that superimposition is the notion of one thing mistakenly applied to another thing'. There is therefore no question of this only being known 'through implication'. The author of the Pañcapādika also gives an artificial ex- planation of the portion of the commentary explaining its own phrase 'the manifestation at one place of what had previously been seen at another place', designed to make it agree with his own interpretation. He says, 'For when a person's sense- organs are bearing on a piece of shell, silver does not erro- neously manifest unless he has previously seen silver' (P.P. p.40-1/7) and 'A cognition which manifests something (like illusory silver) with which there is no present sense-contact

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necessarily depends on a previous cognition of that object (silver) through the valid means of knowledge (P.P. p.42/7). But the revered Commentator was not concerned to enter into the question of how something previously perceived could mani- fest again in memory, or indeed to examine the nature of memory at all. All he was concerned to do was to show that superimposition was of the nature of memory. Nor is the subject-matter of the present portion of the commentary in any way concerned with examining the question how superimposition arises, that one would be justified in interpreting it as saying 'Superimposition is invariably made possible through its object having been perceived before, otherwise it would be impossible'. For there is only one point of similarity between superimposition and memory which the com- mentary iniends to point out and illustrate. It is the fact that, in memcry as in superimposition when the latter is con- ceived as a form of cognition, there is no object of cognition standing in front of us. One cannot pass from this to the proposition 'For no memory of a thing with which there is no present sense-contact can arise unless the thing now manifested has been the object cf the previous application of a means of valid cognition'. For no one can show that this must be the case with the wrong memories that can arise in dreams or states of lunacy and the like. Nor could any Vedantin admit that the superimposition of the original illusory distinction, that between means of knowledge and object of knowledge, could arise from the previous application of a valid means of knowledge bearing on that illusory distinction. For another means of knowledge bearing on that original illusory distinction (which itself brought the means of valid knowledge into being) would be impossible; or even if it were somehow possible, it would lead to infinite regress (as the last means of knowledge would presuppose a fresh instance of the original distinction that brings means of knowledge into being, and this in turn would imply a fresh means of knowledge and so on). So we do not maintain that the object of an erroneous cog- nition has been previously perceived. What we maintain is that there is an illusory manifestation like something that has been perceived before. All we say about superimposition is that it is the erroneous imagination that something like what we have previously seen, such as silver, is really stand- ing in front of us. That is why Śri Śankara did not go into any particulars about what was implied by 'having been seen before' in his concluding summary on superimposition at the end of the introduction to his Brahma Sutra Commentary. He just accepted 'the notion of one thing mistakenly applied to another thing' as being the meaning of his earlier words defining superimposition. And that is how the matter should be understood.

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137 WHY ARE DIFFERENT THEORIES OF SUPERIMPOSITION MENTIONED?

In the introduction to ŚrI Sankara's Brahma Sutra Commentary, the first definition of superimposition is followed by a refer- ence to the opinions of various philosophical schools on the topic. 'Some say that superimpositiou is just superimposition of attributes where they do not belong. Some affirm that wherever there is a superimposition it is invariably caused by some failure to discriminate differences. Others, again, say that a superimposition is nothing mcre than a wrong notion as to the attributes of the object where the illusion is perc- eived'. Whese various views are mentioned, but none of them is criticized, because the qucstion of how superimposition arises, and the answers given to it, are of little interest, and not relevant to ihe topic under discussion. That topic is not an exposition of the causes of superimposition, The topic being expounded is: 'In wcrldly experience there is a natural superimposition of Consciousness and the non-conscious'. In this cortext, the question is raised, 'What is the nature of that superimposition which is being affirmed?' To this it is replied with the definition, 'It is the manifestation at one place of what had previously been seen at another, of the nature of a memory'. And Śri Śankara sums up his reason for mentioning other theories on the topic in the words, 'But in any case, all theories agree that one thing appears with the attributes of another'. That is, philosophers who disagree about the cause of superimposition all agree that it consists in the wrong notion of one thing having the attributes of another. But Śri Śankara's sub-commentators of different schools enquire to whom the different theories set out by Śri Sankara belong in order to detarmine their nature in more detail, and then expound them in order to point out their defects, each sub-commentator using his own particular theory as a criterion. The author of the Pancapadika, for his part, includes two of the doctrines as sub-species of an initial conception. He says, 'Some say that a superimposition is a superimposition elsewhere, for instance onto a piece of shell, of the attri- butes of another thing, such as silver, whether that thing be a cognition (as in the "Ātmakhyati" theory of the Vijñana Vādins) or an actual external object (such as the actual sil- ver in the market, supernormally perceived and wrongly referred to the locus of the shell, as in the "Anyathakhyati" theory of the Naiyāyikas)'. The second conception (the Akhyati theory of the Mimamsaka school of Prabhakara) he describes as follows: 'They say that wherever there is a superimposition it is an illusion of the unity of two (cognitions, namely a partial perception of an object present in front but only perceived vaguely as a "this", and a memory, not recognized as such, of a similar object

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previously experienced); and they claim that the illusion pro- ceeds from a failure to discriminate the two (component ele- ments in the experience, so that the memory is taken for a perceptiun)'. He describes a third conception (the Asatkhyāti theory attributed to the Madbyamika Buddhists) in the words, 'Othors say that, where there is a superimposition of silver onto shell, there is the false notion that that fragment of shell has the contradictory character of being silver - a notion which produccs the appearance of something which in no way exists' (P.P. p.61/1l). The author of the Fancapadika first expounds the second conception of superimposition (Akhyati) in detail, and then refutes it, starting the exposition as follows. 'An error arises when there is a faise appearance of unity - like the false appearance of unity of two trees seen in the distance - due to the failure, on account of a defect in the cognitive mechanism, to perceive the difference between a perception and a memory that occur simultaneously' (P.P. p.43 ff./7-8). He then goes on to refute three conceptions of error: name- ly, the thecry that the manifestation of the piece of shell as silver is perfectly real, the theory that it is a transforma- tion occasioned in the shell on account of some defect, and the theory that the rise of silver is a mere false notion arising from a defective instrument of knowledge (P.P. pp.48- 50/8-9). And then afterwards he sets out his own doctrine. To help set that doctrine in relief he opposes to it two other doctrines - the doctrine that superimpositions occur without a substratum, and the doctrine called anyathakhyati, according to which an actual object present at another place somehow manifests itself in the substratum of the illusion (P.P. pp. 62-71/12-14). It is clear that here, toc, the revered Commentator, while retailing the theories of others about superimposition, was in agreement with them that superimposition was always superim- position (not of objects but) of ideas. He uses the two defi- nitions 'error is caused by a failure to discriminate' and 'error is the false imagination of inappropriate attributes' in the sense of a superimposition of ideas, because that agrees with his own view. The Pañcapādika, however, specifically accepts superimposition (not of ideas but) of objects and explicitly attributes this conception of superimposition to Śrī Śankara's commentary. This is strange, indeed, when its author must have seen that the emphasis in the commentary was on superimposition as 'the notion of one thing mistakenly applied to another thing', and must also have seen that the commentary maintained that all theorists agreed with this definition of superimposition, and must have seen that it spoke of superimposition as erroneous knowledge subject to direct cancellation by right knowledge.

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138 THE TWO EXAMPLES ADDUCED IN ŚRI ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY TO ILLUSTRATE SUPERIMPOSITION

Śri Śankara first shows how all theorists agree essentially in their definition of superimposition, and then, in order to clarify his meaning, he gces on to adduce two examples of superimpositions recognized to occur in worldly experience. His words are: 'And worldly experience agrees with this. For the piece of shell appears as silver (in the well-known silver- illusion), and the one moon (in the case of double-vision) appears to be accomparied by a second moon'. The Pañcapādikā explains the example of the piece of shell appearing as silver as follows.

(1) Now he (Śri Sankara) goes on to explain what the use of reasoning is, when the nature of superimposition can be indi- cated well enough through worldly examples. One may begin with the proposition, 'It is the shell that manifests as sil- ver'. But then the cbjection will arise, 'The shell does not in fact manifest. Only silver manifests'. So neither part of the proposition will hold - neither 'shell (manifests)' nor 'as silver' (since silver itself manifests). To this it is replied that we speak of shell because the illusion is after- wards known through right knowledge to have consisted of shell in truth all along. And the word 'as' is justified, because one has to accept that the true non-silver (the shell) with which one's eye is in contact is identified in the illusion with false silver. The silver is spoken of as false because its existence is caused by a defect that comes adventitiously, ana because it is open to swift subsequent cancellation. The silver is not called false on the ground that it is different from the shell, with the latter conceived as absolutely real. Since the silver is not in contact with the sense-organs, it is not the cause of the rise of the idea 'this'. The idea 'this' pertains to that only (the shell) with which the sense- organ (the eye) is in contact. Although the manifestation of silver is due to a latent impression from previous experience, nevertheless it appears as if it were an object standing in front of one on account of defects in one's organs, and also because it falls within the (partial) cognition (of shell standing in front) based on sense-contact: (P.P. p.69 f./13-14)

(2) But how could it possibly be that there is manifestation of silver when the sense-organs are only in contact with shell? Well, we do not admit the rise of any memory not recognized as such and supposed to be separate from the cognition caused by sense-contact. We admit only one single cognition, arising from the sense-organ associated with a mental impression. How is this? A defect. we reply, in the cognitive mechanism blocks its proper operation on the object, and also activates a

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certain latent mental impression so that it comes into mani- festation. We infer the presence of a defect in the cognitive mechanism from the nature of the effect produced. Behind the superimposition, therefore, lies a single complex of factors, with the cognitive mechanism thrown out of order by the latent impression. Because this complex is a unity, it produces one act cf knowledge issuing in one resultant-cognition. This knowledge arises from a complex associated with an impression activated by a defect. It is therefore quite intelligible that it should have false silver residing in the shell as its object. It is 'false knowledge' because its object is false (in that we later have the cancelling cognition 'this never was silver'). But the rognition as such was not false, in that we do not have any later cancelling cognition of the form 'this was not a cognition'. (P.P. p.51 f./9)

The following explanation is given to show how the silver is false and is also the cbject of false knowledge.

(3) Thus on our theory there is no contradiction with experi- ence. For it is only the falsely manifesting silver that is the object of the cognition. The silver is thus illusory (maya-maya). Had it been real, it would have been perceived by everybody .... But since it is only illusory, it is right that it should only be seen by those whose instruments of cognition are afflicted by a defect, for example by those whose eyes have been placed under the spell of a hypnotist's mantra. Again, the cancelling cognition 'This is not silver' points to its being illusory. Why? Because it shows it is false and of indeterminable reality-grade. For we feel, 'This is not sil- ver. Tt was a mere faise apparition'. And that would be out of place if it had had any form of real existence, for example if it had been (distant real silver) in (super-normal) contact with the sense-organs (as the Naiyayikas hold) or if it had been real as conscious idea, while only the notion that it was an object external to consciousness had to be rejected (as the Vijmanavadin Buddhists hold). (P.P. p.54 f./10)

Here there is a definition of the superimpostion of an idea as a cognition brought about by sense-contact with an object, associated with a latent impression activated by a defect. The view of the Pañcapadikā is that the superimposed cognition is false only because it has the illusory silver residing in the shell as its object, not in itself as a cognition, as it is not subject to any cancelling cognition of the form 'This was not a cognition'. The superimposed object (arthadhyasa), however, (as opposed to the superimposed cognition answering to it (jñānādhyāsa), is false for the following reasons. It is caused by a defect. It is only seen when the cognitive mechanism is defective. And it is revealed as false by the cancelling-cognition 'This is.

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not silver'. We must therefore infer, says the author, that the object-element of the superimposition is illusory (māyā- maya) and an effect of the power of Ignorance. The Pancapadika refutes the objection that the definition of error is too narrow because it does not include the suffer- ings of the dream-state as fcllows:

(4) It has already been said that memory is only the manifes- tation of objects previously experienced through the means of valid cognition. Well, here in dream, the mind, overwhelmed by sleep and other defects, yieids cognitions of unreal ob- jects which arise in conformity with the assistant latent impressions that have been activeted by occult forces like karmic merit and demerit. And it is the power of Ignorance supported by the immediate Consciousness delimited by the mind that cvolves into the objects of these cognitions. (P.P. p.56/10, cp. M.V. 153,1)

The idea is to claim that the drfinition of error may rightly be regarded as extending to dream, because there also the mind is the organ, while sleep and so on are the defects, and there is a latent impression activated by karmic forces. The alleged threefold cause* of superimposition is therefore present. The author adds thut Ignorance supported by Consciousness trans- forms itself into the illusory objects of dream, and through this becomes an object for the mind.

*(The threefold cause of superimposition taught in post-Sankara Advaita comprised (1) sense-contact with the substratum of the superimposition (2) defect in the apprehender, his sense- organ or the object (3) a latent impression. in the apprehen- der, derived from the previous experience of an object similar to the substratum, and now activated by the defect. Cp. M.V. 138,3, note. T.N.)

No such separate description of superimposition of ideas and superimposition of objects is found anywhere in Śri Śankara's commentaries on the Brahma Sutras, Upanishads or Gīta. We will quote a few of the revered Commentator's texts here, reflection on which will enable us to understand his view.

(5) Similarly, in the sentence 'He sees the piece of shell as silver', the word 'shell' simply means the actual shell, where as the word 'silver' implies the imaginary idea of silver. One merely imagines silver, although there is in fact no silver there. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.5, M.V.46,10)

(6) He sees the instruments of the sacrifice as non-existent except as the Self, just as one who knows the shell sees the non-existence of the silver in the shell. Therefore the state ment 'The sacrificial offering is the Absolute' is like saying

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'What appears to be silver is actually only shell'. (Bh.G.Bh. IV.24)

Here what is said is that there is indeed non-existence of silver in the shell, and that the true nature of the silver is shell and nothing else.

(7) He, though seeing, does not see, like one afflicted with double-vision who sees two moons, or like one who erroneously sees the moon as if it were hurtling through the clouds. (Ph. G.Bh.XVIII.16, following on from M.V.25,9)

(8) The moon does not in fact become many when seen as if

M.V.47,6) many by an eye afflicted with double-vision. (B.S.Bh.II.i.27,

What is here said is that what appears to be seen as many by one afflicted with double-vision is not many at that time or ever.

(9) There is no coming-to-be or passing-away of the second moon seen by one afflicted with double-vision. (Taitt.Bh.II.8, cp. M.V.223,9)

(10) (And it is the same in worldly experience. Shell mani- fests falsely as silver.) The one moon (in the case of double-vision) appears to be accompanied by a second moon. (B.S.Bh.I.i.1, intro.)

Here there is a denial of the existence of the second moon that one who is afflicted with double-vision imagines he sees. And it is affirmed that its true nature is the real moon.

(11) We have the example of a piece of shell which is actually being perceived (as a 'this'), and yet, since it is misappre- hended as silver, it is not (properly) perceived. The sole obstacle here is misapprehension. (Brhad.Bh.I.iv.7, M.V.30,8)

Here it is only the shell that is manifesting as silver. Even at the time when one is perceiving the appearance of silver, it is only the shell that is being perceived. It is only wrong knowledge that can be removed by right knowledge, not illusory silver - that is the implication.

(12) It is in fact the rope that is called a snake, under the impression that it is a snake .... But for those who discern the rope in its true nature, the name and notion of the snake cease. (Chand.Bh.VI.ii.3, M.V.47,1)

What is emphasized is that there is no snake in the rope apart from the name and idea of a snake (so that there is no room

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for the illusory snake posited as an ertra-mental object by the Pañcapadi ka, M.V.138, 3)

(13) A piece of mental imagination like a rope-snake does not actually either rise up from or dissolve back into the rope. Nor does any real snake actually rise up in or become dissolved in the mind. Nor do both these things nappen. (C.K.Bh.II.32, M.V. 35,1)

There is no rise or dissolution, etc., of a rope-snake in any way. All that is mere false imagination in the mina.

And so we see from the above-quoted texts that the view main- tained in Śri Sankara's commentaries was that it is the shell and the rope only that manifest in differeni forms through error (i.e. there is no room for the theory of the Pañcapadika that there is an illusory object, silver or snake, picked up by a cognition).

139 THE DEFECT OF IGNORANCE AS THE CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTIONS AMONGST THE INDIVIDUAL SOULS

The Pamcapadika says: 'It has been shown through the shell- silver example that the silver is not the true nature of that (the shell) with which the sense-organ (the eye) is in contact. The purpose was to illustrate a parallel case. The ego is superimposed, and is not the true nature of the Self as pure Consciousness, the latter being the "non-this" element (non- objective element that makes experience of the ego possible). That the ego is by nature a "thou-entity" (an object) is showa by the fact that it has to be illumined by the light of pure Consciousness to become manifest. 'It is a different point that is made through reference to the example of the double-vision of the moon. This is to show that the appearance of a distinction between the soul and the Lord and between the different souls does not represent the true nature of the Self' (P.P. p.70-1/14). Now, the objection may be raised, 'Granting that superim- position has three causes, how do non-perception and wrong perception arise in regard to the individual soul?' The Pañcapādikā states it as follows:

(1) In the case of an external object, defects leading to erroneous perception may be found in the object, such as exces- sive similarity to some other object, and defects may be found in the sense-organ, such as the disease of double-vision. And since external objects have parts, it is reasonable to suppose that while one part of the object was known, the defects should constitute an obstacle to the knowledge of another part, (as

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when part of a shell is perceived vaguely as a 'this', and a defect prompts the rise of the impression of silver, M.V.138,1). But the case with the Self is different. For it is self- luminous and not dependent for its manifestation on any exter- nal cause (which might contain a defect). And the whole prc- cess of superimposition (which implies that part of an object should be perceived and part not perceived) is impossible in the case of the partless, self-luminous Consciousness. (P.P. p.71/14)

No one before the author of the Pañcapādika has laid it down that superimposition requires as its precondition three defects - a defect in the apprehender (such as greed, etc.), a defect in the object and a defect in the apprehending organ. Suresvara's views stand in ccmpleie contrast, for he raised the following question and returned the following answer.

(2) But is it not the case that in worldly experience erron- eous knowledge is found to occur where a memory of silver arises when the general form of the shell has been perceived, without a knowledge of its particular attributes? Erroneous knowledge is found to exist in the world when what is super- imposed is in truth different from that onto which it is super- imposed, and the two are confused. But this situation is impossible in the case of the Self, where all is one .... We take no notice of this useless objection, because, on our view, all the evils of erroneous knowledge arise from the one cause of Ignorance of the inmost Self. (B.B.V. I.iv.415-6,418)

In the Pañcapādika the exponent of the prima facie view is also made to raise an objection against superimnosition on the ground that the individual soul is not different from the Abso- lute.

(3) It might be objected as follows. It is agreed on all hands that (in empirical experience) the Absolute is not mani- fest in its true form. But it does not follow from this that the true nature of the individual soul should not be manifest and should be wrongly perceived. Just because a piece of shell is not perceived, it does not follow that a post should fail to be perceived or be wrongly perceived. Perhaps you (Advaitin) will reply to this by saying that the Absolute is not differ- ent from the individual soul, since the Upanishad recorded 'Being' as saying '(Let me - i.e. Being - enter the elements) as the living soul' (Chand. VI.iii.2), and argue from this that non-perception of the Absolute implies non-perception of the true nature of the soul. But if this were the case, ignorance of the true nature of the soul would be all the more impos- sible. For the Absolute is of the very nature of knowledge. Everything manifests through it alone as Consciousness, as is expressed in the text 'All this shines through its light'

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(Kațha II.ii.15). (P.P. p.71 ff./14)

The reply to this is set out as foliows.

(4) To this we (Advaitins) reply as follows. There certainly is, even here, the defect of non-perception, of the nature of metaphysical Ignorance, hiding the light of Consciousness. How do we know this? From the Veda, and from the implications of its texts. As regards the texts themselves, we have 'Carried away by delusion' (Chand.VIII.iii.2), 'Bewildered, grieving and helplessly drowned in sorrows' (Mund.III.i.2) and others. And then there are also the implications of the texts. Every- where in the Upanishads it is knowledge of the Absolute alone that is declared to be the means to liberation. This implies that a natural bondage exists, of the nature of Ignorance, a failure on the part of the individual soul to be aware that in his true nature he is the Absolute. But have we not said that the soul is nothing other than the Absolute? Yes, we have. That is why Ignorance is taken to rest in the individual soul, obsruring the light of the Absolute (cp. M.V.134,1, note;134,2;241,4, note). Ctherwise, if there were constant awareness of the fact that, from the standpoint of the highest truth, the individual soul was iden- tical with the Absolute, the teaching about their identity in the Veda would be useless. So those who truly understand the Veda, the Smrti and reasoning have to accept that the Absolute, itself one and homogeneous, is the substratum of innumerable individual souls only as delimited by beginningless Ignorance. And thus the Smrti says, 'Know that Prakrti and Purusa are both beginningless' (Bh.G.XIII.19), where it refers by the word 'Prakrti' to the beginningless power of Ignorance which is the cause of the distinction between the Field (M.V. p.35) and the Knower of the Field. And in the Veda we have 'One should know that Nature (prakrti) is Maya' (Svet.IV.10). Hence, though the Absolute is not different from one's own Self, one does not know it because it assumes an individual form as de- limited by Maya. And it has also been said, 'When the indivi- dual soul, asleep under a beginningless illusion, finally awakens, he awakens to a knowledge of the unborn, sleepless, dreamless, non-dual reality' (G.K.I.16). (P.P. p.73-5/14-5)

Here the Vedic text 'bewildered, grieving' (Mund. III.1.2) proceeds on the basis of accepting the familiar distinction between the individual soul and the Lord. ('The individual soul stands on the same tree as the Lord, bewildered and grieving ... '.) Then it goes on in the sequel to speak of the ending of grief through the vision of the supreme Self. The passage runs, 'When he sees the other whom he has propitiated, the Lord in his glory, he becomes free from grief' (Mund. III.1.2). The text 'Carried away by delusion' (Chand. VIII. iii.2) refers to the familiar experience of the way in which

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individual souls gain unity with the Absolute every night in dreamless sleep and yet are not aware of the fact. The con- text in which the text comes shows that the reason for this is that they are under the spell of desire and action caused by erroneous knowledge. These texts, and others like them, refer to the individual soul in the state of empirical experience. They conform to this standpoint, in which the soul is in the grip of the alien forces of desire and action. But it is not at all clear how they can be made out to be concerned with 'the defect of non- perception, of the nature of metaphysical Ignorance, hiding the light of Consciousness', regarded specifically as a pre- requisite for superimposition. One can accept as true the statement that the Upanishads teach knowledge of the Absolute for liberation on the principle that 'a natural bondage exists, of the nature of Ignorance, a failure on the part of the individual soul to be aware that in his true nature he is the Absolute'. But the Pañcapādika does not make it clear why such a bondage of Ignorance should not be just the natural (uncaused and beginningless) superimposi- tion mentioned by the revered Commentator. For what the latter's commentary says, supported by reasons, is the follow- ing.

(5) This 'natural' (i.e. uncaused) and beginningless and end- less superimposition, which is of the nature of false supposi- tion and is the origin of the sense that one is acting and experiencing, is directly familiar to everybody. And the en- tire upanishadic teaching is begun to communicate knowl.edge of the sole reality of the one Self, and thus to put an end to this superimposition, the cause of all evil. (B.S.Bh.I.i.1, intro. ad fin., cp. M.V.23,4;112)

Or consider, again, what is meant by the example of the two moons, which is dealt with in the Pañcapādika sub-commentary. It would have been quite enough to have explained it as saying that the distinction between the individual soul and the Lord, and the distinctions between the various individual souls, is set up by Ignorance in the form of natural superimposition rooted in a failure to discriminate the real in its true nature The author of the sub-commentary does not make it clear why he did not just keep to that. On this topic, too, one can quote a relevant passage from Śri Śankara's commentary.

(6) Name and form, imagined through Ignorance as if they were the very nature of the Self, the omniscient Lord, indetermin- able either as the real principle or as anything (independent and) different from it, the seed of transmigratory experience and the differentiated world, are spoken of in the Veda and Smrti as 'The Power of Maya belonging to the omniscient Lord' and as 'Nature' (prakrti). The omniscient Lord is different

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from them. For the Veda says 'The shining ether, verily, draws forth name and form. That in which they exist is the Absolute' (Chand. VIII.xiv.l), (B.S.Bh.II.i.14, M.V.45,1)

Here it is said that name and form, imagined through Ignorance, are Maya and Prakrti. Prakrti is called Māyā. Ignorance or superimposition, through which Maya is imagined, mist be dif- ferent from it. This is the implication of what is said.

This also explains the texts 'Prakrti and Purusa' (Bh.G.XIII. 19) and 'One should kmow that Nature (prakrti) is Māya' (Śvet. IV.10). Māya, spoken of as Prakrti, is accepted in the com- mentary of Sri Sankara as the seed of name and form, imagined through Ignorance. There is nothing to show that Śri Sankara accepted the view cf the author of the Pancapādikā that Maya was a word that could be used to stend for 'the beginningless power of Ignorance'. But if cne agrees that the word Ignorance may in certain circumstances stand for 'imagined through Igno- rance', then it must also be accepted that the Ignorance in question is an imagining force that does both the obscuring and the projecting, and that it is not name and form, the mere secondary product. Nor can the words of an acknowledged authority 'being asleep through beginningless Maya' (G.K.I.16) be adduced as a proof in favour of the view of the author of the Pancapadika. For the Kārikās of Gaudapāda do not anywhere accept any 'power of Igno- rance': they speak only of non-perception and wrong perception. And the commentary of Śri Sankara on the Karika in question explains it, quite differently from the Pañcapadika, as fol- lows: '(The individual soul in transmigration is) asleep in the states of waking and dream also, seeing dreams ... through a beginningless illusion which has two forms, the seed-form of not being awake to reality, and the (consequent) form cf mis- perceiving reality' (G.K.Bh.I.16).

(7) Thus the Lord appears to conform to the conditioning ad- juncts set up by Ignorance. It is like the ether of space appearing to conform to the shapes of the cavities of pot and jar. Thus in the realm of practical experience the Lord exer- cises lordship over the conscious beings called individual souls, who, corresponding to the pot-ether in the illustration, appear to conform to the limitations of their bodies (gross body and subtle body) and organs, which consist of name and form set up by Ignorance. Such souls are in reality nothing but the Lord's own Self. (B.S.Bh.II.i.14)

When it is said that the Lord has the apparent conditioning adjunct of name and form, and that the individual souls have the apparent conditioning adjuncts of their various bodies and organs, the meaning is that all tha distinctions are due to distinctions in conditioning adjuncts, which are imagined

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through Ignorance. (See also M.V. 242,9, note. )

140 SUPERIMPOSITION AND EMPIRICAL EXPERIENCE ARE ONE AND THE SAME THING

We have already explained how, in the opinion of the author of the Pañcapadika, the use by Śri Sankare of the past indeclin- able participle in expressing the ideas 'superimposing' and 'making a synthesis' was not intended to imply past time or to. dcnote anything apart from woridly experience itself (M.Y.132). The Pancepadika claims that when Śri Sankara zays 'Superimpos- ing ... there is this natural worldly experience' this simply states the nature of worldly experience. Meanwhile in the concluding summary of the introduction to his Brahma Sūtra Commentary Śri Śankara uses the phrase 'this natural, begin- ningless and endless superimposition'. Here the author of the Pañcapādikā thinks that, because Śri Sankars only put this in the concluding summary, he must thereforc be identifying worldly experience with superimposition. The author of the Pañcapādikā analysed the phrase 'worldly experience' that occurs in the commentary as follows.

(1) In the phrase 'loka-vyavahara', the term 'loka' refers to those living beings who have the conviction 'I am a human being'. 'Vyavahara' means 'empirical experience'. The phrase means 'experience of being human', the feeling 'I am a human being'. (P.P. p.24 f./4)

And he explained the words in the commentary 'making a syn- thesis of the real with the false' as follows:

(2) The real is pure Consciousness as not-this (i.e. free from any element of objectivity). The false is the 'thou- element', (the object element in our experience). It is false because it is superimposed (in contrast to pure Consciousness, which is not itself superimposed, but onto which the idea of relationship is superimposed). (P.P. p.25/4)

My own view is that if one examines the Brahma Sutra Commentary as a whole, the revered Commentator's teaching emerges as fol- lows. We have the passage: 'And yet, though these two prin- ciples are utterly distinct in nature, there is a failure to distinguish one from the other, and each, together with its attributes, is superimposed on and idontified with the other. And from that there results this natural worldly experience based, on wrong knowledge and involving a synthesis of the real with the false, which expresses itself as "I am this" and "This is mine"'(M.V.22,4). This passage asserts that Self and not-self, together with their attributes, pure Consciousness

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and the non-conscious, are in reality of contradictory nature, like darkness amd light, and are eternally separate. But the people of the world, with their natural thoughtlessness, fail to discriminate them one from the other. People who fail to discriminate them then go on to superimpose them each onto the other, together with their attributes, making a synthesis of the real with the false. He who does that then has the experi- ence 'I am this, this is mine'. From Śri Sankara's other commentaries we learn that the criterion for reality is unfail- ing existence and presence, the criterion for unreality, failure to exist and be present.

(3) When a thing is determined as being of a particular rorm and that form never fails, that is its real form. When a thing is determined as being of a particular form and that form fails, it is said to be an unreal form. Thus a modifica- tion is something false. (Taitt.Bh.II.1)

(4) That the notion of which never changes, is existent. That the notion of which is transient, is non-existent. The dis tinction between the existent and the non-existent depends on our notions. Everywhere we find two notions arise with refer- ence to one substratum. We are not speaking of (specification through an additional qualifying notion, as in the case of) ideas like 'the lotus is blue'. We are speaking of (the suc- cession of impressions having the form) 'The pot is existent', 'The cloth is existent', 'The elephant is existent' and so on. In these pairs of notions, the notions of 'pot', 'cloth' and 'elephant' are transient, as has already been pointed out. But the notion of 'existent' is not. (Bh.G.Bh.II.16)

Here, the notion of unfailing presence is equivalent to the notion of reality; the notion of failure to be invariably present is equivalent to the notion of unreality. The term 'notion' (buddhi) is here used to mean 'the notion universally present to everyone that such and such is so'.

On this basis, the Self is real, as the notion that reveals it to us never fails. The not-self is unreal, as the notion that reveals it is invariably superseded by another. Self and not- self are therefore of contradictory nature, and separate and distinct from one another. The Brahma Sutra Commentary, there- fore, points out that their separateness is caused by their being of contradictory nature as subject and object. But it is not clear why the Pañcāpādika makes the claim 'The false is the realm of the objective. It is false because it is super- imposed'. (M.V.140,2) Moreover, the claim that if a thing is superimposed it is false appears to suffer from circularity of argument. For establishment of falsity would depend on the prior establish- ment of the fact that the thing itself had been superimposed.

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But establishment of superimposition, which is based on a syn- thesis of the real with the false, would itself depend on the prior establishment of falsity. Nor does the expounder of the orthodox Advaita doctrine expose himself to criticism if he eays thet the Self is superimposed as well as the not-self. It is true thet the superimposed is unreal in the form in which it is superimposed. But it does not necessarily follow from this that it is unreal in its own original form. in worldly experience, just because silver is sometimes superimposed onto shell (mother of pearl) when the two happen to be lying close together, it does not follow that the silver is unreal in its own fcrm independent of the shell. In the same way, though the Self may be unreal in the form in which it is superimposed on the ego-sense, its reality remains unchallengeable in its own true independent form as changeless Consciousness. And so at the conclusion of his introduction to the Brahma Sūtra Com- mentary the revered Commentator has no hesitation in saying:

(5) Thus one first superimposes the ego-notion onto the inmost Self, the Witness of all. And then, having done that, one proceeds contrariwise and superimposes that inmcst Self, ihe Witness of all, onto the inner organ (mind) and other elements of the finite personality. (B.S.Bh.I.i.l, intro.)

Here the notion of being the ego-sense is superimposed onto the Self, the Witness of all, And the notion of being the Witress of all is superimposed onto the ego-sense. But this does not mean that the ego-sense really becomes the Witness of all or attains reality. Nor does it mean that the Self becomes the 9go-sense or becomes unreal, though it may appear to do so. For the commentary itself goes on to say, 'And all this being so, that onto which a superimposition is made is not in the slight- est connected with the qualities or defects of the superimposed appearance' (B.S.Bh.I.i.1, intro.). The Pañcapadika, we saw, makes another claim, namely that worldly experience (loka-vyavahāra), interpreted as the convic- tion that one is a human beiug, is the same as superimposition, quoting in support of the claim the fact that the concluding summary speaks only of 'natural superimposition' (without any qualification to show that 'natural superimposition' should be understood differently from the earlier expression 'natural worldly experience'). My own view, here too, disagrees with the Pamcapadika. It is that the meaning of the word 'super- imposition' is the same at the beginning, middle and end of the introduction to the Commentary (and is not 'worldly experience' but 'the cause of worldly experience'). At the beginning, the Commentary stakes out the initial, claim, 'From that superimpo- sition there results this natural worldly experience "I am this" and "This is mine"'. In the middle, there is the check- ing of the premises. 'All commerce between the means of valid knowledge (perception, inference, etc.) and their objects,

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whether in the Vedic or secular sphere, proceeds on the basis of this same mutual superimposition of the Self and not-self called Ignorance, as does all Vedic tradition, whether con- cerned with injunctions and prohibitions or with liberation'. finally, in the concluding summary he speaks of 'natural super- imposition, of the nature of false supposition, directly familiar to everybody, which promotes the idea that one is capable of artion and experience'. It is true that we do not here actually find the word 'experience'. But the idea is implicit, in that he says that superimposition is what promotes the idea that one is capable of action and 'enjoyment'. There are over a hundred texts in the Brahma Sütra Commen- tary which sneak cf superimposition, conceived as erroneous cognition and identified with Ignorance, as the cause of all empirical experience. Here there is space only to quote a few.

(6) And also because perception and the other means of knowl- edge operate in cattle and other animals, too, who lack dis- crimination. (B.S.Bh.I.i.1, intro.)

That is, their experience depends on superimposition which, in its turn, has lack of (metaphysical) discrimination (between the Self and the not-self) for its pre-condition.

(7) All practical experience of the Absolute as an object of meditation, or as the one performing meditation, takes place in the state of Ignorance. (B.S.Bh.I.i.12 = M.V.26,6;49,5)

(8) And in this sense the Veda says, 'For where there is an appearance of duality, there (a subject who is) one sees (an object which is) another' and so on (Brhad. IV.v.15). It shows that experience of being able to perform action and so on belongs to the realm of Ignorance, just like the experience of elephants and so on in dreams. And then afterwards it points out how he who has achieved metaphysical discrimination of the Self from the not-self does not have the experience that he is able to perform action and so on, in the words 'But when all has become his own Self, then what could a person see and with what?' (B.S.Bh.I.ii.12)

(9) This idea that the individual soul and the Inner Ruler are different is a result of the apparent conditioning adjuncts of bodies and organs set up by Ignorance .... Once this is understood, the Vedic texts speaking of distinctions such as subject and object, means of empirical knowledge such as per- ception, etc., transmigratory experience of the world, and the Vedic texts conveying injunctions and prohibitions all become intelligible (even when non-duality is accepted as the final truth). And the Veda itself confirms this. For it shows that all empirical experience belongs to the realm of Ignorance in such texts as, 'For where there is an appearance of duality,

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there (a subject who is) one sees (an object which is) another' (Brhad. IV.v.15). But this text goes on to deny any empirical experience in the realm of enlightenment in the words, 'But where evcrything has become the Self, what could one see and with what?' (B.S.Bh.I.ii.20, cp. M.V.27,4;49,6;170,16, note)

(10) The continuous empirical experience of the individual soul proceeds solely through its being afflicted with Igno- rance. (B.S.Bh.I.iv.3, M.V.27,2)

(11) And so when the identity of one's true Self with the Absolute has been apprehended through the Veda it contradicts and cancels the previous natural conviction of one's identity with the body, as the ideas of the rope and the like contra- dict and cancel the (illusory) notions of the snake and the like. But when the notion of one's identity with the body has been contradicted and cancelled, all empirical experience based on it stands contradicted and cancelled too, so that there is no longer any need to assume a lower aspect of the Absoluie, characterized by plurality and variety, in order to explain it. (B.S.Bh.II.i.14, M. V.77,7)

Natural empirical experience - i.e. that set up by natural superimposition. This is because superimposition causes one to identify oneself with the body and so on, thinking of it as 'I' and 'mine'.

(12) Nor can it be said that this immediate intuition is either uselcss or erroneous. For it is seen to bring metaphy- sical Ignorance to an end, and there is no other knowledge that. could cancel this intuition. But before this immediate intuition of the unity and sole existence of the Self, all practical experience of the true and the false holds, both within the Vedic and the secular spheres. (B.S.Bh.II.i.14, cp. M.V.161,1, note)

(13) Hence the 'lordship' of the Lord, as well as his omni- science and omnipotence exist in relation to external condi- tions which are of the nature of Ignorance. From the stand- point of ultimate truth, there can be no talk of any opposition between a Lord and his subjects, or of omniscience, etc. (B.S. Bh.II.i.14, cp. M.V.45,2)

(14) Moreover, when one becomes awake to the non-difference of the soul and the Absolute through such texts teaching their non-difference as 'That thou art', this puts an end to the notion that the individual soul is suffering transmigration, and also to the notion that the Absolute is a world-creator. For all empirical notions of distinction, which are introduced by wrong knowledge, are cancelled and eradicated by right knowledge. (B.S.Bh.II.i.22, cp. M.V.45,5)

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(15) Yet the texts teaching that there was a creation are not immediately concerned with proclaiming the ultimate truth. For their subject-matter falls within the realm of practical experience consisting of name and form imagined through Igno- rance. (B.S.Bh.II.i.33, cp. M.V.261,10)

(16) All experience, whether secular or based on Vedic teach- ing, comes to an end in the case of the man cf steady wisdcw, in whom metaphysical discrimination has arisen. For his Igno- rance has come to an end, and that experience was based on Ignorance. (Bh.G.Bh.II.69, cp. M.V.30,10)

In this way, Self and not-self are respectively real and false, since the idea of the Self is unfailingly present, the idea of the not-self not so. And the synthesizing of the real and the false is natural error. It is Ignorance in the form of super- imposition, consisting in the idea that Self and not-self are identical and have the same attributes. Worldly experience, on the other hand, is something that is itself set up by Igno- rance. It is the ides of all means of empirical knowledge and all objects of empirical knowledge in all their forms. It includes the notion that one is able to act and have experi- ences, which depend on it, along with all kinds of speech usage, which likewise depend on it, and all engagement in action and all desistance from action, which also depend on it. This is what we see to be the teaching of Śri Sankara's Com- mentary. In the Pañcapadika, however, 'superimposition', 'synthesizing of the real and the unreal' and 'empirical experience' are all taken as synomymous terms. And the term 'worldly exnerience' is demoted from its natural application to all mental activity whatever and confined to the mere single idea 'I am a human being'. That his system departs from that of Śri Śankara on this point is clear.

141 THE EGO-SUPERIMPOSITION

The Commentary of Śri Sankara says, 'This natural worldly experience, "I am this, this is mine ... "'. Here we extract a few texts to show how the Pañcapadika interprets the ego- superimposition.

(1) Śri Śankara sets forth the nature of superimposition as 'I am this, this is mine'. The ego is the first superimposi- tion. Perhaps you will think that 'I' manifests as partless pure Consciousness, so that there is no other part, whether superimposed or not. Well, we will show later how there is another part that is superimposed. (P.P. p.31/5)

(2) When the ego-sense itself is of the nature of

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superimposition, its accessories, too, must be of the nature of superimposition. The royal panoply of a king anointed only in the realm of dream or conjured forth by the mass hyp- notist is not itself a reality. In the same way, worldly experience, consisting of action, its factors and results and beginning with the ego-sense as its first and foremost feature, is superimposed on the Self, which is eternal, constant, pure, conscious and liberated by nature. (P.P. p.32/5)

This statement that the ego-sense is superimposed on the Self is in harmony with the words of the Commentary, 'Thus one first superimposes the ego-notion onte the inmost Self, the Witness of all one's activities'. That is evident to everyone.

(3) It is true that this ego-sense refers to the experiencing subject, distinct from the body and so on. Nevertheless, because it does not have an exact knowledge of the subject in its true nature, it superimposes the attributes of the latter onio the not-self. We find that a thing may be manifest in its true nature, and yet may appear confused with another thing because its difference from the latter is not clearly apprehended. For example, the vowel 'a' (in the theory of the Mimamsakas) is one; but it appears confused with other notions such as 'short' and 'long' .* (P.P. p.77/15)

*(The Mimamsakas held that vowels were eternal changeless sounds, and that in ordinary speech we utter and hear them in truncated and confused form, superimposing on them shorter or longer duration, high and low pitch, etc. T.N. )

(4) Yes. It is an illusion, since it is the work of Igno- rance. The ego-sense is grounded in its true object (the pure Self) alone. But beginningless Ignorance is found to obscure that sole foundation and create the notion that the ego-sense is grounded in the body and organs. And so (if we take account of Ignorance) there is no contradiction if the ego-sense is founded on its true object (the pure Self), but also takes the body and organs for its object. Therefore, if a discriminative enquiry is also made into the true nature of its object, and this (merely logical) enquiry reveals that nature as it really is, the result is only to get an abstract understanding about where the ground of the ego-sense lies, not to discover any- thing new in immediate intuition. But, as we have said, the fact of the ego-sense being grounded in the pure Self does not prevent it from identifying itself (through Ignorance) with the body and organs with a sense of 'I' and 'mine'. Therefore there is no change in the ego-sense even after the true nature of the object of the ego-sense has been established by reflec- tive analysis. And so the feeling 'I am a man' is never a

p.79 f./16) mere metaphorical idea (as claimed by the Mimāmsakas). * (P.P.

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*(The Mimamsaka ritualists held that the world was real. One school of them said that a person could have knowledge of his eternal scul as separate from his body and yei continue to act in the real world with his body and organs. Indeed, without a conviction that he was an eternal soul no one would perform ritual for the sake of advantages in lives to come. Such a person would speak as if he were the transient body and organs for practical convenience in life, while being clear that in reality he was the eternal soul. The P.P. argues that the mere ubstract knowledge that the true 'I' is eternal is not enough to abolish the universal metaphysical Ignorance that causes the 'I' to be identified with the body and mind. Cp. M.V.141,6. T.N. )

The answer to the question whether this does or does not agree with Śri Śaakara's Commentary depcada on how the passage is interpreted. We start from the propositiou, 'The true object of the ego-sense is other than the body and organg'. We may then say that the notion that the ego-sense is grounded in the body, etc., when it is really grounded in something other than them, is the resuit of beginningless Ignorance. People in the world have ego-feeling both for the pure Self and for the body and organs through mutual superimposition. If that is all that is meant, it agrees with the Commentary. But an obstinate insistence on the view 'The ego-sense is sound only when it bears on the experiencing subject' would not appear to be en- dorsed by the Commentary. For consider the following texts of Śrī Śankara.

(5) This notion that one acts and is an experiencer is a mere piece of imagination arising from the failure to distinguish between the mind and the Self. In truth, action and empirical experience cannot belong to either. (B.S.Bh.I.ii.12)

(6) But can we not say (the Mimamsaka of Prabhakara's school suggests) that the identification of the soul with the body and organs is not false and erroneous, but is a mere figure of speech, since they are known to be different? No. For figura- tive use of words is only possible when both the figurative meaning and the literal meaning of the words in question are patent and familiar to all. For instance, regular concomitance shows that it is a cer- tain figure with characteristic features like a large mane which forms the literal meaning of the word and the idea 'lion'. And if we have acquaintance with a man in whom leonine quali- ties such as ferocity and heroism predominate, he is neverthe- less well known to be quite different and distinct from a lion. Now, it will only be a person to whom the two beings are known to be different and distinct who can apply the word or the idea 'lion' to the man in a figurative sense. Such figurative usage cannot be applied to anyone to whom the distinction between the

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two beings is not clear. If the latter person applies the name or notion of une of the two beings to the other it will be a case of erroneous judgment and not of deliberate figurative usage. Il will be like the application of the name and notion 'man' to a tree-stump not clearly recognized as such in the twilight, or like the application of the name and notion of silver to a piece of shell unwittingly mistaken for silver. How, then, can onc say that the word and notion 'I', when applird to the complex of the individual soul and its bodies and organs, are a case of figurative usage, when they arise from failure to distinguish the Self from the hot-self? Pro- found scholars who know the distinction between Self and not- self in theory, apply the name and notion of 'I' to the body through confusion, just like shepherds and goatherds. Hence those who maintain that an eternal soul exists as something quite separate from the body and its organs apply the notion of 'T' to the body and organs not figuratively but erroneously. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4, cp. M.V.47,2)

(7) It is true that the body and the Self are both already familiar. But they are not familiar to everyone as objects of distinct ideas, like tree-stump and man. In what way, then, are they familiar? Always as objects of inextricably mixed ideas. For no one has the apprehension 'This is the body' and 'This is the Self', where the two cognitions are separate ideas. Thus people are confused about the Self and the not- self, and say 'The Self is such and such, - no, it is such and such else'. It was this particular point I had in mind (said the Teacher) when I said, 'You cannot limit (the range of superimposition) thus (to superimposition of the familiar onto the familiar only). (U.S. (prose) section 54)

After considering the significance of these passages and analysing the subject carefully, one would have to conclude that the contention of the Pañcapādika - that the individual experiencer is the true object of the ego-sense while the body, organs and mind are the apparent object - is not in harmony with ŚrI Sankara's Commentary. For Śri Śankara said, in commenting on Brahma Sūtra I.i.1 (trans. Gambhirānanda p.33), that the individual experiencer was the Self as per- ceived (i.e. misperceived) through Ignorance, conjoined with body, organs and mind. And he claimed that this agreed with the Vedic text, 'The wise say that the individual experiencer is (not the Self in its true nature but) the Self apparently associated with such adjuncts as body, organs and mind' (Katha I.111.4). But the statement in the Pañcapadika also has the force of declaring that some people merely have faith that a soul be- yond the body and organs exists and believe that the ego-sense has that for its true object, and that in the case of such people the ego-sense continues to identify itself with the

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body and organs as before, and this without any question of figurative usage. To this extent, the statement is in harmony with the teachings of Śri Sankara. The Pañcapādika explains how its own definition fits in with the superimposition of the ego-sense as follows.

(8) Self-luminous as the soul is, its difference from the aggregate of its bodies and organs does not manifest as such. From this results the superimposition 'I am a human being'. And as a result of the experience of this superimposition the soul fails to manifest in its true nature, as identical with the Self and the Absolute, the ultimate cause of this being that beginningless Ignorance which conceals the light of Consciousness; the existence of this Ignorance is revealed by the texts of the Upanishads when their proper implications are understood, and it is that which explains the superimposition of the ego-sense. And because it is beginningless it has the characteristics attributedto it by the revered Commentator of 'having been previously seen' and of being 'of the nature of a memory'. Further, there is no distinct awareness of the experiencing subject in its true form, while there is direct awareness of the true experiencer (the Self) as intermingled with the not- self. Thus there is a mutual identification implying the false appearance of one thing as another. Hence the definition of superimposition given by the revered Commentator ('the false appearance at one place of what was previously seen at another place' ) covers the superimposition of the ego-sense onto the Self. (P.P. p.80-2/16)

Here the statement that the ego-sense is not, from the stand- point of the final truth, an attribute of the Self is in con- formity with the teaching of the Commentary, as also is the argument adduced, namely that it belongs to the realm of the knowable, like the conviction that one is an individual human being. And that argument also certainly proves that the ego- sense is superimposed through Ignorance. In this connection we may quote the following passages from Śri Śankara's commen- taries.

(9) And it is the same if he superimposes the characteristics of his body, and thinks 'I am stout', 'I am lean', 'I am fair of skin', 'I am standing still', 'I am walking', 'I am leap- ing'. And it is the same if he superimposes the characteris- tics of the senses .... Thus one first superimposes the ego-

intro.) sense onto the inmost Self, the Witness .... (B.S.Bh.I.i.1,

(10) We infer that (pleasure, pain and delusion - sattva, rajas and tamas - ... ) do not belong (to the Witness). For they are superimposed through Ignorance, like decrepitude, and

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can be rejected or accepted, This being so, transmigratory life, which is equivalent to the notion that one is an indivi- dual capable of acting and undergoing experience, belongs to the realm of the knowable and is superimposed on the knower (Witness) through Ignorance. Therefore it does not affect or harm the Witness in any way. (Bh.G.Bh.XIII.2)

As for the remark (M.v.141.8) 'The soul fails to manifest in its true nature as identical with the Self and the Absolute, the ultimate cause of this being that begiuningless Ignorance which conceals the light of Ccasciousness; the existence of this Ignorance is revealed by the texts of the Upanishads when their proper implications are understccd ... ' - it falls under the criticis= =ade above at M.V.133, so there is ncthing further to be said about it here.

142 THE SELF AS THE OBJECT OF THE NOTION 'I'

In the introduction to hie Brahma Sūtra Commentary, Śri Śankara raises the question: 'But how can there be a superimposition of the object and its attributes onto the inmost Self, which is not an object? For a person normally superimposes one object onto another object standing in front of him, whereas you say that the inmost Self does not pertain to the sphere of the not- self and is not an object'. And the reply is made, 'It is not altogether a non-object. For it is the object of the ego- notion'. This is explained in the Pacapādika sub-commentary as follows.

(1) The ego-sense is regarded as the notion 'I'. It includes a 'this' element and a 'not-this' element. (P.P. p.85 f./17)

(2) Though Consciousness is homogeneous and not a 'this', and therefore not an object, yet, because it becomes capable of entering into empirical experience through the ego-sense, it can be spoken of figuratively as 'the object of the idea "I"'. For what is capable of entering into empirical experience is invariably an object of knowledge. But do we not here have circularity of argument? Superimpo- sition depends upon availability for empirical experience. But availability for empirical experience depends upon an ego-sense (to have the experience), which in turn depends upon superimpo- sition. Not so - there is no defect of circularity, because superimposition is beginningJess. (P.P. p.113 f./24)

Here, too, the teaching is that a latent impression is the cause of error, since it has been earlier explained that the ego-sense and its latent impression precede and follow one another as cause and effect, in a beginningless cycle like

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seed and sprout. (See P.P. p. 112/23.)

(3) The complex that forms the ego-sense is called 'I', and it is also a notion. For, being intermingled with pure Con- sciousncss, the 'not-this', it is the cause of its manifesta- tion, as a mirror is the cause of the manifestution of a mirror-image. As Consciousness therefore seems to be its ob- ject, it is spoken of figuratively as if it was its object, and is called the cbject of the ego-sense. (P.P. p.133 f./29)

Here Śri Śankara's Brahma Sutra Commentary raises the question 'How can there be superimposition of an object and its attri- butes onto something (the Self) which is not an object?' And it gives the reply, 'It is not altogether a non-objcct, because it is the object of the ego-notion'. It is clear that it has been accepted that the Self stands as an object and that an explamation for this fact must be found. But the Pancapadika claims that the ego-notion is only the appearance cf an ego- motion, and that the ego-sense is therefore only figuratively called a notion, because it is the medium through which the Self manifests. Its being an object is also figurative. And being capable of entering into empirical experience is said to be equivalent to having a hypothetical kind of existence. From every point of view, there is the refusal to admit that the Self can be the object of the ego-notion, if the word 'object' be accepted in its primary sense. How this would serve to answer the question raised by the objector is not clear. (The question was: 'How can there be superimposition ... onto the inmost Self, which is not an object?' - to which Śri Śankara gave the simple reply, based on universal experience, 'It is not altogether a non-object, for it is the object of the ego- notion'.) Further, an earlier objection was raised by the opponent envisaged in Śri Śankara's Commentary. The opponent was made to claim that, since subject and object are of contradictory nature, they cannot either be of the nature of the other, so that it is impossible that they should be superimposed. And yet we all have worldly experience based on just this same natural superimposition. The expounder of the finally accepted view answers the objection by appealing to universal experience, on the principle 'Nothing that is perceived can be impossible'. Śri Śankara does not refute the objector (in the manner of the Pañcapādika) by saying that the ego-notion has no object. In- stead, he argues as follows. Superimposition is 'the notion of one thing mistakenly applied to another thing'. It is well known that this normally means the superimposition of one object onto another. But the inmost Self is not an object, as it does not fall into the category of the not-self. And so an objector is again set up asking 'How, then, can there be superimposition in the case of the inmost Self?' And then the answer is given, 'This inmost

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Self is not altogether a non-object', How could the opponent possibly be silenced by appeal, in thc manner of the Pañca- pādikā, to a hypothetical ego-notion having a hypothetical object? An enemy who puts together a great army of well-armed warriors cannot be put to flight by soldiers bearing mere pictures of arms. When the Pancapadika accepts the doctrine that the 'being an object' of the Self consists in becoming accessible to prac- tical experience through an ego-notion that is merely figura- tive, it exposes itself to another charge. In the case of the ego-sense, superimposition depends on availability for empiri- cal experience. But availability for cmpirical experience depends on superimposition (M.V. 142, 2). The reply given that there is no circularity of argument because we have a begin- ningless cycle like that of seed and sprout is not correct. For if accessibility to empirical experience and superimposi- tion fcllowed one ancther in time, like secd and sprout, this wouid result in the absurd consequence that time was not itself superimposed. It follows that the Pañcapadika has not here given a correct interpretation of the Commentary. It is a fact (of universal experience) that the Self is the object of the ego-notion and also that there is superimposition. So there is no contradic- tion, since the opponent, too, agrees that there can be super- imposition of objects on objects. But objectivity of this kind derives from superimposition. Nor does this result either in circularity of argument or in superimposition occurring in time (considered as a real entity, itself not superimposed). From the standpoint of superimposition, the Self appears as object of the ego-notion and as the substratum on which the attributes of the latter are superimposeu at the same time, even as a dream-cow and its calf are perceived at the same time. From the standpoint of the highest truth, nothing but the supreme non-dual Self exists. And this, as it seems to us, is the simple and correct way of explaining the Commentary.

143 THE EGO-NOTION

What is the nature of the experience 'I'? The Pañcapādika mentions two alternative views in the guise of objections, first the view of the followers of Prabhakara, then the view of the followers of Kumarila Bhatta.

(1) The object of an act of cognition is known directly, because it is the object of the act. The knower and the knowl- edge are immediately evident, too, but they are not known as objects. Knowledge is immediate experience (anubhava). It is self-luminous, and is the resultant-cognition that arises from the application of the means of knowledge. The subject and the object manifest through the power of this immediate

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experience. On the other hand we are never directly aware of the means of knowledge (the perception, inference, etc. by which knowledge is gained). It is a function carried out by the knowing subject, but it always has to be iuferred from its ond-product, the resultant-cognition. In the case of 'I know this', knowledge is the function of the knower, but it bears on the object, not on the self of the knower. The self of the knower is known indirectly as 'I' in knowing the resultant- cognition and the object; it is only known mediately through experience of objects. (P.P. pp.87-9/17, expounding the Prābhākara view)

(2) It is not so. The ego-notion is not mediated through the knowledge of the object. It is a separate cognition of the form 'I' bearing on the self alone as its object. The self is an object of knowledge because it is a substance, and yet it is also the subject because it is the knower. Because the ego- sense illumines both the subject and the object in the case of the act of self-knowledge, we know that the self is both a subject and an object. Thus it has a 'this' aspect (aspect as object) and a 'not-this' aspect. For its object-aspect has the form 'this', and its subject-aspect has the form 'not-this'. (P.P. p.89/17-8, expounding the Bhatta view)

This doctrine of the Bhattas (followers of Kumarila Bhatta) is refuted by the Prabhakaras (school of Prabhakara) as follows. It is wrong, they say, because the soul does not have parts (aspects). And the soul is not subject to change. The object has the form of a 'this' because it is external, not being the soul. The self-luminous immediate experience that constitutes the resultant-cognition in knowledge of, say, blue, illumines the objects as a 'this' and the knowing subject as a 'not-this! while it enables one to infer that perception must have been at work.

After refuting both these views, the author of the Pañcapādika sets forth his own view as follows.

(3) Thus the Self, of the nature of pure Consciousness, can be called 'immediate experience' (anubhava) when it has the apparent limiting adjunct of this or that known object (in the course of the knowing process). It is called 'the Self' or by other names when no reference to apparent conditioning adjuncts is intended, as the trees of a forest are referred to as trees when one is not concerned with the fact that they stand packed together to form a forest. This is the view you will have to accept in the end. (P.P. p.93/19)

(4) Thus the ego-sense is not just another idea bearing on an object, differing only from the idea of blue and so on in that it happens to bear on the Self instead of on blue. Nor is the ego-notion a mere by-product of the experience of objects ....

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This beginningless Ignorance, ... which remains in dreamless sleep as the mere latent impression of its power of projection, concealing the light of Consciousness, ... is taught in various ways in the Vedas, Smrtis, Epics and Puranas .... It assumes, under the control of the supreme Lord, a certain form in which it has the two cosmic powers of knowledge and activity. In this form, it is the sole source of the power to act, or experience as an individual. Its light derives from its being united with the eternal changeless Consciousness. As such it stands as the self-luminous, immediately evident ego-sense. It is because of its union with this ego-sense that the eternal changeless Consciousness, the 'not-this' element in the ego- sense, the universal Self, becomes erroneously known as the experiencer. .. This form assumed by the power of Ignorance is scparated intellectually by the exponents of the upanishadic tradition from the Self, which forms the 'not-this'. So separated, it is labelled inner sense, mind, intellect and ego with respect to the individual forms assumed by its power of knowledge. In its power as physical energy it is called the vital energy (prana). Thus the notion that the Self is the ego-sense is false, and is caused by the colouring of Consciousness that the inner sense receives from the Self, which is false like the red colour apparently assumed by a crystal from an adjunct in the form of a red object lying next to it. (P.P. pp.97-100/20)

We have already said that the doctrine taught here and fre- quently elsewhere in the Pañcapādikā (M.V. 134, 1; 139, 4; 142, 2) that the ego-sense is a transformation of the power of Igno- rance supported by pure Consciousness as pure Being is nowhere found in Śri Śankara's Commentary. The question asked in the present extract is, 'How does the experience "I" arise?' Is it the Self that is the object of the ego-notion, being itself both subject and object of such a cognition? Or is it that the notion 'I' is just a by-product of experience of objects? Or is there some other cause alto- gether for the ego-notion? - if these questions are under discussion, then a mere unsupported claim that the ego-sense is a particular transformation of the power of Ignorance is clearly not going to stand as the final answer to the enquiry. The Commentary manifestly says that the ego-notion is a notion that indeed arises, but it does not explain how or why it arises. It does not say, in the manner of the Pañcapādikā, that the ego-sense is called the ego-notion in a figurative sense. All that Śri Śankara says is the following. The notion 'I am the one who acts' is imagined through Ignorance, as is the notion that the individual soul acts and undergoes experiences. However, there exists, over and above the individual soul imagined as acting and experiencing, a Witness onto which this acting and experiencing are superimposed through Ignorance. On

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this topic one should observe the following passages from Śrī Śankara's works.

(5) The Buddhist Nihilists deny that anything exists over and above the body even though they have the ego-notion .... The Mimamsakas and Logicians, howevcr, when they come to know of their own Self, do so through Vedic tradition and through signs for inference pointed out by the Veda. But although they are in fact following the Veda, they suppose that the signs, such as the ego-noticn, that are actually pointed out by the Veda, come from the teachings of their own school, and say, 'The soul is both immediately evident and subject to inference'. (Brhad.Bh.I.i.l, intro. )

This affirms that an ego-notion is something that comes into being.

(6) For it is only the Self perceived through Ignorance as united with the body and organs that is purified through ritualistic acts .... It is only through that ego-sense, the 'knower' who is yet the object of the ego-notion, that all acts are carried out, and it is the ego-sense that experiences their results. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

Here it is affirmed that the one who acts and who experiences, the individual soul, is the object of the ego-notion.

(7) Nor can the Self of all, present in all beings, one, everywhere the same, eternally raised above all change, the Spirit, be known by anyone as an object, either through the texts of the ritualistic section of the Veda or in the context of logical enquiry, except as object of the ego-notion, of which it is in fact the Witness. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

Here, too, it is accepted that it is the Self in the illusory form in which it appears to be capable of action that is the object of the ego-notion, and it is implied that its Witness is not an object at all.

(8) When the ego-notion, the seed of action, present in the inner organ (mind), has been burnt up by the conviction 'I am not the ego', how can further action spring up (from such a burnt seed)? (U.S.(verse) IV.1)

Here, too, the ego-notion is said to be the seed of action. And action belongs to the one who has the ego-notion, the Self in the illusory form in which it appears capable of action. If the seed of action is burnt by the fire of the knowledge 'I am not capable of action' the sprout of action will not appear - that is the meaning of the verse.

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The following verses were written by Suresvara in his Naiş- karmya Siddhi.

(9) Just as there is no manifestation of the 'I' without a modification of the mind directed to the external, so there is no clear manifestation of Ignorance unless the mind is itself manifest. (N.Sid. III.58)

There is no manifestation of the 'I', cven though it is pres- ent, unless there is a mental idea focussed on the external realm. And, in the same way, in the case of those who have not heard the upanishadic texts, Ignorance is not manifest to them in dreamless sleep, even though it is present. Whu is that so? Because Ignorance can only manifest in the form 'I do not know', and this can only occur when the mind is operating.

(10) Just as fire and wood are burner and burnt respectively, though appearing as one blazing indistinguishable mass, even so the 'I' and the knower of the 'I', though indistinguishable in empirical experience, are respectively known and knower. (N.Sid. III.59)

Here we find an answer to the objection, 'There is no subject- object distinction in the Self, the object of the ego-notion, as there is no clear experience of there being one'. The fire as burner and the wood as the fuel being burnt, though dif- ferent, do not appear different in the blazing log. In the same way, the Self as knower and the ego-sense both appear through superimposition without distinction as the Self of the experiencer in the form of 'I'. In reflection on dreamless sleep and other such states, however, one can see that the two are in fact different.

(11) The Witness knows objects as 'this', the 'I' (ego) knows them as 'mine'. The notion 'this' arises through the illusory limiting adjunct of Ignorance. 'Mine' is thus a modification of the 'I'. (N.Sid. III.60)

This is an answer to the objection, 'If the ego, too, belongs to the side of the object, why does not it manifest as "mine"?' The knower has the knowledge 'this' through the sole adjunct of Ignorance. The Self in its unregenerate form as still unknown superimposes onto itself the power to have knowledge as an individual subject, and perceives all else as an object and a 'this'. The notion 'mine' does not arise from the Self as associated with the adjunct of Ignorance. The notion imine' arises when the Self is associated with the adjunct of Igno- rance and also of 'I'. The notion 'mine' can only arise through the operation of the ego-notion. This is made clear in Suresvara's introductory prose commentary to the verse III.60.

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(12) Because nothing else can make any contribution to the Witness, the 'I' is not adopted by it with the feeling 'mine'. On the contrary, it is a 'this', just like a pot or any other object, because its basis is just Ignorance. (N.Sid. III.61)

External objects like pots and so forth are either helpful or harmful. But this is not the case with the ego-sense, so the Witness does not adopt it with the fecling 'mine'. As the only adjunct of the Witness here is Ignorance, the ego-sense is "nown to the Witness as a 'this'.

(13) In itself, the Self is free from Ignorance and modifica- tion, and feels neither 'this' nor 'mine'. For it is only the one who has woken up from sleep (i.e. the empirical knower) who experiences Ignorance and feels 'I did not know (anything then). (N.Sid. III.62)

It nas already been shown earlier that when both Ignorance and a modification in the form of 'I' are present, then the idea regularly comec 'This is mine'. In addition to this positive rule, the purpose of the present verse is to indicate the corresponding negative rule that when neither of them ure present then neither the idea 'this' nor the idea 'mine' arises. In dreamless sleep there is no Ignorance and no ego-notion. So no knowledge of 'this' or of 'mine' arises. The. subsequent reflection 'I knew nothing' occurs to one who has woken up. Otherwise the subsequent reflection would have revealed knowl- edge of objects and sense of possession.

As can be seen from these quotations from the Naişkarmya Siddhi, the system of Suresvara and his Vartikas is diiferent from that of the Pafcapadika. In the system of Suresvara, the ego- notion only manifests when summoned to do so by a mental idea representing an external object. Here, as in the commentaries of Śri Śankara, the ego-superimposition is traced to the non- discrimination of the mind, and is confined to the waking state. For Suresvara claims that the mind is not present in dreamless sleep. Our own opinion in this mattar is as follows. According to Śri Śankara's Commentary, not a single instance of empirical experience occurs without superimposition of the ego-sense. He says, 'Without self-identification with the body and senses expressed in the feelings of "I" and "mine" there can be no empirical knower and so the processes of empirical knowledge cannot begin' (B.S.Bh.I.i.1, intro., cp. M.V. p.274). But the Self is not always throughout our ordinary experience the object of the ego-notion with the feeling 'I' present to con- sciousness, ncr are objects always objects of the notion 'mine'. The feeling of identity with the body, sense-organs and mind is natural (naisargika, uncaused, beginningless). But conscious- ness of the Self as object of the ego-notion is only occasional

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and temporary. From the standpoint of the highest truth, our Self is unborn, non-dual pure Censciousness by nature, eter- nally reised above all change. Dut from the worldly stand- point based on metaphysical Ignorance, it appears to be divided into knower, knowledge aad known, into actor, act, iustruments and results, into experiencer, experience and experienced. This is beginningless Ignorance. You cannot ask for a cause of it. For it is the very mature of Ignorancc that it should set up the appearance of the existence cf things that do not really exist, and should make the Self appear to be circum- scribed by thom. It creates feelings of approbation and dis- approbition towards the realm of i1lusory objects that it has itself projected, along with the imaginary idea that they are favourable or untavourable. It produces attachment and aver- sion in the Self, and the urge to act in accordance with these feelings. Ignorance, itself unmanifest, is the author of all this. Into empirical experience, which is by nature chaotic, it introduccs the appearance of order. It makes the Self into an inaividual capable of empirical knowledge, and it makes objects iato objects of the notion 'this' entertained by the mind of the Self in its capacity as individual experiencer. It confers on the Self the appearance of the power to act, and onto objects the appearance of coming within the range of that 'action' by the Self. It confers onto the Self the appearance of being an iadividual experiencer, and onto objects the capa- bility of being experienced. It confers the notion 'I' on the Self, and the notion of 'mine' onto the objects that fall with- in the Self's experience. This being so, the ego-notion bearing on the Self is not manifest when the mind is engrossed in objects, as it is then totally engrossed in them like the arrow-maker who did not notice the king passing by as he sat engrossed in his work (B.S.Bh. III, 1i.10). Nor is it present in that bewildered state wuere lust or anger or other passions overwhelm the mind and all other ideas are put to sleep. But when the people of the world are engaged in reflecting about themselves, then the ego-notion regularly appears, in such typical forms as 'I am stout', 'I have eyes', 'I have a will', 'I have certitude about such and such', 'I am successful' or 'I am happy'. So it followe that Ignorance in general is the superimposition of the ego-notion onto body, senses, mind, intellect and ego, but that the particular manifestations of the ego-notion in regard to the body and the rest are transient and temporary. The at- tribute of belonging to the realm of the ego-notion, mentioned in Śri Śankara's Commentary, applies equally to the beginning- less and to the temporary forms of the ego-notion. When the matter is understood in this way there is no confusion. Here we should examine what the Pañcapādika means in its doctrine of the mutual superimposition of the Witness and the ego-notion.

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(14) If there were only a superimposition of objective ele- ments onto the inmost Self, the inmost Self would not manifest. For the shell does not manifest when silver is superimposed on it, while Consciousness does manifest in the ego-sense and other component elements of the individual personality. And again, if there were only the superimposition of Consciousness onto the ego-sense and the rest, then the ego would not mani- fast, and neither wouid the world-aprearance, of which it is the chief factor. To avoid both these unacceptable conclu- sions, the rovered Commentator goes on to say, in accordance with experience, '(Thus one first superimposes the ego-notion onto the inmost Self, the Witness of all.) And then, having done that, one proceeds contrariwise and superimposes that inmost Self, the Witness of all, onto the inner organ (mind) and other factors of the finite personality'. (P.P. p.157 f./35-6)

This does not seem to us to be correct reasoning. There is no universal rule to say that, in all superimpositions, only the superimposed element manifests, and the substratum onto which it is superimposed does not manifest at all. For we see even in the case of the superimpcsition of silver that the 'this' element of the shell manifests in correlation with the silvor to yield 'This is silver'. Children superimpose onto their own face the idea that it is identical with the mirror image, and yet the face is manifest independently of the mirror image. And if there were a law that that on which anything was super- imposed did not itself manifest, then, if mutual superimposi- tion of Self and ego wore admitted, why would this not result in the non-manifestation of either? Thus there can be no objection against this assumption of mutual superimposition, since it accords with universal experi- ence. All the Pañcapadika ought to have done was to explain what that universal experience was. You de not need reasoning to support universal experience. The point made by the Pañca- pādikā about the non-manifestation of the substratum of a superimposition was not what Śri Sankara had in mind when he spoke of mutual superimposition. What did he have in mind then? He said elsewhere, 'Superimposition is the synthesis of the real with the false' (M.V.22,4) and also 'That onto which a superimposition is made is not connected even in the slightest with the qualities or defects of the superimposed appearance' (cp. M.V.140.5, note). These two points are brought out again when he says, 'Thus one first superimposes the ego-notion onto the inmost Self, the Witness of all .. And then, having done that, one proceeds contrariwise and superimposes that inmost Self, the Witness of all, onto the inner organ (mind) and other factors of the individual personality'. The superimposi- tion onto the Witness of the power to act and undergo changes of state associated with the ego, and the superimposition of

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the interiority and consciousness that belong properly to the Witness cnto the ego, mind, body and sense-organs of the indi- vidual soul are both false. It is made clear that such superimpositions do not really introduce the defect of change- ability into the Witness. Nor do they really introduce con- sciousness as an attribute of the ego and other factors into the individual personality. On this topic, we find it said elsewhere:

(15) If you say that it is wrong to speak of two notions arising with refcrence to one substratum (as at M.V.140,4), since the substance to which existence is attributed, namely, 'pot', elc., is non-existent in each case, we reply 'No'. For we find two notions arising with refercnce to one substratum when we refer to a non-existence in actual experience, as when we speak of 'this water' in the case of a mirage and so on. (Bh.G.Bh.II.16)

Here, in the idea 'the pot is exictent', the notion 'existent' refers to the Self, which is real. The notion 'pot' refers to the pot, which is unreal, just as the idea 'this' refers to the desert, while the idea of water refers to the illusory water.

(16) Indeed, whenever there is a reflection of a thing, the thing and its reflection are apt to be identified through lack of proper discrimination. In this way everyone naturally fails to discriminate between the Self and the intellect in which it is reflected and says 'He knows' as if it were an act. Superimpcsing onto the Self the agency pertaining properly to the mind, we say of the Self 'he knows' and call it the knower. And superimposing onto the mind the Consciousness (that per- tains properly to the Self), we speak of the mind also as the knower. (U.S.(verse) XVIII.64-5)

The notion that the Witness performs knowledge as an act is false. Similarly, the identification of the reflection of Consciousness perceived in the mind (lit. in the ego) with the mind is also false (cp. Sac, Klesāpahāriņī p. 171).

(17) True, the Logicians say 'Knowledge is produced causally'. But they are deluded by the representations of the mind, which are admittedly produced and have a semblance of consciousness. (U.S. (verse) XVIII.68)

Different states such as knowledge, ignorance and doubt, etc., are falsely superimposed onto the Self as if they were modifi- cations arising in it. Similarly, identity with Consciousness is falsely superimposed onto the ego (or mind).

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144 THE EXAMPLES OF SUPERIMPOSITION GIVEN IN THE PAÑCAPĀDIKĀ

First the Pañcapadika says, 'Therefore it is but a false appearence when the Self seems to acquire the nature of the ego-sense, trough colouring received from the mind, like the felse appearance of red colour assumed by the crvstal through the external adjunct (the red rose lying adjacent)' (P.P. 2.100/20). Then it raises the yuestion 'How can the Absolute assure the false appearance of being the individual soul?' And it quotes three examples by way of illustration, namely the reflection in a crystal, the rope-snake, and the example of the ether of space apparently deiizited by pots.

(1) The red colour of a crystal placed near a red flower is false. One cannot conceive that the rays of light proceeding from the eyes and deflected from the crystal onto the red flower would perceive the red colour anywhere else except in the red flower where it belonged (reading japakusumastham vihayanyatra, cp. r.P. p.100/21). Nor can there be visual perception of a mere colour detached from the thing of which it is a colour. Nor is it correct to maintain that the crystal manifests as red because it is really pervaded by a red sheen emanating from the red flower. (For in that case the notion that the crystal was red would still be faise, as it would really remain its own whitish colour. Or if the red sheen were supposed to dispel the whitish colour, the crystal would be left colourless, and what is colourless (like the air) is not an object of vision at all.) And in any case a red flower does not emit a red sheen (as a glittering red jewel does). So we conclude that the ego-colouring in the Self as Conscious- ness is false, like the apparent colouring in a crystal deriv- ing from an external adjunct. (P.P. p.100 ff./21, summarized)

(2) We point to the example of the reflection of the face in a mirror or the moon in water. It implies that the individual soul is not a reality separate from the Absolute, separate from the 'not-this' element in the ego-sense, any more than the reflection in the illustrations cited is a separate reality different from the original. In fact it is the Absolute. But we speak of it as fillusory' to show that there is just the error that it seems to be different. How do we know that it is identical with the Absolute? Because we see that its nature is the same. An opponent might object that he could accept that the soul was not a separate reality over against the Absolute, but not that it was identical with the Absolute. For shell-silver, though undeniably false, is seen to manifest with the same nature as real silver, (which is nevertheless different, from the very fact of being real). But this objection is incorrect. For the shell-silver is indeed false, since it is contradicted

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and cancelled. But no such contradiction and cancellation is found in the case of the individual soul .. But do we not see it cancelled through the text 'That thou art'? Not so. The words 'that thou' teach that, in his true nature, the indi- vidual soul, corresponding to the reflection in the illustra- tion, is the Absolute, corresponding to the original of the reflection in the illustration. Otherwise the text would have said not 'That thou art' but 'Thou art not', as one says 'It is not silver'. And experience based on the teaching of the Veda also shows that the final truth is that the reflection is identical with the original .... We do not admit that the separation of the individual soul and the Absolute ic real. We affirm their identity. Their separation is an appearance set up by Maya .. But the individual soul, as a reflection, is immediately known to all of us as consciousness; it is not, (unlike the shell, blotted out by the silver), blotted out by the natural non-consciousness of the mind (cp. M.V.244,5). It takes the ego-sense for its Self, and does not realize its identity with the Absolute, as the reflection is identical with its original in the reflection-example. And so it is right to affirm that, when it (realizes it is the Absolute, and) loses its form as a reflection, it will lose its character of falsity too. (P.P. pp.104-11/21-3)

(3) One might object that, in the cases cited, there is a real cause of error near the person under illusion, in the form of a mirror or piece of polished lac. But how can a theorist like you, who holds thai all that is not pure Con- sciousness is the play of illusion, appeal to a real external cause of error near the one under delusion? To set aside doubts of this kind, the Teachers of our school appeal to the (other) example of the rope-snake. You will perhaps reply that even there, though there is admittedly no external snake present, there will be the latent impression of the previous experience of one. We agree. It is the latent impression from previous experience that is the cause of error. We shall explain later (M.V.142,2, above) how, here too, the ego-sense and the latent impression it leaves form a beginningless cycle of cause and effect, like seed and sprout. (P.P. p.lll f/23-4)

(4) Union with the red colour is possible for the crystal, because the crystal has parts. But we know that what manifes- ted as union with red colour was not really such, as subse- quent experience shows it to have been an illusion of indeter- minable reality-grade. Still, what is actually only a reflec- tion in the crystal is imagined as if it were really related to it. In the case of the rope, however, there is simply the notion that it is a snake, without any question of its being either in union with the rope or not in union with it. There- fore ... the relationlessness of the Self is not clearly brought

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out in this illustration. For that purpose there is resort to the illustration of pots and the ether of space. For neither distinction, form, use (e.g. for storing) or name (e.g. 'space in the pot') belong to the space in the pot considered in it- self (since it is one with the undifferentiated universal space); it only acquires these distinctions when it is thought of in relation to this or that context. (P.P. p.112 f./24)

Now, it is true that the author of the Pañcapādika here makes a disclaimer. ne says: 'All these examples ere for the pur- pose of calming the mind and undermining the preliminary prejudice according to which what has in fact been proved by Vedic revelation, reason and the direct experience of the sages is thought to be impossitle. Thoy are not intended as direct proofs of reality'. Nevertheless there is a difference between Śri Śankara's commentaries and the Pañcapadika about how the examples cited relate to what they exemplify and what points of resemblance they are intended to illustrate. So we shall make some examination here of the examples cited in the Pañca- pādikā. When the crystai example is brought forward by Śri Śankara, he never speaks of the red colour as 'indeterminable'.

(5) Compare the case of a piece of transparent crystal, where before the introduction of a discriminating cognition the true nature of the crystal, which is really light and transparent, does not seem to be different from such external adjuncts as the red or blue colour of objects near which it is placed. But after the rise of a discriminating cognition, the crystal be- comes distinct, and it is said to have 'attained' its true nature as light and transparent, although it was really exactly the same all along. In the same way, when the true nature of the soul does not yet appear to be discriminated from the body and external adjuncts, the knowledge arising from the Veda that does effect this discrimination is what constitutes 'transcending the body'. And the 'attainment' of the soul's true nature is nothing other than direct knowledge of the true nature of the Self, the result of the discriminating cognition. The question whether the soul 'has' or 'has not' a body depends simply on whether discrimination has or has not arisen. (B.S. Bh.I.iii.19, M.V.101,3)

Here, the phrase 'although it was really exactly the same all along' negates the possibility of the creation of redness of indeterminable reality-grade at the time of non-discrimination. The assertion 'depends simply on whether discrimination has or has not arisen' shows that the question whether the soul has or does not have a body depends solely on whether or not meta- physical discrimination has been achieved: it does not depend on the rise and negation of an adjunct of indeterminable reality-grade. Similarly; in the phrase 'does not yet appear

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to be discriminated', the word 'iva' (transluted as 'appear') excludes any actual creation of an adjunct of indeterminable reality-grade. .6

Iu regard to the example of the reflection in mirror, water or other reflecting medium, the special poiat emphasized in the Pamcapadika is that no cancellation is effected by 'Tnat thou art' and that the text only affirms the identity of the indi- vidual soul with the Absolute in the same sense that a reflec- tiom is identical with its original (M.V.144,2). That special poirt does not agree with the teachings of Śri Śankars.

(6) The function of teachings like 'That thou art', associated with reasoning over their meaning, is merely to negate the not-self element from this Self, which is itself already exist- ent and evident as 'I am'. The process is like the negation of the idea of a snake falsely imagined in a rope. (U.S.(verse) XVIII.4)

Here what is taught is the cancellation of the notion of an objective element in the self-evident Self, as the notion of a snake is cancelled in the rope by a correcting-cognition.

(7) One should understand that the individual soul stands to the supreme Self as the little image of the sun reflected in water stands to the real sun. The individual soul (as such) is not identical with the Self. Yet it is not a separate entity either. (B.S.Bh.II.iii.50, cp. M.V.95,1, note)

The words 'The individual soul (as such) is not identical with the Self' stand in open contradiction with the ciaim of the Pancapadika, 'The reflection is identical with the original'. It is true that the revered Commentator accepts that the prin- ciple of Consciousness present in the individual soul is identical with the Absolute. But there is no contradiction, as what he is really saying, even here, is that the soul's nature as an individual soul is imaginary. He denies the iden tity of the soul with the Absolute when the soul is considered in its imaginary form as an individual.

(8) If the supreme Self is without suffering and there is no sufferer other than it, would not that mean that the whole initiative of the Veda to remove pain was useless? No, for its purpose is to remove the erroneous notion, superimposed through Ignorance, that one is a sufferer. It is like removing the error of the rustic who forgot to count himself when count- ing up the number (of the people who had crossed the river, cp. M.V.59,14). And we admit the existence of an imaginary self undergoing suffering (cp. M.V.95,1, note). Before the projection of the world (at the beginning of the world-period) the Self was not manifest. After the world as

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effect had been projected and made manifest, the Self became manifest within mind (first in the Cosmic Mind, B.B.V. I.iv. 510). It is taught in the words 'It entered here' that it had projected the world as effect and then appeared to have 'entered' it like the sun or other entity appearing to 'enter' water or some other medium as a reflection. (Brhad. Bh. I.iv.7)

Here the use of the ewamcle of the tenth man shows that iwo points are accepted. The function of the Veda is to put an end to errors about one's own nature, as the bystander put an end to the erroneous notion of the person counting that he was not the tenth. And the Veda has legitimate scope for its activity, in that its teaching envisages the imagined suffer- ing self. It is clear thut on this conception the teaching that one is the supreme Self is effected throuyh the cancel- lation of the individual soul., a merely imaginary idea.

Consider, again, the rope-snake example. Here it was said in the Fancapadika: 'It is the latent impression from previous experience that is the cause of error .... Here, too, the ego- sense and the latent impression it leaves form a beginnirgless cycle of cause and effect, like seed and sprout' (M.V.144,3, ad fin.). If Śri Śankara's phrase 'what has previously been seen ... of the nature of a memory' is interpreted in the manner of the Pañcapādikā as meaning that superimposition implies a threefold cause, (sense-contact with the substratum of the superimposition, defect in apprehemder, organ or object, latent impression from previous experience activated by the defect, M.V.136,1; 138, 1-4) - then. we have already explained how this teaching is nowhere found in Śri Sankara's writings (M.V.136,1, note; 138,4, note; 138;5-12). The teaching about the formetion of a snake of indeterminabie reelity-grade has also been re- futed above (rope-snake example mentioned, M.V.144, 3; theory that the superimposition-cognition has an object of indeter- minable reality-grade, M.V.138,1 and 3; refutation of this theory, M.V.138,4, note; 138,5 ff .; cp. also 136,1, note; 137 ad fin.). Nothing further, therefore, remains to be said here. We shall rest contont with the quotation of two short texts.

(9) And there is no difference between the reality as it is during the time of the snake-idea and the reality as it is after the snake-idea has disappeared. (B.S.Bh.I.iv.6)

Nothing is said here about the formation (as an object) of a snake of indeterminable reality-grade during the time of the erroneous notion of a snake.

(10) Just as the rope-snake, (though unreal), possesses being by virtue of the rope until it is discriminated from it, so also does the complex of the Self, the reflecting medium and the reflection possess being by virtue of the changeless Self

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(until it is discriminated from it). (U.S.(verse) XVIII.46 and 47, cp. M.V.116,13 note)

Even before discrimination, the rope-snake was really the rope. And in the same way, the egc-sense seated in the reflection of the Self, has reality only through the Self. Here, too, there is no acceptance of the existence of an illusory snake over and above the rope.

145 THE IDENTITY OF SUPERIMPOSITION AND IGNORANCE

Śri Śankara's Commentary says: 'This very superimposition, thus defined, the wise call "Ignorance". And ascertainment of the ultirately real principie through discrimination between the confused elements (in this mutual superimposition of the Self and the not-self) they call "knowledge"'. On this the Panca- pādikā commente:

(1) The knowers of the Absolute term 'knowledge' (vidya) that ordinary knowledge (vijñana) in the world which determines the object in its own true nature as a rope, and dissolves the superimposed snake that was not the true form of the rope. (P.P. p.137 f./30)

If the orginary knowledge of the world is termed 'knowledge' (vidya), then why bring forward the extra characteristic of destroying superimposed things, by saying 'dissolves the snake'? We are not ordinarily aware of knowledge of the rope going on to make a further operation to dissolve the rope-snake after it had already put an end to the idea of a snake by its rise. No answer is offered in the Pancapadika to the question why an extra operation should be required to dissolve a non-existent snake. Perhaps it will be said that 'dissolution of the snake' is nothing more than cancellation of the illusory idea of the snake. But this would contradict what had been said in the Pañcapadika. For it speaks directly of the superimposition of an object in the course of its definition of superimposition, and makes imposition of the false cognition of a snake a secondary phenomenon, dependent on the objectively existent false rope-snake (śukti-gata-mithyā-rajatam alambanam ... mithyālambanam jnānam mithyājnanam, P.P. p. 52/9, M.V. 138, 2 ad fin.). Sri Sankara's Commentary, on the other hand, affirms that superimposition occurs through failure to discriminate, and that 'knowledge' (vidya) means ascertainment of the true nature of reality through discrimination; so it is clear that, for him, the description of knowledge and Ignorance (excluded the notion of illusory external objects and) was confined to the realm of ideas.

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(2) If this be so, you might object, then it was an offence against the law of economy in thoughi to have begun with superimposition and then to have called that Ignorance. It would have been simpler to have started with Ignorance in the first place. But this, we reply, js not correct. For if the revered Commentator had first mentioned Ignorance, that would only have covered its veiling function, not its role of caus- ing evil by manifesting reality as diff-rent from what it is. So the right course in the context was first to show, by the use of the word 'superimposition', that Ignorance had the power to make reality appear as other than it is, and then to show by the use of the word 'Ignorance' (avidya, lit. = non- knowledgc) that it could be removed only by knowledge. (p.P. p.138/30)

If this were so, then why did the author of the Pañcapadika explain the phrase '(this worldly experience) based on wrong knowledge: as meaning 'having the power of Ignorance, indeter- minable as real or unreal, as its material cause'? You do not clarify the nature of anything by describing it as its oun material cause. So this appears to be an incorrect conception. In the Sutra 'Now, therefore, the enquiry into the Absolute' it is taught that there must be reflection for the sake of knowledge of the Absolute, and also that knowledge is the means to the highest human end. This implies that the sole cause of bondage is Ignorance, which can be corrected and cancelled through knowledge. What is the nature of this Ignorance? Is it ordinary 'igno- rance' as generally recognized and spoken of in other schools and in other spiritual and philosophical works? Or is it something different? To answer this question, Sri Sankara's Commentary first speaks of 'this Ignorance' as being of the nature of mutual superimposition of subject and object, a synthesizing of the real with the false. Then later it speaks here of this Ignorance, hitherto referred to as superimposi- tion, as 'Ignorance', to agree with the name authorized by the Veda and Smrti. Such, at any rate, is our own view. It is not correct to say that this fails to refer to the veiling qualitu of Ignorance. For Śri Śankara says that the Self is concealed solely by Ignorance in the form of superimposition. Witness his text: '(The Self is always evident by its very nature, the sole obstacle to this being Ignorance.) We have the example of a piece of shell which is actually being per- ceived (as a 'this'), and yet, since it is misapprehended as silver, it is not (properly) perceived. The sole obstacle here is misapprehension. The (partial) perception of the shell can only be knowledge. In the same way, Ignorance (= misapprehension) is the sole obstacle in the case of the perception of the Self. (True) perception of the Self, there- fore, arises from the removal of Ignorance through metaphysi- cal knowledge and in no other way' (Brhad. Bh. I. iv.7, cp.

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M.V.30,8;138, 11). For nowhere in the commentaries of Śri Sankara do we find Ignorance accepted as anything else apart from confusion of the Self and the not-self.

146 EMPIRICAL EXPERIENCE THROUGH THE MEANS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

We find in Śri Śankara's introduction to his Brahma Sūtra Com- mentary the following: 'All commerce between the means of valid knowledge (perception, inference, etc.) and their ob- jects, whether in the Vedic or secular sphere, proceeds on the basis of this sams mutual superimposition of the Sclf and not- self called Ignorance, as does all Vedic tradition, whether concerued with injunctions and prohibitions or with liberation. But in what sense do we mean that perception and the other means of knowledge together with Vedic tradition belong to those realms of Ignorance? What we say here is this. Without self-identificetion with the body and senses expressed in foelings of "I" and "mine" there can be no individual knower, and so the processes of empirical knowledge cannot begin'. On this the Pañcapādikā observes:

(1) Yes, says the opponent, we agree. On that, definition Ignorance could belong to the inmost Self. And yet, that is not enough to show that it does actually do so. Therefore this has to be proved, to accomplish which we argue as follows. The means of valid knowledge belong to the individual knowing subject. Therefore it is the knowing subject that has them, not the one in Ignorance. They cannot belong to one in Igno- rance; that would not make sense. Or the construction may be, 'How can perception and the rest, and also the Veda, be means of valid knowledge if the one they belong to is by definition ignorant? They will be means of valid knowledge, through par- taking of the defects of the being to whom they belong. So says the opponent'. (P.P. p.140/31)

In several printed versions the text followed runs here '(Yet) that is not enough to show that it actually does do so (i.e. that Ignorance belongs to the inmost Self)'. We think the better reading would be 'That is not enough to prove its exist- ence', as that would agree with what the Pancapadika originally undertook to prove. That undertaking was expressed as follows.

(2) The section of the Commentary beginning 'Well, but what is this thing called superimposition?' is intended to prove the existence of superimposition. Within this section there is a distinction. The part that precedes the words 'But in what sense do we mean that perception and the rest ... belong to those in the realm of Ignorance?' is intended to state the

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nature of superimposition and establish its possibility; what follows is intended to establish its actual existence. (P.P. p.32 f./6)

With this in mind, we may ccasider a later passage in the Pancapadiki sub-commentary, which runs: 'Therefore it is the kaowing subject which has them (the meens of valid cognition), not the one in ignorance. They cannot belong to the one in Ignorance; that would not make sense (P.P. p.140/31; M.V.146, 1). It does rot seem that this is in line with what the revered Commentator wanted to say. Why not? He had already said earlies: 'This mutual superimposition of the Self and tne not- self the wiss call Ignorenco. Aad ascertainmen: of the ulti- mately real principle through discrimination between the con- fused elements they call "krowledge"'. Here the nature of superimpositica has bees stated and its logical possibility has alse been explained. But no proof has been eet out of which the phrase 'This natural worldly experiencs based on superimposition' was the preliminary hypothesis. So the 'veritable existence' of Ignorance as superimposition is some- thing that (if it was going to be proved at ail) would have to be esteblished later through objections and answers. The Pañcapādika itself says, 'That is not enough to prove its existence. Therefore it has to be proved'. But why is an irrelevant objection raised and answered? For to raise the objection that the means of valid knowledge must belong to the individual knowing subject, and cannot belong to the one in Ignorance, as that would not make sense, is irrelevant. The topic of how the means of knowicdge operate, or where they belong, has nothing to.do with the subject in haad, and should not have been made the subject of questions and answers here.

(3) The words (from Śri Sankara) 'But in what sense do we mean that perception and the rest ... belong to those in the realm of Ignorance?' ... (P.P. p.140/31; M.V.146,2)

This quotation from Śri Śankara, too, was introduced out of costext. For the revered Commentator's purpese was not to establish the validity of perception and the other empirical means of knowledge along with the Veda, but to show that they were necessarily conditioned by Ignorance. Consider, finally, what the Pamcapadika says by way of conclusion.

(4) The mere existence of the power to act as an individual knowing subject is the cause of the operation of the valid means of empirical cognition. But this power itself proceeds from the play of superimposition, through metaphysical Igno- rance. That is why the Commentator says that all the means of knowledge belong to the realm of those afflicted with Igno- rance. They are independent and establish their objects by

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their own power. They are invariably valid if there is no cancelling-cognition to contradict them. These facts are backed by solid positive evidence, and cannot be gainsaid merely by saying 'No'. The cause of error, when error occurs, is a defect, and that always comes as something adventitious. Defect and error are not natural to the means of valid cogni- tion. For this is what experience teaches. We do not see any defect in what is universal and natural. People do not regard the slight discomtort caused by hunger and thirst, or the con- tinuous adjustments taking place in the bowels, or the down- ward passage of food and drink. as illness. But a passing, momentary, slight touch of fever, or a cold, or even a slight cough is set down as illness, because it is not natural. And when Sabara said that one could only speak of a cognition as faulty when the organ was faulty and when the conviction that it was false later supervened (through conflicting experience, P.M. Bhaşya I.i.5) - this implied that a fault was something unnatural and therefore adventitious. (P.P. p.144 f./32)

The teaching that the power to act as an individual knowing subject results from the play of Ignorance is found in Śri Śeikara's Commentary, and should be accepted. The teaching that, in the the realm of empiricsl experlesce, the deliver- ances of the means of valid knowledge in their own specific fields cannot be gainsaid unless there is a cancelling- cognition is also quite correct. But it seems that there was no occasion for the Pañcapādikā to argue, with the help of examples, that 'natural' (as opposed to adventitious) defects do not falsify the validity of a means of cognition. The example offered was our contiaual expcsure to the slight discomfort of hunger and thirst. But people are not universally aware of the defect of Igmorance in the same way, that one should seek a disclaimer of the form 'We do not feel that Ignorance is a defect'. We have already explained how it is unmanifest Ignorance that ordains all prac- tical experience of means and objects of valid empirical cog- nition (M.V.48,7). Nor does practical experience of the means and objects of valid empirical cognition in perception and so on lead to absolutely valid knowledge on the view of the Vedantin, as it does for the Logicians. So that for the Vedantin an examination to see whether faults affect their validity is meaningless. For the Vedantin, the means of empirical knowledge act upon their objects or cease from so acting simply on natural impulse. As Śri Śankara's Commentary puts it, 'It is the same as in the case of the animals' (B.S. Bh. I.i.1, intro.). So the best view is: 'Natural Ignorance, synonymous with superimposition, brings about the rise and play of the empirical means of cognition, and also the convic- tion of their reality and truth. There is-no occasion for argumentation through objections and answers on this topic'. For Śri Śankara's Commentary says:

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(5) All empirical experiences that occur before one has real- ized that one's Self is the Absolute are taken as real, like the cxperiences of a dream before waking .... Ordinary people, when asleep, see beings of high and low degree in dreams. And this knowledge is felt to be genuine perception until awaken- ing, and there is no notion during the dream that only an appearancc of perception is in play. It is the same with waking perception before realization of the Self. (B.S.Bh. II.i.14, cp. M.V.48,7)

One may enquire into defects affecting the instruments of cog- nition and other factors of error within the realm of empiri- cal experience. But, on the topic now under consideraticn; the contradiciion with all. empirical cognition arising from the clash with metaphysical knowledge of reality is enough to show the falsity of empirical cogniticn on the metaphysicel plane. This shows the point of the saying of one who knew the true tradition quoted by Śri Śankara as follows:

(6) 'Just as the notion of the identity of the body with the Self is imagined to be valid knowledge, so worldly empirical knowledge itself is imagined to be valid knowledge until the true nature of the Self has been realized'. (Quoted at B.S.Bh. I.i.4, ad fin. )

147 THE IMMEDIATELY EVIDENT CHARACTER OF THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE

Nowhere in the Sutras or the Commentary of the Vedanta school do we find any examinaticn of the operation cf the empirical means of knowledge. In this school, it is accepted that all practical experience of the objects and means of empirical cognition is based on superimposition. And the purpose of the Upanishads is to communicate the Absolute, which is eternally pure, conscious and liberated, by the negation of superimposi- tion. It is agreed that, when one studies this or that system, one usually follows a method of enquiry into the means of knowledge agreeable to that school, according to the maxim 'One follows the opponent's view where it does not conflict'. But here in the Pancapadika there appears for the very first time a certain special examination of the means of knowledge and kindred topics. We shall quote it here to enable the reader to think about it for himself.

(1) The 'this' element in the ego-sense thus constituted (the objective element that requires to be illumined by a reflection of the element of pure Consciousness) has the activity called knowing. This activity has an object. It therefore intro- duces a certain modification into its base (pure Consciousness as apparently delimited by the individual mind) relative to

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that object. For every activity occasions a change in the one performing it. The modification here in question is 'being a knower in relation to a known object', and it is said to be analogous to the modification undergone by one performing the act of reaching somewhere (when he comes into a new relation with, say, a village by going to it). In this way, it is only as relaied to particular otjects that the mind delimits Con- sciousness. The object, for its part, stands penetrated by the activity of the mind when the latter asserts itself. Being itself but an illusory modification (vivarta) of Consciousness, the object manifests its immediately evident presence (aparoksata) as identical with the immediately evident presence (aparokşatā) of pure Consciousness (apparently) delimited as the individual knowing subiect, the latter having been condi- tioned by the mind to assume the form of the object. From this results (the perceiver's feeling of) identity with the immedi- ately evident Consciousness present in the object (as its meta- physical support), this feeling being a particular state called 'awareness of an object'. It is produced in the Self through its adjunct the mind, which has itself assumed that state. This experience (though in truth only a manifestation of eternal, changeless Consciousness) is rightly called a 'result' (the 'resultant-cognition'), because it has the same object as the result of the mental act. Thus the ego-sense (identifiable here with the mind) becomes an individual knowing subject through the power of Consciousness, the element of true Selfhood in it, and also through being affected by its own activity; in this way we are able to say, 'A person becomes aware of an object in his mind'. The immediate experience of the self-luminous individual subject, though differentiated by its relation to particular objects, is nevertheless the same in all people, on account of its very immediacy. But a mental act is brought about by the co-operation of a number of factors. Any given mental act bears only on the factors to which it is related, not anywhere else. The object of a mental act of knowing, therefore, is immediately evident only to that subject with whom it co- operates to complete the act, as a village only relates to the one who goes to it. (P.P. p.114 ff./24)

Here, the statement that the individual knowing subject in- cludes a conscious and a non-conscious element agrees with Śri Śankara's Commentary. The latter says, 'Without self- identification with the body and senses expressed in feelings of "my" and "mine" there can be no empirical knower and so the process of empirical knowledge cannot begin'. And we can also approve the teaching about the feeling of the Self apparently located in the mind of its identity with the immediately evi- dent Consciousness present in the object, a feeling referred to as 'awareness of an object' and as a 'resultant-cognition' - provided it is understood that the element of Consciousness is

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included. If it is not included, the feeling ef identity can- not constitute a resultant-cognition. For no one applies a means of valid knowledge with a view to produce a particular idea in the mind only (i.e. without true content). Thus Śri Śankara's Commentary says that the enquiry into the Absolute must end in direct experience, which he expresses as follows.

(2) The object of the wish here expressed is knowledge culmi- nating in direct experience. A wish implies a goal. The desire is to have direct knowledge of the Absolute, with metaphysical knowledge itself as the means of knowledge. Direct knowledge of the Absolute is the true goal of human life. For that is what eradicates Ignorance, ete., and all the causes of the evils of transmigratory life. (B.S.Bh.I.i.l)

That Consciousness itself is of the nature of direct knowledge is made clear elsewhere as fcllows:

(3) But is it not a contradiction to say that direct experi- ence is the resultant-cognition that comes after the application of the valid means of empirical knowledge, and also that it is raised above all change, and the pure essence cf the light of the Self? No, it is not a contradiction. Direct experience is in fact eternal and raised above all change. But it is referred to figuratively as the culminating point in a perception or other empirical cognition, since such cognitive activity pro- ceeds for its sake. And since cognitions arising from percep- tion, etc., are transitory, it, too, seems to be transitory. Hence it is referred to figuratively as their 'result' (phala). (U.S. (prose) section 108)

Thus the true nature of the individual knowing subject is eter- nal Consciousness and nothing else. We may also say 'Yes' and assent to the proposition 'Thus the ego-sense becomes an indi- vidual knowing subject through the power of Conscicusness, the element of true Selfhood in it, and also through being affected by its own activity' - but only if we keep firmly in mind the truth that the individual knowing subject is in reality eternal Consciousness alone. If the statement is made with the indivi- dual ego-sense itself chiefly in mind, then it is in contradic- tion with the writings of Śri Sankara. He says that the Self alone can be spoken of as the individual knowing subject, under certain conditions: in itself, it is the substratum of the superimposition of the body, sense-organs and ego-sense.

(4) Nor can the relationless Self be an individual knowing subject without all these preliminary conditions. (B.S.Bh. I.i.l, intro.)

(5) The author of the Sutras replies by the word 'Conscious'. The soul is eternally and immutably conscious. And he adds the

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words 'For this reason ... '. For the reason of what has just been shown at B.S.II.iii.17, namely, that it has no crigin (beginning). The Absolute, the transcendent, beyond modifica- tion, assumes the appearance of the individual soul through the

II.iii.18) influence of the apparent conditioning adjuncts. (B.S.Bh.

Elsewhere he clearly makes the point:

(6) The individual knowing subject is he who desires to know and resorts to the valid means of empirical cognition. (U.S. (prose) section 99)

But having first thus stated the position from the standpoint of acceptance of apparent conditioning adjuncts, he later adds the following to show that it is only the eternal Consciousness in its true nature that can be accepted as the knower.

(7) Now, on this basis, the individual knowing subject cannot be the seat of right knowledge (a function which is fulfilled, rather, by the Self in its pure form). How, then, can the individual knowing subject actually be an individual knowing subject? We reply as follows. There is no difference in the nature of right knowledge according to whether it is constant or interrupted .... A parallel case is that of the meaning of verbs like 'stands', where the function is not different accord- ing to whether the standing is temporary and preceded by moving, or whether it is constant. We say equally 'The people are standing' and 'The mountains are standing'. In the same way, though the individual knowing subject is eternal direct experi- ence in its true nature, nevertheless there is no contradiction if we refer to it as the individual knowing subject, as its function is still the same. (U.S.(prose) sections 102-3)

Similarly, we regard as vain and superfluous the theory which accepts 'the immediate Consciousness present in the object' as something existing over and above what is figuratively rererred to as the direct experience arising in the Self through the adjunct of a particular state of the mind (termed 'awareness of an object!). No one experiences immediate Consciousness locat- ed in the object as something different from the mental modifi- cation referred to as 'direct experience'. Nor does any idea yielding immediate knowledge ever arise in the mind of the individual knowing subject without contact with an object.

148 ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS ABOUT THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE UPANISHADIC TEACHING

On the topic of the authenticity of the Vedic teaching, the

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following texts from the Pamcapadika are worth quoting.

(1) Before there is a proper realization of the meaning of the text 'That thou art', the Veda relates its teaching to the ego- sense and to transmigratory life as set up by Ignorance; it aoes not go beycnd the realm of (the vision of) those afflicted by Ignorance. (P.P. p.151/34)

(2) Speech in general is only found used to refer to what has previously been the object of perception. But we must explain how a learner learns its meaning. Children learn the meaning of words through observing the behaviour of those to whom they are addressed. The behaviour of one who hears the words of another, if not influenced by knowledge derived from other sources, would clearly be a guide to the meanings of words. The child who is learning the meaning of words by overhearing the conversation of his elders does not know, at the time he is learning the meanings of the words, that they refer to things which the hearer already knows to exist from other sources of knowledge (reading 'siddhartha' with the Vivarana). Thus it is in the absence of such knowledge that he is able to learn the meanings which the words express. And his understanding of the meaning comes from his having learned it in this way. But it is only when the learner has himself once learned the meaning of the word and wishes to use it to teach something to someone else, and wishes to explain something of which he has personally been a witness and has learned from a non-verbal source, that he realizes both that the word can be used to designate its object, and also that the object is known to exist from a non-verbal source. But neither of these points were known at the time of learning the meaning of the word in child- hood. At the time of learning the meaning of the word, there- fore, the fact that it referred to something known from a non- verbal source was not realized. Thus words produce knowledge in accordance with their meaning as learned, without depending on any other source of knowledge; they are just as independent of the help of any other source of knowledge as the faculty of sight and so on. The fact that their meanings are also the objects of non-verbal sources of cognition does not affect the independent power of words to produce knowledge of their mean- ings. Further, in the case of the Veda, which is a non-human verbal authority, there is always the same independence in conveying knowledge as there is in the power of sight. So how could there be any suspicion of its not being a proper authority? (P.P. p.325 f./84-5)

(3) But, you will say, have we not already stated a good ground for suspecting the inauthoritativeness of verbal revelation, when we pointed out how (no means of knowledge is authoritative without corroboration, since) the various dimensions represented

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by the sense of sight when we look at a picture are rejected when we feel (with our fingers) the flat texture of the sur- face on which it is painted? But that objection was not right. For in the case of Vedic revelation there is no potentially defective instrument of knowledge, whereas there is one in the case of the picture (namely the sense of sight, which we know to be deceptive on occasion). But Vedic revelation, being superhuman, has no defects. Nor can one appeal to defects leading to error lying in external objects made known by Vedic revelation (as defects lying in perceived objccts, such as excessive distance or excessive similarity to other objects, can vitiate perception). For in the case of Vedic revelation it cannoi be established that an external object plays a role in promoting the knowledge that results (as even worldly dis- course may refer to past or distant events). For speech is restricted to its own meaning, which is all that it conveys. In the case of visual knowledge, on the other hand, the external object falls within a whole assemblage of factors necessary for such a cognition (sense-organ, object, light, proximity, clarity, etc.). In the above-quoted example, the (confusing) juxtaposition of darker and lighter lines is the defect (causing the illusory perception of depth on a flat surface). For if the surface is washed clean of the lines, correct appre- .hension of the flat surface results. The illusion disappears automatically with the disappearance of the defect, as right knowledge (of the moon) follows immediately on the ending of the disease of double-vision affecting the eye. Accordingly, even if the sense of touch is used to test the vision of the surface after the lines have been removed, it corroborates it, and does not undermine the validity of visual perception. Not that the experts on the criteria of knowledge really define validity as agreement of one means of knowledge with another: they define it as communication of knowledge. And so, just as the injunctive texts of the Veda are valid in their own particular sphere, so are the metaphysical texts in theirs. For they each have the common characteristic of pointing out some matter hitherto unknown. (P,P. p.325 ff./84-5)

(4) But is it not a fact that only the injunctive texts are valid, since the Veda only exists to teach action? No, for the argument is circular. The Veda, it is argued, can only be deemed to exist to teach action alone if the injunctive texts alone are valid; and the view that only the injunctive texts are valid can only be established if the fact that the sole purpose of the Vedic texts is to teach action has been estab -. lished first. So we have a vicious circle. Neither thesis can be established on the basis of the other. Therefore we have to accept that whatever a given text of the Veda teaches, its purpose is to teach that. Just as the texts teaching something that has to be done have that for their purpose, so equally must those which teach the unity and sole reality of

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the Self have that for their purpose. (P.P. p.328/85)

(5) Well, but is it not the case that a great authority in the interpretation of the Veda (Jaimini) declared 'Since the Veda only exists to promote action, the texts that do not deal with that are useless' (P.M.S. I.ii.l, cp. M.V.63, intro.) and taught that any words occurring in the Veda that were not con- cerned with action would be meaningless? We reply. You have not rightly understood the meaning either of the author of the Purva Mimamsa Sutras (Jaimini), or of his commentator Sabara, or of sound empirical reascning on the subject in hand. Consider the sentence, 'Devadatta! Fetch the white cow with the stick'. Here the only word which prompts action is 'fetch'. The other words like 'Devadatta' refer to cxistent entities and do not of themselves prompt any action. Yet, because they belong to a sentence which prompts action, we are entitled to esk whether they have or do not have the power to denote already-existent objects. If they do, then the word 'useless' used by Jaimini only meant 'not the main subject in hand', not (as you suppose) meaninglessness .... And how can one label 'useless' texts which co-operate to lead one to immediate awareness that one's true Self is the Absolute, and so result in the achievement of the highest possible human end? (P.P. p.358 f./95-6)

(6) Very well (says the follower of Prabhakara), let us admit that words can denote already-existent objects if they belong to a sentence which prompts action. But there cannot be knowledge through speech of an already-existent object unless it is included (in a situation involving action). For the meanings of words are only learned through their being joined together for the purpose of inciting action. (P.P. p.359 f./96)

To these objections the Pancapadika offers the following two passages by way of reply.

(7) There are sentences in the Veda which are immediately intelligible to the hearer, yet which lack verbs or any overt reference to anything to be done. For instance, we have 'The first draught (is) the portion of the Hotr priest who utters "Vaşat"' (cp. T.S. III.ii.5.1-2) and 'Therefore Pūşan (has) the well-kneaded portion' (T.S. II.vi.8.5). The connection of the words with an action that has to be done (despite the absence of a verb) depends on their ordering and inflection (which is of such a kind as to demand the supplement of a verb implying something to be done in order to make sense). It is not the case that the understanding of the ordered and inflec- ted words depends on prior knowledge of their connection with something to be done. Then there was the Sutra of Jaimini, 'Words referring to already-existent entities are taken as connected with a verb

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enjoining action' (P.M.S. I.i.25). Here also, it must be accepted that words stand for things like colours that are known without dependence on speech. And it has been shown by the Mimamsaka commentator Sabara that they may stand inter- connected in sentences through various relations such as that of standing in a common grammatical case, with their meanings qualifying one another as substance and attribute (without their necessarily being related to a verb enjoining an action to be done). When the Sutra said 'with a verb enjoining action', it was said at the beginning of the enquiry into merit, and with a view to promote the particular subject in hand. In the same way, the commentator Sabara says 'For the purpose of the Veda is seen to be to give information about the results of action', when he should have just said that it had true teachings to impart about reality; if he said '(its pur- pose is seen to be) to give information about the results of action', that was merely with a view to promote the subject immediately in hand. (P.P. p.360 f./96-7)

(8) Here in the Brahma Sutra we have the text 'But that, (the Absolute, is the main topic of the Veda) on account of the har- mony of the texts'. This points out that the harmonious teach- ing of the Vedic texts culminates in 'That thou art', which, (when properly understood, cp. M.V.144,6) refers to a partless entity, excluding any substance-attribute relation, excluding any acceptance, even on a figurative basis, of subject-predi- cate duality. It is in consonance with this that the revered Panini lays down that the nominative case-ending only expresses the meaning of the nominal stem, together with number and gender (Panini II.iii.46). It does not (of itself) imply that the thing referred to exists or acts - despite Katyayana's view '(If you say "There is scope for the prescription of the nominative because it does not imply action", we reply "This is not so). For the nominative implies the action of existing (even when the latter is not overtly expressed)" '(Katyayana on Paņini II.iii.l, vartika l1). And we find phrases like 'these fruit-laden trees' and 'this representative of the king' used without any implicit reference to the verb 'to be'. Even here, the meaning is not 'These fruit-laden trees which exist' or 'that person who is the king's representative - he exists'. All the phrases do is to express a connection between their constituent terms - 'these fruit-laden trees' or 'this man, the representative of the king' (cp. M.V.99.1). Thus it has been shown that the final purport of the Upani- shads, when they are conceived as an ordered whole, consists merely in affirming that the world-creator - already known to exist from other sources, but only in a general way - has omniscience and other particular attributes. Or again, it consists in affirming that the being (i.e. the hearer of the text ) denoted by the term 'thou' - whose existence is estab- lished in advance by his own experience - has the Absolute

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for his true nature. Thus no action of being is implied here (by the word 'art'), even in regard to the real in its true nature - still less in regard to anything else. (P.P. p.362 ff./96-7)

This should be compared with the following text from Mandana. 'In the Sutra "But that (the Absolute, is the main topic of the Veda) on account of the harmonu of the texts", the word "but" specifies the Absolute, the subject-matter of the Upani- shads, distinguishing it from ritualistic merit, the subject- matter of the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions. And the Sutra declares that the Absolute can be known through the Upanishads conceived as an ordered whole. "Conceived as an ordered whole" implies considering the inter-relation of the meanings of the words, including the due ordering beiween chief and suhordinate themes. The Absclute is known from the meta- physical texts of the Vedu in this way, and not from the injunctive texts' (B.Sid. p.155). In the same way, the texts of the Pancapadika on the verb 'to be' should also be compared with Mndana's work (from which they are largely borrowed, including the examples of the. fruit-laden trees and the king's representative, B.Sid. p.99, M.V.99,1). The same is the case with the texts declaring that a world-creator, already known to exist, but only in a general way, also possesses particular characteristics which need to be known (B.Sid. p.157, M.V.99,1).

Śri Śankara bas said, 'What is.there to prevent the texts pro- claiming the existence of the supreme Self and the Lord from being proper sentences with subject and predicate if they are associated with the verb "to be"?' (Brhad.Bh.I.iii.1, quoted M.V.99,1, note) And Suresvara says, 'We canmot accept this (i.e. that the texts of the Veda are only intelligible if they refer to what has to be done or if the meanings of their words are already known through perception and inference). We accept "art" and "is"' (B.B.V. I.i11.80). It is not clear why the author of the Pañcapadika rejected the grammatical connec- tion of the word 'is' (with other words in the metaphysical teaching), which had been accepted by the revered Commentator and the author of the Vartika, and remained satisfied with examples like 'these fruit-laden trees' after the manner of the author of the Brahma Siddhi. And again, the author of the Pañcapadika paid no attention to such texts from the Vartika as: 'It is hard to make out how the Self could be expressed either by a word or a sentence, since it is different from nothing and related to nothing. This Self, therefore, is only known through its own direct experience of itself' (B.B.V. I.iv.1408, cp. M.V.107,3 for parallel references). It is not clear what he had in mind when he neglected this point, and, following Mandana, limited the final purport of the Veda as a whole to what could be

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taught in a sentence, saying 'We know in advance in a general way that the Absolute is cause of the world, while its true nature (which we do not know without Vedic revelation) has omniscience and other characteristics'. As has been evident in various passages quoted above, the Pañcapadika everywhere grounds the authoritativenesa of the upanishadic texts either on an examination of the denotative powar of words or else on the fact that the Veda is of super- human origin, that is to say, in the same way that one grounds the authoritativeness of the ritualistic texts of the Veda. The author nowhere points out how the results of the knowledge arising from the upanishadic texts can be veriried in one's own experieace. Śri Sankara, however, saya:

(9) In the case of action, the reward, such as heaven, may not be imediately evident, and in such cases there will be doubt whether it will come or not. But the reward of knowledge of the Absolute is imediately evident, for the Veda speaks of 'the Absolute which is immediately and directly evident' (Brhad. III.iv.1) and teaches 'That thou art' as an already accomplished fact. (B.S.Bh.III.iii.32, cp. M.V.75,7)

And there are cther passages in Śri Śankara's writings to this effect. This is another point on which the reasons for the attitude of the author of the Pancapadika are not clear.

149 DIRECT EXPERIENCE OF THE SELF

Can there or can there not be direct experience of the Self arising from the upanishadic texts alone? The author of the Pañcapādikā does not seem to give a clear and unambiguous declaration of his own view on this point. The following texts from the Pañcapadika are here worthy of consideration.

(1) It is true that a certain understanding of the meaning of a text arises through the power of the text itself before exegetical enquiry. But, at the same time that it arises, one's reasoning may also suggest another contradictory idea about the meaning, felt to have equal weight. On account of this contra- diction, the meaning of the text keeps on looming up and dis- appearing again like a man drowning in water, and the outcome is doubt. Then, through exegetical enquiry, one ascertains correctly the meaning of the words, and after this knowledge the opposite idea no longer arises. We say that the meaning has been determined when, because the meaning no longer conti- nues to be submerged in doubt, it is as if a new, fixed and determinate knowledge had arisen through exegetical enquiry. (P.P. p.271 f./69)

Here it is granted that knowledge arises merely from hearing

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the texts. But doubt arises through another cause. The ser- vice of the science of exegesis is to bring the appearance of a new determination of the meaning by eliminating the doubt. That is the teaching here.

(2) In the case under consideration, even when knowledge has arisen it does not necessarily take root. For its content may be suppressed either by a prejudice about its logical impossi- bility or else by some contradictory conviction. In crdinary worldly experience, we may have the conviction that a thing can- not exist at such and such a time or place by its vcry nature. And yet somehow or other fate may contrive that we should per- ceive it there. In such a case, though we may actually be see- ing it, yet we will not believe our eyes till we have logically established the possibility of its presence. Thus, even right knowledge, when unconfirmed as to its content,, may (be attained and yet) appear as if wattained. In such a case it takes the help of logical argumentation to confirm its own content. (P.P. p.170 f./39)

(3) What, then, is the use of logical argumentation? When there is the doubt as to the possibility of the truth of the content of one's knowledge (even though it is in fact genuine), and when it has not yet yielded its reward in direct experience, then logical argumentation is useful in removing the obstacle to that reward, through showing that the content could be true after all. Thus, in the text 'That thou art', the word 'thou' refers to the individual soul. The soul (which hears it) may think it impossible that its true nature should be identical with the Absolute, the meaning of the word 'that'. And it may have a positive notion of itself as limited which is irrecon- cilable with its being the Absolute. In such circumstances, though right knowledge may arise from the text, yet it will not take root tiil the soul has eliminated its contradictory con- victions through logical argumentation, and has convinced it- self by such means that it could indeed in its true nature be the Absolute. Until then, though knowledge has been acquired through the texts, it is as if it had not been acquired. And it is the Upanishads themselves that have given a hint about how it has to be acquired, by speaking of its reward as 'direct and immediate' knowledge. (P.P. p.172/39)

Here, also, the doctrine is that even after knowledge has arisen, there is a place for logical argumentation to dispel such ideas as the logical impossibility of its content.

(4) 'Avagati' means direct and immediate experience. But the word 'knowledge' (jnana) extends also to that which is only known abstractly and is not a matter of immediate concrete experience. We have already mentioned how knowledge of this kind can refer even to an object lying in one's proximity, if

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the presence of such an object is thought io be impossible. In such cases, knowledge is inconelusive. (P.P. p.260 f./66)

Is this inconclusive knowledge here conceived as abstract or concrete? Insofar as its object is lying in proximity, it could be called conerete. Insofar as it is inconclusive, it would be abstract. Here is how the Pancapadika explains Śri Sankara's words, 'exegeti.cal examination of the texts of the Upanishads, sup- ported by logical argumentation not in contradiction with them ... i.

(5) Logical argumentation, dialectic, is a useful preliminary or an accepted part of the preparation for knowledge. Or you could say it was actually a secondary cause of knowledge. Logi- cal argumentation thus understood means logical thinking that is not in contradiction with the upanishadic texts. It means that logical thinking is an aid to understanding the meaning of the Upanishads by strengthening conviction of their truth. (P.P. p.291 f./76)

Here the teuching is that the term 'logical argumentation' (tarka, dialectic) refers to dialectical argumentation aimed at ridding oneself of the conviction that the metaphusical teaching of the Upanishads was impossible, and to inference aimed at strengthening the conviction derived from the texts.

At amother place Śri Śankara writes: 'Here (in the Upanishads as opposed to the ritualistic section of the Veda) it is the same texts (the Veda and Smrti) that are the authority, but with immediate experience (and firm remembrance, etc., ) added in the case of the purely metaphysical texts. . For knowledge of the Absolute requires to culminate in immediate experience, and (unlike the part of the Vede dealing with commands and prohibitions) has an already-existent reality for its object' (M.V.31,7). On this the Pañcapadika comments as follows:

(6) Śri Sankara's text refers to 'Sruti, etc.'. 'Sruti' here means 'direct declaration, depending upon no other words but its own'. He adds 'etc.', which refers to indirect implication, and to syntactical connection, context and other Forms of Evi- dence for the interpretation of passages in revelation (M.V. p.23). But they are not the only authorities for knowledge of the Absolute. Direct experience, etc., are also authorities (where 'etc.' refers to pondering, reasoning, sustained medita- tion and so forth). He gives the reason for this, saying 'For knowledge of the Absolute requires to culminate in immediate experience, and has an already-existent reality for its object'. There can be direct experience of an already-existent reality, and when enquiry into it culminates in that, no further enquiry is needed. (P.P. p.305 f./79)

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(7) Here, however, we have an already-existent reality which is directly perceived but erroneously. The rise of such erro- necus knowledge cannot be halted without immediate right knowl- edge. It is like the case where one misperceives the moon as two. (P.P. p.307/80)

Here the teaching is: Erroneous cognition that is immediate and concrete in character cannot be eliminated without immediate experience of the Absolute as reality.

(8) Well, if this is so, the Absolnte cannot be proved by inference. How then can inference be a support to the texts expounding the Absolute? To this we reply as follows. The mpanishadic texts dealing with the Absolute implicitly appeal to reasoning when they use examples such as that of clay. It is agreed that the texts embodying injunctions and prohibitions require explanatory passages (artha-vada) implying eulogy or blame - passages which encourage or dissuade. implying reasoning have a parallel role in relation to the The passages

metaphysical texts of the Veda. They are explanatory passagcs required to explain the possibility of the truth of the doc- trine, until the teaching has resulted in immediate experience. Hence they are present as auxiliaries in the Vedic teaching. That is what is being taught. (P.P. p.309 f./81)

Here it is taught that the role of reasoning in leading to immediate knowledge of the Absolute is to demonstrate the mere possibility that the metaphysical teaching might be true. One could explain this to imply that knowledge cannot arise directly from the text. The examples like elay are in fact given to answer the question 'What does the teaching mean?' The author of the Pañcapadika does not explain why he claims that they are used to establish the mere possibility that the teaching of the texts might be true.

150 REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE THAT THE ABSOLUTE IS TAUGHT AS AN APPENDAGE TO AN INJUNCTION TO MEDITATE

With a view to refuting it later, Śri Śankara states an oppo- nent's view in his Brahma Sutra Commentary I.1.4 as follows: 'The Veda communicates the Absolute as the object of an injunc- tion to know'. The Pañcapadika explains this as follows:

(1) We reply: What is the nature of this knowledge of the Absolute that is alleged to be the object of an injunction? It cannot be such as arises directly from the words, as that is already covered by the injunction to go through one's appointed texts daily, so that no new injunction here is either necessary or possible.

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Perhaps you will say that repeated affirmation of the knowledge derived from the words is what is enjoined. But we do not see that any result could follow from this. Perhaps you will reply that continual remembrance of a desirable object is found to bring continual joy. But our answer is that if that were so, then, for that very reason, an injunction here would be useless (and so, by implication impossible - as one acts for plcasure from natural inclination). Perhaps you will say that continual affirmation is enjoined for the sake of immediate and direct knowledge. But that also is wrong .. For there cannot bc an injunction to act for a reward expected to occur in this life when it would in fact, be impossible for it to do so. Something whicn is only known indirectly through an inferential sign cannot be known directly through the indirect knowledge arising from the inference, even though the latter be repeated thousands of times (so that mulling over the indirect knowledge coming from words will never take one beyond indirect knowledge). Finally, you may perhaps suggest, that immediate knowledge does not arise directly from re-affirmation of the knowledge derived from the texts. It arises, you may say, from a new cognition produced by this practice of re-affirmation. But we reply that there is no evidence that such could be the case. (P.P. p.333 f./87)

(2) Very well, says our opponent, let us suppose that what is enjoined is the mental activity called meditation (dhyana), focused on what was learned from verbal revelation in the form in which it was learned (i.e. without the hypothesis of the rise of a new cognition). You ask (he says) what such an act of meditation is for? It is in order to become immediately aware of the object of meditation. But we, for our part, do not accept this. We do not find that anything known indirectly can become an object of immediate apprehension when the indirect knowledge is subjected to medi- tation. Nor can you say that an object known indirectly some- times becomes an object of immediate apprehension through the force of overwhelming desire or some similar factor. For in such cases the object is not being meditated on. On the con- trary, it is just a hallucination, as the fact that it is subject to subsequent cancellation shows. Well, says the opponent, but is it not the case that the text 'It should be subjected to sustained meditation' (Brhad. II.iv.5), starting from the earlier proposition 'It should be seen', implies the enjoining of a meditation for the sake of vision? But we have already explained that there cannot be an injunction to act for a reward to occur in this life when it would in fact be impossible for it to do so. Meditation is never found to produce immediate cognition of its object. Even if, for argument's sake, we conceded that an object of medita- tion could be immediately apprehended through meditation, what guarantee is there that the object thus apprehended in

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meditation would be apprehended as it really was? In the con- text of injunctions to meditate, the Veda limits itself. to enjoining meditation as a means to attaining immediate vision. It does not guarantee the reality of what is seen. Very well, says our onponent, but its reality is proved according to the principles to follow later (B.S.Bh.I.iii.26) which show that the gods are embodied beings. But we reply that the two cases are not parallcl. In the case of the gods, there is no evidence either to confirm or to deny anything, so the revealed teaching is accepted as it stands by those who take refuge in faith. But here in the case of the doctrine that all is the Self, the position is not the same. For here perception and the other empirical means of knowledge supply evidence in conflict with the teaching. And the teaching could well be a mere theme for fanciful meditation consisting in deliberate superimpositions. And this same line of argument may also be used to refute the other theories, already mentioned above, that maintain that there is an injunction for knowledge. (P.P. p.334 f./87-8)

And so the Pancapadika goes on. It refutes the doctrine that the Upanishads enjoir another, supernormal form of knowledge, different from that arising from the texts - and conceived as a duty to be carried out. It argues that if the object of knowledge were known, any injunction to know it would be use- less: while if it were not known, an injunction to know it would be impossible. Again, the means to such knowledge is nowhere laid down, so that any injunction abcut it would be inccmplete by nature. As for the doctrine expressed by the words 'He who desires liberation is enjoined to perform medita- tion on the Absolute', which was supported by appeal to the principles according to which the gods were known to be embodied - that theory is refuted along the lines of Śri Śankara's Commentary, by pointing out that the rewards of 'per- formed actions' and 'metaphysical knowledge' are totally disparate (P.P. p.336 f./88). Other questions raised and answered arise out of the follow- ing objection: Granted that there should be enquiry into the Absolute, nevertheless the opening Sūtra of the Pūrva Mimamsa Sutras, 'Now therefore the enquiry into ritualistic merit', includes reflection on the meaning of all the texts of the Veda, because, since it is enjoined (by the very term 'enquiry'), it falls within the realm of merit. According to what is regarded in the Pañcapādika as an in- complete theory, the metaphysical texts of the Upanishads are not associated with any injunction. They were therefore not included by Jaimini when he said 'Now therefore the enquiry into merit'. On this view, it was held to follow that after the completion of the enquiry into ritualistic merit (that is, into the rules of Vedic ritual), the student should put off his concluding ceremonial bath and take up the metaphysical enquiry

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into the Absolute while still a Brahmacari and without leaving the house of his Teacher. For though the metaphysical texts state a fact, the gerundives with which they are associated ('should be seen', 'should be heard about', etc.,) convey a command. And because we know that they have the practical end of putting an end to Ignorance (we cannot deny that they con- stitute injunctions - P.P. p.183/42). The exponests cf ancther incomplete theory argue as follows: Our oppunerts hold, they say, that perception and the other empirical means of knowledge ought theoretically to te able to reveal the Absolute, as they are established as able to reveal already-existent realities. And yet they cannct do so. All the less could the Veda reveal it, since its subject-matter ie (not what is already-existent but) what has to be done. (This being so, they make out that enquiry into the meaning of the Vcda ends with the last four chapters of Jaimini's Sutras, which complete the teaching about ritual. And it is to refute this idea that the Brahma Sutras begin 'Then therefore the enquiry into the Absolute'.) Here, in this enquiry too, these theorists maintain (with a view to refute the opponent of Vedanta) that all injunctions about knowledge of the Self refer to actions that have to be performed, just like the injunciions about ritual. And they maintain that knowledgs of reality is an act that has to be carried out, as it is seen to be the sub- ject of an injunction addressed to one specifically qualified to perform such an act (P.P. p.184 f./42-3). Then there is another theory which runs: And so there is an injunction to see everything as being, in its true nature, the Self. It is through eliminating what is not its true nature that a thing is known. If no injunction is found, then let an injunction be assumed (P.P. p.188 f./44). And here is another view: There is no direct experience of that kind to be had from verbal revelation. Therefore there must be an injunction for (meditating on the abstract knowledge conveyed verbally and) converting it into concrete apprehension (P.P. p.195/46). Another view: A person is prompted by nature to work for immediate realization of the Self, as it is a human end. Re- peated affirmations based on the Vedic texts are known to be a correct option, as they are the means to immediate knowledge of the Absolute. In regard to this view, the author asks 'What

p.196/46) . is the need for a Vedic injunction on this point?' (P.P.

Another unthought-out view: The Veda is only concerned with performance of duties. To suppose that it is an authority on metaphysical reality is mere fancy. The only way to discover the nature of the Self is through the ego-notion. There is no other supersensuous form of the Self, as alleged, accessible only through Vedic revelation. For revelation has no scope in this area. This being so, in texts like 'This Self is the Absolute' and 'This your Self is the Inner Ruler, immortal',

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words like 'Self', 'Absolute' and 'Inner Ruler' are used in some figurative way to refer to our Self (ir this theory equiv- alent tc 'soul') as revealed (in its true form, which is indi- vidual), by the ego-sense. Therefore the text 'That is the Self, that thou art' is an injunction to meditste, for the sake of the reward of liberaticn, on the Self (i.e. on one's own individual soul), bcth with the qualities that it really has and also with others that are attributed to it figuratively (P.P. p.200 f./47). The Pañcapādikā refutos all these views successively. Thus the author of the Pancapadika demonstrates that the Absolute is beyond the scope of any injunction. He does so under the guise of defending the project of enuiry into the Absolute laid down in the first Brahma Stra. On the occasion of explaining the word 'atha' (i.e. the 'then' in 'Then there- fore the enquiry into the Absclute', B.S. I.i.1) he summarizes and refutes the views of a number of previous commentators, some of whom are mentioned in Suresvara's Brhadāranyaka Vartika end in Mandana's Brahma Siddhi, while others are not. Sometimes the Pamcapadika follows here the line of the Brahma Siddhi. I do not say anything on the subject of whether these authors were contemporaries of cr earlier than Mandana, as this is a question for professional philologists.

151 HOW CAN BEGINNINGLESS IGNORANCE HAVE AN END?

The Pancapadika puts the following into the mouth of an objec- tor. 'If superimposition, the cause of all evil, is beginning- less, how can it come to an end? Beginningless metaphysical superimposition is a superimposition of a universal, the uni- versal "bumanity" or whatever the case may be, qualified by individuality (as "this individual human being" or "this indi- vidual animal"). So that even if the ego-sense were effectively distinguished from the true Self, the metaphysical superimposi- tion would still continue unabated as before'. The author replies to the objection as follows:

(1) The objection does not stand. For our doctrine is that there arises from the sentence 'That thou art' another cogni- tion which plumbs the depths of the Absolute. When this knowl- edge arises, it extirpates once and for all the beginningless Ignorance which is the cause of the ego-sense and other illu- sory projections. It is this Ignorance which, by concealing the Absolute, conceals the fact that Consciousness in truth is the Absolute, and sets up instead the false notion that it is the individual soul. It is only reasonable to conclude that, when the cause is removed, the effect, consisting in the notion 'I am the individual soul and the experiencer, equipped with various organs', will also be removed. On the other hand,

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since the ego-sense, itself beginningless, exists alongside the complex of the subtle body and its instruments, the two are not in contradiction. When the ego-sense is discriminated from all else, therefore, it is not thereby brought to an end. There is a difference betwecn the two cases. In the case of knowledge which merely distinguishes the ego-sense from all else, no other metaphysical knowledge arises which plumbs the depths of the Absolute and cancels Igncrance once and for all. (F.P. p.162 f./37)

(2) But would it not be the case that, when Ignorance was removed through knowledge of the Absolute, the ego-complex, which is its effect, would cease at that very moment? No. Ignorance can continue in the form of an impression, as the sensation of fear may continue on as an impression after the snake has been romoved through knowledge of the rope. Though the fear has been removed by right knowledge, it continues on (in a certain sense) and causes further trembling through the power of impressions it has caused in the mind. In the same way, Ignorance also continues on through the impressions it has left, and continues to cause the ego-complex. There is nothing illogical in that. (P.P. p.174/40)

Here the doctrine is that another knowledge can arise from hearing the text 'That thou art'. Ignorance is dispelled by its mere rise. We do not find that direct and immediate ex- perience of reality can occur either through repeated affirma- tion or through meditation. This is declared repeatedly in such passages as the following:

(3) Nor is there anything to show that immediate apprehension can arise through repeated affirmation. (P.P. p.196/46)

(4) For there cannot be an injunction to act for a reward expected to occur in this life.when it would in fact be impos- sible for it to do so. That which is only known indirectly through an inferential sign cannot be known directly through the indirect knowledge arising from an inference, even though

M.V.150,1) the latter be repeated thousands of times. (P.P. p.333/87,

(5) We do not find that anything known indirectly can become an object of immediate apprehension when the indirect knowledge is subjected to meditation. (P.P. p.334/87, M.V.150,1)

(6) Meditation is never found to produce immediate cognition of its object. Even if, for argument's sake, we conceded that an object of meditation could be immediately apprehended through meditation, what guarantee is there that the object thus apprehended in meditation would be apprehended as it really was? (P.P. p.335/88, cp. M.V.150,2)

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And yet the author behaves strangely. He puts the following into the mouth of an objector: 'A person is prompted by nature to work for immediate realization of the Self, as it is a human end. Repeated affirmations based on hearing and pondering over the Vedic texts are known to be a correct option, as they are the means to immediate knowledge of the Absolute'. In replying to this he says:

(7) If so, what is the need for a Vedic injunction on this point? A person is prompted by nature to work for immediate realization of the Self, as it is a human end. (P.P. p.126/46)

Nere, in contradiction to his own express teaching, he accerts, in the manner cf Mandana, the idea that immediate apprehensior can arise from repeated affirmation. Why he does so in unclear. Thus we meet again here with the doctrine that we have already heard from Mandana (M.V.100), here preserted in a slightly differeni form. We heard above: 'After something has been determined ia its true nature by an authoritative mecns of knowledge, all false appearances of it cease in principle, and yet they may continue if there is a special cause. For example, erroneous double-vision of the moon or a false sense of the direction of the quarters of the compass may persist even in those who know the truth about the moon or the direc- tion of the quarters from a trustworthy person' (M.V.100, 1). And the author of the Pancapadika follows Mandana in other points of his teaching, as when he says: 'Similarly, we see the continuation of fear arising from the erroneous noticn of a snake even in the case of a rope that has been correctiy known as such, when that correct knowledge is forgotten' (M.V. 100,1). And: 'Just as, in the case of some people, trembling and symptoms of fear arising from the false superimposition of a snake cease at once, as soon as the source of fear has been removed through right knowledge of the rope, in the case of others they persist for some time on account of latent impres- sions' (B.Sid. p.131, cp. M.V.101,2). There is, however, a certain difference between the accounts of Mandana and the Pamcapadika, as is shown in what follows.

(8) Therefore, even after vision of reality has arisen from the right authority, the Veda, the sages recommend repeated affirmation of the vision of truth in meditation to overcome or root out entirely that more powerful impression acquired naturally from the beginningless repetition of erroneous vision. (B.Sid. p.35, cp. M.V.100,1)

(9) (What is the cause of the apparent continued relationship with the body on the part of the person who has realized the Absolute?) The connection cannot be due to merit and demerit arising from action, as that would involve circular argument (there would have to be connection with the body to get action

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and there would have to be action to get connection with the body); and pure Consciousness is totally devoid of action any- way . Nor is the problem solved by saying that the process is beginningless, as that leaves you without any firm foundation anywhere, like an endlessly proliferating row of blind men (i.e. you remove the problem back indefinitely, but never solve it - there is no light anywhere). Again, even if it were admitted for argument's sake that the person who had gained knowledge of the Absolute could be connected with a body through action, such a connection (on the part of such a per- son) would have to be taken as -deliberate figurative usage, like people identitying themselves in imagination with the bodies of their close relatives. But allthis is impossible. Identification with the body is not experienced in this way, that any of the recognized forms of figurative usage could apply (cp. M.V.47,2;141,6). And if it were supposed to be true, the ridicuious consequence would follow that people could no more have experience through their own bodies than they can through the bodies of their relatives. So it comes to this - that a person's relationship with a body must be based on Ignorance, there being no other possible explanation. When Ignorance has ceased, relationship with the body also ceases. And how then can there remain experience of pleasure and pain, which depends upon it? It is in this sense that teachings from the Veda and Smrti are cited by Sri Sankara in his commentary which show that the person who has direct knowledge of the Absolute no longer indulges in the activities of transmigratory life. One who effectively identifies his Seif in its true nature with the Absolute is no longer subject to transmigratory life, as to identify himself with it would now be a contradiction. In the case of the person who has effectively realized his identity with the Absolute, there is admittedly direct experience of the objects of the transmigratory realm. This experience is caused by the remnants of the portion of merit and demerit from deeds of past lives that brought about the life in which realization of the Absolute was attained. It is like the con- tinuing vision of two moons through the eye-disease of double- vision (on the part of one who is not taken in because he knows that there is only one). Pondering over the meaning of the upanishadic texts one has heard and subjecting them to sustained meditation are not required after there has been direct experience of the Abso- lute. Like the hearing of the texts, they apply only to the period before that experience. (P.P. pp.369 ff./98-9)

Here it is admitted that non-perception of the Self can con- tinue after direct knowledge of the Absolute - and that this would be the cause of (the continued presence of) the ego- complex. But this in fact would contradict the sense of iden- tity with the Absolute. How can it be claimed that it would.

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not imply the continuaticn cf transmigratory life as before? And if pondering and sustained meditation belong exclusively to the period before direct knowledge of the Absolute, as the Pañcapadika maintains, then the work fails to give any clear explanation how the continued non-perception of the Absolute could be brought to an end. Experience of the Absolute (if subjact to effacement by a mental impression) would itself depend on a mental impression; and that impression would itself dissoive with the dissolution of the merit and demerit that brought the current life into being. Such would be the inevi- table conclusicn from the passage of the work we have just quoted.

152 THE TREATMENT OF CAUSE AND EFFECT

The following texts from the Pañcapadika are concerned to teach that the Absolute is the cause of the world.

(1) Thet on the support of which the world unfolds is the Ab- solute, the root cause of all. (P.P. p.300/78)

(2) In the passage of Śri Sankara's Commentary beginning 'of the world with its attributes as we have already described them ... ' he points out that the words of Brahma Sutra I.i.2, 'That from which proceed the origination, maintenance and dis- solution of this world', constitute a piece of reasoning to define the nature of the Absolute, either through interpreting the text as having two functions at the same time, or else, (if this is ruled out), through reading it twice and inter- preting it as having a different function the second time (i.e. interpreting it once to define the Absolute, and the second time to refute the definitions of other schools). (P.P. p.301 f./78)

(3) And so, since we have also used reason to refute the possibility of anything else (such as the 'Nature' of the Sankhyas or the 'atoms' of the Vaisesikas) being the cause of the universe, it follows, as the only alternative left, that the Lord, with attributes as described, must be the cause. (P.P. p.303/79)

(4) Śri Sankara's Commentary proceeds, 'But is it not the case that that (sort of) inference (i.e. based on secular reasoning) is being set out here in the Sutra (.i. 2)?' That is, the objector suggests that just as from a certain kind of fragrant smoke we infer the presence of sweet aloe-wood as cause, so from the particular (complicated) structure of the universe we infer that the Lord is possessed of special attributes such as omniscience and others and that He is its cause. To this the revered Commentator replies, 'No. Because the purpose of the

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Sūtras is (not to indulge in logical argumentation but only) to weave a chaplet of flowers from the upanishadic texts'. That is, the objector is correct. An inference of that (secu- lar) kind is being set out here: but it is only an incidental auxiliary. It is not the real purpose of the Sutras. The

p:304/79) purpose is to weave a chaplet of upanishadic texts. (P.P.

(5) We see that earth and the other elements come into being, persist for a time, and then pass away. But there is nothing to show whether their cause is one or many. All that is clear is that the cause must have the attribute of intelligence. On this we have the upanishadic text, 'That from which these creatures are born ... ' (Taitt.III.i.1). Here the cause is re- ferred to in the singular. And the text, reveals by implication the particular nature of the cause of the world, namely that it is omniscient and omnipotent. For it is only to revcal this that the text is laid down at all. Again, following on the text 'That is what, you should enquire into' (Taitt.III.i.1), the Upanishad says 'That is the Absolute'. From the use of the word 'brahman' meaning 'the Absolute' we infer that the meaning of this word must follow from the verb 'brhati' = 'expand' and must imply that the Absolute is the cause of the world, the Absolute being itself unlimited by anything. And there is another text determining its nature, 'Verily, from bliss are these creatures born ... ' (Taitt. III.6), which, being associated with the word 'hi' in the sense of 'as is well known', implies that the Absolute is of the nature of bliss. (P.P. p.3ll f./81)

(6) Hence, in a text concerned with the Absolute, all the attributes like 'being the origin of the world' and so on are mere apparent indications (valid only from the standpoint of an observer in the grip of Ignorance, and not characteristics of the Absolute in its true nature). For they do not touch the Absolute (as it truly is). Therefore it is clear that what the Sutra 'That from which proceed the origination and so on of the world' (B.S. I.i.2) actually defines is the Absolute, omni- scient, omnipotent, of the nature of supreme Bliss. (P.P. p.312 f./81)

Here, there is agreement on all hands that Brahma Sūtra I.i.1 'Then therefore the enquiry into the Absolute' announces the opening of the enquiry into the meaning of the upanishadic texts by declaring that the enquiry into the Absolute is some- thing that ought to be carried out. Then there comes this next Sutra, which answers the question 'But what is the nature of the Absolute taught in the Upanishads?' (B.S. I.1.2). Here the Sutra and Śri Sankara's Commentary are in perfect agreement. So what was the need for introducing a hypothesis, as was done by the author of the Pañcapādika, saying 'This constitutes a piece of reasoning to define the nature of the Absolute, either

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through interpreting the text as having two functions at the same time, or else through reading it twice and interpreting it as having a different function the second time'? And one can- rot say that the Sutra is intended to demonstrate the possi- bility cf the Absolute existing and having the particular nature there defined. For there is no word expressing the idea of 'possibility' either in the Sutra or in the upanishadic texts with which it deals. It is true that the Commentary says that there cannot be any other cause of the world, such as the 'Nature' of the Sankhyas or the 'atoms' cf the vaisesikas, apart from the Absolute with its attributes as explained. But that is not enough to justify the reasoning acout the impossi- bility of Nature, etc., belng the cause of the world in the way it is presented in the Pañcapadika. For we do not find any- thing in the Commentary to support the statement in the Pañca- pādikā that there are upanishadic texts whose purpose is 'to explain the particular nature of the way in which the Absolute operates as cause of the world, when its general nature as cause of the world is already established' (P.P. p.369/98). On the contrary, the Commentary begins with a sentence explaising the meaning of the Sutra and saying 'When there are upanishadic texts speaking of the Absolute as the cause of the origination, etc., of the world ... ', thus explaiming that this knowledge is only to be had from Vedic revelation. And it then goes on to speak of resort to reasoning as a mere auxiliary to revelation. It openly denies that the Sutra allows the use of independent reasoning. It says, 'Therefore the Sutra "That from which the origination, etc., of the world proceed" is not intended to lay down a logical inference'. And the author of the Pancapadika contradicts his own words. First he says, 'And what Śri Sankara's words imply is that reasoning is an auxiliary to the revealed texts aimiag to help make their truth a matter of immediate concrete experience' (P.P, p.309/80). He then goes on to say, 'The upanishadic texts dealing with the Absolute appeal implicitly to reasoning when they use examples such as that of clay .... They are ... required to explain the possibility of the truth of the doc- trine ... (and) hence present as auxiliaries to the Vedic teach- ing' (P.P. p.310/81, M.V.149,8; cp. M.V.149, 2 and 3). What ŚrI Śankara said in his Commentary was, 'Here it is the same texts (Veda and Smrti) that are the authority, but with immedi- ate exporience (and firm remembrance, etc.,) added in the case of the purely metaphysical texts' (M.V.31,7). The Pañcapadika does not enter into the question how reasoning could be an auxiliary factor in promoting direct experience. Nor does it ask in what sense direct experience (anubhava) could be spoken of as a means of knowledge (pramana), if that were to be under- stood as something different from the result (phala) of the application of a means of knowledge (which is what 'anubhava' is ordinarily taken to be). It appears that this is a point where the meaning of the Pañcapadika requires further

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investigation by scholars. And there is another point worthy of consideration. In Śri Sankara's Commentary it is ciearly said that the creation of the world is illusory.

(7) Nor is the creation of the cosmos, beginning with the ether-element, absolutely real. For the Brahma Sutra itself says, 'It (the world) is non-different from that (from the Ah- solute), as is shown by such texts as "a suggestion of speech"' (B.S. II.i.14, cp. M.V.33,9,34,4) - texts which declare that the world is a mere illusion .... So it is significant if the author of the Sutras here (B.S. III.ii.3) refers to dream as 'a mere illusion', as in the case of dream the words have a special (intensified) sense. (B.S.Bh. III.ii.4)

The Pancapadika, however, argues through appeal to inference and other ferms of evidence that the Absolute is a cause. It does not make it clear whether the word is illusory or whether it is a real effect emanating from the Absolute. True, it raises the question of how the Veda, if per se non-conscious and therefore requiring a conscious cause, could be an indepen- dent authority, and replies as follows. 'It is not dependent on anything else, because, like the Absolute, it is beginning- less, and also chaageless and eternal. In what sense, then, is it said to spring from the Absolute? In the sense that it depeads on the Absolute for its existence, as the illusory snake depends on the rope' (P.P. p.315/82) . From this we might conclude that the world of which the Ab- solute is the cause was illusory. But as we do not have the part of the Pamcapadika commenting on Brahma Sutra II.i.14 we do not know ir exactly what sense the illusory nature of the world was understood. Or again, because he introduces the example of the rope-snake, we might suspect that the author of the Pamcapadika intended to say that a world of 'indeterminable' reality-grade was created (cp. M.V.132,3 and note).

153 THE TREATMENT OF THE THREE STATES

Since we do not possess the part of the Pancapadika that would have commented on the third Book of the Brahma Sutras, we are not in a position to say with certainty how the author would have handled the examination of the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep. In this connection, we have already explained at M.V.138,4 how the Pañcapadika, after raising the objection that the definition of superimposition did nct cover the sufferings of the dream-state, answered it by saying that there also (in dream) there was a defect (sleep) and impressions and the other factors required for superimposition. It is said there that it is the power of Ignorance supported by the

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immediate Consciousness that is delimited by the mind that evolves into the objects of false cognition in dream. The author then goes on as follows:

(1) But, if that were so, would it not follow that dream- objects were mere internal phenomena? Well, they are. Who denies it? All right, but is it not a fact that space is experienced as external in dream, just as it is in waking? That would not be possible if dream- objects were based on internal experience alone. And is not space itself also internal? So how could anything at all manifest as external through relation- ship with space? Here is another defect in your theory. N5, it is nct a defect. For even in the waking state knowl- edge gained through ihe attested means of knowledge is immedi- ate internal ceriitude. It is not anything different from the immediate Consciousness that is the support of the object. As pure light, Conscicusness is everywhere one and the same. Fven in the waking state, an object can only be experienced if it is encompassed by the immediate experience of the knowing subject. Otherwise an object, being non-conscious, could not be known. It is like the case of a pot, which, when enfolded by darkness, cannot manifest without in turn being encompassed by light coming from a lamp. As for the appearance of externality, that is set up by Maya in waking as well as in dream. For the whole universe of plurality has Consciousness as its one support; and Consciousness is partless and without spatial distinctions. (P.P. p.57 f./10-11)

(2) That power of Ignorance ... which in dreamless sleep and similar states stands as a mere remnant consisting of the im-

29 f./5) pressions of projections like egoism, again arises. (P.P. p.

(3) Beginningless Ignorance ... which remains in dreamless sleep as the mere latent impression of creative activity, con- cealing the light of Consciousness. (P.P. p.98 f./20)

(4) Thus in waking and dream this being (the Self) is known as 'I'. In dreamless sleep, its light is blotted out by Igno- rance in the form of non-perception (agrahana) endued with the latent impression of the ego. Coming and going thus (as seen from the standpoint of Ignorance), the Self is spoken of in the Veda and Smrti. as 'the transmigrator', 'the individual soul', 'massed individual consciousness', 'the one whose nature is to have determinate knowledge', 'the one endowed with Consciousness' (prajna), 'the embodied one', 'the Self', 'he who enjoys the repose of dreamless sleep', 'the Spirit' (purusa), 'the inmost Self', 'the one who acts', 'the experi- encer', 'the Knower of the Field (M.V. p.35)'. (P.P. p.134 f./29)

(5) The revered Commentator shows the unreality of evil by

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saying, 'Wherever there is a superimposition, that onto which the superimposition is made is not in the least affected either by the defects or the virtues that apparently result'. Indeed, if the superimposition were anything real, it could not be removed by bare knowledge, and that would undermine the fundamental claim of the system. (P.P. p.138/30)

(6) But would it not be the case that, when Igncrance was re- movea through knowledge of the Absolute, the ego-complex, which is its effect, would cease at that very moment? No. Igno- rance can continue in the form of an impression .... (P.P. p.174/40, cp. M.V.151,2)

(7) But when a person comes to know his own true nature, like one suddenly becoming aware of the necklace lying forgotten on his neck, then, even though he formerly supposed himself to be an individual knowing subject, he now becomes free from all the defects of transmigratory life. (P.P. p.374/100)

On this topic we have the following words of a true expert: 'When the individual soul, asleep under a beginningless illu- sion, finally awakens, he awakens to a knowledge of the unborn,

139,4). sleepless, dreamless, non-dual reality' (G.K. I.16, M.V.44, 4;

(8) But is it not the case that we are aware of the 'I' in dreamless sleep? For we see that when one has awoken from sleep he reflects over it aftervards and is aware of having experienced the pleasure of sleep as expressed in the feeling 'I slept happily'. That can only be experience of one's own Self as 'I'. Yes, we admit that a person bas this experience. But it is not a memory based on an experience of happiness. Rather it is a notion of happiness derived from what was in fact mere absence of pain. (P.P. p.95 f./19, cp. M.V.246,8)

Here the doctrine is that the power of Ignorance persists throughout the three states, accompanied by the latent impres- sion of the ego. But several points are not explained. When Ignorance has been abolished through metaphysical knowledge, how can it in some sense continue through a latent impression? How could Ignorance be an attribute of the (non-conscious) not- self? Through what concrete experience can one have (prior) knowledge of a point (the nature of dreamless sleep) that is taught in the Upanishads? Nor is it explained anywhere in the Pancapadika how the unreality of Ignorance becomes directly evident to spiritual enquirers when it in some sense continues even after it has been abolished. No explanation is offered about why there is no mention of a 'power of Ignorance' in the Sutra and its Commentary when they discuss dreamless sleep. The Brahma Sutra says, 'Dreams are absent. (In dreamless sleep the soul is) in the subtle

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canals (nadi), as is shown by the Vedic texts saying so (Chand. VIII.vi.3, etc.), and in the Self' (B.S.III.ii.7). In commen- ting, Śri Sankars cbserves, 'Therefore it is verily the Self alone that is the dwelling-place of the soul in dreamlcss sleep'. Later he says, 'We now lay down, in accordance with the Veda, the true nature of that Absolute which the soul reaches in dreamless sleep and similar states (mystical trance, swoon, etc.), where the limiting adjuncts fall awey' (B.S.Bh. [II.1i.1l1). One might ask how the soul could possibly attain the Absolute in the state of Ignorance. The answer is given in the Veda, 'This, verily, is his form in which he is free from craving, free from evils, free frem fear' (Brhad. IV.iil.21). On this Śri Śankara comments: 'Now the direct ieaching is given that liberation is realization that one is the Self of all, which is the result of metaphysicai knowledge and is devoid of action, its comporent factors and results. Here Ignorance, desire and action do not exist'. The author of the Pañcapadika nowhere examines how this statement that Ignorance, desire and action are absent in dreamless sleep fits in with his own doctrine. (On the parallel between dreamless sleep and liberation in this regard, cp. Brhad. Bh. IV.iii.22, quoted M.V. p.271.) The author of the Pañcapādikā quotes the Kārikās of Gaudapāda as an authority. Why he does not give the same priority to the exam- ination of the three states that the Karikas do is not clcar.

154 EXAMINATION OF THE MEANS TO METAPHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE

On the topic of the means to metapbysical knowledge, the follow- ing passages from the Pañcapadika are worthy of consideration. First of all, the author brings up the topic 'In what way are rituals helpful for thc enquiry into the Absolute?' He con- siders and refutes two answers to this question. The first runs: 'The word "then" (atha) in Brahma Sutra I.1.1 means "fol~ lowing on after mastery of the science of the Vedic ritual". This is because (according to the first view) one can know from the Veda as a whole in its various sections what discipline is required for the sake of what end, and because the ultimate aim of the Veda is the highest good of the student, and this high- est good may either come from acquiring aptitude for the per- formance of a series of rituals of ascending importance or from the self-purification that ensues'. The second view runs: 'The word "then" implies that the enquiry into the Absolute begins after the enquiry into ritual, as it depends on the latter'.

(1) One who wishes to reach the top of a high house finds that the stairs, if ascended one by one, enable him to do so. But one cannot say that one who wants to enquire into the Absolute

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would be led to it in the same way by rituals performed for

p.242/59) thousands of years, as there is no evidence for it. (P.P.

(2) Therefore, what eradicates pleasure-desire is always in- sight into the defects of sense-objects as sourres of pleasure, and percepiion of the eternal, changeless reality .... The doc- trine thut rituals prepare one for enquiry into the Absolute by abolishing pleasure-desire is simply nct true. (P.P. p.244 f./60, cp. M.V.71)

(3) Well, says the opponent, let us grant that rituals may serve as a prelude to enquiry into the Absolute through their purifying effect .... Indeed, the author of the Sūtras will him- self declare that success in enquiry into the Absolute (usu- ally) depends on the performance of the religious and other duties of one's stage of life. For he says, 'Attainment of metaphysical knowledge depends on the performance of all reli- gious duties, as is shown by such Vedic texts as that (Brhad. IV.iv.22) which speaks of sacrifice as an instrument for attain- ing metaphysical knowledge .. (They are an aid) like a horse (which will take you more quickly and easily to the next vil-

III.iv.26). lage, even though you could have gone there on foot)'(B.S.

This would have been true, we reply, if one could be sure that duties performed in this birth purified one and fitted one for enquiry into the Absolute. (But one cannot; as there are no rigid rules about the timing of the fruition of rewards for

f .! 61) actions performed in obedience to injunctions.) (P.P. p.245

This should be compared with the discussion in the Brahma Siddhi p. 36 f. (See the author's comments on this above, M.V. p.286; on Sri Sankara's interpretation of B.S.III.iv.26, see Sac, Misconceptions, p.106.)

(4) A person does not become detached until he is able to discriminate the real from the unreal. He does not do so until he realizes that all enjoyments up to and including the attain- ment of the state of Hiranyagarbha are produced and limited and subject to destruction. For this is what we are taught. And we are also taught that, although everything up to the constant and eternal reality is perishable, the latter is not. Other- wise, since the production of anything is impossible without a material cause, even what is at present (from the standpoint of empirical experience) existent could not and would not have existed (which is absurd). Who indeed could attain to a genuine desire to know the Ab- solute if he had not first acquired a longing for release, and become equipped with the means to it, which are inner and outer control, withdrawal from all activity for personal ends, power

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to endure hardship and power to concentrate the mind? Such a person must be one who has already attained detachment, who has failed to derive satisfaction from earthly enjoyments, having seen that they disappear while the enjoyer is in the midst of his enjoyment, like the joy of the garlands, sandal-paste, fine robes and crnaments donned by a widow as she ascends the funeral pyre, and who has had direct experience of the sufferings that arise from action taken to procure them. No one who is without these attributes will be able to see how the Absolute intc which hc is enquiring is his own true Self. This will be true in all cases, whether his enquiry be prompted by fate or by curiosity or by the desire for learning. Because he will lack the essential spiritual equipment, his mind will remain extra- verted and unable to practise the necessary introversion. Therefore the Acarya (Badarayana) used the word 'then' to mean 'after the acquisition of practical mastery of the spiritual virtues we have mentioned'. (P.P. p.251 ff./63)

The description of the spiritual equipment of inner control and the rest given here should be compared with that of the Vartika of Suresvara, given at M.V. 126.

(5) This being so, effective knowledge that the Absolute is one's own true Self does not proceed from any form of command to act, since its subject-matter is reality in its true nature (knowledge of which can only be passively received). There is therefore no room for an injunction here. Though injunctions (such as 'the Self ought to be seen', etc.,) appear in the Vedic texts, their force as such is blunted by the fact that they have nc scope in the case of knowledge of the real, which is passively conditioned by the operation of the means of knowledge. They may therefore be taken as eulogistic, turning the mind of the hearer towards knowledge of the Self by extol- ling it. For this reason, and also because they contradict the natural tendency to extraversion and so have an element of the function of an injunction, they may be called injunctions, but only in a figurative sense of the term. (P.P. p.352/93; cp. M.V.125,1 and 2;259,6, note)

(6) And similarly 'hearing' means reflecting over the texts of the Upanishads and studying the Brahma Sutras with a view to obtaining direct knowledge of the Self. Pondering (manana) means pursuit of trains of reasoning about the arguments and examples given in the Veda to support and illustrate the meta- physical texts - passages like that giving the example of the drum (Brhad. II.iv.7, cp. M.V.37, intro.), or like those speak- ing of the origination, maintenance and dissolution of the world (cp. M.V.36, intro.), or like that speaking of the modi- fications of the basic world-elements that form the objects of the world as mere 'suggestions of speech' (Chand.VI.i.4, cp. M.V.33,1). Pondering also includes the pursuit of inference in

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general, in so far as it does not conflict with the teaching cf the Veda. Sustained meditation (nididhyasana) means fixing the mind on the content of the metaphysical texts of the Veda as supported and mediated by pondering. Nididhyasana cannot here mean dhyana in the sense of upasana, for the practice of enjoined meditations for karmic merit would be useless in the present context (cp. B.Cid. p.154, M.V .: 98, 1, ad fin. ). In the text 'The Self should be seen' (Brhad. II.iv.5), the 'see- ing of ihe Self' refers (not to an act performed in response to a command but) to immediete awareness of the unity and sole reality of massed Consciousness, bereft of all manifestations of plurality, arising as a result of having fixed the attention on the content of the metaphysical texts. (P.P. p.352 f./93-4)

(7) (If 'seeing' in the above passage (M.V.154,6; cp.154,5) is not to be taken literally, then we have an eulogy.) What is the eulogy involved here? To this question we answer as follows. Maitreyi, wife of the sage Śri Yajñavalkya, felt a profound sense of detachment from the world of transmigration, consisting of action, its component factors and results, She felt a deep longing to be liberated from it once and for all. Śri Yajnavalkya wanted to teach her Self-knowledge, the means to such liberation. He therefore explained to her that the husband and so on were not what was dearest, in the words 'It is not, indeed, for the sake of the husband that the husband is dear', and taught instead that it was the Self that was dearest (Brhad. II.iv.5) .... If the Self is already known in advance to be the dearest thing, then to say 'It should be seen' or 'It should be heard about' constitutes (not an injunction but) a mere eulogy (cp. M.V. p.19). Ail this is implied in the first Sutra of the Brahma Sutras, and explained in the Commentary. The gerundive is not here used in the sense of an injunction. It is used in the sense of fitness, according to the Sutra 'The optative, the gerundive and the noun of agency may be used to express the idea of fitness' (Panini III.iii.169). And one should see that this is the true explanation of other apparently injunc- tive texts such as 'His meditation should be "It is only the Self"' (Brhad. I.iv.7) and 'He should meditate on the Self alone as his world' (Brhad. I.iv.15). (P.P. p.353 f./94, cp. M.V. 259,6, note)

In this connection one should look at the following passage in the Brahma Siddhi. 'The text "Once the wise man has acquired knowledge of the Self alone, he should practise repeated affir- mation" {Brhad. IV.iv.21) is not an injunction to acquire a new consciousness. The phrase "the Self alone" lays down the non- existence of all else and its burden is to commuinicate that, as the burden of the sentence "The cloth is red" is to predi- cate red colour of the cloth. Here what is taught is the existence of an undifferentiated state of the Self before the

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emergence of the ether and other elements. It is only in the context of enhancing one's consciousness of the Seif in its pristine nature as the sole reality that "the Self alone" is laid down. That is why in the first half of the text the Self was taught as beyond ether and the other elements, with mention of "the great Seif, unborn, taintless, fixed, beyond the ether" (Brhad. IV. iv.20). It is in the context of enhancing one's con- sciousness in this form that the text says "the Self alone", in order to negate the ether und the other elements. Otherwise the word "alone" would have been meaningless, and one would not have known what was to be negated. That is further explained in what follows, "Let him not meditate on many words" (Brhad. IV.iv.21), which is to be taken as part of the same passage, on pain of the fault, of "splitting the sentence". And as the context would not allow us to suppose that a mere prohibition of meditating on words was meant, we should take it that the real prohibition is against meditating on anything denoted by words, as all such meanings depend on words. 'In the same way, in the text "One should meditate only on 'Il is the Self'" (Brhad. I. iv.7), the term "only" has the same force as a negation of the not-self. Again, there is the text, "The Sel.f should be subjected to sustained meditation" (Brhad. II.iv.5), preceded by "but it is only for the sake of the Self that they are dear" (ibid.) occurring in a passage which ends "All this (world) is but the Self" (Brhad. II. iv.6). This all forms one passage, and it is concerned (not with injunctions but) with affirming the existence of the supreme Self' (B.Sid. p.154 f.). And one should especially note the following passage which gives the same doctrine as the Pancapadika. It runs: 'The phrases occurring within it (occurring within the passage Brhad. II.iv.5-6), "should be seen", "should be heard about" and "should be subjected to sustained meditation", though expressed (in imperative form) as gerundives, are not separate injunc- tions, but are intended for eulogy. For the gerundive termina- tion is said to have other meanings apart from command, such as ascribing worth or value (Panini III.iii.169). (The text therefore only means "the Self is worthy of being seen, etc.".) We have such examples of this as "Vignu is worthy of being offered the Upamsu Sacrifice" (T.S. II. vi.6) which occurs amongst the texts about offering the Upameu' (B.Sid. p. 155; cp. M. V. 123, intro. ).

On the topic of hearing the supreme texts, pondering over them and subjecting them to sustained meditation, one should note once more the considerations set out at M.V.125 discussing how far Suresvara's Vartika agreed with Sri Sankara's Commentary, and see from this how far there was agreement with the Pañca- pādikā.

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155 SUMMARY OF THE PANCAPĀDIKĀ

In the Pamcapadika we sometimes find trains of reasoning copied from the Brahma Siddhi, sometimes the same examples are bor- rowed, sometimes the samc terms are used, sometimes whole sen- tences are the same. But the Pañcapādika also introduces new topics, never before raised in other works that survive. With- out doubt this work deserves careful study on certain points by those who wish to determine the true method of the Vedante, for it is in every way a stimulating piece of writing, with a uighly original style of exposition, backed by an impressive array of reasoning. Amongst the more important topics for examination are the description of Ignorance and analysis of its nature,, the reflections over the ego-sense, the dissection of the views of earlier commentators on how to defend the right to institute an enquiry into the Absolute, and the way in which it explains the meaning of Śri Sankara's Commentary at the point where it declares that the Upanishads exist to teach effective knowledge of the fact that all is one as the Self. It is also beyond questicn that we need an examination of the work comparing it wit the commentaries of Śri Śankara and the Vartikas of Suresvara and similar works to see how far it is really of service for understanding the traditional method of teaching by false attribution followed by subsequent retrac- tion. I have brought out a few points on these topics, accord- ing to my lights, at various places in the present chapter. And as we shall be clarifying the same topics further at Chapter XIII below, dealing with Prakāsātman's Vivaraņa, there is no need to go into them further now.

CHAPTER IX BHĀSKARA

156 THE PLACE OF THE DOCTRINE OF BHASKARA IN THE HISTORY OF VEDANTIC THOUGHT

One might suppose that, to complete the study of the Pañca- padikā, the right course would be to follow it immediately with an examination of its commentary called the Vivarana, for this would avoid any break in the flow of thought through the inter- vention of a different system. But the fact is that we have to study the system of Bhaskara, and to study it even before the Bhamati and other works. The reasor for this is that Bhaskara takes up for consideration and criticism many points from Śri Śankara's Brahma Sutra Commentary, and also from the Brahma Siddhi and Pañcapadika, in his efforts to revive the system of Difference in Identity, while his own doctrines are brought up for refutation at every stage by the Bhamati and the Vivarana. Another reason for examining the system of Bhaskara is that parts of it are often brought up for examination in the later Vedantic commentaries of other schools. Though Sanskritists speak of a number of authors called Bhaskara, they are not all Vedantins. One should ignore the conversation between Śankaracarya and Bhatta Bhaskara recorded in the Śankara Vijaya of Madhava as a mere piece of fancy. The refutation of Bhaskara there presented largely follows the Vivaraņa, the well known commentary on the Pañcapadika, while if we turn to the Vivarana itself we find that it is refuting the doctrines of Bhaskara all the time. So we may conclude that the Vivarana itself is the real source for the imaginary account of an argument between Śri Sankara and Bhaskara given in the Śankara Vijaya. The respectful reference to 'the doctrine of revered Bhaskara' made by Kullūka Bhatta in his commentary on Manu Smrti I.15 shows that Bhaskara had many followers in the latter's day .* So although it might have seemed the correct course to proceed next to the sub-

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commentaries on Śri Śankara's work, we shall pass them over for the moment and proceed on to examine the system of Bhaskara first.

*(Kulluka probably wrote in the thirieenth century A.D., accord- ing to Renou, 1947, p.437. T.N.)

157 THE TRADITION FOLLOWED BY BHĀSKARA

The only work of Bhaskara that is compietely available at the present time is his Brahma Sutra Commentary. But in that Com- mentary at I.iv.21 he says, 'The doctrine of Maya and the doc- trinc that the individual has power to eliminate the universe have been refuted in detail at various points in the Chandogya', from which we conclude that he wrote a commentary on the Chandogya Upanishad. In later Vedantic works, including com- mentaries on the Upanisheds and Gita, there are repeated references to Bhaskara's views, from which we conclude that Bhāskaracārya must have written ccmmentaries on all three starting-points of the Vedanta tradition (Sutras, Upanishads and Gita). At present we have available - printed, though in a very corrupt form, - the text of his Brahma Sutra Commen- tary, here to be abbreviated 'Bh.B.S.Bh.'. It is a source of some partial satisfaction at least to students of the history of Vedantic thought to reflect that this work is available and contains enough material to establish the nature of Bhaskara's system. Bhaskaracarya thought that his own system, which followed the doctrine of Difference in Identity, represented the Vedanta tradition in its pure form. He repeatedly claims that the doctrines of Sankara Bhagavatpada contradict it.

(1) Some who do not like the doctrine of Difference in Iden- tity maintained by the author of the Sutras, and who teach the doctrine of Maya, declare that it is the Lord Himself who is the transmigrant, and that there is no such thing as an indi- vidual soul, constituting a part of the Lord. The experience of being an individual soul undergoing transmigration, these people say, arises through distinctiens set up by apparent conditioning adjuncts that are imagined through Ignorance. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.ii.6, p.39)

It was quite wrong to attribute to Śri Sankara the doctrine that it was the Lord who was undergoing transmigration.

(2) Thus the Upanishads and the author of the Sutras teach that there is a real distinction between the individual soul and the supreme Self. There are some, however, who turn their back on the teachings of the Upanishads and the words of the

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author of the Sutras and work out a completely different doc- trine, imagined in their own minds, according to which the distinction is a mere illusion. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.ii.12, p.41)

(3) And this (teaching that the Absolute undergoes a real transformation to manifest in the form of the world) is the traditional doctrine, taught in the Chandogya and accepted there by the commentator and sub-commentator (Bh.B.S.Bh. I.iv.25, p.85; cp. M.V.158)

Again, it is well known that when commenting on the section of the Brahma Sūtras called the Vākyānvaya Adhikaraņa (B.S. I.iv.l9 f2., cp. M.V.73), Śri Śankara set out the three views as mentioned in the three Sutras beginning 'It was the view of Asmarathya that (the teaching at Brhadaranyaka II.iv.5 that the Self should be seen was) a sign that the promise, (at Brhadaranyaka II.iv.5, that through the knowledge of the Self all this world would be known) would be fulfilled'. Of the three views, he eccepted the last (that of Kasakrtsna) as sup- porting the system that he himself propounded. On the view of Bhaskaracrya, however, Asmarathya supported a form of Differ- ence in Identity.

(4) If the individual self and the supreme Self were abso- lutely distinct, then, because the passage (Brhad. II.iv.5) begins by speaking about the individual soul and ends by talk- ing about the supreme Self, it would lack continuity, and then (since absolute difference cannot give way to identity) the promise made at the end of it (that through knowing the Self all this world would be known) could not be substantiated. Therefore the passage begins by stressing the aspect of non- difference between the supreme Self and the individual soul (by referring to the Self as that which is 'most dear'). And yet the implication is that there is also a certain difference between the individual soul and the supreme Self. (Bh.B.S.Bh. I:iv.19, p.81)

The second doctrine referred to (that of Audulomi) is alsc described by Bhaskara much in the same terms as it is described by Śrī Śańkara.

(5) The individual soul is entirely different from the supreme Self. But it attains to identity (reading aikyam) with it in liberation after it has mastered knowledge, meditation and con- centration, and left the complex of its bodies and organs at death. This was the view of Audulomi Acarya about the nature cf the individual soul. And the Upanishads, too, teach this doctrine (Mund.III.ii.8), with the help of the example of rivers (becoming one only when they enter into the sea). (Bh. B.S.Bh.I.iv.20, p.81)

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Then Kasakrtsna's doctrine is described as follows.

(6) Kasakrtsna did not hold (in the manner of Asmarathya) that the individual soul was a modification of the suprcme Self, the latter conceived as a primordial substance undergoing modification. Nor did he hold (with Audulomi) that the indivi- dual soul began as entirely distinct from the supreme Self and obtained identity in libcration. He held that, even before the final emergence of the soul from the complex of bodies and organs at liberation, the supreme Self was non-different from the individual soul in the beginning, since the latter was only a 'state' it assumed. (Bh.B.S.Bh. I.iv.21, p.81)

Bhaskara then imagines an objection to be raised as follows. 'If the individual soul were really identical with the supreme Self, ther the teaching given to Maitreyi (properly speaking, to Janaka) "This great unborn Self ... " (Brhad. IV.iv.22-5) would have been useless. One who is omniscient does not nced a Teacher'. To this Kāgakrtsna is assumed by Bhāskara to make the following reply.

(7) You are right. There is a distinction between the indivi- dual soui and the supreme Self, due to the delimitation of the individual soul by the conditioning adjunct of beginningless Ignorance, along with actions and their results. The indivi- dual soul is a part of the supreme Self. The relation is like that of sparks coming from fire. Or again, the case may be likened to that of the parcels of the ether of space apparently enclosed within apertures of the body (such as the ear-hole, cp. M.V.169,4) which are so perceived and referred to in speech (e.g. 'the ether in the ear'). Or again, it is like the parcel of the cosmic vital energy that, appears to be enclosed within every living body as its fivefold vital energy. Even so, the individual soul, by nature both different from and identical with the supreme Self, is not liberated before (it throws off Ignorance). Hence teaching about metaphysical knowledge given

p.81) to it for the sake of liberation has a use. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.iv.21,

Though the words 'different yet identical' do not occur here in the Sutra, Bhaskara introduces them to show that his own doctrine (which he traces to Kasakrtsna) is different from that of Asmarathya.

From these passages it is clear that, although Bhāskarācārya taught difference in identity, his doctrine did not agree with that of Bhartrprapanca ir every respect. For Bhartrprapañca maintained that the soul was a modification of the conscious- ness of the supreme Self (M.V.79), whereas here in the teaching of Bhäskara the relation of difference in identity between the soul and the supreme Self is taken as beginningless. And there

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are other doctrines of Bhartrprapauca that are not accepted bere. So that, even in the parts of Bhartrprapanca's doctrine that were not singled out for refutation by Śri Saskara and Suresvurs, we must assume that there were some differences from Bhaskara. Or rater, perhaps we should suppose that mamy sub-species of the Doctrine of Difference in Identity arose uver a long period of time, and that that of Bhartrprapanca was just one of them. But we desist from sneculation on this point, remarking that it is a subject which requires further investigation by historians.

158 THE 'AUTHOR OF THE VRTTI' AND THE 'AUTHOR OF THE VAKYA' REFERRED TO BY BHĀSKARĀCĀRYA

We have already explained (M.V.62;53) that many people from early times have set out to lay down the right method for interpreting the Upanishads and have doze so in many different ways. Merely from the study of Bhaskara's Brahma Sutra Commen- tary we can see that, as was thc case with other founders of traditions, he had predecessors of bis own opinion who had already explained the Upanishads, Brahma Sutras and Gita on his own lines with the help of quotations and arguments, even before his own commentary had been composed. And we have already quoted Bhaskara's remark 'And this is the traditional doctrine, taught in the Chandogya and accepted there by the commentator and sub-commentator' (M.V.157,3) It is not easy to be sure at the present day exactly who the commentator and sub-commentator he had in mind were. There is no universally accepted definition for the terms 'author of a commentary' (vakya-kara) and 'author of a sub-commentary' (vrtti-kāra). In his various commentaries, Śri Śankara sum- marizes and refutes the views of a number of Vrtti-karas who belonged to different early traditions of Advaita. And, as earlier pointed out (M.V.106), the same is true of Suresvara's Brhadāraņyaka Vārtika. The Pañcapādika, too, quotes sentences from some early Vrtti-karas in order to refute them. In the latter work we have, for instance, 'Here, some set forth a new doubt and open a separate enquiry into the Absolute' (P.P. p.180/42), 'Others again begin their argument like this ... ' (P.P. p.184/42), 'And this is set forth in another sub-commentary (vrtti) as follows ... ' (P.P. p.239/58), 'There is another author, too, who puts the point differently in his sub-commentary ... ' (P.P. p.239/58), 'The author of another sub- commentary puts a different meaning for the term "the Absolute" into the mouth of an objector and refutes it ... ' (P.P. p.256/ 64), 'But the author of another sub-commentary explains "knowl- edge of the Absolute" (B.S. I.i.1) as a subjective genitive (so that according to his view, specifically rejected by Śri Śankara, the first Brahma Sutra speaks of enquiry on the part

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of the Absolute, rot enquiry into the Absolute)' (P.P. p.257/ 64) . Thus efferts were made for a long time by many different. people in many different ways to establish the right method for the interpretatica of the Upanishads. For this recson the recognition of the right method has become difficult, and that is why we ourselves are making the attempt in the present book. As for the question of =hether or not the commeniator and sub-commentator that Bhaskara had iu mind were follcwers of Bhartrprepanca - there is no moans of solving the problem, as they are not directly quoted i :: the Commentary at present under consideration. Aud that is all we can say in the matter for certain.

159 THE DIVISIONS OF SUBJECT-MATTER IN THE BRAHMA SŪTRAS ACCORDING TO BHĀSKARA

The subjcct-matter of the Brahwa Sutras is divided up as fcl- lows according to Bhāskara.

(1) The Absolute has three conditions - its condition as cause, its condition as effect and its condition as the indivi- dual soul. The enquiry into the Absolute here ordained embraces all phases of the Absolute without distinction. For no distinc- tions of meaning in the term 'the Absolute' are implied when the Veda says 'Verily, all this is the Absolute' (cp. Nrsimha Uttaratāpini VII.3). The first Book of the Brahma Sutras expounds the nature of the Absolute and the proof or its existence. The second Book refutes any belief that the doctrine of the Absolute contradicts Smrti; the second quarter of it, the quarter devoted to dialec- tic (tarka-pada), refutes the doctrines of other schools; and this Book also shows that the various texts of the Upanishads do not contradict one another. The topics of the third Book are as follows: description of the process of transmigration, account of the different states (waking, dream, dreamless sleep, etc., ) assumed by the soul, the nature of the Absolute, reflec- tion over difference and identity in the prescribed meditations, and a consideration of how knowledge and action combined bring liberation. The fourth Book describes the practices of repeated spiritual affirmation, also the Path of the Flame and the results of metaphysical knowledge. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.l, p.8)

What this passage in the Commentary does not explain is the answer to the question, 'If the intention had really been to expound the nature of the Absolute as having three conditions - cause, effect and individual soul - why did the second Sutra say "That from which the origin and so forth of the world pro- ceeds", limiting itself to a definition of the Absolute as

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cause only?'

Here, the division of topics is the same as that in Śri Śan- kara's Commentary. Also like Śrī Śankara, Bhūskara explains the Sutras as carrying their own message while sometimes re- futing the doctrines of cther schools as well. He also analyses Śri Śankara's Commentary in many places, and quotes and refutes it. From this we conclude that, at the time Bhaskara wrete, Bhagavatpada's doctrine had spread everywhere, and Bhaskara thought that he could only establish his own thesis of Differ- ence in Identity by refuting the doctrine of Śri Sankara. And this is why, in the verse with which bis commentary begins, he formally stated ihat this was what he was undertaking to do.

(2) This science (sastra) must be explained anew in order to silence those (i.e. Śri Śankara) who have explained it in such a way as to draw attention to their own private opinions

I.i.l, p.l) through concealing the true meaning of the Sutras. (Bh.B.S.Bh.

160 TREATMENT OF THE TOPIC OF IGNORANCE

Bhāskara does not accept Śri Sankara's identification of Igno- rance with superimposition. Nor does he accept that worldly experience is based on Iguorance. He summarizes Śrī Śankara's view as the theory of an opponent as follows.

(1) Ignorance, (says our Advaitin opponent, does not rest in the Lord but) rests in the individual soul, which, in its true nature, is the real. Metaphysical Ignorance implies the wrong notion that the body and other instances of the not-self are the Self, along with the failure to perceive the Absolute in its true nature, thus including both wrong perception and non- perception. It is brought to an end through the knowledge arising from hearing 'That thou art' and other metaphysical texts of the Upanishads. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.4, p.19)

Having summarized Śri Sankara's view of Ignorance thus, Bhas- kara begins his refutation of it as follows. 'What is this Ignorance you speak of? Is it vision of difference or some- thing else?' (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.4, p.19) And having raised this question he suggests various possible definitions and refutes them as follows.

(2) If you (Advaitin) hold that Ignorance is vision of differ- ence, then there is a point you have to explain. In what sense can vision of difference be Ignorance? Is Ignorance called such because it is something positive, different from knowl- edge? Or is Ignorance just absence of knowledge? It cannot be

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the laiter, because it is immediately perceived as a positive form of consciousness .... Nor can it be something positive that is not knowledge. For knowledge of distinctions is not (on Śri Śankara's theory) either a substance or a quality or an act. It therefore could not be a positive entity other than knowledge. Knowledge of distinctions must itself be knowledge, as the use of the word 'knowledge' shows. Let us assume, however, that Ignorance is something positive, contrary to knowledge. In that case, is it eternal or non- eternal ?... If Ignorance were beginningless, it would follow that there could never be liberation. Ignorance would be ineradicable, like the Absolute. Let us suppose, then, that Ignorance had a beginning. In that case, what did it spring from? If it were produced, it would be an effect, and there- fore something real. And that would ruin the claim that Igno- rance was unreal. No unreal entity, Jike a hare's horn, is ever produced .... So Ignorance cannot be defined as vision of difference. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.4, p.18-9)

(3) If you (Advaitin) say 'Ignorance is indeterminable either as real or as unreal' we reply that this would have consequences that you yourself would not accept. As the verse has it: 'To say that that whereby this whole world is made available to experience is inexplicable is to make a remark that itself illustrates the point it makes (i.e. a remark that is itself inexplicable)'. Or let us suppose that Ignorance was inexplicable. How could a Teacher then expound it to his pupils? If it cannot be taught, how could one claim that it was what made empirical sxperience possible? Again, one must say whether it does or does not have a beginning. If it had no beginning, it would be eternal and so ineradicable, and liberation would be impossible. We have already explained how the theory that the Absolute is its cause will not do. Even if its cause were other than the Self, that cause would have to be (beginningless and so) eter- nal. As the effect of such a cause would never cease, there would again be no possibility of liberation. Perhaps you will say that Ignorance is both real and unreal. But then you would be confronted by the impossibility of that which was real being at the same time unreal. One cannot have genuine knowledge of contradictories co-existing in the same thing at the same time. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.14, p.95)

The true position of Bhagavatpāda Śankara is as follows. Igno- rance is superimposition and superimposition is the synthesiz- ing (the identifying) of the subject and the object, the real and the false. Superimposition may appear to be beginningless from the standpoint of natural empirical experience. But, because it is not real, it can be brought to an end through obtaining an effective knowledge of the real in its true nature.

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(4) Perhaps you (Advaitin) will say that your doctrine of metaphysical Ignorance must be right as metaphysical Ignorance is mentioned in the ancient texts, identified with the Unmani- fest Principle and the shining Ether. Well, we are quite happy that it should be so mentioned. When the matter is properly understood, there is no contradiction of our own position. But the fact that lgnorance is produccd shows that it is real, like any other effect, such as a sprout produced from a seed. (Bh. B.S.Bh.II.i.14, p.95)

The true position of Bhagavatpaau Sankara is as follows. The Unmanifest Principle is not Ignorance in the proper sense of the term. But because it is set.up by Ignorance it is come- times called Ignorance. And it is wrong to speak of things set up by Ignornce as real. For they are just false notions, like shell-silver and the rest. Sometimes we speak of 'ignorance' understood as an attribute of the mind, like non-discrimination. But then we are speaking of something which falls within name and form, like the Unmani- fest Principle, the seed of name and form, set up by metaphysi- cal Ignorance proper. Ignorance is indeterminable either as the real or as anything different from it, from the mere fact of being falsely imagined in the Self, like shell-silver. 'In- explicable' means 'indeterminable either as the Self or as any- thing different from it because of being a mere fantasy'. In this there is nothing strange. Śri Śankara explicitly denied that the Self was characterized by name and form: 'Name and form are imagined to erist in the Absolute like night and day

II.viii.5). in the sun, though in reality they are not there' (Taitt. Bh.

(5) And Ignorance cannot be equated with mere non-perception. Since absence of perception is not a positive reality it cannot be a cause of bondage. If Ignorance were a non-reality., it could no more cause bondage than a flower imagined to be grow- ing in the sky could. To speak of a binding force that was unreal would be a contradiction in terms, like talking of a halter for a fish. So the theory that Ignorance is indetermin- able breaks down. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.14, p.96)

(6) Even in the case of those who hold that 'Ignorance' is a technical term used to denote name and form, indeterminability cannot be established. 'Determinable' means 'open to explana- tion'. Words like 'cow' and so on are open to clear explanation in grammar. And the things that they stand for, such as the objectively existent cows and so on, are regarded as 'explic- able'. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.14, p.96)

This passage does nothing to refute Śri Sankara's position. The points to which Śri Sankara holds are: Both manifest and unmani- fest name and form are indeterminable either as the real or as

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anything different, because they are both merely imaginary. They are in fact unreal. They are subject to cancellation through knowledge. In the last analysis they are non-different from the Self in its true nature.

It is clear that in all this discussion no atteniion has been paid to Ignorance as conceived by Bhagavatpāda Śankara, which is the synthesizing of the real and the unreal. We now go on to set out Bhasksra's treatment of the theme 'The question of where Ignorance has its seat is a hard one to answer on Śri Śankara's principles'.

(7) Metaphysical Ignorance (as conceivod by the Advaitin) can- not belong to the Absolute. For the nature of the Absolute is pure Consciousness and unsurpassable bliss. Nor can it belong to the individual soul. For no individual soul over and above the Absolute is admitted to exist, and an imagined soul in the form of a reflection is nothing real. And an Ignorance that has no seat (no conscious being whose consciousness it obscures) belongs to the realm of non-existence. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.4, p.19)

(8) Whose is this Ignorance? It does not belong to the indi- vidual soul. For (on the Advaitin's theory) the soul is not real. Nor does it belong to the Lord. For in his case Igno- rance would be contradictory, since He consists of the light of eternal Consciousness. And if He were reduced to the status of an ignorart transmigrant, his 'Lordship' would be contradicted. For 'Lordship' means being free from the pleasure, pain and delusion that arise from the three 'constituents' (guna) of Nature, while 'being subject to transmigration' means continuing to be affected by them. As it would be contradictory for one and the same soul at one and the same time to be the seat of subjection to transmigration and freedom from transmigration, of Ignorance and Enlightenment, of bondage and liberation, one of the two must perforce be given up, as either cold or heat would have to be. If the Lord is the Lord, He is not subject to transmigration; if He were subject to transmigration, He would not be the Lord. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.iv.21, p.82)

Here Bhaskara takes no notice of what Śri Sankara says in his Commentary to Brahma Sutra II.i. 14 about the 'Lordship' of the Lord and the 'transmigratorship' of the soul being mere notions of empirical experience (M.V.45, 2). Nor does he take into consideration the teaching at Gaudapāda Kārikā II. 32 that the notions of bondage and liberation pertain to the practical standpoint only, not to that of ultimate truth (M.V. 29, 1).

(9) It is true that when (in Śri Sankara's Commentary) the question is raised 'To whom does Ignorance belong?' the answer is given 'It belongs to you who ask'. But that also was a bad answer. If he had said 'I am the individual soul, a part of

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the supreme Self' we could have replied, 'All right, you can sit quiet'. (Bh.B.S.Bh.IV.i.l, p.219)

Here the meaning of Bhagavatpada's Commentary was not properly understood. The idea of raising the question 'But whose is this Ignorance?' was to show that, on the doctrine that all is one, such a question is impossible. If pure unity is known to be the truth, then (it is seen that) there is in fact no Igno- runce anywhere for anyone. If it is not known, then the question itself shows that Ignorance belongs to the questioner alone. And so the reply to one who answered 'I am the indivi- dual soul' could only be 'Ignorance belongs to you'.

Raising the question 'is Ignorance one or many?', Bhaskara gives the following reply.

(10) If Ignorance were a plurality, it would have to be some- thing real, and that would contradict the theory that it is indeterminable either as the reality or as anything. else. And if it were one, then thac would mean that everyone would be liberated at the same time. (Bh.B.S.Bh.IV.i.l, p.219)

What is overlooked here is the fact that the alternative 'one or many' is only possible in practical experience through Igno- rance. There is no scope for applying it to Ignorance itself.

Fault is also found with the doctrine of the cessation of Ignorance.

(11) Ignorance as you (Advaitin) interpret it means vision of difference. No onc whose body was still being sustained by Ignorance (as you claim the body to be) could lose his knowl- edge of difference, as his eyes and other organs are the cause of it, and where the cause is, there the effect is bound to follow. And knowledge of difference is required for the experience of merit and demerit. How does it help such experi- ence? By making possible empirical experience with its dis- tinction of body, organs and objects. Ignorance, desire and action affect one another mutually and cause each other to continue, like seed and sprout. (If we were to accept your theories) the wheel of transmigration would roll on for ever, contradicting and cancelling knowledge of non-duality. Libera- tion would be impossible, as the contradictory forces would be too strong for it. (Bh.B.S.Bh.1.i.4, p.20)

No account is taken here of the passage in Bhagavatpada's Com- mentary where he says 'Without self-identification with the body and senses, expressed in feelings of "I" and "mine", there can be no empirical knower, and so the processes of empirical knowledge cannot begin' (B.S.Bh. I.i.1, intro .; ep. M. V. 97,1, note; 143, 13, note). If the body and organs had been real, then

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being an individual esperiencing subjeet and experience of transmigratory life would have been the result of their work. But, from the higher standpoint of the witness, the body and organs are not real. Hence Sri Sankara's Commentary says, 'One could not conceive of the Self as embodied except through Ignorance in the form of false identification with the body' (B.S.Bh. I.i.4, M.V. 265,3). And again. once non-duality has been realized, there can no longer be any place for the duality of cancelling and cancelled. For the Upanishad saus, '(But when all this has become his own Self), then what could a person see and with what?' (Brhad. II. iv.14). These are points to which Bhaskara did not pay due attention.

There is nct a trace here in Bhaskara of the doctrines about Ignorance we encountered earlier on in dealing with the system of Bhartrprapañca. There were, for instance, the following passages. 'Ignorance is not being awake to the conviction "All this universe is in truth nothing but my owi Self"' (M.V. 82,1); 'Ou the other hand meterhysical Ignorance has the Self's Consciousness for its seat .... It distorts that Consciousness and conditions it for erroneous perception' (M.V.83, 11); ' Igno- rance springs up spontaneously here and there in the Self, like desert places appearing on the surface of the earth' (M.V.85,3, note). So we should assume either that Bhaskara omitted these subjects in his Commentary because they had been refuted by Śri Śankara and Suresvara, or else that Bhāskara's system was different from Bhartrprapanca's on these points.

131 THE AUTHORITY OF PERCEPTION, ETC., AND THE AUTHORITY CF THE VEDA

Śri Bhagavatpada taught that all commerce between means of experience and objects of experience, as well as the action of Vedic revelation, took place in the realm of Ignorance. He announced this in the words: 'All commerce between the attested means of knowledge (perception, inference, revelation, etc.) and their objects, whether in the Vedic or secular sphere, pro- ceeds on the basis of this same mutual superimposition of the Self and not-self called Ignorance, as does all Vedic tradi- tion, whether concerned with injunctions and prohibitions or with liberation'(B.S.Bh.I.i.1, intro .: M.V.23,2). No notice of this is taken in the system of Bhaskara. So we should not be surprised to find him accepting the Pūrva Mimāmsā doctrine in regard to the operation of the means of knowledge. On this topic, Bhagavatpada raises the following hypotheti- cal objections to his own position. If one accepts absolute unity, there cannot be any plurality, and, in that case, how can perception and the other means of knowledge operate? How could the texts of the Veda containing injunctions and prohibi- tions in that case be meaningful? And if the words of the

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Vedic iexts are an illusion, how can they lead to knowledge of the Absolute? He answers by saying, 'All empirical experiences that occur before one has realized that one's Self is the Abso- lute are taken as real, like the experiences of a dream before awakening' (B.S.Bh.II.i.14; M.V.27,3; 48, 7; 146,6). Bhāskara alludes to this in his owm Commentary, and then goes on as fol- lews :

(1) On this we would make the following observations. An explanation has been given of the phrase 'The truth is, it is only clay' (Chand.VI.i.4). Now, if the universe of plurality werc unreal, clay also would have to be unreal, as it is part of that universe. But how can unreality be established? Not by perception and inference. For they are just what determine this whole universe as real. Nor can we say that there is here a cancelling-cognition that reveals a defect in the means of knowledge leading to error. For all living creatures that in- habit the world share knowledge of the five elements from which it is composed. And so distinctions are a fact, and empirical experience based on them is true. One may very well take it that a cognition which ultimately turns out to have been false retains its validity as long as no cancelling-cogntion arises, as may occur when one re-orientates oneself after losing one's sense of direction; but if it meets with a cancelling-cognition it is nullified. But, you will say, will not Ignorance in association with the individual subject (reading pramatrvad) be present as a defect here also? The experience of distinctions by individual subjects associated with Ignorance would then be false like the double-vision of the moon. Our reply to this is that, in re- futing an opponent, a disputant should avoid arguments that undermine his own position. And this argument certainly under- mines your (Advaitin's) own doctrine. If the knowledge of difference that comes to the individual knowing subject who is afflicted with Ignorance is false because of that affliction, his knowledge of the non-dual Absolute will be equally false for the same reason .... Dc you claim that there is a cancelling-cognition that con- tradicts our knowledge of the world? If so, you yourself have already taught that the cancelling-cognition itself must have causal factors vitiated by the defect of Ignorance. As this situation would hold throughout, the whole basis for proving falsity would be undermined. And again, we challenge you with this further inference. Knowledge of the Absolute must be false, because it is knowledge, like knowledge of plurality. (Moreover, there is no universal rule that falsity only results from a cancelling-cognition.) For all dream-experience is false (even before it is cancelled by waking), because there is a defect in the apparatus of knowledge, just as in dreamless sleep. And one who, afflicted with the disease of double- vision, lives his whole life in the primaeval forests (and so

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never has a chance to be told that there is only one moon and so to have a cancelling-cognition and know better) - such a person continues indefinitely to have false knowledge of two moons. Such people supply examples of error where there is no cancelling-cognition. And finally, there is no example of knowledge of the real arising from something which was itself unreal (as your doc- trine would require). (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.14, p.94)

Hcre it is clear that it is the doctrine of error adopted ir the Pamcapadika that is singled out for criticism, the doctrine according to which error arises from a threefold cause, includ- ing e defect (cp. M.V.138, esp.138,4, note). The doctrine of the revered Commentstor Śri Sankara that all the play of the empirical means of knowledge rests on metaphysical Ignorance has simply been left out of consideration. The revered Commen- tator does not establish falsity with the help of perception and the other empirical means of knowledge, so it would have been irrelevant to have criticized his doctrine by pointing out that these means of knowledge were afflicted with defects. His ows view is that it is only the final direct metaphysical intuition that reveale (read avadhāranenaiva?) the falsity of all experience that comes through the empirical means of knowl- edge (cp. M.V.48,7). Nor is there any force in the inference purporting to show that (on Śri Sankara's principles) knowledge of the Absolute would be false. Since all means of knowledge fall within the universe of plurality, when knowledge of the Absolute has arisen from the Veda, no further knowledge is required. The revered Commentator said, 'And this is the final means of knowledge, which reveals thai the Self alone exists. After that, nothing further is required'. And be adds: 'Nor can it be said that this immediate intuition is either useless or erroneous. For it is seen to bring metaphysical Ignorance to an end, and there is no other knowledge that could cancel this intuition. But before this immediate intuition of the unity and sole existence of the Self, all practical experience of the true and the false holds, both within the secular and the Vedic spheres' (B.S.Bh.II.i.14).

(2) As for the doctrine that perception and the other empiri- cal means of knowledge cannot be false in themselves, but may be shown to be false from ancther standpoint - we should like to be told on the basis of what distinction this claim is made. Perhaps you will say that it is always the case, as illustrated by dreams and so on, that falsity is detected, not. from the false cognition itself, but from some other source. For in- stance, one does not apprehend the falsity of the false cogni- tion of silver through the silver-cognition itself. On this view, irrefutable Vedic revelation is supposed to show that perception and the other empirical means of knowledge are

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always false and never true. This doctrine, however, would jeticon the whole account of the validity of perception, given in the opening section of the Brahma Sutras in order to estab- lish the validity of the injunctions of the Veda. And that account (is not to be taken lightly as it) stems from Acārya Upavarsa, the founder of the tradition. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.ii.29, p.124)

Here one does not quite know what cpponent is being refuted. It ia clear that on the doctrine of Sri Bhagavatpāda, the uncon- tradicted validity of perception and the other empirical means of kmowledge continues uncancelled until the role of being an individual subject is cut short by the intervention of the metaphysical texts of the Upanishads. Indeed, these two anciest verses from some knower of the Absolute are quoted on this subject by the revered Commentator at the ond of his Commentary on Brahma Sūtra I.i.4.

(3) The Self is only an individual knowing subject before the attainment of direct knowledge of that Self which the Upani- shads say has to be investigated. When the true nature of the individual knowing subject has been thoroughly investigated, then it is found to be (the supreme Self) free from sin and other defects. Just as the notion of the identity of the Self with the body is imagined at first to hold as valid, so are all the means of knowledge found in worldly experience (including the Veda) imagined to hold as valid until the Self has been realized. (Old verses quoted at the end of B.S.Bh.I.i.4; cp. M.V.28,10;165,6)

It is clear that Bhaskara rejects the view that the Veda can only give its teaching in the context of metaphysical Igno- rance, and thinks thet the validity of the Veda should only be defended according to the arguments of the Pūrva Mimamsa. This emerges at different points in his Commentary.

(4) Because the Absolute can only be known through Vedic revelation, the Teacher Badarayana goes on to expound the defi- nition of it that is found there. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.2, intro., p.8)

(5) When the Sutra says 'The Absolute has the Veda for its womb', the meaning is that the Veda is the authoritative means of knowledge by which it is known. 'Being the womb of the Absolute' means 'being that by which the Absolute is known', in the sense of being the authoritative means of knowledge in regard to it. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.3, p.9)

This is a refutation of the doctrine that the Self is the object of a Vedic injunction (niyoga) in the sense that there is something that has to be done before it can be known, namely the active elimination of the universe. And Bhaskara goes on

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to refute the notion that knowledge of the Self can be the sub- ject of an injunction at all, using the argument that the forms assumed by knowledge are not conditioned by the will of man (but by the form of the reality known). Here he follows the line of argument alrcady laid doum by Bhagavatpada Sakara.

(6) And if it were maintained, through a complete misconcep- tion, that the Vedic texts are always and everywhere concerned with tasks to be done, that would make it impossible to estab- lish the existence and true nature of the omnipotent Lord. For we have the text: 'The texts of the Veda are divided into three rategories - injunctions, explanatory passages and hymns. Tf the Veda were exrlusively concerned with enjoining things to be done, it would not be an authority for declaring what. truly exists' ... Therefore anyone who believes in the existence of God must infallibly admit that there are certain texts concerned with declaring what truly exists. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.4, p.15).

(7) Nature does not depend on any of its own modifications, since it is self-existent and complete in itself, but the modi- fications depend on Nature, as they are not self-existent and complete in themselves. In the same way, the ritualistic sec- tion of the Veda does not depend on the knowledge-section. But the knowledge-section depends on the ritualistic section, since the Upanishads (e.g. Brhad. IV.iv.22, M.V.53,7;55,1) themselves teach that the obligatory daily ritual is required for libera- tion in co-operation with knowledge. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.4, p.16)

(8) Some teach that action performed on its own and unaccom- panied by knowledge or meditation is only for the preparation of the student and is not part of the teaching given at the highest level. But this is only a wild personal fancy. (Bh. B.S.Bh.I.i.4, p.16)

Bhaskara has explained what he means earlier, in his Commentary to B.S. I.i.1. He said there: 'The word "then" (in the Sutra "Then, therefore, the enquiry into the Absolute") refers to the moment when one has fulfilled one's debts to the gods and other beings, and has cleansed oneself of one's sins through attaining wisdom ... '. The idea is that some held the doctrine that a person renders himself fit for the teaching given at the highest level, namely 'The Self has to be seen ... ', through action.

(9) And there is no objection to holding that the Veda, too, proceeds directly from the Absolute, and that it is through the Absolute that the Veda manifests in the mind of Prajapati at the beginning of the world-period. And since the supreme Self is eternal, the eternality of the Veda is all the more certain as it is identical with the supreme Self. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.iii.30, p.65)

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It does not occur to Bhaskara here to ask himself whether, for one who holds that creation is (perfectly real and yet only) the manifestation of the already existent, it wouid not follow from this principle that everything would have to be eternal.

(10) On this point the Mimamsakas (who reject the doctrine of world-periods) raise an objection. How could any person learn the Veda (at the beginning of a worlu-pcriod) when there would be no tradition for teaching it? And if the Veda were due to the intelligence of one person, it would be he creation of that individual, and so not eternal. To this we reply as fol- lows. On certain points about the Veda you and I both agree. We agrei that, as demonstrated in the first section of your Sastra (Sabara, P.M.S.Bh. I.i.5), the Veda is authoritative, because the connection between words and their meanings is eternal, because tradition does not tell us of any individual human author of the Veda (Sabara, I.i.27-32), because it is not declared to have a mere auxiliary function like the fore- sacrifices (prayaga) and because it reveals matters not known from any othersource. And we have also explained how all evidence is authoritative on the nature of that for which it is the sole evidence. And just as you affirm the existence of heaven on this authority, so do I, on the same authority, affirm that the supreme Self is omniscient and omnipotent and the cause of the (repeated) creation, maintenance and with- drawal of the world. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.iii.30, p.65)

One should notice that on one point (that of the ultimate reason for the authoritativeness of the upanishadic teaching) Bhaskara takes no notice of the reasoning given by Śri Sańkara. What the latter said was: 'Since the results of rituals, results like heaven and so on, are not a matter of immediate experience, there is always the doubt "Will they actually come or not?" But the reward of knowledge of the Absolute is irmediately evident, for the Veda speaks of "the Absolute which is immediately and directly evident" (Brhad. III. iv.1) and teaches "That thou art" as an already accomplished fact' (B.S. Bh.III.iii.32, cp. M.V.75,7).

162 THE RELATION OF VEDIC REVELATION AND REASON

In/Bhaskara's Commentary, the independent character of the authority of the Veda is safeguarded by assigning reason a position defined in the following terms.

(1) Therefore, the conditions governing bondage and liberation have to be enunciated on the authority of the Veda. They can- not be stated on the basis of mere logical reasoning, as the latter has no sure footing anywhere. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.4, p.19)

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(2) The supreme Lord is omnipotent. He is therefore able to create special forms for the benefitof his devotees. Are these forms illusory? No, they are not, we reply. They are perfectly real. Fcr the Veda reports things as they truly are. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.20, p.29)

Bhagavatpada accepted the principle that the Veda was a source of knowledge in the sense that (1) It could convey knowledge (useful at its level) until the rise of immediate intuition and (2) It was not without a (divine) author. But the prin- ciple appealed to here by Bhaskara, namely, 'Whatever the Veda teaches is an ultimate fact', is wrong (because the Veda teaches mary things by way of false attribution followed by later retraction).

(3) Here you might object, 'How can there be two experiencers in one body? By what right do you bring in a contradiction and say this? The Veda says "There is no other seer ... but He" (Brhad. III.vii.23) and denies that there is any other seer apart from the Inner Ruler now under discussion'. To this we reply as follows. We have already explained how this very text brings out the distinction with the phrase 'He who, dwelling in the body, ... ' (Drhad.,Madhyandina version, III.vii.22). Do you not see the point? This text cannot be just passed over as if it were a mere casual word of greeting, as it is just as authoritative as the text 'There is no other seer ... but He'. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.ii.20, p.45; cp. M.V.170,13 and note)

Here Bhaskara interprets the text 'This is your Self, the Inner Ruler, the immortal' as if it was expounding distinc- iions, although its real purpose is to teach that the Self is the one reality present within ali.

(4) One can accept as true that part of the teaching (of the Yoga School) that can be used as a means to help arrive at true vision, because it agrees with Vedic teaching. But the part that does not agree must be wrong, as mere humans are quite capable of expounding things as other than they are. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.3, p.89)

There is a point here that Bhaskara does not consider. Could it be the case that disputants of all schools express their agreement with the Veda in that part of its teaching that agrees with their own, but are not able to refute the part that does not agree by mere logical argumentation?

(5) As for what was said to the effect that the Veda itself teaches that logical reasoning must be brought in when it says 'the Self should be pondered over', this does not mean that the Veda recognizes empty hypothetical reasoning. It only admits reasoning in conformity with Vedic teaching, conducted

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in order to demonstrate its validity. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.6, p.90)

A question that Bhaskara does not here consider is: 'Where dis- putants are not agreed about what kind of logical arguments should be used to support the Veda, how can one arrive at a decision?' (Contrast Sri Sankara's attitude, explained at M.V. 31,12, note. T.N.)

(6) In regard to something that is completely beyond the range of the censes, logical argumentation cannot establish whether it is either the same as or different from anything else. Therefore (in this context) no one can prove their point by logic. Therefore the principle stands that it is only on the basis of the Veda that one can establish the true nature of the cause of the world. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.1l, p.92)

Bhaskara does not here explain how all disputants ure to be brought to agree over this point.

(7) By the word 'etcetera' the author of the Sutras means that, because the piling up of examples and counter-examples is endless, reason can neither refute anything established by Vedic revelation nor subtract from it, nor add to it. (Bh.B.S. Bh.II.i.25, p.104)

What Bhaskara does not say is whether or not that which is established by Vedic revelation has to culminate in immediate experience.

Though Bhaskara, as well as Śri Śankara (cp. M.V.169,6), is capable, on occasion, of appealing to thc principle 'Nct even a hundred texts can alter a perceived fact' (Bh.B.S.Bh. IV.iv.22), nevertheless it is clear that his general principle is that a thing should always be described as it is given in the Veda (1.e. without sufficiently allowing for the degree to which the Veda resorts to figurative usage and provisional teaching). What is more, though he uses dialectic to reveal the flaws in the theories of his opponents, his usual procedure for defending his own doctrines against the objections brought by his opponents is merely to hurl Vedic quotations at them as if they were divinely guided missiles. It is a pity that a number of the later Vedantins followed him in this method of argumentation.

163 THE PRIME IMPORTANCE OF THE CAUSE-EFFECT RELATION IN THE SYSTEM OF BHĀSKARA

In Bhaskara's system the world is a real transformation of the Absolute. Hence the importance attached to the cause-effect

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relation. In his Commentary om the first Sutra we find the following.

(1) The existence of the Absolute is generally accepted be- cause it is known on the authority of Vedic revelation. It is taught to have been the cause of the world in the words 'Being only, my dear one, was all this in the beginning, one only, without a second' (Chand. VI.ii.1) .. We know it also from the etymology of the word Brahman. Brahman (the Absolute) comes from the root brh meaning 'to expand'. "hat beyond which there is nothing greater, the Absolute, must be the root cause of all, as there is no other alternative. The term 'the Absolute' is only applied to thr form that the Absclute assumes as an effect, namely the world of plurality, in a figurative sense, as we might speak of a keen student in a figurative way and say 'The little fellow is fire' But if the existence of the Absolute is generally accepted, what is the need for enquiring into it through the Vedantic discinline? The purpose is to put an end to all disagreement about its particular nature. Some (the Sankhyas) say that the cause of the world is Nature (prakrti) with its three constit- uents (guna). Others (the Vaisesikas, etc.) claim to establish the existence of minute, separate atoms as the material cause of the world. So an enquiry into the Absolute is opened. And the Absolute has three conditions - its condition as cause, its condition as effect and its condition as the indivi- dual soul. The enquiry into the Absolute here ordained embraces all phases of the Absolute without distinction. For no dis- tinctions of meaning in the term 'the Absolute' are implied when the Veda says 'Verily, all is the Absolute' (Mund. II.ii. 12). (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.l, p.7-8)

Where Bhaskara says that it is generally known from the Veda that the Absolute is the true Self of all, but that an enquiry has to be begun because there is disagreement over its parti- cular nature - there he is following Śri Bhagavatpada. But one will only do justice to the meaning of the Veda if one thinks 'One must enquire into the Absolute without any presup- positions about its being a cause or not being a cause'. The Sutra 'That from which proceed the origination, maintenance and dissolution of the world' (B.S. I.1.2) is not intended to teach that the Absolute is the cause of the world. It is intended as an indirect indication of the nature of the Absolute. In this connection, to say that an enquiry into the Absolute is instituted in the Brahma Sūtras because philosophers are seen to disagree about the cause of the world does not appear to be correct. For it suggests that the purpose of the Vedanta is to enquire into the nature of the cause of the world and declare that it is the Absolute; whereas the real intention is to institute an enquiry into the true nature of the Absolute, familiar already in a general way. Even if we conceded for

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argument'e sake that the purpose of the Veda was enquiry into the Absolute as cause, it would still not be right to claim that the Absolute had three conditions (its conditions as cause, as effect, i.e. as world, and as soul), but that an enquiry was ordained which embraced all phases of the Absolute without distinctiom. For (or Bhaskara's own showing) the enquiry into the Absolute is only instituted to put an end to dissent abcut the cause of the world (but not to argue about its nature as effect or as soul).

164 THE TREATMENT OF CAUSE AND EFFECT

The theory advanced by Bhaskara is that cause and effect are equaily real, and that they are both different and also non- different from one another.

(1) The Vaisesikas hold that rause and effect are totally different, that the cause is the lump of clay and that it is perceived as different from the clay dish and other effects. And the effect is a vessel for carrying water, or whatever else it may be, but not the original lump of clay. So the two are different. And an effect that was formerly non-existent is brought into existence. It is to refute this view that Sutra

p.93). II.i.14 (cp. M.V.164,2, ad init. ) is given. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.14,

Here the refutation of the Vaisesikas would be out of context. On the author's own view, the first section of the second Book of the Sutras (B.S. II.i.1 ff.) was concerned only with refuting the idea that the Vedanta lay in contradiction with Smrti (Bh. B.S.Bh.II.i.1, p.87).

(2) The author of the Sutras says, 'It (the world as effect) is non-different from that (the Absolute), as we know from such texts as "a suggestion of speech" (Chand.VI.i.4) and others' .. The author of the Sutras has made the claim that through knowl- edge of the one all is known. Now he brings in an example to substantiate his claim. 'Just as, my dear one, all that is made of clay is known from one lump of clay, so it follows that a modification is a name, a suggestion of speech. The truth is, it is all clay' (ibid.). That passage is what the author of the Sutras had in mind. Both the modification and the name are suggestions of the organ of speech. That which is named can very well be referred to as a modification. Speech embraces both the name and the thing named, as when we say 'Use the pot to bring the water'. The explanation why we say of the pot 'It is made of clay' is as follows. Somebody might claim that if the effect were a reality able to serve as a stimulus for empirical experience,

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the effect could not be non-different from its matcrial cause. To dispel that idea, the Upanishad says, 'The truth is, it is only clay'. It is the material cause which, in the form of the effect, still stands as the pot. For the pot is always apprehended in association with the clay, throughout past., present and future. The effect is dependent on the material cause. It is never apprehended in separation from it in space or time, in the way that a horse and a buffalo are anprehended separately. The effect is only a particular state of the material cause, different and yet not different. And because it is transient like shell-silver, it is referred to as 'un- real' and 'ephemeral'. (Bh.B.S.Bh. II. i.14, p.93)

How he can (on his own principles) say that the effeet is 'false like shell-silver' is not clear.

(3) The Upanishad later says 'The "firehood" of fire has dis- appeared' (Chand. VI.iv.1). It means that the effect is later (after analysis into its component elements, cp. M.V.33,2) seen as the cause and as nothing over and above the cause. It disappears into its own material ceuse. (Bh.B.S.Bh.lI.i.14, p.93)

(4) When the author of the Sutras montioned 'and other' texts, he meant texts like 'This whole world has this for its Self. That is the real. That is the Self. That thou art' (Chand. VI.viii.7). (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.14, p.93)

(5) And there is another text which shows that the world con- ceived as separate from the Self is real: 'His name is "real- ity of the real" Tne cosmic vital cnergy is the real. He is the reality of the vital energy' (Brhad. II.iii.6). If it had been intended to say that the world was unreal, the tcxt would have said 'The vital energy is the unreal'. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.14, p.93)

Here it is not clear why the effect is taken to be both differ- ent and non-different from the cause. It is true that, in the example quoted from the Upanishads, the clay is provisionally accepted as real in deference to perception. But one must take note of the force of the word 'only' in the phrase 'the truth is, it is only clay'. It would not make sense if the effect were taken as real. Again, in the treatment of 'threefolding', if it had been meant that the effect, which (after dissolution) is 'seen as the cause' and 'not. seen as anything over and above the cause', was nevertheless real in its own form, then why does the text speak repeatedly of fire and the sun and other entities losing their 'firehood' and 'sunhood' and disappearing? And why does it affirm that only the three basic elements that compose the world are real, in the words 'The truth is, "there are only the

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three elements"' (Chandogya VI.iv.1, etc.)?People would not imitially doubt the reality of the pot, cited in the example, or cf earthly fire, the sur and the rest, which it is cited to illustrate, since modifications of the elements and their names are the very basis on which empirical experience reste. It is the sole reality of the cause that is repeatedly empha- sized by reiterating the words 'a modification is a name, a suggestion of speech'. For no one denies or doubts that an external object, such as a pot, referred to by the organ of speech, is a fit object for empirical experience through that organ, or that its namo is a fit object either. So.it is not this that the Upanishad is teaching by its repeated atiirma- tion. What it is doing is to teach (from the stardpoint of metaphysical truth) the sole reality of the cause, and to emphasize by repetitica that the effect is a mere suggestion of speech, a mere external appearance and name. And it seems that this cannot be properly explained on the theory of those who hold that the effect is real. Bhaskara says of the effect, 'It is different and yet not different (from the cause). And because it is transient like sheli-silver, it is referred to as "unreal" and "ephemeral"'. Does he only mean by this that the effect is transient because it comcs and goes? Or does he mean that it is literally unreal, a mere piece of fantasy, like shell-silver? This point needs to be explained. In the ensuing part of the Upanishad the word 'false' (anrta) is used, both in the example and the thing illustrated, to mean the opposite of 'true'. 'If (in trial by ordeal) a person has committed the crime, he will have made himself false. Given to falsity, enshrouded in falsity, he will take up the searing hested axe and be branded and then executed. But if he did not do it, then he will have made himself true. Given to truth, enshrouded in (and protected by) truth, he will take up the searing heated axe and not be branded, and then he will be released' (Chand. VI.xvi.1-2). The text goes on, 'Just as such a person would not be branded, so this whole world has this (the Self) for its Self. That is the true/real (satya)'. The word 'satya' (true/real) occurs in the account both of the fllustration and the thing illustrated. We hear (in the ex- ample) 'Given to truth ... he is releascd', and in the thing illustrated (there is the idea) 'Convinced that the Absolute alone is real, one is released'. It seems, therefore, that the only interpretation that really agrees with the intentions of the author of the Sūtra is that of Bhagavatpada Sankara. The latter interprets the Sutra as following the principle of false attribution followed by subsequent retraction. The effect is superimposed onto the material cause like shell-silver onto the shell; it is merely suggested by speech to. appear as 'pot' or 'cup' (when the reality is only the clay). Nothing else apart from the mate- rial cause exists. That was the view with which the author of

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the Sutras was siding when he said, 'It (the effect) is non- different from that (the cause)' (B.S. II.i.14). Ctherwise he would have had to have said, 'It (the effect) is not non- different from the cause'. We have, also, the claim that another upanishadic text (Brhad. II.iii.6) teaches that the cosmic vital energy is real in the words, 'His name is "reality of the real". The cosmic vital energy is the real. He is the reality of the cosmic vital energy'. That claim was wrong. For where a point made in a Vedic text is the main topic of the passage in which it occurs, it cannot be effectively contradicted by a different point mede in another passage, where ihe latter point is not the main topic of the passage in which it occurs, but only something incidental. The passage containing the phrase 'a suggestion of speech' is one which repeatedly affirms that all mcdifications are mere names and that only the material cause is real. The phrase 'The cosmic vital energy is real', on the other hand, is a mere incidental remark made in conformity with general worldly opinion. The purpose of the passage in which it occurred was to proclaim 'He is the reality of the vital energy'. And the 'reality' of the vital energy only meant its reality from the empirical standpoint. It appears to be real. But the truth is proclaimed in the text 'neither this nor that'. Only the Self is real. And that is why the Self is referred to as 'the reality of the real' (Brhad. II. iii.6). 'The reality of the real' is a figurative expression like 'The iron scorches through the heat of the fire' (in which it is not literally meant that the iron has any power to scorch at all; it is only the fire in the iron that actually does the scorching, the iron being simply a vehicle for that fire; but we accept the appearance that the iron does the burning for purposes of ordinary speech). And so we have shown that this text does not contradict the unreality of the world ..

165 REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE UNREALITY OF THE EFFECT

We have already, on the occasion of examining the validity of perception and the other means of empirical knowledge at M.V. 161,1 above, given a bird's-eye view of the way in which Bhaskara's Commentary refutes the view that plurality is an illusion. Bhäskara also argues in the following way that Vedic revelation, too, shows that there is nothing to prove the falsity of the world.

(1) It is said that the fact that the universe is an illusion emerges from Vedic revelation. But that is incorrect. If all knowledge that arose from hearing were an illusion (as such a theory would imply), then texts like 'That thou art', which are composed of spoken syllables, would simply not exist. And then

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what would there be to show that the world was illusory? (Bh. B.S.Bh.II.i.14, p.95)

(2) Becausc the phrase 'There is no plurality here' (Katha II. i.ll) includes the word 'here', the view that it means that there is no plurality in the Absolute in its true nature as cause stands. But there is no contradiction if we affirm that there is plurality in the effect during the worlu-periods when the world is manifest. (ibid. )

(3) The phrase 'This Self is "neither this nor that" isimply states the true nature of the Self to the exclusion of the body and other elements of the not-self (where the nct-self is disregarded but not rejected as unreal). (ibid. )

(4) In the phrase 'For where there is an appearance of dual- ity' (Brhad. II.iv.14), the words 'an appearance of' (expressed in Sanskrit by the one word 'iva') are meaningless. It is as when we say 'It has an appearance of being spread out' (mean- ing 'it is spread out'). Or the word 'iva' may be being used for precise determination (to mean 'precisely where there is duality'), as when we say 'precisely like a horse' (yathasva iva). Or it may mean (not total negation but) similarity, as when we say, in the case of fire burning with damp fuel, 'The smoke and sparks are like the fire' (so that 'where there is an appearance of duality' could mean 'Where there is a manifes- tation which is not unreal but which appears to imply strict duality without actually doing so, there being a hidden element of unity'). In the state of the Absolute where there are various modifications, there a subject who is one perceives an object which is another. The following text 'But where every- thing has become his own Self, then by what power could he see what object?' (Brhad. IV.v.15, modified) denies that there is knowledge of objects when the Absolute has been realized in its causal form. In this way there are no contradictions. (ibid. )

It is an agreed poit in Vedanta that everywhere in duality there is a distinction between true and false. From perversity, the distinction is sometimes wrongly drawn. But if both the knowledge that comes through the ear and the words of such texts as 'That thou art' were illusory, how could the ear and the mouth be real, so that the speaker could pronounce the text and the hearer hear it and understand its meaning? What could then be proved to be true or proved to be false? What could be effectively negated? On this point one should consider the following saying of an expert: 'False imagination might be brought to an end if anyone had really imagined it. This doc- trine. (that things are imagined) is for the sake of teaching (those in Ignorance). When the truth is known, there is no duality' (G.K. I.18).

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Thus a distinction between truth and falsity only obtains before the attainment of the direct knowledge 'All this is the Absolute alone'. As the revered Commentator put it: 'Thus all worldly experience and Vedic teaching holds gocd before one realizes that one's true Self is the Absolute' (B.S.Bh. II.i.14, cp. M.V.48,7). On this point, we take up the study of the texts quoted by Bhaskara to show how incorrect his explanation ci them was.

(1) 'There is no plurality here: (Katha II.i.11): This text declares that there is no plurality in the Absolute as such; it does not say 'in the Absolute as cause'. For attri- buting cause and eifect to the Absclute does not fit in with the context. In the previous Book (valli) the Upanishad had said that a person can become immortal through knowledge of the Self as the Absclute, free from all attributes of the uni- varse of plurality, in the words: 'Oue who discerns that is frced from the jaws of death. It is without sound, impalpable, without form or colour, undecaying, without taste, without odour, constant and eternal; it is beginningless and endless, firm-fixed, beyond the Great Principle (mahat)' (Katha I.ili. 15). In the present (second) Book, the same principle is described in pluralistic form to bring out how the Self does not shine forth if it is only described in pluralistic form. The verse under discussion itself decries vision of the Self in the midst of plurality - 'He goes from death to death who sees the appearance of plurality here' (Katha II.i.1l). It is not in the Absolute as cause that plurality might be found and therefore require to be decried. Therefore the correct view is: 'What the text negates is the plurality set up by Igno- rance'.

(2) 'This Self is "neither this nor that"' (Brhad. II.iii.6, etc.): This phrase occurs several times in the Brhadāranyaka. It is always 'the Self' that is so described, as in 'And so there is the teaching "neither this nor that"' (Brhad. II.11i.6). In the first section of the third Book of the Upanishad the elements are described, beginning with earth and ending with the ether, with each succeeding element pervaded by the earlier ones and being presided over by such and such a deity. The penultimate text of this third Book (Brhad. III.ix.26) begins with the question 'On what are you and your body supported?' And the answer given is 'on the vital energy'. The text then goes on to mention a series of forms of the vital energy, such as the out-breath (prana) and the down-breath (apana), affirm- ing that each is supported on the next in the series. The body and other components of the individual soul are not here mentioned or considered. At Brhadāranyaka IV.ii.2 there is first a consideration of the vital energies of Vaisvanara and Taijasa, beginning with the words 'His name is Indha'. Later comes the text, 'This Self is "neither this nor that"', from

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which we conclude that Vaisvanara and other states are denied of the Self. Then again in the fourth section of the fourth Book the text speaks successively cf the man of worldly desires being bound in transmigration, and of the one whc wants the Self and gives up all other desires and obtains liberation, while the passage concludes with the teaching about the Sclf as 'neither this nor that' (Brhad. IV.iv.22). In neither of these passages is anything found to suggest the discrimination of the Self from the body and other components of the individual personality. Or consider the 'Maitreyi Brahmana' section of the Brhad- aranyaka. There we have various successive teachings. There is the teaching about universals and particulars, illustrated by the sound of the drum and other exampies (Brhad. IV.v.8, cp. M.V.37). There is the teaching about the rise of the universe of rame and form from the Self and its dissolution in the Self, illustrated by the examples of the smoky fire, and the sea as the goal of all waters (Brhad. IV.v.1l, 12). And finally, having described the two kinds of vision, vision of duality and vision of non-duality, the text says, 'This Self is "neither this nor that"' (Brhad. IV.v.15). Here one can only say that, throughout all this, whatever was first attributed to the Self as a means to make it accessible to the mind is later denied of it from the standpoint of final truth. For the whole enterprise is intended to bring out in the end how there is no plurality in the Self. Nowhere does one find the attempt (spoken of by Bhaskara) to see the Self through disregarding the body and other elements of the not-self. For the Self cannot be known as an object in its true form. Therefore, it appears to us correct to conclude that the universe of plurality here negated is an illusory one.

(3) 'Where one sees the appearance of duality, there a sub- ject who is one perceives an object which is another .... But where all this has become his Self ... ' (Brhad. IV. v.15): Here Bhaskara spoke of the phrase 'the appearance of' in 'the ap- pearance of duality' as either having no meaning, cr else as having the meaning of precise determination, or else as expres- sing the idea of similarity. There is not the slightest foun- dation for any of these interpretations. Earlier in the MaitreyI Brahmana (Brhad. IV.v.l ff.) there has already been the account of the Self as the cause of the origination, mainten- ance and dissolution of the world (Brhad. IV.v.1l-12). Then the Self has been spoken of as a mass of Consciousness, but as appearing to acquire differentiated consciousness through asso- ciation with the body and organs composed of the elements, and finally as ascending from the elements and then no longer enjoying individualized consciousness, as expressed in the text 'There is no particularized consciousness after leaving the body' (Brhad. IV.v.13). And so, where there is the appearance of duality, there it is as if the Self were confined within

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(a solid, limited shape, like) a lump of salt (before it is dissolved in water). There we find particularized conscious- ness, and the perception of an object, which is one thing, by a subject, who is another. But one does not find this in Non- duality, our true essence. This is the right way to interpret the teaching of Sri Yajmavalkya. This is shown by the text which limits reality to the Self. 'But where all this has be- come for him the Self alone' (Brhad. IV.v.15). The restriciios 'alone' negates every state of duality; the force of 'iva' in this passage (translated above as 'the appearance of') is to reject a wrong view previcusiy held. There is no text in the Upanishad about a person realizing the Absolute in its causal form (as taught by Bhaskara, M.V. 165, 4 ad fin. ). Bhaskara Acarya further expresses himseif on this topic as follows.

(5) Nor is it possible to suppose that the universe can be false or real, according to whether it is thought of in rela- tion to this or that individual person - for example, to suppose that it was falsc for seekers of liberation but real for others. For you cannot say that a colour is unreal if thought of in relation to a blind man and real if thought of in relation to others. For objects do not correspond to the nature of the human beings observing them, that the answer to the question whether they were real or unreal should depend on the condition of their observers .... And again, there are the lines: 'How could one possibly ac- cept the statement "The universe existed when he was ignorant, but now that he has become enlightened it no longer exists"? It would never be correct to say "A double-moon existed before, but it no longer exists now". But on the theory that we are combating (i.e. the Advaitin's theory) perception and the other means of empirical knowledge are placed on the same level as the illusory cognition of a double-moon' .... Further, in the case of the double-moon, the cause of the error is present in the form of the eye-disease of double-vision; but we are not aware of any such defect of perception that would enable us to dismiss the world as an illusion. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.4, p.17-8)

Here one has to ask, 'Whoever can it be that has said in this way that the same thing exists in relation to one person while not existing in relation to another?' The whole world accepts that the fluctuations of the notions of truth and falsity depend on knowledge and ignorance. One who is seeing illusory shell-silver does not think it to be false while he is seeing it. Nor does the fact that everyone who sees such illusory silver thinks that it is real make it in fact real. Nor does -any previously apprehended real silver vanish when a person who had been seeing shell-silver comes to see the shell and loses his illusion. The same thing holds in the case of perception and the other means of empirical knowledge, along with the

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universe of plurality that they reveal. All are false, but appear as if real to thcse under the sway of Ignorance, while the notion that they are real is eventually cancelled through metaphysical knowledge. You yourself (Bhaskara) accept in the same way that worldly pecple take their sense of identity with the body and so on as true, and then lose this idea through deeper metaphysical knowledge. On this topic the sages who knew the true tradition have spoken as follows.

(6) 'Just as the notion of the identity of the Self with the body is imagined at first to hold as valid, so are all the means of knowledge found in the world (including the Veda) imagined to hold as valid until the Self has been realized'. (Quoted at Sankara's B.S.Bh.I.i.4, cp. M.V.28,10;161,3)

(7) If the world of plurality really existed, it would no doubt come to an end. But this duality is a mere illusion. Non-duality is the final truth. (G.K. I.17, M.V.47,3)

Nor is it right to maintain that no one ever has erroneous knowledge. Those who have attained deep metaphysical discrimi- nation know that, because plurality disappears in dreamless sleep, mystical trauce (samadhi) and kindred states, it is inconstant and therefore illusory. If plurality is illusory, how can we go on seeing it? In just the same way as we go on seeing the sun and moon as if they were little things we could hold in our hands. So we conclude as follows. People who wish to display their ingenuity may explain away these Vedic texts affirming non- duality and denying duality, resorting to this thecry and that. But when these texts are examined in their context, taking note of what comes before and follows, and with proper recourse to such reasoning as leads on to immediate experience of metaphy- sical reality, it will become obvious to the unprejudiced ob- server that everywhere in these passages the method of the Upanishads is false attribution followed by subsequent retrac- tion.

166 THE DOCTRINE THAT THE SELF UNDERGOES REAL TRANSFORMATION

In the Sutra, 'And the Absolute must be understood as the material cause of the world, or otherwise there would be a contradiction between the thesis and the example offered to illustrate it' (B.S. I.iv.23, M.V.33,8), the claim is that from the knowledge of one thing there can be knowledge of all, and the example is that through a knowledge of any piece of clay there is knowledge of all things made of clay. This claim and this example show that the Absolute is not only the ruler of the world, but also its material cause. The same point is also

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made in the two following Sutras. There is the crcation- statement expressed as a determination of the will, in the form 'Let Me be many' (Chand. VI.ii.3; Taitt. II.6). And there are the texts referring to the creation and dissolution of the world with the Absolute as its material cause. In a slightly later Sūtra we find, '(The Absolute is also to be regarded as the material cause of the wcrlu) because it creates itself, tnrough transformation (par inama) ' (B.S. I. iv.26 for Sankara, I.iv.25 for Bhaskara). Cr this Śri Bhagavatpada's comment is: 'The Self, although already existent and evident, transformed itself, assuming particular modifications. We see such a transformation into modifications in the case of other material causes like clay'. But in Bhaskara's Commentary wc find the following:

(1) The meaning is that the supreme Self transformed itself into the (world as) effect. It made a projection of its powers (śakti). Its powers are infinite and inconceivable. It pro- jects them at the time of the creation and maintenance of the world, like the sun projecting its rays; and it withdraws them at the time of world-dissolution in the same way. (Bh.B.S.Bh. I.iv.25, p.85)

Though the word 'transformation' is used by both authors (i.e. by Śri Śankara and Bhāskara), there is a great difference bet- ween the two conceptions: For Śri Bhagavatpada, the clay and other material causes stay what they are, while manifesting themselves as pots or in other forms. For him, the pots and other modifications are mere suggestions of speech. They do not have any existence other than that of the clay, which is their true nature. Similarly, the Self, too, manifests as the universe of plurality. The meaning is that the universe has no existence except as the Self. But on Bhaskara's view, the supreme Self really has an infinity of inconceivable powers. And the world of plurality, which is its effect, and which rep- resents a projection of these powers, is perfectly real. That is the difference between the two doctrines.

(2) And there is a text in agreement with that (doctrine of the real transformation of the Self propounded by the Commen- tator and the author of the gloss on the Chandogya Upanishad) which runs: 'There is a real transformation, as in the case of (milk transformed into) curds and the like'. As for those who propagate that reprehensible, unfounded Maya Vada proclaimed in the verses of the Mahayana Buddhists - they are deceivers of the people. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.iv.25, p.85)

Here what is contradicted is the view that the effect, as a mere false appearance, is illusory. But the teaching here con- tradicted is quite evidently supported by the Veda (which says, 'A modification is a name, a suggestion of speech', (Chand.

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VI.i.4, M.V.33,1, etc.).

(3) Do you ask how there could be a real transformation of something which, like the ether, is partless? We reply: Be- cause it is of the very nature of transformation, like milk. And one could also quite well say that, being omniscient and omnipotent, Being could transform itself by its own will. (Bh. B.S.Bh. II.i.14, p.96)

Here there is a clear case of circular argumentation. The Absolute undergoes transformation bccause it is cf the nature of transformation; and it has that rature on account of its trausformation. One who says that the Self can endue itself with real trars- formation because it is omniscient aud omnipotent is claiming, in effect, that what is omnipotent can periorm the impossible. Wouid something omnipotent, on this basis, be able to effect even its own destruction? Or would some omnisciert being be able to know ite own non-cxistence? These questiens are not raised.

(4) But is it not the case that milk is able to undergo trans- formation because it is made up of parts? We reply: It is not the mere fact of having parts that enables it to undergo trans- formation. If it were, water would be able to undergo trans- formation into curds. So it is not the mere fact of having parts that is the critical factor. Milk undergoes transforma- tion because it is of its very nature to do so. (Bh.B.S.Bh. II.i.14, p.96)

Oh, the habit cf empty rational speculation! What will it not produce next? If transformation implied possession of parts, we are told, then water, too, would be able to undergo trans- formation into curds. What strange new rule of logic is this? Our logician should be asked: 'If what has the power to undergo transformation can (for that reason) become curds, then why cannot water (which has that power) become curds?' If he were to reply 'Because it does not have the nature to do sc', then for philosphers who believed that the behaviour of things was explained entirely by their natures, what philosopher could fail to prove any point he fancied? All that would be required to prove any point one wished to make would be to say 'This happens because this is of this nature, that happens because that is of that nature'. And then, as there would be no need to go to the trouble of showing that the (unobserved) thing to be proved was invariably concomitant with the observed sign, all examination of reasons for proof or disproof could just be thrown into the sea.

(5) Here there is another point that requires reflection. In transformation, does the power (sakti) lie in the whole or in

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the parts? The -proponent of the Maya theory does not accept the existence of a stable whole over and above the flow of transmigratory experience. So for him the power must lie in the parts, as that is the only alternative left. Now, on this theory, the parts themselves could not have parts. For, if they did, there would be a transformation of something having parts (and thus of a whole, which is excluded ex hypothesi). And even if one did assume parts of parts, would they undergo transformation or not? If they did not, you ought to find pure milk in curds. As this is not the case, it must be accepted that all parts undergo transformation. And again, if parts are assumed to have parts, the parts must also have parts, and you fall into infinite regress. And you could put the 'Ocean of Milk' (primeval waters before creation) into a small pot, parts being infinite in number. Therefore the prin- ciple that holds throughout, and holds also for the Absolute, is 'Transformation is only found in that which does not have parts'. And that is why the Veda teaches transformation with the help of such examples as that of the seed of the banyan tree (Chand. VI.xii.1). (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.14, p.96)

This is another example of showing off one's logical ingenuity to small purpose. If parts cannot have parts, and if you fall into infinite regress if you assume parts for them - very well then, let us accept that parts cannot undergo transformation, but how does that damage the case of the exponent of Māya? He does not accept the reality of the cause-effect relation as you do. And again, let us accept for argument that what has parts cannot undergo transiormation. But how does thai help in establishing that oniy that which is without parts undergoes transformation? If you say 'Transformation is perceived' we concede it willingly. But how can we accept that such trans- formation is real? The view of your opponent (i.e. the true expert) is, '(Since the real already exists), its birth through illusion is conceivable, but not its real birth' (G.K. III.27). And again, even if it were conceded for argument that the partless Absolute could undergo real transformation, how could infinite regress be avoided? It is not right to claim that the 'Unborn' (aja) undergoes birth. Hence one must accept here, too, the reasoning of the expert (Śri Gaudapāda) who said, 'He who holds that anything is really born, necessarily holds (the absurd position) that what is already born is born' (G.K. III.27) and realize that the real birth of anything would in- volve infinite regress (i.e. the birth itself would have to be born, and that would involve auother birth, which in turn would have to be born and so on in an infinite series, showing that real birth is inconceivable). As for the example of the seed of the banyan tree given at

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Chandogya VI.xii.l, its purpose was not to illustrate real transformation, but only tc point out how the world, as an effect made up of name, form and action, arose from the Abso- lute, which is of extremely subtle nature.

(6) A certain verse runs: 'Transformation (parinama) is the projection of a power (sakti) on the part of a being that does not lose its original form in the process, like the projection of a cob-web by a spider'. The sages adhere to this doctrine of the projection and with- drawal of powers, because there is evidence for it. They illus- trate it from the examples of the threads which coherc to form a cloth without losing their nature as threads, and of the wind, which comes forth from the ether without the latter losing its nature as ether. (Bh.B.S.Bh. II.i.14, p.96)

Here, the example of the spider has an implication detrimental to Bhaskara's system. That insect eats yet smaller animals and its spittle solidifies into a cob-web. So it is not right to say that the spider does rot lose its original form. It swells through eating other insects, and shrinks through expel- ling them externally in the web. The threads of a cloth may not lose their form as threads. But when they are woven together they are perceived in a new form as the cloth, which excludes perception of their old one. They manifest as the cloth, which appears to be a separate new entity, though it is in fact not so. Thus the cioth is a modi- fication and a mere name. Its true nature is revealed, under analysis, as the threads. One must also accept that the ether, while remaining in its true nature as ether, appears as wind. For the wind has never been perceived by anyone to be produced from the ether as something new, or as existing without being pervaded by the ether. One must accept, indeed, the authority of the Vedic text, 'Wind arose (from the ether)' (Taitt. II.1). But it is known that the purpose of that text is only to show that the wind does not exist except in the ether and as an illusory emanation from the ether. The evidence for this is the two texts which show that the ether is nothing other than the Absolute, namely 'The ether was born from the Self, the. wind born from the ether' (Taitt.II.1) and ' (The Absolute, the Indestructible is) ... not the wind, not the ether ... ' (Brhad. III.viii.8). Then there is the statement in the Smrti which shows that from the empirical standpoint the wind ever stands in the ether, though only as an illusory appearance. The Gita first says 'All beings exist in Me' (IX.4) and then 'And yet they do not exist in Me' (IX.5). To illustrate this it says 'As the wind ever exists in the ether' (IX.6) So we conclude that a trensformation in which the thing undergoing the change does not lose its original form is in fact an illusory transformation.

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(7) Nor is it true to say that transformation does not occur in the case of something that is without parts. For example, lust, anger, greed and bewilderment, each different from one another, arise in the (partless) mind like waves in the sca, without the mind losing its original nature. And this is shown in the text, '(Desire, determination, doubt) ... are all mind' (Brhad. I.v.3, cp. M.V. 79,2), It is like wind coming forth from the ether, and fire from wind. If you say that therc is noth- ing to support the example, it means you must be deaf. Do you not hear the Vedic text which enunciates it? Perhaps you will say, 'l hear it. But it is not evidence. For, since it is contradictory, it is (not authoritative but) a mere expianatory passage (artha-vada) that might be no more than eulogy'. 'Well then, dearest-beloved of the Creator, just take a lock at a spider'. Perhaps you will reply, 'That example (the spider's web) is in order because it. is perceived, (but it will not. suffice lo illustrate an incomprehensible matter that is beyond perception)'. But even then there is no difference, as the Vedic teaching is also part of what is perceived. Nor is there any difference between the various means of knowledge in point of the strength of their authority. Each is equally authorita- tive in its own field. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.14, p.98)

The account of minu here is out of harmony with the Upanishads. For we have 'The mind, my dear one, is composed of food' (Chand VI.v.4) and 'One part was left over. That, when kindled with rood, blazed into light' (Chand.VI.vii.6). These texts prove that the mind has parts, because they teach that it expands and contracts. We have explained about the example of the spider already. As for the question whether or not the Veda teaches real transformation, that remains to be studied in the follow- ing pages. Sowe can say that on the present topic Bhāskara has not said anything of significance.

167. REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF MĀYĀ

The doctrine of Maya is refuted by Bhaskara as follows.

(1)How can this claim that the world is a mere illusion be advanced without proof? For the supreme deity said with con- scious intent 'Let Me make each of the three into a triad' (Chand. VI.iii.3). Who, indeed, undaunted at his prospects from demerit in lives to come, would dare to raise the idea 'All is illusion', having misunderstood the meaning? If he thinks that the unseen future results of his deeds are of no account, being all of one piece with the illusory objects that he sees, he is landed in the contradiction of supposing that the seen and the unseen are one. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.14, p.99)

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We have already explained the meaning of this upanishadic text above (M.V.164, 5, note), when explaining the texts 'The fire- hood of fire disappeared' (Chand. VI.iv.1) and 'A modification is a name, a mere suggestion of speech' (Chand.VI.1.4). That the seen and the unseen are all of one piece (i.e. illusory) has been proclaimed by the Veda itself when it says 'The truth is, it is only clay' (ibid.).

(2) And where do you derive this idea The author of the Sutras nowhere uses the word .Maya' (to describe the world of waking experience). It is true that, in speaking of dream- cog.ition, he says 'It is a mere illusion (maya-matra), because its nature is to be an incomplete manifestation' (B.S. III. ii.3). But he also speaks of the essential difference between waking and dream, saying, 'On account of the essential differ- ence between waking and dream, the ideas of the waking state are not to be classed with thosc of dream and the like' (B.S. II.ii.29). (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.14, p.99)

It is trve that the author of the Sitras does not use the word Maya (of the world of waking experience). But he quotes the upanishadic text which says that all this realm of modification is but a suggestion of speech, in the Sutra 'Cause and effect are non-different, as we know from such texts as "a suggestion of speech"' (B.S. II.i.14). And here he evidently declares that this realm of modification is illusory. As for the Sūtra 'On account of the essential difference between waking and dream' (B.S. II.ii.29), we shall be explaining that when deal- ing with the treatment of the three states (M.V.172,4), so we may leave it for the present.

(3) If the world were a mere illusion, then that would have rendered useless the whole effort of the author of the Sutras in quoting the objections raised by the Sankhyas and others topic by topic in the second Book, beginning 'And if you think that on this view there is no place for the Smrti ... ' (B.S. II.i.l). It would also have rendered useless the discussion of the rise and dissolution of the elements beginning in the third section of the second Book, 'Not the ether, as there is no relevant Vedic text' (B.S. II.iii.1). (Bh.B.S.Bh. II.i.14, p.99-100)

What confusion! On the assumption of the Nature of the Sankhyas (or on that of the eternal atoms of the Vaisesikas) or on any doctrine proclaiming an objective principle as material cause of the world, it becomes impossible to establish the existence of the Self as one without a second. But on the doctrine that the Absolute is the one cause, the unity and sole reality of the Self is established through such texts as 'This whole world has this for its Self' (Chand.VI.viii.7), 'All this is this Self' (Brhad. II.iv.6) and 'There is no plurality here'

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(Brhad. IV.iv.19). Why do you not take note of the refutaticn of your position made by Śri Bhagavatpada, following the hint given by the Sutra 'It (the world as effect) is non-different from that (the Absolute), as is shown by such taxts as "a suggestion of speech"' . (B.S. II. i.14)? That would save you from describing flowering ebeny when asked about mango trees. Then there was the discussion about the creation of the eicments set in train by the Sutra 'Not the ether, as there is no relevant Vedic text' (B.S. II.iii.1). In fact this creation is illusory. For the elements never depert from their true nature as identicel with the Absolute in the three periods of origination, maintenance and dissolution. Why Bhāskara cannot see that the sole point of the Sutra is to support this point of uparishadic teaching is not clear.

(4) Perhaps you (Advaitin) will say, 'Bnt is not the author of the Sutras himself going to declare that everything except the Absolute is an illusion? For we have the Sutra, "Nor does the supreme Being either have or not have finite characteristics, according to the conditioning adjunct under which it is viewed; for it is everywhere taught that it does not have finite characteristics at all" (B.S. III.ii.ll)'. But you should not say so. For the topic of the present passage is something dif- ferent. The Sutra is not teaching how the Absolute should be meditated on with form; it is teaching how the Absolute should be meditated on without forr. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.14, p.100)

Meditation is not the topic of the Sutras here at all. The word 'meditation' (upasana) does not come up in the present Sutra or in the ones that follow either. The topic of medita- tion comes in the third section of the third Sook. You your- self say in your Cummentary to Brahma Sutra III.iii.1, 'This (topic of) meditation is introduced later, after the metaphysi- cal truth has been ascertained'. Thus in the present Sūtra (B.S. II.i.14) the concern is only with establishing metaphysi- cal truth. And this is exactly as you have yourself expressed it in commenting on Brahma Sutra III.ii.ll with the words: ' (Only the formless aspect of the Absolute, as cause, is the proper object of meditation. Why?) Because it implies the bringing to an end of the whole universe of plurality. What exists naturally and of its own accord is the eternal, change- less principle, one only without a second. The effect comes into action later, and is inconstant from the point of view of time .... Even when considered as limited by the adjunct of earth and the other elements, the supreme Being does not both have and not have finite characteristics. For its form brought about by the limiting adjunct of the earth and other elements is not different from itself, and comes adventitiously. The universe of name and form is the Absolute, but the Absolute is not the universe of name and form' (Bh.B.S.Bh. III.ii. 1l). But this being so, how can that which is by nature eternal

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and changeless and without a second be a cause? The Absolute is void of the universe of plurality marked by the distinction of cause and effect. The Veda says, 'This Absolute is without a before (cause) or an after (effect), without anything inside it or outside it in space' (Brhad. II.v.19). In the case of the Absolute in this (its true) form, there can be no possible distinction between meditator and object of meditation. 'The Absolute is this Self', says Brhadāranyaka II.v.19; it is known only as the Self of the meditator.

(5) But this doctrine cannot be made out. So, if we should accept 'All this is an illusion', what it would have to mean would be that this effeci in the form of the multifarious world does not exist in the Absclute as (formless) cause. But it is not taught that the universe of plurality does not exist. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.ii.ll, p.135)

What a display of attachment to the illusory world! How truly the great philosopher Gaudapada spoke when he said 'People feel attachment for what does not even exist. There is nc duality at all' (G.K. IV.75). The Veda informs all of us in emphatic style that all this is in fact the Absolute, manifesting in an illusory way as the world. It says, 'This world is in reality the Absolute, immortal. The Absolute is to the east, the Abso- lute is to the west, the Absolute to the south, the Absolute to the north, spread out above and below. All this world is verily the Absolute alone; the Absolute is the greatest' (Mund. II.ii.12). The meaning is that all this world is in truth the Absolute alone and nothing else, even now. All notions other than the Absolute are mere Ignorance, like the notion that a rope is a snake. This wcrld is verily the Absolute. The Abso- lute is the real in the highest sense. What more could one want, when the world of plurality is demonstrably an illusion?

(6) The text 'Know that this Nature (prakrti) is an illusory display (maya)' was quoted (by Śri Sankara), but inappositely. The Nature here under consideration is that which is 'One and Unborn' (Svet.IV.5) and made up of the elements fire, water and food (earth). That 'Nature' is known by the word 'Maya'. Nature is called 'Prakrti' because it 'projects' (kr) forth (pra-) its modifications. In the Gita, too, Nature is real; for it is referred to as the true nature of the creatures (cp. Bh.G.III. 5;XIII.21;XVIII.40. T.N.) Sometimes the word Maya is used to mean Nature. And Maya is sometimes called 'intellec- tual power' (prajna), being that by which things are limited or determined. Maya has this meaning in the passage ' Indra (goes about in many forms) through his magic powers (maya)'

p.100) (R.V. VI.47.18, quoted Brhad. II.v.19). (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.14,

The upanishadic text 'One should know that Nature is Māya' is

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one in which Nature is called Maya. This shows that Nature is not reality in the highest sense, as follows from the remaining part of the sentence, 'The Great Lord is the magician who oper- ates this magic illusiou (maya) ' (Śvet.IV.10). This text must be taken as forming one sentence along with the previous one, as it would not make sense to say we had a new topic saying 'The strolling magician (undorstood in a work-a-day worldly sense) is the Great Lord'. As the magic show obeys the commaud of the magician, so Nature obeys the command of the Great Lord. The point made is that Nature only exists as the Lord, just as the rope-snake only exists as the rope. In the previous verse the text said, 'From this Indestruc- tible Principle the magician projects this world, and the other (the individual soul) is confined within the world through Māya' (Śvet. IV.9). The teaching is that the individual soul is affected by the illusion of Maya, and that the Lord is indepen- dent of it and unaffected by it. In the Gita, too, we have the text 'This is My divine Māyā, composed of the three constituents, hard to cross. Those who devote themselves wholly to Me cross over this illusion' (VII.14). Here, the fact that Maya is taught as something that has to be crossed over shows that it cannot be real in the highest sense. It is also said later (VII.19) that the enlight ened person has the knowledge "Vasudeva is all'. Here again, because it is the enlightened person (jmanavan, the person who has knowledge) who crosses over Maya, it follows that Nature is not conceived as a reality. For knowledge is never found to remove anything real. It is true that the word 'maya' is sometimes used to mean 'intellectual power' (prajñā), as in 'Indra by his "māyā-s" (plural) ... ' (Brhad. II.v.19). But when the text is seen in context, it becomes clear that it is a form of 'intellectual power' pertaining to the realm of Ignorance that is meant. True cognition would not introduce plurality into what was origi- nally one. Thus the Advaita position is unimpeachably correct. If the Veda and Smrti are to count as authoritative, then the Nature from which the world proceeds must be illusory. But that 'Maya' is supported by a reality, the Absolute.

168 THE DOCTRINE OF THE REALITY OF THE EFFECT BEFORE PRODUCTION

Bhaskara's view of the reality of the effect before production can be seen from the following passages.

(1) There is non-difference of the effect from the cause. We have the text, 'Being only, my dear one, was all this in the beginning' (Chand. VI.ii.1). Here, because the effect that is to come forth later, expressed by the word 'this', is affirmed

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to exist in advance in the cause, it is non-different. from it. How is this known? Because 'this' (the effect, the world) and 'Being' (the cause) stand in grammatical agreement as subject and predicate. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.15, p.100)

But what does standing in grammatical agreement really imply here? Does it imply that the effect (the world) is real in the cause (Being)? Or does it immply that (in its true nature) the effect is real as the cause?

(2) Thus the effect is real in the cause. For it can be shown by argument. By what argument? A pot may be produced from a lump of clay, but not curds or the horn or a hare. If the pot were originally unreal, and were nevertheless produced, then curds and the horn of a hare could also be produced from clay, because they also are equally unreal (i.e. equally non- existent in the clay). Perhaps you will say that developments are determined by the laws governing the powers present in the material cause. But this is not sc. We may ask the objector in return, 'How can there be laws governing the powers present in the material cause?' The power in the lump of clay being (on his theory) as unreal before its manifestation as the effect is before its manifestation, how can it be governed by law and limited to one place? Unless the effect is conceived as present in the cause prior to its production, no proposed causal law can get past that counter-question. Therefore it is as an already previ- ously existing entity that the effect is produced. (Bh.B.S.Bh. II.i.18, p.101)

(3) The effect is definitely real prior to its production. Why? Because the effect is declared to be the cause itself assuming this or that state. And there is no absolute distinc- tion between states and that which undergoes them. absolute distinction between substance and attribute, between There is no

the cloth and its white colour. For they form one entity. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.18, p.101)

(4) We experience both difference and identity between effect and cause. The attribute of identity itself implies distinc- tion, like the 'identity' of the ocean (which implies that the ocean persists as identical through its changes of form). This distinction is said to consist in the fact of being composed of waves and bubbles and foam and the like. For these are not found in stones and so on. They are powers of water only. Powers and their possessors are also found to be both non- different and different from one another. The powers of fire, such as burning and illumining, are distinct entities (even among themselves). Vital energy, too, is distinct according to its different modifications, such as the outgoing vital energy, the down-going and so on. Therefore everything is both

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one and many. There is nothing either wholly without distinc- tions or wholly distinct. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.18, p.101)

(5) The states of manifestation and disappearance overcome one another successively, so that one or other of them supervenes, as the brilliance of an emerald prevails over that of its rivals. And there is the example given in the Veda of a part- less, atomic seed of a banyan tree, which is perceived to undergo many changes of condition as it spreads and thickens. And the image is held out to us, 'A great banyan tree is stand- ing'. Nothing that is perceived is impossible, as the maxim has it. And we have the case of virility, which must be al- ready present earlicr in latent form, even though it does not manifest till adolescence; if this is not admitted, we cannot explain why a eunuch cannot become virile. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.18, p.102)

(6) The meaning is that the supreme Self transformed itself into the (world as) effect. It made a projection of its powers (śakti). Its powers are infinite and inconceivable. It pro- jects them at the time of creation and maintenance of the world, like the sun projecting its rays, and it withdraws them at the time of world-dissolution in the same way. Thus there is the verse of the Svetasvatara Upanishad: 'He has no body and no organs. There is none equal to Him and none greater. His supreme power is described in the Veda as operating in various ways. It is His natural and inherent power of knowing and acting' (Svet.VI.8). (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.iv.25, p.85; cp. M.V. 166,1, note)

(7) When this universe dissolves, it first returns back into its cause as a latent power of the latter. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.9, p.91)

(8) The Lord has two powers: one is His power to assume the form of that which is experienced, the other His power to be- come an experiencer. His power to assume the form of that which is experienced is able to assume the form of the ether and the rest of the non-conscious world. The power to experi- ence, which is conscious, stands as the individual souls. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.27, p.105)

(9) The powers that things have cannot be understood by an untutored mind. For hypothetical reasoning has no secure foot- ing anywhere, and it is never possible to demonstrate that one thing is either totally identical with or totally distinct from anything else. All the less, then, could the ordinary mind fathom the transformations of the conscious, omniscient, omni- potent, independent principle, the cause of the world, knowable only through Vedic revelation. For it transforms itself of its own free will according to its own independent powers for the

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guod of the creatures of the world. (Bh.B.S.Dh. II.i.14, p.97)

(10) And this omniscient Being, (at the beginning of a world- period), knowing that the time for living creatures to undergo further experience has arrived, first of all projects the subtle, unmanifest ether, and afterwards Hiranyagarbha. He then enters what He has projected and abides within it as its Self. Next He projects the cosmos (lit. the 'egg'), stariing with the ether-clement and proceeding with the other elcments in order. Then He projects the whole hierarchy of objects down to the vegetable and mineral realms, according to the merit and demerit of living beings. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.iii.30, p.65)

(11) The controlling power of the Inner Ruler and the supreme Self is perfectly real. It is not the product of anyone's fanciful imagination, that it should be the result of Igno- rance, like a mirage. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.35, p.107)

As the texts quoted from Bhaskara's Commentary reveal, the thrust of his argument is to show that only the real is capable of being produced, not the unreal. In the case of production, something that is already, even before production, existing in the cause in the form of a latent power, is brought out into manifestation, and the 'production' is really that manifesta- tion. Since the Lord has infinite powers, He projects modifi- cations in this form or that. What has been said so far will be accepted by every Vedantin, as there are a number of texts in the Upanishads in which it is taught. But there is another point that has to be considered here. Is this projection real or illusory? Here, on the subject of a cosmic power, serious students should attend to these words of Śri Bhagavatpada.

(12) And if he (the one who denies the pre-existence of the effect in the cause) assumes the existence of a power in the material cause which conditions it to produce one effect (e.g. clay pots ) and not another (e.g. curds), then that power can- not be either different from the material cause or unreal. For if it were either unreal or different from the material cause the effect would also be unreal and different from the material cause (which is absurd). Therefore the power must be non- different from the material cause (in which it resides) and the effect non-different from the power. (Sankara's B.S.Bh.II.i.18; cp. M.V.36,4, with note)

One cannot, indeed, assume that the power of heat in fire has a different nature from fire and is something other than fire. In the same way, one cannot assume a power in the Absolute that is different from the Absolute. In fact, all talk of a 'power' turns out to be a mere figure of speech evoked by prac- tical experience, as when we speak of 'the body of the stone statue'.

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Bhaskara asks, 'Have we not hereby refuted that objection raised in sophistical reasoning which says "A power must be muitifarious in nature, and also natural and not adventi- tious"?' To this we reply, 'Yes, indeed'. When we say of the power that it is 'natural' we mean that it is non-different from its own true Self. But the word 'power' is only men- tioned relative to its products. Wher the effects of the power are seen to be non-different from the Self, it is seen that the power also is non-different from the supreme Self. So non- duality is in no way costradicted. There is, hcwever, another point made by Bhaskara:

(13) Perhaps you will say that the Veda is not concerned with teaching the historical reality of creation, but rather with teaching non-duality. For no human advantage would accrue from a knowledge of the nature of creation, and it cannot be the purpose of the Veda to teach facts about the realm of distine- tions, as these are accessible through other means of knowledge (reading siddhatvat). To this we reply as follows. You teach the unity and sole existence of the Self on the ground that cause and effect are non-different. But the argument for this is unfounded. If creation was not admitted, then the ether and all the other elements would have to be constant and eter- nal, just as the Mimamsakas (who do not admit the doctrine of world-periods) say. Nor is it right to say that creation is not a topic of human interest. For teaching about it is needed so that the soul can know what is implied by human experience. (Bh.B.S.Bh.IJ.i.14, p.98)

This statement has not been properly thought through. To say 'It is not the purpose of the Veda to teach the histcrical reality of creation' is not the same thing as to say 'Ether and the other elements are constant and eternal'. To under- stand this point, one should consider attentively the following texts of Śri Bhagavatpāda.

(14) (To teach us about this creation and world-appearance is not at all what the Veda has in view.) .For such knowledge would not be connected with any human end, either visible or revealed. Nor would it be in any way possible to assume that there was such a connection, for exegesis applied to the prob- lem of the opening and closing of topics in the Vedic texts shows that the creation texts are mere subordinate elements that sometimes crop up in the course of teaching about the Absolute., (Sankara's B.S.Bh.I.iv.14)

The point being made is that no human advantage accrues from a knowledge of the details of creation. This is not to say that creation was not for the sake of human experience. We find that even dream-objects serve the purpose of experience during the time of the dream. But no reward is promised in the

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Veda to follow from a knowledge of the details of creation.

(15) And the Veda itself shows that the accounts of the crea- tion, maintenance and withdrawal of the world-appearance are given solely as a means to teach the existence of the Absolute. Consider Chandokya VI.viii.4. 'With food (= the subtle earth- element) for the sprout, my dear one, seek for water as the root. With water as the sprout, my dear one, seek for fire as the root. With fire as the sprout, my dear one, seek for Being as the root'. (Sankara's B.S.Bh.I.iv.14, cp. M.V. 33, 3-4)

The idea is that with the help of the effect one should seek for the cause, which is in fact the effect in its true nature. That is why the texts about creation can be seen to be for the purpose of expounding pure Being, which is in fact the true nature of creation. Nor is this rule about seeking the cause through the effect confined to the realm of the real. Even when the chjects are illusory, when they are part of a magic show, for instance, we see the audience curious to know who produced the magic illusion and how.

(16) And from the giving of such examples as clay, etc., we see that the purpose cf teaching the creation of the world- appearance was really to expound the non-difference of the effect from the material cause. And thus a great authority on the tradition (Sri Gaudapada) has declared, 'When creation is mentioned in the Veda and taught in various ways, through such examples as clay, iron and sparks, this is only a device for the introduction (of the idea of the sole metaphysical reality of the Self). In truth, there is no differentiation of any kind'. (Sankara's B.S.Bh.I.iv.14)

One must not suppose that these examples are given with the idea of showing that the clay and the like are really causes, or that their 'effects', the pot and so on, are real. The cause and effect relation is a popular conception already established through worldly experience, and so cannot be the content of Vedic revelation, as we already saw. What really accords with the context is the teaching 'Just as everything made of clay is known from the knowledge of one lump of clay, so all effects are known through knowledge of the Absolute'.

(17) But a reward is promised in the Veda for knowledge of the Absolute. 'He who knows the Absolute attains the supreme Being' (Taitt. II.1), 'He who knows the Self crosses beyond grief' (Chand. VII.i.3), 'Only through knowing Him does one pass beyond death' (Svet.III.8). And this reward is something immediately evident in this very life. For when through 'That thou art' one has direct and immediate knowledge that one is noc the one undergoing transmigration, one is delivered from the transmi- gratory state. (Sankara's B.S.Bh.I.iv.14)

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The various narratives about crcation are a device to teach something else. No reward is mentioned in the Veda for know- ing them, nor is there ever experience of any reward. In the case of knowing the Self to be one and the sole reality, on the contrary, a reward is both stated in the Veda and actually experienced. Thus the purpose of the creation-texts is not to teach creation; it is to help teach knowledge of the Self. This is what Sri. Sankara is saying.

(18) Perhaps you will claim that, since there are Vedic texts speaking of the Absolute as the cause of the rise, maintenance and dissolution of the world, the Absolute must have a number of powers. But this would be wrong. For there are other texts denying all distinctions which cannot mean anything but exactly what they say. But will not the texts speaking of the creation, maintenance and withdrawal of the world also mean exactly what they say? No, it is not so. For their purpose is to teach that all is one. Texts which bring out by examples like that of clay and its modifications how the Absolute is one and the only reality, and how modifications are unreal, cannot be intended to teach the origination, maintenance and dissolu- tion of the world as true facts. But why should the texts proclaiming the origination, main- tenance and dissolution of the universe be regarded as subordi- nate to those denying any distinctions within the Absolute, and not the other way about? Our reply is that texts denying dis- tincticus yield a form of knowledge after obtaining which noth- ing further remains to be known. For when once the unity, sole existence, eternality, purity and so forth of the Self are directly known, no further need or desire to know anything else arises ... Nor is it the case that the texts proclaiming the origination, maintenance and dissolution of the world are able to communicate a truth leaving no further knowledge to be desired. On the contrary, we are forced to conclude that they are inserted for the sake of some other teaching. (Sankara's B.S.Bh.IV.iii.14, cp. M.V.36,2)

There are passages on the present topic by Bhaskara where he forgets what he said before and contradicts himself. For instance, we have had the passage 'This effect in the form of the multifarious world does not exist in the Absolute as (form- less) cause. But it is not taught that the universe of plural- ity does not exist' (Bh.B.S.Bh. III.ii.11, M.V.167,5). And Bhaskara expresses himself further as follows: 'After one has first learned that the Absolute has the form of the universe from the sections of the Veda that deal with creation, the Absolute is afterwards determined as formless, as that is the chief meaning in such texts as "Not gross, not subtle ... ". It is from the fact that examples like that of. the lump of clay are cited that one sees that the purpose even of the creation- texts is to expound the Absolute as formless. Therefore one

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should meditate on the theme, "I am verily the Absolute, of the nature of Being, without a second and with all modifica- tions withdrawn in the state of dissolution (pralaya)"' (Bh. B.S.Bh. III.ii.14-5, p.166). This is wrong. For when a person once knows that the whole Veda, together with the creation-texts, is concerned with de- termining the true nature of the Absolute as without form, and knows that nothing other than the Absolute exists, then he no longer has any meditation thet he needs to perform as a duty. Anyone who can see this will have full faith in the system of Śri Bhagavatpada and will subscribe to the view that the Self, one only without a second, appears in variegated form as the world (lit. the effect), likc a magician appearing to assume strange forms through his magic (hypnotic) power. The reality of the effect is its reality as the cause. Sri Bhagavatpada says 'But the effect, the world consisting of sound and the other elements, cannot exisi except as the cause, either beforc creation or now' (Sankara's B.S.Bh.II.1.7, M.V.35,4). And we have the Vedic text, 'Beyond which nothing else exists' (cp. Mahānārāyana XII.28). So this doctrine of the reality of the effect (as the cause) beforc production has to be accepted whether one wishes to accept it or not. And it is only in this way that one can do justice to the Vedic method of false attribution followed by subsequent retraction in regard to this topic. But we desist from further amplification.

169 THE RELATION BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL AND THE LORD

We have studied Bhäskara's doctrine of cause and effect in some detail relative to the space available. And it has been shown that it stands in contradiction with the true upanishadic methcd of teaching. We now turn to a more brief examination of his view of the human soul. Though in general he follows Śri Bhagavatpada's system on this subject, there is the big differ- ence that he accepts a real difference between the individual soul and the supreme Self. And thus (here also) we find Bhäskara's doctrine to be in contradiction with the true method of upanishadic teaching.

(1) Kāsakrtsna did not hold (in the manner of Āśmarathya) that the individual soul was a modification of the supreme Self, the latter conceived as a substance undergoing modification. Nor did he hold (with Audulomi) that the individual soul began as entirely distinct from the supreme Self and obtained identity in liberation. He held that, even before the final emergence of the soul from the complex of bodies and organs at liberation, the supreme Self was non-different from the individual soul at the beginning, since the latter was only a 'state' it assumed. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.iv.21, p.81 = M.V.157,6)

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(2) You are right. There is a distinction between the indi- vidual soul and the supreme Self, due to the delimitation of the individual soul by the conditioning adjunct of beginning- less Ignorance, along with actions and their results. The soul is a part of the supreme Self. The relation is like that of sparks coming from fire. Or again, the case may be likened to that of parcels of the ether of space apparently enclosed with- in apertures of the body (such as the ear-hole, cp. M.V. 169,4) which are so perceived and referred to in speech (e.g. 'the ether in the ear'). (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.iv.21, p.81; cp. M.V.157,7)

(3) A doctrine proclaimed in common in this way by many Vcdic texts cannot be altered. The text on sparks from fire, there- fore, must be interpreted so as not to contradict it. This latter text does not aim to teach that the individual soul is a modification (vikāra) of the supreme Self. Its aim is to teach that the distinction between the soul and the supreme Self is due to conditioning adjuncts (upadhi). The sparks are identical with the fire. And it is only divisions that are introduced into space by the separate positions of the earthen vessels, not qualitative distinctions. As the topic of the passage is dreamless sleep, it is not teaching a doctrine of creation. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.iii.17, p.134)

(4) The word 'part' is used here to mean what is non-different from the supreme Self, merely divided by a conditioning adjunct, as a spark, though identical with the fire from which it pro- ceeds, is separated from it by a conditioning adjunct. But how can the supreme Self, which is partless, have parts? It is from the Veda that we know it does so, for the Veda resorts to the example 'As small sparks fly out from a fire ... ' (Brhad. II.i.20). And then there are other examples, like the division in the ether of space made by the cavities in the body such as the ear-hole, or like the five different modifications of vital energy, such as the outgoing form and the rest, or like the modifications of the mind such as pleasure-desire and so on. The soul is both different and non-different from the supreme Self by nature. Its non-different form constitutes its true nature, its form as different is due to a conditioning adjunct (the mind-body complex). The soul, stupefied by the power of the adjuncts, undergoes transmigratory life through being obsessed with them, though we accept that it is in fact. non-different from the supreme Self. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.iii.43, p.140-1)

It was not correct to say that the word 'part' referred to something non-different from the Self, merely divided by a con- ditioning adjunct. That does not agree either with worldly experience or with Vedic teaching. The word 'part' is used in a figurative sense to indicate the true non-difference of what is divided off by an apparent conditioning adjunct. If 'part'

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is understood as 'apparent part', then it can stand. And words like 'part' are not used in the present context to show that anything is really severed from the Self, but rather to teach identity. On this the great authority Śri Sankara says:

(5) It is clear from such texts as 'He is not tainted by the evil of action' (Brhad. TV.iv.23), 'Standing the same in all creatures' (Gita XIII.27) and 'In a dog and also in a dog- eater' (Gita V.18) thut the supreme Self does not undergo transmigratory experience. And so one cannot suppose that the individual soul is a part or a modification or a power of the supreme Self cr anything different from it, particularly as it is agreed that the Self is without parts. The texts in the Veda and Smrti speaking of a 'part' and so on are intended to teach the unity of the soul with the Self, not its difference from it. For, as we have already just explained above (cp. M.V. p.24), the texts of the Upanishads co-operate like one sentence to teach the doctrine of non-duality that is here be- ing expresced. (Brhad.Bh.II.i.20)

(6) Perhaps it will be said that, since the example of sparks issuing from fire appears in the upanishadic texts themselves, this is enough to show that the supreme Self must undergo some form of real modification to produce the individual souls. But this is not so. For the function of the Veda is only to in- form. It does not in any way exist to alter the constitution of objects, but only to give correct information about existing matters hitherto unknown. You ask what follows from this? Listen and hear what fol- lows. There are certain concrete and abstract entities in the world which have well-known characteristics and properties. What the Vedic teaching does is to take these well-known enti- ties as examples and use them to convey information about other unknown things that have analogous properties. It does not take worldly examples to illustrate matters that are not analo- gous to what is found in the world. If it did this, the example would be useless, as it would not agree with what it was supposed to exemplify. You cannot teach that fire is cold or that the sun does not burn even by a hundred examples, as it would be clear from other ways of knowing (perception, etc.,) that what was being taught was not the case. (Brhad.Bh.II.i.20, cp. M.V. 75,11)

Bhaskara claims that, although the soul is non-different from the Absolute, nevertheless the difference effected by the con- ditioning adjuncts is real. His argument runs in the following way.

(7) When a pot is broken, the ether of space in the pot be- comes one with the ether of space in general, as this is what is seen to occur. And it is the same in this case too. The

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individual soul and the supreme Self are by nature non- different, but they become different through conditioning ad- juncts. When the conditioning adjunct comes to an end, the difference ceases too. (Bh.B.S.Bh.IV.iv.4, p.243)

(8) The text 'That thou art' shows that the individual soul is both different and non-different from the supreme Self. The non-different form is natural and established once and for all as eternal and constant, while the other arises from a condi- tioning adjunct and is constant only while the latter conti- nues - that is the difference between the two forms. (Bh.B.S. Bh.III.ii.6, p.162)

(9) The same rule has to be applied in the case of the text 'Two birds ... ' (Muna. III.i.1, M.V.43,4). In another context, this verse is also found in the Svetasvatara Upanishad (Svet. IV.6). The next verse exhibits them again. 'The individual soul stands on the same tree (as the Lord), bewildered, griev- ing and helplessly drowned in sorrows. But when he sees that other one, the adored Lord, he knows "His glory is mine", and all his grief departs' (Svet.IV.7, cp. M.V. 43,4). Thus both the Veda and the author of the Sutras teach that the soul and the supreme Self are different. But there are some (i.e. Sri Sankara) who turn their backs on the teaching of the Veda and the words of the Acarya who composed the Sutras and construct another doctrine, conceived privately by themselves, that all is mere illusion. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.ii.12, p.41)

(10) The souls are mutually different amongst themselves, but non-different from the supreme Self, as the foam and waves of the sea are different amongst themselves, but all are non- different from the sea. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.iv.10, p.75)

(11) The image of the sun reflected in water is introduced. When the sun and the like are reflected in water, their small reflected images expand and contract with the movements of the water. In the same way, the supreme Self in its universal form remains unchanged, existing independently by its own power, within the individual souls, who conform, like reflec- tions, to the modifications of their various conditioning adjuncts. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.ii.21, p.168)

The notion that when a pot is broken the ether of space inside it becomes one with the ether of space in general is not to be commended. The ether of space is partless and never capable of being divided, so that the ether apparently 'in the pots' is always really one with ether in general. In the same way, even when the conditioning adjunct is present, the individual is, from the standpoint of the highest truth, ever identical with the supreme Self. But through Ignorance the soul fancies that the Self is different. This is the only correct explana-

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tion. As the great sage (Śri Gaudapāda) said:

(12) The Self appears to undergo birth through the multipli- city of souls, just as the ether of space appears to undergo birth through the multiplicity of new forms into which it appears to be enclosed through the production of pots (cp. M.V. 27,4). The ether is also the example to expiain the apparent rise of new oojects like pots through the compounding of the elements (cince the elements are taught to proceed as effects from the ether and the effect is nothing over and above the material cause). (G.K. III.3. cp. M.V.75,9)

Just as the ether is apparently 'produced' as 'pot-ether' and also as pots and other objects (through illusory modification), even so is the supreme Self apparently 'produced' as the soul and as the body-mind complex which houses the soul.

(13) Though there are no distinctions in the ether as such, yet there are apparent distinctions of form (shape), use and name (in different receptacles) at different places. One should see that it is the same in the case of (the Self and) the individual souls. (G.K. III.6)

Just as the disiinctions that appear to exist in the ether of space, on account of the shapes and uses and so on of various receptacles of the ether of space, do not exist from the stand point of the highest truth, so also in the case of the indivi- dual souls there is no real distinction from the Self.

(14) Just as the pot-ether is neither a modification nor a part of the ether, so the individual soul is never either a modification or a part of the Self. (G.K. III.7)

The soul's feeling that it is a part of the supreme Self has to be understood in the same way.

The text 'That thou art' is in the present tense. It implies that, from the standpoint of the highest truth, not even the apparent distinctions due to conditioning adjuncts exist. And it is in this sense that it is said that immediately the ad- junct comes to an end the (apparent) difference comes to an end too. As the revered Commentator put it:

(15) But it would not be right to say that this absence of individual empirical experience (in enlightenment) is limited to any particular state. For the text 'That thou art' (Chand. VI.viii.7) shows that the fact of one's true Self being the Absolute is not conditional upon any particular state. (Śankara's B.S.Bh.II.i.14, M.V.46,6)

Vedic texts like 'Two birds, (together, companions, occupy

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the same tree ... ' (Mund. III.i.1, cp. M. V.43, 4) and 'Both &re lodged in the cave of the heart' (Katha I.iii.1) do not serve to communicate the idea that the soul and the Lord are differ- ent. The first is engaged in demonstrating that the soul is the supreme Self, and is enunciated with the idea 'I shall be proclaiming their identity openly iater on'. For the text goes on 'When a seer attains (true) sight ... (he attains iden- tity with the Lord)' (Mund. III.1.3). The second text also has a concluding passage which says, 'he reaches the end of his journey' (Katha I.iii.9). We see that the passage as. a whole is teaching the means to attaining the highest abode of Viu (with which the 'end of his journey' is equated, Katha I.iii.o 9). One and the same passage cannot both teach the means to the attainment of the supreme human end (identity with the supreme Self) and also proclaim the difference between the individual soul and the supreme Self at the same time. On this basis, it is quite explicable that the Sūtra should have proclaimeu initially that the supreme Self was different fror the individual soul and something to which the latter had to attain. In the first Book of the Sutras, the nature of the individual soul is not expounded for its own sake: it is in- variably brought in to illustrate some other matter (so that the teachings about the soul given in that part of the Sutras are not an authoritative guide to its true nature). But we must leave the final decision about which system best harmo- nizes the Upanishads and Sutras to properly qualified philolo- gists and scholars.

170 THE EMPIRICAL EXPERIENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL

Bhaskara's view that all the experience of the individual soul is engendered through external conditioning adjuncts, and is not natural to it, is in harmony with the true Vedantic system. But this Acarya forgets and fails to take into account the point that the conditioning adjuncts are not real in the high- est sense, but are set up by Ignorance.

(1) The references we make in worldly parlance to the birth and death of the individual, says the author of the Sutra, are figurative. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.iii.16, p.134)

(2) The soul does not undergo birth. Why not? Because that is not the Vedic teaching. There is no mention of the coming into being of the individual soul in the passages which treat of the creation of the ether and other elements. (Bh.B.S.Bh. II.iii.17, p.134)

(3) And the consciousness of the individual soul is immediate self-consciousness. For the knower is always immediately

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evident to himself. Pots and other objects, on the other hand, are only perceived cccasionally and are perceived as dis- tinct from the perceiver. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.iii.18, p.135)

Where Bhaskara wrote 'For the knower ... ' it would have been better if he had referred to the Witness of the knower.

(4) In this state of transmigration, it feels to us as if the Self were minute, but this is not its true form even at the time. For there is the teaching that the Absolute is the Self, in the text 'That thou art' (and this means that our true Self is the Absolute even now). (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.iii.29, p.137)

(5) Power to act is not natural to the soul, or liberation would be impossible .... But if power to act is not natural but due to external adjuncts, that does not mean that it is not fully real. When a person experiences being burnt by the heat of fire, are we to say that that burn is not fully real just because the heat from which it proceeds does not come from the person himself? (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.iii.4O, p.139)

The heat of the fire belongs to the fire not to the Self. The burn, too, belongs to the body, not to the Self, its Witness. That is the correct reasoning. And the burn is not in fact experienced in the Self (cp. U.S. (verse) XVIII. 204, T.N.).

(6) The individual soul's power to act derives from the 'supreme', that is, from the Lord; for that is what the Veda teaches. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.iii.41, p.140)

(7) The objection that the soul's power to act must be inde- pendent has already been raised, and it has been established in reply that the soul's power to act depends on the Lord. As for the charge of unfairness and cruelty (brought against the Lord in these circumstances, because different creatures have different degrees of happiness and misery, and misery always predominates) - it does not apply, because He creates the world in accordance with the merits and demerits of living beings. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.iii.42, p.140)

(8) The soul enjoys happiness as a result of its past good activity, but this is not the case with the supreme Self, as there would be no occasion for it. It is like light (and the ether of space and so on - where light is not really dif- ferentiated or made to move or change by the things on which it falls, and the ether of space is not really enclosed within

p.141) any receptacles as it appears to be). (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.iii.46,

(9) If the individual soul is non-different from the supreme Self, to whom do permission and absence of permission apply ?...

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To this we reply that permission and absence of permission may very well apply to (the individual soul as) a part (of the supreme Self). For it is capable of relationship with a body. (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.iii.48, p.142)

Here 'relationship with a body' means the rise of the erroneous notion in the Self 'erily, I am the body and so on', that is, 'I am the complex of body and organs'. And that is accepted in Bhaskara's system as well as in our oun. But what is ot accepted by Bhaskara is that the body and the other external conditioning adjuncts are caused by Ignorance.

(10) The soul, in company with the chief vital energy, with its sense-organs, organs of action and mind, leaves its pre- vious body at death and goes to another one for further experi- ences of pleasure and pain, under the force of Ignorance* along with merit and demerit and the impressions of past experiences. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.i.1, p.152)

*(Avidyā-karma-pūrna-prajñā: on this phrase, where 'avidya' is probablu u corruption of 'vidya', see the author's comments at Sac, V.P.P. English Intro. p.107. T.N.)

Why waste words? We can say summarily that all the empirical experience of the individual soul is exclusively through ad- juncts. But it is a special point in Śri Bhagavatpāda's system that conditioning adjuncts are set up by an illusion imagined through Ignorance. One must pay attention to this special point if justice is to be done to the method of false attribu- tion followed by subsequent retraction. Otherwise transmigra- tory life will be real and its abolition impossible, while liberation wili be unreal and so never capable of atteinment. And thus a great authority (Śri Gaudapāda) has said:

(11) The Self stands within all bodies, motionless and unaf- fected like the ether of space, whether they die or are born, whether they go, come or stand still. (G.K. III.9, cp. M.V. 46,2)

(12) All bodies are like dreams, empty projections arising from Ignorance of the Self. Their reality is inconceivable, whether they are taken as varying in eminence or as all the same. (G.K. III.10, cp. M.V.46,2)

How can there be two beings having knowledge in one body? Does not the Veda assert that there is no other 'seer' apart from the Inner Ruler, in the text 'There is no other seer ... but He'? (Brhad.III.vii.23) Bhäskara raises this problem and then answers it as follows:

(13) To this we reply as follows. We have already explained

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how this very text brings out the distinction with the phrase 'He who, dwelling in the body, ... ' (Brhad., Madhyandina school, III.vii.22). Do you not see the point? This text cannot be just passed over as if it were a mere casual word of greeting, as it is just as authoritative as the text 'There is no other seer ... but He' (M. V.162,3). Sc difference and identity must be accepted. Nor can one qlaim that a distinction is introduced into the subject-matter in order to deny that there is any other Con- troller but the Lord, for the whole section is concerned with knowledge as the true nature of the Inner Ruler. There is no other Witness-of-all but He. And in any case, when it has been (solemnly ) declared that He is the Witness of the deities and so on in the text 'He whom the earth-deity does not know' (Brhad.III.vii.3), this cannot afterwards be denied. (Bh.B.S. Bh.I.ii.20, p.45)

Bhaskara makes an innovation in adopting as the finally accep- ted view the very position that Śri Bhagavatpada has raised as an objection and refuted. Because all the onponents of the method of interpretation of false attribution followed by sub- sequent retraction follow him blindly on this point, it ought to be refuted here. So we will say a few words on the subject. There is Brahma Sutra I.ii.20, which says 'The individual soul is not the Inner Ruler, as the members of both schools teach it to be different'. That is, both the Madhyandinas and the Kanvas teach it to be different. But that distinction is not real in the highest sense. And there is not a trace of the term 'difference in identity' anywhere in the vocabulary of the author of the Sutras. So when the Sutra says that the indivi- dual soul is not the Inner Ruler - it meams just that and no more. But in what sense does the author of the Sutras first raise the objection that the individual soul is the same as the Inner Ruler and then deny it, in the words 'Not the other' and 'The Inner Ruler is different, because difference is taught' (B.S. I.ii.16-7)? Śri Bhagavatpāda explains the resolution of the difficuity as follows.

(14) On the supreme Self, eternal, pure, conscious and free by nature, raised above all change, one and without relation to anything else, is erroneously superimposed the form of the limited individual soul, whose characteristics are the oppo- site, as impurities (like dust and clouds) are erroneously at- tributed to the stainless infinite ether of the sky. The author of the Sutras therefore emphasized the difference of the supreme Self from the individual soul, knowing that he would be going to negate it later by quotations of Vedic texts teach- ing the unity and sole reality of the Self - such quotations being supported by reasoning and by independent rational refu- tation of the views of the dualists. There is no question of

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his teaching that the individual soul is really different from the supreme Lord. All that the author of the Sutras is doing is to conform initially to the general worldly notion that the individual soul is different, which is based on metaphysical Ignorance. On this basis, the author of the Sutras holds, the Vedic injunctions for ritual, which conform to the natural hu- man idea that one is an individual cepable of individual action and experience, will not suffer coniradiction. But in other places he shows that what the Veda really has to communicate is the unity and sole reality of the Self. We find this, for example, in such a Sutra as 'But there may be teaching (about the identity of the soul with the Absolute) given by a sage who has himself attained the vision of the final Vedic standpoint, as in the case of Vamadeva' (.S. I.i.30, cp. Brhad.I.iv.l0). (Śankara's B.S.Bh.I.iii.19)

And he says in commerting on the Sutra now under consideration:

(15) But how can there be two Witnesses (lit. seers) in one body, namely the Lord, the Inner Ruler, and also the individual soul, who is different from Him? Well, but what is the diffi- culty here? The difficulty is that it contradicts the teaching of the Vedic text 'There is no other Witness (lit. seer) ... but He' (Brhad.III.vii.23). This text denies the existence of any Self as seer, hearer, thinker or knower other than the Inner Ruler, who is the topic of the passage. You cannot say that the text is (not meant to deny the existence of another Witness but) only meant to deny the existence of a second controller. For no one could suppose that a Controller needed another controller to control him, and the text does not specify that

Bh.I.ii.20) it is only meant to deny another Controller. (Sankara's B.S.

That is the passage in which Śri Bhagavatpada explains the objection that the Sutra is answering. But Bhaskara acted as if he had not noticed it, and remarked, 'One can also say that the purpose of the Sutra was to rebut the objection that there could be another Controller of the world'. How could anyone be so deaf as to raise the objection that there could be more than one Inner Ruler, when the Veda repeatedly and without exception identifies the Inner Ruler with the Self, as in 'He

Mānd.6)? is your Seif, the Inner Ruler, the immortal' (Brhad.III.vii.3,

In explaining the answer that the Sūtra gives to the objec- tion, Śri Bhagavatpāda had written as follows:

(16) To this we reply as follows. This idea that the indivi- dual soul and the Inner Ruler are different is a result of the apparent conditioning adjuncts of bodies and organs set up by Ignorance. It does not represent the final truth. For the inmost Self is one. There cannot be two inmost Selves. Where

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there is only one, practical oxperience of such a unity as if it were multiple, and verbal reference to it as such, arise through apparent conditioning adjuncts. It is as when we speak figuratively of the ether of space in the pot and the ether of space in gcneral (as if the pot really circumscribed a volume of the ether of space and effectively cut it off from the rest of the ether, which it does not, since the ether is conceived as a continuum and as too subtle to be effectively circumscribed by gross objects). (Sankara's B.S.Bh.I.iì.20; cp. M.V.27,4;49,6;140,8)

And there is not even the faintest suspicion that there could be more than one Inner Ruler. For the one who raised the ori- ginal question, Uddalaka, was himself quite clear that tuere was orly one Inner Ruler when he said, 'I know thet. If. O Yajmavalkya, you do not know the subtle spirit (lit. thread) pervading the cosmos, and the Inncr Ruler, and yet presume to drive away the cows that belong properly to knowers of the Absolute, your head will fall off' (Brhad. III.vii.1).

Nor is Bhaskara himself entirely unacquainted with the technique found in the Upanishads of establishing the true nature of the supreme Self by negating its aspect as individual soul. For he writes:

(17) Some schools expound the supreme Self and tell the pupil he is that directly, as in the text 'That thou art'. Others, on the other hand, start from the standpoint of the indivi- duality of the soul, and, after successively negating several states of individuality, eventually expound its supreme form as the Self - for example the passage which begins '"Which is the Self?" "This conscious being among the sense-organs ... (Brhad.IV.iii.7) and concludes 'This great unborn Self, without bones, without a body' (Brhad. IV.iv.7 and 22?). (Bh.B.S.Bh. I.iii.20, p.58)

In this connection Bhaskara does not accept that the individual aspect of the soul that is negated is imagined through Igno- rance. Even though he admits that it is created by external adjuncts, he persists through sheer obstinacy in calling it perfectly real. But that is a different point.

171 THE METHOD OF DISCRIMINATION OF THE FIVE SHEATHS

Bhaskara's commentary on the Anandamaya section of the Brahma Sūtras (B.S. I.1.12-9) mostly imitates the view of the author of the Vrtti quoted by Śri Bhagavatpāda. But Bhāskara refutes the teaching (of Śri Sankara, cp. M.V,39) that the Absolute is 'the tail' (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.1.19, p.27). The first thing to point

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out here is that this view of the author of the earlier Vrtti reprcduced in Śri Śankara's Commentary does not actually agree with the tradition followed by Bhaskara. Śri Bhagavatpāda quotes the doctrine of the author of the Vrtti as follows.

(1) But you said earlier that it was wrong to accept it as the literal truth that pleasure, delight and great delight consti- tuted the head and two wings of the true Self, with bliss for its tail (Taitt.II.5). But in fact it was not wrong. For the conception was based on the immediately preceding adjunct (i.c. on the 'self made up of knowledge', M.V. p.94), not on the Self in its true form. The notion that the true Bliss-Self (i.e. the Absolute) has a body at all is only set forth in the course of relating it to (the merely provisional teaching about) a series of bodies beginning with the material body made up of food. The true Bliss-Self (the Absolute) is not genuinely embodied, in the manner of the individual soul in transmigra- tion. (Sankara's B.S.Bh.I.i,12)

The point is explained differeutly by Bhaskaracarya as follows:

(2) As for what was said about association with parts - the intention in bringing that up was to suggest that the Self was like a person, not to teach that it had a body with parts. So there is nothing wrong. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.12, p.25)

Though the general meaning is in line with the author of the Vrtti, still this passage (in using a completely different argument) is another indication that the author of the Vrtti here in question did not belong to the same tradition as Bhāskara.

(3) And again, if the Absolute were taken as 'made up of bliss', it would have to be the conditioned Absolute, endowed with head, wings and tail, and with different degrees of joy, such as pleasure, delight, etc. But the part of the text that follows refers to the unconditioned Absolute, in the words 'That from which words fall back without attaining access, together with the mind. He who knows the bliss of the Absolute does not fear anything from any quarter' (Taitt.II.9). (Śańkara's B.S.Bh.I.i.19)

From this we conclude that those who accepted that the Absolute was unconditioned in its true nature refuted the author of the Vrtti. Otherwise there would not have been this refutation of his view here. Bhāskarācarya, however, answers the author of the Vrtti in a different way, as follows:

(4) Though it has been said that it is the unconditioned Abso- lute that is referred to here, that also was wrong. For the Absolute is represented as having bliss for its attribute. At

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a later point in the Upanishad, there are indirect references to the Absolute as a substance through the mere montion of its attribute of bliss, as in such texts as 'This is the analysis of bliss' (Taitt.II.8) and 'Verily from bliss are these crea- tures born' (Taitt.III.6). And when the text says 'from which words fall back' (Taitt. II.9), what it means is that the Abso- lute is not accessible to speech or minds that are sullied by attachment and other passions. But it is accessible to speech and minds that are pure. For we find other passages in ihe Veda that imply this, such as 'He is seen by those of keen vision through their subtle minds' (Katha I.iii.12) and 'When a person's intellect has been purified through knowledge free from attachment and other passions (he sees the Self in medi- tation)' (Mund. III.i.8). (Ph.B.S.Bh. I.i.19, p.41)

Again, in his Commentary on the Sutra 'And because there is the teaching of difference' (B.S. I.1.17), Śri Sankara quotes the view of the author of the Vrtti as follows. 'The Sutra toaches that the soul and the bliss-self are different. For one cannot be enjoined to seek that (one's own true Self, here interpreted as the bliss-self) which one already possesses (for example in such a text as "He who attains (comes to possess) the savour of the Absolute becomes truly blissful", Taitt. II.7)'. And Śri Śankara further mentions the objection against Advaita formulated by the author of the Vrtti in the words, 'How otherwise (than by assuming the individual soul and the true Self to be different) could one explain such texts of the Veda and Smrti as, 'He, the Self, it is who should be investi- gated' (Chand. VIII.vii.1) and 'There is no greater gain than the gain of the Self' (A.D.S. I.viii.22.2)? And then he re- futes this view of the author of the Vrtti as follows.

(5) True, this looks like a difficulty. But what has happened is that the not-self, such as the body and its organs, has come generally to be seen as the Self, and this through Ignorance of the true nature of the Self, which latter never really falls from its true nature. And, from the standpoint of the 'self' thus constituted by the body and its organs, it is only right to speak of the true Self as something distinct, and not yet properly investigated and requiring further investigation, as not yet heard about and requiring to be heard about, as not yet pondered over and requiring to be pondered over, as not yet understood and requiring to be understood and so on. And yet from the standpoint of the ultimate truth such texts as 'There is no other Witness (lit. seer) ... but He' (Brhad. III.vii.23) deny that there is any other seer or hearer apart from the omniscient supreme Lord. But (in the sense that He is unconditioned) the supreme Lord is different from the indivi- dual soul, the one who has the power of individual action and experience, called also the 'knowledge-self' or 'conscious individual' (vijñana-atman). The case is parallel with that of

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the mass hynotist's magic display, where the magician on the ground, the real figure, is different from his double, appear- ing with sword and shield, having climbed up into the sky on a rope. Or again, the case is parallel with that of the universal ether, which, itself untouched by any external conditioning adjunct, is different from the 'pot-ether', apparently enclosed within such an adjunct. And it was on the basis of a distinc- tion of this kind subsisting between the knowledge-self (soul) and the supreme Self that the author of the Sutras speaks as he does in this and the foregoing Sutra, and says 'Not. the other (i.e. the Self is not the individual soul) because that would be illogical' and 'And because of the teaching that there is difference (between the individual soul and the supreme Self)'. (Sankara's B.S.Bh.I.i.17)

Here this author of a Vrtti, though he maintained (contrary to Śri Śankars) that the bliss-self was the Absolute, nevertheless taught that the soul's embodied state and its powers of action and experience were imagined through Ignorance. Hence his position was clearly not very far removed from that of the Vedantic system approved by Śri Bhagavatpāda. Ācārya Bhāskara, however, took the following line:

(6) Here some (i.e. Śri Śańkara), with a view to safeguarding their own privately hatched theory, offer the following expla- nation which totally obliterates the meaning of the Sūtra. 'There is no other being undergoing transmigration apart from the Lord. He and He alone is the transmigrant'. If you ask them, 'In that case, what are we doing with the two Sutras "The Supreme Self is nct the other, because it wouid be illogical" (B.S. I.i. 16) and "Because of the teaching that there is dif- ference" (B.S. I.i.1?)?', they reply that there is nothing wrong. Such expressions about difference are only made (these Advaitins say) on the basis of accepting distinctions set up by apparent conditioning adjuncts, just as such expressions as 'the ether in the pot' or 'the ether in the cloth'* refer to distinctions in the ether that are only set up by imagination. This view is wrong. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.17, p.26; cp. M.V.199)

*(Should the reading be mathakasa = the ether in the hut or monastery in which the pot stands? T.N.)

And so forth. Bhāskarācārya criticizes the view of the author of a Vrtti that the bliss-self is the Absolute, either because he did not know that it was that of an author of a Vrtti, or else because, with his well-known animus against ŚrI Śankara, he misattributed the view to him. He says as his last remark on the subject:

(7) Therefore, that stands as the most commendable explanation,

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handed down as it is by tradition. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.19, p.29)

In both cases the early author of a Vrtti on the Brahma Sūtras upheld the doctrine that the Absolute was unconditioned. It is only here in the Anandamaya section of the Brahma Sūtras (I.1.12-9) that Śri Bhagavatpada subjects him to criticism, but only in order to set aside oue part of his view. But the tradition of Difference in Identity followed by Bhaskara was fundamenially different from that of the author of the Vrtti and from that of Śri Bhagavatpada, whether it was the Differ- ence in Identity tradition followed by Bhartrprapañca arrayed in a differest dress, or whether Bhaskara was the founder of e new method of interpretation. This has besn well shown. Śri Bhagavatpada described the method of discriminating the Five Sheaths by first attributing them to the soul and then denying them, in the belief that, through effecting this dis- crimination, the pupil would have the reward of establishment is the fearless state of the Absolute in its true nature as unconditioned bliss. The text on plumbing the depths, 'He plumbs the depths of this bliss-self' (Taitt.II.8), is well explained as saying 'Through knowing that biiss-self thoroughly, he attains at one plunge to the Absolute, its true essence' (cp. M.V.39, intro.). The Absolute, as the 'tail' or 'prop' (M.V. p.93) is with- out distinctions. Two texts following on, one of which pretends to raise a doubt about the existence of the Absolute, agree with this. They are, 'Verily, if one thinks that the Absolute is non-existent one becomes oneself non-existent' (Taitt.II.6) and 'From which words fall back, together with the mind, without attaining access' (Taitt. II.9). But Bhaskara says, 'The Absolute is accessible to speech and minds that are pure' (M.V.171,4). In saying this he affirms (the absurdity) that even the Witness of All falls within the scope of speech and mind. He turns his back on the repeated statements in the Veda that speech and mind cannot encompass the Absolute, texts like 'He who is the mind of the mind, the speech of speech' (Kena I.2), 'Neither speech goes there, nor mind' (Kena I.3), 'That which cannot be uttered by speech' (Kena I.5) and 'Which cannot be thought by the mind' (Kena I.6). Thus turning his back on the Veda, he laid a claim to be the author of a new metaphysic, hitherto urknown. What a strange presumption and audacity we find in those who are inordinately enamoured of their own opinions!

172 BHĀSKARA ON THE DISCRIMINATION OF THE THREE STATES

In the system of Bhaskara, discrimination of the three states on its own is no more able to establish the Absolute in its pure form than discrimination of the five sheaths is. Here are

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quotations cf a few of his texts to illustrate his view.

(1) We take up the study of the dream-state to show how the self-luminosity of the scul is familiar to all from the self- luminosity of the dream-state. And we study the state of dreamless sleep to show the true nature of the Self as free from all external limiting adjuncts, beyond danger and fear. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.ii., p.160)

(2) The projections in dream are only an illusion (says the author of the Sutras). He uses the word 'only' to show that there is no external object .... Perhaps you will object that this presupposes an idea without an object, which is an absur- aity. But there is nothing wrong here. It is a case of remem- bering what has been experienced at other times and places. In dream, it is the mind, charged with the impressions born of previous experience of objects and moving about in the subtle canals within the body, that produces a species of memory- knowledge. The fact that dreams have varying pleasure-pain content, such as joy and fear, shows that the mind is prompted to produce them by the merit and demerit arising from former deeds. It is the remembered object that forms the basis of the dream-cognitions. So our theory is not open to criticism. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.ii.3, p.161)

There is no attempt here to deal with the problem that there is experience of erroneous perception in dream as well as in waking, while memory is also distinguished from perception, in dream. How is that possible? Other questions that are not answered are: 'What is meant by "at other times and places"?" and 'How do you account for the appearance of space und time that is experienced in dream?'

(3) And so the author of the Sutras said, in the section con- taining refutations on the basis of logic, 'And not as in dream and the like, on account of the essential difference between waking and dream' (B.S. II.ii,29). (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.ii.3, p.161)

(4) The exponents of the doctrine of Maya who follow the Buddhist teachings should also be regarded as having been re- futed by the author of the Sutras with this argument. If he did not believe in the existence of external objects, why did he take the trouble to affirm it? Perhaps you will reply that the author of the Sutras was not prepared to accept (in the manner of the Vijnana Vadin Buddhist) that the world consisted merely in the modifications of consciousness if no other per- manent reality were admitted, but that, if the Self were admit- ted as an eternal reality, he was prepared to deny the reality of the universe. But what sort of logic is it that says that, if one thing is known to exist, another thing (equally well known) does not exist? The correct position is that earth and

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the other elements do in fact exist as perceived, being effects of the Absolute. (Bh.B.S.Bh.Il.ii.29, p.124)

On this topic, Śri Sankara quotes the Buddhist argument mega- ting external objects as an ill-advised view, later to be refuted by the author of the Sutras in the words 'On account of the essential difference between waking and dream' (B.S. II.11.29). He expresses the ill-advised view in an earlicr passage in the following words: 'The nature of experience of objects in the waking state has to be seen to be analogous to tie expericace of dreams aud the like. For just as in the case of dream-fantasy, or of a mirage, or of the hallucinatory visica of a city is the clouds, consciousness assumes ihe twin form of subject and object without the actual presence of any external object, so does it also do the same, we must conclude, in the case of cognition of objects like pillars in the waking state. For dream-cognition and waking cognition are alike in point of being cognitions' (Sankara's B.S.Bh. II.11.28 ad init.). The ides was to show that one who holds that dream and wak- ing are different will not want to try to establish by infer- ence that the ideas of waking experience lack external objects simply on the grounds that they are similar to the ideas of dream in point of being ideas. Dream is a state which, when remembered in waking, is seen to have been contradicted and cancelled by waking experience. Who but a lunatic would make inferences about waking being equivalent to dream once he admitted that? Nor was the revered Commentator concerned to show that the author of the Sutras did nct accept the reality of externai objects; for the inference of the Commentator was that every- thing should be accepted as experienced. All that he is saying here is that the Buddhist is wrong when, having established some points of similarity between waking and dream, he goes on to argue that the cognitions of waking are in all respects fike those of dream and similar states of fantasy. Nor does the revered Commentator make any inference to the effect that if one thing is known to exist another (equally well known thing) does not. For when refuting the exponents of the doctrine of the Void, he says:

(5) This ordinary empirical experience of the world, solidly established as it is through all the various means of knowl- edge, cannot be argued away without prior knowledge of some other real principle. For where no exception can be shown, an established rule holds. (Sankara's B.S.Bh.II.ii.31)

The meaning here is this. Shell-silver and the like are accep ted as real by their perceivers as long as they manifest. But when such perceivers have the cognition 'This is shell', then they reject the experience of silver as contradicted and can- celled, saying 'This is not silver, it appeared as silver

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through iliusion'. In the same way, if the exponent of the Void wishes tc negate all this world which depends upon accept- ing the objective validity of the play of the meane of knowl- edge and their objects, then, since he says that everything is imaginary, he must be able to point to some totaily real prin- ciple guaranteed in immediate experience to stand as the real Substratum of all this imagination - or else drop his obsti- nate claim that all is void. Bhaskars also said that it was correct to maintain that earth and the other elemerts ware real, since they were effects of the Absolute, and to this the author of the Sütres and the revered Commentator would readily assent. The reality of earth and all other effects is accepted on the basis of their being non-different from the Absolute. For we have the Vedic text, 'Verily, all this is the Absolute' (Mund. II.ii.12). But this does not mean thet their reality car be known through the form in which they are known empirically. For the latter, lite the shell-silver and so forth, does not exist when it is not being perceived. On this we have such Vedic texts as 'A modification is a name, a mere suggestion of speech' (Chand.VI.1.4) and 'The firehood of fire disappeared' (Chand. VI.iv.l).

(6) But those who say that the waking state, too, is a mere illusion (maya) obliterate the meaning intended by the author of the Sutras and deceive the students who listen to them. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.ii.3, p.161)

The author of the Sutras made his own understandirg of this matter clear in the Sutra 1I.1.14 in the words, 'As is shown by such texts as "a rodification of speech"'. The author of the Sutras held (as this Sutra in its complete form shows, cp. M.V.33,8) that the whole world was non-different from the Absolute. So it cannot be claimed that he said that the waking state and the universe of plurality that it contained were dif- ferent from the Absolute. Therefore the 'being a mere illu- sion' that he is speaking of here in the presert Sūtra (B.S. III.1i.3 - which refers to the dream-state) does not determine the waking state as being a mere illusion too. Everyone agrees that from the standpoint of empirical experience dream is dream and waking is something different from it. Thinking that the opponent, too, must accept this as certain, the author of the Sutras himself affirms this differ- ence between the two states (B.S. lII.1i.3). But when the mat- ter is considered from the metaphysical standpoint, the differ- ence between waking and dream cannot be established. For in dream itself, just as in waking, there is experience of a dis- tinction between subject and object as long as there is experi- ence of the dream at all. There also, in the dream, there is the sense of being awake, just as in waking, until the dream is tinally contradicted. Therefore the saying of the great authority (ŚrI Gaudapada) 'The wise say that the states of

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waking and dream are one' (G.K. II.5) is hard to contradict. Taking his stand on his own immediate experience of the truth of what he said in that verse, Śri Gaudapada establishes, after extended discussion in the second Book of his Kārikās, that both the dream-state and the waking state are mere illu- sion, and that the Self alone is real. To see the way he does so, one must examine that actual wcrk. And this teaching is eminently Vodic. The three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep are each known to be dreams from the upanishadic teaching 'three dreams' (Ait. I. ili. 12). So this teaching is not a case of deceiving students. On the contrary, it is a boon to seekers of liberation. For it blends the teaching cf the Upanishads and the Sūtras together with experience by exhibiting the traditional method whereby the three states are first falsely attributed to the Self and then afterwards denied of it. From the standpoint of ordizary waking experience, however, one should accept this statement by the author of the Sutras that dream is (by contrast with waking) a mere illusion. The rovered Commentator says: 'But, before the practical realiza- tion of the fact that the Absolute is one's own Self, the world-appearance, beginning with the ether and the other great elements, has a lasting coherent structure, whereas the world- appearance in dreams is effaced daily. So it is significant if the author of the Sutras here refers to dream as "a mere illu- sion", as in the case of dream the words have a special (inten- sified) sense' (Sankara's B.S.Bh.III.ii.4, cp. M.V.152,7). If we turn to the topic of dreamless sleep, Bhaskara has the following observations:

(7) The phrase 'There is absence of that' means that in dreemless sleep there is absence of dream, and this is turn implies that there is not then the alternative for the soul of abiding either in the Self (in the ether of the heart) on in the subtle canals (nadi) within the body .... He sleeps having attained the supreme Self as the ether in the heart through the avenue of the subtle canals .... If the one in dreamless sleep could also be in the subtle canals, he could not be without subject-object consciousness, as there would be no explanation for its absence. But on the other hypothesis (that he is exclusively in the ether of the heart) we have the text 'When they have attained Being (in dreamless sleep), they have no knowledge' (Chand.VI.ix.2, cp. M.V.42,4): (Bh.B.S.Bh.III. ii.7, p.162-3)

(8) Next the author of the Sutras gives the answer to the question 'How can it be claimed that there is a connection with external adjuncts in dreamless sleep and cosmic dissolution?' And the answer he gives is, 'But this connection can be assumed to exist (in latent form) like virility (in a child), as it is capable of manifestation (later)'. The word 'but' is for

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emphasis. That connection with the mind could only manifest in the waking state if it already existed (in dreamless sleep). (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.iii.31, p.138)

But, in that case, how could there be the union of the soul with the Absolute in dreamless sleep (spoken of at Chand. VI. ix.2, M.V.42, 1; 172.7)? Through any conditioning adjunct, the soul assumes a form in which it is differentiated from pure Being. If the soul retained a conditioning adjunct in dreamless sleep and cosmic dissolution, there could not be total union with the Absolute (in dreamless sleep).

(Contrast Śri Sunkara (M. V. 45, 6), wo can explain ihe identity with pure Being in dreamless sleep, since for him the adjuncts are products of Ignorance and only exist when seen (M.V. 47, 5). They lapse in dreamless sleep when the soul rests in its identity with the Absolute. But they re-appear on waking in the casc of those still ignorant of their true nature as the Absolute, and in this sense are said figuratively to lurk in dreamless sleep as a 'seed' or a 'potentiality' (sakti). Even the notion of a potentiality here is a concoction of Ignorance, which supervenes later in the waking state. Bhaskara, however, cannot explain the Chandogya texts affirming identity with the Absolute in dreamless sleep at all, as for him the adjuncts are not set up by Ignorance but are real. Cp. M. V. 169, 7;170 intro .; 172,11, note; also 45, 6. T.N. )

(9) 'This universe enters the Absolute (at the cosmic dissolu- tion) losing its modified form. It loses its solid form, like salt dissolved in water'. (Quoted in Bh.B.S.Bh.II.i.9, p.91)

The verse quoted means that even at the cosmic dissolution there is no total dissolution of the world into the Absolute, as the world does not give up its nature as the world.

(10) Because the subtle body, the abode of the sense-organs and the powers of action, remains in being until there is dissolution, that is to say, until there is liberation through right knowledge .... The soul does not dissolve into the Abso- lute at the time of the death of the physical body. (Bh.B.S. Bh.IV.ii.8, p.229)

It is true that in all such places the revered Commentator, too, agrees that the individual soul remains in being, yet there is a difference on the point, as the following passage from ŚrI Śankara shows.

(11) Thus, although there are no distinctions in the Self in its true nature, we see that this dream-like empirical experi- ence of distinctions continues regularly during the period of world-manifestation (even though punctuated by intervals of

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dreamless sleep when wrong knowledge is in abeyance). There- fore we should infer by analogy that a potentiality (sakti) for future distinctions remains in the period of world- dissolution, too, this potentiality itself being a mere appear- ance conditioned by wrong knowledge. (Sankara's B.S.Bh.II.i.9, cp. M.V.45,8 and note)

The supreme Self, though in realitv ever bereft of the experj- ence of distinctions, appears to become the object of empirical experience of distinctions in the waking and dream states through wrong kuowledge. But when wrong knowledge has been abolished by right knowledge all empirical experience is anni- hilated. This was the view of the revered Commentator. On Buaskara's view, however, there cannot be a refutation of dis- tinctions through right knowledge, since the persistence of a potentiality for differentiation is real in all states. That is the difference between the two views.

173 REFLECTION OVER THE MEANS TO LIBERATION

In Bhaskara's teaching, the doctrine of a combination of knowl- edge and action for liberation accompanies the doctrine of Difference in Identity, as ir Bhartrprapañca.

(1) And that word 'then' affirms thet both action and knowl- edge are needed for knowledge of the Absolute, both in regard to beginning the discipline and for earning its reward. They are needed for beginning it, since one can only begin the enquiry into the Absolute if rituals have already been per- formed first; and they are needed for earning the reward of the discipline in that salvation (ksema) can only be achieved through knowledge combined with ritualistic action. (Bh.B.S. Bh.I.i.l, p.4)

(2) For here the author of the Sutras teaches that liberation is achieved through a combination of knowledge and ritualistic action. For it is in this sense that he will say, 'Members of all stages of life must resort to ritualistic action and knowl- edge for liberation, on account of the text "Him the true Brahmins seek to know ... through sacrifice, through charity, through austerity ... " (Brhad. IV.iv.22, M. V. 55,1;100,2, note - a text which implies that action and rituals are an aid in travelling the path) like a horse' (B.S. III.iv.26). And un- less one knows the ritualistic science thoroughly one cannot decide which actions have to be combined with knowledge and which do not. But when thorough knowledge of the ritvalistic science has been achieved, one can affirm that the daily obli- gatory ritual should be combined with knowledge, while optional

p.2) ritual and forbidden acts should be avoided. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.1,

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(3) Others, however, explain the relationship betwcen action and knowledge differently. First there must be fulfilment of one's (five) debts to the gods and the rest,* and the thorough digestion of the healing medicine of spiritnal knowledge. The word 'then' implies 'after this'. Why is that so? A person can only engage in ritualistic acts through the Veda when he goes through his prescribed daily texts, repeating them with understanding. Then there must be conquest of desires, both those that are engendered by the promises of the Veda and those thet are natural. Then there must be accumulation of merit and purging of demerit. .After that, a person beccmes fit to carry out the injunctions placed on the highest and best qualified student. But what is the injunction laid on the highest and best yualified student ?... 'It (the Self), verily, should be seen, should be heard about, should be pondered over, should be subjected to sustained meditation' (Brhad. II.iv.5) .... However, the true cxperts do not accept this interpretation of the relation between action and knowledge. For there is no evidence to prove that one becomes fit for the highest injunc- tions of all through self-purification and that this state transcends all qualifications for meritorious work. (Bh.B.S. Bh.I.i.l, p.5)

*(Fulfilment of debts to the Rsis, whose vision provided the Vedic texts, by teaching the texts to others - of debts to the gods by offerings in the sacred fire, and of debts to the ancestors by offerings on the ground. Where five debts are spuken of, propitiation of malicious spirits and fulfilment of debts to mankind by hospitality to guests are also included. Manu Smrti TII.70. T.N.)

The method for refuting the doctrine of liberation through a combination of ritualistic action with knowledge is well known to those who have studied Śri Sankara's commentaries on the Upanishads, Brahma Sutras and Gita (cp. M. V. 68). The fact that a person can purify himself through ritualistic action is also well known. Śri Sankara quotes (at Brhad.Bh. III.iii. 1, intro. ) the text 'By this do I purify this part of my body' (S.B. XI.ii.6.13). The view that a person can purify himself by ritual is accepted even by Acarya Mandana Misra, who taught that liberation was achieved through a combination of ritual- istic action and knowledge (B.Sid. p.36, cp. M.V. 105, 3 and 7).

(4) In the same way, the ritualistic section of the Veda does not depend on the knowledge-section. But the knowledge-section depends on the ritualistic section, since the Upanishads them- selves teach that the obligatory daily ritual is required for liberation in co-operation with knowledge in the text 'Him the true Brahmins seek to know through the repetition of the Veda ... ' (Brhad.IV.iv.22, cp. above, M.V.173,2). (Bh.B.S.Bh.

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I.i.4, p.16, cp. M.V.161,7)

The phrase 'There must be resort by all' means 'there must be resort to ritualistic action and knowledge for libera- (5)

tion by members of all stages of life'. Why? Because of the text, 'Him the true Brahmins seek to know through the repeti- tion of the Veda, through sacrifice, through charity, through austerity and extreme moderation in the enjoyment of sense- objects' (Brhad. IV.iv.22). Here sacrifice and the rest, since the words denoting them are in the instrumental case, are enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge for meditation, like the fore-sacrifices enjoined as necessary auxiliaries for a Soma sacrifice .... Therefore, just as those who have acquired meta- physical knowledge still have to observe inner and outer con- trol and the other disciplines as long as they continue to live, if they wish to make sure of liberation, so must they continue with the rituals and duties of their stage of life. They cannot drop them in the interval between enlightenment and death. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.iv.26, p.207)

What the upanishadic text actually teaches here is that ritual- istic action is a factor in the rise of desire for knowledge or at best a factor in the rise of knowledge. It does not say that action can ever be combined with metaphysical knowledge.

(6) On the strict Vedic doctrine (say the Mimamsakas) there is only one stage of life (householder), and knowledge of (i.e. meditation on) the Self is taught as an aid to ritual. Its basis is (not truth but) eulogy of the performer of ritual. According to the Smrti there are other stages of life (wander- ing monk, etc.), and knowlcdge of (i.e. meditation on) the Self is taught to enable those who are disabled, and so cannot per- form ritual, to realize their ends (through meditation on the ritual instead of physical performance of it). This view of the Mimamsakas will be refuted in the course of the present section of the Brahma Sutras (B.S. III.iv.l ff .; cp. M. V. 55,12). And the author will show at B.S. III.iv.26 (cp. M.V.173,5;174 passim) how, granted that the supreme human goal is metaphysi- cal knowledge, that knowledge must be combined with action. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.iv.l, p.201)

(7) The Sutras also say (quoting Badarayana's view), 'But equal examples can be given on the other side' (B.S. III.iv.9). It means that there are also examples of texts to show that knowledge of the Self is not a mere auxiliary of ritual. 'This is what the enlightened Kavaseya Rsis said of old. They said, "Why should we go through the Vedic texts? Why should we offer sacrifices?"' (text untraced). And there is the text, 'The knowers of the Absolute, verily, having known this Self, rise above the desire for sons, rise above the desire for wealth, and live on alms' (Brhad. III.v.l). The phrase 'Why should we ...? '

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is not an exhortation to give up the practice of going through one's texts each day. It is an eulogy of knowledge of the meaning of the texts. 'In all respects knowledge is the most important thing' is the idea. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.iv.9, p.203)

The Vedic tert here speaks of rising above worldly ends, which implies giving ritual up, not combining it with knowledge.

(8) Rising above the householder state, the state typified by possession of sons, they attain to another stage of life. This simply accepts and repeats the teaching of the Smrti. If one took no regard of the rules for wandering monks set out in the Smrti (the only place where rules for wandering monks are found), then there would be nothing to show that the living on alms practised by Buddhist and Jaina monks was not under Vedic sanction. And it is from the Law-Books such as that of Manu (reading manavadau) that the true nature and churacteristics of the highest stage of life may be learned, and this from the rules about the threefold stave* and sacred thread and so on. So we forbear to say any more on the matter ourselves here. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.iv.26, p.208)

*(Bhaskara was a monk of the Tridandin (threefold staff) Order, and retained the sacred thread for the performance of rituals. Śri Sankara and his followers are Ekadandins (Single Staff Order) who destroy their sacred thread at their initiation and abandon ritual. T.N.)

In his Brhadaranyaka Commentary (Brhad. Bh. III.v. 1, trans. Mādhavānanda, p.482 ff. ;487 ff. ) Śrī Sankara treats the texts on renunciation in the Veda and the Smrti as applying to dif- ferent classes of candidate. As for the Buddhists and so on, disregard of the Smrtis on their part would not suffice to give them Vedic sanction, as they pay no regard even to the Veda.

(9) Being devoted to the Absolute means being wholly absorbed in contemplation of the Absolute. It is a state that is avail- able to members of all the different stages of life without distinction .... And so, (in the context of liberation) action and knowledge are not mutually contradictory, because they co-operate towards the same goal. And it is in this sense that the Veda says, 'He who meditates on the Self alone as his true realm finds that his action is never exhausted' (Brhad. I.iv.15). Though the act is in itself momentary, it is called everlasting because its reward is everlasting. And if someone (the Advaitin) were to make the objection that immortality cannot come merely from a connection with (meritorious) action, we reply that immortality could not ac- crue to the total renunciate (to the parivrajaka whom you champion) either. For he too must perform the physical, mental and vocal activity associated with attending to the needs of

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nature, sipping water, bathing, begging for alms and so forth. And since no embodied being can avoid action of this sort, liberation as conceived by the Advaitin would be impossible. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.iv.20, p.205-6)

Not so. The total renunciate (parivrajaka) is not subject to the rules about attending to the needs of nature and the like, and no combination of ritualistie action and knowledge applies io him. More on this can be found in Sri Sankara's commentar- ies on the Gita, Chandogya and Brahma Sutras. (E.g. see Bh. G. Bh. V.1; Chand. Bh. II.xxiii.1; B.S.Bh. III. iv. 20, M.V. 55, 10. T. N. )

(10) In the Śvetaśvatara Upanishad (VI.21) we hear how the sage Svetasvatara gave teaching to the 'atyasramins'. Yaska's Nirukta I.i.4 declares '"Ati" may be used in the sense of "venerable"'. So it was venerable members of a (high) order of life (aśrama), who led virtuous lives devoted to the repeti- tion of their appointed Vedic texts, who were being taught. So the Svetasvatara Upanishad says that it was to them (i.e. to members of a particular caste and order of life) that Svetaśvatara gave the (high metaphysical) teaching. (Bh.B.S.Bh. III.iv.26, p.208)

It hardly needs pointing out that a venerable stage of life can be obtained by reaching the actionless state too.

(11) As for the reading of Jabala Upanishad 5 which says 'How can he be a Brahmin if he has no sacred thread?' - that is a case raising a doubt, and is itself a doubtful reading. For there is no previous mention of depositing or abandoning the sacred thread. How could a doubt suddenly arise in this way from nowhere? And the word 'Brahmin' is meaningless. For how could the person mentioned here as being 'without a sacred thread' be a Ksatriya (given that the succeeding sentences explicitly treat the Ksatriya 'as different)? Our suspicion is that this passage is an interpolation by a very unskilful per- son. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.iv.26, p.208)

The later part of the passage from the Jabala text in question says 'Shaven and without possessions'. So the text did not 'come from nowhere'. The correct deduction is that it is a further development from the earlier phrase 'Let him renounce even in the midst of life as a celibate student' (Jabāla 4; M. V. 57, 4). Nor is the word 'Brahmin' meaningless. For it indicates that the Brahmin has a special (though not an exclu- sive) right to renunciation. There are other Vedic texts on the point, such as '(Scrutinizing the worlds won through action, the Brahmin should come to view them with indifference' (Mund. I.ii.12, cp. M.V.66,2). From a passage in the sequel we see that an injunction to become Paramahamsas affects even monks (of Bhaskara's order) with the threefold staff. It says, 'They

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have no visible insignia, their ways are unknown' and 'such an one should throw his threefoid staff and his coconut water-pot and his sling and his begging-bowl and his holy water and his sacred tuft and sacred thread - all of them - into the water saying "Bhuh svaha!" and should seek to know the Self' (Jabala 6).

(12) The alleged 'knowledge' of the Sankhyas to the effect that 'Nature is the cause of the world! is a piece of pseudo- Smrti. The doctrine of those same Sankhyas and others that ljberation comes from knowledge alone, with action playing no part, is also a pseudo-tradition. Those (of our own Vedanta school, i.e. the Advaitins) who follow it and speak of the renunciation of all rituals and all action also teach a pseudo- doctrine. And thus their doctrine is mentioned and refuted in the Apastamba Dharma Sutra in the words 'That is contradicted by the Veda. If liberation were attainable through mental enlightenment, he who attained it would cease to feel pain even here in the world (which is not the case)' (A.D.S. II.xxi.16). (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.iv.26, p.209)

This is not a pseudo-tradition. It is rooted in such Vedic texts as 'Let him renounce even in the midst of life as a celibate student' (Jabala 4; M.V.57, 4). And there are such Smrti texts as 'Neither acting nor causing to act' (Gita V.13). There is also the practical example given, 'Thus spoke Yajña- valkya, and left (the world for the forest)' (Brhad. IV.v.15). Nor was the text quoted from the Apastamba Dharma Sutra inten- ded to express the finally accepted view. For both criticism and praise for all the stages of life can be found in that work. If the phrase 'If salvation were attainable through mental enlightenment ... ' was intended as an objection against Advaita, it was wrong. For there are Vedic texts, such as 'He becomes immortal here' (a text of the Taittiriyas) which de- clare that the enlightened man does attain salvation (kşema) here below. Nor does experience of pain contradict metaphysi- cal knowledge. For pain that is experienced (is an object and so) cannot be an attribute of the subject who experiences it.

174 THE REWARDS OF KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION

Bhaskara held that action too, as well as knowledge, put an end to the obstacles to transcendence (kaivalya).

(1) And here it has to be explained how knowledge is of ser- vice for liberation. Perhaps it will be claimed that knowledge of multiplicity is Ignorance. Metaphysical knowledge, on the other hand, is of service for liberation by putting an end to Ignorance. But this view is wrong. For it contradicts what we

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actually perceive. For nobody's knowledge of duality comes to a total halt on the rise of knowledge of the meaning of a text. The embodied one has body, mind and senses, and these means of knowledge give him cognitions of colour and the rest. No means can remain in being without supplying its end. When fire and fuel come together, it is certain that they will produce smoke. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.iv.26, p.209)

What is the meaning of 'cessation of the knowledge of duality?' Is it cessution of ail cognition of duality? Or is it cessa- tion of the belief that duality is real? If it means cessation of all cognition of duality, then the Advaitins themselves do not accept it. But if it is cessation of the belief that duality is real, then this cessation is just what the Advaitins affirm. One who has known the shell in its true form no longer continues to believe in the illusory appearance of silver.

(2) And if you say that there is (in enlightenment) no appear- ance of multiplicity, and also that divine attributes like omniscience and so on supervene, then all secular and Vedic activity would come to an end in a single flash. (Bh.B.S.Bh. III.iv.26, p.209)

This is wrong. Omiscience and other divine attributes do not come to anyone while they are ative. If you say, 'Then they must do so after death, because they are the stated reward for certain meditations' - well, if so, their reality can be no more than a matter of faith. For they will only have been

brooding. attained on the plane of personal conviction attained through

(3) And how could the Self be a performer of action on your (Advaitin's) theory, since it is pure Consciousness alone by nature? How, then, could it act, for instance, in your own ordinary worldly actions? And, in any case, the power to act that derives from external adjuncts lasts as long as the adjuncts. Fire goes on acting to produce smoke as long as it is in contact with fuel. And because the portion of merit and demerit from past lives that initiated the present body is not destroyed (but must work itself out until exhausted, reading avināsāt), the power to act and experience lasts as long as the body does. There is, however, this difference between the enlightened person and the metaphysically ignorant one. The enlightened person regards his power to act as derived from extrinsic adjuncts, and does not accept it as being his own; the ignorant person accepts it as belonging to himself by nature. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.iv.26, p.210)

On Śri Śankara's view, the power to perform action in the world arises from mere illusion. You ask what I gain from say- ing that? Well, if it were not so then we would have your

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theory according to which the enlightened man rejects his power to act because it derives from external adjuncts, and yet he continues to accept it and to conform to it at the same time. And what is the sense in a theory like that?

(4) Perhaps you will ask how action is a means to liberation. Just in the same way that knowledge is on your theory, we reply. You (Advaitin) will say, 'But knowledge puts an end to Ignorance'. We agree. But, as we have already explained, it does not put an end to cognition of multiplicity. And if you reply that knowledge puts an end to the obstacle of supposing the not-self to be the Self, we reply that ritualistic action helps to do the same .... The removal of forms like that of a saffron robe and so on (Brhad.II.iii.6), which have been shown to blur the true nature of the Self, is effected by knowledge and action combined. For freedom from rebirth arises from (obeying) the Veda (in its totality). If you ask how action helps, we reply, 'Who could know? The Veda has been compared to a compassionate mother'. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.iv.26, p.210)

We have shown that the true function of metaphysical knowledge is to cancel the notion that duality is real. The theory that action puts an end to the false notion that the not-self is the Self contradicts plain evidence. For metaphysical Igno- rance is, precisely, the false notion that the not-self is the Self. That is seen to be cancelled by knowledge only, not by action. On Bhaskara's system it is appropriate to say 'Who knows?', since the theory assumes that liberation is the result of the occult future effects of action after this life (adrsta). What needs to be noted is that, apart from pre- scribed meditation, there exists also such a thing as metaphy- sical knowledge conditioned by the nature of reality, the results of which are immediately evident in this very life.

175 REPEATED PRACTICE OF HEARING, PONDERING AND SUSTAINED MEDITATION

Bhaskara says that metaphysical knowledge alone is not enough to effect liberation. For that, prescribed meditations (upasana) are deemed necessary

(1) Through repeated hearing of and pondering over the meta- physical texts of the Upanishads there arises that knowledge of the Self which dispels ignorance, doubt and erroneous knowledge about it. We know that this is so because the discipline for knowledge of the Self (as opposed to final liberation) is pur- sued like the pounding of the paddy (cp. M.V. p.197), for an end that is perceptible in the present life. (Bh.B.S.Bh.IV.i.1, p.218)

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(2) The statement that immediate concrete knowledge can arise frum hearing and pondering over the metaphysical texts of the Veda only once is nonsense. Even Svetaketu failed to overcome his ignorance and doubt after hearing the teaching many times. What will be the case with people whose minds are still sullied by attachment and other defects? (Bh.B.S.Bh.IV.i.1, p.219)

(3) When a sound knowledge of the true nature of the Self has been derived from the texts, then meditation in the form of returning again and again to that same conception has to be practised for the rest of one's life. (Bh.B.S.Bh.IV.i.l, p.219)

(4) Metaphysical Ignorance is the false idea in regard to the body and other aspects of the not-self that they are the Seif, allied to a failure to apprehend the true nature of the Abso- lute. When right knowledge arises, Ignorance comes to an end. Once right knowledge hes arisen it has to be re-affirmed for the rest of one's life and so matured. It then provides for liberation (at death). This we know from the Veda. (Bh.B.S.Bh. IV.i.l, p.219)

This also demonstrates that Bhaskara paid no attention to the fact that true knowledge is conditioned (not by the activity of the knower but) by the nature of the reality known.

176 THE RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND YOGA

Yoga is also partly accepted in this system.

(1) That part of the teaching of the Yoga school that explains the means to right knowledge may be accepted as correct, be- cause it agrees with the Vedic teaching. But the part that does not agree with Vedic teaching is wrong. For the nature of the Purusas is explained differently in the Yoga system (and not in the same way as in the Veda). (Bh.B.S.Bh.II.1.3, p.89)

(2) In the Yoga Sastra of Sanaka and others, this yoga is taught. It has the stages of dhyana, dharana and samadhi. Dhyana is said to be the one-pointed concentration of the mind effected for the sake of some desired goal. Dharana is the simultaneous concentration of breath, sense-organs, mind (manas) and higher mind (buddhi, M.V.43,6, T.N.). Samadhi is continuous contemplation with faith and effort. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.iv.l, p.72)

(3) When a person has attained abundant knowledge, he should practise yoga, to mature his knowledge. Then the author of the Sutras says, 'As in the case of injunctions and so on'. Just as the Agnihotra and other rituals are enjoined on the ignorant one who wants an abundance of worldly and heavenly rewards, so this

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(voga) is enjoined on the person of enlightenment, the renun- ciate, who desires (final) liberation (at the death of the body) and is totally dedicated. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.iv.45, p.216)

(4) (The supreme Self is not totally different from the indi- vidual soul.) It is like the light of the sun. By the words 'and so on' the author of the Sutras refers also to the ether of space. The sun and the ether of space conform to the exter- nal adjuncts within which they appear to be contained - the sun to the motion of the water in which it is reflected, the ether to the shape of the hollows of the empty vessels which appear to 'house' it. When the conditioning adjuncts have gone, non-difference supervenes (in the sun or the ether of space). Thus this individual soul 'attains' the form of the supreme Self (when the conditioning adjunct is discarded) even though it was non-different from the supreme Self even before. By 'the light of the supreme Self'. the author means 'the manifes- tation of the supreme Self'. And this is realized when the supreme Self is made the object of meditation, through yogic and devotional practice (samradhana), and not otherwise. This being so, those who think 'We have become the Absolute without continuous contemnlation with faith and effort (samadhi)' are victims of false pride. This is what is indicated by the author of the Sutras here. (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.ii.25, p.170)

As a general rule, there are no injunctions to perform yoga in those passages of the Upanishads which treat specifically of metaphysical knowledge. The words 'He knew' (Chand. VI. xviii. 3) show that effective concrete knowledge can arise from mere teaching (i.e. without yoga practice), and this also shows that Bhaskara's theory that yoga is also required is wrong. And if realization of the Absolute depended on the attainment of samadhi, it would be something temporary and fitful. Therefore the teaching of the Sutra is that the experience of samadhi is a proof of the fact that there is no internal differentiation in the Self; the Sutra does not contain an injunction to per- form samadhi. There is no word conveying an injunction or com mand of any kind in the Sūtra.

177 THE DESCRIPTION OF LIBERATION

A few quotations are subjoined to bring out Bhaskara's views on the subject of liberation.

(1) Cessation of metaphysical Ignorance does not mean cessation of vision of difference. It means the cessation of the notion that the body and other elements of the not-self are the Self .... When that notion ceases, a person becomes omniscient and omni- potent and possessed of unsurpassable bliss after the death of the body. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.i.4, p.21)

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(2) Liberation is of two kinds. While a person is still alive in the body, liberation for him means liberation from attach- ment, aversion and infatuation, and their offspring such as conceit and the like. After the death of the body, there is total and final liberation. (Bh.B.S.Bh.IV.i.14, p.224)

No notice has been taken here of the upanishadic teaching 'Then he attains the Absolute here in this very body' (Brhad. IV. iv .? ).

(3) There are two kinds of liberation, immediate liberation and liberation by stages. Those who meditate directly on the Absolutc may receive immediate liberation. The others reach Hiranyagarbha with purified hearts. There they attain yet greater knowledge, as we know from the mention of the rise of clear knowledge in the text 'The Self is as clearly visible in the world of Brahma as the distinction between light and shade is here' (Katha II.iii.5). And they are liberated with Brahma (at the end of the world-period). (Bh.B.S.Bh.IV.iii.14, p.240)

(4) In the case of him who has attained his identity with the supreme Self, the state of performing actions and undergoing experiences comes to an end (i.e. after the death of the body). And on this we have such upanishadic texts as 'Him who is with- out a body, pleasure and pain verily do not touch' (Chand. VIII.xii.1, cp. M.V.67,4) and 'having risen up from this body' (Chand. VIII.xii.3). There is no escape from experiencing the whole of the por- tion of merit and demerit which initiated the body through which liberation is attained. And one who supports a body inevitably undergoes pleasure and pain. Therefore those who say that there can be liberation for one who is yet alive go beyond the teaching of the Veda. They (also) contradict per- ceived experience. (Bh.B.S.Bh.I.iii.20, p.58)

He should have remembered the upanishadic teaching, 'Then the mortal one becomes immortal, he attains the Absolute in this very life' (Brhad. IV.iv.7, cp. M.V. 59,9). And we find a little later in the same upanishadic passage 'and so this bodiless one. ..

(5) And if you (i.e. Sankara) were to become liberated while alive, then because you would be omniscient you would know the minds of other people .* Perhaps you will say that 'omniscient' means (not 'all-knowing' but) 'being the all, and the "all" is "the knower"'. But this cannot be so. For on your view the 'all' will have disappeared, so that only pure Consciousness is left. Liberation would then have to be accepted as absence of subject-object consciousness. Or else you might say on the basis of following the Veda that liberation implied omniscience and omnipotence. But in that case there could not be liberation during one's life as

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an individual, and the meditation and ritualistic action that are the means to liberation would have to be continued until the death of the body. (Bll.B.S.Bh.III.iv.26, p.210)

*(Reading paracittavedanam with the Chowkhambi text. T.N.)

Umiscience is not knowledge of all objects. Omiscience is being the non-dual Consciousness in its true nature. As for what was suid about the 'all' having disappeared, that was correct. But the 'all' can very well just be Consciousnecs. The statement 'Liberation is absence of subject-object- consciousness' was also correct. Yet the true nature of such a state is in fact pure Consciousness, so that our doctrine is in no way open to censure,

179 SUMMARY OF THE EXAMINATION OF BHĀSKARA'S SYSTEM

Of the systems that oppose the method of false attribution followed by later retractios, Bhaskara's is the earliest that has survived in complete form. It by no means follows Dhartr- prapanca's systea point for point. Some new arguments in favour of the system of Difference in Identity are produced. And Śri Śankara's arguments are in places subjected to a viru- lent attack. The latter's arguments, however, are not always reproduced exactly as they stood in their original form. In particular, it is clear that the difference between Śri Śan- kara's doctrine and those of the schools of Mahayana Buddhism was not properly appreciated. Amongst the peculiar features of Bhaskara's system we may note the following. Texts are twisted in favour of the inter- pretation that the author wants to give them. Only arguments in favour of his own view are adduced when he wishes to draw attention to sameness or difference through examples. Upani- shadic texts are quoted as authority simply on the basis of their being Vedic texts (contrast ŚrI Śankara, M.V.31,3, note ). The reader must see that there are a number of points in Śankara Bhagavatpada's teaching which Bhaskara did not wholly grasp. For example, Bhaskara did not at all understand that, for Śri Bhagavatpada, enquiry into the Absolute must culminate in immediate experience (cp. M.V.31,3, note). Other points also escaped him. There cannot be alternatives in the determi- nation of reality - as is implied by the teaching that there is both difference and identity - in the way that there is choice in regard to things to be done. The function of a Vedic text is to inform, not to bring about a result. In Vedanta philosophy after Bhäskara's day, authors of al- most all the other schools tended to follow this path. We shall be illustrating this here and there in the pages to come.

CHAPTER X THE BHĀMATĪ

179 PADMAPĀDA, SUREŚVARA AND VĀCASPATI AS SUB-COMMENTATORS ON THE COMMENTARIES OF ŚRI ŚAŃKARA

We find in the Śankara Vijaya of Madhava a story intended to throw light on the inter-relationship of the systems of Sures- vara, 'Padmapāda' and Vācaspati Misra. Suresvara (it is there said) had a desire to compose a sub-commentary on Śri Sankara's Brahma Sutra Commentary, and had obtained his Guru's permission for it (Śankara Vijaya XIII.4,5). But other pupils of Śri Bhagavatpāda were not prepared to accept this. They went to the Acarya in secret and said,' 'This man's mind is still attached to rituals. If he writes a long verse sub- commentary on your Brahma Sutra Commentary, that whole Commen- tary will be seen as teaching rituals. So let Padmapādācārya, Giri or Hastamalaka write a sub-commentary with your permission' (XIII.19,20,22). When Suresvara heard that an obstacle had been placed in the way of his cherished plan, he uttered the curse 'If anyone else writes a commentary, let it not gain currency in the world'. The Acarya, seeking to alleviate his disappointment, gave him the order 'Go ahead and write verse sub-commentaries on my Brhadāranyaka and Taittiriya Commen- taries'(XIII.66). Meanwhile Padmapada wrote a gloss on the Brahma Sūtra Commentary, by permission of his Guru (XIII.71). The Acarya saw it and was satisfied. But he knew what would happen with the passage of time, so he told Suresvara to modify his curse and say, 'Let the sub-commentary on (the first) five sections (pañca + pada, i.e. up to Brahma Sūtra I.ii.31) only gain currency, and, even of this, only the part on the first four Sutras' (XIII.72). And then to ameliorate matters further he added: 'By the force of the maturation of merit and demerit already in operation to initiate your present birth, you (Sureśvara) will be reborn on earth as Vacaspati, equipped with mastery of learning (vacaspatitva). You will write a gloss on

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my Brahma Sutra Commentary that will live till the elements dissolve in destruction' (XIII.73). It is surely obvious that all we have here in the Śankara vijaya is a bit of poetic sleight-cf-hand intended to excite wonder in the reader's mind and supply some kind of reason why the Pamcapadika in its current form should be limited to only four Sutras, whereas Vacaspati's gloss on the Brahma Sutra Com- mentary is complete, and to explain why Surcsvarācārya did not write a sub-commentary on the Brahma Sutra Commentary, though he commented on many subtle points of Vedanta doctrine in his Vārtikas on the Brhadāranyaka and Taittiriya Commentaries. For though the Brhadaranyaka Vartika of Suresvara is a long work, the author does not once consider the Pañcapadika or bestow even a glance on those of its arguments which disagree with his own system. Nor is there any particular similarity between the systems of Suresvara and Vacaspati in the way they handle prob- lems, even on the most important topics. In fact there is a considerable difference, as we shall sometimes have occasion to poist out in the course of our exposition. These authors, therefore, are clearly each propounding different systems. And this hard fact cannot be contradicted merely by stories in a poem.

180 THE WORKS OF VĀCASPATI MIŚRA

A number of famous works in Sanskrit literature are credited to Vacaspati Misra. It has been shown by other evidence that not all of them are the work of the same author. But from the evi- dence of the Bhamati sub-commentary itself, the work under con- sideration in the present chapter, we may be confident that the following other works were written by the same author - namely, (1) a gloss on Mandana Misra's Vidhiviveka called Nyāyakaņikā; (2) a commentary on the Brabma Siddhi called Tattvaparīkşā; (3) an independent treatise analysing how sentences convey their meaning, entitled Tattvabindu; two works on the system of the Logicians, namely (4) the Tatparyatīka gloss on the Nyāya Vārtika and (5) the-Nyāya Sūci; (6) a gloss on the Sankhya Kārikas entitled the Tattvakaumudi; and (7) a gloss called the Tattvavaisaradi on Vyasa's Commentary to the Yoga Sutras. It is surmised that the works were written in this order, and that the gloss on Śri Sankara's Brahma Sutra Commentary called the Bhamati was written last. The reason is that, if the books are placed in this order, the later ones are nowhere mentioned in the earlier ones. This shows that the highly respected figure, Śri Vacaspati Misra, was thoroughly conversant with a number of different systems and inspired by a longing to explain them to others. And in fact we sometimes find him subjecting the texts of the original works he is quoting to slight alterations, according to the requirements of the text he happens to be commenting on

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at the time. For example, there is a text of (the Sakhya Teacher) Varsaganya whici he quotes as follows at Tattra- vaisāradi IV.12, 'The highest form of the constituents (guna) is not within the range of perception. What can be perceived is like an illusory magic display (maya), quite insignificant'. de comments on it therc, 'Like an illusory magic display, but not actvally an illusory magic dispiay. "Quite insignificaat" means transient. As an illusory magic display quickly changes, so the modifications of Hature appear and disappear and are different every instant. But Nature itself, because it is eterral and constant, is not of the same order of being as an illusory magic display and is perfectly real'. Yet he uged the same pen in the Bhamati (II.1.3) to demon- strate the unreality of the constituents (in the light of the same text). First he changed the reading from 'like an illu- sory magic display' (mayeva) to 'verily an illusory magic display' (mayaiva), and so reading 'verily an illusory magic display, quite insignificant'. He then continued, 'Here the expositor of Yoga (Varsaganva) speaks of the constituents (guņa) only as a device for teaching; he does not treat them as realities. This is because they are not in fact real'. He had himself elsewhere spoken of Nature as 'perfectly real'. How he could here disregard (read anadrtya) the wording of Vargaganya's text and interpret 'Nature' in the very opposite way as 'unreal' is a source of astonishment to the reader.

181 THE PLACE OF THE BHĀMATI SCHOOL IN VEDANTA

We have to infer that at the time the Bhamati was composed the school of Bhaskara had acquired wide currency at the expense of the school of pure Advaita. For we see that great efforts are made by Vacaspati Misra to answer the objections raised by Bhaakara against Advaita and to reveal the defects in the doctrine of Difference in Identity. From this point of view, an examination of the Bhamati may be helpful even today to Advaitins aiming to rebut the objections raised against Advaita by other later schools which were influenced by Bhaskara. But the more immediate reason for examining the system of the Bhamati here is to try to discover to what extent it is helpful to those who want to learn to recognize the true method of the Vedanta. Another point is that, at many places in the Bhamati, on the pretext of giving a gloss on Śri Sankara's Commentary, the author actually introduces, the ideas of Mandana as though they were those of the revered Commentator. The Brahma Tattva Samīkga (another name for Vacaspati's Commentary on the Brahma Siddhi) has not yet appeared in printed form, but fragments of it are quoted in the Bhamati. It is true that Mandana's opinions, with slight verbal alterations, find their way into

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the body of Suresvara's Brhadāraņyaka Vartika, especially the Sambamdha Vartika portion. But what we see in the Bhamati is something new. Here the current of Mandana's thought is made to flow into that of Śri Sankara like the Jumna flowing into the Ganges. And the two ways of thinking are blended together to issue in a new cystem, given out in the worid for the first time in the Bhamati, in a form attractive to spiritual enqui- rers. It has alsc to be remembered that there are many new points of tesching in the Bnamati that are not found in the Pañca- padika. And many scholars who bave fallen under the imfluence of the Bhamati have written sub-commentaries on it and sub- commentaries on these. So those who want to be sure about the method of the Vedanta through a strdy of the Brahma Sutra Ccm- mentary must certainly enquire into the Bhamati.

182 THE TWO ' IGNORANCES' IN THE SYSTEM OF THE BHAMATI

In the opening verse of the work, Ācārya Vacaspati Misra speaks of Ignorance as follows.

(1) (We pay reverence to that Absolute) which is the source, when accompanied by the twofold indeterminable Ignorance, of these illusory manifestations, ether, wind, fire, water and earth ....

Here the claim is made that there is an indeterminable twofold Ignorance. Again and again in the Bhamati there are refer- ences to the twofold Ignorance as cause and effect. For example:

(2) '(The inmost Self), the support of the twofold Ignorance as effect and cause, the substratum of the ego-sense, the one subjected to transmigration ... ' (Bha.I.i.1, p.45/59),* 'And metaphysical knowledge is the means to liberation simply through removing the obstacle of the twofold Ignorance ... (Bha. I.i.4, p.121/180), '"Darkness" (tamas ) means "the twofold Ignorance"'. (Bha. IV.iv.22)

*(Page-references are only required and given for the Bhamatī on the first four Sutras of the B.S. They refer to the 1938 Bombay edition, with the page-reference to the Madras English translation of that portion of the work given after an oblique stroke. The Madras translation is a model of accuracy, but the versions here offered are in freer style, in keeping with the rest of the present book. T.N.)

The two aspects of Ignorance are also referred to in the Bhamati under the names of dissolution and projection. For example:

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(3) 'Where Śri Sankara says that the soul has the form of purity in dreamless sleep he means that it seems to have the form of purity, not that it actually has it. For in dreamless sleep the impressions of dissolution and projection are present' (Bha. I.iv.18). 'But when the impression of projection awekens, supported by Ignorance in the form of the impression of dissolution, then, through the rise of particularized knowl- edge, the dreaming state and waking state supervene, and from this there comes a return from the state of (being one with) t.he supreme Self, a return which is of the nature of a fall' (Bha. I.iv.18). 'When Śri. Sankara says, "Nor can Ignorance alone ... (be responsible for differences of pleasurc and pain in dif- ferent individuals without the added factor of merit and demerit)" he refers to Ignorance qua discolution' (Bha. II.i. 36). 'Name and form are set up by Ignorance. Causal Ignorance is of the nature of dissolution (laya), associated with the impressions of projection derived from world-projection in previous world-periods. Name and form so conceived constitute "Māya"'. (Bha. II.ii.2)

(4) It is the superimposition of the not-self onto the Self that is the cause of all evil, and that alone is metaphysical Ignorance properly-so-called, not silver-errors and the like. (Bha. I.i.1, p.40/44)

failure to distinguish difference' (Bha.I.i.l, p.8/7). 'By (5) 'Superimposition is invariably accompanied by a (prior)

"failure to distinguish one from the other" Śri Sankara means "non-perception of the difference"'. (Bha.I.i.l, intro., p.16/14)

From the texts above quoted, it could be inferred that two forms of ignorance were accepted in the Bhamati, as in the Brahma Siddhi, and that they were of the nature of non- perception and wrong perception respectively. For they are found referred to in the Brahma Siddhi by the same two techni- cal terms, 'dissolution' (laya) and 'projection' (vikşepa), as the following passage shows.

(6) Perhaps it will be said that Ignorance is of two kinds, that which conceals the light and that which makes projections. The projecting form of Ignorance occurs in dream and waking; the concealing form, which is a kind of dissolution, occurs in dreamless sleep. The cessaticn of the concealing form of Ignorance is the reward promised for obeying the Vedic injunc- tion to acquire knowledge. But this view is wrong. For a human being does not need the cessation of the concealing kind of Ignorance, but rather that of the projecting kind. For it is the latter that brings sufferings of various kinds. Indeed, one should actually aim for (and not seek the cessation of) dissolution. For disso-

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lution (i.e. the dissolution of dreamless sleep, explains Anandapurna) is often praised in the Veda as being bliss (cp. Brhad. IV.iii.33), due to the cessation of all the various forms of suffering. And again, for him who did not recognize posi- tive wrong cognition, there could not be any distinctions in Ignorance at all; for the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep would consist equally of bare non-apprehension. (This position being obviously untenabie), one must therefore accept that there are two forms of Ignorance, of the form of non-perception and wrong perception, related as cause and effect respectively. (B.Sid. p.149 f.)

It is clear that in this passage it is only the negative form of Ignorance as non-apprehension that is accepted as consti- tuting Ignorance, since that is spoken of as baing of the nature of dissclution and as being the cause. And one may also infer that it is this samc non-perception and wrong per- ception, also there called dissolution (laye) and projection (vikşepa), that are referred to in the Bhamati by the term 'the twofold indeterminable ignorance'. But we also find the term 'power of Ignorance' used some- times in the Bhamati. This term does not occur in the Brahma Siddhi or in Śri Sankara'a Brahma Sutra Commentary, and was taken over from the Pañcapādika. We subjoin a few texts in which this phrase occurs.

(7) Therefore, in texts such as :Then He thought' (Chand. VI.ii.3), being the womb of the world is figuratively attri- buted to the Absclute by making it the seat of the power of Ignorance. But here the (Sankhya) exponent of the provisional view (purva-pakşa) maintains that, since the power of Ignorance can very well be the womb of the world on its own, it is not right to assume that here both an agent and an instrument are in play: in this sort of text it is Nature alone that is de- clared to be the womb of the world. (Bha. I.ii.21)

Here it is clear that the phrase 'power of Ignorance' is used to mean Nature (prakrti).

(8) Although at the time of a great cosmic dissolution (mahā- pralaye) there are no modifications such as mind in evidence, nevertheless they lie present, dissolved in their cause, inde- terminable Ignorance; they remain in being, together with the impressions of Ignorance that will eventually generate action, in the form of a subtle (imperceptible) power. (Bha.I.iii.30)

Here too, we collect that the Ignorance in which minds and so on are dissolved is Ignorance in the form of dissolution, also called Nature.

(9) This power of Ignorance possessed by the Absolute is

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known as Maya and by cther names. It is indeterminable either as identical with or different from reality. The fact that it is indetermineble in this sense is what makes it 'The Unmanifest'. This is the difference between our doctrine which speaks of 'the Unmanifest' and that of the Sankhyas who speak of 'Nature'. (Bha.I.iv.3)

It is quite clear that the phrase 'power of Ignorance' is being used to designate the primary material cause of the world (iagat-prakrti), also here called 'the Unmanifest'.

From the above quotations we see that, as in the Pafcapādikā, the primary material cause of the world is referred to in the Bhamati by the phrase 'power of Ignorance'. But why is mon- perception, which may be called the 'cause aspect' of Igno- rance, not taught to be the pre-conditicn for Ignorance as superimposition? Is it even admitted, after the mamner of the Brahma Siddhi, as a form of Ignorance, of the nature of dis- solution? This is not clearly explained anywhere in the Bhāmatī.

183' THE DEFINITION OF SUPERIMPOSITION

In Śri Śankara's Brahma Sūtra Commentary superimposition is defined as 'the false appearance in one place of what has pre- viously been seen at another place of the nature of a memory'. This text of Śri Sankara's was explained in the Pancapādikā as implying, fundamentally, the superimposition of an illusory object (as opposed to a mere idea, cp. M.V.138,3). It is not so explained in the Bhāmati.

(1) A 'false appearance' (avabhāsa) is an appearance (bhāsa) that has either disappeared (avasanna) or been rejected as unreal (avamata). It is its contradiction and cancellation by another idea that constitutes the 'disappearance' or the 'rejection' of the false appearance. That is why the false appearance is called 'erroneous knowledge'. (Bha. I.i.l, intro., p.18/16)

Here superimposition is explained as erroneous knowledge, and from this we see that superimposition is fundamentally re- garded as superimposition (not of a thing but) of an idea. The Bhamati does not follow the Pancapadika in explaining Śri Śankara's words 'And from that there results this natural worldly experience, based on wrong knowledge and involving a synthesis of the real with the false, which expresses itself as "I am this" and "This is mine"' as meaning 'that which is "false" (indeterminable) and which is Ignorance' (cp. M.V. 132,3). Nor does it follow the Pañcapādika in identifying

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superimposition with experience (M.V.140 passim).

(2) By 'wrong knowledge' Śri Sankara means superimposition. Then he says, 'based on that'. This means that the presence or absence of empirical experience depends on the presence or absence of superimposition. Then, having thus stated the nature and results of superimposition, he goes or to state its cause as 'the failure to distinguish one from the other' (the Self and its attributes from the non-self and its attributes), and by this he means 'non-perception of their difference !. (Bhã. I.i.l, p.16/13-4)

Here superimposition is identified with wrong knowledge. Vacaspati explains what he mcans by the 'indetermimability: of the superimposed clement in the superimposition, in his gloss on the passage in Śri Śankara's Commentary immediately follow- ing the definition of superimposition.

(3) The 'false appearance' is a false appearance at one place of what has previously been seen at another place. Now, there cannct be an erroneous idea without the synthesis of the super- imposed idea with the object onto which the superimposition is made. Hence the phrase 'what has previously been seen at another place' implies that the superimposed element is false. The word 'seen' here is used to show that the superimposition is something merely seen, not an existent reality. And the word 'before' is added (in 'seen before') because what is being actually seen now cannot be being superimposed. What was pre- viously seen was real in its true form when seen; but as superimposed now, it is indeterminable or false. He inserts the words 'at one place' (in the phrase 'a false appearance at one place') to show that the object onto which the superimposi- tion is made is (empirically) real. 'At one place' refers to the piece of shell or whatever stands as the substratum of the superimposition, and that is empirically real. This is why Śrī Sankara spoke of 'a synthesis of the real with the false'. (Bhã. I.i.l, p.18/17)

And Vacaspati uses his opportunity in explaining the definition of superimposition to affirm that the object of which the idea is superimposed lies at a distance.

(4) 'Of the form of a memory' means that the nature of a superimposition is like a memory (though not identical with one). And being like a memory implies having an object that lies at a distance. (Bhā.I.i.1, p.20/17)

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184 CONSIDERATION OF SUPERIMPOSITION AS SUPERIMPOSITION OF AN OBJECT

Thus the Bhamati describes superimposition as fundamcntally the superimpositior of an idea. But the author does not want you to think that the notion of superimposition as superimposition of an object has been forgotten. So he says:

(1) The rays of the sun in a mirage are not water, and their nature as water is not real. They are indistinguishable from absence of water, and so cannot be accepted as existent water. Nor are they unreal. For you yourself (Kumarila, as objector) hold that the absence (non-existence) of one thing implies the presence (existence) of ancther. For you say, 'The non-exist- ence of one thing is simply the existence of something else. It is not anything else, as it has never been proved to be such' (Ś.V. Nirālambana Vāda 118). And the form that is superimposed is not itself an addition- al entity. If it wcre, it would have to be either the sun's rays or the water of the Ganges or whatever was appearing in the mirage. On the first hypothesis, the illusory cognition would take the form 'rays of the sun' not 'water'. On the second hypothesis, the cognition would be of the form 'water in the Ganges' nct 'water here'. Nor would it be right to say that the form that was superimposed was totally non-existent, a mere phantom with no identifiable nature of any kind. For in that case it would be impossible to explain how it entered into experience at all, as we have already pointed out. So the water superimposed onto the rays of the sun in a mirage cannot be either real or unreal. Nor can it be both real and unreal, for real and unreal are in mutual contradiction. Hencc it is indeterminable. The water is like real water, and therefore like what has been previously seen. But in reality it is not water and is not anything that has been previously seen. On the contrary, it is something deceptive, indeterminable. (Bhā. I.i.l, p.23-4/22-3)

185 HOW FAR DOES THE DEFINITION OF SUPERIMPOSITION AGREE WITH THE CHARACTERISTICS THAT HAVE TO BE DEFINED?

The Bhamati demonstrates that the above definition extends to dream and other states.

(1) Dream-cognition, too, is like erroneous perception in point of being a kind of error of memory. There also one may remember one's parents or other relatives, but fail to recol- lect that they are not present, due to the overpowering effect of sleep. One may then superimpose onto them that proximity

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with oneself in time and space that was formerly seen. (Bha. I.i.l, p.20-1/18)

One must wonder whether the words 'that was formerly seen' ure intended to be taken seriously or not, as Vacaspati said in the passage quoted just above (at the end of M.V. 184,1), which dealt with the water of a mirage, 'But in reality it is not water and is not anything that has previously Leen seen'.

(2) Illusions like 'the conch is yellow' (seen by a man with jaundice) and 'the sugar is bitter' (felt when there is a dis- ordcred liver) may be brought under this same definition. A person will say 'The conch is yellow' under the following con- ditions. He is aware of the yellow colour in the bile which (due to his jaundice) taints the exceedingly pure white rays of light emanating from his eyes, withoul being aware that it is due to his bile. He perceives and experiences the conch, but with its white colour concealed by the defect in his sensory apparatus. He is unaware of the fact that the yellow colour is urelated to the conch. He then superimposes onto the notions 'conch' and 'yellow' the same subject-predicate relation that he has previously apprehended, in such experiences as 'the lump of gold is yellow' and 'the plum is yellow', because of the similarity of all cases where (yellow is perceived as an attri- bute of a substance and) it is not perceived as unrelated to it. Finally he has the experience 'The conch is yellow'. This also explains 'Sugar is bitter'. (Bhā.I.i.1, p.21/18)

(3) In a similar way, when the light from the eye of someone looking into some bright object like a mirror or water reaches the object but is reflected back to the observer by the more powerful rays of the sun, then it comes into contact with the face of the observer and causes him to perceive his own face. But, due to a natural defect, it does not reveal where the face is or the fact that it is not in front of the observer. In such a case, it superimposes onto the face of the observer both the spatial position and also the appearance of facing the observer, features that belong properly to the mirror or water already previously perceived. Thus the definition of superimposition covers the case of the illusion of reflection too. (Bha.I.i.1, p.21/18)

This seems to conflict with the account of reflection given in the Pañcapādikā, p.23, trans. Venkataramiah p.78 f .; fragments of this are given above, M.V. 144, 2-3: for more detail on the reflection theory of P.P., see Potter, 198l pp. 574 ff.

(3) And in this way the definition should be applied as re- quired to other illusions such as the double-moon, the loss of sense of direction, the appearance of lines produced by the flames of whirling torches, cities seen in the clouds, the

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illusion of a bamboo appearing as a snake (said to arise from

p.21/19) a certain form of ophthalmic treatment) and others. (Bha.I.i.l,

Here ail would agree that the great Teachers of Vedante (Gauda- pada, Śankara, Suresvara) have pointed to the universal experi- ence in the world that erroneous knowledge is superimpostion, amd used it as an example to implant in the minds of students that the universe of plurality is a superimposition. But it is not clear why this should have beer thrown away in the vain attempt io answer the questiou how errcneous knowledge arises by demonstrating that it always implies vision cf the indeter- minable - indetermin_bility' being a private conception not found (directiy applied to Ignorance) in the traditions cf the great early Teachers. Many of the arguments found used here are the same es those used by Mardana Misra to esteblish (his own peculiar theory of) erroneous knowledge (viparita-khyati) (B.Sid. pp.138-47). it is clear that nc attention has been paid to the characterization of superimrosition as arising irom a threefold cause given in detail in the Pañcapādikā (M.V.138, 2 and 3). In the same way, the passage near the beginning of Śri Śankara's Brahma Sutra Commentary beginning 'Some say that superimposition is the transference to one thing of attributes that belong to another', where the revered Commentator mentions a few different views abcut superimposition, is here in the Bhāmatī (as in the Pañcapādikā) made an excuse for the detailed examination of the topic of theories of error. As this topic is of no use for determining the true nature of the method of Vedanta, which is our main subject, and is of small interest in itself, we omit any examination of it. Vacaspati sums up his intentions in the following senterce.

(4) This superimposition thus defined, which is in fact inde- terminable, is admitted by all investigators. But because there is disagreement about different conceptions of it, Sri Sankara says more to strengthen the idea that it is indeter- minable. (Bha.I.i.l, p.25/23)

The revered Commentator himself sums up his own view about superimposition in the words 'And we have already said that superimposition is the notion of one thing in something else' (B.S.Bh.I.1.1, intro.). On this the author of the Bhamati comments, 'This is a shortened version of the earlier formula "the false appearance in one place of what has previously been seen at another place, of the nature of a memory"' (Bha. I.1.1, p.44/56-7). This being so, it is not clear why there was any need for the insertion of a further discourse explaining the indeterminability of superimposition. It is true that on the revered Commentator's own view it is accepted that all the not-self is indeterminable either as the Self or as anything

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differert. But there was no need to make a special wention of that here. All that was required was to say, 'All is super- imposed on the Self'. But in the Bhamati the doctrine of inde- terminability is introduced again and again, the concern being more for the supposed needs of the student than for the accu- rate interpretation of the text. Thus when the Commentary says, 'Superimpositicn is an errcneous idea', the Bhamati says, by way of elucidation, 'The nature of erroneous ideas is inde- terminability. What has that, is that, i.e. is indcterm'nable' (Bha.I.i.1, p.45/59-60). According to the system expou :: ded in Śri Śankara's Commen- tary, when it is said 'Every notion other than that of the Absolute is false' the meaning is 'This is realiy the Absolute and nothing else'. It was not intended tc speak about the notion and affirm that it had the attribute of falsity. As it is said in the Commentary on the Chandogye Upanishad, 'We hold that it is invariably real Being that is perceived, only it is perceived under the distinctions of duality and hence as dif- ferent from what it really is. Thus we do not maintain that anything auywhere is non-being (Chand.Bh.VI.ii.3, M.V.47,1). So we do not see that there is anything further to be gained from investigating the exact meaning of 'indeterminable'.

186 THE BEGINNINGLESSNESS OF IGNORANCE

We have aiready mentioned that the word 'Ignorance' is not exclusively used in the Bhamati to mean non-perception and erroneous cognition. Sometimes the word is used to indicate the seed power which manifests the world (cp. M.V.182,9). From this we infer that here in the Bhamati, as in the Pañcapadikā, this 'power of Ignorance' is accepted as the pre-condition for superimposition. The fact that there is no explicit avowal of this in the Bhamati is a separate point. If this supposition is correct, then Vacaspati Miara's doctrine would be that the power that produces superimposition is Ignorance, the funda- mental nature of the latter being dissolution (laya). But in that case the conception of superimposition in the Bhāmati would be different from that found in Śri Śankara's Brahma Sutra Commentary. For the beginninglessness of superimposition mentioned in Śri Śankara's Commentary could not be accepted in the Bhamati except in a figurative sense, as superimposition (in the Bhamati) is the effect of the world-creating seed- power, spoken of as 'the Unmanifest' and referred to by other such names. What Śri Sankara's Commentary says is:

(1) This natural (i.e. uncaused) beginningless and endless superimposition, which is of the nature of false supposition and promotes the sense that one is an individual able to act and undergo experience, is directly familiar to everybody.

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(Śańkara's B.S.Bh.I.i.1, intro.)

The Bhamati, it is true, explains this as follows: 'The cause of its being beginningless and endless is stated, namely that it is "natural"' (Bha. p.45/59), and thereby appears to accept that superimposition is beginningless. But irom what the author has said a little earlier it is clear that this begin- ninglessnese is not absolute. For he says that superimposition and being an individual soul are beginningless in the same sense that the cycle of seca and sprout is beginningless.

(2) The inmost Self, apparently delimited by the mind and other organs, being buth an object and a subject at the same time, conscious, the individual doing action and undergoing experience, the support of the twofold Ignorance as effect and cause, the substratum of the ego-sense, the one subjected to transmigration, accepting the burden of every imaginable evil, is the individual soul. The individual soul has the superim- position of Self and not-self for its pre-condition (upadana, cp.M.V.189, intro.), and superimposition has the individual soul for its pre-condition. Because this process (whereby the mutual superimposition of Self and not-self conditions the individual soul and the individual soul conditions superimpo- sition) is beginningless, like that of seed and sprout, the theory does not suffer from the defect of implying mutual dependence. (Bha. I.i.1, p.45/59)

(The argument appears to run as follows. It is true that there can only be an individual soul if superimposition pre-exists to bring such a soul into being. And it is also true that. there can onty be superimposition if an individual soul pre- exists to perform it. But these two conditions can always be satisfied because both the soul and superimposition are begin- ningless. See also M.V.186, 3 and 4, and Śri Sankara's power- ful criticism of such arguments, M.V. 186, 5, and 6, note. T.N.)

There is an earlier occasion, too, when superimposition, though taken as the scurce of all empirical experience, is treated as fitful, and where the individual superimpositions are repre- sented as being set in time, through the introduction of the example of seed and sprout. It comes where Śri Śankara is answering the objection 'Since the inmost Self is accepted as a non-object because of the entire absence in it of any notion of an object (lit. of any "you-notion" as opposed to an "I- notion"), how can there be superimposition onto it of objects and their attributes (since superimpositions are normally superimpositions of objects onto objects)?' In replying to this Śri Sankara says, 'We reply that the Self is not alto- gether a non-object, for it is the object of the ego-notion (aham-pratyaya)'. writes as follows: In explaining this sentence, Vacaspati

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(3) Nor is it correct to say that the argument is circular because it is saying 'The Self can only be the object of the ego-notion if superimposition already exists to render it into such an object, while superimposition can only occur if the Self already exists in individualized form as the object of the ego-notion to produce it'. For the process is beginning- less, like the cycle of secd and sprout. This has already been shown in the passage of Sri Sankara's Commentary under comment, where he speaks of 'this natural worldly experience' (cp. M.V. 22,4). For the implication is that there is no self-contradic- tory circularity, because each later superimposition takes for its object previous superimpositions and the impressions they. have left. (Pha. I.i.1, p.39/41)

The example of the seed and sprout is occasionally found in the Pancapadika (cp. M.V.142, 2, with noie), but not repeatedly, as in the Bhamati. It is found again in the Bhamati, for example, when the object is to explain Śri Sankara's phrase 'this natural worldly experience':

(4) 'Natural'. This worldly experience is natural or begin- ningless. If one says that empirical experience is beginning- less, it is as much as to say that its cause, superimposition, is also beginningless. Each later superimposition can make use of the mind, sense-organs and body, etc., set up by some previous erroneous cognition. And as the process is beginning- less, like the cycle of seed and sprout, the problem of cir- cularity does not arise. (Bha.I.i.1, p.17/15; cp. Sac, Miscon- ceptions, p.59)

Attention must be paid here to the following point. In empiri- cal experience, the beginninglessness of certain cycles of things such as seed and sprout that exist in time is sometimes accepted. But this way of thinking is not applicable when one is considering merit and demerit and the gross and subtle bodies and physical and psychical instruments of a human being. On this, Śri Śankara's Brahma Sūtra Commentary says:

(5) For there is circularity involved in attributing to the Self either relationship with a body or the power to perform meritorious or unlawful acts (because having a body depends on previous karmic merit and demerit, and karmic merit and demerit depend on having a body). Nor will it avail to say that the existence of any given body is made possible by earlier merit and demerit earned in a previous body, arguing that transmigra- tion is a beginningless process, like the cycle of seed and sprout. For this assumption is like a row of blind men (in that, just as you can go on indefinitely adding new blind men to the row of blind men grasping each other's skirts without getting anyone with sight anywhere, so you can push back the alleged cause of embodiment to deeds performed in earlier and

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earlier lives indefinitely without ever accounting for embodi- ment anywhere). (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

In the Karikas of Gaudapada, too, we find the following point made in the course of discussing the relation of body, sub- stance and attribute, etc.

(6) The example called 'the seed and the sprout' is always based on a 'law' that is itself as unproven as the hypothesis it is used to 'prove'. No unproven law can prove the truth of a hypothesis. (G.K. IV.2Q)

On this Śri Sankara comments as follows: 'As the new sprout, just produced, originated from a seed, so will any other new seed have criginated from a sprout, and both will have origi- nated because they belong to a series. Similarly, every pre- vious sprout and cvery previous seed will. have originated in the same way. And as every single seed and sprout will have had an origin, nothing (in the series) can be beginningless anywhere. What is true of seed and sprout is true also of cause and effect. 'Perhaps you will say that, even though no single seed or sprout is beginningless, the series as a whole is beginning- less. But this idea is wrong, too, as.no series can be estab- lished as a single entity. The (Buddhist) philosophers who claim that the seed and the sprout and the cause and the effect are beginningless do not themselves accept the existence of a series of seeds and sprouts, considered as a real entity over and above the seeds and sprouts themselves, or of a series of causes and effects over and above the causes and effects them- selves' (G.K.Bh. IV. 20) .

It is in these terms that Śri Sankara discredits the example of the seed and sprout. It is not clear why Vacaspati Misra did not examine this argumentation before he fell into the habit of always adducing the example of seed and sprout in the context of proving that something or other was beginningless. Consider, in particular, the treatment here of superimposi- tion. Superimposition is treated as the cause of all empirical experience. It is regarded here as being always an individual act, each individual act coming before and after others of the same kind, like seed and sprout. This conception is not only false in itself, but it destroys the whole basis of the method of false attribution followed by later retraction, and has to be avoided at all costs. For there cannot be communication of the true nature of the Self through negation unless everything other than the Self (including time) is first superimposed and then retracted. But if the basic metaphysical superimposition which makes empirical experience possible were regarded, like the superimposition of silver onto shell, as set in time, then time itself would not be superimposed. And that would contra-

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dict the non-duality that is the special point of the Vedic teaching.

187 THE SEAT OF IGNORANCE

We have already cited the objections raised against the Advaitins on the topic of Igmorance by Bhaskaracarya (M.V. 160). We saw there (M.V.160,8) the objection, 'Whose is this Igno- rance? It does not belong to the individual soul. For (on the Advaitin's theory) the soul is not real. Nor does it be- long to the Lord. For in his case Ignorance would be contra- dictory, since He consists of the light of eternai Conscious- ness'. To answer thesc and othcr objections, the Bhāmati resorts to the arguments of Mandana Misra. Mandana Misra says:

(1) As fer the question, 'To whom does Ignorance belong?' - we reply, 'It belongs to the individual soul'. You will say, 'But are not the individual souls identical with the Abso- lute?' ... We reply, 'Yes, this is so from the standpoint of the highest truth. But they are falsely imagined as differ- ent'. You may say: 'But whose false imagination is it that introduces differences? It cannot be the false imagination of the Absolute. For the Absolute is of the nature of knowledge, and hence free from false imagination. Nor can it be the false imagination of the individual souls. For they depend on false imagination for their existence. The argument would be circular' ... Others explain the matter differently. They say, 'Ignorance and the individual soul are both beginningless like the seed and the sprout. So the question of circular argument does not arise'. (B.Sid. p.10, cp. M.V.94,1 and note)

Vācaspati Misra says:

(2) Ignorance does not have its seat in the Absolute, but in the individual soul. And it is indeterminable, as we have said. The purity of the Absolute is thus safeguarded. (Bha. I.i.4, p.126/194)

(3) It is the supreme Self which, acquiring the nature of the individual soul through apparent delimiting factors deriving from beginningless Ignorance, manifests in differentiation through its own power. And Ignorance pertains to these indi- vididual souls thus constituted, not to the Absolute in its true nature, void of conditioning adjuncts. Nor would it be right to say that there was here circularity of argument, inasmuch as there could only be a distinction into individual souls if Ignorance already existed, and Ignorance could only exist if the distinction into individual souls was already in force. For Ignorance has its seat in the individual soul. And

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one cannot dismiss this theory as impossible, since the soul and Ignorance are both beginningless, like seed and sprout. (Bhã. I.ii.6)

Here Misra's (Vacaspati Misra's) account is (by a play on words) 'faulty' (dosa-misra) whichever of the two ways you take it. Neither Ignorance nor the soul car cowe into being on such a theory, as neither ceuld come into peing without the other, any more than a seed could come into being without a sprout (and yet each is asserted to be beginningless and so to precede the other). The explanation which fails back on a beginningless series of seeds and sproute is faulty for the reasons already explained above (M.V.186,6, with note).

(4) Though the Self is partless, yet the variegated universe of plurality is superimposed on it through beginningless, indeterminable Ignorance and its impressions, and it appears to have parts. Through the non-perception of a certain 'part' of this kind there arises the appearance of erroneous cogni- tion. But from the standpoint of the highest truth there is no error, and there is no transmigratory life. All that, we think, should be dismissed as inexplicable, as it contains logical impossibilities at every point. (Bha.IV.i.3)

Here again, he begins by accepting the beginninglessness of Ignorance, and then, on the basis of that, he explains how the Absolute can have parts. The same fault of reasoning already mentioned arises here.

188 THE PLURALITY OF IGNORANCE

Mandana Misra refuted the theory of those who held that Igno- rance had its seat in the Absolute by saying, 'Or if you main- tained that it was the Absolute which underwent transmigration and the Absolute which was liberated, then, when one person was liberated, all would be liberated - which is absurd' (M.V.95,1). On the other kand Bhāskarācarya attacked the theory that Ignorance has its seat in the individual soul, do- ing so in the following terms: 'If Ignorance were a plurality, it would have to be something real, and that would contradict the theory that it was indeterminable either as the reality or as anything else. And if it were one, then that would mean that everyone would be liberated at the same time' (M.V.160, 10). Vacaspati Misra, for his part, offers two different pieces of apologetic.

(1) Apparent differences are introduced into the Self by the various individual souls, complexes of gross and subtle body with senses and mind, all set up as appearances by Ignorance. The Self, having these various complexes as its apparent

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conditioning adjuncts, though really one, appears to be many, and, though really pure, appears to be impure. And when one of these individual complexes comes to an end, the Self appears (there) to be liberated, while appearing elsewhere to remain bound. The case is like that of the simultaneous reflection of a face in a variety of different surfaces such as gems and swords; in some it will appear long, in others round, in some swarthy, in others fair. And so, if one of the conditioning adjuncts of the Self comes to an end and it appears there to be liberated, it will still appear to be conditioned by ad- juncts elsewhere. And so our theory does not imply that if one is liberated all are. (Bha. II.iii.40)

This, also, is simply Mandana's system, B. Sid. pp. 11 and 12 (cp. M.V. 95, 1).

Here there is no explicit statement whether Ignorance is one cr many. Vacespati produces another piece of apologetic to ward off the objection 'If Ignorance were one, then when it was destroyed all apparent conditioning adjuncts would be destroyed with it'.

(2) You cannot raise this objection against us, as we do not say that Ignorance is one and the same in all souls, like the Nature of the Sankhyas. We say that Ignorance is different in each individual soul. Therefore, it is only the Ignorance of the soul in whom metaphysical knowledge has arisen that is removed, not the Ignorance of other souls. Ignorance and meta- physical knowledge are not contradictory when they apply to different individual knowing subjects. (Bha. I.iv.3)

Here one must conclude that Vacaspati ignores Bhaskara's other criticism, 'If Ignorance were a plurality it would have to be something real' (M.V.160,10), on the ground that it has no substance whatever. As for the question whether it is the plurality of Ignorancc that creates the plurality of individual souls, or the plurality of individual souls that creates the plurality of Ignorance, the Bhamati solves it with its univer- sal panacea of the doctrine of beginninglessness.

(3) Nor would it be correct to say 'The distinctions between the individual souls depend on distinctions in their adjunct, Ignorance, while distinctions in their adjunct, Ignorance, depend on the distinctions between the individual souls - so that neither of the distinctions can be proved, since the whole conception rests on the fallacy of mutual dependence'. This is not correct, since both sets of distinctions stand proved, because the process is beginningless like the cycle of seed and sprout. (Bha. I.iv.3)

In the world there. are many individual souls. Each is

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delimited by a separate complex of gross body, subtle body and organs. The Ignorance that occasions this must bc character- ized by plurality. In this way one can well account for the fact that some souls are in bondage while othcrs have been liberated. On these grounds the plurality of Ignorance is accepted in the Bhamati school. It is not clear why no atten- tion is paid to the fact that the lotion of plurality is itself a creation ci Ignorance, so that the question of "hether Igno- rance is one or many is a question that can never properly be raised.

189 THE CAUSE OF IGNORANCF

Since Ignorance is regarded in the system of the Bhamati as beginningless, the question of its cause is not investigated. But superimposition, referred to by the word Ignorance is spoken of, along with the individual soul, as forming a begin- ningless cycle in the manner of the beginningless cycle of seed and sprout. Again, the pr.mary material cause of the world is also referred to as the power of Ignorance (avidya-sakti). And because of this the misconception could easily arise that the author of the Bhamati thought that the power of Ignorance was the material cause of superimposition, just as the author of the Pañcapadika did. But no such claim is in fact found in the Bhamati. It is perfectly clear that when the Bhamati says (M.V.186,2) that mutual superimposition is the pre-condition (upadana) for the individual soul, and that (an earlier) superimposition is the pre-conditicn (upādāna) for that, the reference is only to a pre-condition (upādāna) and rot to a material cause (upādāna-kāraņa). Therefore when Vacaspati says:

(1) Nor is it correct to say that the argument is circular because it is saying 'The Self can only become the object of the ego-notion if superimposition already exists to render it into such an object, and superimposition can only occur if the Self already exists in individualized form as the object of the ego-notion to produce it'. For the process is beginning- less like the cycle of seed and sprout. This has already been shown in the passage of Sri Sankara's Commentary under comment, where he speaks of 'this natural worldly experience' (cp. M.V. 22,4). For the implication is that there is no self-contradic- tory circularity, because each later superimposition takes for its object previous superimpositions and the impressions they have left. (Bha. I.i.1, p.39/41; = M.V.186,3)

It seems reasonable to suppose that he is following (not the Pañcapādikā but) the passage in Mandana which says:

(2) What then is the cause of erroneous vision? Not non-

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perception, but, as we have already said, beginningless, pur- poseless Ignorance. It is useless to ask for a cause of begin- ningless Ignorance. Because erroneous vision and tho impres- sions it leaves act on each other mutually as cause and effect, our theory can stand. (B.Sid. p.33; cp. M.V.92)

190 HOW THE INTERPLAY OF THE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THEIR OBJECTS IS BASED ON IGNORANCE

Śri Śankara wrote: All commerce between the attested means of knowledge (perception, inference, etc.) and their objects, whether in the Vedic or secular sphere, proceeds om the basis of this same mutual superimposition of the Self and the not- self called Ignorance, as does all Vedic tradition, whether concerned with injunctions and prohibitions or with liberation' (M.V.23,2). The Bhamati explains this as follows:

(1) When Śri Sankara said earlier ' ... there results this natural worldly experience, based on wrong knowlege, and involving a synthesis of the real with the ralse, which expres- ses itself as "I am this" and "This is mine"', he referred explicitly to 'worldly experience' in the form of verbal affir- mations. And now (i.e. in the passage just quoted above, 'All commerce ... ') he shows what that worldly experience is that was hinted at by the use of inverted commas (lit. by the use of the word 'iti'). (Bha.I.i.1, p.40/46)

It is not clear why Vacaspati did not just say 'All experience, whether consisting of ideas or of expressions of ideas in speech, is covered by the single word "experience" (vyavahara)'. The passage in Sri Sankara's Commentary that follows on immediately after that quoted above runs: 'But in what sense do we mean that perception and the other means of knowledge, together with Vedic tradition, belong to those in the realm of Ignorance?' Here the Bhamati explains the objection and the answer that follows it in the manner of the Pañcapādika (cp. M.V.146,4). The conclusion is drawn as follows:

(2) Hence (as Śri Śankara has argued) it is possible to account for the occurrence of cognitions for a conscious indi- vidual subject on the basis of mutual superimposition. And when that is accounted for, you have accounted for the possi- bility of the existence of an individual knowing subject. A means of knowledge can only be applied on the assumption that a cognition will follow. Where Śri Śańkara speaks of an indi- vidual knowing subject, he implies the existence of correct cognition. No means of knowledge would be applied where no cognition could result. A means of knowledge would then cease to be a means of knowledge (which is absurd). (Bha.I.i.1,

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p.42/50)

Here the passage from Sri Sankara's Commentary which is being explained is made to refer back to answer two objections that had been raised eariier, not by Śri Śankara himself but only by Vacaspati. These were, first: '(How can the means of knowl- edge belong to those in the realm of Ignorance?) Means of knowledge cannct belong to an ignorant being, since their re sult, knowledge, contradicis Ignorarce' (Bha. I.i.1, p.40/47) .. And secondly, in the immsdiately preceding passage: 'Cognition is knowledge determining the real. How can the means of knowl- euge which lead to it belong tu those in the realm of Igno- rance?' (ibid. ). But in Śri Sankara's actual Commertary, the main and really the sole objection raised is 'How can there be any commerce between means of knowledge and ebjects of knowledge in the presence of Ignorance?' No objection is raised about cognition or about how the means of knowledge could be supposed to func- tion. It is clear that Śri Sankara's treatment of the question is not identical with that of the Bhamati. The point that Śri Śankara's Commentary makes is that being an individual experi- encing subject is only possible through Ignorance, and that (since metaphysical Ignorance therefore exists) it makes sense to begin the study. of the metaphysical portions of the Veda, as that is the way to put Ignorance to an end. This point is not clearly brought out in the Bhamati. Other relevant texts in Śri Śankara's commentaries are the following.

(3) For when there has been direct, concrete knowledge of the non-dual Self, which is not subject either to rejection or acceptance, the means of knowledge no longer have any objects or an individual knowing subject to operate them. They cease to exist. (B.S.Bh.I.i.4)

Here, when there is no longer an individual knowing subject, it is not just a question of the means of knowledge not being able to function. The means of knowledge can no longer be means of knowledge.

(4) It is only when the Self has first been established as an individual knowing subject desiring empirical knowledge of an object that there can be enquiry through a means of knowledge. (Bh.G,Bh.II.18)

Here again it is implied that the means of knowledge can only function when the existence of an individual knowing subject has been established first.

(5) For the final means of knowledge (the highest texts of the Veda, which yield knowledge of the Self), brings to an end the notion that the Self is an individual knowing subject employing

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means of knowledge. (Bh.G.Bh.IT.69, cp. M.V.46,11)

Here again, what is primarily brought to an end by metaphysical knowledge arising from the Veda is the role of the Self as an individual knowing subject. But it is also implied that, when that has been hrought to an end, all commerce between means of knowledge and objects of knowledge is also brought to an end, as it depends on the knowing cubject.

191 THE VALIDITY OF THE VEDA

The following passage in Śri Sankara's Brahma Sutra Commentury is clearly intended to explain how the ritualistic portion of the Veda operates in the context of metaphysical Ignorance, just as the metaphysical portion does. It runs: 'In regard to practical activity laid down in the Veda, the performer, to be duly qualified, must know the connection of the soul with an after-life, and act with a clear knowledge of what he is doing. He does not require to know the true metaphysical nature of the Self as ... not subject to transmigration, knowledge which comes from the upanishadic texts. For such knowledge is use- less for ritualistic action and in fact disqualifies one for it. And the relevance of the Veda, which has its scope before direct knowledge of the Self in its true metaphysical nature has been attained, is confined to the realm of those afflicted with metaphysical Ignorance'. The meaning is made quite clear by the concluding phrase, 'Is confined to the realm of those afflicted with metaphysical Ignorance'. But the explanation in the Bhamati omits the point about necessary association with Ignorance, and raises and answers a different objection as follows:

(1) Objection: Knowledge of the Spirit (purusa, true Self) taught in the Upanishads is not needed to qualify one for ritualistic activity, because it is both contradictory (to the idea that one is doing action) and useless. In fact, when the Spirit is known from the Upanishads, this actually disqualifies one for ritualistic action. What is more, the whole Veda would lose its validity, as its texts (concerned respectively with action and metaphysical knowledge) would fall into mutual con- tradiction. (Bha. I.i.l, p.44/55)

An examination of the context shows that Śri Śankara's Commen- tary does not here raise the objection that the validity of the Veda might be undermined. What his Commentary says is that only a person who supposes that his Self is capable of indivi- dual action and experience will engage in action. And the function of the Veda is to enlighten a person who is labouring under metaphysical Ignorance, since he can only have this notion that he is an individual capable of action and

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experience on the basis of superimposition. That part of the Bhamati's explanation which points this out is relevant and in harmony with the true Vadantic method. But this is not the case with that part cf the Bhamati's explamation which is con- cerned with establishing and defending the validity of the Veda. In fact the author practically admitted this when he was earlier explaining Śri Sankara's preliminary claim.

(2) The part of the Veda that deals with injuuctions and pro- hibitions has in view the person who has received from begin- ningless Ignorance the idea that he is capable of individual action and experience, and is a member of the Brahmin or other caste. (Bh5.I.i.1, p.43/54)

Here the Bhamati points out quite correctly that even the upami- shadic teachings presuppose metaphysical Ignorance.

(3) And in the same way the Upanishads are concerned only with people afflicted with metaphysical Ighorance. For their mean- ing cannot be understood unless the distinction between an individual knowing subject and the objects of his knowledge and so on is in force. The only difference between the upanishadic and the ritualistic texts is that the upanishadic texts give metaphysical instruction to the one afflicted by Ignorance, and they establish him in his own true nature when he has absorbed that instruction and is purged of all Ignorance by doing so. So it stands proved that all Vedic texts are only concerned with people afflicted by Ignorance. (Bha. I.i.J, p.43/54-5)

It should be understood that, in order to remove metaphysical Ignorance, the Veda operates by the method of false attribution followed by later retraction.

Consider the first two sentences of the opening of Śri Śan- kara's Brahma Sutra Commentary (M.V.22,4), running from 'When it is clear ... ' to ' ... must be erroneous'. Here the Self, as 'I', is established by direct experience, indubitable, correct and immediate. The objects and their attributes are clearly perceived as different from that. There cannot logically be a mutual superimposition (involving identification) of these two (subject and object) as they are clearly distinct. This is explained by the Bhamati as constituting the objection. The passage that follows is taken as establishing the finally accepted view through the refutation of this objection. Here the Bhamati rays:

(4) All this might be so if the real Self manifested in imme- diate experience as 'I'. But it does not do so. The true Self is taught in the Vedas, Smrtis and Puranas to be unlimited by any external adjunct, infinite, homogeneous Consciousness, of the nature of Bliss, one without a second, standing in sover-

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eign indifference to the apparent world of plurality. Not even Indra himself could reduce the statements that declare the nature of the true Self to be such to mere figurative teaching, rcpeated as they are, and strengthened by introductions, re- flective observations and concluding summaries. For repetition implies emphasis, as in 'On, she is beautiful! Oh, she is veautiful!' It does not imply minimization, still less does it imply that what is being said is to be dismissed as mere figurative use of language. But the experience of 'I' is frag. mentary and exhibits the Self as overwhelmed with a vast com- plex of pain and suffering. How can it lead to the Self in its true nature? How can it be anything but a disaster? (Bha. I.i.ì, p.8-9/7-8)

On this we would comment as follows. The non-dual Self in its true nature is admittedly the Self cf all, and the Witness of all, and accessible only through the Vedic toxts. But the revered Commentator did not justify the superimposition of Self and not-self merely on the authority of the word of the Veda, as if it could be proved merely by that. Why do we say this? Well, he showed that all commerce between means of knowledge and objects of knowledge rested on superimposition. He com- posed the introductory sectiom to his Brahma Sutra Commentary (the Adhyasa Bhasya) to explain why one must turn to the Upa- nishads in their totality as the final means of knowledge to destroy this evil, namely superimposition. Then, since he had first quoted Vedic and other traditional texts as authoritative against the philosophers who denied superimposition, how could he then later deny their authority? The answer is that the objections against metaphysical Ignorance have ultimately to be stated and answered in the light of immediate experience (anubhava), which is its own authority. Indeed, all valid means of knowledge derive their validity purely from their power to lead to immediate experience. Accordingly our opinion is that the argumentation that appears afterwards in the Bhamati, aimed at deciding which of the two authorities, the Veda and perception, carried the greater weight (and would prevail in case of contradiction), was unnecessary and out of place. It runs:

(5) Nor would it be right to say that because the Veda, in its metaphysical texts, is in contradiction with perception, an anterior means of knowledge on which it depends, it is inau- thoritative where it conflicts with perception, or requires to be interpreted according to some figurative meaning. For the Veda is of superhuman origin, and therefore beyond possibility of reproach. As a source of knowledge it is self-guaranteed, and it is independent in its special function of conveying knowledge unobtainable from any other source. Perhaps you will object as follows. It may well be, you will say, that the Veda is independent in its special function

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of conveying knowledge of its own peculiar subject-matter. But it depends on perception for its existence as an euthoritative means of knowledge. And for this reason, if it were to contra- dict perception it would render itself inauthoritative in the sense of undermining perception, without which it cannot itself exist as an authoritative means of knowledge. But this objection is wrong. For the Veda is never in con- flict with that form of perception that brings it into exist- ence. The knowledge arising from the Veda does not undermine the authority of perception at the empirical level in such a way that the Veda rould not itselr exist as an authoritative means of knowledge for lack of (perception as) an effective cause. The knowledge arising from the Veda only conflicts with the ultimate validity of perception, but it is not absolutely valid perception that stands as a cause for the Veda, but only empirically valid perception. For it is found that absoluiely valid knowledge can arise from means cf knowledge that are only empirically valid and are not themselvos absolutely real .... And there is another point. An eerlier cognition stands to be corrected and cancelled by a later contradictory one, if that later one does not depend on it. For we see that the later knowledge of shell contradicts and cancels the earlier knowledge of silver. If the earlier silver-cognition were not cancelled, the rise of the later cancelling-cognition (the cognition of shell) would be unintelligible. We have shown above how the Veda does not depend on the absolute validity of perception to be known. And in this sense the great Rsi Jaimini has said 'When contradictory instructions come, one earlier, one later, the earlier one is superseded by the later, just as the instructions for the derivative form of a ritual supersede those of the original form' (P.M. Sutra VI.v.54). And it has also been said (by Kumārila, Tantravārtika p.819) 'Where there is a contradiction in texts giving instructions, the later is to be regarded as a weightier authority than the earlier, except where the ideas are mutually dependent'. (Bha. I.i.l, p.9-11/8-9)

Most of this reasoning is taken from the introductory part of the second Book (Tarka Kanda) of the Brahma Siddhi (pp.40-3; Potter, 1981, p.374 f; some fragments at M.V.98,1-3). There it is explained, following the traditions of the Pūrva Mimamsa, how an earlier perception is a weaker authority than a later one that contradicts it, how Vedic revelation is an incontro- vertible authority, how we may infer the possibility of defects in perception and the other means of empirical knowledge from the mere strength of Vedic authority alone, how the fact that perception is prone to error can be seen from our indentifica- tion of our Self wIth the body, how perception and the other empirical means of knowledge can be valid on the empirical plane because this is not contradicted by the Veda - which is an authority for absolute truth in the metaphysical sphere

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only - how the Veda is not dependeut on perception and other means of empirical knowledge for conveying its own peculiar kind of valid knowledge. All this and more is set out there in detail. It is quite evident that none of this is needed or wanted om the occasion of explaining a passage iu Śri Śankara's Brahma Sutra Commentary devoted to expounding superimposition without appealing to ary other authority but immediste experience. And there is a further point about this path followed by our two good 'Misras' (Mandana Misra and Vacaspati Misra) of elevating the authority of rovelation above that of perception and the other means of empirical knowledge. There are other religious works which stand outsiue the Vedic tradition, and which follow this same path and claim to stand above the authority of per- cepilon and the cthcr means of empirical knowledge (including reason). Why should not they, too, have their claim accorded? This is a question that our 'Misras' might find difficult to answer. The Mimamsakas regard the Veda as being eternaily beyond possibility of reproach on the ground of its superhuman origin. This same doctrine of the superhuman origin of the Veda is adopted in a somewhat different way here in the Bhamati.

(6) The followers of Jaimini (Purva Mimamsakas who reject the doctrine of world-periods) do not accept that the world ever underwent creation or that it will undergo dissolution. They teach that there has been an unbroken line of human teachers and pupils like ourselves for handing down the Vedic texts in a beginningless tradition. But those who follow the teachings of Vyasa (the author of the Mahabharata and Puranas) accept that the eternal supreme Self is the source of the Vedas, en- dowed as He is with omnipotence and omniscience proceeding from the adjunct of beginningless Ignorance, and that the Vedas are projected and dissolved anew at the beginning and end of each world-period, according to the doctrine of repeated creations and dissolutions of the world attested by the Veda, the Smrti, the Epics and so cn. But they do not hold that He is free to alter them as He likes; each new projection of the Vedas has to accord with the previous one .. When the followers of Jaimini speak of the 'superhuman' ori- gin of the Vedas, they only mean that they are not created according to characteristic human arbitrary free-will. We, too, accept this, though our reason for doing so is not the same. Further, it is not right to say that there cannot be faith in what is only revealed by one person. Faith in what was revealed by many people would be unjustified if they were ignorant, or if they were well-informed but ill-willed. But faith in one person is justified if he knows the truth and is free from faults of character. It is quite intelligible that Prajapati and the Divine Rsis (devarsi) who existed at the beginning of the world- period, who had merit, knowledge, dispassion and sovereign

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powers, should have had knowledge of the true nature of the Self. Because they had faith, those who came after them, too, were able to have faith. Because it is possible that it should have been transmitted in this way, we may speak of the Veda as 'having its origin in the Absolute', and also as of superhuman origin and as authoritative. (Bha.I.i.4, p.99/141-3)

(7) For the Lord fashioned the Veda at the beginning of the present world-period in the same form as He had done at the beginning of the previous world-period. And each earlier pro- jection of the Veda at the beginning of a world-period agrees with the previous one, and that with the one previous to it- self. So that this relation of canse und effect between the Lord and the Veda is beginningless. (Bha.II.i.1)

(8) Because the relation of cause and effect between the Lord and the Veda is beginuingless, the Lord does not use his knowl- edge of the content of the Veda to project it. He is not free in the matter, as Kapila and other sages are in the construc- tion of their systems. Though his knowledge of the content cf the Veda manifests itself at the time of the Veda's projection, it is not part of the cause of that projection. The Veda and the knowledge of its content manifest simultaneously as identi- cal. (Bha. II.i.1)

The argumentations in the Brahma Siddhi (B.Sid. p.82,155) about the superhuman character cf Vedic revelation follow the Mimam- sakas' tenets as if they were taken to be proved. The Pañca- pādikā, for its part, raises the objection that, if the Veda is to have the Absolute as its source (as B.S. I.1.3 demands), then the Veda must arise dependently - and meets it as follows:

(9) This being so, must there not be intelligence and will be- hind the Veda, and must it not arise in dependence on these? No. For it is beginningless, like the Absolute itself. Indeed, the Veda is eternal and changeless. In what sense, then, is it said to have the Absolute 'as its source'? In the sense that it is dependent for its existence on the Absolute, which is other than itself, as the rope-snake is dependent for its existence on the rope. And there is the Vedic text 'All these (Rg Veda, etc.) are breathed forth' (Brhad.II.iv.10). Breath- ing forth, in the world, is a spontaneous (independent) acti- vity; in the same way, the breathing forth of the Rg Veda and other traditional texts is a spontaneous act (and so not depen- dent on intelligence and will on the analogy of a deliberate human act). (P.P. p.315 f./82)

This is all it says, which is brief. And so we have what is a long and probably original piece of argumentation from Vacas- pati, in which he demonstrates how the Veda can have the Abso- lute for its source and be of superhuman origin, and this

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without any logical contradiction and in agreement with the Sütras and Śri Śankara's Commentary. Śrī Sankara says:

(10) And in support of this there is a Rg Veda verse, 'They sought the traces of (the eternal deity) Speech through sacri- fice, and found her in the form in which she entered the hearts of the ancient seers (rsi): (R.V. X.71.3), which shows that the deity Speech (vac) was found already existent (and hence fixed and eternal). (B.S.Bh.I.iii.29)

(11) The cosmic dissolution admittedly breaks off the conti- nuity of all experience. But cosmic overseers like Hiranya- garbha and others can enjoy continuity of experience through the grace of the supreme Lord. It is true that ordinary mor- tals cannot enjoy continuity of experience with their states in previous births. But the cosmic overseers arc not in the same case as ordinary mortals. (B.S.Bh.I.iii.30, cp. M.V.45,7)

Here it is said that the Vedas, regarded as already established in previous worid-periods, were discovered by the seers (rşi) through investigation. And in the Brhadaranyaka Commentary we find:

(12) The Veda is authoritative, not in the manner of other authoritative texts, but because it came forth effortlessly from the Absolute like a person's breath. (Brhad.Bh.II.iv.10)

That was how Śri Sankara conceived and taught the authority of the Veda. But there is a further point to be noted. Śri Bhagavatpada did not just quote the upanishadic texts on the most important upanishadic topics as if they were in themselves an authority from the mere fact of being upanishadic texts. Not at all. The reason for the authority of the upanishadic texts was not their mere existence. The reason for their authority was the fact that, because they expounded the non-dual Self, the knowledge arising from their teachings culminated in a direct experience which satisfied all demands and left nothing over for further enquiry.

(13) And because knowledge brings its reward immediately, there can be no question of any delay. In the case of action, the reward, such as heaven, may not be immediately evident, and in such cases there will be doubt whether it will come or not. But the reward of knowledge of the Absolute is immediately evident, for the Veda speaks of 'the Absolute which is immedi- ately and directly evident' (Brhad. III.iv.1) and teaches 'That thou art' as an already accomplished fact. (B.S.Bh. III.iii.32, cp. M.V. 75,7;148,9)

(14) And this is the final means of knowledge, which reveals that the Self alone exists. After that, nothing further is

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required. (B.S.Bh.II.i.14, cp. M.V.161,1, note)

At one point (B.S.Bh.I.i.4) Śri Śankara uses the phrase 'be- cause the Veda is concerned with bringing to an end the distinc- tions imagined through Ignorauce'. The Bhamati, it is true, comments upon this passage as follows:

(15) Not every sentence can inform one about a disiinct reality designated as a 'this'. One cannot express in words the variety of different sweet tastes yielded by the sugar-cane, a milk- pudding, molasses and so on. And this inability of speech to express what we want to say is a common phenomenon, found =verywhere. Hence, if this is the case with speech in regard to worlaly things known through other means of knowledge, now will speech fare in regard to the inmost Self, which is tran- scendent? (Bha. I.i.4, p.125/188)

We contend, however, that this explanation does not touch the heart of Śri Sankara's Commentary. The mere fact that one can- not straightaway find a single word to express the different varieties of sweet taste in sugar-cane, milk-pudding and so forth does not mean that those tastes are beyond expression in wcrds altogether. These distinctions of taste do in fact evoke speech in the natural course. The inmost Self is inaccessible to speech only because it is transcendent (and inaccessible to objective knowledge in principle). The holy Veda, which may be considered omniscient, cannot be at a loss for words (to express fine shades of meaning) that it should proclaim its own poverty and say 'The inmost Self is inaccessible to words because of the poor vocabulary at our disposal'. And so the inmost Self is inaccessible to words in principle. It is beyond all con- ceptions. The force of Śri Sankara's Commentary in this pas- sage is to point out that, though the Self is transcendent and not available as an object of knowledge, it is nevertheless self-revealed. It is only by getting rid of the superimposed distinctions of knower, knowing and known, and of speaker, speaking and object spoken of, that the Self reveals itself to itself (in the case of a person gaining liberation).

192 THE RELATION BETWEEN REVELATION AND REASON

Śri Śankara raises the question in his Commentary: Is the Abso- lute already known or not already known? If it is already known, it is not a fit subject of enquiry. So let us suppose that it is not already known. But in that case it is not a possible subject of enquiry. And after raising this difficulty, he gives the following answer: The Absolute exists. It is eternal, pure, conscious and free by nature, omniscient and omnipotent. For when the word 'brahman' is analysed etymolo-

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gically, the meanings 'etermal' and 'pure' and so on emergc, for they are included in the meaning of the root (brh, to ex- pand) (B.S.Bh.I.i.1). On this the Bhamati comments as follows:

(1) Even before entering formally on enquiry into the Abso- lute, and without practising philosophical reflection, the one who has learned his Vedic texts by heart, and has learned the ruies for establishing context, etymology, grammar and kindred sciences, has a superficial knowledge of the nature of the Absolute, with its eternality and cther characteristics, from the passage beginning 'Being only, my dear one, was all this in the beginning' and ending 'That thou art' (Chand. VI.ii.1 - VI. xiii.3). (Bhã. I.i.l, p.79/111)

The doctrine here promulgated by the Bhamati is that after one has yained a superficial knowledge of the existence of the Absolute from the upanishadic texts une proceeds to determine its true nature afterwards through reasoning in the form of etumological enquiry according to the traditional rules (mīmāņsā).

Śri Śankara closes his Commentary on that Sutra with the words: 'An investigation is opened ... into the meaning of the texts of the Upanishads. This enquiry is supported by dialectical reasoning not in conflict with the upanishadic texts, and its purpose is the attainment of supreme beatitude' (M.V.31,8). Several passages in the Bhamati offer comment on this.

(2) Exegetical enquiry into the meaning of the upanishadic texts is itself the 'reasoning'. Other forms of reasoning, not in conflict with the texts, are those of exegesis according to the rules for the ritualistic texts and those of logic, which are used for bringing out the validity of the Veda and other means of knowledge like perception and so on in their respective spheres. These are mentioned here as aids to the main exegeti- cal enquiry into the meaning of the upanishadic texts. (Bhã. I.i.l, p.83/118)

(3) Pondering is analysis through reasoning which is not merely not in contradiction with the text but positively supports it; and 'reasoning' in this context may be either working out what the text must mean when considered in relation to other texts and brought into harmony with them, or plain inference of the secular kind. (Bha. I.i.2, p.89/128)

(4) The purpose of reasoning is to clarify the content of a prior means of knowledge; it is an operation to be performed on such a content, and depends on the prior existence of the lat- ter. If no means of knowledge has been at work beforehand, then reasoning has no foundation on which it is working, and such

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reasoning is dismissed as worthless and called 'empty logic'. But the text 'It should be pondered over' is a positive injunc- tion to carry out reasoning founded on the texts of the Veda as the prior means of knowledge. The purpose of such reasoning is to analyse their meaning; and it should not be conducted in such a manner as to contradict them. (Bha. II.i.6)

(5) Śri Sankara says 'in support of the Vedic texts'. The reference (says Vacaspati) is to reasoning taken up as a duty following upon the 'hearing' made possible by the Veda. Again, Śri Śankara says 'Reasoning is resorted to as an auxiliary to immediatc experience'. 'Pondering' (says Vacaspati) is an auxiliary to immediate experience, because it is only that which has been first pondered over that eventually becomes known immediately as an object of meditation (bhāvanā). (Bhã. II.i.6)

(6) In subjects that are only knowable through the Veda and are not within the scope of independent reason, one should not resort to that form of reasoning that is confined to the search for agreements and differences, as practised by the Sankhyas and other rationalist schools, and through which they establish 'Nature' and other (arbitrary) concepts. That is called 'empty reasoning' because it has no foundation anywhere. (Bha.II.i.1l)

(7) And this knowledge (which secures liberation) comes from the Veda and concerns the Being who stands as the cause both of the world and of consciousness within the world. Such knowl- edge is 'Vedic' in the sense that it consists in reasoning applied to the Vedic texts and pursued as a duty. Logicians who try to determine the cause of the world through independent reasoning conducted without regard to the Veda invariably fall into mutual dissension and fail in their objective. No final conviction is to be obtained from that, and it does not lead to right knowledge. (Bha. II.i.11)

Our own view here is that Vacaspati does not draw any clear lines between reasoning as exegesis and other -forms of reason- ing, between reasoning in support of the Veda and reasoning not in conflict with it, and between all these forms of reasoning and 'empty reasoning'. Exegesis is an activity undertaken primarily to determine the nature and character of the texts under examination. There is, however, another activity (apologetic), the task of which is to analyse this subject-matter further. It uses reason either to explain and defend the texts, or else to advance independent logical arguments in their favour. Argumentation used to explain and defend the texts should lead on to direct experience of the truth of the metaphysical teachings they con- tain, so that attempts to clarify the meaning of the texts for others should invariably follow from and depend on immediate

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experience (anubhava). Though independent reasoning derives its authority initially from secular practice, its special use in Vedanta, where it is nct allowed to conflict with upanishad- ic teaching, is to support the arguments already used to ex- plain and defend the texts. The use of bare logic or dialectic is different again; its task is to take this or thai doctrine as a hypothesis, and, after reviewing it iu the light of experience and establishing agreements and differences, to ac- cept or reject this or that part of the hypothesis. Thus in Śri Śankara's Commentary, textual exegesis, expianation and defence of texts, independent logical argument in support of upanishadic teaching, and the use of bare logic or dialectic are all taken as different from one another.

193 THE TRUE SUBJECT-MATTER OF VEDIC TEACHING

In his explamations of the last two Varņakas of the Catuhsūtri of Śri Śankara's Brahma Sutra Commentary (the two Varņakas which cover B.S. I.1.4), Vacaspati Misra mostly follows the line of Mangana. Before going on to state the finally accepted Advaita view, he expounds at length the doctrine of those who insist that the Veda is primarily concerned with action, and that it is an authority for the existence of the Absolute only as a subordinate element, namely as the theme for meditation in certain injunctions to meditate (where the true authority of the text lies in its word of command enjoining the act of meditation). Their view is briefly summarized in the following verse, which he quotes: 'Certitude as to the existence and true nature of the Absolute can only be obtained from a text enjoin- ing something to be done. For"the Absolute"is not a word whose meaning is known in advance. The topic falls within Vedic tradition and has a practical purpose. And we know that there are the injunctions to ponder and so on' (Bha. I.1.4, p.108 f./160). Against this he argues as follows.

(1) (The Veda is not an authority for the existence of the Absolute only through its texts involving command, as we know from the fact that the rewards for action follow after death, whereas the result of metaphysical knowledge from the informa- tive texts of the Veda is immediate in this very life. Further, the future results of different acts are different, and there- fore conditioned and impermanent in time.) The result of the metaphysical knowledge of the Self, on the other hand, is total and final transcendence of the body, with no possibility of any different state to come, eternal, established by nature, not the result of action (and so not impermanent). It is only figuratively spoken of as a 'result' as it is simply what mani- fests (as having always been the case) when Ignorance is removed. (Bha. I.i.4, p.114/169)

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(2) Thus the tact that one is the Absolute becomes evident simply on the removal of the covering of Ignorance. And the removal of Ignorance arises from a direct knowledge of the metaphysical teaching of the upanishadic texts and occurs only where this knowledge culminates in immediate intuition. Fur- thor, the fact that meditation produces a mental impression (samskara) that is helpful in this regard, and the fact that the wind has to take part in the production of this impression, are both facts that are quite eviaent without prompting from the Veda. For all these reasons, the text 'His only meditation should be "It is the Self"i (Brhad. I.iv.7) is not an injunc- ion; it is only the appearance of an injunction (on account of its grammatical form). (Bha. T.i.4, p.1l5/172)

We shall reserve the remarks we have to make about the concep- tion of 'impression' here until we come to consider the experience to which it gives rise (at M.V.204, 5 ff .; 206,4-5; 207,2 and 11).

(3) Thus, it might have been possible to have claimed that words could not refer to anything except what had to be done, were it not for the fact that they are used to relate facts in ordinary worlly experience, and for the fact that it is possible to infer (from their reactions, etc.) that people who know the language used have understood the meaning. It is not possible to deny that words are so used in ordinary experience. For sentences are frequently found in the world (couched in the indicative mood) which are not concerned with urging anyone to do anything, but rather with satisfying curiosity or allaying fear .... For example, people may give glowing descriptions of Mount Sumeru, or they may say 'That is not a snake, it is a rope', and so on. Nor is it the case that no idea of an existent object can arise in the mind of a listener who knows the meaning cf the words when he hears such sentences couched in the indicative mood. For joy and other emotions are seen to arise from such sentences (as evidenced by the expression on the faces of those that hear them) .. .. And so statements of fact are useful, and it is therefore intelligible that they should be used by sensible people. Thus it has been shown that, even where they do not prescribe action or withdrawal from action, the Upanishads constitute a genuine traditional science (sastra) of the highest benefit to man, because the knowledge of the true nature of the Absolute to which they lead enables man to achieve his highest end. (Bhā. I.i.4, p.131/207-8)

The opponent's view 'Words in the Veda can only refer to things to be done' is rejected in Sri Sankara's Commentary out of hand. Väcaspati first sets it out tentatively as a defen- sible view, and then refutes it on lines laid down by Mandana (B.Sid. p. 23-6, also cp. M.V. 99,1). There is no harm if this

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form of refutation is carried out by later Vedantins, as it helps to clarify the mind of the student.

(4) It is true that, unlike cows and other worldly objects, the Self is not an object of other means of knowledge apart from speech. Yet it can constitute the meaning of a sentence if that sentence eliminates this or that conditioning adjunct, since it is luminous and self-evident by nature. It is like arriving at the idea 'golu' through the elimination of the various conditioning adjuncts such as 'bracelet', 'ear-ring' and so on. Consciousness, being self-luminous, is always manifest; and the psycho-physical organism is manifest as its apparent conditioning adjunct. The text 'This Self is "neither this nor that"' (Brhad. III.ix.26) can convey the self-luminous principle as 'the Self' and 'the Absolute' through negating all external adjuncts, as that principle has immensity (brhattva, as 'Brahman') and pervasiveness (apana, as 'Itman' ). (Bha. I.i.4, p.133/210)

This is also in imitation of Mandana. The latter hus the verse 'That is why the Self as a universal is described as that from which all distinctions have been withdrawn. It is like the case of indicating the gold itself by eliminating the orna- ments and other objects fashioned from it' (B.Sid. p.37, cp. M. V. 102,2). In Sri Sankara's Commentary, on the other hand, neither the words 'the Absolute' nor 'the Self' nor negative phrases like 'neither this nor that' are regarded as directly denoting the Absolute. His contention is that there are por- tions of the Veda which are concerned with giving information about existing reality. That reality, being the Self of all, is self-evident. It can neither be rejected nor acquired. It is the only reality that can be taught. It is at the point above where the author of the Bhamati introduces the word 'self- luminous' (M.V.193,4, ad fin.) that we may say his present pas- sage refers to the supreme reality in its true form.

The following passages from the Bhamati are also worthy of re- mark. They are on the theme 'Should the texts of the Upanishads be taken as mere subordinate explanatory matter?'

(5) In a single sentence, the individual meanings of the words are merely instrumental, while it is the sentence-meaning as a whole that the speaker really wishes to convey. Similarly, when two sentences are joined to form a single passage, one conveys the speaker's basic meaning, while the other is only instrumental in specifying that meaning further .... Where the merely instrumental element is contradicted by some other piece of evidence, it has to be interpreted figuratively .... In ordi- nary human discourse, when the main point of a speaker's address is contradicted by another piece of evidence his words are simply regarded as being without authority. The case with the

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texts of the Upanishads, however, is different. They are not of human origin. If they are considered in their totality, it is seen that their main intention is to proclaim the Absolute, void of all differentiation. They are the means of knowledge giving access to a metaphysical principle that is in fact self- evident. They dethrone perception and the other secular means of knowledge and relegate them to the provisional realm of empirical experience. As for texts like 'The sacrificial post is the sun', they are not meant to affirm that the sun is the sacrificial post (which would be contradicted by other evi- dence, e.g. of perception), but are intended to eulogize the (glittering) sacrificial post. Thereforc the following stands proved. An explanatory or eulogistic sentence in the Veda is different in kind from the sentence conveying the main injunction or affirmation of the

sentcnce is first determined by an understanding of the intrin- passage. The function of each of these two different kinds of

sic meaning; then their mutual connection is established after- wards, relative to some end. (Bha.I.iii.33)

Here the teaching is that those upanishadic texts which directly proclaim the main point of a passage are a more power- ful authority than perception. Even texts that are only instrumental in specifying further the main point in a passage are affirmed to be meaningful in their literal sense in convey- ing some minor point if there is nothing to contradict them. As for the true teaching of Śri Sankara and Suresvara that the different means of knowledge cannot conflict with one another - it is clear that this is not found mentioned in the Bhamati. (For Sankara on this point, cp. M.V.48; for Mandana, M.V.97; for Suresvara, M.V. 116.)

(6) Here, too, the text begins with the Absolute, saying '"Being only, my dear one, (was all this in the beginning, one only without a second)"' (Chand. VI.ii.1). And it concludes with the affirmation that the true Self of the individual soul is the Absolute in the words '"That thou art"'. Hence the pas- sage as a whole has the Absolute for its topic. And there are other texts, too, which, if the implications of what is said at the beginning and at the end are taken into account, can be seen to have the Absolute as their fundamental topic. (Bha. I.i.4, p.103-4/150-1)

194 THE TREATMENT OF CAUSE AND EFFECT

In the Bhamati, the treatment of the topic of cause and effect follows Śri Śankara's Commentary, and brings the doctrine of false attribution followed by later retraction into play.

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(1) When a rope is mistaken for a thin stream of water, the rope together with Igncrance of the rope is the material cause of the stream, and the stream exists only in the rope and dissolves in the rope. And thus it is shown that the world has the Ahsolutc together with Ignorance of the Absolute as its material cause in the same way, and that it exists only in the Absclute and dissolves in the Absolute. (Bha.I.i.3, p.95/136)

(2) Though the Self is already established as existence, it can undergo (apparent) transformation through a modificatiou that is of a reality-grade indeterminable as real or unreal, For, since the modification is of indeterminable reality-grade, it is as if non-different from the Self. In this sense the Self, though already established as existent, can be (appar- ently) the object of its own productive action. (Bha.I.iv.26)

(3) And this talk of material cause and transformation and so on is not for the purpose of affirming that modification actu- ally takes place. It has to be understood, rather, that the Ahsolute is the material cause of the world in the same sense that the rope is the material cause of the snake for which it is mistaken. The Absolute is eternal, changeless and partless. It cannot undergo real transformation either wholly or in part, since, as explained, it is eternal, changeless and partless. The dishes and so on that are fashioned from clay are not dif- ferent from the clay, nor are they identical with it, nor are they both different and identical. They are altogether inde- terminable. And it is in this sense that the Veda says, 'The truth is, "It is only clay"' (Chand. VI.i.4). Therefore, be- cause all (the metaphysical) passages of the Upanishads begin and end with affirmations of non- duality, they are solely con- cerned with proclaiming non-duality. Sometimes they teach non-duality openly. Sometimes they teach it indirectly by negating duality. Sometimes they affirm it figuratively by teaching that the Absolute is the material cause of the world. But this only amounts to the negation of all distinctions. One is not justified in insisting on the real existence of modifi- cations merely because the Absolute is spoken of as a material cause. The meaning of a passage as a whole is not to be deduced from one small (subordinate) element in it. (Bhã. I.iv.27)

(4) When considered in itself, the effect is indeterminable as real or unreal. But it can be called real when considered as its material cause. For this reason, the reality of the effect is in fact the reality of the material cause and nothing else. So how could the effect be unreal before its production (= manifestation), seeing that the material cause would be (existent and) real? But if the effect be considered in itself, then before its production it would be indeterminable as real or unreal, either as 'produced' or as 'destroyed'. There would

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therefore be no production of anything either real or unreal. And in that case the denial of the doctrine that the effect pre-exists as real in the cause would be irrelevant for lack of any subject-matter. (Bha. II.i.7)

Here it is claimed that the perceived world is indeterminable as real or unreal. And it is also denied that the world, so considered, is 'produced'. It seems that in this system (in contrast to the system, for insiance, of the Pancapādika, M. V. 138, 2 and 3) there is no 'production' of indeterminahle enti- ties like purely phenomenal shell-silver. But we must leave the final decision on this point to professionul. investigators.

un this theory, the effect is real as the material cause. In itself, however, it is indeterminable as real or unreal. So far, therefore, the doctrine of the reality of the effect (in and as its material cause) prior to production (= manifestation is safeguarded. What Śri Śankara's Commentary says, however, is: 'But the effect. the world consisting of sound and the other elements, cannot exist except as the cause, either before creation (= manifestation) or now' (B.S.Bh. II.1.7, M, V.35, 4). He held, therefore, that in all conditions of the world the effect was real as the cause. This was all he said. He did not say that the effect was indeterminable as real or unreal (cp. M.V.93,1, note). It is true that there is another point in the Brahma Sūtra Commentary where he says:

(5) Name and form, imagined through Ignorance as if they were the very nature of the omniscient Lord, indeterminable either as the real principle or as anything (independent and) differ- ent from it, the seed of transmigratory experience and of the differentiated world, are spoken of in the Veda and Smrti as 'The Power of Maya' belonging to the omniscient Lord and as 'Nature'. (B.S.Bh.II.i.14, M.V.45,1;139,6)

Nevertheless there is a certain difference between the theory of indeterminability propounded in the Bhamati and that of Śri Śankara's Commentary. The Commentary speaks of 'indeterminable either as the real principle or as anything different'. In the Bhamati, however, which follows Mandana on the point (cp. M.V. 93), there is mention of 'indeterminable as real or unreal'. The revered Commentator explains in the Upadesa Sahasri how he understands the term 'indeterminable'.

(6) And in this way the element called 'the ether' was born from the supreme Self, like the impure (cloudy) foam from clear water. And yet it is not completely different from water, for it is never found apart from water. But water is clear and different from foam, which is of the nature of impurity. In the same way, the supreme Self is different from

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name and form, which answer to foam in the example. For it is pure and clear and of a different nature. (U.S.(prose) sec- tion 19)

Here, whea there is mention of name and form being indetermin- able either as the real principle itself or as anything differ- ent (U.S. (prose) section 18) the purpose is to indicate that the Self is different from name and form as perceived, not to affirm that what is perceived is (existent and) of indotermin- able reality-grade. This is clearly stated in the Brhad- āraņyaka Commentary:

(7) He who is the cause of the whole universe, He who is the real nature of that unmanifest name and form which come to manifestation like cloudy foam from clear water, He who is different from that manifest name and form, by his very nature eternal, pure, conscious and free ... (Brhad. Bh. I.iv .? )

Here it is laid down that the Self is different from name and form, without any mention cf the latter being indeterminable. It should be noted, however, that in the Brhadāraņyaka Upani- shad Commentary it is asserted that name and form have no existence in the supreme Self.

(8) But if the external corditioning adjuncts name and form really exist, will not this contradict such upanishadic texts as 'One only without a second' (Chand.VI.ii.1) and 'There is no plurality here' (Brhad.IV.iv.19)? No, for this objection has been refuted already (cp. M.V. 194,7) through the example of foam and water as well as through clay and other similar examples. From the standpoint of uiti- mate truth, however, no name and form really exist for the followers of the Upanishads. No name and form, at any rate, such as could be determined as distinct from the principle of supreme reality. They could no more exist as distinct prin- ciples over against the principle of supreme reality than the modifications of clay and other such substances (the pots and so forth into which the clay is fashioned) can exist as dis- tinct entities separate from those substances. For name and form are only modifications of the supreme reality, as foam is of watcr and pots are of clay. And from this standpoint it is seen that texts like 'One only without a second' and 'There is no plurality here' can apply with perfect validity to the supreme reality. The case is different, however, as long as the Absolute re- mains, under the influence of natural Ignorance, unperceived in its true transcendent nature, and in clear discrimination from the body and organs, which latter are only conditioning adjuncts consisting of name and form. This true nature, indeed, stands untouched by the imputed adjuncts, just as the shell is untouched by the silver for which it is mistaken, and

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as the colourless ether of the sky is unaffected by the rolcur and shape that are falsely attributed to it when it is seen as blue and tent-formed. For here the natural (unregenerate) vision conditioned by the organs consisting of name and form continues, and it is under this condition that all this world is presented to us as a reality separate from ourselves. (Brhad. Bh.III.v.1)

Here mame and form are not called 'indetermimable'. Because they are affirmed to have the Self for their true nature, the passage agrees with the upanishadic teaching of non-duality. But from the standpoint of natural unregenerate Ignorance, there is practical experience of them as existent. As ŚrI Śankara here cxplains, it is like the prectical experience of silver, and use of the name 'silver', that occur through the erroneous vision of shell-silver, as long as the latter lasts. There will be no conrlict with Śri Sankara's Commentary, therefore, when it is maintained that there is no contradic- tion of the doctrine of the reality of the effect, because the world, in its truo nature is verily the Absclute - aud when it is accepted that we know that the world as effect is real from the fact of its being non-different from Being. But the Bhamati also argues (M.V.194,4) that the doctrine of the reality of the effect (as the material cause) is not wrong because, since it is indeterminable as real or unreal, the ef- fect is never really produced. On this point it is out of harmony with Śri Sankara's Commentary. Further, the author of the Bhamati ought to state what he means by the phrase 'indeterminable as real or unreal'. Does the 'real' (sat) here mean the Absolute? If so, the world is certainly not 'indeterminable as real or unreal'. For we have the text 'All this world is verily the Absolute' (Mund. II. ii.12). In this text, even what is referred to by the word 'unreal' is included under the word 'all' (and so it is to be identified in the end with the Absolute and accounted, not 'neither real nor unreal', but 'real'). On the other hand, if we follow Śri Sankara's formula, the world can very well be 'indeterminable as the Absolute or as anything different'. For the world in the form in which it is perceived (i.e. in the form of plurality) is not the Absolute. And yet it is not distinct from the Absolute either, in the way that a buffalo is distinct from a horse. For it is never perceived except as permeated by the Absolute.

195 THE UNMANIFEST

We have already shown above (M.V.182,7-9), in the course of the description of the nature of Ignorance, that the phrase 'the power of Ignorance' is sometimes used in the system of the Bhamati to designate the condition of the world before its

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menifestation, known as 'the Unmanifest' and by other names. Here something further will be said on the subject in the con- text of the treatment of cause and effect.

(1) Although at the time of the great cosmic dissolution at the end of a world-period (mahapralaya) no modifications such as mind arise and assume manifest form, nevertheless they lie present dissolved in their cause, indeterminable Ignorance; they remain in being, together with the impressions of Igno- rance that will eventually generate action, in the form of a subtle (imperceptible) power. (Bha.I.iii.30)

Here the Bhamati speoks of mind and so on persisting in the form of a power (potentiality) in indeterminable Ignorance and not in anything else (such as the Unmanifest principle that is imugined through Ignorance). So it seems that it is in fact the Unmanifest that is here referred to by the term Ignorance.

(2) Those who are experts in the science of the Absolute aver that the true tradition about the world is that its material cause is Consciousness asscciated with the beginningless inde- terminable power of Ignorance. (Bha.I.i.5)

Here it is taught that beginningless Ignorance is an auxiliary to the Self enabling it to stand as the material cause of the world.

(3) And so all modifications everywhere are so many transfor- mations undergone by the Lord's power of Ignorance. That does duty for his body and organs (and enables Him to function as the controller of the individual soul). (Bha.l.ii.18)

This is said to rebut the charge that the Inner Ruler has no body and organs wherewith to control the body and organs of the individual soul.

(4) You cannot raise this objection against us, as we do not say that Ignorance is one and the same in all souls, like the Nature of the Sankhyas ... (cp. M.V.188,2). And because it is all only Ignorance it is treated figuratively as one and labelled 'the Unmanifest' and 'the Undeveloped' (avyakta, avyākrta). (Bhā. I. iv.3)

Here the Unmanifest is clearly referred to by the word 'Igno- rance', and it is spoken of as consisting of many different units.

(5) For what is non-conscious cannot produce any effects unless it is prompted, guided and supervised by a conscious being. Ignorance, therefore, requires the Lord both to prompt it as efficient cause and to support it as material cause. The Lord

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is the substratum (adhisthana) of the world-illusion as the rope is the substratum of the snake-illusion. Therefore the Lord is the material cause of the world-illusion, just as the rope is the material cause of the snake-illusion. (Bha.I.iv.3)

llere the conception clearly is that the world is superimposed onto the supreme Self, as the illusory snake is superimposed onto the rope. So it is not said here thut a modification is a transformation of the power of Ignorance.

(6) Therefore, aithough Ignorance is located in the individual soul, it depends upon the Lord to stand as its efficient cause and as the object which it conceals. It is in this sense that it is said to have its 'foundation' (asraya) in the Lord. But it does not mean that it has the Lord for its'support' (adhara - i.e. that the Lord is the conscious being whom it afflicts). That would be impossible in the case of the Lord, who is knowledge by nature. (Bha. I.iv.3)

The passage from Sankara's Commentary which this is supposed to be explaining runs: 'For the seed-power is of the nature of Ignorance, referred to by the term "the Unmunifest", having its foundation (atraya) in the supreme Lord'. Śri Sankara's Com mentary, speaks of a power of the nature of name and form, which, though merely imagined through Ignorance, appears to be a conditioning adjunct of the supreme Lord and hence is re- ferred to as 'having its foundation in the supreme Lord'. It is clear that superimposition and its potentiality (sakti) called the Unmanifest are treated here in the Bhamati as iden- tical, and are said to have their seat (asraya) in the indivi- dual soul.

(7) And again, the Veda declares that the effect (the world) is non-different from the cause at the time of maintenancc, production and dissolution alike. Few followers of the Veda would show much inclination to raise objections against this. The defence (against the objection that, if the Absolute is taken as the material cause of the world, it will be infected with the impurities of the world when the latter is dissolved back into its material cause) is the same in regard to dis- solution as it was in regard to the creation and maintenance of the world (during which the latter was also to be taken as non-different from the Absolute). The defence is that the effect is merely superimposed through Ignorance (and so does not touch the Absolute in any way). So in considering this question one should not limit the enquiry to dissolution alone. (Bhã. II.i.9)

Here again the Bhamati speaks of the effect (the world) being superimposed through Ignorance, in each of the three states of the effect, namely production, maintenance and withdrawal. And

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by so speaking it affirms that the power of Ignorance, synony- mous with the Unmanifest, is itself superimposed through Igno- rance. Here the author respects the intention of the text in Śri Sankara's Commentary that he is explaining. That passage runs: 'Therefore we should infer by analogy that a potential- ity (sakti) for future distinctions remains in the period of world-dissolution, too, this potentiality itself being hased (equally) on wrong knowledge' (B.S.Rh.Il.i.9, M. V. 45,8). Therefore the phrase 'power of Ignorance' is only used so long as one is referring to a power whose existence is only in- ferred in the state of metaphycical Ignorance.

(8) Since the power of Ignorance is regular in its cperations, the projection of the world at the beginning of each world- period is also regular. (Bhã.II.i.9)

Here the phrase 'power of Ignorance' clearly refers only to the power of introducing differentiation on the cosmic plane that is itself imagined through Tgnorance.

(9) The possibility of liberated sculs undergoing rebirth is ruled out by the fact that the power of introducing differen- tiation on the cosmic plane, which arises ultimately from (Ignorance in the form of) erroneous knowledge (and its impres- sions), operates regularly and appropriately in each individual case. The idea is that there is a regular law that where there is no cause there is no effect; and that (in the case of the liberated souls) erroneous knowledge with its latent powers will have been destroyed root and branch by metaphysical knowl- edge. (Bhã.II.i.9)

through it'. It means, 'erroneous knowledge and the latent powers imagined

(10) The Absolute (even though in itself partless and change- less) can be understcod to be the ground of the perception of transformation and other changes, through manifest and unmani- fest name and form, imagined through Ignorance, indeterminable as the real principle or as anything different. (Bha. II.i.26)

This follows Sri Sankara's Commentary. In the sequel the Bhamati expresses even more clearly its agreement with the view that the Unmanifest is imagined through Ignorance. For it says, 'Sri Sankara puts into the mouth of an objector the words "But is it not the case that the Veda cannot declare anything contradictory?" to prepare the way for the statement that the Unmanifest is imagined through Ignorance' (Bha. II. i. 27). But how can the author of the Bhamati reconcile this (admission of the correct view that the Unmanifest is imagined by Ignorance) with his other statements that Ignorance is the Unmanifest?

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(11) Name and form are set up by Ignorance. Causal Ignorance is of the nature of dissolution (laya), associated with the impressions of projection derived from world-projection in previous world-periods. Name and form so conceived constitute 'Maya' (cp. M.V.182, 3 ad fin. ). And we have already several times refuted this objection against non-dualism which says that Consciousness, on such a theory, cannot prompt any action for lack of anything other than itself to prompt. We refute it by pcinting out how Consciousness stands connected with Māya by false superimposition. What the Commentary means is this. It is not that this creation is real, so that one tould raise the objection that the real, being non-dual, cannot have any second thing standing over against it. As the creation is only imaginary, the non-dual principle can very well have an imaginary, illusory duality as its companion. As the saying goes, 'Companionship obeys the laws of necessity'. And it does not mean that the Absolute is not, ultimately, the material cause of the world. For it is the Absolute as penetrated by Maya that is the material cause. The Absolute, indeed, is the substratum of the world-error (is that on which we superimpose the erroneous notion that a world of plurality exists). This is correct, because we speak of the shell both as the 'sub- stratum' and as the 'material cause' of the shell-silver. (Bhã. II.ii.2)

The argument in Śri Sankara's Commentary rus as follows. Let us suppose, it says, that you object that if the Self is one there cannot be a prompter of action (which the Lord is said to be) for lack of anything other than Himself to prompt. We say 'No'. This has several times been refuted already on the grounds that He stanas comected through superimposition with the illusory display (maya) of name and form set up by Igno- rance. The author of the Bhamati first agrees that manifest and unmanifest name and form are imagined through Ignorance. Why he even then goes on to bring in new concepts like that of the impressions of Ignorance existing before the start of a new world-period is not clear.

If we take the common thread in the texts here quoted from the Bhamati, it is clear that the teaching has the following points in agreement with Śri Sankara's Commentary. The world is a manifestation of name and form. Name and form are imagined through Ignorance, and form the seed-state or state of poten- tiality (sakti-rupa) of the world. The Unmanifest can be referred to (in a loose sense) by the word Ignorance because it is imagined through Ignorance. But, as we have already ex- plained, the statement in the Bhamati that Ignorance is many (one for each individual soul) is to be ignored (M.V.188). It was made without pausing to reflect that Ignorance itself is the source of all empirical concepts, including substance, attribute, number and so on.

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19S THE SUPERIMPOSITION OF THE NOTION THAT ONE IS AN INDIVIDUAL SOUL

In this system there is an examination of how the notion that one is an individual soul is superimposed on the Absolute in order to establish how the soul and the Absolute appear as distinct in practical experience.

(1) Even those (the Mimamsakas) who hold that the ego-sense reveals the soul should not (on their own principles) take it as a true representation. For they (hold that the soul is all-pervading, and yet like amyone else they) perceive what is all-pervading through the ego-sense as local, in the form 'I am here, having knowledge in this particular dwelling-place (body) alone'. It is an illusion like that whereby great trees on the top of a high mountain appear to one standing on the ground below as tiny blades of grass. Nor is it the case that it is only the body that is felt to be local, and not the soul. For if it were, there would not be the feeling 'I'. Or again, if it is claimed that self-identification with the body is mere figurative speech-usage (employed for practical pur- poses, though known to be untrue), we reply that in that case there wowld not be the feeling (you speak of) 'I am here'. (Bhã. I.i.), p.ll/9-10)

(2) But there is no experience of any direct meaning of 'I' manifestly separate from the complex of gross and subtle body and organs, that is to say, clearly separate from it as a baby is separate from its mother once it has been delivered from the womb. In these circumstances, there cannot be a direct meaning of the word 'I' as the Self and a figurative use of the same word to mean the complex of the gross and subtle boaies. Nor can it be accepted that the use of the word 'I' to mean the body is one of those figurative terms so long consecrated by conventional use that the original primary sense has been forgotten, as the word 'taila', which originally meant sesame-seed oil, has come to mean mustard-seed oil. For one can only know that it is the word that originally stood for sesame-seed oil that is being used for mustard-seed and other oils if one knows that sesame-seed oil is different from the others, on account of its peculiar sticky character and the fact that it comes from sesame-seeds; when such a piece of figurative usage is established, it does not lead to the con- clusion that sesame-seed oil and mustard-oil are identical. Thus it is clear that there can only be primary and figurative usage where a person knows both the primary and the secondary meaning and also the difference between the two. In the case of the pure Self and the complex of the gross and subtle body, the absence of any apprehension of them as separate entails the absence of primary and figurative usage. (Bha. I.i.1,

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p.13/10-11)

(3) Nor is it correct to say that, because one reflects 'I am that same' throughout the bodily changes from childhood through to old age, it follows that one has direct experience of oncself as different from the body, senses and mind. This is only philosophers' talk; it is not the talk of people who engage actively in worldly life. (Bha. I.i.1, p.13-4/11)

Here there is the reflection 'I am that same'. But there is nothing to prove that this reflection really bears on the Self. Vacaspati does not raise the possibility of its being an error, even though he quotes Sri Sankara's phrase 'And because there is no difference, in this respect, between the behaviour of men and animals' (cp. M.V.140,6).

(4) Nor is it correct, in order to safeguard the validity of the ego-sence, to say that the Self is limited in size and localized in a particular place like the body. The Self would then have to be cither atomic or of the size of the body. If it were atomic, one could not account for such feel- ings as 'I am stout' or 'I am tall'. And if it were the size of the body, it would have parts like the body, and thus would not be eternal. (Bha. I.i.l, p.14/11)

Here the doctrine of the Materialist, who would welcome the last position reached (the non-eternality or non-existence of the Self) should have been considered; one cannot refute the provisional thesis through mere quotation of the authority of the Veda.

(5) In the same way (the passage leads on from M.V.184,1) the complex of the gross body, subtle body and organs is also indeterminable as real or unreal. Though it is a novel pro- duct, it is correct to say that it is 'superimposed elsewhere' onto the Self as Consciousness, just like what had been presented in previous erroneous cognitions, since the defini- tion of superimposition applies. We shall explain later how the abolition and final cancellation of the complex of the bodies and organs takes place. The Self as pure Consciousness, on the other hand, is in the province of the Vedas, Smrtis, Epics and Puranas. It can be determined as real, since it can be shown by reasoning based on these authorities, and not in conflict with them, that it is by nature pure, conscious and liberated. Its reality consists in its uncontradictable self-luminosity. And that is the very nature of the Self as Consciousness. is not anything different from that. It is not inherence in Reality

the universal called Being (as advocated by the Vaiseşikas, in whose system Being and inherence and that which inheres in Being are all totally distinct from one another). Nor is it

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the power to produce effects through action (which is the Buddhist test of reality, rejected because action is a mere appearance within changeless Being, and its effects are imper- manent anyway). So all objections, we would claim, have been answered. (Bha.I.i.1, p.24-5/23)

Here it would have been enough to have mentioned that the Self was self-luminous and never contradicted. There is no mention in the Commentary of its being known from the veda and the other sourcec mentioned. As we huve already pointed out (e.g. M.V.191,15, note; 193,5, note) these considerations are not relevani to this topic.

(6) For it is the Self as Consciousness that appears in the ego-notion to be capable of action and experience. In truth it is totally withdrawn, and cannot have the power of acting or experiencing. As for the complex of the gross and subtle body and the organs, beginning with the intellect - that, is potentially able to act and have experience, but it does not have consciousness (as becomes clear, for instance, at death). So it is the Self as Consciousness, (apparently) united with the complex of the two bodies and the organs, that acquires the power to act and experience. Though it is the self- luminous principle, it appears to become painted over with the intellect, organs and body. Somehow it becomes the object of the I- notion, and is called 'support of the ego', 'the soul', the 'living creature' and (cp. M.V. p.35) 'the Knower of the Field'. (Bha.I.i.1, p.39/40-1)

Like the Pañcapādika (M.V. 142, 3), the Bhamaii explains the ego-notion as figurative, using the term 'somehow'. The effect of this is to weaken the force of the words in Śri Sankara's Commentary, 'But it (the Self) is not altogether a non-object, since it is the object of the ego-notion'. This pussage in Sri Sankara's Comentary is an answer to the objec- tion 'How could an object be superimposed on something that is not an object?' One should only say of the Self, he replies, that it is not the object of the notion 'you'; it is not right to say that it is not an object in any sense whatever. For here the words of the Commentary accept that the Self is the object of the notion 'I'. Note also that the opponent is not here made to raise the difficulty of how the Self could be a knowing subject having the notion 'I' for its object - nor is anything said by the exponent of the finally accepted view to dispel this difficulty.

197 THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ABSOLUTE AND THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL

In the short succession of Sutras beginning with Brahma Sūtra

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I.iv.19 called the Vākyanvaya Adhikaraņa (M.V. p.14), three different theories of the relation between the soul and the Absolute are described, beginning with that of Ācarya Āsma- rathya. Asmarathya's doctrine takes the supreme Self and the soul as constituting a primary substance and its modification. Audulomi holds that in the state of transmigration the soul is totally distinct from the Absolute, while in liberation it becomes identical. The third view is expressed by the next Sutra in the words 'Because the soul is identical also in the state of transmigration - so said Kasakrtsna' (B.S. I.iv.22). On this Stra, Śri Śankara remarks in his Commentary: 'The Teacher K5sakrtsna holds that, since that which assumes the form of the individual soul is (in the end) none other than the supreme Self, it is appropriate io begin with this doc- trine of their non-difference'. The Bhamati quotes Bhaskara's refutation of Śri Śankare's view (Bh.B.3.Bh. I.iv.21, not quoted in the M.V.) and then defends Śri Sankara. In the course of his preliminary exposition of the finaliy accepted view, he sets Kasakrtsna's doctrine out as follows:

(1) The soul is not different from the Self. Nor is it a modification of the Self. It is indeed the Self, but imagined as limited by the adjunct of Ignorance. It is like the ether of space, which is imagined to have delimitations, being apparently (but not really) enclosed, say, within a small pot and a large jar. But here the pot-space and the jar-space are not different from absolute space, and they are not a modification of it either. And so, to start from the indivi- dual soul is the same thing as to start from the supreme Self,

I.iv.22) since the latter is not different from the former. (Bha.

(2) In truth, the individual soul and the supreme Self are entirely identical. The difference between them is imagined through the adjunct of beginningless Ignorance. And it can be rooted out through immediate knowledge, which arises through a high degree of the practice of hearing, pondering over and meditating on the text 'That thou art', a text which teaches the identity of the soul with the Absolute. It is the same process as that whereby the erroneous idea of a snake in a rope may be expunged by knowledge of the rope, and the same process whereby a prince, who grew up in a forest in a family of outcasts and supposed himself to be an outcast, lost that idea on being told by an authority. 'You are a prince' (M.V.75,11). Even if it were meditated on hundreds of times over as 'clay', a modification of clay like a clay dish could not be brought to an end by direct vision of clay aris- ing from this practice. Why is that? It is because its true relationship with clay is that of difference in identity. Nothing that is real can be uprooted by knowledge. (Bha. I.iv.22; cp. M.V.205,5, note)

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The doctrine of imediate and direct knowledge wiil be exam- ined later in its proper place (M.V. 205-7). Here, the example of a modification of clay seems to have been cited in agreement with the doctrine of Asmarathya, who held that the effect was both different from and identical with the cause. For according to the Veda, the clay dishes and other modifica- iions of clay perccived by the eye are never perceived apart from the clay of which they are composed, and hence are unreal (the reality being the clay), One can put an end to one's notion that they are roal through the text 'The truth is "It is only clay"' (Chand. VI.i.4).

(3) There are two further difficulties if the soul is taken as a modificaticn of the Self. On this view, the result of applying to the discipline of metaphysical affirmation and meditation and so on will be a dissolution of the individual soul into the Absolute, its material cause. The soul will then have no hope of immortality, and the discipline will fulfil no genuine human end. There will also be a contradic- tion with the Vedic teaching that the soul is immortal. Neither of these difficulties arisc on the doctrine of Kāśa- kṛtsna. (Bhā. I.iv.22)

The reply given in the Bhamati to Bhaskara's objection is as follows:

(4) And if all the upanishadic texts are taken into account in their proper context, with due regard to what has gone be- fore and what comes afterwards, it is seen that their purpose is to teach absolute non-duality through denunciation of duality. Note in this connection that reflections of a pure white object are in strict truth non-different from their pure white original. The imagined distinctness of the various reflections of one pure white original, arising from distinc- tions in the different objects in which it is reflected, say a blue gem, a sword-blade and a piece of glass, all happening to lie close by, sets up the notion of distinct entities, and causes us to think and speak of one as different from another. We say, for instance, 'This, the original object, is pure white, these other reflections are tinted, either blue like a lotus or orange like a palasa-flower, and are all different shapes, some round, some oblong and so on'. In the same way, the individual souls are in truth entirely identical with their pure original, the Self. But they are imagined to be different.on account of differences in their adjuncts, which latter proceed from beginningless indeterminable Ignorance. And this imagined difference sets up the notion of distinct entities, and causes us to think and speak of one as different from another. And we have the idea 'This is the supreme Self, pure Consciousness and Bliss by nature, while these are the individual souls, with ignorance, sorrow, pain and other

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disasters for their lot'. It is true that no adjunct born of metaphysical Ignorance can, properly speaking, exist in the supreme Self, which is knowledge by nature. But we do in fact attribute such adjuncts to the Self, because of the individual soul, which appears to be a reflection in such an adjunct, But this conception dces not imply the fallacy of mutual depen- dence, expressible in the form 'The existence of Igmorance depends on the prior separation of the various individual souls (without which there would be no one to be ignorant), while the separation of the various individual souls itself depends on Ignorance. There is no fallacy of mutual depen- dence, because the process is beginuingless, like the cycle of seed and sprout. (Bha. I.iv.22)

Here the dependence on Mandana's system is clear, both in re- gard to the example of gems and sword-blades (B.Sid. p.7) and in resori to the argument of absence of mutual dependence on account of beginninglessness, supported by the example of the cycle of seed and sprout (B.Sid. p. 10, M. V. 94, 1).

(5) The soul, which in its true nature is the Absolute, eternal and changeless, cannot in that true nature be affected by desire, aversion and attachment. But because there is superimposition of identity with the mind, there is the super- imposed notion that one has these attributes of the mind one- self. It is like the case of the moon being superimposed by way of a reflection in a shallow dish of water. When the water trembles, trembling is falsely superimposed on the moon, the reflected original. (Bhã. II.iii.29)

(6) The individual soul can only exist at all when non- duality is established as the reality on which it depends. For its (appearance of) difference from the Absolute is due to the adjunct of beginningless, indeterminable Ignorance. The case is parallel with that of the different reflections of one original that may occur on account of the different surfaces in which it is reflected, such as mirrors and other shiny objects. And this theory enables us to account for the fact that we favour one thing and oppose another in our worldly dealings, while the Vedic texts recommend some things and dissuade us from others. It also enables us to account for the unequal distribution of pleasure and pain, and for the fact that some are liberated while others are condemned to further transmi- gration. Not one of the whole variety of evils affects liber- ation. For it, is only in their state of individuality that the individual souls are connected with the variety of differ- ent forms of pain. Only the reflections, and not the original, are tinted dark or light according to the darkness or light- ness of the reflecting media. But the Absolute is like the original; it is not affected by the different forms of pain

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that affect the individual souls. Further, when a mirror is removed, whatever had been re- flected in it survives as the original; and the reflection of the original in the sword-blade is not affected by the disap- pearance of the reflection of the original in the mirror or the removal of the mirror. In this way, it can be shown how the soul survives as the Absolute when its adjunct set up by Ignorance is removed. (Bha. II.iii.43)

This shows that in this system the real reason for accepting a plurality of Ignorances is to explain how different souls differ in their circumstances of life, and how some do and some do not attain liberrtion.

(7) It is true that the supreme Self, because He is omni- scient, sees the individual souls as without real difference from Himself, but He does not identify Himself with them (in their finite aspect) or feel attachment or aversion for their pleasures and pains. They, however, do feel this attachment, through the force of Ignorance. Even while they are undergo- ing sensations of pleasure and pain, He has the feeling of being withdrawn, in the form 'Though I dwell in the midst of their house of bondage, no harm results to Me from this'. (Bhã.II.i.22)

(8) (Are the omniscience and omnipotence of the Self real or imaginary? ) If they were real, nothing could arise from Him, as He would be non-dual, and not associated with anything else. No real effect is produced by Him who is pure, conscious and liberated by nature ... If, however, the omniscience and omnipotence were not real but imaginary, then one might think that, because there would be no efficient cause totally differ ent from the material on which the work was taking place, as there is when a potter is working on clay, there could not be a material cause either. But exceptions to this rule (that there must be an efficient cause if there is to be a material cause) are provided by substances like milk and others. For milk and the like are found to undergo a new transformation of their own accord and through the mere passage of time, without the aid of a conscious being as external efficient cause. On these grounds we suppose that the Lord is independent of any secondary cause. But the view is wrong, as He is associated with the indeterminable seed of name and form. And there is the Vedic text, 'Know that Nature is an illusion (maya) and that the Great Lord is the magician who operates this magic illu- sion' (Svet.IV.10). Because that seed expands in an orderly fashion, it must be assumed to contain that order in latent form. We see, too, that a multitude of effects can proceed from a single power in which variety is latent, as, for in- stance, fire, which is one, has the two powers of burning up and cooking, and one act leaves impressions which lead both to

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joining and separation. (Bhā.II.i.24)

(9) And again, the creation of this world is not real from the standpoint of the highest truth, that one should question the Creator's purposes (and charge Him with madness, partiality or cruelty). Its cause is beginningless Ignorance. Ignorance produces its effects acccrding to its nature; it does not con- sider ends and purposes. Errors like the vision of two moons, the false vision of lines of light set up by whirling torches, or the vision of cities in the clouds do not proceed under the dictates of any declared purpose. Nor is there any purpose attached to their effects, such as amazemeni, fear and trem- bling. And we speak of the womb of the world as being con- scious only because it consists of Ignorance as blended with Consciousness. (Bha.II.i.33)

The Bhamati advocates two different theories in different places. Sometimes it says that Ignorance alone is the mate- rial cause of the world; sometimes it says that the Absolute is the material cause, through the instrumentality of Igno- rance, in the same sense that the rope is the material cause of the illusory snake and other things for which it is mis- taken.

(10) This has been said in the context of deliberately conced- ing that creation was real. But, even here, one should not forget that creation is of indeterminable reality-grade. When a mass-hypnotist puts on a magic show, we do not accuse him of partiality if some of the living creatures that appear in that magic show are stout of limb while others are disabled or crippled (cp. B.Sid. p.ll, Potter, 1981, p.353). Nor do we accuse him of cruelty when he suddenly brings the whole show to a halt. The same holds true of the Lord when He exhibits and withdraws this variegated universe of indeterminable reality-grade, whether because it is his nature to do so auto- matically, or whether He does so as a piece of deliberate artistic creation; no fault attaches to Him in either case. (Bhã. II.i.34)

It is clear from the quotations adduced above that on the question of the relation of the Absolute and the world and on that of the relation of the Absolute and the individual soul Vacaspati Misra's system is very largely influenced by that of Mandana Misra, and that the traditional epithet 'tied to the apron-strings of Mandana' (Prakatārtha Vivaraņa III.iv.47) is justified. The procedure everywhere is to proffer different applications of the one dcctrine that Ignorance is indetermin- able as either real or unreal, and use that as a panacea for every doubt.

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198 REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF DIFFERENCE IN IDENTITY

In the ccurse of defending the proposition 'kternity associated with change cannot be absolute reality', Bhaskara's doctrine of aifference in identity is refuted as follows.

(1) Where there is association with change there cannot be absolute reality. For consider. Does the changing entity undergo total transformation, or is the transformation only partial? If the transformation is total, does not that amount to destruction? Let us suppose, then, that the transformation is partial. In that case, is the part that undergoes altera- tion different from or non-different from the whole? If the part undergcing alteration is different from the whole, how can the whole be undergoing any alteration whatever? When one thing undergoes alteration it does not follow that something else that is different does likewise. And if the part under- going alteration is non-different from the whole, how can one avoid the conclusion that the whole is undergoing alteration (which, as we have seen, implies its destruction). It might be possible here to claim that the part was both different and non-different. The part, as effect of its mate- rial cause, the whole, is non-different from the whole insofar as it is the whole, while it is different insofar as it is the effect, as bracelets and other ornaments made of gold are non- different from gold insofar as they are gold, but different insofar as they are bracelets and so on. Nor (you might claim) is it correct to say that, since difference and non- difference are contradictories, they cannot inhere in the same entity. For when do we have knowledge of contradiction? That is contradictory which stands in contradiction with a cogni- tion derived from valid means. That, however, which is known through a valid means of cognition really exists in the form in which it is known. In the cognition expressed by the subject-predicate judgment 'This bracelet is gold', there is a clear manifestation both of difference and identity. If there had been total non-difference, there would simply have been the manifestation of one of the terms twice (as both subject and predicate). And if there had been total difference, then the two could not have been linked as subject and predicate, any more than cow and horse can. If two things are different, but have a relation of supporter and supported or abide in a common support, this does not mean that they are joined in a subject-predicate (i.e. substance-attribute) relation. We do not say of a plum standing in a dish 'The plum is the dish'; nor do we say that Caitra is Maitra if the two are sitting on the same couch. What establishes the difference and non- difference of the material cause and its effect is the uncon- tradicted, indubitable judgment of all who perceive them that they stand in substance-attribute relation. Thus effects are

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of the nature of their material cause, and the cause is every- where Being. In this sense the effect, the world, is non- different from its cause, Being; and yet in its nature as effect, as cow or pot or whatever it may be, it is different. And so there is the verse: 'In their nature as effect, effects are various and different from each other and from the caucc; but as the cause, they are non-different; thus bracelets and other ornaments made of gold are different, as ornaments, from each other and from the gcld, while bcing non-different from their cause, or from one another, as gold'. To this whole suseestion we (pure Advaitins) reply as fol- lows. What, exactly, is this thing called difference, that, exists in the same place together with non-difference? Do you say that it is mutual exclusion? If so, does this mutual exclusion subsist between effect and material cause, between ornament and gold, or does it not? If it does not subsist, then there is identity and no difference. If it does subsist, then there is difference alone, and no identity. Nor is it true to say that there can be no contradiction between being and non-being (and so no contradiction between difference and non-difference). For the two cannot apply together at the same timr. Or if they could, then it would follow that the bracelet and the svastika-ornament were identical, since dif- ference would not be in contradiction with identity. Further, because the bracelet is non-different from the gold, then, since bracelets, crowns, ear-rings and other things made of gold are not different as gold, they are not different from the bracelet even as a bracelet either, for the bracelet is non-different from gold. And thus only gold is real, and not the bracelets and the rest, since no difference is manifest anywhere. To this you will no doubt reply that it is only as gold that the bracelet is non-aifferent from other things made of gold, not as bracelet. As bracelet, you will say, it is evi- dently different from ear-rings and the rest. And you may perhaps argue further as follows. If the bracelet is non- different. from the gold, why is it that gold is found in gold ear-rings but the bracelet is not found in them? And if the bracelet is not found in gold ear-rings, how can the bracelet be non-different from gold? Those things that give way while something else persists are different from what persists, as the flowers of a garland are different from the string on which they are thread. Gold persists, while the ear-rings and the rest do not persist. They must therefore certainly be different from gold. If, on account of the common presence of gold, the bracelets and crowns and so on made of gold were somehow present in the ear-rings, then, because all things are accompanied by Being and non-different from it, they would be non-different from each other (which is absurd). There could not then be such distinctions as 'This is what we have here and not that, this comes from this and not that, there is this

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now and not that, this is the case and not that'. For one could not distinguish one thing from another anywhere, at any time or in any way. A further (absurd) consequence would be that when gold in some form was perceived at a distance no one would feel any desire to know what particular form it had, whether it was an ear-ring or something else, because none of these forms would be anything but gold, and the fact that gold was in evidence would already be known. So we conclude that there must be a differenre between the ear-rings and cther effects proceeding from gold on the one hand, and the gold on the other; for there are cases where the gold is known and the effects are not (e.g. when gold is seen vaguely from afar !. Or let us ask, since there is also non-difference (as well as difference) between the effects of gold and the gold, why are the effects not known? Surely they ought to be known. Wherever there is a cause there must be an effect, and here the cause of knowledge - namely, non-difference from the known gold - is present, so that the effect, knowledge of the modification of gold, be it ear-rings or whatever else, should follow. But this would result in the absurd consequence that, when gold was vaguely seen in the distance, our desire for further determinate cognition of what the gold had been made into would be useless. Hence the principle holds that what-' ever is not known when something else is known is different from the thing that is known. When one perceives a camel but does not perceive a donkey, this shows that the donkey is dif- ferent from the camel. And when gold is perceived vaguely at a distance, distinctions within it, such as ear-rings and the rest, are not perceived. Therefore the latter are different from gold. In these circumstances (i.e. when the effects of gold are seen tc be differcnt from gold) we have to ask how the subject- predicate judgment 'The ear-rings are gold' can arise. We have already said that the subject-predicate relation does not apply to supporter and supported or to those abiding in a com- mon locus. How, then, can we explain how some things persist while others fall away? And how can we explain why, when gold has been known, there is the further desire to know whether it has been formed into an ear-ring or some other artefact? As we have shown, these two points are inexplicable if it is taken that there is non-difference between the gold and its effects, either absolute non-difference or non- difference associated with difference. Now, one cannot have both difference and non-difference simultaneously; one or the other must be rejected. One must therefore argue as follows. The notion of difference depends on non-difference, while the notion of non-difference does not depend on difference. Dif- ference depends on things being differentiated, and the dif- ferentiated things must each be one. If there were no unities there could be no differences, as there would be nowhere for them to be located. But the existence of unity does not

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depend on difference. The perception 'not this, but this' depends not only on the perception of difference but also on the perception of that which the difference is different from; but perception of unity does not depend on anything else. Hence we conclude that imagined dictinctions of indeterminable reality-gradc arise as appearances on a substratum of non- difference, (which is the underlying reality). And thus we have the Vedic text, 'The truth is, "It is only clay"'. (Bha. I.i.4, pp.117-9/174-9; cp. B.Sid. pp.63-9, summarized Potter, 1981, pp. 382-5)

It is not ciear why Bhaskara's doctrine of transformation as projection through a crcative power was not taken up for oxamination here (see Bh.B.S.Bh. I. iv.25, M.V. 166, 1 and 2; 168, 6).

(2) Aithough the individuals comprehended within the univer- sal 'cowhcod' are of indeterminable reality-grade and not real in the highest sense, so that one is bound to ask 'How can the whole universal be comprehended in each one of them? '- still, one chould realize that this whole conception of universals and individuals is only put forward at all as a concession to the theories of the Logicians. (Bha.II.i.18)

This is said in commenting on Śri Sankara's sentence at B.S. Bh. II.i.18, 'Suppose we say that there is nothing wrong, since the whole can be present totally in each part, as the universal "cowhood" is totally present in each individual cow', a remark he attributes to the opponent in the course of dis- cussing the relation of wholes and parts.

(3) But there is another type of causality (other than the atomic) in which the material cause assumes new particular states to stand as the effect, while itself remaining univer- sal. Clay and gold, for instance, are universals perceived as present in all the pots and necklaces and other artefacts into which they are formed. And, as we shall explain later on, the pots and necklaces are nothing over and above the clay and gold from which they are fashioned .. Thus the universal, Being, is absolutely real. But its particular states are of indeterminable reality-grade. They are appearances, having Being for their substratum, as the snake and the like, for which a rope is mistaken, have the rope as their base. Such (illusory) states can very well have the character of coming into being and passing away. (Bhã. II.ii.15)

(4) In reality, the effect in its true nature is not differ- ent from the material cause. Its true nature is the material cause. The effect-form of the material cause is indetermin- able, but manifests both as if different from the cause and

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also as if the same as the cause .... In truth, merely mani- festing as a particular does not amount to being different from the principle of absolute reality. As perceived in empir- ical experience, however, the effect is in some inexplicable way both the real principle and also different from it. (Bhā. II.i.18)

To anyone who has laboured away at reading the Tarka Pada (second Book) of the Drahma Siddhi (summarized in Potter, 1981, pp.374-87), it will be clear that, in the above arguments re- futing the doctrinc of Difference ir Identity, Vacaspati Misra is not a liitle indebted to Mandana Misra. The reader will be able to see how the reasoning in inc criticism of the doctrine of Difference in Identity developed if he compares the treat- ment of this topic in the Brahma Siddhi, the Brhadāranyaka Vartika and the Bhamati. But it is a point peculiar to the Bhamati in the context of refuting Difference in Identity that efiects of causes, particular instances of universals and parts of wholes should all be treated as if they were indeter- minable as real or unreal.

199 THE DISCRIMINATION OF THE FIVE SHEATHS

In the section called 'The Topic of the Bliss-self' (B.S. I.i.12-9), and in the course of explaining the topic according to the doctrine of the author of the Vrtti, the Bhamati first introduces an opponent who speaks as follows. 'The individual soul is (said) not (to be) another knower, distinct and separate from the supreme Lord. But in this case the supreme Jord, by the same token, would not be different from the indi- vidual soul. And then, since the individual soul is of inde- terminable reality-grade, the supreme Lord would be of inde- terminable reality-grade toc. In that way He would not be real'. The Bhamati replies as follows:

(1) The superimposed silver is not different from the shell. For it is indeterminable as either identical with it or dif- ferent. But the shell can be determined as being perfectly real. It is therefore different from the indeterminable silver. (Bhā. I.i.17)

We glean here that the author of the Vrtti was a strict Advaitin and an adherent of the doctrine that the Absolute was without internal differentiation. This agrees also with Śri Śankara's Commentary, when it says: 'Therefore (he holds) one cannot attribute the slightest distinction to the Abso- lute, or claim that, when it is taken in its true nature, "Pleasure is its head"' (cp. Taitt.II.5). Nor is it the Abso- lute as associated with distinctions for purposes of

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meditation that is the subject of this upanishadic passage. For it speaks cf the Absolute as beyond speech and thought. So in the phrase "the Bliss-self" (anandamaya-atman) the suffix "-maya" should be understood as implying a modification, just as it does in "the Food-self" (annamaya-atman, = the physical body, a modification of food) and the other members of the series (M.V.39). It should not be taken to imply "the supreme Self, superabundaut in Bliss"' (B.S.Bh.I.1.19). And so, if the author of the provisional view (i.e. the author of the Vrtti) had nct egreed that the Absolute was undifferentiated, it would not have beer right for him to accept in this way what went against his own doctrine. So far so gocd. The author of the Vrtti was an Advaitin. But what is he doing propageting the view champiomed in the Bhamati that shell-silver and the like are indeterminable as real or unreal? This anachronism passes all comprehension. It is noteworthy that the following verse is quoted in the Bhämati in the course of showing the superiority of the finally adopted view to that of the author of the Vrtti.

(2) On this question, we have a verse that runs as follows. 'On the first (provisional) view (that of the author of the Vrtti), the terms "the Absolute" and "Bliss" and "made up of Bliss" are each understood in a figurative sense. The term "the Absolute" (brahman) is understood figuratively as a (part or) limb. The term "Bliss" (ananda) is understood in a figurative sense as "made up of Bliss". The phrase "made up of Bliss" is itself understood in a figurative sense as "super abundance of Bliss" and applied in a unique way to the Abso- lute. The theory abandons the series of five "selves", each a modification (of some entity known objectively in the worla, food, vital energy, mind ... bliss) as indicated by the suffix "-maya" (annamaya, praņamaya ... anandamaya). (It does so because it identifies the last member of the series with the Absolute, thereby destroying the series of "selves" which are modifications of objectively known entities.) On the second (finally accepted) view, the (preliminary) upanishadic teach- ing about limbs or parts (left wing, right wing, tail, etc., Taitt.II.5) is afterwards negated (because the Absolute is taken in its true form as undifferentiated, and the teaching about limbs is rejected as preliminary false attribution)'. (Bhã. I.i.19)

Vācaspati explains this as follows:

(3) On this we observe that the primary meaning of the word 'puccha' is 'tail', and it is being understood in a figurative sense if it is taken to mean a part, and a part, moreover, which is 'made up of Bliss'. The primary meaning 'tail' is rejected equally, whether, as in the provisonal view (of the author of the Vrtti), it be taken to mean a part, or whether,

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as in the finally accepied view (of Śri Sankara), it be taken to mean 'foundation'. The provisional view contradicts the series of five modifications occurring to form five 'selves' (by taking the Bliss-self out of the series and identifying it with the Absolute); the finally accepted view, while safe- guarding the series of five 'selves' mentioned in the Upani- shad, also contradicts the literal teaching of the text where the latter appears to demote the Absolute to the status of a limb (tail, Taitt.II.5). But the provisional view is quite on its own in interpreting all three terms, 'the Absolute', 'made up of Bliss' and 'Bliss' in a figurative sense. On account of this threefold resort to figurative interpre- tation, the provisional view is weak and must be rejected. But the finally accepted view is correct, because it does justice to all three of these terms in their primary meanings. (That is, the Absolute is the Absolute in its true, undifferentiated form; the term 'made up of Bliss' finds its rightfui place describing the last of the series of five finite selves, each being a modification of some larger principle; and the term 'Bliss' is used in its primary sense to mean the Absolute - (cp. Brhad. III. ix.26) - and is not reduced to a mere 'modifi- cation of Bliss' on the pretext of its being repeated several times). (Bhã. I.i.19)

But although Vacaspati claims in his final summing up, 'The Absolute is here expounded as the foundation, as that which has to be known (and not merely meditated on) and as the main subject of the section', he dces not anywhere explain how knowledge of the Absolute as the foundation arises from dis- crimination of the five sheaths (contrast Śri Śankara at M.V.39) . One might further ask how Vacaspati knew that the author of the Vrtti regarded the Absolute as made up of (superabundant in) Bliss and an object of religious worship and meditation. Vācaspati shows that he thought that the author of the Vrtti held this view when he writes, 'So we must conclude (against the author of the Vrtti) that the principle called Brahman (taken by the Advaitin of Sankara's school as the Absolute in a sovereign and transcendent sense) is not a limb (the tail) of the modification called the Bliss-self. Hence we must also conclude that the Sutra did not intend to teach that the Bliss-self was to be meditated on as the Absolute, the latter regarded as a limb (the tail) of the Bliss-self' (Bha. I.1.19). But he does not explain why he thought that the author of the Vrtti held this view. Our own view is that the author of the Vrtti believed that the Absolute transcended all differentiation. For the revered Commentator, as previously explained (cp. M.V.171,3), showed how the author of the Vrtti contradicted his own doctrine that the Self was without attributes when he taught that it had 'pleasure for its head' (cp. Taitt.II.5) and therefore had

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attributes. Nor did the author of the Vrtti regard the Abso- lute as an object of worship and meditation only (as opposed to direct knowledge). How do we know this? Because of the arguments attributed to him - the argument, for example, that the Veda first accepts from worldly experience the idca that the Food-self (the physical body) is the true Self, and then, on that basis, goes on to teach Successively that the Vital Energy-self and the others are the true Self, in the manner of a percon pointing out the tiny star Arundhati (Alcor) in the sky by successive approximations (cp. M.V. p.13). He also established that the Absolute was without parts (or limbs) by saying that the series of notions that it had pleasure for its head and the rest each resulted successively from the last external adjunct of the series. He held that the expression 'the notion of the true Bliss-seli having a body at all ... ' (M.V.171,1) did not imply that the Self actually existed in a body. It was part of the teaching that the true Self was without a body, expounded through the dialectic of the rejec- tion of the series of bodies beginning with the body made of food. And the author of the Vrtti refuted the idea that the Bliss-self was a modification, on the basis of Vedic texts that used the suffix '-maya' in the sense of 'superabundance' And he added his own personal argument that something could only be superabundant in Bliss if it was the cause of Bliss. There was also the passage in which the author of the Vrtti set out the opening and other marks that showed how the section II.1 ff. of the Taittiriya Upanishad had to be interpreted. That which is taught as being interior to all in the upanisha- dic text 'Being, Knowledge, the Infinite' (Taitt. II.1) is the subject of the section, and this is recognized in the explana- tory passage that follows. All this shows that the author of the Vrtti held that at Taittiriya II.5 the term 'Bliss-self' was used to refer to the Absolute in its supreme transcendent form beyond differentiation, with the implication that it had to be known (and not merely treated as an object of prescribed meditation). Thus he held that, in the last analysis, the Absolute was non-dual. But he held that it was different from the 'Knowl- edge-self' (vijaanatman, cp. Prasna IV.11), the embodied soul capable of action and experience, itself imagined through Ignorance, and that this difference was pointed out in the two Sutras 'The supreme Self is not the other (is not the indivi- dual soul), as this would be illogical' and 'Because of the teaching that there is difference' (B.S. I.i.16-7). So we conclude that the author of the Vrtti had the errone- ous theory that what had to be known was the Absolute, undif- ferentiated in itself but different from the 'Food-self' and the rest up to the 'Knowledge-self' (vijmanamaya-atman, the self made up of exact, determinate cognitions, cp. Taitt.Bh. II.4), and that this was what was referred to in the Taittiriya Upanishad by the phrase. 'Bliss-self'. If we follow the version

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of the teaching of the Vrtti reproduced by the revered Commen- tator, it did not anywhere say that the Absolute was a mere object of meditation. Bhäskara, who himself taught that the Absolute was an object cf meditation, made the error of sup- posing that whai was actually the teaching of the author of the Vrtti was the genuine teaching of Bhagavatpada Sankara. Having found the Sutras (B.S. T.i.12-7) explained in Śri Sankara's Commentary on the lines of the author of the Vrtti, Bhaskara was greatly incensed to come accross a reference to the example of the mass hypnotist (mayavin) at Sutra I.1.17 (reducing all differentiation to illusion), and exclaimed: 'Here scme, with a view to safeguarding their own privately hatched theory, offer the following explanation which totally obliterates the meaning of the Sutra' (Bh.B.S.Bh. I.1.17, M.V. 171,6). Intent on combating this, Vacaspati, too, erroneously attributed to the author of the Vriti here the view that the Absolute should be regarded as an object of worship and medi- tation (not of dircct knowledge). The truth is that the phrase 'the Absolute, the tail, the foundation' can most logi- cally be connected with the text about the Absolute having to be known when the latter is conceived as being taught indepen- dently in its cwn true nature, and not when it is taken as the 'tail' of the Bliss-self. This was all that the revered Com- mentator meant to say in his refutation of the doctrine of the author of the Vrtti. Be this as it may, there is another more serious point. We have a body of traditional teaching concerning five 'sheaths' (cp. M.V.39). Each is taught successively to be the Self with the phrase 'There is another "self" within this one', the pur- pose being to dissolve them (that is, for the student to real- ize through pondering ard meditation that each was but an illusory modification cf something greater). The point of teaching the Absolute through the method of the discrimination of the five sheaths is to show that it can be known as the substratum of all false ideas constituting the universe of duality, by dissolving all such ideas in the Absclute (i.e. realizing that they are nothing over and above the Absolute), as the illusory notions of a snake and so on are 'dissolved' in the rope (when the latter is known). When the Taittiriya refers to the Absolute as 'the tail' (or foundation), that is undeniably part of this procedure. That this is the true traditional doctrine there can be little dispute. But it is never clearly brought out in the Bhamati. This should be noted.

200 DREAM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DISCRIMINATION OF THE THREE STATES

The Bhamati does not give the same fundamental importance to

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the doctrine of the three states that is given to it in Śri Śankara's Commentary and Suresvara's Vartika. Consider, bowever, the Sutra 'And not as in dream and the like, on account of the essential difference between waking and dream' (B.S. II.ii.29, cp. M.V.172,3). On this Sūtra, Śri Śankara's Commentary rewarks, 'What we call a dream-vision is really a kind of memory'. The Bhamati comments on this explanation as follows:

(1) Memory is a kind of cognition born of latent impressions alone. Knowledge properly-so-called is called perception (in a wide sense) and contrasted with it. Knowledge arises only when tne proper conditionc for it are present. These consist in the means of valid knowledge, which are perception (or sense-contact), inference (conceived as based on perception of an inferential sign that is connected by a universal law with something at present unperceived), speech (either uttered by a trustworthy person with authoritative knowledge or consisting in sacred texts), similarity (as when a yak is recognized ana named simply through first-time perception added to the pre- vious theoretical knowledge that it is like a cow), presumption (as when a perceived state or event or text-meaning is deemed inexplicable on any other hypothesis) and knowledge of absence (meaning the non-perception of something where one would ex- pect it). But here, in the case of one asleep, none of these conditions is present, so that only previous latent impres- sions are left as a possible source of cognition. Hence dream, because it is born of latent impressions, is a kind of memory. And that memory born of impressions, perverted by the defect of sleep, makes one's parents and others who are not present appear to be present. There is thus already a distinction between memory and perception (reading upalabdheh); and a dream implies a perversion even of memory. So the difference between perception and dream is very considerable. (Bha. II.ii.29)

In this connection, it is clear that people in the world dis- tinguish verbally between waking and dream, and they experi- ence waking directly, and, having done so, recognize that dream is a kind of memory. It is on the basis of accepting this very distinction between waking and dream that the Buddhist makes the inference that the ideas of the waking state, such as those of a pillar and so on, lack an external object, just like those of dream. This inference is wrong, since it contradicts immediate experience. For one who has immediate experience of the fact that perception and memory are different is not in a position to make an inference that they are not different. This is all that the revered Commen- tator intended to say here. There is no teaching here in Śri Sankara's Commentary that dream is a form of memory. For the similarity between dream and waking is established elsewhere

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(e.g. G.K.Bh. II. 5 and 6; cp. Sac, Salient Features p.74).

It is also relevant on the subject of dream to consider Brahma Sutra II.1.28, together with some remarks at Bhamati III.ii.1 and 3, and Sri Sankara's Commentary on Brahma Sutras III.ii. 3-4. Sūtra II.1.28 says, '(Many may come forth from one with- out destroying its unity.) For it happens thus with the soul iu dream; and (gods and magicians produce) variegatcd crea- tions'.

(2) This Sutra makes the doctrine of Maya explicit. The soul, when beholding a dream, projecis chariots and other objects through the mind alone, without forfeiting its own true form. (Bhã. II.i.28)

It will become clear at every stage below how no projection really takes place (see especially M.V. 200, 6).

(3) The projected worlas of the waking state and the dream- state are both of indeterminable reality-grade and illusory. In this sense they are both different from the Absolute. How- ever, the projected world of the waking state continues con- sistently until the attainment of direct vision that one's true Self is the Absolute; with that it comes to an end. Is that also the case with the projected dream-world? Or is it that the latter comes to an end daily? This is the topic under dis- cussiom. (Bha. III.ii.1)

This is not the topic that was originally under discussion. For the fact that dreams are cancelled and known to have been un- real every day is known to everyone. The conception 'of inde- terminable reality-grade ... and therefore different from the Absolute' is peculiar to the sustem of the Bhamati and does not agree with the doctrine of Śri Sankara. It would have been better to have said that, since nothing is different from the Absolute, the vision of both the waking world and the dream- world is set up by Ignorance and is illusory. The subject of projections coming to an end with direct vision of the Abso- lute will be dealt with at its proper place below (M. V. 204 ).

(4) Here the reference is to all erroneous cognitions in general. They are thought of as real at the time they are per- ceived. Dream-cognition is only referred to here as a special case illustrating the general point being made. (Bha. III.ii.1)

It is true that in considering dream-cognition one also con- siders erroneous cognitions like that of shell-silver. But it does not seem that Sri Sankara intended all erroneous cogni- tions to be under discussion at this point. People in the world do not insist on the truth of illusory perceptions such as shell-silver. And Vedanta does not undertake any general

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enquiry into the nature of empirical knowledge. However, therc does have to be an investigation into dream here. For if what was seen at the time in dream was real, the Self would not be relationless (as the Upanishads claim, Brhad. IV.iii.15, etc.). So we conclude that what was seen in dream must have been false, as there are no difficulties over this. The case of erroneous perceptions like ihat of shell-silver is different. They do not exclude the occurrence of perception of real objects at the same time. For at the time of an error one may well be aware of empirically real things at the same time, in such a form as 'That is a stone there, this is silver here'. In the case of dream, on the other hand, there is the difference that in reflection on waking it is seen that nothing existed in the dream at all. At the time of the dream itself, however, there is no chance of discovering that it is all an illusion, as in the course of a dream one has the notion that one is auke. And then again the upanishadic texi says 'pro- jects' in regard to dreams, which suggests that they ure real. at the time of their projection. So it appears correct to say that there is occasion to investigate whether dreams are real at the time of their projection or whether they are in fact false and only have ihe power of suggesting that they are real.

In his Bhamati sub-commentary to Brahma Sutra III.ii.3, 'But dream is a mere illusion, because its nature is to be an incom- plete manifestation', Vacaspati writes:

(5) Curds are a transformation of milk. But there can be no such transformation of silver back into shell ... The passage ends: 'And thus the Buddhists say: "The object of a judgment is always a series of point-instants (never the single point- instant, which can be apprehended but not represented)"' (Dharmottara, p.16; trans. Stcherbatsky p.34). (Bha. III.ii.3)

This whole refutation of the doctrine of the alleged 'reality' of the shell-silver and the rest was irrelevant and unnecessary. But when he goes on from there, in the style of Sri Sankara's Commentary, 'This shows that dream-cognition is false ... ', everything he says is acceptable.

There is a passage in Śri Śankara's Commentary here, concerned with refuting the opponent's view, 'The projections of the intermediate state (i.e. dream) have absolute reality', on which the Bhamati does not comment. It runs:

(6) (This being so, when the author of the Sūtras said (B.S. III.ii.1) 'There is a projection (of a world) in dream, as the Veda says so', this has to be understood in a figurative sense.) It is like when we say 'The plough keeps the oxen going'. Here it is not literally true that the plough carries the oxen along with it, but we say it because the plough is the occasion for

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keeping the oxen going. Similarly the Veda teaches figuratively that the sleeper projects chariots and the like, and says 'He is the creator (of the dream)' (Brhad.IV.iii.10), meaning that he was the occasion for them, in the sense of being the one who formerly aid the good and bad deeds which were the cause of deserving the experiences of delight and fear occasioned by the drcam-visions of chariots and the like - not that he literally projected (created) real chariots and so on while he was asleep .... This also explains how we should understand the upanishadic texts (Brhad. IV.iii.9 and Katha II.ii.8) which speak of 'fashioning' (nirmana) in dream. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.4)

Here it is said that in dream the sleeper does not create any- thing. He is said figuratively to be a 'creator' on the basis of our experience of delight and fear and other emotions in dream, due to our deeds performed in earlier lives.

(7) The same reasoning (showing the unreality of dream) ap- plies to the other Vedic text (Katha II.ii.8) quoted above (at B.S. III.ii.2) in favour of a real creation of dream-objects. The statement made at the same place (B.S. III.ii.2) that the 'creator' of the dream was the Self as 'the conscious one' (prajña) was also wrong. For in another text we are taught that this is an activity performed by the individual soul (jiva), which itself kills (the body of waking consciousness, in the sense of depriving it of consciousness) and itself creates (a dream-body and dream-world) with its own light and reveals it with its own vision (Brhad.IV.iii.9). Even the passage (from the Katha Upanishad) quoted here earlier, begin- ning 'He is awake in those who are asleep' (Katha II.ii.8), refers to the individual soul alone as 'the creator of its desires', as it is a passage appealing to ordinary empirical experience. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.4)

This emphasizes that the creation of dream-visions is the work of the individual soul, not that of the Self as the conscicus one (prajña). But this is also only admitted in a figurative sense, for the reasons given above (at M.V.200, 6).

(8) Moreover, in the waking state it is difficult to discern how the Self is of the nature of pure self-luminous light, as it is in direct contact with the senses and their objects, and is inextricably confused with external lights such as the sun. Attention is drawn to dream in order to enable us to discern the light of the Self as pure and self-luminous. In this con- nection, if the text about the creation of chariots were taken literally it could not teach self-luminosity (because it would teach that the external objects of dream, including the dream- sun and its light, were real, so that the light in dream would come from outside). Hence the text speaking of the absence of any chariots, etc., in dream must be taken as fundamental, and

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the texts speaking of the creation of chariots, etc., must be taken as figurative. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.4)

The Veda is primarily concerned, in its teachings about dream, to explain the self-luminosity of the Self, and in this capacity it emphasizes the absence of chariots and so on. It speaks of a 'projection' bu the individual soul where the latter is in fact a mere occasion, in the manner euplained above (M. V. 200,6).

(9) Nor does our theory contradict the awareness we have of the presence of the light of the Self as the 'conscious one' (prajña) even in dream. For, as the Lord of all, it can pre- side in all states. (B.S.Bh.Ili.ii.4)

All that is denied is that the Self as the 'conscious one' (prajna) is an arbitrary projector of dreams. It is not donied that it distributes to the soul the results of its deeds in previous lives in the form of experiences of delight, fear and so on. It is instrumental in ensuring that the individual souls experience the resuits of their deeds performed in pre- vious lives, because it is the overseer presiding over the dis- tribution of the rewards of action.

(10) But the sole purpose of the passage now in question (Brhad. IV.iii.9) is to show that this creation that occurs in dream is not real like the creation of the cosmos beginning with the ether and other elements. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.4)

The Veda does not speak of a dream 'being born from the Self' in the same way that it teaches (for its special purposes) a creation wrought by the Self as the 'conscious one' (prajna) in the text 'The ether was born from the Self' (Taitt. II.1). So one cannot proclaim that dreams are perfectly real on the authority of the Veda.

(11) It is not that the creation of the cosmos itself is real in the absolute sense. For it has been explained in commenting on the Sutra 'It (the world as effect) is non-different from that (the Absolute), as is shown by such texts as (Chand. VI.i.4) "a suggestion of speech"' (B.S. II.i.14) that such texts affirm that the whole. pluralistic world-appearance is a mere illusion. But, before the practical realization of the fact that the Absolute is one's own Self, the world-appearance beginning with the ether and the other great elements, has a lasting coherent structure, whereas the world-appearance in dreams is effaced daily. So it is significant if the author of the Sutras here refers to dream as a 'mere illusion', as in the case of dream the words have a special (intensified) sense. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.4)

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The 'conscious one' (prajña) is not the creator of dreams in the way that He is the creator of the ether and the cosmos. However, both cosmos and dreams are illusory.

Even if one were to admit that the world of waking conscious- ness was real, the chariots and other dream-cbjects would be non-existent relative even to that. But it is taught here that they are mere empty phantoms. When all the phemomena of dream, external and internal alike, are shown to be false, this establishes the self-luminosity of the Self. We have also explained how even the creation of the cosmos beginning with ether is a mere illusion, basing our arguments on the non- difference of the effect from its material cause (M.V.33). The account given in the second Book of the Kārikās of Gaudapāda (G.K. II.4-5) showing that waking and dream are both equally illusory agrees with the present portion of Śri Śankara's Com- mentary. There is not so much as a hint of this in the system of the Bhāmati.

201 DREAMLESS SLEEP IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DISCRIMINATION OF THE THREE STATES

On the subject of dreamless sleep, the Bhamati chiefly follows Maņdana.

(1) Though we do not accept that there is in dreamless sleep. a mental cognition bearing on non-existence as its object,, we do accept that there is a mental modification in the form of the latent impressions (samskara) resulting from previous pro-

1981, p.415) jection (viksepa). (Bha. II.iv.12; cp. B.Sid. p.149-50, Potter,

(2) There is this difference between dreamless sleep and cos- mic dissolution, namely that in dreamless sleep the vital energy alone is left functioning, while in cosmic dissolution even that is at an end. Nevertheless, it should be understood that dreamless sleep and cosmic dissolution are both the same insofar as they each consist in Ignorance in its form as dis- solution, but accompanied by the latent impressions of previous action and projection. (Bhã.I.iii.30)

Here it should not be forgotten that dreamless sleep can only be observed by someone else other than the person alseep, not by the sleeper himself. From the standpoint of the dreamless sleep experience itself, there is no difference between dream- less sleep and cosmic dissolution. One should ponder here what Śrī Sankara says in his Mandukya Commentary: 'It is evident that dreamless sleep and the Unmanifest are identical, as neither contain any distinctions' (Mand. Bh. 3 ad fin.).

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(3) Therefore, because this Self, when it lcses empirical con- sciousness in dreamless sleep, is said by Śri Sankara to have the form of purity, he means that it seems to have the form of

182,3) purity, not that it actually has it. (Bha. I.iv.18, cp. M.V.

(4) The ether in the pot, indeed, is non-different from the universal ether, but it appears to be different insofar as it appears to conform to the shape of the pot. There is no dif- ficulty in distinguishing its apparentiy limited form, as its apparent conditioning adjunct, the pot, is clcarly distinguish- able. In the same way, the individual soul, imagined through a conditioning adjunct consisting in beginningless indetermin- able Ignorance, is not really different from the supreme Seli. But it appears to come into being and undergo suppression with the coming into being and suppression of its apparent condi- tioning adjunct. In dreamless sleep and other states where empirical consciousness lapses, the soul appears to be sup- pressed, and in waking and dream, where empirical consciousness resumes, the soul appears to come into buing once again. This individual conditioning adjunct consists of Ignorance and its impressions. It is beginningless, and flows on continuously as cause and effect. Being itself easily distinguished, the soul which it apparently delimits is easily distinguishable too. (Bha. III.ii.9; cp. Sac, Misconceptions p.57 f.)

Here waking and dreamless sleep are represented as standing in the relation of cause and effect, proceeding respectively from Ignorance as effect, and from its impressions as cause. But cause and effect depend upon a flow of time, and in dreamless sleep there is no time whatever. The Bhamati nowhere explains how causality could operaie in these circumstances.

(5) It is the supreme Self only that is the locus of dreamless sleep, as the soul then glides into thc pericardium through the subtle interior canals (nadi) of the body. Because of the absence of wrong knowledge there is partial realization of the supreme Self. For the soul only has that state for that time. Since there is then no knowledge of reality, Ignorance is not completely uprooted. Hence there is a re-awakening of the soul in the form of waking and dream. (Bha.III.ii.7; cp. Sac, Mis- conceptions p.52)

But no explanation is given here to show how the locus of dreamless sleep could be the Self when the barrier of Ignorance remains.

(6) Thus there is union with the Absolute both in dreamless sleep and swoon. But since the union in swoon is not the same as that in dreamless sleep it is called 'half-union'. (Bhã. III.ii.10; cp. Sac, Misconceptions p.65)

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In fact there are no distinctions of degree or anything else in 'union' in this context. For our experience of it is not characterized by any distinctions whatever. And acceptance of the view that there is 'half-union' with the Absolute in swoon contradicts the words of Śri Sankara's Commentary, which say 'We do not say that in swoon there is half-union of the soul with the Absolute' (B.S.Bh. III. ii. 10). The doctrine that in dreamless sleep there is union with the Absolute, and the same union also in swoon, is part of the provisional teaching, but it is a part of the provisional teaching that Śri Sankara's Commentary aceepts. An unjustified dictinction of grade bet- ween sleep and swoon, however, is introduced by the Bhamati when it maintains that in dreamless sieep the soul has particl realization of the supreme Seif, whereas swoon is half-union.

Herc the following is to be noted. There are places in which the Vedic texts take up the examination of the three statcs in order to show the distinction between the states on the one hand and the self-luminous light of the Self that illumines them on the other, the assumption being that this Jight is not distinguished by those who identify themselves with the body and its organs and so on with feelings of 'I' and 'mine'. In the course of such argumentation, various objections are brought up as provisional views and are answered by appeals to what obtains in other states of the soul, until finally the texts proclaim the supreme Seif in its true nature beyond all particular states. There is an example of this in the eighth Book of the Chandogya Upanishad, called the Dahara Vidyā. First of all objections are raised showing the defects that afflict the Self when it identifies itself with the states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep. 'His body in the waking state is (i.e. may be) blind ... they seem to strike him (eva = iva) in dream)' ... '(in dream) he seems to weep' (Chand VIII.x.10-11) and 'Verily, (in dreamless sleep) he does not know himself' (Chand. VIII.xi.2). And then the nature of the true Self is depicted, separate from its bodies and free from any of the states, in the words 'rising above this body it attains the supreme light and manifests in its true form' (Chand. VIII.xii.3).

The explanation in the Bhamati mistakes the order in which the terms appear. It says, 'The text "He is blind ... " refers to the dream-state, as in that state the external sense-organs are not active; the text "He seems to weep" refers to the waking state, because that state is characterized by pain and suffer- ing' (Bha. IV.iv.1). If you compare this with the way the matter is actually set out in the upanishadic text you would presume it must be the result of a copyist's error.

There are other places where the Upanishads first associate the Self in the three different states each with its particular

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cosmic conditioning adjunct, so that the individuality of the soul is contradicted and it assumes the cosmic forms of Vaisva- nara, Hiranyagarbha and the Unmanifest Self, when considered in the waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep states respectively. Then afterwards they exhibit it in its form as Turiya, un- touched by any of the states, free from all conditioning ad- juncts. As, for instance, in the Mandukya Upanishad the Self is first imagined as having four quarters (cp. M.V.43, S); but this is omly a means whereby it is finally exhibited in its true nature as bereft of the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep in the passage beginning 'Without consciousness directed inwards ... ' and continuing later 'The sages regard this Self as "The Fourth"' (Mand. 7) . There are other passages which exhibit the soul in the state of dreamlese sleep itself as free from Ignorance, desire and action, as pure and present in its owr true form. For example, in the meditation on 'Being' in the Chandogya we hear, 'Then, my dear one, (in dreamless sleep) he is merged in pure Being, he has become one with his own Self. That is why they say of him, "He sleeps", meaning that he has become one with his true Self (svam apito)' (Chand.VI.viii.1, cp. M.V.40,5). Or agais, we hear in the Brhadāranyaka (of the state of dreamless sleep) 'This, verily, is his form in which he is free from craving, free from evils, free from fear .... Embraced by the Self as Consciousness, he has no knowledge of anything, within or with- out' (Brhad. IV.iii.21). In this conmection, if the author of the Bhamati holds that 'the Power of Ignorance' (avidya-sakti), otherwise known as 'Ignorance in Dissolution' (laya-lakşaņāvidyā), is canceiled when (Ignorance in the form of) wrong knowledge is cancelled, then there is no contradiction on this point between the systems of Śri Sankara and the Bhamati. For both maintain that belief in the existence of 'the Power of Ignorance' is only based on an inference depending on the experience of wrong knowledge. We have already heard the author of the Bhämati say the following:

(7) The possibility of liberated souls undergoing rebirth is ruled out by the fact that the power of introducing differen- tiation on the cosmic plane, which arises ultimately from (Ignorance in the form of) erroneous knowledge (and its impres- sions), operates regularly and appropriately in each individual case. The idea is that there is a regular law that where there is no cause there is no effect; and that (in the case of the liberated souls) erroneous knowledge with its latent powers will have been destroyed root and branch by metaphysical knowl- edge. (Bha. II.i.9, = M.V.195,9)

Both Śri Śankara and Vācaspati hold equally that the examina- tion of the three states is not intended to affirm the exist- ence of the three states. For instance, Śri Sankara's Commen-

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tary says: 'For the purpose of the texts in expounding the three states of waking, dream and dreamless sleep is not to declare that the Self is subject to these states or to trans- migratory experience in any form, but to show, on the contrary, that it is entirely bereft of these three states and that it is not subject to transmigratory experience in any form' (B.S. Bh. I.iii.42, M.V.44,5). On this the Bhamati commente as fol- lcws:

(8) The intention here is not to teach that the Self has the three states. On the contrary, the intention is to teach that the supreme Self is different from these states and devoid of them, because they come and go while it remains stable. This is clear from the context in the subsequent passage. (Bha. I.iii.42)

Suresvara's Vartiku brings this point out even mcre clearly. Through dreamless sleep the falsity of dream and waking are revealed, since the three states not only exclude one another but also contradict one another (M.V. 122),

202 LIBERATION IS ETERNAL AS IT IS ONE'S STATE WHEN ONE HAS REALIZED ONE'S OWN TRUE NATURE

Śri Śankara's Commentary says 'The bodiless state called liberation is constant and eternal' (B.S.Bh.I.1.4). On this the Bhamati makes the following comments.

(1) For whatever is natural is constant and cternal, like Con- sciousness. And this (the 'bodiless state' called liberation) is natural, so it is constant and eternal. (Bha.I.i.4, p.116-7/ 173)

(2) A goal that is achieved will necessarily vary to some extent with the means adopted to achieve it. But liberation is constant and eternal, since it is establishment in the Absolute in its true nature. Hence, being eternal, it cannot be a goal subject to achievement. (Bha.III.iv.52)

(3) It is true that liberation transcends worldly perception. But it is known from the Vedic teaching to be establishment in the Self in its true nature through the abolition of Ignorance along with its impressions. (Bha. IV.i.1)

(4) The Buddhists say that the Self is the momentary cognition. And since they regard liberation as the engendering of a pure cognition (free from subject-object duality), they regard it as something that has to be achieved. Others have the view that liberation is the assumption by the Self of a state of

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transcendence, after throwing off the state of transmigration. For them, liberation is the result of a modification .... Lib- eration cannot be eternal on either of these views; for it will be an effect, like curds or a pot (and so have a beginning and an end in time) .... Ignorance does not rest in the Absolute, but in the individual soul. As we have alroady said, it is of indeterminable reality-grade. The Absolute is therefore eter- nally pure. lowever, conceding for argument's sake the suppo- sition that the Absolute might be impure, Sri Sankara refutes the teaching that it, could (even then) be purified by action. (Bhā. I.i.4, p.126/190-4)

203 ! IBERATION IN LIFE

Vācaspati admits liberation in life (jīvan-mukti) just as Mandana Misra does (B.Sid. p.132, M.V.101, 1, ad fin.). He accordingiy disregards Bhaskara's refutation of the concept of liberation in life (M.V.177,4-5). Following Śri Śahkara's Commentary, he establishes that the 'attainment of the Absolute' achieved through the Path of the Flame (M.V.127,2, note) is that of the knower of the Absolute in its lower form, not that of the person cf perfect enlightenment.

(1) The truth is expressed in a verse which runs: 'Any path, such as the Path of the Flame, which takes the one proceeding upon it to somewhere he has not been before, must take one to the Absolute in some aspect of its lower form as an effect. The Absolute in its supreme form is already present, as it is the very Self of the universe'. Some say that the enlightened person, as a person of 'steady wisdom' (Gita II.54-5), is admitted to conform to the condi- tions of the transmigratory world before the fall of the body, even though only in appearance. Similarly, he would surely conform to the characteristics of the subtle body until its final destruction. Going on a path and reaching something hitherto not attained (read aprapta-prapter) would then become explicable. And there would be the authority of the Veda to say that on reaching his goal (at the end of the Path of the Flame) he would lose his subtle body and become liberated. But this idea is wrong. For the Veda expressly denies that the one who has the highest knowledge 'goes forth' on any path on the death of the physical body (cp. Brhad. IV.iv.6). (Bha. IV.iii.7)

(2) For how could there be a distinction between a person going, and a place to which he had to go, in the case of an enlightened person who had totally uprooted Ignorance through direct knowledge that the soul in its true nature is the Abso- lute, knowledge based on the unshakable conviction 'All this world is the Absolute' and 'The Absolute am I'? And in the

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absence of that distinction, how could he travel on a path like the Path of the Flame ?... Nor is it correct to suppose that a metaphysically ignorant person is taught meditation on the Path of the Flame to the end that he might attain the Absolute in its supreme form, nor, again, that he should engage on it with the same spirit and for the same reasons that the faithful perform their obligatory and other ritual. For the following dilemma will be found insoluble. If meditation on the Path of the Flame is a means to realization of the Absolute in its supreme form, is it dependent on knowledge of the Absolute in its supreme form, or is it independent of that? It cannot be independent. For the Upanishads cpenly deny that there is any other means to liber- ation apart from knowledge of the Absolute in its supreme form. 'Only when one has known Him can one pass beyond death; there is no other path for the journey' (Svet.VI.15). So we must suppose that it is only as a mere auxiliary to metaphysical knowledge that meditation on the Path of the Flame is a means to attainment of the Absolute. But in that case, in what way is it helpful? Is it helpful in fulfilling the purposes of knowledge, or is it helpful in producing knowl- edge? It could not be helpful in fulfilling the purposes of knowledge of the Absolute .. For once knowledge of the Absolute had arisen, meditation on the Path of the Flame could never co-exist with it; for such knowledge bears on non-duality, and could not co-exist with the duality implied by the meditation, the two being in mutual contradiction. Nor can. meditation on the Path of the Flame be a factor in the production of knowl- edge, as ritual sacrifice and the like are, through preliminary purification of the mind. For the Veda teaches that this meditation has another direct purpose of its own. It leads to attainment of the Absolute (in its lower form as 'The World of Brahma' ), as we know from the text 'He leads them to the Abso- lute' (Chand. IV.xv.5). It is ritual sacrifice and the like (and not the meditations practised on the Path of the Flame) that is an auxiliary helping towards the rise of metaphysical knowledge, as the Vedic texts connect such acts with the rise of the desire for metaphysical knowledge (Brhad.IV.iv.23, cp. M.V.53,7). Therefore, if there is to be agreement with the many Vedic texts that could be advanced, and agreement with reason, the term 'the Absolute' cannot have its primary meaning here. It must be interpreted figuratively to mean the Absolute in its lower form (as the World of Brahma), for that is near the Absoļute. (Bhã. IV.iii.7)

Here it is denied that one can attain the Absolute in its supreme form, ihe means to (direct) liberation, on the Path of the Flame (Chand. V. x.1).

(3) Immediate apprehension of the Absolute as pure.non-duality

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contradicts the whole world-appearance of plurality displayed by beginningless Ignorance. And by contradicting that world- appearance, it contradicts all action within it. Further, it puts an end instantly to all merit and demerit arising from deeds in previous lives that have not begun to fructify in the life in which immediate apprehension of the Absolute is obtained, but not to the stream of successive experiences of pleasure and pain arising from the merit and demerit from pre- viouc lives that has begun to fructify in that life, and which determines its length, and the caste of the bouy in which it Lakes place. For that stream of action and experience goes forward as an entirely excellent way of life, totally differ- ent from the lives of those who are still metaphysically asleep. Otherwise we could not explain the continued luminous cxistence after liberation of divine sages like Hiraņyagarbha, Manu, Uddalaka and others, whose pure minds shed light, on all around them, since they were divested of the whole veil of the web of the passions. And the Vedas, the Smrtis, the Epics and the Puranas cpeak of them as both knowing the metaphysical truth and also surviving through world-periods such as a Day of Brahma, a Year of Brahma and even cycles of such Years of Brahma (manvantara). Nor is it in any way credible that people of such great intellect should not have known the Absolute, and should have been mere humans, ignorant of the metaphysical truth, and without holiness or intelligence. Hence, if we are to follow tradition, we must assert that, even when the meta- physical reality has been known in immediate apprehension, one still has to wait and experience all the results of the acts from previous lives which have begun to fructify in the life in which illumination is attained. Otherwise they will not be exhausted. (Bha. IV.i.15)

(4) The text 'He has to wait only so long ... ' (Chand. VI.xiv.2) does not affirm that he has to wait a long time, but, accepting from other texts that there is a certain time to wait, affirms that this wait is limited till the death of the body. (Bha. IV.i.15)

This was also a view adopted by Mandana. He says that 'waiting only so long' means that liberation comes soon (B.Sid. p. 130, M.V.101, 2). But Vacaspati does not appear to pay attention here to the doctrine of immediate release (sadyo-mukti) also mentioned by Mandana (B.Sid. p.131, M.V. 101,2).

(5) We see in worldly experience that two contradictory things can sometimes co-exist for a certain time; hence we have no ground for contradicting revealed teaching when it says that in some contexts they do so for a long time. There can be no argument about what is firmly established by an authoritative means of proof. (Bha. IV.i.15)

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Here no explanation is given as to what the contradiction actuaily is, And that is indeed what one would expect. For there is no contradiction between knowledge of the Self, in which there is no individual capable of action, und merely conforming to the manifestations of erroneous knowledge without being deceived into the belief that they are true. The con- tradiction lies between knowledge of the Self and erronesous knowledge (where the person in error believes his knowledge to be true). But erronevus knowiedge in this sense is cancelled simultaneously with the rise of knowledge of the Self. So where is the contradiction?

(6) And the man of steady wisdom is not a mere aspirant. For in the case of an aspirant, his earlier ideas do not stay with him steadily. He progresses with each successive improved meditation. But the man of steady wisdom has reached the sum- mit. He is no longer aspiring, but has attained pcrfection. (Bhã. IV.i.15)

This is said to clarify Śri Sankaru's teaching at B.S.Bh. IV. i .15 to the effect that liberation in life certainly occurs and takes the form of the 'steady wisdom' mentioned in the Veda and Smrti. Mandana had a different view. He said: 'The man of steady wisdom is not one who has attained perfection and divested himself of all Ignorance. He is only a student, one who is still undergoing discipline and has reached a certain (advanced) stage' (B.Sid. p. 130, M.V. 101, 2). Vacaspati's present text has the additional aim of contradicting that. However, Vacaspati's view that the aspirant progresses through a series of more and more advanced meditations, while the person of steady wisdom has reached the summit of excel- lence, does not agree with Sri Sankara's Commentary. The revered Commentator does not admit that an aspirant rises to steady wisdom through any upward change in the type of disci- pline he practises. He rises to steady wisdom through discri- mination of the true nature of the Self associated with 'nididhyasana' (which should not be flatly identified with sustained meditation, see references given above at the T.N. to M.V.53, intro.). For we find him saying in his Gita Commen- tary, 'Steady means "soundly established". It refers to the wisdom that arises through discrimination of the Self from the not-self. He who has it is "a person of steady wisdom, an. enlightened person"' (Bh.G.Bh. II. 55).

(7) Nor are fear and trembling and the like results of knowl- edge; they do not arise from mere knowledge alone. It is knowl- edge falsely determined as a snake and the like that causes fear and trembling. And since such knowledge is not real or true but of indeterminable reality-grade, it cannot produce any real result. Its results, such as fear and trembling, are not themselves real. Such results, too, dissolve upon critical

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enquiry and are inexplicable in character. Aud there is noth- ing impossible in an inexplicable result coming from an inex- plicable cause. 'One must offer the food appropriate for the sprite for whom it is intended' (similarly, cause and effect must agree in nature). (Bha. IV.i.15)

'Awakening, throngh cancellation of wrong knowledge, to the fact that oue is not an individual able to perform action, puts an end to action. But wrong kuowledge, though cancelled, may continue for a time through the force of impressions, as in the case of double-vision of the moon. The enlightened person, however, does not have any doubt about whether he does or does not have a body' (B.S.Bh. IV.i.15, cp. M.V.59,15). From a con- sideration of this and similar passages of Śri Sankara's Commen- tary, we would derive the impression that, since the sense of being an individual capable of acting and experiencing was due to wrong knowledge, all actions and their results would be com- pletely cancelled for the enlightened person. The true view was expressed at B.S.Bh. IV.i.13 (M.V.58,7): 'For the conviction of one who knows the Absolute is, "I am the Absolute, by nature incapable of individual action or experience eternally through past, present and future time, quite contradictory to the notion which prevailed before, namely that I was an individual, capable of action and experience"'. But there is a Sutra (B.S. IV.i.15) which was composed from the ordinary common sense standpoint, from which one might sup- pose that an aspirant, a person possessing a body and pursuing discipline in it, should attain liberation after acquiring knowledge through pursuit of that discipline. It runs, 'Only those actions (are destroyed by metaphysical knowledge) whose effects have not begun to fructify' .... And it was in comment- ing on this that Śri Sankara said, 'For if anyone, even though he be only one person, nevertheless has the conviction in his own heart that he has immediate knowledge of the Absolute and is also possessed of a physical body at the same time, how can anyone else shake him from this conviction?' (M.V.101,4). If you say that the truth must be understood in this way, or else we shall have to say that transcending the body occurs only at the death of the body, not during life - we reply 'No'. For it is made clear in Śri Sankara's Commentary that from the highest standpoint the notion that one is embodied is due to metaphysical Ignorance (B.S.Bh.I.i.4, M.V.265,3). And as the arguments for and against have already been given (M.V. 25,1;28, 10;47,2;59, 10; 61, 7; 67,4, etc.) there is no occasion to rehearse them now. In the system of the Bhamati, however, the answer to objec- tions is given on the basis that the liberating knowledge, the fear and the trembling and so on, are all inexplicable (i.e. of indeterminable reality-grade). It will be clear to anyone who studies the parallel passage in the Brahma Siddhi (B.Sid. p.131) that this derives from Vacaspati's weakness for

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following the methods of Mandana.

204 THE MEANS TO LIBERATION

The Ehamati describes the steps leading up to liberation as follows:

(1) From the pcrformance of the daily obligatory ritual there arises merit. As a consequence, demerit is brought to an end. It is this demerit which stains the purity of the luminous quality in the intellect through the wrong idea that transmi- gratory life, which is impermanent, impurc and of the nature uf pain, is eternal, pure and of the nature of joy. With the ces- sation of demerit, the doors of perception and reason are opened, and through them one discovers without hindrance that transmigratory life is impermanent, impure and painful. From this arises dispassion or indifference to worldly life, and from this the desire to get rid of it; consequently one seeks the means to achieve this. When such a seeker hears that the means is metaphysical knowledge, he strives to acquire that. Finally, through the systematic execution of the discipline of hearing the texts, pondering over them and subjecting them to sustained meditation he acquires metaphysical knowledge. It is therefore correct to say that performance of ritual is a remote auxiliary aiding the rise of metaphysical knowledge

p.62-3/85) through purifying the luminous element in the mind. (Bha. I.i.1,

(2) It is the one deeply desirous of knowledge and equipped with self-discipline who can undertake hearing of and pondering over the texts with a one-pointed mind. For such an one, indu- bitable conviction arises from the text 'That thou art'. One who has this conviction (read nirvicikitsam) is no longer in a position to undertake ritual. For him, rituals are of no use for immediate apprehension of the Self, either by way of pro- moting meditation or of promoting the quick fruition of the results of meditation. When once there is a certain (extra- ordinary) idea (vrtti) of the mind (in the form of direct apprehension of the Absolute) this brings liberation, and one should understand that the possibility of rituals being per- formed in these circumstances has been totally refuted. Bhaskara's statement (Bh.B.S.Bh.III.iv.26, M.V.173,5) that the duties and rituals of one's caste and stage of life have to be continued until death, just like inner and outer control, was therefore an ill-considered one. (Bha. III.iv.26)

Here the doctrine of a combination of metaphysical knowledge with action is refuted. The view of the Brahma Siddhi is ignored. There it was maintained (B.Sid. p. 35, M.V. 100; 107, 1, note) that even after metaphysical knowledge had arisen from

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the upanishadic text, a shadow of erroneous knowledge would continue through the force of powerful impressions earlier built up, and that there was still need for the practice of affirmation of the metaphysical. truth and the performance of ritualistic sacrifices and other such auties in order to bring all erroneous knowledge to an end. As for Bhaskaracarya's doctrine, that is openly denounced.

(3) Perhaps you will claim that there is need of ritual to support meditation if immediate awareness of the Absolute is to be gonerated in the vrtti (modification) of the mind. But this would be wrong. For meditation on the Self is incompatible with ritual, so that the latter cannot stand as an auriliary to it. (Bha. I.i.1, p.58/79)

(4) One could make the following objection. It is seen that empirical experience bascd on erroneous cognition is found to continue even after the metaphysical truth has been known .... And so, since an impression of Ignorance continues in force, it is logicai that there shoul be performance of rituals and caste duties, and that it should be these, with metaphysical knowledge as an auxiliary, that root out the impression of Igno- rance. It would not be right to ask how action can destroy Ignorance when it is itself of the nature of Ignorance, or to ask how, if action did destroy Ignorance, action, the destroyer, could itself be destroyed - for there are many examples of things destroying themselves and other things together (as a poison may neutralize another poison while itself becoming neutralized in the act) ... To this objection we reply as follows. What you say is true up to a point. There may be undubitable awareness of the reality as the inmost Self, and as different from the physical body and other phenomena engendered by Ignorance, such aware- ness arising from the discipline of repeated enquiry into the meaning of the Absolute from the upanishadic passage which begins 'All this was Being only in the beginning, my dear one' and ends 'That thou art' (Chand. VI.ii.1 - VI.viii.7). And yet the impressions of Ignorance may continue, and the practical experiences that go with them. Even so, the enlightened person takes such ideas and experiences as illusory. He does not believe in their reality. He is like the man with a disordered liver, who does not believe that sugar is really bitter, even though its taste to him personally is such that he has to spit it out onto the ground. One who has ascertained the unreality of the whole complex of the act, its performer, his. instruments, the procedure and the results is not a fit candidate to perform an act. Only one who knows all these things (and takes them to be real) can perform an act .... Indeed, the enlightened man is not wholly free from the con- viction that he is a human being; the conviction continues up to a point, while the impressions of Ignorance last .... And so

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even the one who knows the truth about the Absolute may still, if he continues to have the conviction that he is an indivi- duai, incur demerit if he commits unlawful acts - just like the one still in transmigratory life. We do not accept any double standard in regard to the laws of action. Thus (in the case of one who has known the Absolute, only prohibitions, not commands, apply and) there is no dependence on activity for getting results through meditation or even for taking up meditation at all. For, as we havc explained, aftcr the rise of indubitable metaphysical knowledge, the enlightened person is no longer a fit candidate for action. And we have the upanishadic text: 'Just a few obtain immortality, and not through ritual or progeny or wealth, but through renunciation' (Kaivalya 2). Are rituals then entirely useless in this context? For, if so, that would contradict such texts as 'They seek to know through sacrifice ... ' (Brhad. IV.iv.22). No, for actions like ritual sacrifices are remote auxiliaries to knowledge (since their performance purifies the mind). (Bha. I.i.l, p.58-61/80-3)

Here Mandana and Vacaspati are alike in point of making knowl- edge derive from verbal revelation dependent on repeated affir- mation; but they clearly do not agree on the topic of combining knowledge with meditation and ritual (cp. M. V. 100, 1;107, 1, note). And Vacaspati's view that there is no possibility of action after the rise of metaphysical knowledge (abandons Mandana and) follows Śri Sańkara.

(5) It is not every kind of knowledge of the Absolute that puts an end to the attributes of the transmigratory life; it is only that form of knowledge that culminates in immediate intu- ition that does so. And immediate intuition of the Absolute is a particular state assumed by the mind. It arises in the mind when the latter is associated with certain impressions derived from hearing, pondering and sustained meditation. It is com- parable to the power to apprehend the exact pitch of the notes of a scale that appears in the mind schooled in the art of music and trained through practice. We have already explained how this (extraordinary) mental idea conveying immediate intuition of the Absolute destroys the vision of the whole magic show of the universe, together with (Ignorance) its cause, and thereby destroys itself as well, as it is itself an indistinguishable part of the phenomenal universe. And here this immediate intuition of the Absolute is spoken of as brought about by the means of knowledge called 'the Veda', because it is based on the authoritative revelation of the Vedic texts. (Bhā. I.i.4, p.150/231-2)

Śri Śankara wrote here in his Commentary, 'No one can demon- strate that the one who has known that his true Self is the Absolute is subject to transmigratory life as before. For that

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would be in contradiction with his conviction that his true Self was the Absolute, derived from that authoritative means of knowledge called "the Veda"' (B.S.Bh. I.i.4, M. V. 229, 17). His purpose was to silence the doubt raised by the opponent about whether any purposes could be served by statements of fact in the way that they could by commands and prohibitions. It is clear that the extract from the Bhamati just quoted (M.V. 204, 5), mhich was supposed to be an explanation of this pussage in Sri Sankara's Commentary, does not in fact follow it. There is nothing in Sri Sarkara's Commentary, for instance, to cay that the conviction that one's true Self is the Absolute is the result of direct intuition brought about by repeated affirmation of knowledge based on the authority of those texts. Here Vacaspati is following the doctrine of the Brahma Siddhi (sākşātkāra, B. Sid. p.67; cp. also M.V. 98,4).

(6) Well, be all that as it may. But Ignorance, being shot through with thick and deeply-rooted impressions, will arise again through the power of its own impressions, even after having been contradicted and cancelled by knowledge. And it will engage in its own characteristic activities, such as the formation of more impressions. 'This being so', continues Śri Sankara, meaning that the truth had been established as being so, 'that onto which a superimposition is made is not connected even in the slightest with the qualities or defects of the superimposed appearance' (cp. M.V.140,5, note) .... The point being made is the follow- ing. It is of the very nature of the act of repeatedly re- affirming the truth that it should remove false notions, even when the latter are beginningless and shct through with thick and deeply-rooted impressions. The mind has a natural bias towards the truth. (Bha.I.i.1, p.40/45-6)

All that Śri Sankara's Commentary in fact says here is that Ignorance is the superimposition of a false appearance due to lack of discrimination, whereas knowledge is determination of the true nature of the real through discrimination. It is clear that it does not say that, when the truth has been ascer- tained through a discriminating cognition, the latter will have to be repeatedly re-affirmed. There is not a shadow of doubt, however, that the author of the Bhamati, through his. prejudice in favour of Mandana, takes Mandana's doctrines of the persistence of an impression of Ignorance (B.Sid. p. 35, M.V.100,1) and the need for repeated re-affirmation of knowl- edge and passes them off as explanations of Śri Sankara's Commentary. It is declared repeatedly in the Bhamati that (even in the case of the enlightened person) the impression (samskāra) of Ignorance, understood as synonymous with vāsanā, had to be suppressed by direct intuition obtained through repeated re-affirmation of knowledge of the truth (Bhamati, Eng. trans. p.61, 108, 127 and also p.80-1 = M.V.204,4). This

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doctrine is expressly refuted by Śri Sankara in his Commentary on Brnadāranyaka Upanishad I. iv.7 (trans. Madhavananda, p. 131 ff .; cp. M.V.67, 1).

(7) Hence it is correct io supnose that the mind matured by meditation on the meaning of the great indubitable text ('That thou art') will reveal, by the successive removal of all exter- nal adjuncts, the identity of the immediately evident principle of Consciousness denoted by the word 'thou' with the transcen- dent Absolute denoted by the word 'that'. This expcrience is not itself the Absolute, or it could not be anything that came into being at a particular point in timc. It is an (extra- ordinary) idea generated in the mind, an idea having the Abso- lute for its content. This does not imply that the Absolute requires to be illumined by anything else. It is agreed that the Absolute is in one sense illumined by revelation; but it does not follow from this that it is not self-illumined. It is the Self void of all conditioning adjuncts that is said to be self-luminious, not the Self as associated with adjuncts. As the revered Commentator said, 'This (Self) is not altogether a non-object' (B.S.Bh.I.i.1, intro.). Now, one cannot claim that when the mind assumes the form of immediate intuition of the Self there is transcendence of all adjuncts; for the intuition is itself an adjunct, about to be destroyed; it is opposed both to itself (which it will destroy) and to other adjuncts. If it were not itself an ad- junct of the Self, it could not receive a reflection of the Consciousness of the latter. And since any form assumed by the mind is non-conscious in itself, it could not, without receiv- ing a reflection of the Consciousness of the Self, be self- luminous, and so could not be an immediate intuition. Nor can we deny that immediate intuition is genuine knowl- edge by making the claim that it is a mere phantasm, like the image of fire we might have when its existence was merely being inferred. For there the fire was by definition remote and inapprehensible; but in the present case there is immediate knowledge from the outset, as the individual soul is itself the Absolute, blurred by adjuncts. The attributes of purity and enlightenment and so on are all present within that same Abso- lute. It is the individual soul itself, when successively divested of all its attributes, that is said to be the Abso- lute, pure and conscious and so forth by nature. Nor is the absence of the various adjuncts anything separate from the Absolute standing over against it. Just as one whose sensibil- ities have been heightened by study and repeated training in the art of music can catch the notes of the scales of the various musical modes, even so the soul which has heightened its sensibilities by repeated re-affirmation of the metaphysi- cal knowledge conveyed by the Upanishads is able to experience its own nature as the Absolute, through the instrument of the disciplined mind. (Bhā.I.i.1, p.47-8/78-9)

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Here we find the doctrine of immediate intuition as approved by Mandana (M.V.98,4) complete with all its appendages. It might therefore be a good thing to examine whether these teach- ings do or do not agree with the commentaries of Śri Sankara. Consider first the foilowing statement of Vacaspati: THERE IS A CERTAIN (EXTRAORDINARY) IDEA FORMED IN THE MIND CALLED ' IMMEDIATE INTUITION' WHICH BEARS ON THE ABSOLUTE AS ITS OBTECT. Our own view is that no such assertion is ever made anywhere in the commentaries of Śri Śankara. In Śrī Gaudapāda's Kārikās on the Mandūkya Upanishad (III.41,48, etc.) a spiritual disci- pline called 'restraint of the mind' is taught (M.V.56;57,5) Śri Śankara's Commentary does in that connection declare that the mind may assume the form of the Absolute. But he does not speak of an immediate intuition of which the Absolute is the object. And even what he does say is for the benefit of students of weak or middling calibre, who are mot continuously awake to the reality of the Self.

(8) Those who take the mind, sense-organs and so on as imagined like a rope-snake and as having no existence at all except in their true nature as the Absolute - they have become the Absolute. They feel no fear and have natural certi- tude that they are enjoying the indestructible peace called liberation, which depends on nothing external. (G.K.Bh.III.40)

At that point, it is clear that Śri Sankara was teaching that attainment of the final human goal did not necessarily depend on the discipline of restraint of the mind (mano-nigraha). Consider in the second place Vacaspati's teaching: REPEATED RE-AFFIRMATION OF METAPHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE IS REQUIRED ON THE PART OF THE SOUL IN ORDER TO EXPERIENCE ITS NATURE AS THE ABSOLUTE - LIKE ONE TRAINING HIMSELF TO RECOGNIZE THE NOTES OF THE SCALES IN MUSIC - IN ORDER TO DESTROY THE IMPRESSION OF IGNORANCE AND TO REALIZE HIS NATURE AS THE ABSOLUTE, ALTHOUGH (IN ONE SENSE) IT WAS ALREADY IMMEDIATELY EVIDENT. It is clear that this description of the discipline does not follow the Vedanta technique of false attribution followed by later retraction. For Śri Śankara, who does follow that tech- nique, teaches in the introductory section to his Brahma Sūtra Commentary that after 'discriminating' what has been superim- posed, and knowing it to have been superimposed, nothing fur- ther remains to be done. Nor do people in the world think that anything more has to be done, in order to know the true nature of anything onto which a superimposition has been made, apart from discriminating what has been superimposed and knowing it to be such. As for the immediaie intuition of the notes of scales, that was not a proper parallel example, as this intui- tion belongs in the realm of objects. It is right to say that that requires practice to give the mind the necessary training, as that intuition arises from the activity of the cognitive organs. But it is not reasonable to say that the Self as

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Consciousness and immediate experience, which is already immediately evident, depends on anything else to reveal itself. Śrī Śankara says:

(9) When we receive a cut or a burn on the body, we find that we have the immediate but false notion 'I am receiving a cut' or 'I am receiving a burn'. And we find that when people's sons or friends are suffering they sometimes feel that, they themselves are suffering, even though their sons and friends are completely external to themselves. And the case of feeling oneself to be the sufferer and so on can perfectly well be the same. For 'being the sufferer' and similar notions are per- ceived as objective ideas falling outside consciousness, just like the body. In dreamless sleep, swoon and similar states they are not perccived at all. But the upanishadic texts declare that consciousness is present even in dreamless sleep in the words, 'Verily, when there (in the state of dreamless sleep) he does not see, he is, verily, seeing, though he does not, see (for there is no break in the seeing of the ceer' (Brhau.IV.iii.23). Therefore immediate experience of the Self has the form 'I am of the nature of the one Consciousness, free from all pain'. (B.S.Bh.IV.i,2)

This demonstrates that no mental idea is required for immediate apprehension of Consciousness. For a mental idea, being an object for Consciousness, is itself apprehended as external, and in dreamless sleep, swoon and other such states there are no mental ideas at all. Śrī Śankara states clearly in his Gītā Commentary that knowledge of the Self is the halting of the process of making false superimpositions upon it and nothing else.

(10) Therefore, all that is required is the negation of what has been falsely superimposed onto the Absolute through Igno- rance. No effort is required actually to know the Absolute, as it is perfectly familiar already. (Bh.G.Bh.XVIII.50)

(11) But in that case the correct course would be that knowl- edge of the Absolute should be conveyed by the negation of the illusory universe of plurality that had been superimposed on it through Ignorance. (This, however, could not occur through injunctions, but only) through (purely metaphysical) texts like 'One only, without a second' (Chand.VI.ii.1) and 'That is the real, that is the Self, that thou art' (Chand.VI.viii.7). When knowledge of the Absolute has been thus conveyed, enlight- enment will arise automatically, and metaphysical Ignorance will stand abolished. Then this whole universe of name and form superimposed through Ignorance will be dissolved like a dream. (B.S.Bh.III.ii.21, cp. M.V.70,2)

Consequently it appears correct to say that the Bhamati follows

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a different tradition (in regard to the present teachings), not the classical tradition of false attribution followed by later retraction.

205 HEARING, PONDERING AND SUSTAINED MEDITATION

The Bhamati also follows the school of Mandana in regarding hearing, pondering and sustained meuitation, and other aspects of the discipline for metaphysical knowledge, as being based on texts having the grammatical form of injunctions, and as holping towards immediate intuition. And yet the Bhamati fol- lows Śri Sarkara's Commentary when describing how they lead to a special kind of activity.

(1) The student is prompted to hearing and the other parts of the discipline by the Vedic texts themselves, though his motives for doing so are already established from another source; and the texts that appear (from their grammatical form) to be enjoining these activities upon him are in fact only conforming to the desires that he has already conceived. Put if they only conform to desires already conceived, this does not mean that they are useless; for they prompt him to a special kind of activity (about which he would not otherwise know) .... The texts having the appearance of injunctions to carry out hearing of the metaphysical texts and so on have the function of blocking the stream of mental desires flowing towards objects and opening up the stream of mental desires bearing on the attainment of the inmost Self. (Bha.I.i.4, p.130/204)

One should compare this with Brahma Siddhi p. 155 (quoted in part at M.V.123 and 148,8, note).

(2) Hearing means hearing of the truth through the traditional texts and the words of the Teacher. Pondering implies the use of reasoning that does not conflict with the traditional texts. And the result of such pondering, allied to conversations between Teacher and pupil and fellow-students (brahmacarin) who do not chafe at the discipline, is that the pupil feels deeper faith in the texts. With the coming of deeper faith, he acquires a deeper insight into the defects of worldly objects other than those connected with the spiritual life. And with the coming of this deeper insight he turns away from worldly objects and practises repeated re-affirmation of the metaphysical truth contained in the supreme upanishadic texts. After this there arises immediate concrete experience of meta- physical reality. Even those outside the tradition (the Yogacara Buddhists) have said the same thing in the words 'The knowledge of the yogi arises from intense meditation on the

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truthi. (Bhã, I.iii.8)

In this connection, it is to be noted that the Brahma Siddhi says that the phrase 'sustained meditation' (nididhyasana) means 'repeated affirmation of the metaphysical truih' (B. Sid. p. 35, M.V.100,1). Immediate concrete experience is spoken of as the reward of repeated re-affirmation of revealed truth (cp. B.Sid. p. 154, M. V. 98,4), and when Vacaspati quotes a text from the Yogacaras to show that the 'sustained meditation' of Advaila agrees with the 'Bhavana' part of their discipline it is clear that he is foilowing the Brahma Sidahi throughout. Note that in the latest edition of the Bhamati we find the reading 'repeated meditation (dhyana) on the metaphysical truth'.

(3) Hearing takes place through the traditional texts and the words of the Teacher. Pondering is the further enquiry into what has been heard with the help of logical reasoning that is not in conflict with it. And concrete knowledge (vijñana) or immediate intuition (sāksātkāra) arises through the maturation of repeated practice of reverent and continuous and prolonged meditation on the content of previous hearing and pondering. It is called 'concrete knowledge' (vi-jñana) because it is superior (vi-sişta) to the earlier forms of knowledge. (Bha. I.iii.14)

The force of the word 'vijñana' here is to teach repeated medi- tation (dhyana) according to the system laid down in the Yoga school. There is no mention of the simple immediate vision of truth that comes through the one-pointedness of the mind that is taught in Sri Sankara's Commentary (dealing with dhyana) on the sixth Chapter of the Gita (Bh. G.Bh. VI. 8). Nor is there any mention of Sri Sankara's point made in the sequel to the section on the 'Meditation on the Cave', the topic now under discussion in Bhamati I.iii.14. Śri Sankara there says, 'The regular result is the cessation of wrong knowledge, a reward that comes in this very life'. The text on the cave refers to meditation, but the section which follows it is concerned with metaphysical knowledge. Hearing and the rest are clearly prescribed in due order for the text on the cave; but there is nc place for pon- dering (i.e. logical reflection) when one is practising bhāvanā or repeated meditation on prescribed themes (practised not for metaphysical knowledge but for spiritual merit). Here the words of Suresvara are relevant: 'It is clear from the command "It must be pondered over" that what is being taught here is reality in its true nature. In the case of mere symbolic medi- tations prescribed for merit, such as "Woman is fire" (Brhad. VI.ii.13), we do not find any injunction to ponder over the meaning' (B.B.V. II.iv.215, M.V. 124,4).

(4) By this Śri Sankara says that first of all discriminating knowledge arises from hearing, pondering and repeated

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meditation. The result of this discriminating knowledge is immediate intuition of one's Self as the sole existent, in which one emerges in one's true nature, This immediate intui- tion has the form of a mental idea, which dissolves the uni- verse, and dissolves itself with it, as it is part of the uni- verse, like the kataka nut (which, placed in fluid, dissolves the impurities in the fluid and dissolves itself along with them). That is how one's own true Self is realized as Light - independent of any other principle, without any external accretions, free from the entire network of the world. That is what is meant by the upanishadic text 'Having reached the supreme Light ... ' (Chand. VIII.jii.4). (Bhā. I.iîi.19)

Śri Sankura's Commentary maises the question, 'What does rising up from the body imply? What does it mean to emerge in one's true nature?' and answers by way of the example of a piece of transparent crystal. 'Before the introduction of a discrimini- nating cognition, the true nature of the crystal, which is really light and transparent, does not seem to be different from such external adjuncts as the red or blue olour of the objects near which it is placed. But after the rise of a dis- criminating cognition, the crystal becomes distinct, and is said to have "attained" its true nature as light and trans- parent, although it was really exactly the same all along' ... And then he adds quite clearly: 'In the same wau, when the true nature of the soul does not yet appear to be discriminated from the body and other external adjuncts, the cognition arising through the Veda that does effect this discrimination is what constitutes "transcending the body". And the "attainment of the soul's true nature" is nothing more than the knowledge of the true nature of the Self, the result of the discriminating cognition' (B.S.Bh. I.iii.19; cp. M. V. 101. 3;144, 5). The origi- nal text speaks only of emerging in one's true nature through a discriminating cognition; it hardly needs pointing out that the notion of repeated meditation, and of immediate intuition as its result, have been dragged in through an inherent bias in Vacaspati towards dependence on Mandana.

(5) In truth, the individual soul and the supreme Self are entirely identical. The difference between them is imagined through the adjunct of beginningless Ignorance. And it can be rooted out through immediate knowledge, which arises through intense and sustained application to hearing, pondering over and meditating on the text 'That thou art', a text which teaches the identity of the soul with the Absolute. It is the same process as that whereby the erroneous idea of a snake in & rope is expunged by knowledge of the rope. (Bha.I.iv.22, cp. M.V.197,2)

Here the teaching follows the view of Kasakrtsna, who held that acceptance of non-difference between the soul and the

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supreme Self was justified because the soul was a state (avasthana) asswned by the supreme Self. And Vacaspati is explaining ri Sankara's view that Kasakrtsna's doctrine is in line with upanishadic teaching. But it is not clear why he drags in the point about imediate and direct knowledge arising from intense application to meditation sustained for a long time. Even in the example that he himself introduces, that of the rope-snake, immediate and direct knowledge of the rope and its truie nature does not arise from regular and sustained medi- tation. There is no law to prevent one saying that knowledge of the true nature of the rope comes simply from hearing from a competent authority 'This is a rope'.

(6) By the word 'concentration', the author refers to the yogic practice called 'samyama' (see Yoga Sutras III.1-4). The word 'samyama' covers fixing the mind on an object (dharana), meditation (dhyana) and concentration carried to the point of trance (samadhi). As the Yoga Sutra says, 'The three collec- tively are called "samyama"'. In this connection, the text 'The Self should be heard about, pondered over ... ' (Brhad. II.iv.5) teaches 'fixing the mind' (dharana). The text 'It should be subjected to sustained meditation' (ibid. ) teaches meditation (dhyana). 'It should be seen' (ibid.) teaches con- centration carried to the point of trance (samadhi). For 'samadhi' is defined in the Yoga Sutras in the words, 'Samadhi is that same meditation when it illumines the object alone, and the mind is virtually eliminated in the object'. (Bha.II.iii.39)

The Sutra says 'Otherwise there could not be concentration' (B.S. II.iii.39). The revered Commentator quotes the upani- shadic texts, 'The Self, verily, should be seen, heard about, pondered over, subjected to sustained meditation' (Brhad. II. iv.5) and 'He (the Self) it is who should be investigated, Him one should desire to know' (Chand. VIII. vii.1) and 'Meditate on the Self as Om' (Mund. II.ii.6), and says that this is the way that concentration is taught in the Upanishads. Clearly he took nididhyasana, vijijnasana and dhyana as synonymous ini this context, and as meaning meditation on the metaphysical reality alone. All that the Sutra intended to teach was that an injunction amounting to 'The supreme Self should be seen through sustained meditation' cannot be carried out by the soul unless it has the feeling that it is an individual able to perform actions. One has the right to ask why the whole Yoga Sastra discipline for obtaining samadhi through samyama should be dragged in here, where it has no place at all. The teaching 'It should be seen' cannot possibly amount to instruction to perform samadhi. For one must conclude that the reference of the Brahma Sutra was to the immediate experience (anubhava) of the Self denoted by the word 'vision', the result (not of the practices of the Yoga school but) of hearing the supreme upanishadic texts,

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pondering over them and subjecting them to sustained meditution.

206 REFUTATION OF THE NOTION OF AN INJUNCTION FOR KNOWLEDGE: THE DOCTRINE OF IMMEDIATE INTUITION

There is a refutation of the notion of an injunction for knowl- edge in the system of Vacaspati just as there is in that of Mandana, and the exposition by Vacaspati in places follows Mandana word for word.

(1) And there are four different kinds of apprehension of the Absolute. The first, called 'hearing', comes from merely hear- ing the texts of the Upanishads. The second, called 'ponder- ing', comes from the same upanishadic text considered in the light of strict scriptural exegesis (mīmāmsa). The third, called 'sustained meditation', consists in a continuous train of thought. The fourth is a state assumed by the mind that entails immediate intuition. And ihat is not anything differ- ent from liberation (kaivalya). (Bha. III.iv.27)

Commenting in the Bhamati on the section comprised by Brahma Sūtra III. iv.26-7, Vācaspati raises the question whether any of the four different kinds of apprehension of the Absolute mentioned above require to be accompanied by action. . He answers by saying that knowledge is only dependent on action (remotely) for its rise, inasmuch as the desire for knowledge is promoted by action. Here is one place where Vacaspati's system differs from Mandana's. (For Mandana, knowledge must always be accompanied by action, cp. M.V. 100, 1.) The defini- tion of pondering differs a little from that given earlier (M. V. 205, 3 - there logical enquiry, tarka, here scriptural exegesis (mīmāmsa) is emphasized). But the definition of sus- tained meditation is virtually the same.

(2) There cannot be an injunction for anyone to have a direct intuition of the Absolute. For direct intuition of the Abso- lute is eternally available, being the very nature.of the Absolute; it is not anything that either has to be produced or can be produced. There cannot be an injunction for meditation in the context of knowledge of the Absolute either. For medi- tation cannot be the object of an injunction in this context, since the need for it is already implicit without one, as medi- tation is known by a universal rule to be the invariable cause . of any high degree of knowledge. There cannot be an injunction to acquire knowledge from the revealed texts either, for that arises without any obstacles in a person who has learned his Veda by heart, who knows the words and their meanings and who knows the rules governing the interpretation of revealed texts .....

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Again, there cannot be communication of the true nature of the Self in the upanishadic texts enjoining knowledge of the Self. For they are not concerned with stating the true nature of the Self, but with enjoining knowledge of it. Their signi- ficance is limited to their main purpose (i.e. to injunction). Nor can one argue that one must derive knowledge of an objec- tive reality from a text enjoining a meditation, on the ground that meditation presupposes a knowledge of what is to be medi- tated on. For an injunction to meditate is intelligible also as enjoining a mere act of fanciful supposition (as in 'One should meditate on speech as a cow'). So we conclude that the Upanishads are not concerned with enjoining knowledge. (Bhā. I.i.l, p.71/93-4)

The last two extracts are in fact summarized reproductions of the teaching of the third Book (Niycga Kanda) of the Brahma Siddhi. That Book is concerned throughout with a detailed refutation of the view that knowledge of the Absolute depends upon an injunction. Summarizing the opening statement of the opponert's case, the Brahma Siddhi proceeds as follows: 'Our intention is to refute those who hold that an injunc- tion only conveys information about past, present and future realities incidentally in the course of communicating what has to be done. And in fact there are three different ways of access to the Absolute. The first is merely hearing the words of revelation. The second is that meditation called dhyana or bhavana or upasana which holds what has been learned from hearing continually in the mind. The third implies completion. It is immediate vision, to the exclusion of all mental idea- tion' (B.Sid. p.74, cp. summary at M.V.98,4)., From this starting-point, the Brahma Siddhi continues throughout the third Book with its refutation of the view that knowledge of the Absolute depends upon an injunction. But what Śri Śankara says in his Commentary is:

(3) An injunction which gives information about the nature and results of an act of merit only gives a person this infor- mation incidenially in the course of enjoining him to do the act. A text affirming the existence of the Absolute, on the other hand, only gives a person information. As immediate apprehension (of the Absolute) arises directly from (hearing) the (affirmation contained in the) text, the person hearing it cannot be enjoined to carry the immediate apprehension out (as if it were the result of some subsequent act). On the contrary, the knowledge just springs up automatically, as in the case of an object standing before one's eyes. (B.S.Bh. I.i.l = M.V.68,1)

Thus Śri Śankara's view was that knowledge of the Absolute arises from some upanishadic text in the manner befitting the subject-matter and means of knowledge involved, just as

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knowledge comes from perception and the other secular means of knowledge. There is no prompting to action through any injuncticn. Knowledge arises from the authoritative means cf knowiedge without dependence on any other factor. But when the Bhamati says that there is no need for a categorical com- mand in the case cf verbal knowledge, meditation and the immediate knowledge that results from these two, it is clear that we have an incorrect and laboured explanation, brought in by a miud greatly attracted towards another schocl. And there is another point. In firing off the arrow 'There cannot be communication of the true nature of the Absolute in the upanishadic texts enjojning knowledge cf the Self', Vacas- pati failed to see that it would turn round and boomerang upon his owr doctrine. For one couid make the counter-claim that one who said 'This immediate intuition of the Absolute is spoken of as brcught about by the means of knowledge called the Veda because it is based on the authoritative revelation of those texts' (M.V.204,5) was also saying that there could not be direct intuition arising from revelation (because, on his view, direct intuition arises from hearing, pondering and sustained meditation, which depend ir turn on injunctions like 'The Self should be heard about', and such texts would be ruled out by the 'arrow' mentioned above).

(4) You admit that the Upanishads contain injunctions to medi- tate. And you also hold firmly to the view, derived from the Upanishads, that the true nature of the individual soul is identity with the Absolute, which is eternal, pure and con- scious. Now, realization of one's identity with the Absolute cannot be the reward for obedience to an injunction to medi- tate, because it is eternally in being and not subject to achievement. Nor is removal of the veil of beginningless Ignorance the reward, for that comes automatically with the rise of knowledge, which is contradictory to Ignorance. Nor could the rise of knowledge be the special reward for obedi- ence to an injunction to meditate; for that arises from the mind itself, associated with the impressions of meditation based on hearing and pondering. Perhaps you will claim here that the occult power generated by meditation as obedience to an injunction helps the mind here, as well as the mere psychological impressions arising from meditation. For occult rewards for obedience to Vedic injunctions, you may argue, are found to occur in this very life. For the injunctions to perform the Citra and Kariri sacrifices bring their rewards in this very life, the Citra sacrifice (for rain) regularly, the Kariri sacrifice (for cattle) occasionally. But we do not accept this argument. The psychological impressions generated by meditation on the teachings in the science of music produce the power to discern the notes of the scale in immediate intuition without depend- ence on occult forces; and the psychological impressions

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generated by the soul in its meditations on the teachings in the Upanishads have the power to lead it to an immediate intuition of its own true nature as the Absolute, without dependence on occult forces either. (Bha. I.i.4, p.114/169-70)

In places like this, the cause of bringing in such misplaccd argumentation is the seduction of the erroneous theory of immediate intuition (depending on meditation, etc,) coming from the system of Mandana. For Śri Sanka:a's Commentary shows that the results of action and of knowledge of the Absolute are different and incompatible. Śri Śankara speaks of 'this freedom from embodiment, called liberation'. We cails this freedom from embodiment 'real in the highest serse, eternal and constant', 'all-pervading', 'free from all modification', 'ever brimming with joy', 'part- less', 'marked by self-luminosity' and 'of such a kind that, after its attainment, it would be inconceivable that it could be taught that there was anything further to be done'. He also said: 'The upanishauic texts expounding how liberation arises from knowledge themselves deny that any other action is re- yuired, and show that the result of knowledge of the Self is merely to put an end to the obstacles preventing the manifes- tation of liberation, (the latter being already existent)'. How could an Acarya who spoke thus countenance even the possi- bility that metaphysical knowledge arising from the authorita- tive texts of the Upanishads required to be enhanced by further pondering and meditation?

(5) In the case of the injunction 'He should meditate on the deity to whom the offering is being made before saying "Vasat"' (Ait. Brahmana III.viii.1), one would never have known that there was a duty to meditate on a deity without the injunction But, in the case of one who has learned the upanishadic texts by heart and knows not only the words but their meaning as well, and also the rules for interpreting revealed texts generally, knowledge that his true Self is the Absolute arises automatically from the passage of the Chandogya Upanishad (VI.ii.1 ff.) beginning 'Being only, my dear one, was all this in the beginning ... ' and ending 'That thou art'. It arises from the power of the authoritative spoken word to convey knowledge, just as direct experience of a pot standing in bright light arises automatically, for one who is paying atten- tion, from the power of the contact of sense-organs with their objects. This experience arises automatically from causal factors. It cannot be altered arbitrarily by human will, like the form assumed by a meditation on a deity. So an injunction would be meaningless in this context. Nor could such an injunction cover either meditation or the culmination of the discipline in immediate experience. For it is found that these two lead to immediate intuition, or the abolition of metaphysical Ignorance, by a universal rule, so that one is

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prompted to pursue them naturally and without an injunction, so that they do not belong to the sphere of what can be done otherwise or left undone according to human will. Therefore knowledge of the Absolute, though a mental act, is not subject to injunction. (Bha. I.i .. 4, p.128-9/200-1)

Here it is inexplicable why Vacaspati should nave accepted the idea that metaphysical knowledge was a kind of act when it was clearly taught in Sri Sankara's Commentary to be a result, as is shown by the phrase 'but knowledge arises from an authori- tative means of knowledge'. In fact it is clear that the notion that metaphysical knowledge has the form of protraeted meditation has been borrowed from the system of Mandana and introduced here by force. (Cp. B.Sid. p.74, M.V.206, 2, note, above p. 633. ) The same is true of the doctrine that imnediate experience arising from meditation follows according to a universal law. The teaching that meditation and the culmination of the discipline in imediate experience follow by a universal rule also stems from Mandana, and is a revival of the doctrine of Prasankhyana in a different form, like uttering an incantation to revive a tiger whose fate has already been settled by death. And Mandana also accepted the following view: 'You will claim, perhaps, that when knowledge of the Absolute has been first attained through another text specifically devoted to affirming its existence, there has to be an injunction as well, an injunction to effect a stream of repeated re-affirmations of this knowledge. Very well, let it be so if you wish; there would be no contradiction. The text "Once he has acquired knowledge of the Self alone, he should practise repeated affirmation" (Brhad. IV. iv.21) shows how an initial knowledge of the Self through words has to be brought to fruition'. Then for fear of his own doctrine getting mixed up with those of his opponents, he adds later: 'Or it could be maintained that an injunction would be useless here, as the desirable end which it promised would already be attained' (cp. above, M.V. 98,4) .... But, as we have already explained, immediate intu- ition so conceived would not be genuine Vedic revelation (cp. M.V.98,4, note).

(6) It is true that liberation transcends worldly perception. But it is known from the Vedic texts to be establishment in the Self in its true nature through the abolition of Ignorance along with its impressions (M.V.202,3). Ignorance, for its part, is contradicted by the rise of knowledge. Metaphysical Ignorance is abolished by the rise of metaphysical knowledge, just as the snake-error is abolished by direct knowledge of the reality of which it is an appearance, namely the rope. It is recognized in the world as a universal rule that the re- peated practice of hearing the supreme upanishadic texts,

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pondering over them and subjecting them to sustained meditation brings its proper reward in the form of immediate intuition of reality (because repeated practice of the discipline laid down in all the sciences, such as music, leads to direct intuition). It is moreover reasonable to suppose that it is only repeated practice of hearing and the rest that could be the means to such a sublime goal as immediate experience in the form 'I am by nature the one Consciousness, free from all pain'. So for all these rcasons we conclude that hearing and the rest bring a tangible reward (in the form of intuition of reality) in this very life. But if these disciplines have a tangible reward in this life, it is not right to suppose that they are performed for the sake of merit leading to occult results in future births (in the manner of the ritual sacrifices). Nor could they possibly lead, as we have said, to such a sublime experience as immediate intuition of reality if they were not performed earnestly and for a long time and without intermission. And if they did not lead to immediate intuition of reality they could not abolish metaphysical Ignorance. If a person is experiencing the taste of sugar as sour on account of a dis- order in the bile, not even a thousand arguments will furnish him with the immediate sensation that it is sweet. For anyone who does not actually have the sensation of sweet taste will spit the sugar out, even though he pay careful attention to the words of others and listen to thousands of arguments. We conclude, therefore, that because meditation and worship (in this context) have a tangible reward in this life they have to be repeated, because this is the general belief in the world, and because repetition is inherent in the very ideas of medi- tation and worship. (Bha.IV.i.1)

This passage is a kind of pot-pourri of the doctrines of Mandana Misra. The following three points are worthy of con- sideration.

(1) We start initially with the doubt whether the hearing and so on taught in such Vedic passages as 'the Self should be heard about, pondered over and subjected to sustained medita- tion' should be performed once or repeatedly. view says that they only have to be performed once, as the The provisional

requirements of the text would be satisfied by that alone. The finally accepted view says that they must be done repeatedly, first because they are taught more than once, and secondly because they are performed for the sake of a goal to be ob- tained in this very life (so that the general conditions that obtain in the secular sciences apply). On this point Śri Sankara writes, 'because the affirmations have to be continued until there is direct vision' (B.S.Bh. IV.i.l, cp. IV.i.12, M.V.56,8). The author of the Bhāmati holds that Śri Sankara was here speaking about a result to be

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cbtained in this very life, meaning that we should infer that direct experience of the Self followed from the practice of hearing and so on. Worldly experience shows ihat it does so, as can be illustrated by such examples as that of the rope. But did Śri Śankara really mean to say that, or did he only mean that direct experience came from hearing and the rest because it was established by the Veda that they did so? Our own view is that there is no place for inference here, as texts like 'the Self should be seen, heard about ... ' enjoin hearing and the rest with immediate experience of the Self as the goal, expressed by such words as vision (darsana), wisdom (prajña) and concrete knowledge (vijñana). Once it is known from the Veda that the affirmations should culminate in direct vision, it is known that they have to be repeated till vision arises, even though they are only taught once. It is like the act of pounding the paddy, which has to be repeated until the rice has actually been husked. The example adduced is 'because the injunction for pounding is for the sake of producing the visible result of having husked rice'. When it h's been established that hearing and the rest are for the sake of vision, then it is implicitly established by the Veda itseif (without dragging in inferences from analogies with worldly practice) that hearing and the rest have to be repeated until vision is attained.

(2) Śri Śankara's Commentary introduces the example of the rope-snake. The Bhamati maintains that the rope-snake is abolished by immediate intuition of the rope in its true nature, and that the case with the Self is to this extent par- allel that Ignorance is extirpated by immediate experience of the Self. But did Śri Sankara really mean this? Or did he mean that knowledge of the true nature of the rcpe was attained through removal of the snake-error, and that knowledge of the Self occurred in the same way through the removal of the non- self element superimposed onto it? Our own view is as follows. The Self is ever immediately evident. It is only concealed by metaphysical Ignorance. When the superimposed not-self is abolished by the upanishadic text, certitude as to the true nature of the Self automatically supervenes, just as certitude as to the true nature of the rope automatically supervenes when the superimposed snake has been abolished by the word of a trusted and competent author- ity. Emphasis was placed by Śri Śankara on the certitude about the Self that supervened automatically after abolition of the snake. For, unlike the rope, the Self is not an object that it could require to be known through ar act of immediate experiencing.

(3) The revered Commentator says: 'Hearing and the rest are performed for the sake of a tangible end in this world, and have to be carried out until vision (of the Self) super-

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venes' (B.S.Bh. IV.i.1). The Bhamati says that the implication here is that no knowledge which is uot immediate can abolish metaphysical Ignorance, since the latter is immediately evi- dent. Is that really what Śri Śankara meant (cp. M.V.69,7) ? Or did he not rather mean that, since hcaring and the rest had been enjoined for the sake of vision as shown by the expres- sion 'The Self should be seen', they should be carried on till vision occurred? Here again we have our own view to express. Ii is not the case that Ignorance is anything (real and) immediately evident that forces itself into manifestation by cverpowering immediatc vision of the Self, as immediate sensation of sour taste over- powers the immediate sensation of sweet taste in the care of onc who eats sugar when his bile is in a disordered state. It is not (any physical blockage like) this that is the reason why the words of a proper authority, supported by arguments, cannot produce knowledge of the Self. The truth is that the Self, though remaining immediately evident, appears not to be immediately evident through metaphysical Jgnorance. Metaphy- sical Ignorance is essentially superimposition of the not-self, which does not really exist, onto the Self. What occurs (at liberatiom) is therefore an appearunce of an immediate intui- tion (as if it were something new), due to what is in fact only the negation of the superimposed not-self and remembrance of the Self brought about by the Vedic texts and the teachings of the Acarya. There is thus a certain difference between metaphysical realization of the Self and the example offered to illustrate it, where a new cognition of the rope as an object takes place after the negation of the rope-snake. For the revered Commentator says:

(7) If you say that there must be a distinction in the Self according to whether Ignorance has or has not been put to an end, we reply 'No'. For we hold that the notion that the Self is afflicted by Ignorance itself belongs to the realm of the false imagination of Ignorance. As we have already explained (Brhad.Bh.III.v.l, M.V.34,5), the Self is not affected by Ignorance, any more than the rope, desert, shell and sky are affected by the imputed snake, mirage, silver and impurities of dust or cloud. If you say that there must be a distinction in the Self according to whether it is or is not afflicted by double vision - again we say 'No'. For the Upanishads deny that the Self, in its true nature, is an individual capable of any form of action, by saying 'It only seems to think, it only seems to move' (Brhad.IV.iii.7). And the error of metaphysi- cal Ignorance is the product of many different factors. Further, it may be argued that Ignorance is witnessed as an object. And he whose error of Ignorance can be perceived objectively like a pot cannot himself be afflicted by the error of Ignorance. And if you say that people do have the error of Ignorance, since they say 'I do not understand what

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you are saying, I am confused', again we say 'No'. For even Ignorance in thau form is perceived to be distinct from the perceiver. (Brhad.Bh.IV.iv.6, cp. M.V.30,12)

This shows how Sri Sankara's view was different from the theory that could he illustrated by the example of immediate sensa- tions of sour and sweet taste. There the inmediate sensation of sour taste totally obliterates the sensation of sweet taste. Here, even when metaphysical Ignorance is in force and the soul belongs to its realm, Consciousness is separate from that Ignorance as its Witness, Hence immediate experience of the Self can arise merely through being informed about it. One does not have to perform any further activity to obtain an immediate intuition.

(8) From the standpoint of the highest truth, the individual soul is already the Absolute. But he identifies himself with the Food-self (the physical body) and other finite external organs composed of the elements. His mind becomes engrossed in these, and resembles the mind of the villager who, engrossed in counting the number of his external confederates, failed to take note of his own Self, which would have completed the num- ber, though he was in no way separated from it (cp. M.V. p.156). Like the villager, the individual soul takes his own true Self, the supreme reality, to be non-existent. And on account of this Ignorance, he identifies himself with various external 'selves' such as the physical body, and will not admit that he is anything different from the aggregate of them. In this way the Absolute remains 'unattained' through Ignorance, even though it is one's own Self. The villager we are considering, who was counting the num- bers of the party, failed, through his own ignorance, to 'at- tain to' himself, the one who would have completed the number. But when he was afterwards reminded by someone 'You are the tenth' he 'attained to himself' through his own knowledge. In the same way, one who fails, through metaphysical Ignorance, to attain to his own true nature as the Absolutc may very well attain to it later, when instructed by the Vedic texts, through enlightenment in the form of direct intuition that he is the Absolute, the Self of all. (Taitt.Bh.II.1, cp. M.V. 59,14)

This disposes of the whole theory that immediate intuition of the Absolute is something that has to be obtained, like obtain- ing the immediate sensation of the sweet taste of sugar. For, unlike the sweet taste of sugar, the Self has not been inter- rupted by anything, that immediate intuition of it should have to be obtained by removal of the interrupting agency. All that has happened is that one's own true Self has been forgot- ten through Ignorance, like the self of the counter in the story of the villagers, the forgotten self that would have

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completed the number.

207 THE SCHOOL WHICH HOLDS THAT IMMEDIATE INTUITION CANNOT ARISE MERELY FROM HEARING THE SUPREME TEXTS

Śri Saakara's Brahma Sutra Commentary mekes an opponent raise the objection that repetition of the discipline of hearing and so on would Le useless in the case of the Absolute in its true form without adjuncts, and then answers the objection. It seems to us that in explaining that answer the Bhamati is really adhering to the doctrines of a different school. In this connection, the arguments raised by the cpponent are the following.

(1) If a text like 'That thou art' dces not engender the conviction that one's true Self is the Absoluie at one hearing, what guarantee is there that it will do so when repeatedly affirned? (2) If the Advaitin claims that the texts will only engender direct experience of the fact that one's true Self is the Absolute as supported by reasoning, then any such reasoning will produce direct experience in regard to its content if per- formed only once - what is the need for repetition? (3) Per- haps the Advaitin will say that knowledge obtained through hearing or through reasoning will only be abstract and general. But concrete particular experience, he will say, is required to put an end to metaphysical Ignorance, so the discipline must be repeated for the sake of that. However, this is also wrong, for if hearing the texts and reasoning over them only produced abstract general knowledge to begin with, they could not produce concrete particular knowledge even if repeated many times. (4) Nor can it be roundly affirmed that hearing and reasoning never produce immediate experience in anyone when only performed once, as people differ widely in their intui- tional powers. (5) In the case of an entity that had many parts, one might ascertain the nature of one part through one act of attention and the nature of another part through another act of attention. Here repetition would be useful. But that is not the case with the Absolute in its undifferentiated form. We shall now give Śri Śankara's answers to these objections together with Vacaspati's explanations of them to show clearly the difference of standpoint between the two Teachers.

(1) Śri Sankara on the first and fourth points: Repeated resort to hearing and the rest is indeed useless in the case of the person who can attain immediate experience of the fact that his Self is the Absolute from merely hearing the text 'That thou art' spoken once. But it is perfectly appropriate in the case of the person who cannot do so (cp. M.V.55,4).

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This replies to the opponent's first and fourth objections. Here it is agreed that the upanishadic text ean engender the conviction that one's true Self is the Absolute even when heard only once.

(2) Vacaspati on the first and fourth points: Śrī Śańkara says 'from merely hcaring the text spoken once'. It means that, after hearing and thinking for an instant, the knowledge will come through the impressions derived from repeated prac- tice in previous lives. (Bha.IV.i.2)

Vacaspati starts from the assumption that conviction cannot arise from one hearing. On this basis the impressions of pon- dering and sustained meditation performed in previous lives are accepted as being an auxiliary. This follows the doctrine of Prasankhyana. For in describing it, with a view to refuting it, Śri Śankara makes its exponents say, 'Even he who under- stands the meaning of the holy texts does not do so at a single hearing' (U.S. (verse) XVIII.10) and 'And even if someone were found to become free from pain through merely hearing the con- tent of a text, it would be inferred that he had performed meditation on it in past vives' (ibia. XVIII. 15 -- 6).

(3) Śri Śankara on the second and third points: the text 'That thou art', the word 'thou', too, expresses iden- Again, in

tity with what is indicated by the word 'that' ... There are some for whom the meanings of the words 'that' and 'thou' are obscured by ignorance, doubt or misunderstanding. In their case, merely hearing the text 'That thou art' will not yield knowledge of its true meaning .... In the case of such people, repeated hearing of the texts and reasoning over them is appropriate in order to discern the true meaning of the words (the first step to understanding the meaning of the sentence). (B.S.Bh.IV.i.2, cp. M.V.55,6)

Here all that is being said is that ignorance of the meaning of the words is an obstacle which prevents an understanding of the meaning of the sentence.

(4) Vacaspati on the second and third points: Thus it is taught that one cannot arrive immediately at the meaning of any sentence. But in the case of the sentence 'That thou art', the meaning even of the component words is extremely hard to grasp. There is no quick understanding of the meaning of such a sentence preceded by the quick understanding of its words. On the contrary, because it takes a very long time to arrive at the meaning of the words, it takes a long time to under- stand the sentence. (Bha. IV.i.2)

The teaching here is: One cannot immediately understand the meaning even of a sentence heard in ordinary secular life. The

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meaning of the text 'That thou art' arisec even more slowly than that of any sentence heard in secular life. (The author here records tuo cmall changes made in the second edition (1938) of the Bombay text of the Bhamati, remarking that the meaning remains doubtful on either reading. T.N.)

(5) Śri Śankara on the fifth point: The Self that has to be known has no parts. But the nature of having many parts, such as body, sense-crgans, lower mind, higher intellect, experience of objects and so forth is superimposed onto it through Ignorance. A person may eliminate one part through one conviction, another through another. In this sense, knowledge of the Absolute is a progressive process. (But this is only the preliminary form of knowledge of the Self.) (B.S. Bh.IV.i.2, M.V.31,10)

This is a reply to the fifth objection. Though there are no real parts in the Self, there are imagined ones.

(6) Vacaspati on the fifth point: This Self is immediately evident and partless. Through the surerimposition and subse- quent withdrawal of all the various bodies and so on it appears as if it had parts, and as if it was (not evident but) utterly transcendent and remote. Therefore it can be known as the meaning of the text by stages.

This explanation is in tune with the Commentary. But the author of the Bhamati should not have added the words 'as the meaning of the text'.

(7) Śri Śankara on the third point: But this process is only

M.V. 31,10) the preliminary form of knowledge of the Self. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.2,

The notion that the Self has many parts is only a preliminary notion. An understanding of the Self by stages is admitted only for the benefit of those who see it with many parts superimposed over it.

(8) Väcaspati on the third point: But why seek this idea of the Self engendered by the text, which is only an abstract idea? For such an idea would bring no results (reading anagama-phalatvad). To answer this question Sri Sankara says, 'But this process is only the preliminary form of knowledge of the Self!, that is, of knowledge accompanied by immediate intuition. What he means is as follows. After hearing and pondering over the supreme texts, meditation serves for imme- diate intuition of the Absolute if it is performed for a long time, without intermission, and with an earnest spirit. For this reason, a (mere abstract) idea of the meaning of the texts is the preliminary form of direct intuition. (Bha.IV.i.2)

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This is not the literal meaning of Śri Sankara's Commentary. For we do not find it taught there that efforts have to be made for direet intuition after the meaning of the text has been understood.

Here the teaching of Śri Sankara's Commentary is that the gifted students can have direct experience that their true Self is the Absclute aiter only hcaring the upanishadic texts once. And he cleerly says that repeated recourse to the Vedic texts and repeated recourse to reasoning are only for those who are unable to enjoy direct experience of the meaning of the supreme texts after hearing them once. When he says 'But this prccess is oniy the preliminary form of knowledge of the Self' the reference is to the preliminary torm of understanding the meaning of the texts, where the Self is associated with many parts. The idea is that an understanding of the Absolute by stages applies only to those who do not properly understand the meaning of the texts. We gather this from the sequel, which runs as follows:

(9) Śri Śankara on the fourth point: Meanwhile, those gifted persons who are not afflicted by any ignorance, doubt or erro- neous knowledge to obstruct their comprehension of the meaning of the words can have direct experience of the meaning of the sentences like 'That thou art' after hearing them only once. For them repetition would be useless. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.2)

This shows that repeated practice of the discipline of hearing and the rest is appropriate only for him who does not under- stand the meaning of the words. And there is no mention here of any special form of immediate intuition other than under- standing of the meaning of the supreme texts.

(10) Śri Sankara on the fourth point: But the case is differ- ent with the person who is of dull intellect and who is about to lose the meaning of the text for lack of insight. Such a person is quite justified in working to strengthen his convic- tions as to the meaning of the text, with a search for the right meaning based on repeated hearing and other ancillary practices. (B.S.Bh.IV.i.2)

Thus for Śri Śankara this practice of repetition was only engaged in for one purpose - to clarify one's idea of the meaning of the words, so as to strengthen one's understanding of the meaning of the supreme texts. It did not, for him, refer to meditation on the meaning of the texts on the part of one who already understood their meaning, practised for the sake of a new knowledge called immediate intuition. This is stated clearly enough in Śri Śankara's texts. But the Bhamati introduces here a doctrine of repeated meditation not taught by Śri Śańkara.

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(11) Vacasputi on the fourth point: Even when the meaning of the text is evident only in an abstract way, there are greater and lesser degrees of clarity. How much more will this be the case with the stream of ideas culminating in immediate intui- tion that ensue in the period after pondering, and which derive from the practice of repeated meditation, itself by nature variable in quality at different times - that is Śri Sankara's meaning here. (Bhã. IV.i.2)

This is all the result of an inclination to cling to the apron- strings of Mandaua - of that there can be no doubt. Vacas- pati's doctrine of immediate intuition is Prasankhyāna Vāda in a now dress. And those who have studied the eighteenth chapter of the verse sectios of the Upadesa Sahasri of Bhagavatpāda Śankara (see Potter, 1981, pp.241-54) will know well that that teaching is not the message of the Upanishads, which follow the method of false attribution followed by later retraction. There are passages in his cther commontaries, too, apart from the Brahma Sutra Commentary, where Śri Sankara has very clearly said that the seekers of liberation have done all that has to be done simply by coming to know the true meaning of the texts. Consider, for instance, the following:

(12) When the subject-matter of a Vedic passage is an injunc- tion to act, such injunctions treat of something like the Agnihotra or other ritual, that has to be performed at a dif- ferent time, after the meaning of the text has been under- stood, and with the help of various factors, such as the per- son doing the act along with his various materials and instru- ments. But when the subject of the texts is knowledge of the supreme principle, the case is different. The aim of the text is then fulfilled as soon as its meaning is properly under- stood. (Mund.Bh.I.i.6, intro., M.V.101,6)

(13) After he has understood the meaning of the injunction to perform the Agnihotra and other ritual, the metaphysically ignorant person finds that he has to gather together various kinds of materials and perform various kinds of rituals, which he does with the feeling 'I am the person doing this, and this is my duty'. But there is nothing left over to be done in the future in this way after understanding the meaning of meta- physical affirmations like 'The Self is never born and never dies' (Gita II.20). Nothing further then arises apart from knowledge of the unity and sole reality of the Self, and of the fact that it has no empirical characteristics such as capacity for action, all this being expressed in such convic- tions as 'I am not an individual capable of action, I am not an individual capable of empirical experience'. (Bh.G.Eh.II.21)

(14) In such texts as 'That thou art', which convey the true nature of the Self, since the vision is conveyed at the time

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of hearing them, one does not have to carry out any further action in cbedience to the injunction saying 'the Self has to be seen'. (Brhad. Bh. I.iv. 7)

208 CONCLUDING SUMMARY

The effect of the appearance of Vacaspati's Bhāmati sub- commentary was to undermine the authority of Bhaskara's doc- trine of Difference in Identity. While the expositions in the Bhamati sometimes partly resemble those of the Pañcapadika, it very much more often sets forth minor points from the system of Mandana as if they were the teaching of Śri Sankara. Mandana's doctrine of immediate intuitior (sākşāt-kāra) is often resolutely intermired with and supported by teachings from the Yoga school. And on account of this teaching the idea has taken firm root amongst students of Vedanta that immediate experience of the Self can never arise from mere reflection on the meaning of the texts, even if supported by logical reason- ing. As far as reasoning goes, the great means for the defence of Non-Duality in the Bhamati is the argument that duality is indeterminable. Reasoning about the nature of Ignorance, the seat that it occupies and the object that it conceals takes a prominent place. With reason thus employed, the original Vedanta method of false superimposition followed by later retraction fell almost into eclipse. It will become clear in the course of our examination of the later schools how the stream of Vedantic thought began to run in new channels, so we need not go into further details for the present and can close our account of the system of the Bhamati here.

CHAPTER XI THE IŞTA SIDDHI

209 REFUTATION OF THE BHĀMATT SCHOOL ALONG WITH REVIVAL OF THE DOCTRINE OF ROOT-IGNORANCE

While the system of Mandana, with some modifications introuuced by others, was being blended with the system of Śri Sankara's Commentary and gradually assuming the form of the doctrine of the Bhamati, the reaction on the part of the followers of the Pañcapādikā's doctrine of Root-Ignorance (mūlāvidyā) was going on unabated. There came a time when even those who had for- merly accepted Ignorance as being essentially superimpoeition were eventually forced to accept a 'Power of Ignorance' (avidyā- sakti) as well. This point was already reached in the time of the author of the Bhamati, whc agreed that Non-dualism could be established through the teaching that the Power of Ignorance was the material cause of the universe. And then came Ācārya Vimuktātman, who thought 'Why be so pretentious as to offer a new system under another name?' The Bhamati, while defending Advaita over some points on which it had been attacked by Bhaskara carya, had brought out many indefensible weaknesses in the doctrine of Difference in Identity. Ācārya Vimuktātman, however, was not satisfied with showing that the system of Difference in Identity was a prey to indefensible errors. He sought to show that these were to be found in the systems accepted by Mandana and Vacaspati as well. And he wrote his Işta Siddhi to establish this and also to support the doctrine of Root-Ignorance.

210 HIGH REPUTATION OF VIMUKTĀTMAN, AUTHOR OF THE ISTA SIDDHI

We know from the colophons at the end of each chapter that the author of the Işta Siddhi was one Vimuktātman Ācārya, pupil of

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Avyayatman. And we know that he was also the author of another work called the Pramana Vrtti, as he refers to it on page 37 iu the body of the Ista Siddhi. As the Pramaņa Māla (p.4) by Anandabodha refers to him by the word 'Guru' in the honorific plural, it is possible that he was the Guru of Anandabodha. Like the Brahma Siddhi, the Ista Siddhi remained for some time unlocated, until it was eventually published about thirty years ago (1933 A.D.) by the Government Oriental Institute at Baroda. Like the Branma Siddhi, this work, too, consists in verses explained by the author in a prose commentary.

211 THE MAIN POINT IN THE BOOK IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDETERMINABLE IGNORANCE

In the Brahma Siddhi, all the topics of Vedanta are examined in order. But that is not the case in the Ista Siddhi. Therc the whole doctrine is compressed into the opening verse and its commentary, and the general course or the rest of the book is to explain it further and refute other opinions. Although in the course of the explanation the author says, 'This work is a compendium of the essence of the Vedantic teaching on all subjects' (I.S. p.37), yet it is clear that a critical account of indeterminable Ignorance was what really lay nearest to his heart.

(1) On the question whether Ignorance is real, unreal or indeterminable as either, and on the question whether it in- heres in the not-self or the Self, I have established that it is indeterminable and inheres in the Self, for that is what sound logic shows ... As has already been indicated, the various means of knowledge such as perception cannot be either authoritative or free from contradiction, whether in the realm of ritual or metaphysics, except in the context of metaphysical Ignorance. The four ends of life, too, merit, welfare, pleasure and liberation, along with all other desirable and undesirable results of action, belong to the realm of Igno- rance. So do the contradictory systems of the great philoso- phers and the whole amazing variety of the universe. Therefore I have reflected over Ignorance and laid down its true nature, that all may attain their desired ends .... I have given special consideration to the supreme bliss on which the experts in the Veda ponder, and which is known from the Upanishads to be the Self, in the belief that this bliss is what all desire. The truth on this subject becomes clear if metaphysical Igno- rance is seen to be indeterminable. Therefore I have treated of that Ignorance in depth, so that the desired end may be attained. (I.S. VIII.15,22-4,27-8; p.377 f.)

Here in the conclusion to the work the author says that all

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onds are realized when it becomes clear that metaphysical Ignorance is indeterminable, so that his main effort was to lay down the truth about that. This is an explicit statement that the chief topic of the work is metaphysical Ignorance.

212 THE DIVISION OF SUBJECT-MATTER IN THE BOOK

The work has eight chapters. In the first, almost all the topics with which the work is comcerned are stated in brief form. It therefore occupies over half the bulk of the book. It contains a protracted account of how the whole world is the effect of indeterminable Ignorance, as illustrated by the example of shell-silver. The next four chapters set out how those who hold different theories of error will have to accept in the end that their theory implies that error is indeterminable. The sixth chapter refutea the theory that Ignorance has its seat in the indivi- dual soul. The seventh chapter shows that only he who accepts metaphysical Ignorance can establish a distinction between the Self and the not-self - no one else can. The eighth chapter answers objections on the topic of the cessation of Ignorance. From this examination of the contents, one can see that the author would not have objected to the work also being called 'The Demonstration of Indeterminable Ignorance'.

213 THE OPENING VERSE CONDENSING THE TEACHING OF THE WHOLE WORK

(1) I bow to that principle of Immediate Experience, which is unborn, immeasurable, infinite and of the nature of the bliss of the Self, and which serves as the wall on which is painted the fresco of this illusory appearance of a world, beginning with the Cosmic Intellect (mahat). (I.S. I.1)

The explanation of this verse occupies just under thirty-eight pages of the Sanskrit text. The gist of it is as follows. Immediate experience is self-established and self-revealed. For if immediate experience had to be illumined it would be an object like a pot, and so not immediate experience. Being self-established, immediate experience is free from birth and the other changing states of empirical existence. Nothing knowable as an object can be an attribute of Con- sciousness; Consciousness is therefore not knowable as an object. It is thus unlimited in space and time or by an object For since space, time and objects are open to objective cogni- tion, they cannot be attributes of Consciousness or immediate experience (I.S. p.1,2). Being infinite, immediate experience can be none other than the supreme Self (I.S. p.25).

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Hence it is of the nature of Bliss. For there ie no differ- ence between Consciousness and Bliss. It is true that they are raferred to by different words. But infereuce is powerless to establish that there is any difference in their nature. Even if there had been any such argument, it would have been in con- tradiction with Vedic revelation (I.S. pp.25-6). A further point made is that the Absolute (brahman), the Seif (atman) and Bliss (ananua) are all one. The argument is as follows. The Brahmananda Valli of the Taittiriye Upanishad begins with a reference to the Absolute (satyam, jñanam, anantam brahma, Taitt. II.1). Referring back to this, the sane text later says 'The ether was born from the Seli' (ibid. ). Here, since the term 'the Self' is used and the context is a consideration of the nature of the Absolute, the Absolute and the Self are designated as the material cause from which the world arcse. Then later the Absolute and Bliss are identified in the text 'He had the knowledge "The Absolute is Bliss"' (Taitt. III.6), while the text 'Verily, from Bliss are these creatures born' (ibid.) shows that the Absolute as Bliss is the material cause of the world (I.S. p.27). And it is this immediate experience that is the cause of the rise, maintenance and withdrawal of the whole universe, resort- ing to its magical power of illusion (maya) called Ignorance. Nor does this involve any contradiction with duality. For the magic power of illusion is indeterminable as either different from or identical with immediate experience (I.S. p.32-3).

214 PREDOMINANCE OF DIALECTICAL ARGUMENTATION

The opening benedictory verse (M.V.213,1) begins (in the San- skrit) with the word 'which', referring to what is admitted to be the self-established and self-revealed principle of immedi- ate experience. And yet the Ista Siddhi paradoxically starts off on a course of negative dialectic, demonstrating the un- tenable consequences for those who do not admit this principle. The author never pauses to ask here 'Why is there doubt over something that is self-established and self-revealed?', nor does he ask in what way the implanting of a new doubt through negative dialectic could lead a doubter to a knowledge of truth. Indeed, nothing outside immediate experience exists that could lead to a knowledge of it or to a knowledge of its attributes. One cannot claim that immediate experience can be established by negative logic. For negative logic itself depends for its existence on immediate experience. Suresvara says in his Naişkarmya Siddhi (II.59, prose intro.) 'For all philoscphical schools take their stand on immediate experience'; and he follows this up by saying:

(1) The logicians bemuse each other with a web of wherefores

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and therefores, heavily afflicted with the fever of debate. But it is to this experience that they make their final appeal. (N.S. II.59)

Even a piece of argumentation like 'For if immediate experience had to be illumined it would be an object like a pot, and so not immediate experience' (M.V.213,1, note; I.S. p.1) can only be carried out on the basis of some piece of immediate experi- ence. Otherwise neither of the disputants would understand what the other was saying and the argument could not begin. And there is no place in Vedanta for argumentation not based on or ignoring immediate experience as an 'astrument for estab- lishing its own doctrine. As Śri Śankara says in his Commen- tary:

(2) But this should not be used as a pretext for allowing empty hypothetical reasoning to gain entry. For in the present context only those arguments that are sancticned by the Veda may be resorted to, and that only as an auxiliary to the attainment of direct experience. (B.S.Bh.II.i.6, cp. M.V.31,1l)

215 REFUTATION OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUBJECT AND OBJECT

An opponent raises objections against the infinitude of immedi- ate experience and says: Now, is it not the case that the object of consciousness appears as a 'this', while conscious- ness is 'not this'. Hence consciousness and object of con- sciousness are universally regarded in the world as different and mutually exclusive .... The distinction between conscious- ness and its object must therefore be accepted, as it is familiar to all (I.S. p.2). The nerve of the opponent's argu- ment is that as there is a real distinction, the infinitude of immediate experience is unproved. Here the Iata Siddhi launches into an examination of the relationship between subject and object in order to parry this objection. As that examination is very long (I.S. pp.2-24), only the gist of it is taken in so that we can explain the general line of our author's thinking.

(1) Though there can be (at the level of uncritical perception) vision of the difference of two objects (reading yadyapi drsyor with Jñanottama), there cannot be vision of difference between subject and object, since the subject is not perceivable as an object. It is not possible to perceive the difference of the unperceived from the perceived or of the perceived from the unperceived, because perception of difference depends on per- ceiving both the different thing and the thing that it is dif- ferent from. Again, what is this thing called difference? If you say it

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is the nature of the different thing, then perception of dif- ference ought not to depend on perception of the thing that the different thing is different from (though in fact it does depend on it). For perception of the nature of a thing cannot depend on that from which it is different. Or otherwise, since perception of a second thing from which the first thing was different would enteil perception of a third thing from which the second was different, perception of difference would fall into infinite regress; or else (if it was claimel that the second thing was known through its difference from the first) perception of difference would fall into the fallacy of mutual dependence (since the first thing could only be known through its difference from the second, while the second could only be known if the firsi had already been known beforehand). Perhaps you will say that, if difference cannot be the nature of the different thing, it can be its attribute (read- ing bhedino, not bhedinor, cp. I.S. p.3,line 5). If so, the attribute of difference cannot itself be taken as non-different (reading abhinna, cp. I.S. p.3,line 14) from the different thing, or otherwise it could not be established as difference, since there would be no perception of any difference between itself and the (allegedly) different thing. So we conclude that if difference is the attribute of a thing that is differ- ent, it must itself be different from that thing, and be established by a separate cognition. Otherwise the thing and its difference would be identical. However, we cannot perceive the difference of a different thing as really different from that thing, even by a separate cognition. And if the difference between two things is accep- ted as different from the two different things it differenti- ates, then there is still the problem of infinite regress (since every perception of difference would depend on a further perception of something different to establish that difference, and the further perception of difference would itself entail a further perception and so on). Mutual exclusion (anyonyabhava) between two things is also impossible in the same way, if it is non-different from dif- ference. And if it is taken as different from difference, the difficulties about difference in general still apply. there cannot be either difference or mutual exclusion between Thus

subject and object. Again, if difference and exclusion are perceptible and so belong to the side of the object, they cannot be attributes of the subject, any more than any other perceptible entity or object can. But if they are not perceptible, then their existence cannot be proved. If they were self-evident (that is, if they did not require proof) they would not be different from the subject. Therefore difference and exclusion are not characteristics of the subject, nor are they its nature. Nor can one thing have two forms. Nor are difference and exclu- sion different from each other. (I.S. pp.2-10, summarized)

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The procedure used here for the refutation of difference should be compared with that in Section Two (Tarka Kanda) of the Brahma Siadhi, the Section that deals with dialectic (see Potter, 1981, pp. 376-87).

(2) Nor should it be supposed that, because subject and object are thus non-different, it follows from that that they are identical, For there is no manifestation of their non- difference, while their appearance of difference is universally evident. Nor is the non-difference of subject and object due io their being invariably perceived together. For they are not invariably perceived together, seeing that the subject is not perceived at all, Nor can it be said that they always manifest together. For the subject is constant and eternal, being self- luminous. But objects like lightning and so on are not of this kind. But is it not the case that I have myself said that no dif- ference between them can be cognized? And does not this mean that they are non-different? No. It does not mean it. All I.have said is that no difference between them can be cognized. Therefore there cannot be non-difference between subject and object on the basis of perception, as they are not so per- ceived; nor can there be non-difference between them on the ground of rational argument, since they are contradictory, like darkness and light. (I.S. pp.10-18, summarized)

(3) Nor is it right to say that subject and object are dif- ferent in themselves (reading nabhedah, cp. I.S. p.18,line 4), although non-different as the Absolute. For if they were both non-aifferent from the one Absolute, there could be no differ- ence between them. Suppose you said that subject and object are different in their own intrinsic forms, and non-different only when thought of in a form that is not their own (i.e. when conceived as identical with the Absolute). To this we would reply as fol- lows. If it be said that there is identity between imagined forms of subject and object, which do not really belong to them, and the Absolute - is it being said that the Absolute is the forms or that the forms are the Absolute? As you are clearly not saying that the Absolute is the forms, the Abso- lute remains different from subject and object as before; or, if subject and object are not different from the Absolute, then they cannot be mutually different at all. Of course, if even the imagined forms themselves are different from the Absolute, subject and object (being mutually different) must be different from the Absolute too. Nor can subject and object really have two forms through one of which they are identical. The subject cannot have the form of the object; neither can the object have the form of the subject. Nor is there any third possibility (since subject and object, Self and not-self, are contradictories, like cow and not-cow, and

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exhaust reality between them by the Law of the Excluded Middle). Therefore, since neither subject nor object can have two forms, they must either be different or non-different; they cannot be (as the theorists of Difference in Identity would have it) both different and non-difrerent, as they cannot have two forms (in the manner that this theory would require). Nor can the two notions 'different' and 'not-different' each apply to hoth subject and object if the latter do not have more than one form, as it would imply the absurd consequence that differ- ence and non-difference meant the same thing. And the notion that one thing has two forms is itself also contradictory. For if you say that one thing has two forms, are you saying that the variety of forms are non-different from the one thing, or different, or both different and non-different? these alternatives it will be hard to make out how one thing On any of

can have two forms. So the Difference in Identity theory, too, is defective -- that which seeks to maintain that subject and object are non-different as the Absolute, though different in themselves. (I.S. pp.18-22, summarized)

216 THE AUTHOR'S DIALECTICAL METHOD

The portion of the work dealing with the relation of subject and object has been set forth in extremely abbreviated form to show the manner of the Ista Siddhi's approach to the topics of Vedanta, and to give a taste of its logical methods. The sort of formulae we find very often throughout the work are: 'Is this real, unreal, or both real and unreal? In relation to "x" is it different, non-different or both different and non- different?' Alternatives are brought forward and the defects of each alternative exposed. We now cite another portion of the work to help bring home to the reader the essence of the method employed.

(1) And, so, because it is free from difference and the rest, the subject is not tainted by even a suspicion of any defect like coming into being (existence, growth, development, decline, destruction, etc., cp. M.V.121, intro.). In fact, these defects cannot be proved to exist even in the object. How much less can they be attributed to the subject! For consider, There can be no relation of substance and attribute, whether the substance and attribute be taken as dif- ferent from one another, or as non-different. The whole con- cept of difference and non-difference has already been refuted (cp. M.V.215). And how could an entity that had no attribute, and consequently no contact with qualities of any kind, have contact with defects? Again, no difference of any kind can touch a reality. For if the difference be taken either as different from the reality that is supposed to be different, or as both different and

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non-different from it, then this will imply a new difference, and this new difference will imply a new difference and so on to infinity in vicious regress. But if the dirference is taken as non-different from the thing that is supposed to be different, then the difference and the thing will be one. And that one will be the thing and not the difference, since with- out the thing there could be no difference. If you say it is the unity here that is the reality, we are agreeable. But the reality is one only. And that is not an object. For objects depend for their existence on another, and are incompatible with non-duality. The reality must therefore be the subject. For the latter can be a true unity, since it is self-established and self-revealed (and so inde- pendent and also capable of being non-dual). And its unity is not an attribute, or the above-mentioned difficulties about difference would apply. And so when we use the word 'one' in this context we mean an entity that is without differentiation and without attributes. When the attribute of difference is absent, there can be no other attributes, since they all de- pend on that for their existence. For attributes are mutually different, and a mutual difference can only subsist between two different things. It cannot subsistwhere there is no difference whatever. And since the presence within reality of a combination of being and non-being is unintelligible, reality is one and homogeneous. The presence of a combination of being and non-being is unintelligible because, if being and non-being are taken as mutually different, we fall into the above-mentioned infinite regress, which characterizes all dif- ference; while if being and non-being are not taken as mutually different, there will be (no difference between them and so) no combination of one with the other. But without some form of non-being, nothing can come into existence, remain or pass away. For nothing can be known to comc into existence unless its previous non-existence is known. The mere perception of something not previously perceived is not of itself enough to prove that it has come into existence. Nor can one prove that a thing has not been previously per- ceived unless such absence of perception is critically estab- ished. Since their previous non-existence cannot be establish- ed, neither objects nor perceptions can come into being. When there is no coming into being, the other modifications that follow (existence, growth, development, decline, destruction, etc. ) cannot take place, since they presuppose coming into being. So the real is raised above all change, of one form, self-established and self-revealed - or, if not, its existence could not be proved. For it cannot have two forms (one proved and one not). If you claim that it exists but that its exist- ence is not proved, that is as good as saying that it does not exist. If it is self-established, (and it is self-established), then it must be the subject only that is the real .... And so our view is that nothing can come into being anywhere

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in any way. Destruction, and other modifications that follow coming-into-being, therefore, do not come into the question. Hence it was only right to say that, when these defects do not even apply to the object, there can be no thought of their being related to the subject. It therefore stands proved that immediate experience is infinite. (I.S. p.23-4)

This passage should be compared with the part of Śri Sankara's Commentary on the Taittiriya Upanishad (Gambhirananda, 1957, pp.301-6) which deals with the iniinitude of the Absolute. It will then clearly be seen how top-heavy with independent intel- lectual arguments the present work is in comparison with (Śri Sankara's) reasoning based on immediate experience. The dialectic of the Ista Siddhi is also quite evidently different from the purely negative dialectic (avita-nyaya) of the fourth Book of Gaudapada's Karikas, intended only to refute wrong opinions.

217 BECAUSE THE WORLD IS INDETERMINABLE, NON-DUALITY IS SAFEGUARDED

If the whole realm of the objective is neither a reality nor an unreality, is neither different from the Absolute nor non- different, and is not 'both different and non-different' - then what is the status of the world-appearance of duality? One cannot say that the universe does not exist, or, if we did, it would imply that perception and all the other means of empirical knowledge existed but that there were no objects for them, and it would be impossible to find a place for the ritualistic teaching as well as the metaphysical teaching of the Veda. On the other hand, if there is a universe, it must be either different from the Absolute, or else non-different or else both different and non-different. It cannot be any- thing else. Facing the objection formulated in this way, which. implies the charge that the existence of the Absolute is indefensible on any of these three hypotheses, Ācārya Vimukt- ātman said:

(1) There is no defect at all in our own view. For we accept that the universe is the work of Maya. And Maya and its effects are indeterminable either as a reality or as an unreal- ity. On our system, there is not even a suspicion of the defects that affect the doctrine that the world is totally real and the doctrine that it is totally unreal. (I.S. p.32)

On the theory that the world is of indeterminable reality- grade, perception and the other means of empirical knowledge retain their authority as sources of valid cognition.

(2) The whole experience of a dreamer, including his means of

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valid cognition and their objects, is of indeterminable reality-grade; but it remains uncontradicted until he awakens. And there are cases (such as that of the roaring of a dream- lion) where the awakening to reality which destroys the dream- world occurs through causes belonging to that world. So it should be understood that there is nothing contradictory if we maintain that the same kind of awakening can occur from the waking state. (I.S. p.34)

(3) Thus the Absolute is as we have defined it (M.V.213,1). And yet, through rescrt to its illucory power of Ignorance it becomes the cause of the projection, maintenance and withdrawal of the whole world, and assumes as its body all the multifari- ous and variegated forms beginning with the Cosmic Intellect (mahat), and thereby becomes a fit and intelligible object for perception and the other means of empirical knowledge, and an appropriate field for carrying out the injunctions of the Vedic texts on ritual and meditation. This being so, one should not imagine that there is even a hint of a contradiction in our doctrine. (I.S. p.35)

The Ista Siddhi adopts and uses the same formula as the author of the Bhamati when the latter maintained that he was elimina- ting all defects by accepting that all this world is indeter- minable. You could say that he virtually followed the same course.

218 PROOF THAT THE UNIVERSE IS THE EFFECT OF THE INDETERMINABLE ILLUSORY POWER OF IGNORANCE

How is the world the work of Maya?

(1) We know that the world is the work of Maya from such traditional texts as 'One should know that Maya is the material cause of the world' (Svet.IV.10), 'Indra goes about in many forms through his magic powers (maya)' (Brhad.II.v.19) and 'This illusory appearance was projected by Myself' (M.Bh. XII.339.45-6, G.P. Ed.). (I.S. p.36)

(2) Ignorance, indeterminable as real or unreal, is known as 'Maya'. But is it not a contradiction in terms to say 'It is called indeterminable?' No, there is nothing wrong here, .as 'indeterminable' is qualified by 'as real or unreal'. When it is rationally considered, one cannot say of it either 'It is' or 'It is not'. For neither of these phrases will character- ize it, as it is different from either the real or the unreal. Hence it is called 'indeterminable' but not 'inexpressible'. It was typical of you (Bhaskara, cp. M.V.160,3) to raise this objection even though you heard the qualification 'as real or

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unreal'. (I.S. p.35)

This is a reply to Bhaskara's criticism 'If you say "indeter- minable as real or unreal" we reply that this would have con- scquences that you jourseif would not accept' (M. V. 160, 3).

(3) Perhaps you will object to the formula (fer describing the world) 'the effect of Ignorance, which is indeterminable as real or unreal' on the ground that we do ict encounter any- thing of this kind in worldly experience. 'If anything of such a kind existed', you might say, 'then you might claim that the world, too, was indeterminable. Bui nothing of this kind does exist'. This objection, howevcr, will not hold. For we find shell-silver and other illusions which match this definition. (I.S. p.38-9)

In Vimuktātman's system Avidyā and Māya are accepted as synony- mous terms. There is an unambiguous claim that the two words mean the same when it is said that the Absolute resorts to the illusory power (māya) of Ignorance (avidya), and becomes the cause of the projection, maiutenance and withdrawal of the whole world, and assumes as its body all the multifarious and variegated forms beginning with the Cosmic Intellect (M.V. 217,3). In Śri Śankara's system, however, we find:

(4) Name and form, imagined through Ignorance ... are spoken of in the Veda and Smrti as the 'Power of Māyā' (māya-śakti) belonging to the omniscient Lord and as 'Nature'. (B.S.Bh. II.i.14, M.V.45,1)

(5) For the seed-power is of the nature of Ignorance, referred to by the term 'the Unmanifest', having its foundation in the supreme Lord, illusory through and through (maya-mayi), the great sleep. (B.S.Bh.I.iv.3, cp. M.V.195,6, note)

What is taught here (by Śri Śankara) is an illusory display (maya) of name and form imagined through Ignorance. And that is correct and reasonable. For it is correct to accept Igno- rance as resting in the Self in its aspect as delimited by the mind, in order to relate knowledge and Ignorance to the same being. And it is also correct to place the illusory display (maya) of name and form on the side of the object, as it is taken as the object of an act of unfolding in such upanishadic texts as 'Let Me unfold name and form' (Chand.VI.iii.2).

(6). And because, when the matter is examined critically, it is found impossible to determine whether it is one or many, a reality or an unreality, differentiated or not differenti- ated, with or without parts ... (I.S. p.63)

What is lacking in this system is a clear statement of how

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Maya could be indeterminable. In the case of the shell-silver, we may say that it is not existent like the shell, nor com- pletely non-existent like a horn growing from a human forehead and other fantasies never met with in practical life. So here there are grounds for speaking of indeterminability. But the case with Maya is different. For one cannot point to anything non-existent outside Maya in order to establish that Maya is neither existent ror non-existent. Since all is an effect of Maya, there cannot be anything outside it.

219 THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ABSOLUTE; MAYA AND THE WORLD

We have mentioned (M.V.213,1) that the words in the benedictory stanza with which the Ista Siddhi begins, 'I bow to that ... which serves as the wall on which is painted the fresco of this illusory appearance of a world, beginning with the Cosmic In- tellect' are a description of the Absolute. The image is ex- plained further as follows:

(1) The phrase 'the fresco of this illusory appearance of a world' implies that the fresco is painted by Maya. 'The fresco' means something like a fresco, not an actual fresco. 'The wall' means something like a wall, not an actual wall. And what is here referred to is immediate experience as the support of Maya. That is the wall on which the illusory appearance of the universe, beginning with the Cosmic Intellect, comes into being. The word we use for 'fresco' (citra) is etymologically cognate with 'cayana', meaning 'what is capable of being per- ceived', that is, the realm of the objective. The realm of the objective is said to have its support in immediate experi- ence, and this shows its essential nullity. Jt is like saying 'Darkness has its support in the sun' or 'Coldness has its root in fire'. Or we may take 'citra' in its conventional (non-etymological) sense of 'many-coloured and multiform'. To say that its sup- port is immediate experience, which is uniform, is to emphasize further that nullity. It is like attributing touch, colour, taste and smell to the subtle imperceptible ether, or like say- ing that the various different illusions for which a rope may be mistaken - such as the illusory snake, streamlet, slit in the ground, stick or streak of urine from an ox - are all 'supported by the rope'. A fresco painted on the absolutely smooth surface of a wall evokes the erroneous notion of heights and depths that are not there. The world, too, is 'strange' (citra) like a fresco (citra). On immediate experience, which is uniform, it gener- ates erroneous ideas, such as the idea that it has distinctions and is a realm of change, that it is not-self, that it is not happy, that it has spatial distinctions such as in front and

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behind and inside and outside. And just as the fresco has no reality except as the wall, and undergoes production, main- tenance and destruction only on that location - so does the world relate to and depend on immediate experience alone. and hence it is aptly called e fresco. But when the verse speaks of 'this illusory appearance of a world' (maya-citra) the point being made is as follows. Although the fresco has no separate reality of its own, the colours from which it is made have their own reality separate from that of the wall: but this is not the case with the material cause of the fresco of the world. (i.e. with Maya). For Maya is indeterminable either as differont from or non-different from immediate experience. We know that the world is the work of Maya from such texts as 'One should know that the naterial cause (prakrti) of the world is an illusion (maya)' (Svet. iV.10). And just as the Absolute is known according to its definition through such texts as 'The Real, Knowledge, the Infinite' (Taitt.II.1), so one should conclude that it is only through resorting to Maya that it projects the world and assumes a plurality of forms. For this knowledge comes on the authority of the Veda. If it were not accepted, Non-duality would be contradicted. (I.S. p.35-6)

Because of the use of the examples of the fresco and the rope- snake, we gather that whatever is perceived is superimposed on the Self. Here one might raise the questiom, 'Why is the problem of the cause of the world tackled first, without a previous ezquiry into the nature of superimposition, which would appear to be the logical procedure?' The answer seems to be, 'Because this syatem is one of thcse which equate (reading abheda) Ignorance and Maya as materiai cause of the world' (so that Śri Sankara's distinctior between Ignorance as superimpo- sition, and name and form, superimposed through Ignorance as the material cause of the world, is lost.)

220 THE TREATMENT OF CAUSE AND EFFECT

The truth is that the Self can have no empirical experience without superimposition, and so superimposition should be the first subject of enquiry. But in the system of Vimuktatman it is (perversely) held that Maya is the cause of superimposition, and consequently that Maya should be given the first place. In conformity with that, we take up the study of Maya first here.

(1) Maya is referred to in the Vedas, Smrtis, Epics and Puranas by such terms as Maya, Ignorance (avidya), Darkness (tamas), the Cause (karana), Dissolution (laya), Cosmic Power (sakti), Sleep (supti), the Great Sleep (mahasupti), Sleep (nidra), the Indestructible (aksara), the Ether (akasa), in such

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texts as 'One should know that the material cause of the world is Maya' (Svet.1V.10). The claim made in the opening benedictory verse that it was the material cause (prakrti) of the whole world beginning with the Cosmic Intellect (mahat) was certainly correct. For, even in the world, errors like shell-silver, with their objects, are explained as being the work of Maya. And so it is demonstrated that the error of supposing that the Self is not the Absolute can only be dis- pelled through knowledge, like the shell-silver error. (I.S. I.34, p.144)

Here the following points should be noted. The statement 'Māya is referred to by terms like "Igmorance" and so on' is based om the system of the Pancapadika (P.P. p.98; M.V.132, 4;143, 4). But there is this difference. The Pañcapadika passage, having mentioned superimposition first, following Śri Sankara's Brahma Sutra Commontary, then goes on to eay that the power of Igno- rance (avidya-sakti) is referred to in the vedic and other texts by Maya and other terms. Here in the Ista Siddhi, what is first mentioned is the distinction between subject and object. It is ther taught that, as the object cannot be either distinct or non-distinct or both distinct and non-distinct from the subject, it must be indeterminable. Then Maya is mentioned as the seed from which the whole objective order springs. And it is claimed that it is Māya that is referred to by the term Ignorance (not vice versa as in Śri Śankara, cp. M.V.45,1). Both the Pancapadika and the Ista Siddhi, however, accept that Maya and Ignorance (avidya) are synonyms and are referred to by the term Prakrti in the Upanishads, although this is in fact nowhere the case. Both, therefore, teach a doctrine that is not in the Veda and which deviates from Śri Sankara's Brahma Sutra Commentary.

(2) But is it not the case that the word 'Maya' appears amongst names for consciousness (prajña; Yāska, Nighantu Kāņda of Nirukta, III.9)? How, then, can it be shown that Maya as material cause of the universe is indeterminable? But this objection is wrong. For we know from the very words of the Veda itself that both the effect of Maya, the world of duality, and knowledge of it, are indeterminable. Now, in the case of the judgment 'There is no pot here', the reference is to a pot that is known to exist at one place and whose existence at another is denied. But in the case of texts like 'There is no plurality whatever here; he goes from death to death who sees the appearance of plurality here' (Brhad. IV.iv.19) the reference is not to duality or to perception of it which is known to exist in one place and whose existence at ancther is denied. On the contrary, we have teaching that wherever duality is per- ceived it is set up in that place alone by metaphysical Igno- rance, teaching that has the same effect as a sentence like 'This is not silver'.

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Thus duality and perception of duality are shown by the Veda itseif io be indeterminable, like shell-silver. And from this we conclude that their (material) cause must be of the same nature. For the (material) cause is of the same nature as the effect. And we have already explained, and will explain again later, how what is absclutely real cannot enter into any cause- effect relation. And though the term 'Maya' is used to refer to consciousness (prajña), it is not a term used to mean the Absolute. For the other names of consciousness (listed in the Nighantu Kauda, Nirukta III.9) do not refer to the Absolute either. And the upanishadic text 'The Great Lord is the magician who operates this Maya' (Svet.IV.10) distinguishes the Absolute from Māya. The Absolute, since it consists of pure unchanging Conscious- ness, cannot function directly as the material cause of the universe. So should we perhaps assume that the alternative mcaning assigned to the word 'Maya' in the Nirukta was 'intel- lect'? But the intellect is not a cause. It is non-eternal, and is itself an effect, and we have already refuted the idea that an effect can be a cause (see M.V.222,1). Auid if the elements, beginning with the ether, were effects of intellect, then, being non-different from it, their material cause, they, too, would be non-eternal (against the Vedic tradition), and they could not be objects of the intellect's knowledge (since they would be non-different from the intellect). We have already explained (cp. I.S. p.113), and will be explaining again later (cp. I.S. p.177) how the intellect cannot, be the object of its own knowledge. And true experts in the Veda do not agree that the universe is an effect of intellect. And so it remains established that the material cause of the world

p.144-5) is indeterminable Maya or metaphysical Ignorance. (I.S. I.35,

Here there is a good deal that requires discussion. So we will divide the material into six sections (i-vi), each dealing with a passage quoted from the above extract.

(i) To begin with, the statement that the material cause of the universe is Maya, and that that is indeterminable Ignorance, contradicts the upanishadic traditions. The tradition carried in all the Upanishads is that it is the Absolute, and nothing else, that is the material cause from which the universe pro- ceeds. We have such texts as 'That from which these creatures are born' (Taitt.III.1), 'With roots above and branches below' (Katha II.iii.1), 'The universe is born here from the Indes- tructible principle' (Mund. I.i.7), 'Verily, the cosmic vital energy proceeds from the Self' (Prasna III.3), 'He is the Lord of all ... the source and ultimate goal of all beings' (Mand.6), 'He projected these worlds' (Ait.I.1.2), 'Then He projected fire' (Chand. VI.ii.3) and 'From this Self ... do all creatures come forth' (Brhad. II.i.10). And we have the words of the Lord

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Himself, 'I am the beginning, the middle and the end of all creatures' (Bh.G. X.20). We alsc have the Brahma Sutras, 'That from which proceed the origination, maintenance and dis- solutiom of this world' (B.S. I.i.2) and 'The Absolute must be understood as the material cause of the world, or otherwise there would be a contradiction between the thesis and the example offered to illustrate it' (B.S. I.iv.23).

(ii) Then there was the claim that in texts like 'There is no plurality whatever here' we have a denial of appearances set up in the Absolute by metaphysical Ignorance, on the model of a sentence like 'This is not silver'. With this we concur. The Veda only speaks of the Absolute as the cause of the world in order to convey that, in its true nature, the world is the Absolute. And so the negation of the universe, and also the teaching that the universe has the Absolute for its true nature, are both appropriate. Thus we find, for instance, 'And so there is the teaching "neither this nor that"' (Brhad. II.iii.6) and 'All this world is verily the Absolute' (Mund. II.ii.12).

(iii) Then there was another argument, the line of which was: 'Because it is known from Vedic revelation that duality and the perception of duality are indeterminable, like shell- silver, the Veda has implicitly declared that its material cause, Maya, is also indeterminable'. But with this argument we cannot agree. For it is not said that duality is indeter- minable like shell-silver in order to imply that its material cause is indeterminable. The implication is that the Absolute, which is real, assumes the form of the world through Ignorance, as shell and other things assume the forms of shell-silver and so on in common illusions. As a true expert has said:

(3) All entities that exist have a (real) cause. (G.K. I.6)

(4) As a rope imperfectly perceived in the dark is variously imagined as a snake or a stream of water or in other ways, so is the Self wrongly imagined as this and that. (G.K. II.17)

(iv) There was the further claim that the cause was of the same nature as the effect, and also that the absolutely real did not enter into the cause-effect relationship. On this we would make the following remarks. There is no rule that cause and effect are necessarily of like nature. That is why, when the philosopher of the Sankhya school makes the objection, as expressed in the Sutra 'No, because it is of a different nature' (B.S. II.1.4), that the world cannot have the Absolute for its material cause, because the Absolute of the Upanishads is fundamentally different from the world in nature - revered Bādarāyaņa contradicts it by saying 'But examples of such a thing are perceived' (B.S. II.i.6). As for the remark 'An absolutely real thing cannot enter

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into a cause-effect relationship', it is a half-truth. For a true expert (Gaudapada) has declared that that which is real as the cause may undergo 'productica' as the effect through illusory appearance (maya), and that the effect is indeed pro- duced through illusion from a real cause.

(5) Production from the real through illusory appearance is intelligible; a real production would not be intelligible. (G.K. III.27).

Cther texts could be cited to the same eifect. And no cne should attempt to retort that the phrase 'production through illusory appearance' implies a declaration that Maya is the material cause of the world. For the phrase 'production through illusery appearance' is nct affirming that the Absolute is a cause; its actual purpose is to deny reai production, as is clear from the original context. And the same author also said this at another place:

(6) If the world of plurality existed, it would no doubt really come to an end. But this duality is a mere illusion. Non-duality is the final truth. (G.K. I.17)

If you ask why shell-silver and the like are brought into the argument in Vedanta at all, we shall be explaining this point below (M.V.223,7, note) when dealing with the topic of cancel- lation of error.

(v) What has been said above is already enough to explain the truth about the claim 'The Absolute, since it consists of pure unchanging Consciousness, cannot function directly as the cause of the universe'. The true Vedantin is not concerned to teach that the Absolute is subject to being known through immediete intuition but rather to teach that the whole world is in truth only the (undifferentiated) Absolute. Perhaps you will ask, 'If that is so, why does the Veda teach that the Absolute becomes transformed into the world?' On this point the revered Commentator wrote as follows:

(7) But the Absolute becomes subject to transformation and to all empirical experience through apparent distinctions consist- ing of name and form, manifest and unmanifest, which are imagined through Ignorance and are indeterminable as being either the metaphysical reality itself or as being anything different. In its ultimately true form, however, it remains beyond all empirical experience and not subject to transfor- mation. (B.S.Bh.II.i.27, M.V.47,6)

But did not the Ista Siddhi say just this when it said that Maya only, and not the Absolute was the cause? No it did not. For the teaching of the revered Commentator is as follows. He

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held that the cause-effect relationship is attributed to the Absolute falsely. This false attribution occurs through an adjuct of name and form imagined through Ignorance, not natu- rally. Name and form, for their part, whether manifest or un- manifest, are imagined through Ignorance, sc that, from the standpoint of the final truth, there is no cause-nature or effect-nature in the Self. In the Ista Siddhi the doctrine is different. Thc world is made out to be indeterminable through quotation of texts and reasozing. The work theu argues (wrongly) that it is reason- able to suppose that an indeterminable entity has an indeter- minable cause. From this it is supposed to follow that the cause is indcterminable Ignorance, Ignorance being made synony- mous with Maya. The Self is a wall or which the world is a fresco painted by indeterminable Maya. This is a different doctrine from that of the revered Commentator, since it is manifestly out of tune with it.

(vi). Whem it was suid that, though Maya could be used as a name for corsciousness, it could not be used as a name for the Absolute because the text 'The Great Lord is the one who operates Maya' (Śvet. IV.10) separates Maya from the Absolute, that was correct. But the view of the Ista Siddhi that Maya means both the material cause of the world and metaphysical Ignorance does not follow from it. Why not? Because there is no evidence in worldly experience to show that Maya is anything at all, in the light of which one could affirm that it was the material cause of the world. The Upanishads ask whether the cause of the world is real or not, and reply that one should know that the world is an illusory display (māya) (Śvet. IV.10). That is, one should know that it is a mere false notion imagined through Ignorance. The sequel, 'The Great Lord is the one who cperates this magic illusion' confirms this inter- pretation. For it cannot be claimed that the Self is called the Great Lord in virtue of his possessing the power of delu- sion. The purpose of the verse is quite different. The magic power of a magician depends on the magician, and, in the same way, the material cause of the world depends on the highest Lord, and is in this sense like an illusory magic show - that is the correct interpretation of the verse. In places like 'Indra assumes many forms by his magic powers' (Brhad. II.v.19) the word 'maya' is used (through its meaning 'consciousness') to refer to (illusory) empirical cognitions. Even there, the fact that the cognitions are referred to in the plural number shows that they are unreal. And thus a true expert has said:

(8) The Self is unborn, but appears to undergo birth in vari- ous forms through Maya, as we know from such texts as 'There is no plurality whatever here' and 'Indra (goes about in many forms) through his magic powers'. (G.K. III.24, M.V.35,5)

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(9) Śankara's Commentary: But does not the word Maya mean consciousness? Yes, it does. There is nothing wrong, since the true meaning is that the consciousness of the organs of knowledge (indra = indriya) can be taken as an illusion, since it, is based on metaphysical Ignorance. So the phrase 'by his magic powers' really means 'through the cognitions of the instrumenis of knowledge, cognitions which are of the nature of Ignoranre'. (G.K.Bh, ITT.24)