1. Vedanta Siddhanta Muktavali Prakashananda Yati Aurtur Venis 1898

The Vedanta

Siddhantamu ..

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Prakaśananda

Prakashananda (Swami)

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Prakashanan.da THE

VEDĀNTA

SIDDHANTAMUKTĀVALI

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PRAKĀŚĀNANDA,

WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND NOTES

BY . ARTHUR VENIS, M. A. BALLIOL COLLEGE, FORMER BODEN SANSKRIT SCHOLAR OF OXFORD UNIVERSITY, . PRINCIPAL OF THE GOVERNMENT SANSKRIT COLLEGE, BENARES. cyyriyn neyisiereu unuer ACl AAV UJ 1001. All rights reserved.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली प्रकाशानन्दविरचिता। - १ ऋदृष्टद्वयमानन्दमात्मानं ज्योतिरव्ययम। विनिश्वित्य शरुते: सातादुत्तिस्तवाऽमिधीयते ॥ १ ॥ तवादो मङलं तत्वानुस्मरयरूपं सूचयन्रमिधेयप्रयोजने सात्ात्प्रतिपाद्य कर्तव्यं प्रतिघ्ानते पदृष्टेत्यादिना। आ्रात्मानमुक्त- विशेषण चतुष्टयविशिषनं श्रुतितोSपरोक्ीकृत्य तपोक्तविशेषणचतुष्टयवि- शिष्ट आत्मनि युक्रि: श्रुत्यनुयाहकस्तर्कौडभिधीयते इत्यन्वयः । २ नन्वात्मसाधास्कारे मुत्यपेनेष नास्ति देहादेरेवात्मत्वात तस्य व लोकिकप्रत्यवादिसिदत्वादिति घेतृ न। 1. Having first gained through Veda a true intuition of that Self, which has no second self and which is bliss and light and is imperishable, we next expound the method of reasoning in regard to that Self .... I. In the opening words 'which has no second self, &c.' the author implies a benediction recalling to mind the Reality ( Brah- man ); and having directly shown the subject matter of his work (i. e. ratiocination in regard to the Self) and its aim (i. e. the attainment of Bliss which is Brahman) he premises his task. The grammatical construction is as follows: Having gained through Veda an intuition of the Self with its four above men- tioned characteristics, reasoning, i. e. ratiocination which. is con- firmatory of Veda, is now expounded in regard to it, tatra, i. e. the Self as characterised in the aforesaid manner. 2. It may be objected that Veda is certainly not necessary Heretical objection : Veda is super- to bring about an intuition of the fluous. Self; for the body and the senee- organs (adi) are the Self, and the existence of this- Self is

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली। SY

आात्मा नित्योऽयवाऽनित्यो भेदस्त्वाद्ये स्फुटो मतः । अन्त्ये कृतस्य हानि: स्यादकृताभ्यागमस्तथा ।२॥

पात्मनो नित्यत्वातृ। जगद्वेवितयस्याऽदृष्टहेतुकत्वात् अन्यथा वेचित्यानुपपत्ते: दृष्टस्य वणविनाशित्वात् ऋदृष्टस्य व पूर्व- जन्मसम्बन्धित्वेन तदाभयस्यात्मनोSनादित्वादनादिभावस्य च नित्यत्वनियमात अन्यथा कृतहान्यकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात देहादेश्व

नात्मत्वनिश्चयात् तस्य व नित्यस्यात्मनोऽविनाशी वा भ्ररेऽयमा- त्माऽनुच्छितिधर्मेत्यादिश्तिषिद्स्यापरोक्षीकरये द्वारान्तराभावाद

proved by ordinary sense-perception and inference (adi). This objection is rejected :- The Self is either eternal or non-eternal. If eternal, then

Reply thereto : Self is neither body the difference (between the Self nor sense-organs, for it is eternal : It and the body) is clear ( for no one is eternal, because the inequalities of the present life demand an eternal believes the body to be eternal). Self : Revelation alone can make known If non-eternal, then what the in- the Eternal Self. dividual had done in a former life would be lost, and further the consequences of actions which he had never performed, would accrue to him (in the present life). ... II.

(It is rejected ) because the Self is eternal. For the diver- sities of the present world must have their source in the unseen retributive power of actions (adrista),-these diversities being inexplicable on any other assumption, since that which is seen is transitory-and since the unseen power links on to prior stages of existence, the Self as the locus of this unssen power must be beginning-less and also end-less, in accordance with the establish- ed induction that a positively existing thing can have no end, if it had no beginning.

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

स्त्येव शुत्यपेता इत्यभिप्रेत्योक्तमव्ययमिति। न विद्यते व्ययो विनाशो धर्मतः स्वरूपतोऽवयवतो वा यस्य स तथा। निरवयष- निर्टधर्मकः कूटस्थनित्य: परिपूर्य इत्यर्थः । ३ नन्वात्मनि प्रमाणमस्ति न वा। न चेत्तस्याऽसन्वापत्ति: न ह्ि प्रमायविरहियो नरशृङ्गादे: सत्वं पश्यामः । ब्राद्े तत्किं लोकिकं वेदो वा। नाद्य: तस्य निर्धमंकत्वात इन्द्रियाणां च.रुपा- दिमत्पराग्वस्तुविषयत्वेन तद्याप्रहेतोर निश्चयेनानुमानाविषयस्वात् If the Self were not eternal (anyatha ) it would follow that the retributive power of actions could not be realised and that the results of certain actions would accrue to an individual who had not done those actions. And it is certain that the body and the sense-organs (adi), which are an aggregate of products, are not the Self; for they are non-eternal, are products and possessed of form, are non-intelligent and limited, &c. And that Veda is necessary follows from the fact that no other means exists for the intuition of that eternal Self which is established in such pass- ages as 'Verily that Self is imperishable and of an indestructible nature.' With this view the word imperishable, avyayam, was used ( of the Self in our opening verse )-that is imperishable of which no vyaya, destruction is known as regards either attri- butes or essential nature or parts, which means that the Self has neither parts nor attributes, being eternally unchanged and infinite. 3. An objection is brought forward in the form of a question : Objection : No evidence, natural or Is there any evidence for the supernatural, for the Self. Self or not? If not, then it fol- lows that the Self does not exist, for we are not conscious of the existence of the horns of a man or like imaginary objects, to which no source of evidence is applicable. If any evidence exists, is it sensible or supersensible (sc. Veda) ? Not sensible. For the Self ( as declared above) is without attributes (and only that which

Brihad: Up. IV. 5. 14.

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8 सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

प्रत्यच्वादाषिषयत्वेन लोकिकवाक्याSविषयत्वात तदन्यविषयत्वस्य सम्भावयितुमशक्यत्वात्। द्वितीयेपि वेदजन्यज्ञानभास्यत्वं वा प्रका- रन्तरेय भासमानस्य वेदिकज्ताननिवत्यSज्ञानविषयत्वं वा। नाद वेदज न्यज्ञानभास्यत्वेन घटादिवज्नडत्वादनात्मत्वार्पततिः । द्वितीये किं. तत्प्रकारान्तरं स्वयं मानान्तरं वा। चरमे दोषस्योक्तत्वाद् मद्यः परिशिष्यते तक्ट नसम्भवति स्वयंप्रकाशमानस्याच्चानविषय- त्वानुपपते: । न ह्वि स्वयंप्रकाशमानस्वरूपे मध्यन्दि नर्वा्नेन्यादित्ये तम: सम्भावयितुमपि शक्थम्। possesses attributes can be known through the senses). And since the sense-organs can make known only external objects possessing form &c., there is no means of gaining a perceptional knowledge of the logical reason* ( middle term ) as being invariably attended by the Self ( or major term here), and (in the absence of this knowledge, the induction or universal major premise of the syllogism cannot be formed ), therefore the Self cannot be proved through a process of inference. Nor can the Self be known through what is technically termed *verbal evidence, since it is not an object of perception or inference; nor possibly even through the other sources of knowledge ( technically termed *presumptive evidence and evidence from *non-perception of an object; for both these are, in the first instance, dependent on sense-perception which, as shown above, is inapplicable to the Self). ' Secondly, if the evidence is supersensible, it may be asked, Is the Self made known ( lit. illumined ) by the knowledge gained through Veda; or, while shining forth through some other means, is it made an object of (i. e. invested by) Nescience, which is de- stroyed by knowledge gained through Veda? On the first alter- native it follows that the Self loses its self-hood (sc. character of Brahman, Intelligence), for it must be unintelligent, like earthen

vi. 91. vii. 813, 318. . cf. Vedantaparibhachs: Pandit Journal. New Series: Vol. v. 620 et seq:

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सिट्धान्तमुक्तावली।

जीवान्या ब्रह्मपदा ह्यविद्या तत्त्वविन्मता। तद्विरुदुमिदं वाक्यमात्मा त्वज्ञानगोचर: ॥३॥ मन्यात्मशब्देन जीवः कथ्यते स चाडधानस्याशयो न तु विषय: विषयत्वं तु ब्रह्मय एव। स च जीबोऽनेकोऽम्यथा व्यव- स्थानुपपत्ति: । यस्य तु श्रवमाद्भ्यासपाटवेन ब्रह्मात्मावबोघस्तस्य pots &c., (which require illumination by Brahman before they can become objects for our consciousness), in that it has to be illumined by the knowledge gained through Veda. Adopting the other alternative, what are the other means? Does the Self know itself? Or is it known through some other evidence? The faultiness of the latter assumption having been exposed above, the former remains to be dealt with and is inadmissible: for a self- luminous Self cannot be invested by Nescience, no more than it is possible to think of darkness as existing in the self-luminous sun at noon. 4. Against this, some thinkers, keeping in view the demands

Met by a Vedantin of the not thorough of bondage and emaneipation, type, who replies that the above argu- narrow Vedantic monism (by ment does not.apply, because it is Brah- man and not the Self or jiva (personal teaching that Brahman and jiva sentiency) that is invested by Nescience. The jivas are many and distinct from or personal sentiency are distinet, Brahman. Nescience also is a plurality. and that there is a plurality of jīvas), and not tolerating the opinion that the Self (or jiva) is an: object for i. e. is invested by Nescience, urge the following :: KRowers of the truth maintain that Nescience has jiva as its locus and Brahman as its object. Opposed to this is the declara- tion that the Self (jiva) is an object for Nescience ... III. Certainly jiva is intended by the word Self. It is the locus of Nescience. And the jivas are many, otherwise the transmi- gratory order of things could not be accounted for. Thus, he who has attained the knowledge that his Self is Brahman, through

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मोघस्तदितरस्य बन्ध इति। वत एवाच्चानान्यनेकानि कल्पन्ते। शन्यथाSस्ञानस्येकत्व एकच्ञानेनाऽज्ानतत्कार्यस्य कृत्स्स्य निवृत्ता प्रत्यवादिसिदुस्य जगतोऽननुभवप्रसङ्गः।न चेतावता कालेन कस्यापि धानं न जातमिति साम्प्रतं प्राचीनानां सम्यक साङ्गोपाङ्गसाधनानु- प्वामुयां व्यासवसिष्ठादीनामपि ज्ञानानुत्पत्ताविदानींतनानां घ्ानो-

यानुरोधेन सत्यमेव द्वेतं किं न स्यादिति चेतु तथ वत्तव्यम। proficient practice in the means prescribed in the Veda termed *hearing, pondering and deep meditation, is emancipated; and he who is without this knowledge is in the bondage of the transmi- gratory world. For the same reason Nescience also must be conceived of as a plurality. For if Nescience were a uuity, then as soon as one single soul had gained the knowledge (described above) there would be an end to Nescience and all its products, whence it would follow that the world whose existence is given in perception &c. would no longer be an object of consciousness (to other souls). Nor can it be justly argued that up to the present time no one has gained sueh knowledge. For if such knowledge was not attained by ancient sages like Vyasa and Vasishtha, who practised all the means, principal and subordinate, for its attainment, its realisation by men of the present day cannot be imagined even to be possible; hence the latter would not turn to 'hearing' and the other prescribed means, and it would therefore follow that for them there could be no emancipation. 5. Here a question may be asked :- Why should not the Why not hold the world to be real as dual order of things be consider- given in ezperience ! ed real, in accordance with the

cf. Vod : paribh : Pandit : Vol. vii, p. 471.

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सिट्ठान्तमुक्तावला।

प्रत्यवादिप्रमायानां प्रमात्वं परतो यदि। अनवस्था स्फुटा तब स्वतस्त्वे दोषसंशय: ।४। किमिदं प्रत्यवादे: प्रामाएयं व्यवहारसमर्थारथेविषयत्वं वा सर्वथाऽबाधितार्थविषयत्वं वा। मादे कन्पितार्थत्वेनाप्यविरोधः। अन्त्ये तत्किं स्वतः परतो वा। नादः प्रत्यवादे: सम्भावितदोष- त्वेन स्वप्रामापयं प्रति दोषाSभावयाहकप्रमायान्तरसापेवत्वेन स्वत- स्त्वाभावात। नापरः गृहीतप्रामाययस्य प्रामाययनिश्चायकत्वेऽनव- स्थानात्। अगृहीतप्रामाययस्य तथात्वे प्रामाययनिश्चयस्य वेयथ्यात data of perception and the other sources of knowledge, just as Nescience was assumed above to be a plurality to accord with the transmigratory order of the world ? The reply is as follows :- If the trustworthiness of perception and the other sources of Because erperience cannot vouch for knowledge is proved by some fur- its own truth : nor is there any voucher ther evidence, then clearly a re- for it : Besides Revelation declares the unreality of the world. gressus in infinitum results. If the trustworthiness is self-proved, it is vitiated by the doubt that (often) arises with regard to the knowledge supplied by perception &c. - IV. What is this trustworthiness of perception &c. ? Does it con- sist in the things known being such as admit of practical treat- ment in daily life ; or such as can never be proved unreal? lf the former, there is no opposition between your view and our own in that (we hold ) then the objects of perception &c. to be falsely surmised (unreal) objects. If the latter, then it may be asked,-Is this trustworthiness self-proved or proved through some further evidence ? Not self- proved, for perception, inference &c. being liable to error demand in support of their trustworthiness, some further evidence which shall testify to their freedom from defect. Nor does their trust- worthiness depend on any further evidence; for a regressus in infinitum results, if the voucher for the trustworthiness of the first cognition is a second whose trustworthiness has been vouched

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प्रथमेनेव विषयनिश्चयात्। किंध नेह नानास्ति किंधन मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यादिति च प्रतिपत्रोपाधे।* निषिट्ठमानत्वमायाप्रकृति- त्वाम्यां कृत्स्स्य जगतो मिथ्यात्वप्रदर्शनेन तद्विषयस्य प्रत्यक्षादेर- प्रामाययस्य श्रुत्येव दर्शिंतत्वात् । तस्माह्यवस्थानुरोधेन इन्द्रो मायाभि: पुरुरुप ईयते इति मायामिरिति बहुवचनानुरोधेन व

नविषयत्वं विकल्पितमिति सङ्रेषः । for (by a third cognition). And if the voucher of the first cognition is one whose trustworthiness is itself unvouched for, tben the ascertainment of the trustworthiness of the first cogni- tion is a useless proceeding ; for certitude as to the object may as well be gained solely through the first'cognition. Moreover, by the declaration of the unreality of the whole

Brihad: Up: IV. 4-19. world, in such passages as 'There is in it ( Brahman ) no diversity'

Śvetáś : Up: IV. 10. and 'know that the material cause of the world is Maya'- (in the first passage ) by means of the negation ( of duality ) with regard to ( Brahman, which is) the substrate of the erroneously surmised (world ), and (in the second passage ) by means of the qualification that the material cause of the world is Māya ( unreal ) -Śruti also declares the untrustworthiness of perception, inference &c. which make known the world. Hence out of a regard both for the transmigratory order of things and for the plural form of the word Maya in the text,

Rig Veda, IV. 47, 18. 'Indra of many forms goes along by his magic powers,' it must be maintained that Nescience is a plurality, residing in the jivas and investing Brahman. The Self or jiva cannot therefore be sup- posed to be an ohject for i. e. invested by Nescience. This is a summary of the views ( of § 4). *A Vedantic technicality, usually oxplained by प्रतपव्रस्य आ्रारोपिसंस्य जगत उपाधिरधिळानं ग्रह्ह।

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६ अप वदन्लि नीवत्र सप्रयोगाभ्यामेकं वस्त्वथवा द्यम। आाध्े त्विष्ठं ममेष स्यात् द्वितीये त्वन्मतक्वतिः ।५॥ जीषब्रह्मशब्दाभ्यामात्मेवोच्यते उत जीवशब्देनात्मा ब्रह्म- शब्देन तु तदन्यदिति ।. बाद्ये कथमात्मनो नाऽज्ञानविषयत्वं ब्रह्मशब्दे नापि तस्येवाभिधानात। ननु पात्मनोSज्ञानविषयत्वे कथं तस्य भानं तमसाSSवृतत्वात न हयन्कारावृतो घटो दृश्यते इति चेतु न प्रद्वयानन्दरूपेरोव तस्याSज्ञानविषयत्वात् चेतन्यमाचस्येव भासमानत्वात तस्य चाऽज्वानाऽविषयत्वात अन्यथाSज्ञानस्याप्यसि- द्गपत्तेः । श्रद्यानन्दस्वरूपं चेतन्यमाचादभिन्नमेवेति चेतु। 6. With regard to the above views some may ask .- Do the words jiva and Brabman denote one substance or two? The Vedantin of § 4 is refuted by an One, you say? To this I agree. opponent who adopts for the time being Two substances? Then your te- the rigorous Vedanta of our author, (u) jiva and Brahman are really one and the net (of Monism, sc. Brahman is same though falsely imagined through the sole substance ) is invalidat- Nescience to be distinct. ed ... V. Is only the Self denoted by both words jiva and Brahman? Or does the word jiva denote the Self, and the word Brahman denote something else? If both words denote the Self, how can the Self not be an object for Nescience ? For by the word Brah- man. (you say ) the Self is intended ( and Brahman you hold to be an object for Nescience, cf. v. 3). Against this you may argue that if the Self were an object for Nescience, it could not shine forth as being involved in darkness (Nescience), just as an earthen pot, involved in darkness, is not visible. Not so. For only in its character of the sole Reality and supreme Bliss is the Self an object for Nescience, since it is only to the Self as Intelligence that the character of shining forth belongs. And the Self as Intelligence cannot be an object for Nescience, for if this were possible, the existence of Nercience could not be proved (for, if Nescience involved the Self, there would be no witness of Nesci-

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90 सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

सत्यम। वस्तुतस्तथेव। कथं तर्झयच्ानविषयत्वव्यवस्थेति चेतु

मानेप्यात्मनि मिथ्येव भेदं परिकल्पाद्वयानन्दस्वरूपस्य विषयत्वा- भिधानम चेतन्यमाचमेव भासते नानन्दस्वरूपमिति भ्रान्तप्रतीत्य- नुरोधात। कथमस्या: प्रतोतर्भ्रन्तत्वमिति चेतु परमप्रेमास्पदस्या- त्मन प्ानन्दस्वरूपेरोष भाषमानत्वादिति वदामः । तथापि पर- मार्थताऽज्ञानस्य विषयाश्ययोरभेंदो न निरूपित इति चेतु। सत्यम्। अविद्या स्वाश्नयाभिन्नविषया स्यातमो यतः । यथा बाह्यं तमा दृष्टं तथा चेयं ततस्तथा ॥ ६॥ ence). Again, you may urge that the Self, as the sole Reality and as supreme Bliss, is identical with Intelligence. This is quite true from the standpoint of absolute truth. How then, it may be asked, is the being an object for Nescience fixed on the Self as the one Reality and supreme Bliss? Through an eternally established connexion of Nescience ( with 'the Self ). Although, in reality, the Self shines forth as self-luminous, absolute and bliss- ful, a differentiation of it into parts is falsely imagined through Nescience; bence the Self in its character of the one Reality and supreme Bliss is said to be an object for Nescience. It is due to this false knowledge that the Self is said to shine forth in its character of Intelligence only, and not in its character of Bliss. But why, you ask, is this knowledge said to be false ? Because the Self, in this very character of Bliss, does shine forth as the object of our highest love .* You urge, however, that the difference be- tween the locus and object of Nescience was not declared by us to be absolutely real (-which we ought to have done, for Nescience being a power, sakti, demands that its locus and object should be absolutely distinct). True, we did not set forth the difference as absolutely real; for The locus and object of Nescience are identical. For Nescience As darkness resides within a honse is a kind of darkness, and is and pervades it, so Nescience resides in known as the external darkness and pervades Brahman. is. Hence, as in the case of exter- nal darkness, its locus and objeot are identical ... VI. * As shown in our derire to live, cf. Panchadaii I, 8.

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली। 99

तस्य तम:शब्दवाच्यस्य तदनपेवत्वात्। न हि गृहोदर- वर्नि तम: स्वाश्नयगृह्दान्तर्वर्तिदेशं न विषयीकरोति येन तदति- रिक्तमपेव्वेत। भत एव न द्वितीय।ऽपि। किज्जु ब्रह्मात्मनोर्विभिन्वत्वे भेद: स्वाभाविको यदि। बोपाधिकोडयवा भेद: सर्वथाऽनुपपतिक: । । ब्रह्मात्मनो: स्वाभाविको भेद: शपाधिको वा। आ्राद्ये आात्मभिन्नत्वेन ब्रह्मणो जडत्वापतिः । तथा व विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्र- होति श्रुतिव्याकोप: ब्रह्मणोSज्वानविषयत्वानुपपतिश्च। आरात्मनश्च For the thing denoted by the word darkness does not require that its locus and object should be different. For darkness within a house makes an object of the space within the house, while this space is itself the locus of the darkness; so that no space other than that within the house need be sought for as the object of the darkness. Hence too (i. e. since locus and object of Nescience are identical) the other alternative, viz., that the words jīva and Brahman denote two different substances, is inadmissible. Moreover, If Brahman and the Self (jiva) are distinct, tbeir differ- (b) The distinction into jiva (Self) ence must be either natural ( sc. and Brahman wholly unwarranted : constituted by the nature of each) or due to external limitations. In either case the difference is altogether incapable of proof ... VII. If the difference is natural, it follows that Brahman as

The distinction not determined from being different from Self is un- within, for then Brahma-hood and Self- intelligent (for Self is intelligent). hood would be at an end : And if this is so, the Sruti passage, 'Brahman is Intelligence, Bliss' is contradicted. And if unin- telligent, Brahman cannot be the object of Nescience (as held in §4 .; for whatever is unintelligent is Nescience, and to assume that Nescience invests itself is idle); and, further, it would follow that the Self, as being different from Brahman, would lose its self-hood (sc. its absolute, pervasive self-presentative character ) to become like earthen pots &c.

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म्र ह्मभिव्नत्वे घटादिषदनात्मत्वापनिः । द्विवीयेऽप्युपाथिनन्यत्वं खेयत्वं तन्तत्वं वा ग्रोपाधिकत्वम्। जीवत्रह्मभेदस्य, उपाधिरप्य- चानमेव वत्तव्यम पच्चानकार्यस्य कादाचित्कत्वेन जीवब्रस्विभा- गानुपाधिकत्वात। तब नाद्यः भेदोत्पत्ते: पूर्वमेव केवले प्ात्म-

पध्ानस्य जडत्वेन •भासकत्वानुपपतेः । नापि तृतीयः । तन्वत्वं

On the other alternative that the difference between jiva and Brahman is due to external limitation, it may be asked, Nor determined from without: for Does this limitation consist in Nescience, the only possible external . determinant in this case, can be neither the difference being an effect cause, actual or logical, of the distinc- tion, nor subject in which the distiuc- produced by the limiting condi- tion should inhere as attribute. tion as its cause, or in the dif- ference being made known through the limiting condition, or is it some other kind of dependence on the limiting condition? It must be premised that Nescience is the only limiting condition possible with regard to the difference between jiva and Brahman : for the products of Nescience ( sc. mind, sense-organs &c.), as being temporary, cannot be the conditions determining the difference between jiva and Brahman (-a difference which in the Vedanta is held to be eternal ab ante, anādi -- ). To consider these alternatives. The first is inadmissible, viz., Nescience as the li- miting condition is the cause of the difference, sc. the effect. For, since Nescience has been proved to have existed in the undiffer- enced Self even before the difference between jiva and Brahman was brought about, the differentiation is unnecessary (-the Vedantin of § 4 distinguished between jiva and Brahman in order to provide Nescience with locus and object; but the identity of the latter is proved in v. 6 et seq .- ). And Nescience cannot be admitted as an independent entity (sc. it must have a locus -- somewhere aud embrace some object: hence the assumption of a differentiation into jiva and Brahman effected through Nescience is unnecessary ). Nor is the second alternative admissible: for Nescience, the limiting condition, being itself unintelligent,

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93

हि विधा दृष्ट लोके जन्यत्वेन आश्नितत्वेन भास्यत्वेन च.। तब अन्यतमस्यापि प्रकारस्याSज्जाननिरुपितस्य प्रकृतेऽसम्भवात्

प्रह्मात्मभेदस्येति वाच्यं सम्बन्धस्य सम्बन्धितन्त्रत्वनियमात भेदस्य व तथात्वाभावात । तस्माज्नीवब्रह्यविभागशून्यमात्मान- मान्रित्य तमेव विषयीकरोतीत्यज्ञानविषयत्वमात्मन: सिट्म । तदुक्तम। आाश्रयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी निर्विभागचितिरेव केवला । पूर्वसिद्धुतमसो हि पश्चिमो नाश्यो भवति नापि गोधर: । can make known (lit. illumine) nothing. Nor is the third ad- missible. For the kinds of dependence commonly recognised are three, viz, the procession of an effect from a cause; the attach- ment of an attribute to a substrate; the cognitional relation between something made known and that which makes it known. And since, in the present case, neither of these kinds of depend- ence is possible with regard to Nescience, dependence on a- limiting condition cannot constitute the difference between * jiva and Brahman. Nor can it be urged that the difference between jiva and Brahman is dependence on' Nescience, like the relation which exists between Nescience and the Self,* jiva, (se. a relation not * Both causal and cognitional relation having been shown to be inapplicable to Nescience, the attributive relation remains to be disposed of. Thus : difference ( bheda) is negation (abhava) : every negation has as its counter-entity ( pratiyogi ) that which is negated, and resides in a locus ( anuyogi: wedtfa in the sense of locus used also in such a case as घठवद्तलम्, where भूतल is अनुयोगि also need in sense of fersonr): other than the pratiyogi : thus, the judgment, "jiva and Brab- man are different" may be otherwise expressed by 'the negation of jiva resides in Brahman and has jiva as its counter-entity'-जीवप्रततयानिका ब्रह्मनिष्ठो भेदो wufy ana-and, vice versa, by 'the negation of Brahman resides in jiva and has Brahman as its counterentity'-ब्रह्मप्रतियोगिकेर जीवनिष्ठो भेदो जोवे वर्तते- Thus,. the locus (anuyogi) of this differenve is either jiva or Brahman, and not ajnana. But ajnana may yet be a locus for this difference between jiva and Brah- man-an oppouent is supposed to argue,-if bheda be regaded as relation (sam- bandha) in the technical sense of something apart from, and linking on to, the thinge related ( sambandhi): thas the difference between jiva and Brahman might be conceived of as a sambandha existing not only between these but also between these and ajnana, and thus finding & loens in ajnans. The text replies; difference (negation) is.not the technical .relation-भदस्य थ तथात्माभावात्-sc.the negation of jiva does not reside in jiva itself, which ought to be the case if bheda were the technical sambandha.

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98 सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

तथापि तदचानमेकमनेकं वेति कथं निर्यय इति घेतु a

एकमेवेति वदामः। किं तन साधकमिति चेतु। उच्चते। लोकिकी वेदिकी चापि नाऽच्ाने दृश्यते प्रमा । कार्यदृष्याथ कल्पं चेल्लाघवादेकमेव तत् ॥ ८ ॥ पच्ानं किं वेदसिद्रुमुत लोकिकप्रत्यवादिषिदमुत परि- दृश्यमानकार्य्यान्यथानुपपत्या कल्पम्। only between Brahman and jiva but also between these and Ne- science). For with regard to relation the restrictive rule is that relation is dependence on the things related; and difference is not relation ( in the technical sense of sambandha or a link that joins on to two things, while it is itself different from them). Hence Nescience takes as its locus the Self, which is free from differentiation into jiva and Brabman, and makes the Self its object. Thus the Self has been proved to be an object for Ne- cience. This conclusion has been declared thus :- ' Undifferenced absolute Intelligence is the locus and object of Nescience. For

Vol. V. 528. Samkshepasariraka, I, 319. Pandit, that which follows from previous- ly existing Nescience (sc. jīva and Isvara ) is neither locus nor object of Nescience.' 7. Nevertheless, it may be asked ( by the Vedautin of §4), (c) Nescience, for whose existence what proof is there of Nescience only presumptive evidence is found, must be a unity, in accordance with the law of being a unity or a plurality? It parsimony. is a unity, we say. What proof of this, (he asks)? We reply :- Of the reality of Nescience there is no evidence, revealed or human. If Nescience is to be assumed as the cause of certain visible effects (sc. this world ), then, in accordance with the law of parsimony, Nescience must be a unity and not a plurality ... VIII. Is Nescience proved by Veda; or by perception &c., sc. in- ference and human testimony; or is it assumed to account for the world of experience, which cannot otherwise be accounted for ?

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। 94

तथ नादा: पूर्वकायडस्य कर्ममानविषयत्वात् वेदान्तानां

पच्वानादो तदभावात्तदप्रतिपादकत्वातृ। नावि द्वितीय: स्पष्टप्रत्य- वादिसिद्ुत्वे विवादाभावप्रसङ्गात। तस्मात्स्वतोडेिसङ्गोदासीनस्य

पपत्याSच्जानं कल्प्यत इत्येष वाच्यं गत्यन्तराऽभावात। तथा च कल्पमानमज्ञानमेकमनेकं वेति विवादे एकस्यापि निद्धादोषस्याने- कविधकार्य्यजनकत्वस्य स्व्ने दृषटत्वाल्लाघवसहकृतान्यथानुपपततिर्ि चिषशकिकमेकध्वानमादाय विश्राम्यतीति युक्तम। Not by Veda. For the earlier portion of the Veda ( karma- kāņda) is devoted to ritual, and the later portion ( Vedanta proper) expounds only Brahman, the Absolute, Existence, Intelligence, Bliss; since in this declaration of Brahman as the only Real, the in- tended result of the Veda (sc. cessation of pain and attainment of absolute Bliss ) is secured. And since this result would not fol- low in the case of Nescience and its products being declared real, the Veda does not set these forth. Nor by perception, inference or human testimony. For if by any of these Nescience were clearly proved, controversy would be at an end. And since there is no evidence for Nescience, it must needs be granted that Nescience is assumed to account for the otherwise inexplicable production of an unreal world, a complex of joys and pains, by the unrelated, passive, ever blessed and satisfied Being. For there is no other course apart from this assumption of Nescience. Accordingly, in the debate as to whether this assumed Nescience is a unity or a plurality, the just conclusion is that, as in the case of dreams, the defective nature of sleep, which is a unity, is known to produce, a variety of objects, so in this.case presumptive evidence, seconded by the law of parsimony, is satisfied in the acceptance of Nescience as a unity possessing manifold powers. Moreover since Nescience is the limiting condition of jiva and is a unity, the Self conditioned

this view. Jiva also a unity : defined according to by Nescience, i. e. jiva, is a unity :

that jiva is a unity. -thus declare those who hold

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पत एवाऽद्ानस्य जीवोपाधित्वातस्य चेकत्वामदुपाधिक चात्मा जीवो भवन्नेक एव भवतीत्येकजीववादिनो वदन्ति। यथो- क्ानुपपलिसिद्धारथानुवादिनी शुतिरपि। प्रजामेकां लोहितशुक्रकृष्णां बही: प्रजा: सजमानां सरूपाः । बजो हयोको नुषमामनुशेते जहात्येमां भुत्तमोगामनोऽन्यः । प्रस्याऽयमर्थः । अ्रस्त्यस्य चगतो- Sविद्याहेतुकत्वे वत्तव्ये सा किं जन्याऽजन्या वेति संशये न जन्ये- त्याह प्रजामिति। न चाडविद्यावाचकपदाभावः पजामित्यस्यव स्त्रीलि इ्गनिर्द्विष्वस्य तद्वाधवत्वात्। तस्या भनेकत्वं व्यावर्नयति एकामिति। तस्या विचिचकार्यजननसामथ्यं विगणात्मकत्वेन सम- थेयते लोहितेत्यादिना। तादृशाऽविद्योपद्वितस्य जीवस्योत्पततिं निरस्यति भज इति। तस्य जीवस्यानेकत्वं निषेधति एक इति। Śruti also declares what the above assumption established (sc. Nescience and jiva as unities). 'There is one unborn (female), red, white and black, producing uniform, manifold offspring. Svetae: Up. IV.5. supports this view. There is indeed one unborn (male) For var. lec. cf. Sacred Books, Vol. XV. who, loving her, lies by her. This other unborn leaves her through whom he has had his fill of en- joyment.' The meaning of this passage is as follows :- Since Nescience is to be declared (in the second quarter of the above verse) as the cause of the unreal world, the doubt arises whether Nescience is a product or not. It is not a product as shown by the word unborn of the text. Nor can it be said that there is no word in the text for Nescience, for the adjective unborn with a feminine termination denotes Nescience (avidya, fem.). In the word one a plurality of Nesciences is denied. In the words red, white and black the text shows that Nescience as made up of the three gunas is able to produce manifold products. In the word unborn ( masc. ) the text denies that jiva, which is condition- ed by Nescience, is a product. In the word one the plurality of jīvas is denied. It might be objected that a plurality of jivas is a matter of common experience, and the unity of jiva is, therefore, not possible. To meet this objection the text shows by the word

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ननु जीवगतभनेकत्वं लेोकऽनुभयते तत्कथमेकत्वमित्याशड्डाडभे दस्योपनिषत््रसिदुत्वं युक्तिसिद्धुत्वं ध प्रसिट्धार्थेन हिशब्देनाह हीति।

शह अनुशेत इति। तामविद्यामनुसत्य निद्रित इव शेते अज्ञा- नेनावृतः सन्मुद्रितज्ञाननेव भवतीत्यर्थः । पश्चात्कार्याकारेय स्थितां तामेव जुषमायाः सेवमान: संसारी भवति स्वप्रदृगिवेत्याह जुषमारा इति। नन्वविद्याया अनादित्वेनाSविनाशित्वाद निर्मोकप्रसङ्ग इत्यत शाह जहात्येनामिति। वाक्येत्थात्मतत्त्वसात्ात्कारेय निवर्नयतीत्यर्थः । त्याज्या चेदविद्या कथं तर्हिं तामाप्ितवाना- त्मेत्याशंड् भोगारथ ह्मविद्याऽडश्रयरं भोगस्य व तया जनितत्वा- दिदानीं स्वात्मदर्शनेन प्रयोजनशन्यां मन्यमानो जहातीत्याह भुत्त- भोगामिति। भुक्तो भोगो यया सा तथेति विग्रहः । indeed, which expresses something well-known, that the non- differentiation (sc. unity) of jiva is proclaimed in the U panishads and is proved by argument. Again, it may be objected that since jīva is identical with the self-luminous Brahmau, it cannot have any other mode of existence. This objection is met by the word lies by, which means that jiva approaches Nescieuce and lies as if asleep, i. e. being iuvolved in Nescience, jīva's eye of knowledge is closed. Afterwards, jiva, loving i. e. serving Nescience in the form of objects, is involved in the bonds of the transmigratory world, just as the dreamer is engaged with the objects of his dreams. It may be objected that Nescience being eternal ub ante must be indestructible-from which it would follow that final emancipation is impossible. This objection is met by the words he leaves her, i. e. he puts an end to Nescience by the intuition of the real nature of Self attained through Sruti. Again, it may be asked, why should the Self approach Nescience, if the latter is to be abandoued? The reply is that recourse to Nes- cience is indeed for the sake of enjoyment, because enjoyment is effected through Nescience. The jiva abaudous it when through intuition of the Self he deems Nescience worthless. Hence the compound in text must be resolved thus :- her through whom enjoyment has been enjoyed.

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95 सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

नन्वविद्याविशिष्टस्य जोवत्वादविद्याया जीवस्वरुपान्तर्भा- वात्कथं जहातीत्युक्तमित्यत बाह अ्रनोऽन्य इति। कनो जीवो विद्यातोऽन्य एव न त्वविद्यान्तर्भीवेन जीवत्वम ऋरविद्याया जड- त्वात् जीवस्य व चेतनत्वाज्जीवोपाधित्वेन स्वीकाराच्चेनि। ८ बन्धमोषव्यवस्था स्यान्जीवाभेदे कथं तव। यथा दृष्नं तथेवास्तु दृष्टत्वात्स्वप्रदृष्टवत्॥ ६॥ नन्वेक एव चेज्नीष: कथमेको बद्ध एको मुक्त इति व्यघ- . Here an objection may be taken that since association with Nescience as an attribute is essential for jiva-hood, Nescience must form a part of the nature of jiva ( sc. Nescience as the attribute portion, viseshana, falling within jīva, the subject por- tiou, viseshya). How then is the declaration of the text possible, viz, jīva abandous Nescience, (i. e. abandons a part of itself)? To meet this objection the text supplies the words, the other un- born, i. e. the unborn jiva which is different from Nescience. For jiva-hood is not constituted by the presence within it of Ne- science as an essential attribute, since Nescience is unintelligent and jiva is intelligent. And for this reason Nescience is held ( by some Vedantins ) to be a limiting condition, upadi, (and not au essential attribute, viseshaņa) of jīva .* 8. If there is only one jiva, what basis have you for

Objection : if jiva is a unity, then the bondage and emancipation ? Ac- transmigratory order of the world be- cept for these, we reply, precisely comes inexplicable : Met, by showing that the objection itself is based on the that basis which is given in ex- unphilosophic consciousness which con- founds the body with the Self, ji.a: perience; for they are matters Illustrations from the fictions of the uf experience as are objects seen dream-world and of the Yogin. in dreams ... IX. The preliminary doubt is, How if jiva is one only, can this settled order be accounted for, viz, that one man is emancipated and another is bound ? What is the contradiction here, we ask? None, for duality is directly given in experience. * For upadhi, viseshana, cf. Ved : paribh : Pandit, Vol. VII., pp. 450-51 note.

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स्थितिः ।.ननु काऽपानुपपतिरनुभवसिदुत्वात् द्वेतस्य। अ्रनुभष एव नोपपद्ते एकमुक्या सकलसंसारोच्छेदादिति चेत न भ्रन्त :- करयादेरय यायथमाविद्यकस्य स्वीकारात् करणानुपपत्यभावात्। विषयाऽभावात् प्रामाययानुपपत्त्याऽनुपपन्रोऽनुभव इति चेत तब वत्तव्यं कीदृशो विषयोऽपेक्षित: । व्यवहारयोग्यश्चेदस्त्येवासा । परमार्थसत्यश्चेत् कथमेवं भविष्यति एकत्वस्येष वेदतात्पर्यविषय- त्वात् तचेत फलसम्बन्धात्। भेदस्य व सर्वस्य प्रतिपत्रोषधो नेति नेतोतिवाक्येन निषिट्यिमानतया मिथ्यात्वस्य सिद्धुत्वात्। वेदे एव If it be argued that ( ou the single-jīva theory ) a conscious- ness of duality is impossible, because the whole world would be at an end as soon as one man was emancipated, we reply, not so; for, in as much as we admit that mind, sense-organs &c., as severally necessary, do exist as products of Nescience (sc. are un- real), the existence of instruments for this consciousness of duality is provided for. If further you urge that the consciousness of duality is impossible, because in the absence of an object to be known ( sc. a real duality ) the instrumentality of mind, sense-organs &c. in regard to such consciousness is impossible, then you must declare what sort of an object is necessary (to make the consciousness possible ). Is the required object one that shall meet the demands of common experience ( sc. such as shall be real to the unphilosopbic consciousness of the many )? Such duality is provided for ( by our admissioa above ). Or do you demand an absolutely real duality ? Sach there cannot be; for nothing but unity is the teaching the Veda, since it is with this as its result that the Veda is connected. And since all duality with re- gard to the substrate ( Brahman ) of the erroneously imagined ( world ) is denidd in the passage ' Brahman is not this, not this.'* the falsity of such duality is proved. Agair it may be urged that the knowledge of Brahman possessed by Vamadeva and other Rishis is declared in the Veda * Brihad: Up. II. 3. 6.

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वामदेवादेज्वानं प्रयते इति चेतु सत्यम तस्य जीवमेदाSप्रतिपाद- कत्वात्। श्रुताथाऽनुपपत्त्या कल्पते इति चेतु न निश्चितार्थजी- वेक्यप्रतिपादकवाक्यान्तरविरोधेन कल्पनानुपपतेः । सेकजीवपसे एकमुत्या सर्वमुत्तिप्रसङ्ग इति चेतु न एंकत्ववादिनं प्रति सर्वेत्वस्य निरनूपयितुमशक्यत्वात्। तथापि बहवो जीवा अनुभवसिद्धा इति चेतु भवतु त्हि स्वप्रवद्दवस्था । itself: ( this knowledge constitutes emancipation, these Rishis were therefore emancipated, and the Veda therefore teaches a plurality of jivas, some bound and some emancipated ). True, we reply, as regards declaration of a knowledge of Brahman, but the passage does not declare a plurality of jīvas. To the further objection that this plurality must be assumed in order to save the meaning of Sruti from contradiction, we reply that this assump- tion is inadmissible as contradictory of another Sruti passage declaratory of the unity of jiva, (which unity is) the undoubted meaning of Śruti. Another objection-it will follow on the single-jīva theory that when one person is emancipated all persons will be emanci- pated. This objection is to be set aside, for the question of all (as implying a plurality of really existing jīvas) cannot be raised against the holder of the single-jiva view (who denies the real existence of such plurality. Yet the jīvas are many, it is urged, as proved by our con- sciousness. Well then, we reply, let this order of plurality be admitted on the same footing with that of dreams. Against this it may be argued that as in a dream the only real person is the dreamer and all the other persons in the dream are falsely imagined, so ( on the above assumption of the duaming and wak- ing states being on the same footing ) in the waking state there can be only one real person, all the rest being falsely 'magined by him-and this being so, there will be uncertainty as to which out of the many persons is the only real person, while owing to this uncertainty no man will apply himself to the prescribed means

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ननु यथा स्वप्ने एक एव स्वम्रदृक परमार्थसत्य: अ्रन्ये तद्भ्रमकल्पिता: सर्वे एवं जागरेपि एक एव परमार्थसत्योऽन्ये सर्वे कल्पिता: तथाच बहूनां मध्ये कोऽसावेक इत्यनिश्चये कः श्रष- पादो प्रवर्त्ततेति साधनानुष्ठानाभावेऽनिर्मेत्प्रसङ्ग इति चेत नूनं देहात्मवादमाग्रित्य भ्रान्तोऽसि। कथमति चेतु शुणु। स्वप्रेऽन्ये जीवा: कल्पिता इति कोरऽर्थः । किं देहा देवगन्धवीदिसञ्तकाः कल्पिता उताऽज्तानोपाधिको यो जीवोऽस्मदभिमतस्तादृशा एव वहवोऽनुभतास्तेषां मध्ये एक: सत्योऽन्ये कल्पिता इति। नाद्ः देहानां कल्पितत्वेऽप्यविरोधात्। नहि देहं वा देहावच्छिन्नं वा श्रव्याद्यधिकारियं बरमो येनाऽविनिगमो दोष: स्यात्। of emancipation termed 'hearing' &c., and since the prescribed means will not be employed, it will follow that there will be emancipation for none. . In reply to the above we would say to the objector .- You are indeed in error, holding as you do that the body is the Self. How so, he asks. Liste! what is meant by your statement that in a dream other jivas are falsely imagined by the dreamer .? Do you mean that bodies under such names as gods, gandharvas &c. are imagined? Or that many jivas are perceived in our sense of the word jiva, s. that which has Nescience as its limiting adjunct, and that one of these jivas is real and the rest unreal. The former interpretation will not avail you against us, for even if the bodies ( in the waking state ) are unreal, the possibility of emancipation is not overthrown (which was the point you uged against us above). For we do not say that the person qualified to enter on 'hearing' and the other means of emanci- pation is the body, or Intelligence limited to a body-which statement would have exposed us to the charge of proposing al- ternatives (sc. as to which of the jivas thus defined is real ) with- out giving reasons to compel the adoption of one or other of the al- ternatives. Nor is the latter interpretation applicable, since in dreams a plurality of jīvas is not perceived, using jīva in the sense

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न द्वितीय: अज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्य सवपे भेदाSननुभवात् । न हि पराऽज्ानावच्छिन्न: परस्य प्रत्यवो भवितुमईति। तथापि तत्तद्वेह्चेष्रया अनुमीयत इति चेत न एकेनाप्यनेकदेहचेष्टापपतेः नेयायिकानां कायव्यहृदशायां योगिदेह्वत। तद्देवानुसन्धानप्रसद्न इति वेतु सत्यम् अ्रविद्यावच्छिन्नं प्रतीपवृत्वात् तत्तट्वेह्ावच्छिन्नं प्रति तथाप्यभावात् आात्ममाचस्यानुसन्धातृत्वाद्। अरत एवेकस्मिन्नपि देहे पादार्वच्छिन्नः शिरोऽवच्छिन्नस्य दुःखं नानुसन्धते पादे मे सुखं शिरसि मे वेदनेत्यनुभवात्। of 'that which is conditioned by Nescience.' For A, or 'that which is conditioned by the Nescience associated with A' cannot be perceived by B similarly defined (none can be im- mediately conscious of another's ignorance or knowledge). Still you urge that a plurality of jivas is inferred from the ( visi- ble) actions of the several bodies. We reply that the infer- ence will not hold; for the actions of various bodies may be proved to result from a single jiva, as is the case with the Yogin's body,* which, as the Naiyayikas teach, assumes a variety of mani- festations. You may further urge that as in the case of the Yogin who recognises himself as real and the bodies he has created as false ; so in the case of jiva there must be a recognition of itself as real, and of the others as falsely imagined by it. We reply that such recognition is to be admitted in the case of jiva defined as ' that which has Nescience as its limiting adjunct' and not as 'that which is limited to a body', for, in the example also, sach recog- nition does not pertain to the bodies created by the Yogm, since his Self alone is the recogniser. And since the Self (jiva or Intelligence conditioned by Nes cience) is the only knower, the Intelligence confined to the foot, even in one and the same body, is not conscious of a pain felt by the Intelligence which is confined to the head, as the common ex- perience, 'my foot is at ease, my head pains,' shows. Thus we

Yoga Aphorisms. Biblio : Indica, p. 172.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। २३

तथाच देहात्मभ्रममान्नित्येव जीवभेदानुभव इति स्थितम्। तथापि कथमचानुभव इति चेतु। श्रेतव्यं सावधानेन। एक एव नित्य- दुबुदुमुक्तस्वभाव उपनिषन्माचगम्यो वस्तुतोडस्ति। स एवाज्ञानमा शित्य जीवभावं लब्ध्वा देवतियङ्गनुष्यादिदेहान्परिकल्प तदुप करयत्वेन ब्रह्मायडादिचसुर्दशभुशनं सष्टा तेषु तेषु देहेषु कश्चि द्वेव: कश्चिन्मनुष्यः कश्चिद्गिरययगर्भ: सर्वेषां स्रष्टा कश्चिद्विष्णु: पालकः कश्चिदन्य: सर्वमंहारकर्ता रुद्र: प्रलये। तेषामुपाधयः सत्वादि- गुयाः तद्धशातेषां सव सामथ्यम बहं पुनः कश्चिद् ब्राह्मयकुमारः तेषां मत्तिं पृजानमस्कारादिनाऽनुष्ठाय श्रवणादिसाधमं सम्पाद्य मोघं साधर्यिष्यामोतोश्वरोपि सन् भ्रान्तो भवति जागरे। have proved that the common view of a plurality of jīvas is due simply to the error of confounding the body with the Self. Nevertheless it may be asked, how in the waking state is this consciousness of a plurality of jīvas to be explained (if jīva is really a unity ? Listen attentively. There is really but one Self, in its own nature eternal, absolute, intelligent, free, made known in the Upanishads only. This Self, associating itself with Nes- cience becomes jīva and fa'sely surmises the bodies of gods, men &c., for whose enjoyment it creates, as means, the 'egg of Brahma' and the fourteen worlds. Of these bodies one is a god, another is a man. There is Hiranyagarbha the creator of all things, Vishnu the preserver, and Rudra who destroys the world at a pralaya or final resolution. These three have the rajas, sattva and tamas qualities respectively as their limiting conditions, to which all their powers ars due. Then again there is the individual man who thinks within himself 'I am the son of a Brahman ; having served the Gods in puja &c. and acquired 'hearing' and the other prescribed means I shall gain emancipation. In all these forms the Self, chough really Isvara ( Brahman ) is deceived in the waking state. Again, the Self having put an end to the world of waking consciousness as described above, and aided by the defects of sleep, surmises in dreams a world precisely similar to that of

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२४ सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

पुनर्यथोक्त जागर प्रणज्जमुपसंहृत्य स्वप्रे निद्रादोषसहकृत: ता- दृशमेव प्रपज्जं परिकल्प तत्तट्टेहेन्ट्रियसाध्यभोगं भुक्का वसिष्ठुदयो मुक्ता अन्ये बट्ा ब्हमपि कश्चिद् बद्: दुःखी संसारी मुक्तो भवि- ·ष्यामीति च कल्पयित्वा पुनस्तामवस्थामुपसंहृत्य जागरं सुषुपिं वा सर्वभ्रमनिवृत्तिरुपां प्राप्ोतीति। एवं सति एक एवात्मा परिपूर्य: स्वयंप्रकाशानन्देकस्वभावः स्वाच्ञानवथाज्जीवः संसारीत्यादिशब्दा- भिधेयो भवति। न तदन्य: कश्चित्संसारी सम्भावयितुमपि शक्य इति स्थितम। तस्येवानादिसंस्वार सजितपुसय निचय क्षपितकल्मस्य

लादिसेवितश्रवणादि साधनपाटवस्य यदा तत्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थात्म- सास्तात्कार उदयमासादयति तदाऽज्ानं तत्कायं सर्वमुपसंहृत्य

waking, falsely imagining thns :- Vasishtha and other Rishis won emancipation, when through their bodies and sense-organs they had experienced the results of their actions; other men are bound; I too am bound, miseratle in the bonds of transmigru- tion, I shall obtain emancipation. Then again the Self puts an end to this dream and enters on the waking state, or that of dream- less sleep in which there is an end to all such false imaginings. Since this is the case, the Self which is one only, absolute, self- luminous and wholly blessed is, through the influence of its associate Nescience, termed jiva, the traasmigrating individual. Nor other than this Self can any transmigrating individual be conceived of: thus we have clearly proved. When through such Sruti passages as 'that hou art' this same Self (termed jīva) has gained intuition of Bralman (sc. recog- nised its identity with Brahman the absolute)-the Self with its sin destroyed by the store of merit acquired during a begin- ning-less round of transmigrations, possessed of dispassion &c. and proficient, through the grace of the Sastras and of a teacher, in 'hearing' &c. which have been practised faithfully and continu- ously-then the Self becomes what is commonly ( regarded as an

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स्वानन्दतृप्र: स्वे महिन्त्नि स्थितो मुक्त इति व्यवहारभाम्भवति। तस्यामवस्थायां न तदन्य: कश्चित्संसारी तेनाननुभयमानं द्वेतं वा किज्रिदस्तीति रहस्यम। ६ पज्वातसत्वं नेषठं चेद व्यवहार: कथं भवेत्। न हदर्शनमाचेय विष्यो नाशन्श्चियात्। १० ॥ ननु कथमेशमुच्यते तेनाऽननुभयमानं द्रेतं नास्तीति याव- ता पघातस्यापि द्वेतस्य सत्वमभ्युपगच्छन्ति अत ए्व चिविध- सत्वमङ्गीकुर्वन्ति वृद्दाः। न व तदचातसत्वानयपगमे उपपद्मते प्रातीतिकपारमार्थिकमेदेन द्वेविध्यस्येव सम्भवात्। अन्यथा गृहा- emancipated man and is ) described thus-'he has put an end to Nescience and all its products, he is self-contained in that Bliss which is his real nature, he is returned to that greatness which is his real nature, he is emancipated.' In that state of emancipation, sc. when knowedge of Brah- man has been gained by one, there is left no jiva oher than that one; nor for this reason does any unperceived order of duality really exist :- here lies the esoteric truth of the matter. 9. If the existence of things when unperceited is an in- Objection : the view that the esse of admissible assumption, pray how things is percipi ( which is a part of the jiva-unity theory ) is opposed at once to is common experience possible ? common sense and to the express teach- For no man grieves for an object, ing of the ancients as to three kinds of existence :- paramārthikī sattā, real thinking it destroyed merely be- existence, sc. that of Brahman alone; pratibhāsikī, the esse of wbich is percipi, cause he sees it not ... X. sc. that of objects of the dream-world and of those erroneously imagined in the waking state; vyāvahāriki, practi- cal existence, sc. that of objects of wak- ing consciousness. An opponent asks how we concluded above that 'for this reason no unperceived order of duality really exists,' seeing that some thinkers have maintained a real existence for a dual order also even when unperceived; and adds that it was just because duality exists tbough unperceived that ancient Vedanta teachers taught three kinds of existence; and that this three-fold division of existence will not stand, if the existence of an unperceived object

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न्विर्गतस्य पुतपश्वादिसकलसाधनजतमपश्यतस्तदभावनिश्वयेन शोकाग्निना दद्यमानस्य रुदतो मरयप्रसङ्ग: । ननु सप्रवज्नागरेपि प्रातोतिकसत्वसंपन्ननेव्र द्वेतेन व्यव- हार: किमिति नोप्पद्यत इति चेतु न वेषम्यात् जागरबोधेन तस्य बाधात इह तु सावात्कारात्यवं तदभावादिति। बवाहु: सत्वष्यं वदन्वादी प्रष्टव्योडपाधुना मया। सत्यं द्वेनमसत्यं वा नाSसत्ये विविधं कुतः ॥ १९ ॥ किं द्वेतं पार मार्थिकमाश्ित्य पचातसत्वं साध्यते उतानिवं is denied; for then there can be only two kinds of existence, viz., the absolutely real (paramarthikī ) and the merely perceptional (prātitikī). If(he continues) the existence of an unperceived ohject is denied, it slould follow that the man, who leaves son and home aud herds ard all other sources of joy, should die weeping and consumed by sorrow in the conviction that these loved objects exist not, sine he no longer bebolds them. Here the opponent (speaking in v. 10.) might be asked by way of objection, why experience of a dual order of things whose existence is merely perceptional is. not possible in the waking state, as it is possible in the dreaming state, (for all schools hold that the esse of the dream-world is percipi ). This objection he would put aside, because the waking and dreaming states are dissimilar: for whereas the latter state is put an end to by wak- ing knowledge, there is no sublation of the world in the waking state previcus to an intuition of Brahman. To the opponent's view they rejoin :-- The man who maintains three different kinds of existence must

Met : the common sense view that be asked whether he holds duality a thing exists even when unperceived is to be real or unreal. Real it beset with difficulties: Ancient weach- ers admitted vyāvahārikī sattā only cannot be. If unreal (non-exis- out of a kind regard for the needs of the vulgar mind. tent, asatya); how can existence (sattva ) be three-fold ?... XI. Does the opponent prove that an object exists even when

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

धनीयम। नादः प्रत्यज्वादिप्रामाययनिरासेन निरस्तत्वात्। अन्त्ये अनिर्वेचनीयं प्रथमतः क्वित्सिदं न घा। न चेतु तांर्ह दृष्टान्ता- भावात् कथमाकाशादेरनिर्वचनीयत्वं साधनीयम। सिद्धं रज्जुस- प्पोदिकमिति चेतु तर्हि तप यादृशं सत्व तादृशमेवाकाशादे: प्रपञ्ज- स्येति स्थिते विवेचनीयं किमच्ातसत्त्वं किं वा प्रातीतिकमेव। यद्यचातमपि सत्त्वमाकाशादे: कल्प्ेत तदा कथमयं दृष्टान्तो दाष्टी- न्तिके सामञ्जस्येनोपसंहियेत विरोधात्। unperceived by maintaining that the dual order is either absolutely real or is what is technically termed inexplicable* ? The former alterpative will not hold, for an absolutely real duality must be rejected on the ( already shown ) rejection of the trustworthiness of perception, inference and other sources of evidence, (cf v. 4). If the latter alternative be adopted, it may be asked whether this merely apparent existence was observed in any instance prior ( to the inference which establishes a merely apparent order of duality), or not ? If not observed, how, in the absence of an instance confirmatory of the inference, is the merely apparent existence of the world, beginning with the subtile element ether, to be proved. If it be replied that the snake, which erroneonsly appears in the place of the rope seen at night, is a well-known instance, among others, of a merely apparent object, then, it being premised that the existence of the world beginning with ether is precisely similar to the existence of the snake in the example adduced, the question remains to be discussed whether the object- world exists even when unperceived, or only so long as perceived. If an existence independent of perceptiou be surmised for the world, the example ( sc. the existence of the snake) and the case in point (sc. the existence of the world ) do not sufficiently corres- pond, because of the dissimilarity ( with regard to the snake whose esse is admittedly percipi).

• An inexplicable object is one that merely appears in consciousness as some thing, i. e., more than nothing (asat), aud yet is proved by experience to be less than real ( sat, Brahman ). Hence it is incxplicable, or a product of Māya.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

न च गृहान्निनिर्गतस्यासत्वनिश्चयेन रोदनादिप्रसङ्गा दोष: बाधकप्रमायास्याप्रवृत्तत्वेन श्रभावनिश्चयानङ्गीकारात स्वप्रवत्सर्वव्य- वहारस्योपपादितत्वाच्च। न च तप बाधोडस्तीति वेषम्यं भ्रमाव स्थायां कुचापि बाधस्यानङ्गीकारात । प्रमायप्रवृत्तो बाधेपि न कश्चि द्वोष: तदानीं भ्रमषिद्ेन व्यवहारानभ्यपगमात्। न च चिविधसत्वा- भ्यपगमविरोध: सर्वस्य द्वेतस्य प्रातीतिकसत्त्वमपरित्यन्य तैग्रान्त- सन्तोषमाचस्य कृतत्वात प्रातोतिकत्वेपि प्रपज्जस्य भ्रान्तबुद्धिषिद्ठा- वान्तरवेषम्यमाश्रित्य व्यावहारिकसत्वाभिधानाविरोधात्। . Nor against us can be urged the case of the man, who leaving home ought (as a logical censequence of our view, you said) to weep for his dear ones, because certain of their non-existence. For we do not say that he is convinced of their non-existence so long as no evidence subversive of his belief in their existence is forth- coming; and, futher, because we have shown that all experience is like that of dreams. [ In dreams, the esse of all objects is percipi, admittedly; and yet the dreamer weeps not for his absent son ]. Nor can it be argued that there is a difference between the states of dreaming and waking, in that the former is destroyed by waking knowledge; for in neither case, while the error lasts, is any sublation ( of either state) admitted. Nor is there any in- consequence in holding that there is a sublation of error on the application of evidence; for none would say that, when the error has been removed, there can be any further dealings with the erroneously surmised object. Nor is the view of a two-fold existence contradictory of the older view of a three-fold existence; for while ancient teachers (e. g. Sarvajna Muni in the Samkshepasarīraka I, 1, 178) did not abandon "TF the position that the existence of a dual order of things is depen- dent on the perception of it, they taught a third kind of existence ( the so called practical) to satisfy the deluded vulgar. For although the esse of the world is percipi, there is no contradiction in maintaining the practical as a third kind of existence, if atten- tion is bad to those intermediate differences (sc. between the waking and dreaming states ) which the unphilosophic are persuaded of.

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

१० द्वेतमेदे प्रतिज्ञानं प्रत्यभिन्वा कयं वद। दशानां युगपत्सर्पभ्रमे तद्दनथेव सा । १२ ॥

तथापि प्रज्ञातसत्वानभ्यपगमे स्वप्रप्रबुदधस्य स एवायं प्रपञ्ज इति प्रत्यभिज्वाने का गतिरिति चेतु एकस्यामेव रज्ज्वां मन्दान्य कारवर्निन्यां दशानां युगपत्सरपेभ्रमेया पलायमानानां परस्पर संवा. देन एक एवं सर्पपः सर्वेरनुभृत इति प्रत्यभिच्वायां या सैरवेति सन्तो- प्रव्यम। तच हि स्वस्वभ्रमसिद्धः सर्वेः पृथक पृथगेवानुभयते विषय: अन्यभ्रमसिद्धस्यान्येन चातुमशक्यत्वात् अन्यभ्रमस्याच्चानात। . 10. If for each cognition there is a separate object ( as must Objection : If esse is percipi, recogni- be the case on the view that the tion (which implies continuity of the object) would be impossible. Answer : esse of things is percipi ), then recognition itself is error. you must explain how recognition is possible (sc. how the present object is recognised as the identical one previously known ). The reply is that the recognition in this instance is precisely similar to the recognition in the case of the imaginary snake observed simultaneously by ten men (each declaring to the other :- I saw the same snake as you did) ... XII.

Still ( an opponent may urge as above )-if the view that an object exists though unperceived be not maintained, what ex- planation is there of the case of the man who waking from dreams recognises the present world as identical with the one be knew before falling asleep? Our opponent, we reply, must content himself here with the explanation he is prepared to offer for the recognition-'one and the same snake we all saw'-of which the ten men speak when they have fled from an imaginary snake, which was only a piece of rope lying in the dark. For in tbis example the erroneously perceived object (sc. the snake) is perceived by all and each separately, since the object erroneously perceived by the one man cannot possible be perceived by anqther, for one can- not have immediate knowledge of another's error.

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३० सिट्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

अविवेकादेव तु तब प्रत्यभिन्वानमेक एव सर्पपः सर्वेरनुम- यत इति। एवं जागदवस्थायां प्रपज्जमनुभय सुघुमि गत्वा पुनरू- त्थाय योऽयं प्रपज्जानुभवः स प्रपज्जान्तरमेत्र विषयीकरोति प्रत्यमम- ज्ानं त्वविवेकादेव। न च सुषप्रो प्रपज्जविलये प्रमायाभावः न हि द्रषटर्दृष्टेरविपरिलोपो विद्यते अविनाशित्वात् न तु तद् द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभत्तं यत् पश्येदिति शुत्या सुषुप्रो द्वितीयाभावं वदन्त्या तथ सर्वप्रपज्जाभावस्य दर्शितत्वात्।

इन्द्रियादेरुपादानं तदभावे यतो न धी: । ५३॥

The fact is that the recognition-' one and the same snake we all saw'-is simply due to error. And so when a man passes from waking cousciousness into the state of dreamless sleep from which again he awakes, his present consciousness relates to a different series of objects; but his recognition of the identity of the present and former series is simply due to error. Nor can it be said that there is no proof that in the state of dreamless sleep there is an end to the world of experience. For the cessation of all experience during dreamless sleep is indicated in the Sruti passage declaratory of the absence of any second thing during that state :- 'For there is no loss of sight to the

Brihad: Up: IV. 3. 23. seer, because it cannot perish- Nor is there then (in dreamless sleep ) any second, any thing different from him that he could see. 11. Waking consciousness is different from the false conscious- ness of an imaginary snake. If Common Sense reasserts itself : If esse is merely percipi, the well ascertained not different, how is it that the distinctions between true and false know- ledge are at an end. organs of sense are accepted as necessary to bring about waking consciousness ? For when organs of sense are absent, no know- ledge results .... XIII.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। ३१

यादृशम्थमिन्द्रियादिजन्यं ज्ञानं विषयीकरोति ाृमेव ््या न्यभ्रमोऽपीति सम्भवति भ्रमात्यवे विषयस्यासन्वात् इन्द्रियदिज- न्यच्ञानस्य च सव्निकर्षादिजन्यत्वेन ज्ञानात्यवं विषयसत्वस्यवश्य म्भावात् अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां चेन्द्रियादे: कारयत्वस्य सिटुचात्। In the above an opponent urges that, in spite of wlat has been said for the view that the esse of a thiug is percipi ( tahāpi ), there is a difference between knowledge of ordinary objets and that of an imaginary object like the snake seen in a roe-the difference being due to the presence and absence respectvely of perception and the other sources of evidence, on the one hind, and of Nescience, on the other, as causes (of these two kinds f know- ledge, sc. sense-organs, aud not Nescience, are the cause ofordinary waking consciousness; whereas only Nescience is the caue of the false consciousness of an imaginary object). For it is na possible (so runs the objection ) that the erroneous cognitior effected through Nescience should have as its object one precisely similar to that which the coguition, effected through sense-orgais, has as its object, since the imaginary object did not exist previos to the erroneous cognition; and, because the cognition effected through the sense-organs and other sources of evidence was effected through con- tact of the object with the sense-organs &c., the existence of the object previous to its being cognised is a necessary postulate; and becauseit can be proved, by theinductive method of conjoint presence and absence, that sense-organs &c. are causes of knowledge (sc. when these are present, knowledge results; when absent, no knowledge.)

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32 सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

वेलवयय नुपपत्तेः । मेतम्

इन्द्रियायां कारयत्वे भवेच्चोदं तदा तव।

स्वग्रभ्रमे यथा तेषामन्वयव्यतिरेकधीः ॥१४ ॥

इन्द्रियादेर्वस्सुतः प्रपञ्गुज्ञानं प्रत्यकारयात्वात्। कुत इति चेत तत वतव्यं किमिन्द्रियादे: प्रमितिमाचे कारयता कि वा भ्रम-

प्रमासधाणज्ञानमाचे भ्रममाचे वा।

Hence, cincludes our opponent, the view that the world exists though mperceived is a necessity; for on any other view the difference ( between true and false knowledge) is inexplicable. Not so, we reply :-

Your objection would hold if the sense-organs were causes But comma Sense is delusive : The senses can proe nothing real: The world, of knowledge. Similar to the or sum of effets, is a pure fiction due to consciousness of the presence and Nescience as is cause. absence of hese in the delusion of sleep ( is the cousciousness, in the waking tate, of the presence and absence of sense-organs, which you urged as a . oof of the sense-organs being causes of know- ledge, i. e. bur consciousness in both cases is false; for no one maintains that the dreamer sees with his eyes though he may imagine that he does so ) ... XIV.

For sense-organs &c. are not really instruments of our cog- nition of the world. Why not, you ask. Declare then, we say whether the sense-orgaus, and the rest, are instruments of true knowledge only, or of true and false knowledge, or of false know- ledge only ?

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। 33

नाद: इन्द्रियादिजन्यज्ञानप्रामाययं भ्रमविषयव्यावृत्तार्थवि- षयत्वेन साधनीयं भ्रमविषयव्यात्ृतार्थत्वं च प्रमितिविषयत्वेनेत्य- न्योन्याश्रयात। न व प्रमितिविषयत्वमर्थसत्यत्वे हेतुरपि मिथ्येदं रजतमिति प्रमित्याऽसत्यस्यापि विषयीकरयात् अबाधितत्वस्य था- उसिद्धेः। किज्जु इन्द्रियायां प्रमायत्वेन पज्ञातार्थविषयत्वे वत्तव्येऽधि- ष्ठानमाचविषयत्वं प्राप्तं प्रपज्जुस्य सर्वस्य जडत्वेन पच्ातत्वाभावात। Not of true knowledge merely; for the truth of the know- ledge effected through sense-organs &c. would have to be proved by declaring that the object of (sc. what was made known by) this knowledge was something different from what false knowledge makes known; and again, that its object was some- thing different from the object of false knowledge would be proved by the declaration that its object was the object of true knowledge-which would give rise to a logical see-saw. Nor does the fact that the knowledge is true, prove the real existence of the object made known by that knowledge; for in the case of the true cognition-'this silver is unreal'-(e. g. where mother of pearl is mistaken for silver) a true cognition has as its object an unreal thing (sc. the imagined silver). And (it cannot be urged that the difference between true and false objects consists in objects of the former kind being such as are not subsequently proved false, for) absence of falsification cannot be maintained (in the teeth of Sruti and argument, which prove all save Brahman to be false). Moreover, since it must be held (on yonr view of things existing independent of cognition) that the sense- organs as sources of knowledge must have for their objects things which exist even when unperceived (for it is the essential character of an organ of knowledge, you say, to make known what existed before unknown), it follows that the sense-organs have as their sole object the substrate of all things (sc. the Self, Brahman). For the wbole world of objects being non-intelligent (jada i. e. Nescience when considered apart from Self, Intelligence the substrate), it cannot be what is termed unknown (ajnata, meauing thereby invested by Nescience; for the objects are Nescience itself, and Nescience could only invest or make unknoum Intelligence and not itself).

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38 सिठ्ठान्तमुक्ताक्ली।

तथाचाधिष्ठानंत्वस्यात्मन्येव विश्वान्तत्वेन प्रत्यगात्मविष- यागीन्द्रियाणि प्रमाणानीति वत्तव्यं तच्च नोपपद्यते प्रत्यगात्मन इन्द्रियाविषयत्वात् तस्य निर्द्धर्मकत्वात्। तथाच श्रुतिः न सन्दूशे तिप्ठुति रूपमस्य न चक्षुषा पश्यति कश्चिदेनं पराज्जि खानि व्यतृमत स्वयंभस्तस्मात्पराड् पश्यति नान्तरात्मव्निति। नचानयेव श्रत्येन्द्रियायां प्रपज्रविषयत्वं दर्शितमिति वाच्यं स्वम्रेन्द्रियवदन्वय-

प्रदर्शने तात्पर्य्यात। सतेन भ्रमप्रमासाधारवज्ञानकारणत्वमप्यपास्तं प्रमाकरयत्वस्य निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात। Accordingly, since the fact of being the locus of the world can apply satisfactorily to the Self only, you will have to declare that the sense-organs as sources of knowledge have the Self within as their object; and such a declaration is impossible, for the Self cannot be an object for the sense- organs, since it is without attributes. And thus runs the ruti-

Kațha Up: II. 6.9: 'His form is not to be seen, no 4.1. one beholds him with the eye.' 'The Self-existent pierced the openings of the senses so that they turn forward (outward): therefore man looks outward not inward into his Self.' Nor can it be said that this passage declares that the sense-organs have the world of phenomena as their object. For while the passage re-states the instrumentality of the sense-organs in regard to our Knowledge of the world-which iustrumentality is commonly regarded as proved by a method of conjoint presence and absence which is really false, as (the presence and absence of) sense-organs in dreams (is purely imaginary)- the real meaning of the passage lies in showing that the Self is not an object for the sense-organs. By thus showing that the sense-organs cannot be instru- mente of true knowledge, we have refuted the (second) alternative that they are instruments of true and false, knowledge together.

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अस्तु तहि भ्रममांचे कारणता इन्द्रियागाम। न भ्रमज्ञानस्या- Sविद्यामाचयोनित्वस्य त्वयेवोत्तत्वात् ज्ानं प्रतोन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरे- कयोश्च स्वम्रेन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकषदुपपतेः । एवं घटादिकार्य्यमापे कारमाकाङ्कायां कारयत्वेनाविद्येवोपसंहर्तव्या। तत्तदर्थिनां तत्तत्का- - रकषविशेषाणदानं तु तघ्ेव स्वम्रवदुषपादनीयम्। ततो ब्रझमातिरिकं कृत्स्कार्यजालं ज्ानं ेयरुपं तत्र्वमाविद्यकमेव। इति प्राताति- कमेव सत्वं सर्वस्येति पिद्धम। तदुतां वसिष्ठेन अविद्यायनयो भाषा: सर्वेडमी बुद्धदा इव। वगामुद्य गच्छन्ति ज्ानेकजलथो लयम्। Let then the (third) alternative stand, viz., the sense-organs are instruments of false knowledge only. This will not hold, for you yourself declared that Nescience alone is the cause of false know- ledge. And because we also have proved that the presence and absence of sense-organs (which you urged as a proof that the latter are instrumental) with regard to (waking) knowledge is on precisely the same footing as the presence and absence of sense- organs which we are conscious of in dreams (sc. is a bare imagin- ing). Thus, to meet our expectation of a cause for all effects, such as earthen pots, cloth &c., Neseience alone is to be accepted as their eause. Bnt the aceeptance of special causes for aach of these effects (-clay for the pot, threads for .the clcth-) by those who desire these effects can be proved to be precisely similar to the acceptance during the dreaming state (of these special causes when, as all admit, the clay, threads &c. are purely fictitious). Hence, with the sole exception of Brahman, all things, whe- ther cognitions or things cognised are the effects of Nescience; and their esse has been proved to be percipi only. And thue Va- sishtha declared :- ' All things have Nescience as their souree: Yogavasishtha Nirvapsprakarapa, el 20: bubble-like they spring up for a The Bombay edition, p. 211, neads Hal: moment and are refunded into the great ocean of knowledge (sc. Brahman).'

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36 सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

१२ मृदादोनां कारवत्वं न चेदिष्टं घटं प्रति । सविद्याया: कारयत्वं कथं विङ्धोत्प्रमां जिना । १५। नन्वविद्यायनि्त्व भावानां कार्य्यकारयभावमङ्गीकृत्य न वा। न वेदविद्यायोनित्वमपि कथम। श्रस्ति चेत्कार्य्यकारयभा- वस्तदा यथायथमन्वयव्यतिरेकादिरेव प्रमायं तय प्रकारान्तरासम्भ- वाल। तथाचान्वयव्यतिरेकरादिसिदुं मृदादिकारणत्वमपहाय ऋवि- द्याकारतत्वाभिधानमनुचितमेव। किज्जु पविद्यायोनित्वं भावानां 12. If you do not admit that clay &c. are causes of a pot, Common Sense again urges that the how, in the absence of a sceptic too must start from certain a8- sumptions: thus he must assume that the correct copfirmatory instance, causal relation is itself real, in order to prove that Nescience is the cause of the world. is the causality of Nescience to be proved ?... XV. It may be asked whether, in maintaining Nescience as the source of existing things, the causal relation is assumed as real. If not, then the causality of Nescience also cannot be affirmed. If the causal relation be admitted as real, then the inductive methods of argument from conjoint presence and absence &c.," as may be demanded in each case, are trustworthy sources of know- ledge; for no other methods of proof can apply to the causal relation (tatra). And so it is manifestly improper to maintain the cansality of Nescience, while rejecting the causality of clay, threads, &c. (in the case of pots and yarn, cf. supra) which has been proved by inductive methods. Moreover, he who holds that Neseience is the source of things should be asked, whether Nescience is the sole cause,

. The etcetera is glossed in Nsuadikshita's Siddbantadipika by efdoresaa. rg sc, all casca in which existence of substrate is inferred from existence of attributes; as subtile ether (substrato) is inferred from sound (attribute).

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। 30

वदन प्रघुव्य: । क्रिमितरनिरपेक्षा प्रविद्यिोष कारयमुतादृष्टेशवादिा रयान्तरसापेक्षा। नाद: कारयवेचित्याभावेन कार्यवेचित्यामुपण: चेतनाधिष्ठानमन्तरेख जडशत्ते: कार्य्यकारित्वानुपपत्तेश्च। नापरः अविद्याकारयवादिनाष्यदृष्टेश्वरादे: कारणत्वस्यावश्यं वत्तव्यत्वा ललाघवात्तत एव विचिचकारयेोपपते। किमज्ञानेन कारवत्वाभिमतेन कल्पितेन। तथाथ प्रत्यवादेलेंंकिकस्य, प्रमायस्य पूर्वकायडस्य च पुषपशुस्वगादिकं प्रति यागादे: साधनताबोधकस्य प्रामाययं सम-

independent of any others, or as conjoined with the retributive power of actions, God and the otber general causes .* Nescience cannot be the sole cause; for variety in the effects is impossible if the cause is a unity (as Nescience is); and because an unintel- ligent force (like Nescience) cannot be a cause without the aid of an intelligent substrate (to will that force). Nor will the other alternative stand, for he who holds to the causality of Nescience is bound also to admit the conjoint causality of the retributive power of actions, God, &c .; and since it is easier to account for the production of a variety of effects from these various causes (tatah eva), what necessity is there to assume Nescience as the cause ? And so (continues the objector) there is established the trustworthiness of perception and the other sources of human knowledge, and of the earlier (or ritual portion) of the Veda which declares that sacrifices &c. are the means of obtaining sons, cattle, paradise &c. If the trustworthiness of both human know- ledge and Revelation be denied (anyatha), pray what view can he adopt who thus places himself in opposition to buman experience and to the Veda? Therefore (concludes the objector), that the world has Nescience as its only cause is a downright rash state- ment.

. To those mentioned in the text are usually added-God's knowledge, desire and volition ; time, space, antecedent non-existence (of the effect); and, sometimes, absence of an obstruotive, cf. Nyšyskois, ed. Bhimācharys, sādhdranakdraņatra.

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्ावली। सिंतं भवति। अन्यथा लोकवेदविरुद्ुः कं पद्तमवलम्बेत। तस्मा- दविद्यामापकारखकं जगदिति साहसमाचम। चव वदाम: यथा सतो जनिर्नेषमसतोऽपि जनिर्न च। जन्यत्वमेत्र जन्यस्य मार्यिकत्वसमर्कम्। १६ । किमिदं काय्ये सत्यमसत्यं वा। नाद्यः एकमेवाद्वितीयमि- त्यद्वेतमाचपर्यव सविताममविरोधात् अनुपपत्तेश्य। तथाहि किमु- त्पते: पूर्व काय सदसद्वा। असन्चेत तरहि शशविषायमपि कारय- व्यापराम्जावेत पमत्वाविशेषात्। सच्चेत्ष किं कारवव्यापारेव पूर्वमचि To the above we reply :- Just as production canuot be (explained as proceeding) from The philosopher replies : So far from something previously existing, so the causal relation being real the very notion of it is inexplicable, and leade us also production from something back to Neecience. Maya, or the Iuex- plicable, as the source of this inexplio- previously non-existent cannot be able world. explained. The bare fact of pro- duction proves that the product is the work of Maya ... XVI. Is an effect something real or unreal? Not sometbing real; for this is opposed to the purely monistic teaching of Sruti in such passages as ' one only without a second.' Nor can an effect be proved to be something real. To explain :- Previous to its pro- duction, is an effect existent or non existent? If non-existent, then a nonsensical effect such as the horn of a hare ought to be produced through the agency of the cause, sc. the non-existent in this case; for the non-existent is a unity without difference (and if the non-existent can be a cause, why should it not endow the hare, as well as the ox, with horn ?) If the effect was something previously existent, then causal agency is unnecessary ; for the effect existed previous to the exercise of this function ; and the nature of the effect (as a consequent) is thus overthrown. If you urge that it is merely the manifestation of the thing that is brought about through causal .agency, we reply that even on thie suppositioh there is no getting rid of the evil fate which awaits you, which-

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सिद्धान्तमुक्कतावली।

सस्य सत्वात् कार्य्यत्वत्याध्यताच्ु। श्रमित्रयक्तिमापं कारयव्यापारा ज्नायत इति घेतृ न तवपि सत्वासत्वबिकल्पयासन्ामानपायात्। . चस्तु तई सदसट्विलक्षरमनिर्बेद्नीयमेव कार्यम । एवं चेतहिं कार्यानुरुणनाद्यनिर्वेचनीयाज्ञानमेव कारयमुचितं उत्यस्यासत्य- हेतुत्वानुपपतेः लोके तथा दर्शनाल। न व कार्य्यवेवित्यानुपपति: विचिकशसिकस्यवाज्ञानस्य कल्पनादित्युत्तम। न च पूर्वकापडस्य प्रामाययानुपपति: लस्यापि साध्यसाधनभावमुखेन सत्वशुद्धिद्वारेय प्रमृतिद्वारेय वा ब्रह्मपयेश तात्पर्य्यात तात्पय्ार्ये शब्दस्य प्रामा- ever of the alternative you assume, (for you will have to admit that the manifestation, previous to its being brought about, was either existent or non-existent). Grant then (you say) that an effect is something inexplicable either as existent or non-existent. In this case, we reply, it is fitting to maintain, as the only canse, Nescience, inexplicalle, eternal ab, ante, and of the same nature as its effects; for it is impossible that entity should be the cause of non-entity and common experience vouches for this impossi- bility. Nor may you urge that a variety of effects is impessible, (if Nescience as a unity be held to be the cause of the world); for, as we have already shown (§ 7) there is presumptive evidence for Nescience as a unity possessing manifold powers, (and the variety of effects would fotlow, consistently, from the variety of the powers of Nescienoe). Nor may you urge that, on our view, the authoritativeness of the earlier or ritual portion of the Veda is impossible; for the real aim of this portion also is to teach Brahman, indirectly, by teaching that certain means, sc. sacrificial rites bring about certain results, through the performance of which the intellect* (of the sacrificer) 'is purified (and thus prepared for a study of

in loco. For this tocbmionl meaning of sattra ef. Katha Up. 1I, 6, 7. Bsntarabhiabya

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80

रयात। तस्मादविद्यायोनित्वं भावानां सुष्ठुक्तम। मतोडविद्याक- ल्पितस्य जगतः प्रतोतिसमकालीनमेव सत्वमुचितं रज्जपर्पशुक्तिर- जवगन्धर्वनगर स्वम्रप्रपज्ञेषु तथा दर्शनात। ९३ अचेदं निरूपणीयम। प्रतीतिमातं सत्वं वेत्सत्वं प्रातीतिकं मतम्। अविरोधान्ममापीषृं तद्ेदे वद का प्रमा । १०॥ प्रतीतिसमकालीनं सत्वं जगत बति को्ऽर्थः किं प्रतीतिरेव सत्वं किं वा प्रतीतिव्यतिरेकेय जगतः पृथक सत्वमस्ति। अन्त्ये Brahman), or through which he becomes possessed with the desire to practise the means of attaining a koowledge of Brahman (sc. hearing &c. cf. vote p. 6). And because the authoritativeness of the Veda (Sabda) depends on the implied (and not on the literal) meaning of the word. Hence our view of Nescience as the cause of things is con- sistent; whence it follows that our view that the Nescience- presented world is strictly cotemporaneous with the cognition of the world is also consistent. For such is our experience of the existence of a snake imagined in rope, or of the silver imagined in mother-of-pearl, or of the mirage, or of the dream-world. 13. Here this must be explained :-

None of the commonly accepted 'means If by your view that existence of proof,' pramanas, will prove duality, is cotemporaneous with percep- bheda. tion (sattvam prātītikam cf. supra) is meant that esse is merely percipi,* I accept your view as not opposed to mine. If you hold that there is a difference (between the existence of the world and the cognition of it), pray declare the proof thereof ... XVIL What is meant by saying that the existence of the world is cotemporaneous with the cognition of it? Is it meant that the

*प्रासीतिर्क सत्वमिति वससपातीतिमनं प्रसोतिरेव सस्वमिति मर्ते चेवादीत्यनुवाठः। M. D'a. glom.

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84 तत प्रमायमस्ति न वा । भ्रस्ति वेतन मिं प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमागमोड- थोपनिवा। प्रत्यक्षमिति चेतु तप घटोडयमिति यत्प्रत्यक्षमिदमेव स्वस्माद् घटस्य भेदं विषयीकरोति प्रत्यवान्तरं वा। स्वयमेव स्वध्ति- षयभेद गृहाति प्रत्यक्षमिति चेतु तत्कि स्वप्रकाशं परप्रकाशं वा। तथादो स्वविषयविशेषयोत्वेन भेदस्य भानेपि विशिषटज्ञानस्य विशेषण esse of it is percipi and nothing else ? Or that the world has an existence independent of the cognition of it? If the latter mean- ing be adopted, it may be asked whether there is any proof (for the existence of an unperceived world) or not ? If proof exists, is it immediate perception, or inference, or Veda or presumptive evidence? If you say that immediate perception is the proof, then we ask, does the perception, ex- pressed in-'This is an earthen pot'-, make known a difference between itself (sc. the perception of the pot) and the pot? Or does some other perception make known this difference? [This other perception taking the form-'this pot is different from the cognition of pot'-]. If you say that the very perception declares (lit. grasps) the difference between itself and the perceived object, then, we ask, is this perception self-known, or known through some other perception ? If self-known, and if the view be adopt. ed that a determinate knowledge* (visishtajnāna is effected * Visishtajnana is judgment or the knowledge of a subject, viseshya, as qualified by an attribute, viseshana. In regard to visishta- jnana two views obtain, as stated in the tert :- (a) "fafe

fufa aa." The former is the Nyaya view (of. Bhashaparichchheda, Muktavali sl. 58). It holds that for the formation of a visishtajnana, e. g. ghato' yam, there is necessary not only intercourse (sannikarsba) of sense-organs with the viseshya or ghata, but also a previous know- ledge of the viseshans or ghatatva. Such previous knowledge is teohnically termed indeterminate, nirvikalpaka, and is not effected

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जनजन्यत्वपसे स्वेनेव मेदलविशेषवविषयेश स्वयं जन्यत इर्तिं प्रहं तथाचात्माश्रय: । through a knowledge of the attribute portion-then, although in the present case the difference (between the pot and the percep- tion of the pot) is known as the attribute of the object (sc. earthen pot) made known by the perception itself (sva), it follows that the perception is self-originated in that it makes known an attribute, viz., the difference (between the pot and the perception of the pot : and, en hypothesi, it is the kuowledge of this difference as the attri- bute portion which brings about the determinate knowledge or judgment that the pot is different from the cognition of the pot) : and this is an instance of the logical vice of self-dependence .*

through sense-organs, atindriyam. The latter view is that of the Mimamsă and Vedanta. It denies the neoessity of a previous know- ledge of the viseshana: all that is necessary is intercourse of sense- organs with both viseshana and viseshya. To follow the argumentation of the text, it should further be re- membered that the difterence between cognition and the thing cognised ( which difference is supposed to be made known by the visishtajnana in question, sc. ghato'yam) may be expressed in two ways :- (i) HAT firar az: Here mattah -ghato' yamiti pratyakshāt: bheda is the viseshapa and is ghatanishtha (sc. resides in loous ghata ): ghata is viseshya; both pratyaksha is hhedapratiyogi. (ii) aezdnia: Hore bheda is vimeshya; both pratyaksha and ghata are viseshana's: pra- tyaksha is bhedapratiyogi; ghata is bhedadharmi. The method em- ployed in the text is that in vogue with controversial Vedanta treatiae such as the Khandana, Chitsukhi and Advaitasiddhi. Briefly stated, it consists in the attempt to show that consciousuess of duality, what- srer theories may be held as to its genesis and formal expremsion, in inezplicable { apirvachaniya ), false ( asat ) .. ·खसिख्ो मव्यवधानेन खवापेा भा्माभमः।

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली। 83

विशेष्यत्वेन भेदस्य भाने विशेषसविशेष्येन्द्रियसन्रिकर्षमानं विशिष्टधानकारयमिति पवे ध्ञानोत्पत्ते: पूरव भेदोऽस्तीति वाच्यं तथा तस्येव ज्ञानस्य कथं स भेदो विषय: स्थात् स्वोत्पत्ते: पूर्व स्वस्ये- वाभावात् । दानान्तरस्य व स्वयंप्रकाशच्ानाविषयत्वेन तत्प्रतियो- गिकभेदा5विषयत्वात। भवर्तमानस्य ज्ानस्य परप्रकाश्यत्वे वर्स- A मानकालेपाचिकं स्वप्रकाशत्वमिति स्यात्। वर्ततमानकाले ज्ानस्व- रूपमेव स्वप्रकाशमिति चेतृ न भतीलानागतयोरपि तथात्वापतेः। If (you say that) the difference (between the pot and the perception of the pot) is known as the subject portion-and if the view be adopted that the sole cause of a determinate percep- tion is the intercourse of sense-organs with both subject and attribute portions (of such determinate perception)-then you will have to admit that the difference existed previous to the perception of it, (otherwise there could be no contact of sense- organs with it, and, ex hypothesi, no determinate perception could follow)-and if the difference existed previously (tatha cha), that difference could not possibly be vouched for by the perception (as you first stated); for the perception did not exist before it was produced (through contact of sense-organs with the subject portion (sc. the difference between the pot and the peroeption of the pot). And since a second perception cannot make known a self-known perception (-and this is what you started with-), it cannot make known a differenee which has as its counter- entity a self-known perception (tat). If it be urged that a percep- tion in other than present time is made known by a further per- ception (in present time), then the self-presentative character of cognition is made to depend on present time as its limiting condi- tion (and is, pro tanto, destroyed). Again you may urge that the self-presentative character of cognition is by its very nature con- fined to the time of presentation,-which we deny; for self-pre- sentative character beloags equally to the cognition of an object poreeived in the past and to the cognition of an object yet to be porceived in the future (since both are cognitions like cognition

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। 88

न हि घटः कदाचिदघट इति स्यात्। इन्द्रियसन्रिकरषाश्र यस्य भेदस्य स्वसत्तामाचेया स्वविषयकज्ञानजनकत्वमित्यपि प्रक्रि यामापं प्रमायाभावेम सतामाषस्याप्यसिद्ेः। ग्रस्तु तर्हि परप्रका- शज्ञानपचे प्रत्यवान्तरेय ज्ञानानवेयस्य भेदयहः। सेडपि व्यावृत्त- प्रतियोग्यादिग्रहपूर्वको न वेति विवेधनीयस। न चेत्कथं भेदं विषयोकुर्यात। न हि निर्द्धर्मिकं निष्प्रतियोगिक वा भेद कश्चित्र- त्येति श्रयमस्माद्विन्न इत्यनुभवात्। in the present time). (Nor can you argue for a change in the nature of cognition corresponding to a change in time), for the once perceived earthen pot ever remains a pot. Again, you may urge that, merely by the fact of its own existence (i. e. without being perceived), the difference (between the pot and the per- ception of the pot), with which difference the sense-organs were in contact, produced the perception in which that difference was declared. This is nothing but a bare statement on your part; for, in the absence of evidence, the mere fact of existence (of difference, to which you refer,) is unproved. Well then, let it be granted, on the view of one cognition requiring a second to make it known, that the difference between the thing perceived and the perception of the thing is made known through a second perception. Now it must be decided whether or not the knowledge of the difference was preceded . by a knowledge of the reciprocally different counterentity and locus (the counterentity, pratiyogi, is the perception of the pot; the locus, anuyogi is the pot : cf. p. 13, note). If not thus pre- ceded, bow could the second perception, we ask, make known the difference? For no one is conscious of a difference which is destitute of locus or counter-entity, as is proved by the form our consciousness invariably takes (with regard to difference), viz., 'this is different from that.' If, on the other hand, you admit that the knowledge of the difference was preceded by a know- ledge of the reciprocally different counter-entity and locus, you commit yourself to a regressus in infinitum in seeking for some

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। 89

न्तरान्वेषये5नवस्था। तेनेत्र व्यावृतिग्रहे आात्माश्रयः। तस्माद्वस्तु- मानावगाहि प्रत्यवषं न भेदवातीं जानातीति सिदधुस। ऋ्रस्तु तहय- नुमानान्जानस्ञोययोर्मेदग्रहः। तथाहि विमतो विषय: स्वविषयश्ता At नाद्िदते तद्विरुद्ुधर्माश्रयत्वात् यो यद्विरुदु्धर्मान्रयः स तो

further cognition to make known this difference (-a second cognition will demand a third and so on-). And if you declare that the knowledge of the reciprocal difference (between the perception of the thing and the thing perceived) was brought about by this same (second) cognition, the logical vice of self- dependence results (-the second cognition merely re-states the already perceived difference : to say then that it is the cause of the latter is to say that it is the cause of itself-). Thus we have proved that perception, which testifies merely to something exist- ing, gives not the least evidence for a difference (between the thing perceived and the perception of the thing). Grant then, you say, that the knowledge of a difference bet- ween the thing perceived and the cognition of the thing follows from an infarence. Thus ;- " i. The thing under discussion differs from the perception wbich makes it known. ii. Because this thing is the substrate of + attributes which are opposed to the attributes of the perception which makes this thing known,

. The five-membered syllogiem (nyaye) consisting of i. pratijua or proposition to be proved ; ii hetu or probans ; iii. udāharana or confirmatory instance; iv. upana- ya or application ; v. nigamana or conclusion. For the reduction of this number to three, cf. Ved. paribh. Pandit Vol. V. p. 659.

tolligent. t ac. the object ia jade, non-intelligent, wherems the perception is chetane, in-

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88 सिद्ठान्तमुततावली।

मिद्यते यथा घठात्पटस्तथाचायं तस्मातया। मेवं विरोधस्य भेद- निहप्यत्वेन भेदासिट्ठग विरोधाषिट्ठा तह्विरुदुधमीश्रयत्वस्याप्य- सिट्धेः। साध्याप्रसिट्ठश व्याप्यविद्ेश्व। न ह्वि घटपटयोर्भेंद: केन चिन्मानेन सिट्धो येन साध्यं प्रसिद्धोत। प्रत्यधाभावेऽनुमानान्- रानुसरयेप्यनवस्थादिदोषस्य तादवस्थ्यात।

iii. Whatever is the substrate of attributes which are oppos- ed to the attributes of some other thing is different from tbat other thing; as for example, a piece of cloth is different from an earthen pot. iv. And the thing under discussion, sc. the perceived object, is similar to the piece of cloth. v. Therefore the perceived object is also different from the perception of the object. We reject the above argument. For since the opposition (of the attributes) is to be known through the difference (between the substrates to which the attributes severally belong), it fol- lows that while the difference (between the substrates) is un- proved, the opposition (of the attributes) is also unproved: hence (the probans, ii.) 'this thing is the substrate of attributes which are opposed to the attributes of the perception which makes this thing known' is invalid. And because as long as the probandum (sadhya, sc. difference between the perception of the object and the object. perceived) is unsupported (by any confirmatory ins- tance) so long the nniversal concomitance (of opposition of attri- butes and difference of substrates expressed in iii, or the universal major premise) is unproved. Nor can the difference between an earthen pot and a piece of cloth (which was adduced as a confirm- atory instance) be proved by any evidence whatever so as to sup- port the probandum. And if in the absence of perception (to prove the confirmatory instance), recourse is had to a second inference to prove it, the logical vices of an infinite regress, a see-saw &c. will continue to haunt the argument.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

भागमस्याभेदमाचे तात्पर्य्येग पर्यवसन्धस्य भेदबोधकत्वं शङ्डि तुमप्यशक्यम्। ननु ब्रह्मः सकाशात् सटिं प्रतिपादयन्रागमः कार्यजा- तस्य ततो भेदमपि प्रतिपादयति। प्रभेदे ततो जन्मेव न स्यादिति चेतु म सृष्टिवाश्यस्य सर्वस्य प्रधानादिपर परिकल्पितकारणन्तरनिराक्क रकपरस्य मृद्घटादो कारणात् कार्य्यस्य भेदेनानिरुपयावद् ब्रह्माप: कारकषात् कार्य्य जातस्य सर्वस्य भेदेनानिरु पयोनाद्वितीयब्रह्मसम्भावना माचे तात्यर्यात्। अन्यथा भेदपरत्वे तव्निषेधोSनर्थकः स्यात। किञ्ज

Since the Veda finds its complete meaning in teaching non- difference only (sc. Brahman alone exists), it is perfectly impos- sible to suppose that it can teach difference (sc. duality or reality of the world). Here it may be objected that, in teaching the emanation of the world from Brahman, the Veda also teaches that all products are different from Brahman : for, if not different, their emanation from Brahman could not be (spoken of). This objection must be set aside. For since every Vedic passage bear- ing on creation is devoted to the refutation of those other causes (of the world), sc. matter, pradhāna &c. (of the Saukhyas) assum- ed by other thinkers (i. e. non-Vedantins), by showing that just as in such cases as that of earth and the earthen pot, it is impos- sible to explain* what the difference is between earth, the cause, and the pot, the effect, so too it is impossible to explain what the difference is between Brahman, the cause, and the whole world which is an effect from Brahman, it follows that every such passage finds its real meaning only 'in making possible a conception of' Brahman, the one without a second. Otherwise, ifthe Veda were devoted to teaching difference (duality, or a real world), the probibition with regard to duality (contained in such passages as 'there is no diversity in Brabman') would be purposeless.

· If the difference ie inexplicable, anirvachniya, it is unreal, asat : this is of course the implication of the tert.

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

सृष्रिवाक्यं न तावत्साक्षाद्वेदं प्रतिपादयति भेदवाचकपदाभावेनापदा र्थस्य वाक्यार्थत्वाभावातृ पदार्थस्येष संसृषृत्वेन वा धर्मिमानपरत्वेन वा वाक्यप्रतिपाद्यत्वात् कल्पनायाश्य निषेधवाक्यविरोधनानुत्था नातृ। न व ज्ानमेव स्वांतिरित्तच्चेयव्यातरेकेणानुपपत्रं स्वमिन्नं च्ेयं विषयोकरोति न हि निर्विषयं ज्ञानं सम्भवति दृष्टं वा सविषयस्येत भा- समानत्वात अन्यथा निष्प्रकारकमेव भासेत ज्ञाने विषयातिरिकस्य प्रकारस्याभावादिति वाच्यं वेयव्यतिरेकेय ज्वानस्यानुपपत्यभावात। Further, passages dealing with creation do not directly teach difference (between Brahman, cause, and the world, effect): for since no word bearing the sense of difference occurs in such pass- ages, these cannot declare a meaning which the words composing them do not bear; because it is only what is meant by the words that a sentence can directly make known, either by showing syn- tactical relation between the words, or by conveying the simple notion of identity* (of subject and predicate in the sentence). And an inference (from Vedic passages bearing on creation of the world to the difference between Brabman and the world) is inad- missible as contradictory of (such) prohibitive passages (as ' Brab- man is not this, not this'; and human inference must yield to the direct utterances of Revelation). Nor can the following be urged :- Cognition, which would be impossible in the absence of an object (to be cognised) different from the cognition, itself declares that the object cognised is different from the cognition; for object-less

*Nanadikshita glosses thus : प्रव्वडवाक्यत्वपन्नमाम्मित्य श्राह धर्मोति । A sentence (vākya) is (a) predicative, i. e. makes known a relation (samsarga) betureen the objects meant by the words (padartha) in the sentence-पवार्थसंसगावर्माचचि afearas-TH-or (b) it expresses the bare identity of the objects meant by the worde without predicating and relation between them-वाक्वस्य भ्रसपडार्थता धर्सि- मात्रपरत्वं धा-पखव्डार्थता=चपय्यीयानेकशव्दप्रकाशयत्वे सति पववितिष्टत्वम, or = सनातीयविजातीयस्वगतभेद शून्यस्वम् For the stock illustrations, tat tvampasi and so'yam Devadattab, cf. Ved. paribh. Pandit Vol VII., p. 463.

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तथाहि तत्किं ज्ानस्य व्ेयव्यतिरेकेणोत्पत्यनुपपत्ति: स्थित्यनुपपत्तिर्ज्वश्यनुपपतिया। नादः ज्ञानस्य स्वरूपत उत्पत्त्यभा- वात। भावे वा प्रमाएतदाभासाभ्यामेवतदुत्पादनसम्भवे विषयानपेघ- पातृ ज्ञानस्य सर्वेच विषय जन्यत्वे नियमाभावात्। नापि स्थित्यनुप- पतिः विषयस्य ज्ञानानाश्यत्वात् तथात्वे वा विषयत्वव्याघातात्। ज्ञानविषयकज्ञानस्य विषयज्ञानाधीनत्वेन द्वेयं बिना चप्यनुपपतिर- स्त्विति चेत न ज्ञानस्य स्वयंप्रकाशमानत्वेन स्वव्यवहाराथ स्वाति- cognition is neither possible nor a fact of experience, since only cognition aecompanied by an object is experienced: otherwise (sc. if objeet-less cognition were a fact) only indeterminate cognition would be experienced, for apurt from an object cognised there is nothing to determine the eognition. (The above is to be rejected) because the impossibility of cognition, in the absence of an object to be cognised, (as held above) does not exist. To explain ;- Is it meant that the production of cognition is impossible, or that the persistence of cognition is impossible or that secondary cognition is impossible? The first view will not hold, for cognition (se. Brah- man) in its essential nature is not a product at all. Or if it be conceded that cognition is a product, an object is not necessary to produce it, since cognition (whether true or false,) can be effeeted through (trustworthy) organs of knowledge (sc. perception, infer- ence &c.) or through their counterfeits-there being no restrictive rule that cognition is in all cases produced by an objeet, (thus, in knowledge through inference the inferred object is not perceived. Nor is it that the persistence of coguition is impossible, for the object cognised is not the locus of the cognition. Or if it be held that the cognised object is the locus of cognition* then the object has lost its character as an object (and has become a sub- strate of coguition, i. e, & cogniser).

• The special point of this argument is against the Naiyayikas, with whom knowledge is an attribute (dharma) residing in Self (ātman) the substrate (séraya).

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रितानपेवयात। परप्रकाशत्वेन ज्ानान्तरापेघ्ायां तस्याध्यन्यतस्त स्याप्यन्यत इत्यनवस्थित्या न्ानासिट्टो जगदान्ध्यप्रसद्गात । प्रक्ता- यमानस्येव ज्ञानस्य स्वविषयसाधकत्वे प्रमाणाभावेन नरशुङ्गतुल्वस्य स्वरूपसत्मसिट्टे:।भास्तु का ज्ानस्य स्वद्यानाथ चानान्तरापेजा तथापि विषयापेययां कुतः विषयच्ञानस्येवापेतपात्। ज्ञानसामान्य-

नीति ततुच्छ जानस्य स्वत एव व्यावृत्तत्वात परषिदुजात्यादिवत। Suppose then that it is impossibility of secondary cognition, in the absence of an object to be cognised; since secondary eog- nition is dependent on the cognition of an oject. This cannot be; for cognition being self-presentative does not require any- thing besides itself to make itself known. Adopting the view that cognition is not self-presented, a second cognition will be needed (to make known the first), the second will demand a third cognition and so on ad infinitum; hence, cognition being left baseless, the world becomes blank darkness (sc. nothing could ever be known). On the view that it is an unknown cognition that testifies. to the object cognised, it follows that the very ex- istence of this cognition is a chimera like the horns of a man, for there is no means of proving; its existence, (the cognition being unknown, ex hypothesi). Or granting that a cognition needs a second cognition to make it known, yet why, it may be asked, is a cognised object needed? For only cognition of the object is. necessary. Against this it may be urged (by the opponent) as follows: Since the necessity of cognition in general (sc. apart from some object cognised) is not here postulated, it follows that thore is a necessity for a cognition as differenced (determined) by some cognised object; and hence the demand for an object is inevitable. But the above objection is idle; for cog- nition- is: self-differenced, as: are the categories of generality (jati): &c: maintainedi by the other (sohools of philosophy).

The etcetera includes akhandopadhi and: visesha. of. Muktāvali 51.10 and 58. विशेषस्तु स्वतएत्र व्यावृत्तस्तेन तत्र विशेषान्तरपेक्षा नास्तीत्यर्थ:॥ad ज.ात्य खय डोपाध्यतिरिक्कप्रदार्थस्य क्रि्विद्धर्मप्रकारत्वनियमात् म

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

त्थापि ज्रानस्य नेयव्यापत्वान्तेवं बोधयतीति चेतु न

पतीतानागतार्थ बामदर्शनेनेककालत्वस्याप्यसिट्ठेः। तस्मात् प्रत्येतव्यपतीत्योश्च भेदः प्रामाणिक: कुतः । प्रतोतिमा ष्मेवेतद्राति विश्वं चराचरम। १८॥ द्ानजेयप्रभेदेन यथा स्वामं प्रतीयते। विद्यानमाचमेवेतत तथा जाग्रचुराधरम । १2 ॥ Nevertheless (continues the opponent) the very fact of cognition* leads us to infer the existence of some object, because of the universally established concomitance of cognition and cognised object (ac. wherever there is eognition, there is also cognised ob- ject) Not so, is the reply. For this universal concomitance cannot be proved: because cognition and cognised object cannot exist together in the same locus (adhikarana) since their spatial positions are distinct (sc. cognition is in the mind, and the cognised object is external to the mind ; whereas smoke and fire are found together in one place) : and, further, because the temporal co-existence (of cognition and cngnised object) cannot be proved, since cognition of a past or future object is a matter of common experience.

Therefore, to sum ap :- There is no proof that cognition and cognised object are differeot. This universe, animate and inanimate, which appears. in conscioueness, is nothing but cognition .... XVIII. As the world of dreams, which is really nothing but cognition (Brahman), appears in conciousness under divers forme of cogni- tions and cognised objects; so too the world of waking conscious- ness, of things animate and inanimate (is nothing apart from Brabman) ... XIX.

• सर्थादि यति बोधयति न्ञानमिति प्रेष: । N. D's gloss.

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

तम्तोर्भेदे पढ़ो यहच्छून्य एव स्वहूपतः । आात्मनोषि लथेवेदं भानमाचं चराथरम । २० । रन्नुयंथा भ्रान्तदृष्ष्या सर्पकपा प्रकाशते। वात्मा तथा मूढ़बुड्धा जगदूप; प्रकाशते । २१ । भात्मन्येव जगत्सवं दृष्टिमावं सतत्त्वक्म*। उद्गय स्थितिमास्थाय विनश्यति मुड्मुंहु: । २९ ! पयोनन्दाउद्वये शुद्धे पाप्मदोषाद्रिवर्र्िते। प्रतिबिम्बमिवाभाति दृष्टिमान जगत्रयम। २३। तदुतं भगवता वसिप्ठेन तस्मिशिचिद्वूर्म्पणे स्कारे सन्नस्ता वस्तुदृषृयः । इमास्ता: प्रतिबिम्बन्ति सरसीव तटददमा: 8 तथा - यस्य चित्तमयी लीला जमदेतचचुराचरम । यम्य विश्वात्मकत्वेपि Just as'a piece of cloth really turns out to be mere non-entity, in the absence of its component threads (i. e. if we attempt to think of the cloth as existing independently of the threads); so too this world, whose esse is percipi, (is reduced to nop-entity, in the absence of Self (Brahman, Intelligence) ... XX. As rope (in the darkness) when vision is deceived, appears to be a snake; so, when the mind is deluded, the Self appears to be this world .... XXI. In the Self alone (as locus), all this world, whose esse is per- cipi takes its rise, and persists, and perishes ever and again ... XXII. In the One without a second, which is absolute Bliss and pure, free from sin and all defects, appear, as if reflected, the three worldst whose esse is percipi.,.XXIII. His reverence Vasishtha has declared the same view :- 'In that pure mirror (Brahman) are reflected all these things

Yesartiinhtha Upasama prakarana, él.13. whose esse is percipi, as trees Utpetti „ il. 3,4. on its banks are reflected in a stream. Again 'All this world

• aNr 100. दृष्टि मात्रमतत्वकम्। + स्वर्गमर्त्यपातालाव्यानि पोसि अनन्ति।

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सिंद्ुन्तिमुक्तावली। 43

खरडाते नेकपियडता। तदेवं दृष्टिमाचात्मकं जगद,त्मान्नयविषये- साज्जानेन कृतमित्यात्मनोSद्ञानविषयत्वं साधु विकल्पितम्। तथा- चात्मनि लोकिकवेदिकप्रमाणासम्भवेन श्शविषायादिवदसत्वे प्राप्े कुतस्तत्साक्ात्काराय शास्त्राभ्यर्थना कुंतस्तरां युतयपेत्तेति सङ्ठेषः। एवं प्राप्ते डभिथीयते। १४ यत्तत्वं वेदगुमं परमसुखतमं नित्यमुत्तस्वभावं सत्यं सूक्ष्मात्ससत्मं मंहदिदममृतं मुक्तमापेक्गम्यम। यस्यांशे लेशमापं जगदिदमखिलं भ्रान्तिमाषकदेहं प्रत्यगन्योतिःस्वरूपं शिवमिदम- धुना कथ्यते युक्तितो डच । २४ । is the mental sport of that one (sc. Brahman as Hiranyagarbha),' and 'That one, although it constitutes the universe, does not lose its character as a unity.' Thus, therefore, the world whose esse is percipi is produced through Nescience, which has the Self both as locus and as object, The opponent of § 6, acquiescing in and the assumption, therefore, of our author's sensationalism, now pushes the Self being an object for Nes- it to ite farthest limit : reduces the Self also to non-entity, and dispenses with cience (cf. § 6.) was excellent ! In both Veda and Vedanta philosophy. accordance with this assumption (tatha cha), there can be no evidence, human or divine (sc. Veda), for the existence of the Self: whence it follows that the Self is uon-entity like the horns of a hare; further, there can be no desire to study Veda in order to gain intuition of the Self, much less can there be any necessity of argument (to support the teaching of Veda as to the Self). The above is a summary of the opponent's view. 14. To the view thus laid down it is replied :- Now, in this place, we declare and support by argument that Reality which lies hidden in the Veda, absolute Bliss, in its own Self, the knower, cannot be prored, nature eternal and unrelated to not because it is non-entity, but because aught else, the existent, smaller it is self-proved, i. e. superior to all proof, as being that by virtue of which proof, than the small and infinite; this pramana, can be said to exist at all. is emancipation and is to be ap- prehended only by the emancipated, a small part of a part of it is all this false world, it is in its essence the light within, it is blessed ... XXIV.

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किं तर प्रमावाभविनात्मन: स्वर्षनुषपति: प्रतीत्यनुष- पतिवा। नादाः मात्मस्वरूषस्य नित्यतयेत्रनिरणेदत्वात प्रमाशस्य स्वप्रमेयानुत्पादककत्वाच्। द्वितीये प्रमाखेषि लर्डि प्रमाकान्तरं वाच्यं

प्रमाये प्रमाखान्तरानुसरखे 5नवस्थिते: प्रमायेनेव वस्तुसिद्धिरित्यभि- मानमापम। पथ प्रमायं प्रमाणान्तरनिरणेक्षमेव एवं स्वप्रमेयं च साधयति स्वप्रकाशस्वभावस्य तस्य स्वपरव्यवहारे प्रकाशान्तरनिर- पेघत्वात प्रदोपग्रकाशवत। न हि सर्वस्य साधकं प्रमायं स्वपिठ्ठा- रथमन्यदपेक्षत इति युक्तिमत। इन्त तहि सर्वस्य प्रमायप्रमेयभेद- भिन्नस्य जगतः साधक चात्मा क्यं स्वाधीनसिट्िकेन प्रमायेन In the above argument (tatra), is it meant that because there iş no evidence (for the Self), the very existence of the Self is im- possible, or that knowledge of the Self is impossible? Not the first; for the Self being in its essenee eternal is independent of aught else (from whieh it should originate); and because evidence cannot originate that of whieh it is evidentiary. As regards the second alternative, even if evidence for the Self be granted, a second evidence must be premised to support the first evidenee; for, if this second evidence be wanting, the first evidence is non- entity, like the horns of a man, and eannot therefore be eviden- tiary of its object. And so, in pcstulating a seeond evidence to support the first evidence, the logical vice of an infinite regress results: hence the view (underlying the second alternative) that the existenee of an objeet can be proved only through one of the (recognised) sources of evidenee (sc. perception, inference &c.) is merely a bold assumption. Now (the opponent interposes) an evidenee is indeed inde- pendent of any second evidence and proves its own existence as well as that of the objeet (to whieh it testifies); for being by na- ture self-luminous the evidence requires no furtber illumination to make itself and its object (para) known, just as the light of a lamp (needs no other light to illumine it). Nor is it logical to hold (eontinues the oppnent) that what is evidence for all things needs to be proved by something else. Sad conelusion this !- we reply-for how in the face of it ean it be held that the Self, which is evidenee for the varied aniverse of things known and instru- ments of knowledge, can be proved by evidence which, in its turn, has to be vouched for by the Self (sva)! For the Self must have

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली। ५५

सिद्धः स्यात प्रमायात्यर्वमेव सिद्धत्वात । अन्यथा Sसिद्धुप्रमातृकं प्रमायमेवात्मानं न लभेत । कथं वा सर्वस्य प्रमातारमात्मानं विषयोकुर्यात प्रमायं कर्मकर्तृविरोधप्रसङ्गात तदन्यस्य व सर्वस्या नात्मत्वेनाप्रमातृत्वात। तथा च श्रुति: विद्यातारमरे केन विजानी- यादिति । तथा च प्रमातुरात्मन: स्वत एव सिदधुत्वात प्रमानाभा घान्नासत्त्वप्रापप्िः । किज्जेदमात्मनो Sसन्वमापाद्यमानं प्रमारासिद्म- सिद्धुस्वभावं स्वतो वा सिद्म । आद्े Sसत्वग्राहकप्रमाकस्य प्रति-

द्वितीयः पसिदुस्यापादनानुपपत्तेः । existed prior to any source of evidence. Otherwise a source of evidence could not take on its character* as evidence while no cogniser of it existed. Or how could a source of evidence make known the Self which is the cogniser of all things; for this would be subversive of the distinction between agent, sc. knower, and object, sc. thing known (-the Self, in this case, being both knower and thing known)! Nor can anything other than Self be a cogni-

Brihad : Up: IV. 5. 15. ser, because it is not Self. And thus Sruti declares :- "By what should one know the knower." And thus, since Self, the knower, is self-proved, its non-existence is not proved by the fact that there is no source of evidence applicable to the Self. Further, we ask, is this non-existence of Self, as urged above, something proved by one of the recognised sources of evidence, or is it by nature something unknown, or is it self-proved ? In regard to the first alternative -- since the restrictive rule is that any source of evidence that makes known a non-existence must also make known the counterentity to that non-existence, the Self also must be proved by that source of evidence which declared for the non-existence of the Self, and therefore the non-existence of the Self cannot possibly be proved. Nor will the second alter- native bold good, because no affirmationt is possible in regard

• भात्मानं स्वरूपम् N. D's gloss. पर प्रति सब्देनानिष्ट प्रसञ्जनमापाठनमन्नापाठनगब्धार्ब: N. D's gloss.

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सिठ्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

न हि बुद्धावनाहकस्वभावमापादयितुं शक्यम। तृतीये त्वा- त्मेघ स्वतःसिद्धो Sस्तु असत्वस्य व स्वतःसिट्ठानुपपत्तेः। अन्यथा भात्मनो नामान्तरकरणप्रसङ्गात। किञ्ञात्मनो 5सत्वं किमात्मना चायते Sनात्मना वा। नान्त्य: अनात्मनो चातृत्वाभावात्। नादाः व्याघामात। तथा हि किमात्मा स्वसताकाले स्वासतां जानाति स्वास- ताकाले वा। आद्े स्वसनाकाले स्वासता कुतः। तथा च किं जानीयात् विषयस्येवाभावात्। द्वितीये कथं जानीयात स्वस्येवाभावात्। स्वस- ताकाले आात्मेव कालान्तरभाविनों स्वासतां जानातीति चेत तर्हिं सन्नेवा S5त्मा Sनित्य: परं तच्च कृतहान्यकृताभ्यागमप्रसक्कन परिह्ट-

to anything wholly unknown; for that which has not entered into the mind cannot be affirmed. But if the third alternative be adopted, then grant that it is the Self alone that is self-proved; and (grant this) because non-existence (being jada non-intelli- gent, like material things) cannot be self-proved. If this be denied (sc. if you regard non-existence as chetana, intelligent), it follows that you have given to Self another name (and called it non-existence). Moreover is the non-existence of Self cognised by the Self or by not-Self ? Not by the latter, for the not-Self is not a knower.' Nor by the former-which is a contradiction in terms. To explain our meaning, we ask, Does the Self cognise its own non-existence while it is itself existent or non-existent? On the first alternative, the non-existence of the Self is impossible while the Self exists. Further, what should the Self cognise, since the very object to be cognised (sc. non-existence of Self) does not exist at that time? On the second alternative, the Self could not pos- sibly cognize, because it is itself non-existent at that time. If it be argued that the Self, while existent, cognises its own future non-existence, then we reply that (according to this view) the Self, existent now, perishes later on. And this view of a non-eter- nal Self (tachcha) we have already refuted (cf. § 2), because it logically implies the destroyal of the retributive power of actions, and the fruition of actions never performed by the individual.

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सिंद्ठान्तमुक्तावली। तम। किज्जात्मनेोSसत्ववादी स्वात्मानं निराकरोति परात्मानं वा। आद्े निराकर्तुरसत्वाच्तिराकार्य सवात्मा परमार्थ: सन्। द्वितीये निराकर्ता परमार्थ एव स्थितः कुतस्तेनात्मनो Sसत्वम्। तथा च श्रति: पसन्नेव स भवति अषद्ूस्ेति वेद चेतृ भ्रस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद सन्तमेनं ततो विदुरिति। किज्जु प्रमायं सति विषये प्रवर्नते अम्तति वा। पम्तति चेतु तदि शशविषायमपि साधयेत् भसत्वा- विशेषादसत्साधनसमर्थत्वाच् प्रमाणानाम। सति घेत न तर्हि प्रमायाधीना वस्तुपत्ता प्रमाणप्रवृत्ते: पर्वमेव प्रमेयसत्ताभ्यपगमात। अन्यथा सति प्रमायं प्रवर्त्तत इति स्ववचनव्याकाप:। सत एव Further, does he who maintains the non-existence of Self mean to deny his own Self or the Self of another? In the first case, since the denier is (by supposition) non-existent, that other Self which it was intended to deny remains behind as real. In the second case, the denier is indeed posited as real. How then is it possible to maintain the non-existence of Self? Sruti confirms our view :- 'He who knows Brahman as non-existing becomes Taittir : Up : II. 6. himself non-existing. He who

in consequence, the wise know as existing.' knows Brahman as existing, him,

Again, we ask, Does a source of evidence apply to (sc. make known) an existent, or a non-existent object ? If it can apply to a non-existent object, then it ought also to prove the existence of a sheer non-entity like the horns of a hare, because non-existence is a unity indivisible (and, therefore, includes pure nonsense like the above); and because (by supposition) sources of evidence are able to prove the existence of the non-existent. If a source of evidence is applicable to an existent object, then (the opponent's view) that the existence of an object is subordinate to some source of evidence (which testifies to the existence of the object) is no longer tenable, because he must admit that the object existed even before the source of evidence was addressed to it. If he denies the previous existence of the object (anyatha), he contradicts his

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.

वस्तुने भानं प्रमाणाधीनमिति चेत भवत्वमानस्वरूपे Sनात्मन्य चेतने तथा 1 स्वयमेव भानस्वरूपे आात्मनि कथमेवं भविष्यति । तथा च शुति: तमेव भान्तमनुभालि सवं तस्य भाछ सर्वमिदं वि- भातीति। किज्जात्मनि किं प्रमाथमित्यभिनि वशमानं प्रति सर्वोषि प्रमायानीत्येवोत्तरस प्रम्ातस्यव प्रमायविषयत्वात नात्मन शवाच्चा- तत्वात जडस्य घ स्वत एवावृतस्वभावस्याप्नानलक्णावरणन्तर- कल्पनाप्रयोजनशन्यतयाSज्ञानाविषयत्वेन प्रमाखाविषयत्वात् प्रमा-

प्रतीत्युपपत्तेः । तथा च सर्वप्रमायषिदुस्यात्मनः प्रमाक्जभावादस- own statement that 'a source of evidence is applicable to am existent object.' But (it may be urged) that it is the presentation in consciousness of an existent objeet that is subordinate to a source of evidence. Grant (we reply) that this is so in the case of not-self which is by nature non-presentative, unintelligent. But this cannot possibly be the case in regard to Self, which is itself consciousness. Sruti confirms our view :- 'When the Self

Kațha Up: II. 5. 15. shines, everything shines after it: by its light all this is lighted.' Moreover to the man who is determined to have an answer to his question, What evidence is there for the self ?- our answer is just this-All the recognised sources of knowledge (are evidence) of the Self. For only that which has been concealed by Nescience (ajnātasya can be made known by an instrument of knowledge, (and) the Self is the only thing concealed by Nescience. And since it is unnecessary to assume further concealment, in the form of Nescience, of an unintelligent (material) thing, which is by nature self-concealed (sc. which is itself Nescience), an unintelli- gent thing cannot be (said to be) an object for (sc. concealed by) Nescience and cannot therefore be an object for (sc. be made known by) any of the recognised instruments of knowledge. For knowledge of all unintelligent (material) things is effected only

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सिद्ठुान्तमुक्तावली।

स्वमिति साहसमापम। कथं तर्ह्ोपनिषदत्वमात्मनः सर्वप्रमाय-

त्यगपेख मानान्तराविषयत्वादोपनिषदत्वमिति वदामः ।ननु स्व- यम्रकाशस्यास्ञानविषयत्वानुपपत्तिरित्युक्तम। सत्यं वस्तुतस्तयेव। तथापि यथा मध्यन्दिनवर्तिन्यपि सवितरि स्वयम्प्रकाशे दिवान्धा: पेचकादयस्तमसा 55वृता 5यं सवितिति कल्पयन्ति तथा Sत्यन्तमढ- through Intelligenee, which is the Self, when the Self is attended by eessation of Nescience-this cessation of Nescience being de- pendent on, as being eftected through, an instrument of knowledge. Henee, it is a downright rash statement to make, that the Self, whieh is prowed by all the instruments of knowledge, does not exist because there is no evidence for its existenee. How then, it may be asked by way of objection, is the Self to be considered as the peculiar subject-matter of the Upanishads; for the Self eannot be said to be made known only by the Upani- shads, if (as just admitted above) it is made known by all the instruments of knowledge? Not so, we reply: for the Self is the peeuliar subject-matter of the Upanishads, in that the Self* as identical with (Brahman) the absolute Existenee, Intelligence, Blisa, cannot be known through any other souree of knowledge. The opponent urges that he has already shown that 'a self- luminous Self cannot be invested by Nescienee.' (p. 4, 1. 6.) True, we reply; precisely so from the stand-point of absolute truth. And yet just as blear-eyed owls fancy that the self-luminous sun at noon is enveloped in darkness, so the grossly ignorant imagine that the Self is concealed by Neseienee. Henee all the Upani- shads start to destroy the Neseienee above deseribed whieh eon- ceals the Self and is falsely imagined, and which, through the speeial virtue of the Self (se. its self-luminousness), was already destroyed, i. e was non-entity even previous (to a study of the

*सत्थनवह्गेरिक मुर्वानषम्मान्रविदय इत्वर्य: । N. D's gloss.

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बुदुयों Sस्वानेनावृतायमात्मेति कल्पयन्ति। भत एवम्भतस्यात्मा- सामस्य कल्पितस्य पूर्वमेवात्ममाहात्म्यादेव वस्तुतो निवृनस्यासतो निवृत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता: प्रवृता: स्वयम्प्रकाशस्वरूपे श्रात्मन्य्ञान- निवृत्तिव्यतिरेकेय फलान्तराऽनिरुपदात् तदाकाररवृत्यत्पादनेनेव वेदान्तानां तद्विषयत्वोषपत्ते: । मं चात्मन: स्वयमप्रकाशत्वे विपरति- पत्तिः। तथा हि व्रात्मा इतरानषेक्प्रकाश: स्वससीरया प्रकाशा व्यमिचारित्वात सविट्वदलिकिवट्वा। तस्मात्स्वयम्प्रकाश समैत्यमिप्रत्योता ज्योतिरिि। सेन्धवर्धेनवद्विच्चानधनेके स्वभावतया Upanishads). For since no other effect than the destroyal of Nescience can be supposed to be wrought in the self-luminous Self, it follows that the Upanishads have the Self (tat) as their subject-matter just in so far as they produce (in the minds of those who study them) a modification (vritti) of the Self (tat), (i. e. effect an intuition, sakshatkara, of the identity of Brahman and Self). Nor can there be any controversy as to the self-luminous character of Self. We explain :- the Self is not dependent on another for its light, because the light of Self invariably accom- panies the existence of Self (sc. where Self is, there light is); as is the case with consciousness (samvit) or the light (of the sun). Hence the word light was used (verse 1, p. 1), meaning thereby that the Self is self-luminous: that is to say, the essence of Self is self-illumination because the Self is one mass of Intelligence, as a lump of salt (is self-salted). And thus runs the Śruti

Brihad: Up: IV. 4. 9. passage :- 'In that state the Self is its own light.' An opponent may argue that at one time our consciousness takes the form 'Iknow the Self; at another time, the form ' I know not the Self: and thus the self-luminousness of Self is contradicted by the fact of cognisability and non-cognisability (of Self) declared in the above states of consciousness. He proceeds to explain-if, in accordance with the consciousness ' I know the Self,' it be ad-

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स्वयंज्योतिःस्वरुपमित्यर्थः । तथा व श्रुतिः अमायं पुरुषः स्वयं० न्योतिर्भवतीति। ननु कदाचिदात्मानमहं जानामोत्यनुभवः कदा विदात्मानमहं न जानामोत्यनुभवः तथा घेतदनुभकद्धयोपस्थापि- तच्ातत्वान्नातत्वाभ्यां स्वयंज्योतिष्टमात्मनो विरुद्धाते। तथा हि यद्यात्मानमहं जानामोत्यमुभावानुरेधिन चातत्वं ज्ानकर्मत्वमा- रमन: स्वीक्रियते तदा Sनात्मवत्स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वानुपपत्ति: । तदेव हि स्वयम्प्रकाशं नाम यत्केनापि रुपेय कस्यापि ज्ञानस्य कदा चि. दपि कर्मतां न भजते। अन्यथा पारिभाषिकमेव स्वयंप्रकाशत्वं mitted that cognisability means 'the fact of Self being the object of the cognitive act' (ac. being illumined by the cognition, jnana), then the self-luminous character of Self cannot be main- tained, for in this case the Self is like not-Self (which needs to be illumined by cognition). Hence only that is self-luminous which never, under any form whatever, becomes the object of any cogni- tion whatsoever. If any other meaning be attached to the term (anyatha), self-luminousness becomes a mere technicality (without logical connotation). Again, if in accordance with the conscious- ness ' I know not myself' the non-cognisability (of the Self) be granted, even then the self-luminous character of the Self is over- thruwn; because we cannot be conscious of one and the same object as both present and not present in consciousness simulta- neously, for there is a contradiction here. Since our consciousness does not take this form-'when the object is in consciousness, even then it is not in conaciousness' -; nor this form-, when it is not in consciousness, then it is in consciousness.' How, therefore. (concludes the opponent) is the self-luminous character of Self proved ? We reply; this contradiction) cannot be urged against us as a fault, for in reality the Self is by nature different from both the cognised and the non-cognised. Sruti confirms our Kens Dp : I. 8. view, thus :- 'That (Brahman)

also than the unknown.' is other than known: it is higher

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स्यात् । यदि व मामईं न जानामीत्यनुभवानुरोधेनास्तातत्वमेव स्वीक्रियते तथापि स्वयंज्योतिषद्धवति: न होकस्मित्रेव वस्तुनि युगयद्गाति न भाति चेत्यनुभक्तिुं शक्यं विरोधात। न द्वि यदा भाति तदानोमेव न मातीत्यनुभव: यदा न भाति तदानी च भातोति। तत्कथं स्वयंज्योतिषट्ठमात्मन उपपद्यत इति नेष दोष: दाताच्ातक्लिववस्येधात्मत्वात् तथा व श्रुतिः अन्यदेव तद्विदि- तादयोऽविदितादधीति। भ्ात्मानमहं जानामीत्यनुभवस्य का गति- रित्ति चेतु तिशिष्टविषयत्वमेव न होकस्मिन्रनुभवे निर्विकल्पकमच्चा- नानानन्द व्यावृतं वस्तुस्वरूपमावं भातीत्यनुभवः येनात्मनो चानक र्मत्वं भवेतृः अपि तपाधिविशिष्टमेव तस्य व ज्ानकर्मत्वेप्यविरोध। What then (the opponent asks) is the process of the consci- ousness.'I know Self.' It consists, we reply, in this consciousness making known the Self as conditioned. For in 'I know Self' we are not conacious of Self, the reality as it is in own nature, uncon- ditioned and free from Nescience and pain (anananda), in which case (you could urge against us) that the Self might be the object' of the coguitive act (and, therefore, not self-luminous) ; but we are conscious of the Self as- conditioned by attributes (upādhi), and there is no contradiction in holding that the conditioned Self (tasya) is the object of the cognitive act. For the conditioned Self is not self-luminous,.since it is only of the pure unconditioned: Self that self-luminousness is maintained. The consciousness 'I: know not the Self is indeed a proof of the self-luminous character of Self. To explain: it is this very consciousness which makes known: the Nescience that conceals (lit. has as its object) the Self .. Accordingly, it must be held that in this same consciousness the Self, concealed by Nescience, is present. If this were not so,. the form: of the consciousness (tat) would. merely be 'I know not.' Hence the consciousness 'I know Self,' having declared the Self which shines forth by reason of its own self-fuminous character, the ' not' (in I know not Self) declares with regard to

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रात मामहं न जयानामोत्यनुभव: पात्मनहस्वयंप्रकाशत्वसाधक एवं तथा हयं हानुभवः पात्मविषयमज्तानं विषयीकरोति। तथा चेतस्मि- ननुभवे: Sज्ञानवदात्मावि भातमीति वाय्यम अन्यथा न जानामोत्येव तदाकारसस्यात पत नात्ममनमहं जानामोति स्वयं्रकाशतया भा- समानमात्मानमुलिख्य नेत्यज्ञानलक्षणमावरयं तन विषयोक रोतीति युगय द्रासमानत्वाभासमानत्ये स्वयंप्रकाशस्याविरुद्े इति मामहं न जानामोत्यनुभवबलादेव स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमात्म नस्सिद्रुम। ननु घटं न जानामोत्यनात्मन्य पीदृशोनुभवोस्तीति तस्याऽपि स्वयम्प्रकाशत्व्र- सङ्ग इति चेत भथ, कोयं घटो नाम यस्य स्वयमपरकाशत्वमापाद्यते the Self (tatra) the concealment which. is Nescience: hence the simultaneous shining forth and not shining forth of the self- luminous are not contradictory : hence on the very strength of the consciousness 'I know not self the self-laminousness of Self is established. The opponent may here urge that since a similar conscious- ness holds good in regard to the not-Self, sc. ' I know not the earthen jar,' it should follow that the jar also is- self-luminous. Pray declare what you mean by this said jar, whose self-luminous character you urge against us. Do you mean that it is the sub- strate (yatra) in which are observed: certain attributes, e. g. jar- ness &c. ? If so then having carefully pondered what the own nature of the jar is, set it forth as discriminated from aught else. You may say that it is a special kind of whole consisting of cer tain parts,. e .. g. the two halves. of the jar &c. Not so, we reply for the relation of whole and part and other attributes pertaining to the jar are different (from the jar) ; these are not the natur. of the jar itself .. The own nature of the jar you must declare t. be something different from these. The opponent may reply :- The own nature of the jar as something different from these at tributes I am unable to specify .. Whence this inability, we ask

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

घटत्वादयो धर्मा यच प्रतीयन्ते S्यमेवेति वेत किमस्य स्वरपं सत्सम्यमनुभय इतरविवित्ततया प्रदश्यतां कपालाद्यार्धावयवि- विशेष इति चेतु न ववयवावयवित्वादयो डि घटसंबद्धा अन्ये न स्वेते एव घटस्वरूषाः । मतदन्यत स्वरपं वाच्यम एतदन्यत्स्वरूपं विशिष्य वतुं न शक्रामीति चेतु कथमश्ति: धननुभयमानत्वाल का निर्विशेषत्वाठ्ठा नादः घटस्वरूपस्य सर्वजनीनानुभवसि दुल्वात् द्वितीथेपि वत्तव्यं निर्विशेषमनुभयमानं यत्स्वरूपं तत्किं स्वतो डनुभयते स्वभिन्वेन मानान्तरेव वा अम्त्येनिरविशेषत्वव्याघातः म हि निर्विशेषं वस्तु मानान्तरविषय इति संभवति चतुरादे; सार्वलोकि- कस्य प्रमावस्य सविशेषवस्तुविषयत्वनियमात। तस्माननिरविशेष सक- Is it because the nature of the jar is not present to consciousness or because it is a simple (undifferenced) entity ? The first alter- native will not hold; for the nature of the jar is a fact of common experience (sc. all know what is meant by jar). On the second alternative too you must declare whether this simple undifferenc- ed nature of jar, present to consciousness, is self-cognised, or cog- nised through some source of knowledge other than the nature of the jar (sva). If you say through some source of knowledge other than the nature of the jar (antye), the simple undifferenced charac- ter (of jar, per se, as maintained above) is overthrown; for a sim- ple undifferenced entity cannot be made known through a source of knowledge different from itself, since all human instruments of knowledge, sc,, the eye &c., are of necessity confined to making known a differenced entity (i. e. one qualified by attributes). Hence (you must admit) the own nature of jar remains as a simple, self-presented entity, not made known by any of the instruments of knowledge, sc. speech, mind &c, Now you must consider whether this own nature of jar is different from the Self or not ? Different, you say ? Not so, we reply; for the nature of jar being an attributeless something, there is no attribute which might serve to establish a difference (between the jar

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लवाङ्गनसाद्यशिषयं स्वमासमानं वस्तु घटस्वरूपमित्यतशिष्यते तत्किमात्मनो भिद्यते न वेति, विचारकीयं मिद्यते चेन्र भेदकध- माभावात् निर्विशेषत्वात धर्र्मिप्रतिये।गिनोरुमयोरि स्वयंप्रकाशत्वेन तद्विशेषितस्य भेदस्य प्रमायोन म्रंहीतुमशक्यत्वात् तस्मात्स्वयंप्रका- शात्मस्वरूपमेत्र घड इति स्थितम। एवं पदार्थान्तरमप्यात्मस्व- रूपमेवेत्यनात्मा आात्मभिन्ञो नास्त्येव। कस्य स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमापा- दते तुल्यन्यायादिति अतः स्वयंज्योति: स्वभाव प्रानन्दघनो 5स- डोदासीन एव पात्मा अनाद्यनिर्वचनीयाविद्यासबन्धात् द्वेताकारेय भाति रज्जरेव सप्पेदवडाद्यात्मना परमार्थनस्तु न द्वेतं नाद्वेतमा- त्मेव केवले। विद्यानघन इति सिटम।

per se and the Self). And further since both the ( Self and the jar per se which are in this case the ) substrate, dharmi and coùnter-entity prativogi (respectively of their mutual difference ) are self-luminous, the difference between them cannot be made known (lit. grasped ) by auy of the recugnised sources of know- ledge. Hence we have proved that the jar in its own nature.is the self-luminous Self. In the same way it may be proved that other things are in essence the Self: hence the not-Self is in- deed not different from Self. For of which of the'two ( Self or not-Self ) is self-luminousness affirmed ( by you ), since the argu- ment (for self-luminousness ) is equally strong in both cases ? Hence we have proved that the Self, wbich is by nature self- luminous, pure bliss, unrelated and without desire, appears in the form of the manifold through its connection with eternal, inex- plicable Nescience; just as a piece of rope (seon in the dark ) at one time appears to be a snake, at another time, a stick or some- thing else: but in reality neither duality nor non-duality is, the Self, pure InteHigence, alone is.

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सिद्धान्तमुकावली।

१५ आत्माऽयं सर्वसंबद्धा भानुभासक उच्यते। नित्यो Sयमविनाशित्वादुपादेय: कथं भवेत् । २४।

नन्वेहिकामुष्मिकसकल सांसारिकसुखवतत्साधनकला पा्द्िमुख स्यानादिभव संवित पुसय निचय वपितकल्मषस्या शेषिषयदोषदर्शेना- सादितोद्वेगस्य परमपुरुषार्थकामिनो मुमुख्: कथमुपदेय:स्ाम् लथ यद्यप्ययमात्मा नित्य: विनाशसामयीरहितत्वात् आत्मविनाश- स्य ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वाच्च स्वसताकाले ग्राह्याभावात् ग्राह्यकाले ग्राह- काभावात्। न थ परिच्छिन्नत्वादस्यानित्यत्वमनुमेयम पात्मत्वादा-

15. This Self is in relation witb (as the substrate of) all things. It is said (of it in the Veda) An opponent argnes that the Self as taught m Ve- that sun-like* it illumines (all things) danta cannot be the highest aim of man : pleasure and It is eternal, for it is imperishable. How the absence of pain are the only aims. then can this Self be accepted (as the goal of humau endeavour ) ?...... XXV.

An opponent now urges that the Self cannot be accepted as the aim of man by one who, when his sin has been destroyed by the store of merit acquired by him during a beginningless round of transmigratory lives, is pained at seeing defects in all earthly objects; and turning his face away from transient pleasure, pre- sent and future, together with the means of obtaining such, desires the highest aim of man, sc. emancipation. (This the opponent maintains) although (he admits that) the Self is eternal

• भान्विति भानुवद्रासकः । उच्यते घुत्या रति श्ेव: । N. D's. gloss.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

त्मा ह्यपरिच्छिन्नः। यत बाङ्ड:। यस्मप्रति यदादने य्ात्ति विष- यानिष्। यस्टास्य संततो भावस्तस्मादात्मेति कथ्यते॥ व्यापकस्या- पि गगनादेरनित्यत्वं दृष्टमिति वेत न व्यापकत्वापरिष्जानात् सर्व-

for there is no means" of destroying Self (since Self is not a product, kārya): nor is the destrnction of Self conceivable, for while Self is, the thing to be known ( grahya, sc. non-existence of Self) is not; and while the non-existence of Self is, the knower (grahaka sc. Self) is not. Nor (continues the opponent) can the non-eternal nature of Self be inferred from its finitude; for to Self belongs self-hood, and Self is infinite. Hence the sages declar- ed :- 'Since in this world it pervades things, grasps and enjoys them, and since of it the presence is unbroken, hence it is termed ātmā.'

But as a matter of fact (some one may argue) ether &c. (viz., time and space), which (like Self) are pervasive (infinite), are also non-eternal. Not so: for such an argument implies a misappre- dou bension of the meaning of pervasion. Pervasion means relation with all things-completet relation with everything-in short, the

• The gloss expands, technically, -समचायिकारयनाश वा ससमवा विकारयनाओो वा ट्रव्यनाशसामयी परेरिष्यले-8c. by the Naiyayikas-न पकार्यस्य भात्मन उभयमस्ति। प्कायत्वं व चनाठ्यटृष्टप्रवाहाधा र्वादिति पामेबोक्त fafa-cf. pp. 2,3 supra .- To annihilate Self, we must destroy either the samavayikaran1, i. e. the material of which Self is composed, or the asamavayikarana, i. e. the contact of the parts which make up the Self. And ti.is would be possible only if Self were a product, karya, which Self is not. + सर्वात्मना is glossed by निःशेषसया 'without a remaiuder.' wf. छठानं by सत्ताप्रदं; further on, श्राम्मनः सर्वाधिष्ठानत्वं नाम मध्यस्तस्य सत्तास्फर्ति- warg I-the substrate gives existence to. that which it pervades, and makes it appear in consciousness, sphurti. 5a = 10; 507= EaTua. Pervasion, vyapti, is not to be taken in the Nyaya seng

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संबदधत्वं रि व्यापकत्वं सर्वेस्मिन्सर्वात्मना. संय दुत्वमनभुगता नाम- धिष्ठानमिति यावत् न सन्येनान्यत्सवोत्मना व्याप्यते व्याप्यस्व-

सर्वोत्मना व्याप्यडसंभवात्। न व कालदेशवसत्वSपरिच्छ्धिन्रेप्वा- त्मनि प्रमाणान्तरापेक्षा भानुवत्स्वयंप्रतिभातत्वात्ं सर्वेजगदष- भासकत्वेन पुत्तो प्रसिद्धत्वात् तमेघ मान्तमनुभाति सव तस्ष्य भाषा सर्वमिदंशिभातीति भुते: । तथापि सुखदुःखाभावेत्तरम्वाद- नपादेयत्वमेव। adullinam being the substrate of finite (uon-pervasive) things. Nor can one finite be completely pervaded by another fiuite, for it would follow from this that the pervaded thing was in itself non-entity, since it has no character apart from that of the pervading thing: other- wise (sc. if it had an independent character ) complete pervasion could not take place. Nor is there need of auy other source of knowledge to make known the Self, unlimited though this is as to time, space and substance; for, like the sun, Self is self-illumined ; for Self is declared in Sruti to illumiue the whole world, thus- 'When the Self shines, every thing shines after it : by its light all tbis is liguted.' Nevertheless (continues the opponent) the Self cannot be accepted as the aim of man, because it is something different from pleasure and the absence of pain ( which are the only aims.)

of invariable concomitance of two or more things; but in the further sense of that final and complete pervasion of the manifold by the Oue Etistent or Self (atman) on which Vedanta terts are for ever insisting. The Self alone is: the mnnifold appears, is unreal, mithya, because inerplicable apart from the Self, anirvachaniya.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

ननु किमिदमनुपादेयत्वं मादानक्रियाऽविषयत्वं वा इच्छा- विषयत्वविरहो वा स्वकृतिसाध्यत्वविरहो वा एतद्विशेषितसुख- दुःखाभावेतरत्वं वा विशेषमेष वा अन्यद्वा। नाद्य इष्टापते: सुख- दुःखाभावयोरनुपादेयत्वापत्तेश्च न हि सुखं वा दुःखाभावो वा आादानक्रियया विषयोक्रियते। न द्वितीय: इच्छातद्विषयत्वयार्य- पादेयत्वापतेः ।

Now what (we ask) is this unfitness to be accepted as the aim of man ? Does it consist (a) in the not being an object for the act of acceptance (in the literal sense of taking by the hand) ? Or (b) in the not being an object of desire? Or (c) in the not being something which one can bring about (sadhya) by volition ? Or (d) in the being different from pleasure and the absence of pain, as qualified above in (e) *? Or (f) simply in the being different from pleasure and the absence of pain, without the above qualification+? Or (g) does this unfitness consist in anything else? The first (definition ) will not avail the opponent, for from it follows what we are quite prepared to admit ( viz., that the Self cannot be handled ): and further will follow ( what he is not pre- pared to admit) that pleasure and the absence of pain are not to be accepted as the aim of man, because neither of these is the object of the act of handling. Nor will the second definition t avail; for from it will follow that both to desire and to the being the object of desire belong

• एप्ठति एतेन स्वकतिसाध्यत्वविरद्ेय इति । gloss. t sc. that Self is not a product (sadhya) to be willed into exist- ence. विशेष्यमेव दति सुखदुःखाभावेतरत्वमात्रमित्यर्थः । gloss. $ The obscure argumentation of the text ( of which a re-statement largely based on Nanadīkshita's gloss is attempted below ) is urged against a Naiyayika, who holds that not the Self but pleasure and the absence of pain constitute the sule end of man. Challenged to give a satisfactory explanation of his stutement that the Self is unfit to be

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S0

fitness to be accepted as the aim of man. Nor can it be argued that what is to be accepted as the aim of man is the desir- ed object itself as characterised by occasional and accidental attributes, sc. desire and the being the object of desire.

accepted as the aim of man, be is suppose i to offer a number of defi- itions of such unfitness; but he is met ou his own ground, and in each definition thus offered some one flaw or another is exposed. So much by way of apology for the inevitable pedantry of the following. Now, if uufituess to be a human aim consists in the thing not being an object of desire, theu, contrariwise, fitness consists in the thing being an object of desire. Next suppose that the emotion of desire has found expression in a proposition, e.g. ' I desire pleasure.' Tbis proposi- tion discovers (at least for the Naiyayika) three elements, viz., the desired object or vishaya; the desire, ichchhi; and the being an object of desire, ichchhavishayata. The two latter are qualifying or a ljective elements to the vishaya, which, in the above proposition, stands, not per se, but in relation to desire, sc. sukhe ichchhavishayata varttate. But now it is for the Naiyayika tosay whether he regurds these adjective elements as viseshana's, i. e. distinguishing attributes ' which must be present with and inhere in (as forming a constituent part of) the object' (for this defn., of. Ved. paribh. Pandit Vol. vii, p. 450). If so, both the ichchha and the ichchhavishayata will have to be accepted as human aims along with the sukha to which they are both present and essential. And this of course he cannot maintain. To escape this diffioulty he is supposed to argue that ichchha aud ichchba- vishayat& are upalakshana's, i. e. occasional and accidental attributes; as ' the crow perched on Chaitra's house yester lay, though not there now, serves to point out the house, and is therefore ouly an upalakshana,' (cf. Ved. paribh. supra ). Now the absence of pain is universally desired, and this.is based on the common consciousness that absence of pain iş desirable: in the latter, again, pain is a part of what is known; and since only what is kuown can be desired, pain too must be an object of desire.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। -

ताभ्यामुपलक्षितं विषयस्वरुपमिति चेन्र दुःखस्याप्यपदेयत्वापते:

कत्वेन दुःखाभावविशेषदुःखविषयत्वात्। विषयेकदेश इति चेन्न सुखे तदाभावत् इच्छाविषयविशेष्यस्वरपमाचमुपादेयमिति चेन्न ्रहं स्वर्गी स्यामित्यपात्मनोपि तथात्वापत्तेः। न तृतीय: स्वकृतिसवाध्य- योरषि दुःखतत्साधनयोरनुपादेयत्वात्। न चतुर्थः विशेषणवेयथ्यीत। न पञ्चुम: साध्याऽवेशिषयात्। अन्यस्य निर्वतुमशक्यत्वात् दुःखत.

For from this would follow that pain also is to be accepted as an aim. For only that which is known can be an object of de- sire: (and pain is known), because the kuowledge which gives rise to desire (for the absence of pain), inasmuch as it implies a know- ledge of certain attribntes in the thing desired (savikalpakatvena), implies a knowledge of puin as the counterpart of the absence of pain. Nor can it be held that only a part of the (desired) ubject (is the aim of man), for in the case of pleasure this is absent ( sc. a part of the pleasure is not desired). Nor that the subject por- tiou only of the thing desired is to be accepted as an aim ; for in such a case as 'May I possess heaven' the Self would have to be admitted as an aim (which the opponent will not admit ). Nor will the third defiuition avail; for pain and the instru- ments of pain, although these are things which one can bring about by volition, are not accepted as the aim of man. Nor is the fourth defiuition valid; because the qualification ( insertedl therein ) is useless ( since the highest aim of man is admittedly not the means of obtaining pleasure, but plensure itself ). Nor is the fifth definition valid; for the probandum (sadhya ) is here identical ( with the probans, hetu ). Nor is it possible to uufold any other definition,* because the

:* The only view opeu: to the opponent is to declare that Self is uot the simcof man, bomuse it is identical with pain.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

स्साधनतादात्म्यस्यानभ्यपगमपराहतत्वात् । न व सवोत्मकत्व- व्याघातः सर्वाधिष्ठानत्वस्येव सर्वात्मकत्वस्यार्थतस्वात् न हि सत्यस्य मिथ्यातादात्म्यमस्ति सत्यत्वविरोधात्। तथा चानुपादेयत्व स्येध निर्वतुमशक्यत्वात् किमिदमनुपादेयत्वमात्मने।5निष्टमापाद्यत

खाभावयोरेव अन्येषां तदुपसर्ज्जनत्वात् सुखदुःखाभावेतरश्चात्मा भावरुपत्वन दुःखाभावानात्मकत्वात्। सर्वशून्यात्मकत्वे दुःखा- भावात्मकत्वमप्यस्तीति चेन्न विद्वातुरात्मत्वात् न व शून्यं विज्वातृ न व विज्ञानं शन्याश्रयमभावस्य भावधर्मकत्वानुपपततेः। view tbat pain aud the instruments of pain are identical with Self is already set aside as being held by nobody. Nor may the opp nent argue that thus (sc. by denying the identity of the Self with pain) the all pervasive character of Self is overthrown; for what we mean by this all pervasive character is that the Self is the substrate of all things (cf. adhis- țhana, p. 67 note). For the identity of thhe real ( satya ) with the unreal, ( mithya ) cannot be affirmed as subversive of reality. And as this very unfitness to be accepted as a human aim can- not itself be explained (by the opponent), what, we ask, has he proved against us (anishta ) as regards the unfitness of the Self to be the aim of man? Nor so, (replies the opponent); for that something is fit to be accepted as the highest aim of man implies the independence of that thing as regar.ls other things. And this independence belongs only to pleasure and the absence of pain ; for to these all other things are subordinate ( as aims). And the Self is something different from pleasure and the ahsence of pain, for since Self is a positive entity ( bbavarupatvena ) it cannot be the negation of pain. And it cannot be urged that since Self is the void ( or blank pervading ) all things, it can be the negation of pain; for self-hood belongs to the cogniser. Nor is the void a cogniser; nor does cognition reside in the void; for a mere nega- tion cannot ( as substrate ) have a positive entity as its attribute.

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03

आारोपितो धर्मधर्मिभाव उति चेल तर्हि शारोप्यस्याधिष्ठानं वाध्यम न हि निरधिष्ठाना भ्रमोस्ति। शून्यमेवेति चेत् ताई शून्यव्यामि- भमेव सर्वः सवे प्रतीयात न च तथास्ति सत्वेनेव सर्वस्य प्रतीतेः। किं च सर्वस्यारोपितित्वे आरोपाधिष्ठानस्य पूर्वमेव सिद्धिवाच्या सा व स्वत प्वेति कथं शून्यं स्यात् न हि शून्यं स्वतः सिद्धति मन्यथा परिभाषामावत्वापत्ते: तस्माद्वावरूपत्वादेव दुःखाभाव- मात्मकत्वम। न च सुखात्मकत्वं स्रगादिविषयज्ञानाऽजन्यत्वात सुखस्य व तज्जन्यत्वात अन्यथा तदर्थितया तदुपादानानुपपले: ! जन्याजन्ययोश्चाभेदानुपपतेः । If it be argued that this relation of substrate and attribute is falsely imagined, then some substrate for this false surmisal must be affirmed; for there is no error without a substrate (of reality). If it be said that this very void is the substrate, then all men should be conscious of all things as blended with this void (which, as substrate, should appear identical with the tbings surmised in it): but such is not the case, for all things are known as existent only. Further, on the view of the universe' being erroneously surmised, some proof of the existence of the substrate of the surmisal previous (to the surmisal) must be declared. If it be said that this proof proceeds from itself alone, than a void cannot be the substrate; for a void is not self-proved : for to say that it is self-proved (anyatha) would be to convert it into a mere technica- lity (or synonym of Self). Hence Self as a positive entity cannot be the negation of pain. Nor is the Self pleasure, for it does not follow as an effect from the knowledge of garlands and other plea- surable oljects. And pleasure is an effect from snch knowledge: if it were not, then the pleasurable objects could not be accepted (desired) through a desire for pleasnre. And the Self is not plea- sure,) because the identity of a product (sc pleasure) and a non- product (sc. Self) is impossible. Nor is it the relation only be- tween pleasure (and the Self) that is brought about as a product by the acceptance of pleasurable objects (tena); for consciousness takes the form, 'pleasure has been produced for me': and further,

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न व सुखसंबन्ध एव तेन जन्य: सुखं मे जातमिति प्रतीते: सुखात्मनो: संबन्धस्य समवायस्याजन्यत्वास्न। न च स्वात्माSसंबद्धे स्वतन्त्रे सुखे प्रमायमस्ति त्वया चाङ्गीक्रियते त्वया. प्यात्मतादात्म्यापत्रस्य नित्यसुखस्येव स्वीकारात्। किं व सुखा- त्मनेोस्तादात्म्ये 5हं सुखमिति प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गः न व तदस्ति तस्मा त्सुखदुःखाभावान्यत्वादनुपादेय एवात्मा। न व साभ्यामन्य: पुरुषार्योस्ति येनात्मा मुमुनयामुपादेय: स्यात। न चात्म- त्वमेव परमपुरुषार्थताप्रयोजकं तथा लोके व्यवहाराभावात। सुखं मे स्याद् दुःखं मा भूदिति आत्मसंबन्धिसुखदुःखाभावयोरेव काम्यमानत्वात। न चात्मा मम स्यादिति कामनास्ति न चाऽ- काम्यमान: पुरुषार्थः । because the relation between pleasure and Self technically termed samavāya, intimate, is not a product (it is considered nitya, eter- nal in the Nyaya). Nor is there evidence for pleasure independent of (as) not in relation with the Self, nor do you admit such; for what you admit is eternal pleasure only, identical with Self. More- over, if Self and pleasure were identical, our consciousness ought to take the form ' I am pleasure'-which is not the case. Hence Self is indeed not to be accepted as an aim; because it is differ- ent from ple sure and the absence of pain. Nor apart from these two is there any other human aim, so that Self might be accepted as an aim by those desiring emancipation. Nor can it be held that self-hood constitutes the highest aim of man, since this is not the common experience of the world; for pleasure and the absence of pain, relating to ourselves, are the only desirable things :- thus 'may .pleasure be mine; may pain cease for me.' Nor does desire take the form ;- ' may Self be miue'; and that which is not desir- ed is uot a human aim.

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सिट्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

न चायमलोकिक: पुरुषार्थः । लोकव्यवहारानुल्ल्टनेने वेदेन पुरुषार्थप्रतिपादनात । अन्यथा * उले.किकत्वात्स्वर्गस्यापि सुखरूपता न स्यात्। किं च किमयं लोकोतरो येनेहिकं पार- चिक व ससाधनं सवे पुरुषाथे परित्यन्याSSजन्मब्रह्मवर्यादडशेष-

कृतार्थ: स्यात। तथा च रागिगीतं। वरं वृन्दावने शून्ये शृगालत्वं य इच्छति। न तु निर्विषयं मोवं मन्तुमहंति गोतम इति । Nor can it be said that this (Self) is a super-sensuous aim ; for the Veda declares the aim of mun without running counter to human experience. If this were otherwise, paradise (svarga) also, as being something super-sensuous, could not have (for men) a blissful character. Moreover, how strangely has this (Veaantin oppouent) transcended human experience, that, setting aside all human aims in this and in the next world, together with the means of attaining them, and harassing himself with all that com- plex of pains from birth onwards through the various stages of studentship &c., to the end of life, he should rest satisfied in the bare statement that the Self is a transcendental aim! To our view conforms (tathacha) the song of the lover :- 'Better he who desires to be a jackal in the louely Vrinda forest +: nor can one accept emancipation in which no objects remain to be desired, O Gautama !'

*पुरुवार्थस्वात् var. iect. t cf. Gadadhara's Muktivāda: वरं वृन्दावने रम्ये गालत्वं व्रन्नाम्थहम। न च वैशेषिकीं मुल्तिं प्रार्थयामि कठायन

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सिठ्ठानमुत्तावली।

किं च यद्ययमात्मा पुरुषार्थः स्यात् कथं तर्ह्यप्रयवलब्धमा- त्मानमुपेक्य वेषयिक्रसुखलोभानतत्काम्यतीथादो प्रियन्ते प्राबिन: न घ ते भ्रान्ता: शास्तेणापि तदभुमोदनात। न लोकवचना- तात न वेदवचनादपि। मतिरुक्रमणीया ते प्रयागमरयं प्रतीति । कुष्ठादुपहताश्च दुःखाभावमुद्दिश्य स्रियन्ते इति तु सर्वजमीनम्। तत्किमनात्मेवोपादेय: । कः संशयः। सुखदुः खाभावयोस्त-

गीतःच्ात। नन्वेहिकामुष्मिक सकलसुख तत्साधनजातमुपेक्य केव- लमात्मानमेवोद्विश्य श्रवणादाघपि के धन प्रवर्तन्ते प्वेति चेते Moreover, if tbis Self is the aim of man, how is it that living beings disreg ird the Self which is to be attained without difficul- ty, and through a desire for sensnous pleasure g. to die at one or other of the favourite tirthas? Nor can it be said that these men are deluded, for even the Sastras approve their action: thus,

Matsya Pu. IV. 23. 'Dear one! thy resolve to die at Prayaga thou shalt not yield through word of man or Veda.' And it is a common fact that lepers and others, seeking rest from pain, choose to die. What then, (the Vedantin asks) is something other than Self to be ac- cepted as the aim of man? Assuredly; for the acceptance of plea- sure and the absence of pain and the means thereto, viz., sons and home, cattle &c., as aims, is without reproacb. : Now it may be urged that some men disregarding all present and future pleasure and the means thereto, and keeping in view the Self alone, enter on heuring and the other prescribed means. Well then, according to the maxim that compliance with the opi- uion of the) many is right, let these men be considered the delud- ed ones; for they are few indeed. It may be urged that the Veda

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

तर्हि भ्रान्ता भवन्तु बहुनामनुगहो न्याय्य इति न्यायात द्विषा एव हि ते। विज्वानमानन्दं ब्रह्मेति सुखरूपत्वमप्यात्मनः भ्रुता भूयत इनि चेतु प्रयतां नाम न हयोतावता डत्मा पुरुषार्थ: न हि सुख- मित्येव पुरुषार्थ: स्वसंबन्धितयेव तस्य पुरुषार्थत्वास अन्यथा शत्र- सुखस्यापि पुरुषार्थन्वापतेः न हि सुखं सुखस्य पुरुषार्थः । सांसारि- कमषि सुखं नानादुःखसभिन्नमनुपादेयमेत्रेति चेन्न गत्यन्तरा- भावात् न हि भित्षुकमिया स्थाल्यनधिश्रयराम। आ्रायाति चेत दुःखं परिहर्तव्यं। सुखं तपादेयमेष। कथं तरहयात्मज्ञानाथ शरवणादि- विधि: दुःखाभावार्धमेव । एवमात्मनोऽपुरुषार्थत्वे प्राप्ते ब्रमः ।

declares that the Self is pleasure in the passage 'Brahman is In- telligence Bliss.' This may be granted; but by this is not meant that Self is the aim of man: for pleasure in itself is not an aim but only as being in relation with one's Self. Otherwise the plea- sure of an enemy also would become an aim. Nor is pleasure the aim of pleasure (which the Vedautin identifies with Self.) It may be urged that wordly pleasure, mingled as it is with all kinds of pain, certainly cannot be accepted as the aim of man. This objec- tion is to be set aside, because no other resource (than this sorrow- mingled pleasure) is open to man: nor does the fear of beggars deter one from putting the cooking pot on the fire. But (you say) pain.comes. Away with it then ! But pleasure is indeed the aim of man. Why then for the sake of a knowledge of the Self are injunctions as to hearing &c. prescribed in the Veda ? Simply to bring pain to an end. To the view thus laid down, viz, Self is not the aim of man, we reply :

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

१६ पात्मा सर्वधस्तनां यदथ सकलं जगत्।

यदन्यदवस्तु तत्सवे यद्गेदे नरशृङ्गवत्। सता सर्वेपदारथानामनादेय: कथं बद। २० ॥ यद्वशे प्राणिन: सर्वे ब्रह्माद्या: कृमयस्तथा। ईशान: सर्वेवस्तनामनादेय: कयं भवेत। ६८ । यवतु: सर्वभूतानां मनसो यन्मनो विदुः । यज्ज्योतिव्योतिषां देवो नोपादेय: कथं विभु:। २ह ।

जीवयत्यखिलान लोकाननादेय: स्वयं कुतः । ३०॥ 16. That which is the Self of all things; for the sake of which the whole world is; that ocean of bliss, independent of aught else ;- pray declare how this Self is to be rejected as the aim of man .. XXVI. How is that to be rejected which is the Existence of all things; that from which all that is regarded as distinct is sheer non-entity like the horns of a man ?..... XXVII. .

How is that to be rejected under whose control are all living things from Brahma down to insects; the ruler of all things ?...... XXVIII. How is that to be rejected which the wise know to be the eye of all things; the mind of the mind, the light of lights, the bright, pervading one ?... .. XXIX. How is that to be rejected, the Self which is Bliss, which, when it has gone to darkness on its two wings of joy* and great joy, gives life to all the worlds ?.. XXX.

• df. Taitt. Up. II. 5.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

यस्यानन्दसमुद्रस्य लेशमावं जगद्रतम । प्रसृत ब्रह्मलोकादो सुखान्थिं कः परित्यजेम॥ ३९। हेरसयगर्भमेश्वयं यस्मिन्दष्टे तृखषायते। सीमा सर्तपुमर्थीनामपुमर्थः कथं भवेत्। ३२। यत्कामा ब्रह्मवर्यन्त इन्दाद्या: प्राप्सम्पदः । स्वस्वभोगं त्यज्यन्त्येत्र न पुमर्थ: कथं नृगाम। ३३ ॥ यद्विदृक्षाफलाः सवा वेदिक्येो विविधाः क्रियाः । यागाद्या विहितास्तत्मिनुपेक्षा बद ते कथम । ३४ ।

That ocean of Bliss of which only a small portion belongs to this world; that sea of pleasure which pervades the world of Brahmā and the rest, who would reject ?............ XXXI.

That which being known, the majesty of Hiranyagarbha is estimated as nothing; * how can that which is the utmost limit of all buman aims be not the aim of man ?. .XXXII. How can that not be the aim of men through desire for which Indra and the otherst, happy as they were, entered on pupilage and abandoned each his own sphere of happiness ?.... .XXXIII. All the various actions, sc. sacrifices &c., prescribed in the Veda, have as their result the desire to know that Self (yat): pray then declare how you can reject that Self. .XXXIV.

• cf, Taitt. Up. II. 8. 4. and Max Müller's note, in loco. t ef. Chand. Up. VIII. 7 et. seq. $ The true aim òf Vedic sacrifice is not the securing of a tran- sient paradise (svarga) for the sacrificer, but that purification of his mind whereby he may gain intuition of Self which is Bliss eternal. Paradise is but the half-way house, as it were, to reach which he en- gages in sacrifice who knows not this highest truth.

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30

सिद्धान्तमुकावली।

यद्दृष्टिमापतः सर्वा: कामाद्या दुःखभमयः । विनश्यन्ति स्रयोनासावुपदेय: कथं न ते। ३२। बाहादरूपता यस्य सुपुप्रे सर्वशानतिकी । तवोपेदा भवेद्यस्य तदन्य: स्यात्पशु: कथम ॥ ३६ ॥

सत्यमितरानुपसर्ज नत्वमुपादेयत्वं तच्चात्मन्येव विश्रान्तं

देयता स्यात् तस्मादात्मेव परमपुरुषार्थ: सुखदुःखाभावात्मक- त्वाच्च। न व भाषरूपस्यात्मनो दुःखाभावात्मकत्वानुपपततिः ।

How can that not be your aim by the mere knowledge of which all desires &c., the causes of paiu, perish instantly ?...... ... .XXXV.

Is he not a beast who rejects that Self which as Bliss is vouched for by all liviug beings in the state of dreamless sleep ?... XXXVI.

Grant then (as the opponent bolds) that fitness to be

His objections met in detail: Self accepted as the aim of man con- which is absolute Bliss, remains as the sists in the thing being indepen- highest aim of man. dent of aught else. But this in-

dependence abides only in the Self; for pleasure and the absence of pain are for the sake of Self (tat). If this were, not se, one might accept as one's aims the pleasure and absence of pain per- taining to another. Hence Self is the highest aim of mau; and further, because Self is pleasure and the absence of pain. Nor can it be urged against our view that Self as a positive entity cannot be the negation of pain.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। 59

भवेदयं दोषो यद्यात्मनि दुःखं पारमार्थिक स्यात न त्वेवमस्ति

र्दुःखेपि स्वात्मनि रे।रवाद्यनेकभेदभिन्ननरकममुदायसमुद्रतदुःखो- घमारोपयत्येव केवलम। आरोपितस्य चाभावो नाधिष्ठानादतिरि- च्यते अधिष्ठानादभेदेनेवरोपितत्वाद्ेदेन व तस्यासत्त्वात् अस्न्नि- षेधस्य च सत्वात्। तस्माद् दुःखाभाव एव परमपुरुषार्थ इति यो मन्यते तस्याप्यात्मेव परमपुरुषार्थः तस्याशेषसंसारदुःखनिवृत्तिरु-

This would be a weak point in our position, if to Self pain pertained as something absolutely real: but such is not the case. But the man whose vision of Self has been overcome by the heat of that deadly poison sc. his passions, lurking in that poison-fang, sc. the false consciousness of his body, sense-organs &c. (as identi cal with Self)-which issues from the hood of that serpent Nes- cience ;- such a man merely surmises in the Self, to which in reality no pain belongs, all those pains which issue from the vari- ous hells, raurava and the rest; just as one might surmise dark- ness in the sun. And the negation of a falsely surmised tbing is no other than the substrate itself (in which that thing was falsely surmised, for only as identical with the substrate was it surmised; and because, as distinct from the substrate, it is non-entity; and because the negation of non-entity is entity. Hence even the thinker who holds that the cessation of pain is the only aim of man has the Self indeed as his highest aim ; because Self (tasya) is the cessation of all this world of pain.

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पत्वात्। असाध्यत्वादात्मनो डपुरुषार्थत्वमिति चेत न। साध्य- त्वेन पुरुषार्थत्वस्य निरस्तत्वात्। स्वतःषिद्दुःखाभावमुद्दिश्य

न्यनुपपत्तेरिष्ृत्वात्। तत्फलस्य जातत्वात्। पूर्व त्वशेषदुःखाभा- वरुपब्रह्मात्मसाक्तात्करेगेव सफलत्वात्। ज्ञानमपि न साध्यं

वृत्तेरारोपितत्वातृ चेतन्यस्यात्मत्वादिति चेन्न अ्स्य परामर्शस्य

ज्वानोत्तरकालीनत्वात्।

Nor can it be argued that Self, inasmuch as it is not some- thing that can be brought about as a result, cannot be the aim of man; for it has been disproved* that a human aim consists in something to be brought about as a result. Nor can it be argued that the aspirant to emancipation would not engage (in hearing and the other prescribed means), if he were to have in view the absence of pain (sc. the Self) which is self-established (i.e. already exists independent of bis efforts). For it accords with our view that activity (on the part of the aspirant) should be impossible after he has gained intuition of Self as identical with Brahman: because the result of bis activity (tat) has been brought about; whereas, previous to this, his activity is fruitful only through his intuition of Self as identical with Brahman, which is the cessation of all pain. Nor is it to be urged that knowledge also is not some- thing to be brought about as a result, because the mental modifi- cation (vritti, which is supposed to give rise to the intuition) is something falsely imagined, and because knowledge (chaitanya, Brahman) is the Self. For this judgment (as to the falsity of mental activity) is subsequent to the rise of (perfect) knowledge (sc. the intuition of the identity of Brahman and the Self).

*निरस्तत्वाद्भाव्यकारेयोति शेष: । Gloss. cf. Ved. Su. I. I. 4. Bhasbya in loco. 7

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सिद्ान्तमुक्तावली। 53

दुःखाभावोपि न केवल: पुरुषार्थः दृष्टदुःखेपि तिषये भोग्य. सुखलोभेन प्रवृतिदशनादिति चेन्न आत्मन एव परमानन्दरूपत्वेन सुखस्यापि सत्त्वात्। न चाच विप्रतिपत्ति: परमप्रेमास्पदत्वेन सुख- रूपत्वस्य सिद्धत्वात्असुखात्मनि प्रेमादर्शनात्। न च सुखस्य जन्यत्वात् जन्याजन्ययोरात्मसुखयोरभेदानुपपत्तिः जन्यत्वाषिट्ठि:। न च सुखं मे जातमिति प्रतीत्या तत्सिद्धि: शुभादृष्टवशादात्मस्व-

सुखमिति प्रतीत्यापत्तिः विद्वांस प्रतोष्टापादनात्। भ्रविदुषस्त्वध्य- स्ताहङ्कारदेहादावेवात्माभिमानात् तब चात्मन उपसर्जनतयेव स्फुरणात्।

Nor is it to be argued that the absence of pain is not alone the aim of man, because, as a matter of fact, through the greed for pleasure to be enjoyed, activity follows in regard to an ob- viously painful object. For the Self in its character of the highest Bliss is pleasure also. Nor is there any contradiction here, for we have proved that Self, as the object of the highest love, is pleasure ( cf. p. 10.), since love for a Self which is not pleasure is unknown. And it must not be urged that because pleasure is something produced, the identity of a product (sc. pleasure ) and a non-product (sc. Self) is impossible: for it has not been proved that pleasure is a product. And it cannot be urged that the consciousness 'pleasure has been produced for me' is a proof of this; for the above consciousness was brought about in another way, sc. through the rise of a mental modification capable of manifesting ( i. e., removing the veil of Nescience from ) pleasure which is the Self,-(and this was possible) through the merit acquired by the individual in his former lives. Nor is it to be argued that (if Self and pleasure are identical ) our consciousness should take the form 'I am pleasure.' For, as against him who knows the truth, this is merely to affirm what he himself main- tains; but such consciousness does not accrue to him who knows not the truth, because he falsely identifies the Self with his body and with his consciousness of 'I' (ahamkara), which again have been falsely surmised ( in the Self ): and because in his case the Self appears in consciousness (sc. I am happy) as subordinate to his body and ahamkāra ( tatra ).

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पत एव ज्ञानसुखादिगुय आत्मेति तार्किका भ्रान्ताः । न च दुःखेपीयं गतिः समा दुःखस्य सुषुप्यादो व्यभिचारित्वेनात्म- स्वरूपत्वानुपपत्तेः । प्रमाणाभावाद् सुखात्मकत्वग्राहकश्रतिविरो धाच्। तथा चात्मत्वमेव परमपुरुषार्थताप्रयोजकं। न घ लोकोत- रत्वोपालम्भ: महानुभावेरेव व्यासवशिष्ठादिभिर्महारानेश्च कषभा- दिभिरैहहिकामुष्मिक सकल सुख त त्साधनस्यात्म लिप्स वैवोपेवितन्वात। न च बहुनुग्रहो न्याय: देहात्माभिमाने तदभावात्। न च सुख- रूपत्वे उप्यात्मनः स्वसम्बन्धिसुखाभावादपुरुषार्थत्वं सम्बन्धस्या-

Hence also the Naiyayikas are deluded who hold that the Self has knowledge, pleasure &c. as attributes. Nor can it be said that the line of argument (adopted above in regard to pleasure ) will hold equally well in regard to pain. For since pain is absent from the states of dreamless sleep &c., it cannot be the Self ( which is all pervasive): and because there is no evidence ( to support the argument advanced in regard to pain); and be- case Sruti, declaratory of pleasure as the Self, contradicts this position. Accordingly, our view is that Self-hood alone consti- tutes the highest aim of man. Nor can the reproach that our position transcends human experience find place; for mighty ishis like Vyāsa and Vasishțha and mahārājas like Rishabha, through a desire to obtain Self, put aside all pleasure, here and hereafter, together with the means of obtaining such. Nor can the maxim that compliance with the majority is right apply here ( to exclude the few like Vyasa and the rest); for this maxim does not hold (even the opponent will admit ) in regard to the false identification of the Self with the body (by the ignorant majority). Nor can it be argued that even if the Self is pleasure, it can- not be the aim of man, on the ground that there is no such thing as pleasure in relation with itself (sc. pleasure viewed as Self). For the relation desired ( uddesyakatvat ), is that of iden- tity of Self ( with pleasure).

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सुखं ह्यत्यन्तमुपादेयं कथं मे प्रियतमे आात्मन्यभेदेन प्रवि- शेदिति कामयमानो भेदभ्रमस्य प्राबल्यादभेदं कर्ुमशक्रवानः सम्ब- न्धमानेया संतुष्यति। न घ सम्बन्ध: स्वतः पुरुषार्थ: सुखदुःखाभा- वेतरत्वात् । यतु सुखस्य सुखं न पुरुषार्थ इति तस्य सुखे अना- त्मत्वारोपनिबन्धनत्वात्* । न व कुष्राद्युपहतानां मरणानुपपत्तिः तत एवात्मन: सुखरूपत्वसिट्ठिः। ते हि परमप्रियतमे आत्मनि दुःखकारयं देह इति तमुपेक्षन्ते न त्वात्मानम। पारलाकिके सुखे कामनादर्शनात। एतेन काम्यतीथादो मरखं व्याख्यातभ । मरण- स्यापि देहपरित्यागरुपत्वात्।

For pleasure is accepted as an absolute aim. 'How may pleasure enter into the relation of identity with my beloved Self' -the man, who thus desires and is unable to identify Self with pleasure because his mistaken notion ( of Self and pleasure being distinct) prevails, is content to desire merely the relation (between Self and pleasure). Nor can it be said that this relation is in itself the aim of man, for it is something other than pleasure and the absence of pain (which alone the opponent regards as the aims of man). But as regards the opponent's statement that pleasure can- not be the aim of pleasure, that was due to his falsely surmising that pleasure is not Self. Nor can it be urged that (on the view of Self and pleasure being identical) lepers and others would not choose death, since the very fact of this choice proved that Self is pleasure; for, thinking that the body is the cause of pain to the beloved Self these men set at nought the body and not the Self :- (they do not disregard the Self ) as is proved by the fact that they do desire pleasure in the world to come. For this reason death at one or other of the favourite tirthas is praised (in the Sastras ), since death too is an abandonment of the body.

• भज्ञानारोपनिबन्धनत्वात् var. lec.

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आत्मन एव पुरुषार्थत्वे मुक्त्तसंसारिणारविशेषापततिरिति चेतु न ज्ञानाज्ञानाभ्यां विशेषात्। प्रज्ञानी हि भ्रान्तः क्ता भोका संसारी जरामरयधमी इत्येवमात्मानं जानाति विद्वांस्तु तद्विरुद्वा

स्वभावाशनायाद्यतीतास्थलानयुनेतिनेतिसत्यज्ञानादि लक्षयसर्वजग-

शेष्दुःखनिदानमद्जानं तत्कार्य च बाधित्वा देशकालवस्तुपरिच्छेद- शून्यपरिपूर्ण नन्दविग्रहः स्वमहिस्तरा प्रतिष्ठितः परमपुरुषार्थो भवति। न च ततः परं कामयितव्यमस्ति सर्वेषां कामानामात्मप्राप्रिसीमत्वात्।

Nor can it be urged that if Self is the sole aim of man, it follows that there is no difference between an emancipated soul and one that is still in the bonds of transmigration. For there is a difference between them due to their knowledge and ignor- ance respectively. For the ignorant one being deceived, regards his Self as agent and enjoyer, as in the bonds of transmigration and subject to decay and death. But he who has knowledge, when he has done away with Nescience as false, the cause of all pain, and its products, on gaining intuition of the Self through the unanimity of the Vedas, of his teacher and his own experi- ence-the Self which is the substrate of the whole world, which, per contra, is neither agent, nor enjoyer, nor bound in transmigra- tory bonds; nor subject to birth, decay and death; ( but which) is self-luminous Existence, Intelligence Bliss, absolute in its own nature, described (in Sruti) as beyond hunger &c; as neither great nor small; as not this, not this; as Existence, Intelligence &c.,-then this one who has knowledge becomes the bighest aim of man (sc. the Self), established in his greatness, the absolute Bliss, unlimited as to space time and substance. Nor beyond this is aught to be desired; for all desires find their goal in the attainment of Self.

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99 नन्वात्मसाक्तात्कार: श्रुतिजन्यः कथं स्यात इन्द्रिय- जन्यस्येव ज्ानस्य साक्षात्कारत्वात शब्दस्य व परोवज्ञानजनक- त्वस्वाभाव्यात। न चापरोचे आत्मनि शब्दस्याप्यपरोवज्ञानजम- कत्वमेव युक्तमिति साम्प्रतम्। करयास्वभावस्यान्यथाकर्तुमशक्य- त्वातृ अपरोकयोग्येऽपि वहुन्यादो शब्दादिना परोक्षज्ञानस्येव जन- नाव। न घ परोक्षमपि ज्ञानमभ्यस्यमानमपरोवषं भवतीति युक्तम भनुमित्यादौ तथा Sदर्शनात् उत्तरोत्तरज्ञानस्यापि शब्दत्वाविशे-

17. An objection: How can intuition of Self be effected Objections :- (a) Veda can effect only through Sruti, for only to know- mediate knowledge of Self : ledge effected through a sense- organ does intuitional character belong; and because it is the nature of verbal communication (sabda ) to bring about non-intuitional ( mediate ) knowledge. Nor is it correct to say that the power to bring about intuition of the Self, which is self-presented, justly belongs to verbal communication also. For the nature of an instrument of knowledge cannot be changed, and because through verbal communication (and inference &c.), only a mediate knowledge of fire and like objects is effected, though these are fit objects for immediate knowledge. Nor is it right to hold that mediate knowledge also, when repeated, becomes immediate; for such is not observed in regard to inferential knowledge, &c., since verbal character belongs equally to each succeeding cog- nition. Nor may an opponent reply,-Well then, away with intuition of Self! For (if there be no such thing as intuition) it will follow that there can be no destruction of Nescience and its products which are forms of intuitional error, ( since intui- tional error can be removed only by intuitional right know- ledge ). Hence (concludes the opponent of p. 66) there is no intuitional knowledge of the Self.

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नाप्रचयसचिवमन्तःकरयमेवात्मसाध्ात्कारे करयं न व भावनाधी

नसाक्षात्कारस्य मृतपुचसाक्षात्कारवदप्रामाययम्। शब्टप्रमायमूल- त्वेन विश्वासात्। न च यतो वाचो निवर्ततन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सहेति विरोध: आगमगम्यत्वे ऽपि तुल्यत्वात् तस्य वात्यस्य लाकिकश-

With regard to this point some ( Vedantins ) * maintain that (b) Veda plus mind necessary for r the instrumental cause of intui- immediate knowledge of Self. tion of the Self is indeed the internal organ, assisted by the store of mental impressions springing from verbal knowledge (sc. knowledge through Sruti) which knowledge was effected through constant practice of hearing and the other prescribed means. Nor is it to be argued that intuition which is dependent on (a store of) mental impressions is untrustworthy, as is the intuition of one's dead son (-such is the force of these mental impressions that the father seems to see his dead son before his eyes-). For trust is to be placed in this intuition of the Self, since it based on the Veda as its authority (sabdapramana). Nor can it be urged that

Taitt. Up. II. 4. this view is contradicted by the passage-'from which (Brahman) speech, with the mind, turns away unable to reach it.' For even if it be held that Self is made known by the Veda, the same contradiction will result (in regard to the above passage, where speech is said to turn away from Brahman). (And there is no contradiction) because the above passage is intended to deny that the Self can be made known by human utterance, and by a miud unpurified by Vedic purifications (sc. hearing, pondering &c. the Veda-word).

• The view of Vachaspati Miera: cf. Bhamati pp. 86, 114.

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निषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामीति प्रुतावात्मन्येवोपनिषदत्वविशेषणाश्रवणात्। तच्चेतराविषयत्वे सति तन्माचविषयत्वे समज्जसम अन्यथा प्रमाय- न्तराव्यावर्तकत्वे विशेषणवैदथ्यात्। लेोकिकस्यापि वाक्यस्य दशम- स्त्वमसीत्यादेरत्मन्यपरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वस्यैव दृष्टत्वात्। प्रमायस्व- भावहानि: स्यादिति चेन्न। प्रमेयानुसारित्वात प्रमाणस्वभावस्य प्रमे- यस्य च नित्यापरोवत्वात। The above view must be rejected; for the Veda alone brings about intuitional knowledge of the Self, since in the passage

Met : It is the character of the object 'I ask for that person (purusha) to be known ( prameya) that determines which is made known in the Upa- the character of the instrument of knowledge (pramana), and not vice nishads,' (Brihad Up. III. 9. 26) versa: Self (Brahman) being an eter- nally self-presented entity, all knowledge a qualification is declared as of it must be immediate; and such knowledge of it the Veda can afford, if to the Self, sc. that of being the sentences be taken in their implied made known by the Upanishads. and not in their literul sense. And this qualification justly ap- plies to Self, provided that the Self, while it is not made known through any source but the Upauishads (itaravishayatve) is made known through them alone; otherwise the qualification is unnecessary, if it does not exclude other sources of evidence for the Self. (And) because it is a fact of experience that human utterance too, sc. Thou art the tenth man, &c. * does indeed bring about intuition of one's Self (when this is regarded as dwelliug .within one's body.) Nor is it to be argued that (as a consequence of our view) the special character of the pramana would be lost (sc. in bringing about intuition, the sabdapramana would cease to be what it is and would become pratyakshapramana): for the character of a pramana depends on the object to be known +; and the Self, the object in this case, is eternally (self-presented).

• cf. Panchadaśi. Pandit Vol. VIII. p. 589. t cf. Ved. paribh. Pandit Vol. VII. pp. 467 et seq.

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न च जानगतो धर्मो Sपरोक्षत्वं यत्साच्षादपरोचाद ब्रह्माय- मात्मा सर्वान्तर इत्यात्मनोप्यपरोक्षत्वप्रवद्ात्। किं तदपरोक्षत्व- मिति चेतृ वस्तुतः प्रमानव्यवहितत्वमेत्र। तच्च प्रमातरि विश्रान्तं यावद्यावत्प्रमातुर्विप्रकृष्यते तावतावत्परोक्षत्वोत्कर्षदर्शनात् तथा चापरोतस्वभावे आत्मनि परोकज्ञानं जनयन्वेदो भ्रन्तिमेत जनयेतु अन्यथास्थितस्यान्यथाबोधनात्। मोवसाधनीभतस्य चात्मसाचा- त्कारस्य मनोजन्यत्वे व्यभिचारिकरयजन्यतया Sप्रामाययप्रसङ्गः । Nor is it to be urged that intuitional character is an attribute only of the cognition (and not of the thing cognised); for intuitional character is declared of the Self also in the passage-

Brihad. Up. III. 4. 1. 'the immediately presented, the positively presented Brahman, the Self which is within all.' What then, it may be asked, is this immediacy (or intui- tional character of the object) ? It consists in the object cognised not being really divided off from the cogniser, (i. e. the object is directly cognised, without the intervention of any second cognition). And this not being divided off from the cogniser, has its end in the cogniser *; for it is a common fact that the farther the object cognised is removed from the cogniser, the more is its mediate (non-intuitional) character increased. And thus, if the Veda gives rise to mediate knowledge of the Self; which is by nature immediately presented, it gives rise to error, .for it makes known a thing as other than it is (sc. the Veda, on this supposition, declares as mediately known the Self, which is really immediately known). And if intuition of Self, which is the means to final emancipation, is effected through the mind, its untrustworthiness follows, since it is effected through an instrument which does not always attend (vyabhichari) right knowledge (sc. the mind is sometimes the instrument of error).

• Jiva the cogniser, and Brahman the cognised, become one; cf. Ved. paribh. Pandit Vol. IV. pp 396 et seq.

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न घ वेदमूलतया प्रामारयम अपरोकतया वेदेनानवबोध- नातृ वाङ्गनसातीतत्वप्रुतिव्याकोपाच्च। न घ लोकिकविषयत्वं मुख्ये बाधकाभावात। न व श्रतिविषयत्वे ऽपि समानो दोषो लक्षयायेव तद्बोधनातृ।।

१८ ननु तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्ये लक्षगेव न युक्ता भागलन्षपया एकदेशपरिग्रहे श्रुतार्थपरित्याग प्रसङ्गात्।

Nor can its trustworthiness be urged on the ground that it is based on Veda; for (your contention is that) the Veda does not furnish intuitive ( but only mediate) knowledge of the Self. And because your view (that mind is the organ of intui- . tion of the Self) contradicts the Sruti passage, which de- clares that Self is beyond speech and mind. Nor can you urge that this passage refers to a worldly mind ( unpurified by hearing &c.) ; for there is no reason why the primary meaning of the passage should be rejected. Nor can you urge that even if tbe view that Self is made known by Veda be adopted, the same fault will apply, sc. that of contradiction in regard to the above Sruti passage. For (we hold that) Self (tat) is made known through the relation technically termed implication ( lakshaņā). 18. Here it may be objected that implication does not Objections :- (a) to take the maha- apply to such sentences as 'that vakya 'that thou art' in an implied thou art'; for if a part of the sense is to surrender the paramount authority of Veda to that of perception, meaning of the words be accepted inference and the other pramanas. through what is technically term- ed bhāgalakshanā ( whereby a part of the meaning is abandoned and a part retained*), the abandonment of what is directly enounced in Sruti follows as a consequence.

• cf. Ved. paribh. Vol. VII. p. 217.

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न व पदयोरेकतिभतयन्तनिर्दिष्टयो: सामानाधिकरययपर।- मशीनन्तरं पदार्थयोरभेदो वाक्यार्थस्तावत्प्रतीयते स च विरुद्धुस्वभा- वयो: संसार्यसंसारियोोरजीवपरमात्मनोर्न संभवतीति मुख्याथानुपपत्या लक्णा युक्तेति साम्प्रतं श्रुतिसिद्धे भनुपपत्यभावास्। न घ विरुद्ध-

इति वाच्यम्। प्रुतिविरोधेन भेदगराहिप्रमाणस्येवाप्रामाययात अन्यथा लक्षपया Sप्यखयडाद्वितीयप्रत्यगात्मबोधनं न स्यात्सकलभेदग्राहि प्रत्यवादिविरोधात। Nor can it be urged against this view that as soon as it is ob- served that two words standing with the same case-affix refer to a common subject, the identity of the things denoted by the two words-which identity is the meaning of the whole sentence-is perceived; and since this identity is impossible in the case of jīva and Paramatman, two things with opposed attributes, sc. jiva is the transmigrating Self, and Paramatmap is the non-transmigrating Self, the primary (or direct) meaning (of such sentences) becomes impossible, and therefore implication may rightly apply to them. For impossibility (cotradiction) cannot hold in regard to the meaning (or thing) established in a Sruti passage (sc. that must be which Śruti declares) .* Nor can it be argued that the identity of the two non-opposed parts ( of that and thou, sc. pure Intelligence) is made kuown ( by Sruti,) by reason of the contradiction resulting from the exercise of the other sources of evidence ( perception) inference &c. which declare a difference between the two naturally distinct things (sc. jiva and Brahman). For the source of evidence which declares for a difference is itself untrustworthy as being in opposi- tion to Sruti. Otherwise (sc. if perception, inference, &c. are not to be set aside by Sruti) a knowledge of the impartite, One without a second, the Self within all things, could not result from Śruti even by implication, as being contradicted by perception inference &c. which make known difference ( duality ) in all its forms *.

• Bheda commonly divided into sajātīya, vijātiya and svagata, for which terms cf Panchadasi: Pandit Vol. V. p. 667.

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तथा च मुख्यार्थे नानुपपतिः । न च शक्यलक्ष्ययो: सम्बन्धो लक्ष्यस्यात्मनो 5सङ्गत्वात्। न चासङ्गेन किज्ञित्सम्बट्ते न चास- म्बट्ो लक्ष्यते तथा Sदर्शनात। न च सर्वथानभिधेयोर्था लक्ष्यत- इति दृष्टं लक्ष्यपदार्थे मूकताप्रसङ्गात् तचापि लक्षयायां लक्षणानव- स्थाप्रसङ्गात। किज्ज पदाभ्यामेकोर्थो लक्ष्यते अर्थद्वयं वा। नादः। एकपद वेयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात् पदार्थवाक्यार्थयोरविशेषापत्तेश्च। विशेषे वा अरखगडा वाक्यार्थो न स्यात्। अत एव न द्वितीयः । लक्षणाडमा- वप्रसङ्गाच्च। न हि विरुद्धयोरभेदानुपपत्या कृता लक्षका भिन्नयोर- भेदे पर्यवस्यति। And so there is no impossibility in regard to the primary meaning (of the sentence ' that thou art'). Nor can there be a connection between the literal and implied meanings of the words; for the thing implied, sc. Self is unrelated. Nor can anything be related to the unrelated; nor can the unrelated be implied; for this is not supported by experience. Nor is it a fact that an object, which is absolutely unnameable, can .be made known by implication ; for, in regard to such implied object, silence must follow (-the object being nameless). If in regard to the implied object (tatra) a further relation of implication* be maintained, then the series of such relations becomes endless. Further, is one thing implied by the two words (that and thou), or are two things implied? Not one thing; for then one of the two words is unnecessary, and it follows that there would be no difference between the meaning of the words and the meaning of the sentence. Or if there be a difference, then the Impartite ( undifferenced Brahman ) could not be what the sen- tence means, (-the difference, whatever it might be, would be- come an attribute to Brahman of which it might be predicated ; but the sentence is supposed to teach the attribute-less, predicate- less Brahman ). Hence also the second alternative (sc. that two things are implied by the two words ) will not hold; and also be- cause there would then be no such relation as implication be- tween them. For implication, which is postulated to remove the contradiction which results when the identity of two opposed things is maintained, does not fulfil its function in teaching the identity of the two distinct things. * The technical lakshitalakshana is here meant : cf. Ved. paribh. pandit Vol. VI. p. 97.

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किं व वेदान्ते तत्त्वमस्यादिवाश्यमेव प्रधानमितरत्सवं तदुपकरयमेव तथा व प्रधानवाक्ये एव कथं लक्णा तचासमवेतार्थ- त्वेनेतरचेव सा युक्ता। गुणे त्वन्याय्यकल्पनेति न्यायात्। अप के चित्। तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्ये लक्षयेव तावन्नाङ्गीक्रियते। न व विरुद्ध- योर्जीवपरमात्मनो: सामानाधिकंरययानुपपति: रज्जसर्पयारिव एकस्य बाधेनापि तदुपपतेः । न चानयोमंध्ये कस्य बाध इति विनिगम- काभावे यदि परमात्मन एव बाधमाशङ्केन तदा शास्त्रमपुरुषार्थे जीवे पर्यवसितमिति न प्रमायं स्यादिति वाध्यम । Moreover, in the Vedanta, such sentences as 'that thou art' &c. are primary to which all others are merely ancillary. And so, implication cannot apply to a primary sentence; it applies ouly to secondary sentences (itaratraiva), since these do not bave their objects in constant connexion with the primary sentences (tatra); according to the maxim that 'the assumption of an irregularity (such as that of puting aside the literal for an im- plied meaning) is to be made only in regard to a secondary sentence. In regard to this some teachers hold that in a sentence such

(b ) implication unnecessary : for by as 'that thou art' implication is the method termed badhasamanadhi- karanya, i. e. by the recognition of jīva not admitted. Nor can it be or personal sentiency as false, the argued that (according to their identity enounced in the mahāvakya may be recoguised. (The opponent states view) the relation of identity (sc. this view only to reject it; with him jīva is real, cf. pp. 9. 15. supra). that of referring to one and the same substrate) cannot attach to. jīva and Paramatman opposed as they are. For this relation is possible when one of the two things has been proved false, as in the case of the rope and the snake mistaken for it. Nor is it to be objected that since in answer to the question,- Which of the two, jiva or Paramatman, is to be rejected as false ?- no compelling reason for the adoption of one or other alter- native is forthcoming, one might urge that the Paramat- man should be rejected as false, in which case Śruti (Sastra ) would terminate with (teaching the reality of) jva which is not the aim of man, aud would therefore cease to be a source of right knowledge.

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सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्मेति मन्त्रवर्गात् ब्रह्मयः सत्यत्वे पवधारिते परिशेषाज्जीवस्येव संसारियो बाधात। ननु कोडयं जीवः चेतन्यं जडो वा आद्ये ब्रह्मेवेति बाधानुपपतिः। द्वितीये घटा- दिवद्वाकतृत्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेतु नेष दोषश्चेतन्याभासत्वेन तस्य प्रसिद्ुनडानडविलक्षयत्वात्। न च नीरूपस्य चेतन्यस्याभासानुप- पत्ति: नीरूपस्यापि गगनस्य स्वच्छे जले आ्रमासदर्शनात् रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभवेति श्रुतेश्च । तथा चेदं सवं यदयमात्मेति शास्त्रात्सर्वस्याज्तानतत्कार्यस्य बाधे केवल आ्रनन्दरूप: परमात्मे- वापवर्गे Sवशिष्यतइति न किज्ञिदनुपपन्रम । For from the passage, 'Brahman is Existence, Intelligence Taitt. Up. II. 1. the Infinite,' the reality of Brahman is ascer- tained, aud therefore the rejection of the transmigrating jiva as false follows by a process of exclusion. What (it may be asked) is this jīva ? Is it intelligent, or unintelligent, If intelligent, jiva is indeed Brahman, and there- fore its rejection as false is impossible. If not intelligent, then jīva, like earthen pots &c. cannot be an enjoyer. It may be answered, there is no fault here; for since jiva is a reflexion of Intelligence, it is not what is commonly known either as Intelligent or as unintelligent (sc. it is an inexplicable product, anirva- chanya, and therefore unreal). Nor cau it be argued that a reflexion of the formless (colourless) Intelligence, (Brahman)- is impossible, for a reflexion in clear water of formless (colourless) ether is a common fact; and because of the Sruti passage-' He Brihad. Up. II. 5. 19. (Iśvara) became like unto every form'. And when, in accordance

Brihad. Up. II. 4. 6. with the passage, 'this every thing, all is that Self,' all things sc. Nescience and all its products, have been rejected as false, then the Highest Self alone, pure Bliss, remains behind in the state of final emancipation. Thus, (in the above view) nothing is left unexplained.

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न हयन्यस्य मोचार्थमन्यो यतते न वा स्वनाशः पुरुषार्थः । न च दुःखनिवृत्या दुःखाभाव एव पुरुषार्थः । कस्यायं पुरुषार्थः स्यात् स्वस्येव बाधितत्वात्। न च जीवात्मा उसत्य: ब्रनेन जीवेना- त्मनेति सत्येन परमात्मना प्रभेदभरवणात् नान्योतोस्ति द्रष्ट्ेत्या- दिना भेदप्रतिषेधाच्। न घ स्वतो Sसंसारिस्वभावस्य परमात्मनः संसारिस्वभावजीवात्मतानुपपतिः प्रतिद्यादुपाधिसम्बन्धान्नमोनी- लिमबदुपपत्ेः ।

But the above view (say others) is to be rejected ; for from it follows that bondage and emancipation do not refer to the same individual (sc. the bound one is the unreal jiva : the emancipated one is Brahman): also that striving after emancipation on the part of an aspirant is impossible; for none strives after the eman- cipation of another, nor can his own destruction be tbe aim of man. Nor can it be urged that because there is an end, to pain (when one is destroyed), the absence of pain is indeed the aim of man. For to whom can this be an aim, since the man himself (or jīva) is (by supposition) set aside as false ? And jiva is not unreal, for its identity with the real Self (the Highest Self) is declared in the passage, 'let me enter with this Chānd. Up. VI. 3. 2. living Self (jīva)'

And because a difference between them is denied in the

Brihad. Up. III. 7. 23. passage, 'there is no other seer but that one';

Nor may it be objected that to the Highest Self, which is by nature beyond the bonds of transmigration, cannot pertain the character of jīva, which is by nature subject to those bonds. For this is possible through the connexion (of the Paramatman) with certain adjuncts such as Nescience &c., just as dark colour is falsely ascribed to ether.

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न च रूप रुपं प्रतिरूपो बभवेतिवाक्यादाभासरूपत्वं जीवस्येति वाच्यं त हि तत्तन्मनुष्यत्वाद्याक्रान्ततत्तच्करीर सादृश्य- स्येष प्रतिरूपपदेन विवनितत्वात्। भवतु वा प्रतिबिम्बस्तथापि नासत्य: प्रत्यभिज्ञानेन बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बयोरभेदयरहात्। कथं तर्हि भेदव्यवहारः । एकस्मिन्नेव स्वरूपे सर्वकलपनरहहिते ुख चन्द्रा दा बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बस्वरूपमिति चिविधव्यवहारस्योपाध्यनुप्रविषठत्वारोपा- नन्तरं दर्शनात्। तस्मात्तत्वमस्यादिवाक्ये बाधायां सामानाधिकर- रयमिति कल्पना वेदबाह्या न न्याय्या। अतो लव्षणया परिपर्यसत्ि

Nor from the passage, 'He ( Isvara) became like unto every form,' can it be maintained that jīva is a reflexion; for by the word pratirūpa is meant only the likeness ( of the Self) to all bodies whatever, as possesisng all attributes, human and the rest. Or granting that jiva is a reflexion, it is still not unreal; for the identity of the reflected object and the reflexion is recog- nised (and the reflected object is real). How then, it may be asked, does the consciousness of these as different arise ? The reply is that in regard to the own nature of a thing (svarupa ) which is really one and without any attributes, (cf. p. 64.) e. g. a human face or the moon, a three-fold consciousness of reflected object, reflexion and own nature of the thing is observed to arise, after a connexion between the own nature of the thing and certain limiting adjuncts has been imagined. Hence the hypothesis, that in re- gard to such sentences as 'that thou art' community of refer- ence ( i. e. identity of that and thou) obtains after one or other of the two has been rejected as false, is beyond the tenor of the Veda and irregular ( for, as shown above, both Paramatman and jīva are real ). Hence it has not been proved that knowledge of the Self, the absolute Existence, Intelligence, Bliss, results from such seutences though implication.

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१६ अणोच्यते। विसदुयेोरभेदो हि न वेदेन प्रमीयते। अनन्यगतिकत्वेन मानान्तरस्य बाधनम । ३०॥

यदबोततं मुख्यथानुपपत्त्यभावान्न लक्षपेति तन्न विरुद्ध योर्जीवपरमात्मनोरभेदस्य प्रमाणोन बाधितत्वात न हि विरुदुयोर- भेद: क्व चित्प्रमायेन दृष्टः न व मानान्तरस्य वेदेन बाधितत्वा- न्ानुष्पत्तिः न हि बाध्यमित्येव बाध्यते किं तु स्वविषयमिट्युा- न्यथानुपपत्या 19. To this it is replied :-

The identity of two opposed things is not indeed made known by the Veda. The rejection of the other sources of evidence (sc. perception, inference) takes place, when no other course is possible (thau that of their rejection in favour of Veda) .... XXXVII.

What was said in regard to this point, viz. that since there is no impossibility ( contradiction ) Reply : the anthority of perception, inference, &c., must be maintained so attaching to the primary mean- long as these can be reconciled with Veda : this is possible by taking the ing, implication will not apply (to implied meaning of Veda. such sentences as 'that thou art'), cannot be accepted. For the identity of the two opposed things, viz. jiva and Paramatman is overthrown by a trustworthy source of evidence, siuce no genuine source of evidence makes known the identity of two opposed things. Nor can it be argued that there is no impossibility (in regard to the primary meaning), siuce the Veda overthrows all the uther sources of evidence. For a thing (sc. cognition ) is not rejected as false merely by saying, it must be rejected; but it is rejected because in no other way can the establisbing of its object (sc. that which it makes known). be saved from contradiction.

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यह तु वृत्यन्तरेगापि तदुपपत्तर्मुख्यार्ये Sनुपपत्तिरेवे अन्यथा सर्वष लघयोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः। लोकेपि निश्चितप्रामायये एव लक्षणा । तथा घ तादृशवाश्यविरेधिन विरोधिमानान्तरस्य बाधितत्वादनुप- पत्त्यभावान्न लघका स्यात् । न घ लक्ष्यार्थस्यासङ्गस्य वाच्यार्थेन सम्बन्धानुपपति: स्वतो-

न्धपरिकल्पि तष्रवितृतम:संसर्गवदुपपतेः। But whereas in the present case, the thing to be proved (tat, sc. that the sentence 'that thon art' teaches the identity of jiva and Brahman ) can be proved in another way, sc. through implication, contradiction does certainly attach to the primary meaning of such a sentence (i. e. the Vedic sentence ' that thou art' does not overthrow the other sources of evidence). Otherwise ( i. e. if perception and the other sources of evidence, which contradict the literal meaning of a sentence, are to be rejected in favour of the literal meaning) it will follow that implication will be altogether done away with: for, as concerning worldly usage also, implication obtains only in the case of a sentence whose authority is certain-(if the sentence itself.be of doubtful au- thority, no attempt is made to explain its implications). And s0, when the other sources of evidence, which contradict the literal meaning of a sentence, are rejected as false because they are contradicted by such a sentence, it follows that there will be no contradiction in regard to the sentence (i. e. it will have to be un- derstood literally) and therefore no implication will obtain in regard to it. And the connexion of the unrelated (sc. Self), which is the implied meaning of the words, with the literal meaning is not impossible; for there can be a connexion surmised by Nescience between even that which is itself unrelated and certain limiting adjuncts, sc. Nescience, internal organ &c., just as owls that cannot see by day imagine that a connexion exists between the sun and darkness.

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900 सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

कल्पितसम्बन्धेन लखया पारमार्थिकी न स्यादिति चेतु नोचेबोच्यम ऋद्वेतविरोधेनेव द्वेतस्यासत्यत्वेप्यद्वेतवादिनां सिट्धा

न च लक्ष्यपदार्थे मकताप्रसङ्गः पदार्थप्रतिपादकवित्वा नमा नन्दं ब्रह्ोत्यादिनेव तत्पदार्थप्रतिपादनात तब घ लक्षणाभावाज्ञानवस्था

पाधिसम्ब दुव्यतयतिरिक्तसामान्यानभ्यपगमात्

An opponent may here object that if (as supposed above) impiication is to apply through a falsely surmised connexion, then such implication cannot be real (and, therefore, the resulting intuition of Self will be false also). Do not speak so loud ( we reply ) as if announcing something new! For it is abundantly clear that there is nothing repugnant to the grand tenet of Monists in maintaining (as we do here) the falsity of duality, just because duality is contradictory of Monism ( non-duality ).

Nor will silence follow in regard to the thing implied (by the words that and thou, cf. p. 93); for the meaning of the word that is made known by such passages as 'Brahman, which is In- telligence, Bliss' which are explanatory of the word. And since implication does not attach to the words Intelligence &c. in the above passage, (tatra, sc. these words make known Brahman, direct- ly, by abhidhā) there is no endless series of implications (cf. p. 93). Nor can it be argued that since (in the above passage) an attribu- tive relation ( vaisishtya ) is made known (between Brahman) and certain class-attributes (samanya), sc. the possessing intelligence &c. the thing implied, viz. the attributeless (Brahman) cannot be prov- ed by such passages. For we Vedantins do not admit any such thing as class-attribute (generality) distinct from the individ- ual thing, which is in relation with many limiting adjuncts.

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भ्रनुगतव्यवहारस्यानुगतव्यतयेतरोपपतेः प्रतिबिम्बेषु विम्ब- वत्। त्वमर्थस्तक्विधया सात्यादिपदेन वकुं शक्य एवं। न च साक्षिगि विप्रतिपति: सर्वप्रमाया व्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात ऋज्यातस्याप्रमाविषयस्य सक्षित्र्यतिरकेया सिद्धभवात् प्रमाणसिदित्वे ज्ञानस्य निधनिर्न स्यात तथात्वे वा प्रमायवेयथ्यात प्रमायकृताति- शयाभावात भ्रमषिदस्य प्रमाणविषयत्वविरोधात Since a persistent consciousness* is due simply to the individual wbich persists in ( or pervades ) the consciousness; just as the one reflected thing, sc. the moon, pervades the many reflexions of the moon (and so gives rise to the persistent consciousness 'This is the same moon reflected in the many waters'). And the thing implied by the word thou can be declared by such words as witness &c., in the manner already shown ( by bhāgatyāgalakshanā cf. p. 91). Nor can there be any controversy as to the existence of the Witness : for (if the Witness exists not) it follows that there is an end to the exercise of all sources of evidence ; since, in the absence of the Witness, an unperceived object, sc. one not declared in any true cognition, could not be proved to exist, (and if no unperceived object exists, the pramanas have nothing to energise in regard to). If it be held that Nescience is proved by a source of evidence, then there can be no destruction of Nescience; (for no pramana can destroy the thing which it makes known, and Nescience is in this case the thing made known ). Or if this be granted (sc. that Nes- cience is not destroyed), then a source of evidence is useless, for in this case no special result (atisaya=ajnananivritti) has been effected. by it (pramanakrita, sc. the object would still remain unperceived, ajnata). (Nor can it be said that an unperceived object is proved by error, i. e. its unperceivedness is a mistake simply), for such an object (being nothing) cannot be vouched for by any pramana.

• For anugatavyavahara and the Vaiseshika prvof of sāmānya, see note p. 108 infra.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

तथाच प्रमायप्रवृत्ते: पूर्त्रमेश्ा ज्ञातत्वेन साच्षिया साधितमेव प्रमेयं प्रमायां विषयोकरोतीति युक्तम पतो नाम विप्रतिपत्तिः । तथाच सुरेश्वरः। प्रमायामप्रमायं वा प्रमाभासस्तयेत्र घ। कुर्वन्त्येघ प्रमां यष तदसम्भावना कुतः । न घ पदयोरेकार्थत्वानेकार्थत्वविकल्प: एकार्थंत्वे ऽपि वाक्य- प्रमायजन्यस्येव ज्ञानस्य भेदभ्रमनिवर्त्तकत्वात्। न चेक्पदवैयथ्य तेन बिना विरोधाभावेन लव्षयया Sखण्डवाक्यार्थस्य प्रतिपादयितु- मशक्य त्वात पदमाचस्याप्रमायत्वाच्च Accordingly, the right conclusion is that a source of evidence makes known an object (prameya), which, as something unper- ceived, had been vouched for by the Witness, even previous to the exercise of the source of evidence. Hence tbere is no conflict as to the existence of the Self (atra). And thus Suresvara Taitt. Up. Bhashyavartika, p. 167. el. declares: 'How can that not 19. ed. Apte. Poona 1889. exist in regard to which (yatra) sources of evidence, false sources of evidence and counterfeit cognitions, all alike declare truly (sc. all these testify to the Witness or eternal Cognition per se, without which they could not be)'. Nor is there any uncertainty as to whether the two words ('that' and 'thou') mean only one thing or more than one thing; for even if the two words denote one thing, it is only the know- ledge eff-cted through a sentence as a source of evidence that can destroy the erroneons notion that the two things meant by the words are distinct (i. e. there must be the two words to make up the requisite sentence). Nor is one of the two words useless, since in the absence of the second word there would be no con- tradiction as to the literal meaning, and, therefore, the Indivisible (Brabman) which is the thing meant by the sentence could not be made known through implication. And because a word alone is not a source of evidence .* * A word serves only to recall an object previously known and does not testify to its reality, cf. Ved. paribh. where smriti (recolleation, is excluded from prama (right knowledge).

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। १०३

न घ प्रधामवाक्ये लक्षकानुपपति: इतरानुपसर्जनार्थप्रतिपादकत्व मेव हि प्रधानत्वं नाम तन्ट लक्षया मुख्यया वेत्यन्यदेतत् न च न्यायविरोध: यम प्रतिपाद्यस्यार्थस्य शब्दशक्तिगोधरत्वं.तप न्यायावतारात्।

निष्कृष्ठस्य प्रत्यगात्मनो डवस्थाचयानुगतस्य शुद्धस्य चिदंशस्य परमा- रमना जगत्कर्तृत्वादिभ्यो निष्कृष्ठेनाSSकाशाद्ानुस्यतेन शुद्ेन परि- पूर्यसच्चिदानन्दस्वभावेनाभेदो लव्षकया बोध्यते इति प्रतिपादितम्।

Nor is implication impossible in regard to a primary sentence. For the primary character of a sentence consists in the sentence making known something which is independent of something else. And this primary character is indepeudent of the question whether the seutence is to be understood literally or through. implication. Nor does this view contradict the maxim (sc. irregu- larity is to be assumed in regard to a secondary senteuce only) for the maxim applies where the thing made known is made known by the power of the words (i. e. literally).

20. Here it may be objected that what has heen established Objections by a bheda-vadin (who is that (from such a sentence as maintains that duality is real as given in perceptiou, inference &c.): (a) Veda, 'that thou art'), through impli- while it teaches the identity of Jiva and Paramatman, does not teach the unrea- cation, the identity is made lity of the world; for the own nature of known of the Self within (pratya- a thing, svarūpa, constitutes bheda, dif- ference, and is vouched for by all the gatman),-or that portion of pure pramāņas : Intelligence which pervades the three states (of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep), and is free from the various attributes of the transmigratory spheres, sc. agency &c., and the absolute Existence, Intelligence, Bliss,-or pure Intelligence, which pervades all products beginning with ether, and is free from the various attributes, sc. the being the cause of the world, &c.

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908 सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

तथा च सर्बो भेदो न निराकृतः स्यात् अनात्मभेदस्य तदव-

स्यापि प्रत्यक्षादेरप्रामाएयमेत्रेति साम्प्रतं दृष्टान्तासिट्े: न झात्म- परमात्मनार्भेदग्राहकं मानमस्ति तयो: स्वयंप्रकाशत्वेन मानाविषय- त्वातृ विशिष्टविषयस्य मानस्य विशेषयभेदगे।चरत्वेनान्ययापिट-

मायेन बाधितत्वात न चानात्मभेदयाहकस्य प्रत्यवादेबीधकमस्ति। But in this way all difference ( duality ) has not been overthrown, for there still remains a difference constituted by the not-Self, ( which remains as the difference, or negation, of the Self affirmed above). Nor is it correct to say that perception, inference &c., which make known a difference between not-Self (and Self), are untrust- worthy, jus s the evidence which declares a difference between Self and the Highest Self is untrustworthy, since the confirmatory example ( now adduced ) cannot itself be proved. For there is no evidence declaratory of the difference between Self and the Highest Self, inasmuch as these two are self-luminous and cannot therefore be made' known by a source of evidence. And because a source of evidence which makes known certain subjects as qualified by attributes, and which has fulfilled its function already (anyathasiddhasya) by making kuown the difference between. these attributes, cannot make known a difference betweeu Self and the Highest Self* (or the subjects). And because such a source of evidence is overthrown by another source of evidence, sc. the sentence 'that thou art,' which makes knowu the identity of the (two) subjects (that and thou). Nor can it be urged that there is something to overthrow perception, and the other pramanas which make known a difference between Self and not-Self.

• cf. Ved. paribh. Pandit Vol. VII. p. 460 et seq.

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909

न धानात्मस्वरुपगोचरत्वेपि प्रत्यक्षादेरन भेदगे।चरत्वं धर्मिप्रतियो-

प्तिरिक्तभेदागोचरत्वेऽपि स्वरूपभेदगोचरत्वस्य दुरक्हूष- त्वातृ न घ स्वरूपं भिन्नमिति प्रतीत्यनुपपत्ति: राहेो: शिर: भात्म-

Nor again that perception, inference &c., although they make known the not-Self per se, do not make known a difference (be- tween Self and not-Self); because, whenever there is a knowledge of a difference (bheda), and of a locus (dharmi) in wbich the difference resides, and of a counterentity (pratiyogi) there arises the doubt whether these are known successively or simultaneously, and either alternative is exposed to the vices of a see-saw, or self-dependence, or an infinite regress, or omission of a former supposition as use- less, or of absence of a reason to compel the adoption of one of two alternatives &c .* (The above objections are not to be urged) because, even if per- ception and the other pramanas make known no difference other than that of the own nature of a thing, it cannot be denied that they do make known the difference (constituted by) the own nature of thing (svarūpa). Nor is it to be argued that (if svarūpa is itself a bheda) the common experience 'this svarūpa is different from that svarūpa' becomes impossible ( which experience implies that svarupa is the locus in which a bheda resides); for this ex- perience may be explained as certain other experiences, viz. the head of Rahu' (which is all head), 'the intelligence of Self'. . (while Self really is intelligence), are explained (i. e. by the assump. tion of an attributive relation between things that are really identical).

• For the general form of the argument cf. pp. 40-45 supra. current defs. are :- अन्यान्यस्य अ्रव्यवह्धितान्यान्या।सित्वम् अ्न्योन्याश्यः।।उत्तरो नरेगीव पूर्वपूर्वकार्यसम्भवे पूर्वेषामन्यथासिद्धिः प्राग्लोप: । (उत्तरोतरेय=कारयन पूर्वपूर्व 8c. पूर्वस्य कारखस्य)।एकतरपत्तपातियुक्तिविरह्ो विनिगमनाविरद्क:।विनिगमन =निश्चयकार गाम।

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न घ भेदस्वरूपशब्दयो: पर्यायत्वापत्ति: स्वव्यवहारे इतर- सापेकत्वनिरपेक्षत्वाभ्यां विशेषात न चाभेदे तद्नुपपत्तिः एकस्मिन्नपि देवदत्ते पितृत्वादिव्यवहाराथे पुनाद्यपेक्षादर्शनात् न व प्राप्ताप्राप्रवि- वेकेन सपेत्षत्वमेव भेदोस्त्विति वाच्यं तस्यापि स्वंरपानतिरेकात न ध स्वरूपाद यस्य भेदस्तस्य निःस्वरपत्वापत्ति: अन्यथा स्वरूपमे वाखयडमिति वाच्यं घटात घटस्य भेदेप्यघटत्वादर्शनात।. Nor does it follow ou this view that the terms svarupa and bheda are synonyms: for there is a difference of usage in regard to the term sva (which stands both for svarūpa and bheda) according as dependence on other things (sc. pratiyogi and anu- yogi) is iutended (wben the term bheda is used), or independence (when the. term svarupa is used). Nor can it be said that this difference of usage is impossible, if svarupa and bheda are identical (abhede); for it is observed that in regard to theindividual Devadatta our experience of him as a father depends ou his having a son. Nor must it be argued that only that which is known through induction* as dependent on something else is bheda. For this dependent bheda is identical with svarupa. Nor must it be argued that from this it will follow that that which is different from svarūpa+ is itself des- titute of svarūpa, otherwise svarūpa becomes a unity indivisible ( akhanda, in regard to which no predication of ditfereuce what- ever would be possible cf. p. 64.). For even .when a difference between two earthen jars is perceived, the jarness (or svarūpa) does not cease to be perceived ..

• Prāpta, aprāptaviveka (a nyāya of the Pūrvamimāmsā ) = discrimination of watter which has been already established from that which has not been thus established. In this case the ghatasvarupa is prāpta sc. when ghata is known, its svarūpa is also kuown, prāpta ; and ghatasvarupa as bheda is aprapta, because something else must be known in order that ghatasvarupa may constitute a difference between the ghata and that other thing. तथा च प्राप्ताप्राप्त विद्ेकात्सापेक एव पदार्थ (thing) भेदशब्दवाच्याऽस्तु न स्वरूपं स्वरूपस्य निरपेक्षत्वात् । gloss. + If svarūpa is bheda, theu pata as different from ghata must be nihsvarupa or a mere nothing. If pata also possesses svarupa, then svarupa censes to be a bheda and becomes a unity indivisible. Ers- प्रात्= घट स्वरूपात्। यस्य तस्य, = प्रदस्य

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। 900

न व घटादेकस्मात् घटान्तरे किं चिद्धेधर्म्यमस्त्येवेति वाच्यं स्थितस्यापि तस्योकदेषिय भेदत्वानङ्गीकारात न च वेधम्यें सत्येव स्वरूपं भेद इति वाच्यम्। अनात्मस्वरूपय्रामपि वेधम्यंत्र्याप्रत्वात्।

यतु केश्चिदुक्तं यथायथं चितयमेव भेदो यथा घटादो स्वर- पमन्योन्याभावो वेधम्यं व सामान्यादो च द्वयमेत वेधम्याभावात प्भावे स्वरूपमेवेतरासम्भवादिति तन्

Nor must it be argued that the one jar possesses special attributes (or individuality)t different from those of the otber jar. For thongh this possession of special attributes exists, it is not admitted as a bheda becanse of the already mentined vices which result in regard thereto.

Nor can it be argued that svarupa is a bheda ouly in the case where this possession of differeut attributes is found. For the svarupas of things B. C. D. other than A (anatmasvarupa)* are also pervaded by this vaidharmya. But the view of some teachers is to be rejected sc. that bheda is rightly three-fold; to jars &c. i. e. to substances, qualities and action pertain svarupa, anyonyabbava (the non-existence of one thing in another) and vaidharmya; to class-generality (samanya), particularity ( visesha) and intimate relation ( samavāya ) pertaiu only the two, svarupa and anyonyabhava, because to these three (as being void of attributes, ) vaidbarmya cannot attach ; to nega- tion (abhava) pertains only svarupa, for to it the other two cannot apply.+

ț Vaidharmya here = tadvyaktitva, individuality, or that which makes this jar what it is, as distinct from jati, class-generality or jar- ness, which inheres in all jars alike. ātmasvarūpa = ghațasvarūpa: anātmasvarūpa = patasvarūpa. t of. Khandanakhaņdakhādya p. 111, (Benares, 1888).

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

स्वरूपभेदस्यावश्यकत्वात् इतरयोश्च व्यभिचारात भेदव्यवद्दा- रापयोजकत्वेनाड्गीकारवेयर्थ्यात एकाकारव्यवह्ारस्य चेकरुपविष- यसाध्यत्वनियमातृ न व स्वरूपभेदपचे स्वस्मादपि स्वस्य भेद: स्यादिति वाच्यं स्वस्य प्रतियोगिकोटिनिवेशेनान्यस्य धर्मियो विर- हात् धर्मिकोटिनिवेशेन वा प्रतियोगिनोऽभावात् न थ भेदस्वरूपयो:

( The above view is rejected ) because svarūpabheda is essen- tial, and the other two fail to apply in all cases. For it is useless to maintain the two latter in that they are not the cause of a per- ception of difference; and because the rule is that a consciousness whose form remains unchanged has been brought about by an unchanging object, i. e. by one whose form remains unchanged .* Nor can it be urged that on the view that svarūpa is a bheda (i. e. the cause of a perception of difference) it follows that svarupa should make known a difference between itself and itself (svasya svas- mät ). . For if svarūpa (svasya) be inserted in the place of (i. e. be regarded as) the counterentity, there remains no locus for the difference : again, if svarūpa be regarded as the locus, no counter- entity remains. Nor does it follow that of the two, svarupa and bheda, one or other must remain by a process of exclusion, since one must fall within the other. For bheda is not something dif- ferent from svarūpa.

• एकाकरेति। यथा घठोयं घटोऽयम दृति व्यवहारे अनुगतं घटत्वं सामान्य- मेव प्रयोजकं न व्यक्तिरननुगतत्वात्। अन्वथा जातेरसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात्। gloss. While individual jars vary (techn .- are ananugata, non-pervasive), the form of the perception in each case is unchanged, thus, this is a jar, this is a jar. This unchanged form of perception must therefore be due to an un- changing, pervasive cause (anugatam prayojakam) sc. to the sāmānya (olass-attribute) jarness. The Vaiseshika thus proves the existence of samanya as a separate category. Applying the above argument the text urges that the unchanging element in regard to a perception of difference is svarūpa.

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

न घ स्वरूपभेद: किं मिन्ने मेदव्यवहारप्रयोजको Sभिन्ने वेति विकल्पावकाशः उपस्थितवस्तुमाषे धर्मि्रतियोगिद्वानपेद्यानपेसा- भ्यां भेदाभेदव्यवहार योनीयमानत्वात्। नन्वज्ञानकार्यत्वं प्रपज्जस्य पूर्वमुत्तं तत्कथं प्रत्यक्षाद्यनुरोधेन भेदाशङ्गा इति चेतृ न तस्येवासिदेवह्यकार्यत्वस्य बहुशः श्रवणात् सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन: आ्रकाशः संभत: यथाग्नेः कुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्गा एव- मेतस्मादात्मन: सर्वे देवा: सर्वे लोकाः सर्वे पते आात्मानो व्यु्त रन्तीत्यादिश्युतिभ्य: जन्माद्यस्य यत इति न्यायाब्व। Nor is there room here for the doubt whether bbeda in the form of svarupa is the cause of the perception of difference in regard to a locus A different from or identical with (counterentity B). For in regard to an object merely as presented the conscious- ness of its difference from or identity with (something else) is effected by the necessity or absence of necessity for the knowledge of (i. e. by the presence or absence of a desire to know) the locus and counterentity. Again, it may be objected that it has already been shown (pp. (b) the Vedantic tenet that the world 38-40 supra) that the world is is a product of Nescience i. e. is false, is a product of Nescience: hence in fact opposed to many Vedic passages. the argument for duality (lit. bheda or the world as different from Self ), based as it is on the authoritativeness of perception and the other sources of evidence ( anurodhena ) can find no place. This objection is set aside; becanse it is not proved that the world is a product of Nescience (tasya), since many Sruti passages declare the world to be a product of Brahman :- Ch. Up. VI 2. 1. 'In the beginning, my dear, the Taitt. Up. III. 1. existent was this,' 'That from II. 1. which these beings are born,' 'From that Self (Brahman) sprang ether', 'As small sparks come forth from fire, thus do all Devas, all worlds ; all these beings come forth from that Self': and so also Brihad Up. II. 1. 20. the sutra declares-'From which Ved. Sū. I. 1. 2. (Brahman) the production, &c. of this (world).'

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990

देदं तहांव्याकृतमासीत इन्द्रो। मायाभि: पुरुरप ईयते मायां लु प्रकृतिं विद्यास् नासदासीन्नोपदासीतम पासीदित्यादिश्रुतिभ्य: माया- मानं तु कारत्क्येनानभिव्यत्तस्वरूपत्वादिति न्यायाब्ु एवं तर्हि: पतीनां परस्परं विरोधान्रेभयमपि कारयमस्तु किं तई जगत्कार- यमिति चेतु यथायोम्यं परमायवादिकमेव। तस्मादनात्ममेदे प्रत्य- मादिषिद्धे जागरूके कथमद्वेतसिद्ि: तदयं संग्रहः । शत्माऽभेदप्रमित्यापि नाद्वितं ते प्रसिद्ठति। पनात्मभेदसंसिट्ठेः प्रत्यक्षादे: प्रमायतः । Again it may be objected that in many Sruti passages the fact of the world being a pro- (c) discrepancy of Śruti passages in regard to the cause' of the world. duct of Nescience is declared, thus :- 'This was encompassed by death.' Now all this was then undeveloped.' 'Indra of many forms goes along by Brihad Up. I. 47. R. V. IV. 47. 48. his magic powers.' 'Know

Śv. Up. IV. 10. that the material cause of the world is Maya.' 'Non-entity was

R V. X. 129. not, entity was not, darkness, (Nescience) was'-and it also Ved. Sū. III. 2. 3. follows from the reason laid down in the sūtra, 'On the con- trary, it (the dream-world) is Maya merely, for its nature is not presented fully.'-thus, then, since the Sruti passages contradict each other, let it be granted that neither Nescience nor Brahman is the cause of the world. What then is the cause? Reply :- ultimate atoms, or any other appropriate cause (sc. pradhana, matter &c. as proposed by various thinkers ). Hence since duality, lit. the difference of not-Self from Self, which has been proved to be real by perception and the other sources of evidence is on the alert (against all attacks), it is not possible to prove (Vedan- tic) Monism (sc .. Self alone is).

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। 999

अनात्मानं पृथक स्तापयित्वा शुद्धांशयोरभेदो बोध्यतइति शुत्यभि- प्रायः किं तु प्रत्यकचेतन्ये कूटस्थे जागराद्यवस्थाचयं कर्मृत्वाद्यनर्थ- जातं घ व्यभिचारि सरव तचेवानुगते सात्िययध्यस्तमित्यन्वयव्यतिरे- काम्यां तर्दातरेकेय तत्स्वरूपं नास्तीति निश्चित्य शुद्धेन प्रत्यगात्मन। ब्रह्मणो Sभेदसिद्धाथे ब्रह्मय्यपि अगत्कर्तृत्वपरोक्षत्वादि भाकाशादिकं

सृष्टिवाक्यसमनन्तरप्रवृत्तेन नेतिनेतीत्यादिवाकयेन घावधारयति।

Wherefore the opponent's view may be summed up thus :-- Your view of Monism is not proved even by the certain know- ledge that Self is identical with Brahman. For through perception and the other sources of evideuce the existeuce of the not-Self as distinct from Self is assured.

21. The above view is to be rejected because the opponent

Met: the opponent has misunderstood has not understood the meaning the bearings of Sruti passages. of the Sruti passages. For the import of these is not that such a passage as 'that thou art' establishes the not-Self as something distinct, and then goes on to declare the identity of the two pure ( attributeless) portions (sc. Intelligence or Brahman underlying what is meant by 'that' and 'thou'). But when an aspirant of the highest order (paramajijnasu, se. one who desires intuition of Brahman as the Self within ) is convinced that the three states of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, and the complex of evils beginning with agency-all of which fail to attach (vyabhichari) to the unchanging Self within -are erroneously surmised in that very Self (tatraiva), the pervading Witness; that, therefore, by the induetive method of

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भेदे वा प्रमागमपश्यन्संदिहानः संसाररोगराजानुचरगर्भवासाद्यने- करोगसमुदतदुःखव्रातानुभवासादितोद्वेगः ब्रह्मलोकप्रभवमपि सुखं विषमिष मन्यमानस्तरति शोकमात्मविदितिश्ुत्या संसारदावानलप्र- सूतसन्तापशमनामृताब्धिमात्मविद्यामनानान: परमजिचासु: स्वरू- पापरोवद्शिनं परमकारुयिकं गुरुमुपसर्पति conjoint presence and absence, it is proved that the world as deşcribed above* (tat) has no existence of its own (svarūpa) apart from the Self (tat): and further when, in order to prove the identity of Brahman with the pure (attributeless) Self witbin, he ascertains beyond doubt that the being the cuuse of the world and the not being positively presented and other at- tributes, and also the whole world beginning with ether-all of which are not pervasive as regards Brahman also-are surmised to exist in that pervasive Self which is Existent (sat, real), Intelli- gence,-are unreal (asat) as being surmised through error, (and this he can do) in accordance with the method of conjoint presence and absence, and by having recourse to the method of unreal predication and annulment of the same in accordance with

. such negative passages as ' Brahman is not this, not this' which find place immediately after passages setting forth the creation of the world. Then, finding no certain evidence for the identity or non- identity of the two entities which are implied by the words that and thou, and from which all relation with the not-Self has been removed (by the processes described above), the aspirant begins to doubt; and being pained by his experience of all those pains which spring from the many diseases of gestation onwards and which attend on transmigratory life (as servants) on a rāja, and deeming as poison even that pleasure which accrues in the world of Brahma, and not knowing that a knowledge of Self is the nectar-sea that quenches the fire of the world-conflagration, as declared in the passage, 'He who knows Self passes beyond sorrow', he approaches his most merciful guru who has attained to intuition of the Self.

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली। 993

तेन व शुद्धयोस्तत्वंपदार्थयारभेदे तत्वमस्यादिवाक्येन नित्यनिर्देषिय बोधिते स्वयमेवाद्वेततत्त्वं सात्ात्कृत्य स्वानन्दतृप् आात्मारामो भवति पतः शरुत्यभिग्रायापरिज्ञानविनृम्भितमेतत् य- दनात्मभेवेनाद्वितक्षतिरिति।

यच् स्वरपं भेद: प्रत्यवादिगोवर इति तदतितुच्छं प्रत्य- बादेरसद्विषयत्वेन स्वरूपागोचरत्वात् स्वरूपस्य भेदत्वानुपपत्तेश्च। कुत इति चेतु शृशु किं शुद्धं सर्वधर्मविनिर्मुत्तं स्वरूपं भेद: किं वा विशिष्टम ।

And being taught by the guru, by means of that eternal faultless sentence 'that thou art', that the two unrelated (suddha) things implied by the words that and thou are really identical, the aspirant himself attains intuition of the one reality without a second, and becomes self-contained in that Bliss which is his own nature, and delights in his Self (alone).

Hence the statement, that (Vedantic) Monism is overthrown by the fact that not-Self exists distinct from Self, was made through misunderstanding the meaning of Sruti.

And as to the opponent's statement that svarupa is a bheda made known by perception and His view that the own nature of a thing the other sources of evidence,- is difference is self-contradictory: that is utter nonsense. For since perception &c. make known the unreal (asat) they cannot make known svarupa or that which is: and further, because svarūpa cannot be proved to be bheda. Why not, you ask ? Then listen, and say whether you mean that svarūpa, pure and simple, sc. destitute of all attributes, is bheda; or as qualified by attributes.

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998 सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

आाद्ये व्यवहारहेतुत्वमपि तस्य नास्तीति वत्तव्यं तथाघ सर्वव्यवहारानास्पदं सर्वधर्मविनिर्मुत्तमस्यूलानयबादिशास्त्रसिदुं स. दात्मकं ब्रह्मेव नामान्तरेव प्रत्यत्षादिगोघर इत्युक्तं स्यातृ न च तदप्युपपद्यते न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नेव वाचा नान्येरदेवेस्तपसा कर्मका वेत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधप्रसङ्गात द्वितीये विशेषराविशेष्ययोर्भेदे विशिष्ट स्वरूपान्तरं भेद इति वाच्यं तथा व तपाप्यन्यतषाप्यन्यदिति सेव दुरुतराऽनवस्था भ्रभेदे वा विशिषृस्वरूपासिद्धि: । If the first, then you will have to declare that such svarūpa could not be the cause of any experience ( vyavahara*), and thus you would have to declare that what is made known by perception &c. is indeed Brahman under another name, sc. bheda,- ( Brah- man ) which is not the object of any experience whatever, which is free from all attributes, which as proved by Sruti is neither great nor small, which is the Existent. But this will not hold good as being contradicted by the Sruti-' It is grasped not by the eye, nor by speech nor by the other devas (senses), not by penance or

Mu. Up. III. 1. 8. work.' On the second alternative sc. that svarūpa, qualified by at- tributes, is bheda, if it be maintained that subject and attribute are different, then you will have to declare (as the cause of this difference) a second qualified-svarupabheda and for the second a third, and so you will not escape the vice of an infinite regress. If subject and attribute be regarded as identical (abhede va) then your qualified svarupa does not exist ! Nor again is your qualified svarūpa made known by perception and the other sources of evidence; for it is attributeless, as is the svarūpa of a thing in itself, since the attribute colour does not pertain to a coloured object, and so with other attributes.

• व्यवहार :- ज्ञानजन्यप्रवृत्तितिवुत्ति: action, or cessation from action, consequent on knowledge.

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न वा बिशिष्टं स्वरूपं प्रत्यक्षादिगोधरः तस्यापि शुद्धवस्तुस्वरूपर्व्नि- दर्मकत्वात न हि रूपदिविशिष्ट रपादयः सन्ति। न च विशिषटं नाम किंचिद्वस्त्वस्ति विशेषणविशेष्यतत्सम्बन्धातिरिक्तस्य तस्याननुभवातु तेषां घ प्रत्येकसमुदायाभ्यां विशिष्टव्यवहाराजननात न घ'सम्बन्ध एव विशिष्टं विशेषणाविशेष्यतत्सम्बन्धा इत्यच सम्बन्धे ऽपि

वस्तुस्वरुपं भेद इति शङ्कितुमपि शक्यं तस्य विदारणात्मनो भेदस्य

विदारयं पटस्वरूपं वस्तुस्वरूपातिरित्तस्य च भेदस्य तस्य निःस्वरू- पस्य निराश्यस्यासिड्िरेव। Nor is your qualified svarupa an entity at all, for it is unper- ceived apart from subject, attribute and the relation between these ; and because a qualified (determinate) judgment in regard to these three (i. e. one in which these three are combined) can not be effected through them singly or taken together. Nor is it rela- tion simply that constitutes (your) qualified svarupa, for when all three are present to the mind, thus, subject, attribute, and re- lation,-no determinate judgment is observed to result, although the relation (between subject and attribute) was present to the mind. And because it would follow that there could be no de- terminate judgment in regard to the subject and attribute (if re- lation by itself were the qualified svarūpa). Nor can it be argued at all that the thing itself is bheda: for since bheda (tasya) implying tearing asunder consists in the destruction of the thing itself, it is impossible for the destruction and its counter-entity (sc. the thing which is destroyed) to be identcal. For the tearing of a piece of cloth is not the cloth itself: in fact, apart from the thing itself, or piece of clotb, this character-less, baseless tearing cannot be affirmed at all (asiddhi). Nor can that which is divided bhinna sc. destroyed, be the substrate of anything: otherwise a broken jar might be regarded as a receptacle for water !

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99€ सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

न हि भिन्न आाशयो भवति अन्यथा ध्वस्तोपि घटो जलाधार: स्यातृ अभिन्ने त्वाश्रये भेद। विरोधादेव न वर्नते। तस्मादलमनेनानात्मविचारेय सवंथा प्रत्यवादेरात्मानात्म- भेदगोचरत्वं नास्तीति सिट्ठम।

विरोध इति तन्न

अधिष्ठानत्वमादेण कारयं ब्रह्म गोयते । ३८। दृश्यत्वाद्यनुमानसिद्धानिर्वेचनीयस्य जगतो Sनादनिर्वधनीया अविद्यो कारगन ब्रह्म तस्य कूटस्थस्य कार्यकारण विलकणत्वात तदेत- द्झाSपूर्वमनपर मनन्तरमवाह्यम पयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूरिति भुतेः। But if the substrate or thing in itself is undivided, bheda, divi- sion, cannot reside in it-for that would be a palpable contradiction ! To conclude this discussion of the not-Self. We have proved that perception and the other sources of evidence in no way declare a difference between Self and not-Self. 22. Thus, we must reject the statement that the two sets of Śruti passages, which deal with the cause of the world and declare, the one that Brahman is, the other that Nescience is, the cause contradict each other. Through Nescience, Brahman is (said to be) the cause of the world; for to Brahman causality does not pertain. Brahman is said to be cause as being simply the substrate (of Nescience which is the cause of the world) .. .. XXXVIII. Nescience, eternal ab ante, inexplicable (cf. note p. 28), is indced the cause of the world, which is inexplicable and which is proved by reason of its visibility &c. Brahman is not the cause ; for the unchanging one (Kutastha) is neither cause nor effect, as declared in the Sruti passage-'This is the Brahman, without Brihad Up. II. 5. 19. cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside : this Self is Brahman, omniscient.'

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली। 990

कथं र्ताह ब्रह्मणो नगत्कारखत्वं प्रुतो प्रसिद्धं जगतत्कारसाधिठ्ठा नत्वेन कारयत्वोपचारात् ब्रह्मकारयप्रुतेरन्यार्थत्वाच्न एकमेवाद्धि- तोयमितिश्रतेरद्वितीयत्वं तावद् ब्रह्मणः सिद्धुं तत्कथं सम्भाव्य- तामिति कार्यक्ारयायोरमेदस्तावल्लेकप्रसिद्ध: ब्रह्मापि जगत्कारय- मिति कथमसम्भावना स्यादित्यद्वितीये सम्भावनाबुद्धिमाचप्रयोजन- त्वातस्याः न वाज्यानमपि जगत्कारणं शत्या विवधितं । तस्य भ्रमनिमित्तमाचत्वेनेवोक्तत्वात् कार्यकारयवादस्य वेदान्तबहिर्भत- त्वात् विवर्त्तेस्येव वेदान्तवादत्वातु How then is Brahman declared in Sruti to be the cause of the world? Because to Brahman as the substrate and cause of the world causality is by a metaphor ascribed. And because the Śruti passage declaratory of Brahman as the cause has a further purport. From the Sruti passage-' (In the beginning) there was that

Ch. Up. VI. 2. 1. one only, without a second,' -is proved the unrelated nature of Brahman. But how is a notion of the unrelated Brahman (tat) possible? The well-known fact of common experience, sc. that cause and effect are identical, (steps in to meet this difficulty)- thus it is not impossible to conceive of Brahman also as the cause of the world. And so the above passage (tasyah) finds its purport in merely making possible (for us) a notion of the unrelated Brahman (sambhavanabuddhi cf. p. 47 supra). Nor does Śruti imply that Nescience also is the cause of the world. For causality is affirmed as simply due to error (sc. the notion of cause depends on that of duality, which again is the outcome of Nescience). For a theory of cause and effect (as implying dnality) lies outside the Upanishads, in that these con- fine their teaching to that of illusory manifestation * (vivartta).

• The Vivarta-vadins or Maya-vadins or Vedantins of Sankara's school hold that the cause ouly appears to pass, but never really passes into a second state, sc. the effect which is therefore only an

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995 सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

किं जगतः कारयमिति पृष्टे प्राप्ताप्रतिभानिवृत्तिमाचप्रयोजनतया पज्ञानं कारयमित्यभिहितत्वाच्च

२३ नन्विदमज्ञानं कार्यमकारय वा आद्ये किमस्य कारयं प्ज्ञानं ब्रह्म वा नाद: तेनेवे तज्जनने आत्माश्यात् ब्ज्ञानान्त- रानुसरये त्वनवस्थादिप्रसङ्गात न द्वितीयः ब्रह्मगोडकारयत्वात्

And because the statement that Nescience is the cause of the world is made with the view merely of obviating the awkward silence (apratibha)* that ensues when one is asked the question, What is the cause of the world ?

23. Now arises the question whether this Nescience is, or is

Objection : The Nescience of the not, a product. If a product, Vedānta is inexplicable nonsense. what is its cause? Nescience or Brahman ? Not Nescience; for the vice of self-dependence follows on Nescience being produced by Nescience. If recourse be had to a second Nescience (as a cause of this Nescience), an infinite re- gress and the other vices result. Nor can Brahman be the cause ; because causality does not pertain to Brahman, and because eman- cipation 'would become impossible (on the assumption of Brahman being the cause of Nescience, since the eternal Brahman as cause would ever bring about Nescience).

illusory manifestation (vivartta) of the cause: the rope, lying on the road at right, appears to be a snake. The world is an illusory mani- festation of Brahman, the only Real, due to Maya the inexplicable power of Brahman. For arambha-, parinama-vadin and cognate terms vide Pandit Vol. VIII p. 488. Panchadaśi, note, also Cap. XIII él. 6 et seg. of the latter. * cf. Nyayasūtravritti p. 261. .

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द्वितीये त्वनादिभावस्याSनिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गो ब्रह्मवत। न च कल्पितत्वाक- ल्पितत्वाभ्यां विशेष: कल्पनासामय्यभावेन कल्पनानुपपत्तेः न चाना- दिरयमध्यासः अध्यासत्वासिद्गे: विद्याबाध्यत्वात्तत्सिद्धिरिति चेन्न अ्र- न्योन्याश्रयात्। न चेते दोषा वस्तुनो वस्तुत्वापहारकाः कल्पितस्य चाज्ञानस्य किमेते कुर्यु: स्वत एव तस्य वस्तुत्वाभावात् अत एवोक्त- मलङ्कारोह्यमस्माकं यद्युत्तिप्रमाणाभ्यां दुर्घटत्वं सुघटत्वे कल्पि- तत्वं दुर्घेटं भवेदिति वाच्यं कल्पितत्वस्यवाद्याप्यसिदुत्वात धर्मिय एवाषिद्ठेः। Again, if this Nescience is not a product, then, as in the case of Brahman, there would be no cessation of this positive entity (bhavasya), eternal ab ante. And it cannot be urged that there is a difference between Nescience and Brahman, in that the former is falsely surmised ( i. e. is unreal). For erroneous surmisal is impossible, in the absence of certain means whereby the surmisal is effected .* Nor (to escape the difficulty can it be urged that) this false surmisal is eternal ab ante, for the fact of there being false surmisal at all is not established. It is proved (the Vedantin may urge), because true knowledge proves the surmisal to be false. Not so; for this involves a logical see-saw, (sc. if there be false surmisal, it is proved false by true knowledge; and, if it be proved false by true knowledge, it is false surmisal). Nor can it be urged (by the Vedantin) that these logical fallacies serve to dis prove the reality (vastutva) of the thing under discussion (vastunah) and can effect nothing in regard to Nescience which is falsely sur- mised; for Nescience itself is not real: hence it has been de, clared (the Vedantin continues)that what we Vedantins prize highly in our system is this, viz. that Nescience is hard to prove by argu- ment and pramana: if by these it were proved easily, the falsity ( kalpitatva) of Nescience would be hard to prove. The above argu- ment is to be rejected, because the unreality of Nescience is not yet proved, since there is no proof for the subject itself (sc. Nescience, in which the attribute of unreality may be supposed to reside). * The means are (a) similarity of two things of whiph one is mistaken for the other; (b) a previous mental retentum by whieh one

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१२० सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

ननु केयं सिद्धि: उत्पत्तिर्व्वप्रिवी नादा: बनादेस्तदभा- वस्येष्वत्वात न द्वितीय: सातिसिद्त्वेन तदभावात्। मेवम पज्ञानस्य सातिसिदत्व सालियो इसङ्गत्वमङप्रसङ्गात सम्बन्धं विना चाडप्रकाशकत्वात्। न व पारमार्थिकसम्बन्धाभावे Sपि कल्पितः सम्बन्धो Sस्त्येवेति वाच्यं सम्बन्धसम्बन्धिनामन्यतमस्य कल्पकत्वे

यथायथं प्राप्तेः ।

(The Vedantin again interposes with thequestion) What doyou mean by proof? Production (sc. the production of an effect from a cause )? Or cognition ( implying pramana, instrument of cognition ) ? The first meaning will not serve your purpose; for, in regard to a thing eternal ab ante (as Nescience is) the absence of proof i. e. of production (tat ) is precisely what I am prepared to admit. Nor the second meaning; for there is absence of proof, i. e. of cognition ( tat) because Nescience is proved by the Witness ( and not by any pramana). Again, no, (replies the opponent ). For if Nescience is proved by the Witness, the un- related character of the Witness is overthrown; and because the Witness could not make known (lit. illumine ) Nescience without entering into relation with it. Nor may the Vedantin urge that though a real relation ( between the two ) is impossible, a relation may be falsely surmised. For either the relation or the related things must be the surmiser of such surmisal; and thus would follow, in order, the faults of self-dependence, logical see-saw, loss to the Witness of its unchanging character and overthrow of its unrelated character, and the impossiblity of final emancipation.

of the two things is now recolleoted; (c) some defeot either in the object or in the instrument of knowledge. The gloss continues :- न चात्माज्ञानयो: सादृध्यमस्ति निरवयवत्वात् । न वा पूर्वसंस्कारा दोषो वास्ति तयेोरज्ञानपूर्वकत्वेन अज्ञानात्मागसिद्ेरित्यर्थ:। Both (b) and (c) presuppose Nescience.

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली। १२१

विद्यादिहेत्वजन्यत्वे Sपि तत्तन्व्तया तन्निवृत्तो निवृत्ति: स्यादिति वाच्यं तस्यानादेरुत्पत्ता निरपेदस्य सात्यधीनज्ञानस्याच्चानानपेद्षतया तत्तन्तत्वानुपपत्ते: न व सम्बन्धिज्ञानाधीनं सम्बन्धच्ानं लोके दृष्टमिति शच्यं तस्य प्रत्यक्षादिसिदुस्य तत्सापेवत्वेपीह सम्बन्धिनो- प्यज्ञानस्य साततिसम्बन्धसापेक्षस्फूर्निकत्वेन घेपरीत्यात न व सम्बन्ध: स्वस्थित्यथं सम्बन्धिनमपेदते इति वाच्यं लब्धसत्तास्पर्तिकस्येव स्थित्यपेघ्रयात हेत्वनपेत्त्वे इतरानपेक्षस्थितिकत्वाच्च

Nor may the Vedantin urge that just as that erroneous surmisal which is itself Nescience is eternaljab ante, so if an erroneous surmisal of connexion with Neseience be regarded as eternal ab ante, then although this surmisal of connexion is not the product of Nescience &c. as the cause, yet by being dependent on Nescience (tat) it will come to an end on the cessation of Nescience ( tat ). For this erroneous surmisal of connexion which is eternal ab ante, sc. independent of production (i. e. of a producing cause), and a knowledge of which depends on the Witness, could not be dependent on Nescience (tat) as in no way standing in need of Nescience. Nor may be urged that the common fact of experience is that the knowledge of a relation depends on the knovledge of the things related. For although the knowledge of a relation as given by perception &c. depends on a knowledge of the things related (tat), yet here the reverse is the case, since Nescience, though it is one of the related things, must be in relation with the Witness in order to be known at all. Nor may it be urged that for the sake of its own persistence a re- lation demands some related thing. For only that which exists and is present in consciousness needs to persist. And because that which is indepedent of a cause does persist independent of aught else. (The Vedantin assumed above that the sambandhadhyasa was uncaused).

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१२२ सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

न चाज्ानस्य गहप्रागभावरुपस्य महानुपलम्भादुपलम्भ इति वाच्यं

वाज्ञानस्याभावरपत्वानुपपत्तेश्च तथा वाज्ञानस्येवाभावात कथं तज्जगत्कारयात्वेनोपन्यस्यत इति। मेवम। प्रश्नस्य ज्ञानपूर्वत्वादाक्षेपे प्रतियोगिधीः । अवश्यं भाविनी पूर्वा विरोध: स्यादितोन्यथा ।३६ ॥ कथमज्ञानसिद्धिरिति वदन्प्रषृव्य: किमयमज्ञानस्वरुपविषयकः प्रश्न: किं वा तत्स्वरूपाड5क्षेपः तत्स्वरुपसाधकप्रमायाप्रश्न एवं वा प्रयम। आद्ि पजाते स्वरूपे प्रश्नानुपपततेः प्रश्नात्पर्वमज्ञानस्वरूप- सिद्धेरवश्यंभावात्तवेवाच्यामस्वरूपं सिद्धमिति कोष प्रश्नः । Nor may it be urged that Nescience, which is the antecedent negation* of knowledge, is known through the non-perception* of knowledge. For there can be no non-perception of the Self, which is itself eternal perception. Nor can Nescience, which is the material cause of a positive entity, sc. the world, have itself a negative character. And thus since Nescience does not indeed exist, how was it declared to be the cause of the world ? Not so (replies the Vedantin): Becaise knowledge must precede a question ; and for a negation a previous knowledge of the thing denied is essential. Otherwise contradiction follows from question and negation (itah). XXXIX. The opponent who puts the question, How is Nescience Met: Nescience, though inexplicable proved ? must be asked whether by any pramana is vouched for by the his question concerns the nature Self or eternal Witness. of Nescience, or is a denial of Nescience, or asks for the evidence (pramana) which proves Nes- cience. In the first case, if the nature of Nescience were un- known, his question would be impossible; for since a knowledge of the nature of Nescience is necessary previous to the question, that nature is known already to the opponent (tava) and there- fore the question is unnecessary. *For pragabhava and anupalabdhi (or the sixth pramana of the Vedantins) cf. Ved. paribh. Pandit Vol. VII. pp. 318-326.

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१२३

न व सामान्यज्ञानाद्विशेषजिद्वासा युक्ता उत्तदोषात न चारेपो युक्तो

मेव वृत्तत्वात न च भ्रमोपस्थितस्याज्ञानस्यानेपो न्याय्य: यतः केन कुच भ्रम इति पृष्ठे परोक्तशब्दाभासेनाज्ञानविषयक इत्येवोत्तरं तथा व भरमस्य स्वसमानविषयकाज्ञानोपपादकत्वादज्ञान विषयका पराज्ञानस्वीकारेडनवस्था दुवारा। हन्त तहि एकाज्ञानासहिष्या- तथा S5द्रेप प्रयुष्वानस्यानेकाज्तानस्वीकरये मदोन्मत्तस्य स्वव्या- घातगारववेयथ्यादिदोषमपश्यतः स्वपधनिवाह्दो व्याहत एवं। 'And he may not reply that the desire for special knowledge, following on general knowledge, is proper; for the fault mentioned above (sc. the desire is unnecessary) applies here. Nor is a denial of Nescience proper; for, in accordance with the rule that the know- ledge of a negation must be preceded by a knowledge of the counter- entity (or thing denied), a knowledge of the nature of Nescience (the thing now denied) must have existed previous (to the denial of Nescience). And he may not reply that of Nescience as some- thing known through error (i. e. false) a denial is proper. For when asked the question,-By what, and in regard to what, is this error effected ?- bis only reply will be, This error relates to Nescience and is effected by means of the false words uttered by some one else. And thus since the error is effected through Nescience which relates to itself, a second Nescience relating to the first Nescience is admitted, which gives rise to an inevitable regressus in infinitum. Alas, then, for the opponent who denies Nescience and, because of his impatience of (our theory of) a single Nes- cience, assumes a plurality of Nesciences, and in his pride fails to see the defects of this view sc. contradiction, combrousness &c .- the free course of his view is indeed overthrown !

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9₹8 सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

न चेवं कचितवापि प्रश्नावेपयो: सत्वातुल्य: पर्यनुयोग इति वाच्यम मज्जाततया सानिसिद्वेञ्वाननिवृत्यथे प्रमासप्रश्नस्य प्रमायादर्शनेन स्वरूपतिरस्काररुपस्य बावेपस्य कतु सुकरत्वात्। ऋस्तु तईि ममापि सात्िषिट्ठे उज्ञाने प्रमायप्रश्नः समज्जसः एवं तर्ह्ज्ञानसाचियो: सम्बन्धो उपि वाच्यः अन्यथा साचियाः साधक- त्वनुपपत्ते: तथा Sज्ञानतत्सम्बन्धयोरनादित्वमपि वाच्यम् अन्यथा पर्वमुत्तस्येदानीं संसारोपलम्भः स्यात न व पूर्वमप्यज्ञानान्तरमेवेति वाच्यम् बज्ञानपरम्परातः एकस्येव लघुत्वात् Nor may he retort that thus a similar objection will apply to any question or denial of ours in regard to anything whatever. For we may well put a question in regard to an object, which as something unknown is vouched for by the Witness, in order to destroy the Nescience investing that object; or we may make a denial, i. e. a rejection of the reality (svarupa) of that object because no pramana for the said object is observed to exist. Well then (replies the opponent) my question as to the pra- mana for Nescience, which is vouched for by the Witness, may be considered to the point also. Very well then (we reply), you must admit a relation between Nescience and the Witness otherwise the Witness could not be a voucher for Nescience. Likewise you must admit that Nescience and the relation of the Witness with it are eternal ab ante: if not, a soul eman- cipated previous to this relation being formed would now be conscious of the world. Nor can it be said that even previous to this relation there was another Nescience (which as cause brought about a connexion between the second Nescience and the Wit- ness); for it is easier to assume a single Nescience rather than a series of Nesciences.

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१२५

तच्ट यद्योन बिना Sनुपपन्नं तत्सवे सम्बन्धित्वमनादित्व मनिर्वधनीयत्वं भावरूपत्वं विचितशकिकत्वमेकत्वमन्यद्वा यत्कि- जरिदपेक्षितं स्वोपपादकत्वेन सवे कल्पयतीत्यपि वाच्यम तथाच प्रमायप्रश्नो अ्रनर्थक एवाज्ानस्य साविगोव सिद्धत्वात न चाज्ञान- विषयाज्ञाननिवृत्यथे प्रमायप्रश्नेो युक्त इति वाच्यं तदभावात पज्ञानस्य प्रमागोन ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वान् तेन तस्य विरोधातृ। तदयं तमोदीपन्याय: तथाहि। पञ्वानं स्ातुमिच्छेद्यो मानेनात्यन्तमूढधीः । स तु नूनं तम: पश्येद्वीपेनोत्तमतेजसा । Hence also it must be granted that Nescience which can- not be accounted for save through something else, sc. through relation ( of Nescience with the Witness), its own eternal-ness ab ante, its inexplicability, its character as a positive entity and as a unity possessing manifold powers, or through any other character which may be necessary to account for Nescience (sva), leads us to infer (kalpayati) all these characteristics. Thus the question whether there is any parmana for Nes- cience is quite useless, since Nescience is vouched for only by the Witness. Nor can it be urged that the question whether a pra- mana for Nescience exists may be rightly put with a view to de- stroy the Nescience relating to Nescience. For there is no. such thing as Nescience relating to Nescience; and because Nescience . cannot be cognised through a pramana, since Nescience and pra- māna are contradictory, sc. ajnāna is put an end to ( nivarttya) by pramāņa (nivarttaka). Hence the well-known illustration of dark- ness and the lamp :- thus, 'That dullest of dull-heads who would cognise Nescience by means of a pramana, would forsooth go looking for darkness with a brilliant lamp!'

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सिट्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

तथा चाज्ञानं कथमिति प्रष्टवात्माच्चानमुपपादनीयमिति स्वानुभवसिद्धे कथंतानुपपतिरेव। कुतस्तर्ष मे मुक्ति: कर्नृत्वाद्य- शेषा नर्थव्रातप्रसव बीजस्यात्माज्जानस्य स्वानुभवसिदुत्वात् तत्त्वमस्या-

२४ ननु को 5यं बाध: तच पूर्वप्रत्ययस्य व्यधिकरणप्रकार- कत्वनिश्चय इत्यन्ये तन्न अन्यथास्यात्यनङ्गीकारात प्ज्ञानस्याना-

तरमणीयं प्रत्येकसमुदायाभ्यामव्याप्रे: । Well then, (some one may ask) how is Nescience proved ? The questioner himself must prove the Nescience whicb relates to his Self: thus the question of How is impossible in re- gard to Nescience which is proved by one's own consciousness. . Whence then emancipation for me (he may ask ), since my own consciousness is a proof of that Nescience which relates to Self, and which is the seed whence grows all that complex of evils beginning with (the false notion of) agency &c? Know then ( we reply ) that emancipation follows on the destruction of Nescience through an intuition of the identity of Self with the immediately presented Brahman-(intuition effected) by means of the passage 'that thou art.' 24. What is this destruction of Nescience? Some teachers.

Badha, destruction of error, explained ( Naiyāyikas ) define it as the according to the Vedantic anirvachaniya- conviction that a previous cog- khyati, to the rejection of other current views, e. g. akhyati, asatkhyāti, &c. nition had (as its predicate por- tion ) a predicate which (really) belonged to another subject. This definition we reject because we do not admit the technical anyathakhyati or mistaken cognition ; and because it would follow on this view that there was no destruc- tion of Nescience. Some of us Vedantins* hold that it is the cessation of Nes- cience together with its products. This view too commends itself at first sight only, for the definition fails to apply to Nescience and its products, if these are taken singly or together.

• The view of the Panchapadikavivarana :- 'असामस्य स्वंकार्षेय वर्स- मानेन प्रविलीनेन वा वह न्ञानेन निर्वुसिबाष:।

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किज्जु केयं निवृत्ति: ध्वंसमार्चं वा ज्ञानसाध्य: स एव वा पदार्था- न्तरमेव वा आत्मस्वहपं वा। नाद्यः मुद्गराद्याघातजन्यघटादि- ध्वंसेतदव्यवहारात्। न द्वितीयः उत्तरज्ञानसाध्यपूर्वज्ञानध्ंसे तथात्वापते: ज्ञानमाचध्वंसे Sतिव्याप्रेश्च। न तृतीयः तद्ध्वंसा- व्यापनात् तदनिवृत्तावद्वेतव्षतेः । न चतुर्थः तस्य नित्यसिद्धत्वेन ज्ञानवैयथ्यापत्तेः । तस्माद्वाधस्येव निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् कथमज्चान- तत्कार्यबाधान्मोव इति।

साक्षात्कृते त्वधिष्ठाने समनन्तरनिश्चितिः । अध्यस्यमानं नास्तीति बाध इत्युच्यते बुधेः । ४० ॥ Further, what is meant by this cessation ? Is it to be defined as destruction merely? Or as destruction effected by knowledge ? Or as something else? Or as the Self? Not as the first; for in regard to the destruction of a jar effected by the strokes of a pestle the word badha (tat) is not applied. Nor the second; for then badha would apply to the destruction of the earlier cognition effected by the later cognition, and because the definition extends too far to destruction of cognition merely. Not as the third; for the definition will not apply to the destruction of that (something else supposed to be destruction, since a thing cannot be its own de- struction) : and if there is no destruction of this something else, Vedantic Monism is overthrown. Not the fourth; for since Self is eternally established, it follows that knowledge (in regard to Self) is unnecessary. Hence, since the very term badha cannot be explained, how is it possible that emancipation should follow on badha of Nescience and all its products ! To this objection we reply :- The wise have declared that badha is conviction, expressed in 'the falsely surmised object is not ' following immediately on an intuition of the substrate (in which the thing was surmised) ... XL.

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शुद्ठेधिष्ठाने विपरीतमध्यस्य प्रवर्तमानस्य निवर्तमानस्य वा यदधिप्ठानविषयकं बाधकज्ञानं परोक्षमपरोखं वोत्पन्नं तदनन्तर- मिदमिड् कालवयेपि नास्तीति योयं निश्चय: स एवं बाध इति

सानमस्तीति वाच्यं तवाध्यस्यमानस्यान्यव सत्वाभ्यपगमात् एवं ब्रह्मात्मशत्ात्कारे जाते पज्ञानं तत्काय व सरव यावत किञ्ञित्तषा- ध्यस्तं तत्सवं तब कालवयेपि नास्तीति यो निश्चय: स्वानुभवषिद्: स एव तस्य तब बाघ इत्युच्यते वत एव प्रतिपन्ञाषाधा निषेधप्रति- योगित्वमनिर्वेचनीयत्वमिति समदायविदां लक्षमप समनसम् । If after a man has falsely surmised something in regard to an unrelated substrate, whether he energise or not in regard to the surmised object, there arises for him a knowledge, be it mediate or immediate, concerning the substrate and destructive of the surmised object, then after this knowledge there comes to him the conviction-this surmised object is not in time present, past and future,-which conviction is wbat the word badha means, as vouched for by the common experience of men. And it cannot be urged that this meaning (of the word badha) applies also to the anyathakhyati view as shown by the context. For this view holds that the surmised thing (e. g. silver) exists elsewhere (while it is being surmised in the nacre- which the Vedantin denies). Thus, when intuition of the identity of Brahman and the Self has been attained, there arises the conviction, vouched for by one's own consciousness, that Nescience and its products, absolutely everything surmised to exist in Brahman (tatra) as substrate, do not exist in Brahman even in trinal time-this con- viction is termed the bādha of Nescience (tasya) in regard to Brahman the substrate (tatra). Hence also the definition of inexplicability given by those who know the traditional teaching is adequate: it runs thus :- inexplicability consists in the being the counterentity to a negation made in regard to the substrate of that which is erroneously surmised .* * cf. Chitsukhī, Pandit Vol. IV. p. 484, and Ved. paribh. Vol. V. p. 660.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

न चोत्तरकालीननिषेधप्रतियोगित्वेवि वर्तमानातीतकालयो: सत्त्वान्न पैक्ालिक निषेध प्रतियोगित्वमनिर्वचनीयत्वमिति वाच्ं परनिर्वेचनीय त्वापरिज्ञानात न हि कादाचित्क त्वमाचेद्यानिर्वचनीयत्वं भवति पराभिमतसत्यस्यापि घटादेस्तथात्वात् न चाविद्यकत्वेन विशेष: कारयास्य नामान्तरकरयापत्तेः न व ज्ानवाध्यत्वेन विशेष: तस्यापि सतो नास्तित्वप्रमित्यनुपपत्तेः न च सकलकार्यकारयबाधरु- पस्य नास्तीनिप्रत्ययस्य बाधान्तरं मृग्यमन्यथा उद्वेतव्वतिरिति वाच्यम् Nor can it be urged that in the above definition the negation cannot hold as to trinal time; for, although the negation concerns future time, the. surmised object did exist in time past and present. This objection is due to a misunderstanding of the term inexplicability. For inexplicability is not constituted merely by the temporary character (of the object), since tem- porary character (tathatva) belongs to jars and like objects; al- though such objects are regarded by non-Vedantins (para) as real things. Nor can it be urged that (between real objects like jars. &c. and unreal objects like the snake and silver of the stock example) there is a difference, constituted by the qualification of being products of Nescience.(in the case of the snake and silver). For what follows from this objection is that a new name, sc. Nescience, has been given to the cause (of things). Nor is there a difference (between these two classes of thiags) constituted by the fact of the (latter class) being destroyed by knowledge. For it would follow that in regard to this difference also (tasyapi), if it were something real, the certaia knowledge of its non- existence could not arise. Nor can it be urged that some further destruction must be sought for this conviction of the non-existence (of the world)-which conviction (the Vedantins teach) is de- struction of all causes and effects : otherwise (sc. if this conviction be admitted as real, sat) Vedantic Monism is overthrown (i. e. there would in this case be two realities, viz., Brahman and the conviction that the world is false). .

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१३० सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

ब्रह्मातिरित्तसर्वबाधरूपस्य तस्य स्वान्तर्भावेनेव तथात्वात् न च ब्रह्मातिरिक्तमस्ति नास्ति वेति विकल्पावकाशः अ्रनिर्वेचनीयत्वेन परिह्तत्वात्। मरख्यात्यात्मख्यात्यसतृख्यातिषादेषु भ्रमबाधव्यव- स्थानुपपत्ते: अन्यथाख्यानिवादिनेव दर्शितत्वात् नेह यत्यते म्रन्थ- गारवभयात् अनात्मविचारत्वाच्य For this conviction (tasya) consisting in the destruction of all that is not Brahman is destruction inasmuch as it includes itself * (within the ull). Nor is there room for the doubt whether the (world as) distinct from Brahman is or is not; for we have overthrown this doubt by showiug the inexplicability of the world (cf. pp. 38, 39.) And because the holder of the anyathakbyati view has shown that neither error nor the destruction of it can be satis- factorily accounted for on the views of akbyāti, ātmakhyāti or asatkhyati, + no attempt has been made here to discuss these views for fear of extending our book; and because this discussion does not directly treat of the Self.

ब्रह्मयध्यस्यमानं सर्व कालनये नास्तीनिनिश्चयस्य शस्ति उण्टवयमेकं बाधा * त्मकम भपरमध्यस्यमानत्वम्। तत्राध्यस्यमानत्वेन रुपेय स्वविषयत्वम्। बाधत्वेन विर्षायत्वमिति नात्माश्य इत्यर्थः तथा च नाद्वतक्षतिरिति भावः । N. D.'s gloss. + Nanalikshita thus states and refutes these views, borrowing sometimes even the words of the Bhamati (Biblio: Ind: pp. 11-18) :- ननु अविवित्व्यवहारप्रसञ्जकं स्मरणादयहीतभेदं वरहयामेव भमत्वेन व्यव- शियते न घ तद्विषयोऽनिर्वंधनीय: पुरोवर्त्तिनः सत्यत्वात्। तथा नेवं रजतम् । दति- बाध प्रत्ययोि व्यवहारमानं बाधते न भमविषयस्य कालन्रयाभावं बोधयति। तत्कथ- मनिरवचनोयवाद इत्यख्यातिषादिनो मन्यन्ते। "The holders of the akhyati view maintain as follows :- that same perceptive cognition, whose difference from recollected knowledge is not cognised, and which brings about the indiscriminate experence-'this (nacre) is silver'- where the knowledge of nacre is not discriminated from that of silver-is com- monly regarded as erroncous cognition. And the object deolared by this cognition is not (what the Vedantins technically term) anirvachaniya, inexplicable; for the object lying before us does exist. And so too the knowledge of destruction conveyed in this is not silver puts an end to the activity merely (which followed on the earlier cognition-sc. this is silver-) but does not (as the Vedantins declare) certify to the non-

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existence, in time present, past and future, of the object (sc. silver) made known in the erroneous cognition (-this is silver -- ). Hence the anirvachauiyakhyati view of the Vedantins; sc. that, at the time of error, anirvachaniya, or unreal s'lver is produced, is untenable." The akhyati view of the Prabhakaras, it may be remarked, follows from their siddhanta that all cognition, jnana, as being self-luminous, self-evidencing, svaprakasa, is true, yathartha. Thus the consciousness expressed in idam rajatam is not (as is commonly supposed) erroneous cognition, bhrama; for both its factors, the one perceptional and em- bracing the idam, the other memorial and embracing the rajatam, are true. But here is akhyati, non-discrimination, of the two factors as distinct. Such non-discrimination is of course due to some defect ( dosha ) visual or otherwise, and to the co-operation of the similarity between sukti and rajata which awakens the mental retentum, samskara, of the rajata previously cognised. Cf. Bhāmati, p. 15. He continues: श्रख्याता तावद ग्रहयामेव स्मरणादगहोतभेदं बाध्याभेदव्यव- हारप्रसज्जकत्वात् भ्म इति व्यवस्थापितम् । तंदसत्। ग्रहयस्मरयो भासेते न वा। न चेर हिन स्तः। त्वन्मते ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वादभासने स्वरूपाभावनियमात्। भासेते चेत् कथं तहिं तयेोभेंदाय्रहो भेदस्य स्वरूपत्वात्। अ्रत एव न श्रभेदव्यवहारप्रसञ्जकत्वम्।तत: कथे भमव्यवस्थापनम। तथा बाधव्यवस्थापनमप्यनुपपच्म्। यत्र त्यत्तेषयास्य व्यवहार एवं नोदेति तन्र नेदं रजतम् दति ज्ञानस्य बाधकर्त्वं न स्यात्। तस्मादख्याता भमबाधव्य- वस्थापनानुपपततिरिति । "On the akhyati view error is thus accounted for-perceptional cognition, whose difference from memorial cognition has not been perceived, is error, in that it leads to the experience of the thing hereafter to be rejected, sc. silver, as identical with the thing perceived, so. nacre. This is wrong. Do the two, sc. the percep- tional and memorial cognitions, appear in conseiousness or not? If not, they exist not. For since you hold that knowledge is self- luminous (self-evidencing), it follows necessarily that when knowledge shines not, it exists not (svarupa = satta). If both the above cognitions shine forth in consciousness, then non-perception of the difference between them is impossible; for this difference does exist as cognition (svarūpatvāt = jnānātmakatvāt). Hence also (to the perceptional cognition ) does not belong. ( as you maintain ) the power of bringing about the erperience of identity (of silver and nacre). Therefore it is impossible, on this view, to account for error. So tou your grounding of badha, or destruction of error, is contradictory. For where, in the case of a desire-less man, no activity follows ( on his error in regard to the nacre), the cognition expressed in 'this is not silver' would not.be

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the destroyer of his error (because you hold that this cognition destroys only the activity in regard to the silver; and therefore this man, having no desire for silver, would remain inactive and still continue to regard the nacre as silver). Hence, on the akhyati view, neither error nor the destruction of it can be satisfactorily accounted for." प्रात्म ख्यातिवादिनोर्गप न रनतमध्यस्तम इत्याहु: किं तु संप्रयोगमन्तरेय श्रप- शेसत्वात् संविदात्म कत्वेनान्तरस्य रजतस्य बद्निष्ठेन प्रतीतिर्भमः।नेदं रजतम् दति बा- धोप न रजतासत्त्वमावेदर्यात किं तु तन्र दृढंताऽपरपर्यायं बहिष्ठां प्रतिषेधति धार्म- धर्माभयनिषेधापेत्षया धर्ममात्रनिषेधे लाघवात् इत्येवं संगिरन्त। " The holders of the atmakhyati view also declare that the silver is not erroneously surmised (as the Vedantins hold ), but that since the silver is im- mediately perceived without any intercourse ( of sense-organs &c. with it ), it consists of knowledge (samvit = vijnana ): that of this internal silver (as thus constituted) there is a cognition under the form of externality: that this cognition is false. Further that the badha, expressed in 'this is not silver,' does not certify to the non- existence of silver but denies in regard to silver ( tatra) externality, which externality is another synonym for this-ness ; because the denial of the attribute, sc. this-ness or externality, is, in accordance with the law of parsimony, preferable to the denial of both the subject, sc. the silver, and the attribute, sc. its externality." आात्मख्यातावषि किं जानाकारता बाहे अध्यस्यते ज्ञानात्मनि रजते वा बह्धि- ष्टम्। नाठाः विज्ञानवादिमते बाह्यस्य अलीकत्वादसत्वेन अ्रधिष्ठानत्वानुपपत्ते:। तथात्वे वा ददं रजतमसत् ति प्रतीति: स्यात्। ननु सत् दत्युल्लेखाभावात् प्स्देव इति चेच। तथात्वे रजतार्थिनः प्रवृत्तिर्न स्थात्। श्रथ रजते बाहिष्ठां समारोप्यते।तर्ह्टि तस्याप्यसत्त्वात् सद्विषयत्ञानस्य अपरोक्षता न स्यात्। श्रसतृख्यात्यापत्तेश्व। रजतस्य ज्ञानाकारत्वे प्रमाणाभावाच्च। न च नेदं रजतम इति बाधप्रत्यय एव लाघधानुम- होतो रजतस्य बाह्यत्वनिषेधेन अर्थादान्तरत्वमावेदर्यात इति साम्प्रतम्। दृदत्वं हि सचिहधितत्वम्। त्च्चेचषिद्धं तह्िं अ्रस्तव्रिहितमेव रनर्तं स्यात् तस्य प्रतिपत्रात्मकं साचद्धिततमत्वं कुतसत्यम्। न च संप्रयोगमन्तरेय अपरोक्षत्वात् तस्य ज्ञानात्मकत्वम्। दोषवश्याकेशान्तरवर्ततिन एव रजतस्य इन्ट्रियसचिकर्वापपततेः । संप्रयोगमन्तरेय द्ति विशेषणाससिद्धेः। यनु नेदं रजतम् दति बाधो बाह्यमिदंत्वं निषेधति न रजतम् दति तब। बाधो नोभयमपि निषेधति कि तु तयोस्तादात्म्यम्। तस्मिंश्च निविद्धे ददंत्वं पुरोवर्तिनि स्थास्यति रजतं रनतत्वं च देशान्तरे रजते च इति तन्मते भमबाध व्यव- स्थापनमनुचितमेव। "According to the atmakhyati view also, either the form of knowledge is erroneously imposed on external (silver), or externality is imposed on the silver which really consists of knowledge ? Not the first alternative; for since according to vijnanavada (sensa:

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tionalism) no external object exists, it is impossible to regard the silver as a substrate (in which something might be surmised), for it exists not. Or even if the former alternative be admitted, our perception ought to take the form ' this silver is unreal' (and this form it does not take). And against this it cannot be argued that since the term real is not applied (to the silver under discussion) the silver must of course be unreal. For if this were the case, one would not attempt to grasp the (unreal) silver. Then, the other alternative remains, sc. externality is imposed on the silver (which is nothing more than a sensation). In this case, since externality also exists not, the knowledge of it could not be perceptional (for perception deals with satvishaya or an existing object); and because on this view would follow asatkhyati or perception of blank non-entity; and because there is no evidence to prove that the silver consists of jnāna sc. is a sensation. Nor is it correot to say that the knowledge of badha con- veyed in 'this is not silver,' accepted in accordance with the law of parsimony, declares by implication the internal character of the silver, in denying its externality. For this-ness is nearness (this represents the object immediate, most nearly perceived): and if this-ness be denied (of the silver, cf. supra), then the silver must be something distant: how- ever then could that maximum of nearness, which constitutes the knower, pertain to silver (which the vijnanavadin declares to be internal)? Nor does the silver consist in knowledge, because it is immediately perceived without any intercourse of sense-organs &c .; for the quali- fication without any intercourse &c. is unproved, since intercourse with sense-organs (-though of the alaukika kind, technically termed jnāna- lakshana pratyāsatti) due to some defect visual or otherwise, must be admitted in regard to silver existing elsewhere. Nor is it correct to say that the badha expressed in 'this is not silver' denies external this-ness and not the silver. The badha denies neither, but it does deny the identity of the two. And when this identity is denied, the this-ness will continue to exist in the presented object, sc. the nacre, and the silver and the silver-ness will exist in some other place and in some silver respectively. Hence the ground- ing of error and its destruction according to the atmakhyati view is quite untenable." It would appear from Bhamati p. 15, that the makhyati view belongs to both the Sautrantikas as well as to the Vijnanavadins. शसतृख्या तिवादिनोपि न शनिर्वचनीयं रजतम् इत्याहुः किं तु निस्तत्त्वमसदेव

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सिद्गम्। तथा च सुरेश्वरः ।

पविद्या सह कार्येग नासीदस्ति भविष्यति। It has therefore been proved that badha is the conviction as to the non-existence in trinal time of that which was surmised, consequent on the knowledge of a badhaka, or destroyer of the surmisal. And thus Suresvara declares :- 'Nescience with its Brihad Up. bhashyavārtika, III. 183. products was not, is not, nor will be, whenever perfect knowledge is produced from sentences as 'that thou art.'* रजतम्। ज्ञानादेवासतरकाशनसमरथाट्रजतं भासते अरत एव बाधोपि रजतासत्त्वमेव बो- -धर्यात नेदं रजतमिति। The asatkhyativadins (Sunyavadins or Madhya- mikas ) also maintain that the silver is not anirvachaniya but a blank non-entity. That the silver appears to consciousness is due solely to cognition, which can illumine (i. e. make known) non-entity. Hence even badha makes known the non-existence of silver thus-'this is not silver.'" यमु असत् ख्याता असदेव प्सत्प्रकाशनसमथ ज्ञानं भासयति इति तदप्यसत्। पसतो पराक्षपतीत्यदर्शनात्। सामर्थ्यस्य व कुत सामर्थ्यम् इति विवयसापेक्षस्वेन विष- वस्य अ्रसतश्थ कार्यन्ाप्यविकल्पासहत्ात् असती एव अस्तख्यातिः । यदषि बाधो रजतासत्वमेवावेदयति इति तदप्यन्यथाख्यातिवादिमते पूर्वमेवात्म ख्याति निराकरय प्र- सङ एव परिहृतम। ततो न ख्यात्यन्तरं युक्तमित्यर्थः। 'Then also the statement, on the asatkhyati view, that cognition which can illumine non-entity, makes the non-existent silver shine forth in consciousness, is incorrect. For immediate perception of a non-entity is unknown. And since power implies an object-thus, power in regard to what ?- aud since in regard to a non-existent object it cannot be affirmed either that it is an existing effect (kārya) or logi- cal effect (jnapya sc. something made known), it follows that the asatkhyati view is wholly erroneous. And the statement that badha declares the non-existence of silver has been already refuted by the anyathakhyativadin, when treating of the atmakhyati view." . * The verse runs thus :- कल्प्याविदीव मत्पसे सा चानुभवसंश्रया।

Sansk. Coll. MS. 9. fol. verso,

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली ।

२५ प्रथ कथं विद्याया पविद्याबाधकत्वम विरोधादिति चेतु कस्तर्ह तयोर्विरोध: किमेकुकालानवस्थितत्वमुतेकदेशनवस्थितत्वैम आाहोस्वित वध्यघातकत्वम अथवा भावाभावात्मकत्वम। नाद्ाः पर्वभाविन्याSविद्यया सह विद्यया एककालावस्थितत्वात विद्योत्त- रमविद्यानिवृत्तेः अन्यथा विद्यावेयथ्यीत्। न द्वितीय: व्यधिकरण-

तृतीये वध्यस्य घातो वाच्यः । यत्कर्तृत्वं घातकत्वं ध्वंसो घातस्त- त्कर्मृत्वं घातकत्वमिति चेतु स तहि वध्याद्िन्नः स्वतन्त्र: पदार्थः कश्चित उत तद्गर्म: तदात्मेव वा। ब्रद्ये वध्यस्य ध्वंसो न स्याद्ि- मवद्विन्ध्ययोरिव परस्परासम्बन्धात्। द्वितीये धर्म एव धर्मियो दीघी- युष्टमानयति अन्यथा निराशयो धर्म एव न स्यातु 25. Now the objection may be raised :- How can Knowledge be the destroyer of Nescience,? Because (the Siddhantin replies) Objection : the supposed opposition they are opposed. What, then, between Knowledge and Nescience can- not be intelligibly stated : is the opposition between them ? Does it consist (i) in the im- possibility of their existing at the same time? Or (ii) in the same place? Or (iii) in the one being the destroyer of the other, sc. that which is to be destroyed? Or (iv) in the positive and negative characters respectively of knowledge and nescience ? Not the first: for knowledge must exist at the same time along with Nescience which preceded, because the destruction of Nescience is subsequent to knowledge ; otherwise knowledge would be useless. Not the second : since (to prove his point of mutual opposition*) the Siddhantin is bound to declare that Knowledge and Nescience have the same locus. because there would be no op- position between Knowledge and Nescience, if they had separate loci. On the third alternative, the destruction (ghata) of that which is to be destroyed must be maintained. If it be replied that ghatakatva implies agency :- thus, it is that which brings about ghata, i. e. dhvamsa, destruction; then it may be asked whether (a) this ghata is an independent something, distinct from that which is to be destroyed (vadhya) or (b) is an attribute of the vadhya or (c) is the vadhya itself ? If (a), then destruction of the vadhya would be impossible, * वक्तव्यत्वात्। विरोधसिद्धार्थमित्यर्थः । gloss.

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तृतीये तु विद्याऽविद्योत्पादिकेवेति कुतो विरोधः । न चतुर्थ: विद्याऽविद्ययोहभयोरपि भावरूपत्वात् अजिद्यायाः प्राग- भावरुपत्वस्य निरस्तत्वात अन्यथा एककालावस्थानं न स्यात । तस्माद्विद्याऽविद्ययोर्विरोधस्य निर्वत्तमशक्यत्वाल्कयं विद्याया पविद्याबाधकत्वं विपरीतं वा किं न स्यादिति। भ्रषोच्यते। उपमर्द्यस्वभावत्वमविद्याया विरोधिता। तत्कर्तृत्वं तु विद्याया: प्रकाशतमसोरिव ॥ ४१ ॥ यद्यपि विरोधान्तरमिह निर्वेत्तुमशक्यं तथाप्यपमर्द्यपम- र्दकभावलक्षणोSयं विरोध: शत्यत एव निर्वक्तम अत्रिद्यो।पमर्द- कत्वस्य विद्यास्वभावस्यान्वयव्यतिरेक्राम्यां लोकप्रसिद्धत्वात। for the two are as unconnected as the mountains Himalaya and Vindhya. If (b) then the attribute prolongs the existence of its substrate, otherwise a substrateless attribute could not exist. If (c) then Knowledge itself brings about Nescience; and thus their would be no opposition between Knowledge and Nescience. Not the fourth ; for both Knowledge and Nescience are positive entities, in that we have refuted the view that.Nescience is the antecedent non-existence (negation) of knowledge: if this were not so, know- ledge and nescience could not exist at the same time. Hence (argues the opponent) since the opposition between Knowledge and Nescience cannot be intelligibly set forth, why should Know- ledge be regarded as the destroyer of Nescience, or why should not the reverse be held, sc. Nescience is the destroyer of Knowledge ? To this we reply :- Nescience is by nature the thing to be destroyed; whereas

Met : they are by nature opposed, as (destroying) agency belonging light and darkness : and the nature of to Knowledge constitutes the op- things is not to be called in question. posing character of Knowledge, just as this is exemplified in the case of darkness and light ... XLI. Although in this case no other opposition can be intelligibly maintained, yet the opposition indicated above as the relation of destroyer and thing to be destroyed can certainly be thus main- tained, in that it is generally admitted fact of induction that Know- ledge is by nature the destroyer of Nescience.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। 939

न च विरोधिताऽविशेषे विद्योपमर्दकत्वमेवाविद्यायाः किं न स्यादिति वाच्यम। तथा सति विद्योत्पत्तिरेव न स्यात्। उपर्मार्द- काया अ्रविद्याया: पर्वमेव स्थितत्वात् प्रतिनियतस्वभावस्य पर्यनु- योक्तुमशक्यत्वाच्च यथा प्रकाशतमसोः। न च तथ वेपरीत्यं शङ्कितुं शक्यते दृष्टविरोधात। न च वध्यघातकपन्नोक्तदोषप्रसत्ति: उपमर्दकस्य कालचयेपि नास्तीति प्रमितिरुपस्य बाधापरपर्यायस्य विद्योत्तरं जायमानत्वात्। २६ नन्वविद्योपमर्दकस्वभावत्वं चेद्विद्यायास्तारई बिदुषो विद्यात्पत्यनन्तरमविद्यायाः सकार्यायाः समलकाष कषितत्वात्तदेव विदेहकेवल्यप्राप्ा देहपतस्तात्कालिकः स्यातृ तथा चोच्छिन्न: - सम्प्रदाय: स्यात Nor may it be asked by way of objection why Nescience should not be the destroyer of Knowledge, since the opposition between the two is quite the same, (whether Nescience or know- leage be considered). Because if this were so, Knowledge could not indeed arise, since Nescience, the destroyer, was already exist- ing : and further, because the settled nature of a thing cannot be called in question, as in the case of light and darkness. Nor can the reverse of this be urged, as being opposed to experience. Nor will there follow (in regard to our view) the defects noted in regard to alternative (iii) pp. 135, 36, because it is subsequent to know- ledge that the negation expressed in 'Nescience is not in trinal time' arises,-which negation is true knowledge, and is another synonym for badha (destruction). 26. Here it may be argued that if knowledge is by nature

Reductio ad absurdum of the Vedanta: the destroyer of Nescience, then emancipation, or the cessation of bodily corporeal existence should at existence, is possible only through a sacred teacher; but the teacher is an impossibili- once cease for the man who has ty, if knowledgedestroys Nescience of which bodily existence is a product : knowledge, on his obtaining that state of isolation in which consciousness of his body is at an end (videhakaivalya) .* Since subsequent to the rise of knowledge Nescience together with its products is entirely destroyed. And thus the traditional line of teachers (of Brahmavidya) would be destroyed, (and without a guru no emancipation !). * Videhkaivalya to be distinguished from jīvanmukti in which

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935 सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

न च प्रारब्धसामथ्याट्टेहपाता नास्तीति वाच्यं प्रारब्धस्या- प्यविद्याकार्यतया तदभावे स्थातुमशक्यत्वात् तन्त्वभावे पटस्येव। न च प्रारब्धकर्मफलभोगनिवाहकतया कियत्कालमविद्याप्यनुवर्त तद्ति वाच्यं विद्याया अविद्योपमर्दकत्वस्वभावहानिप्रसङ्गत्। न घो- तरकालएव तथास्वभाव: एकस्य स्वभाषद्वयानभ्यपममात न चाव- रशक्तिप्रधानमज्ञानं निवृत्तमेव विश्वेपशक्तिप्रधानं त्वनुवर्तते प्रार- ब्धनिवाहायेति वाच्यम। प्रज्ञानद्वयाभावात। न चैकमेव शक्तिदयवि- शिष्टम। एकस्य युगपत्स्थितिनिधृत्योर्विरुद्धत्वात। न च शक्तिनिवृत्ति- माषमेव विवधितं शक्तिशक्तिमतारभेदातृ भेदे वा पज्वानं न निवर्तेत Nor may it be argued against this view that corporeal exis- tence does not cease because of the retributive efficacy of actions. For being a product of Nescience, this retributive efficacy cannot prevail when Nescience has ceased to exist, just as the cloth is at end when the threads have ceased to exist. Nor may it be further urged that Nescience also continues to exist for a short time sufficient to bring about (for the individual) the fruition of the actions (by him) in earlier spheres of existence. For this view would imply the loss to knowledge of its nature as the destroyer of Nescience. Nor against the above is it to be urged that this character of destroyer belongs to knowledge only at a time subsequent (to that indicated above). For one and the same thing cannot have two natures. Nor again that Nescience qua concealing power ceases (with the rise of knowledge, but quâ projecting power it continues to exist in order to work out the retributive efficacy of actions. For there are not two Nesciences. Nor again that though one only, Nescience is possessed of two-fold power. For that the one thing should at the same time both be and cease to be is contradictory. Nor again that the cessation of the power merely is implied (above). For the power and that which possesses power are identical: or if different, Nescience could not cease to be.

there is for the individual a consciousness (abhimana) of his body in . the form samskara or mental retenta: cf. Yogasutra, I. 1. 17-19.

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली। 93€

न च प्रारब्धनिषृत्या तन्निवृत्ि: प्रारब्धनिवृत्तेः पप्रमायत्वा- त्। न घ तदनन्तरं व्वानमेवाप्रतिबदधं तन्निवर्तकमिति वाच्य प्रार- ब्धनाशे देहपातानन्तरं चानस्येवाभावात् पूर्वत्ञानस्य व प्रारब्धेन प्रतिबद्धत्वात्। न चाविद्यासंस्कारो लेशाविद्याशब्दाभिधेयो Sनुवनेत इति वाच्यं तस्याप्यविद्याकार्यत्वात्। प्रविद्यामाचत्वे च संस्कार- शब्द प्रयोगवेयथ्यात्। जीवन्मुत्तिव तिपाद कश्यु तिस्मृतिप्रा मा ययाद्विदुषो देहस्थिति: कल्पयतइति चेन्न शास्त्रस्य जीवन्मुत्तिप्रतिपादने प्रयो- जनाभावात। Nor again that there is cessation of Nescience (tat) through cessation of prarabdha. For the cessation of prarabdha is not a source of knowledge (pramana, and only Knowleege can put an end to Nescience). Nor is it to be argued that after the cessation of prārabdha, Knowledge being unobstructed (by prārabdha) puts an end to Nescience (tat). For when following on the destruction of prarabdha bodily existence has ceased, knowledge itself is not; and because knowledge prior (to the destruction of prarabdha) was obstructed by prarabdha (and could not therefore operate as the destroyer of nescience). Nor again, that a mental retentum of Nescience, technically termed lesā vidyā, continues to exist. For this also is a product of Nescience (and must therfore perish along with Nescience, its upādāna or material cause): and because it is useless to apply the term retentum to that which really is Nescience. Nor may it be argued that the continued existence of a body for him who has gained knowledge is inferred on the authority of Śruti and Smriti passages, which declare the (technical) jivan- mukti state or emancipation of one while alive. For it is not the aim of the Sāstra to teach jīvanmukti.

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980 सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

मुमुनगां श्रवणादो प्रवृत्ति: प्रयोजनमिति चेतु वस्तु त्हि शवमादिविधेरर्थवादस्तत् शास्त्रं तथाच लोकिकवेदिकप्रमायधिरो- धातेन कथं विदुषो देहस्थिति: कल्पते। न व मुक्तेषुद्ष्टान्तेन प्रारब्धस्थिति: साधितेति वाच्यं दृष्टान्ते वेषम्यात तब कर्मोपादान स्येषोरनाशात। न च जीवन्मुक्ता सार्वलोकिकी प्रसिद्धिरव्याहतेति वाच्यं प्रमायविरहेय प्रसिद्वेरन्धपरम्परारुपत्वात्। न चाप्रामाणिकस्य शास्त्रकारेरूपपादनमनर्थकमिति वाच्यं शिष्यस्याविद्वतया गुराववि- श्वासपरिहारप्रयोजनतया तस्यार्थवत्त्वात्। If against this it be said that its aim is to urge those who seek emancipation to engage in hearing &c. then it must be grant- ed that the passage in wbich jīvanmukti is taught (tacchastram) is an arthavāda passage laudatory of the injunction (vidhi) to hear &c. and thus it is not possible to infer by means of the passge teaching jīvanmukti that the body of him who has gained know- ledge continues to exist, for this is opposed to both natural and supernatural evidence .* Nor again is it to be argued that the continued existence of prarabdha is confirmed by the example of an arrow shot from a bow. The analogy is not strict; for in the former case, the arrow as the substrate in which the motion inheres is not destroyed ( whereas Nescience, the substrate of prārabdha, is destroyed ex hypothesi). Nor again that the uni- versal opinion ( of teachers) in regard to jīvanmukti is untouched ( by the abave objection ). For in the absence of proof, common opinion is but blind tradition.Nor again that that the exposition by the Sastra-teachers of something unproved would be pur- poseless. For such exposition has its purpose in destroying the distrust in his teacher which the pupil through his ignorance might entertain.

• natural, sc. the desttuction of the samskara follows on the destruction of avidya its upadana, as is commonly observed in regard to cause and eftects. Supernatural, sc. that afforded by such Vedic passages as 'the fetter of the heart is broken &e.' Mu. Up. II. 2. 8.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। 989

तस्माद्विद्याया अविद्योपमर्दकत्वस्य स्वाभाव्यात् विदुषः सद्योमुक्तावुपदेष्वरभावात कुतो विद्यत्पत्ति: न चाचार्यनिरपेवेव विद्येति साम्पतं पाचार्यवान्यरुषो वेद नेषा तर्केष मतिरापनेया प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत शंचार्यस्ते गति वक्तेति अनन्यप्रोक्ते गतिरष नास्ति प्रोक्तान्येनेव सुज्ञानाय प्रेष्ठ इत्यादिभ्ुतिभ्यः । नेष दोष: ।

कल्पितोप्यपदेष्ठा स्याद्यथाशास्त्रं समादिशेत। न चाविनिगमो दोषो Sविद्यावत्वेन निर्ययात् । ४२ ।

Hence (concludes the opponent) since Knowledge is by nature the destroyer of Nescience, instant emancipation accrues to him who knows; and thus, in the absence of a teacher, the rise of Knowledge is impossible. . Nor is it correct to say that knowledge is certainly independent of a teacher. For as declared in Sruti passages,-So he who has a teacher knows: That knowledge Chand. Up. VI. 14. Katha Up. I. 2. 9. is not to be obtained by argu- , I. 3.14. Chänd. Up. IV. 14. ment: Haviug obtained your boons (sc. excellent teachers) un- derstand them: but a teacher will tell you the way to another life : Unless it (Self) be taught by another there is no way to it: but when it is declared by an- Katha Up. I. 2. 8. I. 2. 9. other, then, O Dearest, it is easy to understand. Our conclusion is not incorrect. A teacher there can be, even though he be surmised : he can teach, as the Veda teaches. Nor Met : an unreal teacher can declare the Real, Brahman, just as the unreal is there here the fault of pro- face seen in water makes known the real face reflected therein. posing alternatives without giv- ing a reason for the adoption of one of them, for decision is arrived at though the fact that ignorance pertains (to one only, sc. the pupil, avidyavattvena) .... XLII.

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98₹ सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

यद्यवि विदुषस्तदानीमेव मुक्तत्वात् पारमार्थिक: कश्चि- दुपदेष्टा नास्ति तथापि कल्पितेन गुरुया विद्योपतिसम्भवात् नानुपपत्ति: काचित्। न च कल्पितस्य कथं सत्यज्ञानजनकत्वमिति वाच्यं शास्त्रवदुपपत्तेः प्रतिबिम्बवच्च। न घ गुरुशिष्ययोर्मध्ये कतरः कल्पक इत्यविनिगमो दोष इति वाच्यम । अविदुषः कल्पकत्वात् गुरोश्च विदुष: कल्पनाबीजाभावेन तत्त्वानुपपत्तेः । तस्माच्छास्त्रा घायप्रसादासादि ततत्वमस्या दिवाक्योत्थसाक्षात्कारेय मोक्षाविर्भाव-

भावाऽद्वितीयानन्दोस्मीति मन्यते ततः कृतकृत्यो भवतीति। .

Although no real teacher exists, for (the teacher as) one who knows is at once emancipated, yet no contradiction finds place here, because knowledge can arise through an imagined teacher. Nor can it be argued that what is imagined (sc. the teacher) can- not bring about real knowledge. For this is possible as in the case of the Veda, and in the case of a reflexion. Nor again that our position is logically defective because a doubt exists as to which of the two, the teacher or the pupil, is here the surmiser. For the surmiser is he who knows not, and this character cannot belong to the teacher, because in him, as one who knows, the germ of surmisal (sc. avidya) exists not. Hence when the pupil has gained intuition (of Self as Brahman) which comes from the sentence 'that thou art' through the favour of Veda and teacher, and has set aside Nescience and its products which are obstructive of emancipation, then he becomes conscious of himself as the Eternal, pure Intelligence, unrelated, one without a second, Bliss; then for him all duties are at an end. Thus we rightly. spoke (in the opening verse p.1) of 'hav- ing directly through Śruti ascertained the Self which is bliss &c.'

TR

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। १४३

अतः सुष्ुक्तमात्मानन्दं साक्षाद्विनिश्चित्येति। विज्ञानमा नन्दं ब्रह्म को हेवान्यात्क: प्राय्याद्यद्येष आाकाश बनन्दो न स्यात्सेषा भानन्दस्य मीमांसा इत्यारभ्य यश्चायं पुरुषे,यश्चासा- वादित्ये स एक इत्यन्तं भृगुर्वे वारुगिरित्यारभ्याSSनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानादित्यन्तं यो वे भूमा तत्सुखं नाल्पे सुखमस्तीत्यादिभ्रुति- शतेभ्यः न वा अरे पत्यु: कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति आत्मनस्तु कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति इत्यारम्य न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सरवं प्रियं भवति आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्व प्रियं भवतीत्यन्तेन व्युत्पादनाच् आत्मन: परमानन्दरूपत्वस्य ।

And because Self has been proved to be absolute Bliss in such many passages as 'Brabman is Intelligence, Bliss' and in that beginning, 'who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that Bliss existed not in the Taitt. Up. II. 7. 8. „ III. 1. 6. ether (of the heart) ? Now this is an examination of Bliss'; and ending, 'that Bliss which is in man and that Bliss which is in the sun, both are one'-and again in the passage beginning Bhrigu Varuni (went to his father), and ending with ' He per- 'ceived that Bliss is Brahman.'-and again in the passage, 'that

Chănd. Up. VII. 23. which is Infinite is Bliss. There is no Bliss in anything finite'- and in the passage beginning, 'Verily, a husband, is not dear that

Brihad Up. II. 4. you may love the husband, but that you may love the Self, therefore a husband, is dear' and ending 'Verily, everything is not dear that you may love everything, but that you may love the Self, therefore everything is dear.'

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988 सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

२० नन्वानन्दत्वादयो धर्मा आत्मनि सन्ति न वा बाद्ो ते किं सत्या असत्या वा नाद्य: द्वेतापतेः नेतरः धर्मियोडनान न्दत्वापते: न ह्वि रजतत्वं यचारोप्यते तद्रजतम्। न चानानन्दत्व- मानन्दभिन्रत्वं सदपि नास्तीति वाच्यं तथाप्यानन्दरूपत्वाषिट्ठि:। न द्वितीयः आ्रानन्दत्वानाश्नये श्ानन्दव्यवहारादर्शनात न व सर्वे- व्यवहारातीतो डलोकिक एवायमानन्दः । लोकिकवेदिकपदार्थयो- रेकत्वात् भन्यथा लोकवेदाधिकरणविरोधः ।

27. Here it may be asked by way of objection whether

Objection : Bliss, ananda, implies bliss- blissful character and the other ful character, anandatva, technically attributes exist in Self or not. known as the jati class-attribute or generality. Hence, over and above If so, whether they are real or Brahman or Self, there exists anan- datva : and thus Monism (advaitavada) unreal (i. e. surmised). Real they is overthrown. cannot be; for this would imply duality (sc. Self, and the real attributes). Nor can they be unreal; for this would imply that the substrate (sc. Self in which these attributes are surmised) does not really possess blissful character : just as that substrate, sc. Dacre in which silver-ness is surmised is not really silver. Nor (in reply) may it be urged (by the Vedantin) that the possession of a not blissful character=possession of a character other than blissful; and that such character also does not pertain to Self. For the blissful character of Self would still remain unproved. And the second alternative, sc. that blissful character does not exist in Self, will not hold. For the term bliss is not applied to anything which is not the substrate of the attribute blissful. Nor can it be urged that this, the Bliss (or Brahman of Vedanta), is something trans- cending the common usage of the word. For the common and Vedic meanings of a word must be identical : to deny this (anyatha) would be to deny the adhikarana (of the Pūrvamīmāmsā I. 3. 30), teaching that words have the same meaning in Veda that they have in common speech.

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984

न च वाक्यार्थ एवायमानन्दस्तेवाऽवि प्रानन्दत्वप्पतिपाद- नातू अखवडे एव तात्पर्यात्। न व सर्वथा अलोकिके सुखे कस्यापि कामना सम्भवति स्वर्गादेरपि लोकिकसुखसजातीयत्वात्। प्रच के चित्। अनानन्दव्यावृत्तिमाचमानन्दत्वं न तु प्रसिद्ध आ्रानन्द एवात्मा धर्मधर्मिभावानभ्यपगमातृ न घ व्यावृ्त्यापि द्वेनापत्ति: तस्या आश्ररयानतिरेकातृ। रतेन ज्ञानत्वादयो व्याख्याताः। तन्त व्यावृत्तेरपदार्थत्वात् पपोहवादापत्ते: व्यावर्त कधमस्याघश्यं वत्तव्य- त्वाच्च अन्यथा व्यावृत्त्यसिद्ठेः ।

Nor is this transcendental Bliss what the sentence (as a whole, considered apart from its constituent words) means. For even so (the Vedic sentence) does not predicate blissful character as an attribute, since it is devoted to teaching the impartite (attributeless ) Brahman. Nor is at all possible for one to desire transcendental bliss; for Paradise and like supersen- suous objects of desire are also generically the same as worldly bliss. Here some teachers might interpose that blissful character is (predicated) merely with a view The view of the Samkshepasariraka I. 1. él: 174 is unsatisfactory : to the exclusion of all that is not bliss; but it is not meant that bliss as commonly understood is Self, for the relation of sub- ject and attribute is not admitted (in regard to the Self). Nor (continue these teachers) does dualistic doctrine follow logically on such exclusion (differentiation), for such exclusion is nothing other than the substrate (or Self). In this way the attribates of possessing knowledge &c. are (by them) explained. The above view must be rejected; for the exclusion urged above is nothing at all. Aud because thereon would follaw the view of universal negation of the Vijnanavadins) .*

• Apobavada is the sensationalist's reply to the question If

१०

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98€ सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

न घ स्वरूपेगोव व्यावृत्ति: पात्मनोडव्यावृतत्वात् अन्यथा उब्रह्मत्वापत्तेः । अन्ये तु बानन्दत्वादयो धर्मा यच कल्पितास्ते एव आनन्दादिपदार्था लोके Sपि प्रसिद्धाः तथाप्यानन्दत्वादीना कल्पितत्वात् न चेतावता बानन्दस्य का चित्वतिरस्ति धर्मस्यानु- पादेयत्वात् तदाश्रयव्यत्ेरेवाभिलषणीयत्वात। तदप्यापातरमणी यमिव प्रतिभाति विशिष्टस्येषानन्दपदार्थत्वात् व्यक्तिमापे तदनुप-

And because some differentia or excluding attribute must be granted : if not, the differentiation remains unproved. And it cannot be said that the differentiation proceeds per se. For Self is the undifferenced : if not, it cannot be Brahman. Others again hold that the substrates, in which blissful character and like attributes are Also that of the Panchapadikaviva. surmised, are just what the words rana. bliss, (knowledge &c.), are com- monly taken in this world to mean ; for in such worldly substrates also are surmised blissful character &c. Further, that on this view no harm is done to Bliss (sc. the Self as the aim of man), for the attribute (sc. blissful character) is not accepted as an object of desire; since it is only an individual substrate (of cer- tain attributes, tat) that is desired. This view also commends itself only at first sight. For the meaning of the word bliss attaches indeed to the individual as possessed of certain attributes (visishta), because it cannot attach to the individual per se. And because it would for ever follow that non-blissful character per- tains to that which is the substrate (sc. Brahman) of a surmised attribute, sc. blissful character.

no object exists apart from the sensation (vijnana), whence variety (bheda) of perceptions in the forms ' this is blue', 'this is yellow' &c .? He admits that blueness, yellowness &c. are the causes of the variety of perceptions, but denies that these attributes are anything distinct from the various sensations : every such. attribute is the attribute.of a sensation and is nothing more than the negation of a negation of itself (svabhedabhava), that is to say, sensation is self-differentiating. Another definition of apoha is atadvyāvritti: here tat = nila; atat= pīta; vyāvritti = bheda. cf. Siddh: muktāv: and Dinakarī to śl. 49 of Bhashaparicchede.

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली। 980

न दि यो धर्मो यच न स्वाभाविकस्तदन्तभीवितः पदार्थः स सम्भवति अन्यथा शुक्यादेरपि रघतपदार्थत्वापतेः । पचोच्यते। उपाधिसंभ्रयो ह्यात्मा आ्ानन्दत्वं तदाश्रयः । विशिष्टशक्यपस्े तु व्यक्तिवी शक्तिगोचरः । ४३ । यदि लोके आ्रानन्दत्वविशिष्ट शवानन्दपदार्थस्तदाप्यात्मे- वानन्दपदार्था मुख्य: एकस्येव नानोणध्यनुप्रविषठस्यानुगतव्यावृत्ति- बुद्धिजनकतया जातिव्यतयभयरूपत्वोपपतेः । For in a case where, in a certain substrate (yatra, sc. nacre,) an attribute (sc. silver-ness,) is not real (i. e. is falsely surmised), that substrate cannot mean that thing (sc. silver) which included within itself the surmised attribute: otherwise it follows that nacre would have to bear the meaning of the word silver. We reply :- On the view that the power * of a word attaches to an in-

Reply : blissful character is really dividual as possessing certain Self : jati, generality, has no real ex. attributes, Self is the substrate istence apart from vyakti, individual: cf. supra, pp. 100, 1. of attributes; blissful character is the substrate of Self (tat). Or the view that it is only the individual that is declared by the power * of a word may be adopted .. .XLIIÍ. Although the word bliss, as commonly understood, means as . individual possessing blissful character, yet Self is the primary meaning of the word bliss. For since a single substrate (ekasya), when in relation with many limiting adjuncts, can give rise to uniform, persistent knowledge (anugata, whence existence of jāti or class is inferred, cf. pp. 101, 8 supra) and to knowledge of dif- ference, (vyavritti, i. e. of individual things), to that single sub- strate can belong both class character and individual character. * For sakti, sakya of. Ved. Pertbh. Pandit Vol .. VI. pp. 95 et seq.

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यथा एवस्मिन्ेव स्वरूपे सर्वकल्पनारहिते मुखचन्द्रादो

पानन्तरं दर्शनादित्युत्तं लक्षणास्थले। त्रथंवा व्यक्तिरेव सर्वेष पद- शक्ति गोधरोस्तु न व व्यक्तीनामानन्त्यात्पदर्श्तिसम्ब्धव्यभिचारदो षप्रसङ्ग: विशिष्ठशक्यपचे ऽषि तुल्यत्वात् विशेषणाभेदे उपि विशेष्य- भेदेन प्रतिविशेष्यं विशिष्ृभेदात्। तस्मादशक्येनापि शक्यतावच्छे- दकेनानुगतशक्य व्यवहाराSशक्य व्यावृततिव्यवहारय र्जनितु शक् त्वात। And thus we declared in discussing lakshana (p. 97): 'in regard to the own natuze of a thing (i e. the thing in itself), which is really one and without any attributes (cf. p. 64), e. g. a human face or the moon, a three-fold consciousness of reflected object, reflexion and the own nature of the thing is observed to arise after a connexion between the own nature of the thing and cer- tain limiting adjuncts has been imagined.' Or let it be granted, that in all cases it is the individual alone that is made known by the power of the word. The objection to this view,-namely, that since the individuals are infinite in number, the connexion of the power of the word (with any one individual object) would sometimes. fail (vyabhichara)-will not hold good: For this ob- jection would apply equally to the. other view-namely, that the literal meaning of a word (sakya as coming directly from the sakti of the word) is the individual as possessing a certain attri- bute (visishta). Because, although the attribute may be only one, the individuals possessing this attribute are many, as each is a subject,-there being many subjects. And since both views are on the same footing (tasmat), both the knowledge of the persis- tent, (sc. jati) which is the literal meaning of the word, and the knowledge of difference (sc. vyakti), can be produced through that attribute sc. blissfui character, which, while it essentially con- stitutes the literal meaning, is not itself the literal meaning (of the word bliss).

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सिट्धान्समुक्तावनी।

तवापि शत्तिकल्पने मानाभावात:कारय स्वर्रपबहिमतकारय- ताव क्केदकबत्। तस्माद्रामन्दरूपत्वे आ्ात्मनो न का विदनुपपत्ि:।

आ्रानन्दरूम्मात्मान सव्िदद्धयतत्वकम 1 भपर्वादिप्रमाशोक्तं प्राप्याहं तद्पुःस्थिर।.४8 ।।' योहमद्वयवस्त्वेव सद्ये दृढनिश्चयः। प्राप्य चानन्दमात्मानं सोहमद्यविग्रहः ॥ ४Y I For there is no reason to assume that the werd bliss possesses a power in regard to this essential constitutive at- tribute also (tatrāpi sc. anandatve): just as it is mnmecessary to assume causal power as residing in that attribute, which, while it is constitutive of causality, is outside (i. e., is not) the cause itself .* Hence there is no contradiction in holding that blissful character pertains to Self. Having gained intuition of Self, which is Bliss, Existence,

The teacher's Song of Joy. One without a second, made known through that new and originative source of knowledge (sc. the Witness, cf. p, 102), I am become that Self .... XLIV. That same 'I' who, though really the One without a second, was once firmly persuaded of duality, am now identified with that One, having gained intuition of Bliss which is Self ... XLIV.

*Taking the stock erample of dande as the kārane of ghate dandatava resides in danda and is the kāranatāvacchedaka er attribute which essentially constitutes the causal power belonging to the danda as being exactly co-extensive with it (anyunanatiprasakta); but, on the other hand, dandatva is not the karana. And so, while there is a relation technically termed sakyata between the word ananda and the individual, i. e. the Self which is Bliss, it would be incorreot to say that anandatva which is the sakyathracchedaka, in this case, is the sakya or literal meaning of the word anands.

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नास्ति ब्रह्म सदानन्दमिति मे दुर्मति: स्थिता। का गता सा न जानामि यदाहं तद्पुःस्थितः । ४६। पूर्यानान्दाद्वये तत्वे मेवीदिजगदाकृति: । बोधे 5 बोधकृतेवासीद बोध: क्व गतोधुना । ४०। संसाररोगसंगस्तो दुःखराशिरिवापरः। .

योहमल्पेपि विषये रागवानतिविहल: । भानन्दात्मनि संग्रप्ते स राग: क्व गतोधुना । ४६। यस्य मे जगतां कर्तु: कार्येरषहृतात्मनः । पाविर्भृतपरानन्द भात्मा प्राप्तः भरतेर्बलात । ५० । 'Brahman the existent, Bliss, is not'-such was my mistaken judgment: but now that I have become that Brahman I know not whither that judgment fled .... XLVI. The external world of Meru, &c., was through Necisence wrought in the One Reality which is perfect Bliss: but now that knowledge of Brahman has been attained, where is that Nescience gone ?.. XLVII. 4! flux d lle Seized by the ills of life I became another, a mountain of pain, as it were; but now through knowledge of Self I am an ocean of Bliss .... XLVIII. Then yearned I for little things and was much disquieted : but such yearning is no more, for now know I the Self which is Bliss .... XLIX. That creator of worlds am I, whose Self was drawn away by the products of Nescience (sc. by mind, sense-organs &c.) : now through Sruti my Self, the highest Bliss, bas been manifested ... L.

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सिठ्ठान्तमुक्तावली। १५१

परामृष्टा सि लब्धो सि प्रोषितोसि िरं मया। इदानीं त्वामईं प्राप्तो न त्यजामि कदा वन । ५९ ।

स्वां विना निःस्वरूपोह मां बिना त्वं कथं स्थितः । दिष्येदानीं मया लब्धो योषि सोसि नमोस्तु ते ॥ ५२॥ देहामिमाननिगडेरबट्रो 5बोधाख्यतस्करैः। चिरं ते दर्शनादेव चुटितं बन्धनं तणत्। ५३। विशुद्ोस्मि विमुत्तोस्मि पूर्णात्पर्यनमाकृति: । असंस्पृश्य ममात्मानमन्तब्रह्ायडकोटय :* । ५४।

तत्वमादिव चोजालमावृत्तमसकृत्पुरा । इदानीम ततुश्रवादेव पूर्णानन्दो व्यवस्थितः । ५५। Thou hast been pondered and gained : long wert thou absent from me: now have I gained thee, never to leave thee ...... LI. Without thee I cease to be: without me thou canst not be; oh joy! thou art what I now have gained : Hail to thee !... LII. Bound was I in the bonds of conceit of body by those thieves, the many forms of Nescience : but at the very sight of thee that bondage was destroyed ... LIII. I am pure and emancipated, my form is more pervasive than the pervadingt (akasa, ether): let numberless worlds then be within me, they touch not my Self ... LIV. Formerly the whole collection of Vedic passages such as . that thou art' was concealed (by Nescience) again and again; but now absolute Bliss remains constant through the 'hearing' of he Veda ... LV.

• Var. lec. समात्मानं सन्तु ब्रज्मायडकाटय:। + पूर्णाद्धिभोराकाश्ादवि पूर्णतम दति त्रिविधपरिष्छेठगून्य इत्यर्थ: । N. D's gloss. तिविध=देश, काल, वस्तु.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

२८ ननु परिपूर्णानन्दस्वभावश्चेदात्मा कथं संसारावस्थायां

स्फर्निरिति वाच्यं तादृगभिमानाभाघात् न द्वि मोबावस्थायां याद गानन्दस्वरूसत्वमात्मनः श्रयते एतस्येवानन्दस्यान्यानि भूतानि माषामुपजीवन्तीत्यादिश्युतेस्ता दृगानन्दात्माभिमान: कस्य चिदस्ति आानन्दं ब्रह्मणो रुपं तच्च मोक्षे प्रतिप्ठितमिति मोे एव तदमित्य क्रिशवयाव्ट संसारावस्थायां प्रतिबन्धसत्वाद्गासमानमप्यानन्दरूपत्वं नाभिमन्यत इति चेत्कस्तहि प्रतिबन्धः प्ज्ानं तत्काय वा आद्ये जीवस्य बरस्य वा नान्त्यस्तस्य सर्घश्वस्य निरवद्यस्य तदभावात् नादस्तस्य परेणाभेदात नान्योतोस्ति द्रष्टेत्यनेन जीवेनात्मना तत्त्वमस्ययमात्मा ब्रह्मेत्यादिभ्रुतिभ्यः । 28. Here it may be asked by way of objection why Self, if it is by nature absolute Bliss, does Objection : Self is not commonly known as Bliss. To argue that this is not appear in consciousness dur- due to Nescience is to raise the question, ing the transmigratory existence Who knows Nescience ?- to which no of the individual. Nor may the answer can be given. reply to this be that the appear- ance of Self in consciousness as the object of our highest love is indeed the presentation of (Self as) absolute Bliss (cf. p. 10, note). For our consciousness (abhimana) does not take this form (sc. I am pure Bliss). And further, becanse no one is conscious of such Bliss as that which Veda declares to be the nature of Self in the state of emancipation (moksha) in the passage :- all other creatures live on a part of this same Bliss &c. . And because the manifestation of bliss (tat) is declared by Sruti to take place only at the time of moksha in the passage :- Bliss is the form of Brahman and is fixed in moksha. Again it may be urged that though Self as Bliss shines forth yet we are not conscious of it during transmigratory life, because of the hindrance then existing. What is this hindranee ? Is it Nescience or a product of it? If Nescience, does it pertain to jiva or to Brahman (parasya)? Not to Brabman, for to that which is all knowledge and is blameless Nescience cannot pertain. Nor to jiva which is indentical with Brahman, as declared in the passages :- 'there is no other seer but that one'; '(let me enter) with this living Self, jiva'; 'that thou art'; 'all is that Self.'

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943

न च कल्पनामानेगेव जीवस्याप्यज्ञान न वस्तुतो उस्तीति वाच्यं परस्मितपि प्रसङ्गात् न व चिन्मावनिष्ठुमज्ञानं तत्सर्वात्मना प्रतिबध्यात्येवेति वाच्यं यदि संसारावस्थायामप्रतिबद्ध आानन्दो ना. स्त्येव कस्य प्राप्या तहि प्रतिबन्धनिवृत्ति: स्यातृ न हि संसारिप्राप्या संसारनिवृत्ति: सम्भवति न चाप्रतिबद्ध एवानन्दः संसारावस्थायाम- प्यस्त्येव केवलमज्चानसमुद्रतद्वेतान्त:पातिशब्दादि विषय विषवषगयास्य

पितविषयवडिशाकृष्टरह्ृदयस्य परम्प्रियतमं जगदीश्वरं सरवाङ्गप्रोततया

कायामवधानवटनवधानमान्नमात्मनि प्रतिबन्धः न वस्तुतः प्रति- बन्धो इस्तीति वाच्यम्। Nor may it be replied that Nescience does not really pertain even to jiva but by a mere fiction. For the same would apply to Brahman also. Nor can it be urged (as in Samkshepasārīraka cf. p. 14, supra) that Nescience which has undifferenced Intelli- gence as its locus, obstructs completely (i. e. both jiva and Brahman). If unobstructed Bliss exists not during transmigra- tory life, there is nothing by the attainment of which an end may be put to the obstruction (of Bliss). For transmigratory life cannot be put an end to by the attainment of anything that pertains to the transmigratory life (sc. jīva). Nor may it be urged that even during transmigratory life unobstructed Bliss exists; that the obstruction is not real but consists entirely in inattention to (non-discrimination of, anavadhana) Self, just as inattention makes one lose sight of the jewel rouud one's neck; (that this inattention) pertains to him who is overcome by the poison of sensuous objects, sc. sounds and the rest, which fall within the duality wrought by Nescience, and whose mind eagerly desires the sight of Self, and whose heart is drawn away, even while he beholds Self, by the bait of sensuous objects a wakened by the firm impressions (these had left behind in his mind), and who thus finds no time to recognise that Self most dear, the lord of the universe, who as the web entering all things is very near to him.

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148 सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

तटूर्यनरूपस्य प्रतिबन्धस्याश्नयनिश्चयासामर्थ्याततया हि कोसै। द्वेतदरष्टा किं परमात्मा किं वा जीवः किं वा परः कश्चित नादा: तस्य सर्वस्तस्य भ्रमबीजाद्तानाभावेन द्वेतदर्शनानुपपत्ते: यस्याद्ञानं भ्रमस्तस्य भ्रान्तः सम्यक व वेति स इति न्यायादध्ानमिथ्याज्ञान- सम्यम्धानानां समानाधिकरयत्वनिश्चयेनाविद्यावत एवं तत्समभ वात अप्तु तर्ई जोवस्याविद्यावतो द्वेतद्रष्टत्वम। न। तस्य परेखषा- भेदस्योत्तत्वातृ न चाभेदे पि बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बव्यवस्थया सर्वध्त्वद्वे. तद्षटत्वयोरुपपतिरिति वाच्यं वेषम्यात्। For of this obstruction, consisting in the contemplation of those things * (sc. pain, duality &c.), the substrate cannot be known with certainty. To explain-who is the seer of daulity ? The supreme Self (Brahman) ? Jiva ? Or some third ? Not Brahman: for Brahman, consisting of all knowledge, cannot have a vision of duality, since Nescience, the cause of error, is absent. For accord- ing to the rule that errors pertains to him to whom Nescience pertains, that the deluded one knows truly (afterwards), it is as- certained that Nescience, false and true knowledge, refer to one common substrate (or person) and therefore vision of duality (tat) - can belong only to that which possesses Nescience. Next suppose that jiva, as associated with Nescience, is the seer of duality. This cannot be. For the identity of jiva with Brahman has been declared (in Sruti). Nor may it be urged that though Brabman and jīva are really indentical (abhede'pi), the characters (belonging to them respectively) of consisting of all knowledge and of be- ing the seer of duality may be satisfactorily accounted for by re- course to the settled relation of reflected thing and reflexion of that thing. For there is a difference here.

• The gloss explains that this is the refutation of the second alternative, sc. that obstruction is a product of Nescience,-inattention being the product of Nescience.

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तब दि पूर्वसिद्ठे उपाधो विम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावान्तर प्रती-

त्थापितद्वेतस्येवोपाधितया तदनुप्रवेशेन बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावकल्प- नायां ततः पूवे दष्टव्यवस्थापकानुपपत्तेः न चानादिसिद्धाऽज्वानप्रति- बिम्बस्याप्यनादितया ततः पूर्वमिति पर्यनुयोगानुपपतिरिति वाच्यम् अनादिसिट्ठाSज्ञानद्रष्टरप्यनादिषिदुस्येष वत्तव्यत्वात्। न चासा वतु शक्य: न व सास्येष तथा तस्य सर्वश्स्य स्वाविद्याविरहेण तद्द्रष्ट- त्वानुपपत्तेः ।

Thus, in the latter case, since the limiting adjunct (sc. the mirror) is already in existence, it is proper, after the relation of reflected object, sc. the face, and reflexion of the face in the mir- ror) has been formed, to account for the perceived characters of purity and impurity (belonging respectively to the face and the reflexion of it) by recourse to this settled relation. But since in the present case, that very duality which has been brought about by the vision of duality, is the limiting adjunct through whose influence 'the surmisal of a relation as between reflected object (sc. Brahman) and reflexion (sc. jīva) is made, there could be nothing to constitute a seer (of this duality) previous to that duality (or Nescience, tatah). Nor may it be replied that the objection implied in the words 'previous to that' cannot be raised, since the reflexion in Nescience, which is eternal ab ante, must also be eternal ab ante. For then an eternal seer of this eternal Nescience would also have to be maintained; but such an eternal seer cannot be maintained. Nor can it be said that the Witness is such an eternal seer (tathā). For to the Witness itself as consisting of all knowledge Nescience cannot attach, and therefore power of seeing that Nescience (tat) cannot belong.

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घाद्रष्टृलोन परमात्मनो आ्रन्तत्वप्रसङ्गात नान्योता डस्ति द्रष्टति था- स्सबिरोधाद्त न व सर्वसत्वं नाम स्वरूपचेतन्येन स्वाध्यक्तसकल- भासकत्वं तक्चाविद्यावत्वेपि न विरुध्यत इति वाचयं निरक्सं निरञ्जनमिति मुत्या कविद्याया अपि सघ निषिद्धित्वात् न च बस्तु- मूलाऽविद्यानिषेध: न तु कल्पिताया पपीति वाच्यं साधारमनिष्रेद्त् वस्तुमताSविद्याऽपयिटेश्व जीवस्य चाविदोत्तरभावित्या Sनादि- त्वानुपपत्तेः अन्यथा Sविद्यानिवृत्यापि जीवभावो न निवर्तेत। व तृ- तीयः जीवपरमात्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्येव जडत्वेन दष्टत्वानुपपत्तेः। Nor can it be said that there is no contradiction in holding that the Witness, although consisting of all knowledge, is the seer of that Nescience which attaches to something other (than the Witness). For it would follow that the Highest Self is subject to error in thus beholding that Nescience which attaches to something other (than Self); and because this would contra- dict the passage-' there is no other seer but this one.' Nor again that consisting in all knowledge means the illumin- ing by Intelligence per se (Brahman) of all that is erroneously surmised in it, and that this character (tat) is not opposed to that of being associated with Nescience (avidyavattvena). For by the passage-'without fault, without taint', Nescience is also denied in regard to Brahman (tatra). Nor may it be replied that this prohibition extends to a real and not to an unreal .(surmised) Nescience. For the prohibition is general, and because a real Nescience. is not a fact of experience. And because to jiva, as being someting subsequent to Nescience, eternal-ness ab ante cannot belong : otherwise the jiva state would not be put an end to by the cessation of Nescience, (according to the maxim that a positive entity, sc. jiva, eternal ab ante is eternal without end- and thus emancipation would be impossible). Nor will the third alternative hold. For everything that is different from jiva and the Highest Self is unintelligent (jada) and could not therefore possess the power of vision.

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न चोभयानुमतवित्सामान्यस्येव दषटत्वमिति वाच्यं तथा घ सति अविध्याया पि तवेध वतव्यलया जोवस्य निरबद्यस्याऽभ्रान्तस्य ந் त्वाच्च वितयविभागस्य। न चाविद्यानड्गीकारे तद्विषयकप्रश्नाचेपानु- पपत्या तवेब प्रषटराधेप्रुवी Sविद्याद्रष्टृतत्वं युक्तमिति वाच्यं तस्येव ममा- घ्यविद्यादष्ट: स्वरूपस्येदानीं त्वया तत्त्वनिर्ययायं वत्तव्यत्वात् न व यस्त्वं स्वात्मस्वहप्मपि न जानासि अ्रयमहमिदं पृ्छामिति तस्य तव प्रश्न एव कथं म्यादिति वाच्यं प्रश्नविषयाऽज्ञाने सत्येव प्रश्नो- पपत्ते: अन्यथा प्रषव्यार्थज्ञानाज्वानविकल्पेन प्रश्नाभावेन नाऽपृष्टःकस्प चिद् बयान्न चान्यायेन पृच्छत: जाननपि हि मेधावी जडकललोक प्राय- रेदिति न्यायेन स्वयं वत्तमशक्यतया सर्व शास्त्रमरययरुदितं स्यात। Nor may it be argued that power of vision belongs indeed to that pure Intelligence which pervades both (jiva and Brahman). For if this were so, Nescience would have to be admitted also in regard to that pure Intelligence (tatrapi;) and so to jiva, (which would then have to be regarded as) faultless and undelud- ed, would pertain the characters of being ever free and of consist- ing of all knowledge, as is the case with the Highest Self. And because this threefold division must be, in point of time, subsequent to the existence of the limiting adjunot (sc. Nescience). Nor may it be urged that the power of seeing Nescience is rightly predicated of you, whether you question or deny; for if you do not admit the extstenoe of Nescience, your question or denial in regard to it is impossible. Because, to ascertain the truth, you must declare what the true nature is of that very seer of Nescience, sc. myself. Nor again,. that you. who know not the nature of your Self, thus, thie I am asking about this (nature of Self ) could not ask a question. For a question is possible only when Nescience exists as to the matter of the question : other- wise; by' admitting as alternatives knowledge or Nescience of the matter in question, there would be no question at all; (and then) in accordance with the maxim that one unquestioned should not address another, &c. (Manu, II. 110) the whole Veda would be a cry- ing in the wilderness, forof itself it could notspeak (until questioned).

• Var. lec.

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न च प्रश्नविषयापरिज्जाने कथं तद्विषयकशब्दरचना न हि संसर्गमस्चात्वा शब्दरचना नार्मेतति प्रसिद्धिरिति वाच्यं स्तोभशब्दव- त्सार्थकस्यापि शब्दस्य तत्स्वरूपज्जानादेव रघनोपपत्ते: सर्वच शब्द- स्वरूपच्ञानस्यव शब्दरचनाहेतुत्वात् संसर्गज्ञानस्य व शब्दरचनाहे- तुत्वेन प्रसिद्ठोोपातस्य प्रमायशब्द प्रामासयप्रयोजकतया उन्यथाषिट्ठे:

त्मव्यावृत्ततया प्रतीयमानानां मध्ये ऽन्यतमं तत्समुदायो वा लव स्वहपमिति वाच्यं। Nor may it be argued that, if the matter of a question is un- known, the employment of words in regard to that question is im- possible, in accordance with the well-known fact that words are not employed where a certain relation has not been perceived. For even a word with a meaning can be employed when there is simply a knowledge of the form of the word, as is the case with mean- ingless words technically termed stobha (e. g. interjections), since in all cases it is simply a knowledge of the form of a word that is the cause of its employment. And because the nowledge of a certain relation, (which knowledge is) commonly accepted as the cause of the employment of a certain word, is the cause (or logical reason) determining the correctness (pramanya) of the word which is here the pramana, it is not the true cause (of the employment of that word) .* Nor can it be said that the real nature of your Self is one of the following, or these taken together, viz. those things beginning with the body and ending with the mind, which are the objects of the consciousness expressed by the word I, and are perceived as different from the not-Self which is other than they are.

• To decide whether a certain word has been rightly used we must know the relations of things which that word is intended to convey; but merely to enounce it, all that we need know is the form, i. e. letters, inflection &c. of the word.

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छचचामरादीतरभोगसाधनवन्मदुपसर्जनतथा प्रतीयमानानां प्रत्येक

यपरमप्रियतमस्वातिरिक्त सर्वावभासक सर्वदाऽव्यभि चार्यात्मवस्तुस्व- रूपत्वानुपपत्तेः न घ देहादिबुद्धिपर्यन्तेभ्यो यत्स्वरूपं त्वया परिशे- षितं तदेव तव स्वरूपमिति गृह्ायोति वाच्यं तस्याप्यज्वातत्वात् न चाज्जानं परित्यन्य तद्विषयस्वरूपमानं प्रत्यक्तत्वं ग्राह्यमिति वाच्यं तस्यापि जीवेश्वरतद्गिन्नन्वादिरुपेय निर्णेतुमशक्यतया सन्देहक्रा- न्तत्वातृ न घ किं नाम निर्यायेन वप्तुस्वरकपं तु निर्णीतमेवेति वाच्यम

For these things are products of Nescience, are known under the word my so far as they minister to my enjoyment, are known as subordinate to me, just as the umbrella &c. are, the means of comfort to another (sc. the raja); hence these things, singly or together, cannot possibly constitute that Self, which is neither cause nor effect, which in its own nature is not to be rejected or accepted as an object of desire, which is not made known by the word my, which illumines all that is different from itself most dear, which at no time fails to pervade all things. Nor may it be replied thus-Accept as your own nature (Self) that thing (svarupa) which was distin- guished by you from body &c., down to mind. For that thing also, the Self within, or Witness, is unknown. Nor again that putting Nescience out of view, we should accept as Self the Reality within, which per se is the object concealed by Nescience (tat). For doubt attaches to that Reality also, in that it cannot be discriminated as jiva or Isvara, or as something different from them. Nor may it be urged that such discrimination is unnecessary since the Reality itself is ascertained. For this is no reply to the man who desires to know that Reality in toto.

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नं घ सामान्यविशेषपान्ये विशेषसुभुत्सेवानुपपन्नेति वाच्यं तस्येष सामान्यविशेषशन्यस्य वत्तव्यत्वापत्तेः न चाच्ञानव्यतिरिक्ततय नि- श्चिते स्वरूपे सन्देह एव नोपपद्यत इति वाच्यम प्ज्ञानस्याद्याप्य- निवृत्तत्वात् स्थिते एवाचाने विवेकदृध्या तद्विवित्तस्वरूपनिर्यये ऽपि तेनेवाज्ञानेन विषयीकृते सन्देहे।पपतेः न वाध्यस्ताच्ञानस्वरूप स्थिते

स्वरपाभावात् ततो यदि विवेक दृष्या उधिप्ठानस्वरूपमात्मतत्वं निश्चितं तदा तवाध्यस्तमज्जानं तत्कार्य वा ततो भेदेन तथ ना. स्तोत्यवधार्य विनिश्चेतव्यं तथा च तपाज्ञानविरह्वात्सन्देहानुपपत्या प्रश्नानुपपतिरवेति वाच्यम। Nor to this may it be answered that, in regard to that which is destitute of both general and special attributes, the very desire for special knowledge is impossible. For it follows that that some- thing destitute of general and special attributes must be declared by you to exist. Nor, again, that no doubt is possible in regard to this reality (svarupa), since it has been ascertained as something dif ferent from Nescience. For a doubt is possible in regard to that Reality which has been invested by Nescience, even though the Re- ality may have been carefully discriminated from Nescience (tat), in that the latter is existing, since even up to this time Nescience has not been destroyed. Nor again may it be argued that siace Nescience is proved to be sometbing surmised, it is quite impós- sible to discriminate it from Self which is its substrate, for that which is surmised has no existence apart from the substrate in which it is surmised: hence when by discrimination the real nature of Self as the substrate of all things has beon ascertained, then a further conviction should arise in the form-Nescience and its products, surmised in the Self (tatra), have. no existence apart from the Self : and thus since Nescience exists not in Self, doubt is impossible, and question (in regand to Self) is also impossible.

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एतावता 5पि ्वेनद्रषटरव्युत्पाद नात न हि शुद्धस्य कूटस्यस्म द्वेतद्रषटृत्व- सुपपद्मते मोक्षकाले 5पि द्वेतदर्शनप्रसङ्गात। ननु मोकस्य नित्यतवेन सर्वेदा सत्वात्सवो हि कालो मोक्षकाल एव विमुत्तश्च विमुच्यते इति शास्त्रात् अन्यथा मोक्षस्य कादाचित्कत्वेनानित्यत्वप्रसङ्ग: तथा च मोतकाले द्वेतदर्शनप्रसङ्गो नानिष्ट इदानीं तट्दर्शनादिति चेन्न सावले- किका नुभर्वावरोधात् न हि द्वेनदर्शनकाले कश्चन मोकमनुभवति न हि सर्तलोकविरुद्मर्थ प्तिरषि प्रतिपादयति अन्यथा शिलाप्नवनवाक्या- नामपि स्वार्थे प्रामाययप्रसङ्गः। ततो न सर्वः कालो मोतकाल: सर्वलो- कानुभवविरोधादिति। हन्त तर्हि ये सर्वेऽनुभवितारस्ते एवं द्वेतदरष्टा- रस्त्वयेव निश्चितास्तथा व स्वाधीननिश्चये द्वेतद्रध्वरि कः प्रश्नः । The above argument is rejected because it does not explain the original question, sc. Who is the seer of duality ? For the unrelated, unchanging Self or Witness cannot be the seer of duality; if this were so, there would be a vision of duality even at the time of moksha, emancipation. Here one (sc. the pupil) may argue that the above conclusion, viz. a vision of duality at the time of moksha, is not an un- satisfactory one, as duality is seen now (during moksha); for since moksha is eternal it exists always, hence the time of moksha is all time according to the passage-and the freed is free-otherwise, if moksha were occasional, it would be non- eternal. The above is to be rejected because it contradicts universal experience, for while knowledge of duality lasts no one experiences moksha. Nor does Veda teach what coutradicts common experience : if such were the case it would follow that (Vedio) sentences declaring that stones float would have to be regarded as literally true; hence the time of moksha is not all time, for this would contradict common experience. Well then, since you have yourself ascertained that all who know duality are seers of it, you cannot ask a question in regard to the seer of duality thus proved by you (sva) to exist.

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किमत इदमतो भवति पतेषां यद् द्वेतदर्शनं तदेव सच्टि- दानन्दपरिपूर्यात्मस्वरूपमोत्ताविर्भाव प्रतिबन्धकमिति गृहाक। वरस्तु तईि सेषां प्रतिबन्धो मम द्वेताऽद्ष्टु: कुततो न मोघ ब्ाविर्भवतीति चेतु सईि त्वं किमेतेभ्यो मिन्नो येन द्वेताऽद्षटृत्वं भवेत। कः संशयः न हि तानात्मत्वेनानुभवामि तेषां सुखदुःखादीनां मम लेपाभा- वात्। महो आश्चयं ताननेकविधानेव देवतिरयङ्गनुष्यादिभेदभि- न्नान्पश्यन् द्वेतं न पश्यामीति वदतस्ते.वचः कथं श्रद्गेयं स्यात् न हि मुमुख्ो: संन्यासिनस्तत्ववुभुत्सोरिदमुचितं यदसत्याभिधान- मिति। ननु त्वतोडभिन्न एवाहं तथा च ममासत्याभिधानमापाद- यतस्तवेधासत्याभिधानमायातीति चेत तर्ाि कोहं त्वयात्मत्वेन दृष्टः किं सद्वितीयोऽद्वितीयो वा। What follows from this, you ask? This, namely, that the vision of duality those seers have is just that (already mentioned) hindrance to moksha whose manifestation is the absolute Self, (Sachchidanande): thus understand. A hindrance may exist (the pupil replies) in the case of those seers of duality ; but why is mo- ksha not manifest to me who am not a seer of duality ( having been taught by Veda through you my teacher) ? What! (asks the teacher ) are you different from those persons that you say you are not a seer of duality? Doubtless I am! For I do not know them as myself: their joys and sorrows touch me not. Strange indeed! What trust can be placed in your state- ment; for while you behold those persons sc. that varied complex of gods, men and animals, you say, I see not duality! Such untruthfulness is improper in one aspiring to moksha, a San- nyasin and seeker after Reality ! Since I am identical with you (retorts the pupil) the charge of untruthfulness recoils on you. The teacher replies, in knowing me as identical with yourself, was I known as one with a second; or as one without a second ?

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यद्याद्यस्तर्ह्ययमप्यपरो दोषे यत्वं विद्वांस तवेवाचार्य मां ब्रह्मरूपेय पर्यवसितं द्वेतवार्नानभिन्नं सद्वितीयं कल्पयसि एकमेवा- द्वितीयं नेह नानास्ति किंचन इतिशास्त्रविरोधश्च। ऋस्तु तर्ह श्रद्धि- तीयप उत्तदोषविरहादिति चेतृ। हन्त तह कुतो मामद्वितीयमा- त्मत्वेन प्वातवानसि। त्वट्चनादुदाहृतशास्त्रान्नेति चेतु एवं तर्ह प्रबुद्धोषि नातः परं प्रषुव्यमस्ति न ह्यात्मनि विदिते Sपरमविदितं वस्त्वस्ति यत्परघुव्यं स्यात। अस्त्यनात्मेति चेन्न आात्मनो वा भरे दर्शनेन श्ुत्या मत्या विज्ञानेनेदं सर्वं विदितमितिशुत्या आ्रात्मदर्श. नेनेतरत्सवं दृष्टं भवतीति उत्तत्वात्। ननु इदमनुपपत्रं यदात्मद: शैनेनेतरत्सवं दृष्टं भवतीति कुत इति चेतु तथा हि किमितरत्सर्व. मात्मनो भिन्नमभिन्नं वा। . If the former, a further fault of yours is that me, your teacher attained to Brabman-hood and unconscious of the least trace even of duality, you imagine to exist as one with a second: and your view contradicts the Veda passage-One without a second: there is no duality here. Grant then the second alternative, because from it the above fault is absent. Then (rejoins the teacher) how do you know me one without a second as identical with Self? Through your statement and that of the Veda text quoted above. In this case you have attained the highest knowledge: nothing remains for you to question: when Self is known, nothing remains to be ques- tioned. The not-Self remains (says the pupil). No! For we have declared that by seeing Self all else becomes seen, in accordance with the passage-Indeed by seeing, hearing, ponder- ing, knowing Self, all this becomes known. The pupil again argues that it is impossible that by the knowledge of Self all .else should become known. To the teacher's question, Why so?' -he replies :- Is all else different from or identical with Self?

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नाद: अन्यदर्शनेनान्यस्य द्ष्टुमशक्यत्वात् न हि घटे दृष्टे पटो दृष्टो भवतीति शक्यं वक्तुम अन्यथा तयोरभेदापतेः। न द्वितीयः शात्मानात्मनोविरोधात परमार्थसत्यात्माSभिन्नस्य नेतिनेत्यादिना निषेद्मशक्यतया बाधानुपपत्तेश्च अन्यथा आत्मनोऽपि बाधित तथा शून्यमेवावशिष्येत। तस्मादात्मदर्शनेन सर्वमेव दृष्टं भवतीत्य- नुपपन्रम । नेष दोष: । आात्मसत्तेव द्वेतस्य सत्ता मान्या यत्स्ततः । आात्मन्येव जगत्सवं दृष्टे दृष्टं भुते श्रुतम। ५६ ॥ आात्मसत्तातिरिक्ताया द्वेतसताया पभावात् पात्मनि दृष्टे सरवे द्वेतं दृष्टं भवति यथा रज्नुस्वरूपे दृष्टेे ा्यस्तानां सदयडादीना स्वरपं दृष्ट भवति तद्वत आात्मनि दृष्टे सर्व दृष्टं भवतीति नानुपपन्रम। Not different. For by seeing one thing a second thing cannot be seen; thus, a piece of cloth cannot be said to be seen. when an earthen pot is seen: if so it would follow that the pot and the cloth were identical. Nor can it be said that all else is identical with Self. For Self and not-Self are contradictories; and because sublation of not-Self would be impossible, since that which is identical with the absolutely real Self could not be negated as in the Sruti passage-Not this, not this :- otherwise, on Self also being proved false, blank non-entity (sūnya) would remaiu. Hence the statement, that by seeing Self all else becomes seen, is untenable. There is no fault here replies the teacher :- Since the existence of duality is indeed the existence of Reply: Self, Brahman, is All. To Self and no other, all the world know Self, is to know All : this is Eman- cipation. is seen and heard when Self is seen and heard .... LVI. For duality has no existence apart from that of the Self; hence when Self is known, all duality is known; for just as when the rope is known, the things surmised in it sc. the garland or stick (which may be mistaken for it) are also known, so too it is not contradictory that when Self is known all else should be known.

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अत एव विधिनिषेधशास्तयोरपि नानुप्रपतिः तद्यथा इदं सवे यदयमात्मा सदेव साम्येदमय्र शासीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम। ब्रह्म वा बदमय्र आ्रसीत। ऋहं मनुरभवं सर्यश्चेति। यप त्वस्य सर्वमात्मेवाभृत। नारायया एवेदं सर्वं यद्रतं य्च भाव्यम इत्यादि- विधिशास्त्रं तथा निषेधशास्त्रमपि नेह नानास्ति किज्रुनेति पथात प्ादेशो नेति नेति न होतस्मादिति नेत्यन्यत्परमस्ति । प्रतो- न्यदातें। न तु तत द्वितीयमस्ति नेवेह किज्ञनाय आसीत। नासदासी चोसदासीदित्यादि। भवति हि लेोके रज्न्वां स्रगाद्यध्यासिनं प्रत्युपदेश इदं सवे रज्जरिति नेह स्रगादिरस्तीति तथाप्युभयोरुपदेशयोर्मध्ये कतरः श्रेयानिति चेतु यद्यप्युभयोरेकार्थत्वमेव तथापि विधेरस्ति कश्चिदतिशयः ।

Hence also no contradiction attaches to the injunctory and prohibitory Sruti passages. Of the former kind are the following :- This everything, all is that Self. O dear One! Existent alone was this in the beginning, one without a second. All this consists of this Self. Brahman, indeed, was this in the beginning. (Seeing this, the Rishi thought) :- I was Manu and the sun. But when to one all has become Self. All this that is, and is to be, is Narayana. Of the latter kind are the follow- ing :- There is no diversity here. Now follows the declaration, No! No! For beyond this No there is nothing. Other than this (Brahman) is perishable. There is no second. There was no diver. sity here in the beginning. Entity was not, non-entity was not. Indeed, in every day life, the instruction given to the man who mistakes a piece of rope for a garland or the like is either- all these imaginary things are that rope, or-no garland or the like exists here. Still it may be asked, which of these two forms of instruction is the better? Though both perform the same function, the injunction has the advantage.

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

तथ हि परिदृश्यमानानां या सत्ता सा नत्मेवेत्युक्ते तद- न्यन्नास्त्येघ आत्मेव परिपूर्ण इतिज्तानं सात्ादेवाविर्भवति निषेधे त्वथान्निषेधाधिष्ठानतया। कथं तर्युभयप्रवृत्ति: विधिनेव पुरुषार्थस्य पर्यवषितत्वादिति चेन्न अधिकारिभेदेनोभयोरुपयोगातृ। कश्चिदि संसारदु:खेनात्यन्तमुप्हतचेतास्तन्निवृत्तिमेव प्रथमतः कामयते तं प्रत्यादो निषेधवाक्यमेवोपयुत्तं विधिवाक्यं तु पश्चात् यथा सर्पमा- रोप्य मिया कम्पमानं प्रति नायं सर्प इतिनिषेध एवादो न तु विधि:। यस्त्वत्यन्तमनुद्विग्न: किमस्य जगतस्तत्वमित्येवं जिश्वासते सं प्रतोदं सव यदयमात्मा इत्येवोत्तरं न्याय्यं निषेधस्तु पश्चात्।

For in this case when it is enjoined that the existence of all things seen is indeed the Self, then the knowledge that nothing other than Self exists, that Self is absolute, directly manifests itself: whereas in the case of the negation the knowledge is gained indirectly through inference that Self is the substrate to which the negation refers. How then it may be asked, do both find scope: since the aim of man (sc. moksha) would be reached through the injunction alone ? Not so, for both forms of instruction are of service according to the varying qualifications of those who seek moksha. Thus, he whose mind is utterly overthrown by the pains of life desires first of all the cessation of these pains: in his case the prohibitory text is certainly the first to be of service, after which the injunctory text avails. To illustrate :- he who fancying he sees a snake trembles with fear needs, in the first instance, the prohibition sc. this is no snake that you see-, but does not need the injunction sc. this that you see is a rope or stick &c. Again in the case of the man who quite undisturbed by this world, desires to know what reality underlies it, the fit- ting answer is-All this world is Self. After this may come the prohibitory text.

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

यथा सर्पमध्यस्म ततप्रतीकारज्ञानान्निर्भयः पृत्कति किमिदं पुरोवर्त्तीति तं प्रति रज्नः इंत्येवोत्तरं न तु निषेधः। तस्मादवस्थाभेदे- नोभयोरुपयोगात्त कस्यापि वेयथ्यमतो विधिनिषेधाभ्यां परिपूर्यस्चि दानन्दः प्रत्यगात्मेति सिद्ुस । २६ ननु तथापि केोसा द्वेतद्रष्टति पद्यापि न निश्चितम इति चेत यस्त्वं पृ्कसि। कोहमिति चेतु ब्रह्मेव। एवं तर्हि ब्रह्मयो विकारित्वापततिरिति चेतु कोयं तरिकारे। द्वेतं तद्टष्टिवी।नाद्यः द्वेनस्य सर्वस्य ब्रह्मातिरित्तस्य निषिद्धित्वात् न हि यन्रास्ति तत्कस्य चित्प- रिगाम: यथा नरशृङ्गम। ततोस्य वेलवययं दृष्टिरेवेति चेतु तई प्राप्ताप्राप्तविवेकेन दृष्टिरेव परिणामोस्तु तदतिरिक्तदृश्याभावात् Thus for him who fancying he sees a snake and knowing the antidote for its poison can fearlessly ask,-What is (really) tbis thing before me ?- the fitting auswer is-You see a snake- and not the prohibition, sc .- This that you see is no snake. To sum up-neither form of Sruti is useless, for both find scope under varying circumstances. Heuce it has been proved by both in- junctory and prohibitory texts that the absolute Intelligence, Existence, Bliss, is the Self within. 29. But the pupil may again urge that the question, who Objection: Parinamavada follows: Self this seer of duality is, has must be materially changed into not-Self; for duality is a fact of experience. Reply: not yet been decided. You No! the changeisillusory- Vivarttavada -For the indivisible Self could not be who question me are that materially changed. seer of duality says tbe teacher. Then who am I? asks the pupil-You are really Brahman. Then ( rejoins the pupil ) it follows that Brahman suffers modification. What (inquires the guru) is this modification ? Is it duality; or the vision of duality? Not the former, for all duality as distinct from Brahman has been negated (by Veda); nor in- deed can the non-existent, e. g. the horns of a man, be a modi- fication of anything. It may be said, the difference between duality (asya) and the above example (tatah) is the fact of a vision of dual- ity. Well then, it follows through induction (praptapraptaviveka cf. p. 106) that vision only is the parinama, material modification, of Brahman; for apart from it things visible exist not.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

शरोमिति चेन्न दृष्टेः फलरुपाया आत्मकपान्त्भोवेन तत्परियामत्वानुपपत्तेः न हि स्वयं स्वस्य परियाम: कार्त्स्येकदेशवि- कल्पेन परिणामपत्तानुपपत्तेश्च। ननु विवर्ततपक्षेप्ययं दोष: समान इति चेतृ न विवर्तस्वरूपापरिज्ञानात न हयाथिप्ठानस्वरूपातिरित्तां विवरते। नाम कििद्वस्त्वस्ति यदाश्रित्य कात््येकदेशविकल्पवतार: स्यात् किन्त्वधिष्ठानमेव दोषवशाद्विलक्षणाकारेय भासमानं विवर्न इत्युच्य- ते। स एव विलकणाकार: कस्येति चेतु वस्तुतो न कस्यापि अधिष्ठाने सस्य बाधातृ अन्यपाप्रतीतेः । भङ्गान्तरेणासतृख्यातिध्युत्पाद नमेवे- तदिति चेन्न ख्यातेरप्यध्यस्तत्वात् असतृख्यातिवादिना व चावीकेया तथाSनभ्यपगमातृ सर्वशन्यवादिनस्तु पूर्व निरस्तत्वात्। This is so, replies the pupil. No! (rejoins the guru) for it is impossible that this vision or product, as included within the Self, should be at parinama of Self: since a thing is not a parināma of itself; and because the parināma view is vitiated by the alterna- tive assumptions of whole or a part of Self undergoing pariņāma. (cf. Ved. Sü. II, 1,26.) Nor may it be argued that the same fault attach- es to the vivartta view ; for you have not understood the meaning of rivartta. A vivartta, forsooth, is no reality existing apart from its substrate, in regard to which the above alternatives may find place; but what is termed a vivartta is nothing but the sub- strate itself, which through some defect appears under a different form. But different form of what ? asks the pupil. Of nothing really; for this different form has its destruction in, i. e. by knowledge of, its substrate (Self), since this different or not- Self form, is not perceived in another substrate. Then (rejoins the pupil) this is simply a teaching of asatkhyati under another guise. Not so, says the guru ; for in our view the khyāti (perception) also is illusory, which the Charvaka or holder of asatkhyati will not admit ( as he holds that the khyāti is real ): moreover we have over- thrown him who holds to a universal blank ( cf. p. 72).

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

किमिद ख्यातेरध्यस्तत्वमिति चेतु वस्तुतो निष्प्रकारिकाया: सप्रकारकत्वेन मानमेवेति गृहाया। तस्येष प्रकारस्य स्वरूपं वाच्य- मिति चेतु वस्तुतो निर्विकल्पक्यातिस्वरूपमेव। तथेव ताई प्रत्येत- व्यमिति चेत उचितमेव तद्विक्षस्य न तुभ्रान्तस्य तस्य भ्रान्तत्वादेव। किं तेनाधिकं प्रतीतमिति चेतु न किमपि। कथमसा भ्रान्त इति चेतु अन्यप्रतीतेरन्यविषयत्वाभिमानादेव यथा लोके रज्नुं प्रत्येति सर्प- मभिमन्यते अयं सर्प इति। कोसवभिमान इति चेतु परमार्थस्थि- सविषयस्य भासमानस्याप्यसतवनिश्चयः ! यदि वस्तुतो रन्नुप्रत्यय एव कथं तार्ह स्पाल्लिखितया स प्रत्यय: परिस्फुरतीति चेतु आकार- साम्यात दोषवशाच्चृति षदामः । But what is this illnsory character of perception ? Know (replies the guru) that it consists in the appearing in conscious- ness of that which is really predicateless as possessing a predicate (khyāti, here=chaitanya, Self). But ( rejoins the pupil) the nature of the said predicate you should explain. It is really nothing but the predicate-less Self (khyati). Then it should be perceived as such. True enough (rejoins the guru) in the case of him who knows Self (tat); but not in the case of the deluded man, simply because he is deluded. What, then, over and above (the real substrate) does this deluded man perceive ? Nothing really, Why then call him deluded ? Because he fancies that his percep- tion of one thing makes known something different : thus, in common life, he sees a rope and fancing it to be a snake, says- this is a snake. But what is this fancy of his? It is his conviction as to the non-existence of a really existing thing, sc. the rope which is even present to his consciousness. But if he really has a perception of the rope, how does that perception present itself to him so as to make him use the word snake? This, we reply, is due to similarity (between rope and snake) and to certain defects (of eye-sight &c., which stand, geuerically, for Nescience).

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950 सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

अत एव बाधोत्तरं मन्यते रज्नुरेव सर्वतया मया प्रतिप- न्नेति। तत्किं सरपेो। न प्रतिपन्र एव। कः संशयः । एवं तर्हयनुभव- विरोध पति वेन्र भ्रान्तानुभवविरोधेप्यविरोधात् तस्य किं प्रतीतं किं न प्रतीतमिति विवेकविरहात् भभ्रान्तस्य तदनुभवाभावेनानुभ- वविरोधाभावात। ३० नन्वेवं सति अ्धिष्ठानं तत्प्रतीतिश्चेति द्वयमेव दृष्टान्ते प्तिरित्तप्रतीतिप्रत्येतव्ययोरसत्त्वस्य व्यत्पादनातृ दाश्गान्तिके त्व- धिष्ठानं तत्प्रतीतिश्च द्वयमप्यात्मेव स्वयंप्रकाशे प्रतीत्यन्तरान- भ्यपगमात् तथा व तटतिरिकस्य विवर्तस्य दर्शयतुमशक्यतया गतं विवर्नवादेन ततोतिस्फट: स्वसिद्धान्तपरित्याग इति चेतु Hence after the false perception of the snake has been de- stroyed, his consciousness takes the form-this rope indeed was perceived by me in the shape of a snake. What ! did he not per- ceive a snake at all ! Certainly not. Then, in this way conscious- ness is violated. Not.so; because in contradicting the conscious- ness of a deluded man, no violence is done, for he does not discriminate between what he perceives and what not ; and because no violence is done to the consciousness of the undeluded man, in that he was not conscious of the snake at all. 30. The pupil argues that since the rope alone is perceived

Objection : Vivarttavada, then, is false (evam sati, cf. supra) there are, also. Reply : Yes ! false for him who knows in the example, two things the truth ; but a way to the truth for him only, viz., substrate or rope, and who knows it not. cf. pp. 116-7. the cognition of it; for the non-existence of any cognition or cognised object other than these has been taught: whereas, in the illustrated case, both substrate and cognition of it are the Self alone, for in regard to self-luminous Self, a second cognition (making Self known ) is uot to be assumed. And so, (continues the pupil) since a vivartta distinct from Self cannot be shown, the vivartta doctrine is done away with : hence the teacher clearly abandons his own doctrine.

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959

'न। तस्य बालव्युत्पत्तिमा प्रयोजनतया उपनिषत्तात्पर्याविष- यत्वात् भन्यथा विपरीतदृष्ट्येघ द्वेनापत्तेः । मिथ्येष सा दृष्टिरिति चेतु किमिदं मिथ्यात्वं वेकालिकासत्वम् मसत्वाविशेषे Sपि कदा चित्प्रती- यमानत्वं वा । नादः दष्टापत्तेः। न द्वितीयः तत्प्रतीत्यवाद्वेतवते- स्तादवस्थ्यात। सात्येघ तत्प्रतीतिरिति चेतृ न तस्यासङ्गत्वात् ब्रसङ्गो हयं पुरुष इति भुते: सानियाः कादाित्कत्वानुपपल्तेश्च। No! (replies the latter) for vivartta doctrine is not the final aim of the Upanishads, in that it serves only to instruct the uninitiat- ed : otherwise, from the false perception of duality would follow duality as something real. But (replies the pupil) that perception is false. What does falsity mean? Does it mean non-existence in time, present, past and future ? Or, since non-existence is a unity indivisible, does falsity mean that the object is perceived temporarily, (occasionally)? *The former definition will not avail you (says the guru), for that is the meaning of the term accepted (by us Vedantins). Nor will the latter avail, for even through such occasional perception, Monism (the final teaching of the Upanì- shads) is overthrown all the same. But (argues the pupil) that occasional perception is the Witness itself. No, because the Witness is unrelated, as declared in the passage-For this Person is unrelated:and because temporary character cannot attach to the Witness.

• भश्वस्वं मिथ्या इत्युत्तें गगनकमलादी परतिव्याप्तिस्तविवारणाय कदा चित्प्र. सीयमानस्वमिति कादाचित्कप्रसीति विषयस्वम इ्ति यावत्। प्रसीतिरत्र अपरोडा विव- चिता। अ्रमत्वं नाम सद्ठिलत्तयात्वम्। कादाचित्कप्रसीतिविषयत्वं वुतिव्याप्यत्वेम भात्मन्य्प्यास्ति इति सदय विशिनष्टि प्सस्वाविशेषेणोति । N. D's gloss. The qualification occasionally excludes a sheer non-entity, sc. a sky-lotus, which is never perceived. Again, perception of Self as an object, effected as this is through a vritti or modification of the antahkarna (vrittivyāpyatvena) might be considered occasional, but is excluded from the context by the mention of non-entity.

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

किज्जात्मनो द्वेतदृष्टिः प्रमायसिद्ा भ्रान्तिषिद्धा वा। नादाः

अन्यथा भ्रान्तित्वानुपपत्तेः । तथा चात्मनो द्वेतदृष्टिः कदा चिदपि नास्त्येव। तथा च श्रुति: यद्वे तन्न पश्यति पश्यन वे तन्न पश्यतीत्यादि आत्मनो Sविलुप्रदृष्टिस्वभावस्य द्वेतदृष्टिं वारयति।

बालान्प्रति विवर्तायं ब्रह्मणः संकलं जगत्। ऋविव्तितमानन्दमास्थिता: कृतिन: सदा ।

इति स्मृतिरपि आत्मनो द्वेतदर्शनाभाषमनुमन्यते।

Further, is this vision of duality pertaining to Self effected by a pramana (trustworthy source of knowledge), or by an erroneous cognition? Not by the former, for this would contradict Śruti passages teaching advaita; nor by the latter, for the rule is that the thing made known by erroneous cognition is non-existent; otherwise the cognition could not be said to be erroneous. Thus vision of duality never indeed pertains to Self. So also Śruti debars vision of duality from Self whose nature is unbroken vision, as in the passage,-when he does not see, he still is seeing, though he sees not.

Smriti also approves the same, thus,-'For the uninitiated it is taught that the whole world is this vivartta of Brahman. The wise hold it to be Bliss unmodified.'

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। 993

३१ नन्वात्मनो द्वेतदर्शनाभावे नित्यमुक्तस्यासंसारियः शास्त्रसा- ध्यप्रयोजनभून्यतथा शास्त्रानार्थश्यप्रसङ्ग इति चेत न नित्यमुक्तस्या- संसारियः अत्यन्तासत्संसारनिवर्तकत्वेन शास्त्रप्रामाययोपपतेः । पत्यन्तासतो नित्यनिवृत्ततया तब शास्त्रव्यापारो Sनर्थक इति चेतु न सत्यस्यापि तुल्यत्वातृन हि सन्निवर्तयति शास्त्रमिति कव चिद् दृष्टम। अनिर्वचनीयं निवर्तयितुं शास्त्रमिति चेन्न तचाप्यदर्शनस्य तुल्य- त्वात् न ह्यनिर्वचनीयं निवनते इत्युभयसंप्रतिपन्रं स्थलमस्ति तस्माद्विमुक्तश्य विमुच्यते निवृतं व निवर्तत इत्यादिशास्त्रादत्य- न्तासत्संसार निवर्तकत्वेनेव शास्त्रप्रामाययम। 31. If to Self vision of duality pertains not, Self, as being Objection: (a) Veda is useless, if Self ever free and uninvolved in is an unrelated Unity. Reply : Not use- less ; for it puts an end to Nescience or transmigratory existence, will the false knowledge of duality, which is sheer non-entity. laek the motive sc. desire of moksha, which Veda is to ac- complish : hence Veda will become useless. Reply : Not so; for even to the ever free Self Veda becomes a source of right knowledge by destroying (the false knowledge of) an abso- lutely non-existent world. But the function of Veda, it is urged, would be vain in regard to such a world, for the ab- solutely non-existent has ceased to be eternally. No; for the argument would apply equally to a real world, since no in- stance is found in which the Veda puts an end to a real object. Then, it may be urged, Veda aims at destroying (what the Vedantins term) anirvachanīya or inexplicable object. No! we reply, for here too no confirmatory instance is found, since what ceases to be is not the anirvachaniya object (e. g. false snake, which never existed at all; but the false knowledge in regard to the snake comes to an end). Thus both cases are propounded. Hence Veda is authoritative in putting an end to the false knowledge of an absolutely non-existent world, according to the passage-'the free is freed, that ceases to be which has ceased to be.'

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998 सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

नित्यबोधपरिपोडितं जगद्विभ्रमं नुदति वाक्यजा मतिः । वासुदेवनिहतं धनञ्जयो हन्ति कोरवकुलं यथा पुनः ॥

इति स्मृतिरपि जगदात्मकस्य विभ्रमस्य नित्यबोधस्वभा- वस्यात्मन: स्वरूपं पर्यालोच्यात्यन्तासत्त्वमेवाह। किज्जु ब्रह्माति- रित्तं शास्त्रसत्त्वमस्तीति ये मन्यन्ते तान्प्रति भवतु शास्त्राप्रामा- रायप्रसङ्गा दोष: तस्य प्रमारोकस्वभावत्वातृ। ये तु मन्यन्ते सदा शद्वेतमेवास्ति द्वेतवालोडनभिद्यास्तान्प्रति कथमयं दोष: स्यातेः शास्तस्य वा तत्प्रामाययस्य वा ब्रह्मातिरित्तस्यानभ्यपगमात प न्यथा ताभ्यामेवाद्वतव्वति: स्यातृ। न घ वेदप्रामाययानभ्यपगमे पाखयडत्वप्रसङ्ग: तदप्रामाययस्याप्यनभ्यपगमात्।

Smriti also, observing the reality (svarupa) of Self whose nature is eternal Knowledge, declares the absolute non-existence of that error (termed) the world-thus: 'Knowledge, effected through Vedic sentences destroys that error termed the world,

Samkahepaśārīraka II. śl. 38. which had already been destroy- ed by eternal Knowledge (Self, Brahman): just as Arjuna slays again the Kuru race already slain by Vasudeva.' Moreover, against those who hold that Veda is a reality apart from Brahman the charge of making Veda untrustworthy may be brought, since the sole character of Veda (tasya) is that of a pramana or trustworthy source of evidence. But the charge cannot be brought against those who, unconscious of the least trace of duality, hold that Brahman alone ever is, since they do not admit Veda or its trustworthiness as existing apart from Brahman; otherwise Vedantic Monism would be violated by the separate existence of these two sc. Veda and its trustworthiness. Nor can we be charged with heresy in not holding the trustworthiness of Veda; for we do not (as the heretic does) hold the untrustworthiness also of Veda.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

न च वेदप्रामाययानभ्युपगमे Sद्वेमस्याप्रामाधिकत्वप्रसङ्गो दोष: द्वेतदर्शिनं प्रति प्रमाणधीनसिद्धिके आात्मनि व तस्य दोषत्वात् । ननु द्वेतदर्शित्वं किमात्मनो धर्मः स्वभावो वा नाद्यः द्वेतापतेः । नेतर: द्वेतजातस्य सर्वस्य स्वतःसिद्धिप्रसङ्गादिति चेतृ न श्रुतिसि- दात्मस्वरु पानुरोधेन द्वेतजातस्य सर्वस्य तुच्छ्वत्वात्। न हि तुच्छस्य स्वतःसिद्धि: सम्भवति तस्य निरस्तसमस्तस्ामर्थ्यस्य स्वतः परतो वा सेद्ुमशक्यत्वात्। नन्वात्मभिन्नस्य जगतस्तद्वर्शनस्य व तुच्छ- त्वं लोकिकानामभिमतं परीक्षकार्यां वा।

Nor while not holding Veda as reliable, can we be charged with leaving Monism without any evidence; for this charge would lie against the seer of duality (with whom) the existence of Self has to be proved by some pramana. Here an opponent may ask whether the character of being a seer of duality is an attribute of Self or is the own nature of Self. Not the former, for then duality is established; (for this attribute, he argues, must be assumed to be a reality; a non-existent attribute would be nonsense-). Not the latter for then it follows that the whole complex of duality is self-proved (i. e. is svaprākāśa, as Self is, into whose nature duality enters, on the above assumption, as a viseshana or necessary predicate, thus-dvaitasya drasbța cf. p. 70 n.) No! we reply. For in accordance with the nature of Self as proved in Veda, all duality is sheer non-entity. Nor can non-entity prove itself, for being absolutely destitute of power it can neitber prove itself nor be proved by something else.

Here it may be asked by way of objection whether the view that the world as distinct from Self, and the vision of the world, are Objection : (b) But the above doctrine sheer non-entity, is one held of Maya is held ouly by the Vedantin whose evidence is obviously inadmissible. by the vulgar or by trained Reply: The final appeal for ali doc- thinkers. Māyā. trine is to Veda, which certainly teaches

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

नाथ: तेषामबाधितत्वबुद्दुस्तषाव्याहतत्वात् तुच्छ्त्वस्य दूरनिरस्तत्वात्। नेतर: परीद्कार्यां सर्वेषामेकमत्याभावात सर्व- शन्यवादिना निःशेषप्रमायप्रमेयापलापिना Sप्रमाणिकेन पशेषस्य तु. चत्वस्वीकारात्। तद्विरुद्स्य नित्यानित्यविभागेन सार्वेदिकका- दांचित्कत्वस्याक्षचरयाकयाभुगादिभि: स्वीकारात तद्विरुद्टस्य व सर्वेदा सर्वसत्यत्वस्य सांख्यादिभिरभ्यपगमात् तस्मात्परीक्षकाया सर्वेषां परस्परविप्रतिपत्तेरात्मातिरित्तस्य तुच्छत्वमसमपतिपन्रमेव। तथा च लोकिकपरीक्षकविरुद्धं जगतस्तुच्द्त्वं कथमङ्गीकारपथमा- रोहति न च परीक्षकायां मतमपि प्रत्येकं परस्परविरुद्धुतया हेयमेवेति वाच्यं तावता प्येकेकारस्य तथ तथाव्याहतत्वातुच्छत्वे तद- भावात्। Not by the vulgar (continues the opponent), for since their notion of reality (abādhitattva) is not destroyed in regard to the world and the vision of it (tatra), the view that these are non-entity is completely rejected by them. Nor by philosophers, for these are not unanimous. Thus, the unreliable Nibilist (Śūnyavādin), denying all sources, and objects, of true knowledge, holds that all is sheer non-entity. In opposition to this view, the Naiyayikas, Vaiseshikas and others hold that existence is both eternal and temporary, by dividing substances into eternal and non-eternal. Opposed to this again is the view of the Sāmkhyas and others that the existence of all things is eternal. And since all these trained thinkers are disagreed, the view that the world as distinct from Self is sheer non-entity is clearly unproved. This view, then, rejected as it is by the common man and the philosopher alike, cannot be accepted by us. Nor may it be urged that each and all of the above views should be rejected as mutually opposed. For in spite of such opposition (tavatapi), in each of the above cases (tatra tatra) the acceptance of some one view or other is an incontrovertible fact; whereas the acceptance of the world as sheer non-entity is found in no case whatever (tadabhāvāt).

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

न चाषापि ममाङ्गीकारे।वत्येवेति वाच्यं तवाप्रामाणिकत्वात् तुच्छ- त्वग्राहकप्रमायाभावात्। न य परीक्षकायामपि परस्परविरुद्धानां मध्ये कस्य मतं समीचीनं कस्याऽसमीचीनमिति विनिगमकाभावात् एकमृपि न ग्राह्मिति वाच्यं नित्यनिर्दुष्टवेदमूलकत्वभावाभावाभ्यां विशेषात् यस्य हि मतं वेदमूलं तद्ढाहां यस्य तु तन्रास्ति तत्याज्यं यथा पाख- यडानां मतम्। हन्त र्ताई भन्ततोपि गत्वा श्ुत्येव विश्वासश्चेत श्रुति- सिद्धमेव मतमदुष्टुं ग्राह्यमिति तदितरदयराह्यमेवाप्रामाणिकत्वात् श्रति- विरुद्धत्वाङ्ग। श्रतिस्तु सदेव साम्येदमये आ्रसीत एकमेवाद्वितीयं स एष नेति नेतीति प्रथ तस्यायमादेश: अ्रमापश्चतुर्थो Sव्यवहार्य: प्रप- ज्ञापशम: शिवा उद्वेत इत्येवंप्रकारिका सजातीयविजातीयस्वगतभेदशू न्यभात्मानं बोधयन्ती भात्मातिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्य तुच्छ्त्वमभिमन्यते। Nor may the Vedantin urge that of this latter view also (atrapi) his acceptance is forthcoming. For the Vedantin is untrustworthy, because there is no evidence for the non-entitative character of the world. Nor may it be argued that no single view of the above opposed schools should be accepted, because no compelling reason for the adoption of any one as the true view exists. For there is a difference between these views according as they are, or are not, based on the eternal faultless Veda. Thus a tenet based on Veda must be accepted, of whatever school it may be; but a tenet not thus based must be rejected, e. g. the tenet of heretics must be rejected. Well then, we Vedantins reply, if your final position is that trust (in a particular tenet) follows through Veda alone, you must accept as faultless only that tenet which is vouched for by Veda, and reject all others as being without proof and contradictory of Veda. But Veda by making known Self as free from all differentiation, * as in the passages,-Existent only was this in the beginning, one without a second, There is no diversity here. That Self is to be described by No, No! And the fourth is without parts, is not an"object of experience, is the cessation of experience, is the blessed One without a second-ap- proves the view that all that is other than Self, is sheer non-entity. * Svagatabheda, inherent variety, e. g. the leaves, flowers and

92

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तदतिरित्तस्यं कथं विदवि सत्वे उद्वेतव्याघातप्रसङ्गात्. तस्मान्न- गतस्तुच्छत्वं शरुत्यनुमतमेव। तदुत्ां गोडे:। तुचछाSनिर्वचनीया व वास्तवी वेत्यसी चिधा। खेया माया पिभिबेधि: श्रोतयोत्तिकलकिके: । वसिष्ठोपीमम्थ साश्चर्यवदाह यहो नु चिए यत्सत्यं ब्रह्म तद्विस्मर्तं नृगाम। यदसत्यमविद्यास्यं तत्परः परिवलति ॥ तथा

प्षिद्यमाना या उविद्या तथा विश्वं खिलीकृतम। तस्माद् द्वेतत द्र्शनयोस्तुच्छत्वात् स्वतःसिद्ुशुदबुद्धमुक्तप- रिपूर्णानन्दात्मनो Sदृषृद्वयत्वमुपपन्रतरम। For if apart from Self, anything existed in any form whatever, advaita would necessarily be overthrown. Hence the non-entitative character of the world is certainly approved by Veda. This view has been declared by Gaudapāda :- 'Māyā is to be regarded under three aspects as sheer non-entity, or as inex- plicable, or as something material, in aceordance with the three (sources of) knowledge, sc. Veda, ratiocination and the common (or unphilosophie) consciousness.' This Vasishtha also declares as something wonderful-'Strange it is that Brahman, that which is, should be forgotten by men, while that which is not, sc. Nescience, dances before them.' Again, 'Strange it would be for mountains to be bound by totus-fibres, and (stranger still it is) that the world is destroyed by Nescience which is really nothing.' Hence, since duality and the vision of it are sheer non-entity, it is all the more clearly established that no second is known to that Self which is absolute Bliss, self-existent Intelligence and unrelated.

fruit of a tree: sajatiya, specific diff rence, distinguishing it from any other tree: vijatiya, class-difference, excluding it from unlike classes, e. g. stones, &c. For ref. cf. note p. 92 supra.

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

तथा व श्रतिः न निरोधो न चोत्पतिर्न बद्ो न व साधकः । न मुमुसुर्न वे मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता । तदेष निष्कलं ब्रह्म निर्विकल्पं निरञ्वानम्। तद् ब्रह्माहमिति ज्ञात्वा ब्रह्मं सम्पद्ते धुत्रम । निर्विकल्पमनन्तं व हेतुदृष्टान्तवर्जितम। शग्रमेयमनादि व यञ्त्ात्वा मुच्यते बुधः ॥ इत्येषमादिका आात्मनो द्वेतदर्शनशून्यत्वमाह। तस्मात्। सत्यं ज्वानमनन्तं घ पूर्यमानन्दविग्रहम। मान्तवर्षिकमात्मानं तिनिश्चित्य विमुच्यते । ५० ॥ न चेतादृशमात्मज्ञानं न जायत इति सामातं साधनचनुष्ट-

मनन्तरमेव तदुत्पत्तिदर्शनात अन्यया तादृशात्मप्रतिपादकागमा-

And so also Śruti declares that to Self vision of duality per- tains not, in such passages as-'this is the absolute truth that there is no such thing as destruction and production (of the world), nor fettered soul, nor ( Vaidic) sacrifices, nor soul seeking eman- cipation or emancipated. He who knows himself as that Brahman, without parts or attributes or passions becomes unchanging Brah- man. That wise one is emancipated who knows that which is with- out attributes, endless, uncaused, unique, not to be known through a pramana) without a begiuning.' (Brahmavindupanishad 8, 9.) Hence, he is emancipated who recognises bimself as identi- cal with that Self described in the mantra * as Existence, Intelli- gence, infinity, absolute bliss by nature ... LVII. Nor is it right to say that such knowledge of Self is not brought about. For the production of such knowledge is observed in the case of him who is desirous of knowing the truth and is provided with the four means (cf. Ved. Sū. I. 1. 1.), but only after he has performed kearing aided by pondering and profound contemplation. If this were not so, it would follow that Vedic passages deolaring such a Self are untrustworthy. * cf. Ved. Sū I. 1. 15.

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950 सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

न व जातमपि ज्ानं साधनान्तरापेवया फलदानाय विल- म्बत इति वाच्यं तद्टेतत्पश्यत्षिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदे श्रहं मनुर- भवं गन्धर्वः सर्यश्चेति ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मेव भवति तरति शोकमा- त्मविदित्यादिश्युतिभ्य आरात्मज्ञानतत्फलयो: समानकालनिर्देशात मध्ये साधनान्तरकालविलम्बयोरभावप्रतिपतेः तमेव विदित्वा- 5तिमृत्युमेति नान्य: पन्या विद्यते ऽयनायेत्यादिसाधनान्तरप्र-

सम्पादनीयं तदभावे यतो महती विनष्टिः भयते इह चेदवे- दीदथ सत्यमस्ति न चेदिह्ावेदीन्महती विनष्टिरित्यय। उत्पन्ने घ ब्र ह्मात्मच्चाने विदुषः फलेन सह विद्योद्वार: स्मयंते। Nor may it be urged that even when knowledge (of Self) has been effected, the result (sc. moksha) is delayed owing to the need of some means besides knowledge. For knowledge (of. Self) and its result are declared to be simultaneous in such passages as-seeing it (Brahman) the Rishi Vamadera understood: I was Manu, I was the Sun. He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman. He who knows the Self overcomes grief-because the absence of any other means and of any time-pause intervening between knowledge of Self and moksha is made known (by such passages): and because the negation of any other means that knowledge is enounced in the passage-a man who knows bim (Self) truly passes over death; there is no other path to go. Therefore knowledge of Self together with renunciation of the world must be carefully acquired as the means to immortality; since, in the absence of knowledge, great is the destruction, a declared in the Sruti passage-'If a man know this here, that is the reality (true end of life); if he does not know this here, then there is great destruction (new births).' And the out-pour- ings of the wise man's knowledge, with its result, when know- ledge of Self as identical with Brahman is attained, are set forth in the Smriti :-

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली। 959

मुत्कृष्योत्तमपूरुषं मुनिधिया मुञ्जादिषीकामिव। कोशात्कारयकार्यरूपविकृतात्पश्यामि निःसंशयं नासीदस्ति भविष्यति क्व नु गतः संसारदुःखोदधि: । पश्यामि चिषमिष सर्वेमिदं द्वितीयं तिष्ठामि निष्कलचिदेकवपुष्यनन्ते। भात्मानमद्ठयमचिन्त्यसुखेकरूपं पश्यामि दग्धरशनामिव घप्रपज्जम। शद्वेतमप्यनुभवामि करस्थबिल्वतुल्यं शरीरमहिनित्वयनीव वीचे। एवं व जीवनमिव प्रतिभासनं व निःश्रेयसाधिगमनं व मम प्रसिद्धुम॥ आ्राश्चर्यमद ममभाति कथं द्वितीयं नित्ये निरस्तनिखिले शिघात्प्रकाशें। भासीत्परेति किमिमा: पुतओो न पूर्व येन द्वितीयमभवत्तिमिरप्रसूतम् ॥

The Self within, the Highest Self, consisting of Intelligence,

Samkshepasārīr : IV. śl. 53-57. closely concealed by Nescience, I now behold without a doubt, having with the sage's mind discriminated it from the sheaths of Self which are a complex of causes and effects; just as one draws out a reed from its (enveloping) sheath. Lo! where was, and is to be, this ocean of world-pain ! This world I now regard as a picture (sc. a mere semblance of reality). I take my stand on the Infinite which is Intelligence alone, and without parts. I behold Self, one without a second, infinite bliss by nature; and the world I regard as I would a - . burnt rope. I am directly conscious of the one Self as if it were a Vilva fruit lying in my hand: my body I look on as the cast off skin of a snake. And thus, as the appearauce of my being alive, so the gaining of moksha, are both quite clear to me. Strange it is how even now duality appears before me in that eternal, unrelated, blessed, luminous Self. Duality existed once- can I say this ? what ! was not the eternal Veda existing then, that duality was wrought by Nescience !

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सिठ्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

मतयभिनयोपि स्मर्यते वतोपीयं विद्या जायत एव। तथा हि त्वत्पादणङ्कजसमाश्ययं विना मे सत्रप्यसन्रिष पर: पुरुषः पुरासीत। त्वत्पादपद्वयुगलाश्रयणादिदानीं नासीन्न चास्ति नभवष्यत भेदबुद्धि:। यस्मात् कृपापरवशामम दुश्चिकित्सं संसाररोगमपनेतुमसि प्रवृतः । त्वत्पादप्ङ्जरजः शिरसा दधानस्त्वामाशरीरपतनादहमप्युपासे। नमु विद्यया S्विदयोपमर्दे उपि कथं संसारस्येह लोकपरलो-

स्य निवृति: स्यातृ तट्टेतो: कामकमीदेस्तदवस्थत्वांत्।र And so the Smritis goes on to desoribe the adoration of the Guru by the pupil, who through the grace of Veda and teacher has gained a clear intuition of the truth that Brahman and the Self are one. Thus it is a fact that this knowledge (leading to moksha) is something brought about as a product. The Highest Self, though indeed it exists, was for me non-

Samkshepaārīr : IV. il. 58, 59. existent, until I had recourse to thy lotus-feet, Finding shelter there, I can no more be conscious of duality. Placing the dust of thy lotus-feet upon my head, I will serve thee till death; for in pity of me thou hast undertaken to remove this world-disease, hard to cure. 32. An opponent may here urge that even if destruction of

Objection : Human effort is vain ; for Nescience takes place through knowledge through Veda can destroy knowledge, cessation of trans- Nescience (cause) but not the world (effect). Reply : Veda and all human migratory existence, which con- experience teach that knowledge does sists in the passage into this put an end to the world. and the next world and is a complex of pains effected by the assumption and laying aside of many forms of life, is impossible because the causes of transmigratory existence, sc. desire and action, continue to exist.

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न चाविद्यानिवृत्त्या तदुपादेयस्यापि सर्वस्य निवृत्तिरावश्य- क्रीनि वाच्यम। वेशेषिकायामुणदाने निवृत्तेपि नयां कार्यावस्थानय- दनिवृत्तिशङ्ाया दुरपन्हवत्वात न व वमन्तरे नड्यत्येवेति न दोष: तत्वणावद्रुत्तरक्षपोप्यनुपपत्त्यभावस्यानुमातुं शक्यत्वात् तस्मादच्ञाने निवृत्ते Sपि संसारो न निवर्तिष्यते प्रमाणाभावादिति व्यर्थः प्रयासः मेवं कर्म मलमनथानां तच्च ज्ानेन बाध्यते। सोयन्ते चास्य कमाणि तथा व प्रतिशासनम् । ५८ । ज्ाने जाते Sपि कर्ममूलकः संसारो Sनुवनिष्यत इति यदुक्तं तन्न शविद्यावत्कर्मणोपि ज्ञानेन बाधितत्वात् अविद्यावत्तत्कार्ये- गापि विद्याया विरोधित्वा विशेषात्। Nor (continues the opponent) may the reply to this be that the cessation of every product (upadeya) of Nescience follows i necessarily on the cessation of Nescience itself. For, as with the Vaiseshika school, an effect is held to exist for a moment of time after the destruction of its material cause, so the objection here urged that the effects of Nescience do not cease to exist is one that cannot be lightly set aside. Nor to obviate the difficulty can it . be said that the effect will perish at some later time. For the possibility of the effect's existence, as well in the subsequent as in the preceding moment, may fairly be inferred. Hence (concludes the opponent) even when Nescience has ceased to be the world will not cease to be-there being.no evidence for such non-exist- ence of the world-and therefore human effort is vain. Not so, we reply. Action is the root of all evil; and action is destroyed by knowledge. And thus Sruti teaches-'And his works perish.' ... LVIII. The opponent's statement, that the world which has its root in action will continue to exist even after knowledge has been gained, will not hold. For action as well as Neacience is destroyed by knowledge, because knowledge is as much the contradictory of the effect of Nescience, sc. action, as of Nesci- ence itself.

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958 सिट्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

न ह्ि सम्भवति रज्जुसा्यात्कारे तदविद्यानिवृत्तो तत्काये सर्पाद्यनुवर्तत इति न व यतो ज्वानमज्ञानस्येव निवर्तकमित्यव- धारयं शास्त्रकारायामेवं सत्यस्षमञ्जसमिति वाध्यम्। श्रज्ञानकार्य- स्याप्यव्वानानतिरेकात तदभावे तत्सत्वानुपलम्भात न चाच प्रमा- ाभावः मिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छ्द्यन्ते सर्वसंथया: वीयन्ते चास्य कर्मायि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे इतिश्रुतेः। न चेतद्वाक्यमशुभकर्मनिवृ- निपरमेवेति वाच्यं कर्मशब्दस्य शुभाशुभसाधारयत्वात् विद्यासाम- र्थ्यस्य चोभंयन तुल्यत्वात्। ब्र समात्मकत्ववित्ञानं शाब्दं देशिकपूर्वकम। बुद्धिपर्वकृतं पापं कृत्स्ं दहति बहवत् । इत्यन बुद्धिपर्वकृतपापस्यापि ब्रह्मज्वानेन दाहस्मरणात्। Since it is impossible that the effect, e. g. the snake or the like should continue to exist after the Nescience concealing the rope has come to an end on the rope being perceived. Nor can the opponent urge that if this is so, the conclusion of the founders of the (Vedanta) Sastra, sc. knowledge puts an end to Nescience alone, is improper. For the products of Nescience do not differ from Nescience itself, since when Nescience exists not, the exist- ence of its products is not perceived. And proof for our position is not wanting, for Sruti thus declares :- 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, his works perish when He has been beheld who is the higher and the lower.' Nor may it be argued that this passage implies the destruction of evil actions only. For the word action is common to both good and evil actions, and the power of knowledge is equally operative in regard to both kinds of action. Thus in the Smriti passage-'The knowledge of Self and Brahman as identical, gained through Veda and attendance on a Guru consumes like fire every evil deed (though) done inten- tionally'-the consuming of even an intentional evil deed by the fire of ) knowledge of Brahman is declared.

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सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली।

ज्ञानाग्नि: सर्वकमायि भस्मसात्कुरूते तथा ॥ इत्यन सर्वशब्देनाशेषपुएयपापे गृहीत्वा तस्य सर्वस्येष चानाग्निना दाहस्य भगवताप्युत्तत्वाच्च। किज्चु यस्य दर्शनमाचाद . न्येषामपि पापवयो जायते का कथा तस्य ब्रह्मीभतस्य पापवये तदाह भगवान् बसिष्ठः यस्यामुभवपर्यन्तं तत्वे बुद्धि: प्रवर्नते। तद्दृष्टिगोचराः सर्वे मुच्यन्ते सर्वपातकेः ॥ तथा व कुलपावित्य हेतुत्वमवि ब्रह्मविद: स्मर्यते । कुलं पविषं जननी कृतार्था विश्वम्भरा पुएयवती व तेन। अरपारसंवित्सुखसागर 5स्मिन लीनं परे ब्रह्मगि यस्य चेतः । तस्माद्यथोत्तव्रझात्मेकत्ववित्ञानेन कृतकृत्यो भवतीति नाच विवदितव्यम इति। And in the passage-'As kindled fire reduces fuel to ashes O Arjuna ! so the fire of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes '- the Divine Krishna, understanding by the word all both good and evil deeds, has declared that all action is consumed by the fire of knowledge. Further, need it be said that the sins of the man who has become Brahman are destroyed, when by the mere sight of such an one the sins even of other men are destroyed ! This his reverence Vasishtha declares-'All men are freed from their sins who come within the sight of him whose mind is engaged with Brahman till intuition (of Brahman) arises.' And Smriti too declares that he who knows Brahman purifies his own family- 'He whose mind has melted into that infinite ocean of Intelli- gence and Bliss, the absolute Brahman, has purified his family, fulfilled his mother's desires and sanctified the earth.' To conclude, then,-our statement, that a man realises all desires through the aforesaid knowledge of the indentity of his Self with Brahman, is indisputable.

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सिद्ठान्तमुक्तावली।

प्रकाशानन्दयतिना कृतिना स्वात्मशुद्धये। सिद्धान्तमुक्तावल्येषा रचिता रन्धवर्जिता ।

नारायणसमासक्ता थ्रिया सापव्यदूषिता॥ शृणु प्रकाशरचितां सद्धततिमिराप्रहाम। वादीभकुम्भनिर्भेदे सिंहदंष्राधरीकृताम॥

पशेषेय मयोततं तत्परुषोत्तमयत्रतः । स्नांतं तेन समस्ततीर्थसलिले सरवोपि दत्ताऽवनियज्ञानां व कृतं सहस्रमखिला देवाश्च सम्पजिताः । संसाराज् समुद्रता: स्वपितरस्त्रे लोक्यपरज्योप्यसा यस्य ब्रह्मविचारये वणमपि स्थयँ मनः प्राम्ुयात्॥

श्रीप्रकाशानन्दविरचिता सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली समाप्रा । To purify his Self the good ascetic Prakasananda composed this Siddhantamuktavali, flawless, a mass of pure Bliss, sharing the nature of (Brahman sc.) Existence and Intelligence, and (as a garland) de- dicated to Narayana (and thus) tainted by rivalry with his consort Lakshmi. Listen to the work written by Prakasa (the Luminous) which destroys darkness (sc. Nescience) and duality, and sur- passes the tooth of a tiger in tearing open the forehead of an elephant, i. e. a non-Vedantin opponent. With Narayana's aid I bave fully declared the very essence of Vedanta unknown to men of the present day. That man whose mind remains fixed in the contemplation of Brahman even for a moment, has bathed in the waters of all the tirthas, and offered all the earth (as his dana) and performed a thousand sacrifices, has honoured all the gods and extricated his fathers from transmigratory bondage, and is himself worthy of honour in the three worlds. Here ends the Siddhāntamuktāvalī composed by Prakāśā- nanda, the pupil of his reverence Jnānananda, paramahamsa parivrājakāchārya.

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INDEX.

ADHIKARAŅA=locus, p. 51. ADHISHȚHĀNATVAŅ (ātmanaḥ): ANUYOGIN: p. 13 note, add :- p. 67 note. used also in sense of viseshya or subject A DRISHȚA : p. 3. of difference, q. v. AJNANA: a unity and assumed ANVAYAVYATIREKA : p. 36. only, pp. 14, 15. ANYATHĀKHYĀTI: p. 126. : an upadhi and not a ANYONYĀŚRAYA: defd. p. 135 viseshaņa of jīva, note p. 18. ANYŪNĀNATIPRASAKTA: pp. 149 : as the cause of the note, & pp. III, IV, infra. world, described- APADANA: as technically used,

AJNATA: in the technical sense p. 39. p. 55 note. APAROKSHATVA : defd. p. 90. to be applied only APOHAVĀDA: defd. pp. 145- to Intelligence or 46 note. : Brahman, pp. 33, 58. APRATIBHA: (NYĀYA techni- AJNĀTASATTI: p. 26. cality ) p. 118. AKHANDĀRTHATĀ : p. 48 note. ASAMAVĀYIKĀRĀŅA : p. 67 note. AKHYĀTI : pp. 130-34. ASATKHYĀTI: pp. 130-34. ANĀDIBHĀVANITYATVANIYAMA : ATADVYAVRITTI = Apoha. q. v. p. 2. ATMAN=Self or pure Intelli- ANAVASTHA: p. 7. gence, the all that ANANUGATA=vyāpya, p. 67 i8, p. 65. note, =svarūpa, p. 55 note. ANIRVACHANIYA: pp. 27 note, ATMASRAYA: (a logical vice) 128. defd. p. 42 note. ANIRVACHANIYAKHYATI: p. 126. AUPANISHADATVAM (ātmanab) ANUGATA = vyāpaka, p. 67 pp. 59, 89. note. AVINIGAMADOSHA = Vinigama- ANUGATAVYAVAHĀRA: p. 101. ANUPASARJANATVA: p. 80. naviraha, q. v.

AVACHCHHEDAKA. [For the general bearings of this and the cognate terma svarū- pasambandha, vishayata, &c. vide Prof. Cowell's valuable notes to Kusumānjali, pp. 13, 23, 61.] To begin with SVARUPASAMBANDHA-defd. as antu विशिष्टप्रसोतिजननायोग्यस्वम् (Bhimacharya's Nydyakosa), i. e. it is the relation which must be held to exist in a case where a determinate know-

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II INDEX.

ledge or judgment (visishtapratiti = visishtajnana, q. v. Index) could not have been effected by any other relation (sc. samavaya and samyoga, which find a place under the seven padarthas). In other words, this relation must be either the subject itself (anuyogin) or predicate itself (pratiyogin) of the said judgment-अनुयोगि प्रतियेोग्यन्यतरस्वरपः सम्बन्ध- faia: (N. kosa p. 260 note). For example take the judgment sITaTfA-into which three factors enter ; (a) ghata, (G) ghatavisha- yakajnana, sc. jnana which has ghata as its vishaya or object, (y) atman, the knower, or the asraya, substrate of the jnana, represented by the termination mip. Between ß and y the samavayasambandha holds (acc. to Nyaya); for jnana is a guna of the individual atman. Between a and ß some sort of relation must also hold, in order that this particular judgment rather than any other, e. g. patam janami, should result. But the relation cannot be samavaya, because the ghatavishaya- kajnana is a guna of atman and not of ghata. Nor can it be samyoga; for this relation holds only between dravyas, and ß is a guna. Hence the only possible determining cause, niyamaka, of this jadgment is the ghatasvarupa or ghata itself. This may be expressed variously :- thus, घटं जानामि इत्याकारकविशिष्टबुद्धिनियामको घट:or thus,घे ज्नगत

The obvious objection to making the ghata itself into a sam- bandha, sc. that the distinction between relation and reluted thing is thus obliterated (vide Index, s. v.), is met by maintaining that the ghata qua ghata is not the sambandha, but gud object of knowledge. Thus, सम्बन्धिविश्रेषसीभूतो यो धर्मः तेन धर्मेक सम्बन्धत्वं न भ्वत किन्तु तदन्यरपेय। घर्टावभेषणीभृतघ ढत्वान्यविवयताल्वेम सम्बन्धत्वं भर्वत। भर्थात् प्रतियोगिनो घटस्य जरनं घटस्वेन भर्वल : सम्बन्धस्य ज्ञानं तु विक्यताल्वेन भर्वात। घटो विष्यश्त एक एवपदार्थ: u[Here sambandhin-ghata and viseshanibhutadharma or avachchhedaka = ghatatva]. AVACHCHHEDAKA is defd. as that which may be considered as an essential, constitutive attribute or predicate :- विशेषणोभतो धर्मेा5व- केदको भर्वात। सस्मिचयच्छेदके प्रवच्छेदकता वर्सते। [Dharma in the preced- ing definition means not merely the technical gunas but anything which as predicate will serve to define a subject, e. g. danda is an ava- chchhedaka in the judgment dandavan purusho'yam.] This AVA- CECHHEDAKATĀ relation is a case of SVARUPASAMBANDHA, because (as already shown) samavaya and samyoga will not apply to such cases. All instances of AVACHCHHEDAKATA may be brcught under either VISHAYATA or PRATIYOGITA: under the former, if

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INDEX. III

the relation considered be that of knowledge, sc. of the relation be- tween subject and predicate in a judgment, in which case the avach- chhedaka may be atiprasakta, thus, in ghatam janami, ghatatva the avachchhedaka is not definitely limited in its application (anatiprasakta); for ghatatva is found in ghatas other than the particular ghata now perceived: under the latter, if determination by negation be under consideration, in which case the avachchhedaka must be of duly limit- ed application, anyunanatiprasakta :- शवच्छेदकत्वं द्वि विधं स्वरुपसम्बन्धस- उपमन्य नानमिप्रसत्तस्वरूप स। आ्राठं वियतानिरुपितं द्वितीयं प्रतियोगितानिरुपितम्। [Nirūpita here = prakasita, explained by. The effect of this word in a long samasa is usually nothing more than to convert the immediately preceding word into the genitive case]. To illustrate VISHAYATA, take again घट जानामि. This judg- ment may be expressed thus (1) घटवुत्तिविषयतानिरूपकं ज्ञानम्. Here, in ghata exist both ghatatva which is avachchhedaka, and the vishayata which is represented by termination wy of H. Between ghata and vishayata the vrittitvasambandha holds :- श्मर्यविषयतायां घटस्य वृत्तित्व- araia ru: I Between vishayata and jnana the nirupakatvasam- bandha holds :- विषयताया: जाने निरुपकत्वसम्बन्धन अ्रन्वयः [Nirupaka= prakasaka]. Or(2) the judgment may be expressed thus :- घटत्वार्वाच्क वा घटवृसि: या विषयता तचिरूपकं ज्ञानम्। Since in this case the vishayata is dependent on its locus, the ghata, and the ghata in its turn is essen- tially constituted by (avachchhinna) ghatatva, the relation between ghatatva and vishayata is termed avachchhinatva sambandha :- aefaa- वणीभृतघटत्वस्य विषयतायां धर्मिपारतन्व्येण पर्वच्किवत्वसम्बन्धेन अ्न्वयः। Since also ghatatva is avachchhedaka aud therefore possesses avachchheda- kata, घटत्वावस्किचा may be expressed by घटत्वनिष्ठावच्छेदकतानिरूपिका। where निरुपिका qualifies विषयता. [It may be added that Gadadhara in his Vishayatavada declares the modern view to be that vishayuta is not a form of svarūpasam- bandha but a distinct sambandha. The modern school of Nyaya in denying that vishayata is a svarupasambandha distinguishes it from vishayita; the former is a dharma pertaining to objeot known, vishaya ; the latter is a dharma pertaining to cognition, jnana, or to desire, ich- chhā, or to volition, kriti.] PRATIYOGITĀ or determination by negation (abhāva) is the re- lation between positive entities (bhava) and their negations. The dhar- ma which serves to exclude any particular bhava from another is term- ed pratiyogitavachchhedaka; and the pratiyogita is said to be taddhar-

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IV INDEX.

mavachchhinna. Thus the negation er arfen may be expressed by घटत्वारवष्किचप्रतियोगिताकाभाव। Uder pratiyogit may be brought the causal relation, karyakaranabhava; acc. to defs. of cause and effeot; thus, कार्याव्यवहितपूर्वशयवृत्वत्यन्ताभाव्ाप्रतियोगिता कारयता, the being a cause consists in not being the counterentity to any absolute non-existence which might find place in the moment of time immediately preceding the (existence of the) effect, i. e. a cause is that which must precede the effect : and प्रागभावप्रत्तिघागिता कार्यता-the effect is the counterentity to its own precedent non-existence. And the avachchhedaka of both kāraņa and kârya is anyūnānatiprasakta, as was shown above to be necessary :- मथा घट शारणतावच्छेदके दवडत्वमेव न तु दूव्यत्वं नीलदण्डत्वं वा। एवं दवडकार्यतावच्छेदकमप घटत्वमेध न तु मीलधटर्त्वं द्रव्यावं वा श्राव्यस्य न्यनस्- सिस्वात् अम्त्यस्य ऋतिप्रसत्तवात्। The precise usage of avachchhedakavachchhinna remains to be noted. The ungainly compound is employed to include all possible cases of any sambandha. Thus, if we wish to turn the maxim, ' From negation of cause, negation of effect-kiranabhavat karyabhavah-' into the current coin of the Nyaya, we must define it more closely in terms of certain sambandhas, without depriving it of its universality by the mention of any special cause e. g. tantu, or any special effect, e.g. pata; and this may be effected by using tbe above compound, thus :- फार सतावच्छेदकाव चक्क प प्रतियोगिलाक्ाभाव प्रयोज्य: कार्यतावच्ेठकावच्छि बाभावः। [ udrsd := sfaa: ] But if the avachchhedaka is specially named in any case, e. g. tantutva or patatva (in the above example), the word avach- hhedaka is omitted as unnecessary. AVACHCHHEDAKATA: p. II supra.| BHEDA: of 3 kinds, pp. 177-78 AVACCHINATVASAMBANDHA: p.III. BĀDHA: defd. p. 127, to be dis- note.

tinguished from Nivritti. BHEDAPRATIYOGIN : p. 42 note. DHARMIN=substrate or sub- BADHASĀMANADHIKARAŅYA: p. ject, p. 65. 94 BAHVANUGRAHANYĀYA : p. 84. DHARMIGRAHARAMĀNA: p. 36

BHAGALAKSHAŅA: p. 91. note.

BHEDA : defd. p. 13 note. DRISHȚISRISHȚIVĀDA: Pref. p. II. EKAJĪVAVĀDIN : p. 16. : aupādhika and svā- bhavika, p. 11. GUŅE ANYĀYYAKALPANANIYA-

: =duality, and not to MA: p. 94.

be proved by any pra- GRAHAKA: p. 67. GRÅHYA: māņa pp. 40, 41 note. ICHCHHHAVISHAYATI: p. 70 and : cannot=svarūpa or 'thing in itself' p. 115. JADA : cannot be said to be note.

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INDEX.

ajnāta in technical sense, p. 33. technical sense-p. 13 note. JIVA: one only and identical Add technical def :- samban- with Brahman, p. 9: defd. dhibhinnatve sati sambandh- thus acc. to view of Ekājiva- yāśritah sambandhaḥ. vādins, pp. 15, 16. SAMBHAVANABUDDHI : p. 117. „ : a plurality of-p. 5. JŅĀTASATTĀVĀDA : Pref. p. II. SATTÃ : of 3 kinds-p. 25 note.

KĀRAŅATĀVACHCHHEDAKA : pp. SATTVA=BUDDHI p. 39 note.

149. and p. IV. supru. SRISHȚIDRISHȚIVĀDA: Pref. p. II.

KHYATI= Self, chaitanya, p. 169. STOBHA: p. 158.

KŅITAHANYAKRITĀBHYĀGAMA : SVAGATABHEDA : p. 177 note. SVAPRAKĀŚA : defd. p. 61.

KŪȚASTHANITYA : p. 3. p. 2. : to be affirmed of

LAKSHAŅĀ : p. 91. the unconditioned Atman

LESĀVIDYĀ: p. 139. only, p. 62.

LOKAVEDĀDHIKARAŅĀ (OF PO. SVARŪPA=Sattā p. 131.

MĪMĀMSĀ): p. 144. SVARŪPASAMBANDHA: pp. II, III.

MITHYATVA : p. 171 and note. supra.

NIRVIKALPAKAJŅĀNA: p. 41 SVATOVYAVRITTATVAM = self- differentiation, p. 50.

NIRŪPAKATVASAMBANDHA: p. III. note. TADVYAKTITVA=individuality,

NIVRITTI: p. 127. p. 107 note.

PĀRAMĀRTHIKĪ (SATTĀ:) p. 25, TANTRATVA: of 3 kinds, p. 13. TARKA=method of argument

PARIŅĀMAVĀDA : p. 167 note. note. to confirm Veda, p. 1.

PRAGLOPA: (logical vice) defd. UPĀDHI= adhishțhana p. 8 note. =a limiting but not p. 105 note. PRĀPTĀPRAPTAVIVEKANYÁYA : an essential condi- tion or attribute, p. 106 note. PRĀTIBHĀSIKĪ=(Prātītikī)SATTĀ thus technically dis- tingd. from viseshaņa p. 25 note. and PRATIPANNOPĀDHI : p. 8 note. upalakshana-

PRATIYOGIN : p. 13 note. pp. 18 and 70 note. UPALAKSHAŅA : p. 70 note. PRATIYOGITĀ: p. III supra. VAIDHARMYA=Tadvyaktivaq.v. PRATIYOGITĀVACHCHHEDAKA: „ VIDEHAKAIVALYA: distgd. from PRATYABHIJNĀ (recognition) p. Jīvanmukti, p. 137 note.

SĀDHĀRAŅAKĀRAŅA: p. 37 note. 29. VIJĀTĪYABHEDA : p. 178 note. VINIGAMANĀVIRAHA: (logical SAJĀTĪYABHEDA : p. 178 note. SĀKSHIN : pp. 101, 2. vice) defd. p. 105 note.

SAKSHISIDDHA : pp. 124, 25. VIŚESHANA= essential attri- bute, p. 70 note. SĀMĀNYA (OF VAIŚESHIKA) : =attribute or pre- how proved-p. 108 note. SAMAVĀYIKĀRAŅA: p. 67 note. dicate of a judg-

SAMBANDRA: or relation in ment, pp. 41, 42 note.

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VI INDEX.

VISESHYA: p. 42 note. cf. also VRITTIVYĀPTATVA: p. 171. Anuvogin. VYAVAHĀRA : defd. p. 114 note. VIŚISHȚAJŅĀNA : defd. pp. 41, VYĀVAHĀRIKĪ (SATTĀ): pp. 25, 42 note. 26 note. VISHAYATĀ : p. III supra. VYĀPTI: explained as different VIVARTTA: defd. p. 168. from the Nyaya technicality VIVARTTAVĀDIN = Māyāvādin, -p. 67 note. pp. 117 note, 170.

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