1. Vedic Ways of Knowing Frank Morales

The Vedic Way of Knowing God

By

Sri Dharma Pravartaka Acharya (Dr. Frank Morales, Ph.D.)

ii

iii

The Vedic Way of Knowing God

By

Sri Dharma Pravartaka Acharya (Dr. Frank Morales, Ph.D.)

Foreword by Dr. David Frawley

Preface by Professor Klaus K. Klostermaier

Dharma Sun Media Omaha, Nebraska

iv

Dharma Sun Media International Sanatana Dharma Society 13917 P Street Omaha, NE 68137

c 2010 International Sanatana Dharma Society

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permis- sion in writing from the publisher.

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"The Word, verily, is greater than name. The Word, in fact, makes known the Rg Veda, the Yajur Veda, the Sāma Veda, the Atharva Veda as the fourth, and the ancient lore as the fifth: the Veda of Vedas, the ritual for ancestors, calculus, the augural sciences, the knowledge of the signs of the times, ethics, political science, sacred knowledge, theology, knowledge of the spirits, military science, astrology, the science of snakes and of celestial beings. The Word also makes known heaven, earth, wind, space, the waters, fire, the Gods, men, animals, birds, grass and trees, all animals down to worms, insects and ants. It also makes known what is right and wrong, truth and untruth, good and evil, what is pleasing and what is unpleasing. Verily, if there were no Word, there would be knowledge neither of right and wrong, nor of truth and untruth, nor of the pleasing and unpleasing. The Word makes all this known. Meditate on the Word."

Sāma Veda, Candogya Upanisad 7.2.1.

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Other Works by Sri Dharma Pravartaka Acharya

Sanatana Dharma: The Eternal Natural Way

Living Dharma: The Teachings of Sri Dharma Pravartaka Acharya

Radical Universalism: Does Hinduism Teach that All Religions are the Same?

Taking Refuge in Dharma: The Initiation Guidebook

The Vedic Way of Knowing God

The Shakti Principle: Encountering the Feminine Power of God

The Art of Wisdom: Affirmations for Boundless Living

The Dictionary of Sanatana Dharma

The Culmination of Wisdom: Understanding the Essence of Vedanta

These works can be purchased at: www.dharmacentral.com

vii

Table of Contents

Other Works by Sri Dharma Pravartaka Acharya vi

Table of Contents vii

Dedication xiii

Acknowledgments XV

Foreword by Dr. David Frawley Xix

Preface by Dr. Klaus K. Klostermaier xxvii

Introduction 1

Chapter I Framing the Preliminary Discussion 7

The Urge to Know 7

Why Epistemology? 10

Date of the Bhāgavata-purāna's Composition 14

Scope of the Present Work 17

Methodology 22

The Term "Vaidika" (Vedic) in the Normative and the Post-Vedic Sense 26

Clarification of Terminology: "Hindu" Versus Vaidika/Vedic 32

Literature Review 37

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Chapter II The Philosophical Milieu 41

The Vaidika Literary Tradition 41

Philosophy as World-View Versus Geographically Bound Philosophy 44

Differences Between Vaidika and Euro-American Philosophy 47

Sapta-darśanas: The Seven Schools of Philosophy 53

Sāņkhya 54

Nyāya 56

Yoga 58

Vaiśesika 61

Vyākaraņa 61

Pūrva Mīmāmsā 62

The Schools of Vedānta 64

Pre-Samkaran Brahma-sūtra Commentators 68

Extant Vedantic Commentators 71

The Caitanya Tradition 77

Radical Theocentrism as a Dei Gratia System of Yoga 81

Jīva Gosvamin: Life and Works 86

ix

Chapter III Jīva's Epistemology 91

Pramāņavāda: The Ten Pramānas 91

All Pramānas Subsumed Under Pratyaksa, Anumāna and Śabda 95

Critique I Peering Through Broken Spectacles: A Critique of Pratyaksa 97

The Four Human Defects 104

Critique II Establishing the Limits of Reason: A Critique of Anumāna 110

Critique III Perceiving the Imperceptible: A Critique of Sabda 127

The Nature of Perception: Vaidusya vs. Avaidusya 129

The Nature of Śabda 134

Śabda as Word and Śabda as Experience 139

Rsis as Āptas: "Perfectly Reliable Authorities" 140

The Rsi Phenomenon 142

Identifying the Rsi 147

Chapter IV Sāstra-Pramāņa: Scripture as a Valid Way of Knowing 155

Śāstra as Śabda in Literary Form 155

What is the Most Authoritative Form of

X

Literary Sabda? 169

Śruti and Smrti 171

Veda-śabda-pramāņa 172

Smrti-śabda-pramāna 175

Purāņa-śabda-pramāņa 178

Śāstra-pramāna and Yuga Theory 180

A Self-Validating Evidentiary Dilemma? 182

Bhāgavata-śabda-pramāna 184

Utilization of the Guna Theory in the Search for the Scripture Par Excellence 185

The Trance of Vyasa: An Illustration of Sābdic Transmission 194

The Ontological Status of Vyāsa 200

Jīva Gosvāmin's Claims to Epistemic Originality 209

Chapter V A Few Problems 211

Intra-Darśana Historical Discrepancies 211

Inherently Contradictory Epistemic Claims 219

Antecedaneous Dependencies Leading to Philosophical Redundancies 231

Śamkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva:

xi

A Comparative Analysis 233

Is the Sad Samdarbha Jīva's Brahma-Sūtra-bhāsya? 240

The Flow of Sabda via Ācārya-paramparā 244

Chapter VI Jiva's Vaisnava Epistemology in the Larger Vedantic Context 249

The Metaphorical Versus the Philosophical 249

Chapter VII The Inter-Philosophical Implications of Sabda-pramāna I: Vedic Versus Buddhist Epistemology 259

A Comparative Analysis of Sabda and Āgama Pramānas in the Vaidika and Buddhist Traditions 260

Pramānavāda 261

Āpta-pramāna in the Vedic and Buddhist Traditions 263

Pre-Dignägan Buddhist Epistemology 272

Nāgārjuna 273

Vasubandhu 275

Dignāga 276

Dharmakīrti 283

Concluding Observations 288

Chapter VIII The Inter-Philosophical Implications of Śabda-pramāna II: The Implications of

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Śabda-pramāna for Euro-American Philosophy 291

Accepted Sources of Knowledge in Euro-American Epistemology 291

The Three Epistemic Eras 292

Plato and the Realm of Transcendent Forms 294

Augustine: Divine Illumination 297

Śabda-brahman and the Search for God's Existence 301

Jīva's Epistemology and Anselm's Unum Argumentum 305

"Aliquid Quo Nihil Maius Cogitari Possit" 306

A Comparative Veridical Analysis 308

Śābdic Epistemology Versus Subjective Faith Epistemology 310

Chapter IX Some Concluding Thoughts 315

Select Bibliography - Secondary Sources 321

Select Bibliography - Primary Sources 341

Glossary of Philosophical Terms 349

About the Author 373

X111

Dedication

"The Vedic Way of Knowing God"

is dedicated to my son,

Michael Prahlad Morales

XİV

XV

Acknowledgments

This work could not have been successfully completed

without the many invaluable comments and insights, as

well as the assistance and encouragement, of numerous in-

dividuals. The following acknowledgements are by no

means exhaustive of the full number of people to whom I

owe a deep debt of gratitude. It is, however, at least an

attempt to acknowledge most of them.

I want to thank, first, Dr. David M. Knipe for encouraging me to pursue this topic when I first approached him with

the idea in 1995, as well as for his greatly contributing to

my understanding of religious studies methodology. Pro- fessor Knipe has proven to be more that a mere academic

advisor over the many years that I have known him; he has

been a trusted guide and friend.

Additionally, I am exceedingly grateful to Dr. Keith E. Yan-

dell for sharing with me over the years his seemingly

unfathomable grasp of the many crucial issues of both In- dian and Euro-American philosophy of religion, as well as

many of his own insights into the answers to these issues. I am also grateful to Dr. Yandell for proving to me by his own illustrative example that truth can, indeed, be lived in

xvi

addition to being thought.

I am also extremely indebted to Dr. Gudrun Bühnemann

for her exceedingly patient and flawless assistance in her

proofreading of my Sanskrit diacritics and translations.

Scarcely have I known a Sanskritist of such brilliance cou-

pled with such personal humility.

I also wish to thank Dr. John D. Dunne for sharing with me

his encyclopedic knowledge of the entire Indian

Pramānavāda tradition, as well as the contents of the phi-

losophical schools of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism.

I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Dr. David Frawley

(Sri Vamadeva Shastri) for his many years of encourage-

ment of my work and for writing a kind and supportive

foreword to this work.

Professor Klaus K. Klostermaier has been extremely gener-

ous with his time and support over the years. I thank him

for his preface to this work.

Additionally, I wish to thank the following people: B.V.

Tripurari Svami for going over my rough draft and provid-

ing his suggestions; Steven Rosen, editor of the Journal of

xvii

Vaisnava Studies, for his moral support; Dr. Tracy Pintch-

man for encouraging me years ago when I was at Loyola

University Chicago in my desire to focus on Jīva

Gosvāmin's epistemology; Vishal Agarwal for encouraging

me to publish my work, as well as offering many invaluable

suggestions.

Additionally, for their general encouragement over the

years, I wish to thank: Dr. V. Narayana Rao, Dr. Martin

Gansten, Dr. Gautam Vajracharya, Dr. Georg Feuerstein,

Dr. Subhash Kak, Dr. Deepak Chopra, Sri Swami Dayanan-

da Saraswati, Sri Yogini Shambhavi Ma, Sri Shivadasa

Bharati Swami, Dr. Mekhala Devi Natavar, Dr. Richard

Westley, Dr. Anita Bhagat Patel, Dr. Manan Patel, Ms.

Heather Mortensen, Mr. David Smith, Mr. Robert Threlfall,

Mr. Vrindavan Parker, Dr. Dan Wilkins, Mr. Frank Griffith

& Ms. Lynda Fife, Dr. Parmender and Manju Mehta, Profes-

sor Tej Adidam, Ms. Molly Romero, Mr. Niraj Mohanka,

Mangesh and Kanchan Bhise, Mr. Narain Kataria, Ms.

Madhvi Doshi, Sri Paramacharya Palaniswami and all the

monks of Hinduism Today Magazine, and my son Michael

Prahlad Morales.

I owe a special thanks to Ms. Heather Lynn Mortensen (Tu-

lasi Devi) for creating the beautiful cover art and design for

xviii

this book, as well as helping immensely with the book's

layout. I am always amazed at your ability to take the vi-

sion of beauty revealed to the inner eye, and to make that

vision manifest in such a way that all can see and appreci-

ate it. You truly personify everything it means to be an

artist.

Dharma Pravartaka Acharya (Dr. Frank Morales, Ph.D.) The Center for Dharma Studies International Sanatana Dharma Society Omaha, Nebraska, U.S.A. January, 2010

XİX

Foreword

By Dr. David Frawley (Sri Vamadeva Shastri)

The Vedic tradition is primarily one of knowledge, going

back to the four Vedas as books of knowledge, the term Ve-

da deriving from the root 'vid', meaning to see, to know, to

directly experience, or to realize within one's own aware-

ness. The Vedic tradition is further defined as Sanatana

Dharma or a universal and eternal (Sanatana) tradition of

truth and natural law (Dharma). What Veda is seeking to

know is the nature of things, ultimately the nature of our

own being that is connected to the Divine presence or

higher consciousness which pervades all existence.

As such, the Vedic tradition is not content merely with be-

lief in God or even communion with the deity as its

ultimate aim. Its goal is to know the deity within our own

minds and hearts in the sense of this higher knowledge

born of direct perception, not as a mere mental or emo-

tional connection, but one that engages our entire being to its immortal core.

XX

Such inner knowing is not a speculative venture or a matter

of salvation through faith. Vedic Dharma teaches specific

philosophies or ways of knowledge about the deity. For

these to really work, specific sadhanas or spiritual practices,

largely yogic in nature are required. Vedic Dharma does

not rest upon faith at a mass level, but spiritual practices at an individual level for achieving the ultimate goal of life

described as moksha, or liberation from the cycle of birth

and death.

Other religious, spiritual and philosophical systems in the

world also have their concerns with and their means of

gaining such inner knowledge of the deity, often put under the banner of the 'religious experience' or the 'mystical ex-

perience'. Such experiences are also commonly referred to

as 'unity consciousness', though they have considerable va-

rieties.

The pursuit of mystical experiences has been a sidelight or

rarity in western religious traditions, and has sometimes

been suppressed by them, particularly when it challenges

the authority of existing institutions. Yet it has been widely

encouraged in India since the most ancient times. Each fol-

lower of a particular spiritual path in India is usually

encouraged to take up such a sadhana to contact the deity

XXİ

within. At the same time, since there are clearly defined

paths to higher realization in the Vedic tradition, there is

less danger of the practitioner falling into the confusion

that mystical experiences can sometimes create for those

who stumble upon them, rather than are trained to receive

them.

Sri Dharma Pravartaka Acharya (Dr. Frank Morales) is a

rare western teacher who knows both the philosophies and

the practices of the Vedic tradition and has firsthand ex-

perience of how they really work. He is a highly qualified teacher, or Acharya, of Vedic Dharma, the first western

Acharya of a western Hindu temple, not merely an aca-

demic looking at Vedic thought with little practical

experience of how it is applied. He has also studied in

depth other religious, spiritual and philosophical traditions. This provides him a much deeper level of insight into the

Vedic tradition than normally found in the vast majority of

teachers today. He takes the discussion out of the mere

speculative realm to the domain of spiritual practice, mak-

ing his discussion relevant to those involved in meditation

and devotional disciplines as well.

Sri Dharma Pravartaka Acharya focuses on the issue of

pramanas or proofs, the complex yet central issue of epis-

xxii

temology. If we want to know something, the first question

that arises is: "What are our available means of legitimate

knowledge?" The issue is particularly important relative to

spiritual studies. If something Divine, infinite and eternal

does exist, through what special means can it be known?

Obviously, our ordinary mind and senses are designed to

know limited, finished and transient objects, though they

can speculate about something beyond. Is there some other

more direct means that we can develop in order to do this?

In western philosophy the means of knowledge are largely

limited to reason and the senses, and what can be extrapo-

lated from them, though theologies regularly bring in faith

and scripture as well. The Vedic tradition has also accepted

samadhi, or yogic perception born of the meditative mind,

as a legitimate means of knowledge. This not only includes

the mystical experience, but allows a practical and scien-

tific approach to it through yogic disciplines.

The Vedic tradition includes the idea of scripture, or shruti,

not as books to merely believe in, but as indicators and guidelines to a higher realization that should be employed

in the context of sadhana, or spiritual practice. The Vedic shruti is linked to the idea of shabda, or sacred sound, and

xXiii

mantra, reflecting the Divine Word and cosmic creative vi-

bration. Sri Dharma Pravartaka Acharya examines the issue

of scripture and sacred sound quite clearly from a Vedic

perspective.

Most modern Vedantic studies have focused on the Advaita

Vedanta of Shankaracharya and his modern proponents

since the time Swami Vivekananda over a century ago. Re-

cently, the Dvaitic and Vishishtadvaitic forms of Vedanta

have also received attention, which adds another dimen-

sion to these studies. Sri Dharma Pravartaka Acharya has

taken a view that can embrace and honor all these systems,

without losing their specific value and different ap-

proaches.

For this examination, he has focused on one primary

thinker, the work of Jiva Goswami, an important figure in

the Vaishnava tradition about whom much has been writ-

ten in recent years with the development of the Bhakti

Yoga movement throughout the world. Yet he grounds his

study of Goswami in a greater analysis of all six Vedic phi-

losophies as well as their connections with other

philosophical and theological traditions East and West. This affords the book a relevance beyond India to the global is-

sues of spiritual knowledge.

XXİV

Goswami's work, like that of many Vaishnava Hindus, in

turn is based on the Bhagavata Purana, which is regarded

by many Hindu scholars as the greatest of the Puranas, as

well as an important extension of the thought and insight

of the Vedas, Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita. Western scho-

larship has often ignored such texts, focusing on the prime

Sutras and texts of the six systems of Vedic philosophy, as if

there was nothing more to be considered. This has limited

their scope and vision in understanding Vedic philosophy, a

situation that the author seeks to correct.

The book reflects an academic rigor in orientation, ap-

proach and expression. It demands profound thought on

the part of its reader. Yet the book also represents a new

type of experiential scholarship from westerners trained in

authentic Eastern traditions. This provides a different view

than what is normally found from academics looking at

Eastern traditions from the outside.

Such 'inside the tradition' views provide a good alternative

and help us frame the focus of a new debate, which is not

simply about different philosophies or theologies, but about the ultimate truth of our own existence and what our true

XXV

nature as conscious beings really resides in. With The Vedic

Way of Knowing God, and his own personal spiritual exam-

ple, Sri Dharma Pravartaka Acharya leads us forward in

this new adventure in consciousness.

Dr. David Frawley (Pandit Vamadeva Shastri) American Institute of Vedic Studies Sante Fe, New Mexico, U.S.A. January, 2010

xxvi

xxvii

Preface

By Dr. Klaus K. Klostermaier

The Vedic Way of Knowing God is obviously a work that has

grown over many years. While focused on Jiva Goswami's

epistemology, it is much more than a conventional schol-

arly study of a particular Indian theologian. It shows wide

erudition and personal engagement, it is a critical study as

well as a statement of faith. Embedding Jiva Goswami's

writings in the entire range of Hindu sacred literature the

work shows at one and the same time Jiva's connectedness

with the sanatana dharma and his originality as a critic of

some of this tradition's more extreme representatives.

Sri Dharma Pravartaka Acharya (Dr. Frank Morales) is

aware of the problems that Jiva's writings present, his ap-

parent contradictions and the unresolved questions

concerning the meaning of the Veda. Better than anyone

before him, he discloses Jiva's uncertainties and non-

sequiturs. But he also shows how one can at one and the

same time avoid Jiva's obvious sectarian biases and appre-

ciate his genuine contribution to the hermeneutics of the

Vedic corpus, based on a Puranic tradition.

xxviii

While focusing on Jiva's epistemology the Acharya provides

a summary not only of Hindu, but also of Buddhist phi-

losophy and defines Jiva's place within the Indian tradition.

Since sabda, "the divine word" plays such a decisive role in

Jiva's system the Acharya's observations on its nature and

importance, are both profound and timely. They are cer-

tainly relevant also for other theological traditions.

One of the aims of this book is to get European and Ameri-

can philosophers interested in India's rich philosophical

tradition. By showing his familiarity with Western philoso-

phy, Sri Dharma Pravartaka Acharya acts as a bridge-

builder between East and West. He also insists on the im-

portance of "doing philosophy", i.e. showing the actual

relevance of what is being discussed. The wide range of

knowledge of Eastern as well as Western philosophy dis-

played in the book should make it attractive even to those

who so far have not been exposed to Indian thought. The

author's personal engagement constitutes by and in itself a

philosophical undertaking of considerable weight.

I hope and wish that this book would find many readers to

continue the debate it initiates.

May the The Vedic Way of Knowing God be heard and fol-

lowed by seekers in East and West!

XX1X

Dr. Klaus K. Klostermaier, FRSC Distinguished Professor Emeritus University of Manitoba Winnipeg, MB, Canada January, 2010

XXX

1

Introduction

The foundation of every individual religion and philosophi-

cal system on earth is the claim that only that one religion

or philosophy possesses the truth ... that it alone has the au-

thority to proclaim what is true and what is not. The

question of what constitutes the proper derivation of reli-

gious authority is one of the most important - and one of

the most contentious - issues in the realm of religious and

philosophical debate. To greater or lesser extents (though

mostly greater), every religious sect, spiritual tradition, de- nomination, school of philosophy, and spiritual leader

makes the claim of having access to the truth. Indeed, for

most religious and philosophical systems, both religious

and secular, it is claimed, either overtly or else by obvious

implication, that theirs is the only direct and sure means

for knowing truth. Whether we speak of Judaism, Christi-

anity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Marxism, Science,

Atheism, or any system of thought on earth, every philoso-

phical system claims that they, and only they, are in a

position of bestowing truth. "Only we have access to the

real Truth", every religious teacher claims. As a direct re- sult of such truth-claims, coupled with the natural variance of such claims that results from multiple individuals claim-

2

ing to know truth, we have witnessed several millennia of

religious and philosophical contention.

While every philosophy can attempt to claim that theirs is

the only path to truth, however, before we can even ap-

proach what religions claim and begin the process of philosophical assessment of these claims, first we need to

answer the fundamental question of how any religion can

even claim to know the truth at all. For those religions that

claim to be revealing the nature of the Absolute, how is it

even possible for the Absolute, which is infinite, to be un-

derstood by finite humans? Before we can claim to know

God, first we need to grapple with the problem of the very possibility of knowing God. The question of "how can we claim to know at all" is the domain of the field of episte-

mology, or the science of human knowledge and

perception.

The scope of the present work is not to attempt to put an

end to all religious contention, nor to necessarily insist on a

conclusive proof that one system of religious/philosophical

thought is in some way superior to all others. Rather it is

my desire that this book will greatly add to a larger general understanding of the basic issues of derivation of religious

authority as these issues pertain specifically to the realm of

3

epistemology, or the systematic study of the nature of

knowing. The focus of this work is centered upon the little

studied, and even less understood, school of Vedic episte-

mology. Though it is undoubtedly one of the most ancient

systems in the world dedicated to the study of knowledge

derivation, Vedic epistemology is a development in the his-

tory of philosophy that has been routinely neglected as a

field of serious study by the majority of both academic ob-

servers of the history and philosophy of religion, as well as

by most spiritual seekers and lay-persons. It is my hope

that this work will mark the beginning of a greater interest

in this fascinating subject.

My book focuses directly on issues of epistemology, as well

as determining the philosophical bounds of spiritual

knowledge. Specifically, I undertake a comparative analy-

sis of the perceptual processes utilized to derive knowledge

of ontologically transmaterial realities (God, soul, etc.) in

the philosophical systems of Hinduism, Buddhism, and the

whole of the Western philosophical tradition (with special

emphasis on Plato, Augustine and Anselm). While the ulti-

mate goal of my book is conducting an examination of

Vedic epistemology per se, I am purposefully centering the focus of this book on the theories of the 16th Century phi-

losopher, Jīva Gosvāmin. Jīva Gosvāmin's epistemological

4

theories represent an interesting approach in the long his-

tory of South Asian religion relative to the question of

what, precisely, constitutes authoritative knowledge. In

many ways, Jiva both personifies radical orthodoxy, while

simultaneously being a very original thinker.

I decided to focus on the epistemological ideas of this spe-

cific philosopher because his epistemological teachings

serves as a highly representative axial milieu around which

to understand both the full scope of Hindu epistemology,

as well as many of the specific issues and implications that

arise from this subject.

Unlike the majority of Hindu philosophers, Jīva Gosvāmin

(c. 1511 - c. 1596) feels that the smrti literature is more

authoritative than śruti, and thus rests the basis of his epis-

temology, not on the Vedas, but on the Purāna literature.

Additionally, he takes the rather unusual approach of ac-

cepting ten distinct ways of knowing (pramānas) as all

being epistemically authoritative. Despite the fact that Jīva

Gosvāmin's philosophical theories represent a somewhat unique approach to the field of Hindu epistemology, very

sparse research has thus far been attempted in the Western

world on this Indian thinker.

5 5

I have several aims in this present work. First, since Jīva

Gosvämin represents a school of thought relatively un-

known in the Western world, I will present an outline of his

epistemological theories and place them within the greater

context of Indian philosophy. This will be accomplished by surveying his theories as contained in his two most impor-

tant works: Tattva-samdarbha and his autocommentary on

the same, the Sarva-samvādinī. Second, I will analyze and

critique his arguments from a philosophical perspective us-

ing propositional, comparative, and veridical analyses. Third, I will explore the significance of Jīva Gosvāmin's ideas for Vedänta. Lastly, I will speak about the implica- tions of these epistemological theories for the future of

epistemology and philosophy of religion.

Again, employing Jiva Gosvamin's ideas as a philosophical

anchor and as a backdrop for the cultural milieu that repre-

sented the historical height of inter-philosophical

epistemological debate, the ultimate goal of this work is

actually to present the profound insights and practical effi-

cacy of the Vedic way of knowing God. Though this may

seem at first glance to be a rigidly academic work, it is my

hope that academic scholars will, in actuality, serve as only

a secondary audience for this work. My primary audience

6

are those sincere spiritual practitioners, yogīs/yoginīs, dedi-

cated Hindus, and followers of Dharma globally who wish

to have a more thorough understanding of precisely what it means to know God in the Vedic tradition, and to thus

deepen their own experience of the presence of God in

their everyday lives.

As I hope this work will make abundantly clear, God is not

merely an interesting idea designed to serve as the theo-

retical kindling of fueled academic debate. Rather, God is

the grounding ontological principle that makes all concep- tual and perceptual activities on the part of all human beings even possible. It is, indeed, in knowing the Absolute

that we have access to knowing absolute knowledge.

Dharma Pravartaka Acharya (Dr. Frank Morales, Ph.D.) The Center for Dharma Studies International Sanatana Dharma Society Omaha, Nebraska, U.S.A. January, 2010

7

Chapter I

Framing the Preliminary Discussion

The Urge to Know

Each and every rational being commences life in this world

with the inherent impetus to expand his or her individual perimeters of experience, knowledge and insight. This ba- sic cognitive urge is as crucial a need as are the biological

urges to eat, drink and breathe. The urge to know is why

we read a newspaper in the morning; the urge to know is

why we ask people about the current weather; the urge to know is why we go to school, read books, or gossip with

our neighbors. This natural urge for knowledge is a vivid

confirmation of the quintessential need for truth on the

part of all human beings. This search for truth, on a larger

scale, is the purported goal of every school and tradition of philosophy and religion, as well as every discipline within

the more concrete realm of the empirical sciences.

The perennial search for truth is negated neither by geo-

graphic and ethnic demarcation, nor by conceptual or ideological framework. The reality of a "truth" - even if it

is prematurely declared by the individual seeker of truth

8

that the truth of the matter is that there is no truth - is a

universally understood concept and desiderative. This om-

nihistorical and transgeographical nature of the search for

truth is, consequently, no less a fact for the many ancient

philosophical schools of Asia than it is for the better-known philosophies of the post-Enlightenment Western world.

Throughout the last century, a good deal of cursory inves-

tigation into the various schools of South Asian philosophy

has been carried out by Euro-American scholars, with the

vast bulk of Euro-American interest being bestowed upon

the well known tradition of Vedänta. This longstanding

Western fascination with Vedänta, however, has been dis-

proportionately preoccupied with only one of the many valid schools of Vedänta, namely the monistic Advaita in-

terpretation of Samkara (ca. 8th century C.E.).1 So

exclusive has Euro-American interest been with this one

specific sectarian expression of Vedānta that, to the minds of many, both scholars as well as lay-people, the very term "Vedänta" is itself very often seen as being nothing less

than synonymous with the Advaita tradition. Both histori-

cally and philosophically, however, Vedānta is very far from being undifferentiated from the specific school of Ad-

1 Or ca. 200-168 B.C.E. according to many traditional Hindu sources.

9

vaita Vedānta.

It has only been in recent decades that scholars have begun

in earnest to acknowledge the historical antiquity, weight

and profound insights of the philosophical arguments ex-

pounded by the more explicitly theistic schools of Vedānta.2 Included among the latter schools are: the Viśistādvaita

school of Rāmānuja (1017-1137 C.E.),3 the Dvaita doctrine

(or Tattvavāda) of Madhva (1197-1276 C.E.), Vallabha's

(1473-1531 C.E.) Suddhādvaita, Vijñānabhiksu's (fl. 1550-

1600 C.E.) Avibhāgādvaita, and Jīva Gosvāmin's (1511-

1596 C.E.) Acintya-bhedābhedavāda, among many others.4

One of the ancillary goals of the present work is to shed

some light on the latter of these non-Advaitic sampradāyas

(schools of thought) in my goal of examining the Vedic

method of knowing God. I will, however, necessarily touch

2 A few of the more recent Euro-American academicians who have made in-depth studies into the non-Advaitic forms of Vedānta include Keith Yandell of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, John Carman of Harvard, Julius Lipner at Cambridge, and Martin Gansten of Sweden.

3 These are the traditional dates given to Ramanuja's life, according to which, he should have lived to be an amazing 120 years of age.

4 According to Dr. Roma Chaudhuri " ... Vedanta is a generic name, not a specific one ... it stands for as many as ten different schools, each with many branches or sub-systems of its own." (Chaudhuri, Vol. I, 19). As will be shown later in this study, the tradition of Vedänta is both much more varied, as well as much older, than is often assumed.

10

upon at least some aspects of the doctrines of most of these

schools in the course of my explication and philosophical

analysis.

Of the above mentioned non-Advaitic philosophical tradi-

tions, perhaps the one which is least known and

understood in the West is that represented by Jīva

Gosvamin. A somewhat influential philosophical school in

parts of northern and eastern India,5 the sampradāya of

Jīva Gosvamin has begun to attract the interest of some Eu-

ro-American philosophers only in very recent years. Rather

than focus the present study on the teachings of Jīva

Gosvamin in their entirety, however, I have chosen to focus

my efforts on only one crucial aspect of his thought, name-

ly his epistemology.

Why Epistemology?

All able Philosophers throughout the stretch of time -

5 Specifically, the Gaudiya sect of Jiva Gosvāmin has its largest follow- ing in West Bengal, Orissa, Bihar, Assam and Manipur in the eastern part of India, as well as the Braj/Mathura area of the north. The sect also has a sprinkling of followers in Rajasthan and Gujarat, as well as a larger following in the nation of Bangladesh. Outside of the South Asian sub-continent, a more heterodox form of Gaudīya Vaisnavism has become popular due to the activities of ISKCON (The International So- ciety for Krishna Consciousness) and several of its offshoots.

11

whether we are speaking of Descartes, Hume and Kant in

the European context, or Samkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva

in South Asia - have recognized the crucial role that epis-

temology plays in any all-encompassing philosophical

construct.° The various intricate claims of metaphysics,

ethics, ontology, soteriology' and theology can potentially

be investigated, formulated and debated endlessly, as the

highly contentious histories of both philosophical and reli-

gious debate have vividly shown us. Before one can even

begin to legitimately speculate on the minutiae of philoso-

phical and theological subject matters, however, one must

first precisely demonstrate how it is even possible to arrive

at the purported knowledge that one claims to possess. Be-

fore analyzing what a philosophy claims to know, in other

words, we must first ask the crucial question: how does one

even claim to "know" anything at all? The fundamental

question of "whence the proper derivation of authority" is

6 In the realm of Hinduism, for example, almost every foundational philosophical text (sūtra) of each and every traditional philosophical school begins with an exposition of epistemology. First the school in question establishes what it will accept as valid ways of knowing. The Yoga-sūtras, for example, states: pratyaksa-anumāna-āgamāḥ- pramānāni, "Valid congnition is predicated on perception, inference, and scripture." (1.7) The Brahma-sūtras similarly state as its epistemic criterion: śāstrayonitvāt, "Scripture is the source of knowledge of the Absolute." (1.3)

7 Soteriology is the science and the study of the nature of liberation or salvation.

12

the first critical question to be dealt with in every philoso-

phical system - religious or otherwise. Consequently, every

philosophical superstructure, however seemingly imposing

and impenetrable an edifice, has epistemology as its stabi-

lizing foundation.

Jīva Gosvāmin's general thought still represents a relatively

unmarked territory of scholarship for most Euro-American

academicians. His ideas on epistemology specifically have

been almost completely unexplored by Western academia.

I therefore felt it necessary to begin the process of explor-

ing Jīva Gosvāmin's Vedānta philosophy at this very

fundamental level of epistemology. It is my hope that this

present work will be only the first chapter in an ongoing

effort on the part of other scholars to study the other di-

mensions of this original Vedantic philosopher's thought.

What makes Jīva Gosvāmin's consciously Vedic-based epis-

temology an especially interesting topic of study from a

Euro-American philosophical perspective is that Vedic epis-

temology's functioning is predicated upon a direct experience of the truth, which for the Vedic world-view is

non-different from the Absolute Reality - Bhagavān, or

God. Epistemology is therefore firmly based upon ontology

in the Hindu world-view. Moreover, it is based, not on on-

13

tology as merely a matter for philosophical speculation, but

on very real, immediate and experienceable ontological states. While many other schools of philosophy - both Hindu (vaidika) and non-Hindu (avaidika) - hold very simi-

lar, if not seemingly identical views, Jiva's very specific

approach is singularly distinctive in respect to where he chooses to place the precise locus of epistemological au-

thority. He finds this authority situated in the direct, non-

mediated insight into the nature of the Absolute that is said

to have been perceived by the ancient sage Vyāsa and re-

corded in the very specific scriptural text known as the

Bhāgavata-purāņa.

In leading to his epistemological conclusions, Jīva

Gosvāmin originates four original theories that distinguish

him quite markedly from the majority of previous orthodox

Hindu philosophers. These four original developments are

the following. 1) He accepts the surpisingly large total of

ten valid ways of knowing (pramānas) as being epistemo-

logically authoritative. Most Vedāntists previous to Jīva

accepted only the three pramānas of a) pratyaksa (percep- tion or empiricism)8, b) anumāna (inference) and c) śabda

8 Though the term "pratyaksa" ordinarily refers to "perception" in most schools of both Indian generally and Hindu philosophy specifically,

14

(divine word)9. 2) He gives authoritative precedence to

the smrti literature over the śruti canon. Jīva takes this po-

sition to the point of giving the Purānic literature a higher

status than the Vedic literature. This is a position that is

clearly at odds with the majority opinion of Hindu (vaidi-

ka) scholars, for whom the Vedic literature (śruti) is

without doubt the highest authority on all matters religious

and philosophical. 3) He finds his ultimate epistemic au-

thority very specifically in the direct insight into the nature

of the Absolute that was perceived by the sage Vyasa and

then recorded in the Bhāgavata-purāna. 4) Moreover, with

both the Brahma-sutras and the Bhāgavata-purana having

been written by the same author (Vyāsa), Jiva holds that

the Bhāgavata-purāna is the natural auto-commentary of

the author on the Brahma-sūtras.

Date of the Bhāgavata-purana's Composition

Dating the Bhāgavata-purāna has proven to be an exceed-

ingly challenging task for most scholars, despite the

Jiva's use of the term is often closer to a more general sense of empiri- cism.

9 One exception to this general trend is Madhva (1197-1276 CE), who, like the Nyāya school, in addition to accepting the above three pramāņas, also accepts upamāna, or analogy, as a forth valid pramāņa.

15

contradictory claims of a large number of persons to have

succeeded at doing so.10 For example, Winternitz, Suren-

dranath Dasgupta and Vaidya all claim that it was

composed some time during the tenth century of the Com-

mon Era. S. Radhakrishnan and J.N. Farquhar, on the

other hand, both subscribe to the ninth century C.E. as the

probable century of its origin. S.D. Gyani is convinced that

the work can be no later that 1200-1000 B.C.E. Traditional

Hindu sources and scholars consider the Bhāgavata-purāna

to be a work written during the beginning of the present

cyclic age, or yuga. Since our present age, known as kali-

yuga, began in 2976 B.C.E., many Hindu scholars hold that

the Bhagavata-purāna can be no more recent than 2900

B.C.E1.

10 Dating Hindu texts in general has proven to be a difficulty that is not exclusive to the Bhāgavata-purāna. The exact dates of composition of many of the most important ancient texts of the Hindu tradition - including the Bhagavad-gītā, most of the Purānas, the Vedic Samhitas, Upanisads, and Sāstras of every description - has proven to be ex- tremely elusive to both Euro-American and modern Indian scholars. Dates of composition for many of these texts may vary by as much as several thousand years, thus leading to a great deal of contention on the part of modern scholars in their attempts to settle on precise dates for these texts. Possible dates for the Rg Veda, for example, have ranged from 6000 BCE - 1400 BCE.

11 For further debate on the process of dating the Bhāgavata-purāna, see D.R. Mankad, Puranic Chronology, p. x, as well as Clifford Hospi- tal's "Bhagavata-Purana" in Steven Rosen's Vaisnavism: Contemporary Scholars Discuss the Gaudiya Tradition (61).

16

At the very least, we can probably safely conjecture that the

Bhāgavata-purāna was first composed no more recently

than several centuries prior to the life of the Dvaitin phi-

losopher Madhva (1197-1276 C.E.). This we know because

in his own 13th century commentary upon the work, called

the Bhägavata-tatparya-nirnaya, he mentions eight other

commentaries on the Bhagavata-purana that were then in

existence.12 That so many commentaries had already been

written on this Puranic work even prior to Madhva shows

the great authority and importance that Hindu scholars had

obviously bestowed upon the work even then. To conjec-

ture that a work of very recent origin would engender such

respect on the part of such a large number of scholars is

highly unlikely to say the least. Thus, logical inferece dic-

tatates that the Bhāgavata-purāna had to have predated

Madhva's 13th century commentary by many centuries at a

shear minimum.

It is more likely that the work had existed for, at the very

least, several centuries previous to any of these commentar-

12 Included among these commentators, Madhva mentions Hanumāna. It is quite possible that this is the same Hanumāna who wrote the Ha- numannātaka, a play that was known to Bhoja, who himself lived between 600 and 700 C.E.

17

ies coming into being. Additionally, Gaudapāda (ca. 5th

century C.E.), the grand ācārya13 (preceptor) of Samkara,

is known to have employed elements directly taken from

the Bhāgavata-purana in at least two of his works: 1) in his

Māṅdūkya-kārikā, and 2) in his bhāsya (commentary) on

the Uttaragīta.14 This strong evidence seems to prove ra-

ther conclusively that the composition of the work cannot have been more recent than at least the 4th/5th century, if

not centuries or millennia earlier. Whatever the final case

may be, determining the exact date of the Bhāgavata-

purana's creation and composition is not the primary aim of

this present work.

Scope of the Present Work

The following work is a project of philosophical analysis

situated within the field of philosophy of religion. The goal

of this book is not merely to create a hisotrical reporting of

the ideas of certain individual philosophers of antiquity, or

13 The Mahābhārata (12.313.23) compares the functional aspect of an ācārya to a ferryman and the knowledge s/he imparts to the ferry itself. Additionally, three categories of ācärya are distinguished in the Brah- ma-vidyā-upanisad (51-52): 1) codaka, the prompter, 2) bodhaka, the awakener, and 3) moksa-da, the bestower of liberation.

14 For further elaboration, see B.N. Krishnamurti Sharma, Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. XIV, p. 216, Poona.

18

even of the development of specific schools of thought

within the current of history of either Indian or world phi-

losophy. The goal of this work is not to merely provide a

historical account, but it is rather an active and conscious

engagement in the philosophical enterprise with the goal of

objectively examining the nature of Vedic epistemology,

with the ultimate conclusion being that the Vedic means of

approaching a meaningful knowledge of God is the highest

and most effective means of directly knowing, perceiving and experience the Divine. My goal is to both explain the

Vedic approach to knowing God, as well as to prove that the Vedic way of knowing God is the most direct way avail-

able to human beings. Thus, this book is not a work on the

history of philosophy. It is a philosophical work in and of

its very own nature.

In achieving the above goals, I will pursue several contigu-

ous tasks.

A) I will first present a detailed outline of Jīva Gosvāmin's

epistemological theories by placing them within the greater context of the more important schools of both Hindu phi-

losophy and the greater realm of Indian philosophy generally. This will be accomplished by surveying Jīva Gosvämin's theories as contained in his two greatest epis-

19

temological works Tattva-samdarbha and Sarva-samvādinī15

in direct juxtaposition with the epistemological theories of

earlier Indian philosophers - both Hindu and non-Hindu.

This will be done by giving an account of the history and

views of several of the major schools and individuals in the

history of pre-Caitanya Indian philosophy. Such an ap-

proach necessitates that I provide a rather comprehensive

overview of the positions of these earlier philosophers by

analyzing their teachings in their own words, as recorded

in the primary texts ascribed to these respective philoso-

phers.

B) I will then provide an in-depth critical description of the

epistemology of Jīva Gosvāmin himself. In addition to giv-

ing an account of his arguments that will be derived

15 The latter is a six volume work and serves as a summa of Gaudīya Vaisnava philosophy and theology. For this reason, it is primarily the Sat-samdarbha that I will focus on in the present study. This magnum opus of Jiva Gosvamin's is divided into six sections. These include: 1) Tattva-samdarbha ("Composition on Truth"), 2) Bhāgavata-samdarbha ("Composition on God"), 3) Paramātma-samdarbha ("Composition on the Supreme Self"), 4) Bhakti-samdarbha ("Composition on Devo- tion"), 5) Prīti-samdarbha ("Composition on Love"), 6) Krsna- samdarbha ("Composition on Krsna"). Of these six volumes, Tattva- Samdarbha serves both as a summary of the philosophical arguments to be discussed in the work as a whole, as well as an in-depth explanation and defense of the epistemological criteria that Jiva accepts in support of these arguments. It is from the Tattva-samdarbha, then, in addition to the Sarva-samvādinī, that the bulk of Jīva's epistemological theory is derived.

20

directly from his own writings, I will also provide several

original metaphorical devices and examples that are neces-

sary in order to draw out Jiva's position in a way that is more readily accessible to an audience trained in Euro-

American philosophical and methodological concepts, as

well as currently defacto Western-situated, cultural per-

spectival locus standi.

C) I will conduct a systematic critical examination of the

validity of Jīva's epistemological claims from a philosophi- cal, historical and literary perspective. This task will occupy a large portion of my efforts in this work. I will cri- tique Jiva Gosvāmin's four original theories in support of

his argument that the Bhāgavata-purāna is the highest epis-

temological authority in the scriptural canon of the Hindu tradition. I will acknowledge his acceptance of a total of

ten pramanas to be unique in the history of Indian philoso- phy, but of little actual philosophical and epistemological significance. I will then critique his other three arguments

by making reference to various internal inconsistencies in

these arguments that are philosophical, theological and lit-

erary in nature.

D) Fourth, I will explore the implications of Jīva

Gosvāmin's epistemological claims for the interpretation of

21

Vedānta philosophy by assessing his claims in the specific light of the epistemological theories of the three most im- portant Vedānta thinkers: Samkara, Rāmānuja and

Madhva. Jīva Gosvāmin, while appearing to be an original

thinker on a cursory reading, proves upon more rigorous

examination to be highly dependent upon these three ante-

cedent philosophers for much of his epistemological theory.

E) I will then comparatively examine the Vedic concept of

śabda (Divine Word) vis-à-vis the epistemological conclu-

sions of several of the more important non-Hindu

philosophical schools. This begins with comparing śabda

and āpta (reliable persons as valid sources of knowledge)

in the Hindu tradition juxtaposed with similar concepts in

Buddhist philosophy. My emphases in the latter will in-

clude the theories of the well-known Buddhist philosophers

Nagārjuna and Dharmakīrti. My comparative analysis in-

volving European philosophy will include Plato and Augustine. I will perform these comparative studies with

the aim of placing the Vedic concept of abda (Divine

Word) in a more global and trans-historical perspective.

F) I will then look at the possible implications of Jiva's con-

cept of acintya, or inconceivability, in the search for a

22

philosophically valid argument for God's existence.16 This

will be necessarily preceded by a brief overview of the his-

tory of such arguments in the histories of both Indian and

Euro-American philosophy. This section will culminate in a

comparative study of Jiva's idea of acintya (inconceivabil-

ity) and St. Anselm's (1033-1109 C.E.) idea of God as "That

than which nothing greater can be conceived", otherwise

known as the famous Ontological Argument.

G) Lastly, I will briefly examine any possible peripheral

contributions of the concept of śabda (divine word) to the

field of philosophy of religion generally, followed by my

concluding thoughts.

Methodology

There are several methods that can be used in the specific

task of exploring the philosophical content of a historical

thinker's world-view. Among many other techniques of

16 By the term "God", I am not referring to any form of sectarian con- cept such as the "Christian" God versus the "Hindu" God versus the "Islamic God", or even to such theological concepts of personal versus non-personal concepts of Godhead. Rather, I am very simply referring to the more philosophically accepted concept of a summum bonum Ab- solute, i.e., X transcendent source of known reality that is omnicompetent in its sui generis nature. This concept of the Absolute is referred to in the Vedanta tradition by the term "Brahman".

23

analysis currently in use, these methods include:

a) Looking purely at the many inter-linking chains of historical causality responsible for the devel-

opment and maturity of the given thinker's ideas.

b) Exploring the myriad social, economic, psycho-

logical and environmental external conditions

that helped give rise to the person's ideas.

c) Doing a literary analysis of the thinker's works,

often coupled with an attempt to ascertain the

date of composition (if this information is at all

contested).

d) Performing a comparative and/or contrastive

analysis of the philosopher's thought in juxtapo- sition with that of other philosophers,

philosophical schools or world-views.

I will necessarily be employing several of the above indis- pensable research methods in my book in an attempt to

outline the Vedic way of knowing God and critique Jīva

Gosvamin's ideas.

24

All of these techniques can, in turn, theoretically be done

from either a Marxist, or a feminist, or a post-modernist, or

a materialist, or a deconstructionist, or a Christian, or a

Freudian perspective, among many other ideological op-

tions. Additionally, which method the author employs in

writing a philosophical account depends to a great degree upon whether the author wishes to a) only provide an ac- count of the philosophical content of the historical figure in question, or b) engage in an additional conscious philoso-

phical assessment of the ideas discussed.

In the present work, it is my hope that I will be performing

both of these latter tasks. I will be systematically recon-

structing the thought of Jiva Gosvamin with the express

purpose of assessing his theories on the specific question of

what constitutes the highest scriptural authority in Hindu-

ism - and thus the highest epistemological authority in

Hindu (vaidika) philosophy.

The specific methods that I will use in this book include a)

literary analyses of several primary Sanskrit sources (pri- marily Jīva Gosvāmin's Tattva-samdarbha), b) a historical

analysis of the philosophical antecedents responsible for the formulating of Jiva's thought, c) and performing com- parative studies of Jiva's thought in comparison to other

25

Asian and Euro-American schools of thought. Additionally,

I will explore what significance the phenomenological ex-

perience of the samādhi (meditative absorption) state

experienced by the rsis (the ancient revealers of Hindu

scriptures) may have had in the formulation of śabda the-

ory.

The primary task of my book, however, is not limited solely

to a historical reporting of Jīva Gosvāmin's epistemology,

but to an active and conscious philosophical analysis on my

part of his epistemology employing the tools of proposi-

tional and veridical analysis17 as they are found and used in

both the Western and Hindu fields of philosophy. Rather

17 While traditional Aristotelian logic is only formal, i.e., only seeks to discern whether an argument is structurally valid, for general Indian logic, arguments must be sound (true) in addition to being valid. Pro- positional analysis is a method for determining whether x truth-claim is structurally valid within the context of formal logical principles. Veridical analysis, a new term that I have personally created, seeks to know, additionally, whether X truth-claim corresponds with the truth of reality. E.G .: A) All Leprechauns are Deontologists. B) Matthew is a Leprechaun. C) Therefore Matthew is a Deontologist. While such a claim is structurally sound, it is also not true, given the generally ac- cepted non-existence of leprechauns. Hindu logic is predicated upon the idea that logical claims that are not consistent with the reality of the situation under question are somewhat akin to speculating about the color of the unicorn who ate my flower garden last night as I slept. To analyse any epistemological theory that is predicated upon the im- portance of revealing truth, without then analyzing the nature of the "truth" arrived upon by that method, is to be intellectually lethargic and ethically dishonest. Thus my decision to employ Veridical Analysis thoughout this work.

26

than just reporting on philosophy, then, the real aim of my

book will be to actually do philosophy in a very active

sense. The actual purpose of this work is to examine the

Vedic way of knowing and directly experiencing God.

Since I will be very consciously using Hindu tools and

methods of philosophical analysis, in addition to the stan-

dardly accepted Euro-American methods, in my task of

examining Jiva Gosvamin's world-view, this work can be

justifiably described as a specific instance of Hindu phi-

losophy in contemporary application, in addition to being a

work of philosophy of religion generally.

The Term "Vaidika" (Vedic) in the Normative and the Post-

Vedic Sense

In the normative sense of the term "vaidika", or "Vedic", is a

word that refers to the Vedic culture of ancient India (c.

4500-2500 BCE), as well as to those individuals who follow

that culture, both historically and in the present day. Thus,

rather than referring only to the practices, outlooks, and

cultural norms of the ancient Vedic society as it was civili-

zationally instantiated in ancient times, the term "vaidika"

represents a continuity of religious culture and tradition that is still being practiced down to our very present day.

In this regard, I, along with the majority of modern schol-

27

ars of South Asian religion, reject the outmoded "Aryan In-

vasion Theory", which postulated the notion that Vedic

culture was a phenomenon extrinsic to the South Asian

sub-continent, and imperialistically imposed upon the "na-

tive" inhabitants by force. Georg Feuerstein sums up the

fallacious nature of this invalidated theory:

Until recently, most Western and Indian scho- lars tended to emphasize the element of discontinuity in India's cultural evolution. In partictular, they saw a clash between the civi- lization of the Indus Valley and the Vedic "Aryan" culture, which they thought origi- nated outside of India. However, this long- standing theory of the Aryan invasion is now being vigorously challenged. A growing number of scholars, both in India and in the West, regard this historical model as a scien- tific myth, which was constructed in the absence of adequate evidence and which has adversely influenced our understanding of ancient India's history and culture.

(82)

The terms "Vaidika"/"Vedic" refers to a continuous, ho-

mogenous, and unbroken religio-cultural tradition

stretching back beyond the mists of pre-history, and con- tinuing to be actively and faithfully practiced to this very day. The appellation "vaidika" is, thus, properly used to

28

designate those who have orally transmitted the Vedas,

who accept the validity of the Vedas as the most authorita-

tive means of understanding our place in the universe, and

who manually perform the grhya and śrauta yajñas down

to our own era.

Traditional Vedic culture was based upon several genres of

texts, known collectively as the śruti literature. According

to David Knipe,

"This vast body of shruti included in antiquity as many as several score of separate texts. Over the centuries many were lost, but the extant corpus is still enormous, with some of the survivors reaching more than a thousand pages in contemporary printed editions. From the nontraditional, text-critical point of view this corpus is a series of genres that re- quired a full millennium to complete."

(Knipe, 28)

Śruti consists of four collections, or genres, of texts: the

Samhitas, the Brahmanas, the Āranyakas and the

Upanisads. The Samhita texts consist of four scriptures: the

Rg, Yajur, Sāma, and Atharva Samhitas. These texts were

all composed approximately 4000-2000 BCE. The Rg-veda exists primarily in the form of hymns to the Vedic gods,

29

such as Indra, Agni, Mitra, etc. The Yajur-veda is a manual

of mantras and directions important for the performance of

ritual sacrifice. The Sāma-veda is an index of melodies

used in the soma yajña. Finally, the Atharva-veda is con-

cerned mostly with domestic and popular religion. It

contains spells, charms and mantras designed to be healing

in nature. (Knipe, 28)

The Brāhmanas (2600-1500 BCE) are a voluminous collec-

tion of texts that are primarily concerned with explanations

of the Vedic sacrifice. The Āranyakas (late Vedic era) and

the Upanisads (1900-1500 BCE) are both considered "forest

treatise" genres and contain similar material. Both deal

with sacred teachings about the metaphysical meaning of

sacrifice, as well as the nature of Brahman (God) and

atman (self). Toward the end of the Vedic era (around

2100-1900 BCE), various ritual manuals known as the Śrauta-sūtras, containing rules and directions for the more

important yajñas (fire ceremonies) were compiled and ed-

ited. The Śrauta-sūtras, along with the Grhya-sūtras

(which deal with domestic rituals) and the Dharma-sūtras

(general compilations of religious law), are known collec-

tively as the Kalpa-sūtras.

30

The early Vedic world-view and religion involved several

integral elements. These include 1) the Cosmic Purusa

concept, 2) the replication of the sacrifice of the Cosmic Purusa, and 3) the centrality of the metaphysical law of rta.

With the Cosmic Purusa concept, the cosmos is seen as a

projection of the body of a mythical cosmic man (the literal meaning of purusa), who is widely interpreted to be God.

The yajña (fire ceremony) ritual is seen as a formulaic rep-

lication of this primordial sacrifice. According to the Vedic

view, it is the ongoing responsibility of humanity to regen-

erate and sustain the cosmos via sacrifice (yajña). Indeed,

until we reach the Upanisadic era, the Vedic religion is

primarily centered upon a deep dedication to ritual and ya- jña. Even in the Upanisads themselves, the Veda is seen as

speculation about ritual, about yajña. As a precursor to the

later concept of Dharma (the Natural Law that undergirds

reality), rta is seen as the trans-empirical ordering principle

behind all events and phenomena in the empirical world.

Though the terms "Vedic" and "vaidika" are normatively

used to indicate the specific world-view and religious prac-

tices of the pre-Purānic era, the same appellations are also appropriated by textually post-Vedic, Classical schools of Hindu philosophy and ritual, and in many cases rightfully

31

so. Some of these Classical schools adhere closely to de-

scendants of the various śakhas, or branches of Vedic ritual,

while others are only partially involved in actual Vedic rit-

ual. Still some other post-Vedic traditions are quite remote from the Vedic school in both adherence to the Vedic texts

and in their ritual systems. For many of these post-Vedic

schools, the terms "Vedic" and "vaidika" include later texts,

such as the Puranas. It is in this latter sense that Jīva

Gosvämin is to be considered a Vaidika philosopher, even

though he regards other texts - specifically the Bhāgavata-

purana - as higher in authority than the four textually ac-

cepted Vedas themselves.

Used in a broader context, the term "vaidika" has two asso-

ciated, yet rather different, meanings. One is the meaning

outlined above, i.e., a follower of the ancient Vedic culture

and world-view in the strictest sense of upholding and

practicing the elaborately ritual-centered ceremonies out-

lined in the Vedic corpus. The second meaning, however,

is much more philosophical and theological in nature, and

refers ultimately to the epistemological stance taken by the

traditional schools of Hindu philosophy. In this sense the word "vaidika" is employed to differentiate those schools of

Indian philosophy that accept the epistemological validity

32

of the Veda, juxtaposed with the avaidika schools that do

not. Stated in simpler terms, "Vaidika" simply refers to

those persons who accept the Veda as their sacred scrip-

ture, and thus as their source of valid knowledge about

spiritual matters. Any follower of the Vedas is a Vaidika.

In this latter interpretation of the term, vaidika is more

commonly used in the non-normative, more textually inclu-

sive, sense of the term.

Clarification of Terminology: "Hindu" Versus

Vaidika/Vedic

Rather than use either the prevailing, but painfully am-

biguous and inaccurate term "Hindu", or the wholly

erroneous and overly-employed word "Brahmanical", I have

very consciously decided to use more historically accurate,

even if more doctrinally technical, terms throughout this

work in respect for this tradition. The terms "Vaidika" and

"Vedic" refer to the Veda-based religious and philosophical

traditions of South Asia throughout the bulk of this work.

These are, thus, the primary terms that I will use in this book.18

18 By the term "Veda-based", I am including both Veda in the normative sense, meaning specifically the śruti literature, as well as in the more textually inclusive traditions of post-Vedic Hinduism.

33

The term "Hindu" is not attested to in any of the pre-

medieval Sanskrit literature, especially the philosophical

and theological literature. Additionally, it is not a term

that has been either indigenous to the region that gave

birth to the Vedic religion or employed by the followers of

this religio-philosophical world-view until only rather re-

cently (the last two or three centuries). The inaccurate

words "Hindu" and "Hinduism" became terms of legal sig-

nificance only beginning in the 19th century under the

British Raj. Klaus Klostermaier explains the origin of the

term "Hindu" in the following way:

The very name Hinduism owes its origin to chance; foreigners in the West extending the name of the province of Sindh to the whole country lying across the Indus River and sim- ply calling all its inhabitants Hindus and their religion Hinduism. Hindus, however, appro- priated the designation and use it themselves today to identify themselves over against, for example, Muslims and Christians.

(Klostermaier, 31)

Thus, the terms "Hindu" and "Hinduism" are words that,

while possibly convenient in usage, are neither accurate nor useful in any historical, religious or philosophical

sense.

34

"Brahmanical", in a similar vein, is a term used mostly by

Euro-American scholars to specifically designate the ideas,

social culture and supposed political maneuverings of only

one varna (class) of "Hindus", namely the brahmanas (the

priests and intellectuals who served as the guardians and

preservers of Vedic culture). This term, however, is of a

highly disingenuous nature since it implies that the only

"Hindus" who ever took the philosophy, culture and relig-

ion of "Hinduism" to be of any personal significance were

the brahmanas, and even then, merely as a mechanism for

ensuring their own political and economic dominance over

the other three varnas (classes). Such a politically loaded

claim, overtly stated, would be wholly unsupportable to say

the least. Using the term "brahmanical" to refer to the

Vaidika religion is as derogatory, bigoted, and disingenu- ous as using the woefully outdated terms "Popish" to refer

to the Roman Catholic Church, or "Lamaist" to refer to Ti-

betan and Mongolian Buddhism.

More precisely, the ancient and living religious tradition

that is predicated upon the Vedic scriptures is termed Sanātana Dharma by the Sanskrit scriptures of this tradi-

tion, as well as by both the leaders and practitioners of this

religion throughout its very long history, and to this very

35

day. The term Sanātana Dharma can be translated as "The

Eternal Natural Way". Sanātana Dharma is the true, most

accurate, and most acceptible name of the religion that is

mistakenly called "Hinduism". Sanātana Dharma repre-

sents the correct name of this religio-philosophical system

from a metaphysical, historical, and broadly ideological

perspective. "Vaidika", on the other hand, is the name of

the very same tradition as reflected in the more specifically

epistemological and scripturally-oriented concerns of the

tradition, as well as in juxtaposition to those religio-

philosophical schools that lay outside of the Vedic tradition. Thus, both Sanātana Dharma and Vaidika Dharma are al-

ternative technical terms both of which refer synonymously

to the one Vedic spiritual tradition. This being a work fo-

cusing upon Vedic epistemology per se, I will thus use the

term "Vaidika" to refer to the tradition, rather than the

more broadly used "Sanātana Dharma".

Unlike the misnomer "Hindu", the word "vaidika" is clearly

attested to in the Sanskrit literature - especially in the re-

ligio-philosophical and logic treatises that will serve as the

primary sources for the present book - and is employed re-

peatedly and consciously by the very subjects under discussion in this work, i.e., the philosophers of the seven main philosophical schools of the Vaidika (Hindu) tradi-

36

tion. The term, very significantly and simply, denotes

those who accept the epistemological (and thus more

broadly religio-philosophical) authority of the Vedas.

Within the tradition of the Sapta-darśanas (the seven main

schools of Vedic thought), Vaidika philosophy has been his-

torically distinguished from avaidika schools of thought - or

philosophical systems not based upon acceptance of the au-

thority of the Vedas. Though Jiva Gosvamin is of the

heterodox opinion that the smrti literature takes prece-

dence over the śruti literature, he nonetheless is clearly a

Vaidika philosopher since he does accept the ultimate au-

thority of the Veda - even if not its supreme authority.

Such minimal epistemological acceptance of the Veda is

precisely what distinquishes a follower of Vedic spirituality

from someone who is not.

Keen accuracy in the employment of terminology is of cen-

tral importance for any field that purports the uncovering of truth as its primary aim. This is the case whether we are

speaking of any of the serious sciences, or of philosophy as

a whole. Thus, in order to ensure accuracy in terminology, I will be consciously and deliberately using the terms Vai- dika and Vedic, rather than the meaningles terms

37

"Hindu"/"Hinduism", throughout the pages of this book to

refer to the Veda-based religious tradition.

Literature Review

Quite unlike the case with the better known Indian phi-

losophers (e.g., Samkara and Rāmānuja), direct scholarship

expositing the thought and writings of Jīva Gosvāmin is

very scant indeed. The present book represents the first

systematic academic attempt to examine Jīva Gosvāmin's epistemology in English. There are two translations of Jīva's Tattva-samdarbha: one scholarly translation by Stuart

Elkman (Jīva Gosvāmin's Tattvasandarbha, 1986) and one

done by the two Hare Krishna devotees Nārāyaņa Dāsa and

Kuņdalī Dāsa (Srī Tattva-Sandarbha, 1995). Additionally,

Tripurāri Svāmī, a Hare Krishna writer, has attempted a

non-academic summary study of Jīva's Tattva-samdarbha

entitled Jiva Goswami's Tattva-Sandarbha (1995). Jīva

Gosvāmin's other five Samdarbhas have yet to be translated

into English at the time of this writing.

The only secondary works dealing directly with Jīva

Gosvämin's thought are Mahanamabrata Brahmachari's Vaisņava Vedānta: The Philosophy of Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī.

38

(1974) and Jadunath Sinha's Jīvagosvāmī's Religion of Devo-

tion and Love. (1983). In addition to these, however, there

are several good works that focus upon the overall philoso-

phy of the Gaudiya Vaisnava school (Jīva Gosvāmin's

lineage) in a more general manner. These works include

O.B.L. Kapoor's excellent work The Philosophy and Religion

of Śri Caitanya (1976), Sudhindra Chandra Chakravarti's

Philosophical Foundation of Bengal Vaisnavism (1969) and

Chanda Chatterjee's The Philosophy of Chaitanya and His

School (1993). In addition to these scholarly works outlin-

ing the general philosophy of Gaudīya Vaisnavism, there

are several non-academic works written by followers of the

sect. Among the latter are Swami B.V. Tirtha's Sri

Chaitanya's Concept of Theistic Vedanta (1977) and Suhotra

Swami's Substance and Shadow: The Vedic Method of Knowl-

edge (1996).

In addition to works directly and indirectly outlining the

philosophical content of Jiva Gosvämin's thought, there are

a number of scholarly works that detail various aspects of

the historical development of the Gaudīya Vaisnava tradi-

tion. These works include: Ramakanta Chakraborty's

Vaisnavism in Bengal: 1486-1900 (1985), A.N. Chatterjee's

Srikrsna Caitanya: A Historical Study on Gaudīya

39

Vaisnavism (1983), Sambidananda Das' The History & Lit-

erature of the Gaudiya Vaishnavas and Their Relation to

Other Medieval Vaishnava Schools (1991) and Melville T.

Kennedy's classic work The Chaitanya Movement: A Study of

the Vaisnavism of Bengal (1925). In addition to these scho-

larly works, one non-academic volume that I will cite in my

biographical sketch of Jīva Gosvāmin is Steven Rosen's

Hare Krishna-inspired The Six Goswamis of Vrindavan

(1990).

40

41

Chapter II

The Philosophical Milieu

The Vaidika Literary Tradition

So vast and comprehensive is the entire corpus of tradi-

tional Sanskrit literature that, to this day, the full extent of

these, in some cases quite ancient writings, 19 has never

been fully cataloged by either traditional Indian scholars,

or by Euro-American trained academicians.20 At the very

least, however, these many works can be divided into sev-

eral very broad categories of genres.

The first of these distinctions can be seen as 1) Secular Lit-

erature, and 2) Sacred Literature. The former category is

quite small and includes such works as the Hitopadeśa, the

19 For example, the oldest literary work originating from the South Asian subcontinent is the Rg-veda, which is given highly diverse dates by various scholars as possible dates of composition, ranging from 6000 BCE to 1200 BCE. I have accepted the date of 3800 BCE as the most probable date for the first instance of the Rg-veda appearing in compo- sitional form.

20 We are aware of an estimated 3.5 million manuscripts in public and private libraries in India and abroad. Of these, a mere 1.5 million have been cataloged. Much fewer of this number have ever been translated into English. The New Catalogus Catalogorum has been published only half way through and even this incomplete catalog comprises close to 20 volumes of names of authors and works presently extant.

42

kāvya (poetic) works of such poets as Kalidāsa, and various

court documents. Reflecting the overarching centrality of

religious consciousness in ancient Vedic society, the vast

bulk of traditional Vaidika writings clearly fall under the

Sacred Literature category.

This category is variously termed by many traditional Vedic

scholars as "Veda"21, śruti, śāstra, śabda, etc. In the present

work, I will often refer to the sacred writings of the Vaidika

tradition under the more philosophically technical term of

Śāstra-pramāna, or epistemically revelatory literature. This

enormous library of sacred writings consists, in itself, of a

vast array of different genres, formats and literary styles,

and can again be divided into the three broad categories of

a) śruti, b) smrti and c) ancillary sacred texts. The former

(śruti) are those works which are "heard" by liberated rsis

(seers, perfected yogīs who revealed Truth) via direct non-

mediated perception of the Absolute, while the contents of

the next category (smrti) are considered to be "remem-

bered", and thereby usually considered to be of a slightly

less sacred nature than śruti. Ancillary texts are works that

contain important and authoritative writings on theological

21 "Veda", of course, not merely in the more denotative sense of the four Veda-samhitas, but in the more generic sense in which the word is intended: that of "knowledge" of the sacred.

43

and philosophical topics, but which are not generally con-

sidered to be revealed texts. Some ancillary texts, such as

the Brahma-sūtras, are broadly accepted as authoritative

throughout the entirety of the Vaidika ("Hindu") world,

both historically and trans-denominationally; others are of

a more limited and clearly denominational nature.22

Of these many genres of literature, it is the sutras that hold

the most fascination for historians of general Indian phi-

losophy. Sūtras (literally "threads") are overtly

philosophical works. The style of these sūtras involve very

short aphorisms designed to communicate sophisticated

philosophical concepts in such a way as to be easily memo-

rized by students. Dasgupta describes the nature and

function of Vaidika sutras in the following way.

The systematic treatises were written in short and pregnant half-sentences (sūtras) which did not elaborate the subject in detail, but seemed only to hold before the reader the lost threads of memory of elaborate disquisi- tions with which he was already thoroughly acquainted. It seems, therefore, that these pithy half-sentences were like lecture hints, intended for those who had direct elaborate oral instructions on the subject. It is indeed difficult to guess from the sūtras the extent of

22 Such works include various Tantras, Pañcaratras and Agamic texts.

44

their significance, or how far the discussions which they gave rise to in later days were originally intended by them.

(Dasgupta, vol. 1, p.63)

At least one sutra work is ascribed to every individual

school of Vedic philosophy. For example, there are the

Nārada-bhakti-sūtras and the Sāndilya-bhakti-sūtras of the Bhagavata school. There is also a Ñyāya-sūtra (treatise on

logic), a Vaiśesika-sūtra (treatise on categories of reality),

and a Yoga-sūtra (teatise on Yoga philosophy), among

many others. In addition to all the many Vaidika sūtras,

there are also a number of Buddhist and Jaina sūtras.23 Of

the many different sutra works still extant, the most fa-

mous by far are the Brahma-sūtras (treatise on the

Absolute) of Bādarāyaņa (Vyāsa). Designed to be a partial

commentary on the philosophy of the Upanisads, it is the

Brahma-sūtras that form the textual basis of the Vedānta

school of Vaidika philosophy.

Philosophy as World-View Versus Geographically Bound

Philosophy

23 Unlike Vaidika sūtras, Buddhist sūtras are very often written in a non-aphoristic style.

45

Before I commence with the historical and applied philoso-

phy portions of this work, it would be helpful to first give a

brief overview of the philosophical milieu in which Jīva's

ideas were born. The philosophical outlook of the Vaidika

tradition is somewhat different from what we know as con-

temporary Euro-American philosophy. What I am

juxtaposing as Euro-American versus specifically Vaidika

philosophy throughout this work is not to be confused with

the categories of Indian versus Euro-American philosophy

in any geographical, ethnic, nor even any necessarily his-

torical, sense. Rather, I am contrasting the totality of

Vaidika philosophy as a living school of thought versus

modern, post-Cartesian Euro-American philosophy-4 as two

distinct paradigmatic approaches, two distinct world-views,

regardless of whether the philosopher or idea in question is

of geographically Indian or of European origin. Philosophy

deals with the realm of ideas, and not nationalities. This

distinction is, thus, one of general philosophical stances,

and not one of ethnicities.

Thus, even a contemporary Indian philosopher who uses

24 Ranging from roughly the 17th Century to the present day, and in- corporating much of what is often considered post-Medieval Euro- American philosophy.

46

methods, ideas, attitudes and approaches that stem from

the Euro-American philosophical tradition is to be consid-

ered someone who is engaging in Euro-American (or,

alternately, "Western") philosophy - either consciously or

unconsciously - despite the fact that the philosopher may

be ethnically Indian. Conversely, if a particular philoso-

pher is American, European or of any other non-Indian

nationality, but employs traditional Vaidika methodological

procedures and insights in her task of doing philosophy,

and especially if this philosopher accepts the epistemologi-

cal authority of the Vedas, then that individual is doing

philosophy from a purely Vaidika context, and this is so re- gardless of the person's ethnicity. The distinction is one of

method, approach and goal, and not one of the philoso- pher's nationality or the geographic influence of the

philosophical idea under discussion.

Additionally, the distinctions between Vaidika and Euro-

American philosophy must not be seen as being historically

bound. Contrary to much of the current academic attitude

toward Vaidika philosophy, the Vaidika schools are not to

be relegated to merely historical importance. To relegate

Vaidika philosophy to the past, while claiming that only Western philosophy is a "modern", living and dynamic phi- losophical trend would be incorrect since there are many

47

brilliant Vaidika philosophers actively doing philosophy to-

day. The Vaidika philosophical outlook is very much a

living and vibrant and relevant tradition of thought, as is

attested to by the presence of many living Vaidika philoso-

phers today actively engaged in doing Vaidika philosophy

in contemporary application. Such individuals as Dr.

B.N.K. Sharma, Dr. S.M. Srinivasa Chari, Dr. O.B.L. Kapoor,

and many others, are vivid proof of the fact that Vaidika

philosophy is still a dynamic and active school of thought,

completely engaged in scholarly and theological interface

with the various world-views of our contemporary global

culture. Indeed, this very book itself must be classified as a

clear instance of Vaidika philosophy in contemporary appli-

cation.

Differences Between Vaidika and Euro-American

Philosophy

Generally speaking, the modern, post-Cartesian Euro-

American approach to philosophic inquiry purportedly

seeks to find an objective vantage point from which to ana- lyze and properly order the many subjective perspectives

48

that constitute what is then termed "reality".25 The Vaidika

approach, by contrast, has sometimes been called a subjec-

tive attempt to find the ultimate objective.

While contemporary Western philosophy can be said to

solely stress theory, dialectic and discursive deductive rea-

soning, the traditional philosophical trends in Asia have

been said to put more of an emphasis on intuitive insight

and introspection, intimately coupled with the modalities

of logical reasoning. The Vaidika philosophical schools

have never neglected the more holistic, interactive and ex-

periential approaches to acquiring knowledge. While the

Vaidika approach certainly employs the tools of systematic

logical analysis to just as effective a degree as the Euro-

American tradition has done, it also refuses to reject any

aspect of the human experience as being inconsequential to

the proper construction of a holistic philosophical world-

view. One could say that Vaidika philosophers took Socra-

tes' fundamental recommendation to "Know Thyself"

(gnothi seauton, Gr.) and ran with it ... and this, many cen-

turies before Socrates was even born.

25 Additionally, of course, there are relativists, skeptics and de- constructionists in Western philosophy who - like Nāgārjuna millennia before - seek the total negation of anything that would be recognized as an objective reality.

49

The contrast between these two relatively distinct ap-

proaches becomes even more apparent when we look at the

respective goals of each. For the contemporary Euro-

American philosopher, knowledge is something that is usu-

ally considered to be divorced from the actual practical

activities and behavior that the philosopher engages in.

Truth is not lived and practiced. Rather it is merely a topic

to be pondered. This is not the case for the traditional Vai-

dika philosopher, for whom philosophy necessarily serves

as a pragmatic guide to everyday life, in addition to a cog-

nitive road map to loftier metaphysical concerns. For most

Vaidika philosophers, one's philosophy is something that is

not merely thought, but is something that necessarily in-

forms and guides the entirety of one's life, in addition to

being thought.26 Philosophy is not just theoretical ... it is

personal. Philosophy is also very much goal-oriented. For

Vaidika philosophers, the philosophic enterprise is ulti-

mately a spiritual endeavor, with personal enlightenment

as the goal. This is a dimension of the philosophic life that

has been consciously and eagerly abandoned by the major-

ity of contemporary Euro-American philosophers from at least the 17th Century to the present day.

26 One of the possible exceptions to this rule, it has been argued, might be the Nyaya school of philosophy.

50

While theory and practice are - ideally - meant to go hand-

in-hand for the traditional Vaidika philosopher, this em-

phasis on a lived philosophy is not to be enjoyed at the expense of reason and the other tools that we in the post-

modern West have come to associate with the philosophic

enterprise. According to Mahanamabrata, a contemporary philosopher in the tradition of Jīva Gosvāmin, the task of

the traditional Vaidika philosopher consists of

" ... formulating a rational and systematic account of the na-

ture of God, man and the world, and the relation between

God and man, God and the world, and man and the world,

considered cosmologically, psychologically and epistemo- logically" (Mahanamabrata, 36). The most conspicuous

feature of Vedic philosophy, then, seems to be an attempt

to employ the very tools of rationality so familiar to the

modern West to better gain a direct personal experience of

the transrational, or the metaphysical.

This attempt at an integral approach on the part of Vaidika

philosophers is in complete contradiction to the many

hackneyed stereotypes of so-called "Eastern" philosophy

painted by even some of the most respected academicians

of both India and the West. Many have attempted to por-

tray the Vaidika and Euro-American approaches to

philosophic thought as being almost distinct opposites in

51

their respective natures and concerns. Even Raimundo

Panikkar makes the interesting, yet highly problematic,

statement that "Greece asks impersonally about the nature

of knowledge. Greece wants to know knowledge. India

asks with a personal and existential urge about the nature

of the knower. India wants to know the knower." (119)

This seems to me to be a very stereotypical and shallow ex-

planation of the purported differences between these two

venerable traditions, if for no other reason than that it is a

plainly false statement.

While it might possibly be argued that "India" is ultimately

seeking to know subjective reality, it would be entirely

wrong to imply that "India" has pursued this experiential project to the utter detriment of also seeking to broaden

the scope of knowledge for its very own sake, in addition to

the sake of seeking the knower. As will become rapidly

apparent in the proceeding chapters of the present work, "India" (which should actually read "Vedic philosophy") has developed - at various times or another in its millennia-old

history - her own indigenous versions of many of the great-

est intellectual developments attributed to European

history. In the fields of logic, linguistics, mathematics, on-

tology, ethics, epistemology, philosophy of science, aesthetics, political and social philosophy, psychology,

52

metaphysics, and many other fields besides, the Vedic intel-

lectual tradition has laid as much emphasis on the pursuit

of scholarly excellence and intellectual progress as has the

Euro-American intellectual tradition. Indeed, in some in-

stances, it is easily arguable that the Vaidika tradition has

even surpassed the Western philosophical tradition in intel-

lectual development and philosophical discovery, as well as

in being historically first to innovate such discoveries.

What makes Vaidika philosophy truly distinct from the

post-Cartesian Euro-American philosophical tradition is not

that it has an opposite emphasis or concern from the latter.

Rather, Vaidika philosophy has shared many of the same

foci, methodologies and developments that have been the

hallmark of Euro-American philosophy. What makes "In-

dia" different from "Greece" is that the former did not

artificially limit its foci, methodologies and developments

to those of the latter. In addition to pursuing intellectual

development for its own sake, the Vaidika philosophical

tradition has always viewed the intellect as being merely a

tool for the discovery of a higher faculty of the human per-

son - that higher faculty being synonymous with the highest faculty - the element of consciousness per se, which

is, as we shall soon see, purely transrational in its very na-

ture.

53

Sapta-darśanas: The Seven Schools of Philosophy

This Vaidika approach to the philosophic enterprise became

institutionally manifest in the seven primary traditional

philosophies27 that I call the Sapta-darśanas, or seven

schools of philosophy. These schools include Sāmkhya,

Nyāya, Yoga, Vaiśesika, Vyākaraņa, Mīmāmsā and

Vedänta.28 United in their respect for, and acceptance of,

the Vedic scriptural corpus as an authoritative vehicle for

knowing the nature of reality, these various schools have

historically emphasized different, if clearly overlapping, as-

pects of philosophical concern. Following is a brief

overview of the positions and areas of concern of these

27 While many contemporary authors on Hinduism maintain that there are only six schools of philosophy (sad-darsanas), I contend that there are actually seven traditional schools of philosophy (sapta-darśanas) with the addition of the very important, if often overlooked, Vyākaraņa school.

28 In addition to these "orthodox" Vaidika philosophical traditions, there are several other systems - both "orthodox" and "heterodox" - that have been recognized by both historians of philosophy, as well as within the history of Indian philosophy itself. In his Sarva-darśana- samgraha, for example, Mādhava Ācārya (a 14th century Advaita phi- losopher not to be confused with the Madhva who is the main philosopher of the Dvaita school) includes Cārvākas (atheist empiri- cists), Bauddhas (Buddhists) and Arhata (Jains) among the non-Vedic schools; and Paniniya and Saiva among the Vedic. The differentiation between "orthodox" and "heterodox" rests upon acceptance of the Vedic revelation, with the latter rejecting the sanctity of the Veda.

54

seven schools.

Sāņkhya

First systematized by the sage Kapila (ca. 1290 BCE), 29

Sāmkhya is possibly the most ancient of these seven

schools. Sāmkhya thought represents " ... that school or sys-

tem which emphasizes the enumeration of principles,

evolutes or emergents." (Larson, 2) It is a dualistic system

in which the two distinct and formative principles of purusa

(spirit) and prakrti (matter) dominate the metaphysical

landscape. As Surendranath Dasgupta explains the doc-

trine, "The Sāmkhya philosophy as we have it now admits

two principles, souls and prakrti." (238) Purusa is the con-

scious principle that constitutes the multiple individual

selves that inhabit and animate the bodies of every living

thing. Being pure consciousness in and of itself, purusa

(spirit) is eternal, incorruptible, self-illuminated and self-

illuminating, unalterable, uncaused and all-pervasive by

nature. Our individual conscious self transcends the limita-

tions of the body, mind, senses and intellect, which are

prakrtic in nature. Its present connection with the force

29 Pañcasikha is known to have been a disciple of Āsuri, who may in turn have been identical with a disciple of Kapila mentioned in the Mahābhārata.

55

known as prakrti (matter) is one of temporary, even if not

easily surmountable, entrapment.

Prakrti is the very antithesis of our spiritual selves, being by

nature limited, changeable, enervating and corrupting.

Prakrti, calm, equipoised and unitary in its quiescent state,

devolves from this state of equilibrium to a reality of vi-

brant multiplicity and diversity as a result of contact with

purusa. As Larson explains this evolutionary process, " ... it

is by the association or proximity of these two diverse prin-

ciples - purusa and prakrti - that the world as we know it

appears. Without this association or proximity of prakrti

and purusa, there would be no worldly existence or human

experience." (Larson, 12) The goal of human life, accord-

ing to the Sāmkhya school, is for our individual purusa

(spirit) to regain our state of freedom beyond the bondage

of prakrti's limiting influence. These Sāmkhyan themes are to be encountered continuously throughout the long history of both Vaidika and Indian philosophy.30

30 We find the idea of prakrti/purusa repeated, for example, in both the Bhagavad-gītā and Yoga-sūtras of Patañjali.

56

Nyāya

Nyāya31 was founded by Aksapāda Gautama (ca. 550 BCE) 31

and represents the formal beginning of the Indian tradition

of logic and epistemology. "The Nyāya school", says Jai

Singh, "can, in a way, be said to be the founder of Indian

epistemology. Most of the other Indian theories of knowl-

edge are in some or the other way influenced by Nyāya

logic and epistemology." (ix) Generally speaking, the objec-

tive of the Nyaya school is to create a "concrete method of

discriminating valid knowledge from invalid ... " (Tigunait,

69), as well as truth from falsehood, using the arsenal of

logic and discursive reasoning. Nyāya employs a very sys-

tematic regime of logic formulae involving sixteen different

divisions of philosophical concerns, goals and means.

These divisions, known as the padārthas, are outlined in

the following chart:

31 This school of philosophy is known in the philosophical texts by a very wide variety of names, ānviksikī, tarka-śāstra, ñyāya-vistāra, ñyāya-darśana, hetu-vidyā, hetu-śāstra, vāda-vidyā, and pramāņa-śāstra being only several of the more important ones.

57

Nyaya Padarthas

pramāņa: the valid sources of knowledge.

prameya: the proper object of knowledge.

samśaya: the state of doubt or uncertainty.

prayojana: the aim of the philosophical endeavor.

drstānta: the example.

siddhānta: the perfect conclusion.

avayava: the constituents of inference.

tarka: hypothetical arguments.

nirnaya: conclusion.

bādha: discussion.

jalpa: discursive wrangling.

vitandā: irrational arguments.

hetvābāsa: specious reasoning.

chala: unfair reply.

jāti: a generality based upon a false analo- gy.

nigrahasthāna: the grounds for defeat.

58

As with the other seven schools of the classical Vaidika tra-

dition, the chosen means of acquiring truth that we find in

the Nyäya system are not considered ends in and of them-

selves, but are merely tools for achieving the final goal of

all Vedic philosophical systems: liberation from the binding

grips of samsāra (the cycle of birth and death).

Yoga

Yoga, our next school under discussion, is Vaidika philoso-

phical thought in overtly practical application. It is a

philosophy whose chief aim is to reunite the presently

alienated individual soul (atman) with the Absolute

(Brahman). Though evidence of this school of thought can

be traced back at least as far as the early Harappan/Indus

Valley civilization,32 the name most clearly associated with

this path is Patañjali, the author of the famed Yoga-sūtras

32 Among the earliest images that we have from ancient Aryavarta civi- lization are Harappan seals from as early as 2,100-1750 B.C.E. depicting people seated in what clearly appears to be padmāsana, or the easily recognizable "lotus pose", found in hatha-yoga. The Paśupati image, which depicts a very early form of Siva, is especially well- known. The Paśupati image is, in turn, remarkably similar in appear- ance to the antlered figure shown on Plate A of the famous Gundestrup cauldron of 1st century BCE Danish Celtic origin, showing the truly geographically expansive nature of both Yoga and Vedic influence.

59

(ca. 150 B C E).33 In 1:2 of his sūtras, Patañjali defines the

goal of Yoga as citta-vrtti nirodhah, or "The restriction of

the modifications of the mind". In addition to the neces-

sary acquisition of knowledge that is stressed in other

schools of Vaidika philosophy, the classical Yoga system of

Patañjali stresses eight limbs (astānga), or techniques, that

lead their practitioners toward the goal of perfection.

These eight limbs include:

1. Yama: or the five negative moral proscriptions;

i.e.

non-violence truthfulness non-stealing Sexual continence non-possessiveness

2. Niyama: or the five positive observances of:

purity contentment austerity study devotion to God

3 While Patañjali's work represents the earliest extant work on Classi- 33 cal Astānga Yoga, Patañjali is by no means the originator of this system. The earlier works on Yoga that we know where written by Hiranyagarbha and Jaigīsavya are presently lost. Jaigīsavya is men- tioned in the Mahābharata, II, 21, 26 and the Harivamśa, 952, thus establishing that he predated Patañjali by at least many centuries if not several millennia.

60

3. Āsana: or physical postures leading to psycho-

physical integration and which prepare the body

for the long periods of meditation necessary for

liberation.

4. Prānāyāma: various breathing exercises that give

one control over prana, the vital life energy.

5. Pratyāhāra: control and interiorization of the

senses.

6. Dhāranā: focused concentration of the mind's at-

tention.

7. Dhyāna: meditation proper.

8. Samādhi: or absorption of the yogin's individual

consciousness in the reality of the Supreme.34

34 The most thoroughly comprehensive treatment of the philosophy, history and practical discipline of Yoga to date is the massive encyclo- pedic work, "The Yoga Tradition: Its History, Literature, Philosophy and Practice", by Dr. Georg Feuerstein. I would highly recommend this very detailed and well-researched work for further information on the vari- ous strands of Yoga philosophy.

61

Vaiśesika

Founded by the sage Kanāda (ca. 550 BCE), the school of

Vaiśesika has been called the physics of India35. The term

vaiśesika itself is a reference to the very attributiveness that

is the main concern of this school. It is, generally speaking,

an attempt to categorize the various components of reality into a coherent system. The goal of Vaiśesika is " ... real

knowledge, produced by special excellence of dharma, of

the characteristic features of the categories of substance

(dravya), quality (guņa), class concept (sāmānya), particu- larity (viśesa), and inherence (samavāya)." (Dasgupta, 285) Over time, Vaiśesika became very closely aligned with the Nyāya school to the point of becoming practically indistin- guishable from it.

Vyākaraņa

Vyākarana, the Vedic school of Sanskrit grammar, is pri-

marily concerned with how sounds, words, sentences and

other components of Sanskrit grammar convey meaning, as

well as with other functions of language. Like other

5 Among many others, this comparison has been made by S. Rad- 35 hakrishnan in his Indian Philosophy.

62

schools of Vedic thought, the Vyakarana school teaches that

the Absolute is manifest in the form of mantra, or the

sound formulations of the Vedas. This is an idea that is in

concert with the teachings of the Vedas themselves. In the

Rg-veda, for example, we find many instances of glorifica-

tion of Väc, the goddess of speech.36 Who the founder of

this school is remains unknown. Though the most cele-

brated scholars of this school are Yāska (ca. 1270 B.C.E.)

and Pānini (circa 350 B.C.E.), they themselves report the

existence of several grammarian authorities who preceded them. 37

Pūrva Mīmāmsā

The Mīmāmsā philosophy seeks to establish a methodology

through which the teachings of the Vedas - the revealed scriptures of the Vaidika religion - can be understood. As

stated by Chandradhar Sharma: "The aim of the Mīmāmsā

is to supply the principles according to which the Vedic

texts are to be interpreted and to provide philosophical jus-

tification for the views contained therein." (212) The

36 See, for example, Rg-veda 10.114.8.

37 The earliest historical Vyākaraņa philosopher was Sākalya, the au- thor of the Padapatha of the Rg-veda, who is mentioned by Pānini.

63

primary focus of this exegetical school is the karma-kanda

section of the Vedic literature, or the pre-Upanisadic litera-

ture, comprised of the Samhitas, Brāhmanas and Āranyakas, dealing with the nature of works, action and

sacrifice. Karma-kanda focuses on the science of Vedic sac-

rifice as a means of both material prosperity, as well as

spiritual progress. This school is also known as the Pūrva

(earlier) Mīmāmsā in order to differentiate it from the

Uttara (later) Mīmāmsā, or Vedānta. As Francis Clooney

and others have pointed out, the two schools of Purva and

Uttara Mīmāmsā are closely linked:

The scope of interest of some scholars in the Pūrva Mīmāmsā is suggested by the way in which the system is named - that system of investigation which is prior (pūrva) to the more interesting Uttara Mīmāmsā, the Vedānta. Attention given to the Pūrva Mīmāmsākas has often been filtered through the Vedanta's evaluation of ritual action, in particular through Sankara's bifurcation of knowledge and ritual. Too often the Pūrva Mīmāmsā has appeared as a kind of ritualis- tic, works-oriented foil to the higher path of knowledge. This caricature obscures not only the (obvious and acknowledged) debt of the Vedāntin thinkers to the Mīmāmsā, but also confuses performance of rituals with the Mīmāmsā explanation of why rituals are per- formed.

64

(Clooney, 25)

Both the Pūrva Mīmāmsā and the Uttara Mīmāmsā schools

of Vedic philosophy are traditionally considered to be natu-

ral and sequential extensions of one another.38 There is

also a continuity in Mīmāmsā literature, with the Pūr-

vamīmāmsā-sūtras (in 12 adhyāyas) of Jaimini representing

the Pūrva Mīmāmsā school; the Devatamīmāmsā-sūtras (in

4 adhyāyas) of Kāśakrtsna serving as a bridge between both

schools; and the Brahma-sūtras (in 4 adhyāyas) of Vyāsa

serving as the textual foundation for the school of Uttara

Mīmām̧sā.

The Schools of Vedanta

The name by which the latter school is more widely known

is Vedānta.39 It is no exaggeration to say that Vedānta has

38 Rāmānuja, for example, strongly holds that one must be proficient in the teachings of Mīmāmsa before one can seriously begin the study of Vedanta. Srinivasachari writes in his classic work The Philosophy of Viśistādvaita, "Rāmānuja considers the Pūrva Mīmāmsā philosophy of karman or duty as a necessary step to the Uttara Mīmāmsā philosophy of Brahman." (xxxi)

39 The term Vedanta is comprised of two words: 1) veda, and 2) anta. "Veda" refers both to the scripture known as the Veda, as well as to knowledge generally. "Anta" means both the sequential end, as well as the culmination. Thus, Vedānta means the end/culmination of śruti/knowledge.

65

clearly been the most important and influential school in at

least the last twelve centuries of the history of Indian phi-

losophy. Whereas for the Pūrva Mīmāmsā school, the

efficacy of ritual activities are of primary religious value,

the Vedanta school holds that the jñāna-kanda, or knowl-

edge portion of the Vedas, are of primary spiritual interest.

Julius Lipner describes the difference in emphasis between

the Vedānta school and Pūrva Mīmāmsā in the following

way:

The Vedäntins for their part had a totally dif- ferent perspective on reality. They regarded the ethic underlying sacrifice-fruit concern of the Pūrva-mimāmsakas as a morally self- centered one, and valuable only as a step- ping-stone to its own transcending. It was only after an individual had had his fill of this ego-centric ethic and become weary of the potentially endless stream of physical rebirth (samsāra) in which it enmeshed him that he was prepared to make the sacrifice that really mattered - that of his ego - and adopt a Brahman-centered way of life.

(Lipner, 10)

Vedānta is predicated upon the teachings of three sacred

works, known collectively as the Prasthānatraya.40 These

40 Something not widely known is that most of the major Vedanta commentators also did commentaries on the Visnu-sahasra-nāma, or

66

are:

a) The terse philosophical aphorisms written by

Bādarāyaņa Vyāsa known as the Brahma-sūtras.

b) The famous philosophical dialogue between

Krsna and His disciple Arjuna, known as the

Bhagavad-gīta, or "Song of God".

c) The collection of philosophical scriptures known

as the ancient Upanisads.41

Thousand Names of Visnu, thus making this work a fourth prasthāna text, so to speak.

41 The following eleven Upani-ads are considered to be the most phi- losophically authoritative: Iśa, Kena, Katha, Praśna, Mundaka, Mandukya, Taittirīya, Aitareya, Chandogya, Brhad-āranyaka and Śvetaśvatara. However, in the Muktikopanisad, verses 30-39, there is a description of 108 Upani-ads. They are as follows:

(1) Iśopanişad, (2) Kenopanişad, (3) Kathopanisad, (4) Praśnopanisad, (5) Mundakopanişad, (6) Mandukyopanisad, (7) Taittirīyopanisad, (8) Aitareyopanisad, (9) Chandogyopanisad, (10) Brhad-āranyakopanisad, (11) Brahmopanisad, (12) Kaivalyopanişad, (13) Jabalopanişad, (14) Śvetaśvataropanisad, (15) Hamsopanisad, (16) Aruneyopanisad, (17) Garbhopanisad, (18) Nārāyanopanisad, (19) Paramahamsopanisad, (20) Amrta-bindupanişad, (21) Nada-bindupanişad, (22) Siropanisad, (23) Athārva-śikhopanisad, (24) Maitrayany-upanişad, (25) Kausitaky- upanisad, (26) Brhaj-jabalopanisad, (27) Nrsimha-tapanīyopanisad, (28) Kalāgni-rudropanisad, (29) Maitreyī-upanisad, (30) Subalopanisad, (31) Kşurikopanişad, (32) Mantrikopanisad, (33) Sarva-saropanisad, (34) Niralambopanişad, (35) Suka-rahasyopanisad, (36) Vajra- sucikopanisad, (37) Tejo-bindupanisad, (38) Nada-bindupanisad, (39) Dhyāna-bindupanisad, (40) Brahma-vidyopanisad, (41) Yoga- tattvopanisad, (42) Ātma-bodhopanișad, (43) Nārada- parivrajakopanisad, (44) Trisikhy-upanisad, (45) Sītopanisad, (46) Yoga-cudamany-upanişad, (47) Nirvānopanisad, (48) Mandala-

67

For the most part, the history of Vedānta consists of a

commentarial tradition centered on these works, the Brah-

ma-sūtras being the main work explicated. The Vedānta

school is predicated upon the acceptance of three Reals

(tattvas), or fundamental ontological categories, that all

perceptual and conceptual reality ultimately devolves into.

These three ontological Reals are:

1. Brahman - the Absolute.

2. Ātman - individual conscious entities.

brahmanopanişad, (49) Dakşina-murty-upanişad, (50) Sarabhopanişad, (51) Skandopanişad, (52) Māhānārāyanopanisad, (53) Advaya- tārakopanisad, (54) Rāma-rahasyopanisad, (55) Rāma-tapany-upanisad, (56) Vasudevopanisad, (57) Mudgalopanisad, (58) Sandilyopanisad, (59) Paingalopanisad, (60) Bhiksupanişad, (61) Mahad-upanişad, (62) Sarirakopanişad, (63) Yoga-sikhopanişad, (64) Turiyatitopanişad, (65) Sannyasopanisad, (66) Paramahamsa-parivrajakopanişad, (67) Malikopanişad, (68) Avyaktopanişad, (69) Ekaksaropanişad, (70) Pur- nopanisad, (71) Suryopanisad, (72) Aksy-upanisad, (73) Adhyatmopanisad, (74) Kundikopanisad, (75) Savitry-upanisad, (76) Atmopanisad, (77) Pasupatopanisad, (78) Param-brahmopanisad, (79) Avadhutopanisad, (80) Tripuratapanopanisad, (81) Devy-upanisad, (82) Tripuropanisad, (83) Katha-rudropanisad, (84) Bhavanopanisad, (85) Hrdayopanişad, (86) Yoga-kundaliny-upanişad, (87) Bhasmopanisad, (88) Rudraksopanişad, (89) Ganopanisad, (90) Darsanopanisad, (91) Tara-saropanisad, (92) Maha-vakyopanisad, (93) Panca-brahmopanisad, (94) Pranagni-hotropanisad, (95) Gopala-tapany-upanisad, (96) Krsnopanisad, (97) Yajnavalkyopanisad, (98) Varahopanisad, (99) Sat- yayany-upanişad, (100) Hayagrivopanişad, (101) Dattatreyopanisad, (102) Garudopanisad, (103) Kaly-upanisad, (104) Jabaly-upanişad, (105) Saubhagyopanisad, (106) Sarasvati-rahasyopanisad, (107) Bahvrcopanisad and (108) Muktikopanisad.

68

3. Jagat - materiality.

Everything that constitutes reality, everything that is either

perceivable or conceivable, ultimately can be reduced to

one - and only one - or another of these three fundamental

categories of existence. Every material thing that we see

around us, whether a chair, a car, a house, or even our own

bodies, is comprised of insentient matter, and can thus be

reduced to Jagat. The spark of consciousness that animates

any living being, whether human, plant, animal, or a god,

is ultimately Atman. Finally, the highest ontological Real

that underlies all experiential reality, giving reality its

meaning and purpose, is Brahman, or God.

While all Vedänta philosophers are in general agreement as

to this tripartite makeup of reality as we know it, there has

been, throughout the long history of Vedānta, a great deal

of contention as to what constitutes the precise nature of

the relationship of these three tattvas (Reals).

Pre-Śamkaran Brahma-sūtra Commentators

It is well established that the Vedāntic commentarial tradi-

tion stretches back into the dating-resistant mists of Indian

historical antiquity. Almost all of the ancient, pre-

69

Śamkaran (circa 8-9th Centuries) commentaries (bhāsyas)

are, unfortunately, no longer extant. In many cases, how-

ever, we at least know of the names of the authors of many

of these ancient works because they are often mentioned,

and even cited, by later Vedāntic commentators. In his

Vedārtha-samgraha (130), for example, Rāmānuja (1017-

1137 C.E.) mentions the names of six previous teachers of

Vedänta who are said to have expounded the philosophy of

Viśistādvaita (Qualified Non-dualism). These individuals

are:

1. Bodhāyana

2. Tanka

3. Dramida

4. Guhadeva (1st century B.C.E .? )

5. Kapardi

6. Bhāruci

Other than the names of these six individual Vedānta phi-

losophers, we currently possess only very scant information

about the more important details of their lives, including

their dates.

Little is known about the dates of Bodhāyana, Tanka,

Dramida, and Karpadi. We do, however, know something

about the works ascribed to them. Bodhāyana is supposed

70

to have written an extensive vrtti on both the Pūrva and

Uttara Mīmāmsās, as well as a possible commentary on the

Bhagavad-gītā. While it was previously believed that all of

these works by Bodhäyana were lost, Vedic researcher Vis-

hal Agarwal reports that manuscripts of his Brahma-sūtras

commentary may have been recently discovered.42 It is

known that Tanka wrote commentaries on both the Chhan-

dogya-upanişad and the Brahma-sūtras. Dramida is

credited with writing commentaries on the Brahma-sūtras,

Chhandogya-upanisad and Māndūkya-upanisad. Karpadi

wrote several commentaries on the texts of the Taittirīya

(Apastamba) recension of the Krsna-yajurveda. If Gu-

hadeva is possibly synonymous with the Vedāntist known

as Guhasvāmin, then it is possible that he flourished during

the first century B.C.E. Commentaries on both the

Apastamba Śrautasūtra and the Taittarīya Āranyaka are at-

tributed to him. Medhatithi (ca. 950 C.E.) is known to

have quoted Bhäruci, thus placing him clearly no later than the ninth century. Bhāruci wrote commentaries on both

the Manava-dharma-śastra, as well as the Visnu-dharma- śāstra.43

2 At least one manuscript is listed as existing in the collection of the Saradā Matha of Sringeri, but has yet to be translated.

43 For this section of my work detailing the history of the pre- Samkaran commentators, I am indebted to Vishal Agarwal of the Uni-

71

Extant Vedantic Commentators

The earliest extant bhāsya, or commentary, is that written

by the ācārya Samkara (ca. 788-820 C.E.)44. Based upon a metaphysical system he called Advaita, Samkara's is a radi- cally monistic outlook. According to Samkara, reality

consists of only one unitary principle: Brahman, which is

pure, eternal and perfect consciousness. Being an undiffer-

entiated reality, anything which is considered to be either

conceptually or perceptually distinct from this Absolute - including the phenomenal world, the beings inhabiting that

world, and the multifarious experiences of those beings - is

perceived as such only due to illusion (māyā) on the part of

the observer. This ultimate reality is " ... that state which is

when all subject/object distinctions are obliterated"

(Deutsch, 9). What will be considered crucially significant

for later Indian philosophers is that, on Samkara's account,

this thorough obliteration of all cognitive categories in-

cludes the complete eradication of any sense of subjective

individuality and individuated consciousness. For

versity of Minnesota for his inestimable groundbreaking research. His as yet unpublished manuscript, from which I derived the bulk of my information on these ancient Vedanta commentators, is titled The An- cient Commentators of the Prasthana Trayi.

44 The traditionally accepted dates for Samkara are ca. 200-168 B.C.E.

72

Samkara, even the sense of personhood is an illusion.

The original Vedānta school of Bādarāyaņa Vyāsa teaches

that the individual sentient being is, in his/her essential

identity, the eternal self, or ātman. The Upanisads inform

us that, like Brahman (God), ätman is also of the nature of pure consciousness, being eternal, full of bliss and thor- oughly perfect in its ontological makeup. These marked

similarities between Brahman and ätman being the case, Śamkara later argued, the nature and identity of both

atman and Brahman must be non-different. The so-called

individual being is ultimately the universal Brahman itself,

temporarily under the illusion that she has an identity dif-

ferentiated from Brahman. Since individual living beings

are viewed by Advaita Vedäntists as being wholly non-

different from the Absolute, this concept of non-distinction

necessarily leads to the eradication of any notion of indi-

viduality or separateness, both on the part of humans, as

well as on the part of God. Thus in Samkara's system, the

Absolute is rendered thoroughly devoid of personality and

all the qualitative attributiveness that any meaningful no-

tion of personhood necessarily entails.

This non-dualistic account of Vedänta philosophy was not

73

left unchallenged by post-Samkaran thinkers. Writing their

own, theistic, bhasyas (commentaries) on the Brahma-

sūtras, several later philosophers would reveal the inherent

inconsistencies in Samkara's reasoning. These thinkers

were almost exclusively followers of the Vaisnava (theistic

and personalistic) tradition of the Vaidika world-view. Among the first of these was Rāmānuja (1017-1137 C.E.), the most important philosopher of the Śrī Vaisnava branch of the Vaisnava tradition and the most well known propo- nent of the Viśistādvaita school of Vedānta. Rāmānuja's famed Śrī-bhāsya commentary contains many arguments

specifically directed at refuting the conclusions of Samkara.

Taking aim directly at Samkara's view that the individual

atman is thoroughly non-different from universal Brahman,

Rāmānuja argued that this view leads to a very fundamen-

tal logical contradiction. Rendered in a propositional format, Samkara makes the following claims:

1. Brahman: is perfect, self-sufficient, uncondi-

tioned, transcends both time and space, and is not subject to any state of subordination to illu-

sion.

74

2. The individual self, ätman, is in every manner

non-different from Brahman, and thus shares in

all the above feature of Brahman.

3. If two seemingly separate beings are actually

non-different in every perceivable and conceiv-

able way, including occupying the same locus in

both time and space, then they are the same be-

ing.

4. Atman and Brahman are non-different in every

perceivable and conceivable way.

5. Therefore, atman is Brahman.

6. Ātman, however, is not currently aware of her

true state as being non-different from Brahman

due to being temporarily in a state of subordi

nation to illusion.

These are fundamental propositions that any Advaitin

would support. As Rāmānuja would point out, however,

this argument contains a crucial flaw. The last proposition

(6) is directly contradicted by the first. The logical causal-

75

ity of the Advaitin argument thus leads to a necessary con-

clusion:

7. Therefore, Brahman is currently under a state of

imposed illusion.

If Brahman is not subject to illusion, and if atman is in fact

Brahman in every respect, then how is it that ätman can

have fallen prey at all to an illusion that logically cannot

have overtaken it? In alternative language, if the individ-

ual soul is indeed God in every respect, and if this

individual soul finds itself presently subject to the bewilder-

ing effects of māyā (illusion), then is māyā - the limiting

factor - not subjugating God, which is by nature uncondi-

tioned? Would this not, Rāmanuja asks, then lead one

quite naturally to conclude that māyā - illusion - is onto-

logically superior to Brahman, since it has the power to

subjugate Brahman? That which subjugates is necessarily

superior to that which it subjugates. That is certainly a

proposition which neither an Advaitin nor a Vaisnava

would ever wish to admit.45

45 Six centuries later, Jiva Gosvamin would strongly concur with Rāmanuja's critique of Samkara's argument. In the 35th anuccheda of his Tattva-samdarbha, Jiva makes the following observation: "It is thus erroneous to contend that one and the same Brahman, pure conscious- ness itself, is simultaneously the embodiment of knowledge, as it

76

Rāmānuja was followed by several other theistic philoso-

phers who also took critical aim at Samkara's Advaita

system. These include (among many others): Nimbārka

(d. 1162), who taught a Vedāntic system known as

Dvaitādvaita (duality-in-unity), Madhva (1238-1317), the

founder of Dvaita (dualism), Vedānta Deśika (a later fol-

lower of Rāmānuja's Viśistādvaita; born 1268),46 Vallabha

(1473-1531), who taught Suddhādvaita (pure non-

dualism), and the subject of this book, Jīva Gosvāmin

(1513-1598), who upheld the philosophy of Acintya-

bhedābhedavāda (inconceivable simultaneous difference and identity).47

functions as the substratum of māyā, as well as overpowered by igno- rance, falling under the sway of that māya. In fact, this is the very sense in which the distinction between īśvara [God] and jīva [individ- ual soul] is to be understood. It thus follows that, due to the respective differences in their natural capacities, the two (i.e., īśvara and jīva) are essentially distinct."

Yarhy eva yad ekam cidrūpam brahma māyāśrayatābalitam vidyāmayam tarhy eva tanmāyāvisayatāpannam avidyāparibhūtam cety ayuktam iti jīveśvaravibhāgo 'vagatah/tataś ca svarūpasāmarthyavailaksanyena tad dvitayam mitho vilaksanasvarūpam evety āgatam//

46 Vedānta Deika's two most important works on epistemology are: Nyāya-pariśuddhi and Tattva-muktākalāpa.

47 For further readings on these Vaisnava philosophers, see the follow- ing works: B.N.K. Sharma's three volume work The Philosophy of Sri Madhvācarya, Geeta Khurana's The Theology of Nimbārka and Maha- namabrata's Vaisnava Vedānta, which deals specifically with Jīva's

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The Caitanya Tradition

It is difficult to understand Jiva - the philosopher - without

knowing about the religious context in which his ideas

were formulated. Jīva was a follower of Śrī Caitanya

Mahāprabhu (1486-1533), the great Bengali Vaisnava saint

who founded the movement that much later came to be

known as Gaudīya Vaisnavism48, or Bengali Vaisnavism.

Caitanya represents one of Bengal's most important

Vaisnava saints and thinkers.

Despite this fact, Vaisnavism as a religious, cultural and

philosophical phenomenon per se had existed in Bengal

since at least the 4th century C. E., and most likely much

Vedantic thought. The Bhakti Schools of Vedānta, by Svāmi Tas- pasyānanda is also a valuable work that offers synopses of the thought of several Vaisnava Vedāntists.

48 One rather unique and highly controversial modern offshoot of this sect is probably better known in the Western world as the Hare Krishna movement, or "ISKCON", founded by Bhaktivedānta Svāmi. Though, as Jan Brzezinski (Journal of Vaisnava Studies, Vol. 5, no. 1), Neal Del- monico and many other scholars of Gaudiya Vaisnavism have recently pointed out, this latter day incarnation of Caitanya's movement is without doubt much more of a modern alteration than anything re- sembling a faithful representation of orthodox Gaudīya Vaisnava thought and practice. For a further elaboration of the Hare Krishna phenomenon, see my paper entitled "The Heart Transplant That Failed: The History of Gaudiya Vaisnavism in America".

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earlier than this.49 In his Vaisnavism in Bengal: 1486-

1900, Ramakanta Chakraborty paints a picture of a pre-

Caitanya Bengal, replete with an ancient and well- developed Vaisnava heritage derived mainly from the Southern Srī Vaisnava tradition of the Āļvārs and

Rāmānuja:

In Bengal, Vaisnavism assumed a tangible shape during the twelfth century, which was the century of Sena rule. The pristine bhakti movement had already been set on a strong basis in the Deccan by Ācārya Rāmānuja (d. 1137 A.D.), the celebrated author of Śrībhāsya and the organizer of a party of sev- enty-four spiritual leaders who preached Viśistādvaitavāda. The early Sena rulers came to Bengal from Canara country. Possi- bly with them came bhakti as a philosophical principle and as a way of life. The Śri Vaisnava influence is faintly discernable in the importance attached to the goddess Laksmī or Kamalā in the inscriptions of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. A synthesis of the vyūha and avatāra doctrines might also have been effected in the twelfth century.

(Chakraborty, 6)

49 In this regard, A. N. Chatterjee states: "There is enough epigraphic, iconographic and literary evidence to show the prevalence of Vaisnavism in Bengal and Orissa long before the advent of Caitanya. The Sununia rock-inscription and the Baigrām copper plate inscription (ca. A.D. 447 - 48) stand testimony to Visnu worship in ancient Ben- gal." (103)

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Thus, the Bengali soil that Caitanya would find himself

born upon was already quite fertile with the powerful de- votional sentiments of the bhakti movement, and of the rī

Vaisnava tradition in particular.

Born in the city of Navadvīpa (approximately ninety miles

north of present-day Kolkata), Bengal, Caitanya is reported by the early hagiographic materials to have exhibited the

exalted qualities of a saint even from the days of his very

early youth50. An apparently brilliant scholar and charis-

matic mystic, Caitanya is said to have vanquished aged

scholars in debate and performed miraculous feats even as

a child. At the age of seventeen, Caitanya traveled to Gayā

to perform the traditional śraddha ceremony for his father's

funeral. It was here where he met his spiritual preceptor,

the Vaisnava ācārya (preceptor) Īśvara Puri. This initial

meeting mysteriously transformed Caitanya from a tradi-

tional scholar engaged in making a living by teaching logic

and grammar, to an ecstatic dynamo of mystical outpour-

ings of almost unparalleled historic proportions. Having

taken formal diksā (spiritual initiation) from Īśvara Puri,

50 For further details on the early life of Caitanya, please refer to the hagiographical account: Śrī Caitanya-bhāgavata of Vrndāvana Dāsa Țhākura.

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Caitanya then returned to Navadvīpa to begin his historic

mission of preaching his own idiosyncratic brand of

Vaisnava bhakti (devotion) throughout the length and

breath of India.

The ideological focus and institutional raison d'être of the

later Gaudīya movement would become largely dependent

upon, and fueled by, the ecstatic devotional fervor and un-

compromisingly Vaisnava ethic personified by the very life

of Caitanya. So important was the very personhood of Cai-

tanya to the formulation of this North Indian religious

movement that even the not unbiased Christian missionary,

Melville Kennedy, felt compelled in 1925 to paint the fol-

lowing positive portrait of Caitanya as the founder of

Gaudīya Vaisņavism:

In the potent influence emanating from Chaitanya's personality we have already seen the real origin of the sect. The materials, in- deed, were not of his making; they had existed for generations in Bengal in the per- sons of Vaishnava adherents. But his was the spirit that took these elements of common faith and fused them in the fire of his own burning devotion, until they came out a new creation - a living movement full of his own energy. Others took advantage and organ- ised what the master spirit had evolved, and gave it a form by which to perpetuate itself.

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But nothing in all the subsequent years of the movement had been able to efface the stamp put upon it in its origin by the personality of Chaitanya.

(52)

What is even more remarkable is that the founder of the

Gaudiya tradition was to make such an overwhelming im-

pact upon his followers in the very scant lifespan of only 48 years. In that short period of time, however, Caitanya had originated and successfully passed on to his disciples his own unique expression of the ancient Vaisnava world-view

and philosophical system.

Radical Theocentrism as a Dei Gratia System of Yoga

Caitanya had re-taught what was actually an ancient and

perennial religio-philosophical system of monotheistic de-

votion found throughout the history of Vaisnavism that I have termed Radical Theocentrism. This devotional world-

view upholds the concept that all reality - the entire realm of living beings, as well as the totality of non-sentient mat-

ter - is ontologically dependent upon the Absolute, God, as

their ultimate originating source, sustainer of being, and ultimate object of destined repose. Further, ultimate hu- man fulfillment, satisfaction, and liberation consists in a

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total and radical self-surrender of the individual soul's in-

terests, agency, and will to the greater will of this Absolute.

For all Vaisnavas, this Absolute is not merely the dry and

amorphous Brahman of the Advaitins, nor the anthropo-

morphic concept of divinity so intricately laid out in

Western Abrahamic theological speculation, but is ulti-

mately Brahman in the form of a perfectly personal and

omnicompetent Supreme Being - the Supreme Personality.

This systematic process of dei gratia self-surrender is con-

sidered by Vaisnavas to be nothing less than the original

and highest form of Yoga, as well as the ultimate fulfill-

ment of the Yoga process, and is variously termed prapatti,

saraņāgati, upāsanā, and ātma-nivedana.51

The notion of the complete self-surrender of the individual

soul to the mercy of a personal and infinitely loving Brah-

man is certainly not a concept that Caitanya innovated.

51 Even with the obvious acknowledgement of some key cultural dis- tinctions, many of the basic core tenets of Vaisnava Radical Theocentrism can be clearly observed in the outlook of the later Abra- hamic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. St. Augustine, for example, writes in his De Civitate Dei (The City of God), "verus philoso- phus est amator dei" - "The true philosopher is the lover of God". In the Indian context, the clear influence of Vedic Radical Theocentrism can be observed in the Vaidika Saiva Siddhanta tradition, as well as in the concept of Tathagata-garbha tradition of Mahāyana Buddhism. As far east as Japan, a form of Radical Theocentrism is also seen in the Ami- tabha devotion of the Pureland sect of Buddhism.

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Self-surrender, or prapatti, or Radical Theocentrism, as the

surest means to moksa was taught four-hundred years ear-

lier than Caitanya by Ramanuja; by the ecstatic Vaisnava

saints known as the Ālvars several hundred years52 before

even Rāmānaja; and arguably as far back as the richly de-

votional hymns of the Rg-veda (ca. 3,800 B.C.E.). The very

word rg in the compound name Rg-veda is derived from the

word rc after euphonic modification. Its literal meaning is

"praise". Thus, as far back as Vaidika (Hindu) literature

extends historically, strong traces of devotion (bhakti) can be observed throughout.53

In addition to the importance of the concept of prapatti,

Vaisnavism also stresses the overarching importance of Di-

vine grace in achieving God-realization and liberation. The

importance of God's grace in knowing the nature of God is found throughout the vast literature of the Vaidika tradi-

tion. In the Katha Upanisad, for example, it states:

52 Two distinct periods are given for these twelve historic figures. Tra- ditional Vaidika scholars say they lived between 4203-2706 B.C.E. Contemporary Euro-American scholars, however, feel they flourished between the 6th and 8th centuries C.E.

53 See Rāmānuja's Saranāgati-gadya; The Tamil Veda, by Vasudha Na- rayanan and John Carman; and Vaisnavism: Its Philosophy, Theology and Religious Discipline, by S.M. Srinivasa Chari, for further elaboration on the ancient tradition of what I call Radical Theocentrism.

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nāyamātmā pravacanena labhyo na medhyā na bahunā śrutena yamevaisya vrute tena labhyas tasyaisa ātmā vivrņute tanūm svām

"This tman cannot be gained by the study of the Veda, nor

by thought, nor by much hearing; only whom God chooses,

by him is He obtained; to him this atman reveals its own

form."

For all Vaisnavas, the Supreme Being, and thus the proper

object of devotion, is none other than Nārāyaņa/Visnu in

one or another of His myriad Divine forms, whether that

form be Nārayana Himself, or one of His many incarnations

(avatāras), such as Krsna, Rāma or Nrsimhadeva, or one of His iconic (arcā) forms, such as Vekateśvara or Śrī

Ranganatha.54 Moreover, Yoga, in its original and unal-

tered form, is designed to be devotional in nature and consists of devotional meditation on God in the form of Śri

54 Generally speaking, five forms of the Absolute are accepted in the Vaisnava tradition. These include: 1) para, the transcendent Supreme; 2) vyūha, the secondary expansions of the original Absolute; 3) vib- hava, or the incarnations of the Absolute on earth; 4) antaryamin, God residing as the Self of each individual self; and 5) arca, or the deity image.

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Visnu.55 For Caitanya and his followers, this Supreme Being

exists very specifically in the forma dei of Krsna, the cow-

herd of Vrndāvana and the Bhagavān (Lord) of the famous

Bhagavad-gītā.

Indeed, the most pronounced distinguishing element be-

tween Gaudiya Vaisnavism versus most other schools of

Vaisnava thought is on the former's insistence that Krsna

takes ontological precedence over Visnu. Remarkably, for

the Gaudiyas, Krsna serves as the source of Visnu, and not

the other way around. Jiva confirms this idiosyncratic view in the 8th anuccheda of the Tattva-samdarbha:

May Krsna, whose being is consciousness it- self and who is designated Brahman in certain Sruti texts, a portion of whom mani- fests as His own partial incarnations and rules over māyā and the purusa, and who, in His principal form, goes by the name Nārāyana, and sports in Paramavyoman - may that Krsna, Bhagavat Himself, bestow the boon of prema [love] on those here who worship His

55 On this subject, the Visnu-purana (6.7.74) says the following:

yathāgnir uddhatasikhah kaksam dahati sānilah/ tathā cittasthito visnur yoginām sarvakilbisam//

"Just as the blazing fire, fanned by the wind, burns up dry wood, in the same way, Visnu situated in the mind of the yogi burns up all trans- gressions." [My translation].

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feet 56

Thus, the Gaudiya version of hierarchical ontology places

the school clearly outside the bounds of the mainstream,

orthodox views of the Vaidika tradition, which has always

maintained that Krsna is clearly an incarnation (avatāra) of

Visnu.

Though Caitanya was known as a formidable philosopher

in his youth (even founding his own school of logic in Na-

vadvīpa), like Socrates, he left the task to his disciples to

formulate his ideas in written form.57 One of the disciples

upon whose shoulders this formidable task lay was Jīva

Gosvāmin.

Jīva Gosvamin: Life and Works

Unfortunately, not a great deal is known of Jīva's life. It is

known that at an early age, he began to live the life of a

mendicant sage. He spent several years living in Benaras,

56 Yasya brahmeti samjñām kvacid api nigame yāti cinmātrasattāpy amśo yasyāmśakaih svair vibhavati vanśayann eva māyām pumāmś ca/ ekam yasyaiva rūpam vilasati paramavyomni nārāyanākhyam sa śrīkrsno vidhattām svayam iha bhagavān prema tatpādabhājām//

57 Indeed, Caitanya is said to have only written a scant eight verses himself, known as the Siksāstaka, or "Eight Instructions".

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where he studied various aspects of Vedic philosophy under

the tutelage of Madhusūdana Vācaspati (Rosen, 148).

Soon after this, Jiva settled in the holy town of Vrndāvana,

the traditional birthplace of Krsna. He would live there for

the remainder of his life.58 Jiva Gosvamin was the founder

of the famous Rādhā-Dāmodara temple, and was instru-

mental in the construction of several other Vaisnava

temples of historical importance in Vrndāvana. It was here,

also, where he began his impressive literary career. An in-

credibly prolific author, it is said that he composed no less

than 400,000 Sanskrit verses in support of his - and

Caitanya's - philosophical outlook (Ibid., 149).59 Two of

58 Jiva, in conjunction with several other ascetic philosophers who were disciples of Caitanya, are known collectively as the Sad-Gosvāmins. These six were all based in Vrndāvana, and became the intellectual patriarchs of the Gaudiya Vaisnava tradition. The other five Gosvāmins are: Rūpa, Sanātana, Raghunātha Bhatta, Raghunāthadāsa and Gopāla Bhațta.

59 Altogether, Jiva either composed or edited at least twenty-five works. Some of the more significant titles include: Brahma-samhita-tīkā, Gopāla-campū, and the Hari-nāmāmrta-vyākarana. The latter is a fas- cinating and ingenious Sanskrit grammar that uses many of the seemingly infinite names of Visnu in order to both educate its reader in the proper rules of Sanskrit grammar, while simultaneously attempting to bring about a state of bhakti, or devotion for Krsna, in the reader. Additionally, Jiva wrote the following works: Sūtra-mālikā; Dhātusamgraha; Kramasamdarbha (a commentary on the Bhāgavata- Purāna); commentaries on the Gopālatāpinī Upanisad, the Yoga- sārastava of the Padma Purāna, the Gāyatrīnirvānakathana of the Agni- Purāņa, and Rūpa Gosvāmin's Bhaktirasāmrtasindu and Ujjvalanīlamaņi; Gopālavirudāvalī; Mādhavamahotsava; Samkalpakalpavrksa; Bhāvārthasūcakacampū. Some of his other, more

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his more well-known philosophical works are the Sarva-

samvadinī and the Sat-samdarbha,60 both of which contain

the bulk of his writings on epistemology. The latter is a six

volume work and serves as a summa of Gaudīya Vaisnava

philosophy and theology.

For this reason, it is primarily the Sat-samdarbha that I will

focus on in the present study. This magnum opus of Jīva

Gosvāmin's is divided into six sections. These divisions in-

clude:

1. Tattva-samdarbha ("Composition on Truth")

2. Bhāgavata-samdarbha ("Composition on God")

3. Paramātma-samdarbha ("Composition on the Supreme

Self)

4. Bhakti-samdarbha ("Composition on Devotion")

5. Prīti-samdarbha ("Composition on Love")

6. Krsna-samdarbha ("Composition on Krsna")

Of these six volumes, Tattva-samdarbha serves both as a

summary of the philosophical arguments to be discussed in

overtly philosophical and religious writings include: Bhakti- rasāmrtaśeșa; Krsnārcanadīpikā; and the Rādhikākarapadacihna. Krsnapadacihna;

60 The former being Jiva Gosvamin's own commentary on the latter.

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the work as a whole, as well as an in-depth explanation

and defense of the epistemological criteria that Jīva accepts

in support of these arguments. It is from the Tattva- samdarbha, then, in addition to the Sarva-samvādinī, that the bulk of Jīva's epistemological theory is derived.

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Chapter III

Jīva's Epistemology

Pramāņavāda: The Ten Pramānas

In general Indian philosophy (Vedic, Buddhist and Jain)

there are several elements that are considered to be crucial

to any complete epistemological discussion. These include

the qualifying factors of:

1. pramā, or valid knowledge

2. prāmānya, or validity of knowledge

3. pramātr, the knower

4. pramiti, the action of knowledge

5. prameya, the object of knowledge

6. pramāna, or the means of acquiring valid knowl-

edge.

Of these six, the school of Vedanta has traditionally focused

most of its attention on the last element of knowing:

pramāna. In keeping with the earlier teachers of Vedānta,

the Gaudiya school tends to confine its epistemological dis-

cussions to the question of what is a proper pramāna (valid way of knowing) and to the various problems relating to

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truth and error. Jiva gives a very detailed account of all

the various pramanas, or sources of knowledge, accepted as

valid by the various traditional schools in his Sarva-

samvādinī. There he recognizes a total of ten different

ways of knowing that are variously recognized by the schools of Indian philosophy - both Vedic and non-Vedic. 61

In his discussion of pramānas, Jīva was obviously seeking

to be both inclusive and very comprehensive in his treat-

ment of such a vast array of pramānas. The ten pramāņas

(valid ways of knowing) that he discusses include:

1. śabda (Divine word)

2. pratyaksa (perception)

3. anumāna (inference)

4. upamāna (analogy)

5. arthāpatti (implication)

6. sambhava (possible entailment)

7. aitihya (tradition)

61 By the terms "Vedic" and "Non-Vedic" I am, of course, only distin- guishing between those philosophical systems which accept the authority of the Vedic revelation versus those which, while indigenous to India, do not accept this authority. This proper usage of the terms is in keeping with the traditional understanding of the Vaidika tradition. Used in this context, the terms refer strictly to philosophical presuppo- sitions, and not historical periods or literary genres necessarily.

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8. ārșa (testimony of self-realized souls)

9. anupalabdhi (non-cognition)

10. cestā (knowledge acquired via direct physi-

cal effort)

While some of these categories of knowing may be familiar

to most Euro-American-oriented philosophers, a few others

might need some further clarification.

Arthäpatti, for example, denotes the supposition of that

which is a necessity in accounting for a fact that is either

seen (drsta) or that is heard (śruta).62 By sambhava is

meant a possible entailment. It is a form of quantitative

reasoning that is predicated on the principle that knowl-

edge of a greater category necessarily leads to knowledge

of a smaller fraction of that same category. For example: if

Devadatta has 100 cows, then it is true - and necessarily so

• that he has 50 cows; if I win a million rupees, then all of

my one rupee problems are solved. Aitihya indicates a con-

tinuous and unbroken chain of tradition of which it is not

62According to Chakravarti, there is a specific form of arthāpatti, i.e., śrutārthāpatti, which is highly valued by Jīva. It involves " ... the as- sumption of a fact in order to explain what is known from scriptures ... " (Chakravarti, 7) Despite its acceptance by Jīva, he curiously does not include śrutārthāpatti in his list of officially acceptable pramānas, pos- sibly subsuming it under arthāpatti proper.

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possible to know the originator. Included under the cate-

gory of aitihya would be, for example, many folk tales

explaining the origins of a local custom or belief. Finally,

by the term anupalabdhi, or non-cognition, is meant the

knowledge of the absence (abhāva) of something at a spe-

cific place and/or time " ... in the absence of any hindrance

to its being cognized there or then." (Chakravarti, 6).

Other than the fact that all of the Vaidika schools accept

the preeminence of śabda as the most valid of pramānas,

there is little agreement among the various Vaidika and

Avaidika Indian traditions as to the exact number of

pramānas to be accepted as valid. For the Cārvākas, who

are atheist empiricists, and thus non-Vaidika, there is only

pratyaksa (sensory perception).63 The Bauddhas (Bud-

dhists), and some Vaiśesikas, accept anumāna (inference)

in addition to perception. Sāmkhyas accept the above two

and śabda (divine word). Naiyāyikas accept the above

three and add upamāna (analogy). The followers of

Prabhākara would add arthāpatti (postulation) to these.

63 Indeed, Carvakas, like their Humean counterparts of later European history, do not even accept the validity of inference, since they feel that one inference is necessarily dependent upon yet another, preceding, inference for its establishment, and this inference would in turn be de- pendent on another inference, and so on leading to a retrogression ad infinitum. As we will see, Jīva Gosvāmin would seem to not totally disagree with this position - but to a very different end.

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Vedänta, and the followers of Kumārila Bhatta, accept all

these and include anupalabdhi (non-cognition). One of the

curious features of Jiva Gosvamin's epistemology is that

unlike the other schools mentioned above, he rejects none

of these pramanas. Rather, he accepts the validity of them

all, and several more, making for a grand total of ten ways

of knowing.

All Pramānas Subsumed Under Pratyaksa, Anumāna and Śabda

Rather than rejecting any potentially valid way of knowing,

what Jiva does is to creatively order them all into a py- ramidal hierarchy of functional dependence. By Jīva's

account, seven of these pramānas are dependent upon, and

can therefore be subsumed under, three main pramānas.

These three overarching pramānas are śabda, pratyaksa and

anumāna, which for our present purposes can now be seen

as the general categories of a) divine word, b) empiricism

and c) inferential reasoning, respectively. Under śabda (di-

vine word), he directly places ārsa. Under anumāna

(inferential reasoning), we find arthāpatti, sambhava and

upamāna. Finally, Jīva sees anupalabdhi, aitihya and cestā

as being dependent upon pratyaksa (empiricism).

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Anumāna and pratyaksa are in turn themselves dependent

upon śabda, divine revelation being the most thoroughly

reliable of pramānas in Jīva's system. The resulting de-

pendent hierarchy looks thus:

Śabda

Pratyaksa Anumāna Anupalabdhi Ārsa Arthāpatti

Aitihya Sambhava

Cestā Upamāna

By way of defending his notion of the superiority of śabda

(divine word) over pratyaksa (sense perception) and

anumāna (inferential reasoning), Jīva Gosvāmin, as well as

later Gaudīya Vaisņava ācāryas (preceptors), offers several compelling criticisms of the latter two pramānas, which I

will now recreate.

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Critique I

Peering Through Broken Spectacles: A Critique of

Pratyaksa

The one pramana that is accepted by all the schools of In-

dian philosophy, Vedic and non-Vedic alike, as being a

legitimate means of knowing is pratyaksa. As Karl Potter explains " ... all schools of Indian philosophy take perception

as a legitimate pramāna or valid means of knowledge, since

there are some events that we directly perceive which are

clearly part of the scope of any adequate philosophical sys-

tem" (Potter, 58). I will begin my description of Jīva's

critique, then, with pratyaksa, that which is perceived by all

beings via the senses.

The full implications of the term "pratyaksa" must be thor-

oughly understood before any critique of this pramāna can

be sufficiently undertaken. One explanation of the word

"pratyaksa" is derived from the verb root aks, meaning "to

penetrate, reach, embrace", coupled with the prefix prati,

"back, against." A better explanation posits prati as mean-

ing "against", with aksa being taken as the noun for "eye". Thus, pratyaksa has the literal meaning of "against the

eye". Pratyaksa, then, cannotes the means of deriving

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knowledge acquired from sensory data that is impressed

upon the sense faculties. Two kinds of pratyaksa are rec-

ognized: a) nirvikalpa-pratyaksa, indeterminate

perception, and b) savikalpa-pratyaksa, or determinate per-

ception. Nirvikapa-pratyaksa is the very base form of

awareness that occurs as a result of the initial impression of

an object upon the senses. This initial impression provides

the senses with isolated data. Savikalpa-pratyaksa is the

developed cognition of the object as qualified. It serves to

compound the seemingly isolated data, thus facilitating the

groundwork necessary for the arising of subject/predicate

conceptualization.

The Nyäya school holds that two different kinds of percep-

tion are possible: a) Normal (laukika) and b) Supernormal

(alaukika). Of the former, six types are listed: 1. samyoga,

2. samyukta-samavāya, 3. samyukta-samaveta sama-vāya, 4.

samavāya, 5. samaveta-samavāya, 6. viśesana-viśesya-bhāva.

Additionally, three forms of alaukika (Supernormal) per-

ception are listed: 1. sāmānya-laksaņa, 2. jñāna-laksaņa, 3.

yogaja. Alaukika perception is trans-empirical, and thus

relates intimately with the means for knowing God that is

the subject of this book. For the Advaita school of Vedānta,

the only cognizable object of nirvikalpa-pratyaksa (base

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awareness) is Brahman. This is a form of knowledge that is

independent of any form of relatedness between the sub-

stantive and the qualifying attributes of the substantive. For the Advaita school of Samkara, Brahman can never be

qualified; thus savikalpa-pratyaksa, or determinate percep-

tion, is not the proper form of perception for knowing

Brahman.64 The Viśistādvaita Vedānta school disagrees

with this claim.

For the latter school, it is incorrect to posit nirvikalpa-

pratyaksa as simply the perception of an amorphous "That". Rather, all knowledge, including even base awareness, is

necessarily knowledge of a qualified object. As Rama Pra-

sad explains the importance of this distinction:

The significant thing in Rāmanuja's theory of knowledge is that it is not at all to be under- stood without the duality of the subject and object. There must be an object given and the subject who knows it. Jnāna, or knowl- edge, is the relation between them.

(103)

Qualification of the object of knowledge is a necessary pre-

64 Śamkara owes much to earlier Naiyāyika (followers of the Nyāya school) and Buddhist philosophers for the earlier formulation of this idea. (Rama Prasad, 108)

100

condition for any form of conscious perception, Rāmānuja

holds, since it simply is not possible for consciousness to

know existence per se without the benefit of any defining

property or attribute. Rāmānuja states this position clearly in his Śrī-bhāsya commentary on the Brahma-sūtras:

Moreover, those that know the power and import of words say that the words samvid, anubhuti, jnāna are words implying relation. It is not seen either in ordinary language or in scripture that the verbs 'to know', etc. are at all used without an object or without a sub- ject

(79)65

For Viśistādvaita, nirvikalpa-pratyaksa denotes primary

perception, and savikalpa-pratyaksa is perception of the same object on subsequent occasions. This would later be-

come the prevailing opinion of all the later Vaisnava

schools of thought, as confirmed by Satprakashananda:

It is to be noted that indeterminate knowl- edge is not recognized by monotheistic Vedānta comprising the five schools of Vaisnavism, which uphold Brahman with at- tributes (saguna) as the ultimate reality.

65 The Vedānta-Sūtras with the Śrī-Bhāsya of Rāmānujāchārya, Vol. I. Madras: The Educational Publishing Co., 1961.

101

(Satprakashananda, 107)

Jīva Gosvāmin, as we will see later on in this book, would

certainly agree more with the latter, Viśistādvaita Vedāntic,

view on this subject.

Employing the Carvakin (atheist materialist) as the most

obvious and most vivid example of a Pratyaksavādin, or an

empiricist, one who holds to pratyaksa basically claims that

if one can not see it, hear it, taste it, smell it, or trip over it,

it does not exist. And if it does not exist in this stark em-

pirical sense, then it certainly cannot be regarded as valid

data that are subject to being known rationally. Jiva easily

refutes this claim by offering several powerful arguments

found previously throughout the history of Vaidika (Hindu)

philosophy.

He begins his critique with an attack on the notion of uni-

versal verifiability. For the Pratyaksavādin (empiricist),

truth is derived from the universal concomitance of percep-

tual experience derived by all living beings at all times, in

all places, via their senses. The truth, for example, of the

otherwise conjectural proposition, "Fire is not a pleasant thing for sentient beings to bathe in" is derived from the as- sumed fact that all sentient beings have the universally

102

identical reaction when having their bodies subjected to

fire: i.e., the very unpleasant physical sensation of pain

(duhkha). However, Vedic philosophy points out that for

any sensory phenomenon to be truly verified on such a

universal scope, then, following the empiricist's very own

criteria, such a phenomenon would have to be simultane- ously experienced by the sum total of all beings capable of

sensory perception. All beings, at all times, all places and all similar circumstances would have to equally confirm the

validity of such a statement for such a statement to be

demonstratively true.66

Such universal confirmation, of course, would never be a

viable possibility since it is clearly impossible to verify the

experiences of literally every sentient being everywhere

and throughout all time. Perhaps, for example, there is at

least one person living in a tiny hamlet in Outer Mongolia

whom we have never met for whom bathing in fire as an

integral part of her morning ablutions is a richly pleasur- able experience, thus ruining the universal concomitance of

such a claim.

66 Such a condition would also have to, of course, bar the possibility of any number of these individuals purposefully deceiving us about the nature of the sensation that they are experiencing, or experiencing such sensations due to a hallucinatory state.

103

The Pratyaksavādin (empiricist) has not tested the experi-

ence of all people on earth (which, again, is the empiricist's very own criterion for basing the validity of truth), Jīva would claim, nor of all people throughout all of history.

Indeed, it is arguable whether the empiricist has had the

opportunity to sample even a minutely tiny fractional quan-

tity of sentient beings large enough to verify any such

general conjecture. It is, then, a distinct possibility that the

supposed general rules derived from empirical observation

are derived from no more than a collection of exceptions,

since the proposed rules cannot be demonstrated. Thus,

such a claim cannot be verified in any meaningful a poste-

riori manner, consequently rendering such a claim to no

more than an a priori assertion.

While such seemingly excruciatingly rigid tests of the logic

of an epistemological claim might seem superfluously pre-

cise on the part of Vedic philosophy, in actuality all philosophers - whether Euro-American or Asian - are in

agreement that such a claim must be able to stand such

testing in order to be considered logically valid and phi-

losophically true. This claim of universal verifiability does

not pass the test of Vaidika philosophy because, strictly speaking, it does not even sufficiently pass the test of rigid

104

empiricism itself. In addition to this criticism of pratyaksa,

Jiva delineates the more significant reasons why, to his

mind, knowledge derived solely through the senses is inca-

pable of ever offering its recipient perfectly valid and

truthful knowledge.

The Four Human Defects

Jīva Gosvāmin points out four epistemic and psychological

defects that are inherent in every member of the human

species, and which thus render empirical knowledge inca-

pable of perfectly certain knowledge.67 These universal

flaws are:

1. Bhrama - the tendency to fall victim to illusion,

and thus make mistakes and errors in

judgment.

2. Pramāda - error caused by inattentiveness on the

part of the presumed recipient of

knowledge.

3. Vipralasā - the desire to cheat others (in addition

to ourselves).

4. Karanāpātava - error arising from inherent insuf

67 See specifically, Anuccheda 9 of Tattva-samdarbha for Jīva's com- ments; "bhramādidoșacatustaya ... ".

105

ficiencies of the sense organs.

Bhrama As an example of the first defect, bhrama, or fal-

ling victim to illusion, there is the ever-famous Vedāntic

illustration of a person mistaking an innocent, insentient

rope lying in the middle of a path for a vicious snake. On closer inspection, the frightened traveler soon realizes that

the apparent snake is no more than a harmless discarded

rope. What the individual is often convinced that he or she

is perceiving empirically is thus not always in consonance

with external or objective reality.

Pramāda An example of inattentiveness, pramāda, can

most likely be provided by almost any individual who has

spent some time as a college student at one period or an-

other. The mind and the senses are not always

simultaneously focused on the same empirical object. We

can be apparently observing some external phenomenon

very closely (such as a laboratory experiment, or notes

written by a professor on a blackboard), while in actuality,

we are internally thinking about problems that we are hav-

ing with our tax return or our computer at home or our

love-life. Human beings are invariably prone to divided,

and thus imperfect, states of attentiveness.

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Vipralasā By vipralasā (the cheating tendency) is meant a)

the natural egoic tendency that many of us have to attempt

to prevail over others - often regardless of any and all valid

evidence contradicting our own view, and b) the ego-

saving tendency we sometimes have to not accept the truth

ourselves for a wide variety of internal psychological rea-

sons. The epistemic defect of vipralasā, the average

Vedāntist would say, arises as a direct result of ahamkāra,

or ego. Even if only on a subconscious plane, the truth can

sometimes be a frightening prospect for anyone to have to face 68

Karanāpātava The fourth empirical defect, karanāpātava,

indicates that the capacity of our senses is frustratingly lim-

ited and far from perfect. Even under the most ideal of

circumstances, our senses cannot deliver a perfectly accu-

rate account of what they are perceiving. This is true as a

result of several possible reasons. First, one's senses might,

for example, be anatomically or genetically flawed (ex-

plaining why so many of us need to supplement our deficiencies with the technical assistance of such devices as

68 The mid 19th century Danish philosopher, Soren Kierkegaard, ap- parently agreed with this assessment of human nature when he wrote, "How many have not asked 'What is Truth' and at bottom hoped that vast spaces would intervene before truth came so close to him that in the immediate now it would determine his duty for action at that very moment". (Works of Love)

107

glasses, contacts, and hearing aids). Second, our senses are

not capable of perceiving everything that we know for a

scientific fact to exist. For example, our eyes are incapable

of seeing the infrared spectrum and radio waves, or of

peering through most constructions composed of suffi-

ciently dense matter, such as the average wall. Third, sense perception alone is no guarantor of either quantita-

tive or dimensional accuracy. The sun appears to the eye

to be no bigger than the circumference of a quarter, yet our

capacity of reason tells us that it is in actuality many times

larger. Forth, we often make significant mistakes about the

qualitative nature of a sense object when we rely only upon

the power of our senses. How often have people mistaken

"fool's gold" for actual gold? How many have seen a piece

of pastry that looked so good to the eye, only to then taste

it and realize that it was stale?

The attempt to govern one's thoughts, judgments and ac-

tions with nothing more than the information that is

derived through sensory perception is a project that is des-

tined to be quite problematic, both rationally and

practically. It is a path that is destined to fail.

It is easily arguable that every footstep we take is predi- cated upon the assumption that with each successive step

108

there will be solid ground upon which to rest our foot.

This assumption on the part of the pedestrian is certainly

not based entirely upon visual observation. For even the

staunchest empiricist most likely does not spend every sec-

ond of her life looking down to empirically verify that each

step she is taking is not actually a step into a bottomless

black void, but rather onto solid pavement. Similarly,

when the empirical philosopher observes her spouse turn the corner while driving away in the minivan, thus depriv- ing the observing empirical philosopher of direct

perception of the vehicle, it is doubtful that the observer

truly believes that the van containing her spouse has now

entered into a perilous state of non-existence, regardless of

how devoted a fan our observer is of either Carvaka or

Hume. Radical empiricism simply does not work, whether

you are a radical empiricist or not.

How, then, do we explain the existence of such seemingly

indispensable non-empirical assumptions on the part of

both exclusively empirical philosophers, as well as rational

human beings in general? Is pure empiricism ever hu-

manly natural, possible, or achievable? Human activities

and judgments are often based upon purely non-empirical determining mechanisms. In the case of the two example

activities cited above, the operative epistemic mechanisms

109

under which our subjects are assuming knowledge would

have to be either a) faith, or b) inference. Faith is the be-

lief in X statement, claim, or existence of a phenomenon in

the face of either 1) no evidence or, 2) evidence to the con-

trary. Faith is, consequently, so weak a form of "knowing"

that it cannot be properly termed a pramāna per se.69

Rather than faith, only the second epistemic mechanism -

inferential knowledge - can be pointed to as the epistemic

factor that provides us with practical and reliable extra-

empirical knowledge. We feel safe taking our steps while

taking a walk, not because of empirical evidence that the

ground will be there, and not because of blind faith, but

because we naturally infer that our previous experiences

with safe walking will most probably be replicated during

our current walk. And we are usually quite correct in our

assumption. Without recourse to inferential knowledge,

then, life would itself be unlivable. Thus, while radical

empiricism can certainly be cognitively understood, it can-

not be even remotely practically lived without the

indispensable aid of inferential knowledge (anumāna).

69 In both Vaidika and Euro-American philosophy, the acceptance of faith, gut instincts, feelings, chance luck, or random guesses as valid ways of acquiring knowledge is not very prominent. Faith, however, does play an overarching epistemic role in the Abrahamic theological dogmas of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

110

Consequently, much greater than the power of the senses,

all Vaidika (Hindu) philosophers hold, are the knowledge

acquiring capabilities of human reason. And it this capacity

that is critiqued next.

Critique II

Establishing the Limits of Reason: A Critique of Anumāna

Anumāna, or inferential knowledge, has been a highly de-

veloped discipline throughout the history Indian

philosophy. The traditional schools of Indian philosophy -

Vaidika, Buddhist and Jaina alike - have always placed a

great deal of emphasis on the tools of logic, deductive ar- gumentation, and propositional analysis in the search for

truth. The dialectically surcharged systems of analysis cre-

ated by the Vaidika logicians comprise an entire corpus of

literature known as the Hetu-śāstra. The systems of logic

developed in India strongly rivals - and in some cases sur-

passes - many of the developments achieved throughout

the history of Euro-American logic. Unlike the three-sided

syllogism of the West,7 for example, Nyāya logicians for-

70 A syllogism consists of three categorical sentences, each of which contains three different terms, with each term appearing in two differ- ent sentences. E.G .:

All humans are mortal Or, symbolically All H are M

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mulated a five-sided syllogistic system consisting of:

1. Proposition

2. Reason

3. General Principle/Example

4. Application

5. Conclusion.

In practical application, such a proposition would have the

following appearance:

1. Proposition: There is a fire on the mountain.

2. Reason: Because there is smoke on the moun-

tain.

3. General Principle/Example: Wherever there is

smoke, there is fire; for example, as in a kitchen.

4. Application: There is smoke over the mountain.

5. Conclusion: Therefore, there is a fire on the

mountain.

Employing tools of inferential reasoning of similar manner

and design, the logicians of India have historically placed

No Gods are humans No G are H

Therefore, no Gods are mortal .. No G are M

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great emphasis on the powers of the human mind to de-

termine the validity of truth claims. Despite its seemingly

apparent superiority over pratyaksa (empiricism), however, anumāna is, in turn, not spared from Jīva Gosvāmin's criti- cism.71

To fully grasp the full breath of Jiva's position on the effi-

cacy of reason, however, it is crucial to first understand the

status of intellect itself in the minds of all Vaidika thinkers

in general. In traditional Vaidika philosophy, subjective

existential reality is firmly demarcated into a hierarchical

order of dependence. Unlike in the West, Vaidika philoso-

phers, especially those of the Vedānta school, make a very

clear distinction between the different functional aspects of

the human person. Broadly speaking, the distinction made

is between the attributes of body (deha); mind (manas);

intellect (buddhi); artificial, egoic "self" (ahamkāra); and consciousness, or soul, or true (natural) self (ātman).72 Of

71 Jīva Gosvāmin is taking a minority view in placing anumāna in a su- perior position vis-à-vis pratyaksa. The vast majority of Vaidika philosophers see pratyaksa (but in the form of "perception", and not "empiricism") as being of more importance generally.

72 In modern Euro-American philosophy, there are two basic schools of thought on the subject of the compositional nature of the human being. The dualist paradigm considers rational beings to be composed of two distinct elements: mind and body (respectively, res cogitans and res extensa in Cartesian Latin terminology). For the Materialist, on the

113

these various aspects of the human being, it is without

doubt ätman that takes precedence over and above the

other elements.

Ātman in its substantial nature is considered to be onto-

logically anterior and qualitatively superior to every other

aspect of the human person, including - in a descending

order of qualified dependence - ego, intellect, mind and

body. Of these, only ätman is eternal, being the ultimate

essential identity of each individual living being.73 Our

true self is ātman. According to Vedānta, the attributes of

this true self, or ātman, are sat, cit and ānanda, or unend-

ing being, consciousness, and bliss, respectively. On the

other hand, whereas the physical body is thought to be

composed of a combination of five gross material ele-

ments,74 mind and intellect are also considered to be

other hand, there is body only, with mind functioning merely as a bio- logical extension, or nervous/chemical by-product, of physicality.

73 Contrary to less informed opinion, a natural sense of self-identity (aham-pratyāya), or 'T'-cognition, is intrinsic to the essential state of ātman. Aham-pratyāya, or the natural 'I'-cognition of atman, is to be radically juxtaposed to the artificial and superimposed element of ahamkāra - literally "I'-maker".

74 These are the mahābhūtas: fire, water, earth, wind, and ether. While very similar to both the ancient Greek and Chinese attempts at an early elemental table, the idea of these five elements clearly has its origins in Sāmkhya philosophy.

114

material in nature as well, but of a far "subtler" variety.

Indeed, mind (manas) and intellect (buddhi) are consid-

ered to be material elements in themselves.

Mind, for Vaidika philosophy, is considered to be the sixth

sense. In the same way that the five normative senses are

perceptual windows to exterior phenomena, similarly the

mind is a window to the internal states that arise within a

person - emotions, fears, cravings and intuitions. It is

through the sense of mind that you feel that you are sad,

angry, or have a sense of foreboding. Mind, additionally, is

the seat of imagination, desire, and the subconscious store-

house of those past experiences that give rise to memory.

Like the five corporeal senses, the mind can be either a per-

son's greatest ally, or a person's worst nemesis.75 The

determining factor creating one or the other situation lies

in the depth of control that an individual has over this

powerful instrument. With one's mind under the full con-

trol of one's higher reasoning faculties (buddhi), which in

75 In the Visnu-purana, an important devotional text, it is said:

mana eva manusyānām kāranam bandha-moksayo bandhāya visayāsangi muktyai nirvisayam manaḥ

"To humans, the mind alone is the cause of bondage and of liberation; the mind attached to sense-objects makes for bondage; the mind which is not attached to sense-objects makes for liberation." [My translation]

115

turn must be under the direct guidance of ātman (one's

true self), one can achieve the state of self-realization and

liberation that is the goal of the Vedantic school, and of

Vedic spirituality in general. But a mind not in the subju-

gation of its possessor can lead to the delusion (māyā) of

misidentifying the true, eternal self with the body, which,

according to the Vedantic world-view, is merely illusory

and temporary.

The functional relationship that the subordinate mind has

vis-à-vis consciousness is explained well by Henry Stapp,

senior physics researcher at U. C. Berkeley:

In GVV [Gaudīya Vaisnava Vedānta], the in- formation flows from the objects, but only up to the mental level, at which point conscious- ness reaches out to directly perceive mental objects, the objectively experiencable stuff of matter

(Stapp, 38)

Rāmānuja, many centuries earlier, would have agreed with

Professor Stapps' accessment of the self-luminous nature of

consciousness:

The essential nature of consciousness - or knowledge - consists therein that it shines

116

forth, or manifests itself, through its own be- ing to its own substrate at the present moment; or that it is instrumental in proving its own object to its substrate.

(Trans. Thibaut, 48)

Thus, the function of perception ordinarily attributed to the

mind in Western philosophy and epistemology are, for

Vedānta, traced back to the inherent powers of conscious-

ness.

While the mind is viewed as both an internal sense and a

storehouse of informational data, the intellect (buddhi), on

the other hand, is considered to be the higher faculty that

processes, categorizes and makes decisions about the in-

formation presented to it by both the physical senses and

mind. Buddhi (intellect) is the cognitive organizing dimen-

sion of the human being that serves as the seat of reason.

It is buddhi that gives direction and focus to the mind. It is

the referee of all the analytic functioning, logical systemati-

zation, and philosophic speculation that takes place in the

otherwise anarchic playground of the mind. Despite being

the wielder of all of these powerful cognitive tools, how-

ever, buddhi is still considered by all Vaidika philosophers to be subordinate to the ätman, which is by its very onto-

logical constitution transmaterial, and therefore

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transrational.

The dependent hierarchy of the various components re-

sponsible for what we know as a human person can be further illustrated in its entirety by the following chart:76

76 This list is specifically taken from the Bhagavad-gītā (7:4), which, as one member of the Prasthānatraya, or three textual sources accepted as foundational to Vedanta philosophy, is considered an authoritative ac- count of these components. In its entirety, Krsna states: "This is My divided eightfold nature; earth, water, fire, wind, ether, mind, intellect and self-consciousness". (Bhūmir āpo'nala vāyuh kham mano buddhir eva ca/ahamkāra itīyam me bhinnā prakrtir astadhā) [My translation]

118

Components of the Human Person

1. Spiritual Component

Ātman (Individual consciousness at its most basic)

2. Subtle Material Components

Ahamkāra (Ego, the artificial sense of distinctness arising from identi- fication with the body)

Buddhi (Intellect, cognitive organizing principle)

Manas (Mind, sixth sense; repository of mental data)

3. Gross Material Components

Deha (Material body, which is composed of the following)

Kha Vāyu Anala Āpaḥ Bhūmi (Ether) (Wind) (Fire) (Water) (Earth)

119

Thus, for the Vedäntist, there exists a descending order of

these elements. Manas (mind) takes precedence over the

body, due to both its inherent qualitative superiority over

the body, as well as the mind's ability to perform functions

that are considered complex and subtle beyond the body's

capabilities. Above manas, in turn, there is buddhi (intel-

lect), without whose higher cognitive organizational

abilities the mind would be an uncontrolled menagerie of

random memories, fantasies and impulses. Ahamkāra

(ego) is the principle that gives the individual human being

an integrated sense of purpose and identity within the realm of samsara. It is the illusory "I" for which every

other subordinate element exists and functions. Finally,

atman, pure, eternal consciousness itself, is considered to

be the fountainhead of all these various modes of material

energy (prakrti).

Jiva Gosvamin, in concert with all Vedantists, feels that the

spiritual dimension of a human person, being categorically

superior to the intellect, is beyond the full purview of the

intellect. Being transrational by its very ontological nature, consciousness (ätman) is inconceivable by the apprehen-

sive powers of the intellect, which are limited to grasping only those descriptive data that are within its cognitive ju-

120

risdiction." Reason, by its very functional nature, is lim-

ited to the realm of intelligibles. How then can it be

possible, Jiva asks, for the limited to fully grasp the infinite

bounds of the unlimited? Contemporary Gaudīya Vaisnava

philosopher O.B.L. Kapoor explains " ... thought necessarily

implies conditions ... It cannot, therefore, apprehend the

Absolute Truth, which is beyond all limits and conditions"

(Kapoor, 64). The powers of human reason are simply not

powerful to the necessarily sufficient degree that must ob-

tain in order to know perfect truth in its total breath and depth.78

The failure of the rational endeavor to grasp the transra-

tional can be understood in two different ways in Vedāntic

thought, one quantitative, the other functional.

77 In order to fully understand this Vedantic contention, it is crucial to make a clear distinction between two different kinds of knowledge: a) Descriptive Knowledge and b) Acquaintative Knowledge. Knowledge by description is certainly a possibility for Vaidika philosophers; for example, the ability to intellectually grasp the factual concept that one of God's attributes is infinite love. To have an intimate experiential understanding of that infinite love via a direct knowledge by acquaint- ance, however, is precisely what Jiva, and all Vedic philosophers, claims is unattainable by the mind and by the intellectual faculties of the human being. To comprehend intellectually is not the same as to know experientially. To know experientially is to know in the most intimate and direct of senses.

78 The Brahma-sūtras support this assessment: tarko 'pratisthānāt, "Logic affords no standing." (2.1.11)

121

Quantitative Limitation: The first argument presents the

anumāna project as a distinctly mathematical impossibility.

It is a project analogous to attempting to place the contents of the Atlantic Ocean into a test tube the size of one's

thumb in order to analyze it; or trying to count up to infin-

ity, but only being allowed to use no more than three prime numbers to do so. Given the vast expanse of the Infinite

(ananta) - which is precisely one of the primary distin- guishing attributes of Brahman (God), the very subject

presently under discussion - any finite instrument, even one

as powerfully capable of probative insight as the human intellect, would be necessarily insufficient for the task.

There simply is no quantitative correspondence between a) the limited tool employed and b) the infinitely daunting

epistemic task at hand (attempting to know God).

Functional Limitation: The functional aspect of the argu-

ment communicates the notion that transcendental subject

matters are simply not within the domain of rationality due

to the categorically different natures of each. A bulldozer,

for example, is a wonderfully sufficient tool for digging massive holes in the ground, but to use such a tool in the

performance of delicate brain surgery would be an absurd

misuse of an instrument indeed. Similarly, buddhi, being

an entity of radically distinct ontological nature when com-

122

pared with the natures of either ātman (individual self) or

Brahman (God), is not, so this argument goes, capable of

being applied to atman or Brahman. B. V. Tripurari

Swami, a modern-day Hare Krishna guru, concurs with this

assessment of Jiva's opinion: "Inferior means cannot reveal

superior ends ... Intellect, being inferior to the soul, does not

have sufficient power to reveal the soul" (Tripurari, 38).

Jīva's critique of the limits of anumāna are not solely re-

stricted to these arguments, however.

The most foundational supposition of anumāna (inferential

reasoning) is what nyāya (Vaidika logic) calls vyāpti, or in-

variable concomitance. Revisiting the example of the

smoke seen over the mountain that I employed in the pre-

vious section illustrating the Indian syllogism, the

inferential knowledge of fire being present on the moun-

tain as a result of the witnessing of smoke is neither an

invariable nor an incontrovertible fact. There can be alter-

native explanations for the presence of the smoke. For

example, smoke is sometimes found to last for quite some

time even after a fire is no longer existent. The existence

of fire on the mountain, then, does not necessarily coincide

in any temporal sense with the perception of smoke. There

could be merely a causal connection between the two (a

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previous fire causing the present smoke) rather than a con-

nection of immediate dependence ("there is smoke now,

therefore there must be fire now"). Alternately, the smoke

that the observer is witnessing could possibly have an al-

ternative origin. The smoke could actually have an origin

that is nothing more incendiary than a dust cloud resulting

from the collective hoofs of a herd of gazelle making its

way across the mountain range. There could possibly be an

entire range of other explanations for the presence of

smoke witnessed over the mountain. Thus there is no nec-

essary entailment, no absolute link of causality, between

the perceived effect and the supposed inferential cause.

In an argument that sounds very similar to that of the Brit-

ish radical empiricist David Hume, some transrational

Vaidika epistemologists - Jīva and many other Vedāntists

among them - would take the argument of non-entailment

and turn it on its head.79 Rather than leading to the imma-

79 Hume's account of the relation between effect and cause is not lim- ited to the epistemological realm, of course, since his skepticism extends to even physical causality as well. Hume's claim is that, since the connection between cause and effect can not be verified either em- pirically, nor by such a connection being a necessary relation of ideas (the proposition "x is the cause of y" not being a proposition that is de- ducible from the concept "x"), therefore there is no such connection operative. Rather, it is merely due to repeatedly experiencing one oc- currence happening subsequent to another that human beings then expect there to be a given effect from a given previous action. Human

124

ture skepticism currently in vogue among many modern

Humean-inspired philosophers, Jiva would likely agree that

any inferential connections between effect and apparent

cause are merely highly conjectural ratio consequentia at

best, only to then offer śabda, or Divine Word, as the only

sure means of solidifying such otherwise weak connections.

Whereas the Skeptics' critique of knowledge leads them to

a reality devoid of meaning, Jīva's critique of knowledge

leads him to a reality centered upon God's necessary grace.

Knowledge, then, that is derived from the pramāna (means

of knowledge-acquisition) of logical conjecture (anumāna)

• like that achieved through the pramāna of sense experi-

ence (pratyaksa) - is ultimately only as perfect and reliable

as the individual using the pramāna. And human beings

are necessarily imperfect by nature. Thus Jiva holds that

anumāna - alone and unaided by other pramānas - is insuf-

ficient for reaching anything approximating a conclusive

foundation of knowledge pertaining to the Absolute.

It is exceedingly crucial to understand, however, that these

ancillary pramānas are not by any means rejected outright

beings, Hume contends, come to merely believe that an effect will fol- low a cause. There is, however, no absolute guarantee in Hume's mind that any seeming conjunctions between cause and effect will always be the case.

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by either Jiva or by most other Vaisnava (Theistic)

Vedantists. Vaisnava Vedantists, like all Vedic philoso- phers, certainly feel that the pramānas of anumāna (inferential reasoning) and pratyaksa (empiricism), with-

out the aid of śabda (divine word), are insufficient for

gaining any firm knowledge of transcendental subject mat-

ters; but they simultaneously recognize these two

pramānas' utility as valid means of gaining knowledge of the material world.

These theistic philosophers do, however, have several notes

of caution in the use of these two non-śabdic pramānas. 1)

They state that such pramānas are only valid within the

bounds that are naturally demarcated by their areas of re-

spective concern. It is legitimate, for example, to use one's

olfactory sense to smell milk in order to ascertain its fresh-

ness (the realm of pratyaksa). This same nose, however,

will not reveal the solution to an algebraic formula (the

realm of anumāna), and certainly nothing about meta-

physical matters (the realm of śabda), such as the nature of

the relationship between God and the material world.

Similarly, these two pramāņas (anumāna and pratyaksa) are rejected as means of acquiring transcendental knowl- edge. Scents are the objects-of-knowledge (prameya) of

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pratyaksa; algebraic formulas are the objects-of-knowledge

(prameya) of anumāna; and God is the object-of-knowledge

(prameya) of śabda. 2) Even when using the pramānas of

pratyaksa and anumāna to determine the nature of subjects

strictly within their respective domains, it is essential that

we realize the inherent limits of these powerful, yet far

from perfect, means of securing knowledge even within

those very domains. Again, these pramānas are only as un-

erring as are the beings employing them. Neither of them -

with the sole exception of śabda - are foolproof. Both our

senses and our intellect can make mistakes. Thus, they

should be used as generally reliable guides towards the ac-

quisition of knowledge, but not as foolproof guarantors of

perfectly accurate knowledge. 3) Ultimately, these

pramānas must function in a subordinate position vis-à-vis

śabda (divine word). All knowledge, according to the Vai-

dika world-view, has its source in Transcendence. This

being the case, that knowledge which reveals the Tran-

scendent to the fullest degree is that knowledge upon

which all other forms of knowledge are predicated and de-

pendent. Pratyaksa and anumāna are not rejected outright

by Vedāntists as valid ways of knowing. Rather, it is their supposed independence from śabda, their claim to offer perfect knowledge, and their ability to peer into the win-

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dow of transcendent reality, that is ultimately denied.

Critique III Perceiving the Imperceptible: A Critique of Śabda

Vaidika philosophers ultimately reject the idea that the

processes of pratyaksa and anumāna are means that are

sufficiently capable of providing definitive criteria for for-

mulating metaphysical judgments. Reliance on empiricism

and rationality alone are seen as being nothing more than

impetuous attempts by the finite to grasp the Infinite. As such, they are ultimately doomed to fail as sufficient means

to understand the Absolute. But, while the finite can never

fully know the nature of the Infinite using finite means, at

the same time, in order for the Infinite to truly live up to

His80 omnicompetent label, He must contain within Himself

the ability to make Himself known to the finite. Any lesser

expectation of God would be a clear encroachment upon

His omnipotent status. This theo-dependent revealing

80 My use of masculine pronouns in referring to God is neither arbitrary nor the result of my own personal gender preference when referring to the Absolute. Rather, they are used in order to convey the fact that for Jīva Gosvāmin (as for Caitanya), God is quite specifically seen in terms of the personage of Krsna, the speaker of the Bhagavad-gītā. For an indepth examination of the question of the gender-identity of God in the Vaidika tradition, please see my book The Shakti Principle: Encoun- tering the Feminine Power of God; Houston, Dharma Sun Media, 2005. Available through: www.dharmacentral.com.

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process is what Vaidika philosophy terms the process of

śabda, or Divine Word. Rather than using an ascending or

accumulative means to achieve knowledge of the Absolute,

Vaisnava (theistic) Vedāntists recommend the descending

route of śabda. In other words, according to Jīva

Gosvāmin, as well as Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbarka and

other Vaisnava philosophers, the proper way of gaining va-

lid knowledge about the Absolute is to have the Absolute

reveal Himself to the human person.

Vaisnava Vedāntists hold that complete and unerring

knowledge of all transcendent and temporal subject mat-

ters, known in Sanskrit as sarva-jñā (omniscience), is one

of the distinguishing attributes of the Absolute. This being

the case, brahma-vidyā, or knowledge of the Absolute, is

not to be attained by making a strenuous ascent up the

steep Himalaya of mental speculation, but can only come

about via a direct connection with that omniscient Abso-

lute. Comparing Jīva's descending model of knowledge

acquisition with the pratyaksa-heavy methodology of mod-

ern science, Henry Stapp, senior physics researcher at U. C.

Berkeley, says:

The G V V [Gaudīya Vaisņava Vedānta] on- tology is analytic, whereas the classical

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physics model of nature is synthetic. That is the G V V conceptualization of the totality is top-down - it starts from the unified whole (the Supreme Person) and tries to identify component processes that exist and are de- fined only within the enveloping structure provided by the whole. In contrast, the clas- sical physics idealization is bottom-up - it starts from the idea of distinct elemental parts and seeks to represent the whole as ag- gregates of these independent elemental parts.

(Stapp, 13)

Thus, knowledge of the Absolute, for both Jīva Gosvāmin,

as well as for the majority of traditional Vaidika philoso-

phers, is revealed by the Whole (God) to the seeker by

means of direct śābdic transmission. As we will see, the

epistemic mechanics of this process of transmission are laid

out by the Vedanta system quite thoroughly.

The Nature of Perception: Vaidusya vs. Avaidusya

Focusing first on the fundamental activity of perception,

Jīva Gosvāmin analyzes the many ways in which sentient

human beings are capable of interacting with various pos-

sible objects of knowledge. First, Jiva upholds the earlier

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Vedāntic distinction between 1) external perception and 2)

internal perception. The former corresponds to perception

as achieved through each of the five physical senses. Thus,

there are five forms of external perception. In addition to

these, there is the means of internal perception (mānasa-

pratyaksa), which is manas, or mind. Whenever we experi- ence such non-tactile emotions as love, hate, sympathy,

pleasure and pain, we are perceiving these with the inter-

nal sensory instrument of manas. This leads to a total of

six tools of perception.

Additionally, in agreement with the Nyāya (logician) phi-

losophers, Jiva says that these six tools can each be of two distinct types, a) determinate (savikalpaka) and b) inde-

terminate (nirvikalpaka), or that perception which either

includes or excludes relations, respectively. This doubles

the six modes of perception, giving us now twelve. The fi-

nal distinction that Jīva makes is between avaidusya

perception and vaidusya perception. It is at this juncture in

our exploration of the epistemological theory of Vedānta

that the specific cognitive conditions for abdic transmis-

sion can begin to be directly investigated.

Vaidusya Perception: According to Monier-Williams' San-

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skrit/English Dictionary, the word vaidusya denotes "learn-

ing, erudition, science." Vaidusya refers to that perception

of wisdom that is free from any tinge of material imperfec-

tion.81 It is immune to all of the defects and errors

inherent within the non-śabdic pramanas, such as the four

deficiencies of bhrama (illusion), pramāda (inattentive-

ness), vipralasā (the impulse to deceive) and karanāpātaka

(insufficiency of the senses). By vaidusya, Jīva is specifi-

cally referring to the ability to perceive the noumenal, the

" ... integral knowing which gives us the genuine knowledge

of the reality ... ". (Mahanamabrata, 103)

Vaidusya perception itself forms the cognitive basis of śabda

• divine transmission - since it is predicated upon a pure

and reliable a priori source: the samādhi state of con-

sciousness that was experienced by the rsis, the ancient

seers of the Vedic religion. "Vaidusya pratyaksa is the basis

of śabda itself", according to Kapoor, "being free from all

kinds of error. Avaidusya pratyaksa is liable to error." (65)

As such, it is not a means of perception that the vast major-

81An illustration of this type of perfection can be found in the ninth chapter of the Bhagavad-gītā: rāja-vidyā rāja-guhyam pavitram idam uttamam pratyaksāvagamam dharmyam susukham kartum avyayam, "This is sovereign knowledge, a sovereign secret, the highest purifier,

able" (9:2). understood immediately, righteous, very easy to practice and imperish-

132

ity of human beings are experiencing on a daily basis. It is

not normative human consciousness. Rather, it is a psycho-

logically illusion-free, and therefore materially non-

mediated, form of perception that is consciously and voli-

tionally acquired through Yoga practice and the consequent

spiritual attainment that follows such practice. Therefore,

vaidusya perception of transcendent reality is radically jux-

taposed with avaidusya perception.

Avaidusya Perception: Traditional Vaidika philosophers

make an important differentiation between vaidusya, un-

adulterated knowledge, which is free from material

imperfections, and avaidusya, or the mundane perception

of ordinary knowledge.82 Avaidusya is knowledge which is

practicably useful on the phenomenal plane, but which is

almost invariably capable of being vitiated due to one sort of inherent fallacy attribute or another. Interestingly, in-

cluded under the general category of avaidusya perception

would not only be Humean "Matters of Fact," or contingent

2 Allusions to this two-tiered distinction of knowledge are mentioned at least as early as the Mundaka-upanisad, "There are two kinds of knowledge (vidya) to be attained, the higher (para) and the lower (aparā)." (tasmai sa hovāca dve vidye veditavye iti ha sma yad brah- mavido vadanti parā caivāparā ca) (I, 1, 4) Though the context of this verse revolves more around a ritualistic concern than an overtly epis- temological one, the philosophical point is nonetheless clearly apparent and applicable.

133

truths the denial of which do not lead to a logical contra-

diction, but also "Relations of Ideas,"83 axiomatic

necessities such as the principles of mathematics, geometry

and the laws of logic, for which the denial of a valid propo-

sition would lead directly to a contradiction.84 Thus, for

Vaidika philosophy, every form of temporal knowledge,

ranging from the immediately factual (for example, the

contingent proposition: "I am presently reading this book")

to the scientific (including the conclusions of such fields of

inquiry as physics, biology, etc.), and including even the

very laws of reason themselves, would fall under the cate-

gory of non-vaidusya, or imperfect, perception. Real

knowledge of the Absolute, being for Jīva Gosvāmin un-

tainted by any imperfection (amala), can only be known by

vaidusya perception.85 Moreover, this perception must be

83 To quote Hume's own brusquely stated criteria: "Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it con- tain any experimental reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain noth- ing but sophistry and illusion." (David Hume. Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951.)

84 E.G .: "The bachelor is not a married man." To deny the truth of this proposition would entail an absurd contradiction, i.e., that "The bache- lor is a married man."

85 This view that knowledge can be seen as being of two distinct kinds - common and perfect - is not a thoroughly foreign notion, but is also found throughout the history of Western philosophy. For example, in Plato's Symposium (I. 211, 11), Diotima makes a very similar distinc-

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in the form of pure śabdic transmission.

The Nature of Śabda

The Sanskrit term "śabda" has several denotative and con-

notative meanings in the Vedic tradition. I shall first

discuss the former in order to shed some further light on

the latter. Sabda in its denotative sense literally means

"word," "sound," "name."6 In Vaidika philosophy there are

two distinct forms of sound: 1) mundane sound, that sound

which is heard through the organ of the ears, and 2) tran-

scendental sound, that living and eternal sound which is

transmaterial in origin, having Brahman (God) as its source

and content, and which is not heard with the ear, but

which is directly perceived by non-auditory, meditational

means. Heinrich Zimmer, in his Philosophies of India, ex-

plains this distinction further. "Sounds heard by the outer

ear are produced by 'two things striking together,' whereas

the sound of Brahman is anāhata śabda, 'the sound (śabda)

which comes without the striking of any two things to-

tion between these two forms of knowledge in her conversation with Socrates. Similarly, in Chinese philosophy, we find a clear distinction between two forms of knowing described in the Tao-Te Ching: "Tao can be talked about, but not the eternal Tao."

86 See V. S. Apte's Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary for a more ex- haustive listing of definitions.

135

gether (anāhata)" (Zimmer, 585). Mundane sound cre-

ated as a result of "two things striking together" - and the

words that originate from the mouths of human beings,

specifically - are not considered to be a reliable source of

metaphysical knowledge for the Vedic tradition. This is so

because these sounds will only be as perfect and as reliable

as is their source. Fallible beings create fallible utterances.

Fallible utterances lead to fallible knowledge. Fallible

knowledge falls infinitely short as a means of knowing the

Infallible. Such imperfect words are termed pauruseya-

śabda, or "mortal sound". As such, they are ultimately only

capable of delivering knowledge of the temporal world -

and even that, as we have seen, quite imperfectly. Sat-

yanarayana confirms this:

In its ultimate sense the term śabda refers to revealed knowledge about the transcendental reality that is realiable and free from defects. This kind of śabda differs from the language used in mundane transactions, called pauruseya-śabda, and is not always reliable.

(Satyanarayana, 23)

On the other hand, śabda-brahma, the divine sound, is an

eternal constant. What is not necessarily constant, how-

ever, is the human apprehension of that divine sound.

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In addition to having its ontological locus in Transcen-

dence, this divine, archetypal śabda serves as the very basis

and primeval source of all posterior sound, including even

the very grammatical structural vehicles of sound, the

grammar of the Sanskrit language. In its eleventh skandha,

the Bhāgavata-purāna gives a detailed description of this

process of the divine descent of sound:

Just as a spider evolves (lit. vomits) out of its woolly cob-web fibers from its heart, the Lord in the form of Hiranyagarbha, through Prāna (the vital air) manifests Himself in the form of Veda. Essentially He is absolutely blissful. With the material of eternally abiding un- struck (anāhata) sound emanating from the cavity of the heart through the medium of mind, He brings out various sounds repre- sented in the letters of the alphabet. The Lord who is the embodiment of the Vedic me- ters and essentially sweet (lit. nectarine), manifests out of Om the Vaikharī form (of speech), which flowed out in a thousand ways beautiful with various sounds classified as consonants, vowels, silibants (S,S,S), semivowels (y,r,l,v). Such proliferated pranava (Om) became expanded in various languages and was characterized by metres each consisting of four more letters than the previous one, and is (in a way) limitless. The Lord who creates this unlimited Vedic speech,

137

also withdraws it within Himself.87

(Bhāgavata-purāņa, 11, 21, 38-40)88

Mundane sound designates something other than itself.

The fact that a specific liquid is referred to by the sound

"water", for example, is a contingent linguistic fact, and not

a necessary and unalterable referential reality. The name

(nāma) and form (rūpa; erscheinung in German) of any ma-

terial object are never synonymous. Transcendental sound

and the transcendental referent to which it is connected, on

the other hand, are one and the same. Due to having its

originating source in the Divine, then, śabda is believed to

intimately participate in the qualities of the Divine. As God

is perfect, that verbum dei sound that emanates from God

must also be a plenary perfection. Therefore, śabda con-

tains within it the same purificatory, enlightening and

salvific qualities as does the very omnisapient presence of

87 yathornanābhir hridayād ūrņām udvamate mukhāt/ ākāśād ghosavān prāņo manasā sparśarūpiņā/ / chandomayo 'mrtamayah sahasrapadavīm prabhuh/ omkārād vyañjitasparśasvarosmāntasthabhūsitām// vicitrabhāsāvitatām chandobhiś caturuttaraih/ anantapārām brhatīm srjaty āksipate svayam/ /

88 All translations from the Bhāgavata-purana that appear in this work are from the edition by Ganesh Vasudeo Tagare unless otherwise indi- cated.

138

God. Additionally, the grammatical vehicle of that very

transcendent sound is thought to have been directly de-

signed by a process of devolution, its inceptive source being Brahman and the devolutionary derivatives of which are

the components of human language with which we are all

familiar.

Both pre-Classical Vedic religion proper and the Classical

Hindu tradition teach that, in contradistinction to the

mundane empiric sounds with which we are all familiar,

there is also a trans-stratum of spiritual sound, which is

eternal, perfect, pre-communicative, and of the same na-

ture of pure consciousness as is the Absolute. It is to this

ontological reality of transcendent sound vibration that the

connotative meaning of the term śabda refers.89 Even more

specifically, in the epistemological sense, the term refers to the direct experiential apprehension of that divine sound by the individual human agent under very specified, yogi- cally induced psychological conditions.

89 As observed above, the specific term sabda-brahman, or "spiritual sound," is sometimes used by Vaidika philosophers in order to make it unambiguously clear what is being referred to by the more general word "śabda."

139

Śabda as Word and Sabda as Experience

The term śabda must be categorically distinguished into

two metaphysically conterminous, yet functionally distinct,

senses. The first sense of śabda denotes the extrinsic Word

as a vital, objectified source of revelatory informational

content. The second sense of the term śabda is more immi-

nently encountered in the subjective experience of the

yogin (yogi in the nominative case) of the instantiated

Word as the very unio mystica experience itself. The first

sense of śabda is the Word itself, either in its eternally

noumenal sense, or in the sense of śabda as it is manifest in

written form. In this primary sense, śabda exists as an onto-

logical Real, having its own inherent value. The second

sense is śabda as the direct experience of the yogi. It is

śabda in its second sense that is of primary significance in

the revelatory process since it is in this second sense that

śabda becomes epistemically operative in the most immedi-

ate sense. For, while the proofs of either a) eternal and

transcendent śabda and b) written śabda may be epistemi-

cally accurate, they nonetheless still provide only an

indirect knowledge of truth. Debabrata Sinha explains the

distinction in the following manner:

140

Cognition through word (śabda) is to be ana- lyzed further in the steps of Vedāntic realization. Firstly, there arises from scrip- tural texts an indirect knowledge concerning the existence of the Supreme Being. There are texts declaring the latter as real (sat), as existing (asti). All that such existential statements yield is the assured, but still indi- rect, knowledge of Reality. In its lack of directness, it is no less mediate (paroksa) than inferential cognition. It is only the ge- neric aspect of existentiality (sattvāmśa) that is primarily conveyed through scriptural texts, as also from ordinary words or infer- ences; but the specific context (vyakti) is not revealed thereby.

(Sinha, 129)

It is the personal, dynamically transformative experience of

śabda on the part of the individual yogī that is the aim of

the yoga process, as well as the via medium through which

eternal śabda is accessed within the realm of human agen-

cy.

Rsis as Aptas: "Perfectly Reliable Authorities"

Perhaps even more important than the mechanics of śābdic

transmission are the subjective qualities of the individual to whom the transcendent experience is being communicated.

141

Unlike the transient pauruseya ("mortal") knowledge of

phenomenal reality, brahma-vidyā (knowledge of the Abso-

lute) is not accessible merely as a result of the desire - or

even the intellectual ability - of the observer. Rather it is

accessed as a direct consequence of the personal spiritual

purity of the seeker.90 Since untainted knowledge of the

Absolute is perfect, infallible and pure,91 it follows that the

vehicle through which such knowledge is revealed must of

necessity also be of the same qualities as this brahma-vidyā

(knowledge of the Absolute). Hare Krishna author, B.V.

Tripurari, confirms this link between subjective spiritual

realization and the objective realization of spiritual truth.

"Proof of the validity of śāstra [the literary form of śabda]

itself as a valid means of knowing lies in those who have

realized its subject through the means recommended

therein" (Tripurari, 40). Such human beings as above de-

scribed are known in Sanskrit as a rsis, or " ... seers of the

Vedic hymns ... ". (Monier-Williams, 226)

90 ° Additionally, according to the Vaisnava (theistic) Vedantists, the grace of God (bhāgavata-prasāda) is a necessary prerequisite for spiri- tual realization (ātma-jñāna), apprehension of the Absolute (brahma- vidyā), and the final liberation (moksa) that is the goal of all schools of Vedanta, and of the entire Vaidika tradition generally.

91 The term "pure" is here referring to that state of being which is de- void of all non-spiritual, non-eternal concerns, hence not subject to falsity, change, diminution and error. It is a term that is rooted in qua- litative ontology, not in relative value judgments. In this philosophical sense, the "pure" is that which is non-different from the "Real".

142

The Rsi Phenomenon

The rsi phenomenon is an instance of a human being who,

through the allied processes of yoga, tapasya (vows of aus-

terity), sādhanas (systematic spiritual disciplines), bhakti

(devotional meditative absorption in God), intense medita-

tion (dhyana), and other esoteric means of systematic self-

purification, has achieved absolute transcendence over the

non-atman (non-spiritual) aspects of herself. Having

gained complete control over the body, mind, speech and

senses, the rsi becomes transformed into a being who is

thoroughly absorbed in the spiritual Reality. Being thus

absorbed, she has a direct and unmediated experiential

connection with the truth. In the terminology of Yoga phi-

losophy, such a state is known as samādhi, or perfect

meditative absorption.

The samadhi state is one of enstasy, in which the individual

undergoes the experience of standing within her true self

and tasting the bliss of her own inner reality. From this

trans-material, transcendental apperceptive92 perspective

92 In the case of the rsi, we must use the term "apperceptive" in both the psychological and Kantian senses, in addition to the epistemologi- cal sense. Psychologically, the residuum of previous experience

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within the samadhi state, the yogi and the Absolute - the

subjective experiencer and the transcendent object of the

experience - become intimately reunited. "Experience is

synonymous with reality", says Mahanamabrata, "which is

to be analyzed, synthesized and plunged into, so that its

ultimate nature may be immediately apprehended." (3)

There are two different levels of samādhi that the yogi un-

dergoes in her attempt to realize the ultimate truth. The

first of these is savikalpa-samādhi, in which the yogī begins

to identify with the essence of the Absolute. At the highest

stage of savikalpa-samādhi, one is able to attain the realiza-

tion of one's own primal substratum, which is composed of

saccidānanda (sat, cit and ānanda), or unadulterated con-

sciousness qualified by the attributive qualities of never-

ending being, cognizance and bliss. In the second stage of

samādhi, known as nirvikalpa-samādhi, the yogī achieves

complete identification with her true self, ätman, and has

direct praesentia dei perception of Parabrahman, the Su- preme Godhead. This is an experience that is described as

being situated beyond the delimiting modes of time and

through which the rsi apperceives present reality is very secifically an eternal and transcendent referent, and not merely the memories and/or impressions (samskāras) contained in mind-substance (citta) as residual data. Philosophically, the rsi's apperception is akin with Kant's notion of the unchangeable consciousness that serves as the necessary condition for the perceiver's unitary experience. Please refer to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason for his views on "transcendental apperception".

144

space, thus utterly transcendental in content.93 In the im-

mediate aftermath of this radical ontological shift in the

yogī's subjective locus, a complete transformation of her consciousness subsequently ensues. The externally observ-

able ramifications of the samādhi phenomenon on the

subject (the yogi/rsi) are two-fold. One is psychological in

nature, the other epistemological.

The psychological and cognitive impact of the samādhi

phenomenon is radically transformative in nature. This

transformation that occurs within the yogi (soon to be rsi)

affects her on a variety of levels, including intellectual,

mental, emotional, nervous, and ethical. For the sake of

remaining firmly situated within the epistemic bounds of

the present work, however, we will focus primarily on the

cognitive modification that takes place in the psyche of the

rsi (seer).

Because the rsi has conquered the demands of the ego, she

is no longer subject to the four imperfections of bhrama (the tendency toward illusion), pramāda (inattentiveness),

vipralasā (the desire to cheat) and karanāpātava (insuffi-

ciency of the senses) put forth by Jiva in his critique of

93 Patañjali refers to these two forms of samādhi in his Yoga-sūtras as samprajñāta and asamprajñāta, respectively. (1:17-18)

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pratyaksa and anumāna. The Bhagavad-gītā explains this

state in the following manner.

He whose mind is not affected in sorrow and is free from desire in pleasure and who is without attachment, fear, or anger - he is called a sage of steady insight (sthita-dhi).94

(2.56, Georg Feuerstein trans.)

Since her knowledge of the truth is derived via direct, non-

mediated transmission - from Brahman (God) to ātman

(soul) - completely bypassing the customary intermediary

routes of the senses, mind, intellect and ego, karanāpātava

(insufficiency of the senses) is averted. Empirical and ra-

tional instruments simply are no longer employed in this

instance. Therefore, their perfection, or lack thereof, is

rendered a thorough non-issue. Additionally, because she

is no longer under the illusion that her self-interest is of

any superior value to the ultimate spiritual interest of all

other beings, the defect of vipralasā (the desire to cheat),

also, no longer applies. The ultimate interest of all other

living beings is now her supreme interest. Thus the āpta

(reliable person) is a perfectly moral being, acting from

94 duhkheşvanudvignamanāh sukhesu vigatasprhah/ vītarāgabhayakrodhah sthitadhīr munir ucyate/ /

146

and in goodness, not due to a mere sense of necessitating

duty, but out of her own intrinsic ātmic (spiritual) nature.95

Having attained a state of dhāranā, or perfect concentra-

tion, she is not subject to pramāda (inattentiveness). Being

thoroughly absorbed in the loving contemplation (upāsanā)

of Brahman, her attention is perfectly and effortlessly alert,

never diverted and ever-focused. Finally, having tran-

scended the firm grip of māyā (illusion) altogether, the

tendency of bhrama (the tendency toward illusion) is noth-

ing more than a faint memory for the rsi.

Having thus risen above all the defective tendencies of the

mundane cognitive processes, the rsi is seen, by both Jīva

Gosvämin and by the vast majority of philosophers within

the Sapta-darśana (seven schools of Vaidika philosophy)

tradition, as the most indisputable source of knowledge.

The rsi is not merely an intellectual who attempts to grasp

95 In describing a wholly good and rational being in a more Kantian sense, H.J. Paton inadvertently provides us with a vivid picture of the categorically transcendent ethical nature of such a morally perfect be- ing: "A perfectly rational and wholly good agent would necessarily act on the same objective principles which for us are imperatives, and so would manifest a kind of goodness just as we do when we obey these imperatives. But for him such objective principles would not be im- peratives: they would be necessary but not necessitating, and the will which followed them could be described as a 'holy' will. Where we say 'I ought', an agent of this kind would say 'I will'. He would have no duties nor would he feel reverence for the moral law (but something more akin to love)". (Paton, 26)

147

the truth, captures it, and then mechanically teaches it to

others. Rather, she is a transparent via medium, a clear

window, through which transcendent truth is seen and di-

rectly experienced first-hand. She is a breathing example

of truth in living, caring motion. In a poem created by

René Dumal, we find a beautiful description of the trans-

formative experience that the rsi has:

You cannot stay on the summit forever; You have to come down again. So why bother in the first place? Just this: What is above knows what is below, But what is below does not know what is above. One climbs, one sees. One descends, one sees no longer, but one has seen. There is an art of conducting oneself in the lower regions. When one can no longer see, one can at least still know.

For Vaidikas (Hindus), the rsi is no less than a living testa- ment to the existence, nature, and power of God. It is for

this reason that the rsis are termed āptāh, or "perfectly reli-

able authorities."

Identifying the Rsi

All this having been drawn out, a legitimate concern may

then arise as to the practical identifiability of such an āpta-

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rsi (perfectly reliable seer). After all, anyone can claim to

be a perfectly realized rsi without this necessarily being the

case in fact. How can we truly know that one person's

cognitive aptitudes are any more spiritually attuned than

any other individual's? How do we know if someone really

is a rsi? For the answer, we must revisit the idea, so preva-

lent in both traditional Asian philosophical systems, as well

as much pre-Cartesian European philosophy, that one nec-

essarily lives one's philosophical claims in order for those

claims to be considered perfectly valid and demonstrable.

One's philosophy must be lived, not merely speculated

upon. We must ascertain the true identity of an āpta by

examining the behavioral modalities of the person under

question.

Even within the familiar confines of our modern Euro-

American scientific paradigm, the process of identifying

and categorizing existents in accordance with their inher-

ent attributes, properties, and effects is recognized as being

a perfectly legitimate course of action in determining the inherent nature of the existent under consideration. The

identification of an object as being fire, for example, is due to said object exhibiting the qualities of heat, brilliance, the ability to burn, etc. Moreover, the observation of such at-

149

tributes - or effects - must be replicable in similarly de-

signed circumstances. In a remarkably similar manner,

there are a number of recognized behavioral characteristics

which are traditionally and scripturally attributed to an

apta, the necessary presence of which objectively confirms

the identity of a person as being decidedly āptic in nature,

and the absence of which render any such claims to be void

of validity.

Illustrations of the uncommon personalities, behaviors, and

activities of perfected aptas, as well as rather detailed and

comprehensive listings of their personal quality traits, are

given in many of the sacred scriptures and ancillary texts of

the Vaidika tradition. A very detailed catalogue of these

distinguishing attributes is given in the Bhagavad-gītā, for

example.

The Lord said: Fearlessness, purity of being, steadfastness in the yoga of wisdom, charity, self-control and sacrifice, study of the Veda, austerity, uprightness, non-violence, truth, absence of anger, renunciation, peace, ab- sence of guile, compassion towards beings, absence of covetousness, gentleness, mod- esty, absence of fickleness, majesty, forgiveness, fortitude, purity, absence of mal- ice and excessive pride - these are the endowments of one who is born with the di-

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vine nature, O Bharata."

(Bhagavad-gītā, 16, 1-3)97

These are some of the many qualities that reveal the au-

thenticity of the rsi (seer, perfected yogi) as a valid source

of knowledge. If a person is deficient in any of these dis-

tinguishing attributes, then her claim to being an āpta, and

therefore her claim to have the ability to communicate per-

fect truth to humanity, is subsequently invalidated.

This is a foundational belief in Vaidika thought and is per-

fectly in concert with at least two of the presuppositions

that I previously noted in the unique outlook of general In-

dian philosophy regarding the very nature and purpose of

the philosophic enterprise. 1) Truth is designed to be ex-

perienced and lived, not merely thought about, and 2) the

mode of consciousness manifest during the state of libera-

tion from illusion and suffering serves as both the final goal

96 Śrī bhagavān uvāca/ abhayam sattvasamśuddhirjñānayogavyavasthitih/ dānam damaśca yajñaśca svādhyāyastapa ārjavam// ahimsā satyamakrodhastyāgah śāntirapaiśunam/ dayā bhūtesvaloluptvammārdavam hrīracāpalam// tejaḥ ksamā dhrtih śauchamadroho nātimānitā/ bhavanti sampadam daivīm abhijātasya bhārata/ /

97 Most Bhagavad-gīta translations that I use in this work are by Eliot Deutsch, unless otherwise clearly indicated.

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(artha), as well as the ultimate methodological procedure

(upāya), for any genuine philosophical endeavor.

In summary, a rsi is a person who has six primary charac-

teristics, one leading in a sequence of direct causality to the

next. An āpta-rsi:

1. has an immediate experiential perception of truth,

coupled with an apperceptive ability to employ such

pre-cognitive truth to present-day circumstances;

2. she is, consequently, positively and radically trans-

formed in her very personality by that experience;

3. therefore, she is beneficent and compassionate to-

wards all beings;

4. therefore, she has a desire to communicate this truth

to all beings;

5. she then communicates this truth to all beings in the

form of her own immediately validating personal

example, in addition to her personal verbal testi-

mony;

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6. As a sixth and final potential development, periodi-

cally that sage will write down either a description, explanation, or account of her realization of truth.

This writing will then be an instance of the manifes-

tation of Sāstra-pramāna, or scripture as a valid epistemic mechanism.98

One more concern that could possibly arise from the con-

cept of the äpta-rsi is the very question of the possibility of the reality of such a being. After all, how realistic is it for a

human being to be expected to perfectly personify all of the

above stated qualities that are constitutive for an āpta?

"I've certainly never met an āpta", the skeptic could very

easily proclaim. The relevancy of such misgivings is quite

negligible, however, when one considers the necessarily

firmly demarcated scope of the philosophical project at

hand. For in order to uphold the validity of the rsi phe-

nomenon as a reliable epistemic tool, the first and most

immediate task required of Jiva Gosvāmin and the other

traditional Vaidika philosophers is merely to show that it is

in no way irrational to hold the idea that knowledge can be

98 Two of many potential examples of this last process are the rsi Vālmīki writing the Rāmāyana and the rsi Vyāsa writing the Mahābhārata.

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adequately derived via the process of śabda. And clearly,

given the validity of the scrupulously outlined chain of ar-

guments proffered by these philosophers, it is not.

In other words, Jiva's is neither a historical inquiry, nor a

sociological/anthropological field-study, but an epistemo-

logical and a philosophical one. Jiva's task is not to display

a living, breathing äpta for us to shake hands with in full

empirically-fueled appreciation. In order to firmly uphold

the śabda theory as a perfectly valid and viable argument,

his only responsibility from a strictly intellectual perspec-

tive is merely to prove to an adequately sufficient degree

the logical tenability of such a being existing. Additionally,

he must show that if such a being ever had existed, then

receiving knowledge from this being would be an epistemo-

logically sound course of action. In my estimation, both

points have been conclusively proven.

The proposition that such a being can possibly exist is nei-

ther a necessary falsehood nor in any way logically invalid.

Therefore, such a contention can be perfectly validly up-

held. Moreover, if there has ever been at least one such

perfectly reliable person at any time within the bounds of human history, then the ramifications of this fact would be

154

to prove that śabda (Divine Word) as a source of knowl-

edge is not only a valid concept in itself, and not only superior to other valid ways of knowing, but is a phenome-

non of immediate personal, religious, and spiritual

relevance for every rational human being. Achieving this

latter task is, however, certainly not within the intended

scope of this present work.

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Chapter IV

Śāstra-Pramāņa:

Scripture as a Valid Way of Knowing

Śāstra as Śabda in Literary Form

Śabda (Divine Word) is believed to be an eternal sonic real-

ity, originating from Brahman (God), that is directly

apprehended by the rsis (seers, perfected yogīs) and which

then becomes periodically manifest in the form of śāstra, or

the sacred texts of the Vedic tradition, for the ultimate ben-

efit of all humanity at all times of human history.

As David Knipe explains this unfolding of revelatory truth:

... these oral texts, regarded as unitary and eternal, are understood to have no human or divine origin. They have always been a sa- cred sound, Brahman, a foundational cosmic utterance. Somehow it was intuited by an- cient seers, the rishis, an aggregate of seven sages who then transmitted the Vedas for the benefit of the world.

(Knipe, 26-27)

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For Vaidika philosophers - Jīva Gosvāmin included - śabda

(Divine Word) is synonymous with Brahman (God) itself.

Consequently, Jiva concurs with the Mīmāmsa school in

their doctrine of varnavada, which upholds the importance

and the eternality of śāstra (revealed scripture).99 What-

ever perfections and attributes are present in the Deity,

Vaidika philosophy holds, are necessarily simultaneously

present in the sonic form of God known as śabda. Present

in the Word of God is God Himself.100 Sabda in literary

form is āmnāya, or the "heard transcendental word" (Ka-

poor, 70). It is for this reason that the śāstra (revealed

scripture), as the literary embodiment of śabda, is consid-

ered to be apauruseya, or authorless, self-existent and perfect. Julius Lipner presents an accurate account of the

concept of apauruseya:

... the Vedas are rooted in Brahman's essence rather than in His will. Their periodic em- pirical manifestation (as of the world) may

99 This is not to say that Jiva is partial to the Purva Mīmāmsā school. He merely agrees with them on this particular point, as do all Vedāntists. Jīva Gosvāmin is undoubtedly a Vedāntist in outlook.

100 Anyone conversant with Christian theology - specifically the field of Christology - will, of course, immediately note the interesting parallels between this Vedantic notion and the Christian claims expressed in the opening lines of the Gospel of John: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God". (New American Bible translation).

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depend on the divine will, but their content - their structure and form - by revealing the divine essence (so far as this is possible) is di- rectly rooted in it and cannot change since the divine essence at heart is unchanging. In short, if the supreme being is to be revealed through language, it must be in the form of the Vedas as we have them.

(Lipner, 10)

Both God and śāstra are co-eternal, both being without

cause, and both co-participating in the essential substance

of Divinity. This belief is especially instantiated in the view

held by traditional Vaidika philosophers that the rsis are

not the imaginative creators of the śāstric literature, but

only the revealers of the objective knowledge contained

therein.

The eternal, divine Word of God, accessed by the integral

trance state of the apta-rsis (perfectly reliable seers), be- comes manifest in literary form in order for the greater

portion of humanity to themselves have a connection with that liberating sound. Thus, Jīva's Vedāntic-inspired epis-

temology, somewhat akin - but by no means identical - to

the Biblical concept of divine revelation, sees knowledge as

more of a causeless gift from above than as a prize won

through sheer volitional effort alone. Also like the Biblical

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literature, the divine revelation, for Jiva and the Vedāntists,

exists in tangible literary form.

Jiva contends that it is not practicable for human beings to

attempt to attain Brahma-vidya, or knowledge of the Abso-

lute, without the aid of the pramāna of śāstra (sacred

texts). In anuccheda 11 of his Tattva-samdarbha, Jīva states

the superiority of knowledge derived quite specifically from

the Vedas over and above pratyaksa (empiricism) and

anumāna (reason) in the following manner:

Therefore, realizing that these (pratyaksa, etc.) cannot serve as pramānas, let us turn to the Vedas themselves as we seek to compre- hend that reality which transcends all and yet is the substratum of all, whose nature is in- comprehensible and wondrous - to the Vedas, whose utterances have no earthly ori- gin, being the source of all knowledge, both natural and supernatural, and having been handed down in an unbroken line of succes- sion from time immemorial.101

In order to fully understand the epistemological signifi-

cance of śāstra (sacred texts), it is crucial that we

101 Tatas tāni na pramānānīty anādisiddhasarvapurusaparamparāsu sar- valaukikālaukikajñānanidānatvād aprākrtavacanalaksano veda evāsmākam sarvātītasarvāśrayasarvācintyāścaryasvabhāvam vastu vivi- disatām pramāņam/

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understand that sastra is in actuality nothing less than the

eternal flow of śabda frozen and displayed in written form.

Therefore, all of the qualities that Vedic philosophers at-

tribute to śabda vis-à-vis pratyaksa and anumāna can also

be predicated of śāstra. In other words, both śabda and

śāstra are greater means of knowing God in comparison to

pratyaksa and anumāna, and for the same reasons.

Empiricism and rationalism are considered reasonably reli-

able only when in accord with śabda and śāstra. "The other

pramānas are rejected", explains Chatterjee, "to the extent

that they cannot be employed as independent sources of

knowledge for knowing that incomprehensible Supreme

Reality, but they can, however, be used as pramānas sub-

sidiary to śabda." (16) Even then, however, the results of

empiricism (pratyaksa) and rationalism (anumāna) as valid

means of knowledge are only reliable when the two are employed exclusively within the bounds of their intended use, i.e., the realms of sensory input and cognitive specula-

tion, respectively. Varadachari describes the integral

relationship between the three pramānas under discussion

in the following way:

... facts of the objective world are given to the embodied soul through perception; relations,

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general and particular, between these facts are inferred or seen by the activity of thought or intellection, vikalpa, and with the help of vyapti, invariable concomitance and memory. The highest knowledge is attained neither by perceptions through sense, which are particu- lars, nor by inference, which present generalizations as such, but only by supersen- sory perception or intuition.

(24)

Thus, Vedäntic epistemology proffers a hierarchically de-

fined, yet functionally integrated, relationship between the

three pramānas in question.

Interestingly, limitations are not placed upon the pramānas

of pratyaksa (empiricism) and anumāna (reason) alone. Like these two less reliable forms of learning, even the lim-

its of śastra, too, are firmly and clearly laid out. Those

subject matters and facts that are readily knowable by

means other than śāstra are not considered to be the sub-

ject matter of the śästric literature. Therefore, they are not

thought to be in conflict with śabda. The domain of śāstra

is limited to knowledge that cannot be easily derived by

any other means of knowing. Thus, how to create fire, or

how to boil rice, or the means of adding numbers to find a

total are not meant to be discovered via śāstra, since the

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answers to these questions can be easily discovered via ei-

ther empirical experimentation or by using one's reasoning

faculties. Such knowledge is not śāstra-dependent.

Śāstra (sacred texts) is a mechanism specifically designed

for discovering the answers to questions that cannot be an-

swered via either empiricism or rationalism alone. Among

many other subject headings, actual śāstra-dependent

knowledge includes cosmological, metaphysical, ontologi-

cal and salvific information, the sacred stories (divya-

katha)102 of the rsis (seers of Truth), devas and devīs (mas-

culine and feminine divinities, respectively), as well as

102 The terms "myth", "mythological", "mythical", etc., are terms that are generally derogatory and negative in connotation. In both aca- demic, as well as in common contemporary usage, these terms tend to designate something that is specifically false, untrue or a lie. Given the derogatory nature of these terms, they should not be used to describe the sacred stories of any religious tradition. In order to ensure proper objectivity and accuracy when studying and communicating the beliefs, attitudes and world-view of any living religion (or even a "dead" relig- ion for that matter), it is crucial that scholars of religion display the maximal extent of respect and sensitivity to the object of their investi- gation. It is in keeping with this objectively sympathetic approach that I decline to use the term "myth" in referring to the religious stories of the Vaidika tradition, and prefer to use the term divya-kathā, or "sacred stories". Whether one holds that such stories have any basis in histori- cal fact, or are to be seen solely as metaphorical vehicles designed to communicate loftier philosophical ideals, or as something else entirely does not negate the importance of taking this more culturally sensitive approach. For further thoughts on the subject of the unnecessarily po- lemic use of academic terminology, see my paper called "Word As Weapon: The Polemically Charged Use of Terminology in Euro- American Discourse on Hinduism".

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more seemingly practical knowledge that, despite their ap-

parent earthiness, cannot be straightforwardly discovered

via non-śāstric pramānas.103 The task of śāstra, from this

broader perspective, can arguably be seen as being of a

supplemental nature. More accurately, however, non-

śābdic forms of knowledge are themselves accepted as sup-

plementary (however flawed they may potentially be)

information not to be found in śāstra. Human-derived

knowledge acquired via either empiricism (pratyaksa) or

rationalism (anumāna) is subservient to God-derived

knowledge (śabda and śāstra).104

Astoundingly, all forms of non-śabdic knowledge - includ-

ing what many Euro-American rationalist, and even many

skeptic, philosophers would consider unalterable laws of

103 Several examples of these more worldly śābdic arts are the medical science of Āyurveda (revealed śābdically by Dhanvantarī, an avatāra of Visnu), Śilpa-śāstra and Vāstu-śāstra (manuals on sacred architecture), and Artha-śastra, the science of politics and economics. What makes these śāstrically derived fields of knowledge different from their more mundane counterparts is that the aim of each (in this case medicine, architecture and politics, respectively) is infused with spiritual purpose and power, being sciences which are in accord with the harmonious intentions of dharma, that is, those laws that are inherent within the natural structure of creation.

104 On this point, Kapoor writes: "While, however, perception and in- ference must, by their very nature, be always denied access to Reality, they can be treated as valid sources of knowledge when purified by Bhakti [devotion]." (64)

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reason - appear to be relegated by Jīva and other

Vedantists to mere contingent matters-of-fact when juxta-

posed with the axiomatic truths of Sāstra-pramana. The

epistemic role that śāstra fulfills, then, is in revealing two

distinct stratum of knowledge: 1) practical knowledge that,

despite its material applicability, is nonetheless undiscover- able via the other pramānas, and 2) truths pertaining

directly to the Eternal, including the nature, means and

goal of moksa, or personal liberation. While Vedic culture

has always placed great value in the former matters of in-

quiry, however, it is without doubt the latter that has historically occupied the bulk of concern of the greatest

thinkers of Vedic culture.

Sāstra itself covers a vast canon of works, indeed, with at

least as many topics, areas of concern and literary styles as

there are titles. While the totality of this enormous array of

sacred texts has been variously called "the Vedic literature,"

"the Hindu scriptures," "the Sacred Works of India" and

other such non-textually based titles, in keeping with the

decidedly epistemological focus of this work, I have chosen to refer to them simply (and more accurately) as Sāstra- pramāna, or that valid means of knowledge which derives

truth through the literary form of śabda. The enormity of

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this collection of works might be more ably grasped with

the assistance of a visual presentation of them. In the fol- lowing chart, I have illustrated only a few of the more important genres of Sāstra-pramāna that are accepted spe- cifically by the Gaudīya tradition of Jīva Gosvāmin.

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The Śāstra-Pramāņa 105

(As accepted by the Gaudīya Vaisnava School)

Śruti

(What is Heard)

1. Vedas: Rg, Sāman, Atharva, Yajus.

2. Brāhmaņas (ritual texts).

3. Āraņyakas (ritual and philosophical texts).

4. Upanisads (philosophical texts).

Smrti

(What is Remembered)

1. Itihāsas (historical epics): a) Mahābhārata. b)

Rāmāyana, the story of Rāma, who is an avatāra (incar-

nation) of God.

2. Purāņas (history of ancient events): 18 Mahā-purāņas,

105 Ultimately, for Jiva Gosvamin, any text that is considered to have been revealed by a rsi, or which upholds the Vaisnava conception of Radical Theocentrism - and most especially, any text that even re- motely seems to support the sectarian Gaudiya Vaisnava notion that Krsna is Himself the supreme Godhead and source of all other manifes- tations of God - is considered to be a sacred text. Consequently, for example, under the heading "Kāvya", Jīva would include the Gītā- govinda by Jāyadeva as a scripture because it is a text glorifying Krsna, but he would not include the works of Kalidāsa as accepted scripture, since they are of a somewhat more secular nature.

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18 minor Purānas.

3. Sūtras : Terse philosophical documents. For example:

Brahma-sūtras, Yoga-sūtras, etc.

4. Dharma Sāstras: A collection of books concretizing the

laws of Dharma in everyday life. These works contain

ethics, laws, codes of righteous conduct, etc.

5. Pāñcarātra Texts: Ritual texts that contain teachings

pertaining to temple ritual, worship (pūjā), ritual sacri- fice (yajña), Deity (mūrti) installation, meditation, etc.

These texts are especially held sacred by Vaisnava, Śaiva and Śakta schools of the Vaidika tradition.

6. In addition to the above, very partial, list, there are lit-

erally hundreds of other Ancient Vaidika texts dealing with every subject ranging from medicine (āyurveda) to

politics (Artha-śāstra), economics, astronomy, astrology,

and physics that are considered authoritative texts.

Supplementary Works

(Non-śābdic, yet authoritative works)

1. Bhāsyas: The commentaries of the Vaisnava ācāryas on

many of the above works.

2. Kāvyas: Poems written by inspired Vaisnava authors.

3. Tantras: Mystical and ritual texts dealing with philoso

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phy, yoga, mudrā, yantra, pūjā, etc.

4. Kathās: Stories, many containing vivid folk elements,

which convey Dharmic values, ethics and world-view.

These include such works as the Pañcatantra, Hitopa-

deśa, etc.

5. Hagiographic materials: Many biographies of great

Vaisņava saints, ācāryas and yogīs; for example, the Cai-

tanya-caritāmrta (16th Century C.E.) of Krsnadāsa

Kavirāja.

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All of the śabdic works listed above, with the exception of a

small number of the supplemental works, are considered by

most followers of Vedic spirituality to have been revealed,

and in some cases actually written, by one individual rsi or

another. For example, the epic Rāmayana was authored by the sage Välmīki after having spent years perfecting his life

by the recitation of the sacred names of Rāma. Similarly,

the Mahābhārata was written by the rsi Vyāsa after intense

meditation. In some cases, a śāstra is actually named after

the apta-rsis to whom its revelation is attributed. Some ex-

amples include:

Manava-dharma-sastra: named for the sage Manu.

Katha-upanisad: named after the rsi Katha.106

Nārada-pāñcarātra: which was revealed by the

devarsi (seer-god) Nārada.

Of all the many aptas encountered in the Sāstra-pramāna

106 Unlike the case for Gaudiya Vaisnavas, for the more orthodox Śrī Vaisnavas, the Katha-upanisad is not on a par with the other two texts. In fact, under the Pūrva Mimāmsā sūtra "akhya, pravāchanat", Sabara, et al., state that Katha and other rsis merely did a pravāchana, or reci- tation, of the Katha-śākhā. Also for more orthodox Vaisnavas, while the Pāñcaratras are at par with the Vedas, the same cannot be said of the text of Manu, even though it is said to have been 'revealed' to Brahmā and then passed onto Manu.

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literature, the most well known - and if all the works at-

tributed to him were indeed written by him, certainly the

most prolific - is the rsi Vyäsa. In addition to the one hun- dred thousand couplet long Mahābhārata epic, Vyāsa is

said to have produced the highly enigmatic Brahma-sūtras

and all of the Maha-puranas.107 Most significantly for Jīva

Gosvämin, as we will later see, he is also viewed as being

the author of the famous Bhāgavata-purana, the most au-

thoritative scripture for the Gaudiya Vaisnava tradition, of

which Jiva Gosvamin is very consciously a follower.

What is the Most Authoritative Form of Literary Sabda?

The Śāstra-pramāna covers a very wide spectrum of sub-

jects and ideas. Almost no topic of philosophical,

cosmological, cosmogonal, theological or metaphysical im-

port lies outside its scope. Even within a single genre,

there can cursorily seem to be contrasting opinions about

some very fundamental philosophical topics. One well-

known example of this seemingly intra-śāstric debate con-

cerns the Upanisadic discussion about the true nature of

Brahman vis-à-vis other ontological Reals. In some pas-

107 Vyāsa is also considered by followers of the Vaidika tradition to be the compiler of the four Vedas (catur-veda) as they exist in their present form. Thus, he is known as Vedavyāsa to Vaidika philosophers.

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sages there is clear support for the notion that Brahman is

ultimately a personal being, distinct from both the plurality of individual atmans, as well as the realm of matter.108

Conversely, other verses seem to indicate that this very

same Brahman is amorphous and non-distinct from the

world and the ätman. Among these apparently more mo- nistic Upanisadic teachings are the famous Mahāvākyas, or

"Great Sayings", such as: tat tvam asi, 109 "that thou art";

aham brahmāsmi,110 "I am Brahman"; and ayam ātmā

brahman,111 "This self is Brahman". With such a vast array

of śbdic works at our disposal, each containing such an

enormous number of topics and perspectives, the logical

questions to ask at this juncture are: Why is there such a

seemingly wide differentiation of philosophical opinion be-

tween these different works, and which of these śāstras is

the most authoritative? This is exactly the question that

Jīva now asks and attempts to settle in his own very unique

manner.

108 Two Upanisads - the Iśāvāsya and the Śvetāśvatara - are quite theis- tic in outlook. The former is sometimes considered to be a Vaisnava influenced text, while the Śvetāśvatara is clearly Saiva in outlook.

109 Chāndogya Upanisad, 6.8.7.

110 Bṛhad-āraņyaka Upanisad, 1.4.10.

111 Mandukya Upanisad, 1.2.

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Śruti and Smrti

The many hundreds of śäbdic works that comprise the col-

lection of scriptures that I call Sāstra-pramāna can be

divided into two separate categories. The first is known as

śruti (or "heard"), and comprises the many works falling

under the auspices of the Vedas,112 Brahmanas, Āranyakas

and Upanisads. All of these works are considered by Vaidi-

kas to have been directly perceived by the rsis (seers of

Truth), and then memorized and orally transmitted by the

brāhmanas (scholar-priests) for countless generation after

generation previous to being finally written down. They are, therefore, sometimes considered to be of a "more sa-

cred" nature than the works comprising the second

category of śāstra.

This second category is called smrti, or "what was remem-

bered." Smrti is a term that refers to an entire corpus of

sacred literature that was remembered and handed down

through the generations as a tradition of sacred history and

stories. The smrti canon includes six principle headings:

112 Also known as the Samhitas or the Mantra-śruti.

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1. The six Vedangas, or "limbs" of the Veda.113

2. The Smārta-sūtra.

3. The Dharma-āstras, or books dealing with laws of vir-

tue.

4. Itihāsas, or epics.

5. The 36 major and minor Purānas.

6. The Nīti-śāstra, which include several collections of fa-

bles containing moral and ethical precepts.

Of all these many works, it is the Vedic literature proper,

the works of the śruti canon, that are traditionally consid-

ered to be the most authoritative śābdic revelation by

Vaidika philosophers.

Veda-śabda-pramāņa

These philosophers are all in agreement that the Vedas rep-

resent a revelation that is apauruseya, or without author.

Having never officially come into existence within the con-

text of anything we might recognize as time, they are

considered to be co-eternal with Brahman (God). Like

Brahman, they are also perfect. "The circumstances that

113 These are six disciplines that are considered appendices of the Veda. They are: 1) Kalpa, the rules that govern sacrificial ceremonies, 2) Jyo- tisa, or astronomy/astrology, 3) Vyākarana, grammar, 4) Nirukta, Sanskrit etymology, 5) Chandas, metre, 6) Śiksā, correct phonetics.

173

render an ordinary verbal testimony invalid", S.C. Chak-

ravarti explains, "or cause the ascertainment of its

invalidity, do not exist in the case of the Vedas, for the Ve-

das were not composed by anybody" (Chakravarti, 15).

The important Vedic commentator, Sāyana, explains that

the Veda contains unimpeded power (akunthita-śakti), and

thus has the ability to establish its own validity, in addition

to establishing the validity of things extrinsic to it. In the

minds of classical Vaidika philosophers, however, it is not

merely due to their śabdic literary content that epistemic

significance is bestowed upon the Vedas, but specifically

due to their sonic impact.

On the auditory and literary levels, the Vedas contain sev-

eral items, including hymns to the gods, incantations, as

well as theological and cosmological teachings. It is on the

more subtle sonic level, however, that the mantras of the

Veda are known to affect their most significant impact. As

has been noted by many contemporary scholars of Vedic

religion114, the actual prosaic content of the Vedas are con-

sidered to be of secondary importance for Vaidikas.

According to Thomas J. Hopkins:

114 Most notably Fritz Staal, Harold Coward, and Guy Beck. See my bibliography for their respective works.

174

Sanskrit words were not just arbitrary labels assigned to phenomenon; they were the sound forms of objects, actions, and attrib- utes, related to the corresponding reality in the same way as visual forms, and different only in being perceived by the ear and not by the eye.

(Hopkins, 20)

It is both the compositional structure of the literary śabda,

and the consequent psycho-spiritual effects on the speaker and hearer that are produced by the recitation of the Vedic

mantras, that are of primary importance for the seeker of liberation. 115

Partly as a result of this perceived salvific efficacy of the

Vedic mantras, as well as due to the vast antiquity of these

works, the Vedas have traditionally been awarded a very

high place of honor among the many works contained in

the Sastra-pramāna canon. Indeed, the consensus among

the overwhelming majority of Vaidika scholars throughout

history has been that the Vedas are a more complete, and

115 P. Chakravarti provides us with several philosophical axioms that provide a basis for the efficacy of eternal sound upon a hearer: "(1) Sound is eternal like space, since both are imperceptible to touch ... (2) Sound is eternal and not liable to perish immediately after its utter- ance, inasmuch as it is capable of being given to others, as in the case of a teacher communicating words to his pupil ... (3) Sound is eternal, as there is no cognition of the cause that might destroy it." (P. Chak- ravarti. The Linguistic Speculation of the Hindus. 1933, pgs. 82-83)

175

therefore superior, revelation when compared to the smrti

literature. While agreeing with the sacred nature of the

śruti (Vedic) literature, Jīva Gosvāmin felt compelled to

come to the defense of the smrti-śabda - specifically the

Purānic literature - as scriptural sources of comparable sa-

credness. This was a crucial sectarian maneuver for Jīva,

for it was specifically within the contents of the Bhagavata-

purāna that Jīva's teacher, Caitanya Mahāprabhu, had told his disciples that they would find the most esoteric teach-

ings of the entire śāstric literature.

Smrti-śabda-pramāņa

It is in the twelfth anuccheda of his Tattva-samdarbha that

Jiva begins to address the arguments of those who would

ascribe divinity only to the śābdic utterances of the śruti; and he presents his case with a meticulous reexamination

of the claims of the smrti literature themselves. Jīva agrees with the mainstream of Vaidika philosophy that the author-

ity bestowed upon the Vedas is due to their transcendent

origins. This being the case, however, this same authority must be admitted of the Purānic literature, due to these lit- eratures also having divine origins. "The Itihāsas and

Purānas are non-different from the Vedas ... ", says Jīva,

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" ... inasmuch as both kinds of literature have no human au-

thor and present the same object of knowledge."

(anuccheda 12.3, Satyanarayan Dasa, trans.). In order to

support this contention, Jiva use several quotes from both

Itihāsas and Purānas that claim the smrti literature to be

the "fifth Veda." For example, he quotes from the

Kauthumīya-chāndogya-upanisad (7.1.2):

rg-vedam bhagavo'dhyemi yajur-vedam sāma-vedam ātharvanam caturtham itihāsam purāņam pañcamam vedānām vedam ityādi

"Venerable Sir, I have studied the Rg, Yajur, Sāma, and

Atharva Vedas, and also the Itihāsas and Purānas, which are the fifth Veda."116 He also cites the Bhavisya-purāna:

kārsnam ca pañcamam vedam yan mahābhāratam smrtam:

"The fifth Veda, written by Krsna, is considered the

Mahābhārata”.117 Jīva's claim that the Purānas are syn-

onymous with the Veda is based on his belief that they at

one time in history constituted a portion of the Yajur-

116 Additionally, verse 7.1.4. of the same Upanisad states: nāma vā rg- vedo yajur-vedah sāma-veda ātharvanaś caturtha itihāsa-purāņaḥ pañcamo vedānām vedah, "Indeed, Rg-veda, Yajur-veda, Sāma-veda and the fourth, Atharva-veda. The Itihasas and Puranas are the fifth Veda".

117 These previous two translations are provided by Satyanārāyana Dāsa.

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veda.118 At a shear minimum, then, the Puranas must be at

least as divinely inspired as are the Vedas.

Since these Purānas complement the Vedas, so Jīva's argu-

ment goes, they certainly cannot be different from them,

since it is not possible for a complement to be absolutely

alien from that item which it is completing. In order to fur-

ther illustrate this point, Jiva offers the analogy of a broken

bracelet made of gold. If a golden bracelet is missing a

piece, it would not be prudent to replace that piece with

lead or some other inferior material. Since they are of two

thoroughly different qualitative natures, such an action

would only lessen the worth of the bracelet as a whole.

Rather, nothing less than a piece of gold should be used to

mend the broken golden bracelet. Similarly, if the Vedas

are not complete - and Jiva contends that they, indeed, are

not - then only a literature of like śābdic nature can serve

as a legitimate supplement, and not something of inferior value. Thus, the smrti literatures must be on an epistemic

par with the Vedas, according to Jīva.

118 For further elaboration of this fascinating claim, please see Sat- yanārāyaņa Dāsa, p. 54-57, and Stuart Elkman, p. 81-83.

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Purāņa-śabda-pramāņa

Jiva Gosvāmin does not stop with this claim, however, but

goes on to resolutely proclaim the actual superiority of the

Purānic corpus over the Vedas (Chakravarti, 9). He offers

several arguments in support of this rather unusual conten-

tion. Jiva feels that the Puranas offer a more complete

account of the nature of transcendent truth, which the Ve-

das, to his mind, do not. Unlike the four Vedas, for

example, the Purānas deal exhaustively with a) ākhyāna:

legends that contain the five characteristics associated with

Purāņas, b) upākhyāna: ancient tales which make the sig-

nificance of Puranic texts initially known,119 and c) gāthā:

varieties of meters dealing with pitrs, devas and other di-

vine beings. It is thus said by Gaudīya Vaisnava gurus

(spiritual teachers) that the Purānas are pūrana, or "com- plete" in themselves.120

119 One example of upākhyana is the dialogue that takes place between Śukadeva and Mahārāja Parīksit in the Bhāgavata-purāņa.

120 Interestingly, both words are derived from the same verb root, pr, which means "to complete", "make full", "supplement". While the ety- mological root of both words may be similar, this fact alone, of course, does not necessarily support the theological claim that Jīva is making.

179

There are thirty-six standardly accepted Purānas altogether,

eighteen of which are considered to be of major importance

(Mahā-purānas), with the same number being traditionally

designated as minor Purānas. While there is a great deal of

diversity as to the foci, the philosophical outlooks, and the

moods of these many works - even to whom each individ-

ual Purana seemingly ascribes the status of supreme

Godhead121 - there are nonetheless several recognized

common elements that are essential for a work to be con-

sidered a Purāna proper. Traditional Vaidika scholars have

listed these topical areas as five in all.

1. Sarga - an account of cosmology.

2. Pratisarga - the destruction and conse-

quent recreation of the world.

3. Vamśa - the genealogy of the gods and

ancient rsis.

4. Manvantara - the time periods linked to

various Manus, or law-givers.

121 Jīva admits the problem of the seeming diversity of perspectives among the various Puranas when he says in anuccheda 17, " ... even though the authoritative nature of the Puranas has been thus estab- lished, the following doubts still remains: since the Purānas are also not available in their entirety, and since they are chiefly concerned with establishing the superiority of various deities, won't their meaning also be difficult to comprehend for modern man of meager intelligence?" Thus, many of the same "defects" that plague the Sruti literature are apparently to be witnessed in the Purānic literature as well.

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5. Vamśanucarita - the histories of the royal

dynasties descending from the sun god

and the moon god.

If a work is missing even one of these five signature ele-

ments, then it is not considered to be a Purāna proper, and

is classified into either another category of śāstra, or non-

śāstric literature, accordingly.

Śāstra-pramāna and Yuga Theory

In addition to supposedly containing information that the

Vedas do not, the Purānas are considered by Jīva to be

more readily accessible to the degraded minds of the in-

habitants of our present age - the Kali-yuga (Era of

Discord). According to many of the Purānas, as well as

other Vaidika scriptures, there is a continual cycle of four

consecutive ages through which our universe perpetually

traverses. These successive epochs are: Satya, Tretā, Dvāpara and Kali, respectively.122 In an almost complete

reversal of the much later Hegelian, Marxist and Social-

Darwinian notion of a historical succession of ages neces-

122 The name of the four yugas appear for the first time in Aitareya Brahmana, VII, 14 (cited by Eliade in Aspects du mythe, Gallimard, 1963)

181

sarily marking the progress of human social attainment,

according to the Vedic world-view, as human history pro-

gresses through each of these different decremental yugas

(ages), civilization becomes increasingly impious and mor-

ally degraded. There is a qualitative degeneration of

human virtue, piety, honesty, strength and wisdom as time

progresses. The Satya era is considered to have been a

Golden Age, a time in which the gods and humans con- versed face to face.123

Among the more unpleasant symptoms of the present age

123 Similar notions of qualitatively degenerating cycles of history are found throughout the entirety of the ancient world, as well as among most indigenous cultures. In India itself, Vaidikas, Buddhists, Jainas, and Sikhs alike all share this same view of history. Similarly, the an- cient Greeks believed in five ages, the fifth being the Age of Heroes. Like its Vedic counterpart, the Greek epochs were correlated with the colors gold, silver, bronze and iron, each color representing the qualita- tive distinction of each age. The Hopis of America's Southwest also believed in this concept of four increasingly degenerate ages. Indeed, the only civilization to have taught the opposite of this Devolutionary Model, i.e., the Progressive Model, which says that human history has progressively led to greater expressions of civilized behavior, has been the Post-Enlightenment European, and subsequently American, world- view. In upholding this Progressive Model of history, the Euro- American view of history as social progress is actually both unique, and very much out of step with the views of the vast majority of civiliza- tions throughout time. For a comprehensive analysis of the more ancient cyclical view of history, see Trompf G., The Idea of Historical Recurrence in Western Thought Vol. 1, University of California Press, 1979. In the 20th century, the scholars Oswald Spengler, René Gué- non and Julius Evola presented an intellectual countercurrent to the maistream acceptance of the Progressive Model; as I am myself at- tempting to present in the 21st century.

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we find ourselves in - the Kali-yuga12 - are an increased

tendency toward corruption by political leaders, a rise in

un-dharmic and materialistic activities, and an increasing

tendency towards intellectual lethargy on the part of hu-

mans, in general. It is this last fact, especially, that leads

Jīva to conclude that the Vedas are simply too complex and

demanding a set of śastras for the intellectually challenged

inhabitants of Kali-yuga to master. It was precisely in order

to help remedy this situation that Vyāsa, in a mood of utter

compassion for the fallen souls of our age, mercifully

deigned to compose the Purānas and Itihāsas for the benefit

of all beings on earth, as well as the Earth herself.

A Self-Validating Evidentiary Dilemma?

In our brief survey of Jiva's arguments thus far, it quickly becomes apparent that the manner in which Jiva attempts

to prove his contentions appears to pose an evidential di-

lemma. Since many of the supporting quotes that Jīva

finds contending the position of equal validity that he as-

cribes to the Itihāsas and Purānas are themselves drawn

from the Itihāsas and Purānas, is this not a clear and vivid

case of self-validation? Can we really trust statements

124 Kali-yuga began at midnight (00:00), on January 23, 3102 BC.

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claiming the perfection of smrti texts which themselves are

found in the smrti? It certainly might be argued, after all,

that it is in the interests of the authors of these many

Puranic and Itihasic works to claim that they were just as

authoritative as the Vedic literature in order to try to gain

widespread acceptance of these works by both the intellec-

tual elite, as well as the masses of Hindu India.

However, from Jiva's epistemological perspective, he would

not only be within his evidentiary rights to use such

Purānic quotes to support the Puranas' authority but, in or-

der to avoid the pitfall of self-contradiction, he would

actually be compelled to do so. For Jiva, the smrti repre-

sents the highest and most exhaustively authoritative

pramana. If it is true that the Puranas are indeed the high-

est pramāna afforded to Kali-yuga humanity, and if it were

then proven necessary to look to another work extrinsic to

the Puranic corpus for validation of the authority of this

Puranic corpus, then this secondary work would itself be

the more decisive scriptural authority. Given its overriding

judiciary command, this secondary work would then be it- self the highest pramāna. A severe problem then naturally

arises. For this secondary work would, in turn, need some

sort of external validation in order to establish its own in-

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herent authority. Thus the search for a final validating au-

thority would be extended on and on, stretching from one

validating text to another ad infinitum.

Bhāgavata-śabda-pramāņa

Having offered the smrti literature as being the most ap-

propriate śābdic lens through which to understand the

truth, the next logical question that Jiva asks is: Which of

all these thirty-six various Puranas offers the clearest in-

sight into that truth? Since these works appear to be so

varied themselves - some seemingly proclaiming the wor-

ship of Siva to be of primary devotional worth, others

Visnu, Krsna, or the great goddess Devi125 - there must be

some reliable way of differentiating which of these many

different interpretations leads to the highest truth, and the

highest spiritual attainment. For Jīva Gosvāmin, as well as

125 Interestingly, while at a cursory reading some of these various Purānas may seem superficially to be proffering various devas and devīs as the Supreme Absolute, on a closer and more careful reading, it quickly becomes apparent that these various texts are all in agreement that Narayana is the ontological source of all reality and the Supreme Absolute. While a specific Purāna may choose to focus its primary lit- erary interest in, for example, Siva or Sakti, this literary emphasis is not to be confused with the false idea that these respective Purānas are consequently claiming the Siva or Sakti are God.

185

a number of predominantly North Indian Vaisnava

sampradayas,126 the answer to this question is the

Bhāgavata-purāna. This one specific scripture is chosen by

Jīva from the vast range of Vedic revelation by a systematic

process of qualitative elimination.

As previously discussed, it is already generally accepted

that the Puranas can be distinguished between the major

and the minor canons. This reduces the candidates for pa-

ramount Purāna by 50%, thus making Jiva's task somewhat

less challenging. For the remaining eighteen Purānas, Jīva

makes a categorical distinction based upon the notion of

guna. The concept of guna, or "quality", probably finds its

origin in Sāmkhya philosophy, but was eventually accepted

by the vast majority of Vaidika philosophical systems.

Utilization of the Guna Theory in the Search for the Scrip-

ture Par Excellence

According to this Guna-theory, prakrti, the prime matter of

which all non-ätmic existents are composed, originally ex-

isted in a serenely quiescent state of repose, knowing

126 In addition to the Gaudīyas, the sampradāya (lineage) founded by Vallabha, known as the Pusti-mārga, or sometimes the Rudra- sampradāya, also accepts the Bhāgavata-purāna as their highest scrip- tural and philosophical authority.

186

neither movement nor differentiation. The gunas (modes

of matter) are the three underlying qualities of prakrti

(matter). This triad of material modes consists of 1) sattva

(positivity, goodness, wholesomeness, cleanliness), 2) rajas

(passion, energy, movement) and 3) tamas (negativity,

lethargy, darkness, ignorance). These three aspects of ma-

terial energy exist as the very core of all empirical material

phenomena. They can be seen as being three different

modes in the spectrum of the one primary material sub-

stance. They represent the unitary material substance in

three different, yet completely interdependent, frequencies

or states. Every aspect of material phenomena that we per-

ceive around us - including our own bodies and minds - is

composed of a combination of these three gunas, with one

or the other of these three gunas predominating. In

Vaidika metaphysics, there is nothing in this world that is not composed of, and affected by, the interaction of all of these modes of nature, one predominating over the other.

The gunas also extend their influence over human beings

by means of their prakrti-composed material bodies. Thus everything in the material world is affected by the interplay

of the gunas. Before we can see precisely how Jīva Gosvāmin employs the concept of gunas in his estimation of the various Puranas, it is important that we first under-

187

stand the difference between the three gunas in depth.

We will now briefly examine the primary characteristics of

each of the three gunas (modes of matter). We will begin

this exploration of the gunas by examining the guna that is

considered to be the highest quality: sattva. Sattva can be

translated as "goodness". This guna denotes such qualities

as purity, brightness, and essence. It is also light - both in

respect to the luster of its radiance and in regard to its ac-

tual weight in terms of physics. Thus, individuals who are of a spiritual, clean (both physically and mentally, exter- nally and internally), and peaceful nature are said to be

living a sattvic existence; they are residing in goodness.

Sattva is the quality most sought by all spiritual practitio-

ners.

The next guna is rajas. Rajas denotes activity and move-

ment. It is the mediator between the other two gunas, as

well as their empowerer. For without the kinetic assistance

of rajas, neither sattva (goodness) nor tamas (lethargy) can

act. It is rajas that motivates the individual to labor and

that inspires work. Those persons in whom rajas predomi- nates tend to be of a fiery and passionate disposition. While a certain degree of rajas is always necessary in order

188

to facilitate any sort of activity, it is believed that too much

of this quality makes one restless, thus hampering medita-

tion and other forms of disciplined spiritual pursuits.

When the material energy (prakrti), through the medium

of rajas, becomes turned to its lowest frequency, it is then

known as tamas. Tamas has the characteristics of dullness,

ignorance, and inertia. It is a dark mode, both intrinsically

and in the consequences it inevitably brings about. Due to

its heavy, weighted nature, it provides stability and forms

the very foundation (ādhāra) of matter. Tamas is the

source of obstacles, resistance and obstructions. Tamas

brings about cessation. Those who are of a tamasic nature

tend toward lethargy, procrastination and self-destructive

behavior. It is the end point of the descent and devolution

of prakrti. It is, thus, the very antithesis of sattva (good-

ness). Those wishing to make any sort of spiritual progress

seek to thoroughly avoid tamasic tendencies.

These three interdependent strands of the material sub-

stance are different aspects of the same material energy,

which, according to Vedäntic philosophy, is in turn under the full control of the Supreme as the controller of all ener-

gies, including material energy. Sattva (goodness) is the

189

finest frequency that prakrti (matter) adopts. Rajas (pas-

sion) is the intermediate catalytic energy source. Tamas (lethargy) is the resting place, the dullest mode of material energy. The qualitative hierarchy of the three gunas (mod- es of matter) can be visually represented in this way:

The Three Gunas

Sattva = goodness Rajas = energy to act

Tamas = dullness

According to Jīva, since not all people are perfectly situated

in sattva-guna (the mode of goodness), not everyone is ca- pable of taking full advantage of that specific Sāstra- pramāna text that is meant to elevate humanity to the

highest level of spiritual attainment: śuddha-sattva, or pure

goodness. Therefore, the individual components of the

Purānic literature are designed to aid people in their spiri- tual quest in corresponding accordance with each individual's predominating guna. The Puranas can thus be,

themselves, divided into the three categories of sattva, rajas

and tamas, with each category of literature meant to appeal

to persons of the corresponding guna. In support of this

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contention, Jiva says the following in his Tattva-

samdarbha:

... the categories into which the various well- known Purānas fall are described in the Mat- sya Purāna itself, based solely on stories concerning the different kalpas; but what means can be adopted by which the relative importance of these Purānas can be deter- mined? If we base our decision on the relative importance of the three gunas, sattva, rajas and tamas, then, on the strength of such statements as "From sattva comes knowl- edge" (Bhagavad Gītā, 14:17) and "Sattva is the basis for the realization of Brahman", we will have to conclude that only sāttvika Purānas etc. are capable of leading us to the highest truth.

(anuccheda 18)

One intra-śāstric citation that seems to support of this idea

of dividing the Purānas according to their gunic functions is

found in the Padma-purāna:

Oh beautiful lady, know that the Visnu, Nārada, Bhāgavata, Garuda, Padma and Varāha Purānas are of the characteristic of sattva, the Brahmānda, Brahma-vaivarta, Mārkaņdeya, Bhavisya, Vāmana and Brahma Puranas are of the characteristic of rajas, and the Matsya, Kūrma, Linga, Śiva, Skanda and

191

Agni Purānas are of the characteristic of tamas.

(Padma-purāna, Uttara-khanda, 236.18-21)

Thus, the idea of classifying the Puranas in accordance with

their gunic qualities both predates Jīva, and is śāstrically

based. The Vedic literature holds that those Purānas deal-

ing with Siva and Devi are tamasic (lethargic) in nature,

while those involving Brahmā are rājasic (ki-

netic/passionate). Only those Puranas detailing the

activities of Visnu-Nārāyaņa (God), His avatāras and His

devotees are naturally sāttvic (goodness). These, then, are

the eighteen Puranas coupled with their corresponding

guņas:

Sattva Rajas Tamas

Visnu Brahmānda Matsya

Nārada Brahma-vaivarta Kūrma

Bhāgavata Mārkaņdeya Liṅga

Garuda Bhavisya Śiva

Padma Vāmana Skanda

Varāha Brahma Agni

As the Sapta-darśanas (seven schools of Vaidika philoso-

192

phy) all agree that sāttvic qualities are the purest, and

therefore the most desirable, of the gunas, only those sa-

cred literatures that are essentially sāttvic in nature can

deliver the highest spiritual knowledge.

Jīva therefore concludes that it is among the sāttvic

Purānas, those Purnas that concentrate upon God in the

form of Visnu and His avatāras (earthly incarnations), that

the paramount Sāstra-pramana will be discovered. Of the

eighteen Mahā-purānas, six are clearly Vaisnava influenced.

These Purānas are: Visnu, Bhāgavata, Nāradīya, Garuda, Padma and Varāha. Of these, the purest vehicle of the Di-

vine Word (śabda), in Jīva's estimation, is found in the

form of the Bhāgavata-purāna. " ... for you have just de-

scribed the very Bhagavata-purana which we consider to be the sovereign ruler of all pramānas.", exclaims Jīva

Gosvāmin with great exigency in anuccheda, 18.

In order to prove this contention, Jiva delineates several

criteria which a Vedic scripture must fulfill in order to be

accepted as a perfect literary pramāna. These guidelines all fall within the parameters of Jiva's earlier conclusions:

1. This perfect scripture must be Purānic in nature. This

193

is because the Purānas are easily accessible to hu-

manity, unlike the Vedas, which are written in a metaphorical, therefore less penetrable, style. The Bhāgavata-purāna certainly fulfills this criterion.

2. It must have been divinely composed. The Bhāgavata-

purāna, the tradition says, was revealed by Vyāsa,

an avatāra, or incarnation, of God Himself. There-

fore, its composition is free from human touch.

3. It must represent all of the revealed scriptures in con-

tent. This work, unlike any other Purāna, contains

within its pages every subject matter touched upon

in all of the other scriptures.

4. It must be based on the Brahma-sūtras, the most im-

portant philosophical text in Vedic philosophy. One of

the beliefs of Jiva's Gaudiya school of Vaisnavism

(theism) is that Vyäsa, the author of the Brahma-

sūtras, also wrote the Bhāgavata-purāņa as his

commentary on the former work. Consequently, not

only is the Bhāgavata-purāna considered by Jīva to

be Vedantic in content, but to be the ultimate com

mentary (bhasya) on the Brahma-sūtras, having

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been written by the very author of the Brahma-

sūtras.

5. It must be available in its complete form. Which we

know it is.

At least for Jīva Gosvāmin, then, the Bhāgavata-purāna

serves as the perfect literary pramāna (valid means of knowing), the preeminent Sāstra-pramāna, and thus as the

most authentic basis for knowledge into the nature of the

Absolute.

The Trance of Vyāsa: An Illustration of Sābdic Transmis-

sion

In addition to all of the above arguments that Jiva uses for

the superiority of the Bhāgavata-purāna, he also makes the

interesting claim that the specific samādhi (meditative ab-

sorption) experience that the rsi Vyasa underwent in

revealing the contents of the Bhāgavata-purāna was of a

singularly unparalleled nature. The case for this claim is based upon three observations: 1) the technique of sādhana (spiritual discipline) that Vyāsa employed was

195

based upon bhakti127, or loving meditative absorption in

the Absolute. 2) The realizations of Vyāsa were of a more

categorically comprehensive nature than anything previ-

ously attained. 3) The very ontological nature of Vyāsa as

an avatāra (incarnation of God) - juxtaposed with that of

the jīvātmans, or the individual units of finite consciousness

which comprise the realm of living beings - affords Vyāsa a

perspective that is perspectivally above and ontologically

distinct from anything that humans are capable of achiev-

ing in terms of spiritual attainment. Jīva begins his

analysis of the śābdic experience of Vyāsa in anuccheda

30.1 and continues through to 32.1.

The actual description of the samadhi-phenomenon that

Vyāsa experienced is described in the seventh chapter of

the first skandha of the Bhāgavata-purāna.

sūta uvāca brahma-nadyām sarasvatyām

127 More accurately, the form of sādhana most likely practiced by Vyāsa was Upāsanā Yoga, the bhakti-yoga system found in the Upanisads, the goal of which is one-pointed devotional meditation on the form and proprium attributes of God. Based upon forty Brahma-vidyās, or ways of knowing God, that are found throughout the Upanisads, as well as upon the teachings of such devotional yoga works as the Nārada- bhakti-sūtras, Bhagavad-gītā and others, upāsanā possibly represents the most ancient form of yoga known to history. For further analysis of the tradition of Upāsanā Yoga, see my work Sanātana Dharma: The Eternal Natural Way.

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āśramah paścime tate śamyāprāsa iti prokta rsīnām satra-vardhanaḥ

tasmin sva āśrame vyāso badarī-sanda-mandite āsīno'pa upasprśya pranidadhyau manah svayam

bhakti-yogena manasi samyak pranihite 'male apaśyat purusam pūrnam māyām ca tad-apāśrayam

Sūta said: On the western banks of the Sa- rasvatī, the presiding deity of which is god Brahmā (or which is resorted to by the Brāhmanas) there is a hermitage called Śamyāprāsa which encourages (lit. extends) the sacrificial sessions of the sages. Sitting in his own hermitage beautified by a cluster of jujube trees, Vyāsa, after touching water, concentrated his mind (as instructed by Nārada). In his mind purified by devotion and thoroughly concentrated, he saw at first the Primeval Being and (His power called) Māyā (Illusion) depending on Him.

(1.7.2-4)

The words "bhakti-yogena manasi" clearly indicate that the

meditational technique that Vyāsa used was both devo-

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tional and theistic in nature. This has special significance

for Jiva Gosvamin because, as a follower of the ancient

Vaisnava (theistic) tradition, Jiva would naturally hold to

the view that the most efficacious means to achieve

Vedäntic enlightenment is through the process of loving

meditation upon the personal form of Bhagavān (God). In

Jīva's case, this persona deitatis form is specifically that of

Krsna. Stuart Elkman, one of the only two translators of

Jīva Gosvāmin's Tattva Samdarbha into English, offers

some very good insight into the precise nature of the

samādhi phenomenon when experienced via the process of

bhakti:

The term samādhi is used in Vedānta and Yo- ga to signify the steady and concentrated dwelling of the mind on a single object. In devotional literature, however, the term is used to indicate the absorption of the mind in a spiritual mood, wherein one communes with the object of this devotion, and enjoys visions and experiences, all of which are con- sidered to be objectively real and to represent direct communication with the divine. Thus, the vision which Vyäsa had prior to his writ- ing of the Bhāgavata is considered by Jīva to be sufficient grounds for classifying the Bhāgavata as revealed literature.

(Elkman, 63)

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As a theistic philosopher, Jiva naturally subscribes to the

position that the most primeval aspect of Brahman is not the impersonal nirguna (without qualities) Absolute of the Advaitins, but Bhagavän, or God as an infinitely loving and

captivatingly personal Absolute. The most efficacious

process for realizing the visio dei experience of this Su-

preme Being, according to the Vaisnava tradition, is

through the yoga of devotional meditation, or upāsanā. He

therefore places great importance upon the details of

Vyāsa's specifically bhakti-inspired vision of the Divine Be-

ing.

In this vision described in verse four, Vyasa is said to have

experienced purusa pūrņa, the "Absolute Person", in addi-

tion to māyā, the illusory principle responsible for assisting

the ätman (individual spirit) to so intimately identify with

non-ātman (matter). What is significant about this image

is that the verse describes māyā (illusion) as being

apāśraya, under the full control of the purusa pūrņa (Abso-

lute Person, God). For Jiva, this relation between the two

elements of a) God and b) the illusory world, supports sev- eral contentions that are held by all Vaisnava philosophers

as being crucial metaphysical presuppositions.

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The most immediate circumstance that this vision shows is

that, contrary to what the Advaitins hold, God and the

world are clearly distinct entities. This is shown by the

clearly subordinate position of māyā (illusion) vis-à-vis the

purusa pūrņa (Supreme Person). As Vaisnava Vedāntists

interpret the significance of this distinction, the realm of

illusion is seen as being a subordinate attribute of the Abso-

lute, as opposed to being non-distinct from the essence of

the Absolute. Vaisnavas hold to the position that, while

God is a unitary being (ekatva), He is yet a being who has

distinguishable attributes (viśesas) and powers (śaktis).

The power of illusion is one of these many śaktis (powers).

Moreover, it is stated here that the "Supreme Person" has

full control over this material energy. For Jīva, this reveals

yet another of God's infinite attributes: aiśvarya, or the

power of complete dominion over all existent things. As

Jīva Gosvāmin states his position in anuccheda 34:

Here, the phrases "māyā resting outside of him" (Bh.P. 2/7/4) and "deluded by māyā" (Bh.P. 2/7/5) indicate that the jīva [individ- ual soul], even though, like parameśvara [Supreme Lord], being essentially pure con- sciousness, is nevertheless distinct from parameśvara.128

128 Tatra jīvasya tādrśacidrūpatve 'pi parameśvarato vailaksanyam ta- dapāśrayām iti yayā sammohita iti ca darśayati//

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This power dynamic, in itself, would imply that there is

clearly a) a controlled and b) a Controller. The distinction

between the Absolute as the wielder of power, and the non-

Absolute as the empowered of God, is another major tenet

of Vaisnava theism. The vision of Vyāsa is thus a via posi-

tiva discovery revealing at least several of the divine

attributes of the Absolute, including:

1. A clear distinction of God from His attributes

(which is itself arguably an attribute).

2. The ability of God to master illusion, thus

displaying God's independent and omnipo-

tent nature.

3. The power of sovereignty inherent in God's

very natura esse.

The Ontological Status of Vyāsa

The level of depth of Vyäsa's experience can be further un-

derstood in light of the unique ontological nature of this being. It is believed by almost all Sapta-darśana philoso-

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phers, as well as by all Vaidikas generally, that the life of

Vyāsa represents an illustrative instance of the avatāra.

The term avatāra denotes the incarnation on the terrestrial

plane of the Unborn and Eternal. An avatāra represents

the descent of God to the realm of phenomenality. It is

taught in Vedic eschatology that at times of crises and dire

circumstances, the Supreme Being, Visnu, Himself descends

upon the world in one of His unlimited forms in order to

both alleviate the sufferings of the earth, as well as to re-

establish the unadulterated teachings of Dharma, or the

eternal path of enlightenment, to humanity." 7.129 Such rec-

ognized incarnations include the righteous God-king Rāma,

the ferocious destroyer of demons known as Nārasimha

and the speaker of the Bhagavad-gīta, Krsna, among many

others. In the Bhagavad-gītā, Krsna Himself provides a vi-

vid description of the role and function of an avatāra:

yadā yadā hi dharmasya glānir bhavati bhārata abhyutthānam adharmasya tadātmānam srjāmy aham

paritrānāya sādhūnām vināśāya ca duskrtām

129 In addition, for many Vaisnavas, and most especially Gaudīya Vaisnavas, there is a third reason for God's descent. This additional purpose is to engage in "līla", or loving sportive relationships, with His devotees. God comes to Earth to please His devotees.

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dharma-samsthāpanārthāya sambhavāmi yuge yuge

Whenever there is decay of righteousness and a rising up of unrighteousness, O Bhārata, I send forth Myself. For the preservation of good, for the destruction of evil, for the es- tablishment of righteousness, I come into being in age after age.

Bhagavad-gītā (4: 7-8)

While it certainly is not the purpose of the present work to

either defend or denigrate the avatāra theory, it is defi-

nitely within our scope to discuss the direct relevance of

this theory upon Vedic epistemology.

It is believed that Vyasa was one such avatāra of Visnu,

whose express mission was to preserve the Vedic and smrti

literatures for the present age of Kali. In anuccheda 16 of

his Tattva-samdarbha, Jīva gives several Purānic references

supporting the divine status of Vyasa, and describing His

specific mission as the compiler of the śruti and smrti litera-

tures. Here, Jiva attempts, in great depth of detail, to

establish the unparalleled nature of the rsi Vyāsa as an

avatāra (incarnation) of God.

As stated in the Skanda Purāna: "Others have

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borrowed bits and pieces from the ethereal realm of Vyasa's mind for their own use, just as one would remove objects from a house and use them." The same idea is found in the Visnu Purāna, in the words of Vyasa's father, Parāśara: "Then, in this twenty-eighth Man- vantara, my son, the Lord Vyāsa, took the one Veda, consisting of four parts, and divided it into four. All the other 'Vyasas'130, and my- self as well, (have made use of) the Vedas just as the wise Vedavyasa had arranged them. Therefor, know for certain that the different branches of the 'Vyasas' in the four yugas were created for this reason alone. O Mai- treya, know that Krsnadvaipāyana (Vyāsa) is the Lord Nārāyana himself; for who on earth but he could have composed the Mahābhārata?" (Vi.P. 3/4/2-5) And in the Skanda Purāna: "In the Krta Yuga, the knowledge which had issued forth from Nārāyana remained intact. It be- came somewhat distorted in the Tretā Yuga, and completely so in the Dvapara Yuga. When, due to the curse of the sage Gautama, knowledge turned into ignorance, the bewil- dered devas led by Brahmā and Rudra, sought shelter with the benignant, refuge- giving Nārāyana, and informed Bhagavān Purusottama [Nārāyana] of their purpose in coming. And the great Yogin, the Lord Hari himself, descended, taking birth as the son of Satyavatī and Parāśara, and rescued the fallen Vedas." ...

130 The plural here is used merely to indicate the various disciples of Vyāsa, in addition to their teacher.

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As an avatāra of the Supreme Being, Vyāsa's status is con-

sidered by Jīva Gosvāmin to be both ontologically and

authoritatively identical with that of the Supreme Being.

The philosophical implications of this belief are several.

First, the assumption of Vyāsa's divine status on the part of Vaidikas keeps intact the contention that the Sāstra-

pramāna literature is a perfect source of knowledge, un-

tainted by human touch. The compiler of the Vedas is

accepted as a manifestation of divinity - the very professed

source, subject and goal of these literatures. Since the Ab-

solute is perfect and infallible, the śabda conveyed by Him is necessarily also perfect.131 Second, the smrti literature,

as well, is to be considered as perfect and authoritative as

the śruti texts, in at least Jīva's estimation, since their

common compiler is none other than this same "Ve-

davyāsa", the perfect source of the perfect śabda. Finally,

Vyasa's identity as the incarnation of the Supreme Being

131 This, of course, is barring the assumption that the Absolute would, out of His inherent ability to make free volitional choices, desire to de- liver imperfect information about Himself due to malicious intent. There is no indication anywhere in the Sāstra-pramāna of His ever hav- ing desired to do this, however. Rather, the Vaidika scriptures insist that God is the source of all good. The opposite of good is necessarily non-existent in God. This being the case, it would be directly contrary to God's nature to foment evil or untruth.

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seems to directly support Jiva's contention that the most

authoritative member of the Sāstra-pramāna corpus is none

other than the Bhāgavata-purāna, whose author is Vyāsa.

In light of this conviction concerning the infallibility of

Vyāsa's words, in Jīva's estimation the Bhāgavata-purāna is

to be accepted as the greatest authority quite simply be-

cause the śabdic content of the Bhāgavata-purāna - a

recognized component of the Sāstra-pramāna - states that

it is the highest authority:

The venerable sage (Vyāsa) compiled this ep- ic (Purāņa) called Bhāgavata, equal in status to the Vedas, describing the deeds of him of pious reputation. For the highest good of the people, he (Vyāsa) made his son (Suka), pre- eminent among those who have realized the Soul, receive this great (Bhāgavata-Purāņa) which is the means of securing bliss.132

(Bhāgavata-purāņa, 1.3.40, 41)

Jīva feels that since the Bhāgavata-purāna is a śāstra re-

vealed by Bhagavān (God) Himself, then the statements of

this work must, like Bhagavan Himself, be perfect. Since

132 Idam bhāgatavam nāma purānam brahma-sammitam uttama-śloka- caritam cakāra bhagavān rsih nihśreyasāya lokasya dhanyam svasty- ayanam mahat / tad idam grāhayām āsa sutam ātmavatām varam sar- va-vedetihāsānām sāram sāram samuddhrtam/

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these perfect statements of the perfect being refer to the

Bhāgavata-purāna as being "equal in status to the Vedas",

then given the self-validating nature of śābdic epistemol-

ogy, it can not but be the case that this is true, using Jīva's

logic.

While we may agree or disagree with Jīva's logic, Jīva is

certainly not alone in his high estimation of the philosophi-

cal merits of the Bhāgavata-purāna. It would be very

difficult, indeed, to overestimate the powerful impact that

this influential work had in the development of post-

Rāmānuja Vaisnavism. Commenting upon the unique abil-

ity of the Bhāgavata-purāna to synthesize the qualities of many previous śāstras, Vopadeva (fl. ca. 13th century C E)

states in his Muktāphala:

Vedāh purānam kāvyam ca prabhur mitram priyeva ca bodhayantīti hi prāhus trivrd bhāgavatam punah

The Vedas teach like a king, the Purānas like a friend, and Kāvya like one's beloved. They state the Bhägavatam, however, to be threefold.

(My translation)

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In agreement with Vopadeva's assessment, Dr. Ramnarayan

Vyas states the following in his Synthetic Philosophy of the

Bhāgavata:

The Bhāgavata occupies a very prominent po- sition in the realm of Indian philosophy, religion and culture. The learned are full of admiration for it, as will be clear from the common maxim that states that the Bhägavata is the touch-stone of learning (vi- dyāvatam bhāgavate pariksa). Moreover, it has been considered a literary incarnation of God (bhagavato vangamayavatarah) - the highest tribute that can be paid to any lofty work of literature.

(Vyas, xi)

Among the many intellectual and spiritual leaders of

Vaisnavism who were influenced by this Purāna are: Mad-

hva, Caitanya, Vallabha, Svāmī Nārāyaņa and Mirā Bhāī.

Additionally, it is at the very least accepted as being a

scripture of prime theological and philosophical importance

by every sampradaya of the Vaisnava (theist) tradition.

Despite its wide-spread acceptance and use by a broad va-

riety of Vaisnava communities, the relationship that

Gaudīya Vaisnavas have established with this Purānic work

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is quite unique in the Vaisnava world. For Gaudīyas, the

Bhāgavata-purāna represents nothing less than the written personification of God Himself; and more, the highest

scriptural authority in creation. S. K. De has very correctly

made the following observation:

Other schools have also attempted explana- tions of the Bhagavata, but they have hardly gone to this extreme limit of basing their fundamental doctrines solely on the interpre- tation of that text. No doubt, the Bengal school, by this method has attempted to se- cure for itself the authority of one of the greatest and most universally revered reli- gious works of medieval times; but this gain has been counterbalanced by the fact that its doctrines stand or fall according as the Bha- gavata must be regarded as one of the fundamental postulates of this school, and even if there may be other interpretations, that of its own theologians must be unques- tionably accepted.

(De, 89)

Thus the Gaudiya concept of Bhāgavata-śabda-pramāna

represents an approach that is very unique and original, both within the context of the Vaisnava tradition, as well as

within the greater history of Vaidika philosophy and

thought.

209

Jīva Gosvamin's Claims to Epistemic Originality

The bulk of Jīva Gosvamin's epistemology falls quite safely

within the orthodox bounds of traditional Vedic thought.

The foundations of his thought are far from original, and

can be easily traced back historically to such schools as

Ñyāya, Mīmāmsā, Vedānta and Yoga, as well as to such in- dividuals as Samkara and Rāmānuja, as will be shown in the next chapter. In addition to these antecedenous de-

pendencies, however, there are, nonetheless, several rather unique and original aspects to Jiva's thought. These are:

1. His acceptance of a total of ten pramānas, all

subsumed under the three primary pramānas of

śabda, pratyaksa and anumāna. No one else ac-

cepts such a large total number of pramānas.

2. His insistence that the Itihāsa (epic) and Purāna literatures are on an epistemic par with the śruti

literature.

3. His contention that within the entire corpus of

the Puranic literature, the Bhāgavata-purāna

210

represents the most important and authoritative

of scriptures.

In the next chapter, we will further explore the issue of the

relative importance of these innovations, as well as any

significant philosophical implications they might have.

211

Chapter V

A Few Problems

It is, indeed, true that the Bhāgavata-purāna represents one

of the most unique and highly philosophical works among

the many Purānic texts. Additionally, Jīva's scriptural evi-

dence supporting the Bhāgavata's preeminence is not

without some merit. Despite these facts, however, there

are several historical uncertainties, contradictory epistemic

claims and philosophical redundancies that must be raised

both about Jiva Gosvamin's method and overall claim.

Intra-Darśana Historical Discrepancies

First, there is Jīva's claim that Vyāsa wrote the Bhāgavata-

purana with the clear intention of this work serving as a

bhāsya, or commentary, on the Brahma-sūtras. He bases

this opinion upon two contentions. The first is that one word contained in the Gayatri-mantra133 is found in the

133 First revealed by the rsi Viśvamitra, the Gāyatrī-mantra is one of most important mantras found in the Vedic literature. It is found in all four Vedas. The Gayatrī-mantra: Aum bhūr bhuvah svah / Tat savitūr varenyam / Bhārgo devasya dhīmahi / Dhiyo yo naha prachodayat aum

212

beginning verse of the Bhagavata-purana.134 134 The significant

word is "dhīmahi" ("let us meditate upon"). Thus, the

Bhāgavata-purāna is seen as a natural literary expansion of

this famous mantra. Second, several passages from the

Brahma-sūtras are also repeated in the Bhāgavata-purāna.

Jīva states his arguments in the following manner:

Even after manifesting the complete body of the Puranas, and composing the Brah- masūtra, Bhagavān Vyāsa was still not content, and so gave form to that which serves as a natural commentary on his own Brahmasūtra, which was revealed to him in samādhi, and which alone illustrates the common significance of all the scriptures, as seen in the fact that it begins by referring to the Gāyatrī, characterized as a concise state- ment of the significance of all the Vedas. For its true nature has thus been described in the Matsya Purana: "That is to be known as the Bhägavata, which, basing itself on the Gāyatrī, describes dharma in its fullness, and which narrates the slaying of the asura Vrtra. Whosoever will make a copy of this Bhāgavata and offer it away, mounted on a throne of gold during the full moon of Bhädra, will attain the supreme goal. This Purāna is said to contain eighteen thousand

134 om namo bhagavate vāsudevāya janmādy asya yato 'nvayād itarataś cārthesv abhijñah svarāt tene brahma hrdā ya ādi-kavaye muhyanti yat sūrayah tejo-vāri-mrdām yathā vinimayo yatra tri-sargo 'mrsā dhāmnā svena sadā nirasta-kuhakam satyam param dhīmahi (Bh.P. 1/1/1)

213

(verses)." (Ma.P. 53/20,22) The word gāyatrī in the preceding verse refers only to the meaning of the Gayatrī, contained in the word dhīmahi ("we meditate"), which occurs unchanged in the Bhagavata, and thus directly indicates the Gāyatrī; for an outright quotation of this mantra, which is the prototype of all mantras, would not have been proper. The fact that the Bhagavata has the same significance as that of the Gayatrī is seen in the phrases janmādyasya yatah ("from whom comes the origin etc. of the universe") and tene brahma hrdā ("who revealed the Veda [to the creator Brahmā] through his heart) (Bh.P. 1/1/1), which form identical explanations regarding the substratum of the entire universe and the ability to inspire the workings of the intellect, with those of the Gāyatrī.

(anuccheda 19)

Thus, for Jiva, the inclusion of the word "dhimahi", and the

inclusion of two passages from the Brahma-sūtras, reveal

that the author of the Bhāgavata-purāna is secretly indicat-

ing his intention of making this work a commentary on the

Brahma-sūtras.

However, if the Bhāgavata-purāna is, indeed, Vyāsa's natu-

ral autocommentary upon the Brahma-sūtras, as Jīva boldly contends that it is, then why did Samkara, the earliest ex-

214

tant commentator on the Sūtras, not mention or endorse

this idea? Rather, he expended a considerable amount of

time and mental ability creating his own unique advaitic

bhāsya (commentary). For that matter, even the great

Vaisnava ācāryas, such as Rāmānuja and Madhva, had

seemingly decided to write their own commentaries on the

Brahma-sūtras, rather than defer to an autocommentary by

Vyāsa.

Jiva's attempted answer to this objection is rooted in the

sacred stories of the smrti literature itself. Quoting from

the Padma-purāņa (Uttara Khaņda, 25.7), Jīva makes the case that Samkara was in actuality an incarnation of Siva,

sent to earth to revive Vedic culture by presenting a crypto-

Buddhist teaching couched in Vedantic terminology. In the

Padma-purāna's account of this incident, Samkara is actu- ally a disguised Vaisnava dutifully following the orders of God. As such, any discussion of the Bhägavata - the most

intimate revelation pertaining to the nature of God in the entire Vedic corpus - was avoided by Samkara out of rever-

ential deference to God. Jīva does not address the

question, however, of why even Vaisnava ācāryas (precep-

tors) did not acknowledge the fact that the Bhāgavata-

purāna was the most authentic bhāsya.

215

The problem with Jiva's line of argument concerning Śamkara is very readily apparent. As an assertion based solely upon the sacred stories of the Purānas, Jīva's claim

that Samkara was insincere about his own teachings cannot

necessarily be sustained from a critical historical or phi-

losophical perspective. While this sacred-story-dependent

argument can be successfully postulated within the context

of śāstric scriptural evidence, it often holds little weight

outside the bounds of a Sāstra-pramāna context, i.e., within

a strictly philosophical context. For a defense of a śābdic-

based philosophical claim to properly withstand the as-

saults of a non-Sapta-darśana philosophical critique (such

as that of a Buddhist, a Jain, or a Marxist), it must be firm-

ly based upon the strengths of either propositional validity,

historical fact, or textual exegetical evidence - in addition

to being verifiable śābdically.

Additionally, if this Puranic evidence were sufficient to ex-

plain Samkara's actions and teachings in the face of the Bhāgavata-purāņa's purported Vedāntic authority, then any and all of the attempts on the part of the Vaisnava ācāryas throughout history to refute Samkara's philosophical argu- ments would certainly seem to be superfluous and

216

unnecessary. This story alone should suffice in showing

that Samkara did not really mean what he said, therefore

why bother refuting someone who does not take his own

claims seriously? This argument may carry weight from a

purely śābdic criterion, but it could be argued that it does

not work quite as well from a rigidly philosophical angle,

or even from the angle of simple historical reality.

A second potential cause for unease about Jīva's conclu-

sions regarding the preeminence of the Bhāgavata-purāna might arise from the following line of reasoning. Tradi-

tionally, Gaudīya Vaisnavas (including Caitanya himself) have had a very high regard for Srīdhara Svāmī's commen-

tary on the Bhāgavata-purāna. Yet this famous

commentary is riddled throughout with overtly Advaitic

sentiments. In anuccheda 27, Jiva makes it clear that the

interpretation of the Bhāgavata-purāna that he presents in

his Sad-samdarbhas is primarily influenced by two indi- viduals: Śrīdhara Svāmī and Rāmānuja.

Therefore, we will examine the Bhāgavata alone, observing the consistency between the earlier and later portions, in order to deter- mine what is the supreme good. Here, in this composition of six volumes, the introductory remarks will occupy the position of sūtras,

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and the words of the Bhagavata, the subject matter. Our interpretation of the words of the Bhagavata, representing a kind of bhāsya, will be written in accordance with the views of the great Vaisnava, the revered Srīdhara Svāmin, only when they conform to the strict Vaisnava standpoint, since his writings are in- terspersed with the doctrines of Advaita so that an appreciation for the greatness of Bhāgavata may be awakened in the Advaitins who nowadays pervade the central regions etc. In some places we will follow Srīdhara's interpretations found elsewhere. In other in- stances, our interpretation will be based on the doctrines found in the writings of the venerable Rāmānuja, such as his Śrībhāsya etc., adhered to by the Srī Vaisnavas, whose renowned sampradāya has originated from the goddess Sri herself, and who are cele- brated as great Bhāgavatas of the Dravida region etc; for as the Bhāgavata itself states, there are many in this area known as Vaisnavas: "O Great King, some devotees of Nārāyana can be found here and there, but their numbers are great in the Dravida re- gions." (Bh.P. 11/5/39) And in some instances, our interpretations will differ from both (Śrīdhara and Rāmānuja), and will fol- low the natural sense of the Bhagavata. As the Advaita doctrines are well-known, they need not be delineated here.

(anuccheda 27)

Śrīdhara Svāmī was known to have been a samnyāsin (re-

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nounced monk) in the daśanāmi sampradāya, the Advaita mendicant order founded by Samkara. Jīva himself here acknowledges Śrīdhara's Advaitic leanings, and says that he

will simply ignore these non-theistic statements of his as

being inconsequential. This seemingly lackadaisical re-

sponse to what is obviously a legitimate cause of concern is

troubling. For if the Bhāgavata-purāna is, indeed, the foremost Sāstra-pramāna, and if it consequently upholds

the theistic conclusions so crucial to Jiva's world-view, then

why was Srīdhara's bhāsya (commentary) upon it not overtly Vaisnava (theistic) in philosophical outlook? Jīva Gosvamin's answer to this question is somewhat reminis- cent of his opinion about Samkara's alleged "true"

motivations previously discussed, but with a greater degree

of historical and literary evidence to back up his claims.

Again, as with Samkara, Jiva felt that Srdhara was a covert Vaisnava at heart, merely playing the part of an Advaitin in

order to attract the monists into the camp of Vaisnavism.

Unlike the case with Jīva's arguments about Samkarācārya,

which were based solely on the evidence of Purānic sacred stories, there seems to be some additional objective literary evidence to support this contention about Śrīdhara Svāmī. For, while it is true that Śrīdhara Svāmī's Bhāvārtha-dīpikā

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commentary on the Bhāgavata-purāna does contain several

Advaitic opinions, this is not the case for his other bhāsyas

on the Visnu-purāna and the Bhagavad-gītā. Those com- mentaries are plainly much more devotional and theistic in

nature when compared to his Bhagavata commentary (Tri-

purari, 93-94). This literary evidence, of course, provides no clear proof of Jīva's claim that Śrīdhara Svāmī wanted to slyly trick Advaitins into becoming theistic Vaisnavas. There is no evidence to prove this conjecture. At most, it

may possibly support his contention that Srīdhara was

more of a Vaisnava at heart than his Bhāgavata-purāna

commentary may reveal at first glance.

Inherently Contradictory Epistemic Claims

Further, as we more closely examine Jiva's claims about the

superiority of the Bhāgavata-purāna, we see that he com-

mits several seemingly contradictory claims about the

nature of the śruti literature. On the one hand, Jīva is cer-

tainly an orthodox adherent of Vedic epistemology. Like

the many upholders of the Vedic system who came before

him, Jīva Gosvāmin makes the claim that the Sāstra- pramāna constitutes the most reliable of all pramānas (valid means of knowing). On the other hand, he directly

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contradicts this very claim in his many attempts to down-

play the authority of the śruti literature in defense of his

Bhāgavata-śabda-pramāņa thesis. Specifically, Jīva states:

Since the Vedas are at present difficult to go through completely and hard to comprehend - for even the sages who sought to ascertain their meaning contradict one another - we will examine śabda in the form of Itihāsa and Purānas alone, both of which partake of the nature of Vedas, and serve to ascertain the meaning of the Vedas. Furthermore, those portions of the Vedas which are not known on their own can only be inferred by examining Itihāsas and Purānas.

(Anuccheda 12)

In the above statement, as well as other places throughout

his Tattva-samdarbha, Jīva makes three very specific

claims:

1. That the Vedas are incomprehensible.

2. That there is a diversity of opinion about the Vedas,

therefore negating the Vedas' validity and value.

3. That the only way to understand the true purport of

the Vedas is through the Purānic literature, and spe-

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cifically, the Bhāgavata-purāna.

One of the claims that Jiva makes, namely the third, can be

conveniently rendered in the following expanded analytic

structure:

Puranic Superiority Proposition:

a) The real nature and purport of the śruti literature

is now incomprehensible by the common person

in this degraded age of Kali.

b) Conversely, the Bhāgavata-purāna is a revealed

scripture that is relatively easily grasped by the

majority of Kali-yuga inhabitants.

c) Therefore, the Bhāgavata-purāna is a scripture

that is necessarily superior to the Vedas.

Unfortunately, the rather tortured conclusion of Jīva's ar-

gument does not necessarily follow from the two preceding

premises for the following reasons.

First, it is not by any means a universally accepted truth

that the śruti literature is currently incomprehensible, and

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therefore meaningless. This is a true statement only in Jīva

Gosvamin's sectarian-colored opinion. Indeed, the

Mimāmsā school, which is both historically and presently

predicated upon the very project of Vedic interpretation,

would vehemently disagree with this assertion, as would

the vast majority of Vaidika philosophers, ancient, medie- val, and contemporary. The Vedic literature is considered

by Vaidikas of every sampradāya (with the arguable excep- tion, of course, of the Gaudīya sampradāya) to be

foundational to any proper understanding of the totality of

Dharma and the Vedic world-view itself. Murty explains

the extremely high regard orthodox Vaidikas ("Hindus")

have for the Vedas by enumerating several of the reliable

epistemic qualities that they have:

The Veda is a reliable authority because it teaches us about things which are highly use- ful (phalavat) and are not known otherwise (anadhigata); and this knowledge is uncon- tradicted (abādhita).

(Murty, 30)

Indeed, important Vaidika philosophers have thought the

Vedic literature to be of such importance as to have written extensive commentaries upon them throughout the history

of this very Kali-yuga in which we are all living. Sāyana's

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fourteenth century Rg-veda commentary and Dayānanda

Sarasvatī's135 nineteenth century commentary attest to the

comprehensibility ascribed to the Vedas by even rather re-

cent Vaidika figures of prominence. Both Aurobindo Ghosh

and Shriram Sharma Acharya were two, among many,

scholars who wrote extensively on the spirituality of the

Vedas in the 20th century. In addition, Vedācārya Sri

Vamadeva Shastri (Dr. David Frawley) has based most of

his almost three dozen works directly on the philosophy of

the Vedas. Jiva's opinion on the supposed incomprehensi-

bility and meaninglessness of the Vedas is thus not shared

by other important Vaidika leaders, past or present. His is,

in fact, very much a minority opinion.

Moreover, Jiva's attempted dismantling of the authority

and primacy of śruti directly and severely undercuts his

very own argument in yet another crucial way. Jīva claims

that the Bhāgavata-purāna is a "natural" commentary on

the Brahma-sūtras. It is designed by its author, Vyāsa, to

shed light upon the true meaning of one of the very same

author's earlier works. What Jiva seems to forget, very

surprisingly, is that the Brahma-sūtras, themselves, were

135 This is the Dayananda Sarasvatī who founded the Arya Samaj in the 19th century, and not to be confused with the currently living guru who is the founder of the Arsha Vidya Gurukulam.

224

designed by their author - the very same Vyāsa - to be a

perfect explication of the philosophy of the Upanisads, the very scriptural foundation of the philosophy of the Vaidika

religion. The Upanisads, in their turn, are recognized by

any and all Vaidika teachers, philosophers, and religious

leaders who would wish to be seen as orthodox Vaidikas as

constituting an integral part of the śruti literature. Indeed,

as the jñāna-kanda, or knowledge portion, of the śruti (of

which the Samhitas, Brahmanas and Āranyakas comprise

the karma-kanda, or works section) the Upanisads are

without doubt the most important part of the śruti litera-

ture, from the Vedäntic perspective. Indeed, it is for this

very reason that the philosophy of the Upanisads is known as the culmination (anta) of the śruti (Veda).

If the śruti is, indeed, a scriptural literature that is incom-

prehensible, and therefore of no redeeming value to the

people of Kali-yuga, then does this fact not in turn render

the Brahma-sūtras a valueless work, since the Brahma-

sūtras are attempting to explicate an inexplicable litera-

ture? In turn, if the Brahma-sūtras are valueless, does this

not make the commentarial function of the Bhāgavata-

purāna - which is supposedly the author's auto-commentary

on the Brahma-sūtras - a rather meaningless interpretive

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exercise?

On the one hand, Jiva claims that the śruti is useless, there-

fore the Bhāgavata-purāna is solely authoritative; but on

the other hand, he says that the Bhāgavata-purāna is au-

thoritative because it is a commentary on a work explicating the philosophical essence of a useless literature,

the śruti. The problem with Jiva's argument, of course, is that in his zeal to uphold the inherent dignity of the

Bhāgavata-purāna as the most valuable part of Sāstra-

pramāna, Jīva undercuts his own stated aims by attacking another valuable section of Sāstra-pramāna. He thus cuts

off his nose to spite his face. Moreover, he is attacking a

section of the Sastra-pramana, without which, the

Bhāgavata-purāna loses its very commentarial raison d'être.

And if it loses its commentarial raison d'être, it loses one of

the primary arguments attempting to prove its uniqueness

as a scripture of supreme pramānic importance. To at- tempt to uphold the validity of Sāstra-pramāna by belittling

Śāstra-pramāna is a project that is predictably doomed to

failure as a necessary result of its own inherently contradic-

tory nature.

A further claim that Jiva makes in his attempts to establish

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the superiority of the Bhāgavata-purāna over the śruti lit-

erature is based upon the very existence of several

differences of interpretation of this literature among vari-

ous Vaidika philosophers. Jiva's argument can be outlined

in the following propositions:

Negation Via Multiple Interpretations Proposition:

a) The śruti literature claims to reveal the truth.

b) There is a wide diversity of opinion discernable

among Vedic scholars about the actual meaning

of the Vedic statements.

c) If there are two or more different opinions about

śruti statement X, then necessarily none of the

opinions about statement X can be correct by the

mere power of these multiple interpretations

alone.

d) If none of the interpretations of śruti statement X in question are true, then every and all such in-

terpretations are necessarily false.

e) If none of the interpretations of the śruti litera-

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ture are subsequently correct, then the śruti lit-

erature's claim to reveal the truth is necessarily

false.

There are several glaring problems with the above argu-

ment. The most significant of these is the fact that (c)

simply is not a true statement. There is no logical axiom to

be found in either the history of Euro-American logical and

propositional analysis or in the Vedic Nyāya (school of log-

ic) system that states that merely because there is a

diversity of opinion about a given subject, it therefore nec-

essarily follows from the mere existence of such diversity

that a) none of the opinions are correct and b) the truth is

not to be found extrinsic to the opinions given.

Let us suppose there are five people in a room attempting

to determine the answer to the mathematical problem "4 +

4 = x". One individual claims that the correct answer is

necessarily 5, another says it must be 29, another insists on

.003, yet a fourth person says "California", and the last says

that it is without doubt 8. Does the shear fact that the five

people have a difference of opinion in any way negate the

fact that one of them is correct? Of course it does not. If

there is a correct answer to any given question, the mere

existence of wrong answers to that given question does not

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affect the validity and truth of the correct answer in any

meaningful manner.

Moreover, let us suppose once again that the same five

people are present in the same room. Instead of giving the

correct answer to the question "what is 4 + 4", however,

this time even the fifth individual gives us the wrong an-

swer. Does a lack of knowledge on the part of all five

individuals mean that the correct answer does not exist

outside of this grouping of people? This, of course, would

be the wrong conclusion to draw. Especially when dealing

with knowledge as rigorously exacting and non-alterable as

mathematical equations, we know that the existence of cor-

rect answers to basic addition questions is not dependent

upon their acceptance by either any one individual, or even

by any group of individuals, but are necessarily true as axi-

omatic and trans-situational facts. 4+4 = 8 independently

of who agrees or disagrees with this statement.

What makes these mathematical analogies especially

poignant, as well as analytically damning, is that Jīva

Gosvämin, along with the bulk of traditional Vedic philoso-

phers, makes precisely such mathematically rigorous axiomatic claims about the truths revealed in the Vedic lit-

erature. If the Vedas are the infallible repository of perfect

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śabdic truths, which all Vaidikas do claim that they are,

then the shear fact that there tends to be a diversity of opi-

nion on the true purport of Vedic pronouncements does not

render the value of those Vedic pronouncements either un-

true, or necessarily inaccessible, or meaningless, or inferior

to supposedly greater truths. At worst, it renders such pro- nouncements merely truths yet to be philosophically

uncovered by one or more individuals.

Jīva's sincere motivations in his project of Vedic decon-

struction were obviously sectarian at heart. His attempts to

downplay the importance of the śruti literature were, how-

ever, certainly not designed with the purpose of

establishing a new anti-Vedic nāstika (heterodox) school.

Rather, his purpose was to offer the Krsna-centered

Bhagavata-purāna as the scripture par excellence for the

fallen, spiritually lethargic denizens of Kali-yuga. This was the theological project imparted to both Jiva, as well as the other five Gosvāmins, by their beloved ācārya, Caitanya Mahāprabhu. Chatterjee directly supports this contention.

By exalting the scriptural status of the Bhaga- vata, an attempt has been made at replacing the supremacy of the Vedas and in this we may see a definite purpose. The earlier popu- larity of the Vedas was on the wane, the

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ancient Vedic rituals were being bereft of their earlier significance and were turning into empty ritualism. These did not remain unnoticed by Jiva. Perhaps it was the inac- cessible and incomprehensible nature of the Vedas and their emphasis on an elaborate ritualism which prompted him to find a con- venient alternative in the Bhagavata Purana.

(Chatterjee, 23)

It is my contention, however, that in his attempt to uphold

the supremacy of the Bhāgavata-purāna over and against the authority of the śruti literature, Jīva only manages to

undercut his own, otherwise very orthodox, support for the

sanctity of the totality of Sāstra-pramāna. Moreover, he

makes the unfortunate mistake of attempting to do this

with arguments that simply do not work. Again, Chatter-

jee:

... although Jiva Gosvāmin tries to identify the Purānas with the Vedas on the basis of the ar- gument that the former supplements the latter, yet the question remains whether the Vedas, which are already self-evident in na- ture, need any such supplement and also whether the supplement can be at all identi- fied with what it supplements. In this regard, his citing 'itihāsa purānabhyām vedam samu- pavrimhayedi,' etc. are undoubtedly serving his own purpose, but it hardly substantiates

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his own standpoint that the Vedas can be sub- stantiated by the Itihāsa and the Purāna.

(Ibid, 27)

Thus, Jiva's attempts to artificially place the Bhāgavata-

purana's importance above that of the Vedic (śruti) litera-

ture, while understandable from a sectarian perspective,

ends up denigrating the very literature he seeks to glorify.

Antecedaneous Dependencies Leading to Philosophical Re-

dundancies

One of the most conspicuous aspects of both Indian phi-

losophy generally, as well as Vaidika philosophy

specifically, is the estimably high regard that is placed upon

maintaining a strict sense of fidelity to the teachings of

one's sampradāya (lineage), preceding ācāryas (spiritual

preceptors) and siddhānta (demonstrated philosophical

conclusion). Unlike the case with the post-Cartesian Euro-

American philosophical tradition, in both India and Classi- cal era Europe originality in philosophic thought is not

something that has been looked upon as being either bene-

ficial or even necessarily progressive. Indian philosophers, whether they are Vaidikas, Buddhists, Jaina, or even Sikhs,

have not prided themselves on their individual abilities to

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surpass those great thinkers and seers who flourished be-

fore them. Such unwarranted pride would be correctly

seen more as an ugly eruption of egotism than deserved self-praise. Rather, these thinkers have traditionally predi-

cated themselves on keeping fidelity to the established

truths that preceded them by purportedly unfathomable

periods of time.

More significant than the importance of the antiquity of the

truths in question, however, is the fact that these truths are

believed by most Vedic philosophers throughout time to have been revealed by greater authorities than they. The

truths safeguarded by contemporary Vaidika philosophers

are truths that were carried down for countless generations

by one guru to another. Therefore, all Vaidika thinkers ac-

knowledge their utter dependence upon their immediate and ancient predecessors for whatever ideas, insights, and

propositions they currently utilize. It is for this reason that these truths are optimally understood in a manner that does not desecrate their inherent sanctity by interjecting

the chaotic element of human speculative endeavor into

the mix. At most, the only speculative thought that is con-

sidered legitimately constructive is in the form of attempts

to understand and communicate a previous sage's original intent. Thus we have the traditions of bhāsya, vrtti and

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other explicative endeavors. Jīva Gosvāmin himself falls

very firmly and consciously within this accepted tradition

of acknowledging one's dependence upon the greater phi-

losophers who proceeded one's contemporaneity. As we

will now see, few of Jīva Gosvāmin's ideas are purely origi- nal, but can be traced directly to previous Vedāntic

thinkers.

Śaņkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva: A Comparative Analysis

Within the Uttara-Mimāmsa school, the philosophy of

Badarāyaņa Vyāsa, known as Vedānta, posits the existence

of three ontological Reals, or tattvas. These Reals are 1)

Brahman, the Absolute; 2) Jīva, or the totality of sentient beings; and 3) Jagat, or empirical reality. While all

Vedāntists are in agreement about the logical necessity of

these three distinguishing categories, they are far from

agreed as to the nature of the existential relationship of

these three categories to one another. As previously noted

(Chapter I), the three most significant Vedāntic thinkers

who preceded Jiva Gosvāmin were, in historical sequence, Samkara (ca. 788-820), Rāmānuja (1017-1137) and Mad-

hva (1238-1317). All of these Vedäntic thinkers attempted

to reconcile the seemingly contradictory accounts of the nature of the three Reals (tattvas) found in the Upanisadic

234

texts in their own uniquely creative ways.

Radical Non-dualism: For Samkara, the contention of the

sameness (abheda) and distinction (bheda) of the three

tattvas is explained by positing the sole existence of the

former and denying any validity to the latter. Samkara po- sits the idea that the sole reality is Brahman (God); and all

perceptual and conceptual things that appear to be sepa-

rate from Brahman appears to be distinct due merely to the

imposition of illusion (māya) upon Brahman. The moment

that the seemingly individual being (jīva) realizes his/her

actual non-distinction from the Absolute, ignorance (avi-

dyā), activity (karma) and rebirth (samsāra) cease to be meaningful, both conceptually and affectively.

Radical Dualism: Conversely, for Madhva's relational on-

tology, the very opposite of Samkara's conclusion is upheld.

Madhva would deny the existence of any similarity be-

tween the three tattvas at all, and opt for their complete

distinction from one other. Madhva holds that there are

five eternal distinctions to be seen among the inter-

relationships of the three tattvas. These distinctions are:

a. Between Brahman and Jiva [B v J]

235

b. Brahman and Jagat. [B v Ja]

c. Jagat and Jīva. [Ja v J] d. Jīva and Jīva. [J v J]

e. Between one element or form of matter (Jagat)

and another. [Ja v Ja]

Only Brahman is substantially non-plural. Thus Madhva's

ontological thought is commonly known as Dvaita, 136 or

dualism.

Integrative Synthesis: Ramanuja takes the sophisticated

approach of incorporating both the bheda (distinction) and

the abheda (sameness) statements of the Upanisads and

harmoniously integrating them to create a system known as

Viśistādvaita. As the name clearly implies, this system pos-

its the Absolute to be advaita, or non-dual in substance,

while being simultaneously possessed of viśista, or com-

prised of clearly identifiable distinctions and attributes.

The relationship between the three Reals, for Rāmānuja, is

one of ontological origination from and dependence upon

Brahman (God) by the two dependent categories of Jīva

(category of individual souls) and Jagat (matter). This in-

ter-relationship of adjectival dependence is analogous to

136 This term is derived from the Sanskrit root dvi, or "two".

236

the dependence of the external, functional body upon the

soul within. In the same way in which the insentient body

is wholly dependent upon the presence of soul for its life,

motion and consciousness, existential reality in the form of

Jiva and Jagat are dependent upon the presence of God.

Thus, in Viśistādvatic parlance, the relationship between

Jīva/Jagat and Brahman is termed one of śarīra-śarīrin, or

the relationship between body and embodied.

Jīva Gosvamin's approach, known as Acintya-

bhedābhedavāda, is a slight throwback to earlier attempts

to reconcile the problem of sameness/distinction by claim-

ing that both can be simultaneously predicated of the

Absolute vis-a-vis the non-Absolute. 137 For Jīva Gosvāmin,

Jīva (category of individual souls) both is and is not syn-

onymous with the Absolute. They are synonymous in the

qualitative sense that both Brahman and Jīva are composed

of the same ontological substance - consciousness. They

are thoroughly distinct, however, in the purely quantitative

sense: though comprised of one substance, Brahman is

nonetheless a perfectly omnicompetent being, while the

137 While somewhat similar to Nimbārka's ontology of Dvaitādvaita, or dualism in non-dualism, and the Bhedābheda of Bhāskara, the histories and central suppositions of these three distinct schools are not to be confused.

237

individual Jīva is ever-dependent upon the grace of the Ab-

solute, and is therefore not omnicompetent.

Despite some considerable variations between Jīva

Gosvāmin and the previous Vedānta ācāryas on several im-

portant questions of relational ontology, there is actually

little variation between Jiva and his predecessors on the

fundamental number of pramānas that are valid, or on

which pramānas are to be seen as preeminent.

Jīva Gosvāmin accepted the preeminence of the three

pramāņas of pratyaksa, anumāna and śabda. However,

with some variance in details, all three of these previous

ācāryas named above also accepted - at the shear minimum

• the validity of pratyaksa, anumāna and śabda

pramāņas. 138 Thus Jiva is not strictly unique in his insis-

tence that all other pramānas can be subsumed into these

three basic ways of knowing. Additionally, all three foun-

dational ācāryas staunchly insisted upon the preeminence

of śabda in determining the nature of the Absolute. Like

Jīva, his predecessors also accepted the ultimate authority

of śabda pramāna in all metaphysical and spiritual pursuits of knowledge. For Samkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva alike,

138 In addition to these three, Madhva also accepted upamāna, or anal- ogy, as a fourth valid pramāna. (Chatterjee, 107)

238

śabda constituted the surest means of knowing God, with

pratyaksa and anumāna serving in the integral, yet subor-

dinate, capacity of revealing objects-of-knowledge of a

lower order.139 Indeed, the Brahma-sūtras itself proffers . 139

Śāstra-pramāna as the highest pramāna in its very third

verse:

śāstrayonitvāt

"Because scripture is the source of [knowledge of Brah-

man]."

In commenting upon this verse in his famous commentary

on the Brahma-sūtras, Samkara states the following:

The scriptures, viz the Rg-veda, etc., just enumerated, are the valid means of knowing (yoni) the real nature of this Brahman. The idea implied is that Brahman is known as the source of birth, etc. of this universe from the scriptures alone that are a valid means of knowledge.140

In commenting on the same verse, Rāmānuja goes even

139 In reference to Rāmānuja's Vedāntic teachings, for example, Sriniva- sachari states: "The central idea of Viśistādvaita as a philosophy of religion is the integration and harmonization of all knowledge obtained through sense-perception, inference and revelation." (21)

140 Quoted from Swami Gambhirananda's translation (19).

239

further than Samkara and states that Sāstra-pramāna is not

only the sole means of comprehending the existence of

God, but of also understanding the transcendental qualities

inherent in God's very being.

... we hence conclude that Scripture is the on- ly source of knowledge with regard to a supreme soul that is the Lord of all and con- stitutes the highest Brahman. What Scripture tells us of is a being which comprehends within itself infinite, altogether unsurpassable excellences such as omnipotence and so on, is antagonistic to all evil, and totally different in character from whatever is cognized by the other means of knowledge [pratyaksa and anumana]: that to such a being there should attach even the slightest imperfection due to its similarity in nature to the things known by the ordinary means of knowledge, is thus al- together excluded.141

Jīva Gosvāmin, then, is not at all unique in his opinion

about the preeminence of śabda since the most important

previous Vedänta philosophers (and arguably the vast ma- jority of Vaidika philosophers in general) also held these

positions.

141 Quoted from the translation by George Thibaut (173).

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Is the Sad Samdarbha Jīva's Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāsya?

One interesting dimension of Jīva Gosvāmin's epistemo-

logical thought that has yet to be explored by scholars who

have studied Jiva's theories is the question of his personal

authorial motivations in writing down his ideas. After all,

if all valid truth is to be found in the Sāstra-pramāna, then

what is the necessity of even writing such seemingly re-

dundant ancillary works as the Tattva-samdarbha? There

are two answers to this question, one more or less obvious,

the other provisional.

1. Even though it might be a prima facie fact that all truth resides in the Sāstra-pramāna, for those fallible beings who

might not necessarily know of, or have direct access to

Śāstra-pramāna, Jīva's work might, to his mind, serve as a

pedagogical road marker pointing the way toward that

highest of pramānas. Indeed, the history of Vaidika litera-

ture is replete with examples of ancillary works written by

a wide variety of philosophers, the sole aim of which are to

further explicate the true meaning of the Vedic literatures.

As is the case with Jiva, all of these commentators and exe- getes claim to only be elucidating what is already the perfect truth revealed in a perfect literature for the benefit

241

of an imperfect audience. Their position is that the works

written by them are merely humble fingers pointing to the

unchanging moon of Truth.

2. A further possibility that has not been entertained by

any Jīva Gosvāmin scholars up till now is that Jīva might

have meant for his Sad-samdarbha to be, itself, a surrepti-

tious commentary on the Brahma-sūtras. Again, it is Jīva's

contention that the Bhāgavata-purāna was, in fact, Vyāsa's

own commentary upon his Brahma-sūtra treatise. If the

sole purpose of the Sad-samdarbha is to reveal the essential

philosophical purport of the Bhāgavata-purana, then would

it not be inaccurate to say that Jīva Gosvāmin's work is an

indirect, unstated bhāsya (commentary) on the Brahma-

sūtras, a "Jīva-bhāsya", so to speak? There seems to be at

least some circumstantial evidence supporting this as a po-

tential possibility.

The major piece of evidence is based upon the precise style

of philosophical writing that Jiva decided to employ in his

Sad-samdarbha and its marked similarity to the style used

in the Brahma-sūtras. The Brahma-sūtras, which form the

basis of Vedānta philosophy, employs a distinct fivefold sys- tem of argumentation to establish its philosophical claims.

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This system is known as adhikarana. The procedure of

adhikarana works in the following manner:

1. Visaya-vākya: A statement taken from Śāstra-

pramāņa is selected as a subject of investigation.

2. Samśaya: A doubt is then proffered about the

actual meaning of the statement under analysis.

3. Pūrva-paksa: The ideological opponent's view is

then stated.

4. Uttara-paksa: Then this prima facie view is re

futed.

5. Nirnaya: Finally a conclusive statement is estab

lished. 142

All of the major metaphysical and ontological conclusions

that the Brahma-sūtras uphold are arrived at via this sys-

tem. Intriguingly, Jīva Gosvāmin made the apparently

conscious decision to use a style very similar to the adhi-

142 In addition to the above names of these five elements of adhikarana, they are sometimes also referred to as: visaya, viśaya, samśaya, pūrva- paksa and siddhānta, respectively.

243

karana system in arguing for his conclusions in his Tattva-

samdarbha.

Jīva's use of this clearly Vedantic system of argumentation,

coupled with the fact that his Sad-samdarbha is designed to

be a commentary upon the Bhāgavata-purāna, which is in turn itself supposed to be a commentary upon the Brahma-

sūtras, seem to support the contention that Jīva Gosvāmin

meant for his Sad-samdarbha to itself be either a commen-

tary, or at the very least a sub-commentary, on the Brahma-

sūtras. Unfortunately, this evidence in itself does not offer

conclusive proof of this possibility.

Indeed, a traditional Gaudīya Vaisnava would possibly

deny this theory as inherently faulty due to the fact that

Caitanya - the founder/ācārya of the sampradāya (lineage)

• had stated that no commentary on the Brahma-sūtras

other than that of the Bhāgavata-purana was to ever be

deemed necessary. The Bhagavata, according to the

Gaudīya tradition, is not only the most conceivably perfect commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, but further, it is neces-

sarily the only commentary that ever needs to be

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written.143

The problem with this counter-view, on the other hand, is

that Baladeva Vidyābhūsana provided the Gaudīya

Vaisnava tradition with just such an extraneous bhāsya in

the eighteenth century in the form of his Govinda-bhāsya, a

work that to this day most Gaudiyas consider their official

commentarial statement on the true meaning of the Brah-

ma-sūtras. The very tradition of which Jīva Gosvāmin is

the foremost philosopher seems, then, to itself have suf-

fered from a bout of literary inconsistency when it comes to

this question of the need of a bhāsya outside of the

Bhāgavata-purāna. Thus, while the evidence for this "Jīva-

bhāsya" theory is far from conclusive, it is by no means out-

side the realm of reasonable possibility.

The Flow of Sabda via Ācārya-paramparā

As we follow the progression of the divine descent of śābdic

truth, we see that its place of origination is located in the

heart of Nārāyana, the Supreme Being. At some instant in

143 Of course, one could justifiably contend that it was precisely the atmosphere created by Caitanya's denial of the necessity of producing another commentary in addition to the Bhāgavata-purāna that possibly led to Jīva not openly declaring his work to be a commentary, though it may have indeed been.

245

the timeless reality of the transcendent realm of Vaikuntha

(the spiritual realm), this same Nārāyana (God) makes the

free volitional decision to utter this eternally existent

(apauruseya) divine sound. From the mouth of God to the

ear of the demi-god Brahma,144 the creator of the material

realm (jagat), it is then transmitted. As utilized by

Brahmā, this abda is then used in the construction of the

material cosmos in all its complexity, from the largest gal-

axy down to the very DNA used to direct the development

of the infinitely diverse physical bodies we witness around

us. This very same śabda is also used in the maintenance

of the cosmos in the form of dharma, yajña (sacred cere-

mony), mantra and - most importantly - the way in which humanity learns of all the above: Veda. Sabda is compiled

in the literary form of the Veda by Vyāsa, the avatāra (in-

carnation) of Nārāyana, the very origin of śabda itself, thus

144 Brahma is synonymous with the Demiurge (Gk. - Demiourgos, dnuiovpyos; Latin - Demiurgus) concept found in Classical European phi- losophy and among the Gnostic sects of early Christianity. God, being of purely spiritual ontological substance and nature, cannot come into direct contact with matter. Thus, He uses an embodied person in the form of Brahma as an intermediary to create the material cosmos. The concept of the Demiurge/Brahma is found in Plato's Timeaus (ca. 360 BCE), and the Apochryphon of John (ca. 200 CE), among other ancient texts. Marcion of Sinope (ca. 85-160 CE) , an important Gnostic phi- losopher, felt the Demiurge was synonymous with Yahweh, the god of the Old Testament. Yahweh was seen as a false god, an evil localized desert demon, and contrasted with the God of the New Testament, who was seen as the true God.

246

completing a revelatory circuit consisting of perfect Truth

perfectly transmitted by the Perfect for the sake of the im-

perfect.

This same knowledge is then safeguarded and carried

down to every successive generation of humanity by the

unbroken lineage (parampara) of gurus.145 These

guru/transmitters themselves serve several śābdic func-

tions. First, as self-realized souls in their own right, they

are concretely representing the samadhi tradition of the

rsis, the original revealers of Sāstra-pramāna. Second,

coming in direct disciplic succession from the first guru,

Vyāsa, they serve as his representatives to individual seek-

ers of truth (śisyas) throughout history. The guru,

consequently, is the ever-historically present replication of

epistemic events originating from a sacred past. Because

the guru is representing, via her own personal liberated

samādhi experience, the same state of śābdic awareness

that her ancient rsi predecessors had, the guru is thus con- sidered to be empowered to deliver that same

unadulterated truth that these rsis originally bestowed

145 Among many other references to the parampara concept is the fa- mous verse from the Bhagavad-gīta:

evam paramparā-prāptam imam rājarsayo viduh / sa kāleneha mahatā yogo nastaḥ paramtapa / / (4.2).

247

upon humanity.

In this way, śabda- the imperishable divine word - is con-

ceived by traditional Vaidika philosophers as flowing in a

dynamic and continuous circuit, within which, reality as we

presently experience it is but a transient and secondary by-

product of a transcendent realm. Sabda exists eternally as

non-different from the Absolute, is perceived periodically

by the perfected āptarsis (perfectely reliable seers), is

communicated to imperfect humanity by means of Sāstra-

pramāna, with the direct aim of inducing the very same

śābdic experience within imperfect humans that was be-

held by the perfected āptas (reliable authorities)

previously.

248

249

Chapter VI

Jiva's Vaisnava Epistemology in the Larger

Vedāntic Context

The Metaphorical Versus the Philosophical

There are several implications for the interpretation of

Vedānta philosophy that directly arise from Jīva

Gosvāmin's epistemological outlook. Jīva's view is that

śāstra is the literary embodiment of śabda, therefore, like

other Vaisnava philosophers before him, he naturally favors

a verbatim interpretation of the Vedas and its ancillary lit-

erature. As a Vaisnava, or a theist, this approach is in

concert with the reverence he places in both śabda and its

proposed source: Nārāyana, or God. The kind of interpre-

tive stance that Jiva consequently employs relies upon the

primary meaning of the texts, unadulterated and free of all

imperfect subjective interpretations and view-points. The

secondary, or metaphorical, meaning146 is to be resorted to

only when the primary meaning is not clear or not suitable.

146 This is referred to in Sanskrit as: jahad-ajahallaksanā, which sug- gests a secondary meaning that is derived by preserving one fact while abandoning the remainder of the meaning of a specific word.

250

In order to more fully understand this crucial differentia-

tion between the primary and secondary meanings of a

śābdic text, let us look at the following example. If we take

the elementary proposition "It is a lion", we can immedi-

ately see that this rather simple sentence, composed of a

nominative subject, a verb, an indefinite article and an ac-

cusative object, can be understood in two entirely different

ways. The clearest and most unmistakable course of action

to discern this statement's import is to search out the pri-

mary meaning, which states the following:

(Explication I)

"X exists, and is a large sentient being of the feline species,

etc., etc.”

The alternative manner in which this statement can be ana-

lyzed is via its secondary, or metaphorical, meaning. This

route leaves the meaning open to a vast array of subjective

and/or poetic interpretations.

While this path may be more challenging or even amusing

to the textual analyst, divertissement is very rarely success- fully equated with philosophical accuracy. The phrase in

question now means any of several diverse options:

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(Explication II)

"X is a male or female / god / hero / demon / animal / sta-

tue who has the strength / bravery / stamina / appetite /

hairiness / scent of a lion".

In this particular understanding of the statement "It is a

lion", the word "lion" no longer designates the integrated

totality of the essential attributes of an actual lion. Rather,

it now designates either one or possibly more of a myriad

of lion-like features, attributed to any existent first-person

individual of a vast range of real and potential species of

beings. Hence, the statement is now merely implying that

"x individual has z qualities of a lion". The problem with

this development, of course, is that x and z can be almost

anything the interpreter conjectures or wishes.

While this flexibility of interpretation might be a desirable

trait in certain fields of endeavor (for example, poetry, epic

prose, and artistic endeavors generally), such a method is

certainly lacking the sharp linguistic precision and rigid

clarity that is the mainstay of the philosophical venture.

"The secondary meaning", as Chakravarti states the prob- lem, "though based on the primary meaning, does not

involve all the constituents of the latter." (16) Vaisnava

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philosophers insist on keeping the metaphorical and the

philosophical as unmistakably distinct endeavors, until

such time as their union is otherwise clearly warranted.

Vaisnava philosophers do not by any means reject the value

of Secondary-Meaning interpretation. Rather, their inter-

pretive formula uses metaphorical interpretation only as a

last resort necessitated by any possible failure to derive a

meaningful explication of the sentence or passage at hand

by Primary-Meaning interpretation. If the meaning of a

proposition is thoroughly unclear, does not follow from the

previous śloka, or makes no sense according to the rules of

Sanskrit grammar, then the verse in question is certainly

open to increasing degrees of conjectural interpretation.

Understanding the effectiveness of Primary-Meaning inter-

pretation, Vaisnava philosophers use this contrast of methods in their critique of Samkara's system of Vedānta

interpretation, which is clearly a non-literal interpolation. Samkara often uses the Secondary-Meaning method as his

primary means of Vedāntic speculation. According to Vaisnava philosophers, Samkara uses this Secondary- Meaning interpretation even in circumstances when it is

unwarranted. As one of many clear illustrations of these Vaisnava philosophers' point, let us examine the famous śloka 18:65 of the Bhagavad-gītā using the textual analysis

253

methods of both the Advaitin and the Vaisnava (theist)

schools of philosophy.

This verse appears at the very last chapter of Krsna's phi-

losophical instructions to His friend and disciple Arjuna,

and is often seen by Vaisnava philosophers as the culmina-

tion of Krsna's teachings.

Manmanā bhava mad-bhakto mad-yājī mam namaskuru / Mām evaisyasi satyam te pratijāne priyo'si me / /

Center thy mind on Me, be devoted to Me, sacrifice to Me, revere Me and thou shalt come to Me. I promise thee truly, for thou art dear to Me.

(18:65)

For the Advaitin, all names and forms (nāmarūpa) are

nothing more than artificial impositions that we place upon

the ultimate reality, Brahman, which is formless, being an

eternal, omnipresent and unitary field of consciousness.

This negation of subjective distinctness occurs not only

with all obviously material identities (prakrti and its by-

products), but it also supposedly occurs with even those forms of God that are described in the Sāstra-pramāna, in-

254

cluding the avatāras.147

This being the case, as the Advaita school of Vedanta inter-

prets this verse, when Krsna is asking Arjuna to surrender

to Him, Krsna is not referring to Himself literally, but to

what it is that He, as the avatāra of nirguna (formless)

Brahman, is representing. What Krsna embodies is none

other than this amorphous Absolute of Samkara's ontology.

Given this non-dualistic metaphysical presupposition, the

Advaitin philosopher has no alternative but to use the me-

taphorical method of interpretation in order to support this

re-characterization of Krsna's words. For, as such Vaisnava

philosophers as Rāmānuja and Jīva correctly posit, if the Advaitin employs the more natural Primary-Meaning me-

thod, he will be compelled to come to a radically different

conclusion on the very strength of normative Sanskrit

grammar.

A Vaisnava philosopher, conversely, would begin analyzing

the meaning of the above śloka (verse) by carefully examin-

ing the immediate grammar, syntax, and denotative

147 Śamkara makes a scripturally unsupported distinction between "two Brahmans", a "lower" Brahman and a "higher". The lower, or saguna (with qualities), Brahman is the illusory form of Iśvara ("the Lord") that is worshipped by the "common person". The higher Brahman, or nirguna-brahman, is the qualityless Reality, which is both the source of Iśvara, as well as the soteriological goal of the Advaita Vedāntist.

255

meanings of the individual words involved. The most con-

spicuous feature of this śloka in question is the use of first

person personal pronouns by the nominative verbal agent,

who is Krsna. He uses the pronoun mat, or "my", three

times, the accusative pronoun mām, or "me", twice, and

the alternate genitive pronoun me, "my", once. There is

nothing within the textual content of this verse to persuade

any objective reader of the text that when Krsna uses these

various first person pronouns He is referring to anything

other than Himself, the speaker, who is speaking only in

the first person. Therefore, a Vaisnava philosopher would

say that the primary meaning would certainly suffice in understanding the words of Krsna in this passage of Sāstra-

pramāna. By way of illustration, if I were to use the word

"I" in a standard North American English sentence, e.g., "I

am human", it would be illogical to say that I meant "you",

"it, "them" "the sun" or "nothing" when I clearly used the

word "I", unless there were very compelling evidence show-

ing it to be the case that an alternative interpretation were

somehow necessary. Indeed, if person A were to make the

statement "I am Human" to person B, and then person B

were to respond to person A "Oh, you're saying that you're

a cow?", we would clearly have a right to question person

B's grasp of language, person B's ability to hear, or even

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person B's sanity.

Moreover, Vaisnava philosophers holds that the act of re-

sorting to the Secondary-Meaning method - especially

when the primary meaning is not shown to be incompatible

with the specific context of a śāstric work - amounts to a

repudiation on the part of the interpreter of the theory of the self-validity of the Sastra-pramana. At the very bare

epistemic minimum, all the schools of Vedänta accept the

basic premise that the sound content (the śabda) of the Śāstra-pramāna represents the unadulterated manifestation

of the Absolute in literary form, and as such is the final

word on the subject of transcendence. This philosophical

acceptance on the preeminence of śabda certainly includes

the adherents of the sampradāya (lineage) of Samkara.

If it is indeed the case that the śāstra (revealed scriptures)

represents the perfect Word, or sound cum literary repre- sentation, of Brahman, Vaisnava philosophers ask, then is it

not the case that the indiscriminate use of the Secondary-

Meaning method in the attempt to explicate these sacred

texts amounts to placing the final authority of transcendent knowledge derivation on an extra-śāstric source? More- over, if a certain extra-śāstric method (i.e., metaphorical

257

speculation) were capable of delivering knowledge about

the true import of śāstra that the śāstras themselves were not capable of, then this technique of knowing would be epistemically superior to Sāstra-pramāna. Metaphorical analysis would take precedence over proper epistemic va- lidity in the search for transcendent Truth. Would this not be a direct affront to the widely accepted theory of śabda-

pramāna? Throughout the history of intra-Vaidika philoso- phical debate, Jiva and other Vaisnava thinkers, would challenge many of Samkara's fundamental Vedāntic inter- pretations based upon these and similar epistemological

bases.

258

259

Chapter VII

The Inter-Philosophical Implications of Śabda- pramāņa I

Vedic Versus Buddhist Epistemology

The legitimacy and efficacy of śabda-pramāna as a valid

epistemological means of comprehending the nature of the Absolute is not dependent upon either one's sectarian reli- gious faith, nor upon any form of cultural or ethnic presuppositions. Sabda is not a concept that can be rele-

gated to the mere religious or sectarian realm. Rather, śabda-pramāna is a concept that is as rigidly philosophical in nature as are empiricism, the scientific method, or the

laws of logic and reasoning, and thus it transcends all pa- rochial considerations in its application. Sabda-pramāna is

a philosophical concept and epistemic mechanism that not only transcends one's personal philosophical preferences

and prejudices, but, as I will now argue in the following section, it is the most highly applicable pramāna for know- ing the nature of metaphysical truth.

260

A Comparative Analysis of Sabda and Āgama Pramāņas in

the Vaidika and Buddhist Traditions

The dual Indian concepts of śabda-pramāna (the Divine

Word revealed to reliable authorities as a means of valid

cognition) and āgama-pramāņa (tradition, or scripture, as a

means of valid cognition), while including the two above

epistemic functions, also have as their fields of inquiry a

much broader range of objects of knowledge (prameya).

As understood in the Vedic tradition, śabda-pramāna repre-

sents the only epistemic mechanism specifically designed to

reveal transcendent truths (brahma-vidya), which would

remain otherwise non-accessible to human cognitive facul-

ties. For Buddhism, only āgama-pramāna is capable of

revealing objects of knowledge that are of a completely im-

perceptible (atyantaparoksa) nature. While cursorily

arising from the very dissimilar metaphysical stances of two

differing South Asian religious traditions (the Vaidika and

Buddhist traditions), it is my contention that śabda and

āgama pramānas share both a common epistemic process,

as well as object of knowledge. They are two interdepend- ent functions of the same mechanism. Agama (scriptural tradition) is the concretized literary form of śabda, while

śabda is the experiential ontic condition necessary for the

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arising of agama. In the following section, I will explore

several issues in order to show this to be the case. These

issues include: a) the interdependence of the Vaidika and

Buddhist schools of pramāna-theory (pramānavāda), 148 b)

the precise nature of the pta, or reliable authority, in both

traditions, c) the concept of pramāna-purusa (a living pramāna) in the thought of the two important Buddhist

philosophers Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, d) an attempt to

reconcile śabda and āgama pramāņas.

Pramānavāda

While the nature of the highest object of knowledge has

always been a topic of discussion throughout the long his-

tory of Indian philosophy (whether that object be

ätman/Brahman of the Upanisads, the nibbana {Sanskrit:

nirvāņa} of the early Pāli texts, or the śunyatā {"empti-

ness"} of the Prajñāpāramitā literature), the pursuit of

indubitable knowledge via formulaic rules of logic and rea-

soning finds its first systematic expression in the Nyāya-

148 The term pramanavada was first used in the modern academic realm by Surendranath Dasgupta to refer merely to Indian theories of knowledge (Dasgupta, 1969). John Dunne later uses the term in a more philosophically creative manner in order to designate the un- stated tradition of Indian philosophers who formulated theories concerning pramānas (Dunne, 1999).

262

sūtras (ca. 550 BCE) of Aksapāda Gautama. Sometime af-

ter this seminal treatise on logic was written, we also find

the Nyāya-bhāsya commentary of Paksilasvāmin149. As Bi-

jlert confirms, the later birth of Buddhist logic can be

directly attributed to the ideas formulated in these texts of

the Vaidika Nyāya (logic) school.

The Nyaya-sutras by its systematic framework and the Nyāya-bhāsya by its formulating some fundamental epistemological and logi- cal principles for the first time, gave the impetus to the Buddhists (Vasubandhu, Dignäga and even to some extent Dhar- makīrti) to develop their own form of 'Nyāya', their own systematic treatment of epistemol- ogy, logic and dialectics.

(Bijlert, 2)

Similarly, later Vedic epistemologists would find them-

selves adopting several innovations in logic and pramāna-

theory that were discovered by Buddhist philosophers.

While the Nyaya school specifically accepts as valid the

four pramānas150 of pratyaksa (sense impression),

149 The time and place of birth of Paksilasvamin are unknown. Frau- wallner (1957) speculates that he must have lived before the time of Vasubandhu (ca. 400-480 CE).

150 pratyaksānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāņāni (Nyāya-sūtas, 1.1.3).

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anumāna (inference), upamāna (analogy) and śabda (Di-

vine Word)151, and the Vedanta school generally accepts all

of the above with the exclusion of upamana,152 Buddhism

has traditionally only recognized two pramānas. These are

pratyaksa and anumāna. This limitation is in keeping with

the Buddhist denial of any metaphysical reality or entities.

Āpta-pramāna in the Vedic and Buddhist Traditions

Both the Vaidika śabda and the Buddhist āgama pramānas

are predicated upon āpta-vākya, or the statements of reli-

able persons. In the case of the Vaidika tradition, the āpta

is specifically an āptarsi, an individual who has achieved a

state of samādhi - uninterrupted absorption of her medita-

tional focal awareness on the positive Absolute. Such a

state has yoga as its direct cause and tattva-vijñāna (knowl-

edge of truth) as its subsequent result. According to

Vātsyāyana (ca. 475 CE, minimally, if not much earlier),

also known as Paksilasvāmin, the authority of such an āpta

151 Interestingly, with the sequentially precise order in which these pramānas are given in the Nyāya-sūtras, there is an ever-increasing dis- tance between the object of knowledge and the knower.

152 The exception to this general rule being the Dvaita school of Mad- hva, which accepts all four pramānas.

264

(realiable authority) is based on the fact that such a per-

fected being:

a) is capable of directly perceiving Dharma (the in

herent order of the universe) in an unimpeded

manner;

b) has compassion toward all sentient beings;

c) and consequently, has a desire to share the truth with others - unchanged and reliably - for the

benefit of all beings.153

Vātsyāyana also offers three other, very similar, criteria for

identifying an äpta. His three formulations constituting

aptahood are:

1. The possession of relevant knowledge.

2. The integrity of the person's motivation.

3. An ability to communicate truth adequately to

others.

In this philosopher's formulations, the inherently virtuous

nature of the apta is stressed.154

153 sāksātkrtadharmatā bhūtadayā yathābhūtārthacikhyāpayiseti (Nyāya-bhāsya of Vātsyāyana, 223.5)

265

Indeed, the way in which the aptahood of an individual sage can be objectively determined is precisely by the radi-

cally heightened compassionate awareness and virtuous

qualities of the person in question. The truths of scripture

are grounded upon the personal trustworthiness of the āpta

who revealed the scripture. In turn, the trustworthiness of

the äpta is directly inferred by the virtuous excellences ex-

hibited by the äpta in his or her daily behavior. An āpta is

known by observing whether or not her personal subjective

behavioral characteristics correspond to the behavioral

norm expected of all aptas.

At this point in our examination of the nature of the apta,

the question naturally arises as to the apparent circularity

of the above claim; i.e., that the means for determining

whether x śāstric proposition is true is by observing the

person who is making the religious claim in order to see whether this person is exhibiting behavior that is itself de-

scribed in religious literature. In Tillemans' words: "Which

is to be shown first, the authoritativeness of the person or that of his words? Or are these arguments circular?" (Til-

lemans, 1993) Alternately stated: Which factor is primary:

154 āptah khalu sāksātkrtadharmā yathādrstasyārthasya cikhyāpayisayā prayukta upadestā (Nyāya-bhāsya of Vātsyāyana, 1.1.7).

266

a) virtuous attributes? or b) the epistemic reliability of

agama, which are the sanctified scriptural utterances of

such ostensibly virtuous persons?

The solution to this seeming dilemma lies in the crucial dis-

tinction of two viscerally similar, yet motivationally distinct, strata of virtuous behavior. I call these distinctions

1. sādhana-virtue, and 2) intrinsic-virtue. In the former,

virtuous behavior is purposefully used by the yogī as a

means of sadhana, or practice, in order to eventually unfold

the secondary stage of intrinsic-virtue. Upon emancipation

from illusion, the latter stage (intrinsic-virtue) is achieved,

and the apta is effortlessly virtuous as a result of now living

in accord with her true liberated nature, from whence

spring all virtuous qualities. The former stage - sādhana-

virtue - is volitionally ethical in nature. A person in this

stage, for example, choses to be non-violent. It is a teleolog-

ically driven and pragmatic ethical program.

The latter (intrinsic-virtue), on the other hand, is revelatory

of the sage's own intrinsic nature. The person, in keeping

with the above example, is inherently now non-violent. It is a non-empirical ontological reality, which then serves as empirical (interestingly!) evidence for objective observers

267

of the apta's internal epistemic reliability. Thus, freely

willed virtuous behavior in the form of sādhana (religious

practice) causes eventual äptahood, and intrinsic-

virtuousness as an ontic expression of the sage's spiritual

attainment is then an indication of the sage's aptahood. To

use an illustrative analogy, fire causes wood to burn - and

the clear presence of fire reveals without doubt the ignifer-

ous power of fire where mere wood used to be. Later

Buddhist epistemologists would generally agree with these

limited criteria.

While similar to the Vaidika version of aptahood, however,

the Buddhist conception of a person of authority does differ in some rather significant ways. Whereas for the Vedic

tradition, śabda (Divine Word as an existent metaphysical

reality) necessarily precedes āgama (the Word expressed in literary form), this cannot be the case for Buddhist episte- mology. For Vaidikas, āgama, or Sāstra-pramāņa, is merely the literary manifestation of śabda. Śabda is truth revealed

in sonic quality, whereas ägama is that same truth ren- dered in written form. They are two functionally distinct aspects of the same phenomenon. Sabda is the ontologi- cal/epistemological side of the coin; while ägama is the

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soteriological/epistemological side. Sabda is itself a meta-

physical Real.

In turn, the concept of śabda is predicated on the concept

of a transcendent and eternally unchanging reality. Thus,

śabda is apauruseya, not created by any living being - in-

cluding God - but is co-eternal with God. Therefore, it is an

ultimate and unalterable Real. Thus, in the Vaidika version

of the relationship between śabda (Word) and āgama

(Text), we have the following causally dependent struc-

ture:

Śabda Āgama

Source Result

Metaphysically manifest Literationally manifest

Experiential Literary

Flowing vitalic truth Concretized vitalic truth

Eternally manifest Periodically manifest

Exists for its own sake Exists for the sake of others

Heard Read/Remembered

A river exists as ever-flowing movement, alive and vibrant.

One can directly and objectively experience the taste, feel

and sensation of a living river. A photographic snap-shot of

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the same river can provide one with a sense of the river's

nature, but not necessarily with the vivid sensation and immediacy of the direct experience. For the Vedic tradi- tion, śabda is just such a living river of Truth. Āgama

(scripture) is merely the snapshot of the same river, catch-

ing its eternal essence in one particular moment within the

context of space/time.

For Buddhism, on the other hand, all potential metaphysi-

cal realities are, without exception, only illusory realities

residing solely within the minds of suffering entities. Given

the allied Buddhist metaphysical concepts of

pratītyasamutpāda (the dependent origination of all in- stances of existents) and ksanikavāda (the absolute

momentariness of every instance of realness), coupled with

the denial of any metaphysically transcendent reality, the

idea of gaining access to an eternal śabda is an unmeaning-

ful, and thus non-consequential, concept.

There is not an intrinsic grounding for agama, or scripture,

according to Buddhism, other than the sheer epistemic reli- ability of the person whose words constitute the scripture. Since, for Buddhism, anything resembling an eternal con- scious grounding of reality - whether subjective (ātman) or

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macrocosmic (Brahman) in nature - is purely illusory in an

ultimate sense, all knowledge is necessarily knowledge of perceptual and conceptual realities only. All meaningful

pramānas are thus necessarily cognitive in nature. Corre-

sponding with the ultimately perceptual and conceptual

grounding of knowledge, the only pramānas that are rec-

ognized are those two which directly correspond to the

perceptual and conceptual: pratyaksa and anumāna, re-

spectively. Moreover, whereas for Vedic epistemologists

there is a necessary distinction between the means of valid

cognition (pramāna) and the fruit of this means (pramānaphala), for Buddhism, both are ultimately inter-

preted as jñāna, or cognitions.

In light of these important metaphysical - and subsequent

epistemological - distinctions between the Vaidika and Buddhist perspectives on the ultimate grounding and

source of knowledge, let us now summarize the similarities

and differences between the two traditions' respective

views on the nature of the āpta.

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Vaidika Āpta Buddhist Āpta

1. Āpta is capable of

revealing supersensible

information. Agreed.

2. Āpta is perfectly reliable. Agreed.

3. Āptahood is revealed via

the individual's personal virtues. Agreed.

4. Āptavākya155 is the basis

for āgama. Disagree.

5. Śabda necessarily

precedes āptavākya. Disagree.

6. Śabda-pramāna is the necessary

means of cognition for revealing

supersensible knowledge. Disagree.

7. Three pramāņas (minimally). Two pramānas

(maximally).

155 The utterances of an apta.

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Before we can attempt a philosophical analysis of the dif-

ferences and similarities between these two epistemologies, it is crucial that we first explore in more depth the histori-

cal development and internal disputes of the Buddhist

schools of epistemology.

Pre-Dignägan Buddhist Epistemology

It is not until the writing of the Nyaya-sutras and the

Vaiśesika-sūtras that a systematized Indian account of

pramana proper is encountered in the history of general

Indian philosophy. In Buddhism itself, we find practically

no attempts at a systematic presentation of logic or episte-

mology in the earliest Pali sources. In the Tipitaka (the

"Three Baskets" that constitute the Pāli scriptures) there is

some attempt at a classification of knowledge, as well as a

reference pointing to the existence of a school of logicians

known as the Takkika. (Prasad, 86). A clear reference to

logical analysis as a distinct branch of learning, however, is

made only in the later Sanskrit Buddhist literature. In the Lalita-vistara, there is a specific mention of this discipline

under the term hetu-vidyā. It is arguably not until

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Nāgārjuna (ca. 2nd - 3rd centuries CE), however, that Bud- dhist logic begins to truly develop.156

Nāgārjuna

Many of Nāgārjuna's metaphysical and epistemological conclusions are based upon the teachings of the earlier

Prajñāpāramitā literature. These Mahāyāna works es-

poused the notion that, in keeping with the ultimate

illusory nature of the entire realm of experience, anything

approximating real knowledge is necessarily also an unreal

possibility. Nāgārjuna later elaborately expands upon this

theory, attempting to prove that all conceptual notions

about the contents of the empiric realm were either of a

contradictory or of a relative nature. Thus, they are all, on

Nāgārjuna's account, devoid of any meaningful truth-

content.

Nāgārjuna makes a distinction between two separate meta-

physical realities, as well as two corresponding levels of

knowledge. The first is samvrti, or phenomenal illusory ex-

istence. The second is known as paramārtha, or real

existence, which transcends the grasp of conceptuality. In

156 Similarly, Jaina logic was not fully developed until the time of Umāsvāti, the 2nd century CE author of the Tattva-sūtras.

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his History of Indian Epistemology, Jwala Prasad makes the

following observations of Nāgarjuna's epistemological

stance as it is found in his only extant text, the

Mādhyamika-kārikās:

... the real doctrine of the Mādhyamika- kārikās is that of phenomenal existence (sam- vrti) and real existence (paramārtha). The former is shown to be false or illusory by demonstrating that the notions pertaining to it are relative or contradictory; and the latter is characterized as devoid of all attributes and relations. The means of knowledge (pramānas) as belonging to the phenomenal world are also regarded as illusory.

(Prasad, 103)

Thus, on the paramārtha (real) realm, pratyaksa and

anumāna pramānas - the only two pramānas recognized by

Nāgārjuna - simply do not obtain. Jīva Gosvāmin and other

Vaidika philosophers would agree with Nāgārjuna in this

general assessment that pratyaksa and anumāna are insuf-

ficient means of knowing Transcendence. As will be seen,

later Buddhist philosophers were to take a more positive

approach to the question of the nature of knowledge.

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Vasubandhu

Several hundred years after Nāgārjuna, we encounter an-

other important figure in the history of Buddhist

philosophy. Vasubandhu (ca. 4th-5th century CE) was an

important scholar of both the Sarvāstivāda and the

Yogācāra schools. 157 Only several fragments of two works

containing his epistemological thought have survived over

the ages in both Sanskrit and Tibetan.158 His Vadavidhāna

is a work on dialectics and comments on logical proof

(sādhana) and refutation (dūsana). The other text is the

Vādavidhi, which establishes pratyaksa (empiricism) and

anumāna (reason) as the only two valid pramānas for as-

certaining knowledge. Thus, Vasubandhu maintains the

traditional Buddhist acceptance of there being only two

pramanas. It is when we arrive at the writings of Dignāga

and Dharmakīrti that we begin to encounter an intra-

157 Though there is an on-going debate as to whether there might not have been two separate individuals known as "Vasubandhu", one a Sarvāstivādin, the other a Yogacarin, this contentious issue has no practical relevance to the purely philosophical topic at hand.

158 These fragments have been collected by Erich Frauwallner in two articles ("Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyāyavārttikam", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 40, 1933, p. 281-304; and "Vasubandhu's Vādavidhih", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd und Ostasiens, 1, 1957, p. 104-146).

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Buddhist debate about the possibility and potential efficacy

of a third means of grasping truth.

Dignāga

Dignāga (ca. 480-540 CE) was a Yogācārin who dealt very

extensively with epistemological issues. Most of his extant

works exist only in Chinese and Tibetan translations. His

most important logical work is the Pramānasamuccaya

(Tshad ma kun las btus pa in Tibetan), or "Summary of the

Means to True Knowledge". On an initial reading of his writ-

ings, Dignāga seems to concur with previous Buddhist

thinking on the number of valid pramānas. For Dignāga,

there are ostensibly only two pramānas - perception (direct

knowledge) and inference. While he recognizes instances

of upamāna (knowledge via analogy) and even śabda (knowledge via verbal testimony), these are reduced to

pratyaksa and anumāna, respectively. As we will see, how-

ever, while Dignāga seems to be supporting this contention

that there are only two valid pramānas, he also seems to

uphold the notion of the possibility of āpta-pramāna as a means of knowing that appears to be independent of the former two pramānas in other sections of his

Pramāņasamuccaya.

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Dignāga correctly holds that pratyaksa, or direct percep-

tion, is only capable of revealing particulars (svalaksana).

Universals (sāmānyalaksana), on the other hand, serve as

the proper objects for anumāna. In 2.5 a-b of his

Pramānasamuccaya, Dignāga claims that the cognition aris-

ing from not only anumāna, but also from āptavākya (the

words of reliable sages), both give awareness of universals. Thus instances of valid knowledge derived from either of

these two pramānas are of a qualitatively synonymous na- ture.159 This linking of äptic supersensory knowledge with

anumāna is similarly coupled with a linking of the former

with pratyaksa.

There are, according to Dignäga, four distinct modes of

perception. These include:

159 Yid ches pa'i tshig ñid bzun nas kyan mi bslu bar mtshuns pa'I phyir de yan rjes su dpag pa ñid du brjod do / de skad du yan / min gi las rnams kyi don du mon sum son ba'I phyir ro zes'byun no (Tibetan). "And further, after we perceived [i.e., heard] only a statement of an expert, we call also this [kind of statement] inference [i.e., of inferen- tial nature] on account of the similarity in trustworthiness [between inference and reliable statement]. And thus [by way of trustworthi- ness, a reliable statement] is produced because the activities of giving names [to things] is [inevitably] preceded by direct perception (Ti- betan = mṅon sum, Sans. = pratyaksa)." (Kitagawa, 1965, p. 455. 1-4)

278

1. Sensory awareness proper

2. The mental awareness of sensory impressions

3. The mental awareness of emotional states

4. The perceptions of yogīs.160

The first seems to correspond to the Vaidika notion of the

indriyas (the senses), and the second and third with manas

(mind). It is the last perceptual mode that is of most sig-

nificance to this present exploration, since the Vaidika

tradition very specifically equates the samadhi-induced per-

ceptions of yogis with the phenomenon of the aptarsi.161

Dignäga seems to be in agreement with the Vedic tradition

when he holds that the primary qualifying factor that

makes the ātpa (who is a perfected yogi) a reliable source

of valid knowledge is the fact that the yogi has the ability to

160 It is crucial in the study of Buddhism to always remember that early Buddhism largely viewed itself, not so much as a strict denomination in the common Western sense, but as a practical path of Yoga and medita- tion. The historical Buddha himself clearly identified himself as a yogi in the Srāvaka tradition, practiced standard Vaidika Yoga disciplines for several years before achieving nirvana, and many of his original teach- ings found in the Pali texts refer directly to Yoga, yogic states, and meditation. The Buddha was essentially a yogi par excellence, and early Buddhism consisted of the Buddha's teachings on Yoga philosophy. Thus, to such early Buddhists as Dignäga, the ideal sage is, not surpris- ingly, the perfected yogī.

161 Indeed, in the Nyāya literature, such perceptual abilities on the part of yogīs is specifically referred to as yogaja.

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view an object of knowledge without the need of a via me-

dium. He says "[The] perception of the yogins is [their]

seeing an object simply as it is, completely dissociated from any description [made of it] by the spiritual preceptor."162

(Pramāņasamuccaya, 1.6)

Further, in his enumeration of the various pramānas by

which one can conclusively prove the non-existence of an

object, Dignāga specifically mentions three different means.

These are pratyaksa, anumāna and āpta-vākya, or the reli-

able statement of an expert. Vittorio Van Bijlert confirms

the rather crucial significance of this statement:

Dignāga mentions the pramānas by which one could deny the existence of a subject. They are perception, inference and (remarka bly enough) reliable statement, the statement of an āpta, an expert, by which Dignāga is probably referring to the syllogism, although in the commentary he calls it lun, āgama, tra dition. (Bijlert, 73-74)

At the very least, then, there seem to be the seeds of some

internal tension within Dignäga's own thought about the

162 mānasam cārtharāgādisvasamvittir akalpikā/ yoginām gurunirdeśāvyatibhinnārthamātradrk//

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natures of both the apta and agama, as well as the precise

number of actual pramānas to be accepted as legitimate.

This indecisiveness is most evident in what has come to be

called Dignaga's famous "Homage Verse" in his

Pramānasamuccaya. The verse, which is designed to offer

Dignäga's respects and obeisances to the Buddha, is as fol-

lows:

Pramāņabhūtāya jadaddhitaisiņe praņamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine/ Pramāņa-siddhyai svamatāt samuccayaḥ karisyate viprasrtād ihaikatah/ /

Having paid homage to him who has become authoritative (pramānabhūta), who seeks to benefit the world (jagaddhitaisin), who is a teacher (śāstr), who is well-gone [to enlight- enment] (sugata), [and] is a protector (tāyin), I shall compose the [Pramāņa] sa- muccaya, uniting here my opinions scattered [in various treatises] so that pramānas may be established.

(Trans. Tillemans, 1993, p.3)

In this very important verse, it is rather apparent that

Dignäga is indicating that the Buddha is himself an authori- tative revealer of knowledge. Dignäga here refers to the

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person known as the Buddha as being a pramānabhūta, or

a "living pramāna." Whether it was Dignāga's intention to

indicate that the Buddha was literally a pramāna (a means

of valid cognition) or merely a metaphorical pramāna is

not an important issue for the purpose of this present

study. What is important is that the Buddha is, at the very

least, recognized by Dignāga as being an āpta, a person

who was a reliable source of knowledge, even if he uses

alternative terminology to indicate this fact.

In addition to accepting the concept of the Buddha as an

āpta, Dignāga adopts the same evidentiary criteria that previous Vaidika philosophers had formulated for proving

the äptahood of an individual sage, i.e., the intrinsic-virtue

qualities of the person in question. Dignāga uses four epi-

thets to conclusively prove that the Buddha is a person of

authority. To review, these are a) jagaddhitaisin (a world-

benefactor), b) śāstr (the quality of one who knows śāstra), c) sugata (one who has gone to enlightenment), and d)

tāyin (a protector). Moreover, these four qualities each

succeed one another in a progressive causative sequence.

Our clearest evidence that Dignāga felt that these qualities established the Buddha as a person of authority (pramāņapurusa) are the words of Dignāga himself. In his

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own explanation of the Homage Verse that appears later in

his Pramānasamuccaya (1.1 commentary line 1-2), Dignāga

explains the following:

atra bhagavato hetuphalasampattyā pramānabhūtatvena stotrābhidhānam śāstrādhau gus pa bskyed par bya ba'I don du'o

As regards this [verse], there is at the begin- ning of this treatise a sentence praising the Lord [Buddha] as one who is a means of valid cognition [or religious authority] through [his] perfection in cause and effect, in order to produce reverence [for the Buddha] in the hearers of this book.

(Translation: Tillemans, 1993)

Due to the Buddha's disposition of compassion toward all

sentient beings, coupled with his status as a teacher, he has

achieved liberation and becomes the protector of all. Thus,

as is evident from the Buddha's own experience, inherent

qualities and behavior, he is a person of authority

(pramānapurusa, or āptarsi).163 Bijlert confirms that this is

Dignāga's apparent conclusion:

163 Bijlert would concur: "The Buddha has perfected and saved him- self, but also saves others by teaching them a road to ultimate salvation, a road which he has traveled himself. This constitutes, ac- cording to Dignaga, the Buddha's being a pramāna." (117)

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The perfection in cause (hetu) and effect (phala) makes the Buddha the religious au thority that he is, makes him a pramāna. In the rest of the commentary, it is taught that cause refers to the Buddha's striving for the welfare of the world (jagaddhitaisin) and his being the Teacher (śastr), while effect refers to the Buddha's being the Well-gone (sugata) and Saviour (tayin). Thus according to Dignaga, the last four qualities are meant to describe the nature of the Buddha's religious authority. (Bijlert, p. 115)

Despite what seems to be some evidence that Dignāga

would support the notion that the Buddha, at least, would

qualify as an āpta (or alternately, as a pramānapurusa) not all of his philosophical descendents would agree. Among

the most important of these post-Dignāga Buddhist episte-

mologists was Dharmakīrti.

Dharmakīrti

Dharmakīrti lived approximately 530-600 CE and is known

to have authored several important works on epistemology.

Of these works, the one that deals most specifically with

the points raised by Dignäga in his Homage Verse is the Pramānavārttika, and very specifically its second chapter,

known as the Pramanasiddhipariccheda. The first seven

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kārikās of this chapter deal with pramana in the strict sense

of the term. The remaining over two-hundred verses focus

on the analogical sense of pramānapurusa. While the

Pramānasiddhipariccheda section will thus naturally be the

main focus of our discussion of Dharmakīrti, we will also

necessarily delve into other chapters of his

Pramāņavārttika.

In the first chapter, Dharmakīrti provides a synopsis of the

general characteristics of an āptavākya, or expert state-

ment:

sambaddhānuguņopāyam purusārthābhidhāyakam/ parīksādhikrtam vākyam ato'nadhikrtam param//

A sentence [an expert statement]: (a) whose [words] are coherent, (b) for [which] there are means that are suitable [for acquiring the desired ends], and (c) which expresses what is useful to man, is [alone] made the subject of an investigation [into the validity of such a sentence as a pramāna]. A [sentence] which is different from [such] a [sentence having these three characteristics] is not made the subject [of an investigation into its validity].

(Pramāņavārttika, 1.214, trans. Bijlert)

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Thus, for Dharmakīrti, an āptavākya must 1) not be inco-

herent; the meaning cannot be shielded in

incomprehensibly mysterious language, as this would ne-

gate its epistemic usefulness. 2) It must provide the

correct means to the end (artha), and 3) it must be useful

information. It must yield information that will specifically

assist its hearer toward the ultimate goal of liberation.

In the very next verse (1.215), Dharmakīrti provides two

more important criteria for determining the trustworthiness

of an āpta, i.e., that a) the contents of the ātpavākya (ex-

pert statement) must have been acquired by the apta in

question via his/her own power of pratyaksa and anumāna;

b) the contents must not be in contradiction to the hearer's

own perception and inference. Dharmakīrti says:

pratyaksenānumānena dvividhenāpy abādhanam/ drstādrstārthayor asyāvisamvādas tadarthayoh//

The trustworthiness of this [useful sentence] about visible and invisible things which are [i.e. can be] objects of the [two pramāņas, perception and inference] consists in the fact that [the information in such a sentence] is neither contradicted by perception nor by two-fold inference."

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(Trans. Bijlert)

The two-fold inference referred to is that of Karnakagomin:

anumānena ca dvividhena vastubalapravrttenāgamāśritena

ca, " ... [inference] that has operated through the power of a

[perceived real] thing and [inference] that is based on tra- dition [agama]."164 Given that these criteria are in place,

Dharmakīrti seems to feel that the words of an āpta can be

generally relied upon. Indeed, Dharmakīrti seems to ini-

tially agree with Dignäga that the Buddha can serve as a

living pramana165, even if he later in his text attempts to

refute the notion that the Buddha is literally a pramāna per

se.

Dharmakīrti does not seek to negate the concept or efficacy

of either āpta or ātpavākya. Rather, what Dharmakīrti

seems to be attempting to create in his epistemology is a

sense of āpta-pramāna and āgama-pramāna that is devoid

of any metaphysical dependency. As we have seen, in

keeping with seeming Buddhist orthodoxy, Dharmakīrti

164 Karnagomin's Commentary on the Pramānavārttikavrtti of Dhar- makīrti, Rinsen Book Co., Kyoto, 1982, Rinsen Buddhist Text Series I, p. 392. 14-15.

165 In 2.7 of Pramānavarttika, for example, he states the following: tadvat pramānam bhagavān, "Like that, the Lord [Buddha] is a pramāņa."

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seeks to firmly ground the functioning of āpta/āgama in

the perceptual and inferential. For example, while ac-

knowledging that atyantaparoksa, or supersensible, objects

of knowledge can be ascertained via the statements of reli-

able persons, he simultaneously demands that the truth-

content of the statements of such reliable persons be in- ferred as a result of the trustworthiness of such individuals'

information about objects of knowledge that are not super-

sensible. If an authority is capable of delivering accurate

knowledge about something that is apparent to the senses

(drstārtha), then he/she must also be reliable about objects

not apparent to the senses (adrstārtha) as well.

In this insistence, he is in agreement with Aksapāda Gau-

tama's Nyāya-sūtras: mantrāyurvedaprāmānyavac ca

tatprāmānyam āptaprāmānyāt, "And the fact that the [Ve- das] are means of valid cognition [i.e., have authority] like

the fact that incantations and medical science are a means

of valid cognition [i.e., have effective authority, is derived]

from the fact that experts are a means of valid cognition."

(Nyāya-sūtras, 2.1.69) In other words, the sages who re-

vealed the Vedas, which deals with supersensible objects,

are the same individuals who revealed the Āyurveda system

of medicine, as well as healing mantras, which deal with

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sensible objects. Since we know they were correct in their

revelation of these more empirically confirmable sciences,

they must by extension also be correct in their empirically

non-confirmable statements. This criterion that the earlier

Nyāya-sūtras had formulated seems to have also been

adopted by Dharmakīrti.

Concluding Observations

While it would be quite unfair to the inherent dignity of

both systems of thought to claim that the Vedic and Bud-

dhist epistemologies are synonymous, there are nonetheless

an overwhelming number of similarities between them.

These similarities include the idea that truth can be re-

vealed via a person who has experienced the truth; that

such a person can be known to be an āpta, or reliable au-

thority, as a result of the person's intrinsic-virtuous

qualities; and that there is a necessary process for becom-

ing such an äpta. Jai Singh agrees with my assessment

when he states: "Even the Jainas and Bauddha [Buddhists],

who deny the authority of the Vedas, tacitly recognize

śabda pramana when they accept the teachings of Mahavīra

and Buddha respectively as their guiding priciples." (iii) The concepts of āpta-pramāna and āgama-pramāņa, though

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not sharing in the same ontological grounding, are found in

both traditions. Moreover, historically there has been a

clear inter-exchange of ideas between the two traditions.

The few differences that exist between the Vaidika and the

Buddhist accounts of supersensible epistemic reliability

seem to be merely a reflection of the two systems' respec-

tive ontological presuppositions.

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291

Chapter VIII The Inter-Philosophical Implications of Śabda- pramāņa II

The Implications of Śabda-pramāna for Euro- American Philosophy

"For often we think about things in India."

Aristotle, Magna Moralia 1899.21

Accepted Sources of Knowledge in Euro-American

Epistemology

The concept of śabda as a valid means of acquiring truth is

not a method that is at all alien to the history of Euro-

American thought. Indeed, all three of the chief means of

epistemic inquiry that are found in Indian philosophy have

almost exact parallels in the West. Throughout European

and American history, revelation, reason and empiricism

have each experienced periods of both popularity and ob-

scurity. In this chapter, I will briefly track the fluid careers of these three methods in the history of Euro-American phi-

losophy, as well as some of the implications of śabda-

292

pramāna for the field of philosophy of religion, specifically

as it relates to the perennial question of the existence of

God.

The Three Epistemic Eras

Throughout the 2700-year history of the Euro-American

philosophical tradition, we encounter very close parallels to

the epistemic methods of śabda, anumāna and pratyaksa, but under different names. Sabda is generally known in

the West under the generic term "revelation", with

anumāna usually known as "rationalism" and pratyaksa as

"empiricism". It can be clearly demonstrated that the his-

tory of Euro-American philosophy progressed through three

distinct, yet over-lapping, successive stages, during which

one or another of each of these three methods had promi-

nence over the other two. These time periods in the history

of Western philosophy I call: a) the Religious Era, b) the

Rational Era, and c) the Scientific Era. During these three

successive eras, śabda, anumāna and pratyaksa served as

the respective dominant epistemic paradigms. The Reli-

gious era was the era in which śabda was predominant.

The Rational age saw the ascendancy of anumāna. And

during the present Scientific era, it is pratyaksa that serves

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as the preferred epistemic tool.

The Religious Era: The idea of intuitive insight and direct

revelation as a means of understanding the Absolute is cer-

tainly nothing new to the Euro-American world. It was, in

fact, the means of preference during the Religious stage of

Euro-American philosophy, roughly corresponding from the

ancient Greco-Roman period, up till the end of the Medie-

val period and the beginning of the Renaissance. Given the

enormity of this time frame, śabda has proven to be the

most ancient, as well as the longest lasting, pramana in the

history of European philosophy.166 During this era, the ma-

jority of philosophers were in agreement with the general

proposition that true knowledge of metaphysical matters

necessarily descended from above, from an ontological re-

ality that was itself transcendent in nature, whether that

reality was Heaven (for Christians) or the Divine Mind of

God (for the Platonists).

166 Despite its current exile to the peripheries of philosophical interest, the legitimacy of revelation is still upheld by a large number of con- temporary Euro-American philosophers, including Alvin Plantinga, Keith Yandell, Leo Sweeney, and Richard Westley. Thus, the era of revelation is still very much alive, if somewhat surreptitiously studied, today.

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Plato and the Realm of Transcendent Forms

On Plato's (ca. 427 - 347 BCE) account, for example,

knowledge came as a direct result of an individual access-

ing the transcendent realm of Forms, the archetypal models of all physical and mental existents.167 While his theory of

Forms is not presented in any strictly systematic fashion in

his writings, very clear traces of this concept are found

heavily sprinkled throughout many of his 27 dialogues. It

is an integral component of Plato's epistemological

thought. Plato came to theorize about the existence of an

ideal world of Forms by first observing the nature of the

world in which he found himself situated.

According to both Plato, as well as many other ancient

Greek philosophers, we live in a cosmos in which all of the

objects of our sense perception are in a constant state of flux. Everything that we perceive empirically is ever-

167 The Platonic Realm of Intelligible Forms seems to be synonymous with the realm of Brahmäloka found in both Vaidika and Buddhist lit- eratures, specifically the four higher realms known as the arūpa- brahmā-loka, which are composed of the purely intelligible, unen- formed matter (buddhi) that serves as the archetypal building blocks that Brahma uses for the construction of enformed matter (rūpa) in the lower echelons of the material creation.

168 On this one point, at least, Plato is very much in agreement with the

295

changing, impermanent, and thus imperfect. Though we

may attempt to draw the most proportionally accurate tri-

angle within our physical capability, for example, the

greatest extent of our capabilities will never match the per-

fection of form found in our conception of the perfect

triangle. Even if our triangle's imperfections are so minute

as to be thoroughly imperceptible to our conscious sensory

apparatus, they exist nonetheless. Plato had the early re-

alization that it is possible to create perfect conceptions of

objects despite their failure to find correspondingly perfect

physical forms. Perfection, then, did exist. However, it

only existed in intelligible form, in the transcendent realm of ideas, and not in the empirical world.

This realization led Plato to adopt the theory that there

must exist another realm, one in which the material reality

with which we are all so familiar must have its archetypal

origin. This transcendent reality is changeless, eternal and

wholly perfect. Conversely, the material plane of existence

and its contents are secondary, inferior in quality and pur-

pose, as well as an ontologically dependent imitation of the

divine realm. Consequently, all knowledge that is empiri-

observations of Heraclitus (d. 486 C.E.). This doctrine of the fluid na- ture of reality is, of course, also a central feature of Buddhist metaphysics, which in turn is heavily indebted to Vaidika and Yoga metaphysics.

296

cally derived is necessarily faulty, being knowledge of no

more than imperfect and pale reflections of the perfect pa-

radigmatic forms of the transcendent realm. The only way

to gain knowledge proper, according to Plato, as opposed

to knowledge of mere opinion, was to access this transcen-

dent realm via direct intuition. Access to divine knowledge

was guaranteed, Plato taught, only if one were capable of

living the lifestyle of a Philosopher,169 or one who was a

lover (philo) of wisdom (sophia).

As the new Judeo-Christian world-view began to take hold

throughout the geographic remnants of the ancient Roman

Empire in the early centuries of the common era, many of

the Church Fathers were to continue the śabdic traditions

of their immediate Pagan philosophical ancestors,170 but

with Christian revelation replacing direct intuitive insight,

faith replacing enlightened trans-rationalism, and the

Christian Heaven wresting ultimate authority from the

Realm of Forms.

169 As described in the Platonic literature, the original notion of the "Philosopher" is very similar, if not synonymous, to the lifestyle and ideals of the traditional yogi, and specifically the jñānī, or seeker of transcendent wisdom.

170 Indeed, such important Christian figures as Origen, Ambrose, Augustine and many others were directly influenced by both Platonism, as well as the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus (205-270 CE).

297

Augustine: Divine Illumination

With little doubt, one of the most intellectually significant

of the early Church Fathers was Augustine of Hippo (354-

430 C.E.). Inheriting many of the foundational ideas of

Plato via the circuitous route of Neo-Platonism, Augustine

incorporated many pre-Christian European Pagan philoso-

phical concepts into the nascent theology of the new

official religion of Rome. As a direct consequence, how-

ever, of his acceptance of the Christian dogma that God

created each individual soul at the time of birth, Augustine

was intellectually proscribed from accepting Plato's view

that the soul was in temporary exile from its natural state

in transcendence. Augustine's attempt to negotiate be-

tween the philosophical conclusions of his own Greco- Roman intellectual heritage, on the one hand, and the

theological dictates of his adopted Roman Church, on the

other, led to his development of the śābdic idea of Illumi-

nationism.

For Augustine, human beings were in essence rational souls, dualistic beings composed of bodies that are pos-

298

sessed of souls.11 Consequently, Augustine was incapable

of locating the origins of knowledge in a transcendent

realm. Rather, he locates revelatory knowledge in the God-

given innate abilities of the human mind. Divine knowl-

edge comes about in the human being as a result of a

process of illumination in the human mind that is directly

caused by the grace of God.

Though Augustine locates the seat of transcendent knowl-

edge in the human mind, this idea is not to be confused

with the notion of rationalism for two reasons. 1)

Augustine holds that the potential for divine insight is

placed in the human mind at the time of birth by God and

is revealed in the human individual later on in life by the

direct grace of God. Thus, as in traditional Vedic episte-

mology, the direct cause of divine knowledge in the human

mind is the Absolute. 2) Unlike in Vedic philosophy,

Augustine views the mind and the soul as being synony-

mous, as do the majority of later Euro-American religious

philosophers. Thus when Augustine speaks of "mind", he

actually means soul. This being the case, it could be ar-

gued that both Vedic philosophers, as well as Augustine,

171 This is an important difference from both the Vaidika and the Pla- tonic teaching that we, in fact, are soul temporarily inhabiting a material form in a similar manner to a human being temporarily wear- ing a coat or a sweater.

299

would be in agreement in placing the locus of human

enlightenment in the soul of the human epistemic agent.

For both the Platonist, as well as Augustine, a) divine

knowledge has its origin from the Absolute, b) is revealed

as a direct result of spiritual proximity to that Absolute and

c) is knowable to the soul solely through direct insight. All

adherents of śabda-theory, both ancient and modern, both

Vaidika and European, would agree with these three basic

points.

Even with some speculative diversity in evidence among

several later Medieval philosophers, the fundamental belief

in the notion of revelatory knowledge being the most accu-

rate means of knowing God served as the dominant form of

epistemic endeavor during the Religious Era. With the

dawn of the Renaissance, however, knowledge based upon

revelation was to play an increasingly insignificant role in

the thought of post-Medieval European thinkers.

Rational Era: The Rational Era can be viewed as corre-

sponding roughly to the time period of the seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries. During this period, there

arose several philosophers who attempted to circumvent

the notion of revelation being the highest arbiter of truth.

While not necessarily rejecting the power of revelation out-

300

right, many of these rationalists felt that the immense ca-

pabilities of human reason alone were sufficient for

arriving at truth - truth about subject matters both terres-

trial, as well as metaphysical. Included among the

adherents of rationalism were such personalities as Leibniz,

Spinoza and DesCartes, all of who viewed the philosophical

pursuit as a rigorous cognitive exercise very much akin to

the laws of mathematics. For the Rationalists, truth was

derived via the employment of rigid laws of thought as axi-

omatic and unforgiving as the rules of geometry. Arguably,

the contemporary Anglo-American school of Propositional Analysis represents the modern vestiges of the Rational

Era. The sovereign rule of anumāna (reason), however,

was to be very rapidly supplanted with a new era of phi-

losophy based upon sensory experience.

Scientific Era: While empiricism has always been recog-

nized as a valid way of knowing true facts, both in the East

and the West, it was not until relatively recently that this

means of knowledge acquisition has come to be the domi-

nant means of seeking knowledge. Beginning with such

individuals as John Locke and David Hume in the seven-

teenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively, and

continuing through the development of such schools of

thought as Logical Positivism and Behaviorism, empiricism

301

has grown to become for many the sole accepted method

for deriving knowledge in our present Scientific Era. Thus,

the pratyaksa-oriented musings of ancient India's Cārvākins

have come to become the foremost theoretical paradigm of

our modern age. The concepts of śabda, anumāna and

pratyaksa are by no means, however, the only parallels we

see between the ideas of such Vaidika philosophers as

Ramanuja and Jiva Gosvamin on the one hand, and those

of Euro-American philosophers on the other.

Śabda-brahman and the Search for God's Existence

One of the most conspicuous preoccupations of the West-

ern branch of philosophy of religion involves the ongoing

debate over the existence, or lack thereof, of God. Plato

first attempted to prove the reality of a divine existence us-

ing what was perhaps the first articulation in Euro-

American history of a cosmological argument, an argument

that seeks to prove the existence of a First Cause of the ma-

terial world by proceeding from the very concrete fact of the material world's contingency.172 From Plato's pre-

Christian era up until the present moment, an untold num-

ber of philosophers have endlessly debated over the

172 For Plato's articulation of this cosmological argument, see especially his Book of Laws, book X.

302

question of whether or not God exists. Of the many nota-

ble personalities who have taken part in this discussion, we

can include Augustine of Hippo, Anselm of Cantebury, Thomas Aquinas, Alvin Plantinga, John Hick, and Keith Yandell on the "pro" side, and David Hume, Bertrand Rus-

sel, and A.J. Ayer on the "contra" side of the spectrum.

Intriguingly, among Vedic philosophers, this question never

quite reached the thought consuming fevered-pitch that it

did among their Euro-American counterparts. The reason

for this was that it was simply never considered to be all

that crucial a question for Vedic philosophers. Rather, with

the almost sole exception of the Cārvākins (atheist materi-

alists), and possibly the Buddhists, the existence of a

transcendent reality was as much a given assumption for

most Indian philosophers as is the existence of empirical

reality to all contemporary empirical philosophers. More-

over, it was precisely from the starting point of this shared

assumption of the existence of a positive Absolute that

Vedic philosophers generally proceeded to articulate their

various metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, political, and epis-

temological theories. Accordingly, instead of focusing

great amounts of time and cerebral energy to the task of

trying to prove the existence of an Absolute, Vedic philoso- phers, and most Indian philosophers generally, devoted the

303

bulk of their time in various attempts to directly experience

this Absolute and to then communicate their objective ex-

periential findings to others. As Mahanamabrata explains

this approach:

Hardly anywhere in the vast literature of Vedānta philosophy does one come across such a thing as proof of the existence of God. One finds instead descriptions of the experi- ences of God and various formulations of methods and disciplines, ways and means which had led one to such experiences ... God is the object of religious experience. How can abstract logic, divorced as it is from the con- crete experience of living, prove or disprove the reality of God?

(37)

Only when involuntarily compelled by their various en-

counters with such non-theistic systems as Buddhism,

Jainism - and much later, the modern scientific world-view

• did Vedic philosophers feel it necessary to begin to seri-

ously articulate several proofs for God's existence. In the

course of Indian history, we thus witness the creation of

arguments that closely mirror their Western counterparts.

Vedic philosophers created theistic arguments that were - among others - cosmological, teleological and ontological in nature. Being a tradition deeply shaped by the episte-

304

mology of śabda, all seven schools of Vaidika philosophy

have recognized the limitations of attempting to "prove"

the existence of the transcendent Absolute by means of in-

tellectual speculation.

These limitations are seen by no one more than Jīva

Gosvāmin. While Jīva does not present us with any single

argument supporting the existence of God per se, he does have much to say about the knowability of God, and of

God's nature and attributes. Like all other Vaisnava phi-

losophers before him,173 Jiva feels that the basic nature and

attributes of the Absolute can not only be known, but are

described in vivid detail in various portions of the Sāstra-

pramāņa, including the Purāņas, Itihāsas, and Upanisads. While the nature and function of various qualities of God

can be known, however, the full quantitative extent of

those qualities can never be known, due to the finite nature

of human intelligence. Thus, Jīva ultimately describes the

quantitative content of God's essence, existence, and at-

tributes, vis-à-vis all human attempts to grasp the full

extent of those qualities, as being acintya, or beyond con-

ceivability. Certain attributive facts about God can be

grasped and understood cognitively, such as the facts of His

173 Most notably Rāmānuja, with whom Jiva shares more philosophical agreements than perhaps any other pre-Jivan philosopher.

305

omnipotence, omniscience, blissful nature, mercy, beauty, etc. Precisely how blissful, how merciful, how beautiful,

etc. God is, however, can never be fully known to the

ätman, or the dependent, individual, finite self. Thus,

while Jiva in no way claims knowledge of the attributes of

God to be ineffable, he does claim that the full extent of

God's qualities are beyond the ken of human conception.

Jīva's Epistemology and Anselm's Unum Argumentum

Of the many comparative illustrations of the similarities

between Vaidika and Euro-American philosophy that may

be attempted, the parallels between Jīva Gosvāmin's con-

cept of God as being ultimately acintya, or beyond full conceivability, and the Medieval Christian-Platonist theolo-

gian Anselm of Canterbury's (1033-1109) concept of God

as "That than which nothing greater can be conceived" are

quite intimate. Additionally, these parallels are full of po-

tential as a prospective subject for future comparative

philosophical analyses. The initial start of such a compara- tive analysis necessarily requires a brief introduction to Anselm's famed "ontological argument".

306

"Aliquid Quo Nihil Maius Cogitari Possit"

Anselm was, himself, a strict Augustinian.174 As such, he

subscribed to the notion that philosophical understanding

was necessary mainly as an aid to religious faith, and not

as a discipline that was possessed of inherent value.

Anselm held that faith necessarily preceded any intellectual

understanding of God's nature.175 With this stance as a

point of departure, he sought to give Christian believers an

intellectual basis for their theological belief. It was this

aim, and not the hope of necessarily converting opponents,

which drove his search for an unum argumentum: a single

proof demonstrating God's necessary existence. His Onto-

logical Argument, as presented in the Proslogion,

accomplishes this in the following manner.

Before we can even begin to conceive of God's existence,

174 And, thus, by natural extension, Anselm was heavily influenced by Neo-Platonist ideas.

175 In this regard, Anselm stated his epistemological stance in the fol- lowing manner in his work, the Proslogion, "I do not seek to understand so that I may believe, but I believe so that I may understand" (Pros., p. 154-155). Thus, rather than employing either a strictly śābdic, or a strictly revelation-based, method of inquiry, Anselm could be said to have used an epistemology of subjective belief, or an epistemology of faith.

307

Anselm argues, we must first have at least some slight

glimpse into His essence. Thus Anselm postulates the fol- lowing formulaic construct as an essential definition of the

Supreme Being. God is aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari pos-

sit, "That than which nothing greater can be conceived".

As soon as this definition is heard by any rational human

person, Anselm's argument continues, its meaning is un-

derstood cognitively. It then automatically exists in the

mind of the hearer. Even if this statement is not accepted

as being true, it is at least understood grammatically, and

thus conceptually; and this fact is alone sufficient for the

present argument.

Now Anselm asserts that there are two distinct modes of

existence: 1) existence in the mind solely (m), and 2) exis-

tence in the mind, coupled with existence in external

reality (m+r). The example he gives is of a painter. First

this painter has a mental image of the work he is about to

produce (m). When the work is finally completed, it then

exists in concrete reality (m+r), in addition to being solely

in the painter's mind (m). What exists in reality, as well as in the mind (m+r), is superior to that which exists in the mind alone (m). This is so because it then has a more in-

dependent and meaningful existence. Its existence thus

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contains within it a greater number of potential possibili-

ties. Anselm posits this truth to show that "That than

which nothing greater can conceived" must exist both in

the mind, as well as in reality (m+r).

It having been established that "That than which nothing

greater can be conceived" can be grasped conceptually in

the mind, if this being existed solely in the mind (m), then

something greater than it would exist, namely, that which

exists both conceptually, as well as in reality (m+r).

Therefore, for the above formula to truly instantiate what it

states, it must exist in the mind as well as in reality (m+r).

Otherwise, something greater than it can be conceived.

This argument ingeniously presents the human reasoning

faculty with a concept of God such that it always manages

to exceed itself, and necessarily so. The ontological argu-

ment for God's existence is, then, a self-contained, single proof that simply requires the medium of a rational mind in order for the proof to be functionally operative.

A Comparative Veridical Analysis

While, again, Jīva did not himself formulate an argument

for God's existence per se, he would nonetheless have

309

agreed with many of Anselm's metaphysical and epistemo-

logical assumptions. For example, like Anselm, most

Vaidika philosophers - Jīva included - would maintain that

it is necessary to first know the nature of God's essence be-

fore it is possible to know of his existence. For Indian

philosophy generally, ontology always precedes epistemol- ogy, essence always precedes existence.176

Moreover, Jiva and Anselm would be in general agreement

in wishing to posit inconceivability as one of the positive

defining attributes of the Godhead. For both ancient Euro-

pean and traditional South Asian philosophy, as well as for

both Christian and Hindu theology, God is a being whose

full dimensional scope is ultimately beyond the grasp of the

human intellect. Whether the proposition is stated in San-

skrit or in Latin, both traditions agree that the Absolute is

beyond the range of full quantitative conceivability.

176 Chakravarti supports this contention: "In India, philosophers have generally based their epistemological conclusions on their metaphysical views, for they have been able to realise that the truth of an epistemo- logical theory finally depends on the truth of some metaphysical theory already assumed ... " (p.3). Further, I would argue that this is the case for all epistemological systems, regardless of their particular stand on the existence of a transcendent reality. Even radical empiricists, for example, base their epistemological notions on the presupposition that matter is the highest (if only because it is the sole) ontological sub- stance in reality. Such a claim is clearly a metaphysical one. The only difference, then, between traditional Vaidika philosophers and others is that Vaidika philosophers readily admit their metaphysical presupposi- tions from the get-go.

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Sābdic Epistemology Versus Subjective Faith Epistemology

It is when we examine the epistemological positions of Jīva

and Anselm a little more closely that we see some diver-

gence of opinion. For again, while we can implicitly

assume that Anselm derives his ultimate epistemic author-

ity from the realm of "śabda", i.e., from the Biblical

revelation, Anselm states rather explicitly that his epistemic

authority is actually derived more from a sense of subjec-

tive religious faith. Rather than being strictly śabda-

pramāna, then, or even a strictly revelation-based episte-

mological stance in the traditionally understood Christian

sense, Anselm's epistemology could be termed a śraddhā-

pramāņa, or "faith-based"-pramāna.

The problem that is produced as a result of placing epis-

temic authority on such a subjective, and therefore

unstable, ground is that faith (śraddhā), at least according

to Vedic philosophers, is a force that arises from the will,

mind and emotions. It is not something that arises from

the plane of pure consciousness. It is, therefore, not con-

sidered to be quite as epistemically reliable as the

experience of trans-subjective śābdic insight, since the

311

śabda phenomenon is one in which unadulterated personal

consciousness is in direct, non-mediated contact with the

Absolute. " ... what is ordinarily considered to be the realm

of faith", according to Mahanamabrata, "is very boldly de-

clared to be the realm of experience by Vedānta

philosophers." (38) Moreover, while both the focus and the

locus of śābdic experience is the subjective cognitive being,

the all-important content of the experience is anything but

subjective. The knowledge that is derived by the subjective

being, from the Absolute, is thoroughly perfect - and there-

fore purely and axiomatically objective - Truth.

Whereas Anselm derives his knowledge of the Absolute

from the realm of faith, which is always subjective and sub-

ject to change, Vaisnava (theistic) epistemology places

knowledge of that Absolute (brahma-vidya) squarely on

Śāstra-pramāna. And seeking such knowledge via Sāstra-

pramāna is only inaccurately to be confused with a mere

matter of subjective faith. Rather, Vedic philosophers

would argue, knowledge derived via Sāstra-pramāna is an

instance of enlightened rationalism. While Anselm's

śraddhā-pramāna (faith-based) epistemological position does not seem to directly alter the formulaic effect of his

ontological argument per se, it is still a major cause of con-

312

cern that the author of this famous argument would base

his philosophical presuppositions on so seemingly ephem-

eral and subjective an epistemological foundation as

personal religious belief.

One of the ontological underpinnings of this argument is

the assumption that the nature of God must include the at-

tribute of an infinite degree of omnicompetance. If there is

a God, it is then assumed by Anselm, that God must be a

being such that He will inherently possess all positive quali-

ties to an infinitely superlative degree. Using Anselm's

formula, God cannot be bad, for there is a state that is con-

ceivably greater: goodness. God cannot be unwise, for

wisdom surpasses unwisdom. But what tells us that the

specific being whom Anselm calls the "God worshipped by

all people", i.e., the specifically Christian conceptual con-

struct of an Absolute, must be this very same God who

necessarily has positive qualities to an infinite degree? There is no evidential linkage, barring the "evidence" of

"faith". Faith alone, however, as the tool by which a phi-

losopher claims to know such attributes of God, devoid of a

sound epistemic base, simply is not sufficient to prove this

contention philosophically.

One possible solution to this weakness of ontological verifi-

313

cation might be to base the epistemological underpinnings

of Anselm's ontological argument on the more sturdy and

proven foundation of śābdic knowledge as formulated in

the Vedic world-view. As all Vaisnava philosophers (as

well as the majority of Vaidika philosophers in general)

would argue, detailed, accurate and authoritative accounts

of the nature and attributes of God, as well as confirmation

that these attributes are all of an ethically positive nature,

are found in abundance in the Sāstra-pramāna literature.

According to Vaisnava philosophers, these descriptions are

found throughout the literary manifestations of śabda,

ranging from the ancient Rg-veda to the later Purānas. On

Jīva's more sectarian-colored account, of course, the

Bhāgavata-purāna would be the most accurately descriptive

of these Divine qualities, since it is the saviśesa - or person-

alistic - śāstra (revealed text) par excellence.

In any case, the totality of śāstra offers insights into the na-

ture of the Absolute which are unparalleled by anything

comparable in the history of Euro-American religion or phi-

losophy. With such a synthetic approach to the question of

God's existence, the Ontological Argument would then

couple its own inherent demonstrative power with an epis-

temology the abundant veridicality of which has been tried

314

and proven, and which is, consequently, both valid as well

as true.

315

Chapter IX

Some Concluding Thoughts

As I have demonstrated, the general epistemological un-

derpinnings of Jīva Gosvamin's approach to pramāna

theory, and his subsequent Vedantic interpretation, are

clearly traced to his Vaisnava philosophic predecessors -

most specifically Rāmānuja - and are firmly grounded in

orthodox Vaidika doctrine. The concept of śabda as the

most authoritative and accurate of the various pramānas of

both general Indian, and specifically Vaidika philosophy, is

not a concept that is in any way unique to Jīva Gosvāmin. Both the Vaisnava schools of Rāmānuja and Madhva, as well as the Advaita school of Samkara, accepted the supe-

riority of Sāstra-pramāna over and above pratyaksa and

anumāna when attempting to acquire insight into the na-

ture of the Absolute. Previous to Samkara, the

preeminence of śabda was accepted by the Vaiśesika and

Pūrva-mīmāmsā schools, as well as by Bodhāyana, and the

other pre-Samkaran Vedāntists. Arguably, all Vedic phi-

losophers - by very definition - are upholders of the theory

of śabda-pramāna, since all Vedic philosophers are uphold-

ers of the philosophical and epistemological efficacy of the

316

sacred Vedic literature. While resting epistemological

claims upon the pramāna of śabda is nothing new in the

annals of the long history of South Asian philosophy, how-

ever, claiming a specific śāstric work - specifically the

Bhāgavata-purāna - to be the perfect manifestation of śabda

is, indeed, a unique attempt on the part of Jīva Gosvāmin.

Moreover, the implications of accepting the Bhāgavata-

purāna as the highest śābdic authority are severalfold. Be-

ing an overtly theistic and devotional work, the Bhāgavata

presents the Absolute in radically saviśesa, or personalistic,

terms. Therefore, what Jiva Gosvāmin implies in not so

subtle tones is that the very specifically, Bhāgavata-

inspired, Vaisnava interpretation of the Absolute as a tran-

scendent personality, full of infinite, divine attributes,

represents nothing less than the highest conception of tran- scendence taught in the entirety of the Sāstra-pramāna

literature. More, however, it was Jīva Goswāmin's personal

task to demonstrate that the Bhāgavata-purāna very spe-

cifically upheld the Krsna-centric theology of Jīva's guru

and predecessor, Caitanya Mahāprabhu, as well as his phi-

losophical concept of acintya-bhedābhedavāda,

"inconceivable, simultaneous difference and unity".

317

Ultimately, however, while Jīva Gosvāmin does a satisfac-

tory service in restating the traditionally held orthodox Vedic defense of śabda-pramāna, he does not fully succeed

in his attempt to prove the primacy of the Bhāgavata-

purana within the greater śābdic corpus. This is true for

several reasons.

1. Some quotations used by Jīva Gosvāmin are clearly tak-

en out of context and very selectively quoted in order to

prove something which they were never designed by their

authors to prove. Since the Sastra-pramana, being in their

totality the literary incarnation of God's thoughts, must be

accepted in their totality for any one part of them to be at all accurate, Jīva again undercuts the very epistemological

base he is claiming to uphold in his attempt to "prove" his

sectarian theological contentions.

2. Jiva's contention that the supposed current incompre-

hensibility of the Sruti literature makes the Purānic

literature of greater epistemic value is very simply inde-

monstrable.

3. Historically, no other antecedent philosophical, precep-

torial or sectarian figure whom even Jīva would consider

318

authoritative has ever held the Bhagavata-purana to be the

apex of the sastric literature, much less the only commen-

tary on Badarāyana Vyāsa's Brahma-sūtras acceptable for a

proper understanding of Vedänta. The fact that even the

Gaudīya-recognized Vaisņava ācāryas, Bodhāyana,

Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhva, Vallabha and Baladeva

themselves saw fit to write commentaries on the Brahma-

sūtras proves that they would not (and in Baladeva's case

could not) support this contention.

That having been stated, whether Jīva Gosvāmin is success-

ful in clearly demonstrating his metaphysical and

theological assumptions is not the primary task of this

book. What is one of this work's tasks, however, is to ex-

amine whether or not Jiva Gosvamin created compelling

and original arguments in his attempts to both uphold his

predecessor's acceptance of the primacy of śabda, as well as in support of his own original attempt to demonstrate the

overall importance of the Bhāgavata-purāna vis-à-vis the

other literary components of Sāstra-pramāna. My conclu-

sion is that he is successful in upholding the former, but

very clearly is not successful in his latter attempt.

Additionally, I have demonstrated that the acceptance of