23. 2. THE GREAT SYNTHESIS OF BHOJA, 1025-1055

2. THE GREAT SYNTHESIS OF BHOJA, 1025-1055

3. ŚP p. 382.2. For additional detail see Pollock 1998a, from which some of what follows here is adapted.

4. The fifth chapter of CC (c. 1385, court of Singabhupala of Andhra), for example, follows the SKĀ closely, and supplements Bhatta Narasimha. The work was read closely by Vishvanathadeva (also originally from Andhra) in the late sixteenth century (see chapter 6.4).

5. Of Bhatta Narasimha (who commented on the entire SKA, contrast Raghavan 1978: 406 n., and see Kamimura 1976) we know nothing beyond his name, but he is certainly identical to the Bhatta Nrisimha who wrote on the Avaloka (see further in chapter 3.2). A second complete commentary by one Ajada (the ms., from Jaisalmer and now in Kobatirtha, Gujarat, Patasanghvi 102-1, is incomplete) came to my attention too late to be of use in this book.

6. Raghavan, for example, frequently found it "very difficult to understand what Bhoja is driving at," postulated nonexistent affinities between him and Bhatta Nayaka (1978: 469), misunderstood Bhoja's differentiation of tātparya and dhvani (1978: 154), failed to grasp his sense of the relationship of gunas and svabhāvokti or his interpretation of a key passage in KĀ (1978: 40), and buried his idea of rasa under an anachronistic hodgepodge of theories (1978: 423, 454, 467).

7. SKĀ 5.9-12; ŚP p. 3. 1963: 106. 6. See for example Bhattacharyya 1963: 106.

8. On Ekāvalī p. 98, below.

9. ŚP p. 377.6.

10. Desire was foundational for Spinoza (cupiditas est ipsa hominis essentia, Ethica III; see Pollock 2012a: 199 n. 35); for a contemporary assessment, see Robinson 1983.

11. ŚP p. 613, below.

12. Vachaspatimishra, Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāmkhyakārikā v. 24.

13. Tattvaprakāśa v. 53 (there is no compelling evidence to deny Bhoja's authorship, in the sense discussed earlier; see also Gengnagel 1996: 18-21). The ego is also analyzed according to the predominance of the gunas (v. 54), which Bhoja uses in his account of the prakrti of the nāyaka: Rama as sāttvika, Agnivarma as rājasa, Bhīma as tāmasa (see SKĀ 5.108, ŚP pp. 862-63, with illustrations).

14. ŚP v. 10; p. 615, both given below. Bhoja's conception of bhāvanā has nothing to do with Bhatta Nayaka's (hence the anodyne translation "production" rather than the charged term "actualization"). Other apparent affinities between the two (the taxonomy śabdapradhāna, arthapradhāna, ukti- or ubhayapradhāna in ŚP p. 355.4-5, or Bhoja's Yogasūtravrtti 1.17, to which Gnoli and others have drawn attention, Gnoli 1968: 47-48 n.) need not presuppose Bhoja's direct familiarity with the latter's aesthetic theory.

15. ŚP p. 625.19, below.

16. Bhoja's disagreement with Bharata becomes most explicit in SP p. 631.18-19.

17. RKA 12.4, above.

18. See SKĀ p. 704; ŚP p. 624 (see also Induraja on KASS pp. 56, 58, 90).

19. From the text in Raghavan 1978: 412.16 ff. (from GOML, Madras: R 2499, a transcript of the Paliam ms.).

20. I conjecture samvidhānaucityavaśena (against the ms. and Raghavan's apparent conjecture samvidhānena (au)cityavaśena); tasyānvayāt (for tasmād anvayāt); sāmājikahrdayānuhlādī (for sāmājikahrdayānukārī).

21. See DR 4.38-39, below.

22. rasikāḥ syuḥ ... rasabhājaḥ.

23. Bhatta Narasimha frames the objection as that of Abhinavagupta; see DhĀL p. 158 (the vibhāvas, etc. are neither kāraka nor

jñāpaka of rasa).

23. The rasasūtra is here cited (omitted by Raghavan).

24. That is, the real Sita, the foundational factor that really produced passion in Rama, is not actually present to the audience.

25. The text of the omitted passage is uncertain (Raghavan's emendations, with the one exception noted, are unwarranted). See Pollock 1998a: 133 n. 34.

26. That is, as opposed to what is taken to be the factual plot of a work like the Rāmāyaņa.

27. rasānvaya = rasāviyoga in ŚP p. 613; see n. 93 below.

28. See Raghavan 1978: 413.18-19.

29. The verse is cited in (or perhaps original to) DhA p. 498, above.

30. Hence the verses that follow address the nature of literary language, for it is that which enables the poet to transmit the character's rasa.

31. What is addressed here is vulgarity and its opposite at the level of word selection, whereas the following two examples concern meaning. (In vv. 4-6 Bhoja borrows from KĀ 1.62-64.)

32. śruti (translation uncertain).

33. I read -arthayuktiś (with Bhatta Narasimha, for -artha yuktiś). He glosses arthavacana; see Abhinava on NS 9.164 (arthasya upapatti).

34. vanmaya. Usually the term refers to all textual genres (śastra and kavya; see KM p. 2), but it is here used in a more restricted

sense.

35. vakrokti refers to the presence of figures of speech, svabhāvokti to direct, unadorned description where language qualities take precedence (see also ŚP p. 628, below).

36. Nos. 13-22 concern elements of the subgenres of the erotic (the paradigmatic rasa for Bhoja), including the erotic thwarted, the erotic enjoyed, the etymologies of these terms (compare SP p. 1173), the qualities of the leading male and female characters, and so on.

37. For the existence of rasa prior to its emotion in Bhoja's system, see headnote.

38. Bhoja replaces apasmara (possession) and marana (dying) with sneha (attachment) and īrsya (envy) (and reads sambhrama- for āvega- and gada- for vyādhi-).

39. The transitory emotions and psychophysical responses, according to Bhatta Narasimha.

40. They persist by virtue of the samskāras, latent memories (Bhatta Narasimha; KD p. 183); "adjuncts," anubandhibhih: according to Bhatta Narasimha and KD, the transitory emotions and psychophysical responses (see below, 5.25) "amplified," pravrddhāḥ (so KD); v. l., prabuddhāḥ, "when awakened."

41. Bhatta Narasimha: kāye viśeșeņābhitaḥ samcāraņān manovāgbuddhiśarīrambhājām anubhāvānām jananam praty api yogyatāpādanam (fol. 152).

42. A second meaning of the word is "inconsistent." The first etymology is drawn from the causative derivation (vyabhicārayanti); the second, from the simplex (vyabhicaranti).

43. prema is a synonym for śrngāra in the sense of primal affect (so in ŚP).

44. In the case of desire when it transforms into the erotic, all the other stable emotions, from amusement onward, can function as transitory emotions (Bhatta Narasimha). See P p. 664, below, where Bhoja argues that stable and transitory emotions are shifting categories.

45. On these four additional rasas see also ŚP p. 632.19, below. They are used again by Hemadri, BhM p. 168, below, and will be

critiqued in RAS 2.159-160, below (on the grounds that sneha is a subdivision of rati, and cannot form the basis of a separate rasa, whereas the three others cannot be "enhanced").

46. āśraya, the feeling subject (kāmitr, Bhatta Narasimha); see 5.35. Other authors confusingly use the term for the object of emotion, i.e., the alambana (for which, as here, the more usual term is visaya); see Induraja on KASS 4.2, and n. 117; so too CC 5.13, 5.19 (though it normally follows SKĀ).

47. The apparent illogicality here, that rasa is generated when it generates, is resolved by Bhoja's conception of a primordial rasa of passion giving rise to specific rasas.

48. I read -atiśayac (with SKA, BHU ed. p. 431 last line, for -atiśayaiś); compare CC 5.19. d-atíšayã 49. Compare CC 5.22.

49. anyadrāgāc glossed anyasmin rāgaḥ (so to be read) by Bhatta Narasimha (see P. 6.3.99), though I am unsure I catch the true implication; he also reports a variant anyodrekāc, "by its being overpowered by," but this seems redundant.

50. I conjecture āśraya- (for āśrayāt; see CC 5. 26: rasasya vāsanāsthairyād āśrayaprakrter uta). 52. Bhoja interrupts his list of the twenty-four powers to discuss the components of the "supplements."

51. Shiva has three eyes.

52. KS 3.67.

53. But not that a rasa has been "generated."

54. RV 7.22.

55. RV 7.23.

56. RV 6.80.

57. This glancing is considered a reaction, unlike that of Shiva in the above-cited verse from the KS, because it is contextualized as such by the transitory emotion mentioned in the preceding RV verse (Bhatta Narasimha).

58. Fuller annotations are available in Pollock 1998a.

59. The reference is to the androgynous form of Shiva.

60. On the referent of rasika-the main character-see the headnote above, and SP p. 616 and n. 148, below.

61. "The 'source of intensification' of the various attributes of the self, i.e., intellect, pleasure, pain, predilection, aversion" (ŚP p. 614.12, below); see Vaiśeşikasūtra 3.2.4 for the signs (pleasure, pain, etc.) establishing the existence of the self.

62. See SP p. 624.25, below; the phrase is used in reference to the character, as the examples show.

63. The vatsala or vātsalya rasa is found first in RKA 12.3.

64. Bhoja will cite this verse in arguing that indifference and even pain bring pleasure to the man of passion (p. 614.1; see also Bhatta Narasimha's explanation of rasa: yena anukūlavedanīyatayā duhkham api sukhatvena abhimanyate [text in Raghavan 1978: 412]).

65. Just as the element of fire is manifested by the flames, so passion is manifested by the stable emotions (p. 616.18, below).

66. We do not experience the "sense of self" directly, but only in the transfigured form of an emotion.

67. For the definitions of "substratum" and "object," see SKA 5.35; the preeminence of the latter and the nature of the former both condition the arising of the predisposition, see SP p. 615.12, below. On the functioning of predispositions, see further below, ŚP p. 637.11-14, below.

68. I conjecture yathāvat (for yāvad). 71. I follow the text of Kulkarni 1989: 43. Bhoja's sentiment is nearly quoted by Shridhara on KP p. 77. He also cites anonymously a verse to the same effect: "Poetic language and dramatic representation are the two ways [of expressing rasa]. The former is

superior in this because of the range of its narrative power"; he adds that one cannot show sexual intercourse on the stage, but it can be imagined through description in poetry. Contrast Vamana (KAS 1.3.30), reasserted by Abhinava and his teacher Bhatta Tota, that the paradigmatic form of literature is drama (see ABh 1.285, below).

72. BKA 1.16.

73. In a move central to his doctrine of the "combinations" that make literature what it is, Bhoja often uses the word alankāra, ornament, in the sense of anything that makes literature beautiful, as well as in the narrower sense of a figure of speech (what later scholars call vacyopaskaraka). This wider meaning is familiar already from Dandin (KA 2.1, cited below by Bhoja); Bhoja is explicit about it at ŚP p. 624.2-3, below.

74. Bhoja's comments on kārikās 3 and 4.

75. I take arthavāda in the Mimamsa sense of accounts, descriptions, etc. (all contrasting with commandments), not in accordance with Bhoja's later definition (p. 458.6).

76. Compare Dhà p. 49, which likens dhvani to lāvanya and takes the latter as a feature of physical beauty. Yet Bhoja's correlation of tātparya and dhvani as "internal" and "external" qualities of speech respectively remains unclear to me.

77. ŚP p. 333; compare kārikā 5a.

78. Bhoja now explains his understanding of the stages of meaning in ordinary discourse by adducing his own introductory verses as examples.

79. Namely, the discussion of the third stage of meaning begun on SP p. 366.

80. On Raghavan's analysis of tātparya in Bhoja, see Pollock 1998a: p. 148 n.

81. Received knowledge (or authoritative testimony), perception, and reasoning (necessary assumption).

82. That is, the second stage of meaning.

83. And Samkhya is unique in accepting only those three.

84. That is, the third stage of meaning, which here lies in the implication of Samkhya conclusions about the ontology and epistemology of rasa.

85. I read trividhapramāņāśraya (for Raghavan's trividha[pramāņāśrayaḥ] śreyān, which led to Dwivedi's impossible trividhapramāņāśrayaḥ śreyān). Compare Dhanika on the "manifestation" of rasa (especially Avaloka p. 217), where despite the apparent critique of a Samkhya view, it is clear that Dhanika's main opponent is Anandavardhana; Bhoja is unconcerned with the vyangyatva of rasa in Ananda's sense.

86. Bhoja is quoting his own observation from ŚP p. 3.

87. Bhoja's combination of Shaivism and Samkhya is on display in his Tattvaprakāśa, chapter 4 in particular, which provides a Samkhya evolutionary account of the world. See also the tripartite division of ego discussed in the headnote.

88. I read utpannaś ca sarvasyā ātmaguņa- (conjectured by A. Aklujkar, for utpannasya sarvasyātmā ātmaguņa-).

89. Compare Ratneshvara ad SKĀ p. 79: "When under the right causal circumstances memory traces manifest themselves, consciousness awakens as if in places where darkness, or stolidity, is breached. On its first appearance it is unmixed with any stable emotions and is called ahankāra."

90. In chapters 18-21 Bhoja discusses the four subtypes of śrngāra (dharma-, artha-, kāma-, and moksa-śrngāra), where it is the psychological state of the character in the literary work enabling him to achieve his ends that is at issue.

91. The ŚP itself.

92. That is, language qualities. 93. The litotes (aviyoga) produces a strong positive (according to the maxim dvau nañau prakrtārtham dradhayataḥ), "the necessary presence of rasa"; note the rephrasing, rasānvaya, in SKĀ 5.1.

94. Source unknown. One might have expected: if there does not exist, in the lover, a heart filled with passion [for his beloved]; i.e., if one has no feeling for a woman, all her outward adornments mean nothing. This is impossible, however, if the simile is to construe with the preceding prose (prema is for Bhoja a synonym of rasa). While the reader (the lover) cannot be ignored, Bhoja's first concern is rasa's existence in the work (the lovely woman).

95. Source unknown. A literary work must be able to represent powerful human emotion, and this requires (on the part of the character) "pride" or "self-confidence," elsewhere "sense of self," which for Bhoja is the same as rasa.

96. And hence, according to standard theory, would become rasas.

97. All these different emotions are in the last analysis resolvable into "love" or emotional intensity. The verses that follow are meant to show the fundamental nature of passion.

98. URC 5.17.

99. Source unknown.

100. URC 2.19.

101. Sattasaī 1.100. The three verses again indicate that all other emotions-pleasure, indifference/impassivity, even pain-are epiphenomenal upon śrngāra. Passion ensures that even something like anger can be, in some sense, pleasurable (thus one can "love anger").

102. Bhoja's opponent is arguing that to equate fully developed emotions with love and love with rasa should mean that we can equate those emotions with rasa.

103. Bhoja is speaking here about characters who are "men of feeling" or not, especially since this rasa, per the next sentence, is the source of the "emotions" characters feel.

104. In his list of the transitory emotions, Bhoja includes jealousy and impassivity (here presumably not reckoned a stable emotion) and excludes death and possession (see above, SKA 5.14 and n. 38). Missing is sneha, attachment (the stable emotion of the affectionate rasa, kārika 6), which should perhaps be read for sama.

105. The four verbs connote four stable emotions, which themselves are related to four rasas: the erotic, comic, heroic, and affectionate.

106. I conjecture sukhadukhādișu (for sukhādișu).

107. See kārika 10, and the headnote.

108. What follows is a restatement of kārikā verse 12.

109. I conjecture -samskāratvāt (for -samskārāt).

110. The former is invariable; and the variations in the latter do not affect the question whether the emotion is "stable" or "transitory."

111. This was already the position of Rudrata (RKA 12.4, above); and compare Abhinavagupta: "Some have noted that while Bharata enumerates all the other components of aesthetic affect-eight rasas, thirty-three transitory emotions, eight physical responses, four forms of acting-the stable emotions are not explicitly enumerated. This suggests that these transitory emotions can also be counted as stable" (ABh 1.262).

112. Compare SKĀ 5.20. This would seem to contain a quotation, but I cannot locate it (for the preceding, see NŚ 1.373.6).

113. Bhatta Lollata fragment #1a, though he knew nothing of the later idea of "manifestation" in its technical sense (for the general sense, see NŚ 1.342 and n. 46).

114. Presumably, however improbably at first sight, the storyworld, since the stable emotion is activated by an aesthetic factor (and not by a real person) and in the next paragraph the emotion will be ascribed to a character.

115. Compare kārikā 4.