6. 1.8 THERE CAN BE NO "MANIFESTATION" OF RASA

1.8 THERE CAN BE NO "MANIFESTATION" OF RASA

Analysis of "Manifestation" of Mahima Bhatta (c. 1025)

Mahima Bhatta's Analysis of "Manifestation"-its title in Sanskrit, Vyaktiviveka, refers to Anandavardhana's theory of "manifestation" (vyakti)-must have been composed sometime in the first quarter of the eleventh century, since it cites The Eye for Light on Implicature (c. 1000) and was itself cited by Mammata (c. 1050). But again, like Kuntaka, Mahima seems generally to be carrying on an older conversation. He is by no means ignorant of Bhatta Nayaka-he quotes a verse that should probably be attributed to him, though he openly admits he never had the chance to read the Mirror of the Heart333-but he has nothing to say about the components of the hermeneutical revolution Nayaka inaugurated. He is similarly unconcerned with most of Abhinavagupta's key questions, though he clearly knew at least The Eye for Light on Implicature. What centrally interests Mahima Bhatta is what interested Shri Shankuka and Ananda, the mechanism by which rasa gets produced, and the cogency of the arguments in support of vyakti, or "manifestation." There is no hint in the Analysis that by vyakti Mahima Bhatta understood anything but Ananda's linguistic modality (śabdavṛtti) of implicature (dhvani), that is, the "manifestation" of literary meaning in general and literary emotion in particular. The term is certainly never used in the treatise in the sense of a psychological modality (cittavrtti), the revelation of a subjective response to the aesthetic object, as would become common in the wake of Abhinava's reinterpretation. In fact, like Ananda himself, Mahima Bhatta takes no notice of the reception theory of rasa-he says explicitly, "We hold rasa to be an imitation of a stable emotion"- and, like his fellow logician from whom he borrowed this view, Shri Shankuka, he was concerned with the cognitive process by which the presence of rasa in the literary text is made known. Of course, writing when he does, Mahima agrees that in the final analysis rasa is an "experience of rapture on the part of the responsive viewer/reader," but the only possible application of the term "manifestation" to that process, he argues, is a figurative one. What actually happens is that we infer rasa from the aesthetic elements; hence, though these elements do not "manifest" rasa, the use of "manifestation" in a figurative sense may be allowed as pointing toward the uniqueness of the final experience. It is toward establishing the limits of this figurative usage of "manifestation," in addition to denying its literal use in favor of inference, that Mahima Bhatta's efforts here are directed.

FROM ANALYSIS OF "MANIFESTATION" OF MAHIMA BHATTA

(p. 59) In the case of a sentence, where we have a cause-effect relationship between the words and the meaning, we easily mark the temporal sequentiality between the apprehension of the cause and the apprehension of the effect. We must understand the same process to be at work in the case of a narrative element and a trope, which are accordingly objects of inference.334 It is only with respect to rasa, which is actually likewise something inferred, that we have a cognitive cause-effect relationship where the succession is unregistered, but this is merely a product of the illusion of their simultaneity. Our opponents consequently accept this relationship as one of "manifester and manifested,"335 upon which their use of the word "implicature" is dependent. But in the case of rasa this can only be a metaphorical usage of "manifestation,"336 not a literal one, since the literal sense is inapplicable given the reasoning we shall present.337 The purpose of using a metaphorical expression is to suggest the experience of sublimity, as we might call it, on the part of the responsive viewer/reader. This is something we can observe with respect to the primary sense of the word "manifestation" in the case of a painting or sculpture.338 o ... [70] One might raise the following objection to our metaphor thesis: Emotions like desire and

the rest are particular states of pleasure and pain. How can they offer "an experience of sublimity on the part of the responsive viewer/reader," which is a purely pleasurable process of savoring, in such a way as to justify using the metaphorical language of "manifestation" in the case of the rasas, when they are actually inferred? For in everyday life, when grief and other emotions are inferred from various signs, the person doing the inferring is not observed to experience the least bit of pleasure. On the contrary, a good man, or even a neutral one, will be found to feel fear, grief, sadness, or other pain. And nothing special distinguishes literature from everyday life so that the pleasurable savoring should be found only in the former and not in the latter. The very same everyday foundational factors and the rest, in the form of causes, effects, and ancillary causes, prompt the inference; the very same emotions, desire and the rest, in their particular states, are the things inferred. So what is special about literature that rasa is savored only there and not in everyday life? There is in fact nothing special, and hence, there being no purpose to be served, it makes no sense to use "manifestation" in a figurative sense with respect to the stable emotions. The answer to this objection is as follows.339 The savoring of rasa, which the sensitive reader alone can have, comes about only when an awareness of emotion arises by means of the aesthetic elements. That is the nature of things, and no serious scholar disputes it. Thus the Sutra on Rasa of Bharata; and to quote further:

The purpose of literature is rasa, which is an experience consisting of savoring; it may be said to be "manifested" only by way of a manifestation called awareness revealed by the conjuncture of aesthetic elements.340

[71] These aesthetic elements do not exist in everyday life. What exists are real causes and effects. Nor can one imagine that the aesthetic elements and the real causes are one and the same thing; they are entirely different, with different definitions. To explain: in the real world the emotions, desire and so on, that exist in Rama, say, as particular stable states are in literature called emotions (bhavas), because, when imputed to characters by poets to enhance their descriptions, they "bring into being" (bhāvayanti) the various rasas, as Bharata says.341 The causal factors of these emotions-Sita in the case of Rama, for example-when conveyed by literature come to be called factors (vibhavas), because they "factor" (vibhavaya-) the emotions. [72] And the same with the reactions and the transitory emotions .... 342 [74] Since aesthetic elements are factitious, whereas cause, effect, and ancillary causes are real, the ones pertaining to literature and the others to the world, the former differ from the latter in both their natures and their objects. Given this difference, when the aesthetic elements produce an apprehension of the stable emotions, which do not really exist, it is entirely appropriate to refer to the stable emotions as "implied" or inferred, in the primary sense of the terms, given that they are nothing but that apprehension. This comprehensive cognition of the apprehension of a stable emotion is itself the savoring of rasa, and it, by contrast, is a real, not factitious, phenomenon. [75] Or let us say that the stable emotions are permanently imperceptible. A perceptible thing cognized directly does not provide thoughtful people with the rapturous experience of something presented by a great poet in language. To quote:

Emotions conveyed by a poet's power conjoined with the force of identification flash forth from a poem in a way unequaled even by seeing with one's own two eyes.343

And even that is not as deeply savored by them as it is when the aesthetic elements enable the emotion to be inferred. This is a fact of nature and not subject to dispute. To quote again:

An emotion inferred from real causes is not savored the way it is when inferred from the aesthetic elements, just as the express meaning does not give as much pleasure as the implied.344

[78] In everyday life, causes, effects and so on, which are nonfactitious, give us to understand real emotions; they are purely inferential, and have not a hint of implicature. How then could there be even a drop of the savoring of pleasure? And precisely herein lies what is "special" about literature over against everyday life, which makes it perfectly reasonable to use, with reference to the stable emotions-which are actually inferred-the figurative language of "manifestation," its purpose being to suggest this savoring of pleasure .... [83] As far as rasa is concerned, it would be impossible for an implied meaning to be made manifest simultaneously with the manifestation of the aesthetic elements. For these are causes and factitious, and in fact are given the name "aesthetic elements" when they are used by poets for bringing to the awareness of the cognizing subject emotions such as desire and the like. In the process the latter, which are more or less reflections,345 acquire the name "stable emotions," and when they reach the state where they can be relished thanks to the heart's concurrence of the viewer/reader, they are called "rasas." Obviously it is not possible for effects that are more or less reflections to become manifest simultaneously with their causes, for the very determination of a causal relationship between them would thereby vanish.346

(98-101) It cannot be, as Anandavardhana claims, that "implicature" refers to a "particular variety of poetry,"347 because implicature is supposed to define poetry as such, and implicature consists, as he himself avers, essentially of rasa.348 [100] Nor can the rasa implicature offers be a "particularly good" variety,349 because rasa is defined as a savoring of pleasure that does not admit of any higher degree.350 To quote: "When rasa attains plenitude through poetry recitation or dhruva singing,351 the viewer/reader becomes focused on its intense savor, and turns inward for a moment. Then all other sensory objects vanish, one dwells within oneself, and one's own streaming joy, the sort that spiritual adepts delight in, becomes manifest."352 Absent this rasa, a poem cannot be poetry at all, let alone a "particular" variety of poetry, and no rational person would bother with it, since it would be completely useless. [101] For "poetry" is defined as the activity of a poet that consists of the "conjoining of the aesthetic elements"-which itself is invariably connected with the "manifestation" of rasa.