9. CHAPTER FOUR

CHAPTER FOUR

Abhinavagupta and His School, 1000-1200

4.1 RASA AND THE CRITIQUE OF IMITATION

Literary Investigations of Bhatta Tota (c. 975)

What we know about Bhatta Tota (sometimes, Tauta) comes principally from the pen of Abhinavagupta. He refers to him at various places in his writings on literature as teacher, and at the beginning of his commentary on the Treatise on Drama explains that he will transmit "the true doctrine of the theory of drama that has issued from the mouth of the goodly Brahman Tota."1 That Bhatta Tota wrote a work on dramaturgy, if not a commentary on Bharata's Treatise, is indicated by Abhinava's later citations in his New Dramatic Art. Also ascribed to Bhatta Tota is a treatise, now lost, the Literary Investigations, upon which Abhinava himself wrote the Exegesis (Investigations might have been the name of the dramaturgical treatise). Bhatta Tota is rarely mentioned in Sanskrit literature after the twelfth century; Hemachandra (d. 1172) may have been the last scholar to have had direct access to his works, though even he was probably only citing citations. Given Abhinava's own coordinates, Bhatta Tota must have lived in Kashmir in the latter half of the tenth century. If the exposition of interpretations of rasa that Abhinava provides in his New Dramatic Art is to be understood as a strictly chronological rather than conceptual ordering, then Bhatta Tota would have to be placed earlier than Bhatta Nayaka, though if our interpretation of the reference in the River of Kings is correct, Bhatta Nayaka must have lived at the beginning of the tenth century. Thin though the evidence is, the former appears to have known and critiqued the latter. We may contrast the two on the definition of "poet" (Bhatta Tota fragment #1 and Bhatta Nayaka #4), and on poetry and pedagogy (fragments #3 and #7 respectively); also, the term "commonization," closely associated with, if not coined by Bhatta Nayaka, is used by Bhatta Tota. One problem with this sequence, however, is Bhatta Tota's argument that the character, the poet, and the spectator all have the same experience of rasa (fragment #4). Such a theory would be unthinkable in the wake of Bhatta Nayaka's transformative ideas-unless, of course, it had been offered as stubborn critique. The fragmentary state of Bhatta Tota's corpus can give us only the merest sense of his views, but they were sometimes as insightful as they were influential. His definition of poetic imagination (pratibha, fragment #1) was to be echoed down the generations. He was the first to draw a radical distinction between the secular poet (kavi) and the Vedic "poet" (kavi), and to restrict the idea of kāvya, literature, to the work of the former (fragment #2). The importance he attributes to "description" in the constitution of literature, rather than, say, narrative action, captures something essential about the specific nature of classical Sanskrit poetry. And the primacy he awards to drama in the conceptualization of rasa (fragment #5) brilliantly recapitulates as theory what was historical fact. Aside from these tantalizing bits, Bhatta Tota is most celebrated, thanks to Abhinava's extended paraphrase (or quotation?), for his devastating critique of Shri Shankuka's concept of rasa in drama as an imitation of emotion.3 This critique reveals both a mind

skilled in dialectic, sometimes dizzyingly, even facetiously so, as well as the difficulty he and his student Abhinavagupta faced in trying to interpret away the many statements in the Treatise on Drama that support the idea of dramatic imitation. The critique itself does not help us determine what his own position on rasa may have been. But his bravura reasoning is a treat in itself, and it was to be taken over almost in its entirety by Abhinava.4

FROM LITERARY INVESTIGATIONS OF BHATTA TOTA

Direct (and Possibly Direct) Citations

(#1)5 Wisdom that has ever new insights is called imagination. Imagination is the very life breath of description, and a "poet" is someone who has mastered description. A poet's work is called "poetry." (#2)6 There is no true poet who is not a seer. "Seer" comes from seeing, and "seeing" is true insight into the properties of the vast variety of existent things Reference made to the word "poet" in the Vedas is based on his true insight, but the meaning of the word that has become conventional in everyday life is based on both his insight and his gift for description. Thus, although his sight was ever clear, Valmiki, the primal sage, did not become a poet until he mastered description. (#3)7 Pleasure is constitutive of rasa, and rasa is simply drama, and drama simply knowledge.8 (#4)9 The protagonist, the poet, and the audience, accordingly, all have the same experience. (#5)10 [Abhinavagupta: "Rasas are found in drama alone, and in poetry only to the degree that it mimics drama. For as my teacher has argued, with respect to the subject matter of the literary text, rasa comes into being only when a state of awareness simulating perception comes into being. To quote his Literary Investigations:]

To the degree that poetry does not approximate the character of a performance, the possibility of savoring rasa decreases. But when the aesthetic elements-foundational factors such as a beloved woman or stimulant factors like a garden or the moon-are properly made available by the full range of imaginative expression blossoming in the course of description, they can become as clear as actual perceptions.

(#6)11 The poet, they say, has a vast burden to bear: definitions, figures of speech, language qualities, knowledge of flaws, dramatic modes, and plot elements.12 Only when all these come together as pleasing virtues in a mutually suitable manner will rasa be manifested, and immediately. A composition that is uncomplicated and engaging, whether with lilting meters or unversified words,13 in an easily comprehended language-this sort of pure poetry (defined as "verbal acting" within the context of the "general style of acting") facilitates the experience of its rasas and emotions. From this kind of poetry, whatever may be its narrative content, rasa will emerge from the transfiguration of the full complement of aesthetic elements, when these are neither deficient nor used to excess. The world of the drama is born from everyday life for the enhancement of rasa. Rasa is the be-all and end-all of the creator poet, deriving from his vivid imagination.

Restatements of Bhatta Tota's Doctrine

#1a, Abhinavagupta)14 The position of Shri Shankuka15 lacks any inherent truth and cannot withstand criticism. To explain: Is the argument that "rasa has the form of an imitation" asserted [1] from the perspective of the apprehending audience member; or [2] from that of the actor; or [3] in reliance on the notions of scholars, who analyze the nature of reality (to quote: "It is scholars, after all, who analyze in this way, and not those who simply engage in the practice")?16 [1] Now, as for the first perspective, we cannot reconcile it with Bharata's actual statements if we follow them closely.17 We can only call something an "imitation" if it has been perceived by some valid means of knowledge. For example, one can only interpret the drinking of water as the drinking of rum (giving us the idea, "That fellow is drinking rum") if we are actually seeing the water-drinking with our own eyes. And thus in the case under discussion, you need to explain what the spectator is perceiving in the actor that appears as an imitation of desire. For one thing, his body, the headdress, the costume and so on it is dressed in, his horripilation, stammering, the shaking or flailing of arms, the movement of eyebrows, the glances, and so on:18 none of this appears to anyone as an imitation of a mental state such as desire, because all of it differs radically from desire. For one thing, it is material; for another, it is perceived by different sense organs; and last, it is located elsewhere than desire.19 For another, this cannot be the imitation of a character since such imitation can manifest itself only if we have already seen the actual person. But none of us has ever seen Rama and the desire he feels. The idea, therefore, that the actor is "imitating Rama" can be dismissed as so much empty talk. Now, suppose you argue that the erotic rasa is an imitation of desire comprehended as simply the mental state of the actor. You still need to explain what the mental state we are apprehending consists of. It consists, you will say, of the everyday mental state-one characterized by causes, effects, and auxiliaries-that we are able to apprehend by signs that prompt an inference: a cause such as a lovely woman, an effect such as sidelong glances, and auxiliaries such as satisfaction and other transitory emotions. But then, unfortunately for you, the mental state we are apprehending is desire itself; forget about the argument of its being an imitation of desire. You will reply that there is a fundamental distinction here: the aesthetic elements, the foundational factor and so on, are real only in the case of the character being imitated; in the case of the actor doing the imitating, they are not. So be it, but if these elements are factitious and not really the causes, effects, and auxiliaries of that desire, but are instead something invented thanks to the actor's study of the poetry, his training, and so on, are they or are they not grasped as factitious by the audience? If they are, then how could the audience possibly have any real awareness of desire?20 That, you will retort, is precisely the reason for claiming that what is being apprehended is an imitation. But, my simple fellow,21 it is only reasonable to draw an inference about some second thing (that is, an imitation of desire as opposed to actual desire) when it has arisen as an effect from some second cause (factitious elements) understood to be second by an observer who knows the difference. But the observer who does not know will only have an inference of the cause itself that is familiar to him (that is, the real desire in the main character).22 From a particular scorpion, only a knowledgeable observer could make the correct inference that dung is the cause of its propagation; an ignorant observer would make an inference that another

scorpion is its cause, and that could be false knowledge.23 You would not infer an imitation of fire from mist that is actually being perceived as smoke.24 It is not even correct to say we can infer an imitation of fire from a sign manifesting itself as an imitation of smoke. We do not find that we apprehend the presence of a bouquet of red roses imitating fire from mist actually perceived as an imitation of smoke.25 [269] But wait, you will say, the actor who is angry is not really angry but only appears to be so. That is true, he is similar to an angry man, the similarity coming from his frowning and so on, the way a cow's similarity to a wild ox comes from its features26-but this in no way suffices to make it an imitation.27 Given that the audience has no sense of any similarity anyway, and that it believes the actor is certainly feeling some emotion, it is a completely hollow argument to say an imitation must be manifesting itself here. You make the further argument that the audience has the awareness "This is Rama." Now, if this awareness is certain at the time it arises and not negated28 at some later point, why does it not count as true knowledge? Or if it is negated later, why does it not count as false knowledge? According to the real nature of things, of course, it is false knowledge even if it is not later negated. It is therefore untrue to say, "We encounter no antithetical ideas .... "29 In addition, we have the same awareness, "This is Rama," when it comes to a second actor too, so there would turn out to be a general class category, a "Ramaness," in which both participate.30 You also argue that "A distinct comprehension of the foundational and stimulant factors is gained on the strength of the literary narrative itself."31 I am not sure what this means. First, the actor does not get the idea "This remarkable woman Sita is mine" as something actually pertaining to himself. And if what you mean by "distinct comprehension" is simply that it is the audience that is supposed to be capable of apprehending the factors, then it should be all the easier for them to "distinctly comprehend" the stable emotion.32 What the audience chiefly understands, after all, is "This stable emotion is present in this person (the actor)." If we are to be in accord with what the audience is actually apprehending, then, it is false to claim that rasa is an imitation of a stable emotion.33 (The distinction in the nature of "verbal acting" introduced in the sentence "For referential language as such is not at the same time expressive" will be considered later at the appropriate place.)34 [2] Now, as for the actor, he certainly does not have the idea, "I am imitating Rama or his mental state." For in the first place, if "imitation" (anu-karana) is taken in the sense of "making similar" (sadrśa-karana), it is not even something that the actor can accomplish, since he has never seen the original. But if the term means merely "making (karana) afterward (anu)" (with anu understood in a temporal sense), then the definition would be too wide, for this species of "imitation" occurs in everyday life.35 Then again, if it is not some particular person but rather the emotion (grief, for example) of a high-status character36 that the actor believes he is imitating, then you still need to explain what he is using to produce the imitation. It cannot be grief, first of all, for there is no reason for the actor to be grieving.37 Nor can an imitation of grief be made by shedding tears and the like, because of the radical difference between material teardrops and immaterial emotions that we have already noted. And if you are only prepared to go so far as to say that the actor believes he is imitating the reactions to grief that a high-status character is feeling, we still have to ask: what high-status character are you talking about? If you answer: Just some unspecified character, then how can such an entity lacking all particularity be brought to our awareness? And if you answer:

Whoever it is that would be expected to weep the way the actor is weeping, well then, we have the actor's own self barging into the midst of the proceedings,38 and the whole relationship of subject and object of imitation collapses. Furthermore, the actor does not feel that what he is doing is an imitation; he just has the sense that he is acting, simply by displaying the physical reactions-first, thanks to his training; next, by reason of his recollecting his own "foundational and stimulant factors" (his own beloved, for example); and last, from the "heart's concurrence" deriving from a "commonization" of the character's mental state-and by reciting the poetry with the proper intonation and all the other appurtenances. [270] For an actor's imitating the actions of Rama is nothing like a woman's imitating the clothing of her lover (as we have shown in chapter 1).39 [3] Last, it is also in accordance with the way things really are that we deny that an imitation of the stable emotion takes place. This is so first of all because nothing of which we have no awareness40 can be said to have any reality. As for what is really the case, this is something we will discuss later. Furthermore, the sage has not directly said anything to suggest that rasa is an imitation of a stable emotion, nor can we find anything in his text that would lead even to an inference of such a thing. In fact, his description of all the things that provide sustenance to drama -the dhruva songs, the variegated rhythms, the components of the preliminary dance-leads us to infer that just the opposite of imitation is taking place, an issue we will enlarge on at the end of the chapter on emplotment in drama.41 As for the statement in the Treatise on Drama itself that drama is "an imitation of everything contained in the seven continents," this is something that can be explained in an altogether different way.42 And last, if we were to grant for the sake of argument that the sage is indeed speaking of an "imitation" of a stable emotion, why is that new term never applied by him to the woman's actual imitation of her lover's clothes or gait?43 Finally, as to your argument about a cow's being "constructed" of yellow and other colors of paint:44 if the sense meant here is "manifested," that is patently false, because no real cow is being manifested by the paint as though by a lamp. All that is being produced thereby is a particular configuration similar to a cow. The painting is the domain of an appearance, namely, that an entity similar to a cow subsists in a particular arrangement similar to the arrangement of the parts of a cow. The configuration of aesthetic elements, however, is never grasped in a cognition of similarity to a stable emotion like desire. Therefore, it is false to assert that rasa is the imitation of a stable emotion. (#2a, Abhinavagupta)45 The peaceful rasa is the most important rasa of them all, insofar as it is based on the highest of the ends of man, because it results in liberation from transmigration. Both my teacher, Bhatta Tauta, in his Literary Investigations, and I myself in my Exegesis thereon, have carefully and repeatedly analyzed both the pros and cons of this position. (#3a, Abhinavagupta)46 Hence, no one should be confused into concluding that drama is an imitation of things that are not particulars. This is what we should understand to be the intention behind the Literary Investigations of my teacher, and not that drama may indeed be an imitation of nonparticulars. (#4a, Anonymous) 47 Bhatta Tota held that rasa is something both "manifested" and "apprehended" in the literal sense of the terms. It can be said to be something that "arises" only in a figurative sense.