Books / Comparitive Aesthetics Kanti Charan Pandey Vol 1 Chowkambha

249. MAHIMA BHATȚA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI 275

Page 304

MAHIMA BHATȚA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI 275

is that he does not recognise Vyakti or Dhvani as an inde- pendent power of language and holds that it admits of inclusion in the inference. He does not differ from Ananda Vardhana on all points. He does admit the soundness of some views and refers to them with approbation. But when after a critical analysis of Ananda Vardhana's views he discovers them to be opposed to his, he has no hesitation in criticising them adversely.1

KASHMIR SAIVA TENDENCIES OF MAHIMA BHAttA.

The modern interpreters of Mahima Bhatta, because of their being out of touch with the Realistic Idealism ( Abhasavada ) of Kashmir, generally think him to be a Naiyayika and interpret his work, the Vyakti Viveka, in terms of the system of Nyaya. A closer study of his work reveals him to be a follower of the Kashmir school of Monistic Saivaism. This becomes evident if we take the following facts into account :-

(I) HIS REFERENCE TO PAKÂ

In the benedictory verse at the beginning of his work, he offers obeisance to Para Vak. We have already pointed out in ch. II, that Bhartrhari had recognised only three aspects of speech and looked upon the Pasyanti to be the highest; that it was Somananda, who established the Para as distinct from and transcending the Pasyanti; and that the later Vaiyakaranas, like Nagesa Bhatța, have borrowed it from the Saiva. His reference to Para at the commen- cement of his work is, therefore, a definite indication of his being a Kashmir Saiva.

  1. V. V., 5.

Page 305

276 CHAPTER V TTARa AMIHAM

HIS REFERENCE TO THE SAIVA THEORY OF ĀBHĀSAVĀDA

Mahima Bhatta divides words into five classes: Noun, verb, prefix, conjunction and Karmapravacanīya. And noun he subdivides into four classes, according to the four reasons for the use of nouns for different objects, such as genus, quality, function and substance. But subse- quently he seems to modify this view and discusses at length the view that the reason for the use of a noun for an object is just one, i.e. the act of attaining the characteristic being, "Ghatananca tadātmatvāpattirūpā kriyā matā" (V.V. 33)

He refers to another view of the reason for the use of a noun for an object, which has close similarity with his own, in order to distinguish his view from it, as follows :- According to some thinkers, the reason for the use of all such nouns as 'ghata' etc. for respective objects is the action, the general idea expressed by the root from which a particular word is derived. The argument in support of the view may be stated as follows: -

If the words such as 'ghata' have to be acknowledged to signify definite objects, there must be a reason why they do so. This reason must be internal such as is identical with the thing and not external. For, if the reason that is external, such as the genus, be looked upon as sufficient to explain why the word 'ghata' stands for a particular object, that externality being common to another object, e. g. a piece of cloth, there is no reason why 'ghata' should not signify it.1 Hence the reason for the use of

  1. V. V. 23.