250. MAHIMA BHATȚA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI 277

MAHIMA BHATȚA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI 277

'ghata' to signify a particular object is the action or the general idea, indicated by the root, from which the word is derived and with which the object is identical or which is its essential nature, The defect in this view, however, is apparent. It was discovered by the Upadhivadins. If the reason for the use of a noun for an object be the action that is signified by the root, from which the noun is derived, the noun 'gauh' should not be used for the object 'cow' at the time when she is not going, but is perfectly at rest; because at that time she does not do the act of going, which alone is the reason for the use of the word 'gauh' for it. Mahima Bhatta, therefore, holds that the reason for the use of a noun for a particular object is not the action, which is signified by the root, from which the noun is derived and which is being done by the object, for which the noun is used. Ruyyaka, commenting on the verse, under discussion, definitely asserts that the action, signified by the root, represents just an aspect of the reason for the use of a noun such as Ghata for a particular object. (Ghațih acpratyayāntah pravrttinimittaikadesābhidhāyī. V. V. V. 33). Accordingly he holds that the reason for the use of a n'oun, such as 'ghata', for an object, such as jar, is the attaining or realisation of the being, which consists in the natural character, form or true constitution and which is non-different from it. i. e. shining as jar in its characteristic form. ( Svarūpībhūta-ghațatvāpattilakșaņam hi ghața- śabdasya pravrtti-nimittam V. V. V. 33).

But it may be objected here that 'attaining' 'realisation' and 'shining' are also acts. How can they, therefore, be attributed to the insentient objects like jar etc. ? For, action

278 CHAPTER VH AMIMAM presupposes an agent, who is free, whose essential nature is determinative consciousness (Svatantrah karta). Action springs from free consciousness: Svatantrya is the basis of action : but how can any body talk of it in relation to the insentient jar, to justify the view that the reason for the use of a word for a particular object is the performance by it of the action, though it may be that of attaining the characteristic being ? To answer this question Mahima Bhatta introduces the Kashmir Saiva metaphysical doctrine that everything is the manifestation of the Absolute. He resorts to the Saiva theory of Âbhasavada. His language is a mere adaptation of the famous Kārikā of Utpalācārya's Īśvara Pratyabhijñā (II, 1, 4.) Kramobhedaśrayo bhedopyabhasa-sadasattvatah doi Ábhasasadusattve ca Citrabhāsakrtah prabhoh. Tha reader may satisfy himself on this point by comparing the second half of this verse with the following line in the Vyakti Vivek :- Mūlañca tasyāścitrārthābhāsāvişkrtirīsituh. (V.V. 33) His argument as elaborated by Ruyyaka may be stated as follows :- Even though we may admit the existence of the objects external to and independently of the knowing subject, yet admission of such an existence is as good as admission of non-existence. For, it would not explain the practical life of man. Because an object in order to explain the practical life of the subject must have its being in the subject, must shine in him. Now if we admit the object to be external to, independent of and, therefore, essentially different from