251. MAHIMA BHATTA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI 279

MAHIMA BHATTA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI 279

the subject, it would mean that the object is of the nature of not-consciousness (Aprakāsa). And if it be so, how can it shine in consciousness, become a fact of consciousness ? For, to shine in consciousness implies shining as identical with it. But how can that, which is essentially different from consciousness, shine as identical with it ? For, the essential nature cannot change; and if it changes it is not the essential nature. The objects, therefore, have to be admitted to be essentially of the nature of consciousness1. Therefore, if we admit the objects to be essentially of the nature of consciousness, as we must in order to explain the practical life of humanity, the objection against the view that the reason for the use of an expression for an object is its action of attaining the characteristic being is answered. For, the objector raised the question "How can we attribute action to an insentient object like jar, because action is recognised to spring from a conscious and free subject only ?" Now if we admit the object to be essentially of the nature of consciousness, the admission of freedom (Svatantrya) as its essential nature automatically follows; because 'Prakāśa' and Vimarsa' are inseparable; there is no consciousness without freedom.

In corroboration of this view Ruyyaka quotes a line which appears to be from a Vedantic text, because the word 'Brahman' occurs in it. Pradesopi Brahmaņaņ Sārūpya- manatikranta scavikalpyaśca' (V.V.V., 34). It asserts that even a part (pradesa) of Brahman is essentially identical with it and cannot be fully determined.

The reason that has been given above, is an epistemic

1. V.V.V., 33,

280 CHAPTER VTAHS AMIHAM reason. There is a metaphysical reason also. It may be stated as follows :- There are three distinct, though allied, views of action (kriya) in the Saiva philosophy of Kashmir. (I) As an aspect of the Ultimate metaphysical principle. As such it is the power, which is responsible for the manifestation of the entire variety that we find in the objective world in temporal and spatial order. As such it is called Kriyāgakti. It is in itself above temporal limitation and, therefore, it is not successive. (II) As a concept. As such it is a unity in multiplicity. It is based on the recognition of identity in the midst of successive differences. For instance, we see a certain body such as that of X associated with a number of spatial points in temporal succession. It is looked upon as different at each moment, because of its relation to different spatial points. But still it is recognised to be the same body of X. Action, therefore, is a concept which is due to the unifica- tion by the determinative mind of a number of successively perceived facts into unity; because of recognition of the element of identity in all. (III) As an external series of phenomena, on which thc concept of action is based. Kashmir Saivaism is not subjectivism. It admits that there are things external to the individual mind, such as stimulate the mind through senses or rather supply the basis for concepts that the mind forms. They are the manifestations of the Absolute Free Will. They have their being in the universal Will before their manifestation. Thus, when a series of momentary phenomena is manifested in temporal succession (Kalakrama) so that the