253. 282 CHAPTER V

282 CHAPTER V

is to be understood to stand for an 'agent' (Karta) and not for a standard of comparison. For, it is this mea ning which is directly apprehended, while the other, namely, 'acting like', is got through implication. For instance, in the case of "Asvati baleyah" the meaning, that is directly apprehen- ded, is that the ass attains the characteristic being of a horse; and then through implication the meaning that he acts like a horse is got for the simple reason that one whose action is not similar cannot attain the characteristic being. In this context Mahima Bhatta again refers to the Śaiva metaphysical doctrine1 to explain how we can talk of action in relation to the insentient object and asserts that we do it because the insentients also are the manifestations of the Free Will and hence, being essentially identical with it, are 'Free' 'Svatantra' and, therefore, are doers (Karta). In this connection he quotes the view of Panini also, which implies that even the insentients act, 'attain being'. For, how otherwise could he assert the meaning of the root Gadi' to be a part of the face (Gadi vadanaikadese)?

(III) HIS ADMISSION OF THREE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE. He admits only three means of right knowledge (Pra- māņa): (I) Direct perception (Pratyaksa) (II) Inference (Anu- māna) (III) Verbal testimony (Sabda . Other means of knowledge such as Analogy2 (Upamana) and implication (Arthapatti) he includes in the inference. For, the mental grasp of one thing at the sight of another can be logically admitted in those cases only in which there is invariable concomitance of the two: otherwise there will be no reason why any other thing than that which can rightly be admitt- ed to be apprehensible, should not be grasped at the sight 1. V. V. 35. 2. V. V. 78-9.