254. MAHIMA BHATȚA'S CRITICISM OE DHVANI 283

MAHIMA BHATȚA'S CRITICISM OE DHVANI 283

of any one. Andiwhatever is known because of invariable concomitance or any other kind of relationship is nothing but inferred. He refutes the view of the Mima saka that Arthapatti is an independent means of knowledge. While discussing how do we get the meaning 'shows' from the use of the word 'Vadati' in 'Krsangyah santapam vadati visinīpatra sayanam,' 'he refers to the explanation that can be offered in the light of the philosophy of Mimamsa as follows :- "If it be said that the use of the word 'Vadati' can- not be explained in any other way than through the assum- ption that it implies the action of showing, which is similar to that for which 'Vadati' stands". And he refutes it by asserting that if it be admitted that the meaning 'shows' figures in consciousness, because otherwise the use of the word 'Vadati' cannot be justified, then the meaning 'shows' is nothing but inferable. For, Arthapatti1 is included in inference. Hence in this case as well as in that of 'Gaurbahrkah', where the identification of the two cannot be explained otherwise than through the assumption that the similarity of 'Bahika' with 'Gauh' is implied, the non-conventional meaning is got through inference only. This view of the number of means of right knowledge (Pramana) is different from that of the Vaisesika. The Vaiseșika does not recognise the2 verbal testimony (Sabda) to be an independent means of knowledge. It brings Sabda under inference. The validity of the scriptural state- ments, according to it, is an inference from the authoritative character of the speaker. But Mahima Bhatta recognises Sabda to be an independent means of knowledge. 1. V. V. 112. 2. V. D. 168-9.