255. 284 AVHO CHAPTER V

284 AVHO CHAPTER V

This view is also distinct from that of the Nyaya.1 For, while the Nyaya accepts Upamana to be an independent means of knowledge, Mahima Bhatta does not. His view of the number of the means of right knowledge is the typical Kashmir Saiva view, as presented by Utpalācārya in his Isvarapratyabhijñā in the course of his exposition of Prāmāņa. (I. P. V. Vol. II. 74-84).

(IV). HIS REFERENCE TO THE CAUSAL THEORY OF KASHMIR ŚAIVAISM

Mahima attempts to refute the theory of the lllumina- tive power (Dyotakatva) of words. And when the ques- tion 'what about the illuminative power (Dyotakatva, or Vyañjakatva) of prefixes, like 'Pra' in such words as Prāp- tam' is raised, he replies just in the same way as that in which he replies to a similar question about the suggestive power of words. He asserts that the prefixes are said to be illuminators (Dyotaka) in the secondary sense of the word.

He refutes the view that the roots stand for action in general (Kriyasamanyavacanah), according to which every particular action of cooking is the meaning of the rooti'pac' and the prefixes 'Pra' etc. are simply illuminators of a particular meaning and not its signifiers (Vacaka). He asserts that if the exponent of the view of the Dyota- katva of prefixes were to obstinately stick to his position, he will be landed into the difficulty of having to deny the relation of substance and attribute. For, if all particulars be supposed to be included within a universal, for which a word stands and under which they are subsumed, and accordingly any expression that is used to arouse the consciousness of a particular be not 'Vacaka' but only Dyotaka, the word blue, which is used to arouse the cons:

1. N. S., 11