256. MAHIMA BHATȚA'S CRITICISM OF DHVNAI 285

MAHIMA BHATȚA'S CRITICISM OF DHVNAI 285

ciousness of a lotus of a particular colour, should be looked upon as Dyotaka. In this context he refers to the causal theory of Kashmir Śaivaism. In order to strengthen his view that the prefixes are not Dyotaka in the primary sense of the word, he asserts that if it be admitted that every word, that refers to what already exists, is only a Dyotaka and not Vacaka, no word would be Vacaka: for, every thing, for which a word may stand, is within the Universal Conscious- ness and, therefore, has being1 (Sattva). Hence all words would have to be admitted to be Dyotaka. For, according to the monistic Saiva metaphysical theory of manifestation (Ābhāsavāda) every object of experience is simply a manifes- tation of what is already within the universal consciousness and when a thing is said to have been effected, the state- ment does not mean anything more than that what was within the Universal Consciousness, has emerged to the objectivity of both the internal and external senses. (Sāntarviparivartinaḥ ubhayendriya-vedyatvam. I. P. V., Vol II, 140). It is, therefore, wrong to think that Mahima Bhatta is a follower of the Nyaya, simply because he very frequently employs the logical technique and because he is the exponent of the inferential theory of æsthetics, For, Kashmir Śaivaism also has a logical. technique connected with the inference, which includes the Buddhistic and the Nyaya technique. The four points discussed above reveal him to be a follower of the Saiva school of Kashmir.

HIS THEORY OF ÆSTHETICS.

He is a follower of Śrīśankuka and upholds the

1. V. V. 131.