258. MIHIMA BHATȚA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI 287

MIHIMA BHATȚA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI 287

HIS CONCEPTION OF RASA AS A REFLECTION OF A STHĀYIN.

He holds that a Sthayin can come in a poetic compo- sition either as a persisting or as a transient emotion. He points out that the definitions of Sthayins, as given in the 7th chapter of the Natya Sastra, called the Bhāvādhyāya, give the definitions of the Sthayins appearing as the Vyabhi- carins. For, otherwise their definitions are meaningless. For, Rasa is essentially nothing else than an imitation of a Sthayin and, therefore, the definitions of the essential nature of the Sthayins can be known from the definitions of the various Rasas ; because the Rasas are nothing but re- fections of the Sthayins1.

HIS ANSWERS TO THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE INFERENTIAL THEORY OF ÆSTHETICS. (I) He attempts to answer the objection of the Dhvani- vadin that in the Æsthetic experience the basic mental state is experienced not in isolation or succession from the situa- tion, the mimetic changes and the transient emotion, but simultaneously and in union with them : how can then the theory of inference and, therefore, of the succession in the experience of the different constituents of Rasa be maintained ? He denies the simultaneity in the experience of the situation etc. and the basic mental state. He asserts that the relation between them is that of cause and effect; that the one is inferred from the other ; that the idea of simul- taneousness in the experience of all is erroneous. (II) And to the objection "how can there be a pleasant experience of the inferred basic mental state at the æsthetic level ; because a similar state of mind is not experienced as

1. V.V.72.