259. 288 CHAPTER V IAHS AMUIIM

288 CHAPTER V IAHS AMUIIM

such when it is inferred at the empirical level ?" he replies as follows :- What are called Vibhava etc. in the context of æsthe- tics are distinct from what are known as cause etc. at the empirical level. The latter are real; but the former are mere products of arts. The latter are to be met with at the empirical level but the former are experienced at the æsthetic level only. They are essentially different from one another and have their distinct spheres. From the situation, which is a product of an art and, therefore, unreal, the basic mental state that is inferred may be spoken of as unreal. But because the æsthete is free from practical attitude, he does not proceed to ascertain the true nature of the inferred i.e. whether it is real or unreal.1 For, such an effort is altogether useless from the æsthetic point of view. It is just to emphasise this distinction of the inference at the æsthetic level from that at the empirical that the inferred is called Pratīyamana or Gamya rather than Anumīyamana or Anumeya. Mahima Bhatta, accordingly asserts that æsthetic experience is nothing but the conscious- ness of a basic mental state that shines in an æsthete in consequence of the apprehension of the situation etc. (This point has been refuted by Abhinava in the course of refutation of the inferential theory of æsthetics, propounded by Śri Šankuka). He points out that the basic mental state (Sthäyin), which is inferred from a situation that is a product of art, is experienced to be pleasant, because it is inferred from a cause, which is essentially different in its nature from that with which we meet at the empirical level and the basic mental state inferred from which is unpleasant. He says that the pleasantness of the basic mental state at the æsthetic level is a fact of experience which cannot be questioned2. 1. V.V.75. 2. V.V.74.