260. MAHIMA BHAȚȚA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI 289

MAHIMA BHAȚȚA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI 289

(III) The theory of imitation, as presented by Mahima Bhatta, implies that the æsthete experiences a basic mental state which is not real, inasmuch as it is inferred from the situation etc, which in themselves are not real but only artistic imitations of them: because from the unreal there can be the inference of the unreal only. The question, therefore, arises : "Does the æsthete know the basic mental state to be unreal ?" To this the reply of Mahima Bhatta is 'No'. The æsthete does not know it to be unreal. The fact is that he does nct know it to be either real or unreal. But then it may be asked "Is not the ignorance of the true nature of the presented a kind of error (Mithya- jñana) ? And if so, how can it have the causal efficiency of bringing about the moral improvement of the spectator, which is the chief aim of dramatic presentation ?" Mahima Bhatta replies that such an error in certain contexts has the causal efficiency. For instance, on the path of worship, the object of worship is not what the devotee thinks it to be and, therefore, his idea of the object of devotion is erroneous; yet this erroneous idea also has the causal efficiency of bringing about the spiritual improvement: just the same is the case with the error in the æsthetic experience1. HIS ADVANCE ON ŚRISAŃKUKA. We know very little of what Śrīśańkuka wrote. Our main source of information about his inferential theory of Æsthetics is the reference to it by Abhinava in his Abhinava Bharatī. From what we find there, it is not clear whether he recognised any distinct subjective condition of æsthetic experience or whether he recognised the inferential experience at the æsthetic level to be essentially non empirical, though he asserts its unclassifiability and predominantly recognitive 1. V. V. Comm. 74, 37