266. 296 CHAPTER V IIH AMIHAM

296 CHAPTER V IIH AMIHAM

kalamapasya' etc., although the precedence of the action, indicated by 'Apasya'1 is in relation to 'Harasya', yet Mallinatha has presented it to be in relation to the action of being, which, according to him, is understood here. Very often an action is related to an agent as his possession and as such is expressed by a noun. Hence there arises the illusion that it is not an action, e. g. 'Smara samsmrtya na santirasti me'. Here the action of enjoying peace appears in the guise of a noun. Hence there arises the error of not looking upcn it as action. The fact, however, is that Ktva in Samsmrtya is in relation to Sam in Śānti.2 Mahima Bhatta does not accept the view discussed above. The way to its rejection had been paved by the Upadhivadins. His view, as we have already stated in the section "His reference to the Saiva theory of Abhasavada," is that the reason for the use of a noun, such as 'ghata' for an object is the attaining or realisation of the being, which consists in the natural character, form or true consti- tution and which is non-different from it. HIS DIVISION OF MEANING. The meaning is of two types: (I) primary and (II) inferable. The meaning of a word is settled either by the usage among the elders or by convention. That meaning, the association of which with a word is fixed by either of the two, is the primary. But the meaning, which is not connected with the word either by the usage or by conven- tion, but to which the primary meaning is related as the premises to the conclusion, is the inferable. This is of two types according as it is inferred directly from the primary meaning or inferred from the inferred meaning. Mahima 1. V. V. 29. 2. V, V, V. 39.