267. MAHIMA BHATȚA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI 297

MAHIMA BHATȚA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI 297

Bhatta includes both the secondary and the suggestible meaning in the inferable, because the sphere of inference is wider than that of Laksana or Vyanjakatva or both taken together. From another point of view, namely, that of the nature of the inferred, he subdivides this meaning into three types (I) Vastu (II) Alankāra and (III) Rasa etc1. Here he follows Ananda Vardhana and like the latter asserts that though the first two admit of the direct presentation, the last is always inferable only. A word in isolation has primary meaning only, because it has no parts which can be split up into premises and conclusion. Accordingly it has no inferable meaning. But a sentence has parts, which are related as subject and predicate and the elaboration thereof (Vidhyanuvāda- bhavena) : and what is predicated may be such as may or may not need the support of reason. Thus, the meaning of a sentence is of two types according as what is predicated need or need not be proved.2

Therefore, when the predicate is such as does not need the support of reason, the elaboration is simply a repre- sentation of matter of fact, e g. 'astyuttarasyam'. But when what is predicated is such as needs the support of reason, it becomes the point to be proved ; and the elabora- tion assumes the form of proof. The consciousness of the relation between premises and conclusion depends upon the knowledge of the invariable concomitance of the two.

One point has to be clearly understood in this connec- tion, that is, the distinction between 'upapadana3, and 'anumana'. Upapadana in this context is not inference, because here the reason does not arouse the consciousness

1. V. V. 39. 2. V. V. 40. 3. V. V. V. 40. 38