272. MAHIMA BHAȚȚA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI 303

MAHIMA BHAȚȚA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI 303

be admitted to be other than the word only.1 As the meaning is of two types only so there must be only two powers to arouse them : and as the one is accepted to belong to word only, the other imust necessarily belong to the conventional meaning.2 Further, because there are only two powers (I) to arouse the conventional meaning (II) to lead to the inference, other powers,namely, Laksaņā and Tatparya, therefore, must be included in the power to lead to inference. We will show in the following sections how Mahima Bhatta justifies their inclusion in the power of meaning to lead to inference.

(a) HIS CRITICISM OF LAKŞAŅĀ.

Mahima Bhatta includes the secondary meaning (Gauņa or Lāksaņika Artha) in the inferable (Anumeya). Accordingly he denies the second power of words, techni- cally called Laksanā. He explains the secondary meaning in terms of his inferential theory of meaning. He asserts that in an instance like "This Punjabi is a bull (Gaurbahīkah)" the identity of the meaning of the word 'bull' with that of 'this Punjabi' is against the fact of experience. But just because the identity of the two is contradictory to all experience and is not possible other- wise than through the assumption of the speaker's intention to imply similarity of one with the other in some aspect ; it leads to the inference of the meaning that the Punjabi resembles a bull in some aspect. For, no man, who has not lost all sanity3, would ever anywhere in any way talk of the identity of the two, between which he sees no similarity whatsoever. Hence the hearer, who is thoroughly familiar with the personality of the speaker, is justified in inferring similarity only as the cause of attribution of

1. V. V. 109. 2. V. V. 110. 3. V, V. 110.