53. 56 CHAPTER I

56 CHAPTER I

For, this is an indefensible position. The possibility of inference of different causes from two effects apparently similar, we do not dispute in those cases, where there is real material causal relation, as between scorpion, and cowdung. But where there is no causal relation of what is similar to the effect with what simply has similarity with the cause, the inference is not possible. A heap of China roses (Japa kusuma), for instance, looks very much like fire; so does the mist like smoke. But does a man, knowing the mist as such, infer a heap of China roses from it ? The inference, therefore, of basic mental state, as an imitation, from perception of artificiality of the situation etc., is impossible. (iii) From the point of view of an impartial analyst of the dramatic presentation also the basic mental state is not an imitation, but is an identical reaction to the situation etc. (Anuvyavasaya), due to identification with the historic through the instrumentality of the situation etc., as we shall show in the following pages, dealing with Abhinava's æsthetic theory. (iv) As1 regards the alternative that the imitation theory is based upon the authority of Bharata, we have to say only this, that there is no passage in the Nātya Sastra, which, taken in proper context, supports the imi- tation theory. All relevant passages establish the identical reaction (Anuvyavasaya) theory. Thus, Srī Saknka's theory that æsthetic object is an imitation is unsound from all points of view.

CRITICISM OF THE IMITATIVE JUDGEMENT :- In2 respect of the æsthetic judgement, consequent upon cognition of the æsthetic object also, his theory is equally

1. A.Bh., Vol. I. 277-8. 2. A.Bh., Vol. I. 278