54. HISTORY OF INDIAN ÆSTHETICS 57

HISTORY OF INDIAN ÆSTHETICS 57

unsound. According to him, "Rasa" is a judgement. It is an expression of the consciousness, which cannot be classed with any one of the well known different forms of cons- ciousness. But this is an indefensible position. For, if consciousness of the æsthetic object, as expressed in judge- ment, implies consciousness of presence of Rama at the time of presentation only, it is a valid cognition, because it is not contradicted by any subseguent cognition. But if it is subsequently contradicted then certainly it is wrong knowledge. And even if there be no contradiction, it will in reality be only wrong knowledge. Therefore, the judge- ment, as stated above, cannot be expression of consciousness of a peculiar type, because there is no such consciousness.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST IMITATION OF STHĀYIN SUMMARISED.

ŚrI Sankuka's theory in the main is that Sthayin is imitated by the hero, who represents an historical character, such as Rama. And because it is imitated and not actual, therefore, it is called Rasa. The difference, according to him, between Rasa and Sthayibhava is only this that Rasa is only imitated Sthāyibhāva, while the real Sthāyibhava is actual and not imitated. The argument against this view is that imitation has two chief characteristics (i) it presupposes the direct percep- tion of the imitated and (iiy it is a presentation of the original in a medium different from the material, of which the original is made up. As there is no possibility of direct perception, on the part of actor, of the historic person, who is far removed in time, no imitation of him and much less of his basic mental state is possible. If it be said that it is imitated in terms of situation and mimetic changes etc., the position is untenable, because they belong to a category different from that of the Sthayin, inasmuch as they are 8

58 BorTaHT CHAPTER NO YAOTEIH

directly perceptible while the Sthayin is not so. But if it be said that the actor has actual emotive state such as that of love, through imaginary identification with the hero, the image of whom he is able to construct with the help of poetic presentation of him, as given by the dramatist : in that case there being no difference in the medium, there being the absence of distinct object of imitation in the actor's consciousness, his emotive state cannot be spoken of as imitation (Anukarana); on the contrary, it is identical reaction (Anuvyavasāya).

CRITICISM OF ANALOGY OF PAINTED HORSE.

It appears that soon after Sri Sankuka, the illusion theory of art of painting was substituted by that of simili- tude. Possibly the latter was contemporaneous with the former. Abhinavagupta and his teachers accepted the latter. Hence the criticism of Śri Sankuka's analogy is based on it. According to the theory of similitude, the paints repre- sent the various parts of the body of the original in such a manner that they, taken together, look very much like the original and give rise to the consciousness of similarity of representation with the original. Accordingly criticism1 of Srī Sankuka's position is that painted horse is an imitation of a living horse, because the former bears similarity with the latter : but Vibhava etc. cannot be taken to be imitation of the basic mental state, because there is no similarity between them in any way. Therefore, Sankuka's theory, that Rasa is nothing but imitated basic mental state, is wrong, because no imitation of the latter (basic mental state) is possible. SANKHYA THEORY OF ÆSTHETICS. eid

Another2 theory, that is summarily treated, is the one V1090119 01e 1. A. Bh., Vol. I,278. 2. A. Bh., Vol. I. 278.