26. 132. See Pradīpa on KP (BHU ed.) p. 154.

132. See Pradīpa on KP (BHU ed.) p. 154.

133. The sentence reproduces what is essentially Dhanamjaya's definition of rasa; see 4.43.

134. That is, "with another aesthetic element."

135. This may seem slightly circular, since in arguing that a stable emotion cannot be blocked by a transitory emotion precisely because it is stable, Dhanika is assuming what the kārikā may be thought to be trying to prove. But the kārikā is offering not a proof but a stipulation: stable emotions are indeed stable precisely because they are not or cannot be interrupted.

136. Namely, that something in conflict with the dominant element cannot be subsidiary to it (so Bhatta Nrisimha). Dhanika has already dealt with simultaneous conflict; he now turns to sequential conflict.

137. I understand the antecedent here to be -alambanatva, attracted into the gender of the predicate, -hetu, in the preceding sentence (i.e., vidheyaprādhānyāt).

138. See Dhà 3.26-27.

139. Source unknown. The single foundational factor is the husband.

140. Source unknown; cited also at DhA 3.24, as a case where two rasas are equally developed.

141. Satakatrayam 2.66.

142. From the unpublished Udattaraghava. Ravana speaks, referring in the penultimate line to the Brahman dress he adopted to disguise himself in Rāmāyaņa book 3.

143. MM 5.18 (trans. Coulson).

144. ekāśrayatvena (expect ca here), and note that āśraya typically refers to the "substratum" of rasa, the subject experiencing the emotion, not the visaya or alambana (see n. 223 below for its use in the latter sense; and KASS 4.2 n. 117; SKĀ 5.24 n. 46, both above). In the other illustrative verses in this passage, the multiplicity of rasas is based on a multiplicity of foundational factors; here the female ghouls appear to be the foundational factor of both desire and revulsion (though for whom is unclear: the male ghouls do not feel revulsion, and the audience does not feel desire). Dhanika will identify the dominant rasa as the macabre.

145. Source unknown (but note the awareness of Udbhata's arguments about "proper terms").

146. See ŚP p. 645, above.

147. I read rodana- (v. l. reported in Adyar ed., for karuņa-).

148. That is, united in a single sentence (other texts in fact read ekavākyabhavaḥ, including the Jaipur Pothikhana fol. 64a).

149. According to Anandavardhana, the conflict is between desire and determination in the soldier, and Dhanika is therefore subtly correcting him here by identifying the emotions as grief and determination, a far more powerful reading (Abhinava claims her weeping enhances his desire, but that seems off the mark). The husband's tragic feeling toward his wife (and it must be he who is feeling, not she, otherwise there would be no question of equipollence) stems from the fact that he knows he is going to die.

150. Dhà p. 237 (Anandavardhana's own composition) is cited in illustration.

151. I understand vāśrūya- (for vā śrūya-), in accordance with Bhatta Nrisimha. Dhanika discusses this on DR 4.37, p. 213.8, below (Bhatta Nrisimha refers to the discussion of the KS verse below, but that is in a pūrvapaksa). For Prabha this means that in those cases the stable emotions are implied by the other aesthetic elements.

152. That is, to the point of becoming rasa.

153. The protagonist of the Nagananda, a drama ascribed to King Harshavardhana (c. 640). See Dhanika's discussion below.

154. vibhāvālambanau: improbable but attested in all editions.

155. Dhanika on DR 2.4cd-5ab.

156. I read -avirodhāt. īpsitam eva ca sarvatra kartavyam iti paropakār-, etc. (with GPP, for -avirodhād abhīpsitam. evam ca sarvatra

draştavyam iti), which Dhanika on 2.5ab confirms: rāmāder api jagat pālanīyam iti dusțanigrahe pravrttasya nāntarīyakatvena bhūmyādilabhaḥ. Bhatta Nrisimha's comment shows he had a corrupt text before him.

157. RKA 12.4, above.

158. It would be easy to read hasa- (with GPP ed.) for hasya- (Adyar ed., Bhatta Nrisimha, Kundu 2000: 361, Jaipur Pothikhana fol. 65r), but the variant would remain unexplained. And note that Bhatta Nrisimha above (see n. 123) refers to rasas themselves as 'stable entities." (Compare n. 123 on the terminological slippage between rasas and stable emotions, but in the present context such slippage is obviously problematic.)

159. The omission of the fourth end, liberation, is unexpected.

160. That is, how does poetry communicate emotion, or how is emotion "apprehended"? (The question is not how readers experience rasa, since that is the result of "actualization" and "experientialization," though this distinction is muddied by the fact that Dhanika refers to stable emotions and rasas indiscriminately in the discussion that follows.) Dhanika emphasizes poetry (kāvyenāpi) because the relation in drama is clearer, being visual rather than purely verbal. Strictly speaking, kāvya of course includes drama, but the two are often distinguished in rasa discourse (by Dhanika himself, e.g., p. 223.3-4, and others such as Ruyyaka and Mallinatha on Bhatta Nayaka, #3a and #5a respectively).

161. Dhanika is echoing Anandavardhana's analysis of the positive and negative concomitance (DhA p. 83, given above: the word "erotic" without the aesthetic elements does nothing, whereas the aesthetic elements without the word can convey the rasa; hence, the word itself is not a causal factor).

162. The Mimamsa notion of connotation: a noun, which naturally denotes the universal, can be said to "connote" a particular once construed in a sentence (since [1] its denotation of a universal is blocked and [2] that general meaning is invariably joined with some particular).

163. I assume the antecedent to tat- and tal- to be śrngārādiśabdāḥ (so Prabhā); less probable is a reference to the aesthetic elements (so Bhatta Nrisimha, though later in his comment here he focuses the discussion on the words for the stable emotions and

rasas).

164. The first, or bare, connotation would be the one just explained (laksana in the Mimamsa sense), and the second, what we think of as normal connotation through metonymy or metaphor. This is close to what Mammata will call laksanalaksaņā (KP [BHU ed.] p. 58; at the same time he rejects the Mimamsa variety insofar as it is constitutive of language as such and not figurative), and should be distinguished from Abhinava's use of laksitalaksanā in DhĀL p. 61 (there it is the coolness that is connoted by the bank's propinquity to the river, while the bank is itself connoted by the "blockage" of the primary meaning of the word "Ganges"; in Dhanika's usage, that second level of meaning, coolness, etc., is not at issue). The matter is also closely examined in ŚP chapter 7.

165. Source unknown.

166. That is, we do not come to understand words for the aesthetic elements-for the foundational factor such as the hero, Rama for example, or for the stimulant factor, such as "battlefield"-by some negation of the direct meaning of the words expressing them (so Bhatta Nrisimha below [p. 216.19]; nāyakādiśabda here does not mean "such words as 'nāyaka," even though nāyaka in itself is occasionally used in literature instead of the proper name of a dramatis persona, as in the case of Jimutavahana in Nāgānanda). Mukula Bhatta (Abhidhā. 8.2) does attribute secondary meaning to a name, "Rama" for example, but the context there is not rasa.

167. See Dhà 1.7.

168. Dhanika will reject (on 4.37) the theory he now proceeds to explain, that rasa is communicated by implicature.

169. KS 3.68 (a verse that also figures prominently in ŚP chapter 11see, for example, p. 638.7, below).

170. Sattasaī 2.75. The example and analysis are taken from Dhà 1.4. A woman aims to dissuade a mendicant from going to the place where she meets her lover (see also Pollock 2001c: 202-205).

171. jala/jada. DhĀ 2.27 (identified by Anandavardhana as his own composition). 172. Mimamsakas sometimes thought of secondary meaning not as laksaņā (metaphor and metonymy) but as ākșepa (implication), which they equated with arthāpatti (Nyāyaratnamālā Vākyārthanirņaya v. 38; see also Kunjunni Raja 1994).

172. E.g., "The stout Devadatta does not eat during the day" does not make good sense as it stands, and thus logically entails the conclusion that he eats during the night.

173. Note that Abhinava speaks of dhvani as appearing at a fourth stage of comprehension, since he includes tātparyavrtti as the second stage (DhĀL pp. 59.8, 65.1).

174. See DhAL pp. 55-56. The occasional similarity in Dhanika and Abhinava suggests both were drawing on the same source for the arguments here, given that Dhanika's work almost certainly antedates Abhinava's. (Abhinava might be thought to cite Dhanika as the proponent of tātparyaśakti at DhĀL p. 70.3, and as kenacit at p. 61.5, depending on how we understand the phrase lakșitalakșanā [see above, n. 164], but there is no conclusive reason to believe this, and in general he seems not to know Dhanika's work.)

175. The full sentence is usually given when the example is adduced (see, e.g., SP p. 366): "Eat poison but do not eat in that man's house," implying: better to eat poison than to eat in that man's house. The true meaning can only be gotten from the full context of the utterance, namely, that a father is speaking to his son. The whole point for Dhanika (and no doubt for Bhatta Nrisimha) is that sentence purport (tātparya) suffices to explain such a sentence; implicature is superfluous.

176. The meaning of this sentence is termed pratīyamāna, "understood," by Bhoja, ŚP p. 366, 476 (see also KD p. 326, though there the question concerns the relationship of the two parts of the sentence, "eat poison, and do not eat in his house").

177. In implicature, the meaning of the second stage is entirely acceptable (the holy man is indeed free to go wandering); it is simply that additional meaning is generated at the third stage-which in fact makes the hypothesis of a third stage necessary. But in the case at hand, the meaning of the sentence, which can only be generated at the second stage, cannot be the literal command to "eat poison"-since that makes no sense in the context-but must be instead a prohibition against going to the enemy's house.

178. Hence, since the literal meaning is impossible, it is the second stage of comprehension that produces the prohibition against eating in an enemy's house. And since we understand this prohibition at the second stage, there is no scope for a third stage, and hence it is only implicature that comes within the scope of the third stage (Prabha)

179. But only at the third stage, that of implicature.

180. That is, at the second stage, of normal syntactical construal (Bhatta Nrisimha).

181. Source unknown, though the definition of dhvani here conforms to what Dhanika attributes to the dhvanivadin in his Kāvyanirņaya, cited below (v. 3). The verses are also cited in BhP 6 (p. 149), which would seem to rule out Venkatacharya's conjecture dhvanitā- (p. 345), though such is the reading of Bahurupa Mishra (p. 124.15). (BhP also reads tāvad āgatam for tāvatā gatam in 2b, and tat tasmāt for tatra syāt in 2c.)

182. Dhanika cites DhA 1.13 and 2.5, adducing "The reddening moon ... " as an example of the latter (DhA 1.13, p. 109; Ingalls et al 1990: 137).

• 184. Compare Ślokavārttika Vākyādhikaraņa VV. 330-331: bhavanaiva ca vākyārthaḥ sarvatrākhyātavattayā anekaguņajātyādikārakārthānurañjitā.

185. This kārikā elaborates on Bhatta Nayaka #12 (which offers a far more pertinent refutation of the dhvani interpretation of the "bhama dhammia" verse than what Abhinava reports as Bhatta Nayaka's critique in DhAL p. 68).

186. Bahurupa Mishra likewise seems to be alluding to the Bhatta Nayaka verse; hence I translate śāstra as Veda. Dhanika, however, speaks of laukikavākyas as the comparative element, suggesting that sāstra in Bahurupa Mishra may mean "scholarly discourse."

187. sākşāt ... viparivartamāno (see above, n. 89).