27. 188. Nāgānanda 3.4.

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Nāgānanda 3.4.
GPP ed. reads niyatabhihita-, "which are necessarily enunciated" (for samnihitābhihita -; Bhatta Nrisimha reads samnihita-).
For the argument here, see Pollock 2010: 150.
I read -ānupalabdheḥ svānand- (with GPP, for -ānupalabdheḥ. kāvyaśabdānām ca svānand-), and take niratiśayasukhāsvādavyatirekeņa as a gloss that has crept into the text.
abhidha, which for Bhatta Nayaka comprises all signifying aspects of language, both literal and figurative. See Bhatta Nayaka fragment #11, and notes 6, 30, and 57 above.
ākrsyamāņā. Prabhā glosses the unfortunately vague word by svānukūlīkrtā.
The title of a celebrated work on the philosophy of grammar by Bhartrihari (c. fifth or sixth century).
Compare Bhatta Nrisimha on DR 1.9: "The aesthetic elements, being communicated as they are by such things as figures of speech-hyperbole, for example [see Dhanika on DR 4.2]-are of course themselves sentence meanings, not word meanings. But since rasa arises from a 'construal' with these elements, they take on the character of words in respect to rasa, and for its part rasa, inasmuch as it is generated by these 'words,' takes on the character of a sentence meaning."
Bhatta Nrisimha's comment on this passage is misleading, suggesting that the "case" concerns the production of rasa, when it is the production of pleasure that is clearly at issue.
Such as implicature.
The work is not extant, and the extract here has been imperfectly transmitted. Bhatta Nrisimha's exegesis is incorporated into the translation.
I find the GPP reading here, tātparyānatirekāc ca vyañjanīyasya ("Since 'manifestation' is nothing other than sentence purport, there can exist no such thing as implicature") to be superior to Adyar's, despite the apparent authority of Bhatta Nrisimha for the latter, but the two texts transmit much the same sense.
That is, this sentence would turn out to be a case of implicature, which the implicature theorist would reject because it makes no sense for it to occur at the second stage.
Literally, "If it did repose ... without further ... it could never shift."
Bhatta Nayaka's own analysis of the verse in question seems to be based on other criteria, at least as reported by Abhinava (DhĀL p. 68), but the proponent of tātpāryaśakti and vivaksāsūcakatva (DhĀL p. 70) must be Bhatta Nayaka or a follower (see also n. 185).
The scholars of Mimamsa.
Dhanika cites NŚ 6.34 (see n. 22 there; I make no sense of Venkatacharya's bhāva- and so adopt the standard reading nānā-). While the verse would seem to validate the simple notion of "production," it does not provide evidence for the more complicated concept, the process of "actualization" by the audience member. Bhatta Nrisimha addresses this in his comment that follows.
Bhatta Nrisimha's literal reading of "actualization" fails to do justice to either Bhatta Nayaka's original formulation or Dhanika's elaboration.
Unlike, say, the words for the foundational factor (such "Rama"), which are connected with actual entities.
See Dhanika on 4.36 above, and n. 166.
This passage is cited in BhP (p. 152.18-21) and ascribed (oddly) to Sadashiva. It is of course pure Bhatta Nayaka; see #1a.
Dhanika on DR 4.2, above.
GPP ed. reads ananubhūyamānatvād (for anubhūyamānatvād), which would seem to mean: We experience the character as a foundational factor, not as a living being (real or unreal) who can experience rasa.

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Dhanika is referring to the foundational factor in reference to the audience. If rasa is experienced by the viewer/reader, the factors must, in the last analysis, be factors for him, not for any other character in the narrative.
This seems to be the conclusion of the whole argument on the location of rasa that is the subject of Dhanamjaya's verses. And it indicates how intimately any given position on the location (or ontology) of rasa-whether in the text or in the reception-is connected with a particular modality of its cognitive genesis (or epistemology)-such as here, whether implicature or actualization.
Dhanika's argument here is crucial, though its logic is elusive. Bhatta Nrisimha seems to take it as rather general (words simply cannot both create and manifest rasa at one and the same moment), but it must be more closely related to what Dhanika has been saying about the substratum of rasa: if rasa existed in the character, it would have to be both produced and manifested by the same words, with the two processes happening simultaneously, but something can only be manifested after it has been produced, and by something other than what produces it. If rasa exists in the audience, however, it can first be communicated by the discourse (tätparya) and subsequently actualized by the viewers/readers. 214. Or, queen (devi). Both were thought of as mothers, and thus not objects of sexual desire.
paramarasika. Bahurupa Mishra would seem to misunderstand the problem at issue, as Dhanika shows. Dhanamjaya is concerned with the question, at once aesthetic-psychological and quasi-ethical, how a foundational factor for Rama, namely, his wife Sita, can be a foundational factor for another man, the spectator. He is not concerned with the difference between seeing real-life emotions and fictional emotions.
Both the subject (Rama) and object (Sita) of emotion in the storyworld become aesthetic factors for the viewer, though it is easier to understand how this works in the case of the object, hence Dhanika's redirection below.
vibhāvayati, which seems to be used almost as a denominative of vibhava, in the sense of providing a foundational factor for the emotion of the viewer/reader.
The pronoun tā must refer to avasthānām in 40a, but Dhanika takes it to refer to sītādisabdāḥ, which is not quite the same thing (Bahurupa Mishra does not comment on the line).
Again Bahurupa Mishra, cleaving to the old model, radically misunderstands the text he is commenting on (though compare his remarks on 4.43-45ab below).
If there are not two separate comparisons here (though this seems likely) and we are actually meant to connect the yogin with historical discourse, the only candidate would be Vyasa, author of the MBh.
With this term (sarvalokasādhāranya) Dhanika seems to be making the point that every viewer thinks the characters "common" to himself (compare ABh 1.43: lokasya sarvasya sādhāraņatayā svatvena bhāvyamānaś carvyamāņo 'rtho nāțyam), not that the process of "commonality" (or more usually, "commonization," sādharaņīkaraņa) is available to all people, though Dhanika may well have assumed this.
The spectator would be feeling desire toward "woman" as such, not toward the queen (or the goddess)-and married

woman-Sita.

rasaśrayah. This normally means the substratum of rasa, the subject who feels it, though it sometimes refers to the object (see above, n. 144), which is how Bhatta Nrisimha is using it here and on 41cd. If we take rasāśraya in its normal sense, Bhatta Nrisimha will not be speaking to Dhanika's concern, which pertains to the problem that arises when the substratum becomes the viewer/reader.
The historical character is merely a typological state providing a substratum for a given rasa, the way the toy elephant is simply a point d'appui of the child's own imagination, and it is the reader's own stable emotion that is savored, not the character's. (The context of the argument is about historical particularity, not ontological truth, as Bahurupa Mishra takes it.)
Bahurupa Mishra (or his editor) loses his way in the syntax of this sentence. "Overcome," pratipannaih, is also uncertain.

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laukika -. Again, the storyworld of the play or poem (there is no rasa in the real real world, only emotion). See n. 106 above.
NŚ 6.15.
Bhatta Nrisimha's comment is odd. Dhanika cites Bharata to draw a distinction between the character's "real-world" emotional experience and the spectator's experience of rasa (and the analytical, even categorical, and therefore numerically limited aspect of such rasa), not between everyday "taste" and aesthetic experience.
Again, Dhanika is speaking of the "real world" of the drama itself, where Rama has rasa when perceiving his own wife, Sita (so Bhatta Nrisimha).
This shows Abhinava's account of Bhatta Nayaka (#1a) to be erroneous. I construe manasah here as well as in v. 44b (so Dhanika and Bhatta Nrisimha). The four states arise when the rasas are present (they are produced by the rasas, per Bhatta Nrisimha, not conditions for their production, per Bahurupa Mishra).
Probably alluding to NS 1.266, above (see n. 16 there), though I understand artha here differently.
See Dhanika and Bhatta Nrisimha below for this Vedantic interpretation (so too Mallinatha on Ekāvalī p. 96, ātmaivānandaḥ).
So Bhatta Nrisimha (Bahurupa Mishra understands, "Hence, the latter four rasas are viewed as being produced by the former four rasas"). See also Venkatacharya pp. 305-306.
Bahurupa Mishra appears to take the two positions as complementary, not contradictory.
The term rasābhāsa is used nowhere else in this sense.
The term cittabhumi is found first in Buddhist thought (Abhidharmakośa) and then in yoga, where the mind is said to have five bhūmis, which bear some faint relationship to these aesthetic states: ksiptam mūdam viksiptam ekāgram niruddham iti cittabhūmayaḥ (Yogasūtrabhāsya 1.1.3; Bhoja on Yogasūtra 1.2 explains these as particular configurations of gunas, but they are decidedly not symmetrical with Bhatta Nayaka's four: viksiptam, for example, contains a predominance of sattva and is a property of the deities for Bhoja, whereas here it is connected with the violent rasa). The notion of cittabhmis is found nowhere else in aesthetic discourse save for a brief echo of Dhanika's remarks here in Ekāvalī (p. 95, see below, misunderstood by Mallinatha).
See NS 6.39, above.
"Conditional" (hetuhetumadbhāva) as in smoke and fire, not "causal" (kāryakāraņabhāva) as in a pot and clay. The erotic and the comic are both "conditioned by," i.e., inferred to exist from the presence of, "radiance"; as Bhatta Nrisimha puts it: just as the presence of vikāsa "indicates" (sūcaka-, contrast Abhinavagupta, ABh 1.289.13) the presence of the erotic, so its presence indicates that of the comic. The two rasas are related by this hetuhetumadbhāva (so correctly Venkatacharya p. 305).
NŚ 6.40, above.
Although there are only four types of fusion, each rasa produces its own specific one (Bhatta Nrisimha). Dhanika below observes that there are eight and only eight "drama rasas"; this is corroborating evidence that Bhatta Nayaka held this to be the case too (though see n. 19 above).
The nondifferentiation here is based on the identity of rasa and blissful experience rather than on the identity of self and bliss (so SSS and RG; and see Vijñapriyā on SD p. 72).
Source unknown.
Brhadaraņyaka Upanișad 3.9.26.
Venkatacharya suggests that Dhanika's position is ambiguous, and can be taken as either restricting the peaceful rasa to nondramatic literature (implied by the last sentence of this section) or denying it altogether. 245. I conjecture samsargin (for samsārin).
I read atiśayoktirūpakādikāvyavyāpāra- (for atiśayoktirūpakāvyavyāpāra-) in view of Dhanika's use of the phrase on 4.2

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(confirmed in Kundu 2000: 389) and Bhatta Nrisimha on p. 169 line 5 (Dandin's remarks on atiśayokti, KĀ 2. 212, 218, notwithstanding).

ABHINAVAGUPTA AND HIS SCHOOL, 1000-1200
ABh 1.1, v. 4 (sadvipra- may simply mean Bhatta).
DhĀL p. 374.
For later reflections on this question, compare ND p. 188. No later writer shows awareness of Bhatta Tota's critique-since none had access to the ABh, in which alone it was reproduced.
See ABh 1.35, given below.
Kshemendra, Aucityavicāracarcā, p. 151, KA p. 3, and later writers quote all or part of this fragment, and ascribe it either to Bhatta Tota (the first) or to Kāvyakautuka (the rest). KD p. 7 and others begin and end the fragment with the following two verses of uncertain origin: "Memory's domain is the past, forethought concerns the future, intelligence the present, but wisdom is transtemporal"; "The goddess of speech has two paths, scripture and poetry. The first is the creation of wisdom, the second comes from imagination."
KA p. 432. An important (and, for cultural history, entirely valid) differentiation between the Vedic kavi and the laukika kavi.
DhĀL p. 336 (tad eva nāțyam: compare p. 402: nāțyam ca rasa eva).
Knowledge, that is, of the four ends of man, something clear from the context of Abhinava's citation.
DhAL p. 92. I do not see how this can be reconciled with Abhinava's position (Ingalls et al. 1990 also note this ad loc.). It clearly is a step back from the insights of Bhatta Nayaka.
ABh 1.284.26-285.4.
ABh 3.78.5-16. My translation of parts of this passage is uncertain. The last verse embodies a conjecture on the part of the

editors.

Compare BKA 5.4.
For cūrņapada, see NŚ 14.40.
ABh 1.268-270, supplemented by KA pp. 93-95 and Manikyachandra on KP pp. 213-16 (2nd ed. Mysore). This section may well be taken directly from the lost work of Bhatta Tota, despite the fact that Abhinavagupta occasionally interjects observations about matters he himself, and not Tota, will later address (e.g., ABh 1.269.14; 1.270 3, 5).
Chapter 1.4 above.
I add, to complete the text, na tu vyavahārtāraḥ. Scholars are tattvacintakā nyāyānusāriņaḥ (Dharmakīrti, Pramāņavārttika, p. 39 [ed. Gnoli]).
Bharata, according to Bhatta Tota/Abhinava, could not have meant that rasa is an imitation (see also ABh 1.35, below).
The psychophysical responses, the main and subordinate physical representations (KLV p. 305).
"The actor's body is a material entity and visible to the eyes, desire is nonmaterial and invisible; the body is the locus of the headdress and so on, whereas the mind is the locus of desire" (Manikyachandra).
And if Shri Shankuka denies they are grasped as factitious, he contradicts his own theory, that rasa is an imitation of a stable

emotion.

I read mugdhabuddhe (with Manikyachandra, for mugdhabuddheh of ABh and Kangle); and I read the rest of the sentence with KA.
KA adds a gloss here: The imitation of desire is a cause different from the familiar cause, desire itself. Only if the reactions

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arising from this imitation of desire are understood as such (i.e., as imitations) by the discriminating observer would it be correct to posit an inference of some second thing, i.e., imitation-of-desire. But this is not the case, so how can one argue that there is an apprehension of the imitation of desire? When the nondiscriminating observer sees those kinds of reactions, he infers desire itself to be present-and that is false knowledge (KA p. 94.15; so KLV p. 305.13).

Conventionally it was thought that scorpions were produced from cow dung as well as from other scorpions, the different provenance accounting for the differences in their virulence, though not in their natures. Abhinava uses the image again in ABh 2.221, below.
In the same way, we do not infer an imitation of desire from artificial reactions mistaken for real ones.
It is hard not to believe that the mindbending complexity here is not tongue-in-cheek; it is certainly a reductio ad absurdum.
The standard example of similarity, or analogy, in Indian philosophy.
The actor is not an imitation of an angry man, nor is there some actually existing violent rasa that is an imitation of anger (KLV p. 305.20).
ABh, KA, and Someshvara (KP p. 547) all read -vaidhuryābhāve. Manikyachandra correctly rephrases as yadi na bādhakodayah, which makes it likely that -abhave was a gloss on -vaidhurye that crept into the text.
Shri Shankuka #1a (end).
Which, the argument presupposes, Shri Shankuka would reject (further evidence that he may have been a Buddhist, since Buddhists deny the reality of class categories; see Gupta 1963).
Shri Shankuka #1a.
Which Shri Shankuka denies; ibid.
This sentence and the next are reversed in ABh; I follow KA.
Presumably chapter 14 (I do not locate the precise phrase, but in any case it is Abhinavagupta, not Bhatta Tota, who is making the argument; see above, n. 14). Shri Shankuka's distinction is offered in ABh 1.267. I make no good sense of the compound bhedābhidhānasamrambhagarbhamahīyan (and find Kangle's emendation radical), and omit it from the translation. Hemachandra omitted it too.
All of us are "doing" things "later" than Rama.
Unlike the erotic, where the locus of rasa must be a person of high status, no such restriction is placed on the tragic in the NŚ, though it is discernible in literary practice.
Compare ABh 1.37.4-5 (na hi națo rāmasadrśam svātmanaḥ śokam karoti, sarvathaiva tasya tatrābhāvāt). Manikyachandra glosses uttamaprakrteḥ śokābhāvāt, which I assume means: because of the absence of the high-status character's grief, sc., in the

actor.

It would turn out that the actor is imitating himself (Manikyachandra).
I read -vad dhi (for -vrddhi). Presumably ABh 1.37 is the earlier passage meant (but kāntaveśānukāra is not discussed there). There is a feminine "charm" known as "mimicry" where a woman dresses up in her lover's clothes for the amusement of her girlfriends. But as we see below, even that does not get the name "imitation" in the NS. The NS (1.112) unambiguously proclaims that drama is lokavrttānukaranam, an "imitation of worldly events," so Bhatta Tota and Abhinava have to admit it in some measure.
I read asamvedyamānasya (with KA, for anusamvedyamānasya); compare ABh 1.271.14: na cāpratītam vastvastitāvyavahāre

yogyam.

NŚ 19 (sandhyangas).
NŚ 1.117; see ABh 1.35.1, below.
I conjecture -gatyanukaraņādau (for -gatyakaraņādau).

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This part of the critique is directed at a proposition of Shri Shankuka's nowhere exactly preserved. Only his analogy of the painting of a horse is extant; see #1a.
DhĀL p. 394.
ABh 1.37.9-10.
KLV p. 303.11, who goes on to say that "like teacher, like student," Abhinava accepts Bhatta Tota's view and for that reason did not bother to set it forth after his refutation of Shri Shankuka in ABh chapter 6.
Tantraloka 37.33-82 (he tells us, for example, that his mother died when he was still a child, thereby consigning him to a life of detachment, 37.56-57). There are several other accounts of his life elsewhere in his works.
Abhinava uses the pun elsewhere; see for example Tantraloka 37.85d. In the Malayalam mss. the title is regularly prefaced by the descriptor Nātyavedavivrti, "Exegesis of the Veda on Drama."
Tantraloka 37.58; he also refers in IPVV v. 2, p. 179 to his ABh commentary and the rasa theory he expounds in it. See also Ingalls et al. 1990: 32-33. Note there is no echo of his work on śanta rasa in his understanding of moksa (Gerow 1994: 192). The most recent assessment of the order of the philosophical works is Sanderson 2007: 352-82, but he does not address the two literary-

critical texts.

See for example Abhinava's reference to DhAL on ABh 1.337.
DhĀL p. 51.
On ABh 1.337, Abhinava notes that he has explained in DhAL how Anandavardhana showed that rasas could not be communicated through their own words, but beyond this and a few other simple references there is no extended account of the crucial concept of implicature. It is entirely absent from the core presentation of his reconstruction (ABh 1.272-287).
ABh 1.272.18.
ABh 1.43.11.
ABh 1.37 for the synonyms ("experience" is one of Bhatta Nayaka's terms of art); sākātkārakalpānuvyavasāya, ABh 1.173, 174; 3.294; pure consciousness, ABh 1.37 and 1.286.
ABh 1.286.5; 1.43.11. See n. 297 below. (IPVV v. 3 p. 251, cittavrttyantarodaya ...- virahita eva āsvādo, however, would seem to stand in tension with this).
ABh 1.278.
Already in DhĀL, p. 189.
Abhinava, like others, anachronistically ascribes the very idea of commonization to Bharata (ABh 1.275).
This appropriation began already in the DhAL, where Abhinava assimilates Bhatta Nayaka's bhoga to the (reformulated) notion of vyakti/vyañjanā, which misled later writers, such as Jagannatha (RG p. 30 and n. 247, below). See also Bhatta Nayaka fragment #14 for what may well be the first psychological interpretation of "manifestation."
DR 4.43, Dhanika on 4.1, above.
ABh 1.278.20-21, below.
ABh 1.274, 276, below. I say "philosophical" mode since even here Abhinava was anticipated by Dhanika, though his position is more general. See Avaloka on 4.43-45ab, above.
Sellars 1963: 154.
Which appears to have been Ananda's concern (Shri Shankuka included the terms for the stable emotions, see there, #1a, p. 267, above; Induraja, all affective terms, see KASS 4.3-4 and commentary, above).
KP kārikā 63ab, below (not evidence he knew the ABh, and I find no other). Abhinava's discussion pertains to all the

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aesthetic elements; Mammata permits the use of a proper term only in the case of transitory emotions not associated with particular physical reactions.

DhĀL p. 336; pleasure subserves instruction.
ABh 1.261 and 1.36, below.
ABh 1.276, below.
Or, again, "newly" to a degree. Udbhata (4.3-4) had already made the argument, but offered no detailed exposition.
Gerow 1994; for the text, see ABh 1.326-335.
Ingalls et al. 1990.
As noted, the work is extant in only a few fragmentary manuscripts from Kerala (three, containing successive sections and so basically constituting one manuscript, have vanished, only transcripts of them remaining; four other fragments, whose relationship to these missing mss. and to each other is unclear, are available in Trivandrum). For the exasperation of the editor of the editio princeps, see NS ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 69. Several later scholars, confronted with difficult readings, simply rewrote the text (Visvesvara Siddhantasiromani, Kangle).
For further reflection on this passage (and references to other reflections) see now Ollett 2015.
See NS 1.336, above. Abhinava (in KA's version) glosses bhava as stable and transitory emotion. On artha, see NS 1.266, above

and n. 16.

KA p. 97.26 adds Abhinava's gloss from ABh 1.337.19, on which see further below.
The first example is untraced, but recalls many well-known arthavādas; the second is an imprecise quotation of Taittirīya Samhitā 2.1.1.4. The Jain Hemachandra replaces the reference to Vedic sacrifice with the following: " 'Samba [Sāmba] once sang a hymn of praise to the sun, and was cured of his illness.' With respect to the poem beginning thus, the reader first understands the bare meaning. Then to this first comprehension he indubitably adds another, whereby the tense and so on of the original are elided, so that he thinks, 'Whoever sings praises to the sun is cured, so I too will praise the sun, so as to be free of disease." (KA p. 98.6-12; I have no idea why the verses should be attributed to Bhatta Nayaka, as the editors of KA ad loc. and Gnoli [1968: 53] believe.)
itivrtta(prarocita-), referring to the arthavāda itself (not itikartavyatā, KLV); compare TV p. 241, arthavādaprarocita -.
I read -svabhāvā (with Triv., for -svābhāvā) and delete the danda. I take -ādi as referring to the interpretative techniques "supplementation" (adhyāhāra), grammatical transformation (vipariņāma), and the like (see, e.g., Śabara on PMS 1.2.1), though I do not find samkramana to be attested elsewhere in the sense I give it here.
I conjecture āsai (for āste; Triv. mss. read āstai, and more rightly read pradadāni, for sam-).
For pratibhā and udyoga see Nyāyamañjarī vol. 2, pp. 140-41.
pratibhāna.
Kuntaka cites this to illustrate the "impulses" of animals in contrast to the stable emotions of higher-order beings (VJ p. 141). See also the introduction, section 8.
AŚ 1.7; KS 3.62 and 3.67. KLV notes that the nature of aesthetic apprehension in the second two examples (the desire of Uma and Shiva) is not detailed, having already been explained in the case of fear (p. 308.24), but this does not explain why extra examples are provided (let alone why Abhinava chose to begin his exposition with fear rather than desire).
Presumably as opposed to the buddhi, where linguistic knowledge arises.
I follow the exegesis of KLV for this convoluted sentence.
I read -grāhyam (with Triv., KA, for -nigrāhyam).
cakșușor iva viparivartamānam, possibly one of Bhatta Nayaka's technical terms (see DR 4.1, 2, and n. 89, above.

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ND p. 161, below (on the "broad inclusiveness" of rasa) suggests it is the capacity for commonization; see also ABh 1.36.8 (sarvaparişadsādhārana-); for KLV, it is the commonization itself captured in an inference.
The actually existing particularities are those of the actors on the stage; the literary ones are those of the characters (see the "synopsis" in ABh 1.278, below).
Source unknown. I read 'pi (with Triv., KA, for hi) and camatkārah | (for | camatkāro).
The goddess of wealth, consort of Vishnu (Hari), was produced at the churning of the cosmic milk ocean, when Mount Mandara was used a churning stick.
In pāda a, read camakkai (for camakkaī).
I accept Pandey's conjecture camatah karanam (for ca manahkaranam; see also Kangle 1973: 160) to account for the ca, despite the fact that, first, the recorded reading, "the activity of the mind of one [immersed]," repeats the reference to the manas as the place of camatkara emphasized in the preceding and following lines, and, second, no etymology as conjectured is found elsewhere in Abhinava's works (contrast IPVV v. 3, p. 251; see also Bansat-Boudon 2011: 321). KA (p. 99.5) deletes the whole compound (as well as the preceding sentence), indicating that the textual uncertainty is old.
I read tathātvenāsphuranty (with KA, see also Triv., for tathātvena sphurann).
AŚ 5.2.
The parenthesis is found only in KA (and certainly seems like an early comment that has crept into the text).
I assume that esā refers back to camatkāra and is attracted into the feminine of the predicate (rather than: "this apprehension is ... ").
I read -avasthāstu (i.e., -avasthā astu, with KA, for avasthāsu).
Presumably, in thinking of the whole dramatic experience as a mental construct of the viewer (hence my addition of "imaginary"). (This position is discussed, obscurely, at ABh 1.170.14, where it is associated with Samkhya.) Kangle perceptively notes that Abhinava does not mention Bhatta Nayaka's position here because he accepts it (1973: 161).
Compare DhĀL p. 331.8-9, and Someshvara on KP 7 v. 329+ (ed. Parikh p. 182).
On NŚ 18.10 (so Kangle).
NS 20.30. In the prologues to Sanskrit dramas, the director and actors appear in their own person, not in the guise of the characters that they will represent.
NŚ 5.157-158.
Bhatta Nayaka's insight is anachronistically attributed to the author of the NS (compare Dhanika on DR 4.2, and n. 100, above).
uparañjana- (or rañjana-) refers to the theatrical elements-poetry, singing, instrumental music-that provide "color" to the drama. A tragic drama, for example, requires substantial "coloration," a farce none (ABh 2.447); music is "the life breath of coloration" (ABh 4.399).
KLV: such as different components of the lasya dance (the seated recitation, āsīna, the puspagandika, etc.).
Both quoted words are Bhatta Nayaka's terms of art.
I read -mandapavidagdha- (with KA, for -mandapapadavidagdha-); improbable is Kangle's -mandalapada-, "circle dancing" (unattested). "Actresses," ganikā; the term means courtesans, but such women also typically performed as actresses.
NŚ 1.11. I have shifted this citation to where it logically belongs.
Or "linguistic signs" (so KLV p. 309.20, and see KA cited in n. 116, below).
Nyāyasūtrabhāșya 1.1.3. The received text actually reads sā ceyam (instead of sarvā ceyam).