31. 131. SD 5.5. Compare VV p. 59, above.

131. SD 5.5. Compare VV p. 59, above.

132. Since Vishvanatha will argue (on 3.2-3 below) that rasa is not a thing but a process, the etymology must be either the passive used in a nonliteral sense (since there is no actual object), or the impersonal passive.

133. Recall that Ruyyaka had explicitly ruled out the yogurt analogy: "This kind of manifestation is independent of any cognition and is simply inherent in the thing itself" (KP p. 570, above). The pot/lamp analogy is Anandavardhana's.

134. DhĀL p. 187. That is, a proleptic expression: it becomes rasa by being apprehended. Rasa does not preexist the experience of it (any more than the cooked rice preexists the cooking); on the contrary, it becomes rasa only upon being tasted.

135. Source unknown.

136. The aesthetic elements do not appear as individual components but rather are merged into a whole (later, as in Chandidasa, referred to as samūhālambātmaka-, composite cognition).

137. That is, not apprehended as a separate object through a second act of thought (apperception), but rendering itself knowable to the subject by its very occurrence: rasa reveals itself (as is argued out in what follows). The term here (and elsewhere in SD), svaprakāśa, which Vishvanatha was the first to use in the context of rasa theory, has a Vedantic resonance; Abhinava had earlier employed svasamvedana, which seems to me identical but carries a (Yogacara) Buddhist tone.

138. Or: consciousness that is bliss.

139. SKA 5.20.

140. kāvyārtha-, that is, the aesthetic elements, the foundational factors and so on. The phrase bears the sense here that it has in DR 4.43, which is cited below (and not Abhinava's, e.g., ABh 1.337.15).

141. See 5.9.

142. See 5.28.

143. See P.5.4.21-22 for the two senses of the mayat suffix, pracurya and prakrta.

144. Consciousness is not a "predominant part" of rasa but its most "essential" part: rasa and consciousness are identical.

145. vistara [sic], a term likely referencing Bhatta Nayaka (Dhanika on DR 4.43). The phrase vyāpāramātra below also hearkens back to him (vyāpāraprādhānya-, fragment #5, above), though Vishvanatha could not have known his writings directly.

146. The source is unknown, as are the two authorities mentioned. Here camatkāra is being equated with vismaya, the stable emotion of the fantastic rasa.

147. Source unknown.

148. Source unknown. Recall that Kumarasvamin notes that all objects vanish in the experience of rasa except for the aesthetic

elements themselves (see above, p. 259)

149. See VV p. 100, above (where dhruvāgānāt is found, for dhruvākhyānāt). The reference is to drama generally, not to the aesthetic response to music (compare with Ruyyaka ad loc.).

150. Or perhaps, "[other] teachers."

151. DR 4.43. Aesthetic taste, like everyday taste, is no thing, but only a pleasurable experience, not an object different from the

act.

152. See v. 1.1, n. 132, above. There the commentaries take rasyate as impersonal passive ("a taste is had"). Here they offer the standard examples of the reflexive, "The rotten branch breaks of its own accord," or better, "Honey tastes sweet." In all cases, the subject-object split is purely formal and not real.

153. Source unknown, though the phrase rasyamāntāsāra is Abhinava's (in DhĀL, e.g., p. 84.8; the term never appears in ABh). "Consciousness as such" (prakāśaśarīra, literally "the body which is light"); the phrase is common in Kashmir Shaiva discourse. See also below after v. 3.28.