32. 154. See, for example, vv. 8 and 12.

154. See, for example, vv. 8 and 12.

155. Pramāņavārttika of Dharmakirti, cited by Ruyyaka, Short Explanation, p. 578, above.

156. Source unknown. Again, the reference to "function" (vyāpāra) echoes Bhatta Nayaka (see above, n. 145).

157. Commentators and manuscripts are in disagreement on this passage. Anantadasa construes the whole passage from vilakșana to bhavatīti (which he thus reads) as the direct discourse introduced by ahus (whom he calls the ancient authorities). I read iti after vyāpāraḥ and omit it after vyapadeśāḥ. The last line seems to me Vishvanatha's defense (asmābhih) of vyañjanā despite its logical irrelevance to a theory based on a hermeneutic vyāpāra (recall that Bhatta Nayaka firmly rejected vyañjanā).

158. On Vishvanatha's hesitations about the vyañjanāpaksa, see the headnote.

159. A king who was forced to give up his kingdom and family.

160. Abhinavagupta, erroneously it appears, attributes the term druta/druti to Bhatta Nayaka (see Bhatta Nayaka fragment #1a, above); in DR's classification of Bhatta Nayaka's system, the reaction to karuņarasa is vikșepa (agitation).

161. I read nanu (for tarhi). A new problem is raised, not a further objection to the preceding one.

162. rāgīņām (not "men passionate about literature," pace some commentaries, since this assumes a difference between literary passion and the experience of rasa).

163. sabhyānām (not, I think, "people of refinement," which adds an additional and unnecessary conditional).

164. Source unknown.

165. This appears to be a critique of the theory of rasa as something "produced" and "enhanced," and has nothing to do with sukhajñāna as kārya (so commentators).

166. The touch and the pleasure cannot be the object of one and the same act of cognition (Tarkavāgīśa).

167. Prior, that is, to our awareness of the aesthetic elements. Continuously existing things are continuously available to our awareness, and rasa is not thus available prior to our arrival at the theater.

168. The phrase abhilāpasamsargayogya- is Dharmakīrti's (Nyāyabindu 1.5).

169. Rasa cannot be denoted or connoted by language (the invariable concomitant of conceptual sense experience). It can only be suggested by the aesthetic elements.

170. The author has shown only that rasa awareness is different from other sense perceptions, not that it is not itself a sense

perception (Tarkavāgīśa).

171. Or: It is held that the act of relishing on the part of the learned is ....

172. The idea comes from Mammata's summary of Abhinavagupta (KP p. 574).

173. Desire and the other emotions may be thought to be insensate (jada) and not forms of consciousness, and hence cannot be thought to reveal themselves (like self-awareness).

174. The five following quotations are untraced, and the lack of context makes their interpretation difficult.

175. The author has claimed that rasa consists of "bliss" (3.2) and "sublimity" (3.3).

176. Since the self-manifesting quality of awareness is a basic tenet of Vedantic thought. This is rejected by the proponents of Nyaya, who believe awareness requires an act of second knowledge, or apperception, to be cognized.

177. This is essentially Abhinava's view; ABh 1.289.16 (carvaņābhāsasāra).

178. From what Singabhupala goes on to say, the term svecchavrtti seems to have a moral sense, referring to a character's "willful," self-willed or improper, behavior (a standard explanation of "semblance of rasa," as in Vidyanatha, p. 106, above; originally Udbhata 4.5, see Induraja ad 4.7, above), yet the BhP quotation points toward a formal sense, where a subsidiary willfully predominates over a principal rasa.

179. This is the only one of the definitions where the primary rasa is associated not with a conflicting rasa (or rasas) but with conflicting stable emotions, which in this case must be those in the mind of the principal character experiencing the violent rasa. (The sole illustration I can locate, SD p. 233, concerns illicit violence, of a brother, Arjuna, against an elder brother, Yudhishthira.)

180. BhP p. 132 (with variations; the author is no doubt quoting from memory).

181. The verse cited (Hanumannātaka 10.12) is evidence only of the absence of passion, and is not itself an example of rasābhāsa.

182. Illustration omitted.

183. AmS 43.

184. I read bodhau (with Ganapati Sastri, for buddho).

185. Nāgānanda 1.1. Mara, the god of desire and death, sent his daughters-in-law to seduce the Buddha-to-be and thereby keep him from reaching enlightenment, bodhi, which is feminine in Sanskrit, hence their jealousy.

186. RV 7.43.

187. The thought here is unclear (the reading of the text is uncertain).

188. Omitted (source unknown).

189. KS 3.36.

190. Sattasaī 4.60. In classical Indian literature, laughter is by convention white. Here, of course, the white teeth are supposed to be showing (presumably the source of the convention), which is also a sign of vulgarity.

191. See Ekāvalī p. 106.4-9, above.

192. I may be mistakenly reading negative connotations into the terms cittam anuvartamānena and -abhimāninaḥ.

193. See Ekāvali p. 106.4-9, above.

194. NŚ 1.294-295, given above.

195. As Vidyadhara does by his example, p. 106.

196. Ekāvalī p. 106.8-9.

197. Foundational factors (such as a woman) become foundational factors only if they are appropriate and known to be such by the subject (e.g., the man who is a potential lover).

198. Presumably: for another animal and hence for the audience. Singabhupala here and in the next sentence seems to be shifting the focus of the argument: from the character (and whether the animal can be a foundational factor for another animal) to the viewer (and whether that animal can be a foundational factor for him).

199. The spectator watching a play about an uncultured person, not the uncultured person himself.

200. The uncultured person in the play.

201. Ekāvalī p. 106.8, above.

202. While the two qualifications are somewhat opaque to me, the author seems to be arguing that "distinction" is not some natural property, but exists only in the act of discerning an entity's distinctive features.

203. RV 1.56 (anvāsitam v. l. for anvāsīnam).

204. An act of discernment, however, would show that these cannot be foundational factors of the erotic, given that the man and woman are both ascetics.

205. That is, not as the object of any particular discernment.

206. I conjecture śrutah (with Ganapati Sastri, for śabdatah, which seems itself to be a conjecture).